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PREM 19/1105



Minister's meeting with Mr. Chadli Klibi,  
 Secretary General of the Arab League and

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATIONS

PRIME  
MINISTER

August 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>5.8.80</del>		<del>21.12.82</del>		<del>16.2.83</del>			
<del>1.9.80</del>		<del>30.12.82</del>		28.2.83			
<del>3.9.80</del>		4.1.83		- Pt Ends			
<del>9.9.80</del>		<del>6.1.83</del>		X			
<del>17.9.80</del>		<del>13.1.83</del>					
<del>21.9.80</del>		14.1.83					
28.10.82		17.1.83					
1.11.82		<del>19.1.83</del>					
<del>6.11.82</del>		20.1.83		PREM 19/11/05			
25.11.81		<del>23.1.83</del>					
<del>26.11.82</del>		25.1.83					
2.12.82		<del>27.1.83</del>					
6.12.82		31.1.83					
8.12.82		2.2.83					
9.12.82		4.2.83					
<del>13.12.82</del>		10.2.83					
<del>17.12.82</del>							



PART ✓ ends:-

Jeddah tel : 115 28/2/83

PART 2 begins:-

Tel Aviv tel: 78 2/3/83







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Prue Murtu

See elsewhere  
to the box a  
note regarding Sw

Antony Parsons conversation  
with Prince Bandar.  
H 25/12

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DESKBY 281400Z

FM JEDDAH 281300Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 115 OF 28TH FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY RABAT, ALGIERS, TUNIS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, CAIRO.

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

1. PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME. HE SAID HE HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM SEEING ARAFAT ON BEHALF OF KING FAHD.

2. ARAFAT HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE PALESTINIAN MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION WOULD NOT/NOT BE FROM THE PLO. THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE WAS BASIL AKL WHO, PRINCE BANDAR SAID IN RESPONSE TO MY RAISED EYEBROWS, WAS NOT IN THE P.L.O.. OTHER POSSIBLE NAMES WERE MILHIM AND WALID AL-KHALIDI, THOUGH EVERYONE SEEMED TO WANT TO KEEP THE FORMER IN RESERVE FOR OTHER OCCASIONS.

3. BANDAR SAID HE WAS FLYING TO LONDON TONIGHT OR TOMORROW TO SEE KING HUSAIN. THEY WERE ON THE VERGE OF "SOMETHING SPECTACULAR" BUT DID NOT WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT UNTIL IT WAS ASSURED. IF THINGS WENT WELL THEY WOULD NEED THE HELP OF ALL THE FRIENDS THEY COULD FIND IN ORDER TO GET THE



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4. ACCORDINGLY, ONCE THE VISIT TO LONDON HAD TAKEN PLACE, HE HOPED THE VISITS OF OUR TWO MINISTERS (PRESUMABLY TRADE AND ENERGY) TO SAUDI ARABIA COULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE - PERHAPS BY THE END OF MARCH OR EARLY APRIL.

CRAIG

NNNN

DWF G 070/28

LEB 800/00

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1328



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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 February 1983

I have told the F/C.O.

that I agree.

JH 23.  
2

Dear John,

As you know, the Moroccans have proposed that the Arab League delegation visit should now take place on Friday 18 March. I enclose a draft telegram to Rabat outlining our proposal for a programme, which I shall despatch if you are content with it. It follows the lines agreed for the previous dates, except that the programme is telescoped from two days into one (which does not affect the Prime Minister's involvement).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
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Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
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FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
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5  
6 FM FCO 211700Z FEBRUARY 1983  
7 TO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, ALGIERS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA  
10 YOUR TELNO 112  
11 ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT *negotiations*  
12 1. In the light of exhaustive ~~discussions~~ with the Moroccans  
13 in past on the programme for the visit we would hope that there  
14 would not be much left to discuss. There are however differences  
15 in what is proposed this time, the most important being  
16 that (we hope) the programme will be confined to Friday  
17 18 March. It would be helpful to have confirmation as soon as  
18 possible that the Moroccans can agree to the following outline  
19 programme. Detailed arrangements for the morning would be  
20 as in FCO telno 58 of 19 January.  
21 2. Thursday 17 March.  
22 Arrival of King Hassan and, individually, other delegation  
23 members.  
24 Evening Private  
25 Friday 18 March

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword 1030	
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Drafted by (Block capitals) D A ROYCROFT			Standard NENAD MED NAD SAD UND EESD	RID Security D MAED ES & SD ERD ESID CONS D
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	IMMEDIATE	Page 2
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<<<< 1 <<<<  
 2 1030 Guard of Honour FCO Quadrangle  
 3 1045 Plenary session  
 4 1215 Tete a tete  
 5 1300 for 1315 Lunch given by the Prime Minister, 10 Downing  
 6 Street  
 7 Early afternoon. Call by the Delegation at the Palace  
 8 (details to be arranged)  
 9 Evening Free/departures. Possible Moroccan press conference.  
 10 Saturday 19 March  
 11 Departures (or perhaps press conference?)  
 12 3. We would expect to see Moulay Hafid in London at some point  
 13 to thrash out the fine details but unless the Moroccans object  
 14 we will plan on the basis of the above.  
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 16 PYM  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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DESKBY 191400Z FEB 83

FM RABAT 191225Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TUNIS.

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL 96 (NOT TO ALL) AND TELECON RESIDENT CLERK:

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT.

1. BOUCETTA SENT FOR ME THIS MORNING. HE APOLOGISED FOR NOT HAVING GIVEN US A REPLY EARLIER AND THANKED ME FOR OUR FORBEARANCE. HE SAID THE KING HAD NOW AGREED TO MARCH 18 AS THE DATE FOR THE VISIT. THE MOROCCANS WOULD BE MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT LATER TODAY TO THIS EFFECT.
2. I SAID I WAS SURE YOU WOULD BE PLEASED THAT THE VISIT WAS FINALLY TO TAKE PLACE. I ASKED WHAT THE MOROCCAN STATEMENT WOULD SAY ABOUT PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. BOUCETTA SAID HE WOULD MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THAT ASPECT UNTIL AFTER THE ALGIERS MEETING SO AS NOT TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR ARAFAT. FOR THE PRESENT, IF QUESTIONED, HE WOULD MERELY SAY THAT WE WERE AGREED ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION LATER.



WE WERE AGREED ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION. LATER -  
SAY WEDNESDAY NEXT WEEK - THE MOROCCANS WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT  
MILHEM WAS TO BE THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE. I ASKED IF  
ARAFAT HAD NOW FINALLY ACCEPTED THIS. BOUCETTA ASSURED ME  
HE HAD - UNLESS, HE ADDED, THERE WAS ANY ADVANCE ON  
OUR SIDE. I SAID OUR POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED. THEN  
MILHEM IT IS, SAID BOUCETTA.

3. BOUCETTA ALSO TOLD ME, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION OF MINE, THAT  
KING HASSAN PROPOSED TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE FEZ  
COMMITTEE ON 24 OR 25 MARCH - HIMSELF, KING HUSSEIN, ARAFAT  
AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE OTHER FOUR MEMBER COUNTRIES - THE  
PURPOSE BEING TO CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF THE COMMITTEE'S  
VISITS (INCLUDING OF COURSE THE ONE TO LONDON) AND A  
QUOTE VERY DETAILED UNQUOTE REPLY WHICH KING HASSAN HAD  
HAD FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO SOME QUESTIONS HE HAD PUT TO THE  
AMERICANS AFTER THE COMMITTEE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST  
YEAR. (I DO NOT KNOW IF THE AMERICANS HAVE GIVEN US  
DETAILS OF THIS EXCHANGE - I WILL ASK MY US COLLEAGUE  
NEXT WEEK).

CAMBRIDGE

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 19/1327Z SDC/RR

PP ABU DHABI

PP ADEN

PP BAGHDAD

PP BAHRAIN



Mufared to Cheques  
1500  
19/2

PRIME MINISTER

Arab League Delegation

The Moroccans have told us that King Hassan would like to bring his delegation to London on 18 March and have further informed us that the Palestinian will be Milhem.

The Moroccan Government want to announce this this evening. They will not today state that Milhem will be a member of the delegation but will let this become known in a few days time.

You can manage 18 March. It is one of the days we have been keeping in reserve for King Hassan. There is a minor complication in that Gaston Thorn was coming to lunch then but he has always known that if the Arab League Delegation elected for that day we should have to make different arrangements for him.

I have agreed with the Foreign Office that they should raise no objection to the Moroccan announcement because they at last seem to be taking a sensible view. Of course, it remains to be seen whether they have really squared this with the other Arabs.

AJC

19 February 1983



cc Mr. Holmes (FCO)  
Mr. Jackling

MR. COLES

CONFIDENTIAL

A-3 C. 16  
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ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, ETC

The Moroccan Ambassador invited me to lunch today. His main object seemed to be to establish himself as an important interlocutor. He was full of flattery about how Britain and Morocco had been directly responsible for the Fez Summit Declaration. The conversation, which consisted mainly of an Ambassadorial monologue (not easy at a tete-a-tete lunch with someone as talkative as myself as his partner) ranged from the Gulf war to the Western Sahara with parentheses about the iniquities of the present French Government. According to the Ambassador, President Mitterrand is trying to overthrow the Moroccan Government for some strange Socialistic reasons of his own.

On the Arab League Delegation, he was fervent in his protestations that there were no problems in bilateral relations between Britain and Morocco. He described the whole episode at length as an enormous and unnecessary mistake. He thought that the PNC meeting would be decisive and that we would have to wait beyond 22/23 February before arranging fresh dates, probably in March, for the Delegation visit.

Taking into account what seemed to me his total unreliability as an informant, he made the interesting remark that the Libyans were putting out powerful feelers to Morocco to change sides over the Western Sahara conflict and generally to come on board with the West. He thought that Qaddafi was becoming very conscious of his isolation and financial short-comings. I showed some scepticism and commented that he could not expect us to exercise much influence in Tripoli.

My only word of warning is that we must be careful not to become the ham in the sandwich of Saudi/Moroccan jealousy. At my two meetings with him, Prince Bandar was scathing about the Moroccans whom he described as prickly and disposed to exaggerate their importance as an influential contact with the United States. The Ambassador was equally scathing about the Saudis whom he described as weak and ridden with fear. By the same token, he claimed that we should rely on Morocco to influence the United States and that Britain and Morocco would make a first class team.

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
/We will have



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- 2 -

We will have to continue the delicate act of dealing with King Hassan with one hand while smoothing down King Fahd with the other.



A.D. PARSONS  
16 February 1983

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GRS 200  
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FM RABAT 101000Z FEB 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 10 FEBRUARY  
INFO PRIORITY ALGIERS, TUNIS, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, AMMAN

MY TELNO 86: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

1. STILL NO REPLY FROM THE MOROCCANS ABOUT DATES. BOUCETTA HAS BEEN AWAY FROM RABAT. I SPOKE TO TAZI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, YESTERDAY EVENING. HE SAID HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE KING WOULD GIVE US A REPLY UNTIL AFTER NEXT WEEK'S PNC MEETING IN ALGIERS.

2. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. THE IMPORTANT THING JUST AT PRESENT FOR MODERATES LIKE HASSAN, IS THAT ARAFAT ESTABLISHES HIS POSITION AT THE PNC MEETING. A CONCESSION IN REGARD TO PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ON THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR ARAFAT THEREAFTER, BUT IS CERTAINLY NOT ON THE CARDS NOW. AND HASSAN WOULD NATURALLY NOT WANT TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT ARAFAT'S AGREEMENT IF THAT CAN EVENTUALLY BE OBTAINED.

3. RABAT IS STILL BUZZING WITH STORIES ABOUT GENERAL DLIMI'S DEATH. I STILL THINK IT WAS NO MORE THAN AN ACCIDENT. ALL THE SAME, THE KING IS REPORTED BY MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE (WHO SAW HIM ON 5 FEBRUARY) TO BE WORRIED BY THE RUMOUR-MONGERING AND MAY WELL NOT WANT TO LEAVE MOROCCO UNTIL THE EXCITEMENT DIES DOWN. TAZI THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT HE WOULD NOT (NOT) ATTEND THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT. ALL THIS SUGGESTS THAT WE CAN VIRTUALLY RULE OUT A FEBRUARY DATE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT.

CAMBRIDGE

MIDDLE EAST

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PM

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DESKBY 041100Z FEB 83

FROM AMMAN 040930Z FEB 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TEL NO 44 OF 04 FEB 83  
AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS PARIS ,UKMIS NEW YORK  
AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO'S 100 AND 102 TO RABAT :

*Read in file*  
*mt*

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION.

1. KING HUSSEIN ENQUIRED LAST NIGHT HOW MATTERS STOOD ON THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON. AFTER I HAD GIVEN HIM A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND YOUR TALKS WITH BOUCETTA, THE KING SAID HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE SOON AND URGED THAT WE SHOULD RECEIVE KHALID AL HASSAN IF NECESSARY RATHER THAN ALLOW THE QUESTION OF HIS MEMBERSHIP OF THE DELEGATION TO PREVENT THE VISIT FROM TAKING PLACE. IF WE FAILED TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATION ,HE FEARED A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS (ALTHOUGH BOTH THE KING AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER PLACE A LARGE SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED ON THE MORACCANS). THE KING ALSO FEARED THAT A REBUFF TO THE PALESTINIAN MODERATES, FOR THIS WAS HOW OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE KHALID AL HASSAN WOULD BE INTERPRETED ,WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT JORDANS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. KHALID AL HASSAN WAS ONE OF THE MOST DECENT AND RESPONSIBLE OF THE PALESTINIANS WITH WHOM THE JORDANIANS HAD HAD TO DEAL.

*The FCO are well aware that this is not acceptable.*  
*2.*

2. ALTHOUGH HE MADE THESE COMMENTS ON A SOCIAL OCCASION (THE KING AND QUEEN WERE DINING PRIVATELY AT OUR HOUSE WITH A FEW FRIENDS), KING HUSSEIN SPOKE WITH GREAT EMPHASIS AND PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT WHAT HE HAD HAD TO SAY SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF.

COMMENT

3. ARAFAT IS ABOUT TO START THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE JORDANIANS IN AMMAN BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL IN ALGIERS, AT WHICH HE IS LIKELY TO SEEK SOME FORM OF MANDATE ENABLING HIM TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. NOT ONLY HAVE SOME OF THE PALESTINIAN ORGANISATIONS COME OUT AGAINST HIM SEMICOLON



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THERE ARE ALSO DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ITSELF ON WHETHER OR NOT TO GO FORWARD. IN ADDITION ARAFAT IS UNDER OPEN THREAT OF ASSASSINATION FROM THE SAME (NOW DAMASCUS BASED) TERRORIST GROUP WHICH TRIED TO KILL AMBASSADOR ARGOV. HE FACES GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO CONVINCE HIS OWN FOLLOWERS OF THE CREDIBILITY OF US ASSURANCES , IN VIEW OF LACK OF PROGRESS IN SECURING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWEL FROM LEBANON AND THE APPARENT INABILITY OF THE AMERICANS TO PREVENT THE ISRAELIS FROM CONTINUING TO EXPAND THEIR SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE ONE OF THE PALESTINIANS KNOWN TO BE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF PURSUING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD THEREFORE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BE A SET BACK BOTH FOR ARAFAT AND FOR KING HUSSEIN.

URWICK

MIDDLE EAST

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GRS 770  
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FM TUNIS 031435Z FEBRUARY 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 03 FEBRUARY  
INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT ALGIERS AMMAN JEDDA DAMASCUS  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER ME POSTS WASHINGTON PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

SUMMARY.

1. KLIBI AND OMRAN SEPARATELY EXPRESSED DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT YESTERDAY AT THE CONTINUED FAILURE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE DELEGATION. THEY ASSUMED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR THE LATEST POSTPONEMENT OF THE LONDON VISIT. NEITHER BELIEVED THAT IT HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE MOROCCAN INTERNAL SITUATION. THEY PLEADED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY BY HMG OVER THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE.

DETAIL.

2. OMRAN FIRST LEARNT OF THE POSTPONEMENT FROM NEWS AGENCY REPORTS FROM RABAT. HE INDICATED THAT THE MOROCCANS HAD GIVEN THE ARAB LEAGUE NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE VISIT OR ABOUT PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY DETAILS WHICH THEY HAD RECEIVED HAD BEEN A COPY OF THE PROGRAMME FOR 7/8 FEBRUARY GIVEN TO OMAR AL HASSAN BY THE FCO ON 31 JANUARY. SPEAKING IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, HE EXPRESSED GREAT FRUSTRATION AT HAVING TO DEAL THROUGH KING HASSAN AND SAID THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE WAS INTENSELY ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HENCE THE ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE A CONFIDENTIAL MEETING BETWEEN KLIBI AND MRS THATCHER, WHICH HE AND KLIBI HAD RELUCTANTLY RECOGNISED TO BE IMPRACTICAL.



WAS INTENSELY ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HENCE THE ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE A CONFIDENTIAL MEETING BETWEEN KLIBI AND MRS THATCHER, WHICH HE AND KLIBI HAD RELUCTANTLY RECOGNISED TO BE IMPRACTICAL.

3. OMRAN SAID THAT IT WAS VITAL TO FIND AN EARLY SOLUTION. APART FROM THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO ARAB-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DELAY WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING THE ARAB CONSENSUS TO WORK FOR A NEGOTIATED ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT AND TO THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF ARAFAT'S POSITION. DIVISIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, IN THE PLO AND WITHIN FATAH WERE REASSERTING THEMSELVES AND IT WAS DANGEROUSLY POSSIBLE THAT HARDLINERS WOULD REGAIN THE INITIATIVE. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REALLY COMPREHEND OUR POSITION AND HE BEGGED US TO CONSIDER SOME WAY OF ALLOWING THE DELEGATION TO INCLUDE A REPRESENTATIVE APPROVED BY ARAFAT. HE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF KHALID AL HASSAN BEING ACCEPTED. I SAID THAT HIS NAME HAD NOT BEEN PUT TO US, BUT THAT I WOULD EXPECT THERE TO BE DIFFICULTIES IF HE WERE PROPOSED.

4. AT DINNER LAST NIGHT, KLIBI SPOKE TO ME SIMILARLY, BUT MORE URGENTLY, EMPHASING THAT WHILE THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HAD NEVER BEEN MORE CRITICAL, IT ALSO OFFERED AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY FOR A SETTLEMENT IF ALL CONCERNED WERE PREPARED TO GRASP IT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS BEWILDERED BY OUR CONTINUED INSISTENCE ON EXCLUDING A PLO MEMBER FROM THE DELEGATION AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS MIGHT BE DUE TO THE APPROACH OF THE GENERAL ELECTION. HE COMMENTED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE STUCK WITH DEALING THROUGH KING HASSAN, BUT HE THREW OUT THE FOLLOWING IDEA AS AN UNOFFICIAL SUGGESTION:- EITHER QADDUMI OR KHALID AL HASSAN MIGHT GO TO LONDON WITH THE DELEGATION AND ATTEND A DINNER GIVEN BY KING HASSAN AT THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY TO WHICH MRS THATCHER WOULD BE INVITED. THE PLO MAN WOULD ATTEND NO OTHER MEETING OR FUNCTION DURING THE VISIT AND THE DINNER WOULD BE THE ONLY OCCASION ON WHICH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE UNDER THE SAME ROOF. I SAID THAT ANY SUCH SUGGESTION WOULD HAVE TO COME TO US FROM KING HASSAN. I WOULD REPORT IT, BUT I COULD NOT SAY THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. (KLIBI GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF SNATCHING RATHER DESPERATELY AT STRAWS).

5. I SPELT OUT OUR POSITION ON PLO CONTACTS YET AGAIN TO KLIBI AND OMRAN, EMPHASING TO KLIBI THAT THIS WAS A LONG STANDING MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, NOT A QUESTION OF ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS. I SAID THAT MILHEM WAS THE ONLY CANDIDATE AS PALESTINIAN MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION THAT HAD BEEN PUT TO US, THOUGH WE WERE READY TO CONSIDER ANY OF THE WIDE RANGE OF LEADING PALESTINIANS WHO WERE NOT PLO MEMBERS. BOTH KLIBI AND OMRAN REPEATED THAT THEY SAW NO PROSPECT OF MILHEM BEING ENDORSED AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE AND SAID THAT THIS NO DOUBT ACCOUNTED FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE VISIT.

6. I SPOKE TODAY (3 FEBRUARY) TO OMRAN ON THE LINES OF (B) AND (C) OF YOUR TEL NO 102 TO RABAT. (A) HAD BEEN COVERED IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS. I DID NOT (NOT) MENTION THE MR HURD/QADDUMI OFFER AND I DO NOT PROPOSE TO DO SO WHEN I GO OVER THUS GROUND WITH OUNAIES (MFA) TOMORROW. I THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE UNNECESSARILY DEFENSIVE, SINCE NEITHER THE ARAB LEAGUE NOR THE TUNISIANS HAVE RECENTLY REPEATED THE SUGGESTION THAT OUR POLICY ON PLO CONTACTS HAS BECOME MORE RESTRICTIVE. IT MIGHT ALSO PROVOKE URGINGS THAT THE



~~DEFENSIVE, SINCE NEITHER THE ARAB LEAGUE NOR THE TUNISIANS HAVE  
RECENTLY REPEATED THE SUGGESTION THAT OUR POLICY ON PLO CONTACTS  
HAS BECOME MORE RESTRICTIVE. IT MIGHT ALSO PROVOKE URGINGS THAT THE  
MEETING SHOULD GO AHEAD REGARDLESS OF PROGRESS ON THE DELEGATION'S  
VISIT.~~

7. SINCE THIS WAS DRAFTED, OMRAN TELEPHONED IN CONSIDERABLE  
AGITATION ABOUT A REUTERS REPORT WHICH, HE SAID, QUOTED FCO  
OFFICIALS AS BLAMING THE ARAB LEAGUE FOR THE LAILURE SO FAR TO  
ARRANGE THE VISIT TO LONDOB (TELECON HARDINGE/RICKETTS), I HAVE  
TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE INVESTIGATING THIS. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME  
POSSIBILITY OF A - PROBABLY DISOBLIGING - STATEMENT BEING ISSUED  
BY THE ARAB LEAGUE. KLIBI AND OMRAN ARE ABOUT TO LEAVE ON A VISIT  
TO ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA AFTER WHICH OMRAN IS DUE TO GO TO  
SCANDINAVIA.

STIRLING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 031828Z SP/AV



~~Arab League Visit~~  
cc. MASTERS



re 15

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 February 1983

Call by the Moroccan Foreign Minister

The Foreign Minister of Morocco, accompanied by the Moroccan Ambassador, called on the Prime Minister at 1515 today.

The Prime Minister asked M. Boucetta to convey her warmest wishes to His Majesty, King Hassan. She much looked forward to the pleasure of meeting him when arrangements for his visit to this country could be made. M. Boucetta said that he brought the warm regards and greetings of King Hassan who particularly wished to thank the Prime Minister for the message which she had sent to him.

After further courtesies, M. Boucetta said that King Hassan wished to convey his regrets for not being able to bring the Arab League delegation to London on the agreed dates. Morocco had just suffered a great loss in the unfortunate death in a sudden accident of General Dlimi who had occupied a number of posts in the country. King Hassan was obliged to remain in Morocco in order to decide upon a successor to General Dlimi and to give him instructions as to his functions. He thus had requested a postponement of the visit for two or three weeks. But he was most anxious that it should be reinstated. He believed this was of capital importance for relations between the United Kingdom and the Arab world and between the United Kingdom and Morocco. He was sure that the Prime Minister would understand the imperative reasons for postponement. In the hope that the postponement need not be of long duration, he (M. Boucetta) hoped to discuss with Mr. Pym later in the day a possible new programme.

The Prime Minister asked that her condolences on the death of General Dlimi be conveyed to King Hassan. She fully understood the difficulties which prevented the visit going ahead at the agreed time and she well understood that King Hassan would not have requested postponement except for very good reasons. Unfortunately, Her Majesty The Queen would be abroad in three weeks' time. She would greatly miss seeing the King. For our part, we very much hoped that it would be possible to reinstate the visit. M. Boucetta commented that it was a pity that King Hassan would not be able to meet Her Majesty The Queen. But the visit had a largely political purpose and arrangements could be made for it to go ahead on that basis. The King would hope to meet The Queen on a longer visit later. As regards the dates for the postponed visit, the Moroccan side had two or three proposals which they would discuss with Mr. Pym.

/ The Prime Minister



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- 2 -

The Prime Minister said that we would make strenuous efforts to meet the Moroccan wishes as to the date and form of the delegation. She would be seeing later in the day President Mubarak of Egypt and, next week, Vice President Bush. Would the Moroccan Government like to convey any message to them through her?

M. Boucetta replied that Morocco wished to see Egypt re-integrated in the Arab world and felt that Egypt's active presence in discussion of Arab affairs was extremely important. He hoped that King Hassan would make contact with President Mubarak soon. He would be grateful if Morocco's interest in relations with Egypt could be conveyed to President Mubarak.

As regards Vice President Bush, he could tell the Prime Minister in confidence that King Hassan had sent messages to President Reagan and King Fahd about the postponement of the visit.

The Prime Minister said that it would be important to handle the announcement of a postponement very carefully. M. Boucetta said that the Moroccans would state publicly what they had already told the rest of the Arab League delegation privately, namely that King Hassan had requested postponement of the visit for domestic reasons. The Prime Minister said that if she was asked about the matter, eg in Parliamentary Questions tomorrow, she would say that she had received a personal message from His Majesty The King to the effect that he wished to postpone the visit for several weeks for domestic reasons; we well understood the reasons for the postponement; and efforts were being made to agree on fresh dates in a few weeks' time. M. Boucetta confirmed that this was entirely acceptable to him.

Concluding the conversation, the Prime Minister said that she much appreciated King Hassan's gesture of sending the Foreign Minister to see her personally. This emphasised the close friendship between our two countries.

The discussion ended at 1545.

AK

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

1 February 1983

AA 1/2.

Dear Sir,

Arab League Delegation

/ You will have seen the enclosed telegram from Rabat about the Moroccan Foreign Minister's visit. It has been agreed that he will call on the Prime Minister at 3.15 pm on 2 February. Mr Pym proposes that Mr Boucetta call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for a further discussion afterwards.

/ I enclose a short brief. We do not know exactly what King Hassan's message will say, particularly on the Palestinian representation point, and Boucetta may well expect that a substantive reply will be sent later in writing. Our objective, at this stage is principally to show that we remain keen to welcome King Hassan and the Arab League delegation once the conditions are right. In his own meeting with Boucetta, Mr Pym may be able to probe in more detail the reasons for this late move on the Moroccan side and the possibilities for getting a visit by the delegation back on to the rails.

Perhaps we could have a further word in the morning about who should be present. Our Ambassador in Rabat is coming back with Boucetta at the latter's specific request. It would be very helpful for his position if he could be involved in the talks at No 10. On the Moroccan side, we do not yet know whether Boucetta wishes to be accompanied at all, eg by the Ambassador here. We have arranged for a French/English interpreter, Mrs Dennis, to be available for the meeting.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DESKBY 011500Z

FM RABAT 011304Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 01 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS,  
UKMIS NEW YORK.

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO MR MILES, BOUCETTA SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE KING FELT COMPELLED TO POSTPONE THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON. THE REASON WAS THE DEATH OF GENERAL DLIMI (MY TELNO 56). THE KING HAD TO REMAIN IN MOROCCO FOR THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE SAHARA WERE PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY IN THE HANDS OF DLIMI'S SUCCESSORS.
2. BOUCETTA SAID THE KING HAD ASKED HIM TO FLY AT ONCE TO LONDON WITH A MESSAGE FOR MRS THATCHER. HE HOPED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR MRS THATCHER TO GIVE HIM A FEW MINUTES OF HER TIME TOMORROW AFTERNOON, 2 FEBRUARY. FAILING THAT, ON THURSDAY 3 FEB. HE WOULD ALSO HOPE TO CALL ON YOU. BOUCETTA EXPLAINED THAT THE KING VERY MUCH WANTED THE VISIT TO GO AHEAD, AND HE STILL LOOKED FORWARD MOST POSITIVELY TO HIS MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER. BUT HE HAD HAD TO ACCEPT A DELAY NOW IN VIEW OF DLIMI'S DEATH.
3. I SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE DISAPPOINTMENT IN LONDON OVER THE POSTPONEMENT OF THIS VISIT FOR WHICH WE AND THE MOROCCANS HAD BOTH WORKED SO HARD. HOWEVER I COULD UNDERSTAND THE KING'S REASONS. (BUT SEE PARA 6 BELOW). I UNDERTOOK TO GIVE BOUCETTA A REPLY LATER TODAY ABOUT WHETHER AND WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF COULD RECEIVE HIM. I REMINDED BOUCETTA THAT I HAD EARLIER ON EXPLAINED THAT THE QUEEN WOULD BE TRAVELLING ABROAD LATER THIS MONTH. SHE MIGHT NOT BE BACK IN TIME FOR A LATER VISIT BY THE DELEGATION. BOUCETTA SAID THAT THE KING WOULD REGRET THAT, BUT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO MAKE IT A REASON FOR DELAYING THE VISIT ANY FURTHER. HE COULD ALWAYS RETURN LATER ON BY HIMSELF TO PAY HIS RESPECTS TO THE QUEEN.



4. I ASKED WHETHER BOUCETTA COULD GIVE ME ANY CLARIFICATION YET ABOUT HOW THE PALESTINIANS WERE TO BE REPRESENTED ON THE DELEGATION. AGAIN HE WAS EVASIVE. HE SAID HE HAD THIS MORNING RECEIVED A NOTE FROM THE PLO ABOUT WHICH HE WOULD GIVE ME FURTHER INFORMATION LATER TODAY. HE SAID IT MENTIONED KHALED AL HASSAN. I SAID I THOUGHT HIS INCLUSION IN THE DELEGATION WOULD PRESENT US WITH THE SAME DIFFICULTIES WE HAD FACED LAST NOVEMBER.

5. I HOPE TO TELEGRAPH FURTHER ABOUT THIS POINT LATER TODAY WHEN BOUCETTA SEES ME AGAIN, AND ABOUT HOW THE MOROCCANS PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE VISIT.

6. COMMENT. I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED (MY TELNO 71) THAT THE SUCCESSION TO DLIMI SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE SMOOTHLY. WE HAVE SINCE HAD CONFIRMATION, REPORTED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS, THAT THERE IS NO (NO) REAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT RUMOURS THAT HE WAS IN FACT MURDERED. I SUSPECT, THEREFORE, THAT THE KING IS USING DLIMI'S DEATH AS A PRETEXT TO PUT OFF THE VISIT. THIS INDICATES THAT HE IS STILL HAVING TROUBLE IN GETTING ARAFAT'S AGREEMENT.

7. EXASPERATING AS THIS LATEST HITCH UNDOUBTEDLY IS, I HOPE YOU AND MRS THATCHER WILL AGREE TO GIVE BOUCETTA A HEARING. I AM CONVINCED THAT KING HASSAN GENUINELY WANTS TO FIND A WAY THROUGH THE COMPLICATIONS WHICH HAVE ARISEN OVER THIS ARAB LEAGUE VISIT, AND TO BUILD UP A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH US.

8. SEE MY I.F.T. (FCO ONLY)

CAMBRIDGE

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 01/1425Z SEA/DD



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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER:  
2 FEBRUARY

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

Points to Make

1. Much regret further postponement of visit. Attach great importance to hearing the King's views and those of delegation. But understand the King's difficulties, and grateful for your visit to explain position.
  
2. Palestinian Representation. Know that you are aware of our policy on contact with PLO. Encouraged by agreement with King Hassan that a Palestinian Mayor should join the delegation. Grateful for King's efforts to persuade other participants this was best compromise for both sides. Hope that efforts to rearrange the delegation's visit can start from this understanding.
  
3. [If Boucetta suggests Khalid al Hassan as Palestinian member of delegation for future visit] We should stick to earlier agreement on Palestinian Mayor. Milhem not the only candidate: open to other suggestions. To have Palestinians represented by elected figure would make good impression on public opinion in this country. Khalid al Hassan closely identified with the PLO. As you will know from previous exchanges not possible to accept him or other PLO member.
  
4. Next steps. Strong British interest in receiving delegation soon to discuss Fez and peace prospects. Arab League decided to come to London and presumably still wish to. How should we proceed? If we miss 7-8 February, re instatement impossible for practical reasons for at least a month. Even then, as you know, The Queen will be out of the country.

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Background

- /
1. HM Ambassador Rabat has reported (his telno 79 attached) that Boucetta will be coming to London at the King's request with a message for the Prime Minister, presumably explaining the reasons for the decision to postpone again the Arab League Delegation visit to London.
  2. Boucetta has told us that the reason is the death of General Dlimi, King Hassan's most powerful aide, on whom the King has relied since attempted coups in 1971/72 to maintain loyalty in the army, to mastermind the war in the Western Sahara, and to run his External Intelligence Services. King Hassan rarely travelled abroad without Dlimi.
  3. Dlimi's death may be partly a pretext. It has become increasingly apparent that the Moroccans were having great difficulties in selling to the other Arabs, particularly the PLO, the proposal that the Palestinian place in the delegation should be taken by a Mayor eg Milhem. King Hassan had committed himself to coming to London with Milhem, or if this was not acceptable to the Arab side, without any Palestinian representation. Boucetta had repeatedly assured us that the King was intending to bring Milhem, and had insisted that we should ignore the flurry of comments from Palestinian sources suggesting that Milehm was unacceptable, and leave it to the Moroccans to handle the other Arabs.
  4. King Hassan seems to have made an effort to get Arafat on board during the weekend of 22/23 January, when the Arab League Committee were meeting in Morocco. The Moroccans failed to make a statement which had been expected 22 January confirming dates for the visit; this was the first signal that the King's talks with Arafat had run into trouble. As late as 29 January Boucetta was assuring Cheysson that the delegation were coming to London with Milhem. Since then the Moroccans have received a note from the PLO (para 4 of Rabat telno 79) which evidently created difficulties for them. We know separately that King Hassan asked King Fahd to



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help find a solution to the Palestinian problem, and that Fahd passed the buck to Arafat. The latter has now taken his decision. We do not know its terms precisely, but it probably concludes that Khalid al Hassan should take the PLO place in the delegation. His name has been mentioned to us by several Palestinians and other sources in recent days. Khalid al Hassan is an office-bearer in Fatah, the senior organisation in the PLO, and a close confidant of Arafat. He would not therefore be acceptable on the basis of our policy on contacts with the PLO.

5. It is just possible that Arafat has agreed to a Washington-type solution, where Khalid al Hassan would remain in his hotel, while the rest of the delegation called on The Queen and the Prime Minister. But it is hard to see what incentive Arafat has to settle for that. We have already put to him (and to King Hassan) the proposal that, separately from a successful Arab League delegation visit, Mr Hurd would see a PLO leader in the region. Arafat reacted coolly when this suggestion was put to him, and we have had no subsequent indication that the PLO will be swayed by it. The PLO have no stake in a mission on lines acceptable to us.

5. If the Moroccans maintain their decision to postpone the visit from 7-8 February, it would not be possible for diary reasons to reinstate it until about 10 March. The Queen will still be out of the country then; the Moroccans know that, and the King has said that he is nevertheless prepared to come.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You wanted to have a preliminary  
look at the attached part  
list for King Hassan and his  
delegation.

see FCO to  
AFC

A.F.C.  $\frac{2}{1}$  18/1/83.

AM  $\frac{3}{2}$

h.a.



## CONFIDENTIAL

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 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM RABAT 250845Z JAN 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 51 OF 25 JANUARY  
 INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, AMMAN, TUNIS, ALGIERS, DAMASCUS,  
 WASHINGTON.

MY JANUARY 24 TELECON GREENSTOCK: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT  
 TO LONDON

1. TODAY'S LOCAL PAPERS CARRY AN AFP REPORT OF REMARKS  
 MADE BY ARAFAT IN ADEN YESTERDAY. HE SAID THAT THE PLO WOULD  
 BE REPLYING NEXT WEEK TO QUOTE THE NEW BRITISH PROPOSAL  
 UNQUOTE ABOUT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DELEGATION. THIS  
 PROPOSAL HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN HIM  
 AND KING HASSAN. THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON  
 THE DELEGATION WOULD NEED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PLO THOUGH NOT  
 NECESSARILY ONE OF ITS TOP PEOPLE (QUOTE INSTANCES DIRIGEANTES  
 UNQUOTE). THE SAME AFP REPORT SAYS THAT BOTH MILHEM AND  
 KAWASMEH DENIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN NOMINATED AS PALESTINIAN  
 REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE VISIT TO LONDON. NEITHER THE  
 PLO NOR THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN HAD ASKED THEM TO TAKE PART.  
 2. I LEARNED LAST NIGHT THAT BOUCETTA FLEW WITH PRINCE SAUD TO  
 SAUDI ARABIA. HE WILL BE IN RABAT LATER TODAY AND I HAVE  
 ASKED TO SEE HIM. WHAT PRECISELY TRANSPIRED BETWEEN  
 ARAFAT AND HASSAN IS BEING KEPT VERY CLOSE HERE. TAZI, WHOM I  
 SAW YESTERDAY, PROFESSED TO KNOW NOTHING. EVEN MY WELL-INFORMED  
 JORDANIAN COLLEAGUE IS IN THE DARK. HE TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT  
 THE PLO HAD BEEN QUOTE VERY DIFFICULT UNQUOTE AT THE  
 MARRAKESH MEETINGS, NOT ONLY AS REGARDS THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN VISIT  
 IN LONDON QUOTE BUT OVER EVERYTHING UNQUOTE.

CAMBRIDGE

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MR EGERTON  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 OF 23 JANUARY  
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, RABAT, AMMAN, TUNIS, ROUTINE TO OTHER  
MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION.

VELIOTES TOLD MINISTER LAST NIGHT THAT PRINCE BANDAR HAD TELEPHONED HIM ON FRIDAY (21 JANUARY) TO LET HIM KNOW THAT THE PLO HAD NOW DEFINITELY REJECTED MILHEM AS PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON. KING FAHD HAD TELEPHONED BANDAR ABOUT THIS TO ASK HIM TO GO TO LONDON THIS WEEKEND TO TRY AND SORT MATTERS OUT, SO THAT THE VISIT COULD TAKE PLACE. KING FAHD HAD ALSO ASKED BANDAR TO DO WHAT HE COULD WHILE IN LONDON TO PUT U.K.-SAUDI RELATIONS ON A BETTER FOOTING.

2. VELIOTES WAS NOT SURE EXACTLY WHAT TIMETABLE BANDAR HAD SET HIMSELF BUT PRESUMED HE WOULD BE TURNING UP IN LONDON ON MONDAY. KING FAHD HAD APPARENTLY INSTRUCTED BANDAR TO GO STRAIGHT AWAY. IF TRUE (AND VELIOTES CLEARLY ACCEPTS IT) THIS INCIDENT, THROWS MORE LIGHT ON THE AUTHORITY WITH WHICH BANDAR SPEAKS. ACCORDING TO VELIOTES...



MORE LIGHT ON THE AUTHORITY WITH WHICH BANDAR SPEAKS. ACCORDING  
• TO VELIOTES, HE IS KING FAHD'S FAVORITE NEPHEW AND DESPITE HIS  
OFFICIAL POSITION HERE AS SAUDI AIR ATTACHE THE KING IS NOW  
USING HIM AS A CHANNEL TO THE ADMINISTRATION MUCH MORE THAN THE  
SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM EGERTON OR MILES TODAY.

WRIGHT

NNNN



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FM TUNIS 210905Z JANUARY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 7 OF 21 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN ALGIERS JEDDA DAMASCU

INFO ROUTNE OTHER ME POSTS

YOUR TEL NO 61 TO RABAT: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. EGERTON AND I SAW ARAFAT ON 20 JANUARY. EGERTON SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR PARA 4, INCLUDING THE OFFER OF A MR HURD/QADDUMI MEETING IN THE REGION. ARAFAT WAS NOT (NOT) RECEPTIVE, THOUGH HE PROMISED TO STUDY OUR PROPOSAL.

2. EGERTON EMPHASISED THAT OUR STAND ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT HAD NOT (NOT) CHANGED. WE WERE DOING ALL WE COULD TO MAKE THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT POSSIBLE AND WE REGRETTED THE INITIAL MISUNDERSTANDING. WE WERE NOW IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH KING HASSAN, THE DATES OF 7/8 FEBRUARY HAD BEEN PROVISIONALLY AGREED AND KING HASSAN HAD SUGGESTED MILHEM AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DELEGATION. PROVIDED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL OF THE PLO, AND THAT WE COULD BE CONSULTED ABOUT HIS NOMINATION, WE DID NOT MIND WHO WAS CHOSEN, AND HE WOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE QUEEN WITH THE REST OF THE DELEGATION.

*n. member*

3. EGERTON WENT ON TO STRESS THAT WE HAD NOT GONE BACK ON THE EARLIER MR HURD/QADDUMI MEETING: HE WAS AUTHORISED TO SAY THAT, AS A SPECIAL AND UNPRECEDENTED GESTURE, MR HURD WAS PREPARED TO COME TO THE AREA TO MEET QADDUMI ONCE THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT HAD SUCCESSFULLY TAKEN PLACE.

... ATTENTIVELY AND PROMISED



4. ARAFAT, WHO WAS MOST AMIABLE, LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND PROMISED TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS ASTONISHED BY THE BRITISH ATTITUDE. BRITAIN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PALESTINIANS' PLIGHT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS NOW ESCALATING A VERY SIMPLE MATTER INTO A MAJOR PROBLEM. IT SEEMED TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT DAJANI HAD ALREADY LED AN ARAB DELEGATION IN THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE (EGERTON POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL). THE AMERICANS HAD INDEED REFUSED TO RECEIVE A PALESTINIAN WITH THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN, BUT THEY AT LEAST HAD THE EXCUSE OF A FORMAL COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS NOT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO BEFORE THE LATTER RECOGNISED ISRAEL. (ARAFAT ADDED THAT EVEN THEN THEY WERE LIARS BECAUSE KISSINGER HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM THREE TIMES). MITTERRAND HAD MADE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT RECEIVING A PLO REPRESENTATIVE. THE FRENCH NO DOUBT HAD COMMERCIAL REASONS FOR THEIR ATTITUDE, BUT THE BRITISH SHOULD HAVE EVEN STRONGER MORAL REASONS FOR BEING AT LEAST AS FORTHCOMING. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTITUDE.

5. EGERTON SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK FRANKLY. OUR POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO HAD BEEN FORMULATED SOME YEARS AGO BY LORD CARRINGTON, A FIRM FRIEND OF THE ARABS. CONTACTS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WERE FREQUENT AS WE NEEDED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE MOVEMENT. HOWEVER WE STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT CONTACT AT SENIOR MINISTERIAL LEVEL MUST BE MARKED BY A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS PEACE. THIS HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN MADE CLEAR. WHEN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT HAD FIRST BEEN PROPOSED, THE MOROCCANS HAD SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A PLO REPRESENTATIVE BEING INCLUDED. THIS HAD CHANGED AT THE LAST MOMENT AND OUR RESPONSE HAD BEEN AN INEVITABLY HASTY ATTEMPT TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WOULD MEET THE WISHES OF BOTH SIDES. WE NOW WISHED TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. WE HOPED THAT THE INCLUSION OF A PROMINENT NON-OFFICIAL PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DELEGATION AND THE SPECIAL GESTURE OF A SUBSEQUENT MR HURD/QADDUMI MEETING WOULD PROVIDE THE ANSWER.

6. ARAFAT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CONVINCED. IT LOOKED TO HIM AS THOUGH BRITAIN WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PLAYING A ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. HE THEN WENT INTO RAMBLING ACCUSATIONS ABOUT BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRISIS AND REPEATED THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN READY TO FIGHT SO THAT 1800 FALKLANDERS COULD HAVE SELF-DETERMINATION BUT WOULD NOT LIFT A FINGER FOR 4 MILLION PALESTINIANS.

7. EGERTON REPEATED THAT OUR PROPOSAL, WITH THE OFFER OF A MR HURD/QADDUMI MEETING WAS AN UNPRECEDENTED GESTURE AND THAT IT PROVIDED THE WAY FORWARD. IT WAS WRONG TO SAY BRITAIN WAS NOT (NOT) INTERESTED IN PLAYING A ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: WE HAD BEEN THE AUTHORS OF RESOLUTION 242 AND OF THE VENICE DECLARATION, BOTH OF WHICH WERE CORNERSTONES OF WESTERN, INDEED WORLD POLICY ON THE DISPUTE. LATTERLY MR PYM HAD ROUNDLY CONDEMNED THE INVASION OF LEBANON AND THE TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS THERE. HE WAS NOW PRESSING FOR A HALT TO NEW ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS.

8. IN LEAD-IN CONVERSATION, ARAFAT SAID THAT THE JORDANIAN/PLO DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING WELL. HE AND KING HUSSEIN HAD AGREED ON AN EVENTUAL CONFEDERAL AS OPPOSED TO FEDERAL SYSTEM. THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO BE ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT, BUT HAD ACCEPTED THIS FORMULA IN ORDER TO REASSURE THE AMERICANS



8. IN LEAD-IN CONVERSATION, ARAFAT SAID THAT THE JORDANIAN/PLO DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING WELL. HE AND KING HUSSEIN HAD AGREED ON AN EVENTUAL CONFEDERAL AS OPPOSED TO FEDERAL SYSTEM. THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO BE ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT, BUT HAD ACCEPTED THIS FORMULA IN ORDER TO REASSURE THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS. (ARAFAT COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF A COMPLETE UNION, WHICH KING HUSSEIN HAD NATURALLY TURNED DOWN FLAT). THE SYRIANS WERE STILL HOSTILE TO THE DISCUSSIONS BECAUSE, ARAFAT ASSUMED, THEY WANTED TO KEEP THE PALESTINIAN CARD IN THEIR OWN HANDS.

9. VERY SOON AFTER OUR MEETING ARAFAT LEFT FOR THE AL-QUDS (JERUSALEM) MEETING IN RABAT, WHICH HE CLAIMS TO CO-CHAIR WITH KING HASSAN.

STIRLING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 21116Z SP/GEH



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SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
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FM RABAT 210950Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 21 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS,  
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 61 (NOT TO ALL): ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT  
SUMMARY

1. I SAW KING HASSAN IN MARRAKESH YESTERDAY. OUR MEETING  
WENT WELL AND HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS LONDON VISIT.  
THE MOROCCANS WILL ANNOUNCE THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT  
AT 11 AM ON SATURDAY 22 JANUARY. THEY STILL HOPE TO  
BE ABLE TO INCLUDE MILHEM IN THE DELEGATION, BUT MUCH  
WILL DEPEND ON THE KING'S MEETING WITH ARAFAT WHO  
ARRIVES IN MOROCCO THIS MORNING. THE KING THOUGHT WELL OF OUR  
IDEA OF A SEPARATE MEETING BETWEEN MR HURD AND QADDUMI, BUT  
SUGGESTED WE SHOULD HAVE IT BEFORE 14 FEBRUARY WHEN THE  
PNC ARE TO MEET. I NEED TO GIVE HIM A REPLY ON THIS SOON - SEE  
PARAGRAPH 6.

DETAIL

2. I HAD TO LEAVE FOR MARRAKESH BEFORE YOUR TUR AND OTHER  
RELATED TELEGRAMS ARRIVED. NEVERTHELESS I WAS GIVEN THE GIST  
OF THEM OVER THE TELEPHONE AND WAS ABLE TO COVER THE  
GROUND ADEQUATELY. I FIRST HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH  
MOULAY HAFID AND BOUCETTA. BOUCETTA AND I THEN WENT IN TO  
SEE THE KING. HE BEGAN BY ASKING ME TO THANK MRS THATCHER  
FOR HER MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 56) AND HE SAID HE HAD FOUND IT FULL  
OF QUOTE BON-VOLONTE UNQUOTE. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE  
PROGRAMME. I SAID THAT MOULAY HAFID HAD TOLD ME HOW  
PLEASED HE HAD BEEN BY HIS RECEPTION IN LONDON ON 19 JANUARY.  
THE KING CONFIRMED THIS. SEE MY I.F.T. (FCO ONLY) FOR  
FURTHER DETAILS ON THE PROGRAMME.



FURTHER DETAILS ON THE PROGRAMME.

