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PREM 19 / 1297

INTERNAL SITUATION

ISRAELI / LEBANESE HOSTILITIES

UK / LEBANESE RELATIONS.

LEBANON

PE 1: July 1979

PE 6: JANUARY 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
4.1.84.		27.2.84					
5.1.84		1.3.84					
5.1.84		27.2.84.					
7.8.1.84		X					
23.1.84							
8.1.							
1.2.84							
2.2.84							
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10.2.84							
13.2.84							
15.2.84							
16.2.84							
17.2.84							
19.2.84							
21.2.84							
22.2.84							
23.2.84							

PREM 19/1297

PART 6 ends:-

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL: 205 27.284 .

PART 7 begins:-

CC(84)8th Item 2 1.3.84

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(84) 7 th Meeting, item 2	23/02/1984
CC(84) 6 th Meeting, item 3	16/02/1984
CC(84) 5 th Meeting, item 3	09/02/1984
CC(84) 4 th Meeting, item 2	02/02/1984
JIC(84)(IA) 3	31/01/1984
CC(84) 3 rd Meeting, item 2	26/01/1984

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray

Date 1/7/2013

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 8 February 1984, columns 881 to 893: Lebanon (British Troops)

Signed

J. Gray

Date

1/7/2017

PREM Records Team

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 280930Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280135Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 205 OF 27 FEBRUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT DAMASCUS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS
ROME
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN JEDDA CAIRO THE HAGUE MOSCOW

MIPT: LEBANON: UN OPTIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT (OUR TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH) OF REVISED
DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY FRANCE THIS EVENING (27 FEBRUARY):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACTION BEING CARRIED ON IN
LEBANON BY THE UNITED NATIONS, BOTH IN BEHALF OF PEACE AND AT THE
HUMANITARIAN LEVEL,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982) AND 509 (1982) AND THE
NEED FOR RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY
AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED
BOUNDARIES,
UNDERLINING THE NEED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL
FOREIGN FORCES WHOSE PRESENCE HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT,
EARNESTLY DESIRING A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE DIALOGUE OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION FROM WHICH NONE WILL BE EXCLUDED, AND WHICH IS AN
INDISPENSABLE BASIS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN LEBANON,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN LEBANON AND,
IN PARTICULAR, THE BEIRUT AREA,
CONVINCED THAT THE SITUATION HAS GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND COULD IMPEDE THE ACHIEVEMENT
OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. ONCE AGAIN ISSUES AN URGENT APPEAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE
AND FOR THE CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES THROUGHOUT LEBANON AND
CALLS FOR THEIR STRICT OBSERVANCE;
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHOUT WAITING TO MAKE ALL
ARRANGEMENTS TO ENABLE THE BEIRUT OBSERVER GROUP TO MONITOR
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE FIRE IN THE BEIRUT AREA.
3. DECIDES, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, TO ESTABL-
LISH IMMEDIATELY, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL, A UNITED
NATIONS FORCE COMPOSED OF PERSONNEL FURNISHED BY MEMBER STATES
OTHER THAN THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
SELECTED, IF APPROPRIATE, FROM CONTINGENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

/INTERIM

INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON. THE SAID FORCE SHALL BE DEPLOYED IN THE BEIRUT AREA, IN COORDINATION WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, AS SOON AS ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON AND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE SHALL HAVE THE MISSION OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE FIRE AND HELPING TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS, AND SHALL, WITHOUT INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON, FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY PARTY WHATEVER, HELP THEREBY TO RE-ESTABLISH THE PEACE NECESSARY FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON:

4. REQUESTS MEMBER STATES TO FACILITATE THE TASK OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE, IN PARTICULAR BY REFRAINING FROM ANY INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON AND ANY ACTION, PARTICULARLY MILITARY ACTION, THAT MIGHT JEOPARDISE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN LEBANON:

5. INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN 48 HOURS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
 LIMITED PS
 NENAD PS/LADY YOUNG
 MED PS/MR LUCE
 DEFENCE DEPT PS/FUS
 FUSD SIR J BULLARD
 NEWS DEPT SIR J LEAHY
 UND SIR W HARDING
 NAD MR WRIGHT
 WED MR CARTLEDGE
 SED MR MACINNES
 ECD(E) MR ADAMS
 FINANCE DEPT MR JENKINS
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280115Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 27 FEBRUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE: BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, PARIS
ROME.

There is some prospect of a
U.N. resolution today on a
U.N. force to the Lebanon.

OR 27/2.

PRIORITY: AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, THE HAGUE, MOSCOW.

MY TELS NOS 199-201: LEBANON: UN OPTIONS

SUMMARY

1. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 27 FEBRUARY THE NON-ALIGNED, RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS ALL PROPOSED COMPETING AMENDMENTS TO THE FRENCH DRAFT. THE FRENCH HAVE PRODUCED A REVISED DRAFT WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF MOST OF THE CONCERNS OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND WHICH THEY AIM TO PUT TO THE VOTE TOMORROW (28 FEBRUARY).

DETAIL

2. AS EXPECTED, THE FRENCH FORMALLY TABLED OVER THE WEEKEND THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 190 WITH ONLY A FEW MINOR AMENDMENTS.
3. THE INDIANS PRODUCED A WORKING PAPER WITH A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS TO THIS DRAFT WHICH THEY DISCUSSED WITH THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING (27 FEBRUARY). WHEN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL BEGAN THIS AFTERNOON, NICARAGUA PRESENTED A SET OF AMENDMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED. THE MAIN ELEMENTS WERE: A NEW REFERENCE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN PREAMBULAR PARA 2: A CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN OPERATIVE PARA 1 TO BE 'THROUGHOUT LEBANON': PROPOSING IN OPERATIVE PARA 2 THAT THE BEIRUT OBSERVER GROUP SHOULD MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE 'AS AN INTERIM MEASURE' UNTIL A UN FORCE WAS SET UP: MAKING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN FORCE IN OPERATIVE PARA 3 CONDITIONAL UPON THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, AND ITS DEPLOYMENT 'IN CO-ORDINATION WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES' THE REFERENCE IN THAT PARAGRAPH TO THE MNF WAS ALSO CHANGED TO BE 'THE MNF TOGETHER WITH THEIR SUPPORT FACILITIES'. AND IN OPERATIVE PARA 4 MEMBER STATES WERE ASKED TO REFRAIN FROM 'PARTICULARLY MILITARY ACTION' THAT MIGHT JEOPARDISE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE.
4. OVINNIKOV (USSR) SAID THAT THESE AMENDMENTS WERE ON THE RIGHT LINES BUT PROPOSED A DIFFERENT SET OF AMENDMENTS OF HIS OWN TO THE FRENCH DRAFT. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS. THE DELETION OF ALL REFERENCE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-LEBANESE FORCES. THE SUBSTITUTION OF 'IN BEIRUT' FOR 'IN THE BEIRUT AREA'. A NEW PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH REFERRING TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN THE STATIONING OF A UN FORCE. THE REFERENCE TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE MNF IN OPERATIVE PARA 3 TO SPECIFY THAT IT INCLUDED THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN NAVAL VESSELS FROM WATERS UNDER LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND ALSO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RENEWAL OF

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/ "SHELLINGS.

'SHELLINGS, AIR BOMBARDMENTS OR ANY OTHER INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON''. A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH STATING THAT THE FORCE WOULD HAVE A TOTAL STRENGTH OF 1,000, WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS, WOULD HAVE ALL COSTS MET BY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, AND WOULD HAVE ITS CONTINGENTS SELECTED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION IN MIND.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK (US) COUNTERED WITH A NUMBER OF AMERICAN AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT. IN PREAMBULAR PAR 2 THE REFERENCE TO SCRS 508 AND 509 WAS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE SCRS 513, 516 AND 520. PREAMBULAR PARA 3 WOULD BECOME AN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH DEMANDING THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES NOT AUTHORISED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. OPERATIVE PARA 3 WOULD CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN FORCE ''AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE'' INSTEAD OF ''IMMEDIATELY''. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE WOULD BE ''IN CO-ORDINATION AND CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON'' AND IT WOULD BE DEPLOYED ''IN AND AROUND BEIRUT AND AS NECESSARY ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON''. THE FINANCING OF THE FORCE SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UN.

6. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE CLARIFICATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT ON HOW A UN FORCE COULD UNDERTAKE THE MANDATE OF MONITORING A CEASEFIRE AND PROTECTING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, ON WHICH EVERYONE SEEMED TO BE AGREED, IF IT WAS RESTRICTED TO THE BEIRUT AREA. WAS THE SECURITY COUNCIL REALLY PROVIDING THE MEANS TO MEET THE AIM? SHAH NAWAZ NOTED THAT I HAD MADE A FAIR POINT ON THE DANGERS OF MAKING PROMISES WHICH COULD NOT BE KEPT.

7. NANTEUIL (FRANCE) INTERVENED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE WHICH WAS SLIPPING RAPIDLY FROM FRENCH HANDS BY PROPOSING THAT HE WOULD SUBMIT A NEW DRAFT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE COMMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE. OVERCOMING RESISTANCE FROM OVINNIKOV HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD TABLE THIS DRAFT THIS EVENING AND SEEK A VOTE ON IT TOMORROW (28 FEBRUARY).

8. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET AGAIN IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 1700Z TOMORROW AND TAKE A DECISION THEN ON WHETHER TO GO ON TO VOTE.

9. THE NEW FRENCH DRAFT WAS HANDED INTO THE SECRETARIAT THIS EVENING (TEXT IN MIFT). IT IS SKILFULLY DRAFTED AND INCLUDES MANY OF THE AMENDMENTS SUGGESTED BY THE NON-ALIGNED. IT RETAINS, HOWEVER, THE ORIGINAL PARA 3 STRESSING THE NEED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON AUTHORISED FOREIGN FORCES. IT MAKES NO MENTION IN OPERATIVE PARA 3 OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF MNF ''SUPPORT FACILITIES'' THOUGH IT DOES INCLUDE A REFERENCE IN OPERATIVE PARA 4 TO REFRAINING FROM ''MILITARY ACTION'' IN PARTICULAR.

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COMMENT

10. WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE REACTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED TO THIS LATEST DRAFT. THE FRENCH WILL NEED THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN ORDER TO PUSH IT THROUGH TO A VOTE. MY GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL GET IT, IN WHICH CASE I DOUBT WHETHER EITHER THE AMERICANS OR THE RUSSIANS WILL VETO, THOUGH THERE WOULD STILL BE A TUSSLE OVER THE REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. I ASSUME IT IS RIGHT FOR US TO TRY TO CONTINUE TO SHEPHERD DELEGATIONS TOWARDS A RESOLUTION THAT WILL PASS.

11. SEE MIFT.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250134Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO 202 OF 24 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS WASHINGTON

MIPT: LEBANON: UN OPTIONS

1. UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL URQUHART TOLD MY HEAD OF CHANCERY IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (WHICH MUST BE RESPECTED) THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE TODAY FROM THE COMMANDER OF UNIFIL SAYING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL TAKING UP A POSITION BETWEEN THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IN THE BEKAA. THIS MESSAGE WAS CONVEYED TO GENERAL CALLAGHAN BY GENERAL ORR OF THE ISRAELI NORTHERN COMMAND WHO HAD ADDED THAT THE ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF WOULD LIKE TO SEE CALLAGHAN ON 27 FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

2. URQUHART, WHO HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN OF THE VIEW THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT EVENTS IN BEIRUT WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION FOR THE SOUTH, IS MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT WHICH IMPLIES A MORE SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THAN HAD SEEMED LIKELY. ODDLY ENOUGH WE KNOW FROM THE US MISSION (AND HAVE TOLD URQUHART) THAT AT HER MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 22 FEBRUARY MRS KIRKPATRICK RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERPOSING UNIFIL BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN THE BEKAA AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE ASKED TO PREPARE A CONTINGENCY PLAN. SHE DID NOT (NOT) REPORT THIS TO WASHINGTON.

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 SIR J LEAHY
 SIR W HARDING
 MR WRIGHT
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FM WASHINGTON 240049Z FEBRUARY 84
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 628 OF 23 FEB
 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, MIDDLE EAST POSTS

LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

1. EAGLEBURGER WAS ILL DURING SIR J LEAHY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON YESTERDAY BUT HE INVITED HIM TO CALL AT HOME. EAGLEBURGER WAS ALONE AND UNUSUALLY FRANK, EVEN FOR HIM. WHAT HE SAID SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED BACK TO OTHER US REPRESENTATIVES.

2. EAGLEBURGER MADE NO BONES ABOUT THE WAY US INVOLVEMENT IN THE LEBANON HAD TURNED OUT. THE POLICY HAD COLLAPSED. THE RESULT WAS A DISASTER. NEVERTHELESS, EAGLEBURGER HOPED THAT THE DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN THE AREA NEED NOT BE ENDURING. HE HAD ADVISED THE WHITE HOUSE THAT THE BEST LINE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT WAS THAT THE US HAD SET OUT WITH THE RIGHT OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE LEBANON. IT HAD DONE SO WITH THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES. IT HAD MADE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE BUT HAD NOT SUCCEEDED. THE TASK WAS NOW, DESPITE THIS, TO TRY TO ACHIEVE THE SAME OBJECTIVE BY OTHER MEANS AND TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

3. EAGLEBURGER WENT OVER THE CURRENT THINKING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT US SECURITY FORCES TO BE LEFT BEHIND IN BEIRUT (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 626) AND WENT ON TO THINK ALOUD ABOUT THE FUTURE. NO FINAL DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN ABOUT HOW MANY TROOPS TO LEAVE OR WHAT THEIR EXACT ROLE SHOULD BE. WHOM WOULD THEY BE SUPPORTING OR TRAINING? EFFECTIVELY A PHALANGIST MILITA? A SIMILAR PROBLEM AROSE OVER THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. WHAT WAS ALREADY ON THE WAY COULD HARDLY BE STOPPED WITHOUT GIVING A CONFUSING SIGNAL. BUT EAGLEBURGER WOULD HIMSELF OPPOSE THE COMPLETION OF ANY NEW EQUIPMENT ORDERS UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR WHO WOULD BE IN CHARGE IN BEIRUT WHEN THE EQUIPMENT ARRIVED. ALL THAT NEEDED TO BE THOUGHT THROUGH AFRESH.

4. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE SHIPS. HOW LONG WOULD THEY STAY. WHOM WOULD THEY BE SUPPORTING? THERE WAS OF COURSE STILL A DANGER OF ATTACKS ON THE EMBASSY: THE REMOVAL OF THE SHIPS MIGHT PERHAPS BE SEEN AS AN INVITATION TO EXTREMISTS. BUT THE SHIPS COULD NOT JUST HANG AROUND. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD PROBABLY GRADUALLY DWINDLE AND IF HE HAD TO BET, HE WOULD BET THAT MOST OF THEM WOULD BE GONE FROM THE LEBANESE COAST BY JUNE.

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9. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT DURING THE KING'S RECENT VISIT HERE, EVERY EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO TREAT HIM GENTLY. IT WAS HE WHO NOW WANTED TO GET A MOVE ON. EAGLEBURGER DOUBTED IF IN FACT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE ABLE TO HURRY ARAFAT INTO MAKING THE NECESSARY MOVES TO ENABLE THE JORDANIANS TO COME TO THE PEACE TALKS. HE ALSO DOUBTED WHETHER ANY ALTERNATIVE COULD BE QUICKLY DEVELOPED. BUT EVEN IF THINGS BEGAN TO MOVE BEFORE THE US ELECTIONS, EAGLEBURGER DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD CAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION ANY DIFFICULTIES. JEWISH OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES WAS STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND WOULD BE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT FAILED TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO AN ARAB MOVE. HE THUS SAW PROSPECTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AS A POTENTIAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT RATHER THAN A HAZARD. THE PRESSURE OF U.S. JEWISH OPINION, HE THOUGHT, WOULD BE ON SHAMIR TO MOVE FORWARD RATHER THAN ON REAGAN TO HOLD BACK.

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FM WASHINGTON 230255Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 611 OF 22 FEBRUARY

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE 22 FEBRUARY

1. SUMMARY: TOUGH QUESTIONS ON LEBANON ANSWERED STOICALLY. CONFIDENCE IN SHULTZ REAFFIRMED. RENEWED PLEDGE TO KEEP OPEN STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
2. THE PRESIDENT GAVE THIS EVENING HIS FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE YEAR AND HIS FIRST AS A CANDIDATE. DESPITE AN OPENING STATEMENT ON CRIME, SCHOOL PRAYER AND THE BUDGET DEFICIT, MOST QUESTIONS WERE ON THE LEBANON.
3. HE WAS PRESSED TO SAY WHETHER AMERICA HAD LOST CREDIBILITY, WHETHER THE MARINES HAD DIED IN VAIN AND WHERE THE ADMINISTRATION GOES FROM HERE. IN REPLY, THE PRESIDENT LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY HISTORICAL SURVEY STRESSING THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE ANF HAD BEEN TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE. HE SEEMED, RATHER SURPRISINGLY, TO IMPLY THAT IT WAS TERRORIST ATTACKS WHICH HAD MADE THEIR MISSION IMPOSSIBLE. HE EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT THE TROOPS HAD ONLY REDEPLOYED, THE FLEET WOULD STAY, AS WOULD THE TRAINING TEAMS. THE MARINES WERE NOT QUOTE BUGGING OUT UNQUOTE ONLY MOVING TO MORE DEFENSIBLE POSITIONS. HE HAD NO REGRETS FOR HAVING TRIED TO ACHIEVE PEACE. HIS AMBASSADOR AT LARGE WAS STILL IN THE AREA. AS LONG AS THERE WAS A CHANCE FOR PEACE AMERICA WOULD TRY TO CONTRIBUTE. THE PRESIDENT DEFENDED EARLIER NAVAL SHELLING WHILE EVADING A QUESTION ABOUT FUTURE USE OF NAVAL FIREPOWER. THE US WAS NOW BEHAVING WITH RESTRAINT SEMI COLON THEY HAD NOT REACTED TO RECENT FIRING ON THEIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS.
4. THE PRESIDENT WAS ASKED WHETHER SHULTZ WAS DISCOURAGED AND WHETHER HE WOULD ACCEPT HIS RESIGNATION. HE REAFFIRMED HIS CONFIDENCE IN SHULTZ ADDING THAT QUOTE HE HOPED HE HAD NO THOUGHT OF LEAVING AT THIS POINT UNQUOTE.

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5. ON THE PERSIAN GULF, THE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT THERE WAS QUOTE NO WAY HE WOULD ALLOW THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ TO BE CLOSED UNQUOTE. A US NAVAL TASK FORCE HAD BEEN IN THE REGION FOR SOME TIME, AS HAD SOME ALLIES (SIC).

6. COMMENT. THE PRESIDENT WAS EVIDENTLY EXPECTING TOUGH QUESTIONS ON THE LEBANON AND PLAYED A VERY DIFFICULT HAND QUOTE WELL SEMI COLON HIS ADVISERS MAY HOPE THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL HELP DEFLATE MEDIA INTEREST. HE DEALT IN A DIGNIFIED MANNER WITH CRITICISMS OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL STYLE.

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LEBANON: SITREP AT 0900Z 22 FEBRUARY

Military Developments

1 Lebanese Army (LAF) positions at Souq Al-Gharb on the Shouf mountain ridge (the only remaining LAF position outside East Beirut) have come under heavy shelling from Druze, though no serious attempt to take the town has yet been made. The Israelis have confirmed that IDF armoured columns have been operating as far north as Druze/Amal militia positions near Damour (8 miles south of Beirut) in recent days and Defence Minister Arens has talked about establishing "semi permanent" positions on the coast north of the Awali. Main purpose of Israeli patrolling is to warn the Druze and Amal not to allow PLO reinfiltration. Israeli planes bombed alleged Palestinian positions around Damour, Bhamdoun and Aley on 19 February and positions south of Bhamdoun on Beirut-Damascus road on 21 February.

MNF

2 Bulk of the Italian contingent withdrew on 20 February, leaving only a token force (100 men) on land and a further group (270 men) offshore. The Italian hospital will remain but the Italians have removed their presence from the Palestinian refugee camps. Redeployment of the US contingent began on 21 February and will probably be completed by 26 February. The operational part of BRITFORLEB remains on board RFA Reliant, which returns to Cyprus on 23 February for 48 hours for restocking and maintenance.

Political Developments

3 The Syrians predictably rejected the "Saudi" peace plan (from which the Saudis have distanced themselves, claiming they have produced no plan but are only working to bring the parties together), and have repeated their demands for abrogation of 17 May agreement, with no conditions such as simultaneous Syrian/Israel withdrawal. Saudi peace efforts continue: Crown Prince Abdullah (First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard) visited Damascus on 20-22 February to discuss Lebanon. Outcome not

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yet known, but talks described by Saudis in public as "very positive and very fruitful". In Lebanon, however, the Commander of the Lebanese Forces (Phalange) and Chamoun (Liberal Party leader, with Israeli links) have both made public statements opposing abrogation of the 17 May agreement.

UN

4 Informal consultations of the Security Council will resume on 22 February. The French have tabled a revised draft resolution, authorising the replacement of the MNF in Beirut by a UN Force. Both the Soviet Union and Syria want removal of the remainder of the MNF and all warships as a precondition of wider UN deployment, to which the US remain firmly opposed. If the French proposal fails, the Non-Aligned members may take up the UK suggestion of a statement by the President of the Security Council, embodying UK ideas for greater use of UN observers in Beirut, and of the good offices of the UN Secretary General. We have also suggested wider use in Southern Lebanon of UNIFIL, whose mandate is due to be renewed on 19 April.

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LEBANON: SITREP AT 0900Z 21 FEBRUARY

Military Developments

1. Lebanese Army (LAF) positions at Souq Al-Gharb on the Shouf mountain ridge (the only remaining LAF position outside East Beirut) have come under heavy shelling from Druze, though no serious attempt to take the town has yet been made. The Israelis have denied reports that their armoured columns have advanced as far north as Druze/Amal militia positions near Damour (8 miles south of Beirut) though such patrols came well north of the Awali river on 15/16 February, as a warning to the Druze and Amal not to allow PLO reinfiltration. Israeli planes again bombed alleged Palestinian positions around Damour, Bhamdoun and Aley on 19 February and positions south of Bhamdoun and at Ain al-Jdideh on Beirut-Damascus highway on 21 February.

MNF

2. Bulk of the Italian contingent has withdrawn with only a token force (100 men) left on land and a further group (270 men) off shore. The Italian hospital will remain but the Italians have removed their presence from the Palestinian refugee camps. Redeployment of the US contingent is due to be completed by 15 March. Despite press reports to the contrary, the operational part of BRITFORLEB remains on board RFA Reliant.

Political Developments

3. The Syrians have predictably rejected the 'Saudi' peace plan (from which the Saudis have distanced themselves, claiming they have produced no plan but are only working to bring the parties together). Syrians have repeated their demands for abrogation of 17 May agreement, with no conditions such as simultaneous Syrian/Israel withdrawal. Saudi mediator Hariri went to Beirut on 20 February with Syrian counter proposals. Crown Prince Abdullah (First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard) also visited Damascus on 20 February to discuss Lebanon.

4. Informal consultations of the Security Council will resume on 22/23 February. The French intend to table a revised draft resolution, authorising the replacement of the MNF in Beirut by a UN Force, but with some amendments designed to meet Soviet objections. Both the Soviet Union and Syria want removal of the remainder of the MNF and all warships as a precondition of wider UN deployment. If the French proposal fails, the Non-Aligned members may take up the UK suggestion of a statement by the President of the Security Council, embodying UK ideas for greater use of UN observers in Beirut, and of the good offices of the UN Secretary-General. We have also suggested wider use in Southern Lebanon of UNIFIL, whose mandate is due to be renewed on 19 April.

GR 140

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FROM RIYADH 210930Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 42 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

JEDDA TEL 92
LEBANON

1. I TOOK SIR DAVID ROBERTS TO CALL ON THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION ON 21 FEBRUARY. ALI SHAER SAID THAT THE EIGHT POINTS WERE NOT A SAUDI PLAN: THEY HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE PEOPLE ROUND GEMAYEL. BUT SAUD AL FAYSAL HAD BEEN VERY UPSET AT THE SYRIAN REJECTION OF THEM AND HAD ASKED THE SYRIANS TO PRODUCE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS.

2. THE KING HAD ASKED PRINCE ABDULLA TO GO TO DAMASCUS ON 20 FEBRUARY QUOTE TO SEE WHAT HE COULD DO UNQUOTE. SHAER COMMENTED THAT PRINCE ABDULLA HAD PARTICULARLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH RIFA'AT AL ASSAD ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THE SOLUTION LAY IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT WITH WHOM PRINCE ABDULLA WOULD BE HAVING A FURTHER MEETING TODAY. THE SAUDIS, SAID SHAER, WANTED TO AVOID A ROW WITH SYRIA OVER LEBANON.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE	IN LEBANON (MNF)
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MED	PS/MR LUCE
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NEWS DEPT	SIR J LEAHY
UND	SIR W HARDING
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Prime Minister

FM BAHRAIN 200745Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

Very interesting.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 20 FEB

INFO MIDDLE EAST POSTS WASHINGTON TEHRAN

A.C. 2 1/2

THE GULF AND LEBANON

1. WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS I HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AND LESS POLICY THERE WITH BOTH THE AMIR, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS WELL AS WITH OFFICIALS. I DETECT A MARKED INCREASED IN THEIR ANXIETY AND A SHIFT IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS. *MB*

2. THE BAHRAINIS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BECAUSE:

(A) THEY SEE AMERICAN POLICY AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE US AS AN ALLY. FIRST THE US PULLED THE RUG FROM UNDER THE SHAH. NOW, HAVING GONE IN TO LEBANON TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THEY HAVE BEEN SEEN OFF BY THE SYRIANS. THEY FAILED TO USE ADEQUATE FORCE AND HAVE BEEN DRAWN THROUGH POLITICAL INEPTITUDE INTO FIGHTING UNSECESSFULLY ON BEHALF OF ONE FACTION AND WITH DISREGARD FOR SYRIA'S OLD-ESTABLISHED AND NATURALLY DOMINANT INFLUENCE IN BEIRUT.

(B) THIS REFLECTS ON THE RELIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AS A GUARANTOR OF BAHRAIN'S OWN SECURITY. THE AMIR COMMENTED THAT THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS WARNED THE GULF STATES AGAINST PUTTING ALL THEIR EGGS INTO THE AMERICAN BASKET; BAHRAIN HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS AND HAD FOR EXAMPLE JUST REFUSED AGREEMENT FOR THE AMERICANS TO INSTAL A NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS DISH AERIAL.

(C) THEY FEEL THERE IS A SAD LACK OF SAUDI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. AT A TIME WHEN THE AMIR THINKS THE GCC HAVE A REAL NEED TO MEET AT SUMMIT LEVEL, KING FAHD IS IN MARBELLA.

(D) DEVELOPMENTS IN BEIRUT UNDERLINE THE ADVANCE OF SHIISM THROUGH THE AREA, A DIRECT THREAT TO STABILITY IN BAHRAIN WITH ITS SHIA MAJORITY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER STRESSED TO ME THE NEED, IF AN INTEGRAL LEBANON CAN EVER BE RESTORED, FOR THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES TO BE ENTRENCHED: THERE SHOULD BE NO WHITTILING AWAY OF THEIR SPECIAL POSITION. →

HIS ARGUMENT IS THAT THE MARONITES

AS A THREATENED MINORITY IN THE LARGELY MOSLEM ARAB WORLD NEED ALL THE REASSURANCE THAT CAN BE GIVEN THEM, BUT UNDERLYING THIS IS HIS FEAR OF SHIA ASCENDANCY.

3. DISTRUST OF VACILLATING US POLICY IS PARAMOUNT. THE BAHRAINIS ALSO REGRET THAT THE BRITISH CONTINGENT SHOULD HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. THOUGH THEY ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF THE MOVE, THEY ARGUE THAT BRITISH POLICY ON ALL MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES HAS COME TO FOLLOW THE US TOO CLOSELY. THEY ADMIRE BY CONTRAST THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH ACTION, AS THEY SEE IT, THOUGH THEY WERE APPALLED BY REMARKS RECENTLY ATTRIBUTED BY AFP TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND IN CONDEMNATION OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND IN SUPPORT OF THE SHIA.

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4. THE GULF WAR REMAINS THE FIRST SECURITY PRIORITY FOR BAHRAIN. BUT THE AMIR AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER NOW SEE DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AS PART OF THE SAME COMPLEX OF ISSUES IN WHICH ESTABLISHED PRO-WESTERN REGIMES THROUGHOUT THE AREA ARE THREATENED BY REVOLUTIONARY, LARGELY SHIA, INFLUENCES BACKED BY IRAN AND SYRIA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY FEAR THAT US POLICY WILL AFFORD ITS ARAB FRIENDS NO MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE THAN THAT ENJOYED BY THE SHAH AND NOW BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

TOMKYS

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FM BEIRUT 200930Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 20 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY MODUK

ROUTINE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKRIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, AMMAN, CAIRO, THE HAGUE, TRIPOLI, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 134: LEBANON

1. THERE IS MUCH PUBLICITY HERE FOR ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ON ALLEGEDLY PALESTINIAN TARGETS NEAR BHUMDOUN AND DAMOUR YESTERDAY.

2. THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIANS RETURNING TO BEIRUT IN THE WAKE OF THE PSP AND AMAL VICTORIES OVER THE ARMY IS OF COURSE VERY SENSITIVE HERE. NOTE THAT THE IDF THINKS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE INFILTRATION (TEL AVIV 170955Z TO MODUK). SO DO THE AMERICAN MNF INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS. THIS IS PRESUMABLY DEPENDENT AT LEAST IN PART ON THE LEBANESE DEUXIEME BUREAU, WHO HAVE BEEN PLAYING THIS UP CONSISTENTLY OVER RECENT MONTHS. AMAL, ON THE OTHER HAND, PLAY IT DOWN. THEY TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT THERE WERE NO ARMED PALESTINIAN FORMATIONS IN BEIRUT AND THAT THEY HAD TURNED BACK ABU MUSA THREE TIMES AT THE AMAL CHECKPOINT BETWEEN SHUWEYFAT AND THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. IF PALESTINIANS HAVE RETURNED THEY HAVE DONE SO WITHOUT PUBLICITY SO FAR. FOR INSTANCE THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC "REOCCUPATION" OF SABRA AND SHATILA IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIANS AS WAS ONCE FEARED FOLLOWING AMAL'S DEFEAT OF THE ARMY IN WEST BEIRUT (CF ARAFAT'S VISIT TO TEHRAN AT THE INVITATION OF EXTREMISTS ON THE MORROW OF THE DEFEAT OF THE SHAH'S ARMY).

3. AS FOR THE ALEY AND SHOUF AREAS WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY DRUZE CONTACTS (NOT SPECIFICALLY CONNECTED WITH THE PSP) THAT PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS ARE PRESENT, BUT NOT IN VERY LARGE NUMBERS. MANY ARE THOUGHT TO BE FROM THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF BEIRUT RATHER THAN INFILTRATORS. THE SUBURBS CONTAIN SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS OF GUN-BEARING AGE (WHO MUST BE PRESUMED TO HAVE UNDERGONE SOME TRAINING) WHO WERE NOT EVACUATED WITH ARAFAT IN AUGUST 1982 AND WHO ARE NOW OPENLY CARRYING GUNS. BOTH OUR DRUZE CONTACTS AND DANY CHAMOUN HAVE TOLD US THAT THERE IS PROBABLY AN UNWRITTEN UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE PALESTINIANS DO NOT OPERATE SOUTH OF THE DAMOUR RIVER. (WE HAVE JUST SEEN TEL AVIV TELNO 42).

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4. WE SHALL OF COURSE KEEP AS SHARP AN EYE OPEN AS WE CAN FOR SIGNS OF PALESTINIAN ACTIVITY AND ENCOURAGE THE MEDIA TO DO THE SAME. THIS IS THE ONE THING WHICH, AS SEEN FROM HERE, COULD BRING ABOUT ISRAELI INTERVENTION TO REVERSE THE PSP/AMAL VICTORIES. MOREOVER THE MARONITES ARE NOW DESPERATELY HOPING FOR THIS - SOME EVEN URGING GEMAYEL TO RATIFY THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT AND CALL ON THE ISRAELIS IN RETURN TO RESTORE ORDER IN THE ENSUING CHAOS: AND WITH IT OF COURSE THE MARONITE ASCENDANCY.

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FM BEIRUT 211210Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 143 OF 21 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS

INFO PRIORITY ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, MOSCOW, MODUK,
CBFC AND BRITFORLEB

UN FORCE FOR LEBANON

1. TODAY'S MEETING OF THE MNF COORDINATION COMMITTEE (FOR WHICH A MOST WELCOME BRITFORLEB REPRESENTATIVE ARRIVED IN GOOD TIME) WAS CHAIRED BY GHASSAN TUENI, FORMERLY LEBANESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN AND ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT.
2. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHED MNF GOVERNMENTS TO KNOW LEBANON'S POSITION ON THE CURRENT PROPOSALS BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WHILE WELCOMING THE FRENCH INITIATIVE LEBANON HAD CERTAIN RESERVATIONS
 - A) ANY UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT MUST NOT (NOT) BE AT THE EXPENSE OF UNIFIL, WHOSE WORK IN THE SOUTH MUST CONTINUE, PREFERABLY WITH A STRENGTHENED MANDATE.
 - B) LEBANON REQUIRED ANY MANDATE FOR BEIRUT TO BE VERY CAUTHOUSLY DRAFTED. THEY DID NOT WANT A UN PRESENCE ON THE GREEN LINE THAT WOULD LEAD TO PERMANENT PARTITION. THE CYPRUS PRECEDENT WAS NOT HEALTHY.
 - C) THE UN FORCE SHOULD HAVE A MANDATE TO COVER ALL LEBANON AND NOT JUST BEIRUT, SINCE LEBANON'S CHIEF REQUIREMENT OF THE UN WAS TO HAVE "CONFIRMATION" OF LEBANON'S BORDERS. THEY ENVISAGED THE UN EVENTUALLY PATROLLING UP TO THE FRONTIERS AND WOULD THEREFORE PREFER A MOBILE NOT A STATIC MANDATE.
3. LEBANON HOPED THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ADOPT A RESOLUTION BY CONSENSUS AS IN 1978. LEBANON WAS AWARE OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING THE UN OBSERVER ROLE, WHICH THEY NOW UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE FRENCH DRAFT. THEY COULD ALREADY ENVISAGE, EVEN TODAY, A NUMBER OF EXTREMELY USEFUL TASKS FOR THE OBSERVERS, PERHAPS IN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA (THIS WAS A REFERENCE, IT EMERGED, TO THE POSSIBILITY OF UN OBSERVATION OF THE CEASEFIRE IN THE HARBIN COUNTERPROPOSALS NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN DAMASCUS).
4. HE SAID THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE INTENDED TO BE COMPLEMENTARY, OR SUPPLEMENTARY, TO THE FRENCH PROPOSALS WHICH WE FULLY SUPPORTED, AND NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO THEM.

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5. BARTHOLOMEW HAS TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT HE IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN GETTING AGREEMENT OVER WHO US MARINES SHOULD HAND OVER THE AIRPORT TO. HE NOW HAS DOUBTS ABOUT AMAL. THE PSP AND AMAL COULD NOT AGREE. I SUGGESTED (ONCE AGAIN) THAT THIS WAS AN IDEAL TASK FOR THE UN. EVERYONE (THE AMAL THE GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS ALSO THE PSP, CERTAINLY THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS) ALL WANTED THE UN INTO BEIRUT. BUT THERE WAS NO PRECISION, AND THEREFORE MUCH POTENTIAL ARGUMENT, ABOUT THE TERMS. THE BRITISH VIEW WAS THAT THE UN COULD BEST HELP OVER A SPECIFIC TASK, WHERE THE NEED WAS OBVIOUS. THE AIRPORT SEEMED TO FIT THIS BILL. WHY NOT GET THE LEBANESE PARTIES TO ASK THE UN TO DO THIS JOB? IF THE RUSSIANS OBJECTED, THEN THE ONUS OF OBSTRUCTION WOULD BE ON THEM, FOR FRUSTRATING AN OBVIOUSLY SOUND PROPOSAL, INSTEAD OF ON THE US FOR NOT REMOVING THEIR FLEET. BARTHOLOMEW AT FIRST SAID THAT INVOLVING THE UN WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE US TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL. BUT AFTER SOME DISCUSSION HE SEEMED TO THINK THE IDEA WORTH PUTTING TO WASHINGTON.

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OO BEIRUT

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PP DAMASCUS

PP TEL AVIV

GRS 176

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FM F C O 191230Z FEB 84 CORRECTED VERSION

TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BRITFORLEB

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.

LEBANON MNF

1. HOOPER, U.S. EMBASSY, TELEPHONED NENAD ON 19 FEBRUARY ON INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT THE FOLLOWING:

THE PRESIDENT HAD NOW FORMALLY DECIDED THAT THE PHASED REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MARINES FROM BEIRUT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AND SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 15 MARCH AT THE LATEST.

THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT MNF COMMANDERS WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED THAT PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR ANHANCED TRAINING AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES SHOULD ALSO PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY, BUT FINAL DECISIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON CLARIFICATION OF THE SITUATION.

2. HOOPER COMMENTED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE AMERICANS WERE KEEPING THEIR PARTNERS CLOSELY INFORMED. HE SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW THE MARINES WOULD BE AWAY FROM THE AIRPORT WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

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PRIME MINISTER

The Duty Clerk rang to say there was a report on the BBC News that the Israelis had bombed Lebanese villages to the South and East of Beirut which they believed to be terrorist strongholds and which posed a threat to the Israeli Northern border.

Barbara
19/2

GRS 650
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DESKBY 181200Z
FROM DAMASCUS 181120Z FEB
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, EC POSTS
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, CAIRO, MOSCOW, TRIPOLI MY TELNO 89: LEBANON

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SUMMARY.

1. DISAPPOINTING AND PERHAPS UNWISE SYRIAN REJECTION OF THE 'SAUDI PEACE PLAN'. POSSIBILITY OF EC OR UNILATERAL ACTION TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS THAT THEIR HITHERTO SUCCESSFUL TACTICS NOW NEED CHANGING.

DETAIL

2. MIFT CONTAINS TRANSLATION OF OFFICIAL SYRIAN STATEMENT ISSUED LAST NIGHT IN REJECTION OF THE 'SAUDI PEACE PLAN'.

3. THIS IS A DISAPPOINTING AND TO SOME EXTENT SURPRISING SYRIAN REACTION. IN THE FIRST PLACE THE SYRIANS HAVE BEHAVED BADLY IN APPARENTLY TURNING DOWN THE PROPOSALS BEFORE PRINCE SAUD HAD EVEN DISCUSSED THEM WITH KHADDAM. THIS MIGHT BE A NEGOTIATING TACTIC BUT ON PAST SYRIAN FORM IT WOULD BE OPTIMISTIC TO ASSUME SO.

*4. SECONDLY, THE SYRIAN OBJECTIONS SEEM EXAGGERATED:-
(A) SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL (AT LEAST IN THE SENSE OF BORDER ARRANGEMENTS) MUST BE PART OF ANY SETTLEMENT AND THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT HITHERTO OBJECTED TO THIS IN PRINCIPLE SEMICOLON
(B) SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL IS A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK BUT OUGHT TO BE NEGOTIABLE.

5. THIRDLY THE SYRIANS SHOULD BE CLEVER ENOUGH TO SEE THAT
(A) BY ACCEPTING THE PLAN AT LEAST AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION THEY COULD WRONG-FOOT THE ISRAELIS BY PUTTING THEM (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) IN THE POSITION OF BEING 'THE OBSTACLE TO PEACE'.
(B) BY REFUSING THE OPPORTUNITY OF FURTHERING THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS THEY RISK THE EMERGENCE OF THE KING OF IMBALANCE ENVISAGED IN MY TUR, THEY PROLONG THE HUMAN AGONY (ADMITTEDLY NOT A POWERFUL CONSIDERATION FOR THIS REGIME) AND THEY LOSE A CHANCE TO IMPROVE THEIR POSTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

6. IN SHORT IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE SYRIANS ANY FOR ONCE BE OVERPLAYING THEIR HAND. WHEREAS HITHERTO THEY HAVE CORRECTLY JUDGED THAT THEY HAD ONLY TO SIT TIGHT AND WAIT FOR EVENTS TO UNFOLD IN A WAY FAVOURABLE TO THEM, IF THEY DO NOT TAKE THE PRESENT TIDE AT THE FLOOD IT MAY TURN AGAINST THEM.

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7. MY US AND MOST EC COLLEAGUES BROADLY ACCEPT THIS ANALYSIS (THOUGH IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY A FIRST-HAND SYRIAN VIEW WHICH I AM STILL UNABLE TO OBTAIN). THE US RECHARGE D'AFFAIRES COMMENTED THAT IF THE SYRIANS DO NOT SEE THINGS THE SAME WAY IT MUST BE BECAUSE THEY ASSESS DIFFERENTLY THE POSITION ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON. FOR EXAMPLE THEY MAY BELIEVE THAT FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCE WILL OBLIGE THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON WITHOUT THE NEED FOR ANY SYRIAN CONCESSIONS SEMICOLON THAT THE SYRIANS CAN STILL CONTROL JUMBLATT SEMICOLON AND THAT BERRI WILL NOT LOSE CONTROL OF THE SHIA EXTREMISTS IN THE ABSENCE OF VISIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS MORE EQUITABLE POWER-SHARING. MY BELGIAN COLLEAGUE BELIEVES THAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT VIEW THE SAUDI PLAN MORE FAVOURABLY IF ABOGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT COULD BE CLEARLY SEPARATED FROM IT SO THAT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE CONDITIONAL UPON THE OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE PLAN.

8. WITHIN THIS LIMITED DIPLOMATIC GROUP THERE IS A CONSENSUS THAT THE KINDS OF ARGUMENT SET OUT IN PARA 5 ABOVE SHOULD BE CLEARLY PUT TO THE SYRIANS. MY BELGIAN COLLEAGUE CLAIMS TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS (BUT NOT THE FRENCH, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS 'EVASIVE') TO AN EC INITIATIVE TO FILL THE CURRENT VACUUM. HE HAS IN MIND A TROIKA COMPRISING PERHAPS THE FRENCH, THE ITALIANS AND OURSELVES) WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE SEPARATE VISITS TO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, RIYADH AND TEL AVIV TO FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS IN LEBANON AND MORE WIDELY.

9. THIS MAY BE RATHER AMBITIOUS AND ANYWAY TOO SLOW. BUT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME THOUGHTS IN MIND OF EC OR UNILATERAL ACTION ESPECIALLY IN DAMASCUS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF FORTHCOMING EC MEETINGS BOTH IN THE POLITICAL CO-OPERATION FRAMEWORK AND WITH SHAMIR.

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FM WASHINGTON 181925Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 587 OF 18 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA PRIORITY TEL AVIV
UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS ROME AMMAN CAIRO THE HAGUE TRIPOLI MOSCOW

BEIRUT TELEGRAM NUMBER 134: LEBANON

1. IN SUCH A FAST MOVING SITUATION IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE ANY HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION FROM HERE OTHER THAN WHAT WE CAN COAX OUT OF U.S. OFFICIALS ABOUT THEIR THINKING. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH THE INITIATIVE TAKEN OUT OF THEIR HANDS, THEIR POLICIES IN COLLAPSE, AND THE MARINES ALMOST SURROUNDED, THEIR THOUGHTS ARE ANYTHING BUT CLEAR OR PLEASANT.

2. AS OF THIS MORNING, MURPHY'S BEST JUDGEMENT IS THAT DESPITE THE FLATNESS OF THE SYRIAN REJECTION, THE SAUDI PLAN IS STILL JUST ABOUT IN PLAY. HARIRI IS REPORTED TO BE GOING BACK TO BEIRUT FROM DAMASCUS (PRESUMABLY WITHOUT PRINCE SAUD) TO SEE WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE. MURPHY SEES THIS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE SYRIANS MAY WANT TO KEEP THE SAUDIS ENGAGED (THOUGH PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY FEEL THEY CANNOT AFFORD LITERALLY, TO TREAT THEM TOO HIGH HANDEDLY).

3. MURPHY TOLD MINISTER THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD NO MEANS OF KNOWING FOR CERTAIN WHETHER THE SYRIANS WERE BEHIND JUMBLATT'S PRESSURE FOR GEMAYEL'S RESIGNATION OR NOT. ON BALANCE HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THE SYRIANS WOULD SEE SOME MILEAGE IN KEEPING ON GEMAYEL AS A WEAK, CRIPPLED LEADER, SUBJECT TO THEIR INFLUENCE. BUT HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS CRYSTAL-BALL-GAZING: THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE.

4. MURPHY'S LATEST INFORMATION ABOUT THE FIGHTING WAS THAT THINGS SEEMED TO HAVE QUIETENED DOWN TODAY AROUND SUQ AL GHARB, WHETHER BECAUSE THE PSP HAD THEMSELVES DECIDED TO HOLD BACK OR WHETHER ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM DAMASCUS ONE COULD ONLY GUESS. IF THEY DECIDED TO PRESS HOME THEIR ADVANTAGE (STILL WORSE, IF THEY BROKE OUT AND FOR EXAMPLE ATTACKED THE PALACE) THE POSITION WOULD BE VERY BAD. REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES WOULD IN THE MEANTIME BE GOING AHEAD. IF SUQ AL GARB LOOKED LIKE FALLING, MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE MARINES WOULD BRING INTO PLAY THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS AS BEFORE. THE SHIPS WERE

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/STILL

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STILL THERE. BUT THERE WOULD BE NO REPEAT NO QUESTION OF MOVING
THE MARINES FROM THE AIRPORT TO BETTER POSITIONS ON SHORE.
THAT OPTION HAD BEEN STUDIED TO DEATH IN JANUARY AND REJECTED.

WRIGHT

mf

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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MED PS/MR LUCE
DEFENCE DEPT PS/PUS
PUSD SIR J BULLARD
NEWS DEPT SIR J LEAHY
UND SIR W HARDING
NAD MR WRIGHT
WED MR CARTLEDGE
SED MR MACINNES
ECD(E) MR ADAMS
FINANCE DEPT MR JENKINS
PROTOCOL DEPT MR EGERTON
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MR JENKINS
MR HORTON

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MR GOODALL
MR R. ARBUTHNOTH CABINET OFFICE

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FM UNIS NEW YORK 172215Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 17 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, PARIS

PRIORITY TEL AVIV, ROME, CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, MOSCOW

NY TELNO 1734 LEBANON UN OPTIONS

1. THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS GOING TO TABLE THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION "IN BLUE" FORTHWITH. SINCE I WAS AWARE (NANTEUIL EXCUSED HIMSELF FROM A MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEN THIS MORNING) THAT HE HAD HAD A MEETING WITH THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS THE RUSSIAN REACTION. NANTEUIL SAID ONLY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE FRENCH NOT TO GO AHEAD.

2. THE CHANCES ARE, THEREFORE, THAT THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 21 FEBRUARY TO CONSIDER THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION AT WHICH THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE TO REACT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS GOING AHEAD WITH HIS VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE (FOR WHICH HE LEAVES LATER TODAY) BUT THAT HE WILL FLY BACK AT ANY TIME, EVEN AS EARLY AS 21 FEBRUARY, IF THE LEBANESE SITUATION DEMANDS.

3. I HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT FROM BOTH THE MALTESE AND ZIMBABWEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF YOUR. THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE NON-ALIGNED SHOULD WAIT AND SEE. THE GENERAL VIEW SEEMED TO BE THAT IT SHOULD BECAUSE TO PROMOTE AN INTERVIEW WITH UNDERSECRETARY THE NON-ALIGNED

~~RESOLVED TO TAKE 3 DE THE~~ WE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE NON-VICTORIOUS SHOULD WAIT AND SEE. THE GENERAL VIEW SEEMED TO BE THAT IF SAUDI EFFORTS TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT WERE SUCCESSFUL THE NON-ALIGNED MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH SOMETHING THAT WOULD HELP CONCILIATE OPPOSING VIEWS. ON A PERSONAL BASIS SAUDI AGREED THAT, IF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION FAILED, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS AN END TO THE PRESENT STAGE OF COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND A SPRINGBOARD FOR THE NEXT STAGE.

4. SINCE DICTATING THE ABOVE I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 74. FRANKLY I AM AMAZED. THERE REALLY OUGHT TO BE NO DOUBT AT ALL IN FRENCH MINDS THAT WE SUPPORT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A UN FORCE. I HAVE KEPT IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH WITH BOTH NANTERUIL AND HIS DEPUTY AND HAVE GONE OVER THE GROUND WITH THEM ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, EVEN GIVING THEM THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ADVANCE AND DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS ABOUT OUR INITIATIVE. AT NO POINT HAVE EITHER OF THEM MADE ANY CRITICISM OF OUR INITIATIVE LET ALONE THE POINTS IN PARAS 1 AND 3 OF YOUR TELNO 79, WHICH ARE NONSENSE. ONLY THIS MORNING I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEN TO CONFIRM EXPLICITLY THAT THE UK SUPPORTED THE FRENCH INITIATIVE AND THAT OUR OWN PROPOSALS SHOULD BE SEEN AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN BEIRUT AND IN NO WAY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF REPLACING THE NMF WITH A UN FORCE.

MARGETSON

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

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FM FCO 171813Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 17 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BEIRUT

PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, ROME, AMMAN, JEDDA,
CAIRO, THE HAGUE, MOSCOW

YOUR TEL NUMBERS 170-172:LEBANON:UN OPTIONS:FRENCH VIEWS

1. MINISTER AT FRENCH EMBASSY CALLED ON LEAHY ON THE AFTERNOON OF 17 FEBRUARY ON INSTRUCTIONS TO REGISTER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S QUOTE SURPRISE UNQUOTE AT PARTS OF THE UK STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 16 FEBRUARY. GRENIER SAID THAT WHILE THE FRENCH AGREED ABOUT AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNIFIL THEY WERE PUZZLED BY OUR PROPOSALS FOR LIMITED STEPS IN BEIRUT WHICH DID NOT IN THEIR VIEW MEASURE UP TO THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO ENSURE THAT FRANCE AND THE UK WERE ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH AND THAT THE UK SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL FOR A UN FORCE IN BEIRUT.

2. LEAHY REPLIED THAT FOR HIS PART HE WAS SURPRISED BY GRENIER'S REMARKS. WE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE FRENCH ON THIS QUESTION. YOU HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH NANTEUIL. FOR EXAMPLE YOU HAD CONSULTED HIM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND WERE AT NANTEUIL'S REQUEST HOLDING THE IDEA IN RESERVE. LEAHY ALSO SAID THAT YOUR STATEMENT DID NOT BEAR THE INTERPRETATION WHICH GRENIER HAD PUT ON IT. IN HANDING OVER A COPY, LEAHY POINTED TO THE PASSAGES WHICH REGISTERED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, AND WHICH EMPHASISED THAT THE LIMITED STEPS PROPOSED DID NOT CUT ACROSS IN ANY WAY THE MAJOR WORK OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON A NEW MANDATE FOR A UN FORCE AND WERE NOT (NOT) DESIGNED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL.

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LEAHY SAID OUR IDEAS WERE DESIGNED TO BE COMPLEMENTARY TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. WE THOUGHT WE HAD TAKEN SOME TROUBLE TO STAY CLOSE TO NANTEUIL, EVEN THOUGH WE HAD HAD NO WARNING OF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION. IT WAS IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT LEAHY HAD PROPOSED OVER 10 DAYS AGO TO VISIT PARIS IN ORDER TO CONSULT WITH BONNEFOUS, WHOM, HE NOW LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING IN PARIS ON 20 FEBRUARY. LEAHY ASKED GRENIER TO CONVEY THIS TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT WE WERE VERY CONSCIOUS THAT THE FRENCH STILL HAD FORCES ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT AND WE WANTED TO KEEP IN STEP.

3. GRENIER ATTEMPTED RATHER LAMELY TO ARGUE THAT THE MODEST PROPOSALS IN THE UK STATEMENT MIGHT TAKE THE STEAM OUT OF SUPPORT FOR THE MORE AMBITIOUS FRENCH IDEA BUT SAID THAT HE WAS REASSURED BY LEAHY'S REMARKS AND UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THEM.

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PS/MR LUCE
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FROM DAMASCUS 171130Z FEB
TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 17 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, MODUK
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, UKHIS NEW YORK, TEL AV-IV, AMMAN,
CAIRO, MOSCOW, TRIPOLI, THE HAGUE.

BEIRUT TELNO 134

LEBANON

1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO UP-TO-DATE FIRST HAND PRONOUNCEMENTS TO GO ON WE BELIEVE THAT SYRIAN ATTITUDES TO THE LATEST FAST-MOVING DEVELOPMENTS ARE DICTATED BY THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER CONSIDERATIONS IN LEBANON (PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 79). THEY WILL BE CONCERNED THAT THE UNPREDICTABLE JUMBLATT IS GAINING GROUND MILITARILY AND THE MORE RELIABLE (BUT LESS SYRIAN-INFLUENCED) BERRI IS EMERGING AS THE POLITICAL LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, WHILE THIS MOVE EASILY INFLUENCED LEBANESE CLIENTS ARE REDUCED TO THE LEVEL OF INTERMEDIARIES.
2. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO WEIGH MORE HEAVILY WITH THE SYRIANS THAN ANY PRESSURE THE SAUDIS MAY REPEAT MAY PUT ON THEM. THEY POINT AMONG OTHER THINGS TO CONTINUED SUPPORT OF GEMAYEL AS THE LEGITIMATE (IF UNREPRESENTATIVE) PRESIDENT (PARA 2 OF BEIRUT TELNO 133). THIS ATTITUDE IS PROBABLY REINFORCED BY THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT TO REPLACE GEMAYEL AT THIS STAGE MIGHT OPEN A CAN OF WORMS, AND THAT GEMAYEL HAS PROBABLY NOT YET EXHAUSTED HIS POTENTIAL USEFULNESS FROM THE SYRIAN POINT OF VIEW. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS HAD INDICATIONS FROM JUMBLATT THAT WHILE HE DOES NOT INTEND TO MODIFY HIS DEMAND OF GEMAYEL'S RESIGNATION (OR WORSE), HE MIGHT STILL BOW TO A MAJORITY OPPOSITION VIEW THAT GEMAYEL SHOULD STAY AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL.
3. IF THIS ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT, THE PRINCIPLE OF "SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL" MIGHT NOT BE SUCH A STUMBLING BLOCK NOW AS THE
X
AMERICANS FEAR (PARA 1 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 558). AT LEAST IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FUDGE THE ISSUE IN PRACTICE, PROVIDED THAT OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE HAD SUFFICIENT APPEAL TO THE SYRIANS. BUT THIS IS A LONG SHOT GOING WAY BEYOND WHAT THE SYRIANS HAVE SO FAR BEEN SAYING.

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4. INCIDENTALLY, WE AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSION DRAWN IN PARA 5 OF PALMER'S TELELETTER 020/5 OF 15 FEBRUARY TO NIXON (NOT TO ALL), THAT THE SYRIANS DO NOT WANT A RESURGENCE OF PLO ACTIVITY IN SOUTH LEBANON AND ARE IN A POSITION TO PREVENT THIS.

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BT

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PS/PUS
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 February, 1984.

Lebanon

I told you in my letter of 16 February that the Prime Minister doubted whether it was now worth while sending a message to President Reagan about the 17 May Agreement, but that she would reflect again before the end of the week.

The Prime Minister has now decided that in the light of events on the ground such a message would be redundant.

She wishes to send a short message to Vice President Bush about this decision. I enclose the text, and would be grateful if you would arrange for it to be delivered by HM Embassy, Washington.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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B.R.

28

Please retype.

SECRET

A.J.C. 17/12

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH

Dear George,

I hope you enjoyed the rest of your travels. We shall always remember with the greatest pleasure the Chequers weekend.

Following our talks I gave careful thought to the possibility of sending a message to the President about the Lebanon. But it was clear that ~~events~~ ^{the situation} on the ground ~~were moving fast~~ ^{was changing fast} and that the main subject I might have dealt with - the status of the 17 May Agreement - was ~~in the forefront of everyone's mind~~. I reached the ~~conclusion that this was a case where back-seat driving would not be helpful and so decided not to write now.~~

But we must stay in close touch about the Middle East and all the other problems on our minds. It was so valuable to talk to you at length and in a relaxed atmosphere.

My best wishes to you both.

Yours ever,

Margaret

already being widely and openly discussed and events seemed to be virtually dictating the decision. So I decided not to write formally to the President

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 February, 1984.

Lebanon

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 16 February about the question of attendance by a BRITFORLEB officer at the MNF Coordination Committee.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that a BRITFORLEB representative should attend MNF meetings until further notice.

I am sure that Mrs. Thatcher would accept the point in paragraph 3 of Mr. Stanley's minute of 16 February - namely that we leave the precise timing of the return to Beirut of the British Officer and his party to the discretion of the Commanding Officer of BRITFORLEB in the light of the security situation on the ground.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1984

LEBANON

Thank you for your letter of 15 February with which you enclosed a possible message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan.

The Prime Minister considered the text of the message last night but is rather doubtful as to whether it is worth sending the message given recent developments in the Lebanon. She has noted, for example, that Jumblatt has now stated publicly that willingness on the part of President Gemayel to abrogate the 17 May agreement will not be sufficient and that nothing short of Gemayel's resignation will be adequate.

The Prime Minister will consider again before the end of the week whether she wishes to send such a message and I shall be in touch with you again.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

E. P.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

We were delighted to see George and Barbara Bush last weekend. George and I had several good long talks and I now feel much more up to date on your thinking and preoccupations.

We spent a lot of time on the Lebanon and I have been reflecting on that problem since. US involvement in the Lebanon is much greater than ours and I am the last person to indulge in back-seat driving. But I want to be as helpful as I can to your efforts to find a way through the present impasse. The following thoughts may be helpful.

We are agreed that Syria is a key factor. We cannot let President Asad dictate the course of events. But I doubt if he will be prepared to work constructively with us unless he is offered some incentive. Everything I hear leads me to believe that the incentive he needs is a new understanding about the 17 May Agreement.

I know how difficult it was to get that Agreement, and we all have cause to be grateful to George Shultz for the work he put into it. Yet it is now clearly an obstacle to the reconciliation process in the Lebanon. I do not see how President Gemayel or any successor Government could put it into effect. And Syria will go on being obstructive until it is offered a new formula. Precisely what that formula should be must be a matter for the American negotiators. But perhaps the

note to strike is that, while the Agreement will not formally be abrogated, it will not be implemented in its present form.

I fully agree with George Bush that this would be an important concession for which a price should be extracted. The Syrians would have to undertake to encourage their clients to work with Gemayel. They would also have to be ready to meet Israel's fears for her security in Southern Lebanon. The precise deal must again be a matter for the negotiators. I know perfectly well that any move in this direction will cause you difficulties with Israel. And I also know that Ambassador Rumsfeld has told the Syrians that everything can be put on the negotiating table. But my feeling is that, if progress is to be made, the time has come to put precise proposals on the Agreement to Syria. I hope you will see your way to doing this.



