

S
808

S
808

PREM 19/1150

SECRET

1096

Confidential Filing

The visit by Senator Jesse Helms and
Mr. John Carbaugh
to discuss Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Sanctions.

USA

Further visit from Mr Carbaugh to discuss
US Political Matters.

June 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
22.6.79							
4.7.79							
5.7.79							
16.7.79							
14.9.79							
21.9.79							
8.10.79							
29.10.79							
25.4.80							
19.5.80							
24.6.81							
13.7.81							
22.11.82							
23.7.83							

PREM 19/1150



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 July, 1983

John Bone

I am not surprised.

A. J. C. 27.

Mr John Carbaugh

p-a.

You saw Mr Carbaugh on 24 June after he had asked for a call on the Prime Minister. You will wish to see the enclosed letter from Washington indicating that so far as the Embassy have been able to establish, Mr Carbaugh had not been commissioned to express formal US Government views. The Embassy's view that no further response to Mr Carbaugh is required seems sound.

John Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street



British Embassy

3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 89-2370/89-2384

Telex International 64224(WUI)/248308(RCA)/440015(ITT)

Telephone (202) 462-1340

Bryan White Esq
MCAD
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 18 July 1983

Dear Bryan,

MR JOHN CARBAUGH: BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. Thank you for your letter of 30 June about John Carbaugh. I am sorry not to have replied earlier, but it has proved difficult to get a full account of the extent to which Carbaugh's claims were correct that he was making representations with the high level authority of the State Department, Pentagon and NSC.
2. I have now heard from the Pentagon that Carbaugh had indeed discussed with Ikle some of the points he raised on his visit to London, in particular the proposal that a training programme might be established in Belize to replace the British garrison. Although my source (Dov Zakheim, who works in Ikle's office) did not go so far as to say that Carbaugh was speaking with Ikle's specific authority, far less with that of the Secretary for Defense, it was clear that Carbaugh was reflecting Ikle's thoughts: as Dov observed with a touch of asperity, he has Ikle's complete confidence.
3. The State Department have been much more cagey. No-one there is willing to say specifically that Carbaugh was speaking with Enders' or Motley's authority: on the whole this is unlikely, the more so since the PUS was told by Eagleburger last week that the idea of a replacement training presence in Belize was a rotten one which was opposed by State Department and the Administration as a whole. Incidentally, you will see from our telegram 1951 that when I informed State Department and the Pentagon that we were willing to discuss the establishment of a training presence, this produced somewhat embarrassed shuffling of the feet. It therefore seems that in as much as Carbaugh discussed that topic, he was reflecting Ikle's view rather than that of the Administration.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL



4. I asked Zakheim how he thought we should handle any response to Carbaugh's points. In spite of the number of reminders, he has so far been unable to come up with a reply.

5. So it seems to me that Carbaugh was, not for the first time, free-lancing. He was certainly not an emissary sent to express formal US government views, although it is true that he did reflect the views of some people within the Administration. Given subsequent indications that the Pentagon themselves were engaging in a little foreign policy of their own without State Department approval, I therefore think it would be best and simplest if we did not respond in any formal way. I think that the Americans now recognise that the ball is in their court and that it is up to them to look at ways of filling whatever vacuum is left by the departure of the British garrison from Belize.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'C D Crabbie', with a large, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

C D Crabbie

CONFIDENTIAL



RECEIVED
22 JUL 1963

PRIME MINISTER

JOHN E. CARBAUGH

The above asked Caroline some time ago if he could see you. I understand that he met you some years ago. He used to work for Senator Helms but no longer does so. We could not fit him into your diary so I undertook to see him instead. He came today and made the following points.

He and Conservative friends in the United States have considerable experience of using computer technology to help with election campaigning. They have developed techniques for what he calls "list targeting" - a means of ensuring that direct mail reaches the right voters in the right places - e.g. old age pensioners get mail about pension increases but not about abortion legislation. He also says that they have had great success in raising money for political campaigns through direct mailing.

He offered to send a group of people over to this country to explain the techniques, or to receive a group in the United States. He stressed that all such advice and help would be free.

Although he no longer worked for Senator Helms, he wished to explain why Helms had taken the position he had over the Falklands affair. Helms was Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Latin America and thus tended to see things from a Latin American viewpoint. But he had been particularly impressed by evidence, early on in the conflict, that the Russians were offering Argentina intelligence, arms, etc. He thought it important to ensure that these offers were not taken up. Mr. Carbaugh then said that he would be glad to offer his own services to promote a better relationship between Argentina and Britain. Unless the 'impasse' was resolved, he feared that the Russians would obtain a foothold in the South Atlantic. What was required in order to solve the problem? I said that all that

/ was necessary

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

was necessary was that Argentina should recognise the clear and virtually unanimous wish of the Falkland Islanders to stay British forever. We were constantly being asked by American friends to negotiate. The request was based on a misconception. There was nothing to negotiate about.

He then said that he had heard that Sir Anthony Parsons was to take up a post here. In that connection he wished to warn you of a problem which might arise. He referred to a problem in Libya some years ago when Mr. Bunker Hunt had lost \$42 million in a law suit with BP. Hunt remained very angry that he had lost this money and was determined, by one means or another, to recover it. He had the resources to make life unpleasant. He knew that Sir Anthony Parsons was Assistant Under Secretary in the Foreign Office at the time of this dispute. Mr. Carbaugh was not explicit but implied that Bunker Hunt would attempt to make trouble about Anthony Parsons' appointment in the media.

Finally, Mr. Carbaugh said that he had been carrying with him for five years the enclosed photograph of yourself and Senator Helms. He now wished to hand this over.

I report the above simply in the terms which Mr. Carbaugh used. He claimed to know you very well, so I was a little gentler with him than I might otherwise have been, given some of his remarks.

| Have met - A.J.C.
him twice!
—

22 November 1982

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

VB

USA

13 July 1981

Thank you for your minute. I enclose a copy of the record of my conversation with Carbaugh. I also enclose a copy of a letter I have just written to Brian Fall. The latter makes clear why I am slightly sensitive about these records and why I should like to have both record and letter back! I would be grateful if you did not discuss either with the other Helms' staffer.

MODBA

MRR. Morland, Esq.

4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 July 1981

I wrote to you on 24 June about my conversation with Mr. Carbaugh here. I am writing now to record a further point, which I mentioned to you a day or two later on the telephone just before my departure for Australia.

Mr. Carbaugh gave one of his other contacts in London an extra piece of information which, he said, he had refrained from passing on to me because on a previous occasion I had allowed some documents which he had passed to me in confidence to be copied to the Embassy in Washington. (This is true.) The additional point was to the effect that American contacts with the Chinese about aid to Dr. Savimbi in Angola had progressed a good deal further than he had told me and that they had indeed resulted in some kind of understanding. The subject had been raised by Mr. Haig on his recent visit to Peking.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1151</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Handwritten note Martin to Michael dated 8/7/1981</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>18/2/2013</i> <i>G. Gray</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES

.....GRA 168.....

PIECE/ITEM49.....

(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that
applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of
years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for
transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a
document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to
TNA)

CONFIDENTIAL

USA

2

PRIME MINISTER

ms

Mr. Carbaugh

Mr. Carbaugh, who you will remember is one of Senator Helms' aides, called on me this morning. (He had, as usual, asked in the first place to see you.)

Mr. Carbaugh asked me to convey Senator Helms' best wishes to you, which I undertook to do. The main purpose of his call, however, was to convey a warning about what he saw as an impending divergence between the policy of President Reagan's Administration and that of HMG on Namibia and Southern Africa generally.

Namibia

Mr. Carbaugh said that there was at present a battle going on in Washington for control of policy towards Southern Africa. However, he was confident that those whom he described as "the conservatives" would win. Senator Helms had the support of 25 or more other members of the US Senate. This was more than enough to ensure that his views, or those similar to his, would prevail. In any case Mr. Clark, the Deputy Secretary of State and himself a conservative, had already taken control of policy towards Southern Africa away from Mr. Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State (of whom Mr. Carbaugh made little effort to conceal his low opinion). Senator Helms and his colleagues intended shortly to force the repeal of the Clark amendment, which limits the extent to which the Administration could involve itself in, eg Angola, and to ensure that full use was made of the opportunities thus created.

Where Namibia was concerned, the intention of the conservatives would be to chart a new course. In their view, the present policy of the Five was wrong both in regard to Namibia and in regard to the relationship assumed between the situations in Namibia and in Angola.

/ In Mr. Carbaugh's

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

In Mr. Carbaugh's view , a settlement of the situation in Angola must come first. Mr. Savimbi must be given the means - financial and military - to secure victory. This was entirely possible. If, for instance, Mr. Savimbi were given adequate supplies of Redeye missiles to shoot down the Antonov transport aircraft used by the Cubans, the Cubans would soon get bored with their mission and go home. Mr. Casey and the CIA shared this assessment. Mr. Carbaugh said, stressing the sensitivity of the information, that he had been in touch with the Chinese about the possibility of their giving, or channelling, assistance to Mr. Savimbi. Mr. Carbaugh said that among the reasons for supporting Mr. Savimbi was the fact that there were enormous potential oil reserves in Angola, particularly in the Cabinda region. Mr. Savimbi had made it clear that those who helped him now would have first refusal of these new resources once they were developed. In Mr. Carbaugh's view it was foolish to argue - as many, including Mr. Crocker did - that President dos Santos would, sooner or later throw out the Cubans, as President Sadat had done with the Russians. This analysis overlooked the fact that President dos Santos relied on the Cubans to keep him in power.

Once Mr. Savimbi was in power in Angola, he would, of course, expel SWAPO. SWAPO would then either have to surrender their arms in Namibia or fight - in which case they would be defeated. This was the necessary prelude to a free and fair election in Namibia. Senator Helms and his colleagues were determined to ensure that Namibia did not fall into the hands of the Marxists and that the country did not go the way of Zimbabwe.

In Namibia itself the approach would be:

(a) to exclude the United Nations from the action.

The United Nations had disqualified itself both by its backing of SWAPO and by the evident ignorance of the vast majority of its membership about democracy and free elections;

(b) the attempt

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) the attempt to find a solution in Namibia would instead be conducted by a new group which did understand democracy and which would include the US and, hopefully, the UK, FRG, Nigeria, Kenya, one or two Scandinavian countries, Peru and one or two other Latin American countries. (Mr. Carbaugh was unable to explain why he thought Nigeria and Kenya would be prepared to associate themselves with his new approach. He did not claim that any approach had been made to either Government.);

(c) once free and fair elections had been conducted in Namibia, the United States would recognise the resulting government whatever its complexion. They would not be deterred from doing so if European or African governments failed to follow suit - though naturally it would be hoped that these governments would do so. Mr. Carbaugh expected that up to 25 countries would be prepared to follow America's lead but he made it clear that the degree of support that the US received was, in his view, immaterial. The US was tired of waiting for other people.

Cuba

Mr. Carbaugh went on to say that there was a growing sentiment in the US in favour of "doing something" about Cuba. If the Soviet Union were to interfere physically in Poland this would certainly be a trigger. The US would then proceed on the basis that Cuba was in its sphere of influence just as Poland was in that of the Soviet Union.

He said that some steps had already been taken. The number of radio broadcasts beamed at Cuba was being stepped up. Military deployments in Florida and Guantamano were being increased. Serious consideration was being given to the possibility of returning to Cuba the worst of the criminals who fled to Florida a few months ago.

In reply to my question about what military action, if any, might be taken against Cuba and in what circumstances, Mr. Carbaugh

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

sketched out a rather imprecise scenario. This involved a war in Central America, which would start with hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras, which would spread to neighbouring countries, into which Cuba would be drawn and which would provide the US with a case for action against Cuba, starting with a blockade. There was an implication, though no more, in what Mr. Carbaugh said that it would be no bad thing if matters developed in this way and that there might be something to be said for helping them along.

General

Mr. Carbaugh referred more than once to the growth of neo-isolationism in the US and to weariness there with the attitude of Europe. There was, according to Mr. Carbaugh, a feeling that money spent in defence in Europe might be better spent in the US. The impending announcement of changes in UK defence policy would not help. Americans would not understand that our defence expenditure was being increased: they would see only the cut in the surface fleet.

Mr. Carbaugh was unmoved when I remarked on the sharply increased polarisation which would result from the implementation of his policies. He did not think his fellow citizens would be worried either - although "regrettably" the US was not at present ready for an outright confrontation with the other super-power.

Conclusion

Recording Mr. Carbaugh's remarks in detail risks giving them more significance than they merit. Mr. Carbaugh's credit does not, I fancy, stand very high in Washington at present. He was the source of some embarrassing leaks during the transition period before President Reagan's inauguration. When I questioned him this morning, he was notably vague on the detail - and the feasibility - of the policy he was outlining. One wonders whether his thoughts had been exposed to the kind of critical analysis that they would get in, for instance, discussion with the State Department's experts.

/ Nonetheless,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

Nonetheless, Mr. Carbaugh represents an important strand of opinion in Washington, particularly where Southern Africa is concerned. Senator Helms and his colleagues appear to be having a significant impact on policy in this area. You should therefore be aware of the kind of input they are making.

Handwritten initials

Handwritten mark

24 June 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



USA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1981

Dear Brian,

I enclose a copy of a minute which I have done for the Prime Minister regarding my conversation with Mr. Carbaugh this morning. I doubt whether there is very much in the minute which will come as a surprise to you. But Mr. Carbaugh laid great stress on the confidentiality of his information. It is probably marginally useful that he gives us the benefit of his wisdom from time to time. I should be grateful therefore if you could give this letter and its enclosure a very limited distribution. I do not think a copy should be sent to the Embassy in Washington, though there would, of course, be no objection to Sir N. Henderson seeing it while he is here.

*Yours ever**Richard Alexander*

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

CONFIDENTIAL

WB
cc720

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Carbaugh

Mr. Carbaugh, who you will remember is one of Senator Helms' aides, called on me this morning. (He had, as usual, asked in the first place to see you.)

Mr. Carbaugh asked me to convey Senator Helms' best wishes to you, which I undertook to do. The main purpose of his call, however, was to convey a warning about what he saw as an impending divergence between the policy of President Reagan's Administration and that of HMG on Namibia and Southern Africa generally.

