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FILE TITLE:

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND

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DEFENCE

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS
(CTB + SALT)

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
(MBFR)

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
PART BEGINS:

24TH NOVEMBER
1983

PART ENDS:

14TH DECEMBER 1984.

CAB ONE:



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TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(84) 39 th Meeting, item 2	29/11/1984
OD(D)(83) 1 st Meeting, only item	14/12/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray

Date 17/6/2023

PREM Records Team

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference: Diplomatic Report No 8/84

Description: Committee on Disarmament: Annual Review for 1983.
Leader of the UK Delegation to the Committee on
Disarmament at Geneva to the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Date: 29 December 1983

The above FCO documents, which were enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed

J. Gray

Date

17/6/2013

PREM Records Team

CONFIDENTIAL



CM
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 December 1984

Dear Charles,

US Draft CW Convention: Article X

/ As requested, I enclose the full text of the US draft
/ Convention on Chemical Weapons, together with the text of
Article X (compulsory acceptance of challenge inspection)
in a separate format, for ease of reference. I also enclose
the text of alternative language on challenge inspection
which we have proposed to the Americans in an extended
process of consultation in which the French and Germans are
also involved.

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B

ARTICLE X

CHALLENGE INSPECTION

1. In accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention and Annex II thereto, each State Party shall have the right to request, through the relevant organs of the Convention, at any time, a challenge inspection of any location or facility under the jurisdiction of another State Party to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or which gives rise to concern about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous.

2. Each State Party shall accede to such a request, within 24 hours of its receipt, and make the necessary arrangements to allow an inspection to be carried out immediately.

3. In the event of a failure to implement a challenge inspection, the following procedures shall apply and shall be completed within the prescribed time limits below:-

(a) the Director General of the Organisation shall require, on behalf of the Executive Council, the challenged State Party to propose, within the following 24 hours, alternative on-site inspection measures, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention which will establish whether that State has complied with its obligations under this Convention. If the challenged State Party fails to comply with the Director General's request within 24 hours, the challenging State Party may supply to the Director General for transmission to the Executive Council more detailed information relating to its request for an on-site inspection;

(b) at the same time, the challenging State may supply to all States Parties to the Convention, through the Director General of the Organisation, its detailed reasons for requesting an on-site inspection;

(c) upon receipt of the more detailed information from the challenging State, the Director General shall, within 24 hours of its receipt, renew his request to the challenged State on behalf of the Executive Council for an alternative on-site inspection;

(d) in the event of the continued failure by the challenged State Party to implement the renewed request for an alternative on-site inspection within 48 hours of its receipt, the Executive Council (convened by the Director General) may recommend immediately to the Consultative Committee, upon the evidence available and the repeated refusal of the challenged State to permit an on-site inspection, that the challenged State Party's rights and privileges of membership of the Organisation should be suspended. The Committee's decision to suspend shall be taken by a two thirds majority of Members present and voting. The Committee shall report a decision to suspend to the Security Council of the United Nations;

(e) following the decision to deprive a State Party of its rights and privileges of membership under sub-paragraph (d) of para 3 of this Article, the other States Parties may, together or individually, regard the continued failure to implement the requested on-site inspection as a material breach of the Convention, entitling them to suspend the operation of the Convention, in whole or in part, in relations between themselves and the defaulting State; and to take whatever other measures they consider appropriate in the light of their continued right to provide for self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

4. The penalties contained in paragraph 3 of this article would not apply in the event that a challenged state had proposed an alternative on-site inspection on a basis acceptable to the Executive Council.

Article XSpecial On-Site Inspection

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Article and Annex II, each member of the Fact-Finding Panel shall have the right to request at any time a special on-site inspection of any other Party, through the Technical Secretariat, to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous, of:

(a) any location or facility subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to Articles III, V, and VI; or

(b) any military location or facility, any other location or facility owned by the Government of a Party, and as set forth in Annex II, locations or facilities controlled by the Government of a Party.

2. A request shall be handled in the following manner:

(a) Within twenty-four hours of the request, the Technical Secretariat shall notify the Party to be inspected and designate

an inspection team in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article; and

- (b) Within twenty-four hours after the receipt of such notification, the Party to be inspected shall provide the inspection team unimpeded access to the location or facility.

3. Each Party may solicit from any member of the Fact-Finding Panel a request for an inspection of any other Party under this Article.

4. Any special on-site inspection requested through the Technical Secretariat shall be carried out by inspectors designated from among the full-time inspectors of the Secretariat. Each inspection team shall consist of one inspector from each member State of the Fact-Finding Panel, except that if the Party to be inspected is a member State of the Panel, the team shall not include any inspector from that State. The team shall promptly provide a written report to the requesting Party, the inspected Party, and the Fact-Finding Panel. Each inspector shall have the right to have his individual views included in the report.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

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- Section E. Special Meeting of the Consultative Committee

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CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Reaffirming their adherence to the objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as set forth in its Charter,

Recalling the significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and also of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Washington, London and Moscow on 10 April 1972, and calling upon all States to comply strictly with the said agreements,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of toxic chemicals being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives,

Fulfilling the commitment under Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction with regard to the effective prohibition of chemical weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Basic Prohibition

Each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer chemical weapons to anyone;
- (b) conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons;
- (c) use chemical weapons in any armed conflict; or
- (d) assist, encourage, or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.

Article II

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. "Chemical weapons" means,
 - (a) super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except for those chemicals intended solely for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes and except for those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal, chemicals and which are used by a Party for domestic law-enforcement and riot control purposes or used as a herbicide; or
 - (b) munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of any chemical which is defined as a chemical weapon under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph and which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; or
 - (c) any equipment or chemical specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.
2. "Super-toxic lethal chemical" means any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to (0.5) mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or (2,000) mg-min/m³ (by inhalation), when measured by the standard methods specified in Schedule D.
3. "Other lethal chemical" means any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than (0.5) mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or (2,000) mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation), when measured by the standard methods specified in Schedule D.
4. "Other harmful chemical" means any toxic chemical not covered under the terms "super-toxic lethal chemical" or "other lethal chemical", including chemicals which normally cause incapacitation rather than death.
5. "Toxic chemical" means any chemical substance, regardless of its origin or method of production, which through its chemical action can interfere directly with normal functioning of man or animals so as to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent damage.
6. "Precursor" means any chemical which may be used in production of a super-toxic lethal chemical, other lethal chemical, or other harmful chemical.
7. "Key precursor" means any precursor that is listed in Schedule C.
8. "Permitted purposes" means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes; and military purposes that do not make use of the chemical action of a toxic chemical to interfere directly with normal functioning of man and animals so as to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent damage.

9. "Protective purposes" means purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons, but does not mean purposes directly related to the development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention or transfer of chemical weapons.

10. "Chemical weapons production facility" means any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for:

(a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in Schedule B, or the production for chemical weapons of any key precursor; or

(b) the filling of chemical weapons.

11. "Other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons" means (to be elaborated), but does not mean activities directly related to protective purposes.

Article III

Permitted Activities

1. Subject to the limitations contained in this Convention, each Party may retain, produce, acquire, transfer or use toxic chemicals, and their precursors, for permitted purposes, of types and in quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The following measures shall apply to toxic chemicals for protective purposes:

(a) The retention, production, acquisition, and use of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes shall be strictly limited to those amounts which can be justified for such purposes. At no time shall the aggregate amount possessed by a Party exceed one metric ton, nor shall the aggregate amount acquired by a Party in any calendar year through production, withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks, and transfer exceed one metric ton. Once a Party has reached the aggregate one metric ton permitted per year, it must not acquire any further such super-toxic lethal chemicals until the next year, at which time it may then acquire only those amounts of such chemicals to replace amounts used or transferred to another Party for protective purposes.

(b) Each Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single specialized facility, the capacity of which shall not exceed (an agreed limit). Information on the facility and its operations shall be provided in accordance with Annex II. The facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex II.

(c) Each Party shall, in accordance with Annex II, make an annual declaration regarding all key precursors devoted to protective purposes and all toxic chemicals that can be used as chemical weapons but are devoted to protective purposes, as well as provide other specified information on its protective activities.

(d) The provisions of the Convention do not preclude transfer for protective purposes of super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors produced or otherwise acquired for such purposes. Such transfers may be made only to another Party. The maximum quantity transferred to any Party shall not exceed (quantity) in any 12-month period, nor shall it cause the receiving Party to exceed the aggregate limit specified in subparagraph 2 (e) of this Article. Prior to any transfer of such a super-toxic lethal chemical or key precursor, the transferring Party shall provide the information specified in Annex II. Items transferred may not be retransferred to another State.

3. In view of the particular risk they pose to achieving the objectives of the Convention, the chemicals listed in Schedules A, B and C shall be subject to the special measures specified in Annex III.

(a) In respect of chemicals in Schedule A, each Party shall prohibit all production and use except for production and use of laboratory quantities for research, medical, or protective purposes at establishments approved by the Party; and

(b) Facilities producing chemicals listed in Schedule C for permitted purposes shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, as specified in Annex II.

4. A Party in a position to do so may assist another Party in destruction of chemical weapons, including shipment of chemical weapons to its territory for the purpose of destroying them, or in destruction of chemical weapons production facilities.

5. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological activities of Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing, or use of toxic chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article IV

Declaration of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and Past Transfers

1. Each Party shall file a declaration, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, stating whether it has under its control anywhere, any chemical weapons, any chemical weapons production facility, any super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes, or any production facility for super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes. The declaration shall also state whether the Party has on its territory, under the control of others, including a State not party to this Convention, any of the foregoing and their locations.

2. The declaration filed by each Party shall comply with the requirements of Annex II and shall state:

(a) the precise location of any chemical weapons under its control and the detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each location;

- (b) its general plans for destruction of any chemical weapons under its control;
- (c) the precise location, nature, and capacity of any chemical weapons production facility under its control at any time since 1 January 1946;
- (d) its plans for closing and eventually destroying any chemical weapons production facilities under its control;
- (e) the precise location and capacity of the single specialized production facility, if any, for super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors permitted by subparagraph 2 (b) of Article III;
- (f) the precise location and nature of any other facility under its control designed, constructed or used, since (date) for the production of chemicals listed in Schedules B and C;
- (g) the precise location and nature of any facility under its control designed, constructed, or used since (date), for development of chemical weapons, including test and evaluation sites; and
- (h) whether the Party has transferred control of chemical weapons or equipment for their production since (date) or has received such weapons or equipment since that date. If so, specific information shall be provided in accordance with Annex II.

Article V

Chemical Weapons

1. Each Party shall, in accordance with Annex II:
 - (a) provide information on the location and composition of any chemical weapons, pursuant to Article IV;
 - (b) provide a general plan for destroying its chemical weapons, pursuant to Article IV and, subsequently, provide more detailed plans;
 - (c) ensure access to its chemical weapons immediately after the declaration is filed, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration, through on-site inspection;
 - (d) ensure, through access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification, and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a destruction facility;
 - (e) destroy its chemical weapons, pursuant to the time-table specified in Annex II, beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it;
 - (f) provide access to the destruction process for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of destruction, through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments;

(g) provide information annually during the destruction process regarding implementation of its plan for destruction of chemical weapons; and

(h) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons have been destroyed.

2. All locations where chemical weapons are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex II.

3. Old chemical weapons found after the declarations required by Article IV and this Article have been filed shall be subject to the provisions of Annex II regarding notification, interim storage, and destruction, as well as systematic international on-site verification of these actions. These provisions shall also apply to chemical weapons which were inadequately disposed of in the past and are subsequently retrieved. A detailed explanation shall be given as to why these chemical weapons were not declared in the declarations filed pursuant to Article IV and this Article.

4. Any Party which has on its territory chemical weapons which are under the control of a State which is not a Party to this Convention shall ensure that such weapons are removed from its territory not later than () months after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it.

Article VI

Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

1. Each Party shall, in accordance with Annex II,

(a) cease immediately all activity at each of its chemical weapons production facilities, except that required for closure;

(b) close each of its chemical weapons production facilities within three months after the Convention enters into force for it in a manner that will render those facilities inoperable;

(c) provide information on the location, nature and capacity of any chemical weapons production facility, pursuant to Article IV;

(d) provide a general plan for destroying its chemical weapons production facilities, pursuant to Article IV and, subsequently, provide more detailed plans;

(e) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility immediately after the declaration is filed, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection;

(f) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification to ensure that the facility remains closed and is eventually destroyed, through periodic on-site inspection and continuous monitoring by on-site instruments;

(g) destroy its chemical weapons production facilities, pursuant to the time-table specified in Annex II, beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it;

(h) provide information annually during the destruction period regarding the implementation of its plan for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities; and

(i) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed.

2. All chemical weapons production facilities shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex II.

3. No Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production facilities, or modify any existing facilities, for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

4. A chemical weapons production facility may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons and, in any case, not later than the deadline for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities set forth in subparagraph 1 (g) of this Article.

Article VII

Consultative Committee

1. A Consultative Committee shall be established upon entry into force of this Convention. Each Party shall be entitled to designate a representative to the Consultative Committee.

2. The Consultative Committee shall oversee the implementation of the Convention, promote the verification of compliance with the Convention, and carry out international consultations and co-operation among Parties to the Convention. For these purposes it shall:

(a) carry out systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, of:

- (i) chemical weapons,
- (ii) destruction of chemical weapons,
- (iii) closure and destruction of chemical weapons production facilities,
- (iv) permitted single specialized facilities for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes, and
- (v) production for permitted purposes of the chemicals specified in Schedule C;

(b) provide a forum for discussion of any questions raised relating to the objectives, or the implementation, of the Convention;

(c) conduct special on-site inspections under Article X and ad hoc on-site inspections under Article XI;

(d) participate in any inspections agreed among two or more Parties as referred to in paragraph 2 of Article IX, if requested to do so by one of the Parties involved;

(e) develop, and revise as necessary, detailed procedures for exchange of information, for declarations and for technical matters related to the implementation of the Convention;

(f) review scientific and technical developments which could affect the operation of the Convention;

(g) meet in regular session annually; and

(h) review the operation of the Convention at five-year intervals unless otherwise agreed by a majority of the Parties.

3. The Consultative Committee shall establish an Executive Council which shall have delegated authority to discharge the functions of the Committee set out in subparagraphs 2 (a), 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (e) of this Article, and any other functions which the Committee may from time to time delegate to it. The Council shall report to the Committee at its regular sessions on its exercise of these functions.

4. Each Party shall co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of its verification responsibilities.

5. Further functions and the organization of the Consultative Committee, the Executive Council, the Fact-Finding Panel, the Technical Secretariat and other subsidiary organs are specified in Annex I.

Article VIII

Non-Interference with Verification

A Party shall not interfere with the conduct of verification activities. This shall apply to verification activities conducted in accordance with the Convention by the designated representatives of the Consultative Committee or by Parties, and shall include verification activities conducted by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Article IX

Consultation and Co-operation; Resolving Compliance Issues

1. Parties shall consult and co-operate, directly among themselves, or through the Consultative Committee or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.

2. Parties shall make every possible effort to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any matter which may cause doubts about compliance with this Convention or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A Party which receives a request from another Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting Party believes causes such doubts or concerns shall provide the requesting Party, within seven days of the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubts or concerns raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention affects the right of any two or more Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Party under other provisions of this Convention.

3. In order to facilitate satisfactory resolution of matters raised, the Parties concerned may request the assistance of the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organs. Any Party may request the Executive Council to conduct fact-finding procedures with regard to the Party's own activities or the activities of another Party in order to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance with the Convention or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous.

(a) Requests sent to the Executive Council under this Article shall state the doubts or concerns, the specific reasons for the doubts or concerns, and the action that the Council is being requested to undertake.

(b) Within two days of receipt of such a request, the Technical Secretariat shall, on behalf of the Council, request the Party whose activities create the doubts or concerns to clarify the state of affairs.

(c) If the doubts or concerns which gave rise to the request have not been resolved within 10 days of the receipt of the request by the Council, its Fact-Finding Panel shall immediately initiate a fact-finding inquiry, and transmit to the Chairman of the Council a report on its work, whether interim or final, within two months of the date of the request. Reports of the Panel shall include all views and information presented during its proceedings.

(d) All requests for special on-site inspections shall be governed by Article X and all requests for ad hoc on-site inspections by Article XI.

4. Any Party whose doubts or concerns about compliance have not been resolved within two months or any Party which has doubts or concerns it believes warrant urgent consideration by all Parties regarding compliance or regarding other matters directly related to the objectives of the Convention may request the Chairman of the Consultative Committee to convene a special meeting of the Committee. The Chairman of the Committee shall convene such a meeting as soon as possible and in any case within one month of the receipt of the request. Each Party may participate in such a meeting, whose functions and rules of procedures are established in Annex I.

5. All Parties shall co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs, as well as with international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative support in order to facilitate fact-finding activities and thereby help to ensure the speedy resolution of the matter which gave rise to the original request.

6. The Executive Council shall promptly notify all Parties of the initiation of any fact-finding procedures and shall provide all available information related thereto to any Party upon request. All Parties shall also be promptly notified of the refusal by a Party of any request made by the Committee or its subsidiary organs as part of a fact-finding inquiry. All reports regarding the fact-finding activities conducted under this Article, as well as on-site inspections under Articles X and XI shall be distributed promptly to all Parties.

7. The provisions of this Article shall not be interpreted as affecting the rights and duties of Parties under Articles X and XI or under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

Special On-Site Inspection

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Article and Annex II, each member of the Fact-Finding Panel shall have the right to request at any time a special on-site inspection of any other Party, through the Technical Secretariat, to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous, of:

(a) any location or facility subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to Articles III, V and VI; or

(b) any military location or facility, any other location or facility owned by the Government of a Party, and as set forth in Annex II, locations or facilities controlled by the Government of a Party.

2. A request shall be handled in the following manner:

(a) Within 24 hours of the request, the Technical Secretariat shall notify the Party to be inspected and designate an inspection team in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article; and

(b) Within 24 hours after the receipt of such notification, the Party to be inspected shall provide the inspection team unimpeded access to the location or facility.

3. Each Party may solicit from any member of the Fact-Finding Panel a request for an inspection of any other Party under this Article.

4. Any special on-site inspection requested through the Technical Secretariat shall be carried out by inspectors designated from among the full-time inspectors of the Secretariat. Each inspection team shall consist of one inspector from each member State of the Fact-Finding Panel, except that if the Party to be inspected is a member State of the Panel, the team shall not include any inspector from that State. The team shall promptly provide a written report to the requesting Party, the inspected Party, and the Fact-Finding Panel. Each inspector shall have the right to have his individual views included in the report.

Article XI

Ad Hoc On-Site Inspection

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Article and Annex II, each Party shall have the right to request, at any time, the Consultative Committee to conduct an ad hoc on-site inspection, to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous, of any location or facility not subject to Article X.

2. A request shall be handled in the following manner:

(a) The Fact-Finding Panel shall meet within 24 hours to determine whether to request such an ad hoc on-site inspection using the guidelines in Section H of Annex II.

(b) If the Fact-Finding Panel decides to request an ad hoc inspection, the Party to be inspected shall, except for the most exceptional reasons, provide access within 24 hours of the Panel's request.

(c) If the Party to be inspected refuses such a request it shall provide a full explanation of the reasons for the refusal and a detailed, concrete proposal for an alternative means of resolving the concerns which gave rise to the request. The Fact-Finding Panel shall assess the explanation and alternative submitted, and may send another request, taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Panel after the original request.

(d) If the request is again rejected, the Chairman shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article XII

Domestic Implementation Measures

Each Party shall:

(a) take any measures necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement this Convention and, in particular, to prohibit and prevent any activity that a Party is prohibited from conducting by this Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control, and

(b) inform the Consultative Committee of the measures it has taken to implement the Convention.

Article XIII

Assistance to Parties Endangered by Chemical Weapons

Each Party undertakes, to the extent it deems appropriate, to render assistance to any Party to this Convention that the Security Council of the United Nations decides has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention.

Article XIV

Non-Interference with Other Agreements

1. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Washington, London and Moscow on 10 April 1972.

2. Each Party to this Convention that is also a Party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, affirms that the obligation set forth in subparagraph (c) of Article I supplements its obligations under the Protocol.

Article XV

Amendments

Any Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for Parties ratifying or acceding to them on the thirtieth day following the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by a majority of the Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining Party on the thirtieth day following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article XVI

Duration; Withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Every Party to this Convention shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Convention, to the Depositary and to the Security Council of the United Nations three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVII

Signature; Ratification; Entry into Force

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.

2. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

3. This Convention and its Annexes, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, hereby designated as the Depositary.
4. This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the (fortieth) instrument of ratification.
5. For each State ratifying or acceding after the deposit of the (fortieth) instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.
6. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. The Depositary shall immediately upon receipt transmit any notices required by this Convention to every Party.
7. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XVIII

Languages

This Convention, the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DETAILED UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE CONTENTS
OF THE ANNEXES TO THE CONVENTION */

Annex I

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Provisions should be included along the following lines:

Section A. General Provisions

1. The Consultative Committee established pursuant to Article VII should convene in (venue) not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force.
2. The Consultative Committee should subsequently meet in regular sessions annually for the first 10 years after the Convention enters into force, and annually thereafter unless a majority of Parties agrees that a meeting is unnecessary. A special meeting may be convened at the request of any Party or of the Executive Council.
3. In order to assist it in carrying out its functions, the Consultative Committee should establish an Executive Council, as provided in Section B of this Annex, as well as a Fact-Finding Panel, a Technical Secretariat and such other subsidiary bodies as may be necessary for its work.
4. The Executive Council should be responsible for carrying out the functions of the Consultative Committee specified in paragraph 2 of Article VII during the period when the latter is not in session. In particular, it shall be responsible for the activities in paragraph 1 of Section B of this Annex.
5. Except as specified elsewhere, the Committee and its subordinate bodies should take decisions where possible by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached within 24 hours, a decision may be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The report on a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.
6. The chairman of the Committee should be chosen by the Committee itself.
7. The Committee should present an annual report on its activities to the Parties.
8. The expenses of the Committee should be met by (_____).
9. The question of international legal personality of the Committee and its subsidiary organs should be addressed.

Section B. Executive Council

1. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Executive Council should, in particular, be responsible for:

*/ This paper presents current United States views on the contents of the annexes of a chemical weapons convention. It is subject to further modification, elaboration and refinement.

- (a) carrying out systematic international on-site verification;
- (b) ensuring the implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;
- (c) obtaining, keeping and disseminating information submitted by Parties regarding matters pertaining to the Convention;
- (d) rendering services to Parties and facilitating consultations among them;
- (e) receiving requests from Parties, including requests for fact-finding;
- (f) deciding and overseeing specific action to be taken regarding such requests;
- (g) overseeing the activities of the other subordinate bodies of the Consultative Committee, including ensuring the proper execution of the functions of the Technical Secretariat, including the carrying out of systematic international on-site verification pursuant to Articles III, V, VI; the carrying out of special on-site inspections pursuant to Article X; and the carrying out of ad hoc on-site inspections pursuant to Article XI;
- (h) reporting to the Consultative Committee; and
- (i) requesting, when it deems necessary, a special meeting of the Consultative Committee.

2. (a) The Executive Council should be established within 45 days after entry into force of the Convention and should be composed of one representative from each of not more than 15 Parties, plus a non-voting chairman.

(b) Ten members should be elected by the Consultative Committee after nominations by the chairman based on consultation with the Parties. In selecting these members, due regard should be given to ensuring an appropriate geographic balance. These members should serve for a two-year period, with five of these members replaced each year.

(c) In addition, those permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations who are Parties to the Convention should be represented.

(d) Each member may be assisted at meetings by one or more technical or other advisers.

(e) The chairman of the Consultative Committee should serve as chairman of the Executive Council.

Section C. Fact-Finding Panel

1. Within 45 days after entry into force of the Convention, the Consultative Committee should establish a Fact-Finding Panel subordinate to the Executive Council, which should be responsible for conducting fact-finding inquiries pursuant to Article IX, considering reports on special on-site inspections pursuant to Article X, and overseeing ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article XI.

2. (a) The Fact-Finding Panel should consist of diplomatic representatives of five Parties, plus a non-voting chairman.

(b) Three Parties should be selected by the Consultative Committee by a four-fifths vote after nominations by the chairman based on consultations with Parties. These member States should serve for a six-year period, with one Party being replaced every other year. Of these three Parties, one should represent the (Western group), one the (Eastern group), and one the (neutral/non-aligned group).

(c) In addition there should be one diplomatic representative each from the United States and the Soviet Union.

(d) The chairman of the Executive Council should serve as chairman of the Fact-Finding Panel.

3. (a) The Panel should convene within 10 days after receipt of a request from a Party for a fact-finding inquiry, within 24 hours after a request for an ad hoc on-site inspection pursuant to Article XI, or immediately on completion of a special on-site inspection by inspectors from the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article X, to review the information available, conduct necessary inquiries, and make appropriate findings of fact.

(b) The work of the Fact-Finding Panel should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform its functions.

(c) The Panel should transmit to the chairman of the Executive Council its findings of fact, whether interim or final, within two months of the date of the convening of the Panel. Reports of the Panel's findings should include all views and information presented during the Panel's proceedings.

(d) Each member should have the right, through the chairman, to request from Parties and from international organizations such information and assistance as the member considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the Panel.

(e) The first meeting of the Panel should be held not later than 60 days after entry into force of the Convention to agree on its organization and rules of procedure. At this meeting the chairman should submit recommendations, based on consultations with Parties and signatories.

Section D. Technical Secretariat

1. The Technical Secretariat should:

(a) conduct on-site inspections pursuant to Articles III, V, VI, X, and XI;

(b) provide the necessary administrative support to the Consultative Committee, the Executive Council, the Fact-Finding Panel and such other subsidiary bodies as may be established;

(c) render appropriate technical assistance to Parties and to the Executive Council in implementing the provisions of the Convention, such as reviewing Schedules A, B, C, and D, developing technical procedures, and improving the effectiveness of verification methods;

(d) receive from Parties and distribute to them data relevant to the implementation of the Convention;

(e) negotiate the subsidiary arrangements for systematic international on-site inspections provided for in Annex II, section B, subsection A, paragraph 3; and

(f) assist the Executive Council on such other tasks as may be agreed.

2. The composition of the Technical Secretariat should be elaborated by the Preparatory Commission.

3. All inspectors should be technically qualified and acceptable to their governments.

Section E. Special Meeting of the Consultative Committee

1. The special meeting of the Consultative Committee provided for in Article IX should undertake to solve any problem which may be raised by the Party requesting the meeting. For this purpose, the assembled Parties should be entitled to request and receive any information which a Party is in a position to communicate.

2. The work of the special meeting should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform its functions.

3. Any Party should be able to participate in the meeting. The meeting should be chaired by the chairman of the Committee.

4. Each Party should have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such information and assistance as the Party considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the meeting.

5. A summary of the meeting, incorporating all views and information presented during the meeting, should be prepared promptly and distributed to all Parties.

Annex II

VERIFICATION

Provisions along the following lines should be included:

Section A. Declarations

A. General Provisions

1. Unless otherwise stipulated, information required to be provided should be submitted to the Depositary until the Consultative Committee is established and thereafter to the Committee. The information should be provided according to a standard format, which should be specified by the Depositary, after consultation with signatories, for information submitted before establishment of the Committee, or specified by the Committee for information submitted after its establishment. The information should be made available to Parties.
2. Locations should be specified with sufficient precision to permit unambiguous identification of sites and facilities. For this reason all locations should be specified by geographical place name and co-ordinates, as well as by any other official or commonly used designation, and should be clearly marked on maps of a suitable scale. For facilities within complexes, the exact position within the complex should be specified.
3. The accuracy and completeness of all declarations should be subject to the procedures specified in Articles IX, X and XI. As specified in subsections B and C, declarations should also be subject to systematic international on-site verification.

B. Contents of the declarations required by Articles IV, V and VI

1. Chemicals should be declared by scientific chemical name, chemical structural formula, toxicity and weight. The fraction in munitions and devices should be given. Munitions and devices should be declared by type and quantity. "Specifically-designed" equipment and chemicals, referred to in Article II, subparagraph 1(c), should be declared by type and quantity.
2. The exact location of chemical weapons within a site and form of storage (bulk, cylinder, etc.) should be declared, and storage standards should be provided.
3. The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons should include the type of operation, schedules of quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed, and products.
4. Chemical weapons production facilities should be declared even if they have been destroyed; are now being used for other purposes; or were or are dual-purpose facilities designed or used in any degree for civilian production. The declaration should specify the chemical name of any chemicals, including civilian products, if any, ever produced at the facility, whether the facility still exists; and, if not, its disposition.
5. The information regarding existing chemical weapons production facilities should include information about the chemical process used, precisely what equipment and structures are at the facility, including any old or replacement equipment not in use, as well as equipment and spare parts stored at the facility; the methods that

will be used to close and eventually to destroy the equipment and structures; the general methods that will be used to dispose of the debris left from the destruction process; and the time periods (i.e., the months or years) when specific production facilities will be destroyed, respectively.

6. The declaration regarding a single specialized production facility for super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes should include a detailed description of the equipment at the facility.

7. The capacity of a chemical weapons production facility, or of a single specialized facility for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes, should be expressed in terms of the quantity of end product that can be produced in (period), assuming that the facility operates (schedule). The capacity of a chemical weapons production facility used for filling chemical weapons should be expressed as the quantity of chemical that can be filled into munitions or other chemical weapons in (period), assuming that the facility operates (schedule).

8. With respect to past transfers, Parties should be required to make a declaration covering activities since (date). The declaration should specify the supplier and recipient countries, the timing and nature of the transfer and the current location of the transferred items, if known. The following should be declared:

(a) transfer of any militarily significant quantities (e.g., one ton) of toxic chemicals, munitions, devices or equipment for chemical weapons purposes; and

(b) transfers of equipment specifically designed or constructed for production of chemicals, munitions, devices or equipment for chemical weapons purposes.

C. Contents of Other Declarations

1. A declaration should be made annually regarding activities for protective purposes. It should cover activities actually conducted in the past year and those planned for the coming year. Information should be provided on:

(a) operations of any single specialized facility for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors, including the schedule and names and quantities of chemicals involved;

(b) the scientific chemical name, chemical structural formula, quantity and use of each key precursor devoted to protective purposes and each toxic chemical that can be used as a chemical weapon but is devoted to protective purposes;

(c) (other protective activities to be agreed).

2. As specified in Article III and Annex III, a declaration should be made annually regarding the chemicals listed in Schedules A, B, and C.

3. Thirty days prior to the transfer to another Party of any super-toxic lethal chemical or key precursor for protective purposes, information should be provided on the recipient, and on the scientific chemical name, chemical structural formula, quantity, and end use, of the chemical transferred.

4. The detailed plan for destruction of chemical weapons, to be provided pursuant to Article V, should be submitted six months before destruction operations are to begin and should contain agreed information necessary for the planning and carrying out of systematic international on-site verification.

5. The detailed plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility, to be provided pursuant to Article VI, should be submitted six months before destruction operations are to begin and should contain agreed information necessary for the planning and carrying out of systematic international on-site verification.
6. As specified in Articles V and VI, notifications should be provided annually regarding the implementation of plans for destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, respectively. These notifications should contain agreed information on activities actually conducted in the past year and those planned for the coming year. Information should also be provided on any changes in the detailed plans for destruction.
7. Should any Party discover or retrieve any old chemical weapons (e.g., weapons found on World War I battlefields or dumped at sea after World War II) anywhere under its jurisdiction or control after the declarations required by Articles IV and V have been filed it should:

(a) notify the Consultative Committee promptly of the approximate quantity and type of the chemical weapons found. The notification should also specify how, where, and when the chemical weapons were found, why they were previously undeclared, and where they are located. The notification should be filed within 45 days of the discovery. In the case of multiple and frequent discoveries of small quantities, a notification may cover a one-month period; such a notification should be made within 30 days of the end of the reporting month; and

(b) notify the Consultative Committee, within five months of the first notification, regarding the exact quantity and type of chemical weapon found, including the scientific chemical name and chemical structural formula of any toxic chemical found and its quantity. The notification should specify plans for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

(c) In the event that some of the information stipulated under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph cannot be provided within the periods specified, submit as much information as possible; specify the reasons the remainder is unavailable, and give an estimate of when such information might be provided.

Section B. On-Site Verification

A. General Provisions

1. All on-site verification, whether systematic international verification, special on-site inspection or ad hoc on-site inspection, under the auspices of the Consultative Committee should be carried out according to procedures which are agreed in advance and based on this Annex.
2. On-site verification should make use of both on-site inspectors and on-site instruments.
3. The Executive Council and the host Party should promptly agree upon subsidiary arrangements which specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Committee to fulfill its verification responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner, how the on-site verification provisions will be implemented at each of the locations subject to systematic international on-site verification.

4. The privileges and immunities which should be granted to inspectors to ensure that they can discharge their functions effectively should be specified. The steps that a Party should take to ensure that inspectors can effectively discharge their functions in its territory should also be specified.

5. Certain rights of a Party with respect to the conduct of verification in its territory should be specified. For example, although it should not be required, host Party representatives should be allowed to accompany international inspectors during on-site inspections.

6. Pursuant to the obligation in Article VIII not to interfere in any manner with the conduct of verification activities:

(a) entry visas for inspectors should be issued promptly;

(b) host Party representatives should be ready to accompany the inspectors immediately. No delays in carrying out the inspections should be allowed to occur under the guise of the unavailability of appropriate host Party representation;

(c) no bureaucratic constraints (e.g., governmental travel approval) should be imposed which would interfere with the inspection or provide the host Party with sufficient advance notification of the site to be inspected that the host Party could cover up possible prohibited activities prior to the inspection.

7. The Consultative Committee and the Party concerned should be required to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the verification measures specified by the Convention.

8. Verification measures should be implemented in a manner designed:

(a) to avoid hampering the economic and technological activities of Parties; and

(b) to be consistent with management practices required for the safe conduct of the activities subject to verification.

9. On-site instruments should incorporate a capability for remote monitoring. They should also incorporate data protection and tamper-detecting devices and be serviced only by international inspectors.

10. Full account should be taken of technological developments in order to ensure optimum effectiveness of verification.

11. An agreed timetable for destruction activities should be included to facilitate verification and to ensure that no Party gains military advantage during the destruction period.

B. Inspection and Interim Monitoring of Stocks

1. After a Party has filed its declarations pursuant to Articles IV and V, chemical weapons should be subject to inspection immediately, under agreed procedures, to confirm the accuracy of the declarations. These inspections should be completed within (number) days after the filing of the declarations.

2. To ensure that a Party does not move chemical weapons to a deployment site or to a clandestine site prior to destruction, the storage facilities should be equipped with monitoring instruments by international inspectors immediately following the confirmatory inspection.

3. During confirmatory inspection of chemical weapons, an on-site survey of each location should be made to determine what preagreed types of instruments would be emplaced to monitor the chemical weapons there prior to removal for destruction. The instruments should be installed and tested by the inspecting team, in the presence of host Party personnel, before the site and facility are declared secure. After emplacement of instruments is complete, on-site inspection should be repeated to confirm that no chemical weapons had been removed from that location since the initial confirmatory inspection. An additional set of agreed procedures should be developed for the removal of chemical weapons from each storage site for transfer to a destruction facility. Until all chemical weapons have been removed for destruction, the storage site should be visited periodically by an international inspection team for routine monitoring and maintenance purposes, e.g., testing the system of instruments.

C. Verification of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that chemical weapons are not diverted during transport or any phase of the destruction process and to confirm that the type and quantity of materials destroyed correspond to the declarations and that all materials are actually destroyed.
2. Transport of chemical weapons from storage sites and their destruction should be verified by systematic, international on-site procedures. International inspectors should be present at the storage facility when chemical weapons are removed for shipment to declared destruction facilities. The inspectors should verify the chemical weapons being moved and resecure the storage facility once they have been loaded on transports. (However, inspectors would not need to accompany the shipments.) Inspectors should verify that the chemical weapons are received at the destruction facility and placed in interim storage there. On-site instruments, as well as inspectors, should be utilized for verification of destruction. Inspectors should be present in the destruction facility continuously when the facility is operating.
3. The destruction procedures should permit systematic international on-site verification. The following procedures should not be used for the destruction of chemical weapons: dumping in any body of water, land burial, or open-air burning. The destruction process should, for practical purposes, be irreversible.

