


TOP SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

5
809


FILE TITLE: Deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe <u>CLOSED</u> .		SERIES DEFENCE
Modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe		
PART BEGINS: September 1983		PART: 4
PART ENDS: 29 June 1984		CAB ONE: 

PART
CLOSED



PREM 19/1182

TOP SECRET

 PART 4 ends:-

CD Power to MOD 29.6.84

PART 5 begins:-

RTA to CD Power (A084/1907) 5.7.84

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 14 November 1983, columns 618 to 630: Cruise Missiles

House of Commons HANSARD, 31 October 1983, columns 624 to 716: Intermediate Nuclear Forces

Signed

J. Gray

Date

18/6/2013

PREM Records Team

SLHAAN

vsc



c. MISC 7
LPO
FCO
HMT
(MOD)
HO
DOE
LCO
CO
Sir P.C.

53

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 June 1984

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has considered the various comments by colleagues on the Defence Secretary's minute of 1 June on the question of a second GLCM base at RAF Molesworth, and also his subsequent minute of 25 June.

The Prime Minister agrees that the Attorney General's advice should be sought on the matters raised by the Lord Chancellor in his minute of 20 June.

The Prime Minister has asked that the Defence Secretary should produce a further paper which would, in more detail:

- a) consider the cost and time constraints of the alternative deployment options.
- b) examine the military factors at stake in the choice between deploying cruise missiles from either one or two bases, particularly in the light of American views reported in your letter of 4 June to Roger Bone.
- c) assess the practical implications of postponing a decision until after the Summer Recess as

Handwritten initials

-2-

proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Prime Minister would wish the paper to be available in time for a ministerial meeting before the Summer Recess to resolve the differences of view.

The Prime Minister does not want the circle of those aware that these problems are being addressed to be widened, at least at this stage. This will inevitably place limits on the evaluation of the scope for further scope for building at the Greenham Common site proposed in paragraph 3 of the Defence Secretary's minute of 25 June. But the Prime Minister hopes that this aspect will nonetheless be addressed as fully as possible in the further paper which she has requested.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of the earlier correspondence.

C.D. POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.



de vsc
CSPC. 52

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD
CABINET OFFICE

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute on this subject of 22 June. The Prime Minister agrees that further ministerial discussion should take place in OD with the addition of the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment. She has instructed that the papers should go round under the most highly restricted procedure, that is to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries only.

C.D. POWELL

29 June 1984

MS.

SECRET
CMO/UK EYES ONLY

57A



COPY NO. 1499

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I have seen Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 25 June.
I would support his proposal that his officials, with the
American authorities should carry out an evaluation.

Copies of this minute go to recipients of earlier correspondence
including the Attorney General.

PJ

P J

28 June 1984

28 JUN 1984

5 10 11 12 1 2 3 4

100E



51

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

A You agreed that the Defence Secretary should be asked for a further paper on the lines suggested by Sir Robert Armstrong.

B There is now a further minute from the Defence Secretary in which he suggests a hard look at whether there really is no alternative way of proceeding by building within the present site at Greenham Common to a completion date of no later than mid-1988.

There seem to me two problems with his proposal:

- a) A largish team would have to visit the site to conduct the evaluation and as Mr Heseltine recognises this would inevitably widen the circle of those aware that the problem is being addressed.
- b) The evaluation would not be ready until the end of next month, which would effectively postpone Ministerial consideration until the autumn.

*Amend
not*

You may wish the evaluation to be conducted on a more restricted basis than this, even accepting that it may be less complete, at least until ministers have considered the issue again.

Agree letter to Defence Secretary's Private Secretary attached?

C.D.P.

28 June 1984

SWHAPP

DRAFT LETTER

CHARLES POWELL TO RICHARD MOTTRAM (MOD)

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has considered the various comments ^{by colleagues} on the Defence Secretary's minute of 1 June on the question of a second GLCM base at RAF Molesworth, and also his subsequent minute of 25 June.

The Prime Minister agrees that the Attorney General's advice should be sought on the matters raised by the Lord Chancellor in his minute of 20 June.

The Prime Minister has ~~also~~ asked that the Defence Secretary should produce a further paper which would, in more detail:

- a) Consider the cost and time constraints of the alternative deployment options.
- b) Examine the military factors at stake in the choice between deploying cruise missiles from either one or two bases, particularly in the light of American views reported in your letter of 4 June to Roger Bone.
- c) Assess the practical implications of postponing a decision until after the Summer Recess as proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Prime Minister would wish the paper to be available in time for a ministerial meeting before the Summer Recess to resolve the differences of view.

While the further paper by the Defence Secretary would need to evaluate the possibilities of proceeding by building within the present site at Greenham Common, as proposed in paragraph 3 of his minute of 25 June, the Prime Minister would not wish this evaluation to be conducted in such a way as to widen significantly the circle of those aware that the problem is under consideration.

(Should attempt to)
way which would
if this means that the evaluation would be incomplete.

The further paper by the Defence Secretary

The Prime Minister does not want the circle of those aware that these problems are being addressed to be widened, at least at this stage. This must ~~restrict the~~

~~scope~~ will inevitably place limits on the evaluation of the scope for further scope for building at the Greenham Common site proposed in paragraph 3 of the Defence Secretary's minute of 25 June.

But
nonetheless be
addressed as fully possible in the further paper which she has requested.

I am sending copies of this letter to [most members of recipients of earlier correspondence].

DRAFT LETTER

CHARLES POWELL TO RICHARD HATFIELD

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute on this subject of 22 June. The Prime Minister agrees that further ministerial discussion should take place in OD with the addition of the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment. She has instructed that the papers should go round under the most highly restricted procedure, that is to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries only.

CR.

1 will talk Ho AM

50

MR. BUTLER

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that, commencing within the next twenty-four hours, there is to be a further off-base deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles.

It is intended that this will be a more extended deployment than those previously, subject to review as events unfold. The plans have been agreed between the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

MK

DUTY CLERK
25 June 1984



B

49A (1)

Prime Minister

C D ?

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I am grateful for the comments on my minute to you of ^{In CP Blue B} 1st June about Molesworth. It may be helpful if I suggest how we might now proceed.

2. The comments by colleagues I think well illustrate that from the political point of view the arguments are, as I suggested earlier, finely balanced. The issues that would potentially tip the balance are those identified by the Secretary of State for Environment, that is in obtaining new land at Greenham Common and the problems which would flow from a technical point of view in building on it. If the Greenham Common alternative would put back the development by some 2 years or so, then I think that we should have to rule it out.

3. Before doing so, I believe that we should go somewhat beyond the present preliminary assessments we have made and take a hard look at whether there really is no alternative way of proceeding by building within the present site at Greenham Common to a completion date of not later than mid-1988 for an IOC at the end of that year. I recognise some of the difficulties to which Patrick Jenkin has rightly drawn attention would still remain but the crucial ones would be avoided. If you are content, I would propose to invite my officials together with his and with the American authorities urgently to carry out such an evaluation by no later than the end of next month. This work would obviously need to be conducted at a suitably high level. We should have to allow the team to visit the site and to carry out all the consultations necessary properly to underpin their conclusions, accepting that this must inevitably widen the circle of those aware that the problem is being addressed.



4. In parallel, I would propose to seek the views of the Attorney General on the matters most helpfully raised by the Lord Chancellor in his minute to you of 20th June. I would then make firm recommendations to you as to how we should proceed.

5. I am copying this to the recipients of my minute of 1st June, and to the Attorney General (with the earlier correspondence).

MA

Ministry of Defence
25th June 1984

Deference fin F Pt 4)



A

26 JUN 1984



SECRET

49 25



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~836 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/2/2

25th June 1984

*Butler
25/6*

*passed on to
Party in Fountainsbleau
25/6.*

*Duty Clerk
W. J. M. K. E.*

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the following message to be passed by secure communications for the attention of Robin Butler or Charles Powell:

"From PS/Defence Secretary

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that commencing within the next 24 hours there is to be a further off-base deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. It is intended that this will be a more extended deployment than those previously, subject to review as events unfold.

The plans have been agreed between the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary."

You will appreciate the need to handle this carefully.

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

18

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-753 0000



1211
1211
1211
1211
1211
1211
1211
1211
1211
1211

25 JUN 1984

A • 48A
Prime Minister

Ref. A084/1822

MR POWELL

with COP/BoT
Yes - in more detail
looks with the cost

Agree:
Yes 1) seek Attorney's advice?
2) ask Defence Secretary for further paper?
3) further Ministerial discussion before recess in OD + Home Sec. e Mr. Jenkin?
C.D.P.
22/6
Yes - papers
to go
round
under the
most
highly
respected
proceeding
with
Minister
or Penkey
only
no

Molesworth: Second GLCM Base
the alternative
adapted to Greenham

With the receipt of the Lord Chancellor's minute dated 20 June, we have now seen comments from all those who received copies of the Secretary of State for Defence's minute of 1 June about GLCM basing in the United Kingdom. Ministers are divided: the Lord President and the Secretary of State for the Environment favour continuing with the plan for two bases; the Secretary of State for Defence, in his original minute, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary favour concentrating on Greenham Common, although Sir Geoffrey Howe favours putting off a decision until after the Summer Recess in order to avoid adding to the difficulties which our Alliance partners face in carrying forward their own deployment schedules in the particularly sensitive period immediately ahead; the Home Secretary finds the political arguments evenly balanced but considers that the right course from the point of view of policing would be to concentrate on Greenham. The Lord Chancellor has raised a number of legal points on which you will no doubt wish to seek the Attorney General's advice.

2. A Ministerial meeting will be needed before the Summer Recess to resolve these differences of view. The political and policing issues have been fully explored in the papers, and the only aspects which require clarification (apart from the legal issues raised by the Lord Chancellor) relate to the cost and time constraints of the alternative deployment options and also to the military factors at stake in the choice, given the American views reported in Mr Mottram's letter of 4 June to Mr Bone. I suggest therefore that, in advance of a Ministerial meeting, the Secretary of State for Defence should be invited to produce, in consultation with the Secretary of State for the Environment, his best estimate of the relative costs and timescales of implementing the two deployment options, together with advice on the practical implications of postponing a decision until after the Summer Recess as proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth

Secretary. The Secretary of State for Defence's further minute should also set out the military factors involved in the choice between deploying these Cruise missiles from either one or two bases and any further views which he wishes to put forward in the light of the points made by colleagues on his original minute.

3. As to the form of the Ministerial meeting, the choice rests between OD and a more restricted meeting of Ministers covering the augmented MISC 7 addressees of the recent correspondence. Although the sensitive nature of the subject and the paramount need to avoid leaks argue in favour of the more restricted forum, the previous decisions on this issue were taken in OD, and, given the high political profile of any change in present plans, it is possible that the matter may need to be referred to Cabinet after the initial Ministerial discussion. I recommend therefore that this question should be discussed in the wider forum provided by OD, with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment being invited to attend. I believe that further papers should continue to be circulated on a CMO basis, and you might invite Mr Heseltine to proceed accordingly.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 June 1984

Defence
INF 104



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: . 4

THE RT. HON. LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, C.H., F.R.S., D.C.L.

48



HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A 0PW

SECRET - UK EYES A - CMO

Copy No. 1 of 9

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH: The Second GLCM Base

1. You have asked for comments on the issues raised in Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 1 June.
2. In his minute Michael says that to avoid delay it may be necessary to decide from the outset not to allow recourse to the appeals system in respect of objections to purchase or planning. In his reply of 12 June 1984 Patrick Jenkin wrote that both the compulsory purchase order and planning clearance would be open to legal challenge by way of judicial review.
3. I understand that Michael Heseltine's view is that the use of his powers under the Defence Acts 1842 - 1873 would attract the extra-statutory procedure introduced by Christopher Soames in his Written Answer of 6 March 1959 ("the Soames procedure") under which I appoint a person to inquire and I regulate the inquiry.
4. Unfortunately it appears that the Soames procedure was a temporary one dealing with particular circumstances at the end of the War period when section 23 of the Defence Act 1842 was in abeyance and seems to have been rendered inapplicable here by the end of the "War period" on 31 December 1960 and the consequent revival of s.23 of the Defence Act 1842. I do not believe that it has ever applied to acquisitions under that section which are certified by a Lord Lieutenant and supported by a warrant from the Treasury and where it was held (per Tomlin, J. in Hutton v. The Attorney-General [1927] 1 Chancery 427 at p.439) that "The question of necessity or expediency must in many cases be largely a question of policy, and it is difficult to suppose that it was ever the intention of the Legislature that a question of policy, possibly vital to the defence of the kingdom should be debated before a tribunal at the instance of an individual whose land the state sought to acquire in the general interest and for the protection of the state."
5. Whilst it is for Michael Heseltine to decide I think it is also arguable that the "Circular 7 of 1977" planning procedure for Ministers might also be totally excluded from the outset where the acquisition is so certified and warranted "in the general interest and for the protection of the state" without attracting the possibility of judicial review.
6. I suggest that the Attorney General might consider these matters before we reach final conclusions.

/...

SECRET - UK EYES A - CMO


7. I am copying this minute to members of MISC 7, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

8. I think I shd: add that in this minute I have dealt only with the technicalities. I am not sure that any of these procedures designed to avoid judicial review cd: be justified politically. But until we have the Attorney's view as to the legalities we cannot come to a rational conclusion on this.

H: of S^r M.

20 June 1984

Defense : Deployment Pt 4



CONFIDENTIAL

F

SECRET

UK EYES A CMO



Await Julian
note on living
from RGD
15/6

47

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLOM BASE

You invited comments on Michael Heseltine's minute of 1 June on this subject.

The political arguments seem to me evenly balanced: concentration at Greenham would no doubt be claimed as a victory by the Peace Movement, but the difficulties - especially for the police - spelt out in paragraph 3 of Michael Heseltine's minute are important. The major task of constructing the fence would be easy to obstruct and could well revive the flagging fortunes of the peace camps. A key factor, which must surely be fully assessed, is the possible technical problem over building at Greenham to which Patrick Jenkin refers.

Solely from the point of view of policing, however, I am clear that the right course would be to concentrate at Greenham. Thames Valley Police have handled a difficult situation with tact and skill, and are now very experienced at it. We should no doubt have difficulties with the Police Authority over costs; but I think all of that is better than starting the protest in a new place and, as it happens, in a police area where resources are rather more thin on the ground than they are in the more densely populated Thames Valley.

I am sending a copy of this minute to those who had copies of the original minute of 1 June.

L.B.

15 June 1984

SECRET

UK EYES A CMO

Defence



INT

Pt 4



SECRET

C
Original of 7 46

To await Defence Secretary's further comment on timing. Bu as soon as available.

COP. 13/6

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH THE SECOND GLCM BASE

You have asked for comments on the issues raised in Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 1 June.

What I have to say reflects the balance of advantage in the factors of relevance to the PSA. There are no other DOE considerations to which I would wish to draw attention. You have presumably already considered the possibility that any proposal to set aside the normal provision for objectors to both the CPO and planning clearance at Greenham Common could be open to legal challenge by way of judicial review. Your own legal advisers will be aware of the risk.

Molesworth is a green field site where we already know the problems. External road access would need improvement; Francis Pym's apparent undertaking that no housing would be built at Molesworth could be awkward; and there would be time-consuming procedures in closing up or diverting public rights of way. But if these can be resolved PSA could, within a year, have the site fenced and ready for the main contract to be let in Summer 1985 which might, with an accelerated programme permit an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by the end of December 1987. If we were to defer a decision until after the summer break, as Geoffrey Howe has suggested there would be a corresponding delay in the operational date of the base.

Greenham Common on the other hand presents quite serious

SECRET

SECRET



problems. The site itself is restricted, with steep contours at either side. I note that some 25 acres of additional land would be needed. I assume this is for the main GLCM facilities. There may also be an additional land requirement for other additional personnel-related and technical facilities. Even if it is possible to acquire the land, it would be difficult and expensive to provide all the extra facilities, since we would have to build around an already operational Base and would also have to contend with steep contours and made-up land which would require special foundation treatment. Possibly more seriously, it could put back the development by some 2 years or so.

On balance I am inclined to agree with Willie that we should stick to Molesworth. Technically it is better and it also avoids the use of controversial powers of acquisition. Greenham Common is feasible but not within anything like the same time frame and only at the cost of extra land, construction costs and risk to the existing capability while work is in progress.

I am sending copies of this minute to Members of MISC 7 and Quintin Hailsham, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

PJ

P J

12 June 1984

SECRET

DEFENCE : INF : P24



SECRET

UK EYES A

CMO

45

Ref.A084/1662

MR COLES ✓

The Defence Secretary will comment again on the timing considerations.

D.U. when he does.

A.S.C. $\frac{P}{6}$

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

The Secretary of State for Defence minuted the Prime Minister on this subject on 1 June. The Lord President, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have now commented. The Lord President favours sticking to two bases; the Chancellor of the Exchequer favours concentrating on Greeham Common; the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary favours putting off a decision (but favours concentrating on Greenham Common on merits).

2. There is no overriding military case in favour of two GLCM bases rather than one for the deployment of the 160 Cruise missiles to be located in the United Kingdom. The Americans would prefer us to stick to two sites partly on grounds of dispersing the risk, and partly on political grounds: they fear that a decision by us could significantly affect the attitude of those NATO partners who may be faltering in their resolution about INF deployment (though the force of this seems to be limited, so long as we stick to our commitment to deploy our full quota of 160 missiles in the United Kingdom, and the Dutch have, in any case, now taken their decision to deploy in the absence of an INF arms control agreement and if the Soviet Union deploy any further SS20 missiles). Given the doubts about the strategic value of GLCM, there is much to be said on merits for not spending money and resources on the development of a second site for which there is no overriding military case.

3. But it is the domestic political considerations which will determine the decision. When Ministers decided in May 1980 that there should be two cruise missile bases in the United Kingdom (OD(80) 14th Meeting, Item 1), they did so on the basis of clear advice from the then Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Pym) that:

UK EYES A

CMO

1

SECRET

"In terms of domestic policies, however, I am clear that it would not be acceptable to have only one base and that it would be preferable to have a minimum of three. The Ministers in my Department agree with this view but believe that two bases would be tolerable. Michael Jopling and the Whips, with whom I have shared this problem, are of the same opinion."

The political situation is now different from what it was in 1980. The choice is between going ahead with Molesworth, and creating a focus for a second "Greenham women" type of running protest, with additional policing problems because of the need to move all the equipment in by road; and concentrating at Greenham Common, would probably save some money, but would probably mean the compulsory acquisition for Newbury District Council of 25 acres of additional land, and the loss of their goodwill and perhaps of their co-operation in dealing with the eviction of the peace camps at Greenham Common. The abandonment of Molesworth would no doubt be hailed as a "victory" by the anti-cruise protest movement.

4. The balance of political considerations may look different later in the year, if by then Mr Lubbers has secured Parliamentary endorsement for his Government's decision. There is therefore a good deal to be said for deferring a decision until the autumn, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggests. It might then be easier to decide in favour of concentration at Greenham Common, which is the way the balance of argument seems (just) to point.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

7 June 1984

DEFENSE
INF
K4

SECRET



COMMONS

SECRET

E

SECRET UK EYES A CMO

44

Await remaining replies

2nd
6/6



PM/84/92

PRIME MINISTER

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

1. You have asked for comments on the issues raised in Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 1 June. *file with HSC.*

2. On the domestic arguments for and against retaining the second GLCM site, I do not wish to do more than recall that my preference when we discussed the question in 1980 was to limit the cruise missile deployments to one base. But clearly we face substantial presentational difficulties in changing course at this point and reverting to a single base only. These difficulties have to be taken seriously, even if Michael Heseltine is right in suggesting (and he may well be) that the picture may look different by the end of the decade in East/West or arms control terms. I agree with him that if we were later to find that less than the full 160 GLCMs were required in the UK, a single base could well be more cost effective, and involve less political risk.

3. The key questions seem to me to be timing and political impact. I think we must assume that a decision to abandon Molesworth would quickly become known. As

/Michael


SECRET UK EYES A CMO



Michael Heseltine's minute clearly recognises, such a decision could easily become caught up in the Netherlands INF debate. Despite the Dutch Government's decision on 1 June, the controversy is by no means over in the Netherlands. Lubbers still has to prevail in a [now over] parliamentary debate later this month. We hope that the Dutch problem will not infect Belgian or German attitudes to their own deployment schedules. If it became known during this sensitive period that we were changing our basing plans, this could well add to the pressures on the Alliance. These arguments have been put strongly to us by the US Ambassador (who spoke separately to Michael Heseltine and myself) and by senior State Department officials in the margins of the North Atlantic Council.

4. Against this background, I firmly believe the safest course would be to defer further Ministerial consideration of this question until after the Summer break. I cannot believe that the practical exigencies are so pressing as to require an immediate decision. The wider Alliance dimension points strongly to postponement, thereby scotching any chances of a damaging leak.

5. I am copying this minute to the other members of MISC 7, to the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.


(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6 June 1984

Defence: INF Deployment Pt 4.

D

43



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

5 June 1984

The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Alan Michael

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 1 June to the Prime Minister.

On financial grounds alone, concentration on Greenham Common seems the better choice: I shall be interested to see the figures when your officials have worked them out. And I agree with your judgement that the political arguments on balance point the same way.

I also agree that whatever we decide, skilful presentation will be essential. But at least we will have the advantage of the initiative.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to the other members of MISC 7, Quintin Hailsham, Leon Brittan, Patrick Jenkin and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

NIGEL LAWSON

John
Nigel

840

Defense PT 4
Deployment of INF

00 1984



B 42



PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

5 June 1984

Avail better regis

AS 5/6

Dear Michael

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I have seen your minute to the Prime Minister of 1 June. I accept that the arguments are finely balanced. My preference however is to stick to Molesworth. My main reason is that it is usually wrong to change difficult decisions since it portrays uncertainty.

- with AG -

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, members of MISC 7, the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Environment Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

John
Lillic
[Signature]

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP

H

SECRET

41

alt



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~9307622~~ 218 2111/3

Prime Minister.

To note that incident

MO 11/2/2

As you may raise this with you.
I think you would be wise not
to commit yourself. It is a
difficult decision.

4th June 1984

A.F.C. 4/6

New Rye,

MOLESWORTH

I should record that the US Ambassador called on instructions on the Defence Secretary this morning, at short notice, to talk about Molesworth. Mr Price said that he understood that we were coming down in favour of concentrating our cruise missile deployment at Greenham Common rather than establishing a second base at Molesworth. The US Authorities would on balance prefer the two site solution. This avoided putting all our eggs in one basket and made dispersal in a crisis easier. They were particularly concerned about the political implications of a change of plan at this stage: there could be a disproportionate impact on less steadfast Allies. The US Authorities were worried about possible leaks, particularly as it was known in the Congress that we were looking again at the Molesworth option.

The Defence Secretary said that no decision had been taken to change the plan but he was currently consulting his colleagues about the best way forward. The military arguments were not clear cut either way and he recalled that the Americans had themselves earlier been in favour of a one site solution. The key question to be addressed was which alternative gave the least impetus to the peace movement. He recognised that a change of plan could be seen as a victory for them. Equally they might be given a new lease of life by the opportunity to attack a new base in a new area. The aim should be to avoid cruise missile deployments being a major issue by the time of the next General Election and this might be easier with concentration rather than establishing a new site. But he recognised that the arguments were finely balanced.

In further discussion, it was recognised that, once we had reached a view, there would need to be careful consultation over the timing and presentation of any announcement. It was clear that the Americans were particularly concerned about the timing aspect.

R Bone Esq



I was subsequently told by the US Embassy that this issue is included in the list of topics on which President Reagan is being briefed for his meeting with the Prime Minister. I am therefore copying this letter to John Coles, No 10 as well as to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours etc,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)



40

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

Dear Richard,

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

BF || The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 1 June. She would be grateful for comments from the other Ministers to whom it was circulated before taking a view on this matter.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of MISC 7, and of the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Environment Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Lol Gles.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

MO 11/2/2

Prime Minister

39

Await comments from other
Ministers ?

A

A.F.C. 1/6

les

ms

PRIME MINISTERMOLESWORTH : THE SECOND GLCM BASE

On 17th June 1980 the Government announced that the 160 Cruise missiles to be based in the United Kingdom would be located at the RAF bases at Greenham Common in Berkshire (96 missiles) and Molesworth in Cambridgeshire (64 missiles). If we are to adhere to the target date of full deployment by 1988 (to which the US will attach great importance) then overt preparations for the construction work required at RAF Molesworth, such as site surveys and consultations with local planning and highways authorities, must begin very soon - desirably this month. Given the obvious political sensitivity of such steps, I have reviewed in detail the requirement for a second GLCM base. I believe that, before proceeding, we should look again at the alternative option of concentration at RAF Greenham Common.

2. You will recall that the original US proposal for the deployment of the UK-based Cruise missiles was for concentration on a single site at RAF Greenham Common. Ministers accepted the US position that there was no overriding military case in favour of two bases rather than one. The Government took the view, however, that split deployment was preferable in political terms, particularly since concentration at Greenham Common was judged to be unacceptable in the Newbury area, given the proximity of Aldermaston and Burghfield, and the local hostility to the earlier proposed deployment of USAF tanker aircraft at Greenham Common. The US authorities acceded to this view (HMG having agreed to provide a UK element for a Joint Defence Force and to make a £4M contribution in cash or kind to their additional costs) and by mutual agreement RAF Molesworth - a disused RAF site - was selected as the second base. It was recognised that Molesworth had



certain disadvantages, notably the absence of infrastructure or a runway, but these were not considered insuperable.

3. In the light of subsequent events, and in particular the scale and pattern of anti-nuclear movement activity experienced at RAF Greenham Common, some of the shortcomings already evident in respect of RAF Molesworth now appear more significant. The site is totally unfenced and the first construction programme must involve the construction of a new perimeter fence. There are very likely to be continual attempts at disruption of this work and to prevent this there will be considerable calls on MOD and civil police resources. There could be a running battle for some years before missiles were delivered. The absence of a runway will mean that all equipment, including missiles and warheads, will have to be air-delivered to the USAF base at RAF Alconbury and moved by road over the intervening 10 miles.

4. A second, possible advantage of concentrating GLCM deployments at one base is that it would be more cost effective should there eventually be an arms control agreement under which less than the 160 GLCMs were deployed in this country. It is, of course, impossible at present to predict the likelihood of this happening: we cannot assume that because the Russians have walked out of the Geneva talks, negotiated limits on INF will not be reached by 1988. While this is a consideration to be borne in mind, it is not an argument which could be used publicly because it would encourage those in the other INF basing countries who would like to argue that construction of the Belgian, Dutch and FRG cruise missile sites need not be hurried.

5. From very discrete enquiries with the US authorities, it appears that it would still be feasible to concentrate all the UK-based Cruise missiles at RAF Greenham Common. This would have some advantages both to the Americans whose manpower requirements would be somewhat reduced, and to us in that we would face a lower bill than at Molesworth for the infrastructure which it is our obligation under the standard NATO



arrangements to provide. On the basis of statements made to us by the US authorities, it does, however, appear that because of the way in which RAF Greenham Common was developed following the decision to go for a split-base deployment, about 25 acres of additional land might be required to site the new GLCM facilities. The land in question is common land owned by Newbury District Council who would be unlikely to be willing to part with it. They might equally be unwilling to grant the necessary planning clearances in respect of additional GLCM facilities. We could, therefore, be faced with a need to use my compulsory purchase powers; and because of the need to avoid delay, to decide from the outset not to allow recourse to the appeals system in respect of objections to purchase or planning. In the case of acquisition, the appeals system in contested compulsory purchase cases involves the Lord Chancellor, while in respect of planning matters the Secretary of State for the Environment is responsible; their consent to such a course of action would thus be vital.

6. We need to consider the political implications of a change of plan in terms of the possible reaction at the local, national and international levels. In terms of local politics, we already own the land at Molesworth and the necessary preparations for deployment could be presented as no more than following through an announced decision; whereas the steps required in respect of land to concentrate at Greenham Common would mean an immediate political row locally. We might for some time lose the valuable co-operation with Newbury District Council which we currently enjoy in respect of eviction of peace camps and land transfer arrangements we are discussing with them to increase our security at the base's main gate. Local residents might also view with scepticism the claim that the deployment of an additional 64 cruise missiles to Greenham Common did not increase the risk to the Newbury district. The Thames Valley Police authority is also likely to be hostile. At Molesworth the local planning authority is not thought to be hostile to deployment and the local MP, John Major, has been helpful. (though of course they have yet to experience the consequences in terms of disruption in proceeding with deployment there).



7. At the national level, we would also face a very difficult task in terms of public presentation. The anti-nuclear movement would undoubtedly claim that their activities forced us to change our plans to develop Molesworth: a claim which might be uncomfortably close to the truth. In order to avoid reinforcing such a claim we would need to justify a change of plan by stressing, for example, the economic advantages of concentration.

8. In terms of the impact on our allies, I believe that the US Administration would be prepared to accept whatever solution we judged to be preferable in terms of domestic political considerations provided that the 1988 deployment date was not put at risk.

A British decision to abandon the development of Molesworth might possibly have an adverse influence on the Dutch Government prior to its own decisions (for good or ill) on the INF deployment, and coupled with an adverse Dutch decision, might also create problems for the Belgians. Concentration at Greenham Common would leave the Federal Republic of Germany as the only country hosting more than one INF base. However, provided that any UK announcement was coupled with a clear commitment to deploy 160 missiles to the announced timetable (in the absence of an arms control settlement calling for a lesser level of deployment), I would not regard such considerations as overriding. The timing of informing our allies of any change would need to be judged in the light of developments in Holland.

9. The arguments are finely balanced. Faced with what is effectively a choice between a good deal of immediate local political difficulty at Greenham Common or a possibly running sore at Molesworth, I am inclined to favour the option of concentration. In 1980 it may have seemed that the existence of a second base would be helpful to the Government in dissipating local political opposition; in 1984 it seems to me that the build up of a second base may provide a second centre of protest rather than dissipate the support enjoyed by the anti-nuclear movement, and present us with security problems we could



do without. I should welcome the views of my colleagues on whether concentration at RAF Greenham Common is on balance the better course, recognising the need in that case to ensure that there is no delay on account of objections should further land have to be acquired.

10. I am copying this minute to the other members of MISC 7, to the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment, and to Sir Robert Armstrong. In view of its obvious sensitivity I should be grateful if any further circulation of this minute within Departments could be strictly limited.

WJA

Ministry of Defence
1st June 1984

GFO 001/01

DD FCO 011630Z JUN

IMMEDIATE

OO UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

OO WASHINGTON

OO MODUK

PP BONN

PP BRUSSELS

PP ROME

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011630Z

FM THE HAGUE 011500Z JUN 84

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 011630Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 01 JUNE 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON AND MODUK (FOR DS 17)

INFO PRIORITY BONN BRUSSELS AND ROME

YOUR TELNO 72: NETHERLANDS/INF

1. VAN DEN BROEK SAW THE US AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON. HE THEN SAW THE FOUR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER DEPLOYING COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE CABINET HAD JUST REACHED AGREEMENT ON A PLAN FOR THE CONDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE NETHERLANDS. A LETTER TO THE SECOND CHAMBER SIGNED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, DE RUITER AND HIMSELF WOULD ISSUE LATER THIS AFTERNOON AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD THEN GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN THEIR DECISION WERE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD -

I) MAINTAIN THE DUTCH COMMITMENT UNDER THE 1979 DECISION TO DEPLOY A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE EVENT OF A US/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION :

II) IF THERE WAS NO SUCH AGREEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE TO DECIDE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON 1 NOVEMBER 1985 TO CARRY OUT CONSTRUCTION AND TO DEPLOY 48 MISSILES IN THE EVENT THAT AT ANY TIME THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS20S ACTUALLY DEPLOYED WAS HIGHER THAN IT IS TODAY.

3. VAN DEN BROEK EXPLAINED THAT AS THERE WAS RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PLANNING SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF THEIR SS20 ARSENAL, THE CABINET COULD NOT SEE HOW DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE AVOIDED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS HIS SINCERE CONVICTION THAT THIS SOLUTION WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE DEvised TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

15
 Hd/Def D
 - /ACDD
 - /WED
 - /News D
 PS (6)
 Dir J Bullard
 Mr Wright
 Mr Jenkins
 Mr Cartledge
 RC

Mr Colles N700's
 MT

~~THIS SOLUTION WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE DEvised TO SERVE
THE INTERESTS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.~~

4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT LUBBERS WAS DETERMINED TO DO HIS UTMOST TO GET THIS PLAN APPROVED BY THE SECOND CHAMBER. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE AFFECTED BY A SIMPLE RESUMPTION OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA. THE TIMETABLE WOULD STAND. BUT VAN DEN BROEK ADMITTED THAT THE LATER DATE FOR THE START OF CONSTRUCTION MEANS THAT THE DUTCH WERE STRETCHING THE IOC. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE DATE FOR DECISION WAS FIRMLY FIXED AS 1 NOVEMBER 1985 DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

5. VAN DEN BROEK ADMITTED THAT THE FORMULA HE HAD OUTLINED GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NETHERLANDS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IN INF. THIS WAS A WEAK POINT, BUT THE DUTCH WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO EMPHASISE THE NEED FOR A REDUCTION ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. IT WAS AT LEAST AN IMPROVEMENT THAT THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT ELEMENT HAD DISAPPEARED. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE EXPECTED SOME EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPOINTMENT FROM NATO ALLIES. BUT HE HOPED THERE WOULD ALSO BE SOME APPRECIATION OF THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL FOR ANYONE TO SUGGEST THAT THIS DUTCH PLAN AMOUNTED TO 100 PER CENT DEPLOYMENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES.

6. PLEASE SEE MY TWO IFTS.

MANSFIELD

NNNN

SENT AT 011630Z NJB

ADVANCE COL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FUS
cc: SPC

84



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1984

Netherlands and INF

The Prime Minister had a brief telephone conversation with the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr. Lubbers, at 7.45 this morning.

The Prime Minister spoke very much along the lines of the note attached to your letter of 31 May to John Coles. She said that we welcomed Mr. Van den Broek's statement to the North Atlantic Council on 30 May. It was, in our view, crucial to avoid giving any encouragement to the Soviet Union in their aim of splitting the United States from Europe. It was particularly important to avoid any such impression at a time when the leaders of the Western Alliance were celebrating the anniversary of D-Day. She hoped that the Dutch Government would reconfirm the fundamental principle of the dual track decision.

The Prime Minister made clear that she was aware of the political difficulties for Mr. Lubbers in seeking to achieve this objective, and aware also of his firm support for the Alliance.

Mr. Lubbers responded by saying that his Cabinet had not, as yet, reached any decision about the basing of Cruise missiles in the Netherlands, although he intended to obtain a decision that day, if at all possible. He could not predict the outcome, but he was none the less grateful to the Prime Minister for letting him know of her concern.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

DAVID BARCLAY

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

85

cc/c

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Do you wish to

London SW1A 2AH

telephone Mr. Lubbers tonight

or early tomorrow morning?

31 May 1984

A.F.C. 2/5.

Dear John,

Netherlands and INF

E Thank you for your letter of 22 May to Roger Bone, recording the Prime Minister's agreement to postpone further consideration of an approach to Mr Lubbers. Until today the advice from The Hague had remained that a Dutch Cabinet decision about basing cruise missiles in the Netherlands was not imminent: (it had been intended that a total of 48 missiles would be deployed between 1986-1988). The picture has now changed, and the Embassy have this morning reported that there is a fair chance of Mr Lubbers insisting upon a decision at his Cabinet meeting at 10.00am (London time) tomorrow, 1 June (I enclose a copy of the Hague telegram number 197).

We have been told this (in confidence) by a senior Dutch official, a US official and a member of the other party in Mr Lubbers' coalition government. The details of the solution for which Mr Lubbers will be seeking agreement, if he goes ahead, are not available: but his proposal is likely to incorporate some, if not all, of the following elements:

- a Dutch promise to take a proportionate share of cruise missiles following a US/Soviet INF arms control agreement;
- a Dutch promise to decide in 1988 whether or not to accept cruise missiles if there were no arms control agreement by then. (In the meantime the Netherlands would not drop any of its existing nuclear defence tasks);
- between 1986 (when the Dutch should begin to deploy cruise missiles) and 1988 the Dutch would be prepared, in a crisis, to have 32 cruise missiles flown into the Netherlands. Preparations at their designated cruise missile site would therefore go ahead.

We have consulted Sir Geoffrey Howe in Washington on HM Ambassador The Hague's proposal that the Prime Minister should telephone Mr Lubbers late today or early tomorrow, 1 June. We have just received his reply in Washington telno 1703 enclosed.

/Sir Geoffrey



Sir Geoffrey sees some value in a telephone message as the Ambassador suggests. He considers that the Prime Minister should not seek to comment on particular elements of the Dutch plan but couch her message in general terms.

As you will see, Sir Geoffrey has summarised the points which he believes the Prime Minister should make to Mr Lubbers; these are a condensed and updated version of the speaking note enclosed with Roger Bone's letter of 11 May.

/ For convenience I enclose a version of these points in a form which the Prime Minister could use in speaking to Mr Lubbers.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram in the MOD.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



SPEAKING NOTES FOR USE WITH MR LUBBERS

1. I fully appreciate the great difficulty in which the Netherlands Government finds itself placed in trying to reconcile the various conflicting domestic political currents on this matter. We have been following developments closely and sympathetically.

2. I welcome and appreciate the view expressed by Mr Van den Broek to the North Atlantic Council yesterday [30 May] that the interest of the Alliance as a whole must come first. At this important and perhaps historic moment for the Alliance I therefore hope that, whatever the Dutch Government's decision, it will

- (i) give absolutely no encouragement to the Russians in their long-term aim of splitting Alliance solidarity on the issue and causing further turbulence between the United States and her European Allies;
- (ii) will reaffirm unambiguously the continuing Netherlands Government's support for the fundamental principles of the 1979 dual track decision and for its continuing implementation by the Alliance.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE 310700Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 310800Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 197, OF 31 MAY

INFO TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 310800Z UKDEL NATO

IMMEDIATE DESKBY 311200Z WASHINGTON (FOR SEC OF STATES PARTY)

IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DS17)

PRIORITY BONN AND BRUSSELS

MY TEL NO 195 AND YOUR TEL NO 994 TO WASHINGTON : NETHERLANDS/INF

SUMMARY

1. THE LATEST INDICATIONS ARE THAT LUBBERS MAY ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE CDA PLAN (MY TUR) OR SOMETHING CLOSE TO IT THROUGH THE CABINET ON 1 JUNE. HE IS LIKELY TO FACE CONTINUED LIBERAL (VVD) RESISTANCE. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO CONTACT HIM BEFORE THE NETHERLANDS CABINET MEETS TOMORROW.

DETAIL

2. THE VVD LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE PRESS. THE CDA, UNDER LUBBERS FIRM INSTRUCTIONS, ARE BEING MUCH MORE CIRCUMSPECT. BUT ON 30 MAY THERE WERE THREE DEVELOPMENTS :

(A) ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY VAN DEN BROEK TOLD SHULTZ ON 29 MAY THAT HE EXPECTED A DECISION TO BE REACHED ON FRIDAY.

(B) EVENHUIS, DEPUTY VVD FLOORLEADER IN THE SECOND CHAMBER, TOLD US THAT HIS PARTY THOUGHT A CRUCIAL DISCUSSION ON INF VERY MUCH ON THE CARDS FOR THE 1 JUNE CABINET.

(C) VAN EENENNAAM, IN THE ABSENCE OF JACBOVITS AND VOS AT THE NAC VAN DEN BROEK'S SENIOR ADVISER ON NUCLEAR AFFAIRS, TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY YESTERDAY EVENING THAT HE HAD SPENT MOST OF THE DAY WORKING ON THE INF FILE WITH LUBBERS, WHO HAD LECTURED HIM STERNLY ON THE NEED TO AVOID LEAKS. HE EXPECTED THIS WORK TO CONTINUE THROUGHOUT 31 MAY (A DUTCH HOLIDAY). THERE WERE STILL "SOME SMAGS" STILL TO BE IRONED OUT, BUT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THAT LUBBERS WOULD HAVE FIRM PROPOSALS TO PUT TO CABINET ON 1 JUNE. VAN EENENNAAM WOULD NOT BE DRAWN FURTHER, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT LUBBERS WOULD NOT IN HIS VIEW BE PUT OFF IF VAN DEN BROEK RETURNED FROM THE NAC WITH A FLEA IN HIS EAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOW A MINORITY IN THE VVD FRACTIE WHICH BELIEVES THAT THE CDA PLAN IS THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED, THE VVD LEADERSHIP AND VAN AARDENNE ARE APPARENTLY CONTINUING TO HOLD OUT FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS. IT THUS SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT LUBBERS WILL BE ABLE TO WIN THE VVD ROUND SUFFICIENTLY UNLESS HE MAKES SOME CONCESSIONS. ALTHOUGH LEADING INDUSTRIALISTS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN URGING THE VVD NOT TO PRECIPITATE A CABINET CRISIS (AND AN ELECTION) OVER INF, WITH THE RISK OF LETTING THE SOCIALISTS INTO POWER, NIJPELS IS UNWORRIED BY THE PROSPECT OF A SPELL IN OPPOSITION, WHICH HE EXPECTS WOULD BE SHORT.

4. FACED WITH THIS UNCERTAIN SITUATION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT THE BEST TIMING FOR A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR WAITING TILL NEXT WEEK, THUS ALLOWING A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION AFTER THE NAC, THERE IS NOW A RISK THAT NEXT WEEK WILL BE TOO LATE. ON BALANCE I WOULD THEREFORE FAVOUR A MESSAGE BY TELEPHONE EITHER LATE ON 31 MAY OR EARLY ON 1 JUNE (WHEN CABINET WILL START AT 10 AM LONDON TIME).

5. SUCH A MESSAGE COULD FOCUS ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN ABOUT SOME ELEMENTS IN THE CDA PLAN REPORTED IN MY TUR (THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN CARRIED IN THE PRESS HERE). I WOULD RECOMMEND PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS THE CDA PLAN WOULD HAVE ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE AND ON THE ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES IT WOULD MAKE FOR THE OTHER DEPLOYING COUNTRIES.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO GOZNEY (DEFENCE DEPARTMENT)

MANSFIELD

LIMITED

DEF D

WED

SOUD

ACDD

NAD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/ PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR JENKINS

MR CARWEDGE

²
CONFIDENTIAL

WONFO 034/31

ZZ FCO

OO UKDEL NATO

OO THE HAGUE

OO BONN

OO BRUSSELS

OO MODUK

GRS 410

SECRET



FLASH

Ho/Defence Dept
Ho/WED
Ho/Secret Dept
Ho/ACDD
Ho/WAD
PS
PS/Lessy Young
Sir J Pullar
Mr Wright
Mr Jenkins

FM WASHINGTON 311425Z MAY 84

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1703 OF 31 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, BONN, BRUSSELS AND MODUK DS17

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

HAGUE TELNO 197: NETHERLANDS/INF

1. I SEE SOME VALUE IN A MESSAGE BY TELEPHONE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO LUBBERS TODAY, AS SIR PHILIP MANSFIELD SUGGESTS. BUT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST FOR ANY SUCH MESSAGE TO BE COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS AND NOT TO APPEAR TO BE PASSING JUDGEMENT ON PARTICULAR ELEMENTS

IN THE CDA PLAN (HAGUE TELNO 195). THE NUB OF THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE CDA PLAN LIES IN THE PROVISION FOR CRISIS DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF ANY CRUISE MISSILES TO THE NETHERLANDS IN THE PERIOD

1986-89 AND THE POSSIBLE DANGEROUS EFFECT THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE, IF ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIANCE, ON OTHER BASING COUNTRIES SUCH AS BELGIUM AND GERMANY. THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WHO ARE THE PEOPLE PRIMARILY CONCERNED SEEM UNDECIDED ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS IN TALKING TO THE DUTCH, AND THIS IN TURN INHIBITS US.

2. A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL POINTS:

(A) HMG APPRECIATES THE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN WHICH THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF PLACED IN TRYING TO RECONCILE THE VARIOUS CONFLICTING DOMESTIC POLITICAL CURRENTS ON THIS MATTER. WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND SYMPATHETICALLY;

(B) WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO HAVE BEEN KEPT SO FULLY INFORMED BY DUTCH MINISTERS ABOUT THEIR THINKING;

(C) WE WELCOME AND APPRECIATE THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY VAN DEN BROEK (WASHINGTON TELNO 169) TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL YESTERDAY THAT THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE MUST COME FIRST. AT THIS IMPORTANT AND PERHAPS HISTORIC MOMENT FOR THE ALLIANCE WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT WHATEVER THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION IT WILL

(I) GIVE ABSOLUTELY NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE RUSSIANS IN THEIR LONG TERM AIM OF SPLITTING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY ON THE ISSUE AND CAUSING FURTHER TURBULENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HER EUROPEAN ALLIES,

(II) WILL REAFFIRM UNAMBIGUOUSLY THE CONTINUING NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION AND FOR ITS CONTINUING IMPLEMENTATION BY THE ALLIANCE.

WRIGHT

29

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 300

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 311300Z LISBON

FM WASHINGTON 310335Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1699 OF 30 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE LISBON (FOR FALL)

INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS,
MOSCOW.

MIPT : SUPER RESTRICTED SESSION OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL
MEETING - DEPLOYMENT OF INF IN HOLLAND

1. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) SPOKE TODAY IN THE GENERAL DEBATE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS ABOUT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POSITION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF INF. HE SAID DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE WAS STILL ACTIVE AND THE SITUATION WAS VERY COMPLICATED AND DELICATE. TO BE FRANK, IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE DUTCH CABINET WOULD SURVIVE. THE DUTCH RESERVATION ENTERED AT THE TIME OF THE DUAL TRACK DECISION HAD LEFT ROOM FOR AMBIGUITY. NOW A CLEAR-CUT YES WOULD NOT OBTAIN A MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT AND A CLEAR-CUT NO WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE DUTCH CABINET. WHAT NEXT? THERE WAS A CLEAR FEELING IN THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT THAT THEIR DECISION MUST NOT DAMAGE THE ALLIANCE OR THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. "LET US HOPE FOR THE BEST, IN THE FIRST PLACE FOR THE ALLIANCE". THE NETHERLANDS WOULD NOT GO ENTIRELY ANTI-NUCLEAR: THEY WERE EVEN NOW PERFORMING SIX NUCLEAR TASKS AND IF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A CERTAIN LEVEL OF INF THE NETHERLANDS WOULD BE READY TO PARTICIPATE PROPORTIONATELY. THE NETHERLANDS WERE NOT ANTI-NUCLEAR BUT WERE WRESTLING WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO ARMS CONTROL.

WRIGHT

LIMITED

DEF D

SOV D

EED

ACDD

TRED

WED

CRD

PLANNING STAFF

SIR J BULLARD

MR JENKINS

CONFIDENTIAL

Defense : NF A 4



10 DOWNING STREET

John: int

Fro have 'phoned re
their letter of 21 May.

Depending on advice
from the Hague
(telegram coming
tonight) they think
it would now be
appropriate for the
PM to speak to
Mr Lubbers tomorrow.
(Fro will be in touch
with you on this).

Peter 30/5

CONFIDENTIAL



De Ks

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1984

NETHERLANDS AND INF

Thank you for your letter of 21 May. The Prime Minister agrees that further consideration of an approach by her to Mr. Lubbers should be postponed for the time being.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CT

ce P.C. (1)

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree no telephone call to

Mr. Lubbers for the time

21 May, 1984

being. A.S.C. 2/5.

New John,

Mussard

Netherlands and INF

In my letter of 11 May I said that Sir Geoffrey Howe believed that a personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Lubbers would be valuable, enclosed a possible speaking note and suggested that the Prime Minister should await the outcome of a meeting of NATO Special Consultative Group on 15 May. Subsequent to that meeting, we spoke on the telephone and I explained that Sir Geoffrey Howe was planning to speak to the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr van den Broek, in the margins of the OECD Council in Paris this week. The question remains as to whether the Prime Minister should now be advised to speak to Mr Lubbers.

The Dutch Representative at the Special Consultative Group meeting was unable to add much to our knowledge of developments in The Hague; nor was Mr van den Broek in Paris, although he plainly appreciated and understood our reasons for and the extent of our concern, which was underlined by Sir Geoffrey Howe. Yet more pressure has been brought to bear on the Dutch through the discussion at this week's meeting of NATO Defence Ministers at the DPC. The question was one of the major items addressed, not only privately but in the press conference afterwards. The Defence Secretary was able to emphasise the extent to which we regarded the forthcoming Dutch decision as of importance to the Alliance as a whole, and Britain in particular. You may have seen telegram number 252 from UKDEL NATO reporting Mr Heseltine's statement at the press conference. By way of follow-up to the discussions in Brussels and Paris the Dutch will have seen the Prime Minister's reply to Mr Edward Leigh MP at Question Time on 17 May and Bryan Cartledge has spoken to the Dutch Ambassador here, drawing his attention to the text of Mr Heseltine's statement at the press conference in Brussels and the Prime Minister's reply in the House.

In these circumstances Sir Geoffrey Howe feels that we have done all we reasonably can for the time being to remind the Dutch of our close interest in a positive outcome to the debate in the Netherlands on INF basing. We would prefer therefore to hold over the possibility of a telephone call from the Prime Minister to Mr Lubbers; there will very probably be a peg on which we can hang such an approach before the Dutch Parliamentary debate on Deployment now scheduled for 18 June, and perhaps before the NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington on 29/31 May. Sir Philip Mansfield in The Hague favours this course. He reports (in telegram number 175 from The Hague, copy enclosed) that a majority of followers of Mr Lubbers' Christian Democratic

CONFIDENTIAL



party are in favour of deployment according to the latest opinion poll and that Dutch business interests are urging Mr Lubbers to come to the right decision. Sir Geoffrey Howe's advice is that we should let these forces work further on Mr Lubbers and his colleagues before making use of an approach by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

See in
signature

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE 171620Z MAY 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 175 OF 17 MAY

AND TO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONIN, BRUSSELS,
ROME .

MY TELNO. 173 : NETHERLANDS / INF

SUMMARY

1. THE VVD, IN PARALLEL WITH VAN DEN BROEK, HAVE BEEN STEPPING UP PRESSURE IN THE FACE OF FURTHER DUBIOUS CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT IDEAS.

DETAIL

2. NIJPELS, THE LEADER OF THE VVD FRACTIE, CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS REQUEST. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED BY MR. HESELTINE'S COMMENTS IN BRUSSELS YESTERDAY ABOUT THE NEED FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE NETHERLANDS ON THIS ISSUE. HE WILL UNDERLINE THIS THEME IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW HE IS GIVING TOMORROW.

3. NIJPELS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH LUBBERS SINCE THE LATTER'S RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA (PARA. 6 OF MY TELNO. 163). IN HIS VIEW, LUBBERS IS STILL THINKING IN TERMS OF SOLUTION THAT COULD AT BEST BE REGARDED AS A VERY TENUOUS YES THAT IS NEGATED BY ILLOGICAL CONDITIONS. (HE WILL NOT HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE BAD CDA RESULTS IN YESTERDAYS' MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN ROTTERDAM) NIJPELS CONFIRMED THAT THE CDA PLAN TO DEFER ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT UNTIL 1988 DID NOT INCLUDE A DECISION NOW TO DEPLOY IN PRINCIPLE. HE BELIEVES THAT AN EVEN MORE BIZARRE PLAN ATTRIBUTED TO DE VRIES, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT FRACTIE LEADER, INVOLVES SOME BUILDING WORK FOR 32 MISSILES : INSISTENCE ON REOPENING OF US/USSR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA : A NATO AGREEMENT TO FLY IN MISSILES UNTIL RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED AT GENEVA : AND A DECISION NOT TO DEPLOY IF RESULTS ARE NOT , REPEAT NOT, ACHIEVED AT GENEVA.

4. A FEW DAYS AGO VAN DEN BROEK SENT LUBBERS A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE VVD PLAN (MY TELELETTER OF 27 APRIL TO CARTLEDGE).. HE RECEIVED A WRITTEN 9 - PAGE REPLY WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT A GOVERNMENT CRISIS LOOKED INCREASINGLY LIKELY. ACCORDING TO NIJPELS IF, AS IS PROBABLE, THE RESTRICTED GROUP OF MINISTERS (THE PENTAGIJS) CANNOT REACH AGREEMENT ON A SOLUTION IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO, VAN DEN BROEK WILL INSIST ON PUTTING HIS PLAN OR SOMETHING LIKE IT TO THE FULL CABINET. THE VVD MINISTERS WILL BACK IT AND WOULD BE READY TO JOIN HIM IF HE FELT HE HAD TO RESIGN. BUT IT IS

CONFIDENTIAL

/ PROBABLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE WHOLE CABINET WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT RATHER MORE THAN THE PENTAGONS SO FAR, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE LATEST OPINION POLL SHOWS A MAJORITY OF CDA VOTES IN FAVOUR OF DEPLOYMENT.

5. NIJPELS HAS ADVISED THE AMERICANS HERE TO LIE LOW FOR THE TIME BEING. HE BELIEVES THAT LUBBERS WOULD LIKE TO PROVOKE THEM INTO SOME OVER-DRAMATIC PRESSURE. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE HELPFUL BRUSSELS NATO MEETING, I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE IN RESERVE FOR THE TIME BEING. } ||

6. LUBBERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN OPPOSED TO AN UNCONDITIONAL YES. THE NEXT STAGE IS FOR HIM TO BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE KIND OF CONDITIONAL NO WHICH HE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN CONTEMPLATING WILL NOT SECURE THE SURVIVAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THE MAIN PRESSURE TO THIS END HAS TO BE DOMESTIC. BIG BUSINESS HAVE BEEN TELLING LUBBERS THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S CREDIBILITY WILL BE FATALLY UNDERMINED IF IT DOES NOT GRASP THIS NETTLE SATISFACTORILY. IF AND WHEN IT SHOWS SIGNS OF HAVING THE RIGHT EFFECT, THERE MAY BE FURTHER SCOPE FOR OUTSIDE PRESSURE.

