

SECRET

Confidential File

Miss R J M Ritchie of the FCO

SECURITY

5
810

March 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
17.3.82							
25.11.82							
30.11.82							
3.13.82							
6.17.82							
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5.1.83							
29.6.83							
22.7.83							
25.7.83							
26.7.83							

PREM 19/1385



SH

cc: Co

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 July 1983

IN CONFIDENCE

Dear Michael

The Security Commission have now submitted their report on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie, which was remitted to them on 21 December, 1982. I should like to publish this report before Parliament rises for the Recess.

I am enclosing with this letter, for the present on Privy Counsellor terms, a copy of the text of the report as prepared for publication. It is as submitted by the Security Commission, save for six minor drafting amendments to protect particular aspects of security (mainly the source of the reports about Miss Ritchie which reached the Security Service). Nothing substantive has been omitted. If you thought it was important to know exactly what the amendments are, the Secretary of the Cabinet would come and show them to you.

As you will see, the report does not contain any major conclusions or recommendations for changes of security procedure. Given that, I should be inclined to announce publication of the report by way of a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, to which the text of the report could be annexed in Hansard - *this would save a separate White Paper.*

If you agree, I should be grateful if you would put a question down to me tomorrow, on the following lines, for

/written

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written answer on Thursday, 28 July:-

To ask the Prime Minister, whether she has received the Security Commission's report on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Holden

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, M.P.

Ref. A083/2225

MR BUTLER

Security Commission: Miss Rhona Ritchie

Thank you for your minute dated 25 June 1983. I have not taken a month to reply.

2. I am advised that the Security Commission's report does not need to be shortened in order to make it acceptable for publication as an annex to a Written Answer. The Editor of the Official Report has been consulted, and would be content to publish the full text in that way. Lord Bridge has been consulted, and would also be content with that procedure, provided that the text (as amended) was published in full: he would not wish it to be shortened.

3. I do not think that we should press him to shorten it. If the Prime Minister announced that the report had been summarised for publication, that could give rise to suspicions that that had been done for some sinister reason to cover up some awkward finding or conclusion. There is no need to run that risk.

--- 4. I attach a revised and shortened version of the Prime Minister's Written Answer, which would be suitable if the report itself were being published as an annex in the Official Report.

--- 5. I understand that the Prime Minister would like to consult the Leader of the Opposition before finally deciding whether to make an oral statement (and publish the report as a White Paper) or to make a Written Answer. I attach a draft letter for her to send to the Leader of the Opposition.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 July 1983

To ask the Prime Minister, whether she has received the Security Commission's report on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie.

I have now received the Commission's report, which I will with permission circulate ~~in~~ in the Official Report as an annex to this Answer. The published text of the Commission's report has been slightly amended at certain points to protect particular areas of security: but nothing substantive has been omitted.

2. Miss Ritchie was a First Secretary in the British Embassy at Tel Aviv, who was discovered to have passed the substance of classified documents to an Egyptian diplomat in Tel Aviv with whom she was having an affair. The Security Commission have confirmed the assessment made by my Rt Hon and Learned Friend the Attorney General at her trial, that the damage to the country's interests resulting from her disclosures was not great, and lay in the breach of confidence and trustworthiness that they implied rather than in the nature of the disclosures themselves. The material which she admitted to having disclosed was graded no higher than confidential, and its disclosure would have been prejudicial to the conduct of international relations rather than damaging to security. There is no evidence that she made any disclosure of material more highly graded than confidential. My Rt Hon and Learned Friend described her as "more foolish than wicked".

3. The Commission consider that any general criticism of the Embassy's failure to be alert to the possible security implications of Miss Ritchie's attitude to sexual matters in general and her relationship to the Egyptian diplomat in particular would be both unfair and unhelpful. They have fully explored with all the Embassy witnesses concerned the areas in which they, as individuals, were open to potential criticism, and are satisfied with their explanations.

4. Even if the damage to the country's interests from this affair has not been great, it illustrates the fact that people in the public services who allow themselves to enter upon such relationships as that between Miss Ritchie and the Egyptian diplomat need to be aware of the dangers and pressures to which the relationships may make them vulnerable, and should not be surprised if such relationships become a matter of concern to ~~their superior~~ ^{their superior} management. Those responsible for the maintenance of security cannot afford to ignore or leave unresolved significant suspicions about individual behaviour. This fact lay behind the Security Commission's recommendation, in its report on the Prime case, that more emphasis should be placed on the responsibility of line managers for security supervision. I endorse the Commission's welcome in its present report for the strengthened statement of the precepts governing these matters which the Head of the Diplomatic Service issued to all Heads of Divisions on 17 September 1982.

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
THE RT HON MICHAEL FOOT MP, HOUSE OF COMMONS

The Security Commission have now submitted their report on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie, which was remitted to them on 21 December 1982. I should like to publish this report before Parliament rises for the Recess.

I am enclosing with this letter, for the present on Privy Counsellor terms, a copy of the text of the report as prepared for publication. It is as submitted by the Security Commission, save for six minor drafting amendments to protect particular aspects of security (mainly the source of the reports about Miss Ritchie which reached the Security Service). Nothing substantive has been omitted. If you thought it was important to know exactly what the amendments are, the Secretary of the Cabinet would ~~be perfectly content to~~ come and show them to you.

As you will see, the report does not contain any ~~startling~~ ^{major} conclusions or recommendations for changes of security procedure. Given that, I should be inclined to announce publication of the report by way of a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, to which the text of the report could be annexed in Hansard. ~~The alternative would be for me to make an oral statement and publish the report as a White Paper; but I really~~ ^{doubt} ~~wonder~~ whether either the length ^{or} ~~and~~ the substance of ~~report would justify that.~~ ^{justify}

If you agree, I should be grateful if you would
~~I should be grateful if you could let me know~~
~~whether you are content for me to proceed by way of~~
~~a Written Answer. If so, I hope that you would agree~~
~~to put the~~ ^a question down to me ^{tomorrow} on the following
lines, ^{for written answer on Thursday 28 July:}

To ask the Prime Minister, whether she has
received the Security Commission's report on
the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie.

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10 DOWNING STREET

9
B/C B. Ingham

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has seen your submission of 22 July (AO83/2194) attaching the report of the Security Commission on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie. She has commented "A White Paper seems a bit much for this report. If the Commission agreed, it could be substantially shorter without losing any of the material facts and could then be given as a written reply. In any event, I would much prefer that".

Could you please see whether the report of the Security Commission could be sufficiently shortened, for example, by omitting the formal introductory paragraphs, to make it possible to publish it either in a written reply or in the Official Report pursuant to a written reply.

B/E

The Prime Minister's written statement could then also be very much shorter, since it would not be necessary to summarise in it the factual material in the Security Commission's report.

As regards the date of publication, the Prime Minister is inclined to prefer Friday, in reply to an arranged Parliamentary Questions put down on Thursday: perhaps you would let me know whether you see any objection to that.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Mr. Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Mr. Steel (Law Officers' Department).

BER BUTLER

July
25 June, 1983

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PRIME MINISTER

I find the attached submission depressing. We seem to me to be making very heavy weather of what was a trivial case, and publication of the Security Commission Report on Miss Ritchie will provide a feast for the salacious appetites of newspaper readers.

I have wondered whether we could avoid publishing the Report at all. But you announced* the reference to the Security Commission and cleared it with the Leader of the Opposition, and I think that you could not forbear from showing it to him. I should expect that the Leader of the Opposition would press for publication and, if this is right, perhaps it is best to volunteer it.

Do you agree?

Are you content that the Security Commission Report should be published as a White Paper on Thursday 28 July?

Do you agree that the written answer (to which I have suggested one or two amendments) should be given in your name on the same day as publication?

F.R.B.

* On checking the announcement I find that it included the words "The Security Commission's findings will be laid before the House to the fullest extent compatible with national security."

22 July 1983

A White Paper seems a bit much for this report. If the Commission agreed, it could be substantially shorter without losing any of the material facts and could then be given as a written reply. In any event

words used in the White Paper

Ref. A083/2200

MR BUTLER

I attach a submission to the Prime Minister about the Security Commission's report on Miss Rhona Ritchie.

2. There are two points which I would like to make to the Prime Minister but not to repeat in the copies of the submission that go to her colleagues.

3. First, I think that the Security Commission have let both Miss Ritchie herself and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office off pretty lightly.

4. You will see from the report that she led an active and varied sex life, and was pretty open about it. You will also see that she took advice from the British Embassy in Israel as to whether she could allow a relationship to develop between herself and an Israeli official. Embassy officials advised against it. She nonetheless went ahead and had a brief affair with the Israeli official. She did not seek advice before letting her connection with the Egyptian diplomat develop into a sexual relationship. It is very difficult to believe that she did not know what she was doing, though I suppose that she may have thought that she could get from him as much as she was giving to him.

5. As to the British Embassy, I can see that they were in a dilemma. Miss Ritchie's relationships were her business, and those who knew about them thought that she could manage them discreetly. But Miss Ritchie's propensity to have love affairs should have been known to them from her PV report as well as from what was known to some members of the staff. In a relatively small community, particularly in one so close and vulnerable as an Embassy overseas, it is perhaps surprising that the people at the top of the Embassy did not know, or (if they did have some knowledge) did not explicitly warn Miss Ritchie to be careful about the relationships which she formed and not to allow them to be exploited in the way they were.

6. But the Security Commission have reached a view, and we have to take it as it is. As far as Miss Ritchie is concerned, I am inclined to accept the view that she has been sufficiently punished. So far as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is concerned, I have made

I imagine that in this comment Sir R. Armstrong is referring to intelligence!

clear to Sir Antony Acland my view that they have got off pretty lightly. The last paragraph of the draft statement is an attempt very obliquely to underline this point.

7. The other matter relates to the Leader of the Opposition. The conventions require us to tell the Leader of the Opposition what amendments we have made to a report on grounds of national security. I am not very anxious to send Mr Foot an unamended text,

I think that the best way out of this dilemma may be for the Prime Minister to write to Mr Foot, when we have a final proof of the Security Commission's report as printed, explaining that the text has been very slightly amended in five places to protect particular areas of national security (in fact, the sources of the reports which reached the Security Service); and that, if he considered that it was important to know exactly what those amendments were, the Secretary of the Cabinet would be very glad to wait on him and show him what they were. With any luck Mr Foot might not think it necessary to take advantage of this offer.

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RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 July 1983

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Ref. A083/2194

PRIME MINISTER

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The Security Commission submitted to you on 28 June their report on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie.

2. At the time when their report was submitted they were not clear whether you intended to publish it. When I said that I thought that you would wish to do so, they indicated that they would wish to modify certain of the references to Miss Ritchie's love life before she took up her duties in the British Embassy in Israel. They considered that she had already been sufficiently punished for conduct which the Attorney General described as foolish rather than wicked by being prosecuted, and by the publicity attached to her trial. When this report is published, the publicity is bound to be revived: the Commission think it reasonable to spare Miss Ritchie unnecessary embarrassment and publicity in respect of matters which occurred before she took up her duties.
3. The amendments which the Security Commission have made to their report on this account are shown in red on the copy attached.
4. I have also asked the Security Commission to agree certain amendments proposed by the Government on grounds of security or national interest.

The Security Commission have agreed all the amendments which I have proposed on this account. They are shown in black on the attached copy.

5. I think that the report is a little too long to be published as an annex to a Written Answer in the House of Commons. I therefore recommend that it be published as a White Paper on Thursday 28 July. The report as amended is being printed accordingly.

6. I also attach a draft statement by you, which has been agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Security Service. I have assumed that you would want to make this statement in the

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form of a Written Answer to an arranged Parliamentary Question, because I do not think that this matter warrants an oral statement. But the draft could of course be easily adapted as an oral statement, if you took a different view.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute and of the attachments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Attorney General.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 July 1983

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To ask the Prime Minister, whether she has received the Security Commission's report on the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie.

I have now received the Commission's report, which is being laid before Parliament as a Command paper this afternoon. The text of the Commission's report has been slightly amended at certain points to protect particular areas of security: but nothing ^{material to the main issue} [substantive] has been omitted.

I suggest

2. Miss Ritchie was a First Secretary in the British Embassy at Tel Aviv, who was discovered to have passed the substance of classified documents to an Egyptian diplomat in Tel Aviv with whom she was having an affair. She pleaded guilty to an offence of wrongful communication of information under section 2(1)(a) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and received a suspended sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

The Security Commission were asked:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Rhona Jane Ritchie, who was convicted on 29 November 1982 of an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to

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advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable."

3. The Security Commission have confirmed the assessment made by my Rt Hon and Learned Friend the Attorney General at Miss Ritchie's trial, that the damage to the country's interests resulting from Miss Ritchie's disclosures was not great, and lay in the breach of confidence and trustworthiness that they implied rather than in the nature of the disclosures themselves. The material which she admitted to having disclosed was graded no higher than confidential, and its disclosures would have been prejudicial to the conduct of international relations rather than damaging to security. There is no evidence that she made any disclosure of material more highly graded than confidential. My Rt Hon and Learned Friend described her as "more foolish than wicked".