D. Closure, Inspection, and Interim Monitoring of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

1. After a Party has filed its declarations pursuant to Articles IV and VI, chemical weapons production facilities should be immediately subject to inspection to confirm the accuracy of the declaration, and to confirm the implementation of agreed procedures for closure. These inspections should be completed within (number) days after the filing of the declaration. Subsequent verification procedures should be implemented to confirm that Parties have not resumed production or filling at the facility and to confirm that equipment has not been removed.
2. An inventory of key equipment should be prepared, and its accuracy verified by international inspectors during confirmatory inspection. At the same time, the inspector should survey the facility to determine which of the pre-agreed types of instruments should be emplaced to monitor the facility until it is destroyed. The instruments should be installed and tested by the inspecting team, in the presence of host Party personnel, before the facility is declared secure. During the interim between securing the facility and actually destroying it, the facility should be visited periodically by an international inspection team for routine monitoring and maintenance purposes, e.g., testing the system of instruments.

E. Verification of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed.
2. International inspectors should be present at the facility to be destroyed prior to beginning destruction to verify that the inventory of structures, equipment, parts, etc., at the facility is consistent with the inventory prepared when the facility was secured. During destruction, inspectors need not be present continuously, provided agreed procedures, including the use of on-site instruments, are implemented to ensure that the facility remains inoperative during the destruction phases. On-site inspections would be conducted periodically throughout the destruction process.
3. Equipment specifically designed for chemical weapons production should be destroyed. All items to be destroyed should be destroyed according to agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification. No equipment may be removed from the site prior to check-off from the original inventory by the inspectors. Structures should be destroyed completely, by razing, and a final international inspection performed.

F. Inspection and Monitoring of the Permitted Single Specialized Production Facility

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors in quantities significantly in excess of one ton does not occur at the single specialized production facility.
2. The precise location of the facility should be declared and the facility should be inspected by international inspectors before it is used to ensure that its capacity will not permit the production, on an annual basis, of quantities significantly in excess of one ton. On-site instruments should be installed which will signal whether the facility is active or inactive. An annual declaration should be made about planned production activities. International inspectors should have the right to visit the facility periodically to enable them to monitor production activities, as well as inactive periods, through on-site inspection.

G. Verification Measures Applicable to Production for Permitted Purposes of Chemicals Listed in Schedule C

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that these facilities are not used to produce chemical weapons.
2. Inspections should occur periodically on a random basis. Such inspections should be conducted under agreed procedures which provide protection for proprietary information.
3. During an inspection, international inspectors should have the right to review certain agreed plant records and interview personnel under agreed procedures. Inspectors should be allowed to view agreed areas; take samples from agreed points, such as finished product storage containers and waste treatment areas; and analyse them using agreed methods. Inspectors would not have the right to interfere with plant operations more than necessary to carry out their agreed functions.
4. Use of special instruments (e.g., end product samplers) between inspections should be permitted when deemed necessary by the inspectors.

5. Plans to change the end product of the facility or substantially change its capacity should be reported in advance to international authorities. Details of process modification need not be disclosed; however, final products and estimated time for completing the work should be provided. International inspectors should be permitted to view agreed areas soon after completion of the modifications. At that time, new or altered instruments should be installed, as required.

H. On-site Inspections under Articles X and XI

1. Agreed procedures for conducting on-site inspections under Articles X and XI should be specified in this Annex, including:

- (a) a requirement for definition of the area to be inspected;
- (b) time limits for providing access to the area to be inspected;
- (c) the maximum number of personnel on an inspection team;
- (d) length of service requirements for designation of inspectors;
- (e) routes of access and means of transportation;
- (f) types of experimental and support equipment which may be employed and who shall furnish specific types of equipment;
- (g) procedures for making observations and measurements, including collecting samples and taking photographs;
- (h) protection of proprietary and confidential information including liability for unauthorized disclosure of such information;
- (i) services to be furnished by the host Party;
- (j) rights of inspection personnel, including privileges and immunities;
- (k) certain rights of the host Party;
- (l) allocation of expenses;
- (m) preparation of reports;
- (n) dissemination of findings;
- (o) additional rights to be exercised in specific situations; and
- (p) duration of an inspection.

2. With regard to "locations or facilities controlled by the Government of a Party," referred to in Article X, subparagraph 1(b), this Annex should provide the means of specifying those categories of locations or facilities which shall be subject to special on-site inspections, including the relevant facilities used for the provision of goods and services to the Government of a Party. It is intended that this provision reach any location or facility that in the future might be suspected of being used for activities in violation of this Convention. The specification of such locations and facilities should be a reasonable one.

3. The Committee should use the following guidelines in determining whether to request a Party to permit an ad hoc inspection pursuant to Article XI:

(a) whether the information available to it causes any doubts about compliance with the Convention or gives rise to any concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) whether the proposed inspection would assist in determining the facts;

(c) whether the locations to be inspected are clearly defined and limited to places relevant to determination of the facts; and

(d) whether the proposed arrangements will limit intrusion to the level necessary to determine the facts.

4. The Technical Secretariat should ensure that sufficient inspectors will always be readily available to carry out special on-site inspections pursuant to Article X and ad hoc on-site inspections pursuant to Article XI.

Annex III

SCHEDULES: CHEMICALS SUBJECT TO SPECIAL MEASURES;
METHODS FOR MEASURING TOXICITY

Provisions along the following lines should be included:

1. Schedule A should contain super-toxic lethal chemicals, key precursors, and other particularly dangerous chemicals, which have been stockpiled as chemical weapons or which pose particular risk of such stockpiling. Information on the persons authorized to possess such chemicals, the quantity produced and used at each location and the end uses should be reported annually.
2. Schedule B should contain chemicals which are produced in large quantities for permitted purposes but which pose a particular risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes. In respect of each chemical in Schedule B, every Party should report annually the location of each production facility and statistical data on the aggregate quantities produced, imported, and exported, and on the end uses of the chemical.
3. Schedule C should contain chemicals whose production for permitted purposes should be subject to systematic international on-site verification, including key precursors. In respect of each chemical listed in Schedule C, every Party should report annually, for each chemical which is produced, imported or exported in an aggregate amount greater than (quantity), the location of each production facility and statistical data on the aggregate quantities produced, imported, and exported, and on the end uses of the chemical. Plans to establish a new production facility or to change substantially the capacity of an existing production facility should be reported ninety days in advance. Production facilities should be subject to systematic international on-site inspection, pursuant to Article III.
4. Schedule D should contain agreed methods for measuring lethal toxicity.
5. If a Party has information which in its opinion may require a revision of Schedules A, B, C, or D, it should provide the information to the Chairman of the Consultative Committee who should transmit the information to all Parties. The Technical Secretariat should also submit any such information to the Committee.
6. The Executive Council should promptly examine, in the light of all information available to it, whether the Schedule in question should be revised. The Council may recommend that the Schedule be revised or it may recommend that no revision be made. Any recommendation should be communicated promptly to all Parties.
7. Any recommendation by the Executive Council should be reviewed by the Consultative Committee at its next regularly scheduled meeting. The Committee may decide to accept the recommendation as stated, or in revised form, or it may decide to reject the recommendation. If requested by five or more Parties, a special meeting of the Committee should be held to review the recommendation. A two-thirds vote of the Committee should be required to revise a Schedule.

SCHEDULE A

1. Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonothioate (VX)
2. Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (Tabun)
3. iso-Propyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin)
4. 1,2,2-Trimethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Soman)
5. Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulphide (Mustard gas)
6. 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ)
7. Saxitoxin
8. 3,3-Dimethylbutanol-2 (Pinacolyl alcohol)
9. Methylphosphonyl difluoride

SCHEDULE B

1. Carbonyl chloride (phosgene)
2. Cyanogen chloride
3. Hydrogen cyanide
4. Phosphorus oxychloride
5. Phosphorus trichloride
6. Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)
7. Thiodiglycol

SCHEDULE C

Key precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals

1. Chemicals containing the P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl bond
2. Methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid
3. 3,3-dimethyl butanol-2 (pinacolyl alcohol)
4. N,N disubstituted-B-amino ethanols
5. N,N disubstituted-B-amino ethane thiols
6. N,N disubstituted-B-aminoethyl halides
(halide = Cl, Br or I)

Key Precursors for other toxic chemicals

1. Phenyl-, alkyl- or cycloalkyl-substituted glycolic acids
2. 3- or 4-hydroxypiperidine and their derivatives

Toxic chemicals

(To be discussed)

ANNEX III

RECOMMENDED STANDARDIZED OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ACUTE SUBCUTANEOUS TOXICITY DETERMINATIONS

1. Introduction

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemicals.

Lethality limits in terms of LD₅₀ for subcutaneous administration were established to separate three toxic categories at 0.5 mg/kg and 10 mg/kg.

2. Principles of the test method

The test substance is administered to a group of animals in doses corresponding exactly to the category limits (0.5 or 10 mg/kg respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing 200 ± 20 g should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be 22 ± 3 °C and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test, the animals are randomized and divided into two groups; twenty animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability etc.) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known. A solution of the test substance should be prepared just before the test. Solutions with concentrations of 0.5 mg/ml and 10 mg/ml should be prepared. The preferable solvent is 0.85 per cent saline. Where the solubility of the test substance is a problem, a minimum amount of an organic solvent such as ethanol, propylene glycol or polyethylene glycol may be used to achieve solution.

SCHEDULE D

Lethal toxicity should be measured by the procedures specified below:

(text of procedures contained in document CD/CW/WP.30, Annexes III and IV;
22 March 1982)

ANNEX IV

RECOMMENDED STANDARDIZED OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ACUTE INHALATION TOXICITY CRITERIA

1. In the assessment and evaluation of the toxic characteristics of chemicals in a vapour state determination of acute inhalation toxicity is necessary. In every case, when it is possible, this test should be preceded by subcutaneous toxicity determination. Data from these studies constitute the initial steps in the establishing of a dosage regimen in subchronic and other studies and may provide additional information on the mode of toxic action of a substance.

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemical.

Lethality limits in terms of L_{Ct}^{50} for inhalatory application were established to separate three toxic categories at 2,000 mg min/m³ and 20,000 mg min/m³.

2. Principles of the test method

A group of animals is exposed for a defined period to the test substance in concentration corresponding exactly to the category limits (2,000 mg min/m³ or 20,000 mg min/m³ respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent, the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal. Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing 200 ± 20 g should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be $22 \pm 3^\circ\text{C}$ and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test the animals are randomized and divided into two groups, twenty animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance. Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability, boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure etc) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known.

3.3 Test method Twenty animals receive in the back region 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 0.5 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after seven days. If the death rate is lower than ten animals, another group of twenty animals should be injected by the same way with 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 10 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after seven days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.4 Evaluation of the results If the death rate in the first group of animals (receiving a solution containing 0.5 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (receiving a solution containing 10 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other lethal chemical" category; if lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) test conditions: date and hour of the test, air temperature and humidity;
- (ii) animal data: strain, weight and origin of the animals;
- (iii) test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; conditions of storage, solvent used in the test;
- (iv) results: the number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

3.3 Equipment. A constant vapour concentration may be produced by one of several methods.

- (i) by means of an automatic syringe which drops the material onto a suitable heating system (e.g. hot plate),
- (ii) by sending airsteam through a solution containing the material (e.g. bubbling chamber),
- (iii) by diffusion of the agent through a suitable material (e.g. diffusion chamber).

A dynamic inhalation system with a suitable analytical concentration control system should be used. The rate of air flow should be adjusted to ensure that conditions throughout the equipment are essentially the same. Both a whole body individual chamber exposure or head only exposure may be used.

3.4 Physical measurements. Measurements or monitoring should be conducted of the following parameters:

- (i) the rate of air flow (preferably continuously),
- (ii) the actual concentration of the test substance during the exposed period,
- (iii) temperature and humidity.

3.5 Test method. Twenty animals are exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of 200 mg/m^3 and then removed from the chamber. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the death rate is lower than 10 animals, another group of twenty animals should be exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of $2,000 \text{ mg/m}^3$. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.6 Evaluation of results. If the death rate in the first group of animals (exposed to the concentration of 200 mg/m^3) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (exposed to the concentration of $2,000 \text{ mg/m}^3$) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other legal chemical" category; if it is lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) Test conditions. date and hour of the test, description of exposure chamber (type, dimensions, source of air, system for generating the test substance, method of conditioning air, treatment of exhaust air etc) and equipment for measuring temperature, humidity, air flow and concentration of the test substance.

- (ii) Exposure data: air flow rate, temperature and humidity of air, nominal concentration (total amount of test substance fed into the equipment divided by volume of air), actual concentration in test breathing zone.
- (iii) Animal data: strain, weight and origin of animals.
- (iv) Test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; condition of storage, solvent used in the test.
- (v) Results: number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

Document Regarding Action Prior to Entry into Force of the
Convention: Detailed Views

A document containing the following should be associated with the Convention:

1. When signing the Convention, every State should declare whether chemical weapons stocks or chemical weapons production facilities are under its control anywhere or located within its territory.
2. Not less than 90 days after the Convention is opened for signature a Preparatory Commission, composed of representatives of all signatory States, should be convened for the purpose of carrying out necessary preparations for the coming into force of the Convention's provisions, including preparing the first session of the Consultative Committee.
3. The Commission should include one representative from each signatory. All decisions should be made by consensus. The Preparatory Commission should remain in existence until the Convention comes into force and thereafter until the first meeting of the Consultative Committee. Its actions must be consistent with the provisions of the Convention.
4. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission should be met as follows (details).
5. The Preparatory Commission should:
 - (a) elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish such committees as it deems necessary;
 - (b) appoint an executive secretary and staff, who shall exercise powers and perform such duties as the Commission determines;
 - (c) make arrangements for the first session of the Consultative Committee, including preparing a provisional agenda, drafting rules of procedure, and choosing the site; and
 - (d) make studies, reports, and recommendations for the consideration of the Consultative Committee at its first meeting on procedural matters of concern to the Committee which would require immediate attention, including:
 - (1) financing of the activities for which the Committee is responsible;
 - (2) the programs and budget for the first year of the Committee's activities;
 - (3) staffing of the Secretariat; and
 - (4) the location of the permanent offices of the Committee.
6. The Preparatory Commission should submit a comprehensive report on its activities to the Consultative Committee at the Committee's first session.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3626 OF 5 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DUS P) ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO,
BONN, PARIS

INFO SAVING TOKYO, US CONSULATES GENERAL

MIPT (NOT TO ALL) AND MY TELNO 3485: SHULTZ AT CHEVENING:
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. SOME OPTIMISM, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT ON THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING ON 7/8 JANUARY. INTER-AGENCY PREPARATORY WORK PROCEEDING, BUT DECISIONS UNLIKELY FOR SOME WEEKS YET. ADMINISTRATION WELL SEIZED OF ALLIES' NEED TO BE KEPT INFORMED.

DETAIL

2. THERE IS A MOOD OF GUARDED OPTIMISM HERE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE GENEVA TALKS ARE SEEN AS CRUCIAL: BUT THE US AIM IS SIMPLY TO START A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD BOTH TO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AND TO AN IMPROVED SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP ACROSS THE BOARD. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT INSTANT AGREEMENTS, EXCEPT PERHAPS ON PROCEDURE.

3. INTER-AGENCY PREPARATION IS NOW IN FULL SWING, AT AN UNUSUALLY SENIOR LEVEL, AND UNDER UNUSUALLY FIRM INJUNCTIONS AGAINST LEAKS. SHULTZ IS CLEARLY IN THE DRIVING-SEAT, BUT MACFARLANE HAS EMERGED AS THE PUBLIC SPOKESMAN. NITZE IS NOW ESTABLISHED AS SHULTZ'S SPECIAL ARMS CONTROL ADVISER, AND IS ATTENDING ALL RELEVANT HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. WHETHER HIS ROLE WILL DEVELOP INTO THAT OF AN "ENVOY" WILL DEPEND ON HOW GROMYKO REACTS IN GENEVA.

4. THE MAIN POINTS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION APPEAR TO BE:-

(A) HOW EXTENSIVE SHOULD BE THE COVERAGE OF THE UMBRELLA. MOST ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS NOW SEEM DETERMINED THAT IT SHOULD FOR THE PRESENT COVER ONLY OUTER SPACE AND OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE VIEWED AS THE ESSENTIAL ISSUES (THEY ARE ALSO OF COURSE PRIMARILY BILATERAL US/SOVIET ISSUES). THIS INITIAL LIMITATION OF THE DIALOGUE APPEARS ALSO TO REFLECT SOVIET PREFERENCES.

EXTENDING THE COVERAGE TO OTHER AREAS, EG CW, MBFR, AND CDE IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT EMERGE LATER, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED AT ONCE:

(B) WHAT ASAT CONSTRAINT REGIME (IF ANY) SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATION BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. THERE IS STILL FIRM AGREEMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT ACCEPT A MORATORIUM ON ASAT TESTS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDER WAY. BUT MANY IN STATE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER, AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, "MEASURES OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT" OUGHT TO BE REFLECTED BY INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT NOW THAT A TIME-LIMITED MUTUAL MORATORIUM

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SHOULD BE OFFERED EARLY ON. DOD DISSENT, AND THE ISSUE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE YET BEEN FOUGHT TO A FINISH. NOR HAS THE QUESTION OF THE ASAT COMPONENT OF A POSSIBLE OVERALL AGREEMENT. BUT THE IDEA OF GOING FOR A "RULES OF THE ROAD" AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE LOSING FAVOUR, EXCEPT IN DOD, AS DOES THE IDEA OF A TIME-LIMITED BAN ON ONLY HIGH LEVEL ASAT TESTING. THAT LEAVES A TIME-LIMITED BAN ON ALL ASAT SYSTEMS (HIGH LEVEL AND LOW LEVEL) AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT FRONT RUNNER:

(C) WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION SHOULD BE ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE PENTAGON APPEAR STILL TO FAVOUR STICKING WITH THE PRESENT START AND INF POSITIONS: WHILE THE STATE DEPARTMENT STILL FAVOUR THEIR "FRAMEWORK AGGREGATES" APPROACH, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE MARRYING LIMITS ON LAUNCHERS WITH LIMITS ON WEAPONS. WE HAVE DETECTED NO SIGNS THAT THE DISCUSSION OF PRECISE NUMBERS (FOR LIMITS ON THE VARIOUS LAUNCHER AND WARHEAD CATEGORIES) HAS STARTED IN EARNEST, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF PENTAGON OPPOSITION: AND OUR SOURCES STRESS THAT IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION WILL BE DRIVEN TO A CONCLUSION BEFORE THE GENEVA TALKS. THAT IS SEEN AS UP TO THE PRESIDENT: AND HE HAS NOT YET RULED:

(D) WHETHER TO MERGE THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS. IN RECENT MONTHS THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN OFFICIAL OPINION IN FAVOUR OF A MERGER IN PROCEDURAL TERMS (IE THE US MIGHT BE READY TO DISCUSS BOTH STRATEGIC AND INF SYSTEMS AT THE SAME NEGOTIATING TABLE. ONE ADVANTAGE, MUCH QUOTED TO US, IS THAT WITH A BIGGER BASKET IT OUGHT TO BE THEORETICALLY EASIER TO PRESENT AN AGREEMENT, WITH NO EXPLICIT PROVISIONS FOR EUROPEAN SYSTEMS, AS CONSISTENT WITH THE AIM OF "EQUALITY". HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONSENSUS YET ON WHETHER START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVELY MERGED AND A SYSTEM OF COMMON CEILINGS PROPOSED:

(E) THE OPTIMUM BLUEPRINT FOR POST-GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION CLEARLY HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE READY TO MOVE ON QUICKLY FROM "TALKS ABOUT TALKS" I.E. OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WILL PROPOSE THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT NITZES' LEVEL. (HARTMAN'S POINT THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO OPERATE AT THAT LEVEL IS WIDELY QUOTED IN STATE, PARTICULARLY BY THOSE WHO RESENT NITZE'S REAPPEARANCE.)

5. ALL OUR CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT THE IDEA OF A MORATORIUM, IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS (OR RATHER NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT), ON INF DEPLOYMENT IS NOT BEING CONSIDERED. MACFARLANE'S STATEMENTS ON

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25 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 3543) REPRESENT AN ALL-AGENCY POSITION. EQUALLY, ALL OUR CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT NO CONSIDERATION IS YET BEING GIVEN TO ANY OUTCOME ON ASATS (EG A TESTING BAN OF INDEFINITE OR LONG DURATION) WHICH MIGHT IMPINGE ON SDI. SDI IS NOT AT PRESENT UNDER ATTACK BY ANY AGENCY.

6. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS STAGE HOW MANY OF THE ISSUES LISTED IN PARA 4 WILL IN FACT BE DECIDED BEFORE THE GENEVA MEETING. ARMACOST TOLD ME ON 3 DECEMBER THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO GROMYKO UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE SHULTZ'S DEPARTURE, IE IN CALIFORNIA DURING THE PRESIDENT'S POST-CHRISTMAS BREAK (WHEN SHULTZ TOO WILL BE THERE).

7. I (AND MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES) REMINDED ARMACOST OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING BOTH THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, AND THE PRINCIPAL ALLIES IN PARTICULAR, IN TOUCH WITH US DECISION-MAKING. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE FULLY SEIZED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BOTH POINTS: AND SHULTZ'S LETTERS TO YOU (AND LORD CARRINGTON) OF 28 NOVEMBER (YOUR TELNO 2035, AND UKDEL TELNO 403) SEEM TO SHOW THAT THEY ACCEPT THE NEED FOR PROPER ALLIANCE CONSULTATION.

8. THERE HAS BEEN INTEREST HERE IN GORBACHEV'S VISIT. BOTH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND ARMACOST HAVE ASKED FOR A FULL BRIEFING SOON AFTER THE EVENT: IT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED BY SHULTZ IF YOU WOULD TELL HIM THAT I SHALL BE AUTHORISED TO PROVIDE THIS.

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FM MOSCOW 291130Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1363 OF 29TH NOV 84

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NAOT, PRIORITY BONN, PARIS.

MY TELNO 1339 US/SOVIET RELATIONS: THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING.

1. AT MEETING OF THE FOUR AMBASSADORS ON 28 NOVEMBER ARTHUR HARTMAN REVIEWED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON 22 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 1331). HE SAID THAT FOLLOWING LEAKS IN WASHINGTON OVER THE WEEKEND THERE HAD BEEN A MESSAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO TALK COMPREHENSIVELY AND SUGGESTING THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS GET TOGETHER. THE AMERICANS HAD INTERPRETED THIS AS A MOVE BY GROMYKO TO ASSERT HIS AUTHORITY AND FORESTALL THE POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL US NEGOTIATOR. THE JOINT STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH HASTILY AGREED ON THE EVENING OF THE 21ST, REPAID CAREFUL STUDY. ALMOST EVERY WORD HAD A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. IN AGREEING TO ENTER INTO "NEW" TALKS THE AMERICANS HAD LET THE RUSSIANS OFF THE HOOK OF THEIR OFT-REPEATED PRE-CONDITIONS. BY ACCEPTING THAT THE POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED SHOULD EMBRACE "THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS" CONCERNING NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS THE RUSSIANS HAD CONCEDED AN AMERICAN POINT. WITH THE REFERENCE TO WORKING OUT A JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON THE "AIMS" AS WELL AS THE SUBJECTS OF SUCH TALKS THE RUSSIANS HAD INSERTED A CONDITION (CF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TUR) WHICH COULD WELL PROVE TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE GENEVA MEETING. THE AMERICAN BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURES COULD WELL CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET PREDILECTION FOR A PRIOR DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES.

2. THE MEETING IN GENEVA ON 7 AND 8 JANUARY WAS HOWEVER ACCEPTED BY THE RUSSIANS AS "TALKS ABOUT TALKS" A CONCEPT WHICH GROMYKO HAD PREVIOUSLY RIDICULED. HARTMAN AGREED THAT WHAT THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO ENVISAGE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT TALKS WAS TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS (A) ON SPACE AND (B) ON STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE LATTER IN EFFECT A MERGER OF START AND INF - IE THE PRESCRIPTION IN THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TUR. (MR HEALEY HAD GIVEN A BRIEFING ON HIS TALK WITH ZAGLADIN TO HARTMAN AT MY RECEPTION ON 26 NOVEMBER FOR THE LABOUR PARTY DELEGATION, BUT THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT HIS ONLY SOURCE). OTHER ARMS-CONTROL ISSUES SUCH AS CW WERE EXCLUDED BUT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE RUSSIANS ENVISAGED THAT TESTS SHOULD BE COVERED. THIS WAS ONE POINT WHICH HARTMAN WOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY AT A MEETING WHICH HE AND KENNEDY (IN MOSCOW FOR THE NPT DISCUSSIONS) WERE DUE TO HAVE WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIENKO ON 29 NOVEMBER.

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3. ANOTHER POINT FOR EXPLORATION WAS HOW THE RUSSIANS SAW THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR POPOV IN LONDON HAD SPOKEN OF AN "ORGANIC RELATIONSHIP" (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 994 PARAGRAPH 1(C)). BESSMERTNIKH HAD REJECTED THE TERM LINKAGE (PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TUR) BUT THE PRAVDA REPORT ON 29 NOVEMBER OF CHERNENKO'S MEETING WITH THE AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR (MY TELEGRAM NO 1361 PARAGRAPH 4) REFERS SPECIFICALLY TO "LINKAGE" BETWEEN OUTER SPACE AND THE TWO CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. THE RUSSIANS HAD STATED THAT THERE WERE NO PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING. THE "STATUS QUO ANTE" FORMULA ON THE REMOVAL OF PERSHING AND CRUISE HAD BEEN SHELVED. BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION (B) A FREEZE ON DEPLOYMENTS WAS OBVIOUSLY STILL THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE IN ANY JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON AIMS AND, AS THE KINNOCK VISIT HAD CONFIRMED, THE RUSSIANS WOULD IN THE MEANTIME SEEK TO PERSUADE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION THAT A FREEZE AT CURRENT UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS WAS A REASONABLE OPTION. AND WITH RESPECT TO OUTER SPACE WHERE AS HARTMAN AGREED, THE SOVIET UNION HAD THE GREATER INCENTIVE TO REACH A SOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO STATED PRE-CONDITION, A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER AMERICAN ASAT TESTS WAS CLEARLY A PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THE NEXT TEST WHICH, AS THE RUSSIANS KNEW, WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE SOON AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING COULD BECOME A STUMBLING BLOCK TO PROGRESS. THE AMERICANS MIGHT AGREE TO POSTPONE THE TEST SEMI COLON OR THE POSTPONEMENT OF THIS TEST MIGHT BECOME A THEME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS HARTMAN SAID THAT THE GENEVA MEETING COULD NOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND TWO DAYS. THE DISCUSSION WOULD, IF ALL WENT WELL, BE CONTINUED BY THE NEGOTIATORS, BUT THE PRINCIPALS COULD MEET AGAIN IF THE EXPERTS REGISTERED PROGRESS.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED	PS
SOVIET D	PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D	PS/MR RIFKIND
RESEARCH D	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/PUS
EED	MR DEREK THOMAS
NAD	SIR W HARDING
WED	MR GOODALL
ACDD	MR JENKINS
Fed.	MR WESTON
	MR DAVID THOMAS

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FROM MOSCOW 261145Z NOVEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1339 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY PARIS AND BONN

US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

SUMMARY.

1. SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON 22 NOVEMBER OF THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING (MY TELNO 1331) THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL COMMENT IN THE SOVIET PRESS ON THE FORM OR AGENDA FOR FUTURE US-SOVIET TALKS BUT ZAGLADIN HAS GIVEN MR HEALEY SOME POINTERS TO THE SOVIET POSITION ON BOTH SEMICLN I HAVE ALSO SOME INDICATORS FROM THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA. BOTH SOVIET OFFICIALS SEE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AS THE CREATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTER SPACE AND OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BUT NOT OTHER ARMS- CONTROL ISSUES. ACCORDING TO ZAGLADIN A FREEZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A SOVIET OBJECTIVE BUT NOT A PRE-CONDITION FOR TALKS.

DETAIL

2. SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT.

PRAYDA OF 23 NOVEMBER PUBLISHED A BALD STATEMENT OF THE GROMYKO-SHULTZ TALKS ON AN INSIDE PAGE WITHOUT PROMINENCE OR COMMENT PLUS A SHORT ITEM STATING THAT AN MFA PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT THE TALKS HAD BEEN GIVEN BY LOMEIKO. THE ONLY COMMENT TO HAVE APPEARED SO FAR WAS IN PRAYDA'S WEEKLY INTERNATIONAL REVIEW COLUMN ON 25 NOVEMBER WHICH DEALT WITH PROSPECTS FOR THE MEETING AT LENGTH BUT CONTAINED MORE ATMOSPHERICS THAN SUBSTANCE. IT ADOPTED A HIGHLY CAUTIOUS NOTE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE "TALKS ABOUT TALKS" BUT THE "DEEDS NOT WORDS" THEME WAS MUTED. BUT QUOTING EXTENSIVELY FROM U S PRESS COMMENT ABOUT A CONFLICT OF VIEWS IN WASHINGTON ABOUT FUTURE POLICY THE ARTICLE SEEMED TO ALLOW THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE "REALISTIC" APPROACH BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. "THE MAJORITY OF AMERICAN OBSERVERS" WAS QUOTED FOR THE VIEW THAT THE "STAR WARS" PROGRAMME WAS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO SOVIET-US AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.

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ZAGLADIN'S ACCOUNT.

3. ON HIS RETURN WITH MR KINNOCK FROM THE WEEKEND IN LENINGRAD, MR HEALEY HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD ON THE AFTERNOON OF 23 NOVEMBER WITH ZAGLADIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ZAGLADIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SAW THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MEETING IN GENEVA AS THE CREATION OF A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR TALKS ON (A) OUTER SPACE AND (B) OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE MEETING SHOULD AGREE NOT ONLY THE SUBJECTS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BUT ALSO REACH AN AGREED DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES. AS REGARDS SUBJECTS, THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO EXCLUDE FROM CONSIDERATION ARMS CONTROL ISSUES OTHER THAN (A) AND (B) SEMICLN TO INCLUDE OTHERS, EG CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WOULD OVERBURDEN AND COMPLICATE THE FRAMEWORK. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES WERE, IN GENERAL TERMS, THE DEMILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE AND TO CALL A HALT TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. ZAGLADIN ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO AGREEMENT ON OBJECTIVES. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH AGREEMENT FOR THE INF/START NEGOTIATIONS, NOT EVEN BETWEEN THE U S AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THOSE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR(B), IN EFFECT TO MERGE START AND INF.

4. ZAGLADIN TOLD MR HEALEY THAT IT WAS A SOVIET OBJECTIVE TO AGREE A FREEZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE AGREEMENT ON THIS SOON SEMICLN IF THE AMERICANS DID NOT AGREE IT WOULD BE A PITY SEMICLN BUT A FREEZE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. (MR HEALEY COMMENTED TO ME THAT THIS PARALLELED WHAT HE HAD WRITTEN IN HIS RECENT ARTICLE IN THE OBSERVER). THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT IN LAND AND AIR-BASED ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A BAN ON CRUISE MISSILES. ZAGLADIN MAINTAINED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUCH A BAN.

BESSMERTNIKH'S ACCOUNT.

5. ZAGLADIN'S ACCOUNT OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION ENVISAGED FOR THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING ACCORDS WITH WHAT BESSMERTNIKH, HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA TOLD ME AT THE U S AMBASSADOR'S THANKSGIVING DAY DINNER, IN THAT HE TOO SPOKE OF THE EXCLUSION OF ALL TOPICS APART FROM ARMS IN SPACE AND OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SAW THE MEETING AS TALKS ABOUT A FRAMEWORK FOR TALKS ON (A) AND (B) IN MY PARA 3 ABOVE, WITH AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TWO

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SETS OF DISCUSSIONS WERE RELATED. BUT HE DID NOT LIKE THE TERM 'LINKED'. ON (B) BESSMERTNIKH ALSO SPOKE OF STARTING ANEW IN COMBINED TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. ON THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS, HE COMMENTED THAT THEY WOULD NO DOUBT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT , IN VIEW OF FRENCH AND BRITISH PLANS FOR MODERNISATION.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PLANNING STAFF	PS/PUS
EED	MR DEREK THOMAS
NAD	SIR W HARDING
WED	MR GOODALL
ACDD	MR JENKINS
FED	MR WESTON
	MR DAVID THOMAS

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T197A/84

ARMS CONTROL: REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF 22 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 1996
NOT TO ALL).

2. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE DEAR RON, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF
22 NOVEMBER, DELIVERED TO ME BY CHARLIE PRICE.

I AM DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT YOUR EFFORTS TO RESUME A SERIOUS
ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE MET WITH A
POSITIVE RESPONSE AND THAT GEORGE SHULTZ AND GROMYKO HAVE AGREED
TO MEET IN GENEVA ON 7/8 JANUARY. THIS SHOWS THAT PATIENCE AND
PERSISTENCE WILL IN THE END PAY DIVIDENDS. I AM PARTICULARLY
GLAD THAT YOU ENVISAGE DISCUSSING THE WHOLE RANGE OF ARMS
CONTROL TOPICS. AS YOU IMPLY, STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND OUTER SPACE ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.
BUT AS I MENTIONED TO GEORGE SHULTZ RECENTLY IN DELHI, I BELIEVE
THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE SCARCELY LESS SO. I UNDERSTAND FROM
OLIVER WRIGHT THAT THESE WOULD ALSO BE A CANDIDATE FOR SEPARATE
NEGOTIATIONS UNDER YOUR UMBRELLA CONCEPT, ALONG WITH CONVENTIONAL
FORCES IN EUROPE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

I AM SURE YOU ARE RIGHT NOT TO UNDER-ESTIMATE THE
DIFFICULTIES AHEAD. BUT YOU KNOW YOU HAVE OUR STRONG SUPPORT AS
THESE PROSPECTS OPEN UP. I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSION
OF ALL THIS AT OUR MEETING ON 22 DECEMBER. YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET UNQUOTE.

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ECU

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 November 1984

Thank you for your letter of 23 November enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan's message about the US/Soviet agreement to enter into new negotiations on arms control.

BF | The Prime Minister is content with the draft and I should be grateful if it could be telegraphed to Washington for delivery by HM Ambassador.

(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER

Dear Ron,

Thank you very much for your message of 22 November, delivered to me yesterday by Charlie Price.

I am delighted to hear that your efforts to resume a serious arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union have met with a positive response and that George Shultz and Gromyko have agreed to meet in Geneva on 7/8 January. This shows that patience and persistence will in the end pay dividends. I am particularly glad that you envisage discussing the whole range of arms control topics. As you imply, strategic and intermediate range nuclear systems and outer space are of particular importance. But as I mentioned to George Shultz recently in Delhi, I believe that chemical weapons are scarcely less so. I understand from Oliver Wright that these would also be a candidate for separate negotiations under your umbrella concept, along with conventional forces in Europe and confidence-building measures.

I am sure you are right not to under-estimate the difficulties ahead. But you know you have our strong support as these prospects open up. I look forward to further discussion of all this at our meeting on 22 December.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1984

Dear Charles,

Message from President Reagan to the
Prime Minister

/ I enclose a draft reply to President Reagan for your consideration.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary


C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER

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I am sure you are right not to under-estimate the difficulties ahead. But you know you have our strong support as these prospects open up. I look forward to further discussion of all this at our meeting on 22 December.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Mered' followed by a stylized flourish.

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GRS 68D

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 220434Z NOV 84

TO PRIORITY FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3485 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS.

MY TELNO 3406: US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

SUMMARY.

1. MESSAGES EXCHANGED WITH MOSCOW. US HOPES FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS, PERHAPS EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. NO QUOTE CZAR UNQUOTE, BUT POSSIBLY A SPECIAL CO-ORDINATOR UNDER SHULTZ. LITTLE NEW INTERAGENCY WORK ON SUBSTANCE, BUT STATE DEPARTMENT CONTINUE TO ENVISAGE A POSSIBLE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON ASATS AND OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS THAT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO START WORK ON ASATS FIRST, UNDER THE OVERALL UMBRELLA.

DETAIL.

2. OUR STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT A SOVIET MESSAGE ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE ARMS CONTROL TALKS WAS RECEIVED HERE ON 17 NOVEMBER. THIS PRESUNABLY EXPLAINS HARTMAN'S REFERENCE TO QUOTE LETTERS UNQUOTE (TELNO 1314), BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE REAGAN MESSAGE HE DELIVERED TO GROMYKO ON 19 NOVEMBER WAS NOT A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET MESSAGE, BUT SIMPLY A FURTHER RE-STATEMENT OF US WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. (IT HAD BEEN DRAFTED BEFORE THE SOVIET MESSAGE ARRIVED).