3. WE TALKED ABOUT THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT. BOUCETTA HAD EARLIER CONFIRMED THAT THE MOROCCANS STILL INTENDED TO MAKE A SHORT FACTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE LINES ALREADY AGREED (MY TELNO 20). THE KING THOUGHT THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE AFTER TODAY'S MEETING OF THE AL QODS COMMITTEE, SAY 11AM TOMORROW JANUARY 22. (OBVIOUSLY HE WANTS FIRST TO GO OVER THE GROUND WITH ARAFAT).

4. I TOLD THE KING OF YOUR IDEA ABOUT A SEPARATE MEETING BETWEEN MR HURD AND QADDUMI. I EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS AN IMAGINATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN OUR POLICY SEMI-COLON THAT WE HOPED IT WOULD HELP THE KING IN GETTING THE PLO TO AGREE TO HIS ARRANGEMENTS FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE LONDON DELEGATION SEMI-COLON AND THAT I BELIEVED, THOUGH I WAS NOT SURE, THAT WE WOULD VERY SHORTLY BE TRYING OUT THIS IDEA ON PLO REPRESENTATIVES IN TUNIS. WE WERE HOWEVER CONCERNED TO LET THE KING KNOW OF IT FIRST.

5. AT FIRST HASSAN MADE NO COMMENT, AND EVEN LOOKED A BIT DOUBTFUL. HOWEVER, WHEN I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE IDEA, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING. BUT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD AIM TO HAVE IT MUCH EARLIER THAN PLANNED - AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE DELEGATION HAD VISITED LONDON, AND PREFERABLY BEFORE THE PNC MEETING ON 14 FEBRUARY. IN POLITICS, HE SAID, ONE SHOULD NEVER DO THINGS BY HALVES: IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THIS GESTURE, WE SHOULD TRY TO GET MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM IT BY MAKING IT SOON. (I THINK HE HAS A POINT) . HE SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING COULD VERY SUITABLY TAKE PLACE IN MOROCCO, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND OF FEBRUARY 12/13. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS, AND WOULD BE READY TO FALL IN WITH OUR WISHES ABOUT PUBLICITY. WE COULD HAVE AS MUCH OR AS LITTLE AS WE WISHED. HE ASKED ME TO LET HIM HAVE A REPLY ABOUT THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENT

6. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO TAKE UP KING HASSAN'S OFFER. BY HAVING THE MEETING UNDER THE AUSPICES, AS IT WERE, OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FEZ COMMITTEE, WE SHALL APPEAR TO BE MOVING CLOSER TO ASSOCIATING THE PLO MORE FULLY WITH THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON. AND IF I CAN GIVE THE KING A POSITIVE REPLY ON THIS STRAIGHTAWAY IT MIGHT JUST TILT THE BALANCE IN HIS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE ARAFAT TO ACCEPT MILHEM OR AN EQUIVALENT AS THE PALESTINIAN MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION .

CAMBRIDGE



Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

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GRS 412

A.J.C. 19  
1

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 200830Z  
FM FCO 192000Z JAN 83  
TO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 61 OF 19 JANUARY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE TUNIS

INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MY TELNO. 50: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

1. YOU MAY TELL THE MOROCCANS, PREFERABLY KING HASSAN, THAT WE SHOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT, SEPARATELY FROM A SUCCESSFUL ARAB LEAGUE VISIT, MR HURD SHOULD MEET QADDUMI. HE WOULD COME TO THE AREA FOR THE PURPOSE. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE DURING THE MONTH FOLLOWING THE ARAB LEAGUE MISSION WHEN MR HURD ALREADY HAS TENTATIVE PLANS TO VISIT NORTH AFRICA AND COULD GO TO TUNIS. SUCH A BILATERAL MEETING, WHICH HAS NO PRECEDENT IN OUR DEALING WITH THE PLO, WOULD BE INTENDED TO SIGNAL THAT THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE MISSION ARE BEHIND US AND THAT WE ADHERE TO OUR WELL KNOWN POSITION ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE PLO'S ROLE.
2. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE HELPFUL TO THE KING. YOU SHOULD ENSURE THAT HE IS AWARE THAT THIS IS A NEW GESTURE ON OUR PART.
3. DEPENDING ON REPORTS FROM SIR A STIRLING YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION TELL THE KING THAT WE MAY REFER TO THIS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO IN TUNIS.
4. FOR TUNIS. PLEASE SEEK URGENTLY A CALL ON ARAFAT (OR IF NECESSARY ON THE MOST SENIOR AVAILABLE PLO FIGURE). WE SUGGEST YOU PRESENT THIS AS INTRODUCING EGERTON AND TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON COVERING LEBANON AND JORDAN/PLO. ONE AIM WOULD BE TO MAKE CLEAR TO ARAFAT THAT OUR STAND ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE NEED FOR THE PLO TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH NEGOTIATIONS HAS NOT CHANGED. WE ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS THE AMERICANS FOR PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY ON SETTLEMENTS ETC. YOU SHOULD



CONFIDENTIAL

48402 - 1

EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT PROBLEM CAN NOW BE SETTLED ON THE COMPROMISE BASIS UNDER DISCUSSION. WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AT SENIOR MINISTERIAL LEVEL WILL REMAIN A PROBLEM FOR US (IF EXAMPLES WERE NEEDED, YOU COULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE RECENT CLAIM BY THE PLO THAT THEY CARRIED OUT A BOMB ATTACK ON A BUS IN TEL AVIV ON 8 JANUARY), YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT GOING BACK ON THE MEETING BETWEEN MR HURD AND QADDUMI AS PART OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION IN THE SUMMER: INDEED, WE WOULD BE READY TO MAKE THIS QUITE CLEAR. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO GO ON TO OFFER A MEETING MR HURD/QADDUMI ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 2, MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS IS A GESTURE ON OUR PART. YOU SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME EMPHASISE THAT OUR DIRECT DEALINGS ON THE VISIT REMAIN WITH KING HASSAN.

PYM

STANDARD

NENAD  
MED  
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SECURITY D  
MAED  
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ERD  
ESID  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL





*R. C. M.*  
PRIME MINISTER.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 January 1983

Thank you for your letter of  
18 January about the commercial  
implications of the Arab League visit.  
The Prime Minister has noted its contents.

A. J. COLES

John Rhodes, Esq.,  
Department of Trade.





bc AP

## 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 January 1983

Arab League Delegation

You told me earlier today that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considered that the time had come to make the further move which he discussed with the Prime Minister informally on 17 January. You said that Mr. Pym had in mind that Yasser Arafat had apparently convened a meeting of senior PLO officials in Tunis on 21 January and that the seven Arab Foreign Ministers would be meeting on that day.

The Prime Minister agrees that Arafat may be approached on the following lines: we cannot change our existing policy whereby PLO representatives are not received at the level of Cabinet Minister or above but we could envisage a meeting between Mr. Douglas Hurd and Farouk Qaddumi in a foreign capital either at the same time as the visit of the Arab League Delegation to London or after that visit.

The Prime Minister has observed that this would amount to a step in the direction of the Arabs in that for the first time a Minister would receive a PLO official alone, not as part of an Arab League Delegation. But it must be clear that we could not be manoeuvred into a position where the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary himself - or any other Cabinet Minister - would receive a PLO official.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1983

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

Thank you for your letter of 17 January. As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister agrees with Mr. Pym's recommendation that she should now send a personal message to King Hassan.

The Prime Minister has made one or two minor amendments to the message which now reads as follows:

"I have been following closely the exchanges between our two Governments about the visit which you propose to make to London next month as the Head of the Arab League Delegation. I am much encouraged by the progress which has been made and am most grateful to Your Majesty for the trouble you and your Ministers are taking to ensure the visit's success. I look forward with much pleasure to seeing you. I know that Her Majesty The Queen is greatly looking forward to welcoming you and your colleagues herself.

The delay in the arrangement of your visit was especially disappointing, as I believe there is a broad area of agreement between the United Kingdom and the Arab States on many aspects of the Palestinian problem. We have done as much as any Western country to try to contribute to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242; also to the now almost universal recognition that the Palestinian people have a right to self determination. We have in no way diminished our support for that right, and we shall continue to play, both nationally and as a Member of the European Community, as active a part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have, for example, been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to cease establishing settlements in the occupied territories, a practice which we regard as illegal and very harmful to peace prospects.

/I attach *de*



I attach great importance to hearing the views of Your Majesty and your Delegation on those and other matters of present concern and assure you of a warm welcome in London."

I take it that you will arrange for this to be delivered. Perhaps you would let me know whether a signed version should follow.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



cc Sue Soatchwell



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 January, 1983

Dear Sam,

On the assumption, optimistic as it may be, that the Arab League Delegation visit will be taking place, you will wish to have a draft guest list for the Prime Minister's luncheon on 7 February. We have few details on the delegation but assume that it will be along the lines proposed at the end of last year. The list has been drafted on the assumption that each Foreign Minister/delegate will be accompanied by an official and by his Ambassador/representative in London, and that the delegation will include both 'a Palestinian

Representative' and the Secretary General of the Arab League. King Hassan will probably require a few extra places (we do not yet know if he intends to bring any members of his family). The Moroccan Minister for the Court, General Moulay Hafid Alaoui will be in London on Wednesday 19 January for a planning meeting and we hope to be given more details then. Meanwhile I enclose a draft guest list, which you may find helpful for planning purposes.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street



GUEST LIST FOR A LUNCHEON AT 10  
DOWNING STREET IN HONOUR OF KING  
HASSAN II OF MOROCCO AND AN ARAB  
LEAGUE DELEGATION



MONDAY 7 FEBRUARY 1983  
[12.45 for 1.00 p.m.]

LOUNGE SUIT

FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<p><u>Host</u> Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  <u>Moroccan Royal Family and Officials of the Royal Household</u></p>	<p>Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco 49 Queen's Gate Gardens SW7 5NE  01-581 5001/4</p>	<p>Delegation Leader</p>
<p>Plus 3 royal officials</p>	<p>Moroccan Embassy (as above)</p>	<p>/Arab League Delegation</p>





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

Arab League Delegation,  
Foreign Ministers &  
Secretary General

(In protocol order - by  
date of appointment.)

HE Mr Abdul Halim -  
Khaddam

Embassy of the Syrian Arab  
Republic  
8 Belgrave Square  
SW1X 8PH

Syrian Foreign Minister

01-245 9012

HRH Prince Saud Bin  
Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz

Royal Embassy of Saudi  
Arabia  
30 Belgrave Square  
SW1X 8QB

Saudi Foreign Minister

01-235 0831

HE Mr Marwan Qasem

Embassy of the Hashemite  
Kingdom of Jordan  
6 Upper Phillimore Gardens  
W8 7HB

Jordanian Foreign Minister

01-937 3685

HE Me. M'Hamed  
Boucetta

Moroccan Embassy  
(as above)

Moroccan Foreign Minister

HE M Beji Caid  
Essebsi

Tunisian Embassy  
29 Prince's Gate  
SW7 1QG

Tunisian Foreign Minister

01-584 8117

HE Dr Ahmed Taleb  
Ibrahimi

Algerian Embassy  
54 Holland Park  
W11 3RS

Algerian Foreign Minister

01-221 7800/4

HE Mr Chedli Klibi

Arab League  
Arab Information Office  
52 Green Street  
WC1

Secretary General of the  
Arab League

01-629 0732

Palestinian Represent-  
ative

c/o Mr Omar Al Hassan  
Arab League Office  
(as above)

/Ambassadors



FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS



REASON FOR INVITATION

ADDRESS

Ambassadors of the Arab  
League Delegation  
Countries

(In protocol order - by  
date of appointment to  
London.)

HE Mr Ibrahim Izzidin

Jordanian Embassy  
(as above)

Jordanian Ambassador

HE Sheikh Nasser H  
Almanqour GCVO

Saudi Embassy  
(as above)

Saudi Ambassador

HE M Sadok Bouzayen

Tunisian Embassy  
(as above)

Tunisian Ambassador

HE M Mohamed Mehdi  
Benabdeljalil

Moroccan Embassy  
(as above)

Moroccan Ambassador

HE M Redha Malek

Algerian Embassy  
(as above)

Algerian Ambassador

Dr Loutof Allah  
Haydar

Syrian Embassy  
(as above)

Syrian Ambassador

Mr Omar Said Al  
Hassan

Arab League  
(as above)

Arab League Representati  
in London

Arab League Delegation  
Officials

)  
)  
)  
) [6]  
)  
) - 1 official per  
) delegate. To be  
) notified

Syrian Embassy  
(as above)  
Saudi Embassy  
(as above)  
Jordanian Embassy  
(as above)  
Moroccan Embassy  
(as above)  
Tunisian Embassy  
(as above)  
Algerian Embassy  
(as above)

Arab League Office

/Her Majesty's Government





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

Her Majesty's Government

Rt Hon Francis Pym  
MC MP

FCO

Secretary of State for  
Foreign & Commonwealth  
Affairs

Rt Hon Michael  
Heseltine MP

MOD

Secretary of State  
for Defence

Rt Hon Cecil  
Parkinson MP

c/o Conservative Central  
Office  
01 222 9000

Paymaster General (known  
and highly regarded in  
Morocco)

Rt Hon Lord Cockfield

DOT  
01-215 7877

Secretary of State for  
Trade

Rt Hon Nigel Lawson  
MP

DOE

Secretary of State for  
Energy

Rt Hon Douglas Hurd  
CBE MP

FCO

Minister of State for  
Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs

Rt Hon The Baroness  
Young  
Reserves

Lord Privy Seal

Recently visited Jordan

Mr Geoffrey Pattie MP

MOD

Responsibility for defence  
sales to Middle East

Mr Peter Rees QC MP

DOT

Responsibility for trade  
with Middle East countries  
visiting Morocco next  
year.

Parliament

House of Lords

Rt Hon Lord Chalfont OBE  
MC

IBM  
103 Wigmore Street  
W1

Friend of King Hassan,  
member of Moroccan Royal  
Academy, Played important  
role in negotiations  
with the King.

01-935 6600

Lord Chelwood MC DL

6 Eaton Terrace  
SW1W 3EZ or  
House of Lords  
01 219 3000

Well known in Middle East  
Frequent speaker in  
Middle East debates.

/House of Commons





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DESIGNATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

House of Commons

Rt Hon Denis Healey  
CH MBE MP

House of Commons

Opposition Foreign  
Affairs Spokesman

Rt Hon David Steel MP

House of Commons

Leader of the Liberal  
Party

Rt Hon David Owen MP

House of Commons

SDP Foreign Affairs  
Spokesman. Former  
Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary

Mr David Watkins MP  
(Lab. Consett)

House of Commons

Takes close interest in  
Middle East affairs.  
Frequent visitor to the  
region.

Sir Anthony Kershaw  
MC MP  
(Cons. Stroud)

House of Commons

Chairman, House of  
Commons Foreign Affairs  
Select Committee

Reserves

Ray Whitney MP OBE  
(Cons. Wycombe)

House of Commons

Chairman, Conservative  
Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs Committee

Rt Hon Roland Moyle MP  
(Lab. Lewisham E)

House of Commons

Labour Front Bench  
Spokesman. Speaks  
regularly on Middle  
East Affairs.

Sir Frederic Bennett MP  
(Cons. Torbay)

House of Commons

Close interest in  
Moroccan and Middle  
East Affairs

/Business Community





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

Business Community

Rt Hon Lord  
Carrington KCMG MC

GEC LTD  
1 Stanhope Gate  
W1

Chairman GEC. Regular  
visitor to Middle East,  
further visits being  
planned.

01-493 8484

Lord McFadzean

Rolls Royce Ltd  
65 Buckingham Gate  
SW1E 6AT

Chairman Rolls Royce  
Extensive business  
interests in Middle East

01-22 9020

Mr E F Given CMG CVO

Bury House  
33 Bury Street  
St James's  
SW1

Director General of the  
Middle East Association

Sir Richard Beaumont  
KCMG OBE

42 Berkeley Square  
W1

Arab British Chamber of  
Commerce

Mr H PM Benson

15 Portland Place  
W1A 4DD

Chairman Davy McKee  
International Ltd.  
Extensive engineering  
interests in Middle East

01-637 2821

Sir Reginald Smith

George Wimpey Interna-  
tional  
27 Hammersmith Grove  
W6 7EN 01 748 2000

Important construction  
projects throughout the  
Middle East

Lord Selsdon

Midland Bank plc  
International Division  
Suffolk House  
Lawrence Pountney Hill  
EC4R 0EU

Chairman Midland Bank,  
Chairman Committee for  
Middle East Trade.

01-606 9944

*Belist Answer? Answer by go?*

Reserves

Sir Trevor Holdsworth

7 Cleveland Row  
SW1A 1DB

Chairman GKN  
Major exporters to Middle  
East.

01-930 2424

Mr P I Walters

Brittanic House  
Moor Lane  
EC2Y 9BU

Chairman British Petro-  
leum

01-920 800

/Media Academics





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

Media/Academics

Mr C Douglas-Home

The Times  
New Printing House Sq  
Grays Inn Road  
WCC

Editor, The Times

01-837 1234

Mr D Trelford

The Observer  
8 St Andrews Hill  
EC4

Editor, The Observer

01-236 0202

Mr Eric Bowman MBE

BBC External Services  
Bush House  
WC2

Head of BBC Arabic  
Services

Sir John Burgh KCMG  
CB

British Council  
10 Spring Gardens  
SW1A 2BN

Recent visitor to Middle  
East. Major interest in  
developing links with  
the region.

Mr Geoffrey Owen

The Financial Times  
Bracken House  
Cannon Street  
EC4

Editor

01-248 8000

Reserves

Mr Andrew Knight

The Economist  
25 St James' Street  
SW1

Editor

01-930 5155

~~Mr Frank Giles~~

~~The Sunday Times  
Thompson House  
200 Grays Inn Road  
WC1~~

Editor

01-837 1234

*Group of Individuals*

/Officials





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

Officials

FCO

Sir John Leahy KCMG

c/o FCO  
01-233 4591

Deputy Under-Secretary of  
State for Foreign &  
Commonwealth Affairs.

Mr S J G Cambridge  
CMG CVO

c/o Heads of Mission  
Section,  
POD  
FCO

HM Ambassador at Rabat

Reserves

Mr S L Egerton CMG

c/o FCO  
01-233 7302

Assistant Under-Secretary  
of State, FCO

Mr R O Miles

c/o FCO  
01-233 6048

Head, Near East and North  
Africa Department

Mr H D A C Miers CMG

c/o FCO  
01-233 5877

Head, Middle East  
Department

Department of Trade

Mr M D M Franklin  
CB CMG

DOT  
1 Victoria Street  
SW1 G1-215 7877

Permanent Secretary

Reserve

Mr A Titchener

DOT  
1 Victoria Street  
SW1

Under-Secretary OT5  
(Middle East)

01-215 7877

Department of Energy

Sir Kenneth Couzens  
KCB

DOE  
Thames House South  
Millbank  
SW1P 4QJ

Permanent Under-Secretary  
of State, Department of  
Energy.

01-211 3000

Private Secretary  
No. 10



PRIME MINISTER

①  
Amend  
mt

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

The Foreign Secretary believes (see attached letter) that it would be a good idea for you to send a personal message to King Hassan, before the Fez Committee meets on 21 January in Rabat.

Sir Anthony Parsons agrees that a message will be useful. We both have minor reservations about the draft and suggest that the message which you send reads as follows:

"I have been following closely the exchanges between our two Governments about the visit which you propose to make to London next month as the Head of the Arab League Delegation. I am much encouraged by the progress which has been made and am most grateful to Your Majesty for the trouble you and your Ministers are taking to ensure the visit's success. I look forward with much pleasure to seeing you. I know that Her Majesty The Queen is greatly looking forward to welcoming you and your colleagues herself.

The delay in the arrangement of your visit was especially disappointing, as I believe there is a broad area of agreement between the United Kingdom and the Arab States on many aspects of the Palestinian problems. We have done as much as any Western country to try to contribute to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242; also to the now almost universal recognition that the Palestinian people have a right to self determination. We have in no way diminished our support for that right, and we shall continue to play, both nationally and as a Member of the European Community, as active a part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have, for example, been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to cease establishing settlements in the

/ occupied



occupied territories, a practice which we regard as illegal and very harmful to peace prospects.

I attach great importance to hearing the views of Your Majesty and your Delegation on those and other matters of present concern and assure you of a warm welcome in London."

18 January 1983





Prime Minister

A.T.C. 107/11

From the Secretary of State

Copy: Sir A. Parsons.

John Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1

18 January 1983

Dear John

MS

ARAB LEAGUE VISIT : COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Events have moved on since your letter to John Holmes of 21 December, enquiring about further action we could take to protect our commercial position in the Middle East. Lord Cockfield naturally hopes the Milhem formula or another similar initiative will be accepted by the Arabs, and the problem will disappear.

At the same time, Lord Cockfield fears that, should an agreed formula continue to elude us, the political climate will continue to deteriorate. Even if no formal sanctions were announced, our exporters would be bound to suffer by being omitted or deleted, at least at the margin, from the list of firms invited to pre-qualify or tender for contracts.

There is as yet little evidence of discrimination against British companies. But it would be all too easy for those responsible for Arab purchasers to come to the view that Britain was out of favour, and to act accordingly. Two such cases have been identified so far - deferral by a Saudi regional Chamber of Commerce of an important mission by the London chamber, and the alleged deletion of British firms from tender lists for major projects of the Algerian/French dominated Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. With the Arab world taking some 10% of our exports even this informal (indeed virtually invisible) process could be highly damaging.

British industry, through the Committee on Middle East Trade and in other ways, has consistently made clear to this Department that a good political climate is essential to them. This is no less true at the present time, as is shown by the large number of expressions of concern received from British firms in the Department.

Lord Cockfield hopes to reinstate his own postponed visit to the Middle East as soon as the central political problem is solved. A visit following soon after its resolution could do much to relieve our exporters anxieties.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes, Richard Mottram and Jonathan Spencer.

Yours sincerely  
John Rhodes

for JOHN RHODES  
Private Secretary




PM, AUG '80,  
Arab League  
Delegation

THE NEWS SERVICE OF THE AIRCRAFT : CANADIAN AIRCRAFT



LONDON 1980



COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS  
COMMUNICATIONS




MR. COLES

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

I agree that it would be helpful for the Prime Minister to send a friendly message to King Hassan at this juncture. I also agree with the amendment you suggest in your minute below.

I would also suggest a redraft of the middle two sentences of the penultimate paragraph to read as follows:

X  
"We have done as much as any Western country to try to contribute to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242; also to the now almost universal recognition that the Palestinian people have a right to self determination. We have in no way diminished our support for that right, and we shall continue to play, both nationally and as a Member of the European Community, as active a part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace."



A.D. PARSONS  
18 January 1983





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1105</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Cole to Parsons dated 18 January 1983, with enclosed draft letter</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2013 DWayland</i>
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FM BONN 171930Z JAN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM 33 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE TUNIS WASHINGTON TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO JEDDA  
INFO SAVING ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN BEIRUT DAMASCUS  
DOHA DUBAI JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANA'A TRIPOLI  
ATHENS EMBASSY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG  
PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS

VISIT BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF ARAB LEAGUE.

1. KLIBI VISITED BONN ON 14 JANUARY AND SAW KOHL AND GENSCHER  
FIEDLER GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 17 JANUARY.
2. FIEDLER PORTRAYED THE VISIT AS PART OF THE BALANCE OF FRG  
MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND IN A SERIES WITH THE VISITS OF MUBARAK  
LAST MONTH AND SHAMIR NEXT. KLIBI HAD SOUGHT AND BEEN GIVEN  
REASSURANCE THAT THE NEW FRG GOVERNMENT STILL STOOD BY THE  
PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION.
3. KLIBI'S MAIN PITCH HOWEVER HAD BEEN TO THE GERMANS AS PRESIDENCY.  
HE HAD ARGUED THAT THE 10 SHOULD IMPLEMENT THE FINAL SECTION OF THE  
VENICE DECLARATION, SHOULD PUT MORE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND SHOULD  
RAISE THE LEVEL OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. ABOVE ALL HE  
URGED THE 10 TO INFLUENCE THE US. THE ARABS HE CLAIMED REGARDED  
THE FEZ AND REAGAN PLANS AS COMPLEMENTARY. THEY WOULD ACCEPT  
THE REAGAN PLAN IF THE EUROPEANS COULD PERSUADE THE US TO INCLUDE  
THE WORD SELF-DETERMINATION IN IT AND IF THE US ACCEPTED ALL  
UN RESOLUTIONS REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL: TROOPS  
FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
4. GENSCHER APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THAT THE FEZ AND REAGAN PLANS  
WERE COMPLEMENTARY AND UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS WITHIN THE  
10 ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH THE US.
5. NEITHER LEBANON, EGYPT NOR THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE WERE MENTIONED.  
FCO PLEASE PASS TO ABOVE SAVING ADDRESSEES  
TAYLOR

STANDARD

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GRS 300

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FM DOHA 171002Z JAN 83

IPS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 18 OF 17 JANUARY

*MT*

MIPT: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION: QATARI VIEWS

1. NORMALLY THE MILDEST OF MEN, THE HEIR APPARENT LECTURED ME FOR 15 MINUTES ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BRITAIN RESTORING RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. HE SAID HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF AMONG BRITAIN'S BEST FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND HAD DEMONSTRATED HIS ATTACHMENT THROUGH THE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP WE HAD BUILT UP IN RECENT YEARS. IN THE EVENT OF TROUBLE HE WOULD TURN FIRST TO BRITAIN FOR HELP. WE SHOULD NOT LISTEN TO THE QADAFIS AND SADDAMS, BUT HE HOPED WE WOULD LISTEN TO HIM.

2. SHAIKH HAMAD STRESSED THE NEED TO RECOGNISE THE CHANGE IN ARAB ATTITUDES SINCE THE INVASION OF LEBANON. HE HIMSELF WAS NO LOVER OF THE PLO, AS I KNEW WELL FROM EARLIER DISCUSSIONS. BUT NOW EVERY ARAB HOUSEHOLD IDENTIFIED WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THIS MADE THE ISSUE AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR COUNTRIES LIKE QATAR. ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD TO BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVE. OUR EXPLANATIONS FOR NOT RECEIVING THE PLO WERE NEITHER UNDERSTOOD NOR BELIEVED BY THE MAN IN THE STREET. WE WERE SEEN TO BE LINING UP WITH THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS AGAINST THE ARABS AND GOING BACK ON OUR COMMITMENTS AT VENICE AND ELSEWHERE TO INVOLVE THE PALESTINIANS IN THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT.

3. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID HE HAD THE HIGHEST RESPECT FOR THE RESOLVE SHOWN BY THE PRIME MINISTER DURING THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. THAT DETERMINATION WAS RIGHT FOR THE FALKLANDS, BUT THE CURRENT ISSUE WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. WE WERE ON THE WRONG SIDE. SINCE THE DEATH OF NASSER BRITAIN HAD RE-ESTABLISHED ITS ROLE AS AN ALLY OF DECENT ARABS. THOSE ARABS WANTED BRITAIN INVOLVED IN THE SEARCH FOR AN ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT BUT TO DO SO WE HAD TO STOP THE ROT.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 January 1983

*Dear John,*

Arab League Delegation Visit

Our negotiations with the Moroccans have reached the point where we are agreed with them that the visit can take place on 7/8 February, with Mohammed Milhem as the Palestinian representative. But public comments made over the past few days by other Arab leaders, including Arafat, throw doubt on the acceptance of the Milhem idea by the whole seven-member Fez committee, though they do not rule it out. The Moroccans have told us that the other Arabs are their business, and that they wish us to proceed soon with a joint announcement of agreement to the visit. We are replying that we are content for the Moroccans to make a formal announcement which we shall support with official comment from London, including a reference to an understanding on the composition.

There is a considerable risk that King Hassan will fail to persuade the other Arabs to accept the Milhem proposal. Mr Pym nevertheless believes it right to show as positive a face as possible to the Moroccans, the better to hold them to their obligation to settle the inter-Arab issues. As King Hassan has from the beginning attached great importance to the Prime Minister's own part in resolving this problem, Mr Pym believes it would be a helpful and timely gesture for her now to send a personal message to King Hassan. This would have the effect of (a) reassuring the King that HMG is fully behind his efforts to rearrange the delegation's visit; and (b) providing the King with evidence, for use if necessary with the other Arabs, that there has been no step backwards in British policy, and that we are still firmly in support of Palestinian self-determination and a freeze on Israeli settlements, two crucial issues for the Palestinians as the possibility of talks under the Reagan plan grows.

/ I enclose a draft message. The Fez Committee meets at Foreign Minister level on 21 January in Rabat and for the message to have the desired effect it should issue in the next day or so.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*John Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/riority  
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FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
TELEGRAM NUMBER

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to King Hassan as soon as possible:

BEGINS'YOUR MAJESTY

I have been following closely the exchanges between our two Governments about the visit which you propose to make to London <sup>next</sup> ~~for~~ month at the Head of the Arab League Delegation.

I am much encouraged by the progress which has been made and am most grateful to Your Majesty for the trouble you and your Ministers are taking to ensure the visit's success.

I look forward with much pleasure to seeing you. I am also delighted that Her Majesty The Queen will be able to welcome you and your colleagues herself.

The delay in the arrangement of your visit was especially disappointing, as I believe there is a broad area of agreement between the United Kingdom and the Arab States on <sup>many</sup> ~~may~~ aspects

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword
File number		Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals)			
Telephone number			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		



Classification and Caveats

1 <<<<  
 2 of the Palestinian problem. Over the past fifteen years we  
 3 have contributed as much as any western country to the now almost  
 4 universal recognition that the Palestinian people have a right to  
 5 self-determination. We have in no way diminished our support for  
 6 that right; and we shall continue to play as active a part as we  
 7 can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have, for  
 8 example, been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need  
 9 for Israel to cease establishing settlements in the occupied  
 10 territories, a practice which we regard as illegal and  
 11 very harmful to peace prospects.  
 12 I attach great important to hearing the views of Your Majesty  
 13 and your Delegation on those and other matters of present concern  
 14 and assure you of a warm welcome in London.  
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B/P FILE RWP

4/c: Miss STEPHENS

P.M.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 January, 1983

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

Thank you for your letter of 14 January. The Prime Minister would be able to carry out the programme suggested on Page 2 of your letter and we shall clear her diary accordingly as soon as you can confirm that the visit is taking place.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A





10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

O.K.

A.S.C. 14.

John

Yes fine -  
there is quite a lot  
to cancel so  
please let me  
know if this  
goes ahead.

U.

15/11





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 January 1983

010  
Dear Idn,

Arab League Delegation Visit:  
Programme

Provided none of the Arab governments involved breaks ranks - which can by no means be taken for granted (you are aware of the latest press reports on Milhem and the PLO) - agreement is likely to be reached soon on a reinstated visit on 7/8 February.

It is clear that for the King at least the programme and protocol arrangements will continue to loom very large (his anger last time was at least as much on protocol grounds, however unreasonable, as about the PLO point). It will be important for us to offer a programme the equal of that discussed last year, key elements of which were set out in your letter of 22 December, namely:

- a) a Guard of Honour;
- b) a tête-à-tête between the Prime Minister and King Hassan;
- c) a plenary meeting with the delegation;
- d) a meal for the delegation.

In addition there would be a meal/call by King Hassan at Buckingham Palace on 8 February (The Queen only returns from Sandringham on 7 February) and, presentation by the King of the complete delegation to The Queen.

The King has now sent us his own suggestions for the programme (Rabat telno 23 enclosed). Essentially he proposes arrival on Sunday 6 February, meetings with the Prime Minister and Mr Pym on 7 February, and meetings with The Queen on 8 February. The King would give a press conference on the morning of 9 February (he seems to envisage staying on for a few days privately). This strikes us a sensible outline; it would in any case help the prospects for a successful visit if we were able to fall in with the King's suggestions as far as possible. We are pursuing arrangements for 8 February separately with the Palace, but it would be helpful

/to have





to have the Prime Minister's views on the programme for 7 February. Our suggested outline would be as follows:

- 1030: Guard of Honour in the FCO Quadrangle for King Hassan and the delegation
- 1045: Plenary session
- 1215: Tête-à-tête with King Hassan  
(simultaneous further talks between the rest of the delegation and Mr Pym at No 10)
- 1300 Lunch for the Delegation  
for  
1315


As you will see, this means an earlier start than that proposed by King Hassan. Our thinking is that we should both give the delegation as a whole a reasonable session (90 minutes including English/Arabic interpretation is not long) and allow King Hassan at least 45 minutes for a tête-à-tête. To obviate the difficulty of either sending the rest of the delegation away at 1215, only to return 45 minutes later for lunch, or having them kicking their heels in No 10, we have suggested separate talks with Mr Pym. This would presumably remove the need for the further session with him at 5 pm suggested by King Hassan. In addition Mr Pym may need to have bilateral meetings with some or all of the delegation other than the King. He would also propose to offer lunch to the rest of the delegation on 8 February while King Hassan is lunching with The Queen. This could help to smooth feelings otherwise perhaps ruffled by a very short meeting with The Queen.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





17 4 JAN 1988





GRS 250

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DESKBY 131230Z JAN 83

FM RABAT 131024Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 131230Z)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 OF 13 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS, TUNIS

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ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON.

MY IPT.

1. KING HASSAN SUGGESTED A PROGRAMME ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

- (I) HE WOULD ARRIVE ON SUNDAY 6 FEBRUARY AND STAY AT CLARIDGES.
- (II) MONDAY 7 FEBRUARY: THE DELEGATION WOULD MEET AMONG THEMSELVES THAT MORNING. THEREAFTER (THE KING SUGGESTED 11AM) THE FULL DELEGATION WOULD MEET THE PRIME MINISTER. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY KING HASSAN'S TETE A TETE WITH MRS THATCHER SEMICOLON AND THEN LUNCH AT NO 10 FOR THE WHOLE DELEGATION. AT 5PM THE DELEGATION WOULD HAVE A MEETING WITH YOU. THE EVENING WOULD BE LEFT FREE.
- (III) TUESDAY 8 FEBRUARY WOULD THUS BE LEFT ENTIRELY FREE FOR WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE WITH THE QUEEN. THE KING ENVISAGES THAT THESE MIGHT BE AS EARLIER AGREED - NAMELY A CALL BY THE WHOLE DELEGATION ON HER MAJESTY FOLLOWED BY A PRIVATE LUNCH FOR KING HASSAN HIMSELF.
- (IV) KING HASSAN WOULD GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE PROBABLY ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, 9 FEBRUARY.

2. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD NOT YET HAD INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT THE PROGRAMME. I SAID I WOULD PUT THESE SUGGESTIONS TO YOU, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PALACE AND WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH GENERAL MOULAY HAFID AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE KING DID NOT REVERT TO HIS IDEA OF HAVING A COURT OFFICIAL COME OUT HERE, AND I DID NOT MENTION SIR R DU BOULAY'S READINESS TO TAKE ON THIS ROLE. I SUGGEST WE KEEP THIS CARD IN RESERVE. I SHALL MAKE A RECOMMENDATION WHEN AND IF TO PLAY IT AFTER I HAVE SEEN GENERAL MOULAY HAFID.

3. PLEASE SEE MY IFT (FCO ONLY).

CAMBRIDGE

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MR ~~ROBERT~~ EGERTON  
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FM RABAT 141235Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 141500Z)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
PARIS, MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 36: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

1. I MET WITH BOUCETTA THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. I LAID PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE CONCESSION YOU HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAKE WITH REGARD TO MILHEM'S RECEPTION BY THE QUEEN. I SAID THIS REFLECTED OUR DESIRE TO MEET THE KING'S WISHES AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO MAKING A SUCCESS OF THE VISIT. BOUCETTA TOOK NOTE AND SAID THE KING WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE.

2. I THEN REFERRED TO THE DOUBTS RAISED BY ABU MARWAN'S







4. TO CONCLUDE THE MATTER I SAID I WOULD PUT TWO ALTERNATIVES TO YOU:

- (I) EITHER WE AGREE ON A JOINT STATEMENT -WHICH MIGHT PERHAPS BE MADE ON TUESDAY (BOUCETTAS AID QUOTE TAKE YOUR TIME UNQUOTE BUT HE WOULD LIKE A STATEMENT BEFORE THE QODS COMMITTEE MEETS ON THURSDAY 20 JANUARY, AND THIS WOULD BE IN OUR INTERESTS TOO) AND WHICH WOULD LIST THE COUNTRIES QUOTE AND PALESTINE UNQUOTE SEMICOLON OR
- (II) THE MOROCCANS WOULD GO AHEAD WITH A UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE LINES OF THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 20.

5. WE BOTH AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER TO HAVE A JOINT STATEMENT. BOUCETTA HAD NO OBJECTION WHATEVER TO OUR SPECIFYING, IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS AFTER A JOINT STATEMENT, THAT WE HAD AGREED WITH THE MOROCCANS THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINE WOULD BE MILHEM.

6. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS, IF POSSIBLE BY MONDAY AFTERNOON. BOUCETTA HAS NOW LEFT FOR MARRAKESH, BUT CAN TELEPHONE YOUR REPLY TO HIM.

CAMBRIDGE

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1105</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Fellowes to Coles dated 14 January 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2013 AWayland</i>
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FM RABAT 130940Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 13 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TEL 31: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON  
SUMMARY

1. I WAS RECEIVED BY KING HASSAN IN MARRAKESH YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. IT WAS A CORDIAL MEETING. HE GAVE ME HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PROGRAMME IN LONDON. HE MADE A STRONG PERSONAL PLEA TO ASK TO TREAT MILHEM AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION. HE IS THINKING OF STAYING IN BRITAIN PRIVATELY FOR A FEW DAYS AFTER THE DELEGATION VISIT. AFTER OUR MEETING I AGREED WITH BOUCETTA, SUBJECT TO YOUR CONFIRMATION, THE TERMS OF A SHORT FACTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PRESS ON FRIDAY 14 JANUARY.

*had - fee.*  
*14.*

DETAIL

2. I WENT DOWN TO MARRAKESH EXPECTING TO HAVE A WORKING SESSION WITH BOUCETTA AND MOULAY HAFID. IN THE EVENT, I WAS WHEELED IN STRAIGHT AWAY TO SEE THE KING. BOUCETTA AND GUEDIRA WERE WITH HIM. OUR MEETING LASTED FOR THREE QUARTERS OF AN HOUR, WAS MOST FRIENDLY AND RELAXED, AND AT THE END OF IT THE KING ORDERED UP ONE OF HIS PLANES TO FLY ME BACK TO RABAT.

3. WE DISCUSSED THE PROGRAMME. DETAILS IN MY IFT (NOT REPEATED TO ALL). THE KING THEN WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT THE RECEPTION OF MILHEM. HE SAID HE MUCH HOPED THAT, SINCE MRS THATCHER HERSELF HAD KINDLY AGREED TO RECEIVE MILHEM, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN THE QUEEN DOING LIKEWISE. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A PERSONAL AND FRIENDLY APPEAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT CAME FROM THE HEART, AND WAS IN NO WAY INTENDED TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR US. HE WENT ON TO SPEAK MUCH AS BOUCETTA HAD DONE (PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 09). WE HAD BEEN AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS IN STANDING TO ARMS IN THE TWO WORLD WARS. BUT WE NOW RISKED BEING LEFT BEHIND OVER DEVELOPMENTS OVER PALESTINE. HE SAID THAT KISSINGER, WHO HAD BEEN IN MOROCCO RECENTLY AS A MEMBER OF KING HASSAN'S ACADEMY, HAD MET DAJANI (PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE) THREE TIMES, HAD TOLD HIM (HASSAN) THAT HE NOW REGRETTED HAVING PUBLICLY SET RIGID CONDITIONS FOR DEALINGS WITH THE PLO. THE KING EARNESTLY HOPED THAT WE COULD SHOW THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE SITUATION WAS CHANGING.

4. THE KING AGREED THAT BOUCETTA AND I SHOULD COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE VISIT. I HAVE TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY ABOUT THIS (TELNO 20). I MADE CLEAR TO BOUCETTA THAT YOU RELIED ON HIM, IN ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS HE MIGHT MAKE TO THE PRESS, TO REFER TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE PALESTINIANS NOT THE PLO WHO WERE BEING REPRESENTED ON THE DELEGATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/COMMENT



# CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT

5. THE KING MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY AGREEMENT BY THE OTHER ARABS AND THE PLO TO THE MILHEM IDEA, AND I FELT I COULD HARDLY QUESTION HIM ON THIS IN VIEW OF THE VERY POSITIVE ASSURANCES BOUCETTA HAS ALREADY GIVEN US. SINCE RETURNING TO RABAT I HAVE SEEN YOUR TELNO 17 TO JEDDA REPORTING SIR J LEAHY'S MEETING WITH THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON 12 JANUARY. I NATURALLY ACCEPT THE NEED FOR CAUTION AND NOT COUNTING CHICKENS. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO ELICIT EITHER FROM ARAFAT HIMSELF OR INTERMS FROM THE MOROCCANS, THAT THE PLO OR THE OTHER HARD-LINERS (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) ACCEPT THE MILHEM IDEA. I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO TAKING HASSAN AT HIS WORD. HE HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SQUARING THE PLO AND THE OTHER ARABS - JUST AS HE DID, SUCCESSFULLY, FOR THE WASHINGTON VISIT. I HOPE THEREFORE YOU WILL SEE NO PROBLEM IN AGREEING NOW TO THE JOINT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT.

CAMBRIDGE

## STANDARD

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SUBJECT

cc M. [unclear]



FILE

C.C. Sir A.P.

WJ

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 January, 1983

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

The problems surrounding the visit of the above delegation were discussed when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary brought Sir James Craig to call on the Prime Minister this afternoon.

The Prime Minister made it clear that she did not wish to modify her original decision that a delegation containing a representative of the PLO could not be received at the level of Cabinet Minister or above.

It was agreed that for the present we should continue to hope that the solution involving the presence of a former Palestinian Mayor in the delegation would commend itself to the Arabs. If this did not succeed, the Prime Minister was attracted by a suggestion put forward by Sir Anthony Parsons, namely that Professor Walid Al Khalidi, now at Harvard, might be persuaded to be part of the delegation. He had undertaken missions for Arafat in the past. Thus it might be possible to devise a formula whereby the PLO would accept that the Palestinian viewpoint on the delegation would be represented by Al Khalidi, and we could say that he was in no sense a member of the PLO. Careful consideration would have to be given to how this suggestion was handled. It might be desirable to persuade the Saudis or Jordanians to put it forward to the King of Morocco as their own idea.

A. J. COLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
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LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1105</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Holmes to Coles dated 13 January 1983, with enclosed draft letter</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2013 C. W. Jayland</i>
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# The Board of Deputies of British Jews

②

by

WOBURN HOUSE, UPPER WOBURN PLACE, LONDON, WC1H 0EP.

Telegrams: DEPUTIES, LONDON, WC1.

Telephone: 01-387 3952 or 388 7651

FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister.

Tom

do you wish  
to deal with

Prime Minister

12th January, 1983. *for*

*As he invites you not  
to reply, I suggest you do not  
do so.*

*A-J-C. 14  
1*

*My dear Prime Minister -*

I trust that you are well - and recovered from your strenuous and remarkable journey to the Falklands.

I write both personally and at the request of my colleagues at the Board to thank you for your firm and resolute policy and approach to any meeting with the PLO - in spite of the quite extraordinary pressures which have been placed upon you and the Government as a result. We appreciate that - as you said to me in a reply in the House - you will continue to look for ways in which agreement may be reached concerning the proposed top level Arab visit to the U.K. - but are much reassured by your determination that this will not be at the expense of your stand concerning Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised frontiers - and your Government's refusal to deal with those who remain committed to its destruction.

Please do not trouble to reply to this letter. But we did - all of us - wish to let you know of our appreciation - and at the same time to send you our best wishes for 1983. I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Pym.

*[Handwritten initials]*

*Yours sincerely,  
[Signature]*

President: The Hon. Greville Janner, Q.C., M.P.  
Vice-Presidents: Dr. Lionel Kopelowitz, J.P., Martin Savitt  
Treasurer: Victor Lucas, F.S.V.A., F.C.I.Arb.  
Secretary General: Hayim Pinner



Arab League  
Lester  
Schofield  
File

RDFOFI 105/11

h.a.

OFFICE  
COMMISSIONERS

original filed  
on 14 Jan  
Aug 1982  
sent by 11  
to Falkland.

PORT STANLEY DESKBY 111630Z

GRS 507  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 111630Z

FM FCO 111215Z JAN 83  
TO IMMEDIATE CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER PERSONAL 3 OF 11 JANUARY  
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO  
THE PRIME MINISTER.

MIDDLE EAST ROUND UP  
1. THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT WISH TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT SINCE HER DEPARTURE.  
2. HM AMBASSADOR IN RAJAHAD HAD A USEFUL TALK WITH BOUCETTA ON 8 JANUARY. THE LATTER SAID THAT KING HASSAN WAS PREPARED TO TAKE MAYOR MILHEM AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE DELEGATION ASKED WHETHER THE OTHER ARABS HAD AGREED TO THIS HE WAS EVASIVE BUT COMMENTED THAT KINGS HUSSEIN AND FAHD HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER KING HASSAN DECIDED.  
BOUCETTA WENT ON TO MAKE TWO REQUESTS.

- 1) THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SHOULD AFTER ALL BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE RADDUNI.
- 11) THAT THE FULL DELEGATION, INCLUDING MILHEM, SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE QUEEN.

AS REGARDS DATES, BOUCETTA SAID THAT THE MOROCCANS COULD ACCEPT 7-8 FEBRUARY AND WERE PRETTY CERTAIN THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WOULD ALSO AGREE. BOUCETTA ALSO HANDED MR CAMBRIDGE A MESSAGE FROM KING HASSAN TO THE QUEEN EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT SHE WOULD URGE TO RECEIVE QUOTE THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION ... UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS PREVIOUSLY UNQUOTE.

3. MR CAMBRIDGE IS DUE TO SEE BOUCETTA AGAIN ON 11 JANUARY. HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO WELCOME MOROCCAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE MILHEM IDEA: TO DRAW ATTENTION AGAIN TO OUR POSITION ON THE LEVEL OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE PLC; AND TO SAY THAT WE NEED MORE TIME ON THE QUESTION OF THE QUEEN'S INVOLVEMENT, BUT ARE CONSIDERING IT CAREFULLY.

4. KING HUSSEIN DISCUSSED THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT WITH MR URWICK IN AMMAN ON 9 JANUARY. THE KING CONFIRMED THAT BOUCETTA HAD TOLD HIM THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN FOUND ON THE BASIS THAT MILHEM WOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION. HE WAS SINCERE THAT THE DATES 7-8 FEBRUARY WOULD BE RATHER LATE, PARTICULARLY IF HIS CURRENT TALKS WITH ARAFAT WENT WELL. THE KING EMPHASISED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT OUT OF THE WAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE LEST THEY DIVERT ATTENTION FROM PURSUIT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD URGE A RAPID SOLUTION ON ARAFAT AND OFFERED TO TRY TO THINK OF AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL IF THERE SEEMED ANY DANGER THAT THE IMPASSE MIGHT CONTINUE. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT COME TO LONDON HIMSELF IF THE ARABS COULD NOT SORT THEMSELVES OUT. HE HAS A VISIT TO BELGIUM PLANNED FROM 27-31 JANUARY.

5. THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO RIYADH WENT WELL, AND HE WAS ABLE TO PUT OUR VIEWS TO THE SAUDIS. BUT HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK OF COMMERCIAL DAMAGE IF AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IS NOT FOUND SOON. WE ARE NOW AWAITING ARAB REACTIONS TO THE MILHEM IDEA PUT TO THEM BY THE MOROCCANS. IF THEY ACCEPT IT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET AWAY OUT OF CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. BUT THERE IS A CLEAR FEELING AMONG THE MOROCCANS ARE BEING OVER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT WHAT THEY CAN DO FOR THEIR COLLEAGUES.