Namibia

Mr. Carbaugh said that there was at present a battle going on in Washington for control of policy towards Southern Africa. However, he was confident that those whom he described as "the conservatives" would win. Senator Helms had the support of 25 or more other members of the US Senate. This was more than enough to ensure that his views, or those similar to his, would prevail. In any case Mr. Clark, the Deputy Secretary of State and himself a conservative, had already taken control of policy towards Southern Africa away from Mr. Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State (of whom Mr. Carbaugh made little effort to conceal his low opinion). Senator Helms and his colleagues intended shortly to force the repeal of the Clark amendment, which limits the extent to which the Administration could involve itself in, eg Angola, and to ensure that full use was made of the opportunities thus created.

Where Namibia was concerned, the intention of the conservatives would be to chart a new course. In their view, the present policy of the Five was wrong both in regard to Namibia and in regard to the relationship assumed between the situations in Namibia and in Angola.

/ In Mr. Carbaugh's

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -

In Mr. Carbaugh's view , a settlement of the situation in Angola must come first. Mr. Savimbi must be given the means - financial and military - to secure victory. This was entirely possible. If, for instance, Mr. Savimbi were given adequate supplies of Redeye missiles to shoot down the Antonov transport aircraft used by the Cubans, the Cubans would soon get bored with their mission and go home. Mr. Casey and the CIA shared this assessment. Mr. Carbaugh said, stressing the sensitivity of the information, that he had been in touch with the Chinese about the possibility of their giving, or channelling, assistance to Mr. Savimbi. Mr. Carbaugh said that among the reasons for supporting Mr. Savimbi was the fact that there were enormous potential oil reserves in Angola, particularly in the Cabinda region. Mr. Savimbi had made it clear that those who helped him now would have first refusal of these new resources once they were developed. In Mr. Carbaugh's view it was foolish to argue - as many, including Mr. Crocker did - that President dos Santos would, sooner or later throw out the Cubans, as President Sadat had done with the Russians. This analysis overlooked the fact that President dos Santos relied on the Cubans to keep him in power.

Once Mr. Savimbi was in power in Angola, he would, of course, expel SWAPO. SWAPO would then either have to surrender their arms in Namibia or fight - in which case they would be defeated. This was the necessary prelude to a free and fair election in Namibia. Senator Helms and his colleagues were determined to ensure that Namibia did not fall into the hands of the Marxists and that the country did not go the way of Zimbabwe.

In Namibia itself the approach would be:

(a) to exclude the United Nations from the action. The United Nations had disqualified itself both by its backing of SWAPO and by the evident ignorance of the vast majority of its membership about democracy and free elections;

(b) the attempt

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) the attempt to find a solution in Namibia would instead be conducted by a new group which did understand democracy and which would include the US and, hopefully, the UK, FRG, Nigeria, Kenya, one or two Scandinavian countries, Peru and one or two other Latin American countries. (Mr. Carbaugh was unable to explain why he thought Nigeria and Kenya would be prepared to associate themselves with his new approach. He did not claim that any approach had been made to either Government.);

(c) once free and fair elections had been conducted in Namibia, the United States would recognise the resulting government whatever its complexion. They would not be deterred from doing so if European or African governments failed to follow suit - though naturally it would be hoped that these governments would do so. Mr. Carbaugh expected that up to 25 countries would be prepared to follow America's lead but he made it clear that the degree of support that the US received was, in his view, immaterial. The US was tired of waiting for other people.

Cuba

Mr. Carbaugh went on to say that there was a growing sentiment in the US in favour of "doing something" about Cuba. If the Soviet Union were to interfere physically in Poland this would certainly be a trigger. The US would then proceed on the basis that Cuba was in its sphere of influence just as Poland was in that of the Soviet Union.

He said that some steps had already been taken. The number of radio broadcasts beamed at Cuba was being stepped up. Military deployments in Florida and Guantaman were being increased. Serious consideration was being given to the possibility of returning to Cuba the worst of the criminals who fled to Florida a few months ago.

In reply to my question about what military action, if any, might be taken against Cuba and in what circumstances, Mr. Carbaugh

sketched out a rather imprecise scenario. This involved a war in Central America, which would start with hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras, which would spread to neighbouring countries, into which Cuba would be drawn and which would provide the US with a case for action against Cuba, starting with a blockade. There was an implication, though no more, in what Mr. Carbaugh said that it would be no bad thing if matters developed in this way and that there might be something to be said for helping them along.

General

Mr. Carbaugh referred more than once to the growth of neo-isolationism in the US and to weariness there with the attitude of Europe. There was, according to Mr. Carbaugh, a feeling that money spent in defence in Europe might be better spent in the US. The impending announcement of changes in UK defence policy would not help. Americans would not understand that our defence expenditure was being increased: they would see only the cut in the surface fleet.

Mr. Carbaugh was unmoved when I remarked on the sharply increased polarisation which would result from the implementation of his policies. He did not think his fellow citizens would be worried either - although "regrettably" the US was not at present ready for an outright confrontation with the other super-power.

Conclusion

Recording Mr. Carbaugh's remarks in detail risks giving them more significance than they merit. Mr. Carbaugh's credit does not, I fancy, stand very high in Washington at present. He was the source of some embarrassing leaks during the transition period before President Reagan's inauguration. When I questioned him this morning, he was notably vague on the detail - and the feasibility - of the policy he was outlining. One wonders whether his thoughts had been exposed to the kind of critical analysis that they would get in, for instance, discussion with the State Department's experts.

/ Nonetheless,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

Nonetheless, Mr. Carbaugh represents an important strand of opinion in Washington, particularly where Southern Africa is concerned. Senator Helms and his colleagues appear to be having a significant impact on policy in this area. You should therefore be aware of the kind of input they are making.

24 June 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

[Apud to hold over

all Monday, 19 May.]

dm
- 16/5

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH**



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH**

OUT TELEGRAM

USA

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL AND DEDIP	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
--	---	---------------------------------------

ZC
S
ASS
VEATS
SKBY
FCO
E/ADD
L NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4 DEDIP
5
6 FM FCO 161400Z MAY 1980
7 IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NO
9 CONTACTS WITH MR REAGAN'S ADVISERS
10 1. Mr Carbaugh, who is an assistant of Senator Jesse Helms,
11 called on the Prime Minister's Private Secretary recently.
12 He claimed to be in contact with Mr William Casey, Mr Reagan's
13 campaign adviser, and said that he expected to be the head
14 of the "transition team" which Mr Reagan was setting up. (He
15 claimed that Senator Helms, and by extension his Aids^e, were
16 likely to have an important role in the remainder of Mr Reagan's
17 campaign because Mr Reagan was running out of money and would
18 require Senator Helms' fund raising assistance.)
19 2. Carbaugh asked whether, in order to give him a channel of
20 communication to the Prime Minister's office, a member of your
21 Embassy could be nominated to keep in touch with him. Subject
22 to your views we suggest that the officer in your Chancery who
23 covers United States domestic political affairs might get in
24 touch with Carbaugh in a routine way, showing awareness that he
25 had been in touch with the Prime Minister's office, but without

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword implying
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Files PS PS/PUS
Drafted by (Block capitals) P Lever		
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL AND DEDIP

Page

2

<<<<

1 <<<<
2 implying any unusual or special channel of contact ~~to it~~ beyond
3 what would be normal between an Embassy in Washington and a
4 member of a Senator's staff.

5
6 CARRINGTON
7 NNNN

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

///
//
/

69486
10-11-68

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------

PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25 April 1980

I enclose a copy of a record of a conversation which I had with Mr. Carbaugh whose name will be familiar to you.

The Prime Minister hopes to discuss some of the points raised by Mr. Carbaugh with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary soon.

I also enclose the documents left by Mr. Carbaugh. I should be grateful if neither this letter nor the documents were given any further circulation for the moment.

M. O. D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

etc.

Handed
to P. O. on
plane return
from Canada
May

file
UP
JCK

SUBJECT.

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a summary record of my conversation with Mr. Carbaugh this morning. You may wish to discuss one or two of the points he raised - specifically the suggestions that you should write to Senator Byrd; that you should see Mr. Reagan; and that a member of the Embassy should be detailed to keep in touch with Mr. Carbaugh - tomorrow morning *with Lord Carrington.*

There are obvious risks in dealing with Mr. Carbaugh who strikes me as a man principally concerned with his own advancement and as a man unlikely to prove particularly reliable. However we should perhaps take steps to establish the precise nature of his relationship with Mr. Reagan. There is clearly a real chance that Mr. Reagan will be the next President of the United States. If this were to happen Mr. Carbaugh might turn out to be a figure of some significance.

I have not attached the documents left by Mr. Carbaugh: they are lengthy & detailed.

Reid

*I will speak to Lord C
about some of these matters*

ms

24 April 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Conversation with Mr. Carbaugh at 10 Downing Street on
Thursday 24 April 1980

Mr. Carbaugh, who is an assistant of Senator Jessie Helms, came to see me this morning. He had earlier asked for a tête-a-tête meeting with the Prime Minister and had been told that this could not be arranged.

Mr. Carbaugh handed over two bulky documents one entitled 'A Programme for Military Independence' and the other entitled 'Foreign Policy of National Independence'. The first document had been drafted by a team of Congressional assistants and co-ordinated by Mr. Carbaugh, the second had been written by Mr. Carbaugh. The first is already publicly available in Washington. Mr. Carbaugh claimed that it had been adopted by Mr. Reagan as the basis for his future defence policy: this is not public knowledge. The second document is still confidential but, according to Mr. Carbaugh, Mr. Reagan's team are showing particular interest in it. It is likely to be considerably expanded in the immediate future.

Mr. Carbaugh said that the "Programme for Military Independence" was already being used by some US Senators to justify increases in the US defense budget. Many Senators considered it excessively ambitious but if Mr. Reagan were to win the election it would form the basis both for his first supplemental request for funds and for his Administration's five-year plan. Mr. Carbaugh said that it would greatly help those who were trying to secure increased defence appropriations if the Prime Minister were able to make statements in the House of Commons arguing for increased defence expenditure. (Mr. Carbaugh claimed to have stimulated questions in recent months by both Lord Cranborne and Mr. Amery. These had resulted in replies from the Prime Minister which had been useful in Washington.)

/On a specific

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

On a specific defense point, Mr. Carbaugh said that the Procurement Sub-Committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee had recently approved a \$50 million appropriation for the Rapier programme. He was confident that Senator Byrd, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, would be prepared to seek funds for the \$100 million cost of a full Rapier programme if encouraged to do so by the Prime Minister. The Procurement Sub-Committee's report would be presented to the full Committee by Senator Byrd within a week or 10 days. If the Prime Minister wished to send him a letter it would, therefore, have to be written in the near future. Mr. Carbaugh said he would be very happy to deliver any such message.

On a more general political point, Mr. Carbaugh said that he thought whoever got the Republican nomination would be the next President of the United States. It seemed virtually certain that Mr. Reagan would secure the nomination. It would of course be an enormous help to his campaign if the Prime Minister, whose influence was very great in the United States, agreed to meet Mr. Reagan in London either immediately before or immediately after the Republican Convention. It would show that Mr. Reagan had access overseas and would much enhance his credibility.

I asked Mr. Carbaugh about the precise nature of his relationship with Mr. Reagan and Mr. Reagan's team. He said that he was in contact with Mr. William Casey, who is Mr. Reagan's campaign manager. He implied that the suggestion for a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Reagan came from Mr. Casey. As regards his own position, Mr. Carbaugh said that he expected to be the head of the "transition team" which was already being set up by Mr. Reagan. Senator Helms (and by extension his aides) were likely to have an important role in the remainder of Mr. Reagan's campaign because Mr. Reagan was running out of money. He had reached the legal limit on the amount of money he was allowed to raise for his campaign and had spent most of it. However individuals were allowed to conduct independent fund-raising campaigns on behalf of the Presidential candidates. Senator Helms had one of the best fund-raising organisations in the United States and intended to mount a fund-raising campaign on Mr. Reagan's behalf.


CONFIDENTIAL

/Mr. Carbaugh

Mr. Carbaugh said that it would be very useful to him in the months ahead to have a direct channel of communication with No. 10. He wondered whether a member of the Embassy in Washington could not be nominated who could keep in touch with him and through whom he could get messages to London rapidly and without their being enmeshed in the bureaucracy.

Turning to international affairs, Mr. Carbaugh gave me the attached memorandum on Namibia. (Most of this has appeared in an edition of Trans-National Security.) He said that, having been written at the end of last year, it was somewhat out of date. Nonetheless it still provided a way to break out of the present fruitless discussions on Namibia. The significance of the document was that it had been accepted as the right way to proceed by Mr. Richard McCall who would shortly be replacing Mr. Maynes as the Assistant Secretary for International Organisations in the State Department. Mr. McCall recognised that a policy based on Mr. Carbaugh's memorandum would be opposed by Messrs Moose, McHenry and Holbrook. Nonetheless he intended to push it through. If the Prime Minister or the British Government were able to indicate support for the approach, it would of course be a great help in securing the adoption of the policy.

I made no response to any of Mr. Carbaugh's requests and gave no indication as to whether or not I thought the Prime Minister would be interested. I said that we would of course consider what he had said carefully and added that if we wished to get in touch with him it would no doubt be easy to do so in Washington. He indicated that he saw no difficulty about this.



24 April 1980

USA

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

F BK



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1979

Senator Helms

I have discussed your letter to me of 9 October and John Robinson's related letter of 24 October with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister was not, I think, altogether surprised by what I had to say. She is well aware of the need to distance herself from some of those with whom she had dealings in times gone by. Senator Helms is certainly among those with whom she will be increasingly cautious in future.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Sir Nicholas Henderson, G.C.M.G.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

9B



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 October 1979

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Michael,

SENATOR HELMS

1. Nicko Henderson wrote to you on 9 October about Senator Helms. Last week we passed on to Senator Helms' office the Prime Minister's letter of 9 October to him about Rhodesia.
2. Yesterday Helms quoted the Prime Minister's letter, interspersed with his own comments, during consideration of the Defence Authorisation Act. The text of the Prime Minister's letter with Helms' comments appear in the Congressional Record: copy enclosed.
3. This illustrates the point made by Nicko Henderson in paragraph 1 of his letter to you.

