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PREM 19/1106



PM's Meeting with Arab  
League Delegations

PRIME MINISTER

Part 1: August 1980

Part 2: March 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>11-3-83</del>							
18.3.83							
<del>23-3-85</del>							
27-3-83							
ends-							
X							
PREM 19/1106							

PART 2 ends:-

Amman Tel 123 24.3.83 T 394/83

PART 3 begins:-

Fco to ASC 15.4.83



SUBJECT

PM

GR 160

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 39A/83

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 271025Z MAR 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 123 OF 27 MARCH 1983

REPEATED TO FOR INFO RABAT

AND REPEATED SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON: MESSAGE TO  
PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

1. THE ROYAL COURT HAVE ASKED IF WE WOULD PASS THE  
FOLLOWING MESSAGE, DATED 24 MARCH, FROM KING HUSSEIN  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO  
CONCLUDE THE ARAB MISSION EMANATING FROM OUR SUMMIT MEETING  
AT FEZ BY VISITING BRITAIN. I HAD FOR LONG FELT SADDENED  
OVER THE UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DELAYED THE VISIT  
OF THE MISSION HEADED BY MY BROTHER, HIS MAJESTY KING  
HASSAN II OF MOROCCO. AS IT TURNED OUT, OUR VISIT COULD NOT  
HAVE CONCLUDED ON A HAPPIER NOTE. I AM DELIGHTED AT THE  
IMPRESSIONS WHICH OUR VISIT LEFT ON ALL MEMBERS OF MY  
DELEGATION, REFLECTING THE TRULY STRONG AND LASTING TIES  
OF FRIENDSHIP, UNDERSTANDING AND COMMONALITY OF OBJECTIVES  
BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

I SEND YOU MY WARMEST PERSONAL WISHES AND HIGHEST ESTEEM.

I AM,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN

ENDS

F C O PASS SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

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REPEATED AS REQUESTED

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
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SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T37/83



FIVE

RM

cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 March, 1983

*Your Majesty.*

I write to thank you most warmly for the beautiful gift which was delivered to me on Your Majesty's behalf by His Excellency M. Boucetta on the occasion of the visit to London by the Arab League Delegation. I shall treasure it as a memento of a successful and friendly occasion.

We were all disappointed that Your Majesty was not able to lead the Delegation in London, as you had planned. But we are most grateful to you for the preparations which you made and for your persistent efforts to ensure a successful outcome.

I very much hope that we shall have the pleasure of welcoming Your Majesty in London on a future occasion.

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

His Majesty King Hassan II

*SW*



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

10

S  
S/MR HURD  
S/PUS  
MR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
MR J BULLARD  
D/NENAD  
D/MED  
D/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10

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D/CONSULAR DEPT

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IMMEDIATE

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RESIDENT CLERK

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FM JEDDAH 220840Z MAR 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 153 OF 22 MARCH

MY TELNO 151: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, AT THE REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (CHAIRER BY CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH) ON 21 MARCH, PRICE SAUD GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS IN LONDON. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION IS QUOTED BY TODAY'S LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AS SAYING THAT THE COUNCIL 'EXPRESSED ITS SATISFACTION AT THE RESULTS OF THE (ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S) TALKS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS, AND ITS SATISFACTION AT THE BRITISH COMMUNIQUE WHICH MADE CLEAR BRITAIN'S DETERMINATION TO WORK TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION'.

CRAIG



S E C R E T

1



10 DOWNING STREET

NOTE FOR THE FILE

The attached documents were given to the Prime Minister by King Hussein when he was here with the Arab League Delegation last week. King Hussein stressed their confidentiality.

A-J-C.  $\frac{22}{3}$ .

22 March 1983

S E C R E T



FIRST, YOU HAVE ASKED IF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RESULT IN THE RETURN OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO THE PALESTINIANS. WHILE I HAVE REFRAINED FROM MAKING ANY ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES TO ANY PARTY REGARDING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH GOD ALONE CAN KNOW, I BELIEVE THAT THE FUTURE OF THESE TERRITORIES SHOULD BE THAT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. YOU MAY RECALL THAT IN MY SEPTEMBER INITIATIVE, I STATED VERY CLEARLY THAT, IN MY VIEW, THE PURPOSE OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS THE PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FROM ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THE PALESTINIANS OF THE TERRITORIES WILL EXERCISE REAL AUTHORITY OVER THEMSELVES AND THEIR AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY INCLUDING THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ULTIMATE STATUS OF THE TERRITORIES UNDER CONDITIONS OF FINAL PEACE. IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE I AM PREPARED TO SUPPORT ANY RESULT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN PROVIDES THE MOST LIKELY AVENUE TO PEACE.

SECOND, YOU HAVE ALSO ASKED IF THE U.S. OPPOSES THE FORMATION OF A CONFEDERATION OF JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF KING HUSSEIN. CONFEDERATION, OF COURSE, COULD BE ONE OF THE POSSIBLE FORMS OF "ASSOCIATION" WHICH I HAVE SAID IS MY PREFERENCE.

THIRD, YOU MUST HAVE NEXT ASKED IF THE ARAB DELEGATION WOULD BE ABLE TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE FEZ SUMMIT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE AGREED PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ADOPTED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES. CLEARLY, PARTIES TO A NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE IN AGREEMENT ON ITS PURPOSE WHICH, IN THIS CASE, IS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, AS CALLED FOR IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS ASSURED THAT ANY APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED RESTS FIRMLY ON THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THOSE RESOLUTIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT, IN ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS, EVERY PARTY SHOULD BE FREE TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS IN THE FORM IT CONSIDERS MOST APPROPRIATE. IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES TO RECONCILE THE INEVITABLE DIFFERENCES IN THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES. THEREFORE, WE, OF COURSE, WILL NOT DICTATE TO ANY PARTY THE POSITIONS WHICH IT WISHES TO PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS.



FOURTH, YOU HAVE ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT OF WITHDRAWAL AND HAVE ASKED THAT I REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "TERRITORY FOR PEACE," YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN MY STATEMENT ON SEPTEMBER 1, I REAFFIRMED THE POSITION OF THE U.S. THAT -- IN RETURN FOR PEACE -- THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS, INCLUDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I DESCRIBED A LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXTENT OF TERRITORY WHICH ISRAEL SHOULD BE ASKED TO GIVE UP AND THE EXTENT OF TRUE PEACE AND NORMALIZATION AND THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL BE OFFERED IN RETURN, PUT ANOTHER WAY, THE FINAL REGIONAL BOUNDARY TO THE EAST OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL WILL, AS WE ALL KNOW, BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION. IN THAT NEGOTIATION, THE U.S., IN ITS ROLE AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL STRIVE TO ASSURE THAT EACH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 IS FULFILLED TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT.



SECRET

Your Majesty:

I look forward to seeing you in London this weekend for a good talk about Lebanon and the peace process. Meanwhile, following Dick Viets' talks with you on this subject, I want to bring you up-to-date on our discussion with our Saudi friends. You of course have Prince Saud with you and I understand Prince Bandar may call on you in London on his way home to Saudi Arabia from Washington. I will be seeing Prince Bandar Thursday evening before his departure but, before you see him, I want you to know for your information that I believe the Saudis now have a better understanding of the difference between the basis of negotiations and any party's negotiating position. Prince Saud told our Ambassador that it might be possible to find a formula indicating that 242 is the basis of negotiations, though he stressed that Fez should be the negotiating position.

On another aspect of the issue, however, I believe the Saudis still support an unrealistic position. That is, they seem to support Arafat's desire for confederation and his interpretation that this means two independent states which then choose to join together. While we have been clear, even blunt, in telling our Saudi friends that this will not work, they have not yet dropped it.

Your Majesty, these are just two of the many issues we will want to discuss when we meet. I have taken the liberty of addressing this message to you at this time, in the belief that the quickening pace of events now requires the closest and most frequent consultation between us.

Respectfully,

Philip C. Habib

SECRET



SECRET

FOR AMBASSADOR VIETS FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:

The report King Hussein gave to Ambassador Barnes about the U.S. agreeing to quadripartite talks involving the PLO, Jordan, Israel, and the U.S. is of course untrue. It results, we assume, from some mixed signals through which King Hassan got the impression that Kissinger would be willing to go to Morocco for talks with Hassan and a "third party" on U.S.-PLO relations. While Kissinger has in the past met with Hassan to discuss global and regional issues of mutual interest, and has a pending invitation to do so again, King Hassan now understands that there should be no "third parties" present for such discussions.

You should convey the above explanation to King Hussein, emphasizing that of course our position on the PLO has not changed, and asking that he try to avoid discussing this matter further with the Moroccans as it was a bit awkward for both us and King Hassan.

SECRET





10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

His Majesty King Hassan is  
addressed as 'Your Majesty'  
and the ending is 'Yours  
sincerely' as you put on the  
original letter.

21 March, 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Now see the telegram

18 March 1983

I send you bundle.

Prime Minister

AM  $\frac{22}{3}$

Apex message to President Reagan

See John

h.a...

A.J.C.  $\frac{18}{3}$

Arab League Mission

I understand that the Prime Minister would like to look at a draft message to President Reagan following the visit of the Arab League Mission and enclose a text.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your recent message about the Middle East.

The long-deferred visit to London of the Arab League Mission, arising from the Fez Summit, took place on 18 March. I found it encouraging that, after the difficult exchanges which we had had earlier with some of the Arab countries about Palestinian representation in the delegation, and given that we stood firm on not having the PLO, all the governments nevertheless felt it was worth coming, even Syria. Their purpose was to tell us that the Fez proposals, which they now call the 'Arab Peace Plan', are still on the table, and that some at least of the conclusions of the recent meeting of the Palestine National Council should be seen in a positive light.

All those who spoke emphasised the need for speed and determination in US policy towards the Middle East. They seek constant reassurance that Israel does not have your unconditional support. Success in obtaining Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon without unacceptable conditions is seen as a test of your resolution though the Palestine problem of course occupies the first priority for them.

King Hussein told me that he is still not sure how far Arafat will go to enable him to declare his readiness to participate in

/ peace talks.

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peace talks. But he is not in an optimistic mood and feels in need of support, not least from the Saudis. He believes, and I must say I sympathise with him, that we have got into a vicious circle. The Arab world is waiting for a clear signal from you that you are truly determined and even-handed, while you are waiting for a clear signal from them that they are ready to negotiate. I hope that you can find a way to emphasise again to the Arab world that you are totally committed to your proposals and will take the necessary steps to push them forward if the Arabs will do their part.

Phil Habib of course continues to enjoy our full support. It is good that he is making his weight felt on the question of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. It occurred to me that the appointment of another impressive figure like Habib - if you could find one - to deal exclusively with the Palestine problem might make it easier for you to get across the message I am talking about. It could help to demonstrate your determination to make the fastest possible progress on both fronts at once.

There is no doubt that the next few weeks will be critical. I want you to know that we are right behind your efforts to make progress in these very complex negotiations. Please be in touch if there is any way in which we can be of help.



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Boe  
DM

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 March 1983

*Dear John,*

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

I enclose a record of the discussion which took place in the plenary session here today.

*Yours etc*

*John Coler.*

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Boe




*Checked by C.F.*

VISIT OF A DELEGATION OF  
THE ARAB LEAGUE  
LED BY

HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL  
OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

17 - 18 MARCH 1983





Visit of a Delegation of the Arab League led by  
His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal  
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
17-18 March 1983

His Majesty King Hussein will lead the following delegation:-

Syrian Arab Republic

His Excellency Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
In attendance: Wing Commander T Cody Car A

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

His Royal Highness Prince Saud bin Faisal bin  
Abdul Aziz  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
In attendance: Mr R Lamb Car E

Kingdom of Morocco

His Excellency Maître M'hamed Boucetta  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs  
In attendance: Group Captain P Worrall Car C

Republic of Tunisia

His Excellency Mr Mahmoud Mestiri  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs  
In attendance: The Hon E Howard Car D



Algeria

His Excellency Hadj Bin Abdel el Kader Azzout  
Secretary-General. Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
In attendance: Mr N Coppel Car E

Palestinian Representative

Prof Walid al-Khalidi

In attendance: Ms J Hancock Car F

Arab League Secretary-General

His Excellency Mr Chedli Klibi  
In attendance: Mr M Fuller Car G

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

His Excellency Mr Ahmed al-Lawzi  
Head of Royal Court  
His Excellency Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
In attendance: Group Captain P Harvey Car H



P R O G R A M M E

Thursday 17 March

1830 Arrive London Heathrow Airport  
by private aircraft.

Special Waiting Room, South Side  
Met by the Lord-in-Waiting to Her  
Majesty The Queen, The Lord  
Skelmersdale and the Secretary of  
State for Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs, the Rt Hon Francis Pym MP  
(See page 6 for details of arrival  
arrangements).

1845 Leave the Airport by car

1920 Arrive Claridges

No official engagements are planned  
for the evening.

Times to be  
confirmed

Arrivals of Their Excellencies the  
Members of the Arab League Delegation  
at London Heathrow Airport.

Friday 18 March

(1015 Arab League Delegates arrive F. C. O.  
(Quadrangle.)

1020 Leave Claridges

1030 Arrive Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Quadrangle



Met by the Prime Minister, The  
Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP

Received by a Guard of Honour found  
by the 1st Battalion Grenadier  
Guards with the Regimental  
Colour, the Band of the Scots Guards  
and the Corps of Drums of the 1st  
Battalion Grenadier Guards.

His Majesty will inspect the Guard  
of Honour.

Leave Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Quadrangle via Main Archway  
accompanied by the Prime Minister  
(See page 7 for details of the  
ceremony)

Arrive 10 Downing Street

1045- Plenary Meeting at 10 Downing Street  
1215

1215  
1245 Tête-à-tête with the Prime Minister

1300 for  
1315 Luncheon given by Her Majesty's  
Government

Host: The Prime Minister  
The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP

1445  
~~1430~~ Leave 10 Downing Street

1443

Arrive Buckingham Palace  
Main gate  
Central Archway  
Grand entrance

~~1445~~

1500

Audience of Her Majesty The Queen  
(see page 10 for details of  
Audience)

Leave Buckingham Palace

There are no further Official  
engagements

Departure arrangements to be notified.



## ARRIVAL OF HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN

Thursday 17 March

His Majesty will arrive by special aircraft at 1830 hours. As soon as the aircraft doors open a representative of the British Airports Authority will escort the greeting party to the tarmac. His Excellency Mr Ibrahim Izziddin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, will board the aircraft and escort His Majesty to the bottom of the aircraft steps where the following will be (in order):-

The Lord Skelmersdale, Lord-in-Waiting to  
Her Majesty The Queen

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MP, Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Group Captain P Heal, Government Escort Officer

Mr R Baxendale, British Airports Authority.

The party will proceed to the VIP Suite and then to the cars for the journey into London.

### Transport

His Majesty will travel in his own car which will have a Police motorcycle escort. A limousine is provided for the use of His Excellency Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

## GUARD OF HONOUR - Procedure

1. A Guard of Honour found by 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards under the command of Major Evelyn Webb-Carter with the Regimental Colour, the Band of the Scots Guards and the Corps of Drums of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards will be formed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle on Friday 18 March at 1030 hours to greet His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Embassy staff and other spectators are requested to arrive not later than 1000 hours.
2. At 1015 hours the Arab League Delegates and Ambassadors will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle by car via King Charles Street. They will alight from their cars just beyond the dais (ie to the east of the latter) where they will be received by The Rt Hon Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. They will remain near the Colour points on the east side of the Main Archway (see diagram attached). Delegates and Ambassadors are requested to arrive not later than 1020 hours. The Delegates' cars and Ambassadors' cars should proceed direct to King Charles Street where they will park while the Guard of Honour is in progress.
3. At 1028 hours the Prime Minister will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle through the Main Archway; she will be met at the Archway by Major General James Eyre (Major General Commanding the Household Division). He will be accompanied by the Brigade Major, Lt Col Richard Heywood, Brigade Major the Household Division. The Major General will then escort the Prime Minister to the right (west) of the dais where she will receive His Majesty King Hussein.




4. At 1030 hours His Majesty King Hussein will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office via King Charles Street.

5. The Prime Minister will welcome him and present Major General Eyre who will escort the King to his place on the dais. The Prime Minister will then take up a position on his right and behind the dais, and the Major General will take up his position on the left and behind the dais. After the Guard Commander has presented his Guard of Honour to the King, the Major General will accompany the King and the Guard Commander on the inspection. The Prime Minister should remain in the vicinity of the dais with the Brigade Major until the inspection is completed and the Major General has accompanied the King back to the dais. His Majesty will introduce his Delegation to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will then escort the King to No. 10 Downing Street. Those participating in the plenary talks will follow.

6. Meanwhile the Major General and the Brigade Major will have taken their leave of the King and will authorise the dispersal of the Guard of Honour once the King has departed for No. 10 Downing Street.

#### Wet Weather Programme

In the event of wet weather the Parade will not be cancelled. The programme will continue as scheduled up to the point where the inspection of the Guard of Honour should begin. If there is heavy rain at that point in the programme and the King does not wish to inspect the Guard of Honour, the Prime Minister should lead the King to No. 10 Downing Street.





AUDIENCE OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

His Majesty King Hussein will present the following to Her Majesty The Queen:-

His Excellency Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam

His Royal Highness Prince Saud bin Faisal  
bin Abdul Aziz

His Excellency Maître M'hamed Boucetta

His Excellency Mr Mahmoud Mestiri

His Excellency Hadj Abdel el Kader Azzout

Mr Walid al-Khalidi

His Excellency Mr Chedli Klibi

His Excellency Mr Ahmed al-Lawzi

His Excellency Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem

The party will arrive at the Grand entrance of Buckingham Palace via the Main Gate and the Central Archway. There they will be met by the Private Secretary to Her Majesty The Queen. Those in attendance on the Delegates and the Escort Officers will await them in an ante-room.

DIRECTORY

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273 3586

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EMBASSY OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN  
6 Upper Phillimore Gardens, Kensington, W8 7HB :  
01-937 3685

EMBASSY OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  
8 Belgrave Square, SW1X 8PH : 01-245 9012

ALGERIAN EMBASSY  
54 Holland Park, W11 3RS : 01-221 7800

EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO  
49 Queen's Gate Gardens, SW7 5NE : 01-581 5001

TUNISIAN EMBASSY  
29 Prince's Gate, SW7 1QG : 01-584 8117

ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA  
30 Belgrave Square, SW1X 8QB : 01-235 0831

ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE  
52 Green Street, W1Y 3RH : 01-629 0732



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SUBJECT cc Master Set

RESTRICTED

CALL BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION LED BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN  
ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1050 HOURS ON FRIDAY 18 MARCH 1983 AT  
10 DOWNING STREET

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Present:

The Prime Minister

King Hussein - Leader of  
the Delegation

The Foreign and  
Commonwealth Secretary

The Syrian Foreign Minister -  
Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam

Mr. Hurd

The Saudi Foreign Minister -  
Prince Saud bin Faisal

Sir John Leahy

Mr. Miles

The Moroccan Foreign Minister -  
Maitre Boucetta

Mr. Miers

Mr. Plumbley

The Algerian Secretary-  
General for Foreign  
Affairs -  
Mr. Hadj Bin Abdel el  
Kader Azzout

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr. Coles

The Palestinian  
Representative -  
Professor Walid  
al-Khalidi

The Secretary- General of  
the Arab League -  
Mr. Chedli Klibi

- and other members of  
delegations

\* \* \* \* \*

The Prime Minister welcomed the delegation and said that we were glad that arrangements satisfactory to all parties for their visit had been made. She invited King Hussein to speak.

King Hussein thanked the Prime Minister for her greetings and for the good atmosphere and delivered an opening address (attached at Annex A).