4. Miss Ritchie's official and professional contacts with the Egyptian diplomat concerned were inherited from her predecessor in the British Embassy at Tel Aviv and were well known to and

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I suggest that we
could omit this sentence
and make the amendment
to the following one.

approved by her superiors there. [Sufficient
was known to some members of the Embassy
about her attitude on sexual relationships
as to make it hardly a matter of surprise
that there should be gossip about her
having an affair with the Egyptian diplomat.
This] ^{that she was having an affair with the Egyptian diplomat} gossip [came to the notice of the
Defence and Military Attache in January
1982, and he reported it to the newly
appointed Head of Chancery; but the Head of
Chancery did not then feel that he had
sufficient ground either to question
Miss Ritchie directly or to report what he
had been told to the Ambassador. The
reports which came to the notice of the
Security Service came before the Head of
Chancery had any occasion to take the
matter further.

5. The Security Commission have fully
explored with all the Embassy witnesses
concerned the areas in which they, as
individuals, were open to potential
criticism, and are satisfied with their
explanations. The Commission consider that
any general criticism of the Embassy's
failure to be alert to the possible security
implications of Miss Ritchie's attitude to
sexual matters in general and her relation-
ship to the Egyptian diplomat in particular
would be both unfair and unhelpful.

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6. Even if the damage to the country's interests from this affair has not been great, it illustrates the fact that people in the public services who allow themselves to enter upon such relationships as that between Miss Ritchie and the Egyptian diplomat need to be aware of the dangers and pressures to which the relationships may make them vulnerable; and should not be surprised if such relationships become a matter of concern to ^{their superior} management. They have to accept the fact that those responsible for the maintenance of security and for the management of staff (of which personnel security is inevitably one aspect) cannot afford to ignore or leave unresolved significant suspicions about individual behaviour. This fact lay behind the Security Commission's recommendation, in its report on the Prime case, that more emphasis should be placed on the responsibility of line managers for security supervision. I endorse the Commission's welcome in its present report for the strengthened statement of the precepts governing these matters which the Head of the Diplomatic Service issued to all Heads of Mission on 17 September 1982.

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PRIME MINISTER

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COMMISSION
ON THE CASE OF MISS RHONA RITCHIEINTRODUCTION

1. On 29 November 1982 Rhona Jane McIntyre Ritchie pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to one offence of wrongful communication of information under section 2(1)(a) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. That is the provision which makes it an offence for a person who holds office under Her Majesty, and who has obtained information owing to that position, to communicate that information to another person otherwise than in accordance with an authority or duty so to do. The maximum penalty for the offence is 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both. Miss Ritchie was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment suspended for 12 months.

2. On 23 December 1982 you asked the Security Commission to investigate and report on the case with the following terms of reference:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Rhona Jane Ritchie, who was convicted on 29 November 1982 of an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable."

CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY

3. In the course of our investigation we have met on 12 occasions. We have considered the following written material:

- (a) transcript of the trial;
- (b) brief for the prosecution and relevant enclosures;

(c) memoranda from the Security Service and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO);

(d) all papers relating to Miss Ritchie's Positive Vetting (PV);

(e) letter from Mr M E Pike, Head of Chancery at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv from September 1978 to mid January 1982.

We received oral evidence from the witnesses named in Appendix A.

4. We repeat what we said in paragraph 2.6 of Cmnd 8876 in appreciation of all the help we have had from Mr Rex Davie and Mrs Sally Sutton in this case, as in the case of Prime. The delay in submitting this Report, which we regret, has been caused partly by the priority we gave to the case of Prime, partly by the difficulty of finding convenient dates to take oral evidence from witnesses still serving in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, partly by the subsequent absence abroad of one of our members.

HISTORY OF EVENTS

5. Miss Ritchie was born on 15 June 1952. She is the daughter of Scottish medical practitioners. She graduated from Glasgow University in 1973 with an honours degree in law. She spent a few months as a research assistant with the Scottish Law Commission in Edinburgh and then studied at the Faculty of Law at Aix-en-Provence University before returning to Glasgow in 1974 as a temporary lecturer in jurisprudence (1974-75) and thereafter a lecturer in European law (1975-79). She was also an assistant warden (1976-78) and deputy warden (1978-79) at halls of residence.

6. On 3 December 1978 Miss Ritchie applied to join the Diplomatic Service. She was granted PV clearance on 8 August 1979.

a ground for refusal of PV clearance.

7. Miss Ritchie joined the FCO on 3 September 1979 and first worked in London in the Hong Kong and General Department. In March 1980 the FCO wrote to the British Embassy in Tel Aviv about her, proposing that she should in due course replace Dr W G Harris, who was then First Secretary in Chancery. The Ambassador at that time, ^{Mr.} John Robinson, was happy to accept her. She was posted to Israel in August 1980, but did not join the Embassy until July 1981. She spent the intervening period studying the Hebrew language, first in a kibbutz near Tel Aviv, then at a language school in Haifa. During this period her principal contact with the Embassy was through Dr Harris. In July 1981 she replaced Dr Harris at the Embassy, initially in the rank of Second Secretary. Shortly before her recall to England in March 1982 she was promoted to First Secretary. Throughout her service at the Embassy she was, as Dr Harris had been, ~~the senior Chancery member of the staff~~ directly responsible to the Head of Chancery.

8.

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9. Miss Ritchie was recalled to London. She returned on 14 March 1982. She did not know the true purpose of the recall. Immediately on return she was interviewed by the Security Service. She admitted her affair with Ansari and that she had disclosed classified information to him. When it had become apparent that she had committed an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, the case was handed over to the Metropolitan Police.

10. The details of the prosecution of Miss Ritchie are on record. It would serve no purpose to examine them at length in this Report. A summary of the principal features of the case will suffice. The single count in the indictment to which Miss Ritchie pleaded guilty was a "specimen charge". The prosecution was presented on the basis, accepted by the defence, that Miss Ritchie had disclosed to Ansari the contents of six telegrams all classified CONFIDENTIAL. The case for the prosecution depended entirely on Miss Ritchie's own admissions. Her conduct was, in our opinion, accurately described by the Attorney General as "more foolish than wicked". The Attorney General, in his opening, also summarised fairly and accurately the nature of the damage caused by the disclosures, as follows:

"The damage to our country's interests was not, in the event, great. Egypt is a friendly power and most of the information she has admitted conveying would have become public knowledge in due course anyway. The mischief lay in the very fact of the breach of confidentiality and the inevitable doubts about our trustworthiness and security which the discovery of her conduct must have given rise to in the minds of other interested parties. Those Governments with whom we enjoy harmonious relationships have a right to expect that confidential exchanges will remain confidential."

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

11.

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12. In our view, the only security significance of this case is in the difficult area of sexual relationships between members of the staff of British Missions overseas and foreign nationals. We set out in Appendix B relevant extracts from Diplomatic Service Procedure instructions which were in force at the material time. We set out at Appendix C relevant extracts from a letter dated 17 September 1982 under the heading "Personnel Security" from Sir Antony Acland, as Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

13. We have explored the aspect of the case referred to in the foregoing paragraph very fully with all the FCO witnesses. Had he been in England, we should also have wished to see Mr Pike. As he is now British Ambassador in Hanoi, we first wrote to him inviting answers to a number of specific and detailed questions. He replied indicating that he would have preferred to give evidence to us orally, but nevertheless answering all our questions very fully and helpfully. Since we had no ground whatever to question the account given in Mr Pike's letter, we judged that it would not be justifiable to ask that he return to England to give evidence to us orally.

14. During the period of her stay in Israel before she joined

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the Embassy, Miss Ritchie had a number of lovers,

an Israeli

Government official with whom she had a brief affair. Shortly after she joined the Embassy she became Ansari's mistress. This became, on her side, a serious emotional involvement. Ansari was a jealous lover who demanded that she should not go out with any other man. She accepted this demand. Ansari was in fact married, but represented to Miss Ritchie that he was separated from his wife. Her affair with Ansari continued until her recall to England.

15. In examining what was known to members of the staff of the Embassy regarding Miss Ritchie's sexual relationships, it is appropriate to approach separately the period before and the period after she joined the Embassy, to which, for obvious reasons, very different considerations apply from the security point of view.

16. During the period before Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy, it became known to Dr Harris that she had a number of lovers, of which she made no secret from Dr Harris and his wife.

He said in

evidence:

"I did not see her as a security risk. You have to remember too that she was a very ambitious, career-minded girl, very intelligent, very capable, and I thought perfectly capable of handling a discreet private life according to her own judgements and not allowing it to impinge on her professional life."

He made no report to Mr Pike, as Head of Chancery, about these

● matters. As regards the Israeli official, however, Miss Ritchie sought Dr Harris' advice as to whether it would be acceptable if a relationship developed between them. He advised her against it. He reported this conversation to Mr Pike, who agreed with the advice given. Mr Pike and Dr Harris both assumed that Miss Ritchie had accepted this advice. We know only from Miss Ritchie herself that she had a brief affair with the Israeli official. Mr Pike has assured us, and we accept, that he knew nothing of Miss Ritchie's sexual relationships in Israel before she joined the Embassy.

17. Turning to the period after Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy and her affair with Ansari, it is essential to a fair judgement to appreciate the professional and diplomatic background to their relationship. We cannot do better than to describe this in the language of Mr Pike's letter to us, which we quote:

"Miss Ritchie took over the contact with Ansari from Dr Harris in July, 1981, shortly after her move to the Embassy in Tel Aviv. (Dr Harris had been in close touch with Ansari since shortly after the latter's arrival). Ansari, who had previously served in London, spoke excellent English and was intelligent and forthcoming. Dr Harris had found the relationship professionally fruitful and it was very much in the Embassy's, and HMG's, interests, to maintain contact with Ansari at a time when complex and sustained negotiations were continuing between the Israelis, Egyptians and Americans on the implementation of the Camp David Agreement and, in particular, on the normalisation of relations between Israel and Egypt. Dr Harris' relationship - and later Miss Ritchie's - reflected the excellent relations between Britain and

Egypt at the time: Egypt was regarded as a friendly country, whose views on many aspects of the Arab/Israel problem paralleled our own. Contact was maintained at all levels in Cairo, London and elsewhere including, of course, Tel Aviv.

"Against this background, it was perfectly natural and desirable that Miss Ritchie should take over Dr Harris' responsibility. She did so with my own, and the Ambassador's full approval On the evidence available at the time their relationship seemed perfectly normal. They saw each other for meals occasionally and Miss Ritchie reported regularly, and in detail, on her contacts. She and Ansari were also members of the junior diplomats' club which was confined to diplomats of the rank of First Secretary and below. It sponsored talks by Israeli, and other, speakers on subjects of current political and economic interests and arranged social events at local hotels."

18. We are satisfied that the sexual relationship between Miss Ritchie and Ansari was not in fact known to or suspected by Mr Pike at any time before he left Tel Aviv at the end of January 1982, or Mr Moberly, who took over as Ambassador in Tel Aviv in the same month as Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy, at any time before *the first week of March 1982.*

We have not considered that it would be profitable to investigate in detail how far the relationship was known to or suspected by more junior members of the Embassy staff. We consider in the next paragraph the evidence of Colonel Boucher, the Defence and Military Attache, and Mr Prendergast, who succeeded Mr Pike as Head of Chancery on 1 February 1982.

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19. Some time after Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy Colonel Boucher heard gossip

which he considered unreliable, that she was having an affair with Ansari. Later, at a party where he saw Miss Ritchie and Ansari together, he could see that they were good friends but saw nothing to suggest that they were lovers. About the third week in February Mr Prendergast and Colonel Boucher had a long, informal conversation, in which Mr Prendergast questioned Colonel Boucher about a number of members of the Embassy staff, including Miss Ritchie. Colonel Boucher repeated to Mr Prendergast the substance of the gossip he had heard, save that, according to Mr Prendergast's recollection, which we accept, he did not name Ansari but mentioned "a young Egyptian diplomat". Mr Prendergast soon appreciated, from his own discussion of professional matters with Miss Ritchie, that Ansari must have been the man to whom Colonel Boucher intended to refer. Mr Prendergast, however, did not at this time feel that he had any sufficient ground either to question Miss Ritchie directly regarding her relationship with Ansari or to report what he had been told to the Ambassador. Miss Ritchie was herself planning to give a party early in March to welcome Mr Prendergast as a new arrival, which, as Mr Prendergast knew, was also to be attended by Ansari. He decided that there was no need, as he put it, "to take urgent action" until he had the opportunity to meet Ansari in Miss Ritchie's company. In the event, the reports referred to in paragraph 8 above were received before the party took place.

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CONCLUSIONS

20. In a case such as this it would be extremely easy to be wise after the event and to say that the responsible staff at the British Embassy should have been alert to the possible security implications of Miss Ritchie's attitude to sexual matters in general and of her relationship with Ansari in particular, and should have taken some step to forestall her unauthorised disclosures of classified information. On mature consideration we are satisfied that such a general criticism would be both unfair and unhelpful. We have fully explored with all the Embassy witnesses who gave oral evidence to us, and with Mr Pike in our exchange of correspondence, the areas in which they, as individuals, were open to potential criticism, and we are satisfied with their explanations.

21. The precepts prescribed for Heads of Mission in Appendix C are, in our view, wholly admirable and, we trust, will always be brought personally to the attention of all Heads of Missions on first appointment. The difficulty of applying those precepts in the infinite variety of situations which may arise in the course of diplomatic life and, more particularly, the difficulty of distinguishing the sexual liaison with security implications from that which can be regarded as a purely private affair present problems which no recommendation can help to resolve.