Yours ever

John

J A Robinson

CC
G G H Walden Esq
PS/S of S

and Britain from a variety of sources, mainly over the land compensation issue.

Leaders of several Commonwealth and African nations criticized Carrington's conduct of the conference and warned him that there could be no acceptable solution without the Patriotic Front.

At the same time, the five "front line" states neighboring Zimbabwe-Rhodesia that support the guerrillas urged a moderate approach by their clients. The "front-line" states are Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Angola.

It was noteworthy that today's agreement came just one day after a "front line" summit in Tanzania that supported the Front on the land issue but took a significantly conciliatory approach, urging that the conference "move to the next crucial stage." The guerrillas are under pressure to settle from their supporters, particularly Zambia and Mozambique which have been attacked repeatedly by Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces.

Last week Carrington made the proposal on the land issue that the guerrillas accepted today. He offered vague promises of financial assistance in a multinational grouping to help an independent Zimbabwe government pay for land expropriated from whites as required under the British-proposed constitution.

About 6,000 white farmers control most of the best land in the country and it is estimated that it could cost more than \$500 million to buy out most of the farmers in order to carry out a land reform program.

When the talks broke off Monday, the Front, citing the overriding importance of the land issue, said it was seeking "clarifications" from various governments about contributions to a land compensation plan.

Today, the guerrillas said in their statement, "We have now obtained assurances that depending on a successful outcome of the conference, Britain, the United States and other countries will participate in a multinational financial donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programs.

"These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in government."

Since the breakoff of the talks, the United States signalled its willingness to participate in an assistance effort. No money figures have been cited.

Britain and the United States are reluctant to give details on what has been offered because of failures of similar past efforts to bail out the whites. British sources said, however, that there had been no contacts with the Front on the issue since last Thursday and "there was nothing to add" to Carrington's statement then on the subject.

The three parties are to meet Friday morning to begin joint discussion of the transition to independence starting with elections.

Analysts are unanimous that the transitional issues will be much harder to settle than the constitution, which took 38 days to resolve.

Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Mississippi.

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS, 1980— CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, on legislative business for today, we have a conference report on S. 428, the Defense Authorization Act of 1980. I submit that report of the committee of conference

on S. 428 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The report will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 428) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1980 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons and for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, to authorize the military training student loads, to authorize appropriations for civil defense, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the Record of October 17, 1979.)

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, that bill has been fully gone over by the conferees and all matters worked out and agreed on.

There has been a matter brought to my attention by the Senator from North Carolina regarding a technical point about one of the amendments. I, therefore, move, Mr. President, that that conference report be sent back to conference for further consideration by the conferees.

I will gladly yield now to the Senator from North Carolina with whom I have repeatedly conferred, and where he was at all times in a spirit of cooperation.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Mississippi.

As he has indicated, he and I have discussed a possible point of order that could have been made in connection with this conference report. As always, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is most cooperative.

Mr. President, I had contemplated making a point of order against further consideration of the conference report on grounds that the conferees have exceeded their authority. It was not an action that I relished. The distinguished managers of the bill know of my affection for them, and my intense interest in the future security of our Nation, and my conviction that this bill is a pledge for that security.

But the issue of lifting sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is also a matter which is of utmost concern for our national security. When dealing with a bill such as the defense authorization bill, it is difficult to make relative judgments as to which element of the bill is more important to our national secu-

rity. The bill, for example, authorizes the construction of a new aircraft carrier. But then we are faced with the fact that we cannot build this new carrier unless we have an ample supply of strategic materials, such as chrome. And we all know that sanctions prevent us from obtaining chromium from the principal place of origin; namely, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Now when the distinguished conferees considered this matter in conference, they took note of the issue; the report addresses the question of access to strategic materials in a general way. Furthermore, at the time the conferees discussed this matter—nearly 4 weeks ago—negotiations at the London Conference on the future of Rhodesia were at a critical stage. There was perhaps some reticence to take an action that might have upset the negotiations.

But now that objection is no longer valid. As we saw in last week's papers, both sides in the Rhodesian talks have accepted the constitution proposed by the British. The substantive issues have been settled, and all that remains is the question of implementation.

This was confirmed in a letter which was hand delivered to me from Prime Minister Thatcher late Thursday afternoon.

I hope the Senators on the floor and those who may be listening by way of the amplifying system in their offices will be attentive to what Mrs. Thatcher had to say in her letter to me. Mrs. Thatcher wrote:

DEAR SENATOR HELMS: I was grateful for your letter of 12 September about Rhodesia.

My letter to her, incidentally, was hand-delivered by my aides in London:

I am sorry not to have replied earlier, but I thought that before doing so it would be best to wait to judge the progress made in the Constitutional Conference.

That, of course, is what we all have been waiting for, what I believe the distinguished conferees were waiting for. But now Mrs. Thatcher feels that it is proper to judge the progress. She continues:

As you know, I want to see sanctions against Rhodesia lifted as soon as possible.

Note that she says, "as soon as possible."

She continues:

I am now confident that the Conference in which we are engaged will help us to achieve this aim. We regard adequate safeguards for the white minority as an essential part of the independence Constitution. We have provided for this in the constitutional proposals we have put forward. (I enclose a copy). As you will know, Bishop Muzorewa has announced his acceptance in principle of our constitutional proposals.

So apparently, Mrs. Thatcher believes that the Conference is going to succeed, and she notes the willingness of Prime Minister Muzorewa to accept the constitutional proposals. I continue to quote:

What Rhodesians need above all is a settlement which will bring them international acceptance. They are looking to the Conference to achieve this: it would provide the strongest encouragement to them to remain in the country.

Mr. President, I believe that the time has come to provide Rhodesians with at least a modicum of international acceptance for having made so many difficult concessions at this point. It is important to reward them. Furthermore, Mrs. Thatcher is determined not to allow the Patriotic Front to have a veto over a fair settlement. She says:

"But we are determined to bring about a solution which will bring Rhodesia to legal independence and enable us and others to lift sanctions with the widest possible international acceptance. I am confident that we are making progress in that direction.

Warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
MARGARET THATCHER.

Mr. President, the letter from Mrs. Thatcher has arrived at a crucial time in our deliberations. I think that she is telling us that the Conference is going to succeed. Now I am aware that the Byrd amendment, as originally passed by the Senate, covered all trade with Rhodesia. It may be that the conferees might want to reconsider their action on the Byrd amendment. It may be that they do not want to go quite as far as the Byrd amendment goes. It may be that the Byrd amendment could be restricted to the question of strategic materials only, not all trade. That would be a reasonable compromise, since it would provide international reassurances to the Rhodesians, while at the same time protecting U.S. national security. It might even enable us to build that carrier once the bill becomes law.

Mr. President, although the State Department has been downgrading the importance of chromium to our developed economy, a recent study by the National Research Council, which has studied the matter solely from a scientific point of view, has come to quite opposite conclusions, and I ask unanimous consent that the study be printed at this point in the RECORD, together with Mrs. Thatcher's letter.

There being no objection, the letter and report were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE PRIME MINISTER,
10 Downing Street.

SENATOR JESSE HELMS,
DEAR SENATOR HELMS: I was grateful for your letter of 12 September about Rhodesia. I am sorry not to have replied earlier, but I thought that before doing so it would be best to wait to judge the progress made in the Constitutional Conference.

As you know, I want to see sanctions against Rhodesia lifted as soon as possible. I am now confident that the Conference in which we are engaged will help us to achieve this aim. We regard adequate safeguards for the white minority as an essential part of the independence Constitution. We have provided for this in the constitutional proposals we have put forward. (I enclose a copy.) As you well know, Bishop Muzorewa has announced his acceptance in principle of our constitutional proposals.

What Rhodesians need above all is a settlement which will bring them international acceptance. They are looking to the Conference to achieve this: it would provide the strongest encouragement to them to remain in the country. We shall not allow anyone to exercise a veto over a settlement we believe to be fair and reasonable. But we are deter-

mined to bring about a solution which will bring Rhodesia to legal independence and enable us and others to lift sanctions with the widest possible international acceptance. I am confident that we are making progress in that direction.

Warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
MARGARET THATCHER.

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR CHROMIUM UTILIZATION

CHAPTER 1: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chromium is an element that imparts unique properties to the material to which it is added. While it is an important ingredient in many commodities, it is irreplaceable in stainless steels and high-temperature-resisting superalloys, two classes of materials that are vital to the technological well-being of the nation. Currently, there are no chromium-free substitutes that can be used in these critical applications nor are any such substitutes likely to be developed in the foreseeable future.

The United States is completely dependent on imported chromium and known commercial deposits are located in only a few countries. The Committee could not identify any technological responses that would eliminate completely U.S. vulnerability to a long-term disruption of chromium imports. Accordingly, contingency plans for chromium utilization are assessed, assuming the worst possible supply situation, that is, a total embargo on all foreign sources of chromium ore and ferrochromium. These contingency plans stem from a technical perspective and the study does not propose measures for coping with chromium contingencies by legal, political, or financial means.

1.1 General conclusions and recommendations:

1.1.1 Conclusions.—These general conclusions and recommendations present the Committee's findings regarding the degree to which the United States can reduce its dependence on imported chromium and recommended programs that might lead to reduction of that dependency.

1. Although important segments of U.S. industry are vitally dependent on chromium, insufficient effort has been made to develop substitutes for or to conserve, reclaim, or recycle chromium-containing materials. Consequently, a drastic curtailment of chromium supply would have serious short- and long-term effects.

2. Known chromium reserves are estimated at about 5 billion short tons and are expected to last for several centuries. On the basis of the currently known information, the quantity and location of proven and potential reserves are such that, at the current rate of consumption, the geographic concentration of chromium deposits will increase: within 25 to 75 years, the world will depend completely upon South African and Rhodesian deposits.

3. U.S. chromium deposits are small and virtually no prospects exist for the discovery of any significant new U.S. deposits. There is little evidence to suggest the existence of significant chromium deposits outside of those geographic areas presently known. The discovery of additional deposits in producing regions with limited known reserves (e.g., the USSR and Turkey or elsewhere) would be beneficial in maintaining the few alternate sources of supply that currently exist, even if the new deposits were not developed initially.

4. No substitutes exist or are likely to be developed for chromium in the high-strength steels, high-temperature metals, and corrosion-resisting alloys that are essential in the manufacture of jet engines, petrochemical

and power plant equipment, and various other critical products. It is highly unlikely that corrosion-resisting or high-strength alloy steels without chromium will be developed for such critical applications, although chromium-free substitutes could be used for decorative stainless steels, automotive flatware, refractories, and some chemicals.

5. Current U.S. chromium consumption could be reduced potentially up to one-third within about five years without creating major economic dislocations by using available technology to substitute alternative materials or processes, to recover and recycle waste chromium, and to design for greater chromium efficiency.

6. A major chromium-conserving research program has the potential of reducing chromium consumption an additional one-third within 10 years but could involve economic penalties (or disruptions) in some areas.

7. Even if the above measures are taken, however, essential or unsubstitutable chromium consumption is expected to be at least 180,000 short tons per year (approximately 6 percent of 1975 world chromium production), on the average, in the foreseeable future.

8. Sudden mandatory chromium conservation programs would result in severe economic dislocations even if all needed development work were completed in advance.

9. Chromium conservation is an ineffective response to short-term (about five year) shortages. Moreover, unilateral changes in U.S. consumption will have very little impact on long-term world conditions but will create severe economic penalties for the nation.

10. Conventional stockpiling can provide short-term protection (five years) against chromium shortages; however, the continued use of chromium in easily collected final products (e.g., hub caps, flatware, coins) may provide a more cost-effective stockpile for the types of shortages the United States is likely to encounter during the remainder of this century.

11. The criticality of chromium to industry generally is not appreciated, this lack of awareness works against the development of long lead-time technology stockpiles, or international agreements necessary to avoid supply interruptions.

12. The optimum response to the nation's increasing vulnerability to a disruption of the chromium supply probably would involve a combination of three approaches: some form of stockpiling to provide short-term (about five years) protection, conservation measures to produce medium-term (five to ten years) protection by reducing consumption rate and thereby extending life of the stockpile, and exploration for deposits to provide long-term (more than ten years) protection against a total disruption of supply from existing sources.

1.1.2 Recommendations.—

1. The criticality of U.S. dependence on foreign chromium should be publicized widely in conjunction with the intention to institute a program to decrease U.S. vulnerability to chromium requirements.

2. A basic research program aimed at developing substitutes for chromium in stainless steels and high-temperature, oxidation-resisting alloys should be initiated. Although this is a long-term program with little chance for early success, it is the only technical possibility for eliminating U.S. vulnerability to a long-term chromium embargo.

3. The search for new chromium deposits outside of current producing areas should be supported with adequate incentives, particularly on the North American continent.

4. Research into chromium conservation and recycling technology should be pursued vigorously, but only price and the market should be used to control consumption.

tion. Detailed examination of this interaction will require further study.

5. A study should be initiated to develop innovative methods for stockpiling chromium to provide up to five years protection against a cessation of supply and improved methods for ensuring that the content of the stockpile is matched properly to changing U.S. needs.

6. The combination of approaches—stockpiling, conservation, and exploration—should be explored as a strategy in addressing the chromium problem.

7. A thorough technoeconomic follow-on study (including cost-benefit analyses) should be undertaken to assess the substitution potential of chromium-containing alloys.

