

PREM 19 / 1148

UN Special Sessions on Disarmament.

UNITED NATIONS

PTI: February 1982.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
17-2-82		21-6-82					
18-2-82		24-6-82					
26-2-82		25-6-82					
3-3-82		25-6-82					
12-3-82		29-6-82					
16-3-82		6-7-82					
21-3-82		19-7-82					
22-3-82		19-10-83					
24-3-82							
26-3-82		\ P11 /					
18-4-82		GNOS					
19-5-82		/ \					
27-5-82							
1-6-82							
10-6-82							
15-6-82							

PREM 10/1148

● PART 1 ends:-

AJC to fco. 19.10.83

PART 2 begins:-

PERSE du. CUBUAR to PM. 4.2.88



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 October, 1983

UK Attitude Towards Disarmament at the UNGA

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 18 October.

E. L. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RW

CC Sir AP (2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1983

Prime Minister.

F.C.O. conclusions on how we should handle disarmament resolutions at this year's UNGA.

A.F.C. 7/10

UK Attitude Towards Disarmament at the UNGA

I am writing about the approach we should adopt towards the debate on disarmament issues in the UN First Committee this autumn, in the light of the views expressed by the Prime Minister to Sir John Thomson and Sir Antony Acland during her visit to New York. At that time the Prime Minister instructed that a greater effort should be made at the UN to present our case on disarmament more clearly and effectively in the First Committee, and to put forward our own proposals for progress in this area even when on occasion they would not command overwhelming support. You may find it useful to have a brief account of where matters now stand.

Following the Prime Minister's visit to New York, FCO Ministers considered the issue in detail. Sir Geoffrey Howe endorsed last week instructions to our Mission to the UN and to our Disarmament Delegation (which has the lead role in the First Committee), in line with the views expressed by the Prime Minister. In summary our representatives were instructed to review this area with special care and, following close consultation between the FCO and MOD, to pursue the possibilities of making our voting record on UN disarmament issues more attractive to domestic public opinion; to continue to avoid giving even UN respectability to resolutions with adverse implications to our security or other national interests; and to explore in the "Barton" Group of Western countries and with our closest Allies the balance of advantage in placing our views firmly on the record, even with the prospect of significant opposition being registered by other UN members.

We recognise that such an approach could give rise to new problems, particularly in the context of the UN, where the insistence by the Soviet Union, her allies and leading members of the non-aligned on "disarmament by declaration" provide an in-built majority for resolutions often contrary to Western interests. It is worth noting also that our own record in previous years of resisting such measures has been criticised by the Government's opponents and others who misunderstand the nature of the debate or the issues at stake. A review of our earlier record suggests that we will have little scope for changing our votes this year; indeed, we must expect that in 1983 we will face even more resolutions which we cannot accept.

/Our representatives

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



Our representatives in New York have been instructed to continue to work for consensus on disarmament resolutions wherever this is possible without sacrifice of principle. They have also been told to encourage our Western partners to support separate Western resolutions on issues where the non-aligned and the Eastern Bloc are determined to press unacceptable proposals to a final vote which they will inevitably win. As a result, a contrary Western resolution may appear, in UN terms, to be a defeat for the West. However, it will enable us to get our own views firmly on the record and to make our subsequent justification of our voting record to domestic opinion that much easier. We do not under-estimate the problems for obtaining the necessary support for this strategy from enough of our Western partners to make it worthwhile (the Irish and the Greeks, at least, can be relied upon to be positively unhelpful); and we recognise that it may therefore be more prudent on occasion not to press our resolution to a final vote but to withdraw it at the last moment, having formally recorded our views in the earlier stages of the debate.

In the light of our experience during this session of the First Committee, we will review the application of similar tactics at subsequent sessions of the UN.


Your own

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

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UNITED NATIONS
Special Session on Disarmament
#682

16 JUN 1963



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 July, 1982

SECOND UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON

DISARMAMENT

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of the minute of 13 July by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

SECRET

F Richards, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



PM/82/57

PRIME MINISTERPrime Minister

To note.

A.F.C. $\frac{13}{7}$

②

Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament ended on Saturday, 10 July without agreement being reached on the main items on the agenda. The Session confined itself to a consensus report of proceedings, and reached agreement on guidelines for a World Disarmament Campaign to be run by the United Nations within its existing budget. The guidelines call for unimpeded access to information in East and West alike.
2. The Special Session opened with national statements by leaders of delegations. Of the 19 heads of state and government who addressed the Assembly, 10 were from the West. Your own statement on 23 June, stressing that the fundamental issues were how to defend peace with freedom, and how arms control could contribute to the fulfilment of that task, was very well received. Mr Gromyko's statement, containing a message from President Brezhnev pledging that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, was the basis of the Russian approach to the Session. Western speakers exposed the pledge as incomplete when compared with the NATO undertaking that no Alliance weapons would be used except in response to an attack. Amongst the Non-Aligned, moderate opinion was in the ascendant at first under the leadership of Pakistan. But as the Session progressed, the hard line advocated by India, Brazil and Mexico prevailed and ensured that differences could not be bridged.
3. The two main items on the agenda, a review of progress since the First Special Session in 1978 and a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and the guidelines for a World Disarmament Campaign, were discussed in Working Groups. On the first two items, it was the insistence of the Non-Aligned on nuclear disarmament in accordance with a strict timetable, and their refusal to consider parallel discussion of conventional disarmament, which prevented agreement being reached. Our Delegation made it clear that we could only subscribe to measures of nuclear disarmament which maintain or enhance security, and thus



protected our position against demands for nuclear disarmament which might call into question our policy for defence through deterrence.

4. We made particular efforts to co-ordinate the defence of Western interests at the Session as a way of ensuring that we were not dangerously isolated. These efforts were successful. The Russians will nevertheless now seek to lay on NATO responsibility for the failure of the Special Session to reach agreement. It will be some time before the Non-Aligned, the promoters of the Session, take stock of their position and their inability to extract additional commitments for nuclear disarmament. Non-Governmental Organisations in this country will be disappointed at the outcome of the Session and may be critical of our role there. But we steadily advised them not to expect much of the Session and we can point to our efforts to widen public understanding of disarmament issues through support for a World Disarmament Campaign.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

7/13

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 July 1982



13 JUN 73

1) Mr ~~Coles~~ ^{Mr 7/7} (4)
2) Prime Minister UN



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

Mr 7/7

R P Nash Esq
UND
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 026/6

Date 6 July 1982

Dear Ronald,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

1. I enclose a letter from the Secretary General to the Prime Minister, together with a copy for your files, expressing thanks for the photograph which Mrs Thatcher gave him on 23 June. Although dated 26 June, it did not reach us until 2 July and missed Friday's bag.

Yours etc.

MIG

M I Goulding

Mr Holmes (Private office)

Could you possibly pass this on to No 10?

Ronald Nash

7/7



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

26 June 1982

Excellency,

I should like to thank you for the photograph which you so kindly gave to me during your recent visit to the United Nations.

You may be sure that I very much appreciated this thoughtful gesture. Let me also take this opportunity to thank you again for your very constructive participation in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and for the extremely useful discussions we were able to have on this occasion.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to read "Javier Pérez de Cuéllar".

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

COPY/COPIE



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

26 June 1982

Excellency,

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With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Javier Pérez de Cuéllar'.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

SUBJECT

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Under matters
file TJ
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US Declassified



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 June 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.139 A/82

Dear Bob,

It was as always a pleasure to see you last Wednesday and I much enjoyed the opportunity for a good talk. Thank you very much for all the arrangements which were made.

The last three months have been a difficult period and I remain most grateful for all the support and help which we have received from the United States.

I was sorry to hear of Al Haig's resignation. I am writing to thank him for all his help. Such changes, whatever the reasons, are always sad. But as you know George Schultz is very highly regarded here and we shall be delighted to work with him. There will be much for America and Britain to do together in the months ahead.

Yours
Raymond

The President of the United States of America

CB



file DSS
cc to

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 June 1982

Parsons,

Many thanks for all you did for me in New York on Tuesday and Wednesday last. It was a pleasure to see you again.

I am sad to think that I am now writing to a retired member of the Diplomatic Service. You have given the country splendid service, and you know how especially grateful I am to you for your cool advice and well-directed activity during these last three months. I thought it right to say so in the House of Commons on Thursday. As you will see from the enclosed extract from Hansard, others joined in.

Thank you. My best wishes to Lady Parsons. Enjoy your retirement. It will not be entirely uninterrupted by further work - indeed it would be a waste if it were - but you have certainly earned some rest.

We shall look forward to seeing you on your return.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Sir Anthony Parsons, G.C.M.G., M.V.O., M.C.

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cc FO

da
UN

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 June 1982

Dear Secretary-General

I write to thank you most warmly for the arrangements made for my visit to New York on 23 June. I much enjoyed our talks and shall remember with special pleasure the lunch which you so kindly gave for me. I am much looking forward to seeing you here on 14 July.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Senor Perez de Cuellar

da

FILE

da



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 June 1982

Dear Nicko,

Thank you for the arrangements made for my very brief visit to Washington on Wednesday - and please pass on my thanks to the members of your staff. It was an agreeable way to end a hectic day.

I hope you will manage to have a rather quieter time now than has been possible in the last three months. Everyone here remains full of admiration for all you did to present the British case in America during that time.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Sir Nicholas Henderson, G.C.M.G.

What a splendid day events after
left. I am so sorry Mr Hunt
resigned. me da

US Declassified

3

subject

UN

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T138/82

CAB/WTE 001/25

ZZ WTE

FLASH

SECRET

Z 251845Z JUN 82

FM NO.10 DOWNING STREET
TO WHITE HOUSE

*g Master
aps*

*Also cc
Sen Union
Expats USSR
Part 2*

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

DEAR RON,

WHEN WE DISCUSSED ON 23 JUNE THE EFFECT ON JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING (JBE) OF AMERICAN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, YOU TOLD ME THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPANY HAD INDICATED RECENTLY TO YOUR OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE SANCTIONS WOULD NOT CAUSE THEM GREAT FINANCIAL DISTRESS. I SAID THAT I WOULD ENQUIRE INTO THE MATTER AND ADVISE YOU FURTHER.

JBE'S VIEWS HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON. THE COMPANY'S REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR TO US OFFICIALS THEIR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE FAR REACHING RESULTS OF THE COMPANY BEING FORCED BY RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION TO ABANDON A CONTRACT WHICH THEY ENTERED INTO IN GOOD FAITH AT A TIME WHEN THE GOODS CONCERNED WERE NOT EMBARGOED. LAST WEEK THEY CONFIRMED TO US OFFICIALS THAT FAILURE TO SHIP THE TURBINES WOULD HAVE VERY DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES. THE PRECISE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE CAUSED CANNOT BE ASSESSED AT PRESENT. AT WORST UNINSURED COSTS AND DAMAGES COULD BE AS MUCH AS POUNDS STERLING 100 MILLION. JBE COULD WELL BE FORCED OUT OF BUSINESS AND THIS WOULD LEAD TO 1700 JOB LOSSES IN THE COMPANY IN AREAS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN SCOTLAND: THERE WOULD ALSO BE EFFECTS UPON COMPONENT SUPPLIERS. THE STABILITY OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE MIGHT BE THREATENED. THE CHAIRMAN OF JOHN BROWN HAS CONFIRMED THESE FACTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE SINCE OUR MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

WE SEE THE FURTHER MEASURES WHICH YOU ANNOUNCED ON 18 JUNE AS WRONG IN PRINCIPLE BECAUSE OF THEIR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION DIRECTLY TO BRITISH COMPANIES. THEY WILL IF PROCEEDED WITH CAUSE SERIOUS ECONOMIC DAMAGE IN THE UK QUITE APART FROM ADDING TO JBE'S PROBLEMS. WE ARE ALREADY RECEIVING REPORTS OF BRITISH COMPANIES FACED WITH LOSSES OR THE THREAT OF CLOSURE AS A RESULT OF THESE MEASURES. YOUR PEOPLE WILL TELL YOU THAT WE HAVE STRONGLY OPPOSED THE EXERCISE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE PAST, AND ARE THEREFORE BOUND TO REACT TO ITS NEW EXTENSION.

AS YOU KNOW, THE VIEWS AND POLICIES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ARE IN VERY CLOSE HARMONY. IT WOULD BE UNHAPPY IF, IN PUBLIC EYES, THIS HARMONY WERE TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY THE VERY SEVERE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR MEASURES FOR BRITISH COMPANIES. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER THESE MEASURES IN THE WIDER POLITICAL, AS WELL AS THE SPECIFICALLY ECONOMIC, CONTEXT.

JBE'S PROBLEM IS NOW BOTH VERY SERIOUS AND URGENT. I WOULD GREATLY VALUE YOUR HELP IN SOLVING THIS PROBLEM BY 2 JULY WHEN THE FIRST SHIPMENTS ARE DUE.

MY BEST WISHES,
MARGARET.

BT

NNNN

SENT 251908Z JH

RG RG QSL UR MSG AT 1908Z AND PLS IF U HAVE TRF AGAIN
TO GIVE US SOME BELLS ONT TYY
TTYN KKK

Hot Line - Flash.

SECRET

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Dear Ron,

When we discussed on 23 June the effect on John Brown Engineering (JBE) of American sanctions against the Soviet Union, you told me that representatives of the company had indicated recently to your officials in Washington that the decision to extend the sanctions would not cause them great financial distress. I said that I would enquire into the matter and advise you further.

JBE's views have been misunderstood in Washington. The company's representatives have repeatedly made clear to US officials their deep concern about the far reaching results of the company being forced by retrospective legislation to abandon a contract which they entered into in good faith at a time when the goods concerned were not embargoed. Last week they confirmed to US officials that failure to ship the turbines would have very damaging consequences. The precise extent of the damage caused cannot be assessed at present. At worst uninsured costs and damages could be as much as £100 million. JBE could well be forced out of business and this would lead to 1700 job losses in the company in areas of high unemployment in Scotland; there would also be effects upon component suppliers. The stability of the group as a whole might be threatened. The Chairman of John Brown has confirmed these facts to the Secretary of State for Trade since our meeting in Washington.

We see the further measures which you announced on 18 June as wrong in principle because of their extra-territorial application directly to British companies. They will if proceeded with cause serious economic damage in the UK quite apart from adding to JBE's problems. We are already receiving reports of British companies faced with losses or the threat of closure as a result of these measures. Your people will tell you that we have strongly opposed the exercise of extra-territorial powers in the past, and are therefore bound to react to its new extension.

/ As you know,

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

As you know, the views and policies of our two governments on relations with the Communist countries are in very close harmony. It would be unhappy if, in public eyes, this harmony were to be overshadowed by the very severe consequences of your measures for British companies. I therefore hope that you will be willing to reconsider these measures in the wider political, as well as the specifically economic, context.

JBE's problem is now both very serious and urgent. I would greatly value your help in solving this problem by 2 July when the first shipments are due.

My best wishes,
Margaret.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Duty Clerk

- 1) Please dispatch the message to President Reagan on the hot line as soon as possible

today.

- 2) Please copy it to
Mr. Nees DOT
Mr. Holmes F/C.O.
Mr. Spenser DOI.

A.S.C. $\frac{25}{6}$



SECRET

From the Secretary of State

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

25th June 1982

Dear John,

As requested in your letter of 24 June to Brian Fall, I attach a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan. This has been cleared at official level with the FCO. The passage on JBE has been cleared with Sir John Mayhew Sanders.

We are now receiving reports from a number of British subsidiaries of US companies about the effects of the new measures announced on 18 June. It is too early to assess the full effect but by way of example the Walter Kidde Co, employing 700 people in Northolt has reported that a major part of its current order book is tied up with the Siberian Gas Pipeline and that it may go out of business if the new measures are not withdrawn.

I am copying this to the recipients of yours, Brian Fall and Jonathan Spencer (Industry).

Yours ever,

Jonathan Rees

JONATHAN REES

Private Secretary

File No.

DRAFT

Addressed to :

~~The Hon Ronald Reagan~~

Copies to :

Originated by:
(Initials and date)

PMSC 25/6/82

Seen by :
(Initials and date)

Enclosures :

Type for signature of

PM
.....
(Initials and date)

Dear Ron

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

When we discussed on 23 June the effect on John Brown Engineering (JBE) of American sanctions against the Soviet Union, you told me that representatives of the company had indicated recently to your officials in Washington that the decision to extend the sanctions would not cause them great financial distress. I said that I would enquire into the matter and advise you further.

JBE's views have been misunderstood in Washington. The company's representatives have repeatedly made clear to US officials their deep concern about the far reaching results of the company being forced by retrospective legislation to abandon a contract which they entered into in good faith at a time when the goods concerned were not embargoed. Last week they confirmed to US officials that failure to ship the turbines would have very damaging consequences. The precise extent of the damage caused cannot be assessed at present. At worst uninsured costs and damages could be as much as £100m. JBE could well be forced out of business and this would lead to 1700 job

(CONTINUE TYPING HERE)

File No.

losses in the company in areas of high unemployment in Scotland; there would also be effects upon component suppliers. The stability of the group as a whole might be threatened. The Chairman of John Brown has confirmed *these facts* the foregoing to the Secretary of State for Trade since our meeting in Washington.

W. M.
 3 The further measures which you announced on 18 June are *objectionable* in principle ~~to us~~ because of their extra-territorial application directly to British companies. They will if proceeded with cause serious economic damage in the UK quite apart from adding to JBE's problems. We are already receiving reports of British companies faced with losses or the threat of closure as a result of these measures. Your people will tell you that we have strongly opposed the exercise of extra-territorial powers in the past, and are therefore bound to react to its new extension.

4 As you know, the views and policies of our two governments on relations with the Communist countries are in very close harmony. ~~We have given you a great deal of support in your efforts to promote a greater degree of prudence in the management of East/West economic relations.~~ It would be *unhappy* ~~unfortunate~~ if, in public eyes, this harmony were to be overshadowed by the *very severe* consequences of your measures for British companies. I therefore hope that you will be willing to reconsider these measures in the wider political, as well as the specifically economic, context.

5 JBE's problem is now both very serious and urgent. I would greatly value your help in solving this problem by 2 July when the first shipments are due.

With my best wishes

Margaret.

United States (Prime Minister's Visit)

3.30 pm

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on my visit to New York and Washington yesterday.

In New York, I addressed the United Nations special session on disarmament and had discussions with the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. I have placed in the Library a copy of my speech to the special session. I emphasised that disarmament, properly defined, is the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security.

As regards nuclear weapons, I welcomed President Reagan's radical proposals for substantial cuts in strategic weapons and for eliminating a whole class of intermediate-range systems—the zero option. I called for a balanced reduction in conventional weapons; commended the fresh proposals which are being made in the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions; urged a new impetus for a convention banning the development and possession of chemical weapons; and advocated a special effort to agree on new mandatory confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Throughout, I emphasised the need for stringent verification of arms control agreements. And I expressed my conviction that the aim of all these measures must be to defend the values in which we believe and to uphold international law and the United Nations charter. We have a right and a duty to defend our own people whenever and wherever their liberty is challenged.

In my discussions with Mr. Perez de Cuellar, we reviewed the prospects for a ceasefire in the Lebanon and discussed how such a ceasefire could be maintained.

I gave the Secretary-General an account of the present situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish for a permanent cessation of hostilities, though I have to report that so far the Argentine's response has been negative. I also referred to the repatriation of well over 10,000 prisoners, but I explained that we could not return them all until we were satisfied that hostilities would not be reopened. The Falkland Islanders would be preoccupied for some time to come with the task of reconstruction, none the less, Britain would in due course seek to bring the islands to full self-government. Mr. Perez de Cuellar stated that he remained ready to act as a channel of communication between Britain and Argentina, if this would help.

My talks with Mr. Kittani, the President of the General Assembly, were devoted mainly to the special session and Middle East matters.

I was particularly glad to be in New York during the last week of Sir Anthony Parsons' term of service as our representative at the United Nations. His contribution and abilities have been widely and rightly praised. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

Subsequently, at the invitation of President Reagan, I visited Washington where we had valuable and friendly discussions. We discussed at some length the tragic situation in the Lebanon. The President described the latest American efforts, through Mr. Habib, to promote a solution. We also discussed the current situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish to do all we can to promote peace and stability in the South Atlantic. The

President repeated his view that our action to repossess the islands had been taken to uphold the vital principle that aggression should not pay.

We discussed East-West relations. The President explained that his recent decision to extend restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union had been based on the principle that normal relations with that country were not possible so long as there was no progress towards liberalisation in Poland. I endorsed the need for such progress while reiterating the reasons why we thought existing commercial contracts should be exempted from the American restrictions.

I also conveyed the concern felt in this country, and elsewhere in the European Community, at the decision by the United States Government to impose countervailing duties on steel imports from the Community.

Finally, I expressed my gratitude for the impressive success of the FBI in defeating attempts by the Provisional IRA illegally to purchase weapons in the United States of America and to export them for use in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): May I express our concurrence with the representations that the Prime Minister made on those last two matters? All of us should join in the tribute that she paid to Sir Anthony Parsons, because he played a conspicuous part in securing support for resolution 502. We certainly wish to congratulate him on the part that he played.

Some of the matters that the Prime Minister raised will be discussed in coming weeks, but I should like to press her on the discussions that she may have had with President Reagan about the Lebanon and the extremely critical situation there. Did she support the proposal for maintaining a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon? What proposal will she and President Reagan put forward to secure that? What other measures should be taken? Does she agree with the President about trying to re-establish the rights of the State of Lebanon and will she give us an account of that?

The report that the Prime Minister has given us today about her speech on disarmament had a slightly better tone than the original speech. Are the proposals that she made and those outlined in her statement the beginning and end of the proposals that the Government intend to put forward at the disarmament conference? We believe that there should be a debate in the House on the special session and discussions about the further proposals that the British Government should advance. At the special session, did she put forward disarmament proposals that differ in any way from those put forward by the President of the United States? Finally, will she consider fresh representations on disarmament to try to make the special session a success?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman has asked me about the Lebanon. Yesterday a ceasefire was negotiated. It was the eighth ceasefire during the sad and tragic sequence of events. However, I believe that it has now been broken. Obviously our great desire is to stop further fighting in West Beirut and on the main road to Damascus. Mr. Habib continues to make efforts to achieve a ceasefire that will hold.

Most people wish to see once again a fully independent Lebanon under the control of its own strong Government. It is easy to say that, but, as the right hon. Gentleman knows from Lebanon's history, it is very difficult to obtain. However, although it will not be easy, we must

continue to try. The life of the UNIFIL forces has been extended by two months by a United Nations resolution that we voted for. It is important to try to keep them in position and to encourage various nations to take part.

The disarmament proposals that I put forward were pretty comprehensive and covered nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons. I congratulated those who had negotiated the agreements on outer space and on the sea bed and I also called for further confidence and security-building measures. There was not much that was not covered.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: I remind the House that there is a further statement, and that the main business is covered by an allocation of time motion. Therefore, I propose to allow questions only until five minutes to four, by the clock.

Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles): I endorse what the Prime Minister has said about Sir Anthony Parsons, who has had both a distinguished and a strenuous period of service at the United Nations. During the Prime Minister's talks at the United Nations, was there any discussion about strengthening the mandate and the organisation of the United Nations peacekeeping forces? Does the right hon. Lady have any hope that the permanent members of the Security Council will take some action about that?

The Prime Minister: No. I am afraid that it is one of the ironies and tragedies that the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council cannot be implemented because the United Nations does not have its own peacekeeping force. I do not know anyone who sees any immediate possibility of securing such a peacekeeping force.

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): The whole House will endorse the Prime Minister's view that the development of the Falkland Islands is desirable. However, no State or financial institution will invest in the Falkland Islands if there is any prospect, however remote, that the Argentines will resume sovereignty over the area.

The Prime Minister: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. That has been one of the problems in securing sufficient investment and has stopped various Governments from making greater investment. It is one of the reasons why we shall have to consider the longer term defence of the islands. There is not the slightest shadow of a doubt that in the immediate future and the middle term that will have to be carried out by us.

Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow): Did the right hon. Lady raise the question of the pernicious international arms trade that facilitated the supply of arms to Argentina in its aggression against the Falkland Islands, and facilitates the supply of arms to Israel while it invades the Lebanon? Is it not time that the right hon. Lady took action to stop the trade in weapons of death?

The Prime Minister: That matter was not discussed at the United Nations General Assembly yesterday. There have been various proposals made on a regional basis, but none of them has ever proved practicable. The hon. Gentleman is wrong if he suggests that there should be no supply of arms. Each and every nation has the right to defend its own people and territories. The fact that we sell arms helps us to have our weapons at a lower cost and keeps some 140,000 people in work.

With regard to the sale of arms to Argentina, as I said to the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) on Tuesday, Governments of both parties have sold arms to Argentina. We carried it on the same basis—of considering the matter on its merits.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): Is the Prime Minister aware that the Government will be judged, not by cheap jibes about whether they are ready to fire shots, but by whether they so conduct themselves that no shots need to be fired? The tone of the Prime Minister's speech in New York was such that it sounded more as if she wanted to beat ploughshares into arms. [Interruption.] Hon. Members should read the speech. Will the Prime Minister say whether in the two arms negotiations in which Great Britain should be playing a major part—the comprehensive test ban treaty and the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna—there has been one positive step taken during her Premiership?

The Prime Minister: The talks in Vienna have continued for over nine years—and that period covers rather a lot of Labour government. It is unfortunate that not much has been achieved. If the right hon. Gentleman takes a reasonable view, he will know why. We have found it difficult to obtain from the Soviet Union the actual numbers of forces they have in conjunction with the Warsaw Pact countries.

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will be extremely disappointed to know that the speech I made to the General Assembly received more applause than any other speech made during the last three weeks.

Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay): Reverting to the tragic position in Lebanon, the Prime Minister will doubtless recall that a couple of days ago both Front Bench spokesmen emphasised that, however hard Europe might try, the main responsibility for ending the Israeli attack upon Lebanon lies with the United States of America. Did my right hon. Friend find that there was an awareness of that fact that can be speedily acted upon?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. The only country that can bring pressure to bear upon Israel is the United States of America, and it is very much aware of that. I tried to get across the fact that if there is to be a proper solution of this problem there must be a solution to the problem of the future of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline): Did the Prime Minister obtain from President Reagan an understanding that our defence role would be a North Atlantic role? Was there any intimation from the President that he would be willing to have United States forces in the Falkland Islands as we would be straining our international defence role if we had to garrison and keep naval forces there?

The Prime Minister: We did not discuss very much the possibility of a multi-national force in the Falkland Islands. I say "very much" because such a multi-national force is frequently mentioned. There is no possibility of having one for some months. It is too early to consider it.

Sir Bernard Braine (Essex, South-East): In her discussions with the President and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, did my right hon. Friend glean any evidence that they were aware of the utter unfitness of Argentina to have any control over the democratic Falkland Islands community? Did she remind them that among the thousands of people who had disappeared, most

[Sir Bernard Braine]

of whom had been tortured and killed, in Argentina—in the years that the Labour Party was in office—there were United Kingdom subjects, who can be named, and that successive British Governments had been pressurised by international communities into negotiating with Argentina? Did she make that plain to those two gentlemen?

The Prime Minister: I have made it perfectly clear time and again, both to the American Government and a number of others, that there is no question of sovereignty to negotiate. The islands are British sovereign territory and their people are British subjects who wish to keep their British way of life. There is nothing on sovereignty to negotiate. We negotiate on sovereignty only with the people of the territory itself. I pointed out to the United Nations that there are 45 nations in the United Nations who obtained their independence through us. I said that with us they enjoyed democracy, which is something that the Argentine citizens would love to have.

Mr. Ioan Evans (Aberdare): As the world is spending over \$500 billion on the arms race and there are 50,000 weapons with the destructive power of a million Hiroshimas, would the right hon. Lady address herself to the fears of mankind about the arms race and adopt a more constructive approach to reducing military expenditure? Will she withdraw the White Paper, "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982", which embarks on a massive programme of spending on the Trident as well as £14,000 million on the arms race?

The Prime Minister: With regard to what the hon. Gentleman said about nuclear weapons, 90 per cent. of world expenditure is on conventional arms. There has been no nuclear warfare since the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, but there have been some 140 conventional conflicts which have led to about 10 million deaths.

With regard to what he said about disarmament, of course people have fears. A few moments ago Opposition Members were accusing us of not having had sufficient armaments in the Falkland Islands and of that having attracted war.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): On the issue of the equipment that my right hon. Friend did well to obtain from the United States, was she able to inform the President that Her Majesty's Government are compiling a record of Argentine war crimes, including the indiscriminate laying of mines which requires this equipment and the bestial pillaging by the soldiery of civilian property?

The Prime Minister: I gave the President a very full account of the situation in the Falkland Islands. I gave as much detail as I possibly could, incorporating some of the treatment of the islanders by the Argentine troops. I also told him of the great difficulty we were experiencing over the indiscriminate laying of plastic mines which cannot be detected. It is customary under the Geneva convention to mark the fields and positions where mines have been laid. That has not been done by the Argentines. There is also a disarmament convention which forbids the laying of plastic mines but, of course, the Argentine is not a signatory.

Mr. Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley): Did the Prime Minister point out to President Reagan that it is grotesque for his Administration to encourage American farmers to earn millions and millions of dollars by exporting grain to the Soviet Union while it tries to put British workers out of work at John Brown by refusing permission for it to supply essential equipment for the Siberian gas line and also inhibits exports from Sheffield of important steel products?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman will have gathered from my statement, I spoke strongly about John Brown's contracts. Normally, when new restrictions are put on trade, it is customary to exempt existing contracts. I pointed out the relationship with the wheat exports to which the hon. Gentleman has referred and the fact that these would be likely to continue. The President pointed out that there would be restraint on manufactured exports from the United States. Finally, I said to the President that if we were suddenly to have prohibitions from the United States on exports of vital parts of equipment that we need to export from here, people in future would not put orders with the United States because they would be liable to cancellation. All these points were made. I shall be taking the matter further.

Sir William Clark (Croydon, South): Is my right hon. Friend aware that the overwhelming majority of people in this country are delighted by the warm welcome that she received at the United Nations? Is this not proof that world leaders admire the firm stand that the Government took over the Falklands issue? Was the question of interest rates raised during her discussions with the President in order to accelerate the disappearance of the world recession?

The Prime Minister: The phrase most frequently used by those with whom I conversed afterwards was that the speech at the United Nations was realistic and balanced. They welcome both realism and balance in these matters.

I did not discuss interest rates with the President. I discussed them with a number of other people whom I met because the matter is causing us some concern. It is also causing some concern in the United States. It is stopping the very expansion that the United States needs. I made clear that we wish to have the deficit down because we are ready to take advantage of an expansion in world trade. We wish therefore to see American interest rates come down so that ours can stay down where they are now, or go lower.

Mr. James Lamond (Oldham, East): Since the United Nations' own specialist committee has reported that there is no problem on verification of disarmament, and since Mr. Gromyko, in his speech earlier in the session, said that the Soviet Union was ready to sign an agreement banning the development of all chemical weapons, that it was ready to make the statement unilaterally that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear arms first and that it was in full support of the freeze proposals put forward in the American Congress by Senator Edward Kennedy, what other steps are required before the right hon. Lady and the President of the United States are ready to talk meaningfully about disarmament?

The Prime Minister: Not all the problems over verification have been solved by a very long way. Words are not enough. There has to be readiness to have inspection on the spot. That is difficult to maintain.

There have been disquieting but fairly well documented reports that chemical weapons have been used in South-East Asia. We have urged the United Nations to consider the evidence. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Russian undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first. I have pointed out that the more effective undertaking is that recently given by NATO not to use any of its military weapons to attack first. That is the undertaking we await from the Soviet Union—if it could be given with full, proper, trustworthy and credible assurances.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 2239 OF 24 JUNE 1982,

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK,

BONN, PARIS,

INFO SAVING CONSULS GENERAL IN USA.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. I THINK THAT WHAT PROMPTED THE AMERICAN INVITATION FOR A SHORT VISIT HERE AFTER THE UN WAS THEIR WISH TO SHOW RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SUCCESS. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE LATIN AMERICANS THAT, THOUGH THEY HAD COME DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE IN THE CONFLICT, THEY WERE READY TO TRY TO PERSUADE US "NOT TO SLAM DOORS" TO USE HAIG'S PHRASE TO ME, REGARDING THE FUTURE. IN THE EVENT, THOUGH THE FALKLANDS WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT, THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE FUTURE: THE TALK WAS EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT RECEIVED EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE INTERVIEWS IN NEW YORK ON 23 JUNE WHICH WERE CARRIED LIVE ON ALL THREE OF THE NETWORK NEWS PROGRAMMES. IN ADDITION, YESTERDAY'S THREE MAIN EVENING NEWS PROGRAMMES (WHICH HAVE A COMBINED AUDIENCE OF OVER 17 MILLION) ALL COVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND HER SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE. THERE WAS FURTHER COVERAGE OF THIS MORNING'S TELEVISION PROGRAMMES.

3. I WAS STRUCK BY HOW ALMOST ALL THE QUESTIONS IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE WERE DEVOTED TO THE FALKLANDS AND TO PROBING OUR INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND THIS IS REFLECTED IN TODAY'S COVERAGE, THE MAIN THEME BEING WHAT THE WASHINGTON POST CALLS THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOUGHLY-WORDED REASSERTION OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY. CONTRARY TO PRESS EXPECTATIONS AND TO SOME PRIOR BRIEFING BY THE LATIN AMERICAN LOBBY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE PRESS NOTE THAT THE PRESIDENT BROUGHT NO PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US ON THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS. THE WASHINGTON POST CONTRASTS WHAT IT CALLS THE PRESIDENT'S BLANDLY-WORDED STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE AT HER SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE AND HER REITERATION THAT THE FALKLANDS ARE BRITISH AND WILL REMAIN SO. THE PRESS ALSO NOTE THAT IN A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE, WHEN HAIG BRIEFED JOURNALISTS ON THE AMERICAN VIEW OF THE TALKS, THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE US DISAGREED WITH THE UK APPROACH. HAIG IS QUOTED AS SAYING: "WE WOULDN'T EXPECT ANYONE TO TELL US HOW TO DEAL WITH OUR PROPERTY AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO PRESUME TO TELL HER." WHEN ASKED FOR THE US VIEW ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, HAIG REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS COMMENTING THAT MRS THATCHER HAD STATED THE POSITION VERY CLEARLY.

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4. THE PRESS PICK UP THE FACT THAT THE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS USED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RUB IN HER CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE US ADMINISTRATION'S LATEST DECISIONS ON THE ABILITY OF JOHN BROWN TO FULFIL THE CONTRACTS IT HAS ENTERED INTO FOR THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTS THIS AS THE ONLY APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT NOTES THAT THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE US IS GOING TO CHANGE ITS POSITION. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY HAIG SAID THAT : "JUST AS MRS THATCHER HAS HER PRINCIPLES, OUR PRESIDENT HAS HIS".

5. UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK HAVE ALREADY REPORTED ON THE WARM RECEPTION WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ACCORDED IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE PRESS COVERAGE OF HER VISIT TO NEW YORK WHICH ALSO DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH HER SPEECH WAS GREETED BY THE UNITED STATES.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1982

Dear Brian,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose the record of the conversation which took place at the White House on 23 June.

There is one point which requires rapid action. The Prime Minister told President Reagan that she would make enquiries as to the precise facts about John Brown's attitude to the recent American decision to extend the embargo on the export of certain goods to the Soviet Union, since the Americans seemed to have obtained from the firm the impression that they were not particularly concerned about it. The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Secretary of State for Trade could take this matter up urgently with John Brown and let her have an account of the situation which can then be conveyed to the US Government. It would be most helpful if contact with the firm could be made this week.