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/56

16 February 1984

Prime Minister

LEBANON

- with
ABC?*
1. I have seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 16 February dealing with the question of attendance of a BRITFORLEB Liaison Officer at MNF Coordination Committee meetings.
 2. I note the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's judgement that attendance by the ADA already based in Beirut would not be sufficient evidence of our continued association with the MNF, and that BRITFORLEB representation is needed to maintain our credibility in this respect. This is clearly a matter of diplomatic judgement; on this basis I am content that we should do what he suggests for the time being. I also agree that the BRITFORLEB officer (and his two supporting staff) should be based at the Embassy; this would also avoid the additional risks in ferrying him between RELIANT and Beirut for each meeting (as demonstrated by the gunfire directed at the US Commander en route to last Tuesday's meeting).
 3. If you agree the Foreign Secretary's proposal, I must only ask that we leave the precise timing of the return to Beirut of the British officer and his party to the discretion of the Commanding Officer of BRITFORLEB in the light of the security situation on the ground.
 4. I understand that Michael Heseltine would also support the course of action proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.
 5. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Jps

Ministry of Defence

LEBANSOW: hut Sir PAB



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

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16 JAN 1967



PM/84/29

PRIME MINISTERLebanon

1. Following the redeployment of our MNF contingent on 8 February, the question has arisen of attendance by a BRITFORLEB officer at the MNF Coordination Committee. The Commander of BRITFORLEB was unable at short notice to send an officer to the meeting in Beirut on 14 February.
2. We agreed at our meeting on 10 February that we should avoid positive statements to the effect that we remained part of the MNF. I have taken the line that although the force has been redeployed, it remains close at hand. I believe however that so long as we remain formally part of the Multi-National force, a BRITFORLEB Liaison Officer should be based at the Embassy and should attend meetings whenever possible. We need a BRITFORLEB representative on shore as visible evidence of our continued participation in the MNF. For this reason attendance at meetings of the Coordination Committee by the ADA who is based in Beirut would not achieve our objective. The presence of a BRITFORLEB officer (plus a driver and clerk) might attract some public attention and be criticised as a move back towards re-engagement of our forces onshore. But I believe it is important that we should make this gesture if we are to maintain a credible position as MNF participants. Furthermore, having a BRITFORLEB representative in Beirut will make it easier to justify moving the remainder of the contingent to Cyprus, rather than leaving them in some danger and much discomfort on board RFA Reliant.
4. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Defence Secretary. Provided you and he agree I hope the Ministry of Defence can arrange for a BRITFORLEB officer to be transferred from RFA Reliant to Beirut on attachment soon.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 February, 1984

Prime Minister.

Agree that a BRITFORLEB representative should attend MNF meetings until further notice?

A.F.C. 16/2

Yes not

J.P.C. ①



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no SUP. Cradock ①

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Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You will wish to consider this. I confess to some doubts as to whether it is worth sending as the situation in Beirut deteriorates once again. Wait till Friday?

15 February 1984

Yes mt

Dear John,

A.J.C. 15/2

Lebanon

We spoke about the message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan. Sir Geoffrey Howe is content with the text of the message, as redrafted in Moscow telno 210 (copy enclosed). There is still no clear sign that the Americans have hoisted in the need to offer up the May 17 Agreement in exchange for something worthwhile while such an exchange is still possible: recent US public statements in Washington contradict Mr Rumsfeld's earlier assurances that everything, the agreement included, was up for negotiation in Damascus. Sir Geoffrey therefore agrees that, if the Prime Minister is content, a message along the lines of the enclosed draft is still worth sending to the President.

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 14 FEB

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR RICKETTS

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING HIS TEXT:

WE WERE DELIGHTED TO SEE GEORGE AND BARBARA BUSH LAST WEEKEND. GEORGE AND I HAD SEVERAL GOOD LONG TALKS AND I NOW FEEL MUCH MORE UP TO DATE ON YOUR THINKING AND PREOCCUPATIONS.

WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME ON THE LEBANON AND I HAVE BEEN REFLECTING ON THAT PROBLEM SINCE. US INVOLVEMENT IN THE LEBANON IS MUCH GREATER THAN OURS AND I AM THE LAST PERSON TO INDULGE IN BACK-SEAT DRIVING. BUT I WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS I CAN TO YOUR EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY THROUGH THE PRESENT IMPASSE. THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS MAY BE HELPFUL.

WE ARE AGREED THAT SYRIA IS A KEY FACTOR. WE CANNOT LET PRESIDENT ASAD DICTATE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. BUT I DOUBT IF HE WILL BE PREPARED TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH US UNLESS HE IS OFFERED SOME INCENTIVE. EVERYTHING I HEAR LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE INCENTIVE HE NEEDS IS A NEW UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT.

I KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO GET THAT AGREEMENT, AND WE ALL HAVE CAUSE TO BE GRATEFUL TO GEORGE SHULTZ FOR THE WORK HE PUT INTO IT. YET IT IS NOW CLEARLY AN OBSTACLE TO THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN THE LEBANON. I DO NOT SEE HOW PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OR ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT COULD PUT IT INTO EFFECT. AND SYRIA WILL GO ON BEING OBSTRUCTIVE UNTIL IT IS OFFERED A NEW FORMULA. PRECISELY WHAT THAT FORMULA SHOULD BE MUST BE A MATTER FOR THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS. BUT PERHAPS THE NOTE TO STRIKE IS THAT, WHILE THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT FORMALLY BE ABROGATED, IT WILL NOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

SECRET

/ I FULLY

SECRET

I FULLY AGREE WITH GEORGE BUSH THAT THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION FOR WHICH A PRICE SHOULD BE EXTRACTED. THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE TO ENCOURAGE THEIR CLIENTS TO WORK WITH GENAYEL. THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE READY TO MEET ISRAEL'S FEARS FOR HER SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE PRECISE DEAL MUST AGAIN BE A MATTER FOR THE NEGOTIATORS. I KNOW PERFECTLY WELL THAT ANY MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION WILL CAUSE YOU DIFFICULTIES WITH ISRAEL. AND I ALSO KNOW THAT AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD HAS TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT EVERYTHING CAN BE PUT ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. BUT MY FEELING IS THAT, IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE, THE TIME HAS COME TO PUT PRECISE PROPOSALS ON THE AGREEMENT TO SYRIA. I HOPE YOU WILL SEE YOUR WAY TO DOING THIS.

SUTHERLAND

LIMITED

HD/NENAD

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

²
SECRET

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

We were delighted to see George and Barbara Bush last weekend. George and I had several good long talks and I now feel much more up to date on your thinking and preoccupations.

We spent a lot of time on the Lebanon and I have been reflecting on that problem since. US involvement in the Lebanon is much greater than ours and I am the last person to indulge in back-seat driving. But I want to be as helpful as I can to your efforts to find a way through the present impasse. The following thoughts may be helpful.

We are agreed that Syria is a key factor. We cannot let President Asad dictate the course of events. But I doubt if he will be prepared to work constructively with us unless he is offered some incentive. Everything I hear leads me to believe that the incentive he needs is a new understanding about the 17 May Agreement.

I know how difficult it was to get that Agreement, and we all have cause to be grateful to George Shultz for the work he put into it. Yet it is now clearly an obstacle to the reconciliation process in the Lebanon. I do not see how President Gemayel or any successor Government could put it into effect. And Syria will go on being obstructive until it is offered a new formula. Precisely what that formula should be must be a matter for the American negotiators. But perhaps the

note to strike is that, while the Agreement will not formally be abrogated, it will not be implemented in its present form.

I fully agree with George Bush that this would be an important concession for which a price should be extracted. The Syrians would have to undertake to encourage their clients to work with Gemayel. They would also have to be ready to meet Israel's fears for her security in Southern Lebanon. The precise deal must again be a matter for the negotiators. I know perfectly well that any move in this direction will cause you difficulties with Israel. And I also know that Ambassador Rumsfeld has told the Syrians that everything can be put on the negotiating table. But my feeling is that, if progress is to be made, the time has come to put precise proposals on the Agreement to Syria. I hope you will see your way to doing this.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1984

Lebanon Evacuation

Thank you for your letter of 13 February,
the contents of which the Prime Minister has
noted.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

107

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

(127)

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR NACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JENKINS
MR EGERTON

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MR GOODALL
SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE

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HD/MED
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HD/PUSD
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HD/FINANCE DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT

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IMMEDIATE

THIS TELEGRAM
ADVANCE COPY

GRS 290

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 142303Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 516 OF 14 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKNIS NEW YORK, PARIS,
ROME, ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO AND MOSCOW

LEBANON

1. U S OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THE ACCURACY OF PRESS REPORTS TODAY THAT LAST WEEK'S INCREASED SHELLING FROM THE NEW JERSEY WAS PART OF THE PRICE FOR SECURING AGREEMENT OF SHULTZ AND MCFARLANE TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES. WEINBERGER WAS DISMAYED AT THE SCALE OF THE SHELLING AND HAS ISSUED ORDERS FOR GREATER RESTRAINT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, TODAY'S NAVAL SHELLING CONSISTED OF ELEVEN FIVE INCH ROUNDS AND WAS IN RESPONSE TO HEAVY SHELLING OF MARINES' POSITIONS AT BEIRUT AIRPORT. THE TARGETS WERE IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY EAST OF HAMMANA. THIS SHELLING WAS NOT RELATED TO TODAY'S FIGHTING BETWEEN THE LAF AND THE PSP IN THE AREA OF QABR SHMOUN. THE BATTALION OF THE THE LAF 4 BDE STATIONED THERE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN OVER-RUN. THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXPECT A FURTHER PSP ATTACK ON SOUQ EL GHARB WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

3. MEANWHILE GEMAYEL IS REPORTED TO HAVE VISITED FRANGIEH AT ZGHORTA. THE STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT YET HAVE AN ACCOUNT BUT SPECULATE THAT FRANGIEH MAY BE TRYING TO SET UP A MEETING BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND ASAD.

WRIGHT

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DD 141600Z MOSCOW

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FM FCO 141250Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 14 FEBRUARY

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM RICKETTS

YOUR TEL NOS 209 AND 210: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. ALTHOUGH RUMSFELD HAS TOLD US ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT QUOTE EVERYTHING IS ON THE TABLE UNQUOTE WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT HE HAS SAID TO THE SYRIANS OR THE LEBANESE AND THE SIGNALS COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON ARE CONFUSING. THE DEPARTMENT SUSPECT THAT RUMSFELD HAS NOT BEEN AS EXPLICIT WITH THE SYRIANS AS HIS REMARK TO US SUGGEST. NN A VERY RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE REPEATED THAT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE ABROGATED. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW FROM THE AMERICANS IS AN ASSURANCE WHICH THE SYRIANS CAN TRUST THAT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE IMPLEMENTED. THEY SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT SYRIAN CONCESSIONS IN RETURN. IN THEIR DETERMINATION NOT TO GIVE INTO SYRIA PRESSURE THE AMERICANS HAVE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES EVEN TO EXPLORE WHAT HHE SYRIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER IN EXCHANGE. WE THEREFORE SEE VALUE IN A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE TERMS REDRAFTED.

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SECRET

DESKBY 140930Z
FM MOSCOW 140856Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 209 OF 14 FEB

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR RICKETTS (PRIVATE OFFICE)

YOUR TELNO 171 : MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. MIFT CONTAINS A REVISED VERSION OF TEXT IN YOUR TUR WHICH HAS BEEN WORKED ON HERE TO PUT IT MORE IN THE STYLE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS LIKELY TO WANT TO ADOPT.

2. ON SUBSTANCE, WE WONDER WHETHER WHAT WE ARE SUGGESTING ON THE AGREEMENT REALLY GOES ANY FURTHER THAN THE AMERICAN POSITION AS IT CAN BE INFERRED FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS. THERE WOULD BE LITTLE PURPOSE IN A MESSAGE WHICH MERELY URGED THE AMERICANS TO DO SOMETHING WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY SIGNALLED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO, AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE DEPARTMENT COULD LET US HAVE QUICKLY THEIR ADVICE ON THIS POINT. WHAT IS THE FURTHEST THAT WE THINK THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE GONE IN TALKING TO THE SYRIANS AND TO GEMAYEL ?

3. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR ANY OTHER COMMENTS ON THE TEXT IN MIFT.

SUTHERLAND

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR NACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JENKINS
MR EGERTON

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MR GOODALL
SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE

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HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/UND
HD/NAD
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HD/SED
HD/ECD (E)
HD/FINANCE DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT

R.C.

late notes

Prime Minister

see para. 3

A.J.C. 1/2

IMMEDIATE

GR 900

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140100Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 13 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW (FOR S OF S'S PARTY), PARIS, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, ROME, DAMASCUS, PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO, THE HAGUE, AMMAN

ADVANCE COPY

PARIS TELNO 180 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON; FRENCH INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE FRENCH ARE TOUTING AN INFORMAL DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN FORCE TO REPLACE THE MNF. THIS HAS BEEN PROMPTLY HIJACKED BY THE RUSSIANS WHO HAVE SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS THAT ARE BOUND TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICANS (AND PERHAPS THE FRENCH THEMSELVES). THE FRENCH WERE PROPOSING A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR 15 FEBRUARY BUT MAY CHANGE THEIR MIND AFTER THE RUSSIAN BOMBSHELL.

DETAIL

2. NANTEUIL (FRANCE) ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON (13 FEBRUARY). HE HANDED ME THE INFORMAL DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RUSSIANS, AMERICANS, ITALIANS AND LEBANESE. HE ALSO PLANNED TO SPEAK THIS EVENING TO THE SYRIANS, EGYPTIANS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (WHO IS ILL IN BED).

3. HE SAID THAT OVINNIKOV (USSR) HAD IMMEDIATELY MADE THREE DEMANDS AND INSISTED THAT THESE WERE RIGID INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE SAID WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE

ADVANCE COPY

HE SAID THAT OVINNIKOV (USSR) HAD IMMEDIATELY MADE THREE DEMANDS AND INSISTED THAT THESE WERE RIGID INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE SAID WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FRENCH PAPER. THE DEMANDS WERE FIRST THAT ALL THE MNF CONTINGENTS SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON:

SECONDLY THAT THE FLEET BELONGING TO THE MNF COUNTRIES SHOULD SAIL AWAY, NOT JUST OUT OF THE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS BUT OUT OF GUN RANGE OF LEBANON AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO AERIAL RAIDS BY MNF FORCES:

THIRDLY THAT THE MNF COUNTRIES SHOULD BE GIVEN AN UNDERTAKING OF NO FURTHER INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON. THESE THREE CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO A WRITTEN DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE TO DO THIS. NANTEUIL ASKED IF HE SERIOUSLY MEANT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE TO CIRCULATE A DOCUMENT EFFECTIVELY ASKING THEIR MNF PARTNERS TO DO SOVIET BIDDING AND GIVE THE UNDERTAKINGS FOR WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE ASKING. OVINNIKOV REITERATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS AS LONG AS THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY SATISFIED ON THE THREE POINTS. HE ACCEPTED THAT THEY COULD NOT BLOCK A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL BUT THEY WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE.

4. OVINNIKOV SAID ON THE FRENCH DRAFT ITSELF THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT CARE PARTICULARLY WHETHER IT WOULD BE A UN FORCE OR OBSERVERS. THEIR PREFERENCE WAS FOR TAKING ELEMENTS FROM UNIFIL (EXCEPT FROM PERMANENT MEMBERS). THE FORCE'S MANDATE, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO MONITORING A CEASEFIRE AND COULD NOT EXTEND TO PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION EXCEPT PERHAPS IN SABRA AND CHATILA. THE LOCATION OF THE FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO BEIRUT. THE AGREEMENT OF ALL THE LEBANESE PARTIES WOULD BE NEEDED.

5. NANTEUIL DID NOT COMMENT ON THE REACTIONS OF OTHERS WHOM HE HAD CONSULTED APART FROM FAKHOURY (LEBANON) WHO HE SAID HAD SEEMED QUITE AT SEA AND HAD MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. THE FRENCH COUNSELLOR TOLD US THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD SAID THAT SHE WAS UNSIGHTED AS SHE HAD ONLY JUST ARRIVED BACK IN NEW YORK (NOT IN FACT TRUE AS SHE HAD BEEN FULLY BRIEFED BEFOREHAND) AND HAD MADE NO REAL COMMENT BEYOND SAYING THAT THE TEXT WAS CLEVERLY DRAFTED.

6. I ASKED NANTEUIL HOW HE PROPOSED TO TAKE MATTERS FORWARD. HE REFUSED EVEN TO SPECULATE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE REFERRING TO PARIS FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

7. I SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. SHAH NAWAZ SAID HE HAD AGREED WITH NANTEUIL THAT THE LATTER WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. NANTEUIL HAD ASKED HIM FOR PAKISTANI SPONSORSHIP BUT HE HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL. SHAH NAWAZ WAS KEEN TO KNOW THE AMERICAN REACTION AND PROPOSES TO SOUND OUT MRS KIRKPATRICK INFORMALLY TOMORROW (14 FEBRUARY). AS TO THE WAY AHEAD, NANTEUIL HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE FRENCH WANTED A FORMAL DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL ON WEDNESDAY, 15 FEBRUARY AND THAT HE WOULD REQUEST THIS IN WRITING TOMORROW. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT RUSSIAN REACTION WOULD LEAD THE FRENCH TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. I TOLD SHAH NAWAZ THAT WE WERE PERFECTLY READY TO TAKE

SUBSEQUENT RUSSIAN REACTION WOULD LEAD THE FRENCH TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. I TOLD SHAH NAWAZ THAT WE WERE PERFECTLY READY TO TAKE PART IN ANY FORMAL MEETING (SEE MY TELNO 154).

8. OVINNIKOV HAD EARLIER INFORMED THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND URQUHART OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION. URQUHART'S ACCOUNT OF THE RUSSIAN DEMANDS TALLIES WITH THAT IN PARAS. 3 AND 4 ABOVE WITH THE ADDITIONAL (AND IMPORTANT GLOSS) THAT ANY UN FORCE SHOULD BE FINANCED ON THE SAME BASIS AS UNFICYP (IE BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND TROOP CONTRIBUTORS HELPED BY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS). HE HAS TOLD THE HEAD OF CHANCERY THAT IN HIS VIEW THE RUSSIAN CONDITIONS ARE SKILFULLY DESIGNED TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS, THE US AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND THE REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS. BUT HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE FRENCH FOR GIVING THE RUSSIANS THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE AMERICANS WHO COULD NOT POSSIBLY ACCEPT THEM. IN HIS VIEW IT MADE NO SENSE AT ALL FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON TO BE INFLAMED AT THIS STAGE. HE EARNESTLY HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ALERTED SOON TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING.

COMMENT

9. THE FRENCH HAVE RUN INTO THE BRICK WALL FORECAST IN MY TELNO 143. AND SEEM AT A LOSS AS TO HOW TO PROCEED. IF NEVERTHELESS THEY CALL FOR A MEETING ON 15 FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS THE LEBANESE SITUATION WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THEIR PROPOSAL, WE WOULD BE PROVIDED WITH AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER OUR OWN IDEAS (SEE MY SECOND IFT).

MARGESTON

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Prime Minister (2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 February, 1984

Dear John,

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Lebanon Evacuation

As you know the evacuation of British nationals who wished to leave Beirut took place on 10 February. A total of 518 people left under British auspices: 190 British nationals; 126 Commonwealth citizens and 202 others (many of them nationals of EC states). The Americans took a further 52 British nationals.

The fighting in Beirut made it necessary to mount separate evacuations from West Beirut and from the port of Jounieh for those in East Beirut. A Consular officer from the Embassy in Beirut was flown by RFA Reliant helicopter to Jounieh on 9 February and instructions to British nationals were broadcast on the BBC World Service. A team of six officials from the High Commission at Nicosia was flown to RFA Reliant off Beirut to help out where necessary; some assisted at Jounieh.

Evacuees from West Beirut were lifted out by helicopter to RFA Reliant and then onward to Akrotiri again by helicopter. The evacuation from East Beirut (from Jounieh Port) was delayed by bad weather, which prevented the chartered ship Sol Ghiorgios from docking. Helicopters were therefore used as for West Beirut and 90 were lifted out on 10 February. Fewer nationals travelled from Jounieh than we had expected; the Americans took off some early arrivals.

Almost all those evacuated were able to make their own arrangements for onward travel from Cyprus; 9 have already been repatriated at public expense against signed undertakings to repay but the numbers requiring such assistance are not likely to be large. 10 foreign nationals with British spouses and children were given clearance to enter the UK. We have received no reports of foreign nationals refusing to proceed from Cyprus to their own countries, or of foreign governments refusing to accept their nationals evacuated from Beirut.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has sent a telegram to HM Ambassador Beirut thanking him and his staff for their effort (I enclose a copy).

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD)


Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AA



113 FEB 1994

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ZZ BEIRUT

GRS 55

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 111300Z FEB 84

TO FLASH BEIRUT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 78 OF 11 FEBRUARY

WE ARE ALL DELIGHTED AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE EVACUATION HAS GONE AND I KNOW HOW MUCH THIS REFLECTS THE SKILL AND HARD WORK YOU AND YOUR STAFF PUT INTO IT, IN THE MOST DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. PLEASE TELL THEM ALL HOW VERY GRATEFUL I AM.
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DEF D

POD

MR EGERTON

SIR J LEAHY

LORD N G LENNOX

PS/PUS

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR WHITNEY

CHIEF CLERK

MR WRIGHT

SIR J BULLARD

GR 240

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FM DAMASCUS 131015Z FEB 84

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 83 OF 13 FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, JEDDA, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, MOKU, ADEN
AND TRIPOLI

LEBANON

1. LEADING SYRIAN FIGURES, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE, HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY IN RECENT PRESS CONFERENCES TO REITERATE SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A WIDER ROLE FOR THE UN IN BEIRUT BUT ONLY ON CONDITION (FOLLOWING TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) ENTER ALMA THAT IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF BOTH ON AND OFF SHORE. THERE HAS BEEN NO (REPEAT NO) MENTION IN THE SYRIAN PRESS OF THE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A WIDER UN ROLE OR OF ANY VISIT TO THE REGION OF A SENIOR UN OFFICIAL. (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 147, PARA 4).

2. SINCE THE NEWS OF PRESIDENT ANDROPOV'S DEATH BROKE THE SYRIAN PRESS HAVE MADE NO MENTION OF THE PROPOSED VISIT TO DAMASCUS BY ALIEV (MOSCOW TELNO 164) AND WE ASSUME THAT IT HAS BEEN POSTPONED OR CANCELLED.

THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HIGH LEVEL SYRIA/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANON IN THE MARGINS OF ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL: THE SYRIAN DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY ABDULLAH AL AHMAR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE BA'ATH PARTY, AND WILL INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

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3. MEANWHILE THE FLOW OF VISITORS HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BY THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOUTH YEMEN PRESIDENT, ALI NASSER MOHAMMED ON 12 FEBRUARY AND THE LIBYAN NO 2, MAJOR JALLOUD, THE PREVIOUS DAY. THERE HAS BEEN NO SUGGESTION TO DATE OF JOINT SYRIAN-LIBYAN-SOUTH YEMEN TALKS BUT THE CLEAR IMPLICATION OF THE VISIT IS THAT THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE REFORGING THE IMAGE OF THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT WHICH HAS BEEN SCARELY MENTIONED IN THE PAST YEAR. THESE MOVES, THOUGH SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO THE LEBANESE CRISIS, ARE ALSO INTENDED TO MATCH THE GROWTH OF THE EGYPT/JORDAN/IRAQ/PLO AXIS. KHADDAM'S VISIT TO ALGIERS (28/29 JANUARY) COULD BE VIEWED IN THE SAME CONTEXT.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
LIMITED PS
NENAD PS/LADY YOUNG
MED PS/MR LUCE
DEFENCE DEPT PS/PUS
FUSD SIR J BULLARD
NEWS DEPT SIR J LEAHY
UND SIR W HARDING
NAD MR WRIGHT
WED MR CARTLEDGE
SED MR MACINNES
ECD(E) MR ADAMS
FINANCE DEPT MR JENKINS
PROTOCOL DEPT MR EGERTON
PLANNING STAFF
NED

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MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FROM TEL AVIV 131410Z FEB 84

Prime Minister

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 37 OF 13 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, UKRMS NEW YORK,
PARIS AND ROME. *mt*

MY TELNO 35: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE ISRAELIS ARE STICKING FIRMLY TO THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT.
DESPITE ITS WANING PROSPECTS THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY ARE
NOT GOING TO LET THE LEBANESE OR AMERICANS OFF THE HOOK BY
ALLOWING IT TO APPEAR THAT THE ISRAELI LINE IS SOFTENING.

2. SHAMIR HAS SPOKEN TWICE IN THE PAST FEW DAYS ABOUT THE
SEVERE VIEW ISRAEL WOULD TAKE OF THE AGREEMENT BEING ABROGATED.
AT A MEETING YESTERDAY OF YOUNG PARTY ACTIVISTS HE SAID THAT
ABROGATION BY THE LEBANESE WOULD BE AN EXPRESSION OF THEIR
ABANDONING THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE. IN THAT EVENT SHAMIR ADDED
QUOTE WE SHALL CONSIDER OURSELVES FREE OF THE OBLIGATIONS WE
UNDERTOOK IN THAT AGREEMENT AND WE MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON IN A UNILATERAL MANNER
UNQUOTE. HIS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE UNILATERAL ACTION IS PICKED
UP IN THE PRESS BY UNATTRIBUTABLE SOURCES WHO SAY THAT ISRAELI
TROOPS ARE LIKELY ANYWAY TO REMAIN IN LEBANON INDEFINITELY BECAUSE
OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE GEMAYEL REGIME.

3. SHAMIR'S REMARKS SEEMED DIRECTED AS MUCH AT WASHINGTON AS
BEIRUT. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN ADVISING
ISRAEL NOT TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF A FUSS SHOULD GEMAYEL ABROGATE
THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON CALLED
ON EAGLEBURGER ON INSTRUCTIONS ON 10 FEBRUARY TO URGE THE
ADMINISTRATION TO MAINTAIN FULL SUPPORT FOR IT, ARGUING THAT IF
THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT CAVED IN TO SYRIAN INSPIRED PRESSURE THEY
WOULD MERELY INVITE FURTHER DEMANDS.

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4. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO FEND OFF ABROGATION, EVEN IF THEY MAY HAVE PRIVATELY CONCLUDED THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BEYOND REDEMPTION. OFFICIALS SUCH AS LUBRANI AND BAR-ON (MY TELEGRAMS NOS 34 AND 35) TAKE A RELATIVELY DETACHED VIEW OF THE REALITIES, THOUGH EVEN BAR-ON ARGUED THAT GEMAYEL DID NOT NEED TO DAMAGE HIMSELF WITH THE CHRISTIANS BY CAVING IN COMPLETELY TO SYRIAN PRESSURE. BUT THE ISRAELIS NEVER WANT TO DISCARD A LOSING CARD FOR NOTHING. HANGING ON TO IT MAY, THEY HOPE, ENABLE THEM AT LEAST TO SECURE SOMETHING IN RETURN IF AND WHEN THEY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ADMIT THAT THE AGREEMENT CAN NO LONGER BE SALVAGED. ABOVE ALL, LIKUD MINISTERS HAVE A STRONG DOMESTIC POLITICAL INTEREST IN PRESERVING EVEN A DORMANT 17 MAY AGREEMENT, AS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING JUSTIFICATIONS TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC FOR THE LONG AND COSTLY WAR IN LEBANON. THIS ALONE WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE STRIDENT TONE OF SHAMIR'S REMARKS.

5. THE ARGUMENTS WHICH THE ISRAELIS DEPLOY AGAINST ABROGATION CAN BE SUMMARISED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) EVEN THOUGH GEMAYEL IS INCAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, ABROGATION IS FAR MORE HARMFUL TO ISRAEL THAN LETTING IT LIE ON THE TABLE SEMICOLON

(B) ITS PROVISIONS WOULD TERMINATE THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS WELL AS RECOGNISING THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. AS SUCH, IT HAS A CERTAIN INTRINSIC VALUE EVEN WHILE UNIMPLEMENTED SEMICOLON

(C) ABROGATION WOULD SET A DEPLORABLE PRECEDENT. IT WOULD SIGNAL TO ALL AND SUNDRY THAT SYRIA CALLS THE SHOTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. NO MODERATE ARAB STATE WOULD IN FUTURE DARE TO SIGN ANY AGREEMENT LET ALONE A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL SEMICOLON

(D) ESPECIALLY IF THE UNITED STATES ACQUESCED IN SUCH BACKSLIDING, ABROGATION MIGHT ALSO ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY TOO COULD BACK AWAY FROM THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL.

6. I SUSPECT THAT THERE IS ALSO AN ELEMENT IN ALL THIS OF THE ISRAELIS PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE AGREEMENT IS ABROGATED. THEY DO NOT WANT TO STAY LOCKED INTO

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LEBANON

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LEBANON. BUT INCREASINGLY IT LOOKS AS IF THEY MAY SEE NO EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RELY LARGELY ON THEIR OWN RESOURCES FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY. IF THEY DO DECIDE ON A REDUCED MILITARY PRESENCE FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE, ABROGATION OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANON WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT WILL CERTAINLY BE PLAYED UP BY THEM IN JUSTIFICATION.

MOBERLY -

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DESKBY 131530Z FCO/UKMIS NY/ WASHINGTON

FM BEIRUT 131500Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 13 FEBRUARY

AND IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, THE HAGUE,
TRIPOLI, MOSCOW, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.Prime Minister

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 147: LEBANON.

1. AKHUND, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE IN LEBANON, ASKED TO SEE ME TODAY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT IN BEIRUT, INCLUDING THE IDEA THAT THE UN MIGHT GUARD CROSSING POINTS ON THE GREEN LINE. HE WAS TO MAKE IT CLEAR IN THIS, IN VIEW OF THE PUBLICITY WE HAD GIVEN TO OUR ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK, THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD NOT TAKEN A VIEW ON OUR PROPOSALS, LET ALONE GIVEN THEM HIS SUPPORT.

2. I EXPLAINED TO AKHUND THAT WE BELIEVED THAT A UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT WOULD BE USEFUL. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ALMOST ANY PROPOSAL WOULD BE OBJECTED TO BY ONE OR OTHER PARTY FOR SOME REASON. THE SYRIANS AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE BELIEVED TO BE OPPOSED TO ANY UN PRESENCE UNTIL THE MNF HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. BUT IT SEEMED TO US THAT THERE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY OF OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS IF THE UN WAS ASKED IN TO FULFIL SOME SIMPLE ROLE OF OBVIOUS HUMANITARIAN VALUE, EG GUARDING CROSSING POINTS. THE FRENCH WERE NOW ENGAGED ON OPENING THESE. BUT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES WERE KNOWN TO BE INTERESTED IN A UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT TO WHICH THEY COULD EVENTUALLY HAND OVER.

3. AKHUND SEEMED PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF THE UN PLAYING THE ROLE ENVISAGED. BUT HE IS CLEARLY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES. MOREOVER, HE HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN INFORMED OF URQUHART'S VIEW (THOUGH HE DID NOT PROFESS TO SHARE IT) THAT AN ARMED UNIT, EG ONE OF THE UNMIL DETACHMENTS, COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN BEIRUT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID THAT THE UNTSO (OGB) OBSERVERS WERE NOT ABLE TO OPERATE AT PRESENT. THEIR VEHICLES WERE LIABLE TO SEIZURE BY MILITIAMEN. THIS PROBLEM WAS A NIGHTMARE FOR THE UN. UNICEF AND UNDP HAD ALSO HAD VEHICLES COMMANDEERED.

4. THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH PUBLICITY FOR OUR IDEAS HERE IN BEIRUT, THOUGH THOSE WITH AN INTEREST ARE WELL AWARE OF THEM AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME REFERENCES IN THE PRESS TO OUR ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK. I SEE WITH MISLEAGE IN PURSUING THE CROSSING POINT IDEA FOR THE MOMENT, SINCE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT WANT THE UN IN FOR FEAR OF LOSING THE MNF (WE SHALL CHECK THIS TOMORROW), THE FRENCH WANT THEMSELVES TO EXPLOIT SUCH KUDOS AS CAN BE GAINED FROM OPENING CROSSINGS, AND THE NATIONALISTS FEAR THAT C

STALLING THE UN ON THE GREEN LINE MAY LEAD TO PERMANENT PARTITION ON THE CYPRUS MODEL (SEE MY SEPARATE TELEGRAM ON BERRI'S VIEWS). ON THE OTHER HAND, WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE ADVANTAGE IN PURSUING THE IDEA THAT THE UN COULD USEFULLY BE BROUGHT IN TO HELP WITH SOME MODEST BUT NECESSARY TASK (IF NOT A CROSSING POINT, WHY NOT THE AIRPORT?): AND IN DUE COURSE EVEN THE FRENCH MAY BE READY TO HAND OVER CROSSING POINTS, AS WELL AS OTHER POSTS, TO THE UN.

MTERS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
FUSD
NEWS DEPT
UND
NAD
WED
SED
ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
NAD
PLANNING STAFF

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
SIR W HARDING
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JENKINS
MR EGERTON

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

2

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GR 750

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DESKBY 131630Z

FM BEIRUT 131445Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 13 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV,
PARIS, ROME, MODUK, CBFC

Prime Minister

MY TELNO 111: LEBANON

ms

1. PALMER AND I CALLED ON BERRI TODAY. HE ASKED HIM HOW HE NOW ENVISAGED THAT GEMAYEL WOULD FORM A GOVERNMENT. BERRI SAID THAT AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING MATTERS IN DISPUTE WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE A GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED. THESE INCLUDED NOT JUST THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT BUT ALSO ASPECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE ARMY. HE DID NOT FLATLY RULE OUT GOING TO GENEVA ON 27 FEBRUARY. BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSARY POINTS COULD BE REACHED IN TIME. GENEVA HAD BEEN A SUCCESS, BUT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CONCENTRATED ON STRENGTHENING HIS OWN POSITION INSTEAD OF WORKING FOR RECONCILIATION. EVEN NOW, IF HE COULD MAKE ONE FIRM GESTURE OF RECONCILIATION - EG ADMIT THAT HE WAS SORRY FOR THE POUNDING OF THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS - THIS WOULD MAKE A GREAT DIFFERENCE. BERRI CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS NOT CURRENTLY CALLING FOR GEMAYEL'S RESIGNATION (DESPITE A SPIEGEL ARTICLE APPARENTLY PUBLISHED TODAY WHICH HAS ATTRACTED PRESS ATTENTION TO THAT EFFECT). HIS POSITION WAS THAT GEMAYEL OUGHT EITHER TO STEP DOWN OF HIS OWN ACCORD OR ELSE UNDERTAKE TO SUBMIT HIMSELF FOR RE-ELECTION AFTER TWO YEARS IN OFFICE, IN THE SUMMER.

2. HE ASKED BERRI WHAT THE NEXT STEPS NOW WERE FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF POLITICAL FIGURES FROM DAMASCUS (MY TUR). BERRI SAID THAT THE SYRIAN INVITATION TO THE EX-PRIME MINISTERS HAD NOT YET HAD NOT BEEN INTENDED TO NOBBLE INTENDING CANDIDATES IN ADVANCE: RATHER TO STRENGTHEN THE SYRIAN INFLUENCE OVER SUNNI OPINION IN GENERAL. BERRI ADDED THAT THE BALL WAS NOW IN GEMAYEL'S COURT. AMAL HAD MADE ITS PROPOSAL ABOUT A TWO-YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM. IT WAS NOW UP TO THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE HIS POSITION CLEAR AND TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR ENDING THE IMPASSE.

3. BERRI MADE IT CLEAR THAT FOR THE TIME BEING HE WAS CONCENTRATING ON PRACTICAL STEPS. FIRST, HE HAD ARRANGED FOR THE GENDARMERIE TO DISPLACE THE MILITIAS FROM THE STREETS OF WEST BEIRUT: THEN HE HAD WORKED ON GETTING CROSSING POINTS ACROSS THE GREEN LINE OPENED. THE NEXT STEP WAS TO ARRANGE RE-PROVISIONING OF WEST BEIRUT (NEWS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF CONVOYS EVEN WHILE WE SPOKE). THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO GET THE SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT RE-OPENED: AFTER THAT, RE-OPENING OF THE AIRPORT.

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/4

4. BERRI THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED A UN FORCE TO TAKE OVER THE POLICING OF ALL BEIRUT. HE DID NOT TRUST THE ARMY. NEUTRAL POLICING WAS NECESSARY WHILE THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION PROCEEDED. THE BRITISH AND ITALIANS HAD DONE A MAGNIFICENT JOB IN THE MNF. HE HOPED THAT THEY, THE CANADIANS (WHOSE AGREEMENT HE CLAIMED TO HAVE OBTAINED) AND OTHERS WOULD NOW BE PREPARED TO JOIN A UN FORCE, ARMED LIKE UNIFIL, TO POLICE BEIRUT IN COOPERATION WITH THE GENDARMERIE. THE ARMY IN BEIRUT WOULD MEANWHILE REMAIN IN BARRACKS. HE DID NOT WANT THE UN JUST MANNING THE CROSSINGS ON THE GREEN LINE. THIS WAS TOO NEAR THE CYPRUS PRECEDENT AND COULD LEAD TO PERMANENT PARTITION. HE SAID THAT ALL THIS WAS WILDLY AMBITIOUS, ALTHOUGH HE SYMPATHISED WITH HIS INTENTIONS. THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD NOT WANT TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENORMOUS TASK HE ENVISAGED. NO COUNTRIES WOULD AGREE TO CONTRIBUTE CONTINGENTS FOR SUCH A DANGEROUS MISSION. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR SUCH UN FORCES TO REMAIN IMPARTIAL, AND THE NUMBERS REQUIRED WOULD BE HUGE FOR ANY FORCE THAT WAS REALLY EXPECTED TO BRING EFFECTIVE POLICING TO A CITY SO TURBULENT AS BEIRUT. HE SUGGESTED THAT, IF HE WISHED TO BRING THE UN IN, HE WOULD DO BETTER TO CONCENTRATE ON GETTING A UN PRESENCE TO HELP OVER A LIMITED AND EVIDENTLY IMPORTANT TASK, EG A CROSSING POINT, THE REFUGEE CAMPS, OR THE AIRPORT. MOREOVER, HE WOULD NEED TO GET GEMAYEL'S AGREEMENT, SINCE THE UN WOULD NEVER ACT EXCEPT AT THE REQUEST OF THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. BERRI SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT ALL THIS. HE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT AND TO LET HIM HAVE ANY FURTHER VIEWS.

5. WHILE BERRI WAS INTERRUPTED BY A TELEPHONE CALL WE ASKED HIS AIDES WHETHER AMAL SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO INTRODUCE THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO ANY AREAS IN THE SOUTH WHICH THE ISRAELIS MIGHT UNILATERALLY ABANDON. THEY SAID THAT AMAL FAVOURED THIS: BUT IT WOULD NEED TO BE DONE BY ARMY UNITS WHICH RALLIED TO THE NATIONALISTS IN WEST BEIRUT (EG 6 BRIGADE) RATHER THAN ARMY UNITS FROM THE EAST. HE ASKED THEM WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE ISRAELIS AS GEMAYEL HAD BEEN DOING. THEY SAID THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE.

MTERS

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
 LIMITED PS
 NENAD PS/LADY YOUNG
 MED PS/MR LUCE
 DEFENCE DEPT PS/PUS
 PUSD SIR J BULLARD
 NEWS DEPT SIR J LEAHY
 UND SIR W HARDING
 NAD MR WRIGHT
 WED MR CARTLEDGE
 SED MR MACINNES
 ECD(E) MR ADAMS
 FINANCE DEPT MR JENKINS
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HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/UND
HD/NAD
HD/WED
HD/SED
HD/ECD (E)
HD/FINANCE DEPT
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT

M. Gales

R.C.

IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140110Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 154 OF 13 FEBRUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW (FOR
S OF S'S PARTY)
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, THE HAGUE.

MY TELNO 147: LEBANON: UK PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1. MORE SPADEWORK ON UK PROPOSALS. THESE ARE REGARDED AS MORE
LIKELY TO RUN BECAUSE THEY ARE LESS FAR-REACHING THAN THE
FRENCH PROPOSALS REPORTED SEPARATELY. URQUHART IS MOLLIFIED.

DETAIL

2. AS FORESHADOWED IN TUR THE HEAD OF CHANCERY SPOKE TO
URQUHART AGAIN TODAY, 13 FEBRUARY. HE HAD SIMMERED DOWN A GOOD
DEAL NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE NEWS THAT THE FRENCH HAD UPPED
THE ANTE SO DRAMATICALLY (PARIS TELNO 190, NOT TO ALL).
HE AS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DAMAGE THAT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE
MIGHT DO TO AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN THAN ABOUT THE DAMAGE,
REAL OR IMAGINED, CAUSED BY THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO OUR APPROACH.
HE DID SAY, THOUGH, THAT HAVING STARTED HIS PEOPLE IN THE AREA
WORKING ON POSSIBLE OPTIONS IN BEIRUT HE HAD HAD TO CALL THEM OFF
BECAUSE OF THIS PUBLICITY. NEVERTHELESS, HE REMAINED INTERESTED
IN OUR IDEAS FOR SMALL STEPS IN BEIRUT WHICH HE THOUGHT WERE MORE
LIKELY TO SUCCEED THAN THE LARGE STEP PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH.
SPECIFICALLY HE SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF
THE UN GUARDING VULNERABLE TARGETS SUCH AS ELECTRICAL

LIKELY TO SUCCEED THAN THE LARGE STEP PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH. SPECIFICALLY HE SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UN GUARDING VULNERABLE TARGETS SUCH AS ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS AND THE AIRPORT AS THEY HAD DONE IN THE CONGO.

3. WHEN I SAW THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE PERFECTLY READY TO TAKE PART IN ANY DEBATE IF THE FRENCH CALLED FOR ONE (MY TELNO 152). IN DOING SO, WE WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO AIR THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAD PUT TO THE SECRETARIAT. OUR IDEA WAS TO MAXIMISE THE UN'S EFFORT WITHIN ITS EXISTING MANDATE. THIS MEANT GIVING THE GREATEST POSSIBLE VISIBILITY TO UN OBSERVERS NOW IN BEIRUT AND SEEING IF THERE WERE PARTICULAR TASKS WHICH THEY COULD OPERATE. SHAH NAWAZ AGAIN RESPONDED POSITIVELY.

4. I ALSO BRIEFED MRS KIRKPATRICK, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON, ON WHAT WE HAD PROPOSED. SHE MADE NO DIRECT COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS BUT SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE PUT OFF BY THE SECRETARIAT.

5. VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) WITH WHOM I HAVE ALSO BEEN CONTACT, SAID THAT OUR IDEAS WERE MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE THAN THE FRENCH INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO PARALYSIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MODEST STEPS WERE BETTER. GAUCI (MALTA) SIMILARLY TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGH OUR IDEAS SOUNDED VERY REASONABLE.

MARGETSON

NNNN

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
SECRET

Department

Drafted by

(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Precedence
FLASH

25

Tel. Extn.

DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date) 13.2.84

(Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.)..SECRET.....

(Caveat/
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

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TO FLASH MOSCOW Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR JOHN COLES, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY FROM BARCLAY, NO. 10.

Lebanon: MNF Coordinating Committee.

1. A meeting of the MNF Coordinating Committee has been called for 1200 local time tomorrow. Mr. Stanley seeks guidance on who should represent the British contingent.

2. The choice lies between Commander BRITFORLEB, who could be flown in from Reliant, and the Assistant Defence Attache (Colonel Cross) who is already in Beirut.

3. Earlier instructions were that we should distance ourself from the MNF, and ~~on this basis Mr. Stanley is proposing to send the~~ ^{this would suggest sending the} Assistant Defence Attache. ~~But~~

CDS's view, however, is that he may be refused

Copies to:-

admission, and for that reason ^{the Minister} ~~the~~ proposes to
send Commander Britforleb. He would be grateful
~~he would be grateful for confirmation, in case~~
~~the decision is affected by weekend discussions~~
with Vice-President Bush, to know whether the
PM would be content.

4. Instructions need to be sent to Beirut by
2200 London time. Grateful if you could telephone
an indication of the Prime Minister's views before
then. ~~say option A equals Commander BRITFORLEB,~~
~~option B equals Assistant Defence Attache,~~

say before then whether the PM
agrees with the Minister's
recommendation.

MESSAGE ENDS

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 24

2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO HOST GOVERNMENT AT THE HIGHEST FEASIBLE LEVEL.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS CONSIDERING IMPLEMENTING HIS PLAN TO RE-ORIENT THE US MNF CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT WITHIN ABOUT THIRTY DAYS.

-- WE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU DURING THIS PROCESS TO ENSURE COORDINATION OF OUR ACTIONS.

-- OUR FORCES IN AND OFFSHORE BEIRUT WILL CONTINUE TO BE AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND PROTECTION TO OTHER MNF CONTINGENTS. (FOR PARIS FYI: WE UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH VIEWS ON THIS, AND ASSUME THEY UNDERSTAND OUR REASONS FOR CONTINUING TO SAY IT. END FYI.)

-- WE DO NOT PLAN ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS

IMETABLE.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AS OUR PLANS EVOLVE. OUR MILITARIES ALSO SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT.

-- WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING THE MNF IN SUPPORT OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BRING STABILITY TO LEBANON, AND TO STRENGTHENING THE LAF. PLANNED PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO THE LAF, INCLUDING COUNTER BATTERY FIRE CAPABILITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM/ COUNTER-INSURGENCY, WILL PROCEED AS RAPIDLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE CONDITIONS IN TANDEM WITH THE REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SHIPS OFFSHORE. THE PRESENCE OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LEBANON WILL THUS BE

TRANSFORMED TO SUPPORT MORE EFFECTIVELY OUR DIPLOMATIC
EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE GOL.

-- FOR LONDON: WE HOPE UK TROOPS WITHDRAWN TO HMS
RELIANT WILL REMAIN OFF THE LEBANESE COAST OR STAY IN
CYPRUS UNTIL THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT BECOMES CLEARER. WE
ENCOURAGE MAINTAINING A STRONG AIR AND NAVAL PRESENCE
OFFSHORE. WE ALSO URGE HMG TO USE ITS SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE WITH THE DRUZE TO URGE MODERATION AND
CONCILIATION, AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO TRAINING OF THE LAF.
WE APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE IMAGE OF
CONSENSUS AND COORDINATION AMONG THE MNF PARTNERS.

~~BE AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND PROTECTION TO OTHER MNF
CONTINGENTS. (FOR PARIS FYI: WE UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH
VIEWS ON THIS, AND ASSUME THEY UNDERSTAND OUR REASONS FOR
CONTINUING TO SAY IT. END FYI.)~~

~~-- WE DO NOT PLAN ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS
TIMETABLE.~~

~~-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AS
OUR PLANS EVOLVE. OUR MILITARIES ALSO SHOULD REMAIN IN
CLOSE CONTACT.~~

-- WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING THE MNF IN
SUPPORT OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BRING STABILITY TO
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OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO THE LAF, INCLUDING COUNTER
BATTERY FIRE CAPABILITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM/
COUNTER-INSURGENCY, WILL PROCEED AS RAPIDLY AS
APPROPRIATE TO THE CONDITIONS IN TANDEM WITH THE
REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SHIPS OFFSHORE. THE
PRESENCE OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LEBANON WILL THUS BE



five

RW

cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 February, 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 10 February containing a message to her from the Prime Minister of Australia about the evacuation of Australian staff from Beirut.

Mrs. Thatcher is glad that we were able to help you in this way.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A.R. Parsons

ls

FSE PASS FOLLOWING TO NO 10

2 NO 10.
1 DIO (FOR INFO)
1 FILE

FOCAB 002/12

~~FOCAB~~ OFF

GR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BEIRUT 120630Z FEB 94

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 111 OF 12 FEBRUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME,
URKIS NEW YORK.

BY TELNO 108 AND 109: LEBANON.

1. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS HERE ARE:

- (A) GEMAYEL APPEARS TO HAVE PERSUADED THE SAUDIS TO RESUME ACTIVITY. HARIRI WAS AT THE PALACE YESTERDAY (11 FEB) BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR YET WHETHER A FURTHER LEBANESE/ SYRIAN/SAUDI MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL CAN BE ARRANGED.
- (B) THE DRUZE LEADERS HAMADE AND JUMBLATT'S COUSIN KHALID HAVE RETURNED TO BEIRUT ALONG WITH RASHED SOLH AND SALIM AL HESS (TWO OF THE EX-PRIME MINISTERS WHO HAVE BEEN CONFERRING IN DAMASCUS). THEY MET BERRI. IT WAS AGREED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE AUTHORITIES TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND ABANDON THEIR STYLE OF GOVERNMENT OVER THE LAST 15 MONTHS.
- (C) THE FRENCH HAVE MANAGED TO OPEN A PASSAGE ACROSS THE GREEN LINE FOR A SHORT PERIOD.

2. THE CHIEF DANGER, AS I SEE IT, IS THAT THE AMERICANS MAY MISS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA BY ONCE AGAIN OFFERING TOO LITTLE TOO LATE. I HAVE NO WAY OF TELLING WHETHER THE SHELLING FROM SYRIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY HAS TAILED OFF (IT HAS NOT STOPPED) BECAUSE OF COUNTER-BOMBARDMENT BY THE SIXTH FLEET. THE AMERICANS MAY BE MISLEADING THEMSELVES. THEIR NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS HAVE CAUSED ENORMOUS RESENTMENT AND SOURED THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. AN EQUALLY PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE REDUCED THE SHELLING BECAUSE THEIR ALLIES HAVE NOW WON THE BATTLE OF WEST BEIRUT. IN ANY CASE THE AMERICANS, HAVING MADE THE VITAL CONCESSIONS OVER THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES, NOW HAVE THE CHANCE OF DOING A DEAL, PROVIDED THAT THEY DO NOT ONCE MORE OVER-ESTIMATE THEIR REAL STRENGTH AND CONSEQUENTLY MISS THE BOAT (CF SHULTZ QUOTE NOW IS NOT THE RIGHT TIME UNQUOTE. WASHINGTON TELNO 481).

3. (FOR RESIDENT CLERK) THIS ANSWER YOUR TELNO 79 TO ME ONLY.


MIERS

BT

SITUATION REPORT

LEBANON EVACUATION: FINAL SITREP 1700 HRS 12 FEBRUARY 1984

1. There have been no general reports from Beirut since the last SITREP at 0630 hrs this morning.
2. Nicosia, with the assistance of the Sovereign Base Area at Akrotiri, continue to provide any necessary assistance to the evacuees. So far, only 9 British nationals have needed to be repatriated to the UK from Cyprus at public expense against undertakings to repay. Some more may require similar assistance, but most have been able to make their own arrangements.
3. Nicosia have reported that a further 35 British nationals (making a total of 52) have been disembarked in Cyprus today from United States vessels. The Americans have no news of any further British evacuees on board their ships.
4. The evacuation can now be regarded as successfully concluded. A total of 518 persons were evacuated under British arrangements. These included 190 British nationals, 126 Commonwealth citizens, 3 Irish nationals, and 199 others. (These figures are subject to a final check by Nicosia of the details of those processed through the SBA at Akrotiri.)
5. There have been only 3 enquiries from members of the public received in the Consular Emergency Unit in the last 24 hours.
6. The Consular Emergency Unit is now closing down. Further enquiries will be dealt with by Consular Department or the Resident Clerks as necessary. Consular Department will submit a round-up report on 13 February.


A G McMahon
Consular Emergency Unit

12 February 1984

Distribution:

PS/No 10 ✓
PS/PUS, W15
Sir J Bullard, W33
Chief Clerk, 3M 013
Sir J Leahy, W35
Mr Wright, E122
Mr Egerton, E205
Mr Cartledge, E303
Mr Long, NENAD, W97
Mr Nixon, NENAD, W97
Mr Chaplin, NENAD, W76A
Head of Defence Dept, E307
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Mr Beveridge, Finance Dept, CH502
Head of News Dept

Private Secretaries:

B J P Fall, W52
S G Eldon, K183
S Lamport, W48
H B Warren-Gash, W57
M A Power, L927
R Kinchen, MVO, WH202
Resident Clerk

*Refused to Cheques
on 12/2 at 0855hrs*

SITUATION REPORT

LEBANON EVACUATION: SITREP 0630 HOURS, 12 FEBRUARY 1984

1. There have been no general reports from either Beirut or Nicosia since the last Sitrep at 1730 hours, 11 February.

East Beirut

2. The British Consular Officer, Mr Wilson, is still at Jounieh to offer advice to any nationals remaining: some passenger ships are now operating from Jounieh to Cyprus.

Beirut

3. A telex reply Beirut have asked us to pass to the Indian Embassy there indicates they asked - too late in the day - whether we could evacuate Indian nationals.

Cyprus

4. The US vessel carrying nine British nationals is due at Larnaca shortly.

General


5. We have now been able to contact a further two Embassies (France and Switzerland) whose nationals we have evacuated.

6. The Immigration Authorities at Heathrow have agreed to admit 10 foreign nationals whose spouses and children are British citizens.

7. The figures of evacuees we have from Beirut, Jounieh and Nicosia are not entirely consistent; we are endeavouring to clarify them.

8. There have been no telephone calls from members of the public since early evening, 11 February.

12 February 1984


Marian Clay
Consular Emergency Unit

Distribution:

PS/No. 10 ✓
PS/PUS, W15
Sir J Bullard, W33
Chif Clerk, 3M 013
Sir J Leahy, W 35
Mr Wright, E122
Mr Egerton, E205
Mr Cartledge, E303
Mr Long, NENAD, W97
Mr Nixon, NENAD, W97
Mr Chaplin, NENAD, W76A
Head of Defence Dept, E307
Head of POD, 3M 010
Mr Beveridge, Finance Dept, CH 502

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H B Warren-Gash, W 57
M A Power, L 927
R Kinchen, MVO, WH 202
Resident Clerk

SITUATION REPORT

LEBANON EVACUATION: SITREP 17.30 11 FEBRUARY 1984

Beirut

1. The Embassy, Beirut have reported (08.45Z) that the flat where two COD Communicators were sleeping was hit by a Rocket. The two officers were shaken but not hurt. Small arms fire (10.55Z) was fired into a group of evacuees being processed by Americans in Beirut; a 10 year old girl in the group, believed to be a Turkish national, was slightly hurt. Beirut have also reported (12.05Z) that American evacuation was proceeding smoothly and that further British helicopters were not required. At 13.00Z Embassy reported quiet morning, more cars and shops open.

Cyprus

2. BHC Nicosia telephoned (10.30Z) to report everything was going smoothly in Cyprus. Most British nationals had made their own arrangements for accommodation in, and onward journeys from, Cyprus. British evacuees have commented that they were pleased with evacuation arrangements and the way that everything went smoothly. Nicosia has repatriated 5 people today (11 February) at public expense by air from Cyprus to UK. A further 4 British nationals (mother and 3 young children) will be repatriated on 12 February. Repatriation to the UK is against a signed undertaking to repay costs in accordance with standard practice

General

3. We have lists giving names, nationality and passport numbers of people evacuated from West Beirut and Jounieh, also of 17 British nationals who arrived on an American vessel at Larnaca during afternoon of 11 February. The Emergency Unit has telephoned all those (13 people) who had enquired earlier about next of kin, where the next of kin concerned appear on our lists. In most cases the next of kin had already telephoned families in UK from Cyprus. The Emergency Unit has also confirmed names to 17 Embassies and High Commissions in London - Afghan, Australian, Austrian, Belgian, Canadian, Danish, West German, Ghana, Greek, Italian, Jordanian, Dutch, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, South African, Syrian, United States of America - whose nationals are on

/ our

our lists; we have so far been unable to reach a duty officer at 10 further Embassies, whose nationals we have evacuated. We are continuing with efforts to make contact.

4. BHC Nicosia say another US vessel is due to reach Larnaca at 07.00 on 12 February. There are 9 British nationals on board. Someone from Nicosia will meet and inform us of names.

5. The Greek Ambassador telephoned (15.50) to ask whether a small number of Greek Embassy families could be included with the British evacuation. I explained that this had been completed, but that the Americans had continued with their evacuation today and we had also heard that commercial vessels were leaving Jounieh. The Ambassador confirmed that the Greeks were in touch with our and the US Embassy in Beirut, also with Washington.

6. The Emergency Unit has answered telephone calls from 25 members of the public about next of kin.

D M Symes

Miss D M Symes
Consular Emergency Unit

11 February, 1984

Distribution:-

PS/No 10
PS/PUS W15
Sir J Bullard, W33
Chief Clerk, 3M 013
Sir J Leahy, W35
Mr Wright, E122
Mr Egerton, E205
Mr Cartledge, E303
Mr Long, NENAD, W97
Mr Nixon, NENAD, W97
Mr Chaplin, NENAD, W76A
Head of Defence Dept, E307
Head of POD, 3M 010
Mr Beveridge, Finance Dept CH502

Private Secretaries:-

B J P Fall, W52
S Eldon, K183
S Lambort, W48
H B Warren-Gash, W57
M A Power, L927
R Kinchen, MVO, WH202
Resident Clerk.

SITUATION REPORT

LEBANON EVACUATION : SITREP 0700 11 FEBRUARY 1984

West Beirut

1. The Ambassador reported at 1430Z 10 February that the evacuation had been completed from West Beirut, and that the Royal Navy had lifted out 458 in total. The US evacuation is now in full swing and no problems have been reported.

East Beirut

2. It was not possible for the Sol Ghiorgios to dock at Jounieh but all those who applied for evacuation in Jounieh were lifted off by helicopter to the RFA Reliant.

General

3. The High Commission in Nicosia have reported that the total of 518 evacuees (both from West Beirut and Jounieh) had arrived safely at Akrotiri. The High Commission and their Consular team at the SBAs are arranging to process the onward journeys of these evacuees, the first of whom are expected to arrive at Heathrow today. They will also make any necessary arrangements for 20-25 British nationals said to be onboard a US vessel due at Lanaka this morning.

4. Full details of a breakdown by nationality of all 518 evacuees are not yet available but the High Commission in Nicosia reports that in the first 224 evacuees there were British, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Germans, Greeks, Canadians, Australians, Italians, Dutch, Danish, French, Austrians, Swedes and one Indian.

5. The High Commission hope to be able to provide more details of the evacuees in the course of today, and the Embassy in Beirut have also promised a further breakdown.


6. The Americans, whose evacuation operation will continue today, have agreed to take on any British stragglers, but in case of real need British helicopter capacity from the

/RFA....

RFA Reliant could be made available if HMA Beirut reports that this would really be desirable.

7. The vessel Sol Ghiorgios is due to return to Cyprus today, and with the standby vessel, Sol Phyrne, is being stood down.

8. In the last 24 hours, the Consular Emergency Unit has received only about twenty enquiries from members of the public.



A G McMahon
Consular Emergency Unit

11 February 1984

Distribution:-

PS/No 10
PS/PUS, W15
Sir J Bullard, W33
Chief Clerk, 3M 013
Sir J Leahy, W35
Mr Wright, E122
Mr Egerton, E205
Mr Cartledge, E303
Mr Long, NENAD, W97
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Mr Chaplin, NENAD, W99
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B J P Fall, W52
S Eldon, K183
S Lamport, W48
H B Warren-Gash, W57
M A Power, L927
R Kinchen, MVO, WH 202

CONFIDENTIAL

Mufaxed to
Cheques 2020 LS
11/2/84

PS

Copies to: PS/No 10 Downing Street
PS/PUS
PS/Mr Luce
Sir J Leahy
Mr Egerton
Resident Clerk, Ministry of Defence
Mr Long, Head of NENAD

LEBANON: MNF

1. As I told you on the telephone, the US Embassy delivered to the FCO at 12.30pm today a further message from Washington. Copies of this have already been sent to number 10: I attach further copies for ease of reference and copies are going to all recipients of this minute.

