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PREM 19/1088

The Situation in the Middle East

MIDDLE EAST

— now incorporated in file

IN ATTACHED FOLDER BOOKLET  
ON THE ISRAELI COLONIZATION OF ARAB LANDS

Part I May 1979

Part II Feb 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>26.8.83</del>							
<del>3.11.83</del>							
13.11.83							
<del>21.11.83</del>							
<del>15.11.83</del>							
<del>16.12.83</del>							
<del>14.12.83</del>							
<del>28.12.83</del>							
<del>10.1.84</del>							
<del>10.1.84</del>							
28.12.83							
PREM 19/1088							
— PART II ENDS —							
X							

● PART 11 ends:-

DB to FCO 28.12.83

PART 12 begins:-

FCO Tel 23 5.1.84

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

Reference	Date
JIC(83)(N) 178	27/10/1983
CC(83) 22 <sup>nd</sup> Meeting, item 2	07/07/1983
CC(83) 13 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	21/04/1983
CC(83) 12 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	14/04/1983
CC(83) 11 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	24/03/1983
CC(83) 10 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	17/03/1983
CC(83) 8 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	10/03/1983
CC(83) 7 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	03/03/1983
CC(83) 6 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	24/02/1983
CC(83) 4 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 2	10/02/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ *J. Gray*

Date 7/2/2013

**PREM Records Team**

AJC ✓ to see

A-J.C.  $\frac{3}{1}$

h.a.



File

Res

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 December, 1983

MIDDLE EAST: US POLICY

Thank you for your letter of 23 December to John Coles.

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter.

(David Barclay)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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NR

CONFIDENTIAL

Noted



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 December, 1983

Prime Minister

For information.

Dear John,

Middle East: US Policy

DMS  
23/12

We had hoped to arrange a meeting with President Reagan's Special Middle East Envoy, Mr Donald Rumsfeld when he was in London on the morning of 21 December after a tour of some Middle East capitals. This unfortunately did not prove possible, but Mr Luce spoke to him on the telephone, and the US Embassy subsequently arranged for Mr Viets, US Ambassador in Amman who had been present at the Rumsfeld's talk with King Hussein, to brief us.

There was one point of particular interest in the account given us by Viets. According to Viets, the King had told Rumsfeld that General Zaid bin Shaker had just returned from Washington after signing on 15 December a far-reaching contingency planning agreement with the US Administration. Mr Viets said that this agreement had emerged from his own recommendation some ten months ago that it was now necessary to 'stitch some more safety nets' for King Hussein, mainly in the form of contingency planning against a Syrian attack. The result, signed on 15 December, was without precedent in US foreign relations. It provided in the event of implementation for the drawing down of US war stocks worth \$8-10 billion, and the use of American servicemen on a graduated basis to man air defences in Jordan. Mr Viets commented that it was a far-reaching and air-tight instrument, which had been carefully drafted so as not to need to be laid before Congress.

John - he might have told us.

Mr Viets commented that unfortunately the Jordanians did not fully realise the merits of this agreement, whose negotiation they had seen initially as a back-door way to get American arms supplies.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Jf O838

Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 27/12.

14

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Terrorism in the Middle East

1. In the latest Weekly Survey of Intelligence (JIC(83)(WSI) 50) the item entitled "Implications of recent bomb attacks in Kuwait" analysed the evidence for Iranian instigation of the attacks on 12 December. Investigations in Kuwait now show the Iraqi Shi'a Al Da'wa party to have been responsible for these attacks and the degree of Iranian involvement is less clear. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat in the Middle East clearly goes wider than the Lebanon and Kuwait alone and, with the agreement of my JIC colleagues, I think I should draw the following to your attention.

- a. The spread of terrorist attacks to the Gulf obviously increases the danger to British institutions of all kinds in the area, but especially Embassies and military advisory or training teams. Shi'a Islamic communities in any of the States could provide cover for terrorists.
- b. The danger is not limited to bomb attacks. Security measures may induce "truck-bombers" to diversify their methods. This adds to the existing threat of assassination and hijack (or bombs in civil aircraft) from such groups as Abu Nidhal and the PFLP (GC).
- c. United States perceptions of a close Iranian connection with the attacks in Kuwait will further strengthen United States hostility to Iran and United States determination to "make Iran pay".
- d. If Iranian responsibility for or connection with the Kuwait attacks is confirmed, this will remove United States inhibitions about using their forces against Iranian-connected targets in Lebanon, as well as Syrian targets. (We do not agree with the United States view of the extent to which Syria is directly involved in recent terrorist acts; the evidence for Iranian involvement is more compelling). It will also increase United States willingness to use force in the Gulf whether to assist the Gulf States or to keep open the Strait of Hormuz.

e. The United States must be thinking deeply about longer-term methods of forcing Iran and Syria to change their policies. It is already planning to enlist support in Europe and elsewhere for restriction of supplies to Iran. Other measures could be increased political and material support for Iraq, attempted boycott of Iranian goods, particularly oil, and in the case of Syria continued military confrontation in Lebanon. The association of the United Kingdom with such policies would increase the exposure of British targets in the Gulf and Lebanon to terrorist attacks.

f. In this situation there is an obvious need to keep in very close touch with United States policy-making and to obtain every possible indication of United States thinking about action against Iran and Syria, whether civil or military.

  
ANTHONY DUFF

19 December 1983

Copies to :

Mr A J Coles, Prime Minister's Office  
 Sir Antony Acland, FCO  
 Mr P R H Wright, FCO  
 Sir Clive Whitmore, MOD  
 Vice Admiral Sir Roy Halliday, DGI, MOD  
 Air Marshal Sir Michael Armitage, DCDS(I), MOD  
 Sir John Jones, DGSS  
 'C'  
 Mr P Marychurch, D/GCHQ  
 Mr A D S Goodall, Cabinet Office  
 Mr R L L Facer, Cabinet Office  
 Mr R J O'Neill, Cabinet Office  
 Mr T W Savage, Cabinet Office



20 DEC 1983





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 December 1983

Monsieur Chedli Klibi

I am grateful to you for your letter of 22 November in which you let me have your views on the present situation in the Middle East.

Although the meeting of the European Council in Athens earlier this month was entirely taken up with Community business and there was no discussion of the Middle East, I would like to take this opportunity to assure you that the British Government remains deeply committed to the search for a just and lasting peace settlement. I fully share your concern at the dangers arising from the present stagnation in the peace process. It is a matter of great regret that Israel rejected the proposals put forward by President Reagan on 1 September, 1982 and that King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organisation were unable in April to agree a joint approach to negotiations. We all still face the challenge of reconciling Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised borders with the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own future. Otherwise there can be no hope of ending the sufferings of the Palestinians and eliminating the causes of instability and tension in the region. In co-operation with our European partners we shall continue to do whatever we can to assist the parties directly concerned to take the steps necessary towards the peace which we all earnestly desire.

Monsieur Chedli Klibi

Yours sincerely  
Rajiv Gandhi

RG

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 December 1983

Dear John,

Type letter pl.

RR 14/12.

Arab League

With my letter of 2 December I enclosed a letter to the Prime Minister from the Secretary General of the Arab League urging the Ten to launch a new initiative on the Middle East at the European Council Meeting in Athens. Mr Klibi wrote in the same terms to all members of the Ten and the Presidency will be replying.

As you know, there was no discussion in Athens on the Middle East. Nevertheless, Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks it would be useful if the Prime Minister replied briefly to Mr Klibi setting out in general terms our continuing interest in helping the parties in the Middle East make progress towards a comprehensive peace settlement.

I enclose a draft.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Middle EA: Sit PH11

London SW1A 2AA

London SW1A 2AA



**DRAFT:** ~~minute~~/letter/~~teletype~~/despatch/~~note~~

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**  
Prime Minister

Reference

**DEPARTMENT:** **TEL. NO:**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

**TO:**

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

M. Chedli Klibi  
Secretary-General of League of Arab States

**Copies to:**

**PRIVACY MARKING**

**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

I am grateful to you for your letter of 22 November in which you let me have your views on the present situation in the Middle East.

**CAVEAT**.....

Although the meeting of the European Council in Athens earlier this month was entirely taken up with Community business and there was no discussion of the Middle East, I would like to take this opportunity to assure you that the British government remains deeply committed to the search for a just and lasting peace settlement. I fully share your concern at the dangers arising from the present stagnation in the peace process. It is a matter of great regret that Israel rejected the proposals put forward by President Reagan on 1 September 1982 and that King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organisation were unable in April to agree a joint approach to negotiations. We all still face the challenge of reconciling Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised borders with the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own future.

/Otherwise

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Otherwise there can be no hope of ending the sufferings of the Palestinians and eliminating the causes of instability and tension in the region. In co-operation with our European partners we shall continue to do whatever we can to assist the parties directly concerned to take the steps necessary towards the peace which we all earnestly desire.

*MR 14/12.*

14 DEC 1983



SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

King Hussein

You will have seen Oman Telegram No. 576 containing the text of King Hussein's letter of 9 December to President Reagan.

The Prime Minister has asked for your advice on this. It would be helpful if that could be made available by Thursday night when I shall be putting in briefing for King Hussein's call the next day.

BM

A. J. COLES

13 December, 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 December, 1983

Letter from King Hussein to  
the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 12 December. In view of the fact that King Hussein has stressed that the copy of his letter to President Reagan which he has sent to the Prime Minister is a personal copy, the Prime Minister does not wish it to be further circulated.

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 December, 1983

*Dear John,*

We have just received in the Confidential Bag from Amman of 12 December the top copy of the letter from King Hussein to the Prime Minister and enclosure of which the text was given in Amman telegram number 575-6.

We shall let you have a draft reply as soon as possible. Meanwhile I would be grateful for your agreement that we may send the text of the King's letter to the President to HM Ambassador Washington.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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SECRET

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UK EYES ALFA  
FROM AMMAN 110930Z DEC 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 576 OF 11 DEC 83

MIPT: JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S LETTER  
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DATED 9 DECEMBER.

BEGINS.

I HAVE RECEIVED WITH APPRECIATION YOUR LETTERS OF NOVEMBER 26 AND NOVEMBER 27 1983. I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR COMMITMENT TO PURSUING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS VIGOROUSLY OVER THE COMING MONTHS, 'THE NECESSITIES OF ELECTORAL POLITICS' IN THE UNITED STATES NOT WITHSTANDING. I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR VIEW THAT 'THE PURSUIT OF PEACE' IS WIDELY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTED IN AMERICA.

MR PRESIDENT,

YOU HAVE ENCOURAGED ME OFTEN -TIMES TO ADDRESS YOU WITH FORTHRIGHTNESS OVER ALL ASPECTS OF OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY AFFECT THE POSSIBILITIES OF OUR ATTAINMENT OF OUR COMMON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. LET ME DO SO ONCE AGAIN SIR, BY STATING IN ABSOLUTE CANDOUR THAT I HAVE CLEARLY PERCEIVED OVER THE YEARS OF MY CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, HOW OFTEN THE WORTHIER OF OBJECTIVES WERE CLEARLY DETERMINED AND IDENTIFIED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. YET HOW OFTEN THE LACK OF A DYNAMIC, COHERENT AND CONSISTENT STRATEGY AND SUPPORTIVE POLICY RENDERED THEM UNATTAINABLE. NY FILES AND RECORDS COVERING THE PERIOD SINCE 1967 ATTEST TO MANY EXAMPLES OF UNFULFILLED COMMITMENTS AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUST AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE WHICH STILL ELUDES US. TWO EXAMPLES FROM OUR RECENT PAST WHICH WERE SO DEVASTATING TO US CREDIBILITY ARE WORTH MENTIONING.

1. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN LEBANON WERE TO SECURE AN UNCONDITIONAL TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY AND TO SECURE ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OF ITS TERRITORIES, ITS INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITY OF ITS PEOPLE. HOW THEN WAS THE UNITED STATES SIDE-TRACKED TO THE POINT OF EMBARRASSING ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS THROUGH BECOMING INVOLVED IN AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON, AS THE GUARANTOR OF A PEACE TREATY, IN EVERY ASPECT OTHER THAN ITS NAME, WHICH PLACED THAT AGREEMENT ABOVE AND BEFORE EVERY LEBANESE COMMITMENT AS A MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THUS INVOLVING LEBANON IN A SEPARATE PEACE ARRANGEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO ITS DETRIMENT, AND THAT OF THE ARABS, AND AWAY FROM THE LOGICAL VENUE OF STRIVING TO SECURE A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB ISRAELI PEACE THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT?

SECRET

13  
Tom Pearson advice phone  
MT

/ WHAT.

WHAT GAVE THE UNITED STATES THE RIGHT, FOLLOWING THIS DEVELOPMENT, TO ANNOUNCE THAT IT RECOGNISED THAT SYRIA HAD LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS IN SOVEREIGN LEBANON, AND WAS THIS RECOGNITION ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO APPEASE SYRIA BY GIVING IT A SHARE TO BALANCE WHAT ISRAEL SECURED AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH THE AFORE-MENTIONED AMERICAN, ISRAELI, LEBANESE AGREEMENT ?

HOW, FINALLY, COULD THE UNITED STATES, ON PRINCIPLE, DENY THE SOVIETS THEIR CLAIMED SECURITY RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN, WHILE CONCEDED SIMILAR RIGHTS TO BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN LEBANON ?

2. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES . IT IS A KNOWN FACT THAT THE INTENSIFICATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES FOLLOWED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES' PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982. IT IS A KNOWN FACT THAT THIS ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY PRIOR TO 1 SEPTEMBER 1982 AND SINCE THE RATIFICATION OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, WAS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE SAID ACCORDS. IT IS A KNOWN FACT THAT THESE SETTLEMENTS AND THEIR CREATION, CONTRAVENE ALL LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS, AS THEY RELATE TO TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY FORCE. IT IS A FACT THAT THESE SETTLEMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED THROUGH FUNDS SECURED FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THAT THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND PHYSICAL CHANGES THAT ARE OCCURRING IN THOSE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ALL BUT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO VISUALISE HOW ANY PEACE PROCESS TO COME COULD OVERCOME THE PHYSICAL OBSTACLES TO PEACE WHICH THEY REPRESENT.

I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN YOUR LETTER OF 26 NOVEMBER 1983, YOU HAVE RE-AFFIRMED A NUMBER OF ASSURANCES WHICH YOU GAVE ME WHEN WE MET IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR. I KNOW THAT ONE OF THEM AFFIRMED THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO SECURE A FREEZE ON THESE SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ONCE WE INDICATED A READINESS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. I HASTEN TO POINT OUT HOWEVER, THAT THE MAIN CAUSE OF OUR INABILITY TO DO SO WAS ISRAEL'S INTRANSIGENT POLICIES AND AGGRESSIVE NEGATIVE ACTIONS, AND THE EVER ERODING CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES' IMAGE IN THIS ENTIRE AREA. CONSEQUENTLY ANY POSSIBLE FREEZE IN ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY BEYOND THIS POINT IN TIME, MAY BE GROWINGLY LESS CONSEQUENTIAL IN ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES CREDIBILITY, SINCE THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE IS ALL BUT COMPLETELY DONE.

FINALLY, THE CONCLUSION OF THE STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AT THIS TIME, AND UNDER PREVALENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE AREA, HAS ALTERED THE UNITED STATES' STATUS FROM THAT OF THE PEACE MAKER, TO THAT OF THE COMMITTED ALLY OF ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. THIS TRAGIC STEP HAS FURTHER PUSHED THE MOMENTUM IN THE AREA TOWARDS THE DREADED REALITY OF POLARISATION AND HAS GIVEN THE RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST AN UNPRECEDENTED BOOST TO PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVES OF AREA DESTABILISATION, WITH ALL THE INHERENT DANGERS TO IT, AND TO WORLD PEACE.

SECRET

IN.

## SECRET

IN VIEWING THIS EVENT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AS THE ALLY OF ISRAEL, HAS CHOSEN TO FORSAKE ITS ROLE AS THE OBJECTIVE PEACE MAKER. IT IS ALSO SADLY EVIDENT THAT THIS ACTION REPRESENTS AN ABANDONMENT OF YOUR INITIATIVE OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982, WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE, WE EARNESTLY STROVE TO KEEP ALIVE BY ALL MEANS WITHIN OUR POWER. I AM SURE, MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WOULD AGREE WITH ME, THAT FOR US TO CONTINUE BEYOND THIS POINT TO TRY TO KEEP ALIVE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CLEARLY ABANDONED INITIATIVE OF 1-SEPTEMBER 1982, WOULD NOT ONLY BE FUTILE, BUT WOULD BE PATHETICALLY RIDICULOUS.

AS YOU WELL KNOW, SIR, WE HAD BEEN DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE AMERICAN VETO OF A JORDANIAN RESOLUTION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES EARLIER ON IN THE YEAR. WE HAD FELT THAT PRESENT CONDITIONS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THOSE OF ISRAEL, WOULD HAVE AFFORDED THE UNITED STATE'S GOVERNMENT A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PERSUADE ISRAEL, IN ITS OWN INTEREST, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ALL IN THIS AREA, AWAY FROM THE DEVASTATING POLICIES WHICH IT FOLLOWED. TO OUR UTTER INCREDULITY WE ARE UNABLE TO PERSUADE OURSELVES, LET ALONE OTHERS, THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT REWARDED HANDSOMELY FOR ITS ACTIONS, ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE ITS POLICIES WITH GREATER ZEAL THROUGH FRESH MATERIAL AND MILITARY AID, TECHNOLOGICAL INDUCEMENTS, TOPPED BY A STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES. INDEED, THE RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON OF BRIGADIER BENJAMIN ELIEZER, THE CO-ORDINATOR OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES, COULD ONLY GIVE ALL SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI ACTIONS AFFECTING THE UNFORTUNATE PALESTINIANS, THE STAMP OF WASHINGTON'S DIRECT APPROVAL BEYOND THIS POINT.

WITH ALL THIS BEFORE US, SIR, I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUGGEST THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE FUTURE COURSE TO RESOLVE THE ARAB ISRAELI ISSUE AND THE PALESTINIAN TRAGEDY, LIES IN STRIVING TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO BE ATTENDED BY ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND THE TWO SUPER POWERS, ALLIED TO TWO OF THE BELLIGERENTS, AND OTHERS, POSSIBLY ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SECURE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LONG OVERDUE MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

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SECRET

LT GENERAL.

SECRET

LT. GENERAL SHAKER, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN ARAB ARMED FORCES IS NOW IN WASHINGTON FOR HIS REGULAR TALKS WITH HIS AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS. I THUS HASTENED TO SEND YOU THIS LETTER TO NSUR THAT YOU ARE FULLY AWARE OF MY FEELINGS AND THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE MAJORITY WITHIN OUR ARAB WORLD, OVER RECENT EVENTS. I LEAVE IT TO YOU, SIR, TO DETERMINE THUS THE LEVEL AND SCOPE OF POSSIBLE FUTURE MILITARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO BE DISCUSSED WITH LT. GENERAL SHAKER WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THESE REALITIES.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,  
I REMAIN, SIR,  
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,  
HUSSEIN.

ENDS.

URWICK

LIMITED

ND. NENAD

ND. MED

ND. NAD

ND. PUSD

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/ PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

COPIED SENT TO  
No. 10 B. STREET

4  
SECRET

DWF G 043/11

1240/11

XX



Prime Minister.

page 4 overleaf.

A.S.C. 9/12.

LDL 694/11

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+ ~~16~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY

UK EYES ALFA

FM AMMAN 111200Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 11 DECEMBER 1983

RC  
HD/NEAD  
HD/MEB  
HD/NAJ  
HD/PUSJ (2)  
PS (6)  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
S. R. T. LEAHY  
M. EGERTON  
N 2-10 J.S.

MY TWO IPTS: JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

Personal & Secret

1. IN HIS LETTER OF 9 DECEMBER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (TEXT IN MY TELNO 576), KING HUSSEIN STATED BLUNTLY THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL HAD ALTERED THE AMERICAN POSITION FROM THAT OF PEACE-MAKER TO COMMITTED ALLY OF ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: THIS "TRAGIC STEP" REPRESENTED THE ABANDONMENT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, WHICH IT WOULD NOW BE FUTILE TO TRY TO KEEP ALIVE.

2. AS HE INDICATED DURING MY AUDIENCE ON 7 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 570), THE KING NOW SEEMS TO BE FOCUSSEING ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY THE TWO SUPER-POWERS AND POSSIBLY THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD. THE KING HAS OF COURSE LONG HELD THAT THE ATTEMPT TO EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION FROM MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WAS A MISTAKE AND, IN A SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE ARAB THOUGHT FORUM MEETING WITH CANADIAN AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS IN AMMAN ON 10 DECEMBER, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN STATED IN TERMS THAT THE XCLUSION OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE PEACE PROCESS HAD BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT BOTH OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS AND OF THE WIDER ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. THE KING'S RECENT MEETING IN

WIDER ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. THE KING'S RECENT MEETING IN AMMAN WITH THE LEADING SOVIET MIDDLE EAST EXPERT PRIMAKOV (MY TELELETTER TO NIXON IN NENAD OF 7 DECEMBER REFERS) WILL HAVE HELPED TO REASSURE HIM THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OUTCOME OF ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH JORDANIAN DESIDERATA.

3. IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF HIS LETTER KING HUSSEIN INDICATED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS WHICH THE ABANDONMENT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE MAY HAVE ON US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN (AND PRESUMABLY ALSO ON THE OTHER IMPORTANT MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER-IN-C SEF'S PRESENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON: SEE MY TELNO 548).

4. THIS STRONG BUT ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE JORDANIAN REACTION, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF EGYPT (SEE CAIRO TELNO 537 REFERS); WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT THE MODERATE ARAB STATES NOW FEEL US MIDDLE EAST POLICY TO BE SO DISCREDITED IN ARAB EYES THAT THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM IT. THE DILEMMA IS A PARTICULARLY CRUEL ONE FOR KING HUSSEIN, BECAUSE IF JORDAN WERE THREATENED WITH ATTACK FROM SYRIA OR ISRAEL HE KNOWS VERY WELL THAT ONLY THE AMERICANS COULD SAVE HIM.

5. SEE PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 575 ON POSSIBLE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION OF THIS AND MY 2 PRECEDING TELEGRAMS.

URWICK

NNNN

LD NR 637/11

OO FCO

GRS 160



12  
+16

**ADVANCE COPY**

**SECRET**

UK EYES ALFA  
FROM AMNAN 110900Z DEC 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 575 OF 11 DEC 83

**IMMEDIATE**

R/C  
ITD/NEWAD  
H/MED  
H/NAD  
H/PS(2)  
PS(6)  
PS/M LUGO  
PS/PUS  
Sir J. LEAHY  
Mr EVERTON  
PS/N3 10

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

1. KING HUSSEIN HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING LETTER MARKED SECRET TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 10 DECEMBER.

BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

ON 9 DECEMBER 1983, I SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. I ENCLOSE, FOR YOU **A PERSONAL COPY** OF THIS LETTER.

I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN LONDON NEXT WEEK.

WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM AND WARM WISHES.

I AM YOURS SINCERELY

HUSSEIN.

ENDS.

2. THE TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS IN MIFT AND COMMENTS IN MY SECOND MIFT.  
3. I HAVE NOT COPIED THIS TELEGRAM TO ANY POSTS, BUT ASSUME YOU WILL WISH TO DO SO TO WASHINGTON AND POSSIBLY OTHERS TOO, SUBJECT TO NO 10'S AGREEMENT. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY TODAY'S BAG.

No  
=

URWICK



SUBJECT

*master  
905*



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T207<sup>A</sup>/83

THE ROYAL PALACE  
Amman

December 10, 1983

*Dear Prime Minister*

On 9 December 1983, I sent a letter to President Reagan concerning the situation in, and the future of the Middle East. I enclose, for you, a personal copy of this letter.

I look forward to our meeting in London next week.

With my highest esteem and warm wishes.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher  
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
10 Downing Street  
London S W 1  
England



THE ROYAL PALACE  
Amman

December 9, 1983

*Dear Mr President,*

I have received with appreciation your letters of November 26 and November 27 1983. I was pleased to receive your commitment to pursuing the Middle East peace process vigorously over the coming months, "the necessities of electoral politics" in the United States not withstanding. I was heartened by your view that "the pursuit of peace" is widely and enthusiastically supported in America.

Mr. President,

You have encouraged me often-times to address you with forthrightness over all aspects of our mutual relations, particularly as they effect the possibilities of our attainment of our common goals and objectives. Let me do so once again Sir, by stating in absolute candour that I have clearly perceived over the years of my close association with the United States, how often the worthiest of objectives were clearly determined and identified by the highest authorities in the United States' Government. Yet how often the lack of a dynamic, coherent and consistent strategy and supportive policy rendered them unattainable. My files and records covering the period since 1967 attest to many examples of unfulfilled commitments and lost opportunities for the establishment of the just and lasting Middle East peace which still eludes us. Two examples from our recent past which were so devastating to U.S. credibility are worth mentioning.



1. The objectives of the U.S. and its European partners in Lebanon were to secure an unconditional total withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country and to secure its sovereignty over all of its territories, its independence and the unity of its people. How then was the United States side tracked to the point of embarrassing its European partners through becoming involved in an agreement with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon, as the guarantor of a peace treaty, in every aspect other than its name, which placed that agreement above and before every Lebanese commitment as a member of the Arab League of Nations, thus involving Lebanon in a separate peace arrangement with Israel to its detriment, and that of the Arabs, and away from the logical venue of striving to secure a comprehensive Arab Israeli peace through the participation of all the parties to the conflict?

What gave the United States the right, following this development, to announce that it recognised that Syria had legitimate security concerns in Sovereign Lebanon, and was this recognition anything other than an attempt to appease Syria by giving it a share to balance what Israel secured at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty through the afore-mentioned American, Israeli, Lebanese agreement?

How, finally, could the United States, on principle, deny the Soviets their claimed security rights in Afghanistan, while conceding similar rights to both Israel and Syria in Lebanon?



2. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories - It is a known fact that the intensification of these activities followed the Israeli Government's outright rejection of the United States' President's peace initiative of 1 September 1982. It is a known fact that this Israeli settlement activity prior to 1 September 1982 and since the ratification of the Camp David accords, was in direct violation of the said accords. It is a known fact that these settlements and their creation, contravene all legal and international accords, as they relate to Territories occupied by force. It is a fact that these settlements have been constructed through funds secured from the United States of America and that the demographic and physical changes that are occurring in those occupied territories all but make it impossible to visualise how any peace process to come could overcome the physical obstacles to peace which they represent.

I am pleased to note that in your letter of 26 November 1983, you have re-affirmed a number of assurances which you gave me when we met in December of last year. I know that one of them affirmed the United States' Government's commitment to secure a freeze on these settlement activities once we indicated a readiness to enter negotiations for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. I hasten to point out however, that the main cause of our inability to do so was Israel's intransigent policies and aggressive negative actions, and the ever eroding credibility of the United States' image in this entire area. Consequently any possible freeze in Israeli settlement activity beyond this point in time, may be growingly less consequential in enhancing the United States credibility, since the physical damage is all but completely done.



Finally, the conclusion of the strategic co-operation agreement between the United States of America and the Government of Israel at this time, and under prevalent circumstances in the area, has altered the United States' status from that of the peace maker, to that of the committed ally of one of the belligerents in the Middle East conflict. This tragic step has further pushed the momentum in the area towards the dreaded reality of Polarisation and has given the radical elements in the entire Middle East an unprecedented boost to pursue their objectives of area destabilisation, with all the inherent dangers to it, and to world peace.

In viewing this event, it would appear that the United States Government, as the ally of Israel, has chosen to forsake its role as the objective peace maker. It also is sadly evident that this action represents an abandonment of your initiative of 1 September 1982, which I am sure you will agree, we earnestly strove to keep alive by all means within our power. I am sure, Mr. President, you would agree with me, that for us to continue beyond this point to try to keep alive your government's clearly abandoned initiative of 1 September 1982, would not only be futile, but would be pathetically ridiculous.

As you well know, Sir, we had been deeply disturbed by the American Veto of a Jordanian resolution on Israeli settlement activities earlier on in the year. We had felt that present conditions in the area, including those of Israel, would have afforded the United State's government a unique opportunity to persuade Israel, in its own interest, as well as that of the United States and all in this area, away from the devastating policies which it followed. To our utter incredulity we are unable to persuade ourselves, let alone others, that Israel was not rewarded handsomely for its actions, encouraged to pursue its policies with greater zeal through fresh material and military aid, technological inducements, topped by a strategic alliance with the United States. Indeed, the reception in Washington of Brigadier Benjamin Eliezer, the Co-ordinator of Activities in the Administered Territories, could only give all subsequent Israeli actions affecting the unfortunate Palestinians, the stamp of Washington's direct approval beyond this point.



With all this before us, Sir, I see no alternative but to suggest that the only possible future course to resolve the Arab Israeli issue and the Palestinian tragedy, lies in striving to convene an International Conference to be attended by all the parties to the conflict and the two Super Powers, allied to two of the belligerents, and others, possibly all permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, to secure the establishment of a just and long overdue Middle East peace.

Lt. General Shaker, the Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Arab Armed Forces is now in Washington for his regular talks with his American counterparts. I thus hastened to send you this letter to ensure that you are fully aware of my feelings and the position of my Government and people, as well as the majority within our Arab world, over recent events. I leave it to you, Sir, to determine thus the level and scope of possible future military co-operation between our two countries to be discussed with Lt. General Shaker within the scope of these realities.

With my warmest personal regards,

I remain, Sir,

Your sincere friend,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Hussein', written in a cursive style.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

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PS/FUS  
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MR SPERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
ED/NEWAD  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1110 OF 07 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME.

MIPT: SHULTZ IN BONN: MIDDLE EAST

1. TELTSCHIK (DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO THE CHANCELLOR) HAS TOLD US THAT SHULTZ ADMITTED TO KOHL DURING THEIR TALKS YESTERDAY THAT THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS WERE NOW IN CLOSER HARMONY, AND CLAIMED THIS CREATED NEW CARDS WITH WHICH TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

2. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONDUCTING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS IN DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON. THEY WERE ALSO IN CONTACT WITH THE USSR, TRYING TO PERSUADE MOSCOW TO INFLUENCE SYRIA TO BE REASONABLE. NEVERTHELESS, SHULTZ FEARED FURTHER ESCALATION NOT ONLY IN LEBANON BUT IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

GEMAYEL MUST BE GIVEN FULL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGED TO WIDEN HIS

~~BYRNA TO BE REASONABLE. NEVERTHELESS, SHULTZ FEARED FURTHER ESCALATION NOT ONLY IN LEBANON BUT IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.~~

GEMAYEL MUST BE GIVEN FULL SUPPORT, AND ENCOURAGED TO WIDEN HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL BASE.

3. SHULTZ AND KOHL HAD DISCUSSED KING HUSSEIN'S NEW INITIATIVE, WHICH HUSSEIN HAD DESCRIBED IN A LETTER TO REAGAN WHICH HE HAD COPIED TO KOHL. TELTSCHIK EXPLAINED THAT THE GERMANS HAD ALREADY TOLD THE AMERICANS LAST WEEK THAT HUSSEIN'S IDEAS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND URGED THEM TO SUPPORT THEM. SHULTZ HAD TOLD KOHL YESTERDAY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WILLING TO COOPERATE AND TO PRESS ISRAEL TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE.

4. TELTSCHIK ASKED US WHETHER THE BRITISH HAD HEARD FROM HUSSEIN, AND HAD BEEN SPEAKING TO THE AMERICANS ON THE SAME LINES AS THE GERMANS. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT ANSWER WE SHOULD GIVE.

5. ACCORDING TO US EMBASSY SOURCES, GENSCHER RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL WITH QADAFI, IMPLYING THAT IF HE COULD NOT BE RESTRAINED THE BEST COURSE MIGHT BE TO CULTIVATE HIM. SHULTZ SHOWED NO ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IDEA.

6. NENAD PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF REQUIRED.

TAYLOR

NNNN



Prime Minister <sup>2</sup>

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1983

Dear John,

ms

Letter from the Secretary General of the League of Arab States,  
Mr Chedli Klibi

/ We have just received the attached letter of 22 November to the Prime Minister from Mr Klibi.

Mr Klibi asks the Prime Minister to consider urging the Ten to make a new initiative on the Middle East at the European Council meeting in Athens from 4 - 6 December. Mr Klibi has written on similar lines to other EC heads of government.

| We are consulting urgently among the Ten about how to reply. There may be opportunities to do this in the margins of the European Council meeting at Athens from 4 to 6 December. Sir Geoffrey Howe will then give his recommendation on a reply.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Middle East  
Sit.



10 DOWNING STREET

John ✓ AS → 8.  
12

The attached came in on  
Friday night and with David's  
agreement I put it in the  
PM's Atkins folder.

Steve

2/12/85

## DRAFT STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The Ten are deeply concerned about the situation in the Middle East. The hopes raised by the Reagan Plan and the Fez declaration have been disappointed. New momentum needs to be given urgently to the peace process. This must be in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and with the principles which the Ten have so often stated: the right to existence and security of all states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples of the region, including recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, with all that this implies. The Ten have repeatedly said that the PLO should be associated with negotiations.

2. The Palestinian problem lies at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A negotiated settlement will therefore require the continuing and independent expression of the will of the Palestinian people. The Ten urge Israel to abandon the policy of establishing settlements in the occupied territories and to join with others in creating a climate conducive to dialogue and negotiation. The threat or use of force must be renounced by all.

3. The Ten are particularly disturbed by the tragic situation in Lebanon which has become more complex as a result of recent events. They recognise the right of Lebanon's neighbours to security but emphasize that this requirement cannot be satisfied at the expense of Lebanese security and independence.

The Ten call on all parties to ~~adhere~~ <sup>adhere</sup> scrupulously to the ceasefire agreed on 25 September 1983.

They welcome the first steps taken in Geneva towards reconciliation and hope that this process will lead to the establishment of a government enjoying the widest possible national support and exercising authority throughout the territory of Lebanon. <sup>embodiment</sup>

(Recalling Security Council Resolution 509,) they stress the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with conditions agreed between Lebanon and the other parties concerned and on the basis of a precise time-table. The withdrawal should be accompanied by the release of any prisoners the parties may still hold. The Palestinian civilians in Lebanon should enjoy appropriate rights while remaining subject to Lebanese law.

Urgent consideration should be given to making full use of observers and to the possibility of redefining the mandate for UNIFIL.

The Ten are prepared to participate, in conjunction with the United Nations, in subsequent arrangements which would be necessary to consolidate peace in Lebanon and to strengthen such status as it may freely choose.

The Ten reiterate their offer to help the reconstruction of the country and consider that a programme of international aid should be set up.

4. The war between Iran and Iraq, in which the Ten have been and will remain neutral, must be brought to an end. This can be achieved through a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the two belligerents within internationally recognised borders and a

negotiated settlement. ~~Security Council~~ Resolution 540 could constitute a starting point of a process leading to peace.

They appeal to the belligerents to refrain from any act of war or measure which might endanger free navigation in the Gulf, or which might lead to an escalation of hostilities.

(ECOF)  
embodiment.

ORIGINAL RETURNED  
TO SIKAF  
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Prime Minister.

S. A. Paran.

MR. COLES ✓

AA-1/12

MF

MIDDLE EAST

I called on Prince Hassan of Jordan this morning. The King had telephoned him shortly before my arrival to say that he had received a positive reply to his letter to Reagan. Prince Hassan wondered how positive it was and what the Americans would in fact do for Jordan if the King stuck his neck out.

We first discussed his latest letter to me, copy attached.

I told him that, in my personal opinion, I saw no likelihood, at least during the next 18 months, of the United States agreeing to any form of cooperation with the Soviet Union over the Middle East. He would be deluding himself if he thought otherwise.

Hassan then outlined a series of steps which the Jordanians were contemplating designed to, in his words, preempt the Syrians and the Israelis from destroying his country. Specifically, they are contemplating:

1. Recourse to the ICJ, probably via the General Assembly, in order to get an advisory opinion on the question of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Israeli behaviour towards the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories.
2. Action in the Security Council to reaffirm SCR 242 and to affirm the illegality of the Israeli settlements.
3. Action with the Americans and the Europeans in regard to the economic and social condition of the inhabitants of Arab Palestine.
4. The initiative regarding the recall of the Jordanian Parliament.

In discussion, it emerged that Hassan was less sanguine than his brother about major initiative ie re-launching the Jordanian Parliament with West Bank representation. He thought that the King would be reluctant to take a fresh initiative unless he was sure of PLO approval, assuming that Arafat survived the battle in Tripoli. But Hussein was more optimistic about Arafat's future behaviour than Hassan was. Hassan was also realistically dubious about the extent

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
/to which

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- 2 -

to which they could extract the necessary public commitment from  
the United States.

All this fits in with the note on the Middle East which I sent down  
yesterday.

At the end of our meeting, Prince Hassan asked me if I would consider  
writing a definitive, official biography of King Hussein after I  
retire. I agreed to discuss this further with the two brothers when  
I visit Amman, probably next February.



A.D. PARSONS  
30 November 1983

SECRET

Amman, 17 November, 1983

Dear Sir Anthony,

As a continuation of our exchange of views, I should like to advise you of a brief visit to the United States where I addressed the Middle East bipartisan peace consultation hosted by former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford at Atlanta, Georgia, I feel more concerned about the apparent pre-election year drift in American policy toward peace-making in the Middle East. There seems to be a certain lack of appreciation in Washington of recent developments and the urgency for quick collaborative action to deal with the rapid deterioration.

The general situation in the Middle East grows more alarming by the day. Recent events have become so serious that they are likely to leave their imprint on the political scene for a long period of time. They may also allow the Soviet Union to improve and strengthen its position in the region as a whole; such an outcome in the absence of superpower dialogue towards peace could encourage the Russians to offer greater moral and material support for those local forces that seek the destabilisation of moderate and peace-seeking states. The Russians have endeavoured to counteract American determination to exclude them from the peace process. It is a matter of vital importance to us all that the two superpowers should embark on a dialogue for a common approach to peace-making in the Middle East. It will be a constructive move on the part of the United States to involve the Soviets so that the danger of polarisation may be prevented and another disastrous war averted.



However, the prospects for such a positive development in the immediate future look rather dim. The Syrian attempt to dominate and control the 'political will' of the Palestinian people could ultimately deprive them of an independent voice to express and defend their interests in international councils. The absence of Arab institutions to represent the wishes of the main Palestinian constituency under Israeli occupation has compounded the pressures to which Jordan is subjected. The Syrian onslaught on the Palestinians in Lebanon, coupled by the Israeli policies in the occupied territories, will eventually produce a confrontation between two potential regional powers seeking to impose their hegemony on the region.

Pressures on Jordan will be mounted from both the West and the North, accompanied by demographic movement toward the country from both sides, as a result of the economic and social dislocations among Palestinians at home and in the diaspora. The influx of a disgruntled population into Jordan would only serve to reinforce the current trends towards extremist politics. Conditions could become so propitious as to allow both the Israelis and the Soviet-backed Syrians to indulge in more adventurist policies which threaten the peace and stability of the whole region. Their enhanced position may permit them to establish a linkage between the Mediterranean littoral and the Red Sea-Gulf theatre, where they want to influence the course of future events.

Jordan is seriously considering the nature of the Palestinian-Jordanian inter-family relationship. Our sole objective, as it has always been, is to protect the Arab identity of the principal Palestinian constituency under Israeli occupation. The preservation of the national character of the Arab community of Palestinians will undoubtedly help us to maintain Jordan's 'middle-ground' posi-

tion between the politics of extremes. We require all the help and support we can obtain to hold on to our present course.

Unfortunately, the prevalent strategic thinking in Washington is inclined to overlook these fundamental considerations. It is mainly for this reason that I have called for the establishment of a bi-partisan peace approach in the United States and the other democracies of the world. We look expectantly to a firm stand by the U.S. in aid of a just and durable peace, at a time when Jordan's basic support is undermined, as was shown over the so-called 'Jordan Rapid Deployment Force'.

As always, I would value your comments on these thoughts, and I very much hope the occasion will arise when we may meet before your retirement this year.

*Yours very sincerely,*

Sir Anthony Parsons, KCMG, MVO, MC  
Foreign Affairs Advisor to  
the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London S.W.1

*Prince Hassan*  
PRINCE HASSAN

THE MIDDLE EAST

A characteristic of the Middle East which distinguishes it from most other regions of the world eg Europe and Latin America, is the unpredictability of events in the short and medium term. Imagine that it is now 1958 (the peak period of Nasserite Arab nationalism) and that I am your Foreign Affairs Adviser: you ask me what the Middle East will be like in 25 years time. I tell you that, in 1983, Egypt will be a capitalist society, close to the United States, on the sidelines of the Arab world and in treaty relations with Israel. The statelets of the Persian Gulf, under the same shaikhly regimes, will be independent members of the Arab League and the UN. Saudi Arabia, under the Al Saud, will have achieved world-wide prominence. King Hussein will still be ruling Jordan, widely respected throughout the Arab World, Iran will be controlled by a medieval religious fanatic, at war with Iraq in the area of the oilfields - but with no Great Power involvement. Lebanon will have collapsed and Israel will be in the process of absorbing the whole of what was Mandatory Palestine. If in 1958 I had painted this accurate picture of the Middle East in 1983, you would probably have had me certified!

But there are constant factors. The deep divisions which have fissured the area since the first Arab conquests in the 7th Century AD have shown no sign of closing after over 60 years of nation-statehood following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Aryan Persian or Kurd against Semitic Arab, Damascus against Baghdad, Cairo against both, Egyptian/Turkish contempt for "Arabs", Sunni against Shia, Hashemite against Al Saud, Wahhabi against non-Wahhabi are only some of the many sources of disunity. It was such as these which helped eg the Crusaders to remain in the area for 200 years, the Ottoman Turks to control the Middle East even in their own decline and which, in modern times, have been of inestimable value to the Israelis. We can be confident that these or similar divisions will persist. In modern times, Nasser's attempt to unify the Arabs was a fiasco and the latest phenomon, "Islamic fundamentalism", is divisive rather than unifying - a Shi'ite movement in Iran, a Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, Moslem Brothers in Egypt and the Sudan, each inimical to the other.

The next constant is the poison of Palestine. It complicated our relationship with the Arabs between the wars and was an ingredient in the pro-Axis movements in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Even with the

Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza firmly under Jordanian and Egyptian rule respectively between 1948 and 1967, Palestine became a cardinal feature in the domestic and foreign policies of the Levant Arab states. When, after the June war of 1967, the Palestinians decided to take matters into their own hands under Arafat's PLO, the poison spread throughout the region, even to the Gulf States at one end and Morocco at the other, and it became a principal element in the formulation of Western, including British, policies towards the Arab world. We should not delude ourselves that, with the fragmentation of the PLO after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian factor will become unimportant. It will remain with us, although the exact form it will take is unpredictable.

The third constant is that the Middle East, albeit for different reasons, always has and always will be important, to Britain: we cannot wash our hands. It used to be our main transit route to India: it was a battleground in both World Wars; it was an important strategic area in the 1950s against a possible Soviet outflanking of NATO's Eastern boundary; it was vital from the point of view of cheap oil supplies and the sterling reserves in the period of economic expansion in the 1960s; it was the epicentre of the oil price/supply convulsions of the 1970s. And, since both super-powers became seriously engaged in the area (after 1955) it has contained the seeds of global conflict to a greater extent than any part of the world outside the Central Front - perhaps even more than the Central Front since the last gap in the Iron Curtain was closed.

As I suggested at the outset, the course of events over the next decade or so will remain unpredictable. There may or may not be further oil supply/price problems even though we are now in a period of glut, buttressed by the North Sea. All that we can be sure of is that there will be recurrent political crises and that the general threat of escalating armed conflict will remain (for the first time both super-powers have combat troops deployed within a few miles of each other in an area of current hostilities).

In this shifting and dangerous kaleidoscope, is there anything we can do beyond keeping strong nerves and dealing with each crisis as it arises? In formulating our policies we should be conscious of our assets and liabilities. We have assets. Notwithstanding the catastrophic mistakes of the past - the assumption of a Palestine Mandate founded on an internally irreconcilable statement of intent

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- 3 -

(the Balfour Declaration), the misconceived attempts in the 1950s to "cut Nasser down to size" culminating in the Anglo-French fiasco at Suez in 1956 - our diplomacy over the past ten years or so has been successful. We now have excellent relations with most Middle East states, good relations with some (Iraq, Syria) and a working relationship even with the mavericks (Iran, Libya, South Yemen). Our Palestine policy, basically as articulated by Sir Alec Douglas Home at Harrogate in 1970 and as extended by the Venice Declaration in 1980, has stood us in good stead with the Arabs without mortally damaging our relations with Israel. We have even learnt over the past year that we can afford to quarrel with the Arabs from time to time (the row over the Arab League delegation) without this having the disastrous effect on our commercial prospects that the apostles of conventional wisdom would have us believe in. The Western world, including the United States, recognise that we possess a wealth of knowledge and experience of the Middle East beyond that of any of our partners and allies, although the French might not entirely agree! In short we are in a good position to make our views heard both inside and outside the region.

Our principal liability is that we have no leverage over any of the parties to any of the disputes which bedevil the Middle East. Our power is limited to that of persuasion. The force of our persuasion is diminished by the fact that the problems of the Middle East are domestic rather than foreign policy problems to the main actors. This includes the Americans so far as Palestine is concerned. This factor severely circumscribes their ability to act on what we (and they) might consider to be objectively good advice, eg what Israeli politician would win an election on the platform of Israeli security being enhanced by withdrawal from all or most of the West Bank, Gaza and Golan even with the most stringent international guarantees, what Levant or Gulf Arab regime could count on surviving public recognition of Israel without a concomitant and irrevocable assurance of total Israeli withdrawal including Jerusalem, what American could become President against the implacable opposition of the Zionist lobby? Moreover, in advising the Americans, the Arabs and the Israelis, we have to accept that we will to a great extent have to paddle our own canoe. The EC peaked at Venice and is unlikely to be able to do more than produce painfully drafted and ineffectual rhetoric in the foreseeable future. French idiosyncrasy and historical jealousy of Britain in the Middle East inhibits full Anglo/French cooperation, the Germans are paralysed by their history and the rest /do not count.

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do not count (except in a negative sense (Greece)). Nevertheless there is too much at stake for us to adopt an attitude of sceptical detachment. To quote Eliot we must emulate those "Who are only undefeated because we have gone on trying". Events in the Middle East are so unpredictable that it is only practicable to deal with current crises and try to anticipate crises in the immediate future. The basic problems, particularly Palestine, are insoluble in the short term and, except when our interests demand some presentational action for public consumption, there is no point in countries like Britain elaborating comprehensive and unrealistic blueprints for settlements. What we have to concentrate on is palliating the symptoms of the diseases, thus reducing threats to our interests and to world peace, while time - long time - does its slow work.

Within these narrow limits there is in my view more that we should be doing by way of contingency thinking and planning. Apart from the current crisis in Lebanon on which our policy is adequately developed, I foresee three main dangers/dramas which could erupt at any time during the next six months:-

(i) Israel-US/Syria. Since the advent of the Likud in Israel in 1977, Israeli foreign policy has taken on a fresh dynamism. It can be summed up in what has come to be known as the "Sharon plan", namely to achieve peace by neutralising Israel's neighbours (Egypt and Lebanon), destroying the PLO as a quasi-sovereign state and then moving to implement "Jordanis Palestine" (thus facilitating the annexation of the West Bank/Gaza) by obliging King Hussein to make way for a "Palestinian" government in Amman. Some of these objectives have already been achieved (although at high cost to Israel in casualties, moral standing and internal dissension) and even protagonists of less dramatic versions of the Sharon plan must see Syria as the main obstacle to further progress. By the same token, I am beginning to hear American voices saying "Syria must be cut down to size" (memories of analogous talk in London about Nasser in 1955/56). Is it possible that the Israelis, with American connivance, may be contemplating military action against Syria? If so, what form might it take? A ground/air attack designed to bundle the Syrians and their Shi'ite friends out of the Bekaa Valley? Something on Syrian territory? A pinpoint /Israeli air

Israeli air attack on the Russian SAM sites to show the Syrians (and the rest of the Arabs) that their big friend is a paper tiger? Or have the Israelis, after the casualties of 1982-83, lost stomach for such an operation?

In any case should we not be talking seriously to the Americans about such contingencies and otherwise focusing our minds on them? If, when it was increasingly obvious from late 1981 onwards that the Israelis were looking for a pretext for a full scale invasion of Lebanon and that Haig was likely to connive, we had brought our attention to bear and had forced the Americans to listen to us, we just might have been able to persuade them to restrain the Israelis.


(ii) King Hussein's intention to recall the Jordanian Parliament and perhaps to launch a fresh peace initiative. The King is desperate. He sees on one flank the Israeli threat of "Jordan is Palestine" with the corollary of another flood of Palestinian refugees arriving on the East Bank. On the other flank he sees Syria gaining control of the PLO and predominant in the Arab world. This presents a serious threat, even a military threat, to the Hashamite regime. The King is a brave man with an impulsive streak and we know that he is contemplating taking the initiative to preempt these dangers. He is already publicly castigating the Syrians and talking about recalling the Jordanian Parliament. If he does so, with nominated West Bank members, this will constitute a major shake of the kaleidoscope. The King would effectively be rejecting the Rabat Declaration of 1974 and sponsoring a new Palestinian voice, independent of the PLO (or perhaps with an anti-Syrian Arafat-led rump PLO). If he offered such a negotiating team to the Americans on the basis of the Reagan plan or Fez, how could Reagan turn him down? How would the Israelis react? Would they even let non-PLO West Bankers attend the Amman Parliament? What would the Syrians do - assassinate and intimidate everyone involved and perhaps threaten military action against Jordan? How would the rest of the Arabs line up?

See separate  
letter.  
AD 30

The FCO is addressing these questions and I now learn that King Hussein wants to visit London on 16 December if the Prime Minister can see him. This would provide an opportunity to discuss the King's plans and to explore the risks and benefits of a Jordanian initiative.

See telegram  
in today's "hot  
box." AD 30

(iii) An Iranian attempt to close the Gulf to tanker traffic. We are now privy to American contingency planning although on a very private basis. A lot of planning is also under way in Whitehall and we are in touch with the Saudis and Gulf governments. A crisis could be on us at any moment and we must clear our minds quickly on possible diplomatic and military action. We must try to keep a hand on the driving wheel which the Americans are grasping and should consider talking to the French as well. The contingencies are legion and possible responses equally multifarious. But we cannot afford to be caught half-prepared.



A.D. PARSONS  
29 November 1983



٤٢/١١/٨٣  
تونس في

جَامِعَةُ الدُّوَالِ الْعَرَبِيَّةِ

الأمين العام

Mrs. Prime Minister,

It is for me a pleasure and an honour, on the eve of the European summit, to call your kind attention to the Middle East problem which, as Your Excellency is well aware, is going now through a painful and a dangerous stage. WE would therefore greatly appreciate if this issue could receive careful consideration on the part of the E.E.C. leaders, meeting in Athens, and would lead to a joint declaration reaffirming the clear determination of Europe to contribute to a peace-settlement.

It is only normal that the Mideast, which is so close geographically to Europe and so vital for its economy, should be, for your Community, a question of great concern. The E.E.C. has already made an important step by recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Yet, this step has not been followed by any practical move, in addition, by equating Israeli security with Palestinian rights, it did not reflect, even, at that time, the reality of the situation. Today, the irrelevance of such a linkage is all the more obvious, after the invasion of Lebanon, the military occupation of the Southern part of this country and the illegal buildup of colonial settlements in the occupied territories. This linkage is today all the more irrelevant after the annexation by Israel of Al Qods and the Golan Heights, and its systematic pursuit of such policies as starkly violate international law and stand in the way of any peace-initiative, whether originating from the Arab side, the United Nations, Europe or even its U.S. ally.

The E.E.C. leaders are now well aware that Israeli security can hardly be said to be under threat and that Israel has more than the necessary means to checkmate all Arab forces put together, let alone the systematic backing it gets from the U.S. and its nuclear capability. In fact, what is in danger is the security of the Arab States, in particular those of the Near East, who are living under the constant threat of a new aggression. What is even more in danger is the Palestinian people, a people dispossessed of its homeland, exposed to daily persecution, and denied, persistently, its most basic right to self-determination. This is why any further European support to Israel would only contribute to more intransigence and more obstination on the part of Israel to pursue the same policies of hegemony and aggression.

On the other hand, it would be fitting that the Ten E.E.C.-countries set up the real parallelism that the reality of the situation imposes. The PLO and all the Arab States proclaimed in Fez their willingness to participate in finding a comprehensive, negotiated solution to the Mideast crisis while, Israël, as I have already pointed out, continues to reject any peace-plans. The Young Plan, the Rogers Plan, the Reagan Plan, not to mention the Arab Fez Plan.

The aggressor and the agressed cannot be put on an equal footing. I believe the moment has come for the European Community to fully realise the dangers of this situation, to overcome a too often biased vision of what it believes to be the interests of Israel and to apply

whatever pressures necessary on Israel so that it will renounce its illusory concept of "Eretz Israel" and come round to the only possible solution, i.e., coexistence with a Palestinian state to be established on retrieved occupied territories. Only in this way can there be an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In view of the daunting difficulties now facing the PLO, it might be highly tempting to bet on the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, which is at the core of the conflict. This would mean driving the Palestinians to despair which, you are all certainly aware, is the worst counsellor for frustrated peoples. It is this despair which explains the PLO's present internal struggles. In fact, it is because of Israel's violent and aggressive response to the peaceful discourse of Yasser Arafat that the enemies of the Palestinian leader are now fighting him with obstination and perhaps an apparent credibility.

There can be no doubt - and the European leaders quickly realised this - that the division and, perhaps, fragmentation of the Palestinian movement can only lead the region into unpredictable turmoil, weakening thus any chances for a peaceful settlement.

I am convinced, Mrs. Prime Minister, that under such circumstances, you will spare no possible effort to avert the impending danger. The solution can only come through a bold international initiative - and we believe the E.E.C. has the proper means for that - that would restore Palestinian hope and confidence in international law and, ultimately, put an end to their ordeal.

جامعة الكويت العربية

- 4 -

In conclusion let me express the hope that the E.E.C.-summit will adopt, through a new joint declaration, the position which will properly reflect its concern for world peace and the defense of law and justice. Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Chedli KLIBI

Secretary General  
League of Arab States

Her Excellency  
Mrs Margaret THATCHER  
Prime Minister of Great Britain  
LONDON  
(Great Britain)

19 — 22 NOV. 1983 — تونس في

جامعة الدول العربية

الأمين العام

3/5249

Madame le Premier Ministre,

A la veille du Sommet Européen, j'ai l'honneur d'en appeler à votre sagesse, pour que la question du Proche-Orient, qui connaît, comme vous le savez, des développements aussi pénibles que dangereux, soit attentivement examinée par les dirigeants de la C.E.E., réunis à Athènes, et fasse l'objet d'une déclaration commune où s'affirme clairement la volonté de l'Europe de contribuer à un règlement de paix.

Il est normal que la région du Proche-Orient, parce que proche de l'Europe et vitale pour son économie, soit au centre des préoccupations de votre Communauté. Celle-ci a déjà accompli un pas appréciable, en reconnaissant le droit du peuple palestinien à l'auto-détermination. Mais, d'une part, cette prise de position n'a été suivie d'aucune initiative opérationnelle; d'autre part, établissant une sorte d'équivalence entre la sécurité d'Israël et les droits du peuple palestinien, elle ne reflétait pas, même à cette époque, la réalité de la situation. Comment pourrait-elle en être le reflet aujourd'hui, après l'invasion du Liban, l'occupation militaire de la partie sud de ce pays et l'installation illégale de colonies de peuplement dans

les territoires occupés, après que l'Etat hébreu eut annexé Al Qods et les hauteurs du Golan et démontré, par toute une série de mesures, son mépris systématique du droit international, ainsi que sa volonté délibérée de contrecarrer toute initiative de paix, qu'elle vienne de la partie arabe, de l'ONU, de l'Europe ou de son allié américain ?

Les dirigeants de la C.E.E. se rendent à l'évidence qu'Israël n'est guère menacé dans sa sécurité, qu'il dispose de forces capables de mettre en échec l'ensemble des forces arabes, et qu'au surplus il bénéficie du parapluie américain - sans parler des armes nucléaires qui seraient déjà en sa possession et qui suffiraient à dissuader n'importe quel agresseur. En réalité, c'est la sécurité des Etats Arabes, en particulier ceux du Proche-Orient, qui vivent constamment sous la menace d'une nouvelle agression, qui est en danger comme l'est celle du peuple palestinien qui, dépossédé de sa patrie, quotidiennement persécuté, se voit toujours refuser le droit à l'autodétermination. A cet égard, tout nouveau soutien européen consenti à Israël ne ferait que renforcer cet Etat dans son intransigeance et dans son obstination à poursuivre la même politique d'hégémonie et de domination.

D'autre part, il serait juste que l'Europe des Dix établisse le véritable parallélisme qu'impose la réalité. D'un côté, l'OLP avec tous les Etats Arabes proclamant, à Fès, sa volonté de participer à une solution globale et négociée à la crise du Proche-Orient; de l'autre, Israël, comme je l'ai souligné, s'obstinant à rejeter tous les plans de paix - le plan Young, le plan Rogers, le plan Reagan - sans parler du plan arabe de Fès.

Agresseur et agressé ne sauraient être mis sur le même plan. Et je crois le moment venu pour la Communauté Européenne de prendre la véritable mesure des dangers de la situation, de dépasser une vision trop souvent centrée sur ce qu'elle croit être les intérêts d'Israël et d'exercer les pressions nécessaires sur Israël pour l'amener enfin à renoncer à ses vues chimériques relatives à l'Eretz Israël et à prendre la seule voie possible : celle de la coexistence avec un Etat palestinien dont la création conjuguée avec le retour des territoires arabes occupés marquera, à n'en pas douter, la fin du conflit israélo-arabe.

La tentation pourrait être grande, au vu des difficultés que traverse l'OLP, de parier sur la liquidation du problème palestinien, véritable noyau du conflit. Ce serait acculer les Palestiniens au désespoir qui est, vous le savez mieux que personne, le plus mauvais conseiller des peuples frustrés. C'est bien le désespoir qui explique les déchirements actuels au sein de l'OLP. En effet, c'est parce qu'au discours pacifiste d'Arafat Israël a répondu par une escalade de la violence et des agressions que les

adversaires du dirigeant palestinien peuvent aujourd'hui le combattre avec force et apparence de crédibilité. Il est certain - et les dirigeants européens l'ont rapidement compris - que la division et, peut-être, l'émiettement du mouvement palestinien, ne pourraient que jeter la région dans des bouleversements imprévisibles et affaiblir d'autant les chances d'un règlement pacifique.

Je suis convaincu, Madame le Premier Ministre, qu'en ces circonstances, vous n'épargnerez aucun effort pour que ce grave danger soit écarté. A cet égard, l'unique solution réside en une action d'envergure, à l'échelle internationale - et nous pensons que la Communauté Européenne en a les moyens - qui puisse redonner aux résistants palestiniens espoir et confiance en la légalité internationale et, par conséquent, mettre fin à leurs déchirements.

En espérant que le Sommet Européen adoptera, en une nouvelle déclaration commune, les positions qu'imposent le souci de la paix internationale, mais aussi la défense du droit et de la justice, je vous prie, Madame le Premier Ministre, de croire à ma très haute considération.

Chédi KLIBI

Secrétaire Général  
de la Ligue des Etats Arabes

Son Excellence  
Madame Margaret THATCHER  
Premier Ministre  
LONDRES  
(Grande Bretagne)





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Note arrived  
29/11/83

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

will do.

JC or

D  
Ayl

The Prime Minister said today that she would be very grateful if you could produce a substantial think-piece on the future of the Middle East which she could discuss with you before your departure.

If you can manage it, it would be good if this could be available shortly after the Athens Council. We would then find a suitable opportunity for discussion with the Prime Minister.

A.J.C.

21 November 1983

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Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I held this up until after  
CHOGA and Atten. but you  
may like to read it before you

London SW1A 2AH

16 November, 1983

Dear John

working supper with Tony Parsons

on Wednesday. 16 Nov 9.11

Policy on the Middle East: Jordan

In your letter of 12 September to Brian Fall, you recorded that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been invited to prepare a paper on ways in which we and our Allies could help to ensure that the integrity and stability of Jordan were preserved in the coming years.

I now enclose a paper, with which the Foreign Secretary is in general agreement. It takes account of the Prime Minister's discussion of the problem with President Reagan in Washington on 29 September. We have held the paper up to enable Mr Luce to consider it further following his visit to the region earlier this month. It now reflects a number of points made by Mr Luce on his return.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

## INTRODUCTION

1. The Jordan of King Hussein appears an oasis of relative stability in an unstable region. However, Jordan's existence has been precarious ever since her Independence. A front-line state in the dispute with Israel, but lacking oil wealth or the military resources of Egypt or Syria, Jordan has always been vulnerable to pressure from more powerful neighbours. King Hussein has successfully weathered a series of crises, notably those provoked by the hostility of Nasser in the 50s and 60s, the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967 and the PLO's attempt to unseat him in 1970/71. Recent developments in the region have disturbing new implications for the longer-term stability of Jordan. Israel's invasion of Lebanon showed how far the Israeli Government were prepared to go in the name of security, and sent shivers down Jordanian spines.

2. The future of Jordan is inextricably tied up with that of the West Bank. Jordan has a majority (57%) Palestinian population. West Bankers tend to look to Jordan for assistance and expect King Hussein to play a role in the peace process. If, as seems likely, the PLO becomes more hard-line after Arafat's latest setback in North Lebanon, this tendency will probably grow. Jordan is concerned by the immigration of Palestinians driven or edged out of the West Bank by the Israelis. Furthermore, the possible recall of the Jordanian parliament (see paragraph 8), would require, under the Jordanian constitution, that the West Bank be represented. Because of this strong link with the West Bank, and Jordan's pivotal role in the US Peace Plan, the continuing failure to make progress towards a comprehensive Arab/Israeli settlement leaves Jordan uncomfortably exposed.

