

Top Secret

Confidential filing

Iraq / Iran Relations - Internal Sit

Iraq / Syria Relations

Threat to oil Supplies from the Gulf

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809

IRAQ

Pt 1 : April '80

Pt 3 : 3 June '82

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PART 3 ends:-

Algiers Tel 40 29.2.84

PART 4 begins:-

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IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

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FM ALGIERS 290915Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 29 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT

ALGERIAN MEDIATION IN IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. DECISION TO ISSUE THIS PUBLIC APPEAL WHILE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL ARE STILL ABSENT IN ADDIS CONFIRMS ALGERIA'S REAL SENSE OF CONCERN AND READINESS TO STEP UP EFFORTS AT RENEWED MEDIATION. DEVICE OF A PUBLIC APPEAL AFFORDS A WAY OF GETTING MESSAGE ACROSS TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES WITH WHOM ALGERIANS HAVE RECENTLY FOUND COMMUNICATION DIFFICULT, WHILE HELPING KEEP ALGERIA ON SIDE WITH ARAB STATES. YOU WILL NOTE ALGERIANS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO SET APPEAL IN AN ISLAMIC CONTEXT.

2. YOU MAY WISH ME TO PASS BRIEF WORD OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT TO MFA.

3. LOCAL BBC CORRESPONDENT, KIRBY, IS LIKELY TO REPORT THE APPEAL. YOU MAY LIKE TO CHECK WHETHER BBC OVERSEAS HAVE RECEIVED TEXT. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS REPORTED IN THE BBC'S RESPECTIVE VERNACULAR BROADCASTS, PARTICULARLY FARSI.

MUNRO

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SENT //RECD THRU 291022Z JC//PM

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FM ALGIERS 290835Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 39 OF 29 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS
NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 37 AND MY LETTER OF 28 FEBRUARY TO HASKELL MED: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF APPEAL TO THE BELLIGERENTS ISSUED
BY MFA SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY.

BEGINS

ALGERIA IS FOLLOWING WITH CONCERN AND DISMAY THE SERIOUS
DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE AT THE MOMENT IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE FRATERNAL COUNTRIES OF IRAQ AND IRAN. IN THIS CONFLICT
IRREPLACEABLE HUMAN POTENTIALITIES ARE BEING LOST. PRECIOUS
MATERIAL RESOURCES AND THROUGH THEM ALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND THE HIGH ASPIRATIONS OF THE TWO PEOPLE ARE BEING SEVERELY
COMPROMISED.

THE NEW DIMENSIONS WHICH THE CONFLICT IS TAKING ON REPRESENT
AN ESCALATION WHICH SERIOUSLY COMPROMISES THE STRUGGLE WHICH
UNITES THE MUSLIM WORLD IN A RELATIONSHIP OF SOLIDARITY OF INTERESTS
AND ASPIRATIONS.

IT IS THEREFORE TRAGIC THAT A WAR SHOULD CONTINUE IN WHICH
ALL OUR FUNDAMENTAL MEANS, POTENTIALITIES, AND STRENGTHS ARE USED

~~IT IS THEREFORE TRAGIC THAT A WAR SHOULD CONTINUE IN WHICH~~
ALL OUR FUNDAMENTAL MEANS, POTENTIALITIES, AND STRENGTHS ARE USED
AGAINST OURSELVES.

IT IS HIGH TIME THAT THE DESTRUCTION AND BLOODSHED SHOULD
BE REPLACED BY A DIALOGUE TO REESTABLISH PEACE AND HARMONY, AND
THAT EVERYTHING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO ACHIEVE A JUST POLITICAL
SOLUTION, BOTH IN THE HIGHER INTERESTS OF THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI
PEOPLES AND THOSE OF THE ENTIRE MUSLIM COMMUNITY.

IT IS THIS CONSTANT CONCERN, AND THIS ALONE, WHICH DETERMINES
THE ATTITUDE AND THE EFFORTS OF ALGERIA.

THAT IS THE REASON WHY ALGERIA APPEALS WITH ALL ITS HEART
THAT DIALOGUE IN FAVOUR OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE SHOULD
PREVAIL.

AND THAT IS ALSO WHY ALGERIA CALLS WITH THE SAME ARDOUR FOR
THE ESSENTIAL OPENING OF TRUE AND HONEST NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH
REMAIN THE ONLY WAY TO A REAL SOLUTION. ENDS.

2. SEE MIFT.

MUNRO

NNNN



x ref

29.

MO 14/2

28th February 1984

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING WITH THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY.
MR WEINBERGER, AT 0815 ON TUESDAY 28TH FEBRUARY 1984
AT ADMIRALTY HOUSE

Those present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
 Secretary of State for Defence

Mr Weinberger
 US Defence Secretary

Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall
 Chief of the Defence Staff

Ambassador Charles H Price II

Mr J N H Bletloch
 DUS (P)

Mr Richard Perle

Mr Lauder

Mr Knapp
 DG Marketing

Mr Burch

Major General C Powell

Mr R C Mottram
 Private Secretary of the
 Secretary of State

Mr Cassidy

2. Mr Weinberger referred to the importance of making contingency plans in advance against a possible closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Should the Iranians close the Straits, he saw the need for very prompt action because, if we delayed, resolving the situation would become that much more difficult. The Americans were in touch with other countries in the region who were as concerned as they were about the implications of the possible export of Shi'ite fundamentalism. They were, however, reluctant to commit themselves about any action in public. The Secretary of State commented that few things were more likely to encourage Shi'ite fundamentalism than a substantial US military presence in the Middle East. Such a reaction would also offer the Soviet Union the best chance to exploit the problem. Mr Weinberger commented that it was not a US presence which would stir up fundamentalist opinion since this was already inflamed.



3. The Secretary of State suggested that the Iranians would close the Straits only if their own capacity to export oil had been cut off. Perhaps in those circumstances we should look at ways in which we might help to get their oil flowing again. Mr Weinberger said that he doubted whether the Iranians would be interested in being placated in this way. They were not seeking a sensible outcome in the war itself: they were essentially demanding that the Iraqis should shoot their President and pay huge reparations. While they had not started the war, they showed no interest in stopping it. He emphasised that he was not advocating an invasion of Iran; but what was required was proper planning so that we could react quickly to events. The Secretary of State said that he accepted the need for this. He was just apprehensive about the response in the area should a significant US force be deployed there. The Americans would provide a focus for criticism. It would be better if the problem could be sorted out by the countries involved.

4. CDS referred to the alternative scenario that the war went against Iraq which then collapsed with a breakthrough of Shi'ite fundamentalism towards Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Mr Weinberger agreed that this was a Jordanian nightmare. Such a development might suit the Soviet Union whose presence in Syria would then take on a different significance. He confirmed that the Americans were trying to step up their military assistance to Jordan with whom their relations had been fitful in the past. They also hoped to do more with Oman and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of State said that a breakout of fundamentalism in this way would not necessarily suit the Soviet Union which with its large Muslim population had as much to fear from this movement as anyone else. Mr Weinberger said that the Russian Government could deal with this problem so much more easily than those which had to depend upon popular support. The Secretary of State asked whether the Americans would intend to make contact with the Soviet Union prior to any military operation in the Straits to make clear its limited nature and Mr Weinberger confirmed that this would indeed be their intention.

5. Ambassador Price asked the Secretary of State about the British Government's attitude towards the problem. The Secretary of State said that he very much agreed with Mr Weinberger's view that critical Western interests were at stake in this area. If the Straits were to be closed he would want to take a cool look at the best way of re-opening them rather than immediately moving to a military solution. He would have in mind two crucial questions: would military action make things better or worse in the region and, if we intervened, where might we find ourselves in three months time. Our experience over the deployment of the MNF to the Lebanon showed the importance of looking carefully at where events might lead us. He said this as someone who had supported the MNF deployment at the time and still believed the effort in the Lebanon had been worth trying. He would also have it in mind that it was not in the Soviet interest, at least in the short term, to exploit a crisis. DUS(P) pointed out that it was important to be clear on the objective of any Western action.



It would be much easier to justify action designed to keep open international waters than an attempt to reverse the spread of Shi'ite fundamentalism. Mr Weinberger agreed that the latter objective could not in any case be achieved by military action. The Secretary of State reverted to the importance of seeking to persuade Iraq not to take action in the first place which would prompt an Iranian attempt to close the Straits.

6. The meeting ended at 0930 hours.

[Handwritten signature]

Ministry of Defence

Mr R C Protherm
Private Secretary of the
Secretary of State

Major General C Powell
Mr Cassidy

2. Mr Weinberger referred to the importance of having contingency plans in case we do not have a complete closure of the Straits of Hormuz. He said that we should have the ability to deal with such a contingency. He said that the British Government was reluctant to commit itself to such a contingency plan. He said that the British Government was reluctant to commit itself to such a contingency plan. He said that the British Government was reluctant to commit itself to such a contingency plan.



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SECCOS

PS/Prime Minister
PS/Foreign & Commonwealth
Secretary
PS/Secretary of the
Cabinet
-Sir O Wright, Washington

...this problem ... popular support. The Secretary of State asked whether the Russians would intend to make contact with the Soviet Union prior to any military operation in the Straits to make clear its limited nature and Mr Mainberger confirmed that this would indeed be their intention.

5. ... Government's attitude towards the problem. The Secretary of State said that he very much agreed with Mr Mainberger's view that the Western European ... to be ...

GRS 625

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FM ALGIERS 271530Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 37 OF 27 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, PARIS,
GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 35 OF 24 FEBRUARY

POSSIBLE ALGERIAN MEDIATION IN IRAN/IRAQ WAR

SUMMARY

1. ALGERIANS CLAIM TO BE CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES. THEY ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN FRESH MEDIATION IF AN OPPORTUNITY EMERGES. EARLY MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE IN VIEW. THEY DOUBT WHETHER IRANIANS IN PRESENT MOOD ARE PREPARED TO SHOW RESTRAINT, AND SEE THIS AS IN PART DUE TO DIVISIONS WITHIN KHOMEINI REGIME. MFA WELCOMED OUR CONTACT ON ISSUE AND OFFER OF SUPPORT.

DETAIL

2. AS MINISTER AND SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS ARE AWAY ATTENDING OAU CONFERENCE IN ADDIS I SPOKE TODAY TO BENKOBI, DIRECTOR (UNDER SECRETARY) ARAB AFFAIRS.

3. HE SAID ALGERIANS FULLY SHARED CONCERN AT LATEST INTENSE FIGHTING AND ITS BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR REGION. DESPITE THE TRAGIC SET-BACK TO THEIR EARLIER MEDIATION EFFORTS WITH THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IN 1982 THEY HAD CONTINUED DISCREET EFFORTS WITH BOTH SIDES TO LOOK FOR A SOLUTION. ALGERIA'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS STEMMED FROM THEIR SUCCESSFUL ROLE AS SPONSORS OF 1975 ALGIERS TREATY BETWEEN IRAQIS AND THE SHAH. SINCE SADDAM'S ACTION IN ABROGATING THIS BY HIS ATTACK ON IRAN, (A MAJOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL MISCALCULATION), ALGERIA HAD SOUGHT TO RESTORE STABILITY TO THE AREA WHILE CAREFULLY AVOIDING TAKING SIDES. THIS AT FIRST BROUGHT ACCUSATIONS OF PARTIALITY FROM THE IRANSIANS, AND IN THE LATEST ROUND, WITH IRAN OCCUPYING IRAQI TERRITORY, MEANT ALGERIA WAS NOW BEING ACCUSED BY IRAQIS OF FORESAKING ARAB CAUSE. BY 1982 ALGERIA THOUGHT SHE HAD COME CLOSE TO ACHIEVING BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT AS (A) KHOMEINI HAD APPEARED READY TO DROP INSISTENCE ON REMOVAL OF SADDAM SEMI COLON (B) IRAQ HAD AGREED TO INDEMNIFY THE IRANIAN EXPELLEES AND (C) ARABIAN STATES HAD AGREED TO PAY SUBSTANTIAL COMPENSATION TO IRAN ON IRAQ'S BEHALF INVOLVING INITIAL PAYMENT OF US DOLLARS 50,000M. BUT IRANIAN POSITION HAD THEN HARDENED, OWING TO INTERNAL STRAINS WITHIN ITS LEADERSHIP BEING DIVERTED BY THE LATEST CAMPAIGN. HE THOUGHT IMMEDIATE IRANIAN MILITARY AIM WAS TO SEVER BAGHDAD'S ROAD ARTERY TO BASRA AND KUWAIT.

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4. BENKOBI SAID THAT IN THEIR MOST RECENT CONTACTS WITH IRANIANS THE ALGERIANS HAD FOUND NO READINESS TO LISTEN TO REASON OR CONSIDER MODERATION. NOR WERE SYRIANS ANY HELP SEMI COLON THEY HAD THEIR OWN SCORES TO SETTLE WITH BAGHDAD. ALGERIANS WERE HOPING HOWEVER TO RECEIVE A VISIT DUE IN ABOUT A FORTNIGHT BY IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. SO FAR THERE WAS NO SIGN OF IRAN CALLING THIS OFF. VISIT FORMED PART OF A REGULAR PATTERN OF CONSULTATIONS BUT OBVIOUSLY HAD PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE NOW. ALGERIAN LABOUR MINISTER, NABI, WAS ALSO DUE TO VISIT IRAQ EARLY NEXT MONTH SEMI COLON THIS WOULD GIVE A CHANCE FOR CONSULTATION ON THAT FRONT. ALGERIANS HOPED THEY COULD EXERT SOME INFLUENCE THROUGH THESE TWO VISITS. THEY WERE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING WHAT ELSE THEY MIGHT DO BUT IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK WAS DIFFICULT. PERHAPS A CLIMATE COULD BE CREATED TO PERMIT UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS OR ISLAMIC MEDIATION TO RESUME.

5. BENKOBI WELCOMED OUR CONTACT AND WAS GRATEFUL FOR EXPRESSION OF OUR SUPPORT FOR ANYTHING THEY COULD DO. HE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN TOUCH. ALGERIA RECOGNISED WE HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH GULF STATES WHO WERE FEELING UNDERSTANDABLY NERVOUS AT PRESENT. HE ALSO REMARKED TENSION WAS NOT HELPED BY RUMOURS OF EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION. DRAWING ON MY TELECON WITH HASKELL I ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NO ROYAL NAVAL PRESENCE IN VICINITY OF GULF AREA AT THIS TIME.

6. BENKOBI SAID ALGERIA NEEDED TO AVOID PUBLICITY IN HER MEDIATION EFFORTS, NOT ONLY FOR SAKE OF EXERCISE ITSELF, BUT ALSO BECAUSE SINCE THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT THERE REMAINED A LATENT RESENTMENT TOWARDS IRAN IN A NUMBER OF CIRCLES HERE WHICH WAS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO CONTROL.

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JS

27 February 1984

IRAN/IRAQ

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend your letter of 23 February, together with the JIC Reports referred to in your second paragraph.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

File

DSC

MR. GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN THE GULF

The Prime Minister read over the weekend your minute of 24 February and the attached JIC Note on the implications of an Iranian victory in the Gulf War.

27 February 1984

DS



FILE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 February, 1984

IRAN/IRAQ

In your letter of 24 February you recommended that the Prime Minister should send messages to Mrs. Gandhi and President Zia encouraging them to mediate in the Iran/Iraq conflict.

The Prime Minister has considered this idea but has decided not to send the two messages. She very much doubts whether they would lead either party to mediate effectively and believes that they could create difficulties in our relations with both India and Pakistan.

M. J. COLES

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 398
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FM FCO 241600Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 081 OF 24 FEB 84
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM,
UKMIS GENVA, AMMAN, CAIRO, THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS,
YOUR TELNO 182:IRAN/IRAQ:MEDIATION

1. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERALS PROPOSAL FOR A TWO-PRONGED MISSION SEEMS AGAIN TO HAVE RUN INTO THE SAND, THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS. WE NEVERTHELESS, HOPE THAT HE AND CORDOVEZ WILL CONTINUE EXPLORING ALL AVAILABLE POSSIBILITIES OF FULFILLING HIS MEDIATORY ROLE. AS SEEN FROM HERE GENUINE PROGRESS ON MEDIATION IS IMPOSSIBLE, EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF ACTIVITY IS BETTER THAN NOTHING, IF ONLY BECAUSE IT MAY HELP TO PUT OFF THE MOMENT WHEN THE IRAQIS COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE HIGH-RISK STRATEGY OF GOADING THE IRANIANS INTO ESCALATING THE CONFLICT AND THUS INVOLVING OTHER STATES, IS THE ONLY ONE LEFT OPEN TO THEM.
2. PLEASE THEREFORE, SPEAK TO CORDOVEZ AGAIN AND FLOAT THE FOLLOWING IDEAS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER.
 - (A) RENEWING PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS TO ACCEPT A MISSION CHARGED ONLY WITH EXAMINING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS MIGHT NEVERTHELESS FACILITATE MORE WIDESPREAD CONTACTS WITH IRAN.
 - (B) SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN WITH NO STATED PURPOSE OR TERMS OF REFERENCE, BUT MERELY TO CONDUCT INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THE LEADERSHIP IN BOTH CAPITALS.
 - (C) SENDING A TWO-PRONGED MISSION TO BAGHDAD ONLY, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WOULD FORCE THE IRANIANS ALSO TO ACCEPT IT (WE ACCEPT THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO REMAIN INTRANSIGENT, AND RENEW THEIR ACCUSATIONS OF UN BIAS).
 - (D) ORGANISING A COLLECTIVE PUBLIC APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT BY THE

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SECRETARY-GENERALS OR PRESIDENTS OF THE UN, ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ICRC AND ANY OTHER SUFFICIENTLY PRESTIGIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH THE IRANIANS COULD NOT REASONABLY CONDEMN AS BEING PARTI PRIS.

3. YOU KNOW OF THE ICRC APPEAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER, TO WHICH WE HAVE STILL TO REPLY. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE ARE TRYING TO WORK FOR A HELPFUL DECLARATION BY THE TEN (EITHER ON IRAN/IRAQ ALONE OR ON THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE), WHICH MIGHT ISSUE AFTER THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES MEETING ON 27 FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT ZIA AND MRS GANDHI AND AN APPROACH TO THE ALGERIANS, ASKING THEM TO RESUME THEIR MEDIATORY ACTIVITIES.

RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM WOULD BE WELCOME.

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TO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 035 OF 24 FEB 84
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM,
PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK
INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER MEDIATION IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WAYS TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS AT MEDIATION IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, NOW THAT ATTEMPTS BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN HAVE, FOR THE MOMENT, COME TO NOTHING.
2. AS YOU KNOW, THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WERE AT ONE TIME ACTIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR, FOLLOWING THEIR SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US EMBASSY HOSTAGES. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WERE IN THE END REBUFFED BY THE IRANIANS WHO CONFIRMED TO A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE UK MISSION TO THE UN IN 1983 THAT THE ALGERIANS NOW REGARDED THEIR MEDIATION EFFORTS AS ENDED.
3. PLEASE DISCUSS THE WAR AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL WITH THE ALGERIANS. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST BE CONCERNED AT THE RECENT UPSURGE IN FIGHTING AND AT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS FULLY SUPPORTED EFFORTS MADE BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MEDIATE IN THE WAR, AND WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT HIS LATEST PROPOSAL TO SEND A MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN HAS BEEN POSTPONED. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED TO FIND A MEANS OF ENDING A WAR WHICH HAS BROUGHT MUCH SUFFERING AND LOSS OF LIFE. WE KNOW THAT THE ALGERIANS ARE WELL RESPECTED BY BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ, AND THEIR PART IN THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US HOSTAGES WAS MUCH ADMIRERD. THE FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND MANY OF HIS TOP STAFF LOST THEIR

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LIVES AN A GOOD OFFICES MISSIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN IN 1982.
WOULD THE ALGERIANS BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A FURTHER INITIATIVE,
GIVEN THE LATEST SERIOUS OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING? IF THEY FELT ABLE TO
MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT, THEY COULD BE ASSURED OF
THE FULLEST SUPPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.
WE WOULD EQUALLY UNDERSTAND IF THEY FELT THEY COULD NOT YET DO SO,
BUT WOULD HOPE THEY COULD KEEP THE POSSIBILITY IN RESERVE, GIVEN
THEIR SKILL AND EXPERIENCE.

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IRAN/IRAQ



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

Shia.

Work is being done urgently on
the questions I put to the JIC
earlier this week.

but you may like to be
reminded of the work done earlier
by the J.I.C. See the attached
papers and especially the memo
entitled "Outlook" at Page A.

A.J.C. $\frac{24}{2}$

Prime Minister.



I find the idea of inviting both India and Pakistan to mediate rather strange.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The F.C.O. agree that if we choose one the other will be offended - and that it is anyway unlikely that both will accept. The alternative would be just to invite Pakistan.

24 February 1984

Agree to messages?

A.F.C. 24/2.

I don't like this with Chris - I believe it can only cause trouble not

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

with AFE (JPM)

In my letter of 23 January I undertook to write to you further about diplomatic activity we could encourage in an effort to promote mediation between Iran and Iraq. What follows should be seen as complementary to the review of Gulf contingency planning to be conducted by the Cabinet Office.

The UN Secretary General remains the best hope, but his more recent attempt to send a Mission to Baghdad and Tehran has collapsed because Iran refused to engage in any political discussion. We are instructing UKMIS New York to urge the Secretary General to continue his efforts. We have also considered which other countries could be encouraged to mediate.

Japan has recently attempted to negotiate a partial ceasefire involving oil and economic facilities. This has not succeeded and the effort has damaged Japan's standing, probably with both protagonists. We do not think it would be worth urging Japan to make any fresh moves at present. The Algerians followed up their successful management of negotiations for the release of the US hostages by mediation efforts. In the end, they were rebuffed by Iran. We are, however, instructing Mr Munro to seek the Algerian Government's views on the chance of their re-entering the field.

The two countries currently best placed to mediate in the war, if anyone can, are probably India and Pakistan. In 1981, the Non-Aligned Movement formed a committee under the chairmanship of Mrs Gandhi to investigate the possibility of mediation. These efforts achieved little. Mrs Gandhi's mandate was renewed in March 1983 when India took on the Presidency of the NAM: but India, which obtains oil from both Iran and Iraq, has hitherto tried to avoid becoming embroiled in the dispute. A message from the Prime Minister might, however, remind Mrs Gandhi of her moral obligation to keep on trying.

/Pakistan



Pakistan is one of Iran's few remaining friends in the international community. Iran is keen to resurrect the Regional Council for Development, made up of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; Iran/Pakistan trade is now ten times the pre-revolutionary level. Pakistan was a member of the mediation committee appointed by the 1981 Islamic Conference which made no more progress than its NAM counterpart. It was hoped that the Islamic Summit Meeting in Casablanca in January might have provided an opportunity for a fresh initiative. Iran, however, refused to attend the Summit because it was held in Morocco, and a resolution was eventually passed in favour of Iraq. Nonetheless, a message from the Prime Minister to President Zia might encourage him to seek again to mediate on behalf of the Islamic Conference.

I attach draft messages from the Prime Minister to Mrs Gandhi and President Zia.

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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and you personally are respected by both Iran and Iraq.

These two countries

~~Both~~ have suffered terrible losses in the latest fighting

in southern Iraq, ^{They} and might conceivably be prepared to

accept another offer of good offices (I know that the

Iranians have a historic dislike of the concept of

mediation). ^{I am sure that} Any such initiative on your part would ~~have~~ ^{be}

^{widely supported} ~~the full support~~ not only ^{by} of the Non Aligned Movement, but

^{by} of the international community as a whole. I ^{too} should be

very ready to support you in any way that I can.

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DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~ letter/telex/cable/airmail/tele

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

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- Secret
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- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Zia

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I was delighted to see you in Moscow last week on the occasion of Mr Andropov's funeral, and glad that we had the opportunity for such a full discussion.

CAVEAT.....

I am sure you are as concerned as I am about the recent resumption ~~of~~ fighting in the Iran/Iraq war. This has increasingly serious implications for the international community as a whole. We have repeatedly ~~made every effort~~ ^{tried} to encourage Iran and Iraq to find an early settlement to the conflict and have urged both sides to avoid any step that might lead to escalation.

The UN Secretary General, with our full support, has recently attempted to send a Mission to both sides. We are ~~greatly~~ ^{greatly} disappointed that this has now been postponed.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I am convinced that the recent escalation in the fighting makes it more urgent than ever that we should find a peaceful solution. Is there any possibility of Pakistan resuming its role as a mediator on behalf of the Islamic Conference? I know that your views are highly

/respected

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respected by both Iran and Iraq, and they might be prepared to respond to a request^e by you to explore means of bringing the war to an early end, the more so as both sides have suffered terrible losses in the latest clashes in Southern Iraq. ^{I believe that} Any such initiative on your part would have ^{wide} ~~the full~~ support not only ^{from} ~~of~~ the Islamic Conference but ^{from} ~~of~~ the international community as a whole. I should be very ready to support you in any way that I can.

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IRAQ: Int. Sec: Pt 3

Prime Minister (2)

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AT
2412
MR TURNBULL

24 February 1984

IRAN/IRAQ - REACTIONS OF THE MARKETS

Despite the increased military activity in the Gulf War, the two most directly affected markets - oil and shipping - have not responded to any significant extent.

Oil Market

Spot oil prices are still 30-50 ¢ /bbl below official prices.

Middle East crude prices have not moved during the last week. Although North Sea prices have firmed a little, there are no signs of panic in the market.

Similarly there is no evidence of increased stockbuilding nor of emergency moves by the companies. Contingency plans were drawn up many months ago and recent events have not led to any significant revisions. Oil shares have not moved significantly.

The general view appears to be that closure of the Straits of Hormuz is either unlikely or would last for a very short period. There is plenty of oil in stock and, although closure would bring an increase in price, there is no volume risk for at least a month.

The market has been reassured by the statements from President Reagan and the Prime Minister and is comforted by the 50 million barrels of oil which Saudi Arabia has in floating storage.

Shipping Market

The shipping market is strongly influenced by the oil market and has remained calm.

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There has been a small increase in charter rates for large tankers during the last week from World Scale 20 to World Scale 22. For Kharg loadings rates have moved from World Scale 21 to World Scale 24. These changes are not particularly significant and also indicate that Iranian loadings do not carry a high premium. Although generally quiet, there have in fact been more loadings at Kharg Island in the last two weeks than previously.

Equally significant is the fact that insurance rates have not risen in recent week although Iranian rates (0.75% of total value) are higher than for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc (0.37% of total value). These rates would cover war damage.

Conclusion

Although the situation in the Gulf is fragile, it is significant that neither the oil nor shipping markets are showing any signs of nervousness or of panic.

The markets consider that Iran needs to continue oil liftings to provide revenue for the war efforts and that closure of the Straits would be counter-productive.

Today's statement by the Iranian President, Ali Khamenei, that Iran would not block the Straits unless it is denied the right of traffic through the waterway, is regarded as generally helpful.

This coupled with the US and UK statements has led to a general state of calm in the markets.

DLP.

DAVID PASCALL



SECRET
UK EYES A

Handwritten signature: "Handy on M"

B.06981

PRIME MINISTER

Escalation of the War in the Gulf

1. The meeting of OD(EM) on 21 February instructed the Secretary of the Cabinet to arrange for a report to be prepared, in consultation with Departments concerned, on the diplomatic, military and economic contingency planning that had been, and might be, undertaken in the event of a collapse of Iraqi resistance to Iranian attacks and of a consequent spread of Shi'a fundamentalist supremacy to the Gulf and the Middle East generally. Work on this is in hand and Sir Robert hopes to let you have the report by the end of next week.

Flagf.

2. Meanwhile, the attached Note on "Iranian Foreign Policy: Implications of an Iranian Victory in the Gulf War" has been prepared by the JIC as an interim answer to some of the concerns expressed at OD(EM), as well as to the specific questions posed in Mr Coles's letter to Mr Ricketts of 20 February. In the short term, the JIC doubts whether Iran will be able to achieve a decisive military success: and whether, even if Iran succeeded in overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein, she would thereafter embark on armed attack on her Gulf neighbours (other than Kuwait, which is militarily weak and vulnerable geographically, and which might be attacked in view of past help to Iraq). The JIC believe that Iran would be more likely then to seek to export its revolution by so-called 'peaceful' means - indirect pressure, subversion and propaganda - albeit from a position of greatly enhanced prestige. Nevertheless, the specifically Iranian and Shi'a character of the Iranian revolution should work against its acceptance in predominantly Sunni Arab countries where the regimes could be expected to move quickly to limit the damage. As to the


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UK EYES A

Soviet attitude, the JIC takes the view that the Soviet Union does not at present regard itself as threatened in its Muslim areas by Shi'a fundamentalism although it would view with concern the possibility of an Iranian victory, both because it would not wish to see Iran's ability to spread its revolution to neighbouring countries strengthened and because it would fear that instability in the Gulf region would provide an opportunity for the United States to increase its influence in the region.

3. The JIC note does not attempt to deal with the question of oil supplies and reserves, which will be covered in the full report to be submitted to you next week. That report will also examine the worst case scenario that could develop if the JIC analysis turns out to be over-optimistic; and it will include some indication of the likely attitude of the Americans in such a scenario, and how we should seek to influence them. Sir John Leahy has been talking to the Americans in Washington this week about the Gulf, and the report will take account of his impressions.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to those Ministers who took part in the OD(EM) discussion on 21 February, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

David Goodall

A D S Goodall

24 February 1984

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UK EYES A

GRS 1000

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FM WASHINGTON 231836Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 617 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, AMMAN,
DAMASCUS, GULF POSTS

BAGHDAD TELNO 98 TO YOU: IRAQ/IRAN

Read in full.
[Signature]

SUMMARY

1. U S ASSESSMENT THAT MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE YET TO COME. SUCCESS UNLIKELY BUT COULD PROVOKE IRAQI ESCALATION. BOTH SIDES HAVE REASONS TO SEEK AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. NEED TO KEEP THE UN INITIATIVE ALIVE. CLOSE US/UK POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSULTATION TO CONTINUE: NEXT ROUND OF MILITARY TALKS TO BE ACCELERATED. U S NOT KEEN TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS AT PRESENT.

DETAIL

2. THE U S ASSESSMENT GIVEN TO LEAHY ON 22 FEBRUARY WAS THAT THE IRANIANS HAD YET TO LAUNCH THEIR MAJOR OFFENSIVE. THIS MIGHT FOLLOW IN A WEEK OR SO: MEANWHILE, FURTHER PROBING ATTACKS WERE LIKELY. HISTORY SUGGESTED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT BREAK THROUGH. THEY WERE STILL PLAGUED BY COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS. BUT IF THEY MADE SIGNIFICANT GAINS THE IRAQIS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE NO COMPUNCTION ABOUT ESCALATING THE AIR WAR. THEY HAD ALREADY CLAIMED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD RESUMED ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS AND THEY HAD NOW PUBLICLY THREATENED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

3. BOTH SIDES HAD STRATEGIC REASONS FOR SEEKING AN EARLY RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. THE IRANIANS, WITH LITTLE MORE THAN MECHANISED INFANTRY, SAW THEIR ENEMIES IMPROVING THEIR EQUIPMENT AND COMING TO TERMS WITH THEIR ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THE TIME WAS THUS RIGHT FOR A MAJOR PUSH, RATHER THAN CONTINUED ATTRITION, MOST PROBABLY ON THE CENTRAL FRONT. THE BAGHDAD-BASRA ROAD, ONLY 35KM AWAY AT ITS MOST ACCESSIBLE POINT, WAS A POSSIBLE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. BUT THE IRANIANS HAD NEVER BEFORE ACHIEVED SUCH PENETRATION AND AN OBVIOUS FAILURE COULD BACKFIRE. THE IRAQIS FOR THEIR PART WERE GROWING INCREASINGLY WAR-WEARY, ALTHOUGH THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES WERE IMPROVING. THE AMERICANS, WHO CONSIDERED THE IRANIANS UNLIKELY TO TRY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS UNLESS THEIR OIL EXPORTS WERE CUT OFF, CONTINUED TO URGE RESTRAINT ON BAGHDAD. THE IRAQIS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY AS LONG AS THERE WAS SOME SIGN OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

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14.

4. IN THE U S VIEW THIS UNDERSCORED THE NEED TO KEEP THE UN INITIATIVE ALIVE. THEY WONDERED WHETHER DIFFERENT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROPOSED VISIT TO EACH COUNTRY MIGHT OFFER A WAY FORWARD. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE U S AND UK SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE IRAQIS TO BE FLEXIBLE. THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, IF IT CAME, MIGHT PROVIDE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR A CEASEFIRE. MEANWHILE, THE AMERICANS WOULD PRESS FOR RESTRAINT, ENCOURAGE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR IRAQ FROM THE GULF AND HELP WITH THE PROPOSED PIPELINE ACROSS JORDAN. THEY HAD TALKED TO THE ISRAELIS AT SEVERAL LEVELS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF SUCH A PIPELINE AND HAD RECEIVED AS GOOD AN ANSWER AS COULD BE EXPECTED: (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 618): VISIBLE U S INVOLVEMENT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT. LEAHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT GOING TO SEE THE IRAQIS GO UNDER BUT OBSERVED THAT THERE COULD BE A FINE LINE BETWEEN OFFERING THEM COMFORT AND GIVING THEM ACTUAL ENCOURAGEMENT.

5. LEAHY STRESSED TO BOTH PLACKE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS) AND HOWE (DIRECTOR, POL-MIL) OUR INTEREST IN CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATION IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS. THE AMERICANS AGREED IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN TOUCH AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. THERE WAS NOTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE PRESS REPORTS OF JOINT US/UK NAVAL EXERCISES, BUT SUCH SUGGESTIONS COULD BE DISTURBING TO THE IRANIANS. (KEMP (NSC), MURPHY (ASSISTANT SECRETARY) AND RAPHEL (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY) ALL DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVES BY THE U S FLEET TOWARDS THE GULF OF OMAN). LEAHY EMPHASISED THE NEED TO KEEP PURSUING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK EVEN IF MILITARY ACTION BECAME INEVITABLE AND TO SEND THE RIGHT SIGNALS. HOWE CONCURRED, BUT COMMENTED THAT EG SHIP MOVEMENTS COULD ALSO SEND POLITICAL SIGNALS. IF MILITARY ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN, SPEED AND PRECISION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. THERE WAS ROOM FOR MORE COORDINATION AND MORE CONTINGENCY PLANNING. LEAHY AGREED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF MILITARY TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

6. LEAHY ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO HOW THEY MIGHT AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE REGION. PLACKE SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN TOUCHED ON IN MOSCOW ABOUT SIX WEEKS AGO. IN BROAD TERMS, THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO SEE THEIR INTERESTS IN LARGELY THE SAME LIGHT: MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AMERICANS DID NOT WANT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THIS STAGE: THESE MIGHT GIVE THE RUSSIANS DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE IN THE AREA. BUT IF THE SITUATION AROSE THEY WOULD QUOTE TRY VERY HARD UNQUOTE TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

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/ COMMENT.

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COMMENT

THERE WAS NOTHING REPEAT NOTHING IN ANY OF THESE DISCUSSIONS TO SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN A MOOD TO CONTEMPLATE PRECIPITATE ACTION IN THE GULF TO COMPENSATE FOR THE FAILURE OF U S POLICY IN THE LEBANON. RATHER THE REVERSE. THERE WAS, ON THE CONTRARY, SOME DEGREE OF OPTIMISM THAT THE STRATEGIC SHIFT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3 MIGHT CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH A NEW MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WERE MISSED, THE FEELING WAS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO RECUR FOR A LONG TIME.

WRIGHT

IRAN/IRAQ

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 February 1984

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 20 February about this subject, which was further discussed at OD(EM) on 21 February.

A good deal of work has been done on the questions raised in (a) to (g) of your second paragraph. Three JIC papers in particular are relevant: JIC(82)(N)94 of 23 September 1982 on Iran's Foreign Relations, JIC(82)13 dated 1 November 1982 on the Islamic Revival and Extremist Muslim Movements in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and JIC(83)(N)81 of 10 June 1983 on Islamic Sectarianism in the Gulf. I understand that the Assessments Staff will be taking a fresh look at the range of subjects raised by the Prime Minister, and will consider urgently what additional work is necessary to provide a full and up-to-date answer to the questions you raised. We shall of course be contributing.

A good deal of work has similarly been done on various aspects of Gulf contingency planning, including both action to contain any threat of disruption to world oil supplies, and the wider question of the circumstances under which some military involvement in the area might become necessary. OD(EM) considered this latter aspect at meetings on 21 December 1983 and 26 January, on the basis of memoranda put forward jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary (OD(EM)(83)4 of 16 December 1983 and OD(EM)(84)1 of 25 January 1984). These were in addition to a number of minutes from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary. Since possible contingency measures directly involve a number of other Departments, the Cabinet Office will urgently review the state of our contingency planning in all areas. This would be a separate exercise from that being undertaken by the Assessments Staff.

On the diplomatic front, we continue to be among the forefront of those encouraging the UN Secretary-General to resume his mediatory activities, despite the relatively discouraging circumstances. You will see from UKMIS New York telegram No 182 of 21 February (copy enclosed) that

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there seems to be no prospect of a UN Mission being despatched to Tehran and Baghdad for the time being. We are therefore exploring other possible avenues of activity, including demarches to leading members of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. We are considering whether to propose that the Prime Minister send messages in this connection to President Zia and Mrs Gandhi. I shall write again very soon with advice on this point.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~8307822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

22nd February 1984

~~Time~~

p.a.

Mr 23/2.

Dear John,

You asked about the deployment of our ships in the Gulf area. Current positions of RN/RFA in the Indian Ocean are on the attached chart as requested. Also USS MIDWAY group.


Future programmes:

- a. HMS INVINCIBLE - transit Suez Canal 6th March
- b. HMS GLAMORGAN AND RFA BLUE ROVER -
 - 20th - 25th February Cochin
 - 28th February - 13th March Gulf Patrol (off Oman)
- c. HMS BRAZEN -
 - 22nd February Sails from Colombo
 - 25th - 27th February Diego Garcia (to embark weapon enhancements)
 - 5th - 13th March Gulf Patrol (off Oman)
- d. HMS AURORA AND HMS ROTHESAY are in the Hong Kong area.

your ever

Wendy
(W ANDERTON) (MISS)

A J Coles Esq



GULF OF OMAN

MIDWAY
(USN)

INDIA

ARABIAN SEA

ARABIAN

BASIN

GLAMORGAN
BLUE ROVER
(RFA)

SRI LANKA
BRAZEN

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IRAN/IRAG

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

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SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

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FM BAGHDAD 221220Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 98 OF 22 FEB 84

INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS.

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IRAQ/IRAN.

SUMMARY.

1. THE IRAQIS CLAIM THAT A MAJOR NEW IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAS STARTED. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CALLS ON SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO CONDEMN IRANIAN AGGRESSIONS.

DETAILS

2. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING TO THE MFA TO SEE SAHHAF, WHO WAS IN A SOMBRE MOOD. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT AND THAT A SIMILAR APPROACH WOULD BE MADE TO OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INDEED ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. ACCORDING TO SAHHAF THE IRANIANS HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT ANNOUNCING A NEW ATTACK, WHICH HAD BEGUN AT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT. THE IRAQIS WOULD RESIST THIS NEW AGGRESSION WITH ALL THE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO STRIKE AT THE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF IRANIAN TROOPS WHCXCEVER THEY WERE TO BE FOUND. SAHHAF DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE IRAQI SPOKESMAN REPORTED IN TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS (NIPT).

3. SAHHAF SAID HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE THEIR POSITION CLEAR IN CONDEMNATION OF THE CONTINUING IRANIAN AGGRESSION. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK ME TO CONVEY A REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF

HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK ME TO CONVEY A REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THIS KIND WOULD PROVIDE A VALUABLE DEMONSTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN RESISTING IRAN'S EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS.

4. SAHHAF COULD NOT TELL ME PRECISELY WHERE THE NEW IRANIAN PUSH WAS TAKING PLACE (THOUGH WE HAVE SINCE HEARD FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY THAT THERE MAY BE TWO PRONGS IN THE IRAQI 4TH CORPS SECTOR, ONE NEAR BUSTAN, AND THE OTHER ABOUT ONE HUNDRED KILOMETRES TO THE NORTH OPPOSITE THE IRAQI TOWN OF ALI AL GHARDI). NOR COULD HE GIVE ME ANY NEWS

OF THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT.

HE WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THIS LATEST ATTACK ANNOUNCED BY THE IRANIANS WAS THE LONG-HERALDED IRANIAN MAIN THRUST OR WHETHER IT WAS A FURTHER DIVERSIONARY ATTACK.

5. I CONFIRMED TO SAHHAF THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS REPRESENTATIONS IMMEDIATELY AND ADDED THAT I KNEW THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT ANY ESCALATION OF THE WAR. SAHHAF COMMENTED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS.

COMMENT.

6. DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY TALKING UP THE SIZE AND PROBABLE SEVERITY OF THE EXPECTED IRANIAN MAIN ATTACK. THERE APPEARS TO BE A GENUINELY HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF CONCERN ON THIS OCCASION THOUGH THE RHETORIC MAY ALSO BE DESIGNED TO GIVE ADDED CREDIBILITY TO IRAQI VICTORY CLAIMS IN THE EVENT THAT THE IRANIAN ATTACKS PETER OUT AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

MODERLY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 212359Z FEB

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, AMMAN
MOSCOW, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, MODUK (D14).

MY TELNO 179 AND TELECON EGERTON/GORE-BOOTH: IRAN / IRAQ.

1. THE HEAD OF CHANCERY TOUCHED BASE WITH UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL CORDOVEZ THIS EVENING TO SEE WHETHER HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ANYTHING TO BE SALVAGED FROM THE COLLAPSE OF HIS PROPOSED MISSION TO TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD.
2. CORDOVEZ WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER THAT THE UN WOULD BE ABLE TO DO FOR THE MOMENT UNLESS EITHER THE IRAQIS DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON A TWO-PRONGED MISSION AND SETTLED FOR A MISSION TO INSPECT CIVILIAN DAMAGE ONLY OR A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE IN THEIR SITUATION ON THE GROUND PERSUADED THE IRANIAN TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL PRONG. PUBLICLY HE IS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE MISSION HAS BEEN POSTPONED BUT PRIVATELY HE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO EARLY CHANCE OF RESUSCITATING IT. HE QUOTED KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA AS TELLING MR PALME IN CANNES RECENTLY THAT 'NOW IS NOT THE TIME' (CF CHATTI'S COMMENTS REPORTED IN JEDDA TELNO 95)
3. ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNISES THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE NOW LOST THE GROUND THEY WON WITH THEIR FIRST LETTER CORDOVEZ FEELS THAT THE IRAQIS DID NOT PLAY THEIR HAND VERY WELL. IN PARTICULAR HE THINKS THEY WERE MISTAKEN IN MENTIONING THE 'SEVEN POINTS' IN THEIR REPLY AND THEN INSISTING THAT IT BE MADE PUBLIC. THE MENTION OF AN AGENDA WAS BOUND TO BE RED RAG TO THE IRANIAN BULL.

MARGETSON

IRAN/IRAQ

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IRAQ PT 3

Internal set

23 Jan 1984



A circular red stamp with numbers 1 through 12 around the perimeter and a central symbol.

DS

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/MR LUCE
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 SIR J LEAHY
 MR EGERTON
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FM WASHINGTON 201935Z FEB 84
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 588 OF 20 FEBRUARY
 INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TEL 337 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. WE WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH PLACKE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT) OUTLING THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY THE UK MEDIA AND THE POSSIBLE THRUST OF QUESTIONS TO THE PM.
2. THE AMERICAN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND THEIR IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS ARE COVERED IN OUR TEL 586. AS REGARDS THE

~~2. THE AMERICAN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND THEIR IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS ARE COVERED IN OUR TEL 596.~~ AS REGARDS THE SOVIET UNION, PLACKE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REGARDED IT AS NEITHER FEASIBLE NOR DESIRABLE TO SEEK NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED IN ADVANCE AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF. THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF WAS FAR SMALLER THAN THE AMERICAN. THE US HAD NO DESIRE TO PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE RUSSIANS TO INCREASE THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE NOR THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSITION GENERALLY. THEY WERE NOT ACTIVELY TRYING TO EXCLUDE THE RUSSIANS BUT WERE CERTAINLY NOT ANXIOUS TO ENCOURAGE THEM PARTICULARLY WHEN IT WAS SO UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD GET ANYTHING USEFUL IN RETURN.

3. IF THE THREAT OF ESCALATION WERE TO BECOME REAL THE US WOULD, AS A FIRST STEP, CONSULT WITH ALLIES AND WITH THE STATES IN THE AREA. THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ACTION IN THE UN WHICH WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BRING IN THE SOVIET UNION. WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALSO TO INITIATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS SOMETHING TO BE JUDGED AT THE TIME.

4. MORE GENERALLY, THE AMERICANS HAVE HAD OCCASIONAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE RUSSIANS. THEY HAVE FOUND THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THE GULF WAR BROADLY SIMILAR. BOTH AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO BRING IT TO AN END WITHOUT EITHER SIDE PREVAILING. US INTERVENTION WOULD BE A QUITE DIFFERENT MATTER OF WHICH THE RUSSIANS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE SHARPLY CRITICAL.

5. AS REGARDS THE LINE SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, PLACKE IS UNAWARE THAT WE HAVE EVER SUGGESTED TO THE US THAT THEY SHOULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED IN ADVANCE ABOUT POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF.

6. IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSITION OUTLINED ABOVE, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT TO MAKE A PUBLIC SUGGESTION IN QUITE THESE TERMS WITHOUT FULLER DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS FOR WHICH THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY DURING LEAHY'S VISIT ON 22 FEBRUARY. COULD WE NOT SAY THAT WE BELIEVE THAT EARLY CONTACTS BETWEEN THE US ITS ALLIES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF THERE WAS TO BE SERIOUS ESCALATION IN THE GULF: THE US ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO.10 AND CABINET OFFICE.

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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Escalation of the War in the Gulf - OD(EM)

BACKGROUND

Flag A

At Cabinet on 16 February (CC(84)6th Conclusions - Minute 3) the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was invited to review the range of contingencies arising from the Gulf war in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Energy. A record of the meeting held by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to carry out this review was circulated by the Cabinet Office on 17 February.

Flag B

Flag C

2. The conclusion of this meeting was that the war between Iran and Iraq would continue but it was doubtful whether the Iranian armed forces had the capability to advance far. The Iranians' immediate objectives were not clear but in the longer term they wished to wear down Iraq's willingness to resist and to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. If the Iranians achieved a substantial breakthrough, Iraq might become desperate and escalate its attacks on Iran, although it was doubtful whether Iraqi forces had the military skills necessary to halt Iranian oil production by missile attacks. Equally, it was unlikely that the Iranians would be able to sustain a closure of the Straits of Hormuz for long, even if they attempted to do so.

3. Against this background, the meeting took the view that no additional measures of military preparedness were required on the part of the United Kingdom at this stage, having regard to the action that had already been taken with the Gulf States in offering assistance to develop


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their own military capability. The reaction of the United States to any interruption in oil supplies would be crucial and great uncertainty was expressed on how the US Administration might react to the latest Iranian offensive in the aftermath of US experiences in the Lebanon. Ministers present agreed that there was a need to keep in the closest possible touch with all US Departments and Agencies concerned with Gulf contingency planning, including plans on oil supplies and stocks, in order to dissuade the US Administration from precipitate action which might cause further de-stabilisation in the area. The United Kingdom should seek to obtain acceptance of its view that, if the Iranians took steps to try to close the Straits of Hormuz, the first priority would be diplomatic action to attempt to de-escalate the crisis with any military response being limited to protective measures such as convoying and mine-clearing operations.

4. It was agreed that an immediate approach should be made by the UK Ambassador in Washington to go over the ground with the Americans again and to use the opportunity of meetings between Ministers and senior officials for influencing the US approach to the various aspects of Gulf contingency planning. These would include Sir John Leahy's visit to Washington this week, the meeting between Mr Heseltine and Mr Weinberger at the end of February and between Mr Walker and Mr Hodel in early March. These occasions should be used to the full for consultation with the Americans on all aspects of Gulf contingency planning, including action in the event of disruption to oil supplies, and for feeding in UK ideas.

5. The immediate US response has been helpful. They have fully endorsed the need to keep closely in touch with United Kingdom thinking and have welcomed the opportunity



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given by Sir John Leahy's visit for further consultation. They have said that they consider that reports in the media of the Iranian offensive have been exaggerated, and have confirmed that the State Department has urged restraint upon the Iraqis.

6. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is unable to attend or to be represented because of pressure of Budget business. The Secretary of State for Energy, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chief of the Defence Staff have been invited to attend. An immediate assessment, concentrating on latest developments in the war, is being prepared by the JIC and will be circulated before the meeting.

HANDLING

7. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the discussion. The Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff might then be invited to comment on the military situation, and the Secretary of State for Energy on the implications for oil supplies. Points to establish in discussion are:

(a) As regards military contingency action, is it still agreed that the deployment of British forces to the Gulf should only be countenanced as a last resort and if United Kingdom interests are threatened?

(b) Have all possible contingency measures now been taken to offer assistance to the Gulf States in building up their own defence capabilities?

(c) As regards diplomatic action, should any additional steps be taken to impress our views on the Americans or to consult them about contingency measures to assure the continuation of adequate oil supplies to the West in the event of the Straits of Hormuz being closed?



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(d) Are there further possibilities for diplomatic action either through the Super Powers or our other Allies to bring restraining influence to bear on either the Iranians or the Iraqis?

CONCLUSION

8. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Sub-Committee to approve the action which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has in hand to concert our contingency plans for diplomatic and other action with the Americans, aimed at reducing the effects of any continuing escalation of the Gulf war.

David Goodall

A D S Goodall

20 February 1984



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

N.B.P.R. 20 February 1984

A.J.C. $\frac{21}{2}$

Dear John,

P.A.

Iran/Iraq: Appeal from the President of the ICRC

I enclose a self-explanatory message from the President of the International Red Cross to the Prime Minister, which we have just received from our Mission at Geneva. We shall let you have advice shortly on how the Prime Minister might respond.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Mag / Iran P3



LE PRÉSIDENT

Geneva, 14 February 1984

Madam,

For the second time in less than a year, the International Committee of the Red Cross is obliged to appeal to the States parties to the Geneva Conventions in the context of the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
10, Downing Street

LONDON S.W. 1

... As you may gather from the enclosed appeal, the violations listed by the ICRC are serious and by their nature affect the very spirit of international humanitarian law.

I am taking the liberty of approaching your Government through you directly because I am convinced that you will understand the importance of the step the ICRC is taking today. This demarche aims not only to protect the tens of thousands of victims affected by the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq, but also to preserve the credibility of international humanitarian law in future conflicts.


Indeed, international humanitarian law, which the States created of their own volition, is based on a principle of universality that could not be flouted anywhere in the world without setting a dangerous precedent.

I am aware of the complexity of relations between States - especially when one of those States is at war - but I cannot keep from believing that humanitarian causes should receive the attention and priority that is their due.

This is especially true in view of the fact that international humanitarian law is a branch of the international law adopted by States. It would be intolerable for any part of that law to become obsolete for it is indeed worthy of the human being it aims to protect.