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DESKBY 111800Z  
FM RABAT 111600Z JAN 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 111800Z JAN 83  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 16 OF 11 JANUARY  
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, AMMAN  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER ME POSTS, WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW  
INFO SAVING MADRID, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TEL 24: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON

1. I SAW BOUCETTA THIS MORNING. I SAID YOU WERE PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS WE WERE MAKING AND HOPED WE COULD BRING MATTERS TO A SPEEDY CONCLUSION. HE SAID THAT WE WERE NOW AGREED ON DATES AND ON MILHEM SEMICOLON THAT ALL THE OTHER ARABS AND THE PLO HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THIS SEMICOLON THAT HE WOULD LIKE ME TO COME DOWN TO MARRAKESH TOMORROW (NOT THURSDAY) TO DISCUSS DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WITH HIM AND MDULAY HAFID, AND THAT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER THE MOROCCANS WOULD WISH TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PRESS ABOUT THE VISIT. BOUCETTA REMINDED ME THAT, RIGHT FROM THE START (IE IN TALKING TO LORD CHALFONT) KING HASSAN HAD ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ANNOUNCING OUR AGREEMENT ON THE VISIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. I SAID ALL THIS SEEMED ADMIRABLE. BUT I DID NOT WANT THINGS TO GO WRONG. I WOULD SPEAK VERY FRANKLY. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNISED ALL ALONG THAT IT WAS FOR KING HASSAN TO CARRY THE OTHER ARABS WITH HIM, THE FACT REMAINED THAT WE HAD HAD INDICATIONS FROM CERTAIN QUARTERS THAT THE MILHEM IDEA HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL. BOUCETTA WAS INSISTENT THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY A RESPONSIBILITY FOR KING HASSAN. WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM SPECIFICALLY ABOUT SAUDI REACTIONS AND ABOUT AHMED BENSOUDA'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 9 JANUARY, BOUCETTA ASSURED ME THAT HE HIMSELF HAD SETTLED THE WHOLE MATTER WITH KING FAHD. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME ON 8 JANUARY (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TEL 09): KING FAHD HAD SAID THAT IF WHAT WAS PROPOSED WAS ALL RIGHT WITH KING HASSAN, THEN IT WAS ALL RIGHT WITH HIM. I PRESSED BOUCETTA TO TELL ME MORE OF THE REACTIONS OF THE OTHER ARABS AND THE PLO (HE HAD SEEN ABU MARWAN, THE LOCAL PLO REPRESENTATIVE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER SEEING ME ON 8 JANUARY). BOUCETTA MERELY SAID THEY HAD BEEN TOLD THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE TAKING MILHEM, AND THAT WAS THAT.

3. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO CONSULT YOU BEFORE BOUCETTA MADE HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESS: IT WAS OBVIOUSLY BETTER THAT WE SHOULD BOTH PROCEED IN STEP OVER THIS. HE AGREED NOT TO MAKE THE STATEMENT UNTIL WE WERE READY. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE WOULD

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/SAY



SAY. HE SAID THAT IT COULD BE SOMETHING FAIRLY SHORT, TO THE EFFECT THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE LEADING THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, WITH QUOTE ITS ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP UNQUOTE TO VISIT LONDON ON 7 AND 8 FEBRUARY. I SAID THERE WERE BOUND TO BE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIANS. HE SAID HE WOULD TAKE EXACTLY THE SAME LINE AS HE HAD IN RIYADH I.E. THAT THE PALESTINIANS (QUOTE NOT THE PLO UNQUOTE HE EMPHASISED TO ME) WOULD BE REPRESENTED.

4. BOUCETTA DID NOT REVERT AT ALL TO HIS HOPES THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE QADDUMI - SO I DID NOT USE POINT (B) IN YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. I DID HOWEVER WARN HIM THAT WE HAD NOT YET HAD TIME TO REACH CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MILHEM AND HIS RECEPTION BY THE QUEEN. I SAID WE WERE DOING OUR BEST TO MEET THE KING'S WISHES ON THIS AND WOULD LET THE MOROCCANS HAVE A REPLY AS SOON AS WE COULD. BOUCETTA AGAIN ARGUED HOW ESSENTIAL IT WAS THAT MILHEM SHOULD BE TREATED EXACTLY LIKE ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. I REPEATED THE IMPORTANCE WE HAD TO ATTACH TO NOT (NOT) INVOLVING THE QUEEN IN ANY MATTER WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS CONTROVERSIAL.

5. COMMENT. ALL THIS IS NOW BEGINNING TO MOVE RATHER FAST - POSSIBLY FASTER THAN YOU MIGHT WISH, IN THAT THERE ARE STILL DETAILS TO BE AGREED. HOWEVER, I CAN SEE THAT THE MOROCCANS NEED TO MAKE AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT IN ORDER TO KEEP THE OTHER ARABS IN LINE, AND THIS IS IN OUR INTERESTS TOO. I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT I CAN HOLD THE MOROCCANS IN CHECK FOR VERY LONG OVER MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT - THE MORE SO SINCE OUR AGREEMENT ON THE DATES AND THE MILHEM FORMULA WERE CONVEYED BY BOUCETTA TO THE ARAB AMBASSADORS AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING IN RABAT. THE REUTERS MAN HERE HAS ALREADY HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THIS MEETING.

6. I REALISE YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEND ME MUCH BEFORE I LEAVE FOR MARRAKESH AT 0730 TOMORROW MORNING. BUT ANY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS WOULD HELP:

- (I) AGREEMENT THAT MILHEM WILL BE RECEIVED AT THE PALACE. FAILING THAT, AN INDICATION AS TO WHEN I MIGHT HAVE YOUR REPLY ON THIS POINT.
- (II) ANY VIEWS ABOUT THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VISIT.
- (III) ANY PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS TO HELP ME DRAW UP A PROGRAMME WITH MOULAY HAFID. IN PARTICULAR, WHEN WOULD THE QUEEN RECEIVE THE DELEGATION, AND WHAT HOSPITALITY WOULD SHE BE ABLE TO OFFER KING HASSAN?

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MADRID AND UKDEL NATO.  
CAMBRIDGE

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RID	

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REPEATED AS REQUESTED





*Paul Muntz*

*AK*

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

*10/1*

10 January 1983

B J P Fall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AL

*[Handwritten signature]*

*New Brian,*

SAUDI ARABIA

*will request is required*  
The Chancellor was grateful for the briefing on the postponement of the Arab League Delegation's visit which was enclosed with your letter of 5 January to me, and which was supplemented by Stephen Egerton on 6 January. He also saw John Cole's letter of 4 January to John Holmes.

The Chancellor's talks in Riyadh on 8 January on IMF matters with the Saudi Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor went well. We shall be reporting separately on the substance, and plans to advance the next Interim Committee meeting to February. In this letter I deal only with the subject of yours.

The Saudis received the Chancellor and M. de Larosiere courteously. The two hosts were at the airport to meet us on 7 January, and to say farewell on 9 January, and gave a dinner on 8 January. At no stage during a three hour plenary discussion and subsequent smaller meetings did they refer to the matter of the Arab League Delegation.

The Chancellor did however raise it privately with his Saudi counterpart on 8 December. He explained that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were concerned to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, and were surprised and disappointed by the way in which the present row had blown up, and extended to neighbouring states. They also attached importance to the results of the Fez Summit, and were disappointed that the Delegation's visit in December had not proved possible. Our position on PLO participation had, we thought, been made clear to the Morrocans in October. Our subsequent compromise proposal had certainly not been intended to give offence; and we were now seeking to identify an alternative arrangement, satisfactory to all parties, which would permit the Delegation's visit to go ahead. He hoped that our traditional close relations with Saudi Arabia on commercial and financial issues would not be affected.

/On this



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On this last point the Minister said that he shared the Chancellor's hope. But he had not spoken to the King about the episode, though he had heard him speak of it in Cabinet. The King was strongly committed to the success of the Fez initiative, and was undoubtedly disappointed that the Delegation's visit to London had run into difficulties.

The Chancellor reported this to HM Ambassador, who found it, and the Saudi handling of the Chancellor's visit, not discouraging. He did however caution against drawing too much encouragement from it. The Chancellor was in Riyadh on specifically IMF business and in an IMF capacity; the Finance Minister is apparently one of the most moderate of Saudi Ministers; and any Saudi Minister would be reluctant to give a detailed exposition of the King's views unless specifically instructed to do so. The Chancellor fears that there must in fact be a substantial risk of damage to commercial relations; and that it is likely to grow the longer the present situation lasts.

A copy of this letter goes to John Coles at No 10.

Yours ever,  
John Kerr.

J O KERR



Am, Aug '89 Arab League Delegation

17 JAN 1989



10 JAN 1989





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1105</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2013 A Wayland</i>
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FM RABAT 081645Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 082000Z JAN 83

TELEGRAM NUMBER 09 OF 08 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKHIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING MADRID, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELEGRAMS 13 AND 14: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON  
SUMMARY

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH BOUCETTA THIS MORNING. SOME PROGRESS: KING HASSAN IS READY TO RECEIVE MOHAMED MILHEM AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE DELEGATION AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING THE OTHER ARABS TO ACCEPT THIS. BOUCETTA ARGUED STRONGLY FOR ALLOWING MILHEM TO BE RECEIVED BY THE QUEEN ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE DELEGATION. ON DATES, WE ARE VIRTUALLY AGREED ON 7 AND 8 FEBRUARY. I AM TO SEE BOUCETTA AGAIN ON TUESDAY 11 JANUARY AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR FURTHER VIEWS BEFORE THEN.

DETAIL

2. I FIRST HANDED OVER YOUR MESSAGE. BOUCETTA READ IT AND ASKED ME TO THANK YOU WARMLY FOR IT. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD NEWS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT, AS WE KNEW, KING HASSAN DID NOT WANT TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR US. UNLESS WE HAD A BETTER OFFER, THE KING WOULD AGREE TO TAKE MILHEM WITH HIM AS THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE. I ASKED IF THE OTHER ARABS AND THE PLO HAD AGREED TO THIS. (THE LOCAL MEDIA HAVE PUBLISHED AN AFP REPORT THAT QUOTE ARAB SOURCES IN LONDON UNQUOTE HAD REJECTED THE IDEA). BOUCETTA WAS EVASIVE. HE SAID SOME HAD AGREED TO THE MILHEM IDEA: OTHERS HAD NOT YET REPLIED. HE HAD HIMSELF SEEN KING HUSSEIN IN VIENNA, WHO HAD BEEN HAPPY TO GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER KING HASSAN DECIDED. KING FAHD HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE.

3. I SAID THAT WE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE OTHER ARABS, AND THE PLO AS WELL, THAT WE WOULD DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH KING HASSAN OVER ALL MATTERS REGARDING THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON. THIS HAD NOT OF COURSE MEANT A TOTAL SUSPENSION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH THE OTHER ARABS (BOUCETTA ENTIRELY ACCEPTED THIS) BUT WE LOOKED TO THE MOROCCANS TO ENSURE THAT THE OTHERS CONCERNED IN THE VISIT WERE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WE AND THE MOROCCANS WERE MAKING AND AGREED TO THEN. BOUCETTA ASSURED ME THAT KING HASSAN FULLY RECOGNISED THAT THIS WAS THE MOROCCANS' RESPONSIBILITY.

4. AT THIS POINT, BOUCETTA SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO YOU AND MRS THATCHER TO BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE QADDUMI. WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS, THE PLO WOULD SET UP A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE WIDELY RECOGNISED. HE HINTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE LONG BEFORE THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE PLO. IF WE WERE TO MAKE A MOVE OURSELVES IN THIS DIRECTION NOW WE WOULD REAP INCALCULABLE BENEFITS WITH THE ARABS. AS THINGS WERE, WE RISKED BEING LEFT  
BEHIND.

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5. I SAID THAT I WOULD OF COURSE CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO YOU. BUT I DOUBTED VERY MUCH WHETHER WE WOULD MAKE ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION UNTIL THERE WERE GOOD REASON TO. OUR POLICY REGARDING MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO HAD BEEN CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT AND WAS WELL KNOWN TO THE ARABS. I REMINDED BOUCETTA THAT IT WAS KING HASSAN HIMSELF WHO HAD SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY FORWARD MIGHT BE FOR QADDUMI TO BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION BUT RECEIVED ONLY BY A MINISTER NOT IN THE CABINET. AS I HAD TOLD HIM ON 26 DECEMBER, WE WERE READY TO GO ALONG WITH THIS PROPOSAL. BOUCETTA SAID THAT IT WAS NOT A STARTER NOW; IF QADDUMI CAME, HE WOULD HAVE TO COME AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION.

6. I THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE RECEPTION OF THE DELEGATION BY THE QUEEN. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO AVOID POSSIBLE FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THE QUEEN HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE THE WHOLE DELEGATION BEFORE, WHEN IT HAD CONSISTED OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, BUT THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN TREATING MILHEM IN THE SAME WAY. IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG TO INVOLVE THE QUEEN IN MATTERS OF POLITICAL CONTROVERSY. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL POINT FOR US, AND WAS ONE WHICH I BELIEVED KING HASSAN HIMSELF WELL UNDERSTOOD. BOUCETTA LOOKED UNHAPPY. HE SAID THIS WOULD GIVE A LOT OF DIFFICULTY TO THE KING. HE ARGUED THAT MILHEM WAS AN ELECTED MAYOR SEMICOLON NOT A MEMBER OF THE PLO SEMICOLON WOULD BE PRESENT AS PART OF THE DELEGATION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE WITH WHOM OF COURSE WE HAD NORMAL DEALINGS SEMICOLON AND HAD EVEN BEEN RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE URGED US TO RECONSIDER, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT MENTION THIS DIFFICULTY TO THE KING OR INDEED ANYONE ELSE UNTIL HE HAD HEARD FROM ME AGAIN.

7. WE MOVED ONTO DATES. I PRESSED BOUCETTA TO RECONSIDER JANUARY 31/FEBRUARY 1. HE CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THESE WERE NO GOOD BECAUSE MITTERRAND WOULD BE STAYING IN MOROCCO UNTIL THE EVENING OF 30 JANUARY. I TOLD HIM THAT 7 AND 8 FEBRUARY WERE A POSSIBILITY FOR US. HE SAID THAT THE MOROCCANS COULD ACCEPT THESE DATES STRAIGHT AWAY, AND HE WAS PRETTY CERTAIN THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WOULD ALSO AGREE. HE WILL CHECK WITH THEM.

8. I TOLD BOUCETTA OF MOULAY HAFID'S TELEPHONE ENQUIRY (MY TELEGRAM 1, NOT TO ALL) AND SAID I OUGHT NOW TO BE IN CONTACT WITH HIM. I ADDED THAT WE HAD NOT FORGOTTEN KING HASSAN'S SUGGESTION THAT A HIGH LEVEL COURT OFFICIAL SHOULD AT SOME STAGE COME OUT TO DISCUSS DETAILS. BOUCETTA SUGGESTED THAT, FOR THE NEXT STEP, HE AND I SHOULD MEET AGAIN ON TUESDAY 11 JANUARY AT MIDDAY SO THAT I COULD GIVE HIM YOUR VIEWS ABOUT (A) ACCEPTING QADDUMI, (B) HAVING MILHEM RECEIVED BY THE QUEEN. HE WILL THEN REPORT TO THE KING IN MARRAKECH. THEREAFTER, PERHAPS ON THURSDAY 13 JANUARY, I COULD GO DOWN TO MARRAKECH AND DISCUSS DETAILS WITH HIM AND MOULAY HAFID QUOTE WITH THE KING IN THE NEXT ROOM UNQUOTE. I WELCOMED THIS.

CONFIDENTIAL -2-

19.



9. I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN TOO MANY MISLEADING REPORTS IN THE PAPERS RECENTLY ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT. BOUCETTA AT ONCE OFFERED AN EXPLANATION OF HIS QUOTE AL RIYADH UNQUOTE INTERVIEW (JEDDA TELEGRAM NUMBER 10, NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MISREPORTED. HE HAD NOT SPOKEN OF THE PLO, BUT MERELY OF OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE THE WHOLE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION INCLUDING A PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE.

10. IN TALKING EARLIER ABOUT HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, BOUCETTA SAID THAT KING FAHD HAD MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF TELLING HIM THAT YOUR VISIT HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN CANCELLED, ONLY POSTPONED. WE HAVE OF COURSE HAD THIS MESSAGE OURSELVES FROM THE SAUDIS, BUT BOUCETTA ESPECIALLY ASKED ME TO CONVEY IT TO YOU.

## COMMENT

11. BOUCETTA HAS NOW FIRMLY COMMITTED KING HASSAN TO SELLING THE MILHEM FORMULA TO THE OTHER ARABS. IT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND WE ARE STILL NOT OUT OF THE WOOD - FOR IF KING HASSAN FAILS, HE WILL OF COURSE WANT THE BLAME TO REST WITH US. IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS THEREFORE TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR HIM. I FULLY REALISE WE CANNOT MEET THE MOROCCANS ON THE QADDUMI POINT, AND I DO NOT THINK BOUCETTA SERIOUSLY EXPECTS US TO. I THINK HE ONLY ASKED US SO AS TO BE ABLE TO ARGUE WITH THE OTHER ARABS WHEN TELLING THEM OF KING HASSAN'S DECISION TO TAKE MILHEM, THAT THE MOROCCANS HAD DONE THEIR UTMOST TO GET THE BRITISH TO BUDGE.

12. I APPRECIATE THE AWKWARDNESS OF INCLUDING MILHEM IN THE RECEPTION AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE AND I LEFT BOUCETTA IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR VIEWS ON THIS. ALL THE SAME, IF WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE TO THIS REQUEST, IT WOULD I THINK REMOVE MUCH OF THE ACRIMONY WHICH HAS BUILT UP OUTSIDE MOROCCO OVER THIS VISIT. IT WOULD ALSO HELP HASSAN EXPLAIN TO THE PLO WHY HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO TAKE QADDUMI.

13. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS FIRST THING TUESDAY MORNING COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (A) REAFFIRMATION THAT WE CANNOT GO FURTHER THAN WE HAVE ON THE QUESTION OF PLO REPRESENTATION
- (B) ANY FLEXIBILITY I CAN HAVE REGARDING MILHEM AND THE PALACE.

14. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MADRID AND UKDEL NATO.

CAMBRIDGE

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

## STANDARD

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B/C: Sir A. PARSONS ✓

## 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 January 1983

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation

There was some discussion of this question when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this morning.

Mr. Pym said that he was convinced that the proposals which we had put to the Moroccans for solving the problem of the composition of the Arab League Delegation would not find acceptance with the Arabs. But it was important to achieve an agreement on this matter before a meeting of Arab League Foreign Ministers which had been arranged for 21 January. Otherwise, the difficulties would worsen and considerable damage could be caused to our interests. He believed it would probably be necessary for him to agree to see the whole Delegation, including a PLO representative. This need not necessarily be regarded as inconsistent with our established policy that we would receive PLO representatives provided this helped the peace-making process.

The Prime Minister said that she saw considerable difficulty in this suggestion. The Government could be accused of appeasement. She doubted whether it could be argued that reception of the Delegation would help the peace-making process. This was now more a matter of public relations and damage limitation. The Government could not give the impression that it was bowing to Arab pressure. A formula which did not involve a Cabinet Minister receiving the Delegation would probably be necessary. It was also most important that on this occasion, whatever formula was adopted, we should have a detailed and carefully devised plan as to whom should be approached in the Arab world and at what time. We should certainly avoid any further public statements about a solution for the time being.

It was agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would continue to explore the possibilities for a solution, without of course going beyond the positions of principle outlined by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Pym said that he believed it would be useful if HM Ambassador in Tunis could have a further discussion with Yasser Arafat to establish more clearly the latter's thinking on this problem. Arafat would have considerable influence on the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers. The Prime Minister said that she had no objection to such a meeting, which did not conflict with the Government's policy that PLO representatives should not be received by Ministers.

RM



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Mr. Pym informed the Prime Minister that he might decide to ask HM Ambassador in Saudi Arabia to return to London shortly for discussions. The Prime Minister said that she would be very glad to see Sir James Craig herself if this would be helpful.

*Yours ever  
John Holmes.*

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

15 X 10

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
ED/NENAD  
ED/MED  
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10

D/...  
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ADVANCE COPIES

IMMEDIATE

*We must take this  
advance into account  
mf*

*mf*

GRS 1060  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM JEDDA 060015Z JAN 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 14 OF 06 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT, PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST  
POSTS AND ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKNIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 3: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. I AM NOT ATTRACTED BY THE OPTION OF "PLAYING THINGS LONG"  
SEMICLN I DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY CHANCE THAT THE IDEA OF THE  
VISIT WILL FADE AWAY WITHOUT OUR BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE SEMICLN AND  
I FEAR THAT THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO OUR INTERESTS IF WE  
ARE HELD SO RESPONSIBLE.

2. I CANNOT PRECISELY ASSESS THE RISKS OF DELAY, SINCE I HAVE NOT  
YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND OUT ENOUGH ABOUT KING FAHD'S STATE OF MIND ON  
THE LEAGUE DELEGATION ISSUE. I BELIEVE HE WAS ANGRY AND UPSET  
AT THE SUGGESTION WE MADE TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, INVOLVING THE  
REJECTION OF TERRORISM. HE PROBABLY FELT THAT, AFTER HE HAD INVES-  
TED SO MUCH EFFORT AND POLITICAL CAPITAL IN GETTING THE ARAB WORLD  
UNITED AROUND A MODERATE PLAN FOR PEACE AT THE EE7 SUMMIT, IT WAS A



~~THE SO MUCH EFFORT AND POLITICAL CAPITAL IN GETTING THE ARAB WORLD~~  
UNITED AROUND A MODERATE PLAN FOR PEACE AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, IT WAS A  
PERSONAL SLAP IN THE FACE FOR THE BRITISH TO TRIP UP THE IMPLEMENT-  
ATION OF THIS PLAN BY MAKING DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE DELEGATION.  
(THE ARABS WERE, OF COURSE, FAR FROM BLAMELESS IN THEIR HANDLING OF  
THE QUESTION; BUT I AM SURE THAT FAHD'S PERCEPTION IS THAT WE WERE  
MORE TO BLAME THAN THEY.) THE REFERENCE TO 'TERRORISM' WITH ITS  
EMOTIVE CONNOTATIONS, MUST HAVE SEEMED TO HIM PARTICULARLY INSEN-  
SITIVE, AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS THE ISRAELIS WHO HAD BEEN WREAKING  
VIOLENCE ON THE PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE, AND WHEN, DESPITE THIS,  
THE PLO WERE WILLING, PARTLY THROUGH SAUDI PERSUASION, TO CONTINUE  
ON THE PEACEFUL PATH TO A SOLUTION. I AM NOT YET CONVINCED THAT THE  
KING WAS SO ANGRY THAT HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN PERSUADING THE UAE  
AND QATAR TO POSTPONE YOUR VISITS THERE. ON THE EVIDENCE SO FAR  
AVAILABLE TO ME, AND PACE HM AMBASSADOR IN ABU DHABI, IT SEEMS RATHER

-----  
MORE LIKELY THAT QATAR AND ABU DHABI, IN THE COURSE OF TAKING SOUND-  
INGS ON THE SAUDIS ABOUT THE VISIT, HEARD THAT THE KING WAS PERSON-  
ALLY ANGRY WITH THE BRITISH, AND DECIDED TO TAKE THE CRAVEN COURSE.

3. IF I AM RIGHT ABOUT WHAT FAHD IS THINKING OVER ALL THIS, I  
WOULD NOT EXPECT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT ITSELF TO TAKE ANY FURTHER  
ACTION TO DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS (THOUGH SOMETIMES, UNFORTUNATELY,  
EVENTS PROVIDE THEIR OWN MOMENTUM): IT IS NOT THEREFORE A QUESTION  
OF TRYING TO JUDGE THE 'SEVERITY, DETERMINATION AND TIMESCALE WITH  
WHICH (THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT) MIGHT MAKE THEIR DISFAVOUR FELT' IN  
THE WORDS OF YOUR TUR. BUT IF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION QUESTION  
IS NOT RESOLVED - AND REASONABLY SOON - I WOULD EXPECT COOLNESS,  
EVEN SOURNESS, IN OUR RELATIONSHIP TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME. EVEN  
IN THE LONGER TERM, THE SNUB, AS THE SAUDIS SEE IT, TO THE ARABS  
OVER THE DELEGATION WILL BE REMEMBERED AND QUOTED AGAINST US AS ONE  
OF A LONG LINE OF BRITISH SINS AGAINST THE ARAB PEOPLE GOING BACK TO  
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION OF 1917, ETC ETC.

4. IN THIS CLIMATE, WE CAN EXPECT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO OUR COMM-  
ERCIAL INTERESTS HERE, NOT BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT WILL ISSUE ~~ADUCTION~~  
~~COO~~ INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE ARE TO BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST, BUT BECAUSE  
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKERS, IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS,  
GIVEN THE CHOICE BETWEEN DOING BUSINESS WITH THE BRITISH OR WITH OUR  
COMPETITORS, WILL CHOOSE THE LATTER COURSE, EITHER BECAUSE THEY  
PERSONALLY FEEL CROSS WITH US FOR TREATING THE ARABS BADLY, OR  
BECAUSE THEY THINK IT PRUDENT TO AVOID THE RISK OF OFFICIAL INTER-  
FERENCE IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR BUSINESS LATER. THIS WAS THE  
PATTERN FOLLOWED DURING AND AFTER THE 'DEATH OF A PRINCESS' SAGA.

4. HOW MUCH HARM VO



HOW MUCH HARM WOULD IT

~~TO BE THE~~ CAUSE? AGAIN, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE EXACT. WE CANNOT EVEN NOW ASSESS RELIABLY THE AMOUNT OF BUSINESS WE LOST OVER 'DEATH OF A PRINCESS'. I MENTIONED SPECIFIC RISKS IN MY TELNO 629. BUT THE REAL ECONOMIC BENEFIT TO THE UK OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA LIES IN LARGE NUMBERS OF SMALL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS FOR THE EXPORT OF GOODS AND SERVICES, AND IN THE MONEY TRANSMITTED ACROSS THE EXCHANGES BY THE 35,000 BRITONS WHO LIVE AND WORK HERE. THESE CONTRACTS, AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS, ARE CONSTANTLY COMING TO AN END AND BEING RENEWED OR REPLACED BY OTHERS. IF OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA REMAINED COOL, WE MIGHT LOSE HALF OF THE BUSINESS WE WOULD EXPECT TO DO OVER THE PERIOD CONCERNED. ON THE BASIS OF FIGURES FOR THE FIRST 10 MONTHS OF 1982, OUR EXPORTS TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1983 WILL EXCEED £1,300 MILLION (SAUDI ARABIA IS OUR 9TH LARGEST EXPORT MARKET). WE MIGHT LOSE £650 MILLION OF THIS (WORTH, ON RECENT DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATES, MORE THAN 33,000 JOBS IN THE UK). OF THE APPROXIMATELY 35,000 BRITISH SUBJECTS LIVING IN SAUDI ARABIA, PROBABLY 16,000 ARE BREADWINNERS. THEIR AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY HERE IS TWO YEARS. IF, THEREFORE, OVER A ONE YEAR PERIOD HALF OF THOSE WHOSE CONTRACTS WERE DUE FOR RENEWAL WERE REPLACED BY FOREIGNERS, WE WOULD NOT ONLY LOSE THE MONEY REMITTED BY 4,000 PEOPLE TO THE UK (AND MOST OF THEM ARE EARNING AROUND FOUR TIMES WHAT THEY WOULD EARN IN THE UK) BUT THEY THEMSELVES COULD JOIN THE COMPETITION FOR JOBS AT HOME.

5. I AM TRYING NOT TO EXAGGERATE THE HARM THAT COULD BE DONE TO OUR INTERESTS. BUT THE LESSON OF THE 'DEATH OF A PRINCESS' EPISODE IS THAT IN A COUNTRY LIKE THIS DAMAGE TO OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN A CASE OF THIS KIND IS INSIDIOUS, CUMULATIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL. IF THE SAUDIS COULD BE PERSUADED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF THE SORT I PUT TO HANSOURI ON 5 JANUARY (MY TELNO 011 REFERS) THAT WOULD DO A GREAT DEAL TO STOP THE ROT. BUT I AM AFRAID THERE IS NOT MUCH LIKELIHOOD OF THAT. THE SAUDIS WILL HAVE FOUND IT GRATIFYING TO BE COMMENDED IN THE NEWSPAPERS OF SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES FOR TAKING A FIRM LINE AND TEACHING THE BRITISH A LESSON, AND THEY WILL FIND IT HARD TO MOVE IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WITHOUT SOME MOVEMENT BY US ON THE MAIN ISSUE.

6. I HAVE ALSO, OF COURSE, CONSIDERED WHETHER WE OUGHT TO TAKE SOME RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST THE SAUDIS, TO INDICATE TO THEM THAT WE ARE NO MORE DISPOSED THAN THEY TO CHANGE OUR VIEWS OR POLICIES AS A RESULT OF UNFRIENDLY GESTURES, OR AT LEAST TO SHOW THEM THAT A PERIOD OF COOLNESS IN OUR RELATIONS MIGHT INVOLVE PENALTIES FOR THEM TOO. THE TROUBLE IS THAT ALL THE ACTIONS OPEN TO US OF THIS KIND



PERIOD OF COOLNESS IN OUR RELATIONS MIGHT INVOLVE PENALTIES FOR THEM  
TOO. THE TROUBLE IS THAT ALL THE ACTIONS OPEN TO US OF THIS KIND  
WOULD VERY SOON HURT US MORE THAN THE SAUDIS. AND WE WOULD RISK  
STARTING A MORE GENERAL ARAB HUE AND CRY AGAINST US.

---

CCNS:- 2ND PARA 4 TO READ 5 THEN PARAS 6 AND 7  
BRARA45LLNNE11....EBOBEDEBE CAUSED? ... ETC

CRAIC

NNNN



file

da

pm

4 January 1983

Arab League Visit

As you know, the Prime Minister wrote to Lord Chalfont on 22 December thanking him for the efforts which he had recently made on the Government's behalf with King Hassan of Morocco. I enclose a copy of Lord Chalfont's reply.

John Coles

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

da



MIDDLE ST: ADVANCE COPIES

15

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
~~MR EGERTON~~  
~~SIR J BULLARD~~  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND

IMMEDIATE

*Mr Goodwin*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/... ..

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PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK



*Prime Minister:*

*The Secretary  
General of the  
Arab League will  
not be coming  
after all*

*TF  
20/12*

GRS 300  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 301145Z  
FM TUNIS 301012Z DECEMBER 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 288 OF 30 DECEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY RABAT  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TEL NO 117 AND MY TEL NO 284 (NOT REPEATED): VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL.

SUMMARY.

1. KLIBI HAS DECIDED THAT IT WOULD AFTER ALL BE PREMATURE TO VISIT LONDON AT THIS STAGE.

DETAIL.

2. I PURSUED THIS ON 29 DECEMBER. KLIBI COULD NOT GIVE AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER (HE WAS ENGAGED WITH A VISITING DELEGATION) BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HE WAS GETTING COLD FEET.



3. OMRAN TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT AFTER THINKING IT OVER, KLIBI AND HE HAD DECIDED THAT THE VISIT WOULD BE TOO RISKY. KLIBI WAS WARMLY GRATEFUL FOR THE PROMPT WELCOME FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF AND HIS OBJECT IN SUGGESTING A CONFIDENTIAL VISIT HAD BEEN TO ASSIST IN RESOLVING PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER, IT WAS FELT THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTRACTING MISLEADING PUBLICITY AND OF APPEARING TO CROSS WIRES WITH KING HASSAN OUTWEIGHTED THE ADVANTAGES. KLIBI, OF COURSE, STOOD READY TO GIVE WHATEVER HELP HE COULD AND HE WOULD LIKE TO COME TO LONDON WHEN BOTH SIDES CONSIDERED IT OPPORTUNE.

4. IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT, THOUGH THEIR INTENTIONS WERE GOOD, NEITHER KLIBI NOR OMRAN HAD THOUGHT THINGS THROUGH WHEN SUGGESTING THE VISIT. THEY HAD APPARENTLY ENVISAGED A SECRET MEETING AT WHICH THE PROBLEM OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON COULD BE LARGELY RESOLVED. THEY HAVE NOW TAKEN IT IN THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT SECRECY AND THEY ARE ALSO UNCOMFORTABLY AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ANNOYING KING HASSAN. THEY THEREFORE THINK IT WISER TO STAY ON THE SIDELINES FOR THE MOMENT. HOWEVER, THEY HOPE THAT THERE CAN BE AN EARLY DECISION ON THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT, SINCE THEY FEAR THAT THE SITUATION MAY DETERIORATE IF DISCUSSIONS ARE PROLONGED.

STIRLING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 30/1104Z SP/RW



NOTE FOR THE RECORD



10 DOWNING STREET

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION.

TF heard that Mr  
Kubi (Arab League Sec. Gen)  
would no longer be  
visiting the PM on  
6.1.83.

Duty Clerk

36.12.82



From The Rt Hon the Lord Chalfont OBE MC

*Prime Minister 2*



*WR  
3.12*

The Rt Hon Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

29 December 1982

*R31*

*mb*

*Dear Prime Minister*

Thank you for your letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> December. I am fully in support of your policy in this matter, and was happy to be able to make some small contribution to clearing up the misunderstanding which obviously existed in the mind of King Hassan.

I very much hope that everything will now go smoothly. It was very thoughtful of you to take the trouble to write.

With best wishes for 1983.

*Yours sincerely,*

*John Chalfont*



Arabs League Delegation : P.M. Aug 20





MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16 21.



PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
~~MR E. G. BROWN~~  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND

*Mr. Goodwin*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
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RESIDENT CLERK

GPS 1000

CONFIDENTIAL

FM RABAT 261500Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 517 OF 26 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON

INFO PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING MADRID, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELEGRAM 939: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON

SUMMARY

1. I SAW BOUCETTA THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. IN PARTICULAR I MADE CLEAR HOW FAR WE COULD GO OVER THE MATTER OF PLO REPRESENTATION. BOUCETTA TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF OUR UNDERTAKING THAT IF THE ARABS COULD AGREE TO THE QUOTE PROMINENT PALESTINIAN UNQUOTE FORMULA (OPTION ONE, PARAGRAPH FOUR OF YOUR TUR) THEN THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD RECEIVE THE WHOLE DELEGATION. THIS NOW SEEMS THE OPTION MOST LIKELY TO RUN, AND THE MOROCCANS ACCEPT THAT IT IS FOR THEM TO SELL THIS FORMULA TO THE OTHER ARABS. SO ON THIS ASPECT THE BALL IS SQUARELY IN THEIR COURT. BUT THERE ARE STILL DIFFICULTIES OVER THE DATE OF THE VISIT AND THE EXTENT OF THE QUEEN'S INVOLVEMENT. I SHALL NEED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS (SEE PARAGRAPH 9).

DETAIL

2. I SPENT THREE QUARTERS OF AN HOUR WITH BOUCETTA. IT WAS A FRIENDLY, FRANK SPEAKING, BUSINESS LIKE MEETING. I FELT I HAD GOT OFF TO A GOOD START WITH HIM IN SPITE OF THE AWKWARDNESS OF THE SUBJECT.

3. WE BEGAN WITH THE PLO ASPECT. I ARGUED HARD FOR THE WASHINGTON FORMULA (PARAGRAPH THREE OF YOUR TUR). BOUCETTA SAID



WASHINGTON FORMULA (PARAGRAPH THREE OF YOUR TUR). BOUCETTA SAID STRAIGHT AWAY THAT IT WAS NOT WORTH PURSUING WITH THE KING. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A POSSIBILITY EARLIER ON: IF WE HAD SAID QUOTE NO UNQUOTE TO PLO REPRESENTATION AT THE OUTSET, KING HASSAN COULD PERHAPS HAVE PERSUADED THE OTHER ARABS TO ACQUIESCE. BUT IT WAS TOO LATE NOW. AFTER THE TROUBLE OVER YOUR MESSAGE, THE ARAB SIDE, PARTICULARLY THE SAUDIS, WERE DETERMINED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME SORT OF PLO REPRESENTATION ON THE DELEGATION.

4. BOUCETTA WAS SO FIRM ON THIS POINT THAT I JUDGED IT RIGHT TO USE THE DISCRETION YOU GAVE ME, AND MOVED ON TO DISCUSS THE OTHER OPTIONS. BOUCETTA TOLD ME THAT AFTER LORD CHALFONT'S VISIT THE KING HAD ASKED HIM TO EXPLORE THE QUOTE PROMINENT PALESTINIAN UNQUOTE IDEA WITH THE PLO. HE EXPECTED A REPLY FROM THEM VERY SOON. HE ASKED IF WE WOULD INSIST ON MOHAMED MILHEM, ADDING THAT THERE WERE THREE OR FOUR OTHERS WHO MIGHT DO AS WELL. I SAID THAT SO LONG AS THE MAN WAS NOT A PLO OFFICIAL, HE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. BOUCETTA DID NOT THINK MUCH OF THE IDEA OF A SEPARATE GROUP OF WEST BANK MAYORS: AND RULED OUT ENTIRELY THE SUGGESTION THAT KING HASSAN MIGHT GO ALONE OR ACCOMPANIED SOLELY BY THE LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL. I GOT THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT OPTION TWO MIGHT JUST STILL BE A STARTER (IE A PLO REPRESENTATIVE TO COME, BUT ONLY TO SEE MR HURD). BOUCETTA ASKED WHETHER THE PLO MAN MIGHT BE RECEIVED BY YOURSELF. I SAID NO.

6. WE THEN TALKED ABOUT DATES. BOUCETTA SAID THERE WAS A NEW DIFFICULTY. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND NOW WANTED TO STAY ON PRIVATELY FOR THREE DAYS IN MOROCCO AFTER HIS OFFICIAL VISIT AT THE END OF JANUARY. THIS WOULD MEAN HE WOULD BE HERE UNTIL 1 FEBRUARY, AND KING HASSAN FELT THAT IT WOULD BE DISCOURTEOUS TO LEAVE MOROCCO BEFORE THEN. COULD WE MANAGE DATES LATER IN FEBRUARY, 7/8 OR 3/5 AT A PINCH? I SAID I DOUBTED IT GIVEN THE QUEEN'S IMPENDING TRAVELS, BUT I WOULD INQUIRE. BOUCETTA SAID THAT ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE 14/16 JANUARY. (THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE MEETS HERE ON 21 JANUARY AND THE KING WANTS THE ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN TO MAKE A PROGRESS REPORT TO IT).

7. WE DISCUSSED THE QUEEN'S INVOLVEMENT. BOUCETTA SAID THAT KING HASSAN STILL EXPECTS TO PRESENT THE MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION TO THE QUEEN.

*Passage deleted and closed,  
40 years, under FOI Exemption.*

*Wayland. 29 May 2013*

HE WOULD LOSE FACE IF HE WERE NOW TO TELL THEM THAT AFTER ALL THEY WOULD NOT BE MEETING HER MAJESTY. IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER TO RESCHEDULE THE VISIT FOR WHEN THE QUEEN GOT BACK TO THE UK IN MID-MARCH. I SAID THIS SEEMED A PITY, BUT I SAW NO ALTERNATIVE IF KING HASSAN ATTACHED SUCH IMPORTANCE TO HAVING THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION CALL ON HER MAJESTY.

COMMENT

8. DISPROPORTIONATE AS IT MAY SEEM TO US, I THINK THIS LAST POINT REALLY IS A SINE QUA NON FOR THE KING. I HAVE



ALREADY REPORTED HOW HE MADE PARTICULAR MENTION, WHEN I PRESENTED CREDENTIALS , OF THE QUEEN'S QUOTE GESTURE UNQUOTE IN AGREEING TO RECEIVE THE ARAB MINISTERS, AND THIS HAS SINCE HAD MUCH PUBLICITY HERE. SO, IF THE VISIT IS TO TAKE PLACE (AND IT MUST, I THINK) WE SHALL NEED TO MEET HASSAN ON THIS POINT. THE MITTERRAND COMPLICATION IS TIRESOME, BUT GIVEN ARAB NOTIONS OF HOSPITALITY I THINK IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE THE KING TO ACCEPT OUR PRESENT DATES. SO IT LOOKS AS IF A DEFERRMENT TO MARCH MAY BE THE ONLY WAY OUT. AS LIVEN FROM HERE, PROVIDED WE AGREE A NEW DATE QUICKLY, NO HARM WILL BE DONE EVEN IF IT IS SOME MONTHS AHEAD - AND WE MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO MAKE MORE OF THE VISIT OURSELVES IF IT COMES LATER RATHER THAN EARLIER.

9. BOUCETTA WILL NOW REPORT OUR CONVERSATION TO THE KING AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN WHEN HE HAS THE KING'S VIEWS AND ALSO THE REPLY FROM THE PLO ABOUT REPRESENTATION. HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT THE KING MAY WISH TO SEE ME HIMSELF . AS A SUMMONS COULD ARRIVE AT ANY TIME, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

- A) WHETHER THE NEW DATES MENTIONED BY BOUCETTA ARE ANY GOOD TO US.
- B) WHETHER THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF HER MAJESTY RECEIVING THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION AT SANDRINGHAM.
- C) IF NOT, WHETHER WE CAN MAKE A FIRM OFFER OF DATES IN MARCH.

10. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

CAMBRIDGE

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 27/1203Z SDC/ET





cc FCO

Morocco B

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 December 1982

Dear Lord Chalfont.

I understand from Francis Pym that your recent mission to Morocco was a great success. I should like you to know how grateful we were that you agreed to give up your valuable time to undertake this delicate and important task. We were extremely fortunate in having available at the right time someone with such good contacts in Morocco and with such ready access to the King.

Your visit has helped improve the atmosphere of Anglo/Moroccan relations and to prepare the way for the possible reinstatement of the Arab League visit. You know the problems we face on the PLO issue and we have no illusions as to the difficulties the matter poses for the Arab side, but we will shortly be putting to King Hassan compromise proposals on which we hope he will be able to secure the agreement of his colleagues, and which will allow the visit to go ahead. We have stressed throughout that we attach great importance to our relations with Morocco. I hope very much that we can agree on a suitable programme.

Thank you again for your valuable contribution to this important exercise.

Every good wish

Yours sincerely

Raymond Richards HC

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Chalfont, OBE, MC.



CONFIDENTIAL



ZBFIS

JD

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 December 1982

VISIT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL

B/P Mh

Thank you for your letter of 21 December. The Prime Minister would be prepared to see Mr. Klibi from 1700 to 1800 hours on 6 January. But I have since seen Tunis telegram No. 279 which suggests that he would only wish to do this on the understanding that the meeting was held privately, preferably at a weekend and not on official premises. These considerations could well cause considerable difficulty. Before I put the matter to the Prime Minister again, I should be grateful to know whether you wish to offer any further advice.

B/F1

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





2 Rofy H

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 December 1982

Visit to London by an Arab League Delegation

Thank you for your letter of 20 December.

The Prime Minister has signed a letter to Lord Chalfont thanking him for his efforts in Morocco. A copy of this will reach you separately.

As regards the programme for the visit by the Arab League delegation, the Prime Minister could offer, on either 31 January or 1 February:

- (a) A Guard of Honour
- (b) A tête-à-tête between herself and King Hassan (one hour)
- (c) A plenary meeting with the delegation (say 90 minutes)
- (d) A dinner for the delegation.

But if (see below) a PLO representative came with the delegation, it would be understood that he did not participate in any of the above events.

As regards the composition of the delegation, the Prime Minister would prefer that we should seek to persuade King Hassan that the same delegation which went to Washington should come here. Should this not be acceptable, we could propose that the delegation should include a prominent Palestinian who is not a PLO official (option one of your draft telegram) or, alternatively, one or more West Bank Mayors.

If these proposals are not acceptable to King Hassan, the Prime Minister would be prepared for a PLO representative to come with the delegation but call on Mr. Hurd only. Mrs. Thatcher is less attracted by the idea of a PLO representative coming in advance of the main delegation, since this would be more conspicuous.

/ The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL



The Prime Minister has also suggested that the visit of the delegation could be made more worthwhile if arrangements were made for a group of Parliamentarians to have a discussion with them (or call on King Hassan).

Your draft telegram would need some re-drafting to take account of the Prime Minister's views as set out above.

JC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Discussed with P.R.  
Now see letter to F/C.O.  
A.J.C. 22/12

CONFIDENTIAL

Who is our  
Ambassador in Rabat - who  
what was his relation with  
with the King? I don't  
think there  
was any  
①

PRIME MINISTER

Visit to London by the Arab League Delegation

Mr. Pym's advice on the next steps is attached.

no p 20/12  
look  
manifested  
not

He wishes to instruct our Ambassador in Rabat to discuss with the Moroccans the composition of the delegation. Our Ambassador would offer three options:-

- a) The delegation would include a prominent Palestinian, but not a member of the PLO - in which case you would receive the whole delegation.
- b) A PLO representative would come but would only call on Mr. Hurd - or, if they preferred, a PLO representative would come with a representative of the Arab League before the main delegation and be received by Mr. Hurd.
- c) King Hassan might come alone or accompanied only by the Arab League Secretary General.

If we do not offer Option 2, the Arabs may regard this as a retreat from our earlier position - when Mr. Hurd saw Qaddumi.

These three options are set out in the attached telegram of instruction. Are you content that it should be sent?

The second question for decision is the actual programme for the delegation, to which the Moroccans took some exception last time round. May we offer on either Monday 31 January or Tuesday 1 February:

CONFIDENTIAL

/a)



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- a) A guard of honour,
- b) A tête-à-tête between you and King Hassan (one hour),
- c) A plenary meeting with the delegation,
- d) A dinner for the whole delegation,

I am afraid that this will take up a lot of your time, But it matches the treatment they have received elsewhere and we may get into difficulties with the Moroccans again if we do not do as much. Agree to this programme?

A. J. C.

21 December 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

As you know, you will have other things on your mind on 6 January. London SW1A 2AH

2. Are you nevertheless prepared to see Klibi from 1700 to 1800?

21 December, 1982

A.J.C. <sup>21.</sup>/<sub>12.</sub>

Dear John,

Visit by Arab League Secretary General

Mr Pym has mentioned to the Prime Minister that Mr Chadli Klibi, Secretary General of the Arab League, is interested in paying a private visit to London to talk over current problems. The Arab League Office in London has confirmed Klibi's wish to do this in early January. I understand it might be possible for Mrs Thatcher to allocate up to an hour on 6 January for talks with him.

/ I enclose a draft telegram of instructions to HM Ambassador, Tunis, to suggest this date to Klibi. The telegram touches on other details, including advance publicity, which both sides will wish to be kept to a minimum.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby PRIORITY
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ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
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FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1	ZCZC
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3	CONFIDENTIAL
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6	FM FCO            DECEMBER 1982
7	TO PRIORITY TUNIS
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
10	OUR TELNO L07 (NOT TO ALL): VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
11	GENERAL
12	1. The Arab League Office in London have confirmed to us
13	that Klibi would like to make a private visit to London within
14	the two weeks following Christmas. Please now tell him that
15	the Prime Minister would be delighted to see him on
16	6 January (we anticipate a meeting lasting one hour).
17	2. As Klibi had indicated from the beginning that the visit
18	should be low-key, the programme might be in essence a talk
19	with the Prime Minister in the morning followed by a working
20	lunch with me (no more than three or four on each side). We
21	hope this will fit with Klibi's preferences.
22	3. Klibi will of course understand that the Moroccans must
23	remain our primary channel for exchanges on reinstating the
24	full Arab League delegation's visit. The discussions on
25	6 January should be expected to cover recent developments in

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword the
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) JOHN HOLMES		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	PRIORITY	Page 2
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1 <<<<  
 2 the Middle East generally, as well as touching on Anglo-Arab  
 3 relations.  
 4 4. We would not (not) propose to make any announcement in  
 5 advance. If questions arise about the appointment in the  
 6 Prime Minister's and my programmes, No 10 press office and  
 7 News Department will mention that the original suggestion came  
 8 from Klibi and will deny that the visit is devoted to  
 9 negotiating a solution to the delegation problem.  
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 11 PYM  
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21 DEC 1982



*[Faint handwritten mark]*







FILE

MJ

Prime Minister

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 December 1982

Offer of Help from the Sultan of Oman over  
the Arab League Visit

Thank you for your letter of 17 December. The Prime Minister has noted the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that we should politely decline the offer of the Sultan to help over the Arab League visit, on the grounds suggested in your letter. Mrs. Thatcher is content that action should be taken accordingly.

The Prime Minister has however enquired whether there is any further action we can take to protect our commercial position in the Middle East, which was the subject of your letter of 16 December about the impact on British trade of the difficulties in connection with the Arab League Delegation. You will no doubt let me know if you have further advice to offer.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

FM TUNIS 201455Z DECEMBER 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 20 DECEMBER

FOR NENAD

YOUR TEL NO 110: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL

1. I DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE VISIT TODAY WITH OMRAN ON HIS RETURN FROM ATHENS. (KLIBI WENT FROM ATHENS TO KHARTOUM AND WILL THEN BE VISITING JEDDA AND DAMASCUS).