3. THERE IS NOW A GENERAL AIR OF EXPECTATION HERE THAT THE REACTIVATION OF THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE ON ARMS CONTROL IS STARTING TO HAPPEN, THAT THE RUSSIANS DO NOT REJECT THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE UMBRELLA TALKS UNQUOTE AND THAT THERE WILL BE AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GROMYKO, PERHAPS IN GENEVA IN EARLY JANUARY.

4. THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE QUOTE UMBRELLA UNQUOTE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN KEPT DELIBERATELY VAGUE IN US/SOVIET EXCHANGES. BUT THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THE CONCEPT IS CLEAR: TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PARTICULAR NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CARRIED ON IN A WAY WHICH PERMITS LINKAGES BUT DOES NOT RESULT IN PROGRESS IN ONE AREA BEING HELD HOSTAGE TO LACK OF PROGRESS IN ANOTHER. SIX AREAS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS CANDIDATES FOR SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UMBRELLA COVERAGE: STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, INF, SPACE WEAPONS, CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, CW, AND CBMS.

5. AS REPORTED IN MY TUR, THE IDEA OF APPOINTING A QUOTE CZAR UNQUOTE TO HOLD THE UMBRELLA SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT. ARMACOST CONFIRMED THIS TO ME TODAY. HE BELIEVES THAT

SHULTZ WISHES TO TAKE THE LEAD (UNDER THE PRESIDENT) HIMSELF, AND IS NOW SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO ENSURE THAT HE DOES. HOWEVER, THE IDEA OF AN ENVOY WHO, REPORTING TO SHULTZ, MIGHT PLAY IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD VERY MUCH THE ROLE PLAYED BY AMBASSADOR SCHLAUDERMAN ON CENTRAL AMERICA IS STILL VERY MUCH ALIVE. NITZE IS NOW THE NAME MOST OFTEN MENTIONED BY ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS AS A LIKELY CANDIDATE, AND HE IS CERTAINLY ATTENDING HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS.

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6. ALL OUR CONTACTS MAINTAIN THAT VERY LITTLE STAFF WORK IS BEING CONDUCTED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF POSSIBLE US NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, THOUGH THOSE IDENTIFIED IN INTERAGENCY WORK IN THE SUMMER (BAND'S TELETYPE TO PAKENHAM OF 10 OCTOBER) OF COURSE REMAIN IN PLACE. STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS STILL REGARD THE LIKELY OBJECTIVE AS A THREE YEAR ASATS MORATORIUM, COUPLED WITH A CAP ON OFFENSIVE LAUNCHERS

AND WARHEAD NUMBERS, AND A JOINT COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR AN AGREED REDUCTION IN SUCH NUMBERS. DOD REMAINS UNHAPPY ABOUT THE MORATORIUM, THOUGH STATE MAINTAINS THAT ITS SHORT DURATION WOULD MEAN THAT IT HAD NO IMPACT ON SDI.

7. SOME IN STATE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOW BE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN A NEGOTIATION ON ASAT CONSTRAINTS IN ADVANCE OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS - AND THE UMBRELLA CONCEPT COULD OF COURSE PERMIT A FAIRLY ELASTIC LINK BETWEEN THE TWO - BUT DOD NATURALLY RESIST THIS TOO. SHULTZ HAS SAID TO FEEL THAT THE US SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW A HINT OF FLEXIBILITY ON SUBSTANCE, AS WELL AS ON NEGOTIATING FORMAT, AND THE OBVIOUS AREAS IS ASATS. BUT THE DOD MOTTO IS NO CONCESSIONS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS (IF THEN). AND OUR STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS ADMIT THAT MUCH MORE WORK WILL BE REQUIRED ON THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION BEFORE THE PRESIDENT COULD BE INVITED TO ENDORSE SUCH A MOVE.

8. THE INTERNAL BATTLE HAS HARDLY STARTED YET, BUT WILL DOUBT NOT UP SOON IF CONTACTS WITH MOSCOW CONTINUE TO GO REASONABLY WELL AND TO PICK UP MOMENTUM. AT SOME STAGE THE PRESIDENT MAY WELL HAVE TO CRACK HEADS TOGETHER.

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED	NAO	PS
SOVIET D		PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D		PS/MR RIFKIND
RESEARCH D		PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF		PS/PUS
EED		MR DEREK THOMAS
NAD		SIR W HARDING
WED		MR GOODALL
ACDD		MR JENKINS
		MR WESTON
		MR DAVID THOMAS

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 November, 1984.

East/West Relations: Message from
President Reagan

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan on East/West relations and arms control, delivered this morning.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C.D. Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TMS

SECRET

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T 197/84

November 22, 1984

cc MASTER
OPS

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed letter to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,



^{for}
Charles H. Price, II
Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure - SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1

SECRET

US Declassified

T 197/84

November 22, 1984

Dear Margaret:

As you know, we have sought to bring greater stability to our relations with the Soviet Union, and as part of that, to resume a serious arms control dialogue with them. This was the purpose of my inviting Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to meet with me at the White House in September and the subject of a number of letters I have exchanged with Soviet Chairman Chernenko.

I'm pleased to be able to report to you that the Soviet side has now indicated to us that they are ready to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. The Soviets have proposed a meeting be held between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz in the first half of January to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of these negotiations. We told the Soviets that Secretary Shultz would be pleased to meet with Mr. Gromyko. The date and venue for such talks have now been agreed through diplomatic channels. A brief statement will be issued November 22nd announcing that our two governments have agreed to enter into new negotiations and that our two Foreign Ministers will meet in Geneva on January 7 and 8, 1985.

I'm sure that you will be as pleased at this news as I am to be informing you of it. The strength and solidarity of the West is one of the reasons the Soviets have now decided to return to the negotiating table. I recognize that what we have achieved is not an end to itself. We are renewing the difficult process of negotiating verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. For our part, we will be prepared to discuss all arms control topics, including strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems and outer space.

As we resume the negotiating process, I want to assure you that we will continue to pay the closest attention to the security interests of our friends and allies, particularly on the subject of INF. The Secretary of State will be prepared to consult on these questions at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels next month.

SECRET

SECRET

I pledge to you today my unswerving dedication to reaching agreements which will reduce the nuclear threat and enhance the security of all our nations. I continue to count on your advice and firm support as we proceed with this vital work.

Sincerely,

/S/
Ron

SECRET

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US Declassified

November 22, 1984

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SECRET

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Sincerely,

/S/
Ron

SECRET

This is already
in 7 books.

S. Kave

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

November 22, 1984



Prime Minister


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22/xi

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Sincerely,



for Charles H. Price, II

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure - SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1

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6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Sir Robert Armstrong

Inertial Confinement Fusion Research

The Prime Minister was grateful to be brought up to date on this matter by your minute (A084/2408) of 7 September.

ep

11 September, 1984.

CONFIDENTIAL

NR

Prime Minister
 Moving very slowly but
 in the right direction.

Ref. A084/2408

PRIME MINISTER

Inertial Confinement Fusion Research

att With my minute A01433 of 15 February 1980^{pt 3} I submitted to you an assessment made by the Nuclear Advisory Panel chaired by Lord Penney of the implications of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research for the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology and possible action to control information emerging from such research. Subsequently (my minute A02803^{pt 3} of 4 August 1980) I reported on exploratory discussions with the United States Administration of the Panel's assessment and proposals. Although the United States initially saw a need for a more restrictive policy for ICF research, domestically and internationally, than the Panel believed to be either desirable or practicable, they agreed to review their position in the light of our proposals.

2. For a number of reasons the United States were not ready to resume discussions until April this year; but, when they did so, they had come much closer to acceptance of the Panel's view that ICF is neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of nuclear weapon technology, and they took a more sympathetic view of its central proposal to decouple ICF work in the defence field from that in the civil field. There was, however, an increased fear of criticism if the United States Administration was not seen to have acted against the disclosure of ICF information that might assist, or be thought to assist, the development of an initial nuclear weapon capability.

3. Although the UK delegation remained less optimistic than the United States about the practicality of inhibiting, much less controlling, the release of ICF information in other countries without disclosing the very information to be



protected, they recognised the domestic pressure on the United States to be seen to be doing something about the perceived dangers and also the importance of the very close collaboration with the United States on defence nuclear matters. They therefore offered to continue our low-key monitoring and guidance of civil research in this field and, on the basis of clear definitions of the sensitive and non-sensitive areas of ICF work, to agree to low-key approaches to selected non-nuclear weapon countries urging restraint on open publication of sensitive information, provided that this could be done without disclosing the significance of the information to be protected, and subject to review of necessary. The United States welcomed this offer as compatible with, though less rigorous than, their own preferred policy and it formed an agreed basis for subsequent trilateral discussion with the French.

4. In the trilateral discussions the French expressed similar views to our own, both on the assessment of the implications of ICF work for nuclear weapon technology and on the feasibility of controlling information and generally took the attitude that "the less said the better". The United States once again urged the need to be seen at least to discourage the publication of certain ICF information emerging from some countries, particularly Japan, and argued that any representations would be more effective if they were seen to be based on the joint technical judgments of the three countries rather than on a unilateral United States approach, and they therefore no longer sought to press their differences over the technical assessment of the implications of ICF research for proliferation.

5. Against this background the French and United Kingdom delegations did not oppose a United States approach to Japan at senior diplomatic level inviting the Japanese Government to encourage restraint over the publication of potentially



sensitive information arising from their ICF programme. It was also agreed, ad referendum, that similar action should be taken by France with Germany and by the United Kingdom with Spain, but that approaches to other countries would not be made unless and until developments in their ICF work suggested that such action was required.

6. A full list of the conclusions of the trilateral --- discussions, agreed ad referendum, is attached. They are consistent with the recommendations of the Nuclear Advisory Panel and from our point of view represent a satisfactory, if belated, outcome.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

7 September 1984

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ANNEX

INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION (ICF)

Conclusions agreed, ad referendum, at trilateral meeting of US, French and UK delegates on 15th June 1984.

Participants considered it would be useful:

- (1) to use the already trilaterally agreed list of sensitive and insensitive areas of information in exercising control over civil ICF work within their own countries and in seeking to influence other countries where necessary. The list would not be classified but it would not be published as such;
- (2) to continue guidance to civil ICF researchers within their own countries in order to divert them from sensitive areas of ICF work;
- (3) to continue national restraints on ICF researchers in the military field, regarding publications and attendance at open ICF discussions;
- (4) to refuse comment on the potential relevance of ICF data to nuclear weapons;
- (5) to arrange for senior diplomatic but low-key approaches to selected countries with advanced ICF programmes to encourage them to act as in (1) and (2) above;
- (6) to approach Japan, West Germany and Spain, with action resting on US, France and UK respectively, who should inform each other when action is completed;

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- (7) to inform USSR and China, in due course, about the common list of sensitive and insensitive areas and the action based on it. In this case US, France and UK should act as opportune but inform the others when action has been taken;
- (8) to discourage, whenever possible, meetings organised by IAEA or other bodies from entering upon discussion of sensitive areas of ICF work, if action can be taken without adverse effect. More thought to be given on how to achieve this objective.

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FILE

WJ

cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 August, 1984

Dear Peter,

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: THE CASE FOR ACTION

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary minuted to the Prime Minister on this subject on 3 August.

The Prime Minister retains her doubts about the wisdom of proposing a technical co-operation fund designed to sustain support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, she is prepared reluctantly to agree to Sir Geoffrey Howe's proposals on the clear understanding that the money can be found without recourse to the contingency reserve.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Michael Reidy (Department of Energy), John Gieve (Chief Secretary's Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. Powell)

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CPC ①



PM/84/137

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

When you discussed this with

Percy ~~Crabtree~~ *me* recently, you agreed to look at the arguments again.

Percy thinks these arguments are strong. I am impressed by the risk of being pre-empted by American proposals which would

Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case for Action

You provided progress can be found without recourse to the contracting party reserve sub.

attached

1. I know that you are not enthusiastic about the idea of a technical cooperation fund designed to sustain and if possible increase support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Your Private Secretary in a letter of 16 April reported your reaction to my minute of 3 April.

cost us more, but earn us less credit.

2. Richard Luce and I have had another careful look at all this and have come to the conclusion that I should ask you to reconsider your reservations, because of the importance of the underlying political interests at stake.

Agree (reluctantly) to what is proposed in para. 7?

3. I think we have to start from the common ground that limiting the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most important long-term elements in the United Kingdom arms control policy. Since 1970 the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime has been the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which (as you reminded the United Nations in 1982) Britain was one of the principal architects. Under this treaty (which claims 120 states party) three-quarters of the non-nuclear weapon states have undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus at present 98% of all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon states are under safeguards. The treaty provides the legal underpinning for the IAEA safeguard system.

CJD 3/8

4. The NPT is unfortunately very much at risk. The 1980 treaty review ended in disarray. Non-nuclear weapon states criticise the nuclear weapon states for their alleged failure to make adequate progress towards nuclear disarmament as required by Article VI. Developing countries claim that the developed countries have failed to help them enjoy the benefits of peaceful



nuclear energy as required by Article IV. The NPT will expire automatically in just over a decade from now, unless a majority of the states party vote to prolong it.

5. If the Treaty were to collapse, the international safeguards system would probably break down too. Countries such as Libya, Iran and Iraq (all parties to the NPT) would then be free to start nuclear weapons programmes without legal constraint and with less likelihood of detection. The stakes at next year's review conference are therefore large. So is Britain's responsibility as a depository power. Bearing in mind your words to the United Nations that "proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be the way to a safer world", the next ten years could be crucial.

6. It is against this background that I think we should consider the case for Britain taking an initiative to canvass support among close allies for a technical cooperation fund, as proposed by the interdepartmental working party. The underlying purpose of the fund would be to give further practical expression to the Article IV commitment to help developing NPT countries enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy (see paragraph 8 below); and thus to provide added incentive to maintain the NPT regime intact. I have never pretended that this alone would be decisive. But it is a positive proposal for practical action, whose acceptance could be made conditional upon securing the right political outcome at the next review conference. As I warned you in my minute of 3 April there is in any case a danger of being preempted by more ambitious and more expensive proposals from other quarters. We know for example that Australian officials are recommending to their Ministers to double technical cooperation funds to developing states party to the NPT and to ask other suppliers (including the UK) to do likewise. We may thus face a situation of being asked to provide more money than is envisaged in our own technical cooperation fund proposal for a scheme for which the UK would receive no credit. Meanwhile the \$1 million pledged by the UK at the last review conference (the so-called IAEA footnote A scheme) has now been spent. Without



something like the new technical cooperation fund proposal, the UK will be providing no aid in the nuclear field specifically to NPT parties; and will be going into the next review conference with a reduced commitment measured against our pledge in 1980.

7. I accept that it is not yet clear where responsibility in financing a UK contribution to such a technical cooperation fund would lie. I have put in a bid for £0.3 million in 1986/7 and for £0.5 million in 1987/8 in this year's public expenditure survey. If the responsibility fell to me and I had to find the money elsewhere, it would involve sacrifices which I would regard as highly undesirable. But I believe there may be another way round this if discussions in Whitehall are pursued. What I require first is your approval in principle to support a line for the NPT conference which might commit the UK to contribute to a technical cooperation fund provided the money can be found and that the results of the review conference would justify this. If the question of financial responsibility could be solved quickly, I should then wish to consult close allies, since the next preparatory meeting for the NPT Review Conference will be upon us in October.

8. Finally a word about your own specific reservations. You expressed concern about the wisdom of promoting nuclear energy in the Third World and about the problems of nuclear waste disposal. You are quite right that many countries will not be ready for nuclear energy for many years if ever, and that we should not pretend that they will. But neither can we turn the clock back. There is a significant group of developing NPT countries who have decided that nuclear energy already makes some economic sense for them and who are committed to pursuing it. This comes out clearly in the interdepartmental working group report, and in particular annexes 3, 4 and 5 as well as the illustrative case studies (copies enclosed for ease of reference). In these cases it is important to ensure that such countries are capable of properly regulating their nuclear activities and

/have

with the
R.D.

with additional
calls on the
London
review.

— not enclosed actually



have adequate sources of expertise in such subjects as safety and waste disposal. Such expertise could be provided at relatively low cost, largely by consultancy and training assistance, with some possibility of net benefit to the UK balance of payments.

9. On disposal of fission products, it is certainly true that the developed world has not yet solved the problems associated with the disposal of radio-active waste, particularly highly active fission products. This challenge will have to be met by the developed countries themselves if nuclear energy is to continue at its present level of importance for their energy programmes. The additional amounts of material associated with developments in the Third World are exiguous by comparison. Any solution for the developed countries will a fortiori encompass them. Without such a solution, the problem will lie at our own doorsteps anyway.

10. I apologise for the length of this minute: but I believe the political importance of next year's NPT Review Conference and the political costs of failure should not be underrated. HMG is often criticised for not taking the initiative in arms control. This strikes me as a modest and sensible opportunity to do so.

11. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 August, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~230 7032~~ 218 6169

D/S of S/PS/9436C

14th June 1984

Dear Charles,

*PT saw for
R. Kennedy questions
briefing on 14/6*

PD 15/6

In your letter of 12th June addressed to Richard Mottram you asked for a note on the significance of the Americans' reported success in destroying a test missile outside the earth's atmosphere with another missile.

I attach a note covering both the military and arms control implications (the latter having been provided by the FCO), together with a suggested line-to-take for use, if necessary, by the Prime Minister this afternoon.

A copy of this goes to Roger Bone in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*Yours sincerely,
Barry Neale*

(B P NEALE)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq

THE US MISSILE INTERCEPTOR TEST

Line to Take

- . The US missile intercept test was part of a well established research programme. The technique demonstrated would form only one component of any future ballistic missile defence system.

- . The US authorities are keeping us fully informed about developments in the Strategic Defence Initiative.

- . The US have repeatedly stated their commitment to the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and have assured us that the test was conducted in full conformity with it.

[If pressed on likely parallel Soviet developments:

- . We are confident that Trident will remain a viable deterrent well into the next century_]

BACKGROUND NOTE

1. Military Implications On 11 June The Pentagon announced the successful test over the Pacific of a missile interceptor vehicle against an incoming dummy warhead. The interceptor vehicle scored a direct hit on the warhead at an altitude of more than one hundred miles. The interceptor vehicle consisted of two modified stages of a Minuteman 1 ICBM. The test was the fourth and final test in a series. Three earlier tests (in February, May and December last year) were unsuccessful.

2. In view of the very limited information currently available to us in the UK it is not possible to produce a detailed assessment of the military implications of this test. In particular, it is not clear in what conditions the interception took place and what level of discrimination the defending missile had to exercise to find and kill the target.

3. On the face of it, however, it is a considerable ^{technical} achievement in that the US have accomplished a non-nuclear kill in space after successfully guiding an interceptor missile accurately to its target.

4. The test was part of a programme called the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE). This programme predates ^{by many years} President Reagan's 'Star Wars' project announced in 1983. ^{conceivably} The technique demonstrated could form one component to support what is now called the Strategic Defence Initiative; it is not however the

NOT CONF.

main technology which would have to be employed in any comprehensive ballistic missile defence - the Strategic Defence Initiative relies on a multi layered system, in which the main weight of an enemy attack would be eliminated in the early boost phase of missile flight by directed energy weapons based in space.

5. HOE, of course, is not foolproof. Identification of targets, for example, is made by infra red sensors; the obvious Soviet response would be to introduce infra red decoys into their war-head package. Another drawback is that HOE can take out only one incoming object in space at a time; a large number would therefore be required to cope with a mass attack.

6. Although the Americans have said that HOE is not an anti satellite system, it should be technically feasible to use the interceptor head as an ASAT weapon given the appropriate launch vehicle.

7. Arms Control Aspects Although they have not yet done so, it is possible that the Soviet Union may claim that the test represents a breach of current arms control treaties. Article VI of the 1972 ABM Treaty signed by the United States and Soviet Union says " ... each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or radars capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or other elements in flight

trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode ..." Article II.

1.(a) defines interceptor missiles as "interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode".

8. Although as an offensive missile Minuteman I would not fit into these categories, the Americans say they have never given the Minuteman I a capability to counter ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory nor has the missile been tested in an ABM mode. Two modified stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, but not the whole missile, were used as part of a technology demonstration they say is permitted by the Treaty. They therefore claim the interceptor was observably a distinct missile that falls within the treaty definition of an "interceptor missile". (In parenthesis they also argue that as Minuteman I is no longer deployed in an operational role it is plainly a research craft not intended for operational deployment as an ABM weapon). The Soviet Union already possesses a layered system of ABM defences around Moscow involving missiles capable of hitting incoming warheads outside the atmosphere. Currently these do not breach the ABM Treaty.

puts to visit Liverpool to confirm the situation—and next time she visits Liverpool, will she come in broad daylight?

The Prime Minister: I seem to remember that last time I went to Liverpool it was very broad daylight.

Mr. Wareing: And everybody was asleep in bed.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

The Prime Minister: I hope that, for the moment, the hon. Gentleman is awake. With regard to the more serious aspect of his question, as the hon. Gentleman knows, a joint paper has been produced by officials of the Liverpool city council and officials of the Department of the Environment on options for achieving a balanced city council budget for 1984-85. It has been presented to the city councillors and the Secretary of State. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is due to meet councillors to discuss it. In the meantime, I understand that the auditor has written, strongly advising the council to set a rate by 20 June. I hope that it will do so.

Viscount Cranborne: Has my right hon. Friend noticed the announcement in this morning's press that the Americans have managed to shoot down a warhead in space? Will she take time today to consider whether that event has any implications for the purchase of the Trident missile?

The Prime Minister: It would be extremely unwise to rush into any conclusions on the basis of a press report or to make any statement without considering its full implications. The difference between one event and turning it into working technology is enormous, especially in this sphere.

Dr. Owen: In view of the Prime Minister's proven involvement in British Rail's pay offer, will she spare the House the humbug of pretending that she is not involved in decisions about whether British Rail should now invoke the civil law in relation to secondary picketing by members of the National Union of Railwaymen? Will she now tell us what she thinks should be done?

The Prime Minister: I have already said, in case the right hon. Gentleman has not noticed, that should the great nationalised industries invoke the civil law, the Government will not override their decision.

Q3. Mr. Norman Atkinson asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 June.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Atkinson: Is the Prime Minister aware that Mr. Denktash and some other Turkish-speaking Cypriots are shortly to host a dinner at the Savoy hotel which 40 or 50 of the Prime Minister's Back Benchers will attend and which will be addressed by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) who will associate the Tory party with the Turkish annexation of Cyprus? Will she dissociate herself from that annexation and assure the House that no Government facilities will be made available for any trade negotiations during Mr. Denktash's visit to the United Kingdom?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman is aware, the Government have condemned the attempts to declare

an independent northern Cyprus. The Government wish there to be a unitary state of Cyprus and have supported and will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring both sides together to achieve the restoration of a unitary state of Cyprus. With regard to other matters, right hon. and hon. Members are free to do as they wish.

Sir Peter Blaker: Has my right hon. Friend any comment to make on the deafening silence of the opposition parties when the Prime Minister of South Africa was received by the Pope?

The Prime Minister: No. I sometimes prefer the deafening silence to the other thing.

Q4. Mr. Marlow asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 12 June.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Marlow: Does my right hon. Friend agree with this summary of the European election campaign that, whereas the Labour party, quite properly for it, puts Socialism first and the Liberal and Social Democratic parties put Europe first, Conservative candidates are putting Britain first? Does she further agree that every Conservative candidate is committed to the retention of the national veto, favours increasing free trade in the Community, and is against a federal system for Europe?

The Prime Minister: I agree broadly with my hon. Friend. With regard to the veto, our manifesto makes it clear that we wish to retain it as it is. With regard to our attitude to trade in Europe, we wish to reduce the internal barriers. Of course, I am against a federal Europe.

Mr. Parry: Will not the Prime Minister agree that the House was deliberately deceived by the Government about intervention in the miners' dispute? Will she state now whether the Secretary of State for Energy actually saw the letter from Andrew Turnbull to Henry Derwent? Will she not also agree that the Secretary of State yesterday treated the House and the National Union of Mineworkers with contempt by saying that he could not remember seeing it because it was not important?

The Prime Minister: With regard to the precise papers that the Secretary of State for Energy sees, I suspect he has seen a great deal more than I have because he is the sponsoring Minister. With regard to intervention, right hon. and hon. Members are still urging me to intervene by getting them all to No. 10. I have not done so, and will not do so. I have repeatedly said that this Government have set—*[Interruption]*

Mr. Speaker: Order.

The Prime Minister: If the hon. Member wishes to call it intervention, this Government have provided £2 million per day for investment in the coal industry. They have seen to it that money is there for a very good deal for the mineworkers, and that the best voluntary redundancy terms are available. They have seen to it that there are extra subsidies and extra prospects for manufacturers who wish to turn from oil to coal. If that is intervention, yes, I have intervened, but asking them to No. 10 and beer and sandwiches, no, never.

Q6. Mr. Wallace asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 12 June.

MJ

File

12 June 1984

Today's press reported the American success in destroying a test missile outside the earth's atmosphere with another missile for the first time. The matter was raised at Prime Minister's Questions this afternoon. It would be helpful to have an assessment of the significance of the event both in military and arms control terms. If possible this should be available by 14 June in case there are further Questions then.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Richard Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence.

CP

ECL



MO 11/9/4

PRIME MINISTER

pa
Dubs
22/4

Prime Minister⁽²⁾
To note the Defence Secretary's view. You have of course expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of such a fund.

Dubs
26/4

INCENTIVES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

I have seen Geoffrey Howe's minute to you of 3rd April on incentives for NPT membership, and the subsequent correspondence. I have no objection to the fund proposals; though I also have doubts as to their likely effectiveness in securing more support for the NPT. I should make it clear that no money from MOD votes could be provided for such a fund.

2. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

WJH

Ministry of Defence
24th April 1984

Reference Arms Control AT5

26 APR 1984



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FILE

54



cc: Sir P. Croad.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1984

Chemical Weapons: US Draft Treaty

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 18 April to John Coles on the above subject.

DAVID BARCLAY

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

JP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister (2)

18 April 1984

To note.

Dms
19/4

Joe John,

Chemical Weapons: US Draft Treaty

Today Vice President Bush tabled at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva the text of the US draft Treaty on chemical weapons, as foreshadowed in President Reagan's announcement of 5 April. I enclose the text of the statement issued by FCO News Department in Mr Luce's name at 1230 hrs today, welcoming the US initiative. I also enclose a background note on the state-of-play in the CD negotiations.

The text of the draft treaty, received late yesterday afternoon, follows closely the contents of the draft on which we were consulted by the US on 4 April in London and later in NATO. We provided considered views at short notice, and some of our comments have been taken into account, particularly on the relationship between the principal organs responsible for implementing the Convention and on definitions of chemical weapons. The Russians and others are likely to be hostile to the US proposal - described by the US as the "open invitation" to inspection - that there should be no exceptions to unrestricted challenge inspection; FCO and MOD officials are considering its implications for our own security interests.

Nevertheless, the US draft Treaty represents a major Western contribution to the Geneva negotiations. While we and our European allies may continue to have reservations about the extent of verification, it will be important to maintain overall Alliance solidarity behind the US initiative if the negotiations are to succeed.

The negotiations will adjourn on 26 April, to resume on 12 June until the end of August. We shall have further consultations with the Americans not only on aspects of their text but on tactics to be pursued when the negotiations resume in June. We shall also discuss with them what steps might be taken to maintain the negotiating momentum during the Autumn, when the Conference on Disarmament adjourns for the UN General Assembly.

/I am

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I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures
to Richard Mottram (MOD) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

Two -

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', with a stylized flourish at the end.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT BY MR LUCE

WEDNESDAY 18 APRIL 1984

Today the United States Vice-President Mr George Bush has tabled at the 40-Nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We and our other NATO allies were consulted on the draft treaty. And, as the Prime Minister told the House of Commons of 5 April, the British Government warmly supports this latest initiative. We hope it will hasten progress towards early agreement on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and use of these appalling weapons of mass destruction. The British Government have played a leading role in the international efforts to achieve such a ban. At the CD negotiations we have made a series of proposals on monitoring of compliance, on verification of non-diversion of civil chemicals into illicit chemical weapons stockpiles, and on challenge inspection in cases of suspected non-compliance: I tabled this latest initiative in Geneva on 14 February. At a time when chemical weapons have recently been used, it is more important than ever that we should secure a comprehensive ban. Agreement on a treaty would constitute a significant advance in practical arms control, and a major contribution to international security.



CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS

Western Aims

1. In the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we are trying to negotiate a total, worldwide ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and the destruction of present holdings. The key elements in this ban will be:

- (i) declarations by all parties of current stockpiles and production facilities;
- (ii) agreement to destroy over a ten-year period such stockpiles and facilities;
- (iii) acceptance of arrangements to verify the above destruction procedures;
- (iv) acceptance of verification that CW will not be produced in civil chemical industries, and that the permitted small-scale production facilities (designed purely for defensive purposes) are not being diverted to other ends; and
- (v) the establishment of a Consultative Committee, an Executive Council, a Technical Secretariat, and a fact-finding panel.

History of Negotiations

2. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banned the use of CW (interpreted by many in the West as meaning the first use); but it made no provisions for other constraints on CW. Various efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban were made after the Second War, culminating in a UK draft Treaty submitted to the (then) CCD in 1976. This however was almost immediately overtaken by US/Soviet agreement to initiate bilateral negotiations on a total ban. These began in 1977 and were suspended in 1980, following lack of success largely due to Soviet refusal to accept the necessary degree of verification.

3. Since 1980, key dates have been:

1982 February: UK paper to CD on compliance;

June: Gromyko statement to UN Special Session, accepting principle of on-site inspection but emphasising need for voluntary nature and inspection quotas;

July: Soviet working paper containing these proposals;

/1983



1983 January: Prague Declaration, advocating CW-free zone in Europe;

February: Vice-President Bush presents US Detailed Views to CD;

March: Mr Hurd presents UK paper to CD on Non-Production (ie non-diversion of civil chemicals into illicit weapons production);

April/June: Other working papers on CW tabled at CD by West and non-aligned;

July: US paper on Stockpile Destruction presented to CD;

August: UK second paper for CD on Non-Production;

November: US-sponsored visit for all CD members (only Romania attended from East) to stockpile destruction facility at Tooele;

1984 January: Soviet repeat of CW-free zone in Europe proposal;

US announcement at CDE of full draft Treaty to be tabled in CD;

February: Mr Luce tabled UK paper on Challenge Inspection;

Soviet acceptance of continuous on-site inspection (OSI) for stockpile destruction;

CW negotiations resumed in CD;

18 April: Bush tabled US draft Treaty.

State of Negotiations

4. Whereas in 1983 we trod water while the Russians refused to reveal further details of their negotiating hand, in 1984 the negotiations have already achieved a new momentum. The US announcement of their draft Treaty provided a higher profile; the UK paper on challenge inspection was warmly welcomed both in the CD and in the UK; and the Russians made one concession in dropping their demand for quota inspection and accepting the principle of routine OSI on a mandatory, not voluntary basis. They earlier accepted the principle of challenge inspection as well, but continue to insist that this can only be conducted on a voluntary basis. The US draft Treaty should maintain this new momentum and ensure that the negotiating initiative remains with the West. Reports of CW use (by Iraq) in the Gulf War, confirmed and condemned by the UN, have also highlighted the dangers of unrestrained CW capabilities; and have focussed more public interest and attention on the issue, including the CD negotiations.

/Verification



Verification

5. The verification provisions for any CW ban will be the key factor in its acceptability to the West. They will provide special problems since we are breaking new ground in arms control by trying to eliminate an entire area of weaponry which has already been well developed and which is closely linked with continued production for civil purposes. Moreover, CW are easily concealed and transported.

6. In Western proposals we are seeking to verify:

- (a) initial declarations of stockpiles and production facilities;
- (b) the destruction of stockpiles;
- (c) the elimination of production facilities;
- (d) non-production of CW under the guise of the civil chemical industry; and
- (e) the operation of permitted facilities.

7. We conceive of two means of verifying these elements:

- (i) routine on-site inspection of various degrees of stringency. In the case of item (a)-(c) above, the need for inspection arrangements should decrease over the ten-year period while destruction was taking place. Inspection for items (d) and (e) above would however continue indefinitely;
- (ii) challenge inspection. This would impose on all parties the acceptance of ad hoc inspection in cases of suspected non-compliance which were not resolvable by other inspection means.

8. The current US proposals envisage mandatory acceptance, at short notice, of inspection on demand of all military and Government-related facilities. This sweeping provision is sure to provoke a hostile Soviet reaction; other CD members may also be reluctant to grant such comprehensive access to sensitive facilities to international inspection teams. The Americans claim that, given the special problems of a CW ban, only such a comprehensive regime would be adequate to meet their concerns. They have however made it clear that they are ready to consider any other proposals which could in sum have an equivalent effect. The successful resolution of this issue, in the course of further negotiations, will be the key to the achievement of an acceptable and enduring Treaty.

8 APR 1984



CONFIDENTIAL

ack



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 13/1/16/4

16th April 1984

A.J.C. 16/4

f.a.

New Jms

MBFR

The Defence Secretary has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 13th April and is content to proceed as he proposes. *with AJC*
I am copying this letter to Roger Bone in the FCO, and to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Secretary's office.

Yms cv,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE: Arms Control Pt 5

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ARMY BUILDING WINDMILL FOUNDRY
CANTONMENT ROAD
SINGAPORE



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16 APR 1984

S E C R E T



FILE

cc: P.C

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April, 1984

MBFR

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 13 April.

Subject to the views of the Secretary of State for Defence, Mrs. Thatcher agrees that we should co-operate with our allies in tabling a reformulation of the Western negotiating position on the lines of the text annexed to Sir Geoffrey Howe's minute.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

S E C R E T

NR

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

67

cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April, 1984

STUDY GROUP OF INCENTIVES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 3 April, as well as the minutes by the Secretary of State for Energy, dated 11 April, and the Chief Secretary, dated 6 April.

The Prime Minister has minuted that she very much doubts the wisdom of establishing a fund "to promote the growth of nuclear energy in the third world". She has observed that we are having great difficulty in disposing of fission products and that there would be considerable problems in controlling the end use of such products.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), David Peretz (HM Treasury), Michael Reidy (Department of Energy), John Gieve (Chief Secretary's Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

WR

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

I very much doubt the
wisdom of establishing a fund "to
promote the growth of nuclear energy
in the third world." We are having great
difficulty in disposing of fission products and

Incentives for Membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

In the attached minute the Foreign Secretary reports that ^{problems in controlling}
~~the~~ ^{them} Whitehall Study Group has concluded that the best incentive
to persuade developing countries to support the Non-Proliferation ^{and we}
Treaty would be establishment of a technical assistance fund
financed by developed countries. A sum of \$10-15 million a year
is envisaged for promoting the growth of nuclear energy in the
third world. It is proposed that the UK should contribute about
£250,000 in 1986/87 rising to a maximum of about £500,000 per annum
thereafter.

The Energy Secretary supports this proposal in principle.

The Chief Secretary has doubts about it but would not press
these provided that the UK contribution was found from within
existing departmental programmes.

So far Whitehall departments have not agreed on which Vote
should carry the UK contribution.

The Foreign Secretary invites you to accept the principle
of UK support for such a fund now. But he stresses that no sound-
ings will be taken of other Governments until the question of
UK finance has been satisfactorily resolved.

You objected last year to an earlier proposal for a fund on
the grounds that it was ill-defined and open-ended. As a result
of your objections, the inter-Departmental Group met and revised the
proposal into the form set out above. Their report is attached
to the Foreign Secretary's minute.

Would you like me to say that you support in principle the
idea of the fund but that before any reference is made to it
publicly or in discussion with other Governments, departments,
including the Treasury, must resolve the question of how the UK
contribution will be financed?

A. J. C.

13 April 1984



Prime Minister.

Agree that we should support the new
American proposals at Vienna?

9

PM/84/56

PRIME MINISTER

A-F.C. 13/4

Yes not

MBFR

(attached).

1. As you will recall from my minute to you of 1 March the Americans have proposed a new way of presenting the Western negotiating objectives in MBFR. Following intensive consultation with ourselves and the Germans, the Americans tabled their ideas in Brussels on 19 March. As you and Michael Heseltine had agreed, British officials supported the American approach.

2. The Germans, with some support from other Allies, have proposed certain amendments to the American approach. Although these in our view detract from the coherence and logic of the original US proposals, they do not overturn the basic concept as summarised in paragraph 5 of my earlier minute. The Americans clearly attach over-riding political importance to the West tabling at least an outline of its new position in Vienna before the end of the present round on 19 April, having apparently indicated bilaterally to the Soviet Union that the Alliance would do so. They have, therefore, now circulated in NATO a text revised to take account of German concerns, a copy of which I attach.