/ The Prime Minister

RESTRICTED



The Prime Minister thanked King Hussein for his excellent presentation. Britain and the Arab Delegation shared a common view of the fundamentals of the problem, the need for freedom, justice and fairness for all. This was the heart of the question. Britain was closely involved both because of our history and because of our close friendship with the Arab peoples.

We had recognised the importance of the Fez Summit declaration from the outset. A unified Arab peace programme was a major step forward. She would not comment on every one of the principles of Fez, some of which would be the subject of negotiation in the eventual peace process. She wished to lay special emphasis on the principle of self-determination. Any party demanding self-determination for itself could not deny it to others, and this was something we had repeated to the Israelis and to everyone else with whom we discussed the matter. The Israelis claimed self-determination for themselves and must grant it to the Palestinians.

King Hussein's address had stressed the right of all people to live in peace, and had supported this by a reference to the legitimacy of the situation based on the 1947 Resolution of the United Nations on the partition of Palestine.

We were committed as members of the Ten and as part-authors of the Venice Declaration to the association of the PLO with peace negotiations. We differed in some respects with the Arab view of the PLO, but unreservedly welcomed the Palestinian representative in the delegation.

We had been distressed by the incidents in the al Aqsa Mosque. Any nation which rested on a strong basis of religious belief was obliged to respect the religious rights of others. We believed that the Israelis had acted quickly to arrest those responsible for the latest troubles, but fully understood the shock which had been felt in the Muslim world.

We deplored and had publicly condemned the continuation of settlement building by the Israelis in the occupied territories.



Every time the world tried to tackle the fundamentals of the Middle East another phase seemed to begin, bringing its own difficulties to block progress. She was referring particularly to Lebanon; at the time of the Venice Declaration the Lebanon problem had been less acute, and the Ten had thought there was a real opportunity for progress. That opportunity had been missed. We now had to ask how to make progress both on withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and on the Arab-Israel problem. Sometimes a way could be found to make progress even as a result of tragedy.

We would do all we could both at the forthcoming European Summit and at the summit meeting at Williamsburg to emphasise to President Reagan that time was short and that the opportunity for progress on Lebanon and on the Arab-Israel problem must not be lost.

Summing up the Prime Minister emphasised our belief in the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and in the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to live within secure borders, and said that we saw an opportunity now for progress, beginning with the Lebanon. We shared the faith of the Arab delegation in a just and lasting peace for all the region, to be pursued by peaceful means.

Professor al-Khalidi thanked the Prime Minister for her remarks about the solution to the problem of the formation of the delegation, and her welcome to himself. Speaking in the name of the party and people which he represented, he asked that Britain should do everything in her power to obtain the right of self-determination for the Palestinians. Nothing in Israel's position could take away this right, which was the right of his people living in their own lands from the Jordan river to the sea.

The recent Palestine National Council had made some important points. First of all it had fully confirmed Palestinian commitment to the Fez Plan. He agreed that the Fez plan was of historic importance; all the leaders of the Arab States, with only one



exception, had endorsed for the first time principles which could lead to a viable settlement.

Fez had also endorsed the principles of Palestinian dialogue with the Lebanese Government and with Jewish leaders who were ready to consider measures consistent with Palestinian rights.

The PNC had pointed out the deficiencies of the Reagan plan: first, the question of Palestinian return (Professor al-Khalidi commented that Russian Jews enjoyed this right while Palestinians did not). Next, the Reagan Plan failed to refer to Palestinian sovereignty which was of great political and psychological significance if the Palestinians were to escape from their mood of statelessness. Speaking personally, sovereignty was important for the Palestinian diaspora exactly as Israeli sovereignty was important for the Jewish diaspora.

The PNC had also endorsed the concept of Palestinian/Jordanian confederation, which was of the greatest significance. The Jordanian people were the closest of all their neighbours to the Palestinians in every respect.

Finally, the form of Zionism to which Mr. Begin adhered went back to the 1920s when the 'revisionists' wanted to change the Palestine mandate in order to allow Jewish settlement east of the Jordan river. Zionism in this sense had nothing to do with resistance to Soviet influence in the area. Revisionism was basic to the thinking of Mr. Begin, Mr. Shamir and Mr. Arens. It was fruitless to think that they would change unless Washington sent unmistakable signals that change was required, as for example President Reagan had sent an unmistakable signal to end the bombing of Beirut. Professor al-Khalidi appealed directly to the Prime Minister as the only person, probably in the world, who had the moral influence to bring these points home to President Reagan.

The Prime Minister said she would not reply in detail to all the points made, but mentioned that only Britain and Pakistan had

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recognised the West Bank as Jordanian territory. She had noted carefully the reference to confederation. Fez was a big step forward, and so was the Reagan plan (which had not been welcomed in Israel). We must use the positive elements in order to make progress; if we failed, with the well known problems of US elections we should find we had lost two years. We must concentrate on working together on what we had in common. In government one could never get one hundred per cent of what one wanted, and to get two-thirds was doing very well. Nevertheless we would continue to press the Americans.

Mr. Khaddam said that he did not believe that the Reagan plan provided a serious framework for peace. The problem was not just the occupied territories and indeed the problem had existed before 1967. The essence of the problem was the Palestinians in exile. He recalled a former US statesman who had said of the Palestinians that America would turn them into a problem for the Arabs.

Washington was not serious about peace, as was shown by the vast arms supplies which the US gave to the Israelis. If Syria looked to receive anything like as much there would be a tremendous row.

The Americans now faced a crucial test in Lebanon; if they could secure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon with no conditions he would admit there was some chance of their playing a useful role on the Palestine problem. Peace required balance. Peace between the strong and the weak was hard to achieve; the weak could do nothing and even the strong could not make peace alone. To create the necessary balance, US arms supplies must be checked. Israeli air power, for example, was greater than that of the UK and France, and equivalent to one-fifth of that of the US.

He was tired of hearing about US elections. This was always put forward as a reason for doing nothing.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that she agreed that the future of the Palestinian people was at the heart of the problem; she believed this message had been understood in Washington. Secondly, she believed that the Americans were genuinely trying to solve the problem; even in electoral terms this would be a tremendous achievement for a US Administration, in spite of all the lobby difficulties. Mr. Khaddam said President Carter had signed the Camp David agreements and then been defeated in an election; the Prime Minister retorted that this had more to do with President Carter than Camp David. She and Mr. Khaddam both loved argument but perhaps they should resist the temptation. Mr. Khaddam said it was not a matter of argument but of 'to be or not to be'. Syria had been attacked by Israeli air power; she had to find a way to defend herself.

The Prime Minister and King Hussein withdrew at 1155 hours for a tête-à-tête discussion; the Prime Minister invited the rest of the meeting to continue for a few minutes and then to join the two leaders for more informal conversation.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Pym referred to the forthcoming European Summit and with the Americans. The Prime Minister had repeatedly stressed to President Reagan the urgency of progress in the Middle East, and he had done the same to Mr. Shultz. The two essentials were a coordinated position on the Arab side, on which great progress had been made, and a real change in Israel. The urgency was such that something had to be done within a very few weeks. What advice would the Arab delegation offer for progress on our common objectives, especially self-determination?

Prince Saud said that with the Fez Summit much of the Arab part had been done. They now had a clear common position based on legality. The crux of the matter was for the Israelis to change, and this required action by Washington as Professor al-Khalidi had explained.

/ The US



The US must show Israel that if there was no change, Israel would lose US support. A way must be found to bring the Americans to their responsibility. Prince Saud paid a warm tribute to the British media, particularly the BBC, for the way that they had portrayed developments in the Middle East. He said that the forthcoming summit meetings were very important and that we had an important role.

Professor al-Khalidi said one thing we might be able to do, since like the Palestinians, we knew Mr. Begin, would be to tell the Americans about him. They seemed, for example, to assume that Mr. Begin would be ready to trade territory for peace, as he had done with Sinai in the Camp David Agreements. This showed a misunderstanding; Sinai was not part of the territory to which Mr. Begin's Zionism committed him, as the West Bank, Gaza and even Golan and South Lebanon were.

Another US misconception was that the more aid the Israelis were given the more reasonable they would be. We should bring home to the Americans that this was false.

Mr. Klibi said that the Prime Minister had mentioned the British position, shared by the rest of the Ten, on self-determination. This was a key gap in the American position and we should bring it home to them. He asked whether the US-Israeli alliance covered only Israel within present frontiers, or whether it was applicable throughout the area?

Mr. Pym said we would continue to press the Americans, but they did now realise that the Palestinians were the heart of the problem, and the Reagan plan showed progress in this direction. Mr. Klibi said he could not understand why the Americans did not accept self-determination for the Palestinians, when self-determination was of such crucial importance in their own history.

Mr. Pym said he would not exclude an adjustment in the US position if peace negotiations began. On Mr. Klibi's second point

/ he said



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- 8 -

he said that the formal position was that the US/Israel strategic alliance was suspended.

Prince Saud said he had the impression the Americans did not pay adequate attention to European and world opinion on the Middle East. They felt obliged to consult us fully over missiles, but surely the Middle East problem was just as important to the international community and to world peace? Mr. Pym agreed.

The meeting ended at 1220 hours.

18 March 1983

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Type please.

CALL BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION LED BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1050A.m. on FRIDAY, 18 MARCH 1983 at 10 DOWNING STREET

## PRESENT:

The Prime Minister	King Hussein - Leader of the Delegation.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Syrian Foreign Minister - Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam
Mr Hurd	The Saudi Foreign Minister - Prince Saud bin Faisal
Sir Anthony Parsons	The Moroccan Foreign Minister Maitre Boucetta
Sir John Leahy	The Algerian Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs Mr Hadj Bin Abdel el Kader Azzout
Mr Miles	The Palestinian Representative Professor Walid al-Khalidi
Mr Miers	The Secretary-General of the Arab League - Mr Chedli Klibi
Mr Plumbly	- and other members of delegations
Mr Coles	

Mr. Coles (no 10)  
Mr. Miles' draft  
revised.

for H. 18/3

1. The Prime Minister welcomed the delegation <sup>and</sup> said that we were glad that arrangements satisfactory to all parties for their visit had been made. She invited King Hussein to speak.
2. King Hussein thanked the Prime Minister for her greetings and for the good atmosphere, and delivered <sup>an opening</sup> ~~a set~~ piece <sup>RAMES</sup> ~~speech~~ (attached at Annex A).
3. After ~~the~~ Prime Minister had asked whether anyone else wished to speak, she thanked King Hussein for his

<sup>excellent</sup>  
/wonderful



*excellent*

wonderful presentation. Britain and the Arab Delegation shared a common view of the fundamentals of the problem, the need for freedom, justice and fairness for all. This was the heart of the question, ~~and we hoped these principles could be applied to all those involved in the problem.~~ Britain was closely involved both because of our history and because of our close friendship with the Arab peoples.

4. ~~The Prime Minister said that~~ <sup>we</sup> had ~~seen~~ <sup>recognized</sup> the importance of the Fez Summit declaration from the outset. A unified Arab peace programme was a major step forward. She would not comment on every one of the principles of Fez, some of which would be the subject of negotiation in the eventual peace process. She wished to lay special emphasis on the principle of self-determination. Any party demanding self-determination for itself could not deny it to others, and this was something we had repeated to the Israelis and to everyone else with whom we discussed the matter. The Israelis claimed self-determination for themselves and must grant it to the Palestinians.

5. ~~The Prime Minister noted that~~ King Hussein's address stressed the right of all people to live in peace, ~~and supported this by a reference to the legitimacy of the situation based on the 1947 Resolution of the United Nations on the~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~protection~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~of Palestine.~~ <sup>partition</sup>

6. We were committed as members of the Ten and as part-

/authors



authors of the Venice Declaration to the association of the PLO with peace negotiations. We differed in some respects with the Arab view of the PLO, but unreservedly welcomed the Palestinian representative in the delegation.

7. We had been distressed by the incidents in the al Aqsa Mosque. Any nation which <sup>rested</sup> ~~resided~~ on a strong basis of religious <sup>u</sup> belief was <sup>obliged</sup> ~~able~~ to respect the religious rights of others. We believed that the Israelis had acted quickly to arrest those responsible for the latest troubles, but fully understood the shock which had been felt in the Muslim world.

8. We deplored and had publicly condemned the continuation of settlement building in the occupied territories by the Israelis.

9. ~~The Prime Minister said that~~ Every time the world tried to tackle the fundamentals of the Middle East another phase seemed to begin, bringing its own difficulties to block progress. She was referring particularly to Lebanon; at the time of the Venice Declaration the Lebanon problem had been less acute, and the Ten <sup>had</sup> thought there was a real opportunity for progress. That opportunity had been missed, <sup>and we</sup> and we now had to ask how to make progress both on withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and on the Arab-Israel problem. Sometimes a way could be found to make progress even as a result of tragedy.

10. We would do all we could both at the forthcoming European Summit and at the summit meeting at Williamsburg <sup>by President Reagan</sup> ~~with President Reagan~~ to emphasise that time was short and that the opportunity for progress on Lebanon and on the



Arab-Israel problem must not be lost.

11. Summing up the Prime Minister emphasised our belief in the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and in the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to live within secure borders, and said that we saw an opportunity now for progress, beginning with the Lebanon. We shared the faith of the Arab delegation in a just and lasting piece for all the region, to be pursued by peaceful means.

12. ~~The Prime Minister invited others to speak.~~  
*the Prime Minister*  
Professor al-Khalidi thanked ~~her~~ *the Prime Minister* for her remarks about the solution ~~of~~ the problem of the formation of the delegation, and her welcome to himself. Speaking in the name of the party and people which he represented, he asked that Britain should do everything in her power to obtain the right of self-determination for the Palestinians. Nothing in Israel's position could take away this right, which was the right of his people living in their own lands from the Jordan river to the sea.

13. The recent Palestine National Council had made some important points. First of all it had fully confirmed Palestinian commitment to the Fez Plan.

~~Professor Walid al-Khalidi~~ *He* agreed that the Fez plan was of historic importance; all the leaders of the Arab States, with only one exception, had endorsed for the first time principles which could lead to a viable

/settlement



settlement.

14. Fez had also endorsed the principles of Palestinian dialogue with the Lebanese Government and with Jewish leaders who were ready to consider measures consistent with Palestinian rights.

15. The PNC had pointed out the deficiencies of the Reagan plan: First, the question of Palestinian return (Professor al-Khalidi commented that Russian Jews enjoyed this right while Palestinians did not). Next, the Reagan Plan failed to refer to Palestinian sovereignty which was of great political and psychological significance if the Palestinians were to escape from their mood of statelessness. Speaking personally, ~~Professor al-Khalidi said that~~ sovereignty was important for the Palestinian diaspora exactly as Israeli sovereignty was important for the Jewish diaspora.

16. The PNC had also endorsed the concept of Palestinian/Jordanian confederation, which was of the greatest significance. The Jordanian people were the closest of all their neighbours to the Palestinians in every respect.

17. Finally, ~~Professor al-Khalidi commented that~~ the form of Zionism to which Mr Begin adhered went back to the 1920s when the 'revisionists' wanted to change the Palestine mandate in order to allow Jewish settlement east of the Jordan river. Zionism in this sense had nothing to do with resistance to Soviet influence in the area. Revisionism was basic to the thinking of Mr Begin, Mr Shamir and

/Mr



Mr Arons. It was fruitless to think that they would change unless Washington sent unmistakable signals that change was required, as for example President Reagan had sent <sup>an</sup> unmistakable signal to end the bombing of Beirut. Professor al-Khalidi appealed directly to the Prime Minister as the only person, probably in the world, who had the moral influence to bring these points home to President Reagan.

18. The Prime Minister said she would not reply in detail to all points made, but mentioned that only Britain and Pakistan had recognised the West Bank as Jordanian territory. She had noted carefully the reference to confederation. Fez was a big step forward, and so was the Reagan plan (which had not been welcomed in Israel). We must use the positive elements in order to make progress; if we failed, <sup>with</sup> ~~over~~ the well known problems of US elections, we should find we had lost two years. ~~The~~ ~~Prime Minister acknowledged what had been said about~~ ~~British influence on Washington and said that~~ we must concentrate on working together on what we had in common. In government one could never get one hundred per cent of what one wanted, and to get two-thirds was doing very well. Nevertheless we would continue to press the Americans.

19. Mr Khaddam said that he did not believe that the Reagan plan provided a serious framework for peace. The problem was not just the occupied territories and indeed

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the problem had existed before 1967. The essence of the problem was the Palestinians in exile. He recalled a former US statesman who had said of the Palestinians that America would turn them into a problem for the Arabs.

20. Washington was not serious about peace, as was shown by the vast arms supplies which the US gave to the Israelis. If Syria looked to receive anything like as much there would be a tremendous row.

21. The Americans now faced a crucial test; <sup>in Lebanon</sup> if they could secure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon with no conditions he would admit there was some chance of their playing a useful role on the Palestine problem. Mr Khaddam said that <sup>P</sup>peace required balance. Peace between the strong and the weak was hard to achieve; the weak could do nothing and even the strong could not make peace alone. To create the necessary balance, US arms supplies must be checked. Israeli air power, for example, was greater than that of the UK and France, and equivalent to one-fifth of that of the US.

22. ~~Mr Khaddam said~~ <sup>he</sup> he was tired of hearing about US elections. This was always put forward as a reason for doing nothing.

23. The Prime Minister said that she agreed that the future of the Palestinian people was at the heart of the problem; she believed this message had been understood in Washington. Secondly she believed that the Americans were genuinely trying to solve the problem; even in electoral

/terms



terms this would be a tremendous achievement for a US Administration, inspite of all the lobby difficulties. Mr Khaddam said President Carter had signed the Camp David agreements and then been defeated in an election; the Prime Minister retored<sup>+</sup><sub>n</sub> that this had more to do with President Carter than Camp David. She and Mr Khaddam both loved argument but perhaps they<sup>sh</sup> could resist the temptation. Mr Khaddam said it was not a matter of argument but of 'to be or not to be'. Syria had been attacked by Israeli air power; she had to find a way to defend herself.

24. The Prime Minister and King Hussein ~~Hussein~~ withdrew at 1155 for a tête-à-tête discussion; the Prime Minister invited the rest of the meeting to continue for a few minutes and then to join the two leaders for more informal conversation.

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25. Mr Pym referred to the forthcoming European Summit and with the Americans. The Prime Minister had repeatedly stressed to President Reagan the urgency of progress in the Middle East, and he had done the same to Mr Shultz. The two essentials were a coordinated position on the Arab side, on which great progress had been made, and a real change in Israel. The urgency was such that something had to be done within a very few weeks. What advice would the Arab delegation offer for progress on our common objectives, especially self-determination?

26. Prince Saud said that with the Fez Summit much of



the Arab part had been done. They now had a clear common position based on legality. The crux of the matter was for the Israelis to change, and this required action by Washington as Professor al-Khalidi had explained. The US must show Israel that if there was no change, Israel would lose US support. A way must be found to bring the Americans to their responsibility. Prince Saud paid a warm tribute to the British media, particularly the BBC, for the way that they had portrayed developments in the Middle East. He said that the forthcoming summit meetings were very important and that we had an important role.

27. Professor al-Khalidi said one thing we might be able to do, since like the Palestinians, we knew Mr Begin, would be to tell the Americans about him. They seemed, for example, to assume that Mr Begin would be ready to trade territory for peace, as he had done <sup>with Sinai</sup> in the Camp David Agreements. This showed a misunderstanding; Sinai was not part of the territory to which Mr Begin's Zionism committed him, as the West Bank, Gaza and even Golan and South Lebanon were.

28. Another US misconception was that the more aid the Israelis were given the more reasonable they would be. We should bring home to the Americans that this was false.

29. Mr Klibi said that the Prime Minister had mentioned the British position, shared by the rest of the Ten, on self-determination. This was a key gap in the American position and we should bring it home to them. He asked whether the US-Israeli alliance covered only Israel within present frontiers,

/or



or whether it was applicable throughout the area?