THE THREATS TO JORDANInternal

3. Internally, the King maintains a tight grip. The economy remains sound, although heavily dependent on payments from the Arab oil producers under the Baghdad Summit arrangements. Jordan's share of these payments is nominally \$1.25 billion per year, but in 1982 there was a shortfall of \$345 million, and Jordan was obliged to cut her development programme and to raise \$200 million on the Euro dollar market. If Arab funds were ever cut off, the effect on Jordan's economy would be disastrous. But this is most unlikely unless circumstances change dramatically. Nor is there any immediate sign that fundamentalism or Palestinian frustration pose a threat to him. But he is closely identified with US policies in the region (especially after the Reagan Plan), and would therefore be particularly vulnerable should this or a successor US Administration abandon serious efforts to reach an Arab/Israel settlement. The specific steps which the King identified in his message (see Annex C) to President Reagan after the collapse of talks with Arafat on 10 April, and on which he said the US should be more flexible, were association of the PLO with peace negotiations; full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon; and a settlements freeze. If the peace process continues to stagnate, for whatever reason, a resurgence of radicalism among the Palestinians in Jordan could once more threaten internal stability. There is also the ever-present threat of assassination. (The extremist Palestinian group led by Abu Nidhal has recently begun a terrorist campaign against Jordanian diplomats). Jordan's success over the past thirty years has been so much a function of King Hussein's own success that his death would pose a real threat to the regime, despite the apparently loyal but not so charismatic Crown Prince Hassan waiting in the wings.

Syria

4. Jordan's traditionally poor relations with Syria could degenerate to the point of conflict as they almost did in November 1980; or Syria could encourage Palestinian attacks on Israel through Jordan, thereby provoking Israeli retaliation against Jordan. The two states are deeply divided on Arab/Israel policy, and support opposite sides in the Gulf War, where King Hussein has allied himself with President Hussain. As a result, a decisive defeat for Iraq would probably have implications for the stability of Jordan (but such an outcome does not seem likely).

ISRAEL AND 'JORDAN-IS-PALESTINE'

5. King Hussein himself considers that the principal threat to Jordan in the longer term comes from Israel. The Jordanian Armed Forces are largely successful in preventing the infiltration of guerillas from their territory into Israel. As long as they can keep the border secure, the threat of major Israeli retaliation, or full scale invasion on the Lebanon model, is some way off. The Jordanians are now concerned about the promotion of the idea that 'Jordan-is-Palestine' by senior Ministers in the Likud Government and their supporters, with its implication that the continuation of a moderate Hashemite regime in Jordan is not necessarily in Israel's interests.

6. At one level, the Jordan-is-Palestine thesis is merely a convenient propaganda line to deflect pressure on Israel to accommodate Palestinian nationalism by territorial concession. Jordan, the argument runs, is already the Palestinian state: it has a majority Palestinian population and represents 75% of mandatory

Palestine, having been arbitrarily hived off by the British in 1921-22 as the Arab territory of Transjordan. Proponents of this view (aspects of which we would dispute on historical grounds alone see Annex A) conclude that there is therefore no reason for a second Palestinian state to be established west of the Jordan. Some Israelis go a stage further and argue that Israel should put the theory into practice, by encouraging Palestinian emigration from the West Bank to Jordan, possibly as a prelude to annexation, and by acquiescing in or even encouraging the downfall of the Hashemite monarchy to make way for the establishment of a Palestinian state in its place. They believe that the existence of such a state, particularly if it turned out to be radical and Syrian or Moscow-oriented, would remove much of the international pressure on Israel to meet Palestinian aspirations West of the Jordan, and enable Israel to absorb the West Bank without endangering her relations with the US.

7. The idea that Israel could take a hand in implementing Jordan-is-Palestine has so far been largely confined to the right of the Israeli political spectrum and is particularly associated with General Sharon. Apart from him, there is probably nobody in the present Israeli Government who believes that it could be put into practice in the short-term. But both Mr Shamir and Mr Arens are on the record as supporting the theory (recent statements quoted at Annex B); and, more important for the Jordanians, some Israeli policies already point in this direction. Israel's economic and social policies in the Occupied Territories, together with the harsh security regime there, have produced a high and sustained level of emigration, particularly of young educated Palestinians, for whom there is little work. If the present Israeli Government's preferred

solution to the Palestinian problem, autonomy, continues to be blocked, then support in Israel for a more radical solution on Jordanian territory could grow, particularly if violence in the Occupied Territories continues to flare up, as at present. The advent of a Labour Government in Israel could of course change the picture. But the Labour Alignment's policy of territorial compromise is looking increasingly obsolete in the face of the expanding network of settlements, and the Jordanians think it prudent to plan on the basis of worst-case assumption. The King is ever looking for reassurance, especially from the Americans, that the basis of any negotiation remains Israeli withdrawal from Occupied Territories, as prescribed in Security Council Resolution 242.

#### POSSIBLE RECALL OF JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT

8. King Hussein is deeply concerned about recent developments in the Middle East, and anxious to see the peace process revived. He is worried about the US position on withdrawal (para 7 above) and has little hope of fresh impetus coming from the Americans before the new President takes office early in 1985. He is therefore contemplating taking a lead himself and has spoken, to Mr Luce and publicly, of the possible recall of Jordan's parliament. There are two main problems with this. First, half the seats in the previous Jordanian parliament belonged to the area now under Israeli occupation - the West Bank. Secondly, and more important for Hussein, representation of West Bank Palestinians in the Jordanian Parliament would put him in breach of the 1974 Rabat agreement by the Arab League that the PLO should be recognised as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hussein's enemies would make great play with this and could use it to turn moderate Arab countries against him. Hussein is, however, fully alive to this risk: he told Mr Luce that

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it was essential, if he was to take this step, that he should know where the Americans stood, (ie would they make clear their continued commitment to the need for Israeli withdrawal, as spelt out in Security Council Resolution 242).

STEPS TO PRESERVE JORDAN'S STABILITY

9. The best guarantee of Jordan's territorial integrity and stability is firm and consistent Western support to deter those who might try to undermine her. The Americans showed in 1971 and 1980, as we had done in 1958, that they were willing to back up their political support with military supplies or assistance when Jordan was threatened. We retain a particular role in refuting the Jordan-is-Palestine argument in view of our former responsibility and actions as mandatory power. But Western support must also take account of Jordan's need to remain firmly in the Arab camp. Jordan's dependence on Arab funds puts limits on her flexibility over Arab/Israel policy. The King is well aware that the West could not match these funds, and he would for this reason alone have been imprudent to risk them by accepting the part assigned to him in the Reagan plan without Arab cover. The West, particularly the US, must beware of trying to push King Hussein further or faster in the peace process than he feels he can go, or of urging closer identification with the West than he believes his relations with the Arab world will bear.

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10. Western financial assistance to Jordan is relatively modest. US aid for 1982/83 was \$98 million. Our own aid programme provides for capital aid and technical assistance of £10.5 million for the period 1983/7. While these sums do not in themselves go far to help Jordan meet the threats she faces, they are an important demonstration of our political commitment (Jordan would not usually qualify for aid on strict developmental grounds). The proposal that we should be doing more to support the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza both bilaterally and through the Community (which formed one of the recommendations in the paper for the recent informal Ministerial discussions) would, if implemented, help to take some of the strain off Jordan's budget, as well as being a significant political gesture which would hearten the Jordanians and strengthen her arm in the Arab world in arguing for moderate pro-Western policies. Arms supplies are of greater practical significance. Jordan buys mainly from the US, France and the UK, although she has recently gone to the Soviet Union for low-level air defence missiles. Her largest purchase from the UK was 274 Khaled tanks worth £266 million: delivery was completed last year. She has expressed interest in acquiring 25 Hawk aircraft in the medium term, although the Jordanian Air Force is at present short of funds.

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11. We have a close defence relationship with the Jordanians which has evolved over the years as the King's armed forces have matured. We provide a lot of training assistance, mostly in the form of courses in the UK. There may be projects in the future for which the Jordanians would like more substantial help eg seconded UK personnel for a Jordanian Air Force Staff College. We should be ready to offer such assistance if requested, and in some cases British help may be preferred for political reasons to American. A comparison could be made with Oman and the Gulf, but this is not a straightforward one. We created the Jordanian armed forces as we are now creating Oman's, but that stage was completed nearly thirty years ago when the King expelled Glubb Pasha. While we could offer a commitment to consult in time of threat (consultation is constant anyway), we should have to accept that in the King's view the main threat is from Israel. In the event of an Arab (eg Syrian) threat the King would only call for British assistance in the very last resort. We clearly could not commit ourselves to Jordan's security as we have committed ourselves to Oman's.

12. Against this background, we should take the following specific steps:

(i) In order to contribute to the maintenance of the stability and identity of the Occupied Territories, we should continue to oppose settlements and examine ways in which, without substantial new financial commitments, we can contribute to the economic and social development of the West Bank;

(ii) We should follow up the Prime Minister's remarks to President Reagan in further discussions with the US Administration

underlining the threats to Jordan, supporting King Hussein's call for changes in US/Middle East policy to enable the peace process to re-start and, in particular, urging the US not to go ahead with 'strategic cooperation' with Israel.

(iii) We should at an appropriate moment raise the subject in the Ten and consider whether there are any joint steps the community might take to underline the need to preserve Jordan's stability;

(iv) Ministers should make clear in public our rejection of the Jordan-is-Palestine argument, (with its implication that the Hashemite monarchy should be replaced by a Palestinian regime in Jordan); and ventilate the subject with the Israelis in bilateral Ministerial discussions;

(v) In Jordan itself we should back up our political support by practical steps, including maintaining our aid programme; promoting arms sales and defence cooperation; and keeping up a programme of high-level visits in both directions;

(vi) We should make full use of the State Visit to Jordan in 1984 to underline our close relationship, and consider a short stop-over by the Prime Minister, eg. on the way to or from Malaysia, to reinforce the message;

(vii) To survive Jordan needs not only Western support but that of moderate Arab Governments. We should therefore encourage the Saudis and Egyptians to play a more active role, but without exaggerated expectations of either;

(viii) If King Hussein takes the risky step of recalling the Jordanian parliament, we should publicly welcome the return of parliamentary democracy to Jordan.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

17 NOVEMBER 1983

## Annex A

## Jordan-is-Palestine: Historical Argument

1. Proponents of the Jordan-is-Palestine argument allege that HMG "partitioned" historic Palestine in 1921-1922 and handed 78% to the Emir Abdullah. This became Transjordan and eventually the (Palestinian) state of Jordan. They also claim that HMG arbitrarily withheld the provisions of the Palestine mandate relating to the establishment of a Jewish National Home from applying in Transjordan, thereby denying Jews the right to settle in what had historically been part of Palestine.


2. The history of the period is complex, but does not support these assertions:

(i) It is not the case that there was historically a well-defined geographical entity known as Palestine covering both banks of the River Jordan. As late as 1922 the League of Nations in approving the Mandate document entrusted to Britain "The administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, with such boundaries as may be fixed by them";

(ii) The area which became Transjordan was part of the territories in which HMG undertook to "recognise and support the independence of the Arabs" in an exchange of letters with Sharif Hussein in 1915. It was always treated separately for administrative purposes from Palestine proper West of the Jordan.

(iii) The Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which HMG confirmed that they "viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people" gave no geographical definition of Palestine. But it would have been inconsistent for HMG to have intended that this provision should apply to the area in which they had already undertaken to support Arab independence;

(iv) The San Remo Conference of 1920 which assigned Palestine



Mandate to Britain left the question of borders open. Far from partitioning historic Palestine, HMG decided, at the Cairo Conference of 1921 called by Churchill to review administrative arrangements in the area, to add Transjordan as "an Arab province or adjunct of Palestine" while at the same time "preserving the Arab character of the area and administration". Hence Article 25 was added to the mandate document providing for the exclusion of Transjordan from the provisions of the mandate relating to the Jewish National Home. In approving this document in 1922 the League of Nations accepted that Transjordan was to be treated as separate from Palestine proper, although nominally covered by the mandate for Palestine.

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## Annex B

Quotations from leading Israeli politicians on the Jordan-is-Palestine theme.

Mr Shamir

Question: What would be the attitude of Israel if the PLO were to overthrow King Hussein and to take control of what you call the Palestinian state across the Jordan River?

Answer : For us, it is not important by whom will be ruled this state of Jordan, which is a Palestinian state. It can be ruled by King Hussein as now. It can be ruled by others. It doesn't matter for us. For us, it's important, the basic fact that this state is a Palestinian Arab State.

Mr Arens

''...certainly Jordan is a Palestinian state. There is no Jordanian nationality: when it was born, where did it come from? One could even say that King Hussein is not a Palestinian, in the sense that his family came from what is today Saudi Arabia, but the population in Jordan is Palestinian to all intents and purposes. Therefore there is a Palestinian State.''

(Israel Radio, 9 September 1983)



THE ISRAELI COLONIZATION OF ARAB LANDS

JULY 1983

*W*

THE OCCUPATION . . . .  
Israeli Colonization of Arab Lands  
(Revised Edition)

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to shed a light on some unique phenomena in the recent history of colonization, namely the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, including Jerusalem. This occupation of Arab territories following the 1967 war is now more than 16 years old; this period is almost 45% of the life of Israel as a state. If this situation is allowed to continue without concrete corrective measures on the part of the international community, the consequences will be grave to the people of the occupied territories, to the region and to the international system, particularly to accepted codes of conduct.

The past fifteen years have clearly demonstrated two phenomena: an increasing propensity to resort to military action on the part of Israel and a rising tendency in the Arab World to move towards peaceful measures to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lack of concrete corrective measures on the part of the international community would lead to the weakening of moderation in favour of militancy in the Arab World. If this Israeli-induced attitude persists, the area in general is bound to be attracted to extremist currents. These attitudes are basically a recipe for instability; their effects cannot be contained within the region but will overflow to other regions.

2. U.S. AID TO ISRAEL - A Possible Tool in the Service of Peace

The economy of Israel, in the context of instability in the region, has been artificially kept, with the help of large amounts of US aid. Despite its economic difficulties, particularly an inflation rate of 130%<sup>(1)</sup>, one of the highest in the world, Israel has continued in its belligerent attitude to its neighbours and in colonizing the territories occupied since 1967.

At the end of 1981, Israel's foreign debt was about US\$24.2 billion<sup>(2)</sup> - most of it owed to the U.S. This was about 112% of Israel's GDP in 1981, and about 426% of its exports in the same year. Recent estimates put the size of Israel's foreign debt at around US\$26.76<sup>(3)</sup>. During the 'seventies, Israel received almost US\$13 b. in U.S. aid, almost half of it in grants<sup>(4)</sup>.

It has been reported that the 1982 U.S. foreign aid to Israel was around US\$2.2 b. with US\$785m. in economic aid and the rest in military aid<sup>(5)</sup>. Recent reports, quoting U.S. officials, stated that the U.S. has requested a total of about US\$2.5b. in aid to Israel for U.S. Fiscal Year 1983. Of this amount, US\$785m. will be in economic grants and US\$500m. in military (F.M.S.) grants. Thus, grants will

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- (1) Measured on annual basis in the first seven months of 1982, The Financial Times, 8 September 1982.
  - (2) Statistical Abstract of Israel. 1982, (Central Bureau of Statistics - Jerusalem 1982).
  - (3) Time Magazine, January 10, 1983, p. 5.
  - (4) The Economist Intelligence Unit, 4th quarter 1980, London; p. 15.
  - (5) Foreign Assistance and Related Programmes Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982. Hearing before a sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, First Session, Washington D.C., 1982.

account for about 51% of total requested aid to Israel . Futhermore, Israel has requested a US\$3.2 billion of U.S. aid for Fiscal Year 1984, indicating an increase of US\$700 million over that of 1983.(1) Israel's dependence upon aid has been increasing. This is in the sense that Israel must raise about US\$9-11 billion in new funds in order to cover its deficits and refinance short-term or redeemable debts in 1983(2). It has been maintained that foreign aid to Israel, of which the US provides 75-80%, generates about one half of Israel's GNP, and there is no indication that its dependence on aid could be reduced(3).

Under the U.S. government Foreign Military Sales programme, Israeli armed forces have received US\$15b. out of US\$28b. distributed worldwide since 1951.(4) Israel is one of only five countries allowed to spend U.S. aid money in countries other than the U.S. It is allowed to order U.S. equipment through the military aid programme even before the U.S. Congress authorizes the needed money.(5) It should be pointed out that allowing Israel to obtain sophisticated weapons not obtainable elsewhere in the world, even if it could afford to buy them, is a unique advantage to Israel.

Official U.S. aid figures do not reflect the full dimension and volume of resources transferred to Israel.

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- (1) Thomas Stauffer: "U.S. Aid to Isreal, the vital link", Middle East Problem Paper, No. 24, Middle East Institute, (Washington D.C. Jan. 1983) p. 1.  
(2) Ibid., p. 2.  
(3) Ibid., p. 2.  
(4) International Herald Tribune, 22 July, 1982.  
(5) Ibid.

There have been other aid methods not available to any other country in the region. The following points illustrate this:

1. Aid flows from U.S.-based Jewish organizations to Israel are fully tax deductible.(1)
2. The underinvoicing of some weapons sold to Israel which subsequently resold them at premium to other countries.(2)
3. Allowing the Israeli arms industry to bid for U.S. defence contracts, a mechanism which is bound to infuse money into such industries. This also includes sub-contracting to manufacture spare parts and components for U.S. armaments.(3)
4. Research and development support to Israeli educational and research institutions, funded by the U.S. Department of Education, the National Institute of Health and other U.S. agencies, amounts to about US\$100m. per year.(4)
5. Israel is categorized by the U.S. as a developing country for tariff purposes even though its per capita income in 1981 was US\$5,404. Consequently, Israeli exports to the U.S. benefitted from the Generalized System of Preferences, thereby 96% of its US\$1b. exports to the U.S. were admitted tariff-free.(5)

Accordingly, it has been estimated that the total transfer of U.S. resources to Israel, from the above-mentioned items as well as official sources, would come to US\$5 billion in 1984.(6)

For comparison, it has been proposed that total U.S. aid to Jordan in U.S. Fiscal Year 1983, would be about US\$95m.(7)

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- (1) Thomas Stauffer, The Christian Science Monitor, 29 December 1981.
  - (2) Ibid.
  - (3) The International Herald Tribune, 22 July 1982.
  - (4) T. Stauffer: The Christian Science Monitor, op. cit.
  - (5) Ibid.
  - (6) T. Stauffer: "U.S. Aid to Israel, the vital link", op. cit., p
  - (7) Figures provided by the National Planning Council, Amman.

or less than 4% of the size of aid to Israel in the same year. On a per capita basis, Israel received US\$546 in U.S. aid in 1982; the corresponding figure for Jordan was only US\$29, or less than 6% of that to Israel.

Israel is relatively rich when compared with its neighbours. Jordan's per capita income in 1981 equals only 25% of the Israeli figure (US\$1,377 vs. US\$5,404). It should be noted that Israel's per capita income in 1980 was close to Arab oil states income<sup>(1)</sup> of US\$6,939 for the same year.

Israel, despite all the economic difficulties it faces, continues to afford to occupy the Arab territories. It is seeking to have its friends and traditional financial donors erase its huge debt. The question is how far will these donors continue to support Israel while it occupies Arab lands illegally. Erasing Israel's debt and the continuation of generous aid while it occupies Arab lands is tantamount to subsidizing occupation and lessening the inclination on the part of Israel to seek peace. It is worth pointing out to Israel at this point of political and economic development, that U.S. aid should be used in the service of peace. It should be used in a compatible manner with U.S. real interests, in strengthening moderate tendencies in the Middle East, and in helping to end the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, thus eventually leading to stability and peace in the region.

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(1) Included: Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.  
Data taken from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981, and Unified Arab Economic Report, The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Kuwait, 1981.

3. THE ISRAELI COLONIZATION OF THE WEST BANK

During the past fifteen years of Israeli occupation of Arab lands, the international community has expressed its strong opposition to the Israeli policy of confiscating, colonizing and settling in Arab lands. The UN Security Council, in 1979, adopted resolution 446 which determined that the Israeli policy and practices in establishing settlements in the Occupied Territories had no legal validity and constituted a serious obstruction to achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.<sup>(1)</sup>

The EEC countries in their Venice Declaration of June 1980 stated that "They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the Occupied Territories, are illegal under international law".

Furthermore, President Reagan in his Peace Plan for the Middle East called on Israel to freeze the establishment of settlements stating that "Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs".

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(1) UN Security Council, Resolution 446 (1979), UN Publication 8/RES/446 (1979) dated 22 March 1979.

Despite clear international opposition, the pace of Israeli colonization of the West Bank has not shown any signs of slowing down. To the contrary, the number of settlements and settlers have increased and the repressive measures have widened, indicating a planned desire to drive out the indigenous Arab population of the Occupied Territories.

Policies and statements of Israeli leadership have stressed their determination to attain the above objective.<sup>(1)</sup> As a matter of fact, Begin has recently stated his Government's determination not to dismantle any settlements in the future and to increase his grip on the Arab West Bank. He specifically stated that Israel would demand sovereignty over the Arab West Bank and Gaza at the end of the five-year transition period envisioned by the Camp David Accords.<sup>(2)</sup> Such intentions, if allowed to take hold, would negate any base for a meaningful durable peace.

Israel has not only been receiving aid from outside to keep its occupation of the West Bank going, this occupation itself has delivered to Israel a captive economy with natural and human resources exploited for the benefit of the occupier.

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- (1) Al-Quds newspaper, 5 May 1982, quoting the Israeli Ma'ariv newspaper reported that a new department for 'Planning & Development' has been established at the Ministry of Agriculture. It will be responsible for fattening up and supporting Israeli settlements in the West Bank and transferring Israeli factories and workshops to the settlements. Deputy Minister of Agriculture was quoted as saying that Israeli settlements plan in the West Bank should be speedily implemented.
- (2) The New York Times, 4 May 1982.



A few points of illustration and the annex tables would suffice to show the nature of Israeli occupation.

At the end of April 1983, Israel had about 162 settlements in the West Bank, of which 31 were in and around Jerusalem. It is extremely difficult to give an exact number of the settlements as Israel has resorted to several measures which would render such an estimate out of date. Israel is known to have established new settlements in army camps on the West Bank<sup>(1)</sup>, thus doing without the approval of the Israeli cabinet.

Following the Security Council Resolution 446 (May 1979) and during the May 1979 - April 1983 period, available information indicated that Israel has taken possession of an extra 1,058,957 dunums (105,895 hectares) of Arab land, making the total area seized 2,576,871 dunums (257,687 hectares) which accounts for about 46.8% of the total area of the West Bank of 5,500,000 dunums (550,000 hectares). Of the total West Bank area, 26% was designated specifically for settlements and alleged security purposes. Some Israeli sources have estimated that Israel has control over 50-60% of the total West Bank area.<sup>(2)</sup>

Although no data exists on the total number of settlers in Israel's ever-increasing number of colonies, Israeli policy measures indicate that the total number of settlers

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(1) The Guardian, 4 February 1982.

(2) The Washington Post, 12 September 1982.

in the West Bank including Jerusalem - has increased beyond the 91,000 figure reported in April 1979, to about 140,000 for 1982.

Recent estimates have shown that the number of settlers in the West Bank excluding Jerusalem was 25,000 at the end of 1982.<sup>(1)</sup> This figure is expected to more than double reaching about 60,000 by the middle of 1983.<sup>(2)</sup> Currently, there are about 12,242 housing units in various stages of construction in the settlements of the West Bank, of which 5,006 housing units are inhabited, while 7,236 are in the building stage.<sup>(3)</sup> Moreover, the Israeli Minister of Industry and Commerce said that there are 229 Israeli industrial plants operating in the West Bank and another 82 plants are expected to be transferred from Israel to the settlements.<sup>(4)</sup> The Israeli government plans to boost the number of settlers to 100,000 by 1987 if not sooner.<sup>(5)</sup> It even expects that by the year 2010, the West Bank will have 1.4 million Jews together with 1.6 million Arabs.

It is worth noting that the Israeli and Western press usually confine their statistics to settlements on the West Bank excluding Jerusalem. Available figures show that the settlers in Jerusalem number more than 110,000. The Begin Government is reported to have allocated about US\$600m. to subsidise settlements during 1977-1981, often from budgets undisclosed to the public.<sup>(6)</sup>

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(1) Time Magazine, 6 December 1982, p. 28.

(2) Time Magazine, 17 January 1983, p. 6.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Tel Aviv Yedi'ot Aharonot, 23 February 1983, (Hebrew).

(5) Tel Aviv Yedi'ot Aharonot, 24 February 1983, (Hebrew).

(6) Newsweek, 5 April 1982.

In 1982, the expenditure on settlements was estimated at IS 5,000 million (about US\$ 200 million). In contrast, only IS 650 million were spent by the Military Government and Municipalities in the West Bank; i.e. about 13% of the settlement budget.<sup>(1)</sup> Furthermore, to finance the objective of settling a total of 100,000 in the West Bank, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture in charge of settlements declared that the sum of US\$ 610 million will have to be spent in the next year or two.<sup>(2)</sup>

As for recent developments, during the period August 1981 - April 1983, Israel has established 43 new settlements. It is interesting to note that while many settlers on the West Bank have lived so far in pre-fabricated units, the World Zionist Organization estimates that work has started on 5,000 permanent houses and units in these settlements.<sup>(3)</sup>

It should be mentioned that since Reagan's peace initiative Israel has intensified its efforts to build new settlements on the West Bank and to attract more settlers. Accordingly, the Israeli government has heavily subsidised settlement housing which makes apartments there at least two-thirds cheaper than their equivalent in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.<sup>(4)</sup> For example a villa in the settlements could be purchased for US\$90,000, a third of which is covered by government-financed mortgages and loans. In comparison, a

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(1) Meron Benvinisti, The West Bank and Gaza, Data Base Project, Pilot Study Report, 1982, p. 18.

(2) Ibid.

(3) The Guardian, 4 February 1982.

(4) Time : December 6, 1982  
Newsweek : December 20, 1982.  
The Times: November 11, 1982.

similar home could cost US\$250,000 inside Israel proper.(1) Moreover, some of these long term governmental loans "are on a never-never basis-as long as one lives there, the loan does not have to be repaid".(2)

In this context, a new approach has been adopted by Israel. Since the beginning of March 1983 Israel has started selling land in the West Bank to American Jews. An Israeli official has declared that on the 12th of March 1983 a meeting was held between representatives of the Israeli Government and American Jews in New York where the former had requested the latter to purchase land in the West Bank at US\$2,500-2,800 per dunum.(3) This measure will have far-reaching implications. On the one hand, it will expedite the process of controlling the West Bank's land. On the other hand, it will allow non-Israeli Jews to purchase Arab land since the Israeli Government has not been able to sell land in certain populated Arab areas to the Israelis.

Furthermore, a new policy measure aimed at controlling Arab land has been adopted since the end of 1979. Instead of limiting land-use planning for Jewish settlements and thus leaving open space for Arab growth, the opposite was imposed. Land-use has been severely restricted in Arab areas. Arab towns and villages have been prevented from expanding on their own land, thus making their open space an area controlled by Israel.(4) Sensitive areas, in which Israel

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(1) Time : December 6, 1982.

(2) M. Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 64.

(3) Al-Fajer, 9/4/1983, and Ministry of the Occupied Territories Affairs.

(4) M. Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 37.

has an interest, have been controlled through the new policy of "outline schemes".(1) These schemes would include regulation of Arab land-use, road building and infrastructure development in order to ensure complete Israeli control over open space in the West Bank. This is in addition to the practices of land confiscation and closure of areas for military purposes.

An important technique of land expropriation that has recently been adopted by the Israelis is "the use of old Turkish Land Code to claim for the State uninhabited lands which lie beyond the sound of human voice from the nearest village".(2) It has been asserted that this technique has increased the amount of West Bank and Gaza land under Israeli control from approximately 35% to an estimated 65%.(3)

#### 4. DISORIENTATION OF THE WEST BANK ECONOMY

The disorientation of the West Bank economy towards Israel continues through several channels including controlling finance of projects and social activities, marketing products of the West Bank and acquiring raw, intermediate and finished products from the Israeli economy. The following are examples of these distorting measures:

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- (1) M. Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 38.
  - (2) Christian Science Monitor: January 19, 1983.
  - (3) Ibid.

#### 4.1 Trade

Israel controls the trade of the West Bank through extensive measures aimed at maximizing benefits to Israel. Imports in the West Bank are controlled to ensure that they come from Israeli sources and all entry barriers to the West Bank market are eliminated. Further, products which might compete with Israeli goods are discouraged from entry to the Israeli economy; a clear example of this is agricultural produce. There is an increasing tendency for West Bank exports and imports to be handled by Israeli agencies, thereby diverting to the Israeli side part of the value added.(1)

Israel continues to be the major exporter to the West Bank, accounting for 89% of the total imports of the West Bank in 1981 (Jordan accounted for only 2%). On the other hand, Israel took only 60% of the West Bank exports, while Jordan took 37% of them in the same year. This imbalance serves Israel since it had a trade surplus with the Occupied West Bank in 1981 of about IL29,127m.,(2) financed in turn by surplus in the trade of the West Bank with Jordan. In comparison, only IS650m. (IL6500m.), or 22% of this surplus, were spent by the Military Government and Municipalities in the West Bank.(3)

#### 4.2 Agriculture

The agricultural sector in the West Bank has been kept under close Israeli supervision as it represents a productive sector, offering many job opportunities to the West Bank people and it symbolizes the attachment of the people to their land. Available figures indicate that the contribution of agriculture to GDP of the West Bank declined from 35% in 1968 to 29% in 1981.(4) In addition to expropriating agricultural land for alleged security and settlement purposes, a variety of measures have been implemented with the objective of weakening this sector, and hence cutting the links between the people and their land. Among the specific measures are:

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- (1) UN Conference on Trade and Development: document TD/B/870, 26 August 1981.
  - (2) In December 1981, 1US\$ = Israeli Lira (IL) 114. IMF International Financial Statistics, Vol. XXXV, October 1982.
  - (3) Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 18.
  - (4) Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982. op. cit.

- a. As of the beginning of 1983 a new Israeli law will be enforced to restrict the total cultivated areas in the Ghor Valley in the West Bank and to determine the pattern of their production. This is to eliminate competition with Israeli agricultural products.
- b. Israel has also tried to decrease the other West Bank areas planted with citrus fruits as they compete with Israeli produce.
- c. Roads to the many settlements have been frequently opened through rich agricultural land, usually through orchards.
- d. Hampering the development of this sector through the control over water resources and restricting the amount of irrigation water in the Arab land.
- e. Prohibiting Arab agricultural workers in the Ghor Valley, who reside outside it, from staying overnight in the valley, thereby discouraging them from working in this vital sector.
- f. Restrictions on grazing land. In one instance, grazing land near Tubas, Nablus was put off limits, threatening the livelihood of people there, then it was added to nearby Israeli army camps.
- g. Preventing the establishment of agricultural cooperatives in the Occupied Territories.
- h. Preventing farmers from obtaining agricultural credit from the specialized institutions in the East Bank.
- i. Discouraging afforestation efforts.
- j. Attracting Arab labourers to work in Israel and thus creating a severe shortage in the agricultural sector which has hindered agricultural growth.

#### 4.3 Water Resources

Water consumption in the West Bank has not improved under the occupation as Israel controls the use of this vital resource. The use of water for agricultural

purposes has remained at the 1967 level.(1) Drilling of irrigation wells has been severely restricted in the West Bank since 1967, while the Israeli Water Company was given permission to drill 30 new wells there. Since 1967, only two new wells for agricultural use have been permitted(2) to the people of the West Bank. The water Commission of Israel usually tries to indicate deficits in the water availability in Israel, which is used as an argument in support of their claims on the water resources of the West Bank and neighbouring areas.

It is worth noting that the quantity of water consumed by the Arab population in the West Bank is estimated at 100MCM. In comparison, Jewish settlements consume about 27MCM most of it for irrigation.(3) This is expected to increase to 46MCM in the late 1980's. On a per capita basis the Jewish settlers consume eight times the amount of West Bank water consumed by the Arab inhabitants, (1080 cubic meters per annum vs. 142 cubic meters).

Israeli designs for water are not restricted to sources on the West Bank but include the Litani river in the Lebanon and the Yarmouk river waters in Jordan, which is the biggest tributary of the River Jordan. The average annual output of the Yarmouk is 475MCM.(4) No sooner had Jordan announced that it is going to build a dam on the Yarmouk than Israel moved to pressure the U.S. so as to obtain almost 180MCM in order to raise the supply of water to the Ghor area in the Occupied West Bank.(5) In view of its control of the West Bank resources and its colonization policies, Israel demands this water so that it would be used to expand its settlements in the West Bank.

Plans for acquiring the Litani River were articulated soon after Israel came into being in 1948,(6) and the recently published diaries of Moshe Sharret reveal such Cabinet-level discussions in the mid-1950s. The engineering studies for diverting the Litani into Israel are reportedly complete.(7)

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- (1) Data taken from a report by the Minister of Health of Israel, presented to the World Health Assembly, quoted in UN General Assembly, Development and International Economic Co-operation: Humman settlements. 37th Session Document S/37/238, 15 June 1982, p. 67.
  - (2) Ibid. p. 6.
  - (3) M. Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 25.
  - (4) Subhi Kahhaleh, The Water Problem in Israel, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1981. p. 45.
  - (5) Zeev Blitze "Water Once Again on the Frontiers", Al-Hamishmar, 22 February 1980.
  - (6) The Christian Science Monitor, 20 January 1982.
  - (7) Ibid.



Moreover, it has been recently reported that Israel plans to dig an aquifer well near Al-Makheba dam as a retaliatory measure against the Jordanian action of pumping water from the Yarmouk river.(1)

#### 4.4 Some Economic Measures

Israel has imposed several measures on the production sector of the West Bank economy which aim, in practical terms, at reducing the capacity of this sector to produce or create jobs. Moreover, these measures have opened the market for Israeli products. Among these practices one can cite the following:

- a. Israel raised the excise duties on the major traditional and non-traditional industries like soap, glass, plastics and textiles. These duties were raised from 7.5% to 15% on soap and glass. Moreover, Israel raised the value added tax level from 12% to 15% in June 1982.(2)
- b. Israel used severe retaliatory measures for any delay in paying these excessive duties, ranging from closure of factories and shops to outright confiscation of property.
- c. In June 1982, the Israeli Military Occupation authorities issued Regulation 973 which restricts the flow of funds and transfers to the Occupied Territories. Prior permits are required to bring in any amount exceeding US\$3000, with full disclosure of sources and uses. Failure to comply will subject violators of these rules to heavy fines and jail sentences.
- d. As of February 3, 1983 the Israeli authorities have replaced the Jordanian Income Tax Law by an Israeli one in the West Bank. Arab inhabitants were asked to fill in the Israeli income forms declaring their movable and immovable properties, their wives' holdings of gold and jewelry, their sons' properties inside and outside the territories and

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(1) Al-Quds: 20/4/1983, and Ministry of the Occupied Territories Affairs.

(2) Jerusalem Post, 17 June 1982.

their furniture if more than JD25. Of course, the objective has been to estimate the income and properties taxes. This income tax law has been implemented in addition to the value added tax.(1) It is worth mentioning that this law has been adopted in the Gaza Strip since January 19, 1983.(2)

- e. Recently, it has been reported that the Israeli authorities have introduced new measures to increase control over money arriving from Jordan. Jordanians carrying retirement payments to Jordanian civil servants and retired officers, are expected to submit an exact report to the occupation civilian administration about the destinations of these funds and their amounts. Any extra funds will be confiscated by the Israelis. Moreover, Jordanians are also not permitted to bring in blank checks and are required to fill them in at the bridges.(3)

In general, conditions under the occupation have hampered the development of the economy. Investment by the public sector has been negligible. In addition, the lack of financial intermediaries has inhibited investments by the private sector. Furthermore, existing enterprises have been discouraged from expanding due to the severe competition of Israeli products. This is to the extent that some businessmen have had to close down their firms.

## 5. EDUCATION

The educational system faces serious obstacles, some of which are:

1. Closure of schools and universities where students show any signs of resisting the occupation. Since 1976, over 32 schools have been closed for varying periods as a

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(1) Al-Fajer: 3/2/1983, and Ministry of the Occupied Territories Affairs.  
(2) Jerusalem Post: 19/1/1983.  
(3) Al-Hamishmar, 2 June 1983 (Hebrew).

punishment. Universities have also been regularly closed in response to any form of student resistance. Bir Zeit University has been closed seven times by the Occupation authorities. During the invasion of Lebanon, Beir Zeit University was closed for three months and Bethlehem University was closed until further notice. Al-Najah University in Nablus was closed for twelve days.

2. The limited areas of specialization available in universities in the Occupied Territories is shown by a high rate of enrollment in Humanities and the lack of specialized schools like Medicine, Agriculture and Engineering.
3. Arrests of students and inflicting physical punishment on them; in many cases students were shot dead while demonstrating against the Occupation.
4. Shortage of teachers due to low wages and denying some of the teachers work permits. In fact 24 teachers were dismissed from their jobs by the military authorities during the 1981-1982 academic year. Further, the military authorities have control over university teaching appointments. During the invasion of Lebanon, three teachers and seven employees of the Department of Education in Nablus were sacked.
5. Shortage of vocational training centres providing training in accordance with development needs.
6. The changes and alterations made in curricula and textbooks in the Occupied West Bank of Jordan, aimed at weakening Arab culture and heritage in the West Bank, and thus weakening the spirit of resistance to the Occupation.

It is interesting to note that there are many restrictions on importing library reference materials. Beir Zeit University is not allowed to subscribe to 50 Arab periodicals even though most of these are available at Israeli universities. There is also an official blacklist of 2,000 books including some translations from Hebrew.(1)

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(1) Newsweek, 5 April 1982.

7. Recently, the Israeli authorities have demanded that all professors and lecturers at Arab universities who entered the West Bank with a visitor's permit must sign a formal document to the effect of denouncing the PLO, otherwise they will be expelled from the territory. In fact, 22 professors have been expelled from the West Bank and there is a threat to deport as many as 100 others. This has been described by Mr. Shultz, US Secretary of State, as a threat to academic freedom reminiscent of the McCarthy era in the United States during the 1950s.(1)

In general, the continued harassment of staff and students and the restrictions on academic freedom of the schools and universities have obstructed the development of education in the Occupied Territories.

#### 6. EMIGRATION

The Occupied Territories have suffered from a substantial growth in emigration due to the deteriorating living conditions. It was estimated that an average of 5,000 persons emigrated from the West Bank per annum during 1970-74. From 1975 onwards, the number of people leaving the territories has been estimated at an annual average of 12,000. On the other hand, the number of immigrants from the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been estimated at an annual average of 30,000 persons.<sup>(2)</sup> The bulk of these immigrants has been males in the working age. This outflow of people has been a direct consequence of both the lack of job opportunities for

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(1) The Times : November 20, 1982. p. 6.

(2) UN General Assembly, op. cit., p. 12.

educated and skilled people, and the atmosphere of tension, insecurity and uncertainty resulting from the continuing occupation.

In addition to severe Israeli restrictions, the absence of institutional structure to mobilize and invest savings, and to plan for socio-economic development in the territories have deterred people from investing in the agricultural and industrial sectors and creating more job opportunities. Aggravating the situation has been the rapidly rising inflation rate which has reduced the purchasing power and in turn has intensified the economic burden on the Arab inhabitants. Consumer price index in the West Bank rose by 114.1% in 1981 relative to that in 1980. Recently, the Israeli authorities have increased the prices of basic necessities by 15%-36% with the aim of raising more money to finance the invasion of Lebanon.(1) The Israeli Ministry of Finance anticipated that this would raise about Israeli Shekel 1340 million.(2)

Moreover, the poor housing, health and educational conditions have contributed to the worsening situation, and enhanced the propensity to emigrate.

Further, the low wage level of workers in the Occupied Territories, in comparison with Israel, has motivated unskilled labourers to seek work in Israel, while skilled and professionally qualified persons have emigrated to the neighbouring Arab countries.(3) Since young males of working age have

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(1) Al-Fajr, 5 August 1982.

(2) Ibid.

(3) UN General Assembly, op. cit., p. 2.

constituted the highest portion of emigrants, the Occupied Territories have been deprived of their most valuable human resources, indispensable for the development process.

The negative migration balance in the West Bank has to a large extent caused the population growth rate to drop to 0.5% in 1980 from 2.7% in 1973.<sup>(1)</sup> Over the period 1968-80 this rate was 1.4% per annum relative to 2.53% for the Jewish population in Israel.<sup>(2)</sup>

It is worth mentioning that Israel experienced a negative growth in the number of immigrants in 1980-81. This was mainly due to the Soviet policy of restricting immigration to Israel. In addition, the number of emigrants from Israel grew from 15,000 in 1980 to 26,000 in 1981, a growth rate of 37%. The deteriorating living conditions in Israel, e.g., rising inflation rate, tax increases, political uncertainty, accelerating unemployment rate, etc., were responsible for this outflow of Israelis.

## 7. HEALTH

Not only has there been no improvement in health conditions on the West Bank, but on the contrary, these conditions have deteriorated.<sup>(3)</sup> There has been a decrease in

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(1) Mr. Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 1.

(2) Ibid., p.1.

(3) Jordan's Ministry of Health report, "The Worsening of Health Conditions on the West Bank", Amman, January 1981.

the ratio of beds to the population of almost 50% from 33.3/10,000 to 17.7/10,000. The decrease would have been greater if the two hospitals that were planned by Jordan before the occupation, had not been opened later on. Moreover, the number of physicians has grown only by 12% during the 1967-1980 period, from 265 to 296.

Also the West Bank is lacking specialized facilities and personnel in many areas, examples of which are: public health, pathology, forensic medicine, rehabilitation and physical therapy and nutrition. A basic contributing factor is not allowing West Bank doctors residing abroad to work in the West Bank.

Furthermore, there has been a decrease in the number of beds available for psychiatric patients from 400 to 320: a decrease of 20% even though the occupancy rate has increased by 124%. The ratio of doctors to patients is also very low. There are only two specialists for the 320 patients.

During 1980-1981, ten preventive medicine clinics and two hospitals were closed; one in Jerusalem was converted into police headquarters, the other was in Ramallah.

Infant mortality has shown signs of increase, from 71 per thousand live births in 1973, to 82 per thousand live births in 1981.

It should be noted that the Israeli authorities prevent Arab charity institutions and organizations from establishing new hospitals in the Occupied Territories.

Furthermore, a serious health incident that took place in the West Bank at the beginning of April 1983 should be recorded. Some 850 teenage Arab girls in the West Bank were taken ill during that period, suffering from a mysterious illness.<sup>(1)</sup> The Arab inhabitants of the West Bank accuse Israel of spreading a poisonous chemical or gas as a measure to intensify the various pressures on them so as to leave the West Bank and migrate to the East Bank and other Arab countries.

8. OTHER NOTICEABLE PRACTICES

The attack on the Dome of the Rock by an Israeli soldier highlights the aggressiveness of the occupation and the lack of respect to the religious values of the people under occupation.

The arming of the settlers by the Israeli authorities has added another dimension to the dangers facing the people of the Occupied Territories. This was clearly demonstrated by the settlers shooting indiscriminately into Arab crowds and homes.

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(1) The Economist: April 9, 1983.



The removal of several elected West Bank Mayors and replacing them with Israeli administrators clearly shows Israel's determination to take into its own hands, the running of Arab land and economy. Over 1,318 homes on the West Bank have been demolished since 1967, and more than 2,015 leading personalities have been deported.

During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the military authorities intensified their harassment practices against Arab inhabitants in the Occupied Territories, in order to impose the civil administration and village leagues. Members of nine city and village councils were sacked by the Israelis because they resisted the civil administration and village leagues.<sup>(1)</sup> In addition, 942 citizens, mostly university students, were arrested. Further, the Israelis suspended and prevented the distribution of Arab newspapers in the Occupied Territories claiming that they had published anti-Israeli articles.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) RSS Economics Department: "Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories during the Invasion of Lebanon". RSS Publications, August 1982, p. 4.

(2) Ibid.

## ANNEX

TABLE 1  
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK & LAND CONFISCATED  
(FOR SETTLEMENTS AND ALLEGED SECURITY PURPOSES)  
(IN DUNUMS)

LOCATION	LAND CONFISCATED (TOTAL)					TOTAL NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS				
	END MAY 1979	END SEPT. 1980	END AUGUST 1981	END DEC. 1982	END APRIL 1983	MAY 1979	SEPTEMBER 1980	AUGUST 1981	DEC. 1982	APRIL 1983
AROUND JERUSALEM	97,864	213,029	375,949	449,974	456,354	18	20	24	31	31
RAMALLAH AND BIERA	36,000	54,350	74,230	95,135	100,135	14	17	17	18	18
HEBRON, BETHLEHEM AND JERICHO	123,500	143,782	171,578	228,678	329,878	13	17	23	31	34
NABLUS, JENIN AND TULKARM	26,850	152,150	177,230	233,154	278,204	18	30	33	50	55
JORDAN VALLEY	83,700	118,600	118,600	262,300	262,300	20	22	22	23	24
TOTAL	367,914	681,911	917,587	1,269,241	1,426,871	83	106	119	153	162

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFFAIRS, AMMAN, JORDAN

\* AN ADDITIONAL 1.03 MILLION DUNUMS WERE EXPROPRIATED FROM STATE DOMAINS, AND ABOUT 120,000 DUNUMS WERE ALSO SEIZED UNDER THE SO-CALLED 'ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP' CLASSIFICATION.

TABLE 2  
POPULATION AND THE LABOUR FORCE OF THE WEST BANK  
1968-1981 (IN THOUSANDS)

No	POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE	1968	1970	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
1	TOTAL POPULATION AT END OF PERIOD	581.7	603.9	629.0	646.2	661.6	665.1	671.2	681.2	690.4	699.6	703.1	707.3
2	WORKING-AGE POPULATION (ABOVE 14 YEARS)	308.6	322.9	336.6	341.6	355.2	366.8	371.0	379.4	389.7	398.6	401.0	402.9
3	LABOUR FORCE (8+9)	93.0	118.4	126.6	127.7	139.0	133.9	131.3	128.8	132.8	134.1	137.2	135.3
4	LABOUR FORCE AS RATIO OF POPULATION (%)	15.0	19.6	20.1	19.8	21.0	20.1	19.6	18.7	18.8	18.1	19.0	19.1
5	LABOUR FORCE AS RATIO OF WORKING AGE POPULATION (%)	30.1	36.7	36.6	37.4	39.1	36.5	35.4	33.9	33.6	33.1	34.2	33.6
6	EMPLOYED IN THE WEST BANK	-	99.8	90.3	87.8	95.0	92.0	92.6	91.9	94.0	92.5	94.3	93.5
7	WORKING IN ISRAEL	-	14.7	34.9	38.6	42.4	40.4	37.1	35.5	36.8	39.8	40.6	39.9
8	TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (6+7)	82.9	114.5	125.2	126.4	137.4	132.4	129.7	127.4	130.8	132.3	131.2	133.4
9	UNEMPLOYMENT (3-8)	10.1	3.9	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.3	2.4	1.9
10	RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT (9+3) PERCENT	10.9	3.3	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.4

- FIGURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE

SOURCE: FOR 1968-1981

ISRAEL CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL, 1975-1982

TABLE 3  
 DISTRIBUTION OF WEST BANK WORKERS IN THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL  
 1970 - 1981

YEAR	IN ISRAEL						IN THE WEST BANK					
	TOTAL NO. IN THOUS.	%	AGRI. %	IND. %	CONSTR. %	OTHER %	TOTAL NO. IN THOUS.	%	AGRI. %	IND. %	CONSTR. %	OTHER %
1970	14.7	100	17.7	12.9	57.2	12.2	99.8	100	42.5	14.6	8.4	34.5
1971	25.6	100	12.9	16.8	57.0	13.3	91.2	100	40.2	14.7	6.1	39.0
1972	34.9	100	12.3	18.6	56.8	12.3	90.3	100	38.0	14.6	7.2	40.2
1973	38.6	100	8.8	20.7	56.7	13.7	87.8	100	34.2	16.4	7.6	41.8
1974	42.6	100	10.6	19.3	56.1	14.0	95.0	100	37.9	15.1	7.0	40.0
1975	40.4	100	10.9	18.6	55.0	15.5	91.9	100	34.6	15.8	8.4	41.2
1976	37.1	100	12.2	20.9	49.6	17.3	92.6	100	33.9	14.9	10.0	41.2
1977	35.5	100	12.7	22.5	44.2	20.6	91.9	100	33.4	15.1	10.4	41.1
1978	36.8	100	11.4	23.6	46.0	19.0	94.0	100	34.4	15.2	10.9	39.5
1979	39.8	100	10.3	23.9	47.7	18.1	92.5	100	31.5	15.9	11.8	40.8
1980	40.6	100	9.9	21.0	50.1	19.0	94.3	100	33.2	15.2	10.7	40.9
1981	39.9	100	9.3	18.1	52.7	19.9	93.5	100	30.5	15.7	11.9	41.9

SOURCE: ISRAEL CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL, 1978, 1979, 1981 and 1982.

TABLE 4  
WEST BANK TRADE BALANCE\*  
1972 - 1981

(IN MILLIONS OF ISRAELI LIRAS)\*\*

YEAR	EXPORTS TO				IMPORTS FROM				BALANCE OF TRADE			
	EAST BANK	ISRAEL	REST OF THE WORLD	TOTAL	EAST BANK	ISRAEL	REST OF THE WORLD	TOTAL	EAST BANK	ISRAEL	REST OF THE WORLD	TOTAL
1972	107.3	107.3	1.8	216.4	18.9	341.1	53.5	413.5	88.4	-233.8	-51.7	-197.1
1973	66.2	174.7	1.7	242.6	16.5	496.7	42.5	555.7	49.7	-322.0	-40.8	-313.1
1974	119.4	287.3	2.8	409.6	20.3	790.0	71.5	881.8	99.2	-502.7	-68.7	-472.2
1975	220.6	442.2	27.7	690.5	31.4	1,297.3	134.7	1,463.4	189.2	-855.1	-107.0	-772.9
1976	342.8	616.6	27.0	986.4	29.9	1,766.9	173.8	1,970.6	312.9	-1,150.3	-146.8	-984.2
1977	462.7	777.4	10.8	1,250.9	48.7	2,526.1	235.0	2,809.8	414.0	-1,748.7	-224.2	-1,558.9
1978	1,085.0	1,327.4	23.4	2,435.8	87.5	3,813.2	505.5	4,406.2	997.5	-2,485.8	-482.1	-1,970.4
1979	1,479.0	2,291.4	25.1	3,795.0	127.3	7,771.0	1,157.0	9,055.0	1,352.0	-5,480.0	-1,132.0	-5,260.0
*** 1980	4,057.0	5,674.0	83.0	9,814.0	279.0	18,194.0	2,482.0	20,955.0	3,778.0	-12,520.0	-2,399.0	-11,141.0
1981	8,806.0	14,968.0	171.0	23,945.0	852.0	44,095.0	4,858.0	49,805.0	7,954.0	-29,127.0	-4,687.0	-25,860.0

\* FIGURES ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST DECIMAL POINT

\*\* 10 ISRAELI LIRAS = 1 ISRAELI SHEKEL

\*\*\* FIGURES ROUNDED UP TO THE NEAREST NUMBER

SOURCE: DATA FOR PERIOD 1972-1981 COMPILED FROM: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL, 1975-1982.

TABLE 5  
HOUSES DEMOLISHED  
1967 - 1982

1967	...	...	...	...	...	...	130
1968	...	...	...	...	...	...	140
1969	...	...	...	...	...	...	301
1970	...	...	...	...	...	...	191
1971	...	...	...	...	...	...	231
1972	...	...	...	...	...	...	35
1973	...	...	...	...	...	...	34
1974	...	...	...	...	...	...	61
1975	...	...	...	...	...	...	77
1976	...	...	...	...	...	...	24
1977	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
1978	...	...	...	...	...	...	2
1979	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
1980	...	...	...	...	...	...	24
1981	...	...	...	...	...	...	32
1982	...	...	...	...	...	...	55

Total 1,346 of which:  
1,318 on the West Bank  
28 on the Gaza Strip

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFFAIRS,  
AMMAN, JORDAN

TABLE 6  
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX IN ISRAEL  
AND THE WEST BANK  
1976 - 1981

YEAR	WEST BANK		ISRAEL	
	Index	% Change	Index	% Change
1976*	114.9	14.9	100.0	-
1977	156.3	36.0	134.5	34.5
1978	235.1	50.4	202.7	50.7
1979	395.3	68.1	361.4	78.3
1980	946.2	139.3	834.9	131.0
1981**	2,025.6	114.1	1,810.1	116.8
AVERAGE		70.4		82.3

\* FOR THE WEST BANK JANUARY 1976 = 100  
FOR ISRAEL THE YEAR 1976 = 100

\*\* FOR ISRAEL 1980 HAS BEEN CHOSEN AS A NEW BASE YEAR.  
THE INDEX PRESENTED HERE WAS COMPUTED WITH 1976  
AS THE BASE YEAR.

SOURCE: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL., 1981 and 1982.

TABLE 7  
MIGRANTS TO AND FROM ISRAEL  
1969 - 1982

YEAR	IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL		EMIGRANTS FROM ISRAEL	
	No.	(%) Change	No.	(%) Change
1969	37804	-	)	
1970	36750	-3.0	)	
1971	41930	14.1	)	
1972	55888	33.3	)	
1973	54886	-2.0	)	
1974	31981	-42.0	) 510528 <sup>(3)</sup>	
1975	20028	-37.4	) during	
1976	19754	-1.4	) 1969-1979	
1977	21429	8.4	)	
1978	26394	23.1	)	
1979	37222	41.0	)	
1980	20428	-45.2	15000 <sup>(4)</sup>	
1981	15000 <sup>(1)</sup>	-27.0	26000 <sup>(1)</sup>	37%
1982	3738 <sup>(2)</sup>	-	N.A.	

SOURCE: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL, 1981. (FOR DATA COVERING THE PERIOD 1969-1980)

- (1) Al-Ard: No. 21, 21/7/1982, p. 22.
- (2) For the first 4 months of 1982, Ha'aretz 12/5/1982.:
- (3) Al-Quds 20/8/1981.
- (4) AlSha'ab 3/2/1981.

N.A. Not available



TABLE 8  
SOME KEY FIGURES

POPULATION

Israel (1981) .....	3,978,000
Jordan (1981) .....	2,322,000

GDP

Israel (1981) .....	\$21.5 billion	percapita = \$5,404
Jordan (1981) .....	\$ 3.2 billion	percapita = \$1,377

CAPITAL FORMATION

Israel (1981) .....	\$ 4.5 billion	percapita = \$1,131
Jordan (1981) .....	\$ 1.5 billion	percapita = \$ 645

EXTERNAL DEBT

Israel (1981) .....	\$24.2 billion
Jordan (1981) .....	\$ 1.5 billion

EXPORTS

Israel (1981) .....	\$ 5.67 billion
Jordan (1981) .....	\$ 0.49 billion

U.S. AID

Israeli (F.Y. 1983)	\$ 2.5 billion (\$785 million in economic aid, rest military aid)
Jordan (Proposed U.S. F.Y. 1983)	\$95 million

WEST BANK RESOURCES

West Bank imports from Israel (1981)	89% of total
West Bank exports to Israel (1981)	60% of total
West Bank workers in Israel (1981)	39,900 one-third of West Bank Labour Force

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

Total number registered by UNRWA (1982)	1,925,726	100%
Jordan (East Bank)	748,552	39%
(West Bank)	340,643	17%
Syria	220,572	11%
Gaza	377,292	20%
Lebanon	238,667	12%

TABLE 9  
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE WORLD IN 1981

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
ISRAEL	550,800	12.4%
WEST BANK	833,000	18.7%
GAZA STRIP	451,000	10.1%
JORDAN (EAST BANK)	1,148,334	25.8%
SYRIA	222,525	5.0%
LEBANON	385,207	8.6%
KUWAIT	299,710	6.7%
IRAQ	20,604	0.4%
LIBYA	23,759	0.5%
EGYPT	45,605	1.0%
SAUDI ARABIA	136,779	3.0%
U.A.E.	36,504	0.8%
QATAR	24,233	0.5%
BAHRAIN	2,000	Nil
OMAN	50,706	1.1%
U.S.A.	104,856	2.4%
OTHERS	140,116	3.0%
TOTAL	4,449,138	100.0%

SOURCE: PALESTINIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, PLO  
 DAMASCUS.

(4) 83/98  
 2/2/1983

*Annie Minister*

PS  
PS/MR WCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR. SPERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
ED/NEAD  
ED/ED  
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/SECURITY S

ED/CONSULAR DEPT

HEI/MRES ...

PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

*Middle East  
Situation*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 130043Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELNO 510 OF 13 NOV 83

AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, ATHENS, PARIS, ROME,  
URGIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

RPT: BOMB INCIDENTS IN AMMAN.

1. ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED PUBLICLY,  
THE BOMB AT SHMEISANI ON 10 NOVEMBER WAS PLACED OUTSIDE THE HOME  
OF A USAID LEGAL ADVISER WHOSE DUTIES TAKE HIM TO SYRIA  
AND HE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN THE TARGET FOR THE ATTACK. SEMICOLON  
THE VICINITY OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY IS REGARDED BY THE JORDANIAN  
SECURITY AUTHORITIES AS COINCIDENTAL. THE POLICE HAVE TOLD  
US THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DEVICE WAS SIMILAR TO THAT FOUND  
NEAR THE SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES OFFICE ON 9 NOVEMBER (PARA 3  
OF MY TELNO 506) AND THAT IT WAS DISCOVERED WITHIN A FEW HOURS  
OF BEING PUT IN POSITION.

2. ACCORDING TO THE JORDANIAN POLICE, THE HIRE CAR IN WHICH THE  
SECOND AND VERY MUCH LARGER EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS FOUND ON  
12 NOVEMBER HAD BEEN STOLEN SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS AGO. FROM THE  
CONDITION OF THE CAR, THE POLICE DEDUCE THAT BOTH THE CAR  
AND THE EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN LEFT ON THE WASTE LAND FOR THE WHOLE  
OF THIS PERIOD. THE LOCATION OF THE CAR WAS ONLY ABOUT 20 METERS  
FROM THIS EMBASSY AND, AS THERE ARE NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT TARGETS  
IN THE VICINITY, THE CAR BOMB WAS PRESUMABLY DIRECTED AGAINST  
US. THE DEVICE HAD BEEN PRIMED TO EXPLODE, BUT THE PERPETRATORS  
HAD BUNGLED THE JOB.

3. IT NOW SEEMS VERY PROBABLE THAT IT WAS THIS VEHICLE,  
RATHER THAN THAT WHICH WAS BLOWN UP AT ZERCA ON 31 OCTOBER  
(MY TELNO 491 REFERS), TO WHICH THE WARNING WHICH WAS RECEIVED  
IN DAMASCUS IN MID-SEPTEMBER REFERRED (SEE DAMASCUS TELNO 260  
OF 15 SEPTEMBER).

4. NOW THAT IT SEEMS CLEAR BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT WE AND  
THE AMERICANS ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR FUTURE ATTACKS, WE MUST  
LOOK AGAIN TO OUR PHYSICAL DEFENCES. I AM TELEGRAPHING SECURITY  
DEPARTMENT SEPARATELY ON THIS.

BRWICK

GRS 406

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 080342Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1268 OF 8 NOV

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,  
TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO, UKMIS GENEVA, BONN (FOR S OF S'S  
PARTY), PARIS, ROME

*Richard M. ...*

MY TEL NO 1264 : MIDDLE EAST : SOVIET COMMENT.

*mt*

SUMMARY

1. RECENT COMMENT BY THE SOVIET PRESS ON EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN MARKED BY RETICENCE ABOUT THE P.L.O. CIVIL WAR AND OMINOUS WARNINGS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS TOWARDS SYRIA AND THE LEBANON. THE LEBANESE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA HAS RECEIVED A POSITIVE PLUG.

DETAIL.

2. PRAVDA OF 5 NOVEMBER HAS PROVIDED SO FAR THE ONLY REPORT IN THE CENTRAL PRESS OF THE FIGHTING BETWEEN PLO FACTIONS AROUND TRIPOLI. THIS QUOTED BEIRUT RADIO TO THE EFFECT THAT SERIOUS CLASHES HAD AGAIN BROKEN OUT AMONG VARIOUS PALESTINIAN GROUPS AND THAT "ARMED FORMATIONS LINKED TO OPPOSITION GROUPS IN FATAH AND LED BY ABU MUSA, WITH ARTILLERY AND TANK SUPPORT, WERE ATTACKING THE POSITIONS OF SUPPORTERS OF ARAFAT, THE PLO'S CHAIRMAN." PRAVDA ALSO REPORTED APPEALS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING WHICH, BOTH WERE QUOTED AS SAYING, WOULD DAMAGE THE PALESTINIAN AND ARAB CAUSE. THE FACT THAT THE APPEALS WERE GIVEN PUBLICITY HERE SUGGESTS THAT THEY BROADLY REFLECT THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE FIGHTING, THE SYRIAN ROLE IN WHICH WAS STRIKINGLY ABSENT FROM PRAVDA'S REPORT.

3. PRAVDA OF 6 NOVEMBER AGAIN RAISED (MY TUR) THE POSSIBILITY OF AN "ACT OF RETRIBUTION" BY THE U.S. AND ISRAEL FOR THE RESPECTIVE BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST THEIR FORCES IN THE LEBANON. SYRIA COULD BE THE TARGET. PRAVDA OF 6, 7, AND 8 NOVEMBER DREW ATTENTION TO THE CONCENTRATION OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND TO LEBANESE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARING LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY.