B/E /

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I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

I should be grateful if circulation of the record could be closely restricted to those who have an operational need to know its contents.

Yours ever
John Major

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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US Declassified

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE AT 1700 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY,
23 JUNE 1982

Present:

Prime Minister	President Reagan
Sir Nicholas Henderson	Vice-President Bush
Mr Whitmore	Mr Haig
Mr Gillmore	Judge Clark
Mr Coles	Mr Rentschler

The Prime Minister opened the conversation by expressing warm gratitude for the successful operation recently conducted by the FBI against arms smuggling by the Provisional IRA in the United States.

President Reagan said that he wished to raise the question of the sanctions applied by the United States to the Soviet Union in connection with Poland. His recent decision that these sanctions should be extended was based on a point of principle. When they had originally been imposed, it had been made clear that they would be kept in being until there had been some internal liberalisation in Poland, either in respect of the position of Mr. Lech Walesa or the release of detainees or the restoration of a dialogue with Solidarity. He knew that his decision to extend the sanctions affected John Brown but representatives of the Company had indicated recently in Washington that it would not cause them great financial distress. He had hoped that following his discussions on this problem in Europe

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/President Mitterrand

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President Mitterrand or Chancellor Schmidt would have indicated to the Russians that if they worked actively to influence the Polish situation the sanctions might be lifted. Private representations to the Russians could be effective. During his recent meeting with Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Haig had raised certain internal questions. For example, he had raised the case of a young man on hunger strike in the Soviet Union who had relatives in the United States. Within 48 hours the Soviet media had indicated that the release of this young man was likely.

The Prime Minister said that we had wanted existing contracts to be exempted from the American sanctions. The latest decision would cause us serious problems in an area which already had heavy unemployment. It would be said that the damage caused to Britain by the American decision was proportionally much greater than that caused to the United States whose main exports to the Soviet Union were of grain rather than of manufactured goods.

President Reagan said that when Mr. Carter had originally imposed the grain embargo, in connection with Afghanistan, American farmers had complained that they alone were being asked to bear a burden. Consequently, he had promised in his presidential campaign that he would remove this discrimination. The existing grain agreement was now coming to an end. The Russians were pressing for the conclusion of a new agreement but the United States had so far declined to open discussions. The Prime Minister said that she presumed there would be a new grain agreement. President Reagan said that he hoped that the Russians would take some step that would make this possible. The Prime Minister enquired whether she could, therefore, say publicly that there would not be a new agreement. President Reagan replied that none had yet been negotiated.

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/Mr Haig

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Mr Haig said that even if there were no agreement, grain would continue to be sold on the market. The Prime Minister commented that in that case American farmers would not suffer. But John Brown's employees would. The company was ready to commence implementation of this contract with the Soviet Union and only needed American rotors to be able to do so. If they were prevented from going ahead, they would be disinclined to buy sophisticated equipment from the United States again. She would be pressed on this matter on her return. She could say that the latest decision was seen by the Americans as being based on principle but the fact was that US grain would continue to be sold while John Brown could not purchase the necessary rotors from elsewhere. President Reagan said that the Americans were prepared to be painted as the villains. But if the Russians brought about change in Poland, then the decision on sanctions could be changed.

The Prime Minister asked again whether she could state that the Wheat Agreement would not be renewed. Judge Clark stated that this question had not be discussed, much less decided. Mr Haig added that so far some \$850 m worth of United States exports of manufactured goods had been affected by the sanctions. The President's latest decision would bring the figure to about \$1 billion. The Prime Minister pointed out that the John Brown contract was worth £400 m. Sir Nicholas Henderson observed that British exports to the Soviet Union were on a downward trend while American exports were rising.

President Reagan repeated that John Brown had not expressed great concern to the US Government about the latest decision.

Sir Nicholas Henderson suggested that there must have been some

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misunderstanding because their statements to us had been quite different. President Reagan suggested that John Brown could obtain the equipment they needed from the French subsidiary of the American company concerned. Judge Clark commented that legal proceedings had now begun. This would lead to delay and the hope must be that there would be change in Poland during that time. The Americans believed that the Russians had not taken seriously the original decision on sanctions. It was hoped that the latest decision would induce a change of mind.

The Prime Minister said that she would arrange for a further discussion with John Brown because our clear understanding was that they were seriously worried about the situation. Meanwhile, there seemed little doubt that the US would continue to export wheat to the Soviet Union by one means or another and thus total American exports to the Soviet Union would continue to rise. European firms would be reluctant to order sophisticated equipment from the United States in future and would go elsewhere. Existing contracts should have been exempted. The effect of the United States decisions was to prevent the fulfilment of normal commercial engagements. America's word was at stake. President Reagan said that it had been made clear at the time of the original decision what the consequences would be. Judge Clark said that John Brown had originally claimed that 1700 jobs would be at risk but the figures seemed to have changed recently. The Prime Minister said that she intended to enquire into the precise facts. But there would be much resentment in Britain if America's exports to Russia continued to rise while ours went down.

The Prime Minister said that we were also concerned

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about the recent United States decision in respect of steel imports from European countries. This was a matter for the European Community but if the Community did not take it up through the courts, we should probably do so. She believed that the British Steel Corporation would contest the decision. It would cost us £50 m in exports of specialised steel and job losses which, as with those in the case of John Brown, would be sustained in Scotland. Sir Nicholas Henderson emphasised that the matter was a very serious one. We had reduced our steel exports to the United States by an enormous percentage. But British Steel was now likely to be badly hurt by the American decision.

The Prime Minister then described the latest situation in the South Atlantic. We had returned around 10 thousand prisoners of war to Argentina. Many of the prisoners we had taken had been in very bad condition. The Argentine Armed Forces appeared to keep their officers in luxury but to have little regard for their other ranks. Some officers had had to be allowed to keep their small arms because they were afraid their own troops might attack them. Some of the soldiers had been in an appalling state, suffering from trench foot, dysentery and parasites. The medical treatment given by the Argentines to their wounded had been well below an acceptable standard.

Sometime ago we had sent a message to President Galtieri through the Swiss Government that we would send back the prisoners, lift sanctions and remove the exclusion zones if we received an assurance that hostilities had been permanently ended. We had received no direct reply.

/ The Argentine

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The Argentine note to the United Nations had been very equivocal. Intelligence reports suggested that while many units were reverting to normal states of alert, the air force at Rio Grande was still on a high level of security. We did not know why. The first group of prisoners which had been repatriated had apparently been taken to camps and not allowed to go home.

President Reagan asked whether we could confirm that some conscripts had been shot in their feet. The Prime Minister said that she had read this story but could not confirm it. We were retaining some 600 officers, pilots and engineers until a permanent cessation of hostilities had been achieved. They would shortly be put on a boat to Ascension, and, in the absence of a satisfactory Argentine statement, might be flown from there to Britain. Then, if the elapse of time revealed that hostilities were not being resumed we might send them back. Another serious problem had been caused by the indiscriminate sowing of plastic mines, whose position was not, as the rules of war required, marked. Four of our personnel involved in mine removal had already been wounded. This was very demoralising. Mr. Haig said that the United States had a good deal of specialised equipment available which he thought could be flown into Port Stanley. President Reagan asked that this should be investigated. The Prime Minister said that this would be most helpful. Meanwhile, we were removing about 3,000 of our troops from the Falklands. But our ships were still vulnerable. We were worried that some wild action might be contemplated by the Argentinians.

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Time was now needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Mr. Hunt was returning as Civil Commissioner shortly and teachers and doctors would be going back. At a later stage, we would discuss the future with the Islanders. We would probably bring them closer to self-government, perhaps resembling the situation in American possession such as Guam.

The President suggested that the United Kingdom needed a peaceful settlement which relieved us of the burden of defending the Islands for a lengthy period. The Prime Minister said that we should be obliged to defend the Islands. The runway would have to be extended, Rapier batteries established and further aircraft deployed. President Reagan asked whether, with the new Government in Argentina, there might be a better prospect of a genuine peace. The Prime Minister replied that this might be possible. But we should have to proceed slowly. The attitude of other Latin American countries had been by no means uniform. A recent leader in a prominent Brazilian newspaper had praised the British action. After her speech in the United Nations General Assembly earlier in the day, the representatives of Colombia, Chile and one other Latin American country had offered their congratulations. We would do everything possible to restore normal relations with other countries of Latin America, and believed that they would respond positively.

The Prime Minister said that events in the Lebanon had produced a mood in Arab countries the like of which she had never seen before.

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They found Israel's actions in the Lebanon utterly disproportionate. President Reagan said he was aware of this. The Arab countries accused the United States of collusion with Israel. The Prime Minister commented that Prince Saud had agreed with her when she had told him recently that she did not believe the stories of United States/Israeli collusion.

President Reagan said that he had sent Mr. Habib to the area to try to secure a ceasefire. He had been very blunt with Mr. Begin during the latter's recent visit to Washington. But he believed that the accounts of the slaughter of civilians had been much exaggerated. The present situation could offer a great opportunity for a Lebanon which had been torn apart for seven years. The Lebanese themselves saw a great need to disarm the PLO. The seven separate Lebanese factions had come together and were discussing the formation of a central authority and a single army. Mr. Habib was trying to promote a settlement. The Israelis wanted a new Lebanese Government to be established, a multi-lateral force to be constituted and all foreign troops to be withdrawn from the country. The Prime Minister asked where the Palestinians were to go. President Reagan said that it was necessary to distinguish between the PLO and the Palestinians. Many of the latter were content to remain in the Lebanon. Mr. Begin had told him that the Israelis had discovered in the Lebanon arms supplies of a far greater quantity than could ever be used by the PLO. Indeed, it looked as though the Soviet Union had been establishing its own arms depots in the Middle East. The removal of these weapons would be a major undertaking for the Israelis. The Prime Minister asked what kinds of weapons had been discovered. Mr. Haig referred rather vaguely to sophisticated

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rocketry and large quantities of ammunition for conventional Soviet weapons.

The Prime Minister said that she found the Soviet attitude to the Lebanese situation rather puzzling. She assumed that they would be concerned about the reputation of the Soviet equipment in Syrian hands which had fared so badly. President Reagan agreed that the Russians had been unpleasantly surprised by the success of the American equipment supplied to Israel. Soviet tanks and planes had been no match for their American counterparts.

Mr. Haig said that the situation was now critical. Mr. Habib had just met the Salvation Council and had presented to them firm propositions. He thought that Sharon would not refrain from entering Beirut unless the PLO made firm commitments to disarm, to leave Beirut and to shed some of their leaders. Mr. Habib was now waiting for answers from Yasser Arafat. The Prime Minister asked what would happen to Major Haddad. Mr. Haig replied that his forces would have to be honourably absorbed. Major Haddad would be retired comfortably to another country. So far, Mr. Begin had not objected to these propositions.

The Prime Minister said that the task of constructing a Government in the Lebanon would be very difficult. The PLO would be forced back to terrorism. And the question would remain - where would the Palestinians go? We felt a special obligation. It was we who had walked out of Palestine. The Israelis were Finlandising Lebanon. The Arabs believed that Jordan would be the next to suffer. When the latest situation had developed she had feared that a third world

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recession would be brought about by Arab action on oil. But so far this had not happened. Mr. Haig commented that this was because most Arabs wanted the Lebanese situation to be straightened out. The Prime Minister observed that the Arabs made the valid criticism that the Middle East went from crisis to crisis but the underlying problem was never dealt with. President Reagan said that he had told Mr. Begin that in return for American patience with Israel he wanted real commitments to deal with the Palestinian problem. Mr. Begin had faced strong criticism on the Hill and had left Washington in a more sober frame of mind. The Prime Minister said that she understood Congressional criticism of Israel. Israel's friends felt let down. The Israelis were inflicting massive suffering and were refusing to let international relief agencies help. President Reagan commented that there had been a great change in American attitudes to Israel.

The conversation ended at 1800 hours.

A.J.C.

23 June 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

24 June 1982

Call by the Prime Minister on the President of the
General Assembly on Wednesday 23 June

The Prime Minister, accompanied by Sir Anthony Parsons, Mr. David Summerhayes and me, called upon Mr. Ismet Kittani, the President of the United Nations General Assembly, at 1030 hours today.

Apart from passing references to earlier speeches in the Special Session on Disarmament and to the Lebanon, the conversation was confined to the Iran/Iraq war. Mr. Kittani said that Iraq had earlier made three proposals. First, there was a war going on and it should be stopped with a ceasefire. Second, there had been an occupation of Iranian territory but Iraq was now willing to vacate it and to withdraw to her own borders. Finally, there should be some kind of international arbitration process aimed at resolving the disputes which had originally led to the outbreak of war. Iran had turned down this approach by Iraq, maintaining that it was all a plot by Iraq to strengthen her own position. Iraq was therefore proceeding unilaterally. She had implemented a ceasefire under which Iraqi forces would open fire only in self defence, and she was withdrawing unilaterally to within her own borders. Iraq would try to involve the Security Council, with a view to getting a reasonable resolution on the matter. There were two envoys from Baghdad at the United Nations now, and they were seeing members of the Security Council.

In response to a question by Sir Anthony Parsons, Mr. Kittani said that Iran had seized on an offer which a number of Gulf countries had earlier made to contribute to a reconstruction fund for both Iran and Iraq and were now claiming that this was an agreement to pay Iran reparations. They were quoting figures and presenting the matter as an Iranian demand which the Arabs had accepted they would have to meet.

/Mr. Kittani

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Mr. Kittani went on to say that he was doubtful whether it would ever be possible to reach a compromise with Ayatollah Khomeini. He regarded all negotiations as wrong because they led to compromise and that was sacrilegious. He had got rid of the Shah and he believed that he had brought down President Carter. He saw President Saddam Hussein, by comparison, as a very little man. Khomeini was a vindictive man who believed "he had a direct line to Allah". Mr. Kittani said that he wanted Britain and Iraq's other friends to see the dangers of the situation. The Gulf countries were getting even more jittery than Iraq herself.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

C. A. WHITMORE

Brian Fall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

23 June 1982

Dear Brian,

PRIME MINISTER'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I attach at Annex A the record of the meeting which the Prime Minister had earlier today with the UN Secretary General in New York.

An hour or so after the meeting de Soto gave Goulding the piece of paper at Annex B. He told Goulding that it represented the points which the Secretary General had "been trying to make" in his conversation with the Prime Minister. It did not require any response from us: there was no question of the Secretary General "putting pressure" on the United Kingdom nor of setting new deadlines for a response. It was simply that Perez de Cuellar wanted the Prime Minister to have a written note of the points he had been attempting to put to her. In reply to Goulding's question, de Soto said that the Secretary General had not decided when he would need to report again to the Security Council: that depended on developments.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its attachments to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Alvin Whiteman.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BK

CONFIDENTIALRECORD OF A MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE U.N.
SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE 1982 AT 0945Present:

Prime Minister	Senor Perez de Cuellar
Sir Anthony Parsons	Mr. Brian Urquhart
Mr. David Summerhayes	Senor Alvaro de Soto
Mr. Clive Whitmore	Mr. Michael Stopford
Mr. Bernard Ingham	

* * * * *

Southern Africa

The Prime Minister said that Senor Perez de Cuellar was well remembered in Britain for the enormous help he had given at the time of Rhodesia's transition to independence. The British Government had made it clear at the outset of that process that it would accept the result of the election whatever it was. There had been others, however, who would let it be known that they would accept only an outcome which suited them. Against this background, it had been very useful to have Senor Perez de Cuellar there as an independent observer. After Britain's success in bringing Rhodesia to independence, there had been those who thought that she should try to perform the same role with regard to Namibia.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was glad that he had been able to play a useful role at the time of Rhodesian independence. As regards Namibia, there was now a feeling of hope and we must do all we could to maintain that mood. In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, he explained that the double vote scheme had been discarded as too complicated a system for Africans new to voting.

Lebanon

Mr. Urquhart said that the latest news from Lebanon was not good. Fighting around Beirut and on the road to Damascus had begun again, though it was not clear who had started it. The

/ battle

battle was now mainly between Israel and Syria, with the PLO joining in from time to time. Beirut airport was closed. Yesterday, Mr. Philip Habib's efforts to establish a ceasefire had appeared to come to nothing, and the UN did not know what turn his negotiations would now take. Israel was being very difficult about assistance for casualties. They were very critical of the Red Cross and wanted to conduct all relief operations themselves. Senor Perez de Cuellar added that the Israelis wanted to distribute all relief themselves no matter where it came from.

Mr. Urquhart went on to say that the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) was due to come up for renewal next month. He understood that Lebanon had said some time ago that they did not want the ADF extended. The Syrians, on the other hand, had made it plain that they intended to stay in Lebanon.

The question of who should contribute to a force to guarantee any ceasefire in Lebanon was causing the American Government difficulties. They did not want to take on this task themselves, and their reluctance was understandable. It would be a far trickier and more complex undertaking than the MFO in Sinai. Israel, on the other hand, would not accept a UN force. Rather, they wanted a force which was underpinned by one of the great powers. He wondered whether a possible answer was a UN force underpinned by guarantees from the great powers. Senor Perez de Cuellar added that most countries were reluctant to contribute to such a force because they felt that to do so would identify them with the Israeli invaders.

Mr. Urquhart said that relations between and within the different confessional factions in Lebanon were thoroughly tangled. Mr. Jumblatt had now joined the new Lebanese Government. He was an important channel to the PLO. The position of the PLO was a cause of very serious concern. So long as it remained in strength and heavily armed in Western Beirut, the possibility remained that Israel would attack that part of the city. The resulting casualties and damage would be appalling.

/ Senor Perez de Cuellar

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that it was essential to keep the PLO in being. Yasser Arafat had certainly been a terrorist, as had a number of now prominent Israeli politicians, but he was the only interlocutor available. He was in fact a reasonable man. The Americans had been wrong in not dealing with him, even indirectly. His position in relation to other Palestinian leaders was now very difficult.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that if the PLO was broken, we would go back ten years to the era of hijacking and other acts of international terrorism.

Falkland Islands

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that the new President of the Argentine did not have the full support of the Navy and Air Force. The political situation in Buenos Aires was obscure. He still had the mandate which had been given to him by the Security Council, though he felt that there was nothing he could do at present. Nonetheless, at some stage, in consultation with the British Government, he would have to do something. There was always the possibility that a member of the Security Council would suddenly ask what he had been doing in fulfilment of the mandate.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that it was difficult to see what he could do at present. As soon as British forces had repossessed the Islands, the British Government had sent a message to the Junta through the Swiss saying that they were prepared to start the process of repatriating the many Argentine prisoners, provided that there was a total cessation of hostilities between the two countries. We had also proposed that in those circumstances the economic measures and exclusion zones instituted by both parties should be lifted. In short we were seeking to get back to normal as soon as possible. But the Argentines' response, which had been contained in their letter to the Secretary General, had been negative. It was still not clear whether the Argentine accepted that there had been a complete cessation of hostilities. Under the Geneva Convention, we did not have to repatriate prisoners until all active hostilities had ceased. Nonetheless,

/ so many

so many of the Argentines taken prisoner in the Falkland Islands had been in bad shape, that we had been anxious to send them back to the Argentine as quickly as possible. We had found that disease was widespread among them, and many were badly fed. The Argentines had agreed to allow British ships into Puerto Madryn which had speeded up the process of repatriation and we had now sent back some 10,000 out of a total of about 11,600. Until such time as the Argentines accepted a complete cessation of hostilities, we proposed to keep some 600 prisoners made up mainly of senior officers, pilots and technicians. We could keep this number in the Falklands in reasonable conditions. Even so, if the undertaking we wanted from the Argentines on the cessation of hostilities was not forthcoming, the prisoners would before long be taken by ship to Ascension Island and thence to the United Kingdom. There were also 35 Argentines who had volunteered to help clear the mine fields which had been laid during the occupation of the Islands. The Argentines had not recorded where they had laid the mines. This was contrary to international law. The lack of information about the whereabouts of the mines posed very real dangers. Moreover, the mines were made of plastic and were therefore very difficult to locate. They would be a danger for a long time to come, and already four British soldiers had been injured in trying to clear them.

The Falkland Islanders had been through a traumatic period of invasion and occupation. Mr. Rex Hunt would be returning shortly to become the Civil Commissioner. The Commander of the Land Forces would be the Military Commissioner. Mr. Hunt's presence would help restore confidence among the Islanders. For many months to come the main preoccupation would be with practical reconstruction. The problems would be considerable, and we should not be able to rush them. Our objective would be to make the Islanders feel that life was returning to normal. The practicalities would absorb them for quite a period. This was just as well, for time healed wounds more quickly than anything else.

/ Looking further

Looking further ahead, Britain would try to accelerate the process of giving the Falkland Islanders self-government. Much had already been done in this direction and now we should try to give them complete self-government.

Britain would continue to seek Argentine acceptance of a complete cessation of hostilities. But if they did not respond and if there was, nonetheless, a reasonable period in which they took no hostile military action against the Falkland Islands and British forces, Britain would assume that there was in practice a complete cessation of hostilities.

The Prime Minister hoped that time would heal Argentine wounds too. It had been her Government which had restored diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina, and until the invasion of the Falkland Islands we had believed that we were getting on well with Argentina. The invasion had thrust us into a new situation.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that friendship between Britain and Argentina must be restored in due course. They were two countries which had been linked happily for many years. Would Britain resume negotiations about the Falkland Islands with Argentina?

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that eventually Anglo-Argentine friendship would have to be restored. The immediate need was to agree upon a cessation of hostilities. We could then build on that. With the passage of time she hoped to be able to make overtures to Argentina leading to a restoration of diplomatic relations. But one immediate problem was that during the present crisis it had been very difficult to know whom we were dealing with in Buenos Aires, and it remained to be seen whether the change in the leadership there would improve matters in that respect.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was worried that there would be a continuing focus of tension in the South Atlantic. This would be very damaging for the whole of Latin America. It would help lessen tension if a dialogue was started. But he saw that there must be a complete cessation of hostilities first.

The Prime Minister said that Britain wanted to be as friendly as possible with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole. It was worth emphasising that Latin America was not a monolithic entity. Some Latin American countries - for example, Brazil - had been very helpful during the Falklands crisis. She did not feel that the UK had lost the friendship of those countries. Nonetheless, she saw problems looming in the future: the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana was one example.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was in touch with Venezuela. He wanted to avoid a repetition of the Falklands episode. The Venezuelan Government would be sending someone to discuss the problem with him shortly. Their Foreign Minister had promised him that Venezuela would not use force but would pursue all peaceful means of solving the dispute. He believed that there was reason for hope.

The Prime Minister repeated that Britain would do everything possible to improve relations with Argentina. We recognised that they would be sensitive and bruised and would need to be handled slowly and gently for some time.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was at Britain's disposal to act as a channel of communication in this process. This was not just a matter of his mandate from the Security Council. He believed that Argentina trusted him insofar as they trusted anyone. Something had to be done, though he accepted that this would be later and not now. There was no need for a special initiative: his mandate was there and could be used. He hoped the Prime Minister would think it over. He emphasised that he was not putting pressure on her.

Looking back, it was remarkable how close to agreement we had got. But as Mr. Haig had said to him recently, we now knew why agreement had eluded us: the Argentine had had no leadership. It was very sad. Argentina had so many advantages such as racial unity and extensive natural resources. Nor

/ was she

was she "exactly a young African country" but that was how she behaved politically.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister and Senor Perez de Cuellar agreed that they would tell the press that they had discussed the Falkland Islands in general terms and had assessed the situation together.

The meeting ended at 1027 hours.

hah.

23 June 1982

-- Despite the present difficulties, restoration of normal relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina should be attainable in time because of compelling common interests.

-- Given existing sensibilities, the United Nations could facilitate communication and understanding between the two sides.

-- The Secretary-General's good offices are, of course, available as mandated by the Security Council, to which he will need to report in due course.

-- The Secretary-General would be prepared to explore with both sides possible ways of resolving immediate problems and achieving a resolution of underlying differences.

-- The initiation of a flexible procedure for the diplomatic solution of these differences as called for by Security Council Resolution 502 could well be the key to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities.

-- The Secretary-General would welcome any ideas the United Kingdom might suggest in this context.


CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Whitmore

cc Sir A Parsons

FALKLANDS

After the Prime Minister's statement in the General Assembly this morning, Mr de Soto gave me the attached piece of paper, asking that I pass it to you. He said that it represented the points the Secretary-General had 'been trying to make' in his conversation this morning with the Prime Minister. It did not ask for any response from us; there was no question of the Secretary-General 'putting pressure' on the U.K. nor of setting new deadlines for a response. It was simply that Mr Perez de Cuellar wanted the Prime Minister to have a written note of the points he had been trying to make. In reply to my question, Mr de Soto said that the Secretary-General had not decided when he would need to report again to the Security Council; that depended on developments



M I Goulding

23 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM ON DISARMAMENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER -

1. I assume that the Prime Minister does not want to contribute to the cant usually talked about disarmament, and it would be immensely refreshing if she could state a few unpopular home truths on the matter. For example: there is no correlation between the size of armaments and the probability of war, nor between 'arms races' and the causes of wars. Some wars have been preceded by 'arms races' and some have not. Some 'arms races' have culminated in war and some have not. Few historians any longer believe that the arms race before 1914 provided more than a contributory cause to the outbreak of World War One, and even fewer that the Second World War was the result of any arms race. There would be general agreement, however, that the adventurism of the Axis Powers was stimulated by the military weakness of the status quo powers, France, Britain and the United States. Perceptions of military weakness have been at least as potent a cause of war as fears of military strength, and disarmament can under certain circumstances be at least as effective a cause of war as great armaments. (British unilateral disarmament in the South Atlantic is an interesting case in point.) I would be happy to write a brief paper dealing with this question if it were thought useful, but I enclose a copy of a recent lecture I gave which elaborates some of the arguments referred to above.

2. What matters then is not disarmament as such but peace, and disarmament is only desirable if it can be shown to contribute to peace. So long as sovereign states exist they will continue to make provision for their security, and will engage in a process of 'competitive modernization' in armaments as in every other field of technology. Arms cannot be frozen at a given point of technological development. Each generation will equip itself with the most effective weapon-systems, as with the most effective transport, communications, health-preserving and nutritive systems, that technology makes possible.

3. We must therefore be clear over what the real problems are with which the development of armaments presents us.

I suggest that these are three.

- 1) Their expense
- 2) Their effect on international stability
- 3) Their inhumanity

4. Cost

The problem of escalating costs is self-evident, and provides the only effective incentive to serious arrangements for disarmament. All major powers, not excluding the Soviet Union, would welcome proposals that genuinely provided them with equal security at less cost. One does not have to share the liberal view that money spent on weapons would be better spent on aid to the Third World in order to accept that defence costs tend to absorb an unacceptably high proportion of all national budgets.

5. Stability

Armaments can be 'destabilising' in two ways. An increase in the military capability of one nation is normally countered by a comparable increase in that of its rivals, leaving both countries poorer but no more secure. In addition, certain kinds of weapons-systems can be seen as offering such an immediate threat of an effective 'first strike' that the adversary will be under a constant temptation to 'pre-empt'. The first of these processes produces 'arms races' that may not be dangerous in themselves but impose grave burdens on all national economies. The second can result in situations of such mutual mistrust that any political crisis may erupt unnecessarily and disastrously into nuclear war. For both these reasons, increase in armaments can result not in greater security but in considerably less.

6. Restraint

In spite of all our efforts, wars may occur; and after every war, peace must be made. Relations must be re-established with the adversary, the damage repaired and an improved political structure created. It is thus a matter of political prudence, as well as a moral imperative, that the war itself should be conducted with the greatest possible restraint and humanity and that laws of war, carefully worked out over generations, should be observed. Nuclear weapons must thus be seen always as deterrents, and preferably as deterrents simply to the opponent's use of his own nuclear weapons. Much

of the moral and intellectual force behind the 'Peace Movement' today arises from the belief that we have abandoned this concept of deterrence and are planning to use nuclear weapons in the conduct of war. A firm reassertion of the original concept of nuclear deterrence would bring the Government much political and moral credit.

7. Any disarmament proposals should address themselves specifically to the above questions. The object, clearly stated, should be to work towards a stable international system in which nations can preserve their security at minimal cost, being neither provoked by the strength of their rivals into a ruinously expensive armaments competition nor tempted by their weakness into military adventurism. Their weapons should also be such that, if an armed conflict should occur, it could be conducted with the greatest possible 'economy of force'; that is, with weapons that will inflict the least possible damage on civilians and on the environment, making it possible to observe those restraints within war that are mandatory on a Christian society.

8. Problems of arms control can be broken down under four heads:

- 1) The central nuclear balance
- 2) The European balance
- 3) Regional balances (including nuclear proliferation)
- 4) Qualitative control - CBW, etc.

9. The central balance is primarily a matter of negotiation between the USA and the USSR, and I assume that the UK would not wish to dissociate itself from the US proposals for deep cuts in strategic systems as a means for achieving maximum stability at minimal cost. Regional balances are a matter for the countries concerned, but there is no harm in reminding a UN audience that arms reductions are a matter of concern for small nations no less than for great - especially since the economic burden on the former is so very much greater than on the latter. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to concentrate, in any detailed proposals she has to make, on items 8.(2) and 8.(4) above.

10. Any proposals for arms control agreements over the European balance will need to carry the approval of our NATO allies, so any initiatives the Prime Minister has in mind will already have been agreed in discussion with them. If the following ideas have not already been approved it is thus too late to consider them, but I put them forward for what they are worth.

1) The main destabilizing factor in Europe is the overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional forces. At present stability is maintained only by an allied commitment to a first use of nuclear weapons that Soviet nuclear parity makes decreasingly convincing. Stability can be restored only by either a substantial increase in alliance conventional forces, or a substantial

reduction in Soviet forces. Clearly the latter would be in every way preferable. A new impetus should therefore be given to the MBFR negotiations as a matter of urgency.

2) Support should be given to the US proposal for a 'zero option' on the emplacement of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) such as SS20s, Pershing IIs and cruise missiles.

3) Consideration should be given to the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons of which the military value is doubtful, whose effect on the local environment would be devastating, and whose presence is highly destabilising.

4) We should continue to press for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons from all military planning and stockpiles.

11. Although it is not immediately relevant to the UN Special Assembly, it might be useful if the NATO allies could agree among themselves as to what they would consider to be a desirable and practicable 'model' of force levels and structures that would take account of the security needs of both sides in Europe at the lowest feasible cost. To the best of my knowledge we have never negotiated with any such objective, however notional, in mind, and such a concept would add clarity to our proposals.

Michael Howard

DISARMAMENT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE

I

1. There is little to recall about discussions of disarmament before 1914. It was not even something imposed on vanquished by victors.

2. There were, however, numerous suggestions for securing "perpetual peace" in the 18th century in which measures of what would now be called disarmament would have played a part.

3. The two conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 concerned themselves primarily with measures to secure rules of war, treatment of civilians, wounded and prisoners, the rights and obligations of neutrals etc. But the first Conference did include a ban on gas warfare, dum dum bullets, & "projectiles thrown from balloons". Britain sought at the second conference to secure some limitation of armaments.

.../ cont.

II

4. The Treaty of Versailles insisted on specific and radical measures of German disarmament to be carried out under Anglo-French military control. These were looked upon as a foretaste of, or introduction to, "the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations" (Part V of the Treaty).

5. These clauses were put forward in an international mood which accepted that great armaments were themselves a cause of war - particularly the naval "arms race" between Germany and Britain. The mood was articulated by President Wilson in his speeches in 1918.

6. Much of the proposed German disarmament was carried but there were numerous evasions. Many of them - perhaps most - became known to the allied control commission in the 1920s. But Britain and France did not agree how these evasions were to be handled. After 1930 the control commission was withdrawn. After 1933

.../ cont

Hitler stepped up rearmament and in 1935 specifically denounced all the clauses on disarmament in the treaty of Versailles.

7. There were several attempts to carry forward the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles to countries other than Germany, e.g. the naval treaties of 1921-22 and 1930 which affected most of the powers which then had substantial navies. There was a protocol banning the use of gas in war (1925), a convention on international (private) arms traffic (1925), plans for the renunciation of war e.g. the Kellogg Pact (1928) and finally a disarmament conference at Geneva in 1932. This last led to nothing, basically, because of divergencies between France and the others: France desired a system of international police and insisted that security must precede disarmament. The Germans demanded equality of treatment. The US in June 1932 proposed a one third cut in all "defence components".

.../ cont

8. A subsequent meeting of this conference did secure a "No Force declaration" by which the major powers promised not to resolve differences between them by force. Other discussions revolved around a scheme put forward by Britain by which all European armies would be reduced by specific figures, and France and Germany would be permitted equality. The US supported this but the plan failed formally at least because Germany, by then with Hitler as Chancellor, refused to agree that the SA (storm troops) should be counted in. The conference met again in 1934 briefly.

9. These efforts seemed to have been wrecked as much by France as by Germany but it is understandable that after 1914-18 the French should be fearful and it is inconceivable that Germany would have been restrained while Hitler was in power. There were arguments (e.g. by Lord Cecil) - still sometimes heard - that, had it not been for French intransigence in 1932, the German government of

.../ cont

of Dr Bruning might have been saved and Hitler kept from power. It is hard to give credence to such "if onlys".

III

10. After 1945, naturally the first series of efforts concentrated on the issue of nuclear weapons. Most of the prewar protocols and conventions on the use of force were, as it were, absorbed in the Charter of the UN. The US put forward ideas to secure the internationalisation of nuclear energy the Barmch Plan (1946-47). This was opposed by the Soviet Union, who were nearer the development of nuclear weapons than anyone supposed: their first nuclear weapon was tested in 1949.

11. Between then and the 1960s there were a series of far reaching but rather over ambitious

.../ cont

disarmament plans which sought formally to secure "general and complete disarmament" including the abolition of all nuclear weapons. These were usually discussed in the UN disarmament Commission or its sub committee. After 1955, however, it was admitted that there was no possibility of achieving a world in which it would be proved that all nuclear weapons had been beyond all doubt dismantled. This led to the pursuit of less ambitious schemes for "arms control", to become the subject of academic and theoretical debate and study in the US and Europe during the 1960s. Meantime the post war mood, unlike that in 1919, was one in which it was supposed that war in 1939 had been caused by excessive disarmament of a unilateral type.

12. Some understandings of a limited kind were achieved e.g. the partial Test Ban treaty (1963), the Antarctic treaty (1959), the Outer Space treaty (1967), the treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the Nuclear non proliferation treaty (1968) and the SALT I treaty (1970).

.../ cont

13. Discussions in the UN or its subcommittees of primarily interested powers in the late 'forties and 'fifties centred also on ways whereby substantial measures of "conventional" disarmament - reduction of armaments and forces to the level "strictly necessary for the mainenance of internal security" - might be interwoven with the measures agreed on nuclear weapons. These discussions, though of value in discovering information about Soviet attitudes to weapons in general, led to nothing.

14. Meantime the situation changed as a result of:

- (a) the Soviet decision, apparently taken after the Cuban crisis of 1962, to devote every effort to reach at least equality with the US in nuclear weapons and methods of delivery to prevent a similar occurrence arising in which the USSR would have to back down again.

.../ cont

- (b) the achievement of this aim in the 1970s. partly as a result of US decisions in the late 1960s to have a policy of minimum deterrence;
- (c) rapid technological advances which changed the whole history of weapons in the 1970s; and
- (d) the achievement by the Soviet Union of an ocean going navy.