30. Mr Pym said we would continue to press the Americans, but they did not realise that the Palestinians were the heart of the problem, and the Reagan plan showed progress in this direction. Mr Klibi said he could not understand why the Americans did not accept self-determination for the Palestinians, when self-determination was of such crucial importance in their own history.

31. Mr Pym said he would not exclude an adjustment in the US position if peace negotiations began. On Mr Klibi's second point he said that the formal position was that the US/Israel strategic alliance was suspended.

32. Prince Saud said he had the impression the Americans did not pay adequate attention to European and world opinion on the Middle East. They felt obliged to consult us fully over missiles, but surely the Middle East problem was just as important to the international community and to world peace. Mr Pym agreed.

33. The meeting ended at 1220.

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P.M.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1983

ARAB LEAGUE VISIT

Following the plenary session here this morning, the Prime Minister had a very brief tete-a-tete discussion with King Hussein. She told me afterwards that the King's main point was that he was getting very little support from other Arab countries in his efforts to put together a Jordanian/Palestinian negotiating team on the Arab/Israel question. In particular, King Fahd was communicating separately with the Americans in an unhelpful way and was doing little to support the Jordanian objective.

Before the lunch for the Arab League delegation the Prime Minister had a brief informal word with the Syrian Foreign Minister. Mr. Khaddam raised the question of the supply to Syria of night vision equipment for helicopters. He claimed that two or three years ago the United Kingdom had agreed to supply this equipment but had then gone back on its agreement. The Prime Minister said that she would look into this matter. I should be grateful to know what the position is and for advice on how a reply should be sent to Mr. Khaddam.

BF //  
28/3.

M. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



A.S.C. 18/3

h-a.

TRANSLATION OF SPEECH DELIVERED BY  
HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN  
ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB SUMMIT DELEGATION

LONDON

MARCH 18, 1983



IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE

YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME AND FOR THE ARAB DELEGATION, WHICH I HAVE THE HONOUR TO LEAD, TO BE HERE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM TODAY. WE HAVE THE DEEPEST RESPECT FOR HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, FOR YOUR OWN PERSON AND FOR THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. WE COME TO YOU IN FRIENDSHIP AND WITH THE DESIRE FOR COOPERATION AND JOINT ACTION - FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE BRITISH AND ARAB NATIONS, AS WELL AS OF HUMANITY AT LARGE. WE ARE COGNISANT OF THE STRONG HISTORICAL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARAB WORLD, BOTH IN THE PAST AND THE PRESENT, AND WE LOOK TO THEIR CONTINUED STRENGTHENING IN THE FUTURE. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE EMINENT POSITION WHICH BRITAIN OCCUPIES IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE EXTENSIVE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO NATIONS.

OUR HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN OUR PRESENT ENDEAVOUR IS FORTIFIED BY BRITAIN'S COMMITMENT TO A GLORIOUS HERITAGE, IMBUED WITH THE VALUES OF FREEDOM, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION, AMONG ALL NATIONS. IT IS STRENGTHENED BY A NOBLE TRADITION WHICH REFLECTS THE SPIRIT OF THE BRITISH NATION OVER THE CENTURIES.



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IN PURSUING ITS PEACEFUL MISSION, THE ARAB COMMITTEE, WHICH GREW OUT OF THE FEZ SUMMIT CONFERENCE, EMBODIES THE ARAB WILL FOR MOVEMENT TOWARDS A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE TO WHICH THE MIDDLE EAST ASPIRES, BUT WHICH HAS ELUDED THE REGION FOR A LONG TIME. IN THIS REGARD, BRITAIN HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS THOSE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE HAD A LONG AND COMMON ASSOCIATION WITH IT AND WHICH CONTINUED, AFTER ACHIEVING THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM, TO PRESERVE THEIR STRONG FRIENDSHIP AND JOINT COOPERATION. I AM SURE YOUR EXCELLENCY IS AWARE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALL ARAB COUNTRIES ARE DRAWN TO YOUR OWN IN TERMS OF CULTURE AND TRADE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, ONLY ONE ARAB COUNTRY, NAMELY PALESTINE, AND ONLY ONE ARAB PEOPLE, NAMELY PALESTINIAN ARABS, THAT CONTINUE TO FACE AGGRESSION, COUPLED WITH DEPRIVATION OF THEIR NATURAL AND LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION ON THEIR NATIONAL SOIL. THEIR LAND HAS BEEN UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION SINCE 1967, AND THE PEOPLE HAVE THUS BECOME THE VICTIMS OF OCCUPATION AND DISPERSAL. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO RESIST OCCUPATION, WHICH ROBS THEM OF THEIR FREEDOM, THEIR IDENTITY, THEIR PEACE AND THEIR SECURITY.



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MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

THERE IS NO NEED TO REVIEW BEFORE YOU THE TRADEGY OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BECAUSE OF MY SURE KNOWLEDGE THAT BRITAIN, BY VIRTUE OF ITS TRUSTEESHIP AND MANDATE OVER PALESTINE, KNOWS BETTER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, THE HISTORY OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. A FAIR AND OBJECTIVE LOOK AT WHAT IS PRESENTLY HAPPENING IN ARAB JERUSALEM, ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP, IN THE CITIES AND VILLAGES, IS SUFFICIENT TO REVEAL THE GRAVITY OF ISRAEL'S INHUMAN PRACTICES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. IT EXPOSES ISRAEL'S BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE - MANIFESTED BY THEIR EVICTION FROM THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTY, THE EXPROPRIATION OF THEIR LANDS, THE ALTERATION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL FABRIC OF THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE, THE IMPOSITION OF COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT AND THE CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES. BY DINT OF THEIR FREEDOM, EFFICIENCY AND INTERGRITY, THE BRITISH INFORMATION MEDIA HAVE EXPOSED THE INJUSTICES SUFFERED BY THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE, AS WELL AS THE BURNING, VIOLATION AND DESECRATION OF ITS MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES. AFTER ANNEXING ARAB JERUSALEM, ISRAEL PROCEEDED IN 1969 TO BURN AL-AQSA MOSQUE, THE FIRST TO WHICH MUSLIMS EVER TURNED TO PRAYERS. IT



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HAS CONTINUED WITH EXCAVATIONS ADJOINING THE MOSQUE'S FOUNDATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO CAUSING ITS COLLAPSE. THE MOST RECENT OF THE BLATANT ATTACKS ON THE MOSQUE WAS THE ATTEMPT AT SETTLING ON ITS PREMISES BY SOLDIERS OF THE ISRAELI ARMY AND OTHER SETTLERS. THESE EXAMPLES, OF WHICH THE ENTIRE WORLD IS FULLY AWARE, SURELY REVEAL THE SCHEMES PERPETRATED BY ISRAEL AGAINST THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

IN VIEW OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF ARAB LANDS, ITS REJECTION OF ALL INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS AND ITS REBELION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, UPON WHICH ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IS BASED ON, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARTITION PLAN OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 181 IN 1947 WHILE ISRAEL DENIES SUCH RIGHT TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND IN THE LIGHT OF ARAB DETERMINATION TO PERSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, THE TWELFTH ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE HELD IN THE CITY OF FEZ HAS RATIFIED THE ARAB PEACE PLAN, WHICH WE HAVE COME TO PRESENT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND EXPLAIN TO BRITISH OFFICIALS. THE PLAN IS AN EXPRESSION OF ARAB SOLIDARITY AND REFLECTS THEIR UNIFIED POSITION AND UNSHAKEN BELIEF IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE FOR

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PAGE 5

THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS FOR ALL THE NATIONS OF THE AREA, FOREMOST OF WHICH ARE THE PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLE. THE ARAB PEACE PLAN IS BASED ON INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND ON THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE UNITED KINGDOM IS A GREAT POWER, AND A PERMANENT MEMBER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL; IT HAS EMINENT STATURE IN THE WORLD AND A POSITION OF INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY. IT PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH DERIVED FROM THE TWIN PRINCIPLES OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF OTHER PEOPLE'S LANDS THROUGH WAR AND THE IMPERATIVE THAT OCCUPATION SHOULD END. MOREOVER, BRITAIN HAS A DISTINGUISHED ROLE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHICH ISSUED THE VENICE DECLARATION OF 1980 THAT INCLUDES MANY OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE EIGHT POINT ARAB PEACE PLAN.

WE HAVE VIEWED WITH APPRECIATION THIS DECLARATION WHICH WE HOPED WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AVERT THE DANGERS OF POLARIZATION OF OUR REGION.

THE BRITISH NATION, WHOSE DEALINGS WITH ALL OTHER NATIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY A SENSE OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, IS CAPABLE TODAY OF PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN LENDING ITS SUPPORT TO THE JUST CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND ENABLING THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO



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SELF-DETERMINATION ON THEIR NATIONAL SOIL, AS WELL AS THEIR RIGHT, BASED FIRMLY ON PRINCIPLE, TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION, THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE. IN THE PEACE PLAN, WHICH THEY PRESENT TO THE WORLD TODAY, THE ARABS SEEK A JUST PEACE, FULLY REALISING THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THEY BEAR TOWARDS THIS PEACE, WHICH CANNOT BE ACHIEVED EXCEPT BY THE REMOVAL OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, FOREMOST OF WHICH IS ARAB JERUSALEM. IN THE FEZ SUMMIT PLAN, THE ARABS ARE EQUALLY COMMITTED TO ALL INTERNATIONAL PEACE GUARANTEES.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

THE VIOLENT EVENTS IN OUR REGION AND THE SUCCESSIVE WARS WHICH ISRAEL HAS WAGED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE AND THE OTHER ARABS, THE LAST BEING THE INVASION OF LEBANON AND OCCUPATION OF BEIRUT, ALL DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PALESTINE QUESTION HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE ESSENCE OF THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CAUSE OF UNREST AND CONFRONTATION, WHICH THREATEN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF OUR REGION, AS WELL AS THE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF EUROPE AND THE ENTIRE WORLD. THE ARAB PEACE PLAN IS A RESPONSIBLE AND SINCERE CONTRIBUTION, WHICH EMANATES FROM THE DESIRE OF THE ARABS TO PUT AN END TO CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST - ON THE BASIS OF JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND THE GUARANTEE OF PEACE, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY FOR THE PEOPLES



PAGE 7

OF THE ENTIRE REGION. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, MANIFESTED BY ISRAEL'S ESCALATION OF ITS PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO ITS SETTLEMENT POLICY, MAGNIFIES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TIME ELEMENT. IT PUTS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO A GENUINE TEST OF ITS WILL AND ITS ABILITY TO CURB AGGRESSION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

WE THANK YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR PROVIDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS MEETING TO BE HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRIENDSHIP, CONFIDENCE AND A COMMON SEARCH FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

PLEASE ACCEPT THE CONSIDERATIONS OF OUR HIGHEST REGARD FOR YOUR PERSON AND YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY.



"REFERENCE PAPER"

FEZ DECISION - ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

---

The Arab Heads of State meeting in Fez in September 1982, have unanimously decided on a unified Arab position for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and have endorsed the following principles as the basis for a just peace:

1. Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.
2. Dismantling of the settlements erected by Israel on the occupied Arab territories after 1967.
3. Guaranteeing freedom of worship and religious practices for all religions in the Holy places.
4. The re-affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self determination, the exercise of its inalienable national rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization - its sole legitimate representative and the compensation of those opting not to return.
5. The placement of the West Bank and Gaza strip under United Nations supervision in a transitional period not exceeding few months.
6. The establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Peace guarantees by the Security Council among all states in the region including the independent Palestinian state.
8. Security Council to guarantee implementation of these principles.



NOTES FOR AFTER LUNCH SPEECH

FRIDAY 18 MARCH



TODAY WE GREET A DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION FROM  
THE ARAB LEAGUE, LED BY HIS MAJESTY,  
KING HUSSEIN.

WE ARE DELIGHTED TO WELCOME YOU TO LONDON, YOUR  
MAJESTY.

AND WE EXTEND A WARM WELCOME TO

- THEIR EXCELLENCIES, THE MINISTERS FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SYRIAN ARAB  
REPUBLIC, THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA,  
AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN.

- THE MINISTERS OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO AND THE REPUBLIC  
OF TUNISIA.

/ - THE SECRETARY-GENERAL



- THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ALGERIA.
  
- PROFESSOR WALEED AL-KHALIDI
  
- AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ARAB  
LEAGUE.

MAY I PAY TRIBUTE TO YOU, YOUR MAJESTY, FOR AGREEING  
AT SHORT NOTICE TO TAKE OVER THE LEADERSHIP  
OF THE DELEGATION.

MAY I ASK YOU ALSO TO CONVEY OUR GRATITUDE  
TO HIS MAJESTY, KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO FOR  
HIS WORK IN PREPARATION OF THE VISIT.

WE HOPE THAT HE WILL SOON FIND AN OPPORTUNITY  
TO VISIT LONDON.

/Most



MOST MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WERE IN DELHI

A FEW DAYS AGO FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING  
OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

WE THANK YOU FOR COMING HERE SO SOON  
AFTERWARDS AND AFTER SO MUCH TRAVELLING.

I CAN TELL THE BRITISH GUESTS HERE TODAY  
THAT IN THE USEFUL AND IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS  
WE HAVE JUST HAD, THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION  
SHOWED NO SIGN OF JET LAG.

THERE IS NO MORE PRESSING PROBLEM FACING THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAN HOW TO ACHIEVE  
A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

/THE PRINCIPLES



THE PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY THE FEZ SUMMIT  
LAST SEPTEMBER, WHICH HAVE BEEN SO CLEARLY  
EXPLAINED TO US TODAY, LEAVE NO ROOM FOR  
DOUBT ABOUT THE ARAB COMMITMENT TO SEEK A  
PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE  
PROBLEM.

WE SHARE THAT COMMITMENT.

BRITAIN HAS WORKED AND WILL CONTINUE TO  
WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH RECOGNISES THE  
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION,  
AS WELL AS THE RIGHTS OF ALL STATES IN THE  
REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL, TO LIVE IN PEACE AND  
SECURITY.

/THERE IS



THERE IS AT THE PRESENT TIME AN UNRIVALLED  
OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACEFUL PROGRESS.

WE IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE WILL DO ALL WE  
CAN TO SUSTAIN AND ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO  
HAVE MOMENTOUS DECISIONS TO TAKE.

YOUR VISIT TODAY IS A SYMBOL OF THE CLOSE TIES OF  
CO-OPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAVE  
LONG BOUND BRITAIN AND THE ARAB WORLD  
TOGETHER.

I RECALL WITH PLEASURE MY OWN VISITS TO  
THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN  
RECEIVED WITH THE GREATEST COURTESY AND THE  
WARMEST HOSPITALITY.

/IHE MANY



-6-

THE MANY MINISTERS IN MY CABINET WHO HAVE  
VISITED YOUR COUNTRIES WOULD ALL SAY THE  
SAME.

WE ARE DELIGHTED TO BE ABLE TO RECIPROCATE  
THAT HOSPITALITY TODAY AND TO SAY TO YOU THIS:-

WE SHARE YOUR CONCERNS

WE SHARE YOUR DESIRE FOR PEACE

WE SHALL WORK TOGETHER WITH YOU FOR A

JUST SETTLEMENT.

(TOAST)



PRIME MINISTER

Visit by Arab League Delegation

Welcoming Ceremony

Details are attached at Flag A. You should arrive at the FCO courtyard at 1028 hours.

After the ceremony you will walk to No.10 with King Hussein. I suggest that you both go briefly to your study while the participants in the plenary session assemble in the Cabinet Room and are served coffee. I will inform you when the plenary session is assembled. You and the King would then take your places, be served coffee and begin the session.

Plenary

I am afraid the Cabinet Room will be rather crowded. The Arab Ministers plus their Ambassadors (18 in all) will sit at the table.

On our side we shall have the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, Sir John Leahy, Mr. Urwick (our Ambassador in Jordan), Sir A. Parsons, Mr. Miles (FCO), Mr. Miers (FCO) <sup>Mr. Miles</sup> and myself.

You should welcome the delegation and then ask King Hussein to speak. He has said (a) that he does not want the plenary to be too long (b) that after a few words in Arabic he will speak in English (but an interpreter will be available in case of need).

When the plenary session is over you and King Hussein will have a tête-à-tête (I suggest with notetakers) in the study. Mr. Pym will remain in the Cabinet Room and continue talks with the rest of the plenary session until lunch.

/ Lunch



Lunch will be at the horseshoe table. I attach some speaking notes for a short toast.

One point which will be noticed and that you will therefore wish to think about in advance is how much attention to give to the Palestinian representative (Waleed al Khalidi). I understand that he speaks excellent English and is easy to talk to. Given the history of this visit I suggest that you single him out before lunch, take him apart from the other guests (though not to a separate room) and have a five minute talk with him.

A. J. C.

N.B. We must go into lunch very  
promptly. The delegation have to leave at  
14.30 for an audience with the Queen.



Coles to PM 17/3/83

11  
9



GUARD OF HONOUR - Procedure

1. A Guard of Honour found by 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards under the command of Major Evelyn Webb-Carter with the Regimental Colour, the Band of the Scots Guards and the Corps of Drums of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards will be formed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle on Friday 18 March at 1030 hours to greet His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Embassy staff and other spectators are requested to arrive not later than 1000 hours.
2. At 1015 hours the Arab League Delegates and Ambassadors will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle by car via King Charles Street. They will alight from their cars just beyond the dais (ie to the east of the latter) where they will be received by The Rt Hon Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. They will remain near the Colour points on the east side of the Main Archway (see diagram attached). Delegates and Ambassadors are requested to arrive not later than 1020 hours. The Delegates' cars and Ambassadors' cars should proceed direct to King Charles Street where they will park while the Guard of Honour is in progress.
3. At 1028 hours the Prime Minister will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle through the Main Archway; she will be met at the Archway by Major General James Eyre (Major General Commanding the Household Division). He will be accompanied by the Brigade Major, Lt Col Richard Heywood, Brigade Major the Household Division. The Major General will then escort the Prime Minister to the right (west) of the dais where she will receive His Majesty King Hussein.
4. At 1030 hours His Majesty King Hussein will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office via King Charles Street.  
*(as will Mr. Pym)*
5. The Prime Minister will welcome him and present Major General Eyre who will escort the King to his place on the dais. The Prime Minister will then take up a position on his right and behind the dais, and the Major General will take up his position on the left and behind the dais. After the Guard Commander has presented his Guard of Honour to the King, the Major General will accompany the King and the Guard Commander on the inspection. The Prime Minister should remain in the vicinity of the dais with the Brigade Major until the inspection is completed and the Major-General has accompanied the King back to the dais. His Majesty will introduce his Delegation to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will then escort the King to No. 10 Downing Street. Those participating in the plenary talks will follow.
6. Meanwhile the Major-General and the Brigade Major will have taken their leave of the King and will authorise the dispersal of the Guard of Honour once the King has departed for No. 10 Downing Street.

Wet Weather Programme

In the event of wet weather the Parade will not be cancelled. The programme will continue as scheduled up to the point where the inspection of the Guard of Honour should begin. If there is heavy rain at that point in the programme and the King does not wish to inspect the Guard of Honour, the Prime Minister should lead the King to No. 10 Downing Street.





DOWNING ST. WEST BUILDING

DOWNING ST.  
Main Archway

DOWNING ST. EAST BUILDING

PRESS

EMBASSY STAFF

KING'S CO  
will park

+ / +  
PM MA  
G of H.

GUARD OF HONOUR

DELEGATES  
and  
AMBASSADORS

BAND

OLD HOME OFFICE BUILDING

WHITEHALL


APPROACH ROUTE FOR CARS

KING CHARLES ST. BUILDING

KING CHARLES ST.