14. MEANWHILE

4. MEANWHILE, IZVESTIA OF 6 NOVEMBER REPORTED THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. GEMAYEL WOULD VISIT ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. TO REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE, THE RESULTS OF WHICH HAD CONFIRMED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS AS THE PRIORITY PROBLEM. IZVESTIA ALSO REPORTED THE FORMATION OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO PREPARE CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR THE RESUMED CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD DISCUSS A CEASE-FIRE AND THE CREATION OF A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACTIVITY IN GENEVA OF U.S. AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES SHOWED CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE AND RULE AND UNDERMINE A LEBANON SETTLEMENT.

SUTHERLAND

MIDDLE EAST

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

Middle East

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM AMMAN 081600Z NOV 83  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELNO 503<sup>SIC</sup> OF 08 NOV 83

AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS ,MOSCOW,PARIS,UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNOS 497 ND 498: JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

1. KING HUSSEIN 'S REVELATION IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH A KUWAITI NEWSPAPER THAT HE IS THINKING OF RECALLING THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT SHORTLY HAS COME OUT OF THE BLUE TO JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS HERE, ALTHOUGH WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE KNOWN FOR SOME TIME THAT THE KING WAS CONTEMPLATING SUCH A MOVE. NO DOUBT ONE OF HIS OBJECTIVES WAS TO TEST PUBLIC REACTIONS.

2. THE KING'S REMARKS ARE BOUND TO STIMULATE RENEWED SPECULATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE JORDANIAN INITIATIVE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN THE PEACE PROCESS: THE RECALL OF PARLIAMENT WOULD INEVITABLY RAISE THE QUESTION OF A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ARAB ATTITUDE TOWARDS PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. WHETHER WEST BANK MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WERE APPOINTED BY DEPUTIES ELECTED FOR THE EAST BANK (THE PREFERRED SOLUTION OF SUCH LEADING JORDANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AS DR JAMAL SHA'ER), OR WERE NOMINATED DIRECTLY BY THE KING, THESE PALESTINIANS WOULD SEEM BOUND TO CLAIM THAT THEY SPOKE FOR THE WEST BANK AND WOULD THEREBY BE CHALLENGING THE PLO'S POSITION AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS.

3. THE MESSAGE OF THE KING'S INTERVIEW IS CLEAR. IF THE SYRIANS DESTROY THE PRESENT PLO LEADERSHIP AND SUBJUGATE THE PLO TO THEIR WILL, THEY WILL HAVE VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE RABAT SUMMIT RESOLUTION AND IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH 5 WHICH 'AFFIRMS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL ARAB STATES TO PRESERVE PALESTINIAN UNITY AND NOT TO INTERFERE IN PALESTINIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS'. THE JORDANIANS WOULD THEN NO LONGER CONSIDER THEMSELVES BOUND BY RABAT.

2. THEY WOULD FEEL JUSTIFIED IN DISREGARDING THE SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FACTION OF THE PLO AND LOOKING INSTEAD TOWARDS THEIR FRIENDS ON THE WEST BANK AND OTHER MODERATE PALESTINIANS AS PARTNERS WITH WHOM THEY MIGHT NEGOTIATE THE RETURN OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 #. MEANWHILE

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4. MEANWHILE KING HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO GIVE SUPPORT TO ARAB EFFORTS TO SAVE THE PRESENT PLO LEADERSHIP. IN RESPONSE TO A CALL FROM ARAFAT, THE KING APPEALED TO ARAB LEADERS ON 3 NOVEMBER TO INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING NEAR TRIPOLI. ON 5 NOVEMBER HE RECEIVED QDNI AL -HASSAN, WHO APPARENTLY REMAINS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ARAFAT AND HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A FATAH MEETING IN TUNIS. AL -HASSAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE GREATLY APPRECIATED THE KING'S EFFORTS ON THE PLO'S BEHALF. THE SAME DAY KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED GROUPS OF LOCAL PALESTINIAN REFUGEE LEADERS AND REAFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE PLO LEADERSHIP. HE HAS SINCE TELEPHONED KING FAHD, SENT A MESSAGE TO THE YAR PRESIDENT AND HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK (SEE PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 498).

5. KING HUSSEIN WOULD PROBABLY PREFER ARAFAT'S SURVIVAL TO A SYRIAN TAKE -OVER OF THE PLO. IF ARAFAT DOES NOT SURVIVE, THE KING WILL WISH TO HAVE BEEN SEEN BY THE PALESTINIANS HERE AND ON THE WEST BANK TO HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO HELP HIM IN HIS HOUR OF NEED. FEW TEARS WILL BE SHED BY THE KING'S PRINCIPAL ADVISERS IF ARAFAT FAILS TO PULL THROUGH. BUT IT WILL BE VITAL FOR THE JORDANIANS, IN SEEKING TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR A NEW PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP NOT UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL AND ALSO FOR ANY FUTURE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, TO RETAIN THE SYMPATHY OF MODERATE PALESTINIANS.

6. WITH PROSPECTS FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING LATER THIS MONTH RECEDING, THE KING'S INSISTENCE ON THE NEED TO ABANDON THE REQUIREMENT FOR UNANIMITY IN ARAB DECISION MAKING AND ITS REPLACEMENT MAJORITY VOTING TAKES ON A SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THERE COULD BE A UNANIMOUS ARAB SUMMIT DECISION TO RESCIND THE PLO'S MANDATE AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. BUT IF THE KING COULD MUSTER MAJORITY ARAB SUPPORT FOR A GROUPING OF MODERATE PALESTINIANS INCLUDING NOMINATED WEST BANK REPRESENTATIVES IN THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT, WHO COULD JOIN WITH THE JORDANIANS IN ANY NEGOTIATION, THEN HE MIGHT FEEL ABLE TO DISPENSE WITH FORMAL CONSENT BY AN ARAB SUMMIT. EVERYTHING WOULD, HOWEVER, DEPEND ON HOW MUCH BACKING HE COULD OBTAIN FROM MODERATE

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ARAB STATES AND HOW CONFIDENT HE FELT THAT THE AMERICANS WERE COMMITTED TO SECURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (A MAIN THEME IN THE KING'S RECENT TALKS WITH MR LUCE:SEE PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 498). THE KING WOULD EXPECT STRONG OPPOSITION FROM SYRIA AND OTHER RADICAL ARAB STATES AND ALSO FROM THE SYRIAN-DOMINATED WING OF THE PLO. IN HIS PRESS INTERVIEW THE KING SPOKE MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER ABOUT SYRIAN BEHAVIOUR ,BUT SAID NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH SYRIA COULD BE REACHED. IT IS ALSO GENERALLY ACCEPTED HERE THAT THE PALESTINIAN EXTREMISTS WOULD, IN THIS NEW SITUATION, STEP UP TERRORIST ATTACKS. RECENT ATTEMPTS ON THE LIVES OF JORDANIAN AMBASSADORS ARE THEREFORE SEEN AS AN OMINOUS PORTENT OF THINGS TO COME.

URWICK

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PM TO PM. 10. DOWNING STREET.

FM WASHINGTON 040445Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3308 OF 3 NOV 83

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT JEDDA

ROUTINE PARIS ROME UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA

INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MT

US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED TODAY THE APPOINTMENT OF DONALD RUMSFELD TO SUCCEED MCFARLANE AS HIS SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT FAIRBANKS WOULD CONTINUE AS HIS DEPUTY.

2. RUMSFELD IS A SENIOR FIGURE ON THE MODERATE WING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. HE REPRESENTED AN ILLINOIS DISTRICT IN THE HOUSE FROM 1963-9, SERVED IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S CABINET FROM 1969-73, AS US AMBASSADOR TO NATO 1973-74, AND IN PRESIDENT FORD'S CABINET AS WHITE HOUSE COORDINATOR AND LATER SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE. HE IS CURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF G D SEARLE, A CHICAGO-BASED PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY. HE MET THE PRIME MINISTER ON 25 OCTOBER LAST YEAR WHEN HE WAS ACTING AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL EMISSARY FOR UNLOSC.

3. RUMSFELD IS NOT PARTICULARLY CLOSE TO REAGAN, BUT HE IS A FRIEND OF SHULTZ, WITH WHOM HE SERVED IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. HIS STANDING IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY SHOULD GIVE HIM CREDIBILITY BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND THE MIDDLE EAST. HE IS WELL REGARDED ON THE HILL. HE HAS A REPUTATION AS A SKILLED BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTER WHO IS NOT AFRIAD TO SPEAK HIS MIND. TRIBAL MEMORY FADES BUT I SEEM TO REMEMBER THAT HIS NATO COLLEAGUES FOUND HIM RATHER ABRASIVE ON OCCASION. HE HAS NO DIRECT PRVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. RUMSFELD HAS SAID THAT HE HAS NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL HE HAS READ HIMSELF IN. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE HOWEVER RECOMMENDING THAT HE SHOULD DO SO SOON, AND THAT HE SHOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT MNF PARTNERS EN ROUTE.

FCO PASS SAVING ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DOHA DUBAI JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANAA TRIPOLI TUNIS.

WRIGHT

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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*MR 25/10  
Mr Coles to -  
No 10 Downing St*

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UK EYES ALPHA  
FM AMMAN 190740Z OCT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 18 OCTOBER 1983  
REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO MODUK (FOR DIA) AND WASHINGTON.  
PRIORITY TO DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV.  
ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND GULF POSTS.

FCO TELNO 262 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2974: US/JORDAN

1. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAS COMPLAINED TO THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH FORCES CYPRUS (WHO IS ACCOMPANYING A BRITISH ARMY POLO TEAM PLAYING IN AMMAN) AND MY DEFENCE ATTACHE THAT, SHORTLY AFTER THE AMERICANS HAD PRESENTED NEW PROPOSALS TO THE JORDANIANS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE RDF, THESE HAD BEEN LEAKED TO THE WASHINGTON POST. THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS HAD IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP THE STORY AND REPORTED IT FURTHER WITH THEIR OWN GLOSSES (PREDICTABLY, THE SYRIANS HAVE USED THE STORY AS THE BASIS FOR AN ACCUSATION THAT JORDAN WAS DEPLETING HER FORCES FACING ISRAEL IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO INTERVENE IN THE GULF). THE CROWN PRINCE COMMENTED THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY ANNOYED, NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, BY AMERICAN METHODS, AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALSO TOLD ME HOW UPSET HE HAD BEEN BY THE WASHINGTON POST STORY. AS A RESULT OF THE LEAKAGE, THE US AMBASSADOR RETURNED HURRIEDLY TO AMMAN OVER THE WEEKEND.

2. THE JORDANIANS HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN ACUTELY EMBARRASSED BY ISRAELI AND SYRIAN REPORTING OF THESE US PROPOSALS AND THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON 17 OCTOBER (SEE MIFT) WHICH IS THE MAIN ITEM IN TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS.

URWICK  
BT

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HD/DEF DEPT  
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PS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO:  
MR COLES No 10 DOWNING ST

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I will talk  
to Geoffrey.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Aid to the West Bank  
and Gaza.

Tony Parson suggests that you  
should intervene to increase our aid  
to the West Bank from £105,000  
to £500,000 a year.

2. The result of the present  
public expenditure discussion is likely to  
be either a cut in the overall aid  
programme or, at best, maintenance  
at its present level.

3. Extra money for the West Bank  
will therefore mean cutting something  
else in the aid programme.

4. I suggest that we ask the  
Foreign Secretary to consider extra  
aid to the West Bank in the  
paper on "The Jordan Factor"  
which he was asked to submit  
following the Beqras discussions.

Agree?

A. J. C.  $\frac{14}{6}$

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*Sir A. Parsons*  
*The Prime Minister will discuss*  
*with the Foreign Secretary.*

MR. COLES ✓

*A. J. Coles 7/10.*

AID TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

The main point which came out of the Chequers meeting on the Middle East was the danger of the destabilisation of Jordan through a massive influx of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Lebanon. The corollary was that efforts should be made, during the negotiating vacuum which is likely to last until 1985, to stabilise the economic and social conditions of the West Bank and Gaza so as to deter the Palestinians from despairing emigration; and to try to ensure that Israeli policies have not irreversibly changed the political and actual geography of the area by the time negotiations for a settlement may be resumed. These conclusions are complementary to Shulz's stated objective of trying to do something about the "human situation" in the Occupied Territories

The background is that the developmental situation in the West Bank and Gaza is more appropriate to the 1940s than the 1980s. This is particularly sad in view of the fact that, up to 1948, the Palestinians, a Mediterranean people, were far more dynamic and advanced than any other Arabs with the possible exception of the Lebanese. Because of mutual hostility between Cairo and the Gazans and between the Hashemites and the West Bank Palestinians, there was virtually no economic or social progress in either area between 1948 and 1967. I can testify to this from personal experience. Since the Israeli occupation, the situation has worsened. The indigenous economy has stagnated, even declined, and the workforce has increasingly become a source of cheap labour for Israel itself.

What is being done at present? The annual sum being spent by the Israeli Government on infrastructure and development in the Occupied Territories is derisory - about \$14 million. This means that basic amenities such as urban sewage, village roads, etc which are now commonplace even in the most grotty independent Arab states, are non-existent or defective in the Occupied Territories. In the last three or four years, in the face of considerable Israeli obstruction, UNDP has mounted a programme of about \$2 million a year. This is doing useful work in a number of fields - education, health, agricultural development etc. But it is very small. The Jordanians are channelling a little aid into the West Bank through

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/through

through their own institutions. EC aid in 1982 came to slightly more than \$1.5 million. It is largely directed into such areas as support for rural populations and health projects. Western voluntary organisations are active but it is impossible to quantify the volume of their aid - probably very small. US aid to the Occupied Territories from all sources amounts to about \$7 million a year, roughly equivalent to US aid to Israel in a single day.

Over the past 16 years, Israeli obstruction has been an important reason why the international community has done so little for the Occupied Territories. The Israeli attitude derives from well-known political reasons, also from a policy of not allowing West Bank Gaza industries to compete with their own. To quote some examples:-

---

i. Permission has been consistently refused for projects which smack of producing real development in eg the agriculture or water sectors.

ii. The Israelis have been sticky about approving projects in places which they regard as being particularly hostile politically - eg since 1977 they have refused to give permission for a much-needed vegetable market at Halhoul.

iii. They have forbidden the Gaza citrus growers to process surplus juices and have refused permission for an agricultural marketing cooperative on the West Bank to build a plant to make wooden crates in order to improve the packing and marketing of its tomato crop.

iv. They have given permission in the last 16 years for only one Arab-run bank to be established - after years of hesitation and only on condition that the bank operates in shekels.

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v. They have been sitting for five years on an application for a cement project at Hebron. The land has been acquired and the feasibility studies completed. The Palestinian investors are now running out of money while they wait for permission to start work.

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There are, however, very faint indications that the atmosphere may be improving slightly and international activity is beginning to increase. The Head of the UNDP Programme, an American UN official, told me this week that the present military administration is being slightly less uncooperative than its predecessor. He attributes this to Sharon's replacement by Arens. The latter seems to appreciate that Israel can ill-afford further international opprobrium, also that, without changing their political objectives in the West Bank, Israel would be well advised to keep the local population slightly above a level of explosive despair. UNDP are trying to raise an extra \$8 million from Arab and European sources and believe that Israeli permission considerably to expand the programme might be forthcoming. The Consul General of the Ten in Jerusalem have recommended projects which are at present under study in Brussels for the EC programme. Following Shulz's initiative, the Americans have just sent a team to the West Bank and Gaza to look at the economic situation and to make recommendations to the Administration.

What about us? Under our present aid framework we have a technical cooperation allocation of £75,000 (£40,000 last year) in 1984/85. Our overall aid provision, with the addition of the British Council element, is running at roughly £105,000 a year. The principal disbursements go on scholarships, book presentations, one subsidised teaching post at a university and grant aid for small development projects. This is pitifully small, taking account of the fact that most of our aid goes on scholarships which probably lead to some people leaving the Occupied Territories, never to return. (It is worth noting that the UNDP official has a semi-promise from the Italians of between \$1 million and \$2 million.)

Notwithstanding the pressures on public expenditure, I believe that there are good reasons for us to do more. First, I am still simple-minded enough to believe that we cannot escape from the responsibility of our past in Palestine. Secondly, a greater material effort would be consonant with our political objectives and would lend practical weight to our public declarations. Thirdly, given the new American interest, we need to be in a better position to coordinate our efforts with theirs. The more we ourselves contribute, the more the Americans will listen to us.

/If we were

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
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- 4 -

If we were to increase our overall budget to the Occupied Territories to, say, £500,000 a year, this would go some way towards meeting our political and practical desiderata. In present circumstances, only the intervention of the Prime Minister would bring about such an increase.

(above)

I should add that the facts and figures derive from discussions with UNDP, with the FCO, reports from our Consul General in Jerusalem, and talks I have had with many interested outsiders.



A.D. PARSONS  
13 October 1983

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10 DOWNING STREET

 cc MOD  
 DTI  
 CPL  
 CO.

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SW

From the Private Secretary

12 September, 1983

Dear Brian,

POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

On 9 September the Prime Minister held a meeting at Chequers to consider the Government's policy towards the Middle East in the next few years. A list of those attending the meeting is enclosed with this letter. A paper by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was before the meeting. The purpose of this letter is to record the conclusions reached. These were as follows.

It was more important to concentrate on the realities of the situation than to think in terms merely of improving our posture. Equally, while we could usefully seek to bring our influence to bear on others, notably the United States, that would be effective only if we had reached a clear view of the fundamental problems and the possibilities for making progress in solving them.

With regard to the Arab/Israel dispute, it was clear that the United States was most unlikely to bring pressure to bear on Israel to change its policy, e.g. in respect of the West Bank, before the American presidential elections were over. But the United Kingdom could perhaps play a useful role in preparing the US Administration so that it was ready to exert new pressures on Israel after the elections.

It was noted that our consultations with the United States Government on the Middle East had become routine in nature and that they needed to take place at a higher level. Further thought should be given to this in connection with the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Washington.

Given the instability of surrounding countries, the importance of stability in Jordan had increased. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was invited to prepare a paper on ways in which we and our allies could help to ensure that the integrity and stability of Jordan were preserved in the coming years.

/The

SECRET

-2-

The importance of Syria was noted. It was recognised that attempts to make progress which ignored Syria were unlikely to succeed and that there might be value in carefully timed high level contacts with the Syrians (though these would be difficult while the current situation in Lebanon persisted).

The Gulf remained an area of considerable interest to Britain. More contacts with the Gulf States, and with the Middle East generally, especially where these would help to promote trade, would be worthwhile.

As regards the Iraq/Iran war, we should not take steps in our relations with Iraq which would inhibit the development of better relations with Iran in the longer term, for Iran was strategically more important. But we should, of course, avoid indicating publicly a preference for Iran because of the implications for our interests in the Arab world.

It was noted that contingency planning was in hand with regard to the possibility of Iran closing the entrance to the Gulf as a reaction to the supply by France to Iraq of Super-Etendards.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry), Alex Galloway (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*John Lee*

*John Lee*

B. Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP

Rt. Hon. Baroness Young

Mr. Richard Luce, MP

Sir Antony Acland

Sir James Craig

Mr. S.L. Egerton

Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP

Mr. Geoffrey Pattie, MP

Mr. John Stanley, MP

Sir Clive Whitmore

Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson, MP

Rt. Hon. Lord Cockfield

Sir Robert Armstrong

Mr. David Goodall

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr. Robin Butler

Mr. John Coles

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September, 1983

N. S. J. S.

Dear John,

A. J. C. 12/9

International Conference on the Question of Palestine

Tim Flesher wrote to me on 26 August recording the Prime Minister's agreement that we should attend the above Conference as an observer. The Prime Minister might be interested to have a brief account of the outcome of the Conference, which ended in Geneva on 7 September.

The Conference adopted by acclamation two documents: a Declaration and a longer Programme of Action, which has a lower status (copies enclosed). The Declaration is a more moderate document than some observers had expected. The Swedes and other European neutrals worked hard in the drafting Committee to introduce balanced language, and the Malaysian Foreign Minister told Mr Luce recently that he had also pressed the Arabs hard to accept moderate wording. They had some success. The Declaration reaffirms the Fez Plan, and also includes a reference (paragraph 5f) to 'the right of all states in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognised boundaries, with justice and security for all the people ...'. This is close to the language of the Venice Declaration, although it omits the specific reference in Venice to Israel, and goes beyond our position in making the right to existence conditional on the achievement of full Palestinian rights, including the right to a state. The Declaration also calls for the convening of an 'International Peace Conference' under UN auspices made up of all the participants in the Arab/Israel dispute, including the Soviet Union and the PLO. This will clearly be unacceptable to Israel and the US.

The Declaration and the Programme of Action, which is repetitious and harsher in tone, both contain language which would have been unacceptable to us. The outcome of the Conference was inevitably one-sided, but it was less extreme than the Israelis and Americans had expected, and the reference in the Declaration to the rights of all states in the area to a secure existence marks a small but useful step beyond Fez. Our attendance as observers, together with eight other members of the EC (Greece was a full participant) attracted little criticism at the Conference, or in Israel so far, and has protected our interests in the Arab world.

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Yours ever  
John Holmes  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

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## International Conference on the Question of Palestine

Geneva, 29 August - 7 September 1983

Distr.  
LIMITED

A/CONF.114/L.3/Rev.1  
6 September 1983

Original: ENGLISH

### International Conference on the Question of Palestine

#### Draft Declaration finalized by the Drafting Group for submission to the Main Committee

1. In pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 36/120C of 10 December 1981, ES/7-7 of 19 August 1982 and 37/86C of 10 December 1982, an International Conference on the Question of Palestine was convened at the United Nations office in Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983 to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and to exercise their inalienable rights. The Conference was opened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar and presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, H.E. Mr. Moustapha Niasse.
2. The Conference, having thoroughly considered the question of Palestine in all its aspects, expresses the grave concern of all nations and peoples at the international tension that has persisted for several decades in the Middle East, the principal cause of which is the denial by Israel, and those supporting its expansionist policies, of the inalienable legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Conference reaffirms and stresses that a just solution of the question of Palestine, the core of the problem, is the crucial element in a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement in the Middle East.
3. The Conference recognizes further that as one of the most acute and complex problems of our time, the question of Palestine - inherited by the United Nations at the time of its establishment - requires a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement. This settlement must be based on the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning the question of Palestine and the

attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and the right to the establishment of its own independent state in Palestine and should also be based on the provision by the Security Council of guarantees for peace and security among all States in the region, including the independent Palestinian State, within secure, internationally recognized borders. The Conference is convinced that the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights, as defined by General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, will contribute substantially to the achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East.

4. The Conference considers the role of the United Nations in the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East to be essential and paramount. It emphasizes the need for respect for, and application of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the United Nations relevant to the question of Palestine and the observance of the principles of international law.

5. The International Conference considers that the various proposals, consistent with the principles of international law, which have been presented on this question, such as the Arab Peace Plan adopted by the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference held at Fez in September 1982, should serve as guidelines for concerted international effort to resolve the question of Palestine. These guidelines include the following:

- (a) the attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent state in Palestine;
- (b) the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;
- (c) the need to put an end to Israel's occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and, consequently, the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

(d) the need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any de facto situation created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;

(e) the need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called "Basic Law" on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;

(f) the right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, the sine qua non of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as at (a) above.

6. In order to give effect to these guidelines, the Conference considers it essential that an International Peace Conference on the Middle East be convened on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, an essential element of which would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Palestine. This Peace Conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of all parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the United States of America and the Soviet Union and other concerned States, on an equal footing. In this context the Security Council has a primary responsibility to create appropriate institutional arrangements on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions in order to guarantee and to carry out the accords of the International Peace Conference.

7. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine emphasizes the importance of the time factor in achieving a just solution to the problem of Palestine. The Conference is convinced that partial solutions are inadequate and delays in seeking a comprehensive solution do not eliminate tensions in the region.



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# International Conference on the Question of Palestine

Geneva, 29 August - 7 September 1983

Distr.  
LIMITED

A/CONF.114/L.4/Rev.2  
7 September 1983

Original: ENGLISH

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## International Conference on the Question of Palestine

### Draft Programme of Action finalized by the Drafting Group for submission to the Main Committee

The International Conference on the Question of Palestine agreed that no effort should be spared to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and exercise their rights in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of international law. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, taking into consideration the Declaration adopted, recommends the following Programme of Action:

#### I.

The Conference recommends that all States, individually or collectively, and consistent with their respective constitutions, their obligations under the United Nations Charter and in conformity with the principles of international law:

1. Recognize the great importance of the time factor in solving the question of Palestine;
2. Intensify efforts for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State within the framework of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the relevant United Nations resolutions and the guidelines of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine;



3. Consider the continued presence of Israel in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, as exacerbating instability in the region and endangering international peace and security;
4. Oppose and reject, as a serious and continuing obstacle to peace, the expansionist policy pursued by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and in particular the alteration of the geographic nature, demographic composition and legal status of those territories and all the measures taken in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Hague Regulations of 1907, such as the establishment and expansion of settlements, the transfer of Israeli civilians into those territories and the individual and mass transfers therefrom of the Arab Palestinian population;
5. Refrain from providing Israel assistance of such a nature as encourages it militarily, economically and financially to continue its aggression, occupation and disregard of its obligations under the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
6. Not encourage migration to the occupied Arab territories until Israel has put a definitive end to the implementation of its illegal policy of establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967;
7. Fully comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its specialized agencies on the Holy City of Jerusalem, including those which reject Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its declaration of that city as its capital;
8. Undertake universal efforts to protect the Holy Places and urge Israel to take measures to prevent their desecration;
9. Consider ways and means of meeting the threat that Israel poses to the regional security in Africa in view of Israel's disregard of United Nations resolutions, and its close collaboration with the apartheid regime in the economic, military and nuclear fields, thereby contributing to the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and enhancing the regime's repressive and aggressive capacity;
10. Encourage, through bilateral and multilateral contacts, all States including Western European and North American States which have not done so, to welcome all peace initiatives based on the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which were also welcomed by Chairman Yasser Arafat at the International Conference on the Question of Palestine;

11. Seek and develop ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to exercise sovereignty over their national resources;
12. Express concern that Israel debars Palestinians from economic activity and access to national resources on Palestinian territory, in consistent violation of General Assembly resolutions on the right of the Palestinians to permanent sovereignty over their national resources;
13. Declare null and void, and counter such measures and practices applied by Israel in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, as the annexation and the expropriation of land, water resources, and property and the alteration of the demographic, geographic, historical and cultural features thereof;
14. Undertake measures to alleviate the economic and social burdens borne by the Palestinian people as a result of the continued Israeli occupation of their territories since 1967;
15. Consider contributing or increasing special contributions to the proposed budgets, programmes and projects of the relevant organs, funds, and agencies of the United Nations system that have been requested to provide humanitarian, economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people, with particular reference to:
  - (a) Resolution 33/147 of the General Assembly, and the appeal of the UNDP Governing Council at its thirty-first session for additional special contributions amounting to at least \$8 million during the third programming cycle (1982-1986) aimed at helping to meet the economic and social needs of the Palestinian people;
  - (b) The proposed UNCTAD programme budget of the United Nations for 1984/1985 for the establishment within UNCTAD of a Special Economic Unit as requested by the sixth session of UNCTAD at Belgrade;
  - (c) Establishing a special legal aid fund to assist Palestinians in securing their rights under conditions of occupation in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians in the time of war;
16. Ensure that UNRWA can meet the essential needs of the Palestinians without interruption and any diminution in the effectiveness of its services;

17. Review the situation of Palestinian women in Israeli occupied territories and in view of their special hardships, urge the Preparatory Committee of the World Conference for the United Nations Decade for Women to be held in Nairobi in 1985 to include this item on the agenda of the Conference;
18. Review, if they have not yet done so, in conformity with their national legislation, their economic, cultural, technical and other relations with Israel, and the agreements governing them with the aim of ensuring that these relations and agreements would not be interpreted or construed as implying in any way recognition of any modification of the ~~international~~ legal status of Jerusalem and of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, or an acceptance of Israel's illegal presence in those territories;
19. Recognize that the process of enabling the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights in Palestine is a significant contribution to the restoration of the rule of law in international relations;
20. Assure the observance of the stipulations provided for in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, speech, publication, education, assembly and association;
21. Express concern that the laws applicable in the occupied Arab territories have been totally eclipsed by a plethora of military orders that have been designed to establish a new "legal regime" in violation of the Hague Regulations of 1907, and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
22. Act in accordance with their obligations under existing international law, in particular with regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which require States Parties to respect and to ensure respect for those conventions in all circumstances, and in particular ensure the respect by Israel for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;

23. Express concern that the Palestinians and other Arabs in the occupied territories are deprived of juridical and other kinds of protection, that they are victims of repressive legislation, involving mass arrests, acts of torture, destruction of houses, and the expulsion of people from their homes, which constitute flagrant violations of human rights;
24. Recognize the necessity that Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel be accorded the status of prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, if combatants, or in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, if civilians;
25. Strive for the adoption of international measures so that Israel implements in the West Bank and Gaza the provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons, in light of Security Council resolution 465 (1980);
26. Recognize, if they have not yet done so, the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people and establish with it appropriate relations;
27. Encourage, in conformity with their national legislations, the formation of national committees in support of the Palestinian people;
28. Encourage the observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people, in a most effective and meaningful way;
29. Request the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly to designate a Year of Palestine, to be observed at the earliest possible time taking into consideration the factors necessary to ensure its effective preparation for the purpose of galvanizing world-wide public opinion and support in further implementing this Declaration and Programme of Action.

## II.

The International Conference on the Question of Palestine stresses the obligation of all Member States under the United Nations Charter to enable the United Nations through an expanded and more effective role to fulfil its responsibility for achieving a solution to the question of Palestine. To this end:

A. The text of Part II/A will be distributed as document

A/CONF.114/L.4/Rev.2/Add.1.

B. Meanwhile the Security Council is also invited:

1. To take urgent action to bring about an immediate and complete cessation of such Israeli policies in the occupied territories, and in particular, the establishment of settlements, as have been determined by the Security Council to have no legal validity and as a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. To consider urgently the reports of the Commission established under its resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, which examined the situation concerning settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to reactivate the above-mentioned Commission;

3. To initiate action to terminate Israel's exploitative policies which go against the indigenous economic development of the occupied territories, and to compel Israel to lift its restrictions on water use and well drilling by Palestinian farmers as well as its diversion of West Bank water resources into the Israeli water grid systems;

4. To keep under its constant attention the actions committed by Israel against the Palestinian people in violation of the stipulations provided for in relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular the stipulations of resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights and freedoms;

5. To consider, in the event of Israel's persistent non-compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions which embody the will of the international community, appropriate measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure Israel's compliance with these resolutions.

C. Taking into account the recommendations of the five regional preparatory meetings of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine<sup>\*/</sup> and United Nations resolutions concerning economic and social assistance to the

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<sup>\*/</sup> 1. Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 29 March to 1 April 1983 for the African region; 2. Managua, Nicaragua, 11 to 15 April 1983 for the Latin American region; 3. Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, 25 to 29 April 1983 for the West Asian region; 4. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 3 to 6 May 1983 for the Asian and Pacific region; 5. Geneva, United Nations Office, 4 to 8 July 1983 for the European region.

Palestinian people, requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a meeting of the United Nations specialized agencies and other organizations associated with the United Nations as well as representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the countries that host Palestinian refugees, and potential sources of co-operation to develop a co-ordinated programme of economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people and to ensure its implementation.

The meeting should also look into the most effective interagency machinery to co-ordinate and sustain and intensify United Nations assistance to the Palestinian people.

D. The dissemination of accurate and comprehensive information worldwide, and the role of non-governmental organizations and institutions, remains of vital importance in heightening awareness of and support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to establishment of an independent sovereign Palestinian State. To these ends:

1. The United Nations Department for Public Information (DPI) in full co-operation and constant consultations with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People should:

(a) Co-ordinate all information activities of the United Nations system on Palestine through Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC);

(b) Expand publications and audio and visual coverage of the facts and of developments pertaining to the question of Palestine;

(c) Publish newsletters and articles in its respective publications on Israeli violations of human rights of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories and organize fact-finding missions for journalists to the area;

(d) Organize regional encounters for journalists;

(e) Disseminate appropriate information on the results of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine.

2. Relevant organizations of the United Nations systems should organize meetings, symposia and seminars on topics within their terms of reference and relating to specific problems of the Palestinian people by establishing closer liaison with non-governmental organizations, the media and other groups interested in the question of Palestine.

III

The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, convinced of the important role of worldwide public opinion in resolving the Question of Palestine, and in the implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action, urges and encourages:

1. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, to increase awareness by the international community of the economic and social burdens borne by the Palestinian people as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and its negative effects on the economic development of the West Asian region as a whole;
2. Non-governmental organizations and professional and popular associations, to intensify their efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people in every possible way.
3. Organizations such as those of women, teachers, workers, youths and students, to undertake exchanges and other programmes of joint action with their Palestinian counterparts;
4. Women's associations, in particular, to investigate the conditions of Palestinian women and children in all occupied territories;
5. The media and other institutions, to disseminate relevant information to increase public awareness and understanding of the question of Palestine;
6. Institutions of higher education, to promote the study of the question of Palestine in all its aspects;
7. Various jurists' associations, to establish special investigative commissions to determine the violations by Israel of the Palestinians' legal rights and to disseminate their findings accordingly;
8. Jurists, to initiate with their Palestinian counterparts consultations, research and investigations on the juridical aspects of problems affecting the southern African and Palestinian struggles, in particular the detention of political prisoners and the denial of prisoner of war status to detained members of the national liberation movements of southern Africa and Palestine;
9. Parliamentarians, political parties, trade unions, organizations for solidarity and intellectuals particularly in Western Europe and North America, to join their counterparts in other parts of the world in giving their support, where it has not been done, to an initiative which would express the desire of the international community to see the Palestinian people at last living in their own independent homeland in peace, freedom and dignity.

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 071720Z SEPT 1983

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 350 OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, TUNIS,  
AMMAN AND ATHENS.

INFO SAVING ALGIERS, TRIPOLI, RABAT, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ABU DHABI,  
TEHRAN, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DELHI, KUALA LUMPUR, PEKING, MOSCOW,  
DAKAR, PARIS, VIENNA, UKREP BRUSSELS, MADRID, SERNE AND VALLETTA.

MY TELNOS 342 AND 343: PALESTINIAN CONFERENCE.

SUMMARY

1. THE CONFERENCE ENDED AS PLANNED ON THE AFTERNOON 7 SEPTEMBER  
WITH THE ADOPTION BY CONSENSUS OF TWO PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS: A  
"DECLARATION OF GENEVA" AND A PROGRAMME OF ACTION. THE DECLARATION,  
AMID MUCH VERBIAGE ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, INCLUDES RECOGNITION  
OF "THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION TO EXISTENCE WITHIN  
SECURE AND INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES", ON THE BASIS  
THAT PALESTINIAN RIGHTS ARE ALSO HONOURED., AND CALLS FOR THE  
CONVENING OF A NEW PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

2. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS LESS AGGRESSIVE THAN EXPECTED. EXTREMIST  
ORATORY WAS TO SOME EXTENT MUTED IN FAVOUR OF A CONSENSUS OUTCOME  
FURTHER COMMENT IS IN PARA 9 BELOW. 137 GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATED,  
20 OF THEM AS OBSERVERS. 43 MINISTERS ATTENDED.

DETAIL

DOCUMENTARY OUTCOME

... THESE PAGES IN LENGTH WAS BASED ON A

#### DETAIL

#### DOCUMENTARY OUTCOME

3. THE DECLARATION (THREE PAGES IN LENGTH) WAS BASED ON A RELATIVELY MODERATE DRAFT PREPARED BY THE MALTESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK, AMBASSADOR GAUCI, AND CIRCULATED IN NEW YORK, AFTER SOME ARAB STIFFENING, IN EARLY AUGUST. IT INCLUDED THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE. LABORIOUS DEBATE, TOGETHER WITH ATTEMPTS BY RUSSIANS, SYRIANS AND OTHERS TO STIFFEN IT FURTHER, HAD LITTLE EFFECT IN THE FACE OF ROBUST INSISTENCE BY SWEDEN WITH SOME WESTERN SUPPORT THAT THEY WOULD CALL FOR A VOTE IF ANYTHING NOT FULLY ACCEPTABLE WERE RETAINED. THE PLO ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO A CONSENSUS OUTCOME, SO THIS LINE CARRIED THE DAY. IN ADDITION TO DEVOTING MUCH SPACE TO PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, THE DECLARATION CALLS FOR THE CONVENING OF AN "INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST" UNDER UN AUSPICES. THE PLO IS DESCRIBED AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE (SIC) OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE", I.E. WITHOUT THE QUALIFICATIONS "SOLE AND LEGITIMATE".

4. THE LENGTHY PROGRAMME OF ACTION, WHICH HAS A LOWER STATUS THAN THE DECLARATION, IS A MIXED BAG. THE FINAL VERSION IS MUCH CHANGED FROM THE VERSION CIRCULATED BEFORE THE CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK. MANY POINTS IN IT PROVED CONTENTIOUS AND IT WAS ACCEPTED BY CONSENSUS BUT ON THE BASIS THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE MIGHT SEND IN WRITTEN RESERVATIONS AFTER THE CONFERENCE WAS OVER ON POINTS WITH WHICH THEY DISAGREE.

#### ATMOSPHERE

5. THIS HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY RELAXED. THE WHOLE THRUST OF THE CONFERENCE WAS ONE-SIDED, BUT THE TONE MUCH LESS SHRILL THAN THE ISRAELIS PREDICTED. CRITICISM WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY LIMITED TO ISRAEL AND THE USA. LEADING ISRAELI PEACE CAMPAIGNERS AND OTHER DISTINGUISHED INDIVIDUALS ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE TO GOOD EFFECT. THE ABSENCE OF THE US AND THE TEN EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES OF ANY SERIOUS SPARRING PARTNER. THE RUSSIANS USED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCREDIT US PROPOSALS AND PROMOTE THEIR OWN, BUT FAILED TO SET THE TONE. EVEN THE TOUGHER ARAB COUNTRIES, NOTABLY SYRIA AND (ON THIS OCCASION) JORDAN, WERE NOT PREPARED TO BE SO NEGATIVE AS THE SOVIET BLOC. THE PLO AIMED THROUGHOUT FOR A CONSENSUS OUTCOME, NO DOUBT TO REGISTER A SUCCESS WHICH WOULD HELP TO BOLSTER ARAFAT'S POSITION WITHIN THE PLO AND WITH THE ARAB STATES.

6. IN AN ECCENTRIC INCIDENT, AMBASSADOR GAUCI (WHO HAD MEANWHILE BEEN ELECTED RAPPORTEUR) ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM VALLETTA THAT HE WAS WITHDRAWING FROM THE CONFERENCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS EFFORTS TO RELEASE A MALTESE COMPANY FROM THE ARAB BLACKLIST HAD FAILED. THIS GESTURE HAS BEEN IGNORED, AND SERVED MERELY TO DAMAGE THE PRO-ARAB IMAGE OF MALTA.

7. THE SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE TURKS, FINNS AND SPANIARDS, DEFENDED MODERATION WITH SOME SUCCESS. GREECE, ALTHOUGH A FULL PARTICIPANT, WAS ALMOST INVISIBLE. THE PRESENCE AS OBSERVERS OF THE REST OF THE TEN

FINNS AND SPANIARDS, DEFENDED MODERATION WITH SOME SUCCESS. GREECE, ALTHOUGH A FULL PARTICIPANT, WAS ALMOST INVISIBLE. THE PRESENCE AS OBSERVERS OF THE REST OF THE TEN DEMONSTRATED OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE, BUT ALSO OUR INTEREST IN ITS SUBJECT AND SERVED INDIRECTLY TO ENCOURAGE THE MODERATES.

#### CONCLUSIONS

8. THE CONFERENCE, THOUGH Milder THAN EXPECTED, WAS STILL BASICALLY FLAWED BY ITS ESSENTIALLY PROPAGANDISTIC NATURE. THE PARAGRAPH IN THE DECLARATION ACKNOWLEDGING THE RIGHT TO THE EXISTENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA, THOUGH HEAVILY QUALIFIED AND OUTBALANCED BY THE EMPHASIS ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS IN THE REST OF THE DECLARATION, IS HOWEVER SEEN BE SOME HERE AS A MINIMAL STEP FORWARD IN THIS VERY PUBLIC CONTEXT, AND A GOOD OMEN FOR DISCUSSIONS ON ARAB/ISRAEL AT THIS YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

9. OUR DECISION TO ATTEND AS OBSERVERS HAS BEEN VINDICATED. WE HAVE RECEIVED LITTLE CRITICISM AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WELCOME. OUR PART IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS AMONG THE TEN ON ATTENDANCE AS OBSERVERS IS ALSO KNOWN AND APPRECIATED BY ARAB DELEGATIONS.

LONG

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SENT AT 071850Z MD/JB

Pa Question of Palestine

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31 AUG 1983		
INDEX	PA	REGISTRY
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GRS 607  
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 FM FCO 261300Z AUG 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
 GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 26 AUGUST 1983

UK PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE  
 QUESTION OF PALESTINE

1. THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE OPENS IN GENEVA ON 29 AUGUST. THE UK (AND A MAJORITY OF THE TEN - SEE PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW) WILL ATTEND AS OBSERVERS ONLY. OUR DECISION MAY ATTRACT SOME INTEREST, AND WILL NO DOUBT BE CRITICISED BY ISRAEL.
2. WE DO NOT (NOT) WISH TO PLAY UP OUR DECISION, BUT IF ASKED YOU MAY DRAW AT YOUR DISCRETION ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 - 6 BELOW. PARAGRAPHS 5 - 6 WILL BE OF USE MAINLY IN TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON. PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 ARE FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION.

LINE TO TAKE

3. THE UK WILL BE REPRESENTED BY THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT UKMIS GENEVA IN AN OBSERVER CAPACITY. OUR DECISION WAS TAKEN FOLLOWING FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN. IT REFLECTS THE FACT THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE.
4. WE HAVE HOWEVER ALWAYS HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE CONFERENCE, AND HAVE MADE THESE CLEAR IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE, LIKE THE MAJORITY OF OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE THEREFORE OPTED FOR THE MIDDLE COURSE OF OBSERVER STATUS.
5. WE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY THE ARGUMENTS FOR STAYING AWAY

/ALTOGETHER,

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ALTOGETHER, BUT CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THESE WERE OUTWEIGHED BY THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMONSTRATING OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AT A TIME WHEN THERE ARE FEW IDEAS AROUND ON HOW TO BREAK THE PRESENT DEADLOCK. OUR PRESENCE AT THE CONFERENCE AS OBSERVERS MAY SERVE TO ENCOURAGE THOSE ARAB MODERATES AND OTHERS WHO ARE WILLING TO USE THE CONFERENCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE THINKING. AT THE SAME TIME WE REALISE THAT THE OUTCOME MAY WELL BE UNHELPFUL, OR AT LEAST CONTAIN UNHELPFUL ELEMENTS. THAT IS IN PART WHY WE HAVE OPTED FOR OBSERVER STATUS.

6. WE SEE THE MAIN CONFERENCE AS DIFFERENT FROM THE EUROPEAN PREPARATORY MEETING IN JULY, WHICH WE REGARDED AS UNNECESSARY. THIS WILL BE A MORE IMPORTANT OCCASION AT WHICH ALL THE MAJOR ARAB AND NON-ALIGNED PARTIES WILL BE PRESENT. A DECISION TO STAY AWAY WOULD HAVE BEEN WIDELY SEEN AS A SIGN OF UK/EUROPEAN INDIFFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAVE NO (NO) POSITIVE PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN TO MAKE ON HOW TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.

#### BACKGROUND

7. THE CONFERENCE IS THE BRANCHCHILD OF THE UN COMMITTEE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, A BODY WHICH WE HAVE LONG CONSIDERED TO BE UNBALANCED IN COMPOSITION AND WORK. WE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS THROUGHOUT THE PREPARATORY STAGES AND DID NOT (NOT) ATTEND THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL MEETING, ALTHOUGH FOUR OF THE TEN DID (GREECE, ITALY, IRELAND AND FRANCE: THE LAST THREE AS OBSERVERS). THE CONFERENCE HAS HOWEVER GAINED A MOMENTUM OF ITS OWN, AND AT A TIME OF STALEMATE IN ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE EFFORTS IS SEEN AS AN IMPORTANT OCCASION BY THE ARABS. WE HAVE SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE CONFERENCE IS SLANTED AGAINST THEM AND IS UNLIKELY TO BE HELPFUL. BUT IT IS IN OUR VIEW CONSISTENT WITH THE TEN'S LONGSTANDING SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM FOR US TO ATTEND AS OBSERVERS. THIS ALSO LOOKED THE BEST BET FOR KEEPING

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THE NINE TOGETHER (THE GREEKS ANNOUNCED SOME TIME AGO THAT THEY WOULD ATTEND AS FULL PARTICIPANTS). AFTER WE HAD GIVEN A LEAD, EIGHT OF THE TEN HAVE NOW DECIDED TO ATTEND AS OBSERVERS. THE GERMANS HAVE BEEN FIRMLY SET ON NON-PARTICIPATION, BUT MAY YET RECONSIDER.

8. IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION THAT THE UK SHOULD MAKE ANY STATEMENT OF POLICY.

YOUNG

BY TELEGRAPH

ATHENS  
BONN  
UKMIS GENEVA  
UKMIS NEW YORK  
BIS NEW YORK  
WASHINGTON  
ADEN  
AMMAN  
BAGHDAD  
BAHRAIN  
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DUBAI  
ABU DHABI  
MUSCAT  
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JEDDA  
KUWAIT  
TEHRAN  
TEL AVIV  
JERUSALEM  
SANAA

DAMASCUS  
ALGIERS  
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KUALA LUMPUR  
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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 26 AUG

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 338 AND TELECOM LONG/MILES:

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE.

1. PLEASE NOW INFORM THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT AND UKMIS NEW YORK INFORM THE UN SECRETARIAT THAT WE SHALL BE REPRESENTED BY YOU AS AN OBSERVER. YOU MAY AS DISCUSSED ADD TWO MEMBERS OF THE CHANCERY TO THE LIST OF UK OBSERVERS.
2. THE UK GROUP SHOULD TRY TO BE PRESENT AT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE BUT SHOULD NOT BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED. IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION THAT THE UK DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE ANY STATEMENT OF POLICY.
3. IF ASKED ABOUT THE REASONS FOR OUR DECISION YOU SHOULD DRAW AS NECESSARY ON THE FOLLOWING: WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE. IN DISCUSSION IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ABOUT THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE CONFERENCE WE AND OUR EC PARTNERS HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH IT COULD MAKE TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM. FOR THIS REASON WE AND A NUMBER OF OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN HAVE DECIDED NOT, BUT TO ATTEND AS OBSERVERS ONLY.

YOUNG

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SIR J BULLARD.

SIR J LEAHY

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Je DA

Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

26 August 1983

From the Private Secretary

Thank you for your letter of 25 August about the International Conference on the Question of Palestine. The Prime Minister has agreed very reluctantly to the proposal that the United Kingdom should attend the Conference as an observer. She feels that this course will be ineffectual and could be disastrous. She has stressed that as observers the UK group should take no part in the Conference and accordingly has agreed a revised form of the telegram to our Mission in Geneva.

I enclose the text of the revised telegram and I should be grateful if you would arrange for its despatch.

BF

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

1. Please now inform the Conference Secretariat and UKMIS NEW YORK inform the UN Secretariat that we shall be represented by you as an observer. You may as discussed add two members of the Chancery to the list of UK observers.
2. The UK group should try to be present at all the more important meetings of the Conference but should not become actively involved. It is not our intention that the UK delegation should make any statement of policy.
3. If asked about the reasons for our decision you should draw as necessary on the following: We remain committed to the search for a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab/Israeli dispute. In discussion in the UN General Assembly about the work of the preparatory committee for the Conference we and our EC partners have consistently expressed reservations about the contribution which it could make to the solution of this complex problem. For this reason we and a number of our partners in Ten have decided not to participate but to attend as observers only.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Very reluctantly  
will attend  
and observe  
takes NO  
part in  
with needs

Yes. I like the  
to totally ineffective  
discussions. I understand an observer  
REVISING. Prime Minister:  
Do you agree with this  
advice that the UK should  
attend the conference as an observer?

25 August, 1983

Dear Tim,

International Conference on the Question of Palestine

PT 25/8

John Coles wrote to Brian Fall on 26 July recording the Prime Minister's agreement that we should work for a common decision among the Ten that we should attend the above conference, which opens in Geneva on 29 August, purely as observers, and that we should reserve the right to reconsider our position if it became clear that the Ten were likely to be badly split.

Although we have had reservations about the way in which this conference has been prepared, it has now developed into a major international event under UN auspices, and will be opened by the UN Secretary-General. There is no ideal answer to the problem of attendance. The arguments on both sides were set out in my letter of 7 June and Brian Fall's letter of 25 July.

Following intensive consultations in the Ten it has emerged that a consensus on participation will not be possible. The Greeks are firmly set on attending as full participants. The Germans will not attend at all. Most of the other member states intend to participate as observers, although the Danes and Belgians are still undecided between non-attendance and observer status. (The Americans are of course not attending in any capacity and have lobbied against our doing so).

If we decide to attend as observers there will therefore be at least six and possibly eight of the Ten sharing the same approach. We would make a final effort to persuade the Danes and Belgians to rally to the majority and would in any case be in respectable company. (I should add that the German decision to stay away has been influenced by Chancellor Kohl's forthcoming visit to Israel). We have worked to achieve the greatest degree of consensus possible among the Ten; our other like-minded partners in the Ten would feel let down if we now decided not to attend.

In the absence of Sir G Howe, Mr Luce believes that it would be right for the UK to attend this conference as an observer and proposes to instruct our Mission in Geneva in

/the

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/ the terms of the attached draft telegram. I would be grateful if you would let me know whether the Prime Minister is content. The telegram needs to be despatched as soon as possible, in view of the shortness of time before the conference opens.

The Israelis and their friends in this country have strongly urged us not to attend the conference and would be critical of a decision to participate even as observers. The Arabs (including the Egyptians) have urged us to go. The draft telegram sets out an explanation for our decision. In response to criticism we could if necessary add that our presence at the conference may serve to encourage those Arab moderates and others who are willing to use it as an opportunity for constructive thinking. At the same time we realise that the outcome is unlikely to advance the peace process: that is in part why we decided to attend only as observers.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

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1 ZCZC  
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6 FM FCO 241745Z AUG 83  
7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK  
10 YOUR TELNO 338 AND TELECOM LONG/MILES:  
11 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE.  
12 1. Please now inform the Conference Secretariat and UKMIS  
13 NEW YORK inform the UN Secretariat that we shall be  
14 represented by you as an observer. You may as discussed add  
15 two members of the Chancery to the list of UK ~~delegates~~ <sup>observers</sup>  
16 2. The UK ~~delegation~~ <sup>group</sup> should try to be present at all the more  
17 important meetings of the Conference but should not become  
18 actively involved ~~in lobbying about or drafting of conference~~  
19 ~~documents.~~ It is not our intention that the UK delegation  
20 should make any statement of policy ~~but we shall wish to keep~~  
21 closely in step throughout with other members of the Ten  
22 represented by observers ~~and could reconsider this point if~~  
23 ~~necessary.~~  
24 3. If asked about the reasons for our decision you should draw  
25 as necessary on the following: We remain committed to the

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File number		Dept NENAD	Distribution  Limited NENAD CABINET OFFICE MED UND ECD(E) SIR J BULLARD SIR J LEAHY	
Drafted by (Block capitals) P M NIXON				
Telephone number 233 6030				
Authorised for despatch				
Comcen reference	Time of despatch			

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

Page  
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1 <<<<

2 search for a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the  
3 Arab/Israeli dispute. In discussion in the UN General Assembly  
4 about the work of the preparatory committee for the  
5 Conference we and our EC partners have consistently expressed  
6 reservations about the contribution which it could make to the  
7 solution of this complex problem. For this reason we and a  
8 number of our partners in - Ten have decided not to participate  
9 fully. Nevertheless we believe it would be wrong not to be  
10 represented when we have long been urging the parties to the  
11 dispute to seek a solution through peaceful negotiations.

*but do attend  
as observers  
only*

13 HOWE

14 NNNN


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FM JERUSALEM 271100Z JUL 83

PS/TO. NO. 10. DOWNING STREET.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 27 JULY

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

HEBRON

1. THE LATEST OUTRAGE IN WHICH THREE ARABS WERE KILLED IN THE ATTACK ON THE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY IN HEBRON YESTERDAY HAS CAUSED FURTHER TENSION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THERE WERE DISTURBANCES IN SOME PARTS OF THE WEST BANK YESTERDAY, WITH ONE GIRL KILLED IN NABLUS IN A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND ARAB DEMONSTRATORS. A GENERAL STRIKE WAS CALLED FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW BUT IS SO FAR BEING OBSERVED ONLY IN EAST JERUSALEM AND NABLUS. THIS REACTION IS MUCH MORE LIMITED THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY A YEAR OR TWO AGO, AND MAY THEREFORE WELL INDICATE THE PRESENT LOW STATE OF MORALE HERE.

2. HEBRON ITSELF IS UNDER CURFEW AND SEALED OFF: I WAS PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE TOWN TODAY.

3. THE IDENTITY OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. ISRAEL RADIO HAS INCLUDED INTER-PLO RIVALRY AMONG THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES. THE ARAB COMMUNITY ARE HOWEVER CONVINCED THAT THE ATTACK WAS THE WORK OF JEWISH EXTREMISTS AND THAT IT WAS PRIMARILY TO AVENGE THE STABBING OF A SETTLER IN HEBRON THREE WEEKS AGO. THE SCALE AND NATURE OF THE ATTACK ARE CERTAINLY INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS INCIDENTS INVOLVING RIVAL PLO FACTIONS HERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF LESS SERIOUS ATTACKS AGAINST THE ARABS IN HEBRON IN RECENT MONTHS, NOTABLY THE PLANTING OF GRENADES (ALSO USED THIS TIME) IN A FOOTBALL FIELD LAST OCTOBER (MY TELELETTER 014/1 OF 3 NOVEMBER 1982 TO CHAPLIN, NENAD).

4. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE STATED THAT THEY WILL DILIGENTLY HUNT DOWN THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK. HOWEVER, AS THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE JERUSALEM POST POINTS OUT IN AN EDITORIAL TODAY, 'PAST EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS' THAT DESPITE THIS PROMISE 'THE KILLERS AT THE UNIVERSITY MAY WELL REMAIN AT LARGE'. THE PAPER ONCE AGAIN CONTRASTS THE AUTHORITIES' TREATMENT OF ATTACKS ON JEWS WITH THEIR HANDLING OF CRIMES AGAINST ARABS IN THE TERRITORIES.

HANLEY

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD MAED  
MED ESSD  
NAD ERD  
SAD ESID  
UND CONS D  
EESD CONS EM UNIT  
ECD MR EGERTON  
WED MR THOMAS  
RID MR HAYES  
SEC D CABINET OFFICE

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 July 1983

*Dear Brian,*

International Conference on the Question  
of Palestine

Thank you for your letter of 25 July.

The Prime Minister agrees that it would be best to work for a common decision among the Ten that they should attend the conference purely as observers - we would reserve the right to reconsider our position if it become clear that the Ten were nevertheless likely to be badly split.

*Yours ever  
John Major*

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL *BTC*





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Foreign Secretary believes that

London SW1A 2AH

we and our European partners should

25 July 1983

attend the Conference as

observers. Agree?

A.F.C. 25/7

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L  
M

Dear John,

International Conference on the Question of Palestine

John Holmes wrote to you on 7 June to inform you that the European Regional Preparatory Meeting for the above conference was to be held in Geneva from 4-8 July. In accordance with the Prime Minister's views recorded in your letter of 6 May we did not participate in this meeting. Four of our EC partners did so: Greece (as a full participant) and France, Italy and Ireland as observers.

Consultations have now begun in the Ten to see whether it is possible to reach a common position on participation in the main Conference, to be held in Geneva from 29 August to 7 September. We will need to inform our partners in due course of our own intentions.

The background to this Conference and the main arguments for and against participation were set out in John Holmes's letter of 4 May. The new factors are as follows:

(i) the concluding documents from the Regional Preparatory Meetings have varied considerably in tone. All have included much standard pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel rhetoric. The African and Middle Eastern Meetings produced extreme documents including calls for sanctions against Israel. The Asian and Latin American Meetings were more restrained. The European Meeting produced the least radical document, including a reference to the rights of all states in the region to existence;

(ii) the current frustration and polarisation in the Arab world has tended to increase the importance of this Conference in Arab eyes, as an opportunity to remind world opinion that the situation in the region is deteriorating, and the

/plight



plight of the Palestinians becoming more serious. The question of whether or not the Europeans attend this Conference will consequently be more important to our friends in the Arab world than it would have been if the peace process were advancing, and the Ambassadors of the Ten in Cairo have already been urged by the Egyptian Government that the Europeans should be represented at a high level.

(iii) the friends of Israel in this country have asked us not to participate in the Conference. The Americans have made clear that they will not attend.

Sir Geoffrey Howe discussed the matter on 22 July with M. Cheysson, who would like the Ten to stick together as far as possible and who thought that this could best be done by working for a common decision to attend purely as observers (though the Greeks may well attend as full participants whatever the rest do). Sir Geoffrey Howe is inclined to agree with this analysis. We followed this path at the Namibia Conference. It has the advantage that we could make our voice heard at the Conference while not being associated with a concluding document which is likely to be unhelpful to the cause of peace. If the Ten (or a large majority of them) took this position it would help to preserve a coherent European approach in public to the problems of the Middle East. Cheysson agreed that the French would be prepared to take the lead in working for such a solution if we were prepared to support it. In doing so, we would reserve the right to reconsider our position if it became clear that the Ten were nevertheless likely to be badly split.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

*HJ*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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25 JUL 1983



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
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MR. COLES

MIDDLE EAST

I am a little worried from our point of view about recent developments in the Lebanon. Shultz's talk to the Foreign Secretary has revealed the total barrenness of American policy on the Middle East (Washington tels numbers 1993 and 2027). Meanwhile, it looks from Tel Aviv telegram number 193 as though the Israelis have begun a partial withdrawal to one of the river lines in Southern Lebanon. The Americans will have no choice but to connive at this.

McFarlane's communication to Robert Armstrong suggests that the Americans have ideas about involving us more heavily with the situation on the ground in Lebanon following a partial Israeli withdrawal. I am sure that it is right that we extend the mandate of the British Force in Lebanon for another three months and I understand that this will be announced in Parliament on 20 July. However, I am powerfully opposed to an expansion of the British contingent or to an undesirable change in its deployment. We should not be flattered or cajoled by the Americans into accepting either of these. My view is that McFarlane should be sent a firm reply, holding out no hope of an increase in the numbers of the British contingent. A situation in which a temporary expansion of the force for a strictly limited period would set the seal on an agreement for the withdrawal of all foreign troops is so improbable as to be not worth considering.



A.D. PARSONS  
19 July 1983

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REVENDED DISTRIBUTION 18 JULY 1983

FM WASHINGTON 162118Z JUL 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2027 OF 16 JULY

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO MOSCOW PARIS BONN TOKYO OTTAWA  
UKREP BRUSSELS.

INFO SAVING CG'S IN USA.

MY I.P.T.

YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

II THE SUBSTANCE.

1. THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR TALKS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN A SERIES OF  
TELEGRAMS BUT IT MAY HELP TO DRAW TOGETHER THE MAIN THEMES.

### 2. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

SHULTZ SHARES YOUR VIEW THAT WE NEED TO BE REASONABLE AS WELL AS  
ROBUST IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THE RECENT  
ELECTIONS IN WEST GERMANY AND BRITAIN HAS PUT THE ALLIANCE IN A  
FAVOURABLE POSITION TO PURSUE A POLICY OF FIRMNESS WITH DIALOGUE.  
THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID TALKS WAS A STEP IN THE  
RIGHT DIRECTION. THE AMERICANS REALISE THAT A SUMMIT MAY BE NECESSARY  
BUT ARE DETERMINED NOT TO HAVE ONE FOR ITS OWN SAKE. THEY ARE VERY  
UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MRS GANDHI'S IDEAS.

3. THE AMERICANS WERE PLEASED WITH KOHL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, BELIEVING  
THAT HE STRUCK JUST THE RIGHT NOTE. THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO THE  
DIFFICULTIES THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL FACE AS THE MOMENT OF  
PERSHING DEPLOYMENT APPROACHES. SHULTZ AGREED WITH THE NEED TO AVOID  
ALLOWING E/W TRADE ISSUES TO DAMAGE THE ALLIANCE BUT WAS GLAD TO  
NOTE THAT YOU SHARED THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING COCOM AND OF AVOIDING  
SALES OF MILITARILY APPLICABLE HIGH TECHNOLOGY.

### 4. MIDDLE EAST.

SHULTZ SAID THAT PROGRESS WAS EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED BOTH ON THE LEBANON  
AND ON WIDER ISSUES. WHILE HE IS PREPARED TO FIND WAYS OF MEETING  
GENUINE SYRIAN SECURITY CONCERNS IN LEBANON, HE HAS COME TO THE  
CONCLUSION THAT ASSAD'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION IS TO ANY AGREEMENT  
WITH ISRAEL. THE AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE SAUDIS  
BUT HAVE NO HOPES OF AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH AND ARE CONCENTRATING  
ON TRYING TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION WITHIN LEBANON ITSELF. THEY ARE  
NATURALLY CONCERNED AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET  
MILITARY ADVISORS IN SYRIA AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT MOVE  
INTO THE BEKAA VALLEY IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES. BOTH SHULTZ AND  
WEINBURGER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO OUR CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE MNF.