I would be pleased if you would agree to transmit - and indeed plead in favour of - the cry of alarm sent out today by the ICRC and I sincerely hope that you will do all in your power to see that the States concerned put an end to the violations with which they are charged.

Accept, Madam, the assurance of my highest consideration.



Alexandre Hay



COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

CONFLIT IRAN/IRAQ

Second mémorandum du Comité international
de la Croix-Rouge aux Etats Parties
aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949

Genève, le 10 février 1984

Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge était contraint d'adresser, le 7 mai 1983, un Appel à l'ensemble des Etats Parties aux Conventions de Genève. En vertu de l'engagement solennel contracté par ces Etats de respecter mais aussi de faire respecter ces Conventions, le CICR leur demandait de déployer tous les efforts utiles afin que le droit international humanitaire soit mieux appliqué par les deux belligérants, la République islamique d'Iran d'une part, et la République d'Iraq de l'autre, et pour que le CICR puisse accomplir efficacement ses tâches humanitaires auprès des victimes innombrables, civiles et militaires, de ce conflit.

Constatant, neuf mois après son premier Appel, que les résultats espérés n'ont été que très partiellement atteints, le CICR se doit d'informer les Etats Parties aux Conventions de Genève de la situation humanitaire prévalant en République islamique d'Iran et en République d'Iraq.

Le CICR souligne que les violations du droit établies et décrites dans ses deux mémorandums revêtent un caractère fondamental, qu'elles mettent non seulement en péril la vie et la liberté des dizaines de milliers de victimes du présent conflit mais qu'elles attentent à l'essence et aux principes du droit international humanitaire. Elles risquent de conduire, à terme, au discrédit des règles de droit et des principes universels par lesquels les Etats ont entendu accorder à la personne humaine une meilleure défense contre les rigueurs de la guerre.

Le CICR sait d'autre part que la persistance et la multiplication des violations du droit international humanitaire ont toujours constitué des obstacles supplémentaires, parfois difficilement surmontables, à l'heure où prévaut la volonté de rétablir la paix. Des conflits récents ont été inutilement prolongés parce que le sort des prisonniers de guerre ne pouvait plus être réglé. Le CICR enjoint donc les Etats qui oeuvrent au rétablissement de la paix dans la région à considérer avec la plus grande attention les problèmes qui surgiront inévitablement en raison de la violation des Conventions de Genève par les belligérants.

Le CICR désire, en particulier, que les Etats abordent, dans le cadre de leurs relations respectives avec chacun des deux Etats belligérants, le dossier humanitaire qui leur est soumis. Il demande, d'autre part, à ces Etats d'apporter leur soutien actif aux efforts qu'il déploie dans l'intérêt exclusif des victimes et dans le cadre strict du mandat humanitaire qui lui a été confié par les Conventions de Genève. Il espère, enfin, que des consultations appropriées permettront de désigner des Puissances protectrices prêtes à prendre en charge les tâches assignées par les Conventions de Genève à de telles Puissances, avec lesquelles le CICR aspire à collaborer étroitement.

Le CICR a la conviction que les Etats, conscients des enjeux véritables de cette démarche, auront le désir et la volonté de traduire en des actes concrets l'engagement qu'ils ont voulu et accepté en adoptant l'article premier commun aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949.

* * *

REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN

A. Prisonniers de guerre irakiens internés en République islamique d'Iran

1. Les activités du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge en faveur des prisonniers irakiens sont à nouveau interrompues depuis le 27 juillet 1983. Le CICR estime d'une manière générale que, depuis bientôt deux années, il n'exerce plus son mandat selon les exigences de la IIIe Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre.

A l'heure actuelle, quelque 50.000 prisonniers se trouvent ainsi au pouvoir de la Puissance qui les détient sans la protection internationale à laquelle ils ont droit de par leur statut.

Le CICR n'est notamment plus en mesure :

- d'établir avec précision l'effectif total et la répartition par lieux d'internement des prisonniers de guerre;
- de connaître l'identité et l'état de santé des prisonniers de guerre afin d'en notifier dans les plus brefs délais leurs familles et leur Puissance d'origine;
- de contrôler les conditions matérielles, psychologiques et disciplinaires de l'internement par des visites régulières dans les camps et des entretiens privés avec les prisonniers;
- d'établir les listes de prisonniers de guerre qui doivent, en raison des blessures et des maladies graves dont ils sont atteints, être rapatriés rapidement;
- de contrôler efficacement les distributions de messages Croix-Rouge entre les familles et les prisonniers.

Toutes ces tâches de contrôle sont impérativement commandées par la Convention et constituent les préalables indispensables à l'exercice d'une protection efficace des prisonniers par les délégués du CICR.

2. De nombreux faits et indices concordants inquiètent le CICR sur le sort que connaissent ces prisonniers et sur les motifs réels pour lesquels les autorités l'ont empêché d'exercer ses activités; le CICR note en particulier que :

- des catégories spécifiques de prisonniers, tels les officiers supérieurs, lui ont été systématiquement soustraites;
- des condamnations graves ont été prononcées à l'encontre de certains prisonniers; malgré ses demandes répétées, le CICR n'a jamais reçu à ce sujet les notifications et explications qui auraient dû, en droit, lui être transmises;
- certains camps ont été le théâtre d'événements graves; le CICR a d'ailleurs reçu, avec beaucoup de retard et sans commentaire aucun, des actes de décès de militaires ennemis déclarés "morts sur le front" alors que ces personnes, en réalité internées depuis des années en République islamique d'Iran, avaient été enregistrées et vues à plusieurs reprises par les délégués du CICR;
- d'une manière générale, des pressions idéologiques et politiques, un processus d'intimidation et de "rééducation", des atteintes à l'honneur et à la dignité demeurent constants et semblent même s'intensifier du fait de l'activité déployée par des personnes étrangères au fonctionnement normal et réglementaire des camps de prisonniers de guerre : les représentants d'un département de "l'éducation politique et idéologique", les membres de mouvements d'opposition irakiens réfugiés en République islamique d'Iran, la presse officielle, tendent à monter les prisonniers contre leur gouvernement. Le CICR est intervenu à de très nombreuses reprises, de façon détaillée et argumentée, auprès des plus Hautes Autorités de la République islamique d'Iran pour qu'elles mettent un terme à ces pratiques que les Etats ont entendu bannir lors de l'élaboration de la IIIe Convention de Genève. Le CICR a subordonné la reprise de ses activités à l'abandon de ces pratiques, l'exercice de son mandat étant incompatible et inconciliable avec les efforts entrepris pour conditionner politiquement et idéologiquement les prisonniers. Le CICR n'a, à ce jour, pas reçu de réponse satisfaisante aux représentations, écrites et orales, entreprises à ce sujet auprès du Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran.

B. Civils iraqiens réfugiés en République islamique d'Iran

Les tentatives du CICR pour apporter des secours à ces populations, composées notamment de Kurdes iraqiens ayant fui leur contrée d'origine et actuellement hébergées dans des camps sis en République islamique d'Iran, ont échoué. Le CICR sait que ces populations connaissent des besoins, tant alimentaires que médicaux. De par leur statut de ressortissants d'une Puissance ennemie, ces personnes tombent sous l'empire de la IVe Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre et devraient, à ce titre, être mises au bénéfice de l'aide que peut leur apporter une organisation telle que le CICR.

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REPUBLIQUE D'IRAQ

A. Prisonniers de guerre iraniens internés en République d'Iraq

1. Chaque mois, sans discontinuer depuis octobre 1980, les délégués du CICR ont visité les prisonniers de guerre iraniens, actuellement au nombre de 7.300, répartis dans six camps d'internement. Ces visites se déroulent conformément aux modalités prévues par l'article 126 de la IIIe Convention de Genève, qui précise notamment que les délégués pourront s'entretenir librement et sans témoin avec les prisonniers de leur choix.

D'une manière générale, les prisonniers de guerre nouvellement capturés sont enregistrés par le CICR dans des délais raisonnables.

La transmission des messages Croix-Rouge entre les prisonniers et leurs familles fonctionne dans l'ensemble, bien que des retards parfois importants soient encore causés par la censure iraquienne.

2. Dans les camps eux-mêmes, le CICR a noté certaines améliorations sensibles des conditions matérielles de l'internement. D'autre part, des mesures ont été prises par les autorités responsables pour mettre fin aux pratiques brutales et arbitraires qui avaient été relevées, à de nombreuses reprises, par le CICR : une amélioration du traitement disciplinaire a pu être constatée depuis l'automne 1983.
3. En date du 29 janvier 1984, 190 prisonniers iraniens, dont 87 grands blessés et malades, ont été remis à Ankara par les autorités iraqiennes au CICR en vue de leur rapatriement en République islamique d'Iran.
4. Le CICR note avec inquiétude qu'un nombre important de militaires ennemis, soldats et officiers, capturés parfois dès le début du conflit par les forces armées iraqiennes, sont encore à ce jour incarcérés dans des centres de détention auxquels le CICR n'a pas accès. Des listes nominatives, établissant l'existence de plusieurs centaines de ces prisonniers de guerre, ont été régulièrement remises par le CICR aux autorités militaires et gouvernementales de la République d'Iraq.

Le CICR note avec satisfaction que plusieurs dizaines de ces prisonniers, capturés au début du conflit, ont pu être enregistrés par le CICR à fin 83 et intégrés dans les camps d'internement que visite le CICR.

Le CICR a tout lieu d'être inquiet pour ces prisonniers maintenus au secret, privés de leurs droits les plus essentiels et qui connaîtraient, selon des informations multiples et concordantes, des conditions de détention non conformes aux exigences du droit humanitaire.

B. Civils iraniens déportés ou réfugiés en République d'Iraq

1. Plusieurs dizaines de milliers de civils iraniens, originaires des régions frontalières du Khouzistan et du Kurdistan, ont été déplacés, au cours du conflit, en territoire iraqien.

Les autorités iraqiennes ont désormais accepté le principe d'une présence régulière du CICR auprès de ces civils et des efforts importants ont été récemment consentis en vue d'améliorer leurs conditions d'existence là où cela était jugé nécessaire.

2. Par ailleurs, le CICR a enregistré, dès le début du conflit, plus d'un millier de civils, dans les camps de prisonniers de guerre, dont des vieillards et des femmes, arrêtés dans les territoires occupés par les forces armées iraqiennes. Bien que des rapatriements successifs aient permis de libérer plusieurs centaines de ces personnes, une solution d'ensemble reste à trouver.

C. Bombardements de zones civiles par les forces armées iraqiennes

Les forces armées iraqiennes ont poursuivi leurs bombardements indiscriminés et systématiques d'agglomérations iraniennes situées, parfois, à plus de 200 km de la ligne de front. Des pertes humaines, parfois en grand nombre, et des destructions considérables de biens strictement civils ont été ainsi causées. Ces attaques délibérées de personnes et biens civils, annoncées parfois comme représailles, violent les lois et coutumes de la guerre, notamment le principe essentiel de la distinction à faire entre les objectifs militaires et les personnes et biens civils.

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COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

Original: French

Second Memorandum from the International Committee
of the Red Cross to the States Parties
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
concerning the conflict between
Islamic Republic of Iran and Republic of Iraq

Geneva, 10 February 1984

On 7 May 1983, the International Committee of the Red Cross was compelled to address an appeal to all the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions. With reference to the solemn undertaking of these States to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions at all times, the ICRC asked them to make every effort to ensure the rigorous application of International Humanitarian Law by the two belligerent states i.e. the Islamic Republic of Iran on the one hand and the Republic of Iraq on the other, and to enable the ICRC to effectively perform its humanitarian task of helping the great number of civilian and military victims of this conflict.

Nine months after making its first Appeal, the ICRC notes that the results hoped for have been achieved only to a very limited degree, and it feels that the States Parties to the Conventions should be informed of the lack of respect for the principles of Humanitarian Law in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq.

The ICRC wishes to stress that its two memoranda concern serious infringements of International Humanitarian Law which are known to have occurred and which endanger the lives and liberty of the tens of thousands of people caught up in this conflict, and which flout the very spirit and principles of that law. These infringements, if unchecked, may, in time, bring into discredit those rules of law and universal principles which the States Parties to the Conventions laid down to provide human beings with a better defence against the evils of war.

From its experience the ICRC is conscious that increasingly numerous violations of International Humanitarian Law have invariably placed insurmountable obstacles in the way of peace negotiations, even when all belligerents wished to end the conflict. For example, recent conflicts have been needlessly prolonged because no agreement was reached on arrangements concerning prisoners of war. The ICRC thus calls upon the States working towards the restoration of peace in the region to consider most carefully the problems which will inevitably arise because of the infringements of the Geneva Conventions by the belligerents.

In particular, the ICRC would ask States, in the course of their dealings with each of the two parties to the conflict, to broach the humanitarian questions which are hereby submitted to them. The States are also urged to lend their active support to the ICRC's efforts to help the victims of the conflict which is strictly within the terms of the humanitarian mandate assigned to the ICRC through the Geneva Conventions. Finally, the ICRC hopes that discussions will be held to designate Protecting Powers willing to undertake the tasks incumbent on such states by the Geneva Conventions. Naturally, the ICRC would wish to work closely with the Protecting Powers.

The ICRC is convinced that the States Parties to the Conventions are aware of what is truly at stake in the steps proposed, and that it will be their desire and intention to translate into action the commitment which they undertook in adopting Article 1 common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

* * *

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

A. Iraqi prisoners of war interned in the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in favour of the Iraqi prisoners were again suspended on 27 July 1983. The ICRC considers that, in general terms, it has not been able to discharge its mandate as prescribed by the Third Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war for almost two years.

At present, some 50,000 prisoners are without the international protection to which they are entitled by virtue of their status.

In this connection, the ICRC is no longer able to perform the following tasks:

- To ascertain the precise number of prisoners of war and to ascertain how they are distributed among various places of internment.
- To obtain information on the identity and state of health of each prisoner of war in order to notify his family and the Iraqi Government.
- To monitor the material, psychological and disciplinary conditions of internment by means of regular visits to the camps and interviews without witness with the prisoners.
- To draw up lists of prisoners of war who should quickly be repatriated because of severe wounds or illness.
- To maintain effective surveillance of the flow of Red Cross messages between the prisoners and their families.

These tasks of surveillance are all categorically stipulated in the Convention and constitute indispensable requirements for the effective protection of prisoners by ICRC delegates.

2. Numerous facts and indications, when considered together, arouse great concern on the part of the ICRC with regard to the fate of the prisoners and the authorities' real reasons for preventing the ICRC from carrying out its activities. The ICRC has noted the following specific points:

- The ICRC has constantly been denied access to certain categories of prisoners such as high-ranking officers.
- Severe sentences have been passed on a number of prisoners. Despite repeated demands, the ICRC has received neither notifications nor explanations which should, by law, have been submitted to it.
- Serious incidents have occurred in certain camps. Furthermore, among the death certificates issued by the Iranian authorities for members of the enemy armed forces "killed in action", the ICRC has received a number which were despatched very tardily and without any comment in relations to persons who were known to have been interned in the Islamic Republic of Iran for many years, since they had been registered and visited on several occasions by ICRC delegates.
- Ideological and political pressure, intimidation, systematic "re-education" and attacks on the honour and dignity of the prisoners have remained a constant feature of life in the camps, and even seem to increase as a result of the activities of certain persons having no connection with the normal running of the camps. Representatives of a "department of political and ideological education", members of Iraqi opposition groups who have fled to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the official press all attempt to incite the prisoners against their government. On many occasions, the ICRC has submitted to the highest authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran detailed and clearly reasoned requests that a stop should be put to these practices which States, in drawing up the Third Geneva Convention, agreed to ban. The ICRC has made the abolition of these practices a condition for the resumption of its activities, since the discharge of its mandate is incompatible and irreconcilable with attempts at political and ideological conditioning of prisoners. To date, the ICRC has received no satisfactory reply to the written and oral representations which it has made on the subject to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

B. Iraqi civilian refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The ICRC has failed in its attempts to bring aid to these groups, consisting mainly of Iraqi Kurds who have fled from their home territory and are now living in camps in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The ICRC knows that these groups are in great need of food and medicine. By virtue of their status as refugees from an enemy power, these people come under the aegis of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians in time of war. They should therefore be allowed to receive the aid which an organization such as the ICRC could provide.

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REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

A. Iranian prisoners of war held in the Republic of Iraq

1. Every month without fail since October 1980, ICRC delegates have visited Iranian prisoners of war, who currently number 7,300 and are held in six internment camps. The visits take place in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 126 of the Third Geneva Convention, a main stipulation of which is that the delegates should be able to talk freely and without witnesses with prisoners of their choice.

As a rule, prisoners of war are registered by the ICRC within a reasonably short time of being captured.

On the whole, the exchange of Red Cross messages between the prisoners and their families works well, though delays which may sometimes be quite long are still caused by the Iraqi censorship procedure.

2. In the camps themselves, the ICRC has observed a number of significant improvements in the material conditions of internment. Moreover, the authorities have taken steps to put an end to the random acts of brutality to which the ICRC drew their attention on many previous occasions. Furthermore, an improvement in disciplinary measures has been apparent since autumn 1983.
3. On 29 January 1984, 190 Iranian prisoners, 87 of whom were severely wounded or sick, were handed over by the Iraqi authorities to the ICRC in Ankara for repatriation.
4. The ICRC is concerned by the fact that a large number of members of the enemy armed forces, both officers and other ranks, some of whom were taken prisoner by the Iraqi armed forces at the beginning of the conflict, are still being held in detention centres to which the ICRC is denied access. The ICRC has regularly submitted to the government and military authorities of Iraq lists of names showing that several hundred such prisoners of war exist. The ICRC mentions with satisfaction that at the end of 1983 it was allowed to register several dozens of these prisoners, who had been captured at the start of the conflict and have now been placed in camps visited by the ICRC.

The ICRC has good grounds to be concerned about the prisoners held in places to which it does not have access. These prisoners are deprived of their most basic rights and, according to many mutually corroborating sources of information, are held in conditions which do not meet the requirements of humanitarian law.

B. Iranian civilians who have been deported to or taken refuge in the Republic of Iraq

1. During the conflict, several tens of thousands of Iranian civilians have been displaced from their homes in the frontier areas of Khuzestan and Kurdistan to Iraqi territory.

The Iraqi authorities have accepted that in principle the ICRC should be present from now on among these civilians, and considerable efforts have recently been made to improve the living conditions of these civilians when it was necessary.

2. Since the start of the conflict, the ICRC has registered more than a thousand civilians in the prisoner-of-war camps, including women and elderly men arrested in the territories occupied by the Iraqi armed forces. Although it has been possible to repatriate several hundred of these people, an overall solution to the problem still has to be found.

C. Bombing of civilian areas by the Iraqi armed forces

The Iraqi air force has continued to carry out regular indiscriminate bombing of Iranian built-up areas, sometimes more than 200 km from the front. The result has been loss of life, sometimes on a large scale, and considerable destruction of purely civilian property. These deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian property are sometimes designated as reprisals; they contravene the laws and customs of war, in particular with regard to the basic principle that a distinction must be made between military objectives and civilian persons and property.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 20 FEBRUARY

AND TO MOSCOW

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. YESTERDAY'S AND TODAY'S UK NEWSPAPERS CARRY PROMINENT REPORTS THAT IRANIAN FORCES HAVE BEEN PUT ON MAXIMUM ALERT TO PREVENT THE PASSAGE OF HOSTILE FORCES THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, AND THAT THE US NAVAL TASK FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS MOVED INTO THE GULF OF OMAN. WE HAVE NO (NO) INDICATIONS OF ANY ABNORMAL ACTIVITY BY THE IRANIANS, AND NOTE THAT THE AMERICANS SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT THAT REPORTS OF THE IRANIAN LAND OFFENSIVE HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED (YOUR TELNO 586 - NOT TO ALL). WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE US TASK FORCE IS UNCHANGED.
2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY BE PRESSED IN THE HOUSE ON US INTENTIONS AND ON WHETHER THE US HAVE COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, DENIS HEALEY HAS RAISED THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD LET THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT KNOW THAT IF WESTERN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE GULF BECAME NECESSARY IT WOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED AND CONSTITUTE NO THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE SHALL NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS IN BRIEFING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE TOMORROW.
3. WE IMAGINE THAT THERE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SOME EXCHANGES BET-

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WEEN THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS ON THIS PROBLEM ON THE DOBRYNIN CHANNEL FOLLOWING FROM THE CARTER STATEMENT OF 1980. UNLESS YOU ALREADY KNOW HOW MATTERS STAND BETWEEN THEM ON THIS SUBJECT, GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD GO OVER THE GROUND WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. MINISTERS WILL WISH TO BE ABLE TO SAY IN THE HOUSE IF ASKED THAT THE US ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR SOME CONTACT BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS IN THIS SUBJECT. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR REPORT DESKBY 210900Z.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Rept on base.

20 February 1984

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p.a.

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 15 February about Mr Healey's concern at the situation in the Gulf, and his view that the Americans should make clear to the Soviet Government that if any Western intervention became necessary, it would be strictly limited and would not constitute a threat to them.

We agreed that Sir Oliver Wright should be instructed to discuss this subject with the Americans. In advance of the meeting of OD(EM) tomorrow, you might wish to have the enclosed copy of our telegram of instructions. As you will see, we have asked for a report from Washington to be available before OD(EM).

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yes me,


Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	SECRET	IMMEDIATE 201500Z (W'ton and MOSCOW only)

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PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
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	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
	10	REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW
	11	YORK
	12	IRAN/IRAQ
	13	1. Yesterday's and today's UK newspapers carry prominent
	14	reports that Iranian forces have been put on maximum alert
	15	to prevent the passage of hostile forces through the Straits
	16	of Hormuz, and that the US naval task force in the Indian
	17	Ocean has moved into the Gulf of Oman. We have no (no)
	18	indications of any abnormal activity by the Iranians, and
	19	note that the Americans share our assessment that reports
	20	of the Iranian land offensive have been exaggerated (your
	21	telno 586 - not to all). We also understand that the
///	22	disposition of the US task force is unchanged.
//	23	2. You should know that the Prime Minister may be pressed
/	24	in the House on US intentions and on whether the US have
	25	come to an understanding with the Russians about military

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File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution STANDARD Iran/Iraq Additional distribn: Iran/Iraq
Drafted by (Block capitals) P F RICKETTS		
Telephone number 233-4641		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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1 <<<<
 2 activity in the Gulf. For your own information, Denis Healey
 3 has raised this with the Prime Minister and has suggested
 4 that the US Government should let the Soviet Government know
 5 that if Western military intervention in the Gulf became
 6 necessary it would be strictly limited and constitute no
 7 threat to the Soviet Union. We shall need to take account
 8 of this in briefing the Prime Minister for questions in the
 9 House tomorrow.
 10 3. We imagine that there may well have been some exchanges
 11 between the Americans and Russians ^{on this problem} on the Dobrynin channel
 12 following from the Carter statement of ¹⁹⁸⁰ ~~1979~~. Unless you
 13 already know how matters stand between them on this subject,
 14 grateful if you could go over the ground with the State
 15 Department. Ministers will wish to be able to say in the
 16 House if asked that the US are aware of our views on the
 17 need for some contact between the US and Soviet Governments
 18 in this ^{subject.} ~~area.~~ Grateful therefore for report ~~DESKBY~~ 210900Z.

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Iraq: Internal Situation pt. 3



AJC



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1984

Dear Sir,

Iran/Iraq

Following the escalation of fighting in the Gulf in the last few days, the Prime Minister has asked me to seek answers to various questions. I appreciate that your answers cannot be made available in time for OD(EM) tomorrow. And it may be that it would be more appropriate for the work to be done by the Joint Intelligence Committee. In any event, I should be grateful if answers to the questions below could be made available in the next few days.

The points in which the Prime Minister is particularly interested are as follows:

- (a) How widespread in the Middle East is the appeal of the Iranian revolution? To what extent do Shi'a communities in the Middle East look to Khomeini for leadership?
- (b) To what extent would these Shi'a communities act as fifth columns if Iranian forces moved beyond Iraq to other Gulf states and further afield?
- (c) Which Arab Governments support Khomeini and which would continue to do so if he overcame Iraqi resistance and moved on to other points in the Middle East?
- (d) What is our current assessment of Khomeini's ability to achieve military victory over Iraq and bring about the fall of Saddam Hussain?
- (e) Has Khomeini created sufficient links with Iraqi dissidents so that, if Saddam Hussain fell, he could install himself in Baghdad, Basra and a few major towns without committing his main forces?
- (f) If the Iranians broke through on the central front, is it likely that the Baghdad regime would fall in a matter of days? And if so, would the US Rapid Deployment Force and fleet be in any position to take effective countermeasures?

(g) What help in resisting the Iranian advance could be expected from:

- (i) Egypt (It has been suggested to the Prime Minister that Egyptian public opinion is pro-Khomeini and that Egypt lacks fighting units of any merit.)
- (ii) Pakistan (To what extent is that country attracted by Moslem fundamentalism?)
- (iii) Turkey (Is it likely that the Turks would be prepared to offer military resistance to an Iranian advance?)
- (iv) France (Are French forces in Djibouti capable of moving to the Gulf in a short time and would the French Government be likely to contemplate military action against the Iranians?)

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

John Cow

John Cow

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1984

Escalation of the War in the Gulf

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the Cabinet Office record of 17 February about the meeting held that day under the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's chairmanship to consider the situation in the Gulf.

You told me on Friday that Sir Oliver Wright is being instructed to discuss with the State Department the desirability of US/Soviet contacts on the Gulf.

The Prime Minister has commented that she wishes to discuss the situation in the Gulf, with the Ministers concerned, very early this week. She believes that we need to develop further our contingency plans, together with the Americans, with regard to diplomatic activity.

A meeting of OD(EM) is being arranged.

I am copying this letter to Michael Reidy (Department of Energy), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 91 OF 19 FEB 84,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, AND ROUTINE
PARIS, STOCKHOLM, GULF POSTS, AMMAN, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE.

MY TELEGRAM NO 87 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KHATTANI BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES OF CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS MINISTER TO CLARIFY, IN THE LIGHT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISTORTIONS IN NEW YORK, IRAQ'S RESPONSE TO THE UN MISSION. CALLAN ATTENDED IN MY ABSENCE.

2. KHATTANI SAID THAT HIS TASK WAS RENDERED STRAIGHTFORWARD BY THE SECOND IRANIAN REPLY (OF 17 FEBRUARY) WHICH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAN EXCLUDED ANY POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE MISSION. KHATTANI REGRETTED THAT AN IMPRESSION HAD SOMEHOW BEEN CREATED THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT IT. EVEN A QUICK READING OF THEIR REPLY WOULD HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY WELCOMED IT PROVIDED THAT ITS MANDATE PERMITTED CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICT AS A WHOLE, INCLUDING CIVILIAN DAMAGE. KHATTANI EMPHASISED THAT IRAQ DID NOT OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE: INDEED IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY WELCOME NOW GIVEN THE LARGE AMOUNT OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. IRAQ HAD BEEN, AND STILL REMAINED, ANXIOUS TO CO-OPERATE IN ANY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END. THIS WAS IN STARK CONTRAST TO IRAN'S VILIFICATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. KHATTANI MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAQ FELT COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN HAVING ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE MISSION'S MANDATE. HE CRITICISED THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR ITS LACK OF CLARITY AND COMMENTED UNFAVOURABLY ON THE FACT THAT IRAQ'S REPLY HAD BEEN CIRCULATED AFTER THE IRANIAN ONE.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (D114), BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 109: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. IRANIAN AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY ATTACKED FURTHER TARGETS INSIDE IRAQ, NOTABLY AT ALI GHARBH BETWEEN KUT AND AMARA, ON 17 FEBRUARY. AN IRAQI AIRCRAFT BROKE THE SOUND BARRIER OVER TEHRAN AT 2245 LOCAL TIME ON 17 FEBRUARY.

2. ON 18 FEBRUARY IRAN ANNOUNCED THAT SHE WAS STOPPING HER RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI TOWNS IN ORDER TO SEE HOW SINCERE IRAQ WAS ABOUT HER ANNOUNCED CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT OF IRANIAN TOWNS. HOWEVER IRAN WOULD RENEW HER RETALIATION IF IRAQ ATTACKED CIVILIAN TARGETS AGAIN.

3. THE FIRST PHASE OF VAL FAJR 5 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A FAIRLY SMALL OPERATION AND TO HAVE ENDED. IT EVIDENTLY INVOLVED RECAPTURING OR CAPTURING ABOUT 60 SQ KM OF TERRITORY WEST OF CHANGULEH, INCLUDING SOME HEIGHTS WHICH OVERLOOK THE IRAQI PLAIN. THE RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE OF THE OPERATION CAN BE JUDGED BY THE IRANIAN CLAIM OF 2,200 IRAQI CASUALTIES.

4. THE IRANIAN DECISION TO STOP BOMBARDING TARGETS INSIDE IRAQ COULD BE RELATED IN PART TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN. IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HELP REOPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISSION VISITING THE AREA.

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 586 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1984

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YOUR TELNO 334 AND OUR JICTEL NO 040: POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR.

1. WE PUT THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF FIRST TUR TO PLACKE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT).
2. PLACKE SAID THAT THE CONSENSUS OF US ANALYSTS WAS THAT MEDIA REPORTS OF THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN MUCH EXAGGERATED. THE IRANIANS HAD MOUNTED TWO RELATIVELY SMALL CROSS-BORDER PROBES, ONE IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR AND ONE SOME EIGHTY MILES FURTHER SOUTH. THE IRANIANS TERMED IT THE OPENING OF VAL FAGR V AND IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE MORE THAN THAT, ALTHOUGH IT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A PRELIMINARY TO AN OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE. IT HAD PERHAPS BEEN ACCELERATED BY IRAQI STATEMENTS AND PROVOCATION. PLACKE NOTED THAT IRANIAN ARTILLERY BARRAGES WERE CONTINUING, BUT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR HONOURED THEIR UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING, ANNOUNCED ON 14 FEBRUARY, TO HALT ATTACKS ON IRANIAN CITIES FOR A PERIOD OF ONE WEEK.
3. PLACKE CONFIRMED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SPOKEN TO THE HEAD OF THE IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION TO URGE RESTRAINT. EAGLETON WOULD BE TAKING PARALLEL ACTION IN BAGHDAD ON 18 FEBRUARY. THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION IN BOTH BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.
4. AS TO IRAQI ABILITY TO WITHSTAND AN IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, PLACKE NOTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD HELD FIRM FOR SOME TWO YEARS. IRANIAN TACTICS HAD NOT IMPROVED. THE IRAQIS HAD CONSTRUCTED EXTENSIVE DEFENSIVE WORKS AND THE DISPARITY IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE TWO SIDES HAD INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THEIR FAVOUR. THEY SHOULD IN THEORY BE ABLE TO HOLD OFF THE IRANIANS. BUT THERE REMAINED QUESTION-MARKS OVER THEIR MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND MORALE.
5. PLACKE THOUGHT THAT IRAQI AIR STRIKES FURTHER DOWN THE GULF WERE POSSIBLE BUT NOT IMMINENT. THE RECENT PROPENSITY OF BOTH SIDES TO ATTACK CIVILIAN TARGETS WAS DISTURBING. THE IRAQI ATTACK ON THE BANDAR KHOMEINI PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX WAS IN PART A REFLECTION OF THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH UNSUCCESSFUL JAPANESE EFFORTS AT MEDIATION. THIS COULD EXTEND TO ATTACKS ON OIL SUPPLIES. BUT PLACKE THOUGHT THAT ANY SUCH IRAQI ESCALATION WAS LIKELY TO BE GRADUAL, BOTH FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE IRANIANS AND TO MINIMISE ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS.

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6. PLACKE FULLY ENDORSED THE NEED FOR US TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH AND IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SIR J LEAHY'S VISIT. IN ADDITION TO TALKS WITH MURPHY AND EAGLEBURGER, WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR SIR J LEAHY TO HAVE SEPARATE MEETINGS ON THE GULF WITH PLACKE, FAIRBANKS, ADMIRAL HOWE AND KEMP (NSC). TEICHER (NSC STAFF), TO WHOM WE SPOKE BEFORE RECEIVING YOUR TUR, SAID THAT THE NSC STAFF HAD BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO WHETHER THE JUNE ECONOMIC SUMMIT SHOULD BE INVITED TO ADDRESS THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FURTHER RESTRICTION OF OIL SUPPLIES. THIS MIGHT USEFULLY HELP TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. THIS MAY BE RAISED WITH SIR J LEAHY ON 22 FEBRUARY.

7. WE HAVE SPOKEN ALSO TO KEMP (NSC). HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCIES IN THE GULF WITH LEAHY. THE AMERICANS DID NOT YET HAVE ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE FULLY TO ESTIMATE THE SCOPE OF THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, BUT THE EARLY REPORTS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. THE AMERICANS WOULD GO ON URGING RESTRAINT ON THE IRAQIS AND HOPED THAT OTHERS WOULD DO SO. WHAT WAS RESTRAINING THEM SO FAR, HOWEVER, WAS NOT DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES BUT FEARS THAT THEIR AIR FORCE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY SOUTH OF BANDAR KHOMEINI. THE IRAQIS SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO PLAN SOME SORT OF LAND COUNTER-OFFENSIVE WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT PRETTY ILL ADVISED.

8. IF IRAQI ATTACKS IN THE GULF DID INTENSIFY, THE IRANIAN RESPONSE WAS LIKELY TO B FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM IN SOME OF THE GULF STATES. THE AMERICANS DID NOT INTEND TO RUSH IN. SUCH ACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH PRIMARILY BY STIFFENING THE RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. IF THE STRAITS WERE CLOSED THAT WOULD BE A DIFFERANT MATTER, AND THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF REQUESTS FROM THE STATES IN THE REGION.

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PS| MR PETER WALKER
PS| MR HESELTINE
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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 334 OF 17 FEBRUARY

POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR

1. AT A MEETING OF MINISTERS ON 17 FEBRUARY GREAT UNCERTAINTY WAS EXPRESSED ON HOW THE U S ADMINISTRATION MIGHT REACT TO THE LATEST IRANIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQ, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THEIR EXPERIENCES IN LEBANON. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH WITH ALL U S DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH GULF CONTINGENCY PLANNING (INCLUDING PLANS ON OIL SUPPLIES AND STOCKS), SO AS TO DISSUADE THE ADMINISTRATION FROM PRECIPITATE ACTION WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST DESTABILISATION OF MODERATE GULF REGIMES. IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT IF THE IRANIANS TOOK STEPS E G TO TRY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO ATTEMPT TO DE-ESCALATE THE CRISIS, E G HIGH-LEVEL APPROACHES TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE IRAQIS. WE SHOULD STRESS TO THE U S THAT ANY MILITARY RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROTECTIVE MEASURES, E G CONVOYING AND MINE-CLEARING OPERATIONS. THOUGH THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN COVERED (E G DURING RAPHEL'S VISIT TO LONDON IN DECEMBER), IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT WE SHOULD GO OVER THE GROUND AGAIN WITH THE AMERICANS ON DILOMATIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN BEFORE, OR IN PARALLEL WITH, MILITARY INTERVENTION AFTER ANY IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION.
2. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE VISIT OF SIR J LEAHY TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, AND THE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND MR WEINBERGER (ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY) AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY WITH MR HODEL (ABOUT 6 MARCH), WOULD BE SUITABLE OCCASIONS FOR FURTHER TAKING OF THE US PULSE ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF GULF CONTINQENCY PLANNING (INCLUDING THE IEA EMERGENCY SHARING SCHEME), AND FOR FEEDINQ IN OUR OWN IDEAS.

3. SINCE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING MENTIONED ABOVE TOOK PLACE, US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEIR INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE IRAQIS AND PRESS THEM TO CEASE ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS. THIS IS WELCOME NEWS, SO FAR AS IT GOES.

4. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD NOW COMPARE NOTES AT AN AOPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (I) HOW DO THEY SEE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND FOLLOWING THE LAUNCHING OF THE VAL FAJR V ATTACK ON 16 FEBRUARY AND THE IRAQI COUNTER-ATTACK? DO THEY BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS CAN HOLD THE IRANIANS IN THIS SECTOR?
- (II) DO THEY THINK THAT DIVERSIONARY IRAQI AIR STRIKES FURTHER DOWN THE GULF THAN BANDAR KHOMEINI ARE IMMINENT?
- (III) WE WELCOME THE ACTION THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN IN URGING THE IRAQIS TO CEASE ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS. AS AND WHEN THEY FORESEE DANGER TO WESTERN SHIOPING IN THE GULF OUTSIDE THE IRAQI MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE, WE TRUST THEY WILL CONTINUE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN BAGHDAD TO URGE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT.
- (IV) WE BELIEVE THERE IS GREATER NEED THAN EVER TO KEEP VERY CLOSE IN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON GULF CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WHICH HAVE GONE WELL SO FAR. THIS WILL BE A PRIME AIM OF SIR J LEAHY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK (HE WILL AIM TO CALL AT N S C AS WELL AS ON STATE DEPARTMENT).
- (V) AS IRANIAN REACTIONS TO ANY IRAQI RAIDS ON KHARG WHICH ARE LESS THAN 100 PER CENT SUCCESSFUL MAY FALL WELL SHORT OF ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, WE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AGAIN ON THE RANGE OF DIPOLMATIC STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO DEFUSE A CRISIS BEFORE IT ESCALATED TO THE POINT OF IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION TO BLOCK THE STRAITS. LEAHY WILL BRING WITH HIM SOME IDEAS ON THIS ASPECT.

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SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR OF EXCHEQUER.

PS/MR PETER WALKER

PS/MR HESELTINE.

MR JAGO, CAB OFF.

MR ONEILL JIC

MR COLES, NO 10.

SECRET

Prime Minister 22nd Feb

ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN THE GULF

Sir Oliver Wright is being instructed to discuss with Mr. Eagleburger the desirability of US/Soviet contacts on the Gulf.

RECORD of a Meeting held in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office at 10.30 am on FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1984

A J.C. 17/2

We must discuss this again very early next week. We must have more concrete plans with the Americans or necessary diplomatic authority.

PRESENT

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP	Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (in the Chair)
The Rt Hon Peter Walker MP	Secretary of State for Energy
The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP	Secretary of State for Defence
Mr Ian Stewart MP	Economic Secretary, Treasury
Mr S L Egerton	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr I P Wilson	Treasury
Mr S Robson	Treasury
Mr J Wiggins	Department of Energy
Air Marshal D P Hall	Ministry of Defence
Mr J M Legge	Ministry of Defence
Mr R J O'Neill	Cabinet Office
Mr D E J Jago	Cabinet Office
Mr D Brennan	Cabinet Office

The meeting considered the escalation of the war in the Gulf. They had before them an immediate assessment (JIC(84)(IA)5) describing developments in the war.

MR O'NEILL said that the situation in the war between Iran and Iraq had not changed greatly from that described in the immediate assessment. The fighting was continuing, and was confined to Iranian territory. It was doubtful that the Iranian armed forces had the capability to advance far. The Iranians had sustained damage from Iraqi missile attacks, to which they could not respond in kind. The Iranians' immediate objectives were not clear, but they might be aiming to cut the road between Baghdad and Basra. In the longer term, they wished to wear down Iraq's willingness to resist, and to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. If the Iranians achieved a substantial breakthrough, Iraq might become desperate and escalate its attacks upon Iran.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENDRGY said that a number of oil companies expected an increase in hostilities in the Gulf in the next few weeks. Some nine million barrels per day (mbd) of oil were exported from the Gulf area. If the Straits of Hormuz were blocked, only one and a half mbd would be exported making a shortfall of seven and a half mbd. If other oil producing nations increased their output, the shortfall might be reduced to four mbd, which was 9% of the world's supplies. If there were no increase in output, because other oil producing countries preferred to see the price of oil rise, the shortfall would be 16% of the world's supplies. In the circumstances of a shortfall, it would be important to implement the International Energy Agency's (IEA) emergency allocation scheme, and to persuade the United States to release as much as possible of their strategic reserve of oil. Action within the European Community should be avoided, since the United Kingdom would be looked to for assistance in providing oil to other members. The United States administration had earlier said that they would co-operate in IEA action in the event of disruption to oil supplies, but it was possible that they might instead decide to allow market forces to effect the necessary redistribution of supplies. This could lead to a sharp rise in the price of oil, which would be damaging to the prospects for world economic recovery.

In discussion the following points were made -

- (a) The Iranians had stated publicly that they would close the Straits of Hormuz if they were themselves struck in such a way as to halt their oil exports. It was unlikely, however, that they would be able to sustain a closure for long. They were unlikely to mine the Straits, but might mount attacks on neutral shipping, which would make shipping reluctant to pass through the Straits.
- (b) The reaction of the United States to an interruption in oil supplies would be crucial. Every attempt should be made to steer them away from taking precipitate military action, which would greatly increase tension in the area, and could provoke a response by the Soviet Union. It would be desirable for the American element of any Western response to the closure of the Straits to be as unobtrusive as possible in order that the Iranians should not be provoked into taking wholesale action against Western interests. The United States might be asked to

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exercise a restraining influence upon Iraq, with whom her relations were improving.

- (c) Diplomatic action to try to bring an end to hostilities in the Gulf was continuing, but the prospects for success were not good.
- (d) The present escalation of hostilities might result in an increase in the price of oil. If the situation worsened, and oil supplies were interrupted, larger increases in oil prices could be expected, particularly if the United States did not release their reserves. Short-term fluctuations in oil prices would probably be manageable, and prices in the range of \$35 to \$40 a barrel were tolerable.
- (e) The Director of Military Assistance Overseas, Major General Dennis, had recently concluded a tour of the Gulf States. As previously agreed by Ministers, he had concentrated on offering those States British assistance in developing their indigenous defensive capabilities against the possibility that they might come under attack from Iran. Defence Ministers of the Gulf Co-ordination Council were meeting on 25 February, and were expected then to reach conclusions as to the sorts of assistance they might require. The Omanis had declined the offer to bring to a greater state of readiness the mine counter-measures force which might be deployed to the Gulf, since this would have involved them in paying for a ship to be taken up from trade. More generally, the intention should be that the Gulf States would meet the cost of any assistance provided to them.
- (f) Although the Iraqis had in theory the military capability to respond to Iranian attacks by sharply escalating hostilities, it was unlikely that they would be competent to organise concerted and effective military action on a greater scale than they had so far achieved.

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, summing up the discussion, said that it seemed clear that the war between Iran and Iraq would continue. The meeting were agreed that no measures of military preparedness by the United Kingdom to respond to a further escalation in hostilities were required at this stage. Every effort should be made to monitor the United States' thinking on the situation in the war and to dissuade

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them from taking precipitate military action in the event that Iran attempted to enforce a blockade of the Straits of Hormuz. In the light of the United States' recent actions in the Lebanon, however, it seemed unlikely that any coherent policy towards the war in the Gulf had yet been orchestrated in Washington. The United States should also be left in no doubt that if a blockade were to be enforced, they would be expected to make available their stockpile of oil for the IEA emergency allocation scheme. Ministers should continue to meet from time to time to take stock of the situation in the war between Iran and Iraq.

The meeting -

Took note, with approval, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's summing up of their discussion.

Cabinet Office

17 February 1984

Circulated to: Members of the Cabinet
Those present
Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Gregson
Mr Goodall
Mr Williamson

SECRET

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

*Not faxed to
Chequers 18/2*

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

ED/MED

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ED/UND

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ED/CONS. EM UNIT

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CABINET OFFICE D I O

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 172230Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 179 FO 17 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN

PRIORITY GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, AMMAN,

MOSCOW, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, MODUK (D14).

IMMEDIATE

MY TELSNOs 167 AND 168: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. CORDOVEZ MISSION TO IRAN AND IRAQ ANNOUNCED ONLY TO BE ABORTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED AT HIS REGULAR DAILY PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS INFORMING THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ THAT HE WAS READY TO DESPATCH A MISSION TO THE AREA AS SOON AS ASSURANCES FOR THE SAFETY OF THE MISSION HAD BEEN RECEIVED. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS GIULIANI SAID THAT THE MISSION WOULD BE HEADED BY UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL CORDOVEZ AND WOULD LEAVE NEW YORK IN THE SECOND HALF OF NEXT WEEK.

3. HARDLY HAD THIS NEWS BECOME PUBLIC THAN RUMOUR SPREAD THAT THE MISSION HAD BEEN ABORTED. HEAD OF CHANCERY CHECKED THE POSITION WITH CORDOVEZ. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE MISSION HAD INDEED BEEN CALLED OFF. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MISSION FOLLOWING THE VARIOUS IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT ~~THEIR RESPONSE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE POSITIVE RATHER THAN NEGATIVE. CORDOVEZ INFORMED THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS LATE ON 16 FEBRUARY AND AL-DAYSI RAISED NO OBJECTION. HOWEVER~~

~~BEEN CALLED OFF. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DECIDED TO GO AHEAD~~
WITH THE MISSION FOLLOWING THE VARIOUS IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT
THEIR RESPONSE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE POSITIVE RATHER THAN
NEGATIVE. CORDOVEZ INFORMED THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THIS LATE ON 16 FEBRUARY AND AL-QAYSI RAISED NO OBJECTION. HOWEVER
THIS AFTERNOON, FOLLOWING THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MISSION,
THE IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE CALLED ON CORDOVEZ WITH A
FURTHER IRANIAN LETTER. THIS SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE NEW CRIMINAL
ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY IRAQ AND THE CALLOUSNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IRANIAN FORCES HAD DECIDED TO RESPOND TO IRAQ'S "INSANE
ADVENTURES". IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS THEY REQUESTED
THAT THE FACT-FINDING MISSION SHOULD ENGAGE IN NO POLITICAL
DISCUSSION.

4. CORDOVEZ TOLD US THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT TO RAJAI-KHORASSANI
THAT THE IRANIANS HAD SCORED A FANTASTIC POINT IN AGREEING TO THE
MISSION IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEY WOULD LOSE THIS ADVANTAGE IF THEY
NOW REFUSED IT. RAJAI SAID THAT THE IMAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN
TEHRAN WAS MORE IMPORTANT (THAN THE POLITICAL PRONG OF THE MISSION).
5. CORDOVEZ COMMENTED THAT THE UN COULD ONLY ACT IN THIS SITUATION
IF THERE WAS A MINIMUM OF WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES. CLEARLY THIS
MINIMUM DID NOT EXIST.

MARGETSON

NNNN

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OO BAGHDAD

OO TEHRAN

PP ABU DHABI

PP BAHRAIN

PP DOHA

PP DUBAI

IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR LUCE

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SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

ED/MED

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 171105Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 63 OF 17 FEB

AND TO PRIORITY INFO: BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS.

IRAN/IRAQ WAR: APPEAL BY INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC).

1. ICRC HAVE HANDED US AN URGENT APPEAL ADDRESSED TO STATES PARTIES TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ABOUT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. (THIS FOLLOWS THE SIMILAR APPEAL OF LAST MAY). THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTIONS BY BOTH PARTIES, AND ALSO THAT SUCH ABUSES MAY UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN FUTURE CONFLICTS. REMINDING GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, THEY ASK THEM TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE THAT IRAQ AND IRAN PUT AN END TO THE VIOLATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY:

(A) TO CONSIDER EXPRESSING CONCERN TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.,

~~(B) TO SUPPORT THE ICRC'S EFFORTS TO HELP THE VICTIMS.~~

(B) TO SUPPORT THE ICRC'S EFFORTS TO HELP THE VICTIMS.,

(C) TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY CAN ACT OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWERS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

2. ICRC HAVE AGAIN EMPHASISED HOW EXCEPTIONAL IT IS FOR THEM TO APPEAL TO GOVERNMENTS FOR SUPPORT AN PUBLICISE ABUSES IN THIS FASHION (REPORTS OF THE APPEAL HAVE ALREADY APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS). THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM. IF VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTIONS CONTINUED, RISKS OF ESCALATION MOUNTED. ICRC EXPECTED IRAN TO MOUNT MAJOR ATTACKS ON IRAQ AND TO RETALIATE "IN OTHER WAYS" AGAINST FURTHER IRAQI BOMBING OF CIVILIAN CENTRES. CLEARLY, THEY FEEL IN NEED OF POLITICAL SUPPORT IN A SITUATION BEYOND THEIR SCOPE.

3. APPEAL FROM ICRC IS ADDRESSED TO YOU. IN VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER'S CLOSE INTEREST IN ICRC'S ACTIVITIES, PRESIDENT OF ICRC HAS SENT HER A SET TOO. (DOCUMENTS BY TODAY'S BAG UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM HOSS TO HASKELL (MED).)

4. ICRC HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL COORDINATE ACTION ON THIS MATTER. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS REPORTED THIS, TOGETHER WITH URGENT REQUEST BY ICRC PRESIDENT TO MEET M. CHEYSSON (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE WITH IRAQ).

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 171150Z DR//LAB



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1984

When travelling on the Prime Minister's aircraft on the return flight from Moscow yesterday Mr. Denis Healey told the Prime Minister that he was particularly concerned at present about the situation in the Gulf and the dangers of an escalation of tension, possibly leading to American intervention.

His main point was that the United States ought to discuss the problem with the Soviet Union with the aim of ensuring that, if Western military intervention became necessary, the Soviet Government realised that the intervention would be strictly limited and would not constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. Mr. Healey feared that if this were not done - and the US decided for example to take some kind of military action on the territory of Iran, the possibilities of a clash between the two super powers would be greatly heightened. Mr. Healey has already expressed his concern in public and I think we should be ready to deal with the point if he does so again.

The Prime Minister made no commitment to contact Mr. Healey again and I do not think we need do so. But I should be grateful for advice on the proposition he advances.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Ref. A084/363

PRIME MINISTER

At the meeting of OD(EM) on 26 January (OD(EM)(84) 1st Meeting), the Sub-Committee concluded that deployment of British ground forces and/or air defence aircraft to the Gulf area should be countenanced only as a measure of last resort if British interests were directly threatened; and that final decisions on any such deployment must rest with the British Government. I was instructed to arrange for officials to examine whether this conclusion was consistent with the various assurances about potential British assistance which had already been given to certain Gulf States. The following examination of the question has been agreed by officials of the Treasury, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence.

2. No formal treaty commitments exist which would oblige the United Kingdom to come to the defence of the Gulf States in time of need. Informal assurances have, however, been given to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to Oman, as follows:

(a) UAE

In October 1980 Mr Moberly (Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) called on Shaikh Zaid with a personal message from Lord Carrington saying that, in the spirit of our very long-standing friendship, we stood ready in principle to provide military assistance if asked. Such assistance would be defensive in nature.

(b) Oman

On 2 December 1981 Mr Hurd (the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) told Sultan Qaboos that the United Kingdom intended to maintain its close defence relationship with Oman. It had been decided to keep in being certain forces that could be used outside the NATO area either with an ally (for example the United States) or alone. The elements that could be made available could include a

naval escort task group, mine clearance units, some combat aircraft, and one or two infantry battalions or commandos with support for land or amphibious operations. Subsequently, you wrote to Sultan Qaboos on 15 July 1982 to assure him "that we are fully committed to the security of Oman". You will however see from the attached copy of your letter that this assurance was directly linked to the use of British Loan Service Personnel in time of internal or regional conflict.

3. In the case of the UAE, the assurance given is in general terms and does not commit us to any specific form of assistance. It is therefore consistent with OD(EM)'s conclusion that deployments of British ground forces and/or air defence aircraft to the Gulf should be countenanced only as a measure of last resort if British interests are threatened, and that final decisions on deployment must rest with the British Government.