SECRET

BRIDGE OF HARWICH

(The Rt Hon the Lord Bridge of Harwich)

(Chairman)

HUGH GRIFFITHS

(The Rt Hon Lord Justice Griffiths MC)

ALLEN OF ABBEYDALE

(The Lord Allen of Abbeydale GCB)

HUGH BEACH

(General Sir Hugh Beach GBE KCB MC)

28 June 1983

SECRET

LIST OF WITNESSES

Sir Antony Acland KCMG KCVO : Permanent Under-Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
and Head of the Diplomatic Service

Mr J K E Broadley : Head of Security Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr P H Moberly CMG : HM Ambassador, Tel Aviv, from
July 1981

Mr W K Prendergast : Head of Chancery, Tel Aviv, from
February 1982

Colonel W S H Boucher : Defence and Military Attache, Tel
Aviv, from June 1980 to February 1983

Dr W G Harris : First Secretary, Tel Aviv, from
March 1978 to September 1981

~~Sir John Jones KCB CMG~~ ^{and} ~~Director-General, Security Service.~~

~~Mr C O Shipp OBE~~ ~~Deputy Director-General, Security
Service~~

Miss R J M Ritchie

EXTRACTS FROM "DIPLOMATIC SERVICE PROCEDURE"
INSTRUCTIONS IN FORCE DURING MISS RITCHIE'S SERVICE IN TEL AVIV

THE ANNUAL PERSONNEL SECURITY CERTIFICATE AND DEFECTS OF CHARACTER

...

3. Heads of Mission should therefore ensure that they and the senior members of their staff know the whole Mission, including UK-based officers on loan or attached from other Government Departments and local staff, well enough to spot in good time such danger signals as heavy drinking, undue extravagance, unexplained overstrain or nervous trouble and sexual irregularities. This may call for remedial action at the Post without reference to London, but the possible security implications should be borne in mind.

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SECURITY DUTIES OF A HEAD OF CHANCERY

7. Morale and Security

...

7.3 A distinction should be made between behaviour that may be considered undesirable on social or moral grounds and behaviour which may be dangerous on security grounds. For example, sexual relations between single people do not normally expose them to blackmail, although they may suggest to a hostile intelligence officer that one or both of those concerned is a likely target for sexual compromise. (No sex with a communist national is safe, however.) The adulterer, on the other hand, may easily be subject to blackmail if one or both of the parties wish the affair to remain unknown. All sexual deviation, whether by men or women, raises an immediate presumption of vulnerability to hostile intelligence operation. And what may pass as acceptable behaviour in London may attract unfriendly attention at Posts abroad. The

security implications of an irregular private life are explained to officers when they first join the Service and they are reminded of these at intervals thereafter. However, it is a very effective reinforcement of security awareness (and often a personal kindness) if new arrivals, and particularly young single people coming to their first Post, are given friendly guidance about unfamiliar attitudes or problems they could encounter in local society.

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7.6 Very often suspicions about individual behaviour are shadowy and inconclusive. However, in the public interest, they cannot be ignored, and a Head of Chancery should not hesitate to write to Security Department if he has unresolved doubts about an individual. Such letters are handled exclusively in Security Department, and doubts which in the event turn out to be unfounded or without security significance will have no effect on someone's career.

EXTRACTS FROM SIR ANTONY ACLAND'S LETTER OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1982
TO ALL HEADS OF MISSIONSEMOTIONAL LIAISONS

...

6. The Annex is a reminder of the need to be especially alert to the possible security implications of emotional relationships between our staff, whether married or not, and foreign nationals, whether diplomats or not. This is a difficult area. Emotional liaisons with nationals from friendly countries, such as those in NATO and the EEC, are unlikely to be a security concern. But, whatever the nationality of the other partner, if you have any doubts in a particular case, it is not good enough to hope that the problem will go away; the personal particulars of the partner should be sent to Security Department ~~for checks to be made~~. If staff consider that this represents an unacceptable intrusion into their private life, you should explain that it is better to be safe than sorry and that there have been too many cases in which the emotions of staff have been exploited ruthlessly by hostile intelligence services.

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8. We are not concerned primarily with the morality of liaisons, whether heterosexual or homosexual, but with their security implications. Indiscriminate and promiscuous sexual activity is of special concern, because it is more likely than a more stable relationship to come to the attention of hostile intelligence agencies and to be exploited, whether the officer is married or single. (In addition, of course, it can bring discredit on the Service and on that ground alone cannot be condoned.)

THE NEED TO TAKE SPECIAL CARE OF THOSE ON THEIR FIRST POSTING

9. Finally, I should like you to pay particular attention to

staff on their first posting overseas. Even though they have have lived overseas and travelled widely before joining the Service, their first exposure to the life of a Mission, with its privileges and temptations as well as its hardships, can sometimes lead to a breakdown in self-discipline. Staff on their first posting should be welcomed and made to feel at home, without of course being nannied. Where they have diplomatic and representational responsibility, they should also be quite clear about the rules for passing on classified information to diplomatic colleagues and officials of the government to which you are accredited. The general principles are laid down in DSR 12, but these will need to be expanded to take account of your local situation. Please make sure that your Post Security Regulations deal comprehensively with this point, and that all staff are briefed to consult their superior officers if they are in doubt.

File

DS

29 June 1983

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 28 June covering the Security Commission's report in the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie. I will lay this before the Prime Minister.

E. E. R. BUTLER

The Right Honourable The Lord Bridge of Harwich

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Lord Bridge of Harwich submitting the Security Commission's report in the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie. I have sent an acknowledgment saying that I will lay Lord Bridge's letter and report before the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful if you would advise me on the handling of this report. I am not enclosing a copy of the report, on the assumption that you already have one.

E. E. R. BUTLER

29 June 1983

RESTRICTED



The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1

28 June 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

I now have pleasure in submitting the Security Commission's report in the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie.

*Yours sincerely
Bridge of Harwich*

LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH

SECRET

7

COPY NO 01

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COMMISSION

June 1983

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COMMISSION
ON THE CASE OF MISS RHONA RITCHIE

INTRODUCTION

1. On 29 November 1982 Rhona Jane McIntyre Ritchie pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to one offence of wrongful communication of information under section 2(1)(a) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. That is the provision which makes it an offence for a person who holds office under Her Majesty, and who has obtained information owing to that position, to communicate that information to another person otherwise than in accordance with an authority or duty so to do. The maximum penalty for the offence is 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both. Miss Ritchie was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment suspended for 12 months.

2. On 23 December 1982 you asked the Security Commission to investigate and report on the case with the following terms of reference:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Rhona Jane Ritchie, who was convicted on 29 November 1982 of an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable."

CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY

3. In the course of our investigation we have met on 12 occasions. We have considered the following written material:

- (a) transcript of the trial;
- (b) brief for the prosecution and relevant enclosures;

(c) memoranda from the Security Service and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO);

(d) all papers relating to Miss Ritchie's Positive Vetting (PV);

(e) letter from Mr M E Pike, Head of Chancery at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv from September 1978 to mid January 1982.

We received oral evidence from the witnesses named in Appendix A.

4. We repeat what we said in paragraph 2.6 of Cmnd 8876 in appreciation of all the help we have had from Mr Rex Davie and Mrs Sally Sutton in this case, as in the case of Prime. The delay in submitting this Report, which we regret, has been caused partly by the priority we gave to the case of Prime, partly by the difficulty of finding convenient dates to take oral evidence from witnesses still serving in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, partly by the subsequent absence abroad of one of our members.

HISTORY OF EVENTS

5. Miss Ritchie was born on 15 June 1952. She is the daughter of Scottish medical practitioners. She graduated from Glasgow University in 1973 with an honours degree in law. She spent a few months as a research assistant with the Scottish Law Commission in Edinburgh and then studied at the Faculty of Law at Aix-en-Provence University before returning to Glasgow in 1974 as a temporary lecturer in jurisprudence (1974-75) and thereafter a lecturer in European law (1975-79). She was also an assistant warden (1976-78) and deputy warden (1978-79) at halls of residence.

6. On 3 December 1978 Miss Ritchie applied to join the Diplomatic Service. She was granted PV clearance on 8 August 1979.

a ground for refusal of PV clearance.

7. Miss Ritchie joined the FCO on 3 September 1979 and first worked in London in the Hong Kong and General Department. In March 1980 the FCO wrote to the British Embassy in Tel Aviv about her, proposing that she should in due course replace Dr W G Harris, who was then First Secretary in Chancery. The Ambassador at that time, Sir John Robinson, was happy to accept her. She was posted to Israel in August 1980, but did not join the Embassy until July 1981. She spent the intervening period studying the Hebrew language, first in a kibbutz near Tel Aviv, then at a language school in Haifa. During this period her principal contact with the Embassy was through Dr Harris. In July 1981 she replaced Dr Harris at the Embassy, initially in the rank of Second Secretary. Shortly before her recall to England in March 1982 she was promoted to First Secretary. Throughout her service at the Embassy she was, as Dr Harris had been, the senior Chancery member of the staff directly responsible to the Head of Chancery.

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

9. Miss Ritchie was recalled to London. She returned on 14 March 1982. She did not know the true purpose of the recall. Immediately on return she was interviewed by the Security Service. She admitted her affair with Ansari and that she had disclosed classified information to him. When it had become apparent that she had committed an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, the case was handed over to the Metropolitan Police.

10. The details of the prosecution of Miss Ritchie are on record. It would serve no purpose to examine them at length in this Report. A summary of the principal features of the case will suffice. The single count in the indictment to which Miss Ritchie pleaded guilty was a "specimen charge". The prosecution was presented on the basis, accepted by the defence, that Miss Ritchie had disclosed to Ansari the contents of six telegrams all classified CONFIDENTIAL. The case for the prosecution depended entirely on Miss Ritchie's own admissions. Her conduct was, in our opinion, accurately described by the Attorney General as "more foolish than wicked". The Attorney General, in his opening, also summarised fairly and accurately the nature of the damage caused by the disclosures, as follows:

"The damage to our country's interests was not, in the event, great. Egypt is a friendly power and most of the information she has admitted conveying would have become public knowledge in due course anyway. The mischief lay in the very fact of the breach of confidentiality and the inevitable doubts about our trustworthiness and security which the discovery of her conduct must have given rise to in the minds of other interested parties. Those Governments with whom we enjoy harmonious relationships have a right to expect that confidential exchanges will remain confidential."

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

11.

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12. In our view, the only security significance of this case is in the difficult area of sexual relationships between members of the staff of British Missions overseas and foreign nationals. We set out in Appendix B relevant extracts from Diplomatic Service Procedure instructions which were in force at the material time. We set out at Appendix C relevant extracts from a letter dated 17 September 1982 under the heading "Personnel Security" from Sir Antony Acland, as Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

13. We have explored the aspect of the case referred to in the foregoing paragraph very fully with all the FCO witnesses. Had he been in England, we should also have wished to see Mr Pike. As he is now British Ambassador in Hanoi, we first wrote to him inviting answers to a number of specific and detailed questions. He replied indicating that he would have preferred to give evidence to us orally, but nevertheless answering all our questions very fully and helpfully. Since we had no ground whatever to question the account given in Mr Pike's letter, we judged that it would not be justifiable to ask that he return to England to give evidence to us orally.

14. During the period of her stay in Israel before she joined

the Embassy, Miss Ritchie had a number of lovers.

an Israeli
Government official with whom she had a brief affair.
Shortly after she joined the Embassy she became Ansari's
mistress. This became, on her side, a serious emotional
involvement. Ansari was a jealous lover who demanded that
she should not go out with any other man. She accepted this
demand. Ansari was in fact married, but represented to
Miss Ritchie that he was separated from his wife. Her
affair with Ansari continued until her recall to England.

15. In examining what was known to members of the staff of
the Embassy regarding Miss Ritchie's sexual relationships,
it is appropriate to approach separately the period before
and the period after she joined the Embassy, to which, for
obvious reasons, very different considerations apply from
the security point of view.

16. During the period before Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy,
it became known to Dr Harris that she had a number of lovers,
of which she made no secret from Dr Harris and his wife.

He said in
evidence:

"I did not see her as a security risk. You have to
remember too that she was a very ambitious, career-
minded girl, very intelligent, very capable, and I
thought perfectly capable of handling a discreet
private life according to her own judgements and not
allowing it to impinge on her professional life."

He made no report to Mr Pike, as Head of Chancery, about these

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matters. As regards the Israeli official, however, Miss Ritchie sought Dr Harris' advice as to whether it would be acceptable if a relationship developed between them. He advised her against it. He reported this conversation to Mr Pike, who agreed with the advice given. Mr Pike and Dr Harris both assumed that Miss Ritchie had accepted this advice. We know only from Miss Ritchie herself that she had a brief affair with the Israeli official. Mr Pike has assured us, and we accept, that he knew nothing of Miss Ritchie's sexual relationships in Israel before she joined the Embassy.

17. Turning to the period after Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy and her affair with Ansari, it is essential to a fair judgement to appreciate the professional and diplomatic background to their relationship. We cannot do better than to describe this in the language of Mr Pike's letter to us, which we quote:

"Miss Ritchie took over the contact with Ansari from Dr Harris in July, 1981, shortly after her move to the Embassy in Tel Aviv. (Dr Harris had been in close touch with Ansari since shortly after the latter's arrival). Ansari, who had previously served in London, spoke excellent English and was intelligent and forthcoming. Dr Harris had found the relationship professionally fruitful and it was very much in the Embassy's, and HMG's, interests, to maintain contact with Ansari at a time when complex and sustained negotiations were continuing between the Israelis, Egyptians and Americans on the implementation of the Camp David Agreement and, in particular, on the normalisation of relations between Israel and Egypt. Dr Harris' relationship - and later Miss Ritchie's - reflected the excellent relations between Britain and

Egypt at the time: Egypt was regarded as a friendly country, whose views on many aspects of the Arab/Israel problem paralleled our own. Contact was maintained at all levels in Cairo, London and elsewhere including, of course, Tel Aviv.