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5. ON THE WIDER ISSUES, THE AMERICANS DO NOT SEE HOW PROGRESS CAN BE MADE UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ARABS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL. THEY STILL THINK THAT HUSSEIN IS WILLING BUT HAVE NO REAL HOPE THAT HE CAN MOVE ON HIS OWN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY HOPE THAT WE CAN JOIN THEM IN HAMMERING HOME THE MESSAGE THAT THE ARABS HAVE TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL AND THAT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS CAN THEY HOPE TO INFLUENCE ISRAELI BEHAVIOUR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

### 6. (C) CENTRAL AMERICA

SHULTZ MADE A FORCEFUL DEFENCE OF AMERICAN POLICY AND STRESSED THE AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC AID THE U.S. WAS PROVIDING. BUT THE AMERICANS DO NOT SEE HOW THE FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NEEDS OF THE REGION CAN BE MET UNLESS ITS SECURITY IS ASSURED. SHULTZ WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED TO HAVE YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT WE SUPPORTED U.S. OBJECTIVES. THE PRESIDENT, SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER SEPARATELY AND SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT WE KEEP OUR GARRISON IN BELIZE AS AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILITY OF THE AREA. SHULTZ AND EAGLEBURGER BOTH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IDEA OF A TRAINING TEAM WITH U.S. INVOLVEMENT WAS A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IDEA WHICH DID NOT REPRESENT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

### ARGENTINA/FALKLANDS

7. REGAN SPOKE REASSURINGLY OF U.S. DETERMINATION TO HOLD ARGENTINA TO IMF CONDITIONS. SHULTZ MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EYES WERE FIXED ON THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS. HE IMPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RUSH TO CERTIFICATION OF ARMS SALES BEFORE THEN BUT THAT, IF THE ELECTIONS TURNED OUT WELL, THE U.S. WOULD WISH TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA. WE CAN EXPECT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITH THE AMERICANS, BOTH ON CERTIFICATION AND OVER THE U.S. VOTE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE AUTUMN.

### BILATERAL ISSUES

8. YOU MADE CLEAR OUR OBJECTIONS TO U.S. MEASURES ON SPECIALTY STEEL IMPORTS AS WELL AS OUR CONCERN ABOUT ASPECTS OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE DECISION ON STEEL HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE ADVICE OF BOTH SHULTZ AND REGAN. THEY WILL EXPECT US TO TAKE ACTION IN THE GATT.

### 9. U.S. ECONOMY

THERE WAS CLOSE INTEREST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR OWN ECONOMY: AND A GENERAL ACCEPTANCE THAT THERE IS AN OBVIOUS LINK BETWEEN HIGH DEFICITS AND INTEREST RATES IN THE U.S. REGAN SEEMED CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT, EVEN IF INTEREST RATES DID MOVE UP A BIT, WHICH THEY ARE NOW DOING, THIS WOULD COOL, RATHER THAN CHOKE, THE RECOVERY. VOLCKER IS MUCH LESS SANGUINE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTINUANCE OF DEFICITS AT THE PRESENT LEVELS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONCLUSION

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10 CONCLUSION. THE AMERICANS WERE VERY GLAD TO TAKE STOCK WITH YOU AFTER OUR OWN ELECTION AND BEFORE THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE AUTUMN. YOUR TALKS SHOWED THAT THE THINGS WE DISAGREE ABOUT - STEEL, AIRLINES EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT - MUST BE PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WIDER IDENTITY OF VIEW AND PURPOSE ON FUNDAMENTALS AND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP IS STRONG ENOUGH TO CONTAIN THE ROWS. YOUR VISIT WAS VALUABLE IN ITSELF AND WILL HAVE PROVED A USEFUL CURTAIN-RAISER TO YOUR VISIT TO THE U.N. AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HERE IN SEPTEMBER.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

WRIGHT

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FM WASHINGTON 150350Z JUN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1993 OF 15 JUL

INFO BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING PARIS ROME MOSCOW OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

**YOUR TALKS WITH SHULTZ: MIDDLE EAST**

1. SHULTZ AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS OR EVEN TO STOP MATTERS FROM GETTING WORSE. SOONER OR LATER, THE ARABS WOULD HAVE TO BE WILLING TO SIT DOWN TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL, THOUGH THIS WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM. KING HUSSEIN WAS READY BUT NEEDED AT LEAST AN AMBER LIGHT FROM OTHER ARABS AND THE PLO. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE SAUDIS ENGAGED.

2. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE PLO. THE SYRIANS HAD INCREASED THEIR CONTROL OF THE PLO BUT MIGHT HAVE OVER-REACHED THEMSELVES. THERE WAS CERTAINLY MUCH LESS PROSPECT OF THE PLO NOW ENDORSING THE SORT OF AGREEMENT REACHED BY ARAFAT WITH KING HUSSEIN IN APRIL. THE EFFECT OF RECENT DISARRAY ON ARAFAT'S POSITION REMAINED TO BE SEEN: HE WOULD NOT LAST IF HE THREW IN THE TOWEL AND SUCCUMBED TO SYRIAN INFLUENCE.

3. SHULTZ WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIANS AS HUMAN BEINGS. THEIR LIVES WERE AT RISK IN LEBANON WHERE NOBODY WANTED THEM: THOSE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAD NO HOPE FOR THE FUTURE. THE PALESTINIANS WERE ENDANGERED REFUGEES USED ALMOST AS HOSTAGES BY SOME ARAB COUNTRIES. THOUGHT NEEDED TO BE GIVEN TO EASING THEIR PLIGHT, THOUGH SHULTZ DID NOT AS YET HAVE ANY NEW IDEAS.

4. THE PROBLEM IN LEBANON WAS SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE. THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO GO TO DAMASCUS TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE SYRIANS, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD CONTINUE. THE SITUATION REMAINED EXPLOSIVE: THERE WERE NOW SOME 7000 OR SO SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SYRIA AND A NUMBER OF ARMED TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE BEKATA WHOSE AIM WAS TO STIR UP CONFLICT. PRESIDENT GENAYEL AND HIS MINISTERS WERE RUNNING GREAT PERSONAL RISKS AND DESERVED FULL SUPPORT. THE AMERICANS WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO SEE THEM SUCCEED. THERE WOULD BE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GENAYEL AND BEGIN DURING THEIR VISITS TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

S. You



**CONFIDENTIAL**

5. YOU ENCOURAGED SHULTZ TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS WHICH HAD OUR FULL SUPPORT. THE PUS ASKED ABOUT THE SYRIANS MOTIVES, OTHER THAN TO ENHANCE THEIR STANDING IN THE ARAB WORLD AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT, AND POSSIBLE MEANS OF INFLUENCING THEM. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUT MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER MORE AS A CARROT. THE SYRIANS DID HAVE SOME LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH THE AMERICANS AND LEBANESE WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS, FOR EXAMPLE ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AREA WHERE THE PROPOSED SECURITY ZONE MET THE SYRIAN BORDER. THE SYRIANS HAD EMPHASISED TO HIM THEIR HISTORICAL INTEREST IN LEBANON, CLAIMING THAT SYRIA AND LEBANON WERE REALLY ONE COUNTRY. THEY APPEARED TO WANT RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR INFLUENCE AND INTEREST IN LEBANON.

6. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU, SHULTZ EMPHASISED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE US FACED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THE US COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL WAS UNCHANGABLE. EVEN THOUGH THE ISRAELIS WERE OFTEN THEIR OWN WORST ENEMY, NOTHING COULD EFFECT THAT BASIC US COMMITMENT. SHULTZ LOOKED TO HUSSEIN AND TO THE SAUDIS AS A POSSIBLE WAY OF KEEPING UP PRESSURE FOR AN ARAB DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS. IT WAS ONLY IN THAT CONTEXT THAT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE UNREASONABLENESS OF ISRAELI BEHAVIOUR COULD BE ADDRESSED.

FCO PASS SAVING PARIS ROME MOSCOW ABU DHABI ADEM ALGIERS BAGHDAD  
BAHRAIN DOHA DUBAI JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANA'A  
TRIPOLI TUNIS

WRIGHT

**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT**

**MIDDLE EAST**

**STANDARD**

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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

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FROM TEL AVIV 141040Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELNO U2G 141040Z JUL 83

AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

INFO FCO AND DAMASCUS.

MODUK FOR DI4 FROM DA.

1. MA IS TOURING NORTHERN ISRAEL. AT 141030Z HE REPORTED THAT MAJOR TANK/APC TRANSPORTER DEPOT ON COLAN NOW EMPTY. HE OBSERVED SOME 6 EMPTY TRANSPORTERS PULLING OUT AND MOVING NORTH TOWARDS METULLA.
2. THIS MORNING'S JERUSALEM POST QUOTING A REUTERS REPORT, SAYS THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF IDF ARMoured VEHS WERE SEEN YESTERDAY MOVING SOUTH THROUGH LEBANON TOWARDS THE ISRAELI BORDER AND THAT 25XAPC, 30XAFVS AND 100 TRUCKS WERE SEEN PASSING THROUGH SIDON OR WAITING AT IDF AIRFIELD NEAR DAMOUR. ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORT HEAVY IAF AIR ACTIVITY OVER LEBANON AND IN PARTICULAR SIDON.
3. COINCIDENCE OF EYE WITNESS REPORTS FROM LEBANON AND MA'S OBSERVATIONS COULD INDICATE THAT FIRST PHASE OF LONG AWAITED IDF REDEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON HAS STARTED. MA BEIRUT MAY WISH TO ATTEMPT CONFIRMATION.

PRENDERGAST

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WASHINGTON 132035Z JUL 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1964 OF 13 JULY

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO AND UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW PARIS ROME OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MIPT (NOT TO ALL):

SHULTZ'S BRIEFING OF ALLIED AMBASSADORS: MIDDLE EAST

1. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST ON HIS WAY BACK FROM ASIA BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO HEAR AT FIRST HAND THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES, PARTICULARLY THE SYRIANS. THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED, THEREFORE, THAT HE SHOULD GO. HE HAD FOUND THE SAUDIS PREOCCUPIED ABOUT LEBANON, BUT NO LESS SO WITH THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS.

2. THE LEBANESE LEADERS FACED THE TASK OF TRYING TO RID THREE QUARTERS OF THEIR COUNTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS. GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, SALEM AND WADI HADDAD HAD IMPRESSED HIM AS PATRIOTS, TAKING CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL RISKS, THEY DESERVED SUPPORT.

3. IN SYRIA HIS FIVE HOURS OF DISCUSSION WITH ASAD HAD BEEN PERSONALLY CORDIAL, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE. THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE OPPOSED TO THE ISRAELI/LEBANON AGREEMENT NOT MERELY BECAUSE OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BUT MORE FUNDAMENTALLY: THEY DID NOT ACCEPT THAT ANY ARAB COUNTRY SHOULD MAKE AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AT ALL. THERE NEVERTHELESS HAD BEEN FULL DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THE SYRIANS HAD LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS. THE US WAS PREPARED TO LOOK AT THESE, TO SEE IF THEY COULD BE MET. ASAD HAD AGREED THAT SHULTZ MIGHT SAY PUBLICLY THAT HE SHARED THE GOAL OF AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN LEBANON, WITH CONTROL OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY AND A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. A JOINT US/SYRIAN WORKING GROUP AT OFFICIAL LEVEL HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. ITS IMPORTANCE SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. IT REFLECTED AGREEMENT THAT A DIALOGUE SHOULD CONTINUE AND PROVIDED A CHANNEL FOR IT: BUT NO MORE THAN THAT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. THE

*A good summary of  
the present U.S. view  
on the Middle East.*

*M 14/7.*

*ms*

CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW SET ON RE-DEPLOYMENT. THIS POSED A DILEMMA. THE AMERICANS WANTED THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW AND COULD SCARCELY OPPOSE THEIR RELINQUISHMENT OF TERRITORY. BUT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD SIMPLY LEAD TO THEIR DIGGING IN FOR A LONG STAY IN SOUTH LEBANON AND TO PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH THE US OPPOSED. IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WERE PART OF A PROGRAMME FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH GEMAYEL AND BEGIN ON THEIR FORTHCOMING VISITS TO WASHINGTON. THERE WOULD, SHULTZ EMPHASISED, BE FULL AND CAREFUL CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.

5. THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH ISRAELI AND SOVIET-BACKED SYRIAN FORCES IN CLOSE PROXIMITY WAS RISKY, AND WAS COMPLICATED BY THE NUMBER OF ARMED GROUPS. THE TERRORIST GROUPS IN PARTICULAR HAD AN INTEREST IN CONTINUED CONFLICT. THE SYRIAN EFFORT TO DOMINATE THE PLO WAS MEETING RESISTANCE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD AND THE OUTCOME REMAINED TO BE SEEN.

6. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WAS HELD UP BY THE DIFFICULTY OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT AND THE INABILITY TO GIVE KING HUSSEIN A BASIS ON WHICH TO MOVE FORWARD. HUSSEIN WAS FRUSTRATED: HE WANTED TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS BUT NEEDED THE RIGHT CONDITIONS TO MAKE THEM FRUITFUL. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE KEY ARAB LEADERS ALL RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THAT TIME WAS WORKING AGAINST THEM. HE HOPED THAT THE KIND OF FORMULA WHICH HAD SO NEARLY BEEN AGREED BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT IN APRIL COULD SOMEHOW BE RECREATED.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*From the Secretary of State*

4 July 1983

PERSONAL

A.S.C. 4/7

p.a.


*Dear Julia*

Thank you for your letter of 23 June reporting Sheikh Zaid's views on the Middle East, and the conclusions you have drawn from them. Richard Luce also had a useful talk with Sheikh Zaid on 24 June.

Your Omani friend reached the conclusion that Arafat should be sent to Amman to sign the agreement which fell through in April. Arafat, with all his shortcomings, did try to move the PLO in the direction of a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian problem. We continue to think that the PLO missed an important opportunity by failing to back his agreement with King Hussein in April. But it must be very doubtful whether Arafat could now realistically sign the agreement with King Hussein. The King too will want to be sure that he carries the Palestinian people with him if he is to enter negotiations. He may well want to see the outcome of the current disarray in the PLO before deciding his next move. To press now for signature of the agreement negotiated last April would be to court failure. But when the situation clarifies, we shall certainly need to resume efforts to bring home to the Palestinians and the Arab side generally that their best interests are served by moderation.

/You


The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP



You drew the conclusion that we and the Americans should put pressure on the Saudis to achieve a rapprochement between them and the Egyptians. Egypt certainly remains a key player. Her present exclusion from the mainstream of Arab affairs can only be temporary, although no-one can say exactly when it will come to an end. We keep closely in touch with the Egyptians and find that we have a very similar approach to the Arab/Israel problem. Even in their isolation they have influence, and have for instance supported King Hussein's efforts to enter negotiations. Closer co-operation between the Arab moderates, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would certainly be a step forward and is coming closer. But it is not easy to force the pace, and I doubt whether the Saudis could be pressurised as you suggest.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)



→ AJC  
R. COLES

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

2

MIDDLE EAST

I had 1½ hours with Prince Hassan of Jordan this morning. The Foreign Secretary is seeing him this afternoon.

The bulk of our conversation followed the lines of the discussion we had with the Prime Minister yesterday and I need not record it. Specifically, Prince Hassan argued that the Americans and the Europeans had an important role to play in the long vacuum stretching ahead of us in order to, as he put it, "protect the Arab identity of the West Bank and Gaza". Apart from the obvious problem of the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements, he drew attention to the following factors:-

1. During the last three months the Israelis have started on a programme designed to resettle and to get rid of as many as possible of the Palestine refugees in the camps on the West Bank and Gaza. A large number had been moved to a camp very close to the Jordan River from which it would be easy for the Israelis to move them across to the East Bank.
2. Political polarisation was becoming serious. The rural population who were both losing their land to the settlements and having to work as day labourers in Israel proper, were becoming seriously affected by Islamic fundamentalism. The more educated population were moving to the radical left. Both sides were making life increasingly difficult for moderate, pro-Jordanian Palestinians. There had been a lot of beating up and intimidation.
3. The natural economy of the West Bank was collapsing and the population was turning into a reservoir of cheap labour for Israel.

If there were to be a vacuum of, say, 18 months without any progress towards a settlement, these trends would all intensify and change the political and actual geography of the region.

/Prince Hassan

CONFIDENTIAL

Prince Hassan's view is that, in the absence of a meaningful and determined American effort to break the central deadlock, and given that the turbulence in the Arab world may well preclude any rational consensus on the Arab side for some time to come, the Americans and Europeans should concentrate on redressing the plight of the West Bank and Gazan Palestinians. The objective would be to give them some political and economic hope and at the same time to discourage arbitrary Israeli action. Such a combination might help to arrest the creeping exodus from the West Bank and Gaza and reduce the internal political polarisation of the area. Thus, if and when the time ever came for a resumption of effort to solve the main problem, the situation on the ground would not make such efforts totally irrelevant.

Politically, Hassan believes that the Americans should be persuaded to set up a high level Congressional commission of inquiry to answer such questions as the legality of Israeli settlements, the international status of the West Bank, Gaza and its inhabitants, the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, etc. An American consensus on these questions would be more effective than an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ which, because of the court's membership, would easily be discredited by the Israelis in the same way as they can denounce the prejudiced nature of action in UN bodies.

Economically, Hassan believes that the United States and the European Community should make a serious effort to find ways of channelling large quantities of aid into the West Bank without setting it at the disposal of the Israeli military administration. At present, the only aid going into the area came from UNDP (a tiny amount of technical assistance) from Jordan via private banks and a little from voluntary organisations. Revival of the West Bank economy through western help would, in his view, do a great deal to encourage morale amongst the inhabitants and to reduce the political polarisation.


Prince Hassan will be seeing the European Commission next week and will no doubt put these ideas to them. He thought that King Hussein would shortly be writing to President Reagan, the Prime Minister and other European heads of government, possibly incorporating some of Hassan's ideas.



CONFIDENTIAL

I do not under-estimate the difficulty of achieving anything - nor does Prince Hassan - but I think that his approach is right. The savage power struggle in the Arab world is obscuring everything for the moment. The storm may subside quickly or it may not. In either event, my guess is that it will leave the landscape bleaker than before. The Americans will continue to concentrate on the Lebanon, and I cannot imagine that they will launch a serious initiative on the Palestine problem until the beginning of 1985. I may be wrong, but even if they do have the courage to take another step, I cannot see them being able to keep it up. Hence, the outside world could do a lot worse than concentrate on alleviating the plight of the population of the occupied territories, rather than continuing on the path of declamatory statements etc. There will in any case be plenty of the latter with the General Assembly of the UN looming up in a couple of months time.

---



A.D. PARSONS  
30 June 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

cc Sir Anthony Parsons

MR. COLES ✓ m/h.

cc POLAND: UK/Polish  
Relations Pt 9

Prime Minister ✓

BELIZE: Dispute with  
Guatemala Pt 3

JIC BUSINESS

The JIC dealt with a long agenda this morning, of which the most significant items were:

a. The PLO

The experts all agree that the situation is fluid, and future developments unpredictable. Beyond that, there are some who believe that Arafat is finished, and it is only a matter of time before he is replaced; and there others - including the FCO - who believe that the Syrians would prefer to see Arafat soldier on, provided that he can be made more compliant, and the PLOs policies more convergent with their own. No-one doubts that the Syrians are determined to exert greater control over the PLO in the future, and it remains to be seen when and how this will be achieved.

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b. Poland

It is too soon to draw any firm conclusions about the way forward in Poland following the Pope's visit. To some extent the regime, the Church and the people of Poland all have reasons for regarding the visit as a success. What is not clear is whether it will eventually result in a real push towards reconciliation. We shall have to wait to observe any practical consequences, but the intelligence community is pessimistic.

c. Belize/Guatemala

The threat to Belize from Guatemala has receded at least temporarily, due in part to President Rios Montt's apparent sincerity in seeking to solve the dispute by peaceful means, and in part to the improved dialogue between the Guatemalan armed forces and British Forces Belize. The JIC continue to believe that no significant military action would be launched against Belize while the British garrison remained, although there is the risk of smaller scale incursions. If Rios Montt were overthrown his successor would be likely to be more intransigent and bellicose on Guatemala's dispute with Belize.

R. T. JACKLING

30 June 1983

GRS 150

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FM JEDDA 290915Z JUN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 311 OF 29 JUN

INFO PRIORITY - DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, TUNIS  
ROUTINE - ALGIERS, CAIRO, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, KUWAIT,  
MODUK (DI4)

MY TELNO 308: SYRIA/PLO

1. AT A MEETING CHAIRED BY KING FAHD IN TAIF ON 27 JUNE, THE SAUDI CABINET HEARD REPORTS FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PRINCE SAUD, ON HIS VISITS TO AMMAN AND DAMASCUS, AND FROM THE INFORMATION MINISTER, ALI SHAER, ON HIS ROUND OF CALLS IN LEBANON LAST WEEK.

2. THE LOCAL PRESS HAS GIVEN NO DETAILS OF THESE REPORTS: BUT UNUSUALLY, THE CABINET ISSUED A FORMAL STATEMENT AFTER ITS MEETING. THE STATEMENT SAID THAT KING FAHD HAD EXPRESSED TO THE CABINET HIS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN THE FATAH ORGANISATION. RECALL-  
*IN A THE*  
29 JUNE 1983 RABAT SUMMIT DECISION RECOGNISING THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGIT-

IMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINE PEOPLE, THE STATEMENT SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA REAFFIRMED HER SUPPORT FOR THE PLO UNDER ARAFAT'S LEADERSHIP. IT URGED ALL ARAB STATES TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS AND USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES TO HEAL THE RIFT BETWEEN PALESTINIANS.  
*ARABIA WOULD BE PURSUING*  
THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT SAUDI ~~ARABIA WOULD BE PURSUING~~

HER OWN EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION.

CRAIG

**MIDDLE EAST**

**STANDARD**

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

29 June 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 9 June, enclosing a copy of your Annual Report on the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

We have read this with much interest here and are most grateful to you for sending us a personal copy. We are glad that you appreciate the efforts of the British contingent in Sinai and the job that they are doing to help peace in the area.

E. L. COLES

Mr. Leamon R. Hunt.

1/15



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1983

Dear Idun,

Sinai Multinational Force

*Type only pl.*

*A.S.C. 29/6.*

Thank you for your letter of 22 June about the Sinai MFO.

We have also received a copy of the Annual Report. Mr Luce has replied. As requested I attach a draft letter from you to Mr Hunt.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Number 10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: J Coles Esq

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Leamon R Hunt Esq  
 Director-General  
 Sinai Multinational Force  
 and Observers  
 CP 642  
 00187 ROME  
 ITALY

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

1. The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 9 June, enclosing a copy of your Annual Report on the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).
2. We have read this with much interest here and are most grateful to you for sending us a personal copy. We are glad that you appreciate the efforts of the British contingent in Sinai and the job that they are doing to help peace in the area.


*AR 29/6*

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Middle East  
Situations, R4 U



28 JUN 1983



Middle East

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 47 OF 27 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS  
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

EXPULSION OF ARAFAT: REACTION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. THE EXPULSION OF ARAFAT FROM SYRIA HAS PROVOKED A WAVE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONDEMNATION OF SYRIA AND LIBYA AND A BROAD EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT AS LEADER OF THE PLO. MANY SPEECHES AND NEWSPAPER COMMENTS REFER TO HIM AS 'THE SYMBOL OF THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION'.

2. THE BIGGEST AND MOST STRIDENT MANIFESTATION OF PUBLIC FEELING CAME AT A MEETING AT THE AL AQSA MOSQUE ON 26 JUNE, CALLED BY THE MUFTI OF JERUSALEM AND ATTENDED BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF 'NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' IN THE TERRITORIES. THESE INCLUDED THE ACTING MAYORS OF HEBRON AND HALHOUL AND THE HEAD OF THE WEST BANK TRADE UNION FEDERATION. THE SPEECHES WERE INFLAMMATORY, NOT LEAST THE MUFTI'S: HE ANNOUNCED THE ISSUE OF A FATWA (KORANIC RULING) PERMITTING ANY MUSLIM TO KILL THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT, WHO HAD 'GIVEN ISRAEL THE GOLAN, KILLED THOUSANDS OF SYRIAN MUSLIMS IN HAMA IN 1981 AND MASSACRED MUSLIMS IN TEL AZ-ZATAR IN 1975. HE IS THEREFORE THE MUSLIMS' WORST ENEMY'. ANOTHER SPEECH REFERRED TO THE SYRIAN REGIME AS 'THE AGENT OF EAST AND WEST AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME'. THE MEETING ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING ON AL-FATAH FIGHTERS IN THE BEQAA TO CEASE



~~OF EAST AND WEST AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME~~". THE MEETING ISSUED  
A STATEMENT CALLING ON AL-FATAH FIGHTERS IN THE BEQAA TO CEASE  
FIGHTING AMONGST THEMSELVES AND SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES BY  
TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC MEANS. IT ALSO REAFFIRMED THE INDEPEND-  
DENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN DECISION. (TEXTS FOLLOW BY BAG.)

5. THE EAST JERUSALEM PRESS HAS BEEN FULL OF ANTI-SYRIAN (AND  
ANTI-LIBYAN) EDITORIALS FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND HAS PUBLISHED INTER-  
VIEWS WITH MOST LEADING FIGURES IN THE TERRITORIES. ALL HAVE MADE  
CLEAR THEIR SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT. MOST HAVE BEEN STRONGLY CRITICAL  
OF SYRIA. BUT THE COMMUNISTS, THE BAATHISTS, AND REPRESENTA-  
TIVES OF OTHER PLO FACTONS (DFLP, PFPL AND JIBRIL) HAVE MADE NO  
DIRECT CRITICISM OF SYRIA. THIS APPLIES TO BASSAM SHAKA'A,  
THE PRO-SYRIAN DISMISSED MAYOR OF NABLUS, WHO WAS WRONGLY QUOTED  
IN TODAY'S JERUSALEM POST AS HAVING DENOUNCED THE SYRIAN REGIME  
IN AN ARTICLE IN THE PRO-PLO DAILY AL-FAJR ON 26 JUNE.

4. ARAFAT'S EXPULSION HAS RESTORED UNITY HERE, FOR THE MOMENT AT  
LEAST. MOST PALESTINIANS HERE SAY THAT THEY HOPE FOR RECONCILI-  
ATION BETWEEN ARAFAT AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND SUPPORT  
ALGERIAN AND OTHER MEDIATION EFFORTS. IT IS WIDELY  
BELIEVED THAT ARAFAT WILL NOT ACCEPT RECONCILIATION UNLESS HIS  
(AND THE PLO'S) FREEDOM TO PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL LINE  
IS PRESERVED. MANY ALSO FEEL THAT THE RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN  
ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TOO STRIDENT FOR FEAR ABOUT THE FATE OF THE  
AL-FATAH FIGHTERS ENCIRCLED BY THE SYRIAN ARMY IN THE BEQAA.  
SOME EVEN SPECULATE THAT IF RECONCILIATION PROVES IMPOSSIBLE,  
ARAFAT MIGHT FORM A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE (IN CAIRO?). MANY  
WOULD PROBABLY DESERT HIM AND THE PLO IF THEY BECAME "PRISONERS"  
OF THE SYRIANS: IN THAT EVENT THE PLO COULD NO LONGER BE SAID  
TO BE "THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS".

5. ANWAR NUSEIBEH, A LEADING MODERATE AND FORMER JORDANIAN  
MINISTER (LPR NO 67) OFFERED AN INTERESTING SIDELIGHT ON THE  
ISSUE OF THE FATWA WHEN HE SPOKE TO HIM TODAY. HE SAID THAT THE  
DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AT A MEETING OF THE WAQF COUNCIL, WHICH  
HE HAD NOT ATTENDED. ON LEARNING OF IT, HE HAD STRONGLY ADVISED  
THE MUFTI TO LET IT LIE ON THE TABLE BUT HIS ADVICE HAD BEEN  
IGNORED. NUSEIBEH CONSIDERED THE ISSUE OF THE FATWA A SERIOUS  
MISTAKE BUT THOUGHT THE MUFTI HAD BEEN LONGING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY  
TO "PUNISH" ASSAD FOR THE MASSACRE OF MUSLIMS IN HAMA.

*FOR PAS'S ANMAN* CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,  
TEL AVIV, UKMS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

HENDERSON

Filed on USA:

Visit of Vice - Pres. Bush June 1981

1) Defence Pt 3: INF

2) Middle East Pt: Situation

3) Hong Kong: future of Pt 6

4) Foreign Pol:

East/West  
Relations Pt 3



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June, 1983

8

### Visit of Vice-President Bush

The Prime Minister has directed that no record should be circulated of her talk with Vice-President Bush on Friday, 24 June. Mr. Bush particularly requested this, stating that some of the information which he wished to pass to the Prime Minister was very sensitive.

The subjects covered were the Middle East, Hong Kong and China, East/West Relations and the INF negotiations.

You will wish to know that the question of Hong Kong was raised by Mr. Bush. The Prime Minister explained the present situation regarding our talks with the Chinese.

With regard to East/West Relations, you should be aware of two points:

- a) The Prime Minister told Mr. Bush that she was fully behind President Reagan in his wish to strengthen COCOM.
- b) Mr. Bush said that the previous American Ambassador in Prague was now a member of the National Security Council and that his views on East/West Relations were worth having. The Prime Minister thought that it might be useful for Sir Oliver Wright to talk to him in the next few weeks (I regret that I cannot supply his name, since Mr. Bush was unable to recall it!).

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

B. Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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FM AMMAN 261000Z JUNE 1983

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 26 JUNE 1983

REPEATED FOR INFO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,  
KUWAIT, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, UKHIS NEW YORK,  
WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

FOLLOWING IS FULL VERSION OF MY TELNO 239 (PARAS 2 AND 3  
OMITTED IN ERROR AT TIME OF DESPATCH).

PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 237: JORDAN/PLO

1. TODAY'S ARABIC PRESS CONFIRMED THAT KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 22 JUNE FROM ARAFAT REQUESTING JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE "PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST "THE ORGANISED AGGRESSION LAUNCHED IN THE LAST 2 DAYS BY SYRIAN AND LIBYAN FORCES AND THE PRO-LIBYAN AHMED JIBRIL GROUP IN THE BEQA'A VALLEY."

2. AN OFFICIAL JORDANIAN SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THESE ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE FREEDOM OF DECISION AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE PLO, WHICH HAS BEEN RECOGNISED BY ALL ARAB STATES SINCE THE RABAT SUMMIT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE SPOKESMAN WENT ON TO REAFFIRM JORDAN'S UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AND TO WARN OF THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF WEAKENING THE ORGANISATION OR TRANSFORMING IT INTO "A TOOL OF CERTAIN ARAB REGIMES." JORDAN WOULD MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT WITH HER ARAB BROTHERS TO AVERT THE DISASTER THREATENING THE PLO, WHILE TRUSTING IN THE CAPABILITY OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND ARAB WORLD TO FRUSTRATE CURRENT MOVES AGAINST THE PLO AND TO PRESERVE THE INDEPENDENCE OF DECISION OF THE PALESTINIANS.

3. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS ON 22 JUNE WITH KING FAHD AND PRESIDENT SADDAM AND ON 23 JUNE WITH THE EMIR OF QATAR ON THIS SUBJECT. THE HEADS OF STATE REPORTEDLY AGREED TO STAY IN TOUCH.

URVICK

## MIDDLE EAST

## STANDARD

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND VICE  
PRESIDENT BUSH ON FRIDAY 24 JUNE AT 10 DOWNING STREET

---

Present: Prime Minister  
Mr. A.J. Coles

Vice President Bush  
Admiral Murphy

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Bush congratulated the Prime Minister on the outcome of the General Election. He asked a number of questions the answers to which could be relevant to President Reagan's prospects of success should he decide to run again.

Mr. Bush then asked how the INF issue had been handled during the campaign. The Prime Minister said that the Conservative Party had in effect defeated the Opposition on the broad general issue of defence policy. So there had been little discussion of INF and the dual key issue had arisen only once or twice. Mr. Bush enquired how the Prime Minister had handled the latter question. The Prime Minister said that she had emphasised that joint decision meant what it said. We had reviewed the arrangements in relation to Cruise and had found them satisfactory. She had also taken the line with Conservative MPs that the whole dual key debate had anti-American over-tones with which she strongly disagreed. Mr. Bush said that this matter might be raised at his Press Conference later in the day. There was some discussion of the line he should take and the Prime Minister gave him a copy of her written Parliamentary Answer to Mr. Anthony Buck, M.P. of 12 May.

Mr. Bush then asked how the Greenham Common women were faring. The Prime Minister said that they had become an eccentricity. Their activities had been inflamed by the media. They were very unpopular in the area of Greenham Common because of the disruption caused to normal life.

She had no doubt that when the time came to deploy Cruise there would be further problems but these would have to be surmounted. She doubted whether Mr. Andropov would negotiate until deployment began.

/ She

She had been very surprised to hear President Mitterrand say at the recent European Council that the Soviet Union now wanted Cruise and Pershing to be deployed. She did not agree with this view. The only possible explanation for it was that the Russians sought a justification to deploy more nuclear weapons themselves.

Mr. Bush then said that he wanted to talk to the Prime Minister in great confidence about a matter which he had not discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and which was not widely known in the American Administration. Mr. Habib would shortly go back to the Middle East with a new proposal. The problem was how to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. It was necessary to dissuade Israel from embarking on partial withdrawal which would only increase the risks of the present situation. American objectives were still the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the reconstitution of Lebanon and security in the Galilee area.

Mr. Habib would try to persuade Mr. Begin to modify the existing Israel/Lebanon agreement. He would be asked to name a definite date for Israeli withdrawal. If he did so, the Americans would try to persuade the Syrians to name a definite date. These dates might not be the same because the Syrians were opposed to the agreement but they would be close enough so that the Israelis could show that their objective of withdrawal was being achieved.

It would be fatal to the initiative if news of it leaked. The Prime Minister said that she would keep this information to herself. In her view Syria was the key to the present situation. It was clearly much under Soviet influence. The question arose of how the West could acquire more influence in Damascus.

Mr. Bush said that money had a role to play. The Saudis were willing to send a large cheque to Syria. He had recently heard why it was that Syria had rejected a proposal that Habib should visit Damascus. This was because, at an earlier stage when Habib was negotiating the eleventh ceasefire in the Lebanon, President Asad had given his word that Syrian troops would observe the ceasefire. Begin had similarly given his word about Israeli troops but the day after the ceasefire agreement Israeli troops had moved forward. Asad had been extremely angry and held Habib responsible for this to this

day. Begin had attempted to argue that the ceasefire agreement did not rule out troop movements. The Prime Minister commented that this was typical of him. She well understood Asad's position. Her own confidence would have been undermined in similar circumstances.

Mr. Bush said that Israel had mounting public opinion problems. The Prime Minister reiterated that in her view more attention should be given to Asad and Khaddam. Arab confidence would be undermined if the Americans did not produce movement in the situation.

Mr. Bush said that President Reagan was well aware of this. His initiative was not dead. Moreover, Begin was less formidable now that Sharon was not with him.

The Prime Minister said that the speech made by President Reagan last September was absolutely first class. But, following Israel's rejection of the initiative, the Arab world had been disappointed at the American failure to follow up the initiative vigorously. They felt that one small country in the Middle East ought not to be able to deter a great power.

She had seen reports about Begin's present frame of mind. But this could have two alternative results. He could become less interested in the problem or more determined.

Mr. Bush said that he found Begin very unattractive. When he had visited Washington he had behaved as though the Israelis had never entered the Lebanon, bombed Beirut etc. Nevertheless the Americans would try to move things forward. They felt that they must have a Lebanon settlement before they could focus again on Arab/Israel. The Prime Minister said that we must also support King Hussein. He was a remarkable man and had made strenuous efforts with the PLO. But when there was no response from Begin, he had practically given up. She believed that Arafat might have made a more positive move if Begin had made some move on Israeli settlement policy.

Mr. Bush said that

the PLO could be serious. A recent report suggested that

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

side with the non-Arafat section. The Prime Minister commented that there was a choice between trying to do something while Arafat remained in the leadership or take the risk of waiting until the real terrorists took over.

Mr. Bush then raised the question of Hong Kong and China. American relations with China were a little better. They had made the mistake earlier of not following up their undertakings to the Chinese. In negotiations with China you had to keep your word. So earlier undertakings on the transfer of technology would now proceed. Taiwan was the exacerbating factor. With regard to relations with Taiwan the Americans had done what their law required them to do. The Chinese had not reacted vehemently. Taiwan remained a very difficult issue but the US Ambassador in Peking was now more optimistic that China and Taiwan might be able to arrive at a settlement of their differences. Was China also likely to get a reasonable arrangement over Hong Kong?

The Prime Minister said that our talks with the Chinese were now entering a more intensive phase. China was suddenly giving more attention to the issue. We had now reached agreement on an agenda for the talks. She took the view that it would be absurd if the United Kingdom and China could not make arrangements for the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong to continue. But that required continuing British administration in one form or another. It might be possible to find a solution which salvaged China's pride but preserve Hong Kong's system. The Chinese would have in mind that if they disrupted the situation in Hong Kong this would have a negative impact on Taiwan.

Mr. Bush asked where the talks with the Chinese were taking place. The Prime Minister said that they were being conducted through diplomatic channels in Peking.

The Prime Minister said that she found it disturbing that Andropov had never set foot in a democratic country. Mr. Bush said that the Administration had divided views on Andropov's health. The Finns had told them that Andropov's health was not as bad as reported. But some sources, reported that he had only two months to live. Mr. and Mrs. Harriman, who had recently visited Moscow, had also said that Andropov's health did not seem to be as bad as reported though he had kept his hands under the

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table during their talk. A family doctor who had had access to Andropov's medical records had given the view that he had only two months to live. The Prime Minister said that she wondered about the quality of decisions taken by a person in Andropov's health. But perhaps this was not of great importance in a collective system.

She was more anxious about the future of East/West relations. It was necessary to reassess them. The West must keep up its strength. But now that the Soviet Union knew that the West would do so, it was necessary to consider how to deal with them in the non-military field. She was fully behind the President in his wish to strengthen COCOM. We should consider how we could best influence the Soviet people and how best we could carry forward relations. We could trade to mutual advantage. Chancellor Kohl would visit Moscow on 4 July. She had every confidence in him. She told Mr. Bush in confidence that she would be reviewing our strategy in September. When she had completed this review it might be useful for her to visit Washington and compare notes. She had the impression that the West had been staggering from decision to decision without an overall concept.

Mr. Bush said that Mr. Harriman had reported a remark by Andropov to the effect that the Russians had no communication with the Americans. But Mr. Shultz had met Dobrynin eleven times, most recently last Saturday. In the Vice President's judgement, President Reagan now had Soviet attention. They might not like American rhetoric but they had been using rhetoric themselves. The onset of the long United States election period was worrying. Mr. Mondale was saying publicly that the first thing he would do, if elected, is visit Andropov. So there was a danger of East/West relations becoming an issue in the election campaign.

The Prime Minister commented that in her view the aim should be to persuade Andropov to visit the West. But we needed a strategy. Otherwise one Head of Government after another would visit Moscow. If Mrs. Gandhi's proposal for a meeting of Heads of Government at the UNGA came to anything, and if this provided possibilities for meetings between Andropov and Western leaders in New York, it could be useful.

Mr. Bush said that the previous American Ambassador in Prague



was now a member of the National Security Council. It might be useful for one of our people to talk to him before our strategy review. Mr. Bush undertook to send the Prime Minister a copy of Mr. Harriman's report on his visit to Moscow.

The discussion ended at 1235.

24 June 1983

②



with the  
compliments of

*[Handwritten signature]*

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, MP

Prime Minister

you should see this copy.

but there is nothing very  
new in it.

MA  $\frac{24}{6}$

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

J.A.  
MA  $\frac{24}{6}$

## Rasana &amp; Confidential

23rd June, 1983.

An Omani friend of mine whose opinion I value, had a talk in the last 48 hours with Sheik Zaid of Abu Dhabi.. What he told me of it seems of some interest in itself and has suggested two trains of thought which you might like to consider. One his. One mine.

\* \* \*

Sheik Zaid began the conversation with a historical survey of the affairs of the Gulf dwelling at some length on the expansionist attitudes of the Saudis towards their neighbours. It was only by good fortune and with British support in 1955 and 1957/58 that what is now the UAE and Oman had avoided being gobled up by them.

He, Sheik Zaid, was now working closely with the Saudis in the Gulf Council but had a poor opinion of their statesmanship. The West were quite mistaken to regard them as the key country in the area. All their efforts to reconcile Syria and Iraq, Syria and Jordan, the PLO and Jordan, still less to mediate over the Iran/Iraq war had cost them a lot of money but had produced no results.

The key country in the area had always been Egypt. He was on record at the Bagdad Summit when Egypt was expelled from the Arab League as advising against expulsion. It was not that he approved of Camp David; simply that he thought that an Arab League without Egypt was a nonsense.

At this stage my friend interposed to say that he hoped President Mubarak would go to Saudi Arabia shortly. Sheik Zaid replied firmly "no". He would be greatly mistaken to do this. He should wait until the Saudis had reached the stage of total despair. Then they will go to him. The time is not far off.

My friend then said that talking of despair, Yasser Arafat's position seemed pretty desperate. As he understood it, Arafat had even sent a message to Mubarak asking for help. Had he sent one to Sheikh Zaid?

Sheikh Zaid said that of course he had. But there was nothing he could do about it. If Arafat wanted to save anything he should go to the Khataib (i.e. the Lebanese Maronite Christians)! There was probably no other way in which he could survive politically or perhaps physically, cut off as he was by land and sea.

\* \* \*

So much for Sheikh Zaid's thinking which may have been partly tailored to my friend who comes from Oman.

I come next to a conclusion which my friend drew from the talk.

Arafat's situation does, indeed, seem desperate. You will, I expect, have seen the statement by his spokesman Ahmed Abdul Rachman "that if Arab mediation failed and Syria maintained its pressure the Arafat loyalists would fight back. If the Arab world is ready to accept a new Masada for the Palestinians, so be it".

My friend has no particular interest in Arafat's survival but wondered whether there might not be advantage in suggesting to the President of Lebanon that he offer Arafat a safe conduct to Beirut. If King Hussein agreed to this, *Amman*, ~~he~~ might then send him on to Amman on condition that he, Arafat, undertook to sign the agreement with Hussein he had initialed back in April - the agreement being no doubt suitably amended to reflect King Hussein's strengthened bargaining position.

If you thought there was anything in the idea I imagine you would want to discuss it with the Americans and the Lebanese and possibly with the Israelis. I have no brief myself for Arafat and no particular desire to see him preserved. But there might be advantage in preserving a relatively conservative wing of the PLO.

\* \* \*

I come now to my own thoughts on the matter of bearing in mind that most Middle East initiatives run into the desert sands.

The US seem all along to have staked their faith on the ability of the Saudis to forward their Middle Eastern policies. In fact, as Sheik Zaid said, Saudi efforts to do so have been less than fruitful. Indeed their subsidies to the Syrians and the PLO have probably been counter productive, simply helping the Syrians to keep going and the PLO to stay independent of Hussein.

Is there an alternative policy? Ought we not to try and persuade the US to put much more pressure on the Saudis to cooperate with Egypt? Saudi money and Egypt would be a pretty powerful combination. We have been, and quite rightly, urging the US to put pressure on Israel; but the Americans probably have just as much clout if not more in Riyadh as they do in Jerusalem. There is no appreciable Arab lobby in the US to restrain the Administration if it decides to use its clout with the Saudis.

Sheikh Zaid is of course only one of many Arab leaders and by no means the most important and, as I know from experience, he has the gift of saying what his visitors want to hear. But his thinking as reported in this letter is not so different from that of Sultan Qaboos. I reported Qaboos' views in a letter to Margaret Thatcher copied to Francis Pym of 21st April. This is no doubt available to you.

In view of what has happened to the PLO since then I ~~have~~ think it more charitable not to comment on Francis's reply to me in any detail. The emphasis in this on the extent of PLO ~~opinions~~ on the West Bank and on the intrinsic importance of the PLO seem to have been to say the least of it, rather behind the game.

On balance these two Arab opinions - Qaboos's and Zaid's - coupled with those of President Mubarak and as I understand it of King Hussein seem to suggest a change of emphasis in our approach to the whole problem. It would suggest rather less reliance on Saudi opinion and a rather more determined effort, presumably through the U.S. to persuade the Saudis to work with the Egyptians and so indirectly with the Israelis. In the crunch the Saudi dynasty have not much alternative.

I am copying this letter to Margaret Thatcher.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP

\* 4<sup>+</sup> May 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 June 1983

SINAI: MULTINATIONAL FORCE

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Director General of the Multinational Force, together with the Annual Report which he enclosed.

I should be grateful if you would let me have a suitable draft reply for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister, and if you would at the same time return the Annual Report. May I please have the draft reply by Wednesday 6 July.

I am sending a copy of this letter, without enclosure, to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



R22

ASC  
~~EF~~

*With the compliments of the  
Multinational Force and Observers*

*Office of Public Affairs*

*C. P. 642*

*00187 Rome, Italy*

*Col. 39-6*

*5918841*

*5920322*

*ext. 245*



Rome, June 9, 1983

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) has now been in the Sinai for over a year.

I felt that it was time to attempt to assess the role it has played and the quality of its performance through this Annual Report.

As Director General of the MFO, I deeply appreciate the commitment and contribution of your Government to our peace-keeping mission. The publication of this Report is also a tribute and recognition for the efforts made by your officers, soldiers and civilians in the cause of peace.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'L. R. Hunt', is positioned above the typed name.

Leamon R. Hunt  
Director General

Multinational Force and Observers

The Right Honorable  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
London.



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 June, 1983

*N. P. P. R.*

*A. J. C. 8/6*

*Dear John,*

International Conference on the Question of Palestine

You wrote to me on 6 May giving the Prime Minister's views on this. Since then there has been much debate about possible postponement or cancellation of the European Preparatory Conference and the Conference itself; consultation with the Ten was held up to await the outcome. But we and our partners have now received formal invitations to a European Preparatory Conference in Geneva on 4-8 July. The Germans propose not to attend, and are now coordinating the views of the rest of the Ten in New York. We shall be giving them support.

No decision need yet be taken on attendance in August at the International Conference itself, as the Preparatory Committee has not yet decided on a venue (having apparently abandoned Paris). There is a distinct possibility of postponement or cancellation.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Middle East: Situation.

Pt 11

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FM WASHINGTON 232347Z MAY 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1453 OF 23 MAY

INFO MOSCOW UKDEL NATO BEIRUT CAIRO JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK  
DAMASCUS AMMAN BAGHDAD ALGIERS RABAT TUNIS AND TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 864: ISRAEL/LEBANON/SYRIA

1. IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXCHANGES IN MIFT IT IS CLEAR THAT  
WHATEVER GRINEVSKY SAYS, THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN ON BOARD THE  
NEED TO KEEP UP A DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS. BUT THEY ARE  
CERTAINLY NOT LIKELY TO BE PERSUADED OF THE DESIRABILITY OF  
LETTING THEM IN ON THE NEGOTIATING ACT.

2. AS SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, THE AMERICANS - ALL AMERICANS AND  
ANY LIKELY ADMINISTRATION OR CONGRESS - HAVE TWO CENTRAL PURPOSES  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FIRST, TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL;  
AND SECONDLY TO SHUT OUT THE RUSSIANS. THE METHOD: THE  
CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, STARTED AT CAMP DAVID AND  
RESUMED IN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE.

3. THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL IS CENTRAL TO AMERICAN PREOCCUPATIONS,  
BOTH BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DOMESTIC JEWISH VOTE  
WHICH WOULD INCAPACITATE ANY ADMINISTRATION WHICH IGNORED IT,  
AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS OF ISRAEL,  
WHICH MAKE IT BOTH WORTHY OF SUPPORT AND IMPERVIOUS TO SOVIET  
BLANDISHMENTS. THIS COMBINATION OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY  
CONSIDERATIONS MAKES AMERICANS AT EASE WITH THE PEACE PROCESS,  
SINCE IT SECURES ISRAEL'S BORDERS ONE BY ONE AND INVITES THE  
ARABS TO JOIN IN THE PROCESS WITH PEACE, FOR THEM AS WELL AS  
ISRAEL, AS THE PRIZE.

4. THIS STRATEGY ALSO SHUTS OUT THE RUSSIANS, SINCE IT DEMONSTRATES  
TO ALL WHO HAVE EYES TO SEE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ONLY THE  
NEGATIVE POWER TO FRUSTRATE THE PEACE PROCESS, EG VIA SYRIA:  
WHEREAS IT IS THE AMERICANS ALONE WHO CAN ACTUALLY ADVANCE THE  
CAUSE OF PEACE FOR THOSE ARABS WHO NEED IT, EG EGYPT AND LEBANON,  
AND WHO ARE ABLE AND WILLING TO ENSURE IT.

5. THE STRATEGY AND THE OUTCOME OF THE SHULTZ MISSION ALSO HAVE  
THE MERIT, IN AMERICAN EYES, OF REFLECTING PRETTY ACCURATELY THE  
POWER RELATIONSHIPS ON THE GROUND, NEVER A BAD BASIS FOR A POLICY.  
THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD, MODERATE OR IMMEDIATE, HAS BEEN REVEALED  
TO BE, WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN, IMPOTENT: STRONG ON RHETORIC,  
WEAK ON ACTION. WHETHER SYRIA IS PURSUING SOVIET OR ITS OWN  
OBJECTIVES IS, ON THIS ANALYSIS, IRRELEVANT. RUSSIA, SYRIA,

*Discarded*

*This thoughtful telegram  
by Olin Wright is  
well worth reading in full  
if you have time.*

*A.P.C. 21.*

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/IS OVER

(IS OVER A BARREL (SEE OTHER ASSESSMENTS) IT HAS HAD TO TAKE THE RISK, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION IN SYRIA, OF INSTALLING SA5 SITES WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL, WITHOUT INDEPENDENT MEANS TO DEFEND THEM. THIS POSES RISKS FOR US ALL IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY GENERALIZED RENEZVAL OF ISRAELI/SYRIAN FIGHTING, BUT NOT LEAST FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE THE PROBABILITY IS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD WIN. ISRAEL MEANWHILE, AS A REWARD FOR HAVING SIGNED ON WITH LEBANON, GETS ITS 75 F16'S.

6. AS THE AMERICANS SEE IT, THE LEBANESE WILL NOW HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SYRIANS: AND THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WILL SHOW WHETHER THE SYRIANS ARE INTERESTED IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EASTERN LEBANON ROUGHLY COMPARABLE TO THOSE THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACHIEVED IN THE SOUTH, OR WHETHER THEIR OBJECTIVE IS SIMPLY TO STAY WHERE THEY ARE. THE AMERICANS WILL TRY TO ADVANCE THINGS. THEY ARE AWARE THAT IF THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES, WE MAY BE FACED BY A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL LATER IN THE YEAR.

7. MEANWHILE, AIDED BY THE PLO'S REJECTION OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK CONTINUES. THE BEGIN VISION OF ISRAEL PLUS JUDEA AND SAMARIA SLOWLY TAKES SHAPE AS OCCUPATION IMPERCEPTIBLY SHADES INTO DE FACTO ANNEXATION. THAT TOO REFLECTS THE FACTS OF POWER. TOO BAD, THE AMERICANS WOULD SAY (AND SOME COMMENTATORS ARE ACTUALLY WRITING IT): THE ARABS HAD THEIR CHANCE TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS AND FUNKED IT.

8. THE AMERICANS ARE NOT GOING TO OFFER AMENDMENTS TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE ON THE WEST BANK OR TO THE ISRAELI/LEBANON AGREEMENT IN RESPONSE TO PLO OR SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE. MEANWHILE, OF COURSE, IT SUITS THE PRESIDENT WELL DOMESTICALLY TO HAVE NO MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH ISRAEL ON HIS HANDS.

9. OBVIOUSLY I OVERSIMPLIFY A SITUATION OF GREAT AND CONTINUING COMPLEXITY. WHAT, YOU MAY ASK, ABOUT OIL: AND THE FUTURE? WHAT INDEED EXCLAM BUT I SHOULD BE VERY GREATLY SURPRISED IF WHAT I HAVE WRITTEN DID NOT REPRESENT THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE AMERICAN POSITION, POST HOC IF NOT PROPTER HOC. THE CONCLUSION FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS TELEGRAM IS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS. APART FROM SOME COMMON INTEREST IN TRYING TO AVOID A FURTHER MAJOR OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES THEY HAVE NOT FOUND THIS VERY PRODUCTIVE. SO FAR AS NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THEY THINK THE RUSSIANS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO PLAY A SPOILING GAME. THEY WILL REMAIN PROFOUNDLY SCEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER THEY WILL DO ANYTHING TO ASSIST IN BRINGING ABOUT A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

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6 cc Mr. Jackling

PRIME MINISTER

JIC BUSINESS

The only important paper in this week's Red Book is the piece on the possibility of war between Syria and Israel. The analysis and the conclusions are fair enough. My own feeling is that the present state of dangerous tension will continue for a long time. With Syrian and Israeli forces confronting each other, with Israel having accepted in principle an agreement to withdraw, and with Syria having rejected it, there will be a permanent danger of a sudden flare-up, either by accident or by the design of one side or the other. Only resolution of the present impasse will diminish the risk.

As regards the Belgian report of a possible hit and run raid on Port Stanley by the Argentine Air Force on 25 May, the CIG will put an assessment in the Prime Minister's box this evening. At this morning's meeting, the Assessment Staff had no evidence either for or against the Belgian report. They were, however, inclined to take it a bit seriously: there have recently been one or two reports of plotting of this kind of action in the Air Force, ultimately restrained by the Argentine Navy. The Assessment Staff were, therefore disposed to take this report a bit more seriously than a report of unexpected Naval movements - three frigates and two Polar research ships with helicopters on board - at a time when they would have expected the whole Argentine Navy to have been in port - May 17 is Argentine Navy Day.

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A.D. PARSONS  
19 May 1983

SECRET

Middle East

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FROM WASHINGTON 171721Z MAY 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1358 OF 17 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT,  
PRIORITY CAIRO, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BAGHDAD,  
ALGIERS, MOSCOW.

ISRAEL/SYRIA/LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAW EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING, HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS THINK THAT ASAD MAY BE 'POSITIONING HIMSELF TO BE BOUGHT'. SHULTZ DOES NOT BELIEVE HE IS IMPLACABLY OPPOSED TO AN AGREEMENT. HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO SCARE THE LEBANESE, WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. THE RUSSIANS WOULD PRESS HIM TO REMAIN RECALCITRANT. SHULTZ FELT THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS IN ITS STATEMENTS CONCERNING SYRIA (EAGLEBURGER INDICATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED WEINBERGER NOT TO HAVE TAKEN SO TOUGH A LINE - (MY TELNO. 1355).

2. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT, WHEREAS THE US AND THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE LEBANON, SHULTZ HAD SUCCEEDED IN SHIFTING THAT RESPONSIBILITY TO SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD RECEIVED SOME DEGREE OF SUPPORT EVEN FROM THE IRAQIS AND ALGERIANS, A VERY GOOD RESPONSE FROM MUBARAK AND A 'TYPICALLY WISHY-WASHY' ONE FROM THE SAUDIS. THE AMERICANS WANTED TO LET THE CONCERN OF SOME OF THE MORE MODERATE ARABS THAT SYRIA WAS BLOCKING WITHDRAWAL BUILD UP ON ASAD, WHO MUST ALSO BE CONCERNED THAT SYRIA MIGHT AGAIN GET MILITARILY EMBROILED WITH ISRAEL. THIS WOULD BE MORE COSTLY FOR THE ISRAELIS NEXT TIME: BUT THEY COULD STILL DO IT. SHULTZ WANTED TO LET THINGS COOK A WHILE. THE LEBANESE HAD SAID THAT THEY WANTED TO DEAL WITH THE SYRIANS, RATHER THAN HAVING THE AMERICANS DO SO, GEMAYEL WAS NOW SAYING SOMETHING RATHER DIFFERENT AND SHULTZ MIGHT HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE AREA, BUT CERTAINLY NOT IMMEDIATELY. THE ISRAELIS, SO FAR, WERE SHOWING CAUTION. THEY WERE NOT REINFORCING IN THE BEKA'A VALLEY. THEY WERE UNDER DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO GET OUT.

3. I ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE UNDER PRESSURE TO GET ALL THE WAY OUT. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THEY WERE - WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT. I ASKED WHAT THE AMERICANS COULD OFFER THE SYRIANS. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SYRIAN HINTS THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN A MORE PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE BEING ABLE TO ASK CONGRESS FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR SYRIA IF THE AMERICANS GOT SOME SYRIAN PERFORMANCE. BUT THE SYRIANS WOULD NO DOUBT ALSO WANT SOMETHING ON THE GOLAN. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY

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/ALSO

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ALSO WANT TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THEY HAD NEGOTIATED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EASTERN LEBANON. ON THESE, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IT WOULD BE FOR THE LEBANESE TO DEAL WITH THEM DIRECT. THE AMERICANS WOULD PROBABLY NEED TO COME INTO THE ACT SUBSEQUENTLY.

4. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT SHULTZ HAD SUCCEEDED IN RE-ESTABLISHING SOME SENSE OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND WASHINGTON. THIS WAS OF NO REAL HELP IN RELATION TO THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT IT WAS HELPFUL IN HOLDING THE ISRAELIS BACK FROM REACTING TO THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE. I NOTED THAT IT WAS ALSO HELPFUL DOMESTICALLY. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT INDEED IT WAS. HE HAD JUST MET A NUMBER OF JEWISH LEADERS, WHO WERE NOW EXPRESSING A GREAT DEAL LESS CONCERN ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES. I ASKED WHERE ALL THIS LEFT US ON THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS. EAGLEBURGER SAID NOWHERE. SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR IN JERUSALEM WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE SETTLEMENTS. BUT THE LEBANON HAD NOW MOVED TO CENTRE STAGE, AS WAS INEVITABLE FOLLOWING ARAFAT'S PERFORMANCE IN THE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN.

WRIGHT

## MIDDLE EAST

### STANDARD

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TELNO 270 OF 17 MAY 83  
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

BAHRAIN TELNO 120 TO FCO AND FCO TELNO 201 TO NEW YORK : OIL SLICK.

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF KUWAIT AND THE UAE ARRIVED IN TEHRAN ON 16 MAY. THE VISIT IS BEING GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY HERE, WITH THE IRANIANS EMPHASISING THAT TALKS ARE BEING HELD ONLY ON THE OIL SLICK, AND NOT ON THE WAR.

BARRINGTON

THIS TELEGRAM  
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FM AMMAN 100840Z MAY 83  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 9 MAY 1983  
REPEATED ROUTINE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS,  
UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 219: US/MIDDLE EAST

1. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS NOW GIVEN ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS DURING MR SHULTZ'S VISIT TO AMMAN ON 6/7 MAY.

2. SHULTZ BRIEFED THE JORDANIANS ON THE AGREEMENT REACHED OVER LEBANON (THE DETAILS OF WHICH I ASSUME ARE KNOWN TO YOU). SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT THE KEY LEBANESE REQUEST FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON HAD BEEN MET. THERE WOULD HOWEVER BE SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN A ZONE BOUNDED BY THE AWALAH RIVER, THE SOUTHERN APPROACHES TO THE BUKHRA MOUNTAINS AND A LINE IN THE BEKAA VALLEY, WHERE JOINT LEBANESE/ISRAELI VERIFICATION TEAMS (NOT MORE THAN EIGHT TEAMS IN ALL), COMPOSED OF TEN LEBANESE AND TEN ISRAELIS UNDER LEBANESE COMMAND, WOULD OPERATE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, SUPERVISED BY A LEBANESE/ISRAELI/US COMMITTEE. THE AGREEMENT MADE NO PROVISION FOR DIPLOMATIC TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SEMICOLON THE IMPORTATION FROM ISRAEL OF GOODS WHICH LEBANON PRODUCES FOR EXPORT WAS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED.

3. KING HUSSEIN HAD WARMLY WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT AND PLEDGED THAT JORDAN WOULD DO ALL SHE COULD TO PROMOTE ITS ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION, ALTHOUGH HE EXPRESSED DOUBT HOW FAR OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD PROVE WILLING TO GO IN THEIR BACKING FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE KING

TO GO IN THEIR BACKING FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE KING HIMSELF WAS PLANNING TO SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO LEBANON THIS WEEK AS A GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT JORDAN FOUND HERSELF IN MANY WAYS IN A SIMILAR POSITION TO LEBANON AND DERIVED HOPE FROM THE RECENT LEBANESE EXPERIENCE THAT A WEAK COUNTRY COULD GET TO GRIPS WITH ITS PROBLEMS, HOWEVER ADVERSE THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. THERE WAS ALSO A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON HOW THE PEACE PROCESS MIGHT BE CONTINUED. THE KING EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE POLARISATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE REGION, AND ALSO HIS FRUSTRATION BOTH WITH THE PLO AND WITH THE LUKE-WARM SUPPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MODERATE ARAB LEADERS. THE KING HAD SAID HE DID NOT WISH THE JORDAN/PLO TALKS TO END WITHOUT RESULT AND REAFFIRMED THAT JORDAN REMAINED FULLY DETERMINED TO WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE. HE HOPED THE AGREEMENT ON LEBANON WOULD HELP IN THIS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF RECENT MOROCCAN ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION, SHULTZ ASSURED THE KING THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH HIM AND THROUGH NO-ONE ELSE. THE KING URGED THE AMERICANS TO MAKE THEIR POSITION ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE SAUDIS AND MOROCCANS, AND TO PRESS THEM TO PERSUADE ARAFAT TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN. HE ALSO ASKED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE PLO. THE KING PRESSED SHULTZ FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION REMAINED DETERMINED TO SEE THINGS THROUGH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SHULTZ SAID THE AMERICANS WOULD INDEED CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT AND WERE AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO MORE WITH THE SAUDIS AND ALSO TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE TENSION BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. SHULTZ TOLD THE KING THAT THERE WERE NOW 6,000 SOVIET ADVISERS IN SYRIA. NONETHELESS HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE SYRIANS REALLY WANTED TO START A WAR. IF THEY DID, ISRAEL WOULD WIN IT SEMICOLON MOREOVER IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO INTERVENE IN A WAR WHICH SYRIA HAD STARTED. SHULTZ ADDED THAT THE US WERE NOT ABOUT TO BE FACED DOWN BY THE RUSSIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE KING CONTRASTED THE LACK OF SUPPORT FOR JORDAN FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHERS WITH CONTINUING SAUDI FINANCIAL LARGESSE TO SYRIA.