MANSFIELD

LIMITED

DEFENCE D

WED

NEWS D

INFO D

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JENKINS

MR CARTLEDGE

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CRUISE MISSILES

A brief for the debate on Cruise
missiles in the House of Commons
on Wednesday 23rd May 1984

<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
1. Soviet superiority and the SS20	1
2. NATO's response	1
3. The need to modernise NATO's forces	1
4. The Geneva disarmament negotiations	1
5. Reduction in nuclear warheads	3
6. The "Dual Key"	3
7. Misconceptions about Cruise missiles	3
8. The Labour Party and Cruise missiles	4
9. The Alliance and Cruise missiles	5

CRUISE MISSILES

1. Soviet superiority and the SS20

The Soviet Union retains a clear and worrying superiority in European land-based intermediate nuclear systems. The 1984 Defence White Paper estimates that the Soviet Union has 4,437 INF systems to NATO's 901. This imbalance in Europe grew steadily between 1977 and 1983 as the Soviet Union deployed 243 SS20 missiles, each with three warheads, aimed at Western Europe. Each of these warheads is 36 times more deadly than the Hiroshima atom bomb. Each one would be able to strike nearly any target in Western Europe. (There are also 135 more SS20s in the Far East).

2. NATO's response

In response to this growing Soviet threat, NATO decided in December 1979 to deploy 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles in certain Western European countries from 1983 in default of a satisfactory arms control agreement with Moscow by then.

Under the plan, 96 Cruise missiles would be based in West Germany, 160 in the United Kingdom, 112 in Italy, 48 in Belgium and 48 in the Netherlands. 108 Pershing II missiles would be based in West Germany.

In view of the lack of success of the disarmament negotiations (see section 4), the first flight of Cruise missiles was deployed at Greenham Common at the end of 1983. This decision was approved by the House of Commons by a majority of 144 on 31st October 1983. The initial flights of Pershing II missiles in West Germany and Cruise missiles in Italy have also been deployed. At the moment, there are a total of 41 Cruise and Pershing missiles deployed in the three countries. Belgium and the Netherlands are due to take their missiles later in the 1980's subject to the final decision of their governments.

3. The need to modernise NATO's forces

As well as a response to the Soviet deployment of SS20s, the cruise missile programme should be seen as a modernisation of an increasingly obsolete nuclear defence capability. NATO's equivalent nuclear forces are older as well as less numerous than the Soviet equivalent. For a long time it consisted of British Vulcan bombers and American F111 aircraft based in Britain. The Vulcans have now been withdrawn and the F111s have become both more vulnerable to attacks on their airfields and less able to penetrate Soviet defences.

4. The Geneva disarmament negotiations

In November 1981, arms control talks opened between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. The United States, with the full support of other NATO countries, put forward the 'zero option', whereby NATO would abandon its plan to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles from Western Europe from 1983, provided

that the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle its equivalent missiles (the SS20s and older missiles called SS4s and SS5s).

At first, the Soviet Union proposed a freeze on all missile deployments at existing levels, which would of course have left the Soviet Union with a monopoly of land-based medium-range missiles in Europe. However, in December 1982, Mr Andropov suggested that the Soviet Union would reduce the number of Soviet intermediate range missiles to the number of nuclear missiles deployed by Britain and France. However, Britain and France have always regarded their deterrents as independent and strategic and therefore not part of the balance of intermediate range weapons.

The victory of the centre-right coalition in the West German General Election on 6th March 1983 was an encouraging endorsement of NATO policy on the Cruise missile issue, which had played a major part in the election campaign. However, the Russians continued to rule out any idea of accepting the zero option. So on 30th March 1983, President Reagan, with the full support of other NATO countries, put forward a new compromise proposal. The key passage in his statement was as follows:

"When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have a few than to have many. If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides. To this end ... we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles provided the Soviet Union reduces the number of its warheads on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis".

Unfortunately, the Russians showed no interest in such compromises and on the 23rd November 1983, following the decision of the German Bundestag to support the deployment of the first Pershing missiles, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Geneva talks. (The Russians also said that they would deploy new shorter range tactical nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia as a response to Cruise and Pershing. These missiles are the 300-mile range SS23s and the 540-mile range SS22s.) Mr Richard Luce, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, deplored the Soviet action and pointed out that:

"The Russians may seek to justify their interruption of the talks by the final preparations for initial Western INF deployment. But the House will recall that the West has remained at the conference table while the Soviet Union has increased its own deployment of SS20s by over 40 per cent ...

I wish to emphasise that the Alliance remains ready to halt

or reverse at any time the deployment of the missiles if only we can secure an agreement with the Soviet Union that would allow us to do so" (Hansard, 23rd November 1983, Col1328).

5. Reduction in nuclear warheads

As part of the NATO 1979 agreement, it was decided that for each of the 572 new warheads to be deployed, one existing warhead would be withdrawn from NATO stocks. Mr Heseltine has pointed out that:

"In practice we have gone far further than that. In 1980 we completed withdrawal of 1,000 warheads ... we have now decided as a result of our further work to reduce our stockpile by a further 2,000 warheads, including those required to make way for Cruise and Pershing warheads ... (Thus) the net reduction in nuclear warheads in Europe will be 2,400, bringing their number to the lowest level for 20 years" (Hansard, 31st October 1983, Col. 630).

6. The "Dual Key"

There has been considerable debate about arrangements for the control of Cruise missiles, while they are deployed in this country. The Government remains fully satisfied with the existing arrangements which have applied for other American nuclear weapons, based in the United Kingdom, for many years. As the Prime Minister has said:

"the use of United States bases in an emergency in the United Kingdom would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time" (Hansard, 18th January 1983, Col. 168).

She later stated that the arrangements had been reviewed again by the British and United States Governments:

"we are satisfied that they are effective. The arrangements will apply to United States Cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom whether on or off bases. The effect of the understandings and arrangements for implementing them is that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister" (Hansard, 12th May 1983, WA, Col. 435).

Labour and Social Democratic leaders now call for a dual key. But when they were ministers in Labour Governments, they were quite satisfied with the existing arrangements for the control of American bases for the nuclear F111 American bombers and Poseidon submarines.

7. Misconceptions about Cruise missiles

It is commonly stated by members of the CND that the Cruise missile is a first strike weapon, that the United States is trying to impose it on the West Europeans, and that the Americans are

thinking of fighting a limited nuclear war. These assertions are entirely false.

Quite apart from the fact that NATO strategy is defensive, Cruise missiles are too slow to be used as a first strike weapon. It would take three or four hours for a cruise missile to travel from England to Moscow. The Russians would know if they were launched and would have plenty of time to retaliate. Furthermore, the number of Cruise missiles to be based in Europe is much smaller than the total number of Soviet strategic missiles, many of which are out of range. Finally, the mobile Soviet SS20s are, once deployed, virtually invulnerable to pre-emptive attack.

So far from the United States trying to impose the Cruise missiles on Europe, it was in fact the Europeans (and particularly the former West German Chancellor Herr Schmidt) who first suggested the introduction of Cruise missiles into Europe in order to deter the Russians from thinking they could seize Western Europe and present the Americans with a "fait accompli". The clear victory of parties committed to the deployment of Cruise missiles if necessary in general elections in Italy, West Germany and Britain in 1983 proves that NATO policy is accepted by the majority of Western Europeans, despite the noisy protests of the one-sided disarmers.

As for the idea that Cruise missiles could be used to fight a limited nuclear war, no NATO government believes that nuclear weapons could be used to achieve military victory in any meaningful sense. The United States realises that it could not launch a limited nuclear attack against the Soviet Union - from Europe or elsewhere - without putting their own homeland at risk.

8. The Labour Party and Cruise missiles

Labour leaders, and particularly Mr Denis Healey, like to give the impression that they have never supported the Cruise missile programme, and that the decision to deploy them here was entirely the responsibility of the Conservative Government. However, there is every reason to suppose that this is incorrect.

In the debate on nuclear weapons on 24th January 1980, Mr William Rodgers, then Shadow Defence Secretary and a member of the previous Labour government, said in relation to the NATO decision in December 1979 to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles:

"we accepted the need to move ahead on the proposed timetable. It was the view of the previous government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essential, and that is our view today" (Hansard, Col. 691).

When pressed later in his speech on the degree of opposition support for the modernisation programme, Mr Rodgers said

"I have stated very clearly the view of the Parliamentary Committee (ie the Shadow Cabinet) of the Parliamentary Party" (Ibid. Col. 692).

It seems inconceivable that Mr Rodgers, who was then a very senior member of the Labour Party, although he was to defect to the SDP 15 months later, would have made such categorical state-

ments , unless he had the authority of the Shadow Cabinet, including Mr Healey and Mr Foot.

Furthermore, there is evidence that members of the last Labour government were closely involved in the preliminary discussions, which led to the decision to deploy the missiles. For example, a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, attended by Mr Frank Mulley, then Labour Defence Secretary, discussed the issue on 24th and 25th April 1979. The communique, published after the meeting said:

"In their consideration of NATO's requirements ... to modernise theatre nuclear forces, Ministers reaffirmed that NATO could not rely on conventional forces alone for credible deterrence in Europe: and that without increasing dependence on nuclear weapons or prejudicing long-term defence improvements in conventional forces, it would be necessary to maintain and modernise theatre nuclear forces".

Despite all this, the Labour party now appears to be unanimously opposed to the deployment of Cruise missiles and committed to having them removed, should Labour win the next General Election.

9. The Alliance and Cruise missiles

The Liberals and Social Democrats have been divided on the issue of Cruise missiles ever since the Liberal Party Assembly voted in September 1981 (against Mr Steel's wishes) against their deployment. The Social Democratic Party has broadly supported Government policy except that they favour a "dual key". The "Liberal Programme" published in August 1982 unconditionally opposed the deployment of Cruise missiles. However, Mr Steel continued to take a different position from that of his party. Thus in the Times of 7th February 1983 he said:

"If we renege on the 1979 NATO decision ... we shall simply hand the Russians everything they want from the present Geneva talks at no cost to themselves" and "the Russians must know that NATO stands united and prepared to deploy unless we get it" (ie a better deal than that offered by Mr Andropov).

The Alliance General Election Manifesto managed to fudge the issue, although the form of words used was closer to the point of view of the Social Democrats. It said that:

"Before deciding whether or not to oppose the deployment of Cruise missiles in Britain, an Alliance government will take account, in particular, of the negotiating position of the Soviet Union and the United States, the attitude of our NATO partners in Europe, and whether arrangements for a double safety-catch system have been agreed".

The failure of the Alliance to oppose Cruise missiles unconditionally annoyed many left-wing Liberals. In the Commons debate on Cruise missiles on 31st October 1983 both Liberal

and Social Democrat MPs voted against the Government, but supported an amendment, which, while calling for the continuation of negotiations, by implication accepted that Cruise missiles should be based in the United Kingdom under certain conditions. However, there is little doubt that the majority of Liberal MPs and activists remain opposed to the deployment of Cruise missiles under any circumstances.

The Alliance European Election Manifesto calls for the suspension "of future deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to come back to the conference table".

Conservative Research Department,
32 Smith Square, London SW1

17.5.84

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR JENKINS
 MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
 HD/DS17 MOD

HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/ACDD
 HD/SOV D
 HD/NAD
 HD/WED
 RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

FROM UKDEL NATO 161608Z MAY 84
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 16 MAY
 AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS12 AND DS17) ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS BONN
 COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA PARIS REYKJAVIK
 ROME WASHINGTON MADRID UKDEL VIENNA MOSCOW

DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE, 16 MAY: RESTRICTED SESSION
 SUMMARY

1. RESTRICTED SESSION OF DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE MINISTERIAL
 DOMINATED BY STRONG APPEAL TO DUTCH TO STAND FIRM ON INF
 DEPLOYMENT. SPADOLINI (ITALY) MADE A REASSURING STATEMENT ABOUT
 ITALIAN FAITHFULNESS TO 2-TRACK DECISION. ENGELL (DENMARK)
 MADE SHORT EMOLLIENT STATEMENT ABOUT FOLKETING RESOLUTIONS ON
 INF.

DETAIL

2. RESTRICTED SESSION OPENED WITH MEASURED STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN
 OF MILITARY COMMITTEE ON THE MILITARY IMBALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND
 THE WARSAW PACT, STRESSING THE NEED FOR NATO TO HAVE A CORRECTLY
 BALANCED RANGE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES. AMONG OTHER POINTS, HE
 MENTIONED THE NEED TO LEARN FROM THE RECENT MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL
 EXERCISE, BOTH IN RELATION TO NATO REACTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING,
 AND MILITARILY; AND HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE
 INFRASTRUCTURE.

3. WEINBERGER (US) REFERRED TO HIS RECENT ANNUAL REPORT TO
 CONGRESS ON BURDEN-SHARING, THE CONCLUSION OF WHICH WAS THAT ALL
 COUNTRIES SHOULD DO MORE. HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE
 PACKAGE OF FORCE GOALS ADDRESSED TO SOME COUNTRIES FELL SHORT
 OF THE 3 PER CENT AIM, WHICH SHOULD BE EASIER TO MEET NOW THAT THE
 RECESSION WAS ENDING. HE DESCRIBED INFRASTRUCTURE AS THE LITMUS

RECESSION WAS ENDING. HE DESCRIBED INFRASTRUCTURE AS THE LIVING
TEST OF ALLIED COOPERATION, IMPORTANT, NOT LEAST, IN PROVIDING
FACILITIES ESSENTIAL TO US REINFORCEMENTS AND IN THE CONTEXT
OF RESISTING ISOLATIONIST PRESSURES IN THE US.

4. SJAASTAD (NORWAY) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVEMENTS
IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND PARTICULARLY OF INFRASTRUCTURE. IT
WAS IMPORTANT TO BRING HOME TO THE US CONGRESS THE SIGNIFICANT
CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH THE EUROPEANS MADE TO THEIR OWN DEFENCE.

5. SPADOLINI (ITALY) SAID THAT ITALY HAD NOT PROPOSED ANY
MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REMAINED ENTIRELY FAITHFUL TO
THE NATO LINE AND TO HER NATO COMMITMENTS. SHE HAD MET HER
COMMITMENT OF DEPLOYING A FIRST FLIGHT OF OPERATIONAL CRUISE
MISSILES BY 1 APRIL 1984 AND PREPARATIONS WERE IN HAND FOR THE
REMAINING FLIGHTS. ITALY WOULD LIKE INF NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME
BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE DAY WHEN THEY COULD DO SO DID NOT
APPEAR TO BE CLOSE. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE AT ALL LEVELS
TO REOPEN DIALOGUE AND ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST
LEVEL.

6. ENGELL (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE FOLKETING RESOLUTION OF 3 MAY
DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY UNILATERAL DANISH STEPS. THE GOVERNMENT
WERE STUDYING THE RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO DECIDE IN WHAT FORUM
IT SHOULD BE PURSUED. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT A SOLUTION TO THE FUNDING
OF INF WOULD BE FOUND CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE FOLKETING
RESOLUTION OF 10 MAY.

7. WORNER (FRG) SAID THAT THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT CONNECTION
BETWEEN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USSR TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AND
THE STRENGTH OF NATO. THE LATTER WAS A CONDITION OF THE FORMER.
NATO MUST NOT APPEAR TO SEEM UNDER TIME PRESSURE.

8. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT NO MEMBER OF NATO COULD MOUNT A CREDIBLE
DEFENCE IN ISOLATION FROM ITS ALLIES; ALL WERE INTERDEPENDENT.
SOLIDARITY MUST BE PRESERVED IN THE EYES OF THE USSR. IN THE UK,
AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, THERE WERE PRESSURE GROUPS TRYING TO
UNDERMINE NATIONAL RESOLVE. A FIRST SMALL CONCESSION BY ONE
COUNTRY TO SUCH PRESSURE COULD BE THE BEGINNING OF AN UNRAVELLING
PROCESS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE WAS CONSTANTLY ASKED WHY THE UK
WAS DOING MORE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES; NO DOUBT MR WEINBERGER
EXPERIENCED THE SAME DIFFICULTY. HE THEREFORE STRONGLY WELCOMED
MR SPADOLINI'S ASSURANCE OF SOLIDARITY. WORNER AGREED. WHEREAS
THE PEACE MOVEMENT AS SUCH IN THE FRG HAD LOST MOMENTUM, THERE
WAS A GROWING THREAT FROM THOSE WHO ADVOCATED A NEW NATO STRATEGY.
IN THE FACE OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR POLITICAL
LEADERS TO SHARE THE POLITICAL AND EVEN MORAL BURDEN AND TO
DEMONSTRATE THEIR SUPPORT FOR NATO'S STRATEGY, TO WHICH THERE WAS
NO PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVE.

9. UP TO THIS POINT, DE RUITER (NETHERLANDS) HAD REMAINED
CONSPICUOUSLY SILENT BUT KRIEPS (LUXEMBOURG) ADDRESSED A STRONGLY
WORDED APPEAL TO THE NETHERLANDS TO STAND FIRM ON INF DEPLOYMENT.
IT WAS IMPORTANT, NOT SO MUCH TO REPROACH THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT,
BUT TO LET THEM KNOW THAT THE PROBLEM OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE
NETHERLANDS WAS A CRUCIAL ONE FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE. VREVEN
(BELGIUM) ASSOCIATED HIMSELF FULLY WITH KRIEPS' REMARKS, AS
WELL AS THOSE OF WORNER AND MR HESELTINE.

10. DE RUITER SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN, BUT
THE NETHERLANDS HAD RESERVED FOR THEMSELVES A SPECIAL POSITION
IN RELATION TO THE 2-TRACK DECISION. THEY STILL HAD TO TAKE A
DECISION. PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT WERE ON SCHEDULE AND A
DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE SOLIDARITY AND

DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE SOLIDARITY AND
COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND HE
WOULD RELAY HIS NATO COLLEAGUES' CONCERN TO HIS GOVERNMENT.
BUT HE EMPHASISED THAT THE POLICY OF THE NETHERLANDS WAS
IN NO WAY ANTI-NUCLEAR. THE NETHERLANDS WANTED A REAL AND IMPORTANT
SHARE IN THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POLICY. THE ARGUMENT WAS ONLY
ABOUT THE PARTICULAR IDENTITY OF THE DUTCH NUCLEAR TASKS.
11. DE RUITER'S STATEMENT MET A STRONG, AND IN THE CASE OF
LUNS, EMOTIONAL RESPONSE. LUNS DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE
NETHERLANDS COULD HAVE DELAYED UNTIL NOW A DECISION WHICH WAS
SUPPOSED TO BE BASED ON THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS OF THE INF TALKS;
NO-ONE COULD POSSIBLE CLAIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY SUCCESS WHAT-
SOEVER IN THOSE TALKS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT
TO SHOW LEADERSHIP AND PRESENT THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE
PEACE MOVEMENTS. DE MOTA PINTO (PORTUGAL) SAID THE ALLIANCE
MUST SHOW RESOLVE AND UNITY. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT IT WOULD
SIMPLY NOT BE CREDIBLE TO THE BRITISH PUBLIC, AND NO DOUBT THE
PUBLIC OF OTHER COUNTRIES, THAT THE DUTCH COULD BE - AS DE RUITER
CLAIMED - IN FAVOUR OF THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POLICY IF THEY
FAILED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT OF INF. SUCH A DECISION WOULD
BE A VERY GREAT VICTORY FOR THE ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUPS. THE
UNRAVELLING EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE FELT IN THE UK,
AND WOULD NOT STOP AT INF. BLAIS (CANADA) ENDORSED THE APPEAL
TO THE NETHERLANDS. DE RUITER PROTESTED AT THE SUGGESTION THAT
DUTCH POLICY WAS SIMPLY A PASSIVE RESPONSE TO PRESSURE. NUCLEAR
ISSUES HAD LONG BEEN A LIVELY POLITICAL ISSUE, NOT LEAST IN HIS
OWN PART. LUNS URGED THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT NOT TO
REMAIN SILENT IN THE FACE OF AN IMMORAL LINE OF ARGUMENT BY
THE PEACE GROUPS. SPADOLINI RE-EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY
AND TO PRESERVE THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE.
12. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION, WEINBERGER WELCOMED THE
DEGREE OF UNANIMITY EXPRESSED, AND CALLED UPON THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT
TO GIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

GRAHAM
BT

NNNN

SENT AT 161716Z JW

etc ①

Prime Minister.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree in principle to telephone Mr. Lubbers on 16 May, subject to the outcome of the NATO meeting on 15 May? A.F.C. 11/5.

11 May, 1984

BF

Await further advice from F.C.O. A.F.C. 18/5

How to do

Handwritten initials

INF Deployment

In your letter of 10 May you recorded the Prime Minister's concern over the possibly serious erosion of the NATO decision on INF deployment; and asked for the Foreign Secretary's advice on the advisability of a direct approach by the Prime Minister to the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr Lubbers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe fully shares the Prime Minister's concern. HM Ambassador at The Hague has reported that no new ideas for resolving the Dutch Government's difficulties with Parliament over the INF issue have emerged, that there is an increasing polarisation of views both within the Coalition and in Parliament, and that the prospects for a compromise which would satisfy both Dutch opinion and the interests of the Alliance are no better than 50/50. In the meantime, the Italian Prime Minister has unhelpfully floated a proposal - for a moratorium on further INF deployments during a resumed US/Soviet negotiation - which can only be interpreted as a concession designed to lure the Russians back to the negotiating table, thus rewarding them for their absence from it. And the Danish Parliament has passed resolutions both calling for the creation of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe and obliging the Government to re-allocate the outstanding portion of Denmark's financial contribution to the expense of the Alliance's INF deployment programme. Taken together, these developments can only be seen in Moscow as evidence of the progressive unravelling of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, which only a few months ago seemed to be satisfactorily on course; as an encouraging vindication of the Soviet decision to break off the nuclear arms negotiations; and as a welcome indication that the Alliance is approaching its 35th Anniversary in a state of considerable disarray.

There is to be a meeting of the NATO Special Consultative Group, which coordinates Alliance policies on the INF issue, in Brussels on 15 May. This will give us and like-minded Allies an opportunity to make our objections to Mr Craxi's ideas and to the Danish Parliament's resolutions very clear. It will also enable us to form a clearer picture of the situation in The Hague and to compare our assessment of it with the Americans.


Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that a personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Lubbers, preferably on the telephone, would be valuable as a means of impressing on him the wider implications of what Dutch Ministers are too prone to regard as a purely local difficulty.

CONFIDENTIAL



We know that Mr Lubbers will be engaged in a round of meetings next week with key Ministers and Parliamentarians and the message could have a salutary impact on his approach to them. This would argue in favour of an early message. On balance, however, Sir Geoffrey Howe shares Sir Philip Mansfield's view that it would be best to await the outcome of the SCG meeting on 15 May and to make the approach on, for example, the following day. I enclose a speaking note embodying the points on which Sir Geoffrey suggests the Prime Minister might draw if she agrees to speak to Mr Lubbers. I shall let you have a report on the outcome of the SCG meeting as soon as it is over so that the speaking note can be amended, if necessary, to take account of that.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).


(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



SPEAKING NOTE

Points to Make

1. I have greatly appreciated the way in which your officials have kept us in London informed of developments over your Government's approach to INF deployment in the Netherlands. I am very well aware of the scale and difficulty of the political problems which you face on this issue. I and my colleagues have been following developments with sympathy and concern.

2. I want you to know of the overriding importance which we attach to preserving the integrity of the 1979 dual-track decision. Any derogation from or dilution if it will be seen in Moscow as evidence of an erosion of Alliance resolve. The Russians will regard this as a vindication of their walk-out from the INF talks. It will encourage them to stay away from the negotiating table in the belief that the NATO position will progressively unravel.

3. I am also profoundly concerned about the possibility that the Alliance could be approaching its 35th Anniversary meeting in Washington in a state of obvious disarray, at least on this important issue. I know that you share our strong reservations about the ideas which Mr Craxi put forward recently in Lisbon: but I fear that they will already have done some damage to the image of Alliance unity - and recent resolutions by the Danish Parliament have not helped either. Irresolution can be contagious and I am worried that processes may be set in train which could be hard to arrest.

CONFIDENTIAL



4. I do not for one moment under-estimate the problems which you face during the coming days and weeks. But I do urge you, as a friend and Ally, constantly to bear in mind the wider - indeed global - implications of the decisions which may be taken in The Hague in the near future. It is my earnest hope that whatever solution may be found for your immediate problem will be accompanied by a strong re-affirmation of Netherlands support for the 1979 decision and of the need to implement it.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 May, 1984

INF DEPLOYMENT

BF/ The Prime Minister is concerned that the NATO position on INF deployment is in danger of becoming seriously eroded. She has in mind the doubts about whether the Netherlands Government will decide to go ahead with their deployment programme, the recent unfortunate initiative by the Italian Prime Minister in Lisbon and the recent resolution adopted in the Danish Parliament. On the assumption that the Italians can be dissuaded from pursuing their ideas, it is the Dutch position which is perhaps the most worrying. Mrs. Thatcher will wish to consider again whether she should make any approach to Mr. Lubbers. I should be grateful if you could let me have advice on this matter by the weekend. Should you advise that, for example, the Prime Minister should telephone Mr. Lubbers I should be grateful if you could provide a line to take.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

Craxi said in Lisbon (see X below)
that if INF negotiations resumed,
deployments should be suspended.

A.J.C. 10/5.

SECRET

17972 - 1

37

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 555

SECRET

FM FCO 091408Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 866 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME

INFO PRIORITY LISBON, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, PARIS, BONN

MIPT : ITALY/INF

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SHULTZ'S MESSAGE TO ME:

'DEAR GEOFFREY:

AS YOU MAY KNOW, PRIME MINISTER CRAXI REPORTEDLY STATED PUBLICLY DURING HIS VISIT THIS WEEK TO LISBON THAT HE COULD ENVISION A MORATORIUM IN NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD THE SOVIETS BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA, AND THAT ITALY HOPED TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL THE CENTREPIECE OF AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE AT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING THIS MONTH IN WASHINGTON.

I KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT A MORATORIUM IS DETRIMENTAL TO ALLIED SECURITY AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE IN THE 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION THAT ONLY A CONCRETE NEGOTIATING RESULT WILL CAUSE NATO TO REEXAMINE ITS DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, IT WOULD ONLY REWARD THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR WALKOUT AND CONTINUING BOYCOTT OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD FREEZE NATO AT AN ENORMOUS DISADVANTAGE IN INF MISSILE SYSTEMS, AND CREATE EVERY INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO STRING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ALONG RATHER THAN REACH AN AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE LACK OF CONSULTATIONS AND AT THE APPARENT DISREGARD, HOWEVER INADVERTENT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, FOR THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT MAY CAUSE YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OF THE OTHER INF BASING COUNTRIES. IT IS ESPECIALLY UNTIMELY GIVEN THE DELICATE SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS AND CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE DECISION THERE.

1

SECRET

SECRET

17972 - 1

I HAVE WRITTEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI TO EXPRESS MY DISMAY AND DISAPPOINTMENT AT THIS DEVELOPMENT AND AT THE LACK OF CONSULTATIONS. OUR EFFORTS WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IF YOUR GOVERNMENT ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT A DEPLOYMENT MORATORIUM IS UNACCEPTABLE IN SUBSTANCE, AND THAT AN ITALIAN INITIATIVE AT THE WASHINGTON MEETING COULD ONLY DAMAGE THE MEETING'S IMPORTANCE AS A DEMONSTRATION OF ALLIED UNITY AND RESOLVE.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON HOW BEST TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE FROM THIS SITUATION, AND TO GET THE ITALIANS OUT OF THE HOLE THEY HAVE PUT THEMSELVES IN. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY THOUGHTS YOU WOULD HAVE IN THIS REGARD. SINCERELY,
GEORGE P SHULTZ'

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY REPLY:

'DEAR GEORGE,

THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR REACTIONS TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI'S STATEMENTS, DURING HIS VISIT TO LISBON LAST WEEK, ABOUT INF. LIKE YOU, WE HAD NO PRIOR INDICATION OF HIS THINKING.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT HIS REMARKS WERE UNFORTUNATE AND UNHELPFUL AND I AM TAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE ITALIANS ARE FULLY AWARE OF OUR CONCERN.

THE REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE HAD FROM ROME INDICATE THAT THE ITALIANS HAVE NOT YET FINALLY DECIDED TO TABLE THEIR CONCEPT OF A MORATORIUM ON INF DEPLOYMENT, DURING A RESUME NEGOTIATION, AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS IN THE LIGHT OF REACTIONS FROM THEIR ALLIES IN THE MEANTIME. THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP IN BRUSSELS ON 15 MAY WILL GIVE ALL OF US A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN AND I SHALL ENSURE THAT THE UK POSITION IS SPELT OUT VERY CLEARLY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS AND OTHER ISSUES WITH YOU WHEN WE MEET IN WASHINGTON. WITH BEST WISHES, GEOFFREY'

HOWE

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
NEWS D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JENKINS
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START

COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

²
SECRET

SECRET

bc. PC

DSG



36

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 April 1984

Dear Roger,

NETHERLANDS/INF

Thank you for your letter of 26 April to John Coles.

As I told you on the telephone last night, the Prime Minister decided not to send any message to Mr. Lubbers. She feels that it could be regarded as interference in his affairs, and that he will do everything he can to get the right decision without any prompting from us.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

David

David Barclay

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Le



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Better not to send this.

26 April 1984

It would be regarded as interference.

Mr. Lubbers will do everything he can to

John Dehn,

get the right decision
without any prompting.
nt

Netherlands/INF

The Prime Minister will be aware from recent telegrams that the Netherlands Cabinet is due to take a decision on 27 April on the proposals which it should put to Parliament on the implementation of the Netherlands' share of NATO's dual-track decision of 1979. The requirement for a Parliamentary decision stems from the then Government's undertaking in 1979 that Parliament would be given an opportunity to consider the Netherlands' commitment to deploy in the light of progress in arms control meanwhile. The timing of this climax of a long-simmering political crisis over INF deployment is dictated by the need to let contracts for the preparation of the designated Cruise Missile site at Woensdrecht in June if the target date for operational deployment, late 1986, is to be met. I enclose a copy of FCO telno 52 to The Hague, which summarises a meeting held in Brussels on 25 April (without a Netherlands presence) to discuss what other basing Allies might do in this situation by way of damage limitation.

A further development has been the arrival in London yesterday, for talks with FCO officials, of emissaries from The Hague charged with explaining the proposal which Mr Lubbers currently intends to put to his Cabinet on 27 April. This, the so-called "crisis deployment option", would involve a Netherlands decision not to deploy Cruise Missiles on Dutch territory in peace time but to fly them in from elsewhere in time of crisis. This proposal is open to a number of serious objections, both practical and political, and it is desirable that the UK, along with other Allies, should make it clear to Mr Lubbers that we have no enthusiasm for it.

Our present information is that President Reagan intends to send a message to Mr Lubbers next week, rather than this week as originally envisaged. Sir Geoffrey Howe has been keeping closely in touch with the issue. His initial reaction had been to incline against intervention by the Prime Minister, not least because such interventions

/should not



should not be devalued by too frequent use. He has now concluded however that the wrong decision from the Dutch on this issue would be so damaging that an intervention by the Prime Minister would be justified. One factor that inclined in favour of this decision was an impression of concern by the Japanese Foreign Minister yesterday on this very subject. Abe raised the point in the course of a more wide-ranging enquiry into the strength of NATO commitments. His reaction is likely to be typical of that of other countries.

If the Prime Minister were to agree to send a message - which could be delivered personally by HM Ambassador in The Hague - there would be advantage in conveying it early on the morning of 27 April, before the Netherlands Cabinet meets. This would both maximise its impact and separate it from the message which President Reagan will be sending later on.

/ I enclose a draft text, which Sir Geoffrey Howe has approved.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

15081 - 2

GRS 1050

SECRET

FM FCO 251630Z APR 84

TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 25 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO (FOR S OF S'S PARTY), WASHINGTON, BONN,
BRUSSELS, ROME, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 142:

NETHERLANDS/INF

1. A MEETING OF THE SCG 'QUINT', MINUS THE NETHERLANDS, TOOK PLACE IN THE US NATO DELEGATION OFFICE IN BRUSSELS ON 25 APRIL UNDER US CHAIRMANSHIP (BURT). REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM (DE LA BARRE), ITALY (DANOVI), FRG (HOLIK), AND UK (CARTLEDGE) ACCOMPANIED BY MOD OFFICIALS) ATTENDED. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING, ARRANGED OVER THE EASTER HOLIDAY, WAS TO CONSIDER THE NETHERLANDS/INF PROBLEM AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE OTHER BASING ALLIES CAN DO, EG THROUGH MEESAGES AT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL, TO HELP IT TOWARDS AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME.

2. BURT GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONTACTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE US AND THE DUTCH (PRINCIPALLY VAN DER BROEK) IN RECENT WEEKS ON THIS ISSUE. VAN DER BROEK HAD MADE IT CLEAR, DURING HIS LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THAT POLITICALLY THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF AN UNQUALIFIED DECISION BY THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT TO APPROVE THE BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION WORK AT WOENSDRECHT IN JUNE OR, EVEN, TO BEGIN BASE CONSTRUCTION WHILE POSTPONING GLCM DEPLOYMENT. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES HAD BEEN CONSIDERED, NAMELY:-

(I) THE 'PACKAGE' APPROACH, COMBINING REDUCED GLCM DEPLOYMENT (EG FROM 48 TO 16), A REDUCTION IN DUTCH NUCLEAR TASKS (ARTILLERY, F16S) AND AN ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE (THE 'X + Y' PROPOSAL). US REACTIONS HAD BEEN NEGATIVE AND THE DUTCH SOON CONFESSED THAT A PACKAGE ON THESE LINES WOULD PROBABLY NOT TURN THE TRICK IN ANY CASE:

(II) THE 'CRISIS DEPLOYMENT' APPROACH, UNDER WHICH PARLIAMENT WOULD APPROVE A REDUCED CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE WITH THE PROVISO THAT NO GLCMS WOULD BE DEPLOYED ON NETHERLANDS SOIL UNTIL A

1

SECRET

SECRET

15081 - 2

CRISIS OCCURRED WARRANTING THEIR TRANSFER TO THE NETHERLANDS FROM, EG BELGIUM, THE FRG OR US. THIS WAS THE OPTION CURRENTLY FAVOURED BY LUBBERS: THE US WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED:

(III) AGREEMENT BY THE NETHERLANDS THAT, ALTHOUGH NO GLCMS WOULD BE STATIONED ON DUTCH SOIL AT ANY TIME, BELGIUM AND FRG GLCMS COULD EXERCISE ON DUTCH TERRITORY AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE AND COULD BE OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS.

(IV) THE SO-CALLED VAN MIERLO (FORMER DEFENCE MINISTER, MEMBER OF FIRST CHAMBER) OPTION BY WHICH A PARLIAMENTARY DECISION ON BOTH CONSTRUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE POSTPONED (EITHER INDEFINITELY OR UNTIL AFTER THE 1986 ELECTIONS) WHICH AT THE SAME TIME PARLIAMENT WOULD REMOVE THE NETHERLANDS RESERVE ON THE 1979 ALLIANCE DECISION.

(V) SIMPLE AND UNQUALIFIED POSTPONEMENT OF BOTH CONSTRUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT, AMOUNTING IN PRACTICE TO THE ABANDONMENT OF THE 1979 DECISION. THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE LIBERALS (VVD) FROM THE COALITION AND TO VAN DER BROEK'S RESIGNATION.

THE AMERICANS HAD ADVISED THE DUTCH TO CONSULT THEIR ALLIES ON WHATEVER OPTION THEY DECIDED TO PURSUE (CURRENTLY (II) ABOVE) AND THE DUTCH WERE SENDING EMISSARIES TO BASING CAPITALS THIS WEEK. (BILATERAL MEETINGS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ARRANGED WITH THE UK - LATER TODAY - AND FRG).

3. IN DISCUSSION, DE LA BARRE (BELGIUM) STRESSED THAT ANY DUTCH DEROGATION FROM THE 1979 DECISION WOULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE AND DAMAGING IMPACT IN BELGIUM: THE BROAD CONSENSUS WHICH BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS HAD ESTABLISHED COULD BEGIN TO UNRAVEL. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT REACT TO THE DUTCH PROBLEM IN A WAY WHICH COULD ALIENATE THE NETHERLANDS FROM THE ALLIANCE. DANОВI (ITALY) SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO BASING ALLIES TO SELECT THE LEAST DAMAGING OPTION FROM THE LIST IDENTIFIED BY THE US: HE THOUGHT THE VAN MIERLO APPROACH WOULD APPEAL TO ITALY MORE THAN THE OTHERS. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT OBLIGE THE VVD TO LEAVE THE COALITION, THUS OPENING THE WAY FOR THE SOCIALISTS TO ENTER GOVERNMENT.

2

SECRET

CARTLEDGE (UK) STRESSED THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE 1979 DECISION. LEADING MEMBERS OF THE VVD HAD RECENTLY ADOPTED COURAGEOUS PUBLIC POSITIONS: THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT UNDERCUT THEM BY ENCOURAGING INGENIOUS FORMULAE WHICH, EVEN IF THEY HELPED TO RESOLVE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS, WOULD CUT OFF WHATEVER LONGER-TERM POSSIBILITY THERE MIGHT BE OF A GENUINELY SATISFACTORY DUTCH DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT. HE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT TOO REGIMENTED AN ALLIANCE APPROACH, EG BY COORDINATED MESSAGES TO LUBBERS, TO THE DUTCH IN THE SHORT TERM: EACH BASING COUNTRY SHOULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF THE TERMS AND THE MEANS OF CONTACT MOST APPROPRIATE TO ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT OVER-DRAMATISE IT. WE SHOULD SIMPLY DRAW ATTENTION TO THE LONG-STANDING NETHERLANDS RESERVE AND CALMLY EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT WISER COUNSELS WOULD IN DUE COURSE PREVAIL. HOLIK (FRG) FOLLOWED OTHERS IN STRONGLY OPPOSING THE 'CRISIS DEPLOYMENT' OPTION AND IN PREFERRING THE VAN MIERLO ALTERNATIVE.

4. SUMMING UP, BURT (US) SAID THAT A CLEAR CONSENSUS HAD EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION, WHICH COULD PERHAPS BE REFLECTED IN WHATEVER MESSAGES HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MIGHT DECIDE TO SEND TO THE DUTCH PRIME MINISTER, NAMELY:

(A) THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE THE INTEGRITY OF THE 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION:

(B) ALLIES RECOGNISED THE ORIGINAL NETHERLANDS RESERVE AND WERE UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES:

(C) IF THOSE DIFFICULTIES WERE SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE A POSITIVE DECISION NOW (UNDERLINED) TO IMPLEMENT THE DEPLOYMENT (AND HENCE CONSTRUCTION) TRACK, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ANY DELAY BE ACCOMPANIED BY A RE-AFFIRMATION OF DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE 1979 DECISION IN PRINCIPLE:

(D) THE DUTCH SHOULD BE URGED TO MAINTAIN THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH BASING ALLIES ON THE DEPLOYMENT ISSUE.

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE BOTH IMPROPER AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR ALLIES TO BE TOO SPECIFIC IN THEIR ADVICE TO THE DUTCH ABOUT POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: BUT, EQUALLY, THE

SECRET

15081 - 2

GENERAL PROPOSITIONS IN PARA 4 ABOVE SHOULD BE IMPRESSED ON THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY POSSIBLE. IT WAS ALSO ARGUED, PARTICULARLY BY THE ITALIANS WITH US SUPPORT, THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MEANS OF CONVEYING TO THE VVD THE HOPE OF SYMPATHETIC ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO REMAIN IN THE COALITION.

6. THE RECOMMENDATION IN YOUR REFTTEL FOR A MINISTERIAL MESSAGE IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE.

HOWE

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION

LIMITED

HEAD DEFENCE DEPT

HEAD WED

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR JENKINS

MR CARTLEDGE

DRAFT: ~~XXXXXX~~ letter/~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr Lubbers

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

It was good of you to arrange to keep us in London informed of the progress of your deliberations in The Hague about your Government's approach to INF deployment in the Netherlands. I am very well aware of the scale and difficulty of the political problems which you face on this issue. I and my colleagues have been following developments with sympathy and concern.

The British Government attaches overriding importance to preserving the integrity of the dual-track decision which was adopted by the Alliance as a whole in December 1979. I am of course mindful of the qualification which the Netherlands Government attached at the time to its own share of the implementation of that decision; but I do believe that we must keep equally in view the effect which a retrospective derogation from the joint decision could have on other basing countries, on the credibility of the Alliance resolve and, not least, on the incentive for the Russians eventually to resume nuclear arms control negotiations.

/For these

Enclosures—flag(s).....

For these reasons, I see major difficulties in the proposal, which your emissaries came to London to explain, for an agreement under which Cruise Missiles would not be stationed in the Netherlands in time of peace but would be flown in only in time of crisis. Even if its obvious practical difficulties could be resolved, a plan on these lines could, as it seems to me, have an escalatory effect during the period of tension which would bring it into operation; and it could open the way to requests from other basing countries for changes in the 1979 decision.

I do not for a moment underestimate the problems which you face during the next few days and weeks. But I do wish to express the strong hope that if your Government is not able at this time to go ahead with the physical preparations for INF deployment in your country, any unavoidable delay in doing so will be balanced by a strong reaffirmation of Netherlands support in principle for the integrated decision of 1979.

GRS 500
DESKBY 241245Z
UNCLASSIFIED
FM THE HAGUE 241145Z APRIL 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 241245Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 24 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE SEOUL (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) WASHINGTON
BONN BRUSSELS ROME UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (FOR DS 17
AND DUS (P))

No 10



MIPT
NETERLANDS/INF : LATEST PRESS REPORTS

1. SEVERAL PAPERS REPORT THAT INTENSIVE TALKS OVER THE HOLIDAY PERIOD BETWEEN THE LEADING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AND LIBERAL MINISTERS HAVE FAILED TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT. THIS IS VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED :

- (A) TO VAN DEN BROEK, SAID TO BE FIGHTING HARD AGAINST THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT PLAN.
- (B) TO STIFF LIBERAL (VVD) OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN. VAN AARDENNE KORTHALS ALTES ARE SAID TO HAVE STRESSED THE CO-RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE 1979 DOUBLE DECISION, AND TO HAVE LEVELLED A NUMBER OF CRITICISMS AGAINST THE PROPOSED SCHEME.

2. NIJPELS (LIBERAL FLORRLEADER IN THE SECOND CHAMBER) MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE ''NRC HANDELSBLAD'' OF 21 APRIL :

- (A) IF YOU LOOK AT ALL THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT PLAN THEN ''IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE WHOLE THING IS ENTIRELY HYPOTHETICAL (.....). A PLAN OF THIS KIND SIMPLY DOES NOT FIT THE COMMON DEFENCE POLICY THAT WE HAVE KNOWN FOR 35 YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE. IT CREATES THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE NOT WILLING TO SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVED IN NATO MEMBERSHIP.''
- (B) ECONOMIC POLICY IS CERTAINLY OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE LIBERALS AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE THIS COALITION TO RUN ITS FULL COURSE (TILL 1986), BUT ''THERE ARE LIMITS, FOR INSTANCE IF THE THE NETHERLANDS SHOULD ADOPT AN ISOLATED POSITION WITHIN NATO, OR DECIDE UNILATERALLY TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR TASKS : WE MUST NOT TAKE ANY STEPS ON A PATH LEADING ULTIMATELY TO NEUTRALITY (.....). THE VVD HAS MADE IT COMPLETELY CLEAR THAT A NO TO DEPLOYMENT IS UNACCEPTABLE. AND WE HAVE ADDED THAT SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED DISCUSSION MUST COVER A PACKAGE INVOLVING ALL ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR DEFENCE POLICY. IT IS NOW UP TO THE CABINET TO DISTILL OUT OF ALL THAT A BALANCED COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO OUR NATO PARTNERS.''
- (C) '' THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UK AND THE FRG SHOWS THAT ONCE THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION IS TAKEN, THEN THE SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND COMMOTION FALL TO PERFECTLY TOLERABLE LEVELS.''
- (D) ''HISTORY SHOWS THAT POLITICAL COURAGE IS ALWAYS REWARDED. I THINK THAT THE 9-14 CDA MEMBERS OF THE SECOND CHAMBER OPEN SQUARE BRACKET CAUSING THE PROBLEM CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET AND ALSO THE RELEVANT MINISTERS NEED TO REMEMBER THIS.''

3. THE SAME INTERVIEW WAS ATTENDED BY VOORHOEVE, ONE OF THE LEADING VVD SECOND CHAMBER DEFENCE SPECIALISTS, WHO COMMENTED AT ONE POINT AS FOLLOWS : ''A NO TO DEPLOYMENT WOULD...

3. THE SAME INTERVIEW WAS ATTENDED BY VOORHOEVE, ONE OF THE LEADING VVD SECOND CHAMBER DEFENCE SPECIALISTS, WHO COMMENTED AT ONE POINT AS FOLLOWS : "A NO TO DEPLOYMENT WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE NETHERLANDS MUST ACCEPT CO-RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DECISION THAT WAS DIFFICULT TO TAKE, BUT THAT WAS AND REMAINS NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE AND ITS POLICY OF PEACE AND SECURITY. FOR US THAT IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE, WHICH IS WHY WE CANNOT ACCEPT A NO TOUCHED UP WITH SOMETHING EXTRA ON THE CONVENTIONAL SIDE AND WITH THE RETENTION OF THE PRESENT NUCLEAR TASKS".

4. SEVERAL PAPERS ALSO REFER TO A RECENT OPINION POLL SUGGESTING THAT A COLLAPSE OF THE PRESENT CABINET OVER THE INF ISSUE WOULD COST THE CDA A SUBSTANTIAL CHUNK OF ITS SUPPORT, THE LARGE MAJORITY OF WHICH WOULD GO TO THE VVD.

CCN PARA 2 SUB-PARA A LINE 2 : THING IS ENTIRELY ETC ..

MANSFIELD

NNNN

SENT 241248Z DAS

OO SEOUL

OO WASHINGTON

OO BONN

OO BRUSSELS

OO ROME

OO UKDEL NATO

OO MODUK (FOR DS 17 AND DUS (P))

GRS 500

DESKBY 241145Z

SECRET

FM THE HAGUE 241115Z APRIL 84

TO IMMEDIATE, FCO DESKBY 241145Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 143 OF 24 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE SEOUL (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) WASHINGTON
 BONN BRUSSELS ROME UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (FOR DS 17
 AND DUS (P))

MY TEL NO. 142

NETHERLANDS/INF

SUMMARY

1. SEE BELOW FOR AN ACCOUNT OF US/NETHERLANDS DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT SINCE THE END OF MARCH, AND MIFT FOR A SUMMARY OF THE LATEST NETHERLANDS PRESS REPORTS.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF A BRIEFING GIVEN US THIS MORNING BY THE US EMBASSY (WHO ARE ALSO INFORMING THE BELGIAN, FRG AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES) :

- (A) FOLLOWING THE DEFENCE POLICY STEERING GROUP MEETING OF 31 MARCH (OUR TEL NO. 114) THE DUTCH FLOATED WITH THE AMERICANS THE SO-CALLED "CRISIS DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT" (IE A PLAN WHICH WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING CRUISE MISSILES INTO THE NETHERLANDS ONLY IN TIME OF CRISIS). THE US HAVE SINCE HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH THE DUTCH - THE US EMBASSY WILL NOT SAY AT WHAT LEVEL - IN ORDER TO "EXPLORE" THE CONCEPT (NOT REPEAT NOT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT IT).
- (B) THE US LINE IN THE TALKS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY NEGATIVE, WITH HEAVY STRESS ON THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE PLAN (A SERIOUS DEPARTURE FROM THE 1979 DECISION, A BAD PRECEDENT IN VARIOUS RESPECTS ETC). THE AMERICANS HAVE SOUGHT TO MOVE THE DUTCH IN THE DIRECTION OF A PACKAGE INVOLVING DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS.
- (C) THE DUTCH HAVE PRESENTED THEIR PLAN AS THE AGREED VIEW OF THE LEADING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AND LIBERAL MINISTERS, WITH THE INFORMAL GLOSS (PRESUMABLY FROM THE MFA) THAT IT IS THE MOST DE RUITER CAN BE MADE TO ACCEPT.
- (D) IN THE PROCESS OF THESE TALKS THE AMERICANS HAVE COME TO REALISE THAT THE DUTCH ARE NOT EVEN FULLY COMMITTED, UNDER THEIR NEW PLAN, TO CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPLETE INF BASE AT WOENSDRECHT, OR TO ACCEPTANCE OF A FULL US MILITARY PRESENCE THERE IN PEACETIME. DE RUITER PLAINLY STILL HAS RESERVATIONS

DEFENCE

WED

PS

PS/MR WJCE

PS/PUS

MR CARTLEDGE

NO 10

No 10

+5

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

(D) IN THE PROCESS OF THESE TALKS THE AMERICANS HAVE COME TO REALISE THAT THE DUTCH ARE NOT EVEN FULLY COMMITTED, UNDER THEIR NEW PLAN, TO CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPLETE INF BASE AT WOENSDRECHT, OR TO ACCEPTANCE OF A FULL US MILITARY PRESENCE THERE IN PEACETIME. DE RUITER PLAINLY STILL HAS RESERVATIONS ON THESE POINTS.

(E) AS TO WHERE TO PUT THE MISSILES, THE DUTCH HAVE MADE NO SUGGESTIONS, ARGUING THAT THIS IS FOR THE US TO DECIDE. THE AMERICANS HAVE INDIGNANTLY REBUTTED THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT.

THE DUTCH STRESSED THAT THEY SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROPOSED PLAN, AND MADE PLAIN THAT THEY HAD VIRTUALLY GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE. THEY STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT DE RUITER WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SCHEME PROVIDING FOR CONSTRUCTION AT WOENSDRECHT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT OPTION, AND ADDED THAT DE VRIES (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT FLOORLEADER IN THE SECOND CHAMBER) HAD SAID THAT THE ONLY ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE ACCEPTABLE TO HIS FRACTIE AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE ONE CLEARLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION (SIC).

(G) THE US UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE LIBERAL MINISTERS (VAN AARDENNE AND KORTHALS ALTES) TAKING THE LEAD ON THIS SUBJECT HAD IN EFFECT BEEN TELLING LUBBERS THAT ANY SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THE VVD PARLIAMENTARY PARTY HAD HOWEVER BEEN TAKING A MUCH HARDER LINE, AND NOW APPEARED (SEE MIFT) TO HAVE FORCED THEIR MINISTERS INTO LINE.

(H) THE US EMBASSY SENSE THAT WASHINGTON IS NOW POISED TO TURN DOWN THE 'CRISIS DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT' OUTRIGHT, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN LATER THIS WEEK.

MANSFIELD

NNNN

SENT/RECD 241158Z DAS//IDS

DESKBY
GRS 250
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIB

FILE COPY

*pa amb
24/4*

FM THE HAGUE 231930Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 240900Z FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 23 APRIL 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE SEOUL (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) WASHINGTON
BONN BRUSSELS ROME UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (FOR DS17 AND DUS(P))

YOUR TELNO 744 TO WASHINGTON: NETHERLANDS / INF

1. ACCORDING TO VAN DEN BROEK'S PRIVATE SECRETARY:

(A) A DECISION MAY WELL BE PUT TO THE CABINET ON 27 APRIL.

(B) MUCH HOWEVER DEPENDS ON DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE OVER THE HOLIDAY PERIOD.

(C) LUBBERS HAS NOW DECIDED TO ACCOMPANY VAN DEN BROEK ON THE LATTER'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA FROM EARLY ON 24 TO LATE ON 26 APRIL.

2. WE GATHER FROM THE US EMBASSY THAT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO LUBBERS WAS DELIVERED AT NOON TODAY. THE US AMBASSADOR AND LUBBERS EVIDENTLY HAD A SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION. WE ARE PROMISED A FULL ACCOUNT IN BRUSSELS EARLY ON 25 APRIL.

3. THE RIGHT MOMENT FOR ANY MESSAGE TO BE COMMUNICATED WOULD THUS BE EARLY IN THE MORNING OF 27 APRIL (WHEN LUBBERS IF TRUE TO FORM WILL BE IN HIS OFFICE FROM 7AM LONDON TIME). THE PROS AND CONS AND THE CONTENT COULD THUS BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF DISCUSSION DURING THE QUAD MEETING, AND ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS HERE.

4. YOU SAY YOU ARE NOT CLEAR WHAT THE PROPOSED MESSAGE WOULD ADD TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS OF OUR VIEW. THE POINT OF THE EXERCISE WOULD NOT AS I SEE IT BE TO ADD NEW ELEMENTS TO OUR POSITION - THOUGH ANY MESSAGE COULD CERTAINLY REFER TO DISQUIETING PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BASING 'DUTCH' MISSILES OUTSIDE THE NETHERLANDS. IT WOULD BE RATHER TO CONVEY OUR CONCERN AS A FELLOW BASING COUNTRY AT THE TOP LEVEL. I AM IN NO DOUBT THAT LUBBERS WOULD PAY ATTENTION TO A MESSAGE FROM THE PM AND WOULD USE IT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. MRS THATCHER HAS NOT, SO FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH LUBBERS FOR SOME TIME, SO IT WOULD ON THE FACE OF IT BE REASONABLE FOR HER TO RAISE IT WITH HIM DIRECTLY. IF SHE WERE TO DO THIS BY TELEPHONE, IT WOULD HELP TO DISTINGUISH HER APPROACH FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WRITTEN MESSAGE.