"Against this background, it was perfectly natural and desirable that Miss Ritchie should take over Dr Harris' responsibility. She did so with my own, and the Ambassador's full approval On the evidence available at the time their relationship seemed perfectly normal. They saw each other for meals occasionally and Miss Ritchie reported regularly, and in detail, on her contacts. She and Ansari were also members of the junior diplomats' club which was confined to diplomats of the rank of First Secretary and below. It sponsored talks by Israeli, and other, speakers on subjects of current political and economic interests and arranged social events at local hotels."

18. We are satisfied that the sexual relationship between Miss Ritchie and Ansari was not in fact known to or suspected by Mr Pike at any time before he left Tel Aviv at the end of January 1982, or Mr Moberly, who took over as Ambassador in Tel Aviv in the same month as Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy. at any time before

We have not considered that it would be profitable to investigate in detail how far the relationship was known to or suspected by more junior members of the Embassy staff. We consider in the next paragraph the evidence of Colonel Boucher, the Defence and Military Attache, and Mr Prendergast, who succeeded Mr Pike as Head of Chancery on 1 February 1982.

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19. Some time after Miss Ritchie joined the Embassy Colonel Boucher heard gossip

which he considered unreliable, that she was having an affair with Ansari. Later, at a party where he saw Miss Ritchie and Ansari together, he could see that they were good friends but saw nothing to suggest that they were lovers. About the third week in February Mr Prendergast and Colonel Boucher had a long, informal conversation, in which Mr Prendergast questioned Colonel Boucher about a number of members of the Embassy staff, including Miss Ritchie. Colonel Boucher repeated to Mr Prendergast the substance of the gossip he had heard, save that, according to Mr Prendergast's recollection, which we accept, he did not name Ansari but mentioned "a young Egyptian diplomat". Mr Prendergast soon appreciated, from his own discussion of professional matters with Miss Ritchie, that Ansari must have been the man to whom Colonel Boucher intended to refer. Mr Prendergast, however, did not at this time feel that he had any sufficient ground either to question Miss Ritchie directly regarding her relationship with Ansari or to report what he had been told to the Ambassador. Miss Ritchie was herself planning to give a party early in March to welcome Mr Prendergast as a new arrival, which, as Mr Prendergast knew, was also to be attended by Ansari. He decided that there was no need, as he put it, "to take urgent action" until he had the opportunity to meet Ansari in Miss Ritchie's company. In the event, the report received before the party took place.

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CONCLUSIONS

20. In a case such as this it would be extremely easy to be wise after the event and to say that the responsible staff at the British Embassy should have been alert to the possible security implications of Miss Ritchie's attitude to sexual matters in general and of her relationship with Ansari in particular, and should have taken some step to forestall her unauthorised disclosures of classified information. On mature consideration we are satisfied that such a general criticism would be both unfair and unhelpful. We have fully explored with all the Embassy witnesses who gave oral evidence to us, and with Mr Pike in our exchange of correspondence, the areas in which they, as individuals, were open to potential criticism, and we are satisfied with their explanations.

21. The precepts prescribed for Heads of Mission in Appendix C are, in our view, wholly admirable and, we trust, will always be brought personally to the attention of all Heads of Missions on first appointment. The difficulty of applying those precepts in the infinite variety of situations which may arise in the course of diplomatic life and, more particularly, the difficulty of distinguishing the sexual liaison with security implications from that which can be regarded as a purely private affair present problems which no recommendation can help to resolve.

SECRET

CHAIRMAN

Bridge of Harwich

Hugh Griffiths

Allen of Ablyddu

Hugh Beach

28 June 1983

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BRIDGE OF HARWICH

(The Rt Hon the Lord Bridge of Harwich)

(Chairman)

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28 June 1983

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Miss R J M Ritchie

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INSTRUCTIONS IN FORCE DURING MISS RITCHIE'S SERVICE IN TEL AVIV

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TO ALL HEADS OF MISSIONS

EMOTIONAL LIAISONS

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THE NEED TO TAKE SPECIAL CARE OF THOSE ON THEIR FIRST POSTING

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From: The Right Honourable the Lord Bridge of Harwich



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Security

Top Copy on Security,
Nov 82, Aldridge

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

5th January, 1983.

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you very much for your letter of 23rd December giving me the terms of your references to the Security Commission in the cases of Ritchie and Aldridge. I am grateful to you for leaving it to the Commission to decide whether to report on these cases and that of Prime separately or together.

I much appreciated having the opportunity to meet you at the Law Society's dinner before Christmas and to hear your views on the task of the Commission.

Yours sincerely
Bridge of Harwich

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON, S.W.1.



Security
26 AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

SECURITY COMMISSION : MISS RHONA RITCHIE
AND LANCE CORPORAL ALDRIDGE

Thank you for your minute of 21 December
(A082/0607).

The Prime Minister has signed letters to
Lord Bridge and Mr Foot in the terms
which you suggested, and I attach copies
of them.

F.R.B

23 December 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

23 December 1982

Dear Lord Bridge,

In the light of your advice and after consulting the Leader of the Opposition, I have decided, in accordance with the arrangements announced in 1969, formally to ask the Security Commission to investigate and report upon the cases of Rhona Jane Ritchie and Lance Corporal P.L. Aldridge. The terms of reference are:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Rhona Jane Ritchie, who was convicted on 29 November 1982 of an offence under Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable".

and "To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Lance Corporal P.L. Aldridge who has been charged with an offence under section 7 of the Official Secrets Act 1920; and to advise in the light of the investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable".

It will be for the Commission to decide whether the issues raised in these cases overlap with your current investigation into the case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime and whether to report on the three together or separately. However, until the pending criminal proceedings on the Aldridge case have been completed

/ it will

AM

it will not be possible to interrogate Aldridge himself or to make any public announcement about this reference.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Bridge of Harwich



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cc 60

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 December 1982

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 16 December about the Aldridge case.

On the point in your second paragraph, in both the Prime and Aldridge cases the view was taken that the person charged with an offence should not be interrogated for the purpose of the Security Commission's investigation until criminal proceedings were complete. In Prime's case, the information available virtually all derived from Prime's confession to the police, and it would have made little sense for the Security Commission to start an investigation until there had been some interrogation of Prime. In Aldridge's case, enough information is available to enable a useful start to be made with the investigation without having to wait for further interrogation of Aldridge.

I am accordingly proceeding with the reference of the Aldridge case to the Security Commission; but, as I told you in my earlier letter, I shall not announce the reference until the criminal proceedings are complete.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, M.P.

114

Ref. A082/0607

MR BUTLER

Top Copy on Security,
Nov '82, Case of
Intelligence corps Lance
Corporal Aldridge passing
secret information to the Soviets.

Prime Minister

Two letters attached for
signature, please.

FEBB

22.12.

Security Commission: Miss Rhona Ritchie and
Lance Corporal Aldridge

--- The Prime Minister wrote to the Leader of the Opposition on
15th December proposing that the Aldridge case should be referred
to the Security Commission and Mr Foot replied on 16th December
agreeing to the reference.

2. The way is now clear for the Prime Minister formally to
refer both the Ritchie case (as has already been announced to
Parliament) and the Aldridge case to the Commission. A draft letter
for the Prime Minister to send to Lord Bridge for this purpose
--- is attached.

--- 3. In his letter of 16th December Mr Foot also asked for an
explanation of why it is possible to refer the Aldridge case to
the Security Commission before criminal proceedings are completed
--- when it was not possible to do so in the Prime case. I attach
a self-explanatory draft of a letter which the Prime Minister might
send in reply.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

21st December 1982

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO

The Rt Hon the Lord Bridge of Harwich
House of Lords
LONDON
SW1A 0PW

SECURITY COMMISSION: MISS RHONA RITCHIE AND LANCE CORPORAL
ALDRIDGE

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"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Lance Corporal P L Aldridge who has been charged with an offence under section 7 of the Official Secrets Act 1920; and to advise in the light of the investigation whether any change in security arrange

ments is necessary or desirable."

It will be for the Commission to decide whether the issues raised in these cases overlap with your current investigation into the case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime and whether to report on the three together or separately. However, until the pending criminal proceedings on the Aldridge case have been completed it will not be possible to interrogate Aldridge himself or to make any public announcement about this reference.

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO

The Rt Hon Michael Foot, MP

Thank you for your letter of 16th December about the Aldridge case.

On the point in your second paragraph, in both the Prime and the Aldridge cases the view was taken that the person charged with an offence should not be interrogated for the purpose of the Security Commission's investigation until criminal proceedings were complete. In Prime's case, the information available virtually all derived from Prime's confession to the police, and it would have made little sense for the Security Commission to start an investigation until there had been some interrogation of Prime. In Aldridge's case, enough information is available to enable a useful start to be made with the investigation without having to wait for further interrogation of Aldridge.

I am accordingly proceeding with the reference of the Aldridge case to the Security Commission; but, as I told you in my earlier letter, I shall not announce the reference until the criminal proceedings are complete.

Security (Positive Vetting)

Q61. **Sir David Price** asked the Prime Minister whether she is satisfied that the current techniques of positive vetting achieve their declared purpose.

The Prime Minister: The adequacy of the positive vetting process and the scope for improving it will clearly be considered again by the Security Commission in the course of its current inquiries. In the meantime I have nothing to add to what I said in answer to questions in the House on my statement on 11 November 1982.

Merseyside

Q66. **Mr. Allan Roberts** asked the Prime Minister if she will visit Merseyside.

The Prime Minister: I have at present no plans to do so.

Bermondsey

Q76. **Mr. Renton** asked the Prime Minister if she will pay an official visit to Bermondsey.

The Prime Minister: I have at present no plans to do so.

Welsh Water Authority

Q77. **Mr. Wigley** asked the Prime Minister if she is satisfied with the co-ordination that exists between the Welsh Office and the Department of the Environment, in relation to those aspects of the charging policies of the Welsh Water Authority that fall within the responsibilities of central Government.

The Prime Minister: Yes.

Central Policy Review Staff

Mr. Arnold asked the Prime Minister, pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Hazel Grove on 7 December, *Official Report*, c. 437, if she will specify the job description of each of the posts which have been established in the unit supporting the chief scientist, Central Policy Review Staff.

The Prime Minister: The holders of these posts will assist the chief scientist, Central Policy Review Staff, in discharging his functions, which were set out in annex A to the Government's response to the first report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology in Session 1981-82 (Cmnd. 8591). Three posts—including the two transferred from within the Cabinet Secretariat—will be concerned primarily with support for the Advisory Council for Applied Research and Development, a fourth with the annual review of Government research and development in the context of the public expenditure survey, and the two others with co-ordination in areas—such as space and biotechnology—affecting a number of departments, and with international collaboration.

Miss Rhona Ritchie

Mr. Robert Atkins asked the Prime Minister whether, further to her reply of 30 November, *Official Report*, c. 114, to the hon. Member for Preston, North, she has decided to refer the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie to the Security Commission.

The Prime Minister: After consulting the chairman of the Security Commission and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, I have decided to refer this case to the Security Commission. The terms of reference will be:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Rhona Jane Ritchie, who was convicted on 29 November 1982 of an offence under Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable".

It will be for the commission to decide whether the issues raised in this case overlap with its current investigation into the case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime and whether to report on the two together or separately. Its findings will be laid before the House to the fullest extent compatible with national security.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT

Zimbabwe (Refugees)

Mr. Proctor asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to the reply by the right hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) to the hon. Member for Basildon of 21 June, *Official Report*, c. 18, if he will give as much information as is available as to the numbers of refugees who have been repatriated from Zimbabwe since April 1980 with British development assistance; which were the countries of destination; what has been the cost to public funds to date; what was the cost for each refugee; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Neil Marten: None. However, in response to an appeal by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, £1 million was provided in 1980 from the British aid programme to assist in meeting the cost of the return to Zimbabwe of those who, during the conflict prior to independence, had fled to neighbouring countries.

At the outset of the repatriation programme an estimated 250,000 refugees were living in camps, mainly in Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. Some returned without assistance, but an estimated 70,000 were helped to return to Zimbabwe under the UNHCR programme.

Falkland Islands

Mr. Stephen Ross asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs why it was decided to purchase timber-built homes for the Falkland Islands from a Scandinavian company; and whether he will ensure that future orders for timber-framed houses are obtained from British manufacturers.

Mr. Neil Marten: The company selected to undertake the contract for the supply and erection of houses in the Falkland Islands is a British one, buying prefabricated units from a Swedish supplier. It was chosen after careful and thorough evaluation of tenders submitted by 10 companies. Of those tenders which were within the specifications laid down, the successful one was adjudged to offer houses of the most suitable design.

In normal circumstances, contracts awarded under the aid programme are confined to British suppliers.

Overseas Students

Mrs. Dunwoody asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to the reply

of 24 November, *Official Report*, c. 489, what were his reasons for deciding to pay the National Health Service directly for any costs incurred by ill health of foreign aid-funded students, rather than taking out health insurance for these students.

Mr. Neil Marten: The general presumption is that the Government do not take out commercial insurance but bear risks directly instead. There was no reason to deviate from normal practice in this case.

Mrs. Dunwoody asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to his reply of 24 November, *Official Report*, c. 489, what he estimates the annual cost will be for paying hospitals directly for any costs incurred by the ill health of foreign aid-funded students.