6. SUMMING UP HIS OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE VISIT, VIETS SAID SHULTZ HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY GLAD THAT THE KING HAD UNEQUIVOCALLY AND PUBLICLY ENDORSED THE AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

7. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHEN I SAW HIM YESTERDAY, WAS MUCH LESS POSITIVE ABOUT THE TALKS WITH SHULTZ AND CLAIMED THAT THE JORDANIAN SIDE HAD MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO EXPOSE JORDAN AGAIN TO THE DANGERS OF ATTEMPTING TO LEAD THE WAY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE MOVES UNLESS OTHERS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION THAN HITHERTO. QASEM THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS, HAVING IMPROVED THEIR IMAGE BY OFFERING TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, WOULD NOW EXPLOIT SYRIAN REJECTION TO

THE ISRAELIS, HAVING IMPROVED THEIR IMAGE BY OFFERING TO  
WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, WOULD NOW EXPLOIT SYRIAN REJECTION TO  
AVOID DOING SO. QASEM, WHO DID NOT REFER TO HIS OWN PROPOSED VISIT  
TO BEIRUT (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE), SEEMED PARTICULARLY  
CONCERNED OVER THE CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT COVERING TRADE  
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND SAID THAT, IF THE LEBANON  
WERE PILLORIED IN AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING FOR IMPORTING GOODS  
FROM ISRAEL, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR EVEN THE MODERATE  
EBBETWQBEDTBISDPBRSEHERBQZODTTE  
AS EGYPT HAD BEEN. ACCORDING TO VIETS, QASEM DID NOT RAISE  
THIS POINT IN THE PLENARY SESSION WITH SHULTZ SEMICOLON  
HOWEVER, HE SUMMONED VIETS AFTERWARDS AND SPOKE AT LENGTH  
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL DANGERS HE SAW FOR LEBANON IN THIS ASPECT  
OF THE AGREEMENT.

URWICK

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Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 May 1983

International Conference on the Question of Palestine

Thank you for your letter of 4 May about this subject.

The Prime Minister's preference is that we should not attend the European Preparatory Meeting in Geneva on 24-27 May. She regards this Preparatory Meeting as unnecessary. Any necessary arrangements to prepare an International Conference on the question of Palestine should, in the Prime Minister's view, be made through diplomatic channels. She accepts, however, that we should need to persuade others of our viewpoint. If they do not accept it, she would be prepared to envisage sending an observer on the understanding that he did not speak.

The Prime Minister will wish to consider the question of our attendance at the International Conference itself in the light of the outcome of the Preparatory Meeting but would not wish any hint to be given that we might take a positive decision on this point.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree that

- (i) we should send an observer to the regional preparatory meeting on 24 to 27 May

4 May 1983

- (ii) we should reserve our position on attendance at the full conference in August?

A.F.C. 5/5

I should prefer that we did not attend this preparatory meeting which seems to me unnecessary. The proper channel for these arrangements is the dip to note one we should however to participate in this need.

Dear John,

International Conference on the Question of Palestine

The UN General Assembly decided in 1981 to hold an International Conference on the question of Palestine, the objectives being subsequently defined as increasing awareness of the facts relating to the issue and winning governmental and non-governmental support for effective measures to enable the Palestinians to exercise their 'inalienable rights'. The Conference itself is to be held in Paris from 16 to 27 August at UNESCO. Regional preparatory meetings have also been organised. The European Preparatory Meeting will be in Geneva on 24 to 27 May. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people, set up by the General Assembly in 1975, is acting as a Preparatory Committee for these meetings and the Conference itself.

on whole authority?

We have long considered this committee to have an unbalanced remit and composition, and have preferred not to associate ourselves with its work and its conclusions. We and the rest of the Ten apart from Greece abstained on the 1981 Resolution which decided to convene the Conference. However the Conference has now gathered a momentum of its own and promises to be a major event. We need to decide whether we should attend the European Preparatory Meeting and the Conference itself and if so in what capacity.

?

The Political Directors of the Ten are due to consider this at their meeting today and tomorrow. It would obviously be helpful to have a common line of the Ten if at all possible, but this looks unlikely. On present form, the Greeks will participate, the French will not (so long as the conference is held in Paris - it is quite possible that they will agree to participate in exchange for a change of venue) and the rest have not made up their minds,

only - no right to speak. not

/although



although most would probably favour some kind of compromise. There are basically three options: non-attendance; full participation; and attendance as observers (with the right to speak).

*Not if France do not attend*

The arguments in favour of attendance in one way or another are essentially that it will be a major event and that it will be difficult to explain, for example to the Arabs, why we are not attending a UN-sponsored conference on one of the world's most pressing problems when we have been in favour of similar conferences on Cambodia and Afghanistan and attended the recent Namibia conference as observers. Moreover if we do not attend, there is no possibility of influencing the outcome in any way and we can thereafter have no complaint if it becomes the basis of future General Assembly discussions.

*This is not the conference*

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the Conference will be a forum for a good deal of anti-Israeli and anti-US rhetoric and that any concluding document will fully reflect this. If we attend, even as observers, we tend to enhance the status of the conference and make it more difficult to dissociate ourselves from its conclusions. We cannot seriously argue that this conference is likely to be helpful to the cause of Middle East peace. Finally, our attendance would be criticized by the Israelis and the Jewish community here.

Sir J Thomson has recommended from New York that on balance we should try to rally a majority of the Ten around participation as observers in both meetings with the right to speak. Having considered this carefully, however, Mr Pym is of the view that while we should agree to attend the European meeting as observers, perhaps being represented at Counsellor level from UKMIS Geneva, we should make clear at the same time that our participation in the same capacity at the full Conference will depend on what emerges from the European meeting and the other regional preparatory meetings. This should be defensible to critics from both sides, and there is a fair chance of achieving a common position of at least 8 of the 10 on this basis.

/Since this



Since this decision may nevertheless attract some attention, it would be helpful to have an indication of the Prime Minister's views. It would be particularly helpful if we could give our Political Director a steer before the end of the meeting on 5 May.

*Then they should have consulted us*

*earlier. A.S.C. 5/5.*

*(I have said they must stall).*


*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

4 MAY 1983





PERSONAL AND  
CONFIDENTIAL


Box

Pr  
I have destroyed the  
letter of 21 April, 1983 to

25th April 1983

Mr. Gow.

A.F.C.  $\frac{3}{1}$



f.a.

Sultan Qaboos

Thank you very much for your letter of 21st April, with which you enclosed a letter of the same date addressed to the Prime Minister. This I have handed to her. The Prime Minister has asked me to say, particularly, how grateful she is to you for having written.

She always values your reports and advice.

IAN GOW

The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP

Middle East Site

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/FUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR ~~EBERTON~~  
SIR J BULLARD  
ED/NENAD  
ED/MED  
ED/UND

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/... ..

ED/CONSULAR DEPT

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*ms*

GRS 920

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FM TUNIS 221208Z APRIL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 22 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN BEIRUT  
CAIRO DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT  
RABAT SANA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI ATHENS BONN UKREP BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME AND MOSCOW

MY TEL NO 69: MR HURD'S MEETING WITH QADDUMI

1. MR HURD SAW QADDUMI FOR FORTY FIVE MINUTES AT THE RESIDENCE THIS MORNING. RAMLAWI AND DAJANI WERE ALSO PRESENT. THE MEETING WAS FRANK AND BUSINESS LIKE.

2. QADDUMI BEGAN BY DESCRIBING HOW THE SITUATION HAD CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE SINCE THE INVASION OF LEBANON. THE US BORE MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY, THE BOMBING OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT SHOWED THE INCREASING FRUSTRATION OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WITH THE AMERICAN ROLE. THE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN HAD BROKEN DOWN BECAUSE ALL THE PRESSURE HAD BEEN ON THE PALESTINIANS TO GIVE MORE CONCESSIONS. AS IT STOOD, THE REAGAN PLAN COULD NOT PRODUCE A PERMANENT AND JUST SOLUTION SINCE IT DID NOT RECOGNISE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND SELF-DETERMINATION, AND IGNORED THE PLO AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE PLO HAD MADE CLEAR TO KING HUSSEIN AT THE OUTSET THAT ANY PALESTINIAN DELEGATION AT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT, THE PLO WANTED TO NEGOTIATE BUT WOULD NOT DO SO THROUGH SUBSTITUTES. IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF THE FEZ PLAN AND UN RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE

~~THE BASIS OF THE FEZ PLAN AND UN RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE~~  
PALESTINIANS. A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ENDORSED BY AN INTERNATIONAL  
CONFERENCE INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAD INTERESTS IN THE  
AREA WHICH COULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. IF THERE WERE TO BE A  
SETTLEMENT THE AMERICANS MUST NOW IMPROVE THEIR OFFER: ONLY  
THIS COULD CHANGE THE PRESENT IMPASSE. IT WAS VITAL THAT AMERICANS  
PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS WHICH WITH SUFFICIENT  
DETERMINATION, THEY COULD DO, AS THEY HAD SHOWN IN 1956. QADDUMI  
ALSO REFERRED TO HMG'S HISTORICAL AND MORE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE  
PALESTINIANS. OUR ABILITY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS,  
INFLUENCE OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND EXERT LEVERAGE OVER THE ISRAELIS  
GAVE US AN IMPORTANT ROLE. OUR VIEWS HAD DEVELOPED A GREAT DEAL,  
ALTHOUGH SLOWLY. BUT WE COULD DO MORE, FOR EXAMPLE BY CLARIFYING  
OUR POSITION ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. MR HURD SAID THAT THE FEZ SUMMIT HAD MARKED A HIGH POINT  
IN EUROPEAN SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PALESTINIANS.  
BUT THE QUESTION THEN WAS HOW IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE REAGAN  
PLAN, HOWEVER OPEN TO CRITICISM FOR ITS SHORT COMINGS, WAS A MEANS  
OF IMPLEMENTING THE POSSIBILITIES THROWN UP AT FEZ. THE EUROPEANS  
HAD HOPED THAT THE PLO WOULD HAVE AGREED TO ALLOW KING HUSSEIN TO  
ENTER ONTO NEGOTIATIONS. THAT WOULD HAVE MAXIMISED THE PLO'S  
POSSIBILITIES OF AMERICAN PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND PROVIDE A REAL  
CHANCE TO BREAK  
THE DEADLOCK. WE HOPED THAT CHANCE REMAINED. BUT THE PLO'S  
REFUSAL WAS A SETBACK. EUROPEAN PEOPLE WERE FINDING IT DIFFICULT  
TO UNDERSTAND THE PLO'S DECISION. IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT  
NOW TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL., THOSE ISRAELIS AND ARABS WHO DID  
NOT WANT PEACE WERE REJOICING. A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PLO  
TO WIN SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN LOST. IT WAS A BAD  
AND A CRUCIAL MOMENT. A PRACTICABLE WAY FORWARD WAS NOW NEEDED  
IF THE SITUATION WAS TO BE RETRIEVED. FOR THIS REASON WE  
DOUBTED THE POINT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE WERE IN  
CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND WOULD CONTINUE TO  
ENCOURAGE THEM IN THEIR PEACE EFFORTS. BUT WE WERE NOT A  
DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

4. QADDOUMI COMMENTED THAT THE PRESENT PEACE PROCESS COULD  
NOT SUCCEED BECAUSE THE PLO WAS BEING ASKED TO MAKE ALL THE  
CONCESSIONS AT THE START. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EXPLANATION OF  
HIS PLAN HAD CONTAINED MANY UNHELPFUL ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ITS  
COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID, ITS FAILURE TO RECOGNISE THE PLO OR  
GUARANTEE THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ITS TOLERANCE OF  
EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. THIS DID NOT GIVE A BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE.  
IF THE PLO WERE TO TAKE A RISK THEY MUST FIRST SEE THE BENEFITS.  
BUT THEY COULD NOT GIVE WAY AT THE OUTSET ON THEIR THREE  
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS TO REPRESENTATION, SELF-DETERMINATION AND AN  
INDEPENDENT STATE. THE INITIATIVE MUST THEREFORE LIE WITH THE  
AMERICANS, NOT THE PALESTINIANS. THEY MUST COME FORWARD WITH NEW  
ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THE PALESTINIANS THAT A RISK WAS  
WORTH TAKING. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION QADDOUMI SAID THAT IT  
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE US WOULD TALK DIRECT TO THE PLO AND  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET TO LAY DOWN SECURITY GUARANTEES  
FOR A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE. NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO  
A PALESTINIAN STATE. GENUINE PROGRESS ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM,  
PERHAPS INCLUDING A TIMETABLE FOR THE PROGRESSIVE RETURN OF

~~THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET TO LAY DOWN SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE. NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. GENUINE PROGRESS ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, PERHAPS INCLUDING A TIMETABLE FOR THE PROGRESSIVE RETURN OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF REFUGEES, WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. INDEED THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS THE HEART OF THE MATTER.~~

5. MR HURD SAID THAT NO-ONE WAS EXPECTING THE PALESTINIANS TO ABANDON THEIR IDEAS OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND A JUST SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. BUT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION REMAINED WHETHER THE PLO WOULD ALLOW HUSSEIN TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE REAGAN PLAN. THIS WOULD HAVE CREATED THE CONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1957. WE WERE NOT SURPRISED THAT HUSSEIN HAD REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE ALONE. BUT WE WERE SURPRISED BY THE PLO'S DECISION. MR HURD EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT IT GAVE RISE TO THE FEELING THAT THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP WERE CONTENT TO REMAIN AS THEY WERE WITH THEIR CONSTANT TRAVELS AND MEETINGS RATHER THAN TAKE RISKS FOR THOSE WHO SUFFERED ON THE WEST BANK. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE NEW MOVES ASKED FOR BY QADDOUMI WERE LIKELY. QADDOUMI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, WITHOUT FURTHER CONCESSIONS FROM THE US, THE PLO WERE IN NO HURRY.

6. QADDOUMI REFERRED AT ONE STAGE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY ARAB SUMMIT. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER PLO TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN.

STIRLING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 22/1340Z CJS/DL



FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

5A

112, EATON SQUARE,  
SW1W 9AA  
TEL: 01-235 1543  
01-235 7409

SECRET

21st April, 1983.

*Dear Margaret,*

Sultan Qaboos came to lunch yesterday. I have always found him frank over the years but on this occasion he was unusually outspoken considering that others were present. He made two points which I understand he has already made to you and Francis Pym. He also asked me to reinforce them to you.

1. The Sultan believes that the essentials of the Reagan Plan can still be saved but on two conditions.
  - a) The Western powers should pay no further attention whatsoever to the PLO. If Yasser Arafat seeks to approach the West he should be told firmly that the proper post office for any approach is "King Hussein, Amman". The PLO are militarily and politically bankrupt. It is important for all concerned to make it clear to the Arab World that this is the Western view.
  - b) Ways must be found to enable the silent majority on the West Bank to show that they want King Hussein to be recognised as their representative. The Sultan considers that we should keep in very close touch with the King of Jordan about how to bring this about. He believes the Jordanians have several suitable West Bank personalities who could be relied upon to express themselves in this sense. If the West and the Jordanians fail to bring this about the West Bank will be lost.

The Sultan said that he had put these views very clearly to the President of the US and to the State Department. He believed they had been well understood in both quarters. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Butros Ghali, who had been received at the White House and at the State Department after the Sultan, had told him that his - the Sultan's views - had made a considerable impact on the Americans.

The Sultan judged that King Hussein could not have risked "going it alone" at this stage without Saudi support. It was essential that the Arab world should first be convinced that the PLO was now wholly discredited in the eyes of the West since only the West (i.e. the US) could bring pressure to bear on Israel. Time here was clearly of the essence since the American election campaign would open soon. Asked if Reagan would bring pressure to bear on Israel, the Sultan said that the President could hardly be expected to pressurise the Israelis until King Hussein was in a position to put his cards on the table. To pressurise the Israelis before this had happened would probably be counter-productive where Mr. Begin was concerned. It would also only encourage weaker elements in Arab opinion to hold back from supporting the Reagan plan.

2. The Sultan said that the crisis arising from the Iran/Iraq war was, of course, much more serious than the Palestinian crisis. In spite of extensive Soviet rearmament the Iraqis were in considerable danger. If they were defeated Iraq itself and the rest of the Middle East would be wide open to a dangerous spread of Shia fundamentalism which could spill over into Islamic fundamentalism generally. If, on the other hand, and this was less likely, the Iraqis prevailed in the fighting, the ensuing chaos in Iran would open the door to deep Soviet penetration of that country. The West should put all its efforts into achieving a compromise, or failing that, a stale mate. He even ventured the view that if the Iraqi position should weaken sufficiently it might conceivably be in the Soviet interest to co-operate with the West over this.

I am copying this letter to Francis Pym. I have marked it Secret in view of its fairly dangerous repercussions in the Arab world if its contents should leak.

*to sum,*  
*Julian,*

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP

PS. 1(a) of this letter rather puts in question the wisdom of Douglas Hurd's opening to the PLO in Tunis; but I suppose this was agreed between Francis and the Saudis before the breakdown in Amman.

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Middle East

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 607 OF 12 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS (INC. RIYADH), UKMIS NEW YORK, ROME  
PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, OTTAWA (PS/PUS).

MY VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST.  
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO SHULTZ.

BEGINS

DEAR GEORGE:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGES. I HAD INTENDED TO TELEGRAPH SOME  
PRELIMINARY IMPRESSIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA.  
BUT FOLLOWING KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT AND MY DECISION TO GO AND SEE  
HIM I THOUGHT IT BETTER TO WAIT.

I HAD A GOOD TALK WITH HUSSEIN. HE TOLD ME HE HAD SET OUT HIS VIEWS  
FULLY IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, SO I NEED NOT REPEAT THEM TO  
YOU.

HE WAS IN A CALM BUT SOMBRE MOOD. HE CLEARLY FEELS THAT WHILE HE HAS  
DONE ALL THAT COULD BE EXPECTED OF HIM TO ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS TO GET  
STARTED, OTHERS HAVE FAILED TO RISE TO THE OCCASION. AMONGST THOSE  
HE INCLUDES, OF COURSE, THE PLO LEADERSHIP, WHICH HE BELIEVES IS  
MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ITS OWN CONDITION THAN CONDITIONS ON THE WEST  
BANK: AND LEADERS OF CERTAIN FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES WHO HAVE  
REFRAINED FROM GIVING THE MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE PLO THE SAME  
DEGREE OF SUPPORT THE SYRIANS (WITH CLOSE RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE) HAVE  
GIVEN THE EXTREMISTS. I MUST ALSO TELL YOU THAT HE BELIEVES YOU  
PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE MOVED MUCH FASTER AND MORE DECISIVELY TO GET THE  
ISRAELIS OUT OF LEBANON AND PUT A STOP TO THEIR SETTLEMENTS ON THE

WEST BANK.

I ASKED HUSSEIN WHETHER HIS STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO INDUCE THE PLO  
TO THINK AGAIN. HE CONFIRMED THAT IN PART AT LEAST IT WAS SHOCK  
TREATMENT BUT HE DID NOT SEEM VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE PLO COULD  
RESPOND TO IT. HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN DUE  
COURSE THE ORGANISATION WOULD SPLIT, BUT EQUALLY HE DID NOT SEEM  
TO THINK THIS WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN SOON.

I TOLD THE KING THAT I NATURALLY WANTED TO SEE THE PEACE PROCESS  
CONTINUE AND WOULD BE CONSULTING YOU AND OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO  
SEE HOW BEST WE COULD HELP HIM. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT  
WANT TO PRONOUNCE THE PROCESS DEAD, AS THINGS STOOD HE HIMSELF HAD  
REACHED A DEAD-END. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD REVIVE  
THE PROCESS HE SAID THAT UNLESS THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHICH  
HE HAD JUST HAD A VERY GLOOMY BRIEFING FROM ELIE SALEM, COULD BE  
SUCCESSFULLY AND RAPIDLY CONCLUDED NO ARAB WOULD BELIEVE IN AMERICAN  
ABILITY TO DELIVER. (THE SAUDIS HAD EARLIER SAID THE SAME TO ME).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/ THE US

# CONFIDENTIAL

THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALSO TAKE SOME FIRM ACTION OVER THE SETTLEMENTS. IF BOTH THESE THINGS COULD BE DONE THE CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CHANGE FOR THE BETTER.

MY OWN VIEW IS THAT IF, AS WE ALL HOPE, THE REAGAN PROPOSALS ARE TO BE KEPT ALIVE IT WILL NEED SOME IMAGINATIVE EVEN DRAMATIC, ACTION EMANATING FROM THE PRESIDENT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. FAILING THAT WE MAY FACE AN EARLY RUSSIAN MOVE TO RE-ENTER THE SCENE BY RESUSCITATING THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND - MORE IMPORTANT - A WEAKENING OF THE WESTERN POSITION EVEN AMONG THE MODERATE ARABS. I IMAGINE YOU HAVE THESE SAME CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND YOURSELF.

I WILL ASK OLIVER WRIGHT TO ARRANGE FOR YOUR OFFICIALS TO HAVE A DETAILED BRIEFING ON MY TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UAE. KING HUSSEIN CLEARLY FEELS THE NEED FOR STAUNCHER SUPPORT FROM HIS ARAB FRIENDS, BUT HE IS DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOUR OF AN ARAB SUMMIT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

BEST WISHES,

FRANCIS

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## MIDDLE EAST

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### ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

### ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 121945Z APRIL 1983

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 175 OF 12 APRIL 1983

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TWO IPTS: SECRETARY OF STATES VISIT TO JORDAN:  
LEBANON.

1. IN THEIR TALKS ON 12 APRIL, KING HUSSEIN GAVE THE SECRETARY OF STATE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER EARLIER THE SAME MORNING.

2. SALEM HAD TOLD THE KING THAT NO PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON DEMANDS WHICH THE LEBANESE COULD NOT MEET. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WANTED MAJOR HADDAD TO COMMAND ALL FORCES SOUTH OF THE LITANI RIVER, ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS ATTACHED TO LEBANESE UNITS DOWN TO COMPANY LEVEL AND JOINT ISRAELI/LEBANESE PATROLS IN THE AREA WITH THE RIGHT TO SEARCH AND OPEN FIRE IF NECESSARY. THE ISRAELIS WERE DEMANDING VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT DEPOTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH BETWEEN 15 AND 25 ISRAELI OFFICERS ~~PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE AREA. THEY WERE ALSO INSISTING ON OPEN~~

~~DEPOTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH BETWEEN 15 AND 25 ISRAELI OFFICERS~~  
PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE AREA. THEY WERE ALSO INSISTING ON OPEN  
BORDERS AND FULL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND  
LEBANON IMMEDIATELY, WHEREAS THE LEBANESE HAD ASKED FOR A SIX  
MONTHS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

3. SALEM HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN THAT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING  
POSITION WAS VERY WEAK, IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG US  
SUPPORT, AND THAT THEY HAD GONE A VERY LONG WAY TO MEET ISRAELI DE-  
MANDS. BUT THEY WERE RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE POINT WHEN LEBANON  
WOULD BE BARGAINING AWAY HER SOVEREIGNTY. THE LEBANESE HAD FOR  
EXAMPLE AGREED TO A DEMILITARISED ZONE 37 KILOMETRES IN DEPTH,  
BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON 45 KILOMETRES.  
THEY HAD ALSO AGREED TO INCORPORATE ALL HADDAD'S MILITIA INTO  
LEBANESE UNITS, AND HAD ACCEPTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY  
WOULD ONLY BE EQUIPPED WITH LIGHT ARMS IN THE SOUTH SEMICOLON  
THEY HAD ALSO RENOUNCED ANY ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY WHICH  
COULD PREVENT ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER LEBANON.  
THERE WOULD BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUING DIALOGUE BETWEEN  
THE PARTIES THROUGH THE TRIPARTITE US/ISRAELI/LEBANESE COMMITTEES.

4. IN ADDITION THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT US TEAMS  
TO TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY TO COMBAT TERRORISM,  
AND SPECIAL US EQUIPMENT TO PREVENT INFILTRATION. THEY HAD ALSO  
AGREED TO THE PRESENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE AREAS  
ROUND TYRE AND SIDON. BUT THE LEBANESE HAD NOW REACHED THE  
LIMIT OF POSSIBLE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT ANY APPARENT WILLINGNESS  
ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS TO REACH AGREEMENT.

5. KING HUSSEIN AGREED WHEN MR PYM SUGGESTED THAT ISRAELI  
WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS PRECISELY THE KIND OF INDICATOR  
NEEDED TO RE-ESTABLISH ARAB CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES,  
BUT WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF  
HIS TALKS WITH SALEM.

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DED:IP

FROM AMMAN 121800Z APRIL 83

Mr Coles  
NO 10 DOWNST.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 174 OF 12 APRIL 1983

Prime Minister

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Handwritten mark*

Given by King Hussein to  
Mr. Lynn in confidence -

MIPT: JORDAN/US

see overleaf especially

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF LETTER DATED 10 APRIL FROM  
KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

A.J.C. 13/4

BEGINS.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT.

AS YOU WELL KNOW, IT IS AFTER ENERGETIC AND PROTRACTED CONSULTATION WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED THAT I DEEPLY REGRET THAT I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OFFER YOU MY CONCLUSIVE REPLY TO YOUR INVITATION TO ME, JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS TO JOIN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER PARTIES IN THE ARAB /ISRAELI CONFLICT IN PURPOSEFUL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SEARCH FOR A LONG OVERDUE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT HAS BEEN MY FIRM CONVICTION, MR PRESIDENT, THAT YOUR SEPTEMBER 1ST SPEECH OF 1982, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PEACE PLAN WHICH I HAD THE HONOUR TO DISCUSS WITH YOU LAST DECEMBER, HAS BEEN THE CAUSE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE TO DATE. IT WAS THE FIRST BOLD AND SINCERE ATTEMPT BY THE UNITED STATES AT INFLUENCING THE COURSE OF TRAGIC EVENTS IN THIS AREA SINCE 1956 SEMICLON PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE MOST OMINOUS AND DISTRESSING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION SINCE JUNE OF 1967. THESE IMPLICATIONS ARE CRITICALLY DECISIVE FOR ALL STATES IN THIS AREA AND POSSIBLY WORLD PEACE.

AS YOU WELL KNEW, ALL ALONG, MR PRESIDENT, I HAVE BEEN HONOUR BOUND BY THE RABAT ARAB SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS OF 1974 WHICH DESIGNATED THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE. AS SUCH THE PLO STATUS WAS REAFFIRMED BY THE ARAB SUMMIT AT FEZ LAST SEPTEMBER.

SINCE THAT SUMMIT, AND PARTICULARLY SINCE OUR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON D.C. IN DECEMBER, 1982, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A CEASELESS EFFORT TO RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FEZ SUMMIT DECISIONS (THE ARAB PEACE PLAN) AND YOUR OWN AMERICAN PEACE INITIATIVE. I HAVE BEEN DRIVEN SOLELY BY A SENSE OF THE DEEPEST CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNDER OCCUPATION, FOR THEIR JUST CAUSE AND INALIENABLE RIGHTS ON THE LAND OF THEIR FOREFATHERS.

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MY SERIOUS CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF GENERATIONS TO COME IN THIS ENTIRE AREA, IF NOT THE WORLD, HAS MOTIVATED ME, AS IT ALWAYS WILL, BY MY ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF ESTABLISHING A DURABLE, JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN OUR REGION.

I HAVE ENCOUNTERED A COMBINATION OF PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE REMAINED INSURMOUNTABLE.

1. THE EXCLUSION OF THE PLO FROM THE PROPOSED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PEACE INITIATIVE AND WASHINGTON'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO UNLESS IT ACCEPTED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND RECOGNITIONS OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, BY ENDORSING THE FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS THE PLO HAS IMPLICITLY MET THE AFOREMENTIONED CONDITIONS AND YET THE PLO WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AT LEAST AT THE INITIAL STAGE.

2. THE PROCRASTINATION BY ISRAEL OVER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WHICH WAS ANTICIPATED IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OF THE UNITED STATES PEACE PLAN, TOGETHER WITH ISRAEL'S ACCELERATED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS. THE DESCRIPTION BY WASHINGTON OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY AS OBSTRUCTIVE RATHER THAN ILLEGAL WAS INDEED UNFORTUNATE. MATTERS WERE MADE WORSE BY THE UNPRECEDENTED REPRESSION METED OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AS WELL AS VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS SHRINES. ALL THIS HAS COME IN THE WAKE OF THE MASSACRES IN SABRA AND CHATILA.

ALL THESE FACTORS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED THE US CREDIBILITY IN THIS AREA AND HELPED THOSE WHO WISHED TO CAST DOUBTS OVER THE UNITED STATES ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL TOWARDS THE HONOURABLE PEACE WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT, AND TO CAUSE ISRAEL TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE DANGEROUS COURSE WHICH IT HAS CHARTED FOR HERSELF IN THE AREA. IT IS IRONIC THAT ISRAEL STILL DEPENDS ON AMERICAN SUPPORT, TOLERANCE AND FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS SUSTAINED IT FOR SO LONG.

3. THE EXCLUSION OF THE U.S.S.R. FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE EFFORT HAS HAD A DISRUPTIVE IMPACT IN VIEW OF ITS NEGATIVE INFLUENCE WITH REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES PEACE PLAN.

4. THE COMPLETE INADEQUACY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ASSISTANCE AND REAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION THROUGHOUT BY SOME OF OUR ARAB BROTHERS AND MUTUAL FRIENDS.

IF ONE IS TO NEGLECT MENTIONING CERTAIN UNFORTUNATE VIEWS PROFFERED TO THE LEADERS OF THE PLO BY VARIOUS QUARTERS IN THE ARAB WORLD WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN WELL INTENTIONED BUT WHICH SADLY DIMINISHED JORDAN'S CREDIBILITY

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WITH THE P.L.O. DURING THE ENTIRE PROCESS. IT HAS GIVEN THEM THE FALSE IMPRESSIONS THAT THE PEACE PLAN, AS WE UNDERSTAND, COULD BE IMPROVED UPON IN DUE COURSE THROUGH OTHER MEANS. INTERESTED PUBLIC FIGURES LIKE DR. HENRY KISSINGER HAVE UNFORTUNATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS END.

5. AS A RESULT OF THESE FACTORS IT APPEARS THAT THE P.L.O. LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN UNABLE TO LIVE UP TO ITS DECLARED INTENT TO US TO SECURE THE APPROVAL OF THEIR ORGANIZATION TO RATIFY THE JOINTLY DRAFTED AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE AS THE PLAN OF THOSE PARTIES MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED WITH THE CONFLICT. THIS PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN POSITION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE OBTAINED ARAB CONSENSUS AND SUPPORT ENABLING US TO ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION TO JOIN IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON YOUR PLAN, AND OUR SUBSEQUENT AMERICAN/JORDANIAN UNDERSTANDING AS TO ITS MEANING AND OBJECTIVE.

CONFRONTED WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS I SADLY FEEL COMPELLED TO ADVISE YOU THAT AS MATTERS STAND I HAVE REACHED A DEAD-END. AFTER STRIVING WITH ALL MY HEART AND ABILITIES TO SURMOUNT COUNTLESS OBSTACLES I CANNOT, UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ACCEDE TO THE REQUESTS OF SOME IN THIS AREA TO PROCRASTINATE FURTHER IN APPRAISING YOU OF ALL THE REALITIES WHEN I, MYSELF, AM UNABLE TO IDENTIFY A SINGLE RAY OF HOPE THAT I HAVE NOT PURSUED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. UNFORTUNATELY, MR. PRESIDENT, WITHIN OUR LIMITED RESOURCES WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST BUT FOR THE TIME BEING IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO NO AVAIL.

I HAVE DECIDED, MR PRESIDENT, TO MAKE PUBLIC OPINION AWARE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS. I FEEL I OWE IT AT LEAST TO PALESTINIANS, JORDANIANS AND ARABS, AS I OWE IT EQUALLY TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE.

I HOPE, MR PRESIDENT, AND KNOW THAT DESPITE ALL THIS THE CAUSE OF THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE WILL EVER REMAIN ALIVE IN YOUR HEART AND IN THE CONSCIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF YOUR GREAT NATION , FOR THEIRS IS A JUST CAUSE THAT MERITS YOUR GREATEST ATTENTION AND SUPPORT.

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I THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR YOUR CONFIDENCE AND TRUST  
IN ME, AND FOR YOUR FRIENDSHIP AND THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT  
AND PEOPLE FOR JORDAN AND MYSELF OF WHICH WE ARE PROUD OF,  
AND WHICH WE FULLY RECIPROCATE.

I AM SIR  
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,  
HUSSEIN

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FROM AMMAN 121900Z APR 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 173 OF 12 APRIL 1983

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO JORDAN, 12 APRIL:

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPENT JUST OVER THREE HOURS IN AMMAN TODAY ON HIS WAY BACK FROM DUBAI TO LONDON.

KING HUSSEIN HOSTED A WORKING LUNCH, WHICH WAS PRECEDED BY A DISCUSSION LASTING THREE QUARTERS OF AN HOUR. ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE THOSE PRESENT INCLUDED THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HEAD OF THE ROYAL COURT, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND THE FOREIGN, INFORMATION AND COURT MINISTERS. MR PYM WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SIR JOHN LEAHY, YOU AND MYSELF. MR PYM MADE A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AT THE AIRPORT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE (SEE MY TELNO 171).

2. KING HUSSEIN WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH 'OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS' AND ASKED THAT HIS GOOD WISHES BE CONVAIED TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE DESCRBED BRIEFLY HIS OWN EFFORTS TO BRING TOGETHER THE ARAB PLAN AGREED AT FEZ AND THE REVWXR INITIATIVE, AND EXPRESSED REGRET THAT HE HAD FAILED. HE HAD HAD FIVE MEETINGS LASTING NINE HOURS WITH ARAFAT ON HIS MOST RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN, DURING WHICH THEY HAD LOOKED AT ALL THE OPTIONS AND HAD AGREED ON THE URGENCY OF MAKING PROGRESS. THE KING HIMSELF HAD DRAWN UP A DRAFT DOCUMENT, WHICH ARAFAT HAD THEN AMENDED AND WHICH THEY HAD AGREED SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING WHERE IT COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO COMMAND GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH WITH EXCEPTION OF SYRIA AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS. ARAFAT HAD CONDUCTED THE NEGOTIATIONS AS IF HE WERE IN MLA POSITION OF AUTHORITY AND HAD NOT REVEALED AT THE TIME THAT ANY FURTHER PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITHIN THE PLO WOULD BE NECESSARY. BUT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR TALKS ON 5 APRIL ARAFAT HAD REVEALED THAT HE HAD TO GO TO KUWAIT FOR 24 HOURS, ALLEGEDLY IN ORDER TO SECURE THE ENDORSEMENT OF FATAH FOR THE DOCUMENT.

3. IT WAS AT THIS POINT, ACCORDING TO THE KING, THAT THE SYRIANS AND THE RUSSIANS HAD WEIGHED IN DECISIVELY. THE SYRIANS HAD THREATENED TO SET UP A NEW PALESTINIAN ORGANISATION IN SYRIA AND ALSO TO CLOSE THEIR BORDER WITH JORDAN. THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAD A SOURCE WITHIN THE PLO PASSING THEM ALL KEY DOCUMENTS, HAD ALSO PUT HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE PLO.

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4. ON 9 APRIL ARAFAT HAD SENT TWO PLO REPRESENTATIVES TO AMMAN WITH A NEW DRAFT, SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED WITH KING HUSSEIN (THE KING GAVE MR PYM A COPY IN TRANSLATION OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT DOCUMENT AGREED WITH ARAFAT, AND A COPY IN ARABIC OF THE NEW PLO DRAFT: TEXTS AS IN WASHINGTON TELNO 938). AT THIS POINT THE KING SAID HE HAD DECIDED HE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER PROCRASTINATION. THE JORDANIANS HAD DONE ALL THEY COULD WITHIN THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES, BUT FOR THE TIME BEING THEIR EFFORTS HAD PROVED TO NO AVAIL. HE HAD THEREFORE RESOLVED TO ADMINISTER A SHARP SHOCK, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD GENERATE NEW THINKING: THIS HAD BEEN THE PURPOSE OF THE JORDANIAN STATEMENT ISSUED ON 10 APRIL.

5. Y KINAID THAT HE HAD ALSO WRITTEN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 10 APRIL, OF WHICH HE GAVE MR PYM A COPY (TEXT IN MIFT: THIS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO NO ONE ELSE AND THE KING ASKED THAT IT SHOULD BE CLOSELY HELD).

IN THIS HE HAD SET OUT TO THE PRESIDENT REASONS WHY HE BELIEVED HIS OWN EFFORTS HAD REACHED A DEAD END. THE KING DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD LED TO THE PRESENT IMPASSE:

A) THE GENERAL EROSION OF US CREDIBILITY IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY OVER THE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS OF SECURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND HALTING SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING SEMICOLON. IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT SALEM HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE MAKING NO PROGRESS AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON CONDITIONS WHICH LEBANON COULD NOT POSSIBLY MEET (SEE MY SECOND MIFT) SEMICOLON.

B) THE FAILURE OF FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES TO GIVE JORDAN SUFFICIENT SUPPORT: EQE AMERICANS HAD TRIED WITH BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO, BUT HAD NOT PROVED PERSUASIVE ENOUGH SEMICOLON

C) THE ATTEMPT TO EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON

D) (THE UNDERMINING OF JORDAN'S CREDIBILITY AS A MEDIATOR, BECAUSE THE PLO HAD OBTAINED THE IMPRESSION FROM GVSINGER AND OTHERS THAT Y COULD OBTAIN BETTER TERMS BY DEALING WITH THE AMERICANS ON OTHER CHANNELS.

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6. WHEN MR PYM ASKED WHETHER THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS NOW TO BE CONSIDERED DEFINITELY AT AN END, THE KING DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY BUT REITERATED HIS WISH TO ADMINISTER A SHARP SHOCK. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONFUSION IN HIS EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAD ASKED BOTH HIMSELF AND KING FAHD FOR A LITTLE MORE TIME. THE KING SAID HE COULD SEE NO PURPOSE IN RESUMING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO, UNLESS THEY SHOWED READINESS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT SEMICOLON IT COULD BE THAT THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES MIGHT NOW PROVE WILLING TO DO SOMETHING MORE.

7. OVER LUNCH THE KING AGAIN EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO GIVE SOME PROOF TO THEIR FRIENDS IN THE AREA THAT THEY MEANT BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY OVER SECURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. WHILE EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR HABIB, THE KING FEARED THAT HE HAD LOST MUCH OF HIS CREDIBILITY THROUGH HIS INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD GIVEN THE KING NO IDEA WHAT HE INTENDED TO DO NEXT TO TRY TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION. IN REPLY TO MR PYM'S QUESTION, THE KING SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED A KRAB SUMMIT MEETING IN THE ABSENCE OF PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE WAY AHEAD WOULD BE DISASTROUS SEMICOLON ONLY MOROCCO WAS AT PRESENT PRESSING FOR AN EARLY SUMMIT. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF HOW THE RUSSIANS WERE LIKELY TO REACT SEMICOLON THE KING THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THEY MIGHT RENEW THEIR CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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FM ABU DHABI 111300Z APR 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 11 APRIL 83

RPTD IMMEDIATE DESKBY TO JEDDA, RIYADH, AMMAN, WASHINGTON  
RPTD PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE TO PRINCE SAUD ON THE TELEPHONE AT 0845Z ON 11 APRIL . HE SAID THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE NEWS AND ASKED FOR PRINCE SAUD'S ASSESSMENT OF THE JORDANIAN POSITION. SAUD SAID THAT HE WAS ALSO DISAPPOINTED BUT SAW NO REASON TO LOSE HEART YET. KING HUSSEIN WAS OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED

~~REASON TO LOSE HEART YET. KING HUSSEIN WAS OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED~~  
BUT IT WAS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE JORDANIAN STATEMENT HAD  
BEEN MADE IN THE NAME OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RATHER THAN  
HIS OWN NAME. IN RESONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
SAUD SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK IT WAS THE KING'S LAST WORD.  
THE SAUDIS WERE URGING THE JORDANIANS TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS.  
ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO IN CONTACT WITH THE PLO TO  
URGE THEM TO ADOPT A MORE HELPFUL POSITION, SAUD SAID THAT THEY  
WERE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PLO ALSO WANTED TO CONTINUE WORKING FOR  
AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY ARAFAT. HE HOPED THAT THE JORDANIAN  
STATEMENT WOULD HELP RATHER THAN HINDER THIS. THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE SAID THAT HE HAD HITHERTO BEEN TAKING A GLOOMIER VIEW AND  
WAS GLAD TO HEAR SAUD'S RATHER MORE OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT. HE WAS  
THINKING OF STOPPING OFF IN AMMAN ON THE WAY BACK TO LONDON. THE  
JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD WELCOMED THIS IDEA. PRINCE SAUD  
SAID THAT HE ALSO WELCOMED IT AND SUGGESTED THAT A VISIT MIGHT  
OPEN THE WAY FOR "A NEW INITIATIVE".

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK SAUD FOR  
THE WARMTH OF HIS RECEPTION IN RIYADH. HE AND SAUD AGREED  
TO KEEP IN TOUCH .

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES #

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FM WASHINGTON 101710Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 934 OF 10 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI (FOR PS/S OF S) RIYADH JEDDA AMMAN RABAT  
INFO PRIORITY TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

RIYADH TELNO 43: JORDAN/PLO

SINCE SHULTZ'S LATEST MESSAGE WAS SENT, THE AMERICANS HAVE LEARNT MORE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER WHICH AL. HASSAN AND KHALIL WAZIR DELIVERED TO KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY FROM ARAFAT. IT REFERS TO THE PLO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. IT CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. AND IT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. IT IS THUS SEEN HERE AS STRAIGHT SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET AND RADICAL PLO LINE. THE AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS REJECTED IT OUT OF HAND AND IT WAS ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY THAT HE WAS RESTRAINED FROM GIVING A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS EVENING TO MAKE HIS POSITION CLEAR. INSTEAD THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTAND THERE IS TO BE A STATEMENT BY THE JORDANIAN CABINET IN THE FORM OF A FAIRLY NEUTRAL PROGRESS REPORT.

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN DISTURBED TO LEARN THAT THE SAUDIS AND THE MOROCCANS ARE DISPOSED TO SUPPORT ARAFAT'S NEW LINE. THEY ARE

~~2. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN DISTURBED TO LEARN THAT THE SAUDIS AND THE MOROCCANS ARE DISPOSED TO SUPPORT ARAFAT'S NEW LINE. THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO PREVENT THIS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE RECOMMENDING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD TRY TO SPEAK TODAY TO KING FAHD AND KING HASSAM TO TRY TO GET THEM BACK INTO LINE, ARGUING THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT DELIVER PEACE: THAT THE MAIN LOSERS WOULD BE THE PALESTINIANS, AND THAT THE BEST COURSE AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE IS TO STICK TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF KING HUSSEIN. THEY ARE ALSO ASKING THE PRESIDENT TO RING KING HUSSEIN TO ASSURE HIM OF HIS CONTINUING FULL SUPPORT. THEY WOULD WELCOME ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS AND THE MOROCCANS IN THE SAME DIRECTION.~~

WRIGHT

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PP BAHRAIN

PP BEIRUT

PP CAIRO

Prime Minister  
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 154 OF 6 APRIL 1983

REPEATED PRIORITY WASHINGTON

REPEATED ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 152: JORDAN/PLO

1. MY US COLLEAGUE SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT AFTER ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE FOR KUWAIT. VIETS SAID THAT THE KING, WHO WAS LOOKING VERY TIRED (HE HAS HAD SIX SEPARATE PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH ARAFAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS: THE LOCAL PRESS HAS ONLY REPORTED FOUR), NONETHELESS PERKED UP CONSIDERABLY IN THE COURSE OF A LONG DISCUSSION. THE KING IS APPARENTLY KEEPING EVEN HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS IN THE DARK ABOUT HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN ~~HAD~~ AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, TAKEN NO PART IN THEM. THE KING HAD LAID EXTRAORDINARY EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR SECURITY SEMI COLON VIETS HOPED WE WOULD THEREFORE UNDERSTAND IT IF HE GAVE A GENERAL PICTURE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING WITHOUT ENTERING INTO DETAIL, AND HE ASKED THAT HIS CONFIDENCE BE RESPECTED.

2. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THE KING HIMSELF STILL BELIEVED HE HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF OBTAINING ARAFAT'S SIGNATURE TO A DOCUMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH ARAFAT IS CARRYING WITH HIM ON HIS PRESENT TOUR OF ARAB COUNTRIES AND WHICH STATES IN GENERAL TERMS PLO AGREEMENT TO THE ESSENTIALS IN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. THE KING HOWEVER THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A CLOSE RUN THING. HE REMAINED MISTRUSTFUL OF ARAFAT AND VERY CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT TO HOLD HIM TO WHAT HE HAD SAID IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITHOUT OTHER PLO LEADERS PRESENT. THE MAIN REASON FOR ARAFAT'S VISIT TO KUWAIT WAS APPARENTLY TO CONSULT WITH ABU IYAD (SALAH KHALAF) AND THE FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND TO MAKE ONE MORE ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE FATAH LEADERSHIP TO GO ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT: ACCORDING TO THE KING, ARAFAT HAD MORE OR LESS GIVEN UP THE ATTEMPT TO WIN OVER THE RADICALS IN THE PLO. KING HUSSEIN DID NOT KNOW LAST NIGHT WHETHER ARAFAT WOULD GO ELSEWHERE ~~AFTER~~ KUWAIT, BUT HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN ARAFAT AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE OF THE EVENING OF 7 APRIL TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS WILLING TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT.

SECRET

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# SECRET

3. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD HAD A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH KING FAHD SEMICOLON THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ARRIVED IN AMMAN LAST NIGHT TO BE BRIEFED ON THE LATEST SITUATION. PRINCE SAUD HAD NOT, AS FAR AS VIETS KNEW, BROUGHT THE ADDITIONAL US DOLLARS 150 MILLION PROMISED TO JORDAN. BUT VIETS CLAIMED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE BEING GENERALLY HELPFUL.

4. VIETS THOUGHT THAT IT COULD STILL GO EITHER WAY, AND IT WAS REALLY NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL AT THIS JUNCTURE WHETHER OR NOT ARAFAT WOULD AGREE TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT. EVEN IF HE DID, VIETS WAS NO LONGER EXPECTING IT TO BE FOLLOWED BY A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF JORDANIAN/PLO WILLINGNESS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. IF ARAFAT SIGNED, IT NOW SEEMS MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT BOTH HE AND KING HUSSEIN WOULD GO TO SAUDI ARABIA TO SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF KING FAHD AND THAT KING HUSSEIN, POSSIBLY ACCOMPANIED BY ARAFAT, WOULD THEN MAKE A SERIES OF QUICK VISITS TO ARAB COUNTRIES. THERE WAS THEN LIKELY TO BE AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING: BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND KING FAHD NOW FAVOURED A SUMMIT MEETING RATHER THAN A MORE RESTRICTED MEETING OF STATES REPRESENTED ON THE FEZ DELEGATION, AS IN THE SMALLER FORUM SYRIA AND ALGERIA WOULD BOTH OPPOSE THE PEACE MOVES WHEREAS THE KING BELIEVED HE COULD COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF 17 STATES AT AN ARAB SUMMIT. HOWEVER, HE AND KING FAHD HAD BOTH AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ARAB SUMMIT MEETING UNLESS ARAFAT HAD SIGNED THE DOCUMENT. IF ARAFAT REFUSED TO SIGN, THE KING THOUGHT THE SAUDIS MIGHT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS PEACE WAS NOT LOST.

5. VIETS WAS EMPHATIC THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT PUTTING UNDUE PRESSURE ON THE KING ALTHOUGH HE CONFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE ON 1 APRIL. CLUVERIUS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS STILL HERE, ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICLY REVEALED AND VIETS WAS VERY VAGUE ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF HIS PRESENCE IN AMMAN.

URWICK

## MIDDLE EAST

### STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

### ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

- 1 -  
SECRET



*M. East*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1983

*Dear Idm,*

Message from President Reagan:  
Middle East

/ I enclose a letter addressed to the Prime Minister from the US Embassy transmitting President Reagan's reply to the Prime Minister's message of 22 March about the Arab League Delegation visit. The US Embassy delivered this letter to the Department on 6 April.

*Yours ever*  
*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



Middle East

file

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6 April 1983

The Prime Minister read with interest your Secretary of State's minute of 31 March about his recent visit to Oman and Egypt.

JOHN COLES

John Rhodes, Esq.,  
Department of Trade.

T 45/83



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

April 5, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this afternoon.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John J. Louis, Jr." The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

John J. Louis, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M. P.,  
Prime Minister,  
London.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 44A/83

April 5, 1983

US Declassified

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your March 22 message about the Arab League delegation led by King Hussein. I welcome and appreciate your thoughtful comments and support.

I know King Hussein has been struggling long and hard with the decision of how best to take the next step toward our shared goal of peace. His efforts these past months have been a remarkable example of leadership and statesmanship under what I know have been great pressures and difficulties. It is important for him to know he does not and will not stand alone, should he decide to make an historic and bold step toward peace. In this respect, your encouragement to the King is most important.

King Hussein has shared with us his frustrations with the level of support from other Arabs for a decision to join the peace process. We have been in close contact with the key Arab leaders whose support the King feels he must have. We have answered their questions, clarified areas of difficulty, and reaffirmed what my September 1 initiative means and what it does not mean. That I am totally committed to my proposals has been clearly and repeatedly stated. I know that time is important if the present opportunity for progress towards peace is not to wither away. We need to hear the Arabs say unequivocally that they are willing to give peace negotiations a chance to produce what five wars in the last 35 years have not produced and what future wars cannot produce -- stability, dignity, prosperity, and peace for all the Middle East.

With the fullest recognition of the risks and difficulties which accompany the decision to become a partner in peace, I have assured King Hussein of my total support, friendship, and determination to succeed.

Thank you again for your support and efforts to help in this most noble cause.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

RESTRICTED

②  
Prime Minister  
To note Lord Cockfield's  
report. A.S.C. 5/4.

*ms*

VISIT TO OMAN AND EGYPT: 11-21 MARCH 1983

1 I visited Oman and Egypt for discussions on commercial and general economic matters and trade promotion from 11-21 March. A summary of my programme is attached.

OMAN

2 The principal purpose of my visit to Oman was to continue the series of high level reciprocal visits by returning the visit to London last October of Mr Mohammad Zubair, the Omani Minister of Commerce and Industry. Lady Cockfield and I were extremely well received and my discussions were conducted throughout in a very friendly atmosphere. I am convinced that a regular programme of such visits is of great benefit to our relationship and I am glad that I shall have the opportunity of receiving Mr Zubair again when he is next in London in late May en route to the Belgrade meeting.

3 I discussed with the Ministers involved the implications for the development plan of a fall in oil prices. At the time of my visit, the Omanis were waiting to see what oil price would result from the OPEC discussions. There was a tendency to take the view that a reduction in price would be offset by an increase in output. But in some quarters at any rate there was a fear that the current 5 year development plan (which runs to 1985) could well be affected. Some less essential projects might have to be postponed, and aid for private sector industrial development cut back. But they expressed a willingness to resort to commercial borrowing to bridge any remaining gaps. What this means in practical terms is not yet clear, but the Omanis seem determined to maintain the broad thrust of the second plan and many opportunities for UK participation undoubtedly remain. But the next 5 year plan (to be prepared next year and operating after 1985) will be a more modest affair than its predecessors.

I visited the sites of two current UK successes: the Rusail Power Station and the £200 million Qaboos University, due to open in 1986. British companies are well placed also for a number of further projects, in particular a major project for two hospitals for which Wimpey hope to negotiate a £200 million contract. I discussed

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this particular project with the Minister for Health and the Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs. Both were optimistic and since my discussions they have seen the Sultan who confirmed his support. Discussions have now been entered into with Wimpey on the price.

4 The Omanis have not in general gone in for major prestige projects in the industrial field to the extent that some of their neighbours have. They are looking more to develop light industry and also agriculture and fisheries. There is plenty of opportunity here both for project business and for technical co-operation. Finally, I formally opened the British Embassy's new Commercial Offices in the heart of the fast-growing business area of Muscat. This event, attended by the Omani Minister of Commerce, attracted some useful publicity for the Embassy's commercial role in this useful and well-disposed market for Britain.

#### EGYPT

5 The principal objective of my visit to Egypt was to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Minister for Investment and International Co-operation, Dr Shindy, reserving project business under Egypt's ambitious development plan to UK companies in return for a £65 million package of aid and ECGD credit which we agreed following President Mubarak's visit to London in February. The MoU in effect gives British companies a fair opportunity to secure business which the Egyptians would otherwise fund with aid from other countries. It sets a tight time-table for identification of projects and envisages signature of contracts by March 1984. A team of officials has already visited Cairo to set the process in motion.

6 Egypt too cannot ignore the effect of lower oil prices, but here again there was optimism that the recent fall would not have too noticeable an effect on plans for development. The Egyptians still predict a growth rate of slightly over 8 per cent for this year. The message I received in meetings with a number of key Ministers was that there are still many opportunities for British companies to participate provided they can be competitive. Competitiveness extends, of course, to the financial arrangements and the Egyptians make no bones about seeking aid wherever possible. Our competitors are very active in this field and while the £16 million aid we have made available under the MoU will undoubtedly help - and of course we have already put a considerable sum in bilateral aid into the very

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important greater Cairo waste-water project - I believe we must stand ready to lend continued support in appropriate cases in this large and promising market.

There is also considerable scope for participation by British firms in joint ventures with Egyptian companies. A number of successful joint ventures are already operating and I took the opportunity to press for progress in a number of further cases where bureaucratic difficulty appears to be obstructing progress. I have no doubt that frustrations will continue, but both Dr Shindy and the new Minister for Industry, Dr Ghoroury, were very keen to see more joint ventures going ahead, particularly where they could lead to import substitution.

7 In addition to my discussions with Ministers and the Prime Minister, I had a frank 30 minute talk with President Mubarak. He expressed his appreciation of our stand on Middle Eastern affairs, while calling for a much greater sense of urgency to be injected into the search for a long term settlement. He is of course afraid that the Reagan initiative will run into the sands as the US Election campaign gets underway. I assured him that we were keeping up the pressure in every way we could.

8 As with Oman, I am convinced that an exchange of high level visits can do nothing but good for our relationship with Egypt. In this context you will know that no British Prime Minister has managed to visit Egypt, apart from Winston Churchill during the War. The question of your making a visit was raised at my meetings both with President Mubarak and with the Prime Minister: I know such a visit would be very greatly appreciated.

9 I am sending a copy of this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and also to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Muscat and Cairo. Both Lady Cockfield and I owe a considerable debt of gratitude to the latter and their wives for the considerable amount of time and effort they devoted to ensuring that our visits to both countries were both successful and enjoyable.

Department of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London, SW1H 0ET

A.C.  
LORD COCKFIELD

31 March 1983

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE'S VISIT TO OMAN AND EGYPT  
11-21 MARCH 1983 - SUMMARY PROGRAMME

FRIDAY 11 MARCH

Arrive Muscat, free day

SATURDAY 12 MARCH

Call on H E Mohammad Zubair, Minister of  
Commerce and Industry

Call on H E Qais Abdul Munim Al-Zawawi,  
Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and  
Economic Affairs

Call on Dr Sharif Lotfi, Secretary General of  
the Development Council

Lunch given by HMA for Omani and British  
Businessmen

Inauguration (in the presence of Mr Zubair)  
of new offices of Commercial Section of  
British Embassy

Reception given by Mr Zubair

SUNDAY 13 MARCH

Call on H E Dr Mubarak al Khadduri,  
Minister of Health

Visit Interior

Private Dinner given by Mr Zubair at his  
residence

MONDAY 14 MARCH

Visit sites of Rusail Power Station and  
Qaboos University

Depart for Cairo

TUESDAY 15 MARCH

Visit Cairo International Trade Fair : tour  
British Pavilion

Call on Dr Wagih Shindy, Minister of  
Investment and International Cooperation :  
Sign Memorandum of Understanding

Call on Eng Abaza, Minister of Electricity

Dinner given by Egyptian Government

WEDNESDAY 16 MARCH

Visit Ahmed Hamdi tunnel under Suez Canal  
(built by Tarmac in consortium with Egyptian  
contractors)

Lunch with Chairman of Suez Canal Authority  
at Ismailia

Reception hosted by HMA for Trade Fair  
(British Day)

THURSDAY 17 MARCH

Call on (new) Minister of Industry, Dr  
Ghoroury

Call on Minister of Economy and Foreign  
Trade, Dr El Said

Address lunch of British Businessmen's Group

Call on Prime Minister

Dinner hosted by HMA

FRIDAY 18 MARCH -  
SUNDAY 20 MARCH

Visit Upper Egypt

MONDAY 21 MARCH

Call on President Mubarak

Return to London



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FM RABAT 310900Z MAR 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 31 MARCH  
INFO ROUTINE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON

MY TEL 185 (NOT TO ALL):

ARAB SUMMIT MEETING

1. BOUCETTA YESTERDAY TOLD THE AMBASSADORS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN THAT KING HASSAN WAS PROPOSING TO CONVENE A SUMMIT MEETING OF THE WHOLE ARAB LEAGUE. EMISSARIES ARE TO BE SENT AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK TO ALL ARAB STATES WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING A DATE.
2. A SENIOR MOROCCAN OFFICIAL TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT THE KING IS PLANNING ON 16 AND 17 APRIL FOR THE SUMMIT, AND 18 APRIL FOR A MEETING OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE. ALL THIS WILL TAKE PLACE IN FEZ.
3. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF AND WHEN THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN WILL MEET. CERTAINLY THE MEETING PLANNED FOR 3 APRIL WILL NOW NOT (NOT) TAKE PLACE. INSTEAD, THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO BE SUBSUMED IN THE SUMMIT.

CAMBRIDGE

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

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FM WASHINGTON 302327Z MAR 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 810 OF 30 MARCH  
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN

ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. VELIOTES OUTLINED TO LEAHY YESTERDAY AMERICAN HOPES FOR KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT AND PLANS FOR COUNTERING THE EXPECTED NEGATIVE ISRAELI REACTION, MAINLY THROUGH A PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN. BEGIN'S SETTLEMENTS POLICY UNPOPULAR IN THE US. CONSTRAINTS ON US ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL THROUGH SOME SANCTIONS ALREADY IN FORCE. KEMP (NSC) ARGUED THAT US ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO BITE.

DETAIL

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT MADE IT CLEAR TO MILES EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THEY SAW NO ACTION THE AMERICANS COULD USEFULLY TAKE IN ADVANCE OF THE NEXT KING HUSSEIN/ARAFAT MEETING TO ENCOURAGE ARAB PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. NOR HAD THEY GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE CONSEQUENCES IF KING HUSSEIN DID NOT COME FORWARD. LEAHY THEREFORE ASKED VELIOTES WHAT THE AMERICANS IDEALLY WANTED KING HUSSEIN TO SAY AND HOW THEY THEMSELVES INTENDED TO PROCEED THEREAFTER.

3. VELIOTES HOPED THAT THE PLO WOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY PROVOKE THE ISRAELIS. ARAFAT WOULD PROBABLY TRY TO AVOID ANY PUBLIC COMMENT, THOUGH NEWS OF HIS ACQUIESCENCE WOULD QUICKLY BECOME KNOWN IN THE ARAB WORLD. KING HUSSEIN WOULD ALSO SEEK A WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT WHICH COULD BE USED WITH OTHER ARABS AS EVIDENCE OF THE SAMETHING.

4. IN HIS STATEMENT THE KING SHOULD CITE THE REAGAN INITIATIVE IN SOME WAY, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AN IMPLICIT LINK WITH CAMP DAVID, AND EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON SCR 242. THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE COULD BE MENTIONED AS PART OF THE ARAB NEGOTIATING POSITION. DETAILS, FOR EXAMPLE OF THE MAKE UP OF THE ARAB NEGOTIATING TEAM, AND CONDITIONS SHOULD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BE AVOIDED. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE WHOLEHEARTEDLY ENDORSED BY THE AMERICANS AND HARD FOR THE ISRAELIS TO DISCREDIT. VELIOTES LATER MADE IT CLEAR THAT EVEN IF CONDITIONS WERE EXPLICITLY MENTIONED THE AMERICANS WOULD STILL DO THEIR BEST TO HAIL IT AS A HISTORIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

5. THE AMERICANS HAD BRIEFED THE SAUDIS IN "EXCRUCIATING DETAIL" ON THESE REQUIREMENTS AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR THEM TO GIVE KING HUSSEIN POSITIVE SUPPORT. THIS MESSAGE SEEMED TO HAVE SUNK IN. A RECENT SAUDI PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT TO JORDAN WAS ENCOURAGING. SAUDI, AND CONSEQUENT WIDER ARAB, SUPPORT FOR A JORDANIAN INITIATIVE WOULD

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# SECRET

BE A REAL BREAKTHROUGH. VELIOTES ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION OVER THE MEANING OF CONFEDERATION. ARAFAT SAW THIS AS REQUIRING FIRST THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THE SAUDIS THAT CONFEDERATION COULD BE PART OF THE ARAB NEGOTIATING POSITION IF THEY SO WISHED.

