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PREM 19/1392

SECRET - UK EYESA Confidential File

Visit of South African ~~Prime~~
- President
~~Minister~~, P W Botha

SOUTH AFRICA

APRIL 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
18.4.84		18.7.84					
4.5.84		19.7.84					
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PREM 19/1392

PART 1 ends:-

FCO NOTE - BOTHA'S EUROPEAN TOUR

PART 2 begins:-

CDP to AP.

28.2.90

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 5 June 1984, columns 157 to 168: South African Prime Minister (Visit)

House of Commons HANSARD, 22 May 1984, columns 141 to 142: African National Congress

Signed _____

J. Gray

Date _____

6/9/2013

PREM Records Team

JSS 027/7

DS(L)2437

Departmental Series
Southern African Department
DS No.8/84

MR P W BOTHA'S EUROPEAN TOUR

The British Chargé d'Affaires at Cape Town to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

SUMMARY

1. The first visit to Britain by a South African Prime Minister since 1961. The European tour was made possible by the Nkomati Accord (paragraphs 1 – 2).
2. Mr Botha's objectives: to break out of South Africa's international isolation, to draw attention to the serious deterioration in Southern Africa's economic situation, to explain the complexities of the internal scene at the highest level and to establish personal contact. A successful visit which has enhanced Mr Botha's standing (paragraphs 3 – 4).
3. Mr Botha delighted with his personal reception in Europe, but he can have drawn little comfort from European responses to his appeals for an understanding of South Africa's internal policies. European anxieties over forced removals (paragraphs 5 – 8).
4. No progress on Namibia (paragraph 9).
5. Mr Botha impressed by the strength of feeling on internal questions. South Africa unlikely to change its policies, but could well pay greater attention in the future to international susceptibilities (paragraph 10).
6. Mr Botha has welcomed the thorough and frank exchange of views with the Prime Minister. He has expressed concern about the vulnerability of the sea route, a desire to strengthen trading links, the need to improve antennae for identifying trouble in advance. We need to be careful of too sweeping generalisations (paragraphs 11 – 12).
7. The timing of a visit by you, Sir, needs careful consideration. A visit by the Minister of Trade most useful, perhaps fairly early in the New Year. A further round of official talks would be welcome when the new Ambassador has taken up his post (paragraphs 13 – 14).
8. Black reaction not at all positive; they think it unlikely that the tour will dispose Mr Botha to genuine reform (paragraph 15).
9. Future plans: a tour of Africa and a tour of the United States, after the Presidential election (paragraph 16).
10. South Africa has a long way to go before she will again be internationally respectable (paragraph 17);

CONFIDENTIAL

Cape Town

3 July 1984

Sir

1. Mr P W Botha, the South African Prime Minister, had an extended working lunch at Chequers with the Prime Minister and yourself, Sir, on Saturday 2 June. His brief visit to Britain – the first by a South African Prime Minister since Dr Verwoerd's visit in 1961 when he took South Africa out of the Commonwealth – was part of a two-week European tour during which Mr Botha, who was accompanied by the Foreign Minister Mr R F ("Pik") Botha, also paid official, working or private visits to Portugal, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany (and West Berlin), Belgium, France, Austria, Italy and the Holy See.

2. For the South African Government, the fact that the tour took place at all was a major breakthrough. For several years South Africa has been anxious to escape from the international isolation which has been imposed on her because of her apartheid policies and practices. There was little likelihood of this happening while South Africa was engaged, for most of 1981, 1982 and 1983, in what was generally but somewhat simplistically interpreted as attempts to "destabilise" certain neighbours known to be harbouring guerillas of the African National Congress. Pik Botha's visit to Europe in late November/early December 1983 appeared to herald a change in policy and he put in some useful groundwork. But it was the Nkomati Accord of 16 March 1984 with Mozambique which opened the way. With the additional stimulus of a deteriorating economic situation at home, Mr Botha felt that the time was right to take up the offer of a visit to Lisbon. He prevailed on the Federal Republic to extend an invitation as well; and when news of this broke prematurely in Bonn, a number of other European countries made a cool assessment of where their best interests lay and agreed to receive him. The invitation from Britain was especially important – the Foreign Minister has told Mr Fergusson that the lunch at Chequers was in the event the high point of Mr Botha's tour. Only France responded negatively to South African overtures, but Mr Botha still managed a private visit there.

3. Mr Botha said on his return that he had not gone to conquer Europe, nor to seek favours or charity; and he said much the same thing in Parliament on 27 June. He had drawn, he said, attention to the seriously deteriorating economic situation in Southern Africa and had sought Western economic and financial support. He had had an opportunity to explain at the highest level the complexities of South Africa's internal situation. He had established personal contact with European Heads of Government.

4. On the whole, Mr Botha must be well pleased with the results of his tour, which he could reasonably claim to have been a success. He has enhanced his standing within South Africa, and to a lesser extent internationally. He must feel that he made an impact with his appeal for increased development assistance in Southern Africa, especially for Mozambique, though he is uncertain about the extent to which this is likely to be channelled, as he strongly recommended, through South Africa itself. He made a strong bid for private sector investment and had as many meetings with businessmen as with politicians. He sought, not unsuccessfully, to persuade European leaders that South Africa is a regional power which cannot be ignored and that peace and prosperity in Southern Africa are to a large extent dependent on the region's industrial giant.

5. Mr Botha was clearly delighted with the courtesy and respect with which he was everywhere received, even though European leaders were careful to maintain a certain reserve in their public welcoming. Mr Botha will be convinced that the personal contacts established have made the trip

worthwhile. He spoke most warmly to Mr Fergusson of the reception from the Prime Minister. He was also particularly impressed with Herr Kohl. He was pleasantly surprised with the depth of knowledge and interest in Southern African affairs shown by Signor Craxi and Signor Andreotti.

6. Although he welcomed the opportunity to explain at first hand the complexities of the internal situation in South Africa, Mr Botha can have drawn little comfort from European responses. He is reported to have told the National Party caucus on his return that South Africa would never be able to evolve a system of government which would satisfy Europe; they could not even agree among themselves what kind of system they wanted to see in South Africa. Mr Botha may have had some success in persuading his European hosts that the limitations of resources were a major obstacle to resolving the glaring inequalities between blacks and whites in South Africa; but none whatsoever in securing the understanding of his hosts for internal policies supposedly designed to promote the separate development and "self-determination" of South Africa's population of minorities. The Portuguese Ambassador has told me that in Lisbon Mr Botha's private audience with President Eanes almost ended abruptly when, after a ten minute indictment by the President of South Africa's apartheid policies, Mr Botha looked at his watch and announced that it was time to leave; he was prevailed upon to stay.

7. Particular emphasis was placed by European Governments on the question of the forced removal of black people under the Government's plans to consolidate homelands, to eliminate "black spots" – land held freehold by blacks since before the First World War in areas subsequently designated white – and to rehouse certain urban communities. Mr Botha gave broad assurances that physical compulsion was no longer being used and that blacks would be continuously "persuaded" until they agreed to move to designated locations. (But only a week after his return, Western Cape Development Board inspectors, backed up by police with armoured vehicles and a "sneeze machine", tore down 701 "illegal shelters" – the Board's figure – in raids on black squatter settlements near Cape Town.)

8. Mr Botha attempted during his tour to put across a number of basic themes about the internal situation in South Africa. "Apartheid" as such was long since dead and the term no longer relevant. The real problem in South Africa was the relations between the various population minorities, including several black minorities who in no sense formed a coherent black majority. It had taken countries like Switzerland some 400 years to evolve a confederal system and South Africa could reasonably ask for a little more time. They were moving in the right direction, but Mr Botha would be out of office at the next election if he moved too quickly and the only alternative government in South Africa was to the right. When it was pointed out to Mr Botha that, much as he might say that one minority should never be in a position to dominate other minorities, this was nonetheless precisely what the white minority were doing in South Africa, Mr Botha attempted to argue that under the new constitutional dispensation South Africa was moving away from the Westminster system to consensus politics incorporating the Indian and coloured minorities and that suitable arrangements for the blacks were being discussed as a matter of urgency. The logic of his argument did not impress his European hosts.

9. No progress was made on the Namibian question, although it was extensively discussed in every capital visited. The likelihood that Namibian independence under the terms of SCR 435 might be achieved in the not too distant future has receded once again. At Chequers Mr Botha suggested somewhat jocularly that Britain might care to share in the administration costs of Namibia prior to independence. He took this further with Herr Kohl in Bonn, suggesting that any or all of the Western Contact Group might care to help out, before or after independence, even taking over the administration of the territory from South Africa, but naturally only on the understanding that the Cubans withdrew from Angola. The South African and international press not unexpectedly

took up the story and the South Africans were more than happy to let it run; it went down well in South Africa. Pik Botha even boasted to the press that South Africa, as a regional power, "demanded" Cuban withdrawal and had the capability to achieve this. In Namibia itself, the Police succeeded in embarrassing Mr Botha by arresting almost the entire SWAPO leadership at a barbecue on land belonging to a Catholic seminary only two days before Mr Botha had an audience with the Pope. Although the Administrator-General of Namibia later disclaimed prior knowledge of the arrests, his public statement the following day showed that the police action enjoyed his full support. The South African Minister of Law and Order denied all responsibility. It has been suggested that the arrests were politically motivated by the right, to embarrass Mr Botha. The only reasonably safe assumption is that the Bothas did not know that the arrests were to take place; they were said to be furious.

10. At a news conference in Vienna, Mr Botha conceded that "it would be a dumb person who listened to another's point of view and then went away without new ideas". Mr Botha cannot fail to have been impressed by the strength of feeling everywhere shown on the question of South Africa's racially discriminatory policies. He found himself repeatedly endeavouring to assure his audience that he did not believe in the inferiority of one man against another because of the colour of his skin. It seems however unlikely that as a result of the tour there will be any intrinsic changes in South Africa's policy of separate development. But it is reasonable to assume that the South African Government are now much more aware of the political pressures on European Governments, especially on Her Majesty's Government, over South Africa and will pay much closer attention to the need to improve South Africa's international image. Greater efforts may be made to prevent the international embarrassments which inevitably arise when local officials execute policy in too ruthless a manner. If this leads to the delay or suspension of arbitrary executive actions in the fields of forced removals and the suppression of civil liberties, European leaders may feel that it was worth their time and trouble to receive Mr Botha. Such beneficial results however are unlikely to be immediately apparent.

11. As far as UK-South African relations are concerned, Mr Botha told Mr Fergusson on 27 June how very much he enjoyed meeting the Prime Minister. He had been particularly pleased by the attractiveness of the venue. He did not expect, and he was sure that the Prime Minister did not expect there to be complete agreement between them. He had however much welcomed the opportunity for a thorough and frank exchange. Mr Botha does not seem to have gone to Britain with any specific objectives, such as the closure of ANC office in London, the supply of BAe Coastguarder aircraft or the release of the four South Africans facing arms embargo violations charges. But he is concerned about the vulnerability of the Cape Sea Route and he told Mr Fergusson that he is anxious to build on our healthy trading links. He also suggested that we should both seek to improve our antennae for identifying trouble in advance, by improving the means of communication between us. The love-hate relationship with Britain seems bound to continue, though Mr Botha must be convinced that we now have a better understanding of South Africa's problems. The visit will have helped to clear the air in our relations after recent difficulties.

12. The visit has however pointed up the need for our critical stance towards South Africa's internal policies to be based upon a sound factual knowledge of the complexities of the internal scene and not on sweeping and sometimes outdated generalisations. There are a welter of laws and regulations under which, for example, individuals and communities are likely to be resettled or rehoused and it is often exceedingly difficult to track down the unvarnished truth about a particular incident. The proposed resettlement of the KwaNgema community in the Eastern Transvaal, whose case was raised by the Prime Minister, was misleadingly explained away at Chequers by the Bothas as a dispute within the community. The facts as known to us are that Gabriel Ngema, at one time the representative of the community, was in favour of moving to the homeland of KaNgwane. But he was replaced in March 1982 by an elected committee chaired by Moses Ngema and supported

by 124 of the 155 household heads in KwaNgema. In February 1984 Gabriel Ngema died, which was very inconvenient for the authorities who continue to refuse to recognise the elected committee and to insist that Gabriel Ngema's family nominate a successor. All the evidence suggests that the "dispute" is an invention of the authorities.