1.2 Specific conclusions and recommendations:

These specific conclusions and recommendations represent the Committee's most attractive approaches for reducing U.S. chromium consumption. However, as indicated earlier, these recommendations will not eliminate U.S. dependence on imported chromium but could reduce by two thirds the quantity of chromium that otherwise would have been consumed. It should be noted that implementing the recommendations would involve considerable time, money, and effort from development of the alloys through various aspects of metallurgical processing such as heat treatment, fabrication, and testing.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, just as a matter of suggestion—and, of course, it has no effect beyond whatever extent that the conferees may want to consider it—I am going to hand to my friend from Mississippi copies of suggested compromise amendments which I have drafted. I ask unanimous consent that the text of each of these amendments be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. TSONGAS addressed the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the texts were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENTS

Sec. 103. In order to insure the unimpeded procurement of weapons and efficient conduct of national defense research and development with the funds authorized herein to be appropriated, taking into account the expense, availability, and quality of strategic and critical materials used in such weapons and research and development, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (60 Stat. 596; 50 U.S.C. 98-92h-1) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"Sec. 11. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after November 15, 1979, the President shall facilitate the importation into the United States of materials determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this Act by permitting trade in lawful goods between the United States and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Sec. 103. In order to insure the unimpeded procurement of weapons and efficient conduct of national defense research and development with the funds authorized herein to be appropriated, taking into account the expense, availability, and quality of strategic and critical materials used in such weapons and research and development, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (60 Stat. 596; 50 U.S.C. 98-92h-1) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"Sec. 11. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after November 15, 1979, the President shall facilitate the importation into the United States of materials determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this Act by per-

mitting the importation of such goods into the United States from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Mr. HELMS. I would say again to my friend from Mississippi that I deeply appreciate his cooperation in this matter and his patience with me. I think he knows that the Senator from North Carolina has always vigorously supported a strong national defense, and I will never want to do anything to impede the progress of this legislation. I thank the distinguished Senator for his patience and cooperation.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I appreciate the attitude of the Senator from North Carolina, and certainly I will pursue the matters he has spoken of, the matters he has put in the Record, and the suggestions that he has, and I know the great good faith in which they are presented.

It is an important matter. Now we are in the last days of the legislative session for this year, and the appropriation bill is right around the corner. I notice the chairman of the Appropriations Committee is here. He is behind me to get that authorization bill out, and we will do the very best we can. I appreciate very much the sentiment and the cooperation of the Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) has arrived on the floor. He is the ranking minority member of our committee, and I would beg him to take the floor, and I hope he does, to make a motion that this matter be taken back to conference. The Senator from North Carolina has stated his position for the Record.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if the Senator from Mississippi will yield—

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair has to interrupt the Senator from Texas for just a moment, with my apology. It is the understanding of the Chair that the Senator from Mississippi has moved to recommit the measure to the conference; is that correct?

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct, yes; and I was recognized in my own right, as I understood.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the thrust of this motion is to recommit the conference report to deal only with the matter of the Rhodesian-Zimbabwe sanction provision in the bill, which was dropped in conference, and there was substituted therefor language of generic nature which simply expressed the sense of the Congress that there should be no impediment to the importation of strategic material.

Understanding that that is the matter that the conference would deal with, that all other matters that have been agreed to in conference will stand and we will not reopen those, I would like to say that I support the motion of the distinguished chairman of the commit-

tee wholeheartedly, and hope the Senate will act in an expeditious manner. I believe we can go to conference very soon, and have a conference report back to the Senate shortly. I would not like to see us delay the vital business of authorization of the defense appropriations any longer than is absolutely necessary to deal with this matter.

So with that understanding, I offer my support to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I certainly thank the Senator, and I am glad to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts, if I may, Mr. President; I believe he has a point or two.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. TSONGAS. I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. President, I wonder whether the Senator from Mississippi fully realizes how important the role he has played is in the whole issue of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It is somewhat ironic that it would be his committee, in dealing with the situation, that should have been the instrument that would have provided the opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia issue.

Although Mrs. Thatcher, Lord Carrington, and others will be recorded as the ones who brought peace if it happens, I think the Senate should know it was the action of this committee that really would have determined that this action was possible. I commend the distinguished chairman and the entire conference committee for giving this opportunity for peace a chance. Although certainly one does not expect the chairman to follow the issues in Africa as much as some of the rest of us, I would like to say to the Senator from Mississippi that we are indebted to him for his willingness to listen to the arguments made, and for having responded accordingly. I commend him for that action.

Just two other points, Mr. President. I do not want the Record to reflect an impression that Mrs. Thatcher is arguing that sanctions be lifted today against Rhodesia, and I am sure that is not what the Senator from North Carolina was suggesting.

Second, I would like to submit to the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Texas language that they might consider in terms of the reconvening of the conference, which I think would achieve the same result as what they came up with before, but would be specific enough to avoid the point of order which was raised earlier.

Again I commend the Senator from Mississippi for the role that he has played in helping all the thousands of people that may hereafter live in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and not be consumed in the conflict. They owe him a great deal of gratitude.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we really thank the Senator very much for his kind words and the real help the Senator has given in his consideration of all phases of this matter.

Mr. President, that completes my pres-



BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

9 October 1979

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Michael,

Now that the fuss over Senator Helms' alleged intervention in the Rhodesia conference has died down, I thought it might be useful to give you a little background about him. In talking to members of my staff Carbaugh has made no secret of Helms' access to the Prime Minister, and I imagine that he lets it be known elsewhere. It seems to me important therefore to ensure that the Prime Minister is aware of Helms' reputation here.

He is not an inhumane man. For example, sixteen years ago he and his wife adopted a nine year old boy with cerebral palsy who is now flourishing after extensive medical treatment. But his political reputation in Washington is not good. A successful broadcaster, he was registered as a Democrat until 1970. He was elected Republican Senator for North Carolina in 1972. His campaign was described by this Embassy as thoroughly nasty and racist, in the worst Southern tradition. He has done little since then to get away from this posture. He has influence in one section of the Republican party, but his views enjoy little respect in Congress. His ambition is believed to be to lead an extreme right wing party, either the Republican party once shifted to this position, or one of his creation.

In his re-election last year he spent (according to the official figures) \$7.4 million (more than \$12 a vote), three times the average, most of it raised through a nationwide right wing mailing system whose organiser is paid more than half of the takings. This does not stop him calling for cuts in Federal spending. He also relies on at least four foundations funded and run by three of his staff, including Carbaugh. One had its charter revoked last year for failure to file annual reports.

yours ever,

Nicholas Henderson

Nicholas Henderson



file USA VB
cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 October 1979

Dear Senator Helms,

I was grateful for your letter of 12 September about Rhodesia. I am sorry not to have replied earlier, but I thought that before doing so it would be best to wait to judge the progress made in the Constitutional Conference.

As you know, I want to see sanctions against Rhodesia lifted as soon as possible. I am now confident that the Conference in which we are engaged will help us to achieve this aim. We regard adequate safeguards for the white minority as an essential part of the independence Constitution. We have provided for this in the constitutional proposals we have put forward. (I enclose a copy.) As you will know, Bishop Muzorewa has announced his acceptance in principle of our constitutional proposals.

What Rhodesians need above all is a settlement which will bring them international acceptance. They are looking to the Conference to achieve this: it would provide the strongest encouragement to them to remain in the country. We shall not allow anyone to exercise a veto over a settlement we believe to be fair and reasonable. But we are determined to bring about a solution which will bring Rhodesia to legal independence and enable us and others to lift sanctions with the widest possible international acceptance. I am confident that we are making progress in that direction.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Roger Douglas White

Senator Jesse Helms

BK

USA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October 1979

Dear Michael,

RHODESIA: SENATOR HELMS

You agreed that we should delay recommendations about a reply to Senator Helms' letter of 12 September to the Prime Minister (enclosed with your letter to me of 17 September) until we were clearer about the position reached in the US Congress on sanctions against Rhodesia.

It now appears that the amendment to the Defence Authorisation Bill will be a "sense of Congress" resolution, which will not oblige the US Administration to lift sanctions at this stage.

--- I enclose a draft reply which Lord Carrington recommends the Prime Minister might now send to Senator Helms.

Tom
Walden

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Registry
No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.To:- Senator Jesse Helms
US SENATEFrom
PRIME MINISTER

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

I was grateful for your letter of 12 September about Rhodesia. I am sorry not to have replied earlier, but I thought that before doing so it would be best to wait to judge the progress made in the Constitutional Conference.

As you know, I want to see sanctions against Rhodesia lifted as soon as possible. I am now confident that the Conference in which we are engaged will help us to achieve this aim. We regard adequate safeguards for the white minority as an essential part of the independence Constitution. We have provided for this in the constitutional proposals we have put forward. (I enclose a copy.)

As you will know, Bishop Muzorewa has announced his acceptance in principle of our constitutional proposals.

What Rhodesians need above all is a settlement which will bring them international acceptance. They are looking to the Conference to achieve this; it would provide the strongest encouragement to them to remain in the country. ~~We shall be doing our utmost to achieve this.~~ We shall not allow anyone to exercise a veto over a settlement we believe to be fair and reasonable. But we are determined to bring about a solution which will bring Rhodesia to legal independence and enable us and others to lift sanctions with the widest possible international acceptance. I am confident that we are making progress in that direction.

Dd 0532000 800M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell

CONFIDENTIAL

Respects mine
Paul

8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8 OCT 1979

(Papers on Senator Helms)

USA

Lanpher & Co.

P. H.

PS/PUS

RHODESIA: CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS

1. Consultation with the Americans about Rhodesia has hitherto been carried on through Mr Ray Seitz in the US Embassy here. It has always worked admirably.
2. Mr Lanpher is a new arrival in the Embassy. Since the beginning of the Rhodesia Conference I have given him daily confidential background briefings on progress in the Conference. He has been very helpful over a number of points - for instance in explaining to the State Department the difference of view between us and President Nyerere over the idea of trying to integrate the forces before elections. These briefings have usually taken place in my office or by exchanges of telephone calls.
3. I have been struck by the fact that at several of these meetings Mr Lanpher asked persistently about the activities of two members of Senator Helms' staff, Messrs Carbaugh and Lucier, who have been in London and - like some parliamentarians here - have urged Mr Smith not to agree to any changes to the Constitution. I took little notice of these references to Senator Helms' staff, as their activities seemed very peripheral in relation to the work of the Conference. I understand, however, that Mr Lanpher was previously detached from the State Department to look after relations with Congress and that, on behalf of Mr Moose, he was engaged in a series of battles with Messrs Carbaugh and Lucier to keep sanctions in force.
4. On 19 September I was forewarned by Bishop Muzorewa that Mr Smith might be difficult in the bilateral meeting because he believed that the meeting of the joint committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Defence Authorisation Bill would agree an amendment lifting sanctions against Rhodesia on 1 October. In order to be able to brief the Secretary of State before the meeting, I asked Mr Lanpher what the position was in the Senate, adding that Mr Smith was obviously going to be difficult if such a prospect existed. Mr Lanpher said that this was no doubt attributable to the activities of Messrs Carbaugh and Lucier. I said that Mr Smith was being advised to hold out by some of his contacts here, but Muzorewa was not supporting him. At no point did I get involved in a discussion of Mr Carbaugh and Mr Lucier.
5. Mr Lanpher subsequently contacted me to say that there was "high level interest" in Washington in the activities of Mr Carbaugh and Mr Lucier and could I do anything to help him "document" them. In particular they seemed to be saying that they had seen the Prime Minister. I said that I could not help him "document" their activities but (in order to prevent him believing that the Prime Minister had seen them) said that I understood that they had seen the Private Secretary at No 10.

/6.


6. At no time did I express concern about the activities of the Senate staffers. Still less did I complain about their activities, which I did not regard as being a matter for us.

7. I subsequently learned that, no doubt in order to try to influence Congress against lifting sanctions, Mr Moose telephoned an American journalist in London to suggest that he might like to follow up a story that we had complained about Senator Helms' staff. Mr Fenn was subsequently asked about this and, after checking with the Department, said that we had not complained.

8. I learned last night from Mr Walden that Mr Vance telephoned the Secretary of State to say that he was concerned that we were denying a statement by the State Department spokesman that we had complained. I was told of the contents of Mr Lanpher's reporting telegram. This attributed to me remarks made by Mr Lanpher. I telephoned Mr Lake in Washington to tell him in the clearest terms what I had actually said to Mr Lanpher. I added that, quite apart from the mis-reporting, it was pretty extraordinary to have State Department spokesmen on the basis of a confidential telegram quoting us in public as saying something we had not in fact said. Mr Lake apologised and said that his only concern was now to help Mr Vance out of this jam. We agreed the line set out in the attached minute, which is generally true apart from the sentence in square brackets.

9. Mr Lake telephoned me again this morning to say that he was very sorry and that Mr Vance was now perfectly happy. I said that it would be very difficult to go on giving full confidential background briefings on the Conference to the US Embassy if these were selectively leaked to the press. He said that he would do all he could to ensure that this never happened again.

10. Mr Lanpher has also telephoned to apologize.


R W Renwick
Rhodesia Department

21 September 1979

cc: PS
Sir A Duff

Mr Renwick (Rhodesia Department)

Call by the American Ambassador
on the Secretary of State on 20 September: Rhodesia

Mr Brewster called on Lord Carrington this afternoon. Lord Carrington said that he was anxious to go to New York to see Mr Vance. Mr Brewster mentioned that the recent activities of Senator Helm's aides in London were presumably not welcome to HMG. The Secretary of State then gave an account of the Rhodesia Conference. The Bishop now seemed to have everyone in line except Mr Smith on the constitution and new elections. But this had been hard going for him, and we could not push the Bishop much further. The Patriotic Front had given remarkably little trouble so far. There had been disagreements, but no hostility. Our impression was that they wanted a settlement, especially Nkomo. Mugabe's attitude was less certain. Despite a problem over the white seats, we might get a constitution. The Patriotic Front might claim that we had not moved; but the Bishop could make the same complaint. The point was that our proposals were the halfway house between the two. The real difficulties would come when we got to arrangements for the elections. The Patriotic Front's proposals were totally unacceptable. In any case, we had our own ideas.

Mr Brewster asked about President Nyerere's attitude. Lord Carrington said that during his stopover in London Nyerere had been very strong on the need to integrate the forces. This seemed to us absurd and quite impossible before the elections. Presidents Kaunda and Machel had been surprisingly helpful. All in all, the Conference was not going too badly. Mr Brewster said that Mr Vance would want to do anything possible to help. Lord Carrington said that it would be awkward if the Senate lifted sanctions. Mr Brewster said that Mr Vance had been outraged by the activities of Senator Helm's two aides in London. The Ambassador himself had telephoned several Senators he knew personally to lobby them. He thought things would come out all right, though the implication of any premature lifting of eg. strategic raw materials sanctions would be bad.

Mr Brewster mentioned that the Americans also stood ready to help eg over arrangements for any UN or Commonwealth force (it was not clear whether he was suggesting American involvement in the former). The Americans might also be able to help over "baiting the hook", eg by financial help after independence.