**GUARD OF HONOUR CEREMONY  
FCO QUADRANGLE**

+ ..... Colour Points  
G of H ..... Guest of Honour  
PM ..... Prime Minister





10 MAR 1983

0 1 2 3 4 5  
6 7 8 9





THE RT HON THE PRIME MINISTER

His Majesty  
King Hussein bin Talal

His Excellency  
Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam

MR DENIS THATCHER

The Rt Hon Francis Pym

His Royal Highness Prince  
Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz

His Excellency Maître M'hamed  
Boucetta

The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd

His Excellency  
Mr Mahmoud Mestiri

His Excellency  
Hadj bin Abdel el Kader Azzout

Dr Walid Khalidi

His Excellency  
Mr Ahmed al-Lawzi

The Rt Hon Lord Chalfont

Mr Peter Rees

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington

Mr P I Walters

His Excellency  
Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem

His Excellency the Ambassador  
of the Syrian Arab Republic

His Excellency Mr Chedli Klibi

His Excellency the Ambassador  
of the Kingdom of  
Saudi Arabia

The Lord McFadzean  
of Kelvinside

Sir Anthony Kershaw

Sir Arnold Hall

His Excellency the Ambassador  
of the Democratic and Popular  
Republic of Algeria

His Excellency the Ambassador  
of the Kingdom of Morocco

His Excellency the Ambassador  
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The Lord Denman

The Lord Selston

Mr A Urwick

Sir Peter Baxendell

His Excellency the Ambassador  
of the Republic of Tunisia

Mr Abdillah Katib

Mr Abuel Maali A/Rahman

Mr Natib Shugum

Mr C A Whitmore

Sir John Leahy

The Lord Vaizey

Sir John Biggs-Davison

Mr Ahmed Harjan

Dr Mustafa Haj Ali

His Excellency  
Mr Mamun Kabbani

His Excellency Mr Abdelhamid Kettani

Mr H P M Benson

Mr Eric Bowman

Sir Reginald Smith

Dr M E Yapp

Mr Nouredine Hamdani

Sir Anthony Parsons

Sir Richard Beaumont

Sir Kenneth Couzens

Mr Roger Mathews

Mr Patrick Seale

The Hon Mark Lennox-Boyd

Mr G W Mackworth-Young

Mr Dennis Walter

Dr M Burrell

Mr Gordon Martin

Mr F F Given

The Rt Hon Lord Stewart  
of Fulham

Sir Frederic Bennett

Dr D Hopwood

Mr William Ryder

The Lord Newall

Sir John King

Mr H C Harrison

Mr Kenneth Harris

Mr Geoffrey Owen

Mr Peter Mansfield

Mr John Coles





MR JOHN COLES



Tunisia

H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. Sadok Bouzayen

Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Mr. Noureddine Hamdani

Tunisian Deputy Representative to the Arab League

Palestinian Representative

Dr. Walid Khalidi

Algeria

H.E. Mr. Alhaj bin Abdelkader Azzout

Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry and Member of the Central Committee

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H.M. Government

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Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

The Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson, M.P.

Secretary of State for Energy

The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, C.B.E., M.P.

Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

Peter Rees, Esq., Q.C., M.P.

Minister of State for Trade

Industry

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The Lord McFadzean of Kelvinside

Rolls Royce Ltd

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Director General, Middle East Association

Sir Richard Beaumont, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

Arab British Chamber of Commerce

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Sir Reginald Smith

George Wimpey International

The Lord Selsdon

Chairman, Midland Bank PLC

P. I. Walters, Esq.,

Chairman, British Petroleum

Sir Peter Baxendell, C.B.E.

Chairman, Shell Transport and Trading Co.

The Lord Vaizey

Lord Denman C.B.E., M.C.

The Royal Bank of Canada

G. W. Macworth-Young, Esq

Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd

William Ryder Esq

Managing Director, Coal Technology, Babcock International Ltd

Sir John King

Chairman, Babcock International  
"BRITISH AIRWAYS"



Industry continued

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Sir Arnold Hall

Chairman, Simon Engineering Group  
Chairman, Hawker Siddeley Group

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The Rt. Hon. Lord Stewart of Fulham  
The Hon. Mark Lennox-Boyd MP  
Sir Anthony Kershaw, MC., MP  
Sir John Biggs-Davison, MP  
Dennis Walters Esq MP  
Lord Newall  
Sir Frederic Bennett MP  
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School of Oriental and African  
Studies

Dr. M. Burrell

School of Oriental and African  
Studies

Dr. D. Hopwood

Specialist on Islamic History,  
St. Antony's College, Oxford

Kenneth Harris

Editor, The Observer

Eric Bowman, Esq., MBE

Head of BBC Arabic Services  
BBC External Services

Gordon Martin, Esq

Diplomatic Correspondent,  
BBC World Service

Roger Mathews, Esq

The Financial Times

Patrick Seale, Esq

Freelance Journalist. Also the  
Observer

Peter Mansfield Esq

Ex-member of FCO and author of  
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Geoffrey Owen, Esq.,

Editor, Financial Times

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Sir John Leahy KCMG

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A. Urwick Esq

HM Ambassador to Amman

Sir Kenneth Couzens KCB

Department of Energy

Sir Anthony Parsons

No. 10 Downing Street

C A Whitmore Esq CVO

Ministry of Defence

John Coles Esq

No. 10



MR COLLES

LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN AND A DELEGATION FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE, FRIDAY 18 MARCH, 1983.  
1.00 p.m. FOR 1.15 p.m. LOUNGE SUIT

The Rt. Hon. The Prime Minister and Mr. Denis Thatcher

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

Jordan

His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal

H.E. Mr. Ahmad Al Lawzy

H.E. Mr. Ibrahim Izziddin

H.E. Mr. Marwan Al Qasem

H.E. Mr. Yanal Hikmat

Chief of the Royal Court

Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Chief of Royal Protocol

Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister

Arab League

H.E. Mr. Chedli Klibi

Mr. Abuel Maali A/Rahman

Mr. Ahmed Harjan

Syrian Arab Republic

H.E. Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam

H.E. Dr. Loutof Allah Haydar

Dr. Mustafa Haj Ali

Secretary General of the Arab League

Deputy Director, Arab League Office London

Secretary, Arab League, Tunis

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Chief of Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Saudi Arabia

His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al Faisal Foreign Minister

H.E. Sheikh Nasser H. Almanqour,  
G.C.V.O.

H.E. Mr. Mamun Kabbani

Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Morocco

H.E. Mr. M'Hamed Boucetta

H.E. Mr. Mohamed-Mehdi Benabdeljalil

H.E. Mr. Abdelhamid Kettani

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Director of the Arab States Department



Tunisia

H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. Sadok Bouzayen

Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Mr. Nouredine Hamdani

Tunisian Deputy Representative to the Arab League

Palestinian ~~Republic~~ Representative

Dr. Walid Khalidi

Algeria

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Chairman, Davy McKee International Ltd

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George Wimpey International

The Lord Selsdon

Chairman, Midland Bank PLC

P. I. Walters, Esq.,

Chairman, British Petroleum

Sir Peter Baxendell, C.B.E.

Chairman, Shell Transport and Trading Co.

The Lord Vaizey

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Sir John Biggs-Davison, MP  
Dennis Walters Esq MP  
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HM Ambassador to Amman

Sir Kenneth Couzens KCB

Department of Energy

Sir Anthony Parsons

No. 10 Downing Street

C A Whitmore Esq CVO

Ministry of Defence

John Coles Esq

No. 10



The following are invited to accompany His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan to the plenary talks and luncheon at 10 Downing Street:-

Syrian Arab Republic

His Excellency Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Dr Loutof Allah Haydar,  
Ambassador

Dr Mustafa Faj Ali,  
Chief of Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

His Royal Highness Prince Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Sheikh Nasser H Almanqour,  
Ambassador

Mr Mamun Kabbani,  
Director of Western European Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kingdom of Morocco

His Excellency Maftre M'hamed Boucetta,  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Mr Mohamed-Mehdi Benabdeljalil,  
Ambassador

Mr Abdel Hamid Kettani,  
Director of Arab States Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Tunisia

His Excellency Mr Mahmoud Mestiri,  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Monsieur Sadok Bouzayen,  
Ambassador

Mr N Hamdani,  
Deputy Representative, Arab League

Algeria

His Excellency Hadj Bin Abdel el Kader Azzout,  
Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Mr Redha Malek,  
Ambassador

Palestinian Representative

Mr Walid al-Khalidi



Arab League Secretary-General

His Excellency Mr Chedli Klibi

Mr A Rahman,  
Deputy Director, Arab League Office

Mr Ahmed Harjan

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

His Excellency Mr Ahmed al-Lawzi,  
Head of Royal Court

His Excellency Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Mr Ibrahim Izziddin,  
Ambassador

His Excellency Mr Hikmat,  
Chief of Royal Protocol





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

*2 copies under the cover.*

*Dear John,*

/// I enclose three sets of briefing for the Prime Minister's talks on 18 March with King Hussein and the Arab League Delegation. The briefing is organised as follows:

1. Briefing for the Plenary session
  - a. Steering brief and programme.
  - b. Arab/Israel background.
  - c. Points to make in reply to Arab League presentation.
  - d. List and Background notes on delegation members.
2. Briefing for the tête-à-tête
  - a. Points to Make.
  - b. Anglo-Jordanian relations/Arab/Israel.
  - c. Jordan: Country brief.
  - d. Personality note.
3. Commercial brief

Covering all countries involved, prepared by DOT.
4. Defence Sales brief

Covering all countries involved, prepared by MOD.

You will see that the Steering Brief contains references to bilateral points and meetings. These are principally for Mr Pym's use in likely bilateral meetings with his foreign minister colleagues.

I might just add that, while the latest (gloomy) view from King Hussein of the prospects for a Jordan/PLO joint position and statement is included in the briefing, the steering brief and background of the main Arab/Israel brief as presently drafted do not fully reflect this gloom.

*Yours ever*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

*John Holmes*



VISIT OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION LED BY KING HUSSEIN OF  
JORDAN: 18 MARCH 1983

BRIEFING

Plenary Session at 10 Downing Street

1. Steering brief and programme.
2. Arab/Israel background.
3. Points to make in reply to Arab presentation.
4. List and Background notes on delegation members.


Prime Minister's tête-à-tête with King Hussein

5. Points to Make.
6. Anglo-Jordanian relations. Arab/Israel. Essential facts.
7. Jordan: Country brief.
8. Personality note on The King.

Commercial Brief

9. Background on trade with delegation countries.

Defence Sales Brief

10. Background on major defence sales projects at stake in delegation countries.
- 



ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: 18 MARCH 1983

BRIEF NO 1

STEERING BRIEF

Background

1. The delegation, led by King Hussein of Jordan, will comprise the Foreign Ministers of Syria (Khaddam), Saudi Arabia (Prince Saud), Jordan (al-Qasem) and Morocco (Boucetta) together with the Tunisian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mestiri), the Algerian Foreign Ministry Secretary General (Azzout), the Secretary General of the Arab League (Chadli Klibi) and a Palestinian representative Mr Walid Al-Khalidi.

2. The delegation are a committee of the Arab League, set up at the Fez Summit in August 1982. The committee was mandated to visit the capitals of all permanent members of the UN Security Council to present the summit's conclusions. King Hassan of Morocco led a delegation (minus a Palestinian) to Washington in October and was originally expected to have led the delegation to London but his place was taken by King Hussein at the last moment. King Hussein himself took full delegations (including the PLO) to Paris, Moscow and Peking in November and December.

Objectives:

3. The delegation's objectives in London:-

- a) To complete their mandate by outlining to us the conclusions of the 1982 Fez summit;
- b) To press for PLO involvement in negotiations on the Palestinian problem, and for high-level contacts between HMG and the PLO;
- c) To urge us (and through us the Ten) to play a more prominent role in support of the Arab cause, in particular by putting pressure on the Americans over Israeli settlements and the PLO's role in negotiations.

/Our



Our objectives:

4. a) To ensure that the visit is conducted in a good atmosphere and the Delegation are left in no doubt as to our goodwill and commitment to a lasting peace in the Middle East;
- b) To explain our position on the Middle East in general and on contacts with the PLO in particular;
- c) To confirm our intention to play a full part in the Middle East peace process;
- d) To take the opportunity to mend fences with individual delegation members.

Programme:

5. King Hussein will be arriving in London on Thursday 17 March to be met by Mr Pym. The other members of the delegation will arrive separately. At 1030 on Friday 18 March the Prime Minister will greet the Delegation in the FCO courtyard before a Guard of Honour at which King Hussein will take the Salute. The Prime Minister will take the Delegation to 10 Downing Street for plenary talks at around 1045. On past form we would expect King Hussein to give an account of the Fez proceedings with minimal contributions from the other members. The Prime Minister will then be invited by the Delegation to comment on King Hussein's exposition and to outline HMG's thinking on the Middle East peace process. Translation will be consecutive (Arabic/English/Arabic). At about 1215 The Prime Minister and King Hussein will withdraw for a separate tête-à-tête. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will continue the discussion with the remainder of the Delegation until luncheon at 1300. At 1445 King Hussein will present the delegation briefly at Buckingham Palace and is to attend a private luncheon with The Queen at Windsor on 19 March. Individual members of the Delegation may request bilateral meetings with Mr Pym on the afternoon of 18 March.

#### Bilateral Points

6. King Hussein of Jordan is a regular visitor to London (he was here last from 19 February to 1 March when he had luncheon with the

/Prime



Holmes to Coles 17/3/83

Brief 1



Prime Minister. Mr Pym, Mr Hurd and Mr Heseltine called on him during his stay). Since President Reagan's initiative of 1 September 1982, King Hussein's position as a participant in the search for peace in the Middle East has assumed growing importance. Discussions between the King and Arafat on future Jordan/Palestinian relations and a joint approach to peace talks have gone as well as could be expected, but The King faces crucial decisions over the next few weeks. He therefore has a particular interest in seeing the PLO involved in negotiations on the Palestinian position. The King has made no secret of his wish to see senior ministerial contacts between HMG and the PLO.

7. King Hassan of Morocco decided late in the day (ostensibly because of illness) to hand over leadership of the London delegation to King Hussein. The question of a bilateral visit by King Hassan may be raised by Boucetta. The Moroccans have been less concerned by the question of Palestinian representation but have been forced by the PLO and Saudis into taking a firm line. If he requests a bilateral meeting the Moroccan Foreign Minister will probably wish to hear our views on Gibraltar, in which the Moroccans, with Spanish enclaves, take a close interest. Boucetta might also wish to discuss the implications of EC enlargement and will give an account of the position on the Western Sahara/OAU issues. Morocco's stance on the Falklands was unhelpful during the war but Moroccans have since been cooperative on over-flights to Ascension.

8. Relations with Algeria were developing well before difficulties over the visit. Immediate UK interests in Algeria are primarily commercial; current prospects include important contracts for housing construction (Memorandum of Understanding signed) and defence sales (Memorandum of Understanding under discussion). Algerian diplomatic relations have widened significantly from earlier close ties with Arab world and Eastern bloc. We should encourage the more realistic and pragmatic policies of President Chedli. We hope Algerians will reinstate Foreign Minister

/Taleb Ibrahim's



Taleb Ibrahimi's planned visit to London soon (March or April have been proposed by us).

9. Our bilateral relations with Tunisia are good but of little substance. During recent visit to London by Tunisian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs it was agreed to set in motion a Joint Commission to study ways to inject substance into our dealings. A major patrol craft contract is in the offing but is held up by shortage of Tunisian funds. We should encourage the Tunisians to consider carefully attractive British financing terms. The Tunisians are preoccupied with the effects of an enlarged EC and M Essebsi may wish to discuss the implications.

10. Our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia are particularly important, both because of their role as the leading Arab moderate and because of the scale of the Saudi market commercially. Following the postponement of Mr Pym's visit in December relations have been under a particular cloud. We will wish to discuss with Prince Saud the reinstatement of normal relations, including visits (there are major ones, pending, inward as well as outward). From Prince Bandar's visit to London on 26/27 January it would seem that the Saudis too will be keen to get back to normal quickly; Saud may also reiterate Bandar's request for particular help from us in urging the Americans to take a robust line with the Israelis.

11. Our bilateral relations with Syria are sound but still not very substantial. Trade remains at a very low level and there are no major British contracts in the offing. But there are no serious bilateral problems. Discussions with the Syrians are likely to centre on Arab/Israel, Lebanon, the PLO and Golan rather than on bilateral matters.

Near East & North Africa Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
14 March 1983



ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: MARCH 1983

ARAB/ISRAEL BACKGROUND

1. The ostensible purpose of the visit is to present the outcome of the Summit to HMG. Now that King Hussein has stepped in as leader, however, discussion is likely to be much more concerned with current issues.
2. The Fez Summit agreed a set of principles (attached) which constitute an Arab policy for a negotiated settlement to the Arab/Israel dispute. The 8 points are based closely on those put forward in August 1981 by the then Crown Prince Fahd, and King Fahd is personally committed to them.
3. The crux is principle 7, with its implied acceptance of Israel's rights. King Hassan expanded on the meaning of point 7 at his press conference during the Arab League visit to Washington in October 1982. He said that it 'signified the will of Arab states to put an end to the state of belligerency which exists between the nations of the region'. He went on to envisage a two-stage process. First, agreement would be reached on a return to the 1967 borders, at which point the Arabs would confirm that they recognised Israel's frontiers. The second phase would be agreement on a state of non-belligerency; those Arabs who wished could go beyond this to full normalisation.
4. Arab attitudes to Fez. The majority of Arab participants at Fez have subsequently stuck closely to the 8 points and have avoided public interpretation. The Syrians however were quick to point out that in their view point 7 did not imply acceptance of Israel. The Syrian Foreign Minister emphasised to Mr Pym in Damascus that Fez represented the absolute minimum Arab demands. But the Syrians have been careful to deny recent suggestions that they reject the Fez approach. The PNC described Fez as 'the minimum for political movement by the Arab States'; and the NAM referred to it as the 'Fez Peace Plan'.  
/5.



5. Ten's attitude to Fez. The Ten Foreign Ministers at their meeting on 20 September 1982 described the communiqué as an important statement which they see as an expression of the unanimous will of the participants, including the PLO, to work for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East encompassing all States in the area, including Israel. On substance, the principles go well beyond our own position, particularly as regards a Palestinian state and a leading role for the PLO. They also contain a number of points which will in practice have to be negotiated between the parties concerned (status of Jerusalem, dismantling of settlements, right of return of Palestinian refugees). But they contain nothing which we would be obliged to oppose.

6. King Hussein led Delegations (including a PLO Representative) to Paris, Moscow and Peking late 1982. King Hassan led the visit to Washington. The presentation in London will no doubt follow the previous pattern. The Delegation will stick closely to the Fez line and may highlight the importance of PLO participation in negotiations, and the opening of a UK/PLO dialogue at Ministerial level. Not to be revealed: we have been told very privately that the Americans spelled out to King Hassan during the visit to Washington that if the PLO met US conditions for a dialogue, the US would immediately establish contact with the PLO, and that Arafat would be received by Shultz within 30 days. No subject would be barred from the subsequent US/PLO conversations.

7. The Delegation will probably ensure that differences among them do not surface at the plenary session. But they will never be far below the surface. A major point of inter-Arab friction is the improving relationship between the PLO and Jordan. King Hussein and Arafat have made good progress in agreeing on the form of future relations between a Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza, and Jordan. Both have confirmed publicly that they are thinking of a confederation on an equal basis. The PNC referred to the "'special and distinctive relations'" between the Palestinians and Jordanians

/and



and considered that future relations should be on a "confederal basis between two independent states". They have made less progress on the difficult question of Palestinian representation in a negotiating team. Arafat seems to accept that this will have to be non-PLO Palestinians, but he now has to take account of the PNC's rejection of all plans aiming at "delegation or substitution or sharing in the right of representation" with the PLO.