4. In the case of Oman, the list of military resources mentioned by Mr Hurd was purely illustrative, and in no sense constituted a commitment to make any particular one of them available if requested. The guidelines for Loan Service Personnel are, as agreed by OD(EM), now being reviewed.

5. We therefore conclude that there is nothing in the assurances already given to the Gulf States which is inconsistent with the conclusions that British ground forces and/or air defence aircraft should be deployed to the Gulf only if British interests are directly threatened. Nor is either assurance inconsistent with the conclusion that final decisions on the deployment of forces to the Gulf must remain with the British Government.

6. I was further instructed to arrange for officials to examine whether the language of the proposed message to Sultan Qaboos about the possible deployment of British mine countermeasures vessels was consistent with the assurances which had been given to the Omanis. The formula now proposed is as follow:

The mine countermeasures force would be deployed to the Gulf in response to an Omani request, subject only to Her Majesty's Government's overriding national requirements,

to agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Omani Government, and to the availability of adequate defence arrangements for the force on arrival in Gulf waters.

Given that no specific commitment to deploy a mine countermeasures force to the Gulf area has been made in the past, this formulation would be in keeping with the assurances that have already been given. It is also explicitly consistent with OD(EM)'s conclusion that final decisions on deployment of the force must rest with the British Government. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Muscat and the Chief of the Omani Defence Staff believe that the proposed formula should be acceptable to Sultan Qaboos. The Ambassador would like authority to pass the message to the Sultan as quickly as possible; I should be grateful to know whether you are content for him to proceed.

7. Finally, I was instructed to have the proposed message to Shaikh Zaid recast in order to ensure that it was consistent with undertakings already given to the United Arab Emirates, preserved the British Government's right to take a final decision on the deployment of British forces to assist them, and was as forthcoming --- as possible. A revised text of the proposed message is at Annex; I should be grateful for your approval to its terms. I recommend that the message be transmitted on your behalf by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Abu Dhabi. It should also be made clear to Shaikh Zaid that the UAE would be expected to meet the cost of any assistance provided to them; and the Ambassador should therefore be instructed to make this point clear at an appropriate stage.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD(EM).

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

1 February 1984

DRAFT MESSAGE TO SHAIKH ZAID

When you kindly received Mr Richard Luce on 18 December, you told him of your concern that an escalation of the conflict between Iran and Iraq might put the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in danger of an Iranian attack. You asked him to indicate whether and in what way the United Kingdom would be prepared to help the UAE defend itself against such an attack. Your request has been given very careful and detailed consideration by Her Majesty's Government, and I am now able to provide a reply.

You will recall that when hostilities first began between Iran and Iraq in 1980, and fears were expressed that they might spread to other parts of the Gulf, Mr Moberly visited you to convey a personal assurance from Lord Carrington that in the spirit of our very long-standing friendship we stood ready in principle to provide military assistance of a defensive nature if asked. Mr Luce told you in December that we stood by this commitment, which I am happy to reaffirm.

In considering the United Kingdom's own defence needs, we have been guided by the belief that the best defence is collective self-defence. That is why we have been substantially increasing our own defence expenditure in real terms. In the same way, we welcome the development of increased co-operation on defence issues between the member countries of the Gulf

Co-operation Council (GCC), including their first joint military exercises last autumn. As hitherto, we are anxious to provide all the assistance in our power, by way of training and advice in the United Kingdom and locally, and through meeting the GCC's defence equipment needs, to help the UAE and its partners to continue building up their capabilities for self-defence. General Dennis has just visited the UAE with a mandate to ascertain what more we can do to help you in these areas. If you believe that the UAE has specific needs which are being overlooked, I should be grateful if you could let me know immediately.

I also understand, however, that in the short term you are concerned that the UAE's own resources might not be wholly adequate to counter an Iranian threat, and have asked what forces the United Kingdom might be able to make available if the UAE called for our assistance. Although the United Kingdom's primary defence responsibilities will continue to be in the NATO area, one lesson of the Falklands crisis is that we need to retain and enhance our capacity to act outside that area. We therefore possess a number of defensive military capabilities, including naval mine counter-measures and escort vessels, tactical air defence, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and air defence missiles and radar, that could in principle be made available to support such action; it would be imprudent to decide at this stage that particular forces would be allocated to specific areas or tasks, in the event of

an escalation of the Iran/Iraq war, since we should need to deploy them where the need was greatest, taking due account of the capabilities of other friendly nations. Chief among these is of course the United States, with whom we are in close touch about the measures that might need to be taken if there were any escalation.

I cannot emphasise too strongly that the continued safety and security of the UAE is a matter of great importance to us. As I have said, if the UAE has specific defence needs which are not at present being met, I should be grateful if you would let me know. I should in any case like to keep in the closest possible contact with you until we are agreed that the threat of Iranian action against the UAE has passed.



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B.06951

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War
(OD(EM) (84) 1)

BACKGROUND

1. The Sub-Committee last considered the Iran/Iraq war on 21 December 1983 (OD(EM)(83) 9th Meeting). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was invited, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Defence, to continue to explore the possibility of further diplomatic action to reduce the risk of escalation in the Iran/Iraq war, and to consider possible responses to requests for military assistance from the Gulf States in the event of an escalation in the war. In his minute of 6 January to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary reported the outcome of recent mediation efforts, which were not encouraging, and noted that the Iranians had been somewhat more active in the Gulf area, but that there had been no further signs of escalation in the war. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary further invited the Secretary of State for Defence to consider various responses which might be made to requests from the Gulf States. In particular, he invited immediate agreement to the Omani request that our mine counter-measures force should be brought to a greater state of readiness; this was given by colleagues on the Sub-Committee.

FLAG A.

2. The joint memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary (OD(EM)(84) 1) presents the results of further consideration of possible assistance to the Gulf States. Actual deployment of British forces to the area would carry penalties to other operational

FLAG B.

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tasks, and could expose the forces to risk. The preference is therefore to concentrate for as long as possible upon forms of assistance which improve indigenous military capabilities in the Gulf States. Possibilities are being explored by the Director of Military Assistance Overseas in his current tours of local states (the Defence Secretary's minute to you of 13 January refers), and are likely to include advice and training on air defence, mine counter-measures and counter-terrorism.

Para C

3. One request from a Gulf State requires an immediate decision. Shaikh Zaid of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has asked for a blanket assurance of British military assistance in the event of an Iranian attack, or for a precise indication of the areas in which we can provide assistance. A blanket assurance would be a stronger commitment than our already expressed willingness in principle to provide defensive assistance if asked, and would be impossible to provide in advance of an assessment as to the most appropriate deployment of our forces if a crisis occurred. It is therefore recommended that the reply to the Shaikh should reaffirm our willingness to help, seek clarification of his likely needs, and encourage him to take up our offer to help build up UAE's own capabilities. We might also indicate the forces we have available to react to an emergency in the Gulf. A suggested reply to Shaikh Zaid is at Annex B to the memorandum.

4. The memorandum also addresses the guidelines for our Loan Service Personnel (LSP) in the Gulf States. Only those in Oman are at present allowed to take part in defensive operations without the prior consent of the British Government. Given that a crisis might develop rapidly, and that our relations with Gulf States might be adversely affected if British LSP stood aside when these States were subjected to attack, it is suggested that revised



SECRET

guidelines be drawn up to allow British LSP in any of the Gulf States to continue to perform their functions even under external attack without prior consent when there is not time to obtain it.

5. The Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Antony Acland have been invited to attend the meeting.

HANDLING

6. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the discussion. The Defence Secretary might then be invited to comment. Points to establish in discussion are:

(a) Is it agreed that the deployment of British forces to the Gulf should be countenanced only as a last resort and if our interests are threatened?

(b) Is it also agreed that concentrating on developing the Gulf States' own capabilities is the right approach at this stage?

(c) Is the draft reply to Shaikh Zaid satisfactory?

(d) Is the revision of the guidelines to our Loan Service Personnel agreed?

CONCLUSION

7. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Sub-Committee to approve the recommendations in OD(EM)(84) 1.

David Goodall

A D S Goodall

25 January 1984



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/11

20 January 1984

Prime Minister.

Dear Richard.

A.S.C. 20

As you know we have discussed the now definite evidence of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the war against Iran, and the recent Iranian allegations that the UK has been supplying such weapons to Iraq - allegations which have been coupled with the threat that our supposed actions would not go unanswered.

Michael Heseltine and I are most concerned at these developments as I know you are, not only because of the importance of preventing the use of chemical weapons but also because of the very real danger that these Iranian misapprehensions may markedly increase the threat to our people in the Lebanon, the Gulf, and perhaps even in the UK. I am glad to know that the FCO is considering what might be done to put pressure on Iraq, and that prompt and firm action has been taken to rebut the Iranian allegations both with the authorities in Tehran and with the Iranian representative here. I gather, however, that there were some difficulties, at least initially, in ensuring that our reputation had reached the highest levels in Iran, and I think it would be valuable to repeat and reinforce our message to guarantee that it gets to the highest possible level.

On the suggestion that there might be some association between food processing plant originally supplied from Britain and the Iraqi production of chemical agents, I will be in touch with you again when I have further information.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister.

Yours truly,
John Stanley

JOHN STANLEY

Richard Luce Esq MP

~~SECRET~~

18



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

Await reply from FCS.

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/57

A.F.C. 20/1

20 January 1984

Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ESCALATION OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Thank you for your minute of 6 January to Michael Heseltine to which he has asked me to reply in his absence in the Falklands. He discussed your minute with me before he left. He had also seen the minute of 9 January from No 10, recording the Prime Minister's support, subject to the views of OD(EM) colleagues, for the Omani request that we should bring our Mine Counter Measures (MCM) force to a higher state of readiness at their expense. As Richard Luce has indicated that a response to this request is urgently required, I am replying on this question now. Consideration of the other questions in your minute can be deferred until the forthcoming OD(EM) meeting.

2. There have been no significant new developments in the Gulf to cause us to believe that Iranian mining of the Straits of Hormuz is any more likely than it was last month. Indeed our assessment is that the Iranian mining capability in the water conditions of the Straits is currently very limited indeed. The case for responding positively to the Omani request is therefore a diplomatic rather than a military one.
3. Our understanding is that the Omanis would at present be satisfied if the readiness of the MCM force were reduced to about one month's notice from its present six weeks. A reduction to 32 days' notice can be achieved, without the significant operational penalties of having to deploy outside UK waters, by taking up the necessary command/support ship from trade. Conversion costs of some £20,000 and daily hire costs of some £10-12,000 would be involved, plus any restoration costs on return.
4. There is inevitably a substantial risk that the Omanis will regard the fact of their payment for putting our force at higher readiness as granting them some lien on its deployment. We therefore consider it essential that we should at the outset make it clear to the Omanis in unambiguous terms that the decision over any future deployment would be taken by HMG in the light of the circumstances at the time. But we must also recognise that even this qualification will not prevent them from holding the strong expectation that the force would be deployed if they so request it.

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5. You will want to consider at what stage we should let the Omanis know that any future deployment of the MCM force outside UK waters to meet their needs might be wholly or partly at their expense. Our best estimate at present is that the total charge would be of the order of a little over £4m a quarter calculated on the normal full cost basis for repayment activities. We would also have to consider the need for indemnification to cover the ships and personnel against loss or damage. An alternative would be to put the charge on to an additional cost rather than on to a total cost basis. We estimate that this would bring the charge down to £1.3m a quarter.
6. I must also make it clear that there would also be operational penalties elsewhere if the force were deployed. In particular this would reduce the MCM effort on route surveys (including the Clyde approaches), development trials of new MCM equipment, and participation in NATO and national exercises. The MCM force would also need protection against the threat from the Iranians that would undoubtedly exist if we were to embark on clearing their mines. The operational penalties would, of course, need to be taken into account in considering any proposal to deploy the force to the Gulf.
7. Provided that you and our colleagues are content, I suggest that our response to Oman should therefore be couched in terms which:
- a. Indicate that our MCM force of 4 Mine Counter-Measures Vessels could be brought to a rather higher state of notice of one month, rather than 6 weeks as at present;
 - b. That we would look to them to meet the costs of our doing so;
 - c. That we would have to reserve to ourselves absolutely any decision to deploy the force to the Gulf, and
 - d. That if such a decision was taken to meet their own requirements we may look to them for a contribution to the costs.
8. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD(EM).



JOHN STANLEY

Iraq: relations Iran/Iraq pt. 3.

20 JAN 1984



17

19 January 1984

Iran/Iraq War: DMAO visit to Gulf States

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 13 January and has noted the purpose of Major General Dennis's visit to the Gulf States between 18 January and early February.

JOHN COLES

SMT

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.



MO 3/9/4/2

C
Prime Minister.

16

To note.

A.S.C. $\frac{17}{1}$ PRIME MINISTER

MS

IRAN/IRAQ WAR: DMAO VISIT TO GULF STATES

You will recall that during OD(EM) discussion of the Iran/Iraq war, on 21st December, I mentioned that I had agreed to a tour of the Gulf States by the Director of Military Assistance Overseas (DMAO), Major General Dennis.

2. Major General Dennis is due to visit Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Doha and Dubai between 18th and 27th January, then Jedda and Kuwait with me from 29th January to 2nd February; and finally Muscat (subject to confirmation) immediately afterwards. The principal purpose of his visits will be to encourage the Gulf States to identify particular British military assistance enhancements, in the form of advice, training and Loan Service Personnel (LSP), which would help them to build up their indigenous capabilities and thereby reduce the likelihood of the possible need for more direct British military involvement in the future. I believe this is in line with our discussion before Christmas, which saw scope for a reasonably forthcoming attitude towards requests for such forms of assistance. Major General Dennis will, of course, only be taking exploratory soundings of the Gulf States; any firm commitments will only be made after subsequent consideration of his report. In particular he will avoid being drawn into discussion of possible deployment of British combat forces in a crisis; we shall need to consider our policy on this further at the next meeting of OD(EM). I would expect any further military assistance which we may provide as a result of Major General Dennis's visit to be made available on a repayment basis.



3. Although it would be premature to anticipate the sort of requests he is likely to receive, it is possible they may include assistance with the protection of key points, bomb disposal and maritime counter-terrorist training; measures to improve the safety of shipping such as advice on mine counter-measures and control of shipping; and air defence improvements such as better coordination of existing assets and possible additional LSP for Rapier units employed in the region. All these are areas in which, in principle, we should be able to help, although our overall resources are, of course, limited.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to our OD(EM) colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

WMA

Ministry of Defence
13th January 1984

Iraq Relations with Iran Pt 3



SECRET

vc



c. LPO
HMT
MOD
CO

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 January 1984

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 6 January from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

In the light of the need for further work before the next meeting of OD(EM), the Prime Minister agrees that the meeting which had been arranged for today should be postponed but has said that the discussion should take place not later than 2 weeks from now. I should be grateful if Richard Hatfield, to whom I am copying this letter, could make arrangements accordingly.

As regards the Omani request for our Mine Counter Measures force to be brought to a higher state of readiness by hiring a civilian support ship at Omani expense, the Prime Minister considers, subject to any views which her OD(EM) colleagues may have to offer, that this request should be met.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD(EM) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Handwritten initials and a signature in blue ink.

A²



Ann to end on
Omani request
at X. Do not
delay 07 (LHM)
more than 2
weeks

Prime Minister

14

A

6/1

FCS/84/7

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Consequences of an escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

1. When OD(EM) met on 21 December, we agreed that we should continue to explore:

- (i) the possibility for further diplomatic action to prevent the Iran/Iraq war escalating; and
- (ii) the military requirements for response to public requests for help from the Gulf States.

2. On the first point, developments on the diplomatic front have not been encouraging. I enclose at Annex A a summary of recent mediation efforts which colleagues may find of interest. Despite the very considerable efforts which have been made, there has been no real progress. Perhaps the most hopeful prospect continues to be the mediatory role given to the UN Secretary-General by Security Council Resolution 540. We shall continue to explore, particularly with the Americans and French, every other possible means towards a diplomatic solution.

3. The situation on the ground has changed little since we met on 21 December. The Iranians have been somewhat more active in the Gulf area, but there has been no further signs of escalation of the war.

4. As regards the second point, we need now to be clear about what assistance we can give to the Gulf States if they publicly seek it. Annex C of our earlier joint memorandum contained a useful statement of the total resources available to us. But

/a number



X
a number of specific decisions are now required. First, the Omanis have urgently asked for our Mine Counter Measures (MCM) force to be brought to a higher state of readiness by hiring a civilian support ship at Omani expense. I consider we should agree, both because there would be military advantage in being better prepared to counter Iranian mine-laying in the Straits of Hormuz, and also because it would demonstrate our sympathy and support for the Gulf States generally.

5. Second, we need to reach decisions on the scale of response we envisage to requests from Gulf States, in particular:

(i) would we in practice envisage despatching any of the ground force elements and RAF air defence aircraft listed in Annex C of the earlier memorandum even in response to a direct request? To do so would involve adopting a higher profile than, for instance, assisting with ground-based air defence;

(ii) a number of Gulf rulers, especially Shaikh Zayid of the UAE, have asked us for specific offers of help in specific areas. In view of Shaikh Zayid's strong representations to Richard Luce, I think there is a good case for being prepared to be reasonably specific in the case of the UAE, for instance on air defence units on the ground. We shall need to consider how far we go in telling Shaikh Zayid of what we conclude;

(iii) it is quite possible that in the event of an escalation in the war, Qatar and Kuwait, in addition to Oman and the UAE would look to us rather than to the US for assistance. In that case how should we allocate our scarce resources between the various states?

Our planned responses to these three questions will need to provide for various alternatives depending on the nature of the threat or threats and to the request or requests received.

/I thought



I thought it would be useful as background to set out the specific commitments we have made to Gulf States: these are at Annex B.

6. I know that our officials have been working closely together in addressing these issues. But I believe that it would be useful to have further comments from you as a basis for decisions in OD(EM) or, as I am sure colleagues would wish, proposals which could be agreed between us. I have, therefore, suggested that the meeting of OD(EM) fixed for 9 January should be postponed and that we should aim to have a further meeting in about two weeks which would have available your comments on the questions set out above. In the meantime, Richard Luce or I would be happy to have a word with you if that would be useful. In view of the urgency of the Omani request for our MCM force to be brought to greater readiness, I would, however, welcome your and our colleagues' agreement as soon as possible that we should endorse this proposal.

7. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD(EM).

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6 January 1984

ANNEX AIran/Iraq: Mediation EffortsSecurity Council Resolutions

1. Mediation efforts within the UN framework have so far come to nothing. Successive Security Council Resolutions calling for a ceasefire or peaceful settlement have been ignored (SCR 479 - September 1980, SCR 514 - July 1982, SCR 522 - October 1982). A fourth SCR (SCR 540), in the drafting of which the UK played a leading role, was passed on 31 October 1983. This called on the UN Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts, and on both participants to cease military operations against civilian targets, to respect free navigation in the Gulf and to end all hostilities in the Gulf area. Iraq welcomed the Resolution on 1 November, but warned that she would only stand by it if it were implemented by Iran in all its parts. The eventual Iranian reaction on 12 December disassociated Iran from SCR 540, but stopped short of ruling out action by the Secretary-General. However, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr Velayati, has since written to the UN Secretary General denouncing the Resolution in strong terms, and saying that there is no current role for the Secretary-General.

UN Secretary-General's Special Representative

2. Following SCR 479 in September 1980, the UN Secretary-General appointed Mr Palme of Sweden as his Special Representative. In this capacity, Mr Palme made a number of visits to the area, the last of which was in 1981. His failure to achieve any progress then, and the increased calls on his time since being reappointed Prime Minister of Sweden, have made him disinclined to be active, at least until both sides show some signs of wishing to make progress. After the passing of SCR 540 in October 1983, the Secretary-General sent a member of his staff to discuss the situation with Mr Palme in Stockholm, but, despite strong encouragement from the UK and other interested neutral countries, nothing concrete has emerged from this meeting.



Missions of Enquiry into Civilian Casualties

3. A UN Mission of Experts visited the war areas in May 1983 to investigate claims and counter-claims about the sufferings of the civilian populations. Their report made it plain that Iraq was more to blame than Iran in inflicting civilian casualties and damage to non-military targets. The Iranians have recently pressed for a second such Mission, to investigate renewed Iraqi attacks on Iranian towns, and also allegations that Iraq has used chemical weapons on the battlefield, but the Iraqis have refused to agree. UK efforts at the UN to trade withdrawal of Iraqi objections to this second Mission for reciprocal withdrawal of Iranian objections to a visit by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, have not so far borne fruit.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

4. In 1981, the Non-Aligned Movement formed a committee under the chairmanship of Mrs Gandhi to investigate the possibility of mediation. It made little progress. There was a temporary revival of interest in the idea after the 1983 NAM Summit meeting, but this appears to have subsided. Mrs Gandhi proved unreceptive to our suggestion, at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in November, that she should again interest herself in this issue.

Islamic Conference

5. A similar mediation committee, including Pakistan and Turkey, was appointed by the Islamic Conference in 1981. It made no more progress than its NAM counterpart. In December, the UN Secretary-General suggested that the forthcoming Islamic Summit meeting in Casablanca from 16-18 January might provide an opportunity to get Iran and Iraq together. This hope has now been torpedoed by the Iranian announcement that they intend to boycott the Conference, which they have accused of showing partiality towards Iraq.



GCC Countries

6. In the autumn of 1983, the GCC countries became interested in the possibility of mediation and the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait and the UAE visited both Baghdad and Tehran. Premature and over-enthusiastic publicity for this visit led to Iranian rejection of any future mediatory role for the GCC. However, two further mediatory visits to Damascus were made by the President of the UAE, Shaikh Zayid and other GCC representatives, in the hope of persuading Syria to reopen the Iraqi oil pipeline, which would help to ease the economic pressure on Iraq. These efforts were unsuccessful.

Algeria

7. The Algerians gained considerable kudos from their successful management of the negotiation for the release of the US Embassy hostages from Tehran at the end of 1980. Encouraged by this, they for some time pursued the possibility of mediating in the Iran/Iraq war. In the end, however, they were rebuffed by the Iranians, who confirmed to a senior member of the UK Mission to the UN in December 1983 that the Algerians now regarded their mediation efforts as ended.

Japan

8. The Japanese Foreign Minister visited both Tehran and Baghdad in August/September 1983, and the Deputy Foreign Minister was subsequently due to visit both countries in November. After he had already visited Baghdad, the Iranians asked for his visit to Tehran to be postponed, and no new date has yet been set. We were in close contact with the Japanese over these visits, which we greatly welcome. However, Japanese willingness to be active in pursuit of mediation has probably been sapped by the recent General Election results, in which the ruling

/Liberal



Liberal Democratic Party lost considerable ground, partly because of reaction to Mr Nakasone's more active stance on foreign affairs.

Direct UK Representations

9. We take every opportunity that arises of urging restraint on both parties. These conversations are too numerous to list in detail, but we made strong representations at Deputy Minister level in both Baghdad and Tehran in December, and spoke also to their diplomatic representatives in London and New York.

ANNEX BUK Commitments to Gulf States

1. Following the abrogation in 1971 of the treaties by which the UK took responsibilities for the defence and foreign relations of the lower Gulf States (the 7 Emirates of the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar) no formal treaty commitments exist which oblige us to come to their defence in time of need. The treaties of friendship which we have signed with these countries contain no such provisions. However, some oral commitments have been made by British Ministers to the UAE and Oman.

UAE

2. In October 1980, Mr Moberly (AUSS at the FCO) called on Shaikh Zaid with a personal message from Lord Carrington that in the spirit of our very long-standing friendship, we stood ready in principle to provide military assistance if asked. Such assistance would be defensive in nature.

Oman

3. Mr Hurd (Minister of State at the FCO) told Sultan Qaboos on 2 December 1981 that we intended to maintain our close defence relationship with Oman. We had decided to keep in being certain forces that could be used outside the NATO area either with an ally (for example the US) or alone. The elements we could make available could include a naval escort task group, mine clearance units, some combat aircraft, one or two infantry battalions or commandos with support for land or amphibious operations. Subsequently, the Prime Minister wrote to Sultan Qaboos on 15 July 1982 to assure him "that we are fully committed to the security of Oman". (This, however,

/referred



referred primarily to use of British Loan Service Personnel in time of internal or regional conflict).

Other Gulf States

4. No such commitments have been made to other Gulf States, though at various times they have been told informally that we would be inclined to look favourably on any request from them for assistance and would, depending on circumstances and on our commitments elsewhere, do whatever we could to help.

SECRET



Je v
13

Tom
Tom

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

As you know, this subject was discussed at OD(EM) yesterday.

Br || The Prime Minister has since said that she would welcome an assessment of likely Soviet moves should we be brought to the point where Western countries have to consider military intervention in the Gulf. It would be helpful if this could be made available early in the New Year and in any case before any further discussion in OD(EM) of this subject.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall and Mr. Mottram.

A. J. COLES

22 December 1983

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I find nowhere in these papers
any comment on what the
Soviet Union might do if the
West intervenes in the Gulf.
Should we not enquire that
before finally deciding to commit
ourselves militarily?

Yes - 1 A.S.C. $\frac{20}{12}$
agree. Perhaps that
statement could be put
in hand ready for our
next meeting in

Ref: B06926

12

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran-Iraq War
(OD(EM) (83) 4)

Flag A

BACKGROUND

Flag B
Flag C

Having seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 25 October to the Defence Secretary and Mr Heseltine's reply of 23 November, you asked that OD should discuss before Christmas the possibility of an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and the extent to which we should contemplate military involvement by the United Kingdom should Western military action be thought necessary.

2. The meeting has been arranged as an OD(EM), with the addition of the Secretary of State for Energy and the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Lord President of the Council may be unable to be present since he is chairing a meeting of the Home Affairs Committee at 4 pm.

3. There is a joint paper before the Sub-Committee by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary. It begins with an assessment of possible military action by Iraq and Iran and goes on to judge that British interests in the Gulf are sufficiently important for the United Kingdom to be prepared to consider responding to requests from the Gulf States for military assistance. Diplomatic action would also be required; and the draft of a possible Security Council resolution has already been prepared (at Annex B to the paper).

4. Military possibilities are then discussed. The paper concludes that the best approach to a Western military intervention would be one based on the closest possible consultation with other participating allies but with

responsibilities for helping particular countries or for particular military requirements allocated on a national basis. In other words, there should be no multinational force under a single command (which in the circumstances would mean American command). The two Secretaries of State recommend detailed follow-up discussions with the United States at the military level to develop a more thorough appreciation of each other's military capabilities for operations in the area.

5. The military forces which the United Kingdom might make available are mentioned at paragraph 6 and in more detail at Annex C. It should be noted that, were the Gulf to be mined, it would take 42 days to get a mine counter-measures force into the area unless advance precautionary action were taken: in particular it would be necessary to hire a support ship from trade.

6. An intelligence assessment on the Gulf war was circulated in the Joint Intelligence Committee Weekly Survey of Intelligence on 16 December. The reports from American sources of a likely immediate use of the Iraqi Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet missiles against the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island seem to have been an exaggeration.

HANDLING

7. You will wish to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the paper and to give his assessment of the likelihood of the Gulf war escalating in the near future. Points to be established in the subsequent discussion are -

- a. Does the Sub-Committee accept that the principles set out in paragraph 5 of the paper should be those which apply to any British action; in particular that military action should take place only at the request of one or more Gulf States?

- b. Does the Sub-Committee agree that we should not take part in a fully integrated force under a single command, but should co-ordinate our action in full consultation with other Western countries?
- c. Should any action be taken now to increase the level of readiness of British forces?
- d. Does the Sub-Committee agree that the Armilla patrol should normally remain within 5 days' steaming time of the Gulf area?
- e. If there are signs of impending Iranian naval action against third parties, should we then increase the readiness of our mine counter-measures force by hiring a support ship from trade and possibly by pre-positioning the ships initially at Gibraltar or later at Cyprus?
- f. Is there any form of military action which we would wish to rule out completely, such as the use of ground forces? There is no sign that the Iran-Iraq war is likely to be over soon: indeed the Americans appear to be determined not to let the weaker country, Iraq, lose it. Therefore we have to face the possibility that any military force sent to the Gulf might have to remain for a considerable period. You will wish to ask the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff for their views on the possible consequences for our military commitments elsewhere.
- g. Where will the costs of any military assistance fall? The normal rules would appear to require the Ministry of Defence to bear the costs; but this will need to be confirmed.

CONCLUSION

8. Subject to the discussion, the Sub-Committee might be invited to -

1. Endorse the conclusions set out in paragraph 10 of OD(EM)(83) 4.
2. Rule out, in principle, the provision of ground forces, confining help to naval, maritime or air defence forces, and then only at the request of one or more of the Gulf States.
3. Agree that any immediate decisions needed over the holiday period should be taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary jointly, consulting you before any overt action to deploy forces to the area or increase their readiness were taken.

David Goodall

20 December 1983

A D S GOODALL

John Gales, Esq.

Referred only to
the Prime Minister last
night.



A.S.C. ¹⁵/₁₂

p.a.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Copy of Cabinet sheet
on travelling as promised.

Picketts

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

IRAN/IRAQ - BRIEF FOR CABINET

POINTS TO MAKE

1. US Ambassador has suggested that a major Iraqi attack on Khar Island may be imminent, and that this heightens the risk of an escalation of the Gulf war.
2. Believe the US concern may be exaggerated, but see a clear need to press on with contingency planning as fast as possible. Essential that we are in a position to move promptly and effectively if necessary.
3. Intending to circulate a joint FCO/MOD memorandum for consideration by OD(EM) on 21 December. At official level, useful UK/US talks on possible sharing of tasks held in London on 9 December. Further meeting to agree assessment of the threat in Washington on 19th.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

- A 1. The US Ambassador's call is reported in FCO telegram No. 745 to Baghdad. We have checked with the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff, who can trace no recent indications of Iraqi preparations to attack Kharg Island or Iranian tanker traffic. The Iraqi information media have called for reprisals against Iran for the recent bomb explosions in Kuwait, but it appears from today's news reports that these have taken the form of further ground-to-ground missile attacks against Iranian towns.
- B 2. FCO telegram No.2070 to Washington records the UK/US discussion on contingency planning in London on 9 December. A further meeting, to assess the threat of escalation more accurately, will be held in Washington on 19 December. Our draft OD paper on this subject has already been submitted separately to the Secretary of State, and will be circulated as soon as it has been approved by him and the Defence Secretary.

1 ZCZC
 2 GRS
 3 CONFIDENTIAL
 4
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 6 FM FCO 141700Z December
 7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 RFI IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, GULF
 10 POSTS,
 11 RFI PRIORITY AMMAN, BONN, ROME, STOCKHOLM, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO,
 12 TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO
 13 RFI SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BERNE, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, LISBON,
 14 MADRID, SEOUL, SINGAPORE
 15 My telno 745 to Baghdad (not to all): Possible escalation
 16 of the Iran/Iraq war.
 17 1, After the meeting recorded in my TUR, Hooper (US Embassy)
 18 telephoned Haskell with some further background on the report
 19 from Eagleton in Baghdad. He apparently envisaged an Iraqi
 20 attack on Kharg using bombing aircraft and Scud B missiles
 21 (both of which they have already employed ineffectively against
 22 this target in the past) and not repeat not Super Etendard/
 23 Exocet ^{attacks} on tanker traffic, although this might follow at a
 24 later stage. Hooper pointed out that the Iraqi information
 25 media are now calling for reprisals against Iran for the bomb

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword explosions
File number	Dept MED	Distribution Standard Iran/Iraq Additional dist: Iran/Iraq
Drafted by (Block capitals) DK Haskell		
Telephone number 233 5877		
Authorised for despatch <i>DK Haskell</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

1 <<<<

2 explosions in Kuwait.

3 2. In our view, this somewhat reduces the impact of Price's
4 original approach, though it clearly makes it all the more
5 necessary to agree an assessment of the threat with the State
6 Department. As discussed with Goulty, Haskell (Head of MED),
7 Legge (Head of DS11 MOD) and Commodore Heaslip (Defence
8 Commitments Staff) will be arriving on 18 December for a
9 meeting with Raphel's team on the 19th. We still intend to
10 telegraph before the weekend a paper outlining our own thinking
11 for you to hand over in advance.

12 3. On a separate but related issue, Hooper, speaking on
13 instructions which the Ambassador would have carried out
14 personally if he had received them in time, said that the US
15 Government would like HMG urgently to consider stopping any
16 traffic in military equipment of whatever origin to Iran, at
17 least until a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq was in place.
18 They further hoped it would be possible to extend the reach
19 of UK law to the activities of UK citizens in third countries
20 and to third country manufacturers of UK licensed equipment.
21 They also hoped it would be possible to retard or reduce the
22 flow of any equipment transiting the UK for either of the
23 belligerents.

24 4. Hooper said that the telegram of instructions commented
25 that the US had so far had some notable success in stopping
26 the export to Iran of items of military significance.
27 They were considering banning also some non-munitions items
28 on the US export control list. However, these additional
29 efforts would not be effective unless partners and allies
30 co-operated. As well as with ourselves, similar US action
31 is being taken in Athens, Berne, Bonn, Brasilia, Brussels
32 Buenos Aires, Islamabad, Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, Seoul, Singapore
33 and Tel Aviv.

34 5. Rumsfeld is apparently visiting Baghdad today to tell

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telegram

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the

1 >>>>

2 the Iraqis of the US demarche and stress the need to take
3 no precipitate action at this time. He will say that in
4 the opinion of the US, the international community as a whole
5 will hold Iraq responsible for any escalation of the war
6 and consequent disruption of oil supplies from the Gulf area.

7 Comment

8 6. We shall need to consider carefully the implications
9 of the US request and are in no hurry to come back to them.
10 In the meantime, we hope they will keep their approach to us
11 confidential. There are obvious limitations on the extent
12 of our response. Moreover, we have already told the Americans
13 of our concern that their indications of support for Iraq
14 may make the latter more rather than less difficult to
15 deal with, while not softening Iranian intransigence. The
16 Americans may thus get the worst of both worlds. However,
17 your views and those of other addressees would be welcome.

19 HOWE
20 NNNN

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MO 26/17/1

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

A & C. $\frac{12}{12}$

r.a.

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

I have seen your Memorandum of 25th November on this subject (OD(83)17). I concur with the underlying assessment of the risks to oil supplies from the Gulf and I agree the conclusions in the paper by officials, including the proposal for preliminary low key discussions with the other main industrial countries concerned.

2. Copies of this minute go to other OD members and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

W.A.H.

Ministry of Defence
12th December 1983

1620 : Iran (Iraq) Pt 3

12 DEC 1983

12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONFIDENTIAL

1109-511-193

2/CNO



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

6 December 1983

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MBE MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
Thames House South
Millbank

N. S. J. R.

A. J. C. 7/12

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

I have read your paper OD(83)17, and Geoffrey Howe's minute of 1 December.

The paper by officials which you attached deals with a crisis lasting perhaps 3 months. It is at least arguable that, given such a temporary oil shortage, the UK's interest as a net oil exporter lies in maximising the resource and financial advantage offered by higher oil prices.

I am, however, inclined instead to agree with the paper's conclusions, and your own views. For a rapid price rise would be likely to be followed by a longer period of price instability, which could have an adverse impact on industrial and financial markets.

In discussions with other countries, and with the EC and IEA, we must however make quite plain that our support for the IEA Emergency Scheme is dependent on all the parties - including the United States - participating fully, and on the scheme working in practice as was envisaged when it was originally drawn up, after the crisis of 1973-74. We must emphasise that, if either of these conditions were not met, or seemed unlikely to be met, our support for, and participation in, the Scheme would lapse.

I do not object to Geoffrey Howe's proposal to authorise some low-key diplomatic activity to promote support for the Scheme, but I am sure that we must beware of becoming too closely

/identified

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identified with it, and so reducing our ability to act independently if it were to prove less than wholly effective.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, members of OD, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours
Nigel*

NIGEL LAWSON

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CONFIDENTIAL



JU131

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422

GTN 215

(Switchboard) 215 7877

6 December 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
Thames House South
Millbank
London SW1

N.B.P.N.

A.S.C. 7/12

p.a.

R. Peter,

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE: OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

I have seen your paper OD(83)17 on this subject and Geoffrey Howe's minute to you of 1 December. I share his view that in an emergency that may arise from the Iraq/Iran conflict the UK interest as both a producer and consumer of oil would be best served by activating the IEA Emergency Allocation Scheme. I therefore agree with your proposal that low key discussions should be initiated with the US, Japan and Germany to get them to accept this conclusion.

I am copying this to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

NORMAN TEBBIT

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Lynch Relations
Part 3



file

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BC for AP.

DSC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD

CABINET OFFICE

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ESCALATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 25 October to the Secretary of State for Defence, and Mr. Heseltine's reply of 23 November.

The Prime Minister considers that OD should discuss before Christmas the possibility of an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and the extent to which we should contemplate military involvement by the United Kingdom should Western military action be thought necessary. It would be helpful if a paper could be prepared for OD addressing these issues and summarising the contingency preparations which have been made.

I am sending copies of this minute to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

6 December 1983

CT.

CONFIDENTIAL



cc: HO VC
LCO LPSO
FCO CDLO
HMT CO
L.P.O. DTI
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December 1983

Dear Michael,

Oil Supplies from The Gulf: (OD(83)17)

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's memorandum OD(83)17 about oil supplies from the Gulf. Subject to the views of colleagues she agrees the recommendations in paragraph 2 of that paper.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
David*

Michael Reidy, Esq.,
Department of Energy.

SH

CONFIDENTIAL



Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

2 December 1983

Dear Michael

MB $\frac{4}{12}$

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

h-a.

The Chancellor of the Duchy has seen your Secretary of State's paper OD(83)17 on this subject and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to him of 1 December.

Lord Cockfield agrees with the conclusions of the paper and with the Foreign Secretary's suggestion that it be agreed rapidly out of Committee.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister and other members of OD and to Richard Hatfield.

Yours sincerely
Sebastian Birch

SEBASTIAN BIRCH

Michael Reidy Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Energy
Thames House South
Millbank
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ: Int Sit: PL2

- 2 DEC 1983



MR COLES2 December 1983OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

We recommend that the Prime Minister agrees to Peter Walker's conclusions in OD(83)17. The implementation of the IEA Emergency Scheme is probably our best chance of maintaining demand without significant price rises.

Nevertheless, we consider it extremely unlikely that we shall be able to avoid rapid price rises in the spot market if the situation in the Gulf becomes serious.

Perceptions rather than facts are crucial in the market's response. Even if a substantial share of any shortfall in supplies can be replaced by increased production and by drawing on stocks, it will still be very difficult to convince the market that the situation is under control. In 1978/79 supplies always exceeded demand yet prices still doubled.

The main difference between 1978/79 and 1983 is that we now have around 10 mbd of spare capacity in the world. Unless the oil installations in the Gulf suffer major damage, we should be able to avoid any immediate price rises becoming a permanent feature of the market.

We shall also need to consider very carefully the circumstances which should trigger the IEA Emergency Scheme. The normal trigger would be a 7% loss in free world supplies ie 3 mbd. The normal flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz is 9 mbd although the paper argues that alternative arrangements are likely to reduce the shortfall in supplies to 4 mbd.

However, it is possible that increased tension or limited military escalation could begin to panic the market before a significant loss of supplies occurred. In these circumstances, implementation of the IEA Scheme would also be the best chance of stabilising the situation. But we shall need to exercise very careful judgement if we are to avoid the introduction of the scheme being itself a cause for panic in the market.

The experiences of 1978/79 emphasise the importance of acting

in close consultation with other IEA members. There is a need to prevent Japan taking independent action which could further destabilise the situation. We note that there is also some doubt about the response of the US.

We support, therefore, the recommendation of approaching the USA, Japan and Germany bilaterally to seek their agreement to this approach.

D.P.

DAVID PASCALL

9

PRIME MINISTER

THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

Please see the attached minute from Tony Parsons.

You have seen correspondence between the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary about contingency planning. I attach again Mr. Heseltine's minute of 23 November and Sir Geoffrey Howe's minute of 25 October.

FLAG A
FLAG B

I quite take Tony Parsons' point that a political decision by you on British participation in military action in the Gulf would concentrate the minds of the bureaucracy. But I do not think that you could possibly take such a decision alone - i.e. without consultation with your colleagues. Nor do I think that you can do it without fuller advice than you have in these papers.

Mr. Heseltine's minute attached clearly shows that our capacity to help militarily is being considered.

Would you like me to write to the Foreign Office and MOD saying that you have noted the contingency preparations, that you think it important that these be quickly completed, and that you would like advice from the Foreign and Defence Secretaries on whether or not it would be right to participate in military action in the Gulf should the need arise? I would ask for this advice to come forward within the next ten days. You could then consider whether an OD discussion was necessary - but I am a bit inclined to think that there can be no final decision on military action until we are faced with an actual situation requiring a decision. Agree?

I think we should have a meeting - with proper papers if possible before James met

A.S.C. - Bureau have already given assurances to some of the Gulf states not

2 December 1983

SECRET

8A

MR. COLES

THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

In my recent paper on the Middle East, I said that I thought we should make contingency plans very quickly against a possible crisis in the Gulf. Although it may not materialise, the problem is that it could be on us at any moment. It only requires the Iraqis to do one thing, eg a determined attack on Kharg Island or sinking an Iranian tanker, for the Iranians to react in some way or another. This would immediately trigger an international crisis.

We know about American contingency planning (Washington tel 3586 - copy attached). The Secretary of State for Energy has circulated a memorandum on the oil supply implications (copy attached). Work is in progress between FCO and MoD on a paper dealing with diplomatic and military contingencies. It may still be some time in gestation.

I believe that Prime Ministerial guidance is needed in order to clear away some of the bureaucratic undergrowth. The diplomatic and technical contingency preparations are arduous but relatively straightforward. The crucial point is a political decision of principle on whether or not we should participate in military action to clear the Straits and/or protect the Arab states of the Gulf if they need it.

I believe that, if it comes to the crunch, we must participate. If we fail to do so, there would be three important negative consequences. The Arab states in the Gulf would lose all faith in us as a residual presence in their area. There would be a serious Anglo/American split. Domestic opinion of the kind which matters would be severely critical. The worst outcome would be for the Americans to do the job themselves, leaving us bleating on the sidelines.

If the Prime Minister feels similarly, and gives the necessary guidance to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary, contingency planning could be accelerated. The money would have to be found - an important point - and we could decide on the nature of our participation. This need not be extensive. It could be confined eg to the provision of Nimrod, or Rapier, or a minesweeping capability. What would matter would be our willingness to participate.

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- 2 -

I am putting this on paper as I will not have a chance to see the Prime Minister until late next week. I should add that I am not meant to know as much as I do about the state of planning within the FCO and the MoD.



A.D. PARSONS
1 December 1983

SECRET



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FCS/83/253

N.B. I.R.

M 2/2

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Consequences of an Escalation of Iran/Iraq War

1. Thank you for your letter of 23 November, assessing the more likely calls on our resources in the event of an escalation in the Gulf war and outlining our own ability to respond, albeit at the expense of other tasks. This analysis and the more detailed work being undertaken by the Chiefs of Staff are a most useful preparation for the decisions on contingency planning which we may need to make at any time, and for our continuing discussions with the Americans.

2. You asked for an up-to-date assessment of the Gulf States' own perception of the Iranian threat. The following comments are based on reports by our Embassies in Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Doha, Jedda and Kuwait and on Richard Luce's meeting with the Omanis on 29 November.

Kuwait considered it would be in Iran's interest to exercise continued restraint. Iran's capacity to retaliate was in any case limited. Closure of the Straits of Hormuz would damage Iran more than the Gulf States. But Iran remained unpredictable and there was a danger that the Iraqis would continue to see how far they could go in escalating the war without provoking Iranian reaction. If Kuwait became the target of hit-and-run Iranian attacks, there would be little the West could do to counter them.

/Oman

S E C R E T



Oman The Omanis believe that Iran is in earnest about its declared intention to disrupt shipping in the Straits of Hormuz if its own oil exports are cut off. Mining, or the threatened use of shore-based artillery or missiles were seen as more likely than a naval blockade. Elsewhere, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline was a more likely target than installations in the Gulf States.

The UAE Recent contacts between the UAE and Iran suggested that Iranians would concentrate any retaliation against Iraq, rather than on targets further afield. Kuwait, because of its logistical and financial support to Iraq, was more at risk than the UAE.

Qatar The Amir considered Iran to be an irrational force which could attack at any time. He shared the Iraqi view that widening the conflict could lead to a solution. The main direct threat to the Gulf States would be a punitive air strike or interference with shipping.

Bahrain shared the Qatari view that Iran's actions could be highly irrational. Discussion of the Iranian threat at the recent Gulf Summit had been unfocused.

Saudi Arabia The Saudis refused to speculate in detail on the nature of the Iranian threat, but considered a blockade of the Straits would be more likely than attack on individual Gulf States. The main Saudi concern appeared to be a wish to avoid giving any unequivocal assurance that facilities to support Western military intervention would be forthcoming before the crisis was upon them.

3. You will see that there was no unity of view among the Gulf States about the likely threat from Iran, and even those

/countries



countries which had clearly thought most about it, such as Kuwait and Oman, had reached different conclusions. The only common points appear to be that:

- (a) despite the indications of greater realism in recent Iranian official statements, it cannot be assumed that their reaction to a successful Iraqi attack on their oil export capability will be a rational one;
- (b) the Gulf States believe that any action to clear the Straits of Hormuz must be an international responsibility: by which they mean a Western responsibility, with as much international support as possible;
- (c) the Gulf States remain reluctant to be seen engaging in contingency planning with the US, ourselves or other Western countries before a crisis occurs.

I shall be writing further on the question of how to carry forward our own contingency planning in the near future.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Energy and Transport, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 December 1983

Iraq : relations with Iran A3

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FCS/83/251

N. B. P. D.

A. S. C. $\frac{1}{12}$

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

Oil Supplies from the Gulf

1. I was grateful for your paper OD(83)17 on this subject.
2. I endorse the conclusions of the paper, in particular that the UK interest in an emergency would best be served by activating the IEA emergency allocation scheme; and that we should initiate low key moves to persuade the US, Japan and the FRG to accept the conclusions in the paper. I also agree with your emphasis on the importance of public presentation and rapid collective action by IEA members if upward pressure on prices is to be forestalled.
3. It is not easy to assess the likelihood and possible timing of an interruption in Gulf oil supplies. It could take place at any time, and with little notice. It would be sensible for us to speak as soon as possible to the Americans, in advance of the Germans and Japanese; and I hope OD colleagues, to whom I am copying this letter, will feel able to agree the paper rapidly out of committee. I understand that the US Energy Secretary will be in London on 8 December and it might be desirable to mention the topic to him then.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 December, 1983



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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Oil Supplies from the Gulf
(OD(83) 17)

→ A.J.C.
Prime Minister.

Subject to colleagues, agree
recommendation in paragraph 2 of
Energy Secretary's paper?

A.J.C. 1/12

BACKGROUND

Over the past weeks officials have considered various aspects of the Iran/Iraq war, and further contingency work is in progress. The paper by the Secretary of State for Energy covers a report by officials on the effects on the United Kingdom's oil supplies and oil prices if oil from the Gulf were cut off or substantially reduced.

2. The paper concentrates on the possibility of a shortfall of about 4 million barrels per day (mbd) compared with the normal flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz of about 9 mbd and a free world market of 44 mbd. It concludes that provided panic buying could be avoided, there would be a good chance that United Kingdom demand could be met at prices close to current levels. Provided that international agreement could be secured, the United Kingdom's interest would be better served by activating the International Energy Agency emergency allocation scheme than by relying on alternative "sub-crisis" measures; and it recommends that action in response to a temporary interruption of supply should focus on mobilisation of stocks rather than on measures of demand restraint.

3. The Committee is invited to endorse these conclusions and agree that we should initiate preliminary low key discussions with the other main industrial countries affected, ie the United States, Japan and Germany.

4. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials are advising the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to support this recommendation and to suggest that it would be helpful if preliminary discussions were opened with the Americans before the visit to London of the United States Secretary of Energy on 8th December.

HANDLING

5. The situation in the Gulf clearly has to be closely watched from day to day. Despite the recent Iraqi Exocet attack on a Greek ship, the Straits of Hormuz remain open and oil is still flowing. The oil markets remain reasonably calm. It is important not to talk the market into a crisis, which premature moves might risk doing. At the same time it would seem a sensible precaution to ensure that the other principal oil consuming countries share our assessment of the supply prospects and

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support our analysis of the action which should be taken as soon as the market began to react to the prospect of a significant shortage of oil supplies from the Gulf.

6. I recommend accordingly that you should agree with the recommendations of the Secretary of State for Energy, subject to the agreement of the other members of OD. There would seem to be no need for the paper to be discussed by the Committee: and it would in fact be difficult to arrange a meeting in the near future because of pressure on Ministers' diaries and the absences of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary from London.

David Goodall

30th November 1983

A D S GOODALL

GPS 1500

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FROM WASHINGTON 292115Z NOV 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3586 OF 29 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,
PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 422 TO JEDDA (NOT TO ALL): THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE
GULF.

1. RAPHEL BRIEFED MINISTER TODAY ON DECISIONS TAKEN BY
PRESIDENT REAGAN ON US POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF.

2. HE STRESSED THAT THESE WERE TO BE SEEN NOT AS A NEW
US INITIATIVE BUT AS PART OF A CONTINUING EFFORT TO DETER
ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR ABOUT WHICH WE HAD BEEN CONSULTING
CLOSELY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. THE PRESIDENT HAD IN MANY
CASES REAFFIRMED DECISIONS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN IN 1980 AND 1981.
RAPHEL REPEATED THAT THE US SAW DIPLOMATIC ACTION AS THE FIRST
AND MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO DETER AND IF
NECESSARY CONTAIN ESCALATION OF THE WAR. IF DIPLOMATIC
ACTION FAILED AND IF POLITICO/MILITARY MEASURES WERE
REQUIRED, THE US WOULD WANT THESE TO BE MULTILATERAL,
INVOLVING THEIR ALLIES AND REGIONAL STATES. ONLY IF MULTILATERAL
ACTION COULD NOT BE AGREED WOULD THE US CONSIDER UNILATERAL
MEASURES, HAVING REGARD TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PLEDGE TO KEEP
OPEN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

3. RAPHEL SAID THAT US DIPLOMATIC ACTION MIGHT INCLUDE THE
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:-

(A) ENCOURAGING THOSE WITH INFLUENCE WITH THE PARTIES TO
URGE THEM TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE TO ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 540:

(B) SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO SHORE UP IRAQ FINANCIALLY,
TO REDUCE THE TEMPTATION TO THE IRAQIS TO TAKE RASH ACTION IN
THE HOPE OF WESTERN INTERVENTION TO END THE WAR. THIS WOULD
REQUIRE THE CONTINUATION OF ARAB ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ AT AT LEAST
THE PRESENT LEVEL:

(C) CONTINUING TO ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE
AND PREVENT ESCALATION (SPEAKING PERSONALLY, RAPHEL ADMITTED
THAT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WERE EXTREMELY SLENDER):

(D) A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON
THE NEED TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION (BOTH SEA AND AIR)
IN THE GULF REGION. RAPHEL NOTED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO
BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID UNSETTLING THE OIL MARKET.
RECENT GCC STATEMENTS HAD BEEN HELPFUL.

