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PREM 19/1296

Box

Part 2

MT

~~SECRET~~ - UNCLASSIFIED Confidential Filings

Visits to London by King
Hussein.

JORDAN


Pt 1: June 1979

Pt 2: July 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
12.7.82		31.8.87					
22.7.82		17.9.87					
4.2.83		18.7.84					
14.2.83		29.11.84					
16.2.83		31.12.84					
21.2.83		29.11.84					
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11.5.84							
18.5.84							
28.8.84							

PREM 19/1296

PART ENDS





offer
then is
at
18.15.

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

Mr. Cales ought to
know better!!

Can we enter:

- (a) give him the hour on
10 December being kept
free for face station
meeting, switching the
in another line
- (b) give him longer on
12 December.
- (c) is preferable if it
can be managed.

Charles

DISTRIB

GR 365
 CONFIDENTIAL
 DESKBY FCO 301830Z
 FM AMMAN 301755Z NOV 84
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 808 OF 30 NOVEMBER 1984
 REPEATED FOR INFO MODUK (FOR HEAD OF DEFENSE SALES).
 YOUR TELNO 478: VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN TO LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Prime Minister~~

1. YOUR TUR CROSSED WITH MY TELS NOS 805 TO 807. THE HEAD OF PALACE PROTOCOL HAS TOLD ME THAT 12 DECEMBER IS NOT, AS THINGS STAND, A CONVENIENT DAY FOR THE KING. IF THAT IS ABSOLUTELY THE ONLY TIME WHICH NO 10 ARE ABLE TO OFFER (AND I CAN APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES) THEN I WILL OF COURSE SEE WHETHER THE KING CAN ADJUST HIS PROGRAMME TO ACCOMMODATE IT.
2. BUT, THOUGH HE WOULD NEVER SAY SO, I WOULD GUESS THAT HE WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED. AS I HAVE REPORTED, THIS IS A CRITICAL TIME FOR HIM. HE IS TAKING MANY RISKS IN TRYING TO RALLY MODERATE VOICES IN THE ARAB WORLD AND NEEDS THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THOSE HE CONSIDERS HIS CLOSEST FRIENDS - HE TALKED AGAIN YESTERDAY WITH WARMTH OF HIS GREAT RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.
3. HE WILL DOUBTLESS BE FETED IN PARIS AND URGED TO GIVE THE FRENCH A MAJOR SHARE OF THE PROSPECTIVE ARMS PACKAGE.
4. SINCE MY TURS WERE SENT WE HAVE RECEIVED FURTHER INDICATIONS OF JORDANIAN DISENCHANTMENT WITH RECENT SOVIET BEHAVIOUR. THERE IS THEREFORE PERHAPS A SLIGHTLY GREATER CHANCE THAN I SUGGESTED EARLIER OF INFLUENCING THE KING AGAINST A MAJOR ARMS PURCHASE FROM THE SOVIET UNION - BUT ONLY, I WOULD JUDGE, IF WE TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THIS VISIT TO LONDON.
5. I WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OFFER THE KING RATHER LONGER THAN 45 MINUTES AND ON EITHER 6 OR 10 DECEMBER RATHER THAN 12 DECEMBER. FAILING ALL ELSE, COULD THE PRIME MINISTER OFFER RATHER LONGER ON 12 DECEMBER?
6. AS YOU KNOW, KING HUSSEIN LEAVES FOR CAIRO ON 1 DECEMBER (FAIRLY EARLY IN THE DAY) AND WILL NOT BE BACK UNTIL 4 DECEMBER. I VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER I CAN OBTAIN FORMAL CONFIRMATION OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF ANY OFFER BEFORE HE RETURNS.

CONFIDENTIAL

10N

CONFIDENTIAL

ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK YOU CAN TAKE IT THAT ANY TIME AFTER HIS LECTURE ON 6 DECEMBER WOULD CERTAINLY BE ACCEPTED AND I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT A TIME ON 10 DECEMBER WOULD BE AS WELL.

7. GRATEFUL FOR A REPLY BY CLOSE OF PLAY ON 3 DECEMBER.

COLES

BT

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NEWS D.
PROTOCOL D.
DEF. D
PS
PS/MR LUCE
MR FERGUSSON
MR EGERTON.

COPIES TO:
PS/NO 10 DS
MR KEELING RMR MOD.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November 1984

King Hussein's Visit to London

The Prime Minister has seen Amman telegram number 797 about King Hussein's forthcoming visit.

The Prime Minister's diary is extremely full at the time King Hussein is here although she would of course like to see him. Virtually the only convenient time is from 6.00-6.45 pm on 12 December. I should be grateful if this could be put to the King.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

C.D. Powell

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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12
6/6.45

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Mr. Gales would like

you to see King
Hussein while he is here

There are no free

lunches.

Agree to see him
for a talk, perhaps over
tea?

CDP Gorkh

Yes
no 20/11 6/11/11

GR 450

CONFIDENTIAL

vis

PS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 271520Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 797 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1984



YOUR TELNO 472: KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. I TODAY DISCUSSED THE VISIT WITH THE CHIEF OF THE ROYAL DIWAN (MARWAN AL-QASEM).
2. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN FINALISED, LARGELY BECAUSE THE PALACE STAFF ARE FOCUSSING ON THE KING'S VISIT TO EGYPT (SEE MY SEPARATE TELEGRAM) WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE HIS VISIT TO LONDON.
3. ON PRESENT PLANS HE WILL BE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM 6 DECEMBER UNTIL ABOUT 14 DECEMBER, THOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FRENCH WILL INVITE HIM TO PARIS DURING THIS PERIOD (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN ENQUIRING ABOUT THE LONDON DATES).
4. APART FROM HIS ADDRESS TO THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES ON 6 DECEMBER AND AN ENGAGEMENT AT HARROW (FOR THE HARROW SONGS) ON 7 DECEMBER THE KING'S ENGAGEMENTS ARE SAID TO BE PRIVATE.
5. THE KING CONFIRMED BY TELEPHONE TO MARWAN AL QASEM WHILE I WAS WITH HIM THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER. I HOPE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE. KING HUSSEIN IS STAKING A LOT TO ON HIS EFFORTS TO PUT TOGETHER A MODERATE GRAB GROUPING AND TO RESTART THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WILL CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE WILLING TO USE HER INFLUENCE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AGAIN TO PERSUADE HIM OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ENCOURAGING JORDANIAN EFFORTS. FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND HIS VISIT TO EGYPT HE MAY WELL HAVE MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS IN THIS REGARD THAN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.
6. A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER MAY ALSO PROVIDE THE LAST HIGH-LEVEL OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE EVENTUAL JORDANIAN DECISION ON THE QRMS PACKAGE. IF, AS I SUSPECT, THE KING IS INVITED TO PARIS, THE FRENCH WILL CLEARLY HAVE A SIMILAR AIM.
7. AS REGARDS THE TIMING OF A CALL, MARWAN AL CASEM THOUGHT THAT THE EVENING OF 6 DECEMBER (YOUR TUR) WOULD BE A GOOD TIME. OTHER POSSIBILITIES, THOUGH HE WOULD NEED TO CHECK THESE WITH THE KING, WERE 10 DECEMBER AND THE AFTERNOON OR EARLY EVENING OF 12 DECEMBER. IF YOU CAN LET ME HAVE A SPECIFIC TIME (OR CHOICE OF TIMES) WHICH WOULD SUIT THE PRIME MINISTER, I WILL TRY TO TIE THE JORDANIANS DOWN.

cc to Mr Powell
No 10
change
2

CONFIDENTIAL

8. IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN WHO WILL ACCOMPANY THE KING ON HIS VISIT. QUEEN NOOR MAY DO SO BUT MARWAN WILL CONFIRM THIS AND OTHER DETAILS LATER.

9. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE KING AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EGYPT AND BEFORE HIS VISIT TO LONDON. MY REPORT MAY BE A LITTLE LATE FOR YOUR BRIEFING PURPOSES BUT I THIZ IT WILL BE MORE VALUABLE THEN THAN EARLIER.

COLES

.....
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NEWS D.
PROTOCOL D.
DEF. D. PS
PS/MR LUCE
MR FERGUSSON
MR EGERTON.

CONFIDENTIAL²

cc master

20

JR
(YDIAAQ)

be PC



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 September 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN

The Prime Minister gave lunch for King Hussein at No. 10 Downing Street today. A list of those who attended is attached. This letter summarises the discussion of the main issues during lunch.

Arab/Israel

2. The Prime Minister recalled that President Reagan had told her, and she had informed the King, that he would put forward a new initiative after the US Presidential elections. But there was little evidence of new thinking in the US Administration. The outcome of the elections in Israel seemed to be a recipe for stalemate rather than progress. The situation in Syria was uncertain. The problem of Israeli settlements on the West Bank had got worse. The Prime Minister continued that she or the King would need to visit Washington soon after the elections. What should they say to President Reagan?

King Hussein said that the basic problem was that the United States had lost all credibility and opportunity to influence events. They had become advocates for Israel. Meantime the situation on the West Bank had virtually passed the point of no return. He had no hopes of the new government in Israel. The effect of US policy was to ensure the polarisation of the Middle East. American promises had been steadily eroded. He would have nothing more to do with the Americans. He would turn for arms to Jordan's friends or to the Soviet Union. All attempts to revive the Reagan plan would be meaningless.

The Prime Minister said that the situation after the US elections would be different. President Reagan would no

longer have to think ahead to re-election. He might have more scope to do what he thought right. His powers of persistence should not be under-estimated. It seemed that he was going to get his way over the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, for instance. He had sold AWACS to Saudi Arabia. She did not exclude a tougher line towards Israel. General Shaker observed that the obstacles lay not just with the US Administration but with Congress, where it seemed likely that the Democrats would win a majority in both Houses. There was a fundamental ignorance of the area in Congress. One Senator whom the King had recently seen had not even been aware that Jordan had accepted the Reagan plan. The Administration's great failing was to look at the Middle East exclusively in terms of East/West relations. The Prime Minister asked whether General Shaker was saying that too strong an anti-Soviet line ended up creating anti-Americanism. General Shaker confirmed that he was.

The Prime Minister asked about the situation on the West Bank. King Hussein referred to the increasing pressures being put on the Arab inhabitants. Despite Israeli claims, facilities - particularly schools and hospitals - were poor. The Prime Minister observed that it was important to try to get these facts across in the United States. In reply to a question from Mr. Heseltine, the King confirmed that the scale of Israeli settlement on the West Bank made it almost impossible to conceive any longer of a peace settlement on the lines which he had earlier been ready to contemplate. Mr. Egerton pointed out that the occupation rate in the Israeli settlements was relatively low, at around 30 per cent. This left some room for hope that Israel's policy was reversible.

The Prime Minister asked about Arafat's position. King Hussein said that the Syrians were still trying to remove him. He agreed with Mr. Luce that Arafat did not seem capable of decisive leadership. He added that the Americans had missed an important opportunity by failing to put pressure on Israel to allow moderate Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to attend the Palestine National Congress.

The Prime Minister said that it seemed that the message which King Hussein wanted her to give President Reagan was that the situation had changed fundamentally; that present US policies were making the area more vulnerable to Soviet subversion; and that it would be no good the Americans just taking out old plans and refurbishing them. King Hussein assented, adding that the Prime Minister might also ask why the Americans were so firmly opposed to an international conference. The Prime Minister said that she thought that the American fear was that such a conference would only break up in chaos. She would be ready to go over to the United States after the elections with the message that the

situation in the Middle East had deteriorated and that early action by the Administration was needed. We would try to influence the nature of this.

Arms Sales

Picking up his earlier remark about the possibility of turning to the Soviet Union for arms, King Hussein said that the United States had pushed Jordan to this point. General Shaker rehearsed the history of Jordan's grievances, ending with Stinger. King Hussein continued that buying arms from the Soviet Union would not change Jordan's policies and alignment. The Prime Minister said that there were always risks in supping with the devil. Britain was ready to help. King Hussein said that, while his armed forces remained loyal, morale was low and it was difficult to motivate them. He needed a long-term credit for some £400 million to re-equip. The Prime Minister said that we were trying to work out a credit package which Mr. Heseltine would bring to Amman in October. She repeated our willingness to help

Saudi Arabia

King Hussein said that the United States was dangerously complacent about the situation in the Middle East generally and nowhere more so than in Saudi Arabia. He himself was very worried about the Saudi leaders who were isolated from reality. Conditions below the surface were not good. The principal threat would come from young Saudis who had travelled abroad and were unable to accept corruption and conservatism at home. When he had visited Mecca, he had been shocked to find that the Saudi Royal Family had built palaces overlooking the Holy Places, so that they could pray without leaving home. Unbelievable errors were being committed. But no-one paid attention to his warnings.

Syria

Asked what was happening to Rifaat, King Hussein said that he was being eased out. He could not predict who would eventually succeed President Assad. It would probably be a military man and an Alawite. It would not be Khaddam.

Egypt

King Hussein said that relations with Egypt were good. He hoped that Jordan would restore full diplomatic relations within a matter of days.

Libya/Morocco

King Hussein was dismissive of the rapprochement which he clearly did not expect to last. It was a very short-sighted move by King Hassan.

Iran/Iraq ^

The Prime Minister asked for the King's assessment of the prospects within Iran. King Hussein and General Shaker said that they expected the stalemate in the war with Iraq to continue. But there was no evidence of readiness for negotiations. A state of war seemed important to the cohesion of the Iranian regime. Keeping the army on the borders reduced the risk of their trying to seize power. But the situation could change very rapidly, in ways which the Soviet Union could exploit. However, the army would be a powerful force. King Hussein continued that he had met General Azhari who had painted a grim picture of conditions in Iran. General Azhari thought the time had now come when he must speak up. He had good contacts with senior officers in Iran. The Prime Minister doubted whether he could have much influence since he had been outside the country for a long period and was elderly. In answer to a question why the Iraqis continued to attack shipping in the Gulf, thus prejudicing international support, King Hussein said that it was the best means available to them to draw attention to the vital importance of the area and thus create pressure for efforts to achieve a settlement. The King added that he was inclined to give the United States a share of the blame for what happened in Iran and for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. He suspected that the CIA had supported religious extremists in the belief that they would be politically conservative and a bulwark against more radical forces.

After King Hussein's departure, the Prime Minister held a brief meeting to consider a number of the points which had arisen. The Prime Minister said that, although she normally sent a message to President Reagan following her meetings with King Hussein, it would not be appropriate this time in the middle of the US election campaign. An opportunity should be found, however, to brief the United States' Ambassador. We must try to discourage King Hussein from turning to the Soviet Union for arms. We should find out what credit terms the French would be offering and see if we could match them. We should not put pressure on King Hussein to buy items which he did not really want. This meant that we should focus on Javelin, on the spares package for armoured vehicles and on the updating package for their aircraft. Consideration should also be given to assistance with Electronic Warfare. It was important that the delegation accompanying the Defence Secretary on his visit should be a high-ranking one.

SECRET

-5-

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram
(Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN: TUESDAY 18 SEPTEMBER 1984

Present

The Prime Minister	His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal
Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine	HE General Zaid bin Shaker
General Sir John Stanier	HE the Jordanian Ambassador
Mr. Richard Luce	
Mr. James Blyth	
Mr. Stephen Egerton	
Mr. John Coles	
Mr. Charles Powell	

PRIME MINISTER

Meeting with King Hussein

He arrives at 1.00 pm accompanied by General Bin Shaker and the Jordanian Ambassador. Other lunch guests will be lined up by the Cabinet Room. You will probably want to go to the Blue Drawing Room before lunch.

Briefs attached with additional * material on the credit terms for purchase of British military equipment, plus a card.

C.B.P.

* at the back of the folder.

17 September 1984

Points for King Hussein

1. Arab/Israel How respond to Peres invitation? Small prospect of activity by US. Soviet proposals cynical. State of King's contacts with Arafat? *Moscow visit?*
2. Iran/Iraq Military stalemate likely to continue. Read Julian Amery's account of his visit to Iraq. General Azhari has been seen but cannot get actively involved with him.
3. Lebanon Outlook better with new Israeli Government. Prospects for Syrian withdrawal?
4. Syria Relations with Jordan. Rifaat banished?
5. Morocco/Libya Short term device or major shift?
6. Defence Sales Keen to help with re-equipment programme. Working on credit proposals: Heseltine to bring in October.
7. Duchess of Kent looking forward to October visit.

Continued over/...

8. Delighted Prince Faisal to start flying training here.

9. Hope Jordan will abstain on likely Argentine resolution on Falklands and persuade other Arabs to follow suit.

Supplies - Stores

Nothing committed

Plans - see vouchers.

30-7 Philipp Colford

Talk, Talk Talk - there is no more to come.

Yoruband - Xmas party

Spring no more other on the table



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 September 1984

King Hussein of Jordan

Thank you for your letter of 14 September enclosing briefs for the Prime Minister's lunch with King Hussein on 18 September.

* The Prime Minister notes from the letter that King Hussein is likely to press her to agree very soft credit terms for the purchase of British military equipment. The accompanying briefing, however, gives her very little indeed to say on this subject. I should be grateful if you could let me have urgently a rather fuller and more explicit line to take on this. The Prime Minister recognises that she will not be able to give King Hussein a definitive answer. But she feels that she must be able to explain the various factors we shall have to take into consideration to him.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

* Charles
✓
At flag.

Charles Powell

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

19 *CCPC*
②

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 September, 1984

*Prime Minister**CDP*
*14/9**Dear Charles,*King Hussein of Jordan

The Prime Minister will be entertaining King Hussein to a working lunch on 18 September. The King will be accompanied by General Shakir, Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces, who is coming to London especially for the meeting with the Prime Minister. Mr Luce will attend in Sir Geoffrey Howe's absence in Brussels. The Defence Secretary will also be present.

King Hussein arrived in London on 5 September with Queen Noor for a 2-week private visit. One of his engagements has been a visit to the Farnborough Air Show. Both he and Queen Noor are to have routine medical check-ups during their time here.

This will be King Hussein's third meeting with the Prime Minister this year. The success of the State Visit in March continues to have a beneficial influence on Anglo/Jordanian relations which remain excellent. But King Hussein is understandably gloomy about the lack of any progress towards peace in the Middle East: his deep disillusion with the United States for its overt support for Israel continues. In the absence of any evidence of US efforts either to play a mediating role between Israel and the Arabs or to mend fences with Jordan, US/Jordanian relations are at a very low ebb. The Jordanians reacted sharply to the US veto of the Lebanese Security Council Resolution on Israeli occupation of South Lebanon earlier this month. Their dialogue with Arafat has made no substantive progress. King Hussein seems to have no ideas of his own for reviving the peace process and has fallen back on hopes for a multilateral solution to be achieved through an international conference. The propagandistic Soviet proposals of 29 July stress the need for such a conference, and have inevitably received wide (but not, we believe, very sincere) Arab support. Mr Peres, in his first public statement as Prime Minister of Israel, has invited King Hussein to come to the negotiating table (although Israeli officials are privately sceptical about whether the King can in practice do so). The King has not yet responded.

Defence sales may be an important subject for discussion with the King. Following the US administration's withdrawal in March this year of its proposal to sell Jordan the Stinger missile system the Jordanians have been looking at alternative sources of supply, including the Soviet Union, France and Britain.



Finance is likely to be an important factor. The Soviet Union is reported to have offered extremely favourable financial terms, which we cannot rival. We have actively promoted Javelin, and the Head of Defence Sales MOD has visited Amman. We are now considering Jordanian proposals for the supply of a package of equipment costing up to £400 million. King Hussein will wish to press the Prime Minister to agree very soft credit terms if he decides to buy British equipment.

The Prime Minister may wish to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf conflict. King Hussein has close links in the Gulf but is in some difficulty with the Saudis who disapproved of his recent offer of direct military aid to Bahrain. King Hussein's assessment of the Federation Treaty between Libya and Morocco, signed on 13 September, will be worth seeking. The Prime Minister may also like to raise the prospects in the UN General Assembly of the Argentine draft resolution on the Falklands, and ask the King for a further Jordanian abstention.

King Hussein may raise the question of General Azhari which was mentioned in a recent letter from Mr Julian Amery to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister might say that we were glad to have been able to arrange a meeting, but we do not wish to go further.

/ I enclose briefs reflecting the above points on Arab/Israel,
/ Iran/Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Morocco and Libya, Anglo/Jordanian
/ relations, the Falklands, and General Azhari. I also enclose
/ personality notes, and a copy of the record of the Prime Minister's
last meeting with King Hussein on 17 May.

Yer ew,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

*Azhari?
The big issue
is not very
helpful.*

THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN: 18 SEPTEMBER

POINTS TO MAKE

Arab/Israel

1. The Israeli elections did not give Labour a clear mandate for progress in the peace process. But at least Shimon Peres has now formed a government. He will doubtless concentrate first on economy and Lebanon, but has already invited Jordan to 'join the peace process' without however offering any serious inducements. How will Jordan respond to this perhaps propagandistic invitation? Important to extract from it any possible advantage for peace. Negotiations, even on a shaky basis, could once started have dramatic effects in Israel. US may shy away from Arab/Israel as too difficult, despite President Reagan's professed intention to resume active role in 1985. PLO disarray, and failure to convene Arab Summit to follow up Fez are further obstacles. Can Arabs confront US/Israel with a credible peace initiative? What way does the King see forward?

2. Soviet proposals cynically timed to make propaganda capital out of present deadlock. A rehash of the Brezhnev proposals of 1982. Six 'principles' include contentious points which should be the subject of negotiations, not a basis for them (e.g. dismantling settlements, status of Jerusalem). International Conference idea fine in principle, consistent with European position, which envisages Security Council guarantees as part of eventual settlement. But not practicable now; Israel, US would not attend; and Arabs/PLO not agreed on negotiating position. An International Conference now, or any Security Council 'seminar' on Arab/Israel, likely to be counter-productive, pushing US and Israel still closer, and further dimming the prospects for a constructive US role. Rumours that Arafat may seek to stage a Security Council debate in October: better to stave this off. Syrians may in any case frustrate it.

/Iran/Iraq

Iran/Iraq3. Gulf Conflict

Stalemate continues. Believe that military reality may deter Iranians from undertaking offensive in near future. Concerned at continuing attacks on neutral shipping in the Gulf; important that international community takes every opportunity to uphold principle of freedom of navigation.

4. Mediation

Although both sides have in the main respected the UN Secretary-General's appeal to cease attacks on civilian targets, little prospect in short term of successful initiative. But United Kingdom ready to support any realistic mediation effort, especially through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General.

5. Iran Internal [If raised]

Although likely that delay in Iranian offensive due to internal differences over tactics, divisions within leadership appear to be on purely tactical level. No reason to conclude that Islamic Republic under serious external or internal political threat.

6. Release of Defence Equipment [Defensive: If raised]

The UK is impartial in the conflict and supplies no lethal items to either side. All export licence applications for defence equipment are rigorously scrutinised to ensure that no lethal items are released. The decision to release the Yarrow ships is merely partial settlement of contracts outstanding since before the Revolution; they are unarmed and could have no role to play in the current conflict.

/Syria and Lebanon

Syria and Lebanon

7. Syria largely pre-occupied with internal matters and Lebanon. Earlier animosity between Syria and Jordan apparently reduced. Does King Hussein detect an easing of tension? President Asad seems to be in full control again at home. Will Rifa'at succeed him or has he in fact been banished?

8. How does King Hussein assess Syria's role in Lebanon? Since abrogation of 17 March Agreement, Syria has devoted much time and effort to building up Lebanese Government of National Unity. Long term prospects of Syrian troop withdrawal?

9. Syrian-inspired terrorist activities have lessened in recent months. Does this mean tighter Syrian control over terrorist groups it harbours or a gradual move away from state sponsored tension as Syria becomes more aware of its national and regional responsibilities?

Libya-Maghreb

10. Qadhafi's regime continue to proclaim publicly their intention of flouting other countries' laws in pursuit of revolutionary violence. No substantive progress in our difficulties with Libya. Welcome release of two hostages but look for release of four still held unjustifiably as precondition for any progress however slight in reducing tension. Firm stance is in interest of international community. Should not rescue Qadhafi from isolation produced by his own policies.

11. We have good relations with other Maghreb countries. Morocco-Libya Treaty of Federation unexpected. A mere short term device or a major shift of balance within the Maghreb? Qadhafi's and Hassan's objectives? Effects on other countries of Middle East?

/Anglo/Jordanian Relations

Anglo/Jordanian Relations12. Defence Sales

Welcome any opportunity to build further on our well established defence relations with Jordan in the field of training and arms supplies. In particular, we are keen to help Jordanian Government with its proposed re-equipment programme. Far reaching effects of a major Soviet arms purchase by Jordan. We are working on credit proposals for latest Jordanian requirements (Javelin, Scorpion, aircraft refurbishing) which we hope will be available in time for Mr Heseltine's visit.

13. Visits

[Together?] Mr Heseltine and Duchess of Kent look forward to their visit to Jordan in October.

14. Prince Faisal

Delighted that he will start flying training here next year.

Falklands at the UN

15. Hope Jordan will again abstain in General Assembly on any new Argentine draft resolution which insists on negotiations on sovereignty and fails to acknowledge the Falkland Islanders' right to live under a government of their own choosing.

16. Hope Jordan will also take opportunities to induce other Arab countries not to vote for such a resolution. Important not to encourage the Argentines in their sterile and unrealistic approach, and thus set back prospects for real progress in the development of better relations between Britain and Argentina.



The National Archives

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BACKGROUND

Arab/Israel

1. President Reagan told the Prime Minister on 5 June that he intended to launch a new initiative on Arab/Israel after the election and the Prime Minister conveyed this to King Hussein in her letter of 20 June. But the US may have been pinning their hopes on a convincing Labour victory in the Israeli elections in July. The National Unity Government which has just been formed will find Arab/Israel policy one of its most difficult subjects. The economy and Lebanon are more immediately pressing. But some public gesture was always on the cards and Shimon Peres has already invited King Hussein to 'come to the negotiating table' knowing (as Israeli officials have told us) that it will be extremely difficult, for Arab reasons, for him to accept.
2. Arafat, with no real incentive to commit himself to negotiation, nor irresistible pressure to abandon it, is keeping his options open. His dialogue with Jordan continues but, according to the Jordanians, lacks substance. King Hussein appears to be losing patience with Arafat. Internal PLO talks continue but a Palestine National Council meeting has yet to be held; the latest, end-September, deadline is slipping. The Arab Summit, not held in 1983, is scheduled for December. This may also slip, and it is in any case doubtful that the meeting would be able to make any advance on the Fez Declaration 1982, which implicitly recognised Israel.
3. The latest Soviet proposals, issued as a press release on 29 July, were plainly propagandistic. They added little to Brezhnev's six principles of 1982, but elaborated for the first time on the details of the proposed International Conference. Arab reactions have been positive but unenthusiastic. Nevertheless the conference proposal enjoys general support, if only because it is the only live proposal. King Hussein has said
/many times

2.

many times that an International Conference is the only way forward. This is more a measure of his continuing disenchantment with the US than a true reflection of his views. Israel and the US have said they will not attend a conference. The UK, France and the Netherlands (European Security Council Members) have said that the time is not ripe. The UNSG has considered, as a fallback option, a Security Council 'seminar' on Arab/Israel; and we have heard in confidence that the PLO intend to call for a Security Council discussion for which Arafat would go to New York in early October. Either scenario would give the Russians a propaganda field-day, and would make less (not more) likely a more constructive US Middle East policy. We should encourage King Hussein to put a spoke in this plan. The Syrians and Saudis for different reasons may do the same.

Iran/Iraq

4. Gulf Conflict

Still no sign that long-awaited Iranian offensive will be launched in near future. Technical military difficulties, and internal tactical differences, may account for delay. Attacks on shipping in the Gulf continue; on 11 September the Panamanian-registered 'St Tobias', and on 12 September an Iranian convoy in the Khor Musa were hit by the Iraqis, the first Iraqi attacks since 24 August.

5. Mediation

Both sides have generally adhered to UN Secretary-General's appeal on attacks on civilian targets. But no reason to believe that any more wide-ranging initiative will bear fruit, given continued Iranian intransigence and insistence on downfall of Saddam Hussein. Although Jordan has tended to support her Arab neighbour Iraq in the conflict, she expresses concern that the conflict should be settled quickly.

/6.

3.

6. Iran Internal

Although the Iranian leadership has recently appeared divided both over the course of the conflict with Iraq and over internal Governmental and social questions, there is no reason to believe that these divisions are anything more than tactical. Nor does the regime face any serious danger from any of the splintered exiled opposition groups. Jordan has tended to be sanguine about the prospects for change inside Iran.

7. Release of Defence Equipment

Jordan may be concerned at recent press reports of the release of British defence equipment to Iran. As far as possible, we maintain normal trade links with both Iran and Iraq. We supply non-lethal, and refuse lethal, defence items (after rigorous scrutiny of export applications) to both. HM Ambassador Amman explained to King Hussein on 4 September our position on the sale of defence equipment to Iran and on the release of the Yarrow ships (but not the armoured vehicle spares).

Syria and Lebanon

8. Syria remains the leading radical Arab confrontation state in the Arab/Israel dispute, but has been pre-occupied this year with its own internal leadership problems and developments in Lebanon. President Asad's ill-health has given rise to a struggle for the succession which has centred on the President's brother, Rifa'at; its outcome remains unclear. Rifa'at has been in Geneva for 4 months. Two of his main opponents (Brigadier Ali Haidah, Commander of Special Forces and Major-General Shafiq Fayyad, Commander of the Third Armoured Division) have been dismissed. The President's health has improved significantly. The succession is probably still pretty open.

9. Following the abrogation of the 17 May Israel/Lebanon Agreement, Syria has worked hard to bolster the Lebanese Government of National Unity and to help implement the Security Plan for Beirut, the product of the Syrian Vice-President Mr Khaddam. Progress has been interrupted by inter-factional fighting and unwillingness to cooperate of Lebanese Government members themselves (Walid Jumblatt and Nabi Berri, in particular, have needed Syrian pressure to bring them into line). The going is hard, but the Syrians will continue to press the Lebanese Government for further implementation of the Security Plan and introduction of political reforms.

10. Syrian-inspired (or condoned) terrorist activity has shown an apparent decline in recent months. Abu Nidhal has been quiescent. There are good reasons for Syria to exert control over terrorist groups, not least the long term risk to its own stability from Shia fundamentalists. But the appearance of the Palistani Al-Zulfikar terrorist organisation in Syria gives cause for concern.

Libya/Maghreb

11. Morocco/Libya Treaty of Federation

King Hassan and Col Qadhafi signed a Treaty of Federation on 13 August. Hassan proposed it (presumably hoping to gain Libyan support over Western Sahara and Libyan jobs to alleviate huge Moroccan unemployment) and Qadhafi, even more in need of friends, agreed. The Treaty

/is seen

is seen by the Moroccans and Libyans as a counterbalance to the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian Treaty of Friendship. On paper, the Treaty provides for a joint assembly and executive committee under the direction of a joint (Hassan-Qadhafi) Presidency; a secretariat to alternate biennially; separate councils for political, defence, economic and educational and cultural affairs. Neither party is to interfere in the internal affairs of the other, but aggression against one will be seen as aggression against the other as well. What it will mean in practice, if anything, remains to be seen.

12. Reactions from others have been predictable. The Americans, despite assurances from Hassan that the Treaty does not alter US/Moroccan relations nor his pro-Western stance, are reviewing their policies towards Morocco. The Tunisians are playing it cool, but seeking to avoid any deterioration in their relations with Libya. The Algerians regard the Treaty as a Moroccan snub and have been shrilly critical. They have reaffirmed their support for the Sahrawi people and insistence that a solution to the Western Sahara problem must be found within the OAU arena. The French have again upset the Algerians by appearing too pro-Moroccan.

13. We have not commented publicly on the Treaty. We are dubious about is practical effects, and consider US and Algerian nervousness rather exaggerated. We should preserve our good relations with King Hassan despite his apparent new closeness with Qadhafi, while safeguarding our much improved - both political and commercial relations - with Algeria. We are studiously neutral on the Western Sahara.

/Anglo/Jordanian Relations

Anglo/Jordanian RelationsBilateral Relations

14. The State Visit to Jordan in March was a high point in our dealings with Jordan which are outstandingly friendly and free of problems. King Hussein is a regular visitor to Britain and has called 4 times on the Prime Minister in the last 12 months. Jordan is a key moderate state which needs and deserves our support, specially when the Americans have been so unhelpful to King Hussein.

15. Mr Luce visited Jordan - in November 1983 and as Minister in attendance on The Queen in March. Mr Heseltine will visit Jordan from 19-23 October. The Duchess of Kent will also be visiting from 11-14 October as King Hussein's guest.

16. A Ministry of Defence offer to provide flying training to Prince Faisal, King Hussein's second eldest son, has been well received by the King. Subject to minor remedial surgery on his nose and successful decompression tests, Prince Faisal will start his course in June 1985.

Defence Sales

17. After withdrawal in March by the US Administration of its proposal to supply the Stinger low level air defence missile system to Jordan, we, the French and Russians, have been active in promoting alternative systems. There have been 3 visits in July and August by joint MOD/International Military Services teams. It is now evident that the Jordanians are working towards a major package of defence equipment amounting to more than £700 million. The Russians have offered very favourable long term credit (we believe 2 to 3% over 17 years) and General Shaker visited Moscow in August. We believe King Hussein will visit Moscow in October/November. In their

/most recent

most recent talks with the Jordanians, MOD/IMS were invited to submit proposals on a revised list of defence requirements, totally £400 million which includes an increased number of Javelin (460 launchers and 4,600 missiles). Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicles, and up-grading the avionics of some of their front-line fighter aircraft. The crux of the Jordanian decision to buy from Britain may be the credit terms we can offer. At present, ECGD medium-term credit for Jordan amounts to £420 million, of which £277 million is already committed. MOD intend to have proposals ready in time for Mr Heseltine's visit in October.

18. The Americans have expressed concern to us (and to the French) about the prospect of a Jordanian arms deal with the Soviet Union. There have been suggestions that the Americans may be in a position to make a new offer to the Jordanians after the November elections. They would clearly like us to help postpone a Jordanian decision to buy Russian both for obvious political reasons and to keep the door open for their own commercial interest. We share US concern at the prospect of a major Soviet advance in Jordan: but have few really pressing arguments other than offering the Jordanians terms which will induce them to buy British.

Falklands at the UN

19. Jordan abstained on the Argentine draft resolutions in 1982 and 1983, in both of which years they represented the Arab group on the Security Council. We have not yet had indication of their voting intentions this year. The Argentines are currently seeking Latin American co-sponsorship for a draft UN resolution based largely on that adopted last year. The draft has not yet been made public, but is circulating in the corridors. It would be useful to remind King Hussein, particularly if we wish to enlist his support with other Arab countries, of the reasons why we regard any likely Argentine resolution about the Falklands as unacceptable.



The National Archives

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PIECE/ITEM <i>1296</i> (one piece/item number)	
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HM KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL

King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan since 1952.

Born Amman 1935.

Educated Bishop's School, Amman; Victoria College, Alexandria; Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Emir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1951 and acceded to the throne in the following year on the abdication of his father, King Talal, owing to ill-health. He has been in power longer than any other Arab leader and has survived numerous assassination attempts and threats to his throne including the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in 1958, the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, the civil war against the Palestinian groups in 1970/71 and periods of bad relations with Egypt, Iraq and, most recently, Syria.

King Hussein has married four times: to Princess Dina 1956-57; Princess Muna (née Toni Gardiner and of British origin) 1961-72; Queen Alia 1972-77 and Queen Noor since 1978. His marriages to Queen Dina and Princess Muna ended in divorce; Queen Alia died tragically in a helicopter crash. He has ten children in all.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SHARIF ZEID BIN SHAKER

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces, since 1976.

Born Amman 1935, son of the Emir Shaker who came to Jordan from the Hejaz with the King's grandfather, Emir Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954-55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. Posted as Assistant Military Attaché to London in April 1957. Attended the Long Armour Course in the United States in 1962. As a Major in 1963 he commanded First Armoured Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in the same appointment. In 1964 he attended the US Command and General Staff College and then took command of the 60 Armoured Brigade. Given accelerated promotion to Colonel in November 1965 and appointed Military Assistant to the King. Acquitted himself well in the 1967 war. Promoted Brigadier July 1968 as Commander Royal Armoured Corps. Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) 1970-72, Major General 1971, Chief of Staff 1974 until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief in 1976.

He and his wife speak excellent English. Their son, Shaker, (b. 1961) entered a preparatory school at Seaford and was at Eastbourne College. They have a daughter, Nesrine, (b. 1959) who was at school in England and at Santa Clara University, USA, before joining the Jordanian Diplomatic Service; she is engaged to be married to an Iraqi.

MR HANI TABBARA

Mr Tabbara was born in 1939. He has a degree from London University.

He joined the Jordanian police force in 1963 with the rank of lieutenant and in 1966 was promoted to major and appointed military prosecutor at the Court of State Security.

In 1971, he was appointed assistant military attache at the Jordanian Embassy in London. He spent six years here, during which time he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary en poste. He returned to Amman in 1977 where he worked briefly in the Prime Minister's Office.

From May 1977 to December 1979, he served as Jordanian Ambassador to Morocco. Thereafter he was Jordanian Ambassador in Romania (1980) and Saudi Arabia (1982).

Mr Tabbara is married and speaks excellent English. His wife is Moroccan and is a fluent French speaker. There are two young sons.

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17 MAY	1984 AT
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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING
HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 1700 HOURS ON THURSDAY 17 MAY 1984 AT
10 DOWNING STREET

Present: Prime Minister King Hussein
Sir John Leahy General Zeid Bin Shaker
Mr. A.J. Coles Mr. Hani Tabbara

The Prime Minister said that we had been delighted with The Queen's visit to Jordan. We had wanted it to be a striking gesture of confidence in Jordan and so it had proved. King Hussein said that the Jordanian people had felt pride and happiness in the visit. There had been a few anxious moments before it happened and he would always remember the support which the Prime Minister had given.

Turning to the Arab/Israel question, he recalled that during his last visit to London he had given to the Prime Minister a copy of the proposed Resolution on Israeli settlements in the West Bank which he had been discussing with the United States Government. At about that time he had also written to President Reagan urging him to use his influence so that members of the Palestine National Council could leave the West Bank. In this connection he had felt strongly that there was an opportunity at that time to change the direction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. But the American response on both issues had been negative. On the proposed Resolution, which had been based on known American positions, the United States appeared to be concerned that it might be amended in the United Nations in unacceptable ways. With regard to the members of the Palestine National Council the United States had not been prepared to take any helpful action. He had also written to President Reagan on a later occasion,

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following appeals from people in the West Bank to relieve their situation and move towards a peaceful settlement. He had drawn attention to American willingness to support the cause of Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union. In his answer, President Reagan had contrasted the position of Jews who wanted to leave Russia with the Palestinians who, he hoped, would be able to stay in their homeland. This reply had been hard to understand.

As a consequence of all this, Arafat was now moving towards a reconciliation of his differences with the radical Palestinians.

The Prime Minister said that she had seen recently in the press a statement which implied that Arafat was moving towards recognition of Israel. General Zeid Bin Shaker said that he had also seen this report. King Hussein said that he was pressing Arafat to move in this direction. In response to a question from Sir John Leahy, General Zeid Bin Shaker confirmed that the meeting of the Palestine National Council had been postponed because Arafat felt that he could not muster sufficient moderate support. Hence, he was now moving towards the radicals. The Prime Minister commented that if a PNC meeting was dominated by the extremists, the results would harm the peace process.

King Hussein then observed that conditions on the West Bank were deteriorating. Settlements were continuing and violence was increasing. There was evidence of Israeli involvement in the violence. The Prime Minister asked whether things would be easier if Mr. Peres was successful in the Israeli elections in July. King Hussein replied that for the first time the Israeli opposition seemed to be more moderate than the Government. So if the opposition was successful in the elections, this would signal a change of approach by Israeli public opinion. That would be helpful. Sir John Leahy pointed out that if the Israeli Labour Party

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won the elections they would still probably have to form a coalition.

The Prime Minister said that President Reagan would be visiting London in early June. We would devise a careful message to convey to him then about the Arab/Israel issue, though we could not expect him to take action during the American election campaign. She believed that at an earlier stage he had been prepared to do more for Jordan than previous American Presidents. We must now try to get him back on board. In his second term he might be able to achieve more. What would the King like her to say to President Reagan? King Hussein said that he believed the Prime Minister was well aware of all Jordan's concerns.

The Prime Minister then invited the King to comment on the current situation in Syria where there appeared to be a power struggle in progress. King Hussein said that the situation was very ominous. Asad appeared to be in poor health. His brother did not have the same stature. The worrying feature was that the divisions evident in the Lebanon might manifest themselves in Syria. There was great resentment against the ruling minority. If the latter divided, the situation would be unpredictable. The Russians were as unhappy as anybody about the Syrian picture. With regard to the Lebanon, the future was entirely uncertain. The Israelis were entrenched in the south and the problem of water resources gave them an increasing motive for staying there.

The Prime Minister then referred to the deterioration in the Iran/Iraq situation. We did not know why the major Iranian offensive had not taken place. It now looked as though Iran was attacking neutral shipping. This made an effort to promote peace even more essential but this was just as difficult as it always had been. Sir John Leahy commented that US intelligence suggested that an Iranian

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offensive was still some weeks off. The Iraqis had flooded a large area of country. It was possible that it was frustration with the failure to launch this offensive that had caused Iran to attack ships in the Gulf. King Hussein suggested that the motive for the Iranian attacks on shipping might be to bring about intervention to stop the war and thus neutralise Iraq.

The Prime Minister commented that ships would not go to the Gulf if the danger of attack increased. General Zeid Bin Shaker said that, if ships had protection from the US fleet, they might be willing to go into the area. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was not easy to give protection against air attacks.

We had told the United States that if the situation deteriorated they ought to contact the Soviet Union to make clear that they did not intend to exploit developments for East/West purposes. King Hussein commented that the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the whole area. Following the United States experience in the Lebanon, American credibility had suffered in the Gulf.