8. King Hussein made clear during his recent visit to London that he had put Arafat under considerable pressure to agree quickly after the PNC meeting to a joint public statement expressing readiness in principle to negotiate, provided that the Americans delivered on their commitments to achieve a freeze on Israeli settlements, and a timetable for withdrawal of forces from Lebanon. He believed that Arafat now accepted that this was his last chance, he did not know whether Arafat would in fact commit himself. The King told us that if Arafat could not deliver after Algiers, he, The King, would be obliged to make public the deal which Arafat had turned down. The King has set a deadline of the end of March for a decision one way or the other. He and Arafat do not seem to have had substantive talks during the Delhi summit. Latest reports suggest that Arafat will go to Amman on 21 March after the next PLO Executive Committee meeting, apparently to be held in Tunis on 17 March. A public statement could follow soon afterwards. It is in our interests that Arafat should give The King the necessary backing; the present visit provides a good opportunity to urge on the Arab team the merits of supporting a Jordanian/Palestinian approach to negotiations as the surest way of securing Israeli withdrawal.

9. The King attached particular importance to Mr Pym's meeting with Mr Shultz in California on 3 March. Mr Pym has now sent a message to the Jordanian Foreign Minister (copy attached) summarising his impressions from that discussion.

/10.



10. Syria has naturally viewed the Jordan/PLO rapprochement with concern, though they have told us in principle they do not object to an 'organic' relationship between Jordan and the future Palestine entity. Syrian/Jordanian relations have been bad for several years, and since the Lebanon war Syria/PLO relations have become increasingly strained. The move of the PLO's Headquarters to Tunis weakened Syrian influence over the PLO, and the Jordan/PLO talks have further shifted the mainstream PLO out of Syria's grasp. The Syrians have responded by promoting the few remaining Damascus-based factions to work against Arafat and his Jordan policy and to forge closer links with the rejectionists such as Libya. Syria has legitimate interests at stake, eg recovery of Golan.

11. The acrimonious split between Jordan and Syria has affected the Saudi reaction to the Jordan/PLO talks. King Hussein has complained that the Saudis have done less than they might to sustain him and urge the PLO to cooperate. The Saudis have several interests at stake: promotion of Arab unity, commitment to the Fez principles, and the need to give some encouragement to a major and helpful US initiative. Where these conflict, the Saudis have normally chosen a low profile.

12. Although not unanimously supported in the Arab world, the Jordan/PLO talks represent the most hopeful way forward. The Arab League Committee have not as far as we know reached any conclusions on what else they might do to follow up the Fez Summit once they have completed visits to the Permanent Members. A major weakness of the Fez approach is that it lacks any mechanism for implementation. It is hard to take seriously the establishment by the NAM of an 8-party Committee under Indian chairmanship (including PLO and Algeria) to carry on the task. King Hussein has in any case decided that time is too short to wait for others to create the conditions for a peaceful settlement, and that the Arab side must take the initiative in responding to Reagan's proposals. But he has been concerned that the earlier difficulties over the Arab League Delegation's visit to London should be overcome as soon as possible,



in order that energies can again be concentrated on the substantive issues. Until King Hussein took over the leadership of the Delegation the Palestinian representation problem remained unresolved. The King acted decisively in insisting that an acceptable figure should fill the PLO slot. A round-up of the latest Jordanian thinking is in Amman telno 112 attached.

13. Disturbances at Al Aqsa Mosque and on West Bank. Tension has risen in recent weeks on the West Bank, with an increase in stone-throwing by Palestinian demonstrators, and incidents in which armed Jewish settlers have taken the law into their own hands by detaining Arabs and forcibly entering Arab property. On 11 March Jewish extremists attempted to settle at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (one of Islam's holiest shrines). They were detained by the Israeli authorities. The incident sparked off further violent demonstrations on the West Bank. The Acting Jordanian Foreign Minister summoned Ambassadors of the Security Council Permanent Members to express concern at the incident, and a Jordanian spokesman has said that the scale of the attack indicated tacit connivance by the Israeli authorities in a plot to destroy the Mosque. Incidents at the Mosque touch a raw nerve.

14. Morocco/Algeria/Tunisia. King Hassan and President Chadli met on the Moroccan/Algerian border on 26 February in the first formal summit between the two countries since relations were broken off in 1976, when Algeria recognised the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the Western Sahara. Presidents Chadli and Bourguiba are due to meet on 18-20 March.



## FEZ SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE: ARAB/ISRAEL

Following are the 8 principles agreed at the Fez Summit (6-9 September 1982):

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab Jerusalem.
2. The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on the Arab territories after 1967.
3. The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religions in the holy places.
4. The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the exercise of its firm and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), its sole and legitimate representative and the compensation of all those who do not desire to return.
5. Placing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the control of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months.
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian State.
8. The Security Council guarantees the respect of these principles.



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TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 11 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROUTINE RABAT, TUNIS, ALGIERS,

DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, PARIS

PARIS.

MESSAGE TO THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON HIS RETURN FROM THE DELHI SUMMIT:

2. BEGINS: THE PRIME MINISTER AND I BOTH HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF MOST INTERESTING DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS MAJESTY DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO LONDON. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR HIS MAJESTY'S VIEWS ON THE POINTS I PLANNED TO PUT TO MR SHULTZ WHEN I MET HIM IN CALIFORNIA ON 3 MARCH. I THEREFORE WANTED TO LET YOU HAVE MY IMPRESSIONS.

3. I EMPHASISED TO MR SHULTZ THAT THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WOULD BE CRITICAL, AND POINTED OUT THAT IF HIS MAJESTY AND YASSER ARAFAT WERE IN A POSITION TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT A JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN APPROACH TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE AMERICANS TO MAKE PROGRESS BOTH ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND ON A FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

4. MR SHULTZ SHARED MY SENSE OF URGENCY. HE ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR EARLY PROGRESS, IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS MUST PLAY THEIR PART. HE BELIEVES THAT THE RIGHT ARAB MOVE, LED BY HIS MAJESTY WITH AT LEAST THE TACIT SUPPORT OF OTHERS, COULD MAKE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT IN ISRAEL, AND WOULD BRING ISRAEL TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ON LEBANON HE WAS AT THAT TIME REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC, ALTHOUGH HE WONDERED WHAT THE SYRIAN REACTION WOULD BE WHEN A WITHDRAWAL PLAN WAS PUT TO THEM.

5. I KNOW THAT HIS MAJESTY IS FACED WITH DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO BREAK THE PRESENT DEADLOCK AND TO OPEN THE WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I LEFT THE AMERICANS IN

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NO DOUBT THAT JORDAN MUST NOT (NOT) BE LEFT TO CARRY THE BURDEN ALONE.

6. I WAS, AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, VERY HAPPY INDEED TO HEAR OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE ARABS LEAGUE MISSION AND LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU WITH HIS MAJESTY NEXT WEEK.  
ENDS

PYM

MIDDLE EAST

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FROM AMMAN 160900Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELNO 112 OF 15 MARCH 1983

AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS , BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS  
UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

JORDAN /PLO

1. I HAVE SEEN BOTH KING HUSSEIN (WHO LEAVES FOR BONN TOMORROW MORNING) AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY, AS WELL AS THE US AMBASSADOR WHO HAS SEEN MUCH OF KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPLE ADVISERS OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS DURING EX-PRESIDENT CARTERS VISIT TO JORDAN. A REVIEW OF THE LATEST POSITION AS THE JORDANIANS SEE IT MAY THEREFORE BE HELPFUL PRIOR TO KING HUSSEIN'S MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF LATER THIS WEEK.

2. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT IT HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO HAVE SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH ARAFAT IN NEW DELHI. SEMICOLON THERE HAD BEEN TOO MANY PEOPLE PRESENT AT THEIR MEETING AND ARAFAT HAD DELIBERATELY WASTED TIME BY RAISING TRIVIAL SUBJECTS SUCH AS THE LOSS BY GEORGE HABBASH'S WIFE OF HER JORDANIAN PASSPORT. CONSEQUENTLY HE STILL FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER ARAFAT WOULD PROVE WILLING TO JOIN WITH HIM IN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING HIS READINESS TO ENTER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN HE NEXT VISITED AMMAN (HE IS EXPECTED HERE ON OR ABOUT 21 MARCH). HOWEVER THE KING THOUGHT THE SIGNALS COMING FROM THE PLO WERE NOT ENCOURAGING. SEMICOLON IT WAS CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON ARAFAT NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAS MUCH MORE PESSIMISTIC AND SAID FIRMLY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ARAFAT WOULD DELIVER.



MORE PESSIMISTIC AND SAID FIRMLY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ARAFAT WOULD DELIVER.

3. KING HUSSEIN ALSO COMPLAINED TO ME THAT HE WAS GETTING LITTLE HELP FROM HIS SUPPOSED FRIENDS. HE SEEMED PARTICULARLY UNCERTAIN WHAT GAME THE SAUDIS WERE PLAYING. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ENRAGED OVER A CLAIM MADE BY PRINCE BANDAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT ARAFAT HAD AGREED TO ANNOUNCE JOINTLY WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 25 MARCH THAT JORDAN AND A DELEGATION OF NON PLO PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES WERE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON PRINCE BANDAR HAD FURTHER ALLEGED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF THE FEZ DECLARATION AND THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD AGREED TO JOIN WITH KING FAHD AND ARAFAT IN SIGNING A SECRET DOCUMENT STATING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FEDERATION BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD CATEGORICALLY DENIED TO THE AMERICANS EVER HAVING DISCUSSED SUCH PROPOSALS WITH PRINCE BANDAR. THE KING ALSO SEEMED UNSURE WHAT WEIGHT TO PLACE ON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND KISSINGER WHICH HAD GIVEN RISE TO SOME THOROUGHLY CONFUSING IDEAS. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION, THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH HIMSELF AND HIS NOMINATED REPRESENTATIVES. HE FOUND IT PUZZLING THAT OTHER AMERICANS WERE APPARENTLY NOW BEING ALLOWED TO GET IN ON THE ACT (THESE COMMENTS MAY ALSO REFLECT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CARTERS PRECISE ROLE, ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTAND FROM THE US AMBASSADOR THAT CARTERS VISIT RESULTED IN A TOTAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN HIM AND THE KING AND THAT CARTER PROMISED THE KING HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HE COULD TO HELP JORDAN BOTH WITH KING FAHD, WHOM CARTER IS SEEING TODAY, AND WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, WHOM HE IS TO SEE ON 16 MARCH).

4. THE KING GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE AND, WHILE STILL DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE OPENING OFFERED BY THE REAGAN INITIATIVE IF HE POSSIBLY CAN, INCREASINGLY DOUBTFUL WHETHER HE CAN PULL IT OFF. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME HE BELIEVED THE KING HAD ONLY RECENTLY COME TO A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION. HE NOW REALISED THAT HE COULD NOT BRING THE OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES ALONG UNLESS HE OBTAINED THE BLESSING OF THE PLO AND HE WAS NOW LESS HOPEFUL OF OBTAINING A GREEN LIGHT FROM ARAFAT THAN HE HAD BEEN TWO WEEKS AGO, FOLLOWING THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE KING HAS ALL ALONG BEEN AWARE OF THESE CONSTRAINTS AND, AT LEAST IN HIS HEART OF HEARTS, SCEPTICAL OF THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. BUT HE WAS NONETHELESS DETERMINED TO MAKE ALL HE COULD OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND TO ENSURE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE BLAMED IF IT FAILED.

5. THE KINGS ADVISERS ARE ALREADY DEBATING WHAT HE SHOULD DO IF ARAFAT FAILS TO COME FORWARD. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD ME THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO KING HUSSEIN VISITING WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARAFATS VISIT AS SOME HAD SUGGESTED SEMICOLON HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG FOR THE KING TO GO TO WASHINGTON IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS IT WOULD EMPHASISE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE UNITED STATES AT A TIME WHEN THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE TO DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM FURTHER LOSS.



HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE UNITED STATES AT A TIME WHEN THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE TO DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM FURTHER ISRAELI ENCROACHMENT.

6. THE KING TOLD ME HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF LATER THIS WEEK. AT THE MOMENT HE SEEMS PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY SAUDI AND MOROCCAN ACTIVITIES AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE US ROLE. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF HIM ON YOUR RECENT TALK WITH SHULTZ AND HAVE ALSO LEFT WITH HIM A COPY OF YOUR LETTER TO QASEM (YOUR TELNO 58).

CCN PARA 4 LINE 9

A GREEN LIGHT FROM ARAFAT THAN ...

URWICK

NNNN



ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: 18 MARCH 1983

POINTS TO MAKE IN REPLY TO ARAB PRESENTATION

1. Delighted to receive Delegation in London. Glad that mutually acceptable solution found to earlier problems.
2. Listened to presentation with great interest. No doubt of importance of Fez communiqué. Unified Arab programme for peaceful settlement a historic achievement.
3. Cannot subscribe to every detail of Fez principles. Believe that solution to many of the problems can only be found in negotiations. But right that Arab side should make clear its objectives.
4. Question now is how to make further progress. Clearer acceptance from Arab side that Israel has rights that must be protected in a settlement, would help US to put pressure on Israel, and encourage internal Israeli debate. With clarification of that point, see no reason why Fez principles should not be opening Arab position on negotiations.
5. Time is short. President Reagan's initiative, and favourable mood in US, an opportunity to be seized. Expanding Israeli settlements programme otherwise threatens to make Israeli hold on West Bank irreversible. Have stressed to US urgency of settlements freeze and withdrawal of forces from Lebanon. Believe joint Jordanian/Palestinian approach to negotiations offers most realistic hope of practical progress on Palestinian problems, and consistent with interests of all.
6. Britain remains fully committed to Palestinian self-determination. Believe Arabs need to consider what route will

/lead



lead most quickly to Israeli withdrawal. To make a Palestinian state precondition for negotiations would risk losing everything. Confederation with Jordan seems to us politically realistic option to explore in negotiations. But agree Palestinians must in the end choose.

7. PLO. Stick to view that PLO will have to be associated with negotiations. Essential if real progress is to be made for PLO to show willingness to acknowledge Israel's rights as part of settlement. Would lose nothing. Continuing stalemate serves only Mr Begin's interests. Policy on Ministerial contacts with PLO not intended to be negative: but to underline importance we attach to PLO taking this step.

8. Disturbed by incident at Al Aqsa Mosque, and upsurge of violence on West Bank. Israelis acted quickly to detain those responsible for attack on Mosque. But fully understand shock throughout Islamic world.

9. Concerned at other threats to stability of region, including the Gulf War. But glad to note summit meeting between King Hassan of Morocco and President Chadli of Algeria: step on the road to better relations between two states with whom we enjoy close relations.



ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

HM King Hussein of Jordan (Leader)

HE Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam (Syria) (Foreign Minister)

HRH Prince Saud Bin Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz (Saudi Arabia)  
(Foreign Minister)

HE Maître M'Hamed Boucetta (Morocco) (Foreign Minister)

HE Mahmoud Mestiri (Tunisia) (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs)

HE Mr Hadj Ben Abdlelkader Azzout (Algeria) (Secretary General  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Professor Walid Al-Khalidi (Palestinian representative)

HE M Chedli Klibi (Secretary General Arab League)

HE Mr Ahmad Al-Lawzi (Head of Jordanian Royal Court)

HE Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem (Jordan) (Foreign Minister)

+ Foreign Ministers listed in order of date of  
appointment to post.



## PERSONALITY NOTES ON THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION MEMBERS

Syrian Foreign Minister: Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister since 1970. Born 1932. Trained as a lawyer. Governor of Damascus 1964. Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade 1969. Survived two assassination attempts in 1976 and 1977. Official visit to Britain 1979. Married, four children. Speaks some French, a little English.

Saudi Foreign Minister: HRH Prince Saud Bin Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz

Foreign Minister since 1975. Born 1941. Third son of King Faisal. Studied USA and Cambridge. Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources 1971-75. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs March 1975. Minister of Foreign Affairs October 1975. Appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the assassination of his father. Married, three children. Speaks excellent English.

Moroccan Foreign Minister: Maître M'hamed Boucetta

Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1981. Born 1925. Trained as a lawyer. Directeur de Cabinet to Foreign Minister, 1956; Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, May to December 1958; Minister for Public Service and Administration Reform, May 1960; acted as Foreign Minister during 1960; Minister of Justice, 1961. Left the government in January 1963. Defeated in the parliamentary elections in May 1963. Was one of the four Istiqlal Party leaders who formed a National Block with the UNFP and boycotted the 1970 parliamentary elections. Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the



Istiqlal Party 1974; Minister of State without portfolio, 1977; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 1977. Speaks French, no English.

Tunisian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs: M Mahmoud Mestiri  
Minister of State since 1981. Born 1929. Studied Political Science at Lyons University. Joined diplomatic service, 1956. Consul-General New York, 1958. Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, 1959. Assistant to the UN Secretary-General's personal representative to the Belgian Government on the Congo crisis, 1961. Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, September 1961. Head of American Department, MFA, 1964. Secretary-General, MFA, September 1964.

Permanent Representative at the UN and Ambassador to Canada, 1967. Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the EEC, 1969. Ambassador in Bonn, 1970. Intermediary during the Munich Olympics massacre, 1972. Secretary-General, MFA, 1973. Permanent Representative at the UN, 1976, Chairman of Group of 77 in 1978. Withdrawn in January 1980, apparently for disregarding instructions on Security Council elections. Secretary-General, MFA, September 1980. Promoted Secetaire d'Etat, MFA, 1981. Elected to PSD Central Committee, 1981. Visited UK December 1982 as guest of Mr Hurd.  
Good English.

Algerian Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Hadj Ben Abdelkader Azzout

Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since August 1982 and is a member of the FLN Central Committee. He was officer in the ALN (military wing of the FLN) during

/the



the war of independence. He was Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN for 7 years, then for a spell Head of International Organisations Department at the Foreign Ministry. About three years ago he was appointed as Algerian Ambassador to Cameroon.

As Secretary-General he ranks as number two to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A strict Muslim, his private interest is Islamic religious philosophy. His English is rusty.

Secretary General of the Arab League: M Chedli Klibi

Born 1925 at Tunis. Educated Sadiki College, Tunis, and at Paris. Taught sociology and nutrition at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Foreign Office guest in UK, May 1958, the month in which he became Director of Tunisian National Radio. Held a succession of Ministerial posts dealing with culture and information, 1962-73. Director of the Presidential Cabinet with rank of Minister in the government reshuffle after the abortive Jerba declaration of union with Libya, 1974. Minister of Culture, December 1976, and was a champion of the use of Arabic in Tunisia. Minister of Information, 1978, when the secrétariat d'état became a Ministry. Secretary General of the Arab League, 1979. Eminent Arabist. Married, three children. Speaks French, no English.

Head of the Jordanian Royal Court: Mr Ahmad Al-Lawzi

Head of Royal Court since 1979. Born 1925. Graduated from a teacher training college in Baghdad. Worked as a teacher 1950-3; Assistant Head of Royal Protocol 1953-6; Head of Royal Protocol 1956-61; Member of Parliament 1961-3;

/Assistant



Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1963-4; Minister of State at the Prime Minister's Office 1964-5; Minister of the Interior (Rural and Municipal Affairs) 1967; Minister of Finance, October 1970 - December 1971, when he became Prime Minister following Wasfi al-Tell's assassination. Resigned in May 1973. President of the National Consultative Council 1978 - December 1979. Married with several children. Speaks indifferent English.

Jordanian Foreign Minister: Mr Marwan Sidqui Al-Qasem

Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1980. Born 1938. Educated at Michigan and Colombia Universities USA. A member of the Jordanian delegation to the UN 1963-66. Consul-General in New York 1964-66. Director of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1966-67. First Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy in Beirut 1967-68 and Washington 1968-72. Private Secretary of HRH Crown Prince Hassan 1972-74 and Secretary-General of the Royal Hashemite Diwan 1974-76. Minister of State for Prime Ministry Affairs July-November 1976. Minister of Supply November 1976-December 1979. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs under Sharif Sharaf, December 1979-July 1980. On the latter's death he became full Minister of Foreign Affairs and retained this post in Badran's administration. Married. Speaks excellent English.