J. J. H. Walden

20 September 1979

(G G H Walden)

cc: PS/LPS Mr Byatt
PS/Mr Luce Mr Day
PS/PUS Mr Barder
Sir A Duff NAD
Lord N UND
Gordon Lennox

CONFIDENTIAL


Mr. Walden

RHODESIA: US SENATE

1. I agreed with Mr Lake and Mr Moose the following press guidance for use if necessary by the State Department spokesman today:

"An FCO official discussed with a US Embassy official on 19 September the progress being made towards agreement on the Constitution at the Rhodesia Conference. In the course of that discussion he indicated that some members of the Salisbury delegation might be more reluctant to accept the changes which would render an agreement possible because they believed they had assurances [from Senate staffers] that the Senate would move to lift sanctions by 1 October."

2. This is an accurate account of this part of the daily background briefing to Mr Lanpher - except for the phrase in square brackets. It was the US Embassy who raised and expressed indignation about Mr Carbaugh and Mr Lucier: their activities were not our affair. Mr Lake said that he realised the report was inaccurate. But Mr Vance would be relieved that we had found a way to help him. He was worried because the vote in Congress might be very close and he did not want to have Congress under-cutting our efforts. I told Mr Lake how matters now stood in the Conference: we hoped that we were on the way to an agreement which would enable both of us to lift sanctions.


R W Renwick
Rhodesia Department

21 September 1979

cc: PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/PUS


RHODESIA: SENATOR HELMS' STAFF

1. Mr Lake telephoned me from Washington this morning to say that he was very sorry for yesterday's events and that Mr Vance was now perfectly happy. The State Department spokesman would if necessary have to say something on the lines we had agreed and he hoped that we would let that rest.
2. I said that of course we would. But there were two points I thought I should make:
 - a. it would be impossible to give full daily confidential briefings to the US Embassy if contents of the telegrams were subsequently leaked by the State Department to the press and attributed directly to us;
 - b. I was even more concerned about the mis-reporting than about the leak.
3. Mr Lake said that they would "pull out all stops" to ensure that nothing of this kind ever happened again. He added that, once we had worked out our ideas on the pre-independence arrangements he would like himself to come to London to be briefed by us, probably with Mr Moose.

R W Renwick
R W Renwick
Rhodesia Department

21 September 1979

cc: PS
= PS/Mr Luce
Sir A Duff



1954 FEB 27



U.S.A
file 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 September 1979

BF 28/9/79

SENATOR JESSE HELMS

At the Prime Minister's request I saw two of Senator Helms' assistants (Messrs. Lucier and Carbaugh) at No. 10 Downing Street on 14 September. I attach a copy of the letter to the Prime Minister from Senator Helms which they left with me. I also enclose a note on the ensuing conversation.

14.9.79

I should be grateful if the enclosures to this letter could be regarded as being for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's information, and that of the most senior officials dealing with the subjects mentioned, alone. I would also be grateful for the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Senator Helms.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G G H Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JRW

①

PRIME MINISTER

You agreed last night that I should see Senator Helms' assistants, Messrs Lucier and Carbaugh, on your behalf this morning. I attach the letter^{12.9} to you from Senator Helms that they left with me together with a record^{14.9} of my conversation with them.

When Senator Helms called on you in July, Mr. Cartledge sent an account of your conversation to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary for Lord Carrington's information and that of one or two senior officials only. Would you like me to do the same on this occasion?

*You please
not*

Amis

14 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION WITH DR J LUCIER AND MR J CARBAUGH
(ASSISTANTS TO SENATOR JESSE HELMS) ON 14 SEPTEMBER AT
1100 HOURS AT NO. 10

I saw Messrs Lucier and Carbaugh on the Prime Minister's behalf.

Mr Carbaugh said that he and his colleague had seen the South African Foreign Minister in Pretoria on 27 August. Mr Botha had asked them to carry a message to the Prime Minister. This was that it was essential for sanctions to be lifted in November. The South African Government was at present giving financial support to the Government in Salisbury to the tune of 40 million rand (50 million dollars) per month. They could not continue to do so. If sanctions were not lifted they would probably cut off support with the result that the economy would collapse. According to Mr Carbaugh this message had been given to Bishop Muzorewa by the South African Prime Minister at a secret meeting on the Limpopo which had taken place between 13 and 27 August.

Mr. Carbaugh said that he had seen Ian Smith and David Smith this morning and told them that he was about to convey the above message to the Prime Minister. Ian Smith had commented, wryly, that it was typical of the South Africans to be saying this to HMG while they were urging him to stand firm in the Constitutional Conference.

Having in mind the message which Mr. van der Post said he had been asked by the South African Foreign Minister to pass to the Prime Minister vis that South Africa would intervene in Rhodesia if sanctions were not lifted in November, I asked Mr Carbaugh whether Mr Botha had given any indication of South African intentions after they cut off financial support. Mr. Carbaugh said that Mr Botha had said nothing more.

/On US

On US attitudes towards sanctions, Mr Carbaugh repeated the message in the attached letter to the Prime Minister from Senator Helms. He said that the latest Senate amendment, which had been attached to the Defence Authorisation Bill, called for sanctions to be lifted on 1 October. This amendment would be considered in the House-Senate Conference on the bill next week. Senators Tower and Stennis, who were handling the bill, intended to fight for the amendment. The only compromises they were prepared to envisage were either (a) that the date be changed from 1 October to 15 November; or (b) that the lifting of sanctions be applied to strategic materials (covering some 77 items) rather than to the whole of United States trade with Zimbabwe. Mr. Carbaugh said that it was only a matter of time before Congress lifted sanctions.

Mr. Carbaugh said that he and his colleague had been in Salisbury before coming to London. There was little new in his account of the situation there. Dr Lucier said that he had heard both from General Walls and Mr Flower that if the Constitutional Conference broke down, the white population would fight on and, specifically, would try to "get" both Mr. Nkomo and Mr Mugabe.

Chile

Mr. Carbaugh said that Senator Helms had been told by General Pinochet that the Chilean Government were extremely anxious that full ambassadorial relations between the UK and Chile should be resumed. The Senator hoped that HMG would be able to agree to this. The Letelier affair would soon be cleared up. Relations between the United States and Chile would rapidly return to normal thereafter.

Cuba and SALT II

Mr Carbaugh said that Senator Helms intended to produce evidence next week that the Soviet Union had nuclear armed submarines based ^{in Cuba} in Cuba. The Senator also intended to question whether all Soviet missiles had been withdrawn from Cuba in 1962. The effect of this and of the statement made yesterday by Senator Long

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

would be, in Mr Carbaugh's view, that the Senate would not vote on the SALT II Agreement until after next year's Presidential election.

Phm
—

14 September 1979

copied to: Master Set of Records,
Rhodesia, Sitn, Pt 7,
Cuba, Sept 79, Troops etc.
Chile, Sept 79, Relations with.

URGENT

MR. ALEXANDER

See sup note.

I was rung this afternoon by Mr. Carbaugh, he works for Senator Helms. He has a message which he and Mr. Lucia insist on handing to the Prime Minister personally, as well as a verbal comment which is too sensitive to put in writing. He will not take no for an answer and I would be most grateful if you could ring him at the Ritz on Ext. 309. They are staying until Sunday. Please have a word with me before ringing Mr. Carbaugh because I know all the background to this and it is extremely sensitive as you will appreciate from the attached copy of the record taken when Senator Helms came to see the Prime Minister on 4 July 1979.

es.

13 September 1979

I rang to say you wd be ringing. Cf. 13/9 [19.00]



(3)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Draft approved by Lord
Cannington

Ans

I have rung up the
FCO to ask them to
send us this enclosure
as soon as pass.

MS 9/10.

✓
P. B. C.



JESSE HELMS
UNITED STATES SENATE
September 12, 1979

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

Allow me to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your handling of the Commonwealth Conference, and the securing of the accession of the Front Lines states to the Constitutional Conference now in progress. When we spoke in July, I did not think that it would be possible to get their consent; but the spectre of bankruptcy and famine that now stalks their lands has apparently added its persuasive arguments to yours.

Yet I remain deeply concerned that the pressures on the Muzorewa government might become too great for the frail structure of Rhodesian morale to bear. My assistants, Dr. James Lucier and Mr. John Carbaugh, have just returned from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. They reported to me that the Rhodesians are prepared to carry on indefinitely if they get the helping hand of recognition or even of allowing sanctions to die; but if one more rebuff -- even one more indefinite delay -- should be the outcome of the London meeting, then there will be a dangerous erosion of the key decision-making citizens in the white community. The expertise in Rhodesia is assembled in a relatively small group; and if that group gives up, then the whole social structure, black and white, will disintegrate.

In mid-August, I took the lead in the House-Senate Conference on the State Department authorization bill to have the

deadline of the Rhodesian sanctions amendment extended from October 15 to November 15. I did this as a result of my conversations with you and President Carter in order to give the British Government time to secure a consensus for the lifting of sanctions. But if the lifting of sanctions is delayed beyond that date for any reason, the consequences will be disastrous not only for Rhodesia, but for all of southern Africa.

The Foreign Minister of South Africa, Mr. R.W. Botha, has sent me a most disturbing personal message via my assistants -- a message too sensitive to put on paper -- which absolutely convinces me that any further delay is fatal to the survival of Rhodesian democracy, and indeed, of all the western democracies. I hope that it is possible that you could find a very few minutes for my assistants to transmit this message directly to you in person.

Next week, the House and Senate will be considering a second Rhodesian sanctions amendment, which I cosponsored with Senator Harry Byrd, calling for the immediate lifting of sanctions without Presidential option. I have a favorable report of votes in the conference committee which strongly suggests this provision will become law by October 1. At the very minimum, the conference is sure to provide for the lifting of sanctions on strategic materials. Once the finger is pulled out of the dyke even to that extent, the whole edifice of sanctions will come falling down. It is therefore urgent that the Constitutional conference extend some hope to the Muzorewa government immediately, without alienating the white community. Only a decisive move by the West to support the government will

stop the killing.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher
House of Commons
Westminster
London SW1, England

I remain very proud of you!

USA

Enter via
Gen
17/7

GRS 30

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 161420Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 850 OF 16 JULY 1979

FOLLOWING FOR AMBASSADOR FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY:

YOUR TELNO 1942: SENATOR HELMS

1. RECORD HAS BEEN SENT BY BAG LEAVING FCO TODAY.

CARRINGTON

FILES
PS
PS/POS
SIR A DUFF

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

USA

CONFIDENTIAL

089



file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 July 1979

SENATOR HELMS

I am writing to confirm that, as I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has agreed that Sir Nicko Henderson may be given, strictly for his personal information, a copy of my note of Senator Helms' recent call on the Prime Minister.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ABB

PRIME MINISTER

SENATOR HELMS

You will have seen from a recent telegram (copy attached) that Senator Helms' call on you has been referred to in the American press. You said at an earlier stage that you wished knowledge of it to be confined to a very small circle and I instructed the FCO accordingly. In view of the press references, however, the FCO would very much like to be able to tell Sir Nicko Henderson about the call - this would be very strictly for his personal information. Can you agree to this?

Yes.

Yes out

13 July 1979

05 1360
UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 110800Z

FM WASHINGTON 110545Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1874 OF 11 JULY

INFO ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

RHODESIA

1. TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST CARRIES ARTICLE FROM LONDON BY LEONARD DOWNIE AND JAY ROSS UNDER HEADING "THATCHER TO OFFER MUZOREWA PLAN" "SUGGESTS REFORMS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO GAIN WORLD ACCEPTANCE"

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TODAY SAID IT WILL PROPOSE A NEW PLAN FOR RESTORING ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO LEGALITY AND MAKING THE MULTIRACIAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER ABEL MUZOREWA ACCEPTABLE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.

PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER'S FOREIGN SECRETARY, LORD CARRINGTON, ANNOUNCED THAT, AS A RESULT OF PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS, BRITAIN INTENDED "TO MAKE FIRM PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."

THOSE PROPOSALS WOULD INCLUDE CHANGES IN MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION TO REDUCE THE POWER RESERVED FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA'S 3 PERCENT WHITE MINORITY, ACCORDING TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THEY SAID THATCHER AND CARRINGTON WILL URGE MUZOREWA IN MEETINGS HERE LATER THIS WEEK TO SEEK CHANGES IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PRESERVING WHITE CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY, POLICE, CIVIL SERVICE, JUDICIARY AND THE PROCESS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION.

LORD HARLECH, BRITAIN'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA'S BLACK AFRICAN NEIGHBORS AND NIGERIA, FOUND THAT SOME OF THEIR LEADERS MIGHT ACCEPT MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT IF SUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WERE MADE, ACCORDING TO ONE WELL-INFORMED BRITISH OFFICIAL. THE OFFICIAL WOULD NOT NAME THESE LEADERS.

"THEY DON'T RULE MUZOREWA OUT IF HE DEMONSTRATES THAT HE IS IN CHARGE AND MAKES THOSE CHANGES," THE OFFICIAL SAID. "SOME OF THEM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD TO BE SOME SPECIAL PROTECTION OF WHITES - AS THERE WAS WHEN THEY WERE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE FROM BRITAIN - BUT THEY FELT THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION JUST WENT TOO FAR."

OFFICIALS HERE SAY MUZOREWA APPARENTLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT HE

Duty blank

Mo 10 DS

DISTRIBUTION SELECTIONS
FILE COPY

/ CAN GET THE

GET THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FROM WHITES TO MAKE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES. BUT THE OFFICIALS ADD THAT THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE HAS RECEIVED AN INFORMAL REPORT THAT SOME INFLUENTIAL WHITES WERE READY TO AGREE TO CHANGES, SO LONG AS THEIR SECURITY WAS NOT COMPROMISED, AND WERE WAITING FOR MUZOREWA TO ASK THEM.

BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE LITTLE HOPE THAT THE PLAN THEY DEVISE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REBELS LED BY JOSHUA NKOMO AND ROBERT MUGABE, WHO ARE CONTINUING THEIR GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT FROM BASES IN NEIGHBORING ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. ONE SOURCE SAID BRITAIN'S GOAL WOULD BE TO WIN ENOUGH AFRICAN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH PLAN TO ISOLATE THE REBELS AND FORCE THEIR DEFEAT OR REPATRIATION.

IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THATCHER'S CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO MUZOREWA AS THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED BLACK LEADER OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA AND DETERMINED TO FIND A WAY TO GIVE HIS GOVERNMENT LEGAL RECOGNITION.