14. In the 1970s direct talks between the US and USSR followed the achievement of SALT I, about further measures of strategic arms limitation. A SALT II treaty was signed in 1979 but not ratified by the US because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It would seem that both sides have kept to the provisions of this non-ratified treaty.

15. Other disarmament conferences, including other powers were held at Geneva and Vienna e.g.

.../ cont

those affecting force levels in Europe and intermediate range weapons. On the whole direct conversations between the super powers have seemed a wiser course in recent years than special UN conferences, though after the first special session on Disarmament (1978) UN activities began again and a UN disarmament centre was founded - largely devoted to gathering information.

IV

16. There seem to me to be seven main points - perhaps obvious - which need to be taken into account when discussing disarmament:

- (a) the power of nuclear weapons and the speed with which they can be delivered is a new dimension in the

.../ cont

world, even though politicians and generals who may give the order to use them may not be very different from those in the past.

- (b) in the new countries of the so called Third World [redacted] armies play an essential civil function comparable to that exercised by monarchies in the past. Armed forces can be the only institution which keeps the nation concerned together.
- (c) similarly in these countries we have seen a steady growth in military rule. Nor can military intervention in politics be excluded even in Europe e.g. Spain, Portugal and Greece,

.../ cont

perhaps even Italy, countries where there remain threats of military rule. Even France has experienced a coup d'etat with a distinct military flavour within the last 25 years.

- (d) many of the threats to peace are not caused by regular armies but by irregular ones - e.g. terrorists, guerrillas etc.

- (e) the great powers' allies need to be watched. If, for example, the USSR were to agree to cut her armed forces by a third, there is an obvious chance that she would make up the difference by using Cubans or others as an international brigade - anyway outside Europe.

.../ cont

- (f) the "Third World" has recently been increasing its arms fast. It seems as if the Soviet Union remains the principal supplier of these weapons.
- (g) There is ample documentation for the fact that the Soviet Union has in recent years devoted enormous resources to propaganda in favour of its own version of disarmament specifically to further its own strategic interest. It may be that the present interest in disarmament in Western Europe is indirectly mainly due to this Soviet campaign, though naturally such a thing would be hard to prove. (Particularly useful recent document on this matter is "Moscow and the Peace Offensive" published by the Heritage Foundation, No.184).

Mr. Colie
22/6 Ambassador

TOAST BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF
THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM - 23 JUNE 1982

*The SG's
toast for
tomorrow.*

MADAM PRIME MINISTER, EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Alto
22/6

IT IS A VERY GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME, MADAM PRIME MINISTER,
TO HAVE THIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME YOU TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
YOUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO
DISARMAMENT DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED KINGDOM ATTACHES
TO THESE EFFORTS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE AND SECURE
WORLD. LET ME ALSO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR ADDRESS TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING AND ON YOUR ENCOURAGING EXPRESSION OF
YOUR COUNTRY'S COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT.

- 2 -

THE UNITED KINGDOM OCCUPIES A SPECIAL
PLACE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN THE HISTORIC MISSION ENTRUSTED
TO THIS ORGANIZATION BY THE CHARTER. ONE OF THE FOREMOST
ARCHITECTS OF THE WORLD BODY, FROM ITS CONCEPTION IN THE ATLANTIC
CHARTER TO ITS REALIZATION IN SAN FRANCISCO WAS AN EMINENT PREDECESSOR
OF YOURS, WINSTON CHURCHILL. EVEN IN THE DARKEST DAYS OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR HE WAS ABLE TO LOOK BEYOND THE FIGHTING AND THE
DESTRUCTION IN PLANNING FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
TO PRESERVE THE FUTURE PEACE. IT WAS TOGETHER WITH THE LEADERS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT CHURCHILL, IN 1943 IN TEHERAN,
RECOGNIZED THE RESPONSIBILITY - AND I QUOTE "RESTING UPON US AND ALL
THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE A PEACE ... AND BANISH THE SCOURGE AND TERRO
OF WAR FOR MANY GENERATIONS."

MADAM PRIME MINISTER, YOUR COUNTRY'S PROFOUND COMMITMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IS AS VITAL TODAY AS IT WAS AT THE FOUNDING OF THE ORGANIZATION. AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER ARE RESPECTED AND THAT PEACE AND SECURITY ARE MAINTAINED. THIS ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS BORN OUT OF THE ASHES OF A DEVASTATING WAR, NEEDS ALL OF THE VISION AND DEDICATION POSSESSED BY ITS FOUNDERS IF IT IS TO REALIZE THEIR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

IF I MAY QUOTE THE FAMOUS WORDS OF ANOTHER ENGLISHMAN, JOHN DONNE, "NO MAN IS AN ISLAND ENTIRE OF ITSELF: EVERY MAN IS A PIECE OF THE CONTINENT, A PART OF THE MAIN". WE HAVE GROWN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE INCREASING INTERDEPENDENCE OF OUR WORLD, BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, BUT WE HAVE STILL NOT DRAWN THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. EVERY CONFLICT RUNS THE RISK OF ESCALATING AND THREATENING THE GENERAL PEACE. OUR MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, CAPABLE OF MASS DESTRUCTION, IS ALL TOO LIKELY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GRIM LOGIC AND LEAD TO EVENTS WHICH WE CAN NO LONGER CONTROL.

FACED WITH THIS AWESOME PERSPECTIVE, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE RESOLVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ONLY EXISTING UNIVERSAL MACHINERY FOR SECURITY AND THE SOLUTION OF CONFLICTS, NAMELY THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR ORGANIZATION POSSESSES THE MEANS TO PRESERVE THE FABRIC OF PEACE, BUT ONLY IF IT IS USED DETERMINEDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH YOUR COUNTRY, ~~MADAM-PRIME-MINISTER~~, HAS CONSISTENTLY EXTENDED TO SO MANY OF THE UNITED NATIONS' ENDEAVOURS, THUS RISING TO THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES I HAVE MENTIONED. LET ME ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PAY A PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, WHOSE BRILLIANCE, GOOD WILL AND INTEGRITY I HAVE VALUED MOST DEEPLY.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

I KNOW THAT YOUR STAUNCH PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE IDEALS OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND SELF-FULFILLMENT, AND YOUR ATTACHMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SOURCE OF STRENGTH EVEN IN DIFFICULT TIMES. YOUR RESOLUTION, VISION AND COURAGE INSPIRE THE CONFIDENCE WE NEED IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A LIFE OF JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL HUMANKIND.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO JOIN ME IN A TOAST TO HER EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AND TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.



MR INGHAM

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEVISION INTERVIEWS: ROOM 2818, UN PLAZA

The three breakfast television shows have a combined audience of 14 - 15 million and are closely watched by senior officials and commentators. The Prime Minister's interviews therefore will help set the tone for questions at the Press Conference at the United Nations and the Press Conference after the talks with President Reagan.

2. The style of the breakfast television shows is relaxed and informal. Apart from Mr Hottel (CBS), the interviewers do not have a specialised knowledge of foreign affairs topics. Their objective will be to give the Prime Minister an opportunity to explain her policies in three or four areas: follow up questions are unlikely to be aggressive.

3. The subjects most likely to be covered are:

- a) The Falklands. Future negotiations? US pressure on Britain? UN involvement? Can Britain afford to keep a garrison in the Islands? Effect on NATO? Effect on US relations with Latin America? US sanctions?
- b) Meeting with President Reagan. What will the Prime Minister say to him about the Falklands? What other topics will be discussed?
- c) East-West relations. What prospects of progress on disarmament? Attitude on sanctions against the Soviet Union including the gas pipeline project?
- d) Middle East. Attitude to the Israeli invasion? What can the European Community do?
- e) Britain. Prospects for the economy? Early general election?
- g) Britain and the Community. Effect of dropping of sanctions against Argentina? Budget contribution.

/...



GOOD MORNING AMERICA: (7.12 - 7.22)

"Good Morning America" is the most popular of the three breakfast television programmes with an audience of over six million. The programme's news presenter, Mr Steven Bell, is flying from Washington for the interview. Mr Bell, who is 47, has been with "Good Morning America" since it was launched in 1976. Before that he has had assignments with ABC as a White House correspondent (covering Presidents Nixon and Ford), as a Vietnam war correspondent, and bureau chief in Hong Kong. He frequently covers major overseas events, and was in London for the President's visit earlier this month.

NBC "Today": (7.37 - 7.47)

"Today" is only marginally less popular than its closest rival "Good Morning America". The interview will be conducted by the programme's Washington news presenter, Mr Chris Wallace. Son of one of the best known correspondents in US television, Mr Wallace is one of the youngest senior correspondents in network television. He joined "Today" last year after working on NBC's "Evening News" programme. He made his national reputation with reports from the Conventions in the 1980 election campaign.

CBS "Morning News": (8.12 - 8.20)

CBS' breakfast programme has been considerably less successful in the ratings than its two rivals, but until recently has concentrated more on hard news. The interview will be conducted by Mr Richard Hottelet who has been CBS' UN correspondent since 1960. Mr Hottelet joined CBS as a correspondent in Europe towards the end of World War II and served as Bonn correspondent from 1951 to 1956. As the most distinguished of the networks' UN correspondents he has interviewed many visiting Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, including Lord Carrington. He is likely to focus the discussion in a more searching manner than the other interviewers on United Nations topics.

P M Nixon
BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

cc: Sir A Parsons
Mr Summerhayes
Mr Goulding
Mr Thorne



Mr Coles

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH

1. Since my earlier minute two new guests have been added to the list:

Mr Ismat Kittani, the current President of the General Assembly. A professional Iraqi diplomat of great ability, whose normal post is Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in Baghdad. Chaired the Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference in 1980. A Kurd.

Miss Edmonde Dever, Permanent Representative of Belgium and currently President of the Ten in New York. (She has cancelled a lunch she was giving in honour of Kittani tomorrow in order to be able to accept the Secretary-General's invitation.) She is personable and a good professional diplomat.

MIG →

M I GOULDING

22 June 1982



Mr Coles

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: SECRETARY GENERAL'S LUNCH

1. I submit brief notes on the personalities whom the Secretary General has invited:

Mr Tony Street

Foreign Minister of Australia. Provided staunch support over the Falklands and made a magnificent speech in the Security Council.

Mr and Mrs David Anderson

Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN. He is sound but dull. She is very nice, lively and intelligent; was brought up in New Caledonia.

Mr and Mrs Luc de la Barre de Nanteuil

Permanent Representative of France since January 1982. Career member of the French Diplomatic Service; previously Permanent Representative to the European Communities in Brussels and Ambassador to The Hague. Currently President of the Security Council. A difficult colleague; arrogant and unpredictable. Both he and his wife have good English.

Mrs Francis Pometta

Newly arrived Permanent Observer of Switzerland. Intelligent, sensitive, energetic, un-Swiss.

Mrs Marietta Tree

American socialite and UN buff; at one time a member of the US Mission to the UN. Friend of Roy Jenkins.

Mrs Brooke Astor

Another American socialite and professional hostess.

Mr David Rockefeller

Well known to the Prime Minister.

Mrs Lucille Mair

Jamaican. Special Adviser to UNICEF on Women's development and Secretary General designate of the International Conference on Palestine. Able and ambitious but good company.

/Mr and Mrs B Urquhart

Mr and Mrs Brian Urquhart

He is Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, responsible inter alia for UN peacekeeping forces. The most senior Briton in the Secretariat (joined in 1945). Currently disheartened by the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon. She is American, his second wife, a journalist with Time.

MI Goulding

22 June 1982

MI Goulding

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

R: 2111 22 JUN 82

TELNO 12 OF 22 JUNE 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE F C O.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY : MY TELNO 2205 TO FCO:
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. THE OUTLINE PROGRAMME REMAINS AS IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE BUT THERE ARE ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS OF WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE.
2. HAIG AND I WILL MEET THE PRIME MINISTER AT ANDREWS AIRFORCE BASE TOMORROW AND WILL COME IN TO WASHINGTON WITH HER BY HELICOPTER. THERE WILL BE NO FORMALITIES ON ARRIVAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE ALTHOUGH THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A BRIEF PHOTO CALL.
3. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO START OFF HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TETE-A-TETE IN THE OVAL OFFICE FOR 10-15 MINUTES. THEREAFTER OTHERS WOULD JOIN THE MEETING WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO FIVE A SIDE. ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL BE THE PRESIDENT, HAIG, CLARK, MEESE AND PERHAPS VICE PRESIDENT BUSH. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET BLAIR HOUSE OPENED UP AS AN OFFICE (BECAUSE IT IS UNDERGOING REPAIRS) BUT WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR THOSE MEMBERS OF THE PRIME MINISTERS PARTY NOT INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE ACCOMMODATED IN AN OFFICE IN THE WHITE HOUSE CLOSE TO THE OVAL OFFICE WHERE THERE WILL BE TELEPHONES OPERATING VIA THE WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD. IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO LAY ON A SECURE SPEECH FACILITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE BUT IF ANY MEMBER OF THE PARTY NEEDS TO TALK ON A SECURE LINE TO LONDON THEY CAN COME TO THE EMBASSY TO DO SO. TELEGRAMS WILL BE DELIVERED BY SAFE-HAND TO THE WHITE HOUSE. IF ANY TYPING NEEDS TO BE DONE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WE SUGGEST THAT A PORTABLE TYPEWRITER IS BROUGHT FROM THE VC10.
- ~~4. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW LONG THE RESTRICTED SESSION OF TALKS WILL LAST BUT THE PLAN IS THAT AT SOME STAGE, THERE SHOULD BE A LARGER MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM WHICH, ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, WOULD INVOLVE (IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT, HAIG AND CLARK) WEINBERGER, COMMERCE SECRETARY BALDRIGE (FOR ANY DISCUSSION OF THE PIPELINE JOHN BROWN) MEESE, BAKER AND DEEVER AND ONE OR TWO OTHER OFFICIALS.~~

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- 4 5. AT THE END OF HER TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT SHOULD GO OUT TO THE SOUTH LAWN TO MAKE BRIEF STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS (THERE WILL BE NO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS). THE PRESIDENT WILL THEN TAKE HIS LEAVE OF THE PRIME MINISTER WHO WILL BE TAKEN BY CAR FROM THE WHITE HOUSE TO BLAIR HOUSE WHERE A ROOM WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN CASE THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO PAUSE FOR A FEW MOMENTS BEFORE HER PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1815 APPROX IN THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING NEXT DOOR (IMMEDIATELY BEHIND BLAIR HOUSE).
- 5 6. AT THE END OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL LEAVE BY CAR FOR THE REFLECTING POOL WHERE HAIG WILL TAKE LEAVE OF HER. I WILL GO BY HELICOPTER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.
- 6 7. THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL ENABLE US TO HAVE FOUR ADDITIONAL PLACES AVAILABLE ON THE HELICOPTERS FOR THE JOURNEY FROM WASHINGTON TO ANDREWS. GIVEN THAT ONE OF THE JOURNALISTS (MS VAN HATTEM) WILL NOT BE RETURNING TO LONDON ON THE VC10, THIS WILL MEAN THAT ONLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE PARTY, CANNOT BE ACCOMMODATED ON HELICOPTERS FOR THE RETURN JOURNEY AND WILL THEREFORE NEED TO REMAIN AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO DECIDE IN ADVANCE WHO SHOULD STAY BEHIND.
- 7 8. WE HAVE ARRANGED A MINIBUS FOR THOSE JOURNALISTS WHO WILL BE COMING IN FROM ANDREWS TO ATTEND THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS WILL GET THEM TO THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING IN PLENTY OF TIME. GRATEFUL IF THEY COULD BE FORE-WARNED THAT, IN ORDER TO GET INTO THE CONVOY LEAVING FOR THE REFLECTING POOL AT THE END OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THEY WILL NEED TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY THE PRIME MINISTER DOES. THE HELICOPTER TAKING THE JOURNALISTS TO ANDREWS WILL TAKE OFF AHEAD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S HELICOPTER.

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FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 212328Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 OF 21 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 56: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II

1. MIFT CONTAINS A REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW YORK ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME AND DETAILS OF THE GUEST LIST FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH.
2. WE HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE IF THEY COULD INCLUDE MR GOW MP IN THE LUNCH. UNFORTUNATELY THEY ARE UNABLE TO DO SO AS THE TABLE IS ALREADY FULL. BUT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT ADDING MR GOW TO THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN SHE CALLS ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
3. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE UNABLE TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH MR STREET. THEY UNDERSTOOD. MR STREET WILL BE AT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH.
4. A REVISED VERSION OF THE SPEAKERS' LIST FOR 22 AND 23 JUNE HAS BEEN SENT BY FACSIMILE TO BROUCHER, ACDD. ARGENTINA HAS INSCRIBED TO SPEAK ON THE EVENING OF TUESDAY, 22 JUNE. SIR A PARSONS OR MR WHYTE WILL SPEAK IN REPLY THAT EVENING IF ANY REPLY IS REQUIRED. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ON 23 JUNE.

SUMMERHAYES

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FM WASHINGTON 220033Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2206 OF 21 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. ON THE SUBJECTS LIKELY TO COME UP WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SEES PRESIDENT REAGAN, YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF CURRENT US THINKING:

(A) FALKLANDS

WITH EVIDENT SATISFACTION AT OUR MILITARY VICTORY, ON WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY CONGRATULATED THE PRIME MINISTER WARMLY GOES A DESIRE TO TRY TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE TO US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO EXAGGERATE THAT DAMAGE AND THE EXTENT OF REAL LATIN AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR ARGENTINA. ON THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS, THE AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL POSITION AND WILL TRY TO PRESS ON US THE NEED TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF TALKS AT SOME STAGE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT APPEAR TO REALISE THAT AFTER THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE AND THE LOSS OF LIFE ON OUR SIDE IT IS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT US TO MOVE IN SUCH A DIRECTION NOW. BUT THIS WILL NOT STOP THEM BELIEVING THAT EXERTING PRESSURE ON US WILL HELP THEM WITH THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA: BUT I DOUBT IF THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL TRY TO PRESS SUCH IDEAS AT ALL STRONGLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS OCCASION.

(B) LEBANON

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE CONCENTRATES ON THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE A CEASEFIRE AND DEFUSE THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT. THERE ARE STILL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. WEINBERGER HAS CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI USE OF FORCE IN LEBANON AND IS NOT KEEN ON US PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. OTHERS, INCLUDING HAIG, SEE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON AND PURSUE THE IDEA OF LEBANON FOR THE LEBANESE, WHILE BELIEVING THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PLO AS A MILITARY FORCE MAY REDUCE TENSION IN THE AREA. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT HAIG'S VIEWS WILL PREVAIL. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT OF CREATING ANY EFFECTIVE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AUTHORITY AND THAT, WHATEVER THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE PLO, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY.

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SO THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY CAN BE DEPLOYED IN WEST BEIRUT. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO TALK OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. HAIG WILL BE LOOKING FOR FURTHER SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF AN EXPANDED KEEPING FORCE TO WHICH HE MAY HOPE THE EUROPEANS MIGHT CONTRIBUTE.

(C) EAST/WEST RELATIONS

HAIG HAD A VERY UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITH GROMYKO, ABOUT WHICH HE HAS SENT YOU A MESSAGE. VERY LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE, THOUGH HAIG PROFESSED TO DETECT SOME GLIMMER OF A SUGGESTION THAT

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/THE RUSSIANS

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THE RUSSIANS MAY BE PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT IF ONE CAN BE ACHIEVED. THE AMERICANS SEEM TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HELP IN GETTING THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA.

(D) SIBERIAN PIPELINE

THE PRESIDENT WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE INADEQUATE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT VERSILLES ON THE QUESTION OF CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION; AND AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT WAS COMPOUNDED BY MITTERRAND AND SCHMIDT'S REMARKS AFTERWARDS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT THOSE LIKE HAIG WHO FAVOUR A POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIES AND THE EXEMPTION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CARRY THE DAY. THE US VIEW IS THAT WHILE THEY CANNOT PERSUADE THE EUROPEANS TO GIVE UP THE PIPELINE PROJECT, THEY WILL SEEK TO IMPEDE IT TO THE FULL EXTENT THEY CAN. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY HERE WITH THE PREDICAMENT OF JOHN BROWN (WE ARE RECOGNISED TO HAVE BEEN MORE SUPPORTIVE OF US POLICIES OVER POLAND THAN THE OTHER EUROPEANS). BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT SEEN HOW IT CAN MAKE AN EXCEPTION IN ONE CASE WITHOUT AFFECTING ITS GENERAL POLICY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN MADE WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE EXPECTING THE PRIME MINISTER TO RAISE THE MATTER.

(E) STEEL

THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF IMPRESSING ON THE PRESIDENT THE DANGER OF TRIGGERING A REALLY SERIOUS EEC/US ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION IF THINGS CONTINUE ON THEIR PRESENT COURSE.

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FM WASHINGTON 220030Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2205 OF 21 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. THE WHITE HOUSE ARE CONTENT WITH THE PROPOSED TIMETABLE OUTLINED IN YOUR TELNO 56 TO UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK. ON PRESENT PLANS, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE MET AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE BY HAIG AND WILL FLY FROM THERE BY HELICOPTER TO THE REFLECTING POOL WHICH IS ONLY A FEW MINUTES BY CAR FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. STATE DEPARTMENT ARE ARRANGING FOR TWO HELICOPTERS, WHICH CAN ACCOMMODATE A TOTAL OF 14 PEOPLE ON OUR SIDE. THEY SAY THAT THIS IS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER FOR WHICH THEY EVER CATER AND THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A BIGGER HELICOPTER OR A THIRD HELICOPTER FOR ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AND THE PRESS. WE ARE EXPLORING WAYS AROUND THIS.

2. BLAIR HOUSE IS CLOSED FOR RENOVATIONS. IF IT CANNOT BE OPENED UP TO PROVIDE OFFICE ACCOMMODATION WE WILL FIND A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE. THE PRESS CONFERENCE WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING (BEHIND BLAIR HOUSE). THIS WILL BE EASIER THAN BLAIR HOUSE FROM THE SECURITY POINT OF VIEW. ALL THE FOLLOWING GROUPS WOULD BE INCLUDED: WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS, RESIDENT BRITISH PRESS CORPS AND THOSE TRAVELLING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE TV NETWORKS.

3. THE WHITE HOUSE WILL LET US KNOW TOMORROW WHO WILL BE WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE TALKS, BUT NUMBERS, AT LEAST INITIALLY, ARE LIKELY TO BE LIMITED ON THE AMERICAN SIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, HAIG, CLERK AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS.

4. AGAINST THE ABOVE BACKGROUND, THE OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT IS AS FOLLOWS.

1630 ARRIVE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE. MET BY HAIG, LUCKY ROOSEVELT (HEAD OF PROTOCOL), STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND MYSELF.

BY HELICOPTER TO THE REFLECTING POOL AND THENCE BY CAR TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR

1700- TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

1815

1815- PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

1840

1840 LEAVE BY CAR FOR THE REFLECTING POOL

1850 BY HELICOPTER TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

1910 DEPART ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.

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IN PRACTICE, THE ABOVE TIMINGS MAY SLIP SOMEWHAT: IF THE TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT LAST UNTIL 1815 IT IS UNLIKELY, THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE CAN BEGIN MUCH BEFORE 1830.

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FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 212330Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 21 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIFT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II,

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE NEW YORK ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT (22-23 JUNE):

BEGINS.

TUESDAY 22 JUNE.

20.40 ETA JFK (VC 10)

MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES

MR NIXON WILL ALSO BE PRESENT

21.30 ARRIVE HOTEL - UN PLAZA

WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE.

07.10 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH ABC TV: GOOD MORNING AMERICA
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)

07.40 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH NBC TV: TODAY SHOW
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)

08.10 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH CBS TV: MORNING NEWS
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)

08.45 HAIRDRESSER

09.45 CALL ON SECRETARY-GENERAL: ACCOMPANIED BY SIR A PARSONS,
MR SUMMERHAYES, MR WHITMORE.

10.30 CALL ON PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 38TH FLOOR

11.00 PM TO ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION.

11.30 ACCEPT CONGRATULATIONS (IN INDONESIAN LOUNGE)

12.00 ON RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN (CONFERENCE ROOM 4)

12.40 SEPARATE INTERVIEWS AT UN (STUDIO 8) WITH:

BBC RADIO : PAUL REYNOLDS OR JAMES LONG

BBC TV : MARTIN DELI

~~Handwritten scribble~~

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BBC TV : MARTIN BELL
ITN : TREVOR McDONALD
IRN : ANDREW MANDERSTAM

13.15 LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 3 SUTTON PLACE - GUEST LIST
BELOW: PERSONALITY NOTES WILL BE PROVIDED.
14.40 DEPART BY CAR FOR KENNEDY AIRPORT
15.20 DEPART KENNEDY AIRPORT FOR WASHINGTON.

ENDS

2. FOLLOWING IS GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH:

BEGINS

SECRETARY-GENERAL	
PRIME MINISTER	
MR TONY STREET	AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
MR AND MRS DAVID ANDERSON	AUSTRALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
MR AND MRS LUC DE LA BARRE	FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
DE NANTEUIL	
MR AND MRS BRIAN URQUHART	UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS
	SWISS PERMANENT OBSERVER
MRS FRANCES POMETTA	
MRS MARIETTA TREE	
MRS BROOKE ASTOR	
MR DAVID ROCKEFELLER	
MRS LUCILLE MAIR	SPECIAL ADVISER TO UNICEF ON WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
SIR ANTHONY PARSONS	
MR DAVID SUMMERHAYES	
MR AND MRS HAMILTON WHYTE	
MR C A WHITMORE	

ENDS

SUMMERHAYES

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For Charles

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FM FCO 211230Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1213 OF 21 JUNE

FROM CONFERENCE SECTION. FOR MISS B. DAVIS

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 23 JUNE

1. PASSENGER LIST ON RAF VC10 AS FOLLOWS:- (NOT IN PROTOCOL ORDER)

1. THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP
 2. MR C A WHITMORE, PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY
 3. MR A J COLES, PRIVATE SECRETARY
 4. MR B INGHAM, CHIEF PRESS SECRETARY
 5. MR H COLVER, PRESS OFFICER
 6. MR I GOW MP, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVATE SECRETARY
 7. MISS C STEVENS , DUTY CLERK
 8. MRS D GREEN , SECRETARIAL ASSISTANT
 9. MRS R MEADOWCROFT, SECRETARIAL ASSISTANT
 10. SUPT G CAWTHORNE , DETECTIVE
 11. SGT B STREVENS , DETECTIVE
 12. MR D H GILLMORE CMG , AUSS, FCO
 13. MR J ENSOLL, COI
 14. MR C HAMPSON, DAILY MIRROR
 15. MR D HEALY, PRESS ASSOCIATION
 16. MR D BUCHAN, DAILY STAR
 17. MR R CARROLL, THE SUN
 18. MR J WIGHTMAN, DAILY TELEGRAPH
 19. MS M VAN HALTEM, FINANCIAL TIMES
 20. MR G GREIG, DAILY MAIL.
2. ALL PASSENGERS SHOULD BE AIRLIFTED BY HELICOPTER TO WHITE HOUSE/BLAIR HOUSE. GRATEFUL IF PRIVATE OFFICE COULD BE SET UP IN BLAIR HOUSE. PLEASE SEND RELEVANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS. AN ENGINEER SHOULD BE IN PRIVATE OFFICE ON PARTY'S ARRIVAL TO INSTALL SECURE SPEECH DEVICE, WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT BY DUTY CLERK.

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3. A SAFEHAND SERVICE BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND PRIVATE OFFICE IN BLAIR HOUSE SHOULD OPERATE AS REQUIRED FOR DURATION OF VISIT.
4. THE DUTY CLERK WILL NOT BRING ALL BOXES OFF THE VC10. A SECURITY OFFICER FROM THE EMBASSY SHOULD THEREFORE BE AT THE AIRPORT FOR THE AIRCRAFT'S ARRIVAL AND REMAIN ON BOARD UNTIL PARTY'S DEPARTURE.

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From the Private Secretary

21 June, 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

I discussed the draft programme for this visit with the Prime Minister in the light of President Reagan's request at the weekend that she should if possible make time for a brief discussion with him.

I enclose a copy of the programme as we now see it. You will note that we have deleted the bilateral meeting with the Australian Foreign Minister. There will be no time for this - and the Prime Minister received him in London recently. Perhaps appropriate apologies could be made.

Our Press Section will make the media arrangements direct with those concerned.

I have considered whether, in view of the inclusion of Washington, we should expand the team of advisers. But I do not think this is necessary. We should be grateful if David Gilmore would accompany us throughout.

A. J. COLES

B Fall, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

POSSIBLE REVISED PROGRAMME FOR WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE

?0700 Breakfast TV (in hotel)

0900 Hairdresser

0945 Call on Secretary General

1030 Call on President of General Assembly

1100 Prime Minister to address Special Session

1130 Accept congratulations

1200 On record Press Conference at UN

1240 BBC Radio, BBC TV, ITN, IRN interviews

1315 Lunch with Secretary General

1445/1500 Depart by helicopter to Kennedy Airport

1515 Depart Kennedy Airport

1630 Arrive Andrew's Airport, Washington

1655 Arrive White House by helicopter

1700-1800/1815 Talks with President Reagan

1815-1840 Press Conference

1840 Depart White House by helicopter

1905 Depart Andrew's Airport, Washington

0730, Thursday, 24 June - Arrive UK

NEW YORK BRIEFS

1. Steering Brief
2. Points to Make
3. Falkland Islands
4. Middle East
5. Iran/Iraq War
6. Global Negotiations

WASHINGTON BRIEFS

- (a) Existing Contracts (John Brown)
- (b) US Steel Measures
- (c) Middle East
- (d) Falklands

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 22/23 JUNE

STEERING BRIEF

1. Attachments

- (a) Programme;
- (b) UN Secretary-General: Personality Note;
- (c) President of the General Assembly: Personality Note;
- (d) Members of UK Delegation;
- (e) List of Speakers;
- (f) Guest list for Secretary-General's lunch;
- (g) Brief on UNSSD II.

2. Introduction

Leaders or foreign ministers of all major countries have attended UNSSD II. The Non-Aligned are critical of the nuclear powers for the lack of progress in disarmament since UNSSD I in 1978. Groups pressing for more rapid progress have organised actions of protest.

3. Objectives

- (a) To emphasise to the international community and our own public that we will match our justifiable defence policies with a realistic and constructive approach to disarmament;
- (b) to promote Western cohesion on disarmament issues;
- (c) to maintain support for non-proliferation;
- (d) to resist Soviet and Non-Aligned propaganda and to reject unrealistic disarmament proposals;
- (e) to gain support for our policies in the South Atlantic;
- (f) to cement relations with the new Secretary-General.

4. Tactical Handling

Meeting with the Secretary-General

He will want to concentrate on the two crises in his first few

/months

months in office: the Falklands and the Lebanon. It would be appropriate to thank him for the great effort he made to help over the Falklands. The Prime Minister might also mention that she is looking forward to seeing him and his wife when they visit London in July. (She is offering him lunch.) His understanding of spoken English is not as good as might appear, though he speaks it quite well.

The Prime Minister will lunch with the Secretary-General. The guests will include the Australian Foreign Minister, who asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Meeting with Mr Kittani, President of the General Assembly

This is purely a courtesy call. Sir A Parsons can advise if required.

Speech

The Prime Minister will be the first speaker of the day. She will be followed by Spain (possibly the Spanish Foreign Minister) and, in the afternoon, by Mr Street, the Australian Foreign Minister. Other speakers that day are from minor Third World countries.

The Belgian Foreign Minister spoke on the first day of the debate on behalf of the Ten. Other Western leaders have included President Reagan, Chancellor Schmidt and M. Cheysson. Mr Gromyko spoke on 14 June.

TV and Press Interviews

Arrangements are being made by No 10 direct with UKMis New York.

5. Other briefing

Separate briefing has been submitted on the Falklands and the Middle East and on the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

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FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 212328Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 OF 21 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 56: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II

1. MIFT CONTAINS A REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW YORK ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME AND DETAILS OF THE GUEST LIST FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH.

2. WE HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE IF THEY COULD INCLUDE MR GOW MP IN THE LUNCH. UNFORTUNATELY THEY ARE UNABLE TO DO SO AS THE TABLE IS ALREADY FULL. BUT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT ADDING MR GOW TO THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN SHE CALLS ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

3. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE UNABLE TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH MR STREET. THEY UNDERSTOOD. MR STREET WILL BE AT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH.

4. A REVISED VERSION OF THE SPEAKERS' LIST FOR 22 AND 23 JUNE HAS BEEN SENT BY FACSIMILE TO BROUCHER, ACDD. ARGENTINA HAS INSCRIBED TO SPEAK ON THE EVENING OF TUESDAY, 22 JUNE. SIR A PARSONS OR MR WHYTE WILL SPEAK IN REPLY THAT EVENING IF ANY REPLY IS REQUIRED. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ON 23 JUNE.

SUMMERHAYES

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DESKBY 220800Z

FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 212330Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 21 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIFT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II,

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE NEW YORK ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT (22-23 JUNE):

BEGINS

TUESDAY 22 JUNE.

20.40 ETA JFK (VC 10)

MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES

MR NIXON WILL ALSO BE PRESENT

21.30 ARRIVE HOTEL - UN PLAZA

WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE.

07.10 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH ABC TV: GOOD MORNING AMERICA
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)

07.40 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH NBC TV: TODAY SHOW
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)

08.10 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH CBS TV: MORNING NEWS
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)

08.45 HAIRDRESSER

09.45 CALL ON SECRETARY-GENERAL: ACCOMPANIED BY SIR A PARSONS,
MR SUMMERHAYES, MR WHITMORE.

10.30 CALL ON PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 38TH FLOOR

11.00 PM TO ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION.

11.30 ACCEPT CONGRATULATIONS (IN INDONESIAN LOUNGE)

12.00 ON RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN (CONFERENCE ROOM 4)

12.40 SEPARATE INTERVIEWS AT UN (STUDIO 8) WITH:

BBC RADIO : PAUL REYNOLDS OR JAMES LONG

BBC TV : MARTIN BELL

ITN : TREVOR MCDONALD

IRN : ANDREW MANDERSTAM

13.15 LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 3 SUTTON PLACE - GUEST LIST
BELOW: PERSONALITY NOTES WILL BE PROVIDED.