Talks were continuing with American firms and Jordan's Gulf friends about a project for an Iraqi oil pipeline through Jordan to Aqaba and perhaps onwards to Sinai. There was also a project for a Kuwaiti pipeline. Then, in a longer timescale, there was a scheme for a pipeline from Qatar and the UAE to Oman. These projects would make it possible to move oil other than through the Straits of Hormuz. The Iraqis insisted that the United States must be involved in the pipeline across Jordan. The Americans were rather hesitant. Once started the pipeline could be completed in 15 months. General Zeid Bin Shaker pointed out that the cost of the pipeline at \$1 billion represented one month of Iraq's present expenditure on the war. King

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Hussein emphasised that the Iraq/Iran conflict was a major war. There were now from 300,000 to 500,000 troops deployed on either side.

Sir John Leahy drew attention to the current meeting of the Gulf Co-operation Council. There were media reports suggesting that the Council had decided to take to the US^N Security Council the issue of Iranian attacks on shipping. The Prime Minister commented that it would be odd not to discuss this matter in the Security Council.

King Hussein observed that international action was at present limited to appeals. At some point it would be necessary to consider firmer action such as sanctions. The Prime Minister suggested that experience showed that sanctions did not work. King Hussein agreed that this was true especially with East/West relations in their present state.

The Prime Minister said that the present range of contacts with the Soviet leadership was insufficient to exert any real influence on them. King Hussein commented that the Russians were paranoid about their vulnerability and the threat posed to the West. Their feelings of insecurity were frightening.

The Prime Minister then referred to the problem of international terrorism and the recent episode at the Libyan Embassy in London. King Hussein said that this was a deplorable event.

The Prime Minister said that the American decision not to supply Stinger to Jordan had caused us concern. King Hussein commented that he had known in advance that this equipment would not be supplied. But what really worried him was why opposition to the sale had been mounted in the United States. Was this attributable to Israeli influence?

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Jordan had suddenly felt more vulnerable than ever before. Its armed forces had always been a source of stability not just for Jordan but the whole area. He had personally always respected and liked President Reagan. His recent public criticism of the United States had been an attempt to arrest the erosion of relations with that country.

The Prime Minister said that she would not be surprised if Mr. Shamir won the Israeli elections in July. Israeli public opinion tended to go for the strong man. King Hussein said that Mr. Sharon could well be the second in command if Shamir were returned.

The Prime Minister referred to the recent visit to London by the President of Israel. General Herzog had claimed that conditions in the West Bank were good - she had contested this. We were all worried about the extent of uncertainty in the Middle East - in Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf and further afield. But we had to go on trying.

Sir John Leahy stated that we were keen to supply Javelin to Jordan. We would be happy to provide any information that was needed. King Hussein said that this possibility was under serious consideration. (As King Hussein was leaving, Sir John Leahy mentioned to General Zeid Bin Shaker our concern that Jordan might seek Soviet arms.)

King Hussein said that he very much hoped that the Prime Minister would pay a visit to Jordan.

The discussion ended at 1745.

A.J.C.

17 May 1984

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THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN: 18 SEPTEMBER

DEFENCE SALES: SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

POINTS TO MAKE

Long-term credit (Defensive)

1. Cannot at this stage go into detail. We are however looking carefully at the length of time over which repayments could be spread. The difficulty is the very wide gap between the normal European credit rates (11.9%) and the very low figures which have been attributed to the Russians (what is the Russian figure ?). It is also against normal British practice to offer credit at all for ammunition and missiles.

BACKGROUND

DEFENCE SALES: LONG TERM CREDIT FOR THE SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN, INCLUDING JAVELIN, SCORPION ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES AND ADVANCED AVIONICS

1. ECGD are urgently preparing long-term credit proposals, but the prospects for putting together a package which is sufficiently attractive to the Jordanians are rather bleak.
2. The normal repayment period of loans to Jordan is five years. ECGD are working on a seven-year repayment period for this package (subject to Treasury approval). With a six-month grace period, and a nominal delivery commencement date of one year from placing of an order, this would in effect allow a minimum repayment period of eight and a half years.
3. ECGD are thinking of offering a first tranche of £150m credit at the "consensus rate" of interest of 11.9%. Credit would cover 75% of contract value, but not missiles or ammunition. Since Javelin missiles are a large part of the proposed contract MOD have pressed ECGD to re-examine this, and the proposed rate of interest. But ECGD have not yet formed a firm recommendation to Ministers.
4. We have heard reports that the Russians have offered their package at an interest rate of 2-3%.

E.R.

~~Caroline~~

Could you please
let me have a
date (or two).

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of King Hussein

I understand that King Hussein is likely to be in London privately from 7 to 23 September. We have not yet had a request for him to see you. But I am sure that he will ask. Would you want to take the initiative by offering a talk and/or a lunch? It should be relatively easy to find a date now that your South East Asia trip has been postponed.

Lunch is often
easier
met

C.D.P.

~~Caroline~~ 4/19.
The FCO will
telegraph
Amman.

31 August 1984

C.D.P.

~~Caroline~~
TUE 18 Sept
Will you
talk to
FCO?

CR
319



He EA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 August 1984

This is just to record that the Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 7 August about the current state of play on defence sales to Jordan.

Tim Flesher

Simon Lowe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-920 7022 218 2111/3

MO 11/10/4

7th August 1984

Dear Charles

Prime Minister

King Hussein may visit Moscow in the Autumn, and Mr Heseltine wants to put together an attractive UK package before then.

DEFENCE SALES TO JORDAN

Nick Evans here wrote to John Coles on 16th May, prior to the Prime Minister's meeting with King Hussein. His letter recorded the Defence Secretary's concern about the extent to which Jordan might look to the Russians for supplies of defence equipment, given her general disenchantment with the USA in the wake of the refusal to supply Stinger. The Prime Minister may now wish to be aware of some recent developments.

Early in July International Military Services Ltd were asked by the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to provide a proposal for financing a large part of Jordan's purported medium term defence requirements. An outline list of equipment requirements was then jointly compiled by IMS and the JAF Procurement staff, and a copy is attached. The estimated value of this list is in the order of £750M - well beyond the Defence Sales Organisation's assessment of Jordanian medium term purchasing ability.

James Blyth, our Head of Defence Sales, visited Amman on 24th-25th July to discuss the matter further and in his meeting with the Commander-in-Chief confirmed that the Jordanians do indeed want the UK to propose a Government-to-Government credit package. A similar request was made of the French during President Mitterand's visit to Jordan (9th-11th July) but without so detailed a list.

The Jordanians have been told by the Americans of a private conversation which Mr Weinberger had with Mr Heseltine in the margins of a NATO meeting in May in which he asked that we should help Jordan, given the inability of the US Administration to do so. Although there was at that time no question of any shopping list, the Americans may have encouraged them to believe that British help will be forthcoming on favourable terms. James Blyth emphasised to the Commander-in-Chief that we will look at their requests on their merits in the context of Anglo-Jordanian relations, rather than because of American influence.

C Powell Esq



The Russians, meanwhile, have already proposed a large equipment package on very soft terms (believed to be of the order of 17 years at 2%). Furthermore, having earlier postponed his visit, the Commander-in-Chief is in Moscow this week, and King Hussein proposes making a similar visit in the Autumn. There seems little doubt that King Hussein and the Commander-in-Chief are trying to obtain a major long-term credit package from the UK (and France) in order to counter those within Jordan who would now turn to Russia, as a reaction to the deterioration in Jordanian/American relationships.

Mr Heseltine is currently planning to visit Amman towards the end of October, and we have undertaken to provide the Jordanians with a credit proposal based on their equipment requirements by then. A team will visit Jordan within the next week to seek further details of these requirements, to establish priority ratings and hence in-service dates and cash-flow data. We will then approach ECGD in the usual way, in the hope that HMG could be as generous as possible, given the wider political considerations.

I am copying this letter to Colin Budd (FCO) and Andrew Lansley (DTI).

Yours ever

Simon Lowe

(S H LOWE)

OUTLINE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS : JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES

- Armour - Khalid Main Battle Tank: 120mm Ammunition and Spares
- Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles
- 105mm Tank Ammunition
- Artillery - Multi-Launch Rocket System
(Launchers and Support Vehicles)
- Low Level and Medium Level Air Defence Systems
(Missiles and Guns)
Including Javelin
- Training Simulators
- Engineer - Mine Clearing Equipment/Vehicles
- Mobile Bridging Vehicles and Combat Bridging
- Armoured Engineer Equipment (including Combat
Engineer Tractor)
- Wheeled Loaders; Graders; Excavators (Tracked and
Wheeled); Tracked Crane (20-40 tonnes); Dump
Truck (8 tonnes); Fork Lift (10 tonnes)
- Plant/Construction Equipment (Dozers, Cement Mixers,
Compressors, etc)
- Signals - HF/VHF Radios with advanced speech security for use
in the forward area
- Electronic Warfare Equipment
- Infantry - Light Anti-Tank Weapon Systems for use at Company/
Platoon level
- Coastguard - Fast Patrol Boats
Logistic and Training Support
Port Facilities

Jordan: King Hussein

P# 2

58 AUG 1984



COMPUTER

CC MASTER

FILE
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 May 1984

Dear Peter,

Call on the Prime Minister by King Hussein

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and King Hussein at 10 Downing Street today.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

You are

for info.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING
HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 1700 HOURS ON THURSDAY 17 MAY 1984 AT
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Present: Prime Minister King Hussein
Sir John Leahy General Zeid Bin Shaker
Mr. A.J. Coles Mr. Hani Tabbara

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following appeals from people in the West Bank to relieve their situation and move towards a peaceful settlement. He had drawn attention to American willingness to support the cause of Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union. In his answer, President Reagan had contrasted the position of Jews who wanted to leave Russia with the Palestinians who, he hoped, would be able to stay in their homeland. This reply had been hard to understand.

As a consequence of all this, Arafat was now moving towards a reconciliation of his differences with the radical Palestinians.

The Prime Minister said that she had seen recently in the press a statement which implied that Arafat was moving towards recognition of Israel. General Zeid Bin Shaker said that he had also seen this report. King Hussein said that he was pressing Arafat to move in this direction. In response to a question from Sir John Leahy, General Zeid Bin Shaker confirmed that the meeting of the Palestine National Council had been postponed because Arafat felt that he could not muster sufficient moderate support. Hence, he was now moving towards the radicals. The Prime Minister commented that if a PNC meeting was dominated by the extremists, the results would harm the peace process.

King Hussein then observed that conditions on the West Bank were deteriorating. Settlements were continuing and violence was increasing. There was evidence of Israeli involvement in the violence. The Prime Minister asked whether things would be easier if Mr. Peres was successful in the Israeli elections in July. King Hussein replied that for the first time the Israeli opposition seemed to be more moderate than the Government. So if the opposition was successful in the elections, this would signal a change of approach by Israeli public opinion. That would be helpful. Sir John Leahy pointed out that if the Israeli Labour Party

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won the elections they would still probably have to form a coalition.

The Prime Minister said that President Reagan would be visiting London in early June. We would devise a careful message to convey to him then about the Arab/Israel issue, though we could not expect him to take action during the American election campaign. She believed that at an earlier stage he had been prepared to do more for Jordan than previous American Presidents. We must now try to get him back on board. In his second term he might be able to achieve more. What would the King like her to say to President Reagan? King Hussein said that he believed the Prime Minister was well aware of all Jordan's concerns.

The Prime Minister then invited the King to comment on the current situation in Syria where there appeared to be a power struggle in progress. King Hussein said that the situation was very ominous. Asad appeared to be in poor health. His brother did not have the same stature. The worrying feature was that the divisions evident in the Lebanon might manifest themselves in Syria. There was great resentment against the ruling minority. If the latter divided, the situation would be unpredictable. The Russians were as unhappy as anybody about the Syrian picture. With regard to the Lebanon, the future was entirely uncertain. The Israelis were entrenched in the south and the problem of water resources gave them an increasing motive for staying there.

The Prime Minister then referred to the deterioration in the Iran/Iraq situation. We did not know why the major Iranian offensive had not taken place. It now looked as though Iran was attacking neutral shipping. This made an effort to promote peace even more essential but this was just as difficult as it always had been. Sir John Leahy commented that US intelligence suggested that an Iranian

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offensive was still some weeks off. The Iraqis had flooded a large area of country. It was possible that it was frustration with the failure to launch this offensive that had caused Iran to attack ships in the Gulf. King Hussein suggested that the motive for the Iranian attacks on shipping might be to bring about intervention to stop the war and thus neutralise Iraq.

The Prime Minister commented that ships would not go to the Gulf if the danger of attack increased. General Zeid Bin Shaker said that, if ships had protection from the US fleet, they might be willing to go into the area. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was not easy to give protection against air attacks.

We had told the United States that if the situation deteriorated they ought to contact the Soviet Union to make clear that they did not intend to exploit developments for East/West purposes. King Hussein commented that the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the whole area. Following the United States experience in the Lebanon, American credibility had suffered in the Gulf.

Talks were continuing with American firms and Jordan's Gulf friends about a project for an Iraqi oil pipeline through Jordan to Aqaba and perhaps onwards to Sinai. There was also a project for a Kuwaiti pipeline. Then, in a longer timescale, there was a scheme for a pipeline from Qatar and the UAE to Oman. These projects would make it possible to move oil other than through the Straits of Hormuz. The Iraqis insisted that the United States must be involved in the pipeline across Jordan. The Americans were rather hesitant. Once started the pipeline could be completed in 15 months. General Zeid Bin Shaker pointed out that the cost of the pipeline at \$1 billion represented one month of Iraq's present expenditure on the war. King

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Hussein emphasised that the Iraq/Iran conflict was a major war. There were now from 300,000 to 500,000 troops deployed on either side.

Sir John Leahy drew attention to the current meeting of the Gulf Co-operation Council. There were media reports suggesting that the Council had decided to take to the US Security Council the issue of Iranian attacks on shipping. The Prime Minister commented that it would be odd not to discuss this matter in the Security Council.

King Hussein observed that international action was at present limited to appeals. At some point it would be necessary to consider firmer action such as sanctions. The Prime Minister suggested that experience showed that sanctions did not work. King Hussein agreed that this was true especially with East/West relations in their present state.

The Prime Minister said that the present range of contacts with the Soviet leadership was insufficient to exert any real influence on them. King Hussein commented that the Russians were paranoid about their vulnerability and the threat posed to the West. Their feelings of insecurity were frightening.

The Prime Minister then referred to the problem of international terrorism and the recent episode at the Libyan Embassy in London. King Hussein said that this was a deplorable event.

The Prime Minister said that the American decision not to supply Stinger to Jordan had caused us concern. King Hussein commented that he had known in advance that this equipment would not be supplied. But what really worried him was why opposition to the sale had been mounted in the United States. Was this attributable to Israeli influence?

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Jordan had suddenly felt more vulnerable than ever before. Its armed forces had always been a source of stability not just for Jordan but the whole area. He had personally always respected and liked President Reagan. His recent public criticism of the United States had been an attempt to arrest the erosion of relations with that country.

The Prime Minister said that she would not be surprised if Mr. Shamir won the Israeli elections in July. Israeli public opinion tended to go for the strong man. King Hussein said that Mr. Sharon could well be the second in command if Shamir were returned.

The Prime Minister referred to the recent visit to London by the President of Israel. General Herzog had claimed that conditions in the West Bank were good - she had contested this. We were all worried about the extent of uncertainty in the Middle East - in Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf and further afield. But we had to go on trying.

Sir John Leahy stated that we were keen to supply Javelin to Jordan. We would be happy to provide any information that was needed. King Hussein said that this possibility was under serious consideration. (As King Hussein was leaving, Sir John Leahy mentioned to General Zeid Bin Shaker our concern that Jordan might seek Soviet arms.)

King Hussein said that he very much hoped that the Prime Minister would pay a visit to Jordan.

The discussion ended at 1745.

A.J.C.

17 May 1984

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KING HUSSEIN

Queen's Visit

Prince Faisal (son)

Glad he is to train at Cranwell as jet pilot.

Iran/Iraq War

Attacks on shipping very worrying.

What can be done?

Arab/Israel

Will see President Reagan in early June.

Israeli elections - would Labour Party victory help?

Jordan/PLO dialogue - is Arafat really committed?

Libya

You will understand difficulties.

Concerned about British community.

Ground-to-air weapons

US refusal to supply STINGER.

Short's proposal to supply JAVELIN.

/ Russian arms

Russian arms - hope you will consider
options very carefully. Major Russian
supply would give us concern.

CC PC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

17 May, 1984

Dear John,

M/S
hKing Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

In my letter of 16 May I undertook to let you have further advice this morning in the light of the letter from Nick Evans to you of 16 May about the possibility of Soviet arms sales to Jordan.

The point is already covered in the briefing I provided last night (which included a contribution from the MOD). I now enclose a copy of Mr Urwick's telegram on this subject to which reference is made in Nick Evans' letter. We share the Defence Secretary's concern about the implications of Jordanian dependence on Russian weapons systems. We suggest that the Prime Minister might probe King Hussein on his intentions and urge that all options should be carefully considered before a decision is taken.

I am copying this to Nick Evans (MOD).

Yours ever,
P F Ricketts(P F Ricketts)
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GR 550

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FM AMMAN 071630Z MAY 84
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 467 OF 7 MAY 1984
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JEDDA, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

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NS 08713

- 9 MAY 1984

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MY TELNO 434: LOW LEVEL AIR DEFENCE FOR JORDAN

- (21)
1. THE HEAD OF DEFENCE SALES VISITED JORDAN FROM 2 - 4 MAY AND OFFERED THE JORDANIANS BOTH BLOWPIPE AND JAVELIN ON FAVOURABLE TERMS. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET OF MR BLYTH'S MEETING WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON 3 MAY, WHICH I ALSO ATTENDED, THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN BLOWPIPE. HOWEVER, GENERAL SHAKER WAS FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED BY OUR OFFER OF JAVELIN, WITH DELIVERY TO BEGIN 18 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF ORDER AND PAYMENT FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF IT TO BE MADE THROUGH OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS IN JORDANIAN PHOSPHATES.
 2. THE JORDANIANS HAD PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE JAVELIN AVAILABLE UNTIL MUCH LATER AND WERE THEREFORE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED THAT WE COULD PRODUCE THEM SO SOON. SHAKER SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH KING HUSSEIN, BUT WELCOMED THE PRESENTATION OF JAVELIN TO BE GIVEN BY SHORT BROTHERS IN JORDAN ON 21 MAY. UNFORTUNATELY, ARAFAT'S UNEXPECTED VISIT TO AMMAN PREVENTED KING HUSSEIN FROM SEEING HDS SEMI COLON HE WAS TO HAVE ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR MR BLYTH ON 2 MAY.
 3. SHAKER HAS SINCE TOLD MY US COLLEAGUE THAT HE IS VERY PLEASED OVER THE BRITISH OFFER. HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE PUT A PROPOSAL TO JORDAN WHICH GOES WELL BEYOND PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO STINGER AND THAT THEY MAY HAVE OFFERED AN INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT SEMI COLON VIETS HAS ALSO HEARD THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE REQUESTED FROM THE RUSSIANS DETAILS OF TANKS AND ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO JORDAN. SHAKER TOLD VIETS TODAY THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE STILL WAITING FOR MORE DETAILS OF WHAT THE RUSSIANS COULD OFFER, ESPECIALLY PRICES. HOWEVER, VIETS REMARKED TO ME THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD SEEN KING HUSSEIN MORE FREQUENTLY IN THE LAST MONTH THAN OVER THE WHOLE OF THE LAST THREE YEARS AND HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE JORDANIANS TO PURCHASE MORE SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

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4. SHAKER HAS HAD AN INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW IN HIS PENDING TRAY FOR SOME MONTHS. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THE DECISION ON WHETHER AND WHEN HE GOES WILL DEPEND PARTLY AT LEAST ON WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO SAY ON THE COST AND AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

5. SHAKER WILL BE GOING TO WASHINGTON IN ABOUT TEN DAYS TIME FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE JOINT JORDAN/US MILITARY COMMISSION. SHAKER CATEGORICALLY ASSURED THE US AMBASSADOR (HE HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN ME A SIMILAR ASSURANCE: SEE MY TUR) THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD NOT TAKE ANY PRECIPITATE DECISION ON ARMS PROCUREMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD FIRST LOOK VERY CAREFULLY AT ALL THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON OFFER SEMI COLON BUT HE ALSO REFERRED TO JORDAN'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND CONSEQUENTLY THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF PAYMENT TERMS.

6. WHILE THE JORDANIANS DO HAVE PRESSING REQUIREMENTS IN THE AIR DEFENCE FIELD, THEY WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE ENOUGH MODERN TANKS, ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY TO MEET THEIR IMMEDIATE NEEDS. IT IS ALSO DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE JORDANIANS, WHO ALREADY HAVE US AND FRENCH AIRCRAFT IN THEIR AIRFORCE INVENTORY, WOULD WISH TO PURCHASE AIRCRAFT FROM THE RUSSIANS IF ONLY ON LOGISTIC GROUNDS. BUT IF THE PAYMENT TERMS ARE RIGHT, THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE TEMPTED BY SOVIET AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT. OUR OFFER OF JAVELIN WAS THEREFORE MOST TIMELY.

URWICK

BT

(REPEATED 'AS REQUESTED')

LIMITED

NENAD

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

ACDD

TRED

PS/MR LUCE

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

16 May 1984

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

King Hussein will call on the Prime Minister at 1700 on 17 May. I enclose briefing. As Sir Geoffrey Howe will be in Paris, Mr Luce will attend. General Zeid Bin Shaker, Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces, who is also here on a short private visit and is one of the King's close advisers, and Mr Hani Tabbara, the Jordanian Ambassador, will accompany King Hussein.

King Hussein arrived in London with Queen Noor on 10 May for a private ten-day visit. One of his engagements was a "phone-in" on 13 May, organised by the BBC in which he answered questions from around the world about the Arab/Israel dispute.

King Hussein last called on the Prime Minister on 16 February on his way home from Washington. A record of that meeting is enclosed. He was pessimistic then about the prospects for restarting the peace process in the Middle East. The US had stumbled in Lebanon and lost sight of the wider Arab/Israel problem, doing nothing to halt the advance of Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

Developments since have given King Hussein no grounds for taking a more optimistic view. US policy in the region has suffered two more blows, with the final disappearance of the MNF at the end of March, and the abrogation of the Lebanon/Israel Agreement of 17 May 1983. There have been other irritants too, including King Hussein's attempts to win US support for a Jordanian draft of a Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlement policies, and his attempts to get the US to put pressure on Israel to allow moderate members of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to leave the West Bank to attend a PNC plenary session. He was particularly angered when, in response to some plain talking on his part to the New York Times, President Reagan withdrew from Congress his proposal to sell Jordan the Stinger air-defence system.

/One



One bright feature has been the State Visit to Jordan at the end of March which was warmly welcomed as a timely gesture of our confidence in King Hussein and his moderate policies.

Arab/Israel, and the Jordan/PLO dialogue will be natural topics for conversation. It would be interesting to hear how the King sees the way forward with a re-elected President Reagan, or with a new Democratic President, and whether he believes that an Israeli Labour administration might bring new approaches on Arab/Israel.

A further visit to Amman by Yasir Arafat on 2 May appears to have added nothing of substance to the PLO/Jordan dialogue resumed at the end of February; but it would be useful to hear the King's own assessment. The Jordanian Information Minister has just returned from a visit to Cairo where she was President Mubarak. There is talk of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Jordan and Egypt. This would be a very significant development for the moderate Arab camp, which we would warmly welcome. It would provide cover for others (e.g. Iraq) to follow suit. What time-scale does King Hussein envisage?

On Libya, King Hussein's own recent painful experiences with the Libyans, and his current low morale, may lead him to recommend a tough and even aggressive line with Qadhafi. This needs to be seen against the background that King Hussein's relationship with Qadhafi is quite different from ours: in particular he does not have a large community resident in Libya whose fate is of immediate concern at home.

The Prime Minister may also wish to discuss the latest developments in the Iran/Iraq war.

On bilateral relations, defence sales are the main item of immediate interest. The withdrawal of the US proposal to sell Stinger to the Jordanians opened the field for other suppliers. The Russians have already made an offer based on SAM7s. Jordanian dependence on Russian weapons systems would be a serious matter. I shall let you have further advice in the morning in the light of Nick Evans' letter of 16 May setting out the Defence Secretary's views, which I have just seen.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 17 MAY

Points to Make

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. Understand King's disappointment with US policy. US failure to intercede with Israel to allow West Bank delegates to attend PNC particularly disappointing. Jordanian draft SCR on Israeli settlements should also have been acceptable to the US, since it did not describe the settlements as illegal.
2. US however remains crucial. Clearly not realistic to expect active US role until after the elections. But President Reagan seems personally committed to his 1982 plan, despite its rejection by Israel. Israeli Labour party, which may form next government, welcomed 'positive elements' in the Reagan plan. We impress on the Americans the importance of resuming active and genuine mediation urgently after the elections, and look forward to a revamped Reagan plan. Will be seeing President Reagan in London next month.
3. Important in the meantime to take no steps which might damage the prospects for a constructive US role in 1985. Arab side must also lay groundwork so as to be ready to respond quickly to post-election US initiatives. Must also be ready to respond to a possible initiative from a new Israeli Government while the US is still preoccupied with elections.
4. Jordan/PLO dialogue? Is Arafat really committed to this? Does he mean it when he says he is ready for reconciliation with Syria? Not realistic to call on US to deal with him if he is mending his fences with radical groups opposed to negotiation.

5. Prospects for restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt? We would welcome this. Timing? Would Iraqis, Moroccans, Saudis, others follow?

LEBANON

6. Encouraging that Karame has managed to form new Government of National Unity. But will it be able to agree on internal security arrangements, let alone tackle fundamental issues of constitutional/administrative reform?

7. Will continue to give public support to new Government. Security arrangements on the Southern frontier will have to be negotiated with Israel before Israeli forces will leave. Will Syria then live up to her promise to withdraw?

LIBYA

8. No need to explain to King Hussein the nature of our difficulties with Libya. Although diplomatic relations are now broken we are under no illusions that our difficulties are over. There are three ways in which Col Qadhafi may make difficulties: by attacking British targets in other countries: by providing support for the IRA, or by action against the British community in Libya.

9. We are seriously concerned about Britons living and working in Libya who face risk of detentions in (false) retaliation for the detention of 5 Libyans in the United Kingdom.

10. Some signs of unrest and dissatisfaction in Libya. But reports of a terrorist attack against Col Qadhafi's headquarters on 8 May were exaggerated. How does the King see Qadhafi's future?

IRAN/IRAQ

The War

11. UK anxious to see an early end to conflict. But, at present, negotiated settlement unlikely. Mediation by UN Secretary-General perhaps remains the best hope. Immediate aim must be to prevent escalation.

Attacks on Shipping in the Gulf

12. Concerned by recent spate of attacks on shipping - Iranian retaliation could affect third countries and thereby widen the conflict. Such attacks harm Iraq's friends without doing great damage to the Iranian war effort.

UK response to escalation (if raised)

13 Initial UK response would be diplomatic and political. But the necessity for military action could not be ruled out. We are keeping in close touch with our friends in the Gulf.

Arms Sales to Iran (if raised)

14. We are neutral in the conflict and supply no lethal items to either side. We scrutinise carefully all applications for Iran and Iraq to ensure no lethal items get through. Our position was made clear to, and apparently accepted by, the Arab League Delegation during their visit to London on 30 April. HM Ambassador also explained our position on the outstanding military contracts with Iran to King Hussein in some detail at the end of April.

Anglo/Jordanian Relations

15. The State Visit was a great success. Delighted to be able to thank King Hussein in person for his and Queen Noor's warm welcome and hospitality.

16. Prince Feisal (King Hussein's 2nd eldest son by Muna). Very glad that he will be coming to Cranwell to train as a jet pilot (at expense of HMG).

Defence Sales

17. Welcome close collaboration between our countries on defence equipment. We would like to extend its scope and are ready to supply a wide range of combat proven equipment.

Blowpipe/Javelin

18. Pleased that proposal to supply Javelin missile system was welcomed. Hope Short's presentation in Jordan (end-May) will be well received.

120mm APFSDS Ammunition (defensive)

19. Aware of your interest in this ammunition which will be available for supply after British Army needs are satisfied and completion of hot weather trials.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Arab/Israel

1. Little movement is expected in the Arab/Israel peace process until after the Israeli elections in July and the US Presidential elections. The Jordanian/PLO dialogue, resumed in February after a break of 10 months, has made imperceptible progress. Arafat has visited Amman three times this year, most recently on 2 May. At the same time his representatives have conducted talks with the PFLP and DFLP, small but ideologically important factions of the PLO, in an attempt to mend fences before convening a Palestine National Council ('parliament') to consolidate his position. If he fails to rally these factions behind him Arafat may consider trying to set up a new PNC. But this would split the PLO, which Arafat still seems reluctant to do in spite of the determination he expressed to President Mubarak in December to 'polarise' the movement.
2. King Hussein called on the Prime Minister on 16 February. Since then he has written to President Reagan (and copied the letter to the Prime Minister - attached B) asking him to intercede with Israel to allow West Bank delegates, who are predominantly moderate, to attend the PNC. President Reagan refused this request and declined to support a moderate Jordanian draft SCR on Israeli settlements the text of which the King gave to the Prime Minister at their last meeting. (The King told HMA Amman that he would copy the rest of the correspondence with President Reagan to the Prime Minister, but he has not yet done so). In a New York Times interview on 15 March King Hussein lambasted the US for one-sided support of Israel and loss of credibility as a Middle East mediator. He has subsequently reaffirmed his personal respect for the President, but remains deeply critical of US policy. Dealings between the US and Jordan are likely to remain difficult at least

until after the US election.

3. The King is also critical of Arafat's dithering between dialogue with Jordan on the one hand and the pursuit of PLO unity on the other. Arafat has even said publicly that he is ready for reconciliation with Syria. The King believes that Arafat must identify with his real constituency in the Occupied Territories, whose inhabitants look to him to make urgent progress towards negotiations. The King has commented privately that he sees one of the main purposes of the current Jordanian/Palestinian dialogue as allowing the Jordanians to get to know and assess a cross section of the Palestinian leadership including middle-ranking officials, against the day when Arafat is replaced. For the moment however there is no clear successor.
4. King Hussein has told HMA Amman that he intends to resume full diplomatic relations with Egypt. His Minister for Information visited Cairo 8-12 May and saw President Mubarak. An invitation to Mubarak to visit Jordan is under consideration. Restoration of diplomatic relations could help promote a moderate Arab consensus and might encourage other Arab states to follow suit.
5. The Likud Government has repeatedly called on King Hussein to negotiate. But Likud's refusal to freeze settlements, rejection of the Reagan plan, and their concept of autonomy of people but not land do not persuade Hussein of their sincerity. A Labour government in Israel might take a more flexible line. Labour welcomed 'positive elements' in the Reagan plan, and Peres has offered to negotiate with Hussein on the basis of SCR 242. He has recently been in contact with both Jordan and Egypt, apparently offering the return of some territory, but retaining some for defence purposes. Labour may also envisage a modification, if not a freeze, of settlement activity. Peres has even met Palestinians who he knows speak with Arafat's blessing. According to their account he said that Labour would be prepared to talk to Hussein on the basis of SCRs 242 and 338, Camp David or the Reagan plan, would not object to PLO representation in the King's delegation and could accept a Jordanian/Palestinian confederation. It remains to be seen whether Labour, if they win, will take this line in office,
/but



but there must be doubts, especially since the next government will almost certainly be another coalition.

Lebanon

6. Despite heavy exchanges of fire in Beirut on 12/13 May, the new Government of National Unity under Rashid Karame (a Sunni Muslim heavily under Syrian influence) is still in business. Its immediate tasks are consolidating the ceasefire, re-opening the airport/ports and reuniting the Lebanese Army - the last point a precondition of any lasting improvement in security. Prospects are uncertain, especially with the powerful Lebanese Forces (Christian militias) refusing to cooperate.

7. Syria will ensure that ending the Israeli occupation is a high priority for the new government. The Israelis have confirmed to us that adequate security arrangements in South Lebanon are now the only pre-condition for their withdrawal and that, despite abrogation of the Israel/Lebanon agreement, they are ready for negotiations with the new Lebanese government. But until the Lebanese Army is capable of re-establishing its authority in the south - a distant prospect - Israel is concentrating on building up the 'South Lebanon Army'. a 2,000 strong mixed Christian/Shia militia under General Lahad. Despite rumours to the contrary, an Israeli withdrawal before the July elections looks unlikely. The Syrians have said that they will only withdraw after an unconditional Israeli withdrawal, and that they have no objection to the negotiation of Israel/Lebanon security arrangements

8. There is little scope at present for help by outsiders, beyond public expressions of support, such as the Prime Minister's messages of congratulations to President Gemayel and Mr Karame. The French have provided 80 observers to help supervise the ceasefire. The Ten's statement on 27 March reiterated support for Lebanese independence and unity and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. We have also publicly endorsed the need for security arrangements for the Israel/Lebanon border, in which we think UNIFIL could play a useful part,

if all concerned can agree to the expansion of UNIFIL's mandate, as suggested in the UN Secretary-General's recent report to the Security Council.

LIBYA

9. In a meeting with HM Ambassador on 22 April, King Hussein expressed his deep concern over our problems with Libya and his sympathy over the death of WPC Fletcher. He thought Libyan behaviour outrageous and fully understood and sympathised with our decision to break diplomatic relations. He recalled that Jordan had been obliged to sever relations with Libya following the burning of their embassy in Tripoli in February. (The Jordanians announced at the time that they held the Libyan authorities responsible for the attack).

10. The Libyan authorities have stated publicly that following the break in diplomatic relations British subjects in Libya have nothing to fear. But an article in the Libyan journal 'Green March' has threatened violent action against British subjects in retaliation for the detention of 5 Libyans held on charges arising from the bombing incidents in London on 10-11 March. These threats may be for local consumption, but could also reflect indecision in Qadhafi's mind about further action against us to secure the release without trial of 5 Libyans currently awaiting trial in this country.

11. Two British residents have been detained in Tripoli without charge since 17 April (British Caledonian's manager, Mr Ledingham and Mr Campbell, employed by the US firm Intairdrill). We have heard that 3 more British residents were detained on 13, 14 and 15 May, one for a minor traffic violation and a second apparently for visa irregularities. We are making urgent enquiries through the Italians.

12. Reports from Tripoli residents discount media reports of 8 May of an attack on Colonel Qadhafi's headquarters in the Azizia barracks. There was heavy firing during the morning of 8 May around an apartment block in the centre of Tripoli. There are indications that the Libyan authorities were expecting some trouble. It is probable that the incident was a preemptive strike against dissidents, all of whom appear to have been killed, possibly to show domestic opinion that there were enemies within Libya and so to justify the scale of the crisis with Britain.

IRAN/IRAQ

The War

13. No major fighting since March, although the Iranians may still be preparing for a further large scale offensive in southern sector. Not clear why this offensive has not yet been launched, but logistic difficulties and flooding of strategic areas are most probable explanations.

14. Iraqi Army's performance has been good, and they should be able to contain further Iranian offensives provided their morale holds.

Attacks on Shipping in the Gulf

15. Iraq continues to attack neutral shipping in the Gulf. On 13 May Iraq claimed to have attacked 2 ships en route to or from Kharg: the Iranian-registered Tabriz; and the Greek-registered Esperanza. A Kuwaiti-owned tanker, the Umm Casbah, was also hit on 13 May by an unidentified aircraft well south of the Iraqi declared Maritime exclusion zone (MEZ). It was well en route to the UK with a cargo of Kuwaiti crude destined for Shell. The aircraft reportedly made several passes before releasing a bomb or short range rocket, which failed to explode and did little damage. Such close range attacks have not been an Iraqi tactic recently, and this may have been an Iranian aircraft; if so this is a worrying development. There were

reports on 14 May of an attack (probably Iraqi) on another Kuwaiti-owned tanker, the Bahra bound for Kuwait and apparently hit by an Exocet). Two crew members were injured, but damage to the ship was only moderate. A Saudi tanker was attacked on 16 May.

Mediation

16. Prospects for peace remain bleak. Egyptian sponsored peace plan (through NAM) was rejected by the Iranians on 2 May. Iranian determination to bring down Saddam Hussein as a precondition for peace seems unaltered. No other mediation effort in train at present.

Contingency Planning (not for use)

17. We remain in close touch with the Americans (most recently on 24 April) and the Gulf States over action in the event of further escalation in the war. We have made clear to them our view that the first reaction to any deepening of the crisis in the Gulf should be diplomatic, although military action could not be ruled out if Western interests were threatened.

Straits of Hormuz

18. Iran has threatened to close the Straits if Iraq is successful in preventing all Iranian oil exports from Kharg Island. (Not for use) Our assessment is that Iraq is incapable of completely halting such exports. Retaliatory Iranian attacks on shipping with cargo destined for Iraq and strikes against Iraq's supporters in the Gulf are more probable Iranian responses to serious Iraqi interference with oil exports from Kharg Island.

Chemical Weapons

19. UK controls on exports to Iran and Iraq, covering 8 chemicals which could be diverted to manufacture CW of the type used in the Gulf war, will now be extended to all destinations. Our EC partners are currently discussing similar measures.

Jordanian View of the Conflict

20. The Jordanians have been consistent supporters of the Iraqi war effort and have assisted in the procurement and delivery of military supplies. A Jordanian volunteer force spent a short time in Iraq and took some part in the fighting.

21. The Jordanians blame Iran for the continuation of the conflict, stressing Iraqi willingness to end it. All attempts at mediation have foundered on Iranian intransigence. The Jordanians consider the best way to bring the Iranians to negotiate is to prevent Iran acquiring any military equipment at all, whether lethal or non-lethal. Their support for Iraq is probably based on a fear of the consequences of an Iranian victory.

Arms for Iran

22. The Jordanians have been concerned by false allegations that the UK is supplying arms to Iran. On 30 April an Arab League Delegation headed by the Jordanian and YAR Foreign Ministers called on the Secretary of State to discuss alleged British arms sales. They were satisfied with our assurances that we are not supplying lethal arms to Iran. HM Ambassador Amman has also explained to King Hussein our position on the supply ships: and on the military spares in the other outstanding contracts with Iran, which are still under consideration.

Anglo/Jordanian Relations

23. Bilateral relations. Our relations with Jordan are excellent and free of problems. King Hussein, a regular visitor to the UK, as are other members of the Royal Household, is a useful sounding board for Arab thinking. He called on the Prime Minister for talks during private visits to London in December 1983 and February 1984. The State Visit of March 1984 set the seal on the close ties of friendship between our two countries and the two Royal Families. A

Ministry of Defence offer to train Prince Feisal free of charge to RAF "Wings" standard has been well received by King Hussein.

24. Mr Luce has paid two visits to Jordan - in November 1983 and as Minister in attendance on The Queen for the State Visit. The Chief of Defence Staff visited Jordan from 14-18 January.

General Shaker, Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces was in London from 4-8 April on a private visit. He called on Mr Heseltine and invited him to visit Jordan, but no dates have yet been fixed.

25. The new Jordanian Ambassador, Mr Hani Tabbara presented his credentials on 23 March.

26. Defence Sales. Following the withdrawal of the US Administration's proposal to sell them Stinger missiles, the Jordanians are looking for another source of comparable ground-to-air weapons. Competition is from Sweden, France and USSR. Shorts of Belfast are keen to sell Blowpipe and/or Javelin: the Jordanians are interested only in the latter. Mr Blyth, Head of Defence Sales, visited Amman on 2 May to make firm proposals: Shorts plan to make a formal presentation in late May/early June.

27. The Jordanians are short of money, so financing will be crucial. Short's proposals therefore include an offset agreement for the purchase of Jordanian phosphates. There is considerable concern that Jordan might be tempted to opt for a Soviet system. The Russian offer is certain to be financially competitive and could comprise a comprehensive air defence system.

HM KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL

King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan since 1952.

Born Amman 1935.

Educated Bishop's School, Amman; Victoria College, Alexandria; Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Emir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1951 and acceded to the throne in the following year on the abdication of his father, King Talal, owing to ill-health. He has been in power longer than any other Arab leader and has survived numerous assassination attempts and threats to his throne including the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in 1958, the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, the civil war against the Palestinian groups in 1970/71 and periods of bad relations with Egypt, Iraq and, most recently, Syria.

King Hussein has married four times: to Princess Dina 1956-57; Princess Muna (née Toni Gardiner and of British origin) 1961-72; Queen Alia 1972-77 and Queen Noor since 1978. His marriages to Queen Dina and Princess Muna ended in divorce; Queen Alia died tragically in a helicopter crash. He has ten children in all (see attached family trees for their names and ages).

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SHARIF ZEID BIN SHAKER

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces, since 1976.

Born Amman 1935, son of the Emir Shaker who came to Jordan from the Hejaz with the King's grandfather, Emir Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954-55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. Posted as Assistant Military Attaché to London in April 1957. Attended the Long Armour Course in the United States in 1962. As a Major in 1963 he commanded First Armoured Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in the same appointment. In 1964 he attended the US Command and General Staff College and then took command of the 60 Armoured Brigade. Given accelerated promotion to Colonel in November 1965 and appointed Military Assistant to the King. Acquitted himself well in the 1967 war. Promoted Brigadier July 1968 as Commander Royal Armoured Corps. Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) 1970-72, Major General 1971, Chief of Staff 1974 until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief in 1976.

He and his wife speak excellent English. Their son, Shaker, (b. 1961) entered a preparatory school at Seaford and was at Eastbourne College. They have a daughter, Nesrine, (b. 1959) who was at school in England and at Santa Clara University, USA, before joining the Jordanian Diplomatic Service; she is engaged to be married to an Iraqi.

MR HANI TABBARA

Mr Tabbara was born in 1939. He has a degree from London University.

He joined the Jordanian police force in 1963 with the rank of lieutenant and in 1966 was promoted to major and appointed military prosecutor at the Court of State Security.

In 1971, he was appointed assistant military attache at the Jordanian Embassy in London. He spent six years here, during which time he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary en poste. He returned to Amman in 1977 where he worked briefly in the Prime Minister's Office.

From May 1977 to December 1979, he served as Jordanian Ambassador to Morocco. Thereafter he was Jordanian Ambassador in Romania (1980) and Saudi Arabia (1982).

Mr Tabbara is married and speaks excellent English. His wife is Moroccan and is a fluent French speaker. There are two young sons.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 1296 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: King Hussein to PM & US President dated 6 March 1984	
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PIECE/ITEM	49
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cc.p.c.
16.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~2307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/10/4

16th May 1984

ALP
h.c.