2. As you asked, I have consulted NENAD who have commented as follows:

- (a) The content of the message is not new: it closely reflects the content of our exchanges with the Americans during the past few days notably with Mr Richard Murphy on 8 and 9 February. Our discussions have been fully reported in the telegrams.
- (b) The latest American message reflects the US interest in our continuing to remain members of the MNF. The reference to our contingent remaining either aboard RFA Reliant or in Cyprus gives us useful operational leeway.
- (c) The message reflects the US interest in continuing close consultation among the MNF in which we have played a leading role.

/(d)

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- (d) The reference to '30 days' in the first sentence is not completely clear. The US Embassy officer who informed us of the message agreed with our tentative interpretation that it looked as if the Americans now intend to carry out within the 30 days the full programme of redeployment which they earlier foresaw as lasting until 'the Spring' or even 'the early Summer'. If so, this would reflect a slightly faster pace, no doubt in response to pressures from Congress in the last two days.
- (e) A request for help with training will be difficult. Any UK help to the LAF ought probably to be only in the context of an agreed programme of reform. Decisions on this will require attention from Ministers in the further discussion of our own future policy on the Lebanese crisis which are to be held early next week in the light of the results of the Prime Minister's discussions with Vice President Bush.

W A Harrison


W A Harrison
Resident Clerk

11 February 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

...

1. I attach a copy of an Australian press release sent to me by the Australian High Commission in London. Paragraph 4 is particularly generous in its praise of the assistance provided by HMG.



A G McMahon
Beirut Emergency Unit

10 February 1984

Distribution:

PS/No 10 ✓ A.J.C. 13/10
PS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Whitney
PS/PUS
PS/Ministry of Defence
Defence Situation Centre, MOD.
Mr Egerton
Lord N Gordon Lennox
News Dept
Consular Dept
NENAD



Mr T. McMahon

*With the Compliments
of the
Political Affairs Branch*

J.M.L. Woods

10 February 1984

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE STRAND,
LONDON WC2B 4LA

2071 12 +

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TOR 1212 10.02.84

O.CH170001 1938 10.2.84 UNC

TO.

II LONDON/7058 WASHINGTON/7226 DAMASCUS/4489
II CAIRO/2426 NICOSIA/498 OTTAWA/1239
II TEL AVIV/267 COPENHAGEN/2301 STOCKHOLM/9417

RP.

RR ALL POSTS/6844

FM. CANBERRA /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

BEIRUT EVACUATION

FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE WAS ISSUED 10 FEBRUARY.

BEIRUT : SAFETY OF AUSTRALIAN STAFF

1. THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR BILL HAYDEN, M.P., SAID TODAY THAT AUSTRALIAN STAFF OF THE MISSION IN BEIRUT HAVE BEEN SAFELY EVACUATED FROM LEBANON BY BRITISH MILITARY HELICOPTERS. THE STAFF MEMBERS ARE: PERRY NOLAN, JOHN MCANULTY AND HIS WIFE MICHELLE, AND JILL MORTIMER. THEY ARE PRESENTLY IN CYPRUS AND ARE FIT AND WELL IN SPIITE OF HAVING BEEN THROUGH A GRUELLING AND TENSE EXPERIENCE.
2. "THEY HAVE DISCHARGED THEIR DUTIES IN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES WITH GREAT FORTITUDE AND COMMENDABLE DEDICATION. I AM SURE THAT ALL AUSTRALIANS ARE PROUD OF THEIR EFFORTS," MR HAYDEN SAID.
3. MR HAYDEN ESPECIALLY COMMENDED THE EMBASSY'S EFFORTS IN LOOKING AFTER THE INTERESTS OF AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS, RIGHT UP TO THE LAST MINUTE OF DEPARTURE. THROUGHOUT THE RECENT MONTHS WHEN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN BEIRUT HAD BEEN PROGRESSIVELY DETERIORATING, EMBASSY OFFICERS HAD CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT THEIR CONSULAR RESPONSIBILITIES OFTEN AT CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL RISK. THIS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY SO DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, WHEN AN INTENSIVE EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO

.../2

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH170001

REACH AS MANY CITIZENS AS POSSIBLE.

4. MR HAYDEN SAID, "I AM ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES AND THEIR ARMED SERVICES FOR THE GENEROUS SPIRIT OF HELPFULNESS WHICH RESULTED IN THIS SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION. I HAVE ALREADY CONVEYED MY APPRECIATION TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE. I AM SURE THE PRIME MINISTER - WHO HAS BEEN KEPT CONSTANTLY INFORMED - WILL BE CONTACTING THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TO EXPRESS THE GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE FOR THE HELP OF THE BRITISH. THE INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE OF THE BRITISH SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

5. "TWO EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO EVACUATE STAFF FAILED., FIRST BY SEA BECAUSE OF ROCKET AND GUNFIRE IN THE HARBOUR AREA MAKING THE EXERCISE UNACCEPTABLY HAZARDOUS., AND THE SECOND BY ROAD, BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE A SAFE PASSAGE WITH ALL FACTIONS IN POSITION ALONG THE ROUTE AND THE CONCURRENT DISCLOSURE THAT KEY PARTS OF THE ROAD HAD BEEN MINED.

6. "THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT WORSENS BY THE DAY. BECAUSE OF THE SUDDEN, UNEXPECTED AND RAPID COLLAPSE OF THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT IT BECAME ESSENTIAL THAT OUR STAFF BE EVACUATED FROM THERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID RAISING HOPES AND THEN RISK CREATING UNDERSTANDABLE FEARS BY ANNOUNCING EVACUATION PLANS PREMATURELY WHICH MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY FAIL, AS INDEED DID EVENTUATE ON THE TWO OCCASIONS I MENTIONED. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED TO TRY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY ABOUT ANY PROPOSED EVACUATION WHICH IS NO EASY MATTER IN BEIRUT AT THE BEST OF TIMES AND IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE IN CIRCUMSTANCES LIKE THOSE AT THE PRESENT. PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF EVACUATION ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT HAVE CREATED SOME RISK FOR THE PLAN.

7. "I MENTION THESE FACTORS BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF REGRET TO ME THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE MORE FULLY ON THESE MATTERS EARLIER BUT ON THE OTHER HAND I AM SURE THAT IS UNDERSTOOD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES."

8. PERRY NOLAN, JOHN MCANULTY AND JILL MORTIMER WILL RETURN TO AUSTRALIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR DEBRIEFING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CANBERRA, FOR SOME REST AND RECUPERATION AND FOR REUNION WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

AC. ADVANCE ACTION COPY TO MR PARSONS 1240/10TH

ACTION: POL

LBBD

HC
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
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INWARD

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1 FEB 1984



SUBJECT

cc. MASTER OPS.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

AUSTRALIA HOUSE STRAND WC2B 4LA TEL. 01-438 8209

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 32/84

A.F.C. 10/2

10 February 1984

mf

My dear Prime Minister

Mr Hawke has asked me to pass to you the following message concerning the evacuation of Australian staff from Beirut:

Text begins

Dear Margaret,

The Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, has informed me of the safe evacuation from Lebanon of Australian staff from our mission in Beirut by British Military helicopters.

I should like to express to you my Government's deep appreciation of the assistance rendered by your Armed Services in this emergency. Please convey our thanks to the unit involved in the operation.

Yours sincerely,

Bob Hawke

Text ends.

Yours sincerely

A.R. Parsons

(A.R. Parsons)


The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

AUSTRALIA HOUSE · STRAND · WC2R 4LA · TEL: 01-433 8209



THE HIGH COMMISSIONER



10 FEB 1984

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

ce 700

HU



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1984

Lebanon

The Prime Minister held a meeting at 0900 hours today to consider the present and future situation in the Lebanon.

The discussion was fairly general in nature and I record here only the firm decisions taken and the points for action.

The Defence Secretary said that he proposed to authorise OC BRITFORLEB to keep about 50 fighting soldiers on RAF Reliant but send his support staff to Cyprus. A sufficient number of those vehicles at present on board Reliant would be removed to Cyprus to create adequate space on Reliant for evacuation facilities.

The question of whether the British contingent should be presented as remaining part of the Multi-National Force was discussed. It was agreed that, where necessary, we should simply refer to our earlier statement that the contingent had been re-deployed until the situation became clearer. We should avoid positive statements either in public, or to other governments, to the effect that it remained part of the MNF. The matter might be reviewed after the visit to Britain this weekend by Vice President Bush.

The Prime Minister expressed concern about the impression which may have been created in public that France was making the running in advocating UN action on the Lebanon and in particular that it was taking credit for the idea of a UN force to replace the MNF. It was agreed that action should be taken to make it clear publicly that we had been working on these ideas for many months. I have briefed our Press Office accordingly.

In this connection, it was agreed that we should pursue various ideas for practical UN activity in the Lebanon such as the suggestion of H.M. Ambassador, Beirut that the UN should become involved in the control of crossing points on the Green Line in Beirut.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ I am

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram
(Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

LEBANON EVACUATION : SITREP 0700 10 FEBRUARY 1984

ADL 19/2
h-a.

WEST BEIRUT

1. The Ambassador has reported (0630GMT) that the local security situation is calm. The weather in Beirut is clear with light winds. The evacuation operation has been cleared with militias at both senior and local levels.

A 2. 208 British nationals plus 104 Commonwealth nationals have
B applied so far to be included in the West Beirut evacuation plan, and have been advised via BBC World Service broadcasts (see copy attached) to assemble at the British Embassy between 0600Z GMT - 1400GMT (local time in Beirut is 2 hours ahead of GMT). The evacuees will be picked up by helicopters (possibly Chinook helicopters from Akrotiri) up to six in all from a landing zone in West Beirut, and transported to RFA Reliant and from there possibly to the San Ghiorgos but more likely direct to Akrotiri.

3. The Americans are mounting a similar operation from 1000GMT in the same area of West Beirut with up to 10 helicopters. Both Embassies have agreed a physical division of operations with British helicopters having exclusive use of the western most landing zones and the Americans those on the east. Our Ambassador has included 50 West Germans and 20 Danes in his current plans. The Belgians are also asking our Embassy for help in evacuating 30 nationals. The Ambassador has confirmed that his plans can cope with non-British evacuees.

EAST BEIRUT

A 4. A consular Office was set up in Jounieh at 0700 GMT 10 February in the Maroun Chahine building (no telephone or telex number yet) near the port. It is headed by Mr Lawrence Wilson from our Embassy in Beirut. British nationals have been advised via the BBC World Service (see message attached) to assemble in Jounieh.

5. Mr Wilson is staying at the Montemar Hotel Jounieh (telex no 45110 and telephone no 91280). The telex works but telephone lines from London to Beirut and Jounieh appear to be blocked. Mr Wilson telephoned the Emergency Unit (0500 GMT); his approximate estimate of the number of British nationals to be evacuated is 300; this may be high. He will not have a more precise figure until assembly time. He said that outwardly Jounieh appeared relatively calm at that time.

/6.

6. The weather conditions are still preventing the San Ghiorgos from docking at Jounieh but the aim is to dock her at 1000 GMT if conditions permit. If not Sea King helicopters will be available to ferry people from the sports stadium Jounieh to the San Ghiorgos; the stadium is about a mile from the port.

GENERAL

7. Six officers from our High Commission at Nicosia are at present on RFA Reliant and will assist the Beirut Embassy staff as necessary in handling the evacuation. They will return to Cyprus with the evacuees. A second team from the High Commission Nicosia will be ready to receive the evacuees on arrival in Cyprus, and will assist them with finding temporary accommodation and with their onward arrangements. Staff of the Sovereign Base Areas are also ready to offer essential help and accommodation as necessary. From Cyprus normal repatriation arrangements will apply: People without immediate financial resources will be treated under our usual repatriation procedures and Consular Department will contact referees for deposit of funds. It is likely that most onward journeys will be by commercial air services.

8. We have drawn to the attention of Beirut, Jounieh and Nicosia the fact that although signed Undertakings to Repay (UTR) are required, in certain circumstances the posts may use their discretion and delay obtaining signatures on the documents until after embarkation. The Ambassador has reported (0630 GMT) that unless the situation changes radically there will be sufficient time to obtain UTRs.

9. Some Commonwealth nationals included in our evacuation plans might not wish to return to their own countries. We are not aware, however, that this was a problem at the time of the 1982 Lebanon evacuation when 141 Commonwealth citizens were included in the British evacuation arrangements. We have submitted separately on this, recommending that all Commonwealth nationals be accepted. Consular officers have been asked to obtain written details where possible of the country to which applicants will travel after Cyprus. A copy of a UTR is attached together with some explanatory notes.

10. Only eight members of the public contacted the Emergency Unit between 12 noon 9 February and 0730 10 February to enquire about the situation.

11. We have asked Beirut and Jounieh to let us have names of evacuees as and when possible.

12. The Consular Emergency Unit within the FCO was activated at 12 noon on 9 February and will offer a 24 hour service until further notice.

D. Symes

10 February 1984

Miss D M Symes
Consular Emergency Unit

Distribution :

Private Secretaries to all Ministers

PS/PUS

Sir J Bullard

Chief Clerk

Sir J Leahy

Mr Wright

Mr Egerton

Lord N Gordon Lennox

Mr Cartledge

Mr Long, NENAD

Mr Nixon, NENAD

Mr Chaplin, NENAD

Head of Defence Dept

Head of News Dept

Head of POD

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U20/19E/YAA

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OR 150

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 091500Z FEB 84

FM BEIRUT 091700Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELNO 91 OF 1 FEBRUARY.

AND IMMEDIATE TO CBFC, LIGESSIA, MOLUK, REA-RELIANT.

YOUR TELNO 50: EVACUATION.

1. AT CLOSE OF PLAY TODAY THE NUMBERS OF PERSONS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE EVACUATION ARE: FROM WEST BEIRUT:

BRITISH	200
CYPRIST	69
AUSTRALIAN	11
W/GERMANS	50
DANES	20
CANADIANS	24

2. NO NUMBERS AVAILABLE FOR EAST BEIRUT. CONSULAR OFFICER WILL OPEN RECEPTION CENTRE TOMORROW MORNING.

NIERE

BT

NNNN

The following message was broadcast on BBC World Service at 2225hours on 9 February. It was repeated in a slightly shorter version at 0315hours on 10 February.

The FCO has asked us to broadcast the following message to British subjects in Beirut. The evacuation of the BPH from Beirut begins at 1000 hours local time on Friday 10 February. An evacuation from West Beirut to Cyprus of British passport holders who are not dual nationals (and their spouses and dependent children under the age of 18 years) will take place. People wishing to travel should come to the British Embassy in Beirut from 0800 local time onwards. (But not later than 1600 local time). They should bring their passports and not more than one suitcase per person weighing 20 kilos. No pets or weapons will be permitted. (Travellers will be required to sign an undertaking to repay the cost of the journey. Onward travel will be the responsibility of individual travellers). The British Government cannot undertake to provide transport at a later date for British Subjects in West Beirut. Members of the British community who wish to be evacuated to Cyprus from East Beirut should assemble with their travel documents at the Maroun Shahine Building at 9am Friday 10 February 1984.

There was a previous broadcast message in a more abbreviated form at 2115 hours on 9 February. No more broadcast messages are planned but the arrangements are continuing to be mentioned in World Service news bulletins.

C

UNDERTAKING TO REPAY

1. The cost of the emergency evacuation of British nationals from crisis situations overseas is funded by HMG. But it has long been standard practice to obtain from those people evacuated in this way a signed undertaking to repay a contribution towards the total cost of the evacuation arrangements. The amount that the evacuees are charged does not exceed the commercial cost of their journey by the same route and method. In the case of the journey from the Lebanon to Cyprus the charge has been calculated at £30 a person.
2. It has been both Conservative and Labour Government policy to obtain the signed undertakings to repay for example at the time of the evacuation of Tehran in 1979 and of the Lebanon in 1982.
3. There is no question of demanding cash from anyone at the time of the evacuation. People are simply required to sign a form of undertaking to repay. Those nationals who wish to leave the Lebanon will naturally have to produce proof of identification and nationality to our consular officials, and we would normally expect them to sign the under-taking to repay at the same time. In certain circumstances, for example if the evacuation is rushed or the situation is dangerous, signatures need not be obtained until after the evacuee has embarked.
4. British nationals were warned in September 1983 that unless they had essential duties in the Lebanon they would be well advised to leave the country then by normal means.

(See para 3.1.1)

(FORM K29)
(revised 1980)

GROUP TRAVEL
UNDERTAKING TO REPAY
To be filled in before departure

This form must be completed in full before embarkation by each head of family, or person travelling separately, and returned to the issuing office or officer before embarkation will be permitted.

PART A

1 Surname (Block letters) Fornames
..... Sex Date of Birth
Place of Birth Nationality/citizenship

2 Accompanied by:

Name	Sex	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Relationship

3 Address in the UK and/or future address to which correspondence can be sent

4 Last address in country from which departing

5 Name and address of next of kin

6 Name and address of employer

PART I

I, (Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss and full name in block letters)
 holder of : passport/identity document
 No. issued at on
 hereby undertake to repay on demand to the *Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Government of
 all such sums as are paid on my behalf for the purpose of, or in connexion with, the
 evacuation from to of myself and the members of my
 family accompanying me, including costs incurred in respect of transport, maintenance, medical attention and any
 other items.

*Furthermore, unless I have repaid the full amount within nine months of the date of the letter notifying me of the
 amount of such costs, I undertake to pay on demand to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office an additional
 amount equivalent to seven and one half per cent (7½%) of the amount then outstanding. (This is to be regarded as
 being in lieu of interest upon my debt.)

I clearly understand:

1. that I am accepting evacuation of my own free will;
2. that the journey is at my own risk and that transport used may cost more than in normal circumstances and
 (except in the case of air transport) may not comply with normal safety and sanitary regulations;
3. that in the case of civil air travel Her Majesty's Government act only as an agent and are not a contracting

4. that passport facilities will not normally be available to me until my debt has been paid in full.

Signed

Date

Place

British Embassy/Consulate at

Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss
 with wife and children has signed an Undertaking to repay all costs of the journey
 from to including any incidental expenses en route.

Date

Embassy/Consular stamp
 and initial of Consular
 Officer.

*Delete as necessary if applicant is other than a UK national

ER
PRIME MINISTER

Beirut

No-one has been evacuated today owing to bad weather.

382 people registered with the Embassy for possible evacuation from West Beirut tomorrow. These include 208 UK citizens, 69 Cypriots, 11 Australians, 50 Germans, 20 Danes and 24 Canadians.

A similar process of registration has been going on in East Beirut but we do not yet have details.

According to the tapes, Beirut has been somewhat quieter this afternoon.

A SITREP will be available early tomorrow morning - before our 9 o'clock meeting on the Lebanon.

John Coles

9 February 1984

GRS 850
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DAMASCUS 091200Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 9 FEBRUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 45 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON

SUMMARY.

1. SYRIANS INFORMED AND APPROVE OF REDEPLOYMENT OF BRITFORLEB, REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THEM AND TO PSP ABOUT SAFETY OF BRITISH EMBASSY AND COMMUNITY IN BEIRUT. THE DOOR STILL OPEN TO THE AMERICANS, AND GEMAYEL SUPPORTED, BUT ABRIGATION OF 17 MAY AGREEMENT REMAINS THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP IN SYRIAN EYES. SYRIANS URGING COMPROMISE ON ALL FACTIONS AND HAVE NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO STATIONING OF UN OBSERVERS IN LEBANON.

DETAIL

2. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE PROMPT RESPONSE IN TUR. UNFORTUNATELY I WAS UNABLE TO ACT ON IT UNTIL MIDDAY 9 FEBRUARY, AND THEN ONLY WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE WEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT SINCE THE MINISTER OF STATE WAS OBLIGED TO CANCEL AT SHORT NOTICE AN APPOINTMENT MADE FOR THE PREVIOUS EVENING.

BRITISH IN BEIRUT.

3. I SPOKE TO HADDAD ABOUT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF BRITFORLEB IN THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 72 AS AMENDED BY PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TUR, AND LEFT A PIECE OF PAPER EMBODYING THE LATTER AS APPROPRIATE. HADDAD INDICATED THAT IN THE SYRIAN VIEW WE HAD DONE THE RIGHT THING.

4. I MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF ASKING FOR ANY HELP THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE IN THE GENERAL PROTECTION OF OUR EMBASSY AND OUR COMMUNITY, AND REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE EVACUATION PLANNED FOR TOMORROW (BEIRUT TELNO 12 TO ME). HADDAD REPLIED THAT WHILE THE SYRIANS THEMSELVES WERE NOT, OF COURSE, INVOLVED, THEY WOULD REINFORCE OUR REPRESENTATIONS IN THIS CONNECTION WITH THE PSP. WHEN I HAD SPOKEN EARLIER TO HAMADE, HE READILY AGREED TO HAVE A MESSAGE CONVEYED TO THE PSP MILITIA BUT ADDED POINTEDLY THAT SO FAR AS SHELLING WAS CONCERNED 'OTHER PARTIES' WERE INVOLVED.

THE WIDER ISSUES

5. ON THE BROADER ISSUES, HADDAD SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO CROW ABOUT THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT HAVING DEVELOPED ALONG THE LINES FORECAST EARLIER BY THE SYRIANS. THE OUTLOOK WAS BLEAK HE THOUGHT THAT THE DIVISION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT MIGHT WELL

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/ CONTINUE

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CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME. THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO BE WORKING FOR PARTITION OF LEBANON. THEIR SHELLING OF THE MOUNTAIN AREAS WAS DEPLORABLE, BUT SO FAR AS SYRIA WAS CONCERNED THE DOOR REMAINED OPEN.

6. I ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT SYRIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS GEMAYEL. HADDAD REAFFIRMED THAT THE SYRIANS DID NOT WANT HIM TO GO. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WERE CRITICAL OF HIM FOR HAVING ANNOUNCED UNILATERALLY A DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WITHOUT HAVING CONSULTED THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED. IF ONLY HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THE ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT HIS POSITION WOULD BE TRANSFORMED. THIS REMAINED THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP WHICH NEEDED TO BE TAKEN.

7. I ASKED ABOUT CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE TALKS WITH VARIOUS VISITORS TO DAMASCUS. HADDAD SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD EMPHASISED TO THE SUNNI LEADERS THAT THEY SHOULD MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH ALL THE OTHER FACTIONS, INCLUDING THE MARONITES, IN THE INTERESTS OF A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT. SYRIA DID NOT VIEW THE LEBANESE PROBLEMS FROM A RELIGIOUS ANGLE. WHEN I SOUGHT HIS COMMENT ON REPORTS THAT THERE HAD BEEN ATTACKS BY SHIA ELEMENTS IN WEST BEIRUT ON BARS, HOTELS AND OTHER ALCOHOL-DISPENSING INSTITUTIONS, AND WHETHER THIS DID NOT REINFORCE THE POINT WHICH YOU HAD MADE TO KHADDAM ABOUT RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS, HADDAD CLAIMED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NO FIRM INFORMATION. HE CONFIRMED THAT ALIYEV WAS DUE IN DAMASCUS TOMORROW.

8. HADDAD VOLUNTEERED THAT GUTMANN HAD, ON HIS RECENT VISIT, CONVEYED MESSAGES FROM MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON SUGGESTING THE EARLY REPLACEMENT OF THE MNF BY A UN FORCE. THE SYRIANS HAD REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE, PROVIDED THAT THE ROLE OF SUCH A FORCE WAS CONFINED TO THAT OF OBSERVERS, AND THAT IT DID NOT REPEAT NOT INCLUDE TROOPS FROM ANY OF THE STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

COMMENT

9. ALTHOUGH IT LOOKS AS IF THE FAST-MOVING DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT DAYS HAVE SURPRISED THE SYRIANS AS MUCH AS EVERYBODY ELSE, THEIR

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IMMEDIATE RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO STICK TO THEIR POSITION THAT PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. THEIR CONTINUED, IF QUALIFIED, SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL IS PROBABLY GENUINE: THEY PREFER ANY PRESIDENT TO NO PRESIDENT, AND FEEL THAT GEMAYEL WILL BE EASIER TO SQUEEZE THAN ANY SUCCESSOR TRYING TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF. A SIGNED EDITORIAL IN AL THAWRA ON 8 FEBRUARY SPOKE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF "MENS

NG BRIDGES", IMPLYING THAT, AS HADDAD TOLD ME, HIS POSITION WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED IF HE MADE THE CONCESSIONS WHICH THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION HAVE DEMANDED ALL ALONG.

LUCAS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
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FM BEIRUT 091250Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 9 FEBRUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

This is being done.

A. J. C. 10/2

FCO TELNO 57 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: LEBANON.

1. I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH GREAT INTEREST THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR A UN PRESENCE HERE.

2. WHAT IS NEEDED MORE THAN ANYTHING AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE, ON HUMANITARIAN IF NO OTHER GROUNDS, IS A CONTROLLED CROSSING OF THE GREEN LINE. COULD THE UN NOT PROVIDE THIS UNDER THE UNIFIL MANDATE - EG BY GETTING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO ASK FOR IT (CLEARANCE HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN ADVANCE FROM BERRI, JUMBLATT AND CO) AND BY QUICK CLEARANCE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND DESPATCH OF A UNIT TO BEIRUT FROM THE SOUTH? ARMED UN SOLDIERS WOULD THEN GUARD UNARMED MILITIAMEN OR POLICE CONTROLLING THE CROSSING. AND A UN PRESENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN BEIRUT, ON WHICH MUCH MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE BUILT.

I think we are following up this suggestion in security net

3. I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS GOING TO TRY TO CROSS THE GREEN LINE THIS AFTERNOON, AND I HAVE MADE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE HIM AT 4 PM. HE PLANS TO COME VIA THE FRENCH MNF HQ, THE RESIDENCE DES PINNS (FORMERLY HIS RESIDENCE: IT IS A LARGE COMPOUND ALMOST ASTRIDE THE LINE). IT STRIKES ME THAT IF THE FRENCH COULD TRANSFORM THEMSELVES INTO A UNIFIL OUTFIT IN THIS SECTOR, THEY COULD PERHAPS FILL THE ROLE IN PARA 2.

4. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ON A PERSONAL BASIS WITH THE COUNSELLOR OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY, BUT WILL NOT PUSH IT FURTHER UNLESS YOU THINK THERE IS MILEAGE IN IT. LIKE MOST IDEAS FOR LEBANON IT WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH PROBLEMS TO IMPLEMENT. BUT THERE IS A VIRTUAL POLITICAL IMPASSE HERE AT PRESENT (SEE MY TEPARATE TEL), AND IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL MADE SOON FOR LINKING THE 2 HALVES OF THE CITY MIGHT PROSPER.
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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
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FM WASHINGTON 092309Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 466 OF 9 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK.

MIPT: LEBANON.

1. AN ARTICLE IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, QUOTING ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, SAYS THAT, AT A MEETING WITH RUMSFELD ON 21 JANUARY, PRESIDENT REAGAN DIRECTED THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO DRAW UP A PLAN FOR PULLING BACK THE MARINES AND FOR INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GEMAYEL. GENERAL VESSEY REPORTED ON THE PLAN ON 26 JANUARY, PRESIDENT REAGAN APPROVED THE PLANNED PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF MARINES IN PRINCIPLE ON 1 FEBRUARY AND DECIDED TENTATIVELY TO PROCEED WITH IT AFTER REVIEWING THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS ON 5 FEBRUARY.
2. THE ARTICLE CLAIMS THAT GEMAYEL WAS INFORMED OF THE PROPOSAL BY RUMSFELD ON 6 FEBRUARY AND AGREED TO IT. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD WANTED TO DELAY AN ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT BECAME CLEARER BUT MADE IT ON 7 FEBRUARY IN ORDER TO FORESTALL FURTHER LEAKS. THE ARTICLE NOTES THAT THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD PRESIDENT REAGAN CONTINUED TO SAY IN PUBLIC THAT ANY LESSENING OF US RESOLVE IN LEBANON WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. THE WASHINGTON POST HAS A SIMILAR STORY.
3. TEICHER (NSC STAFF) WHO WAS A PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF THIS STORY, HAS TOLD US THAT IT IS BROADLY ACCURATE. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON HAD FALLEN APART AT THE WORST POSSIBLE MOMENT SO FAR AS THE PROPOSED US PACKAGE WAS CONCERNED.

WRIGHT

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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MR COLES

LEBANON

1. This has been a bad week in the Lebanon, but it is not without its plus points and it provides some opportunities:
 - a. we have our forces safely out;
 - b. we have kept broadly in step with the Americans;
 - c. we now have a chance to look at policy afresh and realistically.
2. We must recognise that the Lebanon is going to remain highly fragmented, with Syrian presence/influence in the North, and no doubt some Israeli presence in the South. Whether Gemayel survives or not is uncertain, but if he does it will have to be on the basis of larger concessions to Muslim groups, ie a loosely-knit more "cantonised" Lebanon. The latest JIC assessment is that under hard-line Christian pressure he will refuse such concessions.
3. We have an interest in avoiding further chaos in Lebanon, in particular Syrian/Israeli hostilities, but there is very little we can do directly. Any pacification efforts should now be via the United Nations, which means recognising Syrian and Soviet interest. The latest telegrams from New York suggest some softening in Syrian and Soviet attitudes on UN involvement.
4. I am afraid this will all mean some divergence from the Americans. But now that we have extricated our forces we should not allow ourselves to be involved in some anti-Syrian action or hopeless efforts to extend the authority of a government that is rapidly becoming a purely Christian faction. We have already signalled our disquiet to the President about the shelling by the New Jersey and I suggest we speak frankly to Vice President Bush this weekend to avoid any possible US misunderstanding of our future position. The immediate object will be to avoid any public UK/US disagreement while engaging in intensive consultation with them on future policy.

u.
PERCY CRADOCK
9 February 1984

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DESKBY 091800Z

FM WASHINGTON 091749Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 454 OF 9 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, MODUK

PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CBFC, PARIS, ROME

LEBANON

1. GREGG (NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT) TOLD US TODAY THAT THE TIMING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FIVE HUNDRED MARINES WHO ARE TO BE MOVED TO SHIPS OFF-SHORE HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WILL BE CONSIDERED AT A FURTHER MEETING CHAIRED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT, WITH SHULTZ NOW ALSO IN ATTENDANCE, THIS EVENING. GREGG CONFIRMED THAT WHILE SOME (IE THE PENTAGON) WANTED TO DO THIS QUICKLY, OTHERS WERE ARGUING THAT THE RE-DEPLOYMENT SHOULD PROCEED AT A MEASURED PACE, TO PRESERVE WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND MAINTAIN THE COHESION OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE US SHELLING OF SYRIAN GUN POSTS IN THE HILLS ABOVE BEIRUT HAD DONE SOMETHING TO HELP LAF MORALE. THE AMERICANS HAD A MODUS VIVENDI WITH BERRI IN WEST BEIRUT, THOUGH THIS WAS TENUOUS (WE POINTED OUT THAT IT COULD BE AFFECTED BY FURTHER NAVAL SHELLING).

2. GREGG CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS ALSO UNCERTAINTY ABOUT US PLANS IN THE LONGER TERM. WE KNOW FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT THE PENTAGON WANT TO GET ALL ELEMENTS OUT EXCEPT FOR A MILITARY TRAINING PRESENCE; AND THERE WILL BE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE IF THIS IS NOT DONE. BUT A REARGUARD ACTION IS BEING FOUGHT BY THOSE WHO WANT TO MAINTAIN SOME CONTINUING PRESENCE.

3. WHATEVER THE DECISIONS TAKEN HERE IN THE SHORT-TERM, THE OUTCOME WILL BE DETERMINED MORE BY EVENTS IN AND AROUND BEIRUT. THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO THE PROGRESSIVE DISENGAGEMENT OF MOST US FORCES TO POSITIONS OFF-SHORE. THERE IS A GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT THIS PROCESS WILL HAVE TO BE ACHIEVED, AT THE LATEST, WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS.

4. WE EMPHASISED TO GREGG THE NEED TO GIVE US AND OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS A CLEARER VIEW OF U.S. INTENTIONS AFTER THE MEETING THIS EVENING.

WRIGHT

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US POLICY IN THE LEBANON

Lebanon 2
General.

Line to take

My Rt Hon Friend made plain yesterday:

- that we are not going to indulge in cheap anti-Americanism
- that America remains our closest and most important ally
- that we shall continue to consult closely with them and give them frank advice if and when we ~~believe they are wrong~~ ^{disagree with them}.

The House should not underestimate the complexity of the situation facing the United States and the West generally in the Lebanon. There will be many who seek to divide the Alliance now - and the Soviet Union is waiting to exploit the divisions.

Force

That said, it is important that any force used in the Lebanon is limited to the needs of self-defence. Indiscriminate shelling ^{Action going beyond that} can only worsen the situation.

Difficult as it is, the role of the West now is to use all its influence to bring an end to the present fighting and then to encourage a fresh start on the process of reconciliation. If we are to play such a role, we must not become identified with one faction in the Lebanon but seek to obtain the goodwill of all parties who are genuinely interested in reconciliation.

Hope the Syrians will commit themselves to the path of reconciliation.

On Reliant "until situation

9 February 1984

becomes clearer."

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PM'S QUESTION TIME

LEBANON

Lebanon
U.N.

UN INVOLVEMENT

Line to Take

For months the British Government have been working for wider UN involvement in peacekeeping in Lebanon. I raised it myself with the Secretary General last September. Since then we have been discussing detailed proposals intensively with MNF partners, UN Secretary General and other interested parties. Our UN representative saw Secretary General and President of Security Council on instruction yesterday (8 February).

(Pakistan)

Obstacles

Need Lebanese request, Security Council approval (Soviet veto) and agreement of troop contributors and of all concerned parties. Cannot be optimistic but look to all for constructive response.

Type of Force

Observers or UN force. Various roles possible: wider mandate for UNIFIL in South Lebanon most promising first option.

Will be sweep Dush

UNIFIL " TO confirm withdrawal of Israeli Forces - restore int. peace & security and assist gov't of Lebanon to reestablish its authority in the area (i.e. S. Lebanon)

LEBANON

UN INVOLVEMENT

U.N.

Background

The Prime Minister raised the question of wider UN involvement with the UN Secretary General in New York on 30 September. Following the ceasefire in the Shouf of 26 September, the ceasefire stipulated the deployment of "neutral" observers: the Syrians objected to UN observers. Greece and Italy agreed to provide observers but did not deploy them. On 6 January the Prime Minister sent a message to the UN Secretary General expressing our continuing support for his efforts to secure a wider UN role in Lebanon, following remarks by Senor Perez de Cuellar at a press conference on 21 December and numerous contacts with UN Secretary. On 13 January we circulated to our MNF partners a detailed paper setting out various options for an expanded UN role. There was general agreement that the most promising option was an expansion of the role of UNIFIL, already deployed in South Lebanon.

The French have now tumbled to the merits of our idea. On 7 February, M. Mitterrand said publically that France hoped UN forces might take over rapidly from the MNF. The French subsequently on 8 February contacted the UN Secretary General and the President of the Security Council. The French appear to have no specific ideas to put forward. The UK was involved in parallel discussions on 8 February. On 7 February the Italian Defence Minister said that the departure of MNF contingents should be preceded, accompanied and followed by diplomatic action at the UN.

Evacuation Costs - Standard Practice
 - evacuation in 1979 (Feb) under Lebanon
 gov. of Brit. citizens from Teheran
 Charge of £68



General

ANY REQUESTS FROM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BEFORE REDEPLOYMENT?

LINE TO TAKE

- Communications between the British Embassy in Beirut and the Lebanese authorities on 7/8 February were very difficult. Telephones out, firing in the streets.
- Late on the night of 7 February, after the decision to redeploy the British contingent had already been taken, the British Ambassador received by indirect means a message from the Lebanese Foreign Minister. This referred to a request to the United States to "refocus the effort of its contingent", and to other MNF contributors to consider adjusting their MNF presence in the light of the current military situation.

(If pressed)

- It was impossible to clarify further the status of the request in the circumstances prevailing particularly as the Foreign Minister left shortly afterwards on a special mission to Saudi Arabia.

*No clear request was received, but informed
Leban gov. of our action in response to an unclear
message*

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REQUEST FROM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

Background

1. Because of the security situation in Beirut, and with Embassy telephones not functioning, HMA Beirut was unable to make direct contact with the Lebanese Foreign Minister in the Presidential Palace on the night of 7/8 February.

2. Late on 7 February, after Commander BRITFORLEB had been instructed to redeploy the following morning (8 February), and after HMA Beirut had been instructed so to inform the Lebanese Government, the Ambassador received the following message from the Lebanese Foreign Minister, relayed via BRITFORLEB:

' ' In view of the current political and military situation, I have asked the US to refocus the effort of its MNF contingent to provide assistance with coping with the current threat from foreign intervention, specifically artillery fire from Syrian controlled zones, and infiltration of foreign terrorists into Beirut. I also request that the other MNF Governments consider adjusting their MNF presence to conform to the current military situation and the existing threats that we face. ' '

HMA Beirut arranged for the Commander of BRITFORLEB to deliver the following reply to the Foreign Minister at the Palace at 0600Z on 8 February:

' 'In response to your message of 7 February the British MNF contingent is being redeployed from Hadath to a ship borne location as from 8 February until further notice. ' '

3. The US have publicly stated that their redeployment was in response to a request from the Lebanese Government. The Italian Defence Minister in a statement to the Senate on 8 February also referred to the Italian refusal to agree to ' 'President Gemayel's request to broaden our responsibilities to two new areas in Beirut' ' .

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DESKBY 080300Z FCO, MODUK

FM BEIRUT 080140Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 OF 8 FEBRUARY 1984

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, CBFC

YOUR TELNO 52: WITHDRAWAL OF BRITFORLEB

1. SHORTLY BEFORE RECEIVING YOUR TUR I WAS INFORMED BY COLONEL BRITFORLEB THAT BRITFORLEB HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO LEAVE HADATH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND MOVE TO JOUNIEH FOR EVACUATION IN THE COURSE OF TODAY. THEY PLAN TO LEAVE AT ABOUT 0700Z, AFTER A FAREWELL CALL BY COMMANDER BRITFORLEB ON GENERAL TANHOUS AT 0600Z.

2. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ISSUE THE PRESS STATEMENT IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR AT THE TIME OF DEPARTURE, WHICH WILL ALSO BE ISSUED BY MOD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN LONDON. APPARENTLY BRITFORLEB'S DEPARTURE WAS ON UK NEWS AT 072330Z.

3. I PROPOSE TO CARRY OUT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS BY ARRANGING FOR THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED FROM ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER (BY BRITFORLEB VIA THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE: THE BEST QUICK MEANS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO ME) AT ABOUT 0600Z.

QUOTE

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 7 FEB THE BRITISH MNF CONTINGENT IS BEING REDEPLOYED FROM HADATH TO A SHIP BORNE LOCATION AS FROM 8 FEB UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. UNQUOTE. I SHALL MAKE THE SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS IN YOUR TUR ORRALY AS OPPORTUNITY ARISES.

4. THIS WOULD BE IN REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM SALEM TO ME, RECEIVED BY THE SAME MEANS LATE LAST NIGHT, AS FOLLOWS. QUOTE. IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION, I HAVE ASKED THE US TO REFOCUS THE EFFORT OF ITS MNF CONTINGENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITH COPING WITH THE CURRENT THREAT FROM FOREIGN INTERVENTION, SPECIFICALLY ARTILLERY FIRE FROM SYRIAN CONTROLLED ZONES, AND INFILTRATION OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS INTO BEIRUT. I ALSO REQUEST THAT THE OTHER MNF GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER ADJUSTING THEIR MNF PRESENCE TO CONFORM TO THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AND THE EXISTING THREATS THAT WE FACE. UNQUOTE.

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/S. I EXPECT

CONFIDENTIAL

5. I EXPECT THE MOVE BY BRITFORLEB TO GO WITHOUT MAJOR SNAGS. ONE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY IS THE MOVE TO JOUNIEH BY BRITFORLEB'S 3 MAN SIGNAL TEAM, DETACHED TO THIS EMBASSY. WE SHALL SHEPERD THIS THROUGH THE GREEN LINE AS BEST WE CAN.

6. IT REMAINS IMPORTANT FOR THE SAFETY OF THIS MISSION, AND TO THE SUCCESS OF ANY EVACUATION OPERATION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS THAT WE MAY HAVE TO MOUNT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THAT WE SHOULD NOT (NOT) STRESS THAT BRITFORLEB'S MOVE IS IN CONFORMIITY WITH US ACTIONS. IT MAY BE STRONGLY TO OUR DISADVANTAGE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POSSIBLE SHELLING BY THE SIXTH FLEET, THE FUTURE SCOPE INTENTION AND TARGETTING OF WHICH ARE STILL UNCLEAR AND WILL NOT BE WITHIN OUR CONTROL.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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1'S QUESTION TIME

LEBANON

EVACUATION



Evacuation

Line to Take

The BBC World Service has announced arrangements for the evacuation of the British Community and will continue to keep the Community informed of the arrangements being made. One vessel will pick up evacuees from East Beirut today. A second vessel will pick up evacuees from West Beirut and elsewhere as soon as possible.

Advice to Community

The British Embassy has since last September been advising those without pressing reasons to leave. The Embassy have not recommended full evacuation, but are making arrangements to assist those who wish to leave.

Numbers Involved

There are estimated to be about 2600 UK nationals in Lebanon of which perhaps 500 may wish to leave.

Cost of Evacuation

In accordance with normal practice, all those leaving are being asked to sign Undertakings to repay. For those leaving by sea the charge will be £30. Those using helicopters will be asked to pay surcharge.

*Charge - normal practice
1- Feb 1979 - Tehran
But evoked under Lebanon gov't
charge £68.*



LEBANON

EVACUATION

Background

The BBC World Service have announced that those wishing to be evacuated should contact the Embassy. The BBC will broadcast further details of the arrangements. The vessel Sol Ghiorgios will be off Jounieh Bay, 10 miles north of Beirut today (9 February) to pick up residents of East Beirut. Arrangements are being put in hand for the early evacuation, probably on 10 February, by ship or helicopter, of residents in West Beirut and elsewhere.

Arrangements for the evacuation have been hampered by severe difficulties of communication, notably the cutting off of telephone lines to the British Embassy, acute dangers of movement between Christian East Beirut and Muslem controlled West Beirut and by severe gales off the Lebanese coast.

STATEMENT BROADCAST BY BBC WORLD SERVICE FROM 1100Z

'Members of the British Community who wish to apply for evacuation from Lebanon to Cyprus under arrangements being made by the British Embassy should give their names and passport details to the Embassy or to the Consular Unit in the British Council Offices in West Beirut. The Embassy telex number is 20465 (the telephones are currently not working). The telephone numbers of the British Council are 803978 and 803980, and the telex number 42353.

The British Embassy, through the BBC World Service, will keep the British Community in Lebanon informed of the various means whereby the evacuation will be effected. For those in East Beirut, the vessel Sol Ghiorgios will be off Jounieh today, 9 February. There will be some accommodation available on board. Those wishing to travel should apply to British Consular Officers at Jounieh.'

have been made by ship or helicopter
Arrangements for subsequent evacuations of those in
West Beirut and elsewhere will be announced shortly.
Precise details will be given as soon as
more is known of the numbers wishing to leave.

Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978, which defined the mandate as "confirming withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security, and assisting Government of Lebanon in ensuring return of its effective authority in the area".

Area means area of Southern Lebanon occupied by Israelis.



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From the Private Secretary

9 February 1984

Thank you for your letter of 9 February enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan following this morning's discussion in Cabinet.

I discussed the draft with Richard Mottram who conveyed to me orally the comments of the Defence Secretary. You also conveyed to me certain comments made by the Foreign Secretary.

I now enclose the message which was approved by the Prime Minister and despatched to President Reagan this afternoon.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc MA AER
OPS

SUBJECT

22

US Declassified

IMMEDIATE

091610Z

FEBRUARY 84

FROM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITEHOUSE

BT

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE LEBANON RECEIVED EARLY THIS MORNING.

IT WAS IN AN EFFORT TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS THAT WE MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC THAT WE WERE REDEPLOYING OUR CONTINGENT TO RFA RELIANT UNTIL THE SITUATION BECAME CLEARER. BUT THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF KEEPING OUR TROOPS THERE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME ARE SEVERE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE MAY NEED SPACE ON BOARD THIS SHIP FOR BRITISH CITIZENS WHO ARE EVACUATED FROM BEIRUT. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT WE SHALL HAVE TO REDEPLOY THE BULK OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT FURTHER AFIELD TO CYPRUS. BUT IF WE DO THIS WE EXPECT TO LEAVE SOME OF THE CONTINGENT ON BOARD. WE WILL MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU.

WE UNDERSTAND THE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SITUATION WITH WHICH YOU ARE NOW FACED. IN PARTICULAR, I CAN SEE WHY YOU HAVE HAD TO GIVE YOUR MILITARY COMMANDERS DISCRETION TO RETURN FIRE AGAINST SYRIAN CONTROLLED AREAS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT ANY FORCE USED BY OUR COUNTRIES IN THE LEBANON SHOULD BE CLEARLY LIMITED TO THE NEEDS OF SELF-DEFENCE. ANY REPETITION OF THE PATTERN AND SCALE OF SHELLING BY THE NEW JERSEY THAT OCCURRED YESTERDAY COULD INCREASE THE VIOLENCE WHICH GRIPS BEIRUT. IT WOULD PUT AT RISK CURRENT PLANS TO EVACUATE WESTERN NATIONALS AND INCREASE THE THREAT TO THE REMAINING MNF CONTINGENTS AND TO BRITISH AND AMERICAN STAFF WORKING IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY. DRUZE LEADERS HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED US TO POINT OUT THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT FOLLOW IF CASUALTIES CONTINUE TO BE INFLICTED ON THEIR PEOPLE. THEY WOULD FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO RESTRAIN THEIR FOLLOWERS FROM ATTACKING WESTERN TARGETS IN BEIRUT WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN LEFT RELATIVELY UNSCATHED IN THE RECENT FIGHTING. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS ON GAMAYEL'S ALREADY WEAKENED POSITION AND HENCE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR AVOIDING THE PARTITION OF LEBANON COULD ALSO BE SERIOUS. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL URGENTLY CONSIDER ORDERING YOUR COMMANDERS TO USE THEIR DISCRETION WITH THE UTMOST RESTRAINT.

WITH BEST WISHES
YOURS EVER
MARGARET

BT

NNNN

subject
Lebanon

INT
SIT A6

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T29184

Handwritten initials

TOP SECRET

21

MB

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Son,

Thank you for your message about the Lebanon received early this morning.

It was in an effort to meet your concerns that we made clear in public that we were redeploying our contingent to RFA Reliant until the situation became clearer. But the logistical problems of keeping our troops there for any length of time are severe, not least because we may need space on board this ship for British citizens who are evacuated from Beirut. It is therefore possible that we shall have to redeploy the bulk of our MNF contingent further afield to Cyprus. But if we ~~have to~~ do this we expect to leave some of the contingent on board. We will make no announcement of permanent withdrawal without further consultation with you.

We understand the extremely difficult situation with which you are now faced. In particular, I can see why you have had to give your military commanders discretion to return fire against Syrian controlled areas. But I ~~have~~ ^{believe} ~~always thought~~ that any force used by our countries in the Lebanon should be clearly limited to the needs of self-defence. ~~I am bound to say that~~ ^P any repetition of the pattern and scale of shelling by the New Jersey that occurred yesterday ^{could I fear} ~~can~~ ^{increase} ~~only give a further twist to the spiral of violence~~ ^{be} which grips Beirut. It would put at risk current plans to

/evacuate

evacuate western nationals and increase the threat to the remaining MNF contingents and to British and American staff working in the British Embassy. Druze~~s~~ leaders have already approached us to point out the consequences which might follow if casualties continue to be inflicted on their people. They would find it much more difficult to restrain their followers from attacking western targets in Beirut which have so far been left relatively unscathed in the recent fighting. The political effects on Gamayel's already weakened position and hence on the prospects for avoiding the partition of Lebanon could also be serious. I hope, therefore, that you will urgently consider ordering your commanders to use their discretion with the utmost restraint.

With best wishes

Yours ever

Raymond Hill



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 February, 1984

Dear John,

Now see amended version
which has been approved by the
Prime Minister and despatched.

Lebanon: Message to President Reagan

A.S.C. 9/2.

As agreed when we spoke on the telephone this morning,
I enclose a draft message for the Prime Minister to send
to President Reagan registering our views about the shelling
by US naval vessels yesterday. The message also contains a
response to the President's message received this morning
(your letter of today's date to me).

I discussed an earlier version of this draft with
Sir Geoffrey Howe and the enclosed draft reflects the
general lines of his comments. He has not however seen
this text: I shall be showing him a copy in parallel over
lunchtime. I am also sending a copy to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,
P F Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Reagan

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: Lebanon

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your message received early this morning.

CAVEAT.....

Our MNF contingent ^{will probably} cannot remain at sea off the coast of Lebanon for very long. Sooner rather than later they will have to move to Cyprus. They will remain where ^{at least} they are for a day or two longer, ^{partly} not least because some of them ~~at least~~ may be needed to help with the evacuation of British citizens. I will let you know before they go. In any case we shall defer making a formal announcement of their permanent withdrawal from the MNF.

Recall we shall consider their situation further and will be in touch with you

I understand the reasons which led you to give your military commanders discretion to return fire against Syrian-controlled areas. But I have always believed it important that any force used by our countries in the Lebanon should be clearly limited to the needs of self-defence. I am bound to say that any repetition of the pattern and scale of shelling by the New Jersey that occurred yesterday can only give a further twist to the spiral of violence which grips Beirut. Specifically, it would put at risk current plans to evacuate Western /nationals

Enclosures—flag(s).....

nationals, as well as increasing the threat to the remaining MNF contingents and to British and American staff working in the British Embassy. The Druze ^{leaders} have already approached us to point out the implications of inflicting casualties on their people, ~~and their~~ ~~determination to retaliate against East Beirut, if~~ necessary. The political effects on Gemayel's already weakened position of ~~appearing to need such action to~~ ^{and leave on the prospects of avoiding the} ~~sustain him~~ ^{parties of Lebanon} could also be serious. I hope, therefore, that you will urgently consider ordering your Commanders to use their discretion with the utmost restraint.

I am looking forward to discussing this and other matters with George Bush on Sunday.

It would make it much more difficult for them to restrain their followers from attacking West Beirut in Beirut which have so far been left relatively unscathed in the recent fighting



19

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 February, 1984

LEBANON

I enclose a further message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister which arrived this morning.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister wishes to have a further meeting before the weekend with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary to consider our future policy towards the Lebanon. A time will be arranged by our Diary Secretary.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NR-

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF) ADVANCE COPIES

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SIR J LEAHY
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MR NACINNES
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MR JENKINS
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RESIDENT CLERK



IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

This was discussed at today's meeting on the Lebanon. A.J.C. 19/2

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090125Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 8 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT,

PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE

MY TELNO 132 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON (8 FEBRUARY) ON INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF INTRODUCING A UN FORCE INTO BEIRUT. AT HIS REQUEST, THE PRESIDENT IS SOUNDING OUT THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I ENCOURAGED HIM STRONGLY. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS AND SYRIANS MIGHT BE BECOMING MORE FLEXIBLE ABOUT SUCH A FORCE.

DETAIL

2. AS WE WERE FOREWARNED IN TELECON NIXON/HUMFREY, THE FRENCH FINALLY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THIS AFTERNOON AND NANTEUIL SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHAH NAWAZ (PAKISTAN), THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

3. I SPOKE TO URQUHART SHORTLY AFTER NANTEUIL'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCHMAN HAD SIMPLY MADE AN UNSTRUCTURED AND INFORMAL SOUNDING OUT OF THE POSSIBILITIES. NANTEUIL HAS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT THE FRENCH HAVE NO PRECISE VIEWS AT THE MOMENT BUT THINK THAT IT IS TIME TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL UN FORCE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE MNF IN BEIRUT.

4. AFTER HE HAD SEEN NANTEUIL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY ASKED TO SEE ME. HE SAID THAT NANTEUIL HAD ASKED HIM

How come that when we ask Urquhart a few days ago - we are told there is no possibility.
UN force
Nov - 48
French
ask and
difficult answer
is given
not

~~SECURITY COUNCIL TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE MNF IN BEIRUT.~~

~~4. AFTER HE HAD SEEN NANTEUIL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY ASKED TO SEE ME. HE SAID THAT NANTEUIL HAD ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD HOLD INDIVIDUAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF INTRODUCING A UN FORCE INTO BEIRUT TO SUPERVISE A CEASEFIRE, ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND RESTORE NORMALCY AND PEACE. SHAH NAWAZ ASKED FOR OUR REACTION. I SAID THAT WE WERE VERY POSITIVE ABOUT SUCH AN INITIATIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AN ENHANCED UN ROLE. THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN THE SOVIET AND SYRIAN POSITIONS. HOWEVER WHAT I HAD BEEN TOLD TODAY (SEE PARA 7 BELOW) INDICATED THAT THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE SOME MOVEMENT IN THESE POSITIONS AND I WISHED TO ENCOURAGE SHAH NAWAZ IN HIS CONSULTATIONS.~~

5. WE NOTED THE VARIOUS PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES SUCH AS WHO WOULD INVITE THE UN AND WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS. SHAH NAWAZ RIGHTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE FIRST THING WAS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THERE WAS CONSENSUS IN THE COUNCIL. IF THERE WAS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD BE ASKED TO SORT OUT THE DETAILS. HE ASKED WHETHER WE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE A UN FORCE OR OBSERVERS. I SAID WE COULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER THE COUNCIL'S CONSENSUS MIGHT BE ON THIS, BUT I HAD HEARD FROM URQUHART EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THE UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT HAD HAD THEIR TRANSPORT STOLEN, WHICH SUGGESTED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION ANY UN PRESENCE WOULD NEED TO BE PROPERLY ARMED FOR SELF-DEFENCE. THIS MIGHT SUGGEST IT SHOULD BE A FORCE.

6. SHAH NAWAZ WILL NOW BE CONTINUING HIS CONSULTATIONS AND PLANS IN PARTICULAR TO SPEAK TO THE RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY MRS KIRKPATRICK IS IN THE ANTIPODES AND LICHENSTEIN IS AWAY IN WASHINGTON UNTILL TOMORROW AFTERNOON. THEIR POLITICAL COUNSELLOR DELIVERED A MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON SETTING OUT THE US POSITION IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED TO US AS THE BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. IT IS VERY TOUGH, PLEDGING FURTHER SUPPORT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND WARNING THE SYRIANS NOT TO THINK THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS WEAKENING. ('THE SYRIANS WILL NOW BE FACED WITH AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION INDICATING GREATER US ACTIVE SUPPORT AND MORE SUSTAINABLE LONG TERM COMMITMENT TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.'). IT MAKES NO MENTION OF THE UN AT ALL. ACCORDING TO CLARK YOU WILL HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON THE MEMORANDUM IN LONDON.

7. URQUHART HAS TALKED TO OVINNIKOV (USSR), WHO HAD GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. URQUHART ALSO HAD SOME INDICATION THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NO LONGER WHOLLY OPPOSED TO A UN PRESENCE SINCE THEY WANTED TO SEE THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF. (THE ITALIAN CHARGE, WHO HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO OVINNIKOV, TOLD ME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A SIMILAR IMPRESSION. OVINNIKOV HAD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDED A UN PRESENCE IN THE CAMPS IN BEIRUT.

COMMENT

8. I HAVE DONE MY BEST TO ENCOURAGE SHAH NAWAZ AND SUPPORT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. WE NOW AWAIT THE RESULTS OF HIS SOUNDINGS OF THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS (WHOSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE SIMPLY TO LISTEN). IF THEY BOTH CONCUR THE COUNCIL CAN MOVE ON TO CONSIDER

~~COMMENT~~

~~B. I HAVE DONE MY BEST TO ENCOURAGE SHAH NAWAZ AND SUPPORT THE
FRENCH INITIATIVE. WE NOW AWAIT THE RESULTS OF HIS SOUNDINGS OF
THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS (WHOSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE SIMPLY TO
LISTEN). IF THEY BOTH CONCUR THE COUNCIL CAN MOVE ON TO CONSIDER
THE FURTHER PROBLEMS OF AN INVITATION FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT,
ESTABLISHING A CEASEFIRE, THE TYPE OF UN FORCE, ITS MANDATE,
COMPOSITION ETC. IT IS HARD TO BE PARTICULARLY OPTIMISTIC,
ESPECIALLY SINCE IT IS CLEAR FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 447 THAT
EVEN IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A UN PRESENCE
THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THERE IS A PEACE FOR THE UN
TO KEEP.~~

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 081749Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 132 OF 8 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AMMAN JEDDA CAIRO MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 57: LEBANON

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS MORNING, 8 FEBRUARY. URQUHART WAS WITH HIM AND GORE-BOOTH WITH ME. ALTHOUGH THE CALL HAD BEEN ARRANGED BEFORE THE LEBANESE SITUATION BECAME CRITICAL, I RAISED THE SUBJECT STRAIGHT AWAY. I GAVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR AN ACCOUNT OF THE LATEST THINKING IN LONDON (TELECON GORE-BOOTH/LONG REFERS) AND CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT BRITFORLEB HAD BEEN SUCESSFULLY REDEPLOYED OFF-SHORE. I ASKED WHETHER THE FRANCH AMBASSADOR (WHO HAD SEEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF ME) HAD HAD ANYTHING TO ADD.

Some initiative!

2. PERZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT NANTEUIL HAD BEEN UNABLE TO TELL HIM ANYTHING. HE HAD BEEN EXPECTING INSTRUCTIONS BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED THEM IN TIME AND MIGHT HAVE TO COME BACK LATER TODAY. BEYOND THAT, PERZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HIS ONLY NEWS WAS THAT THERE WAS COMPLETE ANARCHY IN BEIRUT. THERE WAS NOTHING THE UN COULD DO WITHOUT A SPECIFIC AND CLEAR REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE ASKED WHETHER WE KNEW IF THE AMERICANS WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS. THIS WOULD BE CRUCIAL FOR EITHER THE INJECTION OF UN OBSERVERS OR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL. I SAID THAT I WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE PREJUDICE IN WASHINGTON AGAINST BRINGING THE RUSSIANS IN ON THE SUBJECT BUT HAD NO FIRMER INFORMATION THAN THAT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS TALK WITH THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR LAST NIGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT ACCEPT OBSERVERS THOUGH MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THEIR NATIONALITY.

3. AS I LEFT MY MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR I WAS IMMEDIATELY ASKED BY THE PRESS WHETHER I HAD DISCUSSED LEBANON AND IF SO WHETHER UN ACTION WAS IMMINENT. I SAID THAT I HAD EXPLAINED THE BRITISH POSITION TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND HAD TOUCHED ON POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD BUT THAT THESE WERE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY IN THE PRESENT COMPLEX SITUATION.

4. YOUR TUR ARRIVED AFTER I HAD SEEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND URQUHART. NEVERTHELESS MY CALL CAN CERTAINLY BE DESCRIBED AS FORMING PART OF OUR CONTINUOUS AND RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SECRETARIAT ABOUT A POSSIBLE UN ROLE. WE SHALL REMAIN IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH URQUHART.
MARGESTON

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

SIR W HARDING

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR JENKINS

MR EGERTON

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MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICESIR P MOORE
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TOP SECRET

18

CC MASTER
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pl. return to A.J. COLES .