Mr. Neil Marten: It is very difficult to make a firm estimate of the costs of such treatment. Experience indicates that aid-funded students, who are medically examined before coming to Britain, normally have a good health record whilst in this country and I should not expect the annual cost of hospital treatment to exceed £100,000.

EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

Universities and Polytechnics

Mr. Nicholas Winterton asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science how many places were available in (a) universities and (b) polytechnics in 1982; how many will be available in 1983; and what was the level of demand for these places in both years.

Mr. Waldegrave: The number of places available at universities and polytechnics is not known as there are no fixed targets for student entry. It is provisionally estimated that there were 79,000 undergraduate and 27,000 postgraduate full-time new entrants to universities in Great Britain in October 1982. No similar information is yet available for the polytechnics alone; but it is provisionally estimated that there were 101,000 full-time and 98,000 part-time new entrants to advanced courses in all establishments of further education in England in October 1982.

A total of 171,500 candidates applied through the universities central council on admissions for entrance to universities in the United Kingdom in 1982-83. According to the council, the number of applications received by 1 November 1982 for entry in 1983-84 was 4 per cent. up over the corresponding period for the previous year. No comparable information is available for the polytechnics.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science in which subjects demand for university and polytechnic places has (a) increased and (b) decreased in the most recent convenient period.

Mr. Waldegrave: The following table gives, in respect of the universities, those subjects for which the numbers of candidates applying through the universities central council on admissions for entry in 1982 had (a) increased by more than 5 per cent. and (b) decreased by more than 5 per cent. since 1981. An analysis over a different period would show different subjects. The subjects are those named as first choice by candidates on their application form. Similar information for the polytechnics is not available.

(a) Increase in candidates greater than 5 per cent.

Dentistry
Mining
Metallurgy
Surveying
Agricultural chemistry
Biology
Botany
Zoology
Physiology/anatomy
Biochemistry
General and combined biological sciences
Mathematics
Physics
Chemistry
Geology
Combinations of biological and physical sciences
Geography
Accountancy
Government and public administration
Sociology
Combinations of arts and social sciences, home, hotel and institutional management
Welsh and the Celtic languages and studies
Hispanic languages and studies
Russian language and studies
Other Slavonic and East European language and studies
Oriental, Asian and African language and studies
Classical studies
Combinations of arts and languages
History
Archaeology
Philosophy
Theology
Art and Design

(b) Decrease in candidates greater than 5 per cent.

Ophthalmic optics
Chemical engineering
Civil engineering
Combinations of engineering and other subjects
Agricultural biology
Forestry
Veterinary science
Other general and combined physical sciences
French

A and O-levels (Statistics)

Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1) what is the number and percentage of the school age group who passed one or more A-levels in 1979, 1980 and 1981, respectively;

(2) what number and percentage of 16-year-olds obtained one or more O-levels in 1979, 1980 and 1981, respectively.

Dr. Boyson: Information about O-level achievements is not available in the form requested. However, information on the academic attainment of school leavers in England is as follows:

England: O and A-level achievements of school leavers

	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81
<i>GCE O-level</i>			
Leavers with one or more O-level* passes ('000)	315.33	323.24	321.94
as percentage of all leavers	42.8	43.1	43.9
<i>GCE A-level</i>			
Leavers with one or more A-level passes ('000)	113.45	117.02	120.83
as percentage of the 17-year-old population	15.5	15.5	15.7

* O-level grades A-C

Source: School Leavers Sample Survey



V31F
Jr Howard

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Security

R07

B/c Mr. KICKETT
Mr INGHAM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE

MISS RHONA RITCHIE

Thank you for your minute (A082/0455). The Prime Minister has agreed that a question should be put down and answered on Tuesday, 14 December in the terms attached to your minute.

E. E. R. BUTLER

10 December, 1982

A

Prime Minister

1

Ref. A082/0455

MR BUTLER

Yes not

Are you content that we should arrange for a question to be put down to be answered in these terms on Monday or Tuesday?

Miss Rhona Ritchie

FERB

9.12.

In your minute of 6th December, enclosing the Leader of the Opposition's letter agreeing that the Ritchie case should be referred to the Security Commission, you asked for advice on the terms of an announcement.

2. I agree that this is best done by another arranged Question and I attach a draft. I will advise separately on Mr Foot's request that a debate should not be delayed as a result of this additional reference to the Commission.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9th December 1982



THE CASE OF MISS RHONA RITCHIE

To ask the Prime Minister whether, further to her reply of 30th November to the Hon Member for Preston North, she has decided to refer the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie to the Security Commission.

DRAFT ANSWER

The Prime Minister

After consulting the Chairman of the Security Commission and the rt hon Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, I have decided to refer this case to the Security Commission. The terms of reference will be:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Rhona Jane Ritchie, who was convicted on 29th November 1982 of an offence under Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable."

It will be for the Commission to decide whether the issues raised in this case overlap with their current investigation into the case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime and whether to report on the two together or separately. Their findings will be laid before the House to the fullest extent compatible with national security.



Security
26 CCs CO
- LPO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary note

~~Mr. Rockett~~
To see

Sir Robert Armstrong
will draft a reply to Foot.

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

WR
7/12

B/F | I attach a copy of a letter from the Leader of the Opposition in reply to the Prime Minister's letter about Miss Rhona Ritchie, of which I also enclose a copy. I should be grateful if you could now advise on the terms of an announcement, presumably by Written Answer.

I have shown the letter to the Lord President, and I am sending a copy of it with this minute to David Heyhoe.

FR. R. B.

6 December 1982

M1.

cc Co
LPO



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

From:
Michael Foot MP

3 December 1982

Dee Margaret

Thank you for letting me know of your ^{3.12.} intention to refer the case of Miss Rhona Ritchie to the Security Commission. This is acceptable to me.

I hope that this will not mean that we cannot have a debate on security until the Security Commission has dealt with this case. John Biffen made it clear yesterday that you are reluctant to have a debate until we have the Security Commission report on the Prime case. The Opposition's preference would be for a general debate before then but in any event we ought not to have to wait until every single case is dealt with by the Commission before we respond to the general desire in the House for such a debate.

M. Foot

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP

6 DEC 1982

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AH

SECURITY

cc Co
LPO



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 December 1982

Dear Michael,

Following the conviction and sentence of Miss Rhona Ritchie on 29 November, I have, in accordance with the procedures laid down by Harold Wilson on 25 March 1969, sought the opinion of Lord Bridge as to whether the case should be referred to the Security Commission.

The damage to national interests in this case has clearly been a great deal less than in the case of Prime. Nonetheless, there are aspects of the matter which it would be useful for the Security Commission to consider, and Lord Bridge has expressed the opinion that the case should be referred to them.

If you can let me know that you agree that the case should be referred to the Security Commission, I will make an announcement to that effect next week. I understand that Lord Bridge's intention would be that this case should be considered by the same panel as is considering the Prime case.

*Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher*

The Right Honourable Michael Foot MP

da

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Letter to Mr. Foot

attached for your signature

Ref. A082/0346

MR BUTLER

F.E.R.B.

2.12

Official Secrets: Rhona Ritchie

In paragraph 8 of my minute of 26 November, I told you that I was sending Lord Bridge a statement of the facts of the Ritchie case, and asking him whether he thought that an investigation would be likely to serve a useful purpose.

2. I have now discussed this with Lord Bridge. His view coincides very much with my own, as indicated in the minute which I sent to you. Were it not for other things that have been going on, we should probably take the view that the facts of the case do not themselves appear to call for further investigation by the Security Commission. But there is the question whether positive vetting could or should have brought Miss Ritchie's vulnerability to light; and I think that, in view of present Parliamentary comment to the effect that Lord Bridge takes too complacent a view of these matters, he would be reluctant to advise that the Ritchie case should not be the subject of an investigation by the Security Commission. His opinion accordingly is that the case should be referred; and I concur in that view.

3. I think that the case for referring the Ritchie case to the Security Commission is strengthened by the consideration that we shall probably not want to refer the Hambleton case. Even if Hambleton is found guilty, he is not a "British" spy, and his activities do not call in question British security procedures or arrangements. We shall, however, have to consider whether the Aldridge case should be referred; and, as Aldridge was positively vetted only this year, his case is relevant to the consideration of positive vetting which the Security Commission will in any case have to undertake in the context of the Prime and Ritchie cases. I am therefore, in accordance with the agreed procedure, seeking a view from Lord Bridge as to whether the Aldridge case should be referred to the Commission straightaway,

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without waiting for the trial proceedings. Before I can consult Lord Bridge, however, I shall need to take a view from the Director of Public Prosecutions, and this may take a little time. I do not think that we should hold up the process of dealing with the Ritchie case in the meantime.


4. If the Prime Minister agrees, the next step is for her to write ___ to the Leader of the Opposition. I attach a draft letter.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the letters 'RA' with a stylized flourish.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

1 December 1982

CONFIDENTIAL


DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
THE RT HON MICHAEL FOOT ESQ. MP, HOUSE OF
COMMONS

Following the conviction and sentence of Miss Rhona Ritchie on 29 November, I have, in accordance with the procedures laid down by Harold Wilson on 25 March 1969, sought the opinion of Lord Bridge as to whether the case should be referred to the Security Commission.

The damage to national interests in this case has clearly been a great deal less than in the case of Prime. Nonetheless, there are ~~certain~~ aspects of the matter which ~~it would be useful for the Security Commission to suggest that some further inquiry would be~~ ^{consider} ~~advisable,~~ and Lord Bridge has expressed the opinion that the case should be referred to ^{them.} ~~the Security Commission.~~

~~I should be glad to know whether you~~ ^{If you can let me know that you} agree that the case should be referred to the Security Commission, ^{I will} ~~If you share my~~ ~~view that it should be,~~ I propose to make an announcement to that effect next week. I understand that Lord Bridge's intention would be that this case should be considered by the same panel as is considering the Prime case.

Security

The Prime Minister: In overall terms the real value of the basic retirement pension is around 4 per cent. higher in November 1982 than in November 1978 when the rate we inherited was set. A precise figure will not be known until mid-December. It is not possible at this stage to extend this assessment beyond November 1982.

Mr. Alfred Morris asked the Prime Minister if she wishes to add to her oral reply to the right hon. Member for Manchester, Wythenshawe on 25 November regarding direct payments from the South Atlantic fund to Servicemen who were disabled in the Falklands conflict and also the clawback of London weighting allowance from disabled servicemen during hospitalisation; and if she will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: As I said on 25 November sums ranging in the main from £2,000 to £20,000 have been paid to the seriously injured. 81 such payments have now been made, the total sum paid is about £400,000. A further £1,500,000 has been given to Service charities so it can be made quickly available to meet any needs which arise among the injured. Further interim payments will be made as appropriate. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Armed Forces has today announced a change in the rules for the payment of the London pay supplement which will be backdated to 1 April 1982.

Mr. Churchill: asked the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on disbursements from the South Atlantic fund.

The Prime Minister: I have consulted the trustees and they are grateful for this opportunity to place on record some of the facts about the work of the South Atlantic fund. They are glad of the opportunity to correct some recent misleading reports about the conduct of the fund.

The fund was established to disburse money through existing charities. Subsequently it was registered as a charitable trust and the trust deed reflects the policy of using the existing experience and machinery of Service charities to achieve the fund's principal aim of meeting needs. Thus many individuals who have received help from the charities may not appreciate that the money they have received originated from the South Atlantic fund. The trustees quickly transferred £1.5 million to Service charities so that they had funds available to relieve immediately any hardship that came to their notice. They have applied this money to assist people in many ways, such as moving house, meeting educational expenses, expenses of visiting the injured in hospital, and the provision of suitably modified cars. Additionally some 200 charities were contacted and invited to give immediate assistance whenever required and subsequently to seek reimbursement.

The trustees anticipated that assessing the long term needs of the bereaved and injured comprehensively and compassionately could take some time as the Services would not wish to press individuals to come to terms with their situation and to decide how they wished to live their future lives. Interim grants totalling £1.9 million were therefore made through appropriate charities to the bereaved to meet their immediate needs pending completion of the longer term assessments, which are being conducted comprehensively, compassionately and as expeditiously as possible. The trustees are very

conscious of the wish for speed and confidentiality in reaching settlements. Specialist charities such as BLESMA and St. Dunstons are being consulted. The trustees have also informed me that compassionate medical assessments have been conducted of those most seriously injured and interim grants totalling some £400,000 have been made to help them over the rehabilitation period, again through other charities. The trustees continue to fund interim awards on a personal and confidential basis and stress that they have so far funded only a small fraction of what will be disbursed over the next four months.

Poverty Trap

Mr. Arnold asked the Prime Minister if she is satisfied with the co-ordination between the Department of Health and Social Security and the Treasury in relation to the problems caused by the poverty trap.

The Prime Minister: Yes.

Republic of Ireland

Mr. Proctor asked the Prime Minister whether she has any plans to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic; and if she will make a statement on Anglo-Irish relations.

The Prime Minister: There are no plans for a meeting at present. Our future relations with the Republic will inevitably depend on the attitude of whatever Irish Government is formed next month. It is our long term aim to foster close relations with all our European Community partners.

Regina v Ritchie

Mr. Robert Atkins asked the Prime Minister whether she will make a statement on the security implications raised by the case of Regina v Ritchie.