Dear John,

I understand that arrangements have been made for King Hussein of Jordan to call on the Prime Minister at 1700 hours on Thursday 17th May. Defence Sales are producing a brief on items of major sales interest for inclusion in the FCO co-ordinated brief, but I thought I should draw your attention to one aspect on which my Secretary of State has expressed concern.

Following the refusal of the US Government to supply Stinger missiles the Jordanians have been looking for alternative sources of comparable ground to air weapons. Short Brothers are hoping to supply their Javelin system, but are facing fierce competition from Sweden, France and the USSR; it is the extent of the latter's involvement that concerns Mr Heseltine.

HMA Amman believes, on the basis of discussions with his US colleagues, that the Russians are making a major effort to persuade the Jordanians to purchase more Soviet military equipment. He understands that the Russians are putting together a proposal which goes well beyond providing an alternative to Stinger and that they have offered an integrated Air Defence System including aircraft. It is also believed that the Jordanians have requested details from the Russians on tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The Russian Ambassador is said to have seen King Hussein more frequently in the last 3 months than over the whole of the last 3 years.

While the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces has assured HMA Amman that the Jordanians would not take any precipitate decisions on arms procurement, Mr Heseltine believes that the Prime Minister should take the opportunity afforded by this meeting to impress on the King how seriously we would view major arms purchases from the Russians, and to seek clarification as to his intentions vis-a-vis arms procurement and the USSR.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts and Richard Hatfield.

Yours ever
Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)


A J Coles Esq



Telephone No. 011 200

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1

16 MAY 1984




COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION


PRIME MINISTER

King Hussein

He is in Britain this week and would
much like to call on you.

May we offer 1700 hours on Thursday
(you have a meeting with the 1922 Executive
at 1545).


Yes  A.F.C.

No. 1922. 

To note. I have asked the
F./C.O. to arrange.

John Coles

11 May 1984

A.F.C. 



file

67

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 March, 1984

JORDANIAN DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

Thank you for your letter of 2 March to John Coles. The Prime Minister agrees that instructions should be sent to our Ambassador in Amman along the lines set out in the draft telegram attached to your letter.

(David Barclay)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CT.

cc fe ①

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree attached

London SW1A 2AH

telegram of instruction?

2 March 1984

Dear John,

A.S.C. 2/3.

Yes

mt

Jordanian Draft Security Council Resolution

During his call on the Prime Minister on 16 February, ^{attached} King Hussein handed over a copy of a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. He had given this to the Americans but Mr Shultz had expressed scepticism. He hoped that if the Americans could not propose such a Resolution, other friends such as the United Kingdom could 'help.' The Prime Minister promised to study the text.

The substance of the text presents us with no major difficulties. It has long been the Government's view that the settlements are both illegal and an obstacle to peace. Previous US Administrations have accepted the illegality of the Israeli settlements, but the present Administration has been stuck with President Reagan's remark while still a candidate that they are 'not illegal'. In August 1983, the US vetoed a Jordanian draft Security Council Resolution on this point.

The new Jordanian draft has been cleverly drafted, using material from President Reagan's own speeches, and stops short of describing the settlements as illegal. It seems to be intended to put the US on the spot. They would find it difficult to reject the draft publicly. But there is strong opposition to it within the State Department, who have prepared a draft Presidential letter to King Hussein explaining that his proposal is not helpful at this juncture, and offering to discuss further how to deal with the settlements problem.

It is not clear whether King Hussein is determined to press ahead with the draft, whatever the US reaction may be. We could hardly refuse to support the draft in its present form if it came to a vote. However, Sir Geoffrey Howe does not think it would be helpful to force the issue now when the Americans are likely to oppose the draft, albeit mainly for domestic political reasons. Sir Geoffrey therefore recommends that our Ambassador at Amman should be instructed to speak to the King in an effort to dissuade him on tactical grounds from pressing ahead with his resolution now. The Americans have expressed interest in keeping in touch with us on this: the telegram authorises the Embassy in Washington to brief them after Mr Urwick has acted in Amman.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby PRIORITY
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC
 GRS 2 GRS
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 271700Z FEB 84
 PRE/ADD 7 TO PRIORITY AMMAN
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
 10 ROUTINE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS,
 11 BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, JEDDA, ROME, JERUSALEM
 E D 12 MY TEL NO 130 AND WASHINGTON TEL NO 627: JORDANIAN DRAFT SECURITY
 13 COUNCIL RESOLUTION
 14 1. The text of the draft Resolution which King Hussein gave the
 15 Prime Minister ^{has been sent to you by separate telegram.} ~~is in MIFT~~ As reported in my TUR, the Prime
 16 Minister undertook to study the text. Although the King did not
 17 specifically ask for UK sponsorship, we should clearly give him
 18 our reactions to the draft. Please therefore seek an early
 19 opportunity to speak to the King. You should thank him for
 20 showing us the text and say that you have been instructed to give
 21 him the Prime Minister's response. You should make the following
 /// 22 points:
 // 23 (a) The UK position, stated many times (including in statements by
 / 24 the Ten) is that Israeli settlements are contrary to international
 25 law and a major and growing obstacle to peace efforts. We have

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword called
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution Arab/Israel Dispute
Drafted by (Block capitals) C W LONG		
Telephone number 233 6048		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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1 <<<<
 2 called on Israel radically to change these policies (my remarks
 3 in Riyadh on 11 January).
 4 (b) It follows from this that we have no real difficulty with the
 5 principle or the content of the Jordanian draft (subject perhaps
 6 to minor amendments: eg we should prefer to replace the words
 7 quote belligerent occupant unquote with quote Israel unquote).
 8 If the text came to the vote in its present form it would
 9 receive UK support.
 10 (c) We do however have reservations on tactical grounds. The
 11 crucial test of any initiative is whether it will help bring
 12 progress towards a comprehensive solution. It is important not
 13 to provoke US hostility or veto. Acceptable as the resolution
 14 is to us as now drafted, it is likely that it would be so changed
 15 in the course of negotiation in the Security Council that the
 16 Americans would once again use their veto. It would be a
 17 serious setback for the moderates if the Americans were
 18 manoeuvred by extremists into aligning themselves with Israel
 19 once again in this way on an issue so crucial to the Reagan plan.
 20 Furthermore, it might direct attention unhelpfully from
 21 current important and serious activity (ie the Arafat/Hussein
 22 dialogue) towards renewed technical (and sterile) wrangles in
 23 New York.
 24 2. King Hussein is apparently using his draft resolution to test
 25 the good faith of the US Administration over the Reagan plan.
 26 He no doubt wishes to find out before deciding his own options
 27 whether the Americans are willing to give him the support he
 28 needs on a settlements freeze. Leahy's talks in Washington
 29 (second TUR), and contacts with the US Embassy here suggest that
 30 he is unlikely to get the answer he wants. You may judge it
 31 appropriate to discuss this point with the King. You could say
 32 that we ^{fully} understand his need to know where he stands with the
 33 Americans. But this is not perhaps the best time to force the
 34 Administration into a decision which could affect policy for

///
 //
 /

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword many
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
3

<<<<

1 <<<<
2 many months ahead. . A better opportunity may present itself
3 later for ~~padding~~ ^{persuading} the Americans ~~into meeting~~ ^{to make} making more
4 positive moves.
5 3. (For Washington) Leahy undertook to keep in touch with the
6 Americans. You may wish to inform them, when HMA Amman has
7 taken action, of the line in para 1 above. Para 2 should not
8 be revealed. ~~_____~~
9 ~~_____~~

10 HOWE
11 NNNN

///

//

/

31
32
33
34

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

Jordan - Visits to London by King Hussein 42.

117
MAY 1984

117
MAY 1984

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

*Given to the Prime Minister
by King Hussein on 16 Febry.*

p.a.

A.S.C. 12/2

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of _____ and other statements made before the Council,

Stressing the urgent need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Taking note of the policies and practices of the Government of Israel, and its instrumentalities, in unilaterally authorizing, establishing, subsidizing, promoting and enlarging settlements of Israeli civilians in the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation,

Recalling Security Council Resolutions 242, 267, 338 and 497,

Affirming that the situation in the Middle East and in the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation remains grave and volatile and that Israeli settlement policies and practices, among other factors, adversely affect the prospect for peace,

1. Reaffirms that peace in the Middle East is to be achieved by the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and negotiations between the parties aimed at establishing a just and durable peace, as called for by Security Council Resolution 338.

2. Recognizes that Israeli settlement activity is not essential for the security of Israel and diminishes confidence that a final peace can be freely and fairly achieved.

3. Determines that Israel's settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, are an obstacle to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and contrary to the purpose and intent of those Resolutions.

4. Determines that Israel's settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories are without permanent effect or validity and cannot prejudice the status of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

5. Affirms that the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, are applicable to the Arab territories occupied

by Israel, including Jerusalem, and calls upon the belligerent occupant to abide scrupulously by the provisions thereof.

6. Calls upon the belligerent occupant to take no action which could result in a change in the legal status, geographical identity or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories.

7. Calls for a halt to the acquisition and allocation of land for settlements, the construction and establishment of new settlements, the enlargement of existing settlements and the settling of Israel's own civilian population in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

8. Calls upon all States to provide no assistance to Israel for use in connection with settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

9. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied Arab territories under close and constant scrutiny.

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months on the implementation of this resolution.

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Master

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, AT 1655 HOURS ON THURSDAY 16 FEBRUARY AT NO.10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	King Hussein
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Taher Masri
Mr. Coles	

* * * * *

The Prime Minister asked how the King's visit to the United States had gone. We lost no opportunity to press upon the Americans the importance of Jordan.

King Hussein said that President Reagan appeared to be determined to proceed with the commitments in the "Reagan plan". Jordan wished to establish what the United States was able to do in an election year. He felt very strongly that the situation in the Lebanon had put the United States in a trap. They seemed unable to find a way out. They would face mounting pressure to their detriment. He wondered whether they should not change their emphasis and return to their original objectives of removing all foreign forces from the Lebanon and promoting a process of reconciliation, leaving aside the political questions relating to relations between Israel and the Arab world until these could be dealt with in a comprehensive settlement. Every day saw further deterioration in the Lebanon. The two belligerents were backed by two super powers. In the circumstances the President of Lebanon was helpless. The United States policy of building up the Lebanese army could not work because that army reflected the divisions among the Lebanese people. The US must continue to concentrate on the Lebanon but should change emphasis so that the Palestinian problem, the root of all the difficulties, was settled.

The United States had many friends in the area. It should establish good relations with them and thereby reduce the Syrian problem to its proper size. It was humiliating to see the United States dealing with people like Jumblatt.

CONFIDENTIAL

/He

He had appraised the US Government of Jordan's recent moves on the Arab/Israeli problem. He planned to meet with the PLO to see if they could make progress towards an agreed concept of the future. He would tell the PLO that the first need was for the Jordanians and Palestinians to reorganise their relationship. Then they could move onto other problems. The/^{other}Arabs would be told that the Jordanians and Palestinians were the people directly involved in the problem. He wished to move away from the debilitating practice in the Arab world of operating by consensus and instead to work on the basis of a moderate majority.

President Reagan was a decent man who kept his word. The State Department were less clear and Mr. Weinberger had appeared far more realistic than they. He/^(Hussein)had made it plain that he did not want the United States to act simply as an ally of Israel but to rise above such a position and become an even-handed peacemaker. He had told them that action was needed to stop Israeli settlements. There had been two worrying developments recently - first, the Israeli plan to redirect people into the West Bank (the first step towards crossing the river Jordan); and secondly, the attempt to apply Israeli land legislation to the West Bank.

The decision to recall the Jordanian Parliament was based on the concept of a balanced relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians. The PLO now had an opportunity to justify its existence by talking to Jordan. If it failed to meet Palestinian aspirations, it would wither away.

Since the recall of the Jordanian Parliament, the Israelis had been preventing persons of influence, e.g. the Mayor of Gaza, from leaving the West Bank. But these people were important. It was they who could persuade the PLO to change their approach. He had therefore asked the US to use its influence with the Israelis to allow West Bankers to come out.

The Americans had said that they needed time. They wished to study matters carefully with the Israelis.

/ The

The Prime Minister said that everything appeared to be crumbling in the Lebanon. Agreeing, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary observed that the United States, and certainly Mr. Shultz, were still insisting on sticking to the 17 May Agreement. King Hussein said that a Saudi eight point plan was now emerging. The idea was that it would replace the 17 May Agreement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the plan appeared to be more a list of objectives. But Syria remained unwilling to move. With regard to the main Arab/Israeli problem, US reluctance to move was one problem. Another was the lack of a single presentation of the Arab case. If he went to Israel, as he must do one day, the Israelis would say that it was impossible to talk to the Arabs because there was no single interlocutor. It was to be hoped that from the present contacts between Arafat and Mubarak and Arafat and King Hussein a clearer presentation would emerge.

King Hussein said that the Syrian and Soviet game in the Lebanon was a waiting one. They aimed to inflict as much humiliation as they could. It was not at all clear what the huge United States naval force could do. When they withdrew this would be tantamount to complete US withdrawal from the area.

Syria like Israel, was becoming a base for terrorism. It had also decided both to infiltrate people into Jordan and to hit Jordanian targets directly. Syrian-inspired terrorists had been instructed to engage the Jordanian army while the Syrian Government gave them cover. There was a danger of recreating the 1980 situation.

He had pointed out to the United States certain Jordanian military needs which he wished to meet. The Americans had promised to consider these but he could not get a clear political view from them as to what they would do in the future. The Americans remained wedded to UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and argued that these must be accepted by the PLO. They were doubtful whether they could get Israel to a negotiating table at which the PLO were present. All in all, he had not got very far.

/ The

The Prime Minister then referred to the Iraq/Iran conflict. We understood that there was a new Iranian offensive today. We were very concerned about the possibility of further escalation. King Hussein said that he saw no possibility of ending the war in the foreseeable future. In answer to a question from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, he confirmed that the recent US shift of support towards Iraq was helpful. Iraq had been discussing the idea of a pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. This would take five years to build. Jordan was discussing with Bechtel the idea of a new pipeline following the route of the old IPC pipeline and a further line from Aqaba to the IPC terminal. This plan could be implemented within 15 months. The Iraqis were very keen to co-operate. But they wanted the United States to be involved so that Israel would be discouraged from attempting to wreck the project. Another interesting development was a possible pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Tripoli in Northern Lebanon. Bechtel had suggested that the Kuwaitis should buy this pipeline, thus furnishing themselves with an alternative to the Gulf route. In effect, the idea was to create a new network of strategic pipelines to lessen reliance on the Gulf.

The Prime Minister asked what we could do to help with the United States. King Hussein asked that we should maintain our present pressure. He had given to the United States Government a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements which was based on previous US positions. The Americans had promised to study it though Mr. Shultz had expressed scepticism about the value of UN Resolutions. He had told the Americans that if they could not propose such a Resolution perhaps other friends such as the United Kingdom could help. King Hussein handed over the text and the Prime Minister promised to study it.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there were two problems. The first was how we could move the United States to apply the right kind of pressure to Israel. The second was the shadow cast by Syria. President Assad had told him that Arafat

/ was

was finished. Was it therefore possible for Assad to have effective control of the PLO? King Hussein replied that Arafat now had a chance to secure that control; depending on the moves he made he would have the support of Palestinians on the ground. He expected to see Arafat soon. He would avoid seeing him alone; the hope was that Arafat would be accompanied by a group of PLO advisers. Mr. Masri commented that Arafat was aware that there were other potential representatives of the Palestinians. The Israelis knew that too which was why they stopped them leaving the West Bank. The Prime Minister said that this Israeli attitude was particularly disconcerting, given their position on the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.

Reverting to the Lebanon, King Hussein said that the 17 May Agreement was totally out of place. It gave Syria and the Soviet Union the opportunity to maintain their presence and exploit the situation. President Gemayel had become progressively weaker. It was difficult to see what could be done. To repeat, the only way the Americans could get out of their trap was to change the emphasis of their policy.

The Prime Minister commented that in a situation where there was very little movement, one or two UN Resolutions might be helpful. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it could also help if, where our position was different from that of the United States, we clearly asserted this. He asked how much influence the Soviet Union had over Syria. King Hussein said that at times he sensed that the Soviet Union was suspicious of Syria.

He was very relieved that the recall of the Jordanian Parliament had been so successful. There was now a new spirit in Jordan. Mr. Masri said that when Arafat visited Jordan, West Bankers would make it plain to him that he must reach agreement with Jordan and that if he did not do so Jordan would look elsewhere.

The discussion ended at 1740.

A.J.C.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1984

Dear Peter,

CALL BY THE KING OF JORDAN

King Hussein called on the Prime Minister today. I enclose a copy of the record of conversation.

*Yours ever
John Major*

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

107



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1984

Dear John,

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister

I wrote to you on 15 February with briefing for the call at 4.45 pm this afternoon.

/// We have received overnight from Washington, Washington tels nos 530, 531 and 532 reporting on King Hussein's visit there (copies of these are enclosed for ease of reference).

/ These telegrams make it clear that King Hussein may raise with the Prime Minister a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements, of which he left a copy with the Americans. The Americans have passed this on to us in strict confidence. I enclose a supplementary brief on this subject. The Prime Minister will wish to bear in mind that King Hussein will not expect us to have seen a copy of his text in advance.

The US Ambassador in Amman, Dick Viets, called on Sir John Leahy this morning and amplified the account of King Hussein's visit to Washington contained in Washington telno 532. He confirmed that King Hussein was now in good health and in extremely confident mood: the Americans did not encourage King Hussein to make a move, rather he was keen to press forward on his own initiative. This is in many ways admirable; but there are dangers for King Hussein in pressing forward too fast and in ways which are bound to heighten Syrian suspicion and hostility. The Prime Minister may wish to sound a note of caution.

/ News was also received this morning of an Iranian offensive in the Iran/Iraq war. I enclose supplementary briefing on this also.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

John Coker Esq

ow



1 copy for
back-up

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Further to the Hussein brief.

$\frac{16}{2}$ Peter Ricketts
h-a-

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 16 FEBRUARY

IRAN/IRAQ : UP-DATE

Iranian Offensive

1. There are reports this morning of what the Iranians claim is the first phase of the expected major new offensive: Val Fajr V. Tehran Radio claims a major attack between Mehran and Dehloran, in the central area north Al Amarah. The Iranian objective is probably one of the main Bahgdad-Basra roads. There are strong Iraqi forces in the area. The attack may be a forerunner of a second thrust further south.

Mediation

2. The Iraqi Permanent Representative at the United Nations informed the UK Deputy Permanent Representative on 15 February that the Iraqi reaction to the UN Secretary-General's proposed two-pronged mission did not amount to rejection of the proposal. The Iraqis are probably urgently reconsidering their response, in the light of the damage that rejection of the mission would do to their position at the UN. We are urging them to accept the mission. The Iranians have already responded positively.

Middle East Department
16 February 1984



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 February 1984

Dear John,

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King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose briefing for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister on 16 February at 4.45 pm. He proposes to be accompanied by Mr Taher Masri, his new Foreign Minister now in London making his farewells as the outgoing Jordanian Ambassador.

King Hussein arrived in London on 15 February from the US where he had been undergoing medical tests since 3 February. While there he had talks with President Reagan, and also with President Mubarak. He will be staying privately in London until 17 February.

When he last called on the Prime Minister on 16 December, King Hussein was deeply worried about the situation in the Middle East and US policy in the region. He had been particularly upset by the US/Israeli understanding on strategic cooperation. Developments since then have shifted the focus of attention but have not altered the general picture. Arafat called on President Mubarak in Cairo on 22 December. King Hussein recalled the Jordanian Parliament on 16 January after a long gap, but the consequences of the step for the Arab/Israel dispute have not yet materialised. Arafat and Hussein are expected to resume the dialogue broken off last April, but no date for this is yet known to us.

The King will no doubt want to discuss Arab/Israel and Lebanon. The Jordanian Foreign Minister told Sir Geoffrey Howe today that he also intends to raise Iran/Iraq. King Hussein enjoys the confidence of President Saddam Hussein. The Prime Minister might ask him for his latest assessment of the situation and his views on the chances of persuading the Iraqis to be more flexible towards the UN Secretary-General's latest initiative for a two-pronged mission. With an Iranian offensive imminent they would be wise to do so, and we shall be saying as much in Baghdad.

/Bilateral

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Bilateral relations are excellent and will reach a new peak with the State Visit (26 - 29 March). Agrément has been given for Mr Hani Tabbara, as the new Jordanian Ambassador to London. He is expected here well before the end of March. I enclose a note on security aspects of The Queen's Visit.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET UK EYES A

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 During his meeting with the Prime Minister on 16 December, King Hussein expressed deep disquiet at the announcement of closer Israel/US Strategic Co-operation following Mr Shamir's visit to Washington on 27-30 November last year. King Hussein's past identification with US policies in the region (particularly the Reagan Plan) has worsened his relations with radical Arab States, particularly Syria, and US/Israel rapprochement compounds the problem. Jordan faces serious terrorist threats. King Hussein has said that he has irrefutable evidence that the Abu Nidhal Group, with Syrian backing, were responsible for the attacks on the Jordanian Ambassadors in Rome and Delhi last November.

2 Many Jordanians fear that after Lebanon they will be next on Israel's agenda. They are concerned at the promotion of the 'Jordan-US-Palestine' line among senior Ministers in the Likud Government and their supporters, with its implications that the continuation of a moderate Hashemite regime in Jordan is not necessarily in Israel's interest.

3 After the meeting with King Hussein the Prime Minister wrote to the President Reagan reporting the King's concern at these developments. To date we have



not received a reply. She urged the President to recognise that Jordan deserved strong Western support, as a force for moderation in the Arab world, and as a key mover in the Arab/Israeli dispute. We should reassure moderate Arabs of the West's commitment to the peace process, by standing firm on Security Council Resolution 242's call for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. Political help to the Palestinians could start with US action to follow up the Reagan plan's call for a freeze on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. Increasing aid programmes should also be considered. If this support was not forthcoming, the Prime Minister said countries in the Middle East might seek to involve the Soviet Union more deeply in its problems. Even King Hussein has spoken publicly about an International Conference.

4 There is however evidence of a strengthening of one aspect of US/Jordanian relations. A secret contingency planning agreement was signed on 15 December in Washington by the two countries. The plan, designed mainly to guard against a Syrian attack on Jordan, provides, on implementation, for the drawing down of US war stocks worth \$8-10 billion, and the use of American servicemen on a graduated basis to man air defences in Jordan. It will be useful to hear from King Hussein

whether his meeting with President Reagan on 14 February did anything to reassure him about American policy on Arab/Israel. Reagan is reported to have told him and Mubarak, who was also in Washington at the time, that he would not 'shy away' from the peace process.

5 Despite some positive developments - Arafat's meeting with Mubarak in December, Egyptian readmission to the Islamic Conference Organisation in January and Arafat's intention to visit Amman later this month - fundamental problems remain. Arafat's own position is still uncertain and important differences exist between these elements of the PLO not dominated by Syria. The Palestine National Council ('parliament') which Arafat had hoped to convene in February to confirm his leadership, has been postponed for two or three months, probably to give Arafat time to win over important minority PLO groupings. If Arafat resumes his dialogue with Hussein - he said he will go to Amman when Hussein returns there after his present stopover in London - he may find that he has too restricted a mandate for the talks to succeed. Hussein himself is likely to be cautious and his first concern must be the security of Jordan and his regime. Syria is totally opposed to a Hussein/Arafat initiative and Israel will have nothing to do with Arafat. The Arab Summit, originally scheduled

for 31 March, has been postponed indefinitely, apparently at Saudi prompting, because of present Arab disunity. It may also have been delayed to give Arafat and Hussein the chance of coming to the Summit meeting with a joint plan for negotiations with Israel.

6 Assistance to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Both the moderate Arabs and the US have been keen that in the absence of moves towards a political settlement, they should explore the question of improving the flow of assistance to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The main problem in this area has been Israel's determination to control entry of all foreign funds and to channel them into approved projects. The Arabs have repeatedly stressed that assistance to the Palestinians must not be allowed to replace need for a political solution. Both UK and the Ten are at present reviewing their own modest aid programme in the Occupied Territories. The UK's present programme stands at £75,000 pa. We also contribute £5m pa to the UNRWA core budget, from which funds are channelled to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The EC also contributes £15m pa to UNRWA, of which the UK share is one fifth.

LEBANON

7 A SITREP on recent political and military developments is attached.

8 King Hussein will understand the reasons for the redeployment of the British MNF contingent, but will be looking for reassurance that we do not intend to abandon President Gemayel altogether. He shares our concerns about US policy. During his talks with the Prime Minister on 16 December, the King described the 17 May Agreement as having been imposed on the Lebanese President and people, representing another stage in the 'fundamentally flawed' US step-by-step approach. He criticised the Americans for not having given President Gemayel anything to offer the Lebanese opposition after the November meeting of the Geneva Reconciliation Conference which gave the President a mandate to seek alternative means of ensuring Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. But he may not have made much impact in Washington: latest reports suggest that Mr Runsfeld is going to Israel on 15 February to reassure the Israeli Government that the US will not support

abrogation of the agreement. Our latest draft of a further message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, requested by No 10, stressed the need to find a formula to give the Syrians confidence that the agreement would not in fact be implemented, as an incentive to the Syrians to play a more constructive role.

IRAN/IRAQ

(Not for Use)

The War

9 After a lull in fighting Iraq has in the past fortnight launched missile attacks against a number of Iranian towns. Iran has in turn shelled Basra, and other Iraqi towns and has mounted a land attack in Kurdistan. Iran is likely to mount a major offensive further south in the near future. Reports reached us on 15 February that Iranian jets have bombed an Iraqi military installation only 22 miles Northeast of Baghdad. This is the first serious attack near Baghdad since mid-1982. A dangerous period ahead, particularly if Iraqi reaction to a successful Iranian push involves attacks on Iranian oil installations and shipping. Iran's moves unpredictable but threat to close Straits of Horuz remains (recently

reiterated by Iranian President). We remain in close touch with Americans and contingency preparations continue (Omani request for increased readiness of UK mine counter measures forces and general message of support to Shaikh Zaid (UAE)).

Mediation

10 The most hopeful prospect continues to be mediation by the UN Secretary General. He has proposed a two-pronged mission, to update the report of an earlier Mission of Enquiry into civilian casualties and to explore the positions of both Governments. This has been accepted by Iran; we hope that the Iraqis will reconsider their initial refusal, and HM Ambassador Baghdad and UKMIS New York both are following this up.

ANGLO/JORDANIAN RELATIONS

11 Bilateral Relations. Our relations with Jordan are excellent and free of problems. King Hussein, a regular visitor to the UK, as are other members of the Royal Household, is a useful sounding board for Arab thinking. The Duke of Gloucester as Grand Prior of the Order of St John, and the Duke of Edinburgh as President of the World Wildlife Fund, both paid visits to Jordan in October last year. Mr Luce was there from 3-6 November as part of a



wider tour of the Middle East including Israel and Egypt, and the Chief of Defence Staff visited this year from 14-18 January. The Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh will make a State Visit at the end of next month. Arrangements for this are proceeding smoothly and the Jordanians have co-operated fully to ensure that every aspect of it is covered. King Hussein has let it be known how much importance he attaches to this.

12 A separate note (Annex B) gives additional background on security aspects to the State Visit and some of the recent coverage in the British Press.

13 Mr Taher Masri, the outgoing Ambassador, leaves his post here after only seven months on appointment (on 10 January) as Jordanian Foreign Minister. He has done well during his short stay in London and is well-disposed. We look forward to the arrival of the new Jordanian Ambassador, Mr Hani Tabbara, who served in the Jordanian Embassy here as Assistant Military Attache (1973) and subsequently as Minister. He comes from 2 years as Jordanian Ambassador in Saudi Arabia where our own Ambassador has found him a pleasant and helpful colleague.

14 The Jordanian parliament, recalled in extraordinary session on 9 January, was formally opened on 16 January. It was prorogued in 1974 following the Rabat Summit which



declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. King Hussein has emphasised that it was reconvened primarily for domestic reasons. Seven new West Bank members have been co-opted; bye-elections for East Bank vacant seats are due to take place within the next six weeks.

LEBANON: SITREP 15 FEBRUARY

Military developments

1. Beirut. Following the major fighting of 3-7 February both East and West Beirut are much calmer, with occasional minor clashes along the 'Green Line' dividing East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut. The Lebanese Army (LAF) have been expelled from almost all parts of West Beirut, where the leader of the Shia Militia Amal, Mr Berri, has emerged as de facto civilian and military commander. The Christian Phalange have claimed that Palestinian fighters have reinfiltrated Beirut and helped the Druze and Amal in the recent fighting.
2. Outside Beirut, there has been some fierce fighting since 13 February between the Druze and LAF. Despite artillery support and raids by Lebanese Airforce Hunters (in action for the first time since September 1983), the LAF have lost control of some positions on the Shouf mountain ridge south-east of Beirut and of the area round Khalde to the south of the airport. The Druze have therefore tightened their hold on Beirut and further demoralized the LAF.
3. On 15 February the Israelis deployed elements of two armoured brigades north of the Awali river as far as Damour where there are reports of fighting with Amal/Druze forces. The Israeli aim is presumably to relieve pressure on the LAF in Khalde. Three Katyusha rockets were fired from Southern Lebanon into the Israeli border town of Metullah on 9 February, provoking an Israeli air strike on alleged Palestinian positions in Bhamdoun (east of Beirut) on 10 February. The Israeli Cabinet is considering a plan for a further partial Israeli withdrawal, possibly to the Zahrani River south of Sidon.
4. MNF The Americans have decided that redeployment of US Marines off shore will be completed within 30 days and that US naval firepower will continue to be used as necessary in retaliation for any shelling of Beirut by Syrians/Druze. A US destroyer responded to and succeeded in stopping Druze shelling of US positions on 14 February. The French and Italians have said that they will maintain a presence in Beirut until the UN can take over, /though the

though the Italians intend to reduce their contingent (1400 men), leaving only enough men to guard the Palestinian refugee camps.

Political Developments

5. President Gemayel announced on 13 February a new 28 point plan outlining detailed administrative and political changes which he hopes to present officially at a resumed national reconciliation conference in Geneva. This is unlikely to be accepted by his opponents: Walid Jumblatt (Druze) has pressed for President Gemayel's resignation, and Berri (Amal), has suggested that the Lebanese Parliament should pass a constitutional amendment shortening President Gemayel's term of office and calling new Presidential elections in summer 1984. Both are concentrating for the time being on consolidating their hold on West Beirut. They may be prepared to allow Gemayel to stay on if he is prepared to make genuine concessions. The Syrians have not so far endorsed calls for Gemayel's resignation, but are still insisting on abrogation of the 17 May Agreement as a pre-condition of any resumption of the reconciliation process. Two former Lebanese Prime Ministers (Takieddin Solh and Selim Al-Hoss) who might be asked to lead a new government were in Damascus on 9/10 February, together with ex-President Franjeh and another ex-Prime Minister Rashid Karame (both members of the National Salvation Front). Gemayel met Franjeh on 14 February and is reportedly engaged in "'secret diplomacy'" with the Syrians and Saudis. The Saudi mediator Hariri is in Beirut and there are reports, so far unconfirmed, of an 8-point Saudi peace plan which includes renunciation by Gemayel of the 17 May Agreement and a new power-sharing arrangement. Rumsfeld has returned to Washington and is due to go to Israel on 15 February.

6. The 17 May Agreement is still a major sticking point: the US remain unwilling to abandon it (although they have told us that they would continue to support Gemayel if he felt obliged to do so), and appear convinced that heavy shelling of Syrian positions has been helpful in persuading Syria to be flexible. The Israelis have warned against abrogation of the 17 May Agreement, hinting that this would mean some Israeli forces remaining in South Lebanon indefinitely.

UN Forces

7. The French are pursuing their initiative to replace the MNF by a UN force. Their draft resolution will be discussed by the Security Council on 16 February but is likely to founder on Soviet/Syrian demands that the MNF, including naval forces, should withdraw entirely and refrain from further 'interference' in Lebanon. The US, while not opposed in principle to wider UN involvement, do not want this confined to replacing the MNF in Beirut. The Italians would like a UN presence to take over guarding of Palestinian refugee camps in their sector. President Gemayel is only likely to accept a UN force if there is no prospect of maintaining an MNF presence. We have suggested more modest steps: better use of the 50 UN observers in Beirut to guard crossing points between East and West Beirut or other important installations, despatch of a Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the area, and expanded use of UNIFIL to cover a further Israeli withdrawal in Southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union have not so far objected to these proposals, though President Gemayel and other Lebanese dislike the idea of UN-manned crossing points which might consecrate the redivision of the city.

STATE VISIT TO JORDAN: SECURITY ASPECTS

Assessment of the Threat

1.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Policy

2. In the FCO Sir John Leahy has been holding fortnightly inter-departmental meetings of senior officials to draw together the threads of the intelligence studies, to consider political points, including liaison with HM Embassy, Amman, and the Jordanians, and to prepare advice to Ministers.

Reconnaissance visits

3. Security for the visit has been taken fully into account by the reconnaissance missions carried out so far. The first of these (3-7 January) considered the threat on the ground in all its aspects. A member of the Security Service went to Amman on 5 February to liaise directly with the Jordanian Intelligence Services and to review any further requirements for closer cooperation - specific or general - between our Services. A third visit, led by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Smith, with police and military support, will take place from 19-24 February to take a further detailed look at the threat on the ground.

Ministerial advice

4. The Smith report will then form the basis of the JIC's final assessment on 2 March before Ministers meet, as planned, on 7 March to consider their advice to The Queen.

/The Press

The Press

5. There have been a number of alarmist reports in the British press about The Queen's safety in Jordan. The Daily Express of 13 February carried an article and editorial about SAS bodyguards for The Queen during her visit. Like similar stories run by the Express on earlier occasions, this one is invention. The fact that a member of Deputy Assistant Commissioner Smith's team is an SAS officer is co-incidental. The press emphasis on this aspect came too early to be politically embarrassing and may have burned itself out.

HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HIM KING

(9000)

King of Jordan.

Born Amman 1935.

Educated Bishops School, Amman; Victoria College, Alexandria; Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952 and acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. He has been in power longer than any other Arab leader and has survived numerous assassination attempts and threats to his throne including the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958, the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, the civil war against the Palestinian groups in 1970-71 and periods of bad relations with Iraq and, most recently, Syria.

In relation to Israel, King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. He has, however, maintained both in public and private strong opposition to the Camp David agreements and to the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations despite US attempts - some heavy-handed - to persuade him to participate. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine, but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and with the oil-rich Arab states which contribute substantial sums to Jordan in budgetary support; he also has to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they will have a credible military option; he will therefore do everything possible to avoid Jordanian involvement in a further Arab/Israel war.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, thereby implicitly renouncing his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, King Hussein has not abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank in any Arab/Israel settlement. He recognises, however, that the initiative for such a development must come from the West Bankers themselves.

Despite the playboy image of his youth King Hussein is now wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck he has shown the ability and experience to take sensible and sometimes courageous decisions in times of crisis.

Both by inclination and because of his assessment of the best interests of his country, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has, however, taken care to maintain relations with the Soviet Union and has argued that the Russians must be associated with a future UN conference to settle the Middle East dispute.

King Hussein takes all major foreign and defence policy decisions himself. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field to Crown Prince Hassan. Perhaps King Hussein's greatest single asset is his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has used this to good effect in keeping in close touch with and maintaining the loyalty of the Armed Forces, whose importance to his throne he has always recognised.

In his personal life, the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his Palestinian-born third wife, Queen Alia, affected him deeply. His marriage in June 1978 to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth or Lisa Halaby, an American of Lebanese origin) appeared at the outset to be one of genuine affection but is now showing some signs of strain. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage did not attract the public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Queen Alia, would be next in the line of succession after Prince Hassan, thus displacing the son subsequently born to Queen Noor in 1980, the two sons of Princess Muna and the son of Crown Prince Hassan and Princess Sarvath. By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by giving precedence to a son of entirely Arab descent.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war, with all the uncertainties it would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for the foreseeable future. For the time being, his neighbours and his financial backers seem likely to continue to believe that their interests will be best served by the maintenance in Jordan of the Hashemite regime headed by King Hussein.

CURRICULUM VITAE OF MR TAHER AL-MASRI

Mr Al-Masri was born in 1942 in Nablus (West Bank). He later studied at the North Texas State University where he received a BA in Commerce.

He joined the Jordanian Central Bank in 1965 and worked there, including a period attached to the Bank of England, until his appointment in 1973 to represent Nablus in the Lower House of the Jordanian Parliament. In May 1973 he was made Minister of State for the Affairs of the Occupied Territories, a post which he held until November 1974.

Mr Al-Masri has previously served as Jordanian Ambassador in Madrid (1975-78), Paris (1978-83) and London (1983). He was appointed Foreign Minister in January 1984 in a major cabinet reshuffle.

He speaks excellent English, and is married with two children.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 16 FEBRUARY

BRIEF: ARAB/ISRAEL

POINTS TO MAKE

- 1 UK commitment to Jordan's stability. Progress on Arab/Israel best way of ensuring this. Some positive developments - Arafat's meeting with Mubarak, Egyptian readmission to Islamic Conference Organisation, prospect of resumed King Hussein/Arafat talks. Momentum must be maintained. Hope postponements of Palestine National Council (PNC) and Arab Summit do not reflect a slowing down of progress. Egypt's role in peace process? Likelihood of Egyptian readmission to Arab League?
- 2 Arafat/Hussein talks. When will they begin and what will be discussed? How far can Arafat go without a new PNC mandate?
- 3 King Hussein's meeting with President Reagan. Was the King encouraged by his talks with President Reagan? Would US put pressure on Israel if Arafat/Hussein came up with an agreement to negotiate with Israel on lines of Reagan plan? Hussein's own view of prospects for Reagan plan? Ten and US differ on certain points and we regularly let Americans know our views.

4 (If raised) International Conference on the Middle East. Americans have rejected this idea so there seems little chance of progress. In any case, Conference unlikely to be productive while gap between parties so wide. Realistic prospects for progress now lie with Hussein/Arafat dialogue.

5 (If raised) Aid to the Occupied Territories. Reviewing our possibilities. In absence of a settlement, assistance could help sustain Palestinian sense of identity and self-sufficiency in Occupied Territories. Need to outflank possible Israeli obstruction, and identify worthwhile projects.

LEBANON

6 Redeployment of our MNF contingent unavoidable in view of deterioration in Beirut and (separate) US decisions. It remains close at hand for sake of MNF solidarity. We are working hard to help restore stability in Beirut and persuade all concerned to resume reconciliation process.

7 Have stressed to the Americans the dangers of their increased use of naval shelling in support of President Gemayel: adds to climate of violence and makes it more difficult for Gemayel to win back the moderate



opposition. Have also pressed them strongly to exploit the fact that 17 May Agreement is a dead letter and to find a formula which gives the Syrians an incentive to co-operate. No doubt King Hussein made the same points in Washington: US reaction?

8 Have also pressed for a more useful role for UN in Lebanon. French are pursuing ambitious goal of putting a UN force into Beirut. Soviet Union and Syria will only approve this on unacceptable conditions. We have been working for smaller steps, as described in Security Council Debate 16 February to make better use of UN observers in Beirut.

IRAN/IRAQ

The War

9 UK remains impartial and keen to see early end to the conflict. Concerned at recent attacks on civilian targets by both sides.

10 Can King Hussein persuade Iraq to accept Secretary-General's proposal for 2-pronged UN Mission? (On 13 February rejected by Iraq, but wisely accepted by Iran). With a new Iranian offensive expected in the Spring (late March, depending on weather) they would be wise to do. The Iraqis should not become overconfident

just because of a little US encouragement.

ANGLO/JORDANIAN RELATIONS

11 Our relations continue to be excellent. Reaffirm our commitment to Jordan. Sad to say farewell to Taher Masri as Jordanian Ambassador, congratulate him on his new appointment. Look forward to arrival of new Ambassador, Mr Hani Tabbara (for whom agreement given), who is highly spoken of.

Jordanian Parliament.

12 Congratulations on recall of Jordanian parliament. It will contribute to constitutional democracy in Jordan.

State visit

13 Plans are going ahead smoothly. Most grateful for all the co-operation received from Jordanians. The Queen and Prince Philip much look forward to the visit.

(Only if raised:) Daily Express article of 13 February on SAS bodyguards for The Queen in Jordan is without foundation.

(If pressed) We will be advising The Queen at the appropriate moment, but the probability of postponing the visit looks very slight. Co-operation very close between Jordanian and British services concerned.



CALL BY KING HUSSEIN ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 16 FEBRUARY

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF (DEFENSIVE): JORDANIAN DRAFT SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

Points to Make

1. Our position, stated many times (including Ten statements), is that Israeli settlements are contrary to international law and a major and growing obstacle to peace efforts. Have called on Israel radically to change these policies (Sir G Howe in Riyadh, 11 January).

2. (If asked for British sponsorship). Stand ready to do what we can to promote negotiations. Crucial test of any initiative is whether it will help bring progress towards comprehensive solution. Important not to provoke US hostility or veto. Will give the King's request close and urgent attention and let him have views.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 During his recent visit to the US, King Hussein gave the Americans a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements (text in Washington telno 531). The Americans have given us a copy in strict confidence; we should not (not) reveal to the Jordanians that we have seen it. The Americans have minor problems with some of the wording but since most of it comes from resolutions which the US has supported or from President Reagan's speeches, and since it stops short of describing the settlements as illegal, they would have difficulty in rejecting it publicly. The initial US response to Hussein was cautious. They have told us at official level that since the King appeared to be using the draft to test President Reagan's good faith the State Department might recommend support for the text (with some amendments, if possible) if the King was determined to go ahead. But Mr Shultz was opposed to the text and might hope to dissuade the King. Others in the administration would also oppose it.

2 King Hussein told the Americans that he envisaged asking a friendly third country to sponsor the draft. They speculate that he might raise this with the Prime Minister on 16 February. The Americans have asked us, if possible, to discuss the matter further with them before going too far down this road.