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O 090250Z FEB 84
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM

~~PRIME MINISTER'S~~

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 28/84

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE WHO1203

FEBRUARY 8, 1984

DEAR MARGARET,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON SAYING THAT YOU WILL REDEPLOY YOUR MNF CONTINGENT TO SHIPS IN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. IN SPITE OF MY EARLIER MESSAGE TO YOU I HAD TO GO PUBLIC WITH OUR OWN PLANS LAST NIGHT, IN PART TO PREEMPT A NEWS LEAK ON THE PLAN WHICH ALL THE NETWORKS WOULD HAVE CARRIED IN THE EVENING NEWS.

I DO UNDERSTAND WHY YOU FELT YOU HAD TO MAKE YOUR DECISION ON REDEPLOYMENT BUT I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DEFER AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON A PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL UNTIL WE HAVE ALL HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIGEST THE EVENTS OF THE PAST 72 HOURS AND CONSULT FURTHER ABOUT OUR MUTUAL PLANS.

TODAY THE SITUATION REMAINS VERY TENSE. SYRIAN CONTROLLED ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS HAVE CONTINUED TO SHELL THROUGHOUT THE DAY, INCLUDING ONE DIRECT HIT ON OUR AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE AND OVER 20 122MM ROCKETS LANDING WITHIN 100-200 METERS. WE HAVE RETURNED FIRE AGAINST SYRIAN CONTROLLED AREAS AND THE NEW JERSEY HAS BEEN IN ACTION. WE HAVE ASKED OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS TO EXPLAIN OUR NEW POLICY TO THE SYRIANS AND TELL THEM TO STOP FIRING INTO EAST BEIRUT FROM THE METN.

THESE HAVE NOT BEEN EASY DECISIONS FOR ME TO MAKE SINCE I HAVE A DEEP DISTRUST OF THE SYRIANS IN ALL THIS BUSINESS. HOWEVER, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT WE DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO GIVE LEBANON A CHANCE TO REMAIN A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATE. FOR THIS END WE MUST BE PREPARED TO BE RESOLUTE BUT REASONABLE IN CONSIDERING THE INEVITABLE COMPROMISES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE MADE.

ON A MORE OPTIMISTIC NOTE, KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL BOTH BE IN WASHINGTON AT THE SAME TIME NEXT WEEK. BOTH HAVE ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO A JOINT MEETING AND LUNCHEON WITH ME. THIS WILL BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MANY ISSUES BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO HELP BUILD UP THE MODERATE ARAB COALITION SO NECESSARY TO CHALLENGE SYRIA, LIBYA AND IRAN.

END OF PAGE 01

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FM PARIS 081245Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 160 OF 8 FEBRUARY

INFO BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, ROME, MODUK,
CBFC.

F C O TELNO 52 TO BEIRUT AND TELECON MACRAE/NIXON: LEBANON/MNF.

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON LUCET (DIRECTEUR ADJOINT) FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE QUAI THIS MORNING TO COMPARE NOTES. LUCET SAID THAT (AS PREDICTED IN OUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 138) THE FRENCH ARE NOT TAKING ANY SNAP DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THEIR FORCE IN LEBANON WHICH THEY DO NOT REGARD AS PARTICULARLY MORE THREATENED THAN BEFORE THE LATEST FIGHTING. RATHER, THEY ARE SITTING TIGHT FOR THE MOMENT AND TRYING TO EVALUATE A FAST-MOVING SITUATION BY KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH (SO FAR AS POSSIBLY) WITH ALL THE PARTIES ON THE GROUND. THE MESSAGE THEY SEEM TO BE GETTING (ESPECIALLY FROM THE SHINITES, NO DOUBT) WAS THAT THE PRESENCE OF THEIR FORCE WAS WELCOME PROVIDED THAT IT REMAINED STRICTLY NEUTRAL BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE STILL KEEN FOR THE UN TO PLAY AN ENHANCED ROLE, AS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AGAIN UNDERLINED IN THE HAGUE YESTERDAY. BUT LUCET SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT THEY HAD MADE ANY NEW APPROACH TO THE UN OVER THIS IN THE LAST 24 HOURS. THE PROBLEMS WERE ONLY TOO FAMILIAR: HOW TO GET ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, THE SYRIANS, ISRAELIS, AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS, TO AGREE TO A NEW UN ROLE. OUR "BRAINSTORMING" ON THIS SUBJECT IN LONDON HAD BEEN USEFUL.

CONFIDENTIAL

12

CONFIDENTIAL

2. LUCET SEEMED DEPRESSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT. IT SEEMED TO HIM UNFORTUNATELY PARTIAL AND GENERALLY BEHIND THE GAME. HE SAID THAT HE DOUBTED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE KEEN ON A MINISTERIAL MEETING ON LEBANON: APART FROM THEIR WELL-KNOWN DOCTRINAL OBJECTIONS, THE SITUATION WAS SIMPLY MOVING TOO FAST ON THE GROUND TO MAKE SUCH A MEETING PARTICULARLY USEFUL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRENCH WELCOMED THE MAXIMUM OF INFORMAL CONTACT AT WORKING LEVEL WITH OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS AND WERE GLAD THAT WE WERE KEEPING IN SUCH CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM.

PETRIE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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PP PARIS
GRS 215
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FM FCO 081500Z FEB 84
TO PRIORITY PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 116 OF 8 FEBRUARY
INFO ROUTINE ROME, BEIRUT
LEBANON

A.J.C. 9/2

f-a.

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE PUS TODAY. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING THE DESIRABILITY OF SECURING SOME EARLY UN INVOLVEMENT (RECORDED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM TO UKMIS NEW YORK), HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE GRATEFUL FOR MY MESSAGES ABOUT OUR DECISION TO REDEPLOY THE BRITISH CONTINGENT TO THE MNF (FCO TELNO 111), BUT WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF WHEN THE DEPLOYMENT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. THE PUS SAID THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH OUR MNF PARTNERS AND THAT THE FIRST THING WE HAD DONE FOLLOWING THE DECISION BY MINISTERS TO REDEPLOY WAS TO SEND MESSAGES TO THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO HAVE GIVEN ANY MORE PRECISE NOFIFICATION IN A SITUATION IN WHICH PLANNING WAS EVOLVING THROUGHOUT THE DAY, AND PRECISE AMERICAN INTENTIONS WERE UNCLEAR. THE PUS SAID THAT EACH GOVERNMENT HAD TO TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS, AS INDEED THE FRENCH HAD DONE IN RETURNING PART OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT TO UNIFIL, AND THE ITALIANS IN REDUCING THE SIZE OF THEIR CONTINGENT. HE ADDED THAT THE OPTION OF REDUCING OUR CONTINGENT HAD NOT BEEN OPEN TO US: WE EITHER HAD TO KEEP IT IN PLACE OR REDEPLOY IT OFFSHORE.

HOWE

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
SIR W HARDING
MR WRIGHT
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DESKBY 08200Z FCO AND WASHINGTON

FM BEIRUT 081915Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 82 OF 3 FEBRUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN,
JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW, UKMHS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 259 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON.

1. AS SEEN FROM HERE IT IS EVEN WORSE THEN TUR. THE COUNTRY IS NOW PARTITIONED. THERE IS A DANGER, WITH THE ASSEMBLY UNABLE TO MEET, THE GOVERNMENT A MERE CARETAKER, AND THE PRESIDENT UNDER PRESSURE TO RESIGN, OF THERE BEING NO RECOGNISED GOVERNMENT IN EITHER PART. AND BOTH SIDES OF THE CAPITAL ARE ARMED TO THE TEETH. IT SEEMS SURPRISING THAT THE AMERICANS CAN CONTEMPLATE SHELLING THE HILLS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WITH THEIR FLEET WHEN THE LIKELY RESULT IS MORE SHELLING OF EAST BEIRUT AND THE MARINES FROM THE HILLS FOLLOWED BY SHELLING OF WEST BEIRUT FROM THE EAST. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HAS RECOMMENDED A MESSAGE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TO STOP SHELLING AS HE FEARS THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT (NOT YET REDEPLOYED) MAY BE HIT AS SELF CONTROL BREAKS DOWN.

3. BERRI AND UMBLATT APPEAR AT PRESENT TO BE DISCOURAGING ATTACKS ON REMAINING MNF DETACHMENTS, DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND FOREIGNERS. U.S. SHELLING WILL NOT HELP THEM TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THEIR ADHERENTS.

MERS

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

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SIR J LEAHY

SIR W HARDING

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

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TO DESKBY 081800Z FCO

TELNO 080 OF 8 FEB

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 077: LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS FROM SPADOLINI'S STATEMENT TODAY TO THE SENATE DEFENCE COMMISSION.
2. PRAISE FOR THE ITALIAN TROOPS IN LEBANON, WHOSE SACRIFICES HAVE NOT BEEN IN VAIN. ITALIAN POLITICAL AND MORAL CREDIBILITY IS NOW HIGH, BOTH IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE. THE ITALIAN ROLE HAS BEEN AND STILL IS APPRECIATED BY ALL THE PARTIES IN LEBANON.
3. THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE MNF HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN ACHIEVED. THERE ARE NO VICTORS IN LEBANON NOW, ONLY LOSERS. BUT THE OTHER REASON FOR ITALY'S PRESENCE, PROTECTION OF THE CAMPS, REMAINS VALID.
4. NO ITALIANS POSITION HAS BEEN ABANDONED, AND THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT IS CONTROLLING THE AREAS ASSIGNED TO IT. ONLY ITALIAN MILITARY VEHICLES ARE CIRCULATING WITHOUT INTERFERENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT IS POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE MEASURES NOW NECESSARY CALMLY. THERE ARE THREE ESSENTIAL POINTS:
 - A. GIVEN THE U S AND BRITISH DECISION TO REDEPLOY, IT HAS BECOME LOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY UNTHINKABLE FOR THE ITALIAN PRESENCE IN THE CITY OF BEIRUT TO BE PROLONGED. THE ROLE OF THE PEACE FORCE ONLY MADE SENSE BECAUSE OF ITS MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER. EVEN IF ACCOMPANIED BY FRANCE (WHOSE DECISION IS NOT YET KNOWN) AN ITALIAN PRESENCE COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED.
 - B. WE CONTINUE TO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND OUR SITUATION IS THEREFORE MORE DIFFICULT THAN THAT OF OUR ALLIES, WHO HAVE NO PRECISE GUARDING TASKS AND CAN THEREFORE REDEPLOY MORE FREELY. WE CANNOT CREATE A VACUUM: WE MUST SEEK TO BRING THE UN TO SABRA AND CHATILA WITHOUT LOSS OF CONTINUITY. THERE ARE ALREADY UN FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON: THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ASKS THAT PART OF THEM SHOULD SOON BE RELOCATED TO PROTECT THE TWO CAMPS. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE MUST SEEK OTHER GUARANTEES TO LEAVE THE CAMPS SECURE.
 - C. THE DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT OF MNG CONTINGENTS SHOULD BE PRECEDED, ACCOMPANIED AND FOLLOWED BY DIPLOMATIC ACTION AT THE UN.
5. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT ALREADY CARRIED OUT WAS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:
 - A) A GUARANTEE THAT OUR TASK COULD BE CARRIED OUT, PARTICULARLY PROTECTION OF CHATILA AND BORG EL BARAJNE WHICH CONTAIN RESPECTIVELY 5,000 - 6,000 AND 9,000 - 10,000 PALESTINIANS
 - B) A GUARANTEE THAT OUR PERSONNEL WOULD BE SECURE
 - C) CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, TO REDUCE THE LOGISTIC BURDEN

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- D) AVOIDANCE OF ANY COMMITMENT TO INCREASE PERSONNEL BECAUSE OF NEW TASKS; WE THEREFORE DID NOT AGREE TO GEMAYEL'S REQUEST TO BROADEN OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO TWO NEW AREAS IN BEIRUT.
6. OUR PRESENT CONTINGENT, AFTER 5 SUCCESSIVE REDUCTIONS, IS NOW 2/3RD OF ITS ORIGINAL SIZE AND BETTER STRUCTURED.
7. ITALY IS ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN DECISION, AND WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE ITALIAN TROOPS. WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE THE TECHNICAL CONCLUSIONS WHICH THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL REACH. BUT WE SHALL PREPARE THE NECESSARY MEASURES, COORDINATED BETWEEN LAND AND SEA FORCES, FOR A GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL, MEANWHILE GUARANTEEING THE CONTINUATION OF OUR HUMANITARIAN TASK OF GUARDING THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS.
8. THE FIRST PART OF THE ITALIAN MISSION IN LEBANON CAN NOW BE CONSIDERED OVER IN ITS OPERATIONAL PHASE OF SEPARATION AND CONTROL IN THE CITY OF BEIRUT. WE ARE PREPARING TO CLOSE THAT PART WITH NATIONAL DIGNITY AND BY AGREEMENT WITH OUR ALLIES. BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN LEBANON IS UNCHANGED.
9. COMMENT. WE CONCLUDE THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS STILL UNWILLING TO REACH ITS DECISION UNTIL MORE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE FRENCH POSITION. ANDREOTTI'S ABSENCE IN BELGRADE MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.

BRIDGES

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DESKBY 081815Z
FROM DAMASCUS 081800Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 73 OF 8 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT AND MODUK
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME AND TEL AVIV

LEBANON

1. MARWAN HAMADE ASKED ME TO SEE HIM AT SHORT NOTICE THIS EVENING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WALID JUMBLATT. HAMADE SAID THAT, SINCE 1330 LOCAL TIME, WITHOUT ANY PREVIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE DRUZE HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONTINUOUS, SYSTEMATIC AND DESTRUCTIVE SHELLING FROM THE AMERICAN FLEET. IT WAS NOT ONLY GUN ENPLACEMENTS THAT WERE BEING ATTACKED BUT CIVILIAN ROADS AND VILLAGES. ONE VILLAGE, TEBIYAT IN THE METN, HAD BEEN ENTIRELY DESTROYED AND 35 CIVILIANS KILLED. A FURTHER 20 TO 30 CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED BY THE AMERICAN SHELLING ELSEWHERE. HAMADE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS SHELLING HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE BRITISH, FRENCH OR ITALIAN CONTINGENTS OF THE MNF BUT SAID THAT IT WAS DEPLORABLE THAT THE MNF SHOULD DEPART ON THIS NOTE OF DESTRUCTION. HE COULD EXPLAIN IT ONLY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTION BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BEING OBLIGED TO REDEPLOY THE US MARINES.

3. THERE WERE TWO SPECIFIC DANGERS. FIRSTLY AS LONG AS THE MNF REMAINED ON THE GROUND THEY WOULD BE A TARGET AND THE PSP WOULD STRIKE BACK AGAINST THEM IN RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON THEIR POSITIONS. SECONDLY THERE WAS THE DANGER OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE POPULAR REACTION AGAINST THE SHELLING WHICH COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS TO AMERICA'S REMAINING INTERESTS IN LEBANON AND COULD ENDANGER INNOCENT AMERICAN LIVES.

4. HAMADE DREW ATTENTION TO THE RELATIVELY FEW INCIDENTS INVOLVING FOREIGNERS DURING THE TAKEOVER OF WEST BEIRUT BUT COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE IF THE AMERICANS CONTINUED THIS BOMBARDMENT, THE PSP WOULD SPARE NOTHING IN EAST BEIRUT.

5. HE EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND THE FACT THAT THE RELATIVE CALM THAT HAD PREVAILED IN BEIRUT EARLIER TODAY SEEMED TO BE COMING TO AN END. HE URGED HAMADE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID ANY DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY SHOULD NOT BE A PSP TARGET ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT HOUSED US EMBASSY PERSONNEL. HAMADE ASSURED ME THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY WOULD NOT BE A TARGET BUT REPEATED THAT AN UNCONTROLLED POPULAR REACTION COULD LEAD TO UNPREDICTABLE DEVELOPMENTS.

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/6.

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6. THE MAIN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE APPEAR NOW TO BE TAKING PLACE IN DAMASCUS (THE NSF AND JEAN OBEID ARE ALL IN THE OFFING). WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO REPORT MORE FULLY IN THE COMING TWO DAYS BUT MEANWHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISPUTE HAMADE'S CLAIM THAT THE CONTINUED SHELLING BY THE US FLEET OF DRUZE POSITIONS IN THE CHOUF AND THE METN WILL JEOPARDISE THE CHANCES OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

LUCAS

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LOBBY BRIEFING

time: 4pm

date: 8.2.84

We repeated the morning's Lobby.

AS 8/2

LEBANON

We said that we had been vague in giving information yesterday for obvious safety reasons. We said we thought that there had been a general disposition to withdraw our contingent at the first meeting of Ministers yesterday and had been firmed up by the time of the second meeting.

On timing we thought that a certain amount of leeway had been left with the Commander on the spot and he had clearly chosen the right moment to go. We understood that the bulk of the redeployment operation had been completed despite bad weather. Equipment had also been taken offshore in Chinook helicopters. (Footnote: according to MOD redeployment had been concluded by 5.30pm our time).

We indicated that there appeared to be three options: i) to move to Cyprus, ii) to return home, iii) to go back into Beirut. Nothing had yet been decided and the men would remain deployed offshore until a policy decision had been taken. We pointed out that with 115 men there could not be phased withdrawal, they all went or they all stayed.

Asked about the position of civilians we referred to the statement from the Foreign Secretary:

"We continue to have very prominently in our minds the safety of British Residents in the Beirut area. I am glad to be able to report that I have received no reports of any casualties. For those British residents who may wish to leave appropriate arrangements are being put in hand." During questions the Foreign Secretary said that as long ago as last September British citizens with no urgent reason to stay were advised to leave, but we did not know how many people had done so.

Asked about predictions that a war in the Gulf (Iran/Iraq) would be the next problem we said that there was nothing new in the sort of implications that could hold and a close eye was always kept on the situation.

Asked about the prospect of a new initiative we said the time had come to stand back and think. The least that could be said was that for 12 months the MNF had kept alive hopes of a reconciliation but there was only so much that could be done if people were determined to resist.

LOBBY BRIEFING

2.

time: 4pm

date: 8.2.84

Asked about our Ambassador to the UN and his talks with the UN we said our position was well known - we thought that the UN could have a role but guided against too high an expectation of a UN force. Other countries would have to be convinced, including Russia. We said that claims that our force was there on the coat-tails of the Americans merely proved that people don't get thanked for trying to help in difficult circumstances.

We restated that we had been in close contact with our allies. We understood that the Italians were likely to say something today but did not know where the French were on their discussions. We were not prepared to get into suggestions of a quarrel between the allies - there had been consultation, and we had known of President Reagan's intentions.

GCHQ CHELTENHAM

We said that the Government had not moved at all on its position. The number of staff who had signed up were in their thousands plus.

AM

17

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

In my message of this morning I gave you my reaction to your decision to begin a phased deployment of the Marines in Beirut.

I should now like to let you have my thoughts on the public presentation of your decision, in particular, in the public statement which I understand you are to make later today.

The safety of our contingents in Beirut, including the French and the Italians, must, of course, be of paramount concern at this difficult time of redeployment. I am very concerned that in your public statement you should not give the impression that US forces might undertake military action which was anything more than strictly self-defensive. If the view gained ground in the region that your forces were ^{likely} actively to intervene by providing naval gunfire and air support against units in Syrian-controlled territory, this would, in my view, dangerously increase the threat to the MNF contingents in Beirut. It follows that if your forces were actually to undertake such action, the threat to all the ^{MNF} troops in Beirut would be even greater.

I therefore hope that you will bear this point very much in mind in putting the finishing touches to your statement today. I must tell you that if this statement did envisage US military action which went beyond self-defence, I should come under very heavy pressure in

Parliament here to dissociate myself from this aspect
of your policy. I am convinced that this is a time for
the MNF contributors to speak as far as possible with
one voice, and therefore wanted to tell you frankly of my
concerns.



TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:

8 FEBRUARY 1984: LEBANON

As my Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister told the House yesterday, we have been considering closely and urgently the situation in Lebanon where conditions and the prospects for achieving reconciliation have deteriorated sharply in the past few days. The Lebanese Government has resigned and factional fighting has broken out again on a large scale.

The British contingent to the multinational force has been performing two important tasks: carrying out street patrols in Beirut and, at the request of all the parties, providing an impartial guard for the ceasefire talks. With the recent deterioration in the situation, it has become impossible for it to fulfil this role, and the danger to the contingent has been greatly heightened.

In these difficult circumstances, we have been in close touch with our MNF partners. And the Government have decided that our troops should be moved to the Royal Fleet Auxilliary Reliant which is stationed off the Lebanese coast and remain there until the situation becomes clearer. The House will be glad to know that the major part of this redeployment has already been successfully completed.

/The British

The British contingent have earned a high reputation among all Lebanese as an impartial force. I am sure I speak for the whole House when I say that they have carried out their tasks in Beirut with exemplary courage and efficiency. They have played an important part in contributing to stability in the Beirut area and in providing an opportunity for political reconciliation. It is a tragedy that this opportunity has not been seized.

We continue to have very prominently in our minds the safety of British residents in the Beirut area. I am glad to be able to report that I have received no reports of any casualties. For those British residents who wish to leave appropriate arrangements are being put in hand. British Embassy staff are safe and well and their position is being kept under close review. I would like to pay tribute to the British Ambassador in Beirut, Mr David Miers and his staff who have been performing their duties under very difficult circumstances.

The need for the restoration of stability, sovereignty and independence to Lebanon remains of the highest importance. We shall stay in close touch with our MNF partners, with the Lebanese Government and with all those who can help in this process. If needless bloodshed is to be avoided, a supreme effort must now be made by all the parties to settle their differences by compromise.

GRPS 450

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DESKBY 081400Z FCO
FM BEIRUT 081300Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 8 FEBRUARY.
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, NICOSIA, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO
CBFC CYPRUS.

BRITISH COMMUNITY.

1. THERE IS A COMPARATIVE LULL IN WEST BEIRUT AT PRESENT, THOUGH SPECULATION ABOUT FUTURE FIGHTING OR SHELLING IS RIFE. BRITISH SUBJECTS ARE ASKING ABOUT EVACUATION PLANS AND WE AND OTHER EMBASSIES ARE REVIEWING PLANS.
2. EVEN IF WE WANTED TO ADVISE EVACUATION AND ARRANGE THE MEANS, IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE AT THIS MOMENT. OUR TELEPHONES REMAIN OUT OF ACTION (THOUGH WE ARE ARRANGING ACCESS TO ONE THAT WORKS). MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED BY THE MILITIA CHECKPOINTS THAT HAVE MUSHROOMED AND WE ARE STILL TESTING HOW FREELY AND SAFELY ONE CAN MOVE TO VARIOUS QUARTERS. IT COULD BE DANGEROUS TO ASSEMBLE ANY LARGE CROWN OF BRITISH SUBJECT FOR EVACUATION. THE ONLY WAY TO DO THIS IN ANY CASE WOULD BE BY ADVERTISING IN THE MEDIA AND/OR THE BBC WORLD SERVICE. FOR HELICOPTERS TO COME IN (THE AIRPORT IS STILL SHUT), IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF THE DE FACTO AUTHORITIES (WHICH WHOM WE ARE URGENTLY SEEKING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT) UNLESS IT WAS FOR AN UNADVERTISED TRIP TO PICK UP A PREARRANGED PARTY. (THE AMERICANS TOOK OFF 3 HELICOPTER LOADS OF USAID PERSONNEL THIS MORNING).
3. WE HAVE NO FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONS IN EAST BEIRUT. A CONVOY OF OUR CHRISTIAN LOCAL STAFF WHO HAVE BEEN MAROONED HERE SINCE MONDAY WERE TURNED BACK AT THE GREEN LINE (NORTH END) THIS MORNING. IT IS POSSIBLE BUT NOT RECOMMENDABLE TO RUN A SNIPER GAUNTLET AT THE MUSEUM CROSSING. IF EVACUATION BECOMES NECESSARY FROM EAST BEIRUT I SHALL NEED TO SEND A CONSULAR PARTY THERE SOMEHOW (PREFERABLY BY HELICOPTER). I MAY IN ANY CASE NEED TO ESTABLISH AN OFFICE IN EAST BEIRUT FOR WIDER OPERATIONAL REASONS SOON.

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4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE I AM NOT RECOMMENDING EVACUATION AT PRESENT. THE ADVICE WE ARE CURRENTLY GIVING TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IS IN MY TELNO 69. BUT WE SHALL HAVE TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE AND CONSTANT REFIEW, DEPENDING PRINCIPALLY ON WHETHER FIGHTING RESUMES AND HOW LAW AND ORDER IS MAINTAINED ON THE 2 SIDE OF THE GREEN LINE.

MIERS

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US Declassified

Dear Ron,

I have just received the news that you will now not be making a public statement about the Lebanon tonight; that you will be adopting a more neutral position; that you hope we will do the same; and that US forces in the Lebanon will fire only if fired upon.

I can well understand the difficulty of formulating a policy towards the very complex situation that now exists in the Lebanon. But this change of mind puts me in a very difficult position. Following my message to you this morning that we had decided to redeploy our own small contingent we have made all the necessary preparations and our plans are now in an advanced stage. I was able to hold the House of Commons this afternoon but only because it was accepted in this very delicate situation that nothing should be said which would prejudice the safety of our troops. Our public opinion now undoubtedly expects that they should not be kept any longer in their particularly exposed situation when, to say the least, their role is unclear.

I have therefore decided that we must go ahead. Our ^{to}troops will accordingly be moved tonight to one of our ships which is off the Lebanese coast. In order to help you as much as possible we shall take the line in public that they are being redeployed from their particularly exposed and dangerous position and stationed on board ship until the situation becomes clearer. We shall avoid committing ourselves in public to permanent withdrawal for as long as we can but I must leave you in no doubt that we are most unlikely to be able to contemplate a return to the situation in which our troops have been in the Lebanon.

I am sorry that we cannot meet your request to "go into neutral" but frankly it came too late - and I do not think public opinion here would understand such a position.

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

MARGARET

Dear Ron,

I have just received the news that you will now not be making a public statement about the Lebanon tonight; that you will be adopting a more neutral position; that you hope we will do the same; and that US forces in the Lebanon will fire only if fired upon.

I can well understand the difficulty of formulating a policy towards the very complex situation that now exists in the Lebanon. But this change of mind puts me in a very difficult position. Following my message to you this morning that we had decided to redeploy our own small contingent we have made all the necessary preparations and our plans are now in an advanced stage. I was able to hold the House of Commons this afternoon but only because it was accepted in this very delicate situation that nothing should be said which would prejudice the safety of our troops. Our public opinion now undoubtedly expects that they should not be kept any longer in their particularly exposed situation when, to say the least, their role is unclear.

at the most suitable moment in the next few days to Ron.

I have therefore decided that we must go ahead.. Our troops will accordingly be moved ~~tonight~~ ^{tomorrow} to one of our ships which is off the Lebanese coast. In order to help you as much as possible we shall take the line in public that they are being redeployed from their particularly exposed and dangerous position and stationed on board ship until the situation becomes clearer. We shall avoid committing ourselves in public to permanent withdrawal for as long as we can but I must leave you in no doubt that we are most unlikely to be able to contemplate a return to the situation in which our troops have been in the Lebanon.

I am sorry that we cannot meet your request to "go into neutral" but frankly it came too late - and I do not think public opinion here would understand such a position, *still less*

our words in the US

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

MARGARET

Copy of T 23/04

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 345

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FM FCO 081300Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 8 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT,

TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 130 LEBANON

L WE FULLY UNDERSTAND URQUHART'S VIEW THAT THERE IS LITTLE THE UN CAN DO IN PRACTICAL TERMS AT PRESENT TO HELP MATTERS FORWARD IN LEBANON. BUT IN THE PRESENT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SITUATION WE CANNOT AFFORD TO RULE OUT ANY CHANCES OF ANY PROGRESS HOWEVER SLIGHT. OTHER AVENUES LOOK EQUALLY DISMAL.

2 PLEASE THEREFORE SAY TO URQUHART THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES AND RESPECT HIS DESIRE TO PROTECT THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, NOT LEAST FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PURPOSES, TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT THE UN IN A GOOD LIGHT AND AS HAVING SOMETHING TO CONTRIBUTE, AND TO SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH BOTH CONTINUOUSLY AND VERY RECENTLY WITH THE SECRETARIAT ABOUT A POSSIBLE UN ROLE. UNIFIL HAS BEEN BY AND LARGE A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION AND THERE MAY BE INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF USING UNIFIL CONTINGENTS AT LEAST AS OBSERVERS IN ONE OF THE MANY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO. THE UN CAN SCARCELY AFFORD TO STAND ASIDE WHEN ONE OF ITS MORE AFFLICTED MEMBER STATES IS IN SUCH ACUTE DIFFICULTIES, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REMAINS THE CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD OF STATE AND NO EARLY ALTERNATIVE IS IN VIEW.

3 WE TOO ARE UNSIGHTED ABOUT FRENCH INTENTIONS. WE HAVE BEEN IN REGULAR TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH IN RECENT WEEKS AND PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BUT OUR INTERLOCUTORS HAVE BEEN EVASIVE. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE THEIR MINISTERS HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER INTERESTS AND CHEYSSON FOR EXAMPLE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL AWAY FROM PARIS.

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18409 - 1

WHEN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE PUS THIS MORNING HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD KEEP UP THE IMPRESSION OF SANG FROID. THEY WERE THEREFORE LOOKING FOR A POSITIVE INPUT AND BELIEVED THAT A UN ROLE IN PLACE OF THE MNF COULD HELP. HE DID NOT ELABORATE BUT COMMENTED THAT THEIR THINKING HAD NOT EVOLVED VERY FAR.

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FM FCO 081215Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 8 FEBRUARY

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AND TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW
YOUR TELNO 429: LEBANON.

1. IT IS CLEAR THAT AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS, THE RESIGNATIO OF GEMAYEL'S CABINET AND THE INCAPACITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, GEMAYEL'S AUTHORITY HAS BECOME GRAVELY WEAKENED. THE POINTS MADE BY GEMAYEL IN HIS SPEECH OF 5 FEBRUARY CONTAINED NO REAL CONCESSIONS AND HAVE CLEARLY HAD NO IMPACT IN ATTRACTING THE SUPPORT OF THE MIDDLE GROUND. HAVING LOST MUSLIM SUPPORT AND WITHOUT A CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCE HE IS UNLIKELY TO RETAIN HIS CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR ANYTHING MORE THAN HIS MARONITE CONSTITUENCY UNLESS HE CAN MAKE AN IMAGINATIVE POLITICAL GESTURE SOON. THE NEXT FEW DAYS OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY TO INJECT NEW IDEAS. IF THIS CHANCE IS NOT SEIZED QUICKLY BY THE AMERICANS IT WILL PROBABLY DISAPPEAR.
2. AS EGERTON INDICATED TO REPRESENTATIVES OF MNF EMBASSIES ON 6 FEBRUARY (MY TELNO 247) THE ONLY WAY GEMAYEL CAN HOPE TO ATTRACT STRONG MUSLIMS BACK INTO HIS TEAM IS BY PUBLIC ABANDONMENT OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. HE WILL ALSO NEED TO TAKE OTHER MEASURES TO SHOW THAT GENUINE CONCESSIONS ARE ON OFFER. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT IN RECONSIDERING US POLICY FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT THE AMERICANS WLL CONSIDER ENCOURAGING GEMAYEL TO TAKE THIS STEP. IN OUR VIEW THE 17 MY AGREEMENT IS ALREADY A DEAD LETTER AND AT THIS STAGE THERE IS NOTHING TO BE LOST BY ADMITTING IT. IT WOULD BE A SMALL PRICE TO PAY FOR RETAINING GEMAYEL IN THE PRESIDENCY WHO HAS A BETTER CHANCE OF HOLDING LEBANON TOGETHER THAN ANY ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATE.
3. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR GEMAYEL'S

CONFIDENTIAL

18410 - 1

SURVIVAL WILL BE HARMED RATHER THAN ENHANCED IF HE IS SEEN TO BE MAINTAINED IN OFFICE SOLELY BY AMERICAN FIREPOWER. DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT WILL ONLY ENCOURAGE SYRIAN RETALIATION AND INTRANSIGENCE AND COULD LEAD TO A DANGEROUS ESCALATION. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT MILITARY ACTION. WHAT IT NEEDED IS A POLITICAL PROGRAMME NOT (NOT) FURTHER MILITARY ACTIONS.

4. WE SHALL BE SPEAKING ON THESE LINES TO MURPHY WHEN HE ARRIVES IN LONDON THIS EVENING. PLEASE TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES TO GET THESE POINTS ACROSS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED
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DEFENCE DEPT
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NEWS DEPT
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SED
ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
SIR W HARDING
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JENKINS
MR EGERTON

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MOD DS11
MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE
SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

²
CONFIDENTIAL

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	SECRET	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 SECRET
4
5
6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE
8 BRITFORLEB, MODUK

FEBRUARY 84
~~BEIRUT II WFO 00~~
WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, CBFC,
(not to all)

A.S.C. 9/2.

We have just heard that President Reagan is making an announcement after all, though we are not sure what precisely he will be saying.

9 YOUR TELNO 70 AND MY TELNO 51 / : LEBANON/MNF
10 1. Thank you for your recommendations. Ministers have now
11 decided that the British MNF contingent should be moved at the
12 most suitable moment in the next twenty-four hours to one of
13 our ships off the Lebanese coast. After confirming that
14 Commander Britforleb is proceeding as planned, you should
15 immediately inform the Lebanese Government, preferably President
16 Gemayel himself. In so doing you should explain that they are
17 being redeployed from their particularly exposed and dangerous
18 position and stationed on board ship until the situation becomes
19 clearer. Strictly for your own information, while we shall
20 avoid committing ourselves in public to permanent withdrawal for
21 as long as we can, we are most unlikely to be able to contemplate
22 a return to the situation in which our troops have been in the
23 Lebanon.
24 2. I shall be making a statement along these lines in
25 Parliament this afternoon (Wednesday). Until then we are making

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword no
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution LEBANON MNF
Drafted by (Block capitals) BRIAN FALL		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch <i>B. Dickoff</i>		
Comcon reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page
	SECRET	IMMEDIATE
		2

<<<<

1 <<<<
 2 no formal announcement here. But if necessary the following
 3 press line will be used by No 10, in response to questions
 4 about anything President Reagan may say:
 5 The Prime Minister mentioned in her answer to questions open
 6 square brackets yesterday close square brackets that we
 7 have been having urgent consultations with our MNF partners,
 8 the Lebanese authorities, the British Ambassador in Beirut
 9 and the Commander of the British contingent. The Government's
 10 position in the light of these continuing consultations and
 11 events on the ground will be made clear in Parliament open
 12 square brackets this afternoon close square brackets.
 13
 14 ~~HOWE~~
 15 ~~NNNN~~
 16 3. If (repeat if) news of Britforleb's redeployment breaks before
 17 I make my statement in the House, No 10 will draw on the
 18 following supplementary press line:
 19 In the light of the deteriorating security situation in Beirut
 20 and the particularly exposed position of the BRITFORLEB
 21 Headquarters building, it has been decided to redeploy the
 22 British contingent of the MNF until the situation becomes
 23 clearer, to the RFA 'RELIANT', stationed off the Lebanese coast.
 24 We are of course in the closest touch with the Lebanese
 25 authorities and our MNF partners about this. There will be
 26 a statement in Parliament this afternoon.
 27 3. For Paris and Rome: messages to your host governments will
 28 follow tomorrow morning 8 February once the terms of my statement
 29 in the House are clearer.
 30
 31 HOWE
 32 NNNN
 33
 34

///
 //
 /

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------

Robin



10 DOWNING STREET

The wording for the
press release has been
rearranged slightly
+ takes into account
discussions throughout
the day.

Brainfall has said
that if any thought
needs to be given to
supplementary questions
it is important that
PTO

we take the line

'we have been in
very close contact
with the Americans'

rather than:

'we will consider
their proposals'

which would suggest
that we are not
fully aware of what
is going on.

Peter

SECRET



file

Loc

cc MASTER.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 February 1984

LEBANON

The Prime Minister held a further meeting at 9 am this morning which was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Luce, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir John Leahy.

The Defence Secretary reported on the latest stage in the operation to redeploy the British contingent but was not yet able to confirm that the operation was complete.

The question of the safety of the British community and the staff at HM Embassy, Beirut, was discussed. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary undertook to instruct HM Ambassador to inform the British community of the facilities which would be available for those who wished to leave the Lebanon. Contingency planning for the evacuation of those who do wish to leave was described. The Ambassador would also be invited to consider whether he wished to reduce his own staff and dependants further. Mr. Miers had pointed out in a telegram overnight that, from the point of view of the safety of his mission, it was desirable that in public comment we should not stress that the redeployment of BRITFORLEB was associated with US moves.

It was agreed that we should impress on the United States Government once more the desirability of allowing President Gemayel to abrogate the 17 May agreement. The Prime Minister stressed that it was important that the US Administration should seize quickly the opportunity which might be presented in the next few days, but which would probably disappear thereafter, for injecting new ideas into the situation. There seemed little possibility, given the present circumstances in the Lebanon, of involving the United Nations effectively. But we should bear in mind the expectation in public opinion that we would be examining all possibilities and should be ready to state that we had been in touch both continuously and very recently with the UN Secretariat about possible UN roles.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

BRIAN FALL 'PHONED.

"THE PRIME MINISTER MENTIONED IN HER ANSWER TO
QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON/YESTERDAY THAT WE HAVE
BEEN HAVING URGENT CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR MNF
PARTNERS, THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE
BRITISH CONTINGENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION
IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS
AND EVENTS ON THE GROUND WILL BE MADE CLEAR IN
PARLIAMENT TOMORROW/THIS AFTERNOON."

310

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 February, 1984

Dear John,

MZ

Lebanon/MNF

I enclose a draft statement prepared by officials here for the Foreign Secretary to make in the House on the redeployment of BRITFORLEB tomorrow 8 February. This has been drafted in the light of the news received late this evening that President Reagan is after all to make an announcement of a partial redeployment of US marines. Ministers may wish to discuss this draft at their meeting at 0900 tomorrow morning. I enclose a further six copies in case we are unable to get copies in advance to all participants.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Resident Clerk in MOD. The Foreign Secretary has not seen this draft: I shall be showing him a copy overnight.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

There has been widespread anxiety about the situation in Lebanon for some time and the conditions have deteriorated sharply in the past few days. The Lebanese government has resigned and factional fighting has broken out again on a large scale. The prospects of achieving reconciliation appear as elusive as ever. It has become increasingly difficult for BRITFORLEB to carry out its role, and its situation has become ever more exposed. In these circumstances we have been in urgent consultations with our MNF partners. In the light of these consultations and of the announcement made by President Reagan yesterday evening the Government have decided that our troops should be moved to RFA Reliant off the Lebanon coast and stationed there until the situation becomes clearer. [The House will be relieved to know that this redeployment has already been successfully completed].

For the time being British residents in the Beirut area are being advised to stay indoors for their own safety. Our Ambassador in Beirut is keeping the situation under close review but has not at this stage advised immediate evacuation. British Embassy staff are safe and well.

SECRET

13#

Ala
12

GRS 200
SECRET
FM ROME
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 073
OF 071330Z FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, WASHINGTON

LEBANON: YRTELNO 111 TO PARIS

1. I HAVE SEEN POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND SPOKE AS REQUESTED. ITALIANS HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN BUT HAVE NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO REACT. THEY ARE TRYING TO ASCERTAIN FRENCH VIEWS. BOTTAI'S PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT ITALY WOULD RETAIN HER HOSPITAL AND TROOPS TO GUARD IT, AND MIGHT ALSO MAINTAIN SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING CAMPS. HE SHOWED ME A LETTER TO YOU FROM ANDREOTTI (YOU SHOULD RECEIVE THIS SHORTLY) REQUESTING A MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS, AT EARLIEST CONVENIENT DATE. BOTTAI SAID THIS REQUEST REFLECTED GRAVE ANXIETIES HERE YESTERDAY, AND WAS MAINTAINED IN TODAY'S CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO CRAXI'S OFFICE, WHO REACTED SIMILARLY. HIS STAFF ARE ANXIOUS THAT IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR DECISIONS THE FOUR SHOULD KEEP THE APPEARANCE OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND MAINTAIN THEIR COMMITMENT TO LEBANON. WE ARE REPLYING AS BRIEFED ORALLY BY NENAD.

3. ANDREOTTI RETURNS FROM BELGRADE TOMORROW AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 8.

BRIDGES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

SECRET

GR 300
SECRET

FLASH

13

FM BEIRUT 071215Z FEB 84

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 70 OF 7 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, CBFC
BRITFORLEB

YOUR TELNO 049: LEBANON.

1. THE US DECISION IS LIKELY TO EASE THE DANGERS HERE. BUT WHETHER OR NOT THE MARINES WITHDRAW FROM THE AIRPORT WE COULD SOON HAVE MILITANT SHIA EGGED ON BY IRANIAN AND PALESTINIAN EXTREMISTS UP AGAINST THE MARINES GUARDING THE UK/US CHANCERY BUILDING. IF THE AMERICAN FLEET WAS AT THE SAME TIME RESPONDING TO GEMAYEL'S REQUEST FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE, A TENSE SITUATION COULD DEVELOP WITH THIS BUILDING A TARGET FOR SHELLING. I MIGHT HAVE TO RECOMMEND AND THEN TRY TO CO-ORDINATE EVACUATION BY WHATEVER MEANS POSSIBLE OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY (PERHAPS 200-300 PERSONS IN WEST BEIRUT ALONE. THERE ARE MORE IN THE EAST, BUT NOT ALL WOULD TRAVEL) AND OF MOST OF THE EMBASSY STAFF. THE ABOVE IS THE WORSE CASE SCENARIO BUT ONE I CANNOT IGNORE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. THEREFORE:

(A) NO REDUCTION NOW. I MAY NEED ALL HANDS TO ASSIST WITH EVACUATION - AND SOME WOULD THEMSELVES TRAVEL WITH THE EVACUEES.

(B) I DO NOT THINK IT NECESSARY TO PLAN FOR THIS. MIXING UK AND US SOLDIERS IN A TIGHT PERIMETER WOULD CAUSE CONFUSION. THIS CHANCERY IS NOT DEFENSIBLE, IN THE CONDITIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA 1. WE SHOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO SEEK SAFETY IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE ATTACKERS - AND PERHAPS MOVING AWAY FROM THE AMERICANS EG TO MY RESIDENCE (IF WE COULD: IF WE COULDN'T I DOUBT IF ANY BRITFORLEB DETACHEMENT WOULD ADD TO OUR SECURITY).

(C) WE SHOULD SAY THAT BRITFORLEB IS HERE TO DO A PEACE KEEPING ROLE. SO LONG AS THERE IS NO PEACE TO KEEP WE DO NOT WISH TO LEAVE IT EXPOSED AT HADATH. WE ARE THEREFORE WITHDRAWING IT TO HM SHIPS (OR CYPRUS). WHEN THERE IS A ROLE FOR IT AGAIN WE CAN CONSIDER ITS RETURN.

MERS

BT

OO WASHINGTON

THE HAGUE

FLASH

GRS 250

SECRET

FM PARIS 071230Z FEB 84

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 150 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, THE HAGUE

YOUR TELNO 111 (NOT TO THE HAGUE): LEBANON

1. I TOOK ACTION WITH SAUTTER, DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE ELYSÉE AND MINISTER SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ANDREANI, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO CHEYSSON'S DIRECTEUR DE CABINET, DUFOURCQ.
2. SAUTTER CONFIRMED THAT MITTERRAND HAD RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE FROM REAGAN. HE HAD INSTRUCTED CHEYSSON, WHO IS WITH HIM IN THE HAGUE, TO LIAISE URGENTLY WITH THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. FOR THE MOMENT NEITHER SAUTTER NOR DUFOURCQ KNEW WHAT CHEYSSON WAS PLANNING TO DO OR WHAT DIRECTION FRENCH POLICY MIGHT TAKE.
3. SAUTTER ASKED WHETHER WE WERE INITIATING A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE MNF OR INFORMING THEM OF A DECISION. I SAID IT WAS A DECISION, THOUGH THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE SOME PRACTICAL LIAISON ON MATTER RELATING TO IT BETWEEN CONTINGENTS ON THE GROUND.
4. DUFOURCQ ASKED ABOUT THE TIMETABLE OF WITHDRAWAL. WOULD IT BE COMPLETED THIS AFTERNOON BEFORE QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE? I SAID I DID NOT KNOW BUT THAT FOR PRACTICAL REASONS THIS SEEMED UNLIKELY.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT

071234Z JW/HH

Seen by Mr P. H. 7/2



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01 ~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

7th February 1984

A.S.C. 9/2

Dear John

LEBANON

/ For the record I should pass to you the attached message from the Lebanese Foreign Minister which we here have received via COMBRITFORLEB. Apparently this was passed on a roneoed sheet because telephones were not working. It was received here at about 7 pm but I cannot say when it was originated.

I am copying this letter and the attachment to Peter Ricketts, FCO.

Yours etc.

R. C. Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

A J Coles Esq

FOLLOWING NOTE FROM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ALL MNF CONTRIBUTORS
PASSED BY HAND TO COMBRITFORLEB ON RONEOD SHEET.

FROM ELIE SALEEM, FOREIGN MINISTER

1. IN VIEW OF CURRENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION I HAVE
ASKED THE US TO REFOCUS THE EFFORT OF ITS MNF CONTINGENT TO
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN COPING WITH THE CURRENT THREATS FROM
FOREIGN INTERVENTION, SPECIFICALLY ARTILLERY FIRE FROM THE
SYRIAN CONTROLLED ZONE AND THE INFILTRATION OF FOREIGN
TERRORISTS INTO BEIRUT.

2. I ALSO REQUEST THAT THE MNF GOVERNMENT CONSIDER ADJUSTING
THEIR MNF PRESENCE TO CONFORM TO THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION
AND THE EXTERNAL THREATS WE FACE.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1984

Dear Peter,

LEBANON

My letter of 7 February about the third meeting held by the Prime Minister today to discuss the Lebanon was overtaken by the news you conveyed to me this evening that there had been a change of policy in Washington - namely that the President would now not make a statement tonight, that he would be adopting a more neutral position, that he hoped we would do the same, and that US forces in the Lebanon would fire only if fired upon.

After consultation with you and Richard Mottram I conveyed to the Prime Minister the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary that we should proceed as planned with the redeployment of BRITFORLEB to RFA RELIANT.

The Prime Minister has tonight despatched the enclosed message to President Reagan explaining this decision. You will wish to note in particular the public line that our troops "are being redeployed from their particularly exposed and dangerous position and stationed on board ship until the situation becomes clearer".

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*You are
for notes.*

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET

US Declassified

Dear Ron,

I have just received the news that you will now not be making a public statement about the Lebanon tonight; that you will be adopting a more neutral position; that you hope we will do the same; and that US forces in the Lebanon will fire only if fired upon.

I can well understand the difficulty of formulating a policy towards the very complex situation that now exists in the Lebanon. But this change of mind puts me in a very difficult position. Following my message to you this morning that we had decided to redeploy our own small contingent we have made all the necessary preparations and our plans are now in an advanced stage. I was able to hold the House of Commons this afternoon but only because it was accepted in this very delicate situation that nothing should be said which would prejudice the safety of our troops. Our public opinion now undoubtedly expects that they should not be kept any longer in their particularly exposed situation when, to say the least, their role is unclear.

I have therefore decided that we must go ahead. Our troops will accordingly be moved at the most suitable moment in the next twenty-four hours to one of our ships which is off the Lebanese coast. In order to help you as much as possible we shall take the line in public that they are being redeployed from their particularly exposed and dangerous position and stationed on board ship until the situation becomes clearer. We shall avoid committing ourselves in public to permanent withdrawal for as long as we can but I must leave you in no doubt that we are most unlikely to be able to contemplate a return to the situation in which our troops have been in the Lebanon.

I am sorry that we cannot meet your request to "go into neutral" but frankly it came too late - and I do not think public opinion here, still less our commander in the Lebanon, would understand such a position.

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

MARGARET

CC MASTER
OPS

US Declassified

11

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T.23/84

CABWTE 002/07=
FLASH 072040Z FEB 84
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
MISC 048

T O P S E C R E T

THE FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

BEGINS

DEAR RON.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE NEWS THAT YOU WILL NOW NOT BE MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT THE LEBANON TONIGHT= THAT YOU WILL BE ADOPTING A MORE NEUTRAL POSITION= THAT YOU HOPE WE WILL DO THE SAME= AND THAT U.S. FORCES IN THE LEBANON WILL FIRE ONLY IF FIRED UPON.

I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY OF FORMULATING A POLICY TOWARDS THE VERY COMPLEX SITUATION THAT NOW EXISTS IN THE LEBANON. BUT THIS CHANGE OF MIND PUTS ME IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. FOLLOWING MY MESSAGE TO YOU THIS MORNING THAT WE HAD DECIDED TO REDEPLOY OUR OWN SMALL CONTINGENT WE HAVE MADE ALL THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS AND OUR PLANS ARE NOW IN AN ADVANCED STAGE. I WAS ABLE TO HOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS AFTERNOON BUT ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS ACCEPTED IN THIS VERY DELICATE SITUATION THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE SAFETY OF OUR TROOPS. OUR PUBLIC OPINION NOW UNDOUBTEDLY EXPECTS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE KEPT ANY LONGER IN THEIR PARTICULARLY EXPOSED SITUATION WHEN, TO SAY THE LEAST, THEIR ROLE IS UNCLEAR.

I HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT WE MUST GO AHEAD. OUR TROOPS WILL ACCORDINGLY BE MOVED AT THE MOST SUITABLE MOMENT IN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS TO ONE OF OUR SHIPS WHICH IS OFF THE LEBANESE COAST. IN ORDER TO HELP YOU AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WE SHALL TAKE THE LINE IN PUBLIC THAT THEY ARE BEING REDEPLOYED FROM THEIR PARTICULARLY EXPOSED AND DANGEROUS POSITION AND STATIONED ON BOARD SHIP UNTIL THE SITUATION BECOMES CLEARER. WE SHALL AVOID COMMITTING OURSELVES IN PUBLIC TO PERMANENT WITH-DRAWAL FOR AS LONG AS WE CAN BUT I MUST LEAVE YOU IN NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO CONTEMPLATE A RETURN TO THE SITUATION IN WHICH OUR TROOPS HAVE BEEN IN THE LEBANON.

I AM SORRY THAT WE CANNOT MEET YOUR REQUEST TO "GO INTO NEUTRAL" BUT FRANKLY IT CAME TOO LATE - AND I DO NOT THINK PUBLIC OPINION HERE, MUCH LESS OUR COMMANDER IN THE FIELD, WOULD UNDERSTAND SUCH A POSITION.

WITH BEST WISHES,

YOURS EVER,

MARGARET

ENDS

NNNN

SENT AT 072102Z KJM

RGRG QSL AT 2102Z KKK

GRS 250

SECRET

10A

SECRET

FM PARIS 071230Z FEB 84

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 150 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, THE HAGUE

RR 9/2

YOUR TELNO 111 (NOT TO THE HAGUE): LEBANON

1. I TOOK ACTION WITH SAUTTER, DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE ELYSEE AND MINISTER SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ANDREANI, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO CHEYSSON'S DIRECTEUR DE CABINET, DUFOURCQ.

2. SAUTTER CONFIRMED THAT MITTERRAND HAD RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE FROM REAGAN. HE HAD INSTRUCTED CHEYSSON, WHO IS WITH HIM IN THE HAGUE, TO LIAISE URGENTLY WITH THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. FOR THE MOMENT NEITHER SAUTTER NOR DUFOURCQ KNEW WHAT CHEYSSON WAS PLANNING TO DO OR WHAT DIRECTION FRENCH POLICY MIGHT TAKE.

3. SAUTTER ASKED WHETHER WE WERE INITIATING A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE MNF OR INFORMING THEM OF A DECISION. I SAID IT WAS A DECISION, THOUGH THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE SOME PRACTICAL LIAISON ON MATTER RELATING TO IT BETWEEN CONTINGENTS ON THE GROUND.

4. DUFOURCQ ASKED ABOUT THE TIMETABLE OF WITHDRAWAL. WOULD IT BE COMPLETED THIS AFTERNOON BEFORE QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE? I SAID I DID NOT KNOW BUT THAT FOR PRACTICAL REASONS THIS SEEMED UNLIKELY.

FRETWELL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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DEFENCE DEPT

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NEWS DEPT

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PROTOCOL DEPT

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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GR 750

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DESKBY 071600Z FCO

FM BEHRUT 071440Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 7 FEBRUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
MODUKI, CBFC, BRITFORLEB.

MY TELNO 70: LEBANON.

1. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION FURTHER WITH MURPHY. THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OMITTS ANYTHING ALREADY COVERED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 417 (JUST RECEIVED).
2. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE EXTREMELY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO GET THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS; NAMELY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT "BUGGING OUT". HENCE THE EMPHASIS ON PHASED REDEPLOYMENT, CONTINUING WITH EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE FOR THE LAF, AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAF COUNTER-BATTERY CAPABILITY.
3. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE PACKAGE WOULD ALSO INCLUDE SOMETHING ON THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE FORMULA USED BY GEMAYEL IN HIS 5 FEBRUARY BROADCAST. HE THEN REVERTED TO THE PROBLEMS OF GEMAYEL'S STANDING WITH THE ISRAELIS IF THE AGREEMENT WAS ABROGATED; AND OF THE ISRAELI'S LEGALISTIC APPROACH TO A DOCUMENT WHICH THE LEBANESE HAD SIGNED. I ASKED WHETHER GEMAYEL MIGHT NOT REASONABLY CLAIM TO THE ISRAELIS THAT HE COULD NOT RATIFY EXCEPT ON THE ADVICE OF HIS MINISTERS (THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD PRESUMABLY TAKE OFFICE ON A PLATFORM OF A MODIFIED, IF NOT ABROGATED, AGREEMENT); AND THEN THE PREMISE ON WHICH THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED NAMELY THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD SOMEHOW ALSO BE INDUCED TO WITHDRAW, HAD PROVED FALSE. MURPHY SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT GEMAYEL COULD JUST AS WELL SAY TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS "NOT WORKING IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN CAST". HE THEN REVERTED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT JERKING THE RUG FROM UNDER GEMAYEL.
4. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE AMERICANS ENVISAGED A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SIXTH FLEET WOULD BE FIRING, AT GEMAYEL'S REQUEST, DURING THE PERIOD OF MARINE REDEPLOYMENT. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THIS COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE TO WHETHER THE PACKAGE PROVED WELCOME TO GEMAYEL'S OPPONENTS, PARTICULARLY BERRI; OR WHETHER IT WOULD PROVE TOO LITTLE TOO LATE. MURPHY READ ME THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WHICH HE SAID

CONFIDENTIAL

/WOULD

CC MASTER

10



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 February, 1984

Lebanon

The Prime Minister held a third meeting today at 1700 to discuss the situation in the Lebanon. It was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Luce, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir John Leahy.

It was noted that Mr. Eagleburger of the US State Department would be talking to Ambassadors of the MFA contributing countries in Washington at 1730.

The Defence Secretary stated that orders had been sent to OC BRITFORLEB in accordance with the conclusions of the previous meeting. Namely, the force was to make preparations to move in such a way as not to endanger the contingent and that they should be ready to move, by preference, at about 0300 London time on 8 February. A meeting would be held in the Ministry of Defence at 2300 hours at which final instructions to move would be issued. The force would take with them the US observers who were present at its headquarters. Two buccaneers would be just off the Lebanese coast in case of need. Only the Lebanese armed forces would be told of our departure plans. The roll-on-roll-off ferry had been hired but not yet told to sail.

Contingency plans had been prepared for the evacuation of British civilians and British Embassy staff.

When the media became aware of the departure of the British contingent, No. 10 would take the line that we were re-deploying our forces and that a full statement would be made in the House of Commons on 8 February.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary observed that there would also be a need for a press line when the details of President Reagan's speech later this evening become clear. It was agreed that No. 10 would speak as follows:

/"The

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"The Prime Minister mentioned in her answer to Questions this afternoon that there have been urgent consultations with the MNF partners, the Lebanese authorities, the British Embassy in Beirut and the Commander of the British contingent. In the light of these continuing consultations and events on the ground, the Government will be making its position clear in Parliament tomorrow."

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he also proposed to instruct HM Ambassador, Beirut (on receipt of a further telegram when President Reagan had spoken) to inform the Lebanese authorities that we had decided that BRITFORLEB should be re-deployed. We would make it plain that any further decision on the role of the British contingent could not be taken until we saw how the situation developed.

In further discussion, it was pointed out that we would need to bear in mind the possible role of British troops in assisting with civilian evacuation. For the time being the plan was to take all the troops to RFA Reliant. Any question of moving the troops to Cyprus would be the subject of a further decision.

The question was raised of whether a further message should be sent to President Reagan expressing reservations about the extension of the rules of engagement for American forces in the Lebanon. It was decided, since we had already taken steps to warn the Americans of the danger of putting the MNF at risk by a more aggressive policy, no further message should be sent to the President at this stage. The line to be taken in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's statement to Parliament on 8 February would be discussed further at a meeting at 0900 hours on 8 February. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would provide a draft statement for discussion then.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC 045

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T22/84

TOP SECRET

cc MASTER
OPS

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED THIS MORNING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE LEBANON.

WE SHALL GIVE THOUGHT TO ALL THE POINTS IN IT. BUT IN VIEW OF THE URGENT AND DETERIORATING SITUATION IN BEIRUT LET ME GIVE YOU MY IMMEDIATE REACTION IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR DECISION TO BEGIN A PHASED RE-DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. MARINES ON SHORE AT BEIRUT AIRPORT BACK TO THEIR SHIPS OFFSHORE.

THE LATEST ADVICE FROM OUR PEOPLE ON THE SPOT (AND WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AGAIN AT ONCE) IS THAT IT IS NOW VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR OUR CONTINGENT TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE AND THAT THERE IS A GREATLY INCREASED RISK OF THEIR INCURRING CASUALTIES (YOU WILL OF COURSE BE AWARE OF THE PARTICULARLY EXPOSED POSITION OF OUR TROOPS). WE HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT WE SHALL SIMILARLY RE-DEPLOY OUR OWN CONTINGENT. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT, SINCE WE HAVE LESS THAN 100 MEN THERE, THE QUESTION OF PHASING HARDLY ARISES. WE ARE STILL WORKING ON THE DETAILS BUT THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT THE BULK OF, IF NOT ALL OUR CONTINGENT WILL BE REDEPLOYED SHORTLY.

I NOTE THAT A CONTINGENT OF U.S. MARINES WILL MAINTAIN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NEAR THE BRITISH CHANCERY. WE SHALL CONSIDER URGENTLY WHETHER ANY OF OUR CONTINGENT CAN HAVE A USEFUL ROLE IN GUARDING OUR EMBASSY.

WE ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER WHEN WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE THE REDEPLOYMENT. THIS WILL DEPEND PARTLY ON THE LIKELY EFFECT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE SAFETY OF THE MNF, PARTLY ON PUBLIC OPINION HERE. WE SHALL ALSO NEED TO KNOW HOW SOON YOU PLAN TO MAKE YOUR OWN MOVES PUBLIC AND OUR EMBASSY WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR PEOPLE URGENTLY TODAY TO ESTABLISH THIS.

WE SHALL ALSO BE IN TOUCH URGENTLY WITH OUR FRENCH AND ITALIAN PARTNERS.