3. Ideally, we would have preferred to have had longer to consider the revised text and to try to improve on some of the details. I also consider that it would be tactically better to table the revised Western ideas early in the next round (beginning on 24 May) rather than now. This would make it more difficult for the East to reject our suggestions publicly without discussion and would provide an opportunity for the re-formulated Western approach to be launched at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington at the end of May. I

/accept



accept, however, that the rest of the Alliance support the American preference for tabling our ideas before the end of this round. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that it would be counterproductive for the UK to stand out alone in continuing to oppose this.

4. I am satisfied that the latest revision of the US ideas, despite some unsatisfactory features, preserves our two essential principles: that before any MBFR Treaty could be signed, the East would have to meet our requirements for:

- a) an exchange of data on combat and combat support forces of all direct participants in the MBFR negotiations, sufficient to fall within a range of Western data estimates and thus to supply the necessary basis of confidence; and
- b) the enhanced package of verification measures to be proposed by the West, fully adequate to ensure that reductions are taken and residual ceilings observed (the detailed elaboration of which within the Alliance is continuing).

On this basis I propose, provided you and Michael Heseltine see no objection, to instruct our delegations in Brussels and Vienna to co-operate with our Allies in tabling a re-formulation of the Western negotiating position on the lines of the attached text, which we shall try if possible to improve still further. NATO's Senior Political Committee will aim to reach agreement on a final version by the weekend; this will be automatically approved by the North Atlantic Council by close of play on Monday, 16 April if no delegation has signified to the contrary. If I have not heard otherwise from your office by noon that day, I



shall therefore assume that you are content and proceed accordingly.

5. I am copying this minute to Michael Heseltine and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 April 1984

11. TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

BEGIN TEXT:

. IN ITS ORAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983, AND IN ITS WRITTEN REPORT TO MINISTERS OF NOVEMBER 3, 1983, THE AD HOC GROUP RECOMMENDED THAT A TIMELY EVALUATION OF THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR WAS NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES IN VIENNA. IN THE MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE NAC IN DECEMBER IT WAS AGREED THAT A REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE.

. ON THE BASIS OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND THE ALLIANCE POSITION, THE COUNCIL HAS DECIDED THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD LONG-STANDING WESTERN MBFR OBJECTIVES, THE AD HOC GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING INITIATIVE TO EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, AND TO NEGOTIATE TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE.

1) THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO MODIFY ITS REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, BY REQUIRING ONLY THAT THERE BE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA, IN A FORMAT TO BE AGREED, SUFFICIENT TO FALL WITHIN A RANGE OF WESTERN DATA ESTIMATES, AND BY REQUIRING SUCH DATA ONLY ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE. THIS OFFER WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON NEW AND SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE EAST IN MEETING WESTERN VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT EFFECTIVE CLARIFICATION OF FORCE STRENGTHS CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH VERIFICATION MEASURES DURING AND AFTER THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

2) THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES OF THE DATA EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 1 ABOVE WOULD BE SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT (A). WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES FOR THE DATA EXCHANGE, AND THE DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES TO BE APPLIED TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTIONS, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DATA EXCHANGE CAN ONLY BE MADE ONCE ACTUAL FIGURES HAVE BEEN TABLED BY BOTH SIDES. THE TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED FOLLOWING

AGREEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND DETERMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DATA EXCHANGE. THE TREATY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE, INTER ALIA: (A) SPECIFICATION OF U.S./SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF C/CS FORCES AND INTERIM C/CS SUBCEILINGS FOR U.S./SOVIET FORCES ONLY; (B) SPECIFICATION OF FINAL NATIONAL CEILINGS ON U.S./SOVIET TOTAL GROUND FORCES (I.E., C/CS AND CSS COMBINED); (C) REQUIREMENT THAT THE U.S./SOVIET REDUCTIONS TO THE SPECIFIED SUBCEILINGS AND NATIONAL CEILINGS TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE EVEN IF NO AGREEMENT IS SUBSEQUENTLY REACHED ON SPECIFYING THE REDUCTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

3) FOLLOWING TREATY SIGNATURE, INITIAL U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS OF 13,000 AND 30,000 RESPECTIVELY WOULD BE TAKEN IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN UNIT CONFIGURATIONS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS. THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN INTERIM RESIDUAL CEILINGS AT THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS ON THE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

4) U.S. AND SOVIET PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE DEVOTED TO CLARIFYING, WITH THE HELP OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION, THE COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF OVERALL FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. AS AN OBVIOUS COROLLARY, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS BUT SUBJECT TO U.S. AND SOVIET SUBCEILINGS FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, WOULD NOT INCREASE THE OVERALL PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES DURING THIS PHASE. (THIS WOULD NOT PREVENT INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS FOR INDIVIDUAL UNITS IF THROUGH COMPENSATION IN OTHER UNITS THE OVERALL CEILINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED.)

5). THE SIZE AND TIMETABLE OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION

WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. THESE REDUCTIONS, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT IN INDIVIDUALS, WOULD LEAD TO INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS ON THE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AT LEVELS TO BE DETERMINED. THESE INTERIM SUBCEILINGS WOULD BE IN EFFECT UNTIL COMPLETION OF ALL SPECIFIED WITHDRAWALS AND SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION THEREOF. IN ADDITION, THE LEVEL OF THE SOVIET AND U.S. PERMANENT NATIONAL CEILINGS TO BE REACHED AT THE COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY.

6). REDUCTIONS BY ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE DETERMINED FOLLOWING THE PHASE TWO VERIFICATION OF THE COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF OVERALL FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

7). TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEILINGS AND INTERIM SUBCEILINGS ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOR GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ROLES THOSE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OR OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE AREA. THESE PROVISIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION.

8). THE CURRENT WESTERN SCHEDULE FOR REDUCTIONS CALLS FOR A SEVEN-YEAR SCHEME WITH ALTERNATE YEARS DEVOTED TO VERIFICATION. FOCUSING SPECIFIED REDUCTIONS ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES MIGHT ALLOW SOME COMPRESSION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

YEAR 1: U.S.-SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF 13,000 RESPECTIVELY IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS.

YEAR 2: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN AN AGREED FORMAT ON THE FORCES OF ALL SIDES, COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL

LEVEL OF GROUND FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD, VERIFICATION OF FORCE STRENGTH BY CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES, AND DETERMINATION OF THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE REQUIRED TO REACH PARITY AT COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF 900,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND 700,000 GROUND FORCES COMBINED.

YEAR 3: REDUCTIONS BY U.S. AND SOVIET UNION IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS TO AN INTERIM SUB-CEILING ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY.

YEAR 4/5: COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS OF ALL FORCES TO PARITY: 900,000 CEILING ON TOTAL FORCES, 700,000 TOTAL GROUND FORCES; NATIONAL CEILINGS ON THE OVERALL FORCES OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION; COMPLETION OF U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF C/CS FORCES TO AGREED LEVELS (TO BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY). (ONCE THE LATTER LEVELS WERE ACHIEVED AND VERIFIED, THEY WOULD CEASE TO BE IN FORCE, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BEING FREE TO CHANGE THE BALANCE BETWEEN C/CS AND OTHER FORCES AS LONG THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL CEILINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED.

9) TO ENSURE THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE FULLY VERIFIABLE UNDER THESE MODIFIED DATA CONDITIONS, THE PARTIES WILL NEED TO AGREE PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE TO THE ENHANCED PACKAGE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES PRESENTED BY THE WEST. THE ENHANCED PACKAGE WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE WEST IS AS SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT (B).

10). ALL ASSOCIATED MEASURES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURE 6 FOR COMBAT SERVE SUPPORT AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WOULD COME IN TO EFFECT UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.

11) ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY OF JULY 1982 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

SHULTZ

Dejance PT 5

Arms Control
MBFR

13 APR 1981





CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

STUDY GROUP OF INCENTIVES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY (NPT)


I have seen a copy of the Foreign Secretary's minute to you of
3 April on this subject, and the Chief Secretary's minute of
6 April commenting on it.

Although the prime interest and responsibility for non-proliferation rests with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my Department has a strong interest in maintenance of a credible world non-proliferation regime to reassure public opinion in this country that the development of civil nuclear electricity and civil nuclear trade does not lead to risks of weapon proliferation. My Department as well as representatives from the nuclear industry participated in the officials group and subscribed to the reports conclusions.

In my view there is a good case for strengthening adherence to the NPT, and the scheme proposed by the official paper seems a promising avenue to explore with other developed countries. I therefore support the concept of such a scheme in principle.

There is however a problem raised by the funding of such a scheme. I infer from the Foreign Secretary's minute that he is not willing to provide funds to cover the scheme from within his existing PES allocation. I conclude therefore that the scheme can only be supported if it can be agreed that new money is provided by the Treasury.


I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, Secretary of State for Defence, Chief Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.


SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

11 April 1984

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11 APR 1984



CONFIDENTIAL



FROM: CHIEF SECRETARY

DATE: 6 April 1984

PRIME MINISTER

INCENTIVES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Geoffrey Howe sent me a copy of his minute to you of 3 April about the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Clearly we all share the aim of wanting to strengthen this important international regime. But it is far from clear that his proposal for a multilateral technical assistance fund would actually help. The proposal relies on an assumption that, if less developed countries are helped with civil nuclear power, they will be more likely to agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. No evidence is produced in support and it seems unlikely. Surely countries decisions on nuclear weapons are more likely to result from assessments of their security interests and the cost and difficulty of acquiring the weapons. (Which might, incidentally, be made easier by technical assistance). My doubt is, therefore, whether this is the kind of problem which we are likely to solve by throwing money at it. Nor do I share the assumption that administering a small fund would be likely to maintain cohesion amongst NPT members: our experience is that dividing up limited finance is a source of friction at international gatherings, particularly where countries (including ourselves) have trading interests to promote.

I would be more convinced by his proposal if the FCO, Department of Energy or the industries which are said to be likely to benefit were offering to find the finance. But the bid for additional funds reveals, I suspect, a lack of conviction behind the proposal.


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Certainly at this very early stage of this year's PES round I could not accept an addition to programme totals for either this proposal or the extension of the current Department of Energy bilateral programme for technical assistance to NPT signatories mentioned in paragraph 9 of the note by officials.

In summary I have reservations about whether the proposed fund would actually achieve the objective intended. But given the importance of the Treaty, I would be prepared to accept their judgement if that was reinforced by a willingness to re-order priorities within their programmes so as to find the funds required without any increase in overall public expenditure.

I am sending a copy of this minute to other members of OD(D) Peter Walker and Sir Robert Armstrong.



PETER REES

(Approved by the Chief Secretary and signed in his absence)

CONCINGIOL

29 APR 1984

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4 5 6 7 8 9



PM/84/59

PRIME MINISTER

Study Group of Incentives for Membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, has an initial life of 25 years and has a provision for regular review every fifth year. The first Review Conference in 1975 agreed a final declaration. The second, in 1980, failed to agree, largely because of the high level of criticism of the Nuclear Weapon States by the developing countries over failure to make progress regarding nuclear disarmament (Article VI), and apparent lack of commitment to share their nuclear expertise (Article IV). Supporters of the Treaty are now concerned lest the Review Conference in 1985 should continue the downward trend, thus making it unlikely that the Treaty would be renewed in 1995.

2. OD(D) at its meeting on 14 December requested the creation of a Study Group to identify options for increasing incentives for parties to the NPT to maintain their support and for non-parties to adhere. The Study Group was formed from experts provided by UKAEA, BNFL and CEGB as well as officials from both wings of FCO and from the Department of Energy. I attach their final report, together with a covering Note by Officials. The Group concluded that the best incentive would be provided by the establishment of a technical assistance fund, with monies provided by developed countries party to the NPT and spent for the benefit of developing country parties. They suggest that \$10 - 15 million a year could be real benefit in

/promoting



promoting the growth of nuclear energy in the third world, as well as valuable projects in areas such as the use of isotopes in medicine and agriculture. Their proposal is that the UK's contribution should be about £250,000 in 1986/87, rising to a maximum of about £500,000 per annum in 1987/88 and thereafter.

3. Through the administration of the fund we will press that to the extent possible our contribution would be spent in the UK. The Study Group reported that the UK is well placed to take advantage of the opportunities offered for exports and for providing training in the UK. We could therefore expect most of our contribution to be spent in the UK with some possibility of a net benefit to the balance of payments. Although the private sector will be among the beneficiaries we do not think that our objective could be satisfactorily attained by trying to persuade them to finance our contribution, as this would be too insecure and unstable a source of funds to permit the kind of project planning over several years which will be necessary if the fund is to be fully effective. Nor is it feasible to try to tap existing multilateral sources of aid funds, such as UNDP or the EC, as all the controlling bodies include non-parties to the NPT who would block the use of their money for assistance to NPT parties only. As the Note by Officials makes clear, discussions are still in progress to identify the most appropriate Vote on which to carry the UK contribution and an appropriate bid for money will need to be made in the current PES exercise. In the view of Treasury officials, the question of which Department would pay the UK contribution and how it would be financed should be settled before any decision in principle is taken to support the fund; they believe that it would be inappropriate to adjust existing public expenditure programmes for the comparatively small sum involved, which should therefore be accommodated within current provision. I hope, nevertheless, that as the



sums involved are indeed small you will be prepared to accept the principle of UK support for an NPT Technical Assistance Fund now. The possibility that any UK ideas might be pre-empted by more ambitious, and therefore more expensive, proposals by other developed countries is a strong argument for pressing forward with our informal deliberations with some speed. I should stress, however, that no soundings will be taken of other Governments until the question of UK finance has been satisfactorily resolved.

4. There are two additional points in the attached papers to which I would like to draw your attention in seeking your approval and that of colleagues. First, the proposal as developed by the Study Group will not result in any major new international bureaucracy, as it is intended that administration of the projects should be put in the hands of the IAEA. Second, the UK contribution would be made contingent upon an acceptable outcome to the Third NPT Review Conference, thus ensuring that we do not spend our money without first achieving our immediate political objective. In deciding what constitutes an acceptable outcome we shall, of course, also need to keep our long term political objectives in view.

5. I am copying this minute and enclosures to the Secretary of State for Defence (as the third member of OD(D)), the Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

3 April 1984

THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Note by Officials

1. At their Meeting on 14 December 1983 (OD(D)(83)1st Meeting) the Sub-Committee agreed that officials should identify options for increasing incentives to states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to maintain their support for the Treaty and for non-states parties to adhere to it, with particular reference to those provisions of the Treaty which enshrine the intention of the parties to co-operate in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world (Article IV of the Treaty). This Note, which has been prepared by an interdepartmental group of officials, presents the results of this further work involving officials and representatives of the UK nuclear industry.

The Problem

2. At the last Review Conference in 1980, the developing countries criticised the Nuclear Weapon States for failing to make progress on nuclear disarmament (Article VI), and the nuclear supplier countries for their apparent lack of commitment under Article IV to make nuclear technology, particularly for power generation, available to developing countries. The Conference failed to agree a final declaration. The maintenance of support for the NPT regime is particularly important in the run-up to the 1985 Review Conference. The Review Conference is not a forum for disarmament negotiations and discussions, and the scope for making progress under Article VI has to be viewed in a wider context than the NPT per se. However, there is scope for making significant and positive progress elsewhere, especially under Article IV. In this regard it is important that nuclear suppliers coordinate and develop a strategy for increasing the real benefits to developing countries of being NPT parties in an effort to counter developing country criticism, as that criticism focuses on alleged restrictions to the supply of technology for electricity generation by nuclear power. A most important

component of such a strategy would be the establishment of a fund providing increased technical cooperation for nuclear power projects for NPT states parties.

3. The Study Group has identified those NPT states parties for which a case could be made for assistance from such a fund, and established that they are almost all countries who are influential in the Group of 77, or who have expressed concern about the fulfilment of Article IV. Officials do not consider that setting up a necessarily modest fund would of itself bring about a revolution in developing country attitudes to the NPT but targetting of assistance on these countries could in the short-term influence them politically to show greater support for the NPT, and in the longer term favourably influence the attitudes to the Treaty of non-NPT states parties.

Types of Assistance

4. Apart from the problem of finance, the strongest impediment to the development of nuclear power in many countries is the lack of adequate intellectual, industrial and regulatory bases. These must be established if nuclear power plants are to be constructed and operated efficiently and safely. Other types of assistance could include aid in planning for the introduction of nuclear power, training staff, developing new regulatory institutions and providing help in studies of the technical and economic feasibility of nuclear power plants.

5. The Study Group has considered the methods by which technical and other assistance could be provided to developing countries who are either signatories to the NPT, or who might be encouraged to become signatories. These states vary from those who have no nuclear facilities or intentions to acquire them in the near future, to those with advanced programmes and the capability to construct nuclear reactors with minimal help. Included in the latter case, are a number of problem non-NPT states parties who are unlikely to be persuaded to adhere to the NPT by increased technical assistance for NPT states parties; sustained diplomatic pressure is more likely to bear fruit. But the majority of

states are not at this advanced stage, and would benefit from, and appreciate, any assistance that was offered.

6. Generalisation as to the types of assistance which might be offered is difficult, as each case would require separate assessment. The Report sets out a number of options of which actual cases are likely to be variants.

Costs

7. Analysis suggests that a fund spending some \$10 - 15m per annum could have considerable political impact by virtue of its size. It would substantially increase the total technical co-operation funds available for nuclear energy development in developing countries (indeed it would add between 30 and 50% to the present technical co-operation fund of the IAEA). It would be possible at that level to mount sensible, continuing programmes in a variety of developing countries so that over a few years all the influential G77 countries would have received assistance in line with their development needs. On the basis of the United Kingdom's existing contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Co-operation fund, it would be reasonable for the British contribution to such a fund to be limited to a maximum of £500,000 a year. It is anticipated that this sum, although relatively modest, will generate substantial consultancy and related business for British nuclear industry and educational establishments. Expenditure would start in 1986/87. Underspensing could be expected during the first year of the fund's operation, because of the time required to commit and spend money on new projects, and the actual United Kingdom contributions in that year could be reduced accordingly. If this scheme is approved then an appropriate budget provision will need to be made. This is being urgently discussed by interested Departments. A bid in the 1984 Public Expenditure Survey for additional provision (new money) of £250,000 in 1986/87 and £500,000 in 1987/88 will be required.

8. If Ministers agree that the establishment of such a fund

would be worthwhile given the likely benefits which would result for the NPT regime, the next steps will be:-

1) To discuss the proposal with other major nuclear suppliers with a view to obtaining maximum support for it. Discussions should begin with the US Government as potentially the most important donor and as the other Western nuclear weapons state party to the NPT - with preoccupations most nearly matching our own relative to the Treaty Review.

2) If adequate support is obtained, then potential donors will have to agree a plan for promoting and developing the initiative, as part of an overall strategy for the 1985 Review Conference.

Alternative Approach

9. An alternative way to address the problems outlined above is for the United Kingdom to increase its bilateral assistance to developing NPT states parties. It seems likely, however, that greater impact on the Group of 77's attitudes at the 1985 NPT Review Conference could be obtained by concerted action by the major nuclear suppliers. It should be noted that the United Kingdom pledged at the last Review Conference an additional \$1 million for funding over 5 years for "footnote A projects" (those approved by IAEA Board of Governors but for which there are no funds available from regular sources). All of this pledge has now been committed on a range of projects in a substantial number of developing NPT states parties. The money has been well spent and appreciated, by the Agency and recipient countries. The Department of Energy, from whose Vote this money has been provided, is proposing that this level of funding on a bilateral basis should continue. It is intended that the UK should obtain maximum political capital at the 1985 Review Conference, by reference to this bilateral assistance in the Ministerial keynote speech and elsewhere. We do not doubt that these funds have helped to demonstrate the UK's readiness to meet its commitments under the NPT and there would be value in its continuation, but we believe that a multilateral approach would

have added effectiveness in obtaining new adherents and maintaining cohesion of parties to the NPT.

10. The establishment of a multinational fund would not replace continued diplomatic efforts to persuade non-parties to adhere to the NPT. In this regard the most valuable targets are France and the PRC. Adherence by Spain would also be of great value if that could be accomplished, particularly given her influence in Latin America.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. The Sub-Committee is invited to agree that:-

1) Officials should now discuss with other major nuclear suppliers, the proposal to establish a new technical cooperation fund discriminating in favour of NPT States parties.

2) If adequate support is obtained then a plan should be agreed with other potential donors for promoting and developing the initiative prior to the 1985 NPT Review Conference.

3) The establishment of such a fund should be made conditional on the developing NPT states parties agreeing to an acceptable Review Conference Final Declaration. If a Final Declaration is not agreed then there would be no fund.

4) Such a fund should be administered by the IAEA with the guidance of a small committee of NPT states parties.

5) The UK contribution to such a fund would start in 1986/87 and rise to a maximum of £500,000 perhaps in 1987/88.

6) If there is inadequate support for this proposal, then it should be dropped.

CONTENTS

- A) CONCLUSIONS
- B) SUMMARY
- C) MAIN REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP
- D) ANNEXES

A. CONCLUSIONS

Size of Fund

1. The Study Group has concluded that a technical cooperation fund with an annual allocation of the order of \$10-15 million, (of which UK share would not exceed \$750,000 (£500,000)) could finance a wide range of projects of real benefit in 20 or more NPT states at different levels of development in the nuclear energy field, over the first five years of its operation starting in 1986/7 at the earliest.

Political Impact

2. It is the Study Group's view that the establishment of such a fund, which will substantially increase the total technical assistance funds available for nuclear energy development in developing countries, could:

- a) have an immediate political impact on those NPT parties who are influential in the G77, and who have expressed concern over the supplier countries' commitment to transfer nuclear technology under Article IV of the Treaty; and
- b) in the longer term, influence politically a significant number of developing NPT non-parties.

3. While the fund should primarily focus on projects in the nuclear energy field, support for nuclear projects in the agricultural and medical fields should also be considered, especially in those NPT states parties (a relatively large group), for whom nuclear energy development is likely to be inappropriate for the foreseeable future. While these states may not be individually politically important, due consideration has also to be given to influencing an adequate number of states through the creation of the fund.

Administration of Fund

4. The fund should be administered by the IAEA, with the guidance of a small committee of NPT states parties, to ensure that it does not appear to be in competition with the Agency's own technical cooperation programme. The Agency's management fee would be such as to ensure that it would incur no extra expense to its regular budget. Details of the mechanism for management of the fund would have to be worked out in collaboration with other potential donors.

B. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON INCENTIVES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Summary

1. A major complaint of NPT and non-NPT developing countries is that nuclear supplier countries have not done enough to meet their commitments under Article IV of the NPT to make nuclear technology available to developing countries (paragraph 3).
2. Greater efforts to assist developing NPT parties with the transfer of non-sensitive nuclear power technology would influence the attitudes to the NPT of a significant number of G77 states (paragraph 4).
3. Consideration should also be given to funding projects in other fields in those countries for whom nuclear energy development is likely to be inappropriate in the foreseeable future (paragraph 5).
4. Development of efficient and safe nuclear power requires the creation first of an adequate intellectual, industrial and regulatory base (paragraphs 6 to 10).
5. Very few developing countries can make an economic case for needing to operate their own plants for uranium enrichment, or reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium (paragraph 11).
6. Eight levels of nuclear development are defined and appropriate types of assistance identified. The cases range from "one" to "eight" where sufficient advancement has been made to enable consideration of the establishment of nuclear power stations. An additional case concerns assistance, appropriate to the prospecting and exploitation of uranium deposits (paragraphs 12 to 14).
7. For some developing countries nuclear power may be an attractive option, while in others the case may not be so apparent. Studies are required to assist countries in their assessment of this, and to ascertain whether there is scope for funding projects in the medical

/and

and agricultural fields (paragraph 15).

8. A fund of \$15 million per annum, equivalent to more than half the present IAEA technical cooperation fund, would have a significant impact merely by its size. It could fund a wide range of projects in over 20 countries over a five-year period (paragraphs 16 and 18).

9. UK contribution to such a fund is likely to be \$0.5 to 0.75 million (c. £0.5 million maximum) per annum (paragraph 17).

10. Flexible administration of the fund will be required to enable allocation of money for projects in the right target countries (paragraph 19).

11. IAEA should administer projects financed by the fund. An appropriate management fee for this service should be charged to the fund (paragraph 20).

12. UK has the technical resources to cope with any additional demands for training of foreign personnel, and for consultants, that may arise after the establishment of the fund (paragraph 21).

C. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON INCENTIVES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE
NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. This report is presented in response to the request from OD(D). The Terms of Reference of the Group and its membership are set out at Annex 1 and 2 respectively.
2. The report analyses the countries who could be the target of further initiatives, the types of initiative, the expected cost of different levels of aid and the overall size of fund required to be politically influential. A brief discussion of the availability of physical resources in the UK is presented.

TARGET

3. A major complaint, undermining adhesion to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is that not enough has been done by the main nuclear supplier countries to meet their commitment under Article IV of the NPT, to make nuclear technology available to developing countries. The grievance is expressed most strongly in relation to technology for power generation. Developing countries can in many cases more readily use nuclear technology in medicine, agriculture and industry, and the Technical Co-operation Programme of the IAEA goes a long way to meet these needs.
4. The Study Group categorised countries according to their membership or not of the NPT and whether or not they are already embarked on nuclear programmes (see annexes 3-11). There are a few developing countries which are parties to the NPT and are embarking on nuclear development programmes, and a greater number of developing countries which have realistic aspirations to acquiring nuclear power who could benefit from further assistance. There was in fact a notable similarity between this group and those NPT states parties who are influential in the G77, or who have expressed concern about the fulfilment of Article IV of the NPT. If assistance were initially targetted on these countries, there is a good prospect that they could be

influenced politically in the short term to show greater support for the NPT.

5. While such a fund should mainly focus on projects in the nuclear energy field, consideration should also be given to supporting nuclear programmes in the agricultural and medical fields, especially in the relatively large group of NPT states parties, for whom nuclear energy development is likely to be inappropriate in the foreseeable future. While individually these states may not be politically important, due consideration has to be given to influencing an adequate number of states through the creation of the fund.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE

6. Apart from the problem of finance, the strongest impediment to the development of nuclear power in many countries is the lack of an adequate intellectual, industrial and regulatory base. This must be established, if nuclear power plants are to be constructed and operated efficiently and safely. Some developing countries have a significant number of nationals qualified in nuclear science, but almost invariably they lack people and organisations capable of:

- a) planning the introduction of nuclear power;
- b) assisting in construction, operation and maintenance;
- c) providing components, or the goods and services needed to support operations;
- d) providing quality assurance, licensing, and safety and environmental monitoring.

PLANNING

7. The successful introduction of nuclear power is a highly complex process involving many developments, other than the building of a nuclear reactor. Planning for it is therefore also highly complex. Many developing countries lack even the

expertise to assess whether or when they could realistically use nuclear power. Provision of assistance with energy planning might show that some countries' hopes to develop nuclear energy are unrealistic and hence remove their grounds for complaints over Article IV. In other countries such assistance would be a valued step along the development road.

TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT

8. There is a large requirement for training staff in nuclear technology, including training of reactor operators, technicians and engineers for industrial support, quality control, environmental and safety monitoring, and administrators and engineers for regulatory and planning functions. Assistance would be given in planning, staffing and equipping training establishments. There is frequently a desire by developing countries to acquire research reactors for such establishments, but there is rarely a real need for this. Often a much cheaper radiation source would suffice.

REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS

9. Even those developing countries which have already started nuclear power programmes have difficulty in setting up organisations to licence operations and assure high safety and environmental standards. The need for such bodies is generally recognised, and the developing countries seek advice on how to run these activities. Assistance could be given in planning the development of new institutions, reorienting inadequate ones already in place and in training staff. Again this is not a very costly business. Provision of such assistance would be beneficial to developed countries, for if developing countries embarked on nuclear programmes without being able to assure high standards of safety and environmental protection, there would be a serious risk of losing public acceptance of nuclear power in developed countries.

10. It is not envisaged that new funds would be large enough

sensibly to assist directly in the purchase of power plants. Funding for this will need to be provided by commercial banks, and aid agencies, with backing from export credit agencies. Backing from these bodies will not be forthcoming except for well presented proposals. A new fund could assist by providing studies of technical and economic feasibility and, if necessary, environmental impact statements.

PROLIFERATION SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY

11. Some countries persistently complain that they are not allowed access to proliferation-sensitive technologies, such as that for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium. Very few developing countries can make an economic case for needing to operate their own plants for these purposes. Those countries whose state of development lends strongest support to their claims are not for the most part parties to the NPT (India, Argentina, Brazil and Pakistan). There is, however, no overall benefit to be gained from offering assistance in these sensitive technologies, as these countries have strong political objections to the NPT and their behaviour leads to suspicions that they would misuse assistance on sensitive technology.

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES

12. The Study Group considered the methods by which technological 'aid' in the areas covered in paragraphs 6 to 10 above, could be provided to non-weapon states which are either signatories to the NPT, or are to be encouraged to become signatories.

These states fall into a wide range of nuclear 'advancement' ranging from those which have no facilities or immediate intentions, to those with advanced programmes and the capability to order and manage the construction of a nuclear power plant as an informed customer, with the minimum of outside help. In the latter cases, and within the scope of funding presently proposed for incentives, there is little point in offering technical aid,

and political pressure is probably the best course. However, the majority of states are not at this advanced stage and would benefit from, and appreciate, assistance within the scale envisaged (see annexes 3-12).

TYPES OF AID OR ASSISTANCE

13. Generalisations are difficult, as each case would require individual assessment and agreement on a costed package. Nevertheless, the Study Group found it useful to consider a number of discrete cases of which actual cases were likely to be variants.

Case 1 Where no real progress has been made towards nuclear advancement or education. It is assumed however that institutions of higher education teaching science, engineering or related subjects exist. In this case the most advantageous aid would be education overseas and this could be provided by meeting the costs of graduates in a related subject studying for higher degrees in nuclear subjects.

Cost: Inclusive of all expenses could amount to £100K per student for complete PhD course. To make a noticeable impact 3 students studying in parallel would be a minimum.

Case 2 Where some progress has been made and a university department teaching nuclear subjects has already been set up or the nucleus of a research organisation exists, (eg Sri Lanka). Three alternatives are possible:-

(a) Provision of specialists together with very basic equipment to improve the teaching of nuclear subjects in a university, either as part of a science course, or ultimately as a specialisation or second degree. This activity could be strengthened by an interaction with a

UK university in carrying out collaborative programmes.

- (b) To provide specialist training for say 3 people over a period of one year. The training should be designed to encourage advances in the use of nuclear and allied scientific technology. Where specifically requested, and considered appropriate, training could be provided in the application of isotopes to medicine, agriculture, environment etc.
- (c) Where appropriate a specialist should be trained to be capable of carrying out energy assessments and needs, on a national basis, and of making first order estimates for future energy planning.

Cost: An expenditure of £500K/annum should establish a reasonable programme.

Case 3 Where the objectives of Case 2 have already been achieved and a nucleus of trained people exist (eg Nigeria) then, as a means of advancing the teaching, more sophisticated equipment with a specialist staff could be provided. In this category a small experimental assembly could be considered, either a graphite stack or a water moderated system. Such a facility would enable practical work to be carried out in basic nuclear physics. At this stage, (or in Case 4) training should also be provided in Engineering covering such topics as Systems Planning, Design, Quality Assurance etc.

Cost: £500K/annum over 2-3 years, with fuel, associated equipment, instruction and training.

Case 4 Where a nuclear research centre already exists, there

is often a desire to obtain a research reactor. This in terms of a reactor in the MW power range is to be discouraged, as it involves considerable numbers of staff and expertise to operate safely and efficiently. Many countries were encouraged in this direction in earlier years and there are numerous cases where reactors are now little more than prestige symbols. Where sufficient progress has been made and the aim is ultimately to develop a nuclear power programme, then most of the nuclear disciplines can be practised using a teaching or university type reactor, (eg Uruguay). This type of reactor is also capable of producing short-lived isotopes, impossible to import but of great advantage in medical diagnostics and therapy.

Cost: £5M over 3-4 years and inclusive of all buildings, services, tuition and initial operation.

Case 5 Where a small research reactor has already been purchased the attachment of experts in reactor utilisation would be worth considering (eg Malaysia). This would have the double effect of advancing the technology in the recipient country and enabling an oversight to be obtained of the safety procedures being practised. The aim would be to use the reactor as a focal point for the integration of a national nuclear programme, with particular emphasis on training.

Further aid could be provided by either supplying equipment to improve the reactor utilisation, eg isotope production. Where applicable, aid could be used to assist the local staff to manufacture equipment for themselves.

Cost: A reasonable programme for this support would amount to £1M/annum.

Case 6 In a case where sufficient progress has been made for a nuclear power programme to be contemplated, then the scope for aid is very large (eg Bangladesh). In the main this will consist of advanced training beyond university courses with a more practical, on the job focus. It can also be complemented by the attachment of experts to lead or advise local teams in setting up and carrying out the infrastructure tasks leading to a nuclear programme, eg safety and regulatory aspects, quality assurance, health physics, etc. In all of this the initial aim should be not to create particular pockets of specialisation, but rather to provide the background so that the recipients become "knowledgeable customers" capable of negotiating with reactor vendors.

Cost: £1M plus.

Case 7 As a follow up to Case 6 or where a good measure of technical competence is evident (eg Egypt or Mexico); there might be provision of sufficient experts to lead or assist in carrying out a feasibility study for a nuclear power station; alternatively, carrying out a complete survey and study. This would cover such aspects as site assessment, environmental impact, existing distribution network(s) evaluation, degree of national involvement, manpower planning, costs etc.

Cost: £1M plus/annum over 2 years.

Case 8 This case lies at the extreme of the spectrum. Sufficient advancement has been made to contemplate a nuclear power programme and to invite bids from international vendors (eg South Korea). However, even in this instance wide areas exist where training and the attachment of experts would be welcomed across the whole range of disciplines. Of

particular importance in this case is training and/or expert leadership in project management. This is a complex problem when applied to nuclear installations because of the multiplicity of disciplines and specialised requirements.

The attachment of experts also has the advantage of influencing thinking and ensuring that the necessary systems are set up and that acceptable standards are applied to safety and related aspects.

Cost: £500K would make an appreciable impact.

Case 9 This is a special case primarily intended for states which are unlikely to contemplate nuclear energy research or utilisation programmes in the foreseeable future, but which have known reserves of or are exploring for uranium and can therefore be regarded as subject to influence, (eg a number of African States).

'Aid' can be provided in a number of ways:-

- Overseas education in advanced mining techniques.
- Resource surveys. (Prospecting).
- Ore recovery feasibility studies.
- Economics of mining studies.
- Mining logistics (Transport).
- Ore dressing and processing.
- Establishment of an analytical laboratory.

The activities listed, other than education, can be undertaken either in total or in part. In the latter event national resources can be augmented by 'aid', personnel and/or equipment.

Cost: £250K/annum over 2-4 years would make a considerable impact.

Training figures largely in the cases considered and is the area in which most effort should be concentrated. Most nations have an understandable desire to achieve standards which ensure a large measure of independence, but there are obvious advantages in ensuring that such independence is based on acceptable standards and practices.

14. If the means could be found to launch several of the above schemes each year for the next decade it would scarcely be possible for the G77 to make supportable claims that Article IV was being ignored. Targetting of the initial schemes on moderate countries influential in the G77 and having serious concerns over Article IV would be feasible and particularly valuable. There would be no question of undermining non-proliferation policies.

DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS

15. Nuclear power, compared to coal, gas and oil, has lower fuel costs, but requires large volumes of capital for the construction of power plants, together with extensive and sophisticated technical and managerial support. There are some developing countries which are consuming, or will later this century consume, large volumes of relatively expensive hydrocarbon generated power and are capable of developing the necessary technical and managerial support. They may therefore find nuclear power an economically attractive option. In other countries it would not be economically appropriate to embark upon a nuclear power programme. Nevertheless a decision to do so might be taken for other reasons. If a country does go forward with nuclear plans it could reasonably do so on the basis of a very small cadre of people trained to become intelligent buyers of turn-key equipment. Many countries may prefer however to develop a greater involvement in the management and support of a nuclear programme. In these cases there could be spin off in terms of indigenous scientific and technical manpower, although this is unlikely to compensate for any basically incorrect economic choice. Assessment studies financed from the fund could be useful in demonstrating which countries would benefit from nuclear energy development. Such studies could also ascertain

whether there was scope for funding nuclear projects in the medical and agricultural fields.