The Prime Minister: Miss Rhona Ritchie, a Second Secretary in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, was tried at the Central Criminal Court yesterday on charges under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. She pleaded guilty, and was given a suspended sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

The facts of the case were fully set out in yesterday's proceedings, and I need not recapitulate them here. Miss Ritchie's activities were prejudicial to the conduct of international relations, in a sensitive area of those relations, but the content of what she admits to having transmitted cannot be described as damaging to national security.

In accordance with the procedure described to the House by my predecessor on 25 March 1969, the Chairman of the Security Commission has been asked to say whether in his opinion an investigation by the Commission would be likely to serve a useful purpose, and in the light of his advice I shall consult the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission. I shall keep the House informed of further developments.

HOME DEPARTMENT

Woolwich Arsenal (Prison)

Mr. Cartwright asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what conclusions he has drawn from the feasibility studies carried out by the Property Services Agency on the possible construction of a new prison at Woolwich Arsenal; when work is now likely to start; and what is the estimated cost.

Mr. Mayhew: The Government have concluded that a local prison should be built on the Woolwich site and the Property Services Agency has been authorised to proceed with the detailed design. It is hoped that tenders will be invited in 1986 with a view to the main construction starting in 1987. The preliminary order of cost at current prices is £40 million.

Airguns

Mr. Bidwell asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will introduce legislation to ban the sale of airguns direct and by mail order to prevent them falling into the hands of young people under 17 years of age.

Mr. Mayhew: There are already restrictions on the possession of air weapons by young people and we are not persuaded that changes in the law are justified or would be effective. A publicity campaign to heighten public awareness about the dangers of air weapons misuse will take place next year. Amongst those actively involved will be voluntary organisations which work with young people.

Confidence Tricksters

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, in view of the increasing number of confidence tricksters calling at the homes of the aged and sick purporting to be officials of public utilities or local authorities, he will propose a code of practice to those bodies whose officials make home visits which would oblige these men to carry photographic identity cards and which would suggest to the public that doors should not be opened to those who do not produce such cards.

Mr. Mayhew: No; it is already the general practice of officers of local authorities and public utilities who call on householders to carry documents of identity or authority, in some cases incorporating a photograph. The Home Office and the police advise all householders always to verify the identity of callers before admitting them. A new Home Office leaflet on this subject will be generally available in the new year.

Deportation

Mr. Proctor asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many immigrants from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan have been recommended for deportation by the courts in each of the last three years.

Mr. Raison: The number of people from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan recommended by a court for deportation in the last three years, is as follows:

	<i>New Commonwealth</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
1979	389	31
1980	414	44
1981	333	40
1982 to 31 October	342	19

Mr. Proctor asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what was the total number of cases for all nationalities where it was decided not to deport the subject of a recommendation by a court in each of the last three years.

Mr. Raison: The information requested is as follows:

<i>Year</i>	<i>No.</i>
1979	124
1980	126
1981	104
1982 to 31 October	83

The relevant court recommendations may have been made in earlier years.

Mr. Proctor asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the total number of persons recommended by a court for deportation who are currently awaiting either a decision to deport or the completion of the arrangements for their deportation and who are in detention at the latest convenient date; and how many of these are citizens of Commonwealth countries, other than Australia, Canada and New Zealand, or citizens of Pakistan.

Mr. Raison: On 26 November there were 334 people detained following a recommendation for deportation by a court, in respect of whom a deportation order has been signed or whose deportation is under consideration. This figure includes persons who received custodial sentences and whose deportation cannot therefore be effected until their release date.

Of the total of 334, 183 were citizens of Commonwealth countries other than Australia, New Zealand and Canada; and 32 were citizens of Pakistan.

Mr. Proctor asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what was the total number of persons of all nationalities who were deported following a recommendation of a court in each of the last three years.

Mr. Raison: The information requested is as follows:

<i>Year</i>	<i>No.</i>
1979	509
1980	616
1981	576
1982 to 31 October	429

Mr. Proctor asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his Department has issued any guidelines to the courts on recommendations for deportation since April 1981; and whether he has any plans to do so in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Raison: No. We shall in due course be issuing circulars about the Criminal Justice Act 1982 which will, among other things, notify courts of the provisions in the Act relating to recommendations for deportation.

Ref. A082/0324

MR BUTLER

Miss Ritchie pleaded guilty, and was given a suspended sentence of nine months imprisonment, at the Old Bailey today.

2. I understand that the proposed question for written answer is being put down.

3. I attach a revised version of the answer; this takes account of comments I have received from other Departments and agencies, as well as the Prime Minister's and your comments on my original draft.

4. I think that we have to be careful neither to underplay nor to overplay ^{the} significance of this case. If we underplay it, the question will arise whether the girl should have been prosecuted at all. She admitted to passing five confidential telegrams, as described in court; but we do not know that that was the limit of her breaches of security and trust.

5. The need to make any kind of statement arises from the necessity of saying something about a reference to the Security Commission. The procedure laid down in 1969 provides for an approach to the Chairman of the Security Commission to ask him whether in his opinion an investigation would be likely to serve a useful purpose, and the consultation of the Leader of the Opposition. I think that in her answer the Prime Minister should refer to both stages in this process, and I have drafted accordingly.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

29th November 1982

Tuesday 30th November 1982

(Answered by the Prime Minister on

To ask the Prime Minister, whether she will make a statement on the security implications raised by the case of Regina versus Ritchie.

Miss Rhona Ritchie, a Second Secretary in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, was tried at the Central Criminal Court yesterday on charges under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. She pleaded guilty, and was given a suspended sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

The facts of the case were fully set out in yesterday's proceedings, and I need not recapitulate them here.

Miss Ritchie's activities were prejudicial to the conduct of international relations, in a sensitive area of those relations, but *admits to having* the content of what she transmitted cannot be described as damaging to national security.

In accordance with the procedure described to the House by my predecessor on 25th March 1969, the Chairman of the Security Commission has been asked to say whether in his opinion an investigation by the Commission would be likely to serve a useful purpose, and in the light of his advice I shall consult the rt hon Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission. I shall keep the House informed of further developments.

*Let's see how
the Court deals
with the case
and whether
any questions are
put down. I don't
want to recall
cases 1, 2
every case
put*

Do you agree that we
should seek to deal with Ritchie case
by a written answer, which will probably
involve putting down the question on Monday
or answer on Tuesday?
If so, are you content with the draft
at flag A?

Ref. A082/0296

MR BUTLER

Official Secrets: Ritchie and Hambleton

FERB

26.11.

Thank you for your minute of 25 November.

2. The Ritchie case is likely to be over within the morning on 29 November, since she is expected to plead guilty. The Hambleton case is expected to run for at least a week, and perhaps for longer.

3. The two cases are quite different from each other, and from Prime. Miss Ritchie is charged under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, not under section 1; and though the charge of passing information to an Egyptian intelligence officer is serious, the damage done is trivial, particularly by comparison with Prime; and, such as it is, it is damage to international relations rather than to national security. There may be a question whether positive vetting could or should have disclosed that Miss Ritchie was liable to put herself into compromising situations which could make her vulnerable to pressure or blackmail to disclose information she should not disclose, and might not therefore be a fit person to have regular access to highly classified information.

4. Professor Hambleton, though he has dual citizenship, is basically a Canadian traitor. He betrayed Canadian and NATO secrets, but not specifically British secrets. It will be argued in court that British interests suffered from the betrayal of NATO secrets; but the case does not call in question British security procedures.

5. I have just received, and attach as briefing for the Prime Minister, copies of drafts of the opening statements by Counsel for the Crown in both cases.

6. I incline to the view that, for the purposes of answering questions or making statements, the Prime Minister should seek to keep the two cases separate. An additional argument for this is that the Ritchie case will cease to be sub judice on 29 November, so that questions can be asked on 30 November. The Hambleton case will be sub judice all next week at least.



7. The procedure laid down by the then Prime Minister on 25 March 1969 requires us, in a case where a breach of security has led to a prosecution:

- (1) to send the Chairman of the Security Commission a statement outlining the facts of the case and to ask him whether he thinks that an investigation would be likely to serve a useful purpose;
- (2) to consult the Leader of the Opposition before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission.

8. Lord Bridge is being sent a statement of the facts of the Ritchie case and asked for an opinion. I am suggesting to him that, though the facts of the case might not themselves appear to call for further investigation, the question whether positive vetting could or should have brought Miss Ritchie's vulnerability to light may be a matter to which, particularly in current circumstances, the Security Commission should give attention; and that it might therefore be sensible to refer the case to the Security Commission, to be investigated by the same panel as is conducting the inquiry into the Prime case and dealt with in the same report.

Can we not leave it to him?

✓ 9. I do not think that the Ritchie case calls for the kind of full statement that the Prime Minister has made in some previous cases - eg Blunt, Hollis and Prime. But she will need to say something about a reference to the Security Commission. She could wait to be asked; but there would be something to be said for a short written answer to an arranged PQ, which could be put down as soon as the Ritchie case is concluded. I attach a draft. She could then refer back to that answer in dealing with any other questions on the subject.

10. For next week at least, any questions on the Hambleton case can and should be sidestepped on the ground that the case is sub judice. At some stage we shall have to go through the process of consulting the Chairman of the Security Commission about a reference, but my present view is that this case will not call for a reference to the Security Commission. On this again, the Prime

CONFIDENTIAL



Minister will have to be ready to say something, but I hope that we can confine it to a written answer. I will advise further when we see how the case is going.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the letters 'R' and 'A' in a stylized, cursive script.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 November 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

THE QUEEN
AGAINST
RHONA JANE McINTYRE RITCHIE



OPENING NOTE

ALLEGATION

On various days between mid-November 1981 and some time late in January or early February 1982 the Defendant who at the time held an appointment under the Crown as Second Secretary at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv wrongfully communicated the contents of a number of confidential telegrams to an employee in the Egyptian Embassy with whom she was having an affair.

INDICTMENT

One Count, contrary to Section 2(1)(a) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 in relation to one such telegram. The Court will hear of four other telegrams. However, there are no further counts dealing with these because the substance of the case is that the defendant's conduct as a whole put the public interest at risk rather than that the disclosure of a particular telegram was itself damaging to the public interest.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

This is a very different kind of case from that which your Lordship had to deal with in this Court recently. Miss Ritchie's behaviour was more foolish than wicked. Nevertheless it involved a sad breach of the trust confided in her by virtue of her appointment and of her duty as a servant of the Crown.

What happened, put quite briefly, was this. Having formed an attachment to her opposite number at the Egyptian Embassy, she allowed herself to be so carried away by her involvement as to reveal to him the text of confidential telegrams which had come to her knowledge in the course of her duties.

The damage to our country's interests was not in the event great. Egypt is a friendly power and most of the information she has admitted conveying would have become public knowledge in due course anyway. The mischief lay in the very fact of a breach of confidentiality and the inevitable doubts about our trustworthiness and security which the discovery of her conduct must have given rise to in the minds of other interested parties.

Those Governments, with whom we enjoy harmonious relationships, have a right to expect that confidential exchanges will remain confidential.

DEFENDANT'S HISTORY

RHONA JANE McINTYRE RITCHIE

AGED 30

3rd September 1979

Appointed to the staff of The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.)

By which time on

1st August 1979

She had signed a declaration relating to the Official Secrets Act EX.1 p.1 including "I am aware that I should not divulge any information gained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorised person".

5th July 1981

She was appointed as Second Secretary at the Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Report Para.3

In due course she was promoted to First Secretary in Chancery, doing political work, although this promotion came after her unlawful activities.

Miles D.p.1

She would have seen all the telegrams from the F.C.O. to the Embassy and telegrams sent from the Embassy; unless they were subject to special restrictions.

The relevant paragraphs for the purposes of this case are:-

- 11 (Dealing with safeguarding and proper security of classified documents)
- 21 (This forbids discussion of classified matter in the presence of domestic staff and in public generally)
- 23 (which simply reminds officers that they are subject to the Official Secrets Act).

While at the Embassy she met and became friendly with an official at the Egyptian Embassy called Refaat el Ansary.

She started to go out socially with him in August 1981.

Vol.57 of the Diplomatic Service Procedure is relevant here and is also a publication with which she should have been familiar.

Para.7.4

It alerts Diplomatic Service officers to the obvious danger of intelligent services of hostile powers making contacts with nationals of neutral or friendly countries with a view to using them suborn members of our Diplomatic Service. "They should report immediately any indication that there is anything unusual arising from a contact with a national of a non-communist country".

Para.12.1

The Official Secrets Act protects all information and material obtained from official sources, whether classified or not.

DSR/12 (Diplomatic Service Regulations)

This stresses in the strongest terms the personal responsibility of Diplomatic officers for safeguarding all official information in their possession or knowledge. It makes reference to the Official Secrets Act in the following terms:- "Under the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 to 1939, it is an offence for you to disclose to an unauthorised person, either orally or in writing, any information you have acquired through your official duties unless you have received official permission. There is, however, no objection to your repeating information which

has already officially been made public".

THE TELEGRAMS

17th November 1981

No 919

EX.5 p.16

This is a telegram to UK Representative in Brussels, giving the text of a message from Lord Carrington to Mr Haig informing him of the Government's willingness to participate in the Multi National Force (MFO) and Observers

(Cont'd overleaf)

in Sinai - which was repeated to, inter alia, the British Embassy,
Tel Aviv.

As we shall see, when interviewed Miss Ritchie identified this as
one where the substance of the text was passed to Ansary.

21st November 1981

No 1773

Ex.6 p.17-20

This is a telegram to Washington repeated to Tel Aviv stating that the
text of the statement agreeing to participation in the MFO was to be
delivered to the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers the following
day.