14.40 DEPART BY CAR FOR KENNEDY AIRPORT

15.20 DEPART KENNEDY AIRPORT FOR WASHINGTON.

ENDS

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2. FOLLOWING IS GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH:

BEGINS

SECRETARY-GENERAL

PRIME MINISTER

MR TONY STREET

MR AND MRS DAVID ANDERSON

MR AND MRS LUC DE LA BARRE

DE NANTEUIL

MR AND MRS BRIAN URQUHART

MRS FRANCES POMETTA

MRS MARIETTA TREE

MRS BROOKE ASTOR

MR DAVID ROCKEFELLER

MRS LUCILLE MAIR

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

MR DAVID SUMMERHAYES

MR AND MRS HAMILTON WHYTE

MR C A WHITMORE

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

AUSTRALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SWISS PERMANENT OBSERVER

SPECIAL ADVISER TO UNICEF ON
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

ENDS

SUMMERHAYES

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B

MR JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

1. Born 1920 in Lima. Graduated in Law from the Catholic University, Lima, 1943. Joined the Peruvian Diplomatic Service 1944 and served in the Peruvian Embassies in Paris, London, La Paz and Rio. From 1964 he was successively Ambassador in Berne, Head of the Foreign Ministry, Peru's first Ambassador in Moscow, and Permanent Representative at the UN. In October 1975 he became the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, and, after a brief interlude as Peruvian Ambassador in Caracas, was appointed UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs in 1979. He later became the Secretary-General's Personal Representative for Afghanistan and at the Rhodesian independence elections. He resigned in May 1981 and was nominated Peruvian Ambassador to Brazil but his appointment became a political issue in the Peruvian Parliament, and he left the service of the Peruvian Government the same year.
2. In the 1981 contest for the Secretary-Generalship he became one of the compromise candidates only after Waldheim and Salim (Tanzania) agreed to withdraw from the contest. The Russians immediately made clear that he was the only one they could accept. In the subsequent ballot he received the necessary nine votes. His nearest rival gained ten but was vetoed by the Russians.
3. He is an able diplomat, non-Latin in temperament, self-effacing and modest. He shuns the limelight, thinks hard before acting, and has said that he does not want to serve more than one term. He regards his years in London and Paris as formative and professes special admiration for the UK. His attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Falklands crisis were scrupulously impartial. The failure was not his fault.
4. He speaks perfect French. His English is less good and he does not always understand what is said. His spoken English is better and he handles questions from the media adroitly.
5. His first marriage, by which he had two children, ended in divorce. His second wife is Marcela Temple de Perez de Cuellar, a Peruvian, whose father is of British origin.

ISMAT KITTANI (Iraq)

President of UN General Assembly since September 1981

GENERAL

Born 1929. Kurd, from leading family near Amadiyah. Career diplomat in Iraqi Diplomatic Service through successive revolutions. Made his peace with present government after 1968 coup.

EDUCATION, POSTS IN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND UN

BA in political sciences, Lux College USA. Joined Iraqi MFA 1952. From 1953-1981 occupied various diplomatic and UN posts including Under-Secretary of Iraqi MFA and Assistant Secretary-General. Secretary-General Baghdad Arab Summit Conference, November 1978. Chairman of Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Geneva, August 1980.

ELECTION TO POST OF ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT

Position rotates annually between main regional groupings. Usually grouping concerned agrees a nomination and Assembly endorses. Last year, unusually, contested election with candidates from Iraq, Singapore and Bangladesh.

PERSONALITY AND PERFORMANCE IN POST

Kittani has considerable intelligence and charm, as well as being professionally very competent. Westernised. There had been fears that he might be unable to preside impartially because of Iraq's war with Iran. However, he has fulfilled his office without any suggestion of bias and has been an able and effective President.

UK DELEGATION TO UNSSD II

Sir A Parsons GCMG MVO MC
Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr D M Summerhayes CMG
Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr L J Middleton
Counsellor, Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

~~Mr J S Chick
Heads of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, FCO~~

Mr N A Thorne, First Secretary

Mrs J I Link, First Secretary

Mr R A Pullen, First Secretary

Miss J E F Wright, Third Secretary

Footnote

Mr Frank Judd, former Labour Minister and Director of VSO, has agreed to act as independent adviser to the Delegation in liaison with NGOs.

E

UNSSD II: General Debate (8-23 June)

Copies to: H of C
UKDIS Geneva in NY
ACDD, FCO
UND, FCO

Speakers List as at: 10 June

(P = President; PM = Prime Minister; FM = Foreign Minister;
PR = Permanent Representative)

R of R = Right of Reply

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UNSSD II
SECRET

Tuesday, 8 June

AM

1. Singapore
2. Morocco (DFM)
3. Belgium (FM)
4. Sweden (PM)
- 5.

PM

1. Iran (FM)
2. Democràtic Yemen (FM)
3. Sierra Leone/
4. Qatar
5. Samoa

R of R = Iraq

Wednesday, 9 June

AM

1. Mexico (FM)
2. Thailand (DFM)
3. Austria (FM)
4. Brazil
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.

PM

1. Sri Lanka (FM)
2. Japan (PM)
3. Kuwait
4. Venezuela
5. Portugal
6. Maldives (FM)
7. /

/ = Changes from last version (4 June)

Thursday, 10 June

Yugoslavia (Head of State)

AM

1. /
2. GDR (FM)
3. Pakistan (FM)
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.

PM

1. Afghanistan (FM)
 2. Indonesia (FM)/
 3. Finland (PM)/
 4. Angola (FM)/
 5. Jordan (FM)/
 6. Ghana/
 7. UNESCO/
-

Friday, 11 June

Cyprus (President)

AM

1. Ireland (PM)
2. Philippines
3. China (FM)
4. Holy See/
5. Hungary (FM)/
- 6.

PM

1. Algeria (FM)
 2. France (FM)
 3. India (FM)
 4. Congo (FM)
 5. Zaire
 6. Seychelles (FM)
-

Monday, 14 June

Panama (Head of State)

AM

1. FRG (PM)
2. Poland (FM)/
3. Madagascar
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

PM

1. Peru
 2. New Zealand
 3. Denmark (PM)/
 4. Zambia (FM)
 5. Uganda (PM)/
 6. Mozambique (FM)
 7. Senegal (FM)/
 8. Chile (FM)
-

Tuesday, 15 June

AM

1. Italy (PM)
2. USSR (FM)/
3. Luxembourg (FM)
4. Norway (PM)
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

PM

1. Iceland (FM)
 2. Netherlands (PM)/
 3. Niger
 4. Nigeria (FM)/
 5. Vietnam (DFM)
 6. Guyana
 7. Sudan
 8. Botswana/
-

Wednesday, 16 June

AM

1. Cuba (V. President)
2. Czechoslovakia (FM)
3. Spain
4. Cameroon
5. Turkey (FM)/
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

PM

1. UNITED KINGDOM (PM)
 2. Nepal
 3. Mali
 4. Nicaragua
 5. Suriname
 6. Dem Kampuchea
 7. Mongolia (FM)/
 8. IAEA/
-

Thursday, 17 June

USA (President)

AM

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

PM

1. Bangladesh (PM)
 2. Malta (FM)/
 3. Bulgaria (FM)
 4. Burma
 5. Jamaica (FM)
 6. Ethiopia/
 7. Iraq/
 8. Albania/
-

Friday, 18 June

AM

1. Israel (PM)
2. Bahamas
3. Canada (PM)
4. Greece (FM)
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.

PM

1. Honduras (FM)/
 2. Kenya
 3. Malaysia/
 4. Libya
 5. Bahrain
 6. Zimbabwe (FM)
 7. Cape Verde
 8. Argentina/
 9. Antigua and Barbuda/
-

Monday, 21 June

AM

1. Upper Volta (FM)
2. Ukraine (FM)
3. Somalia
4. Gabon
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

PM

1. Bhutan
 2. Egypt
 3. Tanzania (FM)
 4. Burundi (FM)
 5. Yemen
 6. Syria
 7. Uruguay
 8. Dominican Republic/
 9. Guinea/
 10. UNEP/
-

Up-to-date version as at 5 pm on 21 June

Tuesday, 22 June

AM

1. Fiji (PR)
2. Byelorussia SSR (FM)
3. Romania (FM)
4. Lebanon
5. Tunisia
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

PM

1. Papua New Guinea (PR)
 2. Benin
 3. Trinidad & Tobago
 4. Rwanda
 5. Togo
 6. Mauritania
 7. St Vincent & Grenadine (FM)
 8. Argentina
 9. Oman
 10. Arab League
-

Wednesday, 23 June

AM

1. UNITED KINGDOM (PM)
2. Spain
3. Grenada (FM)
4. Colombia (FM)
5. UNDP
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

PM

1. Bolivia
 2. Lao
 3. Australia (FM)
 4. United Arab Emirates
 5. Guyana
 6. Mauritius
 7. Liberia
 8. Costa Rica
-

F

GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH

Secretary-General

Prime Minister

Mr Tony Street

Australian Foreign Minister

Mr and Mrs David Anderson

Australian Permanent Representative

Mr and Mrs Luc de la Barre
de Nanteuil

French Permanent Representative

Mr and Mrs Brian Urquhart

Under-Secretary-General for Special
Political Affairs

Mrs Frances Pometta

Swiss Permanent Observer

Mrs Marietta Tree

Mrs Brooke Astor

Mr David Rockefeller

Mrs Lucille Mair

Special Adviser to UNICEF on
Women's Development

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr David Summerhayes

Mr and Mrs Hamilton Whyte

Mr C A Whitmore

G

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 22/23 JUNE

UNSSD II

Points to Make

1. Welcome discussion of disarmament. Nuclear disarmament must be balanced by measures in non-nuclear field. Security of nuclear weapon states depends on balance of deterrence.
2. Special Session can give fresh impetus to disarmament negotiations taking place outside United Nations, eg INF, MBFR, START.
3. Need a practical and realistic approach. Declaratory proposals are no use. Must work for specific verifiable agreements; hence our support for renewed US/USSR negotiations on nuclear weapons.
4. Need for constructive approach. States view their security requirements differently. But search for common ground, for specific and achievable agreements must continue.
5. Comprehensive programme of disarmament has to be flexible. No place for legal language, or predetermined timetable of negotiations.

/Background

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 22/23 JUNE

UNSSD II

Background

1. The main items on the agenda of UNSSD II are a review of progress since UNSSD I in 1978, consideration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and a review of UN disarmament machinery. The dates of the Session are 7 June - 9 July.
2. UNSSD II is dominated by the strength of feeling among the non-aligned over the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations and notably on nuclear questions, to which they attach overriding importance. The nuclear powers, and particularly the US, are coming under heavy criticism.
3. The 'Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament' (CPD), commissioned by UNSSD I, has been under negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament (CD). Discussions in the CD showed a wide gulf between the non-aligned, who demand a legally binding programme with a strict time-frame which lays emphasis on achieving nuclear disarmament in the early stages, and the West, which is aiming for a more realistic programme with no artificial time constraints. The Soviet Union and its allies favour a vague, declaratory approach. No real progress was made in the CD and differences will have to be resolved or circumvented at UNSSD II itself. Work is now proceeding in drafting groups under direction of a working group.
4. UNSSD II is a focus of attention by the peace movements, and demonstrations and protests have occurred. Up to 150 representatives of British Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have attended. Mr Frank Judd, Director of the VSO and former Labour Minister is acting as independent adviser to the UK Delegation in liaison with NGOs.
5. Among the statements made at UNSSD II, those of President Reagan and Mr Gromyko have attracted most public attention. President Reagan reiterated his four proposals for arms control: the
/elimination

elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles; a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads; a substantial reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces; and new safeguards to reduce the risk of accidental war. He also proposed a conference to develop the UN instrument for reporting of military budgets. Mr Gromyko's speech included a message from President Brezhnev pledging the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. He also announced that the Soviet Union would be placing part of its peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system: a welcome move.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE
UNSSD II

Points to Make

1. Welcome Special Session. Hope it will give fresh impetus to disarmament negotiations taking place outside United Nations, eg INF, MBFR, START.
2. Need a practical and realistic approach. Declaratory proposals are no use. Must work for specific verifiable agreements; hence our support for renewed US/USSR negotiations on nuclear weapons.
3. Need for constructive approach. States view their security requirements differently. But search for common ground, for specific and achievable agreements must continue.
4. Comprehensive programme of Disarmament has to be flexible. No place for legal language, or predetermined timetable of negotiations.
5. Measures of nuclear disarmament will, of course, have a high priority but must be balanced by parallel measures in non-nuclear field; security of nuclear weapon states depends on possession of such weapons as a deterrent.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

UNSSD II

Background

1. The main items on the agenda of UNSSD II are a review of progress since UNSSD I in 1978, consideration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and a review of UN disarmament machinery. The dates of the Session are 7 June - 9 July.
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4. UNSSD II will be a focus of attention by the peace movements, and demonstrations and protests are to be expected.

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Up to 150 representatives of British Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) will attend. Mr Frank Judd, Director of the VSO and former Labour Minister is acting as independent adviser to the UK delegation in liaison with NGOs.

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

POINTS TO MAKE

APPRECIATE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS

1. We are grateful for your sustained attempts to create the conditions necessary for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. There is considerable admiration in Britain for your untiring commitment, which has I believe strengthened the standing of the UN.

OUR MILITARY ACTION FORCED ON US BY ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE

2. We are still faced after 10 weeks with continuing Argentine intransigence in their refusal to implement Security Council Resolution 502 and withdraw their forces. The conflict was forced on us against our will. But we were obliged to resort to military action in self-defence, and to protect the Falkland Islanders. We cannot allow the Argentines to maintain or consolidate their position on the Islands. We remain open to diplomatic progress; but you must be as doubtful as we are of the prospect of a change of heart in Buenos Aires.

WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT ARGENTINE DEPARTURE WILL BRING AN END TO HOSTILITIES

3. Our objectives are clear and limited. The Argentine forces must leave. We have absolutely no wish to prolong hostilities beyond the point where all Argentine forces have left the Islands. We sincerely hope that Argentina will recognise this, and will be prepared to adopt a similar position.

NEXT REQUIREMENT IS RECONSTRUCTION

4. We are already giving urgent attention to the economic and social rehabilitation and further development of the Islands, and the possible options for their future political development and security. However, these are difficult and complex tasks, and cannot be undertaken hurriedly. We hope that once peace and proper administration are reestablished we will be able to call on the understanding and cooperation of the international community, including organs of the United Nations, in the process of renewal. We trust that the international community will respond. Everyone's best interests lie in a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the region.



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

BACKGROUND

1. The Secretary-General's actions in the crisis so far have been:

(a) 6-19 May

The Secretary-General held a series of consultations in New York with the British and Argentine UN representatives, leading up to the British draft interim agreement of 17 May and the Argentine response of 19 May.

(b) 19 May

The Secretary-General tabled an Aide Memoire.

In reply we said that we would need to see substantive Argentine reaction before we could respond in detail to the Aide Memoire. No substantive Argentine response received.

(c) 26 May

Security Council Resolution 505 gave Secretary-General a mandate for further exchanges which he pursued.

(d) 31 May

Secretary-General put forward a 5 point plan. We said it was unacceptable. The Argentines made their acceptance subject to impossible conditions.

(e) 2 June

Secretary-General reported the lack of progress to the Security Council.

(f) 5 June

After the vetoing of Panamanian/Spanish Security Council

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/resolution

CONFIDENTIAL



resolution on 4 June

Secretary-General put forward further proposals in a confidential message to the Prime Minister and to President Galtieri. We and the Argentines responded that they were unacceptable.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Original brief filed
in Washington with letter
as brief D.

Reonh

D. J. Clark

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Secretary-General and President Reagan are likely to be concerned about:

- i. our immediate intentions with regard to the remaining prisoners of war and economic sanctions, the total exclusion zone, and the 12-mile limit;
- ii. our longer term intentions for the future of the Islands;
- iii. relations with Latin America.

Immediate Intentions

2. Our aim since the fall of Port Stanley has been to secure an assurance from the Argentines that they regard hostilities in the South Atlantic as at an end. None has been forthcoming. The Argentine Note of 18 June to the UN Secretary-General, which talks of a 'de facto cessation of hostilities', is not at all the same thing. In these circumstances we must put first the safety of the Islanders and of our forces, and it would be wrong at this stage to lift the TEZ or the 12-mile limit. At the same time we shall not be maintaining our full strength on the Islands. About 4,000 troops are expected to return home shortly. We shall also be sending out sappers to help get the Islands running properly again.

3. Our European partners have decided that their economic measures against Argentina should be lifted since 'it is possible to hope that hostilities are now definitely at an end', but the Ten stressed that if this expectation was not fulfilled, a new situation would arise to which the Ten would have to react immediately. The Ten also agreed that

/decisions

decisions to stop arms supplies to Argentina would remain in force. We for our part will maintain for the time being economic measures against Argentina. We hope that the non-EC countries which have undertaken sanctions will do the same. It is especially important that an arms embargo be maintained.

4. As for prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention obliges us to return POWs after the cessation of active hostilities. We are not satisfied that this stage has yet been reached. We shall need to see what happens once the political situation in Buenos Aires has become clearer. But we have continued our humanitarian policy of returning POWs quickly, and nearly 11,000 have been taken back to Argentina in the last few days - for the most part in better condition than when they surrendered.

The Future of the Islands

5. Our first tasks have been humanitarian: to return as soon as possible the great majority of the prisoners of war, including all the wounded, and to clear up the mess on the Islands so that the Islanders can resume their way of life. This latter task is more difficult than we had expected and will consume much of our energies in the near future. Indiscriminately laid mines have to be cleared, and much of the Islands' infrastructure must be repaired.

6. We are not wedded to the exact status quo on the Islands. As life returns to normal we shall be able to give attention to the future, in consultation with the Islanders. In accordance with the principle of self-determination one way forward would be for the Islanders' elected representatives to have an expanded role in the government of the Islands. Our aim will be to allow them to live secure and prosperous lives on the basis of friendly relations with neighbouring countries. But we cannot rush into decisions on how this can best be done. It is in any

/case

case totally unrealistic to expect that after all the traumas the Islanders have been through, and the British lives lost, we should now sit down and negotiate with Argentina on her sovereignty claim.

Relations with Latin America

7. We recognise the need to restore relations of confidence with the region. While damage done to Western/Latin American relations should not be exaggerated, we will be moving to mend fences with tact and urgency, both bilaterally and with our European partners. We should like the Falkland Islands to be able to live in peace and harmony with the region.

8. We recognise also the difficulties which US support for us had caused for their relations with Latin America and we understand that they will wish to move quickly to repair the damage. In the longer term, we see advantage in involving countries of the region in the Falklands' security and economic development. We also wish to build relations of friendship and confidence with the countries of Latin America.

The Role of the UN

9. The Secretary-General may ask the Prime Minister what role we see for the UN and perhaps for the Secretary-General himself in the future. Perez de Cuellar has told Sir Anthony Parsons that he will have to tell the Prime Minister that he cannot ignore his 'mandate', and that he will ask her how long she thinks it will be before we can contemplate any kind of negotiation. (The Secretary-General presumably has in mind SCR 505 which requested him to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, and urged Britain and Argentina to cooperate with him 'with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands').

/10.

10. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his tremendous efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis - which failed through Argentine intransigence and not through any fault of his - but we do not want him to launch any new initiatives. What is needed now is a pause for rehabilitation and reflection. In these changed circumstances we do not see a role at present for the UN.

The Role of the US

11. We are grateful to President Reagan for his message of congratulations as well as for US support, especially military supplies, during the crisis. We agree that a just war requires a just peace; but it is the Islanders who have suffered injustice. President Reagan may wish to expand the three elements relating to the future of his message:

- i. enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic. We agree with the need for this. We would welcome American ideas on, and participation in, arrangements which could guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. (If President Reagan asks about the implications of maintaining forces in the South Atlantic for our defence commitment to NATO, the Prime Minister might say that there will need to be adjustments in our defence posture but that these will be within the framework of last year's defence policy review.)
- ii. mitigation of Argentine hostility. We too want this, and have not ourselves sought a quarrel. But the initiative must surely be with Argentina.
- iii. improvement in the relations of both UK and US with Argentina. We too are keen to achieve this. Have the Americans any plans for a programme of

/economic

economic assistance to Argentina as a
stabilising and confidence-building measure?
Any other American ideas?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

21 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Revised

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: 23 JUNE

MIDDLE EAST

Points to makeLebanon

1. We share hope that the Israeli invasion may have created a situation/ⁱⁿwhich a new consensus can be found in Lebanon, freed from the worst of the Syrian and Palestinian pressures. But before reconciliation in Lebanon can be effective, Lebanon must be freed from Israeli pressure too. Any arrangement negotiated while Israeli troops are there will be bitterly opposed inside and outside Lebanon and cannot last.

Palestine

2. Lebanon for the Lebanese is only possible if there can be at least part of Palestine for the Palestinians. Glad your message acknowledges the importance of the Palestinian question. In this respect Israeli action is misguided, if the purpose is as Israel has stated to destroy the structure of terrorism. If they attack Beirut and destroy the PLO leadership there, the result will be despair throughout the Palestinian Diaspora, and probably the return to terrorism as their only option. Destroy Arafat and Qaddumi: what is left but Habash and Abu Nidal? Your people are concentrating on trying to make autonomy work, but even if they succeed autonomy is unfortunately irrelevant to the majority of Palestinians who remain outside the territories in which it would apply.

Threat to Beirut

3. Must at all costs prevent the appalling bloodshed of an attack on Beirut. No one in the Middle East will believe that you have not got the leverage to stop it. Urge you to declare publicly before the event that, whatever the position up to now, this use of US arms could not be described as

/self-

self-defence.

Peacekeeping

4. The international force which will no doubt be needed will face political difficulties, and we must keep closely in touch. We supported your move to extend UNIFIL's mandate. We believe the best approach is to start from the existing UN force, UNIFIL, and if possible stay within the UN framework. A non-UN force (Sinai style) would risk being damned as doing the Israelis' work in Lebanon for them.

Humanitarian Aid

5. The British Government has pledged almost £250,000 of humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict in Lebanon. This is being channelled through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Lebanese Red Cross and other agencies. We are also contributing through the European Community to an ICRC appeal.

Anglo-US talks

6. Glad you can accept that we should have official discussions on all this. Look forward to seeing your people in London as soon as possible.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

POINTS TO MAKE

Middle East

Lebanon

1. Must achieve Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in accordance with SCR 509. Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. UN important role to play in any future arrangements to restore peace in the area. Perhaps some lessons to be learned for future operations of UNIFIL. But we have to be realistic about what UN forces can do.

2. Do not understand Israeli claim to be acting in accordance with Article 51 of UN Charter and parallels she is drawing with our action in the Falklands. Differences are plain. Argentinians invaded British territory and then refused to obey Security Council's call for withdrawal. So we had to act. Israel has invaded Lebanon in disregard of Lebanon's sovereignty. Of course Israel has security concerns. But this is not the way to protect her citizens. Palestinian problem has to be tackled at its roots, and peacefully.

Arab/Israel

3. Lebanon tragedy underlines importance of reaching comprehensive settlement protecting both Palestinian right to self-determination, and Israel's right to security. Ten will continue to work actively towards this goal. Will remain closely in touch with US who have crucial role to play.

/Background

BACKGROUND

Lebanon (map attached) (Updating will be provided as necessary)

1. As of 9 June Israeli activity had widened considerably to include attacks on Tripoli (over 40 miles north of Beirut), a landing near a PLO naval base 10 miles north of there, and on the outskirts of Beirut, and massive air attacks on Syrian missile bases in the Beka'a valley. Israel has therefore gone far beyond her stated objectives of establishing a 40 kms buffer zone. Some members of the Israeli government undoubtedly see an opportunity to restructure the Lebanon in such a way as to exclude the Syrians and PLO forces. We see such an objective as unrealistic and attempts to achieve it highly dangerous.
2. UNIFIL is still in Southern Lebanon although some troop contributors (Norwegian, Irish) want to pull out. The UN Secretariat is threatening to remove the force altogether. It is not yet clear what future role the Israelis or Americans have in mind for UN forces once a ceasefire has been established. But extension of UNIFIL northwards eg to north of Sidon (the 40 kms line) would need many more troops, and, more important, USSR approval. This seems unlikely to be forthcoming, especially as the Israelis seem to envisage an enhanced role for Major Haddad who has hitherto controlled, with Israeli support, an enclave north of the Israel/Lebanon border. Negotiations will therefore be extremely difficult. A further complicating factor is that UNIFIL's present mandate will expire on 19 June.
3. Copies of SCR's 508 and 509 and Sir A Parson's explanation of vote are attached, together with the statement issued in Versailles on 6 June.

Arab/Israel

4. The Lebanese Crisis is dominating Middle East diplomacy both in the region and at the UN. But when the fighting has died down, the Palestinian problem will remain. The Arab world will expect the Europeans to redouble their efforts with the Americans in the face of the latest Israeli onslaught. It is too early to say how the military defeat of the PLO in Lebanon will affect attitudes among the Arabs to a negotiated settlement. But continuing activity by the Europeans to promote a settlement offering real security to all the parties will be essential if there is to be any hope of drawing the Moderate Arabs and the Americans closer together in the medium term. Preparations are in hand for a statement to be issued by the European Council (28-29 June) reaffirming the Ten's commitment to diplomacy based on the Venice principles.

GPS 300
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M UKMIS NEW YORK 052345Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 060800Z)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 942 OF 5 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 508.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978), 426 (1978) AND
THE ENSUING RESOLUTIONS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY, SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 501 (1982).

TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTERS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
LEBANON DATED 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15161 AND S/15162),
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE DETERIORATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN
LEBANON AND IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA, AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY,
INDEPENDENCE, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON,
REAFFIRMING AND SUPPORTING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AND
THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15163), AS
WELL AS THE URGENT APPEAL ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 4 JUNE
1982,

TAKING NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

1. CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS
THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND NO LATER THAN 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME
ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982:

2. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO
BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR UPON THOSE CONCERNED SO THAT THE CESS-
ATION OF HOSTILITIES DECLARED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 490
(1981) CAN BE RESPECTED:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDER TAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS
TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS
RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF
THIS RESOLUTION.

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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DESKBY 070800Z (FCO)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070301Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 6 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN WASHINGTON,
MODUK,

PRIORITY CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AND JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION 509.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978) OF 19 MARCH 1978 AND 508 (1982)
OF 5 JUNE 1982,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING THE NEED FOR STRICT RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTER-
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES,

1. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW ALL ITS MILITARY FORCES FORTHWITH
AND UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF
LEBANON;
2. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES OBSERVE STRICTLY THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH
1 OF RESOLUTION 508 (1982) WHICH CALLED ON THEM TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND
ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.
3. CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WITHIN 24 HOURS;
4. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION.

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 060800Z (FCO)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052346Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 943 OF 5 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MY 2 IPT'S: ISRAEL/LEBANON; SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

BEGINS

MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT EMPHASISE TO STRONGLY THE SHOCK AND HORROR FELT BY MY GOVERNMENT AND BY THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN AT THE DASTARDLY TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO LONDON, MR SHLOMO ARGOV A MOST DISTINGUISHED AND RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. WILL ALL HOPE AND PRAY FOR HIS LIFE AND HIS RECOVERY FROM HIS WOUNDS.

AS THE COUNCIL WILL KNOW THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAVE MADE ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPALLING CRIME. FOUR MEN ARE IN CUSTODY AS A RESULT OF PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES THE POLICE HAVE DISCOVERED A LIST OF NAMES WHICH INCLUDES NOT ONLY AMBASSADOR ARGOV BUT ALSO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO IN LONDON.

MR. PRESIDENT, THIS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, HOWEVER DESPICABLE, DOES NOT IN ANYWAY JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE ATTACKS ON LEBANESE TOWNS AND VILLAGES BY THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE; ATTACKS WHICH HAVE ALREADY INFLICTED MAJOR LOSS OF LIFE, CASUALTIES AND DAMAGED TO PROPERTY. THESE ACTIONS HAVE ALSO LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE PRECARIOUS CEASE FIRE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN IN EFFECT IN SOUTH LEBANON SINCE JULY 1981. IT IS IMPERATIVE, IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN THE REGION AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUFFERING PEOPLE IN LEBANON, THAT THERE IS NO ESCALATION OF FIGHTING AND THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED.

MY DELEGATION THEREFORE WARMLY SUPPORTS THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND STRONGLY URGES ALL CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH ITS TERMS.

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FM UKDEL VERSAILLES 061220Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 02 OF 6 JUNE 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO,
EC POSTS, OTTAWA, TOKYO

MIPT: LEBANON/ISRAEL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF APPEAL.

BEGINS

1. WE ARE SHOCKED BY THE NEWS REACHING US FROM LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA. WE ARE DEEPLY MOVED BY THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE, THE SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION. WE THINK THAT THIS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, IF IT WERE TO CONTINUE, COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE AREA.

2. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN AT THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON AND CALLING ON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN NOTE OF THE APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES BY MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE U.N., AND OF A MESSAGE SENT BY HIM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, AS CHAIRMAN OF THIS MEETING.

3. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE THE URGENT APPEALS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE AND SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, AND WE CALL UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO HEED THESE APPEALS, IN ORDER THAT PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE AREA BE SAFEGUARDED.

4. EACH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL USE ALL THE MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

ENDS


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
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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK - 15-16 JUNE

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Points to Make

OBJECTIVES

- 1 Any action at UN should work towards just and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides.
- 2 Arab or Islamic states, not the West, should take lead in making realistic proposals. We understand that there was considerable activity by the Iraqis and Iranians at the NAM meeting at Havana. The Islamic Conference is also embarked on a new initiative.

FURTHER ACTION

- 3 What role does the Secretary General see for the UN at this stage?
- 4 Did Mr Cordovez find anything during his trip to Havana to suggest possibility of constructive UN role or concensus among NAM states on basis for a settlement?

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK - 15-16 JUNE

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Background

ACTION IN UN

1 Iranians will be enraged by anything short of an even-handed resolution. A purely Western initiative would be unacceptable to them. A Security Council Resolution leading to a veto or non-compliance would complicate possible UN role in future mediation. We must beware of language in the Security Council that would conflict with our position over the Falklands.

UK ROLE

2 We can best help by working in the margins with the Ten to support constructive efforts by regional states and encouraging existing mediation attempts (Islamic Conference, UN Secretary General's Special Representatives and Non-Aligned Movement). The real need is for the Arabs themselves to take the initiative. The Ten adopted a statement on 24 May (attached) which pleased the Iraqis but was received coolly by Iran.

JORDANIAN INITIATIVE

3 Jordan sought UK support for its request for a Special Security Council meeting on 31 May. The request was ill considered: neither Iraq nor Iran were then ready to discuss the issue.

/US INITIATIVE

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US INITIATIVE

4 Mr Haig's recent remarks indicate US desire to undertake initiative to bring about the end of the war, using certain states eg Spain, Morocco, Oman, to act as intermediaries . (US have approached Ten to be associated with the initiative). Unlikely to bring a settlement nearer.

IRAQI APPROACH TO JAPAN

5 Iraq has asked Japan to sponsor a Security Council resolution. Japan have told us confidentially that they intend to suggest unilateral Iraqi withdrawal from occupied territory to make room for mediation. Japanese will be looking for Western advice and support.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

6 Iraqi and Iranian Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr Cordovez, attended NAM Committee meeting in Havana to prepare for September Summit in Baghdad. Both will be looking for allies. Outcome will affect the decision to go to the Security Council.

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GRPS 450

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DESKBY 241900Z

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241712Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2073 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN

THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK

WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING STRASBOURG

M I P T: DECLARATION OF THE TEN ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

1) THE TEN EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH HAS NOW LASTED TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED VERY NUMEROUS VICTIMS, LED TO CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, CREATED GRAVE SUFFERING FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND HAS DIVERTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

2) WHILE REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE TEN EXPRESS THE GRAVE CONCERN WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF THE FIGHTING CAUSES THEM. THEY DEPLORE THIS THE MORE BECAUSE THEY HAVE LONG STANDING AND CLOSE LINKS WITH EACH OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS AS WELL AS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THEY RECALL THAT SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER 1980 THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

3) THE TEN PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

/4.

4) THE TEN, FOR THEIR OWN PART, EARNESTLY DESIRE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS THOSE DEFINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION NO 479 OF THE 28 OF SEPTEMBER 1980. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A JUST AND LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE TWO STATES IN RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THEIR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY, IS MORE THAN EVER URGENT AND NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION ASPIRE.

5) THE TEN ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN EVERY EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARDS PEACE, TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES REQUEST THEM TO DO SO, AS WELL AS TO CONSIDER, WHEN HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATING IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

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(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAQ/IRAN



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15-16 JUNE

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

Points to Make

1. We are committed to an early launch of Global Negotiations on conditions which all can accept.
2. Vital however that independence of existing specialised bodies, notably the IMF, World Bank and GATT, should not be prejudiced by GNs.
3. As confirmed by participants at Versailles Summit, the latest (Bedjaoui) text serves as an acceptable basis for further consultations; hope these can be finished quickly.
4. Meanwhile, important that other urgent North/South issues should not be obscured.
5. In the interests of all to maintain and strengthen existing international arrangements for co-operation for trade and finance issues.



Background

1. In March the Algerians produced a text for launching GNs which they claimed to have the backing of the G77. With the exception of the Americans all countries regarded the text as an acceptable basis for negotiation. Within the Community all but ourselves and the Germans were prepared to accept it unchanged. We however wanted changes to remove the ambiguity over the link between the GNs and the Specialised Agencies.
2. At the Versailles Summit American officials seemed ready to accept the Bedjaoui text with small amendments; but these were not considered at Ministerial level. President Reagan agreed to positive language on Global Negotiations to the effect that the latest text was helpful and would serve as a basis for consultations with the countries concerned.

Economic Relations Department

9 June 1982

WASHINGTON BRIEFS

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1982

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Visit to Washington: 23 June

I attach briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington on:

- (a) Existing Contracts (John Brown) —
- (b) US Steel Measures —
- (c) Middle East.

Briefing on the Falklands follows separately.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures (a) and (b) to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Secretary of State for Industry, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Francis Richards'.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Faint, illegible text at the top of the page, possibly a header or title.



2861 RNF 1
1 JUN 1982





EXISTING CONTRACTS (JOHN BROWN)

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Your extension rather than mitigation of sanctions against the Soviet Union is a hard blow for John Brown. Several hundred jobs are now in danger.
2. I am also apprehensive about reactions in Western Europe. Will do my best to head off open argument as only the Russians would benefit from this. But I may find it difficult. Will reconciliation in Poland really be helped?
3. Result in medium term could be that European companies will withdraw from licensing arrangements with your companies and develop substitute European technologies. Is this really what you want?
4. Meanwhile, we are considering urgently what action we can take to protect the interests of John Brown. h

EXISTING CONTRACTS (JOHN BROWN)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Prime Minister sought release from American licensing and relicensing requirements of General Electric rotors for John Brown's contracts for Siberian pipeline in messages of 29 January and 5 April to President Reagan (copies attached). She raised question personally with him at Versailles and in London on 9 June. John Brown due to begin turbine deliveries on 2 July.
2. President Reagan announced on 18 June that existing sanctions against Soviet Union would be extended to cover equipment produced by US subsidiaries and licensees (text of statement attached). Aim is to prevent a French licensee of General Electric (Alsthom) from supplying rotors to replace blocked American ones. John Brown is not directly affected by the extension but its contract remains blocked. US action is both retrospective and extraterritorial.
3. Announcement is bound to worsen transatlantic relations. Officials in London are studying the possibility of invoking the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980. John Brown told the Department of Trade on 21 June that they are not prepared to proceed with deliveries without assurances that they will not be blacklisted by the American Administration. Officials are considering the matter urgently. Discussion with other European countries affected will take place in near future.

TOP COPY

H/Planning

Confidential

~~SECRET D E D I P~~

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John Brown UK policy
Page 3

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GRS 1130

D E D I P

SECRET

DESK BY 300100Z TO JAKARTA

FM FCO 291850 JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 154 OF 29 JANUARY 1982.