2. OMRAN SAID THAT HE HAD FIRST SUGGESTED THE VISIT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO KLIBI, WHO HAD SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED. THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED, BUT OMRAN WAS CONCERNED IN CASE THE MESSAGES AS CONVEYED BY DENNIS WALTERS AND OMAR AL HASSAN HAD NOT SUFFICIENTLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH KLIBI AND HIMSELF ATTACHED TO THE MEETING BEING STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND UNOFFICIAL. THEIR SUGGESTION WAS THAT IF THE PRIME MINISTER CONSIDERED THAT A MEETING WOULD BE USEFUL AND IF IT COULD BE HELD AWAY FROM OFFICIAL PREMISES, WITH NO PUBLICITY WHATSOEVER AND PREFERABLY AT A WEEKEND (WHICH THEY THOUGHT WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF IT ATTRACTING ATTENTION), THEN KLIBI WOULD GLADLY COME TO LONDON.

3. OMRAN EXPLAINED THAT, IN THEIR OPINION, A MEETING AT THIS STAGE COULD HELP TO CLEAR THE AIR BY LETTING EACH SIDE GIVE A FULL AND FRANK ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS. HOWEVER, IT WAS VITAL THAT KLIBI SHOULD NOT ACT - OR APPEAR TO BE ACTING - INDEPENDENTLY OF KING HASSAN. HE COULD NOT MAKE A PUBLIC VISIT TO LONDON, SINCE THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MISINTERPRETED (IE IT WOULD BE ASSUMED THAT HE WAS NEGOTIATING AND PERHAPS MAKING CONCESSIONS ON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE FEZ COMMISSION'S VISIT, WHICH HE HAD NO MANDATE TO DO). HENCE THE NEED FOR STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY.

4. OMRAN SAID THAT HE WOULD COME BACK TO ME ABOUT KLIBI'S VISIT AFTER GETTING IN TOUCH WITH KLIBI IN JEDDA OR SEEING HIM IN DAMASCUS, WHERE OMRAN WILL BE ON 23 AND 24 DECEMBER.

STIRLING

LIMITED

NENAD

MED

PS

PS/MR HURD

SIR J LEAHY

MR ECERTON

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 December 1982

Dear John,

Visit to London by an Arab League Delegation

Lord Chalfont, who called on Mr Pym on 17 Decmeber, has given us an account of his mission to Morocco. He and Mr Egerton were received by King Hassan quickly and cordially. The Moroccans appeared keen to put the issue of the abortive visit behind them and have asked us to propose new dates and to outline our proposals on the question of PLO representation. King Hassan has emphasised the need for dates to be agreed quickly: he says he is under pressure from Arafat to bring this phase of the post-Fez operation to an end as soon as possible. The atmosphere of Anglo-Moroccan relations has improved considerably. Mr Cambridge is to present his credentials to King Hassan on 22 December.

Mr Pym hopes that we will be able to put new dates to the Moroccans soon but only on the understanding that the question of PLO representation is settled before a public announcement on dates is made. The attached draft telegram instructs Mr Cambridge to explain to the Moroccans our preferred solution to the problem of PLO representation, and to offer new dates.

The options in the draft telegram are the best we can put forward, on the basis of the discussions which have already taken place between Mr Pym and the Prime Minister. There is a reasonable chance that they will get a good hearing from King Hassan. It is far more questionable whether King Hassan will be able to carry his colleagues with him. Our proposals do not meet the requirements of, for example, King Fahd or King Hussein. Our Arab friends have in fact no sympathy with or understanding of the position we have taken up, and so long as this situation lasts the risk to our interests and commercial prospects remains quite serious. They know that we understand the importance of the PLO and they noted Mr Hurd's meeting with Qaddumi in the summer as part of an

/Arab League

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Arab League mission. Since then we have had the agreement of Arab leaders, including the PLO, at Fez II on a peace strategy, and a determined attempt by Arafat to come to terms with Jordan on the future of the Palestinians and the Jordanians, in direct response to the Reagan proposals - to say nothing of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. They know that despite occasional rhetoric, Arafat has chosen the diplomatic way forward, not least because the armed struggle is now hopeless; and that the main killers in the Middle East depend on Baghdad and Damascus, not the PLO. They therefore believe that our objections are out of date and we ought to be more responsive to the Palestinian aspirations. The PLO themselves are of course likely to find our proposals unsatisfactory, and other Arab leaders will be influenced by what the PLO say.

As against this, factors working in our favour are King Hassan's personal wish to make a success of a visit to London, and a more general wish on the part of Arab leaders to dispose tidily of the programme they set themselves in Fez, as well as an innate reluctance to press home a bitter quarrel with us. But the balance is not a comfortable one.

The earliest dates on which The Queen, the Prime Minister and Mr Pym are all available are Monday 31 January and Tuesday 1 February. The Moroccans will expect a similar programme to those offered earlier, key elements of which are:

- a) a meeting with The Queen;
- b) a tete-a-tete meeting between King Hassan and Mrs Thatcher;
- c) a plenary session at 10 Downing Street with the whole delegation;
- d) a meal offered by the Prime Minister for the delegation.
- e) a guard of honour in the FCO quadrangle.

I enclose a draft outline of three possible programmes. It would be useful to have the Prime Minister's views on these before we get to the stage of negotiating with the Moroccans.

I also enclose a draft letter from Mrs Thatcher to Lord Chalfont thanking him for undertaking his mission to Morocco and for delivering the Prime Minister's

no. P.L.O.  
representative  
to be  
present.  
M 21.  
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submitted  
replied.  
A.S.C. 21.  
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CONFIDENTIAL



message.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
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 FM FCO 6 FROM FCO 17 DECEMBER 82  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 INFO IMMEDIATE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON.  
 10 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW  
 11 INFO SAVING MADRID, UKDEL NATO  
 12 ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON  
 13 1. Unless you think it would be appropriate to seek an audience  
 14 with the King please ask to call on Boucetta and/or Moulay Hafid  
 15 to outline our proposals for a reinstatement of the Arab  
 16 League Delegation visit to London.  
 17 2. You should stress that the Prime Minister and I continue to  
 18 attach importance to receiving an Arab League delegation in  
 19 London. We hope that agreement can be reached on a compromise  
 20 which would enable the visit to take place soon. King Hassan  
 21 and his colleagues are aware of our difficulties over the PLO.  
 /// 22 To avoid any further misunderstandings or embarrassment it is  
 // 23 important therefore, before new dates are publicised, for us to  
 / 24 have the agreement of the Arab League side on the question of  
 25 PLO representation in the Delegation.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword 3.
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution ME STANDARD AND ARAB-ISRAEL
Drafted by (Block capitals) R O MILES		
Telephone number 233 6048		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



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2 3. Lord Chalfont's conversation with King Hassan suggests that  
 3 His Majesty fully appreciates our problems and believes that a  
 4 compromise can be agreed. The King himself put forward his  
 5 own helpful suggestion. We have no illusions as to the  
 6 difficulties but hope that King Hassan, as the leader of the  
 7 delegation, will be able to secure the agreement of his  
 8 colleagues to one of the following formulae (the first two of  
 9 which have been discussed between the King and Lord Chalfont).

10 4. OPTION ONE. A prominent Palestinian, who could have good  
 11 contacts with the PLO, but must not be a PLO official, would  
 12 take the place of a PLO representative on the delegation. The  
 13 name of Mohamed Milhem, ex-mayor of Halhoul on the West Bank,  
 14 has been mentioned to us as a possible candidate. In this  
 15 case the PM would receive the whole delegation. Alternatively,  
 16 the Prime Minister is ready at any appropriate stage to  
 17 receive a separate group of West Bank mayors.

18 5. OPTION TWO. A PLO representative would come with the  
 19 delegation but call on Mr Hurd (next word underlined) instead  
 20 and not take part in the other events.  
~~of taking part in the plenary talks and meal at 10 Downing~~  
 21 ~~Street.~~ A variant would be for a PLO representative to come,  
 22 with a representative of the Arab League, in advance of the  
 23 main delegation.

24 6. OPTION THREE. The scale of the mission might be reduced,  
 25 eg King Hassan might come alone, or accompanied only by the  
 26 Secretary-General of the Arab League.

27 7. You may let the Moroccans know that for planning purposes,  
 28 but not (not) for public use at this stage, we propose that the  
 29 visit should take place on Monday 31 January/Tuesday 1 February.  
 30 Either could be a working day and there are a number of possible  
 31 permutations which we should be pleased to discuss with the  
 32 King once agreement has been reached on the PLO problem and we  
 33 are able to go firm on the dates. \* ~~~~~ \*

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8. You should stress that we fully appreciate the King's position as leader of the delegation and will use him as the sole channel for reaching decisions on both the PLO problem and dates. If the subject arises with other Arabs we will be emphasising the primacy of the Moroccan channel. We will be relying on Moroccan discretion to keep these negotiations private until we are both satisfied that the way is clear to make an announcement. The Prime Minister respects the King's wishes for as direct dealings as possible on the arrangements and a senior protocol representative is being considered for discussion in Rabat of the details, once both the dates and the composition of the delegation are agreed.

PYM  
NNNN

\* ~ ~ \* Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.

Wayland  
29 May 2013

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## ARAB LEAGUE VISIT: POSSIBLE PROGRAMMES FOR KING HASSAN AND DELEGATION

*These programmes are no good. Tuesday is a Quarter day.  
A.S.C. 2/12*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
30 January (Sunday)	Arrive (LHR) (Hassan)	Arrive (LHR) (Hassan)		NOTES:  Flying time: Heathrow/RAF Marham - 45 mins Northolt/RAF Marham - 40 mins  Driving time: RAF Marham/ Sandringham - 20 mins  London/Airport - 30 mins
31 January (Monday)	Fly to Sandringham (Hassan only)  Lunch Sandringham (Hassan)  Fly to London (Hassan)  <u>Tête-à-tête PM (Hassan)</u>  Dinner private	<u>Tête-à-tête PM (Hassan)</u>  Lunch private  Guard of Honour, (Delegation)  <u>Plenary Session</u> (Delegation)  <u>Dinner 10 Downing St</u> (Delegation)	(Hassan)  Arrive from Morocco direct (RAF Marham) *  Lunch Sandringham (Hassan only)  Fly to London (Hassan)  Free  Dinner private	
1 February (Tuesday)	Guard of Honour (Delegation)  <u>Plenary Talks</u> (Delegation)  <u>Lunch 10 Downing St</u> (Delegation)  Depart (LHR)	Fly to Sandringham (Hassan only)  Lunch Sandringham (Hassan)  Depart (RAF Marham) * (Hassan) for Morocco LHR.	Guard of Honour (Delegation)  <u>Tête-à-tête</u> (Hassan only)  Meeting with Secretary of State (rest of delegation)  <u>Plenary (Delegation)</u>  <u>Lunch 10 Downing st</u> (Delegation) Depart (LHR)	

\* Depending on aircraft type (727 or 707 could land but not 747) if Moroccans use a 747 we would need to provide an aircraft of the Queen's Flight.



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ARAB LEAGUE VISIT: POSSIBLE PROGRAMMES FOR KING HASSAN AND DELEGATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
30 January (Sunday)	Arrive (LHR) (Hassan)	Arrive (EHR) (Hassan)		<p>NOTES:</p> <p><u>Flying time:</u>                      Heathrow/RAF Marham - 45 mins                      Northolt/RAF Marham - 40 mins</p> <p><u>Driving time:</u>                      RAF Marham/Sandringham - 20 mins                      London/Airport - 30 mins</p>
31 January (Monday)	Fly to Sandringham (Hassan only)  Lunch Sandringham (Hassan)  Fly to London (Hassan)  Tête-à-tête PM (Hassan)  Dinner private	Tête-à-tête PM (Hassan)  Lunch private  Guard of Honour, (Delegation)  Plenary Session (Delegation)  Dinner 10 Downing St (Delegation)	(Hassan)  Arrive from Morocco direct (RAF Marham) *  Lunch Sandringham (Hassan only)  Fly to London (Hassan)  Free  Dinner private	
1 February (Tuesday)	Guard of Honour (Delegation)  Plenary Talks (Delegation)  Lunch 10 Downing St (Delegation)  Depart (LHR)	Fly to Sandringham (Hassan only)  Lunch Sandringham (Hassan)  Depart (RAF Marham) * (Hassan) for Morocco	Guard of Honour (Delegation)  Tête-à-tête (Hassan only)  Meeting with Secretary of State (rest of delegation)  Plenary (Delegation)  Lunch 10 Downing st (Delegation) Depart (LHR)	

\* Depending on aircraft type (727 or 707 could land but not 747) if Moroccans use a 747 we would need to provide an aircraft of the Queen's Flight.





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 December 1982

*I doubt if a message  
from the Sultan at this  
stage would help.*

*A.J.C. 17/12.*

*MF*

*Dear John,*

Offer of help from Sultan of Oman  
over Arab League Visit

You asked for advice on the report in Muscat telegram number 311 (copy enclosed) that Sultan Qaboos of Oman has offered to help us with King Hassan over the Arab League visit.

Sultan Qaboos is a good friend of Britain, and Mr Pym considers that he is genuinely anxious to help repair Anglo/Arab relations if he can. But following Lord Chalfont's visit to Morocco, we have succeeded in calming the King's anger and we are now working with the Moroccans on the reinstatement of the visit. We are not however yet ready to put forward proposals for dealing with the difficult problem of Palestinian representation. At this delicate stage, Mr Pym considers an intervention from Sultan Qaboos would be unlikely to help in finding a solution. There is no need for an atmospheric message, and as yet nothing concrete that he could put forward. It is also possible that the King might take offence if he thought that we had put the Sultan (who did not attend the Fez summit, and has rather distanced himself from the process) up to exercising pressure on our behalf. For these reasons, Mr Pym feels that we should politely decline the Sultan's offer, on the grounds that the initial misunderstandings have now been cleared up, and that we are pursuing with the Moroccans the substantive questions which remain.

*But what about -  
the commercial position?  
with Qatar etc.*

*mf*

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



PM, Aug '80, Arab League

17 DEC 1982

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Almajalla 11-17/12/82

C/f

Eldon

Giffiths

~~John Miles~~ *[Signature]*

The Arab-British crisis: London suggested, then withdrew its suggestion to receive Kaddumi with the Fez delegation.

Initially it was a British suggestion that Farouk Kaddumi, Head of the Political Department of the PLO, will be included in the seven members delegation to visit London following the Fez Arab summit conference.

The suggestion was forwarded by Mr Jeremy Greenstock, ~~as~~ Assistant Director, Middle East Department in the Foreign Office to Nabil Ramlawi, Director of the PLO office in London on 20/9/82 on one of Ramlawi's routine visits to the Foreign Office.

Ramlawi inquired on the future of PLO-Britain's relations following the Fez meeting. Greenstock did not have ready answers and asked for time. When Ramlawi wanted to leave Greenstock accompanied him and promised him that if Kaddumi will come with the Arab League delegation the Foreign Secretary will meet him with the delegation.

Ramlawi told Greenstock that this suggestion is not attractive enough as Kaddumi met already a British Minister. What will be attractive indeed if following Pym's meeting with that delegation he will meet Kaddumi separately.

Greenstock responded that he will pass this request to his superiors. On the same evening Greenstock called Ramlawi and said that it is not possible.

On the following day Ramlawi flew to Tunis to inform the PLO leadership of the British suggestion. A month later Kaddumi was informed by Mr Oliver Miles, Director, Middle East Department, Foreign Office, that Britain will not receive Kaddumi.



مبادرة ريفان غيرت موقف لندن

## قصة الازمة العربية البريطانية: لندن اقترحت ثم تراجع عن استقبال ابو اللف مع وفد فاس!

تحقيق بقلم محمد معنون

لندن الذي ابلغ بالموقف البريطاني من عضوية منظمة التحرير في الوفد العربي الى العاصمة البريطانية .

هذه الصورة لم تلبث ان انقلبت عكسها تماما بعد حوالي الشهر عندما ابلغ اوليفر مايلز رئيس دائرة الشرق الأدنى وشمال أفريقيا الرملوي بأن لندن الرسمية لن تستقبل القدومي وانه لا بد ان يكون قد حدث سوء تفاهم حول هذه النقطة . ولم يفد الرملوي من الذكر بتفاصيل الحوار الذي جرى بينه وبين غرينستوك ، فالديبلوماسيون البريطانيون «أسفون» .

احد النواب المحافظين المقربين من منظمة التحرير والجانب العربي عموما راجع وزارة الخارجية البريطانية واستوضح حقيقة الموقف الجديد بعد اتصال الرملوي به وتأكد بنفسه من ان هناك موقفا جديدا فعلا هو غير الموقف الذي ابلغ به ، هو أيضا ، قبل شهر . وبعد استكمال اتصالاته اعاد النائب البريطاني الاتصال بالرملوي وأبلغه ان هناك فعلا تحولا في الموقف ، وان ما جرى يشكل في الواقع «خطوة الى الوراء» . الاحراج كان كبيرا للرملوي وهو يبلغ قيادة المنظمة بالموقف البريطاني الجديد . وكذلك بالنسبة الى السفير المغربي حين انصل بالرباط للغاية ذاتها ، ولا بد ان كلا منها رفع تقارير مطولة ومفصلة عن الموقف الجديد وتفسيره لخلفياته وابعاده .

بعد الموقف البريطاني الجديد تأجلت زيارة وفد اللجنة السباعية غير مرة بانتظار ايضاحات دقيقة ورد شاف على الطلب العربي قبول ممثل منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية في عداد الوفد . وفي نهاية الشهر الماضي كان قرار الملك الحسن الثاني رئيس الوفد الغاء الزيارة الى لندن والاجتماعات التي كان مقررا عقدها مع المسؤولين البريطانيين . وعقب ذلك اعلان من الرباط بأن لندن وضعت شروطا «غير لائقة وغير مقبولة» .

### الشروط المرفوضة

تقول مصادر عربية مطلعة ان الجانب البريطاني ادعى حتى الآونة الأخيرة أنه لم يتلق طلبا عربيا بمشاركة منظمة التحرير في الوفد . فقد نسب الى السفير البريطاني في تونس انه التقى احد ممثلي وفد الجامعة العربية وتسلم منه لائحة باسماء اعضاء الوفد لم تشر الى وجود ممثل لمنظمة التحرير . وكان وزير الخارجية البريطاني فرنسيس بيم قد اعلن في ٢٠ تشرين الأول (اكتوبر) الماضي (في نفس الوقت الذي كانت فيه وزارة الخارجية البريطانية

كان اقتراحا بريطانيا ، في الاصل ، ان يكون رئيس الدائرة السباعية لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية فاروق القدومي ( ابو اللف ) في عداد اللجنة السباعية المنبثقة عن مؤتمر قمة فاس حين سترور لندن لاطلاع حكومة مارغريت تاتشر على خطة السلام التي اقراها المؤتمر العربي المذكور وتطورات الموقف في الشرق الأوسط . وقد تقدم بالاقتراح مساعد رئيس دائرة الشرق الأدنى وشمال أفريقيا جيرمي غرينستوك للسيد نبيل الرملوي مدير مكتب منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية في لندن .

كان ذلك في العشرين من ايلول (سبتمبر) الماضي في إحدى زيارات الرملوي التقليدية لوزارة الخارجية البريطانية . الا أنه في تلك المرة كان يحمل مشروع السلام العربي في فاس الى الوزارة ويناقش مع المسؤولين البريطانيين ابعاد المشروع ومضامينه والعقبات القديمة التي يجتازها ، ومرحلة ما بعد المشروع والعلاقات بين لندن ومنظمة التحرير في ضوءه . ولم تكن لدى المسؤولين في وزارة الخارجية البريطانية اجوبة جاهزة على تساؤلات الرملوي حول مستقبل العلاقات ولذلك فقد استمهلهو بعض الوقت ليقدموا تصورا كاملا لها . وحين نهض الرملوي استعدادا للخروج رافقه غرينستوك الى المدخل الخارجي . وعلى الدرج وعد غرينستوك بأنه اذا جاء القدومي في عداد اللجنة السباعية الى لندن فهو متأكد من ان وزير الخارجية فرنسيس بيم سيستقبله في عداد اللجنة . ولم يكن العرض مغريا للرملوي فلن تكون هذه أول مرة يجتمع فيها القدومي بوزير بريطاني . وقد ابلغ غرينستوك بذلك مضيئا بأن العرض المغربي حقا هو ان يعقد بيم والقدومي اجتماعا ثنائيا على هامش اجتماع وفد اللجنة السباعية مع وزير الخارجية البريطاني . ولم يكن رد الديبلوماسي البريطاني مثبتا للعزيمة ، فقد اجاب بأنه سينقل هذا الطلب الى رؤسائه ثم يعود اليه بالجواب . وبالفعل ففي مساء ذلك اليوم ، اتصل غرينستوك بالرملوي هاتفيا وأبلغه بلغة الرموز ان العرض الثاني غير ممكن . بينما العرض الأول اكد . وكان ذلك مفهوما بوضوح : فوزير الخارجية البريطاني مستعد للقاء القدومي في عداد وفد اللجنة السباعية ولكنه غير مستعد للاجتماع به على انفراد في اليوم التالي كان الرملوي في طريقه الى تونس وقد حمل معه العرض البريطاني لتدرسه القيادة الفلسطينية وتنقله الى اللجنة السباعية للتصرف في ضوءه . وفي الوقت نفسه كانت قناة أخرى توصل الاقتراح الى اللجنة السباعية هي القناة الديبلوماسية المغربية عبر سفير المغرب في

بين اسبانيا والعالم العربي ليست في مستوى العلاقات السياسية ؟

— قلة المتابعة هي سبب من الاسباب . فالاستثمارات العربية عادة تجد سهولة في الاتجاه نحو اسواق اوسع او احسن ظرفا من السوق الاسبانية . فضلا عن ان الوجود الاعلامي والتجاري لاسبانيا ضعيف في العالم العربي ، كما لاحظت انا شخصيا خلال زيارتي الى الدول العربية .

● لاشك ان ابرز العلامات الفارقة او المميزة في العلاقات الاسبانية — العربية هي عدم اعتراف اسبانيا باسرائيل ، وهو موضوع مطروح باستمرار ، كما انه دائما مبعث لكل انواع التوقعات والاشاعات . هل يمكن ان نستغل صراحتك (سيد موران او معالي الوزير) لتعطينا فكرة عن مستقبل هذا الموضوع في اطار سياستكم الشرق اوسطية ؟

— يجب ان اوضح اولاً ان اسبانيا تعتمد ما يعرف بنظرية «ايسترادا» في علاقاتها الدولية ، اي انها لا تتبع سياسة اعتراف او عدم اعتراف ، بل اقامة علاقات او عدم اقامتها . وهذا ما يحصل بالنسبة الى موقفها من اسرائيل . وكما ذكرت قبلا فالمسألة قديمة وتعود الى الفترة التي رفض فيها بن غوريون اقامة علاقات مع فرانكو ، وكانت ردة فعل فرانكو المبادلة بالمثل . لكن بعد ذلك وقعت الحروب وما نتج عنها من عمليات الضم الاسرائيلية للاراضي العربية . ونحن نتابع بكثير من الاهتمام تطورات السياسة العربية بالنسبة الى القضية الفلسطينية . وبالرغم من ان اسبانيا في نظرنا يجب ان تقيم علاقات مع كافة دول العالم ، الا اننا لا نستطيع القبول بنتائج السياسات العدوانية وبالتالي لا نوافق على ان تعتبر اسرائيل الاراضي التي احتلتها بالقوة عام ١٩٦٧ اراضي تابعة لها . ولاشك ان عدم وجود علاقات بيننا وبين اسرائيل يضيق مجالات وساطتنا في هذا النزاع . واذا لاحظنا ان النزاع العربي الاسرائيلي وصل الى مرحلة ايجابية بالنسبة الى قضية السلام في الشرق الاوسط وحقوق الشعب الفلسطيني تتطلب اقامة علاقات مع اسرائيل ، فاننا لن نقدم ابداً على اتخاذ قرار بهذا المعنى ، قبل ان نعرف الدول بالضببط ما سيكون موقف الدول العربية . وفي هذا الاطار نجد في مشروع الملك فهد وفي مقررات قمة فاس طريقاً مهما نحو السلام .

### قوات الى لبنان

● اشيع مؤخرا ان لبنان قد يطلب من اسبانيا ارسال قوات للمساهمة في تعزيز القوات الدولية فيه . ماذا سيكون موقف الحكومة الاشتراكية اذا ورد هذا الطلب ؟

— الموضوع بالفعل ليس اكثر من مجرد اشاعات ، لكن ليس ما يمنع ان يحصل . وفي هذه الحالة نحن دائما على استعداد ، كاشتراكيين واسبان ، لتقديم كل العون والمساعدة لتحقيق السلام في لبنان . واذا طلبت الحكومة اللبنانية رسمياً هذه المساعدة فان اسرائيل على الأرجح ستعارض وجود قوات اسبانية في لبنان . لكن هذه مشكلة بالنسبة الى اسرائيل وحدها . ونحن مستعدون لدرس الموضوع بكل اهتمام . واذا وجدنا فعلا ان ارسال قوات اسبانية الى لبنان سيساهم في الحفاظ على الاستقرار الحالي وتثبيته ، فاننا نرحب بذلك ■





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

To note.

16 December, 1982

A.F.C. 16/12

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation: Impact on British Trade

In view of our substantial economic interest in the Middle East we have been keeping a close watch recently to see if any practical steps are taken against us because of our attitude towards the inclusion of a PLO representative in the Arab League Delegation led by King Hassan of Morocco. You may wish to be aware of the position in case the Prime Minister asks. It is always extremely hard to prove cause and effect, but we have noticed the following:

(i) In Qatar a decision is imminent on the choice of a partner for the Qataris in the management of the immense North Field Gas Project. BP have been one of the front runners, and the Prime Minister spoke up for them in Qatar when she was there last year. But when the Chairman of BP entertained the Deputy Chairman of the Qatari General Petroleum Company, a member of the Royal family, last week the main thing he wanted to discuss was the Arab League delegation issue. BP drew the implication that this could prejudice their prospects.

(ii) In Bahrain where HMG have been heavily involved in supporting Davy McKee's bid for a \$150m turn key project for a steel rolling mill, Davy's agent in Bahrain has been told that objections by the important Saudi shareholders in the project as a result of the Arab League issue make Davy's prospects of being included in the short-list poor. Davy have received the same message from another source.

(iii) In Saudi Arabia Lord Denman has expressed deep concern about the effect of Arab resentment on Consolidated Gold Fields' prospects for obtaining a \$118 gold mining concession contract, on which decisions are imminent.

These are no more than straws in the wind. On the other side, there is no indication that the Arab League delegation row has interfered with the negotiations on the important Hawk contract for Abu Dhabi. Our conclusion for the moment is that the case is unproven. We shall of course continue to keep a look out for possible acts of discrimination against British companies and will consider quickly what we should do if any very obvious examples occur.



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I am copying this to John Rhodes (DOT) and Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*J E Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

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11 6 DEC 1982



*PM*

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
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*F.C.O. informed of P.A.'s comment. They will advise.*

*A.S.C. 15/12*

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

1. YUSUF ALAWI, MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE SULTAN IS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. QABOOS WONDERS WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING HA CAN DO TO HELP: EG WOULD YOU LIKE HIM TO WRITE TO THE KING OF MOROCCO AND IF SO IN WHAT TERMS? YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THIS SUGGESTION BEFORE ALAWI CALLS AT THE FCO ON 16 AND 17 DECEMBER.

*- Yes -  
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no P.L.  
P.L. ...*

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 271 OF 13 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
INFO PRIORITY ALGIERS AMMAN BAGHDAD DAMASCUS JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK  
WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS PARIS MOSCOW

*mt*

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON

SUMMARY

1. LORD CARRINGTON CALLED SEPARATELY ON THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 11 DECEMBER. HE SAID THAT HMG WAS DISTURBED BY THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAD ARISEN OVER THE DELEGATION AND HAD SENT LORD CHALFONT TO KING HASSAN IN THE HOPE OF FINDING A SOLUTION. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORT OF THE INTERVIEW. HE OFFERED A PERSONAL EXPLANATION OF WHAT HAD PREVIOUSLY GONE WRONG. BOTH CAID ESSEBSI AND KLIBI EXPRESSED BEMULDERED OUTRAGE AT THE MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN SENT



EXPRESSED BEWILDERED OUTRAGE AT THE MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN SENT ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT, BUT SAID THAT THEY WOULD WILLINGLY HELP TO FIND A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. LORD CARRINGTON CONVEYED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KLIBI. BOTH MEETINGS WERE EXTREMELY CORDIAL.

#### DETAIL

2. LORD CARRINGTON TOLD CAID ESSEBSI THAT LORD CHALFONT'S VISIT TO RABAT APPEARED TO HAVE GONE WELL. BOTH HMG AND KING HASSAN WANTED TO SETTLE THE MISUNDERSTANDING AND HE WAS SURE THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND. ESSEBSI SAID THE MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT HAD SICKENED HIM ( 'M'A FAIT MAL AU COEUR' ). HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TUNISIA COULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THESE TERMS AND HE WAS BEWILDERED THAT HMG COULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE TUNISIANS WOULD STAND FOR IT.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, HMG THOUGHT THAT A STRAIGHT REFUSAL WOULD HAVE BEEN A SLAP IN THE FACE AND HAD TRIED TO FIND A COMPROMISE. THE APPROACH HAD BEEN WELL MEANT, IF MISTAKEN. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THE PRIME MINISTER'S REVULSION AGAINST TERRORISM AND SUGGESTED, AS A PERSONAL THOUGHT, THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FELT THAT READINESS TO RECEIVE THE PLO COULD ENTAIL PRESSURE TO RECEIVE THE IRA. IT WAS REALISED THAT THE PLO WAS NOT A TERRORIST ORGANISATION, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT SOME MEMBERS OF IT WERE UNDENIABLY TERRORISTS.

4. ESSEBSI REMARKED THAT SOME WELL-KNOWN ISRAELIS WERE TERRORISTS BUT HMG DEALT WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, HE REALISED THAT THE QUESTION WAS DELICATE AND HE WAS VERY READY TO DO HIS BEST TO HELP, BUT HMG MUST NOT PUT THE ARABS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ON KLIBI. HE SAID THAT THOUGH HE WAS NO LONGER A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT, HE BROUGHT AN OFFICIAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. HE SAID THAT LORD CHALFONT HAD BEEN SENT TO RABAT IN THE HOPE OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SEEN A TELEGRAM (RABAT TEL NO 495) REPORTING THE VISIT AND THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE ENCOURAGING. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM TO SAY THAT IF KLIBI WISHED TO VISIT LONDON FOR DISCUSSIONS, HE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO MEET HIM.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A PERSONAL AND



6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A PERSONAL AND ENTIRELY UNOFFICIAL COMMENT. HE SPOKE AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

7. KLIBI SAID THAT HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF AS CALM AND WISE LEADERS. HE THEREFORE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW A LETTER SO WOUNDING TO ARAB SENSITIVITIES COULD HAVE BEEN SENT; HE WAS BEWILDERED BY THE BRITISH ATTITUDE. THE ARAB LEAGUE ALWAYS SOUGHT CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISES AND THERE WAS ALWAYS ROOM FOR DISCUSSION. AS OMRAN HAD TOLD ME AT THE TIME, THE LETTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENT WITHOUT PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS. BUT BY THEN IT HAD ALREADY GONE TO OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS AND THERE WAS NOW A DIFFICULT SITUATION. KLIBI SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD AND RESPECTED THE ATTITUDE TO TERRORISM, HE TRUSTED THAT IT APPLIED EQUALLY TO PEOPLE SUCH AS BEGIN AND SHAMIR. HE SAID THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT PROBLEM WITH THE UK MUST BE FOUND WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF ARAB FEELINGS. HE INVITED LORD CARRINGTON'S SUGGESTIONS.

8. LORD CARRINGTON OUTLINED KING HASSAN'S PROPOSAL AND MR EGERTON'S ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION ON PLO REPRESENTATION IN THE DELEGATION. HE COMMENTED THAT, SPEAKING WITH GREAT DIFFIDENCE SINCE HE MUST NOT INTERFERE, HE DID NOT THINK THAT OBJECTION COULD BE TAKEN TO AN ELECTED MAYOR; THE SAUDIS HAD ALREADY MADE THIS SUGGESTION TO HIM. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED BY KING HASSAN AND LORD CHALFONT THAT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND HMG WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT CONTACT COULD BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN HMG AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. OMRAN ASSUMED THAT THIS WOULD NOT EXCLUDE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KLIBI AND THE PRIME MINISTER ON GENERAL ME DEVELOPMENTS. I REPLIED THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT TALKS ON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE VISIT WOULD BE CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY WITH KING HASSAN, BUT THAT WE WISHED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THAT GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH KLIBI WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. (KLIBI HIMSELF DID NOT REACT TO THE SUGGESTION THAT HE MIGHT VISIT LONDON).

9. KLIBI SAID THAT ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE VISIT MUST CERTAINLY BE LEFT TO KING HASSAN, BUT HE WOULD GLADLY GIVE WHAT PERSONAL HELP HE COULD. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSALS MENTIONED BY LORD CARRINGTON WERE PRACTICABLE, THOUGH IT WOULD BE FOR THE PLO TO ACCEPT THEM.

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DESKBY 111600Z

FROM RIYADH 111300Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 81 OF 11 DECEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH:

YOUR TELNO 402 : VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON.

1. SUMMARY: I DELIVERED TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH THE MESSAGE FROM MRS THATCHER TO KING FAHD, AND TOLD HIM OF THE PROPOSAL THAT YOU SHOULD COME HERE IN JANUARY. I WAS WELL RECEIVED BUT THE SAUDIS STILL EXPECT US TO FIND A SOLUTION.

2. DETAIL: BOTH THE KING AND PRINCE SAUD WERE IN MOROCCO. ACCORDINGLY I SAW THE CROWN PRINCE THIS MORNING. BEFORE I HANDED HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, I SAID I HAD TWO POINTS TO MAKE. FIRST THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS PROPOSING TO COME HERE IN EARLY JANUARY FOR TALKS WITH PRINCE SAUD. SECONDLY, WE WERE NOW IN CONTACT WITH KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO AND WERE DISCUSSING WAYS AND MEANS (YOUR TELNO 106 TO TUNIS). ABDULLAH WARMLY WELCOMED BOTH THESE ITEMS OF NEWS AND I SAID I WOULD FOLLOW UP THE QUESTION OF DATES FOR YOUR VISIT WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

3. I THEN HANDED HIM THE MESSAGE. AFTER HE HAD READ IT HE NODDED HIS HEAD AND SAID QUOTE THERE IS HOPE UNQUOTE.

4. I THEN RAISED THE IDEA THAT ONE OF THE ELECTED MAYORS FROM THE WEST BANK MIGHT BE THE PLO DELEGATE. AS HE HAD ALREADY SAID TO LORD CARRINGTON, ABDULLAH THOUGHT THAT IT WAS NOW TOO LATE FOR THIS TO WORK. WE SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT OF IT EARLIER AND SHOULD HAVE FORESEEN THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM. I SAID THAT WE HAD INDEED FORESEEN IT, AND HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH KING HASSAN TO GET ROUND IT. LIKE PRINCE SAUD, ABDULLAH COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW KING HASSAN COULD HAVE AGREED: HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE PLO FROM A VISIT TO LONDON WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE WHOLE DELEGATION.

5. I COMPLAINED GENTLY THAT THE AMERICANS TOO HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE PLO DELEGATE, AND YET THEIR SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMERCE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN RECEIVED IN RIYADH WITH EXCEPTIONALLY KIND WORDS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AND EXPANSION OF TRADE: WHEREAS IN OUR CASE THE PAPERS WERE FULL OF TALK ABOUT BOYCOTTS AND COMMERCIAL SANCTIONS. ABDULLAH SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN A QUITE DIFFERENT POSITION: MORE WAS EXPECTED OF US. BUT HE

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/HIMSELF



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HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN STRONGLY IN PRIVATE TO THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF COMMERCE. AS FOR MEASURES AGAINST US, THAT WAS NEWSPAPER TALK. HE HAD REPLIED TO ENQUIRIES ABOUT MEASURES AGAINST US THAT BRITAIN WAS A FRIEND, AND THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF SANCTIONS. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT WE COULD NOT GET TOO FAR AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS WITHOUT LOSING OUR POWER TO INFLUENCE THEM, AND I REMINDED HIM THAT THE FRENCH WHO HAD BEEN WIDELY PRAISED HAD NO SUCH INFLUENCE, AND COULD BE OF LITTLE ASSISTANCE TO THE ARAB CASE.

6. FINALLY ABDULLAH ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS WARM GREETINGS TO MRS THATCHER AND TO URGE HER TO DO HER BEST TO FIND A SOLUTION.

7. WE SHALL PURSUE THE MATTER OF DATES FOR YOUR VISIT WITH THE MFA BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF PRINCE SAUD (WHO IS SAID NOT TO BE RETURNING FOR TWO WEEKS), IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO GET A FIRM DECISION. AS A PRECAUTION, YOU MAY WISH TO CONTACT HIM THROUGH HM EMBASSY IN RABAT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 495 OF 10 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)  
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, MOSCOW  
INFO SAVING PEKING, TEHRAN

FROM EGERTON

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON

1. SUMMARY. A CORDIAL MEETING. THE KING DECLARED THE AFFAIR OF THE DECEMBER ARAB LEAGUE VISIT CLOSED. HE IS ANXIOUS TO REINSTATE IT IN EARLY FEBRUARY AND IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION. HE WANTS A FIRM DATE FOR THE VISIT TO LONDON AGREED AND ANNOUNCED SOON, WITHOUT RISK OF FURTHER POSTPONEMENT. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND APPRECIATIVE OF ITS CONTENTS.
2. LORD CHALFONT WAS RECEIVED BY KING HASSAN LATE ON 9 DECEMBER. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA AND I WERE PRESENT. THE KING WAS DELAYED AND LORD CHALFONT...



DECEMBER. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA AND I WERE PRESENT. THE KING WAS RELAXED, AND LORD CHALFONT FOUND BOTH MINISTER OF COURT MOULAY HAFID AND BOUCETTA MORE AMENABLE THAN USUAL. WE ALSO CHATTED TO GENERAL DLIMI (CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER) IN THE ANTEROOM.

3. LORD CHALFONT RECALLED THAT WHEN HE HAD LAST SEEN THE KING AFTER THE ROYAL ACADEMY MEETING, HASSAN HAD BEEN UPSET ABOUT HMG'S HANDLING OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON. LORD CHALFONT HAD UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK INTO THE BACKGROUND AND NOW CARRIED A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE KING FROM MRS THATCHER. BUT HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO CLEAR AWAY MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE FORM OF THE MESSAGE (FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO A HEAD OF STATE), AND ABOUT ITS SIMULTANEOUS DELIVERY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM. BOTH HAD BEEN CAUSED NOT BY DISCOURTESY BUT BECAUSE TIME WAS SO SHORT AFTER HMG LEARNED THAT A PLO REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE TEAM, CONTRARY TO THEIR UNDERSTANDING UNTIL 22 NOVEMBER. HMG APOLOGISED FOR ANY SEEMING DISCOURTESY. HE THEN EXPLAINED HMG'S POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AT HIGH MINISTERIAL LEVEL, WHICH WAS OF LONG STANDING AND WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE PLO. HE NEXT DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S ORAL MESSAGE IN THE TERMS AUTHORISED, STRESSING THAT WE REMAINED KEEN TO REINSTATE THE VISIT. WE WERE NOT COMMITTED TO THE PRECISE WORDING OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT WE HAD PROPOSED, NOR INDEED TO THAT METHOD OF PROCEEDING IF ANOTHER COULD BE DEvised WHICH SATISFIED OUR AND THE ARABS' PRINCIPLES. LORD CHALFONT STRESSED THAT MRS THATCHER HERSELF WOULD NOT (NOT) BE PREPARED TO MEET A MEMBER OF THE PLO.

4. ON PROTOCOL ASPECTS, LORD CHALFONT EXPLAINED WHY THE PROGRAMME VIRTUALLY AGREED FOR 1 AND 2 DECEMBER HAD SEEMED LONG DRAWN OUT. THE TIMING COULD BE MADE EASIER FOR THE KING NEXT TIME, PROVIDED WE HAD ENOUGH NOTICE. HIS INVITATION TO PAY A EARLY BILATERAL WORKING VISIT STOOD, AND WAS EAGERLY AWAITED.

5. THE KING WARMLY WELCOMED LORD CHALFONT IN HIS ROLE AS SPECIAL EMISSARY, SINCE HE COULD SEE BOTH SIDES OF THE AFFAIR. IT HAD STARTED BADLY, PARTLY BECAUSE WE HAD HAD NO AMBASSADOR AT RABAT. BUT THE VISIT ITSELF HAD NOT BEEN CANCELLED; HE MUCH WANTED TO BRING HIS TEAM TO BRITAIN. BUT THE FOREIGN OFFICE SHOULD REALISE THAT, AFTER FEZ, THE MODERATE ARABS WERE UNITED AND COULD NOT BE PLAYED OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER. HE THEN CLAIMED THAT PLO INCLUSION IN THE TEAM TO VISIT LONDON HAD NOT BEEN A CONDITION OF THE VISIT. THE RELEVANT FEZ RESOLUTION HAD SAID THE FULL TEAM WOULD



THE RELEVANT FEZ RESOLUTION HAD SAID THE FULL TEAM WOULD VISIT PEKING, MOSCOW AND PARIS. BUT THE ARABS' POLITICAL IMPERATIVE WAS TO TRY AND WIN AS WIDE RECOGNITION AS POSSIBLE FOR THE PLO. LIKE THE FRENCH, WE HAD A PLO OFFICE IN LONDON. IF HMG HAD SIMPLY SAID QUOTE NO UNQUOTE TO THE REQUEST TO INCLUDE THE PLO IN THE TEAM, HE AS LEADER OF THE TEAM WOULD NOT HAVE INSISTED. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED FORMALLY BY THE ARAB LEAGUE TO INCLUDE A PLO MEMBER, THE KING CLAIMED THAT AS SOON AS HE HAD HEARD OF KLIBI'S STATEMENT, HE HAD DEMANDED ITS RETRACTION, WHICH HAD BEEN CARRIED IN A NEWSPAPER THE FOLLOWING DAY. I SAID THAT THE LEAGUE HAD NOT TOLD US. THE KING SMILED AND SAID THAT ALL COMPLICATIONS IN THIS AFFAIR HAD STEMMED FROM THE FCO. IN FUTURE HE WOULD DEAL WITH NO 10 DIRECT. LORD CHALFONT POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO AMBASSADOR IN RABAT BECAUSE MR CAMBRIDGE HAD BEEN HELD BACK IN LONDON SO THAT HE COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE KING. WE NOW HOPED HE COULD PRESENT CREDENTIALS WITHOUT DELAY.

6. THE KING THEN SAID THAT THE AFFAIR OF THE DECEMBER VISIT WAS CLOSED. WE SHOULD CONSIDER WAYS OF RESCHEDULING IT. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS QUICKLY TO AGREE AND THEN ANNOUNCE A DATE. HMG SHOULD SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE SUBSTANCE. HOW WOULD IT BE IF, WHILE HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE BEING RECEIVED BY MRS THATCHER, THE PLO MEMBER OF THE TEAM WERE RECEIVED QUOTE IN THE MARGINS UNQUOTE BY A MINISTER NOT IN THE CABINET? LORD CHALFONT ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN PRESS REPORTS QUOTING ARAFAT AS SAYING THAT THE FEZ FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE WOULD MEET SHORTLY TO CONSIDER ITS REPORT ON ITS VISITS TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW AND PEKING. THE KING DENIED THIS CATEGORICALLY. HE THEN RAN THROUGH HIS OWN CALENDAR FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR AND JANUARY, SAYING THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD SOON BE IN TOUCH TO SUGGEST EARLY AGREEMENT ON A DATE IN THE FIRST TEN DAYS OF FEBRUARY. HE ADDED THAT WHEN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, IT WAS VITAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO (NO) FURTHER POSTPONEMENTS. SO WE SHOULD IN DUE COURSE SEND SOMEBODY OUT FROM LONDON TO SIT WITH OUR AMBASSADOR IN THE KING'S PROTOCOL OFFICE (LIKE GENERAL WALTERS BEFORE HE TOOK THE TEAM TO WASHINGTON), SO AS TO SETTLE ALL FURTHER DETAILS WITHOUT ARGUMENT OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

7. LORD CHALFONT UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE SUGGESTIONS AND SET IN HAND AN URGENT CORRELATION OF DIARIES. IN REPLY TO AN ASIDE FROM THE KING HE CONFIRMED WE WOULD DEAL PRIMARILY WITH HIM BOTH ON PROTOCOL MATTERS AND ON THE BASIS OF EG PLO INCLUSION IN THE

Bohny  
30k



~~ON PROTOCOL MATTERS AND ON THE BASIS OF EG PLO INCLUSION IN THE~~  
TEAM. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT KLIBI AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
ARAB LEAGUE COULD VISIT LONDON WHEN HE LIKED, BUT DISCUSSIONS ON  
THE SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE BETWEEN MR CAMBRIDGE AND BOUCETTA IN  
THE FIRST PLACE, NOT (NOT) THROUGH THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY IN  
LONDON.

8. I SAID THAT AN ALTERNATIVE WAY ROUND THE PLO PROBLEM WHICH THE  
KING MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER WOULD BE FOR THE PLO TO AGREE TO  
NOMINATE A PALESTINIAN MAYOR WHO WAS NOT (NOT) A PLO  
OFFICIAL TO REPRESENT THEM ON THE DELEGATION. AN ELECTED WEST BANK  
MAYOR WAS AN OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY. THE KING AGREED THAT THE  
IDEA WAS WORTH CONSIDERING AND INSTRUCTED BOUCETTA TO LOOK INTO  
IT.

9. THE MEETING , WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER THE KING HAD SEEN KING  
FAHD OFF TO FEZ AND RIYADH AT THE END OF HIS HOLIDAY, LASTED JUST  
OVER AN HOUR.

10. BY AGREEMENT WITH LORD CHALFONT AND HMA, I TOLD  
BOUCETTA THAT WE HAD A PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM MR  
PYM, AND THAT IT WOULD BE DELIVERED BY HMA WHEN HE GAVE  
BOUCETTA THE COPIES OF HIS LETTERS. BOUCETTA UNDERTOOK TO  
GIVE MR CAMBRIDGE AN APPOINTMENT FOR THIS DUAL PURPOSE  
DURING 10 DECEMBER, AND THANKED MR PYM FOR THIS GESTURE.

11. THE MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL RELEASE ON 10 DECEMBER A  
FACTUAL STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT LORD CHALFONT WAS RECEIVED BY  
THE KING IN HIS CAPACITY AS A SPECIAL EMISSARY OF MRS  
THATCHER WITH THE AIM OF RESOLVING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH  
HAVE ARISEN OVER THE POSTPONED ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO LONDON.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING PEKING AND TEHRAN

CAMBRIDGE

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

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FM JEDDA 090905Z DEC 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 589 OF 09 DEC

INFO SAVING RIYADH (ACTIONED)

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

1. I SPENT YESTERDAY IN RIYADH AND WAS ASSAILED ON ALL SIDES ON THIS SUBJECT. THERE IS NO DOUBT OF THE UNANIMITY OF SAUDI FEELINGS. I HAVE SEEN NOTHING LIKE IT SINCE THE AFFAIR OF THE TV FILM IN 1980.
2. ON THE OTHER HAND NOBODY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL MEASURES AGAINST US. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT BY THE SAUDI MINISTER OF INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT BUT THIS WAS MADE IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY A REUTER'S CORRESPONDENT. THIS ASPECT OF THE AFFAIR SEEMS TO BE ENTIRELY THE CREATION OF THE PRESS WHICH IS TRYING TO MANUFACTURE A STORY. THE EGREGIOUS JOHN DICKIE OF THE DAILY MAIL APPEARS TO BE THE MAIN CULPRIT. THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE SAUDIS MAY BE DRIVEN BY THE PUBLICITY INTO CONSIDERING ACTION WHICH THEY HAVE NO DESIRE TO TAKE. THOUGH I REALISE HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO CRUSH A STORY ONCE IT IS RUNNING, I HOPE THAT ANY COMMENTS MADE BY NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL BE FIRM AND DISMISSIVE.
3. I HOPE I DO NOT NEED TO ADD THAT DESPITE DICKIE'S REFERENCE TO TELEGRAMS FROM ME (DAILY MAIL, DECEMBER 6), THIS EMBASSY HAS GIVEN NO INFORMATION AND MADE NO COMMENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY HIS STORY.