Miss Ritchie identified a copy of this telegram and admitted she
supplied Ansary with a copy of the text.

23rd November 1981

No 186

Ex.8 p.30-32

This is a telegram to Tel Aviv giving details of an announcement to be
made in the UK Parliament agreeing to contribute to the MFO in Sinai.
The telegram would have been received in Tel Aviv about noon UK time,
the announcement being made in Parliament at 3.30 pm.

This was not shown to Miss Ritchie at the interview, but she refers to
it in such terms as to make it clear it was one of those of which she
gave what she called an 'advanced copy' to Ansary.

26th November 1981

No 1802

Ex.4 p.13-14

This is a telegram containing a message from Lord Carrington to Mr Haig
in Washington, which was repeated to a number of British Embassies
including Tel Aviv.

Miss Ritchie was shown a copy of this telegram and describes it as the
most sensitive of the telegrams she discussed with Ansary as it was not
going to be made public.

It is in respect of this telegram that Miss Ritchie is indicted.

12th January 1982

Nos 5 and 6

Ex. 9 p. 33-36

These telegrams refer to a message from Lord Carrington to the Israeli Foreign Minister about European participation in the Sinai Force. These telegrams were not available to show to Miss Ritchie at the interview, but again she mentioned a number of telegrams received between November and January relating to European Foreign Ministers understanding of their countries' participation in the MFO; she stated that when the final text had been decided in January (these are the two relevant telegrams) she told Ansary that the Government's answer was going to be given to the Israelis the following day and she admitted noting down the text and giving it to Ansary.

17th March 1982

Westcott D. p. 4

5.32 pm

Waghorn D. p. 7

Defendant was interviewed in London

Ex. 2 p. 3

Q. I have been told today that you have passed the text of certain official telegrams from The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Defence Attache Tel Aviv to an acquaintance of yours called Ansary.

A. If you put it bluntly - yes that's true. It never entered my head in any way to betray secrets.

She was then cautioned.

Q. I have been told that you passed the text of certain telegrams to Ansary. Is that true?

A. Yes, that's true.

She was shown the telegram 1802 of 26th November 1981 and identified it

Ex. 4 p. 13

She was then asked to look at other documents and point out the ones of which she had taken notes to pass to Ansary.

She dealt with:-

Ex. 5 p. 15

A telegram of 17th November 1981 which sets out the text of a message to Secretary of State Haig, about the agreement of various countries to contribute to the multi-national force in Sinai.

About it, she said:

"The substance of this text was passed to Ansary by me. You must appreciate that this is one of many telexes on the statement to be issued by the four European countries on their participation in the multi-national force in Sinai.

What I gave him was the final text of the statement which may have been fully set out in a later telegram. I only did this because I knew the statement would in any case be officially delivered/^{the}next day to the Egyptian foreign minister"

She also admitted giving Ansary the text of a statement that was to be made in Parliament on 23rd November 1981. Ex. 8 p. 30

She said:

"I only did this because I knew the statement would in any case be officially delivered the next day to the Egyptian Foreign Minister."

"There was another telegram or telegrams which are not here giving the text of the statement which would be made in Parliament on 23-11-81 I knew that this also would shortly be public knowledge and so also gave Ansary these texts."

She then made a statement under caution in writing.

Ex. 3 p. 7-12
7

At p. 9

She describes Ex. 4 p. 13 telegram No. 1802 as
"the most sensitive of the telegrams I discussed with Ansary as
it was not going to be made public but it seemed to me obvious
that the content would also be made known to the Egyptians.

About this and other documents she said :

Ex. 3 p. 10

"As before, I again felt uncomfortable in that I should not have released
it to him, but by the same token I was persuaded that this was something
that he was going to get anyway and was therefore tantamount to an
advanced copy given on a personal basis."

I was only prepared to let him see copies of final texts which I
thought he could get from other sources but I realised that this
was a breach of the rules but I never felt that I had given him
anything which he would not in any case find out from other sources.

Ex. 3 p. 11

She then deals with her personal relationship with Ansary and
completes the statement by saying:

"I am obviously aware of the Official Secrets Act but never felt
that I was breaching its spirit."

SECRET

13

REGINA v. HAMBLETON

NOTE FOR OPENING

Background

Hugh Hambleton, 60 years, was born in Canada.

He went to school in the U.K., and completed his education in Canada.

1944-46. He served in the Free French Army in N.Africa, later transferring to the Canadian Armed Forces where he was engaged in military intelligence.

Up to 1956. He worked at University in Mexico, The National Film Board of Canada and then completed 2 years at the L.S.E. in London.

1956-61. He worked for N.A.T.O. in Paris in the Economic and Finance Division.

After 1961. He returned to the L.S.E. for a short while and travelled a good deal especially to France and Spain.

From 1964 he held the post of Professor of Economics at Laval University in Quebec.

Nov. 1979, he was arrested in Canada and a certain amount of sophisticated spying equipment was seized by the R.C.M.P. (He was not prosecuted by the Canadians).

SECRET

1

June 1982. He came to London on a British passport where he was interviewed by Special Branch officers and admitted in considerable detail his activities with Russian agents over a period of some 30 years.

He is a British subject, enjoying dual British and Canadian nationality.

Although he was born in Canada, his father and grandfather were born in the U.K. By the British Nationality Act 1948 all Canadian citizens are British subjects. He holds a British passport.

Allegation

He was recruited in Canada in the late 1940's by a K.G.B. officer attached at the time to the Russian Embassy.

For 30 years he has been in almost continuous contact with Russian agents all over the world but mainly in Paris and Quebec.

In 1956, at the instigation of the Russians, he took a post in the Economics Section of N.A.T.O. which was based in Paris (at that time). Whilst there he passed over a great deal of CLASSIFIED material belonging to N.A.T.O. to Soviet agents in Paris. The U.K. was a founder member of N.A.T.O. and the disclosure of that CLASSIFIED information inevitably damaged the interests of the Alliance and each of its members, including the U.K.

After N.A.T.O. he maintained his association with the K.G.B. visiting Moscow in 1975. When arrested in Quebec in 1979 he was found in possession of very sophisticated communications equipment supplied by the Russians.

The evidence against him emerges mainly from his interviews with Special Branch officers in June 1982. He was interviewed on 6 occasions over 3 days (25th, 26th and 27th June). They can be summarised as follows:-

/Pre - N.A.T.O. period/

In c. 1947 he was "cultivated" by Borodin, the cultural attache to the Russian Embassy, in Canada.

Ex.1.
p.24

This occurred over a period of time - with more and more meetings, invitation] to dinner etc. His association with Borodin lasted c 4 or 5 years.

p.32

He realized subsequently that Borodin was a K.G.B. officer. He was given early training by Borodin in the techniques of espionage.

Ex.4
p.179

His family always had a tradition of "sympathy towards the Russian experience". His mother studied Russian and taught English to Tass people.

Ex.1
p.29
p.24

His first wife knew he was being cultivated and provided him with the opportunity to pass over information because her father worked in the Defence office, But he refrained at that early stage.

p.26

He passed over no information in the early days. It was merely training.

p.27,29,32

At the time he was working for the Film Board in Canada.

p.33

His guess was that the Russians thought of him as "playing a role useful to them in the Canadian political scene in the long term future".

p.34

1951/52 He went to Paris to take a doctorate of economics at the Sorbonne.

p.35

Within a year, Borodin appeared in France (in a small village south of Paris) and introduced him to another Soviet agent.

p.36

Thereafter he had a number of covert meetings with a succession of agents. Meetings would be arranged in Paris at particular places at a fixed time of the month.

p.37-39

He was in Paris for 2 or 3 years and in contact with 3 different agents meeting every 3 or 4 months.

p.40

He didn't think he received any money at that stage.

p.41

"They never had to put pressure on me but they easily could. You get in deeply so slowly you don't see it at first".

p.42

c 1954 He moved to L.S.E. in London - for c 2 years p.42/46
- on a grant from the Belgian Government.

There was no contact in London (he claimed) but he went over to Paris for pre-arranged meetings from time to time.

Whilst at the L.S.E. he received about £60 a month in American bills. p.43

"The Russians take care of your fear about jobs. You can always fall back on them for money". p.44

/ N.A.T.O. period/ 1956 - 1961.

17/9/56 he took an appointment as officer, Grade 2 in the Economics Section of N.A.T.O. on the International Staff. Ex.25

He had applied for a post the year before, even offering his services as an economist "without pay". see Ex.21

He had been asked by the Russians to work for N.A.T.O. This was after about a year at the L.S.E. and when his contact at the time was a short blond agent "who seemed to correspond with somebody at the Russian Embassy in Paris". p.45-47

He was pushed very persistently into making an application.

p.48

For about a year after his appointment he heard nothing from the Russians and then contact was resumed.

p.50/52

Meetings with agents became more and more frequent rising to about once a fortnight.

p.53

Venues varied but usually it was some working-class area in Paris.

There were 5 different agents during this period. The best rapport was established with a man known as "Paul".

p.54,74

The Russians were interested in "original authentic documents of the highest ^{catin}classified".

p.61

They also wanted him to evaluate N.A.T.O. policy, to forecast what N.A.T.O. was likely to do and to advise what attitude the U.S.S.R. should adopt towards N.A.T.O.

p.67,68

Half way through his time at N.A.T.O., a system was introduced enabling radio contact on a fixed frequency at a fixed time of night. This method was used when the Russians asked for specific documents, Sometimes providing the N.A.T.O. reference number. It was also available in case of emergency.

p.252-5

[Hambleton had access to ^{a large number of} most secret N.A.T.O. documents in the ordinary course of his duties. Their classification was as follows:-

- (1) Top Secret (Cosmic) - applying to information/ Considered so important that its disclosure would result in exceptionally grave damage to N.A.T.O.
- (2) Secret - where disclosure was thought to incur serious damage to N.A.T.O.
- (3) Confidential - disclosure would be prejudicial to N.A.T.O.
- (4) Restricted - disclosure undesirable to the interests of N.A.T.O.

Western
p.19

On his appointment Hambleton had signed a Security Declaration promising to preserve the security of classified information and recognising that he was liable to prosecution if he allowed it to pass into unauthorised hands at any time.

Ex.27

Control Sheets are still available of the classified documents issued to him during his employment and demonstrate the large volume of top secret, secret and confidential material passing through his hands. He also had access to secret documents available to others in the Economics Section.

Ex.31

Dobson
p.15

The North Atlantic Treaty came into force in 1949. It is a continuing agreement between the members of the Alliance for their collective self-defence on the basis that an armed attack against one of them should be considered an attack against all. All members have agreed to protect and safeguard each other's classified information as well as that of N.A.T.O. itself. "N.A.T.O. classified information" is a term that embraces all military, political and economic matters.

Western^c
p.17

He took documents home overnight, photographed them and handed the films over to Soviet agents, returning the documents the next day.

p.63

He was provided with camera^f by the Russians and also used his own.

The films were handed to agents at brief meetings in different parts of Paris, often in the Metro, usually in dark streets.

p.62

p.101

He was still receiving \$60 a month.

p.259

Over 4 years he photographed hundreds of documents — "maybe 300 at the top".

p.66

"A document would be either thick or a single page. If you had 36 frames in a film and you used that say every three weeks on average and passed on two films you are talking possibly about thousands of pages."

p.97

There can be no doubt he passed across a great deal of highly damaging material.

About the nature of that material he had this to say:-

(1) "a certain amount on economics and oil Some would be secret but that doesn't mean anything".

p.64

(2) "economics, politics, oil. I am not saying there wouldn't be others".

"the work of the oil Committee, you know plans to Stockpile oil for thirty days".

p.97

(3) "Although the majority were classified secret that was because they may have come from a file classified secret and in themselves not classified. For example I would see security reports from SHAPE but the whole report was classified. Most would be collected by military attaches and I would avoid that but some stuff which may be classified secret such as reports on political parties from open sources which were classified because they came from an Embassy, I would use these".

p.97

(It was not right to say, in effect, that files marked secret contained unclassified documents. N.A.T.O. practice was to classify each document separately within a file).

(4) "a lot would have N.A.T.O. confidential". p.100

(5) ". there may be parts of a Cosmic document contained in another document which you photograph"

Q. So it is possible that something classified Cosmic could have got to them through you?

A. "Yes. I guess so". p.193

(Although, in the main, he denied passing Cosmic documents, he allowed for the possibility towards the end of the 4th interview. His constant refrain was that Cosmic documents would indicate him as the source. However, as can be seen from the Control Sheets, he was issued with a large number of Cosmic files and it is highly unlikely that he would not have photographed them especially as he had already conceded that the Russians were interested in documents "of the highest classification").

When arrested in Quebec in 1979 he was still in possession of a few N.A.T.O. documents - most marked 'Confidential' and dated 1958, 1959, 1960.

NFE JJFD/4

Whilst at N.A.T.O. the Russians had no other tasks for him in case he was compromised in some way. He was supposed to have a life job there.

p.71

However, he resigned in 1961 for reasons that are not entirely clear.