MANSFIELD

LIMITED

HD/DEFENCE

HD/WED

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR JENKINS

MR CARTLEDGE



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 March 1984

VISIT BY MR. LUBBERS: INF

Thank you for your letter of 1 March. I write to record that the Prime Minister did not have an opportunity to raise with Mr. Lubbers this morning the question of INF deployment in the Netherlands.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

REC COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

A. J. C. $\frac{1}{3}$

1 March, 1984

John John,

Visit by Mr Lubbers: INF

There has been an important development in the Dutch political debate about cruise missile basing since we sent over our briefs for Mr Lubbers' call early on 2 March.

Over the last few days the two parties in the Dutch coalition Government have each suggested that the way out for the Netherlands might be to accept 16 or 32 cruise missiles instead of 48 missiles. In the Dutch Parliament this morning, 1 March, Mr Lubbers said that any talk of the Netherlands taking less than 48 missiles was, he thought, in the context of reduced deployments in Western Europe as a whole, but he is unlikely to have stopped speculation.

If Mr Lubbers raises the possibility of less than full deployment of missiles by the Dutch, the Prime Minister might wish to take the following line:

- (a) we should all like to see reduced levels of Pershing II and cruise missile deployments; they could follow from an agreement on INF in arms control talks;
- (b) the prospects for renewing talks about INF would be greatly damaged by one NATO country deciding to cut its quota now;
- (c) such a decision would also damage the prospects for successful deployments in the other four basing countries, perhaps especially in Belgium. In all four countries public opinion would be likely to ask why their Governments, too, could not make arbitrary cuts.

[Handwritten signature]
 (R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street

London SW1A 2AB



MAR 1984





10 DOWNING STREET

34

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Co-operation between the British and French
Governments on strategic issues

Thank you for providing a brief on this subject for the Prime Minister's visit to Paris today.

This is just to record that the subject was not raised by President Mitterrand, possibly because the other subjects discussed (see separate record) occupied the available time.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr. Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

23 January 1984

33

ms

PRIME MINISTER

Strategic Co-operation with the French

I attach a brief which, in view of its classification, I would rather not take abroad with us on Monday.

I suggest that the main thing is not to appear either too enthusiastic or too dismissive about whatever Mitterrand has to say on strategic collaboration.

You will remember that de Gaulle thought he had persuaded Mr. Macmillan of the merits of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration and was rudely disappointed when Mr. Macmillan shortly afterwards went to Nassau to sign an agreement with the United States. I believe that memories of this still rankle with the French.

The French may genuinely want strategic collaboration; they may be trying to inhibit US/UK collaboration; or they may be seeking evidence to demonstrate e.g. to the Germans, that we are not true Europeans.

I therefore think that the best approach is to show cautious interest, try to get the French to say for once what they mean by strategic collaboration and perhaps propose further discussions either between Defence Ministers or persons whom you and the President both decide to appoint.

A-J-C.

20 January 1984

TOP SECRET UK EYES A

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS ON STRATEGIC ISSUESPOINTS TO MAKE

Welcome the chance to share your thinking on collaboration on wider strategic issues.

Strongly in favour of a robust European defence effort backed by a strong and technologically advanced industrial base.

The first of these objectives is one of the best ways to promote the continued solidarity of the Alliance as a whole: the second, intelligently handled, is fully compatible with it.

Specifically, we share the objective of closer collaboration on defence procurement as the Defence Secretary has made clear to M. Hernu. The problem is to make this efficient and to achieve genuine agreement on requirements and then on work shares. The latter, in particular, not easy but happy to join in a concerted attempt to bring it about.

On planning for war welcome anything that can be done more closely to align the operational plans of the French armed forces with those of her allies.

On nuclear matters welcome the official contacts that exist already and which have served to keep our national positions so closely aligned. Agree that these matters might be included in further discussions between Mr Heseltine and M. Hernu but obviously they include matters of great sensitivity to our two countries. Further only fair to say now that we would have to respect the obligations that we have undertaken to the Americans.

BACKGROUND

1. When Sir Robert Armstrong saw M. Attali on 17 January, the latter, making clear that he was speaking on the President's authority, said that when the President and the Prime Minister next met, the President would be proposing that there should be closer co-operation between the British Government and the French Government on a wide range of strategic issues.

M. Attali was not very specific, but it was clear that the issues to be discussed included strategic nuclear issues. He said that the President would also wish the discussions to extend to the possibilities of greater co-operation between the British and French Governments and, as appropriate, between British and French industries, on the development of new weapons and weapons systems, including nuclear submarines but extending also to other advanced technological military equipment. The President saw a need for closer co-operation in these matters with France's principal European allies, and was making a similar overture to the Federal German Chancellor.

2. The collaboration envisaged could be of three main kinds, involving the three countries in different ways:

- a. procurement of major conventional weapons, in the interests of preserving a strong and technologically advanced European industrial base, in the face of US (and Japanese) competition. If it is to be effective such collaboration must involve Britain, France and Germany but need not be - and in the case of the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) for example - confined to them;
- b. planning for war. This could mean a much more explicit commitment of French forces to the defence of Western Europe. This is of immediate interest to the Germans. We also would be directly concerned if French forces were to be committed to NORTHAG: NATO as such must at some stage be involved, though the present French attitude to full integration makes that difficult for them;
- c. nuclear matters: this might include any or all of procurement of submarines, missiles and warheads, targetting and operational deployments. These must be for the French and ourselves. But there is also the very difficult question of how French use of nuclear weapons is to be reconciled with the interests of its allies and that of course would involve Germany.

3. None of these themes is new: and it is not clear to what extent President Mitterrand, in raising them now, is contemplating fundamental changes in French policy. Clearly we have much to gain from a change

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TOP SECRET UK EYES A

in the right direction in the case of the first two. As regards industrial collaboration, the practice in Europe is already well established but a clear lead from the three heads of governments would help, in the next round of major projects, to ease the very difficult problem of how to share work.

4. On planning for war the possible gains for the Alliance speak for themselves but in encouraging the French it will be important not to lose sight altogether of the long-term objective of securing their full re-integration into the Alliance, and with that, the assumption by them of the full range of responsibilities as well as advantages of membership.

5. Nuclear matters. In principle, it makes sense for the UK and France to have a line of communication on all longer-term strategic, including nuclear, issues: as a minimum, we should avoid giving the impression that one of the two European nuclear powers will never be prepared to discuss nuclear weapons policies with the other. If President Mitterrand is seeking to open a dialogue on fundamental policy issues such as the eventual creation of a joint Anglo-French nuclear deterrent capacity, this would be a very significant political step which we would not wish to rebuff until all its implications had been thoroughly assessed - even though our response at the end of the day would probably be negative. But quite apart from the major political problems which any French move in this direction would create, there are also difficulties involved in the more mundane areas of possible co-operation which the President may wish to explore - although, again, it would be preferable to avoid a dismissive or wholly negative reaction. So far as technical collaboration is concerned, we do not believe that the French have anything of significant value to give us. Secondly, much of the information (e.g. SSBN design and deployment) of possible interest to the French is extremely sensitive.

We do not know how the Americans would react to any such approach: it is at least possible that they already have bilateral contacts with the French through which they transfer such information as they are prepared to release.

6. The President must be aware of our close links with the Americans. Further, even without these the very fact of the national independence of both countries would inevitably limit the degree to which we could operate or indeed co-operate in this particular field. The series of very restricted exchanges between senior officials which we have had with the French in March 1981, March 1982 and September 1983, suggest that they see things that way too: it would be sensible for these exchanges to continue. If nevertheless the President confirms it is technical or other sensitive information which is sought, then, since it is important not to be seen to be purely negative, it would be right to agree that this could be pursued in the further talks between M. Hernu and the Defence Secretary. Nevertheless it would be prudent to register now that in agreeing to that we would have to honour the obligations that we have to the Americans.

7. The meeting will be helpful in establishing more precisely what is in the President's mind. If it includes closer collaboration on procurement and war planning both can be welcomed: the Defence Secretary has already made it clear to M. Hernu that we share the first objective: the need is to make collaboration efficient, and to undertake it in ways that do not add to divisions in the Alliance, particularly as between Europe and America.



Prime Minister.

page 2

32

MO 11/9/4

A.S.C. 17/1

MS

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYINF - SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS

Your office wrote to mine on 19th December about the OD(D) discussion on shorter range systems. As that letter related to comments that John Stanley made at OD(D), I have considered the matter further with him and can now elaborate a little further.

2. We are of course fully aware that in the INF negotiations, the NATO position has been that agreement on an equal number of Long Range INF warheads, or the elimination of LRINF weapons altogether, is not enough and would have to be accompanied by collateral constraints on the shorter range INF missiles. There is however virtually no awareness of this publicly. The public impression is that if the Soviets offered to accept the zero option or equal LRINF numbers on both sides - which I appreciate is very unlikely at present - an agreement would be concluded on that basis. We and the Americans would be in some difficulty in saying at that stage that implementation of, say, an agreement on the zero option was in fact dependent on a further agreement on the collateral constraints. I suggest therefore it will be prudent as and when the INF negotiations resume to make it clear publicly that, as far as the West is concerned, constraints on the shorter range systems are an integral part of the LRINF negotiations. Obviously we should not do this in a fashion which makes it appear that we are inserting new "conditions" into the NATO negotiating stance. I believe however that this point can gradually be made without risking this sort of misunderstanding and that, in developing the Alliances presentational line, we should have this specific point in mind.



3. On the other points in your Private Secretary's letter, it is indeed the case that the number of SS20 warheads now deployed facing West (729) is much greater than the number of SS12/22 warheads. There are currently some 76 SS12/22 launchers in the Soviet Union west of the Urals which could be brought forward into Eastern Europe, though it should be borne in mind that each launcher probably has at least one refire missile immediately available and that the yield of an SS12/22 is up to 3 times greater than an SS20 warhead. Some account in addition has to be taken of the SS1 (SCUD) which is to be replaced by the SS23 with a range of 350kms. There are 264 SS1s with Soviet forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Western part of the Soviet Union, and a further 82 with the national forces of the first 3 of those countries. Production of SS23 for SCUD replacement has already started and is expected to reach a peak output of around 400 a year in a few years time. SS1/23's range gives it target coverage over the whole of West Germany and parts of northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands without moving from Warsaw Pact territory while SS12/22's range covers all but the western and northern extremities of Great Britain and France. It could thus in theory reach many of the high value NATO targets in the area covered by SS4, 5 and 20. SS12/22 and SS1/23 are mobile and are launched from vehicles; this would reduce their vulnerability to NATO weapons systems.

4. These points will be covered in more detail at the presentation we are giving to Richard Luce.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

huff

Ministry of Defence

16th January 1984

DEFENCE : INF PC 4

7 JAN 1984





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1983

N. B. P. R.

Dear Richard,

INF: Shorter Range Systems

A.S.C. 19
12.

I understand that during OD(D) earlier this week a suggestion was made that even if we had been able to secure agreement on the INF negotiations on SS20s we should have been no better off because of Soviet ability to cover a comparable range of targets in NATO Europe with the Scud/SS23 missile and the Scaleboard/SS22 missile.

Sir Geoffrey Howe thought it might be helpful to clarify this point. It is not in practice true that under any INF agreement to which the United States would have put its name the Russians would have been free to deploy forward in Eastern Europe large numbers of such shorter range missiles and to restore the target coverage formerly provided by the SS20s. As the texts annexed to this letter show, it has been a cardinal feature of the Alliance position since 1979 to insist on so-called "collateral constraints" on such shorter range Soviet INF missiles, precisely to prevent Soviet circumvention of an INF agreement. The Russians themselves agreed in principle earlier this year that there should be constraints on such missiles, the details to be decided when the central issues of the negotiations were resolved. Our respective Departments explained this to Ministers of State in a parallel submission of July this year.

The draft US Treaty on INF tabled at Geneva in February 1982 would have limited the number of SS12/22 missiles to those deployed as of 1 January 1982, namely around 100 missiles. Even if all such single warhead missiles were deployed in Eastern Europe (as NATO's plans have always assumed they would be), it is difficult to see how they could duplicate the target set of 729 SS20 warheads so long as the numbers remain limited and the development of other comparable missiles is precluded. Nor does the modernisation and replacement, within existing numbers, of the Scud by the SS23 do much to change the picture.

/A further

CONFIDENTIAL



A further relevant point is that the limited number of such shorter range Soviet systems permitted within the provisions of the US draft Treaty would themselves be vulnerable to NATO forces, together with their nuclear storage sites, in so far as they were based forward in Eastern Europe. In that respect also the position is quite different from that of the SS20s based far back in the Soviet Union in a 'sanctuary' beyond the reach of NATO's LRINF.

I am copying this letter to John Coles at No 10 and to David Goodall at the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

R C Mottram Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Defence

DEFENCE
INF PT 4

15 1983





With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Attachment to Peter Ricketts'
letter of 19/12 : INF: SHORTER
RANGE SYSTEMS

Hm Foxester 19/12

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

M 20
/ 12.
p.a.

EXPLANATION OF US DRAFT TREATY

THE DRAFT TREATY ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TABLED BY THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES FOR LIMITS ON SOVIET SHORTER-RANGE INF MISSILES. SUCH MISSILES, IF LEFT UNCONSTRAINED, COULD UNDERCUT AN AGREEMENT APPLYING ONLY TO LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES. SPECIFICALLY, ARTICLE IV OF THE US DRAFT TREATY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF SS-12/22 AND SS-X-23 MISSILES TO THE NUMBER DEPLOYED ON JANUARY 1, 1982. ARTICLE IV FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE RANGE OF THE SS-12/22 AND SS-X-23 SHALL NOT BE INCREASED. WHILE REPLACEMENT OF THE SS-12/22 AND SS-X-23 BY NEW SYSTEMS OF COMPARABLE RANGE AND CAPABILITY IS PERMITTED, IT MUST TAKE PLACE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS. FINALLY, MIRVING THE SS-12/22, SS-X-23 OR ANY REPLACEMENT MISSILE IS PROHIBITED.

AFTER CONSIDERING THESE PROVISIONS AND OTHERS FOR POSSIBLE INCORPORATION IN THE DRAFT TREATY, WE DECIDED THAT THE LIMITATIONS IN ARTICLE IV WERE SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE AIMS OF THE TREATY, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE, I.E., THE ELIMINATION OF ALL LRINF MISSILES.

1. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS TREATY, THE NUMBER OF MISSILES DEPLOYED OF THE TYPES DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), AND THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), WHICH ARE KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS, RESPECTIVELY, THE SS-12/22, AND THE SS-23, SHALL NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMBER DEPLOYED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1982.

AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

2. THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF GLCMS OF SUCH TYPES DEPLOYED SHALL NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMBER DEPLOYED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1982, AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

3. THE NUMBERS OF ADDITIONAL MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS OF EACH TYPE SHALL NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMBERS OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IN EXISTENCE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1982. AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

4. THE MAXIMUM RANGE CAPABILITY OF GLCMS OF SUCH TYPES SHALL NOT BE INCREASED.

5. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST, PRODUCE, OR DEPLOY NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OR NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OF TYPES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE RANGE OF THE GLBM DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE SS-12/22, BUT NOT CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE RANGE OF THE GLBM DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE PERSHING II, WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), THE RANGES OF WHICH ARE SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

6. NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OR NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OF TYPES CAPABLE OF A RANGE COMPARABLE TO THE RANGES OF THE TYPES OF MISSILES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 1, AND LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES, MAY BE FLIGHT-TESTED, PRODUCED, OR DEPLOYED BY THE PARTY POSSESSING THE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 ONLY AS REPLACEMENTS FOR THE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THIS ARTICLE. THE REPLACEMENT AND DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES AND

LAUNCHERS PURSUANT TO THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES TO BE AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

7. MISSILES OF TYPES SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 6 OF THIS ARTICLE SHALL NOT BE EQUIPPED FOR OR FLIGHT-TESTED OR DEPLOYED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS.

8. IF A GLBM OR GLCM IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 5 OR 6 OF THIS ARTICLE, THEN ALL GLBMS OR GLCMS OF THAT TYPE SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 5 OR 6 OF THIS ARTICLE.

9. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE SHALL APPLY TO THOSE GLBMS AND GLCMS, AND THEIR LAUNCHERS, WHICH ARE:

- (A) OPERATIONAL;
- (B) IN RESERVE, IN STORAGE, OR MOTHBALLED;
- (C) UNDERGOING OVERHAUL, REPAIR, MODERNIZATION, OR CONVERSION;
- (D) USED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING.

MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IV:

MISSILES LAUNCHERS

(SS-12/22) LOCATIONS:


- . LOCATION A
- . LOCATION B
-
-

(SS-23) LOCATIONS:

- . LOCATION A
- . LOCATION B
-
-

THE MAXIMUM RANGE CAPABILITY OF THE MISSILE DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE) WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE SS-12/22, IS 925 KILOMETERS.

THE MAXIMUM RANGE CAPABILITY OF THE MISSILE DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE) WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE SS-23, IS 500 KILOMETERS.



" Geographical asymmetries created the potential for the Soviets to offset limitations on LRINF to some degree by forward deployment or additional numbers of shorter range systems consideration should be given to the possibility of collateral restraints on shorter range systems to supplement limitations on long range missiles".

(NATO Integrated Decision Document, 12 December 1979)

ASC ~~NOV~~ 12.
I am obtaining
a wire

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. F. Lyle

We might be asked
on Tuesday about IOC
here. A.S.C. 16.
12

GRS 165
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 151110Z DEC 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1137 OF 15 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DS17)
INFO ROUTINE ROME.

INF DEPLOYMENT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF PERSHING INF HOCS

1. THE US AND FRG AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED AT OFFICIAL LEVEL THAT THE ATTAINMENT OF INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY (IOC) FOR THE FIRST PERSHING INF IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. (BACKGROUND IS IN MISS BAILES' TELELETTER OF 5 DECEMBER TO COLSTON, MOD.) UP TO 31 DECEMBER, FRG SPOKESMEN WILL MERELY CONFIRM IN ANSWER TO ALL ENQUIRIES THAT 'WE ARE ON SCHEDULE'. SOON THEREAFTER, AN ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE TO THE EFFECT THAT 'IOC HAS BEEN REACHED AS PLANNED' (WITHOUT SAYING EXACTLY WHEN). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS POLICY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY REFUSED EITHER TO CONFIRM OR DENY PRESS RUMOURS FROM WASHINGTON THAT IOC WOULD BE REACHED ON 15 DECEMBER. HE RECALLED THAT EARLIER STATEMENTS HAD ALWAYS SPOKEN OF IOC BEING REACHED 'MBY END - 83'.

TAYLOR

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
NEWS D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JENKINS
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START
COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR EDES, CDE DEFENCE DEPT
(Room 116C DS(W))

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1525

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 071700Z

FM MOSCOW 071518Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1410 OF 7 DEC

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 071700Z)

INFO ROUTINE ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK, UKDIS VIENNA, UKMIS NEW YORK, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, MODUK (DS17)

INFO SAVING TO PEKING, ULAN BATOR, TOKYO

EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INF : SOVIET POLICY AND PROPAGANDA

1. I HAVE AN IMPRESSION, SHARED BY MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES, OF LACK OF DIRECTION IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IT IS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN SPECIALIST IN SOVIET AFFAIRS, SEWERYN BYALER, WHO IS VISITING MOSCOW AND WHO IN THE PAST TEN DAYS HAS SEEN A VERY BROAD RANGE INDEED OF SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ESTABLISHMENT. BYALER, WHO WAS LAST HERE IN MAY AND WHO THEN DETECTED A SPIRIT OF INNOVATION INITIATED BY ANDROPOV, HAS DESCRIBED THE SOVIET UNION TO A MEMBER OF MY STAFF AS A 'GROUNDED SHIP', PERVADED BY LOSS OF PURPOSE, PESSIMISM, AND EVEN FEAR OF WAR.
2. THIS MALAISE AFFECTS THE EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIANS. BUT IT STRIKES ME AS PARTICULARLY ACUTE IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY. IN MIRROR IMAGE OF THE WEST'S PRIORITIES, THE MAIN PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS THE HANDLING OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. 1983 HAS SEEN THE RUSSIANS COMPREHENSIVELY DEFEATED BY THE PROBLEM, NO MORE SO THAN IN THE INF TALKS, WHERE THEY HAVE FAILED TO STOP NATO DEPLOYMENT AND HAVE HAD TO DAMAGE THEIR 'PEACE' CREDENTIALS BY THE UNILATERAL SUSPENSION OF THE TALKS AND THEIR DECISION TO TAKE MILITARY COUNTER-MEASURES. ANDROPOV'S STATEMENTS OF 28 SEPTEMBER ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS (MOSCOW TEL NO 1091) AND 24 NOVEMBER ON INF (MY TEL NO 1354) ARE A MEASURE OF THE FAILURE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WHERE ITS INTERESTS ARE MOST VITALLY ENGAGED.
3. ALL THIS HAS HAD TO BE SUITABLY EXPLAINED TO A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. UNLIKE THE ECONOMY, FOREIGN POLICY IS AN AREA WHERE THERE CAN BE NO ADMISSION IN PUBLIC OF FAILURE OR OF DEFICIENCIES. SINCE ANDROPOV'S 24 NOVEMBER STATEMENT, THERE HAS BEEN IN THE PRESS A FLOW OF FOLLOW-UP ARTICLES, LETTERS, INTERVIEWS, AND REPORTS OF MEETINGS. TELEVISION COVERAGE HAS BEEN IN SIMILAR VEIN. THOUGH THE TONE HAS BEEN LESS STRIDENT AND ALARMIST THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEAR: THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IN ITS UNAVOIDABLE RESPONSE TO NATO DEPLOYMENT, HAS THE FULL BACKING OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THE MORAL DRAWN HAS BEEN LARGELY ONE WITH DOMESTIC APPLICATION: THAT A DIFFICULT WORLD SITUATION REQUIRES PEOPLE TO WORK HARDER AND BE VIGILANT I.E. TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPAL PRESCRIPTIONS WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF RADICAL REFORM, HAVE BEEN SET BY ANDROPOV AS A CURE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION TO SOVIET INF PROPAGANDA TO WHICH I HAVE ALLUDED IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OVER THE PAST MONTHS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME TO HAVE AN ENHANCED IMPORTANCE HERE, THE MORE SO IF THE IMPENDING PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET FAIL TO CLEAR UP DOUBTS ABOUT ANDROPOV'S FUTURE AND THE AUTHORITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. LESS CLEAR IS THE LINK BETWEEN PROPAGANDA AND POLICY EXTERNALLY, NOW THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT HAS BEGUN AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE LEFT GENEVA. SO LONG AS THERE IS STILL A CHANCE THAT PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION CAN BE EFFECTIVELY MOBILISED AGAINST PERSHING AND CRUISE, THE RUSSIANS WILL TARGET THEIR PROPAGANDA ACCORDINGLY (THEIR LATEST LINE FOLLOWING THE VOTES IN THE COMMONS AND THE BUNDESTAG IS THAT THE BRITISH AND FRG PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITIES DO NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE). THE NEED TO PUT THE BLAME ON THE UNITED STATES FOR THE BREAK-DOWN AT GENEVA IS ALSO A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT: THIS WAS ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE LATEST ZAMYATIN-KORNIENKO-OGARKOV PRESS CONFERENCE (MY TEL NO 1394). AN IZVESTIA CORRESPONDENT NOTED WITH ALARM ON 7 DECEMBER THAT THE CND CONFERENCE AT SHEFFIELD HAD EXPRESSED REGRET AT SOVIET COUNTER-DEPLOYMENTS. ALL THIS SAID, WE DO NOT KNOW IN WHAT DEGREE PROPAGANDA WILL BE AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY IN ARMS CONTROL IN 1984, SINCE, IN ALL PROBABILITY, THE POLICY HAS NOT ITSELF YET BEEN DECIDED.

5. IT IS WORTH RECALLING THAT THE MAIN INSTRUMENT FOR SECURING SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE INF TALKS BEFORE THEIR SUSPENSION WAS THE APPLICATION OF PROPAGANDA TO WESTERN OPINION, IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THIS WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIET UNION TO OUTFLANK THE US NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA. THIS WAS FROM THE START A HIGH-RISK POLICY WHICH CONSTRAINED THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION. IT PINNED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PUBLICLY TO A MAXIMALIST POSITION ON MAINTAINING ITS EUROPEAN MONOPOLY IN LRINF AND TO THE ARTIFICIAL DEVICE OF A LINK BETWEEN SS-20S AND THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT NATO'S RESOLVE WOULD HOLD, THE RUSSIANS WERE CAUGHT IN A TRAP OF THEIR OWN MAKING, UNABLE TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF FACE.

6. HAVING FAILED TO SECURE THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE - AN INF MONOPOLY - THE RUSSIANS WILL NOW SEEK TO SECURE THEIR FALLBACK POSITION: THE PRESERVATION OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ADVANTAGE IN THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPON. I BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET DECIDED HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THIS AND THAT IT IS POSING DIFFICULT DILEMMAS. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY HAVE EVERY INTEREST IN RETURNING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND REACHING AN AGREEMENT BEFORE NATO DEPLOYMENT GATHERS MOMENTUM. THERE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE FURTHER PRESSURE IN THIS DIRECTION FROM SOME OF THE EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES. ON THE OTHER, ISSUES OF PRESTIGE AND FACE WILL MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO DO SO SOON AND THERE WILL BE THOSE IN MOSCOW WHO WILL ARGUE THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION CAN YET BE BROUGHT TO

CONFIDENTIAL

HALT NATO DEPLOYMENT. THE DIFFICULTY IS COMPOUNDED BY THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: BY THE CHOICE BETWEEN GIVING THE EXPONENTS OF THE CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM NO GRATUITOUS FILLIPS IN ELECTION YEAR, AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GET A BETTER DEAL FROM A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHOSE PROSPECTS WOULD GAIN FROM A MAJOR ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENT.

7. WHICH WAY WILL THE RUSSIANS JUMP ? ANDROPOV'S 24 NOVEMBER STATEMENT TAKEN WITH SUBSEQUENT PRESS COMMENT, KORNIENKO'S REMARKS TO MY US COLLEAGUE (MY TEL NO 1388), AND THE NEWS CONFERENCE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE OFFER ALMOST NO HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL RETURN TO THE GENEVA TALKS AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED. WESTERN EXPECTATIONS THAT THE TALKS WILL BE RESUMED AFTER A SHORT BREAK HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGED (MY TEL NO 1388). ON THE OTHER HAND, OGARKOV AND KORNIENKO DID NOT RULE OUT AT THEIR PRESS CONFERENCE THE POSSIBILITY OF A START/INF MERGER. BEYOND THIS, THE CLUES ARE FEW. MANY OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD ARE REFUSING TO SEE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF. THE AMERICANS ARE EXPERIENCING SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES. THIS COULD BE JUST BAD TEMPER. THE ATTITUDE IS ONE OF INJURED ARROGANCE. BUT IT VERY MUCH LOOKS AS THOUGH, IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR DECISIONS, THERE IS NO SUITABLE LINE TO TAKE WITH FOREIGNERS.

8. IN A SITUATION THEREFORE WHERE THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, FEELING BRUISED AND HARD DONE BY: WHERE ELEMENTS MAY BE ARGUING FOR GREATER ASSERTIVENESS ELSEWHERE TO RESTORE SOVIET CREDIBILITY; AND WHERE ANDROPOV'S ILLNESS MAY MEAN THAT THE AUTHORITY TO FORCE THROUGH DIFFICULT POLICY DECISIONS HAD BECOME TOO DIFFUSE, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DO WHAT IT CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO DECIDE IN FAVOUR OF QUIET NEGOTIATION, NOT PUBLIC DECLAMATION. AS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, THIS CALLS FOR SOMETHING LIKE A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. THOUGH THEY MAY NOT IN TRUTH DESERVE TO BE HAULED DOWN FROM THEIR OWN PETARD, THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AT SOME JUNCTURE WITHOUT BEING SEEN TO EAT HUMBLE PIE. IN SHORT, THE RECIPE FOR GETTING EAST/WEST RELATIONS OUT OF THEIR PRESENT DANGEROUS TROUGH IS TO DEMONSTRATE YET AGAIN THE ALLIANCE'S UNSHAKEABLE DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE DEPLOYMENT IF THE SOVIET UNION MAKES THIS NECESSARY, BUT TO ESCHEW THE MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS FEEL OBLICED TO RESPOND IN KIND (I DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SO CATEGORICALLY DISMISSED AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF INF TALKS NOTWITHSTANDING DEPLOYMENT HAD NOT CERTAIN WESTERN SOURCES PUBLICLY SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY).

I ADVISE THAT THE IDEAS, INCLUDING GENSCHER'S, FOR A NATO MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON EAST/WEST SHOULD BE JUDGED IN THIS LIGHT. A SIGNAL TO THE RUSSIANS IN ANY DECLARATION THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO DEFUSE EAST-WEST RHETORIC COULD BE AN INVALUABLE FIRST

CONFIDENTIAL

STEP. BOTH SIDES HAVE NOW MADE THEIR POINT: THE ALLIANCE IN
DEPLOYING, THE RUSSIANS IN COUNTER-DEPLOYING. THERE IS NO FURTHER
NEED TO SUBJECT ARMS CONTROL TO A PUBLIC TEST OF POLITICAL WILLS.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PEKING, ULAN BATOR, TOKYO.

SUTHERLAND

BT

STANDARD
SOU D
NAD
CABINET OFFICE

(Repetition to REYKJAVIK
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

-4-
CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL NO.

083	11
T 203A JK3	
111	

GRS 266
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FM FCO 051045Z NOVEMBER 1983
 TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 5 DECEMBER
 INFO MOD DS17

MIPT: INF: ANDROPOV'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY:

'THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 NOVEMBER.

AS I MADE CLEAR IN MY LETTER TO YOU OF 27 SEPTEMBER, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE WHILE INSISTING THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT INSTALL MISSILES OF THIS NATURE. WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DEPLOY AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILES IN THIS COUNTRY BY THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF YOUR SS20 FORCE. WE WOULD HAVE MUCH PREFERRED NOT TO DEPLOY THEM BUT SO FAR IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO REACH THE NECESSARY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IN GENEVA.

WE DEEPLY REGRET YOUR DECISION TO SUSPEND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MISSILES. WE FOR OUR PART WOULD WISH THE INF TALKS IN GENEVA TO BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WELCOME THE UNITED STATES' PREPAREDNESS TO DO SO AT ANY TIME. OUR FIRST PRIORITY REMAINS A BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT TO REDUCE AND IF POSSIBLE ELIMINATE THE MISSILES IN QUESTION, WORLDWIDE. IT REMAINS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT THE TALKS CAN ACHIEVE SOON THE SORT OF SUCCESS THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO HALT OR, PREFERABLY, REVERSE OUR PLANS FOR DEPLOYING CRUISE MISSILES HERE.

I HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR INTEREST IN A BETTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND WOULD NATURALLY WISH TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA WOULD OF COURSE BE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THIS.'

HOWE

LIMITED

DEF D

SOV D

ACD D

NEWS D

EED

WED

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR CARLEDGE

MR JENKINS

COPIES SENT TO
 No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

START

ADVANCE COPIES 18

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JENKINS
MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
ED/DS17 MOD

ED/DEF DEPT
ED/ACDD
ED/SOV D
ED/NAD
ED/WED
RESIDENT CLERK

pa

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 1130

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 051500Z

FM MOSCOW 051343Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1394 OF 5 DEC

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (DESKBY 051500Z) (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, MODUK (DS17),

INFO PRIORITY BONN,

INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,

BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSW, PRAGUE, UKDIS GENENA IN

NEW YORK, STOCKHOLM,

INFO SAVING TOKYO

MY TEL NO 1385 (NOT TO ALL) : INF : SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

CONFERENCE WAS GIVEN ON INF BY KORNIENKO

SUMMARY

1) ON 5 DECEMBER A PRESS CONFERENCE WAS GIVEN ON INF BY KORMIENKO (FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER), MARSHAL OGARKOV (CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND FIRST DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER) AND ZAMYATIN

(HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT). THEY KEPT CLOSELY TO ANDROPOV'S 24 NOVEMBER STATEMENT, REPEATEDLY QUOTING HIS REMARKS ON RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS IN RETURN FOR WESTERN 'READINESS' TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION BEFORE WESTERN DEPLOYMENT. (PARA 5 OF MY TEL NO 1354). OPTIMISM IN THE WEST ABOUT AN EARLY SOVIET RETURN TO THE TALKS DESPITE DEPLOYMENT WAS DISMISSED. THE SOVIET POSITION ON INF WAS BRIEFLY REHEARSED, INCLUDING THE NEED TO TAKE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS INTO ACCOUNT. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS A MERGER OF INF AND START WAS DESCRIBED AS A HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 'AT PRESENT'. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEPLOYMENT FOR START WOULD BECOME CLEAR AT THE SCHEDULED START MEETING ON 8 DECEMBER. ZAMYATIN SAID ANDROPOV WAS GETTING BETTER AND CARRYING OUT ALL HIS DUTIES. HE ALSO CONDEMNED AMERICAN ATTACKS ON SYRIAN POSITION IN LEBANON.

DETAILS

2. EACH OF THE THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE AN OPENING STATEMENT. ZAMYATIN STRESSED ANDROPOV'S CALL FOR WESTERN LEADERS TO WEIGH ONCE AGAIN THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPLOYMENT. KORMIENKO SAID THAT, AS WELL AS THE USA, FRG, BRITAIN AND ITALY, A SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS BORNE BY OTHER NATO GOVERNMENTS WHO SUPPORTED THE US STAND. HE ALSO EMPHASISED THAT THE 'OSTENTATIOUS OPTIMISM' IN SOME WESTERN CAPITALS ABOUT AN EARLY RETURN TO THE GENEVA TALKS NOTWITHSTANDING DEPLOYMENT WAS 'NOTHING ELSE BUT A WISH TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY.....TO ASCRIBE TO THE SOVIET UNION READINESS TO CONTINUE, AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED, THE FORMER TALKS, AS THE AMERICAN MISSILES ARE BEING INSTALLED IN WESTERN EUROPE, IS NOT JUST TO ENGAGE IN WISHFUL THINKING.... BUT DELIBERATELY TO MISLEAD BOTH ONE'S OWN PEOPLE AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION IN A BID TO HOLD BACK THE GROWTH OF MASS PROTESTS AGAINST THE STATIONING OF THE AMERICAN MISSILES. BUT THESE ARE ATTEMPTS THAT INVOLVE WORTHLESS MEANS. ONE WILL NOT GET FAR BY PRACTISING DECEPTION.'

3. OGARKOV, WITH THE AID OF CHARTS, RAN THROUGH IN FAMILIAR TERMS THE SOVIET VERSION OF THE INF BALANCE, AND SOVIET AND 'UNACCEPTABLE' US PROPOSALS FOR INF AND START (162 BRITISH AND

TERMS THE SOVIET VERSION OF THE INF BALANCE, AND SOVIET AND "UNACCEPTABLE" US PROPOSALS FOR INF AND START (162 BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WITH A TOTAL OF 430 WARHEADS FEATURED). HE ARGUED THAT THE US WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INF TALKS, WANTING FROM THE BEGINNING NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY RATHER THAN AN AGREEMENT. THEIR START POSITION POINTED IN THE SAME DIRECTION. OGARKOV DID NOT DESCRIBE IN DETAIL SOVIET MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO INF DEPLOYMENT. BUT HE STRESSED BOTH IN HIS OPENING REMARKS AND IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THAT THEY WOULD BE "NO LESS EFFECTIVE THAN THE AMERICAN WEAPONS BEING DEPLOYED IN EUROPE AS REGARDS THEIR RANGE, YIELD, ACCURACY AND, MOST IMPORTANT, THE FLIGHT TIME TO THEIR TARGETS".

4. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

- (A) THERE WAS NO (NO) CONTRADICTION BETWEEN ANDROPOV'S REFERENCE IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE WEST SHOWING "READINESS" AS A CONDITION FOR RESUMING THE GENEVA TALKS (REPEATED BY GROMYKO, AT A MEETING WITH THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER REPORTED IN PRAVDA ON 3 DECEMBER) AND THE DEMAND FOR A RETURN TO A SITUATION OF NO-DEPLOYMENT IN THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON 2 DECEMBER (MY TEL NO 1388). WORDS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVERTED INTO DEEDS (KORNIENKO).
- (B) NO PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AT THE TALKS JUST BEFORE THEY WERE DISCONTINUED (KORNIENKO).
- (C) SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES. THE AIM OF THE MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS TO NEUTRALISE THE AMERICAN THREAT FROM THE PERSHINGSS IN THE FRG. THE NUMBERS OF THESE MISSILES WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE US AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. THEIR RANGE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO REACH MOST OF THE NEW MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. WESTERN CLAIMS THAT THESE MEASURES HAD ALREADY BEEN PLANNED TO GO AHEAD NOTWITHSTANDING WESTERN DEPLOYMENT WERE AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE PUBLIC OPINION. AS ANDROPOV HAD MADE CLEAR SOVIET SYSTEMS WOULD ALSO BE DEPLOYED IN OCEAN AREAS AND IN THE SEAS NEAR US TERRITORY. THE MILITARY POSSIBILITIES (FOR COUNTERMEASURES) WERE NOT RESTRICTED TO MISSILES. OTHER MEASURES WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN, BUT THEY COULD NOT BE SPECIFIED NOW (OGARKOV).
- (D) IT WAS POINTLESS AT PRESENT TO TALK ABOUT THE MERGING OF INF AND START. (KORNIENKO). AT PRESENT THERE "EXIST"

(D) IT WAS POINTLESS AT PRESENT TO TALK ABOUT THE MERGING OF INF AND START. (KORNIENKO). AT PRESENT THERE "EXIST" (CORRECTED TO "EXISTED") PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS ON INF AND START. THE FIRST HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF BY THE AMERICANS AND THE SECOND WERE GOING IN THE SAME DIRECTION. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE AMERICAN APPROACH (OGARKOV). ASKED WHETHER HE EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MERGER, OGARKOV SAID THAT THIS WAS AT PRESENT HYPOTHETICAL.

(E) IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF INF DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE FOR THE START TALKS. THIS WOULD BE CLEARER AT THE LAST MEETING OF THIS ROUND ON 8 DECEMBER (KORNIENKO).

(F) ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE NOT TO COUNT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON INF OGARKOV REPLIED "NO".

(G) THE SOVIET PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST WAS STILL IN FORCE (ZAMYATIN).

5. ANDROPOV'S HEALTH. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ZAMYATIN REFERRED TO ANDROPOV'S OWN MESSAGE TO A CONFERENCE OF DOCTORS IN WHICH HE HAD SAID THAT HE HAD A COLD. ANDROPOV WAS NOW GETTING BETTER AND FULLY ENGAGING IN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUSINESS AND HIS DUTIES AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENCE COUNCIL. ZAMYATIN REFUSED TO ADD ANYTHING WHEN LATER ASKED WHETHER ANDROPOV HAD HAD AN OPERATION AND WHEN HE WOULD RE-APPEAR, BUT IMPLIED THAT WESTERN REPORTS "DID NOT CORRESPOND TO REALITY".

6. ON A POSSIBLE US/SOVIET MEETING IN STOCKHOLM AT THE CDE, KORNIENKO SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT YET AGREEMENT ON AN OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. IT WAS THEREFORE TOO EARLY TO TALK ABOUT A US/SOVIET MEETING. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE CDE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE. BUT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY NAIVE TO THINK THAT THE NEW SITUATION IN EUROPE FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT HAVE AN EFFECT.

7. FOR ZAMYATIN'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TOKYO

SUTHERLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

VC

5 December 1983

Mr. Andropov's Message of 24 November

Thank you for your letter of 2 December to John Coles. The Prime Minister agrees the draft reply to Mr. Andropov subject to the following being substituted for the first sentence of the second paragraph:

"As I made clear in my letter to you of 27 September, we cannot accept that you should maintain a monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe while insisting that the Americans should not instal missiles of this nature."

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the amended message to be despatched.

D BARCLAY

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

LS



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Attached is a draft message
for you to agree to send
Mr Andropov

Mr Cotes has not seen
the Foreign Office submission.

SPeary

Duty Clerk.

2.12.83

Agreed as amended
no

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1983

Dear John,

Mr Andropov's Message of 24 November

Sir Geoffrey Howe has been considering whether it would be right for the Prime Minister to reply to the message from Mr Andropov on INF which was delivered here on 25 November (enclosed).

The short message enclosed the public statement, in Andropov's name, on 24 November, the main points of which were:

- (a) to reaffirm the Soviet decision to break off the Geneva talks;
- (b) to abrogate the Soviet Union's freeze on the deployments of SS20s in Soviet Europe;
- (c) the acceleration of the previously announced preparatory work for the installation of new Soviet missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia;
- (d) plans to deploy missile systems in ocean areas and seas that will directly threaten the United States.

The one additional point in Andropov's message was the linkage between the INF issue and bilateral relations. This was not surprising. Such references are an almost obligatory feature of the official Soviet response to any unwelcome action by a foreign government. Of the other Heads of Government to receive messages (to our knowledge the German Chancellor, President Mitterrand and the Prime Ministers of Italy, The Netherlands and Denmark) Mr Craxi has replied (publishing the exchange); so have the Danes - the Germans are likely to reply soon.

/There is

CONFIDENTIAL



There is no over-riding reason for the Prime Minister to reply. But, on balance, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that a short firm response would be appropriate. For presentational reasons there would be some merit in showing that we had responded; simply to ignore a message from Andropov might sit ill with the Prime Minister's stated aim of maintaining a dialogue with Moscow. It might also be useful to tell them that the Prime Minister had replied firmly.

/ I enclose therefore a draft reply. If the Prime Minister agrees we would, after transmission, inform NATO partners of its gist. We would not propose that the reply should be released publicly (although it can be if the Russians themselves go public).

Yours ever
[Signature]

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Mr Andropov

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your message of 24 November.

CAVEAT.....

B C

~~In response I must restate that, as made clear~~
 in my letter to you of 27 September, ~~it is simply not~~
~~possible for us to accept that you should maintain a~~
~~monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe while~~
 insisting that the Americans should not install
 missiles of this nature. We have been forced to deploy
 American cruise missiles in this country by the massive
 build-up of your SS20 force. We would have much
 preferred not to deploy them but so far it has not
 proved possible to reach the necessary arms control
 agreement in Geneva.

We deeply regret your decision to suspend the
 Geneva negotiations on these missiles. We for our part
 would wish the INF talks in Geneva to be resumed as
 soon as possible and welcome the United States
 preparedness to do so at any time. Our first priority
 remains a balanced and *verifiable* agreement to reduce and
 if possible eliminate the missiles in question,

/worldwide.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

worldwide. It remains our earnest hope that the talks ^{can} could achieve soon the sort of success that would enable us to halt or, preferably, reverse our plans for deploying cruise missiles here.

I have made clear our interest in a better relationship between East and West and would naturally wish to see an improvement in our bilateral relations. Progress in the arms control negotiations at Geneva would of course be a significant contribution to this.

MF

RECEIVED
29 NOV 1983
MRS. PRIME MINISTER,

B (317)
Unofficial translation

I am addressing you in connection with the decision taken in Great Britain to start the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of your country.

Our political assessment of this step as well as the enumeration of counter-measures which the Soviet Union has been forced to take are contained in the enclosed text of the Statement.

We have only to regret that your Government has made a choice in favour of the further sharpening of the situation and it has been done deliberately with the knowledge of the consequences which the decision taken in London will inevitably lead to.

The conclusion follows from this that the British Government just like the US Government preferred the road quite opposite to the accord on the reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, the road leading to the increase of this level and thus leading to the growth of the military danger.

We also cannot help coming to the conclusion that your Government does not value the maintaining of good relations with the Soviet Union based on confidence. It is clear that we have to take it into account in our policy.

However we would not like to regard the situation arisen as irreversible. If another, realistic approach towards the security matters prevail in the West, and if the NATO countries show their readiness to return to the situation which existed before the beginning of the deployment of American missiles in Europe, you can be sure that it would find the appropriate response from our side.

Yours respectfully,

Y. ANDROPOV

24th November, 1983

STATEMENT

BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR YURI ANDROPOV

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already brought its assessments of the militaristic course of the present American administration to the notice of Soviet people and other peoples, and warned the governments of the United States and Western countries coming out at one with it about the dangerous consequences of this course.

But Washington, Bonn, London and Rome did not heed the voice of reason - the deployment of American medium-range missiles is beginning on the territory of the FRG, Britain and Italy. Thereby the appearance of American "Pershings" and cruise missiles in the European continent is becoming an accomplished fact.

For almost forty years - longer than ever before in modern history - Europe is living in the conditions of peace. This has become possible owing to the consistent peace-loving policy of the countries of the Socialist community, the efforts of the continent's peace-loving forces and also the realistic position of sober-minded politicians in the West. The approximate balance of military forces, including nuclear ones, between the states of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty states, that has formed in Europe, objectively served the cause of European security and stability.

Now the United States and NATO as a whole are taking the step directed at tipping the scales in their favour. The nuclear missiles that are being deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies are not at all intended for the defence of Western Europe - no one is threatening it. What will grow with the deployment of American missiles on European soil is not the security of Europe but the real danger that the United States will bring catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe.

During the two World Wars the flames of destruction spared the territory of the United States of America. Now, too, the people in Washington would like to think that by deploying their medium-range missiles in Europe and thus creating an additional nuclear threat to the socialist countries they would be able to divert the return strike from their house. As to the security of the West European allies of the United States, it appears that it interests the American leaders only to the extent to which the West Europeans will be able by their lives, by their cities to lessen the retribution for the United States, should Washington give in to the temptation to unleash nuclear war in the illusory hope of winning it.

The deployment of the American nuclear missiles in Western Europe is by no means a step prompted by a reaction to some supposedly existing concern in the West about the present alignment of forces of the sides in Europe. Many times, using concrete figures, it was proved - and this is accepted by many politicians and specialists in the West - that at present a rough parity continues to exist in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards medium-range nuclear weapons, while NATO has a considerable edge in terms of nuclear warheads. So if anybody has cause to be concerned it is the Warsaw Treaty countries which are being threatened by the military machines of the NATO states.

Neither can the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community, when evaluating all this, turn a blind eye to the fact that Washington has also declared a "crusade" against socialism as a social system and that those who have now issued the orders for the deployment of new nuclear arms on the threshold of our house are basing their practical policy on this reckless premise. It appears that by deploying the "Pershing-2"s and cruise missiles in Europe the governments of a number of NATO countries would want to create a concrete nuclear-missile foundation for this adventuristic premise.

Can the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries ignore this danger? No, they cannot. That is why the highest party and state leaders of seven Socialist countries declared at their meeting in Moscow on June 28, 1983 that under no circumstances will they permit a military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

When confirming their consent to the deployment of American missiles in their countries the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy could not but know that the United States did not want from the outset the attainment of a mutually acceptable accord on nuclear arms in Europe and did everything at the talks in Geneva and outside them to prevent such an accord. Likewise they could not but know that the Soviet Union and its allies would definitely take the necessary measures to safeguard their security, to prevent the United States and NATO as a whole from upsetting the existing rough balance of forces in Europe.

It was also clearly stated by us that the appearance of new American missiles in Western Europe would make impossible a continuation of the talks that were being conducted in Geneva on nuclear arms in Europe.

The decisions taken during the past few days by the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy unequivocally show that contrary to the will of their own peoples, contrary to the interests of the security of their countries and contrary to the interests of European and universal peace these governments have given the green light to the deployment of American missiles. Thereby they have assumed together with the government of the United States the entire responsibility for the consequences of the myopic policy about which the Soviet Union had warned in advance.

Having thoroughly weighed all the aspects of the obtaining situation the Soviet leadership adopted the following decisions:

First. Since by its actions the United States has torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable accord at the talks on questions of limiting nuclear arms in Europe and their continuation in these conditions would only serve as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries directed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in these talks impossible.

Second. Being cancelled are the Soviet Union's unilateral obligations which had for their purpose the creation of more favourable conditions for success at the talks. Thereby the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR is abrogated.

Third. On agreement with the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia the announced preparatory work to deploy on the territory of these countries operational-tactical missiles of increased range, that was started some time ago, will be accelerated.

Fourth. Since by deploying its missiles in Europe the United States increases the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, the corresponding Soviet systems will be deployed with due account for this circumstance in ocean areas and in seas. By their characteristics these systems of ours will be adequate to the threat which American missiles that are being deployed in Europe create to us and our allies.

It goes without saying that other measures, too, will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and other countries of the Socialist community.

As we commence the fulfilment of the decisions adopted by us we state that the counter-measures from the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the limits that will be dictated by the actions of the NATO countries. The Soviet Union, and

we stress this again, does not strive for military superiority, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary to prevent the military balance from being disrupted.

Should the United States and other NATO countries display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will also be prepared to do this. In that event our earlier proposals on questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would become valid again. In that case, that is on condition of the restoration of the former situation, the USSR's unilateral obligations in this field would also become effective again.

The Soviet Union declares with all firmness and in no uncertain terms that it remains committed to the principled course of ending the arms race, first off all the nuclear arms race, of lessening and ultimately totally removing the threat of nuclear war. It will further exert every effort for the attainment of these lofty aims.

The Soviet Union continues to come out for the most radical solution of the question of nuclear arms in Europe. It repeats its proposal to make Europe free of nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical.

The Soviet leadership calls on the leaders of the United States and the West European countries to weigh once again all the consequences with which their own peoples and the whole of mankind are being threatened by the fulfilment of the plans to deploy new American missiles in Europe.

As it is we are living in too brittle a world. That is why responsible statesmen must evaluate the developments and adopt a rational decision. It is human reason alone that can and must save mankind from the grave danger. We call on those who are pushing the world along the road of the ever more dangerous arms race to give up their vain hopes of thus achieving military superiority in order to dictate their will to other peoples and states.

The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed not by way of building up

and inventing ever new types of armaments but, on the contrary, by way of reducing the existing armaments to immeasurably lower levels. Mankind has too many tasks which are not being solved only because colossal material, intellectual and other resources are being diverted. And from this viewpoint, too, the attainment of accords on a radical reduction of nuclear and other arms would be a boon for all peoples.

The Soviet leadership declares that in fulfilment of the Soviet people's will it will further do everything to ward off the danger of war and to preserve peace for the present and coming generations.

ADVANCE COPY

START

ADVANCE COPIES

18
IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JENKINS
MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST ✓

MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD

ED/DS17 MOD

ED/DEF DEPT
ED/ACDD
ED/SOV D
ED/NAD
ED/WED
RESIDENT CLERK

GR 50
UNCLASSIFIED
FM MOSCOW 021400Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1385 OF 2 DEC 83
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON.

INF.

1. ON 5 DECEMBER A PRESS CONFERENCE ON INF WILL BE GIVEN BY KORNIENKO (FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER), OGARKOV (CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF) AND ZAMYATIN (HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPT). A MEMBER OF CHANCERY WILL ATTEND.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~9307022~~ 218 6169

MO 21/17/1

30th November 1983

A.T.C. $\frac{L}{R}$

Dear David,

*writing
8/8/83
HJC 21*

We spoke earlier today about the Prime Minister's reaction to the statements in Mr Heseltine's letter of 24th November to the effect that the GLCM delivery programme is complete.

By way of amplification I should add that this statement refers, of course, to the delivery of the first flight of sixteen missiles, their warheads and associated equipment. There are a further five flights to be stationed at Greenham Common between now and 1988, unless a meaningful disarmament agreement renders this unnecessary. The next flight will not, however, be arriving for some months, and the appropriate security precautions will be taken at the time.

I hope that this is helpful.

Yours ever,
Barry Neale

(B P NEALE)
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

30 NOV 1983

12 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Telephone 01-000 3055

ROYAL AIR FORCE MILITARY ATTACHE
EMBASSY OF DEFENCE



Q

RECEIVED
BRITISH EMBASSY COMMISSION
CHANCERY HOUSE
28 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
OF LETTERS
& ENCLOSURES
STATION

IMMEDIATE

LUK 825

LIC NR 011/28

OO FCO

OO NEW DELHI (FOR PS/PM)

PP BONN

PP PARIS

PP WASHINGTON

PP MOSCOW

GR 430

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ROME 281100Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 618 OF 28 NOV 83

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI FOR PS/PM)

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW.

YRTELNOS 913/914 TO NEW DELHI: INF: ANDROPOV/CRAXI MESSAGES

1. ANDROPOV SENT A MESSAGE TO CRAXI ON 25 NOVEMBER, AND CRAXI REPLIED THE NEXT DAY AFTER CONSULTING SPADOLINI IN THE MARGINS OF AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION FOR THE TEN SPEAKERS FROM COMMUNITY PARLIAMENTS (ANDREOTTI WAS IN JORDAN WITH PRESIDENT PERTINI).

2. ANDROPOV BLAMED THE ITALIANS FOR DELIBERATELY CHOOSING TO AGGRIVATE THE SITUATION AND FOR NOT SEEKING TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE BOUND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH ITALY. AT THE SAME TIME, AS IN HIS MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, HE REPEATED THAT RECENT SOVIET DECISIONS WERE NOT IRREVERSABLE: IF US MISSILES WERE NOT INSTALLED AND DEPLOYED IN EUROPE THE USSR WOULD MAKE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.

3. CRAXI'S REPLY WAS AS ROBUST AS IT WAS RAPID. HE SAID THAT ITALY WANTED PEACE, BUT PEACE MUST NOT BE CONFUSED WITH "A PEACEFUL STATE OF SUBJECTION", NOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH "ACQUIESCENCE IN ALL FORMS OF INTIMIDATION". THE USSR HAD CREATED AN UNACCEPTABLE NUCLEAR IMBALANCE IN EUROPE, AND CRAXI EXPRESSED HIS SURPRISE AT ANDROPOV'S SURPRISE THAT THE WEST HAD WISHED TO CORRECT THIS. ITALY STILL WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH THE USSR, PROVIDED MOSCOW RESPECTED THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL DIGNITY AND RECIPROCAL RESPECT.