3 In August 1983 the US vetoed a Jordanian draft Security Council resolution (text at Annex) on the situation in the Occupied Territories. This draft was prompted by a shooting /incident

incident at Hebron on the West Bank. The US objected to the draft's reaffirmation that the policies and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied in 1967 have no legal validity. HMG have long held the view that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories are illegal, because they contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits inter alia the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. This view is very widely shared in the international community. It forms part of the Venice Declaration. The previous US Administration accepted it, and therefore supported Security Resolution 465 of 1980, from which the 1983 draft resolution was largely drawn. But President Reagan had while still a candidate proclaimed in public his view that settlements were 'not illegal', and his Administration have never been able to get off this hook.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL;

"HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN AND OTHER STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE COUNCIL;

"TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTER OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ARAB GROUP FOR JULY 1983, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/15890);

"STRESSING THE URGENT NEED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

"AFFIRMING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES REMAINS GRAVE AND VOLATILE AND THAT THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES CONSTITUTE A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ALL EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

"AFFIRMING ONCE MORE THAT THE REGULATIONS ANNEXED TO THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1907 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ARE APPLICABLE TO THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM;

"1. REAFFIRMS ALL ITS RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS;

"2. DETERMINES THAT THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL IN ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, HAVE NOT LEGAL VALIDITY; CONSTITUTE A MAJOR AND SERIOUS OBSTRUCTION TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE IN CONTRAVENTION WITH ARTICLE 49 (6) OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949;

"3. CALLS ONCE MORE UPON ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, TO ABIDE SCRUPULOUSLY BY THE PROVISION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, TO RESCIND ITS PREVIOUS MEASURES, TO DESIST FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN CHANGING THE LEGAL STATUS AND GEOGRAPHICAL NATURE AND MATERIALLY AFFECTING THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 AND, IN PARTICULAR, NOT TO TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE

OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND TO FORCE TRANSFERS OF ARAB POPULATIONS FROM THESE TERRITORIES;

"4. STRONGLY DEPLORES THE CONTINUATION AND PERSISTENCE OF ISRAEL IN PURSUING THOSE POLICIES AND PRACTICES AND CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL TO RESCIND THOSE MEASURES, TO DISMANTLE THE EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, TO DESIST FROM EXPANDING AND ENLARGING THE EXISTING ONES AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO CEASE ON AN URGENT BASIS FROM THE PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM;

"5. REJECTS ALL ISRAELI ARBITRARY AND ILLEGAL ACTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH RESULT IN THE EXPULSION, DEPORTATION AND FORCIBLE TRANSFERS OF ARAB POPULATIONS FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES;

"6. CONDEMNS THE RECENT ATTACKS PERPETRATED AGAINST ARAB CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, ESPECIALLY THE KILLING AND WOUNDING OF STUDENTS AT THE ISLAMIC COLLEGE OF THE ARAB CITY OF AL-KHALIL ON 26 JULY 1983;

"7. CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH ANY ASSISTANCE TO BE USED SPECIFICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES;

"8. REAFFIRMS ITS DETERMINATION, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO EXAMINE PRACTICAL WAYS AND MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION;

"9. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER CONSTANT AND CLOSE SCRUTINY;

"10. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THREE MONTHS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION."

SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ARE: ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, DJIBOUTI, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND YEMEN.

(END TEXT)

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 16 FEBRUARY

IRAN/IRAQ : UP-DATE

Iranian Offensive

1. There are reports this morning of what the Iranians claim is the first phase of the expected major new offensive: Val Fajr V. Tehran Radio claims a major attack between Mehran and Dehloran, in the central area north Al Amarah. The Iranian objective is probably one of the main Baghdad-Basra roads. There are strong Iraqi forces in the area. The attack may be a forerunner of a second thrust further south.

Mediation

2. The Iraqi Permanent Representative at the United Nations informed the UK Deputy Permanent Representative on 15 February that the Iraqi reaction to the UN Secretary-General's proposed two-pronged mission did not amount to rejection of the proposal. The Iraqis are probably urgently reconsidering their response, in the light of the damage that rejection of the mission would do to their position at the UN. We are urging them to accept the mission. The Iranians have already responded positively.

Middle East Department
16 February 1984

GRS 770

DESKBY 160900Z

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FM WASHINGTON 152305Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM 532 OF 15 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN CAIRO PRIORITY TEL AVIV ROUTINE JEDDA DAMASCUS
BEIRUT MOSCOW PARIS ROME UKMIS NEW YORK

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KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARAB/ISRAEL
SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN WAS IN BOUYANT MOOD. HE ARGUED THAT THE FOCUS OF US EFFORTS SHOULD SHIFT FROM LEBANON TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS WITHIN WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS WITH OR WITHOUT THE PLO PROVIDED THAT THE US WOULD GIVE HIM SUPPORT OVER SECURITY. PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED US COMMITMENT TO SCR 242.

DETAIL

2. RAPHEL BRIEFED MINISTER TODAY ON KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT. IN ADDITION TO THE MEETINGS WITH MUBARAK THE KING HAD HAD BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, WEINBERGER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND SHULTZ (TWICE). HE HAD BEEN IN A BOUYANT AND OPTIMISTIC MOOD THROUGHOUT.
3. KING HUSSEIN'S MAIN THEME HAD BEEN THE IMPORTANCE OF SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF US PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM LEBANON TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH THE SUCCESS OF HIS INITIATIVE TO RECALL THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT. HE WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS WITHIN WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS WITH OR WITHOUT THE PLO PROVIDED THAT HE WERE ASSURED OF US SUPPORT TO ENABLE HIM TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISTS.
4. THE KING CLAIMED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE ENCOURAGING DISSIDENT PLO MEMBERS TO INFILTRATE INTO JORDAN AND STIR UP TROUBLE THERE. THE KING FEARED THAT THIS SORT OF SYRIAN MEDDLING WOULD INCREASE IF THERE WERE PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT, AS IN 1980 SYRIAN FORCES WOULD AGAIN MASS ON JORDAN'S NORTHERN BORDER. THE JORDANIANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD HANDLE THE INFILTRATION AND TERRORISM THREAT BUT ANXIOUS ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE US HAD EVIDENCE OF SOME INCREASED SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR PLO DISSIDENTS IN JORDAN THOUGH NOT TO THE EXTENT THE JORDANIANS CLAIMED. SECURITY ASSISTANCE WAS DIFFICULT SO LONG AS KING HUSSEIN REMAINED ALOOF FROM THE PEACE PROCESS (THOUGH THE PROPOSED SALE OF 1613 STINGER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE SEEKING FUNDS FOR THE JORDAN LOGISTICS PROGRAMME). IT WAS DIFFICULT TO OFFER THE SORT OF GUARANTEES KING HUSSEIN WOULD LIKE BUT THE AMERICANS HAD TRIED TO OFFER HIM SOME REASSURANCE.
5. KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE INTENDED TO HAVE PROMINENT WEST BANKERS PRESENT WHEN HE MET ARAFAT IN THE HOPE

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OF INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON HIM TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. BUT HE HAD ALSO HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL FOR THE EXPRESSION OF PALESTINIAN VIEWS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY PEACE NEGOTIATION WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF SCR 242 SINCE JORDAN WAS NOT A SIGNATORY OF CAMP DAVID. RAPHEL SAID THAT THIS POINT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON.

6. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ARRANGED ONLY BECAUSE OF THE COINCIDENCE OF THEIR VISITS: NO ONE HAD BEEN PRESSING FOR IT. THEY HAD COVERED MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND. BOTH MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR US RESOLUTION IN LEBANON AND FOR A SHIFT OF FOCUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT HAD REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO SCR 242 AND TO THE POSITIONS SET OUT IN HIS SPEECH OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982, AND HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO GET A PRACTICAL PEACE PROCESS UNDER WAY. WHEN KING HUSSEIN HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PEACE TALKS MIGHT BE DRAGGED OUT INTERMINABLY, THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN AN ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD APPROACH THEM WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY. ALL THREE LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT SYRIA POSED A REAL SECURITY THREAT AND WOULD TRY TO CAUSE FURTHER TROUBLE.

7. RAPHEL CONCLUDED THAT THESE TALKS BEEN MODERATELY ENCOURAGING AND HAD LAID A HELPFUL FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER ACTIVITY ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT, AS ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THERE WAS AMPLE SCOPE FOR UPSETS ALONG THE WAY.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FM WASHINGTON 152302Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 531 OF 15 FEBRUARY

NH127

MIPT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS: JORDANIAN U.N. INITIATIVE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT JORDANIAN RESOLUTION:
BEGINSU.N. SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN THE
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF _____ AND OTHER STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE COUNCIL,STRESSING THE URGENT NEED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST
AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,TAKING NOTE OF THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL, AND ITS INSTRUMENTALITIES, IN UNILATERALLY
AUTHORIZING, ESTABLISHING, SUBSIDIZING, PROMOTING AND ENLARGING
SETTLEMENTS OF ISRAELI CIVILIANS IN THE ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER
ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION,RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242, 267, 338 AND 497,
AFFIRMING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN THE
ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION REMAINS GRAVE
AND VOLATILE AND THAT ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES,
AMONG OTHER FACTORS, ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PROSPECT FOR PEACE,1. REAFFIRMS THAT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS TO BE ACHIEVED BY
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242
AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A JUST
AND DURABLE PEACE, AS CALLED FOR BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
338.2. RECOGNIZES THAT ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IS NOT
ESSENTIAL FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND DIMINISHES CONFIDENCE
THAT A FINAL PEACE CAN BE FREELY AND FAIRLY ACHIEVED.3. DETERMINES THAT ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, ARE AN OBSTACLE
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338
AND CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS.4. DETERMINES THAT ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES ARE WITHOUT PERMANENT EFFECT OR
VALIDITY AND CANNOT PREJUDICE THE STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM.5. AFFIRMS THAT THE REGULATIONS ANNEXED TO THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONS OF 1907 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF
12 AUGUST 1949, ARE APPLICABLE TO THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED
BY ISRAEL, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND CALLS UPON THE BELLIGERENT
OCCUPANT TO ABIDE SCRUPULOUSLY BY THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.6. CALLS UPON THE BELLIGERENT OCCUPANT TO TAKE NO ACTION
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A CHANGE IN THE LEGAL STATUS, GEOGRAPHICAL
IDENTITY OR DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES.

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7. CALLS FOR A HALT TO THE ACQUISITION AND ALLOCATION OF LAND FOR SETTLEMENTS, THE CONSTRUCTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS, THE ENLARGEMENT OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS AND THE SETTLING OF ISRAEL'S OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM.

8. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO PROVIDE NO ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM.

9. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER CLOSE AND CONSTANT SCRUTINY.

10. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THREE MONTHS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

ENDS

WRIGHT

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
MR D THOMAS

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DESKBY 160900Z

FM WASHINGTON 152300Z FEBRUARY, 1984

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 530 OF 15 FEBRUARY.

12
64727

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS: JORDANIAN U.N. INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN GAVE THE AMERICANS A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. THEY HAVE GIVEN US A COPY IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. IT AVOIDS THE QUESTION OF THEIR ILLEGALITY BUT CLEVERLY PICKS UP PREVIOUS US STATEMENTS ON THE ISSUE. POSSIBILITY THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL SEEK UK SPONSORSHIP. INITIAL US REACTION CAUTIOUS: KING HUSSEIN HAS PUT PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE SPOT.

DETAIL

2. WHEN ASKED DIRECTLY IF THE US HAD DISCUSSED ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WITH KING HUSSEIN, RAPHEL TOLD MINISTER THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD PRODUCED A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MIFT) ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE KEY ELEMENT WAS THAT IT DID NOT PRONOUNCE ON THE LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS OR HINT AT SANCTIONS. THE KING WANTED TO HAVE SOMETHING CONCRETE TO SHOW ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. HE HAD NOT PROPOSED ANY TIMETABLE, NOR HAD HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS RESOLUTION MIGHT FORM PART OF A SERIES OF MOVES TOWARDS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.
3. ASSUMING THAT THE US INDICATED THAT THEY COULD SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION, KING HUSSEIN ENVISAGED ASKING A FRIENDLY THIRD COUNTRY (UNSPECIFIED) TO SPONSOR IT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT KNOW WHETHER KING HUSSEIN RAISED THIS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. BUT THEY SPECULATE THAT HE MIGHT PREFER BRITISH SPONSORSHIP AND MAY RAISE THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 FEBRUARY. RAPHEL ASKED THAT IF POSSIBLE WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH THE AMERICANS BEFORE GOING TOO FAR DOWN THIS ROAD.
4. THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN THAT THEY DOUBTED THE USEFULNESS OF UN RESOLUTIONS IN GENERAL. BUT THEY RECOGNISED THAT HE HAD MADE A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT. THEY UNDERTOOK TO STUDY IT VERY CLOSELY AND TO LET HIM HAVE CONSIDERED REACTIONS IN DUE COURSE.
5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, MS WILLIAMSON (JORDAN DESK OFFICER) TOLD US THAT AS FAR AS SHE WAS CONCERNED THERE WERE THREE PROBLEMS WITH THE DRAFT. PARAGRAPH 2 PICKED UP WORDING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S 1 SEPTEMBER SPEECH WHICH HAD REFERRED ONLY TO FURTHER SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY: THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID TAKING THE POSITION THAT EXISTING SETTLEMENTS SHOULD BE DISMANTLED. FOR THE SAME REASON THE PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PERMANENT EFFECT OR VALIDITY UNQUOTE IN PARAGRAPH 4 GAVE THE AMERICANS DIFFICULTY SINCE IT INVITED THE CONCLUSION THAT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WERE ONLY TEMPORARY. FINALLY, MS WILLIAMSON THOUGHT THAT THE LAST PHRASE IN PARAGRAPH 3 CAME UNDESIRABLY CLOSE TO A FINDING ON THE LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS.

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6. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE DRAFT AS A WHOLE AND THE REFERENCES TO JERUSALEM IN PARTICULAR WOULD BE ANATHEMA TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY, WHO ARE CURRENTLY MOUNTING A CAMPAIGN FOR THE MOVE OF THE US EMBASSY FROM TEL AVIV TO JERUSALEM. BUT THE RESOLUTION DID NO MORE THAN REAFFIRM PREVIOUS US POSITIONS INCLUDING SCR 267 FOR WHICH THE US VOTED WITH A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF VOTE. SHE NOTED THAT THE REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBLE TO SCR 497 SKILLFULLY BROUGHT THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE RESOLUTION.

7. MS WILLIAMSON THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN INTENDED THIS DRAFT AS A TEST OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GOOD FAITH AND READINESS TO CONFRONT THE ISRAELIS. IF THE AMERICANS INDICATED THAT THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT IT, SHE DID NOT EXPECT THE KING TO COURT A VETO BY PRESSING IT. BUT HE WOULD ALSO ABANDON ANY HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE COULD PRODUCE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME. ON THOSE GROUNDS, MURPHY WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND SUPPORT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, IF POSSIBLE AMENDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POINTS IN PARA 5 ABOVE AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE KING COULD NOT BE DISSUADED FROM PUTTING IT FORWARD.

COMMENT

8. RAPHEL'S CONFIDENCE SHOULD PLEASE BE CAREFULLY PROTECTED. IF KING HUSSEIN RAISES IT WITH US, WE SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, REVEAL THAT WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY. THE DRAFT HAS FOR OBVIOUS REASONS BEEN GIVEN AN EXTREMELY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION IN WASHINGTON AND HAS NOT BEEN COPIED TO US MISSIONS ELSEWHERE.

9. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THERE WOULD BE STRONG OPPOSITION HERE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO US SUPPORT FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. THE OPPOSITION WOULD COME FROM HEAVYWEIGHTS LIKE MRS KIRKPATRICK, EAGLEBURGER, AND RUMSFELD, NOT TO MENTION (IN AN ELECTION YEAR) THE DOMESTIC POLICY ADVISERS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE DRAFT COULD BE EDULCORATED SUFFICIENTLY TO AVOID THIS TRAP AND STILL MEET THE KING'S OBJECTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN THAT MOST OF THE LANGUAGE COMES FROM RESOLUTIONS WHICH THE U.S. HAS SUPPORTED OR FROM REAGAN'S SPEECHES, IT PUTS THE ADMINISTRATION FIRMLY ON THE SPOT. THEIR POSITION MAY BECOME EASIER IF KING HUSSEIN IS ABLE TO GAIN THE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN SUPPORT HE NEEDS TO EMBARK ON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. AT THAT POINT THERE WOULD BE A BETTER CHANCE OF BRINGING THE AMERICANS ALONG. BUT FOR THE MOMENT THEY SEEM LIKELY TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE KING THAT ACTIVITY IN THE U.N. AT PRESENT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE DIVISIVE THAN HELPFUL.

WRIGHT
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D/HD/PUSD
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
MR D THOMAS

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Boe



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1984

Visit by King Hussein

Thank you for your letter of 10 February.

As you will have heard from our Diary Secretary, the Prime Minister has agreed to a meeting with King Hussein at 10 Downing Street at 1645 hours on Thursday 16 February.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MR. BUTLER ✓
MR. COLES ✓
MR. TURNBULL
MR. FLESHER
MR. BARCLAY
MR. ALISON
MR. SHERBOURNE

I have arranged the following meeting with the Prime Minister:-

Subject
Date 16.2.84
Time 16.45
Venue No 13
Person/people invited King Hussein
.....
Added Ministerial attendance

Briefing

- ✓ a) I have commissioned briefing from
✓ b) Could you arrange briefing if necessary

By 15/2

Caroline Ryder

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 February, 1984

Dear John,

Visit by King Hussein

We have heard from our Embassy in Washington (telegram enclosed) that King Hussein plans to arrive in London en route home from Washington on 15 February. We do not yet have a date for his departure. He has expressed a wish to see the Prime Minister if possible.

I realise that the Prime Minister's diary for the first half of next week will of course depend on arrangements for attendance at the Andropov funeral. But the King has indicated that he would be free to see the Prime Minister on 16 February.

There will clearly be much to talk about with King Hussein. He will have seen President Reagan on 13 February, and will therefore have formed his own impressions of US intentions in Lebanon and more generally in the Middle East. He is due to renew his talks with Arafat later in the month in the hope of unblocking negotiations on the Anglo/Israeli problem.

I would be grateful if you could let me know whether the Prime Minister would be able to see King Hussein, once arrangements for next week are clearer.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GR 130A

RESTRICTED

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FM WASHINGTON 092203Z FEB 84

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 459 OF 9 FEBRUARY

INFO SAVING AMMAN

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT

1. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD US TODAY THAT KING HUSSEIN PLANS TO LEAVE WASHINGTON LATE ON 14 FEBRUARY AND TO ARRIVE IN LONDON EARLY ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. HIS ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS WERE NOT YET FIRM. KING HUSSEIN WAS VERY MUCH HOPING TO BE ABLE TO HAVE A TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT, IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DIARY PERMITTED, IT WOULD BE MOST CONVENIENT FOR THE KING TO ARRANGE FOR LATE ON 15 FEBRUARY OR ON 16 FEBRUARY IN ORDER TO ALLOW HIM TIME TO REST AFTER HIS FLIGHT

FCO PASS SAVING AMMAN

WRIGHT
LIMITED
NENAD
PROTOCOL
PS/MR. LUCE
SIR. J LEAHY


MR. EGERTON

(Repetition to Amman
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

RESTRICTED

10 FEB 1974



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1296</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Telegram No 2153 of 22 December 1983</i>	
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①



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

King Hussein.

I have revised the message
to President Leagan.

If you agree it I will send
it on the hot-line on
Thursday.

A.J.C. ²³/₁₂.

SECRET



to VC

10

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 December 1983

Message from the Prime Minister to
President Reagan about her meeting
with King Hussein

Thank you for the draft message to
President Reagan enclosed with your letter of
19 December.

The Prime Minister has now signed a revised
version of the message and I enclose it. I
should be grateful if you could arrange for
the text of the message to be delivered before
the holidays and for the signed version to
follow thereafter.

AJC

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1296</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>T 228/83 PM to President dated 22/12/83</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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10 DOWNING STREET

Sir A. Parsons

I don't much like the style
and tone of this - and will
adjust them in redrafting.

but do you think the
substance is all right?

A. J. Coler ²⁰/₁₂.

SECRET

8.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1983

Please type letter

won

A.S.C. 20/12

Dear John,

Call by King Hussein of Jordan

Thank you for your letter of 16 December enclosing a record of King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister and a copy of President Reagan's letter of 11 December to King Hussein, as well as for your letter of today with copies of President Reagan's letters of 26 and 27 November to the King. We are keeping these letters very close.

As requested, I now enclose a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Mr Reagan. This refers to the existence of the Reagan/Hussein exchanges, but does not reveal that we have seen copies of any of them.

We have assumed that the Prime Minister will wish, for tactical reasons, to concentrate in her letter to President Reagan on the Arab/Israel question and Jordan's role in it, and not to go over the question of Lebanon - on which we are already putting our views to the Americans on other channels.

The draft, as you will see, does rather more than report what King Hussein had to say. I shall be showing it to Sir Geoffrey Howe overnight and we agreed to get in touch again tomorrow.

Yours ever,
[Signature]

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

Jordan visits by king

Pt 2



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~ minute/letter/teletype/dispatch/word

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Reagan

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I had a long talk with King Hussein on 16 December. He told me that he had recently been in touch with you. Leaving aside what he had to say about the Lebanon, the main burden of his remarks concerned the current Palestinian situation and your recent agreement with Prime Minister Shamir on United States/Israeli strategic co-operation.

On the first of these questions, which he fears is being lost sight of because of the Lebanese crisis, the King spoke forcefully about Syrian attempts to control the PLO. Because of the PLO requirement for consensus, the radical minority were always able to prevent positive moves. He wished that moderate Palestinian leaders would remember that their strength lay in their constituents. If moderate leaders would identify with their people, Jordan would see what could be achieved - and was already in touch with Egypt about this. But as things were,

/the Palestinian

Enclosures—flag(s).....

the Palestinian people, especially those in the Occupied Territories, were in despair. His priority now was to put the Palestine/Jordan relationship in order and then make "a final effort" to get a dialogue going. He told me that he would have to recall the Jordanian Parliament in the next month or so, and that he would be explaining his proposals to the moderate Arab world and to the moderate PLO.

Secondly, King Hussein was still extremely upset by the developments announced during Prime Minister Shamir's visit. He clearly felt that this latest development identified you in Arab eyes with Israel, thus reducing your chances of acting as an honest broker. In his view this sharply increased the dangers of polarisation in the Middle East, with the US and Israel on one side and the Soviet Union and many of the Arab countries on the other. The King also repeated his idea of the early convening of an international conference on the Middle East. I warned him off this. I know he has had it in mind before, but I find it disturbing that he feels constrained to come out with it again now.

You and I, Mr President, were in firm agreement when we met in September on the crucial role of Jordan in the Arab/Israeli dispute, and on the vital need to preserve that country's stability and integrity. We both of us appreciate the value of King Hussein himself as a moderate and pro-Western force for stability in the volatile Middle East. I am worried that despite what you have been able to tell him he should still appear to feel so unsure of his relationship with the United States. It is nonetheless encouraging that he is still clearly seeking to play an active part in the

Ph

search for peace. If the peace process is to remain alive, we need such leaders on the Arab side, and with Egypt still on the sidelines, Hussein is ^{one of the few who can help us.} ~~the only one there is.~~ ^{You will be well aware of} ~~I do not need to explain to you~~ the implications of his decision to recall Parliament and the risks that this, and any attempts at a dialogue with the PLO, will carry for him. The Syrians will be implacably opposed, as will radical elements of the PLO: and Jordan is already facing a terrorist campaign.

This vulnerability demands that we, the West, should consider urgently what kind of support we can best give to Hussein at this difficult time. We should do this, I believe, in two main ways. First, we should give what help we can to the Palestinians (whether on the West Bank or in the diaspora) to encourage them to take the moderate road to negotiation. Second, we should make it plain to the moderate Arab states that the West remains actively committed to the search for a comprehensive solution of the Arab/Israel conflict, of which the Palestinian problem is the core.

To do this it is essential that we avoid the polarisation that King Hussein fears so much. ^{It does seem that} ~~Whatever~~ ^{new agreement} ~~the substance of your co-operation with Israel,~~ ^{has sound} ~~it has been~~ ^{remains as} ~~misunderstood~~ by many of our friends in the area. It ~~is~~ ^{is} vital that the US should be seen as the impartial mediator of goodwill. ^{and} ~~This makes it essential that the United States should stand (and stand publicly) firm on the principles and the text of Security Council Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories~~

the new U.S. / have
cooperation agreement
has sound great
common sense

occupied since 1967, and that the US should press Israel harder to show her desire for peace by freezing the expansion of settlements on the West Bank. I know the difficulties you face in moving the Israelis on this, but it ~~does~~ ^{is an} ~~irreparable~~ ^{irreparable} ~~after all form~~ part of your proposals of 1 September 1982, and unless it is actually achieved (and soon) we ^{may} face an irreparable setback to peace. ^{I believe that} ~~the~~ ^{the} people of the West Bank ^{would welcome a} ~~must be given some~~ sign that you do not wish to see them absorbed by Israel. This cannot be done simply by aid programmes (though we are looking at what more we can do here). It needs unmistakable political signals. ^{otherwise I fear} ~~If not,~~ ^{but} Palestinian despair will end up by offering golden opportunities to the Russians.

I have expressed my views frankly. ~~You would not expect anything else, especially on a question of such importance~~, as you and I always do to each other, because the question is of such great importance to both of us.

SECRET

cc MOD

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 December 1983

Jordan

I sent you on 16 December a record of the Prime Minister's talks with the King of Jordan on that day. Later in the evening King Hussein sent the Prime Minister a letter and enclosed copies of two letters which he had received from President Reagan, dated 26 November and 27 November respectively.

You will obviously wish to take these into account in considering the content of the proposed message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan (see my letter of 16 December). But may I stress again that the fact that King Hussein has let the Prime Minister have copies of President Reagan's letters should be kept very close and the contents of the letters should not be revealed except to those who have an essential operational need to know of them.

I should be grateful if Richard Mottram, to whom I am copying this letter, could take similar precautions to protect the correspondence.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

ATC



10 DOWNING STREET

Attached is a photocopy
of King Hussein's message.
The PM returned the
original.

Vanessa intercepted it
and relayed the contents.

Having discussed with
AT we decided to
leave it for you to
deal on Monday.

Mark
18/12/83.

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 220/83

cc MASTER
ops

London

16 December 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

p.a.
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I write to thank you, Madam, for the pleasure of meeting with you once again at this very ominous period of international tension, particularly as it manifests itself in the Middle East.

I have always valued your advice and appreciated the chances afforded me to discuss with you, in total confidence and friendship, all matters of mutual interest.

It is in this spirit that I enclose the attached two letters for your confidential attention, as they may help complete the current picture of relations with our mutual friends in Washington.

I also wish to affirm that it is our intention to recall the Jordanian Parliament to an extraordinary session to amend the constitution, as early as January 1984. The amendments would then ensure the continuation of the constitutional parliamentary democratic life in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. I shall appraise you, Madam Prime Minister, of all developments in that regard.

The Middle East, and indeed our world, is most unpredictable. I have just learned with incredulity that the new close relations between His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco and Colonel Ghadaffi of Libya, have resulted in the Moroccans arranging a visit to Libya of President Gemayel. I obviously can not make any sense of this event, especially against the background which we discussed earlier on today and particularly the affiliations of the President of Lebanon and his feelings, as conveyed to you. I hope he leaves Libya safely.

With my highest esteem and warmest personal wishes for a Merry Christmas and a happy, successful New Year.

I am,

Your sincere friend,

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRC 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1296</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Attachments to King Hussein to PM dated 16 December 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>2/9/13</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
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CC MOD

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 December 1983

Dear Peter,

Call by King Hussein of Jordan

King Hussein called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. I enclose a record of the conversation.

I also enclose a copy of President Reagan's letter of 11 December to the King which the latter gave to the Prime Minister during the course of the conversation. Would you please ensure that this letter is not copied further except where this is operationally essential. It was handed over in confidence and the fact that King Hussein has made it available to us should not become known more widely.

You will see from the record that the Prime Minister has undertaken to send a message to President Reagan about King Hussein's call and the situation in the Middle East. I should be grateful if you could let me have a suitable draft at the latest by close of play on Monday 19 December.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Gales.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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3

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS MAJESTY
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 1700 HOURS ON FRIDAY 16 DECEMBER 1983
AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present: Prime Minister King Hussein of Jordan
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Sir Anthony Parsons
Mr. Coles

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that she was very pleased to see the King but very worried about the situation in the Middle East. She was grateful to him for letting us see his recent letter to President Reagan. In considering the situation in the Middle East, we first asked ourselves how the future of Jordan could be ensured - she had spoken to President Reagan about this matter on her last visit to Washington. Secondly, we considered how progress could be made on the fundamental problems confronting the area. One test we applied to proposals was their likely effect on the future integrity of Jordan. If we regarded them as prejudicial to Jordan, we rejected them as unacceptable. King Hussein said that the entire Middle Eastern area was in very great danger of destabilisation. There could be eruptions but he could not predict their timing or their scope. The root cause of instability was still the Palestine problem. But for the present the Lebanon was receiving more attention. He was very pessimistic about the future of the Lebanon. The attempts to promote reconciliation were unlikely to succeed. The internal divisions were almost a fact. Even the current evacuation of people from Deir al Qamar was a sign of division - Christian families were leaving a Christian area. The objectives we had all set ourselves in the Lebanon had become hopeless. When the Multi-National Force had entered the country the objective had been to secure an independent and sovereign Lebanon and promote the withdrawal of all foreign forces. But more recently the emphasis had shifted towards the implementation of the Israeli/Lebanese agreement which had been imposed on the Lebanese President and people. It was a peace agreement in all but name. It represented another stage in the fundamentally flawed

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step-by-step approach. The correct approach to Middle Eastern problems was to seek a comprehensive solution.

The Soviet Union was also on the scene. It was behind Syria which controlled much of Lebanon. Israel was still in occupation of the South. It was unclear now whether Europe was involved in the Multi-National Force in order to secure its original objectives or in order to implement the Israeli/Lebanese agreement. If after a certain period the MNF was forced to withdraw, it would represent a symbolic withdrawal from the whole area, leaving the field to the radicals.

President Gemayel had returned empty handed from Washington. In addition the new United States/Israeli strategic co-operation agreement amounted to an alliance. In the Lebanon the two super powers were each supporting a foreign country present in a country which was already divided. If deterioration continued in the Lebanon, the south of the country would become part of Israel and the north part of Syria. There might also be a Christian entity and a Druze entity but this would still leave 300,000 Palestinians who had been there since 1948 and who would have to find refuge elsewhere.

Syria was now attempting to control the PLO. It was not clear whether or not Arafat would be able to leave Tripoli. The PLO had suffered throughout their existence because of the requirement for consensus on every subject. The radical minority were always able to prevent any positive move. He hoped that the moderate Palestinian leadership would remember that their strength lay in their constituents. The Palestinian people, especially those in the Occupied Territories, were in despair. If the moderate leaders would identify with their people, Jordan would see what could be achieved - and was already in touch with Egypt about this matter. But if the PLO were subjugated by Syria a vacuum would be created.

The Jordanian people had decided that they should remain attached to their constitutional life. They did not wish to continue with the contradictory situation of two bodies representing Palestine. There was now the problem that if another five members

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of the old Jordanian Parliament were incapacitated, there would be no quorum and no constitutional capacity to carry out its functions. Therefore, in the next month or so, he would have to recall the old Parliament. He was trying to treat this as a domestic Jordan/Palestine problem. Half of the Parliament was from the West Bank.

The purpose of his recent letter to President Reagan was to establish whether Resolution 242 was still alive, for it was the foundation of all initiatives. The answer he had received was not clear. The President had emphasised his desire to continue the peace process and had said that he would not be diverted from this by the United States elections. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, King Hussein said that President Reagan had attempted to answer the points put to him one by one but the answers had been more vague on some points than on others. Then the whole situation had changed with the visit to Washington of the Israeli Foreign Minister. So he had again written to President Reagan and had received another reply (a copy of which he handed to the Prime Minister). This reply was very difficult to understand.

The Prime Minister said that President Gemayel, in his talks with her on 14 December, had said that without the presence of the MNF in the Lebanon there was no chance of reconciliation. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the force was no longer the original one. We were concerned about the lack of clarity of the MNF's role. But we felt that if we now withdrew there would be terrible bloodshed and unilateral withdrawal would have a very serious effect on the Western Alliance. But the four contributing countries were still attempting to agree on objectives and methods.

With regard to the reconciliation process, President Gemayel had seemed too optimistic. He had emphasised his desire to reconvene the Geneva Conference next week but coupled this with the statement that this would be purposeless unless basic agreement had been worked out in advance. It would be surprising if the Conference were reconvened next week - and it was perhaps not wise of Gemayel to have conveyed this impression of optimism.

With regard to the King's remarks about the division of Lebanon between two super powers, each with a surrogate, it was

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perhaps encouraging that the Soviet Union appeared to be taking a very low profile. The Moscow ship appeared to be rudderless, partly because of Andropov's illness, partly because of the Soviet failure to prevent INF deployment.

Gemayel had given a very clear impression of a strong relationship between the United States, Israel and himself.

We had earlier considered whether UNIFIL should be turned into a truce supervisory organisation and take the place of the MNF. It might be difficult for the Soviet Union to veto such a proposal. Undoubtedly the Israelis were getting tired of their position in Southern Lebanon.

On another matter, was there any hope of the non-radical Arab world acquiring greater unity, embracing Egypt? When the moderate PLO leadership left Tripoli, could the moderate Arabs co-operate with them?

Any progress required United States action to halt the process of Israeli settlement on the West Bank. As the King had stated in his letter to President Reagan, current United States actions were contrary to the peace process.

During her visit to Washington she had obtained the impression that the United States administration had not thought through their Middle East position. For example, both President Reagan and Mr. Shultz had argued that the number of Israelis in the West Bank was not large. She had warned of the danger of both Israel and Syria trying to force Palestinians into Jordan. And, as she had already told the King, she had emphasised that it was absolutely essential for the integrity of Jordan to be preserved. President Reagan had said that he agreed with the Prime Minister on this point.

With regard to the King's idea of an International Conference on the Middle East, she believed that the United States would reject it. We had to keep trying to influence the Americans to proceed in the direction we desired - and should perhaps attempt

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/ to make

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to make them feel guilty about current developments.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if the situation in the Lebanon continued, there was a risk of rising conflict between Syria and the United States. We should encourage Gemayel to continue the reconciliation process. We should also encourage the United States to revert to the original role of the MNF. Then pressure should be put on Syria to moderate the actions of their surrogates in the Lebanon. Could the moderate Arab states bring pressure to bear on Syria?

King Hussein said that the King of Saudi Arabia had discussed with him the idea of the majority of Arab states bringing influence to bear. There was a growing feeling in the area that Britain would help in this respect. Any Arab Summit should deal with the question of the PLO Charter so as to enable the moderate Arabs to move ahead.

The Prime Minister commented that it was her impression that the United States and Israel were closer than were the Soviet Union and Syria. King Hussein emphasised the dangers of polarisation.

The Prime Minister asked how influence could be brought to bear on Syria to induce it to withdraw some of its forces from the Lebanon. The Americans believed that a tough approach might achieve this. She was not sure this was right. King Hussein said that Syria would not have had a leg to stand on if the issue had been the simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. But the problem was the Israeli/Lebanese agreement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that we needed to consider how we could move towards phased withdrawals of the various forces.

King Hussein asked what the Soviet role was in all this. Did the Russians want Syria to withdraw from the Lebanon? The Prime Minister expressed the view that the Soviet Union were unlikely to allow Syria to withdraw while the MNF, including the Americans, remained. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary observed that the tough policy of the United States made it more difficult for Syria to withdraw. King Hussein remarked that the United States had

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again missed a great opportunity. This was precisely the moment when Israel had enormous political and economic need of the United States and that should have led the Americans to put pressure on her.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that the only way forward that he saw in the Lebanon was to set aside the 17 May Agreement, try to get a UN force to replace the Israelis in the South (thereby removing Syrian objections to withdrawal), and then progressively replace all foreign forces by UN troops. Only after that could reconciliation happen. There was some evidence that Israelis were not so opposed to a UN presence in the South now.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of the West Bank. What would the effect of the recall of Parliament be on the moderate Arab world and the moderate PLO? King Hussein said that he would be explaining his proposals to these audiences. But he wanted to get the West Bank MPs out before the Israelis stopped them leaving.

The Prime Minister asked whether we should be trying to persuade the United States to put more aid into the West Bank. Sir Anthony Parsons said that he had discussed this matter frequently with Crown Prince Hassan. We were aware of all the difficulties. But it was depressing that development was at such a low level - and it was demoralising for the inhabitants of the West Bank that the outside world was doing so little. King Hussein said that if a more substantial aid programme could be achieved, this would be very welcome - and the channel used was not important.

The Prime Minister said that we always returned to the question of how we could influence the United States. Sir Anthony Parsons said that they would not be positively influenced by public statements by their friends such as the European Community. We should continue our private dialogue. The Prime Minister told the King that Vice President Bush might be visiting London in the New Year and we would discuss these matters with him. King Hussein

/ said

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said that the Americans were pushing him into a situation which deprived him of choice.

King Hussein then said that he believed that we were on the verge of a new wave of international terrorism. A number of developments pointed in that direction. The Prime Minister said that there was a new feature of fanaticism in recent terrorist actions.

The Prime Minister said that she would send a message to President Reagan about the King's visit and about the situation in the Middle East. She hoped that if there was any serious deterioration in the Middle East while the King was in London, he would not hesitate to call on her again.

King Hussein said that his priority now was to put the Palestine/Jordan relationship in order and then make a final effort to get a dialogue going. Sir Anthony Parsons commented that, judging from recent PLO statements, they had still not learned the lesson that they must conditionally recognise Israel if a peace process was to start.

King Hussein said that he would try to get the moderate majority in the Arab world to be more active. One of his worries was that Mr. Shultz now appeared to have changed his attitude towards Middle Eastern problems. He himself had had recent contacts with the Soviet Union whose attitude was that they were present in the area; they might not be a party to the peace process; but they could prevent any process from succeeding.

The discussion ended at 1825.

A. J. C .

16 December 1983

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minutes.

My only comment on this
very clear minute is that we
should not imply that we
shall intervene militarily, if
necessary, in the Gulf until you
have considered this with your
colleagues next week. It is a
big decision.

A-J C. $\frac{15}{12}$

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Prime Minister.

MR. COLES ^{AD 15}

2

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT

Flag F.

King Hussein's latest letter to President Reagan (Amman Telno 576) is one of the most outspoken communications from one friendly (or unfriendly) Head of State to another that I have ever read. Taken with the Egyptian reaction, I hope, but doubt, that it will shake the apparent American complacency about the effect on the Arab world of the recent US/Israeli agreements. The full Arab reaction has been muffled by the relative silence of the Saudis and the Gulf States, all of whom desperately need the Americans in the context of the Gulf war.

There seem to me to be four subjects which the Prime Minister might discuss with the King; all very bleak:-

1. The King's proposal for an international conference including the Russians and the Americans. Although such a conference would solve nothing, the fact of it taking place would have a calming effect on the region: it therefore has some merit. But it is a non-starter. President Reagan and his advisers are ideologically hostile to any involvement of the Soviet Union in third country problems. Furthermore, the Israelis and the Israeli lobby in the United States would have a fit if the Americans showed any willingness to embark on such an exercise. If the King insists, we could undertake to talk to the Americans but we should not encourage him to think that there is any hope of success.
2. The King's plan to recall the Jordanian Parliament and possibly to launch a fresh Palestine initiative, if feasible with Arafat's blessing. The King has failed to extract adequate prior assurances from Reagan about American commitment to bring about the implementation of SCR.242 - Israeli withdrawal etc - if the King came forward as the Arab interlocutor. As before, the Americans are expecting him to do so without any such assurances. Does the King now consider that the risks are too great, even if he could get support from the (weakened) moderate PLO? (Amman tel No 586 is depressing : it suggests that the PLO have learnt nothing from their recent experiences.) Does he consider that recalling the Jordanian Parliament with nominated West Bank representatives, even without a consequent peace initiative, would be dangerously provocative to the Syrians and other Arab radicals?

/Again, if he

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
Again, if he is desperately keen that we should try to persuade the Americans to give him firmer assurances, we could agree - although with virtually no hope of success.

3. Aid to the West Bank and Gaza. Prince Hassan has frequently urged that the West should do more by way of aid to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in order to preserve their Arab identity and to avoid further drift away from the Occupied Territories into Jordan. We are sympathetic to this objective. What would the King like the West to do bilaterally or collectively, governmentally and/or via the private sector? Would it be possible or practicable to channel larger quantities of aid into the area into genuine development, given the attitude of the present Israeli Government?

4. The Lebanon. The PM could give the King an account of Gemayel's visit. Does the King see any softening of the Syrian position, as Gemayel does?

If there is time, the Prime Minister might discuss the Iran/Iraq war. The difficulty is that the King is wholly committed to the Iraqi side. But it would be interesting to hear his views on the extent to which Jordan could provide military support for the smaller Gulf states if an Iranian threat to them materialises. He will be in no doubt that the Americans and ourselves will take action to help the Gulf states defend themselves and to reopen the Straits of Hormuz if the worst comes to the worst. But we at least would rather see the Arabs defend themselves so far as possible.

Finally, the King may ask for some "European initiative" on Palestine, a new Venice Declaration, some kind of public pressure on the Americans, evidence that we are "distancing ourselves" etc. I am not in favour of this kind of attitudinising. Our national interest does not require it at present and we should concentrate on trying to do something useful rather than striking attitudes. But we could assure the King that we will keep on plugging away at the Americans and that the Prime Minister will be in touch with Reagan following his visit.


A.D. PARSONS
15 December 1983

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>POEM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1296</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Attachment to Parsons to Coles dated 15 December 1983</i> <i>(Telno 576 dated 11 December 1983)</i>	
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FM AMMAN 111200Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 11 DECEMBER 1983

MY TWO IPTS: JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

1. IN HIS LETTER OF 9 DECEMBER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (TEXT IN MY TELNO 576), KING HUSSEIN STATED BLUNTLY THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL HAD ALTERED THE AMERICAN POSITION FROM THAT OF PEACE-MAKER TO COMMITTED ALLY OF ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: THIS "TRAGIC STEP" REPRESENTED THE ABANDONMENT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, WHICH IT WOULD NOW BE FUTILE TO TRY TO KEEP ALIVE.