CRAIG

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- CONS D
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- CABINET OFFICE

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THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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FM FCO 091030Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 232 OF 9 DECEMBER

CANCELLATION OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

1. THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ON 28 NOVEMBER THAT THE DATES FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON (FIXED FOR 1-2 DECEMBER) HAD BEEN CANCELLED (ANNULEES). PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ARABS ARE OFFENDED BY THE BRITISH REFUSAL TO HOLD HIGH LEVEL TALKS WITH A DELEGATION INCLUDING A PLO REPRESENTATIVE EXCEPT ON CONDITIONS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS.
2. THIS GUIDANCE IS PRIMARILY FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, BUT PARAS 4-6 MAY BE DRAWN ON IN DISCUSSION WITH CONTACTS. YOU SHOULD NOT VOLUNTEER THE DETAILS GIVEN IN PARA 3.

BUILD-UP TO THE VISIT

3. WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH THE MOROCCANS (KING HASSAN IS CHAIRMAN OF THE SEVEN-MEMBER COMMITTEE CHARGED BY THE FEZ SUMMIT WITH VISITING THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL) FROM MID-OCTOBER ONWARDS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON. THE MOROCCANS CHANGED THE DATES FIVE TIMES BEFORE 1-2 DECEMBER WAS FIXED. THEY RAISED AT AN EARLY STAGE, AND IN A TENTATIVE MANNER, THE QUESTION OF PLO PARTICIPATION AND WERE AT ONCE GIVEN A CLEAR STEER THAT IT WOULD RAISE VERY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. ON 25 OCTOBER WE WERE GIVEN A PRIVATE ASSURANCE BY THE MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR THAT THE PLO ISSUE WAS 'CLOSED' AND THAT THE DELEGATION WOULD COMPRISE KING HASSAN, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA AND JORDAN AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. ON 9 NOVEMBER A MINISTERIAL EMISSARY FROM KING HASSAN MADE NO MENTION OF THE PLO. ON 22 NOVEMBER, HOWEVER, A

/FURTHER

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FURTHER EMISSARY PUT A FORMAL REQUEST FOR US TO RECEIVE A PLO DELEGATE WITH THE OTHERS. THIS CAME AS AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE, AND WAS FOLLOWED BY STRONG REPRESENTATIONS FROM OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID AN OUTRIGHT REJECTION WE PUT FORWARD A COMPROMISE WHICH WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A BASIS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN POLICY FOR THE VISIT TO GO AHEAD. UNDER THE PRESSURE OF TIME AND SWELLING INDIGNATION ON THE ARAB SIDE, THE PROPOSAL FAILED. WE HAVE NOT MADE PUBLIC THE DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL. BUT FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE INVITED THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DELEGATION TO AGREE THAT WE WOULD PUBLISH A STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT MAKING CLEAR AMONGST OTHER THINGS ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND THAT ALL CONCERNED REJECTED TERRORISM. THE STATEMENT WOULD HAVE INDICATED THAT ALL THOSE INVOLVED AGREED WITH ITS TERMS.

THE UK VIEWPOINT

4. THE ARABS HAVE REPRESENTED THE EPISODE AS A BRITISH REFUSAL TO RECEIVE A TOP LEVEL ARAB DELEGATION EAGER TO DISCUSS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. KING HASSAN HAS IN ADDITION TAKEN OFFENCE AT ALLEGED SLIGHTS OF A PROCEDURAL AND PROTOCOL NATURE. OUR POSITION IS THAT

(A) THE DELEGATION WOULD HAVE BEEN WARMLY WELCOMED IF COMPOSED AS THE MOROCCANS HAD INDICATED. WE HAD PUT OURSELVES OUT TO ARRANGE TOP LEVEL DISCUSSIONS ON EACH OF THE DATES PUT FORWARD BY THE ARAB LEAGUE.

(B) OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE ARAB SIDE BEFORE THE VISIT. MINISTERS HAVE FREQUENTLY SAID THAT THEY WILL ONLY SEE PLO REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THIS ADVANCES THE CAUSE OF PEACE: AND HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT A PLO STATEMENT ACCEPTING ISRAEL'S RIGHTS AND RENOUNCING TERRORISM WAS WHAT WE REQUIRED. THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF A CHANGE IN OUR POLICY AT SHORT NOTICE.

(C) THAT POLICY REFLECTS OUR CONVICTION THAT NO

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REALISTIC PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IS POSSIBLE UNLESS THE PLO CAN ESTABLISH THEMSELVES UNIVERSALLY AS ACCEPTABLE NEGOTIATORS. THERE IS NO POINT IN ENCOURAGING THE ILLUSION THAT THE PLO CAN ACHIEVE A BETTER FUTURE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WITHOUT TAKING THE STEP WE HAVE URGED ON THEM. THE UK WOULD NOT BE A FRIEND TO THE ARABS IF SHE DID SO. OUR AIM WAS TO HELP THE PLO TAKE A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN OF PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

(D) CONTRARY TO WHAT SOME OF THE ARABS HAVE CLAIMED, WE WERE NOT ASKING THE PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE A JOINT DECLARATION ON ANY POINT, NOR TO RENOUNCE TERRORISM (ONLY TO ALLOW US TO CONFIRM THEIR REJECTION OF TERRORISM). WE WANTED ARAB SUPPORT FOR A BRITISH STATEMENT WHICH WOULD SERVE TO COUNTER AN ARGUMENT FREQUENTLY USED BY ISRAELIS AND OTHERS TO DISCREDIT THE PLO

(E) WE ARE KEEN THAT A WAY SHOULD BE FOUND TO REINSTATE THE DELEGATION'S VISIT THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF BOTH SIDES.

#### REMEDIAL ACTION

5. WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO RE-START DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARAB SIDE ON SOLVING THE PROBLEM. A PERSONAL EMISSARY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER (LORD CHALFONT) IS TRAVELLING TO MOROCCO ON 8 DECEMBER ACCOMPANIED BY EGERTON. OTHER CONTACTS ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW. WE ARE FULLY AWARE THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF STEAM HAS BUILT UP ABOUT THE CANCELLATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE ARAB PRESS, AND THAT UNSPECIFIC THREATS HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT THE EFFECT ON ANGLO-ARAB TRADE. IF QUESTIONED ON JOHN DICKIE'S PIECE IN THE DAILY MAIL OF 6 DECEMBER, CLAIMING THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD BEEN TOLD DURING A (BUSINESS) VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA THAT THE DAMAGE COULD AMOUNT TO POUNDS STERLING 1000 M IN ORDERS, NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE SAYING THAT WE HAVE

/RECEIVED NO

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RECEIVED NO SPECIFIC THREATS.

6. WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO TAKE TOO DEFENSIVE A LINE. OUR POLICY WAS CLEAR: WE HAD SENSIBLE AND COURTEOUS EXCHANGES WITH THE MOROCCANS: THE DELEGATION WAS WELCOME ON THE BASIS AGREED: THE PROPOSED CHANGE WAS MADE TOO LATE. WE RECOGNISE, HOWEVER, THAT OFFENCE HAS BEEN TAKEN AND THAT STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO RESTORE RELATIONS TO THEIR PREVIOUS SATISFACTORY STATE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE ARAB SIDE ALSO WILL SEE THE POINTLESSNESS OF A CONTINUING ROW AND WILL RESPOND TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO SET MATTERS STRAIGHT.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

UKMIS NEW YORK  
BIS NEW YORK  
WASHINGTON  
AMMAN  
BAGHDAD  
JEDDA

KUWAIT  
DAMASCUS  
ALGIERS  
CAIRO  
KHARTOUM  
RABAT

TRIPOLI  
TUNIS  
ADDIS ABABA  
LAGOS

[PRIORITY]

ISTANBUL  
ATHENS  
BONN  
BRUSSELS  
UKREP EC BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN  
THE HAGUE  
LISBON  
LUXEMBOURG  
OSLO  
PARIS  
ROME  
BERNE  
DUBLIN  
HELSINKI  
HOLY SEE  
MADRID  
STOCKHOLM

VIENNA  
MOSCOW  
MEXICO CITY  
BRASILIA  
ADEN  
BAHRAIN  
DOHA  
DUBAI  
ABU DHABI  
MUSCAT  
BEIRUT  
TEHRAN  
TEL AVIV  
SANAA  
DAKAR  
KINSHASA  
CG CAPE TOWN  
PRETORIA

[ROUTINE]

ISLAMABAD  
PEKING  
TOKYO  
OTTAWA  
CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON  
NEW DELHI  
DACCA  
KUALA LUMPUR  
SINGAPORE  
ACCRA  
DAR-ES-SALAAM  
NAIROBI  
SALISBURY  
LUSAKA  
KAMPALA  
LILONGWE  
GABORONE

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

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CFK

*With the compliments of*

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA  
DEPARTMENT

*As Requested for Despatch to N<sup>o</sup> 10.*

*Jerry Colman*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH



PM

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OO JEDDA DESKBY 081130Z  
RR AMMAN  
RR DAMASCUS  
GRS 454  
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DESKBY 081130Z  
FM FCO 081010Z DEC 82  
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 400 OF 8 DECEMBER  
INFO AMMAN RABAT DAMASCUS WASHINGTON TUNIS ALGIERS

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

PLEASE NOW PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO KING FAHD

BEGINS: I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW HOW DISAPPOINTED I AM  
THAT IT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION  
TO VISIT LONDON LAST WEEK. LORD CARRINGTON HAS TOLD ME OF HIS  
CONVERSATIONS WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRINCE SULTAN  
DURING HIS RECENT VISIT AND I KNOW HOW DISAPPOINTED YOU WERE TOO.  
THE BRITISH POSITION IS NOT MEANT TO BE RESTRICTIVE OR  
NEGATIVE. OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED AS  
MUCH AS ANY WESTERN COUNTRY TO THE NOW ALMOST UNIVERSAL  
RECOGNITION THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO SELF-  
DETERMINATION. THE SOONER ALL THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL  
DISPUTE, AND THOSE WHO WISH TO HELP THEM, CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER  
AND DISCUSS THE NEXT STEPS WITHIN A REALISTIC AND POSITIVE  
FRAMEWORK, THE SOONER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL BE PUT IN A  
POSITION TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT. I DO NOT BELIEVE A CHANGE  
IN BRITISH POLICY OR MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, IN THE  
ABSENCE OF STEPS BY THE PLO WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD GREATLY  
STRENGTHEN THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSITION, ARE LIKELY TO HELP TO  
BRING THIS ABOUT. OUR POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO IS  
BASED ON OUR CONVICTION THAT PLO ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF  
ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE AND SECURITY, IF ISRAEL IS  
PREPARED TO ACCEPT LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, AND OF THE  
NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT TO BE REACHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS, IS

/A NECESSARY

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A NECESSARY STEP IF THERE ARE TO BE REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS. IT IS VITAL FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON MANY ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM; AND I AM SADDENED THAT THIS PRESENT DISAGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE ARISEN WHEN I WAS SO MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH KING HASSAN AND HIS DELEGATION. I HOPE A WAY CAN BE FOUND, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF OURSELVES AND THE ARAB PEOPLES, FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO COME TO LONDON AND FOR US TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF RECEIVING THEM. I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU IN ANY EVENT THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE PART AS WE CAN IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WE HAVE FOR EXAMPLE BEEN PRESSING THE AMERICANS HARD ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ISRAEL TO IMPLEMENT THE SETTLEMENTS FREEZE PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT I ATTACH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE TO HAVING THE VIEWS OF YOUR MAJESTY ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS OF SUCH CONCERN TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. ENDS

PYM

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FILE

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PM

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 December, 1982

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

The Prime Minister has approved the revised message from herself to King Fahd, subject to some minor drafting changes which I have conveyed to you on the telephone.

I enclose the version which the Prime Minister has approved.

E. L. DOLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



REVISED DRAFT MESSAGE TO KING FAHD

I thought I should let you know how disappointed I am that it did not prove possible for the Arab League Delegation to visit London last week. Lord Carrington has told me of his conversations with Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Sultan during his recent visit and I know how disappointed you were too.

The British position is not meant to be restrictive or negative. Over the past fifteen years we have contributed as much as any Western country to the now almost universal recognition that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination. The sooner all the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute, and those who wish to help them, can sit down together and discuss the next steps within a realistic and positive framework, the sooner the Palestinian people will be put in a position to exercise that right. I do not believe a change in British policy or ministerial contacts with the PLO, in the absence of steps by the PLO which we believe would greatly strengthen their diplomatic position are likely to help to bring this about. Our position on contacts with the PLO is based on our conviction that PLO acceptance in principle of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, if Israel is prepared to accept legitimate Palestinian rights, and of the need for a settlement to be reached by peaceful means, is a necessary step if there are to be realistic negotiations on the future of the Palestinians. It is vital for both sides to take advantage of the present opportunities for making progress towards a peaceful settlement through negotiations.

I believe that there is broad agreement between us on many aspects of the Palestinian problem: and I am saddened that this present disagreement should have arisen when I was so much looking forward to discussing these issues with King Hassan and his Delegation. I hope a way can be found, consistent with the principles and policies of ourselves and the Arab peoples, for the Arab League Delegation to come to London and for us to have the pleasure of receiving them. I should like to assure you in any event that we shall continue to play as active a part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have, for example, been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to implement the settlements freeze proposed by President Reagan. It goes without saying that I attach the greatest possible importance to having the views of Your Majesty on this and other matters of such concern to both our countries.





Prime Minister

The message you signed to Foreign and Commonwealth Office King Fahd has not been delivered. London SW1A 2AH  
 Mr. Pym now suggests a shorter and slightly different one (in particular, he thinks you should refer to Lord Carrington's visit to Saudi Arabia).

6 December, 1982

Content with revised message?

Dear John,

A.J.C. 7/12

Yes not

Arab League Delegation

Our Ambassador in Jedda has reported that King Fahd is still in Morocco and that the Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, would be leaving to join the Arab League Delegation in Moscow before the Embassy could reach him with the message. Sir James Craig has therefore deferred delivery of the message to King Fahd. He has also suggested that the message might usefully be revised to reflect Lord Carrington's conversations with senior Saudi Ministers, on which the Embassy had not reported when the Prime Minister's message was drafted. Lord Carrington also told the Saudis that he would be seeing the Prime Minister. The message might have more impact if it referred to this also.

With this in mind the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends the attached revised draft for the message. It is also shorter than the original, reflecting Mr Pym's belief that with the passage of time it would be less appropriate to cover in detail the events leading up to the despatch of the British proposal for a compromise.

Mr Pym believes that we shall not have lost any advantage in the delay. The next significant date is the meeting in Tunis on 13 December of the Arab Boycott Committee at which, as Lord Carrington may have mentioned to the Prime Minister, there are expectations that the Delegation's failure to visit London will be raised. The despatch of the message to King Fahd in the first half of next week would therefore be timely.

The Prime Minister may also wish to be aware that Mr Pym was in any case planning to visit the Gulf early next year. He had thought of going to the smaller Gulf countries in January and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in February but now proposes to suggest to the Saudis that he visit Saudi Arabia in early January.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
 10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 1AA



6 DEC 1982





## REVISED DRAFT TEXT TO KING FAHD

I thought I should let you know how disappointed I am that it <sup>did</sup> ~~has~~ not proved possible for the Arab League Delegation to ~~have~~ visited London last week. Lord Carrington has told me of his conversations with Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Sultan during his recent visit and I know how disappointed you were too.

The British position is not meant to be restrictive or negative. Over the past fifteen years we have contributed as much as any Western country to the now almost universal recognition that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination. The sooner all the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute, and those who wish to help them, can sit down together and discuss the next steps within a realistic and positive framework, the sooner the Palestinian people will be put in a position to exercise that right. I do not ~~honestly~~ believe a change in British policy or ministerial contacts with the PLO, in the absence of steps by the PLO which we believe would greatly strengthen their diplomatic position, <sup>or</sup> ~~is~~ likely to help to bring this about. Our position on contacts with the PLO <sup>is based on</sup> ~~aims to underline~~ our conviction that PLO acceptance in principle of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, if Israel is prepared to accept legitimate Palestinian rights, and of the need for a settlement to be reached by peaceful means, is a necessary step if there are to be realistic negotiations on the future of the Palestinians. ~~We believe that~~ <sup>it</sup> is vital for



both sides to take advantage of the present opportunities for making progress towards a peaceful settlement through negotiations.

I believe that there is a broad ~~area of~~ agreement between us on many aspects of the Palestinian problem: and I am saddened that this present disagreement should have arisen when I was so much looking forward to discussing these issues with King Hassan and his Delegation. I hope a way can be found, consistent with the principles and policies of ourselves and the Arab peoples, for the Arab League Delegation to come to London and for us to have the pleasure of receiving them. I should like to assure you in any event that we shall continue to play as active a part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have for example been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to implement the settlements freeze proposed by President Reagan. It goes without saying that I attach the greatest possible importance to having the views of Your Majesty on this and other matters of such concern to both our countries.



CONFIDENTIAL

*Prime Minister*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1982

*Dear John,*

*ADL 7/12  
p.a.*

King Hussein's Message to the Prime Minister

/ I enclose the signed original of King Hussein's letter of 22 November to the Prime Minister about the visit to London of the Arab League Delegation. The text of the letter was contained in Amman telegram No 518 of 22 November, a copy of which was enclosed with my letter of 23 November.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



6 DEC 1982





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PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND

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CABINET OFFICE D10

**ADVANCE COPY**

Mr. Goodison

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HD/CONSULAR DEPT

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PUSD (2)  
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AMMAN DESKBY 040600Z DECEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

*mf*

FROM MOSCOW 040530Z DECEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 816 OF 4 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

INFO PRIORITY PEKING

MY TEL 809 : THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN.

*(delivered to him in Moscow)*

1. I DELIVERED THE MESSAGE PERSONALLY TO KING HUSSEIN AT 1430Z (THE TIMING SLIPPED FROM 1230Z).

2. THE KING READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY. HE HAD NO IMMEDIATE REPLY TO COMEY.



2. THE KING READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY. HE HAD NO IMMEDIATE  
REPLY TO CONVEY BUT EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION  
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S KIND MESSAGE. HE WAS DISTURBED AND  
DISTRESSED AT THE ARAB LEAGUE FAILURE TO GO TO LONDON. TOO  
MANY COOKS, HE THOUGHT. HE HOPED BEFORE TOO LONG TO DO  
WHAT HE COULD TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE.

3. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION THE KING TOUCHED BRIEFLY  
ON THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON, ISRAEL; WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS AND  
THE MANY QUESTIONS WHICH REMAINED IN ADVANCE OF HIS MEETING WITH  
PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 21 DECEMBER. THE RECENT TALKS IN AMMAN WITH  
THE PLO HAD HOWEVER GONE VERY WELL. ARAFAT WOULD BE RETURNING TO  
AMMAN ON 11 DECEMBER TO SEE WHAT WORK THE JOINT COMMITTEES HAD  
PRODUCED.

3. KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBED THE DELEGATION'S TALKS WITH THE  
RUSSIANS TODAY ( SEE MIFT ) AS A " FRANK AND  
CONSTRUCTIVE " REVIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. BUT HE  
COMMENTED OBLIQUELY THAT THERE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN " VERY  
MUCH THE DIFFICULTIES WE FORSAW : OUR FRIENDS HERE WOULD ALSO  
LIKE TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION ".

4. THE MEETING WAS SHORT AND THE KING CLEARLY FELT CONSTRAINED  
IN WHAT HE COULD SAY IN IN INSECURE SURROUNDINGS OF A  
SOVIET OFFICIAL GUEST-HOUSE. HE SEEMED TIRED AND RATHER WEIGHED  
DOWN WITH HIS PROBLEMS. IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI MOVES  
ON THE WEST BANK HE COMMENTED AT ONE POINT " THE PRESSURE  
IS UNBELIEVABLE AT THIS STAGE ".

SUTHERLAND

NNNN



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PM

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
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MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KUWAIT.

ADVANCE COPY

020645Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 346 OF 2 DECEMBER

AND TO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS  
NEW YORK.

VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON.

1. THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER, SHAIKH SABAH, TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON ON 1 DECEMBER TO REGISTER A STRONG PROTEST ABOUT OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE A PLO REPRESENTATIVE ON KING HASSAN'S ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW BRITAIN HAD ALLOWED SUCH AN UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT TO HAPPEN. BRITAIN'S FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD EXPECTED BETTER THINGS OF A COUNTRY WHICH HAD DEEP EXPERIENCE OF THE REGION AND OF ARAB PSYCHOLOGY. HE GREATLY FEARED THAT THIS INCIDENT WOULD USHER IN A PERIOD OF DIFFICULT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND BRITAIN.

2. AT LORD CARRINGTON'S REQUEST I REPLIED WITH A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOW ALL THIS HAPPENED. I SUGGESTED THAT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN AT FAULT HAD WE FAILED TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY SEEKING ARAB AGREEMENT TO A FORM OF WORDS DESIGNED TO PUT THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE INCLUSION OF A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DELEGATION IN A WIDER CONTEXT.

3. ALTHOUGH THE KUWAIT PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT REFERRED TO THIS SUBJECT IN A EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH LORD CARRINGTON, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SHAIKH SABAH WAS SPEAKING SINCERELY, FOR KUWAIT, AND WITH WHAT SEEMED TO BE GENUINE CONCERN FOR ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS.

4. YESTERDAYS AL WATAN MENTIONED THE POSSIBLE HOLDING OF AN EMERGENCY ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE IN MID-DECEMBER TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THE CONTACTS OF THE 7 MEMBER ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION.

MELHUIH





PM.

Es

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 December, 1982.

BF (cels)

Cancellation of Arab League Delegation Visit

Thank you for your letter of 30 November in which, inter alia, you propose that the Prime Minister should send messages to King Hussein and King Fahd about the visit by the Arab League Delegation.

As I told you on the telephone yesterday, the Prime Minister has approved slightly amended versions of the two messages, which can now be despatched. I enclose the amended texts.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

B



MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

Your Majesty,

I was grateful for your message sent through Mr. Urwick on 22 November and warmly reciprocate your good wishes. I should be delighted if it were possible for us to meet soon: there is a great deal to discuss on which I should much value your wise counsel.

I considered your message very seriously. The sooner all the parties concerned with the Palestinian problem and those who wish to help them towards peace can sit down together and discuss the next steps within a realistic and positive framework, the sooner the Palestinian people will be released from their ordeals and able to fulfil their right to self-determination. You know from my message of 22 October how much I hope that the American proposals, and your courageous and forthright response to them, will lead to progress. But I do not think that a change in British policy in favour of the PLO, in the absence of any clear move forward by them, will help to bring this about. You yourself have been urging the PLO to make clear their acceptance in principle of Israel's right to exist in peace and security and my earlier message fully supported you in this. I remain convinced that it is an absolutely necessary step if there are to be realistic negotiations on the future of the Palestinians, just as it is necessary that Israel accepts the rights of the Palestinians.

The British position on contacts with PLO, with which our Arab friends are familiar, aims to underline the importance of this step, and is wholly consistent with the Venice Declaration and the European statements which have followed it. I believe it is your own view that the PLO must not be encouraged in the illusion that their maximum demands are negotiable. I fear that

/ the



the news from the recent PLO Central Committee meeting in Damascus is not encouraging. And I cannot see that the latest change in the French approach, for instance, has achieved any progress towards peace. The principles on which our policy is based are intended to be helpful to the cause of Palestinian self-determination. As you know, we have been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to implement the settlement freeze.

I very much regret that the Arab League Delegation will not now be coming to London this week. Only a few days ago it seemed that we had an understanding about its composition that kept apart the procedural and substantive issues. The proposal which we put forward when the formal request for PLO participation was made at a late stage was intended to be constructive. If the PLO were to make or agree to a statement on the lines we suggested, it would go a long way towards silencing those who constantly seek to discredit the Palestinians and their legitimate rights. I am sad that misunderstandings have arisen, and trust they will soon be resolved. The British Government remains firmly committed to helping the search for peace, and to encouraging a positive response to the opportunities that have recently opened up. I hope a way can still be found, consistent with the principles and policies of both ourselves and the Arab countries, for the Arab League delegation to come to London and be appropriately received. I sincerely hope we can continue to work closely with each other in pursuit of our common goals.

MARGARET THATCHER



MESSAGE TO KING FAHD

Your Majesty,

May I thank you for your message, given by Crown Prince Abdullah to Sir James Craig on 28 November, expressing concern about the British position as regards the Arab League delegation's proposed visit to London.

I thought I should let you know how disappointed I am that it has not proved possible for the Delegation to come here this week.

When the visit was first proposed, we had a series of preliminary discussions with the Moroccan Government in which they raised, informally, the question of PLO participation in the Delegation. We explained the well-known British position on high-level contacts with the PLO. And we were subsequently told that King Hassan would be accompanied by the six Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General of the Arab League. We understood that there would be no PLO representative, even though of course we knew that this would have been the Arab preference. When despite this a formal request to us to agree to PLO participation was put to us last week, supported by messages from Your Majesty and from some other Arab leaders, we were faced with the need to settle the matter in the few days remaining to us. Our proposal of 26 November was intended as a positive and constructive response to bridge the gap. The suggestion was not that the Arab side should make or sign any statement, but that the British side should be in a position to make a statement along the lines indicated.

As regards the reference in the statement to terrorism, which HRH Prince Saud discussed with Sir James Craig, our proposal was that the British statement should say that the members of the visiting delegation 'confirm their rejection of terrorism'. I am of course aware that the resolutions of the

/ Palestine



Palestine National Council held in 1981 include a form of words condemning terrorism. Still more important, I am aware of Your Majesty's resolute opposition to terrorism, of which Saudi Arabia, like so many other countries, has sometimes been the target. It would be valuable if the PLO, in association with Arab Governments, could reaffirm its categoric condemnation, and the proposal we made was intended simply to achieve that purpose, thereby destroying one of the arguments most frequently used to discredit the PLO and the Palestinian cause.

The British position is not meant to be restrictive or negative. The sooner all the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute and those who wish to help them can sit down together and discuss the next steps within a realistic and positive framework, the sooner the Palestinian people will be put in a position to exercise their right of self-determination. I do not think that a change in British policy towards the PLO, in the absence of any clear step forward by them, at least a conditional move, will help to bring this about. Our position on contacts with the PLO, which is wholly consistent with the Venice Declaration, aims to underline our conviction that PLO acceptance in principle of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, if Israel is prepared to accept legitimate Palestinian rights, is a necessary step if there are to be realistic negotiations on the future of the Palestinians. We believe that it is vital for both sides to take advantage of the present opportunities for making progress towards negotiations; and inevitably this will mean both sides having to compromise on their maximum demands.

I am saddened that this misunderstanding should have arisen, for I believe there is a broad area of agreement between us on many other aspects of the Palestinian problem. I hope a way can be found, consistent with the principles and policies of ourselves and the Arab peoples, for the Arab League Delegation to come to London and for us to have the pleasure of receiving them.



I should like to assure you in any event that we shall continue to play as active a part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have for example been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to implement the settlements freeze proposed by President Reagan. It goes without saying that I attach the greatest possible importance to having the views of Your Majesty on this and other matters of such concern to both our countries.

MARGARET THATCHER



GRS 80  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM JEDDA 011110Z DEC 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 570 OF 01 DEC  
INFO RABAT, TUNIS, WASHINGTON, RIYADH

MY TELNO 569: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. COVERAGE OF THIS ISSUE CONTINUES TO BE HOSTILE, WITH PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE CRITICAL COMMENTS OF PLO LEADERS.
2. AN ILL-TEMPERED OPINION COLUMN IN ASHARQ ALAWSAT CALLS FOR SPECIFIC MEASURES AGAINST EUROPE, WHICH HAS 'INFLECTED THESE INSULTS ON ALL ARABS'. A BITTER EDITORIAL IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE ARAB NEWS SAYS THAT 'THE ARABS HAVE HAD ENOUGH ... IT IS HOPED THAT THE ARAB STATES WILL TEACH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT A LESSON BY SUSPENDING ALL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THIS MAY BRING THEM TO THEIR SENSES''.

CRAIG

STANDARD

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FM JEDDAH 010840Z DEC 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 568 OF 1 DECEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY ALL ME POSTS, RIYADH (ACTIONED), WASHINGTON  
PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOD (DEF SALES).

M.I.P.T. ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

1. I ACCOMPANIED LORD CARRINGTON ON HIS COURTESY CALLS ON 30 NOVEMBER ON CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRINCE SULTAN. THEY BOTH RAISED THE QUESTION OF OUR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE THE PLO DELEGATE EXCEPT ON CONDITIONS.
2. ONCE AGAIN, THE TONE WAS PERPLEXITY AND DISMAY RATHER THAN ANGER. WHEN LORD CARRINGTON, WEARING HIS GEC HAT, ASKED IF SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT INTEND TO BUY MORE DEFENCE EQUIPMENT FROM BRITAIN (E.G. MARCONI RADARS) SULTAN SAID THE SAUDIS WERE ALWAYS PLEASED TO BUY...



WERE ALWAYS PLEASED TO CO-OPERATE WITH BRITAIN SEMI COLON BUT SOMETIMES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PUT OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF SUCH CO-OPERATION. HE ADDED THAT HE MEANT POLITICAL OBSTACLES: FOR EXAMPLE, OUR ATTITUDE TO THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE.

3. HE THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE PLO MAN WOULD HAVE COME TO LONDON AS PART OF A WIDER DELEGATION: RECEIVING HIM IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HAVE CARRIED NO IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY: A SAUDI MINISTER WAS GOING WITH THE DELEGATION TO MOSCOW AND PEKING, WITH WHOM SAUDI ARABIA HAD NO RELATIONS SEMI COLON

(B) THE OBJECT OF THE DELEGATION WAS NOT/NOT TO NEGOTIATE BUT ONLY TO EXPLAIN THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT SEMI COLON

(C) THE BRITISH WERE RENOWNED FOR THEIR PRAGMATISM AND FLEXIBILITY. IN THE PAST THEY HAD NEGOTIATED (NOT JUST LISTENED TO) TERRORISTS AND OTHERS WHOM THEY DID NOT RECOGNISE: KENYATTA, MAKARIOS, MUGABE SEMI COLON

(D) THE ARABS HAD IN RECENT MONTHS BEEN MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF MODERATION AND DRAWING CLOSER TO THE VENICE DECLARATION IN WHICH THE BRITISH HAD PLAYED SO LARGE A PART. WAS THIS THE TIME TO REJECT THEIR ADVANCES?

4. CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH'S ARGUMENTS WERE NOT SO CLOSELY MARSHALLED, BUT HIS FEELINGS WERE EQUALLY STRONG. IF PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS NOT MAINTAINED AND STIMULATED, HE FEARED AN EXPLOSION IN THE AREA. HE WAS ALREADY BEING PRESSED TO SEND HOME THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD. PEOPLE WHOM HE KNEW TO BE MODERATE AND PIOUS WERE URGING THE NEED FOR CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE THE WEST WAS NOT HELPING.

5. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THE CONNECTION IN MUCH OF BRITISH OPINION BETWEEN THE PLO AND TERRORISM SEMI COLON BUT HE HOPED TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEKEND AND WOULD CONVEY TO HER THE VIEWS HE HAD HEARD. BOTH PRINCES SPOKE WITH ADMIRATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE CROWN PRINCE CHARGED LORD CARRINGTON TO CONVEY TO HER HIS WARM GREETINGS AND TO URGE HER TO RESCUE THE AREA FROM THIS NEW CRISIS.



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~~PS/PUS~~  
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MR EGERTON  
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FM JEDDAH 010815Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 567 OF 1 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY ALL ME POSTS, RIYADH (ACTIONED), WASHINGTON,  
PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOD (DEF SALES).

RIYADH TELNO 71 (TO FCO ONLY): ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

1. LORD CARRINGTON CALLED ON 30 NOVEMBER ON THE SAUDI MINISTER OF COMMERCE TO PRESS THE CASE FOR GEC BEING REMOVED FROM THE ARAB BOYCOTT WARNING LIST ON WHICH THEY WERE PLACED IN JUNE 1982. MY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR WAS PRESENT.

2. DR SOLAIM SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR GEC. BUT THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE BOYCOTT COMMITTEE IN DECEMBER WOULD HAVE BEEN SPOILED, SO FAR AS BRITISH COMPANIES WERE CONCERNED, BY THE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION THAT HAD ARISEN OVER THE PLO. IF A BANDWAGON STARTED POLLING IN FAVOUR OF EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BY TAKING ACTION AGAINST BRITISH COMPANIES, THE SAUDIS WOULD BE UNABLE TO STOP IT.



BRITISH COMPANIES, THE SAUDIS WOULD BE UNABLE TO STOP IT.

3. ON THE PLO ISSUE DR SOLAIM SUGGESTED TO LORD CARRINGTON THAT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOR US TO AGREE THAT ONE OF THE ELECTED WEST BANK MAYORS WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED BY THE ISRAELIS, SHOULD FILL THE PALESTINIAN SLOT IN THE DELEGATION. SURELY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WISH TO REFUSE A RECEPTION TO SOMEONE WHO HAD BEEN DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED? LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER SUCH A PROPOSAL, ASSUMING IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PLO.

4. DR SOLAIM SAID THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF ARAB OPINION WHICH FELT THAT THE ARABS HAD MISSED A TRICK BY NOT TAKING THE AMERICANS UP ON THEIR OFFER TO RECEIVE ONE OF THE MAYORS. WHEN ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF SELLING THIS IDEA TO THE ARAB SIDE DR SOLAIM SAID THAT WE SHOULD USE THE SAUDIS TO SPEAK TO BOTH KING HASSAN AND THE PLO.

5. LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT OF COURSE MAKE ANY COMMITMENT BEYOND AGREEING TO REPORT WHAT DR SOLAIM HAD SAID TO LONDON. BUT HE DID LATER MENTION THE IDEA TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRINCE SULTAN, ON WHOM HE CALLED LATER, AND SEPARATELY, ACCOMPANIED BY ME. BOTH SAID THAT IT MIGHT HAVE WORKED EARLIER BUT THAT IT WAS TOO LATE NOW. YOU MAY NEVERTHELESS WISH TO CONSIDER IT, FAINT THOUGH ITS CHANCES ARE. DR SOLAIM HAD SEEN PRINCE SAUD THE PREVIOUS EVENING AND MAY HAVE BEEN AUTHORISED TO FLOAT THE IDEA. IF SO, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SAUD HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED IT WITH THE KING BY TELEPHONE, EVEN THOUGH ABDULLAH AND SULTAN HAD APPARENTLY NOT/NOT HEARD OF IT BEFORE.

6. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

CRAIG

BT



SUBJECT.

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 2298/82

GRS 752  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 020630Z  
FM FCO 012130Z DEC 82  
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 384 OF 1 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TUNIS, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. PLEASE NOW PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING FAHD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

YOUR MAJESTY,

MAY I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE, GIVEN BY CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH TO SIR JAMES CRAIG ON 28 NOVEMBER, EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE BRITISH POSITION AS REGARDS THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S PROPOSED VISIT TO LONDON.

I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW HOW DISAPPOINTED I AM THAT IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE FOR THE DELEGATION TO COME HERE THIS WEEK.

WHEN THE VISIT WAS FIRST PROPOSED, WE HAD A SERIES OF PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THEY RAISED, INFORMALLY, THE QUESTION OF PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE DELEGATION. WE EXPLAINED THE WELLKNOWN BRITISH POSITION ON HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. AND WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE SIX FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PLO REPRESENTATIVE, EVEN THOUGH OF COURSE WE KNEW THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE ARAB PREFERENCE. WHEN DESPITE THIS A FORMAL REQUEST TO US TO AGREE TO PLO PARTICIPATION WAS PUT TO US LAST WEEK, SUPPORTED BY MESSAGES FROM YOUR MAJESTY AND FROM SOME OTHER ARAB LEADERS, WE WERE FACED WITH THE NEED TO SETTLE THE

/ MATTER



CONFIDENTIAL

39703 - 1

MATTER IN THE FEW DAYS REMAINING TO US. OUR PROPOSAL OF 26 NOVEMBER WAS INTENDED AS A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO BRIDGE THE GAP. THE SUGGESTION WAS NOT THAT THE ARAB SIDE SHOULD MAKE OR SIGN ANY STATEMENT, BUT THAT THE BRITISH SIDE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE A STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES INDICATED.

AS REGARDS THE REFERENCE IN THE STATEMENT TO TERRORISM, WHICH HRH PRINCE SAUD DISCUSSED WITH SIR JAMES CRAIG, OUR PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE BRITISH STATEMENT SHOULD SAY THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE VISITING DELEGATION '(NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) CONFIRM THEIR REJECTION OF TERRORISM'. I AM OF COURSE AWARE THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL HELD IN 1981 INCLUDE A FORM OF WORDS CONDEMNING TERRORISM. STILL MORE IMPORTANT, I AM AWARE OF YOUR MAJESTY'S RESOLUTE OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM, OF WHICH SAUDI ARABI, LIKE SO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, HAS SOMETIMES BEEN THE TARGET. IT WOULD BE VALUABLE IF THE PLO, IN ASSOCIATION WITH ARAB GOVERNMENTS COULD REAFFIRM ITS CATEGORIC CONDEMNATION, AND THE PROPOSAL WE MADE WAS INTENDED SIMPLY TO ACHIEVE THAT PURPOSE, THEREBY DESTROYING ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS MOST FREQUENTLY USED TO DISCREDIT THE PLO AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

THE BRITISH POSITION IS NOT MEANT TO BE RESTRICTIVE OR NEGATIVE. THE SOONER ALL THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THOSE WHO WISH TO HELP THEM CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND DISCUSS THE NEXT STEPS WITHIN A REALISTIC AND POSITIVE FRAMEWORK, THE SOONER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL BE PUT IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. I DO NOT THINK THAT A CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE PLO, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CLEAR STEP FORWARD BY THEM, AT LEAST A CONDITIONAL MOVE, WILL HELP TO BRING THIS ABOUT. OUR POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, WHICH IS WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION, AIMS TO UNDERLINE OUR CONVICTION THAT PLO ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE AND SECURITY, IF ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, IS A NECESSARY STEP IF THERE ARE TO BE REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS VITAL FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS: AND INEVITABLY THIS WILL MEAN BOTH SIDES HAVING TO COMPROMISE ON

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THEIR MAXIMUM DEMANDS.

I AM SADDENED THAT THIS MISUNDERSTANDING SHOULD HAVE ARISEN, FOR I BELIEVE THERE IS A BROAD AREA OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I HOPE A WAY CAN BE FOUND, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF OURSELVES AND THE ARAB PEOPLES, FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO COME TO LONDON AND FOR US TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF RECEIVING THEM, I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU IN ANY EVENT THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE A PART AS WE CAN IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WE HAVE FOR EXAMPLE BEEN PRESSING THE AMERICANS HARD ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ISREAL TO IMPLEMENT THE SETTLEMENTS FREEZE PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT I ATTACH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE TO HAVING THE VIEWS OF YOUR MAJESTY ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS OF SUCH CONCERN TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

PYM

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE



SUBJECT.

cc. Minister act  
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OO AMMAN (DESKBY 020630Z)  
OO JEDDA  
OO DAMASCUS  
GR 594  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 020630Z  
FM F C O 012130Z DEC 82  
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 2288/82

TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 1 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, RABAT, DAMASCUS, TUNIS, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON.  
ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING  
HUSSEIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

YOUR MAJESTY:

I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE SENT THROUGH MR URWICK ON  
22 NOVEMBER AND WARMLY RECIPROCATE YOUR GOOD WISHES.  
I SHOULD BE DELIGHTED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET SOON:  
THERE IS A GREAT DEAL TO DISCUSS ON WHICH I SHOULD MUCH VALUE YOUR  
WISE COUNSEL.

I CONSIDERED YOUR MESSAGE VERY SERIOUSLY. THE SOONER ALL THE  
PARTIES CONCERNED WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND THOSE WHO WISH  
TO HELP THEM TOWARDS PEACE CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND DISCUSS  
THE NEXT STEPS WITHIN A REALISTIC AND POSITIVE FRAMEWORK, THE  
SOONER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL BE RELEASED FROM THEIR ORDEALS  
AND ABLE TO FULFIL THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. YOU KNOW FROM  
MY MESSAGE OF 22 OCTOBER HOW MUCH I HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS  
AND YOUR COURAGEOUS AND FORTHRIGHT RESPONSE TO THEM, WILL LEAD TO  
PROGRESS. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT A CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY IN  
FAVOUR OF THE PLO, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CLEAR MOVE FORWARD BY THEM,  
WILL HELP TO BRING THIS ABOUT. YOU YOURSELF HAVE BEEN URGING THE  
PLO TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT  
TO EXIST IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND MY EARLIER MESSAGE FULLY  
SUPPORTED YOU IN THIS. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ABSOLUTELY  
NECESSARY STEP IF THERE ARE TO BE REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS ON THE  
FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS, JUST AS IT IS NECESSARY THAT ISRAEL  
ACCEPTS THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.

THE BRITISH

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THE BRITISH POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, WITH WHICH OUR ARAB FRIENDS ARE FAMILIAR, AIMS TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STEP, AND IS WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE EUROPEAN STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE FOLLOWED IT. I BELIEVE IT IS YOUR OWN VIEW THAT THE PLO MUST NOT BE ENCOURAGED IN THE ILLUSION THAT THEIR MAXIMUM DEMANDS ARE NEGOTIABLE. I FEAR THAT THE NEWS FROM THE RECENT PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN DAMASCUS IS NOT ENCOURAGING. AND I CANNOT SEE THAT THE LATEST CHANGE IN THE FRENCH APPROACH, FOR INSTANCE, HAS ACHIEVED ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.

THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR POLICY IS BASED ARE INTENDED TO BE HELPFUL TO THE CAUSE OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE AMERICANS HARD ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ISRAEL TO IMPLEMENT THE SETTLEMENT FREEZE.

I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION WILL NOT NOW BE COMING TO LONDON THIS WEEK. ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO IT SEEMED THAT WE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT ITS COMPOSITION THAT KEPT APART THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE PROPOSAL WHICH WE PUT FORWARD WHEN THE FORMAL REQUEST FOR PLO PARTICIPATION WAS MADE AT A LATE STAGE WAS INTENDED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE. IF THE PLO WERE TO MAKE OR AGREE TO A STATEMENT ON THE LINES WE SUGGESTED, IT WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS SILENCING THOSE WHO CONSTANTLY SEEK TO DISCREDIT THE PALESTINIANS AND THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS.

I AM SAD THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS HAVE ARISEN AND TRUST THEY WILL SOON BE RESOLVED. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO HELPING THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, AND TO ENCOURAGING A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT HAVE RECENTLY OPENED UP. I HOPE A WAY CAN STILL BE FOUND, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF BOTH OURSELVES AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES, FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO COME TO LONDON AND BE APPROPRIATELY RECEIVED. I SINCERELY HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER IN PURSUIT OF OUR COMMON GOALS.

PYM

**STANDARD**

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**ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE**





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I think it is important to put our position clearly to Jordan and Saudi Arabia (I mind much less about Morocco).

2. Agree to send these messages to King Hussein and King Fahd?

30 November, 1982

Dear John,

A.S.C.  $\frac{30}{11}$

*Dr. J. Pym  
Yes Mr. amended*

Cancellation of Arab League Delegation Visit

The Moroccans have now confirmed officially that the Arab League delegation will not be coming to London this week. As you will have seen from the note I sent you for the Prime Minister's meeting with a group of MPs on 29 November, the UK is currently the subject of widespread criticism in the Arab world; and it will be necessary to make a robust defence of our position. I enclose / a draft message from the Prime Minister to King Hussein in response / to the King's message (Amman telno 518 enclosed) and a draft / message to King Fahd, who communicated his reaction to our proposal / through Crown Prince Abdullah in Riyadh (Riyadh telno 69 enclosed).

We are considering how best to respond to the unfriendly / message from the Moroccans (Rabat telno 474 enclosed). This can be handled more slowly.

The cancellation of the visit has not so far received much press coverage in this country, although there have already been critical comments in the Arab press and these are likely to grow and attract attention here. We have taken the line in public that the formal request to include a PLO representative was made late; that we considered it seriously; and that on 26 November we made / a proposal to the members of the delegation, which if accepted would have meant that they could all be received in London, and that the search for a peaceful settlement would have been taken a step further. We are adding that we remain in touch with the parties concerned.

The draft statement which we put to the Arab side has not so far been published by the Arabs. Mr Pym believes that it is in our interest not to release it ourselves unless we are forced to do so by inaccurate leaks from the Arabs.

*Yours ever  
John Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary




Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 1AA



30 NOV 1982





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## DRAFT MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

Your Majesty:

I was grateful for your message sent through Mr Urwick on 22 November and warmly reciprocate your good wishes. I should be delighted if it were possible for us to meet soon: there is a great deal to discuss on which I should much value your wise counsel.

I considered your message very seriously. The sooner all the parties concerned with the Palestinian problem and those who wish to help them towards peace can sit down together and discuss the next steps within a realistic and positive framework, the sooner the Palestinian people will be released from their ordeals and able to fulfil their right to self-determination. You know from my message of 22 October how much I hope that the American proposals, and your courageous and forthright response to them, will lead to progress. But I do not think that a change in British policy in favour of the PLO, in the absence of any clear move forward by them, will help to bring this about. You yourself have been urging the PLO to make clear their acceptance in principle of Israel's right to exist in peace and security and my earlier message fully supported you in this. I remain convinced that it is an absolutely necessary step if there are to be realistic negotiations on the future of the Palestinians, just as it is necessary that Israel accepts the rights of the Palestinians. (What we were talking about was of course a conditional move if Israel accepted Palestinian rights.) // *our final*

The British position on contacts with PLO, with which the *French are* Arab world is fully familiar, aims to underline the

/importance



importance of this step, and is wholly consistent with the Venice Declaration and the European statements which have followed it. I believe it is ~~your~~ your own view that the PLO must not be encouraged in the illusion that their maximum demands are negotiable. I fear that the news from the recent PLO Central Committee meeting in Damascus is not encouraging. And I cannot see that the latest change in the French approach, for instance, has achieved any progress towards peace. ~~If the Arabs are interested in British involvement in this issue, then I hope it can be appreciated that the~~

~~The~~ principles on which our policy is based are ~~constructive, and indeed~~ intended to be helpful to the cause of Palestinian self-determination. As you know, we have been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to implement the settlement freeze.

I very much regret that the Arab League Delegation will not now be coming to London this week. Only a few days ago it seemed that we had an understanding about its composition that kept apart the procedural and substantive issues. The proposal which we put forward when the formal request for PLO participation was made at a late stage was intended to be constructive: ~~of course we meant no affront to the Arab world or its leaders.~~ If the PLO were to make or agree to a statement on the lines we suggested, it would go a long way towards silencing those who constantly seek to discredit the Palestinians and their legitimate rights. ~~But our guiding principle continues to be~~

/the



~~the realistic possibility of progress towards satisfactory~~  
~~arrangements for both Israel and the Palestinians.~~ Like  
 you, I fear that these recent exchanges have not helped  
 that course. I should like to reaffirm, however, that

*MP*  
*I am sad that any misunderstanding has arisen and trust this will soon be resolved*

The British Government remains firmly committed to helping in the search for peace, and specifically to encouraging a positive response to the opportunities that have recently opened up. I hope a way can still be found, consistent with the principles and policies of both ourselves and the Arabs <sup>countries,</sup> for the Arab League delegation to come to London and be appropriately received. I sincerely hope we can continue to work closely with each other in pursuit of our common goals.



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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 518 OF 22 NOV

INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS. ROUTINE ALGIERS, BEIRUT, CATRO, DAMASCUS,  
JEDDA, PARIS, RABAT, TEL AVIV, UKIIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON.  
SAVING INFO: OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW AND PEKING.

NFLR	Telex 026/1
RECEIVED	24 NOV 1982
	TOP COPY

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MIPT: VISIT TO LONDON BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:  
MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.  
BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO SEND YOU MY WARMEST GREETINGS AND SINCERE  
GOOD WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH AND SUCCESS.