6. VELIOTES EXPECTED THE ISRAELI REACTION TO BE NEGATIVE. AN INSTANT KNEE-JERK REJECTION WAS ON THE CARDS BUT NOT INEVITABLE. ARENS WAS AWARE OF ISRAELI'S IMAGE PROBLEMS IN THE US AND MIGHT ARGUE FOR A MORE CONSIDERED REJECTION, POSSIBLY INCLUDING AN INVITATION TO KING HUSSEIN TO VISIT JERUSALEM. DURING SHAMIR'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON ISRAELI LAWYERS HAD FOR THE FIRST TIME PUT TO THE AMERICANS DETAILED AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. A DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION OF CAMP DAVID HAD EMERGED OVER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT ACCORDING TO THE WORDING, ALL PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATORS HAD TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED, OR ONLY THOSE FROM OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

7. ON AMERICAN TACTICS VELIOTES SAID THAT POSSIBLE SCENARIOS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED ONLY BY A HANDFUL OF OFFICIALS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT INCLUDING SHULTZ, AND HAD NOT YET BEEN CLEARED WITH THE WHITE HOUSE. CLUVERIUS WAS NOW IN AMMAN, AVAILABLE TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT THE TERMS AND TIMING OF ANY STATEMENT. THE PLAN WAS FOR A HIGH LEVEL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD BOTH MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR BEGIN TO REJECT KING HUSSEIN'S OFFER OUTRIGHT AND STIMULATE POPULAR SUPPORT IN ISRAEL AND AMONG JEWISH-AMERICANS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SCENARIO FOR THE FIRST TEN DAYS WAS CLEAR: THEREAFTER THE PICTURE WAS MORE CLOUDY.

8. THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE "WITHIN THIRTY SECONDS" PUBLIC STATEMENT WELCOMING THAT BY KING HUSSEIN. VELIOTES HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD HELP TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS BY SIMILARLY WELCOMING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT. OTHER MEASURES MIGHT INCLUDE A MAJOR PUBLIC SPEECH AND CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY BY SHULTZ EMPHASISING THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A FRESH START FOR PEACE, A VISIT BY SHULTZ TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND RETURN VISITS TO WASHINGTON. KING HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE WOULD GENERATE A GREAT DEBATE INSIDE ISRAEL COVERING NOT ONLY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE BASIC ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL. THE WEST BANK COULD NOT BE ANNEXED WITHOUT GIVING THE ARAB INHABITANTS THE VOTE - ANY COMPARISON OF ISRAEL WITH SOUTH AFRICA WAS ANATHEMA TO THE DIASPORA - BUT THIS WOULD MEAN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH STATE.

9. VELIOTES ADMITTED THAT A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE WOULD BE A MAJOR PROBLEM. THERE WAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE DEFINITIONS OF A FREEZE. ANY FREEZE HAD TO BE VERIFIABLE. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MONITOR MINOR INCREASES IN POPULATION (NEW BIRTHS.) OR COMPLETION OF HALF-

# SECRET

FINISHED HOUSES. IT MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT TO STOP NEW GROUND-BREAKING.  
THE JORDANIANS MIGHT BE CONTENT WITH THIS: THEY KNEW THE ISRAELIS  
AND THAT FEW JEWS WOULD VOLUNTARILY REMAIN UNDER ARAB SOVEREIGNTY.  
US CONGRESSIONAL AND JEWISH OPINION WAS OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO  
SETTLEMENTS AND TO THE ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK, ON WHICH  
ISRAELI OPINION, ACCORDING TO RECENT POLLS, WAS EQUALLY DIVIDED.  
BEGIN WOULD PROBABLY SEEK AN ELECTION (WHICH HE WOULD BE LIKELY TO  
WIN AND WHICH WOULD BUY TIME, BEFORE AGREEING TO A SETTLEMENTS  
FREEZE.

10. LEAHY SAID THAT THE EUROPEANS FAVOURED A MIXTURE OF THE CARROT AND STICK IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE ISRAELIS WANTED EUROPEAN APPROVAL OF THEIR POLICIES AND THE ACTIVATION OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE EC: THIS GAVE SOME SLIGHT LEVERAGE. THE ARBAS TOLD US THAT THEY COULD SEE PLENTY OF EVIDENCE OF THE PROVISION OF AMERICAN CARROTS TO ISRAEL BUT DOUBTED WHETHER THE US WOULD USE THE STICK, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

11. VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE GOOD POLITICS FOR 1984. FAIRBANKS ADDED THAT THERE WAS A BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF THE INITIATIVE AND THAT SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE AN ELECTION ISSUE (COMMENT: NEVERTHELESS THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFULS ARE ALREADY VYING WITH EACH OTHER IN EXPRESSING FULSOME SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL). VELIOTES CONCEDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS REMARKABLE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN CONGRESS, REINFORCED BY STRONG INSTITUTIONAL LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE BETWEEN LABOUR UNIONS.

12. VELIOTES NOTED THAT INFLATIONS HAD ERODED THE REAL VALUE OF US AID FOR ISRAEL OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY CONVINCED THEMSELVES AND CONGRESS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE EXERTING PRESSURE ON THEM. THE AMERICANS WERE IN FACT WITHHOLDING A NUMBER OF THINGS THE ISRAELIS WANTED: MORE F 16S, OFFSHORE PURCHASES, AND AID FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAVIE AIRCRAFT: THESE ISSUES WERE NOT SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL. BUT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WOULD CHANGE ONCE KING HUSSEIN CAME FORWARD: OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO JORDAN FOR EXAMPLE WOULD BE MUCH REDUCED.

13. VELIOTES AGREED THAT THE CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON WAS A FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. THE AMERICANS WOULD PREFER ANY CONFRONTATION WITH THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE PLACE OVER THE WEST BANK RATHER THAN LEBANON AND HENCE HAD SHIED AWAY FROM A CRUNCH OVER LEBANON. THEY HAD TRIED REPEATEDLY, THROUGH HABIB, TO FIND ANOTHER SOLUTION. SHULTZ HAD BECOME CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE WAS LAUNCHED DURING THE RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY SHAMIR AND SALEM.

14. VELIOTES CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF JORDANIAN/PLO THINKING AND THE ORCHESTRATION OF RESPONSES TO ANY STATEMENT MADE BY KING HUSSEIN.

SECRET - 3 -

115.

# SECRET

15. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION LATER KEMP (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) TOLD LEAHY THAT ONCE THE KING MADE HIS STATEMENT THERE WOULD BE STRONG SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE. BUT THE SAME LIBERAL MEMBERS WHO WOULD FAVOUR THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO AN ARMS SUPPLY PROGRAMME FOR JORDAN UNTIL HUSSEIN ACTUALLY SAT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ONE POSSIBLE WAY OF MOBILISING SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE AMONG AMERICAN JEWS AND IN ISRAEL ITSELF WOULD BE TO PUBLISH A WHITE PAPER EXPOSING THE FACTS IN STARK FASHION, INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT ISRAELI CITIZENS WERE OBTAINING CHEAP MORTGAGES IN THE WEST BANK WITH THE HELP OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL MONEY. BUT THIS COULD OF COURSE REBOUND AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD HAVE TO BE HANDLED WITH GREAT CARE.

16. KEMP SAID THAT ALTHOUGH CERTAIN DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, IN PARTICULAR MONDALE, WOULD BE CRITICAL OF ANY STRONG ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, HE DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE IN FULL FLOW ON THIS ISSUE UNTIL AFTER THE PRIMARIES, IE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR. SOME SENATORS WHO HAD DIFFICULT ELECTORAL BATTLES TO CONTEND WITH MIGHT BE MORE VOCIFEROUS AT AN EARLIER STAGE. BUT IN GENERAL KEMP WAS AT PAINS TO EXPLAIN THAT AMERICAN ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BITE AS QUICKLY AS SOME PEOPLE, FOR EXAMPLE KING HUSSEIN, ASSUMED. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WERE DELAYING, FOR EXAMPLE OVER LEBANON, THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO SO FOR QUITE SOME TIME.

17. (FOR AMMAN) THIS IS REPEATED IN RESPONSE TO YOUR TELNO 137 TO FCO. SOME OF THE FOREGOING IS OBVIOUSLY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED EVEN WITH VIETS. IN THE LIGHT OF KEMP AND VELIOTES' COMMENTS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE THE JORDANIANS NOW ATTACH TO FURTHER US ARMS SUPPLIES.

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MED - NAD  
ECD(E)  
PS  
PS/HR MURD  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO:-  
ASSESSMENT STAFF  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

-4-  
SECRET

*m/Case*

OO FCO DESKBY 280930Z MAR  
PP DOHA  
RR ABU DHABI  
RR BAHRAIN  
RR DUBAI  
RR KUWAIT  
RR MUSCAT  
RR TEHRAN  
RR PARIS  
RR BAGHDAD  
GPS 180

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

*MF*

*R-6*

*PS/AA Hand*

*PS/POS*

*Dir Leahy*

*Mr Cooper*

*Ad/MEN*

*to 10 D.S.(2)*

*RCC*

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 280930Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252340Z MAR 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TEL NO 169 OF 25 MARCH 1983  
INFO PRIORITY DOHA  
INFO ROUTINE ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DUBAI KUWAIT MUSCAT TEHRAN  
PARIS BAGHDAD WASHINGTON

MESSAGE FROM AMIR OF QATAR TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE QATARI AMBASSADOR HANDED TO US THIS AFTERNOON A LETTER FROM THE AMIR TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE LINES OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAINS LETTER OF 28 FEBRUARY (FCO TELNO 47 TO BAHRAIN). TEXT IS IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.
2. IN HANDING IT OVER THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT WAS A RESULT OF A DECISION BY THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL TO ADDRESS LETTERS ON THE SUBJECT TO ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SIMILAR LETTERS WERE BEING SENT BY QATAR TO FRANCE AND THE US. HE THOUGHT THAT KUWAIT, WHICH LIKE QATAR HAD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, WOULD BE ADDRESSING LETTERS TO THOSE TWO COUNTRIES.

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DESKBY 280930Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252345Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 170 OF 25 MARCH 1983

INFO PRIORITY DOHA

ADVANCE COPY

PS - 6

PS/Mr Howard

PS/PUS.

Sir Leahy

Mr Ogente

No (O) S (C)

HH/MED

RC

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM AMIR OF QATAR TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 12 MARCH:

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

AS WE ALL KNOW, IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT THAT WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ARE INTEGRAL, AND THAT THEIR DISTURBANCE IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD AFFECTS ALL OTHER AREAS. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NATIONS OF THE WORLD ARE LINKED IN COMMON MAJOR INTERESTS TO THE STATES OF THE GULF REGION, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS PARTICULAR REGION ARE OF CONCERN NOT ONLY TO ITS COUNTRIES BUT TO ALL COUNTRIES. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THESE INTERESTS TO BE MAINTAINED AND DEVELOPED EXCEPT BY PRESERVING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS REGION WHICH IS THREATENED BY THE GRAVEST DANGERS OF THE CONTINUING IRAN/IRAQ WAR, NOW IN ITS THIRD YEAR.

THE UNITED NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANISATION, THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND SOME FRIENDLY STATES HAVE ALL TRIED TO END THIS WAR. THESE ATTEMPTS HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN INCONCLUSIVE, BUT THE WAR HAS INTENSIFIED.

YOUR EXCELLENCY ARE AWARE THAT THE MEMBER STATES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL HAVE, IN TURN, DEVOTED GREAT EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THIS WAR AND TO PUT AN END TO ITS CONSEQUENT HORRIBLE BLOODSHED AND DESTRUCTION OF HUGE MATERIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES. THE OUTCOME OF THOSE ATTEMPTS, LIKEWISE, HAS NOT BROUGHT US NEARER TO A CEASEFIRE OR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED TO SETTLE THEIR CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

IN THE FACE OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION, IT HAS BECOME THE DUTY OF ALL OF US TO SEEK MEANS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY PROBED,

IN THE FACE OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION, IT HAS BECOME THE DUTY OF ALL OF US TO SEEK MEANS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY PROBED, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE STABILITY AND GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF ITS STATES TO WHICH WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ARE STRONGLY LINKED.

IF IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD AGREE WITH ME THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THIS WAR, AND THE POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF ITS SCOPE, THREATEN WITH A WORLD WAR THAT WOULD EXPOSE MANKIND TO ANNIHILATION. THE UN CHARTER HAS PLACED A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDING MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY. FRANKNESS REQUIRES ME TO CONVEY TO YOU THAT WE FEEL, AS FAR AS THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IS CONCERNED, THE FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE NOT MADE ALL THE EFFORTS THAT CONFORM WITH THAT RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO LAUNCH GREATER EFFORTS BASED ON MANDATORY EFFECTIVE MEANS WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR IN THE UN CHARTER WHEN WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ARE ENDANGERED.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,  
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT YOU FULLY REALISE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. IN FACT, IF CONTINUED, THIS WAR WOULD LEAD TO THE MOST DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCIES NOT ONLY FOR THE TWO BELLIGERENT PARTIES OR THE WHOLE REGION BUT FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. IT IS, THEREFORE, OUR GREATEST HOPE THAT THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS PRESCRIBED BY THE UN CHARTER FOR SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD RECEIVE YOUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL DO YOUR UTMOST, UNDER THE CHARTER, TO HELP BRING PEACE IN OUR REGION.

WHILE LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS IN THIS RESPECT, PLEASE ACCEPT, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SIGNED  
KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL-THANI  
AMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR



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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March, 1983

*John Smith*

Middle East

King Hussein is due to meet Arafat in Amman on 27 March. The King may then move quickly to meet his self-set deadline of 31 March by making a public statement of willingness in principle to enter peace negotiations. If he does so his statement will no doubt include a number of qualifications. But it will nevertheless be an event of major importance. On past form, Mr Begin may move quickly to put on record his rejection of the King's offer to negotiate outside the Camp David framework.

Mr Pym believes that the Prime Minister should follow up the King's statement with an urgent and strong appeal to Mr Begin to consider it favourably and to seize the opportunity to begin negotiations. To be effective, such an appeal would have to reach Mr Begin before he makes a public reaction to the King's statement. The Prime Minister might therefore wish to consider approving in advance the text of a contingency message to Mr Begin. I enclose a draft. We would propose to transmit the agreed version to the Ambassador in Tel Aviv with instructions to deliver it immediately after the King had made his statement, but only on receipt of a further instruction from us. That would give the Prime Minister the opportunity to consider whether the King's statement was satisfactory before agreeing that her message should be delivered.

If the Prime Minister is content with this course of action, we propose to ask the King to give us at least a few hours notice of his public statement, in order to give us time to make the arrangements for the Prime Minister's message to be delivered to Mr Begin as soon afterwards as possible.

*John Smith*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Mr Begin

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

*Please retype + 2.*

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I have just heard of King Hussein's decision to offer negotiations <sup>to take part in</sup> ~~in the hope of~~ <sup>for</sup> a peace agreement. As a long-standing friend of Israel, I ~~want to~~ <sup>urge</sup> beg you to examine it ~~in the most positive light that you can~~ <sup>positively</sup> and at all costs to find a way to respond generously <sup>as you did</sup> ~~to the late President Sadat.~~ <sup>difficulties.</sup>

I am sure you will see snags. But ~~the fact is that it is no use waiting for another Arab leader to make a dramatic flight to Jerusalem.~~ Under your leadership Israel is now stronger than it has ever been before, <sup>can</sup> and ~~it is for you to~~ lead on the path to peace.

~~There can be no certainty that the relative strength which you have built up will be Israel's for ever.~~ This <sup>an</sup> is the opportunity <sup>which will not last long and may not be repeated.</sup> for which your people have been waiting since the foundation of the state. <sup>We all hope that you will</sup> For you personally it is the opportunity to complete the work of peace on which you took the first courageous step.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

~~I most earnestly urge you to rise to a historic opportunity.~~



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 March 1983

Middle East

Thank you for your letter of 25 March.

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation that she should consider sending an appeal to Mr. Begin to make a positive response to a statement by King Hussein of willingness to enter peace negotiations (if in the event the King does make such a statement following his meeting with Arafat on 27 March).

The Prime Minister has given this matter careful thought but has concluded that such an appeal would not be likely to influence Mr. Begin in a positive direction. She believes that only President Reagan could do this. Moreover, Mrs. Thatcher takes the view that Mr. Begin might regard a message from her at this time as an irritant.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Middle East

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 March 1983

Thank you for your letter of 23 March enclosing the original version of President Reagan's letter of 7 March to the Prime Minister about the Middle East.

A. J. COLES

Mr. Edward J. Streator

Handwritten initials, possibly 'JP', in the bottom right corner of the page.



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

March 23, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message  
from President Reagan, the text of which was previously  
transmitted to you on March 11, 1983.

Sincerely,

*Edward J. Streator*  
Edward J. Streator  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure


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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON



24 MAR 1983



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FROM TEL AVIV 231015Z MAR 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 98 OF 23 MARCH 1983

INFO PRIORITY JERUSALEM, AMMAN, CAIRO, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT ON 20 MARCH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT APPROVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 8 NEW SETTLEMENTS IN HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS OF THE WEST BANK, INCLUDING A SITE OVERLOOKING NABLUS.
2. THE FULL FACTS HAVE NOT YET EMERGED. THIS WEEK'S CABINET COMMUNIQUE SAID NOTHING ABOUT MORE SETTLEMENTS. ASTONISHINGLY ENOUGH, THERE IS STILL NO AGREED VERSION OF WHAT AND WHERE THE SETTLEMENTS ARE. ACCORDING TO THE HEBREW PRESS ALL 8 ALREADY EXIST AS MILITARY NAHAL OUTPOSTS. A PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONVERSION INTO CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS WAS MADE SOME WEEKS AGO BY THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANISATION (WZO). APPROVAL BY THE MINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE ABROAD OF ITS CHAIRMAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER EHRLICH. HOWEVER, THE WZO SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE JERUSALEM POST THAT THEY PROPOSED ONLY THAT 5 NAHALS SHOULD BE CONVERTED INTO CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS AND 3 NEW MILITARY OUTPOSTS CREATED WHICH COULD BE CONVERTED LATER INTO CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS. FURTHER CONFUSION HAS BEEN CAUSED BY LACK OF PRECISION AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE 8 SETTLEMENTS.
3. THE US EMBASSY ARE STILL TRYING TO WORK OUT EXACTLY WHAT IS INVOLVED. THEY BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE VARIOUS LOCATIONS NAMED IN THE PRESS ALREADY EXIST EITHER AS NAHALS OR EMBRYO SETTLEMENTS. WZO OFFICIALS FROM WHOM WE HAVE SOUGHT CLARIFICATION HAVE GONE TO GROUND.
4. WHAT DOES SEEM CLEAR IS THAT SUNDAY'S DECISION WAS TAKEN BY THE CABINET, SITTING AS THE MINISTERIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE SO AS TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. THIS SUGGESTS AN EFFORT TO AVOID PRECIPITATING ANOTHER ROW WITH THE AMERICANS. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WOULD BE IN CHARACTER FOR THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT TO TIME THEIR DECISION SO AS TO EMBARRASS KING HUSSEIN. WHO LEAKED THE DECISION EG, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WZO SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT OR A MISCHIEVOUS MEMBER OF THE CABINET (THE FINGER POINTS AT SHARON OR NE'EMAN) IS NOT CLEAR. PUBLICITY FOR PLANS BY WZO TO CREATE A JEWISH TOWN OF SOME 2,000-5,000 FAMILIES OVERLOOKING NABLUS IS PARTICULARLY PROVOCATIVE.

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5. AT ANY EVENT THE DECISION HAS BEEN HEAVILY CRITICISED BY THE OPPOSITION HERE AS DESIGNED TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR KING HUSSEIN TO ENTER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. A LABOUR MEMBER OF THE KNESSET IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT "THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO TORPEDO JORDAN'S ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS FAR MORE THAN IT WANTS TO SETTLE JUDAEA AND SAMARIA".

6. AS WITH PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS, THE MAIN IMPACT OF THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IS LESS PRACTICAL THAN POLITICAL, SINCE THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE MANPOWER AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS ON FURTHER WIDENING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. IN PRACTICE ALSO MORE ISRAELI SETTLERS ARE CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN MOVING TO DORMITORY TOWNS ON THE WEST BANK THAN TO NEW OUTPOSTS SUCH AS THESE LATEST ONES.

MOBERLY

### MIDDLE EAST

#### STANDARD

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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
EID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

#### ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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SUBJECT

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 33<sup>A</sup>/83

US Declassified

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OO WASHINGTON  
GRS 465  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 221300Z MAR 83  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 472 OF 22 MARCH  
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV (PERSONAL FOR  
AMBASSADORS)  
ARAB/ISRAEL

Mr 27  
p.a.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN:

BEGINS. DEAR RON, THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT MESSAGE ABOUT THE  
MIDDLE EAST. I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE CARE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO  
CONSULT US IN RECENT MONTHS OVER A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND IT HELPFUL TO KNOW THE OUTCOME OF  
THE VISIT TO LONDON LAST WEEK BY AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION LED  
BY KING HUSSEIN. THEIR VISIT HAD BEEN LONG DELAYED BECAUSE OF  
DIFFICULTIES ABOUT PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION BUT WE STOOD FIRM  
ON OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE A PLO OFFICIAL AND IN THE END THEY  
ACCEPTED THIS.

THE DELEGATION'S FORMAL MESSAGE TO US WAS THAT THE FEZ  
PROPOSALS ARE STILL ON THE TABLE AND THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE  
CONCLUSIONS OF THE RECENT MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL  
COUNCIL SHOULD BE SEEN IN A POSITIVE LIGHT.

BUT IT WAS THEIR UNDERLYING MOOD WHICH STRUCK ME AND I  
WANTED TO GIVE YOU THE FLAVOUR OF IT. THEY BELIEVE THAT THERE  
IS VERY LITTLE TIME LEFT IF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS  
TOWARDS PEACE IS NOT TO WITHER AWAY. INEVITABLY, IT IS TO YOU THAT  
THEY LOOK. THEY SEEK EVIDENCE THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO PUT  
PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO ENGAGE IN THE PROCESS. THE PALESTINE  
PROBLEM IS THEIR FIRST PRIORITY BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT THE STRENGTH  
OF AMERICAN RESOLUTION WILL BE TESTED BY YOUR SUCCESS OR OTHER-  
WISE IN OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WITHOUT  
UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS BEING IMPOSED.

I FOUND KING HUSSEIN ANYTHING BUT OPTIMISTIC. HE TOLD ME  
PRIVATELY THAT HE IS NOT GETTING THE SUPPORT HE NEEDS FROM THE

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8917 - 1

LEADING ARAB COUNTRIES. AND HE IS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT ARAFAT WILL MOVE FAR ENOUGH TO ENABLE HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE TALKS. HE BELIEVES THAT WE HAVE GOT INTO A VICIOUS CIRCLE. THE ARAB WORLD IS WAITING FOR A CLEAR SIGNAL OF AMERICAN DETERMINATION AND EVEN-HANDEDNESS WHILE YOU ARE WAITING FOR A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM THEM THAT THEY ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE.

I KNOW HOW COMPLEX THE SITUATION IS BUT I HOPE YOU CAN FIND A WAY TO DEMONSTRATE AGAIN TO THE ARAB WORLD THAT YOU ARE TOTALLY COMMITTED TO YOUR PROPOSALS AND THAT, IF THEY PLAY THEIR PART, YOU WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PUSH THEM FORWARD.

IF YOU COULD TELL THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS HOW, ONCE THE WAY AHEAD IS CLEAR, YOU PROPOSE TO START THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT A MAJOR FIGURE IN YOUR ADMINISTRATION WILL MAKE AN EARLY ROUND OF VISITS TO THE CAPITALS CONCERNED, I THINK THEY WOULD BE ENCOURAGED. THEY NEED THIS OR SOME OTHER DEFINITE SIGN THAT YOU ARE ACTIVELY PLANNING FOR PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I MAKE THIS PERSONAL SUGGESTION ONLY BECAUSE WE WANT TO HELP IN EVERY WAY WE CAN. WE ARE RIGHT BEHIND YOU. BEST WISHES, MARGARET. ENDS.

PYM

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FM WASHINGTON 230026Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 724 OF 22 MARCH 1983

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, BEIRUTC TEL AVIV (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS).

*Hand in file.*

*AR 23/3*

YOUR TELNO 472: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. WE HAVE DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

2. CLUVERIUS (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT TODAY SENT A MESSAGE TO KING FAHD REAFFIRMING HIS DETERMINATION TO TAKE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, AND ENCOURAGING HIM TO GIVE KING HUSSEIN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT HE NEEDED. CLUVERIUS CONFIRMED THAT SHULTZ WAS READY TO CONSIDER A VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST IF AND WHEN THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.

3. CLUVERIUS NOTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN TO THE AMERICANS ON VERY MUCH THE SAME LINES AS HE HAD IN LONDON. HE AND THE AMERICANS WERE WELL AWARE THAT ARAFAT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DO MORE THAN THE MINIMUM BY WAY OF ENDORSING ARAB PARTICIPATION IN PEACE TALKS WITH ISRAEL. BUT THE KING ALSO UNDERSTOOD THE ADVANTAGES OF HIS BEING SEEN IN THE US AS READY TO MAKE PEACE.

4. CLUVERIUS FORESAW THAT ONCE KING HUSSEIN CAME FORWARD THERE WOULD BE A PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, INITIALLY OVER THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE. AMERICAN PRESSURE WOULD BE APPLIED IN A NUMBER OF LITTLE WAYS, NONE OF WHICH INDIVIDUALLY WOULD EXCITE THE ISRAELI LOBBY, RATHER THEN BY FOR EXAMPLE A DRAMATIC CUT IN AID. THE OBJECTIVE WAS NOT ONLY TO BRING BEGIN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE BUT TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE CONSTITUENCY IN ISRAEL. CLUVERIUS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS PROCESS COULD TAKE SOME MONTHS AND THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD BECOME A FACTOR. BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE.

WRIGHT

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ECD (E)  
PS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON

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Re 10 PM. (2)

GRPS 600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 221038Z MAR 83  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1228 OF 22 MARCH 1983.  
AND TO IMMEDIATE NO 10 DOWNING ST.

FOLLOWING FOR PS TO SECRETARY OF STATE FROM PS TO PRIME MINISTER  
MIDDLE EAST .

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF HER  
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE MIDDLE EAST. GRATEFUL IF YOU  
WOULD ARRANGE FOR IT TO BE DELIVERED.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT MESSAGE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. I  
AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE CARE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO CONSULT US IN  
RECENT MONTHS OVER A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND IT HELPFUL TO KNOW THE OUTCOME OF  
THE VISIT TO LONDON LAST WEEK BY AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION LED  
BY KING HUSSEIN. THEIR VISIT HAD BEEN LONG DELAYED BECAUSE OF  
DIFFICULTIES ABOUT PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION BUT WE STOOD FIRM  
ON OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE A PLO OFFICIAL AND IN THE END THEY  
ACCEPTED THIS.

THE DELEGATION'S FORMAL MESSAGE TO US WAS THAT THE FEZ  
PROPOSALS ARE STILL ON THE TABLE AND THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE  
CONCLUSIONS OF THE RECENT MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL  
COUNCIL SHOULD BE SEEN IN A POSITIVE LIGHT.

BUT IT WAS THEIR UNDERLYING MOOD WHICH STRUCK ME AND I WANTED TO GIVE YOU THE FLAVOUR OF IT. THEY BELIEVE THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE TIME LEFT IF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IS NOT TO WITHER AWAY. INEVITABLY, IT IS TO YOU THAT THEY LOOK. THEY SEEK EVIDENCE THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO ENGAGE IN THE PROCESS. THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IS THEIR FIRST PRIORITY BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN RESOLUTION WILL BE TESTED BY YOUR SUCCESS OR OTHERWISE IN OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS BEING IMPOSED.

I FOUND KING HUSSEIN ANYTHING BUT OPTIMISTIC. HE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT HE IS NOT GETTING THE SUPPORT HE NEEDS FROM THE LEADING ARAB COUNTRIES. AND HE IS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT ARAFAT WILL MOVE FAR ENOUGH TO ENABLE HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE TALKS. HE BELIEVES THAT WE HAVE GOT INTO A VICIOUS CIRCLE. THE ARAB WORLD IS WAITING FOR A CLEAR SIGNAL OF AMERICAN DETERMINATION AND EVEN-HANDEDNESS WHILE YOU ARE WAITING FOR A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM THEM THAT THEY ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE.

I KNOW HOW COMPLEX THE SITUATION IS BUT I HOPE YOU CAN FIND A WAY TO DEMONSTRATE AGAIN TO THE ARAB WORLD THAT YOU ARE TOTALLY COMMITTED TO YOUR PROPOSALS AND THAT, IF THEY PLAY THEIR PART, YOU WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PUSH THEM FORWARD.

IF YOU COULD TELL THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS HOW, ONCE THE WAY AHEAD IS CLEAR, YOU PROPOSE TO START THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT A MAJOR FIGURE IN YOUR ADMINISTRATION WILL MAKE AN EARLY ROUND OF VISITS TO THE CAPITALS CONCERNED, I THINK THEY WOULD BE ENCOURAGED. THEY NEED THIS OR SOME OTHER DEFINITE SIGN THAT YOU ARE ACTIVELY PLANNING FOR PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I MAKE THIS PERSONAL SUGGESTION ONLY BECAUSE WE WANT TO HELP IN EVERY WAY WE CAN. WE ARE RIGHT BEHIND YOU.

ENDS

BUTLER

NNNN

File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIAL

Department .....

Drafted by .....

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TELEGRAM

Precedence  
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Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO Tel. No. ....of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE 10 DOWNING STREET

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Following for PS to Secretary of State from PS to  
Prime Minister

MIDDLE EAST

The Prime Minister has approved the following  
text of her message to President Reagan on the  
Middle East. Grateful if you would arrange for it  
to be delivered.

/BEGINS

Copies to:-

BEGINS

Thank you for your recent message about the Middle East. I am very grateful for the care you have taken to consult us in recent months over a wide range of issues.

I thought you might find it helpful to know the outcome of the visit to London last week by an Arab League delegation led by King Hussein. Their visit had been long delayed because of difficulties about Palestinian representation but we stood firm on our refusal to receive a PLO official and in the end they accepted this.

The delegation's formal message to us was that the Fez proposals are still on the table and that at least some of the conclusions of the recent meeting of the Palestine National Council should be seen in a positive light.

But it was their underlying mood which struck me and I wanted to give you the flavour of it. They believe that there is very little time left if the present opportunity for progress towards peace is not to wither away. Inevitably, it is to you that they look.

/They

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

They seek evidence that you are prepared to put pressure on Israel to engage in the process. The Palestine problem is their first priority but they believe that the strength of American resolution will be tested by your success or otherwise in obtaining Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon without unacceptable conditions being imposed.

I found King Hussein anything but optimistic. He told me privately that he is not getting the support he needs from the leading Arab countries. And he is not at all sure that Arafat will move far enough to enable him to participate in peace talks. He believes that we have got into a vicious circle. The Arab world is waiting for a clear signal of American determination and even-handedness while you are waiting for a clear signal from them that they are ready to negotiate.

I know how complex the situation is but I hope you can find a way to demonstrate again to the Arab world that you are totally committed to your proposals and that, if they play their part, you will do what is necessary to push them forward.

If you could tell the Saudis and others how, once the way ahead is clear, you propose to start the negotiations and that a major figure in your administration will make an early round of visits to the capitals concerned, I think

/they



they would be encouraged. They need this or some other definite sign that you are actively planning for progress on the Palestinian problem. I make this personal suggestion only because we want to help in every way we can. We are right behind you.

ENDS .

Prime Minister

Agree this revised message to

President Reagan ?

A.J.C. 22/3.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your recent message about the Middle East. I am very grateful for the care you have taken to consult us in recent months over a wide range of issues.

I thought you might find it helpful to know the outcome of the visit to London last week by an Arab League delegation led by King Hussein. Their visit had been long delayed because of difficulties about Palestinian representation but we stood firm on our refusal to receive a PLO official and in the end they accepted this.

The delegation's formal message to us was that the Fez proposals are still on the table and that at least some of the conclusions of the recent meeting of the Palestine National Council should be seen in a positive light.

But it was their underlying mood which struck me and I wanted to give you the flavour of it. They believe that there is very little time left if the present opportunity for progress towards peace is not to wither away. Inevitably, it is to you that they look. They seek evidence that you are prepared to put pressure on Israel to engage in the process. The Palestine problem is their first priority but they believe that the strength of American resolution will be tested by your success or otherwise in obtaining Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon without unacceptable conditions being imposed.

/I found

I found King Hussein anything but optimistic. He told me privately that he is not getting the support he needs, ~~particularly from the Saudis.~~ <sup>from the leading Arab countries.</sup> And he is not at all sure that Arafat will move far enough to enable him to participate in peace talks. He believes that we have got into a vicious circle. The Arab world is waiting for a clear signal of American determination and even-handedness while you are waiting for a clear signal from them that they are ready to negotiate.

I know how complex the situation is but I hope you can find a way to demonstrate again to the Arab world that you are totally committed to your proposals and that, if they play their part, you will do what is necessary to push them forward.

~~I have one personal suggestion which I make only because we all have a duty to help you try to find a way through the difficulties.~~

If you could tell the Saudis and others how, once the way ahead is clear, you propose to ~~organise~~ <sup>start</sup> the negotiations and that a major figure in your administration will make an early round of visits to the capitals concerned, I think they would be encouraged. They need this sign <sup>on some ~~side~~ <sup>side</sup></sup> that you are actively planning for progress. <sup>on the Palestinian matter.</sup> I make this personal suggestion only because we want to help in every way we can. We are right behind you.

## DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

2. Thank you for your recent message about the Middle East.

3. ~~As you know,~~ <sup>to London</sup> The long-deferred ~~London~~ visit of the Arab League Mission, arising from the Fez Summit, took place on 18 March. I found it encouraging that, after the ~~bad~~ <sup>difficult</sup> tempered exchanges which we had had earlier ~~on~~ with some of them ~~on the subject~~ <sup>the Arab countries about</sup> of Palestinian representation in the ~~delegation,~~ <sup>delegation,</sup> team, and given that we stood firm on not having the PLO, all the governments nevertheless felt it was worth coming, even Syria. Their purpose was to tell us that the Fez proposals, which they now call the 'Arab Peace Plan', are still on the table, and that some at least of the <sup>recent</sup> conclusions of the ~~PNC~~ <sup>of the Palestine National Council</sup> meeting should be seen in a positive light.

3. All those who spoke ~~to me~~ emphasised the ~~continuing~~ need for speed and determination in US policy towards the Middle East. They <sup>seek</sup> ~~need~~ constant reassurance that Israel does not have your unconditional support. Success in obtaining Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon without unacceptable conditions is seen as a test of your resolution though the Palestine problem of course occupies the first priority for them.

4. King Hussein told me <sup>that</sup> he is still not sure how far Arafat will go to enable him to declare his readiness to participate in peace talks. But he is not in an optimistic mood

and feels in need of support, not least from the Saudis. He believes, and I must say I sympathise with him, that we have got into a vicious circle. The Arab world is waiting for a clear signal from you that you are truly determined and ~~truly~~ even-handed, while you are waiting for a clear signal from them that they are ready to negotiate. I hope that you can find a way to ~~reinforce~~ <sup>emphasise again</sup> to the Arab world that you are totally committed to your proposals and will take the necessary steps to push them forward if the Arabs will do their part.

5. Phil Habib of course continues to enjoy our full support. It is good that he is making his weight felt on the question of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. It occurred to me that the appointment of another impressive figure like Habib - if you could find one - to deal exclusively with the Palestine problem might make it easier for you to get across the message I am talking about. It could help to demonstrate your determination to make the fastest possible progress on both fronts at once.

6. There is no doubt that the next few weeks will be critical. I want you to know that we are right behind your efforts to make progress in these very complex negotiations. ~~I know~~ <sup>I know</sup> that you will be in touch if there is any way in which we can be of help.

MR. COLES *21.*  
*3*

We spoke.

As I mentioned, I saw Phil Habib for an hour and a half this morning. As a result of that conversation I am rather concerned that the last paragraph of the message to President Reagan as drafted may not be quite right. My reasons are as follows:

- a) In contrast to the last time I saw him (two weeks ago) I got the clear impression that Habib himself has been given instructions to be more active on the central Arab-Israel negotiations, instead of concentrating totally on the Lebanese negotiations as he has been doing recently.
- b) He believes, and I agree with him, that the next two weeks are likely to be crucial. If this is right, there would hardly be time for the President to appoint a new negotiator with much prospect of success.
- c) It will almost certainly get back to Habib that the Prime Minister has suggested his replacement and, if so, we would make a serious enemy of him.

With these thoughts in mind I would like to propose a different final paragraph along the following lines:

"I have been wondering what further evidence you could provide of your determination to push the negotiations through. It occurs to me, as it may have done to you, that it might help if you could let it be known to the Saudis and others that as soon as you feel the way is clear you intend to ask George Shultz to take personal charge of the negotiations. If you could also say that in those circumstances you would expect him to make an early round of visits to the capitals concerned so much the better. The advantage of something like this is that I imagine it is likely to happen anyway. What is needed in my view is that it should be fairly widely known in advance."

/ I have

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I have mentioned this in general terms to John Holmes in Mr. Pym's office, but Mr. Pym himself has not been consulted.

Sir John Leahy  
19 March 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



file R/O

Dr. Streator

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 March 1983

I write to acknowledge your letter of 11 March to the Prime Minister, enclosing a message to her from the President of the United States about the Middle East.

A. J. COLES

The Honourable Edward J. Streator.



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16

M/East

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 160900Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 112 OF 15 MARCH 1983

AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS , BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS  
UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

JORDAN /PLO

1. I HAVE SEEN BOTH KING HUSSEIN (WHO LEAVES FOR BONN TOMORROW MORNING) AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY, AS WELL AS THE US AMBASSADOR WHO HAS SEEN MUCH OF KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPLE ADVISERS OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS DURING EX-PRESIDENT CARTERS VISIT TO JORDAN. A REVIEW OF THE LATEST POSITION AS THE JORDANIANS SEE IT MAY THEREFORE BE HELPFUL PRIOR TO KING HUSSEIN'S MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF LATER THIS WEEK.

2. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT IT HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO HAVE SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH ARAFAT IN NEW DELHI. SEMICOLON THERE HAD BEEN TOO MANY PEOPLE PRESENT AT THEIR MEETING AND ARAFAT HAD DELIBERATELY WASTED TIME BY RAISING TRIVIAL SUBJECTS SUCH AS THE LOSS BY GEORGE HABBASH'S WIFE OF HER JORDANIAN PASSPORT. CONSEQUENTLY HE STILL FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER ARAFAT WOULD PROVE WILLING TO JOIN WITH HIM IN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING HIS READINESS TO ENTER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN HE NEXT VISITED AMMAN (HE IS EXPECTED HERE ON OR ABOUT 21 MARCH). HOWEVER THE KING THOUGHT THE SIGNALS COMING FROM THE PLO WERE NOT ENCOURAGING SEMICOLON IT WAS CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON ARAFAT NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAS MUCH MORE PESSIMISTIC AND SAID FIRMLY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ARAFAT WOULD DELIVER.

~~MORE PESSIMISTIC AND SAID FIRMLY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ARAFAT WOULD DELIVER.~~

3. KING HUSSEIN ALSO COMPLAINED TO ME THAT HE WAS GETTING LITTLE HELP FROM HIS SUPPOSED FRIENDS. HE SEEMED PARTICULARLY UNCERTAIN WHAT GAME THE SAUDIS WERE PLAYING. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ENRAGED OVER A CLAIM MADE BY PRINCE BANDAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT ARAFAT HAD AGREED TO ANNOUNCE JOINTLY WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 25 MARCH THAT JORDAN AND A DELEGATION OF NON PLO PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES WERE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON PRINCE BANDAR HAD FURTHER ALLEGED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF THE FEZ DECLARATION AND THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD AGREED TO JOIN WITH KING FAHD AND ARAFAT IN SIGNING A SECRET DOCUMENT STATING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FEDERATION BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD CATEGORICALLY DENIED TO THE AMERICANS EVER HAVING DISCUSSED SUCH PROPOSALS WITH PRINCE BANDAR. THE KING ALSO SEEMED UNSURE WHAT WEIGHT TO PLACE ON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND KISSINGER WHICH HAD GIVEN RISE TO SOME THOROUGHLY CONFUSING IDEAS. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION, THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH HIMSELF AND HIS NOMINATED REPRESENTATIVES. HE FOUND IT PUZZLING THAT OTHER AMERICANS WERE APPARENTLY NOW BEING ALLOWED TO GET IN ON THE ACT (THESE COMMENTS MAY ALSO REFLECT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CARTERS PRECISE ROLE, ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTAND FROM THE US AMBASSADOR THAT CARTERS VISIT RESULTED IN A TOTAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN HIM AND THE KING AND THAT CARTER PROMISED THE KING HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HE COULD TO HELP JORDAN BOTH WITH KING FAHD, WHOM CARTER IS SEEING TODAY, AND WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, WHOM HE IS TO SEE ON 16 MARCH).

4. THE KING GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE AND, WHILE STILL DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE OPENING OFFERED BY THE REAGAN INITIATIVE IF HE POSSIBLY CAN, INCREASINGLY DOUBTFUL WHETHER HE CAN PULL IT OFF. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME HE BELIEVED THE KING HAD ONLY RECENTLY COME TO A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION. HE NOW REALISED THAT HE COULD NOT BRING THE OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES ALONG UNLESS HE OBTAINED THE BLESSING OF THE PLO AND HE WAS NOW LESS HOPEFUL OF OBTAINING A GREEN LIGHT FROM ARAFAT THAN HE HAD BEEN TWO WEEKS AGO, FOLLOWING THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE KING HAS ALL ALONG BEEN AWARE OF THESE CONSTRAINTS AND, AT LEAST IN HIS HEART OF HEARTS, SCEPTICAL OF THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. BUT HE WAS NONETHELESS DETERMINED TO MAKE ALL HE COULD OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND TO ENSURE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE BLAMED IF IT FAILED.

5. THE KING'S ADVISERS ARE ALREADY DEBATING WHAT HE SHOULD DO IF ARAFAT FAILS TO COME FORWARD. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD ME THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO KING HUSSEIN VISITING WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARAFAT'S VISIT AS SOME HAD SUGGESTED SEMICOLON HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG FOR THE KING TO GO TO WASHINGTON IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS IT WOULD EMPHASISE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE UNITED STATES AT A TIME WHEN THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE TO DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM FURTHER ISRAELI ENCROACHMENT.

~~HIS DEPENDENCE ON~~ THE UNITED STATES AT A TIME WHEN THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE TO DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM FURTHER ISRAELI ENCROACHMENT.

6. THE KING TOLD ME HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF LATER THIS WEEK. AT THE MOMENT HE SEEMS PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY SAUDI AND MOROCCAN ACTIVITIES AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE US ROLE. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF HIM ON YOUR RECENT TALK WITH SHULTZ AND HAVE ALSO LEFT WITH HIM A COPY OF YOUR LETTER TO QASEM (YOUR TELNO 58).

CCN PARA 4 LINE 9

A GREEN LIGHT FROM ARAFAT THAN ...

URWICK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

*M/Beard* (2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March, 1983

Time Minute

To see President Reagan's message.

*MA*

A.F.C. 15/3

*Dear John,*

Message from President Reagan: Middle East

I enclose a letter addressed to the Prime Minister from the US Charge d'Affaires transmitting President Reagan's reply to the Prime Minister's message of 8 February on the Middle East. The US Embassy delivered this letter to the Department on 11 March.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON


March 11, 1983

7/3/83

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

  
Edward J. Streator  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M. P.,  
Prime Minister,  
London.



File AM  
M/Boyd

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

9 March 1983

Dear Christopher,

Many thanks for your letter of 7 March and for the useful memorandum attached to it, which I have shown to the Prime Minister. It was useful because it was concise as well as clear!

I am so glad that you enjoyed your talk with Mrs Thatcher.

Yours ever,

Robin.

C R Reeves Esq.

AM

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 082210Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 125 OF 8 MARCH 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TEL AVIV AMMAN RABAT BEIRUT

MRS KIRKPATRICK: VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

1. WHEN MRS KIRKPATRICK LUNCHEd WITH ME TODAY SHE SAID THAT SHE WOULD BE LEAVING FOR A VISIT TO ISRAEL ON SATURDAY 12 MARCH. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD APPROACHED PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH A REQUEST THAT HE SHOULD ASSIGN MRS KIRKPATRICK AS THE US REPRESENTATIVE AT A CONFERENCE IN JERUSALEM ON SOVIET JEWRY. HE HAD OBLIGED AND SHE WAS GLAD TO GO ESPECIALLY SINCE SHE HAD NEVER BEEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SHE FELT THAT PERHAPS SHE OUGHT TO BALANCE THE VISIT WITH A CONNECTED VISIT TO AN ARAB COUNTRY. DID I THINK THAT A VISIT TO MOROCCO WOULD BE SUFFICIENT? SHE HAD RECEIVED A SERIES OF PRESSING INVITATIONS FROM THE KING DOWNWARDS. I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT AND SUGGESTED AMMAN. SHE THANKED ME AND SEEMED DISPOSED TO ACCEPT THE ADVICE PROVIDED OF COURSE THE

TO AMMAN WOULD BE SUFFICIENT? SHE HAD RECEIVED A SERIES OF PRESSING INVITATIONS FROM THE KING DOWNWARDS. I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT AND SUGGESTED AMMAN. SHE THANKED ME AND SEEMED DISPOSED TO ACCEPT THE ADVICE PROVIDED OF COURSE THE JORDANIANS WERE READY TO RECEIVE HER AT A SUITABLE LEVEL. SHE SAID THAT AT NO PRICE WOULD SHE AGREE TO GO TO THE WEST BANK. WHEN I OBSERVED THAT EAST JERUSALEM WAS PART OF THE WEST BANK SHE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT COUNT IT AS SUCH. SHE SAID SHE WOULD NEED TO RETURN TO THE US ON 19/20 MARCH.

2. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT AT HIS REQUEST SHAMIR WAS COMING TO WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY 11 MARCH. THE ISRAELIS HAD THROWN OUT HINTS THAT HE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING INTERESTING TO SAY ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEBANON.

3. I IMAGINE ALL THIS WILL BECOME PUBLIC VERY SOON BUT MEANWHILE MRS KIRKPATRICK STRESSED ITS CONFIDENTIALITY.

THOMSON

NNNN



Prime Minister

At least we seem to have been successful  
in preserving his illusion!

FEB 8.3.

23 GREAT WINCHESTER STREET

LONDON EC2P 2AX

01-588 4545

From: C.R. REEVES

Champion Greenfield & White

CRR/MMG

7th March, 1983

Robin Butler, Esq.,  
Principal Private Secretary to  
the Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON S.W.1

mt

Dear Robin,

Thank you very much for your letter of 1st March and for your very helpful  
comments following on my visit to the Prime Minister.

I have taken the opportunity of preparing a brief memorandum summarizing the  
points that were discussed regarding trade generally, which I hope may be of  
interest.

On a personal note, may I say how much I enjoyed meeting the Prime Minister and  
also that it was one of the most stimulating discussions in which I have been  
involved. Thank you very much for asking me to come along.

Yours  
Philip

BRITISH TRADE - THE MIDDLE EAST

We discussed the value of Government to Government protocols in promoting UK exports. I agree that mere pieces of paper signed between Governments are of little value; however, our experience suggests that a Government to Government protocol specifying areas of activity or, better still, individual projects on which the two Governments can build a particular mutual interest, can be of significant benefit. They provide a field within which UK exporters and bankers like ourselves can operate without the complication of international competition. These protocols are particularly significant if the decision-taking process in the importing country in question is highly centralized, where officials react positively to the sense of direction given by the protocols.

We also touched on what I regard as an extremely important point concerning the role of the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). I completely understand that you are reluctant to see the Government, and not the private sector, taking risks; but in the context of major project finance, there are, I believe, good grounds for taking the view that the role of ECGD should be counter-cyclical. At the moment, for major projects in LDC's international banks are extremely cautious about taking on medium term project finance lending risks, while many LDC's themselves cannot currently place contracts without such finance. If ECGD were prepared to provide some cover in respect of commercial loans, in addition to the ordinary support given for export credits, then I believe UK exporters would benefit as their financing packages were completed, while those of their competitors were not. Support for these commercial loans would be through the provision of the British Government credit-rating, not subsidies.

The third issue was the question of the targetting of the UK aid programme to assist UK exporters. As a bank, Morgan Grenfell has financed a number of contracts in part under the aid and trade programme; in certain countries such as Egypt it seems essential, if major projects are to be secured, for such aid to be provided; in other countries such aid provides the marginal advantage to win the order. We would certainly support a major increase in the availability of aid and trade programme funds, given the more than satisfactory "multiplier effect" of such aid in securing UK exports.

All of the above issues are clearly significant general ones. I would of course be delighted to take further any one or more of these issues with Ministers and officials.

C.R. Reeves

7th March, 1983

MIDDLE EAST : SITUATION : P211

SUBJECT

cc master  
Ops  
CONFIDENTIAL

~~T 28A/83~~

PRIME MINISTER'S THE WHITE HOUSE

PERSONAL MESSAGE WASHINGTON

SERIAL No. T 27<sup>AO</sup>/83 March 7, 1983

US Declassified

Dear Margaret,

Thank you for your message on your conversation with President Mubarak. In my meetings with him, President Mubarak was just as forceful as he was with you in expressing his concerns about the situation in Lebanon and its potential effect on our ability to obtain a wider peace in the area. I told him that I shared these same concerns and was determined to obtain a timely resolution of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations so that we could focus on a resumed and expanded peace process. My recent public statements on Lebanon and Ambassador Habib's return to the region are all part of an effort to step up the pace of the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations. With the resolution of the Israeli Cabinet crisis, it is my intention that we will now make substantial progress.

While much attention is focussed on Lebanon, I have continued to pursue my peace initiative through contacts with King Hussein, the Saudis and others. I value your continued support of my initiative and hope you will renew your efforts to convince other Arabs of the importance of supporting Hussein's entry to the peace process. I also hope that you will reiterate to Hussein the importance of his stepping forward soon. This decision by Hussein, more than any other factor, would compel the Israeli Government to reconsider its policies with regard to the occupied territories and my September 1 initiative.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-2-

Your message was a welcome reminder of the close cooperation between us in the Middle East. I am grateful for that and will remain in close touch as we move ahead on Lebanon and the peace process.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

*Ron*

The Right Honorable  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

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cc Sir Anthony Parsons

MR. COLES

A.S.C. 4/3

Prime Minister

R. Tackling.

JIC BUSINESS

Thank you - this is most useful to me

I attended the JIC yesterday morning. One or two points may be worth noting about the assessments which will emerge later today.

a. Brunei

The danger would seem to be from the frustration and dissatisfaction of the younger, overseas-educated professionals, who will find their opportunities severely circumscribed by the autocratic and whimsical approach to government of the Sultan. There is little confidence that the Sultan is becoming, or will emerge after his father's death, a more responsible leader.

b. Belize/Guatemala

In response to Sir A Parsons' request last week, the JIC have produced a note on the cross border "cuttings" at Jalacte. This concludes that these are probably a local phenomenon, which could, nevertheless, create some embarrassment or difficulty for the British Garrison. The MoD told me at the end of last week that CBF Belize had been given clear instructions that action to deal with the problem should be left in the hands of the Belize Defence Force, and the garrison should confine itself to providing logistic and other back-up. Following yesterday's JIC meeting, CBF will be asked to reconnoitre the frontier between Belize and Guatemala to establish whether Guatemalan peasants are straying over the border with their cuttings anywhere else.

c. Sudan/Libya

The story of the coup that never was has been pieced together by the Assessment Staff, but it is still not clear (a) whether the Libyan's agent in Khartoum had the plans, the capability and the intention to launch a coup on 18 February, and (b) the extent to which the US Government was involved with the Egyptian and Sudanese Governments in attempting to lead the Libyans on to cause them international embarrassment.

/d. Argentina/Falkland Islands

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
- 2 -

d. Argentina/Falkland Islands

There are no surprises in the routine assessment. A major assessment is due in the next fortnight of the Argentine military capability for an attempt to recapture the Falkland Islands, and separately an assessment of their intentions for marking the anniversary of last year's invasion. It is intended to continue the weekly look at the situation in the South Atlantic, but the JIC are disposed not to produce a written assessment unless there is anything worth saying.

✓ The JIC considered yesterday an assessment of the Soviet attitude to arms control and disarmament, which has been remitted for further work. The intention now is to attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the Soviet Union's underlying attitudes to, and aims for, arms control negotiations, and then to relate these to the individual negotiations START, INF, etc in the attempt to explain and point up Soviet tactics, and anticipate how they may develop. This important assessment should be ready next week.

✓ I raised the question whether Secretary Shultz's public comments earlier this week about the Soviet SAM 5s in Syria were evidence that the US Administration was becoming more concerned about these missiles, and possible Israeli action to deal with them. The US authorities had previously shared our assessment that Israeli action was unlikely in the near future. The Assessment Staff agreed that the situation was now rather more worrying, and that both the US Administration, and the Kremlin, were tending to talk up the crisis. The Assessment Staff will produce an immediate assessment during the course of today.

  
R.T. JACKLING  
4 March 1983

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FROM SAN FRANCISCO 040630Z MAR 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 13 OF 4 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW,  
DAMUSCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ AT PALO ALTO  
ON 3 MARCH: MIDDLE EAST.

LEBANON

1. SHULTZ SAID THAT HABIB WAS INCHING CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON THE LEBANON. IT WAS HARD TO SAY WHETHER HE WOULD SUCCEED BUT THINGS HAD COME TOGETHER QUICKLY IN THE PAST. IT WAS HOWEVER AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER THE SYRIANS WOULD DELIVER WHEN THE US HAD A WITHDRAWAL PLAN TO PUT TO THEM.

2. SHULTZ SAID THAT OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF HAD BEEN VERY WELCOME. THE DISPOSITION AND SIZE OF THE FORCE WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED WAS VERY MUCH IN HABIB'S MIND. MEANWHILE, IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY SEEMED TO BE DOING A BIT BETTER.



3. MR PYM SAID THAT THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WOULD BE VERY CRITICAL. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO PLAY ITS PART IN THE PEACE PROCESS. KING HUSSEIN WAS BEING POSITIVE AND BRAVE (SOME THOUGHT TOO MUCH SO FOR HIS OWN SAFETY). IF HE WAS ABLE AFTER HIS NEXT MEETING WITH ARAFAT TO PUT A PROPOSAL FORWARD, AND IF THERE WERE NO RESPONSE IN THE FORM OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEBANON AND A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS, THE POSITION WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS. THE SOVIET SAM 5'S IN SYRIA MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE ONLY AN APERITIF.

4. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT A GENUINE MOVE BY HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT IN ISRAEL, THOUGH HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THIS HAD ALREADY TO SOME EXTENT BEEN DISCOUNTED. BUT TO HAVE ANOTHER ARAB IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WITH PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AND THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE ARAB COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WOULD BE QUOTE A BIG EVENT UNQUOTE. IT WOULD BRING THE ISRAELIS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THOUGH NOT REVOLUTIONISE THEIR ATTITUDE: THEIR POSITION WOULD BE TOUGH. ON THE FREEZE, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE WORD WAS AMBIGUOUS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE ISRAELIS AGREEING TO FREEZE THE MOVEMENT OF JEWS INTO THE SETTLEMENTS (THICKENING), BUT THEY MIGHT FREEZE QUOTE NEW GROUND-BREAKING INTO NEW AREAS UNQUOTE. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL COMMITMENT, BUT THEY MIGHT DO SO IF THIS WAS MADE A CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND IF THE DEFINITION OF FREEZE WAS A REASONABLE ONE. FINALLY, HE AGREED THAT IF THERE WERE NO CHANGE IN THE POSITION BY END MARCH OR EARLY APRIL THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD BE QUOTE DESTINED FOR DISAPPOINTMENT UNQUOTE.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RE-EMPHASISED THE WEIGHT BEING PLACED ON HUSSEIN AND THE NEED FOR A FREEZE AND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HUSSEIN WOULD BE VERY EXPOSED IF HE CAME FORWARD ON HIS OWN. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE WOULD BE EXPOSED ALSO IF HE DID NOT: THERE WAS A DOWNSIDE RISK IN HIS NOT COMING INTO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE DID HOWEVER AGREE WITH MR PYM THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST PLAY THEIR PART.

#### ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO LONDON

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BRIEFED SHULTZ AT HIS REQUEST ON THE STATE OF PLAY AND SAID THAT THE VISIT NOW HAD LITTLE RELEVANCE TO ARAB/ISRAEL RELATIONS, BUT MUCH TO OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. THE RECENT INDICATIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA HAD BEEN

~~ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO LONDON~~

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FCO PASS ALL ADDRESSEES

BEAVEN

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Middle East 889

2 March 1983

PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 25 February.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Middle East  
Dice AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

1 March 1983

Dear Christopher,

I had a further word with the Prime Minister last night following your talk with her, and we reflected further on the points in the briefing note which you left with me. Her instincts continue to be against extension of risk-bearing by the Government but she said how much she enjoyed the opportunity of going over the ground with you and getting your first hand view of the problems presented by the Middle East at present. You will have detected how much she carries in her mind about our Middle East business.

Thank you so much for coming in at such short notice. The Prime Minister was very grateful, and I hope that you enjoyed it too.

Yours ever,

Robin.

C R Reeves Esq.

AH

# Morgan Grenfell & Co. Limited

TO: ..... C.R.R. Reeves.....

FROM: ..... J.S.S. Syrett/M.P. Knight/P.M. Davies.....

SUBJECT: .. Briefing note for discussion with Prime Minister.

1. Middle East remains an important export market for the UK, particularly in civil and process construction projects and military hardware (see Appendix I).
2. In terms of purchasing power a US\$30 oil price now will still be at the level reached after the last price increase in 1979/80.
3. Despite (2) above a number of factors have dramatically changed and are summarised as follows:
  - a) continuing obligations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar to Iran/Iraq war - \$35bn up to the end of 1982 and Saudi Arabia has given a further \$6bn this month;
  - b) continuing unreasonable high expectations;
  - c) in the case of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE commitments outside in terms of aid and other political contributions in the Middle East and other Moslem countries;
  - d) commitments to other countries such as seen recently to France of about US\$4bn from Saudi Arabia.
4. Therefore dramatic change in purchasing powers of these countries. These must be divided into 4 categories (see Appendix II) as it is impossible to generalise.
5. As markets are changing new opportunities could be taken advantage of by British exporters as method of carrying out business will change. Morgan Grenfell believes that the following 2 factors will be critical to such an initiative:
  - a) direct governmental intervention by means of inter-governmental protocols and use of inter-governmental political initiatives (such as OPEC/North Sea oil pricing);  
*production*
  - b) more extensive use of export credits either in the case of Category A and Category B countries, HMG guarantees without subsidies and in Category C and D the use of subsidised export credit and tied aid.
6. Morgan Grenfell believes that UK, France, Italy and Japan are in the best position to take advantage of the requirement for credit. MG particularly believes that UK is in a strong position to take initiative to increase market share by a combination of HMG support together with expertise and the innovation of the City of London (see Appendix III).

28.2.83

APPENDIX 1

UK Trade with the Middle East in 1982

<u>Country</u>	<u>Exports from the UK (£m)</u>	<u>Imports to the UK (£m)</u>
Saudi Arabia	1,361	1,448
Iraq	875	80
U.A.E.	559	267
Egypt	337	412
Iran	334	226
Kuwait	333	105
Jordan	295	18
	(includes defence equipment)	
Oman	265	47
Libya	261	343
Qatar	245	34
Algeria	199	176
Bahrain	152	36
Sudan	137	10
Morocco	96	60
Syria	90	26
Lebanon	68	24
Yemen Arab Republic	53	1½
Tunisia	39	13
People's Democratic Republic of the Yemen	36	27 (Aden refinery)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u><u>5,735</u></u>	<u><u>3,353.5</u></u>

PMD/jm  
28.2.83.

APPENDIX II

CATEGORISATION OF MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

- A. Major oil exporters who have substantial foreign exchange reserves and maintain significant revenues from oil sales, but may from time to time borrow for individual projects:

ABU DHABI (Part of UAE)  
KUWAIT  
SAUDI ARABIA

- B. Major oil exporters who have more limited foreign exchange reserves, but due to their commitments, will need to borrow on a government and project basis:

ALGERIA  
DUBAI (Part of UAE)  
IRAN  
IRAQ  
LIBYA  
OMAN  
QATAR

- C. Other major countries who obtain some support from Category A countries and are already borrowing, but will need to borrow extensively in the future. These countries will also require aid:

BAHRAIN  
EGYPT  
JORDAN  
MOROCCO  
TUNISIA

- D. Countries who are severely limited or unable to borrow in the international markets. These will also require significant aid:

LEBANON (We believe that the perspective position could change in the foreseeable future)  
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE YEMEN  
SUDAN  
SYRIA  
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

APPENDIX III

Examples of combination of HMG support with innovation from City of London.

Project : To expand existing dairy/agricultural project for Saudi private sector.

Value : US\$ 300 m

Benefit to UK : US\$ 150 m of hardware and services together with prestige for future similar projects (e.g. Egypt/Libya)

Support from HMG : S.R. Guarantee in S.R.'s for the equivalent of \$150 m (No subsidy required)

Support from commercial market : S.R. direct funding for equivalent of \$150 m.

Innovations : 1) Export credit in S.R.

2) No subsidy required

3) Project financing.


Benefits and Incentives

- To borrower to come to U.K. :
- 1) S.R. funding (project revenues in S.R. as product sold domestically).
  - 2) Reduction of borrowing cost as major reduced from 2% p.a. to 0.5% p.a. due to HMG guarantee.
  - 3) Due to size of project would not have been able to raise all funds primarily from commercial market.
  - 4) Reduction in commercial borrowing cost as banks keen to participate in HMG supported loan.



REAL OIL PRICES: INDICES

(nominal prices deflated by world dollar unit export values; indices based on Q3 1981 because nominal spot & official prices approximately equal).