2. AS HE INDICATED DURING MY AUDIENCE ON 7 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 570), THE KING NOW SEEMS TO BE FOCUSSED ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY THE TWO SUPER-POWERS AND POSSIBLY THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD. THE KING HAS OF COURSE LONG HELD THAT THE ATTEMPT TO EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION FROM MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WAS A MISTAKE AND, IN A SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE ARAB THOUGHT FORUM MEETING WITH CANADIAN AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS IN AMMAN ON 10 DECEMBER, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN STATED IN TERMS THAT THE EXCLUSION OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE PEACE PROCESS HAD BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT BOTH OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS AND OF THE WIDER ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. THE KING'S RECENT MEETING IN AMMAN WITH THE LEADING SOVIET MIDDLE EAST EXPERT PRIMAKOV (MY TELELETTER TO NIXON IN NENAD OF 7 DECEMBER REFERS) WILL HAVE HELPED TO REASSURE HIM THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OUTCOME OF ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH JORDANIAN DESIDERATA.

3. IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF HIS LETTER KING HUSSEIN INDICATED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS WHICH THE ABANDONMENT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE MAY HAVE ON US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN (AND PRESUMABLY ALSO ON THE OTHER IMPORTANT MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER-IN-C SEF'S PRESENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON: SEE MY TELNO 548).

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CONFIDENTIAL

4. THIS STRONG BUT ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE JORDANIAN REACTION, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF EGYPT (SEE CAIRO TELNO 537 REFERS), WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT THE MODERATE ARAB STATES NOW FEEL US MIDDLE EAST POLICY TO BE SO DISCREDITED IN ARAB EYES THAT THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM IT.

THE DILEMMA IS A PARTICULARLY CRUEL ONE FOR KING HUSSEIN, BECAUSE IF JORDAN WERE THREATENED WITH ATTACK FROM SYRIA OR ISRAEL HE KNOWS VERY WELL THAT ONLY THE AMERICANS COULD SAVE HIM.

5. SEE PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 575 ON POSSIBLE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION OF THIS AND MY 2 PRECEDING TELEGRAMS.

URWICK

LIMITED

NENAD

MED

NAD

PUSD

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 570 OF 7 DECEMBER 1983

REPEATED ROUTINE FOR INFO TO MOSCOW , PARIS, ROME, UKMIS
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

NY TELNO 557 : US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS IN DSPAIR WITH THE AMERICANS FOLLOWING THE RECENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THAT THE LATEST EVENTS IN LEBANON WERE UNFORTUNATELY IN L'INE WITH WHAT HE HIMSELF HAD PREDICTED WOULD HAPPEN. HE HAD NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND HOW TO REACT, BUT WAS CONTEMPLATING TELLING PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE SHOULD FORGET HIS MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE. THE KING SPOKE VAGUELY OF THE NEED FOR A WIDER CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT DID NOT SPELL OUT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND SEMI COLON HE SAID HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 DECEMBER, AND HE WILL NO DOUBT SPELL OUT HIS THOUGHTS MORE FULLY WHEN HE SEES HER.

2. EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME HE WOULD AWAIT THE FULL TEXTS OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ON SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON BEFORE PUTTING OUT AN OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTRY COMMENT ON THE US/ ISRAELI AGREEMENTS. QASEM SAID HE HAD TOLD A VISITING DELEGATION OF US CONGRESSMEN THAT AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF JORDAN, A COUNTRY WHICH HAD ALWAYS LOOKED FOR GENUINE CO-OPERATION WITH THE US AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, HE HAD NOW RUN OUT OF XCUSES TO JUSTIFY JORDAN'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. GIVEN THE STRONG JEWISH INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA IN THE US, QASEM FORESAW THAT THE STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BECOME ACCEPTED AS PART OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THIS WAS WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER SETTLEMENTS. ALL US PRESIDENTS UP TO CARTER HAD DENOUNCED ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AS ILLEGAL SEMI COLON NOW UNDER REAGAN THE PRESIDENTIAL POSITION HAD CHANGED, AS A RESULT OF A CONTINUOUS CAMPAIGN THROUGH THE MEDIA OVER MANY YEARS. QASEM SAID HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICAN VISITORS THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN JORDAN'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN THE FACE OF THE NEW AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL.

3. QASEM THEN READ ME SOME EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LAST LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN (SEE MY TELNO 550) AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CAMP DAVID, THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND RESOLUTION 242 WHICH QASEM DESCRIBED AS "RUBBISH".

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/ 4. QASEM

4. QASEM WAS QUALLY GLOOMY ON LEBANON. HE SAID THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE MNF WERE REMINISCENT OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE IN LEBANON IN THE LATE 1970S, WITH THE AMERICANS CAST IN THE SAME ROLE AS THE SYRIANS AT THAT TIME. GRADUALLY THE OTHER ARAB PARTICIPANTS HAD FELT OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DETERRENT FORCE, BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH SYRIAN POLICIES.

5. THE US AMBASSADOR MET WITH SIMILAR REACTIONS WHEN HE SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 4 DECEMBER. VIETS TELLS ME THAT HE HAD WARNED THE KING REPEATEDLY OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE WEEKS OF WHAT WAS COMING. NONETHELESS, KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY DISTRESSED, NOT BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE WORST SCENARIO OF US/ISRAELI INTENTIONS PAINTED BY SOME ARAB COMMENTATORS BUT BECAUSE HE FELT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE US/ISRAELI AGREEMENTS IT WOULD BE ALL TOO EASY FOR THE RADICALS TO PRESENT THE US AS THE ENEMY OF THE ARABS AND BECAUSE THE KING BELIEVED THE AGREEMENT ERODED AMERICAN CAPACITY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY IN THE AREA. HE WAS ALSO DEEPLY UPSET BECAUSE NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID DURING THE SHAMIR VISIT ABOUT WHAT THE ARABS MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN BY ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS E.G. ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SETTLEMENTS OR ARMS FOR JORDAN.

6. THE ONLY CRUMB OF COMFORT VIETS PERSONALLY FELT HE COULD FIND WAS THAT HE KNEW THE PRESIDENT HAD PUT SHAMIR ON NOTICE THAT, IF KING HUSSEIN WERE TO AGREE TO ENTER THE PEACE PROCESS, THE US WOULD DROP 'LIKE A TON OF BRICKS' ON ISRAEL WITHIN 24 HOURS (PLEASE PROTECT). VIETS HIMSELF IS GOING TO WASHINGTON ON 10 DECEMBER FOR CONSULTATIONS AND TO BE ON HAND FOR THE VISIT REFERRED TO IN MY TELNO 548 (NOT TO ALL). HE WILL BE RETURNING TO JORDAN VIA LONDON JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 584 OF 12 DECEMBER 1983

AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS , MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME,
UKDEL STRASBOURG, UKMIS NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELS NOS 570, AND 575-577 (NOT REPEATED TO POSTS):

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

SUMMARY.

1. SPEAKING ON US TELEVISION ON 11 DECEMBER, KING HUSSEIN REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON WHETHER OR NOT HE CONSIDERED THE REAGAN INITIATIVE TO BE DEAD, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT A UNITED STATES ALLIED WITH ISRAEL COULD NOT BY ITSELF BRING PEACE TO THE AREA. PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN AMMAN DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS BY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHRIGHT, AND SEEM CLEARLY DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE A SHIFT IN JORDANIAN POLICY AWAY FROM SUPPORT FOR A US-SPONSORED PEACE PROCESS BASED ON THE REAGAN INITIATIVE TOWARDS A BROADER APPROACH IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO BE INVOLVD.

DETAIL.

2. ASKED DURING A LIVE INTERVIEW BY SATELLITE WITH ABC TELEVISION ON 11 DECEMBER WHETHER THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS STILL ALIVE, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN "A GREAT HOPE AT THE TIME" AND THAT HE BELIEVED PRESIDENT REAGAN REMAINED DETERMINED TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. BUT THE KING EXPRESSED DISMAY OVER REPORTS ABOUT THE NEW US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC AGREEMENT WHICH MADE THE US "AN ALLY OF A BELLIGERENT IN THE TRAGEDY IN WHICH WE ALL LIVE" IF THE AMERICANS CONTINUED ALONG THIS PATH, THEY COULD NOT HOPE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR.

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/3.

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3. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD ENTER NEGOTIATIONS IF THE ISRAELIS ANNOUNCED A FREEZE OR LIMITATION ON SETTLEMENTS, THE KING REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE BUT ADDED THAT HE REQUIRED PALESTINIAN AND ARAB SUPPORT AND ALSO REASSURANCES THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE RESULT. THE KING REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, "TOTAL PEACE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL", AND STRESSED THAT ANY PEACE PROCESS WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON AN ACCEPTANCE THAT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WERE ILLEGAL ("THEY CONTRAVENE EVERY KNOWN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IN TERMS OF ADMINISTERING OCCUPIED TERRITORIES"). HE ALSO SPOKE IN THIS CONTEXT OF HIS FEARS ABOUT THE BEN PORAT PLAN TO RELOCATE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE JORDAN VALLEY WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO THEIR EVENTUAL EXPULSION FROM THE WEST BANK. ON JORDAN/PLO, KING HUSSEIN REPEATED THAT HE COULD NOT DO BUSINESS ONLY WITH "THE PLO RECOGNISED OVER THE YEARS" AND NOT WITH A PALESTINIAN ORGANISATION SUBSERVIENT TO ANOTHER ARAB STATE.
4. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, IN HIS SPEECH OPENING THE ARAB THOUGHT FORUM MEETING IN AMMAN ON 10 DECEMBER WHICH IS CARRIED IN TODAY'S PRESS, WAS BLUNT IN HIS CRITICISM OF US POLICY. HE SAID THE AMERICANS COULD NOT BRING PEACE TO LEBANON OR THE AREA AS A WHOLE WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE PEACE PROCESS AND ADDED: "IT IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THAT THE SUPERPOWERS EMBARK ON A DIALOGUE TO FORMULATE A COMMON APPROACH TO ... THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. A TWO TRACK APPROACH IS PREFERABLE: ONE TO DEAL WITH LEBANON AND THE OTHER CONCENTRATING ON THE CRUX OF THE ISSUE, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM."
5. THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER, ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ON 11 DECEMBER, SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL NOW APPEARED TO BE ON ONE SIDE AND THE ARABS ON THE OTHER. BADRAN INSISTED THAT THERE COULD BE NO PEACE IN THE AREA WITHOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION SEMICOLON KING HUSSEIN HAD TRIED IN VAIN TO CONVINCE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE INVOLVED. BADRAN REFERRED WITH EVIDENT IRRITATION TO CLAIMS BY US OFFICIALS THAT THE ARABS WOULD MAKE A FUSS ABOUT US MIDDLE EAST POLICY FOR 2 OR 3 DAYS BUT SOON CALM DOWN.

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COMMENT

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COMMENT

6. THESE STATEMENTS ARE PROBABLY THE MINIMUM THE JORDANIANS FEEL THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH IN FACE OF THEIR OWN AND ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. FEELINGS ARE RUNNING HIGH HERE AGAINST THE AMERICANS AND THE PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES ARE LIKELY TO BE THE RUSSIANS: WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE MAKING THE MOST OF IT LOCALLY BY TELLING THEIR CONTACTS THAT SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY IS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH JORDANIAN OBJECTIVES. EAGLEBURGER IS ON RECORD AS SAYING THAT CAREFUL NOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF WHAT THE ARABS SAID IN REACTION TO THE US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT (WASHINGTON TELNO 3653). BUT ONE WONDERS WHETHER THE AMERICANS YET REALISE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR CURRENT POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS PLAYING INTO SOVIET HANDS.

7. FULL TEXTS TO FCO ONLY BY BAG.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 586 OF 13 DECEMBER 1983

REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO MODUK, PARIS AND TUNIS.

REPEATED ROUTINE TO MOSCOW, ROME, UKDEL STRASBOURG,

UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

PARIS TELNO 1147: PLO

SUMMARY

1. ACCORDING TO ARAFAT'S CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER, THE PLO ARE NOW ACTIVELY CONSIDERING HOW A FRESH IMPETUS CAN BE GIVEN TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS ONCE ARAFAT IS OUT OF TRIPOLI. THEY ARE SEEKING FRENCH HELP, AND WOULD ALSO WELCOME BRITISH INVOLVEMENT, IN LAUNCHING A NEW MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE. THE PLO APPARENTLY STILL HOPE THEY CAN SOMEHOW MAKE POLITICAL PROGRESS WITHOUT PUBLICLY ACCEPTING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

DETAIL

2. IN THE COURSE OF A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION THIS MORNING HANI AL HASSAN (ARAFAT'S CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER) TOLD ME THAT HIS BROTHER KHALID AL HASSAN AND QADDOUMI HAD BEEN TALKING TO FRENCH OFFICIALS IN PARIS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS ABOUT THE TERMS OF A POSSIBLE FRENCH/PLO STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE ISSUED AFTER A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND ARAFAT. ACCORDING TO AL HASSAN THE FRENCH WERE INSISTING THAT MITTERRAND WOULD ONLY RECEIVE ARAFAT IF THE PLO WERE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THEIR CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. AL HASSAN SAID THAT ARAFAT WAS NOT AT PRESENT PREPARED TO AGREE TO THIS, BUT THE PLO WERE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH. THE SAUDIS HAD OFFERED TO HELP BY HOLDING OUT ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO THE FRENCH IF THE PLO WISHED.

3. AL HASSAN CLAIMED THAT, WITH ARAFAT ABOUT TO LEAVE TRIPOLI (I AM REPORTING IN MIFT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE DEPARTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ARAFAT AND HIS FIGHTERS), THE PLO HAD REGAINED THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND WERE NOW THINKING HOW BEST TO EXPLOIT IT. HE SAID THAT THE ARAFAT LOYALISTS HAD MANAGED TO PUT THEIR HOUSE IN ORDER, WHEREAS THE REBELS FACED INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AND WERE DISCREDITED AS A POLITICAL FORCE; HE CLAIMED THAT THE SYRIANS NOW WISHED TO GET RID OF THOSE DISSIDENTS SUCH AS ABU MUSA WHO HAD FOUGHT AGAINST THEM IN 1976. AL HASSAN SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO MUCH TO HELP ARAFAT. SOVIET STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WERE ISSUED ONLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THE PLO KNEW FROM THEIR CONTACTS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN TUNIS THAT THE RUSSIANS IN FACT REGARDED THE ATTAINMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE AS A PIPE DREAM. SEMI COLON THEY ALSO KNEW THAT A LEADING SOVIET OFFICIAL HAD SAID

/AS MUCH

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AS MUCH TO THE JORDANIANS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT HERE (MY TELELETTER TO NIXON IN NENAD OF 7 DECEMBER REFERS).

4. AL HASSAN SAID HE BELIEVED THE EUROPEANS, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH, COULD PROVE MORE PROMISING POLITICAL PARTNERS FOR THE PLO. HE RECALLED THAT, WHEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS HAD STATED THEIR INTENTION IN 1977 TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, QADDOUMI HAD ANNOUNCED PLO SUPPORT WITHIN 15 MINUTES AND HAD BEEN CRITICISED BY THE SAUDIS FOR HIS IMPETUOSITY. AL HASSAN ASKED HOW BRITAIN WOULD REACT TO A PLO SUGGESTION THAT A SIMILAR APPROACH SHOULD BE TRIED NOW, ZKIO WITH THE EUROPEANS CAST IN THE FORMER US/ SOVIET ROLE AND ISSUING A NEW STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST SEMI COLON THEREAFTER THE PLO COULD IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCE THAT THEY "UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD RECOGNISE EACH OTHER AT THE CONCLUSION OF A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION". EMPHASISING THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I REMARKED THAT WE HAD SURELY ALL BEEN ROUND THIS TRACK MANY TIMES BEFORE. IF THE PLO WISHED THE EUROPEANS TO PERFORM A USEFUL ROLE, THEY MUST ALSO PLAY THEIR PART. IT WOULD MAKE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON WORLD OPINION IF THE PLO WERE WILLING TO STATE NOW, WITHOUT FURTHER EQUIVOCATION, THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN RETURN FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AND RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. IN MY VIEW THE PLO HAD ALREADY WAITED FAR TOO LONG TO DO THIS SEMI COLON BUT IT WAS NOT TOO LATE, AND THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS ALSO OFFERED THEM A NEW OPPORTUNITY.

5. AL HASSAN, WHO SAID HE HAD SEEN KING HUSSEIN SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE YESTERDAY FOR FRANCE AND BRITAIN, CLAIMED THAT THE JORDANIANS NOW HAD A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLO'S POSITION AND HAD THEMSELVES MOVED CLOSER TO IT AS A RESULT OF THE US/ISRAEL STRATEGIC AGREEMENT WHICH HAD ACUTELY EMBARRASSED JORDAN AND THE OTHER MODERATE ARABS. AL HASSAN DID NOT BELIEVE KING HUSSEIN WOULD NOW WISH TO EMBARRASS THE PLO BY GOING AHEAD WITH THE RECALL OF THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT. THE KING HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED RECALLING PARLIAMENT WHEN THE PLO SEEMED ABOUT TO PASS UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL SEMI COLON BUT THE NEED FOR THIS MOVE WAS NOW LESS URGENT, AND AL HASSAN THOUGHT THE KING WOULD KEEP IT IN RESERVE AS A CARD TO PLAY IF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT BROKE DOWN. AL HASSAN SEEMED TO THINK KING HUSSEIN WAS GOING TO EUROPE PRIMARILY TO SEEK EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR A NEW MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE, IN WHICH HE HOPED THE EUROPEANS WOULD TAKE THE LEAD.

6. AL HASSAN SAID HE PERSONALLY WAS VERY HOPEFUL THAT, IF AS HE EXPECTED ARAFAT CAME TO AMMAN SHORTLY, A JOINT JORDANIAN/ PLO POSITION MIGHT EMERGE WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED TO AN ARAB SUMMIT. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD NOW CHANGED THEIR MINDS AND FAVOURED AN EARLY SUMMIT MEETING. THE SYRIANS HAD OVER-PLAYED THEIR HAND AND WERE NO LONGER WELL PLACED TO BLOCK ACCEPTANCE OF JORDANIAN/PLO IDEAS AT AN ARAB SUMMIT.

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7. AGAIN SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SUGGESTED TO AL HASSAN THAT THE PLO MIGHT BE WISER TO CONCENTRATE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON ACHIEVING ARAB SUPPORT FOR WHATEVER JOINT POSITION JORDAN AND THE PLO COULD AGREE BEFORE TRYING TO DRAW THE EUROPEANS INTO REACTIVATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THAT PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WAS THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP. AL HASSAN ASSURED ME THAT THIS WAS ONE OF MANY APPROACHES BEING DEBATED WITHIN THE PLO. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH.

COMMENT

8. AL HASSAN IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH ARAFAT AND I AM FAIRLY SURE THAT HIS VIEWS AND THOSE OF BRIGADIER YAHYA (THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN AMMAN WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AND INTERVENED IN THE DISCUSSION FROM TIME TO TIME SEMI COLON CHARLTON ACCOMPANIED ME) REFLECT THE THINKING OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP. AL HASSAN WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES OF GETTING THE AMERICANS TO RE-ENGAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS PRIOR TO THE US ELECTIONS. BUT SEEMED TO SEE ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE FUTURE, HE WAS ALSO ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT HOW MUCH THE PLO STOOD TO GAIN BY MOVING TOWARDS CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AND SEEMED TO BE LOOKING FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE FRENCH AND OURSELVES SEMI COLON BUT THE OLD PREVARICATIONS AND EVASIONS IN PLO ATTITUDES REMAIN AND AL HASSAN HIMSELF DOES NOT INSPIRE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE, I WOULD

EXPECT HIM TO CONTACT ME AGAIN BEFORE LONG. SHOULD ARAFAT COME HERE SOON FOR TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN, WOULD YOU WISH ME TO SEE HIM? ASSUMING THAT PLO ATTITUDES CONTINUE TO EVOLVE CONSTRUCTIVELY, COULD I BE AUTHORISED TO OFFER A MEETING BETWEEN MR LUCE AND QADDOUMI OR SOME OTHER LEADING PLO OFFICIAL, IN TUNIS OR ELSEWHERE?

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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15 December 1983

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose briefs for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister on 16 December at 5 p.m. The King will be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador and Mr Ahmad Al-Lawzi, Head of the Royal Court. As agreed, the Foreign Secretary will attend.

I haven't
checked - yet!
see separate
minutes.
OK 15/12

The King arrives in London earlier on 16 December. He met President Mitterrand in Paris on 13 December and addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 December. He will be staying privately in London until 21 December. The King has already visited London three times this year: privately in February and May; and as Leader of the Arab League Delegation in March. On each occasion he met the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Mr Pym was in Amman in April, and Mr Luce saw King Hussein there during his visit last month.

The King is depressed about the situation in the Middle East. The Arabs are in greater disarray than ever: Lebanon is badly bogged down; Iraq is losing the war with Iran; and after internecine Palestinian strife, Arafat is still stuck in Tripoli. In his discussions with the Prime Minister, King Hussein is likely to express his acute concern at the stagnation in the peace process, the unwillingness of the United States to put pressure on Israel, and, above all, at the consequences of the US decision announced during Mr Shamir's visit to Washington on 29 November to resume 'strategic' co-operation with Israel. He has recently sent the Prime Minister on a personal basis a copy of his strongly-worded letter of 9 December to President Reagan about this. It must have been a particular blow to him at a time when he was considering what he himself could do to inject some movement into the Arab/Israel peace process once Arafat's position became clearer.

Fleg F.

The King will no doubt seek the Prime Minister's advice on ways of influencing the United States to take steps to help its friends in the Arab world. He may still be looking for our views on, and encouragement for, his plans to recall the

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Jordanian Parliament, which may among other things help to prepare the ground for a fresh Jordanian approach (if respectable Palestinian cover could be found) to the problem of entering peace negotiations with Israel. The Prime Minister took a cautious line on this in her letter to the King of 21 November annexed to the briefs. The King seems to have backtracked on this idea recently. It was notable that in his letter of 9 December to President Reagan he did not refer to it, and spoke instead of calling an International Conference.

The King may also wish to discuss with the Prime Minister the increased tension between the United States and Syria in Lebanon. He would no doubt be interested to have an account of the Prime Minister's talk with President Gemayel on 14 December.

King Hussein has been a firm supporter of Iraq in its war with Iran. He is concerned about the implications for Jordan of a prolonged stalemate or an Iraqi defeat. The Prime Minister might wish to thank King Hussein for his efforts to secure the release of two British subjects imprisoned in Iraq, Smith and Hagger. Although these have so far been unsuccessful, we may have to call upon the King's good offices again in the future.

Our bilateral relations are excellent and are to be marked by the State Visit to Jordan between 26 and 30 March 1984. Recent articles in The Times and other newspapers highlighting concern for The Queen's security have irritated the Jordanians, whose record in security matters is good. (Recent State Visits by the Presidents of Turkey and Italy passed off without incident.) We shall be keeping a close eye on the security situation as the Visit draws nearer.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY KING HUSSEIN: 16 DECEMBER

Arab/Israel

Points to Make

1. What are King Hussein's latest plans over the recall of the Jordanian Parliament? What do other Arab states think about it? How would he expect Israel to react to new representation of the West Bank? (If pressed on our attitude). In principle we support any move that will break the present deadlock, but the ground needs careful preparation, and timing will be crucial.
2. PLO/Tripoli. Use of UN flag to help evacuation of Palestinian fighters purely humanitarian. If Arafat is rescued, what will he do? Go to Tunis and leave the front line to Syrian-backed rebels? Might he go to Amman for talks with Hussein? How much support will he command?
3. US policy. Ten and US differ on certain points and we regularly let the Americans know our views. US/Israel 'strategic cooperation' may have little content, but it gave misleading signals. US involvement remains crucial to any chance of peace. If Arabs could make publicly clear that they are ready to enter peace process on realistic basis, pressure will be on US to make Israel react constructively. President Reagan assures us that his initiative is still on the table. We agree that in practice this will require action to ensure that the President's call for a settlements freeze in the Occupied territories, is honoured by Israel. Jordan should not abandon the Reagan initiative unilaterally. Jordan's record of moderation impressive: polarisation must be avoided at all costs.
4. (If Raised). International Peace Conference. We do not (not) see the Arab/Israel dispute in East/West terms, as some others are inclined to do. Does King Hussein see value in involving the Soviet Union at some stage in discussions about the search for peace (rather than in propaganda)? Would he consider raising this

with the Americans? Simple calls for an international conference do not seem to us to be likely to be productive while the gap between the parties remains so wide and US/Soviet relations are so bad.

5. Account of meeting with President Gemayel (14 December). Prospects for early progress towards reconciliation not encouraging: Gemayel hampered by intransigence of both Syrians and US/Israelis, particularly on status of 17 May Israel/Lebanon agreement. We have urged Americans not to let agreement become an obstacle and discussed with them ideas (favoured by King Hussein) on a timetable for phased withdrawals of foreign forces. Compromises must be found. Will Syrians allow this?

6. Risks to Multinational Force increased recently: suicide bomb attacks, US/French/Israeli air strikes, US naval bombardment. Natural that each contributor should want to deter attacks. But we see overriding need not to escalate tension, and where possible to lower the level of violence.

7. British contingent has established impartial reputation. Presence valued by all including Druze. No intention of following more aggressive US policy. Want to see conditions created which will allow early MNF withdrawal, ideally replaced by some form of UN force.

8. Our relations continue to be excellent. Re-affirm our commitment to Jordan.

9. State visit next March. Queen and Duke of Edinburgh much looking forward to it. Regret recent articles in The Times about Queen's safety in Jordan by a correspondent based in Israel. But little publicity ensued.

10. (If pressed) We shall have to advise The Queen at the appropriate moment. We recognise the skill of the Jordanian government in ensuring security in a volatile and dangerous area. The probability of postponement looks small.

11. Aid. Continue to attach great importance to our aid programme.

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Inspite of UK aid fund being under heavy pressure, HMG doing utmost to assist Jordan's continuing development.

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Essential Facts

1. During their meeting in Washington on 29 September, the Prime Minister and President Reagan agreed that Jordan held the key to the Arab-Israel dispute and that we should help maintain her stability. King Hussein, although pessimistic about the prospects for peace, sees no option but to continue searching for a peaceful settlement. His past identification with US policies in the region (particularly after the Reagan Plan) has worsened his relations with more radical Arab states, particularly Syria. He also faces serious terrorist threats. King Hussein has said that Jordan has irrefutable evidence that the Abu Nidhal Group with Syrian backing were responsible for the attacks on the Jordanian Ambassadors in Rome and Delhi in November as well as other bomb incidents inside Jordan.

2. Jordanians also fear that after Lebanon they will be next on Israel's agenda. They are concerned at the promotion of the 'Jordan-is-Palestine line by senior Ministers in the Likud Government and their supporters, with its implication that the continuation of a moderate Hashemite regime in Jordan is not necessarily in Israel's interests.

Israel/US Strategic Cooperation

3. After Mr Shamir's recent visit to Washington (27-30 November) President Reagan announced several measures designed to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries:

i) Establishment of a joint political/military committee to meet twice yearly to examine ways of strengthening strategic cooperation.

ii) Stock-piling of US military and medical equipment in Israel.

iii) Joint planning and combined naval and air exercises.

iv) Resumption of supply of cluster bombs, suspended following their use by Israelis during war in Lebanon last year, subject to Israeli 'guarantees' that they will only be used against military targets.

v) A total of \$550,000,000 funding for development of the Lavi fighter.

Many Arab states, notably Jordan and Egypt, have expressed their deep unhappiness at this development. In identifying the US even more closely with Israel it is likely to undermine further US credibility as an impartial peacemaker in Lebanon and make it more difficult for the moderate Arabs to join in any negotiations based on the Reagan plan to solve the Arab/Israel dispute.

4. Jordanian Parliament. King Hussein has given thought to recalling the Jordanian Parliament and may announce a decision to do so shortly. The Parliament was prorogued in 1974 following the Rabat Summit resolution that the PLO was the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians. The King could expect strong opposition particularly from Syria. Given the risks involved for Hussein, the Prime Minister was careful not to express specific support for the move in her letter to him on 21 November (text at Annex). Whether or not he decides to use the Parliament as a platform from which to launch an initiative to start negotiations with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians must also depend on the outcome of the struggle between Arafat and the Syria-backed rebels in Tripoli. Although the Likud Government would not welcome the emergence of a Jordanian-Palestinian entity offering a real opening to negotiations, they are unlikely to prevent PLO-Jordanian Palestinians from participating in the Parliament which they would regard as a useful way of undermining the PLO.

5. PLO. A Saudi/Syrian plan to end the fighting in Tripoli and evacuate Arafat and his supporters has been accepted in principle by both Arafat and the rebels. The ceasefire that followed the announcement of the plan has been subject to only minor violations. The UN Secretary-General has agreed on humanitarian grounds that ships used to evacuate Arafat's fighters should fly the UN flag. Four Greek ships are expected to evacuate 4000 Palestinians carrying personal weapons only, one to Tunis and three to the YAR. King Hussein is reported to have said on 13 December that Arafat would always be welcome in Amman without conditions. The evacuation procedure has moved slowly, but the Israelis have now answered the Greeks that they will not interfere with the operations. Nevertheless anti-Arafat feeling is high in Israel after a bomb attack on 6 December on a bus in Jerusalem from which 5 Israelis

have now died. Responsibility has been claimed by a group calling itself the General Command of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces.

6. A sitrep on latest developments in Lebanon is attached (Annex A).
7. Jordanian attitudes. King Hussein shares our wish to see a stable independent Lebanon free of all foreign forces. He supports President Gemayel and has given him some practical help (armoured cars for Lebanese Army). He has been generally supportive of the MNF but, like us, sees no future in the US policy of being tough with the Syrians and insisting on no amendment of the Israel/Lebanon agreement. In his message of 25 October to President Reagan he suggested that, with the 23 October bomb attacks, the MNF's bluff had been called and they should work for a phased withdrawal of all forces, including the MNF, with a fixed timetable.
8. National Reconciliation. President Gemayel has nearly completed his round of talks with American, European and Arab leaders. He has seen President Mitterrand, King Fahd, Signor Craxi and President Reagan and saw the Prime Minister and Secretary of State on 14 December. Plans are in hand to arrange the postponed visit to Damascus as soon as President Asad's health allows. But Gemayel is not much nearer to success with the mandate given him at the first session of the Geneva National Reconciliation talks (31 October - 4 November): "to undertake the necessary contacts to end the Israeli occupation". The stumbling block remains the 17 May Israel/Lebanon agreement which the United States and Israel wish to see implemented but which Syria and the Lebanese opposition want set aside, if not abrogated. Gemayel apparently aims to seek a form of words which avoids the question of implementation/abrogation while offering to respect the political and security concerns of Syria and Israel.
9. US/Israeli Attitudes. The Americans seem to have accepted the Israeli argument that a move away from the 17 May agreement will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and President Gemayel came away with little from his recent meeting with President Reagan (1 - 2 December) except for promises of increased military and economic assistance. He was told that the agreement was still the 'best and

most viable basis' for Israel withdrawal and that he should negotiate direct with the Syrians to expedite their withdrawal, attempt to extend his authority outside the Beirut area and pursue national reconciliation.

10. Syrian Attitudes. At Geneva I the Syrians showed some flexibility, indicating informally that they might be prepared to accept the setting aside of the 17 May agreement (without formal abrogation) and the working out of new Israeli/Lebanese security arrangements. But Syria will not accept implementation of the 17 May agreement and the recent US air strikes and naval shelling against Syrian positions in Lebanon appear to have hardened her attitude. The Syrians' ability to switch the fighting on and off at will, demonstrated most recently by the sudden drop in violence after talks among the factions in Damascus on 9 December, further strengthens Asad's hand.

11. Bilateral Relations. Our relations with Jordan are close and free of problems. King Hussein, a regular visitor to the UK, as are other members of the Royal Household, is a useful sounding board for Arab thinking. The Duke of Gloucester as Grand Prior of the Order of St John, and the Duke of Edinburgh as President of the World Wildlife fund, both paid visits to Jordan in October. Mr Luce was there from 3-6 November as part of a wider tour of the Middle East including Israel and Egypt. The Queen and Duke of Edinburgh will make a State visit in March 1984. Two recent articles in the Times, by its Jerusalem based correspondent, have suggested that the security situation in Jordan may put the State visit in jeopardy. This was not well received by the Jordanians and our Ambassador has been at pains to set the record straight with King Hussein and the Jordanian Foreign Minister

12. Aid. Our aid programme makes a valuable contribution to Jordan's development. A £9.9 million loan made in 1977 is almost completely disbursed. Disbursement of a 1982 loan for £8 million is due to start in 1984/85. We have also agreed to provide a grant of £3.6 million towards the Amman-Aqaba electricity transmission line. Our technical co-operation programme is running at £600,000 pa and is greatly appreciated by the Jordanians.

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 16 DECEMBER

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

UK Attitude to Conflict

1. UK anxious to see an early end to the conflict. At present negotiated settlement unlikely. Mediation by UN Secretary-General offers perhaps best hope. Immediate aim must be to prevent escalation of attacks on economic targets, particularly those belonging to third countries.

Widening of Conflict

2. Concerned by recent attacks on maritime targets, including Greek shipping, and Iraqi threat to attack Kharg Island. Iranian retaliation could affect third countries.

Freedom of Navigation in the Gulf

3. UK concerned to preserve safe passage of neutral shipping. Would deplore action by either belligerent which threatens this.

UK Response to any Escalation (If Raised)

4. UK initial response would be diplomatic and political. But the necessity for military action could not be ruled out. We are keeping in close touch with our friends in the Gulf.

Bomb Incidents in Kuwait

5. We deplore the bomb attacks that took place in Kuwait on Monday. As yet no evidence to suggest that this is the first step in an escalation of the Gulf war. What is King Hussein's view of these developments?

/Smith and Hagger



Smith and Hagger

6. Grateful for King Hussein's efforts and those of Crown Prince Hassan to secure better conditions for these British prisoners in Iraq. [If raised: There is no question of an exchange of prisoners - Salim Hassan for the two British prisoners.]



ESSENTIAL FACTS

The War

1. Further Iranian offensive launched on 19 October and renewed in Kurdistan on 3 November recovered some previously Iraqi-occupied Iranian territory and seized some Iraqi territory. Iraq's counter-attacks have not met with success. Fighting has died down but both sides continue to send reinforcements to the area. Iranians may now be preparing a new offensive further South.

2. Iraq has continued attacks on Iranian convoys in the Gulf. The most recent attack was on 8 December, in which a Greek vessel was sunk, along with an unconfirmed number of Iranian vessels. Iraq has threatened further attacks on Kharg Island but has not so far used the Super Etendard aircraft. Iraqi aim might be to goad Iran into some form of retaliation in the Gulf that would involve the West in the conflict.

Jordanian View of the War

3. Jordan remains a firm supporter of Iraq, both materially and diplomatically. UNSCR 540 (which called for Iran and Iraq to refrain from action that endangered peace in the Gulf area) was passed largely through the efforts of France and Jordan, which held the presidency of the Security Council in October. Jordan's support for Iraq has complicated further its relations with Syria which supports Iran.

Bomb Incidents in Kuwait

4. The US State Department have taken the view that preliminary indications point to some Iranian complicity. We have no evidence, as yet, to suggest that this is the first move in an escalation of the Gulf conflict. The Iranian Government has denied that it was involved.

/Mediation



Mediation

5. Iran has denounced UNSCR 540 yet tacitly observes its provisions and has reconfirmed Iranian support for a continuing role for the UN Secretary-General and his representative (Mr Palme). Iraq insists on its implementation yet violates its terms by continued attacks on shipping and on Iranian civilian targets.

6. Iran wishes to persuade the UN Secretary-General to send another mission to the area to look at civilian damage and particularly to investigate the evidence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Before taking action the Secretary-General wants to be sure the move would not fail. He has yet to secure Iraqi agreement to any further mission to investigate war damage. Iraq would welcome follow-up action to SCR 540 by a UN mediator, as would the French and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Iranians would, however, resist any mission specifically to follow-up SCR 540.

7. It would be useful to try to pull these strands together as a way of getting the Iranians back into play with the UN after their disenchantment with SCR 540. If necessary, we could accept separate UN missions to Iran and Iraq with a view to combining them later. We are also discussing with the Americans the text of a possible further SCR in case it is necessary to table this quickly to pre-empt unhelpful Soviet action at the UN.

Contingency Planning (not for use)

8. Talks at Political-Director level were held with the French on 1 December. The French are non-committal on the question of contingency planning in the event of a closure of the Straits of Hormuz. They accept that it would be prudent to plan in advance of a crisis, but are not convinced about the imminence of such a crisis.

/9.



9. We are in close contact with the Americans. A State Department team led by Raphael, Assistant Secretary in the State Department, visited Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states between 29 November and 7 December to discuss concerted action, share assessments of Iranian and Iraqi intentions, and to lay ground work for possible further political/military talks on military contingencies. Raphael discussed his visit with officials in London on 9 December and also met Mr Luce. There had been general support in the Gulf for the visit of a further US military team to assess the Iranian threat and lay the ground work for talks leading to possible joint military contingency planning (although views varied as to how far this should be taken). Raphael also noted that, although the United States remained neutral in the war, it was in the US interest not to see Iraq defeated. The US team had told Iraq and the Gulf states this. The US were also planning to take further measures against Iran, which might include tightening trade controls.

Smith and Hagger

10. Messrs Smith and Hagger are Britons imprisoned in Baghdad: John Smith on charges of attempted bribery of an Iraqi official, and Donald Hagger on spurious charges of espionage. The Iraqis have constantly tried to exchange these prisoners for Salim Hassan, an assassin of the Iraqi Intelligence Service who murdered a former Iraqi Prime Minister outside a London hotel in 1979. He is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment at Wakefield.

11. Mrs Smith had a meeting with the Prime Minister in February 1983 and on 13 July had a meeting at the FCO with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan. King Hussein has, at our request, pleaded with Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, for better conditions for Smith and Hagger. The King has reported that unless we agree to an exchange of prisoners further efforts by him are unlikely to lead to progress.

LEBANON:SITREP 12 00Z 15 DECEMBER

Military situation

1 Beirut/Shouf. Several serious violations of ceasefire 14 December. Clashes in southern suburbs of Beirut between Lebanese Army and Shia militia, Druze shelling of Christian East Beirut. Two French members of MNF, 2 Lebanese Army soldiers and 2 civilians killed 14/15 December. Ceasefire Committee again failed to meet 14 December (No meetings since 2 December). Airport remains closed.

2 Two incidents involving BRITFORLEB. On 14 December 4 Druze shells landed close to BRITFORLEB HQ. Defence Secretary and Mr Luce both spoke by telephone on 14 December to Jumblatt. Embassy Damascus spoke to Druze officials there. Druze undertook to halt any shelling. On 15 December 2 RPGs hit nearby tobacco factory, 2 small arms rounds hit a forward position. No damage, no casualties. Commander BRITFORLEB satisfied no deliberate targetting.

3 Further attacks by Syrian anti-aircraft positions on 2 US F14s carrying out reconnaissance (14 December). Immediately afterwards USS New Jersey, Tatnall and Ticonderoga fired approximately 80 rounds at 6 anti-aircraft sites around Dahr al Beida, 23 miles east of Beirut (14 December). No details of casualties or damage. US have told us naval rather than air bombardment to avoid escalation and allow immediate response. President Reagan has reiterated (14 December) US forces will retaliate if reconnaissance missions fired upon: 'We are not there to shoot first or to enter into combat but ... it has been our policy that if they are attacked they will defend.... We have retaliated as near as we can against those who have actually done the attacking'.

4 Evacuation of Christian refugees from Deir al Kamar due to begin today (15 December). Reports that Israeli and Italian troops will guarantee safe passage of Christian civilians and militia through Druze lines. Evacuation expected to take up to a week; majority are homeless and will go to reception centres in Christian East Beirut.

5 National Reconciliation. President Gemayel told Lebanese journalists in London (14 December) Lebanese officials were in touch with faction leaders and that national reconciliation talks were likely to resume within a few days probably in Montreux. His estimate may be seriously over-optimistic. No news of date for crucial Gemayel/Assad meeting, but Syrian President apparently recovering: shown on television (14 December) in talks with Saudi Foreign Minister. US Middle East envoy Donald Rumsfeld arrives in Damascus for talks 14 December; will continue on to Israel later today, Beirut (16 December) and Baghdad (17 December).

6 PLO/Tripoli. Israeli Government seeking to play down claim by Deputy Prime Minister Levy that Israelis would not interfere with evacuation of PLO loyalists. Government clearly wish to keep their options open, and Israeli aircraft reportedly flew low over Tripoli yesterday. But military intervention still seems unlikely. Italian ship due today or tomorrow to take 97 seriously wounded Palestinians to Cyprus under ICRC auspices. Co-ordinating committee supervising evacuation has announced that Greek ships will arrive 16 or 17 December but other sources indicate up to a week's delay. Greeks continue to seek guarantee of safe passage. It remains unclear whether the French will provide naval escort. Rebel forces have threatened to resume hostilities unless Arafat leaves by 21 December. There are reports that Arafat may be reconsidering alternative plan for evacuation over land, transitting through Syria to Jordan then on to Iraq or Aqaba for departure to Tunis or North Yemen.



10 DOWNING STREET

WAL 0211 13
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 21 November 1983

THE PRIME MINISTER

Your Majesty,

I am grateful to you for your letter of 26 October with which you enclosed copies of your recent letters to President Reagan about the situation in Lebanon and the future of the Middle East. Richard Luce has subsequently given me an account of his discussions with you in Amman. It is most useful to have your ideas about the dangers threatening the region.