IT HAS, INDEED, BEEN TOO LONG SINCE I LAST HAD THE PLEASURE OF  
MEETING YOU TO DISCUSS THE MANY SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND  
CONCERN. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AS  
I ALWAYS VALUE YOUR COUNSEL AND TREASURE OUR FRIENDSHIP.

IT IS IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, CONFIDENCE AND TRUST, WHICH WE  
SHARE, THAT I PERMIT MYSELF TO PRESUME, FOR THE FIRST TIME, UPON  
YOUR TOLERANCE AND TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF THE IMPENDING VISIT  
TO LONDON OF HIS MAJESTY KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO, HEADING THE  
ARAB DELEGATION REPRESENTING THE FEZ SUMMIT.

ALTHOUGH MANY MUTUAL FRIENDS HAVE APPROACHED ME IN THE HOPE THAT  
I MAY RAISE THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU, I DO SO NOW, HOWEVER, OUT OF  
MY PERSONAL CONVICTION AND FOR NO OTHER REASON. I BELIEVE IT TO  
BE FIRMLY IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF STRENGTHENING  
BRITISH/ARAB RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THE INTERESTS OF THOSE  
COMMITTED TO THE CAUSE OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE AREA, TO  
RECOMMEND AND PLEAD WITH YOU MOST URGENTLY AND STRONGLY THAT THE  
TIME HAS COME, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE SUMMIT DELEGATION VISITS  
LONDON, FOR YOU TO RECEIVE AMONGST ITS MEMBERS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF  
THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

DEAR FRIEND, IF YOU SHOULD DO SO YOU WOULD BE RECEIVING THE ARAB  
SUMMIT'S MISSION REPRESENTING, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE TOTAL  
ARAB CONSENSUS AND COMMITMENT FOR PEACE. YOU WOULD BE ENCOURAGING  
THIS TOTALLY POSITIVE TREND AND DIRECTION WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD  
AND THE P.L.O., AS IT REPRESENTS THE LONG SUFFERING PALESTINIAN  
PEOPLE AND THEIR YEARNING FOR A LIFE OF DIGNITY AND PEACE, AS WELL  
AS THE RIGHT OF ALL IN THE AREA TO SUCH A LIFE AND FUTURE.

THE EIGHT POINTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT ARE DERIVED TOTALLY FROM THE  
UNITED NATIONS AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN SPIRIT AND IN  
WORD. THE CONCEPT OF TWO STATES, A JEWISH STATE AND A PALESTINIAN  
STATE OF THE PARTITION PLAN, NOW REFERRED TO AS ISRAEL AND PALESTINE,  
IS THE ONLY FOUNDATION OF ISRAEL'S LEGITIMACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL  
AND LEGAL LEVELS. THE FAMOUS BRITISH PRINCIPLE OF THE

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INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE SEMICLN THE RIGHTS OF ALL FOLLOWERS OF THE THREE GREAT MONOTHEISTIC RELIGIONS IN THEIR HOLY PLACES SEMICLN THE RIGHT OF RETURN OF COMPENSATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS SEMICLN AND THE RIGHT OF ALL IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY. THE SAME PRINCIPLE WAS UPHELD BY BRITAIN IN THE FALKLANDS UNDER YOUR WISE AND COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP WITH OUR TOTAL SUPPORT.

THE P.L.O. LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS TO ALL THESE FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE. WHAT IS THE WISDOM THEN IN QUESTIONING THIS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES WE HAVE ALL LONG SOUGHT TO UPHOLD? HOW CAN WE RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS? AND WHAT RIGHT DO WE HAVE TO DENY THEM THE RIGHT TO BE AMONGST THE FOREMOST TO SEEK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE WHEN THEY ARE THE MAIN AGGRIEVED PARTY, AND WHEN THEY HAVE JOINED THE ENTIRE ARAB FAMILY, AS THEY DID AT FEZ, IN THE CLEAREST COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE?

IT IS, INDEED, SAD THAT IN OUR WORLD WE TEND TO NAME A PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR THEIR RIGHTS DIFFERENTLY, AND THUS A PEOPLE MAY BE CALLED FREEDOM FIGHTERS, MEMBERS OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, MUJAHIDEEN, OR TERRORISTS, BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE AT THE SAME TIME. THE FACT IS THAT A STATE, SUCH AS ISRAEL, ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE, STILL PRACTISES LARGE-SCALE AND INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM AND DENIES THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PALESTINIANS DESERVE TO BE RECOGNIZED IN TERMS OF THEIR CLEAR RIGHTS. IT IS THROUGH THEIR PROLONGED SUFFERING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE WORLD TO MOVE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN DIGNITY, BOTH FOR THEMSELVES AND OTHERS. THEY HAVE TAKEN GREAT STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION WHICH DESERVE OUR RECOGNITION AND ENCOURAGEMENT.

AS YOU ARE FULLY AWARE, WE ARE STEADILY MOVING TO ORGANIZE FUTURE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIANS RELATIONS. THE QUESTION OF SPECIFIC PALESTINIAN RECOGNITION OF THE REALITY OF ISRAEL AND ISRAEL'S RIGHTS, IN ADDITION TO THE P.L.O.'S COMMITMENT AT FEZ, IS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE. YET, PRIME MINISTER, TO BE FAIR, AND YOU ARE ALWAYS FAIR, ISRAEL SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY BE CONVINCED TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE PALESTINIANS RIGHTS ON PALESTINIAN SOIL. NOTHING COULD BE MORE MEANINGFUL OR CONSTRUCTIVE THAN MEETING P.L.O. REPRESENTATIVES AT THIS STAGE TO ENCOURAGE PALESTINIAN POSITIVENESS SO THAT OBSTACLES MAY BE REMOVED FROM THE PATH OF PEACE.

PRIME MINISTER, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM FRANCE WHERE I HEADED THE SAME GROUP, IN OUR TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THAT I SHALL SHORTLY BE LEADING TO THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, AT WHICH POINT THIS PHASE OF COMBINED ARAB DIPLOMACY, EMANATING FROM THE FEZ SUMMIT, WILL BE CONCLUDED.

I KNOW THAT IF THE P.L.O. ARE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE GROUP HEADED BY HIS MAJEST KING HASSAN, WHEN THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU, THEN THE P.L.O. WOULD NOT COME TO LONDON IN THE FIRST PLACE. I ALSO KNOW THAT OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARAB STATES

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/WORLD



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WOULD FEEL THAT THEIR PRESENCE ON THE MISSION, UNDER THOSE  
CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD BE OUT OF PLACE. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES  
YOUR POSITION WOULD, UNFORTUNATELY, APPEAR TO BE A DELIBERATE  
AFFRONT TO THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD AS REPRESENTED BY THE SUMMIT AND  
THE MISSION REPRESENTING IT FROM FEZ. IT WOULD, INDEED, BE  
UNFORTUNATE IF A CRISIS IN RELATIONS RESULTED WITH ALL THE DAMAGE IT  
WOULD CAUSE TO ALL, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE NEED, DEAR PRIME MINISTER,  
TO WORK SO CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THE TIMES AHEAD TO ACHIEVE THE  
JUST, HONOURABLE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA WHICH IS OUR  
MUTUAL OBJECTIVE AND TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.  
WITH ALL THESE REALITIES AND SO MUCH AT STAKE, I FELT IT IMPERATIVE  
THAT I WRITE TO YOU TO REQUEST YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND KIND  
CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER. I PRAY TO GOD THAT HE MAY GUIDE YOUR  
STEPS ALWAYS.

I AM  
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,  
HUSSEIN

ENDS.  
FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES  
URWICK

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
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## DRAFT MESSAGE TO KING FAHAD

Your Majesty,

May I thank you for your message, given by Crown Prince Abdullah to Sir James Craig on 28 November, expressing concern about the British position as regards the Arab League delegation's proposed visit to London.

I thought I should let you know how disappointed I am that it has not proved possible for the Delegation to come here this week.

When the visit was first proposed, we had a series of preliminary discussions with the Moroccan Government in which they raised, informally, the question of PLO participation in the Delegation. We explained the well-known British position on high-level contacts with the PLO. and we were subsequently told that King Hassan would be accompanied by the six Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General of the Arab League. We understood that there would be no PLO representative, even though of course we knew that this would have been the Arab preference. When despite this a formal request to us to agree to PLO participation was put to us last week, supported by messages from Your Majesty and from some other Arab leaders, we were faced with the need to settle the matter in the few days remaining to us. Our proposal of 26 November was intended as a positive and constructive response to bridge the gap. The suggestion was not that the Arab side should make or sign any statement, but that the British side should <sup>be in a position to</sup> make a statement along the lines indicated.



As regards the reference in the statement to terrorism, which HRH Prince Saud discussed with Sir James Craig, our proposal was that the British statement should say that the members of the visiting delegation 'confirm their rejection of terrorism'. I am of course aware that the resolutions of the Palestine National Council held in 1981 include a form of words condemning terrorism. Still more important, I am aware of Your Majesty's resolute opposition to terrorism, of which Saudi Arabia, like so many other countries, has sometimes been the target. It would be valuable if the PLO, in association with Arab Governments, could reaffirm its categoric condemnation, and the proposal we made was intended simply to achieve that purpose, thereby destroying one of the arguments most frequently used to discredit the PLO and the Palestinian cause.

The British position is not meant to be restrictive or negative. The sooner all the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute and those who wish to help them can sit down together and discuss the next steps within a realistic and positive framework, the sooner the Palestinian people will be put in a position to exercise their right of self-determination. I do not think that a change in British policy towards the PLO, in the absence of any clear step forward by them, at least a conditional move, will help to bring this about. Our position on contacts with the PLO, which is wholly consistent with the Venice Declaration, aims to underline our conviction that PLO acceptance in principle of Israel's right to exist in peace and security.



if Israel is prepared to accept legitimate Palestinian rights, is a necessary step if there are to be realistic negotiations on the future of the Palestinians. We believe that it is vital for both sides to take advantage of the present opportunities for making progress towards negotiations; and inevitably this will mean both sides having to compromise on their maximum demands.

I am saddened that this misunderstanding should have arisen, for I believe there is a broad area of agreement between us on many other aspects of the Palestinian problem. I hope a way can be found, consistent with the principles and policies of ourselves and the Arabs, for the Arab League Delegation to come to London and <sup>people</sup> be appropriately received. I should like to assure you in any event that we shall continue to play an active part as we can in the search for a just and lasting peace. We have for example been pressing the Americans hard on the urgent need for Israel to implement the settlements freeze proposed by President Reagan. It goes without saying that I attach the greatest possible importance to having the views of Your Majesty on this and other matters of such concern to both our countries.

Have the

pleasure of receiving them

for us to



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DESKBY 281300Z

FM RIYADH 281045Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 69 OF 28 NOVEMBER 1962

INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT (DESKBY 281300Z)

INFO IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK  
PARIS.

FROM AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH

RIYADH TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 (NOT TO ALL):  
ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON.

1. SUMMARY: I WAS SUMMONED TODAY SEPARATELY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND (ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF KING FAHD IN MOROCCO) BY THE CROWN PRINCE. BOTH EXPRESSED EXTREME DISMAY AT THE WAY EVENTS HAVE TURNED OUT AND ANXIETY LEST ARAB/BRITISH RELATIONS BE HARMED. BOTH HOPED EARNESTLY THAT HMG WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

2. PRINCE SAUD SAW ME FIRST. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD TALK OFF THE RECORD WITHOUT TAKING NOTES. HE BEGAN BY ASKING ME, WITH APPARENT GENUINE PUZZLEMENT, HOW IT HAD ALL HAPPENED. I REHEARSED THE COURSE OF EVENTS AND SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO MAIN POINTS I WISHED TO MAKE: FIRST, HMG'S POSITION ON RECEIVING THE PLO WAS LONG-STANDING AND WELL KNOWN TO THE SAUDIS. MINISTERS HAD SAID MANY TIMES THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO MEET PLO REPRESENTATIVES ON CONDITION THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD LEAD TO A STEP FORWARD IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND WE HAD MADE CLEAR WHAT KIND OF A STEP WE HAD IN MIND. SECONDLY, THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUE OF A PLO DELEGATE SHOULD BE AVOIDED. THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN BREACHED BY SOME CARELESS WORDS FROM AN ARAB OFFICIAL IN LONDON. IT WAS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR HMG TO GIVE WAY UNDER PRESSURE: NEVERTHELESS, WE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE URGENT MESSAGES WE HAD RECEIVED FROM ARAB LEADERS, IN PARTICULAR FROM KING FAHD.

3. IN REPLY, PRINCE SAUD MADE SEVERAL POINTS. FIRST, HE KNEW NOTHING OF ANY AGREEMENT TO AVOID THE ISSUE OF PLO REPRESENTATION IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION. HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. SECONDLY, THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH HMG HAD PROPOSED THAT THE ARAB SIDE SHOULD MAKE WAS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE. HE DESCRIBED THE OBJECTIONS TO IT ON FAMILIAR LINES AND ADDED THAT ASKING THE ARABS, AMONG THEM MODERATE COUNTRIES LIKE SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND MOROCCO, TO REJECT TERRORISM WAS LIKE ASKING A MAN IF HE HAD STOPPED BEATING HIS WIFE. THIRDLY, THOUGH HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE BRITISH POSITION THAT THE PLO COULD NOT BE MET UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON THEIR SIDE, THERE HAD INDEED BEEN SOME MOVEMENT: THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE EIGHT POINT PLAN AT FEZ, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THE TALKS BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND THE PLO. FOURTHLY, IF IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO RECEIVE A PLO DELEGATE,



THEN WE SHOULD HAVE ARRANGED TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO LONDON SO AS TO GIVE TIME FOR DISCUSSION AND RECONSIDERATION. THIS HAD BEEN THE INTENTION IN KING FAHD'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. ( I DO NOT HAVE ALL THE TELEGRAMS WITH ME IN RIYADH BUT I DO NOT RECALL THAT THE IDEA OF POSTPONEMENT WAS CONTAINED IN KING FAHD'S MESSAGE).

4. SAUD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE POSITION OF BRITAIN WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE USA. SHE WAS NOT BOUND BY PRIOR ENGAGEMENTS, SHE HAD ALREADY MET THE PLO IN THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE AND MR HURD HAD ALREADY TALKED TO QADDOUMI.

5. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOW TO SALVAGE WHAT WE COULD FROM THE CRISIS. OTHERWISE BOTH BRITISH AND ARAB INTERESTS WOULD SUFFER. WHAT DID WE INTEND TO SAY IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE MATTER?. I REPLIED THAT WHAT WE SAID WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CAME FROM THE ARAB SIDE. I UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HASSAN INTENDED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT. PRINCE SAUD GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS SECRETARY TO FIND OUT WHETHER SUCH A STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE.

6. WE MET AGAIN HALF AN HOUR LATER WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH WHO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING FAHD BY TELEPHONE TO SUMMON ME TO EXPRESS SAUDI ARABIA'S GRAVE DISQUIET AT OUR POSITION. HIS ARGUMENTS WERE MUCH THE SAME AS PRINCE SAUD'S THOUGH LESS DETAILED. HE SPOKE WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS AND LAID EMPHASIS ON SAUDI-BRITISH FRIENDSHIP.

7. PRINCE SAUD REPORTED THAT HE HAD NOW HEARD THAT KING HASSAN HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT BUT THE TEXT HAD NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED. BOTH HE AND THE CROWN PRINCE AGREED THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER KING HASSAN HAD USED THE WORD QUOTE POSTPONED UNQUOTE OR QUOTE CANCELLED UNQUOTE. IF THE LATTER, THE POSITION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. ABDULLAH INSTRUCTED SAUD TO TELEPHONE MOROCCO.

8. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT SAUDI VIEWS IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE PRESENTED MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER. BUT I FEAR THAT IF THE OTHER ARABS WERE TO MOUNT A CAMPAIGN AGAINST US, THE SAUDIS MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO GO ALONG, NO DOUBT AS MODERATELY AS THEY FELT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH.

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FM RABAT 291230Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 291400Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 474 OF 29 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS, TUNIS, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS

MIPT 473: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MOROCCAN NOTE.

BGINS

THE MINISTRY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND HAS THE HONOUR TO ASK THEM TO COMMUNICATE TO THEIR GOVERNMENT WHAT FOLLOWS:

THE MINISTRY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT ASTONISHMENT THE MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO HIS MAJESTY HASSAN II KING OF MOROCCO AND HEAD OF COMMITTEE OF SEVEN OF THE ARAB LEAGUE FROM MR FRANCIS PYM, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMONWEALTH, AND THE STATEMENT ATTACHED TO IT. THE MINISTRY CONSIDERS THAT BOTH TEXTS ARE IMPROPER REGARDING THEIR FORM, WHILE THEIR SUBSTANCE IS INACCEPTABLE.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE VISIT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN, MEANT TO BE A COURTESY ONE ON THE ONE HAND, AND TO INFORM BRITISH OFFICIALS OF THE ARAB PEACE PLAN AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE OTHER. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS QUESTION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PARTICULAR. THEREFORE, IT WAS UNSUITABLE TO IMPOSE ON THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN CONDITIONS OF ANY SORT, AND ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH CONDITIONS ARE PRELIMINARY AND OFFENDING.

WE CONSIDER THAT INSISTING ON ISSUING A STATEMENT BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE ARAB MINISTERS MEMBER OF THE ARAB COMMITTEE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THAT THIS STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE A DECLARATION OF REJECTION OF TERRORISM IN ALL ITS FORMS, AND THAT ALL COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE SHOULD AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS STATEMENT, ARE MATTERS WHICH ARE NOT CUSTOMARY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND A PRECEDENT WHICH CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.

THE MINISTRY WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT HIS MAJESTY KING HASSAN II IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN, AND THAT HE WAS KEEN THAT CONTACTS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS REGARDING THE PREPARATION OF THIS VISIT BE DONE IN A CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE. THEREFORE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE THAT BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REPLY REGARDING MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE VISIT BE SENT TO HIS MAJESTY ALONE, BE IT CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION OR ANY OTHER MATTER.

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FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE MINISTRY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS UNDER THE OBLIGATION TO RETURN THE TEXTS OF THE MESSAGE AND THE DRAFT STATEMENT AS IT CONSIDERS THESE DOCUMENTS INACCEPTABLE AND DO NOT FIT WITH ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS. THE MINISTRY IS SORRY TO INFORM YOU THAT THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN HAS DECIDED TO CANCEL APPOINTMENTS SET FOR THE MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS ON 1-2 DECEMBER 1982.

THE MINISTRY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

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FM RIYADH 300600Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 30 NOVEMBER 1982

FROM AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH

MY TELNO 68 : ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

1. LORD CARRINGTON, WHO IS IN RIYADH ON G E C BUSINESS, PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 29 NOVEMBER, OF WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT.
2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT KING FAHD WAS EXTREMELY UPSET ABOUT OUR POSITION ON THE PLO. HE HELD A HIGH REGARD FOR THE PRIME MINISTER BUT WAS WORRIED THAT UNLESS THE PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED ARAB/ BRITISH RELATIONS COULD SUFFER CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE. HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTY WE WERE IN NOW BUT WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE PIECES SHOULD BE PICKED UP OVER A PERIOD.
3. PRINCE SAUD TOLD LORD CARRINGTON THAT EVERYBODY IN THE ARAB WORLD WAS ANGRY AND FELT INSULTED BY OUR DOCUMENT WHICH HAD MADE THE SITUATION MUCH WORSE THAN AN OUTRIGHT REJECTION. PARTICULARLY INSULTING WAS THE DEMAND THAT PEOPLE...



~~THE SITUATION MUCH WORSE THAN AN OUTRIGHT REJECTION. PARTICULARLY~~  
INSULTING WAS THE DEMAND THAT PEOPLE WHO DID NOT PRACTISE  
TERRORISM SHOULD RENOUNCE IT.

4. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CANCELLATION ( PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT POSTPONEMENT WAS A BETTER WORD THOUGH THE PRESS WERE TALKING OF CANCELLATION) WERE LIKELY TO BE. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE WHOLE FEZ/REAGAN INITIATIVE COULD WELL BE BADLY SET BACK. BY IMPOSING CONDITIONS WHICH EVEN THEY HAD NOT ASKED FOR WE HAD MADE THE AMERICANS MORE DIFFICULT. SIMILARLY THE ISRAELIS, WHO WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO BECOME EVEN MORE INTRANSIGENT.

5. IN CONCLUSION PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT HE FOUND OUR POSITION INEXPLICABLE. AT VENICE WE HAD SAID THAT THE PLO MUST BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. YET WHEN AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION HAD WANTED TO COME AND TALK ABOUT PEACE, MANDATED BY THE HIGHEST ARAB AUTHORITY AND CONTAINING ONLY ONE MEMBER OF THE PLO ALONGSIDE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF SOVEREIGN ARAB STATES WE HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT IT. IN SO DOING WE HAD REFUSED TO FORWARD THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

6. LORD CARRINGTON UNDERTOOK TO REPORT WHAT PRINCE SAUD HAD SAID TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RETURN TO THE UK.

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FM JEDDA 291105Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 562 OF 29 NOV  
INFO PRIORITY RABAT, TUNIS, WASHINGTON, RIYADH

MY TELNO 561: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION.

1. COVERAGE OF THE ISSUE IN TODAY'S (29 NOVEMBER) PRESS IS GENERALLY HOSTILE.
2. EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS BEGUN TO CALL FOR A REAPPRAISAL OF ARAB-BRITISH RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS EPISODE. THE MOST SPECIFIC IS A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL IN 'OKAZ' BY AZIZ DHIA', WHICH INTERPRETS THE BRITISH POSITION IN TERMS OF OUR LONGSTANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES; BUT POINTS OUT THAT BRITAIN HAS NOT FOLLOWED THE US LINE OVER E.G. THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE AND THE FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN VIEW OF BRITAIN'S HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALESTINE, SHE SHOULD NOT FOLLOW THE US IN THIS CASE EITHER. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY SAYING THAT ON AN (UNSPECIFIED) PREVIOUS OCCASION, WHEN THE ARAB STATES REVIEWED THEIR CONTRACTS WITH BRITISH COMPANIES, MRS THATCHER 'WAS FORCED TO BACK DOWN AND APOLOGISE', AND SUGGESTING THAT THE ARABS SHOULD CONSIDER THE SAME TACTICS NOW.

??



AND SUGGESTING THAT THE ARABS SHOULD CONSIDER THE SAME TACTICS NOW.

3. COMMENT. DHIA' MUST HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO THE DEATH OF A PRINCESS EPISODE. ALTHOUGH HE IS SAID TO BE CLOSE TO KING FAHD, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THIS IS ANYTHING BUT A PRIVATE INITIATIVE.

4. IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE LOCAL PRESS, WE ARE ADHERING TO THE LINE IN YOUR TELNO 860 TO RABAT.

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FM RABAT 291230Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 291400Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 474 OF 29 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS, TUNIS, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS

MIPT 473: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MOROCCAN NOTE.

BEGINS

THE MINISTRY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND HAS THE HONOUR TO ASK THEM TO COMMUNICATE TO THEIR GOVERNMENT WHAT FOLLOWS:

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IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE VISIT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN, MEANT TO BE A COURTESY ONE ON THE ONE HAND, AND TO INFORM BRITISH OFFICIALS OF THE ARAB PEACE PLAN AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE OTHER. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS QUESTION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PARTICULAR. THEREFORE, IT WAS UNSUITABLE TO IMPOSE ON THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN CONDITIONS OF ANY SORT, AND ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH CONDITIONS ARE PRELIMINARY AND OFFENDING.

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THE MINISTRY WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT HIS MAJESTY KING HASSAN II IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN, AND THAT HE WAS KEEN THAT CONTACTS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS REGARDING THE PREPARATION OF THIS VISIT BE DONE IN A CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE. THEREFORE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE THAT BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REPLY REGARDING MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE VISIT BE SENT TO HIS MAJESTY ALONE, BE IT CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION OR ANY OTHER MATTER.

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THE MINISTRY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

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FM ALGIERS 290850Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 29 NOVEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY ME POSTS

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED TODAY TEXT OF FOREIGN  
MINISTRY STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN WILL  
NOT BE GOING TO LONDON IN VIEW OF BRITAIN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A  
PLO REPRESENTATIVE. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, ALGERIA REGARDS SUCH A  
VISIT AS A WASTE OF TIME.

2. THE ARABIC DAILY ADDS A DISOBLIGING STATEMENT BY ARAFAT.



2. THE ARABIC DAILY ADDS A DISOBLIGING STATEMENT BY ARAFAT.

3. THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO OUR TERMS, NOR TO YOUR MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HAVE TOLD ME THEY FIND MOST OFFENSIVE.

STRACHAN

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SENT AT 291000Z GCB



GRS 230

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FM TUNIS 291350Z NOVEMBER 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 262 OF 29 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY RABAT ALGIERS AMMAN DAMASCUS JEDDA WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK OTHER ME POSTS PARIS

RABAT TELS NOS 468 AND 469: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. AGENCY REPORTS FROM RABAT GIVING THE MOROCCAN PRESS STATEMENT ARE CARRIED ON THE FRONT PAGES OF TODAY'S (29 NOVEMBER) TUNISIAN PRESS. THESE REPORTS ALSO GIVE A SUMMARY OF OUR CONDITIONS FOR RECEIVING A PLO REPRESENTATIVE, AS PUBLISHED IN THE MOROCCAN NEWSPAPER QUOTE AL ALAM UNQUOTE. THE ONLY COMMENT SO FAR - IN THE LEADING INDEPENDENT DAILY LE TEMPS - CALLS FOR A COMMERCIAL BOYCOTT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT NORMAL RELATIONS COULD BE MAINTAINED WITH THESE COUNTRIES AFTER THEIR REBUFF OF A DECISION TAKEN UNANIMOUSLY BY THE ARAB KINGS AND HEADS OF STATE.

2. THE CANCELLATION OF THE DELEGATION'S VISIT MAY BE RAISED WHILE MR REES IS HERE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE COULD BE FULLY BRIEFED.

3. OMRAN TELEPHONED YESTERDAY TO SAY THAT THE MOROCCAN STATEMENT, WHICH WAS ALSO ON LAST NIGHT'S LOCAL NEWS BROADCASTS, HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THAT THE REACTIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FEZ COMMISSION TO OUR PROPOSAL HAD BEEN AS SHARP AS HE HAD FEARED. HE EXPRESSED HIS OWN AND KLIBI'S DISMAY AT THE POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO BRITISH/ARAB RELATIONS AND HE HOPED THAT MEANS COULD BE FOUND OF MITIGATING IT.

4. OMRAN ADDED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEZ COMMISSION WOULD ASSEMBLE IN AMMAN BEFORE GOING TO MOSCOW AND PEKING.

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DESKBY 281300Z

FM RIYADH 281045Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 69 OF 28 NOVEMBER 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT (DESKBY 281300Z)

INFO IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK  
PARIS.

FROM AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH

RIYADH TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 (NOT TO ALL):

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON.

1. SUMMARY: I WAS SUMMONED TODAY SEPARATELY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND (ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF KING FAHD IN MOROCCO) BY THE CROWN PRINCE. BOTH EXPRESSED EXTREME DISMAY AT THE WAY EVENTS HAVE TURNED OUT AND ANXIETY LEST ARAB/BRITISH RELATIONS BE HARMED. BOTH HOPED EARNESTLY THAT HMG WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

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2. PRINCE SAUD SAW ME FIRST . HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD TALK OFF THE RECORD WITHOUT TAKING NOTES. HE BEGAN BY ASKING ME, WITH APPARENT GENUINE PUZZLEMENT, HOW IT HAD ALL HAPPENED. I REHEARSED THE COURSE OF EVENTS AND SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO MAIN POINTS I WISHED TO MAKE : FIRST, HMG'S POSITION ON RECEIVING THE PLO WAS LONG-STANDING AND WELL KNOWN TO THE SAUDIS. MINISTERS HAD SAID MANY TIMES THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO MEET PLO REPRESENTATIVES ON CONDITION THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD LEAD TO A STEP FORWARD IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND WE HAD MADE CLEAR WHAT KIND OF A STEP WE HAD IN MIND. SECONDLY, THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUE OF A PLO DELEGATE SHOULD BE AVOIDED. THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN BREACHED BY SOME CARELESS WORDS FROM AN ARAB OFFICIAL IN LONDON. IT WAS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR HMG TO GIVE WAY UNDER PRESSURE: NEVERTHELESS, WE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE URGENT MESSAGES WE HAD RECEIVED FROM ARAB LEADERS, IN PARTICULAR FROM KING FAHD.

3. IN REPLY, PRINCE SAUD MADE SEVERAL POINTS. FIRST, HE KNEW NOTHING OF ANY AGREEMENT TO AVOID THE ISSUE OF PLO REPRESENTATION IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION. HE ~~DID NOT~~ H

~~XXXXXX~~ HE DID NOT SEE

HOW IT COULD HAVE

BEEN AVOIDED. SECONDLY, THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH HMG HAD PROPOSED THAT THE ARAB SIDE SHOULD MAKE WAS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE. HE DESCRIBED THE OBJECTIONS TO IT ON FAMILIAR LINES AND ADDED THAT ASKING THE ARABS, AMONG THEM MODERATE COUNTRIES LIKE SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND MOROCCO, TO REJECT TERRORISM WAS LIKE ASKING A MAN IF HE HAD STOPPED BEATING HIS WIFE. THIRDLY, THOUGH HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE BRITISH POSITION THAT THE PLO COULD NOT BE MET UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON THEIR SIDE, THERE HAD INDEED BEEN SOME MOVEMENT: THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE EIGHT POINT PLAN AT FEZ, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THE TALKS BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND THE PLO. FOURTHLY, IF IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO RECEIVE A PLO DELEGATE, THEN WE SHOULD HAVE ARRANGED TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO LONDON SO AS TO GIVE TIME FOR DISCUSSION AND RECONSIDERATION. THIS HAD BEEN THE INTENTION IN KING FAHD'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. ( I DO NOT HAVE ALL THE TELEGRAMS WITH ME IN RIYADH BUT I DO NOT RECALL THAT THE IDEA OF POSTPONEMENT WAS CONTAINED IN KING FAHD'S MESSAGE).

4. SAUD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE POSITION OF BRITAIN WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE USA. SHE WAS NOT BOUND BY PRIOR ENGAGEMENTS, SHE HAD ALREADY MET THE PLO IN THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE AND MR HURD HAD ALREADY TALKED TO QADDOUMI.



5. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOW TO SALVAGE WHAT WE COULD FROM THE CRISIS. OTHERWISE BOTH BRITISH AND ARAB INTERESTS WOULD SUFFER. WHAT DID WE INTEND TO SAY IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE MATTER?. I REPLIED THAT WHAT WE SAID WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CAME FROM THE ARAB SIDE. I UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HASSAN INTENDED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT. PRINCE SAUD GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS SECRETARY TO FIND OUT WHETHER SUCH A STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE.

6. WE MET AGAIN HALF AN HOUR LATER WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH WHO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING FAHD BY TELEPHONE TO SUMMON ME TO EXPRESS SAUDI ARABIA'S GRAVE DISQUIET AT OUR POSITION. HIS ARGUMENTS WERE MUCH THE SAME AS PRINCE SAUD'S THOUGH LESS DETAILED. HE SPOKE WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS AND LAID EMPHASIS ON SAUDI-BRITISH FRIENDSHIP.

7. PRINCE SAUD REPORTED THAT HE HAD NOW HEARD THAT KING HASSAN HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT BUT THE TEXT HAD NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED. BOTH HE AND THE CROWN PRINCE AGREED THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER KING HASSAN HAD USED THE WORD QUOTE POSTPONED UNQUOTE OR QUOTE CANCELLED UNQUOTE. IF THE LATTER, THE POSITION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. ABDULLAH INSTRUCTED SAUD TO TELEPHONE MOROCCO.

8. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT SAUDI VIEWS IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE PRESENTED MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER. BUT I FEAR THAT IF THE OTHER ARABS WERE TO MOUNT A CAMPAIGN AGAINST US, THE SAUDIS MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO GO ALONG, NO DOUBT AS MODERATELY AS THEY FELT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH.

MUIR

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✓ Ian Gow



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation Visit:  
Reactions

You asked for a note on the position before the Prime Minister's meeting with a group of MPs this evening. I enclose this. In our public reaction and discussions with MPs we have not revealed exactly what we proposed. We have taken the line that we regret the postponement of the visit but remain in touch with the members of the proposed delegation. The formal request for the inclusion of a PLO representative came very late. We did our best to respond constructively in the light of our long-standing policy.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: REACTIONS TO PROPOSAL FOR  
AGREED STATEMENT

1. Summary. The Moroccan reaction has been the strongest, reflecting King Hassan's personal involvement; firm even heated rejection, but with care to leave the door open for a fresh start. The Saudis, Tunisians, Algerians, Syrians and the PLO rejected the terms of our statement. The Jordanians understood our aim and considered the statement a fair one: but were in no position to swing the balance.

2. Morocco. King Hassan has reacted sharply. Lord Chalfont, who saw him over the weekend, reported (and this was confirmed by other accounts) that the King was angry both about the difficulties in meeting all his wishes over the programme for his visit to London, and about the form and substance of our proposed statement. As regards the form, the King would clearly have preferred us to put the draft statement to him first before showing it to other members of the Delegation. On the substance, the Foreign Minister, Boucetta, commented that it was provocative to demand of the PLO that they renounce terrorism, and unacceptable to require endorsement by the whole Delegation to a set of preconditions. Boucetta has now transmitted a formal response, rejecting the message from Mr Pym which accompanied the draft statement. As leader of the Arab League Delegation, King Hassan feels personally affronted. It is likely to be some time before he is prepared to look objectively at the reasons for our position.

3. Saudi Arabia. The Saudi reaction has been one of 'grave concern', but in a tone of sorrow and puzzlement rather than anger. Prince Saud said that it was quite impossible for the Arab side to accept the statement we had put forward. He

/argued





argued that there had already been some movement in the PLO's position (Fez, and the Jordan/PLO talks) and added that if there were still difficulties about receiving a PLO representative, the visit should have been postponed to allow time for reconsideration. He concluded that it was important to salvage what we could from the crisis, otherwise both British and Arab interests would suffer. Crown Prince Abdullah later relayed a message to HM Ambassador in Riyadh from King Fahd expressing grave disquiet at our position, and laying emphasis on Saudi-British friendship.

4. Jordan. The Jordanians share the aim of our proposed statement, and had no difficulty with its substance. They regretted King Hassan's decision to cancel the visit to London. But faced with opposition from other participants in the Delegation, including Kings Hassan and Fahd, King Hussein clearly felt that he was not in a strong enough position to push for reconsideration of the decision to cancel.

5. PLO. As expected, Qaddumi flatly rejected the proposed statement, and subsequently confirmed this position with Arafat.

6. Tunisia. The Tunisian reaction was focussed on the terms of our proposed statement. They particularly objected to our proposal that all participants (ie including Tunisia) should confirm their rejection of terrorism, and concluded that the statement was not helpful.

7. Algeria. We have so far only had a low-level reaction, to the effect that our statement was unacceptable.

8. Syria. The Syrians have responded negatively at official level, but more in sorrow than in anger. Invitations could not be issued with preconditions. They claimed that our decision had been taken under US pressure.



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DESKBY MIDDLE EAST POSTS 271500Z NOV 82

DESKBY PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON FIRST CONTACT  
FROM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 533 OF 27 NOV 82

TO INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND PARIS, UKMIS  
NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 851 TO RABAT: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:

PLO REPRESENTATION.

1. MOST UNFORTUNATELY (OWING TO PROBLEMS WITH OUR COMMUNICATIONS  
EQUIPMENT) YOUR TELSNO 851-853 TO RABAT WERE NOT AVAILABLE  
HERE UNTIL VERY LATE LAST NIGHT. I WAS NOT , THEREFORE , ABLE TO SEE  
THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN UNTIL THIS  
MORNING.

2. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, TO WHOM I GAVE THE TEXT OF  
YOUR MESSAGE AND PROPOSED STATEMENT. TOGETHER WITH A SPEAKING  
NOTE SUMMARISING SOME OF THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 851 (OTHERS  
I MADE ORALLY) , SAID THAT HE THOUGHT YOUR SUGGESTED STATEMENT  
A FAIR ONE AND EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT KING HASSAN  
HAD DECIDED TO CANCEL THE VISIT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE  
DELEGATION TO LONDON (RABAT TELNO 467). QASEM SAID  
HE HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY FAHOUM  
IN DAMASCUS ON 26 NOVEMBER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PALESTINE  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING REJECTING THE REAGAN INITIATIVE (DAMASCUS  
TELNO 333), WHICH HE REGARDED AS A CLEAR SIGN THAT THE PLO  
HAD PUT THE INTERESTS OF THEIR ORGANISATION BEFORE THOSE OF THE  
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THAT IN DOING SO THEY HAD SUCCEDED  
TO SYRIAN INFLUENCE. QASEM SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT  
YET RECEIVED ANY NOTIFICATION FROM THE MOROCCANS THAT THE VISIT  
TO LONDON BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION HAD BEEN CANCELLED:  
INDEED THE LAST MESSAGE THEY HAD HAD FROM THEIR MISSION IN RABAT  
YESTERDAY MORNING HAD INDICATED THAT THE VISIT WAS STILL GOING  
AHEAD.

3. I THEN SAW MR HABIB , WHO WAS DUE TO HAVE TALKS WITH KING  
HUSSEIN LATER IN THE MORNING, AND BRIEFED HIM ON WHAT HAD  
OCCURRED. HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT OF SIR OLIVER  
WRIGHT'S MEETING WITH VELIOTES (WASHINGTON TELNO 3836 RECEIVED  
HERE AFTER MY MEETING WITH HABIB) BUT HAD NOT YET SEEN THE  
TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT IN YOUR TELNO 852 TO RABAT:  
IN SPEAKING TO HABIB I PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS  
ON THE POINT IN PARA 2.V. OF THE INSTRUCTIONS TO WASHINGTON  
IN YOUR TELNO 2088. HABIB EMPHASISED THAT AS VELIOTES HAD

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/ALREADY



ALREADY TOLD HM AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON ,EVEN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE PLO WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO OPEN THE WAY TO A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE US ADMINISTRATION AND THE PLO,ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE A USEFUL FORWARD STEP. US DESIDERATA HAD BEEN CLEARLY EXPLAINED TO KING HASSAN,WHO FULLY UNDERSTOOD THEM. HABIB SAID HE WOULD NOT HIMSELF RAISE WITH THE JORDANIANS THE QUESTION OF THE VISIT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON,WHICH HE SAW AS PRIMARILY A BRITISH AFFAIR,BUT THAT IF THE JORDANIANS BROUGHT IT UP HE WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT PLO AGREEMENT TO A STATEMENT OF THE KIND WE HAD SUGGESTED WOULD REPRESENT A USEFUL ADVANCE.

4. I SAW KING HUSSEIN AT MID -DAY,BEFORE HE STARTED HIS TALKS WITH HABIB,AND LEFT WITH HIM THE SAME PAPERS I HAD ALREADY LEFT WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER (SEE PARA 2. ABOVE).KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY MESSAGE FROM KING HASSAN.

THE KING SAID HE HAD KNOWN THE SITUATION WAS ALREADY CRITICAL AT THE TIME HE HAD SENT HIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEMICOLON HE FOUND IT HARD TO TELL WHETHER IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO RETRIEVE IT. I TOLD HIM OF YOUR HOPE THAT HE WOULD SPEAK DIRECTLY TO KING FAHD AND KING HASSAN SEMICOLON I ALSO EXPLAINED WHY I HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO THIS EFFECT LAST NIGHT. THE KING SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS ,BUT HE WAS CLEARLY NOT OPTIMISTIC.

5. THE FACT THAT KING HASSAN HAD APPARENTLY OBTAINED KING FAHD'S PRIOR AGREEMENT TO THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT AND ALSO THE STRONG REACTION OF THE PLO (DAMASCUS TELNO 332 ) SUGGEST THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS AN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TASK SEMICOLON INDEED HE MAY NOW PREFER TO KEEP HIS POWDER DRY FOR SOME OTHER OCCASION. ARAFAT IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN AMMAN THIS EVENING AND THE KING WILL BE HAVING TALKS WITH HIM TOMORROW.

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FM TUNIS 271140Z NOVEMBER 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 27 NOVEMBER  
AND TORABAT  
INFO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS AMMAN DAMASCUS JEDDA WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS

YOUR TELNO 851 TO RABAT AND TELECON HARDINGE/WILSON:  
ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO OMRAN ON 26 NOVEMBER. (KLIBI WAS TAKEN ILL AGAIN IN TRIPOLI AND RETIRED TO BED ON HIS RETURN ESSEBSI AND MESTIRI HAD DELAYED THEIR RETURN TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE TUNISIAN DELEGATION WAS AMONG THE LAST TO LEAVE THE ABORTIVE MEETING).
2. OMRAN COMMENTED THAT AT FIRST SIGHT THE MESSAGE WAS UNACCEPTABLE. HE FEARED THAT THE WORDING OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT WOULD BE REGARDED AS OFFENSIVE AND HE REGRETTED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED INFORMALLY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. HE CONSIDERED THAT THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD OBJECT TO BEING ASKED TO CONFIRM THEIR REJECTION OF TERRORISM SINCE THIS COULD IMPLY THAT THEY HAD USED OR CONDONED IT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEAGUE WOULD CONSULT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION AND THAT THE MESSAGE WOULD BE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION.
3. I DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO CAID ESSEBSI THIS MORNING. HE ASKED ME TO THANK YOU FOR IT AND TO SAY THAT TUNISIA WOULD ABIDE BY THE CONSENSUS REACHED BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FEZ COMMISSION. HOWEVER, HE HAD TO SAY WITH REGRET THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED AND THAT HAD IT BEEN MADE TO TUNISIA ALONE, HE COULD NOT GO TO LONDON ON THIS BASIS.
4. HE SAID THAT BRITAIN APPEARED TO HAVE RETREATED FROM ITS EARLIER POSITION: OMRANEEEEEE QADDUMI HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY MR HURD WITHOUT THE MEMBERS OF THAT DELEGATION, WHICH HAD INCLUDED HIMSELF, BEING ASKED TO SUBSCRIBE TO A DECLARATION. I REITERATED OUR ATTITUDE, BUT HE WAS NOT MOVED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT PROPOSAL REPRESENTED AN ADVANCE.

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15 ESSEBSI



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5. ESSEBSI SAID THAT WHILE REALISING THAT THIS WAS A CIRCULAR MESSAGE, HE FOUND IT EXTRAORDINARY THAT TUNISIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THESE TERMS. PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAD BEEN THE FIRST ARAB LEADER TO CALL FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AND HAD STOOD UP TO SEVERE CRITICISM AS A RESULT. THE REFERENCE TO THE REJECTION OF TERRORISM COULD BE HELD TO IMPLY THAT THE TUNISIANS HAD AT SOME STAGE CONDONED IT. (HE ACCEPTED MY INTERJECTION THAT NO SUCH IMPLICATION WAS INTENDED, BUT COMMENTED THAT THE WORDING WAS UNFORTUNATE.) HE SAID THAT THE FEZ RESOLUTION ITSELF, TO WHICH THE PLO HAD EXPLICITLY SUBSCRIBED, WAS PROOF OF THE ARAB READINESS TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AND TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE DRAFT STATEMENT WAS NOT HELPFUL AND HE WISHED THAT WE HAD NOT PUT IT FORWARD. HE REPEATED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO TUNISIA, THOUGH HE WOULD BE BOUND BY THE CONSENSUS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION WHICH HE EXPECTED TO BE CONVEYED TO YOU THROUGH KING HASSAN.

6. ESSEBSI DID NOT INDICATE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF KING HASSAN'S REACTION (RABAT'S TELNO 467) AND DID NOT MENTION IT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3836 OF 26 NOVEMBER

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YOUR TELNO 2088: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:  
PLO REPRESENTATION

1. AS SMULTZ WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH PIK BOTNA'S VISIT,  
I MADE THESE POINTS TO VELIOTES THIS AFTERNOON, LEAVING  
COPIES OF YOUR MESSAGE TO ARAB LEADERS, THE DRAFT STATEMENT,  
AND MY TALKING POINTS.

2. VELIOTES COMMENTED THAT THE DRAFT STATEMENT WENT PRETTY  
FAR AND WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD. BUT THE AMERICANS  
WOULD HAVE TROUBLE IN AGREEING THAT IT MOVED THEM CLOSER TO  
A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO BECAUSE THERE WERE NO EXPLICIT REF-  
ERENCES TO SCR 242 AND 338 AND ARAB WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL



WAS STILL CONDITIONAL ON RECIPROCAL ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS. THE PRESIDENT WAS FIRM THAT ANY PLO STATEMENT HAD TO BE MORE THAT CONDITIONAL. VELIOTES NOTED THAT THE ARABS WERE NOW ARGUING THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AS THIS WOULD QUOTE LEGITIMISE THE BALFOUR DECLARATION UNQUOTE; THE MOST THEY COULD DO WOULD BE TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS A FACT OF LIFE WITH WHICH THEY COULD LIVE.

3. VELIOTES THEN GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF A TELEGRAM JUST RECEIVED FROM RABAT REPORTING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND, HE THOUGHT, GENERAL WALTERS. HE STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD NOT QUOTE THIS IN ANY SUBSEQUENT ACTION WE TOOK WITH THE ARABS. HASSAN HAD SAID THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO LONDON HAD BEEN CANCELLED. HE CLAIMED THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT OVER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISIT OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD. IT WAS PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE THAT NO MEETINGS HAD BEEN ARRANGED BETWEEN HIS LUNCH WITH THE QUEEN ON 1 DECEMBER AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S DINNER FOR THE DELEGATION ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS OFFENSIVE BOTH IN ITS SUBSTANCE AND ITS MODE OF DELIVERY (I.E. TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION RATHER THAN TO HIM AS ITS LEADER). HASSAN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FAND WHO WAS IRATE AND IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE VISIT SHOULD BE CANCELLED. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE WASHINGTON VISIT HAD SET A HIGH STANDARD WHICH LONDON WOULD DO WELL TO EMULATE. VELIOTES ADDED THAT THE WASHINGTON VISIT HAD LACKED SUBSTANCE; HASSAN HAD TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS REAGAN TO MODIFY HIS POLICY, AND NO DOUBT HOPED TO USE THE LONDON VISIT TO PERSUADE US TO DO THE SAME.

4. VELIOTES WAS CONFIDENT THAT KING HASSAN HAD BEEN ACCURATELY REPORTED, BUT HE WAS A GRAY THESPIAN AND LIABLE TO MAKE A MOUNTAIN OF PROTOCOL MOLEHILLS; IN THE AMERICANS EXPERIENCE, HE COULD NOT BE RELIED ON TO GIVE A TRUTHFUL ACCOUNT OF HIS DEALINGS WITH FAND. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE COULD BE ANY SUBSTANCE TO HASSAN'S COMMENTS; THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THE DRAFT STATEMENT WHICH HASSAN PROBABLY SUSPECTED WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE PLO. RATHER THAN PRESS THE PLO ON THE SUBJECT HE HAD DECIDED TO BE OFFENDED.



5. VELIOTES CONCLUDED THAT THE AMERICANS DIDN'T REALLY CARE WHETHER OR NOT THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION WENT TO LONDON. THEY WERE CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO FAULT US FOR HANGING TOUGH ON THE ISSUE OF PLO REPRESENTATION. BUT IF IT TRANSPIRED THAT KING HASSAN HAD NOT CANCELLED THE VISIT, WE WOULD CERTAINLY

THAT KING HASSAN HAD NOT CANCELLED THE VISIT, HE WOULD CERTAINLY ENSURE THAT YOUR MESSAGE WAS URGENTLY CONSIDERED AT A HIGHER LEVEL.

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DESKBY WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK 271400Z, DESKBY PARIS 270900Z  
FM RABAT 260810Z NOVEMBER 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 467 OF 26 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE ALL ME POSTS, UKHIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS

TELCON BROAD / RESIDENT CLERK: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. BOUCETTA SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR MESSAGE KING HASSAN HAD DECIDED TO CALL OFF THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO LONDON ON 1/2 DECEMBER. A FORMAL WRITTEN REPLY WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TOMORROW EITHER HERE OR TO THE MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION HAD BEEN INFORMED. BOUCETTA HAD HIMSELF BEEN TO FEZ TO TALK TO KING FAND.