SIZE OF THE FUND

16. The Technical Co-operation fund of the IAEA has a target for contributions of \$22.5 m in 1984. In addition some member states provide bilateral aid which is administered on their behalf by the IAEA totalling about \$6 m. It appears likely, therefore, that a new fund disposing of some \$10m-15m a year would create a significant impact merely by its size, and would be able to support a sizeable number of programmes of the types discussed in paragraphs 12-15 above.

UK CONTRIBUTION

17. It is our intention to obtain the full support of other major nuclear supplier countries for the fund. If we can do this then our contribution to the fund, based on the present formula for contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, would amount to about 5% of the total, say \$0.5 million to \$0.75 million per annum.

ALLOCATION OF THE FUND

18. The Study Group has looked at ways in which the fund might be allocated, and has concluded that over 20 countries could be effectively assisted over the first five years of its operation starting in 1986/87 without overspending the total allocation. For example, an expenditure of \$1.4 million plus per annum over two years on a survey and feasibility study for a nuclear power station, would have a significant political impact on the Egyptian Government. Expenditure of \$0.7 million per annum over two or three years on assisting the development of a nuclear research centre, could have a comparable impact on the Nigerian Government. There will be an underspending during the first year or so of the fund's operation, because of the time required to commit and spend money on new projects.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

19. Two groups of NPT parties present special political problems. The first group, namely Iran, Iraq and Libya, covers those parties whose long term nuclear intentions are suspect. The second group, eg Afghanistan and Vietnam, covers those parties which the UK does not aid bilaterally for political reasons. We shall need to bear this in mind, when we come to consider mechanisms for the administration of the fund with other nuclear suppliers, so that adequate flexibility is built into the system.

MANAGEMENT OF FUND

20. It is important that the fund should not appear to be in competition with the IAEA or in any way reduce the importance of that organisation. A complete new structure to operate the fund would not be justified, and it would seem sensible to ask the IAEA to administer it as a service to the members under Article 111, A1 of the IAEA Statute, perhaps with the guidance of a small committee elected by the NPT parties. The administrative expenses of the IAEA could be reimbursed by means of a management fee on each project, and this money could be handled in accordance with Article XIV, B2. Details of the mechanism for managing the fund will have to be worked out in collaboration with other potential donors.

USE OF UK RESOURCES

21. An alternative to participation in an international exercise would be for the UK to increase its bilateral contribution to assistance for NPT parties. It seems likely, however, that greater impact on G77 behaviour at the NPTRC could be obtained if there is a concerted effort by industrialised countries. This could dilute any political or commercial benefits arising for the UK and it would be important to try to obtain some commercial benefit by ensuring that a reasonable share of the fund was spent on British services. In the short term there might be difficulties in providing certain types of

assistance eg in setting up analogies to the NII. In general, however, the UK disposes of manpower whose skills in nuclear engineering could be turned to good account in assisting developing countries. There is not a great surplus of places for training in nuclear matters in the UK but the UKAEA, the CEGB, the universities and polytechnics could between them accommodate a significant number of trainees. There is no shortage of UK consultants competent to assist with planning and feasibility studies.

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE STUDY GROUP ON INCENTIVES FOR
MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

'To identify options for increasing incentives for parties to the NPT to maintain their support and for non-parties to adhere, with particular regard to Article IV of the Treaty, (which enshrines the intention of the parties to cooperation in application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 'with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world').

Such options should be examined for:

- diplomatic impact;
- scientific and technical soundness;
- developmental value; and
- cost, including source of finance.

The Group should report to Ministers by mid-February 1984.'

MEMBERSHIP OF THE STUDY GROUP

The following participated in the three meetings of the Study Group:-

Dr R D Marsh	Head of Security and Safeguards, British Nuclear Fuels Plc
Mr O Plail	Consultant, Central Electricity Generating Board
Mr A Weaving	Commercial Advisor, Central Electricity Generating Board
Mr F Chadwick	Principal Officer, Commercial Policy and External Relations, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Mr T G Smith	Head of Overseas Projects Branch, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Mr G Stevens	Head, AE2 Division, Department of Energy
Dr R Horscroft	Head, DI52, Ministry of Defence
Mr G Armstrong	Aid Policy Department, Overseas Development Administration
Mr I R Kenyon	Head, Nuclear Energy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr P Gregory-Hood	Nuclear Energy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr D Gordon-Macleod	Nuclear Energy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DEVELOPING NPT COUNTRIES ALREADY ENGAGED IN
NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984 ^X		EXISTING REACTOR(S)	FORM OF AID ^Z
			FUNDED (\$)	FOOTNOTE (a) ^Y (\$)		
Egypt	/	/	709,800	388,400	RR	7
Mexico	/	/	172,900	108,800	PR	7
Philippines	/	/	136,000	71,400	PR	7
Romania	/	/	/	/	PR	8
South Korea	/	/	304,600	82,000	PR	8 & 9
Yugoslavia	/	/	274,400	446,600	PR	7

X Figures in columns 4 and 5 indicate the amount of aid provided and/or required for nuclear energy projects; ticks indicate that aid has been offered in other fields.

Y A footnote 'a' project is one that has been approved by the Agency's Board of Governors for implementation by the Agency for which assistance is provided only in substitution for other assistance which it is planned to provide to the Member State in question or if additional contributions from Member States of funds or services become available.

Z See paragraphs 12 and 13 of paper.

DEVELOPING NPT COUNTRIES CONSIDERING
NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984		EXISTING REACTOR(S)	FORM OF AID ^Z
			FUNDED (\$)	FOOTNOTE (a)		
Bangladesh	/		10,000	81,000		6 & 9
Indonesia	/		229,000	0	RR	5 & 9
Iran	/		59,400	0	RR	5
Iraq	/	/	45,000	0	RR	5
Libya	/		172,600	0	RR	5 & 9
Peru	/	/	138,600	/	RR	4
Sri Lanka			96,200	0		2
Syria			196,600	0	RR	2 & 9
Turkey			42,800	0	RR	6 & 9
Venezuela			150,000		/	3

TABLE 1

DEVELOPING NPT COUNTRIES WITH LONGER TERM
PROSPECTS OR DECLARED INTENTION OF NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT

ANNEX 5

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984		FORM OF AID
			FUNDED	FOOTNOTE A \$	
Malaysia		/	19,800	21,600	5 & 9
Morocco			58,600		2 & 9
Nigeria	/	/	39,600		2
Panama	/		19,800		2 & 9
Thailand			16,000	64,400	5 & 9
Tunisia			/	/	2
Uganda					
Uruguay			19,800		4
Vietnam			/	/	4
Zaire		/	/	/	4

TABLE 2

DEVELOPING NPT COUNTRIES WITH EXPLOITABLE OR SPECULATIVE
URANIUM DEPOSITS

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984		FORM OF AID
			FUNDED \$	FOOTNOTE A \$	
Bolivia			6,600	/	4 & 9
Botswana					9
Burundi					9
Central African Republic					9
Chad					9
Ecuador			52,800		9
Gabon					9
Ghana			/	/	9
Jordan			19,800		2 & 9
Madagascar			25,000		9
Rwanda					9
Somalia					9
Suriname					9
United Rep of Cameroon					9
Zaire			/	/	9

DEVELOPING NPT COUNTRIES WITH NO DECLARED
 NUCLEAR POLICY

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984		FORM OF AID
			FUNDED \$	FOOTNOTE A \$	
AFGHANISTAN			/		1
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA					1
BAHAMAS					1
BARBADOS					1
BENIN					1
CAPE VERDE					1
CONGO					1
COSTA RICA					1
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA					1
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN					1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC			/		1
EL SALVADOR			/		1
ETHIOPIA					1
FIJI					1
GAMBIA					1
GRENADA					1
GUATEMALA			99,600	/	1
GUINEA BISSAU					1
HAITI					1
HONDURAS					1
IVORY COAST			/		1
JAMAICA			93,200		4
KAMPUCHEA DR					2
KENYA			/	/	1
LAO PEOPLES' DR					1

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984		FORM OF AID
			FUNDED \$	FOOTNOTE A \$	
LEBANON			/		1
LESOTHO					1
LIBERIA					1
MALDIVES					1
MALI			/	/	1
MAURITIUS					1
MONGOLIA					1
NAURU					1
NEPAL					1
NICARAGUA			/		
PAPUA NEW GUINEA					
PARAGUAY			/		1
SAMOA					1
SENEGAL			/	/	1
SIERRA LEONE			/		1
SINGAPORE			/		1
SOLOMON ISLANDS					1
ST LUCIA					1
SUDAN			/	/	1
SWAZILAND					1
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO					1
TOGO					1
TONGA					1
TUVALU					
YEMEN PDR					

DEVELOPING NON-NPT PARTIES ALREADY ENGAGED IN NUCLEAR
POWER PROGRAMMES

Country	Serious Concern Over Article IV	Influential in G77	IAEA Technical Assistance* 1984		Existing Reactor(s)
			Funded \$	Footnote A \$	
Argentina	✓	✓	0	0	PR
Brazil	✓	✓	175,600	46,000	PR
India	✓	✓	0	0	PR
Pakistan	✓	✓	167,800	✓	PR

TABLE 1 DEVELOPING NON-NPT COUNTRIES CONSIDERING NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

			IAEA Technical Assistance 1984		
Country	Serious concern over Article IV	Influential in G77	Funded \$	Footnote A \$	Form of Aid
Chile		✓	41,800	115,200	7

TABLE 2 DEVELOPING NON-NPT COUNTRIES WITH LONGER TERM PROSPECTS OR DECLARED INTENTION OF NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT

			IAEA Technical Assistance 1984		
Country	Serious concern over Article IV	Influential in G77	Funded \$	Footnote A \$	Form of Aid
Algeria		✓	✓		3
Kuwait					2
Oman					1
Saudi Arabia	✓	✓	✓		3 - 9
UAE					1

TABLE 3 DEVELOPING NON-NPT PARTIES WITH EXPLOITABLE URANIUM DEPOSITS

			IAEA Technical Assistance 1984		
Country	Serious concern over Article IV	Influential in G77	Funded \$	Footnote A \$	Form of Aid
Angola					9
Colombia*			✓		9
Malawi					9
Mozambique					9
Niger			38,200		9
Zambia					9
Zimbabwe		✓	39,600		9

* Signed but not ratified NPT

DEVELOPING NON-NPT PARTIES WITH NO DECLARED NUCLEAR POLICY

COUNTRY	SERIOUS CONCERN OVER ARTICLE IV	INFLUENTIAL IN G77	IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 1984		FORM OF AID
			FUNDED \$	FOOTNOTE A \$	
ALBANIA					1
BAHRAIN					1
BELIZE					1
BHUTAN					1
BURMA					
COMOROS					1
DEMOCRATIC PR OF KOREA					1
DJIBOUTI					1
DOMINICA					1
EQUATORIA GUINEA					1
GUINEA					1
GUYANA					1
KIRIBATI					1
KOREA DEM PR					1
MAURITANIA					1
MONTSERRAT					1
QATAR					1
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE					1
ST CHRISTOPHER NEVIS					1
ST VINCENT & GRENADINES					1
SEYCHELLES					1
TANZANIA					1
VANUATU					1
WESTERN SAMOA					1
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC					1

COUNTRIES INFLUENTIAL IN G77

NPT PARTIES

Colombia
Egypt
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
Yugoslavia
Zaire

NPT NON-PARTIES

Algeria
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
India
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Zimbabwe

SUMMARY OF CURRENT POSITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
PROGRAMME IN G77

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh has opted for a plan involving construction of a 300MWe nuclear plant at RUPA for operation by 1990 and for which NNC made a representation on MAGNOX to the Bangladeshis in 1981. Competitors include West German and French organisations. Reports indicate that Bangladesh manufacturers have capability to produce 30% of plant. A safeguards agreement between IAEA and People's Republic of Bangladesh has received approval from Board of Governors. Unconfirmed reports in 1983 stated that Bangladesh intended to propose to Islamic conference that there should be set up an Islamic Nuclear Bank as a first step towards formulating an energy policy for all Islamic countries.

Bangladesh has entered into nuclear co-operation agreements with Canada, Pakistan, France, Italy and Germany. It is anticipated that the Iriga MK II now under construction will become operational 1984/85.

EGYPT

Eight nuclear plants are envisaged by the year 2000. Various bilateral co-operation agreements have been signed with the USA, UK, France, West Germany, Canada, Belgium and Sweden. Financial agreements to aid energy projects have been signed with Canada. The Nuclear Power Plant Authority (NPPA) under the Ministry of Electricity and Energy is responsible for the establishment and management of power plants and the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority currently has licensing responsibilities. Tenders, including proposed financial arrangements, for the first two of the proposed units at El-Dabaa have been received from Framatom/Nira, KWU, Westinghouse/Mitsubishi and also Overseas Bechtel. Motor Columbus are retained as consultants by NPPA and are assisting with the assessment of the tenders and the result will probably be announced

in April/May 1984. Following the issue of the invitations to tender the Egyptians agreed that tenderers could quote for only one unit should they be unable to arrange financing for two. The UKAEA together with BEI, Mouchel and ANS has submitted consultancy services proposals to both NPPA and EAEA. British Council has training agreement with the Electricity Authority which is responsible for conventional plant. A member of the UKAEA is shortly to visit Egypt on behalf of IAEA to provide quality assurance advice.

INDONESIA

Official commissioning by the Indonesian President of the Atomic Energy Research and Irradiator Unit Operation Complex took place in December 1983. The IU was obtained with UNDP assistance and is intended for utilisation in development programmes in agriculture, preservation processes, hydrology, health. Research agreements for its use have been made with other members of SE Asia including India and Sri Lanka. In the first half of the 1960s the Centre for Nuclear Materials Exploration and Processing of the National Atomic Energy Agency, Jakarta, embarked upon a programme of uranium exploration surveys. Assistance has been given by the IAEA and work on ore processing has been undertaken in NMEP's laboratory. This work is particularly significant in view of the National Atomic Energy Agency's intention to set up a 25MW reactor which has nuclear fuel production facility. Another area in which the National Atomic Energy Agency has been concentrating effort is the Research Centre for Nuclear Materials and Instrumentation. With co-operation of Interatom a 30MW reactor is under construction at PUSPITEK Centre, Serpong. NIRA (Italy) is involved in this project. Harwell has submitted bids for experimental equipment (rigs) for the reactor. A report from Post in November 1983 said that the Director-General of BATAN had stated long-term plans include a 600MWe station for construction 1990s. Various reports indicate that assistance may be sought by the Indonesians in areas concerned with safety, training, waste management.

IRAN

Reports on current situation of nuclear energy programme are confused; in 1979 the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran said the programme would be confined to a 30MWe research reactor and that all work on the incomplete Bushehr plant would cease. Recently the AEOI senior management was reported to have said that the Bushehr plant would not be completed, although its suppliers KWU have not commented upon this. The AEOI programme of uranium exploration is reported to be continuing.

IRAQ

Iraq's nuclear research programme is centred at Tuwaitha Research Centre, set up under the terms of the French/Iraqi collaboration agreement of 1975. Separate storage facilities for natural and depleted uranium exist at this Centre under IAEA safeguards. Although there have been various reports that the French will rebuild the TAMMUZ I reactor destroyed by Israeli bombs in 1981 this seems unlikely until the Iran/Iraq war and the problems in the Lebanon are resolved. During a visit to the UK in December 1981, Dr Al Kital of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission showed considerable interest in consultancy services which might be available from the UK but subsequently he has informed the UK that the inhibitions of the current political situation prevent the development of nuclear energy plans in Iraq. Future proposals include: hydro power together with irrigation plant and pump storage. State Organisation for Electricity (the State Electricity Authority) is reported to have long-term plans for 3 x 1200MW thermal power stations but these will probably depend upon financial arrangements. The existing 320MW diesel station at Daura will be doubled. Iraq has an agreement with Brazil on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

LIBYA

Libya relies heavily upon gas turbine plant. Development of combined power/desalination complexes are being considered. Plans for a 440MW nuclear reactor (Soviet built) have been postponed. In August 1978 it was reported that Libya was interested in discussions

about possible nuclear energy programme. Libya has an agreement with Brazil on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

MEXICO

Continual deterioration of Mexican economy inevitably affected their proposed nuclear programme of 22,000MWe nuclear capacity by the year 2000. The current situation is that fuel-loading for the first two BWR units, total capacity 1300MW, scheduled originally for start-up mid 1977 at Laguna Verde, is now due in 1988. In 1982 bids were received for their second station but these plans were subsequently postponed and the bids unopened. Mexico is a founder member of Treaty of Tlatelolco. Recently a Mexican official announced priorities will be concentrated on development of oil and gas-fired plant and on hydro schemes. There are also reports that a revised energy plan soon to be announced will allow for 5000MWe nuclear capacity. A senior member of CFE recently was reported to have said that construction of a second nuclear station may commence in 1987. Confirmation of this is awaited.

PERU

The IAEA has sponsored Peru's nuclear energy programme with a grant of \$2M (1977) and Argentina agreed in 1977 to build Peru's first reactor - a 10MW experimental reactor capable of producing radioisotopes for medical and agricultural use. In 1977 there was also an agreement with the French for the provision of nuclear technology, laboratories and training. A report from Post states this reactor should become operational in 1984. Co-operation agreements also exist with Argentina and the US, whilst with India there is agreement for co-operation in uses of nuclear materials in agriculture. Discussions have taken place with the FRG about possible co-operation and it is known that Peru would like some sort of co-operation with the UK, including training. Other areas in which the Peruvian authorities seek assistance are nuclear safety and analytical techniques.

PHILIPPINES

In 1968 - entered agreement with the US for the purchase of 2 nuclear plants and long term supply of uranium. In 1979 agreement was reached for the purchase of 2 x 620MW PR units from Westinghouse for the Bataan nuclear scheme. The scheme has suffered from considerable delays relating to pricing and safety questions. Completion is now expected in 1985 with financial assistance from the US Export Import Bank and other (mainly Japanese) sources. The station will provide approximately 9% of the Philippines' total generating capacity.

Although there is a cleared site for a second 620MW plant, an official has claimed that no more plants will be built for at least ten years. Several disadvantages in nuclear development have come to light: electricity demand growth is less than was predicted in 1974, and more geothermal and hydro resources have been discovered, thus reducing the need for nuclear power; it is also thought that a 620MW unit will put strain on the underdeveloped national grid. It is understood that PAEC (Philippine Atomic Energy Commission) intends to set up a national system of accounting and control for nuclear materials and also to study systems for risk analysis.

ROMANIA

Reports were received in March 1982 that new plans concerning construction of nuclear power plants were included in the 1981-1990 energy programme. This stated that 5 x 600MW units would be constructed at Cernavoda, 3 x 1000MW units at Moldavia (one for commissioning in 1990) and one (?) in Transylvania.

The Canadians were supplying CANDUs at Cernavoda but severe Romanian financial restrictions led to the Canadians suspending drawings from the \$1 billion credit facilities until the Canadian suppliers were paid for services already provided. However in September 1983 it was announced that credit was again available and in November 1983 Romania was reported to have almost completed the exterior construction for the two Cernavoda CANDUs with site preparation for the third under way. In September 1982 agreement was reached with

the Soviet Union for the supply of 3 x 1000PWRs. Economic problems were reported to be the reasons for this turn to Moscow. The USSR is to provide enriched uranium to Romania (under the IAEA agreement) for use in a TRIGA Research Reactor - experimental fuel elements in a CANDU type reactor. Romania's nuclear programme forecasts 4500MW by 1990 to be doubled by 1995.

Under construction at August 1983:

Romania 1 (Olt) PWR 440MW construction commenced 1976

Romania 2 (Cernavoda) PHWR 679MW construction commenced 1980

Romania 3 (Cernavoda) PHWR 679MW construction commenced 1982.

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's first nuclear plant, KORI I, a PWR (Westinghouse/GEC) has been operational since 1978. Since then KORI II and the third plant at Wolsung, a CANDU, have also been commissioned in record time. Six other PWRs are under construction and a contract for the two most recently ordered was awarded to Framatom/Alsthom Atlantique. However, recent reports indicate that the construction schedule for these six will be delayed for some nine months and that plans to commence construction of the tenth and eleventh will be delayed until April 1986. This decision stems from the slowing down in South Korea's economic growth and consequent decrease in power demand. Nonetheless South Korea still plans a total of 12 units to supply 41.5% of estimated 27,000MW peak load in 1991. Problems which will be encountered may be lack of funding and also the need to resolve waste disposal situation.

SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka has entered into a safeguards agreement with IAEA - awaiting entry to come into force. Sri Lanka relies heavily on hydro plant with back-up from gas turbines. Because of the uncertainty of hydro power Sri Lanka is considering nuclear energy. The installation of a research reactor with plans for commercial nuclear plant by 1995 have been proposed. During visit the head of Sri Lankan Atomic Energy Authority asked for training assistance and

that visit also resulted in a UK company agreed to counter submitting a proposal for a research reactor. The Sri Lankan authorities appear to recognise that an increasing application of nuclear techniques in sectors such as agriculture, medicine, industry, etc requires the development of a local core of trained nuclear scientists. Sri Lanka has research agreement with Indonesia.

SYRIA

In May 1983 Syria announced that they had agreed with the USSR that there would be a joint feasibility study for Syria's first nuclear power station, probably a 600MW plant to come on line by 1995. This followed the cancellation of another agreement with Sofratom. Previously assistance had also been sought from the Belgians and from India. (Reports of officials at the 1983 New Delhi Conference claimed that several international bids for nuclear plants were receiving consideration.) During discussions both in the UK and Syria, consideration was given to provision of assistance with training and regulatory and safety procedures.

TURKEY

Two sites for two nuclear stations have been selected at Akkuyu and Sinop and the country's fifth five-year plan (1984-1989) allows for construction of the first station to commence during that time. KWU of West Germany is regarded as the strongest contender in the bids received from international companies for the construction of this first plant.

The President (Mr Kenan Evren) has committed the country to \$2.6bn spending on a nuclear energy programme. It is said that US, Canadian and West German companies will participate and that negotiations will commence during this year.

VENEZUELA

Whilst Venezuela has vast oil reserves and enormous hydro-electricity potential she would like to reduce reliance on oil

as primary fuel. In July 1979 an agreement was reached whereby oil exports to Brazil would be doubled in return for nuclear technology and assistance. There is also a five-year accord with Argentina for co-operation to include research, planning, technology, construction, development and use of experimental reactors. An agreement in 1974 with Italian and Swiss organisations also provides for consultancy on nuclear engineering.

There appears to be no immediate intention by Venezuela to embark upon a nuclear energy programme. However, there was considerable interest shown by them in using a system based upon Magnox design for extraction of heavy crude.

It is also known that the Venezuelan Government is establishing a Nuclear Research Centre, mainly for improving agricultural productivity.

COMADIN (Venezuelan National Council for the Development of the Nuclear Industry) is assessing the advantages of setting up a uranium exploration.

YUGOSLAVIA

Although Yugoslavia's plans for 6000MWe nuclear capacity by the year 2000 are unlikely to be achieved, very severe power shortages emphasise the urgency of meeting these shortages by increasing nuclear generating capacity. The first 600MWe station, a W two-loop PWR, was built at Krsko and it is believed that final handover has now taken place following resolution of steam generator vibration problems. Plans were made to commence construction of a second plant at Prevlaka in 1985 but these have slipped and now initial tenders are scheduled for issue in April 1984 with a closing date for bids in December 1984. The choice of vendor will be made known mid-1986 and construction will commence in 1987. Available information suggests that tender documents may require long-term technology transfer, involvement and development of Yugoslav nuclear industry, guarantee of fuel supplies, although initial documents for Prevlaka will relate only to supply of nuclear island, fuel supply and turbine generator. No decision on type of fuel cycle will be

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McGiles
8 26/3

MO 13/1/16/4

Prime Minister⁽²⁾
The Defence Secretary is content
with the revised approach to
MBFR proposed by the FCS.

PRIME MINISTER

DMS
19/3

MBFR

I have seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 1st March and your Private Secretary's letter of 7th March confirming that you are content, subject to my views, to agree to the proposed change in the Western position on MBFR.

2. Until the details of the new US initiative are fully worked out, particularly the enhancement of the verification measures, it is difficult to reach a final view on its merits. We shall need to watch how the package of verification measures fares in discussion in the Alliance as a whole. But realistically there is little we could do at this stage - even if we wanted to - to stop the US putting forward their proposals, without creating an impression of Alliance disunity which we have always, rightly, been anxious to avoid.

3. I have also in any case some doubts about whether what is proposed is very significant. I can see the attractions for the Alliance in moving to recapture the presentational high ground at Vienna but I doubt whether this package will do that. Nor do I see it breaking the deadlock with the Russians over the data argument. There is not so far as I can see a package within the presently defined MBFR framework which would break through the deadlock without also having unacceptable implications for Western security interests. With present political sentiments in the US on withdrawal from Europe the risks involved in significant movement on MBFR are clear enough. We



must guard against starting a process on certain conditions, finding those conditions are not being fulfilled and then being unable, for political reasons, to repudiate the process.

4. While therefore I am content to proceed as proposed, I do not believe that it gets us very far. I agree with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that it cannot be a substitute for a longer term rethink of the Western approach to conventional arms control, to which I wish to give further thought.

5. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
16th March 1984

Dejance Pt 5 MBFR



MAR 1964

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 March 1984

MBFR

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 1 March containing his recommendations on the Western approach to the MBFR negotiations in the coming months.

Subject to the views of the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister is content with this approach.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

E. J. COLES

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'R. Bone'.

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



6

Prime Minister.

Content with the approval?

A.S.C. 7/3.

PM/84/38

PRIME MINISTER

MBFR

1. At our meeting before Christmas, OD(D) authorised UK officials to contribute to intra-Alliance efforts to devise a tactical counter-move in MBFR, without prejudging the desirability of a new Western move. We agreed that Ministers should keep the negotiations under review. Since then there have been some developments of which OD(D) should be aware.
2. Following the decision of NATO Foreign Ministers last December to review the state of the MBFR negotiations, a strong feeling has grown within the Alliance, clearly shared by the Americans, that the West now needs to make a counter-move to retain the initiative in the negotiations, which are due to resume on 16 March. In practice East and West tend to take it in turns to make major new presentations of their negotiating positions at approximately yearly intervals. The last move was that tabled by the East in June 1983 and described in papers circulated earlier to OD(D).
3. Over recent months, the Germans have advocated, in response to Eastern pressure, that the West should no longer insist on both sides first agreeing on their troop strengths before getting locked into a reductions agreement. Instead, they have suggested that some symbolic US and Soviet reductions should be made; and that there should be a contractual freeze for up to two years during which a set of "verification measures" such as on-site inspection of military installations could be

/used to



used to establish to mutual satisfaction what actual Eastern force strengths were. If this process were successful, the Germans argue that the major reductions could then take place; but if not, either side would be free to withdraw.

4. There were early signs that this line of thinking had attractions for the US Chief Negotiator in Vienna (who is energetic, and understandably wanted results) and that he in turn was beginning to prevail on George Shultz. UK officials, however, have argued strongly - in line with the principles endorsed by OD(D) - that the German approach seemed likely to put at risk a number of important Western political and security interests. In particular we had in mind the dangers of appearing to concede the long-standing objective of prior agreement on data and of a freeze contractualising the present Eastern superiority. In our view there could be no guarantee that the East would in the meantime remove their unacknowledged numerical advantage or that the data dispute would not simply be perpetuated at a much later stage under politically disadvantageous conditions.

5. After a long period of internal gestation the Americans last week produced their own conclusions endorsed by the National Security Council chaired by the President himself. It is gratifying to see that the American position is much more balanced than at one time might have been feared. This undoubtedly reflects the impact made by British views, for which a number of officials both in the State Department and the Pentagon have said they were especially grateful. The essence of the revised American approach, as conveyed to me by George Shultz on behalf of the Administration as a whole, is the following:

(a) a clear re-statement that there could be no MBFR Treaty and no reductions before the East has provided information

/about



about its relevant force strengths, appropriately broken down and falling within a satisfactory range of Western intelligence estimates (i.e. the range of normal margins of error). The US approach would not require the provision of this information to be described as a "formal agreement on data" (in the sense of including it formally in the Treaty) but it would still be an absolute precondition to Treaty signature;

(b) In order to focus the negotiation on the forces which pose the greatest threat, while at the same time providing an opportunity to the East to table new data in a format not previously used, the American approach would propose to concentrate this data requirement on combat and combat-support forces (accounting for up to 80% of Warsaw Pact strength), leaving service support forces temporarily to one side. But the same overall ceilings of 900,000 ground and air force manpower combined (700,000 ground forces) which include service support elements would remain the final objective of the reductions process;

(c) the US approach would require new Eastern flexibility in meeting our verification concerns and their agreement to an appropriately enhanced verification package to ensure that Alliance concerns would be fully met.

6. These ideas were explained more fully by the Americans to UK and German officials in Bonn on 27 February. The Germans are likely to remain attached to their own ideas at least until after Chancellor Kohl's visit to Washington on 7 March. But they will probably calculate that if the trilateral partners are to clear agreed ideas through wider NATO channels in time for possible use in the forthcoming round of MBFR negotiations, they will have to put aside the more controversial elements of these fairly soon. In my view the American approach - with

/further



further work - should provide the basis for a robust new presentation of Western negotiating objectives which can be put forward in such a way as to respond to Eastern concerns. I have told George Shultz that I would wish to commend this approach to you and Michael Heseltine as a basis for the further work that officials will undertake in Washington and London during the next fortnight. Now that this whole exercise is back on the right lines we should in my view work to maximise the presentational possibilities while insisting that no MBFR outcome would be acceptable which did not:

(a) establish at the outset the necessary agreed basis of confidence about the size and shape of forces to be reduced:
and

(b) provide a set of verification measures fully adequate to ensure that reductions are taken and residual ceilings observed.

Given the long history of Eastern intransigence in MBFR I cannot pretend that this revised approach will lead to any breakthrough in the short term. Nor should it be a substitute for a longer term rethink of the Western approach to conventional arms control. But it would meet the widespread Alliance feeling that a tactical counter-move in MBFR is now necessary and would do so in a way that preserves Western negotiating objectives and security interests.

7. I am copying this to Michael Heseltine and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 March 1984

Defense: Arms Control A75.

Prime Minister

5

Agree recommendation at Flag 8?

PM/84/27PRIME MINISTER

Yes → A.J.C. 107/2.

INF/START Merger

1. At our meeting on 14 December last I undertook, in consultation with Michael Heseltine, to bring forward an assessment of the implications for the United Kingdom of a possible merger of the INF and START talks. I am now circulating herewith a note by officials of our two Departments in fulfilment of this remit.

2. The main conclusions which I draw from this preliminary study are these. Without getting into too exhaustive a theoretical exercise, it should be possible to devise a basis for resuming nuclear arms control negotiations which both provides for some overlap between INF and START systems hitherto dealt with at separate tables in Geneva and meets overall Alliance interests. The paper suggests this might be done by enlarging START if necessary to include LRINF missiles (SS20s, SS4s and SS5s; ground launched Cruise missiles and Pershing II) and possibly also some LRINF aircraft. Since our paper was written we have learned in confidence that when Shultz met Gromyko in Stockholm, the Americans told the Russians they would consider any Soviet proposal to include Pershing II and ground launched Cruise missiles in strategic negotiations but would insist on talking about SS20s too. When the Russians were ready to say how they wished to resume negotiations the Americans would listen, but would not themselves propose new arrangements. This shows in my view that we have been thinking along very much the same lines as the Americans.

3. I am sure the paper is right not to under-rate some of the difficulties which could arise within the Alliance if the only way it proved possible to resume nuclear arms

/control



control negotiations were to be by some overlap of this kind. It will take skill and forbearance to devise consultative arrangements within the Alliance which give European allies a continued say, particularly on INF, without making the Americans feel that we are intruding on the more strictly bilateral ground of START. There will also be those who argue that an overlap between INF and START deprives the UK of one of its principal arguments for keeping the British deterrent out of arms control. The inclusion of British and French systems would not, in my view, necessarily be a rigid pre-condition for a Soviet return to the table once they have decided that a resumption of negotiations is in their overall interests. We (and the French) shall, of course, stick to our own guns on this important matter, using the existing arguments and adapting them as necessary.

4. The essential point seems to me that if a genuine opportunity presents itself for the resumption of nuclear arms control between the Americans and the Russians, the West should be in a position to respond positively without pre-conditions, arguing that the details as to form and substance are for negotiators at Geneva.

5. I invite my colleagues to agree the recommendations in the note by officials, which can then serve as guidance for them in the further consultations with the Americans and INF-basing countries due later this month.

/I am



SECRET

6. I am sending copies of this minute to other
OD colleagues.

(D) *

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe'.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10 February 1984

* Typing error

SECRET

AN INF/START MERGER

1. The purpose of this paper is to examine key factors which need to be assessed before we can judge whether a merger of the INF and START talks would be in the political and military interests of Britain and the Alliance as a whole; to make preliminary recommendations and to draw conclusions on what line we should in the meantime take in public and with the Allies.

2. The concept of combining negotiations on strategic and sub-strategic systems is not new. The (classified) 1979 NATO document setting out the INF decision decreed that INF negotiations should be "conducted within the SALT III framework" (although the Allies were already moving towards agreement that the negotiations should be formally separate). The subsequent non-ratification of SALT II and the desire by European leaders (notably Chancellor Schmidt) that there should be no delay in beginning talks on INF led to the decision that this should be in a totally separate forum.

3. During recent months there has been increasing speculation in Western political circles and the media about possibilities of merging the two sets of talks in 1984. In particular the Canadian, Danish, Dutch and Italian Governments have been sympathetic to the idea publicly or privately. The French are opposed and reports indicate that the German Ministry of Defence is too (although the Foreign Ministry is clearly tempted by

it). The Americans, both State Department and Pentagon, have up to now said firmly that they would be opposed to any such proposal.

4. There has so far been no detailed examination within the Alliance of the balance of advantage of merger in terms of long term negotiating objectives, and none of the NATO advocates has adduced any detailed arguments in favour other than some dangerous loose talk about a merger serving to 'solve the problem' of the British and French systems (a point picked up by the media in the West). Clearly it would be wise to undertake a more systematic review of the whole question. Detailed discussion is due to begin in February in a restricted group of the major allies, (the existence of which is unknown to the Alliance as a whole), on the basis of a paper which the US has undertaken to provide.

5. The Soviet position is ambiguous (no doubt deliberately). In press interviews in December and January senior Soviet officials seemed to rule the idea out for the time being (on the basis that as the INF talks were discontinued a merger would be logically impossible). But this is unlikely to be their last word.

6. We need to examine:

- the extent to which a merger could give impetus to the START and/or INF negotiations by removing or reducing current obstacles; or the extent to which

it would simply compound the problems which have so far blocked START/INF;

- the effect on Soviet capacity to drive wedges within NATO and decouple the United States from the defence of Europe;
- implications for continued exclusion of British and French strategic systems from the negotiations (assuming that this remains our objective) and for public presentation of the case for the maintenance of Britain's minimum viable strategic deterrent;
- the military implications of decisions on the scope of any new negotiation (eg will systems be covered which were not covered in START/INF?).

7. A working assumption is that progress in nuclear arms control will remain a major priority for the Alliance. The present position in which, with no negotiations in progress, NATO deployment proceeds as planned while the Soviet Union continues to build up SS20s facing Europe, modernise other missiles based in Eastern Europe and deploy forward the SS22 missiles, presents major and probably increasing political difficulties to the European Allies. There is likely to be increasing public pressure for a resumption of negotiations. In political terms it would be very difficult for the Allies to appear

to decline an offer to resume nuclear negotiations if the Russians make a serious offer.

8. There are some strong general arguments for a merger of negotiations on strategic and intermediate range systems. The inclusion of both in one negotiation would better reflect NATO's strategy of extended deterrence (the "seamless web") helping to "couple" the defence of the US to that of Europe by underlining the European dependence on protection from US strategic systems and the United States' national or strategic interest in the protection of Europe by INF. One drawback of the separation of the INF talks from the SALT/START process has been the encouragement of the notion of a separate European balance and its potential decoupling implications.

9. A second general argument in favour of the idea of some form of merger is that if it led to agreement on overall ceilings covering strategic and INF forces which allowed some freedom to "mix" the two the Allies would be able to work out the right balance between strategic and INF systems, thus denying to the Russians the sort of droit de regard on deployment in Europe which they have in effect claimed during the INF negotiations. (Such a freedom to mix INF and strategic systems need not prejudice the separate question of freedom to mix land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and aircraft under an strategic agreement.) An extension of this point is that the US and Soviet Union would not have to strike

separate balances of their INF and strategic systems. There could be merit, for example, in allowing the Soviet Union advantages in INF levels in exchange for US advantages in permitted levels of strategic systems.