The Russians wanted him to defect immediately, but he declined.

p.73

/Post N.A.T.O. period/

After N.A.T.O. he was told to lie low for a while.

p.74

He returned to L.S.E. in London and spent a lot of time in Spain - doing a thesis.

p.74

1964. He went to ^Laval University in Quebec as Professor in Economics, where he remained employed until 1979.

Before leaving Europe, he met an RIS officer in Vienna where he was told that they would attempt to find him a position in Western Europe. They wanted to push him towards a job in the Canadian Government.

p.106

On his return to Canada, contact was made with an agent in Ottawa after 3 or 4 months. Meetings lasted a while and then petered out. p.112

2 years later an agent called Rudi Herman approached him at the University saying Moscow was worried that contact had been lost. p.117

He maintained contact with Herman until 1974 meeting every 3 or 4 months. p.118

As is clear from his passport he travelled extensively over those years, including:-

1970 - 2 months in Israel paid for by the Russians after which he prepared a report for them. p.130

There were subsequent visits to Israel in 1975 and 1978. p.137

1971 - 6 months in Peru working at the Canadian Embassy and in the President's office working ^{on} ~~as~~ aid for disaster relief. There was contact with an agent in Lima. p.122

1973-5 Haiti - where he trained Government personnel on how to present reports on projects financed by international banks. He gave his Soviet agent a report on the economic situation there. p.135/136

1975 - He went to Moscow through Vienna and Prague.

There he was trained in different methods of secret communication.

In particular, he was shown:-

(a) how to use a "Tonal Converter"

(he called it a "light" machine).

This is a device designed for use at the audio output of a domestic radio receiver to convert a signal conveying a series of tones into a display in which figures corresponding to those tones are illuminated by lights. It is a very sophisticated piece of decoding equipment not available in the West (on the open market at any rate). It involves careful training and practice before it can be used successfully. It enabled Moscow to communicate direct with him in Canada.

NFE Mr "A"

He described in very accurate detail how the machine worked and how he was trained to use it. He was then supplied with a machine in Montreal in 1977 and found with it in his apartment in Quebec in November 1979 by the R.C.M.P.

p.152 et seq.

p.212

JGMBB1

(b) how to use chemicals and specially prepared writing paper to transmit secret messages. He set out in detail the method he was given to reveal messages chemically written on paper. The message would be on a letter or the inside of an envelope.

p.159
et seq.

Experts have confirmed the accuracy of his observations.

NFE Mr."B"

In his office at ^L Naval University, R.C.M.P. officers found a yellow notebook and 2 containers with "potassium iodide" inside.

NFE
JJFD/1,2,3

An expert has discovered that some pages in the notebook have been specially treated for writing secret messages. The same expert has also discovered that the two containers of chemicals can be used for developing incoming secret messages. The instructions for developing secret messages with these chemicals as set out by Hambleton in his interview are very accurate.

NFE Mr."B"

He tended to receive messages in French and on the reverse of the envelope where the address was written. p.162

Whilst in Moscow he saw the head of the K.G.B., Andropov, who said he hoped Hambleton would play a role in world trouble-spots in the future, assessing them politically and economically. An attempt was also made to persuade him to stand for the Canadian Parliament with a campaign financed by the Russians

p.164/5

or to join the Hudson Institute near New York (an institute that carries out research for the Defence Dept.).

p.168

After his return to Canada from Russia, agents were no longer necessary because control was exercised directly from Moscow. He was able to communicate direct - first by secret letters, later through the Tonal Converter.

p.209

He was sent a series of requests through the Tonal Converter to go to the Middle East and other areas. He declined most of them.

p.219

But in 1978 he agreed to go to Cairo where he prepared a report on the Egyptian economy based on a report by the Central Bank of Egypt. He collected his expenses from a contact in Vienna and left the report in Vienna after spending a month in Cairo.

p.226

At the end of 1978 he went back to Vienna where he was told by "Paul" that Western Intelligence Agencies were investigating him and that he should defect to the East. He was given \$5,000 to help his decision. He declined, ~~not to~~.

p.231

He maintains that there has been no contact with the Russians since that meeting.

p.240

He was arrested by the R.C.M.P. in Quebec in November 1979 and the following items were found at his home and office:-

	<u>NFE</u>
Tonal Converter (Decoder)	<u>JGMBB1</u>
Yellow Beaver Notebook (+ treated pages)	<u>JJFD1</u>
2 containers of Potassium Iodide	<u>JJFD1/2</u>
9 N.A.T.O. documents.	<u>JJFD4</u>
2 sheets of paper with instructions for Dead Letter Boxes	<u>DBS1</u>

Finally, He was asked for his motive and, without finding an easy answer, said there was:-

- (a) a sense of belonging to the K.G.B.
- (b) a certain liking for the Security Service network
- (c) an element of glamour and excitement.

p.181
et seq.

SECRET

Security
Zu AA



re Security, Hambleton: June 80 6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

You will have seen Jim Nursaw's letter of 24 November to me about the cases against Miss Ritchie and Professor Hambleton.

May I look to you for advice on the action which the Prime Minister will need to take when these cases are out of the way. I imagine that there will be pressure for her to make a statement on them. It would obviously be preferable for her to make one statement rather than two. But I suppose that there may be pressure for a statement on the case of Miss Ritchie immediately it is disposed of, which would be as early as Tuesday. Nevertheless, if you think it a sustainable line for the Prime Minister to say that she will make a statement on both cases together when Professor Hambleton's case has been disposed of, this would obviously be more convenient.

R.R.B.

25 November 1982

AA

SECRET



File use

ATA

FCO
CO
HO
SS
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

25 November 1982

Dear Jim,

Thank you for your letter of 24 November about the cases against Miss Ritchie and Professor Hambleton. I am following up with Sir Robert Armstrong's office the preparation of briefing for the Prime Minister on statements when the cases are out of the way.

I have shown your letter to the Prime Minister, who has noted the contents of the part of Professor Hambleton's confession which was attached to your letter.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

J Nursaw Esq.,
Law Officers' Department.

p.s. Thank you also for your postscript of today.

ATA

SECRET

cc. Security: Hambleton - True 8

5



J. Nursaw
LEGAL SECRETARY.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

25 November 1982

F E R Butler Esq
Principal Private Secretary
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON S W 1

Dear Robin,

R v HAMBLETON
R v RITCHIE

You already have this
A postscript to my letter of yesterday.

At a conference yesterday with the DPP's staff, Treasury Counsel and Bernard Sheldon, the Attorney General discussed the handling at the trial of Hambleton of the Andropov story. It was agreed that for the Attorney to comment that the Crown is unable to say whether the story is true would be inconsistent with the Crown relying upon the confession as a whole as a truthful account of Hambleton's offences. We have no reason to doubt any other part of the confession. In the circumstances, the most that the Attorney General can do is to introduce the story with some such words as "The Defendant says that.....".

I am giving this letter the same circulation as yesterday's.

*Yours sincerely,
Jin Nursaw*

SECRET

This is for the



A-L's
decision. We
can't interfere
in any
way
not

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I think that you will want to see this immediately.

The Russians, not understanding British justice, will no doubt believe that we have organised that the story about Andropov should come out now, as an unfriendly act.

I will explore tomorrow whether it really is inevitable that this story should come out in the evidence. If it is inevitable, there is no point in seeking FCO advice. But if it could be avoided the FCO may want to comment.

FERB 24.11.

SECRET

Sec. Security: Hambleton: June 80 Jc BI

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LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

J. Nursaw CB
LEGAL SECRETARY.

24 November 1982

F E R Butler Esq
Principal Private Secretary
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON S W 1

Dear Robin,

R v HAMBLETON
R v RITCHIE

You may be pressed for a statement immediately on Miss Ritchie, before the trial of Hambleton is concluded.

FERB

24.11.

On Monday 29 November it is anticipated that Miss Ritchie will plead guilty at the Central Criminal Court before the Lord Chief Justice to an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. Thereafter the Court will try Professor Hambleton who is accused of offences under section 1. Estimates of the length of that trial vary from five working days to three weeks.

I am writing to you because it is inevitable that there will be pressure for a Government statement immediately the trials are ended and in the case of Hambleton (whose spying related to his work in NATO) there is no Department able to answer questions about security aspects of the case. Since the Prime Minister will be under pressure to give details of the cases and to say whether they raise issues which will be referred to the Security Commission, you will wish to begin coordinating the preparation of briefing material. All that I could do would be to provide information about the prosecution evidence and the trials.

I will ask Sir Robert Armstrong's office to do so.

There is one aspect of the case against Hambleton which I must bring to your attention immediately. In a very long confession to the Police he describes his years as a spy in some detail. One of the stories he tells is how the then Head of the KGB came to dinner at his apartment in Moscow and how he asked Hambleton to try to become a member of the Canadian Parliament, offering to finance his campaign. In view of the subsequent elevation of that official, the Attorney thinks that the Prime Minister should be informed that this evidence will undoubtedly come out at the trial. The Attorney thinks it would be quite wrong to take any steps to attempt to conceal it but

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W. J. Nursaw CB
LEGAL SECRETARY.

as we have no idea whether it is a true story, he proposes to mention it in his opening speech with the comment that the Crown are unable to say whether it is true.

I enclose a copy of the relevant extract from the record of the Police interview with Hambleton.

I am copying this letter, together with the enclosure, to Brian Fall (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and without the enclosure to John Halliday (HO), David Omand (MOD) and Bernard Sheldon.

*Yours sincerely,
Jim Nursaw*

SECRET

SECURITY

Miss Ritchie

March 82

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1385</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Record of interview of Hugh George HAMBLETON attached to Newsham to Butler dated 24 November 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>79</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>3/10/2017</i> <i>G. Gray</i>
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WLS Dr. Whitmore - to see
Sir
then p.a. 3

SECRET

A.S.C. ^{18.}/₃

cc PS ✓
PS/Mr. Hurd —
PS/PUS —
Mr. Wright
Mr. Moberly
Chief Clerk
Dep Chief Clerk
Hd/Security Dept.
Hd/POD
Hd /NENAD
Mr. Freeland, Legal Adviser
Hd/News Dept.
Sir R. Armstrong, Cabinet Office
— Mr. J. Coles, PS, No. 10

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TO BE SENT

H/Tel Aviv Please pass following message to Charge d'Affaires as soon as possible. H/Cairo pass to Ambassador as soon as possible.

Strictly Personal for Charge d'Affaires Tel Aviv/
Ambassador Cairo

MISS RHONA RITCHIE

1. Miss Ritchie has admitted in statements to the Security Service and Police that she has passed transcripts of several classified telegrams to the Egyptian First Secretary, Ansari. For your information these telegrams relate mainly to the discussions leading up to the establishment of the Sinai Force, but also included Tel Aviv telegram to MODUK (unnumbered) dated 9 February about the possible mobilisation of Israeli forces. Miss Ritchie will appear in court at 3.15 London time (TODAY (18 MARCH)) charged with an offence under Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act.

2. You should arrange to speak as close to 3.15 as possible to the MFA, to the Director General himself if he is available. We shall be sending later on today precise terms of charge. These will mention Ansari by name but not his country of origin. You should explain to MFA that she is appearing in court this afternoon to be charged under Section of the CSA (relevant section of CSA will be telegraphed to you (- TEL AVIV ONLY)).

You should emphasise that I intend that this case should not in any way affect my forthcoming visit. It seems unlikely that the case will be brought to trial until after the visit. We shall make it plain to the media here that arrangements for this case are

ahead as planned. You should add that though the case is certain to give rise to some publicity we shall not be able to comment on it since it will be sub judice.

3. For CAIRO. Miss Ritchie is a First Secretary in our Embassy in Tel Aviv. We shall be notifying Egyptian Ambassador here as near as possible to 3.15 p.m. London time today of this case.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

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Security

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Miss R. J. M. Ritchie

Your minute A07827 of 17 March, 1982 arrived here about ten minutes before Lord Carrington, who wished to report personally to the Prime Minister on this case.

What he had to say confirmed the content of your minute, and he added that, at her interview with the Security Service, Miss Ritchie had confessed to passing telegrams and a report by our Defence Attache in Tel Aviv to Ansari. Miss Ritchie was now in the hands of the police and, on the assumption that she repeated to them the admission she had made to the Security Service and subject to the views of the DPP, it was likely that she would be charged and appear in court tomorrow.

C. A. WHITMC

17 March, 1982

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MR. WHITMORE

Miss R. J. M. Ritchie

I think that the Prime Minister should know of a security case involving a member of the Diplomatic Service which may come to public notice. The person concerned is Miss Rhona Jane McIntyre Ritchie, born on 15th June 1952. She joined the Diplomatic Service in 1979 and was posted to Israel in 1980, firstly to undertake language training and thereafter to be Second Secretary (and, on promotion last month to Grade 5, First Secretary) in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv.

2. Information was received at the beginning of March that Miss Ritchie had been having an affair with Rifaat al-Ansari, whom they described as a Security Officer at the Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv, and that she had been passing him secret documents, including intelligence material, over a period of months, some of it affecting Israeli security.

3. On receipt of the information, and after consultations with the Security Service, HM Ambassador in Tel Aviv was informed. He had no evidence to support the Israelis' allegations of espionage. However, subsequently Miss Ritchie volunteered in conversation with one of the secretaries in the Embassy that she was having an affair with Ansari, and that, although she felt guilty about not informing the Embassy of this relationship, she had done nothing wrong.

4. It was decided, after consultations with the Security Service, that Miss Ritchie should be brought back to London for interview by the Security Service. She returned on 14th March and is being interviewed today.

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5. Miss Ritchie, as First Secretary (Political), had access to all normal classified information and Defence Attache reporting.

As far as it has been possible to establish, she did not avail herself of the opportunity to read any of this material.

6. The Security Service have consulted the Attorney General about the case. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who is of course to visit Israel at the end of this month, has been informed. I will minute you further when I am told of the results of the Security Service interview with Miss Ritchie.

REA

Robert Armstrong

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17th March 1982

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