2. AS HE HAD SAID ON A FIRST READING THIS MORNING, BOUCETTA TOOK ISSUE WITH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE FORM OF THE MESSAGE AND STATEMENT. HE CONSIDERED OUR CONDITIONS FOR RECEIVING THE PLO TO BE UNACCEPTABLE IN CONTENT AND DISCOURTEOUS IN



CONCEPTION. IT WAS PROVOCATIVE TO DEMAND OF THE PLO THAT THEY RENOUNCE TERRORISM. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLE TO ASK KING HASSAN TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO HELP WITH BRITISH DOMESTIC OPINION BUT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO REQUIRE ENDORSEMENT OF A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS. IT WAS DISAPPOINTING KING HASSAN HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED FIRST OF THE MESSAGE, HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY OUT.

3. BOUCETTA GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING GENUINELY PUZZLED AT WHAT HE REGARDED NOT SIMPLY AS AN UNHELPFUL RESPONSE BUT A PROVOCATION AND A DISCOURTESY. HE SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY BRITAIN WHICH UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND FACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD HAVE ACTED IN THIS WAY. I ARGUED THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS BY ENCOURAGING THE PLO TO MAKE THOSE MOVES THAT CAN BREAK THE LOGJAM BUT HE WAS NOT TO BE MOVED.

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MR EGERTON  
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Prime Minister

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FM RABAT 261615Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 261800Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 466 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA DESKBY 261800Z

IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS

YOUR TELNO 851: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. BOUCETTA PULLED A LONG FACE WHEN HE READ THE MESSAGE AND PROPOSED STATEMENT (YOUR TELNOS 852 AND 853) WHICH I HANDED TO HIM THIS MORNING FOR TRANSMISSION TO KING HASSAN. HIS PRELIMINARY REACTION WAS THAT WHAT WE PROPOSE IS NOT ON. HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING YOUR MESSAGE WITH THE KING LATER TODAY AND SEND A FORMAL REPLY SHORTLY.

2. THOUGH STUDIOUSLY POLITE HE WAS DEJECTED AT THE COMPLICATIONS HE ENVISAGES OUR REPLY CREATING FOR THE ARAB SIDE. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) KING HASSAN WOULD BE READY TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER SEEING MRS THATCHER, CONFIRMING THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION STAND BY THE FEZ DECLARATION WITH ALL IT IMPLIES, BUT TO ASK FOR FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE SPECIFIC WORDING IN OUR STATEMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE EITHER IN FORM OR SUBSTANCE.

(II) IT WAS AWKWARD THAT THE MESSAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT



(II) IT WAS AWKWARD THAT THE MESSAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF IT HAD GONE FIRST TO KING HASSAN ALONE, AS THE DELEGATION HEAD, SO THAT HE COULD DISCUSS ITS CONTENTS IN HIS OWN WAY WITH THE OTHERS.

(III) IN THE PROGRAMME AS SO FAR DISCUSSED, NO SPECIAL MEETING HAD BEEN PROPOSED WITH YOU. IT WOULD BE AWKWARD FOR THE PLO TO SEE YOU BUT BE ABSENT WHEN THE DELEGATION SEES THE PRIME MINISTER.

(IV) THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR REPLY WAS PUZZLING. THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD LIKE TO HAVE US FURTHER OUT FRONT. MOROCCO HAD PERSUADED THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS NOT TO BOW OUT OF THE VISIT TO LONDON ON THE GROUNDS THAT WE WOULD BE OPEN TO ARGUMENT ON FULL PLO PARTICIPATION.

3. I ENDEAVOURED TO PERSUADE MAITRE BOUCETTA THAT WHAT WE PROPOSE IS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO MEET THE ARAB SIDE'S CONCERN BUT I FEAR I MADE LITTLE HEADWAY.

4. KING FAHD IS STILL IN FEZ AND I HAVE TRANSMITTED THE MESSAGE TO HIM THROUGH THE SAUDI EMBASSY (THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IS ALSO IN FEZ). FOR LANGUAGE REASONS, AMONG OTHERS, I DID NOT DISCUSS THE CONTENTS OF THE MESSAGE OR MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR WITH THE SAUDI COUNSELLOR.

5. EMISSARY. IF THE ELEMENTS OF A PACKAGE DEAL LOOK LIKE EMERGING, I HAVE NO DOUBT, GIVEN KING HASSAN'S LIKING FOR THIS STYLE OF DIPLOMACY, THAT A SUITABLE EMISSARY COULD TIP THE BALANCE BUT IT MAY BE BEST TO HOLD THIS IN RESERVE UNTIL WE HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF KING HASSAN'S REACTION. IF HE CHOSSES TO NURSE A GRUDGE, AN EMISSARY MIGHT ALSO HAVE A USEFUL PLACATORY ROLE.

6. KING HASSAN'S PROGRAMME. GENERAL MOULAY HAFID ASKED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING TO URGE THAT THE TIMING OF THE TETE A TETE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BE CHANGED FROM 1800 ON WEDNESDAY 1 DECEMBER TO THE MORNING, PREFERABLY 11.30. THE KING WISHED TO AVOID A FREE MORNING AND TO HAVE A MEETING OF THE DELEGATION IN THE AFTERNOON. I SHOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO GET BACK TO GENERAL MOULAY HAFID, WHO AS YOU KNOW IS TRICKY AND IRASCIBLE, AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, EVEN IF THE ANSWER IS THAT NO CHANGE IS POSSIBLE. IF THE PRIME MINISTER CAN AGREE A CHANGE, I WOULD TRY TO USE IT AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR MEETING US ON AIRPORTS/AIRCRAFT ARRANGEMENTS.

BROAD



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16

PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
RD/NEHAD  
ED/MED  
RD/URD

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

RD/... *NASD* ...

*MS*

~~RD/CONSULAR DEPT~~

PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 262115Z  
FM DAMASCUS 262005Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

TELNO 332 OF 26 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT, ALGIERS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER ME POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 851 TO RABAT.

VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION; PLO REPRESENTATIVE.

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH QADDOUNI THIS EVENING 26TH.
2. AFTER READING TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT QADDOUNI FLATLY REJECTED IT. HE SAID IT WAS SIMPLY A REPETITION OF YOUR CONDITIONS FOR MEETING ARAFAT AND AS SUCH WAS UNACCEPTABLE. BRITAIN WAS ACTING AS PROXY FOR ISRAEL.
3. QADDOUNI THEN TELEPHONED ARAFAT IN MY PRESENCE AND GAVE HIM THE COPY OF THE TEXT... (REMAINS IN THE REFERENCE TO ISRAELI'S RIGHTS)



3. CADDUMI THEN TELEPHONED ARAFAT IN MY PRESENCE AND GAVE HIM THE GIST OF THE TEXT (EMPHASISING REFERENCE TO ISRAEL'S RIGHTS AND COMPARING OUR PROPOSALS WITH THOSE HE SAID MR. DENNIS WALTERS MP HAD PUT TO ARAFAT IN BEIRUT SOME TIME AGO). HE THEN TOLD ME THAT ARAFAT CONFIRMED PLO REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT.

4. THOUGH CADDUMI'S MANNER WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT, THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO ROOM FOR ARGUMENT. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT OTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE TO REMAINDER OF PROGRAMME (PARA 4 OF TUR).

LUCAS

KHND

---



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16

PS/HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/... *NA* ...

~~AD/CONSULAR DEPT~~

... ..  
... ..

PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260030Z

FROM WASHINGTON 260500Z NOV 82.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3825 OF 25 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 851 TO RABAT: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:  
PLO REPRESENTATION.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD WELCOME THIS GENERAL  
APPROACH. IF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND P.L.O. REPRESENTATIVES COULD  
BE BROUGHT TO MAKE THE KIND OF STATEMENT YOU ARE PROPOSING,  
ENTAILING ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, THIS WOULD BE  
REGARDED HERE AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD AND, POSSIBLY, AS OPENING  
THE WAY FOR A U.S. DIALOGUE WITH THE P.L.O. THE PALESTINIANS  
HAVE NOT HITHERTO BEEN PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION:  
AND IT IS BOUND TO BE REGARDED AS PROBLEMATICAL WHETHER THEY WILL  
DO SO NOW. BUT THE AMERICANS SHOULD WELCOME ANY MOVES BY US TO  
BRING THEM TOWARDS SUCH A COMMITMENT. WE WOULD RECOMMEND  
INFORMING THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING.  
WE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO LET YOU HAVE MORE AUTHORITATIVE REACTIONS.

WRIGHT

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

38525 - 1

OO RABAT DESKBY 260630Z  
GRS 433  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 260630Z  
FM FCO 252030Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 853 OF 25 NOVEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TUNIS  
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER ME POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS

A.J.C. <sup>26</sup>/<sub>11</sub>  
h-a.

MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY MESSAGE.  
BEGINS

I HAVE CONSIDERED VERY CAREFULLY THE ARGUMENTS WHICH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE HAVE PUT TO US ON THE QUESTION OF RECEIVING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION DUE TO VISIT LONDON ON 1-2 DECEMBER. I FULLY RECOGNISE THE VERY STRONG VIEWS HELD ON THIS POINT ON THE ARAB SIDE. IN RETURN I WOULD ASK YOU TO ACCEPT THAT THIS HAS POSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US. OUR LONGSTANDING AND PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED POLICY HAS BEEN THAT BRITISH MINISTERS WOULD ONLY MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO IF THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. WE HAVE ADDED THAT THE KIND OF STEP WE HAVE IN MIND IS THAT THE PLO SHOULD MAKE CLEARER THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS AS PART OF A SETTLEMENT MEETING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND CONFIRM THAT THEY HAVE RENOUNCED TERRORISM IN ALL ITS FORMS.

WE HAVE VERY POSITIVE REASONS FOR THIS. OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IS WELL KNOWN. WE HAVE SAID THAT THE PLO MUST BE ASSOCIATED WITH NEGOTIATIONS. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE AMBIGUITIES WHICH REMAIN ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TO ISRAEL AND TO TERRORISM ARE A HINDRANCE RATHER THAN A HELP TO THE SECURING OF THESE RIGHTS THROUGH SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

/WGE

1

CONFIDENTIAL



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38525 - 1

WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR POLICY AGAIN IN THE LIGHT OF THE URGENT REPRESENTATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE ARAB SIDE. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE VISIT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, WHICH WILL BE A VERY USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL HOW PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS PEACE IN THE LIGHT OF THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE AND THE OTHER PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD RECENTLY. I WISHED TO LET YOU KNOW OUR CONCLUSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SEE THE FULL ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, INCLUDING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO, PROVIDED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING THE PLO WERE ABLE TO CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF A STATEMENT WHICH WE WOULD PUBLISH BEFORE THE MEETING. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT WE PROPOSE TO MAKE IS ATTACHED. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO CLARIFY THE UNDERSTANDING, WHICH I BELIEVE WE ALL SHARE, OF THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE.

I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CONFIRM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT YOU AGREE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS STATEMENT. OUR PROPOSED ACTION WOULD REPRESENT A MARKED ADVANCE SO FAR AS THE PLO ARE CONCERNED ON OUR PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THEM. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING YOU IN LKONDON NEXT WEEK.  
ENDS.

PYM

STANDARD

NENAD  
MED  
NAD  
SAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
RID

SECURITY D  
MAED  
ES & SD  
ERD  
ESID  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE



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DM  
free

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1982

Contacts with the PLO

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 23 November and has discussed its contents with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Mrs. Thatcher does not wish to receive at 10 Downing Street an Arab League delegation which includes a representative of the PLO.

She agreed, however, with Mr. Pym that he might receive a delegation, including a representative of the PLO, provided that before the visit took place the PLO formally agreed to certain conditions. The conditions are spelt out in the enclosed draft statement which has been seen and approved by the Prime Minister. You will doubtless now wish to establish whether the delegation, including the PLO, accept the statement.

B/P  
I should be grateful to receive in due course a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's message on this subject.

6/11  
In your letter of 24 November you raised the question of possible changes in the timings of the talks and the dinner on 2 December. I see little difficulty about holding the dinner rather later than has been proposed. But I wonder whether, if in the event Mr. Pym holds a meeting with the delegation, a plenary session will be necessary here. Perhaps we could discuss this again when it is clearer whether or not the visit will go ahead.

John Holmes Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A. J. COLES

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFT STATEMENT

It has been agreed, on the basis indicated below, that Mr Pym will see, on 2 December, a delegation of the Arab League, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia and Mr Khalid al Hassan, who is an official of the PLO. The members of the delegation, including the PLO, have confirmed, in the light of the Fez declaration to which they all subscribe, their intention to work for a comprehensive settlement by peaceful means, in accordance with the UN Charter and international law, if Israel is ready to do the same. They confirm their rejection of terrorism in all its forms. They are ready to recognise Israel's right to live in peace and security if Israel is ready to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The terms of this statement have been agreed by all the parties concerned.



Bk for make colder in Monday

①

PRIME MINISTER

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

Mr. Ernie Ross MP telephoned this afternoon to say that a number of MPs from the Labour Middle Eastern Council, the Conservative Middle Eastern Council and the All-Party UK/Palestine Council would like to call on you to discuss the composition of the Arab League delegation. Clearly, they wish to raise the matter of PLO participation.

He mentioned the following MPs as being interested in calling on you:

- Dennis Walters
- Cyril Townsend
- Tony Marlow
- David Watkins
- and himself.

I said that your diary was very crowded between now and the likely date of arrival of any delegation and I could promise nothing, but would consult you.

Do you want us to try to fit them in?

- It will be difficult -  
~~could it~~ but  
 possibly - after a  
 3-hour debate  
 House

0382.23141.

A.J.C.

mt

25 November 1982

22.10 [after vote]  
 Monday - Please bring  
 colleagues -



②



R 25/11

Prime Minister

A.S.C. -  $\frac{26}{11}$

with the  
compliments of

THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, MP

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M.A.' or similar.

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA



24th November, 1982.

URGENT

I asked you at Question Time this afternoon for an assurance that the Government would not receive the PLO representative in the King of Morocco's delegation unless by the time of his arrival in London the PLO had accepted the Reagan proposals and agreed to recognise Israel. You were not then in a position to give me a clear answer.

I have no doubt that you will come under intense if not necessarily sincere pressure from Arab quarters to receive the PLO man. I cannot help feeling, however, that to do so must weaken President Reagan's initiative and - though he may not care to admit it - weaken King Hussein's position in his negotiations with Arafat.

To receive the PLO representative must also cause some offence in Israel - with the Opposition as well as the Government - and to that extent diminish any influence we might have if negotiations between King Hussein and the Israelis should eventually begin.

I am copying this letter to Margaret Thatcher.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Francis Pym, MP

E.S. I have marked this letter "urgent" in case you should be on the point of taking a decision.



Ke'd 25/11 (2)



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

24th November 1982

Prime Minister  
We shall let you have a  
copy. A.J.C. 12/11

Dear Prime Minister,

As Chairman of the Conservative Middle East Council (which numbers sixty members of the House of Commons and House of Lords), I have been asked to write to you about two matters which seem to us urgent and important in regard to British policy in the Middle East.

They are the need for us to do all we can to encourage Palestinian leaders to develop a constructive response towards the Reagan Administration in its new efforts to promote a comprehensive peace settlement and, secondly the desirability of British participation in an enlarged multinational peace keeping force in Lebanon.

This summer's events have forcibly brought home to us in America and Europe the urgency of the need to reach a comprehensive settlement. Terrible though those events were, they may have provided a chance, possibly the last for a very long time, to bring about a lasting peace. The shift in Washington towards a more even-handed policy and the initial cautious, but not wholly unreceptive, response of the PLO leadership to President Reagan's new peace initiative afford a glimmer of hope.

At this juncture it seems to us extremely important that Western leaders should go out of their way to persuade the Palestinian leaders to put aside their suspicions and to look afresh and constructively at the real options before them. But that cannot be done unless we are prepared at the ministerial level to meet and talk to the PLO frankly and without preconditions. It is an enormous pity and a costly error that the Americans have tied their own hands so as to rule this out for themselves. Who knows what opportunities of progress towards peace may have been lost as a result of the commitment which Dr Kissinger gave to the Israelis and to their supporters in America in September 1975? I believe them to be incalculable.

Had we in Britain taken a similar line in the past we would never have succeeded as well as we did in the difficult task of decolonisation.

Contd...../



But this American error makes it all the more important that ministers of governments in Europe should meet and try to foster a moderate, constructive attitude among PLO leaders. It is we believe a mistake to assume that this will undermine American peace efforts. On the contrary it should help them and indeed the whole cause of peace.

We earnestly hope that Her Majesty's Government will take a fresh look at this question and decide that Ministers should agree to the inclusion of a PLO representative in any Arab delegations they may receive concerning the search for peace. Even from the limited, but by no means irrelevant, standpoint of Britain's own interests it is, we believe, damaging that we should appear to lag behind some of our European partners in this matter.

As for Lebanon there can be no question about the extreme importance for all of us in Europe and the United States of maintaining and if possible strengthening the precarious stability which now exists there and of speeding up the withdrawal of foreign armies from Lebanese territory. Not only for Lebanon itself and its people who have suffered so appallingly but also for the hope of any lasting settlement of the wider Middle East problem it is essential that the Lebanese cauldron should be prevented from boiling over again and engulfing the whole region in a new and still more bloody conflict. And there are no doubt forces at work which may try to bring about just such an outcome in order to frustrate progress towards a tolerable and lasting settlement. The prestige of British soldiers stands so high throughout the world that even a limited contribution by our country to a multinational force would, we believe add greatly to its credibility and effectiveness.

*Yours ever,  
Denis*

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP  
The Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1



cc Sue Goodchild



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 November 1982

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation Visit: Dinner at No 10 Downing Street

The Moroccan Minister of Court called at the FCO on 22 November to discuss arrangements for the visit. The Moroccans have asked if the timings of the talks and the dinner on 2 December could be changed in order both to give more time for the plenary (translation will be consecutive) and to allow more time for the delegates to change for dinner afterwards. Subject to the Prime Minister's wishes one solution would be to bring forward the talks by, say, 30 minutes and delay the dinner by the same amount. But perhaps we could discuss this further, when we have more idea of whether and in what form the visit is likely to go ahead.

/ I enclose a draft guest list for the dinner. We have allowed each member country and the Arab League three guests (Foreign Minister, Ambassador, one official). The Moroccans have been given more to allow for Prince Moulay Rachid (the <sup>second son</sup> Crown Prince) and court officials. We have suggested a selection of others who might be invited, but you will no doubt have views. On one point of detail in the list, Sir A Kershaw should probably be on the main list, rather than a reserve, perhaps in place of Sir F Bennett or Mr Moyle.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





DRAFT GUEST LIST FOR A DINNER AT 10 DOWNING STREET IN HONOUR OF  
KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO AND AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

WEDNESDAY 2 DECEMBER 1982 [8.15 for 8.30PM]

BLACK TIE OR NATIONAL DRESS

FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<u>Host</u>		
1) Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP		
<u>Moroccan Royal Family &amp; Officials of the Royal Household</u>		
2) HM King Hassan II of Morocco	Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco 49 Queen's Gate Gardens SW7 5NE	Delegation Leader
	01-581 5001/4	
3) HRH Prince Moulay Rachid	Moroccan Embassy (as above)	Son of King Hassan
4) )		
5) ) - plus 3 royal		
6) ) officials		
6) )		
		/ <u>Arab League Delegation</u>





FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<u>Arab League Delegation,</u> <u>Foreign Ministers &amp;</u> <u>Secretary General</u>  (In protocol order - by date of appointment.)		
7) HE Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam	Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic 8 Belgrave Square SW1X 8PH  01-245 9012	Syrian Foreign Minister
8) HRH Prince Saud Bin Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz	Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia 30 Belgrave Square SW1X 8QB  01-235 0831	Saudi Foreign Minister
9) HE Mr Marwan Qasem	Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 6 Upper Phillimore Gardens W8 7HB  01-937 3685	Jordanian Foreign Minister
10) HE Me, M'Hamed Boucetta	Moroccan Embassy (as above)	Moroccan Foreign Minister
11) HE M Beji Caid Essebsi	Tunisian Embassy 29 Prince's Gate SW7 1QG  01-584 8117	Tunisian Foreign Minister
12) HE Dr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi	Algerian Embassy 54 Holland Park W11 3RS  01-221 7800/4	Algerian Foreign Minister
13) HE Mr Chedli Klibi	Arab League Arab Information Office 52 Green Street WC1  01-629 0732	Secretary General of the Arab League  <u>/Ambassadors</u>





FULL NAME, TITLE  
AND DECORATIONS

ADDRESS

REASON FOR INVITATION

Ambassadors of the Arab  
League Delegation  
Countries

(In protocol order - by  
date of appointment to  
London.)

- |  |                                 |   |
|--|---------------------------------|---|
| 14) HE Mr Ibrahim Izzidin                | Jordanian Embassy<br>(as above) | Jordanian Ambassador                    |
| 15) HE Sheikh Nasser H<br>Almanqour GCVO | Saudi Embassy<br>(as above)     | Saudi Ambassador                        |
| 15a) HE M Sadok Bouzayen                 | Tunisian Embassy<br>(as above)  | Tunisian Ambassador                     |
| 16) HE M Mohamed Mehdi<br>Benabdeljalil  | Moroccan Embassy<br>(as above)  | Moroccan Ambassador                     |
| 17) HE M Redha Malek                     | Algerian Embassy<br>(as above)  | Algerian Ambassador                     |
| 18) Dr Loutof Allah<br>Haydar            | Syrian Embassy<br>(as above)    | Syrian Ambassador                       |
| 19) Mr Omar Said Al<br>Hassan            | Arab League<br>(as above)       | Arab League Representative<br>in London |

Arab League Delegation  
Officials

- |       |                                 |  |
|-------|---------------------------------|--|
| 20) ) | Syrian Embassy<br>(as above)    |  |
| 21) ) | Saudi Embassy<br>(as above)     |  |
| 22) ) | Jordanian Embassy<br>(as above) |  |
| 23) ) | Moroccan Embassy<br>(as above)  |  |
| 24) ) | Tunisian Embassy<br>(as above)  |  |
| 25) ) | Algerian Embassy<br>(as above)  |  |

[6]

- 1 official per  
delegate. To be  
notified

Arab League Office

/Her Majesty's Government





FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<u>Her Majesty's Government</u>		
26) Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP	FCO	Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs
27) Rt Hon John Nott MP	MOD	Secretary of State for Defence
28) Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP	c/o Conservative Central Office 01 222 9000	Paymaster General (known and highly regarded in Morocco)
29) Rt Hon Lord Cockfield	DOT 01-215 7877	Secretary of State for Trade
30) Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP	DOE	Secretary of State for Energy
31) Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP	FCO	Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
32) Rt Hon The Baroness Young <u>Reserves</u>  Lord Trenchard  Mr Peter Rees QC MP	Lord Privy Seal  MOD  DOT	Recently visited Jordan  Responsibility for defence sales to Middle East  Responsibility for trade with Middle East countries visiting Morocco next year.
<u>Parliament</u>		
House of Lords		
33) Lord Chalfont OBE MC	IBM 103 Wigmore Street W1  01-935 6600	Friend of King Hassan, member of Moroccan Royal Academy.
34) Lord Chelwood MC DL	6 Eaton Terrace SW1W 3EZ or House of Lords 01 219 3000	Well known in Middle East. Frequent speaker in Middle East debates.
<u>/House of Commons</u>		





FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
House of Commons		
35) Rt Hon Denis Healey CH MBE MP	House of Commons	Opposition Foreign Affairs Spokesman
36) Rt Hon David Steel MP	House of Commons	Leader of the Liberal Party
37) Rt Hon David Owen MP	House of Commons	SDP Foreign Affairs Spokesman. Former Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
38) Mr David Watkins MP (Lab Consett)	House of Commons	Takes close interest in Middle East Affairs. Frequent visitor to the region.
39) Rt Hon Roland Moyle MP (Lab Lewisham E)	House of Commons	Labour Front Bench Spokes- man. Speaks regularly on Middle East Affairs.
40) Sir Frederic Bennett MP (c Torbay)	House of Commons	Close interest in Moroccan and Middle East Affairs.
<u>Reserves</u>		
Hon Mark Lennox-Boyd MP (c Morecambe & Lons- dale)	House of Commons	Frequent visitor to Middle East. Follows Arab/ Israel dispute closely.
Ray Whitney MP OBE	House of Commons	Chairman Conservative Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs Committee
Sir Anthony Kershaw MC MP (c Stroud)	House of Commons	Chairman House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee.
Tom Benyon MP (c Abingdon)	House of Commons	Led a recent all party delegation to the Middle East.
		<u>/Business Community</u>





FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<u>Business Community</u>		
41) Rt Hon Lord Carrington KCMG MP	GEC LTD 1 Stanhope Gate W1  01-493 8484	Chairman GEC. Regular visitor to Middle East, further visits being planned.
42) Lord McFadzean	Rolls Royce Ltd 65 Buckingham Gate SW1E 6AT  01-22 9020	Chairman Rolls Royce Extensive business interests in Middle East.
43) Mr E F Given CMG CVO	Bury House 33 Bury Street St James's SW1	Director General of the Middle East Association
44) Sir Richard Beaumont KCMG OBE	42 Berkeley Square W1	Arab British Chamber of Commerce
45) Mr H PM Benson	15 Portland Place W1A 4DD  01-637 2821	Chairman Davy McKee International Ltd. Extensive engineering interests in Middle East
46) Sir Reginald Smith	George Wimpey Interna- tional 27 Hammersmith Grove W6 7EN 01 748 2000	Important construction projects throughout the Middle East
47) Lord Selsdon	Midland Bank plc International Division Suffolk House Lawrence Pountney Hill EC4R OEU  01-606 9944	Chairman Midland Bank, Chairman Committee for Middle East Trade.
<u>Reserves</u>		
Sir Trevor Holdsworth	7 Cleveland Row SW1A 1DB  01-930 2424	Chairman GKN Major exporters to Middle East.
Mr P I Walters	Brittanic House Moor Lane EC2Y 9BU  01-920 800	Chairman British Petro- leum
<u>/Media Academics</u>		





FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<u>Media/Academics</u>		
48) Mr C Douglas-Home	The Times New Printing House Sq Grays Inn Road WCC  01-837 1234	Editor, The Times
49) Mr D Trelford	The Observer 8 St Andrews Hill EC4  01-236 0202	Editor, The Observer
50) Mr Eric Bowman MBE	BBC External Services Bush House WC2	Head of BBC Arabic Services
51) Dr M E Yapp	School of Oriental and African Studies University of London Malet Street London WC1	Middle East Academic Specialist
52) Sir John Burgh KCMG CB	10 Spring Gardens SW1A 2BN	Recent visitor to Middle East. Major interest in developing links with the region.
53) Mr Geoffrey Owen	The Financial Times Bracken House Cannon Street EC4  01-248 8000	Editor
<u>Reserves</u>		
Mr Andrew Knight	The Economist 25 St James' Street SW1  01-930 5155	Editor
Mr Frank Giles	The Sunday Times Thompson House 200 Grays Inn Road WC1  01-837 1234	Editor

/Officials





FULL NAME, TITLE AND DECORATIONS	ADDRESS	REASON FOR INVITATION
<u>Officials</u>		
<u>FCO</u>		
54) Sir John Leahy KCMG	c/o FCO 01-233 4591	Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs.
55) Mr S J G Cambridge CMG CVO	c/o Heads of Mission Section POD FCO	HM Ambassador designate to Morocco
56) Mr S L Egerton CMG	c/o FCO 01-233 7302	Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FCO
57) Mr R O Miles	c/o FCO 01-233 6048	Head, Near East and North Africa Department
58) <sup>H.</sup> Mr D A C Miers CMG	c/o FCO 01-233 5877	Head, Middle East Department
<u>Department of Trade</u>		
59) Mr M D M Franklin CB CMG	DOT 1 Victoria Street SW1 01-215 7877	Permanent Secretary
60) Mr A Titchener	DOT 1 Victoria Street SW1  01-215 7877	Under-Secretary OT5 (Middle East)
<u>Department of Energy</u>		
61) Sir Donald Maitland GCMG OBE	DOE Thames House South Millbank SW1P 4QJ  01-211 3000	Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Department of Energy.
62) Private Secretary No. 10		



FELT VERY GUILTY ABOUT THEIR PERFORMANCE IN LEBANON, ABANDONING  
THE PALESTINIANS. THERE WAS UNREST IN THE SYRIAN ARMY OVER THIS.  
HE WAS HOPEFUL HOWEVER OF MENDING FENCES THERE.

9. HIS MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN HAD GONE WELL. THEY WERE AGREED  
ON A CONFEDERATION. HE HAD REFUSED A FEDERATION: FROM THE  
PALESTINIAN POINT OF VIEW THIS WOULD BE GOING BACK TO SQUARE  
ONE AND FROM THE HACHEMITE POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD HAVE OBVIOUS  
DANGERS WITH A PREPONDERANT PALESTINIAN POPULATION.

10. HE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE PALESTINE  
NATIONAL COUNCIL'S MEETING. FROM HIS GRIN I DEDUCE HE WAS  
CONFIDENT OF A THUMPING MAJORITY FOR HIMSELF.

11. HE SAID HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF WINNING THE  
UNDERSTANDING OF THE JEWS OF THE DIASPORA. HE HAD MADE A POINT  
OF HAVING A LONG TALK WITH VENNER (?) IN THE MARGINS OF  
BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL.

12. AS FOR LEBANON, THE PHALANGISTS HAD MADE A TERRIBLE MISTAKE  
IN LETTING ISRAEL IN, AS THEY WOULD FIND TO THEIR COST. THEY WOULD  
NEVER GET THE ISRAELIS OUT. ALREADY ISRAEL WAS INCORPORATING  
SOUTHERN LEBANON AND ARRANGING TO PUMP LITANI WATERS.

13. HE WAS WELL PLEASED WITH ALGERIAN SUPPORT. HE HAD A HIGH  
REGARD FOR CHADLI AS A WISE MAN. THE ALGERIANS HAD AGREED TO  
PROVIDE EXTENSIVE ARMED MILITARY TRAINING FOR THE PALESTINIAN  
FORCES AGAINST THE DAY WHEN THEY WOULD NEED THEM TO DEFEND THEIR  
OWN COUNTRY. ONE THING THE BEIRUT BATTLES HAD SHOWN THE WORLD  
WAS THAT THE PLO WERE A FORCE OF GENUINE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, NOT A  
BUNCH OF TERRORISTS. HE WANTED NOTHING BUT PEACE FOR HIS PEOPLE.

14. THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW I EMPHASISED REPEATEDLY THE IMPOR-  
TANCE OF MAKING RAPID PROGRESS WHILE WORLD, AND PARTICULARLY  
AMERICAN, SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIANS WAS STILL FRESH. ARAFAT  
INSISTED THAT HE WAS WELL AWARE OF IT.

15. AT A PERSONAL LEVEL THE MEETING WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL (OUR  
FIRST SINCE HE ATTENDED A FAREWELL PARTY GIVEN US BY THE  
PALESTINIANS WHEN WE LEFT BEIRUT EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO).

STRACHAN

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FM ALGIERS 231640Z NOVEMBER 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 286 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1982

INFO PRIORITY ME POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS

1. AT SHORT NOTICE THIS AFTERNOON ARAFAT ASKED MY WIFE AND I TO COME ROUND TO SEE HIM AT THE OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE HERE. IN AN HOUR LONG CONVERSATION HE NATURALLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF PLO MEMBERSHIP OF THE ARAB DELEGATION TO UK. WE MADE A GREAT EFFORT TO GET HIM TO GO FOR CONDITIONAL PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST BUT HE WAS NOT TO BE MOVED. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT AT THE FIRST FEZ CONFERENCE LAST YEAR THE WEST HAD SAID THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE FAHD PLAN WOULD BE TAKEN AS ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THIS YEAR HE HAD PUT HIS ENTIRE POLITICAL PRESTIGE ON THE LINE TO FORCE THE FAHD PLAN THROUGH, INCLUDING QUOTE POINT SEVEN UNQUOTE: THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO SECURITY. THIS OF COURSE INCLUDED ISRAEL WHICH WAS A STATE RECOGNISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. HE SIMPLY COULD NOT GO FURTHER.

2. I SAID THAT IF THE FEZ DECLARATION WAS SO EXPLICIT THEN SURELY HE COULD BE EQUALLY SO. WHAT HAD KING HUSSEIN BEEN URGING UPON HIM? KING HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD WESTERN POLITICAL THINKING BETTER THAN ANY OTHER LIVING ARAB. ARAFAT ADMITTED THAT HUSSEIN HAD BEEN URGING HIM TO DO THE SAME THING, TO WHICH HE HAD RETORTED THAT HUSSEIN HAD ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242 15 YEARS AGO BUT THAT HAD NOT GOT HIM BACK A SQUARE INCH OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.



... ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO BRITISH ACCEPTANCE OF THE DELEGATION NOT FOR ITSELF, BUT BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. HE COULD NOT PUT PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES BUT HE COULD PUT A LITTLE ON BRITAIN. HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH PRESIDENT CHADLI AND KING FAHD AND HAD SECURED THEIR AGREEMENT THAT IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ACCEPT PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB DELEGATION THEN THE ARAB DELEGATION WOULD REFUSE TO GO. THIS WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. HE ASKED THAT I TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO YOU. HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR BRITISH RECOGNITION BUT SIMPLY BRITISH ACCEPTANCE OF AN ARAB DELEGATION, IN PRECISELY THE SAME WAY AS PRESIDENT MITTERAND HAD ACCEPTED IT.

4. IT WAS PRETTY CLEAR FROM WHAT HE SAID THAT A MAJOR CONSTRAINT ON A MORE PUBLIC STATEMENT OF PLO ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WAS THE BEIRUT MASSACRE DISASTER. HE REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO THE WRITTEN UNDERTAKINGS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICANS, ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH PRIOR TO THE EVACUATION OF HIS TROOPS. THOSE COUNTRIES HAD DISHONoured THEIR WORD AND HE HAD SAID AS MUCH TO COLOMBO AND CHEYSSON, WHO HAD ADMITTED IT. THERE WAS NOW A QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AND HE SIMPLY COULD NOT GO FURTHER THAN HE HAD. AFTER BEIRUT THE BALL WAS FIRMLY IN THE AMERICAN COURT.

5. ASKED WHAT WERE HIS MINIMUM TERMS FOR A FORTHRIGHT AND EXPLICIT CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL, HE SAID THEY WERE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD ACCORD TO THE PALESTINIANS THE SAME RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ACCORDED TO THE 1800 INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. E

6. REFERRING TO THE TIME HE MET THE PRIME MINISTER AT TITO'S FUNERAL, HE HAD REFLECTED THAT ALL THE LEADERS OF BRITAIN'S FORMER COLONIES WERE THERE AS HEADS OF STATE WHILE HE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF BRITAIN'S FORMER MANDATE, WAS THERE AS A STATELESS REFUGEE. HE STILL HAD HIS BRITISH PASSPORT, AS HIS FATHER HAD BEFORE HIM AND I COULD TELL MY GOVERNMENT THAT HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS SOON AS PALESTINE RECEIVED ITS RIGHTS.

7. OTHER POINTS MENTIONED WERE THAT AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS IN LEBANON, THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD WAS IN A STATE OF FERMENT. ARAB LEADERS WERE SITTING ON VOLCANOS.





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Prime Minister

difficult. would you like to discuss with the Foreign Secretary?

A.F.C. 23/11

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November, 1982

No difficulty at all (1)  
I do not meet with  
Lebanon. I do not meet

the P.A. - INLA -  
I will not receive the  
P.L.O. Tell our Arab friends  
that if there were any terrorist  
organisation in their countries I  
at least would NOT receive  
them. Tell them I expect to  
maintain the status quo of the  
Middle East. They will

Dear John,

Contacts with the PLO

HM Ambassador in Tunis has reported that the Secretary General of the Arab League has now formally asked whether the Prime Minister would be prepared to receive a PLO representative as part of the Arab League delegation who are due to call on her on 2 December. The Moroccan Minister of the Court, with whom we have been arranging the details of this visit, has also asked us to receive the full delegation as proposed at the Arab League Summit, including a PLO representative. King Hussein has urged HM Ambassador in Amman, in very strong terms, that we agree to receive the PLO representative, backing this up with a message to the Prime Minister. And Saudi Arabia has today made an equally strong plea to HM Ambassador in Jedda. I enclose Amman telno 517-8 and Jedda telno 548. Arafat himself has told us that King Fahd and President Chadli have agreed that the delegation will not come if the PLO are/

No  
No  
No

Our policy on contacts with the PLO has been carefully explained to the organisers of the Arab League visit at every stage. We had earlier reached the position where it was understood by all concerned that the PLO would not be included in the London visit, without our having to turn down flat an Arab League request. But this carefully constructed approach has now collapsed, and we can no longer dodge the direct question. The cancellation of the Arab League visit in public acrimony over the PLO is now a distinct possibility. It would be very damaging. There has been considerable public interest in the visit of the delegation and the Arabs would do their best to see to it that the blame fell entirely on us. They would no doubt make much of the comparison between ourselves and the French (M. Mitterrand received a full Arab League delegation, including Qaddhumi).

not included (Algiers telno 286).

We see three possible ways of tackling this problem:

- (i) We could simply tell the Moroccans and the Arab League that there is no question of a PLO representative being received in present circumstances. If King Hassan and his colleagues have a strong enough wish to visit London, the Arab bluff might be called and the visit might go ahead as planned. One possibility in these circumstances would be that King Hassan might come by himself. But there would be a substantial outcry against us in the Arab world.

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(ii)





(ii) We could tell the Moroccans that we would be prepared to meet their belated request provided that the PLO made a satisfactory statement accepting Israel's rights and renouncing terrorism in advance of the visit. This would of course be in accordance with the position we have taken in recent years, in particular the attempt we made in 1981 to induce Yasser Arafat to make a satisfactory statement as the price for a meeting with Lord Carrington. One possibility would be to give the Moroccans a form of words to illustrate the kind of minimum statement we would need (example enclosed). This would help to ensure that the PLO did not make an unsatisfactory statement and then claim to have met our requirements. If the PLO agreed to make a statement on these lines it would of course be a major step forward. Our obligation would then be to accept a PLO representative (at Foreign Minister level or below) at the talks with the Prime Minister and presumably at the dinner she will be offering afterwards. It is of course much more likely that the PLO will fail to meet our conditions, which would leave us in a sound public position. We would emphasise that we remained interested in making a success of the visit and that we had made clear from the start that, in line with existing policy, the Prime Minister would not be able to receive a PLO Representative until crucial ambiguities in the PLO position had been cleared up.

(iii) We could tell the Moroccans that in the continuing absence of a satisfactory statement by the PLO about Israel's rights and the use of violence, there was obviously no question of the Prime Minister receiving a PLO representative, but that Mr Hurd would be ready to meet a PLO representative (presumably Khalid al Hassan, a senior and moderate adviser of Yasser Arafat, who is currently in London and expects to remain here for the delegation visit). This would be arranged strictly in an Arab League context to follow the pattern of the meeting earlier this year between Mr Hurd and Qaddhumi, who came as part of an Arab League delegation. That meeting did not cause particular controversy here. This would not of course meet the Arab League's direct request, but might just be enough of a sop to them to enable the rest of the visit to go ahead and to avoid the damaging consequences of a cancellation.

Of the above options Mr Pym does not believe that (i) is realistic in present circumstances. A decision simply to reject the PLO would damage our interests and our influence. Even our closest friends in the area, including King Hussein, think we are being too negative about the PLO, particularly since the PLO is in a state of flux at present and will shortly have to take important decisions which we should be trying to influence through contact with them. Mr Pym is conscious of the difficulties of (ii) but believes it to be entirely consistent with our existing policy.



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If, as is almost certain, the PLO cannot do what we ask, we are in a very good public and diplomatic position. (iii) would be less satisfactory but might be enough to hold the position. It would also help us to avoid the accusation that our policy on the PLO has actually gone backwards since the summer, at a time when the PLO appear more ready than before to look for a peaceful solution and when contact with them is therefore more than ever important.

For these reasons Mr Pym prefers option (ii).

Mr Pym would be grateful for the Prime Minister's views. He would be very happy to discuss this difficult problem with her before a decision is taken.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

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Statement to be made by PLO Leadership

The PLO reaffirm that they want to see the Palestinian problem settled by political means. They are ready to take part in negotiations with all of the parties concerned on the basis of the principles set out in the communique issued by the Fez Summit.

The PLO wish to make clear that they interpret point 7 in the Fez Summit communique as meaning that if Israel is prepared to accept just Palestinian objectives as part of a negotiated settlement, the PLO will be ready to accept, also as part of such a settlement, that the rights of all states in the area, including both Israel and the Palestinian state, to live in peace and security must be assured.

The Palestinian people wish not to destroy others, but to live in peace with their neighbours. The PLO confirm that they are opposed to acts of terrorism anywhere in the world.



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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 518 OF 22 NOV  
 INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS. ROUTINE ALGIERS, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,  
 JEDDA, PARIS, RABAT, TEL AVIV, UKIIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON.  
 SAVING INFO: OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW AND PEKING.

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MIPT: VISIT TO LONDON BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:  
 MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.  
 BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO SEND YOU MY WARMIEST GREETINGS AND SINCERE  
 GOOD WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH AND SUCCESS.

IT HAS, INDEED, BEEN TOO LONG SINCE I LAST HAD THE PLEASURE OF  
 MEETING YOU TO DISCUSS THE MANY SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND  
 CONCERN. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AS  
 I ALWAYS VALUE YOUR COUNSEL AND TREASURE OUR FRIENDSHIP.

IT IS IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, CONFIDENCE AND TRUST, WHICH WE  
 SHARE, THAT I PERMIT MYSELF TO PRESUME, FOR THE FIRST TIME, UPON  
 YOUR TOLERANCE AND TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF THE IMPENDING VISIT  
 TO LONDON OF HIS MAJESTY KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO, HEADING THE  
 ARAB DELEGATION REPRESENTING THE FEZ SUMMIT.

ALTHOUGH MANY MUTUAL FRIENDS HAVE APPROACHED ME IN THE HOPE THAT  
 I MAY RAISE THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU, I DO SO NOW, HOWEVER, OUT OF  
 MY PERSONAL CONVICTION AND FOR NO OTHER REASON. I BELIEVE IT TO  
 BE FIRMLY IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF STRENGTHENING  
 BRITISH/ARAB RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THE INTERESTS OF THOSE  
 COMMITTED TO THE CAUSE OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE AREA, TO  
 RECOMMEND AND PLEAD WITH YOU MOST URGENTLY AND STRONGLY THAT THE  
 TIME HAS COME, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE SUMMIT DELEGATION VISITS  
 LONDON, FOR YOU TO RECEIVE AMONGST ITS MEMBERS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF  
 THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

DEAR FRIEND, IF YOU SHOULD DO SO YOU WOULD BE RECEIVING THE ARAB  
 SUMMIT'S MISSION REPRESENTING, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE TOTAL  
 ARAB CONSENSUS AND COMMITMENT FOR PEACE. YOU WOULD BE ENCOUPAGING  
 THIS TOTALLY POSITIVE TREND AND DIRECTION WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD  
 AND THE P.L.O., AS IT REPRESENTS THE LONG SUFFERING PALESTINIAN  
 PEOPLE AND THEIR YEARNING FOR A LIFE OF DIGNITY AND PEACE, AS WELL  
 AS THE RIGHT OF ALL IN THE AREA TO SUCH A LIFE AND FUTURE.

THE EIGHT POINTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT ARE DERIVED TOTALLY FROM THE  
 UNITED NATIONS AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN SPIRIT AND IN  
 WORD. THE CONCEPT OF TWO STATES, A JEWISH STATE AND A PALESTINIAN  
 STATE OF THE PARTITION PLAN, NOW REFERRED TO AS ISRAEL AND PALESTINE,  
 IS THE ONLY FOUNDATION OF ISRAEL'S LEGITIMACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL  
 AND LEGAL LEVELS. THE FAMOUS BRITISH PRINCIPLE OF THE

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INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE SEMICLN THE RIGHTS OF ALL FOLLOWERS OF THE THREE GREAT MONOTHEISTIC RELIGIONS IN THEIR HOLY PLACES SEMICLN THE RIGHT OF RETURN OF COMPENSATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS SEMICLN AND THE RIGHT OF ALL IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY. THE SAME PRINCIPLE WAS UPHELD BY BRITAIN IN THE FALKLANDS UNDER YOUR WISE AND COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP WITH OUR TOTAL SUPPORT.

THE P.L.O. LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS TO ALL THESE FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE. WHAT IS THE WISDOM THEN IN QUESTIONING THIS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES WE HAVE ALL LONG SOUGHT TO UPHOLD? HOW CAN WE RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS? AND WHAT RIGHT DO WE HAVE TO DENY THEM THE RIGHT TO BE AMONGST THE FOREMOST TO SEEK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE WHEN THEY ARE THE MAIN AGGRIEVED PARTY, AND WHEN THEY HAVE JOINED THE ENTIRE ARAB FAMILY, AS THEY DID AT FEZ, IN THE clearest COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE?

IT IS, INDEED, SAD THAT IN OUR WORLD WE TEND TO NAME A PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR THEIR RIGHTS DIFFERENTLY, AND THUS A PEOPLE MAY BE CALLED FREEDOM FIGHTERS, MEMBERS OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, MUJAHIDEEN, OR TERRORISTS, BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE AT THE SAME TIME. THE FACT IS THAT A STATE, SUCH AS ISRAEL, ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE, STILL PRACTISES LARGE-SCALE AND INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM AND DENIES THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PALESTINIANS DESERVE TO BE RECOGNIZED IN TERMS OF THEIR CLEAR RIGHTS. IT IS THROUGH THEIR PROLONGED SUFFERING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE WORLD TO MOVE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN DIGNITY, BOTH FOR THEMSELVES AND OTHERS. THEY HAVE TAKEN GREAT STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION WHICH DESERVE OUR RECOGNITION AND ENCOURAGEMENT.

AS YOU ARE FULLY AWARE, WE ARE STEADILY MOVING TO ORGANIZE FUTURE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIANS RELATIONS. THE QUESTION OF SPECIFIC PALESTINIAN RECOGNITION OF THE REALITY OF ISRAEL AND ISRAEL'S RIGHTS, IN ADDITION TO THE P.L.O.'S COMMITMENT AT FEZ, IS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE. YET, PRIME MINISTER, TO BE FAIR, AND YOU ARE ALWAYS FAIR, ISRAEL SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY BE CONVINCED TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE PALESTINIANS RIGHTS ON PALESTINIAN SOIL. NOTHING COULD BE MORE MEANINGFUL OR CONSTRUCTIVE THAN MEETING P.L.O. REPRESENTATIVES AT THIS STAGE TO ENCOURAGE PALESTINIAN POSITIVENESS SO THAT OBSTACLES MAY BE REMOVED FROM THE PATH OF PEACE.

PRIME MINISTER, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM FRANCE WHERE I HEADED THE SAME GROUP, IN OUR TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THAT I SHALL SHORTLY BE LEADING TO THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, AT WHICH POINT THIS PHASE OF COMBINED ARAB DIPLOMACY, EMANATING FROM THE FEZ SUMMIT, WILL BE CONCLUDED.

I KNOW THAT IF THE P.L.O. ARE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE GROUP HEADED BY HIS MAJEST KING HASSAN, WHEN THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU, THEN THE P.L.O. WOULD NOT COME TO LONDON IN THE FIRST PLACE. I ALSO KNOW THAT OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARAB STATES

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/WORLD



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WOULD FEEL THAT THEIR PRESENCE ON THE MISSION, UNDER THOSE  
CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD BE OUT OF PLACE. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES  
YOUR POSITION WOULD, UNFORTUNATELY, APPEAR TO BE A DELIBERATE  
AFFRONT TO THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD AS REPRESENTED BY THE SUMMIT AND  
THE MISSION REPRESENTING IT FROM FEZ. IT WOULD, INDEED, BE  
UNFORTUNATE IF A CRISIS IN RELATIONS RESULTED WITH ALL THE DAMAGE IT  
WOULD CAUSE TO ALL, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE NEED, DEAR PRIME MINISTER,  
TO WORK SO CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THE TIMES AHEAD TO ACHIEVE THE  
JUST, HONOURABLE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA WHICH IS OUR  
MUTUAL OBJECTIVE AND TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.  
WITH ALL THESE REALITIES AND SO MUCH AT STAKE, I FELT IT IMPERATIVE  
THAT I WRITE TO YOU TO REQUEST YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND KIND  
CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER. I PRAY TO GOD THAT HE MAY GUIDE YOUR  
STEPS ALWAYS.