Country	Loss of* revenue from \$10 price cut (\$ bn)	Current assets (\$ bn)	Imports from UK (1981) (\$ m)	Imports from UK as % of imports from industrial economies
Saudi Arabia	17.3	150 - 180	2,279	8.0%
Iran	9.3	7 - 8	808	9.4%
Iraq	3.4	6 - 8	1,257	8.5%
Kuwait	3.1	75 - 80	570	9.5%
UAE	4.1	15	(	(
Qatar	1.0	1 - 2	981	14.5%
Nigeria	3.5	1 - 2	2,876	18.6%
Algeria	2.4	4	351	4.7%
Libya	6.2	10	1,067	8.5%

\* assumes OPEC production of 17.5 m.b.d. in 1983.

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

To note.

London SW1A 2AH

A.S.C. 1/2

c. Si A. Parson.

25 February 1983

Dear Sir,

Palestine National Council (PNC):  
14-22 February

The Prime Minister may like to have an assessment of the recent PNC meeting in Algiers.

The main product of the meeting is the political statement (summary attached). Microscopic examination of the text is an exercise of limited value. The PNC is an occasion for rhetoric and the political statement is meant to provide a basis for PLO unity. The PNC is a kind of Palestinian festival as much as a political meeting and the Algiers meeting was the largest to date (4,000 visitors in all, 355 delegates).

Nevertheless the important points of the statement are:

- i) Fez. The statement does nothing to undermine the Fez Summit, but describes it as the 'minimum'.
- ii) Jordan. The statement says that relations with Jordan should be 'on the basis of a confederation', naturally adding 'between two independent states'
- iii) Reagan. The statement 'refuses to consider this plan as a suitable basis'. This is a compromise between outright rejection and no criticism at all.

The Executive Committee (Cabinet) of the PLO was re-elected exactly as before, except for one resignation of little or no political significance. Arafat retains majority support, but the Committee continues to include representatives of factions other than Fatah more or less opposed to Arafat's policies.

The statement condemns terrorism in almost exactly the same terms as the 1981 statement. Other points worth noting:

- i) Reaffirmation that the PLO is 'sole representative' of the Palestinians and rejection of any formula for mandating or deputising (but this need not exclude a joint Jordanian Palestinian negotiating team as envisaged by Arafat and Hussein);

/ii)



- ii) The statement rejects Camp David but no longer calls for it to be 'aborted': relationship with the Egyptian regime is to be on the basis of abandonment of the 'Camp David policy';
- iii) The statement expresses appreciation of the Prague statement of 3 January and of the Brezhnev plan of 16 September 1982. The Prague statement called for 'the termination of the state of war and establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel' and the Brezhnev plan called on all parties 'including Israel and the Palestinian state to respect each other's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity'.

The key question is whether Arafat has emerged with sufficient freedom of manoeuvre to allow him to deal with King Hussein and take the peace process forward. In our view, he has, just, although the terms of the declaration inevitably impose some constraints on him. But only time will tell whether he has the will to go with this limited freedom of manoeuvre. We know from King Hussein that he has made it clear to Arafat that if he does not take the opportunity now offered to put the Americans and Israelis on the spot, the King will publicly denounce Arafat. The King has also been stressing to him the urgency of the situation on the West Bank and the potentially disastrous consequences of failure to make progress now. But Arafat will have to take some brave decisions and risk internal feuding if he is to give the King enough on the joint delegation and readiness to talk about the Reagan plan. His past record of avoiding awkward choices wherever possible does not inspire confidence on this score.

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
 10 Downing Street

GPS 770

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FM ALGIERS 231735Z FEBRUARY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 23 FEBRUARY 1983

INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ME POSTS

PNC: POLITICAL STATEMENT

1. MY HASTY TRANSLATION OF MOST OF THIS LONG DOCUMENT LEAVES BY TODAY'S BAG.
2. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS.
  - (A) INDEPENDENCE OF PALESTINIAN DECISION FROM ALL OUTSIDE PRESSURES.
  - (B) ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ALL ARAB FRONTS.
  - (C) FORMATION OF A UNIFIED NATIONAL ARMY OF LIBERATION.
  - (D) SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO ENABLE THEM TO RESIST PRESSURE TO EMIGRATE, TO CONSERVE THEIR LANDS AND TO MAKE ECONOMIC PROGRESS.
  - (E) EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHARGED WITH TASK OF PRESERVING INTERESTS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OF THE DIASPORA AND OF THEIR LIBERTY AND SECURITY.
  - (F) CAUTIOUS GREEN LIGHT FOR CONTACT WITH SYMPATHETIC JEWISH ORGANISATIONS.
  - (G) QUOTE REJECTION OF ALL PLANS AIMING TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHT OF THE PLO AS A SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN WHATEVER FORM, WHETHER BY DELEGATION, SUBSTITUTION OR SHARING THE RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION UNQUOTE.
  - (H) QUOTE CONSIDERS THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT THE MINIMUM FOR POLITICAL MOVEMENT BY THE ARAB STATES WHICH MUST BE INTEGRAL WITH MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ALL ITS REQUIREMENTS TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF FORCES UNQUOTE.
  - (I) HELP FOR LEBANON TO EJECT THE ISRAELIS. DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ABOUT SECURITY OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALS AND GUARANTEES OF THEIR RIGHTS OF ABODE, MOVEMENT, WORK AND FREEDOM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY.
  - (J) QUOTE CONFIRMATION OF THE SPECIAL AND DISTINCTIVE RELATIONS WHICH BIND THE JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLES TOGETHER AND THE NECESSITY OF WORKING TO DEVELOP THEM IN A WAY WHICH ACCORDS WITH THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES AND OF THE ARAB NATION TO ASSURE THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO RETURN, TO SELF-

/ DETERMINATION

DETERMINATION, TO THE SETTING UP OF THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ... PROCEEDING FROM THE BASIS THAT THE PLO IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND OUTSIDE THEM, THE PNC CONSIDERS THE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH JORDAN SHOULD STAND ON CONFEDERAL FOUNDATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES UNQUOTE.

- (K) QUOTE RELATIONS WITH OUR SISTER SYRIA SPRING FROM RESOLUTIONS BY THE PNC AT SUCCESSIVE SESSIONS WHICH AFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLO AND SYRIA IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL MILITANT OBJECTIVES TO CONFRONT THE IMPERIALIST ZIONIST ENEMY, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLO AND SYRIA FORM THE FRONT LINE OF CONFRONTATION OF THE COMMON DANGER UNQUOTE.
- (L) QUOTE THE EC TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT TO DISCUSS THE MEANS OF REVITALISING IT ... STARTING FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT THE FRONT DID NOT LIVE UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE TASKS LAID UPON IT DURING THE ZIONIST INVASION OF LEBANON UNQUOTE.
- (M) THE EC TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH EGYPTIANS HOSTILE TO CAMP DAVID AND TO MAKE RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT DEPENDENT ON ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CAMP DAVID.
- (N) THE EC TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO END THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.
- (O) COMMENDATION OF THE BREZHNEV PLAN.
- (P) QUOTE THE REAGAN PLAN IN FORM AND CONTENT DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BECAUSE IT DENIES THE RIGHTS OF RETURN, OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND OF SETTING UP THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND DENIES THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY. THEREFORE THE PNC ANNOUNCES ITS REFUSAL TO CONSIDER IT A SOUND BASIS FOR A FIRM AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND THE ARAB/ZIONIST CONFLICT UNQUOTE.
- (Q) DEEPENING RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST STATES HEADED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, THE ISLAMIC, THE AFRICAN, THE LATIN AMERICAN.
- (R) QUOTE ENERGISE POLITICAL WORK WITH THE WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS AND JAPAN WITH THE AIM OF DEVELOPING THEIR ATTITUDES AND WIDENING RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AND THE RIGHT OF THE

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SET UP THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. THE PNC SALUTES ALL DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES OPPOSED TO IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE ... CONSIDERING THEM A FUNDAMENTAL ALLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

- (S) ISOLATING ISRAEL IN ALL FORA OF THE UN.
- (T) RESISTING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.
- (U) CONDEMNATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.
- (V) QUOTE CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST TERMS TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INCLUDING AT ITS HEAD OFFICIAL AMERICAN AND ISRAELI TERRORISM ORGANISED AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES AND THE PLO AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON UNQUOTE.
- (W) QUOTE ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES AND CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNQUOTE.

3. SEE MIFT.

STRACHAN

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	MR EGERTON
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RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

2- FEB 3 1984





E.R.

cc Mr. Jackling

Prime Minister

MR. COLES

MS

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS


These are my very preliminary comments on the outcome of the Algiers meeting, based on the first report from the Embassy in Algiers (Algiers telegram number 59) and on comments in the serious British press.

As expected, the PNC has emerged with a multi-coloured set of lights flashing and no clear message. However, the tentative consensus is that Arafat has got enough leeway to enable him to pursue his discussions with King Hussein. In parallel, the PLO are starting a campaign to try to persuade the Americans to add the word "self determination" to the Reagan plan. They will obviously be unsuccessful in this.

On the positive side, although the PNC has come out in favour of continuation of the "armed struggle" against Israel, they have accepted the Fez Declaration with its implicit recognition of the existence of Israel. They have also "condemned in the strongest terms terrorism and international terrorism" qualifying this inevitably with reference to "American and Israeli terrorism".

If there is further trouble about the composition of the Arab League Delegation to London, this may arise from a PLO claim that they have now met our two conditions, namely recognition of Israel (implicit in Fez) and an outright condemnation of terrorism.

I have no doubt that the FCO will be sending across a more profound analysis of the Algiers meeting in the next few days.



A.D. PARSONS  
24 February 1983

GPS 770

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FM ALGIERS 231735Z FEBRUARY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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/ DETERMINATION

DETERMINATION, TO THE SETTING UP OF THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ... PROCEEDING FROM THE BASIS THAT THE PLO IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND OUTSIDE THEM, THE PNC CONSIDERS THE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH JORDAN SHOULD STAND ON CONFEDERAL FOUNDATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES UNQUOTE.

(K) QUOTE RELATIONS WITH OUR SISTER SYRIA SPRING FROM RESOLUTIONS BY THE PNC AT SUCCESSIVE SESSIONS WHICH AFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLO AND SYRIA IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL MILITANT OBJECTIVES TO CONFRONT THE IMPERIALIST ZIONIST ENEMY, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLO AND SYRIA FORM THE FRONT LINE OF CONFRONTATION OF THE COMMON DANGER UNQUOTE.

(L) QUOTE THE EC TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT TO DISCUSS THE MEANS OF REVITALISING IT ... STARTING FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT THE FRONT DID NOT LIVE UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE TASKS LAID UPON IT DURING THE ZIONIST INVASION OF LEBANON UNQUOTE.

(M) THE EC TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH EGYPTIANS HOSTILE TO CAMP DAVID AND TO MAKE RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT DEPENDENT ON ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CAMP DAVID.

(N) THE EC TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO END THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

(O) COMMENDATION OF THE BREZHNEV PLAN.

(P) QUOTE THE REAGAN PLAN IN FORM AND CONTENT DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BECAUSE IT DENIES THE RIGHTS OF RETURN, OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND OF SETTING UP THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND DENIES THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY. THEREFORE THE PNC ANNOUNCES ITS REFUSAL TO CONSIDER IT A SOUND BASIS FOR A FIRM AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND THE ARAB/ZIONIST CONFLICT UNQUOTE.

(Q) DEEPENING RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST STATES HEADED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, THE ISLAMIC, THE AFRICAN, THE LATIN AMERICAN.

(R) QUOTE ENERGISE POLITICAL WORK WITH THE WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS AND JAPAN WITH THE AIM OF DEVELOPING THEIR ATTITUDES AND WIDENING RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AND THE RIGHT OF THE

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SET UP THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. THE PNC SALUTES ALL DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES OPPOSED TO IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE ... CONSIDERING THEM A FUNDAMENTAL ALLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

(S) ISOLATING ISRAEL IN ALL FORA OF THE UN.

(T) RESISTING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.

(U) CONDEMNATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.

(V) QUOTE CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST TERMS TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INCLUDING AT ITS HEAD OFFICIAL AMERICAN AND ISRAELI TERRORISM ORGANISED AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES AND THE PLO AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON UNQUOTE.

(W) QUOTE ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES AND CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNQUOTE.

3. SEE MIFT.

STRACHAN

MIDDLE EAST

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FM ALGIERS 231808Z FEBRUARY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 23 FEBRUARY 1983

INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ME POSTS

MIPT: PNC: POLITICAL STATEMENT

1. I REGRET THAT I WAS UNABLE TO GET TO SEE ARAFAT OR PLO TOP PEOPLE. MAHMOUD LABADI AND SHAFIQ AL-HOUT HAD INTENDED TO COME ROUND FOR A DRINK LAST NIGHT BUT IN THE EVENT THE SESSION DID NOT CLOSE UNTIL NEARLY MIDNIGHT AND THEY DEPARTED THIS MORNING.

2. I THINK ON THE WHOLE ARAFAT HAS REASON TO BE SATISFIED, THOUGH I DOUBT WHETHER THE CONGRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN HELD IF HE HAD NOT BEEN PRETTY SURE HE WOULD GET WHAT HE WANTED.

3. THE TERMS OF SOME OF THE DECLARATION ARE MORE MILITANT THAN WE MIGHT HAVE HOPED FOR, BUT THIS REALLY WAS INEVITABLE GIVEN THE TOTAL LACK OF AMERICAN CREDIBILITY. (MAHMOUD LABADI EXPRESSED THIS STRONGLY TO ME ON THE PHONE.)

4. IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT HUSSEIN IS GRANTED NO MANDATE, THOUGH ARAFAT'S UNCHALLENGED RE-ELECTION MUST GIVE THE LATTER CONSIDERABLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE.

4. IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT HUSSEIN IS GRANTED NO MANDATE, THOUGH ARAFAT'S UNCHALLENGED RE-ELECTION MUST GIVE THE LATTER CONSIDERABLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE.

5. BUT THERE ARE POSITIVE ASPECTS:

(A) THE POLICY OF THE ORIGINAL PLO CHARTERS, SO EFFECTIVELY EXPLOITED BY ISRAELI PROPAGANDA, IS NOW CLEARLY A DEAD LETTER.

(B) WHILE THE REAGAN PLAN IS REJECTED, CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN IS APPROVED, A CHANGE IN POLICY WHICH IS A DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE.

(C) TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS EXPLICITLY CONDEMNED, WITH THE NOT UNREASONABLE RIDER THAT ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN LEBANON COMES UNDER THAT HEADING.

(D) THE QUOTE STEADFASTNESS FRONT UNQUOTE IS OBLIQUELY BUT FIRMLY SNUBBED.

(E) WE ESCAPE ANY CRITICISM.

5. AS A PUBLICITY EXERCISE, THE CONGRESS MUST BE RECKONED A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. JOURNALIST FRIENDS TELL ME THAT 1500 GUESTS WERE EXPECTED BUT 4000 ARRIVED.

STRACHAN

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SENT/RECD AT 231844Z NMG/MNJ

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FM WASHINGTON 240100Z FEB 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 452 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO TEL AVIV AMMAN ALGIERS TUNIS JEDDA CAIRO BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

*Read in file.*

1. TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST QUOTES SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYAD) AS TELLING AMERICAN REPORTERS IN ALGIERS THAT THINGS COULD CHANGE COMPLETELY IF THE REAGAN PLAN WERE IMPROVED BY ADDING THE ONE WORD QUOTE SELF DETERMINATION UNQUOTE. ABU IYAD SUGGESTED THAT IF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WERE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, THEY SHOULD RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION NOT TO THE PLO BUT TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO THE CREATING OF A STATE, AND EXCLUDING THE PLO REPRESENTATIVES FROM NEGOTIATIONS. HE AND ARAFAT WOULD AGREE TO BE EXCLUDED. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD OFFER SELF DETERMINATION DIRECTLY TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, NOT THROUGH KING HUSSEIN, BUT THROUGH THE MAYORS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHOM THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES. ABU IYAD IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT HE AND ARAFAT WERE WILLING TO RISK SPLITTING THE PLO IF THE UNITED STATES REPLIED POSITIVELY.

*mt*

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FIRST REACTION IS THAT THIS IS A CLEVER PLOY BY ABU IYAD, BUT ESSENTIALLY ONLY ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DRAW THE AMERICANS INTO NEGOTIATING CHANGES IN THEIR OWN POSITION BEFORE THE ARABS HAVE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. MORE GENERALLY, THEY THINK THAT THE PNC GAVE ARAFAT AS MUCH FREEDOM OF ACTION AS COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, BUT ARE NOT CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL MAKE GOOD USE OF IT.

3. PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID TO JOURNALISTS TODAY QUOTE WE CANT GO ON WITH THESE PEOPLE (PALESTINIANS) IN NOT PROVIDING SOMETHING IN THE NATURE OF A HOMELAND. ON THE OTHER HAND NO ONE HAS EVER ADVOCATED CREATING A NATION UNQUOTE.

WRIGHT

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 23 FEBRUARY 1983  
INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ME POSTS

PNC: POLITICAL STATEMENT

1. MY HASTY TRANSLATION OF MOST OF THIS LONG DOCUMENT LEAVES BY TODAY'S BAG.
2. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS.
  - (A) INDEPENDENCE OF PALESTINIAN DECISION FROM ALL OUTSIDE PRESSURES.
  - (B) ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ALL ARAB FRONTS.
  - (C) FORMATION OF A UNIFIED NATIONAL ARMY OF LIBERATION.
  - (D) SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO ENABLE THEM TO RESIST PRESSURE TO EMIGRATE, TO CONSERVE THEIR LANDS AND TO MAKE ECONOMIC PROGRESS.
  - (E) EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHARGED WITH TASK OF PRESERVING INTERESTS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OF THE DIASPORA AND OF THEIR LIBERTY AND SECURITY.
  - (F) CAUTIOUS GREEN LIGHT FOR CONTACT WITH SYMPATHETIC JEWISH ORGANISATIONS.



- (F) ~~CAUTIOUS GREEN LIGHT FOR CONTACT WITH SYMPATHETIC JEWISH ORGANISATIONS~~
- (G) QUOTE REJECTION OF ALL PLANS AIMING TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHT OF THE PLO AS A SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN WHATEVER FORM, WHETHER BY DELEGATION, SUBSTITUTION OR SHARING THE RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION UNQUOTE.
- (H) QUOTE CONSIDERS THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT THE MINIMUM FOR POLITICAL MOVEMENT BY THE ARAB STATES WHICH MUST BE INTEGRAL WITH MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ALL ITS REQUIREMENTS TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF FORCES UNQUOTE.
- (I) HELP FOR LEBANON TO EJECT THE ISRAELIS. DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ABOUT SECURITY OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALS AND GUARANTEES OF THEIR RIGHTS OF ABODE, MOVEMENT, WORK AND FREEDOM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY.
- (J) QUOTE CONFIRMATION OF THE SPECIAL AND DISTINCTIVE RELATIONS WHICH BIND THE JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLES TOGETHER AND THE NECESSITY OF WORKING TO DEVELOP THEM IN A WAY WHICH ACCORDS WITH THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES AND OF THE ARAB NATION TO ASSURE THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO RETURN, TO SELF-DETERMINATION, TO THE SETTING UP OF THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ... PROCEEDING FROM THE BASIS THAT THE PLO IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND OUTSIDE THEM, THE PNC CONSIDERS THE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH JORDAN SHOULD STAND ON CONFEDERAL FOUNDATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES UNQUOTE.
- (K) QUOTE RELATIONS WITH OUR SISTER SYRIA SPRING FROM RESOLUTIONS BY THE PNC AT SUCCESSIVE SESSIONS WHICH AFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLO AND SYRIA IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL MILITANT OBJECTIVES TO CONFRONT THE IMPERIALIST ZIONIST ENEMY, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLO AND SYRIA FORM THE FRONT LINE OF CONFRONTATION OF THE COMMON DANGER UNQUOTE.
- Executive Committee*
- (L) QUOTE THE EC TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT TO DISCUSS THE MEANS OF REVITALISING IT ... STARTING FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT THE FRONT DID NOT LIVE UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE TASKS LAID UPON IT DURING THE ZIONIST INVASION OF LEBANON UNQUOTE.
- (M) THE EC TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH EGYPTIANS HOSTILE TO CAMP DAVID AND TO MAKE RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT DEPENDENT ON ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CAMP DAVID.
- (N) THE EC TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO END THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.
- (O) COMMENDATION OF THE BREZHNEV PLAN.
- (P) ~~QUOTE THE REAGAN PLAN IN FORM AND CONTENT DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN~~

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(R) QUOTE ENERGISE POLITICAL WORK WITH THE WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS AND JAPAN WITH THE AIM OF DEVELOPING THEIR ATTITUDES AND WIDENING RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AND THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SET UP THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. THE PNC SALUTES ALL DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES OPPOSED TO IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE ... CONSIDERING THEM A FUNDAMENTAL ALLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

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(V) QUOTE CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST TERMS TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INCLUDING AT ITS HEAD OFFICIAL AMERICAN AND ISRAELI TERRORISM ORGANISED AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES AND THE PLO AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON UNQUOTE.

(W) QUOTE ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES AND CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNQUOTE.

3. SEE MIFT.

STRACHAN

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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 430 OF 22 FEBRUARY  
 INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND CAIRO  
 INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TODAY TO THE AMERICAN LEGION INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST:

QUOTE

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE ARE WORKING TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA THAT LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY CAN ONLY COME THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, NOT THE USE OF ARMED FORCE. A SECURE AND LASTING PEACE FOR ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBOURS, INCLUDING A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM THAT SATISFIES THAT PEOPLE'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IS A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE HAVE

RIGHTS, IS A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE HAVE LAUNCHED A NEW INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO ACCELERATE AND BROADEN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BEGUN AT CAMP DAVID. THAT PROCESS FULFILLED THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCHANGING OCCUPIED TERRITORY FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. TODAY, I REPEAT MY CALL TO THE ARAB WORLD TO ACCEPT THE REALITY OF ISRAEL AND THE REALITY THAT PEACE AND JUSTICE ARE TO BE GAINED ONLY THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATION. KING HUSSEIN SHOULD BE SUPPORTED IN HIS EFFORT TO BRING TOGETHER A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN TEAM TO NEGOTIATE THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND JERUSALEM.

WE ALSO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON SO THAT COUNTRY CAN ONCE AGAIN BE AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATE. WE CALL ON SYRIA, THE PLO AND ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. A CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON BY THESE FORCES CAN ONLY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO UNDERMINE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THIS ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARED TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDERS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI ARMY. TRUE PEACE CAN ONLY EVOLVE THROUGH FREELY-NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS, NOT SOLUTIONS IMPOSED BY FORCE. UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

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PP JERUSALEM

MR. COLES ✓

Now p-a.

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MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY MEETING


I discussed this with Stephen Egerton and Oliver Miles this afternoon, We agreed that we would leave fixing a date for the meeting for another week or so, and that you or I would take the initiative to suggest an appropriate date to the FCO. It would be nice to get the Arab League delegation question out of the way before holding the meeting, but we should not necessarily be inhibited by this.

As regards the form of the meeting, I suggested that the FCO should not send over any more papers. They should prepare an oral presentation covering the main issues in the Middle East. I suggested that this might take the following form:-

1. A quick survey of the trouble spots in the area, starting with the Western Sahara and ending with the Iran/Iraq war etc.
2. A brief look at the Soviet, American, European and British positions in the area.
3. A definition of British interests.
4. A survey of our present policy with any recommendation for changing it.

I suggested that the presentation should take about twenty minutes to be followed by a question and answer discussion.

The FCO will start work on this basis and will wait for us to suggest a date for the meeting itself. My own feeling is that we should decide on timing in relation to the Arab League Delegation visit. If all goes well with the Delegation visit, we might aim for a date before mid-March. If we get tangled up again, we should wait a bit and clear that particular problem before going ahead with the meeting.

  
A.D. PARSONS  
21 February 1983

Middle East

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FM WASHINGTON 172324Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 390 OF 17 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV ROUTINE, MOSCOW, PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, CAIRO, TUNIS, RABAT, ALGIERS

AMMAN TELNO 67: JORDAN/P L O

1. CLUVERIUS TOLD US TODAY THAT KING HUSSEIN MADE IT CLEAR TO AMBASSADOR VIETS ON 16 FEBRUARY THAT HE WAS NOT (NOT) LINKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. BUT THE KING WAS NOT PREPARED ACTUALLY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THERE WAS SUCH AN AGREEMENT. IN PRACTICE, CLUVERIUS THOUGHT THAT AT LEAST PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN.

*mt*

2. WE ASKED CLUVERIUS ABOUT THE NATURE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ASSURANCE TO KING HUSSEIN ON A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT QUOTE GUARANTEED UNQUOTE A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE NOR HAD HE PROMISED EXPLICITLY TO SEEK ONE. WHAT HE HAD SAID WAS THAT HE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE KING TO SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE UNTIL THERE WAS A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS. CLUVERIUS ADDED THAT THE KING WAS SATISFIED WITH THIS FORMULA WHICH CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD DO ALL HE COULD TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A FREEZE. FURTHER DETAILS BY TELETYPE.

3. KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED TO VIETS THAT ARAFAT WANTED TEN DAYS FOR CONSULTATIONS AFTER THE P N C MEETING BEFORE HE SAW THE JORDANIANS AGAIN. THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE SOME SLIPPAGE FROM THE KINGS TARGET OF 1 MARCH, BUT KING HUSSEIN ANSWERED VIETS THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO BE PROLONGED.

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FM FCO 151655Z FEB 83

TO PRIORITY ALGIERS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 25 OF 15 FEBRUARY

PNC

1. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSERVATIVE MIDDLE EAST COUNCIL LORD CHELWOOD HAS TOLD US THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS BEING TELEXED TO ARAFAT, PROBABLY ON 15 FEBRUARY: BEGINS THE OFFICERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE, LABOUR AND LIBERAL MIDDLE EAST COUNCILS WITH SUBSTANTIAL MEMBERSHIP IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT FULLY SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO STATEHOOD. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD GREATLY ASSIST THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THIS IF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOLLOWED YOUR EXAMPLE AND MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT ACCEPTING THE REALITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. WE WOULD UNDERSTAND IF SUCH A DECLARATION REFLECTED A MAJORITY VIEW OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND WAS MADE CONDITIONAL ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

WE ARE FIRMLY OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A DECLARATION ON THE 14 FEBRUARY WOULD GREATLY BENEFIT PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS AND THAT ANY FURTHER EQUIVOCATION ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ONLY DAMAGE THEM.

WE STRONGLY FAVOUR AND ARE URGING TOP LEVEL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE PLC ENDS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 79 OF 14 FEB

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, RABAT, RIYADH

INFO ROUTINE OTHER M.E. POSTS

MY TWO IPT'S: MEETING WITH KING FAHD  
OIL

1. AS WE ROSE TO LEAVE, I ASKED THE KING WHETHER ANY DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN ON OIL PRICES OR PRODUCTION LEVELS. HE SAID NO: A STATEMENT HAD BEEN ISSUED DENYING THAT THE MINISTER FOR PETROLEUM HAD SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO REDUCE PRICES. (CF PARA 1 OF MY TELNO 72)
2. PRINCE SAUD INTERVENED TO SAY THAT BRITAIN HAD REDUCED NORTH SEA PRICES BY TWO DOLLARS. I SAID THIS WAS NOT TRUE. WE HAD SAID THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE REVIEWED AND THAT IF PRICES WERE CHANGED THE NEW PRICES WOULD BE RETROACTIVE TO 1 FEBRUARY. BUT WE WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE COMPANIES.
3. THE KING SAID SAUDI ARABIA WANTED TO AVOID DISORDER IN THE OIL MARKET (I COMMENTED THAT WE DID TOO). IF SAUDI ARABIA REDUCED ITS



3. ~~THE KING SAID SAUDI ARABIA WANTED TO AVOID DISORDER IN THE OIL MARKET (I COMMENTED THAT WE DID TOO).~~ IF SAUDI ARABIA REDUCED ITS PRICE, OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW SUIT AND WHO KNEW WHERE THE PROCESS WOULD END? THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSIONS AND A MEETING. I ASKED IF HE MEANT AN OPEC MEETING AND WHEN HE SAID HE DID, I SAID THAT IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THERE WAS STILL TIME FOR MEETINGS.
4. I CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT FAHD HAS NOT REPEAT NOT STEELED HIMSELF TO REDUCE PRICES AND WILL MAKE NO REPEAT NO EARLY MOVE.
5. FCO PLEASE REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

FCO PSE PASS TO RIYADH

CRAIG

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 079 OF 14 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, RABAT AND RIYADH

INFO ROUTINE ALL M E POSTS

*only seen*

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING FAHD

1. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY HEAD OF CHANCERY. PRINCES ABDULLAH AND SAUD WERE ALSO PRESENT ONCE THE COURTESIES WERE OVER, ABDULLAH DID NOT OPEN HIS MOUTH AND SAUD CONFINED HIMSELF TO A COULP OF ONE-SENTENCE INTERVENTIONS. I STARTED BY REFERRING, AS BACKGROUND TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, TO THE PERSONAL INTEREST FAHD HAD SHOWN (CODE FOR PRINCE BANDAR'S MISSION) IN DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT, THE PRESS CAMPAIGN, CARRIED ON PARTICULARLY BY BRITISH PAPERS WHICH HAD GREATLY EXAGGERATED THE EFFECT OF THIS AFFAIR ON ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS, AND THE URGENT NEED FOR PROGRESS ON THE CENTRAL MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. FAHD REPLIED THAT THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SAUDI ARABIA WAS DEEP AND OF LONG STANDING (SEMI COLON) THE PRESENT PROBLEM WAS NOT BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF FRIENDS TO SOLVE (SEMI COLON) WE MUST GO ON DISCUSSING IT UNTIL WE FOUND A SOLUTION.

2. HE THEN READ THE MESSAGE, COMMENTED THAT IT DID NOT SEEM TO CONTAIN ANYTHING NEW ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF OUR TALKS WITH KING HASSAN ON THE DELEGATION, AND ASKED ME IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE OF VIEW IN LONDON. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT WHEN I HAD SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON SHE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT SHE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECEIVE A PLO LEADER AS PART OF THE DELEGATION, BUT HAD INDICATED HER READINESS TO LISTEN TO ANY

~~SHE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECEIVE A PLO LEADER AS PART OF THE DELEGATION, BUT HAD INDICATED HER READINESS TO LISTEN TO ANY SUGGESTION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.~~ CONSULTATIONS HAD BEEN GOING ON BETWEEN US AND KING HASSAN, AND IT HAD SEEMED THAT A SOLUTION INVOLVING A NON-PLO PALESTINIAN, PERHAPS MILHEM, MIGHT BE AGREED. BUT KING HASSAN HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO POSTPONE THE VISIT BECAUSE OF THE DEATH OF DLI MI. THE KING INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT DLI MI HAD INDEED BEEN A FIGURE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN MOROCCO. BUT HAD FULL AGREEMENT BEEN REACHED ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISIT BEFORE THIS UNFORTUNATE DELAY, OR DID KING HASSAN STILL HAVE THE MATTER UNDER STUDY? I SAID I HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM TELEGRAMS THAT KING HASSAN HIMSELF WAS AN ADVOCATE OF THE MILHEM FORMULA BUT SOME OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION - PRESUMABLY THE PLO AND SYRIA - HAD DISSENTED. THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS HAD NOW INTERVENED, AND THERE WERE PROBLEMS ABOUT DATES. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THE VISIT WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT OFF UNTIL MARCH.

3. FAHD WAS POLITELY CRITICAL OF OUR TACTICS IN TRYING TO DEAL WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION SEPARATELY, WHEN A QUIET WORD WITH HASSAN OR HIMSELF ABOUT OUR PROBLEM MIGHT HAVE SOLVED IT. BUT THAT WAS PAST HISTORY. HE THEN GAVE ME A WHOLE HOUR ON WESTERN POLICY TOWARDS THE ARABS ON LINES VERY FAMILIAR TO YOU. HAD THE WEST NO STRATEGIC VISION? DID WE NOT REALISE THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE 130 MILLION ARABS, WITH ALL THE RESOURCES AT THEIR DISPOSAL, WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL? OUR POLICY WAS PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PREFER THE ARABS TO CLOSE THEIR DOORS TO THE WEST AND TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT. IF WE DID NOT HELP THE ARAB LEADERS NOW WHEN THEY WERE MODERATE AND SENSIBLE, WE SHOULD FIND ONE DAY THAT WE WERE DEALING WITH LEADERS WHO WERE WILD AND UNTHINKING. ISRAEL EXISTED: THAT ISSUE WAS SETTLED (HE REPEATED THIS SEVERAL TIMES, WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS). THE ARABS WERE SIMPLY ASKING THAT THE PALESTINIANS BE ACCORDED THEIR INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED, JURIDICAL RIGHT TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THEY WANTED TO COME AND TALK TO WESTERN COUNTRIES AND DISCUSS THESE CLAIMS IN A REASONABLE AND LOGICAL WAY, BUT THEY FOUND THEMSELVES TURNED AWAY BY THE BRISH. HE SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS SUCH A PROBLEM FOR THE BRITISH TO SPEAK TO A PLO REPRESENTATIVE. MR HURD HAD RECEIVED KADDOUMI AS PART OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION. HERE WAS ANOTHER ARAB DELEGATION REPRESENTING THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD, HEADED BY THE IMPECCABLY MODERATE KING HASSAN AND BEARING THE PEACEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MESSAGE OF THE FEZ SUMMIT, AND WE WERE REFUSING TO TALK TO IT. WERE WE TRYING TO TELL THE ARABS THAT THEY WOULD NOT WIN THEIR RIGHTS EXCEPT BY FORCE? WERE WE WORRIED THAT RECEIVING A PLO REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE TAKEN AS OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE PLO? THE FRENCH HAD RECEIVED THE DELEGATION BUT DID NOT RECOGNISE THE PLO. WE ALLOWED A PLO OFFICE IN LONDON, DID WE NOT? I SAID THAT THERE WAS A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE LONDON OFFICE, WHICH WAS RATHER DIF / ENT. THIS WAS BRUSHED ASIDE. THE PRESENT TIME OFFERED THE BEST PROSPECT EVER FOR A SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION, AND BRITAIN WAS DELAYING PROGRESS. SAUDI ARABIA LIKED AND RESPECTED THE BRITISH AND WANTED TO BELIEVE IN BRITISH FRIENDSHIP. BUT FRIENDSHIP MUST HAVE A PRACTICAL EXPRESSION. HE

~~FRIENDSHIP, BUT FRIENDSHIP MUST HAVE A PRACTICAL EXPRESSION. HE~~  
COULD NOT SEE THAT THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE WORLD WOULD BE  
IN ANY WAY REDUCED BY OUR SPEAKING TO, FOR EXAMPLE, KHALID  
AL HASSAN. COULD I EXPLAIN WHAT WAS OUR DIFFICULTY? HE HAD A  
GREAT ADMIRATION FOR MRS THATCHER: WHAT WAS HER OBJECTION  
TO PLO REPRESENTATION IN AN ARAB DELEGATION?

4. I SAID THAT ON THE MAIN ISSUES HMG WOULD AGREE WITH THE KING'S  
ANALYSIS. IN PARTICULAR WE FULLY RECOGNISED THE PALESTINIANS'  
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PRESENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US  
WAS ON A SUPERFICIAL SIDE ISSUE: COULD X OR Y BE RECEIVED AT  
A CERTAIN LEVEL IN LONDON? WE SAW AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION  
BETWEEN RECEPTION BY A MINISTER OF STATE AND RECEPTION BY THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE. MOREOVER, I WOULD TRY TO EXPLAIN TO HIM  
CONFIDENTIALLY ONE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
THINKING WHICH HAD IMPRESSED ITSELF UPON ME DURING OUR 1 1/2  
HOUR MEETING LAST MONTH. WOULD HE PUT HIMSELF IN HER POSITION,  
AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE ANXIETY WHICH BESET HER 24 HOURS A DAY  
OVER NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE CONSTANT KILLING OF BRITISH SOLDIERS  
AND CIVILIANS BY IRA TERRORISTS. WE HAD SEEN REPORTS THAT SOME  
GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PLO HAD IN THE PAST SUPPLIED WEAPONS  
TO THE IRA. COULD HE EXPECT MRS THATCHER TO SHAKE HANDS WITH A  
REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ORGANISATION WHICH, AS SHE SAW IT, HAD  
GIVEN TO THE IRA TO KILL BRITISH SOLDIERS? ONLY RECENTLY THERE  
HAD BEEN AN EXPLOSION IN ISRAEL FOR WHICH A PLO GROUP HAD CLAIMED  
RESPONSIBILITY.

5. THE KING ASKED HOW THE PRIME MINISTER COULD BRING HERSELF TO  
SHAKE HANDS WITH MR BEGIN, WHO HAD HIMSELF BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR  
KILLING BRITISH SOLDIERS. I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT  
HAVE DONE SO WITH RELUCTANCE (SEMI COLON) BUT MR BEGIN WAS THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF A STATE WITH WHICH WE WERE IN DIPLOMATIC  
RELATIONS. YES, SAID THE KING, CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED. THEY  
HAD CHANGED ALSO IN THE CASE OF COUNTRIES LIKE GERMANY AND JAPAN  
WHICH HAD IN THE PAST USED VIOLENCE AGAINST THE BRITISH. SURELY  
WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE FEZ RESOLUTION CIRCUMSTANCES HAD  
CHANGED VIS-VIS THE PALESTINIANS? REFERRING TO THE EXPLOSION  
IN ISRAEL, HE ASKED HOW MANY EXPLOSIONS THE ISRAELIS HAD CAUSED  
IN THE LEBANON, KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THE ISRAELIS HAD  
BEHAVED IN A SCANDALOUS WAY. HAD AN ARAB COUNTRY DONE ANYTHING  
OF THE SORT, WOULD THERE NOT HAVE BEEN AN OUTCRY IN THE WEST?  
ISRAEL THREATENED WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WITH TURNING WESTERN  
ZIONIST LOBBIES AGAINST THEM. THE ARABS THREATENED NO BENEFICIAL  
RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES. WE AND KING HASSAN MUST  
GET TOGETHER AND SOLVE THE DELEGATION PROBLEM.

6. I ASKED WHETHER SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE READY TO HELP KING  
HASSAN TO PRESUADE THE SYRIANS AND OTHERS TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE  
SOLUTION. THE KING REPLIED, SOMEWHAT EVASIVELY, THAT IF KING  
HASSAN FOUND A SOLUTION WHICH SEEMED ACCEPTABLE TO MOST OF THOSE  
CONCERNED, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD, AS ALWAYS, BE FLEXIBLE. SHE  
WOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE. SHE WOULD NOT "COMPLICATE THINGS".

VISITS

7. WHEN THE KING RATHER RELUCTANTLY DREW TO A HALT, I THOUGHT IT RIGHT, THOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOT VERY PROPITIOUS, TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF MINISTERIAL VISITS, IN ORDER TO AVOID THE INDEFINITE IMPASSE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 62. I SAID THAT WHILE THE PRESS WERE HIGHLIGHTING THE DELEGATION PROBLEM WE HAD DISCREETLY PUT TO ONE SIDE PLANS FOR VISITS BY THE SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR TRADE AND ENERGY. WOULD IT NOW BE APPROPRIATE FOR THESE "SPECIALIST" MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT TO COME. THE KING, WHILE AVOIDING IN ARAB FASHION A DIRECT NO, SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT FOR A WHILE TO SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOPED - WHAT THE OUTCOME WAS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING, WHAT PROGRESS KING HASSAN MADE WITH THE DELEGATION QUESTION, AND SO ON. SAUD INTERVENED AT THIS POINT, PERHAPS IN AN ATTEMPT TO STRIKE A LIGHTER NOTE, TO SAY THAT HIS MINISTRY MIGHT COMPLAIN IF MINISTERS OTHER THAN YOURSELF CAME FIRST. THE KING SMILED AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT MORE PROBLEMS OVER ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS, BUT THAT HE THOUGHT PEOPLE WOULD REACT BADLY IF BRITISH MINISTERS STARTED COMING TO SAUDI ARABIA WHILE THE DELEGATION QUESTION REMAINED UNSOLVED.

8. I THEN MENTIONED THE VISIT OF THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF KENT, SAYING THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THEIR ROYAL HIGHNESSES SHOULD VISIT THE KINGDOM IN MARCH. THE KING WAVERED, SAYING NEITHER YES NOR NO: THE SITUATION MIGHT WELL BECOME CLEARER IN A FEW DAYS. I SAID I HAD HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP THIS VISIT, WHICH SOUGHT TO DEVELOP THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND SAUDI ROYAL FAMILIES, SEPARATE FROM POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. BUT FAHD MADE NO COMMITMENT.

9. IN THE HALL OUTSIDE I SPOKE TO THE CHIEF OF ROYAL PROTOCOL, TELLING HIM WHAT THE KING HAD SAID AND SAYING THAT I HAD BEEN UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE KENTS' VISIT HAD BEEN FIRMLY AGREED. SAYYID AHMED SAID THE KING HAD CERTAINLY AGREED: HE WOULD RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN WITH HIM AND GET IN TOUCH WITH ME. I ALSO SPOKE TO PRINCE BANDAR, WHO LATER CAME TO SEE ME

AND SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE KING AFTER MY DEPARTURE AND HAD URGED HIM TO LET THE ROYAL VISIT GO AHEAD, AS BEING SOMETHING QUITE DIVORCED FROM POLITICS. THE KING HAD READILY AGREED AND HE, BANDAR, WOULD TELEPHONE THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL FROM LONDON AND TELL HIM OF THE KING'S CHANGE OF MIND.

10 . SEE MIFT FOR OIL MATTERS AND SECOND IFT FOR PRESS INTEREST.

CCN PARA 1 LINE 3 A COUPLE OF  
PRA 3 LINE 8 IMPORTANT THAN OUR  
LINE 20 THE BRITISH. HE  
PARA 4 WE FULLY RECOGNISED  
PARA 5 CHANGED VIS-A-VIS

FCO PLEASE PASS TO RIYADH

CRAIG

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

*Re* *S/B* 140900Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 077 OF 14 FEBRUARY  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, RABAT AND RIYADH  
INFO ROUTINE ALL MMM// ME POSTS

YOUR TEL NOS 53 AND 54 (NOT TO ALL): MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO KING FAHD

1. I DELIVERED THE MESSAGE ON 13 FEBRUARY. THE KING'S REACTION WAS DISAPPOINTING. THOUGH HE WAS COUTEOUS AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT, HE PLEADED EARNESTLY AND AT LENGTH FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY ON OUR SIDE ON THE QUESTION OF PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION AND SAID THAT UNTIL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE DELEGATION'S VISIT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO POSTPONE VISITS TO SADI ARABIA BY BRITISH MINISTERS AND ALSO BY THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF KENT. (I HAVE SINCE HEARD THAT HE WILL PROBABLY ON REFLECTION AGREE THAT THE KENTS' VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD).

~~REFLECTION AGREE THAT THE KENTS' VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD).~~

2. THE MEETING LASTED WELL OVER TWO HOURS, MOST OF WHICH WAS, AS USUAL, A LONG MONOLOGUE BY THE KING. HE CANNOT RESIST SIDETRACKING HIMSELF INTO DETAILED EXPOSITIONS OF ANY SUBJECT WHICH HE MENTIONS, HOWEVER IRRELEVANT TO THE MAIN ISSUE.

3. PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN, WHO WAS WAITING OUTSIDE DURING THE MEETING, CAME TO SEE ME AFTERWARDS AT MY HOUSE. HE HAD HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING FROM PRINCE SAUD AND SHARED MY DISAPPOINTMENT. BUT HE SAID, BY WAY OF EXPLANATION, THAT THE KING WAS IN A DEPRESSED MOOD, HAVING HEARD (I DO NOT KNOW HOW) THAT THE GERMANS HAD REPORTED TO THE AMERICANS THE SAUDI RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S APPROACH (MY TEL NO 55) AND THAT THE AMERICAN REACTION HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. BANDAR, DESPITE HIS DISAPPOINTMENT, WAS NOT INCLINED TO DEPAIR, THOUGH CRITICAL OF THE MOROCCANS' INEPTITUDE OVER THE PLO QUESTION.

4. WE TOO, SHOULD NOT BE OVER-DEPRESSED. WE CAN TAKE SOME COMFORT FROM THE KING'S REPEATED EMPHASIS ON HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR BRITAIN, HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, AND HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION PROBLEM AS ''TRIVIAL'' (BASITA) (LAST WORD UNDERLINED). NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT HE FINDS OUR POSITION ON THE PLO QUITE INCOMPREHENSIBLE, FOR ALL HIS GOOD WILL TOWARDS US, AND CONSIDERS THAT THE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM IS OURS.

5. SEE MIFT FOR A FULL RECORD.

CCN PARA 3 LINE 7 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S ... ETC

FCO PLEASE PASS TO RIYADH

CRAIG

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Middle East

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

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DESKBY 151000Z FEB 83

FM AMMAN 150815Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 14 FEB

INFO MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 55: JORDAN/PLO

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN TODAY, HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE ARRIVING IN LONDON ON 19 FEBRUARY AND INTENDED STAYING UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH (I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS VISIT).
2. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY FIRM WITH ARAFAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN AND HAD LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT HE MUST EITHER MOVE FORWARD WITH THE JORDANIANS AND WITHIN THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE OR FEND FOR HIMSELF. IT WAS NOW UP TO ARAFAT: THE KING VERY MUCH HOPED HE WOULD SUCCEED IN WINNING BROAD SUPPORT FROM THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT IN THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING AT ALGIERS AND THOUGHT HIS CHANCES WERE REASONABLY GOOD (THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, WHOM I SAW EARLIER TODAY, THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD BE GREATLY HELPED BY HAVING RECEIVED A PAYMENT OF US DOLLARS 28 MILLION FROM THE SAUDIS AS A RESULT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO JEDDA).
3. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ARAFAT OBTAINED SUFFICIENT ENDORSEMENT FROM THE COUNCIL TO ENABLE HIM TO MOVE FORWARD, THE KING SEEMED TO ENVISAGE A FURTHER MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN AMMAN SOON AFTERWARDS. THE KING SAID HE WOULD THEN BE LEAVING JORDAN AROUND 6 MARCH TO ATTEND THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN INDIA. I ASKED HIM IF HE ENVISAGED A VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE: HE DID NOT RULE THIS OUT IF DEVELOPMENTS JUSTIFIED IT BUT CLEARLY HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND YET.
4. THE KING REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE THINGS THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IF HE POSSIBLY COULD. MUCH WOULD NECESSARILY DEPEND ON THE ABILITY OF THE AMERICANS TO DELIVER, BUT HE WOULD ALSO NEED THE HELP AND SUPPORT OF HIS EUROPEAN FRIENDS. THE KING ADDED THAT, IF THE PRESENT PEACE MOVES WERE TO FAIL, HE WAS DETERMINED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE FOR ANY LACK OF TRYING ON THE PART OF JORDAN.
5. THE KING REFERRED TO THE RECENT UNPUBLICISED VISIT TO JORDAN OF A SOVIET DELEGATION HEADED BY BRUTENTS. HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS REMAINED FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND

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(CONTINUED)



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CONTINUED TO ADVOCATE THE HOLDING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER THE KING THOUGHT THIS WAS JUST A HOLDING POSITION: THE RUSSIANS WERE WAITING FOR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE TO FAIL AND WOULD THEN NO DOUBT TAKE THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WITH THEIR OWN PROPOSALS.

6. KING HUSSEIN ALSO REFERRED TO OUR CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES OVER THE VISIT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON AND SAID HE HOPED HE MIGHT PERHAPS BE ABLE TO BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO US OVER THIS.

URWICK

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MR THOMAS  
MR HAYES

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p-a.

11 February, 1983

1/2 copy letter + paper to Sir A. Parsons and return time.

A.J.C. 1/2.

Dear John,

Middle East

We discussed the possibility of a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister to go over Middle East policy and I told you that a paper was being prepared here which could serve as a peg on which to hang a bid for such a meeting and a focus for discussion at the meeting. You may like to see / on a personal basis a draft of this paper. It has general approval in the office but our thinking is that we will need to look at it again in the light of whatever comes out of the PNC meeting starting on 14 February. We might plan to send you the final version under cover of a letter or minute by the end of next week.

/ I enclose an extra copy which you may wish to pass on to Tony Parsons.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

## ARAB/ISRAEL: MEDIUM TERM PROSPECTS

1. This paper outlines possible developments in the Arab/Israel dispute over the next 2-3 years, and against that background considers whether HMG's policy is correctly focussed.
2. Recent months have seen some drawing together of US and Arab views on the shape of an eventual peace settlement. The US took a major step forward with President Reagan's speech on 1 September 1982. They came down firmly against permanent Israeli control over the Occupied Territories. They also edged nearer acceptance of Palestinian self-determination: the President avoided the word, preferring the formula 'self-government by the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan'. But Shultz glossed this in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1982: 'We do believe that the Palestinians must take the leading role in determining their own future'.
3. The moderate Arabs skilfully used the shock of the war in Lebanon to propel the Arab world into endorsing for the first time a political programme for settling the Palestinian problem. Fez is still inadequate as regards acceptance of Israel's rights. But it is a landmark nonetheless. The rejectionist countries could no longer call the tune. Syria attended, and signed the communiqué; Libya was isolated in staying away. King Hussein has since taken things a stage further by challenging the PLO to develop a negotiating strategy to capitalise on President Reagan's new interest in the Palestinian cause.
4. As a result, there is now a core of agreement between the US, Europeans, moderate Arabs and Israeli Labour Party. This can be summarised as follows:
  - (i) peace can only be achieved by negotiations, not unilateral actions;
  - (ii) a transitional period will be needed before a final settlement is reached;
  - (iii) a settlement will have to provide for the

/security

security of all concerned, including Israel (most Arabs now accept this);

(iv) the Palestinian problem must be addressed directly, and the Palestinians must have a major say in their own future;

(v) Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories is required by Resolution 242 and essential for a peace settlement.

Of course, major differences of substance remain. But the principal opposition to a solution embodying these elements comes (a) from the present Israeli Government, and (b) from a small minority of radical Arab regimes and Palestinian factions.

5. There are too many variables to make a confident prediction as to how the Arab/Israel dispute will develop over the next 2-3 years. But to illustrate the range of possibilities, two models are attached at Annex A. The optimistic model outlines how the point could be reached where negotiations on the final status of the Occupied Territories would begin. The pessimistic model illustrates some of the developments which would interfere with this process.

6. A critical point is likely to be the developing struggle for power within the PLO. If Arafat and the moderates can win through against, or at least neutralize, the radical factions, they may be able to make the Reagan plan work. If on the other hand he gives up and reverts to radicalism himself, or if the PLO breaks up, it is possible that King Hussein might try to find alternative Palestinian leaders. This would be difficult and dangerous for him, and he has clearly decided that among all the dangers besetting him the best course is to try to work out with Arafat a new basis for Jordanian/Palestinian partnership.

7. Annex B summarises the main elements of a peace settlement based on the principles of the Ten's policy. The Ten's thinking was developed on these lines after Venice,

/and

and the result was summarised in the Luxembourg Report (also enclosed), adopted by the European Council in November 1980. The Luxembourg Report contains much useful and detailed work on specific issues, and is worth reading.

8. On past form, what happens will probably lie between the two models outlined; for planning purposes, we assume it will be nearer the pessimistic one. But the present convergence of interests and approaches between many of the key players presents an opportunity to make progress which may not recur. The window is small, and closing. The Israeli Government are stepping up their plans for Jewish settlement of the West Bank and Gaza. The World Zionist Organisation are working for 100,000 settlers on the West Bank by 1985 (at present there are about 25,000). By then all hope of a settlement on the lines envisaged since 1967 will be lost. Only the Americans have the necessary leverage to bring the Israelis to put a stop to their settlements drive.

9. Some in the Arab world will not be sorry to see the political approach discredited. The Syrian Foreign Minister, Khaddam, said to Mr Pym in Damascus in October that the moderates in the Arab world had a year or two to implement Fez and that if they failed, Arab moderation would disappear for a long time, and major changes would follow in the region. Among these changes, the Syrians might press for a greater role for the Soviet Union in the region. The Russians have so far been remarkably unsuccessful in turning Arab frustration at the lack of progress in peace efforts to their own advantage. Most Arab countries are realistic enough to recognise that the Russians have their own motives, and that only the Americans are capable of delivering a settlement. As long as the West are actively working for a settlement, the opportunities for the Russians to improve their position in the region will be limited. But if US policy runs into the sand, many of the Arabs could be tempted to turn to the Russians for arms supplies and political support. Should there be another war, the stage would then be set for a US/Soviet confrontation.

## BRITISH POLICY

10. It is not in Britain's power to solve the problem. If there is to be a solution it will come from the parties themselves; after them the main responsibility lies on the Americans. But nor is it in our power to stand back and do nothing. The Arab/Israel problem colours our relations with the whole Arab world. Even the Japanese have been unable, despite determined efforts, to avoid having a Middle East policy. We are in it much deeper because we are the former mandatory power, and more immediately because we are a member of the Ten. The development of Mitterrand's policy is an object lesson. When he came to power, he made light of Venice and insisted that a European initiative was out of the question. His sympathies were with Israel. But he had to move fast, first to the middle ground and then into a honeymoon with the Arabs. French credibility has suffered, though French exports have benefited - so far.

11. Venice has given us a strong and defensible platform for two and a half years. It has been welcomed by the Arabs and commanded respect elsewhere. The Reagan initiative would not have gone as far as it did without the Europeans having blazed the trail with Venice. The Israeli Government has not accepted the Venice principle of justice for the Palestinians or the association of the PLO with the peace process, and has therefore rejected the Venice Declaration. This has not, however, prevented a dialogue between Israel and ourselves and the other Europeans. Since the invasion of the Lebanon this dialogue has worn thin. The Israelis show themselves keen to improve it; we should respond in our own time and intensify the dialogue without retreating from our policies.

12. But as a symbol of vigorous European input Venice has now faded. Cohesion among the Ten on this issue is no longer strong enough to prevent some Governments from moving under pressure, or perception of national interests, towards the Palestinian cause. If we are to stay within

/the

the European consensus, we must recognise that its centre of gravity has shifted.

13. Assuming that we do not elect for a policy which disregards the rest of the Ten and gives priority to our economic interests (which would lead us in a considerably more pro-Arab direction) the choice for us in the next two or three years lies essentially between

- (i) an effective abandonment of attempts to influence the course of events and a low-profile role within an increasingly thin consensus of the 10; or
- (ii) an attempt, at the right moment and depending on the course of the Reagan initiative, to revitalise European policy.

14. If we were to adopt the first option, the cover the Europeans could offer would almost certainly not be enough for us as time went on. Our position as the European power most involved in the Middle East, a Permanent Member of the Security Council and former mandatory power in Palestine means that we are more exposed than the others, as the difficulties over the Arab League Delegation have amply shown.

15. The second option also carries exposure to risk, but an active and consistent policy based on the search for peace can be defended in a way that protects our material interests. Admittedly the European approach has not achieved anything concrete yet, and does not look like doing so. On the other hand, it has influenced others. It has also left the Ten in a good position to build bridges between the Arabs and the US, if not Israel, and to encourage the Americans to use their leverage with the Israelis. There is plenty for us to do from within the European grouping, and without a substantial British input the Europeans will not hold together long, nor European Political Co-operation thrive, on the Middle East or any other subject. If the Reagan initiative fails, US policy may go into a pre-election limbo similar to that of 1979/80 which led the Europeans to issue the Venice Declaration. It may be up to us and the

other Europeans to make the running again. This is not just a question of adopting a helpful diplomatic posture. There is a danger of a renewed slide to war and we must do all we can to arrest this.

## CONCLUSION

16. (i) There is a window of opportunity for a negotiated settlement. The makings of a satisfactory compromise are there: the Palestinians would give up their cherished goal of a State, while the Israelis would cede the Occupied Territories in return for real peace underwritten by the major powers (on the Sinai model). The Arabs increasingly accept that a deal like this is the best chance of settling the Palestinian problem.

(ii) But the window is closing. Within two years a settlement as envisaged in Resolution 242 will probably be impossible, unless Israeli settlements are frozen. It is difficult to see what other peaceful solution would then be possible.

(iii) Britain's historical connection with the Arab/Israel dispute as well as our Permanent Member status, our role in Europe and our major commercial interests in the region do not allow us the luxury of opting out of the search for a peaceful solution.

(iv) Our interests are best served by active support for a balanced settlement, and by encouraging urgency and realism in the pursuit of the present opportunities by all concerned. Our views still count, and we can still carry the Europeans with us, but only if we are prepared to keep pace with events. Whether there is progress towards a peaceful settlement or not, the Palestinian question will continue to generate strong emotions on all sides: it will not fade away.



## ANNEX A

## MODELS FOR ARAB/ISRAEL DEVELOPMENTS 1983-1985

1. Optimistic Model

A Arafat secures free hand from Palestine National Council (PNC - Algiers mid-February) to continue his contacts with Jordanians.

B Jordan and PLO agree composition of joint negotiating team including non-PLO Palestinians acceptable to US. Also agree negotiating platform which sets no preconditions.

C Agreement in principle on withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon increases Arab confidence that US can produce results with Israel and thaws Israel/Egypt relations. Moderate Arabs conclude that Jordan/PLO/US approach is best hope of recovering the Occupied Territories, and encourage PLO to take part, without conceding any of the Fez principles in advance.

D Armed with more constructive Arab attitude, US step up pressure on Israel (a) to impose settlements freeze and (b) to test Arab willingness to negotiate peace. Significant support for this line from American Jewish leaders.

E Israeli election (possibly during 1983, subject to outcome of massacre enquiry) shows growing public interest post-Lebanon in exploring opportunity for peace. Incoming Israeli Government conclude that they will have to test the professed Arab willingness to negotiate peace.

F As the 1984 US Presidential election approaches, President Reagan makes intensive efforts to bring parties to the negotiating table, with the aim of achieving foreign policy success in time for election.

G Negotiations open between US, Egypt, Israel and joint Jordanian/Palestinian team with objective of agreeing in first stage transitional period, during which negotiations on final status of Occupied Territories can begin.

2. Pessimistic Model

A Internal pressures within PLO abetted by Syrians prevent Arafat from securing majority from PNC for clear policy of negotiations. Jordan/PLO talks continue but Arafat refuses to commit himself decisively to negotiations.

/B

B Saudis and other moderate Arabs, fearing split in Arab world, press King Hussein not to enter negotiations without PLO. King Hussein, in need of Saudi financial assistance and denied requests for more sensitive US arms, distances himself from Reagan initiative.

C Jewish lobby in US presents this as another example of Arab bad faith. US opinion swings back towards uncritical support for Israel. With election approaching, US Administration decide to avoid head-on confrontation with Israel, and soft-pedal on settlements issue.

D Increasing evidence that Arafat's strategy has failed weakens his hold on more radical PLO elements. Renewal of PLO-backed terrorism in Middle East, Europe or US.

E Continuing Israeli settlement policy in West Bank and Gaza gives further twist to spiral of disturbances and harsh reprisals by security forces.

F In run-up to Israeli election, Begin makes vote - catching gesture (possibly to overlay massacre enquiry findings.) Options: strike against SAM sites in Syria; some further step of 'creeping annexation' eg moving his office to East Jerusalem. Lebanon withdrawal negotiations drag on without agreement.

G Israeli elections return Likud Government with mandate to continue refusal to negotiate on basis of Reagan proposals.

H Israel/Egypt relations remain in present strained condition.

I By US Presidential election, tense stalemate in the region, with Israel's grip on West Bank widely perceived as irreversible. Incoming US Administration see no prospect of foreign policy success in Middle East, adopt damage-limitation approach. Arabs conclude only way of unblocking the situation is another war (parallel with 1973).

## ANNEX B

## OUTLINE OF A SETTLEMENT BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN POLICY

Following the Venice Declaration, the then Nine considered in detail how the general principles they had espoused would apply in practice in a peace settlement. The Luxembourg Report agreed by the European Council in November 1980 and still essentially valid set out the result. It dealt with the following issues:

1. Israeli Withdrawal

Before withdrawal can begin, all parties concerned will have to agree on principles of a settlement, in particular on guarantees and security measures. Renunciation of use or threat of force would help create climate of trust.

Withdrawal would take place in stages according to a timetable agreed in negotiations. There would be a parallelism between withdrawal and the progressive normalisation of relations between Israel and her neighbours.

The international community, probably working through the Security Council, would be required to impose sanctions in the event of non-observance by either side of the different stages of withdrawal.

On the extent of Israeli withdrawal, the only generally acceptable reference point is Resolution 242. It follows from this that Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders with the possibility of minor territorial adjustments by mutual agreement. Equally, any continued Israeli military presence in sensitive areas following withdrawal would be for negotiation between the parties.

The future of Israeli settlements after withdrawal will need to be settled in negotiations. The dismantling of Israeli settlements in Sinai before withdrawal is a precedent, but given the number of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, this would not be practicable. There are other options: longstanding settlers might remain with a special status, allowing them to keep

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Israeli nationality. More recent settlements, representing Israel's desire to maintain control of the territories, would probably have to go, or to live under the authority of the Palestinian authority, as Arabs live in Israel.

The principle of withdrawal applies also to East Jerusalem although it has always been recognised that this presents particular difficulties which will have to be settled in negotiations.

A transitional authority would take over responsibility for areas as they were evacuated, pending self-determination. The authority could be the UN or (less likely) Jordan, or a body of local inhabitants (eg mayors). To overcome different objections, a mixed body drawing representatives from all parties concerned may be necessary.

## 2. Palestinian Self-Determination

Three main questions:

A: Which Palestinians should be consulted?