13. So far as the development of the dialogue with South Africa is concerned, I do not wish to recommend any acceleration of existing plans, though I believe it to be important that the impetus created by the meeting of Prime Ministers should be maintained. A first choice would be a visit by you, Sir, though I believe also that, for this to have the right impact, it would be desirable that such talks could centre on serious practical questions in which the United Kingdom was directly involved, such as Namibian developments, or aid for the region. The timing, too, needs to be carefully considered, given that between now and the New Year the Government will be preoccupied with introducing the new constitutional arrangements before the first Plenary Session at the end of January. The outcome of the Presidential Election in the United States will also be relevant, given the overriding impact of US policies on the affairs of the region. All this makes me cautious about suggesting a possible date for a visit within the next six months.

14. Given our major trading and investment interests, and the current good performance of our exporters, a visit by the Minister of Trade would be most useful, perhaps fairly early in the New Year. We have been told that a further round of talks at official level when the new Ambassador has taken up his post in early October would be welcomed. The emphasis in the continuing official dialogue should also be on practicalities and specifics, not so much on principles and generalities. We will pursue these proposals separately.

15. Mr Botha's position in the National Party as well as among the white community as a whole has been enhanced by his European tour. The black population, however, are generally uncertain about the results. Buthelezi was very much in favour in KwaZulu, but politically conscious blacks on the Reef generally doubt that it was wise for European Governments to receive Mr Botha and think it unlikely that the tour will dispose Mr Botha to introduce genuine reforms. But this attitude is not unanimous nor unqualified. The "Sowetan" commented before Mr Botha departed that if the Europeans spoke out firmly against apartheid, the tour might, perhaps, be worthwhile. Even Bishop Tutu relented somewhat and said that if the Prime Minister had said to Mr Botha what she was reported to have said, then it was not so bad that the meeting had taken place.

16. Mr Botha was known to have been a little nervous about his reception at Chequers; but even if the excursion to Britain had been a fiasco, with massive demonstrations, he would not necessarily have lost political capital at home, since National Party supporters would have rallied to the cause. It was of course a major objective of the visit to improve his standing at home and internationally. Mr Botha may now see himself in the role of the economic saviour of Southern Africa. He may be contemplating a visit to African countries later this year or to the United States, but only after the Presidential election in November. The precedence accorded to his visit to Europe could have been related to his expected assumption of the position of State President in September this year, which would be likely to complicate protocol.

17. Mr Botha has emerged from his laager. He found Europe willing at least to listen. His tour was essentially exploratory. He must realise that he still has a long way to go before South Africa is again acceptable in the international community. He may have drawn some comfort from the relatively insignificant nature of the hostile demonstrations which generally greeted him, though the ten thousand or so disparate demonstrators in London will have confirmed his awareness that Britain remains the centre of overseas political opposition to his regime. The relationship with Britain has a deep and continuing significance. Elsewhere in Europe, the message may simply be that South Africa is not really all that important to European interests.

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18. I am sending copies of this Despatch to HM Representatives at Washington, Paris, Bonn, Lisbon, Rome, Harare, Luanda, Maputo, Lusaka, Nairobi, Lagos, Lilongwe, Mbabane, Maseru, Gaborone and to the Permanent UK Representative at the United Nations in New York.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,

Derek Tonkin
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 July, 1984.

I write to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 18 July enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Botha.

I have drawn this to the Prime Minister's attention.

C.D. Powell

Mr. J.A. Davies

57



B7/9/21/2

South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

18th July 1984

The Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Sir,

--- Would you please bring the enclosed letter from
the South African Prime Minister to the
Right Honourable the Prime Minister's attention.

*Yours faithfully,
J. A. Jarvis*

SECRETARY OF EMBASSY



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 July 1984

Dear Mrs. Kinnock.

Thank you for your further letter of 16 June about the KwaNgema community in South Africa.

I, too, have seen references which suggest that it is still the intention of the South African authorities to relocate the people of KwaNgema. As I indicated in my previous letter, the South African Prime Minister is in no doubt of where we stand on this matter, and of our concern to see justice done.

I have instructed officials to keep me fully informed but having pursued the case with Mr. Botha, there is little if any further action that I can take.

Yours sincerely

Ronald Reagan

Mrs. Glenys Kinnock.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mrs. Kinross

Thank you for your further letter of 16 June about the KwaNgema community in South Africa.

I, too, have seen references which suggest that it is still the intention of the South African authorities to relocate the people of KwaNgema. As I indicated in my previous letter, the South African Prime Minister is in no doubt of where we stand on this matter, and of our concern to see justice done.

Having pursued the case with Mr. Botha, there is ^{*little if any*} ~~no~~ further action that I can take. I have instructed officials to keep me fully informed *but*

Yours

Mrs. Glenys Kinnock



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your further letter of 16 June about the KwaNgema community in South Africa.

I too have seen references which suggest that it is still the intention of the South African authorities to relocate the people of KwaNgema. As I indicated in my previous letter, the South African Prime Minister is in no doubt of where we stand on this matter, and of our concern to see justice done.

~~We have to judge carefully how (and when) best to approach such a situation. You may be sure that, having taken up the case with Mr. Botha, we shall watch developments very closely. I have instructed officials to keep me fully informed.~~

Sumner
Henry [unclear] is the case with Mr. Botha
There is no further action that I can take.

Mrs. Glenys Kinnock.



Republiek van Suid-Afrika - Republic of South Africa

Form.
Ref.

④
Prime Minister
CJP 19/7.

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T120CC/84 cc Master
OPS**

Ministerie van die Eerste Minister
Ministry of the Prime Minister

Privaatsak X193
Private Bag

Kaapstad
Cape Town

3000

Dear Prime Minister


6 -07- 1984

I should like to convey to you my sincere thanks for the hospitality extended to me, my colleague the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the officials accompanying me during our recent visit to your country. An opportunity to reciprocate this hospitality sometime in the future would give me great pleasure.

I am grateful for having had the opportunity of discussing matters of mutual concern. Your keen interest in developments in Southern Africa is sincerely appreciated and our exchange of views was very useful to me. Only by such constructive dialogue can differences of opinion on important issues be resolved.

It is my fervent wish that the meeting we had may pave the way for greater British involvement in the process of ensuring continued economic development and stability in those countries of Southern Africa that we ourselves are also trying to help.

Yours sincerely


P W BOTHA
PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

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FM KINSHASA 040940Z JUL 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 4 JULY 84

*Recommnd Summary only
CDP*YOUR TELNO 133: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
MOBUTU - MR BOTHA 'S VISIT -

SUMMARY

1. BOTHA HAD ASKED ALSO TO VISIT MOBUTU, WHO HAD TEMPORISED BUT NOT REFUSED. MOBUTU SHARED THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISH TO SEE THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA BUT COULD NOT SAY SO IN PUBLIC. WITHOUT THE CUBAN PRESENCE THE MPLA GOVERNMENT WOULD COLLAPSE UNDER PRESSURE FROM UNITA - AS MOBUTA HAD TOLD KAUNDA. NO INDICATION THAT MOBUTU PLANS TO INTERVENE TO BRING MPLA AND UNITA TOGETHER.

mb

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAS BEEN INACCESSIBLE FOR 10 DAYS, INTER ALIA ON VISISTS TO SHABA, LUSAKA AND BRAZZAVILLE. BUT I WAS ABLE TO GIVE HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ON 3 JULY ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE. UMBA DI LUTETE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSIONER, WAS THE ONLY OTHER PRESENT.

3. MOBUTU'S FIRST COMMENT WAS THAT BOTHA HAD ASKED TO COME AND SEE HIM TOO. HE HAD SEEN PROBLEMS, AT THIS JUNCTURE, IN GETTING CLEARANCE FROM THE MPR CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO INVITE HIM AND HAD SENT A TEMPORISING ANSWER. BUT HE HAD NOT SAID NO.

4. I SAID THAT ONE AIM OF THE MESSAGE WAS TO REASSURE HIM THAT OUR POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA AND OUR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID HAD NOT CHANGED. MOBUTU SAID THE MESSAGE SHOWED THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN VERY FIRMLY.

5. ON NAMIBIA/ANGOLA, MOBUTU SAID THAT, IN FACT, HIS POSITION ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS OURS. THERE WAS A NUANCE IN THAT HE COULD NOT TAKE THIS POSITION PUBLICLY, BECAUSE THE CUBANS HAD BEEN FREELY INVITED BY A LEGALLY RECOGNISED GOVERNMENT. BUT AS HEAD OF STATE OF ZAIRE HE CONSIDERED IT IN HIS COUNTRY'S INTEREST THAT THE CUBANS SHOULD GO.

6. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL DEPENDED ON MPLA/UNITA RECONCILIATION. MOBUTU SAID HE HAD HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THIS WITH KAUNDA (YOUR TELNO 165 TO LUSAKA REFERS) AND IMPLIED THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT. THE MPLA NEEDED THE CUBANS TO MAINTAIN THEIR REGIME INTERNALLY. IF THE CUBANS LEFT NOW THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT WOULD COLLAPSE UNDER PRESSURE FROM UNITA.

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7. I ASKED IF HE SAW ANY WAY OF BRINGING MPLA AND UNITA TOGETHER. MOBUTU SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD COME EVENTUALLY, BUT IT WOULD TAKE TIME. THERE WERE TWO CAMPS IN LUANDA. ONE GROUP FAVOURED TALKS WITH UNITA AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. THE OTHER ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD PUT THE COUNTRY AT THE MERCY OF THE AMERICANS. SO FAR THE PRO-CUBAN, PRO-SOVIET GROUP HAD PREVAILED, AS THE REGIME DEPENDED ON RUSSIAN SUPPLIES FOR ITS SURVIVAL. A FURTHER COMPLICATION WAS THAT, APPARENTLY, THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS TO TAKE ANGOLAN NATIONALITY AND SETTLE IN THE COUNTRY.

8. MOBUTU GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE CONTEMPLATED TRYING TO BRING MPLA AND UNITA TOGETHER AT THIS STAGE OR THAT HE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH SAVIMBI.

9. MOBUTU'S REALISTIC ATTITUDE TO ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA IS IN CONTRAST WITH HIS PUBLIC POSTURE. UMBA WAS WORRIED THAT I MIGHT REVEAL SOME OF THIS TO THE PRESS AND I UNDERTOOK SIMPLY TO SAY THAT THE MESSAGE CONCERNED SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE PRIME MINISTER HAD EXPLAINED HER OWN IMPRESSIONS AND ASKED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE CONTENT OF THIS CONVERSATION BE TREATED WITH GREAT DISCRETION AND CERTAINLY NOT REVEALED TO OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS OR THE PRESS.

10. THOUGH MOBUTU DOES NOT YET SEEM READY TO EXERT HIMSELF TO RECONCILE MPLA AND UNITA, I BELIEVE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE THESE EXCHANGES, THOUGH WE SHALL ONLY GET FRANK SPEAKING AT THE LEVEL OF MOBUTU HIMSELF, UMBA AND POSSIBLY NYIWA MOBUTU (SEE MY TELNO 87 OF 27 MARCH).

11 CAFD PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS DESIRED.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

BAYNE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Master.

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SUBJECT

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PP LUSAKA
GRS 330

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No

T 117A184
A 2/7

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 291130Z JUN 84
TO PRIORITY LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 29 JUNE 1984

PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER
1. GRATEFUL YOU SEND FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA:

BEGINS

I SHOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR SETTING OUT SO CLEARLY YOUR THOUGHTS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN YOUR LETTER OF 13 JUNE. YOU INVITE ME TO COMMENT ON THE TWO SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD IN IT.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE EARLY AND UNCONDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 AND WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MADE THIS CLEAR. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS DIFFICULT TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE INSISTING ON AN ARRANGEMENT ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AS A PRECONDITION FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. MR P W BOTHA WAS EMPHATIC ABOUT THE NEED FOR THIS IN OUR DISCUSSIONS AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT HE COULD BE PERSUADED OTHERWISE. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THE REGION WOULD BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY.

I FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SETTLE THEIR OWN INTERNAL DIFFERENCES WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. WE OURSELVES DO NOT AFFORD ANY RECOGNITION TO UNITA AND HAVE MAINTAINED THAT POLICY DESPITE THE NECESSITY OF DEALING WITH THEM OVER THE CAPTURED BRITISH TECHNICIANS. HOWEVER, OUR POSITION OF STRICT NON-INTERFERENCE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH A WISH FOR RECONCILIATION WITHIN ANGOLA. THIS MUST SURELY BE THE HOPE OF ALL THE FRIENDS OF THAT COUNTRY.

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LASTLY, MAY I STRESS MY CONCERN THAT EARLY PROGRESS SHOULD BE MADE TOWARDS A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. SOUTH AFRICA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA IS A STEP IN THIS DIRECTION: AND THERE HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT RECENT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS, SOUTH AFRICANS AND ANGOLANS, AND BETWEEN THE VARIOUS NAMIBIAN POLITICAL PARTIES. I KNOW YOU HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THESE. I BELIEVE THAT CONTINUING EXCHANGES OF THIS KIND REPRESENT THE BEST HOPE OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS. PLEASE REST ASSURED OF MY DETERMINATION TO CONTRIBUTE WHERE I CAN. ENDS.

HOWE

NNNN

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From the Private Secretary

28 June 1984

Thank you for your letter of 27 June enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda's letter of 13 June.

The Prime Minister is content for the message to issue. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its early despatch.

(CHARLES POWELL)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JA

PC CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

27 June, 1984

Agree reply to
President Kaunda?

Yes not

CD 27/6

Dear Charles,

As requested in your letters of 15 and 18 June I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda's letter of 13 June.

The draft takes into account the Prime Minister's disagreement with President Kaunda's suggestion that efforts should be made to persuade the United States and South Africa to drop the issue of linkage. The draft aims to give a balanced statement of our position, which makes clear that we do not accept President Kaunda's approach while maintaining our well-established support for the early and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

President Kaunda's second suggestion raises fewer difficulties in as much as it coincides with our view that the people of Angola should decide their own future without interference. But there is no prospect of South Africa dropping their support for UNITA, at least until some agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal has been reached. President Kaunda's rejection of reconciliation is contrary to his known support for this concept, and reflects his present unwillingness to come forward as an intermediary. It would seem right to reiterate own own general support for reconciliation.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

South Africa 4/82

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MAIL ROOM

Botma



CONFIDENTIAL

D 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Kaunda of Zambia

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I should like to thank you for setting out so clearly your thoughts on Southern Africa in your letter of 13 June. You invite me to comment on the two suggestions put forward in it.


The British Government support the early and unconditional implementation of SCR 435 and we have consistently made this clear. At the same time it is difficult to ignore the fact that the South Africans are insisting on an arrangement on Cuban troop withdrawal as a precondition for a Namibia settlement. Mr P W Botha was emphatic about the need for this in our discussions and I believe it would be unrealistic to think that he could be persuaded otherwise. I also believe that the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the region would be a major contribution to stability.

I fully share your view that the people of Angola should be allowed to settle their own internal differences without outside interference. We ourselves do not afford any recognition to UNITA and have maintained that policy despite the necessity of dealing with them over the captured British technicians. However, our position

Enclosures—flag(s).....

of strict non-interference is not inconsistent with a wish for reconciliation within Angola. This must surely be the hope of all the friends of that country.

Lastly, may I stress my concern that early progress should be made towards a Namibia settlement. South Africa's withdrawal from Angola is a step in this direction; and there have been important recent contacts between the Americans, South Africans and Angolans, and between the various Namibian political parties. I know you have played a major role in these. I believe that continuing exchanges of this kind represent the best hope of making further progress. Please rest assured of my determination to contribute where I can.



323

TOP COPY

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL No. T111/84

24433 - 1

OO GABORONE
OO NAIROBI
RR LUSAKA
RR DAR ES SALAAM
RR LAGOS
RR CAPE TOWN
RR ADDIS ABABA
RR HARARE
GRS 574

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 071240Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 7 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI

Recid 21-6-84

355027/7	
RECEIVED	19. 30
- 8 JUN 1984	

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA, HARARE VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

1. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU AND HC NAIROBI WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MASIRE AND PRESIDENT MOI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

QUOTE

(FOR PRESIDENT MASIRE: WHEN WE MET ON 14 MAY, WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO BRITAIN.) (FOR PRESIDENT MOI: AS YOU KNOW, THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER CAME TO BRITAIN ON 2 JUNE FOR A WORKING MEETING WITH ME.) I THOUGHT I SHOULD NOW GIVE YOU MY IMPRESSIONS OF MY MEETING WITH MR BOTHA.

I MADE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT I WANTED A FRANK AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION. INDEED, THE MEETING LASTED FOR OVER FIVE HOURS AND COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS. WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

MR BOTHA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA OF AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

24433 - 1

FROM ANGOLA, SINCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN NAMIBIA WHILE THEY WERE STILL THERE. I EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE I BELIEVED FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA, AND CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA) WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, FOR WHICH SCR 435 PROVIDES THE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

WE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. I MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT I CONDEMNED APARTHEID AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE NEED TO FIND WAY OF SATISFYING THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BLACK POPULATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I REFERRED TO NELSON MANDELA'S CONTINUED DETENTION AND SAID THAT I HOPED THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON THIS SOON. I SPOKE, TOO, ABOUT THE APPALLING PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS OF BLACK PEOPLES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. MR BOTHA SHOULD NOW BE WELL AWARE OF OUR VIEWS THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE LASTING VALUE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE ENTERED INTO FREELY AND WITHOUT A SENSE OF DURESS. (FOR MASIRE: I HOPE THAT AS A RESULT OF MY DISCUSSION, SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO BOTSWANA, AS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, WILL HAVE BEEN MODERATED.)

IN CONCLUSION, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE MR BOTHA'S PERCEPTIONS AT FIRST HAND. I DO NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS, BUT I SEE THIS MEETING AS PART OF A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH AFRICAN LEADERS, AND EUROPEAN LEADERS AND OTHERS MUST CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR THE SORT OF CHANGES WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES. UNQUOTE.

2. IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE, YOU SHOULD STRESS ORALLY THAT THIS MEETING WITH MR BOTHA SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE REGARDED, LEAST OF ALL BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AS CONDONING APARTHEID: NOR AS REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY. IF ASKED, YOU SHOULD ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MADE CLEAR

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

24433 - 1

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO UPHOLD FULLY ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN ARMS EMBARGO, AND UNDER THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT.

3. SEPARATE MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO MR MUGABE, PRESIDENTS KAUNDA, NYERERE AND MACHEL, AND TO GENERAL BUHARI.

HOWE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL No. T 110/84

27537 - 1

OO KINSHASA
 GRS 473
 CONFIDENTIAL

*cc MATTHEW
 OPS*

355027/7		
25 JUN 1984		
SR	RE	STBY
PA		

FM FCO 211300Z JUNE 1984
 TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 21 JUNE
 YOUR TELNO 71: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
 TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS :

'YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER VISITED
 THE UK ON 2 JUNE.

I AM NOW WRITING PERSONALLY TO GIVE YOU MY IMPRESSIONS OF THIS
 MEETING. I MADE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT I WANTED A FRANK AND
 WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION. INDEED, THE MEETING LASTED FOR OVER
 FIVE HOURS AND COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS. WE
 FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN
 SOUTH AFRICA. MR BOTHA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING PERSONALLY
 COMMITTED TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT HE
 ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA OF AN ACCEPTABLE
 ARRANGEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA, SINCE
 HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE
 IN NAMIBIA WHILE THEY WERE STILL THERE. I EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE
 I BELIEVED FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRIES
 OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA
 AND NAMIBIA, AND CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA) WE COULD NOT ACCEPT
 ANY FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AND A
 NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, FOR WHICH SCR 435 PROVIDES THE INTERNATIONALLY
 ACCEPTABLE BASIS. FOR HIS PART MR BOTHA SAID HE COULD SEE NO
 PROSPECT OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THERE WAS RECONCILIATION IN
 ANGOLA. I SHOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW YOU SEE THIS.
 WE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH
 AFRICA. I MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT I CONDEMNED APARTHEID AND
 WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE NEED
 TO FIND WAYS OF SATISFYING THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BLACK

CONFIDENTIAL

27537 - 1

POPULATION. I REFERRED TO NELSON MANDELA'S CONTINUED DETENTION AND SAID THAT I HOPED THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON THIS SOON. I SPOKE TOO, ABOUT THE APPALLING PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS OF BLACK PEOPLES IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. MR BOTHA SHOULD NOW BE WELL AWARE OF OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE LASTING VALUE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE ENTERED INTO FREELY AND WITHOUT A SENSE OF DURESS.

AS YOU KNOW I AM ANXIOUS TO PUSH BACK COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT BELIEVE SOME SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES RUN COUNTER TO THIS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE MR BOTHA'S PERCEPTIONS AT FIRST HAND. I DO NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS, BUT I SEE THIS MEETING AS PART OF A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH WE MUST ALL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR THE SORT OF CHANGES WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES.' ENDS.

2. IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD STRESS ORALLY THAT THIS MEETING WITH MR BOTHA SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE REGARDED, LEAST OF ALL BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AS CONDONING APARTHEID: NOR AS REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY.

HOWE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL No. T 109/84

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25 JUN 1984	
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FM FCO 211547Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 92 OF 21 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN

(393)

MY 2ND PT: MESSAGE TO UPPER VOLTA HEAD OF STATE FROM PRIME MINISTER

THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS: THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE VISIT TO BRITAIN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER, MR P W BOTHA. I AM CONCERNED TO DISPEL ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THIS.

OUR INVITATION WAS ISSUED AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND SIGNALS NO ALTERATION IN OUR POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. LIKE YOU, WE WISH TO SEE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY AND FIRMLY OPPOSED THE RACIAL POLICIES THERE. WE HAVE MADE EQUALLY CLEAR OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION FROM ANY QUARTER.

MR BOTHA'S VISIT WAS AN OCCASION FOR CANDID AND WIDE-RANGING TALKS WHICH PROVIDED A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AT THIS HIGH LEVEL OUR VIEWS AND PERCEPTIONS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE PROBLEMS OF NAMIBIA AS WELL AS OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES AND MANY ASPECTS OF APARTHEID AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. ON NAMIBIA WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE EARLY INDEPENDENCE AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.

I BELIEVE THAT IT IS ONLY THROUGH DIALOGUE THAT WE CAN HOPE TO INFLUENCE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES. WE SEE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MR BOTHA AS PART OF THE PROCESS THROUGH WHICH WE AND OTHER WESTERN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE SORT OF CHANGE WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. ENDS.

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SIR J LEAHY
MR SQUIRE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

S. Africa: Botha's Visit
CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN 210850Z JUN 84.

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 447 OF 21 JUNE

P W BOTHA'S VISIT TO EUROPE

1. WE HAVE LEARNED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FROM ONE OF THOSE PRESENT THAT P W BOTHA BRIEFED THE NATIONAL PARTY CAUCUS THIS MORNING (20 JUNE) ON HIS VISIT TO EUROPE.
2. P W BOTHA TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT HE HAD NOT COME TO CONQUER EUROPE. THE FACT OF THE VISIT TAKING PLACE AT ALL HAD BEEN A BREAKTHROUGH. HE WAS GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE COURTEOUS RECEPTION HE HAD BEEN GIVEN IN EVERY CAPITAL AND THE PERSONAL CONTACT ESTABLISHED MADE THE TRIP WORTHWHILE.
3. SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO EVOLVE A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THEY COULD NOT EVEN AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES AS TO WHAT KIND OF SYSTEM THEY WANTED TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA, SO THERE WAS NO POINT IN SOUTH AFRICA TRYING TO SATISFY THEM. SOUTH AFRICA DID, HOWEVER, HAVE FRIENDS IN A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WHAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD DO WAS TO AVOID MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR PEOPLE TO BE FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC. UNNECESSARY EXECUTIVE ACTIONS WHICH GAVE A BAD IMPRESSION OVERSEAS MUST BE AVOIDED.
4. EUROPEAN LEADERS WERE NOW MORE AWARE THAN THEY HAD BEEN OF SOUTH AFRICA'S IMPORTANCE AS A REGIONAL POWER AND OF THE REGIONAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH SOUTH AFRICA'S STATUS ACCORDED.
5. P W BOTHA HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR REGIONAL AID AND INVESTMENT. WHETHER THIS WOULD LEAD TO ANYTHING CONCRETE REMAINED TO BE SEEN, BUT EUROPEAN LEADERS WERE NOW IN NO DOUBT AS TO THE IMPORTANCE SOUTH AFRICA ATTACHED TO THIS QUESTION.
6. ON HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, P W BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT SOME FALSE IMPRESSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON KWANGEMA, HE HAD INFORMED MRS THATCHER THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY A DISPUTE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY: THE FACTIONS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO AGREE.

FERGUSSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1984

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: Messages to
Presidents Dos Santos and Mobutu, and to Captain Sankara
of Upper Volta

Thank you for your letter of 15 June on this subject.

The Prime Minister agrees to send messages to President Mobutu and to Captain Sankara. The text of the messages enclosed with your letter can therefore be despatched to them.

RF | The Prime Minister does not, however, agree to send a message to President Dos Santos. She takes the view that it is the presence of Cubans in Angola which is holding up further progress on Namibia. You will wish to consider whether to attempt to recast the message to take fuller account of this point or to rest on the briefing which our Ambassador has already given the Angolan Foreign Minister.

C.D. POWELL

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



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e Sir PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 May 1984

Message to the Prime Minister from
President Kaunda

You will recall that I sent you on 15 June a message which the Prime Minister had received from President Kaunda, with a request for a draft reply.

The Prime Minister read the message over the weekend. You will wish to be aware that she does not agree with President Kaunda's suggestion that efforts should be made to persuade the United States and South Africa to drop the issue of linkage.

C.D. POWELL

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Handwritten initials

Glenys Kinnock,
2a Clovelly Road,
Ealing,
London W5

16 June 1984

18

Dear Mrs Thatcher

Thank you for your letter of June 11 and for your intervention concerning the proposed removal of the KwaNgema community.

I understand from press reports that the South African authorities have decided to persist with the removal of this community and I would be most interested to know if you intend to take any further action regarding their case.

Yours sincerely

Glenys Kinnock.

Glenys Kinnock

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1

PRIME MINISTER

Letter from President Kaunda

You should be aware of this letter as you are likely to meet the Zambian High Commissioner tomorrow. He was keen to deliver it personally. I accepted it on your behalf.

C D P.

mf

15 June 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 June 1984

Letter to the Prime Minister
from President Kaunda

I enclose a letter from President Kaunda to the Prime Minister which was delivered to No.10 by the Zambian High Commissioner today. Although a reply to the Prime Minister's message about her meeting with Mr Botha, the letter raises some additional points which seem to require reply. I shall be grateful for a draft in due course.

BF |

CP

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

810

CONFIDENTIAL

ccle



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Case for a message to Upper Volta seems minimal & risks devaluing the medium. Agree

Angola and Zaire only?

15 June 1984

Law Center,

C.D.P. 15/6

We must reply to those who have sent messages (i.e. Upper Volta) but

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: Messages to Presidents Dos Santos and Mobutu, and to Captain Sankara of Upper Volta

The Prime Minister sent messages to a few selected Heads of African governments in advance of Mr Botha's visit. This was part of our effort to present the visit positively and to minimise adverse African and especially Commonwealth reactions. The Prime Minister has since sent messages giving her impressions of Mr Botha's visit to these same Heads of governments, and in addition to President Masire of Botswana and President Moi of Kenya. The Foreign Secretary now recommends that the Prime Minister should send messages also to President Dos Santos of Angola, President Mobutu of Zaire, and Captain Sankara, the Head of State of Upper Volta.

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The Prime Minister's messages to African leaders have been particularly well received. They have formed the major vehicle for presenting our views of Mr Botha's visit at the top level in African governments, doing much to dispel apprehension and suspicion, and countering Soviet and other efforts to present the visit as condoning apartheid and marking a change in British policy. The messages have also had an important bilateral impact.

Namibia
Open
Zaire
not

Although our relations with Angola, Zaire, and especially Upper Volta, are not of the same order as those with, for example, Zimbabwe and even Mozambique, the Foreign Secretary nonetheless considers that messages from the Prime Minister to the Heads of these governments would be timely and useful. They would fulfil the same general purpose as those already sent to other African leaders. There are, moreover, particular arguments in each of the three cases:

ANGOLA: Namibia and Angola were discussed extensively during Mr Botha's visit and although our Ambassador has briefed the Foreign Minister there on the basis of our general guidance President Dos Santos would undoubtedly value a firsthand account from the Prime Minister. It is, in any case, a delicate moment in Angola's discussions with the US over Cubans, and a message would help to encourage the Angolans to have confidence in the West and to carry on with their negotiations. Bilaterally, the message could help to restore

/Angolan

CONFIDENTIAL



Angolan confidence in the UK, following the UNITA hostages affair.

ZAIRE: Although not a Front Line State, Zaire is a major player in central Africa, with a close interest in the Namibia/Angola problem. President Mobutu's personal links with Dr Savimbi could enable him to contribute constructively to a process of reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA. The Foreign Secretary believes that generally we should pay Zaire closer attention. A message to Mobutu would be an important step in this process.

UPPER VOLTA: Captain Sankara, the Head of State of Upper Volta, sent a telex message to the Prime Minister (copy enclosed) protesting at Mr Botha's visit. Our relations with Upper Volta and with Sankara himself are admittedly minimal. Sankara is of little standing in Africa (though he has close links with the present leadership in Ghana) and has no role or knowledge of Southern African issues. He is radical. But if the Prime Minister did not reply Sankara might see this as a gratuitous offence, confirming his view that we take little notice of African opinion, while his ignorance of the Botha visit and the reasoning behind it would remain total. This could be reflected in his behaviour in the OAU or South African gatherings. A message from the Prime Minister might moderate Sankara's stance a little and would probably be well received.

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to Presidents Dos Santos and Mobutu (the same message will, with slight modifications, do for both); I also enclose a slightly different message for Sankara.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA
	10	YOUR TELNO 71: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
	11	1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister
	12	to President Dos Santos as soon as possible: Kinshasa should
	13	deliver the message to President Mobutu.
	14	BEGINS: FOR DOS SANTOS: I know that our Ambassador has briefed
	15	your Foreign Minister on the outcome of my recent talks with the
	16	South African Prime Minister.
	17	FOR MOBUTU: You will be aware that the South African Prime
	18	Minister visited the UK on 2 June.
	19	I am now writing personally to give you my impressions of this
	20	meeting. I made clear at the outset that I wanted a frank and
///	21	wide-ranging discussion. Indeed, the meeting lasted for over
//	22	five hours and covered the full range of regional problems. We
/	23	focused particularly on Namibia and the internal situation in
	24	South Africa. Mr Botha gave me the impression of being personally
	25	committed to Namibian independence as soon as possible. But he

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword also
File number	Dept	Distribution Southern Africa
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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1 <<<<
2 also stressed the importance to South Africa of an acceptable
3 arrangement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, since
4 he did not believe that fair and free elections could take place
5 in Namibia while they were still there. I explained that, while
6 I believed foreign forces should be withdrawn from the countries
7 of Southern Africa (including South African forces from Angola
8 and Namibia, and Cuban forces from Angola) we could not accept
9 any formal link between the withdrawal of Cuban forces and a
10 Namibia settlement, for which SCR 435 provides the internationally
11 acceptable basis. [FOR MOBUTU: For his part Mr Botha said he
12 could see no prospect of Cuban withdrawal until there was
13 reconciliation in Angola. I should be interested to know how you
14 see this.]
15 We had a long discussion on the internal situation in South
16 Africa. I made it very clear that I condemned apartheid and
17 would continue to do so. I laid particular stress on the need to
18 find ways of satisfying the political aspirations of the black
19 population. I referred to Nelson Mandela's continued detention
20 and said that I hoped there would be progress on this soon. I
21 spoke too, about the appalling practice of forced removals of
22 black peoples in South Africa. We also discussed South Africa's
23 relations with neighbouring countries. Mr Botha should now be
24 well aware of our view that the only agreements that are likely
25 to have lasting value are those which are entered into freely
26 and without a sense of duress.
27 [FOR MOBUTU: As you know I am anxious to push back communist
28 influence in Southern Africa, but believe some South African
29 policies run counter to this.] I have no doubt that it was right
30 to try to influence Mr Botha's perceptions at first hand. I do
31 not expect quick results, but I see this meeting as part of a
32 process through which we must all continue to push for the sort
33 of changes we all want to see in South African policies.
34 [FOR DOS SANTOS: I know that your Government has also been in

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword negotiation
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page

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 2 negotiation with the South African Government over issues vital to
 3 Angolan security. I hope that at this important juncture those
 4 discussions, and indeed my own with Mr Botha, can contribute to
 5 progress towards an early Namibia settlement.] ENDS.
 6 2. In delivering this message you should stress orally that
 7 this meeting with Mr Botha should certainly not be regarded,
 8 least of all by the South Afircans, as condoning apartheid; nor
 9 as representing any change in British policy.

11 HOWE
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telegram

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Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TEL NO.	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI ROUTINE CAPE TOWN
	10	VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: MESSAGE FROM UPPER VOLTA
	11	HEAD OF STATE
	12	1. MIFT contains the translated text of a message to the Prime
	13	Minister from Captain Sankara protesting at the visit here of the
	14	South African Prime Minister.
	15	2. Second MIFT gives the text of the Prime Minister's reply
	16	which you should please transmit by the most convenient means.
	17	3. We have no reason to be apologetic to Sankara and the reply
	18	is, accordingly, couched in suitably firm tone; at the same time
	19	we have sought to be constructive.
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	21	HOWE
///	22	NNNN
//	23	
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	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution Limited PS/Mr Rifkind PS/PUS Sir J Leahy Mr Squire
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
UNCLASSIFIED

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	UNCLASSIFIED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI ROUTINE CAPE TOWN
	10	MIPT: MESSAGE FROM UPPER VOLTA HEAD OF STATE
	11	Message is as follows:
	12	BEGINS: Following the announcement of the journey by the South
	13	African Prime Minister to various European countries, including
	14	yours, we have the honour to convey to you our deep concern and
	15	protest most vigorously at the prospect [of this visit]. The
	16	timid initiatives taken by the South African Government with
	17	respect to Angola and Mozambique give no grounds for rejoicing
	18	that there is a desire for change on the part of the racist
	19	regime in Pretoria. We venture to hope that the British
	20	Government is weighing up all the political implications that such
	21	a project, if it should come about, might have for its relations
///	22	with the OAU. We feel that your wisdom and political foresight
//	23	will prevail.
/	24	Captain Thomas Sankara, President of the National Council of the
	25	Revolution, Head of State of Upper Volta, Ouagadougou. ENDS

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword HOWE
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats UNCLASSIFIED	Page 2
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2 HOWE
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OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO	
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	RFI ROUTINE CAPE TOWN	
	10	MY 2ND PT: MESSAGE TO UPPER VOLTA HEAD OF STATE FROM PRIME	
	11	MINISTER.	
	12	The text of the message is as follows:	
	13	BEGINS: Thank you for your message about the visit to Britain	
	14	by the South African Prime Minsiter, Mr P W Botha. I am	
	15	concerned to dispel any misunderstanding about this.	
	16	Our invitation was issued after the most careful consideration	
	17	and signals no alteration in our policy towards South Africa.	
	18	Like you, we wish to see change in South Africa and have	
	19	consistently and firmly opposed the racial policies there. We	
	20	have made equally clear our condemnation of the use of violence in	
	21	the region from any quarter.	
///	22	Mr Botha's visit was an occasion for candid and wide-ranging	
//	23	talks which provided a major opportunity to explain to the South	
/	24	African Government at this high level our views and perceptions	
	25	on the major issues concerning Southern Africa. The discussions	
		NNNN ends telegram	BLANK
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		File number	Dept
		Distribution	
		Drafted by (Block capitals)	
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		Comcen reference	Time of despatch

OUT. TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

2

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2 covered the problems of Namibia as well as other regional issues
 3 and many aspects of apartheid and the internal situation in South
 4 Africa. On Namibia we are anxious to see early independence and
 5 will continue to press for the implementation of the United
 6 Nations plan for Namibian independence.