When the Foreign Ministers of the four contributors to the multi-national force met in Paris on 27 October, they reaffirmed their commitment to the MNF and stressed the urgent need for all the parties involved in the Geneva talks to take the steps necessary to achieve national reconciliation. The task is a difficult one. The first results from Geneva are not discouraging, but the news of further violence in Lebanon in recent days shows how urgent it is that a lasting political solution be reached. We shall do what we can to help the reconciliation process along and so create conditions in which the presence of the MNF is no longer necessary. I see the advantages of your idea of a framework for the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian (and indeed PLO) forces linked to a timetable. Indeed we have been developing some thoughts of our own along similar lines.

I share your concern that the pressure of events in Lebanon has diverted attention from the need to make progress towards a wider peace in the region. Richard Luce has reported to me the

/ feelings

feelings of despair and frustration which he found on his recent tour, especially in the Occupied Territories, as a result of the lack of progress towards an overall settlement. The tragic fighting now taking place in Northern Lebanon underlines the urgent need for renewed efforts to solve the Palestinian problem, and highlights the difficulties facing those who would like to make faster progress. Under the circumstances I can understand Your Majesty's wish to consider whether there are steps which Jordan might take to this end. I realise that the recall of the Jordanian Parliament would have far reaching implications. Your Majesty will no doubt be looking to other Arab countries to provide backing for such an important step.

As for Britain, you can count on our support for any move which helps to break the current deadlock. We stand ready to do all we can to help promote peace in the region.

With my warmest and deepest regards
and respects for Your Majesty at this
most difficult time,

Yours sincerely

Raymond Shabta

His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal

King of Jordan.

Born Amman 1935.

Educated Bishops School, Amman; Victoria College, Alexandria; Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952 and acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. He has been in power longer than any other Arab leader and has survived numerous assassination attempts and threats to his throne including the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958, the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, the civil war against the Palestinian groups in 1970-71 and periods of bad relations with Iraq and, most recently, Syria.

In relation to Israel, King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. He has, however, maintained both in public and private strong opposition to the Camp David agreements and to the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations despite US attempts - some heavy-handed - to persuade him to participate. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine, but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and with the oil-rich Arab states which contribute substantial sums to Jordan in budgetary support; he also has to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they will have a credible military option; he will therefore do everything possible to avoid Jordanian involvement in a further Arab/Israel war.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, thereby implicitly renouncing his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, King Hussein has not abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank in any Arab/Israel settlement. He recognises, however, that the initiative for such a development must come from the West Bankers themselves.

Despite the playboy image of his youth King Hussein is now wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck he has shown the ability and experience to take sensible and sometimes courageous decisions in times of crisis.

Both by inclination and because of his assessment of the best interests of his country, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has, however, taken care to maintain relations with the Soviet Union and has argued that the Russians must be associated with a future UN conference to settle the Middle East dispute.

King Hussein takes all major foreign and defence policy decisions himself. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field to Crown Prince Hassan. Perhaps King Hussein's greatest single asset is his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has used this to good effect in keeping in close touch with and maintaining the loyalty of the Armed Forces, whose importance to his throne he has always recognised.

In his personal life, the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his Palestinian-born third wife, Queen Alia, affected him deeply. His marriage in June 1978 to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth or Lisa Halaby, an American of Lebanese origin) appeared at the outset to be one of genuine affection but is now showing some signs of strain. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage did not attract the public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Queen Alia, would be next in the line of succession after Prince Hassan, thus displacing the son subsequently born to Queen Noor in 1980, the two sons of Princess Muna and the son of Crown Prince Hassan and Princess Sarvath. By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by giving precedence to a son of entirely Arab descent.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war, with all the uncertainties it would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for the foreseeable future. For the time being, his neighbours and his financial backers seem likely to continue to believe that their interests will be best served by the maintenance in Jordan of the Hashemite regime headed by King Hussein.

AL-LAWZI, AHMAD

Head of the Royal Court.

Born near Amman 1925.

Graduated from a teacher training college in Baghdad. Worked as a teacher 1950-3; Assistant Head of Royal Protocol 1953-6; Head of Royal Protocol 1956-61; Member of Parliament 1961-3; Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1963-4; Minister of State at the Prime Minister's Office 1964-5; Minister of the Interior (Rural and Municipal Affairs) 1967; Minister of Finance, October 1970 - December 1971, when he became Prime Minister following Wasfi al-Tell's assassination. Resigned in May 1973. President of the National Consultative Council 1978 - December 1979. Head of Royal Court December 1979 to date.

Once a member of the Ba'ath Party, later an associate of Bahjat al-Talhouni (qv), later still found favour with Wasfi al-Tell to such an extent that Wasfi named him as his successor. Politically, as well as personally, somewhat colourless (apart from his devotion to the Hashemites), he remained Prime Minister longer than many of his critics expected when he was first appointed. His name still features among those thought to be potential future Prime Ministers. A self-important yes-man but financially honest, probably quite a good committee chairman, and regarded as the present establishment's most gifted impromptu orator.

Married with several children. Speaks indifferent English and prefers to do business in Arabic. Personally friendly. His health has not been good recently.

CURRICULUM VITAE OF MR. TAHER MASRI

Mr Al-Masri was born in 1942 in Nablus. (West Bank). He later studied at the North Texas State University where he received a BA in Commerce.

He joined the Jordanian Central Bank in 1965 and worked there, including a period attached to the Bank of England, until his appointment in 1973 to represent Nablus in the Lower House of the Jordanian Parliament. In May 1973 he was made Minister of State for the Affairs of the Occupied Territories, a post which he held until November 1974.

Mr Al-Masri has previously served as Jordanian Ambassador in Madrid (1975-78) and Paris (1978-83).

He speaks excellent English, and is married with two children.

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INFO MOD (FOR PS SECRETARY OF STATE, PS/CDS, PS/HDS) PARIS
STRASBOURG, TUNIS, UKREP BRUSSELS AND VIENNA

DJB
in diary
CR

YOUR TELNO 545: POSSIBLE VISIT TO BRITAIN BY KING HUSSEIN
1. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE GLAD TO OFFER KING HUSSEIN
TALKS AT 1700 ON 16 DECEMBER. GIVEN HER VERY BUSY
PROGRAMME UNTIL CHRISTMAS SHE WILL NOT (NOT) BE ABLE TO OFFER
THE KING A MEAL ON THIS OCCASION.

HOWE

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MR EGERTON	

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file

289

1 December 1983

VISTT BY KING HUSSEIN

Thank you for your letter of 30 November.

The Prime Minister would like to offer King Hussein talks at 1700 hours on Friday, 16 December. Given her very busy programme until Christmas, the Prime Minister would prefer not to offer a meal to the King on the occasion of this visit.

A. J. DOLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.



The alternatives are: - Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(a) just talks at 5.00 p.m.
on Friday, 16 December

London SW1A 2AH

30 November, 1983

(b) talks that day at 6.00 p.m.
followed by dinner at 7.00 to 7.15.

*Would prefer
just talks*

Dear John, *Which would you prefer?*

Visit by King Hussein

*A.S.C. 20/11
Darius
should have been*

HM Ambassador at Amman has reported that King Hussein would like to visit Britain immediately after he addresses the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 December (I enclose a copy of Amman telno 545). Although he has no firm plans, he is likely to travel to London on 16 December and then to leave London for Vienna on about 22 December. Before making firm plans King Hussein would like to know whether the Prime Minister would be available to see him in that period.

*when
Sir A-P
can
attend.
This is
important*

Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that this would be a very timely opportunity to have discussions with the King, and recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to see him. The King is clearly worried about the stagnation in the Middle East peace process and the increasing threat from Syria, as he made clear to Mr Luce when he saw him in Amman on 6 November. He will wish to discuss with the Prime Minister the implications for the resumption of Arab/Israel negotiations of his intention to recall the Jordanian Parliament. The Prime Minister and King Hussein recently exchanged letters on this. For our part, the visit will provide an opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to Jordan and to explore ways in which we can help to revive the peace process.

MS

I understand that the Prime Minister's diary would permit a meeting on the afternoon of 16 December. You might also wish to consider whether the Prime Minister's programme would enable her to offer a meal to the King during his stay. If you are able to confirm a time at which the Prime Minister could see the King, we will telegraph the details to Amman.

The Jordanian Commander in Chief, General Sharif Raid Bin Shaker, will also be in London at the same time as the King. As he is a cousin of King Hussein and ranks in importance next after Crown Prince Hassan, the Prime Minister might wish to include him in any hospitality offered to the King. The King may in any case propose that he bring General Shaker when he calls at No 10.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GR 200

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FM AMMAN 200850Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 545 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1983

REPEATED FOR INFO TO MOD (FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE, PSO/CDS AND PS/HDS), PARIS, STRASBOURG, TUNIS, UKREP BRUSSELS AND VIENNA.

MIPT: POSSIBLE VISIT TO BRITAIN BY KING HUSSEIN

1. I REPORTED IN PARA 1 OF MIPT KING HUSSEIN'S WISH TO VISIT BRITAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS ADDRESS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG ON 15 DECEMBER, PROVIDED HE CAN BE ASSURED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE HIM AT THAT TIME.
2. I DISCUSSED KING HUSSEIN'S TRAVEL PLANS PRIVATELY WITH THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL AND UNDERSTAND HE PLANS LEAVING AMMAN FOR PARIS ON 12 DECEMBER, WHERE HE IS TO SEE PRESIDENT MITTERAND (THIS HAS ALSO BEEN CONFIRMED TO ME BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR) . HE GOES ON TO STRASBOURG ON 14/15 DECEMBER TO ADDRESS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, WOULD TRAVEL TO LONDON ON 16 DECEMBER (ALWAYS ASSUMING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER CAN SEE HIM DURING THAT PERIOD AND WOULD THEN LEAVE LONDON FOR VIENNA AROUND 22 DECEMBER FOR A BRIEF HOLIDAY.
3. THESE PLANS ARE NOT FIRM AND MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER CAN SEE HIM. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY ADVICE ON THIS POINT.
4. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WHO WILL BE IN LONDON IN ANY CASE AT THAT TIME, TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS THE KING TO VISIT LONDON AFTER STRASBOURG. HE MENTIONED A POSSIBLE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS AS ANOTHER POTENTIAL COMPLICATION WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THE KING'S HOLIDAY PLANS IN VIENNA.

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JW MP
Jordan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1983

Dear John,

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 11 May.
I enclose a record of the conversation between
the Prime Minister and King Hussein which
took place here this morning.

Yours ever

John Cole.

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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VC

SECRET
ce Ma Ws
CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN
AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET ON FRIDAY 13 MAY AT 1000 HOURS

Present

Prime Minister
Mr. Hurd
Mr. Coles

King Hussein
Jordanian Ambassador

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said she would be grateful if King Hussein could give his impressions of the current situation in the Middle East.

King Hussein said that he had not yet seen the text of the agreement reached between Lebanon and Israel. Mr. Shultz had promised him a copy and had explained its contents. It provided for total Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanon and a Tripartite Committee under Lebanese Chairmanship to supervise implementation. Some aspects of the agreement gave rise to concern, for example, the provisions for gradual normalisation of trade. But under the circumstances it was probably the best agreement that could have been achieved.

While he had been in London, the Lebanese President had been in touch with him to seek his full support. As soon as the agreement was signed, it would be presented to the Lebanese Parliament for approval.

The Prime Minister said that we were watching Syria's role with considerable anxiety. King Hussein said that he did not know what had transpired during the visit of the Syrian President to Saudi Arabia. The Syrian attitude was traditionally negative and they were probably hoping to extract further aid from Saudi Arabia in return for any movement. The Prime Minister commented that Syria always seemed to be an obstacle to progress - it was hard to believe that their actions were entirely independent. Mr. Hurd said that Syria was dependent on the Soviet Union for armaments and on Saudi Arabia for money. Which did the King think was the strongest influence? King Hussein replied that it was the Soviet Union which influenced Syria more. Agreeing, the Prime Minister said that a threat was always more

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/influential than

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

influential than generosity. She wondered whether the point would not be reached when the Saudis would have to cease being generous towards Syria. Mr. Hurd said that the trouble was that the Saudis were ambiguous. They had allowed Syrian spokesmen to claim ^{that} Saudi Arabia agreed with Syria in its attitude towards the Lebanon/Israel agreement. King Hussein said that he wondered whether the Russians were merely concerned at present to demonstrate that they retain influence in the Middle East or whether they were putting strong pressure on Syria to reject the agreement. The truth was that the only alternative to agreed withdrawal was for Lebanon to be divided between Israel and Syria. That would be very dangerous and would bring comfort to no one except the Soviet Union and Israel. He had told Mr. Shultz that he hoped that the Saudis would not reward Syria again. In response to a question from Mr. Hurd, he said that his own dealings with the Syrians were no better than at earlier periods. Arafat had recently visited Damascus and had apparently been less than happy with his talks. The PLO were now trying to organise a meeting in Tunis of Palestinian intellectuals and representatives of the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat had said that he hoped to resume his dialogue with the Jordanians, to which the King had replied that the opportunities were now much more limited than in the past. The Prime Minister agreed with this view. In the latter half of this year, the United States would be preoccupied with negotiations about nuclear weapons and might not be able to concentrate on more than one major international issue. Had Mr. Shultz also discussed the Palestinian problem?

King Hussein said that Mr. Shultz had assured him that President Reagan had remained as intent as ever to make progress on this issue. But he had an uneasy feeling that American interest was declining. The memories of the Lebanese massacres were beginning to fade in the United States. There was a recurring theme in American comment that Jordan was Palestine. There had been a genuine chance of progress at the end of 1982 but the prospects were fading with every day. A freeze on Israeli settlements in the West Bank would now be almost meaningless.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

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The Prime Minister said that she believed that Israel did wish to withdraw from the Lebanon. The conflict there was taking its toll and disrupting the Israeli economy. This was creating major domestic problems. Israel had been used in the past to achieving quick victories. But the maintenance of troops in hostile territory was a different proposition.

Mr. Hurd asked whether the West Bank Mayors were putting pressure on the PLO. King Hussein said that they tried to put pressure on Jordan but he told them to turn their attention to the PLO. Israeli restrictions still made the life of the Mayors difficult - it was by no means certain that they would obtain permission to leave the West Bank for the proposed meeting in Tunis. He had told Mr. Shultz that even if progress could not be made on the substance of the West Bank problem, the Americans should exert themselves to make the conditions of life in the region better. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, he said he found it hard to judge whether Mr. Shultz had learned a great deal from his visit to the area. It was difficult to penetrate his feelings.

The Prime Minister said that the Middle East would be discussed at Williamsburg. She was considering whether to attend herself. What message would the King like her to take to President Reagan? The King said that the Americans had little leverage with the Syrians. To influence Damascus, they would have to work on Saudi Arabia. During the negotiations of the past few months the Americans had promised Jordan that Saudi Arabia and Morocco would be helpful - but in the event this had not been true. The important message to convey to the United States was that the Middle East was becoming the top priority target for the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that it appeared to her that Andropov may have taken a decision to keep the area on the boil. She would therefore convey to President Reagan the message that the Russians appeared to be becoming more active in the area, that the West must respond to this activity and that a fresh initiative could not be long delayed.

/In response

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- 4 -

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, King Hussein said that the Iran/Iraq war had reached a position of virtual stalemate. Iraq had fared quite well in the last battle with Iran. He had understood from the Algerians that they had been helping to promote a dialogue between Washington and Tehran. He wondered whether the recent Iranian action against the Tudeh Party foreshadowed an improvement of relations with the United States. That in turn could lead to the Soviet Union becoming more deeply involved in the Iran/Iraq situation. He was not encouraged by present circumstances in Tehran. Khomeini appeared to be nearing the end of his life. The Algerian view was that the contenders for power would be even more extreme. The Prime Minister said that she doubted that Khomeini would change his policies but a successor might be able to settle the war on certain conditions. We were appalled by the casualties. Mr. Hurd observed that a recent Red Cross report suggested that both sides were treating their prisoners very badly.

Reverting to the Arab/Israeli problem, King Hussein said that there was still a chance of progress. He had had to announce his inability to enter into talks in order to wake up people in the area. The reaction had been quite positive and the door was still open for talks with the Palestinians.

The conversation ended at 1040.

A. S. C.

13 May 1983

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✓ SP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 May, 1983

Prime Minister

[Handwritten mark]

A
12/5

Dear John,

Call by King Hussein, 1000 13 May

I enclose, in case this is helpful, a copy of the draft record of the conversation between Mr Pym and King Hussein before and over lunch today.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: DRAFT

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY BEFORE AND DURING LUNCH AT 1 CARLTON GARDENS AT 1300 ON 12 MAY 1983

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Present:

Rt. Hon. F Pym

King Hussein

S J Egerton

Mr Ibrahim Izziddin
Jordanian Ambassador

R O Miles

J E Holmes

Lebanon

The Secretary of State said that he had seen Mr Shultz in Paris at the beginning of the week. He had had 'flu, but otherwise seemed in good spirits. The agreement in principle between Israel and Lebanon was certainly progress, although he found it somewhat surprising that no-one outside the ~~principle~~ parties ^{themselves} seemed to have seen the text of what had been agreed. This obviously gave rise to some suspicions of what it contained. The ~~obvious~~ difficulty now was to get the

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Syrians to agree to withdraw. He had also pressed Mr Shultz about where PLO fighters withdrawing from Lebanon were supposed to go. ^{about} Shultz had had no answer to this. He also wondered what ~~was~~ the real price which the Israelis had extracted from the Americans in return for their agreement to withdraw. King Hussein said that he, too, had not seen any text, although Mr Shultz had outlined ^{to him} the key elements of the agreement. Mr Shultz had stressed that there would be a complete Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory within 8 to 10 weeks. President Reagan had since sent him a message to say the same thing. He agreed that the destination of PLO fighters was a problem to which Mr Shultz did not have any clear answer. He had told Mr Shultz that Jordan could not take them all although she would take all Jordanian nationals whatever their background and would consider others on their merits. Egypt might also take some Palestinians. ^{in Amman} ~~the~~ ^{in Amman} while the Syrians were taking a very hard line about the Israel/Lebanon agreement. ~~In his view,~~ ^a this was ^a reflection of a ^{Soviet measure} ~~hard line Soviet~~ attitude. He was not sure whether the Syrians were playing along with ^{Russians} this ^{for tactical reasons, eg} because they wanted extra money from the Saudis. But in any case, there was no doubt that negative Soviet influence was having its effect. //

King Hussein continued that, ~~in his view,~~ while the Israel/Lebanon agreement had obvious defects, it nevertheless represented progress. No-one had come up with any realistic alternative, ~~to it.~~ ^{acknowledged} He agreed with the

Secretary of State that a number of earlier Israeli demands had been dropped ^{in the} ~~about~~ final agreement, although he commented that some of these might have been put forward specifically to be dropped later, with the object of giving the Israelis a negotiating margin. He asked for the Secretary of State's views ~~on~~ whether the mood in Washington had now changed? ^{Was} ~~Did we think that~~ Lebanon was ^{now the} limit of US concern? He had put this question to Mr Shultz in Amman, who had denied this and said that President Reagan remained very determined to make progress on the wider dispute. The Secretary of State said that he could not realistically be optimistic about US commitment in the future. The Americans had not yet sewn up the Lebanon withdrawal. ^{Meanwhile} ~~h~~ The West Bank was of course a much more difficult problem than Lebanon and the pre-election period in the US was fast approaching. It would have been much better if the Americans had exerted ~~the~~ ^{their} influence over Lebanon a good deal earlier, say in November. King Hussein agreed. He was not a great believer in ^(while the agreement in principle was agreed to) shuttle diplomacy in general. ~~h~~ The Shultz shuttle had ended in vagueness and the Israelis remained in Lebanon. He could not regard this as very helpful. He did not know whether Mr Shultz would make another visit to the area. // The Secretary of State asked for the King's impressions of the Saudi attitude at present. King Hussein said ^{it} ~~that this~~ was the usual story. The Saudis were in favour of withdrawal but took refuge in vague talk of the need for a reliable mechanism to bring this about. He did not think that they could contribute very much to the present

situation. In response to a question, the King said that the opportunity for a general withdrawal had not disappeared. He agreed that an effort should be made to persuade the Syrians to move. Mr Egerton said that the Americans thought that the Syrians did not in fact want to be isolated in preventing Israeli withdrawal. What remained unknown was the price the Syrians would demand ^(in return for agreeing to) for withdrawal. The wording of the recent Soviet statement had suggested that they might want to see the MNF out as part of the general withdrawal. This might be a possible ^{lever to} incentive ^{for} the Russians to acquiesce in what had been achieved by the Americans with Israel and Lebanon. King Hussein said that he too had heard that the Russians were worried about the MNF and particularly the US contingent but he doubted whether the Lebanese army was really capable of taking over the responsibilities of the MNF in the near future. He agreed, however, that it might be possible to devise a withdrawal timetable according to which the MNF would ^{be withdrawn} disappear in one or two ^{weeks}. The King went on to speculate about the Soviet position in the area generally. He wondered what lay behind Iran's actions in taking action against the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. He had heard separately that the Algerians had been arranging meetings between the US and Iran. He wondered whether there was a connection and how this would fit into the overall picture. The Soviet Union might ^{now} become ^{more} involved in Iran but this would be difficult to square with their position in Syria, ^{given continuing Syrian/Iraqi} hostility. //

The Secretary of State wondered whether the present levels

of violence in and around Beirut was likely to continue. King Hussein said that the situation was very curious. The Druse positions from which Beirut was being shelled lay in an Israeli-occupied area. The Druse were supplied with arms by both the Israelis and Syrians. It was very difficult to make sense ^{out of all this} of but he feared that attempts were being made to fragment the area. In response to a question, he said that the departure of Soviet dependents from Beirut was certainly nothing to do with school holidays. He was inclined to agree that the Russians were exploiting the obvious parallel ^{everyone saw with} between 1973 in order to stir things up. // The Secretary of State said that there would be an informal meeting of the Ten on 14/15 May. He was inclined to doubt whether they would want to make any statement ^{about} current events. Did the King ^{think} have any view of whether a statement would be helpful? King Hussein did not ^{express a particular} ~~press for a~~ ^{view} statement but said that he thought any statement should contain two elements:

- i) Continued support for Lebanese sovereignty from and freedom, outside interference;
- ii) Efforts to achieve a withdrawal from Lebanon should not preclude efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace.

Arabs/Israel

The Secretary of State asked whether there had been any recent developments within the PLO. The leadership, by missing the golden opportunity ^{given to them by the} ~~they had had, thanks to~~

King Hussein, had set back the prospects of achieving their aspirations. Would they ever be able to agree or make any positive move, or did they remain too attached to their style of living to take the decisive step? King Hussein said that Arafat and others had ^{recently} been in Damascus. They did not seem to have had a very happy time there. While in London, he (the King) had had a meeting with some Palestinians. They wanted his approval for a Palestinian meeting in Tunisia, ~~what they wanted was~~ to include as many West Bank mayors, intellectuals and others ~~who took~~ ^{with} a different view from the leadership as possible. The aim was to reverse the present trend of thinking in the PLO. He thought this might be an idea, but had told those who had met him frankly once again that time was not on the Palestinian side and that the opportunity which had been missed would not ~~re-occur~~ ^{recur}. ~~The King continued that,~~ ^{The King continued that} otherwise, ~~nothing very much had happened.~~ The Moroccans had made an attempt to mediate, in particular by suggesting to the Americans that they should accept self-determination for the Palestinians. The PLO had since ruined this by making clear that in their version of things two independent states, one Jordanian and one Palestinian, had to be in existence before any legitimate act of self-determination could take place. ^{For his part,} He was concerned to keep any arrangement between the Jordanians and the Palestinians out of peace negotiations. The Israelis should not be given any kind of say in this or in how self-determination was exercised. He was keen to restrict the scope of negotiations to the implementation of Resolution 242, as

he had constantly stressed to the Americans. Meanwhile, pressures on the people in the West Bank and Gaza were immense. There was a considerable possibility of a new influx into Jordan, ^{This needed} ~~or Moroccans.~~ Jordan had to think very carefully ^{handling.} ~~how to deal with this.~~

Iran/Iraq

King Hussein said that the Iraqis were now ^{more} ~~very~~ confident about their military position and in particular were content ^{with the} ~~with the~~ results of the last Iranian defensive. He referred briefly to the continuing difficulties the Iraqis were having about the proposed oil pipeline across Saudi Arabia. These ^{problems} ~~difficulties~~ were political and not financial.

Detainees in Iraq

The Secretary of State ^{raised} ~~said that he wanted to mention~~ to the King the two British detainees in Iraq, Messrs Smith and Hagger. The circumstances in which they were held had deteriorated in recent months and their treatment was ^{now} ~~very~~ ^{poor.} ~~important.~~ We had not been able to make any impact ourselves on the Iraqis about this. It was a matter of considerable concern. The families of the two men were close to despair. King Hussein had been kind enough to help in the past with President Saddam Hussein. If he saw any chance of raising ^{these issues} ~~it~~ with the President we would be very grateful, ~~indeed.~~ King Hussein, having asked about the background, particularly in the case of Mr Hagger, said that he would certainly raise it with Saddam Hussein.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May, 1983

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose a brief for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister at 4.15 pm on 12 May, together with two extra copies.

The King will be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador, Mr Ibrahim Izzuddin. Mr Hurd will attend from here.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 12 MAY

ARAB/ISRAEL

Points to Make

1. Disappointed that PLO failed to honour agreement worked out with Arafat. PLO weak and divided, incapable of taking hard decisions. But they cannot be wished away as US sometimes suggest. Would successful withdrawal of forces from Lebanon make further Jordan/PLO negotiations worthwhile?
2. Immediate task to prevent further polarisation. Europeans can help by impressing on US that success in Lebanon, even if attained, not enough: and by encouraging Arab support for move to negotiations after a Lebanon success. What else could we be doing? Stalemate will increase Palestinian frustration and risk growing instability.
3. Israelis taking opportunity of US focus on Lebanon to redouble settlement activity. Mood in West Bank? Any evidence that support for PLO cracking?

Israel/Lebanon/Syria

4. Israel/Lebanon agreement is welcome progress. Implementation will be difficult. Major effort will be needed to persuade Syria to withdraw her forces. Dangerous period ahead in Lebanon as Syria and USSR seek to raise tension.
5. We have agreed to extend our participation in the Multinational Force (until August 1983). British contingent is playing a valuable role. Glad to hear of Jordanian help to Lebanese Government and army.

/Jordanians



Jordanians sentenced for attempted assassination of Israeli
Ambassador (if raised).

6. We have no power to transfer a person convicted of an offence in a UK court to serve his sentence in another country.



KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 8-14 MAY

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE:

Military Situation

1. There is virtual stalemate. Latest Iranian attack achieved no territorial gains. Iranians may try again.

Mediation

2. Little action at present. Kuwaitis, with support of some GCC States, pressing for action in UN Security Council. We are anxious to help. But involvement by UN needs careful handling.

Oil Slick

3. Problem serious but greatly exaggerated by press. Still no sign of agreement to cap leaking well.

Attack on Dezful

4. Such attacks on civilian targets unlikely to help peace process.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 4.15 PM,
12 MAY

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein, accompanied by Queen Noor, arrived in London on 8 May and is due to leave on 14 May. The visit is as usual a private one. During the visit Their Majesties will attend the wedding of the King's London based private secretary.

2. Queen Noor had a third child, Princess Inam, (her first daughter), on 24 April. The Prime Minister sent a congratulatory message.
3. Mr Pym will host a small working lunch in the King's honour on 12 May.
4. The Jordanian Ambassador who will accompany the King, was due to leave London on 5 May at the end of his appointment but is staying until after the King's departure. His next appointment is as Jordan's Ambassador in Washington.
4. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his discussion with the Secretary of State in February 1983 are attached, together with the record of the Arab League visit on 18 March.

Near East and North Africa
Department

11 May 1983



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 12 MAY

ARAB/ISRAEL

Background

1. Since the breakdown of the Jordan/PLO discussions on 10 April, King Hussein has left the running to others. He intended the Jordanian Government statement to shock the PLO into new thinking. It has not yet done so. Arafat has said publicly that he wants the dialogue to continue; the PLO Executive Committee have not demurred, and some contacts continue. The Moroccans have been active in trying to narrow differences between Jordan and the PLO, but without success. The King will not give the PLO the comfort of resuming talks unless he believes they have had a change of heart. He is worried about polarisation in the region and frustrated at the lukewarm support he has received from eg Saudi Arabia (which he contrasts with the continuing generous Saudi financial support to Syria). He does not seem to have any concrete ideas on how the present stalemate can be broken.

2. US success in achieving the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon would go some way to restoring US credibility in the Arab world, and would therefore help King Hussein in persuading other Arabs to follow the American route to a Palestinian solution. But the King still has doubts about the strength of US commitment to see things through in the Middle East, particularly if they can take away a foreign policy success from Lebanon. The King pressed Shultz strongly on this point during the latter's visit to Amman on 6/7 May to explain the Israel/Lebanon agreement. Shultz said that the Americans were aware of the need to do more, particularly with the Saudis and the Palestinians. The King has dropped hints that if the US fail him, he will turn to the Russians: but he is under no illusion that they can deliver a settlement.

3. Despite their frustration with the PLO, the Jordanians have not sought to circumvent them in the peace process. The King asked Shultz to avoid public criticism of the PLO. But they remain acutely concerned at the threat to Jordan from Israeli attempts to exploit the stalemate by encouraging a movement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan. They see this as part of the Likud Government's policy to absorb the West Bank, and regard a number of recent Israeli moves as the start of a campaign to stimulate a further exodus; for instance the proposal to relocate UNRWA - registered refugees within the West Bank and Gaza. Jordanian officials have told us that they will shortly introduce limits on the length of stay in Jordan for travellers from the Occupied Territories. This would be intended as a clear signal to the Israelis that Jordan will oppose a solution of the Palestinian problem on Jordanian territory. To that extent, it will be supported by many Palestinians in the West Bank. But at the same time it may contribute to tension there, by underlining for West Bankers that they have nowhere else to turn.

Israel/Lebanon/Syria

4. We have not seen a full text of the Israel/Lebanon agreement. The Americans are working to resolve further clarifications and amendments sought by Israel. The agreement is likely to be signed next week, but will then have to be ratified by the Lebanese Parliament.

5. The main elements of the agreement provide for:

(a) An end to the state of war, and implicit recognition (but no diplomatic relations) between Israel and Lebanon.

(b) Two security zones in Southern Lebanon. Major Haddad will be Deputy Commander of the Southern brigade in charge of intelligence and anti-terrorism;

(c) Up to 8 Israeli-Lebanese teams of 20 men will be allowed to patrol in the security zones (and by sea and air) but will be under Lebanese Army control;

/(d)



(d) Limited movement of goods and people. Israeli exports to Lebanon to exclude products made and exported by Lebanon. Trade to be reviewed as part of negotiations on normal relations after six months;

(e) UNIFIL to be moved north to Sidon, to assist the Lebanese Army in protecting Palestinian refugee camps in the area (subject to UN Security Council agreement to rewrite the mandate).

6. Issues omitted from the agreement include Israeli air surveillance (which will continue) and hot pursuit of terrorists. In return for the agreement Israel can expect renewed supplies of US F-16 aircraft and reactivation of the strategic cooperation memorandum, and possibly other US promises.

7. Syria has rejected the agreement as an infringement of Lebanese sovereignty and (with more justification) of Syria's security and has called for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal (in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 509). But the United States is taking some comfort in the fact that President Asad has not totally rejected the idea of Syrian withdrawal. They hope that if the Lebanese Parliament approves the agreement, Syria may allow herself to be persuaded to withdraw provided her own security concerns are met (eg a security zone on Lebanon's eastern border) and perhaps if increased Saudi aid^s is offered as an incentive.

8. Soviet reaction to the agreement has been notably hostile. The USSR has tried to keep the temperature up by new accusations of Israeli military preparations and by giving unusual publicity to the departure of Soviet personnel from Beirut. There are some 6000 (US estimate) Soviet advisers in Syria at present.

9. King Hussein supports Lebanese efforts to get rid of foreign forces and has sent his Foreign Minister to Beirut as a gesture of solidarity of the Lebanese Government. Jordan is also providing tanks for the Lebanese army. But the King has remained silent on the Agreement.

10. The security situation in the Beirut area has deteriorated in the last two weeks with renewed fighting between Christian and Druze (Muslim) militias and indiscriminate shelling of Beirut suburbs. There has also been some limited reinforcement of Syrian, PLO and Israeli forces recently. There is no evidence that Syria or Israel is preparing to renew major hostilities, although the risk of an outbreak of fighting remains. The Israelis appear willing to give Syria some weeks to fall into line. But failing this and assuming continuing Israeli casualties, the Israeli Government will be under pressure to agree to partial withdrawal of Israeli forces into Southern Lebanon. The likely result of this would be greater interfactional fighting in the Beirut area and greater hazards for the Multinational Force.

Jordanians sentenced for attempted assassination of Mr Argov

11. The three men found guilty of the attempted assassination in London last June of Mr Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador, have Jordanian nationality. King Hussein may ask that they are allowed to serve their sentences in Jordan.

12. There is no legislation which allows a person convicted in a British court to serve their sentence in another country. A Council of Europe convention to allow prisoners to be transferred to serve their sentences in their European countries of origin is now under study by Ministers. Other countries may be allowed to join subject to the agreement of all participating states.

Near East and North Africa Department
11 May 1983

IRAN/IRAQBACKGROUND :Military Situation

1. The latest Iranian attack in April has not altered the military balance. All fighting took place on Iranian territory, Iran made no territorial gains. The Iraqis able to contain this level of Iranian attack but are increasingly concerned at the cost in casualties. Iraq lost a disproportionate number of officers in the April fighting.


Mediation

2. Regular mediators such as the Algerians, remain inactive. Kuwait and the Gulf States are urging the UN Secretary-General to bring the matter before the Security Council with the objective of seeking to impose a settlement. We do not believe that such a move will lead to a peaceful settlement. The Iranians are unlikely to respond to further Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General still has some influence with the Iranians and when the time is right an initiative by him may lead to progress.

Oil Slick

3. Such reports as we have suggest that the threat posed by the oil slick has been exaggerated by the press. Much of the oil is breaking up and is unlikely to threaten the Gulf States in the short-term. There is still no sign of an agreement between the two parties to cap the leaking well. The Iraqis are the problem in this case. DOT's Marine Pollution Control and BP have offered to provide assistance, through Saudi Arabia, to undertake necessary repair work.

/Attack



Attack on Dezful

4. In April the Iraqis launched several ground-to-ground missiles against the Iranian town of Dezful. There are differing reports of casualties but it seems clear that civilian casualties were high. The Iranians have protested to the United Nations and the European Community.



10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

King Hussein.

The P.R. wants to have a
talk with him. But I have
not yet suggested a time.

Why not try 4.45 on Wednesday?

A.S.C. 75.

~~Has to be Thursday
at 16.15.~~

C.S.
9.15.



10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

King Hussein will be here next week on a private visit but would like a talk with the Prime Minister. Have you any time at all?

2. He is bringing his Queen - and what about the new baby, you may ask? We parents have ways of dealing with such matters.

AJC A. & C. 5/5. !
 really-----!

THU 12th

16.15 - 17.00 but you
told P.M. she has
practically no time
for her speech
G.T. - Speed
C.

CALL BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION LED BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1050 HOURS ON FRIDAY 18 MARCH 1983 AT
10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

The Prime Minister	King Hussein - Leader of the Delegation
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Syrian Foreign Minister - Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam
Mr. Hurd	The Saudi Foreign Minister - Prince Saud bin Faisal
Sir John Leahy	The Moroccan Foreign Minister - Maitre Boucetta
Mr. Miles	The Algerian Secretary- General for Foreign Affairs - Mr. Hadj Bin Abdel el Kader Azzout
Mr. Miers	
Mr. Plumbley	The Palestinian Representative - Professor Walid al-Khalidi
Sir Anthony Parsons	The Secretary- General of the Arab League - Mr. Chedli Klibi
Mr. Coles	- and other members of delegations

* * * * *

The Prime Minister welcomed the delegation and said that we were glad that arrangements satisfactory to all parties for their visit had been made. She invited King Hussein to speak.

King Hussein thanked the Prime Minister for her greetings and for the good atmosphere and delivered an opening address (attached at Annex A).

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister thanked King Hussein for his excellent presentation. Britain and the Arab Delegation shared a common view of the fundamentals of the problem, the need for freedom, justice and fairness for all. This was the heart of the question. Britain was closely involved both because of our history and because of our close friendship with the Arab peoples.

We had recognised the importance of the Fez Summit declaration from the outset. A unified Arab peace programme was a major step forward. She would not comment on every one of the principles of Fez, some of which would be the subject of negotiation in the eventual peace process. She wished to lay special emphasis on the principle of self-determination. Any party demanding self-determination for itself could not deny it to others, and this was something we had repeated to the Israelis and to everyone else with whom we discussed the matter. The Israelis claimed self-determination for themselves and must grant it to the Palestinians.

King Hussein's address had stressed the right of all people to live in peace, and had supported this by a reference to the legitimacy of the situation based on the 1947 Resolution of the United Nations on the partition of Palestine.

We were committed as members of the Ten and as part-authors of the Venice Declaration to the association of the PLO with peace negotiations. We differed in some respects with the Arab view of the PLO, but unreservedly welcomed the Palestinian representative in the delegation.

We had been distressed by the incidents in the al Aqsa Mosque. Any nation which rested on a strong basis of religious belief was obliged to respect the religious rights of others. We believed that the Israelis had acted quickly to arrest those responsible for the latest troubles, but fully understood the shock which had been felt in the Muslim world.

We deplored and had publicly condemned the continuation of settlement building by the Israelis in the occupied territories.

Every time the world tried to tackle the fundamentals of the Middle East another phase seemed to begin, bringing its own difficulties to block progress. She was referring particularly to Lebanon; at the time of the Venice Declaration the Lebanon problem had been less acute, and the Ten had thought there was a real opportunity for progress. That opportunity had been missed. We now had to ask how to make progress both on withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and on the Arab-Israel problem. Sometimes a way could be found to make progress even as a result of tragedy.

We would do all we could both at the forthcoming European Summit and at the summit meeting at Williamsburg to emphasise to President Reagan that time was short and that the opportunity for progress on Lebanon and on the Arab-Israel problem must not be lost.

Summing up the Prime Minister emphasised our belief in the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and in the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to live within secure borders, and said that we saw an opportunity now for progress, beginning with the Lebanon. We shared the faith of the Arab delegation in a just and lasting peace for all the region, to be pursued by peaceful means.

Professor al-Khalidi thanked the Prime Minister for her remarks about the solution to the problem of the formation of the delegation, and her welcome to himself. Speaking in the name of the party and people which he represented, he asked that Britain should do everything in her power to obtain the right of self-determination for the Palestinians. Nothing in Israel's position could take away this right, which was the right of his people living in their own lands from the Jordan river to the sea.

The recent Palestine National Council had made some important points. First of all it had fully confirmed Palestinian commitment to the Fez Plan. He agreed that the Fez plan was of historic importance; all the leaders of the Arab States, with only one

exception, had endorsed for the first time principles which could lead to a viable settlement.

Fez had also endorsed the principles of Palestinian dialogue with the Lebanese Government and with Jewish leaders who were ready to consider measures consistent with Palestinian rights.

The PNC had pointed out the deficiencies of the Reagan plan: first, the question of Palestinian return (Professor al-Khalidi commented that Russian Jews enjoyed this right while Palestinians did not). Next, the Reagan Plan failed to refer to Palestinian sovereignty which was of great political and psychological significance if the Palestinians were to escape from their mood of statelessness. Speaking personally, sovereignty was important for the Palestinian diaspora exactly as Israeli sovereignty was important for the Jewish diaspora.

The PNC had also endorsed the concept of Palestinian/Jordanian confederation, which was of the greatest significance. The Jordanian people were the closest of all their neighbours to the Palestinians in every respect.

Finally, the form of Zionism to which Mr. Begin adhered went back to the 1920s when the 'revisionists' wanted to change the Palestine mandate in order to allow Jewish settlement east of the Jordan river. Zionism in this sense had nothing to do with resistance to Soviet influence in the area. Revisionism was basic to the thinking of Mr. Begin, Mr. Shamir and Mr. Arens. It was fruitless to think that they would change unless Washington sent unmistakable signals that change was required, as for example President Reagan had sent an unmistakable signal to end the bombing of Beirut. Professor al-Khalidi appealed directly to the Prime Minister as the only person, probably in the world, who had the moral influence to bring these points home to President Reagan.

The Prime Minister said she would not reply in detail to all the points made, but mentioned that only Britain and Pakistan had

/ recognised

recognised the West Bank as Jordanian territory. She had noted carefully the reference to confederation. Fez was a big step forward, and so was the Reagan plan (which had not been welcomed in Israel). We must use the positive elements in order to make progress; if we failed, with the well known problems of US elections we should find we had lost two years. We must concentrate on working together on what we had in common. In government one could never get one hundred per cent of what one wanted, and to get two-thirds was doing very well. Nevertheless we would continue to press the Americans.

Mr. Khaddam said that he did not believe that the Reagan plan provided a serious framework for peace. The problem was not just the occupied territories and indeed the problem had existed before 1967. The essence of the problem was the Palestinians in exile. He recalled a former US statesman who had said of the Palestinians that America would turn them into a problem for the Arabs.

Washington was not serious about peace, as was shown by the vast arms supplies which the US gave to the Israelis. If Syria looked to receive anything like as much there would be a tremendous row.

The Americans now faced a crucial test in Lebanon; if they could secure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon with no conditions he would admit there was some chance of their playing a useful role on the Palestine problem. Peace required balance. Peace between the strong and the weak was hard to achieve; the weak could do nothing and even the strong could not make peace alone. To create the necessary balance, US arms supplies must be checked. Israeli air power, for example, was greater than that of the UK and France, and equivalent to one-fifth of that of the US.

He was tired of hearing about US elections. This was always put forward as a reason for doing nothing.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that the future of the Palestinian people was at the heart of the problem; she believed this message had been understood in Washington. Secondly, she believed that the Americans were genuinely trying to solve the problem; even in electoral terms this would be a tremendous achievement for a US Administration, in spite of all the lobby difficulties. Mr. Khaddam said President Carter had signed the Camp David agreements and then been defeated in an election; the Prime Minister retorted that this had more to do with President Carter than Camp David. She and Mr. Khaddam both loved argument but perhaps they should resist the temptation. Mr. Khaddam said it was not a matter of argument but of 'to be or not to be'. Syria had been attacked by Israeli air power; she had to find a way to defend herself.