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(E) IF ESCALATION OF THE WAR APPEARED LIKELY,
ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE HOPE OF FORESTALLING IT:

(F) ACTION WITH THE ALLIES TO DISCOURAGE THE
SALE OF CRITICAL ARMS AND COMPONENTS TO IRAN. THE US WERE LOOKING
AT THIS NOW AND WOULD BE CONSULTING ALLIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
AN OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY WAS THAT IRAN'S MAIN SUPPLIERS, SUCH AS
LIBYA AND NORTH KOREA, WOULD NOT BE AMENABLE TO WESTERN
INFLUENCE.

4. RAPHEL REITERATED THAT, IF DIPLOMATIC ACTION FAILED AND
MILITARY MEASURES BECAME NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG
PREFERENCE WAS FOR THESE TO BE TAKEN MULTILATERALLY AND WITH THE
SUPPORT OF THE GULF STATES. IN ADDITION TO OURSELVES, THE
FRENCH, ITALIANS, GERMANS, JAPANESE, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW
ZEALANDERS WERE BEING BRIEFED IN WASHINGTON. HE WOULD BE
LEAVING WITH A SMALL STATE DEPARTMENT/DOD TEAM LATER TODAY
FOR TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, BAHRAIN, UAE AND PERHAPS
QATAR AND KUWAIT. THE HURRY TO BE OFF WAS DUE TO THE NEED
TO TALK TO PRINCE SULTAN BEFORE HE LEFT FOR A VACATION IN
PAKISTAN. THE TEAM HAD THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES - TO DISCUSS
CONCERTED DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICO/MILITARY ACTION, TO SHARE
ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN INTENTIONS, AND, IN VERY LOW
KEY, TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER POLITICO/MILITARY
TALKS ON MILITARY CONTINGENCIES. RAPHEL STRESSED THAT THIS
ASPECT WOULD BE VERY MUCH UNDERPLAYED.

5. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPROVED THE FOLLOWING
PROPOSALS:-

(A) THAT IN THE EVENT OF INDICATIONS OF AN ESCALATION OF
THE GULF WAR AND IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FROM THE GULF STATES,
THE US SHOULD INCREASE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA, OFFER
TO INCREASE INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE GULF STATES, BEGIN
PLANNING MULTILATERAL ACTION TO PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE GULF
AND TAKE ACTION TO INCREASE THE AIR DEFENCE READINESS OF THE
GULF STATES:

(B) THAT IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE MINED, THE US SHOULD
CONDUCT CLEARANCE OPERATIONS, PREFERABLY WITH MULTINATIONAL
PARTICIPATION AND THE SUPPORT OF THE GULF STATES:

(C) THAT IF THE TERRITORY OR OIL FACILITIES OF A NON-
BELLIGERENT WERE ATTACKED, THE US SHOULD HELP WITH ITS DEFENCE:

(D) THAT THE US SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS
TO HELP DETER ATTACKS ON NON-BELLIGERENT SHIPPING.

RAPHEL ADDED THAT THE US DID NOT REGARD AN ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE
STRAITS OF HORMUZ AS VERY LIKELY.

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6. RAPHEL WAS BRIEFING US FIRST, IN RESPONSE TO OUR STRONGLY EXPRESSED INTEREST. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO BE BRIEFING THE FRENCH, ITALIAN AND GERMAN EMBASSIES, AS HIS ALLIES WITH THE MOST DIRECT INTERESTS. IN ADDITION THEY WOULD BE BRIEFING THE JAPANESE, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS. RAPHEL UNDERTOOK TO BRIEF US AGAIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE GULF. ONE OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED WITH US AND OTHER ALLIES MIGHT BE INTENSIFICATION AND POSSIBLE UP-GRADING OF NAVY TO NAVY TALKS WHICH MIGHT COVER COORDINATION OF DEPLOYMENTS, JOINT EXERCISES IN THE REGION AND POSSIBLY CONTINGENCY PLANNING. SHULTZ WOULD WANT TO TOUCH ON THE GULF DURING THE DISCUSSION OF OUT OF AREA ISSUES AT THE NAC. THERE WOULD ALSO NO DOUBT BE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MARGINS OF THAT MEETING FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION. RAPHEL ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THOMAS'S SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD CALL IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM THE GULF, PROBABLY OVER THE WEEKEND OF 10/11 DECEMBER, AND UNDERTOOK TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THIS VIA EITHER THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON OR ONE OF OUR POSTS IN THE GULF.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RAPHEL SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS TEAM'S VISIT. IF ASKED ABOUT IT THE AMERICANS WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT IT REFLECTED LONG STANDING US POLICY OF KEEPING CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE AREA ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, AND THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE KEPT OPEN.

8. THOMAS SUGGESTED THAT THE MEASURES RAPHEL HAD OUTLINED, IN PARTICULAR US SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO SHORE UP IRAQ FINANCIALLY AND TO SQUEEZE IRAN'S ARMS SUPPLIES, GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF A US TILT TOWARDS IRAQ. RAPHEL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN US POLICY. THEY DID NOT WANT EITHER SIDE TO SUFFER AN IGNOMINIOUS DEFEAT. WHILE THE WAR SEEMED EVENLY BALANCED, A POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY WAS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE. NOW THAT IRAN WAS DOING RATHER BETTER A SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO "RIGHT THE BALANCE". THE US WERE HOWEVER DOING WHAT THEY COULD TO DISCOURAGE THE IRAQIS FROM THINKING THAT WESTERN INTERVENTION WAS GOING TO RESCUE THEM FROM THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

9. ASKED ABOUT LIKELY IRANIAN REACTIONS, RAPHEL SAID THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE TAKING PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A GREATER WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE GULF STATES TO TALK ABOUT MEASURES TO MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF. IT WAS THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO SURPRISE THE IRANIANS OR PROVOKE A SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTION: INDEED IT MIGHT HAVE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT, THOUGH THAT WAS NOT ITS PURPOSE. IN REPLY TO A DIRECT QUESTION, RAPHEL SAID THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN ON WHETHER MEASURES TO DEFEND THE GULF STATES (PARA 5 (C) ABOVE) SHOULD INCLUDE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST IRAN: THAT WAS THE SORT OF DECISION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN ONLY IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME.

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10. WE DREW ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR PRIOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN REGARD TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 1444), IN ORDER TO COORDINATE WESTERN ACTION AND TO PRE-EMPT UNHELPFUL MOVES BY THE RUSSIANS OR OTHERS. THIS WAS EVIDENTLY A NEW THOUGHT AND RAPHEL AGREED THAT ADVANCE PLANNING WOULD BE USEFUL. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT OTHERS MIGHT SEEK TO USE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DELAY OR DETER NECESSARY MILITARY ACTION. WE NEEDED TO BE ON OUR GUARD AGAINST THAT. HE ADDED THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER UN MISSION TO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS. THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR A FURTHER INITIATIVE AT THE LEVEL OF PALME OR CORDOVES.

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MR THOMAS
CABINET OFFICE

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*asked FCO to
copy this telegram
to PM's party in
Delhi 28/11/83
1500hrs*

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DESKBY 280900Z

FM KUWAIT 271438Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 304 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT
INFO PRIORITY DUBAI, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

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PLA.

VWASHINGTON TELNO 3256: THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. US CHARGE D'AFFAIRE'S INFORMATION ON POSSIBILITY OF JOINT STATE/DOD MISSION TO GULF STATES, WHICH PRE-DATES THANKSGIVING WEEKEND, IS THAT MISSION IS UNLIKELY TO COME TO KUWAIT. GRIFFIN HAD BEEN WARNED EARLIER OF POSSIBILITY OF VISIT BUT HE HAS NO NEW TELEGRAMS AT PRESENT.

2. HE THEN TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE RESPECT) THAT HE IS TRYING TO SEE THE UNDER SECRETARY AT THE MFA TOMORROW TO INFORM HIM IN ADVANCE OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON TUESDAY, 29 NOVEMBER THAT US CENTRAL COMMAND WILL BE SETTING UP A SMALL FORWARD HQ CO-LOCATED AFLOAT WITH COMIDEAST FOR. THIS WILL COMPRISE SOME TWENTY MEN AND WILL BE EXPLAINED AS A NECESSARY PLANNING DEVELOPMENT TO MAKE CENTCOMS' ROLE IN THE GULF AREA MORE REALISTIC. GRIFFIN SAYS BAHRAINIS HAVE BEEN CONSULTED AND HAVE AGREED.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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1) Mr Butler
2) Mr Coles

PS/NOTO

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BRITISH MISSION
CHANCERY DEPT
24 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES

OF LETTER.....
OF ENCLOSURES.....
LOCATION.....

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Seen by Prime
Minister

NR 24

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FM WASHINGTON 240020Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3546 OF 24 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOLLOWING FOR P.S./SECRETARY OF STATE)

MY TELNO 3526: THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. RAPHEL BRIEFED US TODAY ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT TO THE NSC, BUT NOT YET APPROVED BY MCFARLANE OR THE PRESIDENT. HE AGAIN ASKED THAT HIS ACCOUNT SHOULD BE HELD VERY CLOSE AND REPEATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PUT TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

2. RAPHEL SIAD THAT US POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT THAT THE GULF WAS AN AREA OF VITAL US INTERESTS WHICH THE US WOULD USE ANY MEANS NECESSARY, INCLUDING FORCE, TO SAFEGUARD, AND BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT TO KEEP OPEN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

3. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:-
(A) THE FIRST RECOURSE SHOULD BE TO DIPLOMATIC MEASURES
(B) THE APPROVAL OF THE GULF STATES SHOULD BE SOUGHT BEFORE ANY MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN
(C) MILITARY ACTION SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE MULTILATERAL AND
(D) ONLY IF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT POSSIBLE WOULD UNILATERAL US ACTION BE CONSIDERED.

4. THE NSC PAPER SOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL OF US RESPONSES IN A NUMBER OF CONTINGENCIES. RAPHEL STRESSED THAT THE EMPHASIS ON MILITARY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS RULING OUT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY TO SOLVE A CRISIS: IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THERE WAS INTERDEPARTMENTAL AGREEMENT IN WASHINGTON ON DIPLOMATIC MOVES BUT THAT POSSIBLE MILITARY RESPONSES HAD BEEN MORE DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS WERE THEREFORE SUBJECT IN ALL CASES TO PRIOR RECOURSE TO DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND MULTILATERAL ACTION.

5. IT WAS PROPOSED THAT:
(A) IN THE EVENT OF INDICATIONS OF AN ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR, THE US SHOULD RESPOND TO ANY REQUEST FROM THE GULF STATES FOR AN INCREASED US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA TO ACT AS A DETERRENT, OFFER TO INCREASE THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH THE GULF STATES, BEGIN PLANNING WITH THE GULF STATES AND THE ALLIES MEASURES TO PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE GULF, AND OFFER TO ASSIST THE GULF STATES IN INCREASING THEIR AIR DEFENCE READINESS (RAPHEL NOTED THAT SOME OF THIS WAS ALREADY IN HAND):
(B) IN THE EVENT OF MINE-LAYING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A NON-BELLIGERENT, THE US SHOULD INTERVENE TO COUNTER IT AND TO CONDUCT MINE-CLEARING OPERATIONS:
(C) IF A NON-BELLIGERENT ASKED FOR HELP TO DEFEND ITS TERRITORY OR OILFIELDS IN THE FACE OF ATTACKS, THE US SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY:
(D) IF THE US WERE ASKED TO HELP PROTECT NEUTRAL SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ OR INTERNATIONAL WATERS IT SHOULD DO SO.

6. RAPHEL CONFIRMED THAT AS SOON AS THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD CONSULT EUROPEAN ALLIES

AS WELL AS THE JAPANESE, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS IN WASHINGTON US AIMS WOULD BE TO COORDINATE A DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO DETER ESCALATION OF THE WAR, TO INFORM THE ALLIES OF THE STEPS THEY WERE TAKING AND PROPOSING TO THE GULF STATES, AND TO SEEK POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO PROCEED TO MILITARY PLANNING AND COOPERATION ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS. THE US WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT POSSIBLE NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE A RENEWED MEDIATION EFFORT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO FOLLOW UP SCR 540, NEW EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE THE SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ARMS TO IRAN (RAPHEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS APPLIED ONLY TO IRAN) AND SOME MORE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE US WOULD ALSO WANT TO TALK ABOUT MEASURES TO DETER ESCALATION OF THE WAR AND WHAT THE ALLIES MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO TO HELP EG BY PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL FORCES AND MILITARY ADVISERS: THEY WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT TO THE HOLDING OF MILITARY PLANNING TALKS.

7. RAPHEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROPOSED BRIEFINGS IN WASHINGTON WOULD DO NO MORE THAN INITIATE THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION. WE URGED THAT HE SHOULD STOP OVER IN LONDON FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION BEFORE HE SPOKE THE GULF STATES AND MENTIONED THE VISIT TO LONDON OF CREASEY AND ALAWI NEXT WEEK (TELECON MINISTER/HASKELL). RAPHEL TOOK NOTE BUT AGAIN WARNED THAT EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE NSC PAPER THIS WEEK TIMING WAS VERY TIGHT: RAPHEL HAS TO BE BACK IN WASHINGTON BY 6 DECEMBER. HIS PRESENT INTENTION WAS TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN, THE UAE AND OMAN (HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE OMANIS WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A MEETING IN LONDON): VISITS TO QATAR AND KUWAIT WOULD DEPEND ON ADVICE FROM THE RESPECTIVE US EMBASSIES. IN ADDITION TO OUTLINING THE ABOVE PROPOSALS HE WOULD AIM TO SHARE ASSESSMENTS OF THE WAR AND DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE GRADUAL DETERIORATION OF THE IRAQI POSITION MIGHT BE HALTED. THESE TALKS MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY NET. HE WOULD OF COURSE BRIEF THE ALLIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS IN THE GULF.

8. RAPHEL EMPHASISED THAT FIFTEEN YEARS EXPERIENCE OF DEALING WITH THESE PROBLEMS HAD MADE HIM FULLY AWARE OF LOCAL CONCERNS AND SENSITIVITIES ABOUT DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH THE US. BUT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE GULF STATES OVER THE PAST MONTH. AT THE REQUEST OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THE COMMANDER OF MIDEASTFOR HAD FOR THE FIRST TIME GIVEN PRESS INTERVIEWS IN KUWAIT AND THE UAE, HIS OWN VISIT TO OMAN AND BAHRAIN HAD GONE WELL, THE UAE HAD ASKED FOR THE FIRST TIME WHAT THE US COULD DO TO HELP IF THINGS WENT WRONG AND THE SAUDIS HAD OVER THE LAST FORTNIGHT BEEN UNPRECEDENTEDLY FORTHCOMING. PRESSED ON THIS POINT, RAPHEL SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WERE NOW WILLING TO ENGAGE IN REAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ALL THIS REVEALED A NEW ATTITUDE BY THE GULF STATES, NO DOUBT REFLECTING THEIR REAL CONCERN OVER THE COURSE OF THE WAR. THE TIME THEREFORE SEEMED RIGHT TO SEEK ENHANCED COOPERATION WITH THEM. THIS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE TACKLED DISCREETLY AND HE WOULD TAILOR HIS APPROACH TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PARTICULAR VIEWS OF EACH STATE.

9. RAPHEL SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A SMALL FORWARD HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT OF CENTCOM IN THE GULF CO-LOCATED AFLOAT WITH MIDEASTFOR. IT WOULD CONSIST OF FEWER THAN 20 PERSONS COMMANDED BY A BRIGADIER WHO WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO GENERAL KINGSTON. AT THE REQUEST OF THE BAHRAINIS THERE WOULD BE NO SUGGESTION THAT CENTCOM PERSONNEL WERE BASED IN BAHRAIN (RAPHEL REPEATED THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN AFLOAT). THE US WOULD PLAY THIS DEVELOPMENT IN VERY LOW KEY: IT WAS LIKELY TO BE MADE PUBLIC AT CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT WEEK.

10. RAPHEL WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO GIVE US THIS ADVANCE BRIEFING: HIS CONFIDENCE MUST, PLEASE, BE PROTECTED.

WRIGHT



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C (2)
Prime Minister

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYCONSEQUENCES OF AN ESCALATION OF IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Thank you for your minute of 25th October on the consequences of an escalation of the Iran/Iraq war.

2. I am in general agreement with your analysis of the possible Iranian retaliatory actions in the event of intensified Iraqi attacks. Our view of the Super Etendards is that their psychological impact has been greater than is justified by their real military value. If they are used against Iranian shipping in the Gulf, Iranian retaliation against Gulf State installations would seem to be more likely than direct disruption of international shipping or attempted closure of the Straits of Hormuz, not least because Iran's own oil exports would be adversely affected. This of course presupposes that the Iranians will act rationally and that the Iraqis will not be able significantly to reduce the flow of Iranian oil exports; if they did so the Iranians would no longer have any self-interest in keeping the Straits open. Neither of these assumptions is certain and I accept that we must keep under review the ways in which we might be able to respond to requests for British military assistance which might arise as a result of the whole range of possible Iranian actions.

3. So far as military assistance is concerned, in the case of the threat of an Iranian attack on Gulf State installations (such as desalination plants, power stations or off-shore loading terminals) the most likely request is for air defence assistance, either for ground based systems such as Rapier or for air defence aircraft plus associated air defence radars where there is no local capability. These could be provided, but only at the expense of other tasks,

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and you will be aware that national and NATO commitments are already depleted by the presence of Rapier units in the Falkland Islands and Belize and of Phantom Squadrons in the Falkland Islands and Cyprus (in support of BRITFORLEB). Nevertheless a request would have to be considered carefully in view of our national, economic and defence sales interests in the area.

4. Against the threat of Iranian interception or air attack on international shipping the Armilla patrol already provides a limited British presence (within 7 days of the area). It would require reinforcement, taking 14-17 days, to operate effectively as an escort task group and would also involve diversion of resources declared to NATO. Air support would also be essential and could be provided if necessary (and again at the expense of other commitments), either by an appropriate combination of Buccaneers, Nimrods and Phantoms or by deployment of a CVS. In the event of mining of the Straits of Hormuz, assistance would almost certainly be sought by Oman which has negligible mine-sweeping capabilities. A Royal Navy mine counter-measures force consisting of 4 MCMVs and a support ship is already on call in the UK for this purpose and could be deployed to the Gulf in 6 weeks to clear the main shipping lines in the Straits. The RN could also provide MCM advisers in much shorter time if needed.

5. I agree with you that we must maintain close liaison with the Americans and that the indications from the recent UK/US politico-military talks are welcome. This is particularly relevant to the question of British assistance because it is difficult to conceive of British action to maintain freedom of navigation, for example, other than in conjunction at least with the US and possibly also with other major Western Allies.

6. As to the way forward I agree that it would be sensible for the situation to be kept under review. The Chiefs of Staff will be assessing the detailed implications of the possible options for



British assistance (in the light of which my officials will write to yours on the more detailed points raised in the attachment to your letter). I believe that it would also be helpful if we could have, from your own sources, an up-dated assessment on the Gulf States own perception of the Iranian threat. This, of course, will in the event influence the likelihood or nature of any request for British assistance.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Energy and Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.


WRB

Ministry of Defence
23rd November 1983

Rate : Iran / Iraq

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24 NOV 1983



OUT TELEGRAM

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TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
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	10	FOLLOWING FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER; FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY; AND
	11	FOR PUS
	12	Situation Report 21/22 November
	13	Gulf War
	14	1. Fighting continues in the northern sector with the Iranians
	15	on the offensive but suffering heavy casualties. Iraq claims to
	16	have destroyed seven ships and one aircraft near Bandar Khomeini
	17	at the head of the Gulf. The Iranians have admitted that two
	18	cargo ships were damaged.
	19	Lebanon
	20	2. HMS Glamorgan and HMS Brazen are due to arrive off Beirut
	21	today (22 November) to provide temporary cover until HMS Fearless
///	22	takes up station as additional logistical support for BRITFORLEB
//	23	(28 November).
/	24	3. At today's EC Foreign Minister's meeting the Ten are
	25	discussing a UK outline draft of principles of a settlement of

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Dms
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File number	Dept PLANNING	Distribution LIMITED
Drafted by (Block capitals) A J COLQUHOUN		Private Secretary PS/Mr Luce PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney PS/PUS
Telephone number 233 7888		Planning Staff
Authorised for despatch	<i>[Signature]</i>	No 10 Downing Street
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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1 <<<<
2 the Lebanese crisis to issue at ^{the} end of ^{the} European Council, 4-6
3 December. This would define the Ten's position within the wider
4 Arab/Israel context. The Americans have seen our first draft in
5 confidence and expressed some reservations which have been taken
6 into account in redrafting. In introducing our draft Mr Rifkind
7 will also make orally the points important to the Americans,
8 notably the need to refrain from publicly torpedoing the unratified
9 Lebanon/Israel account of 17 May 1983. The result after the Ten's
10 deliberations is likely to be further changes, and may not please
11 Washington. But by then it will not be a purely British draft.
12 4. Arafat's loyalists have again lost access to Baddawi Camp in
13 Tripoli. The port and Zahrieh district (Arafat's HQ) are under
14 heavy bombardment from Syrian-backed rebels, who have apparently
15 entered the town. The local Lebanese Militias may be drawn in.
16 Over half the civilian population are now estimated to have fled
17 the city. Arafat remains adamant that he will not leave without
18 guarantees of safety for his men. Diplomatic attempts to arrange a
19 ceasefire continue. A non-aligned delegation composed of the
20 Foreign Ministers of India, Cuba, Senegal and Yugoslavia is due
21 in Damascus by the weekend, ostensibly to mediate between the
22 Palestinian factions but actually to plead with Khaddam to allow
23 for a ceasefire at Tripoli. By then Arafat's position may be
24 desperate.
25 Grenada
26 5. The Governor-General has asked Montgomery for assistance with
27 the prison service. He said that there was an immediate need for
28 an experienced prison administrator plus two or three prison
29 officers in a supervisory grade.
30 Cyprus
31 6. Apart from the messages which the Secretary of State is
32 sending his Greek and Turkish colleagues, main developments are
33 (i) the Turkish Defence Minister is touring certain Islamic
34 countries to drum up support for the Turkish position on UDI; and

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

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(ii) Perez de Cuellar has told Sir J Thomson that he does not intend to appoint a successor to Gobbi. We are urging him to do so to prevent the appearance of lack of interest in Cyprus by the UN at this crucial time.

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TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 403 OF 14 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, KUWAIT AND MUSCAT

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, DUBAI, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. US EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT THEIR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN JEDDA WAS SUMMONED ON 12 NOVEMBER. HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE GCC SUMMIT HAD TAKEN A FORMAL DECISION THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DISRUPTION OF SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, OUTSIDE HELP WOULD BE SOUGHT TO KEEP THEM OPEN. THE GCC COUNTRIES HOPED THAT ANY ENSUING ACTION WOULD BE 'LEGITIMATE', I.E. COVERED BY AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SCR 540 MIGHT BE ENOUGH, IF THERE WERE NO TIME TO SECURE A NEW RESOLUTION.

2. THE SAUDIS SAID THAT YOU AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WOULD BE SUMMONED TO RECEIVE THE SAME MESSAGE, AND THAT ACTION WOULD PROBABLY BE TAKEN BY THE OTHER GCC COUNTRIES WITH AMBASSADORS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PERMANENT MEMBERS. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO THE US EMBASSY HERE OR TO US WHETHER SUCH ACTION WOULD BE CONFINED TO THE US, FRANCE AND UK, OR WHETHER E.G. KUWAIT WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

3. GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS.

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FM BAGHDAD 031920Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 703 OF 3 NOV 83,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEHRAN, PARIS,
PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MODUK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 700: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I WAS CALLED TO THE MFA THIS EVENING BY SAHHAF, WHO SAID HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTION FROM HIS GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE LATEST IRANIAN ATTACK. THIS SHOWED A CLEAR INTENTION ON THE PART OF IRAN TO VIOLATE IRAQ'S FRONTIERS AND TO ATTACK IRAQI TERRITORY. THIS WAS THE MORE REGRETTABLE IN THAT THIS NEW BLOODY ATTACK CAME SO SOON AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD EXPRESSED THEIR CLEAR VIEWS IN FAVOUR OF PEACE AND NEGOTIATIONS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 540. IRAQ STOOD BY ITS STATEMENT ACCEPTING THAT RESOLUTION AND DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE PASSAGE UNDER WHICH IN THE EVENT OF IRANIAN REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION IRAQ RESERVED THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST IRAN'S AGGRESSION BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS. SAHHAF STRESSED THAT IRAQ RESERVED THE RIGHT TO ATTACK IRANIAN TARGETS WHATEVER THEY MIGHT BE.

2. SAHHAF SAID THIS FRESH ATTACK AND ITS TIMING REPRESENTED AN OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE WISHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY APART FROM IRAN. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, THEREFORE, REQUESTED THE FRIENDLY BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO MAKE PUBLIC THEIR CONDEMNATION OF THIS LATEST IRANIAN ATTACK IN WHATEVER WAY THEY SAW FIT. SAHHAF ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD MAKE KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THIS UNACCEPTABLE IRANIAN ESCALATION OF THE WAR.

3. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR THEIR CONCERN TO SEE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY TO YOU THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST WITHOUT DELAY.

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COMMENT.

4. THE GRAVITY WITH WHICH SAHHAF SPOKE SUGGESTS THAT THE IRAQIS MAY BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE ABILITY THE IRANIANS HAVE SHOWN TO SUSTAIN THEIR CURRENT OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE PENJWIN AREA FOR A GOOD DEAL LONGER THAN OTHER ATTACKS IN RECENT MONTHS. THIS IRANIAN PRESSURE MUST INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE IRAQIS TRYING TO BREAK OUT OF THE WAR OF ATTRITION TO WHICH THEY ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN THE IRANIANS, BY DRASTIC MEASURES SUCH AS USING THE SUPER ETENDARDS OR OTHER WEAPONRY TO INHIBIT IRAN'S OIL EXPORTS. THE REFERENCE TO THE IRAQI STATEMENT ON RESOLUTION 540 SEEMS DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY SOME MOVE OF THIS KIND.

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FM BAGHDAD 031040Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 700 OF 3 NOV 83,

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MODUK.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. AN IRAQI MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID AT 12 NOON TODAY,
3 NOVEMBER THAT A FURTHER IRANIAN ATTACK HAD BEGUN LAST NIGHT
IN THE PENJWIN SECTOR. THIS WAS BEING MET BY FIRM IRAQI RESISTANCE.
NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE GIVEN. WE HAVE SEEN A REUTERS REPORT
FROM TEHRAN ANNOUNCING THAT THIS WAS THE THIRD PHASE OF THE
VAL FAJR 4 OFFENSIVE.

2. A LEADING ARTICLE IN TODAY'S AL THAWRA NEWSPAPER CONTAINS A
WARNING THAT IN THE LIGHT OF IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE
CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE GULF AREA CONTAINED IN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 540, IRAQ WILL NO LONGER ALLOW IRAN TO ENJOY
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF WHICH ENABLES IRAN TO PURSUE
HER HOSTILITIES AGAINST IRAQ, WHILE THIS FREEDOM IS DENIED TO
IRAQ. IT CAN HARDLY BE COINCIDENCE THAT THIS THREAT, FOLLOWS
SO CLOSELY UPON THE REVELATION BY TARIQ AZIZ TO FRENCH JOURNALISTS,
SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY A FRENCH MINISTER, THAT THE SUPER
ETENDARD HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO IRAQ IN OCTOBER.

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FM PARIS 031715Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 984 OF 3RD NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ROUTINE JEDDA, KUWAIT, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,
INFO SAVING ABU DHABI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DUBAI.

IRAN/IRAQ.

SUMMARY.

1. THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE FRENCH PRESS HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE SUPER ETENDARDS ARE IN IRAQ. FRENCH POLICY IS NOW AIMED AT MINIMISING THE CONSEQUENCES.

DETAIL.

2. AN EXULTANT TARIQ AZIZ TOLD LE MATIN (PRO-GOVERNMENT DAILY) THAT FRANCE HAD DELIVERED THE AIRCRAFT SOME TIME IN OCTOBER. HE PRAISED FRANCE FOR NOT BACKING DOWN IN THE FACE OF A CAMPAIGN ORIGINATING 'IN THE US, THE UK AND ISRAEL, COUNTRIES WHICH IN VARIOUS WAYS SUPPLY IRAN WITH ARMS OR FACILITIES AND WHICH HAVE NO RIGHT TO LECTURE ANYBODY'. THE US HAD FORTUNATELY AT LENGTH SEEN THROUGH THE IRANIAN BLUFF. THE AFFAIR HAD BROUGHT NUMEROUS ARAB COUNTRIES (SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, EGYPT AND JORDAN) RALLYING BEHIND IRAQ.
3. IRAQ WAS READY TO ABIDE BY THE UN RESOLUTION WHICH REFLECTED IRAQ'S OWN EARLIER PEACE PROPOSALS. THE IRANIANS, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO WANT TO FIGHT ON. IF THEY DID, IRAQ WOULD REPLY 'MASSIVELY' AND NO-ONE COULD BLAME HER.
4. IRAQ'S MAIN PROBLEM WAS FINANCIAL OWING TO SYRIA'S TREACHEROUS CLOSURE OF THE PIPELINE. TARIQ AZIZ'S APPROACH TO KHADDAM IN NEW YORK HAD FAILED, THOUGH THAT HAD AT LEAST SHOWN THE SAUDI AND KUWAITI MEDIATORS WHO WAS AT FAULT. 1983 HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT YEAR FINANCIALLY BUT NEXT YEAR THE SITUATION SHOULD IMPROVE THROUGH THE DOG-LEG TO BE BUILT LINKING IRAQ WITH THE SAUDI PIPELINE AND IN THE LONGER-TERM THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PIPELINE ACROSS SAUDI TERRITORY.
5. CHEYSSON HAD SAID ON 1 NOVEMBER AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ROME THAT THE SUPER ETENDARDS HAD BEEN 'PUT AT IRAQ'S DISPOSITION'. ONE PAPER CLAIMS THEY WERE DELIVERED VIA EGYPT.

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6. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S FRENCH CABINET MEETING ALLUDED TO THE UN RESOLUTION AND REAFFIRMED FRANCE'S KEENNESS TO SEE A GENERAL CEASEFIRE. IT ALSO CALLED FOR THE OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS INSPIRED BY RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 'THE DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF TWO GREAT PEOPLES'

7. FRENCH PRESS BRIEFING HAS DEVELOPED THE THEMES OF FRANCE'S PEACE-LOVING INTENTIONS, THE SUCCESS FOR FRANCE WHICH THE UN RESOLUTION REPRESENTS, AND THE SCANT IMPORTANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR AS A WHOLE. A FURTHER THEME IS THAT THE AIRCRAFT ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR THE TIME BEING TO BE USED AS A DETERRENT WHICH IRAQ WOULD ONLY UNLEASH IF PROVOKED. ON THE WHOLE THE PRESS HAS EITHER RELAYED ALL THIS FAITHFULLY OR REPORTED NEUTRALLY, WITH ONLY THE ODD GROUSE ABOUT THE ELABORATE SMOKESCREEN.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

FRETWELL

THIS TELEGRAM
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Prime Minister
 You should be aware of the study
about how we should respond to
request from the Gulf States for
assistance if the war escalates.

A.F.C. 25/10

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

1. There has been much speculation about the possibility that the Iraqis may use their new Super Etendard aircraft to disrupt Iranian oil exports from the Gulf. In that event, the Iranians might seek to retaliate in one or more of the following ways:

- (i) attacks on the Iraqi/Turkey pipeline;
- (ii) attacks on Gulf state ports and oil installations;
- (iii) blockade of Gulf state oil export terminals;
- (iv) attacks on tankers going to or from Gulf state oil terminals;
- (v) attempted closure of the Straits of Hormuz, which could involve:
 - (a) a declaration that the Gulf was closed to shipping;
 - (b) mining or blockage of the Straits;
 - (c) attacks on shipping.

2. I do not wish to be alarmist about these possibilities. It is not yet certain that the Iraqis will use the Super Etendards in the way that has been feared. Iranian naval and air capabilities are limited, and could not, for example, sustain a blockade of the Straits for long. The latest indications from Tehran are of greater caution, and a retreat from the exaggerated threats of the past few weeks. Recent

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activity at the United Nations has led to the preparation by the Western four members of the Security Council of a resolution calling inter alia for an immediate ceasefire in the Gulf area. Though the Iranians are suspicious of most UN activity, they may be unwilling to reject this out of hand.

3. Nevertheless we cannot assume that Iranian reactions to the use by Iraq of Super Etendard/EXOCET against economic targets will be rational. We may be faced at short notice by requests for air or naval assistance, either from an Arab Gulf state which is threatened by attack or from the Americans, who are, like us, concerned to maintain freedom of navigation throughout the Straits of Hormuz. UK/US politico-military talks in Washington on 18/19 October provided an opportunity to compare notes on the extent of the threat, and established that the Americans have no clearly defined policy as yet for responding to the potential crisis; that their ideas for possible military action are to date modest; and that they would wish to act cautiously, and preferably only in response to a direct request for help from one of the Gulf states. This is reassuring, but there is a continuing need to keep very closely in touch with the Americans, in order to influence their thinking as it develops.

4. I also believe we should clear our own minds about the range of British military support which could be made available in any of the contingencies outlined above, if we decided that the urgency of the Gulf situation required us to divert some part of our forces from their existing commitments. To set the ball rolling, I attach a short self-explanatory paper illustrating some of the questions which might need to be answered if the Iranians exercised any of the options listed above. Your own experts will be best placed to take this further. I should be grateful for your comments on this paper and on the other points I have raised.

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5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Energy and Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G.M.', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 October 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

IRANIAN RESPONSES TO IRAQI INTERFERENCE WITH IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS

<u>Iranian Action</u>	<u>Possible UK Assistance with Counter-Measures</u>	<u>Comments</u>	<u>Points or Clarification</u>
<p>Attacks on Iraq - Turkey pipeline (a) by aircraft (b) by commando squads</p>	<p>none</p>	<p>An unlikely option. Except perhaps for pumping stations, pipe-line would seem a difficult target for air attack. Iraq also has adequate SAM capability. Distance from Iranian territory almost certainly rules out commando attack.</p>	<p>none</p>
<p>Attacks on ports, oil installations, desalination ports etc. in Gulf States</p>	<p>General: provision of additional air defence capability: e.g. Rapier or Blowpipe SAMs, Phantom air defence aircraft, Buccaneer or Jaguar ground attack aircraft (to hit back at Iranian shipping). Or, operational/maintenance help with Gulf States' existing capabilities.</p>	<p>Any UK assistance would have to be integrated with Gulf States' existing capabilities and help given by US. If requests were numerous, political decisions would be needed on which should be met and which refused.</p>	<p>See detailed questions below.</p>
<p>(a) Kuwait</p>	<p>See above (General)</p>	<p>The US believe Kuwait will turn to UK for help if needed. Kuwait is also the likeliest first target for Iranian attack. Kuwait has US and French interceptor aircraft: US and Soviet SAMs: no British defence equipment.</p>	<p>Would equipment supplied from UK fit in with Kuwait's existing resources?</p>
<p>(b) Saudi Arabia</p>	<p>Assistance to Saudi Arabia's Lightning squadrons.</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia has already sought and received assurances of US support. A separate requirement for UK is unlikely</p>	<p>Would Saudi Arabia be likely to ask for emergency assistance with Lightnings, and could we respond?</p>

Iranian Action

Possible UK Assistance
with Counter-Measures

Comments

Points for
Clarification

(c) Bahrain	see above (General)	If Iranian attacks are directed primarily against oil exports, Bahrain is an unlikely target. Bahrain has already sought and received assurances of US support but may approach UK as well. Bahrain currently has no air defence capability except short-range RBS 70 SAMs.	Could we meet a commitment to set up virtually a complete system?
(d) Qatar	see above (General) Qatar operates Rapier SAMs, and might ask for additional missiles and operational/maintenance help.	US might be reluctant to respond to a request from Qatar. However as only a minor oil exporter, Qatar is not a prime Iranian target.	What assistance could we provide particularly over Rapier?
(e) UAE	see above (General and Qatar). The UK has a specific commitment to respond to a request for consultations in emergencies.	The US might similarly prefer the UK to respond to a request from the UAE. See also (g) (Offshore installations).	As for Qatar
(f) Oman	see above (General). The UK has a specific commitment to respond to a request for consultations in emergencies. Oman operates Jaguar aircraft and Rapier SAMs.	Oman has already sought and received assurances of US support but is likely to approach UK as well. Heavy existing UK involvement in supply, training and manning Omani forces. Oman is also of particular significance over convoying (3 and 5 below).	What specific requests would we expect the Omanis to make and how could we meet them?
(g) Offshore	Provision of air defence capability <u>or</u> anti-sabotage measures for offshore oil installations.	Most such are UAE. Offshore oil installations would be particularly vulnerable to air attack, but there might be scope for reducing their vulnerability to sabotage or small-scale commando raids.	Could any assistance be provided by Comachio Company, Royal Marines?

Iranian Action

Possible UK Assistance
with Counter-Measures

Comments

Points for
Clarification

3. Blockade of Gulf state oil export terminals	Convoying tankers which are prepared to challenge the blockade	Convoying implies that UK war-ships would return fire if attacked by Iranian ships or aircraft. Air cover would also be needed.	How much of the requirement could be met from Gulf States own resources? Could requirement be significantly reduced by concentrating on keeping Ras Tanura open, and not worrying about blockade elsewhere? What would be the role of the Armilla Patrol?
4. Attacks on tankers going to or from Gulf state oil terminals.	As for 3	As for 3	As for 3
5. Attempted closure of the Straits of Hormuz by (a) declaration of an MEZ (b) mining or blockage (c) attacks on shipping	As for 3. US are not confident of their ability to cope with a mine-sweeping requirement and might urgently seek help in this area.	Blockage is physically impossible. Mining may be unlikely because it would go directly against the Iranians' own interests: i.e. to keep the Straits open unless their own shipping is severely disrupted by Iraq.	As for 3. Could we help to cover any mine-sweeping requirement? Where Gulf of Oman would requirement end?
NB. There are other Iranian options, such as stopping ships specifically to search for arms destined for Iraq, or ferrying crude oil in their own tankers from Kharg Island to Sirri, to be picked up by international shipping beyond Super Etendard range, which would not be likely to create a requirement for UK military assistance.			

GRS 600

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FM BAGHDAD 230800Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 688 OF 23 OCT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK D14.

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, PARIS, THE HAGUE
AND GULF POSTS.

MY TEL NO 667 AND FCO TELNO 648 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. MY TUR REPORTED THE IRAQI ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE PENJWIN AREA OF THE NORTHERN SECTOR WHICH BEGAN AT MIDNIGHT ON 19/20 OCTOBER. SUBSEQUENTLY IRAQI MILITARY COMMUNIQES HAVE SAID THAT HEAVY FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 21 AND 22 OCTOBER. THE IRAQIS ARE CLAIMING TO HAVE KILLED OVER 3,200 IRANIANS ON THOSE TWO DAYS. HEAVY USE HAS BEEN MADE OF SUPPORTING AIR STRIKES WITH 485 SORTIES REPORTEDLY BEING FLOWN OVER THE BATTLEFIELD BY IRAQI JETS AND HELICOPTERS.

2. IT IS DIFFICULT FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO FORM A CLEAR VIEW ON HOW THE FIGHTING IS PROGRESSING. IRAQI CLAIMS OF IRANIAN CASUALTIES ARE LIKELY TO BE OVER-STATED, BUT THE US INTERESTS SECTION ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIAN CLAIM ON 21 OCTOBER THAT THEIR FORCES HAD ADVANCED INTO IRAQI TERRITORY TO WITHIN ONE KILOMETRE OF PENJWIN ARE LIKELY TO BE EXAGGERATED. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRANIANS SCORED SUCCESSES IN THE INITIAL FIGHTING, BREAKING THROUGH THE FORWARD LINES OF IRAQI DEFENCE AND INFLECTING CONSIDERABLE CASUALTIES UPON THE IRAQIS. IT APPARENTLY FELL TO THE 29 BRIGADE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES TO STOP THE IRANIAN ADVANCE. ON 22 OCTOBER SADDAM HUSSAIN TOOK THE UNUSUAL STEP OF SENDING AN OPEN TELEGRAM TO THE COMMANDER OF 29 BRIGADE, THE TEXT OF WHICH WAS WIDELY BROADCAST, IN WHICH HE CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS TROOPS COURAGEOUS AND SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE. THE COMMANDER, KARMIL SARJIT, WAS PUBLICLY NAMED (IT IS RARE FOR SENIOR OFFICERS TO BE NAMED PUBLICLY IN IRAQ) AND WAS DECORATED FOR BRAVERY. IN HIS TELEGRAM SADDAM SPOKE PARTICULARLY OF THE 'SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATION' OF THE BATTLE ON THE IRAQI SIDE, A RATHER ANBIGUOUS FORMULATION.

3. ON 22 OCTOBER A MILITARY COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCED THAT THE APPROACHES TO BANDAR KHOMEINI PORT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY MINED BY THE IRAQIS. IF CORRECT, THIS ACTION BY IRAQ APPEARS TO BE A DELIBERATE PIECE OF PROVOCATION OF IRAN WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ACHIEVING A RESOLUTION OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE GULF ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND SEEMS TO BE DELIBERATELY INVITING IRANIAN

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RETALIATION

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RETALIATION. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY IN TURN OFFER IRAQ A SUITABLE PRETEXT FOR USE OF THE SUPER ETENDARD. NONE OF THE ATTACHES HERE, NOR THE US INTERESTS SECTION, IS ABLE TO CORROBORATE THIS REPORT YET, (FCO TUR.) INFORMATION ON THIS SORT OF MILITARY OPERATION IS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN IN BAGHDAD. IT MAY BE THAT THERE IS A LARGE ELEMENT OF BLUFF IN THE IRAQI CLAIM. WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR MINE-LAYING CAPACITY IS LIMITED. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE WILL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY TO MODUK D14 ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE OF THIS QUESTION.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS ON THE IRAQI SIDE OF THE SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE ATTACKS AGAINST MASJAD SULAIMAN AND DEZFUL WHICH WERE REPORTED ON RADIO TEHRAN. THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN REPORTS OF SHEELING OF IRAQI CIVILIAN TARGETS BY THE IRANIANS IN MANDALI, KANAQIN, PENJWIN AND OTHER BORDER TOWNS. THE NUMBERS OF CLAIMED CIVILIAN DEAD, HOWEVER, ARE VERY LOW.

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FM WASHINGTON 200005Z OCT 1983

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3034 OF 19 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS,
ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS, AMMAN, JEDDA.

POL/MIL/ TALKS: IRAN/IRAQ

1. THIS ITEM DOMINATED TALKS ON MORNING OF 18 OCTOBER.

CIA PROVIDED A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE WAR AND ITS FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH BELLIGERENTS. THE IRAQIS WERE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE: THE CIA ESTIMATED THAT THEIR RESERVES WERE DOWN TO US DOLLARS 4 BILLION AND FALLING, AND THAT THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT (US DOLLARS 15 BILLION) WOULD GET WORSE, IN SPITE OF GULF SUBVENTIONS, OBLIGING THE IRAQIS TO CUT BACK ON FOOD IMPORTS NEXT YEAR. THE IRAQIS HAD RECENTLY ENDED COMBAT PAY FOR THEIR TROOPS AND HAD BEEN SECRETLY SELLING GOLD. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT KUWAITI AND SAUDI OIL-SWAP ARRANGEMENTS AMOUNTED

OF GULF SUBVENTIONS, OBLIGING THE IRAQIS TO GET BACK ON FOOD
IMPORTS NEXT YEAR. THE IRAQIS HAD RECENTLY ENDED COMBAT PAY FOR
THEIR TROOPS AND HAD BEEN SECRETLY SELLING GOLD. THE AMERICANS
BELIEVED THAT KUWAITI AND SAUDI OIL-SWAP ARRANGEMENTS AMOUNTED TO
SOME 400,000 BPD SOLD ON IRAQ'S ACCOUNT PRIMARILY TO INDIA AND
THE SOVIET UNION. IRANIAN RESERVES WERE ESTIMATED AT US DOLLARS
13 BILLION, SUFFICIENT TO COVER ONE YEAR'S IMPORTS.

2. THE AMERICAN ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE
DELIVERY OF SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT (WHICH THEY THOUGHT HAD NOW
ARRIVED IN IRAQ) WAS NOT WIDELY DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THEY THOUGHT
THE IRAQIS WOULD SEEK TO EXPLOIT THESE WEAPONS IN A SERIES OF
GRADUATED STEPS PROCEEDING FROM THREAT TO USE THROUGH SYMBOLIC
USE OF SINGLE ATTACK (S) IN THE MEZ, ATTACK (S) AGAINST TANKER
TRAFFIC TO KHARG, TO A FULL SCALE AIR ASSAULT ON KHARG ISLAND IN
THE LAST RESORT. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO
SUPPLY AT LEAST 100 EXOCETS WITH THE AIRCRAFT. IRANIAN REACTIONS
MIGHT ALSO BE GRADUATED, INITIALLY PERHAPS LIMITED TO ATTACKS
ON THE IRAQ-TURKEY PIPELINE OR KUWAITI OIL FACILITIES. THEY DID
NOT WANT TO ATTRACT WESTERN INTERVENTION THOUGH AS A LAST RESORT
THEY WERE PREPARED TO TRY TO CLOSE THE GULF TO SHIPPING.

3. THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES PROPOSED BY THE UK
SIDE AND READILY AGREED TO THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION AT
EVERY STAGE. IT WAS AGREED THAT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO A SEPARATE MEETING OF MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS.
NIFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE FROM THIS
EXCHANGE.

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FM BONN 140805Z OCT 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 921 OF 14 OCTOBER

IRAN/IRAQ

1. GORENFLOS, THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY COVERING THE THIRD WORLD AT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, RANG US YESTERDAY EVENING TO SAY THAT THE GERMANS HAD INFORMATION FROM AN EXCEPTIONALLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT IRAN PLANNED TO BLOCKADE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON 23 OCTOBER. GORENFLOS COULD NOT SAY MORE ABOUT THE SOURCE. HE COMMENTED THAT THE GERMANS KNEW THAT IRAN HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF BLOCKADING THE STRAITS, BUT HAD NO COLLATERAL ABOUT A SPECIFIC IRANIAN DECISION. GERMAN OFFICIALS WERE THEREFORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE NEW REPORT. THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH COMMENTS. THEY WERE ALSO CONTACTING THE FRENCH, AMERICANS AND ITALIANS.

2. FOLLOWING MALLABY'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HASKELL (MED), WE TOLD GORENFLOS THAT THE UK HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT AN IRANIAN DECISION, THAT IRAN'S CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN A BLOCKADE OF THE STRAITS WAS VERY QUESTIONABLE AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S FIRST REACTION TO THE NEW REPORT WAS ONE OF CONSIDERABLE RESERVE. WE ASKED GORENFLOS TO LET US KNOW IF THE FRENCH, US OR ITALIAN REACTION WAS DIFFERENT.

3. GRATEFUL IN DUE COURSE FOR ANYTHING MORE WE SHOULD SAY TO THE GERMANS.

TAYLOR

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FM WASHINGTON 142254Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2976 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 2964: IRAN/IRAQ

1. ADMIRAL HOWE ASKED MINISTER TO CALL THIS MORNING TO GO OVER THE OUTLINE OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ON THE THREAT OF ESCALATION IN THE GULF, IN PREPARATION FOR THE POLITICO-MILITARY DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK. RAPHEL AND SOKOLSKY WERE PRESENT.

2. HOWE WAS HIS USUAL DISCREET SELF AND NOT MUCH IN PRACTICE WAS ADDED TO WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND EARLIER TELEGRAMS IN THIS SERIES). HOWE SAID THAT THE INTER-AGENCY WORK ON THIS QUESTION HAD STILL NOT BEEN COMPLETED. IT WAS BASED ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IRAQI ATTACKS ON IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS COULD LEAD TO THE FOLLOWING IRANIAN ESCALATORY RESPONSES:

- (I) ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI/TURKEY PIPELINE:
- (II) ATTACKS ON GULF STATE PORTS AND OIL INSTALLATIONS:
- (III) BLOCKADE OF GULF STATE OIL EXPORT TERMINALS:
- (IV) ATTACKS ON TANKERS GOING TO OR FROM GULF STATE OIL TERMINALS:
- (V) ATTEMPTED CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, WHICH COULD INVOLVE:
 - (A) A DECLARATION THAT THE PERSIAN GULF WAS CLOSED TO SHIPPING:
 - (B) MINING OR BLOCKADE OF THE STRAIT:
 - (C) ATTACKS ON SHIPPING.

YOU WILL SEE THAT THESE SCENARIOS ARE BASICALLY THE SAME AS THOSE COVERED IN THE NON-PAPER WHICH THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON HANDED OVER IN AUGUST, BUT WITH THE ADDITION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK ON THE IRAQ/TURKEY PIPELINE. THE AMERICANS DO NOT THINK THIS LIKELY BUT HAVE INCLUDED IT FOR COMPLETENESS.

3. HOWE SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL TRYING TO THINK THEIR WAY THROUGH THESE VARIOUS SCENARIOS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE EARLY POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO ANY OF THEM WERE CONFINED TO DIPLOMATIC AND PRECAUTIONARY MOVES DESIGNED TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER ESCALATION. THEY WOULD BE KEEN, AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT, TO DISCUSS WITH OURSELVES AND WITH OTHERS WHAT MUTUALLY REINFORCING ACTION WE COULD EACH TAKE. HE SAW THE PRESENT EXERCISE IN THE UN AS FITTING INTO THIS KIND OF APPROACH. UNILATERAL OR COLLECTIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT QUOTE VITAL INTERESTS UNQUOTE MIGHT BE ANOTHER. HE REGARDED THE DEPLOYMENT OF USS RANGER TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE PASSAGE OF THE INVINCIBLE TASK FORCE THROUGH THE INDIAN OCEAN AS BEING SIGNALS OF A DIFFERENT KIND BUT ALSO HELPFUL IN GIVING WARNING ABOUT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION. THESE WERE PART OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A VISIBLE BUT NOT PROVOCATIVE DISPLAY OF FORCE.

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4. HOWE SAID THAT ON PRESENT PLANS THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE NSC NEXT WEEK. HE SEEMED AT FIRST TO BE SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO GO INTO MUCH DETAIL WITH US UNTIL THAT DISCUSSION HAD TAKEN PLACE. THOMAS ARGUED THE CASE FOR HAVING SUBSTANTIVE EVEN IF NON-COMMITTAL DISCUSSION WITH US ABOUT THE OPTIONS BEFORE RATHER THAN AFTER THE NSC DISCUSSION. HE PRESUMED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THEN TO FACTOR BRITISH VIEWS INTO AMERICAN THINKING BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. HOWE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS (RAPHEL CERTAINLY DID) AND IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD AIM NEXT WEEK AT THE MOST FRANK AND OPEN DISCUSSION POSSIBLE, ALBEIT WITHOUT COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE ON EITHER SIDE.

5. THOMAS MADE THE POINT TO HOWE (AND RUBBED IT IN SUBSEQUENTLY IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH RAPHEL) THAT IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT NOT TO SPRING SURPRISES ON THE ALLIES. THE MORE THE AMERICANS COULD SHARE THEIR THOUGHTS WITH US THE BETTER. IT WAS ONLY BY THIS MEANS THAT THEY WOULD GET A SENSE OF WHERE THEY COULD LOOK TO US FOR SUPPORT AND WHERE NOT.