AND TO IMMEDIATE JAKARTA (PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

M I P T

DEAR RON

1. I WAS MOST GRATEFUL TO AL HAIG FOR REARRANGING HIS PLANS AT SHORT NOTICE TO CALL HERE TODAY. IT GAVE US AN INVALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR FROM HIM HOW HE HAD GOT ON IN GENEVA AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AND WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE A GOOD DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH SITUATION.
2. I KNOW THAT AL WILL GIVE YOU A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR TALK BUT I THOUGHT NEVERTHELESS THAT I SHOULD SEND YOU THIS PERSONAL MESSAGE, TO UNDERLINE MY DEEP CONCERN AT THE DANGER THAT THE UNITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE COULD BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY THE CURRENT DIFFERENCES OVER HOW TO REACT TO THE REPRESSION IN POLAND.
3. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS AVOID A DEMONSTRATION OF DISUNITY IN THE ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD GIVE MOSCOW A FIRST CLASS PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND IMPAIR OUR EFFORTS TO CHECK FURTHER ADVENTURISM ON THEIR PART IN THE FUTURE. WE MUST ALSO AVOID MEASURES WHICH WOULD DO MORE HARM TO THE WEST THAN TO THE SOVIET UNION.
4. I HAVE TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST IN THE PREPARATION OF A PACKAGE OF BRITISH MEASURES BOTH TOWARDS POLAND AND TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE ALREADY SAID IN NATO THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE A NUMBER OF MEASURES AS PART OF AN ALLIED REACTION TO COMPLEMENT YOUR OWN RESOLUTE STAND, PROVIDED THAT WE CAN ALL AGREE ABOUT NOT UNDERMINING EACH OTHER'S MEASURES.
5. THE MEASURES WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS TAKEN, OR WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE WILLING TO TAKE, INCLUDE:
TOWARDS POLAND: RESTRICTIONS ON POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS:

1

~~SECRET D E D I P~~

(INCREASED)

INCREASED BROADCASTS, ALREADY BEGUN, TO POLAND: SUSPENSION OF COMMERCIAL CREDIT EXCEPT FOR CONTRACTS ALREADY CONCLUDED: THE PLACING IN SUSPENSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT DEBT RESCHEDULING FOR 1982: THE SUSPENSION WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF FOOD EXPORTS AT SPECIALLY SUBSIDISED PRICES: AND INCREASED HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE POLISH PEOPLE. TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION: SIGNIFICANT NEW RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATS: REDUCED ACTIVITY UNDER TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: CLEAR EXPOSURE IN THE MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE OF SOVIET COMPLICITY IN THE REPRESSION IN POLAND: READINESS TO MOVE WITH OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTNERS TO INCREASE THE INTEREST RATES ON EXPORT CREDIT AND TO RESTRICT CERTAIN IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION: TERMINATION, IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS, OF OUR BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENT: AND NEW RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET FACTORY SHIPS.

6. I AM SURE THAT OUR JOINT OBJECTIVE NOW SHOULD BE A CREDIBLE AND UNITED ALLIED POSITION, TO DEMONSTRATE OUR REJECTION OF MARTIAL LAW AND OF THE SOVIET HAND IN IT. WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE SOVIET CRISIS IN POLAND TO BRING ABOUT A CRISIS IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD SUIT ONLY SOVIET PURPOSES.

7. I KNOW YOU AGREE WITH THIS AIM. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO ATTAIN IT. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND WHY SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE MAY BE GROWING IMPATIENT AND THINKING OF A SECOND SET OF AMERICAN MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. MY FEAR IS THAT FURTHER MEASURES TAKEN UNILATERALLY WOULD NOT CARRY THE ALLIES WITH THEM BUT WOULD GREATLY DEEPEN AND EXPOSE THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THAT COULD ADVANCE SOVIET INTERESTS MORE THAN YOUR NEW MEASURES WOULD SET THEM BACK. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO HOLD BACK ON FURTHER MEASURES UNTIL WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNITED ALLIED POSITION.

8. I UNDERSTAND THAT NEW MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON MAY INCLUDE STEPS SUCH AS DENUNCIATION OF THE 1981 AGREEMENT ON RESCHEDULING POLISH DEBT, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A POLISH DEFAULT. BUT THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THAT WOULD BE THAT THE POLES WOULD GIVE UP THEIR PRESENT EFFORTS TO MAKE SUCH

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PAYMENTS AS THEY CAN UNDER THE RESCHEDULING ARRANGEMENTS, EITHER TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS OR TO WESTERN BANKS. THAT IN TURN WOULD TAKE PRESSURE OFF THE SOVIET UNION TO HELP THEM. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE EFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE, AND PROBABLY VERY SEVERE, PARTICULARLY IF OTHER DEFAULTS FOLLOWED. THESE EFFECTS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE CONFINED TO EUROPE. THE DAMAGE TO THE WEST COULD BE AT LEAST AS GREAT AS THE DAMAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE HEALTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM IS A WESTERN, NOT A SOVIET INTEREST. THEY HAVE EVERY REASON TO REJOICE IF IT IS IMPAIRED.

9. WHAT WE NEED NOW IS A REASONABLE SET OF MEASURES, JOINTLY AGREED. THIS IS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE SHOULD ALL BE WORKING. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE MOST PROMISING BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE EUROPEAN ALLIES TOOK MEASURES COMPARABLE TO YOURS, BOTH IN THEIR EFFECTS ON THE SOVIET UNION AND IN THEIR DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS, AND TOOK POSITIVE ACTION TO MEET THEIR COMMITMENTS NOT TO UNDERMINE YOUR MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE CONTRACTS, WHILE EXISTING EUROPEAN CONTRACTS WOULD GO AHEAD. I REALISE THAT THIS LAST CONSIDERATION IS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR YOU. BUT THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND ITALIANS CANNOT AND WILL NOT GIVE UP THE GAS PIPELINE PROJECT, WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF ITS MERITS. WE TOO HAVE IMPORTANT CONTRACTS AT STAKE, NOTABLY ONE HELD BY JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING, THE CANCELLATION OF WHICH WOULD CAUSE ADDITIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT. AN ACCOMMODATION ON EXISTING CONTRACTS IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO ALLIED UNITY OVER POLAND.

10. YOUR MEASURES OF 29 DECEMBER SENT A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT SERIOUSLY COMPROMISING YOUR OWN INTERESTS. WE SHOULD ALL BE FOLLOWING SUIT. ALTHOUGH THE NATO DISCUSSIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN FRUSTRATINGLY SLOW, IT SHOULD SURELY BE POSSIBLE, IF YOU COULD MOVE ON EXISTING CONTRACTS, FOR THE REST OF US TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MEASURES COMPARABLE TO YOURS. WE SHOULD LOOK RESOLUTE AND UNITED: AND WE SHOULD STILL HAVE SOME SHOTS LEFT IN OUR LOCKERS.

11. I SUGGESTED TO AL HAIG THAT THE BEST APPROACH NOW WOULD BE FOR THE US TO ARRANGE SECRET CONSULTATIONS IN THE VERY NEAR

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/FUTURE

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FUTURE BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM THE ALLIED COUNTRIES MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED - YOU, US, THE FRENCH, THE GERMANS, AND I THINK IN THIS CASE THE ITALIANS. THIS SHOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE PROGRESS AT THE NATO MEETING ON 3 FEBRUARY. BUT I THINK THAT A FURTHER NATO MEETING MAY WELL BE NEEDED A FEW DAYS AFTER THAT.

12. IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO CARRY THE JAPANESE AND OTHERS IN OUR PLANS. IT WOULD NOT BE TOLERABLE TO ASK OUR OWN INDUSTRIES TO FORGO OPPORTUNITIES ONLY TO SEE THEM SEIZED BY JAPAN.

13. WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THE SOVIET UNION A FIRM UNITED FRONT. WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER IN THIS CAN GIVE A LASTING BOOST TO ALLIED UNITY AND A SETBACK TO SOVIET AMBITIONS. WE HAVE EMBARKED ON THIS COURSE AND SHOULD MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO CARRY IT THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE CRISIS IN POLAND LOOKS LIKE BEING A PROLONGED ONE. WE RISK LOSING THE PRIZE IF WE ACT HASTILY OR OUT OF STEP.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS
MARGARET

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/EESD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/LOR/TREFLARNE

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

LOR/BRIDGES

MR HOODISON

MR EVANS

MR URE

4

SECRET D E D I P

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OO WASHINGTON

RR OTTAWA

GRS 419

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FM FCO 061310Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 652 OF 6 APRIL,

INFO PRIORITY BONN, ROME, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO,
TOKYO, OTTAWA AND BRUSSELS.

MY TEL: 630 - BUCKLEY MISSION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 5 APRIL FROM PRIME
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (TOP COPY BY NEXT BAG). PLEASE
ARRANGE DELIVERY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 8 MARCH ABOUT THE VISIT TO
EUROPE OF UNDER-SECRETARY BUCKLEY.

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, MR BUCKLEY AND HIS TEAM SPENT 17 MARCH
IN LONDON. THEY MET PETER CARRINGTON AND HAD TALKS WITH A
TEAM OF BRITISH OFFICIALS WHICH FILLED MOST OF THE DAY. I
UNDERSTAND THAT THEY GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONCERNS
ABOUT THE GRANTING OF WESTERN CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS ABOUT HOW THESE MIGHT BE MET. WE
HAVE SINCE BEEN STUDYING THESE SUGGESTIONS AND PETER CARRINGTON
IS WRITING TO AL HAIG TO GIVE OUR VIEWS ABOUT SOME OF THEM.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH WESTERN
GOVERNMENTS AND BANKS HAVE BUILT UP INCREASING CREDIT
EXPOSURE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS A PROBLEM HERE THAT WE
MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING IT WITH
YOU PERSONALLY DURING YOUR VISIT TO LONDON IN JUNE.
FOR FUTURE WORK ON THIS SUBJECT I THINK WE MUST FIND A
FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL ALLOW THE NECESSARY ANALYTICAL WORK TO BE
DONE AND WHICH WILL ALSO LINK ACTION WITH THE OUTSTANDING ACTION
ON EAST/WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS WHICH WAS COMMISSIONED IN THE
NORTH/ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECLARATION OF 11 JANUARY. OPERATIONALLY,
WE MUST ENSURE THAT ALL THE COUNTRIES WHICH MATTER IN TERMS OF
GRANTING CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING JAPAN, ARE

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John Brown
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ASSOCIATED WITH THE WORK. WE ALSO NEED TO AVOID ACTION WHICH MAY CAUSE GREATER DAMAGE TO THE WEST COLLECTIVELY THAN TO THE SOVIET UNION OR DISPROPORTIONATE DIFFICULTIES FOR PARTICULAR WESTERN COUNTRIES.

I ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE SUBJECT RAISED IN MY MESSAGE OF 29 JANUARY - THAT OF EXISTING CONTRACTS BETWEEN BRITISH COMPANIES AND SOVIET IMPORTERS AFFECTED BY THE MEASURES WHICH YOU ANNOUNCED ON 29 DECEMBER. IT IS NOW MORE URGENT, AS THE COMPANIES CONCERNED WILL SOON HAVE TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THEIR MANUFACTURING PROGRAMMES IN RELATION TO THESE CONTRACTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE COMPANIES CONCERNED, JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING, HAS HELD DECISIONS IN SUSPENSE FOR THREE MONTHS, BUT TIME IS NOW RUNNING SHORT FOR THEM. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MOST HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN ACCEPT THE ARRANGEMENT ABOUT RECIPROCAL COMMITMENTS WHICH I SUGGESTED IN MY MESSAGE.

ENDS

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO LORD DOWNING ST]

NNNN

LIMITED

TRED

EESD

ERD

NAD

PLANNING STAFF

DEF DEPT

ECD(E)

WED

ESID

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

LORD BRIDGES

MR EVANS

MR GOODISON

MR HANNAY

MR GILLMORE

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GR 120
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 190900Z
FM WASHINGTON 182259Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2194 OF 18 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS AND BONN

MY TELNO 2193: SIBERIAN PIPELINE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT.
BEGINS:-

I HAVE REVIEWED THE SANCTIONS AND THE EXPORT OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION IMPOSED ON DECEMBER 30 1981 AND HAVE DECIDED TO EXTEND THESE SANCTIONS THROUGH ADOPTION OF NEW REGULATIONS TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT PRODUCED BY SUBSIDIARIES OF US COMPANIES ABROAD AS WELL AS EQUIPMENT PRODUCED ABROAD UNDER LICENSES ISSUED BY US COMPANIES.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IN IMPOSING THE SANCTIONS HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE TO ADVANCE RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. SINCE DECEMBER 30 1981 LITTLE HAS CHANGED CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN POLAND: THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVEMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO UNDERTAKE POSITIVE RECIPROCAL MEASURES.

THE DECISION TAKEN TODAY WILL, WE BELIEVE, ADVANCE OUR OBJECTIVES OF RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. ENDS.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM BRIDGES AND GOWLLAND (TRED)

FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO CORLEY (DOT) AND HAVELOCK (DOI)

HENDERSON
LIMITED
TRED
EESD
WED
NAD
PLANNING STAFF
PUSD
LORD BRIDGES
MREVANS
MR GOODISON

COPIES TO
MR CORLEY DOT
MR HAVELOCK DOI

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN : 23 JUNE

US ACTION AGAINST STEEL IMPORTS FROM EUROPE

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Deeply concerned about recent US Department of Commerce decision to impose countervailing (ie anti-subsidy) duties on steel imports from EC.
2. Particularly regret treatment of BSC (40% duty), which is now effectively shut out from a large part of its traditional market in US. US action difficult to reconcile with support expressed in the past for tremendous effort being made in UK to reduce steel-making capacity and manpower, notwithstanding economic and social costs. Puts at risk objective of returning Corporation to enduring profitability.
3. UK continues to support negotiated settlement [if appropriate: understand EC Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 22 June that Commission should renew efforts to secure one]. But this is needed very urgently if trade disruption is to be minimised. And terms must be fair to both sides, otherwise real risk of trade war.
4. Not just a technical problem. Look to President Reagan personally to ensure political importance fully taken into account by US Administration.
5. (If it is argued that US investigation procedure will ensure fair outcome) Serious reservations in Europe about definitions of subsidy that have been used so far. Procedures lengthy; meanwhile duties payable so high and uncertainty so great as to pose near insuperable barrier to trade. Political requirement is for an early and mutually satisfactory settlement.

BACKGROUND

EC steel exports to US face disruption as a result of decision by US Department of Commerce on 11 June to impose provisional anti-subsidy ('countervailing') duties which range from 40% for BSC down to around 1% or less for Dutch, Luxembourg and German companies (also for UK private sector). Latter group should be able to continue to sell to US because, pending final determination of subsidy due on 24 August, they can afford to deposit the low provisional duties to which they are subject. But companies in other Member States (France, Italy, Belgium) facing duties in range 20% to 30%. As for BSC, this implies too great a financial risk to allow sales of products subject to duty to continue.

On 18 June Secretary of State for Trade handed US Ambassador aide memoire (text attached) emphasising HMG's concern at impact on BSC. In 1981 BSC exports to US of products concerned were 200,000 tonnes plus, worth over £50 million (out of total UK steel exports to US of 574,000 tonnes).

EC response to be discussed by Foreign Affairs Council on afternoon of 22 June (reporting telegram will be repeated to UKMIS New York and Washington). Agreement likely at Council on:

(a) a statement rejecting method adopted by US for calculating subsidies and underlining potentially serious consequences and

(b) a study of possible EC countermeasures.

We hope Council will also endorse at least principle of continued effort to secure negotiated settlement. A previous attempt by

Davignon at the beginning of June failed because US insisted on smaller EC market share and wider product coverage than was generally acceptable in the Community. Nonetheless US Commerce Secretary Baldrige has said that he too would prefer a negotiated arrangement to resolve the problem. But to secure terms acceptable to European producers the US Administration will need to exert greater pressure on their industry than they have been prepared to so far.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL [FRAME EXTERNAL
FRAME INDUSTRIAL]
ZNY 0 0 211426Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1207 OF 19 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS.

NY 2 IPT'S.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AIDE MEMOIRE.

UK STEEL EXPORTS TO THE USA: PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS
OF SUBSIDY BY THE US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ON 11 JUNE OF
A PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDY TO THE EXTENT OF SOME
40 PERCENT IN RESPECT OF EXPORTS OF STRUCTURALS, PLATE AND HOT-
ROLLED CARBON BAR, BY THE BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION (BSC).

2. BRITISH OFFICIALS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR EUROPEAN COMMISSION
COLLEAGUES, ARE STILL STUDYING THE DETAILS OF THE COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS.
THESE FINDINGS APPEAR TO IGNORE THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
OF BSC, AND THE METHODOLOGY INVOLVED IS OPEN TO SERIOUS
CHALLENGE. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL BE CONSIDERING THE MATTER
FURTHER AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL IN LUXEMBOURG ON 22 JUNE.

3. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WISH TO DRAW ATTENTION YET AGAIN
TO THEIR DETERMINATION THAT BSC SHOULD OPERATE AS A COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISE AND REACH ENDURING PROFITABILITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
TO THIS END, A STRATEGY WAS ADOPTED IN DECEMBER 1979 TO REDUCE
MANNED CAPACITY TO 15 MILLION TONNES THROUGH PLANT CLOSURES
AND THROUGH LARGE-SCALE JOB LOSSES. BETWEEN MARCH 1979 AND
MARCH 1981, THE WORKFORCE WAS REDUCED FROM 186,000 TO 121,000.
THE CORPORATE PLAN FOR 1981/82 INVOLVED A FURTHER CUT IN MANNED
CAPACITY (TO 14.4 MILLION TONNES) AND FURTHER JOB LOSSES TO
IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY. NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN MARCH 1982 STOOD AT
104,000 WITH FURTHER REDUCTIONS LIKELY, THUS VIRTUALLY HALVING
THE WORKFORCE IN 3 YEARS.

4. THIS RESTRUCTURING OF THE UK STEEL INDUSTRY IS A MAJOR
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MUCH NEEDED REDUCTION OF WORLD STEEL MAKING
OVER-CAPACITY. THE ELIMINATION OF OVER CAPACITY
WILL BRING BENEFITS TO STEEL MAKERS IN ALL
COUNTRIES, NOT LEAST THE USA, AND THE ACTION TAKEN IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY APPLAUDED BY THE US ADMINISTRATION.
THE ECONOMIC, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIAL, COSTS OF SUCH A MAJOR
REDUCTION IN UK CAPACITY ARE ENORMOUS AND HAVE NECESSARILY
HAD TO BE FINANCED BY GOVERNMENT. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FIND

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IT PARTICULARLY DISTURBING THAT THE COSTS OF THIS RESTRUCTURING HAVE BEEN PRELIMINARILY DEEMED BY THE US COMMERCE DEPARTMENT TO BE A SUBSIDY ELIGIBLE FOR COUNTERVAILING DUTIES.

THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE DUTIES IS LIKELY TO BE THAT BSC LOSE A LARGE PART OF WHAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A TRADITIONAL MARKET IN THE USA AND THAT THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN WILL BE PLACED IN JEOPARDY. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE BSC HAS SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED THE TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM IN ITS EXPORTS TO THE U.S. MARKET.

5. EARLIER THIS WEEK THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON MADE A FORMAL DEMARCHE TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES FULLY WITH THAT ACTION.

6. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT APPEAL TO THE US ADMINISTRATION TO USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL GIVE STABILITY TO THE STEEL TRADE AND SERVE TO DEFUSE TRADE TENSION!!.

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FRAME INDUSTRIAL

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: 23 JUNE

MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make

1. We share hope that the Israeli invasion may have created a situation in which a better future can be found for Lebanon, freed from the worst of the Syrian and Palestinian pressures. But before such a deal can be struck Lebanon must be freed from Israeli pressure too. Any arrangement negotiated while Israeli troops are there will be bitterly opposed inside and outside Lebanon and cannot last.
2. Glad your message acknowledges the importance of the Palestinian question. In this respect Israeli action is misguided, if the purpose is as Israel has stated to destroy the structure of terrorism. If they attack Beirut and destroy the PLO leadership there, the result will be despair throughout the Palestinian Diaspora, and probably the return to terrorism as their only option. Destroy Arafat and Qaddumi: what is left but Habash and Abu Nidal? Your people are concentrating on trying to make autonomy work, but even if they succeed autonomy is unfortunately irrelevant to the majority of Palestinians who remain outside the territories in which it would apply.
3. Must at all costs prevent the appalling bloodshed of an attack on Beirut. No one in the Middle East will believe that you have not got the leverage to stop it. Urge you to declare publicly before the event that, whatever the position up to now, this use of US arms could not be described as self-defence.
4. Glad you can accept that we should have official discussions on all this. Look forward to seeing your people in London as soon as possible.

Essential Facts

1. The latest Israel/PLO ceasefire has broken down again. With help from the Christian/Phalangist forces, Israeli forces have strengthened their hold around West Beirut. They deny publicly any intention of going into the city to deal with the estimated 6-7000 PLO still holding out, but have left the Americans in no doubt that they will do so unless the Americans somehow deliver the PLO leaders.

2. A six-man National Council of Salvation representing the main Lebanese factions finally met on 21 June. Reassertion of Lebanese government authority over the PLO might provide one way out of the present impasse, but the Council has so far been unable to order the Lebanese army into West Beirut. Another proposal, put forward by the Israelis, is that the US should guarantee safe-conduct for the remaining PLO forces out of Lebanon (presumably to Syria). Habib is still in Beirut.

3. The text of the Prime Minister's message of 15 June to President Reagan and the President's reply of 18 June are attached. The reply suggests that the Americans are continuing to look at the problem in the narrow focus of the ceasefire, and are paying little attention to the wider implications, particularly the Palestinian dimension. It also makes no specific reference to the need for Israeli withdrawal in accordance with Security Council Resolution 509 (text attached).

4. The Americans claim to have put pressure on the Israelis not to enter West Beirut. But their track record in restraining the Israelis in this crisis has not been good. At each stage of their operation, the Israelis have misled all, apparently including the Americans, as to their objectives. These objectives have steadily increased. In recent days, Mr Sharon has warned the Syrians that Israeli guns are now in range of Damascus, and that the Israelis are in a position to move onto the Beirut/Damascus road, so cutting off the Syrian contingent in Beirut and endangering the rear of

/Syrian



Syrian positions in the Beqaa. There is an urgent need for the Americans to spell out that there are limits to what they can tolerate. As the Prime Minister's message to the President made clear, there is widespread bitterness in the Arab world at US failure to prevent the Lebanese tragedy. Our (admittedly limited) information on Habib's current mission suggests that the US have left the initiative entirely in Israeli hands: Habib has been conveying Israeli demands to the Arabs.

5. UNIFIL's mandate was extended by the Security Council on 18 June for two months. The Americans, Israelis and others have aired the idea of a non-UN 'multinational' force on the Sinai pattern. But the two situations are not parallel. The Syrians would be unlikely to cooperate with a force which would inevitably be seen by the Arab world (with Russian encouragement) as a US creature. It would be better to try the UN option first. If the Russians vetoed (as with Sinai), the multinational option would remain, and would be easier to defence.

Iran/Iraq

6. Saddam Hussein's announcement on 20 June of complete withdrawal of remaining Iraqi forces from Iranian territory will create position of equilibrium between Iraqi and Iranian forces. Meets one of Iran's pre-conditions for ceasefire and negotiated settlement.

7. Depending on Iranian reaction to this latest Iraqi move, moment may be ripe for regional states, rather than West, to take initiative in promoting an even-handed resolution in the UN Security Council. One which led to veto or non-compliance could exacerbate the situation. Could lead to further hardening of attitudes in Tehran among radicals. Timing and language important if end to hostilities and negotiated settlement is to be achieved.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 151345Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 1173 OF 15 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

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ARAB ISRAEL

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE HOT LINE.

DEAR RON,

PRINCE SAUD, THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER, CALLED ON ME IN LONDON 11 JUNE. I KNOW YOU SAW HIM YOURSELF WHILE IN EUROPE, BUT NEVERTHELESS I WOULD LIKE TO PASS ON TO YOU THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT POINTS WHICH HE MADE DURING OUR DISCUSSION.

- I) THE ISRAELIS WERE GOING BEYOND A JUSTIFIABLE CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY, AND WERE USING THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION TO CHANGE THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANON AND TO ACHIEVE OTHER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SUCH AS THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN INFLUENCE. THIS WAS A DANGEROUS PROCESS AND NO ONE COULD TELL WHERE IT MIGHT LEAD:
- II) THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO BOLSTER THE POSITION OF MAJOR HADDAD IN THE SOUTH AND OPEN UP A CHANNEL TO THE CHRISTIANS IN THE NORTH. THIS WOULD BE THE END OF THE STRUCTURE OF LEBANON AS WE KNEW IT AND WOULD LEAD TO THE CATASTROPHE OF RELIGIOUS WAR IN A SIMILAR WAY TO THE RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR:
- III) WE SHOULD WORK TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HELP IT TO EXTEND ITS MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE SOUTH AND FOSTER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONCILIATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS:
- IV) IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ARAB WORLD. IF THE IMPRESSION OF ISRAEL/US COLLUSION GAINED GROUND THIS WOULD MAKE GRAVE PROBLEMS FOR THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE US:
- V) THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO POLARISE THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESENTING THESELVES AS THE SOLE PROTECTORS OF WESTERN INTERESTS. THIS WOULD DRIVE THE ARABS INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIANS. THE GULF WAR ALSO PRESENTED GRAVE DANGERS. RELIGION WAS BEING MADE INTO A MESSAGE OF CONFLICT NOT RECONCILIATION. THE ISRAELIS WERE EXPLOITING THIS BECAUSE THEY WANTED THE ARABS TO FIGHT EACH OTHER:
- VI) FIRM US ACTION COULD QUICKLY INFLUENCE ISRAELI POLICIES.

THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR KAMAL HASSAN ALI, WAS ALSO IN LONDON ON 11 JUNE AND TOLD FRANCIS PYM THAT HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PLANNING THE INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON FOR THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS. LIKE PRINCE SAUD, HE THOUGHT THAT THE

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/ISRAEL

VN. Disarmament - Bremer Pack 1983

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ISRAELI OBJECTIVE WAS NOTHING LESS THAN A MAJOR REALIGNMENT IN THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT THE INVASION PUT EGYPT IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION AND WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH EGYPT HAD INVESTED SO MUCH.

KING HUSSEIN HAS ALSO JUST MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO ME ABOUT THE SITUATION.

YOU AND I DISCUSSED LAST WEEK THE TRAGEDY WHICH HAS OVERTAKEN THE LEBANON. WE MUST NOW TRY NOT ONLY TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT CRISIS BUT ALSO TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. THE LATEST FIGHTING HAS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE URGENT NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY TOWARDS THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING FOR A LASTING PEACE. UNLIMITED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL CAN ONLY LEAD TO GROWING POLARISATION AND DESPAIR IN THE ARAB WORLD. I HAVE TO TELL YOU FROM OUR ARAB CONTACTS THAT ARAB OPINION IS RUNNING VIOLENTLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN GIVEN, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THAT YOU CONDONE RATHER THAN CONDEMN THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTION. THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN HORRIFYING AND I FEAR THAT THE ARABS, INCLUDING SOME OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, WILL LOOK INCREASINGLY TO THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS THEY SEE SOME MOVE SOON IN THEIR DIRECTION. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH URGENT, ARE NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WHICH LIES AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE; UNLESS WE DO THIS WE SHALL NEVER ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE.

OUR POLICY TAKES AS ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509, WHICH CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IT WILL CLEARLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECREATE THE STATUS QUO THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE INVASION; NOR WOULD THIS BE SATISFACTORY. BUT IT IS NOT FOR ISRAEL TO DICTATE THE FUTURE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL APPLY IN THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LEBANON. MOREOVER, IN OUR VIEW ISRAEL'S APPARENT INTENTION OF REMOVING THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO AS AN ELEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST EQUATION JUST WILL NOT WORK.

I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF OUR OFFICIALS COULD GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS WHAT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE IN BUILDING A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BOTH IN LEBANON AND THE REGION. OUR PEOPLE HAD ALREADY BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH BEFORE THE LATEST CRISIS ERUPTED. I SUGGEST THAT THIS DIALOGUE SHOULD NOW BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WITH MY WARM BEST WISHES

PYM
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
UND
PS
PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

MARGARET.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following is text of President Reagan's reply to Mrs Thatcher, sent by the hot line on 18 June.

'Dear Margaret:

I appreciate your message about Lebanon. We have been hearing the same strong concerns from our Arab friends that you describe. In addition to the meeting with Foreign Minister Saud in Bonn, King Hussein has twice written me about Lebanon and the subject has been a central concern during Mr Hassan Ali's talks here this week.

There is no question that we must try to deal effectively with the Lebanon tragedy. We have been making every effort to consolidate a cease-fire as a first step. That has been Ambassador Habib's first priority. We are particularly concerned how to avoid further fighting in and around Beirut, which will cost additional innocent lives if it continues or escalates. We are also doing everything possible to help alleviate the human suffering caused by this tragic war. I have asked Congress for special funds for relief, and we are working to provide a twenty-five million dollar package to finance at least some portion of what we hope will be a broadly supported international effort.

Beyond the cease-fire and relief, however, we too believe that the present tragedy offers the opportunity to create a better future for Lebanon. That country's independence and unity must be preserved and its government's authority must be strengthened.

Phil Habib is presently in Beirut. He has met with President Sarkis and has had good talks. I believe there is a hope that the Lebanese themselves are working toward reconciliation and that they understand the need to work together. It is also clear they share the desire for a future without outside military forces in their country. These are also our objectives. We hope others will also encourage and support Lebanon's national leaders as they work toward a new national consensus.

We are aware that it is vital to create conditions in which the Lebanese government can act within its constitutional procedures and without intimidation from any quarter. I am concerned about the presence of Israeli forces around Beirut and the problems that can create for Lebanon's leaders. Phil Habib is making every effort to gain Israeli cooperation in steps which will permit Lebanon's leaders to act freely.

I agree that we need to stay in close contact regarding this and other developments in the Middle East. I fully endorse the idea that our people should consult closely in the near future about how we can cooperate in achieving a solution to the Lebanon crisis and to the broader issues, including the Palestinian question. We will have to be closely in touch concerning humanitarian relief and a formula for peacekeeping forces which will be essential to ensure rapid Israeli withdrawal.

Sincerely, Ron''

GRS 215

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 070800Z (FCO)

FM UKHIS NEW YORK 070301Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 6 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN | WASHINGTON,

MODUK,

PRIORITY CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AND JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION 509.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978) OF 19 MARCH 1978 AND 508 (1982)
OF 5 JUNE 1982,GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL,REAFFIRMING THE NEED FOR STRICT RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTER-
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES,

1. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW ALL ITS MILITARY FORCES FORTHWITH
AND UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF
LEBANON;
2. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES OBSERVE STRICTLY THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH
1 OF RESOLUTION 508 (1982) WHICH CALLED ON THEM TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND
ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.
3. CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WITHIN 24 HOURS;
4. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Secretary-General and President Reagan are likely to be concerned about:
 - i. our immediate intentions with regard to the remaining prisoners of war and economic sanctions, the total exclusion zone and the 12-mile limit;
 - ii. our longer term intentions for the future of the Islands;
 - iii. relations with Latin America.

Immediate Intentions

2. Our aim since the fall of Port Stanley has been to secure an assurance from the Argentines that they regard hostilities in the South Atlantic as at an end. None has been forthcoming. The Argentine Note of 18 June to the UN Secretary-General, which talks of a 'de facto cessation of hostilities', is not at all the same thing. In these circumstances we must put first the safety of the Islanders and of our forces, and it would be wrong at this stage to lift the TEZ or the 12-mile limit. At the same time we shall not be maintaining our full strength on the Islands. About 4,000 troops are expected to return home shortly. We shall also be sending out sappers to help get the Islands running properly again.

3. Our European partners have decided that their economic measures against Argentina should be lifted since 'it is possible to hope that hostilities are now definitely at an end', but the Ten stressed that if this expectation was not fulfilled, a new situation would arise to which the Ten would have to react immediately. The Ten also agreed that

/decisions



decisions to stop arms supplies to Argentina would remain in force. We for our part will maintain for the time being economic measures against Argentina. We hope that the non-EC countries which have undertaken sanctions will do the same. It is especially important that an arms embargo be maintained.

4. As for prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention obliges us to return POWs after the cessation of active hostilities. We are not satisfied that this stage has yet been reached. We shall need to see what happens once the political situation in Buenos Aires has become clearer. But we have continued our humanitarian policy of returning POWs quickly, and nearly 11,000 have been taken back to Argentina in the last few days - for the most part in better condition than when they surrendered.

The Future of the Islands

5. Our first tasks have been humanitarian: to return as soon as possible the great majority of the prisoners of war, including all the wounded, and to clear up the mess on the Islands so that the Islanders can resume their way of life. This latter task is more difficult than we had expected and will consume much of our energies in the near future. Indiscriminately laid mines have to be cleared, and much of the Islands' infrastructure must be repaired.

6. We are not wedded to the exact status quo on the Islands. As life returns to normal we shall be able to give attention to the future, in consultation with the Islanders. In accordance with the principle of self-determination one way forward would be for the Islanders' elected representatives to have an expanded role in the government of the Islands. Our aim will be to allow them to live secure and prosperous lives on the basis of friendly relations with neighbouring countries. But we cannot rush into decisions on how this can best be done. It is in any

/case

case totally unrealistic to expect that after all the traumas the Islanders have been through, and the British lives lost, we should now sit down and negotiate with Argentina on her sovereignty claim.

Relations with Latin America

7. We recognise the need to restore relations of confidence with the region. While damage done to Western/Latin American relations should not be exaggerated, we will be moving to mend fences with tact and urgency, both bilaterally and with our European partners. We should like the Falkland Islands to be able to live in peace and harmony with the region.

8. We recognise also the difficulties which US support for us had caused for their relations with Latin America and we understand that they will wish to move quickly to repair the damage. In the longer term, we see advantage in involving countries of the region in the Falklands' security and economic development. We also wish to build relations of friendship and confidence with the countries of Latin America.

The Role of the UN

9. The Secretary-General may ask the Prime Minister what role we see for the UN and perhaps for the Secretary-General himself in the future. Perez de Cuellar has told Sir Anthony Parsons that he will have to tell the Prime Minister that he cannot ignore his 'mandate', and that he will ask her how long she thinks it will be before we can contemplate any kind of negotiation. (The Secretary-General presumably has in mind SCR 505 which requested him to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, and urged Britain and Argentina to cooperate with him 'with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands').

/10.



10. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his tremendous efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis - which failed through Argentine intransigence and not through any fault of his - but we do not want him to launch any new initiatives. What is needed now is a pause for rehabilitation and reflection. In these changed circumstances we do not see a role at present for the UN.

The Role of the US

11. We are grateful to President Reagan for his message of congratulations as well as for US support, especially military supplies, during the crisis. We agree that a just war requires a just peace; but it is the Islanders who have suffered injustice. President Reagan may wish to expand the three elements relating to the future of his message:

- i. enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic. We agree with the need for this. We would welcome American ideas on, and participation in, arrangements which could guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. (If President Reagan asks about the implications of maintaining forces in the South Atlantic for our defence commitment to NATO, the Prime Minister might say that there will need to be adjustments in our defence posture but that these will be within the framework of last year's defence policy review.)
- ii. mitigation of Argentine hostility. We too want this, and have not ourselves sought a quarrel. But the initiative must surely be with Argentina.
- iii. improvement in the relations of both UK and US with Argentina. We too are keen to achieve this. Have the Americans any plans for a programme of

/economic

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economic assistance to Argentina as a
stabilising and confidence-building measure?
Any other American ideas?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Possible Visit to Washington, Wednesday 23 June

In my earlier note to you I stated that I had asked the FCO to consider how the visit to Washington could be fitted into the existing programme without delaying your return to the UK. Working back from an arrival time of 0730 hours in the UK on Thursday 24 it would be possible to have talks with President Reagan for 1½ hours between 1645 and 1815 on Wednesday 23. This would allow you to keep the luncheon engagement with the Secretary General although this would mean curtailing it by 30 minutes or so (leaving 1¼ hours). This would (1) also involve rescheduling your meeting with Mr. Street although our New York Mission advise me that the Australians are happy to fit in with whatever we wish, and (2) may result in losing one or both interviews (at New York Times and CBS TV) - although it may be possible to reschedule them. This can be worked out on Monday.