I SHALL DO MY BEST TO PRESENT OUR DECISION AS BEING IN LINE WITH AND SUPPORTIVE OF YOURS - AND TO RESIST THE ATTEMPTS OF THOSE WHO WILL TRY TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN US.

I LOOK FORWARD TO BEING IN TOUCH SEPARATELY ABOUT THE LONGER-TERM ISSUES DEALT WITH IN YOUR MESSAGE - AND WILL HOPE TO DISCUSS THEM WITH GEORGE BUSH AT THE WEEKEND.

MY BEST WISHES AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME.

YOURS EVER,

MARGARET.

NNNN



cc MASTER SET

file
 cc John Coles
 LPO
 8

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1984

Dear Peter,

The Lebanon

I sent you earlier today an account of the Ministerial meeting held at 0830 at 10 Downing Street.

The Prime Minister held a further meeting at 1245 today which was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Luce, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir John Leahy.

It was confirmed that the Prime Minister's reply to President Reagan's overnight message had been despatched (a copy of the reply is enclosed with this letter). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary confirmed that messages had been sent to the French and Italian Governments. Mr. Luce said that we had learned from the Americans that President Reagan would make a public statement about US policy at 8.55 p.m. British time today. It was not yet known precisely what he proposed to say. Sir John Leahy added that information from the Americans indicated that the first phase of US re-deployment would begin within the next two days and would involve 500 out of the 1,800 US soldiers currently in the Lebanon. The Americans had added that the first phase could take up to a month to implement (some surprise was expressed at this statement). The rest of the offshore re-deployment was to be completed by the early Spring. President Reagan was determined to avoid accusations of precipitate action. There had so far been no leak of American intentions but as soon as arrangements were made to book TV time for the President's announcement, the danger of a leak would be greatly increased.

The Defence Secretary said that the roll-on/roll-off ferry referred to at the earlier meeting was available. It could not reach Beirut for 48 hours. It had not yet been ordered because news of this would leak in Cyprus. OC BRITFORLEB would need six hours notice for the departure of the British contingent. But there was a danger of leakage when he was ordered to move because of the presence of the media in Beirut. The plan was to evacuate the British contingent by helicopters to RFA Reliant. Their equipment would be taken to Jounieh, which was thought to be secure, until the ferry could pick it up. It was necessary to decide when the ferry should be commissioned and when the British

/ contingent

MR

contingent should be given orders to move.

After further discussion it was decided that BRITFORLEB should be ordered to prepare to move as from first light on 8 February and to await further instructions. The Commanding Officer should further be told to inform London immediately if there were a further deterioration in the situation and he considered it desirable to move his troops earlier. Subject to further confirmation, it would probably be right for definitive orders to be issued at the time of President Reagan's broadcast to the effect that BRITFORLEB should move as soon as they judged it practicable.

The meeting was informed, on the basis of Beirut telegram no. 70 of 7 February, that H.M. Ambassador did not think it necessary for a party from the British contingent to assist in guarding his Embassy. British subjects in the Lebanon had been advised to stay indoors.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought it would be desirable to reinforce the message which had already been sent to the US Government to the effect that they should take no military action which might prejudice the safety of the MNF.

Note was taken of Damascus telegram no. 71 reporting a message from Mr. Walid Jumblatt expressing the concern of the PSP not to become engaged with the MNF.

The remainder of the meeting was spent in discussion of the line which the Prime Minister might take in answer to Questions in the House this afternoon.

Finally, it was agreed to meet again if necessary at 5.00 p.m. Meanwhile efforts should be made to establish precisely what President Reagan intended to say in his announcement later in the day.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

John

John Cole.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1984

LEBANON: MNF

The Prime Minister held a meeting at 0830 this morning to consider the position of the British contingent in the MNF in the light of the deteriorating situation in the Lebanon. The meeting was attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Luce, The Defence Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Antony Acland. A message from President Reagan, dated 6 February, but received early this morning, was before the meeting. Copies have been distributed separately.

It was noted that in his message, President Reagan was not seeking consultation with us but rather informing us of his decision that the United States will begin a phased re-deployment of the US marines on the shore at Beirut Airport back to their ships off shore. It was agreed that the position of the British contingent which, though it had not yet sustained serious casualties, was now in the heart of an area where serious fighting was taking place was no longer tenable, either politically or militarily. The Defence Secretary reported that for the first time OC BRITFORLEB had reported that, while the British contingent was in good spirits and could do its job as long as necessary, there was a significant increase in the risk of the contingent's Headquarters being hit.

It was decided that the British contingent should in principle re-deploy to ships off shore as quickly as possible. A precise plan would be worked out by the Ministry of Defence, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, after further advice had been received from OC BRITFORLEB. It was noted that a roll-on roll-off ferry now in Cyprus could be immediately chartered and that this would enable the equipment of the British contingent to be removed. If possible, it was desirable to arrange an orderly departure of the contingent complete with its equipment but priority should be given to the safety of the British troops. The Chief of the Defence Staff believed, subject to further examination, that the minimum time necessary for re-deploying the British contingent off shore, together with all its kit, was 48 hours.

/It was further

It was further agreed that urgent consideration should be given to the safety of the staff of HM Embassy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would seek immediate advice from HM Ambassador. It was noted that President Reagan, in his message, had stated that a contingent of US marines would maintain defensive positions near the British Chancery. The question arose of whether a small party of British infantry should also be deployed to help in the task of protecting the Embassy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that HM Ambassador had reported at 0630 this morning that there was fighting close to the Embassy but that all the staff were safe and well. Mr. Miers appeared to be unable to leave the Embassy.

Careful consideration should be given to the timing of any announcement. This would be affected by the state of British public opinion, US intentions as to the timing of the announcement of their own decision and the possible effect of an announcement on the safety of the operation of re-deploying the British contingent. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should immediately instruct HM Embassy, Washington, to establish when the US re-deployment would begin and when the US Administration proposed to make a public announcement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence, would prepare two lines to take for use in Parliament today, the first on the assumption that we wished to announce re-deployment, the second on the assumption that, in order not to prejudice the safety of British personnel, an announcement of our decision should not be made immediately.

It was agreed that it was essential to consult the French and Italians immediately, since they would presumably have received similar messages from President Reagan, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was asked to arrange this.

Finally, it was decided that an immediate reply should be sent to President Reagan's message indicating that, in the light of his own decision, we intended to re-deploy our own contingent. We should attempt to present our decision in such a way as to avoid the attempts which would undoubtedly be made to portray the proposed moves as another example of disagreement between the United States and its allies. I have sent you separately a draft of a possible reply.

A further meeting will be held by the Prime Minister at 1230 this morning.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
Precedence
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
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Distribution:-

[TEXT]

LEBANON

The situation in Beirut is serious and had deteriorated further overnight.

The Government have been following the situation closely and will continue to do so. I have held two meetings with ministerial colleagues today.

We are in urgent and constant touch with our MNF partners and with the Lebanese authorities. We have also communicated today with the British Ambassador in Beirut and the Commander of the British contingent.

/The safety

Copies to:-

The safety of our men is a major factor in
our thinking.

We are also watching closely the situation
of the remaining British Community in the
Lebanon and our Ambassador has their
well-being constantly in mind.

A statement will be made to the House when
there is anything further to report.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



10 DOWNING STREET

Mr Coles ✓ ADL²/2.

Two points from US
ambassador:

- ① 4 pm announcement will
most of
reproduce/, but not go
beyond, the President's
message to the PM.
- ② No movement on the
ground yet. No intention
to start redeployment
before announcement, and
PTD

"probably not till 8 or 9
days after it."

FCO find last ~~the~~ point
difficult to believe. But
Ambassador has apparently
been in touch with
Washington.

Dms

7/2

7
A.S.C. 7/2.LEBANON: STATEMENT A [HOLDING LINE]

1. As the House will know, the situation in Beirut has deteriorated further. As my Hon Friend the Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office told the House yesterday (6 February), we are in close touch with our MNF partners and with the Lebanese authorities. These exchanges have continued in the last 24 hours. All MNF contributors are reviewing the role and deployment of their contingents in the light of the latest developments in Beirut. The safety of our men is a major factor in our thinking. The Government will keep the House closely informed.

2. The Government hope that the parties in Lebanon will agree to an early ceasefire and that it will still be possible to organise the early resumption of negotiations to settle differences by peaceful means. We shall continue to weigh carefully how we can best contribute to this process.



57 FEB 1984





A.F.C. 7/2.

p.a -

LEBANON: STATEMENT B [US decision already known]

1. The Government have carefully reviewed the position of our contingent with the Multinational Force in Beirut, in the light of the recent deterioration in the security situation there. In this process we have been in the closest contact with our MNF partners as well as with the Lebanese authorities.

2. I can now confirm to the House that the US Government have decided to begin a phased redeployment of their contingent to US ships off the Lebanese coast [add news of French and Italian decisions if known].

3. For our part, Her Majesty's Government have decided that we should also redeploy the British contingent of the MNF in a similar manner. Arrangements for this redeployment are already in hand. [If confirmed: part of Britforleb will be detached to assist in the defence of the British Embassy].

4. In taking these decisions we have had very much in mind the safety of our men and their ability to contribute both now and in the future to the restoration of stability in Lebanon.


/I would



I would stress that the decision we have taken is for the redeployment, not the withdrawal, of our contingent. We shall continue to follow developments in Beirut closely and consider carefully what contribution we can make to restoring stability there.

5. British residents in the Beirut area are being advised to stay indoors. An evacuation is not planned at present, but we are keeping the situation under careful review. British Embassy staff are safe and well: some non-essential staff and dependents are being evacuated to Cyprus.

6. Our objectives in the Lebanon remain the same: we wish to see a resumption of the reconciliation process and the withdrawal of foreign forces, which are both essential for a long-term solution and the restoration of Lebanon's independence and sovereignty.



27 FEB 1984



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TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

BY PRIVATE NOTICE

Mr Tony Marlow (Northampton N): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, if he will consider the immediate withdrawal of UK forces from Lebanon.


Fighting broke out on 2 February in Beirut between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Shia Militia Amal. The fighting escalated on 3 and 4 February and continues today. Heavy Lebanese casualties have been reported.

The Lebanese Government resigned on 5 February but continues as a caretaker administration. President Gemayel has begun consultations on the formation of a new government and has issued an appeal to all parties in Lebanon to resume reconciliation talks.

The British contingent of the Multinational Force has not been the target of any deliberate attacks. Stray rounds have landed in or near the contingent's base. The contingent has suffered one minor casualty.

We are today consulting our partners in the Multinational Force and will keep the situation under close review. We wish to see an early end to the violence and bloodshed, an effective ceasefire, and more vigorous efforts by the Government of Lebanon and all

/the



the parties to settle their differences by negotiation. We do not intend to withdraw our contingent precipitately. But against the background I have described we have to judge with other partners whether the MNF can still help in this process.

US Declassified

PRIME MINISTER'S **6A**
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. **T218/84**

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T O P S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE WHO1119
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

BEGIN TEXT:

FEBRUARY 6, 1984

DEAR MARGARET:

I KNOW THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, OUR ATTEMPTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THAT NATION, AND THE SAFETY OF OUR PERSONNEL THERE REMAIN IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR CONCERNS. I, THEREFORE, WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED. THE SECURITY PLAN WHICH WAS PROMISED HAS NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED, AND CRIES OF VIOLENCE ONCE MORE DROWN OUT THE VOICES OF REASON. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE WE MUST PERSEVERE. I AM CONVINCED OF THE JUSTICE OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND I AM COMMITTED TO THE COURSE WE HAVE CHOSEN.

UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ARE MANY WHO NEITHER UNDERSTAND NOR APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO LEBANON, NOR THE REAL CAUSE OF THE CONTINUING LEBANESE TRAGEDY. SYRIA REMAINS THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE, NOT ONLY TO THE SECURITY PLAN, BUT ALSO TO THE WIDER GOALS OF A BROADENED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. SYRIA HARBORS THE TERRORISTS WHO INFILTRATE INTO BEIRUT TO ATTACK OUR TROOPS AND NOW EVEN OUR CIVILIANS. IT IS SYRIAN ARTILLERY OVERLOOKING BEIRUT WHICH CONTINUES TO INTIMIDATE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT AND WOULD INTIMIDATE US AS WELL. AND IT IS SYRIAN-SUPPLIED SHELLS THAT RAIN DOWN UPON LEBANESE CIVILIANS AND THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ALIKE.

BEHIND SYRIA STANDS THE SOVIET UNION, WITH ITS THOUSANDS OF ADVISERS ON SYRIAN SOIL AND ITS UNENDING SUPPLY OF ARMS. ALONGSIDE SYRIA STAND IRAN AND LIBYA AND THEIR FANATICS AND TERRORISTS WHO FREELY ROAM LEBANESE TERRITORY. ALTHOUGH SYRIA AND HER FRIENDS STAND IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE, THE WESTERN ROLE IN LEBANON AND THE ROLE OF OUR MULTINATIONAL FORCE, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE UNJUSTLY BECOME THE ISSUE FOR MANY. AS WE KNOW SO WELL, THE PATH TO PEACE IN LEBANON IS NOT BLOCKED BY THE MNF. I KNOW WE SHARE THE SAME CONCERN THAT TO LEAVE THE FIELD TO SYRIA AND TO RETREAT IN THE FACE OF TERRORISM WILL ONLY EMBOLDEN THOSE WHO WISH TO DO US HARM.

END OF PAGE 01

EVERTHELESS, ALL THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH A SYRIAN PERCEPTION THAT DOMESTIC CONCERNS IN OUR COUNTRIES WILL ULTIMATELY FORCE US TO WITHDRAW THE MNF FROM LEBANON, IF DAMASCUS ONLY WAITS. THIS PROBLEM OF SYRIAN PERCEPTION IS ONLY COMPOUNDED BY THE PERCEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES THAT AN ELITE AMERICAN FORCE IS TIED DOWN AT BEIRUT AIRPORT, REDUCED TO PASSIVITY AND ACCOMPLISHING LITTLE OR NOTHING. OUR MARINES HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN LITERALLY FORCED UNDERGROUND FOR PROTECTION. STILL, THE CASUALTIES AMONG ALL MNF CONTINGENTS CONTINUES.

UNLESS BOTH THESE PERCEPTIONS ARE ALTERED, OUR JOINT ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN LEBANON WILL REMAIN CIRCUMSCRIBED AT BEST. YET, I KNOW YOU SHARE MY BELIEF THAT WE MUST NOT ACCEPT SYRIAS CHOSEN ALTERNATIVE: THAT THE MNF CUT AND RUN.

AFTER CONSIDERABLE DELIBERATION AND DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARIES SHULTZ, WEINBERGER AND AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PURSUE SEVERAL NEW MEASURES THAT WILL HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HM MEET ITS CHALLENGES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CHANGING THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE MNF ROLE IN LEBANON AND THE PERCEPT ON IN SYRIA OF MNF RESOLVE AND STAYING POWER. IN DEVELOPING THESE MEASURES, I HAVE DRAWN ON YOUR OWN WISE COUNSEL TO ME IN THE PAST.

I HAVE DECIDED, AT PRESIDENT GEMAYELS REQUEST, TO MODIFY THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. CONTINGENT TO THE MNF. FOLLOWING CLOSE COORDINATION AMONG OUR MNF MILITARY COMMANDERS AND THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, THE UNITED STATES WILL BEGIN A PHASED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES ON SHORE AT BEIRUT AIRPORT BACK TO THEIR SHIPS OFFSHORE. THIS REDEPLOYMENT WILL BE IN STAGES BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. THIS FORCE WILL REMAIN OFF THE LEBANESE COAST AS A MOBILE RESERVE READY FOR RENEWED OPERATIONS ASHORE IF NECESSARY. A CONTINGENT OF THE MARINES WILL MAINTAIN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NEAR THE BRITISH CHANCERY AND THE OTHER BUILDINGS USED BY U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.

THIS REDUCTION OF OUR MEN ON THE GROUND WILL BE BALANCED BY EVEN STRONGER SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY. I WANT TO STRESS THAT WHILE OUR FORCES ASHORE WILL BE SMALLER, OUR COMMITMENT TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REMAINS UNDIMINISHED. I HAVE THEREFORE ORDERED A NUMBER OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE EVEN FURTHER THE STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEBANESE ARMY WHICH HAS ALREADY MADE SO MUCH PROGRESS. WE WILL ACCELERATE AND INCREASE OUR CURRENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING FOR THE ARMY, AND PROVIDE A SPECIAL UNIT FOR NEW COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING. WE WILL ALSO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND TRAINING. FINALLY, WE WILL IMPROVE LAF COUNTER-ARTILLERY CAPABILITY SO THAT THE LAF WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE ARTILLERY OF THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION.

SYRIAN ARTILLERY, HOWEVER, WILL REMAIN A THREAT TO THE BEIRUT AREA. IN ORDER, THEREFORE, TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF MNF PERSONNEL,

END OF PAGE 02

AUTHORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO U.S. NAVAL FORCES OFFSHORE TO PROVIDE NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR SUPPORT AGAINST ANY UNITS IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY FIRING INTO THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA, AS WELL AS AGAINST ANY UNIT CONDUCTING A HOSTILE ATTACK DIRECTLY AGAINST THE MNF OR U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES.

I BELIEVE THESE MODIFICATIONS IN THE ROLE OF OUR FORCES IN THE MNF WILL LEAD TO AN ENHANCED LAF CAPABILITY AS WELL AS DECREASED EXPOSURE FOR OUR MNF PERSONNEL. MORE IMPORTANT, THE SYRIANS WILL NOW BE FACED WITH AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION INDICATING GREATER MNF ACTIVE SUPPORT AND A CONTINUING STRONG COMMITMENT TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. WE WILL, IN FACT, BE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING THE LAFS ABILITY TO CONTROL BEIRUT AND TO EXTEND THE GOLS AUTHORITY OUTSIDE THE CITY AND ULTIMATELY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

WHILE THESE CHANGES ARE UNDERWAY AND ONCE THEY ARE COMPLETED, WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO BRING ALL SIDES TO THE BARGAINING TABLE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION ALIKE TO MOVE TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. LIKE YOU, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT ONLY A PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CAN ULTIMATELY STAUNCH THE FRATRICIDAL SPILLING OF LEBANESE BLOOD.

I BELIEVE THE COURSE I HAVE OUTLINED OFFERS THE BEST MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF A UNITED, SOVEREIGN AND FREE LEBANON. I HOPE I WILL HAVE YOUR SUPPORT NOW AS IN THE PAST. IN THE COMING DAYS, OUR EXPERTS WILL BE ABLE TO COORDINATE THE DETAILS OF THE STRATEGY I AM PROPOSING AND TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ROLES YOUR FORCES AND THOSE OF OUR MNF PARTNERS MIGHT USEFULLY PLAY IN CONJUNCTION WITH AMERICAN FORCES, KEEPING IN MIND THE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. THE CHALLENGE WE FACE IN LEBANON IS GREAT, BUT IT IS A CHALLENGE WE, THE LEADERS OF THE FREE WORLD, MUST MEET. OUR COOPERATION AND STEADFASTNESS REMAIN ESSENTIAL. I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR MURPHY TO VISIT YOU IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO TO GIVE YOU MORE COMPLETE DETAILS OF OUR THINKING.

SINCERELY,

RON

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RECD AT 07/0627Z PJ

Not sent out

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

In my message of this morning I gave you my reaction to your decision to begin a phased deployment of the Marines in Beirut.

I should now like to let you have my thoughts on the public presentation of your decision, in particular, in the public statement which I understand you are to make later today.

The safety of our contingents in Beirut, including the French and the Italians, must, of course, be of paramount concern at this difficult time of redeployment. I am very concerned that in your public statement you should not give the impression that US forces might undertake military action which was anything more than strictly self-defensive. If the view gained ground in the region that your forces were ^{likely} actively to intervene by providing naval gunfire and air support against units in Syrian-controlled territory, this would, in my view, dangerously increase the threat to the MNF contingents in Beirut. It follows that if your forces were actually to undertake such action, the threat to all the ^{MNF} troops in Beirut would be even greater.

I therefore hope that you will bear this point very much in mind in putting the finishing touches to your statement today. I must tell you that if this statement did envisage US military action which went beyond self-defence, I should come under very heavy pressure in

Parliament here to dissociate myself from this aspect of your policy. I am convinced that this is a time for the MNF contributors to speak as far as possible with one voice, and therefore wanted to tell you frankly of my concerns.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/ACE WCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/HEAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

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CABINET OFFICE D10

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 061000Z F C O

FM BEIRUT 060920Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 6 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, ROME, PARIS, UKMIS-NEW YORK,
DAMASCUS

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, CBFC

NY TELNO 55: LEBANON

1. SUMMARY: THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS RESIGNED. SYRIA HAS A STRANGLEHOLD OVER THE FORMATION OF A NEW ONE. THERE HAVE BEEN SHIA DESERTIONS FROM THE ARMY. THE PRESIDENT'S BROADCAST TO THE NATION CONTAINED NOTHING NEW. RUMSFELD IS PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE. BRITFORLEB HAS NOT BEEN TARGETTED. SUMMARY ENDS.

2. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT RESIGNED YESTERDAY. THE PRESIDENT LAST NIGHT CONSULTED WITH MOST OF THE EX-PRIME MINISTERS ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A NEW ONE. EARLIER, BEFORE WAZZAN'S RESIGNATION, THE EX-PRIME MINISTERS (EXCEPT FOR SAEB SALAAM AND KAPANE, WHO IS ALREADY IN SYRIA'S POCKET) WERE INVITED TO DAMASCUS. SEVERAL OF THEM, INCLUDING SALIM AL HOSS WHO DID NOT GO TO SEE THE PRESIDENT LAST NIGHT, ARE TRAVELLING TO DAMASCUS TODAY. THIS UNDERLINES SYRIA'S STRANGLEHOLD, WHICH HAS BEEN EVIDENT SINCE SHE IMPOSED HER JANUARY VETO ON THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNLESS THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WAS ABROGATED.

~~HE VETOED A JANUARY VETO ON THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNLESS THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WAS ADOPTED.~~

3. THE RESIGNATIONS BECAME INEVITABLE YESTERDAY FOLLOWING MEETINGS BETWEEN WAZZAN AND THE 3 REMAINING MOSLEM MINISTERS IN HIS CABINET. THEY WERE UNABLE TO RESIST PRESSURE TO RESIGN CREATED BY THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE SHIA MILITIA AND BY BERRI'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 3 FEB (MUCH OF IT CENSORED) WHICH A) CALLED ON THEM TO STAND DOWN AND B) APPEALED TO SHIA SOLDIERS TO REFUSE TO FIGHT THEIR CORELIGIONISTS. BERRI MADE THIS APPEAL AFTER A DELEGATION OF ARMY OFFICERS CALLED ON HIM.

4. YESTERDAY AND LAST NIGHT THERE WAS LESS FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE SHIA AND LESS SHELLING OF CHRISTIAN AREAS THAN ON THE TWO PRECEDING DAYS, WHEN IT WAS VERY BAD. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THIS SLACKENING OF THE TEMPO IS DUE TO THE COMBATANTS WISHING TO WAIT UPON EVENTS FOLLOWING THE RESIGNATIONS. SOME SHIA DESERTIONS HAVE CLEARLY OCCURRED. CERTAIN CHECKPOINTS NEAR THE AIRPORT ARE NOW MANNED JOINTLY BY ARMY AND AMAL MILITIA. GENERAL TANNOUS IS CLAIMING THAT ONLY 150 SOLDIERS WHOSE FAMILIES ARE UNDER THREAT HAVE DESERTED. BUT IT IS ALMOST CERTAINLY WORSE THAN THIS. SALEM (WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED THE CRISIS YESTERDAY) SAYS THAT IF THE DESERTIONS CANNOT BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL THE POSITION OF THE ARMY COULD BE ERODED VERY SWIFTLY. BERRI'S STANCE ON THIS WAS VERY DANGEROUS: IT WAS THE MOST DAMAGING THING HE COULD HAVE DONE.

5. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BROADCAST TO THE NATION LATE LAST NIGHT. HE CALLED FOR A RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON 27 FEBRUARY: EVERYTHING, EXCEPT THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY, WAS NEGOTIABLE. THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE PROTECTED, WITH IMPROVED MACHINERY. LEBANESE-SYRIAN CONTACTS MUST BE INTENSIFIED. THE 17 MAY ACCORD HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED: GEMAYEL WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A FORMULA GUARANTEEING WITHDRAWAL. ON THE MNF HE SAID ONLY THAT ITS FORMATION WAS THE 'LIVING MANIFESTATION OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AROUND LEBANON'.

6. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THIS. ACCORDING TO SALEM, GEMAYEL'S INTENTION WAS TO SET OUT HIS POSITION FOR THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, BUT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE FLEXIBILITY SHOWN ON KEY POINTS, NOTABLY OF COURSE THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MOLLIFY SYRIA AND FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.

7. SALEM ALSO SAID THE GOVERNMENT WOULD STAY AT THEIR DESKS UNTIL A NEW ONE WAS FORMED. SO HE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT THE MINISTERS WOULD ONLY PERFORM ROUTINE TASKS AND WOULD NOT MEET COLLECTIVELY AS THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HE WOULD BE SUPRISED IF THE PRESIDENT GOT AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY ON THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE WANTED TO GO STRAIGHT TO A FULLY FLEDGED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (HE NO DALLYING WITH A HALF-WAY HOUSE AS ENVISAGED AT ONE STAGE). CONTACT WITH THE SYRIANS WOULD BE MADE VIA THE PRIME MINISTERS WHO WERE TRAVELLING TO DAMASCUS. THE PRESIDENT MIGHT MAKE DIRECT CONTACT LATER BUT NEEDED TO TREAD VERY CAREFULLY.

8. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO BARTHOLOMEW. HE HAS PROMISED TO

NEEDED TO TREAD VERY CAREFULLY.

8. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO BARTHOLOMEW. HE HAS PROMISED TO BRIEF ME ON THE US ROLE BUT HAS NOT YET DONE SO. I ASSUME IT TO BE CENTRAL, SINCE HE AND RUMSFELD HAVE BEEN LOCKED IN CONCLAVE AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE FOR MUCH OF THE LAST TWO DAYS. THE PRESS HERE HAS PICKED UP A STORY FROM RIYADH TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE WORKING ON A CONFERENCE BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, THE US, LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION. BUT SALEM SAYS THAT WHEN ASKED ABOUT THIS RUMSFELD DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE. SALEM HOWEVER CLEARLY SUSPECTS A PLOT AMONG THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS (HE MENTIONED THE US AND FRANCE) TO SETTLE LEBANON'S FUTURE OVER LEBANON'S HEAD.

9. SALEM SAID THAT THE PLAN TO INTRODUCE THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO AREAS EVACUATED BY A FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS STILL BEING PURSUED BUT THIS WAS VERY DELICATE. THIS WAS ONE OF THE SPECIFIC THINGS OVER WHICH THE LEBANESE HAD ASKED FOR AMERICAN HELP WITH ISRAEL. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THAT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE WAS 'BETTER THAN LEBANON FEARED': BUT PRESSURE COULD ONLY BE EXERCISED ON ISRAEL VERY GENTLY.

10. THE UPHEAVAL OF THE LAST THREE DAYS HAS NOT YET AFFECTED THE MNF OR BRITFORLEB SIGNIFICANTLY. STRAY SHOTS, INCLUDING ONE 122MM ROCKET, HAVE LANDED ON BRITFORLEB: BUT HIS HAS NOT BEEN DELIBERATELY TARGETTED. THERE WERE HOSTILE GESTURES RECENTLY TOWARDS BRITFORLEB PATROLS IN CERTAIN AREAS (NOW NO LONGER VISITED). ON THE OTHER HAND THE JOINT AMAL/ARMY DEFECTOR CHECKPOINTS (PARA 3) HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY. ONE SOLDIER FROM BRITFORLEB RECEIVED A MINOR SHRAPNEL WOUND TO HIS ARM YESTERDAY. HE WAS TAKEN TO THE USMC DOCTOR FOR TREATMENT ALONG WITH A BBC CAMERAMAN GASHED BY A SPLINTER WHILE PHOTOGRAPHING FROM A DANGEROUS POSITION SOME WAY FROM BRITFORLEB'S BASE. UNFORTUNATELY THE BBC ANNOUNCED THE SOLDIER'S INJURY PREMATURELY BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLICITY ABOUT THE CAMERAMAN SINCE THE BBC THEMSELVES DO NOT WANT IT.

11. FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS SEE MIFT.

MIERS

BT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 February, 1984

Dear John,

Lebanon

For discussion at
8.30 meeting on Tuesday.
A.J.C. 6/2.

You will have seen the telegrams from Beirut (numbers 63-66) summarising recent military and political developments. The latest reports suggest a further deterioration in the security situation today, with the Lebanese Army engaged in attempts to prevent militias taking over areas of West Beirut, a curfew imposed, and the barricades going up again on the 'Green Line' dividing Muslim (West) and Christian (East) Beirut. Some stray rounds have hit BRITFORLEB's HQ at Hadath, resulting so far in only one minor casualty (on 5 February). There has also been heavy fighting today near the British Embassy in West Beirut, but staff there are safe so far.

You will also have seen the reports from Paris, Rome and Washington with some immediate reactions from other MNF contributors. The Foreign Secretary held an office meeting this morning to take stock, and there was a further exchange of views with our MNF partners at one of the regular meetings with MNF Embassies here this afternoon. I enclose a copy of the report of the meeting. The preliminary view of other contributors is, like our own, to take no immediate decisions on the future of the MNF but to see whether Gemayel has any success in his attempts to form a representative government in this new situation. He is unlikely to achieve this without public abandonment of the 17 May Israel/Lebanon agreement and other measures to show that genuine concessions to the Muslims and Druze are on offer. It remains to be seen whether Gemayel is ready to offer such concessions. If he is, that very fact will put him under threat from hotheads on his own side. But if he fails to form such a government, we may have to recognise that the MNF can no longer play a useful role: it will clearly be seen as supporting a faction, rather than a broad section of Lebanon opinion.

Further consultations with our MNF partners will clearly be needed and we would like to see them take place quickly. The US position remains a key factor. Murphy of the US State Department was intending to visit London today en route from Beirut to Washington, but was unfortunately delayed by events in Beirut. We are hoping to arrange for him to come here later this week. We are also considering the Italian proposal put to us at the meeting of MNF representatives today for a meeting at Ministerial level later this week.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD). I shall be showing Sir Geoffrey a copy overnight.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

John ever
(P F Ricketts) Peter Ricketts

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OUT TELEGRAM



Classification and Caveats
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7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK
10 INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA,
11 CAIRO, MOSCOW
12 LEBANON
13 1. Egerton held a meeting this afternoon with representatives
14 of the US_Italian and French Embassies to review the situation
15 in the light of the deterioration ~~in the situation~~ over the
16 weekend. He said that Ministers were extremely worried by the
17 latest developments which left Gemayel and the Army dangerously
18 exposed with no constituency except the Maronites.
19 2. Egerton said that we did not think that the present was a
20 time for quick or early decisions by MNF governments. We should
21 wait to see if Gemayel could come up with a new team. The least
22 he must do was to recapture some of the middle ground,
23 especially to regain the confidence of Nabih Berri. In our view
24 the only way Gemayel could attract strong Muslims back into his
25 team was by public abandonment of the 17 May agreement. He had

///
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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword already
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution MNF in Lebanon
Drafted by (Block capitals) P M NIXON		
Telephone number 233 6030		
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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2 already hinted at this in his speech of 5 February but not
3 clearly enough. He would need to take other measures to show
4 that genuine concessions to the Muslims and Druze were on offer.
5 Painful concessions were required without delay: they would have
6 to ~~be~~ broader than the 8 point plan, ~~of 5 February~~
7 3. Egerton went on to say that we should give Gemayel a little
8 more time to see if he could put together another government. ~~But~~
9 If he could not rebuild confidence in himself as a national,
10 rather than a factional leader, we believed that we were fast
11 approaching the point at which we would have to say that the
12 basis for the MNF's presence in Lebanon no longer existed. For
13 the British Government any Lebanese Government must be seen to
14 act as a national government and this meant that it must have ~~a~~
15 representative Muslim support at least from the Sunni and Shia.
16 Druze support was also desirable. Egerton asked representatives
17 to seek views from capitals especially on attitudes towards the
18 17 May agreement. Hooper ^(US) emphasising that he had no
19 instructions, said that he could hold out no hope that his
20 authority ^{ies} would agree to the public abandonment of the 17 May
21 agreement.
22 4. Turning to the security situation Egerton said that I had
23 conveyed in messages to my MNF colleagues last week clear
24 British views about any Lebanese operations to close the
25 Shweifat Gap. We had received a reply from one Foreign Minister
26 and would be grateful for early views from the other two. We
27 assumed that sporadic fighting would continue in Beirut until
28 Gemayel's efforts to form a more broadly based government
29 succeeded or failed. The fate of the security plan was unclear.
30 Saudi statements suggested that they had given up trying to
31 coax the plan into life. ^{Did} ~~But~~ our partners have ~~no~~ information
32 on this or on any new moves which the Saudis might be
33 contemplating such as a conference between Saudi Arabia, Syria,
34 the Lebanese Government and the opposition parties. [?]

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Catchword
5.

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

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2 5. Hooper reported that the Syrian Foreign Minister had told
3 the US Assistant Secretary of State, Murphy, on 31 January that
4 Syria still supported the security plan. Khaddam had outlined
5 a sequence of 8 steps which would meet Syrian concerns:

6 (1) Gemayel states that he will not implement the 17 May
7 agreement.

8 (2) Geneva II decides in principle to abrogate the 17 May
9 agreement.

10 (3) Geneva II accepts the internal reforms already drawn up by
11 subcommittees.

12 (4) Formation of a government of national unity.

13 (5) The new government abrogates the 17 May agreement

14 (6) The new government implements internal reforms.

15 (7) The US implements the Habib plan of June 1982 for Israeli
16 withdrawal.

17 (8) The new Lebanese Government secures southern Lebanon,
18 Israeli troops withdraw, Syrian troops withdraw.

19
20 6. Discussing the prospects for further Israeli withdrawal,
21 Egerton said that this might help Gemayel by diverting attention
22 from the Beirut area and encourage^{ing} the Syrians into cooperating
23 with him. If the Lebanese Armed Forces were^{un-}able to replace the
24 departing Israelis in eg Sidon did our MNF partners think that
25 Gemayel could be persuaded to seek a role there for UNIFIL?
26 It seemed to us that SCR 425 already allowed for this and that
27 a request from the President of Lebanon for UNIFIL's deployment
28 would be sufficient.

29 ~~Hooper~~ Hooper noted that the US did not wish to take a leading
30 part in canvassing a wider UN role. Egerton asked for
31 clarification ^{whether the US} would agree to joint or several approaches to the
32 Lebanese. ~~Egerton~~ Egerton noted that the Syrians had called a meeting
33 of the National Salvation Front in Damascus today. It was clear
34 that they were paying close attention to developments in Lebanon.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

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2 We wondered whether they were becoming worried by the prolonged
 3 fighting in Beirut. Was there any indication that they saw the
 4 apparent deterioration of the fighting into uncontrolled chaos
 5 as being against the interests of all, *including their own long term*
 6 *interests.* Egerton said that in the light of observations on our paper
 7 on UN options we were now working on a further paper setting out
 8 the next steps. It was important to set down a logical
 9 diplomatic approach as something to aim for in the present
 10 confused situation. ~~We would circulate our paper within ten~~
 11 ~~days.~~

12 9. Vattani (Italy) on instructions said that the MNF partners
 13 had to do something before long. He had therefore been asked
 14 by Bottai to propose a meeting at ministerial level as soon as
 15 possible. A political statement by the 4 could help ease
 16 tensions as it had done following the meeting in Paris in
 17 October. Andreotti would be available later this week. If a
 18 ministerial meeting was not possible there should be a meeting
 19 of political directors. Failing that the London contact group
 20 should meet as often as possible. Egerton said that we would
 21 give the proposal urgent and sympathetic consideration. Hooper
 22 commented that Murphy tentatively planned to visit European
 23 MNF capitals later in the week. It was agreed that the contact
 24 group would meet on 13 February if a ministerial meeting later
 25 in the week was arranged: otherwise a further meeting would be
 26 held on 9 February.

28 HOWE

29 NNNN

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
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Prime Minute.

For discussion at

8.30 a.m. on Tuesday.

A.J.C. $\frac{6}{2}$.PRIME MINISTERLEBANON: THE NEXT STEPS

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary copied to me his minute to you of 2nd February, on the next steps in the Lebanon. The analysis in his paper is a cogent one and the package he puts forward would provide a worthwhile way forward. I have to say, however, that the events of the last few days do not offer much hope that there is a rational, diplomatic solution to present difficulties in the Lebanon.

2. The reality is that the security situation has deteriorated rapidly and the country seems to be on the point of disintegration. While they have to remain in the Lebanon, BRITFORLEB are probably safer in their present base than anywhere else but the risks we are running have clearly increased. In terms of domestic opinion there is little or no support that I can discern for perpetuating the present exposed position of our contingent. Against this, I recognise the importance of taking full account of the international implications of any move we make and of seeking to keep in step with some or all of our MNF partners.


3. I have myself come to the conclusion that, should anything go wrong, we should find it very difficult to justify having kept our people there unless there are genuine grounds for believing that there is a prospect of contributing to political reconciliation within a realistic timetable. The judgements involved are extremely difficult. I believe that we should meet to discuss these issues as soon as you can manage.

4. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
6th February 1984



 FEB 1964



CONFIDENTIAL



file

LPL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 February 1984

Lebanon: The Next Steps

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 2 February and the attached paper. She has noted the contents of both. You told me on the telephone that you thought Sir Geoffrey Howe might wish to reconsider the contents of the proposed paper for OD, in the light of recent events.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

*Copy given
to PFI. 5.2.84*

NI 7384 4 XXX 102

GEMAYEL ACCEPTS CABINET'S RESIGNATION
BEIRUT, SUNDAY - PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL THIS AFTERNOON ACCEPTED THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN'S CABINET, A PRESIDENTIAL PALACE STATEMENT SAID.
WAZZAN SUBMITTED THE RESIGNATION OF HIS NINE-MAN TECHNOCRATIC CABINET TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT GROUPING RIVAL FACTIONS, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID.
THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE SAID WAZZAN'S CABINET WOULD ACT IN A CARETAKER CAPACITY UNTIL A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED. STATE-RUN BEIRUT RADIO SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS ITS FORMATION.

051249 FEB 84

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NEW FRENCH TROOPS ARRIVE TO JOIN U.N. FORCE
BEIRUT, SUNDAY -- FRENCH TROOPS BEGAN LANDING ON A BEACH IN SOUTHERN LEBANON THIS MORNING TO BOOST THE FRENCH BATTALION OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNFIL), A U.N. SPOKESMAN SAID.
UNIFIL SPOKESMAN TIMUR GOKSEL SAID 400 FRENCH TROOPS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT WERE TRANSFERRED FROM FRENCH NAVAL VESSELS TO LANDING CRAFT OFF THE COAST NEAR THE SOUTHERN PORT OF TYRE.
THE NEW ARRIVALS WILL BRING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE FRENCH BATTALION TO ITS ORIGINAL FORCE OF 1,392.

051256 FEB 84

~~ADVANCE COPIES~~ 21

Prime Minister

PS (6)
SIR J LEAHY
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEWS D
ED/RESIDENT CLERK

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 4 FEBRUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK AND WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND CBFC
INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

MS

MY TELNO 2 TO BUDAPEST (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON.

1. COUNSELLOR SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 218 TO WASHINGTON TO THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE TELEPHONE THIS MORNING (4 FEB). IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO VISIT HIM AT BAABDA BECAUSE OF SHELLING.
2. IN WHAT WAS NECESSARILY A GUARDED CONVERSATION SALEM RE-ITERATED THE ASSURANCES HE GAVE YOU IN LONDON ON 20 JANUARY (YOUR TELNO 26) ABOUT CONSULTATION WITH MNF PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT (NOT) CURRENTLY PLANNING ANY OFFENSIVE OPERATION. HE WAS WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS.

3. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT SALEM SAID THAT THE PICTURE WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. HE COULD SEE LITTLE SIGN OF EARLY BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ISSUE OF PROMOTIONS. JUMBLATT STILL SEEMED UNWILLING TO ACCEPT "FIRMLY" THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPROMISE PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING IT. THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO NEW INITIATIVE BEYOND FLOATING SOME GENERAL IDEAS TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE GOING. (THE PRIME MINISTER WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN TO-DAY'S LOCAL PRESS AS CALLING FOR THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A BROADER-BASED GOVERNMENT SOON.)

4. SALEM HAD NO COMMENT ON THE LATEST PROPOSALS FOR RE-STARTING THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS ANNOUNCED BY THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT IN ZGHORTA ON 3 FEBRUARY. THESE INCLUDE A CEASEFIRE, ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF (AND REPLACING IT WITH "NEUTRAL" FORCES) AND REMOVING THE ARMY FROM THE INTERNAL CONFLICT (IE NOT LETTING IT HAVE AN INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE). IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT THESE ARE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION. IF THEY ARE THEY REPRESENT A HARDENING OF THE NSF POSITION.

5. THE SCALE OF FIGHTING HAS INCREASED THIS MORNING. BRITFORLEB HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF BEIRUT THE ARMY ARE TRYING TO PREVENT AMAL FROM OCCUPYING BUILDINGS FROM WHICH THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DOMINATE THE ARMY'S POSITIONS AT GALERIE SEMA'AN (ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE "NO-GO" AREA). SHELLING HAS INTENSIFIED: THE LOCAL RADIO ANNOUNCED AT MID-DAY THAT THE PSP AND ALLIES HAD ORDERED THE BOMBARDMENT ONCE AGAIN OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF EAST BEIRUT AND THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE.

MERS

DWF P 5/4

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OO F C O

OO MODUK

OO WASHINGTON

PP PARIS

PP ROME

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INFO IMMEDIATE F C O, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, MODUK
PRIORITY DAMASCUS
INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

MY TELNO 1: LEBANON

FOLLOWING FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

1. BEIRUT HAS HAD A QUIETER DAY. THE CEASEFIRE AGREED THIS MORNING IS GENERALLY HOLDING. IT IS BROKEN BY OCCASIONAL SHELLING AND SHIPING. THE LAF HAVE REGAINED THE POSITIONS THEY LOST TO AMAL.
2. THE SHELLING BY THE PSP AND OTHERS FROM THE HILLS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IN SUPPORT OF AMAL AND ITS ALLIES FIGHTING AGAINST THE LEBANESE ARMY ON THE EDGE OF THE 'NO-CO' AREA OF THE CITY.
3. TWO BATTALIONS OF THE FIFTH BRIGADE - DEPLOYED EARLIER

3. TWO BATTALIONS OF THE FIFTH BRIGADE - DEPLOYED EARLIER THIS WEEK WELL TO THE NORTH OF BEIRUT - HAVE BEEN MOVED DOWN TO THE EASTERN PART OF THE CITY, WHERE THEY REMAIN IN RESERVE.

4. DUE TO THE SECURITY SITUATION AND POOR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE SO FAR TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 218 TO WASHINGTON. WE SHALL KEEP TRYING.

5. THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR HAS ALSO BEEN UNABLE TO SEE SALEM. HE HAS BEEN MAROONED IN HIS RESIDENCE AT YARZE AND NOT ABLE TO BRIEF US AS FORECAST IN WASHINGTON TELNO 380. HOWEVER, LAST NIGHT HE SPENT SOME HOURS IN THE SAME AIR RAID SHELTER AS PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HADDAD.

6. HIS DCM TOLD COUNSELLOR THAT BARTHOLOMEW BELIEVES THAT HE HAS PERSUADED GEMAYEL THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY TO LAUNCH ANY OFFENSIVE AT THIS MOMENT. UNLESS THERE IS A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE STATE OF SECURITY, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN RIDE THE LEBANESE OFF LAUNCHING ANY MILITARY OPERATION FOR THE NEXT TWO TO THREE DAYS AT LEAST. HOWEVER, PUGH HINTED THAT AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE COUNSELLING THE LEBANESE AGAINST SUCH ACTION DEPENDED ON THERE STILL REMAINING A CHANCE OF BREAKING THE POLITICAL LOG JAM BY NEGOTIATION. BARTHOLOMEW HAD DISCUSSED WITH GEMAYEL SOME IDEAS (PUGH DID NOT SPECIFY) FOR RESOLVING THE PROMOTIONS ISSUE WHICH MIGHT BE PUT TO JUMBLATT IN DAMASCUS. BARTHOLOMEW HAS REPORTED THESE TO WASHINGTON. NO ONE SEEMED VERY HOPEFUL THAT, IF JUMBLATT COULD BE SATISFIED ON THE QUESTION OF PROMOTIONS, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO LET THE SECURITY PLAN GO AHEAD. BUT IF NOTHING ELSE, THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD SERVE TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE OPEN.

MIERS

BT

NNNN



PM/84/23

PRIME MINISTERPrime Minister.

Agree that the attached
 paper should be circulated to
 OD?

A.S.C. $\frac{2}{2}$.Lebanon: The Next Steps

1. My visit to the Middle East, our recent meetings with MNF partners (Shultz and Rumsfeld here, Cheysson and Andreotti in Stockholm and your discussion with President Mitterrand on 23 January) and with Mr Gromyko and the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Dr Salem, have given us a useful picture of the positions of most of the key players. We also discussed the matter further with the Italians at the Rome Summit.

2. Our aim is easy to state: the extrication of the Multinational Force from Beirut at the earliest possible date, but on the basis that our withdrawal must not precipitate a further bloodbath. But it is much more difficult to devise practical steps, given our limited influence, which will have a material effect. Clearly we need to identify and organise some viable alternative to the MNF. Some form of wider UN involvement offers the best hope of this. As the UN Secretariat have told us, this is only likely to be possible as part of an agreed package involving the withdrawal of all other forces from Lebanon, including the MNF. We shall of course keep pressing our MNF partners (particularly the Americans) to agree on common objectives and tactics in Lebanon, including an agreed contingency plan in the event of a major terrorist attack which might generate irresistible pressure on one or more of the MNF partners to pull out its contingent. We shall also continue to urge strongly the need for military restraint on

/the part



the part of the Lebanese and US forces, to avoid precipitating a final breakdown of the ceasefire in Beirut. The initial US response to our latest approach over reports that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) might act to close the Shuweifat Gap was encouraging, but there remains a serious risk that the LAF will act at some stage, and that this will precipitate wider fighting in and around Beirut.

/ 3. The attached paper summarises the present stalemate and lists the steps which I consider we should be taking to promote progress. Many of them are in hand already. If we could secure the endorsement by our MNF partners of the package deal outlined in the Annex to the paper, this would give greater coherence to our joint efforts. The Americans in particular need to be convinced that this is the path to be followed.

4. I am only copying this minute and the paper at this stage to Michael Heseltine. If you agreed with the general line, I would propose to circulate it to OD.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe'.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2 February 1984



LEBANON: THE NEXT STEPS

Introduction

1. The prospects for a peaceful settlement in Lebanon are described in detail in two recent JIC assessments. One can summarise them by saying that as things stand the chances of achieving a sufficient degree of stability to allow an early withdrawal of the Multinational Force, with its task complete, are remote and if anything receding.
2. Our overall objective must therefore be to create the circumstances in which we can nevertheless extricate the MNF from Beirut at the earliest possible date, but without leaving a vacuum which could result in even greater instability and bloodshed, as well as being seen as a defeat for Western interests in the Middle East.
3. Wider UN involvement in Lebanon in some form offers hope of a viable alternative to the MNF. It will probably only be possible to achieve this as part of a package of proposals which gives all the parties involved some incentive to agree. Much work is needed on the other parts of such a package before the UN element can fall into place.



The present Stalemate

4. The formal positions and aims of Israel and Syria are further apart than ever. Israel remains committed to the 17 May Israel/Lebanon Agreement (ie normalisation of relations with Lebanon as well as full security guarantees for her northern border), and insists on linkage between Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. Syria insists on abolition of the 17 May Agreement, unilateral and complete withdrawal of Israeli Forces and the MNF, and withdrawal of her own forces only at the request of a reformed Lebanon Government (which would be greatly under Syrian influence).

5. We can assume that at least some of the elements in both positions are tactical. The minimum conditions which might satisfy both parties are:

(a) Israel. The Israeli Government needs to show some positive result for the 1982 invasion in the form of agreed security arrangements for Northern Israel. Their bottom line might be a security package adequate to prevent the return of Palestinian or other terrorists to the border zone and the deployment of long range weapons to threaten Northern settlements. If this could be achieved the Israeli Government might (might) be



persuaded to agree to full withdrawal, in the context of
an agreed package including later Syrian withdrawal and a
more stable Lebanese regime, foregoing the non-security
elements of the 17 May Agreement and formal linkage with
Syrian withdrawal. Even a Labour Government in Israel
would need to seek some security provisions before
withdrawing the IDF completely.

(b) Syria. At present Syria seems confident that the
withdrawal of the MNF and of the IDF will take place
without Syrian concessions. If Israel agreed to complete
a unilateral withdrawal, Syria might (might) be open to a
deal to secure MNF withdrawal on reasonable terms: and
would then come under some Arab pressure to leave
Lebanon. After IDF and MNF withdrawal, Syria would not
need and might not wish to maintain her own military
presence in Lebanon in order to exert continued influence
over Lebanese players, especially if by then a more
broadly based Lebanese Government had been formed.

6. It is these, admittedly slim, hopes for progress
which we need to pursue. The immediate aims should be to
encourage agreement on implementation of the Security
Plan to reinforce the ceasefire; and to build on the
first tentative steps of US and Israeli readiness to find



a way round the 17 May Agreement. We should do this by continuing diplomatic action with all the parties and exploring further the possibility of a package of proposals. Some thoughts on one way in which such a package might be put together are attached at Annex A.

Future Diplomatic Action

MNF Partners

7. There is a close identity of views between the three European contributors to the MNF who are united in regarding the 17 May Agreement as the major obstacle. But the United States still disagree on this and other points, especially over the best tactics to pursue, even when we all agree on objectives. In further bilateral contacts with the Americans, for which we would hope to gather strong French and Italian support, we need to clarify US intentions and objectives on the following points:

(i) The need to get the MNF out. Shultz and Rumsfeld have shown an increasing awareness of this though they are also clearly attracted by the idea of a longer term US presence which would enable them to exert continuing influence. It is the prevention of precisely this which

is, of course, the main preoccupation of the Syrians, not to mention the Soviet Union. The Americans therefore talk in terms of "extracting a high price" for the withdrawal of the MNF. They have urged us and other contributors to "maintain our resolve" and not send signals, either in public statements or in too enthusiastic pursuit of UN alternatives, which in the US view only encourage Syria to believe that she does not need to make any concessions. As we have ourselves acknowledged there is some strength in this argument. But we need at the same time to convince the Americans that the MNF is a wasting asset and that "'resolve'" and especially US "'robust self-defence'" in response to attacks on the MNF is dangerous if it is not combined with serious attempts to negotiate the withdrawal of forces without implementation of the 17 May Agreement. We also need to nail them down to explicit confirmation that their aim is to withdraw their contingent within an appropriate time scale.

(ii) The need to avoid being drawn into military action in support of the LAF. Recent reports suggest that President Gemayel may be contemplating further military action by the LAF to close the Shuweifat gap, that is to extend by force the area controlled by the Lebanese Army



into the Southern suburbs and along the mountain ridge South East of Beirut to prevent infiltration of terrorists and weapons into the city. This is a laudable aim but cannot, we believe, be achieved by force, only by political negotiation. We have warned the Lebanese that unilateral action of this sort would in our view destroy the ceasefire and all hopes of progress towards reconciliation and would oblige us to reconsider our contribution to the MNF. We have informed our MNF partners of the line we have been taking. The US response is not altogether reassuring. President Gemayel may calculate that if he takes action of this sort, the Americans will be forced to support him. Rumsfeld, frustrated by Syria's success in thwarting US aims in Lebanon, may recommend US support. We should try to persuade the Americans to join us in a démarche of all four MNF contributors to President Gemayel, to emphasise that such action will not be supported by the MNF and might precipitate its withdrawal. If the Americans declined to be persuaded we should then consider a démarche of the three Europeans on the same point.

(iii) Pressure on the Israelis to withdraw further. The Israelis are already contemplating this. We should offer to support the Americans in encouraging a further Israeli



withdrawal - ideally as the first phase of a package, with wider UNIFIL deployment setting the precedent for UN involvement further north. The Americans see tactical advantage in Israeli forces remaining close to the Syrian frontier, to keep pressure on Asad, and may discourage early Israeli withdrawal. We should make clear our disagreement on this.

(iv) Encourage the US to adopt a package approach of the sort outlined at Annex A, with the 17 May Agreement tacitly left on one side and early substitution of UN elements for the MNF as a necessary incentive for Syrian/Soviet cooperation.

8. We have to face the fact that, despite the efforts of the 3 European MNF contributors, the US may remain unconvinced of the need to replace the MNF by a UN force at an early stage and of the need to draw Syria into a negotiated solution by incentive, not force. It may eventually be necessary to warn the Americans that the European MNF contributors will take a very serious view of a decision to give US military support to unilateral LAF action, and that we cannot rule out a concerted European withdrawal from the MNF if US action distorts its peacekeeping mandate and effectively destroys the



chances of reconciliation.

Syria

9. M Cheysson has promised to report back on a further French approach to the Syrians about wider UN involvement, following his discussion with Mr Gromyko in Stockholm. Subject to that we should explore further the extent of Syrian flexibility and ways of encouraging the Soviet Union to exert helpful influence on Syria. We could try to tempt both with the package proposals, in which the first phase would be a further unilateral Israeli withdrawal, stressing that such a package would only be viable if the Syrian and Lebanese Governments could agree between them on a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian forces, preceded if necessary by national reconciliation talks (at which Syria would again be an Observer) leading to the formation of a government of national unity. Some of these elements might be included in a message to President Asad or Foreign Minister Khaddam, with a renewed invitation to Mr Khaddam to come to London to discuss them.

Israel

10. The Embassy in Tel Aviv have stressed the need to bring the Israelis into our consultations at an early



stage, to increase the chances of a constructive Israeli reaction. This is especially true if we engage the Syrians in further discussion. HM Ambassador in Tel Aviv could discuss with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the UN options we have in mind and also explore the conditions Israel would set for a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, if necessary in stages, without implementation of the full 17 May Agreement, but in exchange for security arrangements. The latter would include deployment of the Lebanese Army, with the addition of local militias, and a wider role for UNIFIL, plus an undertaking from Syria (which only the Americans could obtain) that she would prevent infiltration through areas she controls to Southern Lebanon. It would be important to establish whether the Israelis can in fact contemplate no direct linkage between Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. Depending on the initial Israeli reaction we could invite Mr David Kimche, the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (but in effect acting Foreign Minister) to London to discuss these ideas. I plan to visit Israel myself as soon as I can find an opportunity.

Lebanon

11. Our meetings with Foreign Minister, Dr Salem, on 20 January and recent reports suggest there is not much



serious thinking by President Gemayel about genuine concessions to move the reconciliation process forward; on the contrary he is toying with military options. We and our MNF partners should keep up the pressure, emphasising to the Lebanese and Americans that for us progress with reconciliation is the essential justification for the MNF's continuing presence. We should encourage ideas mentioned by Salem such as a unilateral initiative setting out major reforms which the government is prepared to offer. If we can persuade the Americans to agree we might also start discussing UN options with the Lebanese Government, to try to persuade them to make a formal application at the right time to the UN Security Council. The Security Council debate on the renewal of UNIFIL's present mandate must take place by 19 April.

12. Another form of pressure to consider is public statements on Lebanon. We need to strike a balance between sending the wrong signals to Syria, encouraging her to believe that an early withdrawal of MNF is inevitable, and the need to reinforce the message to the Lebanese Christians that the MNF will not stay indefinitely and that concessions by all sides are required.

UN Forces

13. Only the Americans have commented in detail on the UK paper on UN options. There is however a fair degree of consensus that the easiest option to pursue immediately is wider deployment of UNIFIL to help with a further Israeli withdrawal. The UNIFIL debate could provide a vehicle for redefining the mandate in such a way as to enable UN forces to be deployed, at the right moment, throughout Lebanon. There would in any case be advantage in using the UNIFIL debate to set deadlines, as an additional source of pressure on the Lebanese Government eg allowing the mandate to be renewed only for 3 months or less, rather than six-monthly.

The Ten

14. We are keeping in touch with our partners in the Ten and encouraging non-MNF members to do what they can, in their contacts with the parties to encourage a peaceful settlement. The French Presidency have proposed a statement by the Ten at the European Council in March. Most of our partners will want this to concentrate on recent Arab/Israel developments. But the statement should include a passage on Lebanon. Political Directors at the Athens European Summit agreed a text which could be drawn on, setting out the basic principles for a



settlement in Lebanon. This would demonstrate that the Ten have their own interests in the area and encourage the United States, without upsetting them unduly, to keep in close touch with European MNF partners.

Summary of Recommended Action

15. Diplomatic action with:

(A) MNF partners

- (i) invite them to endorse a sanitized version of this paper;
- (ii) Clarify US intentions and objectives on points in Para 7 (i) - (iv);

(B) Syria

- (i) Press the French to report on any further discussions with the Syrians;
- (ii) Possible invitation to Khaddam to visit London.

(C) Israel

- (i) Discuss UN options and explore conditions Israel would set for full Israeli withdrawal without 17 May Agreement;
- (ii) Possible invitation to MFA Director-General to visit London;
- (iii) Possible visit by Foreign Secretary to Israel.

(D) Lebanon

- (i) Maintain pressure on Lebanese government to stick to



reconciliation process;

(ii) Encourage government to make formal application to Security Council for wider UN mandate;

(iii) Keep under review use of public statements as a source of pressure.

(E) UN Forces

Focus minds of all parties, including UN Secretariat, on use of renewal of UNIFIL's mandate (19 April) as vehicle for widening UN involvement in Lebanon.

(F) The Ten

Ensure proposed statement by the European Council in March includes a passage on Lebanon, setting out basic principles for a settlement.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 February 1984



LEBANON/MNF: A PACKAGE DEAL

ANNEX A

1. The principal objective of any package would be the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces. The key elements would probably have to include:

- (A) Israeli forces moving first, in any phase.
- (B) No explicit linkage of Syrian and Israeli forces.
- (C) No mention of the 17 May Agreement.
- (D) Full withdrawal of MNF, to be replaced by a UN presence.
- (E) Some progress in national reconciliation.

2. A possible approach might therefore be:

(A) Israel

- Full withdrawal, in phases if necessary, with security arrangements consisting of a combination of LAF (plus militias) and a more widely deployed UNIFIL.
- Such arrangements to be set out in a Security Council Resolution which refers to SCR 509, (of June 1982 calling for unconditional Israeli withdrawal; a reference to it would be useful in meeting Syrian sensitivities), and which authorises wider UN deployment both in Southern Lebanon and 'to assist all parties including the Lebanese



Government in the maintenance of the ceasefire throughout Lebanon'.

(B) Syria

- To discuss with Lebanese Government a timetable for Syrian withdrawal, subject to security arrangements, and formation of a government of national unity before last phase of Syrian withdrawal.
- Syrian agreement to formula at (A), with incentive of full MNF withdrawal at or before formation of a government of national unity, but not before expansion of UN presence in Beirut.
- Syrian agreement to prevent Palestinian/Iranian etc infiltration from Syria or through Syrian controlled areas into southern Lebanon.
- Encourage Syrian agreement by emphasising the disadvantages for Syria of permanent partition of Lebanon: encampment of Israeli forces in Bekaa Valley 23 kms from Damascus, with threat of Israeli attack in the future, when in more aggressive mood again: US contingent or at least US Navy standing off permanently in support of Maronite statelet: uncontrollable growth of Shia extremism.