6. THE AMERICANS ARE IN TWO MINDS ABOUT THE IDEA OF MULTI-LATERAL DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS. THEY FEEL FOR EXAMPLE THAT TO BRING IN THE FRENCH MAY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE: THEY GET A GOOD DEAL FROM THE FRENCH IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NAVIES, BUT THE RESULTS GET PROGRESSIVELY WEAKER THE MORE THE QUAI D'ORSAY GETS DRAWN INTO IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY RECOGNISE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO FIND SOME WAY OF MULTI-LATERALISING RESPONSES TO PARTICULAR CONTINGENCIES THAT MIGHT ARISE AND THEY RECOGNISE THE DESIRABILITY OF WORKING FOR THIS IN ADVANCE. ONE OF THE THINGS THEY WILL HOPE TO DISCUSS WITH US NEXT WEEK IS HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE.

7. RAPHEL MENTIONED THE IDEA THAT WE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GULF USERS. WHAT DID WE HAVE IN MIND? THE AMERICANS SAW NO LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS TOGETHER ROUND A TABLE IF THAT WAS WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF. AT THE SAME TIME RAPHEL RECOGNISED THAT IT MIGHT SEEM CONFRONTATIONAL TO HAVE A MEETING OF GULF USERS THAT EXCLUDED THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS. THOMAS SAID THAT IF WE WERE THINKING OF SOMETHING ON THESE LINES IT WOULD NO DOUBT COME UP IN THE DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM ATHENS 111715Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 514 OF 11 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAN/IRAQ : RELEASE OF SUPER ENTENDARDS

ATHENS TELNO 1 TO WASHINGTON

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD CHEYSSON IN THE MARGINS OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL TODAY OF OUR CONCERN THAT DELIVERY OF SUPER ETENDARD TO IRAQ MIGHT SERIOUSLY ALARM THE IRANIANS AND RISK ENCOURAGING RETALIATION IN A WAY INIMICAL TO WESTERN INTEREST. CHEYSSON AVOIDED CONFIRMATION THAT DELIVERY HAD TAKEN PLACE, BUT CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT IT EITHER HAD OR WAS ABOUT TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, HAD TOLD THEM NOT TO BE BLACKMAILED INTO NOT DELIVERING. THE FACT WAS THAT THE ETENDARD WOULD BE ONLY A SMALL COMPONENT OF IRAQI FIRE POWER, FOR USE PRINCIPALLY AGAINST SHIPPING. IRAQ IN ANY CASE ALREADY HAD A

CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT IT EITHER HAD OR WAS ABOUT TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, HAD TOLD THEM NOT TO BE BLACKMAILED INTO NOT DELIVERING. THE FACT WAS THAT THE ETENDARD WOULD BE ONLY A SMALL COMPONENT OF IRAQI FIRE POWER, FOR USE PRINCIPALLY AGAINST SHIPPING. IRAQ IN ANY CASE ALREADY HAD A CAPABILITY OF ATTACKING SHIPPING (THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE ETENDARD WOULD MAKE RELATIVELY LITTLE DIFFERENCE). HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF URGING RESTRAINT ON THE PARTIES, AND ON THE NEED FOR A BALANCED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. ON THE LATTER, CHEYSSON SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE LATEST DRAFT WOULD PROBABLY BE ALL RIGHT. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ONLY ONE SMALL PART OF THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH TO WHICH IRAN WAS LIKELY TO TAKE EXCEPTION, AND THAT PERHAPS THIS COULD BE RESOLVED. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AIM AT A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT PROVOKE DISSENT FROM THE US AND USSR.

2. (FOR PARIS). THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FOLLOW UP AS APPROPRIATE WITH THE QUAI IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONVERSATION, AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO KEEP US IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEIR THINKING.

R H O D E S

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 October 1983

Credit for Iraq

The Prime Minister took a meeting today attended by your Secretary of State, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for Trade. The meeting considered whether the Iraqi delegation should be offered an enlarged credit facility of £250 million for five years against the existing offer of £100 million for three years.

It was argued that the original offer was conditional and that the conditions had not been fulfilled. Delays in repayment were mounting. The problem was not that Iraq could not pay, but that it preferred to delay in order to increase finance for its war effort. The aim should be to increase exports where these were being paid for. Accordingly, no offer of credit should be made.

In support of a larger offer, it was argued that the Iraqi market was potentially a very strong one and that it was important to keep a foothold in it. The current arrears of repayment were small in relation to total trade.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that in view of the longer term potential of the Iraqi market and the need to maintain contact with it, an enlarged offer of up to £250 million for five years could be made. But it was important to attach stringent conditions to this. Past arrears should be cleared up; there should be a firm undertaking not to allow new arrears to accumulate; the Iraqis should accept the standard terms of ECGD contracts; and the repayment period should be five years rather than 8½ years as provided for in the OECD consensus.

It was also agreed that at their various meetings with the Iraqis, the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and your Secretary of State would all press for the early release of Mr. Smith and would make it clear that agreement on credit would be dependent upon this.

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- 2 -

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (H.M. Treasury), Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Jonathan Rees (Minister of State's Office, Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

ANDREW TURNBULL

Jonathan Spencer, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry.

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PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mr. Coles

IRAQI CREDIT

Mr. Channon has asked to attend this meeting. This seems sensible as he will be chairing the meeting of the Anglo-Iraqi Joint Commission which will take place in the afternoon. But I think we should ask him to be a non-speaking member in order that DTI do not appear to have two votes.

So far there has been no protest from the Iraqi officials who have arrived, but they may be interpreting our failure to make an offer as a desire to hold back the prize for the Ministerial meetings.

Sir Anthony Parsons has commented that in view of the underlying strength of the Iraqi economy, it is worth offering just enough credit to maintain a favourable relationship. He would favour at least maintaining the existing offer of £100 m.

AT

4 October 1983

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PRIME MINISTER

Meeting 1100 on 5/10

Mr Fisher
Can you get together
a meeting asap?
AT

8/10

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister arrives on Wednesday, 5 October and meets you on Thursday, 6 October. Improved credit facilities are an important objective of his.

Iraq has been offered, conditionally, £100 million for three years.

- i. The commercial case for going beyond this is weak - ECGD losses are large and mounting;
- ii. but it is argued that Iraqi long-term prospects are good; that it is a good market for UK firms; and that the political arguments are strongly in favour.

DTI (Flag A) and FCO (Flag B) both argue that if the Iraqis are not given an advance indication of an improved offer there is a risk that Ramadhan will cancel his visit. Both suggest offering £250 million for five years subject to improved performance on existing debts.

The Treasury (Flag C) argue that we should not offer the Iraqis new medium term credit, i.e. that the original offer should be withdrawn since the conditions have not been met.

There are two further considerations:

- i. this is an early test of the conclusion of the Chequers meeting that "we should conduct a major drive to sell less to countries who were unable to pay for our exports";
- ii. should we allow ourselves to be pressurised by a threat to cancel the forthcoming visit?

/The choices

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The choices are:

- i. to offer no new medium term credit;
- ii. to confirm the original offer of £100 million;
- iii. to offer £250 million over five years.

Or you may wish to hold a short meeting

Meeting - Yes no. AT

30 September 1983

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

30 September 1983

The Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

John Cecil

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

Your letter of 29 September asked for urgent comments on a proposal that the Iraqi team visiting the UK next week should be offered £250 million of medium term credit over 5 years.

I am very reluctant to agree to this. As your letter makes clear to do so would be incompatible with our recent decision to adopt a more rigorous approach to country underwriting and would put us in the position of offering significantly more generous credit terms than other Western credit insurers. You suggest that we should nevertheless depart from normal principles for commercial and political reasons. As I understand it the commercial case is that the underlying position of the Iraqi economy is sound and it will therefore be a major market once oil exports resume and the war is over. I agree that in the longer term Iraq has much to offer as a market but in the meantime the country's resources are being channeled into the war effort, there are no signs of the war ending - indeed it may escalate - and the bulk of the repayment of the credits you propose will fall due during the next 5 years ie in advance of the time when you believe they may be in a position to pay their debts. These are all factors which should lead us to look with extreme scepticism on any case for extending credit.

You also suggest that the need to meet the Iraqi expectation for an offer of credit amounts to a political imperative because failure to meet such an expectation would be seen as an act of bad face. But the Iraqis latest demands are clearly unrealistic. The original very much smaller offer was made in conditional terms. Since then their economy has deteriorated and the conditions have not yet been met. There seems no point in securing a political, and perhaps commercial success in the short term if the only result is exports which are not paid for or which are paid for only after considerable delay. As you know this is very much the line which we are taking in other cases where we are under pressure to extend new credit.

My conclusion therefore is that we should not offer the Iraqis new medium term credit at this time.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Nigel Lawson

NIGEL LAWSON



FCS/83/187

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Credit for Iraq

1. I have now seen Cecil Parkinson's letter of 29 September and your reply of 30 September. There are, as you say, good arguments for taking a very sceptical view of the case for more credit. On the other hand, there are strong political arguments for doing as Cecil Parkinson has proposed, not least because of the imminence of Ramadhan's visit. Iraq remains a major market for us and the financial difficulties which result from the war are likely to continue to be offset at least to some extent by support from other Arab countries. The balance is not an easy one to strike, but I think that Cecil Parkinson has got it right and I hope that you will be able to agree that the political and commercial arguments should be allowed to prevail.

2. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, to other members of E(X) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
30 September 1983

A



CCATP

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5422
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

JU564

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

29 September 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP
Chancellor of the Exchequer
HM Treasury
Treasury Chambers
Whitehall SW1

Dear Nigel,

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

As you will know, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ramadhan, with the Trade and Oil Ministers and a large official party, arrive as guests of the Prime Minister on 5 October. The Anglo/Iraqi Joint Commission will take place concurrently. The Iraqis have recently made clear that they regard credit as by far the main issue and would judge the visit accordingly.

2 On instructions from EGC, the Ambassador in Baghdad wrote to the Governor of the Central Bank in February about the re-financing of existing major contracts - the Iraqis' top priority at the time; the letter stated that when the refinancing process was complete, we would consider extending £100m, minimum 3 year credit for new business at consensus rates. The Iraqis are now reported to be taking this offer for granted and have just given us a draft financial protocol for £1.35 billion of new credit! At present ECGD, like other credit insurers, offer only 1 year against letters of credit.

3 Clearly none of us like the idea of leading a move to convert a cash to a credit market. I set out below the arguments for and against doing so in this case.

4 Against extending credit

Iraq's economic situation has deteriorated since February and their economic prospects for the next 2/3 years (during which period the bulk of repayments would fall due) also look appreciably worse. There is no sign of the war ending and whilst Iran appears able to sustain a war of attrition it is increasingly having a serious effect on Iraq. ECGD's experience has also been deteriorating with claims up to £15 million either paid or under examination and a further £30 million potential losses reported. In addition some contracts have been arbitrarily cancelled by the Iraqis where the contractor has been



unable to provide financing facilities. No Western credit insurer (except possibly Austria) is currently prepared to offer support for medium credits to Iraq (indeed many are off cover even for cash business). Finally to grant credit would be incompatible with our decision to adopt a more rigorous ECGD approach to country under-writing, and would lead to criticism from other countries forced to follow the UK lead.

5 In favour of extending credit

a Commercial

Though the Iraqi economy has deteriorated since EGC authorised the February offer, the basic commercial case remains valid. Iraq is a striking example of a wealthy country with a serious, albeit temporary, cash flow problem, arising from the war, and closure of its Gulf oil outlet. Its oil reserves are the second largest in the Middle East. It has no accumulated debt, so extending credit is not a question of bailing out the banks. Iraq is a major market for our goods. In 1982 Iraq took £875m of UK exports - more than Japan and Korea combined. Once its oil exports resume, it will again be a major market. Although payments problems are likely to persist for 2 to 3 years, and there is considerable uncertainty about the state of Iraqi reserves, they should be in a position to pay debts in 5 years time, whether through the end of the war or through the development of alternative oil outlets, such as the Red Sea pipeline. The only current oil outlet, through Turkey, will in any case be expanded by 50% next spring to produce a revenue flow of \$10 bn annually. Saudi aid continues at about \$1 bn per month. Although there is still no hard evidence of other major credit insurers offering medium term cover, Austria is known to be considering it; (Mr Ramadhan will come here from Vienna).

b Political

The political arguments seem even more compelling. Commercial decision-taking in Iraq is more centralised and more subject to political considerations, than in almost any other Arab country. Mr Ramadhan ranks effectively as Prime Minister in the Iraqi hierarchy, and is the formal overlord of the entire economy. He has a powerful voice in Defence Sales matters, in the DSO's best recent market. His visit will be quite the most important meeting between British and Iraqi Governments for several years, and "success" or "failure" will have repercussions on our political and commercial relations for years to come. To appear in Iraqi eyes to renege on the undertaking implicit in the February letter would be seen as an act of bad faith with damaging long-term effects across the whole range of Anglo/Iraqi relations.



6 I conclude that the commercial case supports what is in effect a political imperative, to extend credit. Furthermore, if we are to move into medium-term credit at all, there is a good case for doing it boldly - not in such a half-hearted way that our competitors would at once more than match us, and our people would face an impossible task of choosing the lucky few from the several good contracts now in prospect. It would give us the worst of both worlds to start the race in such a way as to ensure we were soon running behind the pack. Thus the minimum we can do politically (£100m) - is commercially too small an amount. £250m for 5 years (a more sensible period, since in 5 years the underlying strength of the Iraqi economy should have been re-established) would enable us to cover serious business now in prospect, with a small margin. In my view it is both politically and commercially about the minimum realistic figure. We would naturally limit it to British capital goods, with some minimum contract value.

7 I am not, of course, suggesting that any offer should be unconditional. We shall wish to ensure in negotiation of the details that the Iraqis meet our interests, for instance over prompt payment of 1983 and 1984 maturities from the earlier refinancing exercise. On past form, these negotiations would take some considerable time to complete, before credit was actually made available. All we can sign next week with Mr Ramadhan will be an agreement in principle, subject to satisfactory negotiation.

8 Red Sea pipeline

Of all the civil projects in Iraq in which British firms are interested, this is unique both in scale, (the larger version would have £500m UK content, the smaller £200m), and more importantly in its role as a revenue-earner rather than spender for Iraq. Even if the war drags on indefinitely, this project offers Iraq a return to a positive cash-flow within 3 years of starting work. The Oil Minister and his officials will wish to discuss it again next week with the British-led international consortium and with my Department. To keep these discussions going I propose that my officials should tell the Iraqis that we are prepared to support this project, subject to satisfactory security in the form of either a Saudi guarantee of last resort or acceptable equivalent arrangements.

9 Iran

Although it is not strictly relevant to this letter, I should mention my concern that, if we do reach agreement with the Iraqis, we should consider some gesture, for instance in the defence sales field, to moderate Iranian dissatisfaction. Officials should, in my view, pursue this separately.



10 I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of E(X), and to Sir Robert Armstrong. I fear there is considerable urgency about taking a decision, in that if we cannot at least give the Iraqi officials arriving for the Joint Commission meeting some kind of positive indication by 1 October, there is a real danger that Ramadhan will cancel the visit at the last moment, rather than risk a rebuff. I would therefore welcome your most urgent comments.

The 1 October deadline is no longer thought pressing

James
Ear,
Leil

Iraq: visit by Ramadhan

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11 12 1

29 SEP 1983

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

As you will know, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ramadhan, with the Trade and Oil Ministers and a large official party, arrive as guests of the Prime Minister on 5 October. The Anglo-Iraqi Joint Commission will take place concurrently. The Iraqis have recently made clear that they regard credit as by far the main issue and would judge the visit accordingly.

On instructions from EGC the Ambassador in Baghdad wrote to the Governor of the Central Bank in February about the re-financing of existing major contracts the Iraqis took priority at the time. The latter stated that when the re-financing process was complete, we would consider extending 1 million pounds, minimum three-year credit for new business at consensus rates. The Iraqis are now reported to be taking this offer for granted and have just given us a draft financial protocol for pounds 1.35 billion of new credit! At present, ECGD, like other credit insurers, offer only 1 year against letters of credit.

Clearly none of us like the idea of leading a move to convert a cash to a credit market. I set out below the arguments for and against doing so in this case.

Against Extending Credit

Iraq's economic situation has deteriorated since February and their economic prospects for the next 2 - 3 years (during which period the bulk of repayments would fall) also look appreciably worse. There is no sign of the war ending and whilst Iran appears able to sustain a war of attrition it is increasingly having a serious effect on Iraq. ECGD's exports have also been deteriorating with claims up to pounds 15 million either paid or under examination and a further pounds 30 million potential losses reported. In addition, some contracts have been attributably

/cancelled

cancelled by the Iraqis where the contractor has been unable to provide financing facilities. No Western credit insurer (except possibly Austria) is currently prepared to offer support for medium credits to Iraq (indeed many are off-cover even for cash business). Finally, to grant credit would be incompatible with our decision to adopt a more rigorous ECGD approach to country underwriting, and would lead to criticism from other countries forced to follow the UK lead.

In Favour of Extending Credit

Commercial

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/b.

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/with a

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/Saudi

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From Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to Chancellor of the Exchequer

FCO OFFICIAL WILL ADVISE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY THE FOLLOWING

1. The deadline is a real one. Iraqi officials arrive on 1 October and will be looking for indication of credit being offered.
2. There is a genuine risk that if one is unsatisfactory they may suggest cancellation.

/therefore,

therefore,

3. Support pounds 250 million for five years. The Foreign Secretary will not see his officials' advice until tomorrow. Treasury officials are likely to advise the Chancellor not to go beyond pounds 100 million.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

DA

9/10

The answer to the question
you asked about the Gulf States
to which we have given informal
assurances is :-

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

U.A.E.

In each case our commitment
is to "consult" if they are
threatened.

FERB

All save Kuwait!

2.8.

Thankyou. MB.

covering SECRET



From the Secretary of the Cabinet

Mr Colles

The Prime Minister
will wish to see
the attached note
by the Chairman
of the JIC.

RA

1/2 Yes, this
is what
we can do
about (3)

28. iii save
work.
out.

Pine Murtis

Jf 0665

CABINET OFFICE
A 6661
 28 JUL 83
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
 FILE No. _____

29/7

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

RA

cc Mr Goodall
Mr Wright (FCO)
DGI

*Thank you
mb.*

JIC ASSESSMENTS

1. I think I should draw your attention to two assessments issued by the JIC today.

Armenian Terrorism

2. Warnings about the increased danger from Armenian terrorists were of course issued as soon as Bedros was convicted on 23 July. The JIC assessment, however, is intended to emphasise that there is a real threat of attack on British targets by a terrorist organisation which has shewn itself to be, on the whole, more ruthless and more effective than any other - except perhaps the PIRA.

The Threat to Shipping in the Persian Gulf

3. After considerable discussion we have reached the uncomfortable conclusions that:

- (a) the danger of Iraqi attacks on international shipping in the Gulf has increased;
- (b) there is some danger that Iran might take military action against individual targets in other Gulf States (to certain of which the UK has given informal defence assurances); *which?*
- (c) Iran might seek to threaten shipping in the Straits of Hormuz - although it could not effectively close the Straits; and the United States have already implicitly recognised the threat by their statement yesterday that they would act to preserve the freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

*Bahrain
Oman
Qatar
UAE*

4. You may wish to send a copy of this to Mr Coles.

Anthony Duff
ANTONY DUFF

28 July 1983.



CHINA

A

CHINA

CHINA

28 JUL 1983

11 12 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10

Faint, illegible markings or text in the bottom left corner.

GRS 250
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEHRAN 201230Z JUN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 342 OF 20 JUNE 83
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MODUK (FOR D14)
SAVING TO GULF POSTS, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY OF THE LATE AYATOLLAH HAKIM IN IRAQ LAST MONTH (RUNDLES TELELETTER 050/1 OF 24 MAY) IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED HERE THAT THREE OF HIS SONS AND THREE OF HIS GRANDSONS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. THIS WAS ANNOUNCED BY BAQER HAKIM, ANOTHER OF HIS SONS, WHO IS THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SUPREME ASSEMBLY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAQ. HE SAID THAT THE NEWS OF THE EXECUTIONS HAD BEEN CONVEYED BY AYATOLLAH MOHAMMAD HOSSEIN HAKIM, WHO WITNESSED THEM AND BEEN SENT TO IRAN WITH A LETTER STATING THAT IF THE IRAQI MOJAHEDIN DID NOT STOP THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM THE IRAQI REGIME WOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MUSLIMS IN IRAQ.

2. ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF NO REPORTS ON THE BBC OR IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE EXECUTIONS TOOK PLACE, AS THERE HAVE BEEN MOURNING CEREMONIES HERE. THE NEWS HAS CAUSED A FURORE, AND A SPATE OF MESSAGES OF CONDOLENCE FROM TOP CLERGYMEN INCLUDING KHOMEINI HIMSELF. IN HIS MESSAGE HE LIKENED THE BA'ATH PARTY TO A PREDATORY BRUTE AND SAID THAT SADDAM WAS A MURDERER AND SO MAD THAT HE WOULD NOT STOP AT ANY LIMIT OR HONOUR ANY AGREEMENT. THE IRANIAN NATION WOULD NEVER YIELD TO THE DISHONOUR OF MAKING PEACE WITH HIM.

3. THIS EPISODE WILL ~~NOT~~ SET BACK ANY CHANCES OF LESSENING KHOMEINI'S OBIDURACY OVER CONTINUING THE WAR.

FCO PASS SAVING GULF POSTS, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

BARRINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED
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MR EGERTON
MR THOMAS
MR HAYES
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

IRAN/IRAQ

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

107

cc FO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 June, 1983

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to acknowledge receipt of the letter received via your Embassy from Shaikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghitah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference, about the Iraq/Iran war. I have drawn its contents to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Her Majesty's Government remain ready to do all they can to bring a peaceful end to the war.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Dr. Wahbi Abdul-Razaq Fattah Al-Qaraghuli

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 June 1983

Type letter pl.

AL 10/6.

Dear Idan,

Tim Flesher wrote to Roger Bone on 2 June enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from Shaikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghitah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference on the Iraq/Iran war.

The Popular Islamic Conference was held in Baghdad on 14-17 April and resulted in resolutions and other measures calling for an end to the war. It was more an Iraqi propaganda exercise than a serious attempt to end the war, and the letter from Shaikh Ali (a pro-Baathist Shi'a Mullah based on Najaf) was no doubt written with the knowledge and encouragement of the Iraqi Government (it was on Iraqi Embassy writing paper).

In the circumstances it would not be appropriate for the Prime Minister to reply. It might be easiest for you to send an acknowledgement through the Iraqi Embassy. I enclose a draft.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DSF 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Private Secretary (No 10)

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: His Excellency
Dr Wahbi al-Qaraghuli
Ambassador of Iraq
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
21 Queen's Gate
LONDON SW7 5JG

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to acknowledge receipt of the letter received via your Embassy from Shaikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghitah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference, about the Iraq/Iran war. I have drawn its contents to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CAVEAT.....

Her Majesty P

This government remain ready to do all they can to bring a peaceful end to the war.

[Signature]
10.
6

Enclosures—flag(s).....

1 KUP
Waji / 1 ran Nels.
Pt. 3

10 JUN 1983



✓
2 June 1983

We spoke about the attached message which the Prime Minister has received from Sheikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghatah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

TIM FLESHER

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

dg

SUBJECT
ce MASTER
ops

01-884 7141-6



EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No: T75A/83

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP
PRIME MINISTER, FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY AND MINISTER FOR
THE CIVIL SERVICE ,

I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT MY COMPLIMENTS TO YOU PERSONALLY ,
AND ALSO EXPRESS MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR GREAT COUNTRY.

AS ALL HUMAN COMMUNITIES AND RELIGIONS SHOULD ADOPT THE
VALUES OF GOOD, LOVE, AND PEACE; THOSE WHO POSSESS THE
MEANS AND POWER ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CHECKING EVIL WHEN IT
PREVAILS.

THEREFORE, I AM CALLING UPON YOU IN MY CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POPULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HELD IN
BAGHDAD, IRAQ, WHICH IN TURN REPRESENTS THE WILL OF ALL
MUSLIMS, TO ASSUME THAT RESPONSIBILITY AND USE THE AUTHORITY
OF YOUR COUNTRY AS MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO PUTTING AN END TO THE BLOODY
IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT, AND AVOID THE EFFECT SUCH A WAR
WOULD HAVE ON OVERALL WORLD PEACE.

I WOULD LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE POPULAR ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE HAS NOT SPARED AN EFFORT IN ATTEMPTING TO
PERSUADE THE IRANIAN SIDE OF RESORTING TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND REFERRING TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,
OR BENDING AN EAR TO THE VOICE OF MAN'S CONSCIENCE AND THE
DICTATES OF HEAVEN AS TO THE RELATION THAT BINDS MAN TO MAN
AND ONE SOCIETY TO ANOTHER.

**EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ**21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

-2-

HOWEVER, EVERY PEACE EFFORT MADE HAS REGRETTABLY FAILED BECAUSE OF IRAN'S INSISTANCE TO REJECT GOOD OFFICES AIMING TO END THE GULF WAR.

THE POPULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAS REACHED A CONCLUSION TO THE EFFECT THAT IN ORDER TO SECURE PEACE AND DECLARE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF IRAQ AND IRAN, YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SUPER POWERS THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL , TO ADOPT MANDATORY RESOLUTIONS FOR STOPPING THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR, INSTEAD OF THE UNBINDING RECOMMENDATIONS UNANIMOUSLY ISSUED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE, ACCORDING TO ARTICLES (41) AND (42) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

YOU WOULD APPRECIATE THAT BY SO DOING YOU WOULD PERFORM A GLOBAL AS WELL AS A HUMAN DUTY. YOU WOULD ALSO PROMOTE THE VALUES OF LOVE AND PEACE, AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND RANK OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WAS SET UP ORIGINALLY TO DEAL WITH SUCH MATTERS AND CONSOLIDATE PEACE.

WITH THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SHEIKH ALI KASHIF AL-GHATAH
PRESIDENT OF THE POPLULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
IRAQ - HOLY NAJAF

01-584 7141-6



AKD 3-6

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

27th May, 1983.

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

B2/6

Dear Mr. Private Secretary,

I should be grateful if you would convey the
enclosed letter to the Prime Minister.

With best regards,

Yours Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Wahbi Al-Qaraguli'.

Wahbi Al-Qaraguli
Ambassador

DD JEDDA (DESKBY 011500Z)
DD RIYADH (DESKBY 011500Z)
OO KUWAIT
OO ABU DHABI
OO BAHRAIN
OO DOHA
OO BAGHDAD
OO TEHRAN
GRS 395



CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011500Z (JEDDA, RIYADH)
FM D O T 011327Z MAY 83

TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER OTTER U/N OF 1 MAY

AND TO RIYADH,

INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA BAGHDAD TEHRAN.

FROM MARTIN OT5.

YOUR TEL NO 205: HMG HELP WITH OIL SLICK.

1. I HAVE CONSULTED REAR ADMIRAL STACEY, AND WE CAN CONFIRM THAT HMG FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE AT ONCE ON A NON-COMMERCIAL BASIS TO ASSIST SAUDIS IN RESPECT OF FOLLOWING ITEMS:

- A) LABORATORY TESTING.
- B) ACCESS TO WARREN SPRING FACILITIES (IN PRACTICE (A) AND (B) ARE PROBABLY THE SAME).
- C) ADVICE FROM FISHERY RESEARCH STATIONS.
- D) ADVICE ON DISPOSAL OF OIL RECOVERED.
- E) INFORMATION AND ADVICE FROM DOT MPCU.

2. ON OTHER POINTS IN SHOPPING LIST:

- (A) WE HAVE NO (NO) AIRCRAFT YET WITH SIDE-LOOKING RADAR. ONLY REMOTE SENSING AVAILABLE IN UK IS INFRA-RED FROM BRITISH AERO-SPACE.
- (B) SAUDIS ARE MORE EXPERT THAN WE AT QUICK AIRLIFTING OF EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI. THIS REQUEST NOT UNDERTOOD.
- (C) WE HAVE STOCKPILES OF VARIOUS PUMPS FOR VARIOUS OIL/WATER

MIXTURES (AS DO BP ETC), AND WILL GLADLY CONSIDER RELEASING SOME ONCE PROBLEM HAS BEEN DEFINED AND EXACT REQUIREMENT IS KNOWN. BUT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THEY CANNOT OBTAIN THIS EQUIPMENT, PLUS ANY OTHER, IN A CONCERTED MANNER FROM ONE OF THE NUMEROUS COMMERCIAL SOURCES.

(FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION).

3. MORE GENERALLY WE ARE SURPRISED AT THIS SUDDEN APPROACH TO HMG. WE ASSUME IT OWES AT LEAST AS MUCH TO A LLOYD FAMILY AS TO A SAUDI GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE. GIVEN RECENT HISTORY OF BP'S OFFER OF HELP ON A SOUND COMMERCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASIS, WE ARE UNIMPRESSED BY SAUDI CLAIM TO BE DISGUSTED BY WESTERN COMPANIES' COMMERCIALISM. GIVEN LONG LEAD TIME, CORMACK VISIT, AND CONTACTS WITH BP, WE ARE PUZZLED BY SUDDEN APPARENT URGENCY. AND OUR EXPERTS, FROM BOTH BP AND MPCU FIND THE DIMENSIONS, LOCATION, NATURE AND INDEED ALMOST EXISTENCE OF SLICK INCREASINGLY MYSTIFYING. WE NOTE THAT DUTCH GOVERNMENT TEAM RETURNED HOME LAST THURSDAY, BAFFLED AND EMPTY-HANDED. BUT WITHOUT OVER REACTING, WE ARE OF COURSE HAPPY TO EARN GOODWILL MEANWHILE WITH OFFER OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS ABOVE.

4. PLEASE DRAW ON PARA'S 1 AND 2 ABOVE AS APPROPRIATE WHEN SPEAKING TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. YOU MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO DISCOVER FROM THEM DIRECT WHAT THEY WANT FROM US.

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND MR. IAN LLOYD, M.P. - SATURDAY 30 APRIL, 1983, 1545 HOURS

PM: Hello Ian.

IL: Prime Minister its very good of you to ring. I now have the information which I think is essential for looking at this problem. If you've got a pen perhaps you'd jot this down. There are two production platforms with several wells discharging large quantities of oil into the Gulf - between 6 and 10 thousand barrells a day.

PM: Two production platforms?

IL: They were fired by rockets and the structures are now completely melted down. The well has not been capped and is not likely to be in the near future. The second is your own question what other governments have been involved. My information is Holland, France, Germany and Norway through their governments have all offered some kind of help, but all on a joint commercial basis. That is the governments would be supplying the equipment via the companies and negotiations have all been about what it is going to cost. In addition this morning a United States company has made an offer, which might conceivably involve the US Coastguard. They consider that a maximum of £10 million worth of equipment could conceivably be required. The British Ambassador has not at the time of my telephoning this morning so far been in touch with the government about this matter. The prevailing weather is presently off the Saudi shores but a change at any moment would affect them

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- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

very seriously because it would affect all their desalination plants. Now their specific requests for help are as follows. They would like if possible access to the Department of Trade stockpiles of equipment, particularly very large capacity pumps, capable of pumping large quantities of sea water and heavily emulsified crude oil. They would be most appreciative of any offers to airlift equipment.

PM: I'll tell you what my information is. It makes me very surprised about this but go on.

IL: They would like if possible any help with aerial surveillance light aircraft.

PM: This is the Saudis?

IL: The Saudi Arabian Government. With a particular type of radar which is known as side-looking airborne radar. They would like if possible to have access to the expertise of our fisheries research stations at Burnham-on-Crouch and Torrey, Aberdeen. They would like similar access to the Warren Springs Laboratory at Stevenage.

PM: Warren Springs, is that ours?

IL: Yes it is. They would like if possible assistance by the Government laboratories in the testing of oil samples. They would like someone to authorise and have direct contract with the Department of Trade's Marine Pollution Control Unit under Admiral Stacey.

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/PM:

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- 3 -

PM: I find this astonishing, because my information is that an expert from the Department of Trade spent two weeks in the Gulf in April to give technical advice to officials of Gulf countries on the oil slick.

IL: Really.

PM: Yes. And his impression was the Gulf States at that time ^{were}/~~not~~ very interested in the numerous offers of assistance which they had received and I have a list of British companies but go on . . .

IL: And all they want is telephone contact so they can get advice.

PM: Under Admiral Stacey?

IL: Yes and finally and hardly worth stating, they would like whatever diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear on Iran and Iraq to allow people to go in and cap the wells.

PM: Well that I think is the real problem.

IL: Yes of course.

PM: That's the real problem. I've ^{got}/~~the~~ Foreign Office onto the Embassy who in fact advise that one of the official secretariats told us that the real problem was political rather than technical. The one that you've just been dealing with. I've got a whole list of British companies that are right to the

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- 4 -

fore in trying to do something. Insofar as they want help from us they can have it. Also incidentally I understand that our Embassy are now in touch with your son Mark. And Nigel Lawson arrives in Riyadh on 2 May and so we obviously can take advantage of that to give any offer of help but in the meantime its very very useful to have this because there's nothing to stop them having access to all of this. We'd be delighted to let them have access to everything we know but I gather the real problem is to get Iran and Iraq to agree to cease fire long enough so the thing can be capped.

IL: Yes I quite agree Prime Minister and until they do so the pollution will continue and will cause grave devastation throughout the Gulf.

PM: Well I'll let Nigel know and the Department of Trade know just exactly what they want Ian, but I think you'll find our Embassy are now in touch with Mark.

IL: Yes, his chap (Mr. ?).

PM: Is your chap secretary to the President of the Saudi Ports Authority?

IL: Yes. And he is the man who has been charged by the King with full authority dealing with the slick and that really is why he's come on to me. And I can only repeat what he said.

PM: Well indeed it might be good to let him know the extent to which we have been making offers but what we didn't know

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/is what

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- 5 -

is what they wanted.

IL: Well I asked him to define the requirements . . .

PM: That's very helpful Ian. Enormously helpful. Now I've got something to bite on.

IL: Thank you very much Prime Minister.

PM: Thank you Ian. Bye.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

The Resident Clerk at the Foreign Office telephoned with the following message about your conversation with Mr. Ian Lloyd, M.P.

H.M. Embassy, Jedda, have advised that the Gulf Co-ordination Council Secretariat have confirmed to them three days ago that the problem was political rather than technical. The Iranians want guarantees that the Iraqis will not attack while repairs are being made and refuse to make any linkage between this issue and the wider one of the ceasefire.. The wells are in Iranian waters and Iran is confident that it can manage technically either through its own resources or by hiring. The Iraqis will not give an undertaking to stop attacking the Iranian oil fields without some assurance that Iran will refrain from attacks on other ports of Iraq. Iraq has offered a safe conduct on condition that Iran submit to UN supervision for the period of the repair - a condition which Iraq knows Iran will reject.

The Gulf Co-ordination Council Secretariat have told the Embassy that the problem of stopping the spillage and clearing it up can only be tackled once there is a political agreement. If such an agreement is reached the countries concerned will be able to choose among a number of technical offers, and the Embassy advise that there is little doubt that they would be prepared to pay for assistance received. British companies are well to the fore. BP/Powell-Dufferin have been trying to set up a pollution control contract with the Saudis, and BP independently have representatives in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar who can offer help if facilities are threatened (a small BP team has been sent to Qatar to talk to officials and have indicated their ability to mount a much larger offer to protect Qatari facilities if necessary). Other British companies have also offered help.

An expert from the Department of Trade spent two weeks in the Gulf in April as part of UN Environment Programme/International Maritime team to give technical advice to officials from Gulf countries on the oil slick. His impression was that the Gulf States were at that time not very interested in the numerous offers of assistance that they had received.

/ The Secretary

The Secretary of State for Energy arrives in Riyadh on 2 May, for talks with the Saudi Minister of Petroleum, Sheik Yamani, and will no doubt be able to take a further opportunity of mentioning the British offers of assistance with the clean-up. Michael Scholar is contacting the Secretary of State's Private Office to make sure that Mr. Lawson knows about this and will raise it as he judges appropriate in Riyadh.

The Embassy are in touch with Mark Lloyd who is Private Secretary to the President of the Saudi Ports Authority.

Hilary

30 April 1983

Michael Scholar rang to say that he has been in touch with the FCO and with John Coles and they think this is the best way to handle the problem as Mr. Lawson will be going to Riyadh next week.

GR 250
RESTRICTED
FM TEHRAN 210930Z APR
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 227 OF 21 APRIL 1983
AND TO GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD.

RESTRICTED DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).

MY TELNO 215 : IRAN/IRAQ/THE GULF.

1. UNCONFIRMED STORIES ARE CIRCULATING IN TEHRAN THAT THE OIL SLICK COULD PROVE MORE OF A DISASTER IN THE GULF FOR IRAN THAN ANYONE WILL SO FAR ADMIT, IN PARTICULAR THAT IRANIAN NAVAL VESSELS, AND TANKERS HOPING TO TAKE OIL OFF FROM KHARG ISLAND, MAY BE RELUCTANT TO GO INTO HEAVILY OIL-POLLUTED WATERS.

2. IN THE MEANTIME THERE SEEMS LITTLE IMMEDIATE HOPE OF POSITIVE PROGRESS IN COMBATING THE OIL LEAKAGE. EBRAHIMI, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IRANIAN COMPANY RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATING THE OFF-SHORE OIL WELLS, SAID ON 21 APRIL THAT ABOUT 10,000 BARRELS OF OIL A DAY WERE LEAKING INTO THE GULF WATERS, AND THIS COULD INCREASE. SO FAR THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE NOWRUZ, ABUZAR AND SORUSH OIL WELLS WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 700 TO 800 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS INCLUDED DAMAGES TO INSTALLATIONS.

3. HE SAID ARAB COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PAY COSTS OF DAMAGE FROM THE OIL SLICK. IRAN WOULD DECIDE IN FUTURE WHETHER IT WOULD RECEIVE COMPENSATION FROM THE IRAQI REGIME AS WAR REPARATIONS OR IN ANOTHER FORM.

4. EBRAHIMI SAID THAT IRANIAN ENGINEERS WERE CAPABLE OF SOLVING THE OIL SLICK PROBLEM PROVIDED IRAQ WOULD NOT THREATEN THEIR SECURITY. THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL OTHER MEMBERS ATTENDING THE MEETINGS IN KUWAIT EXCEPT THE IRAQIS. IRAQI INSISTANCE THAT THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE IRANIANS MENDING THE LEAKS WAS ABSURD. IRAN OWNED SOME FOUR HUNDRED OIL WELLS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WATERS AND HAD APPROPRIATE EXPERIENCE SEMICOLON IRAQ HAD NONE.

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MR HAYES
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

THIS TELEGRAM
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1983

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 20 April.

I enclose letters, signed by the Prime Minister, to the King of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Kuwait and the Emir of Qatar. I should be grateful if you would arrange for their delivery.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SW

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**



for 10/83
efo

SERIAL No. ~~TS/83~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1983

SUBJECT

ccops
Moster

Your Highness.

I am grateful for your letter about the dangers presented by the war between Iran and Iraq and the need to find a way to end the conflict.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by the conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. We are deeply concerned at the continuation of the fighting, and are anxious to see an early end to this distressing conflict.

To this end we have been in close touch with others, including other permanent members of the Security Council, in recent weeks to exchange views and explore ways of encouraging new mediation efforts. It is unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement, including those initiated by the United Nations, have so far proved unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic attempts aimed at ending the war.

In your letter you suggested that it is now time for stronger action by the Security Council under the terms of the United Nations Charter. We have considered this carefully

/and discussed

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and discussed it with others but have concluded that fresh moves by the Security Council at this stage would be unlikely to lead to serious negotiations to end the war, and indeed might have the opposite effect. In our view it is essential that any new initiative by the Security Council must be properly prepared in advance if it is to stand any chance of realising its objective. Iran as well as Iraq must indicate some willingness to respond positively to a call by the Security Council. Action by the Security Council which is ignored by either party to the conflict will do nothing to enhance the Organisation's credibility, and could possibly prejudice its ability to play a constructive and effective role in any future mediation efforts.

We shall remain in close touch with our friends, and with the UN Secretariat, in the days ahead to ensure that any new opportunities likely to contribute to progress are carefully considered. In the meantime, our representative at the United Nations has encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field. This grave threat to the environment must be brought under control very soon and we are hopeful that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a first step, will enhance his prospects for mediating the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely
Rayan Shalita

His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 352/83



10 DOWNING STREET

21 April 1983

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT

cc Ops
Mater

Y
Your Highness.

Thank you for your recent letter about the need to take steps to secure an early end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

We are deeply concerned at the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. It is tragic that these, and the various other attempts to reach a settlement, have so far proved unsuccessful.

As I am sure Mr. Hurd made clear during his recent visit to Kuwait, we are anxious to do all we can to bring this distressing conflict to an end. We are ready to support any new ideas which seem likely to contribute to progress towards a settlement. However, we have some doubts that action by the Security Council will prove effective. Until it is clear that both sides are willing to enter into serious negotiations, I fear that action by the Security Council would serve only to

/prejudice

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prejudice that body's ability to play a constructive role in any future peace-making effort. Similarly, we believe that precipitate action by the UN Secretary-General could jeopardise his future acceptability to both parties, and that it would be unwise to initiate such a move in advance of clear signals from Iran as well as Iraq that mediation efforts by him would be accepted. We have been in close touch with others about this in recent weeks, including other permanent members of the Security Council, and have found no significant dissent from this view.

Nonetheless, we agree that the Secretary-General could have a useful role to play in finding a solution, providing that, in his judgment, the time was right to take an initiative.

We are ready to play our part in any new UN-based initiative at the appropriate time, and we remain in close touch with the UN Secretariat to ensure that they take advantage of any new opportunity which might arise. We shall also continue to talk to our friends and allies about how we can best help. In the meantime we have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field, which presents a growing threat to the environment of the Gulf. It is our earnest hope that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a first step, will enhance his prospects of mediating in the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely
Rajiv Gandhi

His Highness Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al Sabah GCMG

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T50/83



for v.
cfo.

TO DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1983

SUBJECT

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Your Majesty,

I am grateful for your letter about the need to take urgent steps to bring about an early end to the Iran/Iraq war. I know that Mr. Pym was able to discuss this with His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia. He has told me of the great warmth of his reception in your country. I am sure that his visit has further enhanced the excellent relations between our two countries.

I too am deeply concerned at the continuation of the distressing conflict between Iran and Iraq. The enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction already caused by the war are constantly in our minds. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause.

I also share Your Majesty's concern at the lack of progress towards a settlement. It is tragic that the various attempts at mediation have so far proved unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic moves aimed at achieving peace. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. I know that Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council have also striven to find a solution.

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In your letter Your Majesty mentioned that previous Security Council resolutions had failed because they lacked any means of applying pressure on the belligerents, and that any future resolution should indicate the possibility of sanctions against whichever party fails to respond to a ceasefire call. We have considered this very carefully but have come to the conclusion that not only would a Security Council initiative at this stage be unwise but that the additional threat of sanctions would not necessarily have the desired effect.

In our view, the timing of any new initiative by the Security Council will be crucial to its success. We are ready to act when the time is right, but it is essential that before such an initiative is launched there are sound reasons to believe that both sides may be willing to respond positively to a call to observe a ceasefire and begin negotiations. Premature moves by the Council will do nothing to enhance the standing of the United Nations with both parties, and could possibly jeopardise the Organisation's ability to play a constructive and effective role in any future mediation efforts.

In the meantime we are in close touch with the UN Secretariat to encourage them to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise. We have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field in the hope that his involvement in this limited sphere, as a first step, may enhance his position to mediate the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Majesty, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely
Raymond D. White

His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz of
Saudi Arabia

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 April 1983

Type letters please.

A.S.C. 2/4.

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

/ I enclose draft replies from the Prime Minister to the letters
/ from the Amir of Kuwait, the Amir of Qatar and King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia about the Iran/Iraq war. I also enclose the
original letters from Qatar and Saudi Arabia (the latter was enclosed
with your letter of 13 April), a copy of the letter from the Amir
of Kuwait (the original of this was sent to you with my letter of
8 April) and copies of the letter from the Amir of Bahrain and
the Prime Minister's reply to it.

The latest messages are along the same lines as that from the
Amir of Bahrain, urging action by permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council to end the Iran/Iraq war.

Our views on the possibility of a fresh initiative by the
Security Council have not changed since the reply was sent
to the Amir of Bahrain. We have talked since at different levels
to the Americans, Russians and French about this. All share
our reluctance to initiate fresh action in the Security Council
at this stage. And contacts with the Iranians have shown the
strength of their likely reaction to any new UN action. We have
also sought guidance from UKMis New York on how we might use
the UN Machinery; in particular whether a Security Council
Resolution was realistic. The reply from New York confirmed our
view that further action by the Security Council at this stage would
be unlikely to lead to serious negotiations. Our draft replies
take account of this guidance, while reminding addressees that we have
been in touch with other permanent members, as well as
encouraging the Secretary-General to bring the two sides together
to deal with the environmental threat caused by the oil slick.
When the Iranian offensive of 10 April peters out, this may still
prove the most practical first step.

I should be grateful if the replies, once approved by the
Prime Minister, could be sent back to me to arrange onward
transmission.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: LETTER
minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
THE PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

His Highness Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad
Al-Sabah GCMG
Amir of Kuwait

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your recent letter about the need to take steps to secure an early end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

We are deeply concerned at the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. It is tragic that these, and the various other attempts to reach a settlement, have so far proved unsuccessful.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As I am sure Mr Hurd made clear during his recent visit to Kuwait, we are anxious to do all we can to bring this distressing conflict to an end. We are ready

to support any new ideas which seem likely to contribute to progress towards a settlement. However, we have some doubts that action by the Security Council will prove effective. Until it is clear that both sides are willing to enter into serious negotiations, I fear that action by the Security Council would serve only to prejudice that body's ability to play a constructive role in any future peace-making effort. Similarly, we believe that precipitate action by the UN Secretary-General could jeopardise his future acceptability to both parties, and that it would be unwise to initiate such a move in advance of clear signals from Iran as well as Iraq that mediation efforts by him would be accepted. We have been in close touch with others about this in recent weeks, including other permanent members of the Security Council, and have found no significant dissent from this view.

Nonetheless, we agree that the Secretary-General could have a ~~use~~ful role to play in finding a solution, providing that, in his judgment, the time was right to take an initiative.

We ^{are} remain ready to play our part in any new UN-based initiative ^{at the appropriate time} ~~when the time is right~~, and we remain in close touch with the UN Secretariat to ensure that they take advantage of any new opportunity which might arise. We shall also continue to talk to our friends and allies about how we can best help. In the meantime we have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field,

which presents a growing threat to the environment of the Gulf. It is our earnest hope that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a first step, will enhance his prospects of mediating in the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

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unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic attempts aimed at ending the war.

In your letter you suggested that it is now time for stronger action by the Security Council under the terms of the United Nations Charter. We have considered this carefully and discussed it with others but have concluded that fresh moves by the Security Council at this stage would be unlikely to lead to serious negotiations to end the war, and indeed might have the opposite effect. In our view it is essential that any new initiative by the Security Council must be properly prepared in advance if it is to stand any chance of realising its objective. Iran as well as Iraq must indicate some willingness to respond positively to a call by the Security Council. Action by the Security Council which is ignored by either party to the conflict will do nothing to enhance the Organisation's credibility, and could possibly prejudice its ability to play a constructive and effective role in any future mediation efforts.

We shall remain in close touch with our friends, and with the UN Secretariat, in the days ahead to ensure that any new opportunities likely to contribute to progress are carefully considered. In the meantime, our representative at the United Nations has encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field. This grave threat to the environment must be brought under control very soon and we are hopeful that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a

first step, will enhance his prospects for mediating the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

MR 20/4.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I am grateful ~~to you~~ for your letter about the need to take urgent steps to bring about an early end to the Iran/Iraq war. I know that Mr Pym was able to discuss this with His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia. ~~He~~ He has ~~incidentally~~ told me of the great warmth of his reception in your country. I ~~hope~~ ^{am sure} ~~that you will share~~ ^{this} my view that ~~the~~ visit has further enhanced the excellent relations between our two countries.

CAVEAT.....

I too am deeply concerned at the continuation of ~~this~~ ^{between Iran and Iraq.} distressing conflict. The enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction already caused by the war are constantly in our minds. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Your Majesty

I also share ~~your~~ ^L concern at the lack of progress towards a settlement. It is tragic that the various attempts at mediation have so far proved unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic

/moves

moves aimed at achieving peace. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. I know that Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have also striven to find a solution, ~~but these efforts too have met with no success yet.~~

In your letter Your Majesty mentioned that previous Security Council resolutions had failed because they lacked any means of applying pressure on the belligerents, and that any future resolution should indicate the possibility of sanctions against whichever party fails to respond to a ceasefire call. We have considered this very carefully but have come to the conclusion that not only would a Security Council initiative at this stage be unwise but that the additional threat of sanctions would not necessarily have the desired effect.

In our view, the timing of any new initiative by the Security Council will be crucial to its success. We are ready to act when the time is right, but it is essential that before such an initiative is launched there are sound reasons to believe that both sides may be willing to respond positively to a call to observe a ceasefire and begin negotiations. Premature moves by the Council will do nothing to enhance the standing of the United Nations with both parties, and could possibly jeopardise the Organisation's ability to play a constructive and effective role in any

/future

future mediation efforts.

In the meantime we are in close touch with the UN Secretariat to encourage them to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise. We have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field in the hope that his involvement in this limited sphere, as a first step, may enhance his position to mediate the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Majesty, the assurances of my highest consideration.

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/MR HURD
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MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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RR DOHA (ACTIONED)

RR MUSCAT

RR DUBAI (ACTIONED)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 131021Z APRIL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 131500Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 13 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT, DUBAI.

GULF OIL SPILL.

1. THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MFA HAS TELEPHONED TO INFORM US THAT IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE UAE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLUGGING THE IRANIAN OIL LEAK, WHICH IT PROPOSES TO DO BY DESPATCHING TWO VESSELS CARRYING THE NECESSARY EXPERTS. HE SAID THAT THE UAE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE JOB ON, FOR FEAR THAT THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY PROVIDED BY IRAQ AND IRAN WOULD BREAK DOWN, BUT HAD AGREED TO DO IT WHEN AN EARLIER PROPOSAL INVOLVING SAUDI ARABIA HAD FOUNDERED ON IRANIAN OBJECTIONS.

2. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABDUL RAHMAN AL JARWAN SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY DIRECT CONSULTATIONS, NOT THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE UN, AND THAT THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY WOULD CONSIST OF SIGNED UNDERTAKINGS BY IRAN AND IRAQ NOT TO INDULGE IN WARLIKE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA IN QUESTION.

WALKER

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. TUSA/83

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن

SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

Subject on Saudi Arabia : visit of
Saudi Ambassador
cc Mr. Opi

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP,
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I present to you my greetings and sincere compliments and it gives me great pleasure to address this letter to you in view of the belief and eagerness of all of us to co-operate in preserving world security and peace as an undivided whole, which cannot be separated into individual areas. This mutual concept dictates that stability in the Gulf area is the concern of the international community as much as it is the concern of the states of that region, where their common interests converge. It is our belief that such interests cannot conceivably continue and develop while security and stability are not being enjoyed in our area.