Palestinian Representative: Prof Walid Al-Khalidi

Director of the Institute for Palestine Studies. Comes from a leading Jerusalem family long associated with Palestinian nationalism. A founder of the Institute for

/Palestine



Palestine Studies, Khalidi is regarded as foremost among Palestinian intellectuals. He holds a first degree from London University and a DPhil from Oxford where he lectured for a time in Arabic: he resigned at the time of Suez. He is Professor of Political Studies at the American University, Beirut, Cairo and currently a Research Fellow at the Harvard Centre for International Affairs. He is considered to be a level-headed, fervent, though moderate nationalist, and is an articulate and persuasive spokesman for the Palestinian cause in both the United States and the UK.

Khalidi, though not associated with any PLO bodies, has served as an adviser to and theoretician of the Palestinian Movement since the late 1960's. He has close ties with and influence on PLO leaders. He has acted as intermediary between the Palestinians and the Lebanese State. Married to a sister of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam. His cousin, Rashid, is a teacher at AUB and a member of the Institute of Palestine Studies in Beirut.



## ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT

## PRIME MINISTER'S TÊTE-À-TÊTE WITH KING HUSSEIN

## POINTS TO MAKE

## ARAB/ISRAEL

1. Most grateful to King for cutting through difficulties on Palestinian representation. Glad unnecessary obstacle in Anglo/Arab relations now cleared away.
2. Developments since King's recent visit to London? Impression that Arafat may be hesitating. Joint public statement still possible by end of March?
3. We have impressed on US importance of action both on settlements and Lebanon (Mr Pym's meeting with Shultz 3 March). They accept urgency: and are convinced that public statement by King would make great impact in Israel.
4. Anything more UK/Ten can do to help? European Council meeting imminent: statement likely reaffirming European principles.
5. Lebanon. Concerned at slow pace of negotiations. Have told Israelis limits beyond which Gemayel cannot go if he is to maintain place in Arab world.



## ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: MARCH 1983

## BACKGROUND

## UK-JORDAN RELATIONS

1. Britain's relations with Jordan are close and friendly. Jordan is important to us as a stable country in an unstable area and for the moderate and generally constructive policies she follows in the Arab/Israel dispute. Both these qualities depend heavily on the Hashemite regime which has received our constant support. There are no major bilateral problems between us. Jordan is not rich but is now one of our more important export markets in the Middle East. The British share of the market is high. Our exports in 1982 at £295 million showed a 45% increase in value terms over the previous year. Much of this growth reflected deliveries of the Khalid Tank (Jordan ordered 274 in 1979) but even after taking this into account our exports have increased in recent years. The outlook for 1983 is less rosy, as the shortfall in Arab payments agreed at the 1974 Baghdad summit, means that some development projects will have to be delayed owing to shortages of funds. Imports from Jordan are low, totalling only £18 million in 1982. The UK has offered £8 million in capital aid and technical assistance towards the 1981-85 Five Year Development Plan. (The Plan as originally published envisaged expenditure of JD 3,300 million, (US £10 billion) of which 61% was to be /spent



spent on the public sector). The principal areas of our assistance in 1976-80 have been in water supply, rural electrification, phosphates and agriculture. King Hussein makes frequent private visits to the United Kingdom, when he invariably meets the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He was last here in February 1983.

2. Ministerial visits to Jordan in 1982 included visits by Mr Pym, Mr Rees and the Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young).

3. The most sensitive point in our otherwise cordial relations and one which is constantly referred to by The King and other senior Jordanians is the lack of a return State Visit (King Hussein's State Visit was in 1966). There are no firm plans for a state visit to Jordan and discussion on this point is best avoided.

4. *Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under  
FOI Exemption. A Wayland. 23 July 2013*

The Duke and Duchess of Kent visit Jordan next week as the Crown Prince's guest.

5. In February 1982 The King repeated his invitation for the Prime Minister to visit Jordan. A British Prime Minister in office has never visited Jordan since the Kingdom was established. No decision on when or if a visit could take place has been taken.



ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: 18 MARCH 1983

JORDAN COUNTRY BRIEF

Introduction

1. The greater part of the country (90,650 sq kms excluding the West Bank) - about three quarters of the size of England - is arid desert with the relatively small population (2.3 million) concentrated in the fertile uplands East of the Jordan rift. Prosperous by the standards of the developing countries (estimated per capita GNP \$1,700 in 1980) Jordan nevertheless remains heavily dependent on foreign aid. Development of limited natural resources (eg phosphates and potash) is under way.

2. Modern Jordan came into being after the 1948/9 Arab Israeli war. In theory it is a constitutional monarchy, although in practice the democratic institutions are ineffective and power is concentrated in the hands of The King and his closest advisers (who include the present Prime Minister, Mudar Badran; the Commander-in-Chief, General Sherif Zaid Bin Shaker; and Crown Prince Hassan). The King appoints and dismisses Prime Ministers and closely supervises Cabinet appointments. He maintains close personal contact with the leaders of the Armed Forces.

3. There is democracy in form but not in substance. Parliament  
/comprises



comprises an (appointed) Senate and an elected National Assembly. But the Lower House has (with one short interlude) been in recess since the Rabat decision of 1974 to avoid embarrassment over West Bank representation. A National Consultative Council was appointed by The King in 1978 to give a semblance of democratic consultation in the absence of an elected chamber. In April 1982 the number of appointed members was increased to 75. Although its influence has so far been very limited, care is taken to consult the Council.

4. The regime derives its strength from the loyalty of the East Bankers (especially the Bedouin tribes) and the Armed Forces are dominated by them. But over half of the population are of Palestinian origin. The civil war of 1970/71 led to the expulsion of the Fedayeen from Jordan and for some time afterwards left a legacy of ill-feeling among some Palestinians. The majority are now content to co-operate with, if not wholeheartedly support, the regime. Palestinians are not usually chosen for the top ranks of the Services and are also under-represented in sensitive or policy-making jobs. But they dominate commercial life.

#### Internal

5. The present Government, under Mudar Badran has been in office since August 1980. The Government's internal programme has led to an improvement of the administrative and educational

/system





system by strengthening the armed forces and internal security. But the Government has ignored more radical proposals for reform put forward by the previous Prime Minister, Sharif Sharaf. External affairs have had their impact on the regime's position at home. Jordan's support for Iraq in the war with Iran caused concern in Jordan, but this evaporated as the financial benefits were realised. There are groups, eg Moslem Fundamentalists and many Palestinians (who believe the dispute distracts attention from Arab/Israel), who object in principle to Jordanian support for Iraq. But the majority of Jordanians accept that Jordan's interests lie with Iraq. (The 4,000 volunteers answered the King's call in February 1982 for a Yarmouk force to go to Iraq, have now returned).

6. An Iraqi defeat leading to the fall of Saddam Hussein could have serious repercussions for the government and might lead to trouble with the Moslem Brotherhood, who at present pose no serious subversive risk. The Moslem Brotherhood have been careful to eschew political activities and to profess loyalty to the regime; in return the regime has tried to soothe Moslem Fundamentalist sensitivities. Private support (largely financial) by members of the Jordanian Brotherhood goes to Brotherhood dissidents in Syria. Jordan has denied any official support and had tried not to give the Syrians any excuse for claiming otherwise.

7. The National Consultative Council (NCC) is generally regarded as playing a useful role in discussing Government

/legislation





legislation, but it has failed to prove itself as a forum for political debate. The regime is well aware of the desire for greater democracy, but The King has given no indication when and how this might be brought about. However the President of the NCC in a recent interview came close to making a firm commitment to a return to Parliamentary Life as soon as the West Bank problem is settled. A further recent development is that Press reporting of NCC meetings now includes remarks critical of the Government.

#### Foreign Policy

8. Foreign policy is dominated by the Arab-Israel dispute. King Hussein's talks with Arafat are covered in the Arab/Israel brief.

Near East and North Africa Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
14 March 1983



HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING (GCVO)

King of Jordan

Born Amman 1935

Educated Bishops School, Amman; Victoria College, Alexandria; Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952 and acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. He has been in power longer than any other Arab leader and has survived numerous assassination attempts and threats to his throne including the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958, the loss of the West Bank of Israel in 1967, the civil war against Palestinian groups in 1970-71 and periods of bad relations with Iraq and, most recently Syria.

In relation to Israel, King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. He has, however, maintained both in public and in private strong opposition to the Camp David agreements and to the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations despite US attempts - some heavy-handed - to persuade him to participate. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine, but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and with the oil-rich Arab states which contribute substantial sums to Jordan in budgetary support; he also has to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population. In the light

/of



of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they will have a credible military option; he will therefore do everything possible to avoid Jordanian involvement in a further Arab/Israel war.


At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people thereby implicitly renouncing his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, King Hussein has not abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank in any Arab/Israel settlement. He recognises, however, that the initiative for such a development must come from the West Bankers themselves.

Despite the playboy image of his youth King Hussein is now wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck he has shown the ability and experience to take sensible and sometimes courageous decisions in times of crisis.

Both by inclination and because of his assessment of the best interests of his country, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has, however, taken care to maintain relations with the Soviet Union and has argued that the Russians must be associated with a future UN conference to settle the Middle East dispute.

/King





King Hussein takes all major foreign and defence policy decisions himself. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field to Crown Prince Hassan. Perhaps King Hussein's greatest single asset is his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has used this to good effect in keeping in close touch with and maintaining the loyalty of the Armed Forces, whose importance to his throne he has always recognised.

In his personal life, the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his Palestinian born third wife, Queen Alia, affected him deeply. His marriage in June 1978 to his fourth wife, Noor (nee Elizabeth or Lisa Halaby, an American of Lebanese origin) appeared at the outset to be one of genuine affection but is now showing some signs of strain. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage did not attract the public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Queen Alia, would be next in the line of succession after Prince Hassan, thus displacing the sons subsequently born to Queen Noor in 1980/1, the sons of Princess Muna and the son of Crown Prince Hassan and Princess Sarvath. By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by giving precedence to a son of entirely Arab descent.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues

/to





to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reasons short of an all-out Arab/Israel war, with all the uncertainties it would bring, why he would not remain King of Jordan for the foreseeable future.

For the time being, his neighbours and his financial backers seem likely to continue to believe that their interests will be best served by the maintenance in Jordan of the Hashemite regime headed by King Hussein.



## VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

## COMMERCIAL BRIEF

	<u>1981</u>	£ million <u>1982</u> <u>Jan-Nov</u>
1 <u>UK visible exports to Middle East,</u>	4,995	5,146
of which:		
Morocco	56	78
Algeria	173	174
Tunisia	35	36
Syria	85	80
Jordan	204	252
Saudi Arabia	1,134	1,124
 <u>UK imports</u>	 3,923	 3,228

Invisible earnings are believed to be between one and two-thirds of visible trade.

2 Exports to the Middle East represent some 10<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>% of Britain's total exports worldwide, and increased 13.3% in the first 11 months of 1982 over the corresponding 1981 period (compared with an 8<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>% increase in our 1982 exports worldwide). Major markets are Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE taking between them nearly 50% of our Middle East exports. Fastest growing markets for us last year were Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and most of the Gulf States; only Iran and Libya showed significant falls.

3. There is so far little hard evidence of discrimination against British firms because of the problems over the Delegation. No Arab League state has indicated to us, formally or informally, that sanctions might be imposed over the issue of the Delegation.

/Nonetheless





Nonetheless numerous firms have made clear their belief that they are likely to suffer, if only at the margin, from any prolonged period of poor relations.

#### 4 Saudi Arabia

Our most important Middle East market taking about 25% of total visible exports to Arab countries and now our largest market outside Western Europe and North America at £1.3 bn in 1982. Despite the North Sea, we need heavy Saudi crude to give the right refinery mix and the visible trade balance is still in the Saudi favour. Considerable invisible earnings, probably some £400m net annually. Despite a generally poor project performance, notably in construction, we export across a wider spectrum than most competitors. Development under the Dollars 235 billion Third Plan (1980-1985) may well be unaffected by the weak world oil market. Crude prices are still far higher than assumed when the Plan was drawn up, although Saudi volume sales are somewhat lower. The Saudis can bridge the likely gap between revenue and expenditure by drawing on reserves, currently over Dollars 150 bn.

#### 5 Jordan

UK sixth largest supplier in 1981. Exports in 1982 were £270m, half defence sales. 50 British companies have regional/local offices in Amman. Joint ventures between UK and Jordanian companies increasing. Minister for Trade visited in February 1982. Steady economic expansion, with emphasis on thriving private sector. Main industry phosphates. Heavy reliance on Arab aid and workers remittances. Current cash flow problems as Arab donors slow payments; recent resort to international money markets; some payments delayed.

#### 6 Syria

A medium sized market, with UK exports at £85m, with market share of 4%. Minister for Trade visited Syria in February 1982. The current Five Year Plan (1981-1985) concentrates on



completing existing projects rather than starting new ones and indicates a realistic approach, with emphasis on agriculture. But 50% of budget goes on defence, and foreign exchange remains short.

NOTE: Following three countries are all Francophone, where British industry is striving to enter a French preserve.

7. Algeria

UK is 10th largest supplier, with 4% share of increasingly important market. 1982 exports £199m. 1980-84 Five Year Plan envisages £40 bn expenditure, particularly on social infrastructure. UK signed Memorandum of Understanding on Construction in 1981 and negotiations under way on 20,000 housing units and 30 vocational training centres. £46m contract to build 4 hospitals recently won by CLASP/Tarmac.

8 Tunisia

UK 11th largest supplier, with 2% share. 1982 exports £39m. 1982-86 Five Year Plan - major priority is job creation and foreign investment. Minister of Trade paid successful visit in December 1982 accompanied by businessmen. ATP offer of £13m made in September 1982 for phosphate/sulphuric acid complex; no contracts yet awarded.

9 Morocco

UK is 12th largest supplier, with 2% share. 1982 exports £96m (up 54% on 1981). Minister for Trade hopes to visit in 1983.



VISIT OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION: 18 MARCH 1983

DEFENCE SALES BRIEF

JORDAN

1. Jordan has been one of our best customers in the region - orders over £450m in the last three years (<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> of which for sale of Khalid MBTs, ammunition and support). Jordan is short of money and relies on external subvention (or soft credit/aid) for her major systems purchases eg Baghdad Summit funding of Khalid programme. Arab funding seems unlikely to be resumed in the near future - at least on the previous scale, despite the promises made at Fez.

Main Prospects

Hawk - worth up to £100m

Refurbishment of F5Es - value unknown

Tornado/Agile Combat Aircraft - value unknown

Coastguard patrol boats - £12m

2. Khalid Tanks: There were early problems over the tank's transmission/steer unit. Agreement has now been reached with the Jordanians on a refit programme for the delivered tanks and to incorporate modifications in the tanks under construction.

SAUDI ARABIA

3. Resolution of the problem of the Arab League delegation would open the way for us to push, at a political level, for expansion of our share of the defence equipment market; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Western arms sales in that market amounted

/to





to some £1900m in 1981 of which Saudi Arabia accounted for about 80%. But Saudi Arabia has tended to rely on US and (to a lesser extent) French equipment, and our own share of that market has been small.

4. Saudi equipment preferences will affect our chances of selling to the other GCC states. The GCC is working towards closer co-operation in arms purchases with the aim of attaining interoperability and ultimately standardization. A 12-year programme of GCC funding for equipment purchases by Oman and Bahrain has also been agreed. But Saudi Arabia appears to be using her weight within the GCC to influence decisions there. We cannot rely on our equipment selling on its merits alone and need to get across the message (a) that it is in the GCC interest as much as our own that the Gulf States should not rely exclusively on US equipment and (b) that our equipment fully interoperable with that of the US.

5. The atmosphere for renewed British equipment sales to Saudi Arabia has improved recently with the extension last year of the MOD/BAe contract (£400m over 3 years) for RSAF training and maintenance of Lightnings. 1982 also saw the sale of 72 FH70 Howitzers to the Saudi Army (at £64m our first sale of a major equipment to the Army). Prince Sultan acknowledged to Mr Nott in September that the way was open for further co-operation.

#### Main Prospects

- a. Air Force: Nimrod AEW, Hawk trainer and Ground radars (the latter we are pressing to be included in the US AWACS package).
- b. Army: Lynx helicopters and Army pilot training; Artillery, engineering and NBC/EOD equipment packages; and (longer term) Challenger and other AFVs.
- c. Navy: AD missiles and Mine Countermeasures vessels.

/d.





d. Ministry of Interior: Hovercraft and internal security equipment.

e. National Guard: Extension of MOD run medical and communications projects (each worth around £200m) AD missiles and armour.

6. Our major prospects elsewhere in the Gulf include Aircraft (Tornado for Oman, Hawk for UAE and Kuwait), Air Defence Radars (Oman, UAE and Kuwait), Tanks and AFVs (Oman, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain), AD Missiles (Rapier for Qatar) and C3 (UAE and Qatar).

7. We would like to buttress our relationship in Saudi Arabia by establishing a Military Mission in the Saudi MOD similar to those operated there by the Americans and French. Equipment sales (such as FH70) could provide a peg on which to hang this.


#### ALGERIA

8. Potentially, Algeria is one of our biggest markets for defence sales. Two years ago it was virtually a closed market, 90% equipment was Soviet. Following political decision to move away from Russians and become demonstrably non-aligned, contacts between UKMOD (Defence Sales) and Algeria MOD have become frequent. Furthermore, £100m sales have been achieved in past 2 years (Primarily naval vessels and communications equipment).

9. Algeria demands a greater involvement of HMG than many other countries: we have been negotiating a 'Defence Co-operation Memorandum of Understanding' for 18 months. This MOU has had to break new ground in giving HMG guarantees and support to industry, necessary to beat the French who are obviously our greatest competitors.

/Main





Main Prospects

- a. Hawk and maintenance renovation of Soviet aircraft (£150m).
  - b. Major air defence project - 'Project ACCORD' (£200m+) and possibly
  - c. Further ship sales including submarines.
10. Algeria is demanding a very favourable finance deal with the MOU. Already we have offered to support £500m at better than consensus rates, but Algeria is demanding lower than consensus interest rates. We are seeing what can be done; but already we have broken new ground with the offered deal.
11. Negotiations have halted since December; possibly the Arab League row has caused certain reticence although relations are very friendly and optimistic on both sides.

TUNISIA


12. Virtually no UK arms sales of any significance have been made to Tunisia for the last 5-6 years. Majority of equipment is of US and French origin.

Main Prospects

- a. Vosper Thornycroft were in the final stages of contract negotiations for 2 fast patrol craft (2 similar boats having been supplied some years before) but negotiations came to an abrupt halt in December 1982. The reason given was that severe floods in southern Tunisia necessitated the diversion of funds to relief work, aggravating an already over-stretched budget (lower receipts from oil and tourism than anticipated).
13. The ECGD supported finance package for this deal was

/exceptionally





exceptionally favourable to the Tunisians (80% over 10 years from delivery at 10% interest) in response to the Tunisian Foreign Minister's pleas to Lord Carrington during his last visit. For once, the offer does not appear to have been bettered by the French. A commercial loan can be arranged for the 20% front end to minimise the impact on their budget for the next 2-3 years.

#### MOROCCO

14. Few UK arms sales to Morocco in recent years. Majority of their equipment is of US and French origin although some Soviet and UK equipment also in service. Most notable UK hardware is £5m worth of 105 mm Light Guns and associated items sold to the Army in the mid 1970s.