10. There is the further point that some forms of merger could remove certain current problems of system definition (for example whether Backfire is a strategic or intermediate range bomber).

11. There are, however, important counter arguments. A merger could lead to new and difficult divisions within the Alliance.

(a) it would undoubtedly complicate the consultative process. The Americans have stuck close to their commitment to consult the Allies on all aspects of their INF negotiating position. Although they have always been reasonably forthcoming in keeping the Allies informed on progress in SALT/START it would be unreasonable for the Allies to expect (and the Americans would not provide) the sort of detailed consultations which have taken place on INF. However a formula could probably be worked out to provide for intensive consultations on those areas the merged negotiation which were the direct business of the European Allies and which required their agreement (There are precedents in the SALT negotiations);

(b) More important, it is only too likely that there would be divisions over the relative importance to be attached to strategic and INF weapons in any overall agreement. We could expect the Russians to be ready to exploit any opportunity to present offers which were attractive to the Europeans on INF but disadvantageous to the Americans on strategic arms. Similarly, there could be a temptation for the Americans to conclude a deal which gave them what they wanted on strategic systems but sold the Europeans short on INF.

12. The effect of a merger on the position of British and French systems in relation to arms control is not clear cut. A merger would make it less easy for the Russians to highlight the British and French systems as a significant factor in the East/West balance because they would be a smaller proportion of the whole (although they could be expected to make the most of the planned modernisation of these systems). It would be in some senses easier for the Americans to argue, as they did throughout the SALT process, that the British and French systems were an incidental and relatively insignificant problem which should not be allowed to impede the central purpose of the talks - viz the negotiation of balanced reductions of US and Soviet forces. On the other hand it could be more difficult for us to maintain our current position viz that by definition our forces have no place in the INF process and that the time has not yet come when they would be of sufficient significance in the

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strategic balance to warrant their inclusion in any form of strategic balance. The Russians could claim that it was only just to include third party systems in the new, broader negotiation. This argument would fall on fertile ground in some Western European capitals. There are sound counter-arguments, in particular:

- the priority in strategic arms control must be to reduce the arsenals of the superpowers;
- arms control is likely to promote East/West stability only if it provides for equality between the superpowers. Taking British or French forces into account would seem to break that principle;
- if INF systems are added to START, British and French forces are an even more tiny proportion of the whole;
- British and French systems cannot be included in a negotiation where neither Britain nor France is present.

But these arguments may not be easy to put over publicly, although the French too can be expected to make strong use of them.

13. The overall balance of advantage in any merger would depend to a considerable degree on the categories of

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weapon systems included. The following are possible formats:

- (a) it would be compatible with the Russians' negotiating position in the SALT/START process for them to demand that START be expanded to include both British and French systems, and US medium range systems in Europe including the new INF missiles (ie those weapons which can reach the Soviet Union and which the Russians therefore argue to have a strategic role). This would be clearly unacceptable to NATO. At a minimum the Allies would need to insist that any new forum should address the SS20 (and SS4s and SS5s) on the basis of the principles in the existing NATO position, since restrictions on these weapons must remain a first priority in the Western arms control position;
- (b) the enlargement of START to address all medium range missiles viz those with a range of over 1,000kms - SS20s, (SS4s and SS5s) GLCMs and Pershing II or;
- (c) to include in addition medium range nuclear capable aircraft - ie Backfire, Badger, Blinder, (?Fitter and Fencer), F1-11, FB1-11, Mirage IV;
- (d) including INF down to a range of 500km. This would have the advantage of drawing in the new SS22 (range around 950km) which, deployed forward in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have the range to reach most of

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Western Europe including Britain. It would also draw in large numbers of Soviet shorter range INF aircraft (Fitter, Fishbed, Flogger, Fencer, Foxbat) where they enjoy a superiority in Europe of over 4:1. But it would raise old problems of negotiating limitations on dual capable aircraft with important conventional roles (including on the NATO side F16, F4, Jaguars and Tornado) and the diversity of such aircraft and size of global figures presents negotiating problems which are almost certainly unmanageable. The problem of the forward deployment of the SS22 would have to be met. But it would be easier to include it in collateral constraints to be negotiated under scenarios (b) and (c) above;

(e) it is common ground amongst the Allies that inclusion of short range systems, ie bringing in battlefield systems, would be quite unmanageable given verification problems, dual roles etc.

14. Given the problems of possibilities (a), (d) and (e) the Alliance is likely to focus on (b) and (c). The advantages for NATO/Britain of (b) or (c) would be:

(i) it would catch Soviet systems of particular concern to Europe (SS20, Backfire);

(ii) however the Russians attempted to present the figures we should be able to demonstrate a considerable global disparity in their favour;

(iii) the Soviet lead in medium range systems is so considerable as not in realistic terms to be totally removeable by negotiation. There would thus be room for the Americans to argue that they should be allowed compensating right to numerical superiority in strategic systems;

(iv) it would at least in theory be open to the Americans to accept that they should not take this compensation in full in recognition of the contribution of French and British systems (although there would be considerable domestic political constraints on their accepting inferiority in strategic systems).

15. The disadvantages to NATO of a merged negotiation on the lines of (b) or (c) would be:

(i) any blurring of the principle of right to parity in INF could lead some European Allies to seek to wriggle out of supporting the full programme of NATO INF missile deployments on the grounds that the full programme, of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles, was no longer necessary;

(ii) we could come under considerable pressure from European Allies if the Russians were to demand the inclusion of British and French systems as a pre-condition for negotiations on this basis.

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Such a pre-condition is likely. But it would be open to us to try to deflect any such pressure by some evolution in the British public stance, as will almost certainly be necessary when HMG announces further procurement decisions on UK Trident D5. For example, it should be possible to show that our Trident missiles will involve no greater total explosive force than that first deployed with Polaris in 1970.

16. Provided that we keep these two dangers clearly in mind there would seem to be a strong argument for discussing possible negotiating models of formats (b) and (c) with our closest Allies. We could do so in advance of whatever offer to resume negotiations is eventually made by the Soviet government, without suggesting that NATO should itself propose a merger on these lines, at least in the near future. The restricted group of major allies mentioned in para 4 above would be a natural forum. In the discussion we might start with the simplest model: the minimum changes to the US START position needed to accommodate the medium range systems which we wish to limit and reduce.

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Illustrative Approach

	Current forces (end 1983)		US START proposals	US/NATO INF proposals	Possible proposal under a START/INF merger
	US	Soviet Union			
Strategic ballistic missile warheads	7400	7900	5000	-)) 5400
Land-based INF missile warheads of ranges 1800-5500kms	25	1380	-	420)) with no) sub-) divisions)
Sea-launched cruise missiles (accurate of ranges over 1800kms not available)	? 44	0	un- specified limits offered	-)) ?
Strategic bombers	410	356	400	-) c. 700) possibly) with sub-
Land-based INF aircraft of ranges 1800-5500kms	330	485	-	un- specified) limits offered) divisions) con-) straining) ALCMs

The chart addresses warheads, rather than launchers as in SALT II and the Soviet START proposals. Some earlier studies have looked at the questions from the point of view of launchers. The distinction may be more apparent than real in so far as the US and Soviet START proposals are moving towards each other (independently of any question of merger).

CONCLUSIONS

17. (a) It is possible that there could be benefit in terms of substantive negotiating possibilities in merging START and INF. But the issues are complex and there are important counter-arguments;
- (b) any form of merger could lead to problems in the Allied consultative process;
- (c) merger would better reflect Allied strategy with its emphasis on extended deterrence, but it might present new practical opportunities for the Russians to play the Europeans and Americans off against each other;
- (d) our preliminary view is that merged talks would be more likely to complicate our position on the exclusion of British and French systems from current arms control negotiations. But we cannot expect this consideration to be conclusive for

B

all the Allies; nor are any such complications necessarily unmanageable from the UK point of view;

(e) the Russians may not necessarily see it as in their overall interests to propose an early merger. Despite the advantages this would present them in complicating the NATO consultative process and perhaps in causing further divisions within NATO on the position of British and French systems, they may conclude that it is not to the advantage of their long term security interests to bring INF into the strategic arms control process, which they probably regard as more important. (It is particularly difficult to forecast Soviet intentions in a US election year);

(f) if however the Russians do propose some form of renewed nuclear negotiations which amount to merger of some kind the Alliance will face complex decisions. Much will depend on the precise form of merger proposed, and the degree to which the motives behind the proposal are seen to be serious rather than mere propaganda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. (a) that British representatives at NATO meetings where the subject is discussed should be

instructed to outline the potential difficulties,
treading carefully on the issue of the impact on
the position of British and French systems, but
pulling no punches on problems over future
consultations within the Alliance;

- (b) that in restricted meetings with the closest Allies British representatives should explore the substantive merits of possible formats for a merged negotiation on a contingency basis;
- (c) there is a requirement to keep European Allies aware of the dangers of public advocacy of a merger before full implications have been thought through, and terms of any proposals precisely defined;
- (d) the Alliance must also coordinate a public line, against the possibility of a Soviet proposal, which does not pre-judge the substantive issues before full military and political implications have been analysed in NATO;
- (e) that meanwhile our national public line in response to questions on our view of merger should remain the same as it has been in recent months: viz that we do not believe we would have objections in principle to a merger if both the Soviet Union and NATO believed that this would facilitate agreement on the control of strategic

SECRET

and intermediate range nuclear weapons; but we doubt that time has yet come - the risk of a premature merger would be that the problems which have hitherto prevented agreement in START and INF would simply be compounded.

SECRET

Disarmament (Stockholm Conference)

3.30 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): Last week I attended the opening meeting in Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, known as the CDE. It is the first of the follow-up conferences agreed at the CSCE review meeting in Madrid last September; and the opening was attended by the Foreign Ministers or their equivalents of all 35 participating states. On Friday, I delivered an opening speech on behalf of the United Kingdom. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

This is the first time that so many states have met together specifically to tackle some very basic questions affecting the security of Europe. The aim is to lower tension and reduce the risk of war by finding practical ways of improving mutual confidence and trust.

Together with our allies, we are today tabling proposals which, as the terms of reference of the conference require, are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe. We are proposing measures designed:

- first, to reduce secrecy by the exchange of information and by the observation and inspection of military activities;
- second, to make clear provision for the advance notification and reporting of military activity;
- third, to promote stability and to inhibit the use or threat of force for political purposes;
- and fourth, to facilitate crisis management in periods of tension and to reduce the risk of surprise attack.

If we can secure agreement on measures of this kind, I have no doubt that Europe will be a safer place. We would then be in a position, as I told the conference, to consider moving to further stages of negotiation, providing for the restriction of military activities and for reductions in force levels. The first job must be to build a basis of confidence by measures of the kind that I have described.

I emphasised that arms control negotiations alone cannot and should not have to bear the full weight of East-West relations. The dialogue between East and West needs to be broadened and given more substance.

My meeting with Mr. Gromyko on Thursday thus gave me the opportunity to discuss with him not only arms control, but East-West relations more generally, as well as the middle east. I also raised with him the question of Soviet fulfilment of its international commitments in the field of human rights. We agreed that arrangements should be made for a further meeting between us.

The opening of the Stockholm conference came at a difficult time in East-West relations. The difficulties remain, but I hope that I shall be proved right in seeing in the events of last week signs of a new determination to tackle them. We must look to the causes of tension and try to reduce them. At Stockholm and elsewhere, that remains our purpose.

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): The Foreign Secretary must realise that he has given us a depressing account of the recent meeting in Stockholm, which forms a startling contrast to the claim of all Government Ministers in recent months that the moment that cruise and

Pershing were deployed the Soviet Government would be prepared to talk to us and make concessions about everything. What must worry all people throughout the Western world is that technology is now moving at the speed of lightening and that diplomacy is moving with the stately majesty of a glacier. The responsibility for that must lie in part with Western Governments, including Her Majesty's Government.

Did the right hon. and learned Gentleman discuss with Mr. Gromyko during his talks last week the conclusion of all the leading Western scientists of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union that if only one out of every 200 nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers is used the country using that weapon will condemn its own people to slow starvation in arctic night? Does that not have important implications for all Governments on both sides of the iron curtain, and does it not make total nonsense of the attempt by the Soviet and Western Governments to pile more weapons on top of the totally redundant and unusable armouries that they already possess?

Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us a little about the implications of his statement that it is important to discuss East-West relations more generally? Does he really believe that the Prime Minister's visit to Hungary will fulfil that need? Is it not rather like visiting the mayor of Reading because one does not want to talk to the leader of the GLC?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The right hon. Gentleman has revealed a curious insight into the pattern of international relations. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will visit Hungary between 2 and 4 February, and it is important to recognise that contact with all countries in the so-called Eastern bloc has a part to play in improving relations. Such contacts should be looked at and considered separately. Certainly they should all be undertaken alongside one another.

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the scene we faced in Stockholm—indeed, the scene that the peoples of the world faced—is a depressing one simply because of the difficulty that has been faced in securing progress in the many fora for arms reduction. That is one of the features that overshadowed all our talks there. It is certainly true, as we were all well aware, that the use of any single nuclear weapon is something that should be avoided at all costs. It should also be remembered that the surplus of longer-range international nuclear forces held by the Soviet Union overshadows that of the United States by five to one, and there is a not quite so large but similarly daunting disparity in the possession of strategic missiles on the Soviet side. So it is of the utmost importance to press ahead with the negotiations that we are trying to get under way.

The glacier-like quality of decision taking in the Soviet Union is, unfortunately, a formidable feature of the scene that we have to face. We very much regret that the Soviet Union has withdrawn from the INF and START negotiations. We hope that discussion through the normal diplomatic channels will lead to a resumption of the MBFR talks on 15 and 16 March. It should be acknowledged that it was only the preparations of the Alliance for deployment that brought the Russians to negotiate in the first place. It is only by sticking to

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Canavan: When the Prime Minister casts her vote at the end of the Scott Lithgow debate, will she be batting for Britain or for overseas shipyards? Why is it so difficult to muster the political will and necessary money to intervene here in the renegotiation of a contract when she can find billions of pounds to spend on the Falkland Islands, including a handout of over £7 million for 54 prefabs to a Swedish company, with the possible help and intervention of a former British ambassador?

The Prime Minister: To secure business overseas British shipyards must be as good as any in the world. They must be able to produce their products within budget and on time. Only then shall we be able to compete with the rest of the world. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that since nationalisation, the taxpayer has paid about £165 million to Scott Lithgow, and, during the last year, the amount was equal to £13,000 per employee. We must win contracts by being very good and by completing ships and rigs on time.

Mr. John Townend: Is it not a strange world in which the Welsh leader of the Opposition refuses to attend an international at Cardiff Arms park merely because a team of mixed race schoolboys from South Africa is there? Is

it not even stranger when Ministers at the Welsh Office take the same action? As the Russian have committed far more acts against humanity than have the South Africans, should we not end such double standards and either discourage Russian teams or give notice that we wish to terminate the Gleneagles agreement?

The Prime Minister: I cannot terminate the Gleneagles agreement, to which this country is a party, and which we must uphold. It is a voluntary agreement and we try to see that it is honoured in that spirit. I understand that it was a very good match.

Mr. Sedgemore: Talking about scroungers, may I ask the Prime Minister to tell us whether it was her influence or that of the Cementation company that enabled her son to fly through Oman on a plane owned by the Omani air force—or does she not care to distinguish between grace and favour business deals and grace and favour political deals?

The Prime Minister: I answer for carrying out my public duties, and they are all in the public domain. Members of my family are as much entitled to privacy as those of any other citizen in the United Kingdom. We have not yet reached the stage when parents and their sons have to report everything to the authorities. If it comes to that, 1984 will be here.

NATO's INF policy that we shall show the Soviet Union that agreement on all these matters remains profoundly in its interests.

Mr. Healey: The right hon. and learned Gentleman appears not to have listened to what I said, or even to have read the papers that were prepared by his own advisers. Is it not the case that in long-range nuclear missiles and strategic nuclear weapons there is now rough parity between the Soviet Union and the West? That has been conceded by all leading spokesmen of the United States and, until this afternoon, by spokesmen of Her Majesty's Government.

Secondly, does the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept the view expressed by leading scientists in the United States, Britain, Europe and the Soviet Union that to use even one out of 200 of the existing nuclear weapons would condemn the world to the destruction of humanity and the slow death of our populations in arctic night? Has he drawn any conclusions from this important finding?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I need no reminding of the emphatic importance of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons and of taking all the steps we are seeking to take, wherever we have the opportunity, to secure their reduction for precisely the reasons offered by the right hon. Gentleman in his closing remarks.

In reply to the right hon. Gentleman's first question, the destructive power of Soviet strategic missiles is more than twice as great as that of the United States. In regard to longer-range intermediate nuclear forces, the Russians possess a superiority of five to one. Those are the reasons why we should be so concerned.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): Will the Foreign Secretary accept that many countries in NATO now want to see a meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Andropov? Since Mr. Andropov's health is reported to be better and he is likely to be seen in public, will the British Government make it clear that they wish such a public meeting to take place? In regard to the confidence-building measures, will NATO now propose in Stockholm a corridor in which we will withdraw battlefield nuclear weapons, which would be the best confidence-building measure that could be taken and which would alleviate the considerable public concern about any battlefield nuclear war fighting strategy?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: As I said in my statement, the Stockholm conference at this stage is concerned only with measures that arise out of the terms of reference that were agreed after a great deal of tribulation at Madrid, so it is not the appropriate place in which to make a proposal of the kind referred to by the right hon. Gentleman. As I also said in my statement, if we are able to reach agreement on the measures that are within the terms of reference, we shall want to see whether we can go further in the direction suggested by the right hon. Gentleman.

In regard to visits between President Reagan and Mr. Andropov, I am not, of course, able to give any definite information about Mr. Andropov's health, although we must all hope that it is improving. It will be for the President of the United States to consider the suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman. Certainly we believe that it would be desirable to intensify the dialogue, both in quantity and in quality, at all levels, remembering that if there is anything less fruitful than the absence of

meetings at top level it is a meeting that has been inadequately prepared. We must take encouragement from the fact that in a speech last week President Reagan offered to the Soviet Union a constructive and realistic working relationship, which is appropriate.

Sir Peter Blaker (Blackpool, South): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware there will be a welcome from the House for the fact that the British Government have put forward these practical proposals? Was he able to discern in the remarks of the spokesman for the official Opposition this afternoon any practical proposal related to the purpose of the conference, which is to improve confidence-building measures in Europe, or any practical proposal at all?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his remarks and I leave him to confirm the judgment he made.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): If, in the words which the Secretary of State has just used, the use of a nuclear weapon is to be avoided "at all costs", what is the point of having one?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I think it is universally acknowledged that the possession of these fearful weapons has probably been the most important foundation of the absence of war in Western Europe during the past 38 years.

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme): While entirely predictable, is it not regrettable that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) should once again be seeking to blame the Western democracies for the failure of the recent nuclear arms negotiations? Bearing in mind that since the start of the INF talks in 1981 the Soviet Union has deployed no fewer than 108 SS20 missiles, each the equivalent of 100 Hiroshima bombs, it is utterly unwarranted that it should use as a pretext to walk out of the INF talks the deployment of a couple of score of Western missiles in Western Europe? Would it not be more appropriate for the right hon. Member for Leeds, East, instead of castigating the NATO allies, to urge upon the Soviet leadership that it should resume its place in these talks?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. One SS20 has been deployed during each of the weeks of the two years since the deployment of SS20s started. Throughout those two years the United States persisted in its participation in the INF negotiations. It is a matter for extreme regret that the Soviet Union chose to discontinue those talks as it did and when it did. It is entirely right for my hon. Friend to urge upon the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the House the need to remind the Soviet Union of the need for it to return to negotiations and the extent to which we are willing to welcome it.

Mr. Robert Parry (Liverpool, Riverside): Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that in his address Mr. Gromyko accused the United States of thinking in terms of war, especially since the deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe? In view of the growing opposition of the British public to the deployment of cruise on British soil, which has been shown in recent opinion polls, will he bear that fact in mind when he next meets Mr. Gromyko?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I shall bear considerably in mind that the British public supported the Government's policy at the general election. As the House knows, deployment is taking place notwithstanding the sustained attempts by the West to secure participation by the Soviet Union in meaningful negotiations. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that Mr. Gromyko referred to the conduct of the United States in terms that were intemperate and disrespectful. I reminded the conference of the proposition which Mr. Gromyko quoted from Mr. Andropov, in which he called for the conduct of calm and respectful relations between states. I hope that that advice will be heeded by the Soviet Union itself.

Mr. George Walden (Buckingham): Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is an uncanny symmetry between the negotiating tactics used by the Leader of the Opposition on the Elgin marbles and his position on the British nuclear deterrent.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: My hon. Friend makes an entirely fair comparison, which is not one to be taken lightly. If the Leader of the Opposition were ever to be in a position to decide matters of this sort, he would be making decisions similar to those that he made on the Elgin marbles but of much greater gravity to the British people.

Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed): As the right hon. and learned Gentleman recognises the importance of confidence-building measures, may we assume that the rhetoric of war will come out of the Prime Minister's speech-making vocabulary? Does he see as part of the process of confidence building an exchange of visits between the Soviet leadership and leaders from Britain at a fairly early date?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The rhetoric of war has no part in my right hon. Friend's vocabulary. The position adopted by the Government has been to declare firmly our determination to defend the interests of the British people if necessary and, equally fairly, our determination to seek disarmament by any legitimate means.

As for the prospect of further contacts, my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry, will be visiting the Soviet Union in May at the next meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission. We hope to be able to welcome to Britain before long the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kornienko. I hope to be able to arrange a meeting of a more substantial sort with Mr. Gromyko before we meet, as will be the normal practice, at the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Jonathan Aitken (Thanet, South): Will my right hon. and learned Friend take the opportunity of pouring scorn on the somewhat convoluted metaphors of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) about Arctic glaciers and mayors, and acknowledge the two real reasons why there was no fundamental progress in the talks? Does he agree that Mr. Gromyko could not take any initiatives because of the paralysing sickness of Mr. Andropov, and did not want to take any initiatives for fear that they might help President Reagan in his re-election?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I cannot pronounce upon the second reason given by my hon. Friend, but it is certainly a factor that is suggested. Nor can one be sure of the impact of Mr. Andropov's health on the Soviet Union's position. The decision-taking process within the Soviet

Union, even under normal conditions, is a slow and protracted one. That is why it will be necessary for us to maintain the presentation of the urgency of our case for genuine, verifiable and balanced disarmament with tenacity and purpose.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dumfermline, West): Will the Secretary of State, in terms of confidence-building measures, reveal how many manoeuvres on either side have been examined by observers from either side? Have any of those manoeuvres involved the observation of battlefield nuclear weapons? If the right hon. and learned Gentleman resists the area of activity that we are discussing as being the appropriate forum, which forum will we deploy to discuss the prevalence in Europe of large quantities of so-called battlefield nuclear weapons that will be used, overrun or destroyed within hours of a nuclear war?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I cannot without notice answer the hon. Gentleman's specific factual questions. The negotiations have relatively restricted first terms of reference that do not take us as far as consideration of battlefield nuclear weapon control. The INF and START negotiations have been broken off, and we hope shortly to resume the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. It is worth noticing, however, that since 1979 there has been a reduction of about 2,400 in the warheads available to NATO within Europe.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is an important statement, but I remind the House that later this afternoon we shall have two important Opposition day debates and a ten-minute Bill. I propose to take three questions from each side.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood): Will my right hon. and learned Friend, in seeking to re-establish the MBFR talks in Vienna, bear in mind that those talks, until they were abruptly called off, had persisted since 1973 without any progress because the Soviet Union refused a proportionate reduction in armed forces? Will my right hon. and learned Friend therefore make certain that the Western powers are not strung along in the new Vienna talks while the Soviet Union continues to augment its nuclear build-up?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I take the force of my hon. Friend's point. We believe that the Western draft treaty at those talks remains a sound basis for agreement. Obviously we will keep the prospects and progress of the negotiations under review when and if they start, and we will ensure that they are not used as a substitute for action in other directions if we can achieve that.

Mr. Norman Atkinson (Tottenham): Is it not a fact that every NATO and Chinese nuclear weapon can reach and is targeted upon Soviet territory, yet only a small proportion of Soviet nuclear weapons can reach and is targeted upon United States' territory? Is it not a fact that, until that understanding spreads throughout the NATO leadership, little or no progress will be made at any future meetings, whether or not the Soviet Union returns to the negotiating table in March or at any other time?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: It is important to try to secure progress in any of the many negotiations that are occurring. The first condition to establish the prospects for

progress is for the Soviet Union to be willing to return to meaningful negotiations. That is why we are insistent upon our willingness to receive the Soviets as soon as they return.

Mr. Michael Latham (Rutland and Melton): Following the declaration of the NATO powers on 9 December that their weapons would never be used first except in response to attack, did the Western powers consider not only today's measures but tabling at the conference a new draft treaty that there will be no first use of any weapons by either side which would go some way towards meeting the Warsaw proposal for a non-aggression pact?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: NATO has repeatedly said that it will never use any weapons, nuclear or conventional, in response to attack. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—except in response to attack. I am sorry if I misled the House. NATO has repeatedly said that it will never use any any weapons, nuclear or conventional, except in response to attack. A similar obligation is entered into by each member of the United Nations, and we believe that that is the right position.

Mr. Robert Litherland (Manchester, Central): Does the Secretary of State wish to comment on Mr. Shultz's reference in Stockholm to artificial barriers in Europe, which could only refer to reunification of Germany? Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman feel that that helped the peace talks?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: It has long been recognised by successive Governments that the division of Germany is not something which is likely to or should endure permanently. Equally, it has long been recognised that the division of Europe based purely on a sharp differentiation between East and West is not for the long-term good of the continent. We must all hope that divisions of that kind will be replaced by a growing sense of the unity of culture and history which is part of the European continent.

Mr. David Sumberg (Bury, South): Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that if the Soviet Union is genuine in its desire to build up mutual confidence and trust it should immediately increase the number of exit visas for people who wish to leave that country and release Anatoly Shcharansky from imprisonment?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I agree with the force of my hon. Friend's point. I made it clear to Mr. Gromyko that the extent to which the Soviet Union is willing to fulfil its

international commitments on human rights has an important impact on international perception of that country and confidence in its actions. I could not bring every specific case to his attention, but I selected a number of examples, all of which involve the ill health of the people concerned and specifically Mr. Anatoly Shcharansky and Mrs. Bonner Sakharov.

Mr. Healey: Does the Foreign Secretary agree—even Mr. Nitze and Mr. Kvitsinsky agree on this—that before the weapons were deployed by the West the Soviet Government offered to reduce the number of intermediate-range warheads to under half the number deployed when NATO took its dual track decision in December 1979, as both sides have confirmed? Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that we now face a far more dangerous situation in which both sides are continuing to pile up weapons which have no conceivable political, military or other advantage, especially in view of the discovery of the risk of a nuclear winter if just one out of 200 existing weapons were ever used? Does he accept that many Opposition Members and, I suspect, Conservative Members cannot accept the hibernation of our Foreign Secretary when the world faces such dangers, although winter and summer seem to make little difference to the right hon. and learned Gentleman and he seems not even to understand the Government's policy as we realised when he informed us, I hope rightly, that the British Government would never use nuclear weapons in response to an attack?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The right hon. Gentleman has to look a long way to find any points to make and they all lack validity. The matter is too serious for such triviality. Far from hibernating, we are devoted to the pursuit of effective, balanced, verifiable disarmament measures.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the Soviet Union's offer during the INF talks. It is difficult to be confident or certain about what the final offer was, but it seems to have been 120 SS20s within range of Western Europe—

Mr. Healey: That is fewer than in 1979.

Sir Geoffrey Howe:—in return for no deployment of United States weapons. The Soviet Union would have remained in possession of 800 SS20 warheads world wide. It will have modernised its weapons considerably since 1979. As the offer involved no United States deployment in Western Europe, it would not have been a balanced or satisfactory conclusion.

Ministerial Responsibility and Accountability

4 pm

Mr. Brian Sedgemore (Hackney, South and Shoreditch): I wish to raise a point of order of which I have given you, Mr. Speaker, notice. It touches the heart of the issue of ministerial responsibility and the accountability of Ministers to the House.

Last Tuesday I tabled seven questions to the Secretary of State for Energy about the safety of the civil nuclear programme and the incidence of cancer at Sellafield. Yesterday I was astonished to receive a reply from the Minister saying that the questions had been transferred to the chairman of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., and that a copy of the chairman's answer to me would be placed in the Library. It is extraordinary that a Minister should abdicate his statutory responsibilities in favour of the chairman of a company.

I have worked in the Department of Energy, and I know that the Secretary of State is charged with overall responsibility for the safety of the British civil nuclear programme. If the chairman of BNFL gives me a wrong or misleading answer, what shall I do? Is he responsible, or is the Minister responsible?

BNFL faces the possibility of prosecution by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and an eminent scientist is studying the incidence of cancer in and around Sellafield. At such a time, Ministers may well wish to wash their hands of what BNFL is doing. However, they are statutorily responsible, and it would be a help to the House and to the nation if they were to answer before the House. I ask for your guidance on this point, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman gave me notice of his point of order. However, I am sorry to have to tell him that I have no responsibility for the content of ministerial answers.

North England and Scotland (Weather Conditions)

Mr. Martin J. O'Neill (Clackmannan): I have given you notice of my point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the blizzards which are hitting the northern part of the country, and Scotland in particular, would it be possible for you to use your good offices with the Leader of the House to ensure that the Secretary of State for Scotland will make a clear statement in the House as soon as possible about what is happening and the damage that is being done?

Mr. Speaker: I shall not need to use my good offices, as the Leader of the House and the Secretary of State for Scotland are both present.

Mr. Bill Walker (Tayside, North): For your information, Mr. Speaker, I should like to say that the police and rescue services in my constituency, which has been badly hit, have kept me fully in the picture.

Questions to Ministers

Mr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You kindly advised the House last week that when an hon. Member had a question on the Order Paper his prospects of being called to put a supplementary question were enhanced. If an hon. Member puts a supplementary question at Question Time, are his chances of asking a question on a statement reduced?

Mr. Speaker: That might seem to be an impertinent suggestion. Let us leave it at that.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS &c.

Ordered,

That the Draft Grants to Redundant Churches Fund Order 1984 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[*Mr. Garel-Jones.*]

cc Russ
Well Question

STATEMENT BY THE RIGHT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE QC MP, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 24 JANUARY 1984 ON THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE)

TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

Last week I attended the opening meeting in Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, known as the CDE. It is the first of the follow-up Conferences agreed at the CSCE review meeting in Madrid last September; and the opening was attended by the Foreign Ministers or their equivalents of all 35 participating states. On Friday (20 January) I delivered an opening speech on behalf of the United Kingdom. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

This is the first time that so many states have met together specifically to tackle some very basic questions affecting the security of Europe. The aim is to lower tension and reduce the risk of war, by finding practical ways of improving mutual confidence and trust.

Together with our Allies, we are today tabling proposals which, as the terms of reference of the Conference require, are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe. We are proposing measures designed:

firstly, to reduce secrecy by the exchange of information and by the observation and inspection of military activities;

secondly, to make clear provision for the advance notification and reporting of military activity;

third, to promote stability and to inhibit the use or threat of force for political purposes;

and fourth, to facilitate crisis management in periods of tension and to reduce the risk of surprise attack.

If we can secure agreement on measures of this kind, I have no doubt that Europe will be a safer place. We would then be in a position, as I told the Conference, to consider moving to further stages of negotiation, providing for the restriction of military activities and for reductions in force levels. The first job must be to build a basis of confidence, by measures of the kind I have described.

I emphasised that arms control negotiations alone cannot and should not have to bear the full weight of East/West relations. The dialogue between East and West needs to be broadened and given more substance.

My meeting with Mr Gromyko on Thursday (19 January) thus gave me the opportunity to discuss with him not only arms control, but East/West relations more generally, as well as the Middle East. I also raised with him the question of Soviet fulfilment of its international commitments in the field of human rights. We agreed that arrangements should be made for a further meeting between us.

The opening of the Stockholm Conference came at a difficult time in East/West relations. The difficulties remain. But I hope that I shall be proved right in seeing in the events of last week signs of a new determination to tackle them. We must look to the causes of tension and try to reduce them. At Stockholm and elsewhere, that remains our purpose.



FILE

67

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 January, 1984

MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT:
A NEW APPROACH

Thank you for your letter of 16 January. The Prime Minister was grateful for your analysis of Mr. Stephen Salter's ideas and notes your conclusion that they are unlikely to form the basis for a new approach to multilateral nuclear disarmament.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

db



Prime Minister.

As you suspected, Mr. Salter's ideas are not very practical.

A.S.C. $\frac{16}{1}$

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 January 1984

Dear John,

Handwritten initials and signature

Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament: a New Approach

By agreement with the MOD I am replying to your letter of 3 January to Richard Mottram in which you asked for advice on Mr Stephen Salter's ideas for a new technical approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament. (Incidentally, according to our information, Mr Salter does not hold a chair at Edinburgh University.)

Mr Salter's proposals would involve each party to an agreement choosing from its opponent's arsenal the most threatening items up to a previously agreed percentage of "military value", for elimination. The initial percentage might be very small, say one per cent, but the process could continue indefinitely.

Ingenious as this approach is, there is nonetheless a gap between the mathematical exactness of the formula and the political realities which disarmament negotiations have to face. The approach is perhaps in principle more readily applicable to nuclear armed missiles than to other weapons. Nuclear disarmament cannot, however, be considered in isolation from the balance of conventional forces.

But the main obstacle to the negotiability of Mr Salter's ideas is that neither party to a negotiation is likely to agree to a procedure which would give its opponent total freedom to select which item in its armoury shall be eliminated. Each side's armoury contains a range of weapons which cannot be considered in isolation from each other. The elimination of one weapon would seriously jeopardise the role of another.

Finally, Mr Salter's approach would call for a degree of openness to inspection which the Russians have shown no willingness to accept. While the Russians claim to support verification procedures for prospective arms control agreements, there is a substantial difference between what they will tolerate in terms of inspection and compliance measures and what the West would regard as adequate.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

/In summary



In summary, Mr Salter's ideas, thoughtful as they are, are unlikely to form the basis for a new approach to multi-lateral nuclear disarmament.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts



R B Bone
Private Secretary



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January, 1984

Multi-lateral Nuclear Disarmament: A New Approach

I enclose a paper which was given to the Prime Minister some time ago by Professor Salter of the University of Edinburgh in which he advocates a new technical approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament. The Prime Minister doubts whether the proposition he advances is practical but she would be grateful for any advice which you wish to offer.

BT/

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

R. Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

John - Professor Sella not
this to me but it did
not look a mechanism

MULTI-LATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT : A NEW APPROACH proposals,

However we had better check

It has been a feature of the many failed attempts to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons that one side puts forward a rigid take-it-or-leave-it proposal which the other side receives with extreme caution. The fact that Side A proposes something is taken as sufficient evidence that it must be to the disadvantage of Side B. *with the military me*

It is reasonable to suppose that the difficulty in reaching agreement will be in proportion to the magnitudes at stake. It would therefore be harder to agree to a large cut than to a series of more modest steps.

The problem of matching one weapon system with another can lead to endless argument. Complications arise from the number of warheads, the mobility of launchers, the hardness of silos, the accuracy of guidance and the sophistication of evasion electronics. These matters would be difficult to resolve in a friendly discussion between the services of one power. But in the debate between rival super-powers it is safe to assume that the problem is quite intractable.

I therefore conclude that a successful scheme should proceed by small steps, that it should convince both sides that each has bettered the other and, most importantly, that it should not become embroiled in the difficulties of weapon comparison.

It has proved possible to design a mechanism which has these three characteristics. Indeed it can turn to advantage the inevitable differences of opinion about weapons of the two sides. It is based on the 'I cut - you choose' rule by which children can divide a cake.

The plan would work as follows. Each side begins by assigning a number to each separable nuclear device in its armoury. This number, which we may call a *military value percentage* is chosen by the weapon owner to represent his view of the usefulness of the item as a part of his entire inventory. The sum of all the numbers of each side is equal to one hundred. To take an example, if the Soviet Union decided that the 350 missiles in the SS-20 system represented, say, 15% of its nuclear strength then the military value of each would be 0.04292 %.

The selection of numbers may involve heated advocacy by the service chiefs. But this discussion is an internal, private matter for each side. Everybody involved speaks the same language, shares the same patriotic motives and is ultimately subordinate to the military discipline imposed by a single Head of State.