We are, Your Excellency, together with the other leaders of the Council for Co-operation of the Arab Gulf States, watching with grave anxiety the present developments in our area caused by the continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran which is increasingly worsening the state of

peace/.....

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peace and security in this area and which requires an all out international effort to put an end to this war which has already lasted nearly three years without any indication of any imminent solution, but becoming rather more ferocious day by day. It is now not only endangering the states of the area, but in fact posing a direct threat to world peace which is violating the principles of the United Nations Organisation and its charter.

Since the outbreak of that war, we have made unceasing efforts together with the other leaders of the Council for Gulf Co-operation in supporting the good offices carried out by the Islamic Conference Organisation, the non-aligned states movement and the United Nations as well as bilateral contacts made by friendly nations in their search for a way out leading to the ending of this war. However, all these efforts have failed up till now to produce a result which would enable the two parties concerned to cease fire and to start negotiations for a settlement of the conflict by peaceful means. This necessitates making united efforts and resorting to more effective means than

have/.....

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have been applied previously. Undoubtedly, you share with us our appreciation of the gravity of the implications which might possibly lead to the extension of the area of conflict. Since the outcome of the prevailing situation cannot be predicted, we are confident that Your Excellency shares our view that the dangers of this situation now necessitate more than ever before that member states of the Security Council should carry out their special responsibility specified by the charter to preserve international peace and security, to put an end to this ruinous war and to ensure the execution of previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council which asked both parties to cease fire and to enter into peaceful negotiations aimed at arriving at a satisfactory solution which would secure the interests of both parties within a framework of international guarantees.

The said resolutions adopted by the Security Council were never implemented because they lacked any means of pressure upon the two belligerent states. Therefore, you may consider that the present developments require that the next Security Council resolution to be expected on this issue should contain some weight which would induce the

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two warring parties to end hostilities such as a stipulation in that resolution to impose - or at least a threat to impose - sanctions against the party which does not respond to the cease fire call and does not observe the terms of other resolutions.

In this connection, we are confident that the efforts made by your country under your wise leadership will have great significance in expediting the end of this catastrophic war, because of our conviction that you share our view that the continuation of the war and the extension of its threat would result in great damage not only to the states of the area but also, going beyond that, would affect the interests of your own country.

We greatly appreciate the important role now being played by your country as a permanent member of the Security Council and the international weight and prestige carried by your country which impose on you grave responsibilities towards world peace. Therefore, we are confident that your sincere efforts would find their way towards success in achieving that peace.

We/.....

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We look forward to hearing in the near future from Your Excellency the results of such efforts, and trust that our good relations will continue to progress and prosper.

(Signed)

Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz
King of Saudi Arabia.

12th April, 1983.



سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن

SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

م١٩٨٣/٤/١٢

صاحبة الدولة السيدة ماجريت تاتشر

رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة

اطيب تحياتي مع اصدق التمنيات .

وبعد يطيب لي ان اتوجه اليكم برسالتي هذه انطلاقا من ايماننا وحرصنا على التعاون من اجل الحفاظ على الامن والسلم الدوليين باعتبارهما كل لا يتجزء ولا يمكن فصلهما من منطقة الى اخرى ،وانطلاقا من هذا المفهوم المشترك فان استقرار منطقة الخليج يهـم دول المنطقة بقدر ما يهـم الاسرة الدولية من حيث التقاء المصالح المشتركة بينها، تلك المصالح التي لا يمكن تصور استمرارها ونموها حسب اعتقادنا دون ان تنعم منطقتنا بالامن والاستقرار .

اننا يا صاحبة الدولة . نراقب بقلق بالغ مع قادة مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية التطورات الراهنة في منطقتنا بسبب استمرار الحرب الدائرة بين العراق وايران التي تشكل مزيدا من تدهور الامن والسلام في هذه المنطقة الامر الذي يتطلب تضافر الجهود الدولية لوضع حد لهذه الحرب التي مضى عليها قرابة ثلاثة اعوام . دون ظهور اى دلائل تشير الى قرب ايجاد حل لها وهي تزداد حدة يوما بعد يوم وباتت تهدد ليس دول المنطقة فحسب بل تشكل تهديدا مباشرا للسلام العالمي وبما يتنافى مع ميثاق ومبادئ الامم المتحدة .

يا صاحبة الدولة ،

اننا ومنذ اندلاع تلك الحرب لم تتوقف جهودنا مع قادة مجلس التعاون الخليجي في دعم المساعي الحميدة التي تقوم بها منظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ودول حركة عدم الانحياز والامم المتحدة وكذلك دعم الاتصالات الثنائية التي تقوم بها الدول الصديقة للبحث عن مخرج لانهاء هذه الحرب ،غير ان هذه الجهود لم تتوصل لحد الان الى نتيجة تمكن الطرفين من وقف اطلاق النار وبدء المفاوضات لحل النزاع بالطرق السلمية ،مما يستتبع بالضرورة - تكاتف الجهود واللجوء الى وسائل اكثر فاعلية وتأثيرا مما اتبع في السابق خصوصا

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لندن

SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

وانتم تدركون معنا خطورة المضاعفات التي تترتب على احتمال اتساع رقعة النزاع طالما ان الموقف السائد في الوقت الحاضر لا يمكن التكهن به ولذلك فاننا على ثقة من ان دولتكم تشاركوننا الراى بان مخاطر هذا الوضع اصحت تتطلب اكثر من اى وقت مضى . ضرورة اضطلاع الدول الاعضاء في مجلس الامن بمسؤولياتها الخاصة بموجب الميثاق تجاه صيانة وحفظ السلام والامن الدوليين ،وممارسة كافة الوسائل التي كفلها لها الميثاق من اجل وضع حد لهذة الحرب المدمرة وتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الامن التي طالبت طرفي النزاع بوقف اطلاق النار والدخول في مفاوضات سلمية والوصول الى الحل الذي يكفل مصالح الطرفين في اطار التعهدات الدولية .

ان تلك القرارات التي صدرت عن مجلس الامن لم توضع موضع التنفيذ لانها جاءت خالية من اى شكل من اشكال الضغط على الدولتين المتحاربتين ،ومن ثم فقد ترون ان تطور الامور يقتضي ان يتضمن القرار المنتظر صدوره من مجلس الامن في هذا الصدد ثقلا يوءدى الى تجاوب طرفي الحرب لوقف الاعمال العدائية وذلك من خلال النص في القرار على فرض عقوبات او التهديد بفرضها على الاقل على الطرف الذي لا يستجيب لايقاف اطلاق النار وتنفيذ بنود القرارات الاخرى .

وفي هذا المجال فاننا على يقين بان الجهود التي ستبذل من قبل بلدكم بقيادتكم الحكيمة ستكون لها اهميتها البالغة في المساعدة على التعجيل في وضع حد لهذة الحرب المدمرة ، انطلاقا من قناعتنا بانكم تشاركوننا الراى بان استمرار هذة الحرب واتساع دائرته ---مخاطرها سوف يعودان بالضرر البالغ ليس على دول المنطقة فحسب وانما ستتعدى ذلك للمساس بمصلحة بلادكم . اننا نقدر الدور الكبير الذي يلعبه بلدكم بصفته عضوا في مجلس الامن ،وبما لبلدكم من ثقل دولي ووزن عالمي تقع على عاتقه مسؤوليات جسام تجاه السلام العالمي ،فاننا لعلى ثقة بان جهودكم المخلصة سوف تجد طريقها للنجاح تجاه تحقيق السلام ،متطلعا الى ان اسمع من فخامتكم نتائج هذة الجهود في المستقبل القريب .

فهد بن عبدالعزيز

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

To note Emir of Kuwait's
message, pending further
advice from Mr. Pym.

8 April 1983

A.J.C. 11/4

John Dehn

Iran/Iraq: Message from the
Amir of Kuwait

I enclose a message from Sahikh Jabir al Ahmed al Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, which has been delivered to us by Mr Rashid al Rashid, PUS at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for onward transmission to the Prime Minister.

Copies of this message (which is similar to those already received from the Amirs of Bahrain and Qatar) are being sent to the five Permanent Members of the Security Council.

In handing over the message, Mr Rashid al Rashid said that Kuwait envisaged a new initiative by the UN Secretary General under Article 99 of the Charter, the ground having been carefully prepared in advance with the Permanent Members. He would visit Tehran and Baghdad and report back to the Security Council. It would then be up to the Permanent Members to ensure that progress was made.

Mr Pym will be discussing what more we can do to try to end the Iran/Iraq war during his visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and we shall submit a draft reply to the Amir's message after his return.

Yours ever
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.43^A/83

cc Minister
yjs

From Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah

To Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Your Excellency,

It is doubtless that your excellency share with us the realization of the continued and devastating tragedy caused by the continuation of the bleeding armed conflict between Iran and Iraq for these two neighbouring countries and their peoples. The serious menace and harm created by the breakout and continuation of this conflict, not only for the states of this vital area of the world, but also for the maintenance of international peace and security, are too evident to be elaborated.

While joining the whole world in its deep regret for the lack of success of any of the several efforts made so far by various states and international bodies to put an end to this dangerous conflict and find a just solution to all pending questions between the two combating countries, we believe that the international community, represented by the U.N., should not cease for a single moment its efforts to terminate this tragedy which is daily causing great numbers of victims from both peoples. Indeed if the U.N. failed in this domain, it would thus fail to fulfil the essence of its existence and the justification for its continuation, namely the preservation of peace and the promulgation of mutual understanding and cooperation amongst brothers in humanity.

To be more specific, we in Kuwait do not believe that the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, have exhausted all available ways and means in their attempt to find an appropriate solution to stop this destructive war. The efforts made by the U.N. including the Security Council resolutions and the Secretary

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



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General's mediation efforts are highly appreciated. But speaking with frankness made imperative by our deep feelings of, and immediate proximity to, this problem, nevertheless, we believe that these efforts are not sufficient and there is more to be done by the Security Council which bears special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as stipulated by the charter.

Accordingly, your excellency, we call upon the Security Council to intensify its efforts and to commence without any delay its direct and continuous tackling of this conflict with the aim of reaching ^{an} ~~the~~ adequate formula to end it. In this endeavour the Security Council should spare none of the practical measures that are within the mandate vested in it by the charter. In this respect we refer to the special responsibilities shouldered by the permanent members of the Security Council. In our opinion the situation in this area no longer requires further resolutions that are merely content with appeals and the display of good will. It is high time to move into what is more positive and effective. Only this we believe would preserve for the U.N. its dignity and justifies the confidence in its viability by all peoples.

Finally, your excellency, we are certain that the entire world will share with Kuwait the due expression of appreciation for the special attention given by the permanent members of the Security Council and for the urgent measures they undertake towards this matter.

Please accept, your excellency, our most sincere wishes coupled with our highest esteem and consideration.

(Sgd.)

Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah
Amir of Kuwait

30th. March, 1983

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



من جابر الاحمد الصباح

الى سعادة السيدة مرغريت تاتشر رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة •

يا صاحبة السعادة ،

ما لا شك فيه انكم تشاركوننا الادراك بما يمثله استمرار الصراع المسلح الدامي بين ايران والعراق من مأساة مستمرة ومدمرة بالنسبة للبلدين الجارين وشعبيهما • وانه لغني عن البيان ما سببه نشوب واستمرار هذا الصراع من تهديد وضرر خطيرين لا بالنسبة لدول هذه المنطقة الحيوية من العالم فحسب بل وبالنسبة لاستتباب الامن والسلام الدوليين •

وفي الوقت الذي نشارك فيه العالم اجمع الاسف الشديد لعدم نجاح اي من المساعي المتعددة التي بذلت حتى الان من قبل مختلف الدول والمنظمات الدولية من اجل وضع حد لهذا الصراع الخطير وايجاد حل عادل للمشاكل العالقة بين البلدين المتحاربين فاننا نعتقد ان على المجتمع الدولي ، ممثلا بمنظمة الامم المتحدة ، ان لا يتوقف للحظة واحدة عن مواصلة العمل لايقاف هذه المأساة الدامية التي تذهب ضحيتها اعداد كبيرة من ابناء الشعبين كل يوم • فاذا ما فشلت الامم المتحدة في هذا المجال فانها تكون بذلك قد عجزت عن القيام بجوهر وجودها ومبرر استمرارها وهو الحفاظ على السلام وانشاعة التفاهم والتعاون بين الاخوة في الانسانية •

ومشكل اكثر تحديدا فاننا في الكويت لا نعتقد بان الامم المتحدة وبالذات مجلس الامن الدولي قد استنفدت كل سبلها ووسائلها في السعي لايجاد الحل المناسب لايقاف هذه الحرب المدمرة • فمع تقديرنا للجهود التي بذلتها الامم المتحدة بما فيها القرارات التي صدرت حتى الان عن مجلس الامن وجهود الوساطة التي بذلت من قبل الامين العام للمنظمة فاننا ، وبصراحة يحتملها احساسنا العميق وملاستنا المباشرة لهذه المشكلة ، نرى بان ما بذل حتى الان ليس بكاف وان هناك المزيد مما يمكن عمله من قبل مجلس الامن الذي حملته ميثاق المنظمة المسؤولية المباشرة في الحفاظ

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



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على الامن والسلام الدوليين • ولذا فاننا نشاهد مجلس الامن ان يكثف من جهوده وان يياشر دون اى ابطاء بمجابهة هذا الصراع والعمل بشكل متواصل من اجل التوصل الى الصيغة المناسبة لايقافه مهما تطلب ذلك من اجراءات تدخل ضمن الصلاحيات التي اوكلها الميثاق للمجلس • ونشير هنا الى المسؤوليات الخاصة التي تتحملها الدول ذات المقاعد الدائمة في المجلس في هذا المجال • ونحن نرى بان الموقف في هذه المنطقة لم يعد بحاجة الى المزيد من القرارات التي تكثفي بمجرد المناشدة وابرار حسن النوايا ، بل ان الوقت قد اصبح مناسباً للانتقال الى ما هو اكثر ايجابية وفاعلية ، الامر الذي من شأنه ان يحفظ للامم المتحدة كرامتها ويبرر الثقة بجدواها من قبل جميع الشعوب •

وانه لمن المؤكد ان العالم اجمع سيشارك الكويت في ابداء التقدير لما توليه الدول ذات المقاعد الدائمة في مجلس الامن من اهتمام خاص وما تتخذه من اجراءات عاجلة تجاه موضوع هذه الرسالة •

وتقبلي يا صاحبة السعادة ، اخلص تمنياتنا مقرونة بفائق التقدير •

جابر الاحمد الصباح

امير الكويت

الكويت في : ١٥ جمادى الآخرة ١٤٠٣ هـ

الموافق : ٣٠ مارس ١٩٨٣ م

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 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 062205Z APR 83
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 225 OF 6 APRIL
 INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN
 INFO PARIS, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, AMMAN, JEDDA, BAHRAIN, DOHA,
 ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

mt

MY TELNO 219: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AS REPORTED IN TELECON HUMFREY/HENDERSON, CORDOVEZ HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ENCOURAGED BY THE RESPONSE FROM THE TWO PARTIES TO FLY TO KUWAIT TO SEE IF HE CAN NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT ON DEALING WITH THE OIL SPILL.
2. ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARIAT THE IRANIANS TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT THEY DID NOT WANT A FORMAL CEASEFIRE, BUT WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME ARRANGEMENT (PRESUMABLY INVOLVING A DE FACTO LOCAL CEASEFIRE) THAT WOULD MAKE THE OPERATION POSSIBLE. TWO PROBLEMS WHICH CORDOVEZ STILL NEEDED TO TACKLE WERE THE SUPERVISION OF ANY AGREEMENT AND THE FORM WHICH THE AGREEMENT MIGHT TAKE. THE IRAQIS WERE PRESSING FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT BUT THIS WAS ANATHEMA TO IRAN. (ACCORDING TO THE US MISSION, WHEN THE KUWAITIS FIRST ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INTERVENE THEY ASKED HIM TO DO SO WITHOUT RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.)
3. WHEN HE LEFT CORDOVEZ WAS PLANNING TO STAY IN KUWAIT FOR ONLY 24 HOURS BEFORE GOING ON TO GENEVA (FOR HIS NEXT ROUND OF TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN).

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 MR HAYES
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FM JEDDAH 051035Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 175 OF 5TH APRIL.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, DOT (OT5), PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 219: IRAN/IRAQ (NOT TO D.O.T.).

1. THE BRITISH COMPANY WHICH CORDOVEZ MENTIONED AS A CANDIDATE TO WORK ON THE OIL SLICK IS PROBABLY THE BP/POWELL DUFFRYN CONSORTIUM. THIS HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR SOME TIME WITH THE SAUDIS FOR A PERMANENT CONTRACT FOR ANTI-POLLUTION WORK, AND THINKS IT IS LIKELY TO WIN THE CONTRACT. IT HAS RECENTLY SUBMITTED AN OFFER TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT SLICK AND I HAVE, AT ITS REQUEST, SENT A LETTER TO THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE (PRINCE SULTAN, MINISTER OF DEFENCE, CURIOUSLY ENOUGH) SUPPORTING THE BID.

2. GETTING THE PRESENT JOB WOULD NO DOUBT HELP TOWARDS WINNING THE PERMANENT CONTRACT. THERE IS, I UNDERSTAND, AMERICAN COMPETITION. ANYTHING UKMIS NY COULD DO TO PROMOTE THE CONSORTIUM'S INTEREST WOULD BE WELNCOME. D.O.T. (OT5) HAVE THE DETAILS.

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cc Mr. Jackling

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MR. COLES

Prime Minister.

IRAN/IRAQ

One of the many troubles in dealing with Arabs is that they are never satisfied. Having expressed their pleasure at our reception of the Arab League Delegation and the subsequent passage on the Middle East in the Brussels communique, they are now bringing pressure to bear on us to take an initiative in the Security Council on the Iran/Iraq war. Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait are leading the field: the Iraqis have joined in, and I feel that it is only a matter of time before the Saudis and others enter the act - the Foreign Secretary's forthcoming visit to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia will provide the opportunity.

It is ironical that it was the Arabs, led by Iraq, who blocked the Security Council from meeting for several days following the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. Now that Iraq is feeling the weight of military pressure, the Arabs have had a change of heart about the Council - provided that someone else takes the initiative.

Admittedly, the Gulf Arabs have every reason to feel apprehensive. First, they face the reality of having to shore up Iraq with money in order to enable her to continue to fight the war. Secondly, they face the spectre of an Iraqi defeat leading to the establishment in Baghdad of an Iraqi Shi'a regime. This would cause major convulsions all down the Gulf.

Obviously, it would be in our interests for the war to end with neither side having defeated the other. The trouble is that there is absolutely nothing that we or anyone else can do to influence Iran. They know that they are in no danger of defeat and will carry on the war for as long as it suits them. They are impervious to outside pressure.

Hence, if we were to take an initiative, it would be to please the Arabs, not in any hope of achieving results. Against this background, I am against our exposing ourselves too much. The French may well do so since they have come out more or less openly on the Iraqi side. If they or others in the Security Council decided to take an initiative, we could probably go along, provided that the wording of

/any resolution

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
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any resolution was right. But we still have important interests in Iran and we should not lose sight of the fact that any initiative in the Security Council will be seen by the Iranians as a hostile act. Choosing sides between Arabs and Persians, traditionally deadly enemies, has been a tricky business for centuries.

My advice, therefore, is that we should continue to avoid making this choice. We should keep a reasonably low profile, while maintaining an attitude of friendly concern in our talks with the Arabs. Not very heroic perhaps, but the best course for British interests.

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000



A.D. PARSONS
30 March 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

MR. COLES ✓ A.F.C. 28.3

THE SHIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

If the Prime Minister has any time to read anything over the Easter Recess, she might be interested in the attached paper. It has been written by a close friend of mine who is a considerable expert on the Eastern Arab world and in particular on the Shia Sect. He prepared it for the Board of a Bank for which he works. It is one of the most lucid background papers which I have seen on the position of the Shia in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. I entirely agree with his conclusions.



A.D. PARSONS
23 March 1983

The Shi'a and the Persian Gulf

THE VICTIMS OF INJUSTICE

Unlike "orthodox" or Sunnite Islam, Shi'ism was born in adversity and defeat. It has its hierarchy of martyrs, and the historical defeat has become a theological triumph through suffering. In this and in other respects, as several Western observers have noted, it bears a certain resemblance to Christianity. In Iraq during the Second World War I was allowed to visit the Shi'ite Holy Cities, Kerbala and Najaf, and to take part in Shi'ite ceremonial there ; and I was often impressed by the element of atonement in popular Shi'ite belief, an element which is quite foreign to orthodox Islam. To the Shi'a of Iraq Hussein, the martyr of Kerbala, "died to save us all."

2. Equally, I have no doubt that there is a special connection, within the Islamic context, between Shi'ism and radical, indeed revolutionary thought. Those set in authority over the Shi'a have certainly taken this view : they have almost always employed the instruments of oppression, or at least practised discrimination against them, with the result that the Shi'a have come to see themselves as permanent victims of tyranny and injustice. This feature is so marked that one often feels that it has become part of their faith, that they are only happy when they are wronged, and that if they are not suffering from real injustice, they will feel the need to parade their historic wrongs or to invent new ones. However, they do not often have cause to exercise their imagination : the injustice or discrimination is usually real enough, for it is the standard conviction of Sunnite rulers that the proper medicine for Shi'ite turbulence and mendacity is repression. Thus we have the vicious circle of discrimination and disaffection. (It should be added that "normal" - i.e. not extreme - Shi'ite political theory does not admit the possibility of anything beyond interim or provisional government until what in Western terms might be described as the Second Coming).

DISTRIBUTION

3. Shi'ite minorities are to be found all over the Muslim world - there have been several cases of trouble recently in Pakistan for example. The deprived and long-suffering inhabitants of South Lebanon are mainly Shi'a ; some of the troubles of eastern Turkey are Shi'ite in origin ; and in Syria an extreme minority sect of Shi'ites holds precarious and violent sway over a Sunnite majority. But it is in the Persian Gulf in particular that the Shi'a constitute a political problem and may one day cause political upset.

4. In Iran the majority are Shi'a and Shi'ism has been the "official" religion since the sixteenth century. At present it is in a revolutionary phase, and this is exciting Shi'ites elsewhere in the region. Iraq has a Shi'ite majority (a large one if the Kurds are excluded from the reckoning), contains four Shi'ite holy cities or shrines, and in the southern parts adjacent to the Gulf is exclusively Shi'a. But it is (as it almost always has been) ruled by a Sunnite minority. The eastern province of Saudi Arabia was originally mainly Shi'ite ; but many of the Shi'a were slaughtered or expelled by waves of Wahhabi incursion, beginning at the end of the eighteenth century. There is now a minority of perhaps 250,000 who (despite some recent spending in the area) suffer total discrimination, economic, political and religious. Kuwait has at least 25% Shi'a, of various origins (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bahrain), and Bahrain has a Shi'ite majority (?55%), the "original" inhabitants of the country for the most part (some are Persians), with a Sunnite Ruling Family and a Sunnite merchant élite. There are Shi'ite communities (chiefly of Persian origin) in the UAE, Oman and Qatar ; but only in Dubai, and Sharjah (where many are Hyderabadis), are they to be found in significant numbers.

BAHRAIN - THE TEST TUBE

5. It is in Bahrain that the problem can be studied most conveniently, for the state is small, and all the elements of the predicament are clearly present. The ^CUtbi Arabs, led by the present Ruling Family (or rather tribe, they are now so numerous) of Al Khalifa, invaded the island in 1783. The people they found there, and who are still the majority of the population, were Arab or Arabic-speaking Shi'ites. There has since been some immigration from

Iran, both Sunnite and Shi'a. The Iranians laid claim to the island until 1970.

6. The Al Khalifa and their followers naturally acquired all the land and the Shi'ite inhabitants remained the underdogs. Towards the end of the period of British protection (1971) the traditional overt discrimination had become milder ; and even now the rule of Al Khalifa is more humane than anywhere else I know. But in recent years the effective discrimination and the disaffection seem to have been growing : although there are Shi'ites in the government, they do not hold key positions of power, nor do they find it possible to join the Army or the operational branches of the Police (the Government say they do not try). The Shi'a get less than their share of Government handouts ; they are under-represented in educational missions abroad ; and efforts have been made to get foreign concerns to discriminate against them in those areas of skilled employment in which the Shi'a predominate. They protest, usually ineffectively, and are accused of subversion : the only way to deal with them, it is said, is to keep them down. And it has to be said that this policy has worked so far. An efficient security service has uncovered successfully the conspiracies hatched in revolutionary Shi'ite Iran, and on the surface all is peaceful in what most westerners find the most congenial Arab country.

THE CATALYST

7. Yet the rulers of Bahrain are nervous. They talk of propaganda and subversion from Shi'ite Iran, and that is the danger on which public attention - rightly at present - is focussed. An Iranian religious leader spent three years in Bahrain in the late seventies and must be presumed to have done much to intensify Shi'ite opposition to the ruling Al Khalifa ; and it was in Iran, and with Iranian support, that planning and training for the attempted coup of December 1981 took place. But in Bahrain, and I suspect in Saudi Arabia also, the deep fears of the authorities lie elsewhere : their nightmare is a Shi'ite Iraq, for it is with the Arab Shi'a of Iraq that their potential dissidents could most easily make common cause. What are the chances of Shi'ite government in Iraq, and what would be the consequences?

8. Under the four centuries of Ottoman rule which ended with the First World War Iraq was badly governed and made little social or economic progress. Those who wanted education sought it in Istanbul, and very few of them were Shi'ites ; so that when Iraq achieved independence in 1932 nearly all the educated administrators and politicians were Sunnite, though the majority of the Arab population was Shi'a. The Shi'ite tribes of the south were deeply divided (Ottoman rule had exploited their natural divisions) and it was as easy for the Sunnite rulers of Baghdad to exploit them as it had been for their predecessors in Istanbul. Moreover, the more obvious forms of discrimination were removed : in theory at least the Shi'a enjoyed equal opportunities in education, in the Army and the police, and in the ownership of land and water. Twice after the Second World War there was a Shi'ite Prime Minister. Yet the impression that they were being manoeuvred by the old Sunnite elite persisted at any rate up to the revolution of 1958, when the connection between Shi'ism and radical thought (see paragraph 2 above) became immediately apparent.

9. The Iraqi revolution did not long maintain its original direction (if indeed it had one). After some false starts it was taken over by the Ba'ath Party in 1968. The Ba'ath have a secular ideology, but it so happens that all the leading people in the Iraqi Ba'ath are Sunnite. It was widely thought in the early years of the Ba'ath Government that Shi'ite turbulence would overthrow it, particularly since the then Shah of Iran disliked the Ba'ath and had many agents among the Persian Shi'ite residents in the Iraqi holy cities. But this did not happen : the Ba'ath security apparatus was more efficient than the Shah's Savak, the Shi'ite Arabs turned out to be Arabs first and Shi'ites second, and many of them may indeed have thought that the Iraqi Ba'ath were less oppressive, and indeed less "anti-religious", than the Shah himself. The situation was further confused by the Kurdish problem and by the 1975 agreement between the Shah and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

10. The Iranian revolution changed all that. The Baghdad Government could no longer feel secure against militant Shi'ism ; and one of the motives of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in autumn 1970 must have been to be rid of that danger. During the Iraq/Iran war it has often looked as though Iraq has backed nationalism (south-western Iran is or was inhabited by Arabs) and Iran has backed religious sectarianism. So far both gambles have failed : the (mainly Shi'ite) Iraqi army has not, it seems, deserted en masse to the enemy, any more than the Arab masses of Khuzistan welcomed their Iraqi liberators.

11. But the war cannot go on for ever. Iraq cannot win it : Iran may. An Iranian victory would have grave consequences for the whole of the Gulf, and I need not discuss those here. But there is a serious political danger which might well arise even if the Iranians do not achieve a military victory. One way in which the war might end is in the fall of one of the two régimes ; and the more brittle is probably the Iraqi. What people in the Gulf fear (or hope for) is the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein and his replacement by a régime dominated by the Shi'a and allied to Khomeini's Iran and perhaps also to Assad's Syria. This would be very dangerous whilst it lasted (I do not think it would last long); this would be the catalyst for subversion in Bahrain (and perhaps also in Kuwait) ; and this would bring Saudi intervention in Bahrain. The fat would be in the fire.

12. Saddam Hussein has lasted well. Arab friends of mine who have met him have been favourably impressed despite themselves. He is not without Shi'ite support, and his security still seems unusually efficient. But I have noticed recently that his Gulf friends are no longer confident of his survival. It would be prudent to assume that the conspiracies against him will succeed before too long. What then?

now
about 50%
of the
population

13. I do not know enough about Iraq these days to guess where the power would lie if Saddam were overthrown. A still secular Ba'ath which would make peace at least with Syria and if possible Iran? An Arab nationalist military régime? Perhaps, and perhaps best so. But I cannot suppose that the Iraqi Shi'a have changed. They hate the Tekritis (whence most of the present Ba'ath), they despise the Gulf Arabs, and above all they hate the Saudis ("son of a dog" was the normal Shi'ite description of King Abdul Aziz). Like the Irish, they have long memories : in 1801/2 the Wahhabis plundered the Holy City of Kerbala. The Shi'ites think (and so do I) that they would do it again if they could. So the chances are that an Iraqi régime which had come to terms with Iran would turn to mischief in the Gulf.

14. At all events a Shi'ite régime in Iraq would immediately lift the morale of the Shi'a of the Gulf. Even in Dubai (where I write this) there would be some excitement. The resentment is strong, just under the surface. It could break through as minority resentment did in Northern Ireland nearly fifteen years ago. The Sunnites might however console themselves with the thought that there is something politically enervating in Shi'ism, that the very history and mythology of the Shi'a would be, I am tempted to say, tarnished by success. We may find that a factor something like this will operate eventually in Iran.

15. The parallel with Northern Ireland should not be pushed too far. Apart from other differences, the Shi'a of the Gulf would not find much "liberal" sympathy among the ruling Sunnites. It is difficult to predict the likelihood and extent of the danger : my purpose in writing this short paper is simply to note that the danger is real and that we may be in for a rough ride in the Gulf during the next few years.

1 March 1983.

SUBJECT

CC FCO

JR.



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 33/83

10 DOWNING STREET

cc master
ops

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1983

Your Highness.

I am grateful for your letter about the urgent need to take steps to secure an early end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers.

It is very unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement have so far proved unsuccessful. I am not sure how much influence we can realistically bring to bear, but we are willing to support any effort, including through the Security Council, which offers hope of bringing an early and negotiated settlement to the conflict. During his brief visit to your country on 23 March, Mr. Pym will be happy to

/ explore

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explore in detail how in practice the international community might work to end the present conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifah, GCMG

IRAQ



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

Type letter.

A.S.C. 17/2

Dear John,

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Bahrain's letter of 28 February about the Iran/Iraq war, which was enclosed with my own letter of 15 March.

The Gulf States, including Bahrain, floated a proposal at the 7 - 10 March Non-Aligned Summit calling for a ceasefire, a pull-back to pre-war boundaries, a UN peace-keeping force and a possible ban on arms supplies to any state which rejected the ceasefire. The Iraqis added further elaboration by suggesting the establishment of a Non-Aligned Movement Committee to make recommendations about ending the war and sanctions against any belligerent which flouted its recommendations. Neither proposal was acceptable to Iran, which wants a clear condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor and down-payment of US\$50 billion before agreeing to a ceasefire.

There is little we can do to end the war, but we need to be responsive to Bahrain's concerns. We already help the Bahrainis with their internal security arrangements, which proved effective in suppressing an attempted coup in December 1981 by Iranian-trained dissidents. If mediation does work, it will be because Iran recognises she has more to gain from a negotiated settlement than by continuation of the war. The Algerians are still active and other channels are available. Public pressure from the United Nations will merely cause Iran to dig in its heels. The draft reply is an attempt to preserve our even-handed approach to the problem while showing suitable concern over Bahrain's anxieties. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be able to expand on this during his planned two-hour stopover in Bahrain on 23 March on his way to the EC/ASEAN meeting in Bangkok.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teletype~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

HH Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Your Highness,

CAVEAT.....

I am grateful for your letter about the urgent need to take steps to secure an early end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, ^{the} grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers.

It is very unfortunate that

Unfortunately, the various attempts to reach a settlement have, so far, proved unsuccessful. I am not sure how much influence we can realistically bring to bear, but we are willing to support any effort, including through the Security Council, which offers hope of bringing an

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/early and

early and negotiated settlement to the conflict. During his brief visit to your country on 23 March, Mr Pym will be happy to explore in detail how in practice the international community might work to end the present conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Handwritten signature]
17.
3

16 MAR 1963

16 MAR 1963



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1983

Prime Minister

not
To note message from the
Amir of Bahrain. We shall let
you have a reply.

A.J.C. 15/3.

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq: Message from the Amir of Bahrain

I enclose a message from Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifah, the Amir of Bahrain, which has been delivered to us by the Bahraini Ambassador for onward transmission to the Prime Minister.

The Ambassador said that similar messages have been sent to the Americans and the French, although he did not know whether the message had been sent to the Russians or Chinese.

The Ambassador implied that the message had the support of the other members of the GCC. When asked, he said that he did not know whether the message related to anything said at the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi.

I will write again with any further comments, together with a draft reply, shortly.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 22A/83

CC MASTER
OPS

28th February 1983

H E the Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England
United Kingdom

Madam Prime Minister

We feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with us that the international peace and security of the world is entirely integrated and that one region cannot be isolated from another in this respect. Security, as you are certainly aware, is indivisible. Accordingly, the stability of the Gulf region is as important to the other States of the world as it is to the States of that region by virtue of the many important mutual interests involved. Such mutual interests cannot be preserved and developed unless the States of the region are able to enjoy peace and security, and this peace and security has become seriously threatened by the continuation for approximately the last three years of the war between Iraq and Iran.

Peace cannot be maintained in the Gulf unless an end is put to this war. Hostilities have recently intensified and it has become the urgent duty of all States to discover a more effective means to secure peace than those previously sought by the United Nations, in particular through the Security Council, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, and by certain friendly States.

The continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran will generate serious instability in the Gulf region. As long as the current situation remains unpredictable this war will jeopardise both the regional and individual safety of the States of the region and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Moreover, it will prejudice international peace and security contrary to the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Your Excellency, it is not unknown to you that the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have made considerable efforts to find a means to end the Iraq-Iran war, and to arrest the consequent wastage and drain of human and financial resources. We have however, been unable to date to find a way to ensure that the two parties will cease hostilities and will enter into negotiations to solve their dispute by peaceful means.

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



Page 2

The States which comprise the United Nations Security Council bear a special responsibility under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Charter prescribes the measures to be taken whenever such international peace and security is threatened. We consider that the States of the Security Council have not yet done their utmost to secure an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

We write to urge you to give further consideration to the possibility of applying the measures contained in the United Nations Charter, in the strongly held belief that the application of such measures will bring an end to a war which has exhausted both countries, destroyed their economic structures and undermined the stability of the entire Gulf region.

We look forward to learning of your views in this connection, and remain confident that you will take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Gulf region.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Isa bin Sulman

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

CONFIDENTIAL

Tracy
3

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS ←

In your minute of 10 March to the Prime Minister about last week's JIC business, you referred to a Ministry of Defence estimate that the Iraqis have suffered about 200,000 casualties (killed, wounded and taken prisoner) in the war with Iran. You will see from the Prime Minister's marginal comment on your minute (attached) that she believes that we should query this estimate. You may like to provide a further comment.

A. J. Wiles

I queried the estimate vigorously at the meeting. We discussed it for about 1/4 hour.

14 March 1983

All the agencies, including stuck to their guns. I will get them to look again but doubt whether they will change it.

M. Cole
A.J.C. 15/3

CONFIDENTIAL

15/3

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

SUBJECT

cc M. A. S.
ops

TRANSLATION



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T29A/83

Madam Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Britain and Northern Ireland,
London.

Madam Prime Minister,

As we all know, it is an established fact that world peace and security are integral, and that their disturbance in any part of the world affects all other areas. In view of the fact that nations of the world are linked in common major interests to the states of the Gulf region, peace and security in this particular region are of concern not only to its countries but to all countries. It is not possible for these interests to be maintained and developed except by preserving peace and security in this region which is threatened by the gravest dangers of the continuing Iran/Iraq war, now in its third year.

The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, the Islamic Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned countries and some friendly states have all tried to end this war. These attempts have not only been inconclusive, but the war has intensified.

Your Excellency are aware that the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have, in turn, devoted great efforts to find a way out of this war and to put an end to its consequent horrible bloodshed and destruction of huge material and human resources. The outcome of those attempts, likewise, has not brought us nearer to a ceasefire or possible negotiations between the two parties concerned to settle their conflict by peaceful means.

In the face of this serious situation, it has become the duty of all of us to seek means other than those already probed, in order to preserve stability and guarantee freedom of navigation in the Gulf and safeguard the security of its states to which world peace and security are strongly linked.

It is my firm belief that Your Excellency would agree with me that the continuation of this war, and the possible expansion of



- 2 -

its scope, threaten with a world war that would expose mankind to annihilation. The U.N. Charter has placed a special responsibility on the five permanent member countries of the Security Council regarding maintaining world peace and security. Frankness requires me to convey to you that we feel, as far as the Iran/Iraq war is concerned, the five countries have not made all the efforts that conform with that responsibility. It is our view that the time has come to launch greater efforts based on mandatory effective means which are provided for in the U.N. Charter when world peace and security are endangered.

Madam Prime Minister,

We are confident that you fully realize the gravity of the situation resulting from the Iran/Iraq war. In fact, if continued, this war would lead to the most disastrous consequences not only for the two belligerent parties or the whole region but for the world at large. It is, therefore, our greatest hope that the possible application of the means prescribed by the U.N. Charter for such circumstances would receive your careful consideration. However, I am confident that you will do your utmost, under the Charter, to help bring peace in our region.

While looking forward to receiving your views in this respect, please accept, Madam Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL-THANI
AMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR

Doha on Saturday 12th March 1983
(27th Jamad Awwal 1403 Hijri).

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



صاحبة الفخامة السيدة مارجرت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة وشمال أيرلندا
لندن

صاحبة الفخامة ،

من المسلمات ، كما نعلم جميعا ، أن السلام والأمن الدوليين كل لا يتجزأ ، وأن اضطرابهما في منطقة ما في العالم تتأثر به سائر المناطق الأخرى . ونظرا لارتباط دول العالم بمصالح كبرى مشتركة مع دول منطقة الخليج ، فإن السلام والأمن في هذه المنطقة ، بوجه خاص ، لا يهتمان دولها فحسب ، بل يهتمان دول العالم كافة . وليس في الامكان الحفاظ على هذه المصالح وتنميتها الا بصون السلام والأمن في هذه المنطقة التي أصبحت تتهددها أجسام الأخطار بسبب استمرار الحرب الدائرة بين العراق وايران منذ ثلاث سنوات تقريبا .

لقد بذلت الأمم المتحدة وبخاصة مجلس الأمن ، ومنظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ، ودول عدم الانحياز ، وبعض الدول الصديقة ، بذل كل من هؤلاء جهودا من أجل انهاء هذه الحرب . ولكن هذه الجهود لم تؤد الى أي نتيجة ، بل أن الحرب ازدادت حدتها .

وتعلمين فخامتكم أن دول مجلس التعاون العربية في الخليج ، بدورها ، كرست جهدا كبيرا للبحث عن مخرج لانهاء هذه الحرب ولوضع حد لما تؤدي اليه من نزيف دموي مروع واهدار لطاقات مادية وبشرية ضخمة ، الا أن ذلك الجهد ، هو الآخر ، لم يؤد حتى الآن الى أي نتيجة من شأنها أن تؤدي الى وقف اطلاق النار وامكان بدء المفاوضات بين الطرفين لحل خلافهما بالطرق السلمية .

وازاء هذا الوضع الخطير ، أصبح لزاما علينا جميعا أن نبحث عن وسائل وأساليب غير تلك التي سبق اتباعها ، صونا للاستقرار في الخليج ، وضمانا لحريية الملاحة فيه ، وحفاظا على سلامة وأمن دوله ، اللذين يرتهن بهما السلام والأمن الدوليان .

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٢ -

ويقيني أن فخامتكم تتفقين معي على أن استمرار هذه الحرب ، وما يمكن أن يستتبعه من اتساع نطاقها ، يهدد باشتعال حرب عالمية تعرض البشرية للفناء . ولقد وضع ميثاق الأمم المتحدة على عاتق الدول الخمس الأعضاء الدائمين في مجلس الأمن مسئولية خاصة بشأن الحفاظ على الأمن والسلم الدوليين . ويقتضيني واجب الصراحة أن أفضى اليك بأننا نشعر بأن الدول الخمس لم تبذل كل الجهد الذي يتفق وهذه المسئولية من أجل وضع حد للحرب بين العراق وايران . واننا لنرى أن الوقت قد آن لبذل جهد أكبر يقوم على ما يقرره ميثاق الأمم المتحدة من وسائل فعالة واجبة الاتباع عندما يهدد الخطر الأمن والسلام العالميين .

صاحبة الفخامة

اننا لعلى ثقة من أنك تقدرين كل التقدير خطورة الموقف الناجم عن الحرب العراقية الايرانية ، تلك الحرب التي دفعت بالمنطقة الى وضع يؤدي استمراره الى أوخم العواقب بالنسبة للطرفين المتحاربين ، والمنطقة بأسرها ، بل والعالم أجمع . ولذلك فأكبر الرجاء أن تولي النظر في موضوع تطبيق الوسائل التي يقرها ميثاق الأمم المتحدة في مثل هذه الظروف كل ما يستحقه من اعتبار واهتمام . وعلى أي حال ، فيقيني أنك ستبذلين قصارى جهدك من أجل استتباب السلام في منطقتنا ، وفقا للميثاق .

وانى ان أتطلع لتلقى رد منك أقف منه على رأيك في هذا الصدد ، أرجو أن تقبلنى ، يا صاحبة الفخامة ، فائق التقدير والاحترام .

خليفة بن حمد آل ثاني

أمير دولة قطر

الدوحة ، فى يوم السبت ١٢ مارس ١٩٨٣ م
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MR. COLES

JIC BUSINESS

There was a heavy agenda at today's JIC. The following are subjects of particular interest:-

i. Zimbabwe

The paper in front of the JIC was overtaken by the news of Nkomo's flight to Botswana. A fresh paper is being prepared which will be circulated separately from the Red Book on 11 March. It will reveal amongst other things that the 5th Brigade has been more or less out of control in Matabeleland and that civilian casualties have been higher than originally estimated. However, Mugabe is now making efforts to restrain 5th Brigade. The paper will also deal with the probable effect of Nkomo's departure from the country on the internal political situation. The general feeling of the Committee was that it would make things easier for Mugabe; that a number of Nkomo's followers might now try to do a deal with ZANU; and that his departure would probably accelerate Zimbabwe's slide towards being a one party African state on the classical model.

ii. Iraq

I do not suggest that the Prime Minister need read in full the longish and quite useful piece about the internal situation in Iraq. What struck me most forcibly was the Ministry of Defence estimate that the Iraqis have suffered about 200,000 casualties (killed, wounded and taken prisoner) in the war with Iran. This represents about 10% of the adult male population - the equivalent of well over a million casualties in Britain. It is remarkable that this has not already had a greater effect on civilian and military morale in Iraq.

I think we should query the estimate

iii. South Africa


The Red Book will contain a brief and watered-down summary of a paper which is being circulated separately about South African destabilisation of neighbouring African countries. This is stark evidence of the divergence

/between

between South African and Western interests. As the South Africans see it, if your neighbours are implacably opposed to your system of government and cannot be won round, it is better to render them economically weak and politically helpless. As I see it, this policy simply leads to opening the door to extremism and eventual Russian/Cuban penetration.

iv. Belize/Guatemala

The JIC have done a useful piece on warning time for Guatemalan incursions or even a Guatemalan invasion of Belize. There is no need to study the paper in detail, but the Prime Minister should be aware that this piece of contingency planning has been done.



A.D. PARSONS
10 March 1983

SUBJECT

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T 22A/83

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 22A/83

cc master
AP5

28th February 1983

H E the Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England
United Kingdom

Madam Prime Minister

We feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with us that the international peace and security of the world is entirely integrated and that one region cannot be isolated from another in this respect. Security, as you are certainly aware, is indivisible. Accordingly, the stability of the Gulf region is as important to the other States of the world as it is to the States of that region by virtue of the many important mutual interests involved. Such mutual interests cannot be preserved and developed unless the States of the region are able to enjoy peace and security, and this peace and security has become seriously threatened by the continuation for approximately the last three years of the war between Iraq and Iran.

Peace cannot be maintained in the Gulf unless an end is put to this war. Hostilities have recently intensified and it has become the urgent duty of all States to discover a more effective means to secure peace than those previously sought by the United Nations, in particular through the Security Council, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, and by certain friendly States.

The continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran will generate serious instability in the Gulf region. As long as the current situation remains unpredictable this war will jeopardise both the regional and individual safety of the States of the region and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Moreover, it will prejudice international peace and security contrary to the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Your Excellency, it is not unknown to you that the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have made considerable efforts to find a means to end the Iraq-Iran war, and to arrest the consequent wastage and drain of human and financial resources. We have however, been unable to date to find a way to ensure that the two parties will cease hostilities and will enter into negotiations to solve their dispute by peaceful means.

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



Page 2


The States which comprise the United Nations Security Council bear a special responsibility under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Charter prescribes the measures to be taken whenever such international peace and security is threatened. We consider that the States of the Security Council have not yet done their utmost to secure an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

We write to urge you to give further consideration to the possibility of applying the measures contained in the United Nations Charter, in the strongly held belief that the application of such measures will bring an end to a war which has exhausted both countries, destroyed their economic structures and undermined the stability of the entire Gulf region.

We look forward to learning of your views in this connection, and remain confident that you will take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Gulf region.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,


Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

Iraq 2

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FM FCO 081850Z FEBRUARY 1983
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 8 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN,
DAMASCUS

YOUR TEL 92: IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

1. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN BACKGROUND LATEST REPORTS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION CONFIRM THAT IRANIANS HAVE RECAPTURED 260 SQUARE KILOMETRES OF IRANIAN TERRITORY PREVIOUSLY HELD BY IRAQ AND TWO IRAQI BORDER POSTS (TEHRAN TELNO 75 REFERS). THIS REPRESENTS AN ADVANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 10 KILOMETRES ALONG A 30 KILOMETRE FRONT. AN IRAQI BATTALION (APPROXIMATELY 800 MEN) HAS BEEN COMPLETELY OVERRUN, WHICH SUGGESTS A QUICK IRANIAN ADVANCE.

2. THE ADVANCE HAS NOW STOPPED, EITHER FOR REGROUPING OR BECAUSE OF RESISTANCE BY THE IRAQIS. THE MAIN IRANIAN FORCES NORTH OF FAKEH HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMMITTED BUT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN REINFORCED. ALTHOUGH THE MAIN BATTLE HAS YET TO COME, THE RECAPTURE OF IRAQI-HELD TERRITORY IS ALREADY A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL GAIN FOR THE IRANIANS. ALL FIGHTING SO FAR IN THIS

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ROUND HAS BEEN ON IRANIAN TERRITORY.

3. YOU SHOULD NOT SEEK ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH KITTANI EARLIER THAN NECESSARY. WE SHOULD PREFER TO SEE HOW THE FIGHTING DEVELOPS BEFORE REPLYING AND TO FRAME OUR REPLY IN THE LIGHT OF ANY VIEWS EXPRESSED BY ALLIES (THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSULTATION, E.G. AT THE MIDDLE EAST WORKING GROUP, LATER THIS WEEK). IN THE MEANTIME IF IRAQIS RETURN TO THE CHARGE YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IF AND WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS THE LATEST ROUND OF FIGHTING WE WOULD HOPE TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF PREVIOUS DRAFTS (I.E. CALLING FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS AN END TO HOSTILITIES). YOU COULD ADD AT YOUR DISCRETION THAT THE IRAQIS WILL PRESUMABLY NOT WISH ANY ACTION AT THE UN SO LONG AS THE MAIN IRANIAN GAINS SEEM TO BE RECOVERY OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ANY ACTION BY THE UN SHOULD NOT BE INEFFECTIVE AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS AND LIKELY MERELY TO DIMINISH THE ORGANISATION'S STANDING.

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BACKGROUND

State of War

Both sides have about 100,000 troops each deployed to the West of Dezful. At 9 p.m. local time on 6 February, 7 brigades of Revolutionary Guards (15,000 men), plus one regular Iranian infantry brigade, attacked Iraqi positions situated almost 35 miles due east of Al Amara. By end of 7 January, Iranians had recaptured 260 square kilometres of Iranian territory previously held by Iraq, and two Iraqi border posts. This represents an advance of approximately 10 kilometres along a 30 kilometre front.

The advance has now stopped either for regrouping or because of resistance by Iraqis. The main Iranian force of 8 regular brigades, plus Revolutionary Guards (70,000 men) north of Fakeh, has not yet been committed. They have recently been reinforced by one air-borne brigade from the Basra region.

Iraq has claimed to have killed 7,000 Iranians. A captured Iranian doctor confirmed over 50% casualties in his unit, but we have no firm evidence. One Iraqi batallion and an artillery unit (800 men) have been completely overrun which suggests a quick Iranian advance.

Comment: the main battle has yet to come, although recapture of Iraqi-held territory is already a significant political gain for the Iranians.

Advice to British citizens

When the British community working in Basra might have been at risk from earlier Iranian offensives, we have encouraged them to leave the area temporarily for either Baghdad or Kuwait. But we have not yet seen a need to offer similar advice on this occasion. We are monitoring the situation carefully.

Time Limited

(2)

I do not think you had time to read this which was supplied to Question - Time today.

2. My impression is that the latest Iranian attack would be more significant than anything we have seen for a long time.

A.S.C. 9/2

LINE TO TAKE AT PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME ON 8 FEBURARY
IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Have Iranians Attacked?

1. We understand that the Iranians launched an offensive on 6 February towards Iraqi positions at the southern end of the central sector.

Is there any threat to the British Community?

2. There are about 125 British citizens in the Basra and Amara areas. Our Embassy in Baghdad is in close touch with the British community in the war area about what action they should take if their safety is threatened.

Arms Supplies to the Combatants

3. We are neutral in the war and we have not supplied lethal equipment to either side. [If pressed: Sales of defence equipment are subject to customary licensing procedures. Applications are considered on their merits in the light of all relevant circumstances, including our relations with the countries involved and, in this case, our neutrality during the present hostilities. Our over-riding interest is to encourage an early and negotiated settlement]

Conflict as a threat to World Peace

4. The war has been fought largely in the area around the border between Iran and Iraq. We hope that the conflict can be contained. We would view very seriously any threat to the security of a third country or freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

Assistance to our Friends in the Gulf

5. We are in close touch with our friends in the Gulf and with other Arab leaders about developments in the war.

/Mediation

Mediation

6. We have consistently supported attempts by the United Nations and others to secure an end to this conflict. We shall continue to support all efforts aimed at a just and honourable settlement.

West's Role in Mediation

7. We do not see any direct role for eg the Ten to play. We do not have adequate leverage with the main parties.

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FM TEHRAN 071130Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 75 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR D14)

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD.