7 I believe that it is only through dialogue that we can hope
 8 to influence South African policies. We see our discussions with
 9 Mr Botha as part of the process through which we and other
 10 Western and African countries must continue to press for the sort
 11 of change we all want to see in Southern Africa. ENDS.

12
 13 HOWE

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
34

NNNN ends
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Catchword

15 JUN 1984



Subject



cc Master
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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T98 A184

STATE HOUSE

LUSAKA

THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

13th June, 1984.

My Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for the message on your meeting with Mr. P.W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, which your High Commissioner brought to me on Friday last week.

It was kind of you, for which I am grateful, to have informed me in advance, of your intention to invite Mr. Botha for a working visit to your country. I was, however, apprehensive about this visit. I thought that such a visit would be used by South Africa for propaganda purposes in its attempt to strengthen the oppressive apartheid system.

I also feared that Botha's visit to Europe would undermine the campaign to isolate South Africa internationally. This campaign is an important pressure on South Africa which is bound to have positive results provided that it is not undermined.

I find it hard to believe that European Governments can use President Machel's and my meeting with Mr. Botha as a pretext for allowing the South African Prime Minister to visit their countries. This is not a fair comparison as our meeting with Mr. Botha was done out of pressure which the South African regime is exerting on all of us in this region. In other words, President Machel and I have no choice but to meet Mr. Botha in order to lessen the pressure on us. I believe that none of the European countries is under such pressure.

/...

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

However, I am pleased to learn that during your meeting with Botha, you condemned the system of apartheid in South Africa and rejected any link between the withdrawal of Cuban Forces from Angola and a Namibia settlement on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). I wish to thank you for this positive stand.

The idea of reconciliation between MPLA and UNITA which the South African Prime Minister raised with you must be rejected on two grounds. Firstly, the UNITA problem is an internal matter for the Angolan Government to solve. Secondly, the idea of reconciliation as a condition for the withdrawal of Cuban Forces from Angola introduces another linkage which cannot be accepted.

The question now is what should we all be doing to break the impasse over the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). I wish to offer two suggestions for your consideration. These are:-

- Firstly, we should all persuade the United States and South Africa to drop the issue of linkage.
- Secondly, we should all persuade South Africa to stop supporting UNITA so that the people of Angola themselves can settle their own differences. Indeed, it will be useful if all Western Governments can make public statements stating that they do not support any anti-MPLA Government Forces.

I shall be grateful to have your views on these two suggestions.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Ko

Kenneth D. Kaunda
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 131035Z JUN 84

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 216 OF 13 JUNE

AND TO ROUTINE HARARE, LUSAKA, DAR-ES-SALAAM, LAGOS
REPEATED SAVING LUANDA, GABORONE, CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA

YOUR TELNO 191 OF 7 JUNE TO HARARE: VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME
MINISTER TO UK

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL LAST NIGHT, BEING RECEIVED SOON AFTER HIS RETURN FROM A VISIT OUTSIDE MAPUTO.
2. MACHEL EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION WITH IT AND ALSO THAT OF 18 MAY CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO 159, WHICH I HAD DELIVERED IN HIS ABSENCE UP-COUNTRY THROUGH MINISTER VELOSO OF THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID HE HAD WANTED TO CALL ME IN WHEN HE HAD READ THE EARLIER MESSAGE AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS I HAD MADE THEN TO VELOSO TO UNDERLINE HIS APPRECIATION OF THIS COURTEOUS AND TO THE POINT RESPONSE TO HIS OWN CONCERNS OVER SOUTH AFRICA, BUT HE HAD BEEN SO FULLY IN AGREEMENT ON ALL GROUNDS THAT HE WOULD HAVE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY. THE PORTUGUESE PROVERB QUOTE HE WHO KEEPS QUIET AGREES UNQUOTE SUMMED IT ALL UP. SINCE THEN HE HAD READ THE PRESS REPORTS OF MR BOTHA'S VISIT TO LONDON AND COULD SEE HOW THE PRIME MINISTER HAD FULFILLED JUST WHAT SHE HAD SET OUT TO DO. HE HAD TOLD OLIVER TAMBO THE DAY BEFORE THAT HE AGREED WITH THE BRITISH DECISION TO SPEAK TO MR BOTHA. BRITAIN HAD INFLUENCE TO BE USED WITH SOUTH AFRICA. IT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT STAGE IN MR BOTHA'S TOUR WHERE THE MESSAGE HE HAD HOPED WOULD BE PUT ACROSS WOULD COUNT.
3. NOW HE FOUND HIMSELF IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE LATEST MESSAGE TOO. HE HAD TAKEN PARTICULAR NOTE THAT, JUST AS WE HAD BEEN THE ONLY ONE OF THE FIVE COUNTRIES TO SHOW TO HIM THEIR RESPONSE TO HIS DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR BEFORE MR BOTHA'S JOURNEY, SO BRITAIN WAS THE FIRST TO SHARE IN CONFIDENCE THE OUTCOME WITH HIM.
4. THROUGHOUT MY READING OF THE MESSAGE, MACHEL NODDED OR EXPRESSED ASSENT. IN DISCUSSION HE PICKED OUT FOR SPECIAL ENDORSEMENT HIS SATISFACTION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN TO BOTHA ABOUT MANDELA WHERE PROGRESS WAS IMPORTANT TO RELEASE THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN WHICH, AS I KNEW, HE ACCEPTED THAT ALL RACES IN SOUTH AFRICA HAD A PART TO PLAY. THEY WERE ALL AFRICANS. BRITAIN WITH THE ONE POINT EIGHT MILLION IN THE REPUBLIC OF BRITISH DESCENT, LIKE PORTUGAL WITH HER SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND OR SO THERE, STILL HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY THERE. MOZAMBIQUE AND BRITAIN SHOULD

CONFIDENTIAL /COORDINATE

CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATE A COMMON STRATEGY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND WITH PORTUGAL TOO. HE HAD SENT HIS OWN PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PORTUGAL TO KEEP HIM IN TOUCH WITH MARIO SOARES DURING MR BOTHA'S VISIT THERE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED ALSO THE REFERENCE TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BUT GRACEFULLY DID NOT PRESS ME ON THIS OR ON MR BOTHA'S PARTICULAR RESPONSES.

5. I COMMENTED THAT SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR OPPOSITION TO OUR RECEIVING MR BOTHA, MACHEL DISMISSED THIS AS MERE SPEECH FROM THE TRIBUNE. HE SIDESTEPED MY QUESTIONS ON HOW HE SAW DEVELOPMENTS IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA UNFOLDING.

6. COMMENT. MACHEL DISPLAYED NO DOUBTS AT ALL ABOUT THE RIGHTNESS OF HIS POLICY OF OPENING UP SOUTH AFRICA BY DIALOGUE. HE IS SAID TO HAVE COMMENTED AS LONG AGO AS EARLY 1983 THAT HE MUST SOLVE THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM FOR AFRICA. IF HE CAN BRING MOZAMBIQUE INTERNALLY INTO SAFER HARBOUR, HE IS AMBITIOUS TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS THE NATURAL LEADER OF SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA AFTER NYERERE AND KUANDA FADE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THESE EXCHANGES OVER MR BOTHA'S VISIT HAVE NOT ONLY GIVEN HIM SINCERE PLEASURE AND FURTHER RESPECT FOR OUR DIPLOMACY, BUT ALSO CONFIDENCE IN OUR SUPPORT IN HIS STILL LONELY PATH TOWARDS PRAGMATIC POLICIES TOWARDS THE REGION'S PROBLEMS. COORDINATION WITH US IS TOO MUCH TO ASK, BUT HE IS OPEN TO CONTINUING DIALOGUE. I HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO TAKE HIM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE.

F C O PLEASE PASS ALL

VINES

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 June 1984

Dear Bishop.

Thank you for your letter of 2 June about Mr. Botha's visit. When we discussed Mr. Botha's visit on 30 May, I made clear that this visit signalled no change of policy by the British Government, and that while I felt very strongly about apartheid and wished to see it changed, I firmly believed in dialogue as the best way to influence South African policies, and to bring about the sort of changes we all want to see.

In the event, as I have explained in Parliament, I had candid and comprehensive discussions with the South African Prime Minister and was able to express to him my views on a range of Southern African issues. On Namibia, I made clear our desire to see early progress towards an enduring settlement, for which SCR 435 provides the internationally accepted plan. Our views on South Africa's policies towards its neighbours are well known, and I stressed that the only agreements which were likely to last were those that were freely entered into without duress. On South Africa's internal policies, I stressed my strongly held views on apartheid, and the need for early progress towards a system of government which has the consent of the South African people as a whole. I expressed concern at the continued detention of Nelson Mandela and my hope for early progress on this; and also at the practice of forced removals, citing the specific case of the KwaNgema community who had earlier written to both The Queen and to me. I stressed our determination to uphold our international commitments under the Arms Embargo and the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport.

/ My

NC

My discussions with Mr. Botha enabled me to raise many important issues, in some cases issues which people in Southern Africa, such as the people of KwaNgema, had asked me to mention. It is in this constructive way that we and other Western and African governments must continue to press for the sort of changes in South Africa, and the reduction of tension in the region generally, which we all wish to see.

Lastly, you ask about the possibility of export licences for maritime surveillance aircraft. The position on this remains that we have received no export licence application, nor has the South African Government approached us, and we cannot give decisions on hypothetical proposals. But should we be asked to consider such an application, I can assure you that we will honour our obligations under the UN Arms Embargo.

Yours sincerely
Nanjund Reddy

The Most Reverend Trevor Huddleston, CR, DD



file 888

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 June 1984

Visit of South African Prime Minister: Messages from Bishop Tutu, Chief Buthelezi and the Natal Indian Congress

Thank you for your letter of 8 June with which you enclosed draft replies to the above named people.

The Prime Minister is content with the proposed messages to Chief Buthelezi and to the Natal Indian Congress. She also agrees with the method of transmitting them which you suggest, and I should be grateful if you could arrange for their despatch accordingly.

I enclose a revised version of the message to Bishop Tutu, which the Prime Minister has approved for despatch as amended.

David Barclay

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

✓

Ate JFM

DRAFT LETTER FROM MR FERGUSON

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 25 May about the visit to Britain by the South African Prime Minister, and to let you have the following reply.

Mrs Thatcher is sorry that you should be unhappy at the government's decision to invite Mr Botha to Britain. Our views on apartheid are well known and have been made clear by the Prime Minister both before and following Mr Botha's visit. We share your concern to see peaceful solutions to the problems of South Africa and the region generally. We believed it would have been wrong not to have taken the opportunity of Mr Botha's visit to Europe to impress upon him our views and perceptions.

The Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Botha was an occasion for wide ranging and candid talks covering all the major issues. There was much discussion of the internal situation in South Africa and Mrs Thatcher was able to express our views on serious problems of importance to her, as to you, including forced removals (where the Prime Minister expressed our concern, and raised the particular case of the plight of the KwaNgema Community). The Prime Minister also raised the case of Mr Mandela. More generally, the Prime Minister left Mr Botha in no doubt of our strong feelings on apartheid and desire to see peaceful change towards a system of government which has the support of all South Africans.

Mr Botha's visit signalled no change in British policy. But we firmly believe that it is only through contact and dialogue such as this that we can hope to influence the complex pattern of events in Southern Africa in a constructive sense. The decision to invite Mr Botha to Britain, far from suggesting that we and other Western countries have abandoned the people of South Africa, reflects our continuing concern for their future and the future of Southern Africa.

I enclose a copy of the statement of Mr Botha's visit made by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 5 June.