THATCHER SAID IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN AUSTRALIA LAST MONTH AND PRIVATELY IN A MEETING WITH U.S. SEN JESSE HELMS (R-N.C.) LAST WEEK THAT BRITAIN'S 13-YEAR OLD ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WILL BE ENDED WHEN THEY COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN BRITAIN'S CONSERVATIVE-CONTROLLED PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER.

SHE IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE RIGHT WING OF HER PARTY IN BOTH THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND HOUSE OF LORDS TO END SANCTIONS AND MOVE MORE QUICKLY TO GIVE MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT LEGAL RECOGNITION.

BUT HER COMMITMENT TO RESTORE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO LEGALITY HAS BEEN PUBLICLY CRITICIZED BY MUCH OF BLACK AFRICA AND THE REST OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY SUMMIT MEETING NEXT WEEK IN MONROVIA, LIBERIA, IS BOUND TO PRODUCE MORE CRITICISM.

THATCHER COULD FACE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WHEN THE COMMONWEALTH NATIONS MEET NEXT MONTH IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, THE BASE FOR NKOMO'S GUERRILLAS. LUSAKA HAS SUFFERED FREQUENT MILITARY ATTACKS FROM ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THERE HAVE BEEN FEARS HERE THAT A CONFRONTATION OVER ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA AT THE CONFERENCE, WHICH BOTH THATCHER AND QUEEN ELIZABETH II WILL ATTEND, COULD LEAD TO THE BREAKUP OF THE COMMONWEALTH. BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC TIES WITH NIGERIA, ITS BIGGEST TRADING PARTNER, ALSO ARE THREATENED.

THATCHER TOLD HELMS, THE CHIEF SUPPORTER OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT IN THE U S SENATE, THAT SHE WAS AFRAID OF THE COMMONWEALTH

MEETING,

MEETING, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES. SHE TOLD HELMS THAT SHE WANTED TO CONVINCENOUGH BLACK AFRICAN NATIONS TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH PLAN FOR RECOGNIZING ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO WIN OVER A MAJORITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS.

ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH PLAN WILL NOT BE COMPLETED AND ANNOUNCED UNTIL AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING, THATCHER WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN LUSAKA ON ITS LIKELY CONTENTS. HER GOVERNMENT'S HOPE IS TO HAVE THE MOST ACCEPTABLE PLAN POSSIBLE READY BEFORE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN PARLIAMENT HERE IN NOVEMBER.

IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY OF BRITAIN'S INTENTIONS, CARRINGTON MADE NO MENTION OF THE UNITED STATES. THE PREVIOUS LABOR GOVERNMENT HERE AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD JOINTLY DRAWN UP A SETTLEMENT PLAN FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA THAT FAILED TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE. BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE CONSULTED BUT THAT THE PLAN LIKELY WOULD BE SOLELY BRITISH.

U.S. OFFICIALS, ATTEMPTING TO FORESTALL ATTEMPTS BY CONSERVATIVES IN CONGRESS TO FORCE RECOGNITION OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT, HAVE EMPHASIZED IN RECENT MONTHS THAT THE PROBLEM IS BASICALLY A BRITISH ONE NOW AND THE NEXT MOVE WAS UP TO BRITAIN.

IN MAKING HIS ANNOUNCEMENT IN A SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS HERE TODAY, CARRINGTON NOTED THAT BRITAIN DID NOT SHARE THE "DISPOSITION IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SEEK TO IGNORE THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA TO ARGUE THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT OF IAN SMITH."

BUT CARRINGTON SAID THAT LORD HARLECH, IN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN NIGERIA, ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, BOTSWANA, MALAWI, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, "FOUND IN AFRICA ENCOURAGING RECOGNITION THAT MAJOR CHANGES HAD TAKEN PLACE "IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WITH THE ELECTION BY BLACK AND WHITE VOTERS OF A MULTI-RACIAL GOVERNMENT.

HE SAID THEY ALSO MADE CLEAR, TO HARLECH THEIR CRITICISMS OF THE NEW RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION AND THEIR "RECOGNITION AND INDEED EVEN A DEMAND THAT A SOLUTION MUST SPRING FROM BRITAIN, AS THE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY" FOR ITS FORMER COLONY.

CARRINGTON SAID HARLECH ALSO MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND COMMUNICATED "THE VIEW AND ATTITUDES" OF THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO MUZOREWA. HE ALSO CONVEYED BRITAIN'S "CONVICTION THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH HIM FOR A LASTING AND GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT," CARRINGTON SAID.

CARRINGTON

CARRINGTON SAID HE BELIEVED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THROUGH ITS NEW CONTACTS WITH THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT, IS NOW "IN A BETTER POSITION TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN RHODESIA THAN AT ANY TIME" SINCE IAN SMITH DECLARED WHITE-RUN RHODESIA'S UNILATERAL INDEPENDENCE IN 1965 AND WAS OUTLAWED BY BRITAIN AND THE WORLD.

MANY OBSERVERS FEEL THAT MUZOREWA'S CHANCES TO MAINTAIN POWER ARE DECREASING MARKEDLY AS THE GUERRILLA WAR CONTINUES AND HE FAILS TO GAIN RECOGNITION. LAST MONTH, MUZOREWA LOST HIS ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT WITH THE DEFECTION OF AN EIGHT-MEMBER BLOC LED BY JAMES CHIKEREMA.

WHITE EMIGRATION, WHICH HAD SLOWED EARLIER THIS YEAR, HAS INCREASED AGAIN TO ABOUT 1,400 A MONTH. SINCE WHITES FORM THE BACK BONE OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES, A CONTINUING EXODUS COULD LOOM MUZOREWA NO MATTER WHAT THATCHER DOES.

ANOTHER POTENTIALLY CRUCIAL TEST WILL COME NEXT MONTH WHEN THE SPRING PLANTING SEASON BEGINS. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT MANY WHITE FARMERS WILL CUT BACK OR STOP PLANTING BECAUSE OF FEARS FOR THEIR SAFETY, WHICH WOULD BE ANOTHER BAD BLOW TO THE ALREADY WEAKENED ECONOMY.

ROBINSON

FILES
RHOD.D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

ADVANCE COPY

✓ Mr Cartledge No 10

P/S

Res blk

QWONFO095/13

OO F.C.O. (DESKBY 140900Z)

GPS 50

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 140900Z

FM WASHINGTON 132225Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1942 OF 13 JULY.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR CARTLEDGE, NO 10, AND PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SENATOR HELMS.

1. AS STATED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1874 OF 11 JULY THE WASHINGTON POST EARLIER THIS WEEK REPORTED A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SENATOR HELMS LAST WEEK. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY RECORD YOU CAN LET ME HAVE OF THIS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

Action taken
for
1/9/79

No action.

P.A.
G.M.
9/1

1

PRIME MINISTER

Senator Helms and Mr. Carbaugh

The attached letter to you from Mr. Carbaugh arrived today. It repeats Senator Helms's sceptical view of the value of the assurances which we have received from the Americans about the non-circumvention clauses in SALT 2;

; and asks you to give an interview to Roland Evans of the Evans/Novak partnership.

I have already sent Senator Helms the text of your reply in the House about the assurances which the Americans have given us about SALT 2. I remain of the view that the firm assurances given orally by Mr. Vance to both you and Lord Carrington, in the presence of witnesses, during his last visit to London are as good as we can hope to get and satisfactory. If, as Lord Carrington has recommended, you visit Washington in September you could extract similar oral assurances from President Carter himself.

That is not the point. Oral assurances do not outlast the given. Written " would be expected to bind a gov. There is no

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

the creation of the interest of the Probate Act.

Since you have not given any interviews to British journalists since taking office, I doubt whether it would be right for you to see Mr. Roland Evans.

I have seen Roland Evans privately before + never has any been out. It's not just him

In short, if you agree, I do not think that it is necessary to take any action on Mr. Carbaugh's letter.

G.M. interview. ref.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 5, 1979

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

Thank you so very much for taking the time to see Senator Helms and party yesterday. A successful resolution of the entire Rhodesian matter is so near; your stand on the whole affair has brought such resolution much closer.

Please understand the Senator's skepticism concerning oral guarantees from the SALT advocates in the U.S. administration. While such guarantees well may be sincerely motivated, the delivery on such promises — especially without legislative approval from the Congress — is, arguably, questionable.

- 2 -

Included with this note are two papers which the Senator regrettably forgot to give to you:

One is the vote count which he mentioned to you. While all Senators will not be in proper category, the count is valid, and has been used - I might add - as the authoritative account by a number of leading U.S. newspapers.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

The memo from the Senator only suggests a very confidential exchange, as you may wish

to pursue. The Senator has asked me to coordinate with your designated person any activity you may wish to initiate or have initiated. Obviously, all matters would be handled quite discreetly.

Mr. Rowland Evans, partner of Robert Novak whom you met during your trip to Washington, will be in London around the 9th and wishes to see you. This could prove to be a most valuable exchange, need only be very short visit, but could be used quite profitably by you in dealing with America. Evans-Novak column reaches more than 250 daily newspapers, and is quite useful. Needless to say, Mr. Evans is quite discreet himself.

Thank you again for your most gracious hospitality. It was a great pleasure to see you.

London
7-5-79

John Carbaugh

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM

DATE: JULY 4, 1979

SUBJECT: VOTE COUNT, SENATE VOTE ON SALT II

Following is a tentative vote count, as of today, of Washington estimates on how Senators may vote on the SALT II Treaty.

AGAINST	SHOULD BE AGAINST	REASONABLY SHOULD BE AGAINST	NEUTRAL	REASONABLY SHOULD BE FOR	SHOULD BE FOR	FOR
1. Armstrong	Baker	Boschwitz	Bellmon	Burdick	Biden	Baucus
2. Byrd, H.	Cannon	Cochran	Bentsen	Chafee	Bumpers	Bayh
3. Garn	Hayakawa	Cohen	Boren	Chiles	Byrd, R.C.	Bradley
4. Goldwater	Lugar	Dole	Danforth	Glenn	Durkin	Church
5. Hatch	Schmitt	Domenici	DeConcini	Heinz	*Hatfield	Cranston
6. Helms	Schweiker	Durenberger	Heflin	Kassebaum	Inouye	Culver
7. Humphrey	Simpson	Exon	Huddleston	Moynihan	Magnuson	Eagleton
8. Jepsen	Young	Ford	Melcher	Pressler	Mathias	Gravel
9. Laxalt		Hollings	Nunn	Pryor	Packwood	Hart
10. McClure		Jackson	Roth	Sasser	Percy	Javits
11. Stevens		Johnston	Stafford	Stewart	Weicker	Kennedy
12. Thurmond		Long				Leahy
13. Tower		Morgan				Levin
14. Wallop		Randolph				Matsunaga
15. Warner		Stennis				*McGovern
16.		Stone				Metzenbau
17.		Talmadge				Muskie
18.		Zorinsky				Nelson
19.						Pell
20.						Proxmire
21.						Ribicoff
22.						Riegle
23.						Sarbanes
25.						Stevenson
25.						Tsongas
26.						Williams
27.						
28.						
29.						
30.						



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1151</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Memorandum from US Senate dated 4/7/1979</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>18/2/2013</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>GRA 168</i>
PIECE/ITEM <i>49</i> (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)

FILE

DS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1979

During your conversation with the Prime Minister this morning about the SALT II Treaty, the Prime Minister promised to send you the text of her Statement in the House of Commons concerning the assurances which the Government had been given by the United States Administration on certain aspects of the Treaty.

I now enclose a copy of the Parliamentary reply which the Prime Minister gave on Tuesday, 14 June 1979.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Senator Jesse Helms

ASD

CONFIDENTIAL



Rhodesia (int) B2 p 5
de Master
file WDA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1979

Dear Sir,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY SENATOR JESSE HELMS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 4 JULY 1979

Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina), following a written request by him for a private and confidential discussion with the Prime Minister about Rhodesia, called at No.10 at 10.30 this morning by prior arrangement. He was accompanied by Mr. Carbaugh and another personal assistant. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's discussion.

The Prime Minister began the conversation by telling Senator Helms that she thought it desirable that their meeting should be given no publicity. In particular, she hoped that he would not consider it necessary to inform the other Conservative Members of Parliament whom he was meeting later in the day that he had called on her. In answer to questions, No.10 would if necessary confirm that he had made a brief call on the Prime Minister, in return for the Prime Minister's own meeting with him in Washington during her visit as Leader of the Opposition. Senator Helms accepted this, but with evident reluctance.

Rhodesia

Senator Helms told the Prime Minister that when President Carter had announced his "unfortunate" determination concerning sanctions against Rhodesia, he had suggested to the President that he should take an early opportunity of meeting Bishop Muzorewa. President Carter had telephoned him on the following day to ask him to invite the Bishop to visit the United States as his (the Senator's) guest. This was the genesis of Bishop Muzorewa's forthcoming visit to Washington on 7 July. President Carter, Mr. Vance and Dr. Brzezinski were taking the line that the US could not unilaterally move ahead of the UK on the Rhodesia issue. The Senator greatly feared, however, that any inordinate delay in recognising the Muzorewa Government would cause it to fall apart. The Prime Minister's own statements had been helpful but what was now needed was a clear statement by the US and British Governments together that sanctions would be lifted. This might

/enable

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

enable Bishop Muzorewa to survive. The present mood on the Hill was generally supportive of lifting sanctions although some highly placed members of the Administration were in favour of holding back, thereby playing, in the Senator's view, into the hands of the terrorists. The best way of defeating the terrorists would be to revive the Rhodesian economy by lifting sanctions.

Mr. Carbaugh said that President Carter was now seeking a way out of the impasse. The Prime Minister should make it clear that the British Government intended to lift sanctions after Bishop Muzorewa's forthcoming visits to Washington and London. If she did not make this move before the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, the pressures there would be hard to resist. It would be much better to present the Lusaka meeting with a fait accompli. Mr. Carbaugh said that it would be wrong to anticipate that in these circumstances the Commonwealth would fall apart. It would be useful if Bishop Muzorewa could have had some firm indication of support and of an end to sanctions from the Prime Minister before he went to see President Carter.