MY TELNO 73 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. ACCORDING TO FURTHER COMMUNIQES AND REPORTS, THE MAIN ACTION HAS TAKEN PLACE TO THE SOUTH OF FAKKEH. THE IRANIANS CLAIM TO HAVE LIBERATED 250 SQUARE KILOMETRES OF TERRITORY AND TO HAVE ROUTED ONE BRIGADE OF THE IRAQI 14TH DIVISION. THE IRANIAN BORDER POSTS OF SUBALEH, SAFARIEH AND RASHIDEH HAVE BEEN LIBERATED AND THE IRAQI BORDER POSTS OF HAB AND KARAMEH TAKEN. THE SHIB-RASHID ROAD INSIDE IRAQ HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN TAKEN.

2. RAFSANJANI HAS SAID IN THE MAJLES THAT THE IRANIAN TROOPS SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE OFFENSIVE AND FINISH THE WAR AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO WARNED FOREIGN STATES NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WAR WAS AGAIN PROLONGED.

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FM BAGHDAD 071130Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 86 OF 07 FEB 83
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, MODUK (D14)
INFO PRIORITY ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS AMMAN BAHRAIN BEIRUT
CAIRO DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT
MUSCAT RABAT SANAA'S TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS WASHINGTON PARIS
UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW BONN ANKARA MODUK CINC FLEET
STOCKHOLM

TEHRAN TELNO 73:
IRAQ/IRAN

1. RADIO BAGHDAD ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING (7 FEBRUARY) THAT A "HUGE" IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THE MORNING AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IN THE MEISAN SECTOR. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE ATTACK IS THOUGHT TO BE TOWARDS TID, THE BORDER VILLAGE SITUATED TO THE EAST AND SLIGHTLY TO THE SOUTH OF ANARA.
2. THERE IS NO RELIABLE INDICATION YET AS TO THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING. THE IRANIAN ATTACK WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED HERE TO COINCIDE WITH THE IRAQI NATIONAL HOLIDAY 8 FEBRUARY. ON PAST EVIDENCE, ITS LAUNCHING ONE DAY EARLIER MAY HAVE TAKEN THE IRAQIS A LITTLE BY SURPRISE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN LONG AWAITED. IN ITS LATER BROADCASTS, RADIO BAGHDAD HAS CLAIMED THAT SEVERAL SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED, MOST OF THEM SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND THAT IRAQI FORCES HAVE NOT YIELDED ONE INCH OF LAND.

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FM TEHRAN 240530Z JAN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 39 OF 24 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS,
INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, BEIRUT, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD.

MF

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. DURING THE LAST THREE DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BY PROMINENT IRANIAN PERSONALITIES WHICH, TOGETHER WITH THE PRESS COVERAGE THEY HAVE RECEIVED, SUGGEST THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE MAY BE IMMINENT.
2. ALREADY LAST WEEK RAFSANJANI AND OTHERS WERE HINTING THAT A PERIOD OF INACTIVITY BY THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT SOON BE OVER AND THAT THEY WOULD NEED THE GOOD WISHES OF GOD AND THE NATION. ON 22 JANUARY THE PAPERS HEADLINED RAFSANJANI'S FRIDAY PRAYER SPEECH THE PREVIOUS DAY AS AN ULTIMATUM TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT: THEY SHOULD ACCEPT IRANIAN CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE WAR OR FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. THERE WERE A VARIETY OF REPORTS ABOUT THE INSECURITY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S POSITION BASED ON HIS PANICKY-LOOKING VISITS TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, AND A REITERATION OF WARNINGS TO THE GULF STATES NOT TO TEST IRAN'S PATIENCE BY SUPPORTING THE TOTTERING IRAQI REGIME. THERE WERE ALSO SHARP WORDS FOR THE FRENCH AND RUSSIANS FOR STEPPING UP ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ. ALL THIS COULD BE A CALCULATED BLUFF BUT IN THE PAST THIS SORT OF BUILD-UP HAS USUALLY PRECEDED AN IRANIAN ATTACK.
3. A CORROBORATORY SIGN IS THE RECENT DESPATCH OF MANY COMMITTED YOUNGSTERS TO THE VIRTUALLY UNTRAINED BASIJ (UNDERLINED) UNITS AT THE FRONT, WHERE SOME OF THEIR PARENTS AT LEAST FEAR THEY MAY BE USED FOR CANNON FODDER. THE IRANIAN PUBLIC BELIEVE THAT ANOTHER OFFENSIVE IS LIKELY.

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4. MEANWHILE MEDIATION PROSPECTS HAVE BEEN GETTING NOWHERE. THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER DENIED GRATUITOUSLY LAST WEEK THAT ALGERIA WAS MEDIATING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. IRAN'S CONCEPT OF THEIR ROLE IS TO IMPRESS ON OTHERS THE FORCE OF IRANIAN ARGUMENTS. THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR HERE TOLD US ON 20 JANUARY THAT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF MEDIATION, AT ANY RATE FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 772 OF 25 NOVEMBER 82

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI,
DUBAI

INFO SAVING ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO, NEW DELHI, PARIS.

MY TELNO 760 AND MODUK SIGNAL SIC U2G OF 23 NOVEMBER
(NOT TO ALL :

IRAQ ATTACK ON IRANIAN SHIPPING

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT AN IRANIAN TANKER AND THE HOTEL SHIP RAFFAELLO WERE BADLY DAMAGED. THERE IS SOME CONFUSION HERE AS I GATHER THE SHIRVAN WAS THE TANKER REFERRED TO OR IS A CARGO SHIP. IT HAD SOME WEST GERMAN OFFICERS, ONE OF WHOM MAY HAVE BEEN INJURED. THE RAFFAELLO WAS ONE OF TWO PRIZE ITALIAN TOURIST LINERS SOLD TO THE SHAH IN 1978 AS FLOATING HOTELS. IT WAS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED AS A HOSPITAL SHIP AND NORMALLY KEPT IN BUSHEHR PORT. WE ARE TOLD IT WAS CARRYING FEW OR NO PASSENGERS AT THE TIME IT WAS HIT. AN INDIAN CARGO SHIP WAS HIT BUT ONLY SLIGHTLY DAMAGED, AND WENT ON TO DUBAI. THE GERMANS HAVE A REPORT THAT A FOURTH SHIP WAS ALSO HIT.
2. AT A MEETING OF EC HEADS OF MISSION ON 24 NOVEMBER THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AND FRENCH CHARGE BOTH THOUGHT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN USING EXOCETS FROM GAZELLE HELICOPTERS. THE FRENCHMAN SAID THAT ABOUT 25 IRAQI HELICOPTERS HAD ALREADY BEEN SHOT DOWN AROUND KHARG, WHERE THE DEFENCES WERE QUITE STRONG.
3. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WERE NOW 10 TANKERS WAITING AT SIRRI AND FIVE HAD JUST BEEN CALLED FORWARD, ONE OF WHICH WAS ITALIAN. HE HAD REFUSED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS SAFETY, ALTHOUGH SHIPS APPROACHING KHARG ITSELF HAD NOT SO FAR SUFFERED ATTACK. ALTHOUGH SOME COLLEAGUES EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING TANKERS GOING DIRECT INTO KHARG, THE GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT THEY MIGHT WELL NOW HAVE A GO. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE TRYING TO FULFIL THE REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT A NAVAL EXCLUSION ZONE, ONCE CLAIMED, SHOULD BE PROPERLY CONTROLLED.

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4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAST PRACTICE, THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF THE LATEST ATTACKS IN THE IRANIAN MEDIA.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BARRINGTON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

THIS TELEGRAM
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FM MUSCAT 180701Z
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 289 OF 18 NOV 82
RPTD ROUTINE TO KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, JEDDA, ALGIERS,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.

KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO 319 TO FCO: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AT THE UK/OMAN JOINT COMMITTEE TALKS TODAY, MR HURD ASKED YUSUF ALAWI WHETHER THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL SUMMIT HAD MANDATED KUWAIT TO LOOK FOR A NEW SOLUTION TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.
2. YUSUF ALAWI SAID THAT THE GCC HEADS OF STATE HAD AGREED THAT THE BEST HOPE OF BRINGING ABOUT PEACE LAY AT PRESENT WITH THE ALGERIANS. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT KING FAHD SHOULD GO TO ALGERIA ON 21 NOVEMBER AND ENCOURAGE THE ALGERIANS TO MAKE A FURTHER INTENSIVE EFFORT WITH THE IRANIANS, USING THE 1973 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.
3. THIS SUGGESTS, DESPITE THE LINE TAKEN BY THE LOCAL PRESS (PARAGRAPH 5 OF KUWAIT TUR) THAT THE IDEA OF A UN FORCE IS AN ENTIRELY KUWAITI INITIATIVE.

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FROM FCO 091745Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 301 OF 9 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MODUK(DI4)

ROUTINE JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO,
UKREP BRUSSELS.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Prime Minister

Important. The Iranians are
having significant military success.

A-J-C. $\frac{10}{11}$.

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE ON THE STATE OF THE WAR:
IRANIAN OFFENSIVE CODENAMED MOHARRAM, WHICH BEGAN ON
1 NOVEMBER, IN THE MUSIAN REGION IS DEVELOPING INTO A SERIOUS
CLASH. IRANIAN TROOPS HAVE NOW CROSSED THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER
TO A DEPTH OF BETWEEN 7 AND 9 KMS OVER A FRONT WHICH
IS NOW BETWEEN 25 AND 30 KMS BROAD. THIS IS THE WIDEST
IRANIAN PENETRATION INTO IRAQ SINCE THE WAR BEGAN.
THE IRANIANS HAVE BADLY MAULED 2-3 IRAQI BRIGADES AND
WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THEIR CLAIMS OF HAVING TAKEN
3,400 POWS. THE IRAQIS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT WITHDRAWING IN GOOD ORDER.
2. ON 8 NOVEMBER THE IRANIANS BEGAN MOVING TOWARDS
FAKKEH, WEST OF BOSTAN. IF THE IRAQIS CONTINUE
TO FALL BACK FROM THE MUSIAN FRONT THERE IS A DANGER THAT
THE TACTICAL GAINS WHICH THE IRANIANS HAVE MADE COULD DEVELOP
INTO SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS. THE SITUATION IS FLUID AND IT IS
STILL TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE
OF THE REVERSE INFLICTED ON THE IRAQIS. THE IRAQIS HAVE THE MEN
AND EQUIPMENT TO HOLD THE IRANIANS BUT THE BREACHING OF THEIR
SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE COULD BADLY AFFECT THEIR MORALE.

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FM BAGHDAD 021115Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 635 OF 2 OCTOBER, 1982

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN DAMASCUA JEDDA CAIRO

KUWAIT WASHINGTON MOSCOW TEHRAN MODUK (FOR D14)

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

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IRAQ

OUR TELNO 631 (NOW BEING REPEATED TO TEHRAN) AND UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 1564 TO FCO (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. IN THE EVENT THE IRAQIS DID NOT HAVE MUCH LONGER TO WAIT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAMMADI, SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATE LAST NIGHT TO CONFIRM, AS ALREADY REPORTED ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE, THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ATTACKED IRAQI FORCES IN THE AREA OF MANDALI AT 0100 ON 1 OCTOBER AND THAT FIGHTING WAS STILL CONTINUING. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IRAQ'S INTENTION TO CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASKED FOR SUPPORT. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HAMMADI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS BELIEVE THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS LATEST IRANIAN ATTACK WOULD BE TO SEIZE AND HOLD IRAQI TERRITORY. THEY ALSO EXPECT THAT THE ATTACK IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR WILL BE COORDINATED WITH A RENEWED OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH, TOWARDS BASRA OR AMARA.

2. BAGHDAD IS OUTWARDLY CALM BUT AN UNDERCURRENT OF NERVOUSNESS IS DETECTABLE, EVEN IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. MANDALI IS ONLY SOME 112 KMS FROM BAGHDAD AND THIS THE NEAREST THE FIGHTING HAS COME TO THE CAPITAL IN OVER TWO YEARS OF WAR. INITIAL BAGHDAD RADIO CLAIMS THAT THE IRANIAN ATTACK HAD BEEN DEFEATED WERE CONTRADICTED BY SUBSEQUENT BROADCASTS WHICH CONFIRMED THAT FIGHTING WAS STILL IN PROGRESS. AT 11.00 AM LOCAL THIS MORNING, 2 OCTOBER, BAGHDAD RADIO ADMITTED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD NOW ENTERED IRAQI TERRITORY. IF CORRECT THIS MEANS THAT THEY WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DEFEATING SOME IRAQI FORCES REMAINING IN IRANIAN ENCLAVES.

3. IRANIAN FORCES FACING THE IRAQIS IN CENTRAL SECTOR ARE UNDERSTOOD TO CONSIST OF FOUR DIVISIONS PLUS TWO INDEPENDENT BRIGADES AND A BRIGADE OF PARATROOPS SUPPORTED BY TWO LIGHT DIVISIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. THE IRANIAN DIVISIONS CONCERNED ARE THOUGHT TO BE 81 AND 16 ARMoured DIVISIONS, 21 INFANTRY DIVISION AND 28 MECHANISED DIVISION.

4. WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO ATTEMPT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. THIS LATEST ATTACK COULD BE A FEINT. BUT THE AXIS OF THE ATTACK APPEARS INITIALLY TO HAVE TAKEN THE IRAQIS AND SOME OBSERVERS BY SURPRISE SINCE ANY IRANIAN THRUST IN THE IRANIAN SECTOR WAS EXPECTED TO BE ALONG THE AXIS KHANAQIN-BAQUBA. IN ANTICIPATION OF THIS THE IRAQIS HAVE PREPARED FOUR STRONG DEFENSIVE LINES ACROSS THAT AXIS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE CHOSEN TO APPROACH BAQUBA THROUGH MANDALI IN ORDER TO BYPASS THOSE DEFENCES. AN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF THAT ROUTE IS THAT IT OFFERS BETTER GOING FOR ARMOUR.

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5. THERE HAS BEEN NO IRANIAN AIR ACTIVITY OVER BAGHDAD SO FAR AND THE BRITISH COMMUNITY REMAINS CALM. THERE ARE ONLY EIGHT BRITISH SUBJECTS AT BAQUBA, ALL OF WHOM ARE THOUGHT TO BE EMPLOYEES OF TAYLOR WOODROW. WE HAVE ADVISED THE COMPANY'S BAGHDAD OFFICE THAT THEY SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, BE WITHDRAWN TO BAGHDAD ON SOME DEFENSIBLE PRETEXT UNTIL THE MILITARY SITUATION CLEARS. BAGHDAD ITSELF DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO BE THREATENED. I INTEND TO HOLD A MEETING OF COMMUNITY WARDENS AT 5.00 PM LOCAL TOMORROW, 3 OCTOBER. A COMMON FACTOR OF ALL PREVIOUS IRANIAN OFFENCES EG THE CROSSING OF THE KARUN RIVER, IS THAT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE CONTINUED FOR NO MORE THAN THREE OR AT THE MOST FOUR DAYS BEFORE LOGISTIC AND OTHER PRESSURES NECESSITATE REGROUPING AND CONSOLIDATION. THE PATTERN MAY REPEAT ITSELF IN THIS INSTANCE.

FCO PASS SAVING UKDEL NATO

RAMSAY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM WASHINGTON 080049Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2966 OF 7 SEPT 82
INFO BAGHDAD TEHRAN AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT CAIRO
TEL AVIV TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW GULF POSTS.

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IRAN/IRAQ

1. VELIOTES COMMENTED TO LEAHY TODAY THAT THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR MIGHT IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR A POSITIVE ARAB, ESPECIALLY JORDANIAN, RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE. THE IRANIANS APPEARED TO BE PREPARING A NEW OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, BUT THE IRAQI DEFENCES, AIDED BY THE TERRAIN, WERE STRONG AND VELIOTES EXPECTED THEM TO HOLD. THE AMERICANS HAD NO EVIDENCE OF ANY EXTENSIVE IRANIAN REDEPLOYMENT NORTHWARDS, AND DID NOT EXPECT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS THERE.
2. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORRIED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRANIANS, WHO HAD STATIONED F14S AT BUSHIRE, MIGHT RETALIATE FOR RECENT IRAQI AIR RAIDS BY ATTACKING OTHER GULF STATES. THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN

~~STATES. THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN~~
SAUDI ARABIA.

3. LEAHY DESCRIBED THE RECENT IRANIAN INTEREST IN SETTling OUT-
STANDING CIVIL AND MILITARY CLAIMS, MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS RAISED
DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR US AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT WAS STILL SOME
WAY OFF. HE MENTIONED THE IRANIANS' INTEREST IN ACQUIRING WEAPONS.
VELIOTES DID NOT REACT SPECIFICALLY TO THIS POINT, BUT WELCOMED
THE IRANAIN MOVE WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT INDICATE THAT THEY WERE
LOOKING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AFTER THE WAR.
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO STRENGTHEN THE WEST'S ABILITY TO COUNTER
SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN, VELIOTES AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS FACED
PROBLEMS IN DECIDING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT, AND
HAD SO FAR MADE LITTLE HEADWAY IN IRAN.

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10. DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).

FM ANKARA 031200Z AUGUST 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF AUGUST.

REPEATED FOR INFO TO PRIORITY: BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEWYORK, UKDEL NATO, ALGIERS.

SAVING TO ALL OTHER M.E. POSTS.

ANKARA TELNO 203: IRAN/IRAQ

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED TODAY 3 AUGUST ON OKYAYUZ, WHO HAS TAKEN OVER AS HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT AT MFA. HE ASKED ABOUT THE REPLY TO GEN. EVREN'S MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN DELIVERED BY THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER (BAGHDAD TELNO 502).

2. OKYAYUZ SAID THAT THIS HAD STATED THE IRAQI POSITION IN FAMILIAR TERMS, I.E. THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY CEASE-FIRE FORMULA WHICH PRESERVED IRAQI HONOUR (AND HENCE, OKYAYUZ COMMENTED, THE SADDAM HUSSAIN REGIME).

2. THE TURKS REGARD THIS AND THE IRANIAN RESPONSE TO EVREN'S MESSAGES AS ENCOURAGING ENOUGH FOR THEM TO TAKE THE TEXT STEP, WHICH WILL BE A VISIT BY THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO TEHRAN, STARTING ON 5 AUGUST. ULUSU WILL NOT (NOT) TAKE ANY PROPOSALS WITH HIM, BUT HIS PURPOSE WILL BE TO ASK THE IRANIANS, FRANKLY AND AS A BROTHER AND NEIGHBOUR, WHAT THEIR REAL NEGOTIATING DEMANDS ARE. IN PARTICULAR, HE WILL SEEK TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE IRANIANS WILL REDUCE THEIR DEMAND FOR REPARATIONS. HE DOES NOT EXPECT TO SEE KHOMEINI.

3. THE TURKS WILL DECIDE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN RESPONSE, WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH A MEDIATION EFFORT. OKYAYUZ STRESSED THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED NOT TO GET THEIR FINGERS BURNT; THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ISLAMIC GOOD OFFICERS COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY TAUGHT THEM SOME LESSONS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT EXTREME IRANIAN SENSITIVITY TO MEDIATION EFFORTS. ULUSU'S VISIT WILL BE PURELY BILATERAL, ALTHOUGH THE TURKS ARE CONTENT (FOR COVER PURPOSES) FOR THE PRESS TO HINT THAT IT WILL BE IN THE GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE CONTEXT. THEY BELIEVE THE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN JEDDA IN ABOUT TWO WEEK'S TIME, BUT DO NOT EXPECT MUCH FROM THAT.

4. SHORT ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DIRECT RELATION BETWEEN TURKISH AND ALGERIAN ACTIVITIES. OKYAYUZ SAID NOT. THE ALGERIANS WERE WELL PLACED TO MEDIATE, HAVING SCORED SUCCESSES WITH THE 1975 AGREEMENT AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, BUT THE IRANIANS WERE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THEY WERE SHIITE AND THE ALGERIANS SUNNI. SO WERE THE TURKS, BUT THEY WERE AT LEAST SECULAR AND NON-ARAB.

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5. THE TURKS THINK THAT NOW MIGHT BE AS GOOD A TIME AS ANY TO TRY FOR A CEASE-FIRE, SINCE SOME FORM OF MILITARY BALANCE HAS BEEN STRUCK. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIAN GENERAL STAFF MAY BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THEIR POLITICAL MASTERS TO TAKE A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE SLIM PROSPECTS OF DECISIVELY DEFEATING THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES.

6. THE US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT, SHORTLY BEFORE IRAN INVADED IRAQ, THEIR AMBASSADOR HAD ON INSTRUCTIONS URGED EVREN TO INTERVENE TO TRY TO FORESTALL THIS. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE ON TURKEY. WE CANNOT GAUGE THE EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TURKS HAVE CHANGED COURSE. THEY SEE THAT THERE MAY JUST BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE A CEASE-FIRE AND/OR SETTLEMENT, AND IF THERE IS, THEY WILL TAKE IT. BUT THEY WILL TREAD WITH EXTREME CAUTION AND DISCRETION. IN PARTICULAR, PLEASE PROTECT WHAT OKYAYUZ SAID ABOUT ULUSU'S VISIT TO TEHRAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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DESKBY 123800Z

FM BAGHDAD 110945Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 441 OF 11 JULY, 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY TEHRAN AMMAN JEDDA MOSCOW WASHINGTON PARIS CAIRO

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1108 AND MY TELNO 433: IRAQ/IRAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I TRUST WE CAN COME OFF THE FENCE IN GOOD TIME BEFORE ANY VOTE ON A RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO THAT SET OUT IN UKMIS TELNO 1107. TO ABSTAIN WILL BE TANTAMOUNT, IN IRAQI AND MODERATE ARAB EYES, TO A VOTE AGAINST, AND WOULD DO OUR INTERESTS HERE GREAT HARM. I NOTE THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND THE US DELEGATIONS SAID THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH THE WORDING AS OF 9 JULY. DR HAMMADI LEFT HERE FOR NEW YORK ON 10 JULY.

2. THE REASONS WHY MR WHYTE'S INSTRUCTIONS, IN YOUR TELNO 607 TO NEW YORK, NEED URGENT MODIFICATION AS WE APPROACH A VOTE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) IRAN, WHICH COULD HAVE ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN DRAFT RESOLUTION IF IT HAD DEIGNED TO PARTICIPATE, SEEMS TO BE PREPARING INSTEAD TO TURN ITS BACK ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A MOST DANGEROUS PRECEDENT, AS NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) APTLY POINTED OUT (PARA 5 OF UKMIS TUR). "NO MEMBER STATE HAD THE RIGHT TO TELL THE COUNCIL IT HAD NO BUSINESS TO TRY AND STOP A WAR."

(B) FURTHERMORE IRAN HAS NOW MADE SPECIFIC THREATS OF INVASION OF IRAQ (TEHRAN TELNO 418). IF THAT IS ITS ATTITUDE, IT PRESUMABLY DOES NOT (NOT) WORRY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF ITS DISDAIN OF THE COUNCIL AND ITS LEGITIMATE PROCEEDINGS, IN THIS CASE A DISTASTEFUL RESOLUTION.

(C) SINCE THE FALL OF KHORRAMSHAHR ON 25 MAY, IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY AND PUBLICLY HUMILIATED ITSELF TO OBTAIN A CEASEFIRE. WITNESS ITS OFFER OF CEASEFIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL PLUS ARBITRATION ON 10 JUNE (MY TELNO 360) SEMICOLON ITS UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OFFER OF 20 JUNE (MY TELNO 392) SEMICOLON ITS VIRTUALLY COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1975 BOUNDARIES BY 29 JUNE (MY TELNO 413) SEMICOLON AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BOTH UN OBSERVERS TO CHECK THAT WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE (30 JUNE), AND OF A COMMISSION TO DETERMINE WHO WAS THE AGGRESSOR (APRIL). IT IS CLEAR ALSO, AS DR HAMMADI LET FALL WHILE IN DELHI (PARA 4 OF WETHERELL'S TELELETTER TO FINLAYSON OF 7 JULY) THAT IRAQ IS NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSAL FOR THE PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS, IN CONCERT OF COURSE WITH ITS ARAB GULF BANK-ROLLERS.

(D) IRAQ HAS, ARGUABLY, ONLY HELD OUT AGAINST IRANIAN PRECONDITIONS WHICH IMPINGE DIRECTLY ON ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IE WHO RULES IRAQ. THIS MUST BE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO DECIDE, AT LEAST WHEN WE DEBATE THINGS IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM.

(E) NO SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY PRESIDENT SINCLAIR OF GUYANA (UKMIS TELNO 1107) IS PER SE

UNREASONABLE OR UNACCEPTABLE TO US, EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE PHRASE AT THE END OF PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 2 (PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 607 TO UKMIS), WHICH NO DOUBT WOULD BE DROPPED IF MR WHYTE INSISTED. FURTHERMORE, SIR A PARSONS IS ON RECORD AS HAVING TOLD SAHRAF THAT THE SORT OF TEXT THE IRAQIS CONTEMPLATED WOULD CAUSE US NO (NO) PROBLEMS, THOUGH THE IRANIANS WOULD OF COURSE NOT (NOT) ACCEPT IT (PARA 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1049). HIS REMARKS WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY NOTED. WHY THEREFORE SHOULD WE NOW FIND

(PARA 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1049). HIS REMARKS WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY NOTED. WHY THEREFORE SHOULD WE NOW FIND DIFFICULTY WITH SINCLAIR'S DRAFT AS A WHOLE ?

3. ALL THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS WILL APPLY WITH REDOUBLED FORCE IF IRAN ACTUALLY INVADES IRAQ, AS NOW SEEMS LIKELY. THE CONFRONTATION THEN WILL NO LONGER BE IRAQ VERSUS IRAN BUT THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES (GULF MODERATES PLUS JORDAN PLUS EGYPT VERSUS IRAN). THE WAR WILL HAVE ENTERED A NEW AND MUCH MORE SERIOUS PHASE.

4. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I HOPE YOU WILL RECONSIDER THE INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO MR WHYTE IN YOUR TELNO 607 (ESPECIALLY ITS PARA 4) TO UKMIS NEW YORK. AS SIR A PARSONS PREDICTED, VIRTUALLY ANY TEXT WILL BE REJECTED BY IRAN. THAT SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE OUR CRITERION. ANY CHANCE OF BEING ON PUBLIC RECORD IN FAVOUR OF A CEASEFIRE AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME SHOULD SURELY BE SEIZED.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM BAGHDAD 280932Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 490 OF 28/07/82

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4) AND PRIORITY WASHINGTON; KUWAIT; TEHRAN.

SIC U2G

OUR TEL NO 470

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE US INTERESTS SECTION HERE SAY THEY HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE PREPARING TO LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH TOWARDS BASRA. ONE ASSESSMENT, DATED 27 JULY, STATES THAT THE ATTACK CAN BE EXPECTED WITHIN FORTY EIGHT HOURS.

2. THOUGH IT IS PROBABLY AN EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT THE IRANIANS SEEM TO BE PREPARING TO THROW EVERYTHING THEY HAVE GOT INTO THE ATTACK, THE US INTERESTS SECTION CLAIM THAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE ARRIVING IN CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS THE PLANNED DURATION OF THE ATTACK IS SAID TO BE FIVE DAYS. IT IS NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER IT WILL BE ALONG THE SAME AXIS AS PREVIOUS ATTACKS SINCE 13 JULY. AS INDICATED IN PARA 3 OF TUR, THE IRANIANS MAY CHOOSE TO STRIKE SLIGHTLY FURTHER NORTH, ROUGHLY LEVEL WITH AL QURNA, BEFORE TURNING SOUTH TOWARDS BASRA. THERE ARE APPARENTLY NO (NO) SIGNS OF ANY IRANIAN DEPLOYMENTS WHICH MIGHT PRESENT A THREAT OF A DIVERSIONARY ATTACK ELSEWHERE EG IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR. INDEED, IF THE US ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT, MOST OF THE IRANIAN UNITS HITHERTO DEPLOYED IN THAT SECTOR HAVE BEEN MOVED SOUTH.

3. THE IRAQIS DO NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO HAVE MADE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITION OF THEIR FORCES, SO FAR.

4. I SHALL BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER WE HAVE ANY COLLATERAL FROM OUR OWN SOURCES FOR THE ABOVE INFORMATION. HM VICE CONSUL RETURNS THIS EVENING FROM A TWO DAY VISIT TO BASRA AND I SHALL TELEGRAPH DETAILS OF HIS VISIT, INCLUDING A NUMERICAL UPDATE OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, AS SOON AS WE HAVE DEBRIEFED HIM.

RAMSAY

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FM BAGHDAD 210815Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 478 OF 21 JULY, 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE DISTRESS FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4 AND RMT2)

PRIORITY DOT (OT5) TEHRAN AMMAN KUWAIT DAMASCUS CAIRO JEDDA

UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKDEL NATO NEW DELHI BELGRADE

HAVANA

SAVING STOCKHOLM PARIS BONN ALL OTHER ME POSTS (EXCEPT BEIRUT)

IRAQ/IRAN: AIR RAID ON BAGHDAD

1. AT 0629 LOCAL THIS MORNING, 21 JULY, BAGHDAD EXPERIENCED ITS FIRST AIR RAID SINCE OCTOBER 1980. TWO IRANIAN AIRCRAFT MADE A LOW LEVEL RUN OVER THE CITY ALONG A LINE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT - PRESIDENTIAL PALACE - RASHID CAMP. THERE WERE TWO OR THREE LOUD DETONATIONS BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) REPORTS OF ANY DAMAGE TO

PRESIDENTIAL PALACE - RASHID CAMP. THERE WERE TWO OR THREE LOUD
DETONATIONS BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) REPORTS OF ANY DAMAGE SO
FAR.

2. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE WAS HEAVY, THOUGH IT APPEARED BELATED, AND
THE AIRCRAFT APPEAR TO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE CITY'S
OUTER DEFENCES. ONE AIRCRAFT IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN,
FLATTENING TWO HOUSES AS IT CRASHED. THE NAVIGATOR IS REPORTED
TO HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY THE IRAQIS. THE FACT THAT ONE AIRCRAFT
HAD A TWO MAN CREW INDICATES THAT IT WAS A PHANTOM.

3. THIS DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A HIT AND RUN RAID.
THE FLIGHT PATH CHOSEN TOOK THE AIRCRAFT OVER BAGHDAD'S MOST
SENSITIVE AREAS, AND PASSED VERY CLOSE TO THE BRAND NEW NAM
CONFERENCE COMPLEX. AT FIRST SIGHT THE ATTACK APPEARS TO HAVE
HAD THE OBJECTIVES OF:

(A) DEMONSTRATING THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE THE CAPACITY TO RETALIATE
FOR THE RECENT PUNITIVE IRAQI RAIDS ON EG HAMADAN (CF. TEHRAN
TELNO 449) SEMICOLON AND

(B) EXPOSING TO NAM LEADERS BAGHDAD'S CONTINUING VULNERABILITY TO
AIR ATTACK.

IN THE LATTER RESPECT ONE MUST NOW CONCLUDE THAT THE IRANIAN
CAMPAIGN TO ABORT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT HAS BEGUN IN EARNEST.

4. THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, WITH WHOM I AM IN CONSTANT CONTACT,
REMAINS CALM. SEE MY IFT NOT TO ALL ON ADVICE TO TRAVELLERS,
BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHT PLANS, ETC.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

EGERTON

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM AMMAN 201000Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 20 JUL

INFO GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEHRAN, TUNIS, UKMIS
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

SAVING INFO TO ADEN, ALGIERS, ANKARA, EC POSTS, ISLAMABAD, KHARTOUM,
MOSCOW, RABAT, SANAA, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI

YOUR TELNO 199 TO JEDDA: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I WAS ABLE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY EVENING, 19 JULY, AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. IN DESCRIBING THE LINE WE WERE TAKING IN OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE GULF, I FIRMLY INCLUDED POINT 2(B) OF YOUR TUR ABOUT THE DANGERS OF THE WAR SPREADING BUT JUDGED IT BEST NOT TO USE THE OPTIONAL POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 6. THE JORDANIANS DO NOT, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, APPEAR TO BE CONTEMPLATING MILITARY INTERVENTION (MY TELNO 313) BUT I AM SURE THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL HAVE TAKEN THIS PARTICULAR POINT ON BOARD, EVEN THOUGH I MADE IT IN THE MORE GENERALISED CONTEXT OF THE GULF REGION AS A WHOLE.
2. ON THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY IN THE GULF WAR, THE KING SAID HE WAS MUCH REASSURED BY IRAQI SUCCESSES. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE

2. ON THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY IN THE GULF WAR, THE KING SAID HE WAS MUCH REASSURED BY IRAQI SUCCESSES. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE IRAQI FORCES WERE NOW PERFORMING IN A MUCH MORE CONFIDENT WAY AND THAT IRAQI MORALE WAS HIGH. HE HAD NOTED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOW TRYING TO TAKE OUT THE IRANIAN OIL INSTALLATIONS AT KHARG ISLAND. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NEVER UNDERSTOOD WHY THE IRAQIS MADE SO LITTLE ATTEMPT TO DO THIS EARLIER IN THE WAR SINCE HAD HE HIMSELF BEEN IN CHARGE OF THE WAR THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN ONE OF HIS FIRST PRIORITIES. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY BEEN CONCERNED EARLIER ABOUT THE IRAQIS' INABILITY TO MOTIVATE THEIR TROOPS PROPERLY WHEN THEY WERE OCCUPYING IRANIAN TERRITORY. BUT NOW THAT THE IRAQIS WERE FIGHTING TO DEFEND THEIR OWN SOIL THIS QUESTION OF MOTIVATION SEEMED NO LONGER TO BE A PROBLEM. ..

3. WHEN, LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, I MADE REFERENCE TO THE DANGERS OF POLARISATION OF THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR, KING HUSSEIN COMMENTED IMMEDIATELY THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING ON WHICH HE HELD STRONG VIEWS. HE SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, IRAN HAD ALREADY FALLEN INTO THE GRASP OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND REITERATED THAT HE HAD BEEN CONFIRMED IN THIS VIEW DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION. KING HUSSEIN THEN SPOKE TO ME IN IDENTICAL TERMS TO THOSE HE HAD USED EARLIER WITH ALAN URWICK DURING THEIR CONVERSATION AT THE END OF JUNE (AMMAN TELNO 278 PARAS 4 AND 5). THE KING ADDED THAT HE SAW IT AS THE DUTY OF THE WEST TO HELP PRESERVE IRAQ AS A SHIELD AGAINST IRANIAN AND SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO URGE THIS VIEW, IN PARTICULAR, ON THE AMERICANS BUT, AS USUAL, THEY FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE TRUE NATURE OF THE THREAT. NOT ONLY WERE THEY REFUSING TO HELP IRAQ THEMSELVES, BUT THEY WERE USING END-USER CLAUSES IN EARLIER ARMS SALES CONTRACTS TO PREVENT COUNTRIES SUCH AS SOUTH KOREA OR BELGIUM SELLING MUCH-NEEDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ.

4. KING HUSSEIN ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, SAYING HE COULD SEE NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. HE HAD SEEN WALID JUMBLATT (WHO HAS BEEN IN AMMAN VISITING HIS WIFE) ON 18 JULY AND HAD FOUND BOTH DEPRESSED AND UNABLE TO POINT TO ANY EARLY AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN CONTINUED TO BE THAT WHATEVER EMERGED FROM THE LEBANESE WITUATION SHOULD BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, IE THE ESSENTIAL NEED TO FIND SOME WAY OF SATISFYING PALESTINIAN NEEDS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND A HOME OF THEIR OWN.

5. KING HUSSEIN, WHO SEEMED REMARKABLY CHEERFUL CONSIDERING HIS REAL CONCERNS OVER BOTH THE GULF WAR AND LEBANON, CONCLUDED BY SAYING HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THESE ISSUES MORE FULLY DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN LATER THIS WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED BOTH BY THE PROGRAMME BEING ARRANGED FOR

FULLY DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN LATER THIS WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED BOTH BY THE PROGRAMME BEING ARRANGED FOR HIM AND BY THE PROSPECT OF GETTING AWAY FROM AMMAN AND HAVING A TOTAL CHANGE OF ATMOSPHERE.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO POSTS LISTED ABOVE.

SINDALL

CCN PARA 4 LINE 7 FOR 'WITUATION' PSE READ ''SITUATION''

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 July, 1982

IRAN/IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 16 July.
The Prime Minister has noted the action we are
taking.

A. J. COLES

B J P Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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~~PS/PS~~

PS/MR HURD

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 449 OF 19 JULY 82

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AMMAN,

JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,

CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW,

UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 441 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. EXCEPT FOR THE SOUND OF AMBULANCES BRINGING WOUNDED TO THE HOSPITALS, TEHRAN REMAINS SURPRISINGLY NORMAL. THE STREET LIGHTS SOY ON AT NIGHTS AND THERE ARE NO BURSTS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE TO KEEP PEOPLE ON THEIR TOES.
2. IN FACT PEOPLE ARE LETHARGIC. THERE IS NO SIGN OF ANY ENTHUSIASM FOR THE FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH AND PRIVATELY MANY IRANIANS EXPRESS CONCERN TO US ABOUT THIS EXTENSION OF THE WAR.

IRANIANS EXPRESS CONCERN TO US ABOUT THIS EXTENSION OF THE WAR.

3. THE PRESS DESCRIBES CONTINUED HEAVY FIGHTING AT THE FRONT WITHOUT BEING TOO SPECIFIC. IT IS REPORTED THAT 800 IRAQIS HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER AND ONE OF THEM, A COLONEL ABDULLAH, COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALIAN OF THE 504 DIVISION, HAS GIVEN AN INTERVIEW CRITICISING HIS OWN SIDE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF INCREASED (AND OBSCURE) ACTIVITY IN KURDISTAN, AND DESULTORY ACTION ON THE OTHER FRONTS. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF WHAT IS CALLED SAVAGE BOMBING OF CIVILIANS AND TOWNS IN WESTERN IRAN, PARTICULARLY HAMADAN WHERE 100 PEOPLE WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 600 WOUNDED IN A RAID SEVERAL DAYS AGO.

4. THE COMMANDER OF THE GROUND FORCES, COLONEL SHIRAZI, IN AN INTERVIEW ON 18 JULY, SAID ONLY THAT THE OPERATIONS HAD PROGRESSED "RELATIVELY WELL". HE MENTIONED THE EXTREME HOT WEATHER AND THE LOW MORALE OF THE ENEMY, WHO WOULD RECEIVE "A STRONGER BLOW IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS". SHIRAZI, WHO IS CLEARLY NOW A LEADING HAWK, SAID THAT THE IRANIAN TARGET WAS THE OVERTHROW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO JERUSALEM. THE IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT NOT ONLY HAVE TO BESIEGE BASRA BUT TO MOVE TOWARDS BAGHDAD. NO POWER COULD STOP THEM.

5. OTHER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MORE RESTRAINED. PRIME MINISTER MOUSSAVI, WHEN STOPPING OVER IN ANKARA ON 17 JULY ON HIS WAY TO ALGERIA, SENT AN UNUSUALLY FRIENDLY MESSAGE TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. IN TURKEY AND IN ALGERIA MOUSSAVI STRESSED THAT IRANIAN ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ONLY FOR DEFENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND SECURITY OF THE REGION. MOUSSAVI SAID THAT HE HAD GONE TO ALGERIA TO DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS (HE TOOK WITH HIM THE MINISTERS OF ENERGY AND SCIENCE AND THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, AZIZI) AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE DENIED THAT HIS VISIT WAS DUE TO ALGERIAN MEDIATION. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE EFFORTS OF THE ALGERIAN PRESIDENT, BUT THERE WERE REALITIES ABOUT THE SITUATION WHICH NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED. IT SEEMS, THEREFORE, THAT HE HAS BEEN UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM THE ALGERIANS.

6. MEANWHILE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ARDEBILI, SAID IN A SPEECH IN THE PROVINCES THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING IF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE BA'ATH PARTY REMAINED IN POWER. FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, RETURNING FROM THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN CYPRUS, SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED IRAN'S DEFENSIVE ACTION. HE SEEMED

CYPRUS, SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED IRAN'S DEFENSIVE ACTION. HE SEEMED TO BE CONCERNED TO COUNTER CRITICISM THAT IRAN SHOULD BOYCOTT INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS BECAUSE HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR IRAN TO BE PRESENT AT SUCH MEETINGS AND TO PUT THEIR CASE.

7. THE NERVOUSNESS OF THE GULF COUNTRIES HAS EVIDENTLY GOT THROUGH TO THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP. PRIME MINISTER MOUSSAVI, INTERVIEWED BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGERIA, SAID THAT IRAN DID NOT COVET THE LAND OF THE SMALL PERSIAN GULF STATES AND POSED NO THREAT TO THEM. IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THESE STATES, HOWEVER, NOT TO BE SO DEPENDENT ON THE UNITED STATES. THEIR INTEREST WAS TO LIVE SIDE BY SIDE WITH A REVOLUTIONARY, POWERFUL AND ISLAMIC COUNTRY WHICH DID NOT COVET THEIR TERRITORY.
8. THE SPEAKER OF THE MAJLES, RAFSANJANI, IN A STATEMENT ON 18 JULY, REPEATED THAT IRAN HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND THE GULF COUNTRIES NEED NOT FEAR THIS. HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF TRUCK-LOADS OF ARMS CONTINUED TO GO TO IRAQ, IRAN WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.
9. RAFSANJANI ALSO ARGUED THAT IRAN'S OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. BUT ANOTHER AIM WAS TO OPEN AN EASTERN FRONT AGAINST ISRAEL, AND THE DESTINY OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ WAS IMPORTANT FOR IRAN. RAFSANJANI SAID IT WAS NO SECRET THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AIMED TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION, BUT THEY WOULD NOT DO THIS BY ARMED FORCE UNLESS AGGRESSION WAS COMMITTED AGAINST THEM.
10. MEANWHILE NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD MORE FROM KHOMEINI, EXCEPT A LONG RAMBLING SPEECH ON JERUSALEM DAY URGING THE PALESTINIANS TO FIGHT RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE AND THE MOSLEM PEOPLES, IF NECESSARY, TO DISAVOW THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND FIGHT ALONGSIDE IRAN AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. HE PRAYED FOR THE TRIUMPH OF THE WORLD'S MOSLEMS AND OPPRESSED AND THE VICTORY OF IRANIAN FORCES OVER THE MEN OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.
11. I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE RADIO RUN BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE TUDEH PARTY FROM BAKU HAS CRITICISED THE INVASION OF IRAQ. SUCH ACTION, RESULTING IN MUCH BLOODSHED, WAS SAID TO BE NOT NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAHRAIN 180940Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 18 JULY

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS AMMAN BAGHDAD CAIRO DAMASCUS TEHRAN TUNIS
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING ADEN ALGIERS ANKARA EC POSTS ISLAMABAD KHARTOUM MOSCOW
RABAT SANAA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI UKDEL NATO MODUK (FOR DS11 AND DMAO)

YOUR TELNO 199 TO JEDDA: IRAN / IRAQ

1. I CALLED ON MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING AND SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

2. SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK EXPRESSED THANKS FOR OUR OFFER OF HELP. HE WOULD SPEAK TO BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMIR LATER TODAY AND LET ME KNOW IF THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR REQUESTS. HE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME A QUOTE CLEAR CUT STATEMENT UNQUOTE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONDEMNING IRAN'S INVASION AND CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT SLACKEN IN OUR EFFORTS TO PURSUE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS AND BY OTHER DIPLOMATIC MEANS A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN A REVIVAL OF THE PALME MISSION (FCO TELNO 620 TO UKMIS NEW YORK). PRESENT IRANIAN ATTITUDES PRECLUDED ANY FORESEEABLE PROGRESS BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE.

3. IRAQ MUST, SHAIKH MOHAMMED CONTENDED, BE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE WEST BOTH QUOTE MILITARILY AND LOGISTICALLY UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT EXPAND FURTHER ON THIS POINT BUT REMINDED ME THAT KHOMEINI HAD MADE PLAIN HIS AIM TO ESTABLISH A SECOND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN IRAQ AND THAT THE CREATION OF AN IRAN/IRAQ/SYRIA AXIS WOULD MEAN DISASTER FOR THE AREA AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN IT.

4. ON KUWAIT'S POSITION, HE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH OUTWARD APPEARANCES THERE WERE CALM THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT MUCH CONCERNED. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM YESTERDAY HOW PLEASED HE HAD BEEN TO RECEIVE OUR REACTIONS TO THE SITUATION. BRITISH WILLINGNESS TO STRENGTHEN THE KUWAIT ARMY WAS MOST WELCOME. SHAIKH MOHAMMED HOPED ANYTHING WE COULD DO IN THIS REGARD COULD BE DONE SPEEDILY. HE VOLUNTEERED NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBLE GCC HELP FOR KUWAIT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ADEN ALGIERS ANKARA EC POSTS ISLAMABAD
KHARTOUM MOSCOW RABAT SANAA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI UKDEL NATO MODUK
(FOR DS11 AND DMAO)

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(CORRECTED VERSION)

FM JEDDAH 171540Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 301 OF 17 JULY

REPEATED IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, KUWAIT, DOHA, DUBAI, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT. PRIORITY BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, MODUK (DS11), MOD TEAM RIYADH (DMAO), TEHRAN, AMMAN, ALL EC POSTS.

SAVING TO KHARTOUM, ADEN, RABAT.

YOUR TELNO 199: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I SAW THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER (POLITICS) TODAY AND SPOKE ACCORDINGLY. I GAVE HIM A COPY OF MY SPEAKING NOTE.
2. MANSOURI THANKED ME FOR OUR WILLINGNESS TO HELP. HE WOULD TRY TO CONVEY YOUR MESSAGE TO PRINCE SAUD (WHO IS PROBABLY LEAVING FOR WASHINGTON TOMORROW). IN THE MEANTIME HE DID NOT THINK THERE WERE ANY MEASURES HMG COULD USEFULLY TAKE AT THIS STAGE.
3. THE SAUDIS AGREED WITH US THAT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR THEM TO AVOID SENDING MILITARY HELP TO IRAQ AND TO MAINTAIN CORRECT RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THEY WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE U.S. AND HAD TOLD THEM THEY WERE OPPOSED TO ANY MILITARY MEASURES, SUCH AS THE RDF. HE SHOWED ME A COPY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT: THOUGH HE MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT, HE SEEMED TO APPROVE OF IT.

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

THE REPORT HE SHOWED ME A COPY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT. THOUGH HE MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT, HE SEEMED TO APPROVE OF IT.

4. THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO IN TOUCH WITH PAKISTAN, ALGERIA AND TURKEY IN THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD INFLUENCE IRAN. THEY SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF HELP FROM SYRIA WHICH WAS CONCERNED ONLY TO PROMOTE THE DOWNFALL OF SADDAM HUSSAIN.

5. LIKE CHATTI (MY TELNO 298 - NOT TO ALL) MANSOURI WAS WORRIED ABOUT A POSSIBLE SYRIA/IRAQ/IRAN AXIS. THIS COULD BE JOINED BY PDRY, LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA AND RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HAFIZ AL-ASAD AS A NEW NASSER: THE ARBITER OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BLACKMAILING THE MODERATE GOVERNMENTS.

6. I ASKED WHETHER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD DIVERT THE IRANIANS. WERE THE SAUDIS PERHAPS ADVOCATING HIS RESIGNATION? MANSOURI SAID NOT. SADDAM WAS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN HE HAD BEEN, BUT HE WAS READY TO FIGHT TO THE DEATH.

7. ON FINANCIAL HELP TO IRAQ MANSOURI WAS EQUIVOCAL. FINANCE WAS NOT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION AT THE MOMENT. ANY IRAQI REQUESTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL MERITS.

8. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE. I SAID WE SAW LITTLE HOPE OF PERSUADING THE IRANIANS TO DESIST BY ARGUMENT: ONLY IRAQI MILITARY SUCCESS COULD AVAIL. BUT WE WERE URGENTLY CONCERNED TO STOP THE WAR SPREADING TO THE GULF: HENCE OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A STATEMENT OR CONSULTATION OR A VISIT TO THE AREA. MANSOURI SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT ANY OF THESE THINGS AT THE MOMENT. BUT HE AGAIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY SAUDI GRATITUDE FOR YOUR OFFER.

9. I AM SURPRISED THAT MANSOURI DID NOT TAKE UP OUR OFFER OF A STATEMENT. WE MAY GET A DIFFERENT ANSWER FROM PRINCE SAUD ON THAT SUBJECT, BUT I DOUBT WHETHER HE WILL WANT ANYTHING THAT SMACKS OF MILITARY COOPERATION UNLESS THE DANGER GETS A GOOD DEAL MORE IMMINENT.

10 ON FINANCIAL AID IT LOOKS AS IF THE SAUDIS HAVE DECIDED THAT SINCE MONEY WILL NOT RESCUE SADDAM THEY HAD BETTER SAVE THEIR RESOURCES FOR A POSSIBLE REPARATIONS FUND. BUT THERE IS NO/NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE BACKING A RIVAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO KHARTOUM, ADEN, RABAT.

(ERROR REGRETTE).

CRAIG

BT

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PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

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MR J C MOBERLY

MR ADAMS

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FROM KUWAIT 180605Z JULY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 188 OF 17 JULY 82

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS,
AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TUNIS,

INFO PRIORITY MODUK FOR DS11 AND DMAO,

PNFO SAVING TO TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, RIYADH, KHARTOUM,
RABAT, SANA'A, ADEN.

YOUR TELNO 199 TO JEDDA: IRAQ/IRAN

1. ACTION TAKEN. THE KUWAITIS ARE CALM. THEY ARE NOT (NOT) ASKING FOR HELP.

2. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO KHALID JA'AFAR, THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA. SHAIKH SABAH AND RASHID, THE UNDER SECRETARY, WERE OCCUPIED WITH THE VISITING IRANIAN DELEGATION (TEHRAN TELNO 432).

3. KHALID SEEMED GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF OUR CONCERN. HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT SHAIKH SABAH AND COME BACK TO ME IF THE KUWAITIS HAD ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS. HE DID NOT SEEM AT ALL WORRIED. HE THOUGHT THE IRANIANS MILITARILY INCAPABLE OF OPENING UP A NEW FRONT. IN ANY CASE, KUWAITI RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE "GOOD" AND THE KUWAITIS FELT THEMSELVES UNDER NO (NO) PRESSURE. I ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN COMPLAINTS OF KUWAIT'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND THE

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

THE KUWAITIS FEEL THEMSELVES UNDER NO (NO) PRESSURE. I ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN COMPLAINTS OF KUWAIT'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND THE TRANSIT OF ARMS. KHALID SAID THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS AT PRESENT AND "NOT MUCH" WAS GOING NORTH IN THE WAY OF ARMAMENTS.

4. HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH YOUR POINT (B) AND SAID FIRMLY THAT NONE OF THE GULF COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN THE WAR. ABDLATIF AL HAMAD, THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, WHOM I SAW LWTER THIS MORNING TOOK THE SAME VIEW. "WE COULD NOT JOIN IN EVEN IF WE WANTED TO. WE HAVE NOT THE CAPABILITY. PERIOD." I ASKED ABDLATIF ABOUT FINANCIAL HELP. HE SAID THAT ANY KUWAITI AID WOULD BE ABOVE-BOARD AND VISIBLE. NO FRESH PAYMENTS HAD BEEN MADE RECENTLY. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA; THEY MIGHT POSSIBLY STILL BE PROVIDING SOME MONEY.