The Prime Minister and King Hussein withdrew at 1155 hours for a tête-à-tête discussion; the Prime Minister invited the rest of the meeting to continue for a few minutes and then to join the two leaders for more informal conversation.

* * * * *

Mr. Pym referred to the forthcoming European Summit and with the Americans. The Prime Minister had repeatedly stressed to President Reagan the urgency of progress in the Middle East, and he had done the same to Mr. Shultz. The two essentials were a coordinated position on the Arab side, on which great progress had been made, and a real change in Israel. The urgency was such that something had to be done within a very few weeks. What advice would the Arab delegation offer for progress on our common objectives, especially self-determination?

Prince Saud said that with the Fez Summit much of the Arab part had been done. They now had a clear common position based on legality. The crux of the matter was for the Israelis to change, and this required action by Washington as Professor al-Khalidi had explained.

/ The US

The US must show Israel that if there was no change, Israel would lose US support. A way must be found to bring the Americans to their responsibility. Prince Saud paid a warm tribute to the British media, particularly the BBC, for the way that they had portrayed developments in the Middle East. He said that the forthcoming summit meetings were very important and that we had an important role.

Professor al-Khalidi said one thing we might be able to do, since like the Palestinians, we knew Mr. Begin, would be to tell the Americans about him. They seemed, for example, to assume that Mr. Begin would be ready to trade territory for peace, as he had done with Sinai in the Camp David Agreements. This showed a misunderstanding; Sinai was not part of the territory to which Mr. Begin's Zionism committed him, as the West Bank, Gaza and even Golan and South Lebanon were.

Another US misconception was that the more aid the Israelis were given the more reasonable they would be. We should bring home to the Americans that this was false.

Mr. Klibi said that the Prime Minister had mentioned the British position, shared by the rest of the Ten, on self-determination. This was a key gap in the American position and we should bring it home to them. He asked whether the US-Israeli alliance covered only Israel within present frontiers, or whether it was applicable throughout the area?

Mr. Pym said we would continue to press the Americans, but they did now realise that the Palestinians were the heart of the problem, and the Reagan plan showed progress in this direction. Mr. Klibi said he could not understand why the Americans did not accept self-determination for the Palestinians, when self-determination was of such crucial importance in their own history.

Mr. Pym said he would not exclude an adjustment in the US position if peace negotiations began. On Mr. Klibi's second point

/ he said

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- 8 -

he said that the formal position was that the US/Israel strategic alliance was suspended.

Prince Saud said he had the impression the Americans did not pay adequate attention to European and world opinion on the Middle East. They felt obliged to consult us fully over missiles, but surely the Middle East problem was just as important to the international community and to world peace? Mr. Pym agreed.

The meeting ended at 1220 hours.

18 March 1983

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN HM KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AT 1100 ON 23 FEBRUARY 1983 AT 7 PALACE GREEN

Present:

- | | |
|---|--|
| Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs | HM King Hussein |
| Mr Hurd | General Zaid bin Shaker (Commander-in-Chief) |
| Mr Miles | HE Mr Ibrahim Izziddin |
| Mr Holmes | |

Arab-Israel

1. After initial courtesies, Mr Pym said that he had seen overnight reports of the outcome of the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers. Our initial impression was that while the final declaration was undoubtedly negative about the Reagan plan, this did not amount to a complete rejection of it. It looked as if Arafat had kept himself a little room for manoeuvre as well as protecting his own political position. King Hussein said that he could give no definite assessment at this stage. Arafat had told him before the Algiers meeting that negative-sounding statements about the US plan would be made but that he would retain his freedom of action. He had said that he would come and see the King again soon after the Algiers meeting with a view to an announcement of his intention of acting with Jordan on the future relationship between the Palestinian nation and Jordan and also on the composition of a joint delegation to negotiate for peace on the basis of the Reagan plan. Arafat was aware of the need to take the present opportunity and of the immense damage which could result if the opportunity was missed. Arafat knew that if he could not deliver after Algiers, he, the King, would make clear publicly what had been on offer, what the Jordanian position had been and what the PLO position had been. The King did not relish the prospect of going public in this way but felt that he would have little choice if Arafat let him down.

2. The King continued that the Russians were working against the Reagan plan and Jordan's role in taking it forward. This had been made clear to him both in Moscow and, more recently, by the Soviet delegation visiting Jordan. The Russians resented it because they

were not involved. He did not know whether they would in practice put their full weight against the Reagan plan or would rather calculate that President Reagan would ^{not} in any case carry his plan through and that therefore they need do no more than wait for its failure. Mr Pym said that his impression was that the Russians had become more active in recent months on the Middle East and might become more so still. King Hussein agreed. The Soviet hand could be seen in Syrian and Libyan hostile activity.

Lebanon

3. King Hussein said that the other aspect of the present situation was the lack of progress over withdrawal from Lebanon. He had been given assurances by President Reagan that he would exert maximum efforts to ensure Israeli withdrawal and that if the King and Arafat could reach agreement on a delegation to begin peace talks, the Americans would give him a timetable for complete Israeli withdrawal, as well as a settlement freeze, before expecting the Jordanians and Palestinians to begin talking. However, American pressures seemed to be making no impression on the Israelis and the situation was dragging on. Mr Pym said that the position in Lebanon was in substance no different from that which had obtained when they had last discussed it in October. He still found it difficult to see where the Israeli incentive to withdraw lay. He wondered whether President Reagan's statement about guaranteeing Israel's northern border implied a future US presence there. This sort of approach might not suit the complexities of the situation and might not in any case take the trick of achieving Israeli withdrawal. King Hussein added that there had been a recent statement from the Syrians which suggested that they too might be hardening their position about their own withdrawal. Mr Hurd asked whether the absence of an Israeli withdrawal would totally block talks on a wider peace if the King was able to reach agreement with Arafat. King Hussein said that it would, principally because Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was a test of US commitment and capacity to put pressure on Israel. If the Americans could not succeed in Lebanon, where Israel had no real claim, the Arabs could have no faith in US policy to deliver over the West Bank. It was quite possible that a situation would be reached in which he would tell the Americans that he and Arafat were agreed and ready to negotiate, and were waiting for the promised Lebanese withdrawal and settlement freeze. The Americans would then be on the spot and a critical moment would be at hand.

4. Mr Pym said that he had talked recently to Vice-President Bush, who had not been particularly optimistic on this. The Congressional pressures on the US Administration were always there. He had conveyed to Mr Shultz on his return from Amman the urgency of the need for progress. Nothing had happened since except that the settlement process on the West Bank and Gaza had intensified. He expected to see Mr Shultz and President Reagan next week. He

would be grateful for any guidance the King could give him on what he should say to them, but he proposed in essence simply to repeat his message on the urgency of the situation, but with greater strength. On one particular point, he wondered whether King Hussein would not be satisfied with a freeze on the existing settlement situation, given that six months had passed since the Reagan plan had first been publicised and the situation on the ground had considerably deteriorated. King Hussein said that a freeze remained what was needed, although in his view for the existing settlements to remain would make no sense in the context of an overall peace settlement. He agreed that Mr Pym should speak as he proposed. He was very worried about the situation. It was impossible to know whether President Reagan would go through with the commitments which he had made. Jordan was looking to its friends to help so far as they could.

5. Mr Pym said that he shared the King's concern. Six months ago the atmosphere for progress had been more propitious. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon had created an opportunity in US politics. Embarrassment over this episode was now lessening. The consequences of a failure of present efforts could be disastrous. He would do his best to get this message across to Mr Shultz and President Reagan. It might be helpful if Mr Hurd could have another word with King Hussein on 28 February before the King's departure so that he, Mr Pym, would be fully up-to-date when talking to the Americans. King Hussein readily agreed to this. He said that the President had been consistent in his approach since he had announced his initiative and had been very positive with him. But the Israelis remained obdurate and it appeared that if there were another election in Israel, Mr Begin might well be returned with a larger majority. Apart from the result of the election, the fact of one being held would delay matters further and risk the process running up against the US election.

Arab League Delegation

6. Mr Pym said that the Delegation's visit now appeared to be on again for 18 March. The Moroccan Foreign Minister had visited London some weeks before to explain that, because of the death of General Dlimi, the Moroccans had to postpone the previously arranged date. King Hassan remained, as he had always been, confident and positive about the problem of Palestinian representation on the Delegation, but it was very difficult to be sure about the view of others. The initial difficulty over the Delegation had stemmed from a late change of mind on the part of the Moroccans, who had previously assured us that there was no question of a PLO representative being included in the Delegation. It was disappointing that the arrangement we thought we had agreed, which was similar to that for the Washington visit, had not been implemented. The consequences had been distressing in terms of Anglo-Arab relations. But we had stuck to our policy, which had the virtue of consistency. We believed that the PLO would be in a better position politically if they had taken the steps we suggested.

7. King Hussein asked about the present position on Palestinian representation. On a particular point, he would be interested to know where the name of Milhem had come from. Mr Pym said we had not been in the business of suggesting names. We had made clear that we could not accept a PLO office-holder, and had suggested that there were many Palestinians, for example elected mayors, whom we would find perfectly acceptable. We had however made clear separately that Mr Hurd would be ready to meet a PLO office-holder. There had been no response so far to this suggestion. Mr Hurd added that the Moroccans had assured us very recently that Milhem would definitely come as the Palestinian representative in the Delegation. This put us in a difficult position since we could not say to the Moroccans that they did not know their own business, but we continued to have doubts whether the position was quite as clear cut as the Moroccans were suggesting. King Hussein said that he had been very upset by the fuss which had arisen over this delegation. The visit should have taken place a long time ago. It was now in substance an irrelevance but since it had been blown up, it had somehow to be put behind us. It would be very helpful if we could make sure that we could keep him fully informed of the position as it developed. The affair had been dogged by misunderstandings and misinformation throughout. Mr Pym said that we would gladly do this. Any nudge which King Hussein could give the issue in the right direction would be very much appreciated.

Iran/Iraq

8. Mr Pym said that he would appreciate the King's assessment of the position. His impression was that it had not changed very much since their last talk in October. King Hussein agreed. The present Iraqi position was not too bad. The Iranians had suffered very large losses in the recent offensive. He had heard from the Pakistanis (who were worried separately about subversive Iranian influence in Pakistan) that there were two competing schools of thought in Tehran. One group thought that Iran could not bring about a political change in Iraq and should therefore seek to end the war soon. The other, which was in the majority, thought that it was necessary to continue the war for the sake of internal unity. It was possible that something helpful on Iran/Iraq would come out of the Non-Aligned Summit (The King added that he had recently visited Yugoslavia to see for himself whether Yugoslav policy had changed in the post-Tito era. He had the impression that it had not. Mr Pym agreed, but commented that the Yugoslavs had not only to deal with difficult political problems but also had some very difficult economic decisions to take). Mr Pym wondered whether Khomeini had changed his ground and modified his objectives. King Hussein said that this might be the case. It seemed that the Iranians were now asking for only \$50 billion in compensation rather than the \$150 billion, which they had

/previously

previously wanted and might not be insisting on a change of regime in Iraq. The Gulf States seemed ready to put up the necessary money as part of a general reconstruction fund (from which in practice all the money would go to the Iranians) but the Iranians were demanding that Iraq should pay as an admission of guilt. The Iraqis were clearly feeling the strain on the material side but this might be eased if it were true that they had reached agreement with the Saudi Arabians to build an oil pipeline across Saudi Arabia. In response to a question from Mr Pym, the King said that the Russians were trying to keep in with both sides in the war. They were helping to supply the Iranians via Libya and North Korea (ironically, and embarrassingly for the Americans, the other main supplier was the Israelis) and they had now agreed to resume supplies to Iraq of equipment on which agreement had been reached before the war started. He expected Andropov to be a formidable adversary in the Middle East in general. He seemed to know the area well and to have a sharp mind.

9. In a short discussion on Afghanistan, Mr Pym said that the situation showed no sign of improvement. There was some talk around of the Russians being ready to make a deal under which they would withdraw but he did not believe this. King Hussein agreed that there was no prospect of an early Soviet withdrawal.

10. The call ended at 1140.

Near East and North Africa Department
24 February 1983

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1983

Dear John,

VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN

The Prime Minister gave a working lunch for King Hussein here today. I enclose a note of the main points made during the discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Colson

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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✓ Master

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Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION AT A WORKING LUNCH GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER
FOR KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 1300 HOURS ON MONDAY 21 FEBRUARY AT
10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister

King Hussein

Sir Antony Acland

Commander-in-Chief
Zaid bin Shaker

Field Marshal
Sir Edwin Bramall

Jordanian Ambassador

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr. John Coles

* * * * *

The discussion began with a brief exchange of views about the forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi. King Hussein said that a number of members of the movement were determined to avoid a repetition of the Havana Summit. This would be the first Non-Aligned Summit with a strong representation of Arab countries at Head of State level. It would also provide an occasion for President Mubarak to rejoin the Arab ranks. Relations between Egypt and Jordan were now very good.

With regard to the Iran/Iraq war, General Shaker said that it was his impression that the weight of Iranian forces was now being moved to the south end of the central sector. King Hussein said that he had recently gathered from the Pakistan Foreign Minister that there was an internal debate in Iran about the desirability of continuing the war. But there was one faction which thought that once the war was over, internal dissension in Iran would be intensified. Sir Antony Acland said that a recent report from our own Mission in Tehran confirmed the impression of a growing internal debate.

King Hussein said that Iran had modified its original demands. It no longer insisted on a change of regime in Iraq and the original demand for compensation had been lowered.

/ Turning

Turning to the Arab/Israel problem, the Prime Minister said that the tragedy of the Beirut massacres could be turned into an opportunity for peace if the moment were seized. The question was whether the United States would bring pressure to bear. She had never been able to understand why the Americans were so reluctant to use the powers of persuasion at their disposal.

King Hussein said that he had earlier put the thought to President Reagan that if he saw difficulty in dealing with internal pressures, the only course might be to arrange an international conference, as advocated by the Soviet Union. But later Reagan had made it clear that before he had announced his plan for a settlement last September, he had been in touch with the Jewish community in the United States. As a result of these contacts he believed that his plan was viable. The President's two international priorities were now defence and arms control and the Middle East. He believed that the outcome of the debate on these matters would determine his political future. Since the President's speech last September, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories had greatly increased. Within two months at most the number of Israelis in the occupied territories at the time of the speech would have been doubled.

The Jordanian Ambassador said that it was significant that, according to recent reports, Mr. Sharon would continue to serve in the two key committees of the Israeli Cabinet dealing with the situation in the Lebanon and the situation in the occupied territories. The Prime Minister said that she thought the retention of Sharon in the Israeli Cabinet was a mistake. We had recently seen reports that negotiations on the Arab/Israel problem would be linked to substantial prior withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Lebanon. The difficulty with this linkage was that the Israelis could delay withdrawal and thus delay negotiations.

King Hussein said that he would explain the background. In his discussions with the Americans, they had accepted that the Israeli settlements were illegal. They further accepted that Resolution 242 applied to the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights.

/ The Americans

The Americans had implied that, following a solution, some Israelis might wish to continue to live in the occupied territories but without extra-territorial rights. He himself had insisted that major projects, such as the Canal from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, should be halted while peace negotiations were in train. He had equally insisted that the future borders should be those of 1967, but with some minor adjustments in particularly difficult areas. An independent Palestinian state was ruled out. There should instead be a Palestinian entity in association with Jordan and, within that concept, the right of self-determination would be an internal matter for Palestinians and Jordanians.

He had advocated that there should be no period of transition, but that the aim should be a full peace settlement. But the Americans had said that a transitional period was both necessary and provided for in Camp David. However, as soon as transitional arrangements were agreed, discussion could begin on a final peace settlement.

In the month after the Beirut massacres ten thousand people had moved from the West Bank into Jordan. The current situation could not be tolerated for much longer. Unless there was early progress the situation in the occupied territories would be a fait accompli and there would be nothing to discuss.

He had told the Americans that for the Arab negotiating position to be credible it would be necessary, before negotiations commenced, that there should be a final timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and a freeze on Israeli settlements. President Reagan had given him these two commitments in writing. (Later in the conversation the King said that he had not solicited these undertakings. They were freely given by the United States and thus amounted to American commitments).

Sir Antony Acland asked what Mr. Begin would need, for internal political reasons, to produce if he stopped the settlements, as he ought to do, and agreed to the concept of a Palestinian entity in association with Jordan. King Hussein said

/ that

that in return Israel would secure peace and an opportunity to play a role in the area.

The Prime Minister said that nothing would happen unless the United States applied pressure to Israel. Sir Anthony Parsons stated that his impression from a number of contacts in the United States was that President Reagan could only proceed with his peace plan if the Jewish community in America were at least not actively opposing him. Meanwhile, Jewish leaders were saying that they would support the President provided the Arabs agreed to negotiate without prior conditions on the settlements and on Lebanese withdrawal. If the Arabs insisted on pre-conditions, the Jewish community would withdraw their support from the President.

King Hussein said that he found this very strange. He had obtained a quite different impression from his talks in the United States. These had resulted in the two American commitments to which he had referred.

As regards his talks with the Palestinians, these had so far been quite promising. He had asked Arafat just before the Algiers meeting to clarify his position. The reply had been that Arafat would support anything and everything in order to recover Arab land. He did not intend to seek a precise mandate at the Algiers meeting, but instead wanted a broad "political" mandate to go ahead. Arafat recognised that this was the last chance. He accepted that negotiations would be on the basis of the Reagan plan. The King did not know whether Arafat would succeed in getting the go-ahead.

Andropov had told the King that he thought Jordan would come under pressure to join the United States and Israel in negotiation. This would not succeed - the Palestinians and the Russians would oppose it. Andropov wanted an international conference and an independent Palestinian state. He took the view that the question of any association between that state and Jordan would be for later discussion. He had told Andropov that threats and pressure

/ against

against Jordan would not work (and Andropov had accepted this). Jordan maintained a dialogue with the Soviet Union which had recently sent a delegation to Amman.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Soviet Union would put pressure on Syria not to withdraw from the Lebanon and thus frustrate the whole withdrawal process. She had noted that there were new SA5s in Syria. King Hussein said that the Syrians were fully committed to withdrawal. The SA5s were under Soviet control.

On another matter, he had asked Weinberger, in the presence of President Reagan, whether Israel was helping Iran in the Iran/Iraq war. Weinberger had confirmed that Israel was supplying arms to Iran and some of the equipment was, embarrassingly, subject to American permission to export. The Soviet Union were also helping Iran. Sir Anthony Parsons said that he believed that the Soviet Union regarded Iran as basically more important than Iraq. The Chief of Defence Staff asked whether the Russians might see an Iranian defeat as an opportunity to promote a left-wing regime in Iran. King Hussein thought it probable that they would attempt to exploit such a situation in this way. Sir Anthony Parsons commented that he did not believe that the Tudeh Party were powerful enough on a country-wide basis to take over.

King Hussein said that Iran was trying to destabilise the whole area. They were making efforts in Jordan and he wondered how many cells they had been able to establish in the Gulf.

Reverting to the Arab/Israel question King Hussein said that Mr. Khalid el Hassan had been with him throughout his stay in the United States. El Hassan was even more enthusiastic about peace prospects than the Jordanians themselves were. The Prime Minister thought there was some ground for hope, given the situation following the Beirut massacres and the inquiry, and the fact that Shultz was now a powerful voice in Washington.

King Hussein said that he had told Arafat that if he did not live up to his promises, Jordan would have to make public what had been going on. Everyone would lose in that situation.

/ The

The Prime Minister asked how negotiations on the Lebanon were going. Sir Antony Acland said that progress was very slow. It seemed that Haddad had strengthened his position in the South. The Lebanese Government now had more widespread authority in Beirut. But fundamentally, there was little movement. The Prime Minister pointed out that one danger was that a timetable for withdrawal would be announced but not implemented. King Hussein said that the Americans had spoken in terms of completing the withdrawal process before the end of the year.

The Prime Minister said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would meet President Reagan and Mr. Shultz during The Queen's visit to the United States. We would take the opportunity to discuss the Middle East situation and urge the need for rapid movement.

The discussion ended at 1420 hours.

A. J. C.

21 February 1983

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COVERING RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 February 1983

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Lunch for King Hussein

/ I enclose a brief note summarising weekend developments on the Arab League Delegation and the PNC meeting in Algiers.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'John Holmes'.

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING RESTRICTED



ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. The Moroccans have said publicly that King Hassan and his delegation will be coming to London on 18 March. The Moroccan Foreign Minister has assured our Ambassador privately that, unless our position changes, Milhem will be the Palestinian representative. The Moroccans have also announced that the Fez Follow-Up Committee will meet in Morocco on 24/25 March to discuss all the visits to capitals.

2. Comment. It is encouraging that the King has committed himself to a new date before the end of the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers. It indicates that King Hassan is determined to go through with the visit, and is counting on PLO approval for Milhem in due course. As before, it remains uncertain whether this will be forthcoming; but the situation is more satisfactory for us than if the King gave up altogether.

Palestine National Council (PNC)

3. The meeting in Algiers is likely to last another two or three days. The moderates have not had it all their own way; but Arafat is likely to be left with just enough flexibility to continue exploring the Reagan initiative with King Hussein, provided that:

- (i) the Jordanians alone do not represent the Palestinians;
- (ii) an independent Palestinian state is on the agenda.

4. King Hussein will expect Arafat to visit a number of Arab countries following the PNC, before returning to Amman with his final position. He has given the PLO until 1 March to make a decision.

Prime MinisterAR 15-
2

Prime Minister

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. King Hussein has told the British Ambassador in Amman that he hopes he may perhaps be able to help us over our difficulties with the Arab League. As you know, the position is still uneasy and potentially damaging. King Hussein's preference is that we should agree to receive a delegation including a member of the PLO, as he wants nothing to complicate further his prospects of persuading the PLO to join him in entering negotiations under the Reagan proposals. He is, however, fully aware that we have a consistent policy on Ministerial contacts with the PLO.
2. His advice should be valuable, but he may prefer to wait for a signal from you that you wish to discuss the subject. If you decide to do so I suggest that a natural way of doing this might be to refer to the death in a car accident last month of General Dlimi, King Hassan's security adviser, and ask King Hussein for his view on how great a blow this was to King Hassan. You could add that we entirely accept that this was a sufficient reason for King Hassan's postponement of the 7 February visit, and hope soon to discuss new dates with the Moroccans.
3. King Hussein may well ask whether it will make any difference to the Government's position if the outcome of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers is a clear signal to Arafat to continue his discussions with the Jordanians about the Reagan plan. You will no doubt wish to point out that we have already told the PLO that I am authorised to meet a PLO official for talks in the Middle East, once the Arab League visit has taken place; and that a further step will need an explicit advance by the PLO on the points of importance to us and already known to them.
4. It would be better not to raise the problem of Ministerial visits to Saudi Arabia with King Hussein since he cannot help us over this. King Hussein's relationship with the Saudis is a delicate one and he will not wish to expand goodwill for our sake. Although it is always an option for King Hassan to leave the matter where it now rests, I believe it more likely that he will return to us for agreement to new dates on the previous basis, ie that it is for him to deal with the composition problem. That will leave us no further forward. It would, however, be useful to have King Hussein's views about one possible outcome: that King Hassan will decide to come whether or not all the other members are in agreement with him (in the hope that, in the event, they will all join him). But our difficulties will

/be



be eased only if the Saudis decide to come and it would be helpful to know King Hussein's views on the likelihood of this.

DH.

18 February 1983

Douglas Hurd

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1500
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FROM AMMAN 171500Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 68 OF 17 FEB 83
AND TO INFO ROUTINE MIDDLE EAST POSTS MOSCOW,PARIS,
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JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST.

1.KING HUSSEIN LEFT AMMAN THIS MORNING SEMICOLON HE ARRIVES IN LONDON ON 19 FEBRUARY AFTER ONE DAY VISITS TO ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA.IT MAY BE USEFUL TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON SUBJECTS LIKELY TO BE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND DURING HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF.

JORDAN/PLO

2.DESPITE THE CONTRADICTORY PRONOUNCEMENTS BEING MADE DURING THE MEETING IN ALGIERS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL,KING HUSSEIN REMAINS FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC THAT ARAFAT WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A RESOLUTION DRAFTED IN SUFFICIENTLY GENERAL TERMS TO ENABLE HIM TO WORK WITH THE JORDANIANS FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.ARAFAT HAS APPARENTLY TOLD THE KING THAT HE WILL NEED ABOUT 10 DAYS AFTER THE COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSULT OTHER ARAB STATES BEFORE HOLDING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS.IT SEEMS THAT KING HASSAN IS PRESSING FOR AN EARLY ARAB SUMMIT MEETING SEMICOLON KING HUSSEIN THINKS THIS MIGHT PROVE USEFUL,BUT IF IT HAPPENS IT COULD AFFECT THE TIMING OF THE NEXT MOVES.

3.BADRAN ,THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER,TOLD A SECRET SESSION ATTENDED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO THAT JORDAN WOULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE PLO. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION (WHO IS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN ALL BUT NAME)HAS SINCE TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT BADRAN HAD BEEN UNWISE TO CLOSE OPTIONS IN THIS WAY AND CLAIMED HE HAD TOLD HIM SO IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS.WHEN MY US COLLEAGUE RECENTLY CHALLENGED THE KING ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT,SUGGESTING THAT IT HAD BEEN UNWISE BOTH AS TO TACTICS AND TIMING,KING HUSSEIN WAS DEFENSIVE AND ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW JORDAN COULD BE EXPECTED TO GO IT ALONE .WHEN VIETS SUGGESTED THAT THE SURVIVAL OF THE COUNTRY AND DYNASTY MIGHT DEPEND ON HIS DOING SO,KING HUSSEIN WENT OVER WHAT HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT AT THEIR LAST MEETING,SAYING THAT WHAT HIS PRIME MINISTER HAD TOLD THE NCC WAS TRUE 'BUT ONLY UP TO A POINT'.I THINK THE KING HAS PROBABLY NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND WHAT HE WILL DO IF ARAFAT CANNOT DELIVER THE PLO.HE MUST REALISE THAT SUPPORT FOR A JORDANIAN OPTION WITHOUT THE PLO IS AT BEST MEAGRE ON THE WEST BANK,AND PROBABLY LITTLE STRONGER ON THE EAST BANK WHERE THE DANGERS TO WHICH SUCH A MOVE WOULD EXPOSE JORDAN ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD.

/4. IT IS

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4. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT KING HUSSEIN IS LINKING HIS OWN ANNOUNCEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT, DURING KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES LAST DECEMBER, HE ACCEPTED THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE A DIRECT LINK. BUT JORDANIAN MINISTERS SEEM TO THINK THAT THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE. I WOULD GUESS THAT, WHILE THE KING MAY BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE HIS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE THE ISRAELIS START LEAVING LEBANON, HE WILL NOT IN FACT AGREE TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES UNTIL AT LEAST PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE. IT IS ALSO HARD TO BELIEVE THAT AN ARAB TEAM COULD SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN AT LEAST A FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS.

JORDAN/SOVIET UNION

5. THE UNPUBLISHED VISIT TO JORDAN LAST WEEKEND OF A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL (KAREN BRUTENTS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE) HAS AGAIN FOCUSED JORDANIAN ATTENTION ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. KING HUSSEIN TOLD VIETS THAT BRUTENTS HAD WARNED HIM NOT TO GO ANY FURTHER IN FOLLOWING UP THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, WHICH BRUTENTS HAD DESCRIBED AS MUCH CLOSER TO CAMP DAVID THAN TO RESOLUTION 242 SEMICOLON BRUTENTS HAD ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD IN ANY CASE NEVER BE ABLE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW. THE KING CLAIMS TO HAVE TOLD THE RUFIJMMINS THAT HE HAD GONE TOO FAR TO DRAW BACK NOW. HE ASSUMED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WAIT FOR THINGS TO GO WRONG AND THEN RENEW THEIR CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

6. BRUTENTS HAD ALSO GONE TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO EXPLAIN TO THE KING THE SOVIET DECISION TO SUPPLY SA 5S TO SYRIA. HE HAD SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW A SYRIAN FINGER ON THE TRIGGER SEMICOLON THE SA 5S WOULD REMAIN UNDER TOTAL SOVIET CONTROL.

IRAN /IRAQ

7. FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE YARMOUK VOLUNTEER FORCE, KING HUSSEIN IS APPARENTLY ONCE AGAIN CONTEMPLATING SENDING JORDANIAN REGULAR TROOPS TO IRAQ SEMICOLON HE HAS NOT YET TAKEN ANY FINAL DECISION AND SEEMS TO BE CONSIDERING A RANGE OF OPTIONS FROM AN ARMoured BRIGADE TO A MUCH SMALLER UNIT DRAWN FROM THE SPECIAL FORCES. MY US COLLEAGUE BELIEVES HE HAS PUT OFF ANY DECISION UNTIL AFTER THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN DELHI SEMICOLON IT COULD WELL BE THAT HIS MILITARY ADVISERS, WHO ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SUCH A MOVE, WILL BE ABLE TO DISSUADE HIM ENTIRELY. THE KING SEEMS EMBARRASSED THAT SUDAN AND YEMEN SHOULD BOTH HAVE TROOPS IN IRAQ SEMICOLON HE MAY ALSO BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM TO HAVE A JORDANIAN REGULAR UNIT FIGHTING ALONGSIDE THE IRAQIS.

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8. ANY DECISION TO SEND JORDANIAN REGULAR TROOPS TO IRAQ WOULD BE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL HERE AND COULD COME AT A TIME WHEN THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN MAY ALREADY BE DIVIDED OVER THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. IF, THEREFORE, THE QUESTION OF SENDING JORDANIAN REGULAR TROOPS TO IRAQ SHOULD ARISE IN THE KING'S TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOURSELF, I RECOMMEND COUNSELLING CAUTION. A JORDANIAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTION COULD IN ANY CASE ONLY BE SYMBOLIC AND WOULD HARDLY AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR.

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON.

9. ALTHOUGH THE KING HAS URGED THE PRIME MINISTER TO ACCEPT A PLO MEMBER IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, HE IS STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT IT IS NOT IN THE ARAB INTEREST TO PURSUE A QUARREL WITH BRITAIN ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE PRESENT TIME. I UNDERSTAND HE HAS SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT SADDAM, KING FAHD AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS INCLUDING ARAFAT IN THIS SENSE, URGING THEM TO BRING MATTERS QUICKLY TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION AND REMINDING THEM OF THE VALUABLE ROLE WHICH BRITAIN HAS PLAYED AND CAN CONTINUE TO PLAY ON THE MIDDLE EAST BOTH IN EUROPE AND WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION. THE KING WILL THEREFORE BE ANXIOUS TO GIVE US ANY HELP HE CAN IN RESOLVING THE MATTER. HIS MINISTER OF COURT SPEAKING TO ME THIS MORNING ECHOED THE GENERAL VIEW HERE IN SAYING THAT, IF ONLY KING HUSSEIN RATHER THAN KING HASSAN HAD BEEN LEADING THE DELEGATION TO LONDON, THE PROBLEM WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ARISE.

/JORDAN/EASTERN EUROPE

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JORDAN/EASTERN EUROPE

10. I WOULD NOT EXPECT ANYTHING VERY SIGNIFICANT TO EMERGE FROM KING HUSSEIN'S VISITS TO ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN LONDON, ALTHOUGH HE IS PROBABLY ANXIOUS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS SHOULD NOT GIVE INDISCRIMINATE SUPPORT TO THE PLO'S MORE EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS AND NO DOUBT HOPES THAT THEY WILL ALSO USE THEIR INFLUENCE AT THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ.

JORDAN/EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

11. KING HUSSEIN VISITED BELGIUM AT THE END OF JANUARY SEMICOLON HE HAS SINCE RECEIVED HERE THE DUTCH AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE GERMAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE ITALIAN PRESIDENT, WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY COLOMBO, WILL BE PAYING A STATE VISIT TO JORDAN FROM 16-20 MARCH. WHILE THE KING IS NOT LOOKING FOR ANY INDEPENDENT MOVE FROM EUROPE AT PRESENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HE NATURALLY HOPES THAT THE EUROPEANS WILL CONTINUE TO EXPRESS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIS OWN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND ALSO TO PRESS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS. ONCE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY, (3 28) ?3)99 KING TO THE EUROPEANS TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE BOTH WITH THE AMERICANS AND WITH THE ISRAELIS TO ENSURE A SATISFACTORY NAVNMVME.

BILATERAL RELATIONS.

12. THERE ARE NO BILATERAL PROBLEMS AT PRESENT. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO GIVE THE KING SOME INDICATION OF WHEN THE QUEEN MAY BE ABLE TO PAY THE RETURN STATE VISIT TO JORDAN FOR WHICH THE KING HAS SO LONG BEEN HOPING, THIS WOULD NATURALLY GIVE HIM THE GREATEST PLEASURE.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose a brief for King Hussein's working lunch with the Prime Minister at 1 pm on 21 February. You will have received a separate note from Mr Hurd about how the Prime Minister might raise the subject of the Arab League visit to London, on which King Hussein has offered to try to help.

The King will be accompanied by his Commander in Chief, General Shaker and the Jordanian Ambassador. Sir Antony Acland will attend from here.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 19-26 FEBRUARY

Arab/IsraelPoints to Make

1. Admire King's skill in difficult discussions and determination to see peace process through.
2. Discussions with Arafat on basis of Reagan proposals only realistic way forward. Next steps after PNC meeting? If Arafat falters?
3. Working hard to encourage maximum support for Jordanian/PLO efforts to make progress towards negotiations on West Bank. Have made our view quite clear to US on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and settlements. Anything more that Europeans can usefully do?
4. Hope to re-arrange Arab League Visit after PNC. In full agreement with King Hassan, but he does not seem able to convince the PLO.

Lebanon and SyriaIsrael/Lebanon negotiations

5. Share Jordanian concern at slow progress. Hope Habib can produce some movement. No evidence yet of greater Israeli flexibility needed for agreement. Does King think Syria/PLO are sincere in their promises to withdraw from Lebanon in parallel with Israeli forces?

British participation in Multinational Force

6. British contingent has settled in well. Three months deployment only, but welcomed by Lebanese Government as visible sign of our support.



SAM-5's in Syria

7. Syria's SAM-5 missiles a threat to Jordan?

Jordanians on trial for attempted assassination of Mr Argov,
Israeli Ambassador (if raised)

8. We have no power to transfer a person convicted of an offence in a UK court to serve his sentence in another country.

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 19-26 FEBRUARY 1983

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

Military Situation

1. Now a hiatus in the military position. Major Iranian attack may still come. But this no longer seems inevitable.

Arab Military Support for Iraq

2. Some Sudanese and North Yemeni troops already in Iraq. Some Jordanian volunteers also in Iraq but we would counsel caution on question of sending regular Jordanian troops.

European Support for Iraq

3. We do not share French views on European role. No leverage in Tehran. Strategic interest in not isolating Iran.

Syria

4. We see no chance of Syrians re-opening pipeline. This would be the most effective way of bringing Iran to negotiating table.

Mediation

5. Iraq sounded us out about Security Council Meeting. We are not convinced that at this stage this is best way to end the fighting.



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VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 19-26 FEBRUARY

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NAM SUMMIT

POINTS TO MAKE

1. After the events of 1982 we would regret it if the NAM were to continue to support Argentina on sovereignty.
2. Grateful that Jordan abstained on General Assembly Resolution 37/9. Hope for continued support. We cannot negotiate with Argentina as if nothing had happened, particularly as she still refuses to agree a definitive cessation of hostilities or renounce the use of force.
3. Pleased to learn that draft of Summit declaration refers to non-use of force and the right of people to self-determination. Hope that more extreme language will not be added to present text and if it is, friendly governments will enter reservations. Support from NAM risks encouraging Argentina to further military action.

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VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDANUK/JORDAN DEFENCE RELATIONSPOINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome our very friendly defence relations with Jordan. Hope relations will continue to develop.

2. Hope Prince Abdullah enjoyed his time with the 13/18 Hussars, where I understand that he enjoyed the considerable respect of his brother officers. Very pleased that he has decided to join the Territorial Army; hope that he will enjoy his attachment to his old regiment in Germany at Easter. Pleased that Prince Talal may be following his cousin's example.

3. (Defensive) Hope that problems over training charges are being resolved. Jordan has a high priority for UK defence assistance. We would like to have many more Jordanians on courses here, and are always willing to assist in new areas - eg at present we are hosting a team from the RJAF studying photo-reconnaissance training methods, and we are helping to set up gunnery staff courses in Jordan.

4. Pleased to help in training the Jordanian Coastguard.



DEFENCE SALES BRIEF

Points to Make

- 1 General. We welcome the close collaboration between our countries on defence equipment and we would like to extend its scope. UK remains ready to supply a wide range of items which have been fully combat proven. UK companies always prepared to quote for your requirements. The Floating Sales Exhibition which visits Aqaba next month will demonstrate the wide range of the UK's defence industries.
- 2 Agile Combat Aircraft (ACA)/Tornado. Very encouraged at your interest in ACA/Tornado family of aircraft. Keen to see dialogue continue. What timetable are you and the other Arab countries working towards?
- 3 Hawk. Best advanced jet trainer in the world and now chosen by US Navy. Ideally suited to meet Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) requirement for advanced jet trainer aircraft. It also has ground attack and air-to-air missile capability.
- 4 Khalid (defensive only). Regret past technical difficulties. Hope these are now behind us. UK always prepared to go to great length to ensure customer satisfaction.



KING HUSSEIN'S LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER 1245 PM
21 FEBRUARY

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives in London on 19 February and is due to leave on 26 February. The visit is as usual a private one. The King has just completed one day visits to Romania and Yugoslavia.
2. Queen Noor is not accompanying the King as she is expecting her third child in March. The King's party includes his Commander in Chief (and Chief Adviser) General Shaker.
3. Mr Pym will call on the King on 23 February.
4. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his
A discussion with the Secretary of State in July 1982 are attached.

Near East and North Africa Department
18 February 1983



KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 19-26 FEBRUARY

ARAB/ISRAEL

Background

1. King Hussein will be waiting for the outcome of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) meeting to see how further progress can best be made with Arafat towards negotiations with Israel under the US auspices. He has a difficult balancing act to perform. He must bring the PLO to aim at a realistic target somewhere close to the Reagan proposals (and compromise on PLO representation in negotiations) whilst avoiding Arab criticism for appearing to push the PLO too far towards the American position and usurp their role. At the moment King Hussein seems to have the backing of the moderate Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia.
2. The PNC meeting, which opened in Algiers on 14 February and could last for ten days or more, is vitally important for the continuation of the Hussein/Arafat discussions. The indications are that Arafat will receive a qualified mandate to proceed with King Hussein. The King seems determined to see the peace process through (see Amman telno 58 of 14 February).
3. Even so the path forward is full of obstacles, eg Palestinian representation in the negotiations, US credibility, the Israeli response. Scepticism in the Arab world is growing and King Hussein is not immune.
4. King Hussein will wish to help us if he can with the Arab League Delegation Visit to London; but he undoubtedly still strongly believes we should accept a PLO representative. He is worried that this episode may divert attention from the main issue and weaken the position of the PLO moderates.

Lebanon and SyriaIsrael/Lebanon negotiations

5. Habib has been back in the Middle East since early February but no evidence yet of Israeli willingness to give up demands such as early warning stations in Southern Lebanon manned by IDF personnel, a security role for Major Haddad and his forces (recently expanded with Israeli help) and a substantial degree of normalisation of bilateral relations. All these demands are unacceptable to the Lebanese who are under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Syria (which has threatened to close her border with Lebanon) not to make substantial concessions.

6. Both Syria and PLO have given undertakings to the Lebanese and Americans that they will withdraw in parallel with Israeli forces. But Syria will want assurances that her own security will not be threatened by whatever arrangements are made between Lebanon and Israel and the PLO will seek guarantees for the security of the Palestinian population. The German Presidency has recently made representations on behalf of the Ten to both the Israeli and the Lebanese Government about killings and harrassment of Palestinians in Southern Lebanon.

British participation in Multinational Force

7. The British MNF contingent (97 men from the Queen's Dragoon Guards equipped with 16 Ferret Scout cars) has been operational since 8 February. The Commander has established good liaison with local Lebanese forces and there have been no incidents. With other MNF contingents we have agreed to provide patrols in support of the recent Lebanese Army deployment into East Beirut.

SAM-5's in Syria

8. Two SAM-5 complexes are nearing operational readiness in Syria. Their high altitude and long-range capability could cover all Jordan's airspace. The Soviets have assured the King that the missiles will remain under Soviet control.

/Jordanians



Jordanians on trial for attempted assassination of Mr Argov

9. The three men currently on trial for the attempted assassination in London last June of Mr Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador, have Jordanian nationality. King Hussein may ask that if convicted they are allowed to serve their sentences in Jordan.

10. There is no legislation which allows a person convicted in a British court to serve their sentence in another country. A Council of Europe convention to allow prisoners to be transferred to serve their sentences in their European countries of origin is now under study by Ministers. Other countries may be allowed to join subject to the agreement of all participating states.