#### Main Prospects

a. International Military Services Limited have been negotiating for 2 years over a £150m equipment package which includes Land Rovers, Mortar Locating Radars, Mortar, FH70 Howitzers, more Light Guns and associated ammunition. Negotiations have been protracted but IMS Limited remain optimistic.

b. Vosper Thornycroft have submitted proposals for the supply of 4 Fast Patrol Boats and a Frigate; Brooke Marine are currently proposing a contract for 10 Fast Patrol Boats (6 to be local build), followed in the longer term by 2 larger examples and a Landing Ship Logistic. In addition Rowbotham (Tankers) Limited have the prospect of supplying 2 ex-chemical tankers which they will convert to Naval Tankers to enable the Navy to carry out Replenishment-at-Sea operations and thereby extend the range of their Fast Patrol Boats.

15. With all of these prospects one of the main sticking points

/is





is finance even though good credit arrangements have been offered. Morocco relies on Saudi aid for new purchases and that has been in short supply. In addition a further set back to all negotiations has been the recent death of Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, one of King Hassan's principal advisers.

SYRIA

16. Sales to Syria since 1980 total some £31m, plus a local manufacture project for tank radios (Racal) worth up to £40m. Syria's poor financial position and low security rating (due to large number of Soviet advisers in country) are tight constraints on what might be made available. Our sales have therefore been in items of low security content such as armoured cars, land radars, radios.

Main Prospects

Lynx helicopters	-	up to £100m
Air Defence Radars	-	up to £80m
Barmine/Ranger	-	up to £25m

Regional Marketing Directorate  
Ministry of Defence  
14 March 1983



cc B1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

HR 18/3.

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation: Press Statement

/ I enclose as requested a draft press statement which could be drawn upon as required after the Prime Minister's talks on 18 March with King Hussein and the Arab League Delegation. Mr Pym and Mr Hurd are planning to give television and radio interviews on the afternoon of 18 March. We will of course ensure that the actual press line is concerted after the departure of the delegation from Downing Street.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

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Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT: 18 MARCH

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

CAVEAT.....

The Prime Minister the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP held talks earlier today with a Delegation of the Arab League led by His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

His Majesty was received by the Prime Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Courtyard before a Guard of Honour. A session of plenary talks lasting [ ] minutes was held at 10 Downing Street and attended by members of the Arab League Delegation (see background for list) and Arab League Ambassadors. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP and the Minister of State at the Foreign Office the Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

In the plenary session of talks, held in an extremely /friendly



friendly and constructive atmosphere, there was a wide-ranging discussion on the situation in the Middle East. The Arab League Delegation presented the conclusions of the Fez Summit. The Prime Minister welcomed the commitment of the Arab states to work for a peaceful resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict. She reaffirmed the Government's determination to work for a just and comprehensive settlement on the basis of the two Venice principles, namely the right to existence and security for all states in the region, including Israel, as well as justice for the Palestinians, including self-determination. The Prime Minister emphasised that there was now an important opportunity for peaceful progress in the Middle East, and made clear that Britain would support and encourage all those who declared their willingness to enter peace negotiations.

The plenary talks were followed by a private session of talks between the Prime Minister and King Hussein lasting [ ] minutes.

Following a luncheon given by the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street in <sup>honour</sup> of His Majesty and the delegation, the delegation were granted an audience of Her Majesty The Queen at Buckingham Palace.

#### Background

The Delegation, led by King Hussein of Jordan, comprised the Foreign Minister, of Syria, Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam; Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz; Jordan, Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem and



Morocco, Maitre M'hamed Boucetta; together with the Tunisian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Mahmoud Mestiri; the Algerian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Hadj Bin Abdel el Kader Azzout; the Secretary General of the Arab League, Mr Chedli Klibi; a Palestinian representative <sup>Professor</sup> Walid Al-Khalidi and the Head of the Jordanian Royal Court Mr Ahmed al-Lawzi.

The delegation are a committee of the Arab League, set up at the Fez Summit in August 1982. The committee was mandated to visit the capitals of all permanent members of the UN Security Council to present the summit's conclusions. King Hassan of Morocco led a delegation [redacted] to Washington in October and was originally expected to have led the delegation to London but his place was taken by King Hussein at the last moment. King Hussein himself took [redacted] delegations [redacted] to Paris, Moscow and Peking in November and December.



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8 9 0

17 MAR 1983





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

*Dear John,*

I enclose as promised a list of the Arab delegation and their language capabilities. As you will see, only the Syrian Foreign Minister speaks neither French nor English. To overcome this, we suggest Mr Plumbly might sit behind him.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





ARAB LEAGUE VISIT: 10 DOWNING STREET LUNCHEON  
 INTERPRETER REQUIREMENTS

	Speaks English	French	Interpreter required
Jordan:			
King Hussein	Yes		No
Al Lawzi	Yes		No
Al Qasem	Yes		No
Ambassador	Yes		No
Syria:			
Khaddam	X	X	Arabic (Mr Plumbly)
Ambassador	Yes		No
Haj Ali	Yes		No
Saudi Arabia:			
Prince Faisal	Yes		No
Ambassador	Yes		No
Kabbani	Yes		No
Morocco:			
Boucetta	X	Yes	French
Ambassador	Yes		No
Kettani	X	Yes	French
Tunisia:			
Mestiri	Yes		No
Ambassador	Yes		No
Hamdani		Yes	French
Algeria:			
Azzout	Yes		No
Ambassador	Yes		No
Palestinian:			
Walid Al Khalidi	Yes		No
Arab League:			
Klibi		Yes	French
Rahman	Yes		No
Harjan		Yes	French

Note:- Mr Miles, on guest list, could interpret into Arabic or French





**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AH Old Admiralty Building

Telephone 01-

*Mr. Coles* <sup>17.</sup>  
*W. U. Gantell*  
*He P. 7*  
*G*

Miss Caroline Stephens  
10 Downing Street

Your reference

Our reference

Date

17 March 1983

*Caroline*

GUARD OF HONOUR FOR HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

1. There is one amendment to the procedure for the Guard of Honour described on pages 7 and 8 of the programme for the visit of the Arab League Delegation. *see inside cover.*
2. After the Prime Minister has welcomed King Hussein on his arrival in the FCO Quadrangle and before the Prime Minister introduces the Major-General, the Secretary of State will step forward to greet His Majesty.
3. You kindly agreed to bring this addition to the attention of the Prime Minister. All others concerned with this part of the ceremony are being informed.

*Yours sincerely*  
*J H W Reid*

J H W Reid (Miss)  
Inward Visits Section  
Protocol and Conference Department

cc: Lt Col R Heywood  
Jordanian Embassy





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 March 1983

A.S.C. 1983

Dear John,

Visit of Arab League Delegation

/ I enclose a list of the members of the Arab League Delegation  
/ who will be involved in both the talks and the lunch. You will wish  
to issue the invitations to lunch accordingly. I also enclose a  
proposed seating plan for the plenary session which has been agreed  
with the Jordanian Ambassador. I understand that you have already  
received a copy of the programme.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN ✓

H.E. MR. AHMAD AL LAWZY ✓  
- Chief of the Royal Court

H.E. MR. MARWAN AL QASEM ✓  
- Minister for Foreign Affairs

H.E. MR. IBRAHIM IZZIDDIN ✓  
- Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

H.E. MR. YANAL HIKMAT ✓  
- Chief of Royal Protocol

- Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister ✓

Talks /

Umeh.

ARRIVAL BY SPECIAL FLIGHT AT THE SOUTH SIDE SUITE AT  
18.30 HOURS G.M.T. THURSDAY, MARCH 17TH 1983.

CLARIDGE'S HOTEL



ARAB LEAGUE

H.E. MR. CHEDLI KLIBI ✓  
- Secretary General of the Arab League

MR. ABUEL MAALI A/RAHMAN ✓  
- Deputy Director, Arab League Office, London

MR. AHMED HARJAN ✓  
- Secretary, Arab League, Tunis.

} Talks }  
Lunch

ARRIVING THURSDAY, MARCH 17TH 1983 BY ALITALIA 280 FROM  
ROME AT 17.30 HOURS G.M.T. (HOUNSLOW SUITE)

THE DORCHESTER HOTEL



SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

H.E. MR. ABDUL HALIM KHADDAM ✓  
- Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

H.E. DR. LOUTOF ALLAH HAYDAR ✓  
- Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

DR. MUSTAFA HAJ ALI ✓  
- Chief of Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Talls!

hmd.

ARRIVAL BY SPECIAL FLIGHT ON THURSDAY 17TH MARCH 1983  
AT 13.00 HOURS G.M.T. (HOUNSLOW SUITE)



SAUDI ARABIA

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE SAUD AL FAISAL ✓  
- Foreign Minister

H.E. SHEIKH NASSER H. ALMANQOUR, G.C.V.O. ✓  
- Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

H.E. MR. MAMUN KABBANI ✓  
- Director of the West European Desk at the Foreign Ministry

H.E. MR. HASSAN SHAWWAF ✓  
- Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister

DR. NIZAR MADANI ✓  
- Director of the Information Office of the Foreign Minister

} Talks/  
lunch

ARRIVAL ON 17TH MARCH 1983 BY SPECIAL FLIGHT AT 13.40 HOURS GMT  
HEATHROW.

BERKELEY HOTEL (Foreign Minister and H.E. Mr. Shawwaf)  
CARLTON TOWER HOTEL



MOROCCO

H.E. MR. M'HAMED BOUCETTA ✓  
- Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

H.E. MR. MOHAMED-MEHDI BENABDELJALIL  
- Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

H.E. MR. ABDELHAMID KETTANI  
- Director of the Arab States Department

} Talks / luncheon

ARRIVING THURSDAY, 17TH MARCH 1983

CLARIDGE'S HOTEL



TUNISIA

H.E. MR. MAHMOUD MESTIRI ✓  
- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. SADOK BOUZAYEN ✓  
- Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

MR. NOUREDDINE HAMDANI ✓  
- Tunisian Deputy Representative to the Arab League

Talls /

Under -

ARRIVING ON 17TH MARCH 1983 BY AIR FRANCE 814 FROM PARIS  
AT 14.30 HOURS G.M.T.

CLARIDGE'S HOTEL



PALESTINIAN *rel.*

DR. WALID KHALIDI. /

*Talks / Lunch.*

ARRIVAL ON THURSDAY, MARCH 17TH 1983 AT 08.10 HOURS G.M.T.  
HEATHROW, TERMINAL 3 (FROM BOSTON) FLIGHT BA 274

CLARIDGE'S HOTEL



ALGERIA

H.E. MR. ALHAJ BEN ABDELKADER AZZOUT  
- Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry and Member  
of the Central Committee

H.E. Mr. REDHA MALEK  
- Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

Talls/

limer.

ARRIVAL BY AIR ALGERIE 2732 AT 14.15 HOURS G.M.T. ON  
THURSDAY, MARCH 17TH 1983 (HOUNSLOW SUITE)

CLARIDGE'S HOTEL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 March 1983

A.J.C. 17/3

p.a.

Dear John,

I enclose as requested a draft note for a toast by the Prime Minister at her luncheon for King Hussein and the Arab League Delegation on 18 March. A full list of those taking part in the talks at 10 Downing Street and attending the luncheon from the Arab League side will be sent over later today. The briefing will follow tomorrow.

Yours ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





NOTES FOR A TOAST BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF  
HM KING HUSSEIN AND AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION: 18 MARCH

Your Majesty, distinguished members of the Arab League delegation. Delighted to see you in London. Thanks to His Majesty King Hussein for agreeing at such short notice to take over the leadership of the Delegation. Thanks also to His Majesty King Hassan of Morocco for his work in preparation for the visit.

Glad that it has been possible at last to assemble the Delegation. Aware of considerable difficulties of assembling such a distinguished group in the face of enormous pressures of the international timetable which affects us all. Your Majesty and most of the delegates recently in Delhi for the Non-Aligned meeting only a few days ago. No signs of jet lag in the useful and important discussions we have just concluded.

[There is no more pressing problem facing the international community than how to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The principles adopted by the Fez Summit last September, which have been so clearly explained to us today, leave no room for doubt about the Arab commitment to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the problem. We share that commitment. Britain has worked and will continue to work for a settlement which recognises the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, as well as the rights of all states in the region, including Israel, to live in peace and security. There is at the present time an unrivalled opportunity for peaceful progress. We in Britain and Europe will do all we can to sustain and encourage those who have momentous decisions to take.] Your visit today is a symbol of the close ties of cooperation and friendship which have long bound

/Britain






Britain and the Arab world together. We must continue to work together in the search for a peaceful settlement.

Toast, His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal.





16 MAR 1983





RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1983

A. J. C. <sup>n.</sup>/<sub>J</sub>

*Dear John*

I attach a note covering the procedure for the Guard of Honour which is to be mounted for King Hussein in the FCO Courtyard on 18 March when he brings the Arab League Delegation to No 10.

The arrangements which we have made incorporate some improvements which we have been able to effect as a result of your letter of 2 December about reception ceremonies for visiting VIPs. The main innovations are the provision of a red carpet and a dais; some floral decoration; and increased attendance by the admission of guests from the Arab Embassies involved. I should be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister is content with the proposed arrangements.

We had a preliminary word about the procedure involving the dais. When you have looked at the attached details, perhaps you could confirm that it remains your view that the Prime Minister should be on the dais with King Hussein (rather than standing to one side) and that if this involves Major General Eyre's presence on the dais also, it is important that the dais be big enough to accommodate all three in a dignified way.

*Your ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



## GUARD OF HONOUR - Procedure

1. A Guard of Honour found by 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards under the command of Major Evelyn Webb-Carter with the Regimental Colour, the Band of the Scots Guards and the Corps of Drums of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards will be formed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle on Friday 18 March at 1030 hours to greet His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Embassy staff and other spectators are requested to arrive not later than 1000 hours.
2. At 1015 hours the Arab League Delegates and Ambassadors will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle by car via King Charles Street. They will alight from their cars just beyond the dais (ie to the east of the latter) where they will be received by The Rt Hon Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. They will remain near the Colour points on the east side of the Main Archway (see diagram attached). Delegates and Ambassadors are requested to arrive not later than 1020 hours. The Delegates' cars and Ambassadors' cars should proceed direct to King Charles Street where they will park while the Guard of Honour is in progress.
3. At 1028 hours the Prime Minister will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle through the Main Archway; she will be met at the Archway by Major General James Eyre (Major General Commanding the Household Division). He will be accompanied by the Brigade Major, Lt Col Richard Heywood, Brigade Major the Household Division. The Major General will then escort the Prime Minister to the right (west) of the dais where she will receive His Majesty King Hussein.
4. At 1030 hours His Majesty King Hussein will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office via King Charles Street.
5. The Prime Minister will welcome him and present Major General Eyre who will escort the King to his place on the dais. The Prime Minister will then take up a position on his right and behind the dais, and the Major General will take up his position on the left and behind the dais. After the Guard Commander has presented his Guard of Honour to the King, the Major General will accompany the King and the Guard Commander on the inspection. The Prime Minister should remain in the vicinity of the dais with the Brigade Major until the inspection is completed and the Major-General has accompanied the King back to the dais. His Majesty will introduce his Delegation to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will then escort the King to No. 10 Downing Street. Those participating in the plenary talks will follow.
6. Meanwhile the Major-General and the Brigade Major will have taken their leave of the King and will authorise the dispersal of the Guard of Honour once the King has departed for No. 10 Downing Street.

## Wet Weather Programme

In the event of wet weather the Parade will not be cancelled. The programme will continue as scheduled up to the point where the inspection of the Guard of Honour should begin. If there is heavy rain at that point in the programme and the King does not wish to inspect the Guard of Honour, the Prime Minister should lead the King to No. 10 Downing Street.



N

DOWNING ST. WEST BUILDING

DOWNING ST.

DOWNING ST. EAST BUILDING

Main Archway

PRESS

EMBASSY STAFF

KING'S CO. will park

+ / +  
PM MA  
G of H.

GUARD OF HONOUR

DELEGATES and AMBASSADORS

BAND

OLD HOME OFFICE BUILDING

WHITEHALL


APPROACH ROUTE FOR CARS

KING CHARLES ST. BUILDING

KING CHARLES ST.

GUARD OF HONOUR CEREMONY  
FCO QUADRANGLE

+	Colour Points
+	Guest of Honour
+	Prime Minister







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1983

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C. 15/3

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation: Palestinian Representation

In my letter of 14 March I said that it was not yet certain who the Palestinian representative in the Delegation would be, but that the principle of a non-PLO Palestinian seemed to have been generally accepted.

The Jordanians have now told us that the Palestinian representative will indeed be Walid Khalidi. He is, in brief, a leading Palestinian intellectual who took a degree at London University and lectured at Oxford in the 1950s. Professor at the American University of Beirut, he is currently a Research Fellow at the Harvard Centre for International Affairs. He is an independent Member of the Palestine National Council and not associated with any PLO bodies.

For the record, and in case of last-minute change, the other three non-PLO Palestinians who were under consideration were:

Dr Edward SAID

American educated. For many years Professor of English at Columbia University, New York. Now Professor of European and Comparative Literature at Columbia, and author of several well-known books on Orientalism and Islam. Independent Member of the Palestine National Council.

Dr Hisham SHARABI

Professor of History and Government at Georgetown University, Washington and since 1972 President of the National Association of Arab Americans. Editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies.

/Dr





Dr Ibrahim ABU LOGHUD      Professor of Political Science,  
Northwestern University, Illinois.  
Writer on Palestinian affairs,  
and independent member of the Palestine  
National Council.

None of these three has any known association with PLO bodies.  
All would in our view be acceptable as members of the  
Delegation. (I should add, by the way, that membership of  
the Palestine National Council, the 'Parliament' of the  
Palestinians as a whole, is very wide and embraces leading  
Palestinians from all walks of life, many in an independent  
capacity.)

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'John Holmes'.

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



15 MAR 1983

12 11 2  
10 K 3  
9 8 4  
7 6 5







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 March 1983

18.  
3

Dear John,

Arab League Delegation

The Jordanians have confirmed that King Hussein will take the place of King Hassan as leader of the Arab League delegation and have agreed to the following programme, essentially the same as that negotiated with the Moroccans.

Friday 18 March

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 1015      | Foreign Ministers etc arrive FCO courtyard - met by Mr Pym   |
| 1030      | King Hussein arrives FCO courtyard - met by Prime Minister. Guard of Honour etc.                   |
| 1045      | King Hussein introduces delegation members before walking to 10 Downing Street for plenary session |
| 1215      | Tete-a-tete  |
| 1300/1315 | Luncheon at 10 Downing Street  |
| 1445      | Presentation to The Queen of the delegation by King Hussein  |

King Hussein is to have luncheon with The Queen at Windsor on Saturday 19 March at 1 pm.

PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS

A list of the delegation based on available information is attached. It is not yet absolutely certain that the Palestinian representative will be Walid Khalidi, but the principle of a non-PLO Palestinian seems now to have been generally accepted. The Jordanian Ambassador has made a strong plea, faced with our stated intention to keep the numbers down to foreign ministers plus one official, that we should accept two supporting officials per delegation (ambassador plus notetaker). This may pose considerable physical difficulties, but to agree to the request would be in the interests of a smooth visit without last-minute complications. I would be grateful for your views. On our side, we suggest that representation should be, in addition to the Prime Minister and yourself:

/Mr Pym



Holmes to Coles 14/3/83





Mr Pym

Mr Hurd

Sir J Leahy

Interpreter

This would of course leave the parties very ill-matched as far as numbers are concerned. It might therefore be best to add one or two more officials, including Mr Miles, the head of the relevant department here.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT LIST AS AT 14 MARCH

THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON

HM King Hussein of Jordan (Leader)

HE Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam (Syria) +

HRH Prince Saud Bin Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz (Saudi Arabia)

HE Mr Marwan Sidqi al-Qasem (Jordan)

HE Maître M'Hamed Boucetta (Morocco)

Mr Mohamed Chaker, Justice Minister (Tunisia)

Mr Hadj Abdl el Kade~~Y~~ Azzout (Algeria)  
or/M Mehri - Information Under Secretary


Mr Walid Khalidi (Palestinian representative)

HE M Chedli Klibi (Secretary General Arab League)

+ Foreign Ministers listed in order of date of  
appointment to post.