4. BOTH LETTERS HAVE NOW BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS. BOTTAI TOLD ME ON 25 NOVEMBER THAT THE IMMEDIATE ITALIAN REACTION TO THE ANDROPOV MESSAGE WAS THAT IT WAS "VERY HARD" IN TONE. THE REFERENCE TO POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS NEW. HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE ITALIAN PUBLIC'S LIKELY REACTION, BUT DID THINK A "CRITICAL MOMENT" HAD BEEN REACHED IN EAST/WEST AFFAIRS. DANОВI TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY TODAY THAT DESPITE THE THREATENING TONE OF ANDROPOV'S LETTER, HE, LIKE OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, DID NOT BELIEVE THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD NECESSARILY BE AFFECTED. THE RUSSIANS WOULD HUFF AND PUFF IN PUBLIC, BUT IN SPEAKING TO LAMBSDORFF, THE FRENCH AND "INDIRECTLY" TO THE ITALIANS, THEIR PRIVATE COMMENTS REMAINED MORE CONCILIATORY.

5. THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) HAVE CALLED FOR A REFERENDUM ON CRUISE MISSILE INSTALLATION IN ITALY. DANОВI COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS NOT NEW: THE PCI HAD PROPOSED A REFERENDUM BACK IN MARCH. IT COULD NOT (NOT) TAKE PLACE UNLESS THERE WERE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT, SINCE THERE WAS NO PROVISION IN THE CONSTITUTION FOR REFERENDUMS TO ABROGATE DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT AS DISTINCT FROM ITALIAN LAWS.

FITZHERBERT

NNNN

Only copy

LUK 513/27

CONFIDENTIAL

OO FCO

OO WASHINGTON

OO BONN

OO ROME

OO MOSCOW

OO PARIS

GRS 30

*ML 27
" "
h-a.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NEW DELHI 271140Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NUMBER 966 OF NOVEMBER 27

RPTD FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME,
MOSCOW AND PARIS.

FROM PS/PM

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 913: ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT OF 24 NOVEMBER.

1. WHAT YOUR PROPOSE IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 4 AND 5 IS AGREED.

WADE-GERY

NNNN

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Department

Drafted by PUS
(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Tel. Extn.

DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

513

30

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)..... Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.)... CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword)... CIPHER

(Deskby)..... Z

TO... IMMEDIATE FCO
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. 966 of

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO... IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, PARIS

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:—

[TEXT]

FROM PS/PM

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 913: ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT OF
24 NOVEMBER

1. What you propose in your paragraphs 4 and 5 is
agreed.

Copies to:—

P^a Dmb
28/11

N13463 4 XXX 118

ANDROPOV ACCUSES ITALY OVER SUPPORT FOR U.S. MISSILES
ROME, SATURDAY - PRIME MINISTER BETTINO CRAXI AND YURI ANDROPOV
HAVE EXCHANGED SHARPLY-WORDED MESSAGES IN WHICH THE SOVIET LEADER
ACCUSED ITALY OF CHOOSING TO HEIGHTEN NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN
EUROPE, MR CRAXI'S OFFICE REPORTED TODAY.

IT SAID MR ANDROPOV'S LETTER PRESSED FOR A RETURN TO THE
SITUATION THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF NEW U.S. NUCLEAR
MISSILES IN EUROPE AND CHARGED THAT ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
DEPLOYMENTS SHOWED ROME DID NOT WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

MR CRAXI, IN HIS REPLY SENT TODAY, DECLARED: "GOOD RELATIONS
SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FACE OF ANY FORM OF
INTIMIDATION."

262037 NOV 83

John.

The Andropov letter.

The PA tape in London is saying that Craxi of Italy has received a letter from Andropov, & he has replied.

FCO are trying to ascertain details.

Nicky 7.45

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T198/83

cc master
Opr

S

LUK 7⁴³/25

FDW F 43/25

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

I will discuss a draft
reply with the F.I.C.O. on
Monday. A.S.C. 27.
11

DD 260300Z DELHI

OO ROME

OO MOSCOW

GRS 299

DE DIP

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260300Z - DELHI

FM FCO 252005Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 914 OF 25 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/MINISTER) WASHINGTON

BONN ROME MOSCOW PARIS

1. TEXT OF ANDROPOV'S LETTER OF 24 NOVEMBER TO THE PRIME
MINISTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

'MRS PRIME MINISTER,

I AM ADDRESSING YOU IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECISION TAKEN IN GREAT BRITAIN TO START THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES ON THE TERRITORY OF YOUR COUNTRY.

OUR POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THIS STEP AS WELL AS THE ENUMERATION OF COUNTER-MEASURES WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN FORCED TO TAKE ARE CONTAINED IN THE ENCLOSED TEXT OF THE STATEMENT.

WE HAVE ONLY TO REGRET THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS MADE A CHOICE IN FAVOUR OF THE FURTHER SHARPENING OF THE SITUATION AND IT HAS BEEN DONE DELIBERATELY WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE DECISION TAKEN IN LONDON WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO.

THE CONCLUSION FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT JUST LIKE THE US GOVERNMENT PREFERRED THE ROAD QUITE OPPOSITE TO THE ACCORD ON THE REDUCTION OF THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE, THE ROAD LEADING TO THE INCREASE OF THIS LEVEL AND THUS LEADING TO THE GROWTH OF THE MILITARY DANGER.

WE ALSO CANNOT HELP COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT VALUE THE MAINTAINING OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BASED ON CONFIDENCE. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE HAVE TO TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR POLICY.

HOWEVER WE WOULD NOT LIKE TO REGARD THE SITUATION ARISEN AS IRREVERSIBLE. IF ANOTHER, REALISTIC APPROACH TOWARDS THE SECURITY MATTERS PREVAIL IN THE WEST, AND IF THE NATO COUNTRIES SHOW THEIR READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN EUROPE, YOU CAN BE SURE THAT IT WOULD FIND THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM OUR SIDE.

YOURS RESPECTFULLY,
Y ANDROPOV'

HOWE

NNNN

*dictated to CHOAM fastly
28/11/83.*

GRS 50

UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS 251638Z NOV 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1087 OF 25TH NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 1085 : INF : ANDROPOV STATEMENT.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT
WAS NO SURPRISE. FRANCE MAINTAINED A POSITION OF FIRMLINESS IN THE
FACE OF THE NUCLEAR DISEQUILIBRIUM IN EUROPE.

FRETWELL

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
NEWS D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JENKINS
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START

COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR EDES, CDE DEFENCE DEPT
(Room 116C DS(W))

LUK 744/25

FDW F 44/25

DD 260300Z DELHI
OO ROME
OO MOSCOW
GRS 286
D E D I P
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*Si A. Andropov has been
seen.
A.J.C. 27
11*

DESKBY 260300Z - DELHI
FM FCO 252000Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 913 OF 25 NOVEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/
MINISTER) WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, PARIS.

FOLLOWING FOR PS/PM FROM PS/SECRETARY OF STATE

INF: ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT OF 24 NOVEMBER

1. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON WRIGHT ON 25 NOVEMBER
TO DELIVER A LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER FROM PRESIDENT ANDROPOV TO
THE PRIME MINISTER, ENCLOSING A COPY OF ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT
OF 24 NOVEMBER. TEXT IN MIFT.

2. POPOV DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE PASSAGES IN
ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT REFERRING TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FURTHER
PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NEED TO
REDUCE WEAPON LEVELS BECAUSE OF THE WASTE OF RESOURCES
RESULTING FROM THE ARMS RACE. HE ALSO UNDERLINED THE FACT
THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS NOT IRREVERSIBLE.

3. WRIGHT EMPHASISED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REGRET AT
THE SOVIET WALK OUT, ESPECIALLY WHEN A REVISED UNITED STATES
OFFER LAY ON THE TABLE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE SAID THAT HE
SHARED THE VIEW THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE. NATO HAD
MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET THAT ITS PROGRAMME TO DEPLOY
MISSILES WAS REVERSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES STOOD READY TO
CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY MOMENT.

4. PROVIDED PM SEES NO OBJECTION, WE SUGGEST THAT COPY
ADDRESSEE SHOULD BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO SAY THAT THE PM HAS
RECEIVED A MESSAGE AND - IF IT EMERGES THAT SIMILAR MESSAGES
HAVE BEEN RECEIVED - TO COMPARE TEXTS ORALLY BUT NOT, REPEAT
NOT, TO HAND TEXT OVER.

5. IF THE RUSSIANS REVEAL PUBLICLY THAT A MESSAGE HAS BEEN
SENT, WE PROPOSE TO GO NO FURTHER THAN CONFIRMING THAT THIS
IS SO, AND SAYING THAT IT IS NOT OUR PRACTISE TO REVEAL THE
CONTENT OF CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES. OTHER NATO POSTS WILL
BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.

HOWE

NNNN

INF.

PRESS LINE PUT OUT BY BOTH NO 10 AND FOREIGN OFFICE

It is a matter of profound regret that the Soviet Union has discontinued with no date for resumption the Geneva INF talks

The first priority for the NATO Alliance since 1979 has been to seek a balanced and verifiable agreement to limit and if possible eliminate the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles.

The West has proposed a number of ideas to achieve this and we have done all in our power to continue with these crucial negotiations. Only last week the US put forward a new and constructive proposal which remains on the table.

During this period, since 1979, when we first gave the Soviet Union formal notice of our concern about the SS20, they have almost tripled the number of these missiles deployed.

Since 1981 when the first negotiations began, they have increased the numbers deployed by over 100 which is an increase of more than 40 per cent over their 1981 position.

Throughout this build up of Soviet SS20s, the West has remained at the conference table. We have made it clear that we wish the negotiations to continue. This remains our firm position. Our first priority is a negotiated agreement.

Today, not a single weapon of this sort is operationally deployed in Europe on the Western side. The Soviet Union has 243 SS20s targeted on Western Europe.

There could be no justification therefore for a breakdown in the negotiations and we sincerely hope that these will be resumed as early as possible in the New Year.

Four years ago we made it clear to the Soviet Union that whilst our first priority was to conclude a satisfactory agreement, in the absence of such an agreement we would have to go ahead with the modernisation of our own intermediate range weapons systems by the end of 1983.

Final preparations for deployment have begun. In the interest of Alliance security we will not be deflected from our intention to achieve operational deployment by the end of this year. But it is important to stress that we remain prepared to halt or reverse any deployment that takes place if we are able to achieve an acceptable agreement with the Soviet Union and we will spare no effort to achieve this.

We must hope that an early Soviet return to the negotiating table will make this possible.

ADVANCE COPIES 18

31

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT

MR COLES NO 10 ~~DOWNING ST~~
MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
HD/DS17 MOD

MR JENKINS
MR CARTLEDGE

ED/DEF DEPT
ED/ACDD
ED/SOV D
ED/NAD
ED/WED
RESIDENT CLERK

cc New Delhi

JA

PP-TOKYO

GR 740

SECRET

FROM UKDEL NATO 251433Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 293 OF 25 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BONN BRUSSELS PARIS ROME MOSCOW

MODUK (DS17) PRIORITY ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE

LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK MADRID UKDEL VIENNA TOKYO

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

INF BRIEFING OF NAC BY AMBASSADOR NITZE

1. AMBASSADOR NITZE BRIEFED THE NAC THIS MORNING ON THE SIXTH ROUND OF INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE FULL TEXT OF THE FINAL PLENARY STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23 BY KVITSINSKY FOLLOWS IN M I F T.
2. HE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE HIS PREVIOUS APPEARANCE BEFORE THE NAC ON OCTOBER 14. (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG). IN PARTICULAR, HE REFERRED TO THE PRIVATE MEETINGS HE

HAD HELD WITH AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKY SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE ROUND IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY ROUND THE OBSTACLES SEPARATING THE TWO SIDES IN GENEVA, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWING HIM TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE AREAS OF AGREEMENT. THREE TOPICS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY:

A) THE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS PACKAGE:

B) SOVIET REFERENCES TO AN APPROACH THAT WOULD RESULT IN 54 SS20S-V-ZERO US DEPLOYMENT:

AND

C) THE POSSIBILITY RAISED BY KVITSINSKY IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION ON OCTOBER 26 OF REACHING AGREEMENT VIA EQUAL REDUCTIONS.

3. ON THE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS PACKAGE, AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKY HAD STATED THAT IF ANY ON THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED THAT THE PACKAGE MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATION THEY WERE SPEAKING OUT OF TURN AND THAT IF PROPOSED, MOSCOW WOULD REJECT THE PACKAGE IN ITS ENTIRETY. AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKY ALSO STATED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE IN THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD THINK OF ACCEPTING A NUMBER OF SS20S AS LOW AS 54: THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD NOT AGREE. (IN DISCUSSION NITZE ADDED THAT NO NUMBER BELOW 120 HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE SOVIETS, NOR HAD THE RUSSIANS BEEN READY TO TALK SERIOUSLY OF ANY US DEPLOYMENT HOWEVER TOKEN).

4. NITZE SAID THAT DESPITE HIS EFFORTS HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CLARIFICATION OF THE INFORMAL SUGGESTION OF EQUAL WARHEAD REDUCTIONS BETWEEN OCTOBER 26 AND NOVEMBER 13, ON WHICH DAY HE WAS INFORMED BY KVITSINSKY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO SUGGEST THAT THIS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD AS A US PROPOSAL.

5. IN CONCLUSION, NITZE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ROUND 6 DID NOT LEAD TO A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION, THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE, LIMITATION OF LRINF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AS THE RATIONALE FOR THEIR DEMAND FOR A MONOPOLY. THE CRUCIAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE SIDES THUS REMAINED THAT OF THE CONTINUING MONOPOLY OF SOVIET LRINF MISSILE FORCES IN EUROPE.

6. DURING DISCUSSION, NITZE CONFIRMED THAT PART OF THE US DELEGATION WOULD REMAIN IN GENEVA BUT THAT THE ENTIRE SOVIET TEAM WOULD LEAVE ON SATURDAY (26). HE SAID THAT KVITSINSKY HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO LEAVE OPEN BOTH THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUATION OF INF NEGOTIATIONS OR TRANSFER TO START. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THERE WAS A DIVISION OF OPINION ON THIS IN MOSCOW.

7. HE OFFERED THREE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR SOVIET CONDUCT BETWEEN 12-21 NOVEMBER.

1) IT COULD REFLECT A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN MOSCOW IN THAT THE LATTER FOUND IT

AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN MOSCOW IN THAT THE LATTER FOUND IT EASIER TO GET CONSENSUS ON THE PROPOSAL IF IT WERE PUT FORWARD AS A US IDEA. THEY HAD THEREFORE DELIBERATELY MIS-REPRESENTED THE INFORMAL CONTACTS IN MOSCOW.

II) THE SOVIET SIDE, BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT IN PUTTING FORWARD THE CONCESSION OF ABANDONING THEIR RATIONALE FOR A MONOPLOY THEY WOULD OBTAIN NOTHING IN RETURN, HAD HAD TO DO SO IN A WAY WHICH ENABLED THEM TO REPUDIATE THE CONCESSION IF NEED BE.

III) THIS WAS A PROPAGANDA OPERATION PLANNED FROM THE BEGINNING TO INFLUENCE THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE. NITZE TENDED TO FAVOUR THE SECOND EXPLANATION.

8. HE SAID KVITSINSKY HAD TOLD HIM THAT ACCEPTANCE OF ANY US DEPLOYMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF MILITARY OPINION IN MOSCOW, THE VIEWS OF WARSAW PACT ALLIES (NITZE EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM) AND THE REACTIONS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENTS AND OTHERS WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE SOVIET POSITION. NITZE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN A POLICY DECISION IN SUMMER 1982 THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT WITH NO AGREEMENT WAS PREFERABLE TO OVERT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ANY DEPLOYMENT IN AN AGREEMENT.

9. ON BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, NITZE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS NOW UNDERSTOOD THE LOGIC OF THE AMERICAN POSITION THAT THEY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION, AND ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD BE A POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR NATO. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MILITARY COULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT ALLOW THEM TO RETAIN A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT PROPONDERANCE OF SS20S.

GRAHAM

NNNN

WAS THAT OK ??

IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFIED

RECEIVED
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CHANGERY
25 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
OF LETTERS
OF ENCLOSURES
LOCATION

V

LUK 674/24

OO NEW DELHI

GRS 336

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 241926Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1986 OF 24 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION) MOSCOW, BONN, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, PRAGUE, EAST BERLIN, PRIORITY THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, OSLO, COPENHAGEN, ROME, SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, WARSAW, UKDEL VIENNA, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, TOKYO, MODUK (FOR DS17 AND DPS(N)).

INF: ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT ON 24 NOVEMBER.

OUR INITIAL REACTION TO THE FIRST REPORTS OF A STATEMENT TONIGHT, 24 NOVEMBER, BY ANDROPOV, ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION NOT CONTINUING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS AND SOVIET SO-CALLED COUNTER MEASURES, IS THAT IT CONTAINS NO SURPRISES. THE MEDIA MAY FOCUS ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PREPARATIONS FOR NEW MISSILES IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE SPEEDED UP. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE (WHICH IS UPDATED VERSION OF THAT IN FCO TELNO 1765 TO WASHINGTON OF 24 OCTOBER, REPEATED TO ALL EXCEPT TOKYO AND NEW DELHI):

" A. THESE WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EASTERN EUROPE. LAUNCHERS FOR THE SHORT RANGE FROG MISSILES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN EASTERN EUROPE SINCE THE EARLY 1960S, AS HAVE LAUNCHERS FOR THE SLIGHTLY LONGER RANGE SCUD MISSILES. THERE ARE CURRENTLY ABOUT 250 LAUNCHERS FOR FROG MISSILES AND 280 LAUNCHERS FOR SCUD MISSILES IN EASTERN EUROPE. IN ADDITION THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEGUN TO REPLACE THE FROG LAUNCHERS IN EAST GERMANY WITH SS21 LAUNCHERS.

B. IF THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW PREPARING TO INTRODUCE THEIR OTHER NEW MISSILES INTO EASTERN EUROPE THIS COMES AS NO SUPRISE. THESE MISSILES, THE SS23 WHICH WILL REPLACE THE SCUD AND THE SS22 WHICH UP TO NOW HAS BEEN DEPLOYED ONLY IN THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE BEEN READY FOR DEPLOYMENT FOR SOME TIME. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE WANTED TO DEPLOY THEM IN EASTERN EUROPE IN ANY CASE.

C. WE CANNOT SEE THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SOVIET MISSILES IN EUROPE WOULD SERVE ANY SECURITY REQUIREMENT WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BELIEVE THEY HAVE: THEY WOULD ONLY DUPLICATE THE ROLES OF EXISTING MISSILES INCLUDING THE VAST NUMBER OF SS20S ALREADY FACING US."

HOWE


NNNN



DUTY OFFICER NO. 10

I attach a copy of the
statement referred to in
FCO Telno 914 to
25 November to New
Delhi.

With the compliments of

 C.R.S. Dorso

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH

ASST. RESIDENT
CLERK.

Pa
20/4
28/4

STATEMENT
BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR YURI ANDROPOV

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already brought its assessments of the militaristic course of the present American administration to the notice of Soviet people and other peoples, and warned the governments of the United States and Western countries coming out at one with it about the dangerous consequences of this course.

But Washington, Bonn, London and Rome did not heed the voice of reason - the deployment of American medium-range missiles is beginning on the territory of the FRG, Britain and Italy. Thereby the appearance of American "Pershings" and cruise missiles in the European continent is becoming an accomplished fact.

For almost forty years - longer than ever before in modern history-Europe is living in the conditions of peace. This has become possible owing to the consistent peace-loving policy of the countries of the Socialist community, the efforts of the continent's peace-loving forces and also the realistic position of sober-minded politicians in the West. The approximate balance of military forces, including nuclear ones, between the states of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty states, that has formed in Europe, objectively served the cause of European security and stability.

Now the United States and NATO as a whole are taking the step directed at tipping the scales in their favour. The nuclear missiles that are being deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies are not at all intended for the defence of Western Europe - no one is threatening it. What will grow with the deployment of American missiles on European soil is not the security of Europe but the real danger that the United States will bring catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe.

During the two World Wars the flames of destruction spared the territory of the United States of America. Now, too, the people in Washington would like to think that by deploying their medium-range missiles in Europe and thus creating an additional nuclear threat to the socialist countries they would be able to divert the return strike from their house. As to the security of the West European allies of the United States, it appears that it interests the American leaders only to the extent to which the West Europeans will be able by their lives, by their cities to lessen the retribution for the United States, should Washington give in to the temptation to unleash nuclear war in the illusory hope of winning it.

The deployment of the American nuclear missiles in Western Europe is by no means a step prompted by a reaction to some supposedly existing concern in the West about the present alignment of forces of the sides in Europe. Many times, using concrete figures, it was proved - and this is accepted by many politicians and specialists in the West - that at present a rough parity continues to exist in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards medium-range nuclear weapons, while NATO has a considerable edge in terms of nuclear warheads. So if anybody has cause to be concerned it is the Warsaw Treaty countries which are being threatened by the military machines of the NATO states.

Neither can the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community, when evaluating all this, turn a blind eye to the fact that Washington has also declared a "crusade" against socialism as a social system and that those who have now issued the orders for the deployment of new nuclear arms on the threshold of our house are basing their practical policy on this reckless premise. It appears that by deploying the "Pershing-2"s and cruise missiles in Europe the governments of a number of NATO countries would want to create a concrete nuclear-missile foundation for this adventuristic premise.

Can the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries ignore this danger? No, they cannot. That is why the highest party and state leaders of seven Socialist countries declared at their meeting in Moscow on June 28, 1983 that under no circumstances will they permit a military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

When confirming their consent to the deployment of American missiles in their countries the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy could not but know that the United States did not want from the outset the attainment of a mutually acceptable accord on nuclear arms in Europe and did everything at the talks in Geneva and outside them to prevent such an accord. Likewise they could not but know that the Soviet Union and its allies would definitely take the necessary measures to safeguard their security, to prevent the United States and NATO as a whole from upsetting the existing rough balance of forces in Europe.

It was also clearly stated by us that the appearance of new American missiles in Western Europe would make impossible a continuation of the talks that were being conducted in Geneva on nuclear arms in Europe.

The decisions taken during the past few days by the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy unequivocally show that contrary to the will of their own peoples, contrary to the interests of the security of their countries and contrary to the interests of European and universal peace these governments have given the green light to the deployment of American missiles. Thereby they have assumed together with the government of the United States the entire responsibility for the consequences of the myopic policy about which the Soviet Union had warned in advance.

Having thoroughly weighed all the aspects of the obtaining situation the Soviet leadership adopted the following decisions:

First. Since by its actions the United States has torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable accord at the talks on questions of limiting nuclear arms in Europe and their continuation in these conditions would only serve as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries directed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in these talks impossible.

Second. Being cancelled are the Soviet Union's unilateral obligations which had for their purpose the creation of more favourable conditions for success at the talks. Thereby the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR is abrogated.

Third. On agreement with the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia the announced preparatory work to deploy on the territory of these countries operational-tactical missiles of increased range, that was started some time ago, will be accelerated.

Fourth. Since by deploying its missiles in Europe the United States increases the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, the corresponding Soviet systems will be deployed with due account for this circumstance in ocean areas and in seas. By their characteristics these systems of ours will be adequate to the threat which American missiles that are being deployed in Europe create to us and our allies.

It goes without saying that other measures, too, will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and other countries of the Socialist community.

As we commence the fulfilment of the decisions adopted by us we state that the counter-measures from the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the limits that will be dictated by the actions of the NATO countries. The Soviet Union, and

we stress this again, does not strive for military superiority, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary to prevent the military balance from being disrupted.

Should the United States and other NATO countries display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will also be prepared to do this. In that event our earlier proposals on questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would become valid again. In that case, that is on condition of the restoration of the former situation, the USSR's unilateral obligations in this field would also become effective again.

The Soviet Union declares with all firmness and in no uncertain terms that it remains committed to the principled course of ending the arms race, first off all the nuclear arms race, of lessening and ultimately totally removing the threat of nuclear war. It will further exert every effort for the attainment of these lofty aims.

The Soviet Union continues to come out for the most radical solution of the question of nuclear arms in Europe. It repeats its proposal to make Europe free of nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical.

The Soviet leadership calls on the leaders of the United States and the West European countries to weigh once again all the consequences with which their own peoples and the whole of mankind are being threatened by the fulfilment of the plans to deploy new American missiles in Europe.

As it is we are living in too brittle a world. That is why responsible statesmen must evaluate the developments and adopt a rational decision. It is human reason alone that can and must save mankind from the grave danger. We call on those who are pushing the world along the road of the ever more dangerous arms race to give up their vain hopes of thus achieving military superiority in order to dictate their will to other peoples and states.

The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed not by way of building up

and inventing ever new types of armaments but, on the contrary, by way of reducing the existing armaments to immeasurably lower levels. Mankind has too many tasks which are not being solved only because colossal material, intellectual and other resources are being diverted. And from this viewpoint, too, the attainment of accords on a radical reduction of nuclear and other arms would be a boon for all peoples.

The Soviet leadership declares that in fulfilment of the Soviet people's will it will further do everything to ward off the danger of war and to preserve peace for the present and coming generations.

TELEGRAM 913 - FCO to New Delhi

IMF Andropov Statement of 24 November

1. The Soviet Ambassador called on Wright on 25 November to deliver a letter dated 24 November from President Andropov to the Prime Minister enclosing a copy of Andropov's statement of 24 November. The text of that statement is in Moscow telegram No. 1345 of 24 November which was copied to Delhi.

2. Popov drew particular attention to the passages in Andropov's statement referring to the impossibility of further participation in the talks by the Soviet Union and the need to reduce weapon levels because of the waste of resources resulting from the arms race. He also underlined the fact that the present situation was not irreversible.

Wright

3. ~~THEXXXXXXXXXX~~ emphasised the British Government's regret at the Soviet walkout especially when/ revised US offer lay on the table. Speaking personally he said that he ~~xxx~~ shared the view that nothing should be irreversible. NATO have made it clear from the outset that its programme to deploy missiles was ~~ir~~reversible. The US stood ready to continue the negotiations at any moment.

4. Provided PM sees no objection we suggest that copy addressees should be given authority to say that the PM has received a message and if it emerges that similar messages have been received to compare texts orally but ~~NOT~~ ~~NOT~~ ~~NOT~~ NOT hand over text.

5. If the Russians reveal publicly that a message has been sent we propose to go no further than confirming that this is so and saying that it is not our practice to reveal the contents of confidential exchanges.

Under NATO posts will be guided.

TEXT OF ANDROPOV'S LETTER OF 24 NOVEMBER

Mrs Prime Minister,

1. I am addressing you in connection with the decision taken in Great Britain to start the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of your country. Our political assessment of this subject as well as enumeration of counter-measures which the Soviet Union has been forced to take are contained in the enclosed text of the statement. We have only to regret that your government has made a choice in favour of the further sharpening of the situation and it has been done deliberately with the knowledge of the consequences which the decision taken in London will inevitably lead to. The conclusion follows from this that the British Government, just like the US Government, preferred the road quite opposite to the accord on the reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, the road leading to the increase of this level and thus leading to the growth of the military danger. We also can't help coming to the conclusion that your Government does not value the maintaining of good relations with the Soviet Union based on confidence. It is clear that we have to take it into account in our policy. However, we would not like to regard the situation arisen as irreversible. If another realistic approach towards these security matters prevails in the West, and if the NATO countries show their readiness to return to the situation which existed before the beginning of the deployment of American missiles in Europe, you can be sure that it would find the appropriate response from our side.

Yours respectfully,

YURI ANDROPOV

Summary

1. A lengthy statement in Andropov's name was issued this evening 24 November. This criticised the UK, FRG, and Italy as well as the US for deciding to proceed with INF deployment. The Soviet leadership had decided that participation in the INF talks was impossible: the moratorium on deployment of missiles in the ~~Europe~~ European part of the USSR was abrogated: preparatory work to deploy missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia would be accelerated and in response to the new American threat to the Soviet Union corresponding Soviet systems would be deployed at sea. If the US and NATO displayed readiness to return to the situation before deployment Soviet proposals on nuclear arms control in Europe and Soviet unilateral obligations would again be valid.

2. Detail

Andropov said that the appearance of Pershing and Cruise in Europe was becoming an established fact. Deployment would increase not European security but the real danger that the US would bring catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe. There was rough parity in medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. If anything it was the Warsaw Pact countries which were being threatened. By going ahead with deployment a number of NATO governments seemed to want to create a concrete nuclear missile foundation for the "crusade against socialism". The Soviet Union and other socialist countries could not ignore this danger.

3. The Governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy could not but know that the US from the outset had not wanted a mutually accepted agreement and that the Soviet Union and its allies would definitely take measures to safeguard their security. The decision adopted during the past few days by the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy unequivocally show that contrary to the will of their own peoples: contrary to the interests of the security of their countries and contrary to the interests of European and universal peace these governments have given the green light to the deployment of the American missiles. Thereby they have

/ assumed

assumed together with the US the entire responsibility ~~and~~ for the consequences of the myopic policy about which the Soviet Union had warned in advance.

4. The Soviet leadership had taken the following decisions:

(i) further participation in the talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe was impossible. The US, by its actions, had torpedoed the possibility of a mutually acceptable agreement. Continuation of the talks would only serve as a cover for the actions of the US and a number of other NATO countries aimed at undermining European and international security.

(ii) Soviet unilateral obligations designed to create very favourable conditions for the talks were cancelled. The moratorium on deployment on medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR was abrogated.

(iii) By agreement with the GDR and Czechoslovakia the preparatory work to deploy in those countries "operational tactical missiles to increased range" would be accelerated.

(iv) Taking due account of the increased US nuclear threat to the Soviet Union from deployment in Europe corresponding Soviet systems would be deployed "in ocean ~~xxx~~ areas and in seas".

5. Other measures would also be taken. Soviet reply measures would be kept strictly within the limits dictated by NATO actions. The Soviet Union did not strive for military superiority, it only ~~was~~ did what was absolutely necessary to prevent disruption of the military balance. Should the US and the other NATO countries display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of the American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will also be prepared to do this. In that event our earlier proposals on questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would become valid again. The USSR's unilateral obligations in this field would also become effective again.

6. The Soviet Union remained an adherent of ending the arms race. It repeated its proposal to rid Europe of all nuclear weapons. The Soviet leadership called on the leaders of the US and Western European countries to weigh once again all the consequences of ~~the~~ fulfilling deployment plans.

LUK 676/24

LLO NR 936/24

OO FCO DESKBY 250900Z

OO NEW DELHI DESKBY 250300Z

OO MODUK

OO UKDEL NATO

OO WASHINGTON

OO BONN

PP PARIS

PP ROME

RR ANKARA

RR ATHENS

RR BRUSSELS

RR COPENHAGEN

RR LISBON

RR LUXEMBOURG

RR MADRID

RR OSLO

RR OTTAWA

RR REYKJAVIK

RR THE HAGUE

RR UKDEL VIENNA

RR SOFIA

RR BELGRADE

RR BUCHAREST

RR BUDAPEST

RR EAST BERLIN

RR WARSAW

RR PRAGUE

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

RR TOKYO

mt

RECEIVED
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CHAMPAGNE
25 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES
OF LETTERS
OF ENCLOSURES
LOCATION

242035Z NOV 83
FROM COMMCEN HSP
TO MODUK

UNCLASSIFIED/
SIC

IMMEDIATE

GR850
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY FCO 250900Z
DESKBY DELHI 250300Z
FM MOSCOW 242035Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1354 OF 24 NOV 83
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR CHOGM DELEGATION), MODUK (DS17),
UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN,
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME,
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,
BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK, TOKYO.
INFO SAVING PEKING AND ULAN BATOR

INF: ANDROPOV STATEMENT.

SUMMARY.

1. A LENGTHY STATEMENT IN ANDROPOV'S NAME WAS ISSUED THIS EVENING (24 NOVEMBER). THIS CRITICISED THE UK, FRG AND ITALY AS WELL AS THE US FOR DECIDING TO PROCEED WITH INF DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD DECIDED THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE INF TALKS WAS IMPOSSIBLE: THE MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR WAS ABROGATED: PREPARATORY WORK TO DEPLOY MISSILES IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD BE ACCELERATED: AND IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW AMERICAN THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION CORRESPONDING SOVIET SYSTEMS WOULD BE DEPLOYED AT SEA. IF THE US AND NATO DISPLAYED READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION BEFORE DEPLOYMENT SOVIET PROPOSALS ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNILATERAL OBLIGATIONS WOULD AGAIN BE VALID.

DETAIL.

2. ANDROPOV SAID THAT THE APPEARANCE OF PERSHING AND CRUISE IN EUROPE WAS BECOMING AN ESTABLISHED FACT. DEPLOYMENT WOULD INCREASE NOT EUROPEAN SECURITY BUT THE REAL DANGER THAT THE US WOULD BRING CATASTROPHE UPON THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE. THERE WAS ROUGH PARITY IN MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. IF ANYTHING IT WAS THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHICH WERE BEING THREATENED. BY GOING AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT A NUMBER OF NATO GOVERNMENTS SEEMED TO WANT TO CREATE A CONCRETE NUCLEAR MISSILE FOUNDATION FOR THE "CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM". THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES COULD NOT IGNORE THIS DANGER.

3. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRG, BRITAIN AND ITALY COULD NOT BUT KNOW THAT THE US FROM THE OUTSET HAD NOT WANTED A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WOULD DEFINITELY TAKE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SECURITY. "THE DECISIONS ADOPTED DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRG, BRITAIN AND ITALY UNEQUIVOCALLY SHOW THAT CONTRARY TO THE WILL OF THEIR OWN PEOPLES: CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THEIR COUNTRIES AND CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN AND UNIVERSAL PEACE THESE GOVERNMENTS HAVE GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN MISSILES. THEREBY THEY HAVE ASSUMED TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MYOPIC POLICY ABOUT WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD WARNED IN ADVANCE".

4. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD TAKEN THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:
(1) FURTHER PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS ON LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE WAS IMPOSSIBLE. THE US BY ITS ACTIONS HAD TORPEDOED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS WOULD ONLY SERVE AS A COVER FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE US AND A NUMBER OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES AIMED AT UNDERMINING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

(2) SOVIET UNILATERAL OBLIGATIONS DESIGNED TO CREATE MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE TALKS WERE CANCELLED. THE MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR WAS ABROGATED.

(3) BY AGREEMENT WITH THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE PREPARATORY WORK TO DEPLOY IN THOSE COUNTRIES "OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES OF INCREASED RANGE" WOULD BE ACCELERATED.

(4) TAKING DUE ACCOUNT OF THE INCREASED US NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION FROM DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE, CORRESPONDING SOVIET SYSTEMS WOULD BE DEPLOYED "IN OCEAN AREAS AND IN SEAS".

5. OTHER MEASURES WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN. SOVIET REPLY MEASURES WOULD BE KEPT STRICTLY WITHIN THE LIMITS DICTATED BY NATO ACTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY IT ONLY DID WHAT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO PREVENT DISRUPTION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE.

"SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES DISPLAY READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE: THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO DO THIS. IN THAT EVENT OUR EARLIER PROPOSALS ON QUESTIONS OF LIMITING AND REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE WOULD BECOME VALID AGAIN..... THE USSR'S UNILATERAL OBLIGATIONS IN THIS FIELD WOULD ALSO BECOME EFFECTIVE AGAIN".

6. THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED AN ADHERENT OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE. IT REPEATED ITS PROPOSAL TO RID EUROPE OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CALLED ON THE LEADERS OF THE US AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO WEIGH ONCE AGAIN ALL THE CONSEQUENCES OF FULLFILLING DEPLOYMENT PLANS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING PEKING AND ULAN BATOR.

SUTHERLAND
BT

NNNN

INF

PS/Mr Luce

INF: POSSIBLE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT CONFIRMING NEW MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

1. I understand that the Soviet authorities are to make an important statement at 1800Z this evening. It is quite likely that this will be confirmation of the deployments of new Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe, specifically in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

the / 2. On 24 October the Soviet Defence Ministry announced that preparatory work was starting in the GDR and Czechoslovakia for the deployment of 'operational-tactical missile' complexes. 'Operational-tactical missiles' are, in Soviet terminology, shorter range INF missiles: SCUD/SS23 missiles and the SS12/SS22 missiles. Following/Soviet Defence Ministry announcement we prepared a line to take for News Department. I have slightly updated this and attach a copy of the text (which Mr Weston has agreed). This could be used freely if this evening's Soviet announcement is about new missiles in Eastern Europe.

R.H.T. Gozney

R H T Gozney
Defence Department

24 November 1983

- cc: Mr Mayhew News Department
- PS ✓
- PS/Mr Rifkind
- PS/PUS
- Sir J Bullard
- Mr Wright
- Mr Cartledge
- ACDD
- ACDRU
- Soviet Department (Mr Gowan)
- EED (Mr Carter)
- DS 17 MOD (Mr Colston)
- DPS (N) MOD

NEW SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

LINE TO TAKE

1. These would not be the first Soviet nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe. Launchers for the short range FROG missiles have been deployed in Eastern Europe since the early 1960s, as have launchers for the slightly longer range SCUD missiles. There are currently about 250 launchers for FROG missiles and 280 launchers for SCUD missiles in Eastern Europe. In addition the Soviet Union has begun to replace the FROG launchers in East Germany with SS21 launchers.

2. If the Russians are now preparing to introduce their other new missiles into Eastern Europe this comes as no surprise. These missiles, the SS23 which will replace the SCUD and the SS22 which up to now has been deployed only in the Soviet Union, have been ready for deployment for some time. The Soviet Union would probably have wanted to deploy them in Eastern Europe in any case.

3. We cannot see that the deployment of new Soviet missiles in Europe would serve any security requirement which the Russians might believe they have; they would only duplicate the roles of existing missiles including the vast number of SS20s already facing us.

NNNN

UK 02 EPF230

241809 :AM-NUCLEAR-SOVIET "" URGENT 2NDLD

ANDROPOV SAYS MISSILE TALKS ENDED AND CITES NEW RETALIATION:

BY CHARLES BREMNER

MOSCOW, NOV 24, REUTER - SOVIET PRESIDENT YURI ANDROPOV SAID TODAY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE NO FURTHER PART IN TALKS ON LIMITING MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AND ANNOUNCED NEW RETALIATORY MEASURES.

MORE CJB/RLH

NNNN

UKP805 EPF232

241817 :AM-NUCLEAR-SOVIET 2NDLD =2 MOSCOW:

ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT, READ OUT ON TELEVISION, WAS THE FIRST AUTHORITY KREMLIN WORD ON YESTERDAY'S SOVIET WALK-OUT FROM THE GENEVA MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE NEGOTIATIONS.

MORE CJB/RLH

NNNN

UKP812 EPF233

241832 :AM-NUCLEAR-SOVIET 2NDLD =3 MOSCOW:

ANDROPOV BLAMED THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FAILURE OF THE TWO-YEAR-OLD GENEVA TALKS AND SAID THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW CRUISE AND PERSHING-2 MISSILES RAISED A +REAL DANGER THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BRING CATASTROPHE UPON THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE. +

SINCE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS IN THESE CONDITIONS +WOULD ONLY SERVE AS A COVER FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND A NUMBER OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES ... THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS ITS FURTHER PARTICIPATION IN THESE TALKS IMPOSSIBLE, + HE SAID.

THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALSO DECIDED ON THREE OTHER MEASURES, ANDROPOV SAID. HE LISTED THEM AS:

- ABROGATION OF MOSCOW'S 1981 FREEZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF 55-20 MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN USSR
- ACCELERATION OF PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE INSTALLATION OF NEW SOVIET MISSILES IN EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
- DEPLOYMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION OF MISSILE SYSTEMS +IN OCEAN AREAS AND SEAS+ THAT WILL DIRECTLY THREATEN THE UNITED STATES.

MORE CJB/RT/ADB

4

*Sig. increase in Europe - SS-20's
No new dep in Europe since talks for*

*Mark 8
anacran
May '82
clarified
formed out
kept putting
them into
existing and
sites that d
not have full
complement*

PP MOSCOW

PP NEW DELHI

PP PEKING

PP ROME

PP TOKYO

GROUPS 450

UNCLASSIFIED

FM COI LONDON 231732Z NOV 83
TO INFORMATION ITEM ADDRESSEES

RETRACT NR 06223 NOV 83

STATEMENT ON INF NEGOTIATIONS TO BE MADE BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, MR RICHARD LUCE MP, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON WEDNESDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1983.

WITH PERMISSION, MR SPEAKER, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

AS HONOURABLE MEMBERS MAY BE AWARE, THE SOVIET DELEGATE TO THE INF TALKS HAS MADE IT CLEAR THIS MORNING THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INTEND TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT ROUND AND HAS GIVEN NO DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS.

HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT REGRET THIS SOVIET DECISION AND CAN SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR IT. AS RECENTLY AS 15 NOVEMBER THE UNITED STATES TABLED A FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL IN THE NEGOTIATION WHICH WAS REJECTED OUT OF HAND BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE RUSSIANS MAY SEEK TO JUSTIFY THEIR INTERRUPTION OF THE TALKS BY THE FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR INITIAL WESTERN INF DEPLOYMENT. BUT THE HOUSE WILL RECALL THAT THE WEST HAS REMAINED AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE WHILE THE SOVIET UNION HAS INCREASED ITS OWN DEPLOYMENTS OF SS20S BY OVER 40 PER CENT.

THE NATO ALLIANCE HAS MADE ITS FIRST PRIORITY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT TO REDUCE AND IF POSSIBLE TO ELLMINATE THESE WEAPONS WORLDWIDE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT UNTIL SUCH AN AGREEMENT CAN BE ATTAINED THE ALLIANCE WILL PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DECISION IN 1979 TO WORK TOWARDS A BALANCE WHICH WOULD SAFEGUARD WESTERN SECURITY.

WE WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM ACHIEVING THE FIRST STAGE OF THIS OBJECTIVE BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.

BUT I WISH TO EMPHASISE THAT THE ALLIANCE REMAINS READY TO HALT OR REVERSE AT ANY TIME THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES IF ONLY WE CAN SECURE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO DO SO. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT REMAINS OUR UNSHAKEABLE OBJECTIVE. THE ALLIANCE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO SECURE IT. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE AND THAT IT REMAINS IN THE INTERESTS OF EAST AND WEST THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD RESUME AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. WE THEREFORE URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO DEMONSTRATE AN EQUALLY SINCERE COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL BY RETURNING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

ENDS

COI LONDON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Sub



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

INF NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET MANOEUVRING

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 18 November.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

gy



Four

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 19 November enclosing a message from President Reagan about INF.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. Charles H. Price, II

SECRET

Tom



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister received from President Reagan on 19 November.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RB

SECRET

Rec'd
19/11

Prime Minister
I have copied
this to the foreign office.

Wnty Clerk
19/11



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON
November 19, 1983

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed message from President Reagan regarding INF.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure:

SECRET

CONQUEROR

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M. P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

SUBJECT

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S 30

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 192^A/83

Dear Margaret,

As you know, the Soviet Union has recently suggested in Geneva that, if the US were to propose equal reductions of 572 on each side, the Soviet Union would accept such a proposal. Now the Soviet Union has begun saying that the US negotiator, rather than their own, put forward these suggestions. This is a total fabrication.

19/11/83

The fact is that the Soviet negotiator approached Ambassador Nitze on instructions last Sunday with the suggestion that the US advance a proposal for "Equal Reductions" which would result in zero US deployments while leaving about 120 SS-20 missiles targetted on Europe. Ambassador Nitze, although agreeing to forward Ambassador Kvitsinsky's suggestions to Washington, made clear that he thought it certain Washington would not convert a Soviet proposal into a US proposal.

Indeed, the Soviet suggestions are unacceptable. They do not change the consistent Soviet demand for a monopoly in longer-range land-based INF missiles. Under the proposals, the Soviet Union would retain at least 360 warheads targetted on Europe and an approximately equal number targetted on Asia. The US would have zero.

Also, although the Soviets have indicated that under their suggestion no specific mention would be made of British and French systems, in fact they are seeking compensation. First, they have demanded de facto compensation in the form of their monopoly of 360 warheads targetted on Europe. Second, they are seeking to include UK and French systems - also in some other arms control forum.

I greatly appreciate and value the close consultations which have developed within the Alliance in handling the INF issue. The Alliance has demonstrated a truly extraordinary depth of understanding and cohesion in difficult circumstances. As you know, I believe that the latest proposals we have advanced provide a sound basis for an agreement. The solidarity for the Alliance has provided the essential foundation for the negotiating effort from the beginning. On this basis, we are continuing our search for an equitable and verifiable outcome in Geneva.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

US Declassified

SECRET

Rec'd
11/19/83

Yame Minis
I have copied
this to the foreign office

Duty Clerk
11/19/83

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON
November 19, 1983

mt

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the
enclosed message from President Reagan regarding
INF.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price II

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M. P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

SECRET

US Declassified

Dear Margaret,

As you know, the Soviet Union has recently suggested in Geneva that, if the US were to propose equal reductions of 572 on each side, the Soviet Union would accept such a proposal. Now the Soviet Union has begun saying that the US negotiator, rather than their own, put forward these suggestions. This is a total fabrication.

The fact is that the Soviet negotiator approached Ambassador Nitze on instructions last Sunday with the suggestion that the US advance a proposal for "Equal Reductions" which would result in zero US deployments while leaving about 120 SS-20 missiles targeted on Europe. Ambassador Nitze, although agreeing to forward Ambassador Kvitsinsky's suggestions to Washington, made clear that he thought it certain Washington would not convert a Soviet proposal into a US proposal.

Indeed, the Soviet suggestions are unacceptable. They do not change the consistent Soviet demand for a monopoly in longer-range land-based INF missiles. Under the proposals, the Soviet Union would retain at least 360 warheads targeted on Europe and an approximately equal number targeted on Asia. The US would have zero.

Also, although the Soviets have indicated that under their suggestion no specific mention would be made of British and French systems, in fact they are seeking compensation. First, they have demanded de facto compensation in the form of their monopoly of 360 warheads targeted on Europe. Second, they are seeking to include UK and French systems - also in some other arms control forum.

I greatly appreciate and value the close consultations which have developed within the Alliance in handling the INF issue. The Alliance has demonstrated a truly extraordinary depth of understanding and cohesion in difficult circumstances. As you know, I believe that the latest proposals we have advanced provide a sound basis for an agreement. The solidarity for the Alliance has provided the essential foundation for the negotiating effort from the beginning. On this basis, we are continuing our search for an equitable and verifiable outcome in Geneva.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

The Foreign Office have been informed by Rome that Signor Craxi would like to speak to you on the telephone tomorrow to discuss INF. Mrs. Scrimgeour will be coming to see you at 1130 am. A suitable time might therefore be after lunch at 2.30 pm. We will commission briefing for this from the Foreign Office and Mr. Turnbull will listen in on the call.

Are you content for me to proceed with the arrangements?

Yes me

DUTY CLERK
19 November 1983

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR WRIGHT

MR JENKINS
 MR CARTLEDGE

ED/DEF DEPT
 ED/ACDD
 ED/SOV D
 ED/NAD
 ED/WED
 RESIDENT CLERK

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD

ED/DS17 MOD

ADVANCE COPY
 IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ROME 181600Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 590

OF 18 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS,
 UKDEL NATO, COPENHAGEN

NY TELNO 579: ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON INF

1. ON 16 NOVEMBER, AT THE END OF THE THREE DAY DEBATE, THE GOVERNMENT OBTAINED A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY OF 132 FOR ITS MOTION CONFIRMING ITALY'S INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENT AS PLANNED. NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES EMERGED BETWEEN THE COALITION PARTIES.
2. THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE DEBATE WERE DULL, AND THE GOVERNMENT BENCHES WERE AT TIMES ALMOST EMPTY. SPOKESMEN RESTATED THEIR PARTIES' RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN STANDARD TERMS. THE ONLY MOMENT OF TENSION (AND THEREFORE EXAGGERATED BY THE ITALIAN PRESS) WAS A SCUFFLE OUTSIDE PARLIAMENT BETWEEN POLICE AND PEACE DEMONSTRATORS (INCLUDING A FEW EXTREME LEFT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT). THE DEBATE CONCENTRATED ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES RATHER THAN ON THE DETAILED ARITHMETIC OF THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. LITTLE ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CRUISE MISSILES AT GREENHAM COMMON.
3. ON 16 NOVEMBER THE PCI SECRETARY, BERLINGUER, SUGGESTED THAT NATO'S INF DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE DELAYED, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE USSR SHOULD BEGIN DISMANTLING ITS SS20S. THIS NEW SUGGESTION, AND THE MODERATE TONE ADOPTED BY BERLINGUER, WAS IN CONTRAST TO THE TWO MOTIONS ALREADY PRESENTED BY THE PCI: ONE (LATER WITHDRAWN) HAD CALLED FOR ALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO BE

WITHDRAWN) HAD CALLED FOR ALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE OTHER (DEFEATED IN A SEPARATE VOTE) ASKED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSE CONTINUATION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS FOR A YEAR, IN WHICH TIME NO PERSHING II OR CRUISE DEPLOYMENTS WOULD BE MADE AND THE USSR WOULD ALSO FREEZE ITS SS20 DEPLOYMENT. BERLINGUER'S REFINEMENT OF THE PCI POSITION WAS WELCOMED BY SUBSEQUENT SPEAKERS FROM THE COALITION PARTIES.

4. IN HIS WINDING UP SPEECH CRAXI REPEATED THE STANDARD ARGUMENTS FOR DEPLOYING CRUISE MISSILES, QUOTING FROM REAGAN'S LETTER TO HIM TO DEMONSTRATE U S WILLINGNESS TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 420 WARHEADS FOR EACH SIDE. HE CRITICISED THOSE IN EUROPE (OBVIOUSLY A REFERENCE TO THE SPD) WHO HAD SINCE 1979 CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE DOUBLE DECISION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED FRENCH VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ENLARGED NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING THEIR SYSTEMS (NO DOUBT CRAXI HAD ONE EYE ON HIS SUMMIT WITH MITTERRAND, WHICH BEGAN IN VENICE YESTERDAY. FIRST REPORTS SUGGEST THAT MITTERRAND TURNED ENLARGED NEGOTIATIONS DOWN FLAT).

5. CRAXI MADE TWO POINTS IN REPLY TO BERLINGUER. FIRST, IN ITALY THERE WOULD BE A SLIGHT DELAY FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, AND THE MISSILES AT COMISO WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL MARCH 1984. SECOND, THE GOVERNMENT COULD SOUND OUT NATO ALLIES TO DISCOVER THEIR REACTION TO BERLINGUER'S SUGGESTION OF A DE FACTO POSTPONEMENT BALANCED BY SOVIET SS20 REDUCTIONS. CRAXI WAS CAREFUL NOT TO ENDORSE THE PCI PROPOSAL, AND SAID THAT ANY DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE A COLLECTIVE ONE BY NATO. THE PCI, ALTHOUGH STILL COMMITTED TO VOTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, WERE PLEASED WITH CRAXI'S RESPONSE AND IT SHOULD FOR A TIME REDUCE THE RISK OF FRICTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION OVER INF.

6. THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE CONTENT THAT THIS DEBATE CAUSED THEM SO LITTLE DIFFICULTY AND PROVED AGAIN THAT THEY HAVE A SOLID MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT IN FAVOUR OF DEPLOYMENT AT COMISO. CRAXI'S OWN PERFORMANCE WAS DETERMINED AND SKILFUL: IN PARTICULAR THIS GESTURE TOWARDS THE PCI HELPED TO DEFUSE THEIR OPPOSITION WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONCESSION OF SUBSTANCE. WE SHALL CHECK WITH THE MFA HOW HIS VAGUE UNDERTAKING TO CONSULT NATO ALLIES WILL BE PUT INTO PRACTICE, IF AT ALL: IT IS PROBABLE THAT AS ON OTHER OCCASIONS CRAXI'S PURPOSE WAS TACTICAL, TO OVERCOME A DOMESTIC DIFFICULTY, RATHER THAN TO LAUNCH A SERIOUS NEW PROPOSAL WITHIN NATO.

BRIDGES

NNNN

*A gesture of weakness which can
never be cloaked by skills*

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister's

July Clerk

Foreign and Commonwealth Office 18.11.83



London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1983

John Doe

MS

INF Negotiations: Soviet Manoeuvring

The Soviet Ambassador called on Mr Luce on 18 November to talk about the informal ideas which were floated in Geneva by the Soviet negotiator on 13 November. Under these ideas the number of SS20s facing Europe would be reduced to 122, a level somewhat lower than anything the Russians have already offered, but no Pershing II or cruise missiles would be allowed. The Americans briefed us in detail on the exchange very soon after it happened and said that having set them out, the Soviet negotiator asked the American, Nitze, to put them forward as his own. Other Allied Governments agree that the ideas are quite unacceptable. Following the leak of part of them by Chancellor Kohl on 17 November, we and other Foreign Ministries have been making this clear publicly.

Mr Popov, as the enclosed record shows, was adamant that the ideas came originally from Nitze and not the Russians. The Russians, he said, had expressed interest and the hope that they would see formal proposals containing them. The Soviet motive for turning the truth on its head is not clear yet. It is just possible that following the leak of the ideas by Chancellor Kohl, the Soviet negotiator and his backers in Moscow wished to protect themselves from others in the Soviet leadership who would conceivably have been opposed to the ideas. But this does not seem very likely. Our best guess at present is that the Russians are planning to publicise their claim that Nitze has put forward positive ideas when they leave the negotiating table in Geneva. They could allege that despite every effort by themselves, and even by the US negotiator, to reach a reasonable agreement, Washington had blocked all progress.

We know that the Russians have taken parallel action in Bonn and we expect them to act also in the capitals of the INF basing countries.

Mr Popov did not mention Greenham Common. Soviet statements in Moscow about INF are also avoiding any critical reference to the arrival of the first cruise missiles. This fits with the Soviet interest in focusing all attention on the arrival of Pershing II missiles in Germany next week.