Near East and North Africa Department
18 February 1983

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 14 FEB
INFO MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 55: JORDAN/PLO

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN TODAY, HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE ARRIVING IN LONDON ON 19 FEBRUARY AND INTENDED STAYING UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH (I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS VISIT).
2. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY FIRM WITH ARAFAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN AND HAD LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT HE MUST EITHER MOVE FORWARD WITH THE JORDANIANS AND WITHIN THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE OR FEND FOR HIMSELF. IT WAS NOW UP TO ARAFAT: THE KING VERY MUCH HOPED HE WOULD SUCCEED IN WINNING BROAD SUPPORT FROM THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT IN THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING AT ALGIERS AND THOUGHT HIS CHANCES WERE REASONABLY GOOD (THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, WHOM I SAW EARLIER TODAY, THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD BE GREATLY HELPED BY HAVING RECEIVED A PAYMENT OF US DOLLARS 22 MILLION FROM THE SAUDIS AS A RESULT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO JEDDA).
3. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ARAFAT OBTAINED SUFFICIENT ENDORSEMENT FROM THE COUNCIL TO ENABLE HIM TO MOVE FORWARD, THE KING SEEMED TO ENVISAGE A FURTHER MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN AMMAN SOON AFTERWARDS. THE KING SAID HE WOULD THEN BE LEAVING JORDAN AROUND 6 MARCH TO ATTEND THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN INDIA. I ASKED HIM IF HE ENVISAGED A VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE: HE DID NOT RULE THIS OUT IF DEVELOPMENTS JUSTIFIED IT BUT CLEARLY HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND YET.
4. THE KING REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE THINGS THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IF HE POSSIBLY COULD. MUCH WOULD NECESSARILY DEPEND ON THE ABILITY OF THE AMERICANS TO DELIVER, BUT HE WOULD ALSO NEED THE HELP AND SUPPORT OF HIS EUROPEAN FRIENDS. THE KING ADDED THAT, IF THE PRESENT PEACE MOVES WERE TO FAIL, HE WAS DETERMINED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE FOR ANY LACK OF TRYING ON THE PART OF JORDAN.
5. THE KING REFERRED TO THE RECENT UNPUBLICISED VISIT TO JORDAN OF A SOVIET DELEGATION HEADED BY DRUTENTS. HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS REMAINED FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND

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CONTINUED TO ADVOCATE THE HOLDING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER THE KING THOUGHT THIS WAS JUST A HOLDING POSITION: THE RUSSIANS WERE WAITING FOR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE TO FAIL AND WOULD THEN NO DOUBT TAKE THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WITH THEIR OWN PROPOSALS.

6. KING HUSSEIN ALSO REFERRED TO OUR CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES OVER THE VISIT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON AND SAID HE HOPED HE MIGHT PERHAPS BE ABLE TO BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO US OVER THIS.

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IRAN/IRAQ

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Military Situation

1. Iran launched a new offensive in Amara sector on 6/7 February and recaptured approximately 250 sq km of Iranian territory previously held by Iraq. Further fighting in same sector on 9/10 February when Iraq launched successful counter-attack and halted Iranian advance. Bulk of Iranian forces yet to be committed and major Iranian attack could still come. Signs that Iranians may be having second thoughts on this.

Arab Military Support for Iraq

2. Jordan so far sent only volunteers to Iraq (the Yarmouk brigade), but majority now returned to Jordan. Some Sudanese and North Yemeni forces also in Iraq and Jordan now apparently considering committing regular troops.

European Support for Iraq

3. France is heavily committed to Iraq and is now seeking support from EC partners for this policy. We do not share French views on spread of Khomeinism : the threat of external attack or subversion can be met; the threat to the area posed by the example of successful revolution in Iran cannot be exorcised by aligning with Iraq. Whilst we lack leverage with Tehran, there is little the Ten can do to bring the conflict to an end.

Syria

4. Iraqi economy in serious short term difficulties. Re-opening of Syrian pipeline would bring financial relief and would have profound psychological effect on Iran. Recent Saudi attempts to achieve Iraqi/Syrian rapprochement ended in failure.

/Mediation

Mediation

5. Iraq has approached us about Security Council meeting and is engaged in intense diplomatic activity to bring the Iranians to the negotiating table. We would support even-handed resolutions calling for an end to conflict but further UN action ignored by Iran is worthless and may even be counter-productive.

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VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 19-26 FEBRUARY

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NAM SUMMIT

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Jordan voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 502 and abstained on the Argentine Resolution at the UN General Assembly in November despite considerable pressure to vote in favour along with the majority of members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

2. We have seen the Indian first draft of the NAM Summit Declaration (the text of the relevant extracts from the Latin America section is attached). Our Mission in Amman has on instructions made representations locally with the Secretary General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Falkland Islands Department
18 February 1983

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TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 14 FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE, BELMOPAN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, AMMAN, NAIROBI, MUSCAT, CASTRIES, SINGAPORE, COLOMBO, PORT OF SPAIN, BAHRAIN, DHAKA, BRIDGETOWN, GABORONE, YAOUNDE, CAIRO, LIBREVILLE, BANJUL, ACCRA, ABIDJAN, KUWAIT, BEIRUT, MASERU, MONROVIA, LILONGWE, KUALA LUMPUR, KATHMANDU, ISLAMABAD, DOHA, JEDDA, DAKAR, FREETOWN, KHARTOUM, MBABANE, KINSHASA, NEW DELHI
INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, KAMPALA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, HARARE, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

MIPT: NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM THE LATIN AMERICA SECTION OF THE INDIAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

86. THE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT NOTED WITH GRAVE CONCERN THE CONTINUED TENSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC WHICH WERE THE RESULT IN PARTICULAR OF POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY OUTSIDE POWERS IN VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE REGION AND THE EXPRESS WILL OF THEIR PEOPLES. THEY PROTESTED AGAINST THESE ACTIVITIES AIMED AT EXERTING PRESSURE ON AND DESTABILISING ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA.

89. THE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT URGED ALL STATES TO SCRUPULOUSLY REFRAIN FROM ALL ACTS OF AGGRESSION: RESORT TO USE OR THREAT OF FORCE: INTERVENTION AND INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES AS WELL AS OTHER FORMS OF PRESSURE, INCLUDING ECONOMIC OR MILITARY BLOCKADES. THEY REAFFIRMED THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE REGION TO NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THEIR RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS FREE FROM ANY TYPE OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE, INTERFERENCE OR PRESSURE.

94. THE CONFERENCE REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA TO SECURE THE RESTITUTION OF THE

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MALVINAS ISLANDS TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND URGED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THIS REGARD BE REINSTATED WITH THE PARTICIPATION AND GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS WOULD ENSURE A SPEEDY, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE NON-ALIGNED DECLARATIONS AS WELL AS UNGA RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) AS WELL AS OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE SUBJECT.

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VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDANUK/JORDAN DEFENCE RELATIONSBACKGROUND

1. The UK and Jordan have well established defence relations, partly as a result of the personal links between King Hussein and the British Armed Forces. These links are being continued by the King's eldest son (by his English-born wife Princess Muna) Prince Abdullah, who recently served with the 13/18 Hussars and is now attending Oxford University, and Prince Talal, the King's nephew, who has been provisionally accepted for the Standard Military Course at Sandhurst. Prince Abdullah has recently applied for a commission in the Territorial Army to enable him to return to his old regiment during vacations; this request is receiving favourable consideration.

2. Substantive defence relations have increased since 1979, when we received a number of Jordanian requests for help in training and organising their Armed Forces. A substantial proportion of the training assistance was associated with Jordan's purchase of 274 Khalid tanks. This training programme is now running down, and the number of Jordanian students undergoing training in the UK has fallen accordingly (although this may also reflect Jordanian dissatisfaction with the level of our training charges - see para 4). During 1981, 126 Jordanian students attended military courses in this country. This fell to 60 students during the 1981/82 financial year, but the figure for the 1982/83 financial year will probably be higher, reflecting an increase in the number of Jordanian Coastguard personnel attending UK courses following a DNAO study on the Coastguard conducted in 1980. At present 10 Jordanian Army students, 4 Royal Jordanian Air Force students (one officer on the RAF's Advanced Staff Course and three pilots) and one Coastguard officer are training in the UK.

3. Two Loan Service personnel are serving in Jordan; both are FAR flying instructors conducting basic flying training. Small numbers of Army personnel are attached to IMS in Jordan in support of the Khalid contract. There are also occasional short-term visits to train or advise on specific skills. Among recent visits

was one by an SAS training team in 1982 (cost subsidised by the UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS)). There have been no recent RN ship visits to Jordan and none are planned.

Training Charges

4. The Jordanians have regularly complained about the high cost of UK training courses. The Jordanian Commander-in-Chief, General bin Shaker, twice raised the question with Sir John Nott in 1981, and again with the Foreign Secretary in November 1982, when he made an unfavourable comparison between our charges and those of the Americans. General bin Shaker's specific complaint, about the cost of the Long Gunnery Staff Course, prompted Prime Ministerial interest and an exchange of letters explaining the background.
5. Comparisons in price between our training courses and those of our competitors are very difficult to make because of differences in course content and length. A recent MOD study showed no clear pattern as between UK and US courses; some of our courses were more expensive, others cheaper than their US equivalents. We have no independent information about the cost of the gunnery staff course mentioned to Mr Pym, which was alleged to cost \$4000 compared to \$370,000 for the UK course. But we do charge full costs for ammunition used on such courses, which in this case accounts for about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the total (we recover about 60% of the full cost of tuition), and we know that the Americans heavily subsidize countries in which they have an interest. Together these factors may account for the large discrepancy.
6. Jordan has for some time been a recipient of UKMTAS funding; the current UKMTAS allocation is £325K, which has been used during this financial year to pay for 67 Jordanian students on UK courses (including RCDS, Army and RAF staff courses) and 4 Loan Service personnel in Jordan. In 1980/81 UKMTAS funded a Jordanian student attending the Long Gunnery Staff Course.
7. Partly as a result of General bin Shaker's approaches to Sir John Nott, Jordan was earmarked as one of the three Category / A countries



A countries for assistance from the Defence Policy Fund (DPF) this financial year. Since the General's remark to Mr Pym, we have asked HMA Amman to informally advise the Jordanians that subsidies are available for training assistance, and DA Amman has prepared a detailed list of other training projects suitable for DPF funding. Among the projects already approved are partial funding of a visit to RAF Coltishall by a RAF team studying photo-reconnaissance training techniques and an advisory visit to Jordan to help set up a gunnery staff course for the Jordanian Army. We hope that these steps will ensure that the Jordanians will not have cause for further complaints.



DEFENCE SALES BRIEF

General Background

Until the Baghdad Summit meeting after the Camp David peace settlement, Jordan had little to spend on defence procurement. In 1979, however, following the Summit and Jordan's rejection of the Camp David agreement, Arab funds were made available. This led to the ordering of 274 Khalid tanks (improved Chieftains originally destined for Iran) and supporting equipment, worth nearly £400M; the biggest defence deal ever made by Jordan. They also bought 36 Mirage F1 aircraft from France and £100M worth of Soviet SAM8s and ZSU 23-4s (multy-barrelled guns). The Soviet order is disappointing as we had hoped to sell Rapier, but neither UK nor US could match Soviet prices and delivery. The presence of Soviet technicians could affect our readiness to release classified information and equipment to Jordan but King Hussein has said that this presence will be kept to the bare minimum.

Various recent Arab summits have promised Jordan more defence (and general) aid but most of the pledged money has never materialised. This has meant Jordan is cutting back on her current spending although medium term prospects for more aid - and thus more orders - look fair.

Recent Visits

The Head of Defence Sales visited Jordan in September to discuss a range of future Air Force projects - mainly the ACA, Hawk and F5E refurbishment but also looking ahead to possible future interest in UK electronic warfare equipment, airborne early warning aircraft and improvements to Jordanian Air Defence Command and Control facilities.

The Defence Sales Exhibition ship (currently on a Gulf promotional tour) visits Aqaba, Jordan on 7-9 March. The Jordanian C in C and top military staff are expected to visit the boat.

DEFENCE SALES BRIEFPoint-by-Point BackgroundAgile Combat (ACA)/Tornado (£200M?)

The Prime Minister wrote to King Hussein in January 1981 offering Tornado for consideration by a consortium of Arab countries as an advanced fighter in competition with Mirage 4000. This was subsequently elaborated to include the ACA, a derivative of Tornado, and it was hoped that some Arab states would participate in a joint development programme. Iraq seemed the best prospect for early funding but Iraq has now said that she has no requirement for an ACA-type aircraft till the late 1980s, and the prospect for other early Arab funding is slight. The consortium has not met recently and we have opened up discussions on ACA/Tornado with individual countries. Although the Jordanians do not have the capacity to fund joint development of ACA we are anxious to maintain a close dialogue with them as they remain very interested in the concept and have been a strong lobbyist for the British aircraft with other Arab countries. King Hussein flew Tornado in April 1981.

The Jordanians have asked the USA for supply of F16 fighters (which would shut out the Tornado/ACA) but USA has only been prepared to offer the less sophisticated and as yet unsold F5G (now relabelled F20): This is not acceptable to the Jordanians. A possible compromise however may be the sale of smaller quantities of both types of aircraft.

As an alternative to an early buy of new aircraft Jordan is considering refurbishing a number of her early marks of F5 fighters (F5E). UK companies are working up proposals. An extension of the F5Es life would shut out other front line fighter sales until the late 80s/early 90s when ACA would be a strong competitor.

Hawk (£100M)

The Jordanians need to replace their current advanced jet trainer aircraft (F5A) from 1985 onwards and British Aerospace are offering

/Hawk



Hawk in competition with the Franco-German Alpha Jet and the Italian MB339. BAe have also advised the Jordanians on flying training cycles and are considered to be well placed to secure the contract. A decision on Hawk may be delayed while there is uncertainty over the future front-line aircraft - in particular whether the F5Es will be run on. A BAe team visited Jordan in August 1982 which emphasised Hawk's versatility including its ground attack capability and its ability to mount air-to-air missiles as done by RAF.

Khalid

Deliveries of the 274 Khalid tanks ordered in 1979 are well under way. Earlier difficulties associated with the transmission/steer unit assemblies on the tanks forced UK to revise the original delivery programme. These problems have now been overcome and a refit programme covering delivered Khalids is progressing. Completion of the delivery programme is planned for April 1984.

RESTRICTED

JORDAN *88*



cc: Mrs. Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1983

KING HUSSEIN

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has agreed to give a working lunch for the King on Monday, 21 February.

We shall, as you suggest, be inviting from the Jordanian side Commander in Chief Zaid bin Shaker, and the Jordanian Ambassador.

The Prime Minister also hopes that the Secretary of State for Defence and, in the absence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Hurd abroad, Sir Antony Acland will be able to attend. Sir Anthony Parsons will also be present.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

RESTRICTED

①

PRIME MINISTER

LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN - MONDAY 21 FEBRUARY

You agreed to give a working lunch for eight (and as this is the only occasion for a serious talk with him, I suggest we stick to that number).

I suggest that the eight should be yourself,
King Hussein, General Shagr (Jordanian Chief of Staff),
Jordanian Ambassador, Secretary of State for Defence,
Sir Antony Acland (Mr. Pym and Mr. Hurd will both be abroad),
Sir Anthony Parsons, Private Secretary.

Agree?

Yes
met

A.F.C.

15 February 1983

Jordan JGG

File



cc: Sir A. Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

41F for collaboration

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1983

VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN

We spoke this morning on the telephone about John Holmes' letter of 14 February.

The Prime Minister would much like to give a small working lunch for King Hussein on Monday, 21 February. I should be grateful if this invitation could be conveyed to the King. The Prime Minister would hope to use the occasion for a good talk about current Middle East problems.

I think we might envisage a total of, say, eight participants. Could we have a word on the telephone soon about who they might be?

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A

PRIME MINISTER

ms

VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN

King Hussein will pay a private visit to London from 19-27 February (see attached letter).

If you would like to entertain him, the only possibility seems to be a lunch on Monday, 21 February - this would mean cancelling your lunch for colleagues on that day.

You may think that a very small lunch in the Small Dining Room would be best - then you would not need a separate time for talks (your diary is very crowded at that time). If you agree to this I will submit a guest list for, say, 6 - 8 people.

Agree to give a working lunch for King Hussein on Monday, 21 February?

Yes ms

A.J.C.

14 February 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 Feb.
lmd

14 February 1983

Dear John,

Visit by King Hussein

As you will have seen, King Hussein is planning to pay a private visit to London from 19-27 February. This is good news. He had earlier suggested that he would find it difficult to come here while the Arab League Delegation problem remained unsolved. He will be accompanied by his Commander in Chief, General Zaid bin Shaker. The King has said that he very much hopes that it may be possible for him to meet the Prime Minister, Mr Pym and Mr Heseltine while he is here.

In the past the Prime Minister has set aside at least an hour for talks with King Hussein and she may wish to do so again during this visit. He is coming at a particularly crucial moment for Middle East peace prospects. I assume that it would be very difficult at this notice for the Prime Minister to offer the King a meal, but this would no doubt be much appreciated if it were possible.

A senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office official will be available to attend the meeting if required. Mr Pym and Mr Heseltine propose to call separately on King Hussein.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Visits of Hussein : Jordan MR2



1982



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

WOL 17/2
b--

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

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PP WASHINGTON

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GR 200

Sir J. Leahy

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Egerton

FM AMMAN 110820Z FEB 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 OF 11 FEB

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON: ROUTINE ALGIERS, RABAT, TUNIS, U
NEW YORK

SAVING INFO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

VISIT TO BRITAIN BY KING HUSSEIN

I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED BY THE HEAD OF ROYAL PROTOCOL THAT
HUSSEIN WILL BE VISITING BRITAIN FOR ABOUT 8 DAYS FROM FEBRUARY 19.
2. I HOPE TO SEE THE KING WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO FIND OUT
MORE ABOUT HIS PLANS. HE HAS TOLD ME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RECENTLY
THAT HE INTENDED GOING TO LONDON SOON IN ANY CASE AND WAS NOT
PREPARED TO WAIT MUCH LONGER FOR THE ARABS TO GET THEIR ACT
TOGETHER OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT. NO DOUBT HE WILL
HOPE TO SEE BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF DURING THIS VISIT.
HE NOW SEEMS LIKELY TO BE IN LONDON WHEN THE RESULTS OF THE
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS (WHICH BEGINS ON
14 FEBRUARY AND IS EXPECTED TO LAST ABOUT A WEEK) BECOME KNOWN.
IF, AS IS GENERALLY EXPECTED IN PLO CIRCLES HERE, THE COUNCIL GIVES
ARAFAT ENOUGH LATITUDE TO PURSUE THE PEACE PROCESS IN COMPANY WITH
THE JORDANIANS, THE KING MIGHT WELL DECIDE TO GO ON TO WASHINGTON
FROM LONDON.

FCO PSE PASS SAYING ADDRESSEES

URWICK



A. COLES

Carline

MR 14/2

CF.

please file
Cl. +4/2

KING HUSSEIN

King Hussein is coming on a private visit on 23/24/25 February. The dates are thoroughly inconvenient but I appreciate the Prime Minister will have to see him. The FCO are writing. I fear we might have to put him in after Signor Fanfani's visit on 25 February.

Yes.
MR 14/2

Ed.

11 February 1983

to master



FILE

RH/18K Jordan

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 July 1982

Dear Brian,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER
BY KING HUSSEIN

King Hussein called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. I enclose a record of the conversation.

I should be grateful if this could be closely guarded and circulated only to those who have an operational need to know what transpired.

Yours ever

John Wiles.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

R,

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
KING OF JORDAN AT 1600 HOURS ON THURSDAY 22 JULY 1982 AT NO. 10

Present: Prime Minister King Hussein
Sir John Leahy Lt. Gen. Sharif Zeid bin Shaker
Mr. Urwick Jordanian Ambassador
Mr. Coles

* * * * *

Welcoming King Hussein, the Prime Minister said that she would be particularly grateful to hear his views on the current situation in the Middle East. It was particularly complex. The problems of Lebanon and Iran/Iraq were causing great concern now and the Palestinian problem seemed to be assuming a different complexion. King Hussein agreed. It was unfortunate that the situation in Lebanon had been allowed to endure, thus leading to the present problems. It would take a major effort to get Israel out of Lebanon and the question arose of whether we should see an independent Lebanon again. If Israel had its way its invasion of the Lebanon would be followed by further steps elsewhere. Their next objective might be Jordan. They already claimed that Jordan was Palestine.

The Prime Minister said that this prospect worried her considerably. Sharon's ideas would upset the State which had been most stable and the most reasonable in its attitude towards Israel. She did not see where the Palestinians now in Beirut could go. It was revealing that Arab countries were declining to take them. She suspected that in the end most would go to ^{Jordan} Israel thereby creating fresh difficulty for Jordan. She further suspected that the PLO would be led to carry out international terrorism on a greater scale. It was difficult to see what the next stage would be in discussion of the future of the Palestinian problem. Everything had now become much more complicated. Israel's virtual conquest of the PLO would make it less and less disposed to consider a resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Sir John Leahy said that it appeared that Mr. Habib might start on a round of visits to Arab countries to see if the PLO personnel could be parcelled out among them. The Prime Minister thought most

/ Arab countries

Arab countries would be chary of this. Israel had secured dominance the Lebanon. What would the next step be? King Hussein said that Jordan would perhaps be the candidate for Israel's attentions. Excuses would doubtless be manufactured. There was growing Israeli pressure on the Arabs of the West Bank to move into Jordan. The numbers were not yet considerable but the process was beginning. Sir John Leahy said that there was a suspicion in many people's minds that once Israel had changed the demographic position of the West Bank, it could begin to talk in terms of self-determination for the area.

King Hussein said that Israel was deeply involved in supporting Khomeini in Iran and was supplying arms, spare parts and probably some experts. One could almost speak of coordination between Israeli and Soviet efforts. When in Moscow, he had asked Gromyko how he could explain this situation but had received no answer. The Russians had made it clear that they were very content with the situation in Iran. There were ideological differences but there were no foreign troops or bases. They had predicted that the war would progress in their favour. At the same time they wanted a dialogue with Saudi Arabia and a relationship with Oman. If the pressure on their border with Iran could be relieved, they would be free to divert troops elsewhere. He believed that Israel was more and more acting as a surrogate of the Soviet Union. But Jordan was determined to stand its ground. The new Saudi leadership was promising and relations with Egypt were improving.

The United States had asked him to put pressure on Egypt to accept the PLO. He had declined to do so unless the United States changed its attitude on the promotion of a comprehensive peace settlement in the area. If President Mubarak accepted the PLO in present circumstances he would appear to be the accomplice of Israeli designs. He had been told later that Egypt had refused outright to accept the PLO. Syria on the other hand already had plans to change the PLO leadership into a more extreme form. He had pleaded with the Americans that they should not allow the humiliation of the Palestinians beyond a certain point. People who had lost everything were liable to attempt to damage all around them.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that we must not allow stable countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to be destabilised. What was the King's view of Iraq? It seemed that whenever Iraq and Iran entered each other's territory they encountered military reverses. Perhaps that created the best hope for a de facto settlement. Soviet behaviour was hard to comprehend. They appeared to be giving help to both sides. Noone could trust them. King Hussein said that the Russians were clearly on Iran's side. He was trying to convince the Americans that the loss of Iraq would be a serious blow. Now that Iraq was fighting on its own soil it seemed more determined to stand fast. But he did not know what the future held.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that the United States always seemed to approach the problems of the Middle East in a theoretical way. They had little real knowledge of the area. She hoped that Mr Shultz would be able to make a contribution. His statements to the Foreign Relations Committee had been encouraging. But she remained pessimistic. The Israelis were triumphant about their success in the Lebanon and would now believe that they could Finlandise that country. The United States would simply have to say "no" to the plans of Begin and Sharon in respect of Jordan.

Sir John Leahy said that a number of inhabitants in the West Bank were leaving on their own initiative, because they saw the situation as hopeless. Mr Urwick referred to the closing down of universities which led the young to leave.

King Hussein said that a worrying feature of the present situation was the concentration on the plight of the Palestinians in Beirut rather than on the fundamental problem. Sir John Leahy commented that the United States was at present not prepared to indicate that any change of policy might be possible in case this led the Israelis to move into Beirut.

King Hussein asked why there could not be an international conference on the Middle East problem. The Prime Minister questioned whether such a conference could make any progress at present. Since the Venice Declaration, the situation had changed very considerably. King Hussein said that such a conference might offer the Americans a way out. They did not realise that their image in the area had been totally destroyed. They lacked credibility and were seen simply as the benefactor of Israel. In an international conference, they would be obliged to play a major role. The Prime Minister thought that even if there were a conference it would be difficult to envisage solutions to the fundamental problems. She did not believe that the Israelis would give up the West Bank after their efforts in the Lebanon. Sir John Leahy said that Begin had been reported today as once again ruling out a Palestinian State in the West Bank. General Shaker said that the Israelis wished to radicalise the Palestinians, thereby creating trouble in surrounding Arab countries. Mr Urwick said that this could lead to a situation in Jordan much like that which had obtained in Lebanon - and the Israelis would see this as an excuse to move against Jordan.

/King Hussein

King Hussein said that he was trying to arrange an Arab Summit, if not with all Arab countries participating, with as many as possible. He wanted Egypt back in the Arab fold as soon as possible. The Prime Minister said that for any such meeting to be successful it would be desirable to have clear proposals on paper. Otherwise no decisions would be taken. King Hussein said that the paper existed. The problem was to persuade the Arab countries to attend. There was a big danger that the United States would soon start talking again about Camp David. But this approach was now dead. It would be a great help if the Americans would release Egypt to join the rest of the Arab world.

The Prime Minister agreed that the Camp David approach now offered no hope of progress. It was the fundamental Palestinian problem which mattered. The Jordanian Ambassador suggested that it would be useful to have a new Security Council Resolution, building on Resolution 242. This could be followed by an international conference. King Hussein commented that the United States were opposed to anything new. The Prime Minister suggested it should be possible to persuade President Reagan that Camp David was the creation of President Carter and that he (President Reagan) had an opportunity to take a new initiative though not very long to implement it.

The Prime Minister said that Yasser Arafat did not cut a good figure in the media in this country. People reacted adversely to him. When, in addition to this, they saw that no Arab country was willing to absorb the PLO, they began to ask whether there was not something in the Israeli cause. The Israelis had recently launched a propaganda counter attack to cast doubt on the figures of casualties in the Lebanon, to draw attention to their weapon finds and to blame destruction on the fact that the Palestinians had deployed their troops in civilian areas. King Hussein agreed that Arafat was an unfortunate choice to portray the Palestinian cause. The Prime Minister said that the worst result of the present situation would be the destabilisation of Jordan. She repeated her fears that the Palestinians would take to international terrorism unless they were given some kind of entity. General Shaker commented that there were many moderate Palestinians who were prepared to endorse a reasonable solution.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that the paper which King Hussein had given at an earlier stage to President Reagan (and of which he had given her a copy last November) had been brilliant. But she understood that the Americans had never responded to it. King Hussein confirmed that this was the case.

The Prime Minister asked whether, given the suffering of the Palestinians, they would be hostile to Israel if they were given their own territory - or would they be prepared to live in peace with their neighbours? King Hussein said that he believed that the Palestinians in these circumstances would settle down. Sir John Leahy commented that they would have to be very careful not to provoke Israel.

The conversation ended at 1650 hrs.

A.J.C.

22 July, 1982



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 July, 1982

Dear John.

M 22/7

L-2

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose a briefing for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister at 4 pm on 22 July. We are sending you separately a brief on the Lebanon/Palestine crisis.

The Jordanian Ambassador and the C in C Jordanian Armed Forces Lt General Sharif Zeid bin Shaker will accompany the King.

Sir J Leahy and Mr Urwick will, as agreed, also attend.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER 4 PM ON 22 JULY

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives in on 21 July and leaves about 30 July. The visit is as usual a private one.

2. The King and Queen Noor will be guests of HM The Queen at lunch on 22 July. The King will visit the 22 SAS regiment Headquarters (23 July); take the salute at the trooping of the guidon of the 13/18th Hussars at Wimbish (24 July) where Prince Abdullah is serving; attend "'Army Air 82'" at Middle Wallop (25 July).

3. Mr Pym accompanied by Mr Hurd will call on the King on 23 July. Mr Nott and the Chief of the Defence of Staff will call on 26 July.

4. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his discussion with the Secretary of State in November 1981 are attached.

A

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER 4 PM ON 22 JULY

DEFENCE SALES

Points to Make

P110/Tornado

Very encouraged at your interest in P110/Tornado family of aircraft. Keen to see dialogue continue on possibility for joint development of a high-performance combat aircraft to meet both our future requirements. What timetable are you, and the other Arab countries working towards?

Hawk

Best advanced jet trainer in the world and now chosen by US Navy. Ideally suited to meet Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) requirement for advanced jet trainer aircraft. It also has ground attack and air-to-air missile capability. Understand that British Aerospace will be having further discussions with RJAF in August.

Khalid Tank

Regret difficulties. Hope these are now largely behind us. UK always prepared to go to great length to ensure customer satisfaction.

Rapier

Performed excellently in the Falkland Islands. Understand RJAF are considering some enhancements to your airfield defence systems. Hope you will again consider the proven Rapier missile (towed). BAe pleased to discuss this with you.

DEFENCE SALES:

General Background

Until the Baghdad Summit meeting after the Camp David peace settlement, Jordan was largely dependent on the US for defence procurement. In 1979, however, following the Summit and Jordan's rejection of the Camp David agreement, Arab funds were made available. This led to the ordering of 274 Khalid tanks (improved Chieftains originally destined for Iran) and supporting equipment, worth nearly £400M; the biggest defence deal ever made by Jordan. They also bought 36 Mirage F1 aircraft from France and have recently ordered £100M worth of Soviet SAM 8s and ZSU 23-4s (multi-barrelled guns). The Soviet order is disappointing as we had hoped to sell Rapier, but neither UK nor US could match Soviet prices and delivery. The presence of Soviet technicians could affect our readiness to release classified information and equipment to Jordan, but King Hussein has said that this presence will be kept to the bare minimum.

Further major purchases of defence equipment will depend on Arab funding being made available.

P110/Tornado (£200m ?)

The Prime Minister wrote to King Hussein in January 1981 offering Tornado for consideration by a consortium of Arab countries as an advanced fighter in competition with Mirage 4000. This was subsequently elaborated to include the P110, a derivative of Tornado, and it was hoped that some Arab states would participate in a joint development programme. Iraq seemed the best prospect for early funding but Iraq has now said that she has no requirement for a P110 type aircraft till the late 1980s; and the prospect for other early Arab funding is slight. The consortium has not met recently and we have opened up discussions on P110/Tornado with individual countries. Although the Jordanians do not have the capacity to fund joint development of P110, we are anxious to maintain a close dialogue with them as they remain very interested in the concept and have been a strong lobbyist for the British aircraft with other Arab countries.

The Jordanians have asked the USA for supply of F16 fighters (which would effectively shut out the Tornado/P110) but USA has only been prepared to offer the less sophisticated F5G.

King Hussein flew Tornado in April 1981.

Hawk (£100M)

The Jordanians need to replace their current advanced jet trainer aircraft (F5A) from 1985 onwards the British Aerospace are offering Hawk in competition with the Franco-German Alpha Jet. BAe have also advised the Jordanians on flying training cycles and are considered to be well placed to secure the contract. A BAe team will be visiting Jordan in August, when they will re-emphasise Hawk's versatility, including its ground attack capability and its ability to mount air-to-air missiles as done by RAF.

Khalid Tank

Deliveries of the 274 Khalid tanks ordered in 1979 are currently under way. There have been problems with the transmission/steer unit assemblies on the tanks (a new assembly developed for Khalid replacing the proven Chieftain fit), which forced UK to revise the delivery programme. It has now been agreed that the improved transmission unit developed for Challenger will be retrofitted to the Jordanian Khalids already delivered and be incorporated in the Khalid production line at the earliest opportunity. Twenty-one tanks were modified at Jordanian request in a crash programme to enable the vehicles to take part in the Army Day parade on 25 May (which the Jordanians subsequently cancelled): the detailed arrangements to retrofit the remaining tanks have now been agreed with Jordan.

There were also problems with the delivery state of the tanks arriving in Jordan. A senior MOD team visited Jordan in March and made a report with recommendations which have now been implemented.

Despite the difficulties experienced, the Jordanians have purchased a tank of advanced design and which represents excellent value for money. On 7 April 1982 King Hussein saw 3 tanks (manned

by Jordanian crews) give a mobility and firepower demonstration including 4 hits out of 4 on a long range moving target.

Rapier

The Jordanian Army were very interested in Rapier until an unsuccessful in-country demonstration in mid-1981. They have now instead purchased Soviet equipment (SAM 8 and ZSU 23/4 multi-barrelled guns) and are no longer interested in Rapier. Royal Jordanian Air Force are, however, reportedly interested in Rapier to supplement their airfield point defence and we are arranging for an RJAF officer to be briefed next month on its performance in the Falklands.

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER 4 PM ON 22 JULY

Points to Make

West Bank and Gaza

Concerned at disturbances and increasing Israeli pressure on inhabitants. Regret dismissal of Mayor of Gaza. Israelis believe they can now do what they want on the West Bank - how do you see events developing?

'Jordan is Palestine'

As you will know from Jordanian Ambassador, campaign continues here on the theme Jordan is Palestine. We receive regular correspondence. Also letters in the press etc.

We do our best to rebut both the historical and political arguments. But much effort is put into picking holes in our case. It would be most useful to have further authoritative statement making clear that in Jordan's view a Palestinian homeland must find its natural place on the West Bank. This would help us counter the campaign. The Crown Prince did refer to the problem briefly in his article in the Times (20 July).

King Hussein's visit Moscow

How did your visit to Moscow go?

Secretary of State's visit to Jordan

Mr Pym hopes to visit later this year, possibly early November.

Background Note

West Bank and Gaza

1. There was no demonstration in the West Bank against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon until 4 July when a two day strike took place. Israeli forces forced shopkeepers to open in all towns except East Jerusalem. In the disturbances that accompanied the strike two Arabs were killed and ten injured. Two Arab collaborators were shot (one later died) in Nablus in late June and a Jewish settler was found stabbed to death. The Israelis have arrested a number of people.

2. On 10 July the Mayor of Gaza (Rashad ash-Shawwa), a leading moderate, was dismissed for rejecting an order from the Head of the Civil Administration. More Village Leagues have been established. The Jordanians see these developments and events in Lebanon as the blue print for a plan to establish their autonomy plan on the West Bank Arabs. They fear that increasing Israeli pressure will lead to an exodus of West Bankers which could lead to an Israeli majority when there would be an Israeli call for self-determination.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Secretary of States Visit to Jordan

4. The dates for the Secretary of State's visit to Jordan have not yet been finalised. The dates 8/9 November will shortly be put to the Jordanians.

JORDAN IS PALESTINE

Essential Facts

1. "'Jordan is Palestine'" is shorthand for a solution to the Palestinian problem favoured by a number of Israeli cabinet ministers including Mr Sharon, and also much publicised in this country. It rests on two propositions, one historical and one political. The historical argument is that Britain was given a mandate over the whole of Palestine (ie. including modern Jordan) and chose to subdivide this into (a) a territory upto the River Jordan which continued to be known as Palestine (now roughly the modern state of Israel, with the West Bank and Gaza) and (b) Transjordan, which evolved into the modern State of Jordan. Transjordan was kept exclusively for the Arabs. The argument runs that since the original Palestine has already been divided into two states, of which the larger is the 'Palestinian' Arab state of Jordan, there is no need for a second Palestinian state on the West Bank.
2. The political argument is that a large proportion of Jordan's population are Palestinian Arabs and that Jordan has only foresworn its Palestinian identity under pressure from the PLO, who have since 1974 had their sights on a Palestinian state in the West Bank. The Jordan is Palestine campaign argue that Palestinian refugees should therefore be returned to Jordan, and that any act of Palestinian self-determination should take place there. The Jordanians suspect that Sharon would like to drive as many West Bank Palestinians as possible across into Jordan and put an end to the Hashemite dynasty.
3. The historical arguments are not clear-cut. But the political realities of 1982 are clear. Neither the Palestinians living outside Jordan nor the Jordanians themselves accept that Jordan is the natural homeland of the Palestinians. The problem is that prominent Jordanians from the King downwards have often spoken in public (particularly prior to 1974) about the close links between the Palestinians and Jordan. In a similar vein, the King said in his interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram on

6 May he said ''We and the Palestinians have been one people in the past and are so at present''. Remarks like this make it more difficult to shoot down the Jordan is Palestine thesis. It would be useful to have a firm Jordanian statement on the record making clear that in their view Jordan was not Palestine.

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 4PM ON 22 JULY

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

POINTS TO MAKE

Progress of the War

1 The Iraqis seem to be doing well; Iranian advance blunted. Probably a lull in the battle before the Iranians try again. How do you assess the situation? Will the Iraqis hold?

Gulf States

2 We hope war will not spread. Gulf States alert to danger of provoking the Iranians. We have asked them how we might best help.

Mediation

3 Iranian rejection of Security Council Resolution 514 (of 12 July) and apparent refusal to accept mediation shows that 'hawks' are in ascendant in Tehran. But if Iraqis can continue to block Iranian advance, Iranians may eventually accept mediation. Islamic or NAM mediators could perhaps refine reconstruction/compensation proposals, thus helping Tehran 'doves'. Main objective must be to engage Iranians in a dialogue.

UN

4 Iraqis are considering a special session of UNGA. Value must depend on pressure likely to develop on Iran, eg through NAM activity during session. A further visit to the region by Palme could be helpful; but Palme reluctant to travel at this juncture.

Soviet Position

5 Soviet Union in quandary over which side to back. Russians would obviously like to extend influence in Iran. Iranians

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suspicious of USSR and now clamping down on Tudeh. No proof of reports that Russians have seriously penetrated elements of Revolutionary movement or captured allegiance of leading figures. But there is a danger here for the future and we must be vigilant. West must avoid driving Iran into arms of Russians.

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IRAN/IRAQ WAR

BACKGROUND

1 Since launching a major offensive several kilometres into Iraqi territory on 13 July, Iran has been unable to break Iraq's main defensive line. Two subsequent attacks on 17 and 18 July appear to have been repulsed. The present battlefront is just inside the international border. Iraq has launched attacks against Iran's main oil exporting terminal at Kharg Island and several provincial capitals in the west of Iran. Iranian aircraft bombed Baghdad on 21 July. Heavy fighting is likely to continue on the ground, with Iranian forces ready to exploit rapidly any sign of Iraqi weakness.

West's Role

2 No direct role for the West or the Ten to play. Those with influence in Tehran - principally Algeria and perhaps Pakistan and Turkey - are best placed to persuade the Iranians to come to the negotiating table.

Action at the UN

3 We voted for UN Security Council Resolution 514 calling for a ceasefire and a just settlement and suggested an early visit to the area by a representative of the Secretary General. In rejecting the Resolution Iran has ruled out a role for the United Nations for the time being. Iraq has now suggested a UN Special Session on the war. We believe this will be dismissed by Iran as manipulation of the UN by the US, though the Iranians may in due course respond to international pressure if their military offensive fails. We remain in the dilemma of being obliged to back our Arab friends despite our disapproval of Iraq's miscalculated war: while being also conscious of the danger of pushing Iran into Russian arms.

Reaction of other governments

4 We have asked our Arab friends whether they would welcome any gestures of UK solidarity (FCO tel no 199 to Jeddah). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE are grateful for offers of help but see no need for detailed action at this stage. All are reluctant to involve the American Rapid Deployment Force. None plans to send military assistance to Iraq. Qatar and Bahrain want an immediate condemnation of the Iranian invasion. Before the recent offensive Gulf states appear to have agreed that US\$ 50 billion might be made available as 'reparations' to buy off Iran.

Jordan's Position

5 King Hussein is Iraq's staunchest ally. He sent a volunteer force to Iraq in April as a token of support for Saddam Hussein with whom he is in regular contact

Soviet Union

6 The Egyptians and Jordanians (the latter partly as a result of King Hussein's visit to the USSR) seem to have an exaggerated view of the extent of Russian influence over Iran. (Iran 'already in grasp of Soviet Union' according to King Hussein). We believe the Russians naturally wish to increase their influence, but are not

making as much headway at present as King Hussein may believe. Our policy is to resist Russian encroachment by (a) working for a more normal relationship with Iran; (b) refraining from hostile gestures that could drive Iran towards the Soviet Union, and (c) relying on historic Iranian suspicion and the present strength of revolutionary fervour to keep the Russians out.

US Position

7 The Americans are considering various contingency options aimed at reassuring Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. These could include a joint air exercise with the Saudis and joint naval exercises with the Omanis, but the Americans are conscious of the need to be guided by the wishes of their Gulf friends.

PRIME MINISTER

Tea for King Hussein
Thursday, 22 July

I attach the list of guests attending the
tea party tomorrow afternoon.

Sue Goodchild

21 July 1982

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE TEA TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER
FOR HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON THURSDAY, 22 JULY 1982
AT 1600 HOURS

The Prime Minister

His Majesty King Hussein

His Excellency the Jordanian Ambassador

General Shakar

Commander-in-Chief, Jordanian Army

Sir John Leahy

Mr. Alan Urwick

HM Ambassador, Amman

Mr. John Coles

bcc Carol

AM
Jordan

12 July 1982

Visit by King Hussein

Thank you for your letter of 8 July.

The Prime Minister could not see King Hussein at 5.00 p.m. on 22 July but would be able to do so for an hour at 4.00 p.m. on that day. Could you kindly confirm that this is acceptable to King Hussein.

We can discuss attendance later.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

to 4 p.m. on 22 July
all right for King Hussein's
call?

(You address the 1972
Committee at 6 p.m.).

Richard [unclear]

Yes, but we don't A & C - 9/7

Was any night
colloquial?

Keep a

That speech

what is -
very important
one
not



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree to receive King Hussein on 22 July?

- Yes - but not at 5 pm. That

John A.S.C. 9/7

8 July 1982

16.00 - 17.00. Same day.

day. It is my
around speed to the
1922 committee at 6p.
ms.

Dear John,

Visit by King Hussein

King Hussein is planning to visit London from 21 to 30 July. He has told our Ambassador in Amman that he very much hopes that it will be possible for him to meet the Prime Minister and Mr Pym while he is here. I understand that the Prime Minister might be free to see him at 5 pm on 22 July.

Queen Noor will be accompanying the King on his visit to London. However, in view of the need for a working meeting to talk about developments in the Middle East, we recommend that should the Prime Minister agree to receive King Hussein, the invitation should not be extended to include Queen Noor. A senior Foreign and Commonwealth official and our Ambassador in Amman, who will be on leave in the United Kingdom on 22 July, will be available to attend the meeting if required. (Mr Pym will be at Buckingham Palace at a Royal Garden Party on that afternoon).


Mr Pym will call on King Hussein on 23 July.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

8 JUL 1982





Sgt/Gardahid Jordan
for information
et.

B.F

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

King Hussein is
passing through London
[1700 v.7.15] on Thursday
22nd July. Could he
come ~~and~~ see you
at 1700 for Tea. You
can't do lunch or
Dinner.

Yes
no Agree?
C.P.

1/7.

PART 1 ends:-

FCC to WR 1/8/41

PART 2 begins:-

CS to PM 1/7/42

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