I AM  
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,  
HUSSEIN

ENDS.  
FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES  
URWICK

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T225A/82

22 November, 1982

*Dear Prime Minister*

I take this occasion to send you my warmest greetings and sincere good wishes for your continued good health and success.

It has, indeed, been too long since I last had the pleasure of meeting you to discuss the many subjects of mutual interest and concern. I look forward to the earliest opportunity to do so as I always value your counsel and treasure our friendship.

It is in the spirit of friendship, confidence and trust, which we share, that I permit myself to presume, for the first time, upon your tolerance and to address the subject of the impending visit to London of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, heading the Arab Delegation representing the Fez Summit.

Although many mutual friends have approached me in the hope that I may raise this subject with you, I do so now, however, out of my personal conviction and for no other reason. I believe it to be firmly in our mutual interest and in the interest of strengthening British/Arab relations, as well as in the interests of those committed to the cause of a just and durable peace in the area, to recommend and plead with you most urgently and strongly that the time has come, particularly when the Summit Delegation visits London, for you to receive amongst its members the representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Dear friend, if you should do so you would be receiving the Arab Summit's mission representing, for the first time, the total Arab consensus and commitment for peace. You would be encouraging this totally positive trend and direction within the





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Arab world and the P.L.O., as it represents the long suffering Palestinian people and their yearning for a life of dignity and peace, as well as the right of all in the area to such a life and future.

The eight points of the Fez Summit are derived totally from the United Nations and Security Council resolutions in spirit and in word. The concept of two states, a Jewish State and a Palestinian State of the Partition Plan, now referred to as Israel and Palestine, is the only foundation of Israel's legitimacy at the international and legal levels. The famous British Security Council Resolution 242 emphasized the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force; the rights of all followers of the three great monotheistic religions in their Holy Places; the right of return or compensation for the Palestinians; and the right of all in the area to live in peace and security. The same principle was upheld by Britain in the Falklands under your wise and courageous leadership with our total support.

The P.L.O. leadership is committed in our discussions to all these foundations for peace. What is the wisdom then in questioning this commitment to the principles we have all long sought to uphold? How can we resolve the Palestinian problem in the absence of the Palestinians? And what right do we have to deny them the right to be amongst the foremost to seek the establishment of a just and durable peace when they are the main aggrieved party, and when they have joined the entire Arab Family, as they did at Fez, in the clearest commitment to the cause of peace?

It is, indeed, sad that in our world we tend to name a people's struggle for their rights differently, and thus a people may be called freedom fighters, members of a resistance movement, mujahideen, or terrorists, by different people at the same time. The fact is that a State, such as Israel, established through the use of force, still practices large scale and indiscriminate terrorism and denies the rights of others to self-determination. The

Continued/... 3





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Palestinians deserve to be recognized in terms of their clear rights. It is through their prolonged suffering that they have been encouraged by the world to move for peace and human dignity, both for themselves and others. They have taken great steps in that direction which deserve our recognition and encouragement.

As you are fully aware, we are steadily moving to organize future Jordanian/Palestinian relations. The question of specific Palestinian recognition of the reality of Israel and Israel's rights, in addition to the P.L.O.'s commitment at Fez, is agreed in principle. Yet, Prime Minister, to be fair, and you are always fair, Israel should simultaneously be convinced to recognize the legitimate Palestinians rights on Palestinian soil. Nothing could be more meaningful or constructive than meeting P.L.O. representatives at this stage to encourage Palestinian positiveness so that obstacles may be removed from the path of peace.

Prime Minister, I have just returned from France where I headed the same group, in our talks with the President, that I shall shortly be leading to the Soviet Union and China, at which point this phase of combined Arab diplomacy, emanating from the Fez Summit, will be concluded.

I know that if the P.L.O. are to be excluded from the group headed by His Majesty King Hassan, when they have the opportunity to meet with you, then the P.L.O. would not come to London in the first place. I also know that other Foreign Ministers of Arab States would feel that their presence on the mission, under those circumstances, would be out of place. Under those circumstances your position would, unfortunately, appear to be a deliberate affront to the entire Arab world as represented by the Summit and the mission representing it from Fez. It would, indeed, be unfortunate if a crisis in relations resulted with all the damage it would cause to all, particularly when we need, dear Prime Minister, to work so closely together in the times ahead to achieve the just, honourable and lasting peace in the area which is our mutual objective and to which we are dedicated.

Continued/.... 4





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With all these realities and so much at stake,  
I felt it imperative that I write to you to  
request your understanding and kind consideration  
of the matter. I pray to God that he may guide  
your steps always.

*I am*

*Your Sincere Friend,*

*James*

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain & Northern Ireland  
10 Downing Street  
London S.W.1  
England



PM

SP

BF

17 November 1982

VISIT BY KING HASSAN

Thank you for your letter of 12 November. The Prime Minister could offer King Hassan a tete-a-tete conversation (with Private Secretaries present) at 1630 on Wednesday, 1 December. This would last for an hour.

As you know, dinner has been arranged for 2000 hours on Thursday, 2 December. Do I take it that a plenary session is still required on that day? If so, this could take place from 1800 to 1900 hours.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

g



MR. COLES

VISIT OF KING HASSAN

The letter from the Foreign Office is slightly misleading.

1. If you want a plenary as well as a tete a tete I can offer you the tete a tete at 1630 on Wednesday 1st for 1 hour and the plenary at 1800 hours for 1 hour on Thursday 2nd. This will give King Hassan time to return to his hotel and change for the dinner at 2000 hours for 2015 hours.

2. But if the tete a tete is on the Wednesday afternoon please remember that the Prime Minister is looking in at a Reception given by the Board of Deputies of British Jews that evening.

3. It would be difficult for me to do tete a tete and plenary on Thursday 2nd as the Prime Minister has Cabinet, Questions and the European Council briefing meeting.

*CS.*

15 November 1982





10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

KING HASSAN

As I think you already know, King Hassan has changed his visit to this country for about the fifth time. It would be convenient for him to have a plenary session followed by dinner (though there would be a gap in between) on Thursday, 2 December; the day before you go to Denmark. But he has now requested a separate tete-a-tete with you on Wednesday 1st.

Shall I arrange?

*Es.*

*Yes  
not*

12 November 1982





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 November 1982

*Dear John,*

We have discussed on the telephone the Arab League request that the date for the visit to London by the delegation led by King Hassan be changed again.

M Abbas el Fassi called on Mr Rifkind on 10 November to deliver a request from King Hassan on behalf of the Arab League that the visit to London be delayed by a week. The OAU decision to hold their foreign ministers' meeting on 15 November, with the Tripoli Summit on 23 November, meant that the Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian foreign ministers could not come to London on 24 November.

After consulting you on 11 November we told the Moroccan Ambassador that the Prime Minister could not see the delegation on 1 December as they had proposed but could agree to a session of talks on 2 December (6 pm to 7 pm) followed by a dinner that evening.

The Ambassador said that the King attached great importance to a call on The Queen and to the planned tête-à-tête with the Prime Minister. He asked if time could be set aside for these additional calls. We understand from Buckingham Palace that The Queen is out of London on 2 and 3 December but that a call could be probably arranged on the afternoon of 1 December if the Moroccans requested it. Would it be possible for the Prime Minister to see the King either on the afternoon of 1 December or 2 December, or, if an earlier time is not possible, perhaps on the morning of 3 December?

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



PM + ARAB LEAGUE DELS. AUG 1980





*Sheila*  
PRIME MINISTER

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 November 1982

VISIT OF KING HASSAN AND THE ARAB  
LEAGUE DELEGATION

---

Thank you for your letter of  
27 October. The Prime Minister agrees  
to the timetable which you suggest.

A. L. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*John*



CONFIDENTIAL

①



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I am afraid that this will take  
time away from the preparation of your  
brochure speech. but you can do it  
otherwise. Content?

Yes Mr

27 October 1982

A.J.C.  $\frac{28}{10}$

Dear John,

The Moroccan Ambassador called on Sir J Leahy on 25 October to discuss the visit of King Hassan and the Arab League delegation. He said that the date proposed for London, 8 November, would not allow Prince Saud to brief the Gulf Summit as he was now committed to do, and that since Saudi participation was crucial to the whole exercise he must reluctantly ask us to accept a new date for the visit to London. His first bid, 15/16 November, clashes with, among other things, the State Visit of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands. The earliest possible date on which the visit could be reinstated appears to be Wednesday 24 November. Subject to the Prime Minister's wishes the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes that the programme take the following form. (The times given are illustrative, but the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will be top for questions on that day; Mr Pym and Mr Hurd would not be free to take part until 3.30 pm).

- a. 1545 A Guard of Honour in the FCO quadrangle with the Prime Minister and King Hassan taking the salute.
- b. 1600 A tête-à-tête between the Prime Minister and King Hassan with -
- c. At the same time a meeting between Mr Pym and the Foreign Ministers
- d. 1630 Plenary session
- e. Dinner that evening at 10 Downing Street

The delegation will apparently now consist of all seven members of the Fez 'commission', ie apart from King Hassan, the Foreign Ministers of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, plus the Secretary-General of the Arab League. The Moroccan Ambassador assured us that the question of PLO representation was now 'closed'.

I should be grateful to know if these proposals are acceptable to the Prime Minister. We have made clear to the Moroccans that we hope very much that this latest bid is their last.

Yours ever

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

John Holmes



U.S. of Arab League Delegation - Prime Minister

Secretary

19



010  
CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1982

*Dear John,*

*Over the  
10/26*

Visit of the Arab League Delegation

As you know, we have been looking at the ceremonial arrangements for the visit of King Hassan of Morocco. We consider that it would be appropriate, and helpful to our relations with the King, if the Prime Minister could meet the King and accompanying delegation with a guard of honour in the FCO quadrangle. I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister would be prepared to do this.

The guard would be mounted in honour of King Hassan as Head of State who would take the salute. We envisage that the accompanying Foreign Ministers would stand behind the saluting point with the Prime Minister and Mr Pym and we would not expect them to participate in the ceremony itself. As is usual on these occasions we would arrange for a press and VIP enclosure behind the saluting point on either side of the main archway. After the ceremony the Prime Minister would conduct King Hassan to 10 Downing Street for tête-à-tête talks: Mr Pym would take the remainder of the delegation for separate talks before joining the Prime Minister for the plenary session.

As you know, the dates of the Arab League Delegation's visit are once more in flux. We shall let you know the latest position as soon as possible.

*Yours ever  
John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



26 OCT 1982

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10 09 15



TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

31103 - 1

RR TUNIS  
GRS 430  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM FCO 221200Z OCTOBER 82  
TO ROUTINE TUNIS  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 80 OF 22 OCTOBER

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

1. CHEDLI KLIBI SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE IN BRIGHTON ON 4 OCTOBER:  
DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I SEND YOU MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR PARTY'S CONFERENCE, AND FOR SUCCESSFUL WORTHWHILE DELIBERATIONS. MAY I ALSO AT THIS CRITICAL TIME IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE MIDDLE EAST - APPEAL TO YOU TO EMBARK UPON POSITIVE ACTION TO ELEVATE THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

THIS, I BELIEVE, CAN BE ACHIEVED VIA REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. THIS IS DOUBTLESS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH A JUST, SECURE, AND LASTING PEACE CAN BE OBTAINED, AND I EARNESTLY REQUEST OF YOU TO EXERCISE YOUR WORLD RENOWNED POSITION TO HELP TO OBTAIN THE UNITED NATIONS DESIRES.

TO ACHIEVE THIS END I HOPE WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR VALID HELP AND SUPPORT, AND AT THE SAME TIME URGE YOU TO INITIATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT TOP LEVEL TALKS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE PLO WHO ARE THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THIS HAS NOW BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE OTHER BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND I TRUST THAT YOUR CONFERENCE WILL MAKE A SIMILAR PRONOUNCEMENT.

KINDEST REGARDS YOUR SINCERELY

CHADLI KLIBI SECRETARY GENERAL LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES TUNIS

2. PLEASE NOW PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KLIBI:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 4 OCTOBER ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, AND FOR YOUR KIND WISHES ON THE PARTY CONFERENCE.

1

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

31103 - 1

AS YOU KNOW, WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH EMBODIES THIS PRINCIPLE, AS WELL AS PROVIDING SECURITY FOR ALL STATES IN THE REGION INCLUDING ISRAEL. FOLLOWING THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN BEIRUT, THERE IS NOW WIDE RECOGNITION THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE MUST BE ENABLED TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS. I WAS GLAD TO SEE THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING AT FEZ REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SET OF OBJECTIVES FOR NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. PRESIDENT PEACAN HAS PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ALSO, PROPOSALS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE A REALISTIC BASIS FOR PROGRESS, EVEN IF THEY FALL SHORT IN SOME RESPECTS OF ARAB WISHES. OUR POSITION ON TALKS WITH PLO LEADERS IS WELL KNOWN. THEY NOW FACE A PERIOD OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. IF THEY CAN MAKE AN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR STATEMENT WHICH ACCEPTS ISRAEL'S RIGHTS AS PART OF A SATISFACTORY COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND CONFIRMS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL PATH TO A SETTLEMENT, THAT WOULD BE A MOST IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD.

PYM

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

2

CONFIDENTIAL



PM  
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FM WASHINGTON 222325Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 3437 OF 22 OCTOBER 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS,  
BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS, RADAT, ALGIERS, PARIS, MOSCOW,  
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MIDDLE EAST: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON

1. THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, LED BY KING HASSAN, HAD THREE HOURS OF TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN TODAY AND A SEPARATE MEETING WITH SHULTZ. AFTER THE MEETING REAGAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE ON THE ROAD TOWARDS THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. KING HASSAN SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND CO-EXISTENCE (PRESUMABLY IMPLYING CO-EXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL) WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE REAGAN AND FEZ PEACE PROPOSALS AND OF SCR 242 AND 338.

3. CLUVERIUS (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT THE AMERICANS ACHIEVED THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE - OF AVOIDING A DISASTER. THE ARAB DELEGATION HAD BEEN WELL DISCIPLINED: KING HASSAN HAD BEEN THE ONLY SPOKESMAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE. OTHERS HAD SPOKEN BY ARRANGEMENT IN THE MEETING WITH SHULTZ, BUT EVEN THE ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN MINISTERS HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND HAD NOT PUT QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD ELICIT NEGATIVE REPLIES.

3. CLUVERIUS THOUGHT THAT THE ARABS NOW HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS OVER THE CAMP DAVID LABEL. BUT HE ARGUED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT LET THE ISRAELIS OFF THE HOOK BUT SEIZE THE MOMENT TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND GIVE KING HUSSEIN A MANDATE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. THE DELEGATION HAD ADHERED CLOSELY TO THE POSITION AGREED AT FEZ BUT HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION OF BEING READY TO CONSIDER THIS, SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PLO. THE POSITION OF THE PLO WAS THEIR MAJOR CONCERN: THEY HAD ARGUED THAT ONLY THE PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM COULD NEGOTIATE AND MAKE CONCESSIONS. THERE HAD BEEN A LONG DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ OF THE WELL-KNOWN CONDITIONS FOR A US/PLO DIALOGUE, (ON WHICH SHULTZ OFFERED NO CONCESSIONS).

CONFIDENTIAL

PM  
/4. CLUVERIUS



# CONFIDENTIAL

4. CLUVERIUS EXPECTED THE NEXT STEP TO BE A LETTER FROM KING HASSAN TO THE PRESIDENT REHEARSING THE ARAB POSITION AND SEEKING FURTHER CLARIFICATION, WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD OF COURSE PROVIDE. BILATERAL CONTACTS WOULD CONTINUE, BUT NO DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT COULD BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

FCO PASS SAVING TO :- ABU DHABI, ADEN, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI.

WRIGHT

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

## STANDARD

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## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

2  
CONFIDENTIAL





10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline . d .

FCO has now confirmed that  
King Hassan will be coming  
to see the PM at 11.45 ~~am~~ am.  
on 8 November.

Mark  
22/10.





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 October, 1982

Message from Secretary General  
of the Arab League

Thank you for your letter of 20 October.

The Prime Minister has approved a modified version of the draft reply to Mr. Klibi. The revised text is enclosed. I should be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



Thank you for your message of 4 October about the Palestinian question, and for your kind wishes on the Party Conference.

As you know, we support the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. We shall continue to work for a settlement which embodies this principle, as well as providing security for all states in the region including Israel. Following the tragic events in Beirut, there is now wide recognition that the Palestinian people must be enabled to exercise their rights. I was glad to see that the Arab Summit Meeting at Fez reached agreement on a set of objectives for negotiations aimed at a just and lasting peace. President Reagan has put forward proposals also, proposals which we believe are a realistic basis for progress, even if they fall short in some respects of Arab wishes.

Our position on talks with PLO leaders is well known. They now face a period of important decisions. If they can make an absolutely clear statement which accepts Israel's rights as part of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement, and confirms their commitment to the peaceful path to a settlement, that would be a most important step forward.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1982

Prime Minister

*As amended  
Yes not*

*Agree to send message  
at Flog F to Secretary -  
General of Arab League?*

*A. J. C. 20/10*

Dear John,

Middle East

Thank you for your letter of 12 October enclosing a message from the Secretary General of the Arab League to the Prime Minister.

In our view it would be right for the Prime Minister to reply. I enclose a draft reply in the form of a telegram to Tunis.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



20 OCT 1982





OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby ROUTINE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FROM FCO <sup>19</sup> 1800Z OCTOBER 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO ROUTINE TUNIS
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE
	10	1. Chedli Klibi sent the following message to the Prime Minister
	11	at the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton <del>last week:</del> <sup>ON 4 OCTOBER:</sup>
	12	Dear Prime Minister
	13	I send you my warmest good wishes on the occasion of your party's
	14	conference, and for successful worthwhile deliberations. May I
	15	also at this critical time in the affairs of the Middle East -
	16	appeal to you to embark upon positive action to elevate the
	17	plight of the Palestinian People.
	18	This, I believe, can be achieved via realistic implementation
	19	of the United Nations Resolutions. This is doubtless the only way
	20	in which a just, secure, and lasting peace can be obtained, and
	21	I earnestly request of you to exercise your world renowned
///	22	position to help to obtain the United Nations desires.
//	23	To achieve this end I hope we can count on your valid help and
/	24	support, and at the same time urge you to initiate at the
	25	earliest possible moment top level talks with the leaders of

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword the
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution M E Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) P F RICKETTS		
Telephone number 233 3736		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

(F)

Classification and Caveats

Page

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

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2

the PLO who are the sole legitimate representative of the

3

Palestinian people. This has now been acknowledged by the

4

other British Political Parties and I trust that your conference

5

will make a similar pronouncement.

6

Kindest regards your sincerely

7

Chadli Klibi Secretary General League of Arab States Tunis

8

2. Please now pass the following reply from the Prime Minister

9

to Klibi:

10

A Thank you for your message of 4 October about the Palestinian question, and for your kind wishes on the Party Conference.

11

12

As you know, we support the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. We shall continue to work for a settlement which embodies this principle, as well as providing security for all states in the region including Israel. Following the tragic events in Beirut, there is now wide recognition ~~than ever~~ that the Palestinian people must be enabled to exercise their rights. ~~This is an opportunity which the Arab states should not miss.~~ I was glad to see that the Arab Summit Meeting at Fez reached agreement on a set of objectives for negotiations aimed at a just and lasting peace. President Reagan has put forward proposals also, proposals which we believe are a realistic basis for progress, even if they fall short in some respects of Arab wishes.

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~~The PLO must of course play their part in the search for a comprehensive settlement. That is why we have said that they must be associated with negotiations.~~ Our position on talks with PLO leaders is well known. They <sup>now</sup> PLO face a period of important decisions. If they can make an absolutely clear statement which accepts Israel's rights as part of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement, and confirms their commitment to the peaceful path to a settlement, that would be a most important step forward. B

PYM NNNN

///

//

/

NNNN ends telegram

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Catchword



CAROLINE

*Princess Margaret*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 October 1982

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

Thank you for your letter of 19 October. On the assumption that the delegation does not include a PLO representative, the Prime Minister will be glad:

- (a) to receive King Hassan at 1145 on 8 November;
- (b) to have a plenary session with the delegation at 1215 - Mrs. Thatcher would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary could attend this;
- (c) to give lunch for the delegation at 1300 hours.

I should be grateful if you could provide as soon as possible a draft guest list for a lunch of 48 people.

With regard to your penultimate paragraph, you should know that on 18 October, at a dinner given by the German Ambassador, I was asked by the Moroccan Ambassador whether a PLO representative could be part of the Arab League Delegation. I told him that there was no question of a PLO representative being received at No. 10 and that it would be best not to make such a proposal.

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AJC

CF.

Please let me know when this is confirmed as I have other meetings to cancel.

CF.

20/10.



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

20 October 1982

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

Thank you for your letter of 19 October. On the assumption that the delegation does not include a PLO representative, the Prime Minister will be glad:

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John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JHC



Prime Minister

We shall make it plain that Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
the delegation cannot include the  
P.L.O.

London SW1A 2AH

Agree:-

(a) to receive King Hassan at 11.45  
on 8 November

19 October 1982

(b) to have a plenary session with the  
delegation at 12.15

Yes MT.

(c) to give lunch for 48 at 13.00?

Dear John,

A.J.C. 19/10

Thank you for your letter of 14 October about the Arab League Delegation. The Commission met in Morocco on 15 October to finalise their plans. The Moroccan Ambassador told us on 18 October that the earliest date on which all members of the delegation could be in London is Monday, 8 November (the Members plan to arrive on 7 November).

The Moroccans have stressed that King Hassan will be coming to London in his capacity as leader of the Arab League Delegation rather than on a bilateral visit, and that the plenary session with the whole delegation will be the main part of the programme. They hope however that as a Head of State he will be granted the honour of a short tete-a-tete with the Prime Minister before or after the main talks. We are in touch separately with Buckingham Palace on an Audience of The Queen. Subject to the Prime Minister's wishes, Mr Pym recommends that the visit might take the following form on the morning of 8 November:

- a) a short meeting between the Prime Minister and King Hassan (say 20 minutes) with, at the same time
- b) a meeting between Mr Pym (Mr Hurd) and the other members of the delegation,
- c) a plenary session (45 minutes to one hour) with the Prime Minister, Mr Pym and the delegation,
- d) a luncheon given by the Prime Minister for the delegation.

/It is





It is clear from the Moroccan Ambassador's conversation with the Department on 18 October, and from news agency reports we have seen, that the PLO at least still cling to some hope of being included in the visits to Washington and London, despite firm indications from the Americans and ourselves that they will not be welcome. This insistence is perhaps not surprising since the PLO are the seventh member of the Commission. But the Moroccan Ambassador has invited us to tell him formally that we would not be prepared to accept a PLO representative. It is possible that our refusal to meet the PLO may lead to the cancellation of the London visit. This is a risk we must accept; it is for the Arab League to decide their own priorities. We shall of course do all we can to avoid a situation in which a PLO representative turns up in London and attempts to bounce us into a meeting in some way.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister can agree to these proposals.

*I met the Moroccan Ambassador at dinner last night and told him to forget any idea of a P.L.O. representative being included in the delegation.*

*A. J. C. <sup>14.</sup>/<sub>10</sub>*

*Yours ever*  
*J. E. Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





FILE  
MOROCCO

R07

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 October, 1982

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

Thank you for your letter of 13 October. The Prime Minister is prepared to receive a delegation from the Arab League, subject to its composition and provided that the date is convenient. You have indicated on the telephone that there is considerable uncertainty as to the date of the visit. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as the position is clarified - the Prime Minister's diary is already very committed for the foreseeable future and it may not be easy to find a convenient time.

A. J. DOLEST

J Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SW





Prime Minister:

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1982

Do you agree in principle to see the delegation, subject to its composition?

Yes

Dear John,

R  
13/10.

As you know, King Hassan of Morocco is to lead a delegation of Arab League Foreign Ministers to Washington, probably on 21 or 22 October. The Moroccan Ambassador has told us that the King wishes to bring the delegation to London on 26 or 27 October (with 27 October as the main working day). Arab League delegations are also to visit Moscow, Paris and Peking, although their composition is not yet known. The precise composition of King Hassan's delegation has also yet to be decided but it is likely to include at least the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia.

We had thought that the London delegation would be the same as that visiting Washington and that there would be no question of PLO representation, but the Moroccan Ambassador told us informally on 12 October that a request that we receive a delegation including a member of the PLO was now a possibility. (Arafat is reported to have said in Amman yesterday that the PLO would be involved in the exercise.) We made it clear to the Ambassador that such a request would cause great difficulties and that we very much hoped that it would not be made even if (as the Ambassador had speculated) Arafat himself would not be involved. We are asking the Americans about their own reactions if they too should be asked.

The level of the delegation is such that Mr Pym believes that, if at all possible, the Prime Minister should receive them and offer a meal in their honour. The Arab League attach great importance to this exercise, which is being conducted during a crucial phase in efforts to find a lasting solution to the problem of the Middle East. The arrival of the delegation from Washington would present us with a unique opportunity to put across our views at a high level to a cross-section of Arab opinion. It is clear that the eventual Arab view of the Reagan proposals may depend to a large extent on their report, and we must stress the need to seize the opportunity for progress which these proposals represent.

The timetable outlined above may change (a high-level meeting is being held in Rabat on 15 October to discuss the arrangements and King Hassan is notoriously fickle), but I hope that, if the Prime Minister is willing to see the delegation in principle (subject to its composition), time

/can



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can be at least provisionally reserved on the proposed London dates. (We are of course aware that the Prime Minister of Luxembourg is lunching with the Prime Minister on 27 October.) I will let you know as soon as we have firmer information.

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PM

Type for PM's signature

22 December 1980

PM Reply on middle East P.S.  
situation

Dear Michael,

Secretary-General of the Arab League

M. Chedli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League has sent the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister through our Embassy in Tunis. You will remember that M. Klibi called on the Prime Minister on 3 September. The Secretary of State believes a reply would be appropriate even though the letter looks as if it may have been addressed to others also.

A reply also provides an opportunity for the Prime Minister to remind the Arab League that Arab moderation would be helpful to all.

I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister agrees we will send the reply through our Embassy in Tunis.

Yours ever,

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

HE M Chedli Klibi  
 Secretary General  
 League of Arab States  
 TUNIS

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 11 December.

CAVEAT.....

I share your concern over the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhul. We have made our own concern very clear to the Government of Israel at ministerial level and the European Community is also making a joint demarche in Tel Aviv.

The expulsions and other recent events on the West Bank underline the need for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. As you will have seen from the statement issued at the Luxembourg meeting of the European Council on 2 December, we are determined to step up our activity and to continue to work for a settlement. Over the next few months, the European Community will be working hard to seek the widest possible acceptance of the principles of the Venice Declaration. This will require ~~truth~~ a spirit of compromise from Israel. <sup>Bur</sup> Progress will also depend on the willingness of the Arab side, including the Palestinians, to express their agreement to negotiate a just and permanent solution with Israel.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I believe that 1981 will offer an opportunity, perhaps through the Euro-Arab Dialogue, for the Arab side to take this historic step towards peace.

/I know



I know that the Presidency of the European Community and Lord Carrington will wish to keep in close touch with you throughout 1981. Let us hope that the New Year will be truly a year of peace in the Middle East.



11 DEC. 1980

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جامعة الزيتونة

الأمين العام

9/9437

Excellency,

Once again, Israel stresses its scorn for world opinion and the international will. In point of fact, Israeli authorities continue inexorably their policies of repression and racial discrimination in the Arab occupied territories, subjecting to all forms of exactions the Palestinian people struggling for its freedom and independence. Their latest move was to expel the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, Merrs Had Kawasmeh and Mohamed Melhem, from their country, despite all U.N. resolutions pertaining to this issue, the repeated injunctions of the N.U. Secretary General, and the pressing pleas of the international community.

Non content with this utter violation of human rights, Israeli authorities resort now to massive arrests, closing down of schools and universities, and a showdown of unspeakable violence to repress popular demonstrations organised everywhere in the occupied territories in protest against the deportation of two of their elected mayors who are being denied the most elementary rights that every constitution throughout the world recognizes : the right for every citizen to live in his country.

../.



جامعة الدول العربية

الأمين العام

- 2 -

As I bring these exactions to your attention, it honours me to call upon your influence so as to put an end to such practices as are condemned by international law and rejected by the most basic moral principles.

Please, accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.



Chedli KLIBI

Secretary General

League of Arab States

Her Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain

LONDON



17 September 1980

Further to your letter to me of  
12 September, I enclose a signed photograph  
from the Prime Minister for M. Klibi. I  
should be grateful if you could arrange for  
it to be forwarded.

MODBA

Myles Wickstead, Esq.,  
Lord Privy Seal's Office.







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1980

Grand Room: for action

Dear Michael,

After the Secretary General of the Arab League called on the Prime Minister on 3 September, we were asked if it would be possible to obtain for him a signed photograph of Mrs Thatcher. It seems that he is a fairly ardent collector of such photographs of the eminent persons he has met.

May I ask you therefore if it might be possible send one to us for forwarding to M. Klibi? We have in mind a standard signed photograph, unframed, perhaps with a simple dedication to M. Chadli Klibi.

Yours ever,

M A Wickstead  
Assistant Private Secretary  
to the Lord Privy Seal

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

P.S. Sorry to have to bother you with  
such matters of high policy!



file

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 September 1980

Monsieur Klibi,

Thank you so much for sending me such an attractive basket of flowers. It was a most kind thought.

I too found our discussions together most useful.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Monsieur Chedli Klibi

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*League of Arab States Office*

52 GREEN STREET  
LONDON W1Y 3RH

Telephone 01-629 0732/3  
Cables: Alnasr, London W1

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

THE MEETING WITH YOU WAS INVALUABLE.  
I HOPE IT HAS CREATED NEW CHANNELS OF  
FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM  
AND THE ARAB WORLD.

BEST REGARDS,

CHEDLI KLIBI  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.



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274  
Prime  
Minister

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 September 1980

Call by M. Klibi

As you know the Secretary General of the Arab League called on the Prime Minister this morning. I enclose a copy of the record of their discussion.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

S.J. Gomersall, Esq.,  
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, M. CHADHLI KLIBI, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY 3 SEPTEMBER AT 0930 HOURS

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Present: Prime Minister M. Chadhli Klibi  
Mr. J.L. Bullard Omar al Hassan  
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander 1 Official

\* \* \* \* \*

After exchanging courtesies, M. Klibi said that his meeting with the Prime Minister was timely. A number of years had passed since President Sadat had taken his initiative. The fears of the Arab states about that initiative were now in the course of being realised. Arab doubts about President Sadat's policy had not been motivated by resentment of the fact that he had acted unilaterally but by an awareness that the policy was wrong. The Arab/Israel dispute could not be resolved by tackling peripheral problems. The central issue, that of the Palestinian people, had to be dealt with. Events were demonstrating that the Camp David approach would not work. Camp David envisaged autonomy for the Palestinians on the West Bank, but Mr. Begin continued to make it clear that he believed only in Samaria and Judaea which formed part of Eretz Israel. Given this attitude, and recent Israeli legislation annexing Eastern Jerusalem, what was left of Camp David? Nothing.

M. Klibi said that in this situation the Nine had an important role to play. Among the Nine the UK had a position of special significance partly because we had privileged relations with many Arab states and partly because of our involvement at the time the present problems originated. The Prime Minister had supported the Venice Declaration. The Arabs admired the part she had played in Venice, the stand she had taken since and the way in which she had resisted criticism. A new European initiative should not take place within the Camp David framework but outside it. Camp David envisaged Palestinian autonomy under the aegis of Israel. But the Palestinians would never accept this. Rather than wasting time and spilling blood by going down this road, it would be better to tackle the issue of independence now. The Prime Minister asked whether the

/ Palestinians

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Palestinians wanted independence now or the right to decide their own future. It was not inconceivable that the Palestinians might choose to throw in their lot with one of the neighbouring states. M. Klibi said that this was a theoretical possibility, but in his view there was no doubt that the Palestinians would, if consulted, opt for an independent state. As he saw it, a European initiative should be built on three cardinal points:

- (a) Recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people to their own homeland;
- (b) Recognition of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination (though M. Klibi said that in his view it would be better to refer to independence);
- (c) Agreement that Jerusalem should be an Arab city - or at least that that part which had been Arab before 1967 should revert to Arab control.

Failing agreement on these points, there was a risk of loss of time and of the outbreak of a new conflict. The Prime Minister had said that self-determination would require a lot of time to realise. But there were dangers in waiting. The situation in the Middle East, and in particular in South Lebanon, was deteriorating. Israeli legislation on Jerusalem had created disquiet throughout the Arab world: even the moderates in Saudi Arabia had become hard-liners. The situation in Syria was difficult. Israeli threats might tempt the Syrians to try an adventure. In doing so, the Syrians might invoke Soviet assistance. Even if their threats to do so were only a bluff, they had to be taken seriously. Finally, the ascendancy of the moderates in the PLO might not last much longer. The moderates could only hold their position if they could show results. There was <sup>an</sup> increasing tendency to ask what had been achieved by moderation. This was a particularly dangerous trend and could lead to changes in the orientation of the PLO.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister asked how much time M. Klibi thought there was. Was he suggesting that an initiative was necessary before the Presidential elections in the United States?

M. Klibi confirmed that he thought the time between now and the installation of the next President should be exploited by the Nine to seek a new departure in the Middle East. If President Carter was re-elected, he would be happy to find a European solution on the stocks to help him persuade his party and American public opinion to move. He would be free from the pressures of the various lobbies and would need to consider nothing but the interests of the United States as a 'global' power. Those interests, in the Middle East, involved not only Israel but the Arab world as a whole. At present the Arabs did not consider the U.S. as their friend because the Americans had always backed Israel unconditionally. The Americans should recognise that it was possible to be friends with both sides. There were obvious dangers in leaving the Russians with a free run in the Middle East. Events in Afghanistan could be repeated in the Middle East. If Syria went the same way as Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia the balance in the whole area would be upset. Therefore there was considerable urgency. Europe did not have months to play with.

M. Klibi noted that the U.S. and the Nine had been having difficulties with the question of the representivity of the PLO. They were embarrassed by Arab claims that the PLO were the sole legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. The Arab argument was that the Palestinian people had to be associated with any realistic peace process. It was unreasonable to suppose that Egypt or Jordan could speak in the name of the Palestinians. After all, the Palestinians were a people in their own right and had the highest proportion of intellectuals among all Arabs. The Palestinians had learned about democracy in the universities of Britain and the United States. They would not have others speaking for them. If the PLO did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent it. No other organisation claimed to speak in the name of the Palestinians. The PLO embraced all the different Palestinian factions. Vice President Mubarak would no doubt have told the

/Prime Minister

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Prime Minister the previous day of the Egyptian Foreign Minister's recent statement that following the delays of the last year, the Palestinian people would now have to be associated with the talks between Egypt and Israel. This was what the Arabs had been saying for years.

M. Klibi said that he was aware of another fear entertained by Western Governments viz that any Palestinian state would be Marxist controlled. If Mr. Begin persisted with his present policies and if, as a result, no early solution was found, this would indeed be a real danger. But for the moment those in control of the PLO favoured ideas and values close to those of the West and of the Maghreb States. If progress could be made soon, there was a good chance that these ideas would continue to prevail. But time was short. The Nine, and among the Nine the United Kingdom, would have a determining role in the new period which lay ahead. Their task would be to produce an initiative which would help the United States to see matters in a clear and pragmatic way.

The Prime Minister thanked M. Klibi for his remarks. She said that the initiative taken by the Nine in Venice had been based on an effort to ensure that each side recognised the rights of the other. There were striking similarities between the positions in which the Israelis and the Palestinians found themselves. Both wanted a homeland, both wanted to live behind secure borders, both had a substantial proportion of their people dispersed in other countries. Each wanted the same thing but neither trusted the other sufficiently to accept their point of view. This was the blockage which prevented progress and which the Nine had been trying to remove. The Nine also felt that while over the years there had been a great deal of talk about the Arab/Israel dispute, insufficient effort had been devoted to working out the various options in full and in all their practical details. The Nine - and in particular the UK, because of her past links with the area - had a role to play here. The Prime Minister noted that the Palestinian problem went a good deal wider than the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. She wondered whether, if and when a settlement was reached, the Palestinians would stay where they now were or seek to return to the West Bank. The Prime Minister also referred to European concern



about the terrorist activities of the PLO and to the influence of the Soviet Union on the Organisation. Would the Russians relinquish their hold on the PLO? They were experts at infiltration.

Taking the last point first, M. Klibi said that terrorism was, in the Palestinian context, a relatively marginal issue. There were admittedly elements in the PLO which were not fully under control. Every revolution attracted lawless elements. The longer the present situation lasted and the more distant the hope of a solution appeared, the more it would favour those who advocated terrorism. Despair was their best friend. Progress towards a solution would encourage stability and discourage the Communists. If there was no discontent, the Russians would have no influence.

M. Klibi agreed with the Prime Minister that the absence of confidence between the two sides was the central problem. The Arabs distrusted Israel because, from an Arab point of view, the Zionists had siezed land which had been Arab for centuries. The creation of Israel was perceived by the Arabs as an expropriation. But the Arabs had matured in the last 30 years. There was no longer any question of their aspiring to push the Israelis into the sea. They were now seeking a modus vivendi. If mistrust persisted, it was because Israel had never defined its frontiers. No-one knew how far the Israeli empire might extend: there were those who claimed it would run from the Nile to the Euphrates. The way to restore trust was to create confidence about Israeli intentions. The Israeli Government should state publicly that they had no intention of expanding beyond the 1967 frontiers, and that they accepted the need for an independent Palestinian state. If Israel adopted this attitude a dynamic peace process could be set in motion. As the Venice declaration had made clear, defined and guaranteed frontiers would be required for all. The Prime Minister referred to Resolution 242 and to the fact that minor adjustments in frontiers might be required. M. Klibi referred to these as details which would cause no difficulty if the major principles could be agreed.

/The Prime Minister



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The Prime Minister said that she expected things to move slowly. Some way would have to be found of reducing the existing mistrust but it would take a long time. Her own position was based on the belief, which she had stated many times in public, that no-one could demand rights for himself if he was not prepared to grant to others. That was the only basis on which a settlement would be possible. But it would not be easy so long as Mr. Begin was on the scene. M. Klibi said that confidence could not be established until all the parties felt that justice had prevailed and that their dignity would be respected. It was an illusion for the Israelis to suppose that their security could be preserved by force of arms.

As the discussion ended, at 1030, the Prime Minister thanked M. Klibi for his help in overcoming the recent difficulties between HM Government and Saudi Arabia.

*Phus*

3 September 1980

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*Prime Minister*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 September 1980

*Dear Michael,*

VISIT OF M. CHEDLI KLIBI, SECRETARY GENERAL  
OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

I enclose briefing material for M. Klibi's call on the Prime Minister at 0930 on 3 September, as requested in Caroline Stephens' letter of 5 August. M. Klibi speaks French; Mr P W Ford will interpret. Mr J L Bullard will attend the meeting.

*Yours ever  
Stephen Gomersall.*

S J Gomersall

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY M. CHEDLI KLIBI,  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, 3 SEPTEMBER 1980

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Recognise urgent need for progress and depth of Arab frustration. Committed to contributing if we can. Thorn mission aims to lay a basis for this.
2. Regret provocative Israeli acts and concerned about mood of defiant isolation in Israel. Arabs for their part must recognise that peace cannot be imposed on Israel but must be negotiated with her. This involves creation of goodwill by both sides.
3. PLO importance recognised, but they must show readiness to co-exist with Israel if they are to be accepted as a responsible negotiating partner.

Afghanistan

Internal Scene

4. The regime of Babrak Karmal still has no popular support. Without the backing of Russian forces it would fall. Resistance to the Soviet occupation continues throughout the country. The Russians have incurred significant losses (around 4,000 casualties) but not as great as the Press would suggest. Resistance fighters have suffered heavy casualties. They face helicopter gunships with primitive weapons.

/Reactions of

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Reactions of Soviet Union and Babrak Karmal

5. The Soviet Union have so far given no indication that they are prepared to withdraw their troops. Their aim appears to be to obtain international recognition for the Babrak Karmal Government and to win acceptance of the present situation by normalising relations with neighbouring countries.

Next Steps

6. The next major occasion for the international community to express its disapproval of the Soviet invasion will be at the UNGA. Vital that pressure be maintained and that any resolution commands solid support from Islamic, Non-Aligned and Third World countries. Hope that representatives of the independence movements may be able to address the Assembly and will be involved in any conference that may be planned.

Anglo-Saudi relations

7. Pleased that relations are now back on course and grateful for M. Klibi's intervention on our behalf. Most important to resume dialogue on regional and world issues, especially Arab/Israel (Lord Carrington's valuable discussions last week with Saudi leaders).

Euro-Arab Dialogue (defensive)

8. Ready to resume Dialogue. Political and technical aspects must be kept in balance. Await response of Arab side to our proposals.

(If pressed) Concerned that there should be sufficient preparation before all the Foreign Ministers of both sides are committed to a meeting.

/Diplomatic



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Diplomatic status for the Arab League Office (defensive)

9. Diplomatic status is only accorded to the missions of Sovereign states. The present situation does not seem to hamper the League's operation in London. The question of according any special status to the Office is for the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

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Essential Facts

Arab/Israel

1. M. Klibi wishes to claim for himself a leading role on the Arab side in discussing Arab-Israel affairs. In practice he can wield little influence. While his own views are reasonable and pragmatic, he has a tendency to make hardline noises on occasions in order to impress the radical Arab states and build up his own prestige. M. Klibi saw M. Thorn when the latter visited Tunis at the outset of his Middle East contact mission, but had little of interest to say. He welcomes European interest and activity although like others he sees Europe mainly as a channel to the US.

Autonomy talks

2. There is no sign of a resumption in the talks, but equally a final breakdown remains unlikely. President Sadat is still committed to his peace policy and shows little inclination to abandon Camp David and rejoin the Arab consensus despite the temptation to do so in the face of Israeli intransigence.

Thorn Mission

3. M. Thorn is engaged on his final visits to Cairo and to the West Bank. He has been welcomed everywhere but his talks have been hasty and superficial and he had heard little new. He has promised a written report to his Nine colleagues on 16 September and is due to address the General Assembly on behalf of the Nine at the end of September.

Anglo-Saudi Relations

4. HM Ambassador returned to Jedda on 19 August for Lord Carrington's visit on 26 and 27.

5. M. Klibi contacted Crown Prince Fahd in May to help restore our relations (our Ambassador has thanked him).



6. In Taif Lord Carrington had lengthy discussions with the King, Crown Prince Fahd, Prince Saud, (Foreign Minister) and Ministers of Petroleum, Defence, Interior and Finance.

Euro-Arab Dialogue

7. The Dialogue emerged at the time of the Summit of the Nine in December 1973. It aimed at establishing special relations between the Nine and the Arab League, covering a broad field of (mainly economic) co-operation, excluding only the Middle East conflict. The PLO take an active part in the Arab League side but we have avoided giving them recognition. The two sides meet without any national identification.

8. The Dialogue made slow progress, limited to technical work on its various sub-committees on, eg investment protection. It was suspended in March 1979 at the request of the Arab side following Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League. Subsequently the League's new Secretary General expressed a wish to renew the Dialogue, and EC Foreign Ministers agreed to the resumption of contacts at a technical level. They stipulated that Egypt should be kept informed.

9. During these exploratory contacts the Arab side moved from an early willingness to concentrate on technical aspects to a position which placed increased emphasis on political questions. They eventually demanded that the Europeans should formally recognise both the political nature of the Dialogue and the exclusion of Egypt from it. They also revived earlier demands for recognition by the Nine of the PLO, the reconsideration of the European position on the rights of the Palestinians and for a meeting of all the Foreign Ministers of both sides in a General Committee.

10. The Nine agreed at Venice that the Dialogue should have a political dimension and that there should be a meeting between the

/two



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two sides at a political level but we have resisted the Arab League's more extreme demands (eg on the PLO). We have proposed a limited Ministerial meeting and await the Arab side's formal reply, which will emerge from the Arab League Council meeting in mid-September. Klibi is echoing the demands of the PLO and the hardliners in the League for a meeting of all Foreign Ministers. The PLO assume the Presidency of the League on 21 September and such a meeting would therefore require very careful preparation in order to avoid political polemics and confrontation. The Dialogue is so far insufficiently substantial to justify a Ministerial meeting.

Diplomatic status for the Arab League Office

11. Some months ago there were indirect approaches to the FCO for diplomatic status to be accorded to the Arab League Office in London. We refused, on the ground that we accord such recognition only to missions established here by Sovereign states. To treat the Arab League Office similarly would require prime legislation.

12. Klibi may draw a comparison with the offices of United Nations Agencies in London; EEC Commission representatives in Arab countries etc. This comparison is invalid, since the UK is a member of those bodies, but the question is detailed and should be referred to FCO.



Personality Note

KLIBI, CHEDLI

Tunisian, Secretary General of the League of Arab States since May 1979.

Deputy in Tunisian National Assembly and Mayor of Carthage since 1964. Member of the Political Bureau of the Destour Socialist party since January 1968.

Born at Tunis in 1925. Studied in Tunis and Paris, specialising in philosophy and Arabic literature. Formerly a professor at the Ecole Normale Superieure, also carried on journalistic activities. Held a succession of Ministerial posts dealing with cultural affairs and information from 1972 until November 1973. Designated against his will as Ambassador to Cairo in December 1973 and in fact avoided going there. Appointed Director of the Presidential Cabinet with the rank of Minister in 1974. Minister of Culture in December 1976 and of Information in September 1978. A champion of the use of Arabic in Tunisia.

A superficially unimpressive personality, he has worked hard to make the Secretariat General in Tunis effective, following Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League in 1979. Has pretensions to Pan-Arab Foreign Minister status and is something of an empire-builder. Reasonably well-disposed towards Britain, his characteristically Tunisian moderation is influenced by his need to maintain his acceptability to the hardline PLO supporters in the League.

Married. Three children.



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BF 1/9/80

5 August 1980

Visit of Mr. Chadhli Klibi, Secretary-General of  
the Arab League

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Thank you for your letter to Mike Pattison of 4 August regarding the visit of Mr. Chadhli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League.

The Prime Minister will be happy to see him and may I please offer you Wednesday 3 September at 9.30 a.m. Could your brief please reach this office by close of play on Monday 1 September. I should warn you that the Prime Minister's diary is very crowded for that period so she might not be able to give him quite so long as she would wish.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Prime Minister

Mr Klibi would like to call on you on Sept 2 (when Mubarak sees you) or 3. You will be preparing

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

speech, but there is 4 August 1980

time available. Would you like to see him for half an hour?

MP 4/8

Visit of Mr Chadli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League

Will do  
Dear Mike,



You mentioned a few days ago that an informal enquiry had been put to the Prime Minister whether she would be prepared to receive Chadli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League. The Syrian Ambassador, who is the informal "Dean" of the Arab Ambassadors in London, approached John Moberly in that capacity on 31 July and said that Klibi would like to visit London on 2 or 3 September for talks with the Prime Minister. He said that Klibi wanted to range widely over the whole field of relations between the European Community and the Arab world, including the Euro-Arab dialogue. Omran mentioned that Klibi had had talks both with President Giscard and with Schmidt and that he was very keen to see Mrs Thatcher on this occasion so that relations between the Arab League and the Nine would not be weighted unduly in the direction of France and Germany.

It is correct that Klibi has recently been received by President Giscard and by Schmidt. He made a good impression. He is a sensible and well-informed man with reasonable ideas about the Arab/Israel problem and other problems of the Arab world. We should not wish to press the Prime Minister to receive him, and if she agrees to do so we would make it clear to Omran that it was an exceptional arrangement for this particular visit. Nevertheless, if the Prime Minister did see him, she would not be wasting her time and the effect on our general position in the Arab world could only benefit.

Vice-President Mubarak of Egypt will be in Britain as the Prime Minister's guest at the same time. Although Egypt is not a member of the Arab League of which Klibi is Secretary-General, we do not believe that either side would make anything of this coincidence or that it would cause embarrassment.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M A Pattison Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

Copies: PS/LPS  
PS/Mr Hurd  
Sir A Acland  
Mr J Moberly  
Mr Miers (MED)



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1-4 AUG 1980