- 2 FEB 1984

SECRET

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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

2 February 1984

Sve: for w/land



*switch have got
these numbers.*

Dear Tim,

The Lebanon

John Coles sent me a copy of his letter of 1 February to Philip Francis about the possible need for Lord Whitelaw, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Heseltine to consult over the weekend.

I thought that you, as the Duty Officer, might find it helpful to have the attached note of the telephone numbers on which Lord Whitelaw, Ron Lawrence and I can be contacted while the Prime Minister is away.

I am sending copies of this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Janet.

JANET A LEWIS-JONES

Tim Flesher Esq

SECRET

	Thursday 2 Feb evening	Friday 3 Feb evening	Saturday 4 Feb daytime	Saturday 4 Feb evening	Sunday 5 Feb morning
Lord Whitelaw	London 584 2862	Dorneywood 06286 4028	Dorneywood 06286 4028	Dorneywood 06286 4028	London 584 2862
Janet Lewis-Jones	home 586 4828	out 286 6550	home 586 4828	out 435 1838	home 586 4828
Ron Lawrence	home 641 4724	home 641 4724	home 641 4724	home 641 4724	home 641 4724

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FM WASHINGTON 022340Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 2 FEBRUARY 1984

✓ INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME, MODUK, DAMASCUS, BUDAPEST,
(FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER DESKBY 030700Z)
PRIORITY TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 356 AND TELECON LONG/GOULTY: SHUWEIFAT GAP

1. I CALLED ON DAM (ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE IN SHULTZ'S ABSENCE) THIS AFTERNOON TO UNDERLINE YOUR CONCERN CONTINUED AFTER DISCUSSION WITH YOUR COLEAGUES THIS MORNING AT THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

2. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US ASSESSMENT WAS THAT LEBANESE ACTION TO CLOSE THE SHUWEIFAT GAP WAS NOT IMMINENT, (DAM NODDED ASSENT). BUT WE HAD INDICATIONS FROM BEIRUT THAT PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A MOVE WERE CONTINUING. IF THE LAF DID ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE GAP, THE MNF WOULD INEVITABLY BE DRAWN IN. AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE CLEAR TO BOTH SHULTZ AND RUMSFELD RECENTLY, THE UK WOULD NOT WITHDRAW ITS CONTINGENT UNILATERALLY AND HAD MADE THAT COMMITMENT PUBLIC. BUT IN THE UK AS IN OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES, PUBLIC OPINION WAS FRAGILE AND THE TASK OF MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE MNF CONSIDERABLE. I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS THEREFORE TO REQUEST THEREFORE THAT THE US AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE ACTION NOW WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO DISSUADE THEM FROM ATTEMPTING TO CLOSE THE GAP.

3. DAM SAID THAT THE US VIEW WAS THAT, AT LEAST IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AN ATTEMPT BY THE LAF TO CLOSE THE SHUWEIFAT GAP WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA. THE CLOSURE OF THE GAP WAS NOT REPEAT NOT U.S. POLICY. HE AGREED THAT LEBANESE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS HAD GONE FORWARD. BUT OVER THE LAST 36 HOURS THE US HAD GAINED THE DISTNCT IMPRESSION THAT ACTION WAS NOT IMMINENT. THERE WAS A QUOTE DOWN SIDE UNQUOTE TO ADVISING AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT NOT TO DO SOMETHING, WHICH IT MIGHT NOT BE INTENDING TO DO, RELATED TO ITW OWN INTERNAL SECURITY. BARTHOLEMWAS WAS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND WOULD CERTAINLY REMIND THEM OF US VIEWS IF IT SEEMED THAT THEY WERE ABOUT TO ACT. BUT THE AMERICANS DID NOT THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE SUCH ACTION WITHOUT INFORMING THEM. THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE LEBANESE THAT THEY WANTED NO SURPRISES.

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4. I SAID THAT THIS WAS ONLY PARTLY REASSURING. WE WOULD MUCH PREFER BARTHOLEMW TO BE INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE LEBANESE NOW. DAM SAID THAT IF WE HAD INTELLIGENCE ABOUT LEBANESE INTENTIONS, AS OPPOSED TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE SHOULD SHARE IT WITH THE AMERICANS. MEANWHILE THEY WOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM AND CONSULT BARTHOLEMW AGAIN. WE COULD BE ASSURED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER OUR VIEWS VERY SERIOUSLY. AS I WAS LEAVING I STRESSED PRIVATELY TO DAM THE NEED TO AVOID ANY MORE SURPRISES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP AS WELL: HE TOOK THE POINT.

5. RAPHEL CONFIRMED TO US SEPARATELY THAT SHULTZ AND RUMSFELD WERE AWARE OF OUR APPROACH ON 31 JANUARY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN BRIEFED ABOUT IT YESTERDAY.

WRIGHT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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FM WASHINGTON 030125Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 380 OF 2 FEBRUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, MODUK, BUDAPEST (FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER DESKBY 030700Z)

PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.

*M. Fisher
3/2*

MY TELNO 375: SHUWEIFAT GAP

1. SCHNEIDER (MURPHY'S CURRENT DEPUTY) TELECPHONED LATER THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT HE HAD TOLD BARTHOLEMW AND RUMSFELD'S PARTY OF MY REPRESENTATIONS THIS AFTERNOON.

2. BARTHOLEMW HAD SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS AND THAT HE HAD AN EXPLICIT AFFIRMATION THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING IMMINENTLY TO TRY TO CLOSE THE SHUWEIFAT GAP. BARTHOLEMW WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE HAD RAISED ENOUGH QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSED THE ISSUE SUFFICIENTLY FOR THE LEBANESE NOW TO BE QUITE CLEAR ABOUT U.S. CONCERNS.

3. SCHNEIDER ADDED THAT BARTHOLEMW HOPED TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH MIERS EARLY TOMORROW.

WRIGHT

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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FM BEIRUT 011200Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 OF 1 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND MODUK

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, ROME, PARIS, KUWAIT, UKMIS
NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 193: LEBANON.

1. I SAW HADDAD AT THE MNF CO-ORDINATION MEETING YESTERDAY. THERE WAS NO (NO) DISCUSSION OF ANY OPERATION. AFTERWARDS I SPOKE TO GENERAL BARAKAT (MILITARY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT FOR MNF). HE SAID NO OPERATION WAS PLANNED, BUT THE ARMY MUST OBVIOUSLY DO ITS PLANNING. LAST NIGHT AN OFFICIAL DENIAL WAS ISSUED BY THE INFORMATION MINISTRY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS SHOCKED BY THE RUMOURS OF A PLANNED OPERATION; ITS POLICY WAS TO SEEK PROGRESS BY AGREEMENT.

2. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ELBANESE ARE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR VIEWS. IN THE ABSENCE OF SALEM I SPOKE THIS MORNING JR INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TUR TO MAKKAWI AT THE MFA. HE SAID THAT YESTERDAYS DENIAL HAD BEEN PUT OUT ON THE EXPRESS INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER. HE TOOK OFFICIAL NOTE OF OUR POSITION. HE SAID THAT A MOVE OF THE KIND REFERRED WOULD BE A VERY GRAVE STEP AND HE UNDERTOOK THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTED BEFORE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MADE ANY SUCH MOVE.

MIERS

BT

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16



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ED/ED
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DESKBY 010830Z

FM WASHINGTON 010310Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 353 OF 1 FEBUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, MODUK, KUWAIT(PS/MR
HESELTINE), PRIORITY TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELEGRAM NO 343: SHUWEIFAT GAP

RAPHEL TELEPHONED MINISTER AT 0200Z TO SAY THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAD NOW
BEEN SENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT TO ADVISE THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT STRONGLY AGAINST TAKING ACTION TO CLOSE THE GAP. THE
PRECISE TIMING OF THE APPROACH WAS BEING LEFT TO BARTHOLEMEW AND
RUMSFELD ON THE SPOT, SINCE THE LATEST ASSESSMENT FROM BEIRUT WAS
THAT ACTION WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE AS IMMINENT AS EARLIER REPORTS HAD
SUGGESTED. BUT HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE EXPECT ACTION TO BE
TAKEN TOMORROW, IF NOT TONIGHT.

2. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS HAD NOT
REPEAT NOT YET BEEN INFORMED AND HE WOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL
IF WE WOULD KEEP THE INFORMATION TO OURSELVES FOR THE TIME BEING.
THIS WAS NOT TO KEEP THE OTHERS IN THE DARK BUT BECAUSE NO REPLY
HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED TO AN ATTEMPT MADE EARLIER TODAY BY THE U.S.
EMBASSY IN PARIS TO ELICIT FRENCH VIEWS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF
IMMINENT LEBANESE ACTION. HE RECOGNISED HOWEVER THAT WE HAD URGED
THEM BOTH TO MAKE SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS AND HE AGREED THAT IT
WOULD BE ALL TO THE GOOD IF WE ALL DID SO.

WRIGHT

NNNN

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DESKBY 011700Z
FM PARIS 011620Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 123 OF 1 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS,
KUWAIT (PS/MR HESELTINE), MODUK
PRIORITY TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO. 122: SHUWEIFAT GAP.

1. MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO BONNEFOUS (DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST)
WHO SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD INSTRUCTED THEIR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT
TO SPEAK TO THE LEBANESE ALONG THE SAME LINES AS THE UK.

FRETWELL

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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DESKBY 011630Z

FM PARIS 011530Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 122 OF 1 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, ROME, DAMASCUS

KUWAIT (FOR PS/MR HESELTINE), MODUK

PRIORITY TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 193 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON: SHUWEIFAT GAP

1. MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS BEING UNAVAILABLE, FIRST SECRETARY (CHANCERY) TOOK ACTION THIS MORNING WITH PAVEC, HEAD OF NEAR EAST DEPARTMENT AT THE QUAI, EXPLAINING THAT THE APPROACH WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AT A HIGHER LEVEL IF POSSIBLE. FORD SAID THAT YOU WERE DISTURBED AT THE APPARENT LIKELIHOOD OF LAF ACTION TO CLOSE THE SHUWEIFAT GAP, IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WENT AHEAD WITHOUT CONSULTATION THE UK WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF. WE WERE PRESSING THE LEBANESE TO DESIST, AND URGED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO MAKE SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS.

2. PAVEC, ASKING NOT TO BE QUOTED, SAID THAT THE US EMBASSY HAD EARLIER IN THE MORNING SOUGHT THE QUAI'S VIEWS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LAF ATTACK IN THE ALEY AREA (CF WASHINGTON TELNO 353) AND ASKED IF THE FRENCH INTENDED TO LEND ASSISTANCE. BONNEFOUS, THE QUAI MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR, HAD TOLD THE US EMBASSY THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE FRENCH LENDING ASSISTANCE FOR WHAT SEEMED LIKELY TO BE A DANGEROUS ENTERPRISE. PAVEC ADDED THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WHILE HAVING NO PRECISE INFORMATION ABOUT LAF INTENTIONS HAD REPORTED THAT IF THE OPERATION WENT AHEAD IT WAS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED.

3. PAVEC UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THE UK APPROACH IMMEDIATELY TO HIS SUPERIORS. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE FRENCH BEING WILLING TO TAKE PARALLEL ACTION TO THE UK IN BEIRUT.

FRETWELL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

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SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

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4 file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 February 1984

Dear Sir,

The Lebanon

Thank you for your letter of 1 February about the possibility of tension in the Lebanon during the Prime Minister's absence in Hungary, arising from a possible move by the Lebanese Government to close the "Shuwayfat gap". I have consulted the Prime Minister who has asked me to reply in the following sense.

First, you will be aware of the details of the Prime Minister's movements (Mr. Heseltine's Private Office confirmed to me this afternoon that they have received the usual note on administrative arrangements). The Prime Minister leaves the House of Commons at 3.45 on 2 February for Heathrow Airport. She reaches Budapest at 2030 local time (1930 London time). Between then and about 0830 (0730) on Saturday 4 February, she will be in Budapest. From 0830 (0730) until 1400 (1300) on 4 February she will be visiting places outside Budapest. From 1400 (1300) until 1720 (1620) she will be in Budapest. Take-off for the return journey is at 1800 (1700) with arrival at Heathrow at 1940 London time.

On this occasion there will be no secure voice communications between London and Budapest, and it must be assumed that all telephone conversations will be heard by the Hungarians and/or Russians. The only secure means of communication will be by telegram.

In general, and if time permits, the Prime Minister would wish to be consulted in her absence about all major decisions affecting the multinational force. She would be grateful if the Defence Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could keep a close eye on the situation you describe, and if necessary let her have their joint recommendations on action to be taken. If time does not permit this, or the Prime Minister cannot be contacted, she would be grateful if, in consultation with Lord Whitelaw, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. Heseltine would take such decisions as they think appropriate. The Prime Minister considers that the most important point is that decisions should be taken in time for BRITFORLEB to take the necessary action.

Telephone conversations will best be conducted through the No. 10 switchboard.

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/ The No. 10

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- 2 -

The No. 10 Private Office should be kept informed. The Duty Officer on the evening of Friday and on Saturday will be Mr. Flesher.

Clearly, the period of maximum difficulty of communications could be that when the Prime Minister is outside Budapest (see above). The Embassy in Budapest will be able to send messages to the Prime Minister by car during this period and to give an estimate of how long it would take to deliver a message.

I am sending copies of this letter to Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

For use

for Col.

P.M.W. Francis, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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PRIME MINISTER

I attach a letter which I propose to send to the Ministry of Defence, in answer to an enquiry from John Stanley about the possibility of decisions being needed on the MNF while you are in Hungary.

Are you content with the letter, in particular paragraph 4 which answers John Stanley's questions as to the extent to which you wish to delegate decisions on the Lebanon during your absence?

A.J.C.

I agree the
terms of this letter. The
most important thing is

1 February, 1984. That the decisions
are taken in time for
our local commanders
to take the necessary action
me

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 February, 1984.

The Lebanon

Thank you for your letter of 1 February about the possibility of tension in the Lebanon during the Prime Minister's absence in Hungary, arising from a possible move by the Lebanese Government to close the "Shuwayfat gap". I have consulted the Prime Minister who has asked me to reply in the following sense.

First, you will be aware of the details of the Prime Minister's movements (Mr. Heseltine's Private Office confirmed to me this afternoon that they have received the usual note on administrative arrangements). The Prime Minister leaves the House of Commons at 3.45 on 2 February for Heathrow Airport. She reaches Budapest at 2030 local time (1930 London time). Between ~~then~~ and about 0830 (0730) on Saturday, 4 February, she will be in Budapest. From 0830 (0730) until 1400 (1300) on 4 February she will be visiting places outside Budapest. From 1400 (1300) until 1720(1620) she will be in Budapest. Take-off for the return journey is at 1800 (1700) with arrival at Heathrow at 1940 London time.

On this occasion there will be no secure voice communications between London and Budapest, and it must be assumed that all telephone conversations will be heard by the Hungarians and/or Russians. The only secure means of communication will be by telegram.

In general, and if time permits, the Prime Minister would wish to be consulted in her absence about all major decisions *affecting* involving a change of policy on the multinational force. She would be grateful if the Defence Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could keep a close eye on the situation you describe, and if necessary let her have their joint recommendations on action to be taken. If time does not permit this, or the Prime Minister cannot be contacted, she would be grateful if, in consultation with Lord Whitelaw, Sir Geoffrey Howe

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/ and

and Mr. Heseltine would take such decisions as they think appropriate. *The Prime Minister considers that the most important point is that decisions should be taken in time & BE INFORMED to take the necessary action.*
Telephone conversations will best be conducted through the No.10 switchboard.

The No.10 Private Office should be kept informed. The Duty Officer on the evening of Friday and on Saturday will be Mr. Flesher.

Clearly, the period of maximum difficulties of communications should be that when the Prime Minister is outside Budapest (see above). The Embassy in Budapest will be able to send messages to the Prime Minister by car during this period, and ~~would be able~~ to give an estimate of how long it would take to deliver a message.

I am sending copies of this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A.S.C.

P.M.W. Francis, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

2.



Private Secretary to:
MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/56

1st February 1984

Don Coles

Mr Stanley had a word with you this morning about the latest situation in the Lebanon and agreed that it would be helpful to forewarn the Prime Minister of the possible need for urgent decisions about the British MNF contingent during the period of her visit to Hungary.

The Prime Minister will have seen from the JIC assessment of 31 January that the Lebanese Government may proceed with an operation at short notice to close the "Shuwayfat gap". The Prime Minister will also have seen from Washington Telegram No 353 of 1 February that the US are making a strong demarche to the Lebanese authorities to try to dissuade them from this course. Nevertheless the risk remains significant, and action on these lines could result in a breakdown of the ceasefire and a rapid deterioration of the military situation in and around Beirut with all MNF contingents, including possibly (but by no means necessarily) our own, coming under attack. In such circumstances MOD Ministers might have to seek urgent decisions on the immediate future of BRITFORLEB, involving the partial or full implementation of one of the existing contingency plans for withdrawal.

As this could happen at short notice during the Prime Minister's absence in Hungary, Mr Stanley would be grateful if you could let us know what arrangements are available for consulting the Prime Minister during her absence abroad and whether or not she wishes to delegate decisions on the Lebanon in any way during the period of her absence.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts and to Richard Hatfield.

Tom Francis
Private Secretary

P M W FRANCIS

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary to Prime Minister

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT



MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT

1 FEB 1984





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 February, 1984

Lebanon

Thank you for your letter of 31 January about indications that the Lebanese Armed Forces might launch an operation to close the Shuweifat Gap.

The Prime Minister saw your letter and its enclosure last night (together with the JIC's assessment of 31 January) and has said that she is grateful for the swift action taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).


AM COLEY

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SIR J LEAHY
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FM WASHINGTON 312250Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 31 JANUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, MODUK, KUWAIT
(PS/MR HESELTINE)
PRIORITY TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 193: SHUWEIFAT GAP

1. MINISTER TOOK ACTION THIS EVENING WITH RAPHEL (NEWLY APPOINTED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS) IN MURPHY'S ABSENCE. THOMAS RE-EMPHASISED THE POINTS WHICH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PUT TO RUMSFELD ON 20 JANUARY AND URGED STRONGLY THAT RUMSFELD SHOULD NOW BE INSTRUCTED TO DISSUADE GEMAYEL FROM TAKING ACTION TO CLOSE THE GAP. HE LEFT RAPHEL IN NO DOUBT THAT IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WENT AHEAD WITHOUT CONSULTATION, WE WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF. THOMAS SAID THAT PARALELL ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN IN BEIRUT AND THAT THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS WERE BEING INFORMED AND URGED TO MAKE SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE LEBANESE.
2. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HEARD SIMILAR REPORTS TO THOSE THAT WERE CAUSING US CONCERN BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE ACTUALLY PLANNING A MOVE. THERE WERE RUMOURS ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS BUT NOTHING HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE STILL CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION TO TAKE AND A DECISION WAS IMMINENT. BUT AS OF 2220Z TODAY NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. RAPHEL UNDERTOOK TO



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 January 1984

Dear John,

*Thank you for the
swift action. MF*

The Prime Minister may have seen Beirut telegram number U2G of 31 January to MODUK (copy enclosed) reporting indications that the Lebanese Armed Forces might launch an operation to close the Shuweifat Gap from tonight, 31 January, at only a few hours' notice. The Current Intelligence Group met this afternoon to consider this telegram and other evidence: their report, which will be available to the Prime Minister this evening, suggests that some action by the Lebanese Armed Forces is imminent. We must assume that President Gemayel is counting on US artillery support at some stage in the operation.

The Prime Minister will wish to know that we have sent a telegram to Washington and Beirut instructing both posts to restate our view that such action would destroy the chances of reinforcing the ceasefire and the prospects for reconciliation, completely change the environment in which the MNF was operating, and make it necessary for us to reconsider our contribution to the MNF. We have reminded the Americans of Rumsfeld's discussions with the Prime Minister and Sir Geoffrey Howe on 20 January, and asked them to join us in urging the Lebanese not (not) to make such an attempt.

Our people in Beirut, both in the MNF and the Embassy, have been instructed to take all appropriate security precautions.

I am sending a copy of this letter to PS/Mr Stanley, in Mr Heseltine's absence in Kuwait. The telegram has been copied to Kuwait for Mr Heseltine.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

2220Z TODAY NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. RAPHEL UNDERTOOK TO
PASS ON URGENTLY HMG'S REQUEST THAT THE US GOVERNMENT SEEK TO
DISSUADE THE LEBANESE FROM TAKING THIS STEP. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK
TO TRY TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

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FM BEIRUT 311000Z
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELNO U2G OF 31 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS
PRIORITY TEL AVIV, FCO (NENAD), CABINET OFFICE, WASHINGTON.

FOR D4B FROM ADA. DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV FOR DA

LEBANON SINTREP

FCO TELNO 25 OF 23 JANUARY 84: POSSIBLE LAF OPERATION

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN TUR WE HAVE BEEN KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON THE SITUATION.
2. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE CURRENT LEBANESE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT NOW INDICATES THAT THE LEBANESE COULD LAUNCH AN OPERATION TO CLOSE THE SHWAYFAT GAP FROM TONIGHT, 31 JAN. WE ARE CONTINUING TO WATCH THE UNITS INVOLVED VERY CAREFULLY AND TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO GAIN WARNING OF THE OPERATION BUT THE DISTANCES ARE SO SHORT THAT IT COULD HAPPEN AT ONLY A FEW HOURS' NOTICE.
3. CURRENT UNIT MOVES ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. 73 BN HAS RELIEVED 52 BN ON THE ALEY FRONT AT ARRAYA YC 4046.
 - B. AN LAF STAFF OFFICER AT THE BEIRUT OPS CENTRE TOLD USMA ON 30 JAN THAT 71 AND 72 BN WILL RELIEVE 51 AND 53 BN IN BEIRUT ON 31 JAN 84.
4. IF TRUE (AND WE BELIEVE IT IS) THIS MEANS THAT 5 BDE WOULD BE UNCOMMITTED AND FREE FOR OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT FROM PM ON 31 JAN. THE THREE HELIBORNE BNS OF 10 BDE ARE ALSO MAINLY UNCOMMITTED.
5. COMMENT
5 BDE IS, NEXT TO 8 BDE, THE MOST RELIABLE BDE IN THE ARMY. IT IS NORMALLY BASED AT ARBA CAMP NEAR JOUNIEH AND IS THOUGHT TO BE PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN. THE THREE HELIBORNE BNS OF 10 BDE ARE SPECIALLY SELECTED, WELL TRAINED AND ALSO THOUGHT TO HAVE A STRONG CHRISTIAN BIAS. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THE LEBANESE WOULD RISK USING HELICOPTERS IN THE OPERATION. THE CONSIDERABLE AIR THREAT HAS PERSUADED THEM NOT TO DO SO IN THE PAST.
- 6 COMMENT CONTINUED.
WE SPECULATE THAT THE THREE HELIBORNE BNS WOULD BE USED FOR THE SHWAYFAT GAP OPERATION. THE 5 BDE WOULD BE KEPT IN RESERVE TO TACKLE ANY PROBLEM WHICH MIGHT BREAK OUT IN BEIRUT. PART OF

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/ 5 BDE

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5 BDE COULD ALSO BE USED TO MAKE A LIMITED ADVANCE EASTWARDS FROM ARRAYA. THIS WOULD BE AQBBCSAXJQQZSJONARY TACTIC WITH THE ADDED BONUS THAT THEY MIGHT SECURE SOME HIGH GROUND IMPROVING THEIR PRESENT POOR POSITION AND EVEN DOMINATING ALEY. THE OPERATION COULD BE LAUNCHED AT NIGHT.

7. FOR DA DAMASCUS.

WE WOULD EXPECT THE AMERICANS TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION BY ENGAGING TARGETS IN THE METN. YOUR ROUTE OVER WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND YOU MIGHT ALSO HAVE DIFFICULTY IN RETURNING TO DAMASCUS. IF LAUNCHED TONIGHT WE WOULD EXPECT THE NEWS TO BREAK ON THE BBC BY DAWN 1 FEB.

WEATHER.

IF SAY ROADS ARE OPEN BUT PATRICK COCKBURN HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT IT IS ONLY ONE LANE AS YOU APPROACH DOVER SHOULDER. ONLY EASTWARD TRAFFIC IS ALLOWED UP TO 1300 LOCAL AND WESTWARD AFTER THAT.

8. IF YOU DO COME OVER WE HAVE A US REQUEST WHICH WE AM SENDING BY SEPERATE DESKBY TELEGRAM.

MIERS

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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MR WRIGHT

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE <i>DESKBY 2100Z</i>

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 311700Z JAN 84
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON <i>DESKBY 2100Z</i>
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT <i>PARIS, ROME, MODUK, Kuwait (for Mr Hoxethia)</i>
	10	INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS <i>PRIORITY TEL AVIV, URMIS NEW YORK</i>
	11	MY TEL NO 25 TO BEIRUT AND BEIRUT TEL NO U2G OF 31 JANUARY
	12	TO MODUK: ACTION BY LAF TO CLOSE THE SHUWEIFAT GAP
	13	1. I am disturbed at the Beirut report that the LAF may launch
	14	an operation for this purpose any time from this evening
	15	(31 January). You should take action at an appropriate level
	16	in US/Lebanese government to say that we remain firmly of the
	17	view that such a step would amount to a grave departure from
	18	the process of reconciliation, would be seriously divisive and
	19	could precipitate in the short term bitter fighting in which MNF
	20	contingents would be exposed to grave risks.
	21	2. (For Beirut) Please emphasise again my remarks to Salem
///	22	(para 6 of my tel no 26 to Beirut) that such action would
//	23	completely change the environment in which the MNF, as a peace-
/	24	keeping body, is operating and would make it necessary for HMG
	25	to reconsider our contribution to the MNF. If the Lebanese

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword revert to
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution <i>LEBANON MNF</i>
Drafted by (Block capitals) C W LONG		
Telephone number 233 6048		
Authorised for despatch <i>P. H. Hoxethia</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

2

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1 <<<<
 2 revert to the argument used with you by Haddad (para 2 of your
 3 tel no 43), you should point out that MNF support for the
 4 Lebanese government is aimed at giving it enough timing for
 5 genuine attempts at national reconciliation, not (not) to
 6 increase its ability to take military action against mainly
 7 domestic opponents. If the government's survival is at stake,
 8 it seems foolhardy to destroy the remaining vestiges of the
 9 September ceasefire agreement.
 10 3. (For Washington) You should remind the Americans of the
 11 conversation between Rumsfeld, the Prime Minister and myself
 12 of 20 January on closure of the Shuweifat Gap. The Prime
 13 Minister said that Gemayel must consult closely with us if he
 14 planned to take this serious step. Salem admitted the same day
 15 that such action would ruin the ceasefire and alter the position
 16 of the MNF if it became involved, adding that any move to close
 17 the Gap was "a long way down the road". There has been no (no)
 18 consultation and it seems that LAF action is imminent. We hope
 19 that Rumsfeld will be instructed to dissuade Gemayel from this
 20 course. If it goes ahead without consultation, we shall have to
 21 reconsider our contribution to the MNF, given BRITFORLEB's
 22 proximity to the scene of operations and the substantially
 23 enhanced threat to our men, *that would result.*

24 4. (For Paris, Rome) Please inform ^{host} governments of line we are
 25 HOWE taking and urge them to make ^(similar) representations to Lebanese.
 26 NNNN

/// 31
 // 32
 / 33
 34

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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LIC 889/27

LUF 415/27

00 F C O

00 MODUK

00 WASHINGTON

00 PARIS

00 ROME

PP DAMASCUS

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FM BEIRUT 270830Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 27 JANUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND ROME

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, UKMIS
NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND CBFC

INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

MY TELNO 42: LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAID THAT ACTION BY THE LAF TO CLOSE THE SHUWEYFAT GAP WOULD LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE, A CHANGE IN THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE MNF OPERATED, AND TO RECONSIDERATION OF OUR READINESS TO MAINTAIN OUR CONTINGENT HERE, HADDAD'S REACTION WAS PREDICTABLY SHARP.

2. HE SAID THAT THE CEASEFIRE HAD ALREADY BEEN RENDERED INOPERATIVE BY THE BUILD-UP OF WAR MATERIAL IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS AND BY AMAL'S USURPATION, SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, OF THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY IN CERTAIN AREAS THERE, EG AL MASSOURIEH. OF COURSE THE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO PROCEED BY AGREEMENT, IF THIS WAS POSSIBLE. BUT THE SYRIAN POSITION SEEMED TO HAVE HARDENED AGAIN. THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS WAS NOW VERY GRAVE. THE GOVERNMENT WAS BEING PRESSED VERY HARD TO ACT BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. IT WAS INTOLERABLE FOR IT TO HAVE ITS HANDS TIED. IT WAS SOLELY THE FEAR OF FORCIBLE INTERVENTION BY THE ARMY THAT HAD PREVENTED, HITHERTO, HOSTILE ELEMENTS FROM SEEKING TO EXTEND THEIR AUTHORITY FROM THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS UP INTO WEST BEIRUT. MNF CONTRIBUTORS WERE ON THE ONE HAND PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT TO BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE: ON THE OTHER DISCOURAGING IT FROM EFFECTIVE ACTION WHEN ITS VERY SURVIVAL WAS AT STAKE. IF BEIRUT WAS ONCE AGAIN TO FIND ITSELF IN THE HANDS OF RIVAL MILITIAS IT WAS DOUBTFUL IF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SURVIVE. WERE WE SERIOUSLY SUGGESTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD STAND BY AND DO NOTHING WHILE ITS OPPONENTS BUILT UP THEIR STRENGTH FOR A TAKEOVER? THAT WAS THE IMPLICATION OF WHAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY. THE GOVERNMENT WAS IN THE LAST RESORT CONTEMPLATING ACTION AGAINST THE SUPPLY ROUTE RATHER THAN IN GREATER BEIRUT ITSELF SINCE THIS WAS THE LEAST CONFRONTATIONAL TACTIC. BUT IT WAS IN THE CITY THAT THE DANGER LAY. WHAT WOULD BE THE UK REACTION IF TROUBLE SPILLED OVER AND THE ARMY HAD ONCE AGAIN TO RESTORE CONTROL IN WEST BEIRUT? HE NEEDED TO KNOW.

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4. AFTER CONSIDERING THE PRESSING FOR AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION ABOUT THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS FIGHTING IN BEIRUT. I SAID THAT MINISTERS MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO ADDRESS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION AND THAT HE MIGHT NOT THEREFORE GET A HELPFUL ANSWER.

5. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF THE MNF COUNTRIES COULD SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON THIS (PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 274). PENDING THE OUTCOME OF FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN CONTRIBUTORS, I PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE, IF I AM PRESSED ON THIS, THAT OUR CONTINGENT IS SMALL AND HAS NO MANDATE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN FIGHTING BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE CEASEFIRE. IT IS HERE TO PLAY A PEACEKEEPING ROLE. IT STANDS READY TO DO THAT IF THERE IS A PEACE TO KEEP. IF PEACE BREAKS DOWN, WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS PRESENCE HERE.

MIERS
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11/27

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 27 JANUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND ROME

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NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND CBFC

INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 27 JANUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND ROME
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, UKMIS
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INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

26th January 1984

Prime Minister⁽²⁾

Dear JShu,

MS
DMS
26/1
A.S.C. 27/1
f.a. MOD

The Defence Secretary has seen your letter of 23rd January about possible Lebanese action to close the Shuweifat Gap.

Mr Heseltine agrees that any such deployment of the Lebanese Government forces in the absence of political agreement would be a matter of very considerable concern. Such an action could precipitate the final collapse of the ceasefire and might well spark off an upsurge of violence in Beirut. This could have the most serious consequences for the whole MNF. He was therefore pleased to note that HMA, Beirut has been instructed to represent our concern to the Lebanese authorities and that Mr Miers and COMBRITFORLEB have been told to keep a close eye on Lebanese intentions.

Yours ever

N H R Evans

(N H R EVANS)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

LIC 879/27

FDW 6 46/27

PP BEIRUT

PP DAMASCUS

PP TEL AVIV

PP AMMAN

PP CAIRO

PP JEDDA

PP ROME

PP MOSCOW

GR 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 262350Z JAN 84

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 307 OF 26 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW.

LEBANON

1. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT, FOR THE TIMEBEING WITH SOME SUCCESS, TO DAMP DOWN CONGRESSIONAL WORRIES ABOUT THE MARINES' ROLE IN LEBANON. THE PRESIDENT AND RUMSFELD HAVE HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS THIS WEEK WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND SHULTZ HAS BRIEFED THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE FULL SENATE.
2. IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON 25 JANUARY PRESIDENT REAGAN CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. WAS MAKING PROGRESS IN LEBANON, THAT THERE WAS HOPE FOR A FREE AND INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON AND THAT THE U.S. MUST NOT BE DRIVEN FROM ITS OBJECTIVES BY STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM.
3. WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN EMPHASISING THAT PUBLIC DISSENT FROM ITS POLICY ENCOURAGES SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE. CONGRESSIONAL ANXIETIES ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD, BUT IT WOULD PLAY INTO SYRIANS' HANDS AND RENDER AN AGREEMENT HARDER TO ACHIEVE FOR CONGRESS TO SEEK TO PUT A NEW TIME LIMIT ON THE MARINES' PRESENCE. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS ALSO BEEN POINTING OUT THAT PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL OF THE M.N.F. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE PEACE-KEEPING ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE LIABLE TO PRECIPITATE A BLOOD BATH. CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS HAVE TOLD US THAT THERE IS SOME RELUCTANCE AMONG OPPONENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S LEBANON POLICY TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THWARTING IT OR FOR AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION, SUCH AS WITHDRAWING THE MARINES, WHICH COULD LEAD TO WORSE CHAOS IN LEBANON.
4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY GEMAYEL'S COMPROMISE OFFER ON DRUZE ARMY PROMOTIONS WHICH WAS CONVEYED BY HARIRI TO KHADDAM AND JUMBLATT IN DAMASCUS TODAY. RUMSFELD WILL BE LEAVING FOR THE MIDDLE EAST TONIGHT.

WRIGHT

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MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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FM WASHINGTON 242342Z JANUARY, 1984

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 274 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MODUK, BRITFORLEB, DANASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW AND CBFC.

YOUR TELNO 25 TO BEIRUT: LAF ACTION IN THE SHUWEIFAT GAP

1. WE TOLD MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR FOR LEBANON) TODAY OF THE LINE WE ARE TAKING WITH THE LEBANESE. MACK HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY HEARD IT SUGGESTED THAT THE LAF SHOULD INTERVENE IN SUPPORT OF THE ISF TO HELP CLOSE THE GAP AND DOUBTED THAT BERRI AND JUMBLATT WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THIS. LAF IDEAS FOR CLOSING THE GAP REPRESENTED CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO BE PUT INTO ACTION ONLY IF THERE WERE NO HOPE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN. MILITARY ACTION WAS NOT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S PREFERRED OPTION. THEY WERE WELL AWARE THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS, WOULD

~~WAS NOT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S PREFERRED OPTION. THEY WERE WELL
AWARE THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS, WOULD
OPPOSE SUCH A COURSE IF THEY HAD NOT TRIED IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN.~~

2. IF, HOWEVER, SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED, MACK
THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT
TO ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE GAP. THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED SIMPLY TO
SIT TIGHT IN BEIRUT UNTIL THE TERRORISTS AND MILITIAS GREW STRONG
ENOUGH TO OVERTHROW THEM.

3. WE SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS TO KEMP (NSC STAFF).

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PP WASHINGTON
PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 395

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 231730Z JAN 84

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 OF 23 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS
NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 66 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON: UN OPTIONS

1. EGERTON HELD A FURTHER MEETING ON 23 JANUARY WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, ITALIAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES TO HEAR COMMENTS ON OUR PAPER (FCO MY TELNO 67).
2. HOOPER (US) CIRCULATED A NOTE (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH STATED THAT THE MOST PROMISING OPTION WAS THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL TO COVER ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE ADDED (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT A SECTION IN THE NOTE COVERING THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF UNISO OBSERVERS IN THE BEIRUT AREA HAD BEEN DROPPED AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON.
3. VATTANI (ITALY) SAID THAT THE ITALIAN MFA WELCOMED OUR PAPER AND AGREED THAT THE OPTION OF AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN SOUTH LEBANON OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE OF OVERCOMING SYRIAN AND SOVIET OBJECTIONS. THE ITALIANS ALSO SAW A ROLE FOR UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT. IN STOCKHOLM GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE WHEN HE DISCUSSED THE ROLE OF UN WITH ANDREOTTI HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN NEGATIVE: HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE VIEWS OF THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE MNF PARTNERS SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE UN SECRETARIAT TO KEEP THE PROBLEM ALIVE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL MET THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN CASABLANCA, KHADDAM DID NOT DISPLAY PREJUDGED OPPOSITION TO A UN ROLE BUT HAD NOT "OPENED UP HIS MIND"
4. TREMEAU (FRANCE) SAID THAT OUR THINKING WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE QUAI. THEY AGREED THAT THE MOST PROMISING OPTION WAS AN EXPENSION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE WHICH MIGHT ALSO COVER THE PALESTINIAN CIVILIAN POPULATION, NOT NECESSARILY IN THE BEIRUT AREA. GROMYKO HAD TOLD CHEYSSON THAT IF WE SECURED

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14630 - 1

SYRIAN AGREEMENT FOR AN EXTENDED ROLE FOR UNIFIL, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LEND ITS SUPPORT.

5. EGERTON GAVE BRIEF ACCOUNTS OF OUR MEETINGS WITH SALEM (FCO TELNO 23 TO BEIRUT) AND MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO (UKDEL CED TELEGRAM NUMBER 22). IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD A FURTHER MEETING ON 6 FEBRUARY UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE MEANTIME, EG A FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, NECESSITATED AN EARLIER MEETING. THIS FOLLOWED A THROW - AWAY REMARK BY HOOPER THAT A FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MIGHT WELL TAKE PLACE BEFORE UNIFIL'S MANDATE CAME UP FOR RENEWAL IN MID-APRIL.

6. SEE MY IFT (B)

HOWE

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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DEFENCE DEPT

PUSD

NEWS DEPT

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FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

2
CONFIDENTIAL



file VC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1984

Dear Peter,

LEBANON

We spoke on the telephone on Friday night about Beirut telegram number 38 and in particular the statement, reported in paragraph 2, by the Security Adviser to the President of the Lebanon that the Lebanese Government was determined to close the Shuweifat Gap. As you know, this question arose in Rumsfeld's conversation with the Prime Minister on Friday.

You told me that you would be arranging for instructions to be sent to HM Ambassador in Beirut over the weekend to the effect that, since action in relation to the Shuweifat Gap could have repercussions for the British contingent in the MNF, he should make it plain to the Lebanese authorities that we would expect to be fully consulted in good time if there was any prospect of such action.

The Prime Minister has since commented that should any further information of Lebanese intentions to act come to the attention of HM Ambassador or the Commander of BRITFORLEB, they should inform London immediately so that we can, if necessary, take steps to dissuade the Lebanese from going ahead. Subject to any views which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary may have, I should be grateful if you could ensure that this point is clear to all concerned.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*you see
for Cole.*

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VC

MS

GRS 650

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DESKBY 201230Z FCO
FM BEIRUT 201150Z JAN 84
TO IMMEDIATE F.C. O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 38 OF 20 JANUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW, CBFC
SAVING BRITFORLEB

Prime Minister

On X, the Lebanese Foreign Minister told the Foreign Secretary today that action to close the gap was a distant possibility and he recognized that the UNF 4 would have to be consulted.

I have asked the F/C.O. to telephone the Ambassador in Beirut this weekend and instruct him to tell the Lebanese that in view of our exposed position we expect to be fully consulted in good time if there is any prospect of such action.

1. I CALLED ON KASSIS (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE), AND WADIH HADDAD (SECURITY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT) THIS MORNING, TO PROBE THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY. THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY INTENDED TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO GET THE SECURITY PLAN BROUGHT INTO EFFECT.

KASSIS WOULD PROBABLY GO TO DAMASCUS FOLLOWING KHADDAM'S RETURN FROM CASABLANCA. SYRIAN OBJECTIONS WERE NOT FUNDAMENTAL. THEY WANTED TO GET WHAT THEY COULD FROM AGREEING TO THE PLAN, BUT THE REAL OBSTACLE WAS JUMBLATT, WHO WAS CONFUSED AND IRRESOLUTE AND AFRAID OF BEING CRITICISED FOR NOT CONVERTING THE DRUZE VICTORY OF SEPTEMBER INTO REAL GAINS FOR HIS PEOPLE. HADDAD SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD OFFERED JUMBLATT A LOT POLITICALLY, BUT THEY COULD NOT MAKE PROMISES THAT MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER GROUPS COMPARABLE TO THE DRUZE, EG THE GREEK ORTHODOX. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROBLEM OF DRUZE PROMOTIONS COULD BE SOLVED ROUND A TABLE WITH JUMBLATT AND BERRI. KASSIS SUGGESTED THAT THE LAF HAD ADAMANTLY OPPOSED THE PROMOTION OF DESERTERS: BUT HE SAID THAT A COMPROMISE WAS ON OFFER UNDER WHICH THE DESERTERS WOULD BE GIVEN RETRO-ACTIVE PROMOTION WHEN THEY RETURNED.

X

2. HADDAD MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO CLOSE THE SHUWEIFAT GAP. THIS WOULD BE DONE BY THE ISF IN TWO KEY POSITIONS. THE ARMY WOULD BACK THEM UP AS NECESSARY. SUCH ARMY ACTION WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE SECURITY PLAN OR CEASEFIRE, SINCE THEY WOULD ONLY BE INTERVENING TO HELP THE ISF, WHOSE ACTIVITIES WERE PART OF THE PLAN. HE ASSURED ME THAT BERRI AND JUMBLATT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO CLOSE THE GAP IN THIS WAY. AT ONE STAGE HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO RELY ON THE GOODWILL OF THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT: AT ANOTHER HE SAID THAT THE NEED TO IMPOSE THE LAW (IT WAS ILLEGAL TO MOVE ARMS WITHOUT PERMISSION) MUST IF NECESSARY TAKE PREFERENCE OVER WHAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE OPPOSITION. HE ALSO SAID THE ARMY WAS MUCH STRONGER NOW THAN IT HAD BEEN IN AUGUST.

(A.S.C. 20)
We must ask for guidance from our Commander-in-Chief so that we can, if necessary, prevent it happening
ms.

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3. I ASKED HOW THE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT NABIH BERRI COULD ACCEPT GOVERNMENTAL CLOSURE OF THE SUPPLY LINE INTO THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS WHEN THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY OF THE AMAL MILITIAMEN AND OTHERS WHOSE SUPPORT HE CLAIMED. KASSIS SAID THAT BERRI EXERCISED REALLY VERY LITTLE CONTROL ON THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS NOW. SOONER OR LATER HE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER HE WAS WITH OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. HADDAD ALSO SAID THAT ONCE THE SECURITY PLAN WAS IN FORCE THE ARMY WOULD UNDERTAKE A BIG OPERATION TO "CLEAN UP" WEST BEIRUT. IF THEY TRIED THIS NOW, THEY WOULD RUN INTO A LOT OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION FROM PEOPLE LIKE SAEB SALAM. BUT SUCH OPPOSITION WOULD BE DEFUSED ONCE THE SECURITY PLAN WAS IN FORCE, SINCE IT PROVIDED FOR THE ARMY TO TAKE OVER FROM THE LEBANESE FORCES IN MANY PLACES: THE LEBANESE FORCES WERE "THE BIG LOSERS" UNDER THE PLAN.

4. I THANKED HIM FOR THIS INFORMATION. I SAID THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS ONE WHICH HMG WANTED TO FOLLOW VERY CLOSELY. IT WAS NATURALLY OF CONCERN TO THEM IF CLASHES WERE TO OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY PLAN GOING INTO EFFECT. WE NEEDED THE FULLEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATION IF FIGHTING WAS FORESEEN WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE THE MNF.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 18 JANUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
JEDDA, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEHRAN

MY TELNO 22 (NOT TO ALL): SECURITY SITUATION IN BEIRUT.

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB) WAS ASSASSINATED THIS MORNING ON THE CAMPUS BY GUNMEN WITH SILENCED WEAPONS. THIS FOLLOWS SIMILAR ATTACKS IN THE LAST TEN DAYS ON THE FRENCH CONSUL'S CHAUFFEUR (PRESUMED TO BE IN MISTAKE FOR THE FRENCH CONSUL HIMSELF), THE WIFE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE FRENCH CULTURAL CENTRE, AND AN EGYPTIAN DIPLOMAT DRIVING A CAR WITH DIPLOMATIC PLATES ALLOCATED TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY. YESTERDAY THE SAUDI CONSUL WAS KIDNAPPED. IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED THAT ALL THESE ACTIONS WERE THE WORK OF ONE OR MORE OF THE SHIA EXTREMIST GROUPS NOT (NOT) UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE AMAL LEADER BERRI.

2. THERE SEEMS ALSO TO HAVE BEEN A SYSTEMATIC PATTERN OF ATTACKS ON FRENCH MNF POSITIONS IN RECENT DAYS: THESE HAVE TAKEN THE FORM OF HIT AND RUN ATTACKS WITH SMALL ARMS OR RPGS. THE

~~THE FORM OF HIT AND RUN ATTACKS WITH SMALL ARMS OR RPGS.~~ THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN PUTTING MUCH PRESSURE ON THE LEBANESE ARMY TO EXERCISE MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE APPROACHES TO FRENCH POSITIONS.

3. THE ABOVE ATTACKS ARE ONE ASPECT OF THE GENERALLY WORSENE
SECURITY SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT TO WHICH I REFERRED IN MY
TUR (PARA 7). ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE:

- A) THE ATTACKERS NOW SEEM TO BE GOING FOR "SOFT" TARGETS -
THOUGH THIS BY NO MEANS INDICATES THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER
CONSIDERING HOW TO ATTACK BETTER DEFENDED HIGHER PROFILE,
TARGETS.
- B) AT LEAST ONE OF THE ATTACKS ON FRENCH POSITIONS WAS NOT A
"HIT AND RUN" ONE. LAST FRIDAY'S ATTACK WAS IN THE
NEIGHBOURHOOD OF MY RESIDENCE AND MY PROTECTION TEAM WERE
ABLE TO OBSERVE AMAL GUNMEN ON THE STREETS FOR SEVERAL HOURS
AND UNTIL WELL AFTER NIGHTFALL. THEY EVINced NO HOSTILITY
TOWARDS US. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN STANDING READY TO RESIST AN
ATTEMPT BY THE ARMY TO PURSUE THEM BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE
VICINITY OF THEIR ATTACK.
- C) IF THE EXTREMISTS ARE BENT ON DISRUPTING OR EVEN FORCING THE
CLOSURE OF THE AUB (AND TODAY'S MURDER IS MERELY THE LATEST
IN A SERIES OF LESSER INCIDENTS AT THE AUB OVER A CONSIDERABLE
PERIOD), THEN THIS COULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS IN VIEW
OF THE IMPORTANCE AND PRESTIGE OF THE AUB AND THE CHALLENGE
TO THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY WHICH THE AUB'S INABILITY TO
FUNCTION WOULD CONSTITUTE.

4. I AM IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH COUNCIL ABOUT
THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM.

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MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 16 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 155: LEBANON

1. MINISTER CALLED ON MURPHY TODAY TO TAKE STOCK.
2. MURPHY SAID THAT RUMSFELD PLANNED TO BRIEF MNF PARTNERS IN CAPITALS ON 19/20 JANUARY BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON. HE HOPED TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD ASKED THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO PREPARE COMMENTS ON OUR PAPER ON UN OPTIONS (YOUR TELNO 67) BEFORE HIS VISIT TO LONDON AND MURPHY UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO KEEP US ABREAST OF THEIR THINKING ON THIS AS IT DEVELOPED. RUMSFELD'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF IN BEIRUT WAS A VALUABLE BARGAINING CHIP WITH THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS WHO SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY AS HIGH A PRICE AS POSSIBLE FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. MURPHY THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT A UN OPERATION IN BEIRUT SHOULD NOT BE SET IN HAND PREMATURELY: IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THINK OUT POSSIBLE UN DEPLOYMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF LEBANON AS WELL.
3. THOMAS ASKED ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES. MURPHY THOUGHT THIS UNLIKELY TO COME TO A HEAD IN THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS (23 JANUARY TO 10 FEBRUARY). IT WAS NOT CLEAR

~~3. THOMAS ASKED ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES. MURPHY THOUGHT THIS UNLIKELY TO COME TO A HEAD IN THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS (23 JANUARY TO 10 FEBRUARY).~~ IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WANTED EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES: MARINES' RECRUITMENT HAD IMPROVED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 23 OCTOBER BOMBING. IN BRIEFINGS ON THE HILL, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE MAKING USE OF PRIVATE ADVICE FROM MODERATE ARABS THAT THE MNF SHOULD STAY WHERE IT WAS. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US WAS ON THE RUN. THE ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO DO A BETTER JOB OF EXPLAINING THE MARINES' MISSION. AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID, THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN WHEN WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FOREIGN FORCES WAS ESTABLISHED, (IE NOT NECESSARILY COMPLETED) AND SECURITY ASSURED. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE MORE PRECISE.

4. MURPHY SAID THAT IT SEEMED THAT THE SYRIANS NOW WANTED AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN, BUT NO PROGRESS BEYOND THAT UNTIL THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WAS ABROGATED. THEY CLAIMED THAT BOTH JUMBLATT AND BERRI HAD SIGNED THE SECURITY AGREEMENT. IN THEIR VIEW IT WAS NOW UP TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO TIE UP THE DETAILS. MURPHY THOUGHT IT CONCEIVABLE THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE QUOTE DURING THE COMING DAYS UNQUOTE. KHADDAM WOULD BE MEETING THE LEBANESE AND SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE MARGINS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE THIS WEEK. MORE NEGOTIATION WITH JUMBLATT WOULD BE REQUIRED WHEN HE RETURNED FROM MOSCOW TOWARDS THE END OF THE WEEK. IF THE SECURITY PLAN COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IT WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE STEP FORWARD WHICH MIGHT ITSELF OPEN THE WAY FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

5. THOMAS ASKED ABOUT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE SECURITY PLAN. MURPHY SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THE DISORGANISATION OF THE LEBANESE BUREAUCRACY. NO ONE TRUSTED ANYONE ELSE AND NOTHING WAS WRITTEN DOWN. IT WAS INCAPABLE OF CONDUCTING COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS EFFICIENTLY. BUT GEMAYEL HAD APPROVED THE PLAN, OVER-RULING THE OBJECTIONS OF GENERAL TANNOUS. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE MOSLEM-DOMINATED ISF WAS NOT A COMPETENT FORCE. BUT FOR THAT VERY REASON IT WAS WIDELY ACCEPTABLE AND COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE.

6. MURPHY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TAKE SWIFT ADVANTAGE OF BERRI'S SIGNATURE ON THE SECURITY DOCUMENT BEFORE MORE RADICAL ELEMENTS DOMINATED THE SHIA COMMUNITY. THE SHIA WERE INTENSELY SUSPICIOUS OF THE ISRAELIS AS WELL AS THE US AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND FEARED THAT THEY WERE COLLUDING IN PARTITION, WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE SHIA COMMUNITY MOST. THE ISRAELIS HAD HAD NO SUCCESS IN WINNING SHIA HEARTS AND MINDS IN THE SOUTH WHERE TEMPER WERE RISING. IN BEIRUT THE RADICAL IRANIAN QUOTE AFFILIATES UNQUOTE WERE OUT OF EVERYONE'S CONTROL AND WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE ROOTED OUT AND EXTERMINATED. THE SYRIANS WERE WRONG TO SHRUG THEIR ACTIVITIES OFF AS LEBANESE PATRIOTISM: THESE TERRORISTS OWED THEIR PRESENCE IN BEIRUT TO STATE SUPPORT, NOT LEAST FROM THE SYRIANS WHO TURNED A BLIND EYE TO THEIR PASSAGE OF THE MOUNTAINS.

7. THOMAS ASKED HOW THE STATE DEPARTMENT JUDGED SYRIAN OBJECTIVES IN THE LIGHT OF RUMSFELD'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THEIR ONLY CLEAR DECISION HAD BEEN TO ALLOW THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO GO AHEAD, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEIR LEBANESE ALLIES WANTED THEM. A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WAS STILL HOSTAGE

~~ARRANGEMENTS TO GO AHEAD, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEIR LEBANESE ALLIES WANTED THEM. A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WAS STILL HOSTAGE TO ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, THOUGH THERE WAS A GLIMMER OF HOPE THAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT PROVE MORE FLEXIBLE OVER THIS THAN HAD AT ONE STAGE SEEMED LIKELY. THEY HAD ASKED RUMSFELD QUOTE WHAT HE HAD IN MIND UNQUOTE, IMPLYING THAT THEY MIGHT BE UNACCEPTABLE IN PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWAL. RUMSFELD WOULD PROBABLY RETURN TO DAMASCUS AFTER HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON. HE HAD BEEN MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT THEY COULD NOT OBTAIN ALL THEY WANTED AND THAT SOME COMPROMISE WOULD BE REQUIRED. THOUGH THE SYRIANS WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH GEMAYEL AS PRESIDENT, THEY STILL SAW HIM AS REPRESENTING PRIMARILY THE PHALANGISTS. BUT MURPHY DID NOT THINK THAT THE SYRIANS HAD ANY ALTERNATIVE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON IN MIND: THEY WOULD DEAL WITH ANY LEBANESE PROVIDED THAT HE RESPECTED SYRIAN INTERESTS. RUMSFELD HAD ASSURED THE SYRIANS THAT THE US RESPECTED THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN LEBANON: THIS POINT COULD USEFULLY BE FLESHED OUT IN HIS FURTHER TALKS WITH THEM.~~

8. THOMAS SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT BE CONCLUDING FROM THE POLITICAL NOISES COMING FROM ISRAEL THAT THE SITUATION THERE MIGHT LIKELY TO CHANGE IN THEIR FAVOUR. MURPHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY ISRAELIS, INCLUDING SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS, WANTED TO GET OUT OF LEBANON QUICKLY. THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT WAS IN DIFFICULTIES, IT WAS BY NO MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD FALL. MOREOVER, WHAT EVER PERES MIGHT SAY ABOUT GETTING OUT OF LEBANON, THE LABOUR OPPOSITION HAD CRITICISED THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT AS INADEQUATE. THEY WANTED THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE TO BE UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL AND GREATER FREEDOM FOR THE IDF TO PATROL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL WORSE FROM THE SYRIAN POINT OF VIEW THAN THE PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT IN VIEW OF THE LONG HISTORY OF PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES THE SYRIANS MUST BE UNCERTAIN AS TO ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO CONFIDENCE IN DAMASCUS THAT TIME WAS CLEARLY ON THEIR SIDE. THE SYRIANS DID NOT LIKE BEING SEEN AS SOVIET PUPPETS AND WERE INTRIGUED BY THE PROSPECT OF A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH WASHINGTON.

9. THOMAS ASKED WHAT MURPHY THOUGHT THE FRENCH WERE UP TO. WE HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON M GROSSOUVRE'S RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS. MURPHY SAID THAT ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS M GROSSOUVRE HAD BROUGHT NO NEW IDEAS. THE DESK OFFICER FOR SYRIA ADDED THAT THE VISIT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE GONE WELL: THE SYRIANS HAD NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING AND HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT FRENCH BOMBING OF THEIR POSITIONS IN LEBANON. (BUT THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE HAVE COMMENTED TO US PRIVATELY THAT THE QUAI D'ORSAY OFTEN KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT RUMSFELD IS DOING THAN WHAT THE ELYSEE IS UP TO.)

10. MURPHY COULD NOT RECALL ANY RECENT US/FRENCH EXCHANGES ON LEBANON (HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM LEAVE AND MAY NOT HAVE BEEN FULLY IN THE PICTURE). THE FRENCH HAD CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE NOT WAVERING BY MOVING SOME OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT BACK TO UNIFIL. BUT THEY WERE BEING UNUSUALLY RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN CONSULTATION WITH THEIR MNF PARTNERS. THEY LIKE US SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF WAYS OF MOVING THE UN TO CENTRE STAGE. MURPHY REPEATED THAT THE MNF WAS AN INTENSE IRRITANT TO DAMASCUS AND THAT A HIGH

~~CONSULTATION WITH THEIR MNF PARTNERS. THEY LIKE US SEEMED TO BE~~
~~THINKING OF WAYS OF MOVING THE UN TO CENTRE STAGE. MURPHY REPEATED~~
THAT THE MNF WAS AN INTENSE IRRITANT TO DAMASCUS AND THAT A HIGH
PRICE SHOULD BE EXACTED FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. THOMAS TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASISE ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF RUMSFELD'S
KEEPING CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 28 OF 12 JANUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, AMMAN, CAIRO.

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

LEBANON

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A FIRST SHORT SESSION WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BEFORE DINNER THIS EVENING SOON AFTER ARRIVING IN DAMASCUS. THE MAIN SUBJECT WAS LEBANON WITH SOME BRIEF REFERENCE TO ARAB/ISRAEL. FULL RECORD WILL FOLLOW BUT YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE A REPORT NOW OF THE TWO MAIN POINTS MADE BY KHADDAM.

2. THE FIRST WAS THAT DESPITE WHAT PRINCE SAUD TOLD US IN RIYADH, KHADDAM WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE SECURITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT (NOT) COMPLETE. IT HAD BEEN ^{ACCEPTED} ACCEPTED BY JUMBLATT AND BERRI, BUT

~~(WST) COMPLETE. IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY JUMBLATT AND BERRI, BUT~~
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS HOLDING OUT OVER THE QUESTION OF THE
PROMOTION OF DRUZE OFFICERS.

3. THE SECOND POINT WAS THAT KHADDAM INSISTED THAT NO (NO)
PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITHOUT
THE ABROGATION REPEAT ABROGATION OF 17 MAY AGREEMENT. KHADDAM
SAID THAT GENEVA I HAD AGREED ON ABROGATION AND GEMAYEL HAD
ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT HAD THEN FAILED TO HONOUR HIS VOMMITMENT TO
SEEK ANOTHER MEANS OF ENSURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. KHADDAM WENT SO
FAR AS TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DIALOGUE
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE LEBANON WITHOUT ABROGATION OF THE
17 MAY AGREEMENT.

4. FULL RECORD BY BAG.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 27 OF 10 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, JEDDA, CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD,
KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN.

MS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

RIYADH TELEGRAM NO 10: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A MORNING'S TALKS WITH PRINCE SAUD ON 11 JANUARY. ON LEBANON SAUD CONFIRMED THAT AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN HAD BEEN REACHED, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT BEING FORMALLY ANNOUNCED. ON ARAB/ISRAEL HE MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR A CHANGE IN US POLICY, BUT WITHOUT PUTTING FORWARD ANY IDEAS ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED BEYOND THE FAMILIAR PLEA FOR PRESSURE ON THE US. ON IRAN/IRAQ HE SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST WAY TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END WAS TO ASSIST IRAQ IN STANDING FIRM: WITH THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAN WOULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE. ON SUDAN HE WAS MORE INCLINED THAN MUBARAK HAD BEEN TO BELIEVE THAT ISLAMICISATION HAD STAVED OFF EXTREMIST PRESSURE.