It would be extraordinary if the values of usefulness chosen by one side were in exact agreement with the magnitude of threat felt by the other. Indeed we may expect that the weapons with accurate terminal guidance and short launch times, which are suitable for pre-emptive first strikes, will induce a feeling of threat in their victims which is much greater than the feeling of comfort they offer to their owners. On the other hand, second-strike weapons are valuable deterrents and provide a large feeling of security, but do not pose a threat in proportion. It is precisely this *difference of opinion* which provides the incentive for the disarmament process and which ensures that both sides can believe that they have secured advantage. I was encouraged to discover that this somewhat paradoxical conclusion had been reached by sound mathematical reasoning. (See Dubins and Spanier, Amer. Math. Monthly, Vol. 68, 1961).

The first reduction should be very small. Let us suppose that it is a step of about 1%. Each side picks from the list of its opponent the most threatening items with total military value percentage not exceeding this 'table limit'.

The selections may be announced simultaneously and small differences carried forward as credits for a second round.

If the Americans happened to decide that the SS-20 was the most serious threat they would request as a first move that the number of missiles be reduced by 23. Meanwhile the Russians would pick the most threatening 1% of weapons from the American list. The Americans would be quite indifferent about the Russian choice because the numbers would have been chosen to make any 1% selection equal, in their view, to any other.

Both sides will think they benefit from this exchange by an amount which depends on the ratio of perceived threat removed to perceived protection lost. The process will seem exciting and even enjoyable to the selectors. They will be taking out the weapons which they see as posing the greatest threat and paying for this pleasure with reductions which, in their own judgement, are as indistinguishable as the dollar or rouble bills in their wallets.

The absolute, as opposed to the relative, magnitude of the reductions of each side, measured in terms of fire-power or lethality, will be greater for the power with the greater original armoury. But as each side argues that the other has the excess they can hardly object to this feature of the scheme.

The problem of verification is common to all disarmament plans. A necessary assumption for any scheme is that both sides have reasonably accurate knowledge of the weapon systems of their opponents. This assumption is supported by several factors. Firstly, unknown weapons do not deter, and reluctance to disclose one's weapons can lead to accusations that one is preparing a surprise war-fighting system rather than a deterrent. Secondly, modern satellite techniques provide outstanding surveillance. Thirdly, the Soviet Union is now much more amenable to site inspections than in earlier years.

If the reductions proceed by small, slow steps then neither side need fear that its national security has been greatly endangered if verification goes wrong. However, if a side is sincere about its wish to disarm it can use the interpretation of verification procedures to send messages about its sincerity and entice the other side to continue.

Either side may wish to distort the percentage values it declares. But because the sum total is always equal to one hundred a reduction in one area must necessarily mean an increase in another. Distortion is quite legitimate but the ploy may backfire and lead to the loss of good weapons at less than their true value. If one gives any credit to the intelligence services of one's opponent it will probably be best to make the military values as accurate a reflection of one's views as possible.

I had feared that the scheme would collapse under the pressure to modernise weapons. But it has proved possible to design rules which allow updating to occur. For example if Side A insists on the introduction of some new missiles it may do so provided that it also declares a military value percentage for them. Side B may then, without loss to its armoury, remove items to that same value from any part of Side A's inventory including the new ones. Side A will not want the new ones to be instantly lost and so will have to put a higher than true value on them. It will therefore have to give up rather more of its obsolete inventory. This rule would encourage the evolution of new weapons which provide high perceived security for low perceived threat - a most desirable feature.

The mathematicians have extended the rules for cake-sharing to divisions among more than two people. It is thus possible to devise ways in which the secondary nuclear powers can be brought in. However, I would hope that the Russians would agree to let the first few steps take place as a private arrangement between themselves and the Americans. The secondary nuclear powers can join the scheme once confidence has developed but before their smaller armouries become significant.

It is also possible to extend the idea to conventional forces but I am strongly in favour of clear definitions and therefore suggest that for the first stages the scheme should be confined to nuclear devices. There is some way to go before the danger of conventional forces equals the danger of nuclear ones and discussions about conventional weapons would be easier if tension could be reduced.

It must be admitted that the scheme may be very slow and indeed might never achieve complete disarmament. But the safest number of nuclear weapons might not be zero and a slow scheme will give us time to decide what that number might be. We are at present facing a dangerous increase in both quantity and accuracy. An arrangement which slowed the rate of increase would be good. One which stopped it would be better. But one which reversed it by even the smallest amount would be best of all and would produce a very large relaxation in tension. Just as in levitation, the first millimetre will be the hardest!

Stephen Salter
Department of Mechanical Engineering
University of Edinburgh

May 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 December 1983

Internationalisation of Nuclear Energy

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 14 December setting out the objections to a proposal for internationalisation of nuclear energy. Mrs. Thatcher accepts the arguments which you advance.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CT



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.
 Hugh Thomas raised this point · London SW1A 2AH

A.F.C. 15/12.

14 December 1983

Jan Tsch,
 [unclear]

Thompson
 [unclear]

Internationalisation of Nuclear Energy

In your letter of 8 December you report that the Prime Minister has asked for the advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the idea that the UK should propose the internationalisation of all nuclear energy.

It is true that such a proposal was put forward in 1946 by the US representative, Bernard Baruch, at the first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. He suggested the establishment of an international atomic development authority which would own and manage all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security. The authority was to have rights of inspection and verification. Once a system of controls and sanctions was operating effectively, production of nuclear weapons would cease and existing stocks be destroyed. The plan was rejected by the Soviet Union who saw it as institutionalising the US lead in atomic weapons and because the proposed authority represented an encroachment on national sovereignty.

Although the proposal was rejected and nuclear programmes, both military and civil have since developed on the basis of independent national programmes, there has been a continuous attempt to provide an element of international control. The International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1956 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to provide a system of safeguards designed to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities under its control were not used for any military purpose. The Agency does not have such strong verification powers as had been envisaged by Baruch but it nevertheless represents the most important step yet achieved in truly internationally operated inspection systems.

/The Euratom



The Euratom Treaty represented another attempt at internationalising the development of nuclear energy. The Treaty gives legal ownership of enriched uranium and plutonium to the Community and provides for a Community monopoly in purchase and allocation of all nuclear materials. These aspects of the Treaty have never worked and in practice the individual Member States nuclear industries are largely independent of Commission control.

A proposal at this stage from the UK for sweeping measures of internationalisation would suffer from a number of disadvantages:

- (a) The economic importance of our own civil nuclear industry would cast doubts on the sincerity of our proposal;
- (b) It would be unwelcome to our friends and allies, many of whom are more dependent than we are on nuclear energy, as a vital part of their overall energy strategy (France plans to generate 70% of her electricity from nuclear plant by 1990);
- (c) It would be categorised by the non-aligned as another plot to deprive them of the benefits of national nuclear energy programmes (they already resist IAEA safeguards and resent the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group);
- (d) It would be virtually impossible to design an international control system which could be relied upon to take sensible decisions; a one-state-one-vote system would result in control by the non-aligned, and any system of group voting or vetoes would result in frequent stalemate on key issues.


This is not to say that we should not continue to strive for greater elements of international control where these might be achievable. We should continue to press for universal application of IAEA safeguards and to support exercises like the study on International Plutonium Storage. But we are more likely to achieve our aims by working to extend the existing system than by making sweeping new proposals.

[Handwritten signature]
 (R B Bone)
 Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street



14 DEC 1983





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3 ✓ DP

PRIME MINISTEROD (D)

As background to our forthcoming discussion on arms control and disarmament, I asked my people to prepare some statistical information on the nuclear balance, the balance of conventional forces and on comparative defence expenditure. I asked that the figure work should embrace nuclear systems not covered by START and INF, and the forces and expenditure of significant military powers outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

2. Comparisons of this sort are very difficult to make and the data produced thus far is provisional. The way in which different systems are counted may also differ in some respects from the papers circulated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I thought, however, that you and the others involved in the OD(D) discussion might find the information prepared of background interest and a copy is therefore attached.

3. I am copying this minute and the attachments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Richard Luce, John Stanley and Sir Robert Armstrong and also to the Secretary of State for Energy.

Ministry of Defence
13th December 1983

**SUB-STRATEGIC
NON-EUROPEAN NUCLEAR CAPABLE LAND-BASED SYSTEMS**

USSR

Aircraft⁽¹⁾: Badger, Fencer, Flogger, Fitter, Fishbed, Foxbat
 Missiles: SS-20, Scaleboard/SS22, Scud/SS23, Frog
 Artillery: 152, 203, 240mm

USA

Aircraft⁽¹⁾: F111, F4, F16, A6, A7, A10, A4, F15, F105
 Missiles/Artillery⁽²⁾ ?

CHINA

Aircraft: Badger
 Missiles: CSS-1, CSS-2

**SUB-STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR CAPABLE NAVAL SYSTEMS – WORLDWIDE**

USSR


Aircraft: Badger, Fitter
 Missiles: SS-N-2, 3, 7, 9, 12, 19, 22
 and SS-N-5 on GOLF II

USA

Aircraft: F4, A6, A7
 Missiles⁽¹⁾ ?

UK

Aircraft: 18 Buccaneer



(1) Includes all aircraft with nuclear association – proportion which would be used in nuclear role not known.
 (2) Numbers of nuclear capable missiles and artillery in USA not known.

(1) Numbers of nuclear capable tactical missiles with US Navy not known

NATO DEFENCE EXPENDITURE - 1982

	<u>Total Defence Expenditure</u> <u>(US \$ million)</u>	<u>Defence Expenditure as a</u> <u>proportion of GDP</u>
BELGIUM	2892	3.4%
CANADA	6205	2.1
DENMARK	1400	2.5
FRANCE	22522	4.2
GERMANY (WEST)	22350	3.4
GREECE	2639	7.0
ITALY	9090	2.6
LUXEMBOURG	41	1.3
NETHERLANDS	4464	3.2
NORWAY	1698	3.0
PORTUGAL	803	3.4
TURKEY	2755	5.2
UK	24243	5.1
USA	196345	6.5
NATO EUROPE	94897	3.8
NATO TOTAL	297447	5.1

Note: Figures for calendar year 1982, using NATO definition of defence expenditure. 1982 average market exchange rates.

WARSAW PACT DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

<u>Country</u>	<u>Defence Budget</u> (as published)	<u>Estimated Expend.</u> (1)	<u>% GNP</u>	<u>Expenditure in dollars (million)</u> (2)
Soviet Union (1981) (bn Roubles) (3)	17.1	86-95	14-16	222,000
GDR (1982) (bn GDR Marks)	10.8	13.3	5-6	4,300
Czech (1980) (bn Crowns)	22.9	23.1	about 3½	6,100
Poland (1980) (bn Zlotys)	70.4	82.0	3-4	2,500
Hungary (1982) (bn Forints)	20.2	24.9	about 3	8,400
Romania (1981) (bn Lei)	10.4	22.6	about 3½	3,400
Bulgaria	NA	NA	NA	

(1) Based on DIS and NATO estimates

(2) All figures are from US sources. Most recent estimates we have are 1981 for USSR and 1980 for NSWP. Figures are converted to dollars by estimating what it would cost in the US to reproduce the defence activity of the WP countries. Figures are therefore not directly comparable to NATO figures.

(3) Burden for 1982 cannot yet be provided because of the price reform.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF OTHER SELECTED COUNTRIES

<u>Country</u>	<u>Defence Budget</u> (as published)	<u>% GNP/GDP</u>	<u>Estimated in dollars</u> (million)
China (1981) (bn yuan)	20,170	5% GNP (UK estimate 8%)	11,870
Japan (1982) (bn yen)	2,586.1	0.98% GNP	10,361
India (1982) (bn Rs)	53.500	3.7% GDP	5,556
North Korea (1983) (bn Won)	3.602	10.2% GNP	1,916
South Korea (1982) (bn Won)	3,782	7.5% GDP	5,173
Pakistan (1982) (bn Rs)	22.878	6% GDP	1,801
Iran (1982) (bn Rial)	576.80 - 1,111.90	6 - 11% GDP	6,900 - 13,300
Yugoslavia (1982) (bn Dinar)	119.0	5% GMP *	2,319

* GMP = Gross Material Product



SECRET

2

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD(D): Arms Control

BACKGROUND

This first meeting of the Sub-Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament is part of the follow up to the general Ministerial discussion of foreign affairs, including East-West relations and arms control, which were held at Chequers on 9 September. There will be a discussion of East-West relations in OD on 15 December.

Flag A

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 7 December provides a broad overview of the positions reached in the discussions of arms control and disarmament in various international fora. Attached to his minute are notes by officials giving details and policy recommendations in respect of

Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT)

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

The Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)

Intermediate Nuclear Forces negotiations (INF)

Strategic Defence ('Star Wars')

United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD)

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary draws attention to the differences in timescale in relation to arms control, and particularly nuclear arms reductions, as between the Soviet Union and the West: the Russians can afford to play their cards long, hoping that public restiveness will lead to disunity within the NATO Alliance. But he believes that it would be wrong not to explore every feasible possibility of identifying a fresh approach to nuclear and other arms control

by the United Kingdom which might help to regain momentum in the various sets of talks. Any British initiative would have to be developed within the Alliance, and it would be essential not to use arms control simply as a means of restoring a climate of international confidence, without thinking through the implications for our security. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recognises that the papers by officials suggest that there is no substantial initiative open to us at present, but he believes that we should look more fundamentally and widely for a fresh approach. He suggests that possibilities include a re-examination of the importance of the concept of arithmetical parity in arms control arrangements; a review of possible steps in the area of multilateral disarmament at the United Nations, and an examination of the implications of a possible merger of the INF and START talks, with particular reference to the position of the British deterrent in relation to arms control.

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary also seeks the Sub-Committee's views on three areas where decisions are needed now. Details of each are given in the notes by officials attached to his minute. The decisions the Sub-Committee are invited to take now are set out below.

5. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) The Sub-Committee is invited to endorse a series of propositions reaffirming the importance we attach to the NPT, and agree that efforts should continue to secure adherence to the Treaty regime of further nations. More specifically, Ministers are invited to agree that, in response to suggestions by President Reagan, the United Kingdom should enter into discussions with the other nuclear suppliers of the President's proposal to tighten the existing safeguards regime and agree that any state wishing to acquire significant supplies of nuclear material, or significant items of nuclear plant, should first agree to the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all nuclear facilities on its territory ("comprehensive safeguards"). Ministers are further invited to agree that our aim in discussion should be to support this

proposal, provided that our commercial and other interests are not damaged, and that the potential damage to the Treaty regime caused by the tightening of the system of safeguards is kept to a minimum. Lastly, Ministers are invited to agree that officials should undertake further work to identify options for increasing incentives for parties to the NPT to maintain their support for, and for non-parties to adhere to, the Treaty.

6. MBFR It is proposed that the United Kingdom should suggest an evaluation within NATO of the Western position in the light of recent moves by the East, and contribute to Western attempts to develop a counter-move on the basis of principles already approved by Ministers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence. Further reference would be made to Ministers if this approach looked like producing a consensus in favour of a new move. It is further recommended that it would be premature at this stage to consider a meeting of Foreign Ministers of all participants (as proposed by Mr Trudeau), although the proposal should be kept under review. Finally, it is recommended that the Sub-Committee should keep the negotiations under review.

7. The Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) opens in Stockholm in January. The first phase of the conference will attempt to negotiate a set of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. Work is proceeding in NATO on refining a set of proposals whose outline was agreed by the North Atlantic Council in 1980. The general objectives are

- a. to provide for a mutual exchange of military information;
- b. to establish a clear pattern of normal military behaviour through notification;
- c. to establish an effective verification mechanism including direct observation and a mandatory consultative mechanism;

d. to have regard for the principle of reciprocity and to avoid obligations whose application would be more advantageous to the East than to the West.

The detail of the proposed approach is set out in the Annex to the note by officials. The Sub-Committee is invited to endorse the line being taken by British officials; to note that they will shortly be asked to approve a detailed package of proposals worked up within the Alliance, and to note that further study will be required in due course of the longer term implications for conventional arms control against the possibility that a successful first phase of CDE is achieved by 1986.

8. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Luce), the Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr Stanley) and Mr Cartledge (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) will be present.

HANDLING

9. To make best use of the limited time, it would be best to address first the specific issues on which decisions are needed now. You might invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to explain his proposals on

- a. the Non-Proliferation Treaty
- b. the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
- c. the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

In each case, the main point to establish in discussion is whether the Sub-Committee endorses the general line which it is proposed the United Kingdom should take; further reports will be made to Ministers on progress on each subject.

10. You could then invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce a broader discussion of arms control and disarmament. The main points here are

- a. does the Sub-Committee agree with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view that we should explore every feasible possibility for a fresh approach to nuclear arms control?

b. in particular, should we be looking for possible British initiatives within the Alliance before Ministers have taken decisions on the number of missiles and warheads to be mounted on the Trident submarines? (Work on this is proceeding with a view to submission to Ministers in early spring);

c. would it be sufficient to concentrate for the moment on the possibility of a British initiative in the area of non-nuclear arms control, at least until the Trident decisions have been taken, meanwhile preparing our position carefully on the implications for our national nuclear deterrent of a possible INF/START merger?

d. as to re-examining the need for arithmetical parity in any arms control arrangements, what would be the effect on the Americans, and on the cohesion of the Alliance, of questioning this principle at this juncture? Might it suggest British readiness to include our own nuclear weapons in an arms control agreement ahead of major reductions by the super powers?

CONCLUSION

11. Subject to the points made in discussion you could guide the Sub-Committee to

a. agree the recommendations in the notes by officials attached to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute as to the approach to the Non-proliferation Treaty, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe;

b. invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to set in hand further work by officials on possible British arms control initiatives within the Alliance, concentrating for the present on non-nuclear arms control;

e. invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Defence Secretary, to prepare an assessment of the implications for the United Kingdom of a possible INF/START merger.

David Goddall

A D S GODDALL

Deputy

Miss Campbell

Ke. 4



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 December, 1983

Nuclear Disarmament

The Prime Minister has received a suggestion from a private source that we should consider proposing, as the West apparently did in 1946, the internationalisation of all nuclear energy. The author of this idea has observed that this might mean major sacrifices by all powers who had invested heavily in "atoms for peace" but that it would have great benefits and that, if the Russians were to turn the idea down, we should derive great propaganda advantage.

The Prime Minister has asked me to bring this idea to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to seek his advice.

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



PM/83/98

PRIME MINISTERArms Control

1. I welcome your decision to have OD(D) review the major current issues of arms control on 14 December. Within this wide field, the sector in which progress would do most to increase international confidence and reassure public opinion would be that of limiting or reducing the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons. In that context, our meeting will be taking place against a discouraging background. The START talks have been suspended for the anticipated Christmas recess but will, we hope, resume in January. The Soviet Union has broken off the INF talks and the Russians are taking the line that these cannot be resumed unless the West reverses its initial deployments of Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles. (I attach notes by FCO and MOD officials on both these negotiations for the information of colleagues). In their public statements on arms control matters, for example at the opening on 17 January of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CDE), Western governments will have to strike a careful balance between responding to understandable public concerns about the lack of progress on nuclear arms control while, at the same time, giving no encouragement to Soviet hopes that Western resolve to seek equilibrium as well as agreements may now begin to falter.

2. We must bear in mind the different timescales to which the Soviet leadership and Western governments operate in tackling these crucial long-term issues. Democratically elected Western governments have to respond to immediate pressures - to Parliamentary debates, to impending elections, and to significant shifts in public opinion. The leaders in the Kremlin have no such concerns. They can take their time and choose their moment. They have just sustained a major setback in failing to achieve their prime objective of four years standing, preventing the deployment of LRINF missiles by NATO in Western Europe. The Russians may



take some time to adjust to this, but they are in no hurry. The West has just embarked on a programme of deployments which, in the absence of an INF agreement, will take five years to complete. The Russians will continue to hope that at some point along that road they will be able to bring about a significant breakdown in Western unity leading to a halt in the process or, worse, its reversal. They know very well that the progress of Western deployments coupled with the absence of progress towards an INF agreement will create public unease and hence political problems for Western leaders. They can be confident that, quite soon, the West will begin to fidget.

3. We have to accept that, given the nature of our political societies and the genuine public concern to which the nuclear issue gives rise, this Soviet prognosis may well be justified. Public and private pressures on Western governments for efforts to break the log-jam can be expected to mount. Initiatives will be canvassed which, like Premier Trudeau's, reflect a sound political aspiration but a less sound assessment of Western security interests. The problem of the UK and French national deterrents will again be cast as the main obstacle to progress. While the Russians sit tight, there will be a risk of restlessness within the Alliance which could generate either disunity - which the Soviet leadership would be quick to exploit- or the temptation to compromise aspects of Alliance security, or both.

4. The Defence Secretary and I have discussed this perspective informally and I think we are agreed that, despite an unpromising outlook, it would be wrong not to explore every feasible possibility of identifying a fresh approach to these issues by the UK which could help the negotiations on nuclear arms control to regain momentum. It would be essential for new UK input to be developed within the Alliance rather than to break ranks in a spurt for the headlines which would delight the Russians above all. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that to use arms control negotiations simply as a means of restoring a climate of international confidence risks putting the cart before the horse. We and our colleagues in OD will be considering on 12 December how the UK



can contribute to a resumption of East/West dialogue and thus to an international climate in which arms control negotiations would be more likely to succeed.

5. The conventional wisdom is that some change of atmosphere in East/West relations is a precondition for any successful major new arms control initiative, assuming that one can be identified. Indeed, it would be argued that the potential benefit of any well-founded initiative would merely be dissipated if the wider political atmosphere is unreceptive. That again emphasises the length of timescale involved. Certainly I accept that it is necessary to go on trying to improve the atmosphere for East/West relations and to re-constitute the political dimension for managing our differences with the East. But the question still remains whether there may not be some substantial initiative to propose in the arms control field, for consideration alongside whatever steps we agree should be taken to improve the atmosphere.

6. The papers before us suggest not. Yet a number of outside commentators (for example the Bishop of Birmingham and ex-US Defence Secretary Macnamara) suggest that there could be. Certainly I am not myself enough of an expert to propose what or where that new initiative could be. I accept that it is easy for those outside government to call for initiatives when they are not responsible for thinking through the security and defence implications of striking a new position at the negotiating table and we must recognise that the constraints of a US election year will compound the difficulties. But like Michael Heseltine, I am by no means entirely convinced that there is no truly fresh approach deserving consideration. I should myself be disposed, if colleagues agree, to look more fundamentally and more widely for just such an approach. I cannot be optimistic but I think we should at least try to agree on the right method for taking forward our thinking on this question.

7. Several possibilities spring immediately to mind. First, I hope that within NATO it may be possible for Britain to take something



of a lead in defining and shaping the way in which the Alliance reconstitutes the dialogue dimension of its policy, which will have such a critical impact on the prospects for arms control business across the board. I would not exclude, a priori, that we might seek to encourage some re-examination within NATO as to whether we are right to assign to the concept of arithmetical parity its current importance as a necessary ingredient of any arms control agreement.

8. Second, my officials have already begun to review the prospects for a better Western performance at the UN in the light of the disappointing results this year over arms control (the result of Soviet propaganda efforts, non-aligned extremism and lack of Western unity). I have now instructed them as a matter of urgency to consider whether there are any new steps which HMG could take in the area of multilateral disarmament, to respond to public concern for more progress while preserving our essential security interests. This review will cover both institutional and policy elements of the Alliance's approach.

9. We also need urgently to examine the implications of a possible INF/START merger if events were to move in that direction next year, particularly as they may affect our position on the UK deterrent in relation to arms control. I have instructed my officials in cooperation with their MOD counterparts to take this work forward.

10. But none of this should distract us from the need for progress on other stages and in other fora. The temporary hiatus in nuclear arms control negotiations reinforces the need, in political terms and in terms of domestic public opinion, to examine very carefully the possibilities for constructive activity on the existing and immediate arms control agenda. With this in mind, I suggest that at our meeting on 14 December we must attend seriously to three areas in which more immediate guidance is needed by officials. These are the MBFR negotiations in Vienna; the CDE, which opens in Stockholm in January; and the British approach to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for whose review conference in 1985



preparatory work has already begun. I am circulating with this minute notes by FCO/MOD (and, in the case of the NPT note, Department of Energy) officials about each of these three subjects, together with recommendations which we are asked to endorse.

11. MBFR and CDE are, of course, among the specific areas in which Premier Trudeau in his recent initiative has suggested that a new political impulse could be helpful. As regards the talks in Vienna I remain sceptical whether much can be done without yielding important Western principles. But we need to consider the tactical possibilities with an open mind, in conjunction with our American and German allies: Richard Luce who visited the negotiations last week will be able to give colleagues a first-hand impression.

12. The Stockholm Conference is clearly an important occasion, if only because it is upon us so soon. At present it is seen as affording a real opportunity for a new approach towards a limited objective, namely strengthening European security as it affects conventional forces. We need to ask the experts whether it can be anything more than that. If not, then it is necessary to prevent expectations rising too high upon the Conference. And, once it is under way, we shall need to ensure that this effort does not degenerate into a mere propaganda forum. It looks as though it will probably be a long haul towards its restricted objective. But we need to be sure there is no other alternative to be taken up.

13. On non-proliferation, Argentina's development of a uranium enrichment plant is a timely reminder of the importance of maintaining and if possible strengthening the NPT regime. The attached paper by officials seeks OD(D)'s endorsement of the UK approach to this issue and of an urgent study, drawing on expert advice from outside Whitehall, of ways in which the attractions of NPT adherence might be enhanced.

14. There are other important areas of arms control which we

/shall



shall need to keep under review in OD(D), although they are not for immediate decision at this meeting. These include chemical weapons (on which I understand Michael Heseltine may wish to present some considerations at a later date) and the whole question of arms control in outer space, with particular reference to anti-satellite systems. We shall also need to press the United States to consult us closely about their programmes for defence against ballistic missile attack (President Reagan's 'Star Wars' speech): these have far-reaching implications which could among other things affect the future of the ABM Treaty and thus the longer term credibility of Britain's independent strategic nuclear deterrent. Background notes on these subjects by officials are also attached, for information.

15. I invite my colleagues (1) to consider the right strategy for the UK to adopt at this present critical stage: (2) to note the overall picture in the arms control field, as summarised in the papers prepared by officials: (3) to endorse the specific recommendations on MBR, CDE and the NPT.

16. I am sending copies of this minute to colleagues in OD(D).

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 December, 1983

MBFR

(Note by FCO/MOD Officials)

State of the Negotiations

1. The West's aim is to whittle down the East's preponderance in military manpower in Central Europe.
2. The Western draft treaty tabled in 1982 provides for parity at 900,000 men in the reduction area; agreement on initial data; specified reduction amounts; and effective verification.
3. Eastern proposals tabled in 1983 also speak of parity at 900,000 men; this figure would be reached via small-scale US-Soviet reductions outside a treaty framework; a subsequent freeze on forces and armaments on the basis of an open "political" undertaking; and self-determined reduction quotas.
4. The talks are stalled by the Soviet contention that approximate manpower parity now exists and that asymmetrical Eastern reductions to reach parity are not called for. This has been supported by spurious Eastern forces' figures which we believe now understate the total by some 240,000 men (about 20% of the total). The Russians have also been unwilling to accept effective verification.
5. The Russians have recently made a number of concessions over verification which, although inadequate, come close to Western requirements. But they are unwilling to discuss these further without the West's first accepting the Eastern "concept" of a data-less agreement; this would perpetuate existing Eastern superiority. Also, being perceived as a back-down by the West in face of Eastern obduracy, it could have an effect in other disarmament negotiations.
6. Although not sanguine of the outcome, the American MBFR negotiator, the Germans and others consider that the West should be prepared to advance fresh terms, not including agreement on

/initial

initial data (on the basis of which reduction amounts can be easily ascertained); hoping, in return, to secure Eastern verification concessions. The hope is that the latter, retroactively, should provide assurance we seek on numbers. The UK regards this as wishful thinking.

7. However, the German National Security Council has endorsed an option based on this concept which the Americans have collaborated in improving. In informal UK/US/FRG liaison we have put forward a different proposal intended to avoid certain pitfalls.

8. The latest position is that, by Presidential decision, the Americans have decided not to move for the moment; the Germans will not go it alone. The debate on the Western side is between those who nonetheless hanker after a major move now, (likely to involve conceding initial data agreement) and the UK - normally supported in Vienna by the Belgians, Italians, Greeks, and Turks (five in all, of the twelve Western members), who remain sceptical whether the West should offer up positions of principle for purely tactical reasons.

9. The Russians (who must know what is afoot) are unlikely to budge while new proposals are in the offing, which could concede some Soviet objectives. The terms that the West requires are more likely to be achieved if we continue to point up patent insufficiencies in the East's position - especially over verification and identification of reductions. We are seeking NATO support for this - the only policy currently available; but some Americans and the Germans are unenthusiastic, as success might queer the pitch for their option if it comes forward.

10. Dr David Owen has argued for a "political solution" in which Ministers might "by-pass the data issue", and impose a settlement based on verifying withdrawals and residual manpower. Mr Trudeau may also have something of this sort in mind.

/11.

11. Without agreement on initial data we could not know in advance the reductions the East would take. It would then be unlikely that we could accurately monitor the reduction process, and ensure that the Russians withdrew all forces necessary to enable parity to be reached. Nor could we expect the Russians to accept the very stringent verification measures necessary (in the absence of agreed data and known reductions), to satisfy the West that parity was maintained.

12. The State of the Negotiations is set out in fuller detail in the Annex A to this note.

Recommendations

13. Ministers are invited to agree that:

- (a) in the light of recent Eastern moves an evaluation within NATO of the Western position at the MBFR negotiations would be timely and appropriate;
- (b) without prejudging the question of the political and tactical desirability of any Western move, UK officials should contribute to intra-Alliance efforts to devise a tactical counter move, basing themselves upon the principles underlying the UK Paper already approved by FCO/MOD Ministers and circulated informally to the Americans and the Germans;
- (c) in the event of any consensus beginning to emerge within the Alliance, UK officials should refer again to Ministers for instructions;
- (d) at this stage it would be premature to consider a meeting at Foreign Minister level in Vienna, though this possibility in due course, even in circumstances short of complete agreement being within grasp, should not be excluded;
- (e) Ministers should keep the negotiations under regular review in OD(D).

MBFR

State of the Negotiations: The Details

1. The present Western position is contained in the comprehensive draft treaty tabled on 8 July 1982. This calls for reductions by all direct participants in 4 stages over 7 years to a combined collective ceiling of approximately 900,000 ground and airforce manpower on each side. The first stage would be a 30,000/13,000 reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively.
2. The Western concept, in essence is: agreement on initial force levels followed by quantified, staged and monitored reductions, to an agreed and verifiable common ceiling. It is thus predicated upon the assumption that the existing national manpower totals for both sides would be specified in the treaty, and would therefore have to be agreed at the outset. Eastern manpower strength is, however, the subject of major dispute. The East claims that existing force levels on each side are already roughly equal at just under one million. But long-standing and reliable Western intelligence shows that in fact Eastern force levels are over 1.2 million and all attempts to get the East to disaggregate their data in order to identify the discrepancy have failed.
3. As an integral part of this draft treaty, the West proposes a set of confidence building and verification measures (associated measures) designed to monitor the reductions taken and to verify compliance with the residual ceilings. The essential features of the verification elements of this set of associated measures are:
 - a. an exchange of information, at the time of signature, covering data on all ground and airforce personnel on each side;
 - b.

- b. declared exit/entry points with observers through which all ground and airforce personnel not indigenous to the area of reductions should enter and leave the area;
 - c. the right to carry out up to 18 inspections in any calendar year in the territory of the other side to monitor compliance with the treaty;
 - d. a commitment by each side not to interfere with the national technical means of verification at the disposal of the other (eg satellite photography).
4. The Eastern response during 1983 has been a 3-part proposal offering:
- a. an initial Soviet and US reduction of 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively, as an earnest of commitment, outside any treaty framework and on the basis of mutual example;
 - b. a political commitment by all direct participants to freeze the level of their forces and armaments while further agreement of reductions to parity is negotiated.
 - c. to circumvent the data dispute, each side to decide for itself what reductions it needs to make, in the framework of a single agreement, to reach the agreed collective ceiling of 900,000 on either side, by a continuous unstaged reductions process over three years. It was indicated that if the West would buy this approach, the East would be more forthcoming over the verification of residual force levels.
5. In its unvarnished form this Eastern proposal thus amounts in essence to: no agreement on initial force levels necessary; followed by unquantified (except for the initial US/Soviet step) and unmonitored reductions; leading to eventual arrival at a common ceiling, at which point verification would establish that each side had indeed arrived at the stated goal.

6. To the optimist it might appear that this way of proceeding would afford the East the opportunity quietly to remove its extra 200,000 men by making reductions beyond those required by its own declared figures. Were it the case that we knew the East to be looking for a face-saver, this prescription might have some attraction. But there is no evidence of a wish on the Eastern side to draw down its unacknowledged superiority by this means. (Nor would they need to wait for an agreement in order to do so.) Indeed if anything the East has gone out of its way to disabuse the West of any such expectation.

7. There has been no narrowing of the gap between the two sides on the central question about whose figures are right as to existing force levels. If the West were therefore to accept an agreement on the lines of the Eastern approach described above, this would imply one of two things, either:

- a. abandoning the Western objective that the negotiations should lead to ceilings on force strengths at a level of equality, or
- b. keeping the notional aim of equality, but accepting that a treaty entered into on the basis of explicit disagreement as to initial force strengths could after reductions result in an even less favourable force ratio for the West; and would almost certainly reanimate the existing data dispute several years later under circumstances in which Western force size would be limited by treaty obligations.

8. In the last month or so the East has nevertheless deployed some concessions in response to Western pressure on the verification aspects of their proposals above. For example:

- a. it now offers some exchange of information, before signature of an agreement, including numerical specification of the bulk of the reductions that the East would take. But this would be on the basis of its

own figures (which we do not accept) and would thus cover at most only some 79,000 of the 314,000 or so reductions necessary. Detailed ~~dis~~aggregated strength data on the ground and air force personnel remaining after reduction has not been offered;

b. It would invite observers to be present at the reductions of the most substantial contingents involved in the East's overt reduction commitments and would offer that all Eastern movements in and out of the area after completion of the reduction process should take place through designated points;

c. it is ready to consider some on-site inspection following the end of the reduction process and to say in advance that refusal of a request for inspection would be exceptional.

9. Taken together these elements represent some movement toward meeting expressed Western concerns and the wording of them has been clearly chosen for that effect. To that extent they justify Western firmness in Vienna in forcing the East to concentrate on verification without ourselves paying a price in terms of other Western desiderata. A major defect nonetheless remains that most of the Eastern verification measures would be postponed until after the completion of the reductions process and do not therefore provide adequately for monitoring that process itself. Moreover, the Western set of measures, to which the East now presents itself as attempting to approximate, were designed for an accord based on agreement about existing force levels and therefore agreement also about the precise staged reductions which each side would take. If, as under the Eastern proposal, the whole onus were to be placed upon verification only of the end result, with initial force strengths still in dispute and the actual reductions process taken largely on trust, a far more stringent set of verification measures would be required. These have yet to be properly devised; given the size of the task, they may not be realistically feasible let alone negotiable.

10. There is nevertheless some feeling within the Alliance that, if only for tactical purposes, the West now needs to 'respond', and that this should be done by seeking to explore whether there are any elements in the Eastern position as it now stands which could be turned to Western advantage, even if this means presenting a counter-proposal which we know would have little chance of actually being accepted. Should the West be prepared to be less demanding about the need for comprehensive agreement at the outset on existing force strengths, if in return the East can be brought further towards the Western position on verification? So far informal Western thinking has centred on trying to make something out of subparagraphs a) and b) of the Eastern position at paragraph 4 above, while substituting the draft Western Treaty for subparagraph c) of the Eastern approach. The underlying notion here would be to permit some Soviet and US reductions as a first step without prior agreement on force levels; and then to use the subsequent period (which the East in its proposal describes as a freeze) to establish by means of previously agreed verification measures the actual force strengths either of all direct participants, or at least of Soviet forces. Complete overall force strengths would have to be established, either by physical verification or by data exchange or a mixture of the two, before proceeding to reductions to the agreed collective ceiling of 900,000 as in the Western draft Treaty.

11. The Western aim of agreed data before major reductions is thus "saved" by postponing it one stage, assuming the required verification measures could be evolved and agreed. If any such approach were to be successful in practice, it would still require the East to remove its unacknowledged manpower superiority before the verification process was carried out. And this may seem inherently unlikely (and perhaps for that reason also unacceptable to the East). There are also important questions about how safely to accomplish an initial Soviet/US reduction step eg whether to insist on specific numerical quantified sub-ceilings on

/Soviet

Soviet and US forces after that step; the preferred size of such initial reductions, given the possibility that the process might never go beyond the freeze phase; and whether acceptance of a freeze in MBFR carries unacceptable implications for other arms control negotiations.