The Prime Minister told Senator Helms that most African countries now accepted that there was a new situation in Rhodesia, following the elections in April. The next step was to determine whether the existing constitutional arrangements were, in accordance with the Fifth Principle, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The Prime Minister said that she did not share Senator Helms' approach to the Lusaka meeting. She thought it essential that the UK should attend that meeting in the position of being able to point to continuing consultations with all the parties concerned. The impact of any premature move on the forthcoming meeting of the Organisation of African Unity also had to be borne in mind. The Prime Minister said that she disagreed with Mr. Carbaugh on the desirability of presenting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting with a fait accompli: it was essential to persuade some countries to go along with the UK - a wide degree of international acceptance would be essential to the future of Bishop Muzorewa's Government, which would be gravely handicapped by an unnecessary measure of African hostility towards it. For all these reasons, the Prime Minister said, she did not think it wise to make any further move before the Lusaka meeting.

As you know, the Prime Minister wishes knowledge of her meeting with Senator Helms to be confined to the smallest possible circle. The above account, therefore, is for the personal information of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary only. Lord Carrington may wish to authorise you to convey the gist of it to the one or two senior officials who were directly concerned in preparing the brief for Senator Helms' call.

*Yours ever,
Elizabeth*

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FILE

25



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1979

As I believe you know, Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina) called on the Prime Minister this morning, primarily to discuss Rhodesia.

At the end of the discussion, Senator Helms made a few remarks about the SALT II Treaty and urged the Prime Minister to be very wary of Article 12 of the Treaty which, he said, contained a number of ambiguities. The Prime Minister told Senator Helms that the British Government had received firm assurances from the United States Administration, to which she had referred in Parliament, to the effect that nothing in the SALT II Treaty would affect the continuing availability to the United Kingdom of the technology which we might require for the development of our nuclear deterrent. Senator Helms asked whether the Prime Minister had been given these assurances in writing and indicated that, when Mr. Vance appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to answer questions about the Treaty, he would himself ask Mr. Vance to specify the nature of the assurances. The Prime Minister replied simply that she would send Senator Helms the text of her Parliamentary Answer (on 14 June 1979) for his information; I have done so today. Senator Helms made the final remark that amendments to the Treaty were likely to be put forward during the Senate's debate on ratification: his head count showed that if the vote on ratification were to be taken tomorrow, the required two thirds majority for an affirmative vote would not be forthcoming.

Since the Prime Minister wishes to confine knowledge of her meeting with Senator Helms to the smallest possible circle, I am not copying this letter elsewhere, and should be grateful if you would give it the most restricted distribution.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

ASO

W. R.

EXTRACT FROM HOUSE OF COMMONS OFFICIAL REPORT (HANSARD)

Tuesday 14 June 1979

Mr. Latham : Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that the SALT treaty which the President is about to sign adequately defends the interests of the European nations, including Britain? If she shares the doubts of Senator Jackson and others, will she tell the President that he must take into account the British negotiating view as well?

The Prime Minister : We look forward to studying the full text of SALT II, which we have not yet seen. The United States has made clear that SALT II will not affect existing co-operation within the Alliance. So far as our own position is concerned, we have received assurances that there is nothing in the agreement to prevent us from ensuring the continuing effectiveness of Britain's nuclear deterrent.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

CALL BY SENATOR JESSE HELMS ON THE PRIME MINISTER, WEDNESDAY
4 JULY

--- I enclose a brief on Rhodesia for the Prime Minister's
use when receiving Senator Helms tomorrow.

As the background note makes clear, it is not at present thought likely that the Senate will succeed in its attempt to oblige the US Administration to lift sanctions before the autumn. Bishop Muzorewa will be having talks in Washington, probably on 10 July. We shall be letting the Americans have an account of Lord Harlech's discussions in Salisbury. Mr Vance will impress on Bishop Muzorewa the need to work with us - as the constitutionally responsible authority - to gain wider acceptance. It is not yet known whether Bishop Muzorewa will see President Carter.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





CALL BY SENATOR HELMS ON THE PRIME MINISTER : WEDNESDAY 4 JULY

RHODESIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Rhodesian elections showed the extent of popular support for Bishop Muzorewa, and acceptance of a new form of government. Lord Boyd and others consider they were as free and fair as was possible in the circumstances. Our intention is to work with Bishop Muzorewa to achieve international acceptance. It is in western interests to support a moderate solution in Rhodesia.
2. But we have to carry other countries with us. Otherwise, there will be strong reactions in Africa and the Commonwealth and increased opportunities for Soviet and Cuban involvement.
3. Parliament is unlikely to renew sanctions in November. But we should try to build support for Bishop Muzorewa and bring Rhodesia to legal independence in such a way as to attract the widest possible acceptance among other western countries and the more moderate western states in Africa.
4. In Lord Harlech's talks with African leaders he found a widespread desire for a solution and a disposition to acknowledge that the situation had changed. But to gain wider acceptance a solution will have to stem from us, as the legal authority. It will probably also have to involve some improvements on the status quo, including the departure of Smith and ^{possibly} some improvements to the Constitution (though the changes should not go so far as to undermine white confidence).
5. Lord Harlech is discussing these reactions with Muzorewa. We hope that in Washington Senator Helms and others will impress on him that he can have confidence in our intentions; but that he must work with us and show the flexibility needed to win wider acceptance. If he just sits tight and waits for sanctions to be lifted, political support could drain away from him. There is a /real need



real need to exert his authority inside Rhodesia. We will be seeking to help him; but we cannot solve his problems for him. We hope that Muzorewa's friends in the United States will impress on him the need:

- (a) to show that he is in charge in Salisbury
- (b) to work closely with us to win wider acceptance (and thereby help to deprive the Patriotic Front of their backing).



RHODESIA : BACKGROUND

1. The security situation remains difficult. The series of cross-border attacks carried out by the security forces before the elections against Patriotic Front bases in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, and the mobilisation of all available manpower to protect the election, won the Rhodesians a respite. But, as General Walls has acknowledged, guerrilla activity is once again running at a high level, particularly that carried out by ZANU (Mugabe). The security forces are in control of the towns and the main European farming areas; but they cannot give full protection to the Tribal Trust Lands and lines of communication. The military stalemate will continue so long as the morale of Rhodesian whites and a high level of South African support are sustained. But the Rhodesians will not make significant military progress unless there are defections from ZANU and ZAPU. So far only a handful of guerrillas have taken up the offer of an amnesty.

2. To counter the resurgence of guerrilla activity, the security forces have resumed their cross-border attacks on Zambia and Mozambique. Bishop Muzorewa has presumably been consulted about the broad strategy, but may not have been involved in the decision to mount particular raids. The raids into Zambia on 26 June and 1 July have reduced the chances of a meeting between him and President Kaunda.

3. Within Rhodesia there is concern that hopes of a scaling down of the war with the transfer to an African-led Government have not been fulfilled. Bishop Muzorewa's supporters in the UANC are somewhat dissatisfied that he has not begun to pursue policies of his own. Sithole's 12 MPs are still refusing to take their seats in parliament; Chikerema's 7 MPs have been barred from doing so under a temporary court injunction. The UANC remains by far the largest party (with 44 seats). There is a clear need for more decisive leadership from Muzorewa.

/SENATOR HELMS



SENATOR HELMS

4. Bishop Muzorewa will be visiting the USA from 7-11 July on the invitation of Senator Helms (Republican, North Carolina), who is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Helms has been one of the leading Congressional supporters of the internal settlement in Rhodesia. In July 1978 he arranged for Bishop Muzorewa to visit Washington. He was one of the signatories of the invitation to Mr Ian Smith and his colleagues in the transitional government to visit the United States in September 1978, and played a prominent part in the visit itself. In March 1979 Senator Helms was associated with an attempt in the Senate to lift sanctions immediately after the Rhodesian elections. There were reports from Salisbury that Senator Helms advised Mr Smith to stay on in the government (possibly to use his departure as a bargaining counter for the lifting of sanctions).

Flag A 5. Following the Rhodesian elections, Senator Helms introduced an amendment to lift US sanctions against Rhodesia without waiting for President Carter's "determination" on the Case/Javits amendment. A copy of the Senator's speech introducing the amendment is attached. He declared the Rhodesian election to have been the most free and open election in the history of Africa, and said that the terms of the Case/Javits amendment had been fulfilled. His amendment was subsequently overtaken by Senator Byrd's amendment to the Defence Authorisation Bill, which called for the lifting of sanctions by 30 June.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION OVER RHODESIA

Flag B 6. On 15 May the Senate approved by 75 votes to 19 a "sense of Congress" resolution, declaring that the Case/Javits conditions had been substantially complied with and that the President should determine as much within 10 days of the installation of the new government in Salisbury and should lift sanctions. The Presidential determination (text attached) followed on 7 June. On 13 June the Defence Authorisation Bill, incorporating Senator Byrd's amendment, was passed by the Senate.

/7.



7. The House of Representatives has not passed a similar amendment to the Defence Authorisation Bill. Instead, on 28 June, the House adopted by 350 votes to 37 Representative Solarz's Bill calling for the termination of sanctions on 15 October unless the President determined that it would be against US national interests to do so (Washington telegram no 1470). The Administration lobbied hard in support of Representative Solarz's bill.

8. The two Houses of Congress are thus in a stalemate over sanctions. The next stage is for each House to nominate members to represent it on a Conference Committee on the Defence Authorisation Bill. The composition of the Committee, which will deal not just with Rhodesia but with the Defence Bill as a whole, will influence the final outcome. On past form, the Committee is expected to adopt the lowest common denominator, and therefore to accept an amendment closer to Representative Solarz's bill than to the stronger measures in Senator Byrd's amendment. The final outcome is expected to be known before Congress rises in August. One possibility is that President Carter will be required to make a further determination by September or October, but that the conditions of the determination will be more stringent than those proposed by Representative Solarz. If the President vetoed the Bill, he would probably be able to muster enough support to prevent the Congress from overturning his veto.

MUZOREWA'S VISIT

9. Senator Helms will obviously wish to use Bishop Muzorewa's visit to convince the Congress and American public opinion that he deserves their full support. The US Administration will impress on Muzorewa the need to work closely with us - to achieve wider international acceptance. Even if the Senate succeeded in its attempts to force the Administration to lift sanctions (which is now unlikely, at any rate before the autumn), the Administration would not be prepared to recognize Bishop Muzorewa's government on the basis of the status quo.

Rhodesia Department

3 July 1979

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

GR 320

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 290800Z

FM WASHINGTON 290420Z JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1740 OF 29 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO (FOR S OF S)

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY,

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA,
MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA.

MY TELNO 1549: RHODESIA.

1. LATE TONIGHT, 28 JUNE, THE HOUSE ADOPTED BY 350 VOTES TO 37 A BILL CALLING FOR THE TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA ON 15 OCTOBER UNLESS THE PRESIDENT DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE AGAINST U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS TO DO SO AND REPORTED THUS TO CONGRESS.
2. EARLIER, OPPONENTS OF THE BILL HAD SOUGHT TO INSERT A WRECKING AMENDMENT CALLING FOR THE AUTOMATIC LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ON 1 DECEMBER, REGARDLESS OF ANY PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION. THIS WAS DEFEATED BY 242 TO 147 AFTER A STORMY DEBATE. A MOVE TO INSTRUCT THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO DRAFT A SUBSTITUTE BILL REQUIRING THE U.S. TO LIFT SANCTIONS IF H.M.G. DID SO FIRST WAS ALSO DEFEATED ON A VOICE VOTE.
3. SUPPORTERS OF SOLARZ'S BILL ARGUED AGAIN THAT IT WAS BEST TO DELAY MATTERS UNTIL H.M.G. HAD REACHED ITS OWN DECISIONS. THEY ALSO MAINTAINED THAT U.S. INTERESTS IN AND RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY THE PREMATURE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. OPPONENTS OF THE BILL ASSERTED THAT THE U.S. HAD A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE THE LEAD IN SUPPORTING WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS RHODESIA'S MODERATE, MULTI-RACIAL DEMOCRACY.

RESTRICTED

/4. PASSAGE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PASSAGE OF THE BILL WITH SUCH A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY WILL GREATLY ENCOURAGE THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HAD LOBBIED HARD IN ITS SUPPORT. THE VOTE SHOULD FORCE A STALEMATE IN CONGRESS FOR THE TIME BEING, SENATE HAVING VOTED IN FAVOUR OF LIFTING SANCTIONS ON 12 JUNE. IT IS UNLIKELY THEREFORE THAT U.S. POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS WILL CHANGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CERTAINLY THIS CONVINCING VICTORY IN THE HOUSE AND THE UNEXPECTEDLY NARROW DEFEAT IN THE SENATE WILL GIVE THE PRESIDENT ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE IN HIS HANDLING OF POLICY TOWARDS RHODESIA.

JAY

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
NAD
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS 2

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

RESTRICTED

BF 2/7/79



USA

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. CARTLEDGE

I have put Jesse Helms in the diary for Wednesday 4 July from 10.30 a.m. until 11.00 a.m. I have not specified who is coming. It simply says "keep free, ask CS". Is it alright for his name to go in? And is any briefing required?

(cs)

22 June 1979

Briefing requested
by 1700 on 2 July.
B/F Her. Col 20/6

CONFIDENTIAL

+

PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia

In his letter to you below, Senator Helms claims President Carter's authority to seek a completely private meeting with you to discuss Rhodesia. This raises a number of difficulties.

Not necessary.

I think you could expect to have had some word direct from President Carter, perhaps over the hot-line, if it was indeed his wish that you should have a meeting of this kind with Senator Helms. Equally, you will wish to ponder the implications of the Senator's apparent desire to exclude the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary from his talks with you. If you agree, I should be grateful for your authority to send Lord Carrington a copy of Senator Helms' letter on a strictly personal basis and for his eyes only so that you and he can discuss it.

[A]

You may also like to glance, at the same time, at the attached report by Miles Hudson on his recent visit to Washington, which throws some light on the political and atmospheric background to Senator Helms' letter.

Blm,

18 June 1979

*I would rather show it to Lord C. myself - the F.O. is known to be unhappy about this "leaking".
Should check to make sure appropriate to case Helms.
Richard*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Action in hand.
P.A.
G.M.
20/6*

to be emulated by other nations in Africa and the Third World? If the U.S. foreign policy possesses even the barest element of fairness and good faith, we must now do what we pledged to do when the Case-Javits amendment passed the Senate.