/I am

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



The Foreign Secretary has not yet seen this letter or enclosure: I shall be submitting a copy to him in parallel this evening.

I am also sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram in Mr Heseltine's Office.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R B Bone'.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY RECORD OF CALL ON MR LUCE BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MR POPOV,
ABOUT INF AT NOON ON 18 NOVEMBER

1. Mr Popov said he was instructed to inform the Prime Minister urgently and confidentially that in Geneva the US negotiator had expressed to the Soviet negotiator some considerations about a possible compromise over the main outstanding issues.
2. The essence of Nitze's suggestion was that the United States would forego deployment of all 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would liquidate a corresponding number of its missiles, carrying 572 warheads. According to Nitze's calculations the Soviet Union would retain 122-127 SS20s which would approximately equate to the medium range missiles of the other, non-American, Allies. The question of what should be done about a possible increase in the forces of those other Allies would be left to other negotiations, for instance START.
3. Nitze had been told by the Soviet negotiator that the Soviet Union would be prepared to consider these ideas if they were officially tabled. At the same time he confirmed the amendments to the Soviet negotiating position put forward by Andropov in his Pravda interview of 27 October.
4. The Americans had not reacted officially to the Pravda interview. Instead the US delegation had officially tabled one clarification of the offer of an "interim agreement": a figure of 420 "missiles." Thus the Americans reaffirmed their plans to deploy missiles while proposing that the Soviet Union should disarm unilaterally. Whether or not there was an agreement, and whether or not the talks continued, depended entirely on the US side. The Russians had expressed their interest in Nitze's ideas and given the United States an opportunity to show goodwill and a serious interest in an agreement.
5. Mr Luce stressed the British Government's strong commitment to the search for balanced and verifiable arms control agreements. In their view these matters had to be discussed at the talks in Geneva

/where

where they would be put to the test. On the substance of an agreement the British concern was to avoid a monopoly for either side in classes of weapon under discussion. He hoped that the Russians would pursue the talks vigorously in Geneva. Would they continue to negotiate there?

6. Mr Popov said the Russians sought an agreement and had never aimed to have a monopoly in any kind of arms. The Soviet wish for the negotiations to continue had been proved through the Soviet proposals tabled. The British Government had acknowledged that a number of these as serious proposals. The Soviet Union was prepared to continue on condition that the other side was taking the negotiations seriously but they did not want to talk for the sake of talking or only to provide a cover for NATO's deployments.

7. The US delegation had taken a step backwards by repeating an unacceptable proposal officially very soon after Nitze had proposed unofficially his interesting ideas.

8. Mr Luce undertook to study what Mr Popov had said. The importance of the Geneva negotiations was paramount and the world would not understand if they were broken off. Mr Cartledge asked how the British Government should interpret the fact that ideas which they had understood to have been Soviet ones were being described by Mr Popov as coming from the Americans. Would these ideas be tabled formally by the Soviet Union at Geneva?

9. Mr Popov was adamant that the ideas put forward unofficially had come from the Americans. Reading from his telegram of instructions he said that the Americans had gone on to put forward officially a proposal which was practically the same as their long-standing one.

10. Mr Cartledge asked if the reference to considering increases in third country systems in the course of other negotiations such as START meant the Soviet Union accepted that British and French missiles were strategic. Mr Popov replied that they did not; there had been no change in the Soviet position about British forces. But Nitze's ideas could open up the way to the inclusion of British and French

/forces

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 172240Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1052 OF 17TH NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), WASHINGTON, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW.

MIPT: MITTERRAND: EAST/WEST AND DEFENCE ISSUES.

INF.

1. MITTERRAND GAVE A CLASSIC EXPOSE OF THE CASE FOR WESTERN INF DEPLOYMENT. THE SS20S CREATED AN IMBALANCE IN FAVOUR OF THE RUSSIANS. IF NOT CORRECTED, THIS WOULD TEND TO DECOUPLE EUROPE FROM THE US, GIVE THE RUSSIANS A REGIONAL SUPERIORITY AND ALLOW THEM TO ACHIEVE GAINS BY INTIMIDATION WHICH THEY COULD ONLY OTHERWISE MAKE BY WAR.
2. MITTERRAND EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO BREAK OFF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS PERSHING WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPLOYED (HE SPOKE ALMOST DISMISSIVELY ABOUT CRUISE). HOWEVER, HE DID NOT EXPECT THE BREAK TO LAST LONG. IN THE POST-PERSHING SITUATION A BALANCE WAS NEEDED AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AND BOTH SIDES WOULD NEED TO BE REASONABLE. HE (MITTERRAND) WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MAKE PROPOSALS BUILDING ON THE GENEVA RUBBLE.
3. MITTERRAND GAVE THE PACIFISTS SHORT SHRIFT (THOUGH HIS LANGUAGE WAS MORE RESTRAINED THAN THAT OF SOME GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN RECENTLY). THEIR SUGGESTION OF A FREEZE WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE ESSENTIAL BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE WORLD. IT WOULD MEAN CRYSTALLISING A DANGEROUS SITUATION. NO DOUBT THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION WHO WANTED PEACE BUT FOR THE MOMENT THE EAST WAS DEVELOPING ARMS WHILE THE WEST WAS DEVELOPING PACIFISM.
4. MITTERRAND WAS SCATHING ABOUT THE ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUSION OF FRENCH SYSTEMS AT GENEVA. THE 18 MISSILES IN SILOS ON THE PLATEAU D'ALBION COULD CONCEIVABLY BE REGARDED AS INTERMEDIATE BUT THE FRENCH SUBMARINES WERE PURELY STRATEGIC. IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS FOR THE SUPER-POWERS TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT FRENCH SUBMARINES WHEN THEY WERE NOT EVEN NEGOTIATING ABOUT THEIR OWN. IN THE LONG TERM, AS MITTERRAND HAD SAID AT THE UN, FRANCE AS ONE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD ALWAYS BE INTERESTED WHEN IT CAME TO TALKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT DISARMAMENT. BEFORE THAT POINT COULD BE REACHED, HOWEVER, THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE "CONSIDERABLY" THE EVER-INCREASING NUMBER OF THEIR MISSILES. THERE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROHIBITED AND RESEARCH ON ANTI-SUBMARINE, ANTI-MISSILE AND ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS WOULD ALL HAVE TO STOP.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. NONE OF THIS IS ORIGINAL. MITTERRAND DID, HOWEVER, SEEM TO BE SAYING SOMETHING NEW WHEN HE WELCOMED THE LATEST ANDROPOV PROPOSALS (MY TELNO 1047). HIS WORDS COULD BE READ IN MORE THAN ONE WAY BUT THE MOST OBVIOUS INTERPRETATION IS THAT TO MITTERRAND'S MIND, ANDROPOV'S COMING DOWN TO THE FIGURE OF 122, I.E. LESS THAN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF UK AND FRENCH MISSILES, REPRESENTED A WELCOME STEP AWAY FROM RUSSIAN INSISTENCE OF TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS. WE SHALL SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM THE QUAI.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE.

6. ON THIS MITTERRAND WAS STUDIOUSLY VAGUE. IT WAS A FINE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE. BUT BEFORE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, EUROPE WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT OBSTACLES DERIVING FROM THE LAST WAR, NOTABLY GERMANY'S PROHIBITION FROM HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY VIGILANT ON THAT POINT AND THEY WERE NOT THE ONLY ONES. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MOVE FORWARD PRUDENTLY TO AVOID BUILDING ON SAND, CAUSING NEW EXPLOSIONS AND CONSECRATING THE YALTA CARVE-UP. THE IDEA OF JOINT EUROPEAN DEFENCE SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND: BUT EUROPE SHOULD FIRST SETTLE ITS PRESENT PROBLEMS AND MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS PROCUREMENT. THEN, OR PERHAPS EVEN NOW, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LOOK AT ''COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGIES''. FRANCE WAS ALREADY GOING DOWN THAT PATH: MITTERRAND HAD REVIVED THE MILITARY CLAUSE OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY AND ALSO ''OPENED MILITARY CONVERSATIONS WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN BRITAIN''. FRANCE WAS ALSO NOW BUILDING UP A RAPID INTERVENTION FORCE WHICH COULD ACT IN GERMANY. BUT THERE WAS NO WAY IN WHICH FRANCE COULD ENSURE THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE.

7. IN DEFINING THE MISSION OF THE FRENCH DETERRENT MITTERRAND HAD SAID THAT IT WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT ALONE TO DECIDE WHETHER A PARTICULAR EXTERNAL THREAT DIRECTLY THREATENED FRANCE. THIS WAS AMBIGUOUS, HE ADMITTED, BUT IT HAD TO BE SO AS THE PRESIDENT HAD TO HAVE A CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

8. WHILE TAKING AN ESSENTIALLY TOUGH LINE, MITTERRAND MADE SEVERAL POLITE GENUFLECTIONS IN THE RUSSIANS' DIRECTION. HE RULED OUT A MEETING WITH ANDROPOV PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING'S BUT DID NOT RULE IT OUT AFTERWARDS IF IT COULD HELP PEACE.

PETRIE
STANDARD
DEF D
WED
NAD

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

ADDITIONAL DISTN
START

COPIES TO
MR COLES NO10 DOWNING ST



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 November, 1983

John Tanner,

*A.S.C. ²⁰/₄
h-a.*

INF: Romanian Initiative

The Prime Minister might be interested in an analysis of the messages which President Ceausescu of Romania has sent to Western leaders on INF.

On 5 November HM Ambassador, along with some of his NATO colleagues, was summoned by the Romanian Foreign Minister and asked to convey a message from President Ceausescu to Mrs Thatcher. Ceausescu had sent proposals to President Reagan and Andropov which he now wished to pass to other NATO allies. These were that:

- (a) in exchange for non-deployment of new NATO missiles, the Soviet Union should destroy its SS20s;
- (b) French and British missiles should not be included in the calculation of the balance of forces in Europe at this stage, but should be taken into consideration when negotiations took place on the wider question of nuclear disarmament;
- (c) a meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers should be held;
- (d) a US-Soviet summit should also be considered;
- (e) at the very least, negotiations at Geneva should not be broken off.

By 8 November Ceausescu had sent a letter to Chancellor Kohl. This appears to contain significant differences compared to that passed orally to HM Ambassador. The main points in it were: that the West should abandon deployment or delay it until 1984 while negotiations continued and that the Russians should destroy 'the greater part' of their SS20s. The wording of Ceausescu's message to President Reagan was:

'It is essential to reach agreement providing for the halting of deployment of new US missiles and for the withdrawal and destruction in totality or in the greatest part of Soviet missiles'.

It is clear from accounts of what other allies have received that the Romanians are sending different signals. The obfuscation is probably intentional.



The important point which is clear from the messages is the exclusion of British and French systems from the INF negotiations.

In judging how much weight to place on what the Romanians are up to we need to assess whether they are playing their customary role in the Warsaw Pact or whether they are in fact acting as stalking horse for the Russians. Moscow telno 1283 of 10 November (enclosed) addressed this in detail. A final assessment must await analysis of a possible new Soviet negotiating move of which details are just beginning to emerge from Geneva; at first sight it seems to have something in common with the Romanian proposals.

Our public line so far has been:

- (a) to note that at long last a Warsaw Pact country has recognised that there can be no place in the INF negotiations for British and French systems; but
- (b) there can be no question of delaying INF deployment beyond the end of this year unless the Russians agree to the zero option;
- (c) we will continue to pursue a negotiated settlement after first deployments.

There is some mileage in underlining point (a) above, although the arguments on why British and French systems should be excluded from the INF negotiations are widely accepted, and we need to take care to avoid emphasis being placed on the second barrel of the Romanian argument; viz that a place be found for them in subsequent disarmament negotiations.

As we understand it the Prime Minister has not received any written confirmation of Ceausescu's message, and, unless she does so we would propose to give the Romanians a brief oral response on the lines above.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CATF



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-830 7022 218 6169

D/S of S/PQ 7730

14th November 1983

Dear John,

A.J.C. 14/11

f.a.

DELIVERY OF CRUISE MISSILES
TO RAF GREENHAM COMMON

Further to Richard Mottram's letter earlier today (not to all copy-addressees), I attach two copies of the draft Statement which Mr Heseltine intends to make to the House this afternoon on the delivery of cruise missiles to RAF Greenham Common.

Copies of this letter go to Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's office), David Heyhoe (Lord Privy Seal's office), Murdo MacLean (Chief Whip's office) (6 copies), David Beamish (Lords Whips office) (8 copies), Roger Bone (FCO), Bernard Ingham and Richard Hatfield (Sir Robert Armstrong's office). I am sending copies separately to the Speaker's Secretary.

Yours ever,

(B P NEALE)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ON CRUISE MISSILE DELIVERIES

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about preparations for the operational deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom.

On 31st October, this House reaffirmed by a majority of 144 its support for the NATO 1979 twin track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces, its backing for the West's efforts to achieve a balanced and verifiable agreement at the Geneva negotiations, and confirmed that in the absence of agreement on the zero option cruise missiles must be operationally deployed in the United Kingdom at the end of 1983.

In the course of that debate, I indicated that the initial supporting equipment for the first flight of cruise missiles had been arriving at RAF Greenham Common for some time, that further equipment, including the transporter-erector-launchers, would be arriving shortly, and that I would make a further statement when the missiles themselves arrived in this country. In honouring that commitment I should inform the House that, earlier today, the first cruise missiles were delivered by air to RAF Greenham Common.

The delivery of the missiles is wholly consistent with the Alliance decision, to achieve an initial operational capability by the end of 1983 in the absence of agreement on the zero option.

CONFIDENTIAL

Much work remains to be done - including the final assembly and testing of equipments and personnel training - before the missiles are operational.

I wish to emphasise that these continuing preparations for operational deployment do not in any way lessen NATO's commitment to negotiations or reduce the desire of the Alliance to reach agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union. The NATO deployment is planned to be completed over a 5-year period; it can be halted, modified or reversed at any time if results in Geneva warrant it.

But the fact remains that since the 1979 decision the Soviet Union has almost trebled - from 126 to 360 - the number of SS20 missiles it has deployed. Even since the debate on 31st October we assess that another nine missiles are operationally deployed, compared with the figures I gave the House on that occasion.

In contrast, I would remind the House that last month NATO Defence Ministers agreed to the most radical reduction in the number of nuclear warheads deployed in Europe that has ever taken place.

The effect of this decision will be to reduce the number of NATO nuclear warheads in Europe to their lowest level in 20 years, even if full deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles takes place. The number of these warheads will be reduced by one third from their December 1979 level, and the number of warheads for shorter-range systems will be reduced by one half.

The Government hopes that the Soviet Union will now respond positively to the radical proposals put forward by NATO for arms control.

That is our foremost hope.

But let me make it clear that this Government will remain resolute in its commitment to take those steps which are essential for the defence of this country and our allies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CCVTF



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01 ~~XXXX XXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/2/2

14th November 1983

Dear Roger.

DELIVERY OF CRUISE MISSILES TO RAF GREENHAM COMMON

As you know the first cruise missiles were delivered to RAF Greenham Common this morning. The Defence Secretary intends to inform the House this afternoon. I attach a draft statement which has been approved by Mr Heseltine. If you have any comments on the draft, I should be most grateful to have these if possible by 1130 this morning by telephone please.

I am copying this letter to John Coles, No 10, and Richard Hatfield, Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

R Bone Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ON CRUISE MISSILE DELIVERIES

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about preparations for the operational deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom.

On 31st October, this House reaffirmed by a majority of 144 its support for the NATO 1979 twin track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces, its backing for the West's efforts to achieve a balanced and verifiable agreement at the Geneva negotiations, and confirmed that in the absence of agreement on the zero option cruise missiles must be operationally deployed in the United Kingdom at the end of 1983.

In the course of that debate, I indicated that the initial supporting equipment for the first flight of cruise missiles had been arriving at RAF Greenham Common for some time, that further equipment, including the transporter-erector-launchers, would be arriving shortly, and that I would make a further statement when the missiles themselves arrived in this country. In honouring that commitment I should inform the House that, earlier today, the first cruise missiles were delivered by air to RAF Greenham Common.

The delivery of the missiles is wholly consistent with the Alliance decision, to achieve an initial operational capability by the end of 1983 in the absence of agreement on the zero option.

CONFIDENTIAL

Much work remains to be done - including the final assembly and testing of equipments and personnel training - before the missiles are operational.

I wish to emphasise that these continuing preparations for operational deployment do not in any way lessen NATO's commitment to negotiations or reduce the desire of the Alliance to reach agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union. The NATO deployment is planned to be completed over a 5-year period; it can be halted, modified or reversed at any time if results in Geneva warrant it.

But the fact remains that since the 1979 decision the Soviet Union has almost trebled - from 126 to 360 - the number of SS20 missiles it has deployed. Even since the debate on 31st October another nine missiles have been added to the figures I gave the House on that occasion.

In contrast, I would remind the House that last month NATO Defence Ministers agreed to the most radical reduction in the number of nuclear warheads deployed in Europe that has ever taken place.

The effect of this decision will be to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in Europe to their lowest level in 20 years, even if full deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles takes place.

The number of warheads in Europe will be reduced by one third from their December 1979 level, and the number of warheads for shorter-range systems will be reduced by one half.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Government sincerely hopes that the Soviet Union will now respond positively to the radical proposals put forward by NATO for arms control and for reducing the nuclear stockpile in Europe.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

FIVE 84

~~Rf~~

29

From the Private Secretary

14 November, 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan which states that he intends to authorise the US negotiator in Geneva to propose a new figure of 420 warheads for a global ceiling at his meeting early this week with the Soviet negotiator.

Since this decision appears to be the outcome of consultations and the President does not ask for further views, I shall assume, unless you advise to the contrary, that we need not contemplate prolonging this correspondence.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

No reply required

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

28

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S November 14, 1983

PERSONAL MESSAGE


cc MASTER
OPS

SERIAL No. T 182/83

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed message from President Reagan regarding INF.

Sincerely,


Edward J. Streater
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

US Declassified

SECRET

Prime Secretary

A.S.C. $\frac{14}{11}$

Dear Margaret:

I believe the strong support received from Allied governments and publics for our negotiating position was instrumental in producing the limited movement in the Soviet position outlined by General Secretary Andropov October 26.

Clearly, however, that Soviet position fails to meet our criteria for an acceptable agreement. It would preserve a substantial and threatening Soviet monopoly in LRINF missiles, bar NATO deployments, demand compensation for the independent nuclear forces of third countries, and rejects equal global limits on LRINF missiles. Ambassador Nitze is pressing his Soviet counterpart to explain other important ambiguities and apparent shortcomings in the Soviet position.

Despite the failure of the Soviet Union to move on the crucial issues in the negotiation, I know you share my belief that we should make every reasonable effort to achieve an agreement this year. Based on my own review of the situation, the results of our most recent NATO ministerials, last week's Special Consultative Group meeting -- and Deputy Secretary Dam's consultations in your capital -- I have concluded that it would be useful in the near future to elaborate further on my September initiatives by indicating to the Soviet Union and our own publics a specific equal level of global LRINF deployments which would be acceptable to us.

I have in mind informing the Soviet negotiators that while the U.S. continues to prefer the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles, and while we remain prepared to discuss other interim global ceilings on such missiles, the U.S. would be prepared to accept an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads. This would equate to a global limit of 140 of the Soviet three-warhead SS-20 missiles, which is, as you will recall, the number to which they have proposed to limit their SS-20 force in Europe. The U.S. would reiterate its willingness, under such a ceiling, not to offset the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by U.S. deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe. We would also reiterate our willingness to distribute the reductions to be made from planned levels of forces between both the Pershing II ballistic missile and GLCM deployments, in an appropriate manner.

SECRET

I believe such an elaboration of our proposal would be a further demonstration of Allied flexibility and would be an integral part of the framework set out in the March proposal for an interim agreement involving reductions to equal global ceilings of warheads on LRINF missile launchers.

I intend to authorize Paul Nitze to propose this new figure for a global ceiling of 420 warheads at his next meeting with the Soviet negotiator, which will occur early this week. I am not planning to give this move any publicity -- but would have no objection if, in the course of your upcoming Parliamentary debates on INF, you alluded to the fact that the U.S. has taken yet another step in an effort to secure an INF agreement in Geneva.

The readiness of the West to continue negotiating, and to advance constructive new proposals, stands in sharp contrast to the crude threats from the Soviet Union to break off the talks. We must not be distracted by such threats, and we must ensure that our publics understand the efforts we are making to achieve a more stable and secure peace. However, we must be equally clear to all concerned that in the absence of an agreement which meets our criteria, NATO will deploy its LRINF missiles as planned and on schedule. Any delay at this time would undercut the proposals for such an agreement.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

CONFIDENTIAL



CC MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 November, 1983

INF

The Netherlands Prime Minister spoke on the telephone to the Prime Minister at 1700 hrs this afternoon.

Mr. Lubbers referred to Mr. Dam's visit to The Hague where the state of INF negotiations had been discussed. Following that visit Mr. Lubbers had had further discussions with his own Ministerial colleagues as a result of which he had spoken to Chancellor Kohl earlier today. His purpose in ringing the Prime Minister was to ask whether it would be worthwhile tabling the "Walk in the Woods" proposal.

The Prime Minister said that this would not be a good move. The essential element of that proposal was that the deployment of Pershings should be delayed. It was vital that the initial deployment went ahead. If Pershings were delayed, the United Kingdom would be alone in deploying missiles at the end of this year. The Soviet Union would have won.

Mr. Lubbers referred to deployment by Italy but the Prime Minister pointed out that Italian deployment would not take place until next year. She reiterated that it was vital that the first tranche of Pershings should be deployed and that, if there were any interim agreement short of the zero option, Pershings and Cruise should be deployed in the same ratio as was envisaged for the total deployment. Adoption of the "Walk in the Woods" proposal would have a devastating effect.

Mr. Lubbers said that he concluded that, if this proposal was tabled, the Prime Minister considered that we should reject it. The Prime Minister replied that no one was likely to table it

CONFIDENTIAL

/since

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

since it was the Americans who were negotiating in Geneva. Mr. Lubbers said that the Soviet Union might table such a proposal. The Prime Minister replied that it would suit their book to do so.

After a brief discussion of other matters, the discussion ended at 1707 hrs.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

DVF 0 113/10

LIC NR 827/10

DD 101800Z FCO

GRS 225

IMMEDIATE

27

ADVANCE COPY

SECRET

ESKBY 101800Z

FM ROME 101630Z NOV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 572
OF 10 NOVEMBER 1983



No 10 D.S.T.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM CARTLEDGE

INF NUMBERS

1. BURT MADE IT CLEAR DURING TODAY'S SCG MEETING THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN IN WASHINGTON ON WHETHER TO FILL OUT THE U S NEGOTIATING POSITION ON INF WITH THE ILLUSTRATIVE NUMBERS WHICH DAM MENTIONED TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 07 NOVEMBER. HE DID COVER THIS GROUND IN SOME DETAIL IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION, AT WHICH IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE ISSUE. BUT THE CANADIANS (AS A NON-STATIONING COUNTRY) DO NOT ATTEND THE RESTRICTED SESSIONS: AND WE CHECKED WITH THE AMERICANS THAT THE CANADIANS HAVE HAD NO SPECIAL BRIEFING ON NUMBERS. ALTHOUGH, THEREFORE, THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO BE AWARE THAT THE QUESTION IS STILL UNRESOLVED IN WASHINGTON, SHE SHOULD NOT MENTION THE SUGGESTED NUMBERS OR RATIOS TO MR TRUDEAU WHEN SHE MEETS HIM ON 11 NOVEMBER.
2. IF, AGAINST EXPECTATION, MR TRUDEAU DOES RAISE THE MATTER, THE PRIME MINISTER COULD TAKE THE SAME LINE AS SHE TOOK WITH -AM, IE THAT THE KIND OF NUMBERS WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE THINKING -F GIVE US NO DIFFICULTY, ALTHOUGH ANYTHING LOWER MIGHT CALL -UESTION THE NECESSITY FOR ANY DEPLOYMENT.
3. PLEASE COPY TO 10 DOWNING STREET.

RIDGES

-NNN H

-CN PARA 1 LAST LINE MR. TRUDEAU

GR600

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 101500Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1283 OF 10 NOV 83

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATES' PARTY),

INFO PRIORITY BUCHAREST, MODUK (DS17),

INFO ROUTINE ROME, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS.

ROMANIAN PROPOSALS ON INF.

1. I HAVE NOT SEEN THE TEXTS OF CEAUSESCU'S MESSAGES TO WESTERN LEADERS. BUT I NOTE THAT THERE ARE AMBIGUITIES IN THE MESSAGE TO REAGAN (WASHINGTON TELNO 3364) AND THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MESSAGES TO REAGAN AND KOHL AND THE INFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF BUCHAREST TEL NO 248 THAT THE ROMANIANS ENVISAGE THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF SS-20S. IT IS ALSO NOT CLEAR TO ME WHETHER CEAUSESCU INTENDS THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD UNDERTAKE A UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN SS-20S IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.
2. THE KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER THE ROMANIANS ARE PLAYING THE MAVERICK IN THE WARSAW PACT OR ACTING AS STALKING HORSE FOR THE RUSSIANS.
3. IF THE FORMER, THE US SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO DISCOURAGE PUBLICITY SEEMS MISGUIDED (UKDEL NATO TELNO 261), THE MORE SO SINCE THE WESTERN PRESS IS ALREADY AWARE OF CEAUSESCU'S INITIATIVE. THE INITIATIVE WOULD SEEM TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PAY THE RUSSIANS BACK SOME OF THEIR OWN MEDICINE AND TO PROMOTE AN EXERCISE IN WEDGE-DRIVING WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT WHICH MIGHT EVEN HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE SOVIET POSITION.
4. AS WE HAVE REPORTED (MOSCOW TEL NO 1224), THE ROMANIAN EMBASSY HERE HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ROMANIAN POSITION ON INF HAS LED TO STRAIN IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR ROMANIAN CONTACTS HAVE SINCE SAID THAT AT THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN SOFIA, THE RUSSIANS SHOT DOWN A ROMANIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO A WIDER NEGOTIATING FORM: THAT THE KEY, BUT AMBIGUOUS, PASSAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE FUTURE OF THE INF TALKS AFTER DEPLOYMENT HAD BEGUN WAS A DIFFICULT COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE ROMANIANS AND THE RUSSIANS: AND THAT THE ROMANIANS REFUSED TO AGREE TO ANY REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO COUNTER-MEASURES. ON COUNTER MEASURES, THERE IS ALSO SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE HUNGARIANS AND POSSIBLY ALSO THE BULGARIANS THEMSELVES HAVE ALSO OPPOSED SOVIET PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE MISSILES INTO BULGARIA (MOSCOW TELNO 1214, PARA 4). DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE PACT OVER INF VIE WITH ANDROPOV'S HEALTH AS POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF A WARSAW PACT SUMMIT REPORTEDLY PLANNED

CONFIDENTIAL

(FOR.

Defence
WF - with ATC

START ADVANCE COPIES 18 ⁽¹⁹⁾

A

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
~~MR JAMES~~
MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
HD/DS17 MOD

HD/DEF DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOV D
HD/NAD
HD/WED
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~



IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 081000Z

FM BONN 080845Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

Handwritten scribble

TELEGRAM NUMBER 999 OF 8 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS17, PS/S OF S) BUCHAREST WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO MOSCOW PARIS
INFO ROUTINE THE HAGUE BRUSSELS ROME

INF: NEW US PROPOSAL AND ROMANIAN LETTER

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON 7 NOVEMBER TO MARK HIS RETURN FROM HIS ASIAN TOUR, FEDERAL CHANCELLOR KOHL MADE TWO NEW POINTS ON INF:

- A) HE CONFIRMED THAT HE EXPECTED THE US TO MAKE A FURTHER, 'NUMERICALLY DEFINED' NEGOTIATING OFFER IN THE GENEVA INF TALKS (NB: KOHL WILL BE SEEING DAM ONLY TODAY):
- B) HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER DATED 4 NOVEMBER FROM PRESIDENT CEAUDESCU, ADDRESSED ALSO TO ANDROPOV, IN WHICH THE ROMANIAN LEADER - ALONGSIDE OTHER, UNACCEPTABLE SUGGESTIONS - PROPOSED THAT UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INF TALKS AND REMITTED TO A SUBSEQUENT FORUM WHERE FRANCE AND BRITAIN COULD PARTICIPATE. KOHL SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE LETTER WITH THE ALLIES.

2. KOHL ALSO SAID HE STILL SAW SCOPE FOR LAST-MINUTE PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS: AND HE DID NOT EXPECT AN 'ICE AGE' IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AFTER INF DEPLOYMENT.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE IMMEDIATE TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

MALLABY

FOBO 012/09

pp BONN

GRS 400

VCONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 082345Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3364 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17) ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, BUCHAREST
MOSCOW, PARIS

INFO SAVING THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS

BUCHAREST TELNO 248 AND BONN TELNOS 999 AND 1001: CEAUSESCU'S
LETTERS ON INF

1. AS TRANSLATED BY THE US EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST, THE KEY PASSAGE
IN CEAUSESCU'S MESSAGE TO REAGAN IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE HALT
OF DEPLOYMENT OF NEW US MISSILES AND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL AND
DESTRUCTION - IN TOTALITY OR IN THE GREATEST PART - OF SOVIET
MISSILES, LEAVING OTHER ASPECTS TO BE SETTLED AT OTHER STAGES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE GENERAL
RELATION OF FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THUS IT COULD BE
AGREED THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH MISSILES AND ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
MEANS OF DELIVERY BE TAKEN INTO CALCULATION IN THE GENERAL RATIO
OF FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND BE MADE THE OBJECT OF
SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN WOULD ALSO
PARTICIPATE.

UNQUOTE

THE LETTER GOES ON TO SAY THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA MUST
CONTINUE AND (SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTING THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE)
TO REHEARSE SOME ASPECTS OF ANDROPOV'S PRAVDA INTERVIEW OF 27
OCTOBER. THE ROMANIANS HAVE TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT A QUOTE
SIMILAR MESSAGE UNQUOTE HAS BEEN SENT TO ANDROPOV. THE ROMANIANS
DID NOT MENTION THE MESSAGE TO KOHL, ABOUT WHICH THE AMERICANS
HAVE LEARNED ONLY FROM THE GERMANS. THE MESSAGE TO REAGAN
DOES NOT PROPOSE A MEETING OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS
OR A US/SOVIET SUMMIT.

2. THE PRELIMINARY STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW IS THAT, IN SPITE OF
THE AMBIGUITIES IN THE LANGUAGE, CEAUSESCU'S LETTER GOES BEYOND
THE SOVIET POSITION IN SUGGESTING THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA
SHOULD NOT BE BROKEN OFF, AND THAT THE PROBLEM OF UK AND FRENCH
SYSTEMS CAN BE LEFT UNTIL A LATER STAGE. NO DOUBT DELIBERATELY,
HOWEVER, IT IS HIGHLY AMBUGUOUS ON THE DRAW-DOWN IN SOVIET INF.

3. BURT IS IN EUROPE WITH DAM. HE WILL NO DOUBT WANT TO DISCUSS
HANDLING OF THE ROMANIAN LETTERS IN THE SCG ON 10 NOVEMBER.

FCO PASS SAVING THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS

WRIGHT

26



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 November 1983

Jan Shaw

NR 8/11

Soviet Attitude to INF Negotiations

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware, in the light of her forthcoming discussions at the Anglo-German Summit, of the latest indications from the INF negotiations in Geneva about Soviet intentions there. For some time now, in discussing the future work schedule of the negotiations, the Russians have been agreeing to future meetings in Geneva on a more or less week by week basis within the current round, avoiding committing themselves to more than a few days ahead. Earlier this week they gave the clearest hints so far that their attendance at the INF negotiating table in Geneva would continue only so long as no cruise missiles had arrived in Europe; and that they expected that the first cruise missile deliveries will be to the UK. If we take this linkage at face value, it means that the Russians may be expected to walk out from the first INF plenary scheduled after the arrival of cruise missiles at Greenham Common, which would be Thursday 17 November.

In discussion with Herr Kohl, therefore, we suggest that the Prime Minister might underline the way in which a Soviet reaction of this kind could be turned to Western advantage. The West will be able to point to the contrast between the Soviet desire to impress Western opinion with the reasonableness of the Soviet approach to negotiations and their abrupt refusal to continue to talk. She might point out that the whole credibility of the Soviet negotiating position would be eroded by the fact that, while expecting the US to take seriously the latest elements formulated publicly by Mr Andropov (in his Pravda interview on 27 October), the Russians had refused to do us the courtesy of remaining at the negotiating table to answer Western queries about the Soviet position. We take it that the Germans would agree that this contrasts sharply with the readiness of the US, with Alliance backing, to negotiate seriously for two years notwithstanding the deployment of an extra Soviet SS20 once every five days throughout that period.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence and to David Goodall in the Cabinet Office.

Jan Shaw
[Signature]

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

Defence (ASC)

PS
LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
HD/DS17 MOD

HD/DEF DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOV D
HD/NAD
HD/WED
RESIDENT CLERK

[Handwritten mark]

GRS 120

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 041610Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 985 OF 04 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MODUK (DS 17)

INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS THE HAGUE ROME UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW

OUR TELNO. 955 AND TELCON. GOZNEY/MISS BAILES: BUNDESTAG
DEBATE ON INF: LATEST POSITION

1. THE ALTERNATIVE TIMINGS FOR THE DEBATE CURRENTLY ON THE
TABLE ARE 21-22 NOVEMBER (THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL) AND 21-23
NOVEMBER (THE SPD/GREENS' DEMAND). THE 'COUNCIL OF ELDERS'
WHICH FIXES BUNDESTAG ARRANGEMENTS BEHIND THE SCENES WILL MEET ON
10 NOVEMBER AND THE GOVERNMENT HOPE THEN TO USE THEIR MAJORITY
ON THE 'COUNCIL' TO WIN ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR TIMETABLE. THE US
HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY CAN ARRANGE MISSILE DELIVERIES TO FIT
IN WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S PLAN, I.E. NO ARRIVALS BEFORE THE
NIGHT OF 22 NOVEMBER.

MALLABY

RT

ADVANCE COPIES 18

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
HD/DS17 MOD

HD/DEF DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOV D
HD/NAD
HD/WED
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 031930Z

FM COPENHAGEN 031825Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 239 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, OSLO, BONN, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

MY TELNO 230 (NOT TO ALL): DENMARK/INF

SUMMARY

1. I ATTENDED THE FOLKETING DEBATE ON 3 NOVEMBER. THE PRIME MINISTER AND ELLEMANN-JENSEN SPOKE ROBUSTLY ENOUGH AGAINST THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' ANTI-INF RESOLUTION, BUT IN THE END IT WAS PASSED: WITH THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES WEAKLY ABSTAINING. (THEIR LINE WAS THAT TO BE VOTED DOWN COULD HAVE BROUGHT IN A WORSE GOVERNMENT.) THE RESULT MUST BE THAT DENMARK WILL BE ACTIVELY TROUBLESOME IN NATO.

WITH THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES WERE... (THAT TO BE VOTED DOWN COULD HAVE BROUGHT IN A WORSE GOVERNMENT.)
THE RESULT MUST BE THAT DENMARK WILL BE ACTIVELY TROUBLESOME IN
NATO.

DETAIL

2. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' RESOLUTION WAS AS FOLLOWS:

'THE FOLKETING INSTRUCTS THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AN ACTIVE EFFORT TO PUT A BRAKE ON THE BUILD UP OF ARMAMENTS IN EAST AND WEST FOLLOWING THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN THE RESOLUTION OF 26 MAY 1983 AND CONFIRMED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT, THE GOVERNMENT IS URGED TO TAKE AN IMMEDIATE INITIATIVE TO BRING NATO COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE A NEW POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE INSTALLATION OF THE MISSILES BEGINS.'

IT WAS CARRIED BY 85 VOTES (SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND OTHER SOCIALIST PARTIES AND RADICALS) TO 10 (PROGRESS PARTY). THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS TO ABSTAIN. (THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS EVIDENTLY HAD ENSURED IN ADVANCE THAT THE WORDING WAS AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO WITHOUT PROVOKING THE MINORITY GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION.)

3. THE RESOLUTION DOES NOT TIE THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDS ABOUT HOW NATO CAN RE-ASSESS NEGOTIATIONS; THE NEXT MEETING OF SCG MAY BE ENOUGH. BUT WORKING ACTIVELY FOR THE 26 MAY RESOLUTION (EXTENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS, POSTPONEMENT OF DEPLOYMENT, MERGER OF INF AND START AND INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS) MUST GIVE THEM TRICKY PROBLEMS.

4. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER EMPLOYED MANY OF THE ARGUMENTS USED BY MINISTERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 31 OCTOBER. ELLEMANN-JENSEN EMPHASISED THAT THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS EXACTLY THAT: DEPLOYMENT AND NEGOTIATION COULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY. DEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT MEAN THE END OF EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE. HE THEN CONTRASTED US CONSTRUCTIVENESS WITH SOVIET INFLEXIBILITY, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE NEGATIVE REACTIONS HE HAD OBTAINED ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW.

5. ELLEMANN-JENSEN DEPLOYED THE STANDARD ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS; BUT LATER IN AN UNFORTUNATE PASSAGE DEALING WITH THE SITUATION IF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BREAK DOWN HE SAID: 'IT IS ALSO A QUESTION OF HOW THE INF NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE CONTINUED AND IF THEY COLLAPSE WHETHER WE SHOULD TRY TO COMBINE THEM WITH START. IT JUST MIGHT HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE FRENCH AND BRITISH

WHETHER WE SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THEM WITH STAFF. IT COULD BE A
HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE FRENCH AND BRITISH
NUCLEAR FORCES.' THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP BY THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS.

6. ELLEMANN-JENSEN MAY ARGUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT GOT THEMSELVES
OFF LIGHTLY BUT HE WILL EXPECT YOU TO REACT FIRMLY TO ANY IDEA OF
CALLING EMERGENCY MEETINGS OF NATO. THIS CAN ONLY HELP THE GOVERN-
MENT WHEN THEY FACE PARLIAMENT AGAIN ON THIS SUBJECT ON
10 NOVEMBER. BUT THEIR ACCEPTANCE NOW OF AN OBLIGATION TO WORK
ACTIVELY FOR THE 26 MAY RESOLUTION (PARA 2 ABOVE) MUST MEAN THAT
THEY WILL BE EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME PARTNERS IN NATO.

7. FCO PSE PASS SAVING.

MELLON

NNNN

CCCN : PARA 4 LINE 7 AGAIN

INFLEXIBILITY, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE HNEGATIVE REACTIONS HE HAD
OBTAINED.. ETC

SENT//RECD AT 031848Z JK//JM

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, RESOLUTION FOR THE LONDON
CONFERENCE

AND

THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO VOLUNTARILY PROBBESOME IN

THIS TO BE ADDED DOWN-COURT HAVE BEEN IN A HOUSE BOARDS-REAR

THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL IN THIS LINE AND

BE VERY CLEAR WITH THE GOVERNMENT THAT IN THE END WE ARE PASSED

THE DIFFERENCE - JENSEN SHOULD BE VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE SOCIAL

DEMOCRATS' ATTITUDE THE LOCKING DEBATE ON 3 NOVEMBER THE GOVERNMENT

SHOULD

SECRET

25



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-~~962 2022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/2/2

1st November 1983

A. J. C. ¹/₁₁
h.a.

Dear David,

INF DELIVERY TIMETABLE

I understand that the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister have agreed that no record should be circulated around Whitehall of Mr Heseltine's conversations at Montebello about the timetable for deliveries of INF equipment to this country but that you should hold a record which can be consulted by those with a need to know. I am therefore enclosing for you only a summary of Mr Heseltine's three conversations about this matter with Mr Weinberger on 27th/28th October, at two of which Dr Woerner was also present.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and Roger Bone (FCO).

Yours ever

Richard Mottram


(R C MOTTRAM).

A D S Goodall Esq CMG

SECRET

Defence,
INF,
PT ~~B~~

1-1 NOV 1983



1
11 . 2 3 A

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 271800Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 955 OF 27 OCTOBER

AND TO DESKBY 280800Z OTTAWA (FOR DELEGATION TO NPG)

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON MOSCOW MODUK (DS 17)

INFO SAVING CHCC(G)

*Mr. Heselbine will
have seen this.*

A.S.C. 45

INFO: FORTHCOMING BUNDESTAG DEBATE

1. THE TIMING OF THIS DEBATE WHICH COULD AFFECT THE FRG DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE, HAS NOT YET BEEN FINALLY SETTLED. IT HAD BEEN FIXED FOR 21 NOVEMBER, AND PLANNED AS A ONE-DAY AFFAIR: BUT SPD LEADER VOGEL ASKED THE CHANCELLOR LAST WEEK TO EXTEND IT TO TWO FULL DAYS (TORRY'S TELELETTER OF 19 OCTOBER TO MUNRO).
2. THE CDU PRAESIDIUM DISCUSSED VOGEL'S REQUEST LAST WEEK. THEY WERE OPPOSED TO LETTING THE DEBATE RUN BEYOND THE DEADLINE OF 2400 HOURS ON 21 NOVEMBER, AFTER WHICH IT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH THE AMERICANS THAT DEPLOYMENT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BEGIN. BUT THEY ALSO FELT THAT TO REJECT THE SPD REQUEST OUTRIGHT MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING AFRAID OF FULLER DEBATE, AND THUS CAUSE POLITICAL DAMAGE. THEY THEREFORE INSTRUCTED THE CDU WHIPS TO EXPLORE WITH THE OPPOSITION THE POSSIBILITY OF STARTING THE DEBATE ON 17 NOVEMBER, BREAKING OFF FOR THE SPD, FDP AND GREEN PARTY CONFERENCES ON 18-20 NOVEMBER, AND RESUMING AND CONCLUDING THE DEBATE ON 21 NOVEMBER.
3. THE SPD HAVE NOW REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL, ARGUING THAT THEY MUST HOLD THEIR PARTY CONFERENCE BEFORE THE START OF THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE. THEY ARE THREATENING THAT, UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT AGREE TO A 2/3 DAY DEBATE STARTING ON 21 NOVEMBER, THEY WILL FILIBUSTER TO PREVENT A BUNDESTAG VOTE BEFORE THE 21 NOVEMBER DEADLINE. THIS IS AN EMPTY THREAT AS THE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE POWER TO TERMINATE A BUNDESTAG DEBATE WHEN THEY WISH. BUT THE CDU STILL THINK IT IMPORTANT TO BE SEEN TO ALLOW FULL PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION, AND WOULD PREFER TO HANDLE THE DEBATE ON AGREED CROSS-PARTY LINES IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.
4. THE CDU/CSU HAVE THEREFORE NOW PROPOSED A 'FINAL' COMPROMISE, UNDER WHICH THE DEBATE WOULD BEGIN ON 21 NOVEMBER AND CONTINUE UNTIL 2100 ON 22 NOVEMBER. THE OPPOSITION ARE STILL CONSIDERING THIS. THE GREENS ARE BOUND TO REJECT IT: THE CDU/CSU HOPE THAT THE SPD WILL ACCEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY WHETHER POSTPONING THE END OF THE DEBATE TO THE TIME NOW PROPOSED WILL AFFECT THE US DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. BUT JENNINGER (MINISTER OF STATE AT THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE), WHO HINTED AT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO US EARLIER IN THE WEEK, CLAIMED THAT AS THE MISSILES WOULD NOT BE LEAVING THE US UNTIL THE MORNING OF 22 NOVEMBER THEY WOULD ONLY REACH THE FRG THAT EVENING IN ANY CASE. HE THEREFORE FELT THE GOVERNMENT HAD SOME EXTRA TIME TO PLAY WITH FOR THE DEBATE, THOUGH THE AMERICANS SEEMED BOUND TO GRUMBLE.

BONN WILL PASS SAVING TO CHCC(G).

TAYLOR

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
NEWS D

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL



24

cc MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD
Cabinet Office

Cruise Missile Deployment in the United Kingdom

The Prime Minister held a meeting here at 0930 on Wednesday, 26 October to discuss the above subject. The meeting was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord President of the Council, the Chief Whip and officials.

The Defence Secretary said that the delivery date of 1 November for the first batch of Cruise missiles arriving in this country had been prejudiced by its disclosure in The Guardian of 22 October and by the parliamentary reaction to the American military intervention in Grenada. It was essential for the United Kingdom to adhere to the agreed timetable for deployment, which meant that the missile system must be installed and operational by the end of the year. But there was no reason why adjustments should not be made to the delivery schedule. The Germans had already made it clear that it would be helpful to them if the missiles themselves (as distinct from related items of equipment) were not delivered until after the Bundestag debate on 21 November; and Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger had both been relaxed about this possibility when he had raised it with them in Washington in September. The aim should be to dissociate the delivery of the missiles from the parliamentary debate on deployment which was to take place on 31 October, and also to avoid prejudicing the outcome of the debate in the German Bundestag.

There was general agreement that it was now important in parliamentary terms that the missiles should not arrive here immediately after the parliamentary debate. But the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that any adjustment of the delivery schedule was likely to become known and would inevitably be linked with our disagreement with the United States over Grenada. It would be seen by the Americans as a form of retaliation; and it would pinpoint the issue of mutual confidence between the United States and her European allies in a way which could have damaging consequences for the Alliance.

/The

SECRET

-2-

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the disagreement over Grenada must not be allowed to affect or be thought to affect Britain's policies towards the Alliance. There was nothing unusual in disagreements between allies on issues where interests and perspectives differed. Nothing should be done which might encourage isolationist or anti-European tendencies in the United States. It must therefore be made clear to the Americans that it remained our common objective to ensure that Cruise missile deployment was implemented by the agreed date, and that the British Government was determined to stick to the timetable. Within that timetable, however, a new date should be found for the delivery of the missiles consistent with keeping their arrival well clear of the parliamentary debate on 1 November and with the need to have the missiles operational by the end of the year. The Parliamentary difficulties facing the West German Government were also relevant. The Defence Secretary should explore the matter personally with Mr. Weinberger in the margins of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting with a view to reaching agreement with him on a new delivery date which would meet the conditions she had described.

In view of the sensitivity of this document, I am not copying it to other recipients. I am, however, writing to the Private Secretaries of the Ministers who attended the meeting to say that the record is available in the Cabinet Office for consultation if necessary.

A. J. COLES

27 October, 1983

SECRET

The Defence Secretary said that the delivery date of 1 November for the first batch of cruise missiles arriving in this country had been prejudiced by its disclosure in The Guardian of 22 October and by the parliamentary reaction to the American military intervention in Grenada. It was essential for the United Kingdom to adhere to the agreed timetable for deployment, which meant that the missile system must be installed and operational by the end of the year. But there was no reason why adjustments should not be made to the delivery schedule. The Germans had already made it clear that it would be helpful to them if the missiles themselves (as distinct from related items of equipment) were not delivered until after the Bundestag debate on 21 November; and Mr Shultz and Mr Weinberger had both been relaxed about this possibility when he had raised it with them in Washington in September. The aim should be to dissociate the delivery of the missiles from the parliamentary debate on deployment which was to take place on ~~1 November~~^{31 October}, and ^{also} to ~~time it so as to cause least embarrassment to our German allies.~~ ~~to avoid prejudicing the outcome of the debate in the German Bundestag.~~

There was general agreement that it was now important in parliamentary terms that the missiles should not arrive ^{here} immediately after the parliamentary debate. But the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that any adjustment of the delivery schedule was likely to become known and would inevitably be linked with our disagreement with the United States over Grenada. It would be seen by the Americans as a form of retaliation; and it would pinpoint the issue of mutual confidence between the United States and her European allies in a way which could have damaging consequences for the Alliance.

Mr Cles
A note of this
morning's Ministerial
discussion of
cruise missile
deployment.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the disagreement over Grenada must not be allowed to affect or be thought to affect Britain's policies towards the Alliance. There was nothing unusual in disagreements between allies on issues where interests and perspectives differed. Nothing should be done which might encourage isolationists or anti-European tendencies in the United States. It must therefore be made clear to the Americans that ^{it remained} our common objective ~~was~~ to ensure that cruise missile deployment was implemented by the agreed date, and that the British Government was determined to stick to the timetable. Within that timetable, however, a new date should be found for the delivery of the missiles consistent with keeping their arrival well clear of the parliamentary debate on 1 November ^{and the need to take account of the domestic} ~~and the need to take account of the domestic~~ ^{difficulties facing the West German Government} ~~difficulties facing the West German Government~~ ^{The} ~~The~~ Defence Secretary should ^{explore} ~~discuss~~ the matter personally with Mr Weinberger in the margins of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting ^{with a view to reaching} ~~and reach~~ agreement with him on a ^{new} ~~delivery~~ date which would meet these ^{the best described} ~~conditions~~.

and with the need to ~~meet the need~~ have the missiles operational by the end of the year ~~and with the desirability of taking~~

Parliamentary

~~should also be taken~~
~~were also relevant~~

Please will you ^{and other recipients ensure} ~~ensure~~ that this letter is only seen by those with an operational need to do so and that no further copies are made.

I am copying this letter to

SECRET



22
Fall

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October, 1983

Cruise Missile Deployment in the
United Kingdom

The Prime Minister held a meeting at 0930 on Wednesday, 26 October to discuss the above subject. In view of the sensitivity of the discussion, I am not circulating a record. But a record is available in the Cabinet Office and may be consulted on application to the Cabinet Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Colin Walters (Lord President's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

CCTF



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 11/9/4

27th October 1983

Dear Roger,

INF DEBATE - MONDAY 31ST OCTOBER 1983

/ I attach the terms of the motion for this debate, which has been cleared by Mr Heseltine. I should be grateful to know that you are content with this formulation by close of play today.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10 Downing Street), David Heyhoe (Lord Privy Seal), Murdo MacLean (Chief Whip) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Nick Evans

(H N R EVANS)

R Bone Esq

INF DEBATE - 31ST OCTOBER 1983

This House reaffirms its support for the NATO 1979 twin track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces: it strongly backs the West's efforts to achieve a mutual, balanced and verifiable agreement at the Geneva negotiations which could make unnecessary the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe; but confirms that, in the absence of such an agreement, cruise missiles must be operationally deployed in the UK by the end of 1983.

INF DEBATE - 31ST OCTOBER 1983

This House reaffirms its support for the NATO 1979 twin track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces: ~~it~~ strongly backs the West's efforts to achieve a ~~mutual, balanced and verifiable agreement at the Geneva negotiations~~ which could make unnecessary the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, but confirms that, in the absence of such an agreement, cruise missiles must be operationally deployed in the UK by the end of 1983.

a zero option agreement to

and ~~support~~ in the lack of such agreement supports efforts to achieve a mutual balanced agreement at the Geneva negotiations.

INF DEBATE - 31ST OCTOBER 1983

This House reaffirms its support for the NATO 1979 twin track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces: [it] strongly backs the West's efforts to achieve a mutual, balanced and verifiable agreement at the Geneva negotiations which could make unnecessary the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe; but confirms that, in the absence of such an agreement, cruise missiles must be operationally deployed in the UK by the end of 1983.



Prime Minister

21

I hope none of papers 2
will leak.

A.J.C. 26/10

Ref. A083/3039

PRIME MINISTER

Cabinet: Parliamentary Affairs: INF Deployment

Flag A

Mention will be made under Parliamentary Affairs of the Government's decision to offer the Opposition a debate on INF deployment on Monday 31 October. You may wish to explain that this decision was taken in the light of the disclosure in the Guardian of 22 October that the first American cruise missiles were scheduled to arrive in this country on 1 November. It was thought that this disclosure, combined with the criticism of the United States generated by American military intervention in Grenada, might well prompt a demand for a debate on the cruise missile issue under Standing Order no. 10. Since the Government had indicated in the summer that there would in any case be a further opportunity for the House to debate the INF issue, it was decided that it would be sensible to offer the debate now. In view of the Secretary of State for Defence's absence in Canada (to attend an important meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)) 31 October was the earliest date available.

2. As a consequence of the Guardian's disclosure it has also been decided to negotiate a new date with the Americans for the delivery of the missiles. This will not involve any change in the deployment timetable: we remain firmly committed to the agreed programme whereby the missiles will be installed and operational in the United Kingdom by 31 December. The intention is that delivery of major items of missile-related equipment should start on 1 November as planned, but that the missiles themselves should now arrive towards the end of the delivery programme rather than at the beginning. This will have the advantage of separating their arrival from the Parliamentary debate. It may also make it possible to take account of the German reluctance to have any missiles delivered to Europe until after their Bundestag debate on 21 November. The Secretary of



State for Defence will be negotiating a new date with Mr Weinberger in the margins of the NPG meeting. The new date will not be announced in advance; but the Secretary of State for Defence will tell the House that Parliament will be informed when the missiles have been delivered.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

*approved by Sir Robert Armstrong
and signed in his absence.*

26 October 1983

Lindsay Wilkinson

A

Guardian 22.10.83

Troops stand by for the Greenham missile date

Whitehall sets November 1 cruise arrival

By David Fairhall,
Defence Correspondent

EXCLUSIVE

The first American nuclear cruise missiles are scheduled to arrive at Greenham Common in Berkshire on November 1 with their atomic warheads.

They will arrive by air, to be followed on present secret plans over the next seven days by further deliveries of launch vehicles and other operational equipment. The British and US governments are evidently prepared to go ahead with the deliveries in spite of the possibility that Soviet negotiators at the Geneva arms control talks may use the missiles' arrival as a public excuse to walk out.

But a three-week postponement is still being considered in Whitehall, presumably to give the German Bundestag time to debate the controversial Nato nuclear modernisation programme of which the ground-launched cruise missiles at Greenham Common form part, along with Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany.

If the missiles are coming on November 1 — and in the light of this report the timetable is almost certain to be called into question again in Whitehall — security at the Berkshire base will be massively strengthened, initially by Ministry of Defence police and members of the RAF Regiment, but if necessary also

by several battalions of British soldiers.