SLHAAR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 June, 1984

GR
John John, Re type for PM
D
12/6

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: Letter from
Archbishop Trevor Huddleston

Your letter of 4 June enclosed a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Archbishop Trevor Huddleston and others on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement about Mr Botha's visit. I enclose a draft reply.

15 May
23 May FCO

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A. J. Coles Esq.
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Archbishop Trevor Huddleston
 President
 The Anti-Apartheid Movement
 13 Selous Street
 LONDON
 SW1 ODW

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 2 June about Mr Botha's visit. When we discussed Mr Botha's visit on 30 May, I made clear that this visit signalled no change of policy by the British Government, and that while I felt very strongly about apartheid and wished to see it changed, I firmly believed in dialogue as the best way to influence South African policies, and to bring about the sort of changes we all want to see.

In the event, as I have explained in Parliament, I had candid and comprehensive discussions with the South African Prime Minister and was able to express to him my views on a range of Southern African issues. On Namibia, I made clear our desire to see early progress towards an enduring settlement, for which SCR 435 provides the internationally accepted plan. Our views on South Africa's policies towards its neighbours are well known, and I stressed that the only agreements which were likely to last were those that were freely entered into without duress. On South Africa's internal policies, I stressed my strongly held views on apartheid, and the need for

/early

Enclosures—flag(s).....

S. A. Botha: April 84

- 2 -

early progress towards a system of government which has the consent of the South African people as a whole. I expressed concern at the continued detention of Nelson Mandela and my hope for early progress on this; and also at the practice of forced removals, citing the specific case of the KwaNgema community who had earlier written to both The Queen and to me. I stressed our determination to uphold our international commitments under the Arms Embargo and the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport.

My discussions with Mr Botha enabled me to raise many important issues, in some cases issues which people in Southern Africa, such as the people of KwaNgema, had asked me to mention. It is in this constructive way that we and other Western and African governments must continue to press for the sort of changes in South Africa, and the reduction of tension in the region generally, which we all wish to see.

Lastly, you ask about the possibility of export licences for maritime surveillance aircraft. The position on this remains that we have received no export licence application, nor has the South African Government approached us, and we cannot give decisions on hypothetical proposals. But should we be asked to consider such an application, I can assure you that we will honour our obligations under the UN Arms Embargo.

GR 280

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 110800Z JUN 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 250 OF 11 JUNE

INFO HARARE, LUSAKA, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONE, CAPE-TOWN, NAIROBI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA.

YOUR TELNO 191 TO HARARE - VISIT BY MR BOTHA.

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE AT HIS MSASANI RESIDENCE ON 9 JUNE AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED.

2. NYERERE, WHO WAS IN A RELAXED MOOD, READ THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY. HE THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER FOR GIVING HIM THIS FULL ACCOUNT OF HER DISCUSSIONS, BUT COMMENTED WRYLY THAT, WHATEVER HAD BEEN SAID TO HIM IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE, BOTHA HAD ACHIEVED HIS MAIN PURPOSE BY BEING RECEIVED IN SO MANY WESTERN CAPITALS.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT AS BOTHA HAD BEEN VISITING EUROPE ANYWAY, IT SEEMED APPROPRIATE THAT MRS THATCHER SHOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE HIM IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON NAMIBIA, APARTHEID ETC. NYERERE CONCEDED THAT IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE BOTHA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN A HARD TIME. HE DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES OR SPORTING CONTACTS.

4. I ASKED NYERERE HOW HE SAW THE SITUATION DEVELOPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISED AT THE DELAY IN COMPLETION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETE, THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION 435 COULD BEGIN AND NEITHER THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOR THE AMERICANS WERE READY FOR THIS. HE THOUGHT THE MOZAMBICANS HAD GONE UNNECESSARILY FAR IN THEIR MEASURES TO CONTROL THE ANC, BUT THIS WOULD ADJUST ITSELF IN TIME. HE DID NOT EXPECT THE FLS MEETING ON ANC STRATEGY (AGREED AT THE ARUSHA MEETING) TO TAKE PLACE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

5. WE THEN DISCUSSED INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

SANKEY

SOUTHERN AFRICA [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GABORONE 110800Z JUNE 84

TO PRIORITY FCQ

TELNO 122 OF 11 JUNE 1984

INFO HARARE, ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NY, WASHINGTON, LUANDA, MAPUTO,
LAGOS, DAR-ES-SALAAM, LUSAKA, NAIROBI

YOUR TELNO 88 : VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MASIRE
ON 8 JUNE AND I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2 OF THE TUR.

2. PRESIDENT MASIRE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGE
AND ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR IT.
HE ALSO RECALLED WITH GRATITUDE A PREVIOUS OCCASION EARLY LAST
YEAR WHEN HE ASKED US TO SPEAK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS WHEN THEY
WERE UTTERING THREATS AGAINST BOTSWANA FOLLOWING THE PRETORIA
BOMBING.

3. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO DISCUSS SOUTH AFRICAN ATTEMPTS
TO MAKE BOTSWANA SIGN A SECURITY TREATY AND THE REASONS WHY
BOTSWANA OBJECTED, BUT NOTHING NEW EMERGED.

FCO PSE PASS ALL ADDRESSEES

W JONES

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 091600Z JUN 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 9 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, HARARE,
GABORONE, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA.

YOUR TELNO 191 TO HARARE: VISIT BY SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER
TO THE UK.

1. I SAW PRESIDENT KAUNDA YESTERDAY EVENING (8 JUNE) AND
DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. KAUNDA READ IT AND
SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER
HAD KEPT HIM INFORMED BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE MEETING WITH
BOTH. HE INTENDS TO ADDRESS HIMSELF TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S
QUESTION ABOUT RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA.

2. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE HAD HAD ANXIOUS MOMENTS ABOUT THE
MEETING. NO DOUBTS CROSSED HIS MIND ABOUT WHAT THE PRIME
MINISTER WOULD SAY TO BOTH. BUT, KNOWING THE BOERS, HE
THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT EXPLOIT THE MEETING TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.
NOW, AFTER THE STRONG REACTION OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE TO
THE VISIT, HE WAS SATISFIED THAT BOTH COULD HARBOUR NO
ILLUSIONS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD GAINED NOTHING.

3. KAUNDA OBJECTED TO REPORTS FROM THE ZAMBIAN HIGH
COMMISSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING HAD BEEN COMPARED
WITH HIS AND MACHEL'S MEETINGS WITH P. W. BOTH. THERE WAS
NO ANALOGY. THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN IMPOSED ON ZAMBIA BY SOUTH
AFRICA'S MIGHT. THEY WERE LIKE DUKERS FACING THE LEOPARD.

4. I ASKED KAUNDA ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH DOS SANTOS IN LUANDA
EARLIER IN THE WEEK. HE SAID THAT DOS SANTOS HAD EXPLAINED
THE DIFFICULTIES IN ESTABLISHING CONTROL IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS
IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AND THE DANGER OF CLASHES WITH SWAPO FORCES.
BOTH LEADERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SWAPO'S MORALE. BUT IF THE
GUERRILLAS STEPPED UP THEIR ACTIVITIES THERE WAS A RISK THAT
SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WOULD RETURN.

5. I ASKED KAUNDA IF HE SAW THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER SWAPO/SAG
MEETINGS SOON. HE SAID THAT, IF ASKED AGAIN, HE WOULD NOT
HESITATE TO CONVENE A MEETING AS LONG AS ALL THE PARTIES
ACKNOWLEDGED THE PRIMACY OF UNSCR 435.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL.

JOHNSON

STANDARD(PALACE)

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EED

MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister⁽¹⁾

Agree replies to Bishop Tutu,
the Natal Indian Congress, and
Chief Buthelezi? 8 June, 1984

Bishop Tutu's as amended

John Johnson,

Dms
8/6

Origin - agreed. mt

Visit of South African Prime Minister: Messages from Bishop Tutu,
Chief Buthelezi and the Natal Indian Congress

/ I enclose draft replies to messages for the Prime Minister from Bishop Tutu, and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) about Mr Botha's visit. I also enclose a draft reply to a message / from Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu. The Foreign Secretary advises that it would be appropriate for the replies to Bishop Tutu and Chief Buthelezi to be sent by our Ambassador in South Africa, on behalf of the Prime Minister; that to the Natal Indian Congress can appropriately be sent by our Consul in Durban.

/ Bishop Tutu, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, was in New York in May and handed to our mission there a letter (copy enclosed) expressing regret, on behalf of the South African Council of Churches, at our decision to invite Mr Botha here. Bishop Tutu is evidently concerned that Western governments have misunderstood the true nature of Mr Botha's 'reformist' policies at home and abroad and have now forsaken South Africa's black population. Bishop Tutu is a prominent activist within South Africa against Apartheid and is viewed with deep mistrust by the South African Government. As a church leader he is naturally a supporter of a peaceful solution to South African problems. But this letter reflects his despair and his deep concern that Western countries should do nothing to encourage Mr Botha's regime.

Chief Buthelezi, the internationally respected Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland and leader of Inkatha, a major black cultural/political organisation, issued a memorandum addressed to the British, German and Italian Governments. Buthelezi, himself a proponent of dialogue and peaceful change, was nonetheless uneasy at the implications of Mr Botha's visit. But he was prepared to give our invitation a guarded welcome providing we used the opportunity to speak forthrightly about the South African Government's domestic and foreign policies, the continued pursuit of which he believes threatens a 'Southern African holocaust', damaging to the West and to the region alike. Chief Buthelezi had earlier expressed these views to Mr Rifkind when he called on him in London on 9 May.

The Natal Indian Congress sent a message to the Prime Minister condemning our decision to invite Mr Botha to Britain, seeing it as offering succour to the South African Government in the pursuit of its apartheid policies. The NIC is one of a number of political

/groups



groups representing South Africa's Indian community. They are opposed to participation by Indians in the new constitutional structures, and take a radical approach to South Africa's problems.

The replies we send to these messages are effectively public documents. The enclosed drafts have been prepared with this in mind. While each is tailored to the particular concerns of the addressee, they are all based on the Prime Minister's statement in the House on 5 June about Mr Botha's visit, and other material authorised for use in public.

If the Prime Minister is content with the replies and the proposed method of transmitting them, we will instruct our Posts in South Africa accordingly.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Mr Fergusson

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

The Rt Rev Bishop Desmond Tutu
 General Secretary
 The South African Council of Churches
 Khotso House
 42 de Villiers Street
 Johannesburg

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

The Prime Minister has asked me to
 Thank you for your letter of 25 May to ~~Mrs Thatcher~~ about
 the visit to Britain by the South African Prime Minister,
and to let you have the following
~~I have been asked to reply.~~

CAVEAT.....

PM Mrs Thatcher
The PM is sorry

I am ~~sorry~~ that you should be unhappy at ~~my~~ ^{the} government's
 decision to invite Mr Botha to Britain. Our views on
 apartheid are well known and have been made clear by
 the Prime Minister both before and following Mr Botha's
 visit. We share your concern to see peaceful solutions
 to the problems of South Africa and the region generally.
 We believed it would have been wrong not to have
 taken the opportunity of Mr Botha's visit to Europe
 to impress upon him our views and perceptions.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

The Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Botha was an
 occasion for wide ranging and candid talks covering all
 the major issues. There was much discussion of the
 internal situation in South Africa and Mrs Thatcher was
 able to express our views on serious problems of importance
 to her, as to you, including forced removals (where the
 Prime Minister expressed our concern, and raised the

particular case of the plight of the KwaNgema Community).
The Prime Minister also raised the case of Mr Mandela,
~~making clear she hoped for early progress.~~ More generally,
the Prime Minister left Mr Botha in no doubt of our strong
feelings on apartheid and desire to see peaceful change
towards a system of government which has the support of
all South Africans.

Mr Botha's visit signalled no change in British policy.
But we firmly believe that it is only through contact and
dialogue such as this that we can hope to influence the
complex pattern of events in Southern Africa in a
constructive sense. ~~(We do not expect any quick results,~~
but as Mrs Thatcher has said, we see our discussions with
Mr Botha as part of the process through which we and
other Western and African countries must (and will)
continue to press for change in Southern Africa.) The
decision to invite Mr Botha to Britain, far from suggesting
that we and other Western countries have abandoned the
people of South Africa, reflects our continuing concern
for their future *and the future of Southern Africa*

I enclose a copy of the statement of Mr Botha's visit
made by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 5 June.