12. When the Administration recently put to the White House certain suggestions for exploring such a move within the Alliance and perhaps then putting it to the East, President Reagan decided against any new move for the time being. We too, at the official level, had some reservations about the versions of any such move that the Germans, for example, were recently toying with. But we have said that, subject to approval by Ministers, we would be prepared to participate in intra-Alliance consultations to see whether a counter move can be devised that meets essential Western security criteria. And indeed, we circulated informally to the Americans and the Germans (with the approval of FCO and MOD Ministers) some preliminary ideas in that direction (which are at Annex B).

13. The Western group of negotiators in Vienna have recommended to the North Atlantic Council that in the light of the tactical situation the West now needs to evaluate its position. Mr Trudeau's suggestion that the West should respond to latest eastern moves goes in the same sense (he seems to have moves on German lines in mind). But there is less justification for Mr Trudeau's other proposal (which echoes Dr Owen under the last Labour Government) that Foreign Ministers of all direct participants should meet soon in Vienna to impart new political momentum to the negotiations. The most likely outcome of that would be a propaganda field day for the Warsaw Pact and heightened public expectations which could only be satisfied at the cost of conceding central Western negotiating principles.

UK PAPER FOR TRILATERAL GROUP : POSSIBLE MOVE IN MBFRAIM

1. To probe Eastern intentions by exploring two aspects of the East's February 1983 proposals: initial US-Soviet reductions separate from subsequent overall reductions to parity; and the suggestion that mutually acceptable measures might be worked out for verifying residual ceilings.
2. The West would convey readiness to be flexible over the requirement for agreed initial data, in return for Eastern willingness to accept effective verification. Agreement on data would have to be achieved before a second phase of reductions. Our requirement for large asymmetrical reductions to reach parity would remain.

ELEMENTS OF OPTION

3. "Minimum" Soviet-US reductions (say 60,000 Soviet and 25,000 US ground forces) to be followed by agreement on residual ceilings (of about 400,000 for Soviet ground forces, and 200,000 for the US). Agreement that these ceilings had been reached would provide us with our essential data base. Already-tabled Western measures for verification should apply.
4. A "goodwill clause" or "mutual political commitment" along the lines of the West's December 1979 Proposal to cover all direct participants would take effect after Soviet-US residual force levels had been reached. This commitment would be for a fixed period, during which agreement might be reached on data and the process for reductions to parity. The West's Draft Treaty of July 1982 would remain on the Table as a suitable framework for this stage.

/RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR REDUCTIONS

5. Large Soviet reductions would give assurance of Soviet commitment and would secure significant military benefit for the West.
6. Specifying 'minimum' Soviet reductions and allowing extra withdrawals to be made would allow some ambiguity, thereby offering the Russians a means of escaping from their present data predicament.
7. All units withdrawn, whether or not specified, would be prenotified and would pass through permanent checkpoints. The procedure would be the same as for all movements after signature of an agreement.
8. We could also consider specifying reductions in terms of lists of units withdrawn. Prior agreement on these lists, and overt observation of the withdrawal, would itself provide considerable assurance about overall numbers. There would be the additional advantage of building even more directly on the Soviet 'mutual example' concept, which involves detailed exchanges of lists.

RATIONALE FOR CEILINGS

9. Ceilings would broadly reflect Western data. But this could have an attraction for the Russians, since it would involve fewer Soviet reductions than a lower ceiling reflecting official Soviet figures.

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10. The US ceiling after a 25,000 withdrawal would be about 190,000. But a rounded figure, of about 200,000 US forces (my para 3), would convey that our data calculations were approximate only; this would ease the presentational problem for the Russians. But if they preferred the lower figure, we could concede this.

VERIFICATION

11. Even a detailed breakdown of data would be unlikely to allow totally fool-proof verification and such a breakdown would anyway be difficult to negotiate. In connection with the verification of super power sub-ceilings after the initial phase of reductions, we should aim at a data breakdown sufficient, in company with the standard associated measures package, for the purposes of adequately verifying these ceilings. We could draw, in addition, on direct observation of the asymmetrical reductions.

OTHER ELEMENTS

12. To provide the obligations on other participants on which the Soviet Union would insist, we could go along with the idea of a political understanding, now put forward by the East in connection with a freeze, and previously by us in the "goodwill" clause of our December 1979 Proposal. An obligation on all participants is needed an immediate contractual freeze not based on data agreement would be even less satisfactory.

OVERALL POLICY

13. The proposition would have similarities with the West's interim agreement of December 1979. But instead of agreement on initial data there would be the prospect of substantial and observed Soviet reductions leading to specified ceilings. It builds on current Eastern concepts. At some stage in negotiations we could consider amending our position on some other points at issue.

14. We would have responded to the recent Eastern proposals; and shown flexibility over initial data agreement, to encourage Eastern movement on verification. The Russians might find enough of interest for them in this to enter into a meaningful dialogue.

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE)

(Note by FCO/MOD Officials)

State of the Negotiations

1. As agreed at the Helsinki Preparatory Meeting in October, the CDE will begin in Stockholm on 17 January next year. The opening may stimulate public anticipation since it will provide a new forum for East/West discussions about arms control at a time of considerable international tension and when the other major negotiations are in baulk (MBFR/START) or have been suspended (INF). Attendance by senior political figures at the opening is likely to increase such interest.

2. In the Conference's first phase, signatories of the Helsinki Final Act will attempt to negotiate a set of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) "designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe". The mandate lays down that these shall be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, ie up to the Urals. In the Western view, CSBMs are concrete non-reduction measures which set rules for military behaviour and inter-change. They should be designed to enhance mutual understanding, institutionalise East/West military behaviour over time and thus contribute to stabilising the military situation in a crisis. The aims of CSBMs is thus:-
 - (a) to reduce secrecy
 - (b) to promote stability and inhibit the use of force
 - (c) to establish agreed standards and patterns of peacetime military activity
 - (d) to inhibit attack options
 - (e) to enhance warning and thus facilitate timely political decision in periods of tension or crisis.

3. The East's objectives at CDE are tempered by their overall view that increased information-sharing and openness (transparency) is a Western device for penetrating the greater level of secrecy

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with which the Warsaw Pact can cloak its military activities. They are therefore likely to propose CSBMs which involve the minimum amount of verification on their side (they clearly dislike the unprecedented "droit de regard" over the European parts of the Soviet Union which the CDE mandate implies). They may also seek to negotiate constraints where these would disadvantage the West eg by limiting the size and type of exercises allowed. They will also introduce a number of declaratory proposals such as the non-use of force, regional nuclear-free zones and the freezing of force levels or military budgets. Because such declarations would rest merely on statements of good faith, they would not materially increase confidence and might actually undermine Western security. However, they are likely to be used by the East to reinforce their "peace offensive". The West may come under pressure from public opinion and the Neutral/Non-Aligned nations to support such superficially appealing declarations rather than to persevere with our own practical, if more realistically limited, proposals.

4. Western objectives are, in line with the aims set out in paragraph 2 above, to work for the early adoption of a set of CSBMs which:-

- provide for a mutual exchange of military information;
- establish a clear pattern of normal military behaviour through notification;
- establish an effective verification mechanism including direct observation and a mandatory consultative mechanism;
- have regard for the principle of reciprocity and entail no obligations, the application of which would be more advantageous to the East than to the West.

5. To this end, work is proceeding in NATO on refining a set of proposals whose outline was agreed by the North Atlantic Council in 1980 (when it was thought that the package might actually be deployed at Madrid). These are at Annex. It is intended to complete work on the NATO package by Christmas so that Governments

/can

can approve its contents by early January in time for final endorsement by the North Atlantic Council around 11 January. The West is also emphasising that CDE remains subject to the overall control of the CSCE process. This is essential, since the East seeks to separate disarmament from questions of human rights observance to which they are tied by the Helsinki Final Act.

6. Some practical difficulties remain to be resolved before a full Alliance consensus on the NATO package. For example, on the measure concerning the extension of facilities for accredited military personnel, it will be important to ensure that existing restrictions on Soviet attaches in this country, which are close to an irreducible minimum, are not altered in a way which endangers our security. We shall similarly wish to make sure that the right of inspection upon the territory of a participating state is compatible with our own need to deny access to certain sensitive defence facilities or activities in this country. A further substantive point arises over the measure concerning prior notification of military activities within the CDE zone. At present the draft NATO proposal would not require any notification of arrival into the zone of military forces from outside it. Such forces would only become notifiable if and when they deployed from their arrival bases to take part in a notifiable activity within the CDE zone. Similarly, notification would not be required of the movement of such forces out of the CDE zone to some other destination. This reflects the American position that CSBMs should not in any way touch the transit of American forces through Europe for rapid deployment purposes outside the NATO area or the deployment from Europe of US forces for such purposes. Most other Allies consider this to be a conspicuous omission from the NATO package, which renders it vulnerable to criticism since nations could legitimately argue that substantial arrivals of troops in Europe would be potentially threatening and of direct security concern to all CDE states. The omission also offers at least a theoretical loop-hole which the East could seek to exploit for movements of its own military forces.

/British

British officials have therefore argued so far, along with many other NATO partners, that this omission can be made good by providing that notification of such movements should be included on a similar basis to alert activities, ie by notification at the time of arrival in, or movement out of the CDE zone, but not in advance. The French have suggested compromise language on this point, but it is uncertain whether the Americans will yield.

7. The prospects for early achievements at the Stockholm conference should not be over-rated given the differing objectives among many of the thirty-five participants, the present strains in East/West relations and the detailed and complicated subject matter. It is nevertheless a Western interest to establish the Stockholm forum as a serious addition to the multilateral arms control process in the conventional field. Not only would CSBMs on Western terms be worth having because they would contribute to security in Europe; but, if this first phase of a CDE were to prove successful (it will be reviewed at a further CSCE meeting in Vienna in 1986), the process could lead on to measures involving military constraints and perhaps force limitations or reductions in the longer run. This prospect need not be pre-judged at this stage and would of course depend among other things on whether the MBFR negotiations at Vienna continue indefinitely without reaching agreement.

Recommendations

8. Ministers are invited to:-
- (a) endorse the general line taken by UK officials in the approach to the CDE as described above;
 - (b) to take note that they will shortly be asked to approve a package of detailed NATO proposals for CDE and
 - (c) to note that it will be appropriate in due course to put in hand a study of the longer term implications

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for conventional force arms control (including MBFR), if it proves possible to achieve a successful first phase of CDE by 1986.

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NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

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Document Date: 21 November 1983

Destruction Date: 17 June 2013

Signed:

J. Gray

PREM Records Team

START

(Note by FCO/MOD Officials)

State of the Negotiations

1. The US/Soviet START talks began in June 1982. It is assumed that despite the break in INF, they will resume as normal in the New Year. Present negotiating positions are briefly as follows:-

The Soviet Position (on the explicit assumption that there were to be no new NATO LRINF deployments).

A draft treaty, amounting essentially to an extrapolation of the SALT 2 Treaty, proposes reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by 1990 to:-

	1800 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers
of which	1200 could be MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with ALCMs
of which	1080 could be MIRVed ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs)
of which	680 could be MIRVed ICBMs.

The Russians have now relaxed their previous position which would have sought to limit Ohio/Typhoon class SSBNs to only four to six submarines on each side. This therefore permits the US Trident submarine programme to go ahead, together with deployment of the D5 missile. The Russians have also relaxed their position by allowing some deployments of ALCMs, provided the US would agree to ban GLCMs and SLCMs of over 600 km range. Although, as is clear from the above, their primary counting unit continues to be launchers, the Russians have also proposed that there should be a single combined aggregate of ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons corresponding to the launcher ceilings. They have not yet provided a specific figure, but claim that it will be less than the current US total (around 10,000).

/The United States Position

The United States Position

A draft treaty proposing that each side reduce from the present approximately 7500 ballistic missile warheads to 5000 warheads on no more than a limited number of ICBM and SLBM launchers (the Americans are no longer wedded to their original stipulation of 850 ballistic missile launchers and seem to be thinking of a figure around 1200). The Americans would also like a direct limit on ballistic missile throwweight at some unspecified point between the current Soviet total of 5.6 million kgs and the current US total 1.8 million kgs; but they have dropped their earlier numerically quantified sub-limits on heavy and medium ICBM launchers. In addition the Americans are proposing a separate sub-limit on heavy bombers (including Backfire) at 400 on each side, with a maximum limit of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber. By stating that all strategic systems are in principle on the table, the Americans have indicated that they would not any longer exclude limitations on strategic nuclear sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Up to now the Americans have refused to aggregate ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a combined total, on the grounds that a gravity bomb or a slow flying ALCM cannot be compared with a ballistic missile warhead in terms of the threat it poses. More recently however the Americans have for the first time indicated that they would be prepared to consider trade-offs that would take into account Soviet advantages in missiles and US advantages in bombers in ways providing each side maximum flexibility, so long as they would result in a more stable balance of forces. This is a further sign of genuine flexibility on the US side.

The key elements are thus:

1. Reductions to 5000 ballistic missile warheads-
2. Flexible approach to reducing disparity in the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missiles;
3. Substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles;
4. Effective verification.

In addition, the Americans have tabled a number of nuclear

/confidence

confidence building measures, such as for example the prior notification of all missile test launches. Out of deference to Congress, they have also recently introduced the idea of "build-down" (removing more than one old warhead for every new one deployed) but have not specified details.

Prospects

Both sides have moved some way from their initial positions, but there has been little genuine negotiation, with the Soviet Union holding progress in START hostage to the INF talks. Viewed purely in terms of the nuclear accountancy, the distance between the US and Soviet positions is not so great as to put an agreement in principle beyond reach. The essential points to be dealt with are:

1. How to match Soviet launcher numbers with US warhead numbers in terms of the unit of account;
2. How to strike the balance between limits on the destructive capability of Soviet missiles and limits on current US advantages in heavy bombers (including heavy bombers with ALCMs);
3. How to deal with the Soviet Backfire bomber;
4. How to deal with nuclear long-range SLCMs.

But the prospects for progress in START do not depend primarily on these technical issues. The real question is whether, after failing in their objectives in INF, the Russians will be willing to negotiate for an early agreement in START during the year of a US Presidential election campaign. Even if the Russians wish to do so, it seems very likely that they will have to make some adjustment in their START negotiating position to take account of the fact that they have not succeeded in preventing NATO's LRINF deployment programme. It is thus possible that the Russians will seek to re-introduce the GLCM/Pershing 2 factor in the START context, which in turn would

/oblige

oblige the US to consider some analogous move vis-a-vis the Soviet SS20.

In technical terms again, this complication could probably be accommodated. But it is by no means self-evident that the prospects for an outline agreement in such a modified START negotiation would therefore be improved in the short term. Moreover, some American analysts take the view that the Russians will not wish to do anything too early in strategic arms control which might improve President Reagan's prospects of re-election. On the other hand, if they hold off until they are convinced that President Reagan is going to win anyway, it may be too late to achieve a breakthrough during 1984.

If the Russians decide to stay away from the INF negotiating table for any length of time, the focus for public expectation on nuclear arms control will turn naturally to START. This will happen regardless of whether the Pershing 2/GLCM and SS20 problem has itself been transposed to an enlarged START context ("merger"). We should also recognise that in so far as the British/French nuclear deterrents are seen as having been one of the stumbling blocks to agreement on INF, this question is likely to recur with renewed force in START. HMG will be pressed to be more specific about the circumstances in which we would acknowledge the relevance of arms control to the British strategic deterrent, if we argue (as we shall have to) that it has no place in START any more than in INF. The Trudeau initiative for a five-power nuclear conference is a portent. Forthcoming decisions on UK Trident configuration and any consequences for arms control will be relevant.

INF

(Note by FCO/MOD Officials)

State of the Negotiations

1. The negotiations were discontinued on 23 November when the Soviet delegation walked out following the Bundestag vote in favour of deployments. A Soviet statement on 24 November issued in the name of Andropov has said that further participation in the talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe was impossible. The counter-measures announced in the same Soviet statement were:-

- (a) Abrogation of the moratorium on deployment of medium range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR;
- (b) Acceleration of preparatory work to deploy in Czechoslovakia and the GDR "operational - tactical missiles of increased range" (this is thought to mean the SS23 replacement of Scud; and the 900 km SS22 replacement of SS12/Scaleboard which has up to now been deployed only in the Soviet Union);
- (c) Soviet systems to be deployed "in ocean areas and in seas" (it is not clear whether this means some modification in planned SSBN deployments or the introduction of Soviet SLCMs which, it is estimated, will be deployable from 1984).

The statement also says that other (unidentified) measures would be taken.

2. At the time that the negotiations were discontinued, the respective negotiation positions were as follows:-

3. The US Position. Readiness to consider any interim solution on the way to zero, provided it would respect key principles of balance, exclusion of third party systems, no shifting of the problem eastwards, verification and no degradation of NATO's conventional capability. This position was refined in September by making it clear to the Russians that

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in any interim solution an appropriate proportion of Pershing 2s would be reduced, some limitations on longer range INF aircraft could be considered, and that within a global ceiling the US would deploy in Europe a number which matched (but did not exceed) the SS20s which the Russians would deploy from their global entitlement against NATO Europe. On an illustrative basis, the Americans suggested that the global LRINF missile warhead ceiling on each side might be 420, with the expectation that the proportions deployed by the Russians in the West and in the East respectively would be of the order of two-thirds to one third.

4. The Soviet Position. Towards the end of the last round the Russians had modified their version of the balance of so-called medium range systems in Europe. They dropped their claim to include on the Western side the FB1-11 bombers based in the US, the US F4 Phantom aircraft in Europe and also reduced their count for A6 and A7 carrier-based aircraft within range of the Soviet Union. They had earlier accepted that the UK Vulcan aircraft were no longer relevant even by their own criteria. The result of the Soviet adjustment is to leave NATO, by the Russians' own admission, with only half as many medium range systems as the Soviet Union even if all the British and French missiles and aircraft are included. This is a notable acknowledgement that their earlier statement of the so-called balance was spurious.

5. The substantive Soviet negotiating position remained to the end an attempt to secure agreement for a continuing high number of SS20s facing Europe, with no new US deployments permitted. But during the last round the Russians twice reduced the precise number. First from 162 missiles (their calculation of the number of British and French missile launchers) to 140 (allowing 420 SS20 warheads, which is the Soviet calculation of British and French warhead numbers). Then in an ambiguous series

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of informal contacts with Ambassador Nitze on 12/13 November the Russians appeared to offer to reduce SS20s in Europe to 122 provided the whole of NATO's deployment programme was cancelled: this they described as each side reducing by a figure of 572 warheads. The earlier version of this offer (subsequently disavowed publicly) appeared to "concede" that no reference to British or French systems need be made in an INF agreement and that the 122 SS20s in Europe could be offset against any future Soviet claim in another negotiating context to seek compensation for British and French systems. But since the Russians still wished to preserve a monopoly of SS20s here and now, the "concession" was little more than a play on words. The Russians did not sustain this line and indeed have since tried widely to give the impression that the idea came from the Americans in the first place.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STAR WARS SPEECH OF 23 MARCH: NEW
DEPARTURES ON STRATEGIC DEFENCE

(Note by FCO/MOD Officials)

1. In his speech of 23 March about a comprehensive and long term effort to develop a programme of defensive measures against offensive nuclear missiles, President Reagan undertook that the US would act in a manner "consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognising the need for close consultations with our Allies". In his message to the Prime Minister of the same date, President Reagan said he was very conscious that strategic defensive systems raised certain problems and ambiguities. In a message to the Secretary of State for Defence of 25 March, Mr Weinberger affirmed that the Administration would wish to explain to the UK in more detail American thinking about the new effort launched by the President. He undertook to provide additional information on the initiative and to suggest appropriate consultation arrangements.

2. Since then there have been some bilateral contacts between British and American technical experts, but otherwise no real consultation on the wider policy issues involved, though the Americans were due to raise the subject at NATO Ministerial meetings in Brussels attended by the Foreign and the Defence Secretaries last week. As Mr Heseltine pointed out to the US Deputy Secretary of Defence on 21 October, the implications could be very far reaching. Apart from wider questions affecting Western security strategy and deterrence policy, there are also implications for the future of the ABM treaty in its current form, which in turn could affect the credibility and indeed the viability of Britain's independent strategic nuclear deterrent in the longer run.

3. FCO and MOD officials have therefore prepared a short UK "non-Paper" setting out some of the political and technical questions which seem to us to be raised by President Reagan's 23 March initiative, and on which fuller information about US

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

thinking is required if we are to be able to brief UK Ministers properly. This "non-Paper" will be passed shortly at official level to the State Department and Department of Defence via HM Embassy at Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT: ISSUES ACTIVE AT THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

(Note by FCO/MOD Officials)

I. Introduction

1. In contrast to the major East/West negotiations, few areas of wider multilateral diplomacy offer prospects for arms control or disarmament which would be consistent with UK national interests. Only in the chemical weapons (CW) negotiations in the CD, and perhaps in discussions on arms control in outer space within the same forum, have we a good chance of advancing these. For the rest the UK, the US and to a lesser extent the rest of NATO remain on the defensive. The reason is that the chief interest of others in multilateral disarmament remains constraints on or the abolition of nuclear weapons. The neutrals and non-aligned (NNA) use these fora to concentrate on nuclear issues since the UN and the CD are the only places where they hold a hand, however poor, at the negotiating table; the Warsaw Pact countries do the same because these fora provide them with much greater propaganda opportunities than they do to the West.

II. Conference on Disarmament (CD)

2. The former Committee on Disarmament will be retitled the Conference when its next session starts in February. The 40 present members are divided between the Western Group (10), the NNA (21), China, and the East (8). Despite being "the single multilateral negotiating forum", it has in the four years of its existence produced no results. The sole prospect for an immediate agreement, a Radiological Weapons Convention of which a skeleton outline has already been agreed between the US and the Soviet Union, has been blocked for two years by NNA insistence that it deal also with wider issues. UK interests are focussed mainly on the negotiations for a total ban on chemical weapons, and - depending on the US attitude - on prospects for some progress towards arms control on military developments in outer space. Another key UK interest, nuclear testing, is

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increasingly under threat from pressure within the CD for new constraints.

III. Chemical Weapons (CW)

3. The CD's CW Working Group will resume negotiations in January on a comprehensive CW ban. Given the threat from the massive Soviet superiority in these weapons, and reports of their use in areas of Asia controlled by Communist governments, a total ban would be a major gain for Western security interests, as well as bringing presentational advantage. Verification is the main stumbling block in the negotiations, with the Russians proposing the minimum degree of on-site inspection and the West the opposite. To capitalise on strong NNA support and to put pressure on the Russians, we have proposed to our Allies that early next session the West should table a new range of proposals on verification. For our part, we intend to table a paper in February on the crucial issue of challenge inspection in cases of suspected non-compliance. The extent of serious Soviet interest in an agreement remains unclear. The failure of the US Congress to provide funds for future binary production has reduced Western leverage on the Soviet Union.

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IV. Arms Control and Outer Space

4. There is growing pressure from the NNA and all our Allies except the US for some form of restraints on military developments in outer space. The French, Canadians and Italians have made proposals in this sense; the NNA are calling for the demilitarisation of space and its dedication exclusively to peaceful purposes; and the Russians have tabled at the UN proposals for the non-use of force in space, the abolition of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and other sweeping measures. Only the US remain opposed, or at best sceptical about the merits of arms control in this area. This must influence our own view because of the need to protect the benefits we receive

5. In August the CD almost agreed on a mandate for a Working Group to discuss the prevention of an arms race in space. But at the last moment agreement was withheld by the East, probably because they did not wish attention diverted from the recently tabled Soviet draft Treaty. The Working Group is likely to be constituted at the start of the next session, with the Americans insisting on a very broad and non-negotiating mandate. The testing and deployment of nuclear weapons in space are already banned by previous treaties. There are two other areas on which there might be a temptation for the Working Group to focus: strategic defence (see separate note); and anti-satellite systems (ASATs). We have no interest in having these debated in the CD, and shall do our best to support the Americans in their inevitable efforts to prevent this.

6. In the latter category of ASATs, a British interest in seeking constraints is dictated by three factors: greater Western than Eastern dependence on satellites for intelligence

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and communications purposes; the danger of diverting defence resources and funds towards ASAT development and away from more important areas; and the risks of endangering strategic stability at a time of crisis as a result of US and Soviet ASAT competition. Neither side has yet developed or tested an ASAT system for use at high altitude. However, the Russians have already developed a low altitude ASAT capability. Starting in 1985 the Americans should start to have overtake them, but both political and strategic arguments demand that they establish at least a balance. Some Americans also entertain doubts about the verifiability of any ASAT agreement; an area which would certainly present problems.

7. Against the above background, it seems desirable to explore possible limits on the testing and deployment of ASATs at high altitude, coupled with potential limits at a later stage on low altitude ASATs, plus a range of other steps including confidence building measures. We believe that the Russians are genuinely concerned about the probable US technical superiority in this field, and, while not ready to let the US "win the arms race in outer space", would be seriously interested in some form of arms control. Detailed proposals will be put to Ministers separately. Any serious negotiation would eventually have to be done bilaterally between the Americans and the Russians. The CD is not a suitable forum to produce worthwhile results in this sensitive area. But some sort of role for the Conference may have to be accepted.

8. In the UN First Committee voting on a non-aligned/Eastern resolution on outer space, the US were the only nation to vote against, and the UK the only one to abstain; 125 countries including the rest of our Allies voted in favour. Our isolation, largely dictated by the need to show some solidarity with the Americans, might have been avoided by better Western coordination. It provides some indication of

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the strength of international feeling on the subject and of the opposition the Americans face.

V. Nuclear Testing

9. We and the US believe that a comprehensive test ban (CTB) at this stage would not be in our interests. It would not be fully verifiable and would prevent us conducting the tests essential to maintain the credibility of our national deterrent. However, our obligations under the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty commit us publicly to continuing to pursue restraints on testing. Until and unless our deterrent is included in some arms control context, negotiation on testing is arguably the only direct way in which we will also fulfil our NPT obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. The Russians, the NNA and now a number of our Allies reject our public line that, until adequate verification provisions are available, there can be no negotiations on a Treaty. They argue that concluding a CTB is merely a matter of political will. This growing pressure on us and the US to resume negotiations will make our position at the next CD session increasingly uncomfortable.

10. Our two papers (on peaceful nuclear explosions and verification) tabled at the last CD session may help to ease our position temporarily; and US undertakings to play an active role may help. It would be more useful if the US were to pursue one or both proposals we have made to them repeatedly over the past two years: ratification of their limited Treaties (1974 and 1976) with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing; and some sort of degressive threshold for tests. But the chances of the present US Administration agreeing to do are not good. We must therefore resign ourselves to an uphill battle in the CD, keeping the focus where possible on verification problems and resisting attempts to dragoon us into new negotiations. We must also recognise that we and the Americans will be isolated, with most of our Allies increasingly reluctant to keep in step with us even in public.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

(Note by Officials)

The Present Situation

1. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is crucial to international security. Efforts to this end have two main components - the political and the practical: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is fundamental to both. At the political level, we endeavour to persuade other nations to forego the nuclear weapon option; and adherence to the NPT is the touchstone of their commitment to a non-nuclear course. We also rely on practical measures to prevent easy access to nuclear weapon technology and materials by those who have not renounced the nuclear weapons option; the international safeguards and export control systems, derived from the Treaty, provide a basis for achieving this without totally stifling the world's peaceful nuclear trade.

2. Preservation and improvement of the non-proliferation regime involves a constant diplomatic battle in various multilateral fora. There are three main threads running through all the discussions:-

Firstly, the search for an international consensus on the importance of a strong non-proliferation regime, backed up by effective IAEA safeguards and balanced by assured nuclear supplies, for peaceful uses. The main signs of progress would be further significant accessions to the NPT, which now has more than 120 parties, and the negotiation of new or improved safeguards agreements between individual countries and the IAEA.

Secondly, the imposition of supplier controls in an attempt to deny to those states which reject the non-proliferation consensus key items of material, plant or technology related to nuclear weapon production. The main tools for this purpose have been the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines and ad hoc supplier meetings. Unfortunately, activities in this sphere have tended to damage the consensus by

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giving the appearance of the creation of a supplier cartel. The most enthusiastic deniers, such as the United States, have also been prepared to extend their policies in this field to the point where they even threaten damage to the peaceful nuclear activities of their friends in Western Europe and Japan. Another problem has been a tendency for commercial considerations to over-ride non-proliferation interests.

Thirdly, the skilful attempts of the principal rejectors of consensus, such as India, Pakistan and Argentina, to unravel the whole non-proliferation regime and in particular to undermine the NPT. They do this by disinformation and misrepresentation of the intentions and effects of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. They also make much capital out of the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, which they categorise as a breach of the "bargain" under which the Non-Nuclear Weapon States supposedly gave up the nuclear weapons option in return for nuclear disarmament by the existing Nuclear Weapon States.

3. Non-Proliferation discussion and negotiation is carried on in several separate and only partially connected fora. Detailed discussion on horizontal proliferation occurs mostly in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - at meetings of the Board of Governors; at the Annual General Conference; in the Committee on Assurances of Supply; and in specialised expert groups. Discussion at the United Nations General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament tends to be of a general nature and simply to reflect positions taken in the more specialised fora. However, critics of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system have attempted to create a new forum in the proposed United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. It has now been agreed that this Conference will meet in 1986 with Preparatory Committee meetings in 1984 and 1985.

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4. Matters needing immediate attention are the commencement of the third review of the NPT and the US proposal that nuclear suppliers should hold a new series of meetings to discuss further conditions for nuclear supply:-

(i) NPT Review. The NPT, which came into force in 1970, has an initial life of 25 years and has a provision for regular review every fifth year. The first Review Conference in 1975 agreed a final declaration. The second, in 1980, failed to agree, largely because of the high level of criticism of the Nuclear Weapon States by the developing countries over failure to make progress regarding nuclear disarmament (Article VI), and apparent lack of commitment to share their nuclear expertise (Article IV). Supporters of the Treaty are now concerned lest the Review Conference in 1985 should continue the downward trend, thus making it unlikely that the Treaty would be renewed in 1995. The Preparatory Committee will meet three times before the Review Conference, twice in 1984 and once in 1985. There is considerable concern amongst our Western partners about the need to prepare a strong credible agreed position in good time before discussions begin in earnest, probably at the second Preparatory Committee meeting.

(ii) US Proposal. President Reagan has twice written to friendly Heads of Government in the course of 1983 to propose the adoption by the nuclear suppliers of the requirement that any state wishing to acquire significant supplies of nuclear material, or significant items of nuclear plant, should first agree to the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities on its territory ("comprehensive safeguards"). There has been concern amongst our Western partners that a series of meetings to discuss such a proposal might have a serious negative impact on third world attitudes to the third NPT Review Conference. However, all our partners agree that we cannot

/refuse

refuse to cooperate with the US in this matter and that we should agree to participate.

Recommendations

5. Ministers are invited to agree that:

(i) the UK line in discussions of non-proliferation should be based on the following propositions:-

(a) the Non-Proliferation Treaty is working well. Proliferation is being contained (only one new state has exploded a nuclear device in the last 19 years). It must be in the interests of all states to maintain this situation, irrespective of other developments.

(b) the UK recognises its commitment "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" as called for by NPT Article VI. However, the difficulties being experienced in this endeavour must not be allowed to detract from (a) above.

(c) parties to the NPT have given important undertakings which should be recognised by suppliers when setting conditions of supply. In some cases this will mean positive discrimination in favour of NPT parties.

(d) our support for the NPT does not mean that we are not prepared to discuss non-proliferation and nuclear supply issues with non-parties, or to trade with them under appropriate conditions. However, our attitude will be consistent with the undertakings we have given to NPT parties and our appreciation for their support for our non-proliferation objectives. We still believe that full-scope safeguards are the best basis for nuclear trade.

/(ii)

- (ii) The UK should support and, where appropriate, initiate action designed to increase adherence to the NPT.
- (iii) In discussions among the nuclear suppliers, such as those proposed recently by the US, UK policy should be:
- (a) to support additional conditions on supplies of nuclear items to non-NPT Parties, provided our commercial interests are protected by the maintenance of a common position with all members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
 - (b) to support additional conditions for supplies to NPT Parties, if that is the only way to control the activities of problem countries, provided that our obligations under the Treaty are not breached and the benefits outweigh the damage which might be done to the Treaty among its members.
 - (c) to stress the importance of presenting the activities of the Suppliers Group in a way designed to minimise damage to the NPT, and to seek presentational improvements in the way existing Guidelines are applied.
- (iv) A Study Group should be established consisting of officials from FCO (Diplomatic and ODA), Department of Energy, Ministry of Defence and experts from UKAEA, CEGB etc, with the following mandate:

To identify options for increasing incentives for parties to the NPT to maintain their support and for non-parties to adhere, with particular regard to Article IV of the Treaty, (which enshrines the intention of the parties to cooperate in application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world")

Such options should be examined for
diplomatic impact,

/scientific

scientific and technical soundness,
developmental value, and
cost, including source of finance.

The Group should report to Ministers by mid-February 1984. Meanwhile, UK representatives should do nothing which might imply commitment to provide resources or money for any new scheme for the benefit of NPT parties. Proposals by other states should be referred to the Group for assessment.

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR JENKINS
 MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST
 MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD
 ED/DS17 MOD

ED/DEF DEPT
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FROM UKDEL NATO 091812Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 8 DECEMBER

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: START

1. AT THIS AFTERNOONS SESSION SHULTZ DISTRIBUTED THE
 FOLLOWING

BEGINS

THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR'S STATEMENT AT THE START TALKS THIS
 MORNING WAS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THE USSR DELEGATION STATES THAT THE CHANGE IN THE GENERAL
 STRATEGIC SITUATION CREATED WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE DEPLOYMENT
 OF US ROCKETS IN EUROPE CAUSES A NECESSITY FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO
 REVIEW ONCE AGAIN ALL THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF DIS-
 CUSSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON START. THEREFORE WE ARE ENDING THE
 PRESENT ROUND WITHOUT SETTING A DATE FOR RESUMPTION. UNQUOTE

AMBASSADOR ROWNY MADE A SHORT STATEMENT REGRETTING THAT THE
 SOVIETS WOULD NOT SET A DATE FOR RESUMPTION AND THAT THEY HAD BROUGHT
 IN EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES. KARPOV RESPONDED THAT HIS REMARKS HAD BEEN
 MADE ON INSTRUCTIONS AND THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY HAS GIVEN A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE WE REGRET THAT THE USSR HAS CHOSEN NOT TO SET A RESUMPTION
 DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND. WE CANNOT AGREE WITH SOVIET ASSERTIONS
 THAT DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRE
 THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHHOLD AGREEMENT ON A RESUMPTION DATE FOR
 THE 6TH ROUND OF START. THE US FOR ITS PART IS FULLY PREPARED TO
 CONTINUE THE REGULAR PATTERNS OF START NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE PROPOSED
 TO RESUME ROUND 6 IN EARLY FEBRUARY AND WE HOPE THE USSR WILL AGREE
 ON A DATE FOR RESUMING THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE IN THE INTEREST
 OF BOTH OUR NATIONS AND THE ENTIRE WORLD. UNQUOTE

IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTION, I WOULD SUGGEST YOU
 RESPOND ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

THE SOVIETS HAVE DECLINED TO SET A DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND

IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTION, I WOULD SUGGEST YOU RESPOND ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE DECLINED TO SET A DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE ON THEIR NORMAL PATTERN, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE A RESUMPTION FOLLOWING APPROXIMATELY A TWO-MONTH RECESS, IN FEBRUARY. WE HOPE THE SOVIETS WILL SOON AGREE TO A DATE FOR A RESUMPTION IN THAT TIMEFRAME.

-- CLEARLY IN START AS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO STIMULATE ANXIETY IN AN EFFORT TO TEST WESTERN RESOLVE. I AND MY NATO COLLEAGUES HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR OPENNESS TO A COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND OUR DESIRE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE ALSO REAFFIRMED, HOWEVER, OUR DETERMINATION TO TAKE SUCH STEPS AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE SECURITY.

-- IN THE PAST ROUND OF START NEGOTIATIONS, THE US HAS INTRODUCED NEW IDEAS WHICH RESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND CREATIVELY, AND WE LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION TO DO LIKEWISE.

ENDS

2. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION.

GRAHAM

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 081919Z DD/WJL