I attach a possible programme from which you will see that this will unfortunately result in a crowded and hectic day on Wednesday. Agree to send a message to our Ambassador in Washington stating that you would like to have talks with President Reagan provisionally at 1645 on Wednesday 23 June?

19 June 1982

ALAN LOGAN
Duty Clerk

Yes - if he can
manage it. I
will understand if
he can't.
ALB.

We could arrive about
1 - 1½ hours later on Thursday
morning if we could come into
London by helicopter.

POSSIBLE REVISED PROGRAMME FOR WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE

0800 Hairdresser

0945 Call on Secretary General

1030 Call on President of General Assembly

1100 Prime Minister to address Special Session

1130 Accept congratulations

1140 or
before 0945 Mr. Street, Australian Foreign Minister

1200 On record Press Conference at UN

1240 BBC Radio, BBC TV, ITN, IRN interviews

1315 Lunch with Secretary General

1445/1500 Depart by helicopter to Kennedy Airport

1500 1515⁵ Depart Kennedy Airport

1615¹⁶³⁰ Arrive Andrew's Airport, Washington

1640 1655⁵ Arrive White House by helicopter

1645-1815^{1700-1800/1815} Talks with President Reagan

1815-1840 Press Conference

1840 Depart White House by helicopter

1905 Depart Andrew's Airport, Washington

0730 Thursday 24 Arrive UK

This has now been
overlaid by my late
minutes to the
the

PRIME MINISTER

Washington Tel. 2199, 19 June attached,
Flag A.

President Reagan extends a formal
invitation to you to visit Washington as
part of your trip to New York.

I have asked the FCO to consider how
this can be fitted in to the present
programme without delaying your return to
the UK. This will obviously mean cancelling
some of the scheduled meetings (see copy of
present programme attached - Flag B).

Do you accept President Reagan's
invitation?

Alan Logan

Alan Logan
Duty Clerk
19 June 1982

If it is possible -
we should have to
cancel the media +
go straight to Washington -
at least

A

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Ps/Mr Redmond
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 190102Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2199 OF 19 JUNE
AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

HAIG HAS TELEPHONED FROM NEW YORK AFTER FIVE ROUGH AND UNPRODUCTIVE HOURS WITH GROMYKO.

HE SAYS THAT HE HAS SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE PM'S VISIT TO NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO INVITE THE PRIME MINISTER TO COME ON DOWN TO WASHINGTON FOR A TALK. HE REALIZES THE PRESSURE ON HER TIME AND WOULD QUITE UNDERSTAND IF SHE COULD ONLY COME TO WASHINGTON FOR A VERY SHORT STAY.

I DO NOT SUPPOSE YOU WANT ANY ADVICE FROM ME. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE WARMTH OF THE RECEPTION SHE WOULD RECEIVE HERE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SURRENDER.

HENDERSON

NNNN



B

Provisional Draft Programme: 22/23

(All times local)

22 June

1800 Depart Heathrow by RAF VC10 (to be confirmed)

2040 Arrive Kennedy (to be confirmed)

23 June

0945 Call on the Secretary-General

1030 Call on the President of the General Assembly (may have to be rescheduled)

1115 Address the General Assembly

1200 Possible Press Conference (may have to be rescheduled)

1315 Lunch with the Secretary-General (to be confirmed)

pm Possible bilateral meeting with Mr Street

1940 Depart Kennedy by RAF VC10 (to be confirmed)

24 June

0730 Arrive Heathrow (to be confirmed)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 190102Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2199 OF 19 JUNE

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

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HENDERSON

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SW



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June, 1982

Prime Minister's Visit to UNSSD II

Thank you for your letter of 17 June. The Prime Minister is content with the proposed arrangements, including the bilateral meeting with the Australian Foreign Minister.

A. J. COLES

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



Prime Minister

Contact with these arrangements
including meeting with
Australian Foreign Minister?

Yes not

17 June 1982

Dear John,

A J.C. 17/6

Prime Minister's Visit to UNSSD II

Following the Prime Minister's decision to postpone her visit to New York until next week, the delegation in New York have proposed a programme for Wednesday 23 June. I enclose a copy. The programme includes a call on and probably lunch with the Secretary-General and a call on Kittani, the President of the General Assembly, as previously agreed.

I suggest that your press people continue to pursue media arrangements with New York direct. The latter hope it will be possible simply to put back the previous arrangements by one week.

The delegation have suggested that the Prime Minister should have a bilateral meeting with Mr Street, the Australian Foreign Minister. We endorse that recommendation. Such a meeting would inter alia enable the Prime Minister to reiterate her personal thanks for Australia's strong support during the Falklands crisis.

I should be grateful to know soon if these arrangements are acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Provisional Draft Programme: 22/23

(All times local)

22 June

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1940 Depart Kennedy by RAF VC10 (to be confirmed)

24 June

0730 Arrive Heathrow (to be confirmed)

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 June 1982

UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

I enclose the latest draft of the speech which the Prime Minister will make in New York next week. I am also sending a copy to David Omand.

The Prime Minister will be working further on this draft tomorrow. Should you or David Omand have any comments, I should be grateful to receive these as soon as possible and at latest by close of play on Friday.

B/F

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Mr. President,

This is the first time I have spoken in the General Assembly. It is a privilege to do so, and to do so under your Presidency.

But what makes the occasion most special forme is the underlying subject of our meeting - the subject of peace. The leaders who come here carry a special duty - not just to our own countries but to the common interest of all, in the most vital matters of all. We are the trustees of mankind in our generation. It is in that spirit that I ~~intend~~ to speak today.

I want to begin by talking briefly about our fundamental aims, and where arms control and disarmament must fit in. I shall then offer some views upon the broad issues which nuclear and non-nuclear weapons set before us all, and upon the use of force. And I shall address particular tasks for arms control and disarmament in the context of these wider aims and issues.

I can state my view of basic aims very simply. I want peace for everyone; but not peace at any price. It must be peace with freedom and justice. A great American President once said that he would sooner die on his feet than live on his knees. I agree with that. I want my own country, and every other country - large or small, developed or developing, all have the same rights - to live at peace, in liberty, in its own way within its own established borders. And I tell the Assembly frankly that I assess measures of arms control and disarmament purely as possible instruments to that central aim. If they serve it, if they help

/, us to attain

us to attain it more surely or at less cost, I am in favour of them. If they are irrelevant to it, I am not interested in them. If they damage it, I am against them.

I come now to the means of war. Our generation faces a very special responsibility, because of what the march of modern technology has done to the weapons of war. We are all aware of that most keenly in respect of nuclear weapons. Mankind now has the knowledge of how to destroy itself. We cannot cancel or forget that knowledge. We have to live with it as an irreversible fact; and Governments which possess nuclear weapons have the burden of managing the consequences.

In their own terrible way, however, these weapons also bring a special opportunity. For part of what they mean is that starting a war among the nuclear powers is simply not a rational option. Given what nuclear weapons can do, recourse to arms between these powers can never be a sane way of dealing with our differences. The past 37 years show a deepening recognition of that. In circumstances often tense and difficult, deterrence has worked. Nuclear weapons have kept the peace between East and West. That is an achievement beyond price. We must not abandon or endanger it.

I am sure that we can continue that vast achievement at much reduced levels of these armouries if there is the will and the good sense to do so. I shall have more to say later on the way towards this. But we must have the wisdom and the honesty

/ to recognise

to recognise that in today's world to attempt or pretend to dismantle the deterrent system would be a course of reckless danger, and danger for the whole world. We must never let the launching of world war seem again in any way a rational option.

not
I am/taking nuclear deterrence for granted for the rest of human history. We must of course look for a better system of security. But to suggest that there is one within reach now would be a pretence, and a perilous pretence. There is not; and to act as though pious rhetoric were the same as reality could destroy the peace and freedom of us all. For our time, the task within reach is to harness the existence of nuclear weapons, as we have done for half a lifetime now, to the service of peace. In that task the nuclear powers' duty is to show restraint and responsibility. The distinctive role of the non-nuclear countries, I suggest, is to recognise that proliferation cannot be the way to a safer world.

I have spoken so far of nuclear weapons. These were a major concern of the 1978 Special Session; and they must remain so for us. But I am uneasy that they may be allowed to mask the facts about what we sometimes call, too comfortably, conventional weapons and conventional war. I earnestly hope that this Session will focus new and sharper concern upon these. Let us consider just a few facts. Since the disaster of Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used at all. But there have been something like 140 non-nuclear conflicts, in which up to ten million people have died. We have just been watching the tragedy in the Lebanon; and I have vividly in my own mind the many hundreds of men - brave

/ young men from

young men from my country and from Argentina - cut down in the South Atlantic by the impersonal killing-power of modern armaments. Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is a terrible reality. We must do more about its dangers and its burdens. Those burdens are far greater than those of nuclear weapons. If we deplore, as I do, the amount of military spending in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces, which absorb far the greatest proportion - around 90 per cent - of military spending world-wide.

We are all involved in this - virtually all of us have conventional forces. I am convinced that we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field, looking at weapons and manpower and deployments, to see what we can do together to lighten the risks and the burdens and the fears. I would particularly welcome ^{new} action over arms transfers, especially if this came through agreement among the states of a region to which others could subscribe, and not by having the big suppliers impose their own limitations and preferences from outside.

But in a crucial sense, Mr. President, I have still not reached the root of the matter. For the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types or in particular numbers or places. It is, above all, the existence of political willingness to initiate their use. This is where we need action and protection. And our key need is not for promises against first use of this or that kind of military weapon - such promises

/ can never

can never be dependable amid the stresses of war. We need guarantees against first use of any kinds of military weapons; guarantees against starting military action at all. The leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance have just given a solemn collective undertaking to precisely that effect.

Let us face the reality. The springs of war lie in the readiness to resort to force against other nations, and not in "arms races", whether real or imaginary. Aggressors do not start wars because an adversary has built up his own strength. They start wars because their calculations predict a profitable result. I mentioned a moment ago 140 conflicts since 1945. Few if any of them can be traced to an arms race. No historian can imagine that the World War of 1939 to 1945 was caused by any kind of arms race. On the contrary, it sprang from the belief of a tyrant that his neighbours lacked the means or the will to resist him effectively. A formidable countryman of that tyrant, 70 years earlier, is quoted as saying "Do I want war? Of course not - I want victory". Hitler believed he could have victory without war, or with not very much or very difficult war. The cost to humanity of disproving that belief was immense; the cost of preventing him from forming it in the first place would have been infinitely less. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not ensure peace; they may even damage it.

I am totally opposed to massive arms build-ups. I am saddened to read in Andrei Sakharov's writings about the militarisation of his country's economy and the unchecked power of its military-industrial complex.

But I am not prepared merely to wring my hands about such things
I would much prefer to see arms build-ups prevented, by good sense or /
agreement. But if that does not work, then the owners of these vast/
be allowed to imagine that they could safely be used, either to
blackmail or to coerce. And that cannot be achieved just by
words. I am not prepared to entrust the security of my country
and its friends to speeches and hopes and virtuous example.
It can be ensured only by deterrence, by adequate strength.

Mr. President, I have explained why in general I do not believe
that weapons cause wars. It is not merely a mistaken analysis
but an evasion of responsibility to imagine that we can deal
with the problem of war primarily by focussing upon its instruments.
These are often more symptoms than causes. But I have said all
this not to decry arms control and disarmament but to give them
their real value, to set them in their true context. It has in
my view been a frequent and serious disservice to these useful
techniques to raise unreal expectations about what they can do
for us. Excessive claims and demands for disarmament have too
often been not an aid to practical action but a paper substitute
for it. Disarmament measures cannot, in any realistic framework,
remove the possibility of war. But the limitation and reduction
of armaments can still help greatly in the right circumstances.
It can reduce the cost of legitimate self-defence. It may ease
fear and political friction. It can help to make conflict a

/ little less

little less inhumane, as the work on the laws of war seeks to do. It can sometimes seal off or limit the military use of advancing science and technology, as in outer space or with anti-ballistic missile deployments. To do such things, and to do them in a way that is balanced, visible and dependable, is to do a great deal.

Critics too often play down what has already been achieved in arms control agreements, whether formal or informal - outer space, the sea bed, Antarctica, nuclear-free Latin America, banning nuclear tests above ground, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the various Geneva accords over the years, the SALT agreements, the banning of biological and radiological weapons. Much of this is perhaps imperfect or incomplete, and relatively little of it is actual disarmament. We can all wish that the achievement were much greater. But to suggest that what has been done so far is merely trivial is both inaccurate and unhelpful to further progress. We have a useful foundation to build on. What we have to do is to seize every opportunity, and indeed to make new opportunities, for further building. I want now to turn to some specific issues in that direction.

In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie above all with direct talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have

/ by

by far the largest arsenals. As I said earlier, I believe that these arsenals could both be greatly reduced without any danger to peace. Decisive action is needed here, not just declarations or freezes. I welcome the radical proposals made by the United States for completely eliminating whole classes of intermediate-range systems and for substantially cutting the strategic armouries. The negotiations must surely have the urgent support of us all.

/I hope

I hope moreover that action on nuclear armouries will thereafter go wider still. In Europe, East and West each deploy thousands of nuclear warheads for medium and short-range delivery systems. No doubt some weapons in this category are needed to keep deterrence credible and sure. But I believe that if we think clearly we will recognise that far fewer would be enough. The United States showed the way during 1980 by unilaterally withdrawing a thousand warheads without replacement. We should make this an important area for further action, by both the great alliances.

I am deeply concerned about chemical weapons. When the world community decided in 1972 to ban biological weapons - a matter in which Britain played a leading role - we all looked forward to action next on chemical weapons. It has not happened. There is even ground for unease about whether everyone is truly observing the agreed ban on biological weapons; and many of us have been further disquieted by well-documented reports, which urgently need investigation, that chemical weapons and toxins have actually been used. The Committee on Disarmament needs to give renewed and determined impetus to agreeing a convention banning development and possession of such weapons. Britain has sought recently to contribute further to this.

I spoke earlier about the huge weight of conventional forces. The biggest concentration and confrontation of such forces anywhere in the world lies in Europe, my own continent. We need to reduce the frictions and burdens of this without causing imbalance or insecurity. This must be possible if both sides sincerely want

/it

it, and the Western participants in the overlong negotiations in Vienna are making an important fresh proposal. Britain would also like to see a special effort made to agree quickly on new mandatory confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. This would be a valuable complement to action at Vienna on force levels.

Through all these subjects there runs a vital thread - verification. It is frankly absurd to expect that in these matters where national security is at stake countries should take the observance of agreements by others simply on trust, especially when ^{some} states are so deeply secretive. Agreements which are not backed by proper verification can be worse than useless - they can be a new source of danger, fear and mistrust. Verification is not an optional extra item in disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the matter, and we must always tackle it in that light.

There are in progress several further endeavours to which Britain gives its backing, like the Secretary-General's project for much greater openness about military spending. We will this year table the full range of information asked for. I shall not go right through the list of other efforts; my country will demonstrate its support by the quality of our practical participation.

I believe that Britain's record over the years in work on disarmament and arms control stands up well to any comparison. But I cannot be complacent; Britain and everyone else needs to

do more. And the way in which we need, all of us, to do it is not by ringing speeches, still less by propaganda postures, but by patient, realistic, relevant work, step by step in difficult and complex matters. Frankly, I am not very interested in broad disarmament theory or rhetoric; I am interested in specific, sensible disarmament action in the practical service of security. This is a long business, and an unspectacular one; but there is no short cut and no sensible alternative.

Mr. President, let me summarise what I have said. The central aim is peace in freedom for every country to live according to its own choices. The test of all our efforts in this Special Session must be whether they help that aim. We cannot abolish nuclear weapons, and we must not endanger the massive contribution which they make, however paradoxically, to peace; but we can surely preserve this with far fewer of them. We should tackle much more vigorously than hitherto the problems of non-nuclear armaments, with which all recent wars have been fought and which absorb the vast bulk of military spending. And we should recognise that wars are caused not by armaments but by aggressors; that what tempts aggressors^{is} the prospect of easy advantage; and that the best safeguard of peace is to deny them that prospect. Within the context of these realities measures of agreed arms control and disarmament can make an important contribution if we use them sensibly, without cant or illusion. I hope this Session will help to enhance that contribution. I pledge my own country to play its part.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



H M Treasury

Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG

Switchboard 01-233 3000
Direct Dialling 01-233 8173

f-a.
ML 16/6

M E Quinlan CB
Deputy Secretary, Industry

J Cole Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

15 June 1982

Leon John,

SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Herewith a very rough first shot. I shall be meditating on it further (not least because it is, I fancy, as yet a bit on the short side) but you may like to see it in case you have any marked views on whether or not it is anywhere near the board.

I am sending a copy to David Gillmore on the same basis; he has told me how matters stand (as of half-past-three this afternoon) on the matter of timing.

Yours ever,
Michael

M E QUINLAN

Mr President:

1. This is the first time that I have had the opportunity to address the General Assembly. I account it a privilege to do so, and to do so under your Presidency.

2. But what makes the occasion most special to me is the subject - the subject of peace. The leaders who have come here, as I have, carry in this matter an especial duty; not just to our own countries' interest but to the common interest of all, in the most vital matter of all. We are collectively the trustees of our generation. I shall try to speak ^{now} in that spirit; ~~and not~~ ^{I shall not be concerned} to score national debating points.

3. Our generation faces a ^{very} special responsibility, because of what the march of modern technology has done to the weapons of war. We are all conscious of that most vividly in respect of nuclear weapons. Mankind now has - and can never lose, never forget - the knowledge of how to blow itself up; and we have to live, as our forebears did not, with that irreversible fact, and to manage its implications.

4. In its own terrible way, however, that fact also carries a special opportunity. For ^{part of} what it means is that the initiation of war among the major nuclear powers is simply not a rational option. Given what these ghastly armouries can do, recourse to arms between these powers can never be a sane way of ^{settling about the} regulating or resolving differences. The history of the past thirty-seven years displays a deepening recognition of that by every participant. ^{stable ; it has} In circumstances often tense and difficult, deterrence has ^{been} kept the peace between East and West; and that is an achievement beyond price, one which we must not for the future relinquish or endanger.

5. I believe ^{nonetheless that} we can sustain that vast achievement at much lower levels of these awful armouries and at much lower costs, if we have the will, the vision and the flexibility to agree to do so. These are major goals, and I shall have more to say later on the ways towards them. But let us throughout have the wisdom and the honesty to recognise that to attempt ~~to~~ pretend to dismantle the deterrent system wholesale - above all to do so one-sidedly - might be a course of reckless danger, and danger for the whole world. I do not want to make world war ^{seem} appear a rational option again; it cannot be, and it must not for a moment ^{be allowed to appear so.} seem to be.

6. I have spoken so far of nuclear weapons. These were a special concern of the 1978 Special Session; they must manifestly remain so for us. But I am uneasy that they may sometimes mask the appalling facts about what we sometimes call, in the over-cosy jargon of the strategic theorists, non-conventional weapons and conventional war; and I venture to hope that this Session may focus renewed and sharper concern upon these. Let us consider just a few facts. Since the disaster of Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used at all. But there have been something like one hundred and forty non-nuclear armed conflicts, and in those conflicts perhaps up to ten million people have died. This very week we watch the tragedy in the Lebanon; and I naturally have vividly in my own mind the many hundreds of men - brave young men from my country and from Argentina - cut down in the South Atlantic by the impersonal killing-power of modern armaments. Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is ~~just~~ a terrible reality. We must - all of us, for virtually all of us wield conventional forces - seek to do something about the dangers of conventional war, and its burdens. Those burdens, let us remember, are far greater than those of nuclear weapons. If we deplore, as I certainly do, the amount spent on military preparations in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces, which absorb far the greatest proportion - over ninety per cent - of military spending world-wide.

7. We are all of us involved in this - virtually all of us have conventional forces. I am personally convinced that we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field, looking at weapons and manpower and deployments, to see what we can do together to lighten the risks and the burdens and the fears.

8. But in a sense Mr President, I have still not come to the root of the matter. For the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons, whether nuclear or other, of particular types or in particular numbers or places. It is, above all, the existence of political willingness to initiate recourse to force, to the use of arms. It is here, and not in "arms races", whether real or imaginary, that the springs of war lie. I mentioned a moment ago a hundred and forty conflicts since 1945. Few if any of those can plausibly be traced to an arms race. No informed historian can imagine that the World War of 1939 to 1945 was caused by any kind of arms race. On the contrary, it sprang most clearly and tellingly from the belief of a tyrant that his neighbours lacked the means or the will to resist him effectively - from weakness in deterrence. A formidable countryman of that tyrant,

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seventy years earlier, is quoted as saying "Do I want war? Of course not - I want victory". Hitler believed he could have victory without war, or with not very much or very difficult war. The cost of disproving that belief was immense; the cost of preventing him from forming it in the first place would have been infinitely less. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not guarantee peace; they may even destroy it. ~~It may therefore~~

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it can

be not merely a mistake of analysis but an evasion of responsibility to suppose that we deal with the problem of war, and the duty of peace, primarily by focussing upon weapons. These are ^{often} more symptoms than causes.

9. We are entitled, every one of us, to live in peace with our own values and way of life; not to have the doctrines, the institutions or the control of other ^{Countries} forced upon us, not to be compelled to choose between peace and freedom. We are entitled to be protected from ^{external} aggression - if necessary through our own efforts, if possible ~~it~~ (and preferably) through a just international system. The efforts of political leaders for peace, both through this great organisation and in other ways, need to be directed first and foremost to removing the conditions that lead to conflict - injustice between and within nations, mistrust and secrecy, the denial of human rights - and to strengthening the methods and mechanisms for resolving conflict without war. ~~[My country for its part was always ready, and would be ready still, even after the events of the past three months, to submit the matter of the Falkland Islands to the judgement of the International Court at The Hague.]~~ ^{We have to work at this urgently; but we} must also do so realistically, without cant and without illusion

why in general

10. Mr President, I have explained ~~that~~ ^{alone} I do not believe that armaments cause wars or that action on them ^{in any way} will prevent wars. But I have said all this not to decry disarmament and arms control but to give them their real value, to set them in their true context. It has in my view been a frequent and serious disservice to their cause to attribute to them potentialities which they cannot make good; excessive claims ^{and demands} have too often been not an aid to ~~more modest~~ ^{but} realistic practical action but a substitute for it. Disarmament measures cannot, in any realistic ^{framework} sense, remove the possibility of war. But the limitation and reduction of armaments can still do a great deal. It can reduce the economic burden of military preparation, ^{it can} and sometimes ease ~~its~~ political friction and the fears ^{this} may heighten; it can in some ^{the} degree moderate the scale or inhumanity of conflict. To do these things, and to do them in a way that is balanced, visible and dependable, is to do a ^{very} great deal; ^{and we must seize every opportunity, and indeed make new opportunities.} and I should like now to turn briefly to some specific issues in this direction.

legitimate for self-defence

11. In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie above all with the direct dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have

it can sometimes seal off or limit the ^{destructive} exploitation of ^{advancing} science and technology;

by far the largest arsenals. As I implied earlier, I believe that provided reasonable balance is not lost these arsenals could both be greatly reduced without any danger to peace. This is where ^{decisive} action, not just deceleration or standstill, is needed; and I therefore welcome the radical proposals made by the United States for eliminating intermediate-range systems and substantially cutting the strategic armouries. The negotiations must surely have the urgent support and goodwill of us all.

12. I am deeply worried about chemical weapons. When the world community in 1972 decided to ban biological weapons - a matter in which I am proud that Britain played a major initiating role - we all looked forward to successful action on chemical weapons. It has not happened; indeed, many of us have been greatly disquieted by persistent reports that these ^{obscene} ~~obscure~~ weapons have actually been used. The Committee on Disarmament needs to give renewed and special impetus - and Britain has sought recently to contribute to this - to arriving at a convention banning development and possession; and the reports I have just referred to underline how vital it is that such a ban should be truly verifiable if it is not to be simply a source of danger, instability and suspicion.

13. I spoke earlier about the huge weight of conventional forces. The biggest concentration and confrontation of such forces anywhere, in the world lies in Europe, my own continent, ~~and~~ ^{and} something needs to be done about this, to reduce the burden without creating imbalance or insecurity. This must be possible if both sides truly want it, and the Western participants have recently made an important ^{fresh} ~~new~~ proposal. Britain would also like to see a ^{new} conference take place soon to agree ^{quickly} on new mandatory confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. This would be a powerful complement to the ~~necessary~~ action on numbers, ^{at} Vienna.

14. There are several other efforts in progress to which Britain gives its full support, like the valuable project under the Secretary-General's auspices for much greater openness about military spending, and the work on the relationship between disarmament and development. I shall not catalogue all this work in detail now; my country will ^{demonstrate} ~~show~~ its support by the breadth and quality of our practical participation.

in the long
negotiations
at Vienna

I have no reason to be ashamed of Britain's record over the years
 15. ~~I am moderately proud of our record~~ in the disarmament and arms control field - I believe it stands up well to comparison. But I cannot be complacent; Britain and everyone else needs to do more. And the way in which we need, all of us, to do it is not by ringing speeches, still less by propaganda postures, but by patient, realistic, relevant work, step by step in difficult and complex matters. Frankly, I am not very interested in disarmament theory or rhetoric; I am interested in disarmament action, because that is what people want. It may be a long business, and an unspectacular one; but there is no ~~alternative~~ ^{short cut and no} ~~sensible alternative~~.

16. I should like to finish what I have to say, Mr President, by reverting to my central theme of peace. There is, I believe, a real prospect that we can keep the notion of all-out global war, of nuclear war, simply obsolete and unreal; and I believe we can do it at less cost than today if we have the wisdom to agree on the measures to that end. We cannot yet, I fear, make all sorts of war obsolete; ~~in candour~~, I doubt whether our generation can realistically expect to achieve in full the goal which Pope John Paul proposed during a visit to my country ^{only} last month, when he said "War should belong to the tragic past, to history; it should find no place on humanity's agenda for the future". But we can less and less afford to regard that objective as wholly unattainable, or just a pious theoretical aspiration. We have to make it a ^{central} ~~genuine~~ ^{genuinely shared by all,} political goal to be pursued by concrete practical action directed to removing real causes ^{and risks}. All of us can help, in large ways or small, ~~and I hope and expect that this Session will make a distinctive contribution.~~ Disarmament and arms control are important among the instruments available to us. I hope and expect that this Session will make a distinctive contribution to exploiting them more fully. I pledge my own country to play its part.

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See AH
UN

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

15 June 1982

See Francis,

You wrote to John Coles on 14 June 1982 about the Prime Minister's visit to the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

The Prime Minister is perfectly content to call on the President of the General Assembly whenever her visit takes place. But in view of all the uncertainty about when she will go to New York, she feels that there is no point in trying to arrange a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria. She sees no reason why she should see General Ershad of Bangladesh in New York, as she will have met him in London later today.

Yours ever,

Alvi Lsharman.

Francis Richards Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1982

Handwritten: 1-a. 22-6

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Speech

Thank you for Clive Whitmore's letter of today (but dated 10 June), to which you attached a copy of Hugh Thomas' draft of the Prime Minister's speech at the UNSSD this week.

I attach at Annex our suggested amendments. These have already been telephoned to you by David Gillmore.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

UNSSD: PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

SECTION II: BRITAIN AND ARMS CONTROL

1. If it was thought necessary to reduce the length of this speech, it might be preferable to omit all of the first sentence of the first paragraph of this section and the first sentence of the second paragraph.
2. Amend last sentence of second paragraph to read: 'We have also been prominent at all the discussions . . . '.
3. Last paragraph, last sentence, amend to read: ' . . . we came to know all too well the destructiveness of modern weapons.'

SECTION III: THE NEED FOR CAUTION

1. Amend end of last sentence of first paragraph to read: 'many questions about which a large number of people are content to suspend judgement altogether.'
2. Paragraph 4, first line, delete 'morals'; insert 'lessons'.
3. Paragraph 8 line 4, insert the word 'orderly' before 'commerce'.

SECTION IV: THE NEED TO GO AHEAD

1. Amend first sentence to read 'Despite all these cautionary tales, we know that the limitation and reduction of armaments are essential.'
2. Amend paragraph 3 to read: 'We must thus be ready to sit down at negotiating tables even with governments whose policies, we know, threaten the peace in freedom we hold so dear.'
3. Paragraph 5, last sentence, amend to read: 'The fire raids of the Second World War, even if nominally conventional, were destructive on a massive scale.'
4. Paragraph 6, amend to read: ' . . . the dark shadow cast over the West by Soviet conventional forces which have kept the East of the continent in subjection for so long.'
5. Paragraph 7, amend to read: 'The First Sepcial Session of this Assembly very properly thought that there should be regional consultations about the trade in conventional armaments. We should not exclude from consideration during this Session the accumulation of conventional weapons through production as well as through transfer.'
6. Paragraph 9, delete 'unfortunately' from the second line.
7. Paragraph 10, at the end of first sentence delete 'soothe the fears' and insert 'reduce mistrust'.

8. Paragraph 10, amend last sentence to read: "The progress made in SALT and the agreement to begin the START talks between such very different nations as the US and the USSR are further indications of what can be done."

SECTION V: GUIDELINES

1. Amend beginning of paragraph 4 to read: "Our ambition in negotiations should be . . ." (ie remove reference to 'these discussions').

2. Paragraph 7, delete last sentence beginning "These Governments which have military rulers . . .".

3. Delete last paragraph (paragraph 11). The point here is that it is difficult to sustain an argument about economy of force in relation to nuclear weapons.

SECTION VI: PRACTICAL STEPS

1. Paragraph 2, amend to read: "I hope that the Special Session will endorse the proposals made by President Reagan both for large cuts in the systems of strategic nuclear delivery and for the elimination of the most threatening nuclear forces in Europe."

2. Amend paragraph 3 to read: "Once this has been achieved, the way will be open for negotiations on other intermediate systems. My strong hope is that we could in due course achieve substantial reductions in so-called battlefield nuclear weapons. Many of these systems are of doubtful military value and they constitute a potential source of serious instability."

3. Paragraph 4: amend last sentence in parenthesis: "I here reaffirm our formal assurance given to the non-nuclear weapon States at the First Special Session about the non-use of nuclear weapons."

4. Paragraph 5. Amend to read: "Bearing in mind that we have ourselves abolished our stock of chemical weapons, Britain urges the Special Session to devote attention to eliminating them all from all stockpiles. We are disturbed by well-documented reports that chemical weapons, perhaps including toxins, have recently been used in several countries in South East Asia. Those reports must be minutely investigated."

5. Paragraph 6, amend last sentence to read: "The West is making an important new proposal on this."

6. Paragraph 7, amend to read: "We are also interested in the ideas originated by France for a European Disarmament Conference (CDE). I hope that when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe resumes in Madrid in the autumn, we can reach agreement to sit down to negotiations on confidence and security-building measures in Europe. Such measures would increase trust between the two sides in Europe and thereby reduce the risk of war in Europe's heartland."

7. Paragraph 8. Delete third sentence (the Soviet Union is the biggest arms dealer only according to SIPRI and then only in the Institute's figures for the last year; previously it had been the United States). Amend end of last sentence to read: ''limitations to which all their different suppliers may be able to subscribe.''

8. Paragraph 9, amend opening to read: ''Britain supports, and will participate this year in, the Secretary General's scheme . . . ''.

9. Paragraph 10, amend to read: ''We have also welcomed the work begun on the relationship between arms spending and development.''

SECTION VII: CONCLUSIONS

a. Falklands

1. Paragraph 2, amend third sentence to read: ''The State with whom we are in dispute drew erroneous conclusions from the patient restraint with which we had conducted our policy in that area.''

b. Principles

2. Amend opening of first paragraph to read: ''My second point in conclusion is this: the resources which we in Britain devote to arms are, we believe, the minimum needed . . . ''.

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Mr. Wargie
Mr. Gallucci
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FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 142321Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 14 JUNE.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II.

TUESDAY, 15 JUNE

20.40

ETA JFK (VC10).

MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES
MR NIXON (BIS) WILL ALSO BE PRESENT.

21.30

ARRIVE HOTEL - UN PLAZA.

WEDNESDAY, 16 JUNE

08.00
10.00

Carrie Keller
CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: ACCOMPANIED BY
SIR A PARSONS, MR SUMMERHAYES, MR WHITMORE. THERE-
AFTER TO HOTEL UN PLAZA.

11.15

CBS EVENING NEWS: UN PLAZA (MR INGHAM'S SUITE).

11.45

ABC: BARBARA WALTERS: UN PLAZA (MR INGHAM'S SUITE).

12.15 (FOR 30
MINUTES)

NEW YORK TIMES: UN PLAZA (PM'S SUITE).

13.15

LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 3 SUTTON PLACE - GUEST
LIST ATTACHED: PERSONALITY NOTES WILL BE PROVIDED.

15.00

CALL ON PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 38TH FLOOR.

15.15

PM TO ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION.

16.30

STAY TO HEAR NEPAL OR UNTIL 16.30.

17.15

ON THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN.

17.45

MEET BRITISH MEDIA (BBC, ITV, IRN) AT UN.

18.45

RETURN TO HOTEL UN PLAZA.

19.40

LEAVE HOTEL FOR JFK.

ETD JFK.

GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, 16 JUNE AT
13.15 HOURS.

SECRETARY-GENERAL
PRIME MINISTER
MR. ISMET KITTANI

PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SECRETARY-GENERAL
PRIME MINISTER
MR. ISMET KITTANI
M LUC DE LA BARRE DE NANTEUIL
MISS EDMONDE DEVER
MR AND MRS BRIAN URQUHART

MRS BROOKE ASTOR
MR DAVID ROCKEFELLER
MR DOUGLAS DILLON

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS
MR AND MRS DAVID SUMMERHAYES
MR AND MRS HAM WHYTE
MR C A WHITMORE

SUMMERHAYES

NNNN

PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
BELGIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM

NYFO 003/15

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FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 142320Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 14 JUNE.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

413
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Head ACBB
Head UNB
Head PCB
Head News
PS Madaya
PS Kalkanda
Mr Wright
Mr Gullmer
Head of Gordon Bennett
Mr Adams
RC

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MY TEL NO'S 54 - 56; AND TELECON NIXON (BIS)/ COLVER (NO 10 PRESS OFFICE); PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II.

1. MIFT CONTAINS A DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT AND A GUEST LIST FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S LUNCH. IF THE PRIME MINISTERS DECIDES TO TRAVEL BY CONCORDE, ARRIVING 09.30 LOCAL ON 16 JUNE, THE ONLY PROBLEM WILL BE THE CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 10.00. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRIME MINISTER COULD TRAVEL DIRECT TO THE UN BUT COULD NOT EXPECT TO ARRIVE BEFORE 10.15. THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BUT HE WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO BE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY 10.45 FOR THE FIRST SPEAKER, THE VICE PRESIDENT OF CUBA.

MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS (MY TEL NO 56).

2. IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR PRESS FACILITIES ON THE TARMAC WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER ARRIVES. PARA 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE IS THEREFORE REDUNDANT.