LEBANON

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO NEWS YET ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT IN LEBANON. SAUD CONFIRMED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. IT MIGHT HAVE TO BE

2. ~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO NEWS YET ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT IN LEBANON. SAUD CONFIRMED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. IT MIGHT HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE BEING FORMALLY ANNOUNCED, AS THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT PROMOTING DRUZE OFFICERS.~~

ARAB/ISRAEL

3. SAUD WELCOMED THE ARAFAT/MUBARAK MEETING AND SAID THAT ARAFAT WAS EXPECTED SOON IN SAUDI ARABIA. ARAFAT'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE WAS NOW CLEAR. THIS HAD REQUIRED COURAGE AND DESERVED ENCOURAGEMENT. IT WAS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RECALL OF THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT WAS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. THIS TOO SHOWED PLO WILLINGNESS TO TALK SERIOUSLY ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. THE PROBLEM WAS LACK OF A SERIOUS APPROACH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE BY THE UNITED STATES. THE US REJECTED CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND REFUSED PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. ALL OF US SHOULD INFLUENCE THE AMERICANS TO PRODUCE REAL PROGRESS. THE AMERICANS HAD MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. WITHOUT THIS NO ONE COULD BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP.

4. PRINCE SAUD COMMENTED THAT THE PLO WAS NOW CLEARLY SPLIT INTO THOSE WHO SHARED ARAFAT'S IN WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT THE FEZ APPROACH, AND THOSE COMMITTED TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE GREAT MASS OF PALESTINIANS BACKED ARAFAT AND IN THE WEST BANK HIS SUPPORT WAS COMPLETE. SAUD SAID THAT THERE WERE DANGERS IN CALLING AN EARLY MEETING OF THE PNC LEST A RIVAL MEETING BE CALLED IN DAMASCUS. THIS WOULD PUT HAWATHEH AND HABASH IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT POSITION. IN ADDITION ISRAELI REFUSAL IN THE PAST TO ALLOW PALESTINIAN LEADERS FROM THE WEST BANK TO ATTEND THE PNC HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL, AS THOSE CONCERNED WERE MODERATES. A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIGHT BE A MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD NEXT STEP.

5. SAUD CONTINUED THAT IT WAS ASKING A GREAT DEAL TO PRESS ARAFAT FOR FURTHER SIGNALS OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. ARAFAT WAS ALREADY PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING PEACE FOR TERRITORY ON THE LINES OF THE FEZ PACKAGE, YET ISRAEL HAD GIVEN NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY IN RETURN. THE CREDIBILITY OF AMERICAN POLICY HAD MEANWHILE SUFFERED. REAGAN'S POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS MADE MATTERS WORSE. MEANWHILE THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED TO STOP THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE AMERICANS COULD HELP BY LIMITING THEIR AID TO ISRAEL, OR AT LEAST BY PREVENTING IT BEING USED TO SUPPORT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. UNLESS THE AMERICANS MADE THEIR POSITION CLEARER, SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT'S APPROACH (FOR WHICH ARAFAT HAD JUST FOUGHT A WAR) WOULD BE ERODED.

6. SAUD WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE US/ISRAEL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE (FOR WHICH THE US HAD OBTAINED "NOTHING IN RETURN. HE ARGUED THAT IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN POLICY, THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD WORK IN PARALLEL TO ESTABLISH A DEGREE OF COMMON 'RESONANCE'. THE ARAB SUMMIT DUE

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7. ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES WOULD BE WILLING TO PUT REAL PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS, PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT PERSUASION SHOULD BE ENOUGH. IF FRIENDLY ARGUMENT AND RATIONAL PERSUASION WAS NOT ENOUGH, THIS WOULD IMPLY A LACK OF AMERICAN GOODWILL TOWARDS THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THIS WAS NOT THE ASSUMPTION ON WHICH THE SAUDIS WERE WORKING. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE REAGAN PLAN WAS THE BEST PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS THE AMERICANS WHO HAD THE LEVERAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AGREED THAT IT WAS ^{IMPORTANT} ~~UNWARRANTED~~ TO PERSUADE THEM. EGERTON SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS A DETERMINED LEADER WITH BASICALLY SOUND REACTIONS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS INITIATIVE OF SEPTEMBER 1982 AND RECENT AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THE ARAFAT/MUDARAK MEETING. BUT AMERICAN POLICY HAD BEEN DISTRACTED BY THE LEBANESE IMBROGLIO AND BY CONSTANT CHANGES IN AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. SAUD AGREED. HE RECOGNISED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION AND GOODWILL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDED THAT, AS THE MAIN ACTORS IN THE DISPUTE, THE ARABS WERE PARTICULARLY WELL PLACED TO CONVINCING THE AMERICANS. IN CONCLUSION PRINCE SAUD WELCOMED THE NEWS THAT ENBOTOGE MIGHT COME TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE MIGHT HIMSELF MEANWHILE VISIT THE UK AND SOME OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NO-ONE TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN SAW AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, MUCH AS WE WOULD WISH IT. MEANWHILE, WE WERE MAINTAINING A POSITION OF NEUTRALITY. SAUD SAID THAT THE WAR WAS NOW CONTINUING ONLY BECAUSE IRAN WANTED THIS. EUROPEAN NEUTRALITY WOULD NOT INFLUENCE IRAN, WHO WOULD STOP FIGHTING ONLY IF THEY SAW NO PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS. THEY WERE GETTING SUBSTANTIAL SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST. THOSE OPPOSED TO THE WAR IN IRAN NEEDED ENCOURAGEMENT. THE IRANIAN POLICY OF ATTRITION DEPENDED ON LARGE CONTINUING ARMS SUPPLIES. HELPING IRAQ TO STAND FIRM WAS THE BEST WAY OF BRINGING THE CONFLICT TO AN END. THEY SAW LITTLE POINT IN RATIONAL APPROACHES TO IRAN, WHOSE ATTITUDE WAS CONFRONTATIONAL, AND WHO RESORTED TO TERRORISM LIKE THE RECENT KUWAIT BOMBINGS. IF THE WEST CHANGED THEIR NEUTRAL STANCE, IRAN WOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE WAR COULD NOT BE WON. IF IRAN MADE FURTHER MILITARY PROGRESS IT WOULD THEN

~~ON A NEUTRAL STANCE, IRAN WOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE WAR COULD NOT BE WON. IF IRAN MADE FURTHER MILITARY PROGRESS IT WOULD THEN BE EXTREMELY COSTLY TO STOP THEM.~~

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED THE VISIT OF THE IRAQI PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON IN SEPTEMBER AND OUR CREDIT AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ. HE ASKED ABOUT THE DANGERS TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IF ATTACKED FURTHER, THE IRAQIS WOULD BE BOUND TO RESPOND. BUT FURTHER IRAQI ACTION WOULD ONLY BE IN RESPONSE TO IRANIAN ATTACKS.

SUDAN

10. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SAUD SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S INTRODUCTION OF SHARIA LAW MIGHT HAVE SERVED THE CAUSE OF STABILITY BY HEADING OFF EXTREMIST PRESSURE. ITS EFFECT ON THE SOUTH SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AUTONOMOUS POLICY WHICH NIMEIRI HIMSELF HAD INTRODUCED: IT SHOULD NOT HAVE TOO MUCH IMPACT IN THE SOUTH. THE TROUBLES IN THE SOUTH WERE NOT A CHRISTIAN/MUSLIM CONFLICT, BUT A TRIBAL AFFAIR, AGGRAVATED BY THE LACK OF ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE THREAT OF ETHIOPIAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF EXTREMISTS. NIMEIRI'S RECENT POLICIES MIGHT HAVE CAUSED PROBLEMS, BUT HAD PERHAPS FORESTALLED WORSE PROBLEMS. HE HAD COMPLAINED TO THE SAUDIS ABOUT HIS HEADACHES OVER SADIQ AL-MAHDI WHOSE WIFE WAS "VERY ACTIVE" IN LONDON LOBBYING FOR HIS RELEASE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT NIMEIRI SEEMED NOW TO BE ADOPTING A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH WHICH WAS WELCOME.

BILATERAL

11. THE DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, REPORTED SEPARATELY.

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FROM WASHINGTON 120120Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 116 OF 11 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) ROME
PARIS BEIRUT AMMAN TEL AVIV ROUTINE CAIRO JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK

RIYADH TELNO 10: LEBANON.

1. WE GAVE PELLETREAU THIS EVENING A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH PRINCE SAUD AND ASKED HOW RUMSFIELD WAS GETTING ON.
2. PELLETREAU SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MNF WOULD NOT LAST LONG. ACCORDING TO ELIE SALEM, KHADDAM TOLD HIM THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO EASE OUT OF LEBANON AND SHIFT THE FOCUS TO THE CREATION OF AN EGYPTIAN/JORDANIAN/ARAFAT FRONT TO TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AFTER THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THE SYRIANS WOULD COUNTER THIS PLOY AND FREEZE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.
3. RUMSFELD SAW THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITY AS TO DISABUSE THE SYRIANS. AT HIS PROMPTING DAM HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN A STATEMENT TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY THAT IF CONGRESS WERE TO CURTAIL THE PERIOD OF AUTHORISATION OF THE MARINES THE SYRIANS MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THE US WAS FINISHED IN LEBANON. SYRIA MUST NOT REACH SUCH A CONCLUSION. THE CONGRESS SHOULD CONVEY A STEADFAST MESSAGE IF THE US WERE TO BE SEEN AS SERIOUS ABOUT ITS SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL, POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND RUMSFELD'S NEGOTIATIONS.
4. PELLETREAU HOPED THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THE SYRIANS OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS' RESOLVE AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO

~~4. PELLETREAU HOPED THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THE SYRIANS OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS' RESOLVE AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO SUPPORT THE SECURITY PLAN AND TO ALLOW POLITICAL RECONCILIATION TO CONTINUE. FOR THE MOMENT THE SYRIANS SEEMED TO BE SUPPORTING THE SECURITY PLAN WHICH DID NOT AFFECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN LEBANON, PERHAPS IN THE HOPE THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD OFFER A PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF. BUT JUMBLATT CONTINUED TO RAISE OBJECTIONS: THE US AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT HAD MADE NO IMPRESSION ON HIM IN A LONG AND FRIENDLY TALK ON 9 JANUARY.~~

5. PELLETREAU SAID THAT KING FAHD HAD ADVISED THE LEBANESE NOT TO TAKE KHADDAM'S LATEST LINE TOO SERIOUSLY AND HAD ASSURED THEM THAT HE WOULD PRESS THE SYRIANS NOT TO BLOCK THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY OR THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA TALKS. WE ASKED ABOUT THE SYRIAN LETTER AGREEING TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH PRINCE SAUD MENTIONED TO YOU. PELLETREAU SAID THAT SAUD HAD OFTEN REFERRED TO THIS LETTER BUT HAD NEVER SHOWN THE AMERICANS THE TEXT. IN ANY CASE IT PREDATED THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT WHICH HAD COME AS A SURPRISE TO THE SYRIANS. IN HIS VIEW THE SYRIANS HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES ABOUT THEIR WITHDRAWAL ONLY BECAUSE THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW.

6. MEANWHILE SENATOR TOWER HAS TESTIFIED ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND SENATOR WARNER TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES WITHOUT CLEAR EVIDENCE OF DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE US INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. THIS CLEAR VIEW FROM SENATORS WHO HAVE JUST BEEN TO BEIRUT WILL HELP TO HOLD REPUBLICAN OPINION IN CONGRESS STEADY BEHIND THE ADMINISTRATION'S LINE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 24 OF 11 JANUARY

AND TO FLASH RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

INFO ROUTINE JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME AND
UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 6 (NOT TO ALL): JUMBLATT

1. I CALLED ON WALID JUMBLATT ON THE EVENING OF 10 JANUARY TO DELIVER MR LUCE'S MESSAGE. JUMBLATT WAS STAYING IN A PLUSH MODERN VILLA IN A HEAVILY GUARDED COMPOUND BELONGING TO RIFAT AL ASAD. HE WAS IN A GLOOMY, NOT TO SAY APOCALYPTIC, MOOD THOUGH HIS TONE GAVE RATHER AN IMPRESSION OF PLAY-ACTING.
2. JUMBLATT GAVE THE DRUZE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE LOSS OF ABEY AND THE PROMOTION OF 'HAMANA OFFICERS' (QUERY PARA 2 OF BEIRUT TELNO 21) AS TWO REASONS WHY HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE SECURITY PLAN. BUT THESE WERE ONLY PART OF HIS DETAILED OBJECTIONS (UNSTATED) AND UNDERLYING THEM WAS HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PHALANGISTS INTEND TO ATTACK HIS PEOPLE AND THAT THE MARONITES WOULD NEVER GIVE UP THEIR MONOPOLY OF POWER. ARMED CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE AND THE DRUZE WOULD HAVE TO DO THE BEST THEY COULD. 'IT IS 1860 ALL OVER AGAIN'.
3. THE GEMAYELS WERE INCORRIGIBLE. BASHIR HAD BEEN A BIG CRIMINAL AND A LITTLE THIEF. AMIN WAS A BIG THIEF AND A LITTLE CRIMINAL. THEY WERE ALL IN WITH THE ISRAELIS. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY, THE LEBANESE FORCES, THE ISF OR THE GENDARMERIE. THE ARMY HAD RECENTLY ARRESTED 400 MUSLIMS IN SABRA (PARA 4 OF BEIRUT TELNO 22). THERE WAS NO DEMOCRACY: AT MOUKHTARA THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD RECEIVED AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW IN THE PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS JOURNALISTS, YET NO REPORT OF THE MEETING HAD APPEARED IN THE PRESS.
4. JUMBLATT RECITED THE FAMILIAR CRITICISMS OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. GENEVA I HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING. THE RIYADH FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 3 JANUARY HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING. THE MNF SHOULD GO HOME. I INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD MR LUCE THAT IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN GREAT BLOODSHED WOULD FOLLOW. JUMBLATT REPLIED THAT NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE FIGHTING THE MUSLIMS SEMI CLN FRANCE'S MACHINATIONS (HE MENTIONED THAT FRANCOIS DE GROSSOAUVERE WAS STAYING IN THE NEIGHBOURING VILLA IN THE SAME COMPOUND) WOULD COME TO NAUGHT SEMI CLN THE BRITISH CONTINGENT WAS DOING NOTHING, AND THEY AND THE ITALIANS WOULD SOON BE IN THE SAME KIND OF TROUBLE AS THE OTHERS.

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/S. JUMBLATT

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5. JUMBLATT WOULD HEAR NOTHING OF DISENGAGEMENT PLANS, POLITICAL SOLUTIONS, BROADER-BASED GOVERNMENTS OR ANY OTHER PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS. HE AGREED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION COULD PROMOTE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, BUT ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NO WORSE THAN THE CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE MARONITES.

COMMENT

6. IF PROGRESS IN LEBANON DEPENDS ON JUMBLATT, THERE WILL BE NONE. BUT ON THIS FORM IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HOW SERIOUSLY TO TAKE HIM AS A PARTICIPANT IN ANY 'NATIONAL DIALOGUE'.

LUCAS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR EGERTON
MR JENKINS

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MR GOODALL)CABINET
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SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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Prime Minister.

FM RIYADH 101325Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 008 OF 10 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, DAMASCUS

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND
KHARTOUM

Nothing new here.

A. J. C. 1/1

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO EGYPT: CALL ON PRESIDENT MUBARAK

mf

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY OF STATE HAD JUST OVER 45 MINUTES WITH MUBARAK AND DREW HIM OUT ON LEBANON, ARAB/ISRAEL, IRAN/IRAQ AND THE SUDAN. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, SECRETARY OF STATE PUT DOWN A MARKER ABOUT TRADE: WE WANTED TO SELL MORE, AND HAD HAD SOME RECENT DISAPPOINTMENTS. MUBARAK REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BUY MORE FROM US - BRITISH EQUIPMENT HAD AN EXCELLENT REPUTATION- BUT THE PROBLEM WAS MONEY: WHERE IT WAS AVAILABLE, WE WERE THE NATURAL CHANNEL. MUBARAK MADE CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO AN EARLY VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

LEBANON

2. SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED TO A NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF A GREATER ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. THE MNF WAS THERE TO ACHIEVE A PURPOSE AND HE HOPED THAT WE WERE HELPING TO SECURE STABILITY: BUT IT COULD NOT STAY FOR EVER. MUBARAK MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN REPLY:

(I) HE DID NOT SHARE GEMAYEL'S OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION, AND GEMAYEL HAD RECENTLY SENT HIM A MESSAGE SUGGESTING THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW COMPLETELY, EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS DID.

(II) IT WAS NEVERTHELESS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL WITHDREW: THE ISRAELI INVASION HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH PUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND STOOD TO BENEFIT ONLY THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAD TOLD SHAMIR AND SHARON AS MUCH BEFORE THE INVASION, AND HAD PRESSED THE UNITED STATES TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE AGAINST IT. BUT HAIG HAD HAD OTHER IDEAS.

(III) SYRIA WAS NOT A THREAT TO ISRAEL AND ISRAEL KNEW IT. IF THE ISRAELIS WITHDREW TO THEIR BORDERS AND MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT THEY WOULD TOLERATE NO INCURSIONS, EITHER FROM SYRIA OR THROUGH THE LEBANON, THE SYRIANS WOULD TAKE THE MESSAGE. BEGIN HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE IDEA BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER SHAMIR WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO IMPLEMENT IT.

(IV) AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THE ARABS WOULD BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO PRESS SYRIA TO DO LIKEWISE, THE SAUDIS SHOULD PLAY THEIR PART BY REDUCING THE FLOW OF FUNDS TO SYRIA AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD PRESS THEM TO DO SO (HE CLAIMED THAT SAUDI FUNDS REACHED SYRIA ONLY WITH US APPROVAL).

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(V) MUBARAK SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY TO HIM ABOUT SYRIAN ATTACKS ON HIS PEOPLE IN THE LEBANON. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS STRIKING THAT ISRAEL HAD BLOCKED MILITARY TRAFFIC ON THE ROAD FROM DAMASCUS TO BEIRUT UNTIL THE SYRIANS HAD STARTED ATTACKING ARAFAT, WHEREUPON THEY HAD LET EVERYTHING THROUGH.

(VII) ON THE SYRIAN POSITION, MUBARAK SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO ASSAD THAT HE WAS GIVING THE ISRAELIS A PRETEXT FOR STAYING IN SOUTH LEBANON BY REMAINING IN THE BEKAA. BUT THE FACT WAS THAT THE SYRIANS HAD ONLY TOLD GEMAYEL THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW BECAUSE THEY HAD CALCULATED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT. THE AGREEMENT OF 17 MAY HAD THEREFORE COME AS A SHOCK TO THEM.

(VIII) IN CONCLUSION, MUBARAK EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT WITHOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. THEY KNEW THAT THE ARABS TURNED TO THEM ONLY WHEN THEY NEEDED ARMS. HE QUOTED, BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO GET A FOOT IN THE DOOR IN EGYPT BY OFFERING TO SUPPLY HELICOPTERS AT KNOCK-DOWN PRICES.

ARAB/ISRAEL

3. MUBARAK ARGUED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD PRESS ISRAEL TO TALK TO ARAFAT AND SHOULD TALK TO HIM THEMSELVES, IN ORDER TO PULL THE RUG FROM UNDER THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS WHO WERE OPPOSED TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS BE ENCOURAGED. ARAFAT COULD NOT EXPLICITLY ENDORSE RESOLUTION NO 242 OR RECOGNISE ISRAELI RIGHT TO EXIST, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY HAD ALREADY DONE SO INDIRECTLY. THERE WERE SIMILAR LIMITS TO WHAT OTHER MODERATE ARABS WERE PREPARED TO SAY IN PUBLIC (HE WAS CRITICAL OF SAUDI PUSILLANIMITY), BUT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THEY WANTED PEACE.

4. MUBARAK EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE LIKELY EFFECT OF THE RECALL OF THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT WHICH THE REJECTIONISTS WOULD OPPOSE AND WHICH WAS CAUSING CONCERN ALSO AMONG SOME OF ARAFAT'S PEOPLE. BUT ARAFAT WOULD GO TO JORDAN SOON, AND MUBARAK WAS PRESSING KING HUSSEIN TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE LINK.

5. MUBARAK DESCRIBED THE HIGH PROFILE DECLARATION ON THE US/ISRAELI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AS A DISASTER. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO HAVE DONE THIS AT THIS VERY CRITICAL TIME, AND THE RESULT HAD BEEN ONLY TO ALLOW THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS TO ARGUE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT SINCERE IN WANTING EITHER A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO RUMSFELD THAT HE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADVISE BEFORE SUCH A DECISION WAS TAKEN.

6. HE CONCLUDED THAT IF 1984 PASSED WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT MOVE FORWARD ON ARAB/ISRAEL, IT WOULD BE TOO LATE. THE SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE A FAIT ACCOMPLI.

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7. MUBARAK SAW NO PROSPECT OF AN EARLY END TO THE WAR AND ARGUED THAT KHOMEINI WANTED IT TO CONTINUE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS. SUDAN

8. MUBARAK MADE CLEAR IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOW ACTIVE HE HAD BEEN IN PERSUADING NIMEIRI OF THE DANGERS OF HIS POLICY OF ISLAMISATION. NIMEIRI HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO EMBARK ON THIS COURSE BY THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD, WHO HAD ARGUED THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO STABILITY. MUBARAK HAD IMPRESSED ON NIMEIRI THE FACT THAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE THE OPPOSITE, AND GIVE THE COMMUNISTS A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY TO CAUSE TROUBLE. HE THOUGHT THAT NIMEIRI HAD BEEN CONVINCED, BUT ADDED THAT HE HAD FOUND ATTRACTIVE THE IDEA OF RULING QUOTE LIKE A KING UNQUOTE IN A COUNTRY WITHOUT ELECTIONS. MUBARAK DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF QADDAFI MEDDLING SUCCESSFULLY IN THE SUDAN, AND WAS TYPICALLY DISPARAGING ABOUT HIS MENTAL STATE.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FM MOSCOW 101036Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 026 OF 10 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH (FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT,

TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, THE HAGUE:

INFO ROUTINE HELSINKI, SUVA, OSLO, DUBLIN, ACCRA, DUBAI, STOCKHOLM

YOUR TEL NO 11 TO UKMIS NEW YORK :

LEBANON, UN FORCES, AND THE SOVIET UNION.

1. THE RUSSIANS WANT THE AMERICANS OUT OF LEBANON. BUT, MORE THAN THAT, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE MNF, AND THE US MARINES IN PARTICULAR, RETREAT WITH DISHONOUR FROM BEIRUT, EXPELLED BY THE FORCE OF DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION. SO LONG AS THEY THINK THAT THIS IS A POSSIBILITY, I DO NOT SEE THE RUSSIANS LIFTING A FINGER, IN ELECTION YEAR, TO PULL REAGAN'S CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE.
2. ABOUT LEBANON, OR ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY, THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT BE MORE 'RESPONSIBLE' UNTIL THERE IS SOME INDUCEMENT FOR THEM TO BECOME SO. AT PRESENT, THERE IS NOTHING WHICH OUTWEIGHS THE ATTRACTIONS OF WATCHING THE AMERICANS SINK DEEPER INTO THE LEBANON QUAGMIRE. ADMITTEDLY, THERE ARE DANGERS FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS POLICY. IT HANDS THE INITIATIVE TO THE AMERICANS AND THEIR ALLIES. IT CREATES THE IMPRESSION IN ARAB CIRCLES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS AN IMPOTENT BYSTANDER. IT TENDS TO MAKE THE SOVIET DOG BEHOLDEN TO THE SYRIAN TAIL. BUT, AT A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE LEADERSHIP HERE, THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT YET READY FOR A BOLDER ROLE. THEIR PRESENT POLICY IS PART OF A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC ASSUMPTION THAT THE US/ISRAEL ALLIANCE WILL EVENTUALLY ALIENATE THE ARAB WORLD TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE: AND COINCIDES WITH THEIR DETERMINATION TO AVOID A DIRECT CONFRONTATION IN THE REGION WITH THE US.
3. IN THE ABOVE, THE RUSSIANS ARE IN SOME DEGREE MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY. WHAT RILES THEM THE MOST IS THAT THEY ARE SHUT OUT OF THE MAIN MIDDLE EAST ACTION BY WASHINGTON, WHO REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT THE RUSSIANS CONSIDER TO BE THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN THE REGION. IN HIS TELEGRAMS NO 9 AND 16, MR LUCAS HAS SPELLED OUT THE LIKELY SYRIAN PRICE FOR GOING ALONG WITH THE IDEAS IN YOUR TUP. THE SOVIET PRICE WOULD BE, ADDITIONALLY, TO BE PLAYED BACK INTO THE MIDDLE EAST GAME, PREFERABLY, THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVELY, THROUGH THEIR FAVOURITE HOBBY-HORSE, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AT WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PRESENT. BUT I ASSUME THAT THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT AGREE TO. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I JUDGE THE LIKELIHOOD REMOTE OF GETTING OVER THE SOVIET ROADBLOCK.

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4. MEANWHILE, THE ENGLISH SERVICE OF TASS HAS REPORTED YOUR MIDDLE EAST TOUR AND THE EXPECTATION THAT YOU "WILL TOUCH UPON THE IDEA OF REPLACING THE +MULTINATIONAL FORCE+ WITH U.N. PEACE-KEEPING UNITS."

THE REPORT CONCLUDES: "IT IS NOT FORTUITOUS THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE HAS BEEN MADE. IT HAS BEEN PROMPTED BY PUBLIC DEMANDS IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE TO WITHDRAW THE +MULTINATIONAL FORCE+ FROM LEBANON SINCE ITS PRESENCE THERE IS ONLY FACILITATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S.-ISRAELI PLANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

SUTHERLAND

MIDDLE EAST
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FM BEIRUT 101415Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 10 JANUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), DAMASCUS
 ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, PARIS, ROME,
 TEL AVIV, MOSCOW

FCO TELNO 11 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: LEBANON

1. SUMMARY. THE LEBANESE ARE LIKELY TO OPPOSE ALL UN PLOYS FOR BEIRUT BECAUSE THEY DREAD WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF. DISCUSSION OF A UN ROLE IN PHASE II OF THE SECURITY PLAN OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF HOOKING THEM. BUT WE MAY SIMPLY HAVE TO DO WITHOUT LEBANESE COOPERATION WHILE WE SOFTEN UP THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE MNF'S DETERRENT ROLE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. SERIOUS DISORDER HERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY. PERHAPS AMERICA WILL ACCEPT THE MNF CONTINUING HERE IF THE ALTERNATIVE IS PARTITION OF LEBANON AND MORE MASSACRES. SUMMARY ENDS.

2. THE LEBANESE MAY NOT FAVOUR ANY OF THE FORMULAE IN TUR (BEIRUT TELNO 747 OF 1983). THEY RECOGNISE ONLY TOO CLEARLY THAT A UN PRESENCE, UNLIKE THE MNF, WOULD HAVE NO TEETH. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF STATES CONTRIBUTING TO UNIFIL ON 6 JAN. CONTRARY TO THEIR EXPECTATION HE TOLD THEM THAT LEBANON DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) ENVISAGE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTH LEBANON. BUT HE APPEARS NOT TO HAVE RAISED OBJECTIONS TO MORE OBSERVERS.

3. ON DETAIL, THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR VOLUNTEERED TO ME THAT IF SWEDEN WAS ASKED TO MOVE THEIR CONTRIBUTION (A HOSPITAL) TO BEIRUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO DO SO. BUT THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT.

4. A UN FORCE IN BEIRUT WITH A MANDATE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE MNF - IE SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT - IS PROBABLY NOT ON, AS LONG AS THAT GOVERNMENT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA. THE IDEA OF SUGGESTING A UN PRESENCE IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IS ATTRACTIVE AS A DEVICE FOR INSERTING THE THIN END OF THE WEDGE PAST A SOVIET VETO. BUT IT WOULD GIVE THE UN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REFUGEES WITHOUT THE POWER TO PROTECT THEM. HOW WOULD OBSERVERS ON THEIR OWN COPE WITH, SAXGN A PHALANGIST STYLE "INCIDENT" IN THE CAMPS - A PROBABLE EVENTUALITY? IN ANY CASE THE ITALIANS MAY CLING TO THEIR ROLE IN THE CAMPS UNLESS OR UNTIL THEY CAN WITHDRAW ALTOGETHER (MY TELNOS 2 AND 4 AND ROME TELNO 6). THE LAF MAY THEMSELVES OPPOSE A UN FLAG: THEY ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OF THE CAMPS FOR HOUSING ARMS AND DISSIDENTS. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO INCIDENTS RECENTLY OF ROUGH LAF SEARCHES AND ARRESTS THERE.

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/5. PSP

5. PSP WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY AT PRESENT TO AGREE TO UN GUARDING OF CEASEFIRE TALKS (PARA 1A OF TUR). OTHER PARTICIPANTS TOO MIGHT HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT DEPENDABILITY OF UN GUARDS IN A CRISIS. I AGREE WITH YOUR COMMENT ON 3C (UN TO REPLACE MNF IN PASE 2 OF SECURITY PLAN BUT I DOUBT WHETHER TRIPOLI IS YET ON. AND WHAT ABOUT THE REFUGEES IN BAALBECK?) WHEN THE TIME COMES TO TALK TO THE LEBANESE THEY WILL NOT EASILY BE ABLE TO REJECT THE PRINCIPLE OF UN INVOLVEMENT WITH PHASE 2: WE COULD THEN PRESS THEM TO CONSIDER OTHER UN ROLES. BUT WE MAY SIMPLY HAVE TO DO WITHOUT LEBANESE AGREEMENT UNTIL WE HAVE GOT THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOFTENED UP.

6. MORE GENERALLY, I SUBMIT THAT IN PURSUING UN IDEAS WE SHOULD BE WARY OF UNDERESTIMATING THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THE MNF (WHICH A UN FORCE WOULD NOT HAVE) OR THE UPHEAVAL THAT PREMATURE MNF WITHDRAWAL COULD CAUSE. THE MNF IS TAKING CASUALTIES REGULARLY WITHOUT ANY SPECTACULAR ACHIEVEMENTS TO ITS CREDIT AND IT IS EASY TO BE SCORNFUL OF THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL TO THE CHRISTIAN SECTOR AND THE INCREASINGLY ELABORATE US DEFENCES AT THE AIRPORT. BUT THE ENEMIES OF STABILITY HERE KNOW THAT THE AMERICANS ARE, IN AN EMERGENCY, CAPABLE OF REINFORCING THE LAF WITH TANKS AND INFANTRY, TO SAY NOTHING OF THEIR AIR POWER AND CAPACITY FOR INTERVENTION WITH NAVAL GUNFIRE. THIS KNOWLEDGE MUST (MUST) HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT ON THOSE WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE READY TO SLOG IT OUT WITH THE ARMY IN THE STREETS. GEMAYEL'S INSISTENT ANXIETY TO KEEP THE MNF HERE SHOWS THAT HE AT LEAST HAS NO ILLUSIONS.

7. THE CONTINUING INFILTRATION OF ARMS AND DISSIDENTS INTO THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS POSES A VERY GRAVE THREAT TO LAW AND ORDER IF GEMAYEL'S PLANS FOR SECURITY AND GENEVA II BOG DOWN. INDEED MANY HERE ARE SCEPTICAL OF THESE PLANS AND BELIEVE THAT SECURITY MAY BREAK DOWN IN WEST BEIRUT SOON IN ANY CASE. MY CONTACT GROUP OF BRITISH NATIONALS TOLD ME IN DECEMBER THAT THE SITUATION WAS AS GLOOMY AS THEY HAD EVER KNOWN: THEIR CONSENSUS ON 3 JANUARY WAS THAT IT WAS EVEN WORSE. PALMER'S TELELETTER OF 9 JANUARY TO NENAD (WHICH I HAVE HAD REPEATED TO JEDDA, RIYADH AND DAMASCUS) DESCRIBES HOW A FUNDAMENTALIST TAKEOVER IN THE HEART OF THIS CITY IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

2.
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SENATOR

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8. SENATOR TOWER HAS JUST BEEN HERE ON A FACT-FINDING MISSION. HE TOLD COMMANDER BRITFOPLEB, WHO WAS INVITED SPECIALLY TO MEET HIM (SEPARATE REPORT TO MODUK) THAT HE NOW REALISED THAT THERE WAS MUCH MISINFORMATION IN THE US ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE MARINES HERE. MY US COLLEAGUE IS OPTIMISTIC THAT HE WILL INTERVENE HELPFULLY IN CONGRESS. PERHAPS THE ADMINISTRATION MAY YET CONVINCED CONGRESS, OR THE PRESIDENT MAY HIMSELF CONCLUDE, THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE WORSE THAN THOSE OF SOLDIERING ON. THE MOST RECENT US CASUALTY KFS HEADING NOT FOR THE AIRPORT BUT TO DILL SANDBAGS AT THE EMBASSY (WHICH THE AMERICANS CAN HARDLY WITHDRAW). LAST TIME THE AMERICANS WITHDREW THE MARINES, THEY GOT PART OF THE -BLAME FOR SABRA AND SHATILA. NEXT TIME THEY MAY FEAR THAT MORE AND WORSE MASSACRES, FLOWING FROM THE DISORDERLY PARTITION OF LEBANON, MAY BE AT STAKE.

MIERS

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FM PARIS 101800Z JAN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 10 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROME
INFO ROUTINE STOCKHOLM

TELECON FORD/CHAPLIN: PROPOSED MNF MEETING IN STOCKHOLM

1. PAVEC, HEAD OF NEAR EAST DEPARTMENT AT THE QUAI, TELEPHONED THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT CHEYSSON WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND AN MNF MEETING AT 6PM ON 16 JANUARY BECAUSE OF HIS BILATERAL WITH GROMYKO, AND COULD OFFER NO ALTERNATIVE TIME. PAVEC DID NOT SUGGEST, AS THE QUAI HAD TENTATIVELY SUGGESTED TO THE U S EMBASSY, THE SOMEONE SUCH AS THE FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR MIGHT STAND IN FOR CHEYSSON.

FRETWELL

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DESKBY 101600Z (FCO AND WASHINGTON)
FM RIYADH 101607Z JAN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 009 OF 10 JANUARY.
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATES VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: LEBANON

1. ON THE WAY IN FROM THE AIRPORT THIS AFTERNOON THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A PRELIMINARY PRIVATE WORD WITH PRINCE SAUD ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE HERE ON 3 JANUARY.
2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE PRESS REPORTS OF THIS MEETING HAD BEEN MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN WAS WARRANTED. THE MEETING HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN, SUBJECT TO ONE DETAIL WHICH REQUIRED FURTHER WORK IN THE SECURITY COMMITTEE. THE PLAN PROVIDED FOR SEPARATION OF THE VARIOUS MILITIAS AND THE STOCKPILING OF HEAVY WEAPONS AT PRESENT IN MILITIA HANDS.
3. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE SYRIAN POSITION HAD HARDENED, INCLUDING ON THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT. THEY APPEARED NOW TO BE SITTING BACK AND AWAITING EVENETS.
4. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT EVERYONE WAS AWARE OF THE INCREASING ANXIETY AMONG MNF CONTRIBUTORS. HE BELIEVED THAT MNF WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT HOWEVER BE A GOOD THING: IT WOULD MAKE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S POSITION MORE DIFFICULT.

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DESKBY 100930Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100010Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 36 OF 9 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, MODUK, CAIRO
PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE, JEDDA

MY TELNO 27: LEBANON

MS

1. IN THE COURSE OF HIS MEETING WITH MR WHITNEY THIS MORNING UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL URQUHART GAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON ON 6 JANUARY.
2. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE WITH SHULTZ THAT THERE SHOULD BE A NATURAL EVOLUTION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF, THE EXPANSION OF THE UN OBSERVER TEAM IN BEIRUT AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL TO THE NORTH OF THE ISRAELIS. ELEMENTS IN THIS EVOLUTION WOULD BE THE LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN, THE DEBATE IN ISRAEL ON WITHDRAWAL (WHICH HE HOPED WOULD TAKE THE IDF BACK TO THE LITANI) AND THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MNF COUNTRIES ON THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE IN LEBANON. A GOOD DEAL OF WORK ON THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE REQUIRED.
3. URQUHART SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD BEEN 'VERY LEVEL-HEADED' EXCEPT OVER THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT OF 17 MAY WITH WHICH HE SEEMED 'VERY STUCK', IN URQUHART'S VIEW TOTALLY UNREALISTICALLY. SHULTZ HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN COURTING A RUSSIAN VETO WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE THE FATE OF ANY INITIATIVE NOW (HE HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH WAS NEWS TO BOTH URQUHART AND MYSELF). IN ANSWER TO URQUHART'S QUESTION I SAID THAT IT WAS PROBABLY RIGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD VETO ANY INDIVIDUAL MOVE BUT THAT THIS COULD BE A DIFFERENT MATTER IF SUCH A MOVE WERE PRESENTED AS PART OF A PACKAGE.

THOMSON

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DESKBY 100500Z CAIRO

FROM WASHINGTON 100100Z JAN 84.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 9 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY),
PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE,
ROUTINE HELSINKI, SUVA, OSLO, DUBLIN, ACCRA, DUBAI, STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELNO 11. TO UKMIS NEW YORK: UN FORCES IN LEBANON.

1. WE DISCUSSED THE IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH PELLETREAU TODAY.

2. HE AGREED GENERALLY WITH YOUR COMMENTS ON THE VARIOUS OPTIONS. IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION (C) HE THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE NOW REGARDED POSSIBLE RE-DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF AS SEPARATE FROM PHASE 2 OF THEIR SECURITY PLAN.

3. IN PELLETREAU'S VIEW, THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE UN TO TAKE ON THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. A MAJOR ADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT THIS WOULD GIVE THEM A FOOHOLD THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING TRIPOLI AND BALBECK. IT WOULD BE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS THOUGH THE SYRIANS MIGHT OBJECT TO A UN PRESENCE IN THE BEKA'S. HE NOTED THAT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT PROVIDED THAT THE UN SHOULD PATROL IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN TYRE AND SIDON BUT NOT HAVE A PERMANENT PRESENCE THERE. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE FLEXIBLE OVER THIS: THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT THEY NOW HAD A SLIGHTLY HIGHER OPINION OF UNIFIL.

4. PELLETREAU SAID THAT HE HAD PUT THIS POSSIBILITY TO URQUHART ON 6 JANUARY. URQUHART HAD THOUGHT PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS A ROLE WHICH THE UN COULD PROPERLY PLAY. BUT UNIFIL WOULD NOT BE THE RIGHT FORCE SINCE TOO GREAT A CHANGE IN ITS MANDATE WOULD BE REQUIRED. A DIFFERENT UN FORCE WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE SET UP. URQUHART DID NOT THINK THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TRYING TO FIND A WAY ROUND SOVIET OBJECTIONS. THE INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE LEBANESE. PELLETREAU COMMENTED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION AMONG THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS WOULD BE VALUABLE BUT THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME TO PUT NEW IDEAS TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH EFFORTS TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN.

5. IT MAY BE WORTH ADDING THAT BURT (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPE) COMMENTED TO MINISTER TODAY THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE TO ANY GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE LEBANON. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY THEY WOULD WANT TO HELP THE US AND OTHER MNF GOVERNMENTS OFF THE HOOK. NOR COULD HE SEE ANY LIKELY VOLUNTEERS COMING FORWARD AS CONTRIBUTORS TO A UN FORCE OR UN OBSERVER TEAMS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

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6. BURT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING OFF HIS OWN SUBJECT BUT WHAT HE SAID WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDERLYING US VIEW THAT IT IS LIKELY TO BE MORE FRUITFUL TO TRY TO WORK ON THE SYRIANS RATHER THAN THE RUSSIANS. FROM BURT'S STANDPOINT THERE WAS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN TALKING TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND CUTTING THEM INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE OBJECT OF TALKING TO THEM WAS TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO INADVERTENT MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. BUT BURT SAW NO ADVANTAGE FOR THE US IN BRINGING THEM ANY MORE DIRECTLY INTO THE PROCESS.

WRIGHT

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 January 1984

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 9 January and has noted your account of where we now stand on the various Lebanon and MNF issues. The Prime Minister will look forward to a further report in the light of the Foreign Secretary's talks in Cairo, Riyadh and Damascus this week and I hope that you can arrange to let me have this before the end of the week.

BF

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

on Middle East Sit pt

"Foreign Sec's visit to

ME 13-1-84

A. J. COLEN

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A progress report. The Foreign Secretary will doubtless report to Cabinet on Thursday.

9 January 1983

A. & C. 7/1

Jew Thomson

MB

Lebanon

Thank you for your letter of 6 January with the text of the Prime Minister's message to the UN Secretary General. You might find it useful at this stage to have a brief round up of where we now stand on the various Lebanon and MNF issues. We shall of course be reporting further in the light of Sir Geoffrey Howe's talks in Cairo, Riyadh and Damascus this week.

We have given further thought to possible forms of more extensive UN involvement in Lebanon. Some options are set out in the enclosed telegram to UKMIS New York. We have asked Sir J Thomson to discuss these informally with the UN Secretariat and to let us have his comments. Mr Brian Urquhart (UN Secretariat) is due to discuss the same subject with the US State Department next week. UKMIS New York were in touch with Urquhart on this on 5 January.

You will have seen from FCO telegram No 4 to UKMIS New York (copy enclosed) that we do not favour a separate initiative by European MNF contributors at this stage, as this might cut across our efforts to bring the Americans along at a time when there is a fair degree of consensus among the four MNF contributors in favour of greater UN involvement in Lebanon. We have sounded out the Italians on their idea of a UN presence in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, as a first step towards greater UN involvement in the Beirut area, and the French on whether they would be prepared to help with a concerted approach to the parties concerned.

The UN aspects were also discussed again in a further meeting which Sir J Leahy held with MNF representatives here on 6 January. The French representative confirmed that his government favoured the idea of a UN presence in Palestinian refugee camps despite the risk of a Soviet veto. The Americans have suggested that MNF Foreign Ministers discuss UN aspects at the meeting which we hope to arrange in the margins of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm on 16 January. In preparation for this, we shall

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/circulate

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



circulate some notes on the various possibilities when we brief MNF representatives on Arab, especially Syrian, reactions after Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to the Middle East this week. By then we may be in a position to agree the next steps: an approach to the Lebanese Government, who will have to make a formal proposal for wider UN involvement; and our best tactics in overcoming likely Soviet and Syrian opposition (we shall, for example, try to spot discrepancies between their attitudes).

It is clear from the discussions with MNF representatives here and from reports from capitals that public anxiety remains high in other MNF contributing countries about the risks to their contingents in Beirut. Domestic criticism in the United States has risen sharply following publication of the Congressional and Pentagon reports on the 23 October bomb attacks. Mr Mondale is trying to exploit this, with his call for the withdrawal of the US marines within 45 days. Republican concern has prompted Senator John Tower, Republican Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee to set off on a tour of the Middle East. The US Administration's aim is to secure some progress in Lebanon before Congress re-assembles on 23 January.

It is not surprising, therefore, that none of the other MNF contributors is enthusiastic to redeploy its contingent in accordance with President Gemayel's recent request, details of which you will have seen in the telegrams from Beirut. The immediate steps which the Lebanese are seeking are that the Italians should take over from the French in some parts of West Beirut while the Lebanese Army try to seal West Beirut off from the Southern suburbs. The Lebanese are also trying to persuade the Americans to help prevent infiltration into the Southern suburbs from the Shouf. President Gemayel has also requested deployment of the three other MNF contingents outside Beirut at a later stage. But it is clear that for the moment these "second phase" proposals are cosmetic, and that no early decisions by MNF contributors are required.

The British contingent is not directly affected by either set of proposals. But we may be faced before long with a request that a sub-committee of the Cease fire Committee should meet at the Haddath HQ on a 24-hour basis. We shall consult you again if and when we receive a request.

Meanwhile there is much activity in Beirut aimed at the next step towards national reconciliation. A lot will depend on the meeting of Lebanese, Saudi and Syrian Foreign Ministers in Riyadh on 8 January. The status of the 17 May Israel/Lebanon agreement is still a problem but latest reports from the Americans suggest that this meeting could conceivably

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agree to leave the agreement on one side, to allow the second round of reconciliation talks to take place, which might in turn lead to the formation of a government of national unity. But the Lebanese have been consistently over-optimistic in the past.

We are urgently considering the implication for British participation of the possible establishment of a UN force and will be writing to you shortly in the light of further advice from UKMis New York.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

For [unclear]
(R B Bone) *[Signature]*
Private Secretary

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 430

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FM FCO 051500Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 004 OF 5 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, MODUK

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, CAIRO, THE HAGUE

FCO TELNO 14 TO WASHINGTON: LEBANON

1. WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT PURSUING A SEPARATE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE ALSO TRYING TO IMPROVE MNF CONSULTATIONS. I SHARE SIR O WRIGHT'S VIEW (WASHINGTON TELNO 19) THAT WE SHOULD INVOLVE THE AMERICANS FULLY AT EVERY STAGE. THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME, BUT NOT WISH TO BE TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH, AN INITIATIVE AIMED AT EXPLORING THE UN OPTIONS FURTHER. BUT WE DO NOT WISH TO CUT ACROSS RUMSFELD'S ACTIVITIES AND FULLY REALISE THE DANGERS OF GIVING THE RUSSIANS AND SYRIANS A VETO BY APPEARING TOO ANXIOUS TO GET OUT. NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS FOR ISRAEL/SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS A PART OF THE PACKAGE WHICH CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY AMERICAN MUSCLE.

2. OUR PRIORITY THROUGHOUT IS TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO AN EXTENDED ROLE FOR UN FORCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE MNF TO WITHDRAW WITH HONOUR. WE ARE THEREFORE ATTRACTED BY THE IDEA FLOATED BY VATTANI ON 4 JANUARY THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS TO OBJECT TO A UN FLAG OVER THE SABRA AND CHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS. SUCH A FIRST STEP COULD BE THE THIN END OF THE WEDGE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ROME COULD TAKE SOUNDINGS AS TO WHETHER THE ITALIANS HAVE SERIOUSLY STUDIED THIS POSSIBILITY. WE SHOULD ALSO WELCOME COMMENTS FROM UKMIS NEW YORK. IN PARTICULAR DOES THE RECENT AGREEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ALLOW THE VESSELS USED TO EVACUATE THE PLO FROM TRIPOLI TO FLY THE UN FLAG CREATE A USEFUL PRECEDENT? WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO OUTFLANK SOVIET OBJECTIONS BY WORKING FOR A PRESIDENCY STATEMENT

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WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION?

3. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE FRENCH SOUNDING OUT THE PARTIES ON SECURING GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF UN FORCES. WE SHALL WISH TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE MODALITIES IN THE LIGHT OF COMMENTS FROM OUR MNF PARTNERS TOMORROW. WE SHALL ALSO NEED TO STUDY IN MORE DETAIL, AS SIR J THOMSON SUGGESTS, THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF LEBANON. THE DEPARTMENT HAVE WORK IN HAND. PARIS SHOULD SOUND OUT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TO THE IDEA OF A CONCERTED APPROACH TO THE PARTIES.

4. WASHINGTON SHOULD TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT I WOULD GREATLY VALUE BEFORE SETTING OFF FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AN ACCOUNT OF RUMSFELD'S LATEST VISIT TO BEIRUT. I HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS CAN ARRANGE FOR ME TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN THE COURSE OF MY TOUR.

HOWE

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
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FM PARIS 071045Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ROME, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS,
MODUK, MOSCOW.

YOUR TELNO 4 TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND TELECON MACRAE/NIXON:
LEBANON

1. ON 6 JANUARY, HEAD OF CHANCERY SOUNDED OUT LUCET, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE QUAI, ON THE IDEA OF A CONCERTED APPROACH TO THE PARTIES AS A WAY OF SECURING GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF UN FORCES. LUCET NOTED THAT ALL THE MNF COUNTRIES NOW SEEMED TO SHARE THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURING GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT, ADDING THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN GLAD TO SEE THAT THE UK HAD NOW SO PUBLICLY NAILED ITS COLOURS TO THIS MAST. HE AVOIDED, HOWEVER, GIVING A DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE IDEA OF A CONCERTED APPROACH TO THE PARTIES, DIVERTING THE CONVERSATION INTO A MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE LEBANESE AND ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEMS.

2. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE TO GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SPEAK TO THEM AT A HIGHER LEVEL. LUCET SEEMED TO HINT THAT CHEYSSON MIGHT TACKLE GROMYKO ON THIS SUBJECT IN STOCKHOLM. THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO SEE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES, SUCH AS REMOVING THE AMERICANS FROM LEBANON, WHICH THEY HAD ALWAYS SAID THEY WANTED, AND ALSO POSSIBLY OBTAINING INVOLVEMENT FOR THEMSELVES IN THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. IN THIS LATTER CONNECTION, LUCET THOUGHT THE LEBANESE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE WIDER ARAB/ISRAEL CONTEXT. HE SEEMED RELUCTANT TO EXPAND ON THIS STATEMENT BUT DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE KIND OF APPROACH TO WHICH HE HAD REFERRED. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT CONSIDERABLE PREPARATORY WORK WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE THE FRENCH FELT READY TO PLAY THAT CARD.

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/3. BOUTROS

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3. BOUTROS GHALI CALLED ON BOTH MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON YESTERDAY. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE DELIVERED A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK BUT NO INFORMATION IS YET AVAILABLE ABOUT ITS CONTENTS.

4. LUCET HAD NO OTHER NEW ELEMENTS TO OFFER WHICH MIGHT BE OF INTEREST IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATES FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE AREA. HE REMARKED THAT THE FRENCH WERE VERY MUCH GROPING THEIR WAY FORWARD FOR THE NEXT STEP OVER LEBANON, WHICH WAS FAR FROM OBVIOUS.

FRETWELL

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

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SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO WASHINGTON

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,

DAMASCUS, CAIRO, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE

ROUTINE HELSINKI, SUVA, OSLO, DUBLIN, ACCRA, DUBAI, STOCKHOLM

OUR TEL NO.4 (NOT TO ALL): UN FORCES IN LEBANON

1. AN URGENT STUDY HAS THROWN UP THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES FOR WIDER UN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON:

(A) BEIRUT AREA. COMPLETE REPLACEMENT OF MNF BY A UN FORCE (WITH A SIMILAR MANDATE QUOTE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND LAF IN THE BEIRUT AREA UNQUOTE) WOULD BE THE IDEAL ANSWER. BUT WE REALISE THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING AGREEMENT TO THIS IN ONE FELL SWOOP. IT MIGHT BE TACTICALLY SENSIBLE THEREFORE TO LEAD UP TO IT BY STARTING WITH SOMETHING LIKE THE ITALIAN IDEA FOR PUTTING A UN PRESENCE INTO THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS OF SABRA AND SHATILA, AND BOURJ AL BARAJNEH. ADDITIONAL TASKS MIGHT BE SUPERVISING THE CEASEFIRE TALKS (AN EMINENTLY NEUTRAL ROLE) AND A PRESENCE AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (TO BE DECLARED NEUTRAL GROUND IN THE NEW LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN, ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS):

(B) DEPLOYMENT OF UN OBSERVERS IN THE SHOUF, AS DISCUSSED IN THE WAKE OF THE 25 SEPTEMBER 1983 CEASEFIRE:

(C) UN FORCES TO PLAY ROLE ENVISAGED FOR MNF IN PHASE 2 OF LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN IE DEPLOYMENT ON COAST ROADS NORTH AND SOUTH OF BEIRUT AND ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD. POSSIBLY EXTENDED TO PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN TRIPOLI:

(D) UN SUPERVISION OF DISENGAGEMENT OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. COULD TAKE THE FORM OF OBSERVERS OR PREFERABLY A CONVENTIONAL FORCE WHICH MOVED INTO AREAS SUCCESSIVELY EVACUATED IN STAGES BY ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES:

(E) SOUTHERN LEBANON. SECURITY COUNCIL WILL PRESUMABLY NOT

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AGREE TO UNIFIL'S MANDATE BEING ENDED COMPLETELY IN FAVOUR OF OTHER UN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON, AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MAY WANT RESIDUAL UN PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH, THOUGH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE BULK OF UNIFIL MOVED FURTHER NORTH TO TAKE UP MORE USEFUL DUTIES IF (A BIG IF) TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WERE TO AGREE. POSSIBLE TASKS: CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POPULATION, PRESENCE IN TYRE AND SIDON PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS, UNTSO OBSERVERS TO REMAIN ON ISRAEL/LEBANON BORDER.

2. COMMENT. OPTION A IS OBVIOUSLY OF MOST IMMEDIATE INTEREST, GIVEN OUR PRIORITY OF PROMOTING DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES TO ALLOW HONOURABLE EXIT BY MNF. OPTION B COULD ALSO HELP IN THIS RESPECT BUT WE ARE NO LONGER VERY CONVINCED THAT PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO ENFORCEMENT OF CEASEFIRE IN THE SHOUP AND SYRIAN/SOVIET OBJECTIONS WOULD NO DOUBT STILL BE STRONG. OPTION (C) WOULD NEED FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM LEBANESE WHO SEEM TO HAVE NO VERY FIRM IDEAS. IT COULD BE SUGGESTED TO LEBANESE AS WAY OF RESISTING EXTENSION OF MNF DEPLOYMENT.

OPTION D COULD PROBABLY BE SOLD TO ISRAELIS (TEL AVIV TEL NO.351) BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE FRAMED TO TAKE CARE OF SYRIAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT NOT PUTTING THEIR FORCES ON SAME BASIS AS THOSE OF ISRAEL, AND LEBANESE FEARS OF PARTITION (BEIRUT TEL NO.747). ON OPTION (E) WE NOTE LIKELY ISRAELI OBJECTIONS (TEL AVIV TEL NO.351) BUT SHARE YOUR VIEW (YOUR TEL NO.3, PARA 7) THAT SOME FORM OF CONTINUING UN ROLE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON MAY BE NECESSARY FOR ANY PACKAGE. IF, AS PART OF THE PACKAGE THE LEBANESE ARMY, INCORPORATING LOCAL MILITIAS, HAD MOVED INTO THE SOUTH WITH THE MAIN TASK OF PREVENTING SOUTHWARD INFILTRATION, ISRAELI OBJECTIONS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE LESS.

3. THERE ARE MANY POSSIBLE VARIATIONS. ONE COMMON THEME TO OPTIONS A, C AND E IS PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. THIS MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR EG A NEW RESOLUTION WHICH REFERRE BACK TO SCR 521 (AUTHORISING THE INCREASE IN UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT AFTER THE MASSACRES): AND THE ORIGINAL ROLE OF THE MNF (ALSO PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS):' AND AUTHORISED A UN PRESENCE WHEREVER REQUIRED TO ASSIST IN THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS, IN-

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CLUDING PALESTINIANS (USING SOME OF THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN YOUR TEL NO.1469 OF 30 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL)? EVEN ON SUCH A BASIS HOWEVER THE DRAFTING OF A UN FORCE'S MANDATE AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD NOT BE STRAIGHTFORWARD.

4. YOUR COMMENTS AND THOSE OF OTHER ADDRESSEES WOULD BE WELCOM (REPEATED TO CAIRO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY). BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOW DISCUSS THESE INFORMALLY WITH URQUHART AND REPORT HIS REACTIONS.

5. WE ARE REPEATING RECENT RELEVANT TELEGRAMS TO POSTS IN THOSE UNIFIL CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WHO HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT (NOT) SEEK VIEWS FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THIS STAGE. BUT COMMENTS ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY OF THE ABOVE OPTIONS FOR WIDER UN ACTIVITY WOULD B WELCOME.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

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MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/REID MR WELBORN
ED/ED MR CHAMBERLAIN
ED/USD MR PERRY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 28 OF 6 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, MODUL, PRIORITY MOSCOW, CAIRO, THE HAGUE
MIPT : LEBANON

1. THIS EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (SUPPLEMENTED BY A TALK WITH URQUHART) UNDERLINES AGAIN THE INABILITY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN EXTENDED ROLE FOR UN FORCES ALLOWING THE MNF TO WITHDRAW WITH HONOUR. HE IS OF COURSE HIGHLY SYMPATHETIC TO THIS GOAL AND WOULD LIKE TO FORWARD IT IF HE CAN. BUT WITHOUT A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUEST AND SECURITY COUNCIL COVER HE CANNOT ACT. HE BELIEVES THAT EVENTUALLY A UN FORCE WILL TAKE OVER FROM THE MNF THOUGH PROBABLY IN AN EXPANDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. BUT HE THINKS THAT THIS WILL BE A RESULT OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS PULLING OUT WILLY-NILLY UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURES.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CLEARLY DOES NOT THINK THAT THE ITALIAN

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CLEARLY DOES NOT THINK THAT THE ITALIAN IDEA ABOUT FLYING A UN FLAG OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS IF THAT MEANS MORE THAN WHAT IS HAPPENING AT PRESENT WOULD BE EASY TO SQUARE WITH LEGALITIES. MOREOVER HE HAS NO CONFIDENCE, THAT IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS NATURALLY KEEN TO PURSUE THE PROSPECT WHICH HE NOW SEES AS BEING ON THE VERGE OF ACTUALITY THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL CONDUCT A FURTHER UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. AFTER THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST ONE HE HOPES THAT ALL CONCERNED WILL AGREE THAT UNIFIL SHOULD PLAY A ROLE IN MONITORING THE WITHDRAWAL AND IN SECURING THE AREA VACATED. HE HAS ONLY A RATHER VAGUE HOPE THAT THIS WILL IN SOME WAY DISPOSE THE INTERESTED PARTIES PARTICULARLY THE SYRIANS AND SOVIETS TO THINK BETTER OF UN ACTIVITY ELSEWHERE IN THE LEBANON INCLUDING THE BEIRUT AREA.

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS TRYING TO WORK ON THE AMERICANS TO DO A DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS. IF AS URQUHART EXPECTS THIS FAILS HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE A FALL-BACK POSITION. HE WAS HOWEVER DISTINCTLY PLEASED AT THE THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD BE SPEAKING NEXT WEEK IN DAMASCUS. CLEARLY HE HOPES THAT YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT A NEW UN ROLE IN THE LEBANON. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS OBVIOUSLY GRATIFIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND WAS CLEARLY READY TO CONSULT CLOSELY AND TO LISTEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE. THAT IS GOOD. BUT I DO NOT THINK WE CAN COUNT UPON HIM TO LAUNCH AN EFFECTIVE NEW INITIATIVE.

5. URQUHART SAID HE WISHED TO DISCUSS THE POSITION WITH ME AGAIN ON MONDAY. I MAY BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE SOMETHING THERAFTER.

THOMSON

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BUT HE THINKS THAT THIS WILL BE

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PS (6)
PS/ME WUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/REYAD
ED/ED
ED/ED

MR WRIGHT
MR COOPER
MR ADAMS

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 53 OF 6 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, MOSCOW, CAIRO
PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE, JERUSALEM AND URMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 4 TO URMIS NEW YORK & LEBANON

1. PELLETREAU TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT RUMSFELD HAS BEEN CONCENTRATING ON TRYING TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT ON THE LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN. HE HAS SEEN GENAYEL AND HARIRI AND VISITED ISRAEL BRIEFLY TODAY. THE ISRAELIS HAVE AGREED TO URGE JUNBLATT TO WITHDRAW HIS LATEST OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN. PELLETREAU THOUGHT THAT RUMSFELD MIGHT GO TO SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE THE TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 8 JANUARY AND VISIT SYRIA EARLY NEXT WEEK. BUT HIS TRAVEL PLANS WERE NOT YET FIRM.