A balance has to be struck between the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, who have to live with the result and whose interests must be protected, and the Palestinian diaspora, who will have to be involved if a settlement is to attract wider Arab support. The allocation of voting rights will need to be carefully judged. This in turn raises the subject of resettlement. The absorptive capacity of the West Bank and Gaza is limited. But a large proportion of the 3 million Palestinians living outside Israel and the Occupied Territories will have little desire to uproot themselves and settle in the economically backward West Bank. However, the numbers wishing to settle would still be considerable, and there would need to be a system to regulate the rate of resettlement in the transitional period, depending on the economic circumstances at the time, and to establish criteria and priorities for those eligible to settle.

B: How should they be consulted?

Possibilities are:

- a consultative assembly, democratically elected, could

/either

either organise a referendum and define the question to be posed, or it could take the decision itself;

- a referendum. A weighted system of voting would be needed to take account of the different categories of Palestinians. The Security Council in cooperation with the transitional authority could play a role in determining the procedure and terms of choice.

C: When should they be consulted?

Timing will need to be agreed in the negotiations, in relation to withdrawal, etc. It could have a significance for the outcome of the act of self-determination.

### 3. Security Arrangements and Guarantees

Security of all the parties concerned will be a fundamental element in the negotiations, and a major factor in whether or not the settlement will last.

Each of the parties will need to make a series of political commitments: end of state of belligerence; recognition of borders; renunciation of threat or use of force.

Security guarantees will also be essential. These could include demilitarised zones, or zones of limited deployment; Confidence Building Measures limiting military movement and the building of military facilities; early warning systems; and stringent measures to verify that undertakings were observed. The international community would have to be prepared to guarantee a peace settlement. For this an international force would be essential, if possible under UN auspices, to monitor the agreement and provide a physical buffer between the sides.

### 4. Soviet Involvement

There is no scope at present for reconciling the Western and Soviet approaches to the crisis. The Russians are intent on re-establishing a locus standi for themselves, and would see no advantage in supporting the Western sponsored peace process.

/But

But progress is made towards a comprehensive settlement, the Soviet Union will have a role to play as a Permanent Member of the Security Council with any package of security guarantees which are required. This would to some extent tie the Russians' hands, and might add some strength to the guarantees themselves.

#### 5. Jerusalem

Probably the most intractable problem in view of the irreconcilable claims of the two sides, and the emotive issues involved. Venice affirmed that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access to the Holy Places. Both Israel and the Palestinians will demand Jerusalem as their capital, and the Israelis are determined that the city shall remain united as the capital of Israel.

Many possible solutions have been advanced, including:

- internationalisation of the whole of Jerusalem (not realistic now);
- partition. Would certainly be opposed by Israel;
- condominium involving Israel and Arabs. This would imply joint sovereignty, and require much greater trust and goodwill than exists at present;
- question of sovereignty left in abeyance, with Jerusalem administered by local authorities and Holy Places run by religious authorities. Ad hoc arrangement along these lines could have some hope of success in better political climate.

#### Economic Viability of a Palestinian Entity on the West Bank and Gaza

The Luxembourg Report did not study this area in detail. It recognised that large-scale economic aid would be needed. Arab states would be an obvious source, although Western and other states as well as international organisations would also be called upon to help. The new entity would not be economically self-sufficient for a long period if ever, but need not be more dependent in the long term on outside aid than other comparable small states, including Israel. Economic aid would also be needed to provide

/compensation

compensation for Palestinians opting for resettlement outside the Palestinian entity.

Comment

The proposal for confederation with Jordan changes somewhat the environment in which a Palestinian entity would operate. King Hussein has evidently decided that the balance of advantage for Jordan lies in close association with an independent Palestinian entity where Palestinian energies could be harnessed to the task of economic construction and nation-building. Such an entity would be likely to be weak and to need close political as well as economic ties with other Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. It would be essential for Jordan to preserve good relations with the Palestinians, who even now form a majority within the country. But the King has concluded that the alternative to pursuing a close Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, ie continuing Israeli sovereignty and increasingly harsh repression of Palestinian national aspirations, would be more dangerous for Jordan and the region in the long run. Arafat and the mainstream PLO have publicly accepted the confederal concept and they and the Jordanians are working out its implications together.

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FM AMMAN 110855Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 55 OF 11 FEB

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON: ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS,  
UKMIS NEWYORK.

MY TELNO 52: JORDAN/PLO

1. HANNA NASSER (PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE), WHOM I SAW ON 10 FEBRUARY, CONFIRMED THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY JORDANIAN MINISTERS AND BY MILHEM THAT ARAFAT WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY THE DAY AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL IN ALGIERS.
2. NASSER SAID HE WAS LEAVING FOR ALGIERS ON 12 FEBRUARY. TWO DAYS HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PRIOR TO THE FORMAL OPENING OF THE COUNCIL MEETING ON THE EVENING OF 14 FEBRUARY. NASSER WAS EXPECTING CHANGES TO BE MADE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND EVEN SEEMED UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE HIMSELF WOULD REMAIN A MEMBER.
3. NASSER CONFIRMED THAT ABOUT 50 NEW MEMBERS HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. ALTHOUGH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE HAD CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH ARAFAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN, NASSER SAID HE REMAINED UNCERTAIN HOW ARAFAT PROPOSED TO PLAY HIS HAND AT ALGIERS AND THOUGHT HE WOULD KEEP HIS OWN COUNSEL UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT. NASSER BELIEVED IT WOULD BE TOUGH GOING FOR ARAFAT, BUT AS THERE WAS NO CONVINCING ALTERNATIVE TO HIM AS PLO LEADER HE WOULD IN THE END PROVE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE SORT OF MANDATE HE NEEDED. NASSER DOUBTED WHETHER THE DISSIDENT FACTIONS OPPOSED TO PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD IN THE LAST RESORT BREAK AWAY AND SEEK TO FORM A SEPARATE ORGANISATION OF THEIR OWN. OUTSIDE THE MAIN PLO BODY THEY WOULD HAVE NEITHER STANDING NOR CREDIBILITY, AND WOULD BE SEEN TO BE MERELY STOOGES OF THE SYRIANS OR LIBYANS.
4. NASSER SAID HE NOW THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WOULD BE FOUND TO THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ON THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION DUE TO VISIT LONDON. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN, NASSER HAD FOUND THAT ARAFAT'S OWN ATTITUDE ON THIS QUESTION SEEMED TO HAVE HARDENED, AND NASSER NOW THOUGHT THAT THE VISIT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AT ALL.

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FROM TEL AVIV 111000Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 53 OF 11 FEBRUARY 1983  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELNO 50: COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

1. BY A 16 TO 1 VOTE THE CABINET HAS NOW ACCEPTED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT AND SHARON HAS RESIGNED. BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE THE END OF THE STORY.

2. AT YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING SHARON WAS STILL INSISTING THAT HE WOULD NOT RESIGN OF HIS OWN ACCORD AND BEGIN WAS KNOWN TO BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO SACK HIM. HOWEVER, YESTERDAY'S CABINET ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS WOULD HAVE ENABLED BEGIN TO PLAY THE TRUE DEMOCRAT RELUCTANTLY BOWING TO MAJORITY PRESSURE FROM HIS COLLEAGUES AND TO PRESENT A DISMISSAL NOTICE NOT AS HIS OWN DECISION BUT AS ONE OF THE CABINET

NOTICE NOT AS HIS OWN DECISION BUT AS ONE OF THE CABINET COLLECTIVELY. HAVING SLEPT ON THIS OVERNIGHT SHARON TOOK THE INEVITABLE WAY OUT THIS MORNING.

3. IN REALITY IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT BEGIN WILL BE RELIEVED AT SHARON'S DEPARTURE. DESPITE SHARON'S ENORMOUS DRIVE AND DETERMINATION TO EXPLOIT THE LEBANESE VENTURE TO THE FULL, RECENTLY HE HAS BEEN AN INCREASINGLY CONTOVERSIAL FIGURE DOMESTICALLY AND HAS SEEMED TO BE STRIKING OUT INDEPENDENTLY ON MATTERS WHICH BEGIN WOULD PREVIOUSLY HAVE KEPT UNDER HIS OWN CONTROL. OF COURSE BEGIN CANNOT AFFORD TO ADMIT THIS OPENLY BECAUSE IT WOULD IMPLY THAT BOTH BEGIN HIMSELF AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES WERE INDIRECTLY AT FAULT. HENCE THE ENORMOUS CARE TAKEN TO GET RID OF SHARON WITHOUT WEAKENING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AS A WHOLE.

4. EVEN IF BEGIN HAS SUCCESSFULLY DROPPED THE SHARON PILOT, THE KAHAN REPORT LEAVES A BLACK MARK OVER THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT TAKES AND IMPLEMENTS ITS DECISIONS. INDIVIDUAL ARMY OFFICERS MAY BE PENALISED. BUT I BELIEVE BEGIN WILL PROBABLY WISH TO GO OVER THE HEAD OF THE KAHAN COMMISSION BY SEEKING A NEW MANDATE FROM THE ELECTORATE. RE-ELECTION WOULD SHOW THAT THE COUNTRY AT LARGE STILL HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICIES GENERALLY, THUS CANCELLING OUT THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF THE INQUIRY INTO A SINGLE INCIDENT. BUT I DOUBT IF BEGIN WILL BE RUSHED INTO EITHER A KNESSET VOTE FOR NEW ELECTIONS OR TOO EARLY AN ACTUAL DATE FOR POLLING. THE GOVERNMENT MAY WELL FACE A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE FROM ONE OR OTHER OPPOSITION PARTY IN THE COMING DAYS WHICH I WOULD EXPECT THEM TO BE ABLE TO DEFEAT.

5. ISRAELIS SEE NOTHING WRONG IN A GOVERNMENT CONTINUING IN A CARETAKER ROLE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE MOST COMMONLY MENTIONED DATE FOR NEW ELECTIONS IS STILL NOVEMBER. THIS WOULD ALLOW BEGIN SEVERAL WEEKS OF MANOEUVRING BEFORE HE NEED PUT A VOTE FOR EARLY ELECTIONS TO THE KNESSET. THE VITAL ROLE OF THE SMALL NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY IN SUCH A VOTE SEEMS TO HAVE MOVED SLIGHTLY IN BEGIN'S FAVOUR WITH A DECLARATION YESTERDAY THAT THE NRP WOULD STICK WITH THE PRESENT COALITION IN THE EVENT OF THE GOVERNMENT RESIGNING (WHICH NOW SEEMS UNNECESSARY). BUT I WOULD NOT EXPECT THE NRP TO PLAY A VALUABLE CARD FOR LITTLE OR NOTHING IN RETURN. IF THEY DO GO ALONG WITH PRESSURE FOR NEW ELECTIONS THEY MAY KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN, AND THUS INCREASE THEIR BARGAINING POWER, AS BETWEEN SUPPORTING AN EVENTUAL NEW ADMINISTRATION LED BY LIKUD OR LABOUR AFTER FRESH ELECTIONS.

6. I JUDGE THAT BEGIN WOULD PREFER TO FIGHT AN ELECTION WITH THE

LIKUD OR LABOUR AFTER FRESH ELECTIONS.

6. I JUDGE THAT BEGIN WOULD PREFER TO FIGHT AN ELECTION WITH THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE RATHER THAN LEBANON. WITH SHARON OUT OF THE WAY WE COULD SEE FASTER PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON. I SUGGESTED EARLIER THAT THERE MIGHT PROVE TO BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITION.

7. LIKUD WOULD NOT HAVE IT ALL THEIR OWN WAY IN AN ELECTION, DELAYING TILL NOVEMBER WOULD BE A CALCULATED RISK, GIVEN THE INEVITABLE UNCERTAINTY HOW EVENTS MIGHT DEVELOP BETWEEN NOW AND THEN. IN 1981 THE FINANCE MINISTER HELPED BEGIN TO WIN THE ELECTION THROUGH CAREFULLY JUDGED TAX CUTS. THIS TIME THE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN THE ECONOMY WILL BE MORE LIMITED. AND BY NOVEMBER, NOT ONLY WOULD NAVON BE FREE TO RE-ENTER THE POLITICAL ARENA WITH LABOUR BUT A NEW CENTRE PARTY MAY HAVE EMERGED UNDER EZER WEIZMAN.

8. HAVING GRASPED THE NETTLE OVER SHARON, BEGIN CAN BE EXPECTED TO WEIGH ALL THIS CAREFULLY AND TAKE HIS TIME BEFORE EMBARKING ON ANY FURTHER STEP. THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO HAVE WEATHERED THE IMMEDIATE STORM WITH SOME SKILL. THEY ARE BATTERED BUT SUBSTANTIALLY INTACT AND MAY ACTUALLY BE BETTER OFF MINUS SHARON. IN THE MEDIUM TERM, THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE IN MY VIEW REMAINS AN ELECTION LATER THIS YEAR. AS FOR SHARON, HE AND HIS FOLLOWERS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THEMSELVES HEARD, BUT I SUSPECT IT WILL BE A LONG TIME IF EVER BEFORE HE GETS BACK INTO THE INNER SANCTUM OF POWER.

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FM AMMAN 101050Z FEB 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 10 FEB

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON: ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW,  
PARIS, UKMIS NEWYORK

MY TELNO 48: JORDAN/PLO

1. SINCE ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE, I HAVE DISCUSSED HIS LATEST VISIT HERE WITH THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE MINISTER FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ALSO WITH MUHAMMAD MILHEM, THE EXILED MAYOR OF HALHUL. QASEM AND HASSAN IBRAHIM BOTH SAID THAT THE VISIT HAD GONE WELL AND THEY SEEMED FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT ARAFAT WOULD OBTAIN THE MANDATE HE NEEDED FROM THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL.
2. MILHEM, WHO HAD ATTENDED A BRIEFING GIVEN BY ARAFAT FOR PNC MEMBERS DURING HIS VISIT HERE AND SEEMS GENERALLY AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON EVEN THOUGH HE IS NOT A MEMBER OF ARAFAT'S INNER CIRCLE, THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY THE DAY IN ALGIERS. HE BELIEVED ARAFAT HAD COME TO A PRIVATE AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE PFLP AND THE DFLP AND COULD COUNT ON THEIR GENERAL SUPPORT SEMICLN IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT ARAFAT HAD DROPPED HIS EARLIER INSISTENCE THAT MILHEM SHOULD TRAVEL TO ALGIERS SOME DAYS AHEAD OF THE COUNCIL MEETING TO PREPARE THE GROUND. MILHEM ALSO REFERRED TO HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH SYRIAN-BASED GROUPS OPPOSED TO PLO PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHOM HE BELIEVED HE HAD MADE SOME IMPRESSION. HE WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF QADDOUMI AND HIS POLITICAL OFFICE.
3. MILHEM SAID THAT A TAPE RECORDING OF THE VOICES OF PALESTINIAN MAYORS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT IN GOING AHEAD WITH MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN SMUGGLED ACROSS FROM THE WEST BANK AND WAS BEING SENT TO ALGIERS TO BE PLAYED AT THE COUNCIL MEETING: IT WAS ALSO HOPED TO OBTAIN WRITTEN STATEMENTS FROM MOST OF THE MAYORS. MILHEM ADDED THAT PROGRESS ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD BE DECISIVE IN WINNING FOR ARAFAT THE NECESSARY SUPPORT SEMICLN HE THEREFORE FERVENTLY HOPED THAT HABIB'S RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST SIGNIFIED PROGRESS. NOTHING WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ARAFAT'S CREDIBILITY WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT.

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4. WHILE MILHEM BELIEVED THAT ARAFAT WOULD SUCCEED IN OBTAINING A GENERAL MANDATE FROM THE COUNCIL, HE SAW A DISTINCT DANGER THAT IT MIGHT BE WATERED DOWN BY THE ENTRY OF NUMEROUS RESERVATIONS. HE SEEMED TO SEE THIS POSSIBILITY AS THE MAIN DANGER TO ARAFAT, WHO MIGHT THEN BE LEFT TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY ALONE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT MOVE FORWARD.
5. I AM SEEING HANNA NASSER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGIERS AND WILL REPORT IF HE HAS ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT TO ADD.
6. WITH THE BALL NOW SQUARELY IN ARAFAT'S COURT, ATTENTION HERE HAS SHIFTED TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR AND I UNDERSTAND KING HUSSEIN LEAVES FOR BAGHDAD LATER TODAY.

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No 10 Downing St

MY TELNO 48: JORDAN/PLO

1. THE US AMBASSADOR SAW KING HUSSEIN SHORTLY AFTER ARAFAT LEFT AMMAN ON 9 FEBRUARY. THE KING CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD ONLY SEEN ARAFAT ONCE DURING HIS LATEST VISIT SEMICLN THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT. THE KING CLAIMED TO HAVE SPOKEN VERY TOUGHLY WITH NO HOLDS BARRED TO ARAFAT AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT, AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED, THE END OF THE ROAD HAD BEEN REACHED. EITHER THE PLO AGREED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE JORDANIANS IN PURSUIT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OR THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT JORDANIAN/PLO ACTION WAS AT AN END.
2. ARAFAT HAD GIVEN THE KING HIS SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
  - A. THE FORMATION OF A JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM IN WHICH THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY PLO MEMBERS SEMICLN
  - B. THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE SEMICLN
  - C. ARAFAT WOULD TELL THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS THAT HE HAD GIVEN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HIS BACKING SEMICLN
  - D. HE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC OBJECTION TO THE FACT THAT PLO MEMBERS WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATING TEAM.
3. WHEN VIETS ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER HE THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD DELIVER, THE KING HAD REPLIED, "IT'S UP TO HIM: THIS IS THE DEAL." THE KING SAID IT WAS HIS FIRM INTENTION TO MOVE FORWARD SHORTLY AFTER THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE.
4. KING HUSSEIN TOLD VIETS THAT ARAFAT WAS "PARANOID" ABOUT THE DANGER OF LEAKS AND, IN ORDER TO SECURE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE PROTECTION FOR WHAT THE KING HAD TOLD HIM, VIETS HAD ADDRESSED HIS TELEGRAM PERSONALLY TO MR SHULTZ AND HAD NOT REPEATED IT TO ANY US POSTS. HE PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT WE SHOULD ACCORD WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME SIMILAR PROTECTION.
5. VIETS ALSO READ OVER TO ME THIS MORNING THE LATEST WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT OF THE LINE-UP WITHIN THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. ARAFAT HAD ADDED 45 NEW MEMBERS TO THE PNC, WHICH NOW NUMBERED 355. THE AMERICANS CALCULATED THAT HE WOULD COUNT ON A MAJORITY OF 100 WITHIN THIS BODY FOR PURSUING HIS POLICIES. THEY ARE DOUBTFUL IF THE RADICAL GROUPS WILL DEFECT EN MASSE AND BELIEVE THAT ONLY THOSE FEW GROUPS DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON SYRIAN SUPPORT WOULD DO SO. THEY BELIEVED THE REMAINING RADICALS WERE MORE LIKELY TO TEMPORISE.

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SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON

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FM WASHINGTON 100027Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 340 OF 9 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, ROUTINE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, TUNIS,  
BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 67 TO BONN: U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. THERE IS NO HARM IN RUBBING IN EUROPEAN CONCERNS IN DISCUSSION WITH BURT. BUT I WOULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT GETTING THEM TO MAKE EARLY CHANGES IN THEIR POLICY BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY SEE AS THE REAL CONSTRAINTS.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE AWARE OF THE ARAB DEMAND FOR A GESTURE OF SOME SORT TO DEMONSTRATE AMERICAN CREDIBILITY, AND THAT ANY SUCH GESTURE WILL PROVOKE THE, PERHAPS INEVITABLE, CONFRONTATION WITH THE ISRAELIS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY SUSPECT THAT ARAB CONCERN ABOUT AMERICAN CREDIBILITY IS BOTH A DEVICE TO EXTRACT AMERICAN CONCESSIONS BEFORE THE ARABS NEED COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED PREVARICATION BY ARAFAT IN PARTICULAR. THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO RISK PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS, EG OVER SETTLEMENTS, AND BEING LEFT IN THE LURCH BY CONTINUED ARAB HESITATIONS ABOUT JOINING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A SERIOUS LOSS OF FACE FOR THE PRESIDENT. ANY ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI INTERESTS WILL AROUSE A POLITICAL STORM HERE ALTHOUGH THE REACTION WOULD BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT IF KING HUSSEIN, WITH ARAB SUPPORT, HAD FIRST INDICATED HIS READINESS TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. THE AMERICANS CONSIDER THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE OFFERS A CLEAR INCENTIVE FOR THE ARABS TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS (ESPECIALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE). THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR SINCE THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF MODIFYING THE PRESIDENT'S STATED POSITION OR OF ENGAGING IN PRENEG-

MODIFYING THE PRESIDENT'S STATED POSITION OR OF ENGAGING IN PRENEGOTIATIONS. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO STICK THEIR NECKS OUT FURTHER FOR NO OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE. THEY BELIEVE THAT KING HUSSEIN UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THIS POSITION AND IS DOING HIS BEST TO PERSUADE THE P L O TO GO ALONG. THEY DO NOT SEE THAT THE ARABS HAVE ANYTHING TO LOSE. EITHER THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE GOOD HIS ASSURANCES TO KING HUSSEIN AND CARRY THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD OR THIS ASPECT OF U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY WILL COLLAPSE.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I FEAR THE AMERICANS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING TO ALTER THEIR FORMAL POSITION ON SELF-DETERMINATION. IN PRINCIPLE THE ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO IT. BUT, AS SHULTZ HAS MADE CLEAR, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PHRASE CAN BE USED IN THE PALESTINIAN CASE, BECAUSE QUOTE SELF-DETERMINATION UNQUOTE IN THAT CONTEXT HAS COME TO BE EQUATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A PALESTINIAN STATE, WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE NEITHER TO THE AMERICANS NOR TO THE ISRAELIS. HIS WORDING IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN OCTOBER WAS DESIGNED TO GET ROUND THIS.

5. ON TACTICS, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE GIVING SOME CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF REINSTATING BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, PROVIDED THAT IT CAN BE MADE TO APPEAR THAT BEGIN IS BEING QUOTE SUMMONED UNQUOTE, AND TO A POSSIBLE VISIT BY SHULTZ TO THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT NO DECISIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE TAKEN AT LEAST UNTIL THE DUST HAS SETTLED WITHIN ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE MASSACRE INQUIRY COMMISSION'S REPORT. BEGIN IMPLIED TO HABIB TODAY THAT IT MIGHT BE A FEW DAYS BEFORE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN.

6. AS TO LEBANON, THE AMERICANS ARE OPEN TO CRITICISM FOR HAVING UNDERESTIMATED ISRAELI CAPACITY FOR AND INTEREST IN DELAYING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL. BUT ISRAELI CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL APPEARED LAST AUTUMN TO BE LIMITED TO SECURITY ISSUES AND WERE MUCH LESS EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE PUT FORWARD RECENTLY BY SHARON. GIVEN SENSITIVITIES HERE OVER THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. MARINES TO BEIRUT, IT WAS PERHAPS NATURAL FOR THE AMERICANS TO EXPRESS OPTIMISM IN PUBLIC THAT THE PROBLEM COULD BE SPEEDILY RESOLVED. THEY NOW ACCEPT THAT LACK OF PROGRESS ON LEBANON MAY WELL DERAIL THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. BUT IT IS THE ARABS, NOTABLY PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN, WHO ARE MAKING THE LINKAGE EXPLICIT. THE AMERICANS WOULD, I BELIEVE, BE GLAD TO REVERT TO A TWO-TRACK APPROACH IF THE ARABS WOULD ONLY RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.

F C O PASS SAVING TO ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS.

THOMAS

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FM WASHINGTON 100027Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 340 OF 9 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, ROUTINE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, TUNIS, in  
BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 67 TO BONN: U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

*This is the  
point I put**my note yesterday: hmdg**Confirmation!**AD 10  
AD 1/2*

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*McGee*

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THOMAS

**MIDDLE EAST**

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FROM TEL AVIV 090810Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 50 OF 9 FEBRUARY 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NO 49 (NOT TO ALL): COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

1. THE REPORT IS TOUGHER THAN MOST PEOPLE HAD EXPECTED. THE VIGOUR OF ITS LANGUAGE AND THE SHARPNESS OF ITS CRITICISM AND RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE LEFT MANY EARS BURNING. BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO ASSUME THAT IT NECESSARILY PRESAGES THE DOWNFALL OF THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT OR EVEN EARLY ELECTIONS.

2. THE CHOICES FACING MR BEGIN SEEM SIMPLE ENOUGH. BROADLY SPEAKING, HE CAN:

- A) TRY TO RIDE OUT THE STORM, REFUSING TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KAHAN COMMISSION SEMICOLON
- B) DECIDE TO IMPLEMENT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS, DISMISSING SHARON IF HE REFUSES TO RESIGN SEMICOLON
- C) RESIGN, IN THE EXPECTATION OF BEING ABLE TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT

SEMICOLON

D) RESIGN AND CALL FOR EARLY ELECTIONS.

3. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN BEGIN'S NATURE SIMPLY TO IGNORE THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. HE DID NOT WANT A JUDICIAL INQUIRY, BEING AWARE THAT IT MIGHT WELL PROVE A TIME BOMB. BUT HE SEES HIMSELF AS AN HONOURABLE MAN, AND BOTH HONOUR AND HIS LEGAL MIND WILL MOVE HIM TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF ITS REPORT.

4. NOR DO I BELIEVE THAT SHARON WILL RESIGN. HIS SKIN IS THICK AND HE IS NOT IN THE HABIT OF DOING THE GENTLEMANLY THING. HE IS ALREADY PRESENTING THE REPORT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE AMERICANS TO USE HIS DISMISSAL IN ORDER TO ADVANCE THE REAGAN PLAN.

5. EQUALLY I DOUBT WHETHER BEGIN CAN BRING HIMSELF SIMPLY TO DISMISS SHARON. ALTHOUGH ONE CAN INTERPRET SOME RECENT BEGIN ATTITUDES AS A SLIGHT DISTANCING OF HIMSELF FROM SHARON, IT IS HARD FOR BEGIN (EVEN IF HE WISHED) TO FORCE OUT SHARON WITHOUT BADLY DAMAGING HIS OWN POSITION AT THE SAME TIME. IT IS BEING ARGUED HERE THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR BEGIN TO SUBMIT A TACTICAL RESIGNATION, WITH PRIOR AGREEMENT BY ALL COALITION PARTNERS TO REGROUP IN A NEW CABINET UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. WHETHER SHARON WOULD BE INCLUDED, PERHAPS AS MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, IS A SUBJECT OF SPECULATION. BUT SHARON HIMSELF IS RULING OUT A SHIFT SIDWAYS.

6. HITHERTO I HAVE BELIEVED THAT BEGIN'S OWN STRONG PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO GO FOR NEW ELECTIONS, WHICH WOULD TAKE AT LEAST THREE AND A HALF MONTHS TO ARRANGE. POSSIBLY THEY MIGHT NOT EVEN TAKE PLACE UNTIL NOVEMBER WHEN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ARE DUE, BY WHICH TIME BEGIN MIGHT CALCULATE THAT THE PUBLIC AT LARGE WILL HAVE MUCH ELSE TO THINK ABOUT BESIDES THE KAHAN REPORT. BEGIN'S RATINGS IN THE OPINION POLLS HAVE CONTINUED TO SHOW HIM AND HIS PARTY IN THE LEAD, ALTHOUGH NAVON WOULD BE A MORE FORMIDABLE OPPONENT IN AN ELECTION THAN THE PRESENT LABOUR LEADERSHIP.

7. ONE PROBLEM OVER EARLY ELECTIONS IS THAT AT THE TIME OF YAMIT BEGIN PRIVATELY PROMISED THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN WRITING THAT HE WOULD NOT INTRODUCE AN ELECTIONS BILL WITHOUT THEIR SUPPORT. WHILE HE CAN NOW ARGUE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED RADICALLY, THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY IN PARTICULAR ARE IN BAD

~~SUPPORT. WHILE HE CAN NOW ARGUE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED RADICALLY, THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY IN PARTICULAR ARE IN BAD SHAPE TO FACE THE ELECTORATE: A RECENT OPINION POLL FORECAST THAT IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD NOW NRP REPRESENTATION IN THE KNESSET WOULD FALL TO FOUR, AND THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT ONE OF THEIR SIX PRESENT MEMBERS IS ABOUT TO DEFECT TO FORM A SPLINTER PARTY.~~

8. IF BEGIN BROKE HIS PROMISE TO THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES, IT WOULD IN THEORY BE OPEN TO THEM TO ENTER INTO A COALITION WITH LABOUR AND THE SMALL TAMI PARTY WITHOUT ELECTIONS. BUT WE KNOW THAT THE NRP, WHO ARE THE KEY TO THIS PARTICULAR EQUATION, ARE NERVOUS THAT THEIR SUPPORTERS WOULD NOT FORGIVE THEM IF THEY TEAMED UP WITH THE ALIGNMENT IN THIS WAY. THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT COALITION SEE THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AS ONE POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. I AM INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THIS POSSIBILITY.

9. THE CABINET ARE STILL CONSIDERING THE KAHAN REPORT. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT MOST MINISTERS FAVOUR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: SHARON HAS CONSIDERABLE GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT BUT MANY ENEMIES WITHIN THE CABINET. BEGIN IS PRETTY GOOD AT GETTING HIS WAY. BUT UNLESS HE CAN WITHSTAND PRESSURE ON HIM TO DISMISS SHARON, OR PERSUADE HIS COALITION PARTNERS TO AGREE TO EARLY ELECTIONS, THE ONLY CHOICE OPEN TO HIM MAY BE TO SUBMIT A TACTICAL RESIGNATION TO PRESIDENT NAVON.

10. IT WOULD IN THEORY BE OPEN TO NAVON TO INVITE PERES TO HAVE FIRST CRACK AT FORMING A GOVERNMENT, SINCE THE ALIGNMENT FORM THE SINGLE BIGGEST BLOCK IN THE KNESSET. IF SO, WE COULD BE IN FOR A PERIOD OF PROLONGED UNCERTAINTY, WITH PERES BEING ALLOWED UP TO SIX WEEKS TO WOO THE SMALLER PARTIES WHILE THE PRESENT CABINET STAYED ON AS A TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION (WITH SHARON FROZEN IN POSITION AS MINISTER OF DEFENCE). PERES IS CERTAIN TO STRAIN EVERY SINOW TO BRING ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT FROM OFFICE ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT ELECTIONS. BUT PRESIDENT NAVON COULD HARDLY ASK PERES TO FORM AN ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT IF ALL COALITION FACTIONS IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM THAT THEY SUPPORTED BEGIN. THE INDICATIONS AT PRESENT ARE THAT THEY WOULD DO SO, CHANGE BEING MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM THAN CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO.

11. WE MAY BE IN FOR A PERIOD OF EXCEPTIONAL TURBULANCE ON THE INTERNAL FRONT. BUT I SUSPECT THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY BEGIN WILL STILL BE IN OFFICE, WITH OR WITHOUT NEW ELECTIONS. BY ALL

BEEN SURPRSED AND PERCEIVED LATELY. THE CHALLENGE

ACCOUNTS HE HAS BEEN SUBDUED AND DEPRESSED LATELY. THE CHALLENGE OF THE KAHAN REPORT COULD BE JUST THE THING TO SET THE ADRENALIN FLOWING AGAIN.

12. ALL THIS MAY SEEM RATHER BIZARRE IN OUR TERMS. BUT, AS ERIC SILVER POINTED OUT IN THE GUARDIAN THE OTHER DAY, ISRAEL IS NOT POPULATED SOLELY BY ACADEMICS, JOURNALISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF PEACE NOW. MOST OF BEGIN'S SUPPORTERS DO NOT READ NEWSPAPERS, LET ALONE EDITORIALS, AND ARE ANYWAY UNLIKELY TO BE MUCH DISTURBED BY THE KAHAN REPORT. THE THEME THAT JEWS SHOULD NOT TAKE THE BLAME WHEN GENTILE MURDERS GENTILE FINDS A READY ECHO HERE, THOUGH THE COMMISSION REPORT DEMOLISHES THIS ARGUMENT.

13. THE THEME OF AN EDITORIAL ABOUT THE REPORT IN TODAY'S JERUSALEM POST IS ISRAELI DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE AT WORK.

MOBERLY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090105Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 76 OF 8 FEBRUARY 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV BEIRUT AMMAN WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY C.G. JERUSALEM DAMASCUS JEDDA TUNIS CAIRO

UKMIS GENEVA

INFO ROUTINE PARIS MOSCOW

*mf*

MY TEL NO 72: SECURITY COUNCIL: ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. THE ARABS TODAY (8 FEBRUARY) FORMALLY REQUESTED A RESUMPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. THIS REQUEST WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW MORNING (9 FEBRUARY).

DETAIL

2. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IN THE ARAB GROUP YESTERDAY AND TODAY, JORDAN THIS EVENING SENT A LETTER ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL REQUESTING "AN IMMEDIATE COUNCIL MEETING TO RESUME DISCUSSION OF ISRAEL'S PERSISTENCE IN ITS POLICY OF

TO RESUME DISCUSSION OF ISRAEL'S PERSISTENCE IN ITS POLICY OF ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES''.

3. THE LEBANESE APPEAR TO HAVE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED P.L.O. ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IN THE SCOPE OF THIS REQUEST. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN NO ATTEMPT SO FAR TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT NONE MAY BE PUT FORWARD.

4. IF THE DEBATE TAKES PLACE WITHOUT A DRAFT RESOLUTION LITTLE DAMAGE MAY BE DONE. THE OBVIOUS DANGER IS OF COURTING A U.S. VETO WITH THE P.N.C. MEETING DUE ON 14 FEBRUARY; AND DIVERTING SOME ATTENTION FROM THE FALL OUT FROM THE REPORT OF THE ISRAELI COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. THE U.S. MISSION, WHO ARE VERY MUCH ALIVE TO THE RISK, CONFIRM THAT THEY HAVE SPOKEN TO THE JORDANIANS (IN NEW YORK NOT AMMAN).

5. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (TROYANOVSKY) WILL RAISE THE JORDANIAN LETTER AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL BEGINNING AT 1530Z TOMORROW. I PROPOSE TO RAISE NO OBJECTION TO THE ARAB REQUEST, BUT TO WORK FOR AS SHORT A MEETING AS POSSIBLE AND NO RESOLUTION.

WHYTE

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DESKBY 041230Z (MODUK)  
FROM TEL AVIV 041230Z FEB 83  
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
TELNO 041030Z FEBRUARY 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, BEIRUT, PRIORITY WASHINGTON.  
MODUK FOR DS11 FROM AA

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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1. THE ATTACHE CORPS FAREWELL PARTY FOR UKDA AND TWO OTHER DEPARTING ATTACHES WAS HELD LAST NIGHT, 3 FEBRUARY. THESE FUNCTIONS ARE USUALLY ATTENDED BY SAGI (DM1), ALTAR (HD OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS) AND MOR (FLO) PLUS OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. IN THE EVENT ALL WERE NOTABLE BY THEIR ABSENCE.
2. ALTAR PHONED UKDA THIS MORNING TO APOLOGISE FOR THESE ABSENCES. SEEMINGLY ALL HAD BEEN SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE, FIRST BY CHIEF OF STAFF, THEN BY DEFENCE MINISTER. THE SUBJECT OF THESE URGENT DISCUSSIONS WAS FREQUENT AND MOUNTING CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN IDF AND MULTY NATIONAL FORCE, PARTICULARLY THE US CONTINGENT. ALTAR LEFT BOUCHER WITH THE IMPRESSION OF SENSE OF CRISIS.
3. ALTAR GAVE NO INDICATION OF DECISIONS MADE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED TO BACK OFF AND AVOID POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CLASHES. BUT THEY SEEM TO HAVE PERSUADED THEMSELVES THAT IT IS THE AMERICANS WHO ARE INITIATING THE TROUBLE, AND IT IS NOT SHARON'S STYLE TO SHIRK CONFRONTATION. IN ANY CASE, IF THE IDF GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT PLO AND OTHER QUOTE TERRORISTS UNQUOTE ARE GAINING SANCTUARY BEHIND MNF, THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER AND MORE AGGRESSIVE INCIDENTS CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED (THE ISRAELIS ALLEGE THAT PLO HAVE BEEN INFILTRATING NEAR THE BEIRUT UNIVERSITY SCIENCE FACULTY BUILDING AND THAT, INSTEAD OF STOPPING THEM THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN SENDING FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHO ARRIVE FAR TOO LATE). THIS COULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITISH CONTINGENT ARRIVING 8 FEBRUARY.
4. IDF SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT ON THE MORNING OF 3 FEBRUARY IDF COMMANDER OF BEIRUT AREA AND REPRESENTATIVES OF US EMBASSY HAD AGREED THAT:-
  - A) THE OLD RAILROAD TRACK CONSTITUTED THE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN IDF FORCES AND THE MNF SEMICOLON
  - B) THE ZONES WERE CLEARLY DEMARCATED AND WOULD BE MARKED IN THE FIELD BY COLOURED BARRELS TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDING.

PRENDRERGAST

**MIDDLE EAST**

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FILE

Middle east

B/c: Sir A. Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 February, 1983

B/F for Hs

e

MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND KING FAHD:

MIDDLE EAST

Thank you for your letter of 4 February. We had a word on the telephone yesterday about the proposed messages to President Reagan and King Fahd.

The Prime Minister has now approved revised drafts of the messages. The final texts are enclosed with this letter.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for despatch of both of them.

A. J. COLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc Master  
Ops

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

US Declassified

MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T12183

President Mubarak called on me in London on 2 February. I know that you have also just talked with him in Washington. I was struck by the force with which he made a number of points about the Middle East. Since these bear directly on American policy I thought that you should have an account of what he said to me.

President Mubarak was worried that America's friends in the region had lost confidence in the United States' ability to achieve a solution of the pressing problems which confront us all there. In his view this pessimism had gained ground in recent months for two main reasons. First, the slow pace of negotiations over the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. President Mubarak was concerned that, if withdrawal was not achieved soon, the resulting frustration would prove fertile ground for the Soviet Union. Secondly, confidence had been undermined by the lack of any demonstrable progress towards an Arab/Israeli settlement, and in particular by the continuing lack of response by Israel to your call for a settlements freeze.

I remain convinced that the proposals in your speech of 1 September offer the most realistic way forward. They will continue to have my strong support. But I share President Mubarak's concern that Arab confidence in the negotiation route is being seriously eroded by the lack of progress, both in the Lebanon negotiations and in the search for a wider peace settlement. The Egyptians left me in no doubt that Arab confidence would continue to wane unless there is early agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Lebanon and unless (even more important in their eyes) the spread of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is checked.

None of this will be new to you. But I thought it right to get in touch with you because the strength of Arab concern is impressive, because it would be a tragedy if the opportunity for progress presented by your proposals is lost and because I fear

/ that

that that could happen unless there are early, positive steps to restore confidence in the peace process. Only the United States can achieve this but we shall try to support you to the best of our ability, both nationally and through the European Community.

8.2.83

cc Master  
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 11/83

MESSAGE TO KING FAHD

As Your Majesty knows, King Hassan of Morocco has had to postpone the visit by the Arab League Delegation to Britain that he was to have led on 7 February. I know that Your Majesty has been making every effort to arrange a successful visit by the delegation, and I am very grateful that you have been good enough to ensure that I have been kept informed of your views. I therefore wanted to let you know that my colleagues and I stand ready to welcome the delegation as soon as new ~~arrangements can be made.~~ *dates can be arranged.*

In the meantime I am glad that we have been able to dispel certain misunderstandings. Britain has contributed as much as any Western country to the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the acceptance of the need for the PLO to be associated with negotiations for a settlement. We have not retreated an inch from that position and we remain determined to make our contribution to progress towards a just and lasting settlement through negotiation.

We shall do all that is in our power to ensure that the opportunity presented by the decisions of the Fez Summit and President Reagan's proposals is not missed. In particular, I have just sent a personal message to President Reagan stressing the need for early, positive steps to restore confidence in the peace process.

I am sure that Your Majesty will agree that our two countries should co-operate closely to achieve the aims which we hold in common. We both have a fundamental interest in making progress towards peace and justice in the Middle East and in finding solutions to the problems facing the world economy and the security of the free world. The Soviet Union will not be slow to exploit any divisions in our ranks.

For our part, Your Majesty, we shall work for the maximum co-operation and friendship with your country. It is in that spirit that I have sought to let you have my views on the current problems which face us.

8.2.83

PRIME MINISTER

c. Sir A. Parsons

Messages to President Reagan and King Fahd: Middle East

Following your comments at the weekend I have re-drafted the message to King Fahd to make it much shorter and, I hope, less familiar. The new text is attached.

Unless you are able to say in it that you have sent a personal message to President Reagan, its impact will be very much reduced. I do of course understand your hesitancy about the draft letter to President Reagan that you saw over the weekend. But we undertook to Mubarak that we would say something to the Americans and he told a Press Conference in London that we would be doing this. There are of course other ways of conveying messages to the Americans but none will have the same status as a personal message from you to the President. I have therefore radically re-drafted the message. It now consists of (a) an account of what Mubarak said to you and (b) a much shorter comment by you that avoids the more controversial elements of the previous draft.

Would you now be prepared for both messages to be despatched?

*W. J. C.*

A. J. C.

7 February 1983

MESSAGE TO KING FAHD

As Your Majesty knows, King Hassan of Morocco has had to postpone the visit by the Arab League Delegation to Britain that he was to have led on 7 February. I know that Your Majesty has been making every effort to arrange a successful visit by the delegation, and I am very grateful that you have been good enough to ensure that I have been kept informed of your views. I therefore wanted to let you know that my colleagues and I stand ready to welcome the delegation as soon as new ~~arrangements can be made~~ *dates can be arranged.*

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MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

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President Mubarak was worried that America's friends in the region had lost confidence in the United States' ability to achieve a solution of the pressing problems which confront us all there. In his view this pessimism had gained ground in recent months for two main reasons. First, the slow pace of negotiations over the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. President Mubarak was concerned that, if withdrawal was not achieved soon, the resulting frustration would prove fertile ground for the Soviet Union. Secondly, confidence had been undermined by the lack of any demonstrable progress towards an Arab/Israeli settlement, and in particular by the continuing lack of response by Israel to your call for a settlements freeze.

I remain convinced that the proposals in your speech of 1 September offer the most realistic way forward. They will continue to have my strong support. But I share President Mubarak's concern that Arab confidence in the negotiation route is being seriously eroded by the lack of progress, both in the Lebanon negotiations and in the search for a wider peace settlement. The Egyptians left me in no doubt that Arab confidence would continue to wane unless there is early agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Lebanon and unless (even more important in their eyes) the spread of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is checked.

None of this will be new to you. But I thought it right to get in touch with you because the strength of Arab concern is impressive, because it would be a tragedy if the opportunity for progress presented by your proposals is lost and because I fear

/ that



that that could happen unless there are early, positive steps to restore confidence in the peace process. Only the United States can achieve this but we shall try to support you to the best of our ability, both nationally and through the European Community.

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PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
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HD/UND

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GRS 410  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON 050045Z FEB 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 308 OF 5 FEBRUARY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT  
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, MODUK, ROUTINE AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CBFC  
BEIRUT TELNO 60: MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. WE ASKED MS JONES (STATE DEPARTMENT) THIS EVENING TO EXPLAIN  
THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS OVER  
THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OF THE U S CONTINGENT.

2. AS THE U S EMBASSY TOLD SIR D ROBERTS THERE IS NO WRITTEN  
AGREEMENT. THERE IS A VERBAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS  
AND AMERICANS BUT NOT THE MNF AS A WHOLE.

3. THIS STIPULATES A QUOTE NO GO UNQUOTE LINE (RATHER THAN A  
DEMARICATION LINE) RUNNING FROM THE KHALDE TRIANGLE NORTH ALONG THE  
RAILWAY TRACK, EAST AND NORTH ROUND THE SCIENCE FACULTY BUILDING

3. THIS STIPULATES A QUOTE NO GO UNQUOTE LINE (RATHER THAN A DEMARCATION LINE) RUNNING FROM THE KHALDE TRIANGLE NORTH ALONG THE RAILWAY TRACK, EAST AND NORTH ROUND THE SCIENCE FACULTY BUILDING AND WEST ON A LINE APPROXIMATELY 200 METRES NORTH OF AND PARALLEL TO THE SCIENCE FACULTY PERIMETER ROAD TO THE RAILWAY TRACK AT THE JUNCTION OF THE ITALIAN AND AMERICAN SECTORS. THE PERIMETER ROAD MAY BE USED BY THE LAF AND MNF BUT NOT THE IDF. THE STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT HAVE COORDINATES OF THE LINE AROUND THE SCIENCE FACULTY WHICH HAS NOW BEEN MARKED BY COLOURED BARRELS. THEY ARE NOT SURE, INCIDENTALLY, WHETHER THEY ARE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT THE RAILWAY FORMS THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE ITALIAN SECTOR.

4. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN (AS THEY HAVE SINCE SEPTEMBER) THAT THE ENTIRE AREA BETWEEN THE OLD SIDON ROAD AND THE RAILWAY IS PROPERLY UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE U S CONTINGENT. BUT IN PRACTICE THE U S MARINES HAVE NOT PATROLLED IN THIS AREA AND HAVE NO PLANS TO DO SO. THE ISRAELIS HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN POSITION AND BEGAN THEMSELVES TO PATROL UP TO THE RAILWAY IN RESPONSE TO INCREASED QUOTE TERRORIST UNQUOTE ACTIVITY LAST MONTH. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS DO NOT RECOGNISE THE IDF'S RIGHT TO PATROL THIS AREA THEY HAVE TACITLY ACQUIESCED IN IT. THE ISSUE REMAINS IN DISPUTE.

5. THE U S MARINES HAVE NOT PATROLLED ALONG THE OLD SIDON ROAD, BUT HAVE SENT PATROLS ACROSS IT IN THE DIRECTION OF BAABDA. ISRAELI USE OF THE ROAD FOR SUPPLY AND RECCE PURPOSES HAS INCREASED RATHER THAN DIMINISHED AS THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN LED TO EXPECT.

6. MS JONES CONCEDED THAT THE POSITION WAS UNSATISFACTORY. HER PERSONAL VIEW (PLEASE PROTECT) WAS THAT THE INCIDENT ON 2 FEBRUARY WAS A DELIBERATE PROVOCATION BY THE IDF, THOUGH SHE DID NOT KNOW AT WHAT LEVEL IT HAD BEEN AUTHORISED. SHE NOTED THAT GENERAL DRORI HAD GIVEN THE AMERICANS AN ASSURANCE ON 28 JANUARY THAT THE U S MARINES AT THE SCIENCE FACULTY WOULD NOT BE TROUBLED BY THE IDF, THOUGH HE HAD INSISTED THAT THE LATTER WOULD CONTINUE TO PATROL IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

WRIGHT

NNNN



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I have been through these and have made a few small changes. I think that they are alright.

4 February, 1983

Dear John,

Tony P 5/2.

John Guss, I do not like the Reagan draft - I do not like it, will do any good at all. The King's draft has not got the right flavour. It is too summation and too long.

Messages to President Reagan and King Fahd: Middle East

President Mubarak told the Prime Minister at their meeting on 2 February of his concern at the widespread loss of confidence in the Americans' will or ability to achieve progress on Middle East problems, particularly the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and a freeze on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. The President hoped that the Prime Minister would emphasise to the US Administration the danger of the present situation and the need to take action to restore Arab confidence. He spoke to the Press on these lines before he left.

As you know, Mr Pym is very concerned about the lack of progress on both these fronts and the potential consequences of a loss of confidence among the Arabs in American resolve to face up to the difficult issues on the Middle East, in particular the need to bring pressure to bear on Israel. We can make these points to Vice President Bush next week. But he considers that they would have greatest impact in Washington if the Prime Minister included them in a message to President Reagan. The discussion with President Mubarak provides a good starting point for such a message. The main purpose would be to underline that we share the preoccupations which President Mubarak has no doubt expressed direct to President Reagan. I enclose a draft message.

Prince Bandar has told Sir Anthony Parsons that King Fahd for his part believes a message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan would be most helpful. We should earn credit with the Saudis if we tell the King what we have done with the Americans, especially on Lebanon, in response to Bandar's account of his thinking. A possible message from the Prime Minister to King Fahd is also enclosed (but should issue after the message to President Reagan). If this is approved, we would propose to instruct Sir J Craig to deliver it personally to the King.

I am sending these drafts to you now so that the Prime Minister can have a chance to look at them over the weekend. Mr Pym has not yet seen them but will also do so over the weekend.

Yours ever J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq 10 Downing Street

(J E Holmes) Private Secretary

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Reagan

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

*John - I doubt the wisdom of sending this. Some of the comments can be said but not written.*

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

President Mubarak called on me in London on 2 February. I know that you have also just talked with him in Washington. I was struck by the force with which he made a number of points about the Middle East. Since these bear directly on American policy I thought that you should have an account of them.

*What he said to me.*

President Mubarak was worried that America's friends in the region had lost confidence in the ~~US~~ *United States' ability* will to achieve a solution of the pressing problems which confront us all there. In his view this ~~impression~~ *pessimism* had gained ground in recent months for two main reasons. First, the slow pace of negotiations over the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, ~~which had created a dangerous situation.~~ President Mubarak was concerned that, if withdrawal was not achieved soon, the resulting frustration would prove fertile ground for the Soviet Union. Secondly, confidence had been undermined by the lack of any demonstrable progress towards an Arab/Israeli settlement, and in particular by the continuing *lack of* ~~response~~ *to* defiance by Israel *of* your call for a settlements

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/freeze.

freeze.

I much admired the wisdom and balance of the proposals you put forward in your speech of 1 September. I remain convinced that they offer the most realistic way forward and have given them my strong support. I also know that you are determined to hold to your course and that <sup>Mr.</sup> Phil Habib and others have made strenuous efforts to move the Lebanon negotiation forward. But I share President Mubarak's concern that Arab confidence in the negotiation route is being seriously eroded by the absence of progress on both fronts.

~~I believe that it would be very damaging if the Lebanon negotiations continue much longer without real progress being made. While opposing armies remain in <sup>that</sup> ~~Lebanon~~ <sup>Lebanon</sup> there is an ever-present danger of renewed conflict. There is a widespread belief in the region that Israel has pitched her demands unreasonably high and has yet to show the will to negotiate seriously for <sup>a rapid</sup> ~~an early~~ withdrawal. President Mubarak is right to point to the opportunities thus created for the Soviet Union, I know you will be making every effort to bring the Israeli Government to see that early agreement on withdrawal from Lebanon would make a significant contribution to stability in the region and is therefore in their own interests.~~

It is <sup>equally</sup> ~~also~~ vitally important to make rapid progress in the search for a wider peace settlement. There have been some hopeful developments in recent months, particularly King Hussein's courageous decision to follow-up your initiative in conjunction with Arafat, But the pace of Israeli settlement activity in the

/Occupied

viz the deployment of new Russian SAMs in Syria.

and the attitude of Saudi Arabia.

Occupied Territories is rapidly foreclosing ~~the~~ <sup>any</sup> possibility of a negotiated settlement. ~~I do not believe~~ <sup>it will be extremely</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>difficult for</sup> any Arab Leader will feel able to sit at the negotiating table while the building of settlements continues. The Arabs see this issue as the touchstone of American ability to create the conditions in which negotiations can be ~~fruitful~~ <sup>lead to progress.</sup> I well understand what is involved, but I have to say frankly that, unless Israel can be brought to accept a settlement freeze, I do not see how negotiations ~~can begin on the basis of~~ <sup>based on</sup> your initiative ~~x~~ <sup>can prosper.</sup>

These are difficult and sensitive issues. The friends of the United States around the world were greatly encouraged when you committed your own prestige to resolving them. It would be a tragedy if this opportunity for progress were to be lost. You can rely on my full support.

I remain convinced that the proposal in the  
spirit of 1 September is the most realistic way forward.  
They will continue to have my strong support. But I  
share incidentally Debasaki's concern that Arab  
confidence in the negotiation route is being eroded  
eroded by the lack of progress, both in the Lebanon  
negotiation and in the search for a wide peace settlement.  
The Egyptians left me in no doubt that ~~the~~ Arab  
confidence would continue to wane unless there ~~was~~ is  
early agreement <sup>the</sup> withdrawal ~~from~~ of foreign bases  
from the Lebanon and unless (even more important  
in their eyes) the ~~spread~~ spread of Israeli  
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is checked.

None of this will be new to you. But I  
think it right to put it in touch with you because  
the absence of Arab concern is <sup>impressive</sup> ~~surprising~~, because it  
would be a tragedy if the opportunity ~~to~~ to be proposed  
frustrated by your proposal in doubt and because  
I fear that that could happen unless ~~the~~ ~~point~~  
there are early, positive steps to



restore confidence in the peace process. Only the  
United States can achieve this. ~~but you know that~~  
~~we are ready to help~~ we shall try to support you to the  
best of our ability, both nationally and through the  
European Community.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: His Majesty King Fahd

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

*Johr - this is a letter to the families in its draft*

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

As Your Majesty knows, King Hassan of Morocco has had ~~once again~~ to postpone the visit by the Arab League Delegation to Britain that he was to have led on 7 February. I know that <sup>your Majesty has</sup> ~~you have~~ been making every effort <sup>yourself</sup> to arrange a successful visit by the ~~d~~ <sup>de</sup>legation, and I am very grateful that you have been good enough to ensure that I have been kept informed of your views. I therefore wanted to let you know <sup>that</sup> ~~of my deep personal disappointment at this postponement~~. My colleagues and I stand ready to welcome the delegation as soon as new <sup>arrangements</sup> ~~dates~~ can be <sup>made.</sup> ~~fixed.~~

*I am glad*

In the meantime I ~~hope~~ <sup>am glad</sup> that we have been able to dispel certain misunderstandings. ~~It is clear that~~ ~~There are so many aspects of the situation on which~~ you and I are at one. Britain has contributed as much as any Western country to the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the acceptance of the need for the PLO to be associated with negotiations for a settlement. We

/have

Enclosures—flag(s).....

have not retreated an inch from that position and we remain determined to make our contribution to progress <sup>towards</sup> a just and lasting settlement through negotiation.

~~I entirely share the view that problems arising over the Delegation's visit should not be allowed to obscure the need for urgent and decisive progress on the substance of the main problem. The present opportunity, following the decisions taken at the Fez Summit and the possibilities opened up by President Reagan's proposals, must not be missed. We shall be doing our utmost, both nationally and with our partners in the European Community, to hasten progress. In particular, I have just sent a personal message to President Reagan stressing the need for withdrawal, without further delay, of all foreign forces from Lebanon, as well as for a halt to Israeli settlements on the West Bank.~~

*We are determined that*  
*We shall do all that is in our power to ensure that*  
*presented by*  
*of*  
*early, positive step to restore confidence in the peace process.*

~~I hope that we can stay in close touch on all this. I know that Francis Pym ~~too~~ attaches importance to maintaining the dialogue at this level, which has proved so valuable and stimulating over the years. I was very concerned, as I know you were, at the sensationalised press treatment of the postponement of his proposed visit to Saudi Arabia earlier this year. We must not allow bilateral relations between our two countries to be distorted by the media. There are very serious and fundamental problems facing the world economy and the security of the free world. We are both oil producers. it is essential that countries like ours which <sup>have</sup> share the same fundamental interests should work together. The Soviet Union will not be slow to take advantage if we do not. We will do everything we can to I hope we can try harder than ever to coordinate~~

I am equally aware of the great efforts which you are making.

I entirely share your view that I strongly believe, with you, that

/our

cooperate  
our policies and to/~~wherever we can~~, for example, in  
the economic and defence fields, as well as over  
The many political problems where we have  
a common interest.

am sure  
I hope that Your Majesty will agree that our  
two countries should cooperate closely to achieve the  
aim which we hold in common. We both have  
a fundamental interest in making progress towards peace  
and justice in the Middle East and in finding  
solutions to the problems facing the world economy  
and the security of the free world. The Soviet  
Union will not be slow to exploit any divisions  
in our ranks.

For our part, Your Majesty, we shall  
need for the maximum cooperation <sup>and friendship</sup> with the free  
countries. It is in that spirit that I have sought  
to let you have my views on the current problems  
which face us.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/PUS  
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MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
ED/NEWAD  
ED/ED  
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10

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PUSD (2)  
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GRS 480

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DESKBY 070830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 050001Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 DATED 4 FEBRUARY 83

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, AMMAN, WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TUNIS, CAIRO, UKMIS GENEVA: ROUTINE  
PARIS, MOSCOW.

SECURITY COUNCIL: ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. THE ARAB GROUP APPARENTLY DECIDED THIS EVENING (4 FEBRUARY) TO  
SEEK A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL EARLY NEXT WEEK ON THE  
SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE PLO  
HAVE EXPRESSED FEARS OF FURTHER MASSACRES OF PALESTINIANS  
IN LEBANON.

DETAIL

2. TERZI (PLO), APPROACHED THE PALESTINE RIGHTS COMMITTEE  
EARLIER THIS WEEK SEEKING SUPPORT FOR AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE

DETAIL

2. TERZI (PLO), APPROACHED THE PALESTINE RIGHTS COMMITTEE EARLIER THIS WEEK SEEKING SUPPORT FOR AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE DEBATE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 12 NOVEMBER LAST ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS (UKMIS TELNO 1881). IT WAS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT HE WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE ACTIVITY HERE BEFORE THE PNC MEETING. THE JORDANIANS, WHO ARE THIS MONTH'S CHAIRMEN OF THE ARAB GROUP, MADE DISCOURAGING NOISES. (ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELI'S THE AMERICANS LOBBIED IN AMMAN AGAINST ANY COUNCIL MEETING).

3. AT TERZI'S INSISTENCE A MEETING OF THE ARAB GROUP WAS CONVENED THIS EVENING. ACCORDING TO THE JORDANIANS, TERZI TOLD THE GROUP THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ARAFAT TO PRESS FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AS HE FEARED ANOTHER MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS WAS BREWING IN LEBANON. THE ARAB GROUP AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE ASKED TO MEET AND THAT THE PALESTINE RIGHTS COMMITTEE SHOULD MEET ON MONDAY, 7 FEBRUARY TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION. IT WAS NOT CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT THIS RESOLUTION WOULD COVER BUT PROBABLY BOTH LEBANON AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE LEBANESE APPARENTLY EXPRESSED PREDICTABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELI'S.

4. THE PLO HAVE MEANWHILE HAD THREE LETTERS CIRCULATED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (SOVIET UNION). THE FIRST REFERS TO THE "WORSENING SITUATION" IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOLLOWING FURTHER LAND SEIZURES. THE SECOND REPORTS THE DISCOVERY OF THE CORPSES OF 10 PALESTINIANS WHO HAD BEEN ABDUCTED AFTER BEING RELEASED FROM ISRAELI DETENTION IN ANSAR CAMP. (THE UN SECRETARIAT TELL US THAT THEY HAVE ASKED THE ICRC TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ESCORTING NEWLY RELEASED DETAINEES FROM ANSAR TO PLACES OF SAFETY). THE THIRD ALLEGES THAT A FURTHER 7 MUTILATED BODIES HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED NEAR SIDON, THAT 10 PALESTINIAN FAMILIES HAVE BEEN DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOMES IN ABRA, NEAR SIDON, AND THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAVE STARTED A CAMPAIGN TO FORCE PALESTINIANS TO GO TO AIN EL-HILWEH PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP. IT DESCRIBES THESE EVENTS AS A POSSIBLE PRELUDE TO A NEW MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS AND CALLS UPON THE UN AND ITS ORGANS TO ASSUME THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN ISRAELI OCCUPIED LEBANON.

WHYTE

MR. COLINS

Prime Directive

A.S.C.  $\frac{3}{2}$ .

MIDDLE EAST

I was impressed by the Egyptian presentation yesterday evening. Mubarak and his colleagues had got it absolutely right in regard to the need for speed, not to allow the Lebanese negotiations to preclude a start on the Reagan initiative, etc.

Where I thought that we were the victims of special pleading was over Iran/Iraq. Other Arabs are beginning to use the same argument, namely that, if the West does not come down on the Iraqi side, the Iraqis will disappear back into the Soviet orbit in the face of Syrian pressure on the pipeline and Khomeini's military pressure.


No-one knows better than I do how easy it is to be wrong about anything connected with Iran. But the Egyptian argument is misconceived. What the Iraqis need is not more military equipment which is about all the Russians could or might do for them - so far as I know they have plenty. They need money and military/civilian morale. The Soviet Union can provide neither. Money can come only from the rich Arab states who have already been paying up liberally and/or from a reopening of the pipeline and a general improvement in the oil situation. Morale is a matter for the Iraqis alone. Furthermore, the Russians share the preoccupation of most Western states with avoiding taking sides too obviously in the Iraq/Iran conflict. Intrinsicly Iran will always be more important to the Soviet Union than Iraq, for reasons of geographical proximity, size, natural resources etc. They have to live with Khomeini since they must know that the Tudeh party does not have the country-wide capacity in Iran to seize power, certainly not in present circumstances. They do not want Khomeini to win the war outright - a victorious Ayatollah would be even more dangerous than an embattled one. At the same time, they would not wish to do anything vis a vis Iraq which would mortally offend opinion throughout Iran. Hence, my guess is that they will remain on the fence, supplying some arms to both sides, but avoiding any decisive move which would identify them wholly with one side or the other.

This is not a bad policy for us to follow, as we have been doing. We must avoid being persuaded by the Arabs into coming out too firmly on the side of the Iraqis. Each side in the conflict is about

/equally



equally ghastly, and the consequences of an outright victory by either side equally frightful. Our interests on each side are fairly evenly balanced. Against this background the top of the fence is probably the most comfortable place on which to remain for the time being.



A.D. PARSONS  
3 February 1983

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PART 10 ends:-

AJC to FCO 3/1/83

PART 11 begins:-

Sir-A. Parsons to AJC 3/2/83