4 MAR 1983





MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10



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CONFIDENTIAL

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FM RABAT 141300Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 14 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TUNIS, ALGIERS

INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 155: VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. I SAW BOUCETTA THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WAS VERY SORRY NOT TO HAVE REPLIED BEFORE NOW TO THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU HAD SENT HIM IN DELHI. HE MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF ASKING ME TO CONVEY APOLOGIES. HE SHOWED SURPRISE THAT WE HAD NOT ALREADY BEEN TOLD BY THE MOROCCANS OF THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP. HE SAID GUEDIRA, THE KING'S COUNSELLOR, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TALK TO ME ON SATURDAY MORNING. I THOUGHT THERE WAS NO POINT IN PRETENDING TO GRUMBLE AND LET IT PASS. I MERELY SAID THAT WE HAD HAD NEWS OF THE CHANGE FROM KING HUSSEIN WHEN HE RETURNED TO AMMAN.

2. BOUCETTA SAID THE KING VERY MUCH REGRETTED THAT HE WAS NOT AFTER ALL TO LEAD THE DELEGATION. HE HAD PUT OFF A DECISION



UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. THE FACT WAS, BOUCETTA SAID, HE WAS QUOTE VERY TIRED UNQUOTE. I DID NOT GET A HINT OF ANY OTHER REASON. I SAID WE WERE ALL SORRY TO HEAR THAT THE KING WAS UNWELL.

3. BOUCETTA WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE KING WOULD BE TELLING ME QUOTE OFFICIALLY UNQUOTE TOMORROW ABOUT THE CHANGE AND ALSO ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION. HOWEVER, IN REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE, HE WISHED ME TO LET YOU KNOW OF IT NOW. (THE MOROCCANS CLEARLY REGARD THEMSELVES AS STILL RESPONSIBLE FOR PUTTING THE DELEGATION TOGETHER.) THE PALESTINIAN WOULD BE WALID KHALIDI. BOUCETTA SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD AGREED TO THIS NAME IN DELHI WHEREUPON BOUCETTA HAD INFORMED KING HUSSEIN AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. THE OTHERS WOULD BE PRINCE SAUD, AL MAHRI FOR ALGERIA, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR TUNISIA, ABDUL HALIM KHADDAM FOR SYRIA, KING HUSSEIN AND QASEM OF COURSE, AND BOUCETTA HIMSELF FOR MOROCCO.

4. BOUCETTA MENTIONED THAT ARAFAT WAS COMING TO FEZ TODAY.

CAMBRIDGE

NNNN

SHE BE GRSELN V  
SHED BE GRS 320

'3SENT/RECD AT 141415Z SEA/KRD



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

~~12~~ (21)

IMMEDIATE

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PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
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13 MAR 1983

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FM AMMAN 131005Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 13TH MARCH 1983.  
REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO ALGIERS, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT AND TUNIS.  
REPEATED ROUTINE TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS,  
ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 93: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. KING HUSSEIN TELEPHONED ME AGAIN TWICE ON THE EVENING OF 11 MARCH, ONCE TO SAY THAT THE ITALIAN PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO JORDAN HAD BEEN PUT OFF (UNTIL MAY, I UNDERSTAND) AND THE SECOND TIME TO CONFIRM THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO KING HASSAN ON THE TELEPHONE: THE REASONS KING HASSAN HAD GIVEN FOR WISHING KING HUSSEIN TO LEAD THE DELEGATION TO LONDON WERE HIS OWN ILL-HEALTH AND 'OTHER FACTORS TOO DELICATE TO DISCUSS ON THE TELEPHONE', BY WHICH KING HUSSEIN ASSUMED HE MEANT PROBLEMS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF DLIMI.

2. I WENT OVER THE DRAFT PROGRAMME IN DETAIL WITH THE HEAD OF ROYAL PROTOCOL ON THE MORNING OF 12 MARCH: HE HAD ALSO



2. I WENT OVER THE DRAFT PROGRAMME IN LIGHT OF ROYAL PROTOCOL ON THE MORNING OF 12 MARCH: HE HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. HIKMAT CONFIRMED THAT THE PROGRAMME WAS ACCEPTABLE AS IT STOOD, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE CERTAIN DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS ON WHICH HE WOULD BE SEEKING FURTHER INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE THROUGH THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON: FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER KING HUSSEIN SHOULD GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN YET AS TO WHERE KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE STAYING WHILE IN LONDON.

3. I SAW THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM NEW DELHI LAST NIGHT. QASEM EXPLAINED THAT, WHEN THE MOROCCANS HAD SUGGESTED TO KING HUSSEIN IN NEW DELHI THAT HE SHOULD LEAD THE DELEGATION, QASEM HAD BEEN UNEASY THAT THE MOROCCANS MIGHT NOT IN FACT HAVE SOLVED THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION EVEN THOUGH BOUCETTA HAD CLAIMED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT WALID AL KHALIDI HAD BEEN SELECTED. QASEM THEREFORE DECIDED TO HAVE A FURTHER TALK TO ARAFAT BEFORE LEAVING NEW DELHI IN ORDER TO TRY TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHERE MATTERS STOOD. WITHOUT REVEALING TO ARAFAT THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD NOW BE LEADING THE DELEGATION, QASEM HAD ASKED HIM WHAT HIS VIEWS WERE ON THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE. IT EMERGED FROM THIS DISCUSSION THAT THINGS WERE STILL CONFUSED. ARAFAT HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION FROM THE MOROCCANS THAT MILHEM WAS A BRITISH NOMINEE AND, WHEN HE HAD TURNED HIM DOWN, THE MOROCCANS HAD PROPOSED MAYOR SHAKAA (WHO IS APPARENTLY ANATHEMA TO ARAFAT). AT THIS POINT ARAFAT CLAIMED TO HAVE SAID THAT HE WANTED NO WEST BANK MAYORS. HE TOLD QASEM THAT ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING 4 PALESTINIANS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM: EDWARD SAID, HISHAM SHARABI, WALID AL KHALIDI OR IBRAHIM ABU LOGHUD. QASEM HAD LEFT IT THAT ARAFAT WOULD PONDER ON THESE 4 NAMES: QASEM SAID HE HOPED TO FIND OUT IN THE COURSE OF TODAY WHICH ONE ARAFAT HAD SELECTED. IT SEEMS, THEREFORE, THAT THE MOROCCANS WERE, TO SAY THE LEAST, PREMATURE IN TELLING KING HUSSEIN THAT WALID AL KHALIDI WAS TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIANS. IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DISCUSSION, ARAFAT TOLD QASEM HE HAD IT IN MIND TO CHOOSE A CANDIDATE WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE BRITISH AND THE AMERICANS. QASEM MENTIONED THAT HE HAD URGED ARAFAT TO TAKE UP THE INVITATION FOR TALKS WITH MR HURD AFTER THE DELEGATION'S VISIT: ARAFAT SAID HE WAS HOPING HE MIGHT SEE MR HURD DURING VISITS WHICH ARAFAT UNDERSTOOD MR HURD WOULD BE MAKING TO TUNISIA AND ALGERIA.

4. QASEM TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD ALSO BE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER



4. QASEM TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD ALSO BE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER THE DELEGATION IN THE COURSE OF TODAY: HE WAS STILL UNCERTAIN PRECISELY WHO WOULD BE GOING. THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD QASEM IN NEW DELHI THAT HE WOULD DEFINITELY BE GOING TO LONDON. QASEM WOULD BE TELEPHONING THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER URGING HIM TO COME. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TUNISIAN AND ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND, AS PRESIDENT CHADLI BIN JADID WOULD BE STARTING A VISIT TO TUNISIA ON 18 MARCH. QASEM THOUGHT AL MAHRI WAS LIKELY TO REPRESENT ALGERIA AND THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE TUNISIA. AS SOON AS HE HAD THE NAMES OF THE DELEGATION, HE WOULD LET ME KNOW.

5. IN THE MEANWHILE HE URGED WITH GREAT EMPHASIS THAT:

A. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO OR THE ARAB COUNTRIES CONCERNED ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT. HE WISHED TO BE LEFT TO SORT THINGS OUT AS BEST HE COULD:

B. HE PARTICULARLY WANTED US TO AVOID DISCUSSION WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES UNTIL ARAFAT HAD FORMALLY GONE THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF CHOOSING HIS REPRESENTATIVE:

C. HE HOPED WE COULD LEAVE IT TO THE JORDANIANS TO ANSWER PRESS ENQUIRIES FOR THE TIME BEING. IT HAD ALREADY BEEN REVEALED BY AN ITALIAN NEWS AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSTPONEMENT OF PERTINI'S VISIT THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE LEADING THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION IN LONDON AND THIS IN TURN HAD BEEN PICKED UP LAST NIGHT BY RADIO MONTE CARLO AND THE ISRAELI MEDIA. THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW THEY WOULD RESPOND TO PRESS ENQUIRIES.

6. QASEM MENTIONED THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD STAY IN LONDON UNTIL 20 MARCH WHEN HE WOULD FLY TO TUNIS FOR A MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE AFRO/ARAB DIALOGUE.

CCN PARA 3

.... 4 NAMES: QASEM SAID HE HOPED .... ETC

URWICK

NNNNN



SUBJECT

US Declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

cc master  
6/5

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. J28A/83

March 11, 1983

MB

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your message on your conversation with President Mubarak. In my meetings with him, President Mubarak was just as forceful as he was with you in expressing his concerns about the situation in Lebanon and its potential effect on our ability to obtain a wider peace in the area. I told him that I shared these same concerns and was determined to obtain a timely resolution of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations so that we could focus on a resumed and expanded peace process. My recent public statements on Lebanon and Ambassador Habib's return to the region are all part of an effort to step up the pace of the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations. With the resolution of the Israeli Cabinet crisis, it is my intention that we will now make substantial progress.

While much attention is focussed on Lebanon, I have continued to pursue my peace initiative through contacts with King Hussein, the Saudis, and others. I value your continued support of my initiative and hope you will renew your efforts to convince other Arabs of the importance of supporting Hussein's entry to the peace process. I also hope that you will reiterate to Hussein the importance of his stepping forward soon. This decision by Hussein, more than any other factor, will compel the Israeli Government to reconsider its policies with regard to the occupied territories and my September 1 initiative.

Your message was a welcome reminder of the close cooperation between us in the Middle East. I am grateful for that and will remain in close touch as we move ahead on Lebanon and the peace process.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

Arab League Delegation

There has been a surprising development. King Hussein has told us that he will now lead the delegation instead of King Hassan and will come on the arranged date i.e. next Friday.

He has said that the Palestinian will be Mr. Walid Al Khalidi. You will recall that this is the person whom Tony Parsons mentioned at one stage. He is an academic who was once at Oxford and is now at Harvard. He has never held a formal position in the PLO though he has carried out certain missions for Arafat. Tony Parsons thought he would be entirely acceptable to us.

King Hassan is apparently pleading indisposition but we believe that he and King Hussein made this arrangement in Delhi. We shall see whether this arrangement holds.

A. J. C.

11 March 1983



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u rcs. outred  
Rhodes

PRIME MINISTER

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

The present position is that we have asked the Moroccans for a list by Monday of the members of the Delegation. I have not bothered you with a large number of telegrams which suggest that there is still considerable disagreement in Arab ranks as to who the Palestinian should be. But the Moroccans keep assuring us that King Hassan will sort this out.

Our objective now is to get a clear decision by Monday because we can leave it no longer if we are to make satisfactory arrangements for Friday 18 March. If the visit goes ahead, there will be a Guard of Honour in the FCO Courtyard, a plenary session with the whole Delegation, a tête-a-tête between you and King Hassan and a lunch here for the whole Delegation.

You have seen before the suggested guest list but that was some time ago. I attach a revised version and should be grateful to know whether you are content with it. Agree?

Could you please indicate which of the three attached menus you prefer.

A. J. COLES

11 March 1983



DRAFT GUEST LIST FOR THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
IN HONOUR OF HIS MAJESTY KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO AND AN ARAB  
LEAGUE DELEGATION ON THURSDAY, 2 DECEMBER 1982 AT 8.15 PM FOR 8.30 PM  
BLACK TIE OR NATIONAL DRESS

---

The Prime Minister

Moroccan Royal Family and Officials of the Royal Household

His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco

His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Rachid

plus 3 royal officials

Arab League Delegation, Foreign Ministers and Secretary General

(In protocol order - by date of appointment)

His Excellency Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam	Syrian Foreign Minister
His Royal Highness Prince Saud Bin Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz	Saudi Foreign Minister
His Excellency Mr. Marwan Qasem	Jordanian Foreign Minister
His Excellency M. M <sup>H</sup> amed Boucetta	Moroccan Foreign Minister
His Excellency M. Beji Caid Essebsi	Tunisian Foreign Minister
His Excellency Dr. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi	Algerian Foreign Minister
His Excellency Mr. Chedli Klibi	Secretary General of the Arab League

Ambassadors of the Arab League Delegation Countries

(in protocol order - by date of appointment to London)

His Excellency the Jordanian Ambassador

His Excellency the Saudi Ambassador

His Excellency the Tunisian Ambassador

His Excellency the Moroccan Ambassador

His Excellency the Algerian Ambassador

His Excellency the Syrian Ambassador

Mr. Omar Said Al Hassan

Arab League Representative in  
London

Arab League Delegation  
Officials

1 official per delegate. (6 in total)

/Her Majesty's Government



Her Majesty's Government

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP

Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson, MP

known and highly regarded in Morocco

Rt. Hon. Lord Cockfield

Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson, MP

Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

Rt. Hon. Baroness Young

recently visited Jordan

Parliament

Rt. Hon. Lord Chalfont

friend of King Hassan, member of Moroccan Royal Academy

Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, MP

Rt. Hon. David Steel, MP

Rt. Hon. David Owen, MP

Rt. Hon. Roland Moyle, MP

Speaks regularly on Middle East Affairs

Sir Frederic Bennett, MP

close interest in Moroccan and Middle East Affairs

The Hon. Mark Lennox-Boyd, MP

frequent visitor to Middle East. Follows Arab/Israel dispute closely

Mr. Ray Whitney, MP

Chairman, Conservative Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Committee

Sir Anthony Kershaw, MP

Chairman, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee

Business Community

Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

Chairman, GEC. Regular visitor to Middle East, further visits being planned

Lord McFadzean

Chairman, Rolls Royce. Extensive business interests in Middle East.

Mr. E.G. Given

Director General of the Middle East Association

Sir Richard Beaumont

Arab British Chamber of Commerce



Business (continued)

Mr. H.P.M. Benson

Chairman, Davy McKee International Ltd. Extensive engineering interests in Middle East

Sir Reginald Smith

George Wimpey International. Important construction projects throughout the Middle East

The Lord Selsdon

Chairman, Midland Bank. Chairman, Committee for Middle East Trade

Media/Academics

Mr. Frank Giles

Editor, The Sunday Times

Mr. D. Trelford

Editor, The Observer

Mr. Eric Bowman

Head of BBC Arab Services

Dr. M.E. Yapp

School of Oriental and African Studies. Middle East Academic Specialist

Sir John Burgh

British Council. Recent visitor to Middle East. Major interest in developing links with the region

Mr. Andrew Knight

Editor, The Economist

Officials

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sir John Leahy

Mr. S.J.G. Cambridge

HM Ambassador designate to Morocco

Mr. S.L. Egerton

Department of Trade

Mr. M.D.M. Franklin

Department of Energy

Sir Kenneth Couzens

10 Downing Street

Mr. John Coles

Sir Anthony Parsons



RESERVE LIST

Her Majesty's Government

Mr. Peter Rees, MP

Responsibility for trade with  
Middle East countries visiting  
Morocco next year

Business

Sir Trevor Holdsworth

Chairman, GKN. Major exporters to  
Middle East

Mr. P.I. Walters

Chairman, British Petroleum

Media/Academics

Mr. Geoffrey Owen

Editor, Financial Times

Sir Frederick Bennett, MP

Lord Vaizey

Sir John Biggs-Davison, MP



LUNCH FOR KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO 18 MARCH 1983

MENU A

Mousse of Avocado with  
Spiced Mushrooms

Rost Fillet of Beef Bearnaise  
Grilled Tomatoes  
Noisette Potatoes  
Watercress and Endive Salad

Strawberry Pavolva

Coffee

MENU B

Terrine of Baby Turbot with  
Fresh Herbs and Hovis Toast

Noisettes of Lamb with Rosemary  
Fried Courgettes  
Anna Potatoes  
Tossed Green Salad

Cherry Flan  
Double Cream

Coffee

MENU C

Fennel and Almond Soup

Fried Breast of Chicken with Asparagus  
Grilled Tomatoes and Mushrooms  
Florentine Potatoes  
Green Salad with Lemon Dressing

Chocolate Mousse  
Gavottes

Coffee



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
FROM TEL AVIV 020910Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 78 OF 2 MARCH 1983  
INFO CAPETOWN.

PS / NO 10

**IMMEDIATE****NEW ISRAELI AMBASSADOR**

1. TODAY'S ISSUE OF THE LEFT-WING WEEKLY KOTHERETH RASHITH CARRIES A REPORT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SENT A SPECIAL MESSENGER TO ISRAEL LAST WEEK. MR DAVID WOLFSON IS SAID TO HAVE MET BEGIN AND SHAMIR SECRETLY TO INFORM THEM OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRONG OPPOSITION TO LANKIN.
2. ACCORDING TO KOTHERETH RASHITH THE MESSAGE WHICH WOLFSON BROUGHT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT APPOINTING LANKIN WOULD HARM RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE ALSO MENTIONED THE FACT THAT SHE HAD PREVENTED THE INCLUSION OF A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION DUE TO VISIT LONDON SHORTLY. KOTHERETH RASHITH TAKES THIS AS A HINT THAT IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INSISTED ON NOMINATING FORMER TERRORIST LANKIN AS AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD RECONSIDER HER DECISION NOT TO MEET A PLO REPRESENTATIVE.
3. THE PAPER GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT SHAMIR ORIGINATED THE IDEA THAT LANKIN SHOULD WRITE AN OPEN LETTER WITHDRAWING HIS CANDIDATURE (AS REPORTED IN TEL AVIV TELNO 72) IN ORDER TO COVER UP THE FACT THAT THE APPOINTMENT WAS BEING CANCELLED AS A RESULT OF DIRECT PRESSURE FROM DOWNING STREET.
4. THE KOTHERETH RASHITH REPORT HAS BEEN PICKED UP BY ONE OF THE TWO MAIN HEBREW LANGUAGE DAILIES. DAVAR SUMMARISES IT PROMINENTLY ON ITS FRONT PAGE. OTHER PAPERS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW SUIT.
5. IF ASKED ABOUT THE REPORT, WE SHALL SAY THAT WE ARE UNWARE OF ANY VISIT BY WOLFSON, AND DECLINE TO BE DRAWN FURTHER. KOTHERETH RASHITH ALREADY REPORTS THAT A SPOKESMAN FOR THE EMBASSY DECLINED TO COMMENT IN REPLY TO A QUESTION WHETHER A SPECIAL ENVOY FROM MRS THATCHER HAD COME TO JERUSALEM.
6. GRATEFUL TO HAVE TELEGRAPHICALLY LINE TAKEN BY NEWS DEPARTMENT AND NUMBER 10 IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS.



MOBERLY

LIMITED  
NENAD  
PCD  
NEWS.D  
PSPS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON**CONFIDENTIAL**



PART 1 ends:-

Jeddah tel : 115 28/2/83

PART 2 begins:-

Tel Aviv tel : 78 2/3/83