3. WHEN HE ACCEPTED OUR OFFER OF A 30-MINUTE INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 JUNE THE FOREIGN EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AT FIRST AGREED THAT THE INTERVIEW WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY ANOTHER SENIOR CORRESPONDENT, PROBABLY BERNARD GWERTZMAN, CHIEF STATE DEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENT, AS WELL AS BERNARD NOSSITER, UN CORRESPONDENT. WE ENCOURAGED THIS AND STRESSED OUR HOPE THAT THE INTERVIEW WOULD RANGE BEYOND UN AND DISARMAMENT TOPICS.

4. THE NEW YORK TIMES HAVE NOW COME BACK TO US TO SAY THAT NOSSITER ALONE WILL CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW. THIS IS A PITY BECAUSE SOME OF NOSSITER'S REPORTING ON THE FALKLANDS' NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN HAS BEEN INACCURATE AND UNHELPFUL TO BRITAIN AND HE IS UNSYMPATHETIC TO OUR NORTHERN IRELAND POLICIES. HOWEVER HE IS AN EXPERIENCED AND DISTINGUISHED CORRESPONDENT WITH AS DEEP A KNOWLEDGE OF

AND DISTINGUISHED CORRESPONDENT WITH AS DEEP A KNOWLEDGE OF BRITISH AFFAIRS AS ANYONE FROM HIS TIME AS WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON (1971-79).

5. WE CAN HARDLY OBJECT TO THE TIMES' OWN CHOICE OF INTERVIEWER THOUGH WE HAVE, AS INSTRUCTED, ALREADY WARNED THE FOREIGN EDITOR THAT THERE IS A RISK THAT THE INTERVIEW MAY HAVE TO BE DROPPED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OF TIME. I ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD STILL LIKE THE INTERVIEW TO GO AHEAD IF POSSIBLE.

BILATERALS.

6. THE BANGLADESH MISSION ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR A BRIEF MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL ERSHAD SOME TIME ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 JUNE, IN ADDITION TO HIS PLANNED CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 15 JUNE IN LONDON. THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER REQUESTS FOR BILATERALS.

SPEAKERS' LIST FOR 16 JUNE.

7. THE SPEAKERS' LIST FOR THE DAY OF 16 JUNE IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:
MORNING: CUBA (V. PRESIDENT), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (FM), SPAIN, CAMEROON
TURKEY (FM).

AFTERNOON: UK, NEPAL, SENEGAL (FM), NICARAGUA, SURINAME, DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHEA, MONGOLIA (FM), IAEA.

8. SEE MIFT.

SUMMARHAYES

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FROM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 101318Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 56 DATED 10 JUNE 82
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

Hd AEDD
Hd Defence D.
Hd UN
Hd. Ped
Hd. NAD
Hd. NENAD.
Hd. MED.
Hd. S. Am. D.
Hd. News D.
Hd. Em. U.

PS
PS/Mr. Hurd
PS/Mr. Rifkin
PS/pas.
Mr. Wright

Mr. Gullone
Lord N. C. Lennan
Mr. Adams.
No. 10. D.S.

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II: MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS

1. DESPITE THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEWS TODAY WITH US COMMERCIAL TV NETWORKS (WHICH WERE USED ON ALL 3 BREAKFAST PROGRAMMES) MEDIA INTEREST IN HER VISIT IS LIKELY TO BE INTENSE BECUASE OF THE FALKLANDS. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH UKMIS, THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND BIS, THE FOLLOWING IN ORDER OF PRIORITY ARE OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS ON 16 JUNE:

A) ON THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS SHOULD BE AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH TO UNSSD AND COULD BE HELD IN THE UN AT 1630.

- B) SHORT SEPARATE INTERVIEWS WITH BBC RADIO AND TV, ITN AND IRN. THESE COULD BE FITTED IN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1715 IN THE UN PLAZA, ALTHOUGH AN EARLIER TIME WITH AN EMBARGO OF 2000Z WOULD IF POSSIBLE BE PREFERABLE SO AS TO CATCH THE EVENING NEWS PROGRAMMES IN BRITAIN.
- C) LIVE INTERVIEWS AT THE UN PLAZA HOTEL OF 5-10 MINUTES ON ONE OR POSSIBLE TWO OF THE INFLUENTIAL BREAKFAST TV PROGRAMMES; THESE COULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN 0710 AND 0750.
- D) A SHORT TV INTERVIEW FOR USE ON AN EVENING NEWS PROGRAMME AND A LONGER INTERVIEW FOR THE MCNEIL/LEHRER PROGRAMME ON THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK TO BE TAPED DURING THE MORNING. ALTHOUGH THIS PROGRAMME HAS LOST SOME OF ITS LUSTRE SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER APPEARED ON IT IN FEBRUARY 1981 IT IS STILL ONE OF THE BEST OUTLETS FOR AN EXTENDED INTERVIEW.
- E) AN INTERVIEW ON THE RECORD WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES DURING THE MORNING.

2. THE PRESS WILL WISH TO COVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL AT JFK ON 15 JUNE AND WILL HOPE TO OBTAIN A STATEMENT FROM HER. I RECOMMEND THAT WE ARRANGE PHOTO FACILITIES ONLY AND THAT BECAUSE THE VISIT IS NOT BILATERAL IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HER TO MAKE A STATEMENT. I DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY PRESS FACILITIES FOR THE DEPARTURE ON 16 JUNE

SUMMERHAYES

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OO F C O DESKBY 101700Z

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 101700Z

FROM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 101316Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 55 DATED 10 JUNE 82

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

M.I.P.T.: UNSSD II : PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: 15/16 JUNE

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED DRAFT PROGRAMME

TUESDAY 15 JUNE

2040 HRS ETA KENNEDY AIRPORT. MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES

2130 HRS ARRIVE HOTEL UN PLAZA

WEDNESDAY 16 JUNE

0730 HAIRDRESSER

X18



ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

- Hd. ACD
- Hd. Defense
- Hd. UN
- Hd. PC
- Hd. NAD
- Hd. NENAD
- Hd. MED
- Hd. S.A.M.
- Hd. News-D.
- Hd. Emi.
- PS
- PS/Mr. Hurst
- PS/Mr. Riekin
- PS/ps
- Mr. Wright
- Mr. Callmore
- Lord N. G. Tennor
- Mr. Adams
- Ne. to D.S.

1000 CALL ON SECRETARY-GENERAL
1315 LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL
1500 CALL ON PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (KITTANI)
1515 ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION. WE IMAGINE THE PRIME MINISTER
WILL WISH TO REMAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY TO LISTEN TO NEPAL,
THE NEXT SPEAKER.
1630 PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN (SEE MIFT)
1845 LEAVE HOTEL FOR AIRPORT
1940 DEPART KENNEDY AIRPORT

2. SEE MIFT

SUMMERHAYES

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VOK THNAKS

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IMMEDIATE

NYFO 002/10

OO F C O DESKBY 101700Z

GRS 430

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DESKBY 101700Z

FROM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 101314Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 DATED 10 JUNE 82

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 479 TO UKMIS: UNSSD II; PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: 15/16 JUNE

Hd. ACDD
 Hd. Defense
 Hd. UND.
 Hd. PED. < Hd. NAD.
 Hd. NENAD < Hd. S Am.
 Hd. MED < Hd. News.
 Hd. Em. u.
 PS
 PS / Mr. Hunt.
 PS / Mr. RIFKIND.
 PS / PUS
 Mr. Wright
 Mr. Gillingham
 Lord N. Gorden Lennart.
 Mr. Adams.
 No. 10 D.S.

1. IN HIS LETTER OF 4 JUNE, CHICK (ACDD) ASKED FOR MY VIEWS ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE COMBINED ADVICE OF SIR A PARSONS AND MYSELF.

2. UNLESS THERE ARE UNTOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FALKLANDS OR ELSEWHERE WHICH WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE FORESEE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD COME AS PLANNED. THE FALKLANDS

ELSEWHERE WHICH WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE FORESEE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD COME AS PLANNED. THE FALKLANDS ISSUE HAS BECOME DORMANT AT THE UN. IT WILL BE REFERRED TO IN THE LATIN'S PEECHES IN THE GENERAL DEBATE. BUT PASSIONS HAVE COOLED AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK OF A MASS LATIN WALK-OUT OR ANY OTHER DISCOURTESY TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

3. MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS CONTAIN A DRAFT PROGRAMME AND SUGGESTIONS ON POSSIBLE MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS.

4. ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH, AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE WORKING DINNER SHE PLANS FOR 11 JUNE, I WOULD SIMPLY ADD THAT WE ARE VERY HAPPY WITH THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS WHICH I NOTE FROM THE RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING OF 28 MAY (LETTER WHITMORE/FALL OF 28 MAY). THE TONE OF THE GENERAL DEBATE SO FAR HAS BEEN ALL TOO PREDICTABLE. THE MAJORITY OF SPEAKERS HAVE MADE TRADITIONAL STATEMENTS WITH THE USUAL TEDIOUS EMPHASIS ON THE IMMINENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR WHILE LARGELY IGNORING THE VICIOUS CONFLICTS THAT ARE RAGING IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE OPENING OF THE SESSION, HAS SO FAR HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON THEIR RHETORIC. ALTHOUGH OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE FALKLANDS IS AN INHIBITING FACTOR, SIR A PARSONS AND I HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL REMIND THE ASSEMBLY THAT A REAL WORLD EXISTS OUTSIDE ITS WALLS AND THAT IT IS CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NOT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, WHICH HAS CAUSED MILLIONS OF CASUALTIES, ALMOST ALL OF THEM IN THE THIRD WORLD, SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

5. THE PROGRAMME IN MIFT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO BILATERALS. TO DATE WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED ONLY BY BANGLADESH. GENERAL ERSHAD WILL BE IN NEW YORK FOR UNSSD II FROM AROUND MID-DAY ON 16 JUNE AND WOULD LIKE A BRIEF MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE TOO WILL BE STAYING AT THE UN PLAZA HOTEL AND I HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER CAN AGREE TO SEE HIM. THE ONLY OTHER BILATERAL WHICH WE WOULD WANT TO SUGGEST AT THIS STAGE WOULD INVOLVE A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AUDU OF NIGERIA. WE HAVE NOT PUT THIS TO THE NIGERIAN MISSION AS YET BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT AUDU WILL REMAIN IN NEW YORK FOR A FEW DAYS AFTER HE HAS SPOKEN ON 15 JUNE.

6. SEE MIFT

SUMMERHAYES

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FM FCO 071100Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 7 JUNE 1982

SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD II)

1. UNSSD II WILL TAKE PLACE FROM 7 JUNE TO 9 JULY IN NEW YORK. MANY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED TO ATTEND. UP TO 150 BRITISH NGOS WILL BE REPRESENTED, AND MR FRANK JUDD, DIRECTOR OF VSO, HAS AGREED TO ACT AS INDEPENDENT ADVISER TO THE UK DELEGATION IN LIAISON WITH NGOS. REPRESENTATIVES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, ARE EXPECTED IN EVEN GREATER NUMBERS AND THE SESSION IS LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY NUMEROUS PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO ADDRESS THE ASSEMBLY ON 16 JUNE. COPIES OF HER SPEECH WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE VERBATIM SERIES.

LINE TO TAKE (MAY BE DRAWN ON FREELY)

3. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE PURSUIT OF DISARMAMENT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS IN WHICH THE SECURITY OF STATES IS ASSURED AT ALL STAGES.

4. THE MAIN TASK OF THE SESSION WILL BE TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT SINCE UNSSD I IN 1978. THIS HAS BEEN SLOWER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE WISHED. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, IN PARTICULAR THE DELIBERATE DISREGARD OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES FOR THE UN CHARTER, HAVE NOT HELPED TO INSPIRE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE. BUT THERE ARE NOW FIRM SIGNS THAT THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. TALKS HAVE OPENED BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS ABOUT INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AND WILL SHORTLY OPEN ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS (START). LIKE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, THE UK SUPPORTS THE AMERICAN AIM OF ACHIEVING MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN BOTH TYPES OF WEAPON. MOREOVER, THE WEST WILL SOON MAKE NEW PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO UNBLOCK THE MBFR TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL

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FORCES IN VIENNA. IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA CONVENTIONS BANNING CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNDER DISCUSSION AND THERE IS AGREEMENT TO BEGIN LOOKING AT VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN.

5. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SUCCESS OF WHICH WOULD POINT THE WAY TO THE FUTURE. WE HOPE THAT UNSSD II WILL ENDORSE THIS VIEW. IT IS ILLUSORY TO SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS ANY DRAMATIC SHORT CUT TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. THE WAY LIES THROUGH CAREFUL AND PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH REALISM, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND VERIFICATION WILL BE THE WATCH WORDS.

6. AS A DELIBERATIVE BODY, WHOSE DECISIONS TAKE THE FORM OF RECOMMENDATIONS RATHER THAN OBLIGATIONS, UNSSD II CANNOT ITSELF NEGOTIATE TREATIES. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO EXPECT TOO MUCH OF IT. WE HOPE THAT THROUGH REALISTIC DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, UNSSD II WILL GIVE AN IMPETUS TO THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE ELSEWHERE, IE INF, MBFR, ETC.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MUST PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH NON-NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SINCE THE SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES DEPENDS ON THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INSEPARABLY BOUND UP. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR: DETERRENCE IS CONTINUING TO WORK. BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE DOES NOT MEAN ANY SLACKENING OF OUR RESOLVE TO HELP PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO AREAS WHERE THEY ARE NOT YET A FACTOR IN THE SECURITY BALANCE.

8. WE HOPE THAT UNSSD II MAY AGREE A REALISTIC AND FLEXIBLE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES. BUT THE VALUE OF UNSSD II SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED BY ITS SUCCESS IN FULFILLING WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE TOO AMBITIOUS OR TOO UNWORKABLE AN ENTERPRISE. PIECES OF PAPER ALONE DO NOT HELP THE CAUSE OF REAL DISARMAMENT. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT UNREALISTIC COMMITMENTS, EG TO IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, TO A TIMETABLE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OR TO A PROGRAMME WHICH REQUIRES A BINDING COMMITMENT BY STATES.

/9. WE

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9. WE SEE NO NECESSITY FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO THE UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY AND INSTITUTIONS. WE SHOULD WELCOME A STRENGTHENING OF THE CO-ORDINATION ROLE OF THE CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE VARIOUS UN BODIES.

FOR USE WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS

10. WE INTEND TO TAKE A ROBUST LINE AT UNSSD II IN RESISTING NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR BLANKET COMMITMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WHICH DO NOT ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLES ABOVE.

11. WE SHALL WORK FOR A REALISTIC OUTCOME. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF UNSSD I RAISED EXPECTATIONS UNJUSTIFIABLY THROUGH ITS RHETORICAL, IDEALISTIC TONE.

12. ON MACHINERY, WE WOULD PREFER THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO STAY THE SIZE IT IS (40) FOR REASONS OF EFFICIENCY, BUT IF THERE IS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT ON AN INCREASE WE WILL SUPPORT THE CANDIDATURE OF OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

13. WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE MERITS OF A UN-SPONSORED WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN. THERE IS A CASE FOR EDUCATING PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT DISARMAMENT, BUT THE FACT IS THAT INFORMATION ONLY FLOWS FREELY IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF PAYING FOR A CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT BE DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ONLY.

BACKGROUND (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION)

14. A DECISION WAS TAKEN AT THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT, HELD IN 1978, TO HOLD A SECOND SPECIAL SESSION IN 1982. THE MAIN ITEMS ON ITS AGENDA ARE A REVIEW OF PROGRESS SINCE UNSSD I, CONSIDERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT, AND A REVIEW OF UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY.

15. UNSSD II WILL BE DOMINATED BY THE STRENGTH OF FEELING AMONGST THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES (NNA) OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND NOTABLY ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS, TO WHICH THEY ATTACH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE. THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND PARTICULARLY THE US, WILL COME UNDER HEAVY CRITICISM FOR THE SLOW PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAY BE A THEME TO WHICH THE ARABS WILL RETURN FOLLOWING

/THE ISRAELI

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THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR LAST YEAR.
16. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS AT UNSSD II WILL BE THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT (CPD), COMMISSIONED BY UNSSD I, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER NEGOTIATION IN THE CD. DISCUSSIONS IN THE CD SHOWED A WIDE GULF BETWEEN THE NNA, WHO DEMAND A LEGALLY BINDING PROGRAMME WITH A STRICT TIME FRAME WHICH LAYS EMPHASIS ON ACHIEVING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE EARLY STAGES, AND THE WEST, WHICH IS AIMING FOR A MORE REALISTIC PROGRAMME WITH NO ARTIFICIAL TIME CONSTRAINTS. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES FAVOUR A VAGUE, DECLARATORY APPROACH. NO REAL PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE CD AND DIFFERENCES WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED OR CIRCUMVENTED AT UNSSD II ITSELF.

17. IT IS EXPECTED THAT A NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE STALEMATED MBFR TALKS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AT THE BONN SUMMIT (9/10 JUNE) AND TABLED IN VIENNA SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

ANKARA
ATHENS
BONN
BRUSSELS
UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN

THE HAGUE
LISBON
LUXEMBOURG
OSLO
PARIS
ROME

UKDIS GENEVA
MADRID
UKDEL VIENNA
BIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
OTTAWA

[PRIORITY]

UKMIS GENEVA
BELGRADE
BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST
MOSCOW
PRAGUE

SOPIA
WARSAW
EAST BERLIN
MEXICO CITY
BRASILIA

ISLAMABAD
PEKING
TOKYO
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI

[ROUTINE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL
INFORMATION D

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GUIDANCE

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MR COLWES UN

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h.c.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Points to get across

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (7 June - 9 July) will be an important event. It will stimulate action within the UN framework and outside it. We hope that the Session will agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament setting flexible and realistic guidelines for the future. We have put forward our ideas on this to the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Senior representatives of NATO and other government will attend the Special Session and lend their authority to its proceedings. The Prime Minister's intention to speak to the Session is a mark of the importance which the Government attach to it.
3. We are working for specific measures of disarmament which will assure our security at lower levels of armament and risk. We can only achieve this through the negotiation of balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements.
4. The search for arms control and disarmament measures is wider than people realise. Resolutions, petitions and speeches are no substitute for patient negotiation of the detailed issues between the governments actually concerned. Several such negotiations are going on or are in prospect. On intermediate range nuclear weapons we support President Reagan's zero option, ie. the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe. This is much the most radical proposal in the field. Mr Brezhnev is talking of steps which would leave the Russians with a substantial superiority in this field. We are preparing to do away with such missiles altogether. We welcome President Reagan's commitment to achieving substantial reductions in strategic weapons and we look forward to the opening of negotiations between the USA and USSR.

POINTS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PRESSED

Trident and Non-Proliferation

1. There is no provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 which denies a state the right to maintain and modernise its nuclear deterrent. The obligations in Article VI of the Treaty are met by virtue of the INF talks in Geneva for a reduction in nuclear weapons, and the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Trident and Arms Control

2. As a strategic deterrent, the Trident force is irrelevant to the INF negotiations in Geneva since these talks are concerned with sub-strategic, land-based forces. Nor will the British nuclear deterrent be considered in the forthcoming START talks, the objective of which must be to bring about reductions to a level of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. (If pressed) If circumstances were to change significantly, we would of course be prepared to review our position in regard to arms control. But that point would appear to be a long way off.

Size of Trident Force

3. As with Polaris, the Trident force will be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring effective deterrence. The number of missiles will still represent only a very small proportion of the nuclear arsenals of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

4. Trident D5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads associated with our strategic deterrent force in comparison with the original intentions for a force based on the C4 missile system.

/A freeze

A freeze on the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Britain

5. We share the concern for a reduction of nuclear weapons. But the NATO decision of 1979 to modernise with the Cruise and Pershing missiles was taken as a means of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table. In that we have succeeded, We should not now remove the incentive to the Russians to negotiate for the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear weapons in Europe.

Date of NATO Summit (10 June)

6. The determining factor in the choice of date was the need to find a day when the fifteen Heads of State and Government could be gathered in one place (Bonn). There is plenty of time for NATO leaders to attend both the NATO Summit and UNSSD II.

Conflict on purpose between NATO Summit and UNSSD II

7. We see no conflict. NATO is a defensive alliance which has long been active in arms control eg the talks on Mutually Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

Coincidence of UNSSD II and British Army Equipment Exhibition (21-25 June)

8. The Government is fully committed to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament through the negotiation of equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements. While such negotiations continue, sovereign states have an unquestionable right to self-defence; we claim this right for ourselves and it would be inconsistent to deny it to others. Industrialised countries like the UK are recognised as traditional sources of supply by those states which are unable to meet their own security needs. There is no inconsistency in the coincidence of the two events.

Addition to Defensive Points

9. Will the Government put forth proposals to the Special Session as their predecessors did in 1978?

We will put ideas to the Special Session for better progress in the negotiation of specific measures . While the Session cannot itself negotiate measures we hope it will act as a spur to the negotiators.

FILE

RD

MR RICKETT

The Prime Minister wishes to hold a dinner party on Friday, 11 June to discuss her disarmament speech. Hugh Thomas will be invited and is at present contacting Michael Howard and Hugh Trevor Roper to see if they are available as well. He may also ask Peter Wiles. The other guests will be Douglas Hurd and myself.

Hugh Thomas will tell me this evening what progress he has made. We can then send out invitations.

A J COLES

1 June, 1982

NYFO 003/28

Miss Charlotte Stevens UN

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RESTRICTED

TELELETTER

FROM : MRS V E M HARTLES JAO NEW YORK

FILE REF: ADM 018/2/2 DATED 27 MAY 1982

FOLLOWING FOR MISS M M GOLDSMITH MBE, PCD F.C.O.

0124/28

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 19 MAY. IT IS USEFUL TO LOOK AT ALL THE DETAILS.

2. TRAVEL

WE NOW HAVE THE REVISED TIME OF ARRIVAL (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 461 OF 25 MAY). THE SECRET SERVICE SUGGEST THAT IF SUPERINTENDENT CAWTHORNE COULD BE HERE ON THE MORNING OF SUNDAY 13 JUNE IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THEM TO SHOW HIM THE PLACES THE PRIME MINISTER WILL VISIT. OF COURSE IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST ON 14 JUNE. HE HAS BEEN BOOKED AT THE BEVERLY HOTEL, 50TH ST AND LEXINGTON, TELEPHONE (212) 753 2700 FOR THE NIGHTS OF 13 AND 14 JUNE. THIS IS VERY CLOSE TO THE OFFICE AND THE SECRET SERVICE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE OPERATION.

3. WORKING ACCOMMODATION

THE PRIVATE OFFICE WILL BE SET UP AS USUAL. THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT USING OUR OFFICE AT THE UN WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER IS MAKING HER SPEECH. THERE ARE TYPEWRITERS THERE AND EXTENSIONS FROM OUR SWITCHBOARD. THE ROOM IS NOT SECURE.

4. COMMUNICATIONS

A) TELEPHONE NUMBERS

UN PLAZA HOTEL (212) 355 3400

MISSION OFFICE AT THE UN EXTENSIONS 235, 236, 237 OFF THE MISSION SWITCHBOARD (212) 752 8586

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS' RESIDENCE (212) 688 5508

ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF STAFF CAN OF COURSE BE REACHED THROUGH THE MISSION SWITCHBOARD.

B) BOTH ROOMS OF THE PRIVATE OFFICE WILL HAVE THREE TELPHONES FROM THE MISSION SWITCHBOARD, EXTENSIONS 296, 297 AND 298. A PHONE ON EXT 298 WILL BE IN THE BEDROOM OF THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, TO WHICH ALL CALLS WILL BE DIRECTED IN THE SILENT HOURS.

ON CAT 270 WILL BE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, TO WHICH
ALL CALLS WILL BE DIRECTED IN THE SILENT HOURS.

5. SECURITY

WE HAVE A SUITE OF SAFE HAND BOXES (THREE) WHICH SHOULD SUFFICE UNLESS NO 10 PREFER TO SEND THEIR OWN. OUR SECURITY OFFICERS ARE UNDERSTAFFED AT PRESENT AND WE COULD NOT SPARE ONE TO GUARD THE PAPERS OVERNIGHT. THE SAFE HAND BOX RUN WILL CONTINUE UNTIL STOOD DOWN AND IF NECESSARY COULD BE REACTIVATED DURING THE NIGHT. OTHERWISE WE WOULD ANTICIPATE FIRST DELIVERY ABOUT 7 AM.

6. SUBSISTENCE

WE SHALL OPERATE CONFERENCE TERMS. THIS MEANS THAT WE WILL PAY FOR THE COST OF SUITES/ROOMS AND FOR OFFICIAL ENTERTAINMENT INCURRED IN THEM. INDIVIDUALS WILL BE EXPECTED TO SETTLE ANY INCIDENTAL CHARGES THEY INCUR. WE WOULD EXPECT ALL OFFICIAL TELEPHONE CALLS TO BE MADE THROUGH OUR SWITCHBOARD. RESIDUAL ALLOWANCES ARE:

A1 (PRIME MINISTER) US DOLLARS 62.38

CLASS A US DOLLARS 54.25

CLASS B US DOLLARS 46.12 BUT IT APPEARS FROM YOUR LETTER THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY EXCEPT THE PRIME MINISTER ARE TO RECEIVE 'A'. IS THIS CORRECT?

7. HAIR APPOINTMENT

WE SHALL MAKE THIS APPOINTMENT AS REQUESTED.

8. NEWSPAPERS

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BUY BRITISH NEWSPAPERS ON THE DAY OF ISSUE IN NEW YORK. NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE COI TO GET THEM TO US BY THEIR NORMAL METHODS. THE ONLY WAY I CAN SUGGEST IS BY HAND OF PILOT OF CONCORDE BA 193. THEY SHOULD BE COVERED AS AN OFFICIAL BAG TO AVOID CUSTOMS DELAYS AND WE WILL ARRANGE TO HAVE THEM COLLECTED. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THIS IS BEING DONE.

9. TRANSPORT

I WILL SEND YOU THE DETAILS OF CARS NEARER THE TIME. THERE IS A REINFORCED CAR AVAILABLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER; THE SECRET SERVICE WILL INSIST ON ONE OF THEIR AGENTS RIDING IN IT. IF MEMBERS OF THE PRESS ARRIVE ON THE VC10 WE WOULD NEED TO HIRE A BUS OR LIMOUSINE DEPENDING ON NUMBERS. BOTH COST ABOUT US DOLLARS 30 AN HOUR. WE SHALL HOPE TO AVOID ANY OTHER HIRING.

PM DUTY FREE LIQUOR

10 WE COULD ADD CIGARETTES TO THE TAKE-HOME ORDERS IF REQUIRED.

SIGNED V E M HARTLES



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 May 1982

J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear John,

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT SECOND UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD II)

I attached in my letter of 4 May a suggested outline for the Prime Minister's speech at the second Special Session on Disarmament. It has not proved possible in the meantime to arrange a meeting for the Prime Minister to discuss the outline with Ministers. I am nevertheless forwarding a draft so that the Prime Minister may have it, as requested, before the Whitsun holiday. Mr Hurd has seen the draft. He thinks it covers broadly the right ground, but will need to be turned into Prime Ministerial language.

2. The Falklands crisis has obliged us to place square brackets around paragraph 4 of the draft which refers to the obligations of members of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means.

Yours ever,

S M J Lamport
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

DRAFT PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT SECOND SPECIAL SESSION

[COURTESY REMARKS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT]

1. Leaders of countries in every corner of the globe come to this Special Session, as I from Britain, in search of surer ways of preserving peace. Ways that match the reality of the world in which we live. Ways that will keep pace with the rate of change which we are witnessing. We carry into this Chamber the aspirations of men and women, wherever they may be, that governments will respond to the challenge they face today, that they will foster and defend conditions in which our peoples may live in peace and justice and follow the way of life of their choice. In taking up this challenge I begin with a tribute - to the values and wisdom of those who decided, in 1945, that the principles under which governments should conduct their relations with one another be written into the Charter of this Organisations.

2. Too many countries, of varying power and in different areas, are bent on imposing change on others by resorting to force. They acquire arms to prepare for such a possibility. Their neighbours or opponents then acquire arms to match the potential aggressor's. And so the accumulation mounts within regions and world wide. Tension, in other words, breeds arms, and arms in turn feed tension. We must find a way of breaking this vicious circle and curbing the resources spent on arms.

3. One part of this Herculean task is to try to deal with the very sources of tension - the disputes and rivalries between states. That is a broad subject. It requires efforts to make progress on

/the

the various regional problems that create tension. Britain attaches the highest priority to this task. It is one in which we have played our part and to which we will continue to dedicate our energies. We are active with four other countries in efforts to bring Namibia to independence in peace. That would help to reduce tension in Southern Africa, as the independence of Zimbabwe did in 1980. Britain has been co-operating with the other members of the European Community in helping to find ways of making progress and easing tension in the Middle East. We have also made proposals for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

[4. If tension is to be reduced, there must also be strict adherence to international law. Britain stands today at the centre of a serious conflict arising from action taken by another State in defiance of its obligations under the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. That State's action also demonstrated its determination to set aside the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and it has persisted in its illegal military action in defiance of its obligations under the Charter to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Faced with such total contempt for the purposes and principles of this Organisation, we have had to take recourse to the right of self-defence which the Charter recognises as inherent.]

5. None of us should underestimate the importance of this Second Special Session. It brings under examination matters of vital concern to all of us. It will probe into the reasons why earlier

/hopes

hopes of more rapid progress have been disappointed. It will search for new and practical steps to lower the risk of war, to reduce arsenals and to restrain the development of new weapons. It is essential that our examination of the problems should be thorough and that we should find practical means of resolving urgent problems.

6. The British Government has given its commitment to the aims set out in the Final Document of the First Special Session. It has shown its practical support for these aims by playing a constructive part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. It has continued the active role played by Britain in all the discussion and negotiations on multilateral disarmament questions that have taken place under United Nations and other auspices both before and since the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. My Government is disappointed that the negotiations in the UN-inspired bodies have not achieved the positive results that were looked for, with so much hope, four years ago.

7. Perhaps this is because we have lost sight of the real objective. Throughout the Final Document of the First Special Session there are repeated references to the essential principles of disarmament. I should like to offer a simple definition of disarmament. It is this: the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security.

8. There can be no argument about the need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Some believe that nuclear conflict is imminent. I do not share that view. I find in the experience of more than three decades convincing proof of stability - a stability born of

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the recognition that there would be no victor in a nuclear exchange. [The report of the Palme Commission to this Session, reflecting the opinion of leading statesmen from all regions of the world, and the 1981-82 survey by the independent International Institute for Strategic Studies support the contention that our efforts to keep the peace in Europe have been and will continue to be effective.] Deterrence has played a vital role in this.

9. But we cannot afford to be complacent. Without adequate controls the endless accumulation of weapons will jeopardise security. Equally, measures of arms control and disarmament can only achieve lasting results and help the cause of peace if they enhance security. Realisable prospects of achieving substantial reductions of nuclear weapons are now offered by the direct path of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries which have the largest nuclear arsenals. These negotiations, of concern to the world at large, are of vital interest to Europe, where the concentration of nuclear weapons is greatest. We fully support the radical proposals which have been made by the United States for the elimination of intermediate-range weapons and for substantial reductions in the strategic field. These go to the heart of the matter, as moratoria, freezes and declarations do not.

10. We share the widespread international concern about the dangers of chemical warfare. Our concerns are heightened by reports that these hideous weapons may recently have been used in defiance of accepted legal and moral standards. As part of a determined effort to eliminate chemical warfare once and for all, we have given a new impetus in the Committee on Disarmament to the search

/for

for a properly verifiable convention banning the development and possession of chemical weapons. This is a matter to which my Government attaches great importance.

11. Negotiations on nuclear and chemical weapons have to be complemented by further multilateral efforts directed at the central question of conventional arms and forces. There is a heavy concentration of conventional forces in Europe and we shall continue to explore in the Vienna talks for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions every possible avenue for reductions which sustain - indeed improve - the security of all. The Western participants in these talks have recently made an important new proposal designed to facilitate agreement. Britain also favours a conference which will reach agreement on new mandatory confidence and security building measures which will increase trust about the military intentions of either side and thereby reduce the risk of conflict in Europe.

12. All will recognise the need for resolution in face of the threats to security and peace that confront us now and which will do so in the future. In the case of the British Government we will draw strength from our experience in the pursuit of peace which stretches back over many years. In the span of the 37 years which have elapsed since the end of the Second World War, successive British Governments have played a constructive and central role in the achievement of specific measures. These are measures which we value today for the constraints they place on the use of force. Quick to run down our forces at the end of World War II, we proceeded to abolish compulsory military service. We were protagonists of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of /1968.

1968. We then destroyed our stocks of chemical weapons and were proud to take the initiatives which led to the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 and the Inhumane Weapons Convention in 1980. Let there be no doubt about our intention to continue in this creative role.

13. We cannot regard it as legitimate that the ideas of one people should be imposed on another by force of arms, at the cost of the latter's sovereignty and in defiance of agreements governing the respect for human rights. Nor, for all that we are told to the contrary, can we regard the apparently endless build-up of forces, both conventional and nuclear, by the Soviet Union, as anything but an indication of a wish to extend its influence and control. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly declared their wish for peace, for restraints to be placed on the development of weapons. I share those objectives and appeal to them to consider further how they might best be attained. Declarations are not enough. They have to be matched by deeds.

14. With regard to our strategic deterrent I wish to emphasise that the force stands at the minimum credible level. If circumstances were to change significantly - if, for example, Soviet military capabilities were to be reduced substantially - we would of course be prepared to review our position in relation to arms control, for the goal we all share is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the world. But we should be honest and realistic enough to recognise that this is still a long way off. In the meantime our nuclear weapons pose no threat to any country unless it commits aggression against us. Their sole purpose is the prevention of war.

/15. Britain

15. Britain supports the regime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 as a valuable instrument for limiting the possibilities of nuclear conflict. I reaffirm the formal assurance given to Non Nuclear Weapon States at the First Special Session about the use and threat of use of our nuclear weapons.

16. The fact of the matter is that the majority of states are not threatened by nuclear weapons. 'Security is assured' in the first instance by conventional forces. It is outside Europe that the problems of keeping the peace have arisen in the sharpest form. The problems are manifest in regional conflicts and in ever increasing expenditure on defence. We cannot ignore the fact that 140 conflicts with conventional weapons have taken place since 1945. These have cost at least 10 million lives. I am glad that the Secretary-General is appointing a group of experts to examine the question of conventional disarmament. We hope that careful thought will be given to measures which could increase confidence between groups of states and reduce the demand for weapons.

17. Greater confidence between nations is essential: to achieve this we need openness in the publication of military expenditure. It has long been our practice in the UK to publish this information. I am happy to announce that the British Government will participate in the Secretary-General's scheme for the reporting of military expenditures by supplying information in matrix form for inclusion in the United Nations' work for the Reduction of Military Budgets.

18. I express our support for the studies that have been undertaken at the United Nations about the relationship between disarmament and /development.

development. We would all like to spend less on defence, while maintaining security. But it is really too simple to suggest that a pound saved on armaments will always be a pound added to the aid programme. Outside the OECD, there are too many industrialised countries which order their priorities differently. They spend a lot on arms and only a little in aid. On their own admission they will never become major aid donors. By contrast, Britain's aid programme is the fifth largest among OECD members. Our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries. The total flows of finance from the United Kingdom to developing countries are amongst the highest in the world.