DRAFT: ~~xxxxx~~ letter/teletype ~~xxxxx/xxx~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Mr Fergusson

DEPARTMENT:

TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi
 Chief Minister
 Kwazulu
 SOUTH AFRICA

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I have been asked to thank you for the memorandum which you addressed to the British Government in the context of the visit of the South African Prime Minister to Britain. This has been carefully studied, as has the paper you left with Mr Rifkind when you called on him on 9 May.

As you know, we share your belief in the value and importance of contact and dialogue with the Government in South Africa, and your commitment to working for peaceful solutions to the problems of South Africa and the region generally.

Against that background, and recognising that this is a particularly important juncture in Southern African affairs, my Government felt it right to take the opportunity of the South African Prime Minister's visit to Europe to invite him to Britain and to explain at the highest level our views and perceptions on developments in the region.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/The

The Prime Minister's talks with Mr Botha were candid and comprehensive. They covered all the major regional issues, including Namibia. There was much discussion about the internal situation in South Africa itself, including the important questions raised in your memorandum. The Prime Minister made clear our strongly held views on apartheid, our concern for the rights of the black majority in South Africa, and deep disquiet at the practice of forced removals.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mr Botha's visit signalled no change of policy on the part of the British Government. Rather, as Mrs Thatcher has said, it was part of the process through which we and other Western and African countries must (and will) continue to press for change in Southern Africa.

I enclose a copy of the statement on Mr Botha's visit made by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 5 June.



DRAFT: ~~write~~/letter/~~teletype~~/~~dispatch~~/~~note~~
~~XXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

HM Consul Durban

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Chairman
Executive Committee
Natal Indian Congress
St Joseph's Centre
St Andrew's Street
DURBAN

Secret

Copies to:

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I have been asked, on instructions from London, to thank you for your message to the British Prime Minister about the visit to Britain of the South African Prime Minister.


The British Government has long made clear its wish to see peaceful change in South Africa and progress on other regional issues. We believe it would have been wrong not to have taken the opportunity of Mr Botha's visit to Europe to explain our views to the South African Government directly and at the highest level.

As you will see from the enclosed text of Mrs Thatcher's statement in Parliament on 5 June, about her talks with Mr Botha, the very issues to which you refer in your message were amongst those discussed.

We firmly believe that it is only through such contact and dialogue that we can hope to influence the complex pattern of events in Southern Africa in a constructive sense. Far from signalling any change in our policy, Mr Botha's visit was, as the Prime Minister has said, part

Enclosures—flag(s).....

part of the process through which we and other Western and African countries must (and will) continue to press for change in Southern Africa.





THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

May 25, 1984

Mrs. M. Thatcher
10 Downing Street
London, SW 7, England

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

On behalf of the South African Council of Churches, I hope that you and yours had a pleasant and happy Easter.

I am writing to express our sense of shock that you and your government should have seen fit to invite Mr. P.W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister to come to England as an official guest of your government. It is, in our view, an affront to those such as many in our member churches who are striving to work for fundamental change in South Africa by peaceful means. It is like a slap in the face of millions of black South Africans who are the daily victims of one of the most vicious policies in the world.

Recently a delegation of church leaders visited England as part of their tour to various countries of the Western world to publicize the appearance of a report on the South African government's Force Population Removal Policy. This report is a joint effort between the South African Council of Churches and the Catholic Bishop's Conference designed to highlight the most vicious aspect of apartheid. The report shows that at this point the South African government has uprooted over three and one-half million black people.

The South African government wants to project an image of a regime that is embarking on a reform policy. It has produced a new constitution and has signed a peace pact with Mozambique and is disengaging from Angola. So, its supporters would argue, it should be given a chance. But is it really involved in real change or reform? The constitution excludes totally from its provisions 70% of the population. How can that be construed as even remotely democratic or as being a step in the right direction? It provides for three chambers: one for whites, one for coloured, and one for Indians. Clearly, far from moving from racism, this constitution actually entrenches and sanctions it. The ratio of white: coloureds: Indian in the parliamentary committee is to be 4:2:1. This means that the whites can never be out-voted at all. Thus, the constitution perpetuates the rule of small white oligarchy. So, it is a momental hoax to hoodwink the international community into believing that the South African government is reforming.

With regard to the peace accord with Mozambique, I want to state categorically that all Christians are happy whenever there is a cessation of hostilities anywhere in the world and so we welcome the peace accord for this reason. But we must then hasten to add a few points. First, that Mozambique has had a long war of liberation that played havoc with her economy. She had a devastating drought. South Africa has tacitly admitted destabilizing her through the support she gave to MNR dissident groups and pounded Mozambique in South Africa's hot pursuit policy against alleged ANC bases. Consequently, it was not surprising that Mozambique succumbed to South Africa's bludgeoning. President Masire of Botswana was right when he said that Mozambique had been bullied into submission. More than this, without being cynical, we have wondered why all this diplomatic flurry should happen in a year when there is to be a presidential election in the United States of America. It is a strange coincidence. The South African government has recognized that President Reagan with his constructive engagement policy is the best thing to have happened to them in a long time. They would do anything to get their friend re-elected.

The South African government wants the international community to ease off any pressure it may have wanted to exert on it to change apartheid. In the meantime it has not abated one bit of its evil policy to uproot blacks and dump them in arid poverty-stricken Banstustan homelands and to strip blacks of their South African citizenship turning them into aliens in the land of their birth. The pass laws are applied as viciously as they ever were: influx control of blacks is as rigid as always. Arbitrary banning and detentions without trial are still the order of the day. Our children still receive an inferior education. I am a Bishop in the Church of God. I am 52 years of age. I am reasonably responsible. In the land of my birth I cannot vote. A child of 18 years of age because he or she has a white skin can vote. We still live in ghetto areas such as Soweto. It is not the perpetrators of apartheid who can tell you that apartheid is changing. Surely, it is the victims who should be asked what they think.

It is good for Mr. P.W.Botha to be concerned about detente with South Africa's neighbors. But the threat to peace in the sub-continent and indeed in the world is apartheid. This is South Africa's internal policy and that will not be changed by external detente. Mr. Forster's failure of the past has proved that. The crisis of our country will be solved when the government sits down with the authentic leaders of all sections of our society to talk about dismantling apartheid. This is what most of our member churches have been calling for without avail. Mr. Botha has recently refused to meet with us church leaders inside South Africa, but he has met with Marxist leaders outside the country.

He heads a government which is carrying out a policy which is as evil, as immoral and as un-Christian as Nazism and Communism. You are providing him with the opportunity of deceiving the world that change is happening in South Africa. His government denies 70% of the inhabitants of South Africa the most elementary human rights and you are providing him with the opportunity of gaining a respectability for apartheid it should not have.


Are you and your government telling us that black South Africans are really expendable: that when it comes to the crunch, blacks can never trust white people because they will always gang up against us, that blood is thicker than water? Would you have collaborated with Stalin when he was carrying out his diabolical policies against his fellow Russians? Would you have collaborated with Hitler when he perpetrated the holocaust? Then why can you collaborate in this way with the perpetrators of a policy as diabolical as Stalinism and Nazism?

It is for us a sad day when the leaders of democratic countries in the West seem to indicate that Christian morality is perhaps a stranger in the corridors of power.

We pray for you and pray also for our people who have been abandoned by the free world. We pray that they will not become desperate because of this for desperate people tend to use desperate methods. Of course if the West can show that apartheid is changing it will be convenient for western governments since they will be let off the hook. They won't need to take measures against South Africa that would be politically unpopular in their own constituencies.

We have no doubt that we will be free and that South Africa will one day be a non-racial and just democracy. And we will remember who helped us in the process of becoming free. God bless you.

Sincerely,


Bishop Desmond Tutu
General Secretary

cc Archibishop of Canterbury
Lambeth Palace
London, SW 7, England

General Secreatry
British Council of Churches
Edinburgh Palace
2 Eaton Place
London, SW 7, England

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FM BONN 071510Z JUN 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 567 OF 07 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, PARIS, VIENNA, EMBASSY
BRUSSELS, LISBON, BERNE, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROME, LUANDA, HAVANA

VISIT BY P W BOTHA TO BONN, 4-6 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. A COOL RECEPTION: CRITICAL DIALOGUE WITH EMPHASIS ON CRITICAL. KOHL UNDERLINED THE CONTINUITY OF FRG POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA. SOME CREDIT GIVEN FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. BUT THE BALANCE OF THE GERMAN MESSAGE WAS THAT THESE WERE NOT ENOUGH. NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS EMERGED IN THE OFFICIAL TALKS. BUT BOTHA'S ''OFFER'' ON NAMIBIA, MADE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE, HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS A NEW INITIATIVE.

DETAIL

2. THE OFFICIAL PART OF BOTHA'S VISIT CONSISTED OF A CALL ON KOHL (ACCOMPANIED BY PIK BOTHA) FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH. OTHER CALLS WERE MADE ON GENSCHER, SPD LEADER VOGEL AND BAVARIAN MINISTER-PRESIDENT STRAUSS IN THEIR PARTY CAPACITIES. BOTHA ALSO PAID A COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT CARSTENS AND VISITED BERLIN. THE TONE OF THE VISIT, THE CALL ON STRAUSS EXCEPTED, WAS NOT UNFRIENDLY, BUT DECIDEDLY COOL IN PUBLIC. KOHL FOR EXAMPLE DID NOT SHAKE HANDS WITH BOTHA IN FRONT OF THE CAMERAS, ALTHOUGH HE DID SO IN PRIVATE. THERE WERE SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE VISIT, THE LARGEST OF WHICH CONSISTED OF 500 PEOPLE.

3. DR VERGAU (HEAD OF SOUTHERN AFRICA REFERAT, AUSWAERTIGES AMT) BRIEFED THE TEN AND CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES SEPARATELY. VERGAU STRESSED THE FACT THAT THE VISIT WAS AT WORKING LEVEL, AND HAD BEEN ARRANGED AT THE INSTIGATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE CALL ON PRESIDENT CARSTENS DID NOT SIGNIFY SPECIAL TREATMENT: THIS WAS NORMALLY ACCORDED TO ALL VISITING HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OR STATE FROM ''IMPORTANT'' COUNTRIES. THE GERMAN AIM HAD BEEN TO SHOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THAT THERE WAS A CONSENSUS OF OPINION IN EUROPE AMONG CONSERVATIVES AND SOCIALISTS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THAT THE CHANGE IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN NO WAY HERALDED A SOFTER LINE IN BONN.

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4. IN THEIR TALKS WITH BOTHA, KOHL AND GENSCHER HAD GREETED THE MODERATE SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN THE INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. BUT THEY HAD DRAWN A NEGATIVE BALANCE, CONDEMNING THE LACK OF A POLITICAL ROLE FOR THE BLACKS, THE COMPULSORY RESETTLEMENT POLICY, THE ARREST WITHOUT TRIAL OF OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME, THE REFUSAL OF ENTRY VISAS TO PROMINENT OPPONENTS AND THE REFUSAL TO LET CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS JOURNEY ABROAD. THEY HAD ALSO GREETED THE IMPROVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES BUT WARNED THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS COULD ONLY BE SUSTAINED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE, FREE FROM ECONOMIC OR MILITARY PRESSURE. ON NAMIBIA THEY HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR REJECTION OF LINKING INDEPENDENCE TO CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, HAD REPEATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435, AND HAD CALLED FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT DELAY. (COPY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PRESS RELEASE BY BAG.)