5. AT ONE POINT IN OUR MEETING P.N. KHALID SAID REVEALINGLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS "WOULD NOT ALLOW THE IRANIANS TO MESS AROUND". I ASKED IF THE KUWAITIS WERE HAPPY WITH YESTERDAY'S PUBLICISED OFFER BY THE U S TO PROVIDE DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE GULF ST

TES. KHALID THOUGHT SUCH STATEMENTS USEFUL: THE IRANIANS NEEDED TO BE SHOWN THE "RED EYE".

(COMMENT: THIS KUWAITI RELIANCE ON AMERICA TO COME TO THE RESCUE IF THINGS GO WRONG IS NOT SURPRISING. BUT SITS ODDLY WITH THE FACT THAT MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS STILL NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET IN TO SEE ANY SENIOR KUWAITI ABOUT THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.)

6. THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF GCC HELP FOR KUWAIT (PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE TUR). IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ODD IF THERE HAD, GIVEN THAT KUWAIT HERSELF HAS NOT BOTHERED TO MOBILISE HER OWN RESOURCES. IN MILITARY TERMS, SUCH HELP WOULD BE USELESS. IN POLITICAL TERMS (PACE TWINAM IN WASHINGTON TELNO 2457) IT MAY IRK THE IRANIANS. WHY RISK IT THEREFORE? I AM SURE THIS WOULD BE HOW THE KUWAITIS WOULD SEE IT - AT LEAST UNTIL THE THREAT BECOMES MORE SERIOUS.

7. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN BRIEFLY WITH SHAIKH SALIM, THE DEFENCE MINISTER, ON THE 'PHONE. HE SOUNDED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS ON WEDNESDAY (MY TELNO 185). THERE ARE STILL NO SIGNS OF ANY SPECIAL ACTIVITY AMONG THE DEFENCE FORCES. RASHID LEAVES FOR HIS SUMMER HOLIDAYS TOMORROW. ABDLATIF TOO IS OFF FOR A HOLIDAY IN TUNIS WITH A FEW DAYS IN LONDON ON THE WAY. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THUS OF LIFE GOING ON NORMALLY. THE KUWAITIS MAY BE UNEASY BUT THEY ARE NOT (NOT) ALARMED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, RIYADH.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, MASCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, RIYADH,
KHARTOUM, RABAT, SANA'A AND ADEN.

CAMBRIDGE

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PARA 5 LINE 4 WA THE GULF STATES. KHALID ETC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 July 1982

Prime Minister
To note what we are doing.

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

A.J.C. 11/7

If the Iranians succeed in overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq this will create a menacing situation for our moderate Arab friends particularly in the Gulf. We are keeping in close touch with them.

Kuwait seems the most militarily exposed of the Gulf states. But for the moment the Kuwaitis seem inclined to maintain a low profile and not to ask for Western help in case this should seem provocative to the Iranians.

We are also keeping in close touch with the Americans, in case action may be needed to stop the war spreading. They are not at this stage considering any fresh deployments to the region though they are discussing contingencies with the Saudis and have offered to deploy a squadron of F15s to Saudi Arabia. (The Saudis have not responded to this.) They have also suggested special contacts between the US Navy and the Royal Navy so that we can keep in close touch. On our side, the ships of the Armilla patrol have until recently been at seven days steaming from the Gulf of Oman. But the current intention is that the New Zealand frigate Canterbury (volunteered to us in the Falklands context) should arrive in the Gulf of Oman on 21 July, while HMS Aurora is due to pay a visit to Bahrain from 31 July to 3 August.

None of the Gulf countries has yet asked for our help, and the need may not arise. But FCO and MOD officials are looking on a contingency basis at what we might be able to send to the region - eg for air defence - if or when an emergency developed, so that we shall have the facts at our disposal if we need to talk to the Americans or the Gulf countries.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD.

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

IMMEDIATE

PS

~~PS/IPS~~

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR J C MOBERLY

MR ADAMS

HD/MED

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 441 OF 15 JULY 82

INFO BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, JEDDA,
KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, CAIRO,
DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 439 : IRAN/IRAQ

1. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE WAR HERE SUGGESTS THAT THE
IRANIAN FORCES ARE ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES, TAKING
PRISONERS AND CAUSING CASUALTIES, BUT NOT THAT THERE HAS YET
BEEN ANY MAJOR VICTORY. THEY ARE REPORTED NOW TO BE 25
KILOMETRES INSIDE IRAQ.

2. THERE HAS BEEN AN INDIRECT PRESS REFERENCE TO AN IRAQI
ATTEMPT TO BOMB ONE OF THE SOUTHERN IRANIAN ISLANDS
(PRESUMABLY KHARG) IN WHICH OPERATION THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE
ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SHOT DOWN FOUR IRAQI PLANES.

3. MEANWHILE THERE ARE RUMOURS HERE OF SEVERE CASUALTIES,
WITH THE WOUNDED BEING HELICOPTERED INTO TEHRAN HOSPITALS.

4. THERE ARE THEORIES AMONG THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN TEHRAN
THAT THE IRANIANS' MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS TO CUT OFF

THE BAY OF PERSIA. WHATEVER MORE LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVE

4. THERE ARE THEORIES AMONG THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN TEHRAN THAT THE IRANIANS' MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS TO CUT OFF THE TOWN OF BASRA. WHATEVER MORE LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVE MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROCLAIMED OR INTENDED, HOWEVER, KHOMEINI'S APPEAL TO THE IRAQI NATION TO RISE AND OVERTHROW THE BA'ATH PARTY MEANS THAT THE IRANIANS ARE GAMBLING ON THE BIG THROW. KHOMEINI'S TARGET IS NOT JUST SADDAM HUSSEIN BUT THE WHOLE OF THE BA'ATH PARTY WHOM HE CALLS INFIDELS AND ACCUSES OF BEING WORSE THAN THE MONGOLS (EXAGGERATED), OF KILLING AYATOLLAH HAKIM (SURELY HE DIED OF OLD AGE) AND AYATOLLAH SADR AND HIS SISTER (FAIR ENOUGH). KHOMEINI HAS APPEALED TO THE IRAQIS AS THE PATRIOTS AS WELL AS MOSLEMS TO RISE UP AND JOIN THEIR IRANIAN BROTHERS. HE HAS TOLD THE IRANIANS THAT DEFEAT FOR THEM WILL BE A DEFEAT FOR ISLAM AND A DISGRACE ON THE IRANIAN NATION.

5. A WELL INFORMED ARAB COLLEAGUE TOLD ME TODAY THAT NOW THAT KHOMEINI HAD SPOKEN, THE DIRECTION OF THE WAR IN IRAN WOULD GET OUT OF HAND SINCE NO-ONE COULD CONTRADICT THE OLD MAN, WHO WAS VINDICTIVELY DETERMINED TO UPSET THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME. THE IRANIANS THOUGHT THEY WERE GODS GIFT TO THE WORLD AND UNDERESTIMATED BASIC HOSTILITY TOWARDS PERSIANS IN IRAQ.

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE IRANIANS CAN NOW WITHDRAW FROM THE BATTLEFIELD UNLESS AT LEAST SADDAM HUSSEIN IS OVERTHROWN, IF NOT THE BA'ATH PARTY

7. ONE HOPE MAY BE ALGERIAN MEDIATION. THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN SUMMONED HOME TO ALGIERS, AND IT IS REPORTED THAT THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAY GO THERE, PRESUMABLY TO FORESTALL A CRITICAL ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM JEDDAH 150747Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 298 OF 15 JULY

REPEATED PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, MUSCAT, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
MOSCOW.

YOUR TELNO 195: IRAN/IRAQ

1. NO WORTHWHILE SAUDIS ARE ACCESSIBLE. NOT ONLY IS
IT RAMADAN: PRINCE SAUD AND HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE
BEEN PREOCCUPIED IN TAIF WITH THE GCC SEMI COLON AND FAHD AND HIS
STAFF ARE MOSTLY IN MECCA (WHITHER I CANNOT PENETRATE WITHOUT
UNACCEPTABLE SACRIFICE). I THEREFORE CALLED ON DR CHATTI,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANISATION (ICO)
YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. HE HAD SEEN SAUD AND FAHD RECENTLY AND
WAS DUE TO SEE FAHD AGAIN LAST NIGHT.

2. HE SAID THE EFFORTS OF THE ICO GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE
WERE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. IRAQ HAD BEEN CO-OPERATIVE:
IT HAD BEEN ON THE COMMITTEE'S ADVICE THAT SADDAM HAD
AGREED TO WITHDRAW WITHIN IRAQI FRONTIERS. BUT IRAN
REMAINED OBDDURATE. THE COMMITTEE'S LATEST PROPOSALS HAD BEEN:

(A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SOLIDARITY FUND" TO PROVIDE

(A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SOLIDARITY FUND" TO PROVIDE "AID" WHICH, THOUGH OSTENSIBLY AVAILABLE TO BOTH BELLIGERENTS, WOULD IN PRACTICE BE INTENDED FOR IRAN;

(B) THE REFERENCE OF THE QUESTION OF GUILT TO THE COURT OF ISLAMIC STATES WHICH WAS ABOUT TO BE SET UP UNDER ICO AUSPICES.

3. THE IRANIANS HAD BEEN TOLERABLY INTERESTED IN (A) THOUGH THEY WANTED "REPARATIONS", NOT "AID" SEMI COLON BUT THEY HAD REJECTED (B). THEY WANTED A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL TO BE ESTABLISHED WHOSE TERMS OF REFERENCE WOULD BE TO CONDEMN SADDAM; NO QUESTION OF A TRIAL - HIS GUILT WAS TO BE ASSUMED FROM THE START.

CHATTI BELIEVED THIS RESPONSE WAS DESIGNED TO "PARALYSE" MEDIATION. THE IRANIANS WERE CONFIDENT OF THEIR MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND DETERMINED TO IMPOSE A SHI'ITE REGIME ON IRAQ. THIS WOULD BE, IN CHATTI'S VIEW, A DISASTER FOR EVERYBODY, FOR THE ARABS, FOR EUROPE, FOR AMERICA. THERE WOULD BE AN "AXIS" OF SYRIA, IRAQ AND IRAN SPREAD RIGHT ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS THEN NO HOPE. CHATTI SAID THERE WAS ONE FAINT CHINK OF LIGHT (BUT HE SOUNDED FAR FROM CONFIDENT): SADDAM HAD SAID HE THOUGHT HE COULD REPEL AN IRANIAN ATTACK AND MAYBE EVEN DESTROY THE IRANIAN ARMY. IF IRAQ COULD RESIST FOR 3 OR 6 MONTHS, CHATTI THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE ICO'S PROPOSALS WHICH HE WAS HOPING TO IMPROVE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY.

5. HE HAD SUGGESTED TO PRINCE SAUD THAT THE "SOLIDARITY FUND" SHOULD BE CALLED "AID" TO BEGIN WITH SEMI COLON BUT IT MIGHT BE AGREED THAT IT COULD BE RENAMED "REPARATIONS" IF THE TRIBUNAL DECIDED THAT IRAN WAS THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION. MOREOVER THE SUM CONTEMPLATED MIGHT BE RAISED FROM DOLLARS 30 BILLION TO DOLLARS 50 BILLION. SAUD HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AND CHATTI WAS HOPING TO GET FAHD'S APPROVAL LAST NIGHT, THOUGH OF COURSE THE AGREEMENT OF THE GULF STATES WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY.

6. BUT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE IF IRAN PUSHED AHEAD AND OCCUPIED BAGHDAD. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED HELP ON A LARGE SCALE FROM ISRAEL WITH AMERICAN APPROVAL. NOT ONLY ARMS BUT

PUSHED AHEAD AND OCCUPIED BAHYSAH. THE PROBLEM WAS
THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED HELP ON A LARGE SCALE FROM
ISRAEL, WITH AMERICAN APPROVAL, NOT ONLY ARMS, BUT
TECHNICAL TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN
I OBJECTED, CHATTI READILY AGREED THAT IRAQ WAS NOT SHORT
OF ARMS; HER FAILURE WAS DUE TO POOR MORALE AND BAD
LEADERSHIP. JORDAN WOULD HELP IRAQ, AND POSSIBLY EGYPT TOO SEMI
COLON BUT HOW COULD THE EGYPTIAN ARMY GET THERE?

7. I ASKED WHETHER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM WOULD BUY OFF
THE IRANIANS. CHATTIE SAID THAT A YEAR OR 6 MONTHS AGO IT
MIGHT HAVE DONE SO. BUT NOW THE IRANIANS NOT ONLY WANTED
SADDAM TO GO; THEY WANTED TO CHOOSE HIS SUCCESSOR. WAS
SADDAM LIKELY TO BE OVERTHROWN FROM WITHIN IRAQ? CHATTI
SAID WITH REFRESHING FRANKNESS THAT THOUGH SADDAM WAS NOT
POPULAR WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE, IN THE THIRD WORLD THE PEOPLE
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THE ARMY WAS WHAT CNHNTED AND
SADDAM SEEMED TO HAVE CONTROL OVER THE ARMY.

8. I ASKED WHETHER SAUDI AND GULF FINANCIAL AID WAS STILL
GOING TO IRAQ. CHATTIE SAID OF COURSE. BUT FINANCE WOULD
NOT SAVE THE SITUATION.

9. FINALLY I ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS AGREED WITH CHATTI'S
ANALYSIS. CHATTI SAID THEY DID - COMPLETELY. I DID NOT
THINK IT WISE TO ASK POINT BLANK WHETHER THE SAUDIS HAD
WITHDRAWN THEIR SUPPORT FROM SADDAM (AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR TUR)
SEMI COLON BUT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE FOREGOING TO SUGGEST
THAT THEY HAVE. QUITE THE CONTRARY.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM WASHINGTON 152210Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2443 OF 15 JULY

Prime Minister
I have asked the FIC.O. to circulate
a paper to OD saying what they and the
Raf are doing about the Iran/ Iraq situation.

A.F.C. 16/7

MY TELNO 2433 AND TELECON RENWICK/MIERS: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I TOLD EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING OF OUR INTENTION TO CONSULT URGENTLY WITH THE GULF STATES ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE THREAT FROM IRAN, OF THE MOVEMENT OF A FRIGATE AND FLEET AUXILIARY TOWARDS THE GULF OF OMAN, AND OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO BAHRAIN BY ANOTHER FRIGATE AT THE END OF THE MONTH (DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THAT TIME)

2. EAGLEBURGER WELCOMED THESE STEPS. THE AMERICANS AT PRESENT HAVE A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN THE ARABIAN SEA OFF OMAN AND FOUR SMALL NAVAL SHIPS IN THE GULF. THEY DO NOT AT PRESENT PLAN TO DEPLOY ANY FURTHER VESSELS TO THE GULF. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT WE SHOULD KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH AND PROPOSED TALKS BETWEEN OUR TWO NAVIES. HE HAD SUGGESTED SIMILAR TALKS WITH THE FRENCH WHO WERE CONSIDERING REINFORCING THEIR OWN TWO SHIPS NOW IN THE AREA. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT INTEND TO DEPLOY THE RDF TO THE REGION.

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE SUGGESTED THAT IRANIAN CLAIMS YESTERDAY HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED, THOUGH HE DISCO

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE SUGGESTED THAT IRANIAN CLAIMS YESTERDAY HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED, THOUGH HE DISCOUNTED IRAQI CLAIMS TO HAVE THROWN BACK THE INVADERS. IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS IRANIAN OPERATIONS THEY WERE CLAIMING TO HAVE CAPTURED ONLY A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF PRISONERS. THE IRANIAN AIRFORCE HAD BEEN ACTIVE AROUND BASRA AND THE IRAQIS HAD ATTACKED KHARG ISLAND, BUT NEITHER AIRFORCE WAS A SERIOUS FACTOR IN THIS WAR. VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT AND ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE IRAQI SHIA. HE THOUGHT THAT KHOMEINI MIGHT HAVE MADE A STRATEGIC ERROR IN CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE BA'ATH PARTY FROM POWER—THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE ARMED FORCES TO RALLY ROUND SADDAM HUSSAIN, AND THE SUNNI'S TO BURY THEIR RIVALRIES.

4. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO INVADE KUWAIT, BUT WILL TRY TO CUT THE SUPPLY ROUTE FROM KUWAIT TO IRAQ. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE KUWAITIS ARE WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE SUBVERSION BY THE SHIA MINORITY AND PALESTINIANS IN KUWAIT, AND THAT THEY WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING TO UPSET THE IRANIANS. THE AMERICANS DO NOT EXPECT ANY REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITIS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT THAT THE KUWAITIS WILL AS NECESSARY, SEEK TO DEAL WITH IRAN.

5. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WERE CONCERNED AT KHOMEINI'S CLAIM TO ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP WHICH CHALLENGED THE BASIS OF LEGITIMACY OF THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY AND, SECONDLY, AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBVERSION VIA THE GULF STATES AND THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICANS DID NOT EXPECT SAUDI REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BUT THE SAUDIS WERE KEEPING THE OPTION OF JOINT EXERCISES OPEN AND WOULD NO DOUBT SWALLOW THEIR PRINCIPLES TO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES IF THEY JUDGED THAT NECESSARY. VELIOTES REMINDED ME THAT THE SAUDIS HAD CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED JORDANIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB GULF STATES; THIS WAS A PITY AS THE JORDANIANS HAD THE BEST TRAINED FORCES IN A POSITION TO HELP.

6. VELIOTES ASKED WHETHER WE HAD HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT OMAN PLAYING A LARGER ROLE WITHIN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL TO PROMOTE THE FORMATION OF A QUICK REACTION FORCE. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION ON THIS.

7. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY SOVIET MOVES OF ANY SORT RELATED

7. ~~IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY SOVIET MOVES OF ANY SORT RELATED TO THE IRANIAN INVASION OF IRAQ.~~ VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BENEFIT FROM INSTABILITY IN THE GULF. GREATER PROBLEMS FOR THE GULF STATES COULD LEAD THEM TO LOOK FOR REASSURANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION AS THE NEARER SUPER-POWER.

8. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION RAPHEL (DEPTUY DIRECTOR FOR P/M AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ENVISAGED THE CONTACTS ABOUT NAVAL MOVEMENTS AS BEING NEITHER AS FORMAL OR AS COMPLEX AS IN 1980: AND NOT AS A SUBSITUTE FOR BUT AS COMPLEMENTARY TO THESE EXCHANGES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. THEY DO NOT SEE WHAT IS PROPOSED AS A JOINT PLANNING GROUP, BUT AS ENABLING THEM TO EXPLAIN US INTENTIONS AND TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US. SUCH CONTACTS COULD BE CONDUCTED EITHER THOUGH THE US NAVAL COMMANDER IN EUROPE IN LONDON: OR THROUGH THE NAVAL ATTACHE, ADMIRAL SYMONS, HERE. THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO BE. IN TOUCH WITH THE AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS.

9. RAPHEL ADDED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A US TEAM SHOULD VISIT SAUDI ARABIA, WITHOUT PUBLICITY, TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCIES.

THE SAUDIS HAD GIVEN NO RESPONSE AS YET ON THE QUESTION OF A JOINT EXERCISE WITH US F15S AND, RAPHEL MADE CLEAR, NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN UNLESS THERE WAS A POSITIVE SAUDI RESPONSE

HENDERSON

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FROM KUWAIT 141015Z JULY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 185 OF 14/7/82

INFO BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD,
TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND CAIRO.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. ON THE SURFACE, KUWAIT SEEMS TO BE REACTING CALMLY TO THE NEWS FROM IRAQ LAST NIGHT THAT IRAN WAS ATTACKING BASRA. WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE KUWAITI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THIS MORNING. THEY SAID THEY HAD NO RECENT NEWS OF THE FIGHTING. LIKE US, THEY HAVE BEEN HAVING DIFFICULTY THIS MORNING WITH A RADIO BLACKOUT. THEY DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

2. I HAD AN APPOINTMENT LATER THIS MORNING WITH SHAIKH SALIM, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, TO SAY FAREWELL. I FOUND HIM IN A VERY DEPRESSED MOOD. HE TOO HAD NO NEWS OF THE FIGHTING AND ASKED IF WE HAD ANY. I EXPLAINED I HAD NOT, BUT UNDERTOOK TO KEEP HIS PEOPLE INFORMED AS BEST WE COULD.

3. I ASKED HOW WORRIED HE WAS FOR KUWAIT. HE SAID "VERY": HE THOUGHT IRAN WOULD DEAL WITH IRAQ FIRST THEN TURN ON KUWAIT. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE BY MEANS OF STEPPING UP POLITICAL PRESSURES AT FIRST, BUT IN THE END THEY WOULD USE FORCE. HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD EXPLOIT THE FACT THAT THE BORDER BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT WAS NOT SETTLED. THEY WOULD MOVE INTO KUWAITI TERRITORY ASSERTING THAT IT WAS IRAQI. THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE TO DEFEND WHAT THEY REGARDED AS KUWAIT.

4. I SAID THAT THIS STRUCK ME AS AN EXCESSIVELY GLOOMY SCENARIO. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. SALIM ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WOULD DO. I SAID I COULD NOT SAY: WE WOULD NATURALLY BE CONSULTING WITH THEM.

5. COMMENT: SALIM TENDS TO BLOW HOT AND COLD. I DO NOT REGARD HIS ALARMIST VIEWS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE THINKING OF THE KUWAITI LEADERSHIP. SHAIKH NASSER'S ATTITUDE (MY TELNO 184) IS MORE TYPICAL.
CAMBRIDGE

IRAQ/IRAN

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 435 OF (14) JULY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN,

MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD,

ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

MIPT : IRAN / IRAQ WAR

1. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE IRANIAN DECISION TO ATTACK BUT IT LOOKS AS IF THE LEADERSHIP GAVE THE GO-AHEAD TO THE MILITARY AND MEDIA AROUND 7 OR 8 JULY. THEY WILL HAVE OBTAINED A NIHIL OBSTAT FROM KHOMEINI

WHO HAS NOW ISSUED A MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES OF IRAQ TO RAISE UP AND OVERTHROW THE SADDAM REGIME.

2. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE IRANIANS HAVE SET THEMSELVES ANY CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND WHETHER THESE CAN BE REALISED, BUT I HAVE A FEELING THIS ADVENTURE COULD BE THE REGIME'S BIGGEST MISTAKE SO FAR. THEIR EXTREME SUPPORTERS MAY BE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER THEY ARE TOLD IN THE NAME OF ISLAM BUT THE BROAD MASS OF POPULACE MAY BE MORE WEARY

~~OF ISLAM BUT THE BROAD MASS OF POPULACE MAY BE MORE WEARY~~
OF WAR THAN THEIR LEADERS UNDERSTAND. LIBERATING IRANIAN
SOIL IS ONE THING BUT EMBARKING ON A MILITARY ADVENTURE WITH NO
CLEAR GOAL IS ANOTHER. WE HAVE HEARD THAT SOME REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS HAVE ALREADY SLIPPED AWAY FROM THE FRONT TO GO HOME.

3. NO DOUBT FRUSTRATION OVER EVENTS IN THE LEBANON HAS STRENGTHENED THE EXTREMISTS HERE AND THE FAILURE OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS TO HALT THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN BAGHDAD WILL HAVE WEAKENED ARGUMENTS THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY HAVE TRIED TO DEPLOY ABOUT THE DANGER OF ALIENATING INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THE IRANIANS MAY FIND THEMSELVES ONCE AGAIN IN GRIM ISOLATION.

4. THE IRANIAN ECONOMY DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON OIL SALES BUT IS BOUND TO SUFFER FROM RENEWED DIVERSION OF RESOURCES TOWARDS WAR, FROM FURTHER DELAYS IN THE PROSPECT OF REPARATIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND FROM THE GENERAL LOSS OF CONFIDENCE THAT WILL FOLLOW AMONG THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITY. WE SHALL BEAR IN MIND THE POSSIBLE NEED TO REVISE ADVICE FOR VISITING BUSINESSMEN.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM WASHINGTON 150100Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2433 OF 14 JULY

MY TELEGRAM NO 1314:
IRAN/IRAQ: US CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. THE IRANIAN ATTACK THIS MORNING HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY A FLURRY OF ACTIVITY HERE.
2. ADMIRAL HOWE (DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO/MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) ASKED MINISTER TO CALL TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS. HOWE SAID THAT AT PRESENT THE AMERICANS HAD NO MORE IDEA THAN ANYONE ELSE HOW FAR THE IRANIANS WERE INTENDING TO GO. THE US ASSESSMENT OAT PRESENT WAS THAT THEY CERTAINLY HAD AMPLE RESOURCES TO TAKE BASRA BUT IT WAS BY NO MEANS CLEAR WHAT THEY MIGHT DO THEN.
3. HOWE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN DOING SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING OVER THE LAST MONTH OR SO FOR THIS EVENTUALITY. THEY STILL HAD A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND WOULD BE KEEPING THIS WITHIN REACH. THEY HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF

3. HOWE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN DOING SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING OVER THE LAST MONTH OR SO FOR THIS EVENTUALITY. THEY STILL HAD A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND WOULD BE KEEPING THIS WITHIN REACH. THEY HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF MOVING EITHER OF THE TWO CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS THEY COULD DO TO TRY TO PROVIDE SOME REASSURANCE FOR THE GULF STATES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMERICANS WERE AT PRESENT DISCUSSING WITH THE OMANIS THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT NAVAL EXERCISE INVOLVING THE INDIAN OCEAN CARRIER BATTLE GROUP. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO PLANNING TO EXPLORE VARIOUS KINDS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS PURSUING THE IDEA OF A CONTINGENCY PLANNING GROUP WITH THE SAUDIS. IN THE PAST, THE SAUDIS HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH INTEREST BUT THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THEY MIGHT NOW SHOW MORE. THE PENTAGON HAD A GROUP OF ABOUT HALF A DOZEN COLONELS READY TO GO TO JEDDA AT ANY MOMENT FOR SUCH TALKS IF THE SAUDIS WANTED THEM. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT SEND SOMEONE AT HIGHER LEVEL, SUCH AS GENERAL KINGSTON, IF THE SAUDIS SHOWED AN INTEREST.

4. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY THEY WERE CONSIDERING WAS A BILATERAL AIR DEFENCE EXERCISE WITH THE SAUDIS. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND OVER A SQUADRON OR SO OF F15S, WITH THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FACILITIES, FOR THIS PURPOSE. HOWE HINTED THAT THESE AIRCRAFT MIGHT STAY THERE FOR A WHILE, IF THE SAUDIS WISHED. HE RECALLED ALSO THE AMERICAN AWACS AIRCRAFT WHICH WERE STILL IN SAUDI ARABIA AND WOULD REMAIN THERE. (HOWE SEEMED TO THINK, ON THE BASIS OF A REPORT FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON THAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP THE KUWAITIS WITH AIR DEFENCE AND HE WARMLY WELCOMED THIS.)

5. HOWE CONTINUED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION BUT IT WAS NOT AT PRESENT CLEAR HOW THEY COULD DO THIS. THINKING ALOUD, HOWE WONDERED WHETHER THE UK MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE A SHIP INTO THE AREA, FOR INSTANCE FROM THE KENYA COAST WHERE HE BELIEVED WE HAD SOMETHING. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT A FORMAL SUGGESTION BUT AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE SORT OF THING THAT MIGHT BE WORTH DISCUSSING. WE HAD HAD USEFUL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS KIND IN 1980 AND SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS COULD BE USEFUL AGAIN NOW. THE THREAT WAS DIFFERENT, BUT THE PRINCIPLES WERE THE SAME. BUT HOWE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO ACTIVATE THE R.D.F.

6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICANS HAVE YET REACHED ANY FIRM DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS IN THE MEETINGS HELD THIS AFTERNOON IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN

6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICANS HAVE YET REACHED ANY FIRM DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS IN THE MEETINGS HELD THIS AFTERNOON IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING CONCERN TO THEM ABOUT THEIR AIR DEFENCE; IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE SAUDIS WILL WISH TO HAVE ANY VISIBLE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA IN THIS PERIOD. US INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE DESPATCH OF A SQUADRON OF F15S WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON WHETHER ANY REQUEST FROM THE SAUDIS IS FORTHCOMING. IT IS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICANS WILL TAKE SOME ACTION TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. TWINAM (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING SOME REINFORCEMENT OF THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE ARABIAN SEA (BUT NOT TO THE GULF ITSELF), PROBABLY FROM UNITS ELSEWHERE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN).

7. THOMAS MADE CLEAR TO ADMIRAL HOWE THAT HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE MIGHT THINK IT RIGHT TO DO IN THAT REGARD, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF OUR COMMITMENTS ELSEWHERE. BUT WE WELCOMED THE KIND OF CONSULTATION THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING. WE SHOULD MAKE AN EARLY RESPONSE TO HIS APPROACH.

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FM FCO 141700Z JUL 82

TO FLASH BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 532 OF 14 JULY

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT

YOUR TEL 453: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN THE BASRA REGION

1. LATEST JIC ASSESSMENT WILL BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

2. IRANIAN OBJECTIVES MAY BE TO REACH THE EAST BANK OF THE SHATT AL ARAB NORTH OF BASRA, THUS CUTTING OFF IRAQI TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. THE IRANIANS COULD THEN EFFECT FURTHER CROSSINGS TO CUT OFF THE MAIN BASRA/BAGHDAD HIGHWAY.

3. YOU WILL WISH TO TAKE THIS ANALYSIS INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING A DECISION WHETHER TO ADVISE EVACUATION.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 122319Z JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1121 OF 12 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.

NIPT: IRAN/IRAQ.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 514 (1982) ADOPTED ON 12 JULY.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING CONSIDERED AGAIN THE QUESTION ENTITLED "THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ",

DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLONGATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, RESULTING IN HEAVY LOSSES OF HUMAN LIVES AND CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DAMAGE, AND ENDANGERING PEACE AND SECURITY,

RECALLING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION REQUIRES STRICT ADHERENCE TO THESE PROVISIONS,

RECALLING THAT BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 479 (1980), ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1980, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 5 NOVEMBER 1980 (S/14244).

TAKING NOTE OF THE EFFORTS OF MEDIATION PURSUED NOTABLY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND HIS REPRESENTATIVE, AS WELL AS BY THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE,

1. CALLS FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND AN IMMEDIATE END TO ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS,
2. CALLS FURTHER FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES.
3. DECIDES TO DISPATCH A TEAM OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO VERIFY, CONFIRM AND SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL A REPORT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THAT PURPOSE.

4. URGES THAT THE MEDIATION EFFORTS BE CONTINUED IN A CO-ORDINATED MANNER THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES,
5. REQUESTS ALL OTHER STATES TO ABSTAIN FROM ALL ACTIONS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT AND TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THREE MONTHS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

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FM JEDDA 120655Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 291 OF 12 JUL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. I WAS APPROACHED YESTERDAY BY THE ACTING HEAD OF WESTERN DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPUTY MINISTER.

FAGI SAID THE SAUDIS HAD INFORMATION THAT THE IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK ACROSS THE IRAQI BORDER AND HAD MASSED 80,000 OR 100,000 TROOPS. THE ATTACK WAS EXPECTED TO COME WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WAS ANXIOUS TO TRY ALL WAYS OF PREVENTING IT. THEY HAD IN MIND ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND URGED HMG TO LEND THEIR SUPPORT AND HELP TO ORGANISE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON IRAN.

2. I ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS HAD ANY PARTICULAR ACTION IN MIND. FAGI SAID HE IMAGINED A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS THE BEST WAY FORWARD. I POINTED OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH SUCH A RESOLUTION. FAGI HAD NOTHING TO ADD.

3. FAGI IS ONE OF THE FEW OFFICIALS STILL IN JEDDA AND HAD SUMMONED ME AT 5 MINUTES' NOTICE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE AFTERNOON. I PERSUADED HIM TO GIVE ME HIS MESSAGE OVER THE TELEPHONE AND MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SAUDIS, AS USUAL, HAVE NO CONCRETE IDEAS AND ARE CLUTCHING AT STRAWS WITHOUT ANY GREAT HOPE OF SUCCESS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 12 JULY 82

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, MOSCOW,

UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS, STOCKHOLM, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 418 AND JIC TELS: POSSIBLE IRANIAN INVASION.

1. I FEAR THAT THE IRANIANS MAY AFTER ALL HAVE DECIDED TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK INTO IRAQI TERRITORY. FOR THE LAST FEW DAYS THERE HAS BEEN A STRONG PRESS BUILD-UP TO THIS EFFECT AND AN EVEN STRONGER CAMPAIGN ON THE TELEVISION AND RADIO, APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO CONDITION THE IRANIAN PUBLIC TO THE IDEA OF GOING INTO IRAQ. THIS IS DONE BY SLANTED EDITORIALS, CAPTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHS ('WITH RECENT OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS THE QUESTION IS NOW WHEN IRANIAN TROOPS (SEE ABOVE) WILL MARCH TO BAGHDAD'), AND INTERVIEWS WITH PRIMED REGIME SUPPORTERS, RATHER THAN THROUGH ANY AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT INTENTIONS. THERE ARE ALSO CONTINUED REPORTS OF IRAQI BOMBARDMENTS AND OVERFLIGHTS, AND POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS TO COUNTERATTACK.

2. AT THE BEST THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA ARE DELIBER-

2. AT THE BEST THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA ARE DELIBERATELY TRYING TO BRING THE PUBLIC NEAR TO THE BOIL ON THE IRAQ ISSUE. THERE IS TALK AROUND TOWN THAT THE DAY OF THE INVASION MAY EVEN BE TOMORROW, 13 JULY, ONE OF THE SHI'A HOLY DAYS, OR 16 JULY WHICH IS 'INTERNATIONAL JERUSALEM DAY'.

3. MOHAMMAD BAQER HAKIM, ONE OF THE IRAQI RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN IRAN, IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN MILITARY HAD THE RIGHT TO ENTER IRAQI TERRITORY TO DEFEND IRAN AND LIBERATE THE MOSLEM NATION OF IRAQ. THE ENTRY OF IRANIAN FORCES INTO IRAQ WOULD BE JUSTIFIED BY ISLAMIC AND HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES. PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO MODERATELY ATTENDED PARADES BY IRAQIS RESIDING IN TEHRAN, LED BY THEIR CLERGY. THE GROUND FORCES COMMANDER, SHIRAZI, IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT IRANIAN SOLDIERS WERE IMPATIENT TO INFLICT FINAL BLOWS ON THE IRAQI REGIME.

4. A CAREFUL READING OF STATEMENTS BY THE TOP LEADERSHIP REVEALS NO COMMITMENT TO CROSS THE FRONTIER. RAFSANJANI'S SPEECH AT TEHRAN FRIDAY PRAYERS ON 9 JULY DISCUSSED COMPENSATION RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTION. THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, TAVAKOLI, SAID ONLY THAT SINCE IRAQ CONTINUED TO OCCUPY CERTAIN PIECES OF IRANIAN TERRITORY THE IRANIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT THE ENEMY OFF. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON 11 JULY THE PRIME MINISTER SAID, 'WE THINK WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ANY MEASURE DEEMED NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR COUNTRY, CREATE REAL SECURITY AND TO OBTAIN REPARATION FOR WAR DAMAGES.' HARDLY A CLARION CALL FOR ATTACK. MOUSSAVI CRITICISED ONCE AGAIN THE HOLDING OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN BAGHDAD. AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, MEANWHILE, HAS DONE NO MORE THAN TO REPEAT THAT THE WAY TO JERUSALEM LIES THROUGH KERBALA. HE PLANS TO SEND EIGHT ISLAMIC DELEGATIONS TO 24 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE TO SPREAD THE WORD ON JERUSALEM DAY.

5. WHEN I HAD A TOUR D'HORIZON A WEEK AGO WITH A CONTACT WELL

PLACED WITH THE REGIME (AFROUZ), HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SEND TROOPS INTO IRAQ. THEY WANTED TO TOPPLE THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME, BUT THERE WERE MANY DISADVANTAGES IN SEEKING TO DO THIS BY A MILITARY OPERATION. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, AND WOULD LOSE THE IRANIANS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WHAT WAS REALLY IMPORTANT WAS FOR THEM TO SECURE

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, AND WOULD LOSE THE IRANIANS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WHAT WAS REALLY IMPORTANT WAS FOR THEM TO SECURE REPARATIONS TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY. BUT THIS TALK WAS BEFORE THE RECENT INTENSIFIED PRESS BUILD-UP.

6. WHEN I CALLED ON THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR, SHORTLY TO BE TRANSFERRED TO PEKING, ON 8 JULY, HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WARNING THE IRANIANS FOR SIX MONTHS NOT TO INVADE IRAQ. THEY HAD TOLD THEM FRANKLY THAT JUST AS THEY NOW SUPPORTED IRAN, THEY WOULD SIMILARLY SUPPORT IRAQ IF IRAN WERE TO BE THE AGGRESSOR. I SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIAN AND LIBYAN GOVERNMENTS MIGHT ALSO BE OF THE SAME OPINION, BUT GHARAIEB DEMURRED. THESE COUNTRIES WERE BOTH EGGING THE IRANIANS ON, BECAUSE THEY WERE SO ANXIOUS TO TOPPLE SADDAM HUSSEIN. GHARAIEB SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN IRANIAN LEADERS, SUCH AS PRESIDENT KHAMENE'I HIMSELF AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO TOOK A LEGALISTIC VIEW ABOUT CROSSING THE FRONTIER AND WERE ADVISING CAUTION. ON THE OTHER SIDE WERE THE HOT-HEADED MILITARY AND RAFSANJANI, WHO SEEMED TO BE WINNING THE ARGUMENT. EVEN THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZI HAD TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID SOME ADVANCE INTO IRAQI TERRITORY BECAUSE ONLY WITH THIS BARGAINING COUNTER COULD THE IRANIANS HOPE TO GET AN APPROPRIATE SUM FROM THE ARABS IN REPARATIONS. GHARAIEB WAS NOW DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE IRANIANS WOULD AFTER ALL ADOPT THE PRUDENT COURSE.

7. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE EVIDENCE OF MILITARY DISPOSITIONS IN THE SOUTH (CF BAGHDAD TELNO U2G OF 8 JULY) APPEARS CONCLUSIVE: WHEREAS THE PRESS CAMPAIGN COULD BE AIMED TO DECEIVE IT LOOKS AS IF THIS BUILD-UP MEANS BUSINESS. I AM TOLD THAT THREE DAYS AGO THERE WAS A CALL-UP FOR FIVE NEW CATEGORIES (THOSE BORN IN THE YEARS 1959 TO 1963 INCLUSIVE), AND PENALTIES FOR EVADING THE DRAFT HAVE BEEN INCREASED.

8. IF THE IRANIANS DO MAKE A MOVE IT WILL PRESUMABLY BE JUSTIFIED OUTWARDLY AS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT IRAQI SHELLING OF IRANIAN CIVILIANS, AND THEREFORE MAY ONLY INVOLVE OCCUPYING A SLICE OF TERRITORY CONTIGUOUS TO THE FRONTIER. BUT WE KNOW FROM ISRAEL'S POLICY IN THE LEBANON WHERE THIS THEORY CAN LEAD. THE REAL REASON WILL BE THE FEELING THAT IN A SITUATION OF STALEMATE THE IRANIAN POSITION WILL BE ERODED: THE ARMY WILL LOSE MOMENTUM AND MOTIVATION AND THERE WILL BE NO REAL INCENTIVE FOR THE ARABS TO COME UP WITH THE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION THE IRANIANS NEED. THE IRANIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO IGNORE INTER-

LOSE MOMENTUM AND MOTIVATION AND THERE WILL BE NO REAL INCENTIVE FOR THE ARABS TO COME UP WITH THE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION THE IRANIANS NEED. THE IRANIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO IGNORE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY IF IT IS TRUE THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE SYRIANS (NEEDING A DIVERSION FROM THE LEBANON?) AND LIBYANS. BUT THEY WILL BE AWARE THAT THERE MUST BE MANY UNKNOWN FACTORS SUCH AS THE ATTITUDE OF THE USSR AND WHETHER THE POPULATION OF IRAQ DO INDEED RESPOND IN THE WAY THAT THEY HOPE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS.

CCN...PARA 2 LAST LINE.. WHICH IS "INTERNATIONAL JERUSALEM DAY"

BARRINGTON

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IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister

To see

*Alan King
Party Clerk*

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MR J C MOBERLY

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FM AMMAN 121130Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 303 OF 12 JUL

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, '28'
TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

BAGHDAD TELNO 433: IRAQ/IRAN

1. KING HUSSEIN'S BRIEF VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON 9 JULY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE PUBLIC IN AMMAN ON 10 JULY IN THE FORM OF A TOTALLY ANODYNE COMMUNIQUE AND TV FILM OF THE KING TALKING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.
2. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS VISIT WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 10 JULY. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT SADDAM HAD EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN TO HIM OVER IRAQ'S FINANCIAL POSITION. IRAQ HAD RECEIVED NO (NO) FINANCIAL HELP FROM SAUDI ARABIA ORQ THE GULF STATES SINCE APRIL. AS A RESULT, CIVIL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS HAD ALREADY BEEN SEVERLY CUT BACK, BUT THE IRAQIS WERE NOW BEGINNING TO FACE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OVER THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY SUPPLIES. SADDAM HAD CLAIMED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT FUNDS HAD DRIED UP FOR 3 REASONS. FIRST, THE GULF STATES WERE BEGINNING TO HEDGE THEIR BETS SINCE THEY CALCULATED SADDAM'S POSITION WAS NOW NONE TOO SECURE. SECONDLY, THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN ADVISING THE GULF STATES TO EASE UP ON FINANCIAL HELP TO IRAQ (WHICH DICK VIETS FIRMLY DENIED WAS THE CASE).

AMERICANS HAD BEEN ADVISING THE GULF STATES TO EASE UP ON FINANCIAL
HELP TO IRAQ (WHICH DICK VIETS FIRMLY DENIED WAS THE CASE).

THIRDLY, THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO CONTEMPLATING WHAT SUCCESSOR TO
SADDAM MIGHT EMERGE. VIETS COMMENTED THAT THE SAUDIS DID NOT
SEEM TO BE REVIEWING THE IRAQI SUCCESSION BUT HAD ONLY SO FAR COME
UP WITH TARIQ AZIZ AS A POSSIBLE.

3. THE US AMBASSADOR ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER HE WAS CONTEMPLATING
OFFERING ANY FRESH FORM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ. KING HUSSEIN
REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING FOR SOME WEEKS THAT JORDAN WOULD
HAVE TO DO MORE FOR IRAQ AND CLAIMED HE HAD THEREFORE OFFERED
SADDAM "ONE OR TWO BRIGAVES." SADDAM HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD
HAVE WELCOMED SUCH AN OFFER FROM JORDAN SOME MONTHS AGO BUT NOW
THAT IRAQ WAS BACK ON HER OWN TERRITORY HE DID NOT (NOT) NEED ANY
SUCH HELP FROM JORDAN SINCE IRAQ COULD COPE ON HER OWN WITH
ANY NEW OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING WITH IRAN.

4. THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (WHO DID NOT ACCOMPANY KING
HUSSEIN TO BAGHDAD AND HAS NOT YET DISCUSSED THE VISIT WITH HIM
PERSONALLY) TOLD A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THIS MORNING THAT IT WAS
NEVERTHELESS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT SADDAM WAS EXPECTING AN
IRANIAN INVASION IN THE SOUTH AND WAS REASONABLY CONFIDENT BOTH
OF THE MORALE OF IRAQI FORCES AND OF THEIR ABILITY TO
WITHSTAND A MAJOR IRANIAN ASSAULT.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 122321Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1122 DATED 12 JULY 82

AND TO IMMEDIATE C O I

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, ANKARA, TEHRAN

INFO PRIORITY OTHER GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, CAIRO,

DAMASCUS, ALGIERS, EEC POSTS

INFO SAVING KHARTOUM

MY TWO TPTS: IRAN/IRAQ

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 12 JULY:

MR PRESIDENT

MY DELEGATION HAS VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. WE DID SO BECAUSE WE SHARE THE CONCERN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION IN THE GRAVE AND THREATENING SITUATION WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THAT CONFLICT HAS ALREADY LASTED TOO LONG, COST TOO MANY LIVES AND CAUSED TOO MUCH MATERIAL DAMAGE. WE EARNESTLY ENTREAT ALL THOSE CONCERNED TO IMPELEMENT THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED, AS WELL AS RESOLUTION NUMBER 479 OF 1980, IN ORDER TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END AND BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO THE PATHS OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION.

AT THE SAME TIME, MR PRESIDENT, MY DELEGATION, WHILE SUPPORTING THIS RESOLUTION, DOES HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT ITS LIKELY EFFICACY AT THE PRESENT TIME. WE BELIEVE THAT AN IMPORTANT PREREQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEMAKING BY THE COUNCIL IS THAT ITS PROPOSALS SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES TO A DISPUTE. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE IN THE PRESENT CASE THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. MY DELEGATION APPLAUDS THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE, MR PRESIDENT, TO PERSUADE THAT PARTY TO ACCEPT THE NEED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS A MATTER OF REGRET TO MY DELEGATION THAT, IN SPITE OF THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE, THAT COOPERATION IS NOT YET FORTHCOMING. FOR WITHOUT SUCH COOPERATION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.

HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE WRONG TO DESPAIR. AS IS RECOGNISED IN THE RESOLUTION WE HAVE JUST ADOPTED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAVE ALREADY BEEN PLAYING AN IMPORTANT PART IN EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE. MY DELEGATION IS SURE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AND WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF BOTH PARTIES SO THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH PARTIES AND, OF COURSE, THE REQUIREMENTS

OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE HOPE IN PARTICULAR THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL CONSIDER URGENTLY THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO TEHRAN AND TO BAGHDAD, SO THAT HE CAN REPORT TO THE COUNCIL VERY SOON ABOUT WHAT FURTHER ACTION IT MIGHT TAKE.

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FM BAGHDAD 110520Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 437 OF 11/07/82

INFO PRIORITY: BIS TEHRAN, KUWAIT: MODUK (DS4) : WASHINGTON:

AMMAN: DAMASCUS: MOSCOW: UKMIS NEW YORK.

AND ROUTINE: OTHER MED POSTS: STOCKHOLM: UKREP BRUSSELS: UKDEL NATO.

SIC

TEHRAN TEL NO 418 AND NY TEL NO 433 (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

1. RECENT IRANIAN STATEMENTS DO NOT (NOT) LOOK LIKE SABRE-RATTLING HERE. THEY HAVE THOROUGHLY ALARMED THE IRAQIS.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING MY DA'S TEL NO 080840Z OF 8 JULY TO MOD (NOT TO ALL) INDICATES THAT THE IRANIANS ARE SERIOUSLY PREPARING TO INVADE.

2. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY SENT TELEXES VIA THE LUMBUS THYSSENAREAD OFFICE HERE TO ALERT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT BASRA AND CLEVELAND BRIDGE AT KHOR AL-ZUBAIR AND THROUGH THE LOCAL WARDEN SYSTEM.

2. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY SENT TELEXES VIA THE LUMMUS THYSSENAEAD OFFICE HERE TO ALERT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT BASRA AND CLEVELAND BRIDGE AT KHOR AL-ZUBAIR AND, THROUGH THE LOCAL WARDEN SYSTEM, THE REST OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. THERE IS NO (NO) NEED FOR MEN TO LEAVE THE BASRA AREA AT PRESENT BUT I HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT WIVES AND CHILDREN SHOULD DO SO.

3. WE HAVE ASKED FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SMALL BRITISH COMMUNITY OF ELEVEN WORKING FOR A SWISS COMPANY SCHULTZ AT THE AMARA PAPER MILL TO COME TO THE EMBASSY FOR A BRIEFING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. BAGHDAD IS TENSE AND ANXIOUS UNDER A SUPERFICIAL CALM. THERE IS A NOTABLE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ARMED GUARDS AT KEY POINTS. I DO NOT (NOT) INTEND TO BRIEF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN BAGHDAD AT PRESENT BUT WILL DO SO AT THE FIRST SIGN OF IRANIAN MOVES ACROSS ANY BORDER.

EGERTON

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IMMEDIATE **CONFIDENTIAL** **INWARD TELEGRAM**

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FM FCO 281655Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 28 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE
WAS RECEIVED FROM BIS TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 381 OF 28 JUNE.

BEGINS

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, PARIS, MOSCOW,
INFO SAVING GULF POSTS, UKDEL NATO, STOCKHOLM.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELS TO FCO NOS 1049 AND 1050 :

IRAN/IRAQ: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I ASSUME WE WILL TRY NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN PRONOUNCING
ON WHAT CONDITIONS ARE OR ARE NOT REASONABLE FOR ENDING
THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.
2. THE IRANIANS ARE NOW TELLING WESTERN INTERLOCUTORS THAT
THEIR THREE ORIGINAL CONDITIONS ARE SURELY REASONABLE.
WITHDRAWAL HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE
IRAQIS AND SO HAS, TO SOME EXTENT, THE IDEA OF A NEURTAL BODY
WHICH MIGHT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, LOOK INTO THE CAUSES OF THE
WAR, THOUGH I IMAGINE THE IRANIANS WILL BE UNLIKELY TO GER
FROM ANY SUCH BODY THE UNEQUIVOCAL CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ AS
THE AGGRESSOR THAT THEY WISH.
3. I AM NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS EVER,
IN SO MANY WORDS, INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER
REPARATIONS, THOUGH IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT SOME OF THE GULF
STATES HAVE BEEN IMPLICITLY RECOGNISING THIS. CERTAINLY THE
IRANIANS FEEL THAT THEY CAN LEGITIMATELY CLAIM DAMAGES FOR
WHAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED. BY ALL ACCOUNTS KHORRAMSHAHR, QASR-E
SHIRIN AND OTHER TOWN HAVE BEEN FLATTENED, LEAVING HARDLY ANY
HABITABLE BUILDINGS, AND INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE HAVE SUFFERED
BADLY IN KHUZISTAN. THE QUESTION IS, OF COURSE, WHAT SUM OF
REPARATIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE ENORMOUS FIGURE OF DOLLARS
150 BILLION WAS CONJURED UP BY THE IRANIANS AS A ROUGH ESTIMATE
OF DAMAGE SUFFERED AND THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN STUCK WITH IT.
BUT THEY SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATIONS. A BELLIGERENT EDITORIAL
HERE THE OTHER DAY SAID THAT "IRAQ AND OR ITS PATRONS SHOULD
BE WARNED TO PAY IN CASH IN A MATTER OF ONE OR TWO DAYS THE SUM
WE DECIDE". INSTALMENTS AND BACK-PAYMENTS WERE OF NO INTEREST
AT ALL. BUT SUCH WRITERS DO NOT, OF COURSE, REALISE THE PHYSICAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF SPENDING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN A SHORT TIME
ON RECONSTRUCTION.

IMMEDIATE

INWARD TELEGRAM

00 BRUSSELS

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 281655Z JUN 82
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PART 2 ends:-


Baghdad tel 361 10/6/82

PART 3 begins:-

From tel 168 to Brussels, covering
Tehran tel 381 28/6/82

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