2. PELLETREAU SAID THAT MWF REDEPLOYMENT DID NOT FORM PART OF THE GENERAL SECURITY PLAN NOW BEING NEGOTIATED BUT REPRESENTED LEBANESE IDEAS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED ONCE THE SECURITY PLAN WERE PUT INTO EFFECT. FOR THE MOMENT THEY WERE ON THE BACK-BURNER. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER JUNBLATT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE SECURITY PLAN (BEIRUT TELNO 6) WERE INSPIRED BY THE SYRIANS OR MADE ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. THEY WERE RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUES. PELLETREAU HOPED THAT JUNBLATT COULD BE BROUGHT BACK INTO LINE IN TIME FOR AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE ON 9 JANUARY. THERE WAS AS YET NO RELIABLE INDICATION OF THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN RIYAD WOULD BE CRUCIAL.

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3. PELLETREAU SAID THAT DETAILED TIMINGS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY PLAN HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. ON THE FIRST DAY THE LAF WOULD DEPLOY ALONG THE COAST FROM THE AWALI RIVER TO THE MAJFOUH RIVER TAKING OVER AN LF CHECKPOINT THERE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY THE ISF WOULD TAKE UP POSITIONS IN THE VILLAGES IN THE KHARROUB. ON THE THIRD DAY THE LF AND PSP MILITIAS WOULD WITHDRAW. THE ISF WOULD DEPLOY TO THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF BEIRUT A WEEK LATER. PELLETREAU CONFIRMED THAT BERRI AND SHAMSEDDINE HAD AGREED TO ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS.

4. PELLETREAU SAID THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO BRIEF URDUHART ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON. HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, PELLETREAU SAID SOME ATTRACTION IN POSSIBLE USE OF THE UN FLAG IN BEIRUT PROVIDED THAT THIS WERE REQUESTED BY THE LEBANESE RATHER THAN THE MAF CONTRIBUTORS. HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE CURRENTLY 50 UNTSO OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT WITH NOT MUCH TO DO.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM TOLD MR WHITNEY TODAY THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME INTEREST IN REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES THIS WAS NOT PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND FOR THE TIME BEING THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE. IN DAM'S VIEW THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS AT PRESENT WERE MANAGEABLE; CONGRESS WOULD NOT FORCE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES.

WRIGHT

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

PS (U)
PS/NE LUCE
PS/FUS
SIP J LEAHY
MR MERTON
SIP J BULLARD
ED/NEAD MR. MORRISON
ED/ED MR. CONNOR
ED/USD MR. ADAMS

GO TO DOWNING STREET

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 27 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW CAIRO THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELS NOS 4 AND 7: LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND REMAINS SYMPATHETIC TO THE AIM OF AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. HE HOPES THAT UNIFIL MIGHT BE DEPLOYED TO OVERSEE A FURTHER ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THIS COULD HELP TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, BUT HE CANNOT ACT UNTIL THE PARTIES CONCERNED INCLUDING THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS, AGREE. SEE ALSO COMMENT IN WIFT.

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR NEARLY AN HOUR THIS MORNING (5 JANUARY). LIU (ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS), WAS PRESENT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR READ THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THROUGH CAREFULLY AND GAVE WARM THANKS FOR IT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS VERY INTERESTED IN CONSIDERING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO ACHIEVE AN EXPANDED UN ROLE IN LEBANON. BUT IN ORDER FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO ACT IT WAS NECESSARY TO MEET THE FOUR CONDITIONS TO WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED (PARA 2 OF NY TEL 40 3). THE KEY WAS TO OBTAIN SOME UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS. HE WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE THE U.S. OF THIS. JURQUHART LEFT THIS MORNING FOR WASHINGTON TO

... ..

SEE SHULTZ. HE STRESSED TO ME WHEN I SAW HIM BRIEFLY BEFORE HE LEFT THAT HE TOO PERSONALLY REGARDED BRINGING THE RUSSIANS IN AS ESSENTIAL THOUGH HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD AGREE NOW OR INDEED PROBABLY EVERY. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS UNDER SUCH PRESSURE THAT HE WILL HAVE TO DO SO EVENTUALLY).

3. LIU NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN THREE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE CHRISTMAS. FIRSTLY, THERE WAS GENAYEL'S SECURITY PLAN, SECONDLY THERE WAS AN APPARENT CHANGE IN ISRAELI THINKING IN FAVOUR OF A FURTHER UNILATERAL PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, AS WELL AS A MORE FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS UNIFIL (RABIN FOR EXAMPLE HAD SPOKEN POSITIVELY OF THE FORCE'S ACHIEVEMENT). THIRDLY, THERE WAS INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT REAGAN TO WITHDRAW THE MARINES.

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HOPED THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TOWARDS AN EXPANDED UN ROLE IN TWO AREAS - DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL IN CONNECTION WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SOUTH, AND AN EXPANSION OF THE UN PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THE FIRST OF THESE WOULD BE LINKED TO THE ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL MENTIONED ABOVE AND OVERSEE IT USING UNIFIL'S EXISTING MANDATE WHICH WAS TO FACILITATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST SUCH A DEPLOYMENT AND FOR THE AREA OF OPERATION TO BE AGREED WITH THE PARTIES. HE THOUGH THE SYRIANS WOULD SUPPORT THIS. EXPANSION OF THE UN ROLE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, PROBABLY FOLLOWING THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH, WOULD BE EITHER THROUGH THE USE OF UN FORCES OR OBSERVERS. OBSERVERS WOULD BE EASIER. DEPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL COULD ENCOURAGE ACCEPTANCE OF AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, PARTICULARLY IF THE DRUZE THOUGHT THAT SUCH A PRESENCE WOULD PREVENT ATTACKS ON THEIR POSITIONS. THE COMPOSITION OF THE UN CONTINGENTS IN BOTH CASES WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED. THE NEPALESE WERE READY TO RETURN. SOME OF THE BOSNIES COULD ALSO HELP.

5. I QUESTIONED WHETHER DEPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, DESIRABLE THOUGH IT MIGHT BE, WOULD REALLY LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT ON AN EXPANDED UN DEPLOYMENT IN THE BEIRUT AREA. NEITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOR LIU WERE ABLE TO GIVE CONVINCING REASONS WHY THE ONE SHOULD LEAD TO ANOTHER. THEY MERELY SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST OPERATION WOULD ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE LEBANON.

6. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO THE IDEAS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND ASKED HOW WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PROMOTING AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. I ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF HE COULD SEE A WAY IN WHICH UN FORCES MIGHT SOON TAKE OVER FROM THE MNF. HE COULD NOT, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD SEEN THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY WHO CONTINUED TO EXPRESS SYRIAN RESERVATIONS. HE HAD POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT ONLY THE UN COULD PROVIDE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE MNF. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOWEVER
~~UN ACCORDING TO GENAYEL HAD BEEN REPRESENTING CURRENT SYRIAN VIEW~~

YOU ACCURATELY FAYTAL HAD BEEN REPRESENTING CURRENT SYRIAN VIEWS. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT YOU WOULD BE GOING TO DAMASCUS NEXT WEEK, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR OBTAINING AN AUTHORITATIVE VIEW OF THE SYRIAN POSITION AND FOR EXERCISING PERSUASION.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALSO EXPRESSED SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REALLY WANTED. HE REITERATED THAT HE WOULD NEED A SPECIFIC REQUEST FROM THEM BEFORE HE COULD TAKE ANY ACTION. HE THOUGHT THAT AT PRESENT THEY PREFERRED THE MWF TO A UN PRESENCE. HOWEVER, THE DAY WOULD COME WHEN THE MWF WITHDREW AND THEY HAD NO OPTION BUT TO PLAY THE UN CARD.

8. I ASKED ABOUT FLYING A UN FLAG OVER SABRA AND CHATILA. LIU NOTED THAT A MAIN TASK OF THE 50 UN OBSERVERS IN SEIRUT WAS TO CHECK ON THE SITUATION IN THOSE CAMPS. IN ADDITION, UNRWA HAD FACILITIES THERE AND IT WAS POSSIBLE (THOUGH HE WOULD NEED TO CHECK THIS) THAT THE UN FLAG ALREADY FLEW OVER THESE FACILITIES. BUT THE UN FLAG ALONE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO PROTECT THE CAMPS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE SYMBOLICAL VALUE OF FLYING A FLAG SINCE HE COULD NOT SEE THAT IT COULD BE ANY KIND OF SHIELD AND THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES BOTH IN RELATION TO A PRECEDENT BEING SET AND MORE IMPORTANTLY IN REGARD TO LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. I SHARE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DOUBTS. THERE IS NO REAL ANALOGY BETWEEN FLYING THE UN FLAG ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG - ON SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND FLYING THE UN FLAG OVER THE SABRA AND CHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS. THE CAMPS ARE PART OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND, IN THEORY AT LEAST, ARE SUBJECT TO LEBANESE JURISDICTION AND CONTROL IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER PARTS OF ITS TERRITORY. EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE UN FLAG COULD BE FLOWN OVER A UN PRESENCE IN THE CAMPS, TO FLY THE FLAG OVER THE CAMPS THEMSELVES WOULD NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT THEY HAD PASSED TO UN ADMINISTRATION).

9. SUMMING UP HIS RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, PERZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE REMAINED READY BEHIND THE DOOR. THE SECRETARIAT HAD CONTINGENCY MEASURES READY FOR AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. BUT BEFORE HE COULD HELP WORK WAS NEEDED WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. HE HOPED YOUR VISIT TO DAMASCUS WOULD PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SYRIAN POSITION AND PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT.

10. SEE COMMENT IN WIFT.

THOMSON

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OO WASHINGTON

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 7 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW CAIRO THE HAGUE

YOUR TELNOS 3 AND 4: LEBANON

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO UN.
SECRETARY GENERAL:

BEGINS 'SIR JOHN THOMSON EXPRESSED TO YOU BEFORE CHRISTMAS, ON INSTRUCTIONS, BRITISH INTEREST IN THE REMARKS WHICH YOU MADE AT YOUR END OF YEAR PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES BEING PERHAPS THE BEST WAY OF PRESERVING PEACE IN THE LEBANON. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS, AS YOU KNOW, BOTH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR OUR WISH TO SEE A GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY THE UN IN PEACE KEEPING IN THAT TRAGIC COUNTRY. MY SUPPORT FOR THIS HAS NOT ALTERED SINCE WE HAD OUR USEFUL DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT LAST SEPTEMBER. I AM THEREFORE MUCH ENCOURAGED BY YOUR OWN CONTINUING ADVOCACY OF SUCH A COURSE. CLEARLY EVERY EFFORT HAS TO BE MADE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO WHAT IS A COMPLEX AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND WE SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM ATTEMPTING THIS BY POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS FROM SOME OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL WORK ACTIVELY IN CO-OPERATION WITH OTHERS CONCERNED TO PROMOTE MORE EXTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING IN THE LEBANON. WE ARE CONSULTING OUR PARTNERS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND WILL WANT TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITIES, AND TO OFFER OUR ASSISTANCE WHERE THIS MAY BE HELPFUL TO YOU. ENDS.

Howe

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICESIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CONFIDENTIAL

A.S.C. $\frac{6}{1}$
f.a.

Box



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 7114 - (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MS

5th January 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

I would like you to know how much we in the Army appreciate you finding the time to meet

Colonel Gordon Fergusson on his return from Beirut.

It will have meant a very great deal to him and his

Regiment. He has certainly done a first class job

for us out there.

I hope it won't be too long before you manage

to visit them there yourself. It is not until you see

the extraordinary set up there that the whole
picture becomes alive.

With all good wishes for 1984

Yours sincerely

John Stenius.

~~6 JAN 1984~~

Please to reply this time!

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IMMEDIATE

PS/MR WICE

PS/FUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SPERTON

SIR J BULLARD

ED/ASAD

ED/ED

ED/UND

MR WRIGHT
MR WATKINS

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FM WASHINGTON 060020Z JANUARY, 1984

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 5 JANUARY, 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, NODUK ROUTINE MOSCOW, CAIRO, THE HAGUE, JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO 4 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: LEBANON

1. I CALLED ON ADMIRAL POINDEXTER, MCFARLANE'S DEPUTY, TODAY TO EXPLORE WHITE HOUSE THINKING ON THE WAY AHEAD IN LEBANON BEFORE YOU SET OUT FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. POINDEXTER SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW YESTERDAY HAD BEEN RIGHT ON THE MARK. ALTHOUGH SOME PARTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT WERE RECOMMENDING CHANGES OF POLICY, PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS DETERMINED NOT TO CUT AND RUN. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS AND MAKE ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE THE MNF COULD BE WITHDRAWN. OTHERWISE WE SHOULD BE YIELDING TO TERRORISM WHICH COULD EXPOSE US TO FURTHER ATTACKS WORLDWIDE.

3. POINDEXTER SAID THAT RECENT CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS HAD BEEN SHOOTING FROM THE HIP: THEY HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. MCFARLANE HAD SUCCEEDED YESTERDAY IN BRINGING A GROUP OF REPUBLICAN MEMBERS TO SEE THINGS THE ADMINISTRATION'S WAY. SENATOR PERCY (MY TELNO 23) HAD TOLD SHULTZ TODAY THAT HE HAD BEEN MISQUOTED. THE ADMINISTRATION'S GOAL WAS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS BEFORE CONGRESS REASSEMBLED ON 23 JANUARY. RUMSFELD PLANNED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON 22 JANUARY.

4. RUMSFELD WOULD GO TO SYRIA WHEN ASAD WAS PREPARED TO SEE HIM. JACKSON HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT ASAD SEEMED TO BE RECUPERATING

~~JACKSON HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT ASAD SEEMED TO BE RECUPERATING~~
AND THAT IN HIS OPINION ASAD VERY MUCH WANTED BETTER RELATIONS
WITH THE US. POINDEXTER THOUGHT THAT ASAD NEEDED THE US AS A LEVER
FOR USE WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE WAS CURRENTLY IN A DIFFICULT POSITION.
THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS WERE STANDING UP TO HIM: THE PLO HAD ESCAPED
FROM TRIPOLI: THE ARAFAT/MUDARAK MEETING AND KING HUSSEIN'S RECALL
OF PARLIAMENT THREATENED TO LEAVE HIM ISOLATED: THE RUSSIANS WERE
NOT GIVING HIM FULL SUPPORT OVER LEBANON AND SYRIA FACED DIFFICULT
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. HE WAS THEREFORE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE TIME MIGHT
BE RIGHT FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH ASAD.

5. POINDEXTER WAS ALSO QUOTE QUIETLY OPTIMISTIC UNQUOTE THAT
AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED
BY GEMAYEL (THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT SIMILAR AMERICAN HOIES HAD
BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THE PAST). RUMSFELD WAS HAVING AS MUCH
DIFFICULTY WITH GEMAYEL AS WITH ASAD OVER THIS. WHEN I SUGGESTED
THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE A DIVERSION FROM GEMAYEL'S PRIMARY
TASK OF SECURING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, KEMP (NSC STAFF) SAID
THAT THE TWO WENT HAND IN HAND. IT WAS NECESSARY TO AGREE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS TO CREATE THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE FOR RESUMING THE GENEVA
TALKS. IT WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST TO ESCALATE THE FIGHTING.
THERE HAD BEEN TWO ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS. FIRST, SINCE SHAMIR'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN MOVING IN THE DIRECTION
OF FURTHER UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL IN COORDINATION WITH THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT AND THE SHIA LEADERSHIP, COMBINED WITH RESUMED ATTACKS
ON RADICAL AND TERRORIST ELEMENTS. FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO AN EXTENSION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT AND SEND A SIGNAL TO THE SYRIANS THAT IT WAS THEIR TURN
TO MAKE A MOVE. SECONDLY, THE SITUATION IN THE ARAB WORLD WAS MORE
FAVOURABLE. THE SPLIT IN THE PLO HAD ENABLED ARAB MODERATES TO
BREAK WITH CONSENSUS POLICIES, AND HAD LEFT THE SYRIANS INCREASINGLY
ISOLATED. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER RUMSFELD COULD WORK OUT
ANYTHING WITH ASAD. BUT HE HAD A NARROW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO
DO SO. NOW WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE TIME TO PULL THE RUG OUT FROM UNDER
HIM BY SETTING DATES FOR WITHDRAWING THE MNF.

6. ON POSSIBLE UN INVOLVEMENT, KEMP SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK
THOUGHT THIS A SERIOUS OPTION. SHE SAW THE KEY AS HOW TO PREVENT
A SOVIET VETO. IF THE RUSSIANS FELT THAT EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S
MANDATE WOULD LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF, THEY MIGHT ACQUIESCE

BUT IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE TO REMOVE OUR TRUMP CARD - THE
MNF - NOW. POINDEXTER ADDED THAT URQUHART WOULD BE COMING TO
WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

7. POINDEXTER EMPHASISED, IN CONCLUSION, THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS
RESOLUTE OVER LEBANON. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE TOO HAD NO INTENTION
OF WITHDRAWING ON OUR OWN, OR UNTIL VIABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
COULD BE MADE.

COMMENT

8. POINDEXTER'S QUALIFIED OPTIMISM MAY BE MISPLACED. THE US
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN PARTICULAR ARE SCEPTICAL OF GEMAYEL'S
READINESS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO REACH
AGREEMENT WITH HIS OPPONENTS. BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE IS RIGHT



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 January 1984

Lebanon: Message from the Prime Minister to the UN Secretary-General

The Prime Minister has considered the draft message from herself to the UN Secretary-General which was enclosed with your letter of 4 January.

She has approved the text with the following changes:

- (a) In line 18 substitute "The British" for "My".
- (b) Replace the penultimate sentence with "The British Government will work actively in co-operation with others concerned to promote more extensive involvement by the United Nations in peacekeeping in the Lebanon".

The message in its amended form may now be despatched.

The Prime Minister considered a further strengthening of the draft message enclosed with your letter. In accepting the version described above, she asked me to make it clear that in her view it should be the British objective to replace the present Multi-National Force during the early months of this year with an expanded UN presence. Mrs. Thatcher recalls earlier advice that UNIFIL could be given truce supervisory functions and presumes that this is one of the ways of expanding the UN presence which is now under consideration.

The Prime Minister would be grateful to receive regular reports on the progress we are making to secure our objective.

A. J. COLES

CT

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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LETTERB

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 January 1984

Britforleb

The Prime Minister has expressed interest in the possibility of members of Britforleb being awarded a medal in recognition of their service in the Lebanon. I should be grateful if you could let me know, within a week or so, what the possibilities are.

BT/1

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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file

5 January 1984

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 3 January.

The Prime Minister agrees that an "oral reply" to President Mubarak should be sent on the lines of the draft telegram enclosed with your letter.

AJC

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister
Agree message?



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

S/Sgt
Duty Clerk

Not just
enough - see 4/1/84

4 January 1984

Proposed
amendments

Dear John,

Lebanon: Message from the Prime Minister to the UN Secretary-General

/ write to enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to the UN Secretary-General. This is based closely on the draft suggested by Sir J Thomson in his telno 4 (copy enclosed). We believe that a message along these lines would usefully encourage Sr Perez de Cuellar to follow up his declared interest in an expanded UN peacekeeping role in Lebanon. We recognise that if we are to make progress in this direction it will be necessary at the appropriate time to test the extent of Soviet intransigence and, if need be, expose this as a factor in the situation. At the same time there is a risk that if we put too much emphasis on the question of a UN force at this stage, before we have clarified the intentions of our MNF partners, we would play into Soviet hands by indicating to them the strength of their position on this point.

As regards the views of our MNF partners, Sir J Leahy had a useful meeting this afternoon with representatives of the US, French and Italian Embassies here. A separate report of this meeting will reach you shortly. We have asked the representatives to attend a further meeting on 6 January.

/ Sir J Thomson's telno 3 (copy also enclosed) set out a number of ideas on how we might pursue wider UN involvement in Lebanon in the longer term. These will clearly need careful thought and we shall be letting you have our considered views shortly. This need not, in our view, affect the terms of the Prime Minister's message to Sr Perez de Cuellar.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 AND INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV,
10 DAMASCUS.
11 AND PRIORITY TO MOSCOW, CAIRO AND THE HAGUE
12 YOUR TELNOS 3 AND 4 : LEBANON
13 1. Please pass following message from Prime Minister to
14 UN Secretary General:
15 " Sir John Thomson expressed to you before Christmas, on instruc-
16 tions, British interest in the remarks which you made at your end
17 of year press conference about UN peacekeeping forces being
18 perhaps the best way of preserving peace in the Lebanon. *No intel*
19 Government has, as you know, both in the Security Council and
20 elsewhere repeatedly made clear our wish to see a greater involve-
21 ment by the UN in peace keeping in that tragic country. My
22 support for this has not altered since we had our useful dis-
23 cussion on the subject last September. I am therefore much
24 encouraged by your own continuing advocacy of such a course.
25 Clearly every effort has to be made to find a solution to what is

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword a
File number		Dept NENAD	Distribution MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON
Drafted by (Block capitals) E G M CHAPLIN			
Telephone number 233 4856			
Authorised for despatch			
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 <<<<
 2 a complex and potentially dangerous situation, and we should not
 3 be deterred from attempting this by possible objections from
 4 some of the interested parties. I should like to assure you that
 5 my Government stands ready to do what we can in cooperation with
 6 others concerned to promote further constructive involvement by
 7 the UN. We are consulting our partners in the Multinational
 8 Force, and will want to remain in close touch with you in order
 9 to exchange views on the possibilities, and to offer our
 10 assistance where this may be helpful to you.

HOWE

NNNN

*already wanted it
 from UN. Will note to
 a time very soon.
 I told it v. much that S. has
 had change in his attitude
 towards*

Not short enough. - J. Williams

By force will actively
 promote further involvement of the
 U. N. by way of a plebiscite or
 Truce Supervisory force. ~~And we~~ We
 believe this should replace the present
 MNF during the early months of this year and
 could then possibly extend its responsibilities to

NNNN ends telegram

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Catchword *without wear for which
 the Israel in Syria with them*

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SIR J. BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GERTON
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TEL NO 004 OF 4 JANUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT TEL AVIV
DAMASCUS
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW CAIRO THE HAGUE

MIPT: LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED DRAFT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL:

"SIR JOHN THOMSON EXPRESSED TO YOU BEFORE CHRISTMAS, ON INSTRUCTIONS, BRITISH INTEREST IN THE REMARKS WHICH YOU MADE AT YOUR END OF YEAR PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES BEING PERHAPS THE BEST WAY OF PRESERVING PEACE IN THE LEBANON. MY GOVERNMENT HAS, AS YOU KNOW, BOTH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR OUR WISH TO SEE A GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY THE UN IN PEACE KEEPING IN THAT TRAGIC COUNTRY. MY SUPPORT FOR THIS HAS NOT ALTERED SINCE WE HAD OUR USEFUL DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT LAST SEPTEMBER. I AM THEREFORE MUCH ENCOURAGED BY YOUR OWN CONTINUING ADVOCACY OF SUCH A COURSE. CLEARLY EVERY EFFORT HAS TO BE MADE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO WHAT IS A COMPLEX AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU ONCE AGAIN THAT MY GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO DO WHAT WE CAN IN COOPERATION WITH OTHERS CONCERNED TO PROMOTE FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY THE UN. I HAVE THEREFORE ASKED SIR JOHN THOMSON TO CONTINUE TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITIES, AND TO OFFER OUR ASSISTANCE WHERE THIS MAY BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN REGARD TO A ROLE FOR THE UN.

THOMSON

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040056Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 003 OF 4 JANUARY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT TEL AVIV

DAMASCUS

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW CAIRO THE HAGUE

YOUR TELNO 928: LEBANON

1. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1724, I WELCOME THE IDEA OF A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE WHICH WOULD FIT IN WELL WITH THE HIGHER PROFILE REACTION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS TO WHICH YOU REFERRED IN YOUR TELNO 923. SUCH A MESSAGE WOULD, I BELIEVE, ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR AN EXPANDED UN PEACE KEEPING ROLE IN LEBANON. MIFT-CONTAINS A SUGGESTED DRAFT. WHAT FOLLOWS ELABORATES ON THE CONTEXT IN WHICH I SEE SUCH A MESSAGE BEING SENT.

2. AS SET OUT IN MY TELNO 1723, THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, IN A POSITION, AT PRESENT, TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. IN HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS ON 21 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 1714) AND TO MYSELF ON 22 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 1717,) HE LISTED THE FOUR CONDITIONS WHICH WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO HIM TO BE ABLE TO ACT. THESE WERE A REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT: THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE SUPPORT OF THE UN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS: AND THE SUPPORT OF THE "INTERESTED COUNTRIES." THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT MET AT PRESENT. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOUNDINGS OF THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY IN DECEMBER (MY TELNO 1722) SHOWED PRETTY CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHILE THEIR POSITIONS ARE NOT IDENTICAL NEITHER THE SYRIANS NOR THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO AN EXPANDED UN ROLE, WHETHER OF UN OBSERVERS OR OF UN FORCES, IN LEBANON IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BOTH OF THEM INSISTED THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAD TO COME FIRST, AND MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE ALSO SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING TO HELP THE AMERICANS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL (DESPITE WHAT HE SAID AT ONE POINT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE), ACCEPTS THAT THERE IS NO WAY FOR THE MOMENT OF GETTING ROUND THE SYRIAN/SOVIET ROADBLOCK IN TERMS OF UN PROCEDURES OR MANOEUVRES.

3. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT I CONCLUDED IN MY TELNO 1723 THAT WE HAD BETTER TRY ANOTHER ROAD AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE A DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, OUTSIDE THE UN TO BEGIN WITH, TO PROMOTE SYRIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS FROM LEBANON. AFTER REFLECTING ON THIS FURTHER OVER THE HOLIDAY, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VARIOUS VALID COMMENTS FROM WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV AND BEIRUT IN THE INTERVAL, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE APPROACH WHICH I OUTLINED IN MY TUR OFFERS SOME HOPE OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM IN WHICH WE AND OUR MNF PARTNERS FIND OURSELVES IN LEBANON. THE INCREASING DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON PRESIDENT REAGAN TO WITHDRAW THE US MARINES MAY MAKE THE AMERICANS MORE RECEPTIVE TO SUCH AN IDEA. **CONFIDENTIAL** 14.

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4. MY IDEA IS THAT THE THREE EUROPEAN MNF COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE, KEEPING THE AMERICANS INFORMED AS APPROPRIATE. THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTING SUCH AN INITIATIVE - NORMAL EMBASSY CHANNELS; DESPATCH OF A EUROPEAN SPECIAL EMISSARY; OR PRESSING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO UNDERTAKE SUCH AN EMISSARY ROLE. THE FIRST OF THESE IS IMPORTANT BUT NOT ENOUGH BY ITSELF. THE SECOND AND THIRD ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE AND COULD USEFULLY BE USED IN COMBINATION.

5. THE COINCIDENCE OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY SUGGESTS THAT THE FRENCH (WHO HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE WAYS OF THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE) MIGHT BE ASKED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN SUCH A VENTURE (WITH CLOSE INVOLVEMENT BY THE ITALIANS AND OURSELVES). THE FIRST STEP, AFTER THINKING IT ALL THROUGH OURSELVES, WOULD BE TO APPROACH THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS TO GET THEIR AGREEMENT. CAREFUL THOUGHT WOULD NEED TO BE GIVEN AT THE SAME TIME AS TO HOW TO CLEAR OUR LINES WITH THE AMERICANS. CLEARLY THEY WILL BE RELUCTANT TO BE UPSTAGED IN ANY WAY, BUT SINCE THEY ARE UNDERTAKING AN INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE THEMSELVES I HOPE THAT THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE EUROPEANS DOING LIKEWISE. THEY MAY AGREE THAT WE ARE IN SOME RESPECT BETTER PLACED THAN THEY TO AVOID AUTOMATIC SYRIAN AND SOVIET OPPOSITION. AND AS REGARDS THE UN DIMENSION PARA 7 OF WASHINGTON TEL NO 3382 IS ENCOURAGING.

6. THE AIM OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WOULD BE TO PROMOTE A PACKAGE SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON PROBLEM, INCORPORATING AN EXPANDED UN ROLE, AND INVOLVING A DEAL BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA (WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED INDIRECTLY BETWEEN THEM). THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY MEAN TAKING SOUNDINGS IN DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, KEEPING THE AMERICANS CLOSELY IN TOUCH AND SPEAKING ALSO TO THE RUSSIANS. THE SECRETARY GENERALS SUPPORT SHOULD BE ENLISTED. HE COULD BE ENCOURAGED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SEND URQUHART TO THE REGION TO HELP PROVIDE A CROSS CHECK ON THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO REACT SENSIBLY. AS I SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 1723, ONCE SUCH A PROCESS APPEARED TO BE APPROACHING AN AGREEMENT, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BOUNCE THE PARTICIPANTS INTO FINAL AGREEMENT THROUGH SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION. RATIFICATION BY THE COUNCIL WOULD IN ANY CASE BE NECESSARY IF AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE UN WERE INVOLVED. THE THREE WESTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL COULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE COUNCIL, BASING THEMSELVES PERHAPS ON THE KIND OF RESOLUTION IN MY TELNO 895. IF THE SYRIANS ACQUIESCED THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL FOLLOW SUIT. IN SPEAKING WITH ME MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE MADE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN A ROLE FOR THE UN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALTERNATIVELY AS PART OF A PACKAGE INVOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE LEBANON.

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7. THE EXACT ROLE FOR UN OBSERVERS/FORCES WOULD EMERGE DURING NEGOTIATIONS. TEL AVIV TELNO 351 (AND BEIRUT TELNO 747) OUTLINED SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES, THOUGH I BELIEVE THAT SOME SORT OF UN ROLE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL EVENTUALLY PROVE NECESSARY FOR ANY PACKAGE. IN ORDER TO US TO BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEFINING POSSIBLE EXPANDED UN ROLES IN LEBANON - AND THEY WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL DEFINITION - IT WOULD PERHAPS BE HELPFUL IF THE DEPARTMENT COULD PREPARE A LIST GOING INTO SOME DETAIL ON THE POSSIBILITIES. I COULD THEN DISCUSS THIS LIST INFORMALLY WITH URQUHART TO GET HIS REACTIONS. ONE ELEMENT WOULD BE, OF COURSE, THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MNF CONTINGENTS NOW IN BEIRUT.

8. IN PUTTING FORWARD THE ABOVE IDEAS, I REMAIN AS I SAID IN MY TELNO 1723, VERY DIFFIDENT. I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF SEEING THE WHOLE PICTURE FROM HERE. BUT THE QUESTION REMAINS WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? CAN WE CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE DIPLOMATIC SIDE PRIMARILY TO THE AMERICANS: WILL NOT THE SOVIETS AUTOMATICALLY BLOCK ANY US SCHEME UNLESS THEY ARE THEMSELVES GIVEN A ROLE? I SUBMIT THAT IT IS WORTH TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A SYRIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE SUPER POWERS CAN ACQUIESCE. THE EUROPEANS ARE BETTER PLACED AND BETTER QUALIFIED TO DO THIS THAN ANYONE ELSE, AND THE MODERATE ARABS WOULD WELCOME IT.

9. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN CONSTRUCTING A PACKAGE. IT WILL AT A MINIMUM BE HELPFUL TO KEEP HIM IN PLAY. A FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO EXERT A HELPFUL INFLUENCE (THOUGH WITHOUT, AS I HAVE INDICATED ABOVE, HAVING FALSE EXPECTATIONS THAT HE CAN ACHIEVE ANYTHING ON HIS OWN AT THIS STAGE). THE DRAFT PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE IN MIFT WOULD PROVIDE SUITABLE WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO HIM. I ASSUME THAT YOU WERE THINKING OF KEEPING IT CONFIDENTIAL THOUGH I WOULD SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN REFERRING PUBLICLY TO IT IN GENERAL TERMS IF THIS SEEMED HELPFUL, E.G. IN A PARLIAMENTARY CONTEXT.

THOMSON

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

- 3 -
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MR. COLES

MOD have suggested that the Prime Minister might like to see Colonel Ferguson, who is the most recent 'ex' Commander in the Lebanon, today or tomorrow.

There is a slot in the diary at 1130 hours tomorrow.

1200

Would the Prime Minister like to meet Col. Ferguson?

+ Chief of Defence Staff

DSG.
P.P. Timothy Flesher

4 January 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

10393 - 1

OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 858

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 041900Z JAN 84
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 4 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, CAIRO, THE HAGUE,

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 003 AND 004: LEBANON

1. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO DEVELOPMENTS HERE TODAY. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS GIVEN AN INTERVIEW TO SIR ALISTAIR BURNET TO BE BROADCAST LATER TODAY IN WHICH SHE ANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR MNF ROLE AND THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF UN FORCES. A TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON MY INSTRUCTIONS LEAHY ALSO HELD A MEETING WITH THE CHARGES D'AFFAIRES OF THE US, FRENCH AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES. HOOPER (US EMBASSY) ALSO ATTENDED. THE PURPOSE WAS (A) TO START A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL (ALTHOUGH WE WERE CAREFUL NOT TO BILL IT AS SUCH) AND (B) TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS ON EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE UN AND INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S SECURITY PLAN (BEIRUT TELNO 2).

2. LEAHY BEGAN BY OUTLINING THE ITINERARY FOR MY VISIT TO EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA NEXT WEEK AND SAYING THAT I HAD ASKED HIM TO DISCUSS WITH OUR MNF PARTNERS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AND CONCERNING LEBANON BEFORE I LEFT. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE COMMENTS AND IDEAS FROM OUR PARTNERS ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WHICH MIGHT COME UP DURING MY TOUR. OVER THE HOLIDAY PERIOD THE ITALIANS HAD ANNOUNCED A REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT AND THE FRENCH HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD BE RETURNING SOME OF THEIR MNF TROOPS TO UNIFIL. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD ON 3 JANUARY REVEALED HIS SECURITY PLAN

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10393 - 1

WHICH HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. IN ADDITION THERE WAS INCREASING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE US ADMINISTRATION CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE US CONTINGENT. ALL THIS IN TURN HAD GENERATED GREATER POLITICAL PRESSURE HERE. ALTHOUGH NO IMMEDIATE DECISIONS WERE BEING TAKEN THERE WAS MOUNTING UNEASE AND ANXIETY. WE SHOULD BE AS ACTIVE AS POSSIBLE IN SEEKING WAYS TO MAKE THE SORT OF PROGRESS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE MNF CONTINGENTS TO BE WITHDRAWN.

3. IN DISCUSSION OF GEMAYEL'S SECURITY PLAN LEAHY SUGGESTED THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS WOULD WISH TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THE REQUEST TO THE US CONTINGENT TO DEPLOY AT BAABDA WOULD IDENTIFY THE MNF MORE CLOSELY WITH GEMAYEL. PHASE 2 WOULD REQUIRE AN EXTENSION OF THE TERMS OF THE MANDATE OF THE MNF. EVEN IF PHASE 1 COULD BE REGARDED AS WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE EXISTING MANDATE IT MIGHT BE SEEN AS A DEEPENING OF THE COMMITMENT OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS. HOOPER (US) COMMENTED THAT A REASSESSMENT OF LEBANON POLICIES WAS TAKING PLACE IN WASHINGTON AND THE ADMINISTRATION WAS LOOKING FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS. THE INITIAL INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD LOOK AT THE SECURITY PROPOSALS IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT.

4 ON THE ROLE OF UN FORCES LEAHY SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD RAISED THIS WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER. WE HAD BEEN INTERESTED BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S REMARKS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 21 DECEMBER (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1714).

IT WAS CLEAR THAT NONE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED COULD AT PRESENT BE SATISFIED. BUT ALTHOUGH THE SYRIAN AND SOVIET ATTITUDES APPARENTLY REMAINED NEGATIVE WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT PROGRESS WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND WANTED TO PRESS THEM. WE SAW VALUE IN EXPLORING FURTHER THE POSSIBILITIES. POSSIBLY IN NEW YORK AND WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. WE HAD NOT YET FORMULATED DETAILED IDEAS ON THE DIFFERENT OPTIONS: WE SHOULD FIRST DISCUSS THEM AMONG OURSELVES AND EXPLORE THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE.

5. IN DISCUSSION HOOPER COMMENTED THAT OPINIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ON UN INVOLVEMENT WERE DIVIDED. ECHOING

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10393 - 1

PELLETREAU (WASHINGTON TELNO 3882) HE SAID THAT RUMSFELD DID NOT WISH TO GIVE A SIGNAL TO THE SYRIANS THAT THE US CONTINGENT WAS ON THE WAY OUT BUT THE AMERICANS WERE UNLIKELY TO OBJECT TO EXPLORATION BY OTHERS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE ITALIAN COMMENT THAT ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE UNLIKELY TO BE HELPFUL IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW THEM IN GRADUALLY. IT WOULD FOR INSTANCE BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS TO OBJECT TO A UN FLAG OVER THE SABRA AND CHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS.

EGERTON SUGGESTED THAT THE SAME APPLIED TO THE CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS COMMITTEE. SUMMING UP LEAHY SAID THAT OUR AIM SHOULD BE FIRST TO WIN OVER THE LEBANESE AND THEN TO LOOK FOR WAYS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION SO THAT AT THE VERY LEAST THEY WOULD BE UNCOMFORTABLE IN REJECTING OUR PROPOSALS.

6. LEAHY ASKED FOR REPORTS ON PROGRESS MADE BY GEMAYEL TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. HE STRESSED THAT FOR ALL MNF CONTRIBUTORS PROGRESS WAS ESSENTIAL IF WE WERE TO CONTINUE TO JUSTIFY OUR PARTICIPATION.

VATTANI (ITALY) COMMENTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PUTTING PRESSURE ON GEMAYEL. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM.

7. IN CONCLUSION LEAHY SAID THAT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY FOR A MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WAS LIKELY TO BE AT THE CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM (16-18 JANUARY). WE WOULD FAVOUR A FURTHER MEETING. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD A FURTHER MEETING ON 6 JANUARY TO FOLLOW UP THE PRESENT DISCUSSION IN THE LIGHT OF ANY COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM CAPITALS.

8. THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW UP ACTION IN CAPITALS WILL BE COVERED IN A FURTHER TELEGRAM.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 January 1984

Lebanon: Message to the Prime Minister from
the Druze Community

Thank you for your letter of 4 January.

I am sure that the Prime Minister would agree with Sir Geoffrey Howe that the message from the Druze community does not merit a reply from the Prime Minister herself and that Mr. Luce should send an acknowledgement on her behalf. The draft enclosed with your letter seems admirable for the purpose and I am sure that the Prime Minister will be content for it to be despatched (you may wish to substitute "bringing" for "bring" in line 18).

ALCOUS

Sig

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 January 1984

Dear John,

Lebanon: Message to the Prime Minister from the Druze Community

I enclose the original of a message to the Prime Minister from the Lebanese Druze Community, which was handed to our Embassy in Damascus on 7 December. You will have already seen the text in Damascus Telno 404. Identical messages have been sent to a wide range of European political leaders, including Mr Kinnock.

Sir Geoffrey Howe does not think that the message merits a reply from the Prime Minister. He proposes instead that Mr Luce, who met Mr Jumblatt in London on 28 November and spoke to him during his subsequent visit to Damascus, should send him an acknowledgement on the Prime Minister's behalf. I enclose a message cast in the form of a telegram to Damascus, which we shall despatch if the Prime Minister is content.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Peter Ricketts".

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		CONFIDENTIAL	PRIORITY
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO	
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT	
	10	YOUR TELNOS 403 AND 404: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM DRUZE	
	11	COMMUNITY	
	12	1. Please pass following reply from Mr Luce to Walid Jumblatt.	
	13	BEGINS: I am writing to thank you for the message from the Druze	
	14	community addressed to Mrs Thatcher, which you gave our Ambassador	
	15	in Damascus last month.	
	16	As you will know from our recent conversations, the British	
	17	Government remains firmly committed to helping to restore the	
	18	unity and independence of Lebanon, and to bring to an end the	
	19	suffering which recent conflicts there have inflicted on all	
	20	Lebanese communities. We recognise that recent decisions by the	
	21	Druze community, for example in lifting the siege of Deir al Kamar,	
///	22	have made a constructive contribution to restoring peace in	
//	23	Lebanon. We hope that our contingent with the Multinational Force	
/	24	will continue to be helpful in promoting conditions in which the	
	25	all-important process of national reconciliation can move forward.	
		NNNN ends telegram	Catchword We
		BLANK	
		File number	Distribution Lebanon/MNF
		Dept	
		Drafted by (Block capitals) PS	
		Telephone number 233 4641	
		Authorised for despatch	
		Comcen reference	Time of despatch

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<
2 We shall continue to do what we can to impress on all concerned
3 the need to avoid any escalation of the conflict in Lebanon, and
4 to give priority instead to working out a peaceful solution to
5 Lebanon's problems. With best wishes for 1984, Richard Luce.
6 ENDS.
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8 HOWE
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F4 JAN 1984

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مكتب العلاقات العامة - دمشق

التاريخ:

الرقم: 1

حضرة:

Her Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London

The druze community which remains faithfully attached to the unity and independence of Lebanon and which has fought its hardest battle to preserve the democratic and pluralistic character of the Lebanese system conjures you and the international community to put a stop to the aggression that has been conducted against it in the last eighteen months.

Attacked by the phalangist militia, shelled by the Lebanese army, bombarded by the American forces, the druze community is threatened in its very existence. Its villages have been destroyed, its population displaced, its economic and cultural life paralysed. Furthermore and along with the druze, all other democratic forces of Lebanon have been systematically decimated whichever faith



مكتب العلاقات العامة - دمشق

التاريخ:

الرقم: 2

المحترم

حضرة:

they may belong to through individual and collective attacks, bombardments, reprisals for non-committed acts, intimidation and segregationist practice. After having agreed to a cease-fire, taken part in the Geneva dialogue, accepted disengagement propositions, lifted the blockade on Deir el Kamar, we are paid back in turn by a pursuit of the bombardment by the pro-phalangist Lebanese army and, a direct intervention of the United States air force, naval and ground forces against our cities and villages.

Your intervention in order to put a stop to this escalation, reestablish the dialogue, and save the populations of Lebanon in their very life and liberty is of the direst necessity.

M. Abou Chakra

W. Joumblatt

Mohamed Abou Chakra
Sheikh Akl of the druze
community

Walid Joumblatt
President of the Socialist
Progressist Party



مكتب العلاقات العامة - دمشق

Her Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree attached telegram
containing message from you to
President Mubarak?

3 January 1984

A.J.C. 4/1

Dear John,

Yes not

Message from President Mubarak to the Prime Minister

An 'oral message' from President Mubarak to the Prime Minister was delivered to HM Ambassador at Cairo on 30 December. I enclose Cairo telno 579 which contains the text of the message. Sir Michael Weir was told that similar messages would be sent to Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Craxi.

President Mubarak's message describes Egypt's attitude towards the PLO evacuation from Tripoli and gives an account of his meeting with Arafat on 22 December. Notable points are: Mubarak's encouragement to Arafat to accept unequivocally 'the principle of peaceful settlement', and to resume his dialogue with Jordan (and the offer of Egyptian help in this); and Arafat's point that he needed time to put his house in order, and that he was determined to force a polarisation within the PLO (by implication) to thwart Syrian efforts to control the Organisation (this would, if carried out, represent a considerable change of tack by Arafat).

Sir Geoffrey Howe will be visiting Egypt from 8-10 January and will be able to discuss these and other points with Egyptian ministers and President Mubarak himself. He recommends therefore that the Prime Minister should send a brief 'oral' reply to President Mubarak, via the Ambassador in Cairo, on the lines of the attached draft telegram.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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FROM CAIRO 301218Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 579 OF 30 DECEMBER

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.
BEGINS

1. PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER OF CERTAIN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HE FINDS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROCESS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. WHEN PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT AND HIS LOYALISTS DECIDED TO LEAVE TRIPOLI, HE REQUESTED EGYPT TO TAKE PART IN GUARANTEEING SAFE PASSAGE FOR THE DEPARTING MEN AND FAMILIES.

3. PRESIDENT MUBARAK SENT URGENT MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR RESPECTIVELY, ASKING THEM TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT INFLICT ANY HARM ON THE DEPARTING PALESTINIANS. ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ISRAEL WOULD REFLECT QUITE NEGATIVELY ON THE ISRAELI INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS AND PUT TO QUESTION ITS DESIRE TO COEXIST PEACEFULLY WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

4. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED SOME ENCOURAGING REPLIES. MOREOVER, HE AGREED TO A PALESTINIAN REQUEST THAT SOME UNITS OF THE EGYPTIAN NAVY PARTAKE OF THE PROTECTION OF THE CONVOY.

5. PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TO EGYPT, HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PAYING A BRIEF VISIT TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND CONVEY TO THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE THE APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

6. THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MR ARAFAT TOOK PLACE IN CAIRO ON DECEMBER 22 AND LASTED FOR THREE AND HALF HOURS.

7. THE PLO CHAIRMAN STATED THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE MOST GRATEFUL TO EGYPT FOR THE FIRM STAND IT TOOK THROUGHOUT THEIR PLIGHT PARTICULARLY DURING THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI. HE COMPARED BETWEEN THIS STAND AND THAT OF CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH DID EVERYTHING TO FOMENT DISSENSION AND RIFT WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND INCAPACITATE THE PLO TO TAKE ANY MOVE TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF THEIR RIGHTS.

8. HE ADDED THAT HE IS DETERMINED AT THIS CROSSROADS TO FORCE A POLARIZATION IN THE MOVEMENT WITH A VIEW TO DETERRING ANY ATTEMPTS MADE TO CONTROL IT OR FORCE IT TO FORFEIT ITS INDEPENDENT WILL AND MAKE IT SUBSERVIENT TO CERTAIN REGIMES IN THE REGION. TOWARDS THAT END, HE PLANS TO CONVENE THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL Council

COUNCIL WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO AND FORCE A SHOWDOWN WITH THOSE WHO ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH HOSTILE ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

9. THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT WHILE IT IS VITAL AT THIS POINT THAT THE PLO TAKE A FIRM AND UNAMBIGUOUS STAND FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BE CAPTIVES OF THE PAST. WE MUST LOOK AHEAD AND CONCENTRATE ON THE FUTURE AND THE PROMISE IT HOLDS FOR ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA. THE PALESTINIANS WOULD SERVE THEIR CAUSE AND HELP THEIR SUPPORTERS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IF THEY MAKE CLEAR THEIR OBJECTIVE AND CLAIMS. SO LONG AS THEY ACCEPT WHOLEHEARTEDLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THEY CAN PROCEED TO ILLUSTRATE THEIR PERCEPTION OF PEACE AND SET THEIR CONDITIONS. NO FORMULA WOULD BE IMPOSED ON THEM. WE, IN EGYPT, BELIEVE THAT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS A STEP FORWARD THAT SHOULD BE UTILIZED AND DEVELOPED. IT COULD ALSO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS (OF THE ARAB SUMMIT) AND THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION. THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE FORMULAS WHICH STEM FROM SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ITS LETTER AND SPIRIT. IT IS CRUCIAL TO GENERATE A NEW MOMENTUM AND SURGE AHEAD, OTHERWISE THE WORLD WOULD LEARN TO LIVE WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM UNSOLVED FOR DECADES. WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT 1984 IS AN ELECTION YEAR IN THE UNITED STATES.

10. THE PRESIDENT CONVEYED TO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT A MESSAGE HE RECEIVED JUST BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN STATING THAT THE US REMAINED WILLING TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AS SOON AS THE LATTER ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 242 AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

11. THE PLO CHAIRMAN SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE PLO HAS ACCEPTED THE SAID RESOLUTION, AT LEAST TACITLY, AS IT ENDORSED THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS, HE SAW NO WISDOM IN TAKING A NEW STEP AT THAT JUNCTION. FURTHERMORE, HE NEEDED SOME TIME TO SET HIS HOUSE IN ORDER BEFORE EMBARKING ON ANY ACTION.

12. PRESIDENT MUBARAK SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SUCH NEED AND THE LIMITATIONS ON MR ARAFAT'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTION 242 BUT CHAIRMAN ARAFAT MAY DEEM IT USEFUL, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, TO TAKE NEW STEPS AND BUILD UPON THE PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE FEZ FORMULA.

13. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO RESUME THE JORDANIAN PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. EGYPT WAS WILLING TO DO ALL THAT IT COULD TO STIMULATE THIS DIALOGUE. SUCH STEPS WOULD HELP REGENERATE THE PEACE MOMENTUM AND WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR MOVEMENT. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION ARE APT TO CREATE NEW REALITIES THAT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A GENUINE CHANGE CONDUCIVE TO ENABLING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

14. CHAIRMAN ARAFAT RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

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AND MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM IN THE COMING FEW MONTHS.

15. THE PALESTINIAN LEADER SAID THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WOULD BE RENDERED MORE FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE IF ATTENDED BY MEMBERS RESIDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SINCE ISRAEL DENIES THEM THE RIGHT TO ATTEND COUNCIL MEETINGS UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT THE PLO IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, IT WOULD BE A MATTER OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO PERSUADE ISRAEL NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THEIR ATTENDANCE OF THE COMING SESSION. IF THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE REMAINS UNCHANGED, THE UNESCAPABLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT IT DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PALESTINIAN MODERATION.

16. PRESIDENT MUBARAK SENT ANOTHER MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THAT POINT. ISRAEL WAS CONTACTED AS WELL IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD APPRECIATE THE DESIRABILITY OF ALLOWING THOSE MEMBERS, WHO NUMBER A HUNDRED AND SIXTY, TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND GO BACK TO RESUME THEIR RESIDENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

THE PRESIDENT WISHES THE PRIME MINISTER A HAPPY NEW YEAR.''

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IMMEDIATE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
 GRS 2 GRS
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 YOUR TELNOS 578 AND 579

10 PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

11 1. Please convey the following "oral reply" to President
 12 Mubarak's message. Begins: I was most grateful for your oral
 13 message of 30 December. It was particularly useful to have your
 14 impressions following your meeting of 22 December with
 15 Mr Yasser Arafat. I share your view that it would be valuable
 16 if the Palestinian/Jordanian dialogue could be resumed. Progress
 17 in resolving the Palestinian problem will only come if those
 18 who are genuinely seeking a peaceful solution are willing to come
 19 forward to the negotiating table. You have my full support in
 20 your efforts in this direction.

21 2. As you will know, Sir Geoffrey Howe will be visiting Egypt
 22 from 8 to 10 January. This provides another opportunity for a
 23 full ~~bilateral~~ exchange of views on the Middle East between
 24 Britain and Egypt. I hope that there will be an opportunity for
 25 Sir Geoffrey to discuss with you the matters raised in your

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Drafted by (Block capitals) P F Ricketts		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
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	Classification and Caveats	Page
	CONFIDENTIAL	2

1 <<<<
2 message. I look forward to keeping in close touch as we both
3 confront the urgent problems of the Middle East. Ends.
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5 HOWE
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CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 3 JANUARY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND ROME
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV AND CBFC
INFO SAVING BRITFORLEB

BEIRUT TELNOS 737 AND 746: LEBANON

1. TODAY'S MEETING OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE WAS AGAIN CHAIRED BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. HE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO PUT MNF GOVERNMENTS IN THE PICTURE ABOUT THE 'SECURITY PLAN'. THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AGREED BY ALL PARTIES INCLUDING THE SYRIANS AND OTHER INTERESTED FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (AND 'WHILE KEEPING THE ISRAELIS IN THE PICTURE'); TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT FROM THE AWALI TO THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND FROM BEIRUT TO SHTOURA IN THE EAST. THE ARMY OR THE ISF WOULD ASSUME CONTROL IN ALL AREAS NOT OCCUPIED BY THE SYRIANS OR THE ISRAELIS. THE ONLY PLACE WHERE THE DISPOSITIONS WERE NOT YET FINALLY AGREED WAS THE SHOUF. BUT THE GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT, EVEN IF THE PSP CAUSED DELAY HERE, THIS NEED NOT AFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN ELSEWHERE. IT WAS HOPED TO GO AHEAD IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO FIX UP THE IMPROVED COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE MNF CONTINGENTS AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED THE PREVIOUS WEEK. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO EFFECT A SLIGHT RE-DEFINITION OF THE MNF'S ROLE, TO WHICH HE HOPED THAT MNF GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE VERY SOON.

2. THE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED GENERAL FARES (MILITARY ADVISER AT THE PALACE) TO EXPLAIN THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MNF IN MORE DETAIL. FARES SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ENVISAGED A RE-DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF IN TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST PHASE THE FRENCH WOULD RE-DEPLOY TO CERTAIN NEW POSITIONS (EFFECTIVELY THOSE THEY HAVE UNILATERALLY ADOPTED, IT SEEMS) WHICH WOULD REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS OF PATROLS AND CHECKPOINTS IN BEIRUT. THE ITALIANS WOULD TAKE OVER THE 'SOUK' AND HOTEL AREAS (THE LATTER EVACUATED BY THE FRENCH). THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO GUARD THE AIRPORT AND WOULD IN ADDITION ASSUME POSITIONS IN BAABDA. THESE MOVES TOGETHER WOULD FREE LEBANESE ARMY UNITS FOR OTHER PURPOSES. NO (REPEAT NO) CHANGE WAS PROPOSED IN THE ROLE OF THE UK CONTINGENT.

3. FARES CONTINUED THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PROPOSED RE-DEPLOYMENT WOULD COINCIDE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY PLAN (PARA 1 ABOVE). IN THIS PHASE THE ITALIANS WOULD DEPLOY TO THE AREA OF MOUNT LEBANON BETWEEN BEIRUT AND THE MADFUN BRIDGE, THE FRENCH ON THE ROAD BETWEEN BEIRUT AND SHTOURA TO THE EAST, AND

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A SUGGESTION TO THIS EFFECT HAD BEEN MADE. IT WOULD ONLY APPEAR TO MAKE SENSE IF AN AMERICAN PRESENCE AT BAABDA WAS TO LINK UP WITH THE EXISTING US POSITIONS AT THE AIRPORT - A VERY RISKY AND PROVOCATIVE MOVE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES: WE ARE INVESTIGATING FURTHER TO SEE IF THE LEBANESE ARE SERIOUSLY SUGGESTING THIS.

7. **COMMENT.** IF THESE LEBANESE PROPOSALS REFLECT A CONSIDERED ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO THE CURRENT ANXIETIES OF MNF CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THEIR CONTINGENTS, AND TO PRE-EMPT FURTHER UNILATERAL RE-DEPLOYMENTS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME OFFERING A SAFER AND MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR THE MNF IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 'SECURITY PLAN', THEN THIS MAY BE FOR THE GOOD. BUT CONSIDERABLE FURTHER PROBING OF LEBANESE INTENTIONS IS NECESSARY BEFORE CONSIDERED COMMENT OR RECOMMENDATIONS FROM HERE ARE POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE THE PROPOSALS ARE LIKELY TO LEAK. SO COMMANDER BRITFORLEB AND I ARE URGENTLY CONSULTING OUR COLLEAGUES, ALL OF WHOM APPEARED TO BE GENUINELY SURPRISED BY THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSALS. COMMANDER BRITFORLEB IS REPORTING IN MORE DETAIL ON HIS OWN CHANNELS (PARTICULARLY ON FARES AND THE PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER WHEN I HAVE MADE A MORE THOROUGH ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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DEFENCE DEPT
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FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
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THE AMERICANS ALONG THE COAST BETWEEN BEIRUT AND SIDON. AGAIN NO (REPEAT NO) CHANGE WAS SUGGESTED IN BRITFORLEB'S ROLE. (COMMENT: APART FROM THIS LATTER POINT, THESE PHASE 2 DEPLOYMENTS, WHICH THE LEBANESE AT ONE STAGE ADMITTED WERE ONLY FOR THE LONG TERM BROADLY REFLECT IDEAS WHICH WERE CURRENT BEFORE THE SHOUF FIGHTING OF LAST SEPTEMBER WHEN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE BEING DISCUSSED FOR A FURTHER PERIOD FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.)

4. THE PRESIDENT THEN INVITED QUESTIONS AND COMMENT. ALL FOUR AMBASSADORS SAID THAT ANY RE-DEFINITION OF THE MNF ROLE WOULD NEED TO BE CLEARED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ONLY CHANGE IN THE EXISTING EXCHANGES OF LETTERS WOULD BE THE REPLACEMENT OF 'THE BEIRUT AREA' BY 'MOUNT LEBANON AND THE COASTAL REGION' IN THE PASSAGES DESCRIBING THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA IN WHICH THE MNF OPERATE. NO (REPEAT NO) CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OR ROLE OF THE MNF WOULD BE EXPECTED. NOR WAS IT CONSIDERED THAT THIS CHANGE NEED AFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 1 OF THE PROPOSED RE-DEPLOYMENT. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT PHASE 1 WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT HE WOULD NEED TO CONSULT HIS GOVERNMENT ABOUT PHASE 2. MY US AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES POINTED OUT THAT THEY COULD NOT AGREE EITHER THE PHASE 1 OR 2 PROPOSALS WITHOUT CONSULTING THEIR GOVERNMENTS. THE ITALIANS SAID THEY COULD NOT TAKE ON THE SOUK AND HOTEL AREAS AS WELL AS THE SABRA AND SHATILA CAMPS WITHOUT MORE MEN (COMMENT: THEY SUBSEQUENTLY MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY WERE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THIS PROPOSED RE-DEPLOYMENT. IF THEY GAVE UP THEIR PROTECTIVE ROLE AT SABRA AND SHATILA, THEY MIGHT BE MORE RATHER THAN LESS VULNERABLE, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, IN THEIR NEW POSITIONS AROUND THE SOUK AND HOTELS. THEY FEARED THAT THE LEBANESE MIGHT WISH TO GET THEM OUT OF THE WAY IN ORDER TO TRY TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER AREAS OF THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS.)

5. I ASKED HOW THE PROPOSED RE-DEPLOYMENTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY PLAN. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN PHASE 1 LEBANESE FORCES WOULD BE FREED FOR MORE TASKS, EG PATROLLING ALONG THE GREEN LINE. IN PHASE 2 IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT THE MNF CONTINGENTS WOULD ACT, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES ('AS NOW'), THUS ENABLING THE LATTER TO BE SPREAD MORE WIDELY WHERE IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE ON THEIR NEW ROLE UNDER THE SECURITY PLAN.

6. BOTH THE ITALIAN AND US AMBASSADORS, TO WHOM I SPOKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING, SAID THEY HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THESE LEBANESE PROPOSALS. THE ITALIAN WAS VERY SCEPTICAL (SEE ABOVE). THE AMERICAN SAID THAT HIS FIRST NEED WAS TO FIND OUT 'WHAT WAS BEHIND THIS'. HE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED ON THE PROPOSAL FOR DEPLOYMENT TO DAARDA, NOR ON THE SUGGESTION THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT PLAY A ROLE HELPING PREVENT INFILTRATION FROM THE SHOUF INTO THE SOUTHERN-SUBURBS (AT THE MEETING OF MILITARY COMMANDERS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THAT OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE

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