This is not only to prevent members of the women's peace camp cutting through the perimeter wire to demonstrate against the American weapons' arrival but also to ensure that armed US Air Force troops guarding the missiles are not provoked into opening fire under the strict rules of engagement which the American military authorities apply to the protection of their nuclear equipment.

If the anti-nuclear demonstrations do lead to violence it is considered politically vital to keep the Americans as far away from it as possible.

The Defence Minister, Mr Michael Heseltine, is believed to have advised the Prime Minister that, since the missiles arrival, accompanied by 50ft-long articulated launch vehicles, can hardly be disguised from the women camped outside the airbase gates the Government's best course is to make an immediate public announcement on the same day in the House of Commons.

This can then be followed by a Ministry of Defence press conference to explain and justify the Government's support for Nato's nuclear programme before the parliamen-

tary opposition or the campaign for nuclear disarmament can get their word in.

Mr Heseltine is bound also to emphasise that the cruise missiles arrival in this country does not mean that they are operational. The first flight of 16 missiles forming part of the USAF's 501st Tactical Missile Wing is not scheduled to declare its "initial operating capability" until the end of December, so there is still time for the operational deployment to be cancelled if there is a last-minute breakthrough in the Geneva talks.

Even beyond that, the deployment could be limited to fewer than 96 missiles allocated to Greenham Common if an agreement to this effect were reached with the Soviet Union. The complete US force planned for the UK consists of 160 missiles, but some of these will be based at Molesworth, near Huntingdon, where the base will not be ready to accept them until the late 1980s.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said last night: "We have nothing to add to what we have previously announced about the planned deployment by the end of the year."

However, the fact that the plan has now leaked out must force the Government security services to a hasty review of their delivery timetable in consultation with the US Air Force, particularly since atomic warheads are involved.

Extract from The Guardian 22/10/83



2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

AJC: to see

My ref:

Your ref:

Prime Minster

To be aware.

26 October 1983

Dear Michael,

AJC. 27/10

MB

THE SECOND GLCM BASE: RAF MOLESWORTH

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 4 October to Geoffrey Howe.

Whatever Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date is chosen for the Molesworth facilities, the building completion date will need to be at least six months earlier, to allow the Americans time for the installation and commissioning of their own equipment. In addition, it is unlikely that a four flight installation as required at Molesworth could be completed in less than 2½ years bearing in mind our experience at Greenham Common and with an accelerated programme. In the normal event, PSA would allow at least a further year to cover the pre-planning, designing, specifying and tender invitation processes, all of which means that to achieve an IOC of December 1987 we ought to have full briefing available and be ready to start work in earnest not later than December of this year.

By cutting corners and phasing the work so that the flight facilities can be handed over in a staged programme as has been done at Greenham Common, PSA is reasonably confident that the essential programme can still be met even if the start date slips by another 3 or 4 months to the Spring of next year, as you are now suggesting. However, this needs to be subject to the following provisos:-

i. that the Americans (and NATO) are prepared to accept the higher costs likely to be associated with an accelerated programme. The relatively modest acceleration required (and achieved) at Greenham Common added 10% to the initial contract price and since more seems likely to be required at Molesworth, we should allow for the possibility that acceleration could amount to some 20% extra in that case, or about £4m-£5m on that part of the work which would need acceleration;

ii. that for the operational part of the Molesworth works (aside from the sizeable infrastructure requirements which will have to be designed from scratch anyway) the US eschew all but unavoidable changes in requirements so that we can make the maximum reasonable use of the existing detailed drawings produced for Greenham Common; and


iii. that the various planning and approval processes can be contained well within normal timescales. We would of course do as much as we could by consulting local authorities immediately a decision to go ahead has been taken and generally gearing all concerned - including NATO - to accept the need for prompt action. Even so, there are risks of delays for reasons beyond our direct control.

I mention these points only to avoid misunderstanding. PSA will do its utmost to help, but clearly the earlier we can be given full briefing, permission to consult local authorities and appoint consultants for surveying and design, the better the chances will be of achieving the very tight timetable now envisaged.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Your ever
Patrick

PATRICK JENKIN



GRS 1385
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 270700Z
FM MOSCOW 262057Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1223 OF 26 OCT
AND TO FLASH PARIS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
FLASH OTTAWA (FOR PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY)
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER NATO POSTS
INFO PRIORITY SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN,
WARSAW, PRAGUE, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, UKMIS NEW YORK

INF : ANDROPOV INTERVIEW WITH PRAVDA

1. ENGLISH TASS THIS EVENING, 26 OCTOBER, CARRIED THE TEXT OF AN INTERVIEW WITH ANDROPOV TO BE PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON 27 OCTOBER.

2. MAIN POINTS:

(A) ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION AT THE GENEVA TALKS, ANDROPOV SAID THAT THE IMPASSE THERE CONTINUED. ONLY BLOC LOYALTY PREVENTED EVEN THE MOST DEVOTED ALLIES OF THE US FROM ADMITTING THE REASON OPENLY. SOVIET PROPOSALS OVER THE TWO YEARS OF TALKS CONTAINED ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD THAT DID NOT DAMAGE ANYONE'S INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF RECENT US STATEMENTS AND WHAT WAS BEING SAID BY THE US DELEGATION IN GENEVA. IT TRANSPIRED THAT US FLEXIBILITY DID NOT GO FURTHER THAN WORDS. THE ESSENCE OF THE US LINE, TO ENSURE A CONSIDERABLE US SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR BY DEPLOYING NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE, REMAINED UNCHANGED. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO COUNT ON PROGRESS AT THE TALKS SO LONG AS THE US KEPT TO ITS UNREALISTIC AND LOPSIDED POSITION.

(B) ASKED IF ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR AGREEMENT HAD BEEN EXHAUSTED, ANDROPOV SAID THAT THIS DEPENDED PRIMARILY ON THE US. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT GIVING UP THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCORD UNTIL THE US MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE BY ITS ACTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY WHILE OBSERVING ONE IMPERATIVE REQUIREMENT: THE BALANCE OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE MUST NOT BE DISRUPTED. THE LEVEL OF THESE ARMS ON BOTH SIDES COULD AND MUST BE RADICALLY LOWERED BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAVE THE RATIO OF FORCES BETWEEN THEM UNCHANGED. THIS MEANT THAT (I) NEW AMERICAN MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE BECAUSE THIS WOULD SHARPLY CHANGE THE ENTIRE MILITARY STRATEGIC SITUATION BY NATO'S ADVANTAGE, AND (II) ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN ON BOTH SIDES OF ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE CORRESPONDING RANGE WITHOUT ANY EXCLUSIONS WHATSOEVER. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT RETREAT FROM THIS JUST DEMAND. BUT WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK IT WAS DISPLAYING FLEXIBILITY AND CONSTRUCTIVENESS. ANDROPOV SAID HE COULD NOW SPEAK OF SOME ADDITIONAL SOVIET STEPS.

(C) THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED READINESS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE TO SIMILAR LEVELS FOR BOTH SIDES OF BOTH DELIVERY VEHICLES (MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT) AND WARHEADS. SOME PEOPLE HAD ASKED WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO IF, IN ORDER TO ENSURE EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE USSR ON ONE SIDE AND THE UK AND FRANCE ON THE OTHER, IT WAS COMPELLED TO HAVE A SMALLER NUMBER OF MISSILE LAUNCHERS THAN NATO ALREADY POSSESSED. HAVING IN MIND THE PRESENT NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES, THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO HAVE IN EUROPE 'ABOUT 140 SS-20 LAUNCHERS' WHICH WAS NOTICEABLY LESS THAN THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHERS POSSESSED BY THE UK AND FRANCE.

(D) IT HAD BEEN ASKED WHETHER, FOLLOWING ITS STATED READINESS TO LIQUIDATE INSTEAD OF REDEPLOYING ALL MISSILES TO BE REDUCED IN ITS EUROPEAN ZONE IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT AT GENEVA, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD IN PARALLEL TO THE LIQUIDATION OF MISSILES IN ITS EUROPEAN PARTS BUILD UP SUCH MISSILES IN ITS EASTERN AREAS, WHICH COULD THEN BE MOVED FROM THE EAST TO THE WEST. ANDROPOV SAID THAT TO REMOVE ALL DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE HE COULD EXPLICITLY SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REDEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES FROM EAST TO WEST AND IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT BEING REACHED AT GENEVA AND ENTERING INTO FORCE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO PUT AN END TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS20 MISSILES IN ITS EASTERN AREAS, AND WOULD FIRMLY PROCEED ON THIS BASIS ON CONDITION THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OCCURRED IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE ASIAN REGION. THIS MEANT PRIMARILY THAT THE US SHOULD NOT DEPLOY NEW MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AREAS FROM WHICH THEY COULD REACH THE EASTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION.

(E) IT WAS SOMETIMES SAID THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR THE RETENTION, AFTER REDUCTIONS, OF NOT MORE THAN 300 MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES EXCESSIVELY UNDERCUT THE AMERICAN AVIATION SYSTEMS OF CORRESPONDING RANGE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO AIM TO IMPINGE ON THE UNITED STATES ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE PLANES WERE NOT BASED IN OTHER COUNTRIES FROM WHERE THEY COULD REACH US TERRITORY. BUT HERE TOO THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO SHOW ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY: TO ESTABLISH FOR THE USSR AND NATO EQUAL TOTAL LEVELS OF MEDIUM RANGE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE QUANTITATIVE RANGE, EVEN THOUGH THIS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERRED FROM THE EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE CONCRETE TOTALS OF THESE LEVELS COULD BE AGREED UPON JUST AS THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT SUBJECT TO LIMITATION COULD BE SPECIFIED.

(F) ANDROPOV WAS ASKED ABOUT THE SUGGESTION IN THE WEST THAT IN ORDER TO DISPLAY GOODWILL, THE SOVIET UNION COULD EVEN NOW CARRY OUT A UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF ITS MISSILES IN EUROPE. ANDROPOV REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF UNILATERAL STEPS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE WITH THE AIM OF CREATING THE MAXIMUM FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESS AT THE TALKS. THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN ITS EUROPEAN PART, ANNOUNCED A YEAR AND A HALF AGO,

WAS BEING UNDEVIATINGLY OBSERVED. THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES BEYOND THE URALS IN AREAS FROM WHICH THEY COULD REACH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ALSO BEEN STOPPED. MOREOVER, BY NOW ALL THE SS5 MISSILES WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DEPLOYED 'IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE' AND WHICH HAD A NO LESSER RANGE THAN THE SS20S WHILE EXCEEDING THEM GREATLY IN WARHEAD YIELD, HAD BEEN PHASED OUT. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE US AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES SHOULD SURELY BE WELL INFORMED OF THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS ON THIS SCORE BUT THEY WERE CONCEALING THE TRUTH FROM THEIR PEOPLES. THERE WERE NO SIGNS AT ALL THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF ITS CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED FURTHER TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY ITS MISSILES. ON THE CONTRARY EVERYTHING POINTED TO THE OPPOSITE. FOR THIS REASON THE SOVIET UNION NATURALLY COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT RISK ITS SECURITY AND THAT OF ITS ALLIES.

(G) IF HOWEVER THE US RENOUNCED THE DEPLOYMENT OF ITS MISSILES IN EUROPE WITHIN THE ANNOUNCED DEADLINES AND THEREBY PROVIDED A POSSIBILITY FOR CONTINUING THE TALKS AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS THEN THE SOVIET UNION COULD COMMENCE 'ALREADY NOW' THE REDUCTION OF ITS SS4 MISSILES, OF WHICH IT HAD OVER 200, AND COMPLETE THEIR LIQUIDATION IN THE COURSE OF 1984 TO 1985. AND IF IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE A JUST AGREEMENT IN GENEVA THEN A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE PRESENTLY EXISTING SS20 MISSILES WOULD NATURALLY ALSO BE LIQUIDATED.

(H) FINALLY, ANDROPOV WAS ASKED ABOUT STATEMENTS BEING MADE IN WESTERN CAPITALS THAT WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN MISSILES THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD SUPPOSEDLY GAIN A NEW IMPULSE AND BECOME MORE PRODUCTIVE. ANDROPOV SAID THAT THIS WAS AN UTTER DECEPTION DESIGNED TO DAMP THE INTENSITY OF THE STRUGGLE BY WEST EUROPEAN PEOPLES AGAINST INF DEPLOYMENT. HE THEN CONTINUED: 'EVERYTHING MUST BE TOTALLY CLEAR HERE: THE APPEARANCE OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL MAKE A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT TALKS IN GENEVA IMPOSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GENEVA TALKS CAN BE CONTINUED IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT START THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES'.

3. THE TEXT ENDED AT THIS POINT. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

RATFORD

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
NEWS D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START

COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET



20 A

FCS/83/210SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE25
10
T-a.The Second GLCM Base: RAF Molesworth

1. Thank you for your minute of 4 October about your decision that no site surveys or local consultations should take place at Molesworth at present.
2. I endorse the decision you have taken. If we can avoid creating a further focus for the anti-nuclear weapon demonstrators this autumn then we should do so. I understand there may be some flexibility not only in the date of the operational deployment of cruise missiles at Molesworth but in the time needed for the construction programme and local consultations. I am confident that we can continue to explain to the Americans why activity at Molesworth would be unwise just yet.
3. I am copying this minute to the recipients of yours.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 October 1983

Defence,
IN F,
Pt 4

20 JUN 1983

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



Prime Minister.

MF

ADL 24/10

PM/83/82

PRIME MINISTER

Cruise Missile Deliveries

OK with AJC

1. I have seen copies of the Secretary of State for Defence's two minutes of 20 October, in which he suggests that in preparing a line for Parliament, we need to cater for the alternatives that the first Cruise missiles themselves may arrive either on 1 November or three weeks later.

2. On the timing of deployment of the missiles, the position as I understand it is that Chancellor Kohl has not responded to your message of 10 October in which you made clear your reasons for deciding to stick to the agreed timetable, which, of course, means deployment during the period 1 - 8 November. I gather that President Reagan has heard no more on the subject from the Germans, and Genscher made no reference to the point during the lengthy informal discussions between EC Foreign Ministers at Vouliagmeni this weekend.

3. In these circumstances, I see no reason to raise the issue with the Germans again, or to reconsider the decision on timing that we have already taken.

/4. I am

SECRET



4. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Attorney-General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
24 October 1983

SECRET

DEFENCE: INF
PT 4



24 OCT 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

cc LPO
HO
FCO
LPS
CWO
Co

ll
19A

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1983

Deliveries of Cruise Missiles to RAF Greenham Common -
Parliamentary and Public Statements

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 20 October.

Mrs. Thatcher has commented that she would like to discuss the Parliamentary and public handling of Cruise deliveries at Cabinet on 27 October. She is inclined to think that the Government should adopt a low profile in relation to public handling and therefore has some doubt about the specific proposals in paragraph 4 of Mr. Heseltine's minute.

I am copying this letter to Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), David Heyhoe (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Press leak may affect cruise arrival date

By David Fairhall
Defence Correspondent

Ministry of Defence officials meet this morning to decide whether to call for a change in the US Air Force plan to deploy the first nuclear cruise missiles at Greenham Common on November 1, now that the women camped in protest outside the gates of the Berkshire base are aware of the date.

Details of the delivery timetable — starting with the atomic warheads on the first aircraft so as to have them safely stored in underground bunkers before any demonstrations begin and continuing with launch vehicles and other operational equipment through to November 8 — were published exclusively

in later editions of the Guardian on Saturday.

From a security point of view, if the women demonstrators were considered a threat, the obvious response would be to change the dates. But this may not be easy. The Defence Secretary, Mr Michael Heseltine, who will want to make the first public announcement of the missiles' arrival, is away in Canada at a NATO nuclear planning group meeting — which will need to be briefed on the cruise missile deployment — until next Saturday.

Any substantial postponement, on the other hand, might cause difficulties for the USAF's 501st Tactical Missile Wing, which has been asked to demonstrate an "initial operating capability" with the first

flight of 16 missiles before the end of December.

A possible delay of three weeks has been allowed for the delivery of the missiles themselves—though not their conspicuous 50ft launch vehicles—apparently to give time for the

Million march for peace, page 5; Terry Coleman, page 11; 400,000 at Hyde Park, back page.

German Bundestag to debate Nato's controversial nuclear modernisation programme, which also includes the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany.

What has not been allowed for in the US-British timetable, or so it seems, is the danger

that the Russians will use the weapons' arrival in Berkshire as an excuse to walk out of the Geneva talks where their numbers are under negotiation. The two governments have evidently taken the view that since the chances of a real breakthrough in the talks before Christmas is remote, that risk is worth taking.

Sooner or later, warheads and missiles must be brought in if the initial operating capability is to have any military meaning as a deterrent before the end of the year. Mr Heseltine will no doubt emphasise to the British public that installing them in the Greenham silos does not mean that they are operational.

A key factor in deciding whether to change the plan is

the extent to which the weapons physical security—and especially that of the 200 kiloton W-84 atomic warheads — can be guaranteed however many "Greenham Women Against Cruise" turn up to swell the protests of the 40 or so permanently camped outside the perimeter wire.

The most serious danger, as seen from Whitehall, is that some of the women might break through to confront the armed US troops escorting the warheads from aircraft to bunkers—probably with orders to fire on anyone who interferes with them. To avoid this possibility, however remote, armed British troops will be placed between the Americans and the outer cordons of RAF

Turn to back page, col. 2

Leak may affect date for cruise

Continued from page one

Regiment guards and Ministry of Defence police. Up to four battalions of soldiers will be on call if necessary.

One surprising feature of the plan as disclosed to the Guardian—and not yet officially confirmed by the Ministry of Defence or the USAF—is that the warheads are being flown in with the first missiles, rather than being brought over separately from the US, perhaps by sea and then taken discreetly into one of the Berkshire base's secondary gates.

People living on the southern outskirts of Newbury under the approach to the main Greenham runway may be particularly concerned. Multiple safety catches should ensure that there is absolutely no possibility of a nuclear explosion, even if the warheads have been assembled. But a crash would obviously carry the risk of contaminating the area with highly radioactive material.

In the end Mr Heseltine may decide, if he believes his own speeches about having won the nuclear debate, that now the plan is out in the open the best policy is to press ahead with it. Nuclear deterrence is a function of credibility.

On the domestic political front, neither Mr Heseltine nor Mrs Thatcher will be pleased to be faced with such a difficult choice when they and the security forces had hoped to take the Greenham peace camp by surprise. The Prime Minister was warned by officials about the Guardian's disclosure before Saturday's edition went on sale and Downing Street indicated last night that an immediate investigation to find the source of the leak was expected.

Extract from The Guardian 24/10/83

*copied!
Defence!
Military
Planning of
Buses
Feb 83*

SECRET



Jo VC

19

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1983

RAF Greenham Common: Cruise Missile Deliveries and Security Arrangements

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 20 October on this subject.

She is content with the security arrangements which have been made.

We agreed on the telephone that the second sentence of Mr. Heseltine's minute was subject to any further messages that we might receive on the timetable for deployment from the Federal German Chancellor and the President of the United States.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Brian Fall (FCO), Henry Steel (Attorney General's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

EC

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

18A

MO 11/2/2



Prime Minister

Content will be proposed
for public handling:

A. J. C. 24/10.

PRIME MINISTER

*We must discuss
at Cabinet on
Thursday.
a low profile
- pub*

DELIVERIES OF CRUISE MISSILES TO RAF GREENHAM COMMON -
PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Major items of equipment for the first cruise missile flight will be arriving at RAF Greenham Common from 1st November onwards, with deliveries spread over the following week. I have minuted you separately on the contingency security arrangements. We need to consider the Parliamentary and public handling of the issue. Our approach at this stage needs to cater for the alternatives that the first cruise missiles themselves will arrive on 1st November or three weeks later, on which, for reasons you know, final decisions have yet to be taken.

*We await
a reply
from
Chancellor
Kole
21/10*

2. I believe that in either case there is no sensible alternative to announcing the beginning of the arrival of "sensitive" items of equipment on 1st November (while of course maintaining our existing policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear warheads). Clearly there can be no question of revealing the timetable for equipment deliveries in advance. But we must work on the basis that the presence of sensitive equipments will become known on 1st November, given the increased level of activity at the base and the presence of transporter-erector-launchers. There is nothing to gain - and much to lose - from trying to be evasive. Defence is top for questions that day and there are a number of related questions on the delivery and deployment timetable. If it is decided that deliveries at the beginning of the month should exclude the missiles, I would propose to explain at question time that the launchers and other equipment were beginning to arrive but to make it clear that the missiles themselves had not arrived. If, on the other hand, the full programme including the missiles goes ahead, I propose instead to make a statement to the House after questions.



3. This statement would rehearse the collective nature of the NATO decision which led to deployment, note that we are proceeding with implementing a decision agreed 4 years ago, and emphasize our interest in securing an equitable arms control agreement and that deployments can be halted, modified or reversed in the light of progress in Geneva. It would also refer to NATO's decisions on reductions in warheads for shorter-range nuclear weapons, about which I am minuting you separately. Finally and crucially I should need clearly to draw and to emphasise the distinction between the operational deployment of the missiles (which we have always said would take place by the end of the year), and their delivery (which must be presented as another step in preparation for operational deployment).

4. Assuming the full delivery programme goes ahead that day, my aim in handling Parliament and the Press on 1st November would be to concentrate as much attention as possible on the Government's position before the Opposition and the "peace movement" had an opportunity to react. To this end I would hold a press conference in London on 1st November after the statement and I am considering following this with a photographic facility at Greenham Common itself.

I believe both that things are under

5. We need of course to take account of the international implications of our public line. We have already explained to the Germans that arrivals cannot be concealed. The Soviet Union might use an announcement as a pretext for walking out in Geneva, although this may not suit them in relation to seeking to influence German opinion prior to the Bundestag debate. In any case, as the arrivals cannot be concealed, they could use publicity about them as the pretext if they are minded to pull out at Geneva.

6. Prior to 1st November, I have no doubt that we should continue to make clear that missiles have not yet arrived, and add that Parliament will be kept informed of all significant developments in the delivery programme. Without this, any announcement may appear to be a concession to Opposition pressure rather than a positive decision by the Government. There will be a number of opportunities



for questions on the timing of deliveries to be raised next week, particularly during the debate on the Defence Estimates in the Lords on Tuesday and your Questions in the Commons on Tuesday and Thursday. I enclose a suggested line to take for use then.

7. I am copying this minute to the Lord President of the Council, the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chief Whip and Sir Robert Armstrong.

MJA
Ministry of Defence
20th October 1983

LINE FOR USE IN PARLIAMENT PRIOR TO 1ST NOVEMBER

The necessary preparations are proceeding at RAF Greenham Common in order to achieve NATO's aim of operational deployment of the first flight of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom by the end of the year, unless an agreement can be reached in the arms control talks in Geneva involving the total abolition of all missiles of this sort including SS20s. The House will be informed when the first cruise missiles and launchers arrive.

18



MO 11/2/2

*copied!
Defence
Advising of
demonstrations
at military
Bases 83,
Feb 83.*

Prime Minister

*Important. Content will state
arrangements?*

A.S.C. 24/10.

Yes mb

PRIME MINISTER

RAF GREENHAM COMMON:
CRUISE MISSILE DELIVERIES AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Deliveries by USAF aircraft of warheads, missiles and associated equipment necessary to meet the objective of achieving initial operational capability by the end of the year are to be made to Greenham Common in the period 1st-8th November 1983. The warheads will arrive on the first aircraft on the first day. We can expect some sort of reaction by the anti-nuclear movement to these deliveries. You will wish to know the security arrangements we have accordingly made, in close liaison with the Home Office, the Thames Valley Police and the American authorities.

2. Despite some initial low-grade reports that the anti-nuclear movement had plans to mount a major demonstration at around this time there is currently no hard evidence to suggest either that they are aware of the delivery timetable or have made any concrete plans. Experience has shown that to mount a major demonstration they must first advertise the event widely, and well in advance, and take other overt steps such as booking coaches. None of these things has yet happened which makes it unlikely that at least for the period of the delivery programme we need fear any planned activity on a major scale. The anti-nuclear movement's main emphasis is on the October 22nd demonstration in London. For Greenham Common it looks at the moment as though the most likely forecast is of a relatively minor, and by now traditional,

*depending
on refs
from
Channel
Kohl.*



demonstration by the resident peace camp and its supporters over the Halloween period (29th/30th October) and perhaps a larger demonstration in December, as last year, on the anniversary of NATO's INF modernisation decision, with random and probably determined outbreaks of action from those at the camp site once they get knowledge of the deliveries.

3. The Thames Valley Police, who have been kept discreetly informed of our plans, are on the alert for an increased activities by the anti-nuclear movement and are ready to respond. As for our own arrangements, I have directed that a plan be drawn up on a contingency basis so that sufficient UK reinforcements are available at Greenham Common to contain any trespass which the civil police are unable to prevent, to prevent any interference with the delivery programme, and to prevent confrontations between demonstrators and armed US personnel. I have further directed that our plans should be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with attempted incursions on a larger scale than anything seen hitherto, or anything we currently have cause to expect. It is essential that we are effective against any level of threat.

4. Any early deployment of reinforcements (unless a demonstration has already built up) would give warning to the peace camp. Our present intention is that on the evening before the first aircraft deliveries, RAF personnel should be inserted covertly into the base to be reinforced by substantial numbers of Ministry of Defence Police who would arrive very shortly before the first aircraft landed. To cater for the possibility that the anti-nuclear movement will attempt to attract supporters to the base as soon as the delivery programme is noticed, up to four infantry battalions will be held in reserve. The entire force will be available for deployment in part or in full from 28th October 1983. All these arrangements will be made very discreetly, in close co-ordination with the Americans own security arrangements.



5. The period of greatest risk is when the warheads are being transferred from the transport aircraft to the GLCM facility, an operation which will be cordoned by the armed American guards permanently based at Greenham Common and who are charged with the direct protection of these weapons with rules of engagement exactly the same of our own. While our security arrangements already minimise the risk of any demonstrator getting sufficiently close to warheads as to necessitate the use of firearms by the US guards, the political implications of a demonstrator being shot by an American guard would, at this stage of initial deployment, be very grave. I have therefore directed that the screen of UK personnel which will support the USAF guards on this particular part of the delivery programme should include a small number of armed RAF personnel, operating very close to the armed US personnel and with the same rules of engagement. Therefore any determined demonstrator who managed to penetrate the perimeter fence and its guard force, and was then able to penetrate the next screen of unarmed UK personnel, would finally confront an armed British Serviceman rather than an armed American. I believe this to be a prudent precaution although I would stress that the situation is highly unlikely to arise.

6. I shall be minuting you separately about the Parliamentary and Public Relations aspects.

7. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to the Attorney General and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

WJA

Ministry of Defence
20th October 1983



21 OCT 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 550A
CONFIDENTIAL
FM COPENHAGEN 201030Z OCT 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 20 OCTOBER
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO OSLO BONN WASHINGTON

DENMARK: INF

SUMMARY

1. SCHLUETER'S MINORITY GOVERNMENT WILL SHORTLY FACE RENEWED PRESSURE FROM THE FOLKETING AND PROBABLY BE FORCED TO ACCEPT A RESOLUTION REQUIRING IT TO WORK ACTIVELY AGAINST THE INSTALLATION OF PERSHING III AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE. THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO TO HELP SCHLUETER RESIST THIS PRESSURE; BUT WE SHOULD PUT DOWN A MARKER BEFORE ELLEMANN JENSEN VISITS YOU ON 4 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. ASSUMING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SURVIVES (MY TELNO 229) IT WILL SHORTLY FACE TWO PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE FIRST WILL BE ON 3 NOVEMBER OCCASIONED BY QUESTIONS ABOUT INF TALKS FROM THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE LEFT WING SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY. THE SECOND WILL BE ON 10 NOVEMBER AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY AND WILL COVER WIDER ISSUES OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. THERE MAY BE A LEFT WING ATTEMPT IN THE SECOND DEBATE TO FORCE AN EXTENSION OF THE BAN ON STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON DANISH SOIL TO WARTIME AS WELL AS PEACETIME.

3. THE GOVERNMENT EXPECT THE DEBATE ON 3 NOVEMBER TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT. ELLEMANN JENSEN AND DEFENCE MINISTER ENGELL HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING A ROBUST PUBLIC CAMPAIGN ON INF, BUT THE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY REMAINS OPPOSED TO INF DEPLOYMENT. AS ELLEMANN JENSEN HAS WARNED YOU (ATHENS TELNO 516) HE DOES NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO HOLD EVEN THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY DANISH LINE ON INF. SENIOR OFFICIALS EXPECT THE MINORITY GOVERNMENT ON 3 NOVEMBER TO HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION WHICH WILL MOVE THEM ONE FURTHER STEP DOWN THE SLOPE TOWARDS OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO INF DEPLOYMENT. THE RESOLUTION WOULD PROBABLY DRAW ON THE EARLIER ONE OF 26 MAY (MY TELNO 118) BUT DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WORK FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION RATHER THAN MERELY PUT IT FORWARD IN NATO. THE GOVERNMENT, VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES THIS WILL CREATE FOR THE ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE GERMANS, WILL DO THEIR UTMOST TO BLUNT THE LANGUAGE. BUT THEY HAVE NO MAJORITY ON DEFENCE MATTERS AND REMAIN UNLIKELY TO GIVE A HIGHER PRIORITY TO HOLDING THE LINE ON INF THAN TO THEIR OWN SURVIVAL.

4. THE GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT A COMPROMISE WITH THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AT THE DEBATE ON 3 NOVEMBER WILL ENABLE THEM TO KEEP THE DEBATE ON 10 NOVEMBER IN LOW KEY AND HARMLESS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5. ELLEMANN

CONFIDENTIAL

5. ELLEMANN JENSEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE DETERMINEDLY ROBUST IN FIGHTING FOR THE DOUBLE DECISION BUT THEY CANNOT CHANGE POLITICAL ARITHMETIC. MY GERMAN AND AMERICAN COLLEAGUES ARE LIKELY TO BE ADVISING THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO PLAY IT COOL: THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT FLATTER THE FOLKETING BY APPEARING TO TAKE ITS, IN THIS CASE PERIPHERAL, VIEWS TOO SERIOUSLY. I AGREE WITH THIS ADVICE BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS PUT DOWN A MARKER IN ADVANCE OF THE DEBATE THAT A FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE DANISH POSITION WILL CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR US AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. WE COULD DO THIS AT THE NPG MEETING IN OTTAWA ON 27/28 OCTOBER, WHICH DEFENCE MINISTER ENGELL WILL ATTEND.

6. ELLEMANN JENSEN'S TALKS WITH YOU ON 4 NOVEMBER WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION FULLY. HE SHOULD BE PRESSED TO EXPLAIN HOW HE PROPOSES TO HANDLE ANY NEW INSTRUCTION FROM THE FOLKETING WITHOUT ROCKING THE BOAT IN NATO. HE WILL ALSO EXPECT YOU TO UNDERLINE THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF ANY ATTEMPT AT THE DEBATE ON 10 NOVEMBER TO CHANGE DENMARK'S POLICY ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY.

MELLON

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
NEWS D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
START

COPIES TO:
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141530Z

FM BONN 141435Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 924 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO PARIS MOSCOW VIENNA MODUK (AUS
D STAFF, DS 17) BMG BERLIN EAST BERLIN

INFO SAVING CICC(G) BSSO(G) CG'S IN FRG

MIPT:

INF: PEACE MOVEMENT DEMONSTRATIONS

1. THE PRE-PROGRAMMED CLIMAX TO THE FRG PEACE MOVEMENT'S AUTUMN CAMPAIGN AGAINST INF STATIONING WILL TAKE THE FORM OF AN ACTION WEEK THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FROM 15 TO 22 OCTOBER. THE MAIN DEMONSTRATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN MAJOR CITIES AND AT US MILITARY BASES. THE AUTHORITIES EXPECT UP TO A MILLION PEOPLE TO TAKE PART INCLUDING, ON 22 OCTOBER, SOME 300,000 IN BONN ALONE.

2. PEACE MOVEMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE BEEN NOTABLE FOR THEIR ORDERLINESS AND LACK OF VIOLENCE. THIS TIME THE PREVAILING VIEW IS THAT SOME VIOLENT INCIDENTS WILL BE INEVITABLE, THOUGH THE AUTHORITIES ARE EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION.

3. AUTONOMOUS GROUPS IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT ARE KNOWN TO BE MORE INCLINED TO VIOLENCE THAN THE MAINSTREAM, AND TO BE INTENDING TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON THE NORTHERN PARTS OF BREMERHAVEN AND NORDENHAM WHERE MILITARY EQUIPMENT COMING BY SEA FROM THE USA IS LANDED. A CURTAIN-RASING BLOCKADE OF US BARRACKS AT BREMERHAVEN ON 13 OCTOBER, INVOLVING SEVERAL HUNDRED DEMONSTRATORS, PASSED OFF WITH ONLY MINOR CLASHES WITH THE POLICE, BUT ONE DEMONSTRATOR IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO HOSPITAL WITH HEAD INJURIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

14. ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. ALL THE EVIDENCE IS THAT GERMAN AND AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS RATHER THAN BRITISH ONES WILL BE THE MAIN TARGETS. ONLY A FEW MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE BRITISH MILITARY SITES ARE EXPECTED. THIS EMBASSY, ALONG WITH THOSE OF THE USA, USSR, FRANCE, CHINA, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA, WILL BE THE TARGET OF A HUMAN CHAIN DEMONSTRATION ON 22 OCTOBER, AND WE MAY GET THE BACKWASH OF DEMONSTRATIONS ON OTHER DAYS AGAINST NEIGHBOURING BUILDINGS. (WE ARE TAKING SUITABLE PRECAUTIONS.)

BONN WILL PASS SAVINGS

TAYLOR

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EMD
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START
COPIES TO
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CB BONN/FCO 003/14

DD FCO 141530Z

OO VIENNA

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKDEL NATO

PP PARIS

PP MOSCOW

PP MODUK

PP E BERLIN

GRS 380

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 141530Z

FM BONN 141430Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 923 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE VIENNA

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK (AUS D STAFF, DS 17), BMG BERLIN, E BERLIN.

INFO SAVING CICC(G), BSSO(G), CGS IN FRG.

INF: GERMAN ATTITUDES.

SUMMARY

1. WITH GENSCHER ABOUT TO MEET GROMYKO IN VIENNA AT THE WEEKEND, AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT'S ACTION WEEK BEGINNING SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE STILL CLAIMING THAT A SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE IN GENEVA, AND ARE EMPHASIZING THEIR COMMITMENT, EVEN IF DEPLOYMENT PROVES NECESSARY, TO A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST. LARGE SCALE ANTI-INF DEMONSTRATIONS ARE EXPECTED THROUGHOUT THE FRG DURING THE COMING WEEK (DETAIL IN MIFT). THE AUTHORITIES ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN CONTROL THEM, BUT SOME VIOLENCE SEEMS INEVITABLE.

DETAIL

2. GENSCHER, SPEAKING IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 13 OCTOBER, DESCRIBED A SOVIET MONOPOLY IN INF AS UNACCEPTABLE, BUT SAID THAT:
(A) THE WEST REMAINED ANXIOUS FOR AGREEMENT AT GENEVA WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. IF THE RUSSIANS WOULD GIVE UP THEIR INSISTENCE ON TAKING ACCOUNT OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS, THE WAY TO AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE FREE. WHAT YOU AND



ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

Mr Gales
no 10 DS

MS

~~Handwritten scribble~~

14
PS
PS/hady Young
PS/mr hance
PS/pus
Sir J Bullard
Mr Wright
Mr James
Mr Bartledge
Rif D
ACDD
EED
SOVIET D
NAID
WED

MITTERRAND HAD SAID ON THE SUBJECT AT UNGA WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR MAKING A DRASTIC REDUCTION IN SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ADVOCATED.

(B) THOSE WHO, IN THEIR CONCERN AT THE POSSIBLE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT, DISMISSED THE DANGER TO WESTERN EUROPE CREATED BY EXISTING SOVIET DEPLOYMENT, ENDANGERED THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRIBUTED TO DESTABILISATION IN EUROPE.

(C) THE FRG WOULD ADHERE TO ITS LONG-STANDING POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THE FEDERAL SPOKESMAN HAS REJECTED THE SOVIET ALLEGATION THAT INF DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE EASTERN TREATIES. HE DESCRIBED THE VARIOUS STORIES THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ABOUT TO BREAK OFF THE GENEVA TALKS AS PART OF A PROPAGANDA WAR OF NERVES, DESIGNED TO FUEL THE PEACE MOVEMENT'S ACTIVITIES. VOLKER RUEHE, DEPUTY LEADER OF THE CDU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, WHO WENT WITH BAHR TO MOSCOW EARLIER THIS WEEK, HAS CLAIMED HE WAS TOLD IN MOSCOW THAT THOUGH THE RUSSIANS WOULD INTERRUPT THE GENEVA TALKS IF DEPLOYMENT BEGAN, THEY WOULD NOT BREAK OFF THE TALKS COMPLETELY. AN EARNEST OF THEIR INTENTIONS WAS THAT THE BUNDESTAG COMMITTEE'S SOVIET HOSTS HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO BONN FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 1984.

BONN WILL PASS SAVINGS.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 141515Z GU

RESTRICTED

file *W*

13 October 1983

Exchange of Messages with Andropov

Thank you for your letter of 13 October.

I have noted its contents.

AJL

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

SA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1983

John T. ...

Noted.

AR 13/10

Exchange of Messages with Andropov

We owe you advice about the question of publicity for the Prime Minister's reply to Mr Andropov's message of 27 August. *P4 3*

Although the fact, and general sense of, Mr Andropov's messages to various Heads of State and Government in late August is widely known, the Russians have not published the contents of these messages as such. Our view is that unless they were to do so there would be little to gain in publishing the Prime Minister's reply. There may be times when we would not wish to encourage publicity about an exchange of messages with the Russians at the highest possible level through diplomatic channels; and it would therefore seem prudent to avoid unnecessary precedents to the contrary. This of course need not exclude public references by Ministers as appropriate to the fact that we have made the Russians aware through correspondence at the highest level of British views about the INF negotiations. In particular it may be useful and timely at some juncture to indicate that our position on the British deterrent and arms control is something which the Prime Minister has conveyed personally to Mr Andropov. Such a reference could be useful in rebutting any ill-directed criticism that the Russians do not know where we stand on this issue. Parliament would probably be the best forum for this and officials will bear the point in mind in drafting Ministerial speeches or statements for use in the House of Commons.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence and David Goodall in the Cabinet Office.

John T. ...
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
 Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street

Refence 1 pt 4
INF. PT 4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540



OCT 13 1987



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 75
CONFIDENTIAL
FM ATHENS 111659Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,
TELNO 516 OF 11 OCTOBER 1983.,
REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO COPENHAGEN, BONN AND UKDEL NATO.

MS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

DENMARK: INF

1. ELLEMAN JENSEN MENTIONED THIS BRIEFLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE TODAY IN THE MARGINS OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT IF, AS HE FEARED (AND DESPITE HIS EXPECTATION THAT SCHMIDT PERSONALLY WOULD REMAIN FIRM) THE SDP TURNED AGAINST DEPLOYMENT, IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DESTROY HIS MAJORITY ON THIS ISSUE IN THE FOLKETING. HE TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT HE WOULD BE SEEKING TO FIND A FORM OF WORDS THAT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO MAINTAIN HIS COMMITMENT.

R H O D E S

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START
COPIES TO
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET DEDIP

23265 - 1

ZZ BONN
GRS 565
SECRET
DEDIP
FM FCO 101100Z OCT 83
TO FLASH BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 501 OF 10 OCTOBER
INF

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 149/83

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR KOHL URGENTLY, THE BACKGROUND TO WHICH YOU WILL KNOW FROM ORAL DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK.

BEGINS

DEAR HERR CHANCELLOR

I UNDERSTAND FROM MICHAEL HESELTINE THAT MANFRED WOERNER AND HE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING YOUR CONCERN THAT THE DELIVERY OF CRUISE MISSILES TO BRITAIN AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER IS LIABLE TO BE USED BY OPPONENTS OF DEPLOYMENT TO EMBARRASS YOU IN THE FORTH-COMING BUNDESTAG DEBATE. MICHAEL HESELTINE HAS PASSED ON TO ME YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DELAY THE ARRIVAL OF THE EQUIPMENT HERE UNTIL AFTER THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE HAS TAKEN PLACE. CAP WEINBERGER HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM ABOUT THIS.

I HAVE GIVEN YOUR SUGGESTION VERY CAREFUL THOUGHT, AND I HAVE ALSO HAD A MESSAGE ABOUT IT FROM RONALD REAGAN. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE TESTING PERIOD WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT FACES OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND I KNOW HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR ALL OF US THAT THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE SHOULD GO WELL. I KNOW, TOO, HOW MUCH PERSONAL EFFORT YOU ARE DEVOTING TO THIS END. I RECOGNISE THE DANGER OF ENABLING THE CRITICS OF DEPLOYMENT TO ARGUE THAT BY ALLOWING IT TO GO AHEAD ON THE PRESENT TIMING WE ARE PREJUDICING THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND ANTICIPATING THEIR FAILURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE RISKS INHERENT IN MAKING ANY CHANGE TO THE TIMETABLE WHICH, IF IT BECAME KNOWN, COULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR COLLECTIVE RESOLUTION WAS BEGINNING TO FALTER. THIS COULD NOT ONLY STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF OUR CRITICS AT HOME: IT COULD ALSO TEMPT THE RUSSIANS TO THINK

1

SECRET DEDIP

SECRET DEDIP

23265 - 1

THAT, BY SOME PROPAGANDA MOVE, THEY COULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR BOTH OF US TO ACHIEVE DEPLOYMENT BY THE AGREED DATE OF 31 DECEMBER. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ALL THIS WOULD BE MORE DAMAGING THAN ANY ALLEGATIONS YOU MAY HAVE TO FACE THAT WE ARE FAILING TO TAKE THE GENEVA TALKS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUSLY.

IT IS VERY DIFFICULT JUDGEMENT TO MAKE: BUT ON BALANCE I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL OF US, INCLUDING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, TO STICK TO THE AGREED TIMETABLE WHEREBY DELIVERIES OF THE MAIN EQUIPMENT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL START AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I DO NOT REACH THIS CONCLUSION LIGHTLY: AND THAT IT REFLECTS RONALD REAGAN'S CONCERN AS WELL AS MY OWN. IF YOU STILL FELT THAT THIS COURSE WOULD CREATE INSUPERABLE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR YOU YOU WOULD NO DOUBT WANT TO CONSIDER EXPLAINING THE PROBLEMS TO RONALD REAGAN. WE COULD THEN ALL LOOK AT THE QUESTION AGAIN TOGETHER. BUT IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THE BULK OF THE EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THE LAUNCHERS, MUST ARRIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER. EVEN IF THE DELIVERY OF THE MISSILES AND WARHEADS THEMSELVES DID NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL 22 NOVEMBER (WHICH WOULD BE THE VERY MOST WHICH WE HERE COULD CONSIDER, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF YOUR DEBATE) I UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT WOULD BE OPERATIONALLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS.

LET ME ASSURE YOU AGAIN HOW AWARE I AM OF THE VERY REAL DIFFICULT YOU FACE BUT FOR ALL THE REASONS I HAVE GIVEN I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH OF US - AND OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE - FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO STICK TO THE EXISTING TIMETABLE. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT ON REFLECTION YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEEDS.

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS EVER,
MARGARET THATCHER.
ENDS

HOWE
LIMITED
HD/DEFGNCE
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/AUS
SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES 2

SECRET DEDIP

Subject
Master
of
16
US Declassified

DEDIP SECRET

23266 - 1

OO WASHINGTON
GRS 460
DEDIP
SECRET
DESKBY 101400Z
FM FCO 101100Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1670 OF 10 OCTOBER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T148/83

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE BACKGROUND TO WHICH YOU WILL BE AWARE OF FROM TELECON WESTON/RENWICK ON THE SECURE LINE ON 7 OCTOBER.

BEGINS

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 OCTOBER ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF CRUISEMISSILES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. I ABSOLUTELY AGREE ON THE NEED NOT TO JEOPARDISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S DECISION AND TO HELP THE GERMANS BY DEMONSTRATING FIRMNESS OF PURPOSE AT THIS DIFFICULT MOMENT. AT THE SAME TIME THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM WHICH HELMUT KOHL FACES: AND THIS WAS WHY MICHAEL HESELTINE, AS HE EXPLAINED TO GEORGE SHULTZ AND CAP WEINBERGER IN SEPTEMBER, WAS VERY ANXIOUS THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF THE PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR DELIVERIES HERE.

IN RESPONSE TO A SUGGESTION FROM THE GERMANS THAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER SOME ADJUSTMENT IN THE TIMETABLE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POST

BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON 21 NOVEMBER, I HAVE TODAY WRITTEN TO HELMUT KOHL. I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT I HAVE HAD A MESSAGE FROM YOU: AND I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE BOTH RECOGNISE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE THAT THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE SHOULD GO WELL. BUT I HAVE LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE DANGERS OF MAKING ANY CHANGE TO THE TIMETABLE - PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE IMPRESSION WHICH THIS COULD CREATE THAT OUR RESOLUTION WAS BEGINNING TO FALTER. I HAVE POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THIS COULD NOT ONLY STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF OUR CRITICS AT HOME BUT

1

DEDIP SECRET

DEDIP SECRET

23266 - 1

COULD ALSO TEMPT THE RUSSIANS TO THINK THAT, BY SOME PROPAGANDA MOVE, THEY COULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR ALL OF US TO ACHIEVE DEPLOYMENT BY THE AGREED DATE OF 31 DECEMBER. I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF US ALL, INCLUDING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, TO STICK TO THE EXISTING TIMETABLE.

I HAVE, HOWEVER, THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO ADD THAT, IF HE STILL FELT THAT THIS COURSE WOULD CREATE INSUPERABLE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR HIM, HE WOULD NO DOUBT WANT TO CONSIDER EXPLAINING THE PROBLEM TO YOU. WE COULD THEN ALL LOOK AT THE QUESTION AGAIN TOGETHER. BUT I HAVE STRESSED THAT THE BULK OF THE EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THE LAUNCHERS, MUST ARRIVE HERE AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER: AND THAT, EVEN IF THE DELIVERY OF THE MISSILES AND WARHEADS THEMSELVES DID NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL 22 NOVEMBER (WHICH WOULD BE THE VERY MOST WHICH WE HERE COULD CONSIDER, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE BUNDES-TAG DEBATE), SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT WOULD BE OPERATIONALLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR YOU. IN CONCLUSION I HAVE STRESSED MY HOPE THAT HE WILL ON REFLECTION AGREE THAT THE RIGHT COURSE IS TO MAKE NO FURTHER CHANGE AND FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO STICK TO THE EXISTING TIMETABLE.

WITH BEST WISHES
YOURS EVER
MARGARET THATCHER
ENDS
HOWE

LIMITED
HD/ DEFENCE D
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

2

DEDIP SECRET

RESTRICTED

file

855

10 October 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO MR. ANDROPOV

You earlier arranged for the text of the Prime Minister's reply to Mr. Andropov's message of 27 August to be delivered in Moscow.

I now enclose the signed version and should be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. COLE

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

BS
15

File



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 October 1983

TIMETABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF INF

Following the meeting held here on 7 October to discuss this subject (a record will reach you separately) the Prime Minister has approved revised draft messages from herself to Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan.

BS | The final texts are enclosed with this letter. I should be grateful if you would arrange for them to be delivered urgently.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A.L. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

Dear Herr Chancellor,

I understand from Michael Heseltine that Manfred Woerner and he have been discussing your concern that the delivery of cruise missiles to Britain at the beginning of November is liable to be used by opponents of deployment to embarrass you in the forthcoming Bundestag debate. Michael Heseltine has passed on to me your suggestion that we might be able to delay the arrival of the equipment here until after the Bundestag debate has taken place. Cap Weinberger has also been in touch with him about this.

I have given your suggestion very careful thought, and I have also had a message about it from Ronald Reagan. I fully understand the testing period which your government faces over the next few weeks and I know how important it is for all of us that the Bundestag debate should go well. I know, too, how much personal effort you are devoting to this end. I recognise the danger of enabling the critics of deployment to argue that by allowing it to go ahead on the present timing we are prejudicing the outcome of the Geneva talks and anticipating their failure. On the other hand, I am very worried about the risks inherent in making any change to the timetable which, if it became known, could create the impression that our collective resolution was beginning to falter. This could not only strengthen the hand of our critics at home: it could also tempt the Russians to think that, by some propaganda move, they could make it more difficult for both of us to achieve deployment by the agreed date of 31 December. It seems to me that all this would be more damaging than any allegations you may have to face that we are failing to take the Geneva talks sufficiently seriously.

/ It is a very

It is a very difficult judgement to make; but on balance I believe that it would be in the best interests of all of us, including the Federal Republic, to stick to the agreed timetable whereby deliveries of the main equipment to the United Kingdom will start at the beginning of November.

I am sure you will understand that I do not reach this conclusion lightly; and that it reflects Ronald Reagan's concern as well as my own. If you still felt that this course would create insuperable political difficulties for you you would no doubt want to consider explaining the problems to Ronald Reagan. We could then all look at the question again together. But it is clear to us that the bulk of the equipment, including the launchers, must arrive at the beginning of November. Even if the delivery of the missiles and warheads themselves did not take place until 22 November (which would be the very most which we here could consider, whatever the outcome of your debate) I understand that such an adjustment would be operationally very difficult for the Americans.

Let me assure you again how aware I am of the very real difficulties you face but for all the reasons I have given I believe that it would be in the best interests of both of us - and of the Alliance as a whole - for the United Kingdom to stick to the existing timetable. I very much hope that on reflection you will agree that this is the right way to proceed.

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

Margaret Thatcher.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your message of 6 October about the arrival of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. I absolutely agree on the need not to jeopardise the implementation of NATO's decision and to help the Germans by demonstrating firmness of purpose at this difficult moment. At the same time there can be no doubt about the scale of the problem which Helmut Kohl faces; and this was why Michael Heseltine, as he explained to George Shultz and Cap Weinberger in September, was very anxious that the Germans should be fully aware of the proposed timetable for deliveries here.

In response to a suggestion from the Germans that we might consider some adjustment in the timetable to take account of the postponed Bundestag debate on 21 November, I have today written to Helmut Kohl. I have told him that I have had a message from you; and I have made it clear that we both recognise how important it is for the whole Alliance that the Bundestag debate should go well. But I have left him in no doubt about the dangers of making any change to the timetable - particularly because of the impression which this could create that our resolution was beginning to falter. I have pointed out to him that this could not only strengthen the hand of our critics at home but could also tempt the Russians to think that, by some propaganda move, they could make it more difficult for all of us to achieve deployment by the agreed date of 31 December. I have explained that against this background I believe it would be in the best interests of us all, including the Federal Republic, to stick to the existing timetable.

/ I have

I have, however, thought it right to add that, if he still felt that this course would create insuperable political difficulties for him, he would no doubt want to consider explaining the problem to you. We could then all look at the question again together. But I have stressed that the bulk of the equipment, including the launchers, must arrive here at the beginning of November; and that, even if the delivery of the missiles and warheads themselves did not take place until 22 November (which would be the very most which we here could consider, whatever the outcome of the Bundestag debate), such an adjustment would be operationally very difficult for you. In conclusion I have stressed my hope that he will on reflection agree that the right course is to make no further change and for the United Kingdom to stick to the existing timetable.

With best wishes

Yours ever

Margaret Thatcher



10 DOWNING STREET

Briefing Notes

Letter to Andropov

You approved this text which
was delivered in Rosnow while
we were in North America.

2. We should now send
a signed version (which we
shall date 27 September)

"Dear Chairman"

A. S. C. ¹⁵⁷/₁₀.

SUBJECT.

SECRET FILE

14A
~~14A~~

da

cc Master



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 October 1983

INF

The Prime Minister chaired an ad hoc Ministerial meeting at 4.30 today to consider President Reagan's message of 6 October in which, having referred to the approach from the German Government urging that we delay the arrival of Cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, the President expresses the hope that we will inform the German Government that equipment deliveries to the UK must adhere to the existing schedule, which envisages initial deliveries on 1 November.

The meeting was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr. Goodall, Mr. Blelloch and Mr. Wright. In addition to the President's message your letter of 7 October and Roger Bone's letter of the same date were before the meeting.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in his view any postponement of the deployment programme to meet German wishes would be very damaging in the light of President Reagan's message. It was not clear yet how far German vacillation might be carried. Herr Genscher had rung him today and explained that when he met Mr. Gromyko shortly he would say to the latter that if the Soviet Union intended to make a proposal which might lead to deployment being deferred, that proposal should come forward quickly. Thus there was at least some prospect of further delay on the part of the Germans.

The Defence Secretary said that his aim had always been to arrange that the equipment should arrive in Britain with the minimum of political difficulty. In various conversations with Mr. Weinberger he had taken the line that we should make such adjustments as were necessary to take account of politically sensitive factors. As a consequence the programme had been adjusted several times. The deployment of major equipment had been postponed from last May until November. More recently, it had appeared that the Germans may not have realised the political significance of the deployment of Cruise missiles in Britain for the debate now scheduled in the Bundestag for 21 November. He had discussed this matter with Mr. Weinberger and suggested that he should put the point to the Germans. Mr. Weinberger had raised no objection. He had therefore

/ talked

SECRET

STO

talked to Dr. Woerner who had said that he would consider the point and let us know the German reactions. Subsequently, Dr. Woerner had conveyed a message to the Defence Secretary, apparently endorsed by Chancellor Kohl, asking that our two Governments should work together to minimise German difficulties. It was somewhat awkward that the US Government had now urged that there should be no delay in our deployment schedule.