19. I have stressed the priority we attach to specific measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, the need for greater openness and confidence. Current negotiations are engaged which could carry us further towards these goals. The first requirement then is to press for progress in those negotiations. They fall within a wider scheme of action, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We believe that any such programme should be practical and flexible, reflecting the problems of today, capable of adjusting to those of tomorrow. Legal language, time-frames, and attempts to pre-determine the path of negotiation are inappropriate. We should shape our ambitions to match reality.

20. Only thus will the legitimate concern of our people be satisfied. Public opinion is not however a universal instrument. It cannot flourish in states where there is no parliamentary opposition, no free press, no independent non-governmental organisations. If

/public

public opinion is to be effective, it must be able to apply pressure on governments to negotiate. I pay tribute to the constructive role played in Britain by the many non-governmental organisations active in the disarmament field and welcome their participation in this Session. They continue an honourable tradition. The UK was actually the first country to have an independent World Disarmament Campaign. When the United Nations Centre for Disarmament formulates its own proposals, we shall look particularly for ideas which may ensure a freer flow of information about the issues in debate to those parts of the world at present denied that information.

21. Mr President, measures of arms control and disarmament, if they are to be successful, must improve the prospects of peace and security for all. These are no less than the fundamental aims of the United Nations. The need for disarmament has never been stronger. The opportunities have never been greater. It is up to us to grasp those opportunities. We must turn the proposals now under negotiation into firm and binding disarmament agreements. The United Kingdom gives highest priority to the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, substantial reductions in the strategic arms of the major nuclear powers, conventional force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, confidence building measures in the European continent, and a complete ban on chemical weapons. The British Government and our Delegation at this Special Session will spare no effort to achieve agreement on a plan for a safer world in which our children can grow up in peace.

RESTRICTED

7021 - 2

GRS 45

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 251400Z MAY 1982
TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 461 OF 25 MAY.

FROM CONFERENCE SECTION

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. OUR TEL NO 404 REFERS.

1. ARRIVAL TIME ON 15 JUNE IS NOW 2040 HOURS LOCAL TIME.
DEPARTURE TIME ON 16 JUNE REMAINS UNCHANGED.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

NNNN

DIST

LIMITED

PCD

ACDD

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NAD

MR GILLMORE

1

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

25 May 1982

UNSSOD: DUTY FREE LIST

We spoke. I have included Ian Kydd's and Rosemary Meadowcroft's requirements in case they come.

PM	Whisky	Cigarettes
Mr. Whitmore	"	"
Mr. Ingham	"	"
Mr. Kydd	"	"
Miss Brown	"	"
Mrs. Meadowcroft	"	"
Miss Stevens	"	"
Supt. Cawthorne	"	"
Sgt. Strevens	Gin	"

Charlotte Stevens

Miss Mignon Goldsmith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 5414

John - I have
told Hugh
this is fine.
Charlotte
25/5

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

24 May 1982

Dear John,

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

Travel

1. Further to my letter of 2 April, and your acceptance of an RAF VC10 to transport the Prime Minister and party to the above meeting, the RAF have now informed me that due to prevailing winds the outward leg will take seven hours 40 minutes as opposed to the eight hours quoted. The revised timings are therefore as follows:

15 June

ETD LHR 1800 local time
ETA New York 2040 local time

Flying time seven hours 40 minutes.

16 June

ETD New York 1940 local time

17 June

ETA LHR 0730 local time

Flying time 6 hours 50 minutes.

New York = GMT - 4 UK = GMT + 1 (=BST)

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will authorise the RAF to go ahead on the above timings.

M M Goldsmith
M M Goldsmith

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

cc: Miss Boots, ACDD
Wing Commander Ball, RAF



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Mrs V E M Hartles MBE
JAO NEW YORK

Your reference

Our reference

TXW 408/304/1

Date

19 May 1982

Dear Valerie,

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

1. Although I am sure you have the administrative arrangements for the above visit well in hand, I thought a round up letter covering the various requirements might be useful.

2. TRAVEL

As you know the party will travel on an RAF VC10, timings as given in my telegram number 404 of 13 May. Superintendent Cawthorne will make his own way to his hotel on Sunday 13 June and will present himself at the Mission early on 14 June ready to fulfill his engagements. All members of the party will return on the VC10.

3. LIVING ACCOMMODATION

You will have seen my telegram confirming No 10's agreement to the UN Plaza .

4. WORKING ACCOMMODATION: Private Office

One room of the Duplex suite referred to in your teleletter should be furnished with two desks for the Private Secretaries plus some additional chairs. The second room should be furnished with two desks for the Duty Clerk and Personal Assistant (three desks if there are two PAs). Electric typewriter, with manual back up, photocopying machine and the usual stationery requirements.

The Duty Clerk and or Personal Assistants may wish to be installed in our office at the UN during the time the Prime Minister is making her speech. I should be grateful for your confirmation that this would present no difficulties.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Telegrams

A 24 hour watch will need to be maintained during the Prime Minister's visit. The COI summary will be transmitted during the early hours of 16 June by the FCO Signals Office. This should of course be delivered to the Private Secretary, Press Secretary and Private Office with the first safehand run.



(b) Telephones

The UKMIS switchboard will need to be manned on a 24 hour basis during the visit. Your telegram states that the telephone lines at the UN Plaza may be hooked up to the UKMIS switchboard. The minimum requirement would be for telephones in the Private Offices to be extensions from the UKMIS switchboard; in addition it should be possible for the telephone in the Private Office to be switched through to the bedroom of the Private Secretary at night. I should be grateful for your confirmation that this will be done.

Please telegraph, when known, a list of useful telephone numbers, ie UN Plaza, our office at the UN etc.

6. SECURITY

Regular safehand runs between the Mission and the Private Office will be needed throughout the visit. Do you need a suite of safehand boxes? If so, they could be sent out on the VC10. Can you spare a Security Officer to guard the papers in the Private Office over night? If not all papers will need to be transferred to the Chancery at night and returned to the Private Office early the following morning.

7. FINANCE

(a) Subsistence

All members of the party will be on Conference Terms. Can you confirm that the suites/rooms will be paid for direct by the Mission, and that individuals concerned will receive a residual allowance, ie:-

Class A 1	(Prime Minister)	\$49, and all other members
of the party, excluding detectives		Class A 11 \$42.60, to cover
all meals including breakfast.		

The detectives will provide their own subsistence.

(b) No 10 and common service costs will be borne by the Management and Personnel Office (now that the CSD has been dismantled). The exceptions to this will be the expenses of the air crew (MOD) and the detectives (Metropolitan Police).

8. HAIR APPOINTMENT

I should be grateful if you would arrange a hair appointment for the Prime Minister in her suite on the morning of 16 June at approximately 7.30 or 8.00 am (time to be confirmed). This will be a Carmen Roller session, duration 45 minutes. Please confirm that it will be possible for the hairdresser to provide Carmen Rollers as the Prime Minister does not wish to take her own.

9. NEWSPAPERS

Three sets of newspapers covering the editions of 16 June should be purchased locally. If these will not be available before the Prime Minister's departure, please let me know and I will make arrangements for them to be sent out from here.

10. TRANSPORT

Please send me, when known, by telegram, the car allocation from the airport on arrival. If the Mission are unable to supply all the cars needed for the visit, you have authority to hire, in which case I should be grateful if you would let me know the charges involved. In arranging the car allocation during the course of the visit, please ensure that the Press Secretary is allocated a car for his exclusive use. Is a reinforced car available for the Prime Minister? A van will be needed at the airport to transport boxes, luggage etc.

If members of the press travel on the VC10 (not yet decided) the charge we make for their air ticket includes transport to and from the airport, but their transport charges during the course of the visit are their own responsibility.

11. DUTY FREE LIQUOR

Three bottles each of Scotch and Gin should be placed in the Press Suite for official entertainment. Mixes can be ordered from the hotel, the bill to be sent direct to the Mission.

Please also place one bottle each of Gin and Scotch (not Bourbon) in the Prime Minister's suite, plus mixes. Can you also ensure that there is a supply of Perrier water (or similar) available in the suite.

Members of the party would be grateful if they could purchase some duty free liquor to take home. In order to facilitate this chore the Duty Clerk from No 10 will let me know in advance what everyone would like. (I have restricted the list to Scotch and Gin).

*Yours sincerely,
M. M. Goldsmith*

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

cc: Mrs Boots, ACDD
Miss Charlotte Stevens, No 10 Downing Street.

CS 19

Note for file.

45 mins for
Carmen Rollers
arranged for
16. 6. 82

PRIME MINISTER

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament:
Your Speech

We had arranged a meeting with Douglas Hurd and Peter Blaker tomorrow evening to discuss the attached outline. You will clearly not wish to hold this meeting when your mind will be on your speech for the debate on Thursday.

However, we must if we can stick to the agreed plan to give you a full draft text before the Whitsun Recess - you will have no time afterwards given the crowded calendar of the first half of June.

The attached paper sets out the objectives for your speech and, on a separate page, provides an outline. If you are content with these, the FCO and MOD will work up the outline into a full speech.

Agree?

18 May 1982



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Miss Charlotte Stevens
Duty Clerk
No 10 Downing Street
SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

13 May 1982

Dear Charlotte UNSSOD:

As promised I attach herewith a copy of the teletype from New York giving details of the suggested accommodation for the Prime Minister and party. I should be grateful to know if the arrangements outlined are acceptable to the Prime Minister. For ease of reference I also attach a copy of my original teletype of 29 April.

*Yours sincerely,
M M Goldsmith*

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

14/5 Told MS that CAW
and be next to PM.
otherwise arrangements OK.

FO016/11

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RESTRICTED

TELELETTER

FROM MRS V E M HARTLES, NEW YORK

FILE REFERENCE ADM 018/2/2 DATED 6 MAY 1982

FOLLOWING FOR MISS M M GOLDSMITH, PCD, F C O.

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 29 APRIL. WE SHALL AWAIT CONFIRMATION OF TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

totline? 2. AS THE VISIT WILL BE UN ORIENTATED I RECOMMEND THE UN PLAZA HOTEL WHICH IS USED BY SECRETARIES OF STATE WHEN HERE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ITS SITUATION IS CONVENIENT AND IT HAS THE FACILITIES WE REQUIRE, FOR INSTANCE TELEPHONE LINES ARE IN PLACE WHICH CAN EASILY BE HOOKED UP TO OUR SWITCHBOARD. IN ANTICIPATION WE HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN HOLDING A PROVISIONAL BOOKING AS FOLLOWS:

CAW TWO BEDROOM DUPLEX SUITE - FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND DETECTIVE BUT SEE PARA 3 BELOW.

ADJOINING ONE BEDROOM DUPLEX SUITE - PRIVATE OFFICE

A ONE BEDROOM SUITE ON ANOTHER FLOOR - FOR THE PRESS SECRETARY

NINE SINGLE ROOMS

3. THE SUITE HELD FOR THE PRIME MINISTER IS THE ONE USUALLY OCCUPIED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE SECOND BEDROOM HAS ITS OWN BATHROOM AND SEPARATE ENTRANCE AND IS NORMALLY OCCUPIED BY A DETECTIVE. WOULD THIS ARRANGEMENT BE SUITABLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER?

4. NATURALLY IF MORE THAN NINE SINGLE ROOMS ARE LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED, WE WOULD NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SIGNED V E M HARTLES

TELELETTER TO NEW YORK

GRS 165

RESTRICTED

TELELETTER

FROM MISS M M GOLDSMITH, PCD, FCO

FILE NO TXW 408/304/1 DATED 29 APRIL 1982

FOLLOWING FOR MRS V E M HARTLES, MBE, JAO, NEW YORK

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

1. I AM AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM NO 10 REGARDING THE PRIME MINISTER'S TRAVEL REQUIREMENTS BUT HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT SHE SHOULD TRAVEL ON RAF VC10. A DEPARTURE FROM LONDON AT 1800 HRS LOCAL TIME (AFTER QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE) WOULD GIVE AN ARRIVAL TIME IN NEW YORK ON 15 JUNE OF 2100 HRS. THE DEPARTURE TIME ON 16 JUNE WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON HER PROGRAMME BUT THE SUGGESTED DEPARTURE IS 1940 HRS LOCAL TIME GIVING AN ARRIVAL AT LONDON HEATHROW OF 0730 HOURS ON 17 JUNE.

2. THE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO BE RELATIVELY SMALL I.E. 8/10 PEOPLE FROM NO 10, AND ONE OR TWO OFFICIALS FROM THE FCO. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ACCOMMODATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND PARTY. A PRIVATE OFFICE WILL HAVE TO BE INSTALLED WHEREVER THE PRIME MINISTER IS STAYING. THE PRESS SECRETARY WILL NEED A SUITE.

PYM-

U.N.

13 April, 1982

UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Thank you for your letter of 6 April. The Prime Minister is content that Mr Frank Judd should be invited to join the United Kingdom Delegation as an 'independent adviser in liaison with British non-governmental organisations'.

I am copying this letter to Peter Graine (Ministry of Defence).

F N Richards, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

k



CBT

Prime Minister

4

Content that Mr. Judd should
do this?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

M 7/4

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1982

Dear John,

UN Special Session on Disarmament

The Prime Minister may wish to know that we are proposing to ask Frank Judd, the Director of Voluntary Service Overseas, to join the UK Delegation to the UN Special Session as an 'independent adviser in liaison with British non-governmental organisations'. An announcement would be made in Parliament as soon as Mr Judd had formally accepted the invitation.

We have been under some pressure from various NGOs to attach one of their representatives to the UK Delegation, on the precedent of Lord Noel-Baker's attendance at the first Special Session in 1978. The names suggested by the NGOs were of people who would be completely opposed to Government policy and who had no knowledge of international negotiations. We obviously wished to find someone of sensible ideas who would be acceptable to the NGOs. Mr Pym agrees that Mr Judd would be the best man for the job. His experience as a Minister in MOD, ODA and FCO would be particularly valuable. I should be grateful if you could confirm that the Prime Minister would not object to our offering this post to Mr Judd.

I am copying this letter to Peter Graine in Mr Blaker's office in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

United Nations

Caroline

Thank you.

MS 2/4

MR. COLES

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

I spoke to Douglas Hurd's office and the first meeting for the above speech is at 1030 on Tuesday 4 May. Mr. Hurd then goes on honeymoon. The next meeting is on Wednesday 19 May at 1800. Mr. Blaker has been invited to both meetings.

CS.

2 April 1982



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

John
Five marks
- noted idory to the timetable at
cl.
x O.K. from your point
of view?
A-J-C. 16/4

Telephone 01-233 5414

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
SW1

Your reference

Our reference
TXW 408/304/1
Date
2 April 1982

Dear John,

UN SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

1. At your request, I have made enquiries regarding the cost of chartering Concorde for the Prime Minister's use on the above visit. Mr Kendall, the Concorde Marketing Manager, explained that it would be necessary to take a Concorde out of commercial service and the total cost for the flight both ways would be £106,000. This covers one hundred seats and does not allow for any re-fit to suit the Prime Minister's needs.

2. The timing of the outward flight to New York by Concorde would be beneficial in that a departure time at 1800 hours would give an arrival time in New York of 1700 hours. The Concorde does not normally make a return flight New York/London Heathrow in the evening; if the Prime Minister were to depart on the morning of 17 June at 0830 hours, the arrival time at London Heathrow would be 1715 hours.

3. The cost of travel by RAF VC10 would total £40,000; this includes a fit of the aircraft to the Prime Minister's needs.

4. Suggested timings would be as follows:-

15 June - ETD London Heathrow 1800 hours
ETA New York 2100 hours.

Flying time 8 hours.

16 June - ETD New York 1940 hours

17 June - ETA London Heathrow 0730 hours

Flying time 6 hours 50 minutes.



5. I recommend that the RAF VC10 would be more convenient both from the point of view of the Prime Minister's comfort and the cost involved. I should be grateful for your instructions.
6. I must apologise for the delay in giving you this information.

Yours sincerely,
Meggin Goldsmith

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1982

Dear Francis,

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 25 March. The Prime Minister agrees to speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June and therefore to leave London after Questions on Tuesday 15 June.

Mrs Thatcher has also confirmed that she would like her speech to the Special Session to be prepared well in advance. With that in mind, she would be grateful if an outline could be produced which would serve as a basis for discussion early in May. We shall arrange a meeting in due course. The Prime Minister would be grateful if Mr. Hurd and Mr. Blaker, plus one or two officials, could attend. The objective thereafter will be to produce a draft in final form for the Prime Minister to consider during the Whitsun recess.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Lamport in Mr. Hurd's Office and Peter Craine in Mr. Blaker's Office.

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

As you requested, I have investigated alternative times for your speech in New York.

You will see from the FCO letter attached that Sir A. Parsons recommends that you leave London after Questions on 15 June in order to be able to speak in New York on Wednesday, 16 June.

You were concerned at the limited time available for the preparation of your speech, given the very busy first part of June which included Versailles, President Reagan's visit and the NATO Summit.

This new proposal would give you a little more time after your return from Bonn on 10 June. But I think we should aim to get your speech in as near to possible final form well before that. If you agree, I should like to arrange for Mr. Hurd and Mr. Blaker plus one or two officials to discuss an outline for the speech fairly early in May with a view to getting a full draft to you before the Whitsun recess.

Yes We need to make a firm reservation of your place in the list of speakers at New York. May we go firm on Wednesday, 16 June?

Yes Agree that we should proceed with the preparation of your speech as recommended above?

mf

A.J.C.

25 March 1982



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1982

Dear John.

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 16 March about the timing of the Prime Minister's speech at the Special Session.

We have consulted UKMis New York who say it would be possible for the Prime Minister to leave London after Questions on 15 June and speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June. She could speak first that afternoon and would be followed by speakers from Nepal, Nicaragua, Mali and Niger. Alternatively, it would be possible for the Prime Minister to address the Assembly on the afternoon of Friday 18 June; she would again speak first, followed by Kenya, Qatar and Libya.

Of the two options, Sir A Parsons recommends the first, as does our Disarmament Delegation in Geneva which will shortly move to New York in preparation for the Special Session. We agree with this advice. There would clearly be disadvantages in the Prime Minister speaking near the end of the week when her audience and the press coverage will be smaller.

We note your remarks about the procedure and timetable for the preparation of the Prime Minister's speech and will set work in hand with these in mind.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Francis Richards

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

united nations



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 March 1982

AFC has seen,

Dear John,

Arms Control and Disarmament

I attach as requested in your letter of 21 March, notes for the Prime Minister's use under two headings:

- (a) The points which the Government might attempt to get across on these matters.
- (b) The points on which the Government might be pressed and the response which it should make.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Points to get across

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (7 June - 9 July) will be an important event. It will stimulate action within the UN framework and outside it. We hope that the Session will agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament setting flexible and realistic guidelines for the future. We have put forward our ideas on this to the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Senior representatives of NATO and other government will attend the Special Session and lend their authority to its proceedings. The Prime Minister's intention to speak to the Session is a mark of the importance which the Government attach to it.
3. We are working for specific measures of disarmament which will assure our security at lower levels of armament and risk. We can only achieve this through the negotiation of balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements.
4. The search for arms control and disarmament measures is wider than people realise. Resolutions, petitions and speeches are no substitute for patient negotiation of the detailed issues between the governments actually concerned. Several such negotiations are going on or are in prospect. On intermediate range nuclear weapons we support President Reagan's zero option, ie. the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe. This is much the most radical proposal in the field. Mr Brezhnev is talking of steps which would leave the Russians with a substantial superiority in this field. We are preparing to do away with such missiles altogether. We welcome President Reagan's commitment to achieving substantial reductions in strategic weapons and we look forward to the opening of negotiations between the USA and USSR.

POINTS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PRESSED

Trident and Non-Proliferation

1. There is no provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 which denies a state the right to maintain and modernise its nuclear deterrent. The obligations in Article VI of the Treaty are met by virtue of the INF talks in Geneva for a reduction in nuclear weapons, and the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Trident and Arms Control

2. As a strategic deterrent, the Trident force is irrelevant to the INF negotiations in Geneva since these talks are concerned with sub-strategic, land-based forces. Nor will the British nuclear deterrent be considered in the forthcoming START talks, the objective of which must be to bring about reductions to a level of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. (If pressed) If circumstances were to change significantly, we would of course be prepared to review our position in regard to arms control. But that point would appear to be a long way off.

Size of Trident Force

3. As with Polaris, the Trident force will be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring effective deterrence. The number of missiles will still represent only a very small proportion of the nuclear arsenals of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

4. Trident D5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads associated with our strategic deterrent force in comparison with the original intentions for a force based on the C4 missile system.

/A freeze

A freeze on the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Britain

5. We share the concern for a reduction of nuclear weapons. But the NATO decision of 1979 to modernise with the Cruise and Pershing missiles was taken as a means of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table. In that we have succeeded, We should not now remove the incentive to the Russians to negotiate for the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear weapons in Europe.

Date of NATO Summit (10 June)

6. The determining factor in the choice of date was the need to find a day when the fifteen Heads of State and Government could be gathered in one place (Bonn). There is plenty of time for NATO leaders to attend both the NATO Summit and UNSSD II.

Conflict on purpose between NATO Summit and UNSSD II

7. We see no conflict. NATO is a defensive alliance which has long been active in arms control eg the talks on Mutually Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

Coincidence of UNSSD II and British Army Equipment Exhibition (21-25 June)

8. The Government is fully committed to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament through the negotiation of equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements. While such negotiations continue, sovereign states have an unquestionable right to self-defence; we claim this right for ourselves and it would be inconsistent to deny it to others. Industrialised countries like the UK are recognised as traditional sources of supply by those states which are unable to meet their own security needs. There is no inconsistency in the coincidence of the two events.

Addition to Defensive Points

9. Will the Government put forth proposals to the Special Session as their predecessors did in 1978?

We will put ideas to the Special Session for better progress in the negotiation of specific measures . While the Session cannot itself negotiate measures we hope it will act as a spur to the negotiators.

cc Mr. Ingham
Mr. Pattison

PRIME MINISTER

The Disarmament Campaign


You will remember that Mr. Foot pressed you on disarmament questions at Question time last week. I think there will be an increasing need for you to deal with the disarmament arguments, both at Question time and in other public comment. The range of possible questions is wide and it will never be easy to guess precisely which aspect will be emphasised by the Opposition.

I therefore asked the FCO to prepare the attached note which falls into two parts:

- (a) Points we should try to get across;
- (b) Points on which the Government might be pressed, together with suggested answers.

You may like to retain this as a standard brief for Question time.

A. J. COLES



24 March 1982



United Nations ds

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 March 1982

Dear Mr. Sitarin,

Thank you for your letter of 12 March, about the United Nations General Assembly Second Special Session on Disarmament, to be held in New York in June.

As I said in the House last week, I hope to speak for the United Kingdom at the Plenary stage of the Session.

*Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher*

The Rt. Hon. John Silkin, M.P.

HL



10 DOWNING STREET

file
cc Mr Pattison

From the Private Secretary

21 March 1982

Arms Control and Disarmament

You may have observed that during Prime Minister's Question Time last Thursday the Leader of the Opposition pressed the Prime Minister on the attitude which the Government would be taking towards the UN Special Session on Disarmament. It seems likely that in the coming weeks there will be an increasing need for the Prime Minister to deal, at Question Time and on other public occasions, with this and other disarmament issues. I should be grateful if you could provide by Wednesday, 24 March a succinct statement, couched in language for public use, of:

- a) The points which the Government might attempt to get across on these matters.
- b) The points on which the Government might be pressed and the response which it should make.

It would be helpful if the whole could be expressed in clear language which can be virtually read out at Parliamentary Question Time.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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United Nations file 13

B/F?

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 March 1982

U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament

Would you please refer to my letter of 3 March.

The Prime Minister has decided to attend the Special Session to deliver the UK speech. She so informed Parliament this afternoon in an oral answer.

1
We now need to reach early agreement on a date and time for the Prime Minister's speech. You said earlier that a provisional speaking slot had been reserved for the afternoon of Tuesday, 15 June. I should be grateful if possible alternatives could be examined. For example, would it be possible for the Prime Minister to leave London after Questions on 15 June and speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June before returning to London on the night of 16/17 June? Could you also establish whether there would be any possibility of the Prime Minister speaking on Friday, 18 June (though you may think it is not advisable for Mrs Thatcher to address the Assembly at the end of the week). In the light of your views, the Prime Minister would take a final decision on the date of her speech.

2
It may be helpful if I point out now that the Prime Minister's visit to New York will be preceded by an extremely busy two weeks on the foreign affairs front and that she will therefore have much less time than usual to work on a major speech. I therefore think we should aim to produce a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration before the Whitsun recess. The Prime Minister may wish to have a word about the contents with an FCO Minister before the drafting work is put in hand.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

c. Mr. Pattison

UN SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

You asked (see attached minute) what your diary looked like for the period covering the opening of this meeting.

The Disarmament Session runs from 7 June to 9 July.

You will have President Reagan here from 7 - 9 June and will be at the NATO Summit on 10 June.

I don't think we can. There will have been no time for speech upon and I need to have something.

Lord Carrington's proposal is that you should address the Disarmament Session on the afternoon of 15 June. This is not strictly the "Opening of the Session" but it falls within the period when Heads of Government will be visiting New York and speaking. The Belgian Prime Minister will be delivering the EC statement on 8 June and will be followed later that week by Chancellor Schmidt and the US representative. So Western representation in the first week is good. What we need is good representation in the second week as well.

Mr. Ken Marks, M.P. has a Parliamentary Question for you tomorrow "to ask the Prime Minister if she will seek to address the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June". If you are now disposed to go, there would be advantage in saying so orally in reply to a Conservative M.P. at Questions tomorrow (Mr. Marks' Question will not be reached).

NATO summit because of structure of Questions

May I remind you that you are missing Question Time on Thursday, 10 June because of the NATO Summit. If you did not wish to miss Questions again on Tuesday, 15 June we could see whether we could find another speaking slot early that week.

Agree to announce in reply to an Oral Question tomorrow that you will visit New York to speak to the Disarmament Session?

If a suitable date can be found

Agree that we should look for a speaking slot which will enable you to attend Questions on 15 June but that failing that we should maintain our present provisional arrangement for you

/to speak

to speak on the afternoon of 15 June?

A. J. C.

There is far too much on
foreign affairs in my programme.
It just won't do. We have got
to cut down

15 March 1982

PRIME MINISTER

UN second Special Session on Disarmament

I attach a letter from John Silkin, M.P. seeking your assurance that you will be present at New York for the opening of this Session.

I know that when you last looked at the papers you were reluctant to commit yourself. But there is obviously some danger of a campaign building up. You will not want a decision on your part to appear to be a response to Opposition pressure. There may also be advantage in announcing your decision some time before the House of Commons debates Trident.

My own view is that it would be wise to go to New York. Otherwise the Opposition and the disarmers will try to make capital out of your absence throughout the summer. I also now think that it would be advantageous to announce that you are going. If you agree, we could arrange an announcement this week. And after a suitable delay you could then reply to John Silkin.

May I have a look at the
draft from memory
It is just not possible
to be used for the opening
of the session.
A.S.C.
M

12 March 1982

THE RT. HON. JOHN E. SILKIN, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

12 March, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

You were present in the House when during my reply to John Nott's statement on Trident I asked whether you would be attending the opening of the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament in New York on 7 June. I received no reply from John Nott so I am writing to you instead.

I know you will be aware of the urgency of this Session and the need for heads of government from the N.A.T.O. powers and the Warsaw Pact to demonstrate that they really do believe in global disarmament. I will be glad to receive your assurance that you will be present at New York for the opening.

Yours sincerely
John Silkin

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3 March 1982

SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Your letter of 24 February and Francis Richards' letters of 16 and 19 February refer.

The Prime Minister has taken a preliminary look at these papers and has commented that she is reluctant to commit herself yet to the idea of attending the Special Session.

I shall now submit to the Prime Minister the draft letters enclosed with your letter of 24 February.

JC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

*Am reluctant to commit
myself yet not.*

*f.a.
10/3*

SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

You will recall that Lord Carrington (see letter at Flag A) has recommended that you should visit New York on or about 15 June to address this meeting. You asked for more precise information about the intentions of the German Chancellor and the French President. We now know that Schmidt will definitely go and speak on 11 June. Mitterrand's position is not clear but the French are saying that he will probably go - we must expect that he will.

May I remind you of the arguments.

Arguments against going

- (a) You have a very busy "foreign affairs" programme during June:
- 4-6 June: Economic Summit
 - 7-9 June: President Reagan
 - 10 June: NATO Summit
 - 20/29 June: European Council*
- (b) You will certainly miss Questions on Thursday 10 June. It is still possible that if the current programme for President Reagan's visit is changed, you will wish to consider missing Questions on Tuesday 8 June. The new proposal would involve you being abroad on Tuesday 15 June as well (though if you decided to go to New York we might be able to arrange for a different speaking time which would avoid you missing Questions).
- (c) Any UK speech at the Disarmament Session is bound to disappoint the disarmament lobby in this country since their expectations of the Session are unrealistic. The speech will have to defend our reliance on the deterrent and on the search for balanced and verifiable disarmament agreements against the UN majority's call for nuclear disarmament as a first priority.

Arguments for going

- (a) Lord Carrington and Douglas Hurd believe that a decision on your part not to go will be exploited by the Opposition, will be criticised hotly and at length by the disarmament lobby in this country and will make the Government's current campaign to defuse the disarmament issue less effective.
- (b) There is already quite a head of steam building up. You have received a number of letters from the UN Association, the World Disarmament Campaign and Women for World Disarmament urging that you go. The Churches are likely to join in soon.
- (c) As stated above, Schmidt will go; Mitterrand is likely to. The Japanese, Belgian and Irish Prime Ministers seem certain to go. It remains to be seen whether Brezhnev will. We do not know what the US will do, though it is possible that Vice-President Bush will go.

If you are reluctant to accept the Foreign Secretary's recommendation, you may think it wise to have a talk with him, and perhaps with the Secretary of State for Defence as well, so that you can go over the arguments. It is possible that you could defer a decision for a while, though there would be advantage in pre-empting the campaign which is building up. You will not want a decision to appear to have been forced upon you by the Opposition and the disarmament lobby.

It would in any case be helpful to have at least a preliminary reaction now so that we can judge how to deal with the various letters.

A.J.C.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1982

Dear John,

Letters to the Prime Minister on the NATO Summit and the Special
Session on Disarmament (UNSSD II)

Francis Richards wrote to you on 18 February about the intentions of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt over attendance at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament. There remain the letters addressed to the Prime Minister by the General Secretary of the World Disarmament Campaign (5 February) and the Director of the United Nations Association (8 February) about the decision to hold the NATO Summit at the same time as the Special Session.

// The Prime Minister may prefer to answer the letters in advance of taking a decision on her own attendance at the Special Session. I enclose drafts which might issue whichever decision she takes.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 February 1982

Dear John,

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 18 February asking for further information about the intentions of Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand.

We have today received confirmation from our Embassy in Bonn that Chancellor Schmidt will definitely attend UNSSD II and will speak on 11 June. As you know the French are not so open about these matters but the French Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva gave our Ambassador a 'firm indication' that President Mitterrand would go to New York. Our Embassy in Paris have today reported that the French are saying that, while a decision has yet to be taken, it is 'probable' that the President will go to the Special Session.

You may recall that the World Disarmament Campaign and the United Nations Association have written to the Prime Minister (copies of letters attached) accusing her of not giving sufficient priority to disarmament. A positive response from the Prime Minister would be helpful in dealing effectively with such criticism.

Yours over,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Francis Richards

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

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19 FEB 1982



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18 February 1982

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 16 February.

B/P
Before taking a decision on this matter the Prime Minister would be grateful if more precise information could be obtained about the intentions of Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand. Can you enlarge on your statement that they "seem certain to go"?

A J COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

①

p.a. AR 26/2

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament

Please see the attached advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Lord Carrington recommends that you should visit New York to address this session on 15 June. It is a difficult decision. I know that in offering this advice FCO Ministers have had much in mind the fact that the Opposition will try to make capital out of anything they can portray as inadequate UK representation. If other Western leaders attend, and you do not, their task will be much easier. Criticism will come from other quarters as well. We have already received letters arguing that it is wrong to hold the NATO Summit at a time when the Disarmament Session is beginning in New York.

On the other hand, you will wish to have in mind that you are already committed to a very extensive "Foreign Affairs" programme during June:-

4	-	6	June	:	Economic Summit
7	-	9	June	:	President Reagan
		10	June	:	NATO Summit

You will certainly miss Questions on Thursday, 10 June. If our current plans for President Reagan's visit are upset, you may want to consider missing Questions on Tuesday, 8 June. This new proposal would involve you being abroad on Tuesday, 15 June as well.

If you are disposed to go to the Disarmament Session, there is something to be said for taking an early decision to do so. Otherwise any decision might appear to be in response to the criticism which may build up here. On the other hand, if by any chance the German Chancellor and French President decided not to go, you would be less exposed if you also decided to send someone else. Would you like us to try to get more precise information about the intentions of Schmidt and Mitterrand before taking a final decision yourself?

Yes/MS

17 February, 1982

A. J. C.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1982

Dear John,

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament
(UNSSD II)

The Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSD II) will be held in New York from 7 June to 9 July this year, four years after the first, where Mr Callaghan spoke.

It is a deliberative body of the whole UN membership and has no negotiating role. It provides a framework in which arms control negotiations, both inside and outside the UN machinery, can be reviewed. The First Special Session adopted by consensus a lengthy Final Document covering all aspects of disarmament. UNSSD II has been tasked to agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

There will be widespread interest in this country in the debate at UNSSD II, among bodies interested in disarmament, including churches. A mass lobby of Parliament focussed on the Special Session will take place on April 27. Those concerned are deliberately directing attention to the Special Session, as the similar aid lobby directed attention last year to the Cancun Summit. They will mount quite a head of steam. They have high expectations of what the Session might activate. These hopes are unrealistic. But in the context of the public debate about nuclear weapons and unilateral disarmament we need to be seen to take this multilateral forum seriously. Our statement to UNSSD II is bound to some extent to disappoint the disarmament community in this country, since we will wish to discourage these unrealistic expectations. We will need to defend our reliance on the deterrent and on the patient search for balanced and verifiable disarmament agreements against the majority at the UN of the neutral and non-aligned, who call for nuclear disarmament as a first priority. We plan no major disarmament initiative, but our approach is defensible in any forum.

A number of our friends and allies, some of whom the Prime Minister will be meeting in the previous weeks at the Economic and NATO Summits, plan to be represented at the level of Head of Government or Head of State. Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand seem certain to go, as do the Japanese, Belgian and Irish Prime Ministers. If they go, the Prime Minister's absence

/would

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would be much commented on and criticised in this country. By contrast if she went she would have an opportunity to disarm criticism by a robust but reasoned and constructive account of our policies. Here again there is a close parallel with Cancun, though the Special Session will have quite a different flavour.

Given the importance of the issues in the domestic debate and the trend among our partners towards representation at Head of Government level the Secretary of State believes it would be best for the UK to be represented by the Prime Minister. This would also enable her to rebut personally any attempt by the Soviet Union to claim that the NATO Summit the previous week demonstrated that the Alliance was more interested in building up than in controlling arms.

As to timing, the Belgian Presidency will deliver a statement on behalf of the EC on the first day of the general debate (8 June), followed later in the week by Chancellor Schmidt and the US (possibly Vice-President Bush). Because of this good level of Western representation in the first week, and the timing of the NATO Summit (9-10 June) we have provisionally inscribed the UK to speak early in the second week, on the afternoon of 15 June. I understand that while the Prime Minister's diary is full there are moveable items in that week. If she wished to attend, but was unable to do so on that date, we would try to inscribe the UK on another date.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

16 FEB 1982