As Senators will recall, the Case-Javits amendment was an amendment to my proposal to lift sanctions within a specified time. The Senate accepted the compromise proposal worked out by Senators CASE and JAVITS. I have cooperated in good faith since that time to make certain that the U.S. commitment clearly stated in the terms of Case-Javits would be met.

Those terms have been met, Mr. President. They have been met.

I am troubled that our State Department has not followed suit. Since Case-Javits was signed into law by the President, it should have been a good-faith guideline for executive branch actions dealing with Rhodesia. The State Department's record, sad to say, falls short of good faith, let alone even a reasonable adherence to the commitment, explicit in Case-Javits.

BACKGROUND OF CASE-JAVITS

On June 28, 1978, I offered an amendment to the foreign relations authorization bill. This amendment sought to lift sanctions against Rhodesia until the end of fiscal year 1979. While the amendment was successfully tabled, the vote, 48 to 42 disclosed a degree of support for lifting sanctions that could not be ignored.

Subsequent to that, I asked Prime Minister Ian Smith if Bishop Muzorewa would be willing to come to the United States to present the Rhodesian case to the Congress. Smith consulted with Muzorewa; Muzorewa agreed to come.

Muzorewa spoke eloquently about the hopes and aspirations of the majority of Rhodesians. He emphasized that Rhodesians wanted a peaceful transfer of power from white to majority rule—via the ballot box, not with violence. He urged Congress to lift sanctions, so that Rhodesians might have hope, and positive incentives to participate in the electoral process.

On July 26, 1978, I moved again to attempt to lift sanctions, this time until the end of the year—as a trial period to assess the transitional government's good faith in moving toward open and free elections. The Case-Javits substitute to my amendment was supported by 59 Senators. A vote on a measure offered by Senator DANFORTH as an amendment to Case-Javits (in substance the amendment that I originally had offered) was taken. The Danforth-Helms amendment received 42 votes, and Case-Javits prevailed.

It is interesting that in these two votes, a total of 94 Senators went on record as favoring the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia in some form or another.

Mr. President, a clear, unequivocal signal was sent to the State Department by the Senate that day. Unfortunately, if we are to judge by the subsequent actions by officials of the executive branch in general, and the State Department

By Mr. HELMS:

S. 996. A bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1954 with respect to the enforceability of Executive orders which apply measures against Rhodesia; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA: IT IS TIME TO LIFT SANCTIONS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, it is time to lift all sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

All conditions of the Case-Javits amendment have been met; the transitional government time and again has agreed to meet with the Patriotic Front, with every good faith attempt to conduct an all-parties conference arrogantly rebuffed by the Patriotic Front and its allies.

Moreover, Mr. President, the most free and open election in the history of the continent of Africa has just been concluded—despite efforts to frustrate it—with a 63-percent turnout at the polls.

So, Mr. President, how can the United States now refuse to normalize relations with the new government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia? What further excuse can be contrived as a basis for refusing to lift sanctions, and hold out the good-faith attempt by Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to set up a participatory democracy as an example

in particular, there was no inclination to abide by the Senate's wishes.

Following these efforts, after much wrangling with the Department of State, a visa was granted for Ian Smith to visit the United States. The Smith visit opened up a new chapter in Rhodesian-American relations. It was during this visit that Ian Smith and other members of the transitional government first agreed to attend an all-parties conference.

RHODESIA AGREES TO ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE

Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Chirau, and Mr. Sithole all visited the United States in early October of last year. It was a highly productive visit.

While here, Smith talked with many friends in the United States. Other members of the transitional government quickly came to agreement with Smith, and with Americans interested in a peaceful resolution to Rhodesia's problems. It was agreed that the transitional government should make clear its willingness to attend an all-parties conference without preconditions.

This information was communicated to the State Department, first under my direction, then by the transitional government members themselves.

When the willingness of the transitional government to attend an all-parties conference was transmitted to the State Department, the news was met with surprise and interest. It was even suggested, by one high ranking official at State—still basking in the euphoria of President Carter's Camp David success—that perhaps Camp David would serve as a good meeting place for such a conference.

I am informed that other places also were considered, including one site in New York.

All of this came to naught. State Department inquiries with Nkomo produced a negative response. Nor was Mugabe willing to meet.

Thus, as early as last October, the transitional government had indicated its willingness to attend an all-parties conference without preconditions. The Patriotic Front was not. This was acknowledged by the chairman of Africa Affairs Subcommittee last month, and has been acknowledged by members of the State Department on numerous occasions.

FREE AND OPEN ELECTIONS, INTERNATIONALLY OBSERVED

While the leaders of Rhodesia continued to remain open to an all-parties conference without precondition, they also proceeded with plans for free and open elections, with the participation of international observers, including a sizable corps of foreign press.

The elections were held last week. That they were, indeed, open and free is not in serious dispute. The newspapers have been filled with headlines about the freedom of the electoral process in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The size of the turnout far exceeded any national election in our own 200-year-old history.

Surely all fair-minded Americans will now acknowledge that Rhodesia has be-

come a model for other African nations. Rhodesia's attempt to emulate the democratic process and tradition of our own country is commendable. Rhodesia, by these elections, has clearly become the most free and openly democratic nation on the African continent.

Thus, Mr. President, the time has come for the United States to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and to normalize relations with this nation.

Now, Mr. President, there may be objections raised to lifting sanctions and normalizing relations with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Some may question the continuing role of whites in the governmental process; or, the possibility of increased guerrilla activity—possibly with active Soviet participation.

But those concerns are irrelevant to our obligations to deal with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia fairly, and in good faith. This is a matter that I hope to explore in more detail at a later date.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

B. 998

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended—

(1) by striking out the second and third sentences of subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "In recognition of the settlement of March 3, 1979, reached by leaders representing a majority of Rhodesians, and of the willingness of the transitional government established pursuant to such settlement to participate in and negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference without preconditions, and of the government chosen by free elections held in April, 1979, and observed by international observers, no Executive order issued under this subsection may be enforceable after such elected government is installed;" and

(2) by striking out subsections (b) and (c).

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

*Wed 4 July
10.30 - 11.00*

June 14, 1979

The Honorable Margaret Thatcher, M. P.
Prime Minister
House of Commons
Westminster, England

VERY CONFIDENTIAL !!

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

Our mutual friend, Bill Simon, has shared with me your concern about U.S. actions toward lifting sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

I write this letter to you, in strictest confidence, concerning several private conversations that I have had with President Carter, Secretary Vance and Mr. Brzezinski concerning this matter.

From those meetings and conversations, all of which occurred over the past week, I assure you that the President's private posture is quite different from his public one on this matter. I am convinced that what President Carter seeks is a graceful exit from his present policy, one which will cause as little offense to his anti-Rhodesia constituency as possible.

He has requested, affirmatively, my aid in this endeavor. I have offered my assistance to him.

As part of this process, which will lead to a lifting of sanctions by the United States at an early date, I have asked Mr. Muzorewa to visit the United States as my guest. During this visit, which will begin, officially, on July 9, Mr. Muzorewa will meet privately with President Carter, again at the President's request, conveyed through me to the Bishop on Friday of last week.

After that meeting, and hopefully in coordination with you and your government, President Carter will proceed to lift sanctions.

Needless to say, the President desires that the entire matter, most especially his involvement in it, remain in the strictest confidence.

To explain further to you the full scope and details of this activity, I seek the opportunity to meet with you at your convenience, sometime in the period July 4, 5, or 6. Again, because of the delicacy of the matter, I would desire that the meeting be completely private. There is a very important aspect of this matter in which you might wish to involve yourself, relating to Prime Minister Muzorewa's meeting with the President, which might lead to a highly satisfactory conclusion of the Rhodesian problem for all parties.

As you are no doubt aware, there is little support in Congress for the President's Rhodesia policy. On Tuesday, the Senate upheld, 52-41, a section of the defense procurement bill which mandates the lifting of sanctions upon enactment of the legislation. The informed opinion is that, when the House of Representatives acts upon the defense measure, it will accept the Senate provision. The date of enactment, and hence the mandatory lifting of sanctions, will depend upon when the bill is presented to the President for signature, and his decision to sign or to veto. Through parliamentary tactics, this decision can easily be postponed until after the meeting with Bishop Muzorewa.

No one other than your own good self knows the extent that I have been conferring with the President, and I assure you that no one will be informed by me that I have met with you. If you can find time in your schedule, I have reason to believe that the result will be quite substantive. I would appreciate it very much if your personal secretary could contact one of my aides, Dr. James Lucier or Mr. John Carbaugh, with a date and a time. (Our phone number is 202-224-6342.) No other details need be discussed on the telephone.

I note with great satisfaction the courage with which you are moving to implement your economic policies. The election of your government may well be the catalyst for the rescue of the West. I am very proud of you.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

GR GR 900

UNCLASSIFIED

BT WASHINGTON 072305Z JUN 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1396 OF 7 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CAPE TOWN, DAR ES SALAAM,
GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,

INFO PRIORITY UKNIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, PRETORIA.

RHODESIA: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER AT
1720 WASHINGTON TIME TODAY.

2. BEGINS.

AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION: I HAVE
MADE A DECISION ON THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN SANCTIONS. FIRST, I AM
ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING THE SANCTIONS.

SECOND, I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING
OF THE SANCTIONS.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME
VERY ENCOURAGING PROGRESS MADE IN THAT COUNTRY, THAT THE ACTION
TAKEN HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE PROVISION OF THE UNITED
STATES LAW DESCRIBED IN THE SO-CALLED CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT.

IN REACHING THIS DECISION, WE HAVE CAREFULLY ASSESSED RECENT
EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. WE HAVE CONSULTED VERY CLOSELY WITH
THE BRITISH WHO RETAIN BOTH LEGAL AND HISTORIC INTERESTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THAT COUNTRY.

THE ACTUAL VOTING IN THE APRIL ELECTIONS APPEARS TO HAVE
BEEN ADMINISTERED IN A REASONABLY FAIR WAY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
BUT THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD UNDER A CONSTITUTION THAT WAS DRAFTED
BY AND THEN SUBMITTED ONLY TO THE WHITE MINORITY, ONLY 60 PERCENT
OF WHOM THEMSELVES SUPPORTED THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

THE BLACK CITIZENS, WHO CONSTITUTE 90 PERCENT OF THE
POPULATION OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, NEVER HAD A CHANCE TO CONSIDER NOR
TO VOTE FOR OR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS
WERE HELD.

/THE CONSTITUTION

THE CONSTITUTION PRESERVES EXTRAORDINARY POWER FOR THE FOUR PERCENT WHITE MINORITY. IT GIVES THIS SMALL MINORITY VASTLY DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBERS OF VOTES IN THE COUNTRY'S PARLIAMENT. IT GIVES THIS FOUR PERCENT CONTINUED CONTROL OVER THE ARMY, THE POLICE, THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, AND IT ALSO LETS THE FOUR PERCENT MINORITY EXERCISE A VETO OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. MOREOVER, WHILE THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT CALLED FOR FREE PARTICIPATION OF ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS OR GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY IN THE RECENT ELECTION, THE INTERNAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSING POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BANNED FROM THE ELECTION. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THEY WERE PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING MEETINGS, FROM HAVING POLITICAL RALLIES, FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS AGAINST VOTING IN THE ELECTION, AND EVEN PREVENTED FROM ADVERTISING THEIR VIEWS IN THE NEWS MEDIA.

FOR THESE REASONS, I CANNOT CONCLUDE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE EITHER FAIR OR FREE. NOR CAN I CONCLUDE THAT THE OTHER CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES LAW HAS BEEN FULLY MET. THE AUTHORITIES IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING, BUT THEY HAVE NOT INDICATED THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT "ALL RELEVANT ISSUES". ALL RELEVANT ISSUES HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED STATES LAW.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO KEEP THE QUESTION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF SANCTIONS UNDER REVIEW. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT FUTURE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE AND MADE RAPIDLY. ALONG WITH THE BRITISH, WE WILL PARTICULARLY LOOK FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS AND MORE LEGITIMATE AND GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. IN SO DOING, WE WILL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND OBVIOUSLY CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS ON A MONTHLY BASIS ON THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THE POSITION THAT I HAVE OUTLINED BEST SERVES NOT ONLY AMERICAN INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES IN A REGION OF THE WORLD OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO US. IT SHOULD PRESERVE OUR DIPLOMATIC AND TIES OF TRADE WITH FRIENDLY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND ALSO LIMIT, AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT -- LIMIT THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUTSIDE POWERS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

/NO OTHER

NO OTHER GOVERNMENT ON EARTH HAS EXTENDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OR RECOGNITION TO THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, THESE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT I AM DESCRIBING SHOULD HELP AND ENCOURAGE THE NEWLY-ELECTED AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING MR. MUZOREWA, TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, AN END TO APARTHEID AND RACISM, BASED ON FIRM, REASONABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES THAT EXEMPLIFY THE VERY PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FOUNDED.

I CONSIDER THIS PRINCIPLE TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO REPRESENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WHAT OUR NATION STANDS FOR, WHAT OUR PEOPLE BELIEVE IN.

I RECOGNIZE, TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK WITH YOU, THAT I DO NOT HAVE A MAJORITY OF SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE. MY GUESS IS THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE HOUSE WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN THIS POSITION PREVAILING. BUT BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO ME PERSONALLY, AND TO OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE I SEE THE PROSPECT OF OUR NATION BEING SERIOUSLY DAMAGED IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME WOULD DIRECTLY VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, OUR PAST AGREEMENTS EVER SINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF EITHER OUR COUNTRY OR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN WITHIN MY POWER TO PREVAIL IN THIS SITUATION.

IT MEANS A LOT TO OUR COUNTRY TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS DECENT, AND WHAT IS FAIR, AND WHAT IS PRINCIPLED. AND IN MY OPINION THE ACTION THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED FULFILLS THESE REQUIREMENTS.

JAY

F I L E S

RHOD D

OADS

NAD

NEWS D

PUSD

PLANNING STAFF

ES & SD

CCD

FRD

UND

LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

ECON D

PCD

DEF D

OID

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