Equipment had been arriving here over many months. But we were now reaching the most sensitive and most photogenic equipment. He believed that we should stick to the timetable except in respect of missiles and warheads and that these should be brought in on 22 November. Such a delay would not be critical for operational deployment at the end of December. The problem for the Germans was that if missiles and warheads were known to have arrived here before the Bundestag debate opponents of the Federal Government would argue that the debate was not genuine since Germany's allies were proceeding with deployment.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that, given the uncertain touch displayed by West German parliamentary managers on this issue, there could be no certainty that the timing of the debate might not slip even further or that the German Socialists might not find some device by which to block final Bundestag approval for the deployment of Pershing II by 31 December. German officials had recently accepted that their problems would be eased if we were to make it clear at a suitable moment in public that although deliveries had begun on a contingency basis, Cruise missiles would not be operational in this country until 31 December and only then if no satisfactory agreement had been reached in Geneva. So, in effect, we could give the Germans what they wanted without damaging the timetable. The Defence Secretary commented that the Germans had seen our timetable and it was precisely that which worried them. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, referring to President Reagan's letter, said that it was clear that the Americans did not wish to see any change in our timetable. If we delayed deliveries, there was a possibility of this leaking and the impression of slippage would not help the German Government.

Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that she thought that our basic message to Chancellor Kohl should be that we were under heavy pressure from President Reagan to stick to the deployment timetable. If this really caused the Germans difficulty, they should approach the US Government. In that event, the maximum delay which we could envisage was until 22 November. We might add the thought that it would be better if we stuck to the existing timetable and thus showed our firmness in carrying out NATO's decision.

There was a danger that the Soviet Union would produce a new proposal shortly before the Bundestag debate. This argued in favour of our sticking to the present timetable.

We should also send a suitable reply to President Reagan, making plain what we had said to Chancellor Kohl.

In view of the different attitudes which appeared to have been adopted by the White House on the one hand and Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Shultz on the other hand, the message to President Reagan

/ should

SECRET

should make it plain that the Defence Secretary had discussed this question with Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger over a period of some weeks.

It was agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office should revise the proposed messages from the Prime Minister to Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan and that these should be submitted to the Prime Minister for her consideration over the weekend.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

Ref: B06866

*Prime Minister**14*MR COLVES*Agree that these two messages should be sent on*

c Sir Robert Armstrong

*Yes mt Sunday? A.J.C. 7/10.*Timetable for Deployment of INF

Following the Prime Minister's meeting this afternoon with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary, I submit draft messages for the Prime Minister to send to Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary have been consulted and the drafts reflect their views.

*David Goodall*7th October 1983

A D S GOODALL

ANDROPOV

He now says that he agrees to negotiate towards an equal number of warheads on intermediate range nuclear weapons.

NATO has always wanted that. But we prefer no such warheads on either side.

If the Russians are signalling that they will now negotiate seriously in Geneva, I welcome that.

But we must be careful. There are a lot of ambiguities in Andropov's statement which will have to be cleared up in Geneva.

His statement that the British and French strategic deterrents should be included is completely unacceptable.

There is no difference between these weapons and the enormous number of American and Soviet strategic weapons which are excluded from the INF talks. It is nonsensical to include them. Why include our submarine-based deterrents but not the Russian?

The Russian tactic is transparent. They want to include the British and French warheads, match them with an equal number of Soviet SS20s and so keep a monopoly of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

/ If we

If we fall for this, the end result will be that the Russians have modernised INF weapons in Europe and the West have none. We shall not fall for it.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-~~930 7922~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/9/4

7th October 1983

Dear John,

INF

Roger Bone copied to me his letter of today's date about the response to President Reagan's message. As it has not proved possible to agree on the proposed response, the FCO preferred that I should record separately to you our views.

Mr Heseltine believes that it is important to see the present exchanges with the Americans in context. For the last year or so, we have been at great pains to work closely with the Americans and the Germans in order to ensure that, so far as possible, the timetable for the deliveries of equipment recognises the political problems that the basing countries (and the Germans in particular) undoubtedly face. These discussions have been handled personally by the Defence Secretary (initially Mr Nott but largely Mr Heseltine) with Mr Weinberger and Dr Woerner. The Americans have certainly done a good deal to help and Mr Weinberger has recognised the importance of seeing deployment in its political context.

It was against the background of that cooperation that the Defence Secretary made a point of raising with Mr Weinberger on 13th September that having received the Americans' detailed proposals for the delivery of major items of equipment to the UK, he proposed to let the Germans know what was envisaged so that it could be looked at in terms of the possible impact in Germany prior to the Bundestag debate. The point arose briefly in similar terms in Mr Heseltine's meeting with Mr Shultz the following day. Mr Heseltine emphasised, and the point was well understood, that the timetable was otherwise entirely acceptable to the British Government. Neither at those meetings nor afterwards did the Americans tell us that the timetable was absolutely immutable and it would therefore be pointless to consult the Germans about it.

Having - with American agreement - raised the matter with the Germans, Mr Heseltine considers that we could not refuse to meet German concerns altogether without them legitimately feeling that the consultation had been a charade and that we had let them down because of American pressure. Once the deliveries of all the

A J Coles Esq

SECRET



equipment including the missiles are completed, we shall find it very difficult to hold a public line that the system has not effectively been deployed - the general public (and even informed opinion) are likely to be sceptical about the distinction that the system is not "operational". Equally, we must meet American concerns that the deliveries of equipment should begin on 1st November and that we should not give the German Government a handle on deployment here and the opportunity repeatedly to delay.

/ I attach the planned schedule of deliveries to this country. In the light of US concerns, Mr Heseltine proposes that initial deliveries should indeed begin, as the President clearly wishes, on 1st November; that these deliveries should include all of the sensitive items outstanding except for the missiles and the warheads (which are the least of the Americans' logistic problems); and that the Germans should be told that the latter will arrive, come what may in Germany, on 22nd November. The most visible items would thus arrive on schedule and our determination could not be clearer. The Americans' logistic problems would be kept to a minimum, and Mr Heseltine finds it scarcely credible that a delay restricted to the missiles and warheads would in any meaningful way prejudice achievement of the initial operational capability. When Mr Weinberger telephoned him yesterday, Mr Heseltine floated with him without commitment on our part a proposition on these broad lines and Mr Weinberger himself recognised the possibility of one aircraft load of critical items being held back for delivery on 22nd November.

/ I attach an alternative draft message to President Reagan couched in these terms. Ministers may wish to discuss whether a message to Chancellor Kohl should go in parallel or be held back until President Reagan had been given an opportunity to respond to the attachment.

I am copying this letter, and the attachments, to Roger Bone (FCO), David Goodall and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

GLCM EQUIPMENT DELIVERY SCHEDULE

- 1 November: two Launch Control Vehicles (LCCs); two Transporter-Erector - Launchers (TELs); ten missiles; three prime movers. ↖
- 2 November: sixteen warheads; three prime movers.
- 3 November: two TELs; two prime movers; one LCC driver training vehicle.
- 4 November: two TELs; two prime movers; one LCC driver training vehicle.
- 5 November: one prime mover.
- 6 November: no deliveries.
- 7 November: ten missiles, one LCC.
- 8-20 November: four TEL driver training vehicles.

SECRET

DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your message. I think it is very unfortunate that the Bundestag debate has slipped. But I do not myself doubt the Federal Chancellor's determination though I am conscious of the scale of the problem he faces. The Germans, as have we, have always seen the need to manage the delivery schedule with an eye to the political realities. They and we have had unstinted help from your people to that end. As things stand now, I agree with you entirely that the best way we can help the Germans is to stick to the existing timetable whereby the first major equipments arrive, as planned, on 1st November. The arrival of these equipments, which it will be impossible altogether to conceal at Greenham Common, will be taken here as ample evidence of our determination to proceed. You need have no doubt of that determination. But I would, for my part, be prepared to see the missiles and warheads arrive last if that would help the Federal Chancellor, provided it was made absolutely plain to him that they would arrive on 22nd November, come what may in Germany. I have no doubt that in this country a delivery schedule completed by the third week in November will be seen to be wholly consistent with the Alliance's decision to deploy and achieve an initial operational capability by the end of December, some five weeks later. My judgement would be that that is how it will be seen in Europe at large.

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 October 1984

John Selvon,

Att⁷/12.

p.c.

INF

attached.

In your letter of 6 October you asked us to let you have a draft reply for the Prime Minister in response to President Reagan's message yesterday about the arrival of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. We have also seen Richard Mottram's letter of 6 October recording Mr Weinberger's telephone discussion with Mr Heseltine yesterday.

As you know, it has not proved possible to reach agreement on this with the MOD, and I understand that you are therefore arranging a meeting a little later this afternoon.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views were set out in his minute of 5 October to Mr Heseltine. They have been reinforced by the strength of the subsequent American reaction culminating in President Reagan's message. In addition to the considerations set out in his earlier minute, Sir Geoffrey Howe is now convinced that any attempt to change British plans at this late juncture would be very damaging to us politically in Washington, while any benefits with Bonn seem at best uncertain. Given recent German vacillation and the further delay in holding the Bundestag debate, the Americans clearly see our role as crucial in demonstrating NATO's resolution over the modernisation programme. We must also reckon with the possibility that the Russians may come up with some further inducement around the time of the Bundestag debate, which could be seized on as yet another pretext for delay. If we change our own plans there is also a high risk that this will leak somehow, with damaging consequences that will give comfort only to the Russians and to the anti-nuclear movement. In all the circumstances, it is hard to disagree with President Reagan's view that sticking to our own plans is the best way to help the Germans through this difficult period. The enclosed drafts therefore reflect this line.

I am

SECRET



I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosures, to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence and Richard Hatfield and David Goodall in the Cabinet Office.

Yours

R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

DSR 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Reagan

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your message of 6 October about the arrival of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. I absolutely agree on the need not to jeopardise the implementation of NATO's decision and to help the Germans by demonstrating firmness of purpose at this difficult time. I have therefore told Helmut Kohl that equipment deliveries to the United Kingdom must in my view adhere to the existing schedule beginning on 1 November. If we can be helpful to him over public language in the period prior to the Bundestag debate, we shall naturally do this. But I foresee that we shall have to tell Parliament here as soon as equipment deliveries begin.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

CHANCELLOR KOHL

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I understand that Herr Woerner telephoned Mr Heseltine on 3 October to express your concern that deployment of cruise missiles in Britain at the beginning of November would be used by those opposed to deployment in Germany to embarrass you in the forthcoming Bundestag debate. Michael Heseltine has passed on your request that we consider delaying the arrival of equipment here until after your debate or at the very least making no announcement before then about the arrival of the missiles and other equipment.

I have given your request the most careful consideration and I fully understand the testing period your Government faces over the next few weeks. It is, however, clear to me from a message I received from President Reagan yesterday that any delays to US equipment deliveries to the United Kingdom would be most unwelcome at this late juncture, for both political and technical reasons. I know we both share an over-riding concern that NATO's resolution should not appear to falter at this time. I believe the best contribution that the United Kingdom can make to this

Enclosures—flag(s).....

objective is to proceed with delivery schedules beginning on 1 November as planned. But we shall naturally do our best in public statements here before the Bundestag debate to be as helpful as possible in meeting German concerns. I know our respective officials have already been in touch about this. I look forward to discussing all this further with you in Bonn on 8/9 November.

Advisory



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

M. F/10.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	PRECEDENCE/DESKBY
	CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE BONN
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, and PRIORITY ALL EC CAPITALS
10 GENSCHER'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO OTHER
11 1. Genschler telephoned me this morning to give me the
12 background about his forthcoming meeting with Gromyko.
13 2. He said that, after the cancellation of Gromyko's visit to
14 New York, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had approached him to
15 suggest a meeting with Gromyko in the near future. The first
16 Soviet suggestion had been for Genschler to visit Sofia, where
17 Gromyko would be attending a meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign
18 Ministers. Genschler had declined, but had suggested instead a
19 meeting on neutral territory somewhere in Western Europe, perhaps
20 Vienna. Gromyko had then suggested a meeting in Moscow.
21 Genschler had made clear that this would not be possible. The
22 Russians had then agreed to a meeting in Vienna, and the dates
23 agreed were 15/16 October. Genschler said that a public
24 announcement to this effect would be made either on Monday
25 afternoon or Tuesday morning, 10/11 October. He wanted to let

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword me
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) R B Bone		<i>de Gene Dept</i>
Telephone number 233 4831		<i>PS</i>
Authorised for despatch <i>RM 7/10</i>		<i>PS/ONS</i>
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	<i>Sir S. Bullard</i>
		<i>Mr. Wrayle</i>
		<i>Mr. Rutledge</i>
		<i>EESD</i>

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

ESG 1700 5

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

<<<<

1 <<<<
 2 me know that this was in prospect. We would have the opportunity
 3 in Athens next week to discuss the meeting in a little more
 4 detail. He particularly wanted to ~~take the opportunity to~~ talk
 5 in restricted session with Cheysson and myself about it.
 6 3. Genscher said he would of course take the opportunity to make
 7 clear to Gromyko again that there could be no question of
 8 postponement or cancellation of deployment in the F7G. He would
 9 also make clear to Gromyko that if the Russians had any
 10 constructive proposal to make, now was the time to ^{make} do it.
 11 Genscher added that his second objective, ² would be to bring home
 12 to Gromyko the fact that the Americans had made ^{very} clear their
 13 willingness to talk constructively, not only in the INF
 14 discussions but also on START.
 15 4. I thanked Genscher for this and said I looked forward to
 16 talking to him in Athens.

*in the
course of his
discussions
with
Skuba in
Washington*

18 HOWE
19 NNNN

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------

Defence 1 p44
INF 1 p44

= 7 OCT 1983



CONFIDENTIAL



File 116

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1983

INF

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from the President of the United States about the above subject.

BT
I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply, agreed with the Ministry of Defence, as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ls

US Declassified

010
SUBJECT

cc MASTER
ops

ZCZCWAGO84
TOO WTE24
DE WTE £7741 2791426
O 061446Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO THE CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

1
we understand that
equipment deliveries
are no use drop in
everything but the
missiles.
mk

Prime Minister

We shall let you have a
draft refg soon.

OR 6/10

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO7741

OCTOBER 6, 1983

DEAR MARGARET:

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED
YOURS REGARDING A DELAY IN THE ARRIVAL OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE
MISSILES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

AS WE DISCUSSED LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON, IT IS ABSOLUTELY
ESSENTIAL THAT OUR INF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM REMAIN ON SCHEDULE,
AND I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR EMPHASIS THAT THE KOHL GOVERNMENT
WILL NOT FALTER. THE DELAY IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE, NOW COUPLED
WITH THE GERMAN APPROACH TO YOUR GOVERNMENT, ARE ESPECIALLY
TROUBLING.

WHILE I AM SENSITIVE TO THE GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL
SITUATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP THE KOHL GOVERNMENT FOR
US TO DELAY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. INDEED,
SUCH A DELAY COULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER DELAYS AND JEOPARDIZE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATOS DECISION ON SCHEDULE. THEREFORE, I HOPE
THAT YOU WILL INFORM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT THAT EQUIPMENT
DELIVERIES TO THE UK MUST ADHERE TO THE EXISTING SCHEDULE, WHICH
ENVISIONS INITIAL DELIVERIES ON NOVEMBER 1. IN MY VIEW, THIS IS
THE BEST WAY FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO HELP THE GERMANS.

IT WAS GOOD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH
YOU FIRST-HAND LAST WEEK. PLEASE KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

WARM REGARDS

SINCERELY,

RON

0263
£7741

NNNN



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/2/2

6th October 1983

Prime Minister

Important.

Al 6/10.

Dear Roger,

INF

Mr Weinberger telephoned Mr Heseltine at 1345 today. He said that his Government were aware of the German request to delay the deployment of INF in this country and were most concerned about the political and technical implications of any delay. The President would be sending a message to the Prime Minister about the political aspects. He wished to express his concern that, if there were to be delays, it would no longer be possible to achieve the deployment timetable of the end of the year. The Defence Secretary reminded Mr Weinberger of their earlier conversation on 13th September at which this problem had been discussed. He said that we had now heard from the Germans that they were concerned. Discussions were proceeding at present within the British Government about what might be done to meet these concerns. He hoped that we could come up with a proposal under which virtually all of the equipment was delivered on the present timetable. If there were to be a gesture in the direction of German anxieties, it would concern only the last and most critical equipments.

Mr Weinberger emphasised the importance of meeting the December date. He said that President Carstens and Herr Genscher had been in Washington for discussions about the INF timetable in Germany. The Americans were very concerned about the reasons for the delay in the timing of the Bundestag debate. It appeared to them that Genscher had so delayed discussion by the FPD of the issue to ensure that the debate had to be delayed and Chancellor Kohl had gone back on earlier assurances to the Americans that this would not happen. Mr Weinberger's view was that Genscher was expecting the Russians to make some last minute gesture (of a meaningless kind) which would provide an excuse for further delay. He understood that the motion for the Bundestag debate had been posed in terms of "Had anything happened since the original decision to deploy INF which would now make delay desirable?", which also suggested the Germans were seeking some way out. Everyone in the German Government whom the Americans



consulted said that the Bundestag vote would be favourable but that did not take account of the possibility of this last minute development. He was therefore worried that any delay now could become open-ended and was anxious to proceed directly on what was in any case a very tight timetable.

The Defence Secretary commented that there was no suggestion that the vast bulk of the deliveries should not proceed on time. If any equipment was to be held back, this would be on the basis that it would be delivered on 22nd November, which would be a firm date to be stuck to regardless of what happened between now and then in Germany. Mr Weinberger commented that he could see the possibility of the last few items of equipment being held back for delivery straight after 21st November. His preference was to stick to the present timetable. The Defence Secretary emphasised that, as Mr Weinberger knew from their earlier conversations, there was no doubt or hesitancy over INF on the part of the British Government. We had to consider German views and we hoped to reach a view on the way forward shortly. There followed a brief, friendly exchange about other defence issues and about their forthcoming meeting in Canada at the NPG.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard

(R C MOTTRAM)

Prime Minister

9



FCS/83/193

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

There are a lot of considerations
 here which did not come out
 in Dr. Heilmann's presentation to
 you yesterday. It looks as though
 further discussion will be needed.

INF

A.S.C. 5/10

will request
 if required


1. I understand (your Private Secretary's letter of 4 October to mine), that in response to representations by your West German colleague, Dr Woerner, you have decided to ask the Americans to postpone the delivery of Cruise missiles to Greenham Common until after the Bundestag's debate on INF, and that the Prime Minister has concurred in this decision.

2. This is a matter which concerns the political as well as the military security of the Alliance. In the light of the considerations which follow, I hope that you will agree to postpone action until we have had time to reflect. It might also be useful to have further discussion with the US military on the logistics of deployment.

3. My present understanding, based on information arising most recently from the meeting of the UK/US London Working Group on 30 September, is that delivery to Greenham Common of the first flight of Cruise missiles would have to take place during the first week of November if the undertaking to which we subscribed in 1979, that the missiles would be deployed by the end of 1983 in the absence of a satisfactory agreement at Geneva, is to be fulfilled. I gather that this longer lead-time for our deployment is due at least in part to the compression of the time-scale for the deployment of Pershing IIs in the FRG necessitated by the postponement of the Bundestag's INF debate.

/4.

5 1 1303





4. If the American logistical assessment is correct, any delay in deliveries to Greenham Common beyond the first week of November will mean that UK deployment cannot be effective by 31 December. The Bundestag debate is not now due to take place until 21 November. I would be very reluctant to make UK deployment hostage to the Federal German political process. Recent weeks have shown that this process can be fickle and uncertain.

5. Since the Federal Government first agreed in June, in response to SPD pressure, to allow the Bundestag to debate INF stationing on or after 15 November before Pershing deliveries began, the debate has been rescheduled twice. Chancellor Kohl nevertheless assured the Americans (as State Secretary Mertes informed us in London on 13 September) that in no circumstances would deployment be delayed beyond 15 November. Not only has this assurance evidently now fallen by the wayside, but the Bundestag debate itself has been postponed until 21 November. Given the uncertain touch which the West German parliamentary managers have displayed on this issue, there can be no certainty that the timing of the debate may not slip even further or that the German Socialists may not find some procedural device by which to block final Bundestag approval for the deployment of Pershing IIs by 31 December.

6. This is an issue on which the Americans will no doubt be looking to us to set an example of firm resolve to the rest of the Alliance. As the Prime Minister said in Ottawa and in Washington, our nerve is being tested. West German anxieties could all too easily become contagious. We should not risk allowing the West German

/Government

Ps / No 10 Downing St
8A

GRS 250

SECRET

SECRET

DESKBY BONN 060830Z

FM WASHINGTON 052007Z OCTOBER 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2878 OF 5 OCT

INFO IMMEDIATE TO BONN (FOR CARTLEDGE) UKDEL NATO AND ROME

A. J. C. 6/10.
h.c.

YOUR TELNO 219 TO UKDEL NATO: INF

1. BURT HAS JUST TELEPHONED MINISTER TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HMG WAS LOOKING URGENTLY AT THE PROBLEM WHICH THE GERMANS RAISED OVER THE DATE OF DELIVERY OF MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. BURT SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH CARTLEDGE IN BONN TOMORROW BUT WANTED, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, TO LET US HAVE US VIEWS.

2. HE SAID THAT THE FEELING HERE WAS THAT THE GERMANS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL WERE CONFUSED ABOUT DELIVERY AND DEPLOYMENT. IT MIGHT BE THAT FROM THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STANDPOINT THEY WERE RIGHT TO MIX THE TWO UP. BUT THE US FELT STRONGLY THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE DEPENDED ON DEPLOYMENT ON SCHEDULE AND THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT A SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN THE DATE OF DELIVERY WOULD MAKE DEPLOYMENT ON SCHEDULE IMPOSSIBLE. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY APPLY TO DELAY IN DELIVERY BEYOND 21 NOVEMBER WHICH WAS WHAT THE GERMANS SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND. THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE WOULD THEN RISK BECOMING A FULCRUM ON WHICH THE WHOLE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT IN ALL THREE BASING COUNTRIES WOULD DEPEND. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG TO BRING DEPLOYMENT IN OTHER COUNTRIES INTO THE GERMAN PROBLEM IN THIS WAY.

3. BURT WILL BE SPEAKING ON THESE LINES TO RUTH TOMORROW AND HOPES, LATER IN THE DAY TO SEE BOTH WOERNER AND GENSCHER.

WRIGHT

(REPEATED AND REQUESTED)

LIMITED

DEF D

Ps

Ps/Pus

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

SECRET



Government or opposition parties to exercise, in effect, a veto over the timing of our own deployments: to do so would vindicate the Soviet strategy of working on West German nerves.

7. I am of course very well aware of, and sympathetic to, the domestic political problems which Chancellor Kohl and his colleagues face. In the annual Political/Military Talks between UK and German officials which took place in Bonn yesterday, the Germans reflected Dr Woerner's concern about the impact in the FRG of an announcement in London in early November that missile deliveries had begun. In discussion, they accepted that their problems would be eased if we were to make it clear, on 1 November or whichever date you choose for your statement in the House of Commons, that although deliveries have begun on a contingency basis, Cruise missiles will not be operational in this country until 31 December and only then if no satisfactory agreement has been reached in Geneva. I think this would go as far as we should towards meeting German domestic political concerns, which must not be allowed to take priority over the implementation, at least as far as the UK is concerned, of NATO's 1979 decision.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary to the Cabinet.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

5 October 1983

DEFENSE: INF Pt 4

GRS 300

SECRET

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 052259Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2887 OF 5 OCTOBER

AND TO MODUK (AUS (D STAFF) AND DS17)

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN (FOR CARTLEDGE),

Lead - full.

PRIORITY UKDEL NATO PARIS

INF

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US TODAY THAT IN GENEVA THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN CONTINUING TO THREATEN TO INTERRUPT THE NEGOTIATIONS. KVITSINSKY QUOTE OFFERED UNQUOTE YESTERDAY TO LET THE AMERICANS HAVE THE SOVIET FIGURES FOR THE COUNTER-DEPLOYMENT THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE IN RESPONSE TO US INF DEPLOYMENT. THOUGH ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ASKED, THERE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE SERIOUS PROBING OF THE NEW ALLIED POSITION. THE RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED TO SCHEDULE TWO TO FOUR FURTHER MEETINGS BEYOND 12 OCTOBER, BUT APPEARS TO BE LEAVING OPEN THE OPTION OF INTERRUPTING OR DOWNGRADING THE TALKS AT SOME TIME TOWARDS THE END OF OCTOBER. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO THINK IT ON BALANCE UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BREAK THEM OFF ALTOGETHER.

2. IN THE SCG MEETING, BURT WILL DISCUSS OTHER POSSIBLE SOVIET PLOYS, INCLUDING ONE VAGUE HINT FROM BOVIN AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN QUOTE BUILD-DOWN UNQUOTE PROPOSAL IN THE FORM OF AN OFFER TO RETIRE BUT NOT DESTROY SS20'S IN THE EUROPEAN PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION DOWN TO 162 MISSILES IF THERE IS A MORATORIUM ON WESTERN DEPLOYMENT. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN OF ANY GIVE IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES I.E. ACCEPTANCE OF SOME WESTERN DEPLOYMENT AND THE EXCLUSION OF ALLIED SYSTEMS

WRIGHT

LIMITED
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
EED
SOV DEPT
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START
COPIES TO
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SECRET



MO 11/2/2

7A ②
Prime Minister

To be aware.

A.J.C. 4/10.

M

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYTHE SECOND GLCM BASE : RAF MOLESWORTH

I have been considering the American proposals for the timetable of the development of RAF Molesworth, a disused RAF site in Cambridgeshire, as the second GLCM base. Your officials, and Patrick Jenkin's, know the details.

2. The choice of Molesworth as the second GLCM base was part of the June 1980 announcement on the deployment of cruise missiles to the United Kingdom. All public statements by the Government have referred to a deployment date for Molesworth of 1988. The Americans have now put to us formally proposals for the development of the base working to an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) with the first flight operational of December 1987. On PSA's assessment of the time needed for the construction programme, this timetable would require that initial site surveys, and consultations with planning and highway authorities, would have to begin very shortly and indeed should ideally have already commenced. Physical site surveys would almost certainly attract attention and, very understandably, the necessary consultations with highway and planning authorities could not be guaranteed to be kept confidential.

3. These local consultations ought not in themselves, if handled properly, to give rise to special difficulties in a planning sense. But this activity would serve to raise the public profile of the Molesworth deployment just at the moment of maximum sensitivity at Greenham Common with the arrival of the ground launch cruise missiles for the IOC there of the end of the year. Moreover, a decision now

-4 OCT 1983





to proceed with the second base could be seen, and represented, as suggesting we see no possibility of an INF agreement which would make unnecessary some, at least, of the planned INF deployment in this country. It would complicate our task in persuading reasonable opinion that we are committed to arms control.

4. I do not believe that it is critical for the GLCM programme that this work goes ahead now and I have therefore decided that site surveys and consultations should not take place at Molesworth for the present. I suggest we review the position at the end of the year in the light of whatever progress has been made in the INF talks and of public attitudes here at the time. We can look then at whether the IOC date should "slip" from the American preferred date or whether we should seek to accelerate the construction programme. For the moment, I have arranged for the Americans to be informed of where matters stand through the London Working Group. This decision may not be welcome to the Americans at the working level but I know from my recent talk with him that Mr Weinberger himself accepts the general need to handle the GLCM programme carefully in relation to public opinion and to the Geneva talks. With the Greenham Common deployment well on target we have no reason to feel on the defensive.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for the Environment and Sir Robert Armstrong.

WJH

Ministry of Defence

4th October 1983

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

INT
with ABC

From the Private Secretary

7

JP
CT.

4 October 1983

GLCM DEPLOYMENT TIMETABLE

Your Secretary of State called on the Prime Minister this afternoon to discuss the above subject.

He explained that the deployment of cruise missiles in this country had originally been scheduled for the first week of November. When it became apparent that there would be a crucial debate in the German Bundestag on 15 November, he had told Mr. Weinberger that it would be necessary to postpone deployment in order to avoid handing an argument to the opponents of the German Government in the Bundestag debate. Weinberger had not demurred.

On 3 October, Weinberger had rung your Secretary of State to say that he had spoken to Chancellor Kohl and that the latter had confirmed that it would be embarrassing for him if the missiles arrived before the Bundestag debate which had now been postponed until 21 November.

From our point of view, delay did not matter provided that the missiles were in this country in December. He therefore believed that he should now tell the United States that no actual weapons should be deployed here before 21 November, though other items of equipment could be. He would similarly say to the German Defence Minister that we would wait until 21 November before any missiles were imported.

The Prime Minister agreed with this approach but expressed the hope that no further delays would occur.

As regards publicity, Mr. Heseltine explained that we had never stated publicly when the missiles would arrive. He believed that we should not make an announcement in advance of their arrival but once they were here we should have to confirm that they had arrived.

gc

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-~~XXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 18/1/1

4th October 1983

MR
5.
10

P.C.

New Binn.

TIMETABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF INF

During his visit to the United States, Mr Heseltine raised with Mr Weinberger the deployment timetable for major items of cruise missile equipment at Greenham Common and it was agreed that we should consult the Germans about whether the proposed deliveries at the beginning of November were difficult for them. We have now heard from Dr Woerner that they do indeed find the timetable difficult. The Defence Secretary has decided that, in the light of the German objections, we should tell the American Government that the timetable for delivery should be put back until after the Bundestag debate. He spoke to the Prime Minister about this briefly this afternoon who agreed with this decision.

I attach a draft telegram to Washington which Mr Heseltine has approved. I should be grateful if this could be despatched quickly: we would then propose to tell Brelloch to get together with his German and American colleagues in the margins of tomorrow's HLG meeting to fill out the details.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).


Yours ever,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

B J P Fall Esq

5 OCT 1983



DRAFT TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON

COPY TO: BONN
 UKDEL NATO
 MODUK (for Ps/sups)

TIMETABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF INF

When the Defence Secretary, accompanied by you, met Mr Weinberger on 13th September you will recall that he raised the timetable for the delivery of the major items of equipment at Greenham Common at the beginning of November. He said that this was acceptable to the British Government but needed also to be looked at from the point of view of the possible impact in Germany prior to the Bundestag debate. He said that he would be raising the point with Dr Woerner in the margins of the trilateral Ministerial meeting on 21st September.

2. When Mr Heseltine raised this with Woerner he agreed to consult his colleagues and informers^{US} of their views in due course. Woerner telephoned^{Mr Heseltine} yesterday to say that Chancellor Kohl had now been consulted. The Chancellor was most concerned that the deployment of missiles in Britain at the beginning of November would be used by those opposed to deployment in Germany to embarrass him in the forthcoming Bundestag debate. It would be argued that this deployment proved that NATO countries were not serious in seeking a solution by negotiation at Geneva and had already anticipated failure of the talks. His Government hoped that the arrival of the equipment might be delayed until after the debate or at the very least that no announcement should be made about the arrival of the missiles^{and other equipment}. Mr Heseltine explained that the latter alternative was not feasible since the arrival could not be concealed, Parliament would be sitting, and questions would have to be answered.

3. In the light of Chancellor Kohl's strongly-held views we now wish the deployment of the major items of equipment to be deferred until after the Bundestag debate. We appreciate that this deferment may delay the initial operating capability of the system but consider that this is less important than the potential political difficulties for the German Government.

4. Mr Heseltine would have preferred to explain this decision personally to Mr Weinberger but feels it should not be done over an insecure telephone. Would you therefore please arrange at the earliest opportunity to explain to Mr Weinberger the ^{need to change the} ~~nature of our~~ ^{request}, referring back to his earlier conversation ^{with} ~~with you and~~ ^{and with you} Mr Heseltine. You should suggest that the detailed background to the German concern and the implications for the timetable for deliveries to the UK might be discussed privately by Perle, Brelloch and Tandecki in the margins of the meeting of the High Level Group which is about to take place in Brussels. We shall be instructing Brelloch accordingly. *Please inform us of US reaction.*

5. Could Bonn please explain to Dr Woerner the action we are now taking to follow up his conversation with Mr Heseltine.

Reference : INF
A 4

RIME MINISTER

The Defence Secretary has asked to see you tomorrow to discuss INF deployment.

This follows his recent conversations with Weinberger and others as a result of which it emerged that the Americans are not entirely happy with our timetable for deployment. I have no further details, but Mr. Heseltine will explain these to you tomorrow.

A.J.C.

3 October, 1983.

OO WASHINGTON

OO UKDEL NATO

RR PARIS

RR THE HAGUE

RR BRUSSELS

RR ROME

RR MOSCOW

RR EAST BERLIN

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 301600Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 031 OF 30 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS17, DPS) WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE PARIS THE HAGUE BRUSSELS ROME MOSCOW EAST BERLIN
CICC(G)



[STANDARD]
IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

HD. DEFENCE DEPT.
HD. ACDD
HD. WED
HCL. NAD
HCL. LEED
HD. SOVIET DEPT
HD. PLANNING STAFF
HD. NEWS DEPT
HD. INT. DEPT.
DS
AS/LADY YOUNG
AS/MR WHITNEY
AS/MR LUCE
AS/MR RIFKIND
AS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR STAMES
MR CHATLEDGE
MR URE
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10 Dst.
RC.

INF: TIMING OF BUNDESTAG DEBATE AND DEPLOYMENT IN THE FRG

SUMMARY

1. THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON INF, WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE PROMISED WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE ANY DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES OR PARTS THEREOF COMMENCES IN THE FRG, HAS NOW BEEN FIXED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALL POLITICAL PARTIES FOR MONDAY 21 NOVEMBER. THE US ARE ANGRY ABOUT THIS POSTPONEMENT BUT WILL HAVE TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER COMPRESSING THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE.

DETAIL AND BACKGROUND

2. IN JUNE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROMISED THAT THE BUNDESTAG WOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEBATE INF STATIONING AFTER 15 NOVEMBER AND THAT NO MISSILES OR PARTS OF MISSILES WOULD BE "DEPLOYED" IN THE FRG UNTIL AFTER THE DEBATE. KOHL PUBLICLY REPEATED THIS LATTER ASSURANCE ON 21 SEPTEMBER.

3. ONCE IT WAS REALISED THAT 15 NOVEMBER FELL IN A WEEK WHEN THE BUNDESTAG WAS NOT IN SESSION, THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO ANN AT A DEBATE IN THE PREVIOUS WEEK. AS MINISTER OF STATE MERTES CONFIRMED DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON ON 12-13 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO. 820), KOHL GAVE THE AMERICANS A SPECIFIC ASSURANCE THAT THE START OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT BE DELAYED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND 15 NOVEMBER.

4. PARTY MANAGERS IN THE BUNDESTAG BEGAN, HOWEVER, SOME WEEKS AGO TO SEEK A LATER TIMING FOR THE DEBATE. THEY HAD IN MIND THAT THE FDP IS DUE TO HOLD A SPECIAL PARTY CONFERENCE TO DETERMINE ITS POSITION ON INF ON 18-20 NOVEMBER, AND GENSCHER WOULD FACE A SERIOUS ROW WITH HIS PARTY (WHICH HE CAN ILL AFFORD) IF HE LET A

ROW WITH HIS PARTY (WHICH HE CAN ILL AFFORD) IF HE LET A
BUNDESTAG DEBATE PRE-EMPT THE ISSUE BEFORE THEN. THE SPD HAS ALSO
POSTPONED ITS SPECIAL INF PARTY CONFERENCE UNTIL 19-20 NOVEMBER.

5. AFTER A PERIOD OF CONFUSION DURING WHICH THE OPTIONS OF BRINGING
FORWARD THE FDP CONFERENCE AND HOLDING AN EXTRAORDINARY BUNDESTAG
SESSION ON 15 NOVEMBER WERE MOOTED BUT REJECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT
AND PARLIAMENTARY MANAGERS OFTEN SEEMED TO BE WORKING AT CROSS
PURPOSES, THE BUNDESTAG YESTERDAY SENT NOTICES TO ALL MPS ANNOUNCING
THAT THE DEBATE WOULD DEFINITELY BE ON 21 NOVEMBER. GENSCHER INFORMED
SHULTZ OF THIS IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY AND ADDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT
NOW EXPECTED INF DELIVERIES TO START FROM 22 NOVEMBER.

6. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE TOLD US, AND THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE
NOT CONCEALED, THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE ANGER IN WASHINGTON ABOUT
THE WAY THE GERMANS HAVE GONE BACK ON THEIR ASSURANCES. BUT THE
AMERICANS HAVE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT TO REVIEW THE DEPLOYMENT SCHED-
ULES YET AGAIN AND SEEK WAYS OF MEETING THE MOC TARGET IN SIX WEEKS
INSTEAD OF SEVEN.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

CORRECTION PARA 5 LINE FOUR 'PARLIAMENTARY'

TAYLOR

NNNN

QSL YR 00 055 THKS

CB BONN/FCO 008/30

00 FCO

00 MODUK (DS17, DPS)

~~XX~~
not

cc BB
RTA
AA

INF
with AJC

NYWON 10/29

ZZ WTON

BB

GR 1200

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 291700Z SEP 83

TO F L A S H WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 7 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, PARIS, UKDIS GENEVA

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

BB 3/10

h.a.

MY TELNO 953 TO FCO AND TELECON RENWICK/GORE-BOOTH:
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SPEECH: DISARMAMENT

1. FULL TEXT OF MITTERRAND'S SPEECH NOW TO HAND.

PASSAGES ON DISARMAMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS :

" EACH OF US, I BELIEVE, IS CONVINCED THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NEW WORLD WAR WOULD BE INCALCULABLE AND DOUBTLESS IRREPARABLE. BUT PEACE AMONG NATIONS CAN ENDURE ONLY ON A BASIS OF GENUINE EQUILIBRIUM. HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US THIS. THROUGH RESPECT FOR THIS GOLDEN RULE, THE RIGHTS OF ONE AND ALL ARE RECONCILED WITH INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY. ESTABLISHING THESE BALANCES OR REESTABLISHING THEM WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN BROKEN, GUARANTEEING THEIR STABILITY, GRADUALLY REDUCING FORCES TO EVER-LOWER LEVELS AND VERIFYING AT ALL TIMES THE INFORMATION PROVIDED --THIS IS THE APPROACH, THE ONE APPROACH POSSIBLE, TO THE PROBLEMS WE FACE.

IN THE RECENT PAST THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE AMERICANS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, KNOW AS SALT, HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO LIMIT CERTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TO SLOW DOWN, QUALITATIVELY, THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE WITNESSED AN ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THESE ARMS, AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR ACCURACY.

NUCLEAR SYSTEM OF 2,000 TO 3,000 LAUNCHERS CARRYING 8,000 TO 9,000 WARHEADS. THESE ARE ABLE TO REACH AND DESTROY EACH OTHER, IF I MAY SAY SO, SEVEN OR EIGHT TIMES OVER. RIA
AA

ONE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA FOCUSES, AS YOU KNOW, ON THE REDUCTION OF "INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC" ARMS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT A BALANCE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARMS.

FRANCE HOPES THAT THIS NEGOTIATION IS SUCCESSFUL. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING WORLD OPINION IS FOCUSED ON THE OTHER NEGOTIATION, ON WHAT IS CALLED THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VIEW ON THIS WITH THE UTMOST CLARITY.

FOLLOWING A CONTINUOUS ESCALATION ALL ACROSS THE EUROPEAN SOIL, A NEW SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED WHEREBY THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT ALONE, HAS A SIZABLE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE ON OUR CONTINENT, WITH TRIPLE-WARHEAD MISSILES WHICH ARE MOBILE AND ACCURATE AND HAVE A RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 5,000 KILOMETERS. SINCE THEY CANNOT CROSS THE ATLANTIC, THEIR ONLY POSSIBLE TARGET IS THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE SAME REASONING HOLDS TRUE FOR THE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN THE ASIAN TERRITORY OF THE U.S.S.R. AND POINTED AT THE NEIGHBOURING STATES IN THIS REGION. FRANCE WELCOMED THE OPENING IN GENEVA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS TYPE OF WEAPON BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AS A VERY POSITIVE ACT, COMING AS IT DID AFTER THE UNITED STATES HAD ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD INSTALL PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS OF THE END OF THIS YEAR, IN APPLICATION OF THE "TWO-TRACK" DECISION TAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES OF THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND, OF WHICH FRANCE IS NOT A MEMBER. I WILL NOT REVIEW ALL THE ASPECTS OF A DEBATE WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED ELSEWHERE AND WHICH DOES DIRECTLY COMMIT FRANCE, EVEN IF FRANCE IS CONCERNED, BUT I WISH TO CLARIFY MY COUNTRY'S POSITION IN THE FACE OF THE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF EUROMISSILE EQUILIBRIUM.

I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL IN THIS CONNECTION THE FACT THAT FRANCE HAS HAD A NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY, A FORCE THAT IS DEFENSIVE BY ITS VERY NATURE VIS-A-VIS ANY EVENTUAL AGGRESSOR. THIS FORCE FORMS A COMPLETE ENTITY AND CONSTITUTES A CENTRAL DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR MY COUNTRY WHICH IS INDISPENSIBLE FOR ITS SECURITY. A FEW FIGURES WILL SUFFICE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DEFENSIVE NATURE: I MENTIONED JUST NOW THAT EACH OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CURRENTLY HAS BETWEEN 8,000 AND 9,000 WARHEADS. FRANCE HAS 98. THIS IS SUFFICIENT, CERTAINLY, FOR DETERRENCE BUT RULES OUT ANY

FURTHERMORE, THESE 98 MISSILES ARE PART OF A STRATEGIC, NOT TACTICAL, CONCEPT OF DEFENSE: THEY ARE NOT PART OF AN INTERMEDIARY CONCEPT, TO USE THE EXTREMELY PRECISE VOCABULARY USED BY THE SOVIET AND AMERICANS WHEN THEY DISCUSS THEIR AFFAIRS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE PARADOXICAL FOR A COUNTRY, MINE, TO BE SUBJECT TO A CONFERENCE IN WHICH IT DOES NOT PARTICIPATE AND WHICH WOULD DISCUSS, WITHOUT OUR CONSENT, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, IN PARTICULAR UNDERWATER STRATEGIC ARMS, WHICH NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAVE A GREAT MANY MORE OF THEM, ARE DISCUSSING BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AT LEAST NOT AT THIS CONFERENCE.

22
RTM
AA

ONE CAN COMPARE ONLY THAT WHICH IS COMPARABLE: IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO INCLUDE THE CENTRAL DEFENSE SYSTEM ON WHICH THE INDEPENDENCE AND SURVIVAL OF MY COUNTRY REST WITH THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, WHICH IN THEIR CASE MERELY COMPLEMENT THEIR FORMIDABLE STRATEGIC ARSENALS. SINCE IN CONCRETE TERMS WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A REQUEST ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, ON WHAT GROUNDS DOES THIS COUNTRY EXPECT FRANCE TO RENOUNCE SOMETHING SO VITAL, I REFER TO ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE? OF COURSE, WE ARE TOLD THAT THIS IS NOT THE AIM OF THE PROPOSAL, AND I WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE IT. WE ARE ASSURED THAT INCLUSION OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY REDUCTION IN IT. BUT ONCE FRANCE ENTERS INTO AN EQUATION IN WHICH IT HAS NO PART, WOULD IT NOT BE EXPOSED TO THE RISK OF SEEING THE MODERNIZATION OF ITS DEFENSE COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, AND WOULD IT NOT BE ASSUMING A RESPONSIBILITY IT REJECTS -- THAT OF UPSETTING WORLD EQUILIBRIUM?

MY COUNTRY IS INDEPENDENT. ITS DETERRENT FORCE IS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE COMMAND OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, FRANCE'S LOYALTY TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DOES NOT UNDERMINE ITS AUTONOMY. WE RESPECT THE GREAT RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND HOPE TO PRESERVE THE CENTURIES-OLD GOOD RELATIONS WHICH JOINS US. MY COUNTRY HAS NEITHER THE INTENTION NOR THE MEANS -- AND IT DOES NOT DESIRE THEM -- TO IMPOSE ITS WILL BY FORCE OF ARMS. IT HAS THE WEAPON TO INSURE ITS OWN DEFENSE. NOTHING MORE, NOTHING LESS. IT WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE ALLOWED TO HAVE A MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, AS IS THE CASE TODAY. IT HOPES THAT MUTUAL CONCESSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTNERS IN GENEVA WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO END THIS MONOPOLY WHILE CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM -- SOMETHING I FERVENTLY HOPE FOR."

BUT IT IS TIME TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENT IN THE WORLD. WE CANNOT REJECT THE IDEA THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD, WHEN THE TIME COMES, DISCUSS TOGETHER A LASTING LIMITATION OF THEIR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IT IS APPROPRIATE THEREFORE TO SET FORTH CLEARLY THE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

THE FIRST PRESUPPOSES THE CORRECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE, QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY, WHICH SEPARATES THE WEAPONS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FROM THOSE OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A COUNTRY THAT WOULD RISK DEPLOYING THIS WEAPON TO ASSERT ITS POWER AND A COUNTRY THAT WOULD BE FORCED TO USE IT FOR ITS VERY SURVIVAL.

THE SECOND CONDITION FOLLOWS FROM THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE EXISTING AMONG CLASSIC --OR MORE PROPERLY-- CONVENTIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN EUROPE: DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE ENHANCED, I FEAR, BY THE EXISTENCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WHOSE MANUFACTURE AND STOCK-PILING SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BANNED BY CONVENTION.

MY THIRD CONDITION IS AN END TO OVERARMAMENT IN ANTI-MISSILE, ANTI-SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONRY. ANOTHER IMPERATIVE IS TO SAFEGURAD PEOPLE FROM THREATS FROM OUTER SPACE. WILL SPACE BECOME ANOTHER ARENA FOR THE UNLIMITED GROWTH OF OLD TERRESTRIAL ANTAGONISMS? SPACE IS BY ITS VERY NATURE THE COMMON PATRIMONY OF MANKIND. WE WOULD BETRAY THE INTEREST OF OUR PEOPLES WERE WE NOT TO DEFINE A RIGHT WHICH PRESERVES IT IN TIME.

YET, THERE IS NOTHING TO HALT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-MISSILE WEAPONS IN SPACE, NOR TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SATELITES, SINCE ONLY ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, THAT IS TO SAY NUCLEAR ARMS, ARE BANNED BY THE TREATY OF 1967. AN

Amendment which

WOULD FORBID THE PLACING IN ORBIT OF ALL TYPES OF WEAPONRY, WHICH ORGANISE THE PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMS ALREADY IN ORBIT AND WHICH WOULD CALL FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WOULD GIVE THIS TREATY ITS TRUE FORCE.

IN ANOTHER AREA, AND DESPITE THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THESE TESTS, FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO OPEN ITS UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST SITE NEXT MONTH TO A FACT-FINDING VISIT BY FOREIGN SCIENTISTS FROM COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC. I HOPE THIS EXAMPLE WILL BE FOLLOWED."

ce BB
RTA
AA

INT
with AJC

NYWON 10/29

ZZ WTON

2846

GR 1200

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 291700Z SEP 83

TO F L A S H WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 7 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, PARIS, UKDIS GENEVA

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

202 3/10

h-a.

MY TELNO 953 TO FCO AND TELECON RENWICK/GORE-BOOTH:
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SPEECH: DISARMAMENT

1. FULL TEXT OF MITTERRAND'S SPEECH NOW TO HAND.

PASSAGES ON DISARMAMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS :

" EACH OF US, I BELIEVE, IS CONVINCED THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NEW WORLD WAR WOULD BE INCALCULABLE AND DOUBTLESS IRREPARABLE. BUT PEACE AMONG NATIONS CAN ENDURE ONLY ON A BASIS OF GENUINE EQUILIBRIUM. HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US THIS. THROUGH RESPECT FOR THIS GOLDEN RULE, THE RIGHTS OF ONE AND ALL ARE RECONCILED WITH INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY. ESTABLISHING THESE BALANCES OR REESTABLISHING THEM WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN BROKEN, GUARANTEEING THEIR STABILITY, GRADUALLY REDUCING FORCES TO EVER-LOWER LEVELS AND VERIFYING AT ALL TIMES THE INFORMATION PROVIDED --THIS IS THE APPROACH, THE ONE APPROACH POSSIBLE, TO THE PROBLEMS WE FACE.

IN THE RECENT PAST THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE AMERICANS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, KNOW AS SALT, HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO LIMIT CERTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TO SLOW DOWN, QUALITATIVELY, THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE WITNESSED AN ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THESE ARMS, AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR ACCURACY.

THUS THE TWO SUPERPOWERS EACH HAVE A CENTRAL
NUCLEAR SYSTEM OF 2,000 TO 3,000 LAUNCHERS CARRYING 8,000 TO 9,000 WARHEADS. THESE ARE ABLE TO REACH AND DESTROY EACH OTHER, IF I MAY SAY SO, SEVEN OR EIGHT TIMES OVER.

DB
RTA
AA

ONE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA FOCUSES, AS YOU KNOW, ON THE REDUCTION OF "INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC" ARMS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT A BALANCE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARMS.

FRANCE HOPES THAT THIS NEGOTIATION IS SUCCESSFUL. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING WORLD OPINION IS FOCUSED ON THE OTHER NEGOTIATION, ON WHAT IS CALLED THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VIEW ON THIS WITH THE UTMOST CLARITY.

FOLLOWING A CONTINUOUS ESCALATION ALL ACROSS THE EUROPEAN SOIL, A NEW SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED WHEREBY THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT ALONE, HAS A SIZABLE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE ON OUR CONTINENT, WITH TRIPLE-WARHEAD MISSILES WHICH ARE MOBILE AND ACCURATE AND HAVE A RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 5,000 KILOMETERS. SINCE THEY CANNOT CROSS THE ATLANTIC, THEIR ONLY POSSIBLE TARGET IS THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE SAME REASONING HOLDS TRUE FOR THE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN THE ASIAN TERRITORY OF THE U.S.S.R. AND POINTED AT THE NEIGHBOURING STATES IN THIS REGION. FRANCE WELCOMED THE OPENING IN GENEVA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS TYPE OF WEAPON BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AS A VERY POSITIVE ACT, COMING AS IT DID AFTER THE UNITED STATES HAD ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD INSTALL PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS OF THE END OF THIS YEAR, IN APPLICATION OF THE "TWO-TRACK" DECISION TAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES OF THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND, OF WHICH FRANCE IS NOT A MEMBER. I WILL NOT REVIEW ALL THE ASPECTS OF A DEBATE WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED ELSEWHERE AND WHICH DOES DIRECTLY COMMIT FRANCE, EVEN IF FRANCE IS CONCERNED, BUT I WISH TO CLARIFY MY COUNTRY'S POSITION IN THE FACE OF THE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF EUROMISSILE EQUILIBRIUM.

I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL IN THIS CONNECTION THE FACT THAT FRANCE HAS HAD A NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY, A FORCE THAT IS DEFENSIVE BY ITS VERY NATURE VIS-A-VIS ANY EVENTUAL AGGRESSOR. THIS FORCE FORMS A COMPLETE ENTITY AND CONSTITUTES A CENTRAL DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR MY COUNTRY WHICH IS INDISPENSIBLE FOR ITS SECURITY. A FEW FIGURES WILL SUFFICE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DEFENSIVE NATURE: I MENTIONED JUST NOW THAT EACH OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CURRENTLY HAS BETWEEN 8,000 AND 9,000 WARHEADS. FRANCE HAS 98. THIS IS SUFFICIENT, CERTAINLY, FOR DETERRENCE BUT RULES OUT ANY OTHER USE.

FURTHERMORE, THESE 98 MISSILES ARE PART OF A STRATEGIC, NOT TACTICAL, CONCEPT OF DEFENSE: THEY ARE PART OF AN INTERMEDIARY CONCEPT, TO USE THE EXTREMELY PRECISE VOCABULARY USED BY THE SOVIET AND AMERICANS WHEN THEY DISCUSS THEIR AFFAIRS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE PARADOXICAL FOR A COUNTRY, MINE, TO BE SUBJECT TO A CONFERENCE IN WHICH IT DOES NOT PARTICIPATE AND WHICH WOULD DISCUSS, WITHOUT OUR CONSENT, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, IN PARTICULAR UNDERWATER STRATEGIC ARMS, WHICH NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAVE A GREAT MANY MORE OF THEM, ARE DISCUSSING BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AT LEAST NOT AT THIS CONFERENCE.

ONE CAN COMPARE ONLY THAT WHICH IS COMPARABLE: IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO INCLUDE THE CENTRAL DEFENSE SYSTEM ON WHICH THE INDEPENDENCE AND SURVIVAL OF MY COUNTRY REST WITH THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, WHICH IN THEIR CASE MERELY COMPLEMENT THEIR FORMIDABLE STRATEGIC ARSENALS. SINCE IN CONCRETE TERMS WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A REQUEST ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, ON WHAT GROUNDS DOES THIS COUNTRY EXPECT FRANCE TO RENOUNCE SOMETHING SO VITAL, I REFER TO ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE? OF COURSE, WE ARE TOLD THAT THIS IS NOT THE AIM OF THE PROPOSAL, AND I WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE IT. WE ARE ASSURED THAT INCLUSION OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY REDUCTION IN IT. BUT ONCE FRANCE ENTERS INTO AN EQUATION IN WHICH IT HAS NO PART, WOULD IT NOT BE EXPOSED TO THE RISK OF SEEING THE MODERNIZATION OF ITS DEFENSE COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, AND WOULD IT NOT BE ASSUMING A RESPONSIBILITY IT REJECTS -- THAT OF UPSSETTING WORLD EQUILIBRIUM?

MY COUNTRY IS INDEPENDENT. ITS DETERRENT FORCE IS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE COMMAND OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, FRANCE'S LOYALTY TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DOES NOT UNDERMINE ITS AUTONOMY. WE RESPECT THE GREAT RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND HOPE TO PRESERVE THE CENTURIES-OLD GOOD RELATIONS WHICH JOINS US. MY COUNTRY HAS NEITHER THE INTENTION NOR THE MEANS -- AND IT DOES NOT DESIRE THEM -- TO IMPOSE ITS WILL BY FORCE OF ARMS. IT HAS THE WEAPON TO INSURE ITS OWN DEFENSE. NOTHING MORE, NOTHING LESS. IT WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE ALLOWED TO HAVE A MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, AS IS THE CASE TODAY. IT HOPES THAT MUTUAL CONCESSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTNERS IN GENEVA WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO END THIS MONOPOLY WHILE CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM -- SOMETHING I FERVENTLY HOPE FOR.'

407 c
RR
RTA
AA

✓
201
AA

'' BUT IT IS TIME TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENT IN THE WORLD. WE CANNOT REJECT THE IDEA THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD, WHEN THE TIME COMES, DISCUSS TOGETHER A LASTING LIMITATION OF THEIR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IT IS APPROPRIATE THEREFORE TO SET FORTH CLEARLY THE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

THE FIRST PRESUPPOSES THE CORRECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE, QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY, WHICH SEPARATES THE WEAPONS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FROM THOSE OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A COUNTRY THAT WOULD RISK DEPLOYING THIS WEAPON TO ASSERT ITS POWER AND A COUNTRY THAT WOULD BE FORCED TO USE IT FOR ITS VERY SURVIVAL.

THE SECOND CONDITION FOLLOWS FROM THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE EXISTING AMONG CLASSIC --OR MORE PROPERLY-- CONVENTIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN EUROPE: DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE ENHANCED, I FEAR, BY THE EXISTENCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WHOSE MANUFACTURE AND STOCK-PILING SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BANNED BY CONVENTION.

MY THIRD CONDITION IS AN END TO OVERARMAMENT IN ANTI-MISSILE, ANTI-SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONRY. ANOTHER IMPERATIVE IS TO SAFEGURAD PEOPLE FROM THREATS FROM OUTER SPACE. WILL SPACE BECOME ANOTHER ARENA FOR THE UNLIMITED GROWTH OF OLD TERRESTRIAL ANTAGONISMS? SPACE IS BY ITS VERY NATURE THE COMMON PATRIMONY OF MANKIND. WE WOULD BETRAY THE INTEREST OF OUR PEOPLES WERE WE NOT TO DEFINE A RIGHT WHICH PRESERVES IT IN TIME.

YET, THERE IS NOTHING TO HALT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-MISSILE WEAPONS IN SPACE, NOR TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SATELITES, SINCE ONLY ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, THAT IS TO SAY NUCLEAR ARMS, ARE BANNED BY THE TREATY OF 1967. AN

Amendment which

WOULD FORBID THE PLACING IN ORBIT OF ALL TYPES OF WEAPONRY, WHICH ORGANISE THE PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMS ALREADY IN ORBIT AND WHICH WOULD CALL FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WOULD GIVE THIS TREATY ITS TRUE FORCE.

IN ANOTHER AREA, AND DESPITE THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THESE TESTS, FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO OPEN ITS UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST SITE NEXT MONTH TO A FACT-FINDING VISIT BY FOREIGN SCIENTISTS FROM COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC. I HOPE THIS EXAMPLE WILL BE FOLLOWED.''

16-145

27.9.83 ?

XY 42

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

Department

Drafted by

(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Precedence

FLASH

Tel. Extn.

DESK BY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time) Z

POST BY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat)

(Privacy marking)

(Codeword)

(Desk by) Z

TO FLASH FCO
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND TO SAVING

INFO FLASH UKMIS, NEW YORK

INFO SAVING

Distribution:—

[TEXT]

YOUR TEL NOS 286 AND 287: INF.

FOLLOWING FOR BONE FROM COLES.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS APPROVED HER REPLY TO ANDROPOV.

PLEASE INSTRUCT MOSCOW TO DELIVER IT.

THE PRIME MINISTER NOTES THAT IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNCA

ON 28 SEPTEMBER THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY WILL BE

DRAWING ON THE WORDING ABOUT THE BRITISH STRATEGIC DETERRENT.

Copies to:—

Subject

cc: Major ops File

MFJ



cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 September 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.141A/83

Dear Chairman,

I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview,

In response I must at once emphasise the British Government's sincere desire that the negotiations in Geneva should succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing 11 missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new missiles.

I note with interest your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and second because we had no wish to increase the number of weapons facing our friends in Asia. We hope you will

/expand

DSG

expand upon your proposal at the negotiations in Geneva and also address the important question of how destruction of missiles would be verified.

But I believe that your message reveals some misunderstanding of the basic security requirements which underlie NATO's position in the INF talks. The security of Western Europe demands that the Soviet Union and the United States are permitted equal numbers of intermediate range nuclear forces. It is simply not possible for us to accept that you should maintain a monopoly of missiles of this range while insisting that the Americans should not be allowed to install a single new missile. The problem of the disparity in these forces became acute for us when in the late 1970s the Soviet Union began the massive build-up of SS20s, for which we could see no defensive purpose, at a time when, as now, NATO had no comparable missiles. We were thus forced to modernise our forces. To do so NATO planned to install Cruise and Pershing 11 missiles but we have always made it clear that there would be no increase in the number of NATO's warheads as a result of this. Thus, the deployment of new warheads would be accompanied by the withdrawal of old.

We said from the start that we would review the plans if we achieved concrete results in arms control negotiations. Our preference would still be that there should be no missiles of this type on either side. As long as this solution is not acceptable to you, we and our allies will pursue an interim agreement: but this will have to respect the principle of balance between yourselves and the Americans.

It follows from what I have said that NATO cannot accept that account should be taken of the strategic nuclear forces of Britain in the INF negotiations. This is a position unanimously agreed by NATO since 1979 for reasons of the security of the Alliance as a whole. That our nuclear forces

/in question

in question are strategic was acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself during the SALT talks. They have no place in negotiations on intermediate range weapons, where we need to address the problems of the Soviet and American ground-launched weapons which are of such concern to both sides.

I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupations with British strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three per cent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). In that they constitute our ultimate national deterrent they are weapons of last resort which are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. They are the minimum necessary for effective deterrence. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should never be relevant to arms control. If Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would of course want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. But I must repeat that British nuclear strategic forces can have no place in any current negotiations at Geneva.

I note with disappointment what you say in your message about Soviet intentions to take "counter-measures" following any new NATO deployments. If by this you have in mind steps towards increasing the nuclear arms race, that, as you say yourself, would be in nobody's interest.

For our part we shall remain committed to the search for arms control measures which are balanced and can be verified properly and which thus protect the security of both sides.

/If it is

If it is necessary for NATO to begin deployment of the new weapons by the end of this year, this can be discontinued or reversed at any time that a satisfactory agreement is reached. But, I repeat, our hope remains that there can still be an agreement this year which makes it unnecessary for NATO to begin deployment.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher.

Mr. Yu. V. Andropov.

PRIME MINISTER

INF: YOUR LETTER TO ANDROPOV

You will remember that you approved a reply but ~~that~~ agreed that it should be discussed with the French and the Americans.

This has now been done. Ideally, we should now instruct Moscow to deliver the reply.

I attach the text. The only section that you need look at again is the sidelined one on the last page. This concerns the British deterrent. It has been changed only very slightly, to meet American concerns that the previous wording could have been misunderstood to imply a readiness to have British nuclear systems included in the current START negotiations.

If you agree the wording (and I am sure it is alright), the Foreign Secretary will use this formula in his speech to the UN General Assembly tomorrow.

Agree?

Agreed mb

A. J. C.

27 September, 1983

SECRET

SECRET

FM FCO 261453Z SEP 83

TO FLASH OTTAWA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 286 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY).

5

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR COLES (PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY) FROM BONE

INF

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU DID NOT SEE, BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE, MY LETTER OF 23 SEPTEMBER ENCLOSING A SLIGHTLY REVISED DRAFT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO ANDROPOV.
2. THE REVISED DRAFT, CLEARED WITH THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS, IS IN MIFT. PARA 3 BELOW EXPLAINS THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGES FROM THE VERSION ENCLOSED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF 14 SEPTEMBER.
- 3.(I) IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE THE VERSION ENCLOSED WITH YOUR LETTER READ 'THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE DEMANDS THAT THERE IS A BALANCE BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTER-MEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES'. WE SUGGEST THAT THE REVISED FORMULATION REFLECTS MORE CLEARLY THE NATO POSITION ON THE NEED FOR EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS.
(II) IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE SAME PARAGRAPH, WE HAVE SUBSTITUTED THE WORD 'WARHEADS' FOR 'WEAPONS' AND THE WORD 'ACCOMPANIED' FOR 'MATCHED'. BOTH THESE MINOR CHANGES ARE FOR THE SAKE OF ACCURACY, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THAT THE WARHEADS TO BE REMOVED WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FROM SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS.
(III) IN THE 7TH PARAGRAPH, THE 5TH SENTENCE IN THE VERSION ENCLOSED WITH YOUR LETTER READ '... NOT TRYING TO CLAIM THAT BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NEVER BE RELEVANT TO ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS'. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE PARAGRAPH READ '..... HAVE NO PLACE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS'. THE AMERICANS WERE ANXIOUS THAT THIS WORDING MIGHT BE MISTAKENLY MISUNDERSTOOD TO IMPLY A READINESS TO HAVE BRITISH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS INCLUDED IN THE CURRENT

START NEGOTIATIONS. THE REVISED VERSION REMOVES ALL GROUNDS FOR DOUBT.

SECRET

4. MY LETTER OF 23 SEPTEMBER RECORDS THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SUGGESTIONS THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO PUBLISH ANY OF HER REPLY TO ANDROPOV AS SUCH, THERE WILL BE A NEED TO ADOPT A STANDARD PUBLIC LINE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RELATION TO ARMS CONTROL, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FURTHER INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORK ON THIS SUBJECT, COMMISSIONED FOLLOWING RECENT MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION. HE CONSIDERS THAT THE FORMULATION OF UK SYSTEMS IN THE DRAFT REPLY TO ANDROPOV, AS NOW ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH, WOULD SERVE THIS PURPOSE WELL FOR THE TIME BEING. HE WOULD THEREFORE PROPOSE TO DRAW ON THIS WORDING IN HIS OWN SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 28 SEPTEMBER.

5. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE DESIRABLE FOR THE REPLY TO ANDROPOV TO BE DELIVERED IN MOSCOW IN ADVANCE OF DELIVERY OF THE UNGA SPEECH. GRATEFUL THEREFORE TO KNOW WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER IS CONTENT WITH THE REVISED DRAFT. IF SO, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO INSTRUCT THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO DELIVER IT, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE SIGNED TOP COPY WILL FOLLOW.

HOWE

NNNN

ZZ OTTAWA

SECRET

4

GRS 893

SECRET

FM F C O 261453Z SEP 83

TO FLASH OTTAWA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 287 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1983,

~~INFO~~ IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK,

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR COLES (PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY) FROM BONE
MIPT : INF

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED DRAFT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO
ANDROPOV.

BEGINS: I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 27 AUGUST ON THE GENEVA
TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AND FOR SENDING
ME THE TEXT OF YOUR PRAVDA INTERVIEW.

IN RESPONSE I MUST AT ONCE EMPHASISE THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT'S SINCERE DESIRE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA SHOULD
SUCCEED. IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT TO BAN
COMPLETELY THOSE WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR
CONCERN - THE SS20S, SS4S AND SS5S ON YOUR SIDE AND THE CRUISE
AND PERSHING II MISSILES ON NATO'S SIDE. IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT
CAN BE REACHED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR NATO NEED NEVER DEPLOY
ANY OF THE NEW MISSILES.

I NOTE WITH INTEREST YOUR STATEMENT THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF
AN OVERALL AGREEMENT, YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESTROY SS20
MISSILES NOW STATIONED IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION.
AS YOU KNOW WE HAD BEEN UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU HAD
INTENDED ONLY TO MOVE THOSE WEAPONS TO SOVIET ASIA. THIS WAS
UNACCEPTABLE TO US, FIRSTLY BECAUSE THESE MOBILE MISSILES COULD
QUICKLY BE MOVED BACK AGAIN TO EUROPE IN A TIME OF CRISIS AND
SECOND BECAUSE WE HAD NO WISH TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS
FACING OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA. WE HOPE YOU WILL EXPAND UPON YOUR
PROPOSAL AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND ALSO ADDRESS THE
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF HOW DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES WOULD BE
VERIFIED.

SECRET

BUT I BELIEVE THAT YOUR MESSAGE REVEALS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WHICH UNDERLIE NATO'S POSITION IN THE INF TALKS. THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES ARE PERMITTED EQUAL NUMBERS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. IT IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT THAT YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF MISSILES OF THIS RANGE WHILE INSISTING THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INSTALL A SINGLE NEW MISSILE. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISPARITY IN THESE FORCES BECAME ACUTE FOR US WHEN IN THE LATE 1970S THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF SS20S, FOR WHICH WE COULD SEE NO DEFENSIVE PURPOSE, AT A TIME WHEN, AS NOW, NATO HAD NO COMPARABLE MISSILES. WE WERE THUS FORCED TO MODERNISE OUR FORCES. TO DO SO NATO PLANNED TO INSTALL CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF NATO'S WARHEADS AS A RESULT OF THIS. THUS, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW WARHEADS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF OLD.

WE SAID FROM THE START THAT WE WOULD REVIEW THE PLANS IF WE ACHIEVED CONCRETE RESULTS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. OUR PREFERENCE WOULD STILL BE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISSILES OF THIS TYPE ON EITHER SIDE. AS LONG AS THIS SOLUTION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO YOU, WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL PURSUE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT: BUT THIS WILL HAVE TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF BALANCE BETWEEN YOURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS.

IT FOLLOWS FROM WHAT I HAVE SAID THAT NATO CANNOT ACCEPT THAT ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF BRITAIN IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A POSITION UNANIMOUSLY AGREED BY NATO SINCE 1979 FOR REASONS OF THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THAT OUR NUCLEAR FORCES IN QUESTION ARE STRATEGIC WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF DURING THE SALT TALKS. THEY HAVE NO PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS, WHERE WE NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND-LAUNCHED WEAPONS WHICH ARE OF SUCH CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES.

I MUST SAY IN ALL FRANKNESS THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDER-
STAND YOUR PREOCCUPATIONS WITH BRITISH STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THEY
REPRESENT A TINY FRACTION OF YOURS (THE BRITISH DETERRENT IS
LESS THAN THREE PER CENT OF THE SIZE OF YOUR STRATEGIC MISSILE
AND BOMBER FORCE). IN THAT THEY CONSTITUTE OUR ULTIMATE NATIONAL
DETERRENT THEY ARE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WHICH ARE IN NO SENSE
COMPARABLE TO YOUR SS20 FORCE. THEY ARE THE MINIMUM NECESSARY
FOR EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE. BUT IT IS WORTH ADDING THAT WE ARE
NOT TRYING TO CLAIM THAT BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NEVER BE
RELEVANT TO ARMS CONTROL. IF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES STRATEGIC
ARSENALS WERE TO BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED AND NO SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES HAD OCCURED IN SOVIET DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, BRITAIN
WOULD OF COURSE WANT TO REVIEW HER POSITION AND TO CONSIDER HOW
BEST SHE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO ARMS CONTROL IN THE LIGHT OF THE
REDUCED THREAT. BUT I MUST REPEAT THAT BRITISH NUCLEAR STRATEGIC
FORCES CAN HAVE NO PLACE IN ANY CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA.

I NOTE WITH DISAPPOINTMENT WHAT YOU SAY IN YOUR MESSAGE
ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS TO TAKE QUOTE COUNTER-MEASURES UNQUOTE
FOLLOWING ANY NEW NATO DEPLOYMENTS. IF BY THIS YOU HAVE IN MIND
STEPS TOWARDS INCREASING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, THAT, AS YOU SAY
YOURSELF, WOULD BE IN NOBODY'S INTEREST.

FOR OUR PART WE SHALL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR
ARMS CONTROL MEASURES WHICH ARE BALANCED AND CAN BE VERIFIED
PROPERLY AND WHICH THUS PROTECT THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. IF
IT IS NECESSARY FOR NATO TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW WEAPONS
BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, THIS CAN BE DISCONTINUED OR REVERSED
AT ANY TIME THAT A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS REACHED. BUT, I
REPEAT, OUR HOPE REMAINS THAT THERE CAN STILL BE AN AGREEMENT
THIS YEAR WHICH MEAKES IT UNNECESSARY FOR NATO TO BEGIN
DEPLOYMENT. ENDS

HOWE

NNNN

SECRET

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL

*Duty Clerk -
No 10 Downing Street -*

CONFIDENTIAL
FM OTTAWA 260120Z SEPT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 487 OF 26 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MA

FOLLOWING FOR BONE FROM PS TO PRIME MINISTER

INF: NATO'S NEW NEGOTIATING POSITION

YOUR LETTER OF 23 SEPTEMBER TO ME.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT, TO BE ISSUED IN HER NAME IN OTTAWA AND LONDON AS SOON AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SPOKEN IN NEW YORK.

BEGINS

DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCES DETAILS OF NEW NATO PROPOSALS ON INF

I WELCOME THE NEW INITIATIVE WHICH THE UNITED STATES ARE TAKING IN THE GENEVA TALKS ON INF, AND WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBED IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY. AS BEFORE THESE PROPOSALS ARE THE RESULT OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THIS NEW INITIATIVE IS THE THIRD MAJOR PROPOSAL MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT UNDERLINES THE DETERMINATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE NATO ALLIES TO ACHIEVE A LASTING AND EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT ON TERMS WHICH WILL ENHANCE EAST/WEST STABILITY AND PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. DESPITE THE KOREAN AIRLINER ATROCITY IT IS RIGHT THAT WE CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

THE NEW PROPOSALS TAKE ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED AT GENEVA. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL TAKE THEM FOR WHAT THEY ARE - A SINCERE EFFORT TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD - AND THAT THEY WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. IF THEY ARE NOW PREPARED THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY IN GENEVA, CONCRETE RESULTS COULD BE QUICKLY ACHIEVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

/OUR

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR PREFERENCE REMAINS TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT BANNING ALL THE LONGER RANGE US AND SOVIET INF MISSILES - THE ZERO OPTION. IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED SOON, NATO WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF NEW DEPLOYMENTS. BUT EVEN THEREAFTER WE REMAIN READY TO NEGOTIATE BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS.

PROGRESS NOW DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WILL SEIZE THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED TO THEM AT THE TALKS: I WILL URGE THEM TO DO SO.

ENDS

MORAN

LIMITED
HD/DEFENCE D.
PS
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/PUS
MR. WRIGHT
MR. CARTLEDGE

COPIES TO:
DUTY CLERK NO. 10.

²
CONFIDENTIAL

INF



File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Department

TELEGRAM

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

Drafted by
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.).....CONFIDENTIAL..... (Caveat/
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword)..... (Deskby).....Z

TO.....IMMEDIATE FCO..... Tel. No. **487** of.....
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Following for Bone from PS to Prime Minister

INF: NATO'S NEW NEGOTIATING POSITION

Your letter of 23 September to me.

The Prime Minister has approved the following statement,
to be issued in her name in Ottawa and London as soon as
the President has spoken in New York.

(Take in attached text)

Begins

Copies to:-

Mr. Inglen
Mr. Colas

DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCES
DETAILS OF NEW NATO PROPOSALS ON INF

I WELCOME THE NEW INITIATIVE WHICH THE UNITED STATES ARE TAKING IN THE GENEVA TALKS ON INF, AND WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBED IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY. AS BEFORE THESE PROPOSALS ARE THE RESULT OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THIS NEW INITIATIVE IS THE THIRD MAJOR PROPOSAL MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT UNDERLINES THE DETERMINATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE NATO ALLIES TO ACHIEVE A LASTING AND EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT ON TERMS WHICH WILL ENHANCE EAST/WEST STABILITY AND PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. DESPITE THE ~~RECENT TRAGEDY~~ ^{ATROCITY} ~~OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER~~ IT IS RIGHT THAT WE CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

THE NEW PROPOSALS TAKE ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED AT GENEVA. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL TAKE THEM FOR WHAT THEY ARE - A SINCERE EFFORT TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD - AND THAT THEY WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. IF THEY ARE NOW PREPARED THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY IN GENEVA, CONCRETE RESULTS COULD BE QUICKLY ACHIEVED.

OUR PREFERENCE REMAINS TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT BANNING ALL THE LONGER RANGE US AND SOVIET INF MISSILES - ^{THE} /ZERO OPTION. IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED ^{SOON} ~~BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR~~, NATO WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF NEW DEPLOYMENTS. ~~THERE SHOULD BE NO~~

~~DOUBT~~

But even thereafter we remain ready to negotiate balanced and verifiable reductions in the number of weapons.

Progress now depends on whether the Russians will seize the new opportunities offered to them at the talks; I urge them to do so.

Ends

WOL $\frac{25}{9}$

Ar / No 10 D. 95

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 3200
CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
DESKBY 251600Z OTTAWA
FM WASHINGTON 241903Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2765 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER)
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

M I P T: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT : CHURCHILL AWARD SPEECH.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO UNGA :

QUOTE

MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, MR. PRESIDENT, DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE WORLD.

THANK YOU FOR GRANTING ME THE HONOR OF SPEAKING TODAY, ON THIS FIRST DAY OF GENERAL DEBATE IN THE 38TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ONCE AGAIN I COME BEFORE THIS BODY PREOCCUPIED WITH PEACE. LAST YEAR I STOOD IN THIS CHAMBER TO ADDRESS THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. I HAVE COME TODAY TO RENEW MY NATION'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE. I HAVE COME TO DISCUSS HOW WE CAN KEEP FAITH WITH THE DREAMS THAT CREATED THIS ORGANISATION.

THE UNITED NATIONS WAS FOUNDED IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II TO PROTECT FUTURE GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR, TO PROMOTE POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND GLOBAL PROSPERITY, AND TO STRENGTHEN THE BONDS OF CIVILITY AMONG NATIONS. THE FOUNDERS SOUGHT TO REPLACE A WORLD AT WAR WITH A WORLD OF CIVILIZED ORDER. THEY HOPED THAT A WORLD OF RELENTLESS CONFLICT WOULD GIVE WAY TO A NEW ERA, ONE WHERE FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE PREVAILED.

WHATEVER CHALLENGES THE WORLD WAS BOUND TO FACE, THE FOUNDERS INTENDED THIS BODY TO STAND FOR CERTAIN VALUES, EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT BE ENFORCED, AND TO CONDEMN VIOLENCE, EVEN IF IT COULD NOT BE STOPPED. THIS BODY WAS TO SPEAK WITH THE VOICE OF MORAL AUTHORITY. THAT WAS TO BE ITS GREATEST POWER.

BUT THE AWFUL TRUTH IS THAT THE USE OF VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL GAIN HAS BECOME MORE, NOT LESS, WIDESPREAD IN THE LAST DECADE. EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS HAVE PRESENTED NEW, UNWELCOME EVIDENCE OF BRUTAL DISREGARD FOR LIFE AND TRUTH. THEY HAVE OFFERED UNWANTED TESTIMONY ON HOW DIVIDED AND DANGEROUS OUR WORLD IS, HOW QUICK THE RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE DREAMS OF THE U.N.'S FOUNDERS?

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE SPIRIT WHICH CREATED THE U.N.?

THE ANSWER IS CLEAR: GOVERNMENTS GOT IN THE WAY OF THE DREAMS OF THE PEOPLE. DREAMS BECAME ISSUES OF EAST VERSUS WEST. HOPES BECAME POLITICAL RHETORIC. PROGRESS BECAME A SEARCH FOR POWER AND DOMINATION. SOMEWHERE THE TRUTH WAS LOST THAT PEOPLE DON'T MAKE WAR, GOVERNMENTS DO.

AND TODAY IN ASIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE NORTH PACIFIC, THE WEAPONS OF WAR SHATTER THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES WHO LIVE THERE, ENDANGER THE PEACE OF NEIGHBORS, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

/CREATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CREATE EVER MORE ARENAS OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS. DURING THE PAST YEAR ALONE, VIOLENT CONFLICTS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE HILLS AROUND BEIRUT, THE DESERTS OF CHAD AND THE WESTERN SAHARA, IN THE MOUNTAINS OF EL SALVADOR, THE STREETS OF SURINAME, THE CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN, THE BORDERS OF KAMPUCHEA, AND THE BATTLEFIELDS OF IRAN AND IRAQ.

WE CANNOT COUNT ON THE INSTINCT FOR SURVIVAL TO PROTECT US AGAINST WAR. DESPITE ALL THE WASTED LIVES AND HOPES THAT WAR PRODUCES, IT HAS REMAINED A REGULAR, IF HORRIBLY COSTLY, MEANS BY WHICH NATIONS HAVE SOUGHT TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES OR ADVANCE THEIR GOALS.

AND THE PROGRESS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY HAS FAR OUTSTRIPPED THE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. IN MODERN TIMES, A NEW, MORE TERRIFYING ELEMENT HAS ENTERED INTO THE CALCULATIONS - NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. I BELIEVE THAT IF GOVERNMENTS ARE DETERMINED TO DETER AND PREVENT WAR, THERE WILL NOT BE WAR. NOTHING IS MORE IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE U.N. CHARTER THAN ARMS CONTROL.

WHEN I SPOKE BEFORE THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, I AFFIRMED THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS'S COMMITMENT, AND MY PERSONAL COMMITMENT, TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH TOWARD THAT END.

TODAY, I REAFFIRM THOSE COMMITMENTS. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLD WIDE AND, WHILE REPLACEMENT OF OLDER WEAPONS IS UNAVOIDABLE, WE WISH TO NEGOTIATE ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT, EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. AND LET ME ADD, WE MUST ENSURE THAT WORLD SECURITY IS NOT UNDERMINED BY THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION MUST NOT BE THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT OF THE WORLD'S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA.

AT THE TIME OF MY LAST VISIT HERE, I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT A WHOLE CLASS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS -- THE LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE -- COULD BE BANNED FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH. I BELIEVED THAT TO RELIEVE THE DEEP CONCERN OF PEOPLES IN BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA, THE TIME WAS RIPE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, TO RESOLVE A SECURITY THREAT EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. I STILL BELIEVE THE ELIMINATION OF THESE WEAPONS -- THE ZERO OPTION -- IS THE BEST, FAIREST, MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS.

WHEN I WAS HERE LAST, I HOPED THAT THE CRITICAL STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WOULD FOCUS, AND URGENTLY SO, ON THOSE SYSTEMS THAT CARRY THE GREATEST RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR -- THE FAST-FLYING, ACCURATE, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH POSE A FIRST STRIKE POTENTIAL. I ALSO HOPED THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD REDUCE BY ONE-HALF THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC MISSILES ON EACH SIDE AND REDUCE THEIR WARHEADS BY ONE-THIRD. AGAIN, I WAS DISAPPOINTED WHEN THE SOVIETS DECLINED TO CONSIDER SUCH DEEP CUTS, AND REFUSED AS WELL TO CONCENTRATE ON THESE MOST DANGEROUS, DESTABILIZING WEAPONS.

CONFIDENTIAL -2 - / DESPITE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESPITE THE REBUFFS, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ABANDONED AND WILL NOT ABANDON THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. LAST JUNE, I PROPOSED A NEW APPROACH TOWARD THE START NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID NOT ALTER OUR OBJECTIVE OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, BUT WE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS TO ACHIEVE THIS END. DURING THE LAST ROUND OF GENEVA TALKS, WE PRESENTED A DRAFT TREATY WHICH RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF CONCERNS RAISED BY THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BUILD UPON THIS INITIATIVE.

SIMILARLY, IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THESE WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES MADE A NEW OFFER. WE PROPOSED, AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION, SOME EQUAL NUMBER ON BOTH SIDES BETWEEN ZERO AND 572. WE RECOMMENDED THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

ONCE AGAIN, THE SOVIETS REFUSED AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION AND PROPOSED INSTEAD WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED A QUOTE HALF ZERO OPTION UNQUOTE -- ZERO FOR US, AND MANY HUNDREDS OF WARHEADS FOR THEM. THAT IS WHERE THINGS STAND TODAY, BUT I STILL HAVEN'T GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS ARMS CONTROL INSERT CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS.

I WANT TO MAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL PLEDGE TO THOSE GATHERED TODAY IN THIS WORLD ARENA. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS AND WILL ACCEPT ANY EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT THAT STABILIZES FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS THAN CURRENTLY EXIST. WE'RE READY TO BE FLEXIBLE IN OUR APPROACH, INDEED, WILLING TO COMPROMISE. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, COMPROMISE ON THE NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

REACTIONS TO THE KOREAN AIRLINER TRAGEDY ARE A TIMELY REMINDER OF JUST HOW DIFFERENT THE SOVIETS' CONCEPT OF TRUTH AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS FROM THAT OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. EVIDENCE ABOUNDS THAT WE CANNOT SIMPLY ASSUME THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE FULFILLED. WE NEGOTIATED THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT THE PROMISED FREEDOMS HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED, AND THOSE IN THE SOVIET UNION WHO SOUGHT TO MONITOR THEIR FULFILLMENT LANGUISH IN PRISON. WE NEGOTIATED A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, BUT DEADLY YELLOW RAIN AND OTHER TOXIC AGENTS FALL ON HMONG VILLAGES AND AFGHAN ENCAMPMENTS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED ARMS AGREEMENTS, BUT THE HIGH LEVEL OF SOVIET ENCODING HIDES THE INFORMATION NEEDED FOR THEIR VERIFICATION. A NEWLY DISCOVERED RADAR FACILITY AND A NEW ICBM RAISE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS ALREADY NEGOTIATED.

PEACE CANNOT BE SERVED BY PSEUDO ARMS CONTROL. WE NEED RELIABLE, RECIPROCAL REDUCTIONS. I CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TODAY TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS IT HAS HEAPED ON THE WORLD IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, AND TO SHOW A FIRM COMMITMENT TO PEACE BY COMING TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF ITS OBLIGATIONS. I URGE IT TO MATCH OUR FLEXIBILITY. IF THE SOVIETS SIT DOWN AT THE BARGAINING TABLE SEEKING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS, THERE WILL BE ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WEST AND THEIR PEOPLE WILL NOT BE DIVERTED BY MISINFORMATION AND THREATS. THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW PROOF THAT IT WANTS ARMS CONTROL IN REALITY, NOT JUST IN RHETORIC.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE REASON RESTS ON OUR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CIVILIZED LIFE AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE CONFIDENCE THAT ALLOWS A MOTHER OR A SCHOLAR TO TRAVEL TO ASIA OR AFRICA OR EUROPE OR ANYWHERE ELSE ON THIS PLANET MAY BE ONLY A SMALL VICTORY IN HUMANITY'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE YET WHAT IS PEACE IF NOT THE SUM OF SUCH SMALL VICTORIES?

EACH STRIDE FOR PEACE AND EVERY SMALL VICTORY ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE JOURNEY TOWARD A LASTING LARGER PEACE. WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS. WE HAVE AVOIDED ANOTHER WORLD WAR. WE'VE SEEN AN END TO THE TRADITIONAL COLONIAL ERA AND THE BIRTH OF 100 NEWLY-SOVEREIGN NATIONS. EVEN THOUGH DEVELOPMENT REMAINS A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE, WE'VE WITNESSED REMARKABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AMONG INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE U.N. AND ITS AFFILIATES HAVE MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE QUALITY OF LIFE ON THIS PLANET, SUCH AS DIRECTLY SAVING COUNTLESS LIVES THROUGH ITS REFUGEE AND EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAMS. THESE BROAD ACHIEVEMENTS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY THE PROBLEMS THAT WEIGH SO HEAVILY UPON US. THE PROBLEMS ARE OLD, BUT IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO A NEW BEGINNING, A BEGINNING FRESH WITH THE IDEALS OF THE U.N. CHARTER.

TODAY, AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS 38TH SESSION, I SOLEMNLY PLEDGE MY NATION TO UPHOLDING THE ORIGINAL IDEALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR GOALS ARE THOSE THAT GUIDE THIS VERY BODY. OUR ENDS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE U.N.'S FOUNDERS, WHO SOUGHT TO REPLACE A WORLD AT WAR WITH ONE WHERE THE RULE OF LAW WOULD PREVAIL, WHERE HUMAN RIGHTS WERE HONORED, WHERE DEVELOPMENT WOULD BLOSSOM, WHERE CONFLICT WOULD GIVE WAY TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE.

IN 1956, PRESIDENT DWIGHT EISENHOWER MADE AN OBSERVATION ON WEAPONRY AND DETERRENCE IN A LETTER TO A PUBLISHER. HE WROTE: QUOTE WHEN WE GET TO THE POINT, AS WE ONE DAY WILL, THAT BOTH SIDES KNOW THAT IN ANY OUTBREAK OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES, REGARDLESS OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, DESTRUCTION WILL BE BOTH RECIPROCAL AND COMPLETE, POSSIBLY WE WILL HAVE SENSE ENOUGH TO MEET AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ERA OF ARMAMENTS HAS ENDED AND THE HUMAN RACE MUST CONFORM ITS ACTIONS TO THIS TRUTH OR DIE UNQUOTE. HE WENT ON TO SAY, QUOTE . . . WE HAVE ALREADY COME TO THE POINT WHERE SAFETY CANNOT BE ASSUMED BY ARMS ALONE . . . THEIR USEFULNESS BECOMES CONCENTRATED MORE AND MORE IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AS DETERRENENTS THAN IN INSTRUMENTS WITH WHICH TO OBTAIN VICTORY . . . UNQUOTE

DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, LET DIPLOMACY TRIUMPH. DIPLOMACY, THE MOST HONORABLE OF PROFESSIONS, CAN BRING THE MOST BLESSED OF GIFTS, THE GIFT OF PEACE. IF WE SUCCEED, THE WORLD WILL FIND AN EXCITEMENT AND ACCOMPLISHMENT IN PEACE BEYOND THAT WHICH COULD EVER BE IMAGINED THROUGH VIOLENCE AND WAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

I WANT TO LEAVE YOU TODAY WITH A MESSAGE I HAVE OFTEN SPOKEN ABOUT TO THE CITIZENS OF MY OWN COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY IN TIMES WHEN I'VE FELT THEY WERE DISCOURAGED AND UNSURE. I SAY IT TO YOU WITH AS MUCH HOPE AND HEART AS I'VE SAID IT TO MY OWN PEOPLE. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DREAM GREAT DREAMS. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK A BETTER WORLD FOR YOUR PEOPLE. AND ALL OF US HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK FOR THAT BETTER WORLD. AND, AS CARING, PEACEFUL PEOPLES, THINK WHAT A POWERFUL FORCE FOR GOOD WE COULD BE. DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES, LET US REGAIN THE DREAM THE UNITED NATIONS ONCE DREAMED.

UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

LIMITED
HD/NAD
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET





Ajcov

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1983

Repl sent from Canada.

AK 3/10

f.c.

Law 2.1.

Mr Andropov's Message to the Prime Minister about INF

Thank you for your letter of 14 September. *see Pt 3*

We have now cleared the proposed reply to Mr Andropov with the French and the Americans. It has been amended very slightly in deference to the views of the latter, as described in paragraph 3(c) below.

Thus our only remaining textual comments, which are agreed with MOD, are as follows: -

- (a) In the fourth paragraph we would prefer the second sentence to read 'the security of Western Europe demands that the Soviet Union and the United States are permitted equal numbers of intermediate range nuclear forces'. We believe that this formulation reflects more clearly the NATO position on the need for equal global ceilings between the Americans and the Russians.
- (b) In the last sentence of the same paragraph we should substitute the word 'warheads' for 'weapons' and the word 'accompanied' for 'matched'. Both these minor changes are for the sake of accuracy, particularly given that the warheads to be removed will almost certainly be from shorter range systems.
- (c) In the seventh paragraph delete the words 'any' and 'negotiations' from the fifth sentence. Amend the final sentence to read 'But I must repeat that British strategic nuclear forces can have no place in any current negotiations at Geneva'. The Americans were anxious that the original formulation should not be mistakenly understood to imply a readiness to have British nuclear systems included in the current START negotiations.

/The Foreign

SECRET



The Foreign Secretary believes that, whether or not the Prime Minister wishes to publish any of her reply to Andropov as such, there will be a need to adopt a standard public line in response to questions about the future of British nuclear weapons in relation to arms control, without prejudice to further interdepartmental work on this subject commissioned following recent Ministerial discussion. He considers that the formulation in the draft reply to Andropov, as now acceptable to the French and the Americans, would serve this purpose well for the time being. He proposes to draw on this wording in his own speech to the UN General Assembly on 28 September, the text of which has been sent separately to No 10. No doubt others concerned will also wish to use it in any public references or written material for use in the public debate.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office). I enclose a copy of the draft reply with the above amendments written in for ease of reference.


Yours
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

23 SEP 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR. ANDROPOV FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I thank you for your message of 27 August on the Geneva talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and for sending me the text of your Pravda interview.

In response I must at once emphasise the British Government's sincere desire that the negotiations in Geneva should succeed. It is still possible to reach agreement to ban completely those weapons on both sides which are of particular concern - the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s on your side and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on NATO's side. If such an agreement can be reached by the end of this year NATO need never deploy any of the new weapons.

I note with interest your statement that, in the context of an overall agreement, you would be prepared to destroy SS20 missiles now stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union. As you know we had been under the impression that you had intended only to move those weapons to Soviet Asia. This was unacceptable to us, firstly because these mobile missiles could quickly be moved back again to Europe in a time of crisis and second because we had no wish to increase the number of weapons facing our friends in Asia. We hope you will expand upon your proposal at the negotiations in Geneva and also address the important question of how destruction of missiles would be verified.

But I believe that your message reveals some misunderstanding of the basic security requirements which underlie NATO's position in the INF talks. The security of Western Europe demands that ~~there is a~~ ^{the Soviet} ~~balance~~ Union

CONFIDENTIAL

and the United States are ⁻²⁻permitted equal numbers of ~~balance between Soviet and American~~ intermediate range nuclear forces. It is simply not possible for us to accept that you should maintain a monopoly of missiles of this range while insisting that the Americans should not be allowed to install a single new missile. The problem of the disparity in these forces became acute for us when in the late 1970s the Soviet Union began the massive build-up of SS20s, for which we could see no defensive purpose, at a time when, as now, NATO had no comparable missiles. We were thus forced to modernise our forces. To do so NATO planned to install Cruise and Pershing II missiles but we have always made it clear that there would be no increase in the number of NATO's warheads as a result of this. Thus, the deployment of new ^{warheads} ~~weapons~~ would be ^{accompanied} ~~matched~~ by the withdrawal of old.

We said from the start that we would review the plans if we achieved concrete results in arms control negotiations. Our preference would still be that there should be no missiles of this type on either side. As long as this solution is not acceptable to you, we and our Allies will pursue an interim agreement; but this will have to respect the principle of balance between yourselves and the Americans.

It follows from what I have said that NATO cannot accept that account should be taken of the strategic nuclear forces of Britain in the INF negotiations. This is a position unanimously agreed by NATO since 1979 for reasons of the security of the Alliance as a whole. That our nuclear forces in question are strategic was acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself during the SALT talks. They have no place in negotiations on intermediate range weapons, where we need to address the problems of the

/Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

Soviet and American ground-launched weapons which are of such concern to both sides.

I must say in all frankness that it is difficult to understand your preoccupations with British strategic weapons. They represent a tiny fraction of yours (the British deterrent is less than three per cent of the size of your strategic missile and bomber force). In that they constitute our ultimate national deterrent they are weapons of last resort which are in no sense comparable to your SS20 force. They are the minimum necessary for effective deterrence. But it is worth adding that we are not trying to claim that British nuclear weapons should never be relevant to ~~any~~ arms control negotiations. If Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and no significant change had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would of course want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. But I must repeat that British nuclear strategic forces can have no place in any ^{current} negotiations ~~about intermediate range weapons.~~ *at Geneva.*

I note with disappointment what you say in your message about Soviet intentions to take "counter-measures" following any new NATO deployments. If by this you have in mind steps towards increasing the nuclear arms race, that, as you say yourself, would be in nobody's interest.

For our part we shall remain committed to the search for arms control measures which are balanced and can be

/verified

verified properly and which thus protect the security of both sides. If it is necessary for NATO to begin deployment of the new weapons by the end of this year, this can be discontinued or reversed at any time that a satisfactory agreement is reached. But, I repeat, our hope remains that there can still be an agreement this year which makes it unnecessary for NATO to begin deployment.

START

LIMITED

~~TOP SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

Hd DEFENCE DEPT

Hd ACDD

Hd EESD

Hd NAD

Hd WED

PS 6

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

~~SIR J BULLARD~~

MR WRIGHT

~~MR GIBSON~~

MR JAMES

MR CARTLEDGE

Resident

Clk

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

~~START~~ (23)

Copy to: - Mr. Pascale No 10

ADVANCE COPY

X18



UNCLASSIFIED

FROM MOSCOW 231230Z SEPTEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1064 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON , MODUK (FOR DS17) AND UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS, UKDIS GENEVA AND UKDEL VIENNA

INF : NEW AMERICAN PROPOSALS : SOVIET COMMENT.

SUMMARY.

1. THE ENGLISH SERVICE OF TASS HAS RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO REAGAN'S NOTIFICATION OF NEW U S INITIATIVES AT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

DETAIL.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF A 22 SEPTEMBER TASS PIECE BY " MILITARY WRITER " BOGACHYOV :-

(A) THE DETAILS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN REVEALED,

ink

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF A 22 SEPTEMBER TASS PIECE BY " MILITARY WRITER " BOGACHYOV :-

- (A) THE DETAILS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN REVEALED, BUT REMARKS BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN AND OTHER REPORTS SUGGEST THEY WOULD GIVE NATO AN ADVANTAGE OF AT LEAST 200 DELIVERY VEHICLES, INCLUDING 162 NUCLEAR MISSILES OF NATO'S EUROPEAN MEMBERS.
- (B) THE U S CONTINUED TO REJECT THE PRINCIPLE ADVANCED BY THE SOVIET UNION OF ABSOLUTE EQUALITY IN NUMBERS OF MISSILES, PLANES, AND " ROUNDS OF NUCLEAR AMMUNITION " ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.
- (C) THE AMERICANS WANTED AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PERMIT DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING AND CRUISE " IN DIRECT PROXIMITY " TO THE TERRITORY OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND UPSET THE PRESENT BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE. A REAGAN-STYLE AGREEMENT WOULD PRECLUDE THE SOVIET UNION FROM STATIONING ITS OWN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE SAME PROXIMITY TO U S TERRITORY.
- (D) REAGAN WAS NOW READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE INF TALKS SHOULD DEAL " ABOVE ALL WITH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND NOT IN ASIA, AFRICA OR THE NORTH POLE ". BUT HE STILL REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR BOTH PARTIES, AS ALSO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUI-DISTANCE OF U S AND SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS FROM TERRITORY, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. IF HIS PROPOSALS WERE ADOPTED, AMERICAN MISSILES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH SOVIET TARGETS IN LESS THAN SIX MINUTES, WHEREAS SIMILAR SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REACH TARGETS AT ALL IN THE UNITED STATES. REAGAN'S NEW PROPOSALS CONTAINED THE " CONTOURS OF THE OLD U S CONCEPTION " OF A NUCLEAR WAR LIMITED TO EUROPE.
- (E) BY EXCLUDING THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, REAGAN WANTED THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE ITS BLESSING TO NATO'S SUPERIORITY OVER THE WARSAW PACT. HIS NEW PROPOSAL SMELT STRONGLY OF THE " OLD, ODIUS PSEUDO-ZERO OPTION ".
- (F) THERE WAS EVERY INDICATION THAT WASHINGTON'S MAIN AIM REMAINED DEPLOYMENT AT WHATEVER COST OF PERSHING AND CRUISE. REAGAN WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC RELATIONS THAN WITH REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

RATFORD
BT

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Now see my

telegram.

MR 26/9.

23 September 1983

Joe Shm.

INF: NATO's New Negotiating Position

President Reagan announced yesterday that new instructions had been given to Ambassador Nitze following the consultations within the Alliance (and with Japan). He has not yet revealed the details of the new proposals. He is expected to do this when he addresses the UN General Assembly on 26 September.

At the meeting of the NATO Special Consultative Group on 19 September the Americans particularly requested that allies should all make statements of support for the initiative once the details were announced. This wish has been now repeated personally by the President in his latest message to the Prime Minister about INF. Particularly in view of her forthcoming meeting with the President, the Foreign Secretary believes that it would be desirable for the Prime Minister to issue a statement personally and I enclose a draft text which could be put out in her name simultaneously in Ottawa and in London as soon as the President has spoken in New York.

See on

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN
ANNOUNCES DETAILS OF NEW NATO PROPOSALS ON INF

1. I wholeheartedly welcome the new initiative which the ~~United States~~ ^{As before,} Americans are taking in the Geneva talks on INF, ~~this~~ ^{These} proposals are the result of ~~has~~ resulted from intensive consultations within the NATO Alliance. ~~As ever,~~ ^{They're} the Americans have taken fully into account the interests and concerns of their European Allies.

^{This} is the third major proposal ^{made} to the Soviet Union. It 2. The new initiative ^{underlines} the determination of President Reagan and the NATO Allies ~~to do everything in our power~~ to achieve a lasting and effective arms control agreement on terms which will enhance East/West stability and protect the security interests of both sides. ^{it} ~~It~~ is absolutely right that we continue ~~in~~ the search for such an agreement ^{despite} the recent tragedy of the Korean airliner.

3. The new proposals ^{take account of} are designed to meet concerns which the ~~Russians~~ ^{Soviet Union} have consistently expressed at Geneva. I very much hope that ~~the Russians~~ ^{the Soviet leaders} will take them for what they are - a very sincere effort to move the negotiations ^{and that they will respond accordingly.} forward. ^{It concerns} If they are now prepared ^{and sincerely} to negotiate seriously ^{quickly} in Geneva, concrete results could be ^{quickly} achieved very quickly.

4. ^{Our preference remains} We ~~still~~ wish to achieve an agreement banning all the longer range US and Soviet INF missiles ^{the zero option} of most concern to both sides or at least reduce them to the lowest possible level on a basis of warhead parity. If such an agreement

/cannot

and while the President Reagan described in his speech to the United Nations today,

cannot be reached before the end of this year NATO will
~~have to~~ ^{There should be no doubt about that.} begin the process of new deployments. ^{But the} ~~that~~
process ^{no could} can be halted and reversed and the weapons removed
again, ^{if a satisfactory INF} ~~just as soon as the necessary arms control agreement~~
^{was to} ~~can~~ be reached.

5. Progress now depends on whether the Russians will seize
the new opportunities ^{offered to} ~~we are offering~~ them at the talks;
I urge them to do so.

2089
2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 September 1983

INF

I enclose a reply from President Reagan to the Prime Minister's recent letter to him commenting on the American ideas for elaborating their position in the INF negotiations.

Unless you wish to recommend to the contrary, I doubt whether the Prime Minister need continue this correspondence. Rather, she could take it up in her talks with President Reagan in Washington towards the end of next week.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Sg

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CC MASTER
OPS

PPS

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON


September 22, 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 137 / 83

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed message from President Reagan which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,


John J. Louis, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

S E C R E T

US Declassified

Dear Margaret:

I appreciate your prompt and thoughtful response to my letter outlining ideas for certain specific negotiating initiatives to elaborate the INF interim agreement proposal. I value both your advice and your continued steadfast personal support as we implement both tracks of the Alliance's 1979 dual-track decision to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

I also attach importance to the exchange of views in NATO's Special Consultative Group, particularly the very helpful suggestions made in the September 19 meeting, which considered the new approach in detail.

As a result of these consultations, and the very positive allied responses to the new negotiating moves, I have instructed Ambassador Nitze to inform Ambassador Kvitsinskiy of our initiatives on September 22 in Geneva. We are making a brief announcement in Washington that the U.S., in consultation with the allies, has decided to undertake new steps intended to move the negotiations forward. I will refer to these steps in somewhat more detail in my address to the United Nations General Assembly September 26.

In public statements on the new INF initiatives, I think we should stress both the flexibility and the seriousness of our negotiating approach, and make it unmistakably clear that it is incumbent on the Soviets to respond with similar flexibility and seriousness if there is to be real progress in the INF talks. We should also note the important role of the alliance consultative process in developing our position. This role will be just as essential in the coming months, as the intensive SCG schedule indicates. I look forward to working closely with you as part of this process.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

S E C R E T

PRIME MINISTER

SECRET

T 137 183 ^②

Prime Minister

Dear Margaret:

I appreciate your prompt and thoughtful response to my letter outlining ideas for certain specific negotiating initiatives to elaborate the INF interim agreement proposal. I value both your advice and your continued steadfast personal support as we implement both tracks of the Alliance's 1979 dual-track decision to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

A-2C 22/9

I also attach importance to the exchange of views in NATO's Special Consultative Group, particularly the very helpful suggestions made in the September 19 meeting, which considered the new approach in detail.

mf

As a result of these consultations, and the very positive allied responses to the new negotiating moves, I have instructed Ambassador Nitze to inform Ambassador Kvitsinskiy of our initiatives on September 22 in Geneva. We are making a brief announcement in Washington that the U.S., in consultation with the allies, has decided to undertake new steps intended to move the negotiations forward. I will refer to these steps in somewhat more detail in my address to the United Nations General Assembly September 26.

In public statements on the new INF initiatives, I think we should stress both the flexibility and the seriousness of our negotiating approach, and make it unmistakably clear that it is incumbent on the Soviets to respond with similar flexibility and seriousness if there is to be real progress in the INF talks. We should also note the important role of the alliance consultative process in developing our position. This role will be just as essential in the coming months, as the intensive SCG schedule indicates. I look forward to working closely with you as part of this process.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

SECRET

GRS 240
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 212320Z SEPT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2704 OF 21 SEPT 83
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO BONN
PRIORITY PARIS UKMIS GENEVA MOSCOW
ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS

MY TWO IPTS : INF

1. TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST CARRIES AN ARTICLE DATED BRUSSELS GIVING DETAILS OF REPORTED ALLIED AGREEMENT AT THE SCG MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 19 SEPTEMBER ABOUT MODIFICATIONS TO THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE REPORT SAYS THAT THE US IS READY TO ACCEPT EQUALITY OF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE IN EXCHANGE FOR A SOVIET GUARANTEE THAT SS20 DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA SHOULD REMAIN AT THEIR CURRENT LEVEL.

2. THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIES A REPORT FROM WASHINGTON GIVING A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF DECISIONS SAID TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN BRUSSELS ON 19 SEPTEMBER. THE REPORT SAYS THAT THERE WAS ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THREE POINTS:

- A) THE US WOULD SEEK EQUALITY OF DEPLOYED MISSILES IN EUROPE ALONE IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO FREEZE THEIR INF DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA. THE US WOULD ALSO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET INF DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA;
- B) THE US WOULD AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF INF AIRCRAFT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS;
- C) IN ANY FUTURE REDUCTIONS, THE US WOULD REDUCE PERSHING IIS IN FIXED PROPORTION TO REDUCTIONS IN GLCMS.

WRIGHT

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START

COPIES TO
MR PASCALL NO 10 DOWNING STREET

pm

PS TO PM 10 DOWNING ST.

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 212315Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 2703 OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1983,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PRIORITY PARIS, UKDIS GENEVA,
MOSCOW, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS.

MIPT: INF

1. TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

ONE OF MY FIRST DECISIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRAGIC SHOOTING DOWN OF KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT 007 WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE TO PURSUE EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

ON SEPTEMBER 3, I MET WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE, TO DISCUSS THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND TO REAFFIRM MY COMMITMENT TO SEEKING A SUCCESSFUL RESULT IN THOSE TALKS.

SINCE THEN, THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES AND JAPAN REGARDING THE U.S. POSITION IN THE TALKS. THESE CONSULTATIONS HAVE INCLUDED BOTH DIRECT CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MYSELF AND ALLIED LEADERS, MEETINGS OF THE NATO SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP, AND BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE.

IN THOSE CONSULTATIONS, SUGGESTIONS FOR U.S. INITIATIVES TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD WERE OFFERED. THESE SUGGESTIONS WERE WELCOMED BY ALLIED LEADERS, WHO REAFFIRMED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING EFFORT. OUR NATO ALLIES ALSO REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION.

BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, AMBASSADOR NITZE HAS RECEIVED NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO PURSUE THESE U.S. INITIATIVES WITH THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA.

THESE INITIATIVES REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH THE U.S. PUT FORWARD LAST MARCH. THEY ADDRESS A NUMBER OF SOVIET CONCERNS.

THE U.S. ACTION IN TAKING THESE ADDITIONAL STEPS IS FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. COMMITMENT, AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES, TO ACHIEVING A POSITIVE OUTCOME IN THE GENEVA TALKS.

WE CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RESPOND IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER TO THESE PROPOSALS, SO THAT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS CAN ARRIVE AT A POSITIVE RESULT.

UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START
COPIES TO
MR PASCALL NO 10 DOWNING STREET

mu

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 140

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 212307Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 2702 OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1983,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PRIORITY, PARIS, UKDIS GENEVA,
MOSCOW, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS.

INF

1. THE PRESIDENT TODAY ISSUED A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT) IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ANNOUNCING THAT THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED TO US INITIATIVES TO MOVE FORWARD THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE STATEMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY INTENDED PARTLY BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM THE GERMANS AND SOME OTHER ALLIES FOR AN EARLY STATEMENT AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF LEAKS IN TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS ABOUT SCG DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS ON 19 SEPTEMBER (SEE MY SECOND IPT). THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE DECLINING AT THIS STAGE TO RELEASE ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATING MOVES THAT HAVE BEEN AGREED AND ARE STILL PLANNING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD REVEAL THESE WHEN HE ADDRESSES THE UN ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

WRIGHT

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
START
COPIES TO
MR PASCALL NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

PART 3 ends:-

Moscow Tel 1047 21.9.83

PART 4 begins:-

Washington Tel 2702 21.9.83