5. IN REPLY BOTHA HAD ASKED FOR PATIENCE ON INTERNAL QUESTIONS. HE HAD QUOTED THE EXAMPLE OF SWITZERLAND AS A CASE WHERE IT HAD TAKEN MANY CENTURIES FOR MINORITIES TO BE ACCEPTED IN A CONFEDERATION. (THE GERMAN SIDE HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT AND HAD QUOTED BACK THE SWISS GOVERNMENT'S OWN REJECTION OF ANY PARALLEL BETWEEN SWISS AND SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE.) ON RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, BOTHA HAD APPEALED FOR MORE WESTERN AID, ESPECIALLY FOR MOZAMBIQUE. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT, AS WESTERN AID PROJECTS HAD NOT BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE, A DEVELOPMENT BANK SHOULD BE SET UP TO CHANNEL SUCH FUNDS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE THE BEST PEOPLE TO RUN SUCH A BANK SINCE THEY UNDERSTOOD THE AREA BETTER. (NOT SURPRISINGLY THIS IDEA LEFT THE GERMANS SOMEWHAT BREATHLESS.)

6. ON NAMIBIA, BOTHA HAD REFERRED TO THE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING 435 IN TERMS OF THE NECESSITY FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA PRIOR TO CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. HE HAD THEN MENTIONED THE ADMINISTRATIVE COST OF NAMIBIA TO THE SAG AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP SHOULD TAKE THIS OVER. THE FIVE COULD THEN WORK NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THEMSELVES. VERGAU SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN TOSSED OUT BY BOTHA AS AN OFF-THE-CUFF REMARK. IT HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED AS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL, NOR WAS ANY DETAIL GIVEN. THE GERMANS HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO REACT AND HAD THEREFORE IGNORED THE REMARK. THEY WERE IN CONSEQUENCE ANGRY THAT BOTHA, AT A LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, HAD PRESENTED THIS AS A NEW INITIATIVE PUT FORWARD BY HIM TO KOHL. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT MADE SERIOUSLY DURING THE TALKS AND THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WISH TO PURSUE

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IT THEY SHOULD GIVE FURTHER DETAILS THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS AND NOT THROUGH THE MEDIA. ON THE SUBSTANCE, VERGAU'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT BOTHA'S PROPOSAL WAS SUCH AN OBVIOUS NON-STARTER THAT IT COULD ONLY BE A PROPAGANDA PLOY. DID THE SOUTH AFRICANS REALLY BELIEVE THAT THE CONTACT GROUP COULD TAKE OVER THEIR COLONIAL ROLE WHILE WAITING FOR THE MPLA AND UNITA TO PATCH UP THEIR DIFFERENCES?

7. FURTHER DETAILS OF THE VISIT FOLLOW BY BAG.

TAYLOR

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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	CABINET OFFICE

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OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 735

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 071240Z JUNE 84 (CORRECTED VERSION)

TO IMMEDIATE HARARE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 191 OF 7 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, MAPUTO
INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, GABORONE, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA

VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

1. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF ACTION ADDRESSEES WOULD
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
MR MUGABE, PRESIDENT KAUNDA, PRESIDENT NYERERE, GENERAL
BUHARI, AND PRESIDENT MACHEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

QUOTE

I WROTE TO YOU IN MAY TO TELL YOU OF MY DECISION TO INVITE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO BRITAIN FOR A BRIEF
WORKING VISIT, AND MY REASONS FOR THIS. (FOR BUHARI:
WE HAVE SINCE EXCHANGED FURTHER LETTERS ABOUT THIS.)
(FOR NYERERE: YOU SUBSEQUENTLY WROTE TO ME EXPRESSING
YOUR CONCERN.) (FOR MACHEL: I WAS GLAD TO HAVE YOUR
VIEWS THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR BEFORE THE VISIT.)

I AM NOW WRITING TO GIVE YOU MY IMPRESSIONS OF MY MEETING
WITH MR BOTHA.

I MADE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT I WANTED A FRANK AND WIDE-
RANGING DISCUSSION. INDEED, THE MEETING LASTED FOR OVER
FIVE HOURS AND COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS.
WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

MR BOTHA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING PERSONALLY
COMMITTED TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA OF AN
ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES
FROM ANGOLA, SINCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT FAIR AND FREE
ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN NAMIBIA WHILE THEY WERE STILL

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RECEIVED 11 JUN 1984		
11 JUN 1984		

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THERE. I EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE I BELIEVED FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA, AND CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA) WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, FOR WHICH SCR 435 PROVIDES THE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. (FOR KAUNDA: MR BOTHA STRESSED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, CUBAN FORCES WOULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA UNTIL THERE WAS A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MPLA GOVERNMENT AND UNITA. I SHOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER YOU YOURSELF SEE ANY PROSPECT OF THIS HAPPENING.)

WE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. I MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT I CONDEMNED APARTHEID AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE NEED TO FIND WAYS OF SATISFYING THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BLACK POPULATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I REFERRED TO NELSON MANDELA'S CONTINUED DETENTION AND SAID THAT I HOPED THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON THIS WOOD. I SPOKE, TOO, ABOUT THE APPALLING PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS OF BLACK PEOPLES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. MR BOTHA SHOULD NOW BE WELL AWARE OF OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE LASTING VALUE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE ENTERED INTO FREELY AND WITHOUT A SENSE OF DURESS. (FOR MUGABE: I STRESSED OUR STRONG DESIRE TO SEE SOUTH AFRICA APPROACH ITS RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT AND TOLD MR BOTHA OF MY HIGH REGARD FOR YOU.) (FOR MACHEL: WE TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMIC NEEDS AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO MEET THESE. THIS IS SOMETHING TO WHICH I SHALL BE GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT.)

IN CONCLUSION, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE MR BOTHA'S PERCEPTIONS AT FIRST HAND. I DO NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS, BUT I SEE THIS MEETING AS PART OF A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH AFRICAN LEADERS, AND EUROPEAN

CONFIDENTIAL

24675 - 1

LEADERS AND OTHERS MUST CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR THE SORT OF CHANGES WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES. (FOR BUHARI: SIR GEOFFREY HOWE LOOKS FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU FURTHER WHEN HE VISITS LAGOS.)

UNQUOTE

2. IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD STRESS ORALLY THAT THIS MEETING WITH MR BOTHA SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE REGARDED, LEAST OF ALL BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AS CONDONING APARTHEID: NOR AS REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY. IF ASKED, YOU SHOULD ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MADE CLEAR THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO UPHOLD FULLY ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN ARMS EMBARGO AND UNDER THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT.

3. FOR MAPUTO: WHEN DELIVERING THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SADDENED TO LEARN OF THE DEATH OF MACHEL'S FATHER (YOUR TELNO 203) AND HAS ASKED YOU TO CONVEY HER SYMPATHY.

4. SEPARATE MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO PRESIDENT MASIRE AND PRESIDENT MOI.

HOWE


SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



1984

TTS

file
RESTRICTED

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 June 1984

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 6 June.
The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed messages to Messrs. Mugabe, Kaunda, Nyerere, Buhari, Machel, Masire and Moi should be sent.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for their despatch.

A.L. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

Bot

✓
6 June 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to
thank you for your letter of 2 June, the
contents of which have been noted.

AGC

Councillor Shreela Flather

6



bc PC *h*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June, 1984.

South Africa: Coastguarder Aircraft

Thank you for your letter of 6 June. I agree that Mr. Rifkind should reply on the Prime Minister's behalf to the telex from Mr. Abdul Minty.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JK



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 June, 1984

Joe John

South Africa: Coastguarder Aircraft

Thank you for your letter of 24 May asking for advice on a telex to the Prime Minister from Mr Abdul Minty, about possible supply of Coastguarder aircraft to South Africa.

Mr Minty is prominent and active in the broad anti-apartheid movement in UK and internationally, and accompanied Archbishop Trevor Huddleston when he called on the Prime Minister on 30 May. He has frequently sent messages to Ministers about particular issues relating to South Africa, often connected with alleged breaches by the UK of the UN Arms Embargo. The then Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, answered two messages from Mr Minty in 1979 and 1981, and Mr Onslow, as Minister of State, answered a further message in 1983. In the circumstances, we do not think it necessary for the Prime Minister herself to reply to Mr Minty but consider it appropriate for an FCO Minister to do so. We therefore recommend that Mr Rifkind should reply on the Prime Minister's behalf.

Mr Rifkind has recently been in correspondence with Mr Robert Hughes MP, Chairman of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and a colleague of Mr Abdul Minty, about Coastguarder aircraft. I enclose a copy of the reply we are proposing, which closely follows the line Mr Rifkind has taken in correspondence with Mr Hughes. You will note that the response does not give the assurances requested by Mr Minty that the Prime Minister would not discuss Coastguarder or other deals with Mr Botha on 2 June. As you know coastguarders were not raised but we think it unnecessary and undesirable to respond to this point.

Joe Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Mr Rifkind

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: Mr Abdul Minty
 Director
 World Campaign Against Military
 and Nuclear Collaboration with
 South Africa
 PO Box 2
 Lindeberg Gaard
 Oslo 10
 NORWAY.

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your telex of 23 May about reports concerning the possible supply of British Aerospace Coastguarder aircraft to South Africa.

As you may know, equipment of this kind cannot be exported to South Africa without an export licence. No application for an export licence has yet been received by the Government. It is our policy to examine any application received individually on its merits, and you will understand that it would not be proper for me to offer a definitive view now on the hypothetical question of the issue of a licence in the case of Coastguarder aircraft. You may however be assured that if we had to reach a decision on this question we would fully comply with our obligations under the UN Arms Embarg

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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60 JUN 1984



JU445

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422
GTN 215
(Switchboard) 215 7877

4 June 1984

John Coles Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear John

SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister asked for defensive briefing on the importance of our trade with South Africa in anticipation of Parliamentary criticism of the meeting with Mr Botha.

2 We have approached several leading exporters, selecting particularly those with plants in areas of high unemployment, for information about jobs related to their trade with South Africa. Most are reluctant to provide estimates of jobs created. They believe that their commercial interests would be best served by playing down their South African connections, if mentioned at all in Parliament, for fear of repercussions in other valued Third World markets. Many would, in any event, find it difficult to quantify jobs dependent on exports to South Africa and less still to relate such jobs to particular plants in the United Kingdom.

3 We would therefore advise that the Prime Minister should, if pressed in the House, take the line that the longstanding policy of successive British Government has been to leave civil trade with South Africa to the commercial judgement of individual companies, for many of which South Africa is a valuable market. Over half our exports to South Africa (£1.1 billion in 1983) are power generation equipment, specialised machinery for mining and industry, transportation equipment and chemicals, much of which helps maintain jobs in areas of high unemployment.

4 If pressed further on the question of employment, the Prime Minister is advised to explain that, given the spread of work among different factories and among sub-contractors, it is not possible to estimate employment related to South African trade on a sector-by-sector basis. However, companies such as Babcock and Anderson Strathclyde in Scotland, NEI and ICI in the North East, GEC and ICL in the Midlands and North West are all long term regular exporters to South Africa with consequent benefit to employment in their factories.

Yours sincerely
Michael Kenny

RP

RUTH THOMPSON
Private Secretary

SUPPLEMENTARIES

Q HOW IMPORTANT IS OUR TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA?

A South Africa was our 13th largest export market in 1983, worth over £1100 million, and more important to us than any other market outside US, West Europe and Saudi Arabia.

Q HOW MANY JOBS DEPEND ON EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA?

A As I told the House on 28 June last year, at least 150,000 British jobs are involved in our trade with South Africa. A substantial proportion are likely to be in regions of high unemployment because power generation equipment and other engineering products represent half of total exports. One power station contract meant several thousand man years of work, ^{spread over six years,} mainly in the Midlands and the North West.

The Prime Minister: With regard to the building of the new airstrip in the Falkland Islands and the contract that has been awarded, the arrangement made for people to get there to fulfil the contract is a purely commercial matter for those who won it. If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that we should have no commercial relations with South Africa whatsoever, may I remind him that there would be 150,000 jobs at stake in the United Kingdom. Perhaps that is what he wants.

Q2. Mr. Shersby asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 28 June.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Shersby: Will my right hon. Friend take time today to consider the extraordinary situation whereby the Leader of the Opposition will be elected by trade union leaders, who will cast millions of votes on behalf of their members, whom they have not consulted? Does she agree that that amply justifies the case for the Bill on trade unions, referred to in the Queen's Speech, to give union members more control over their unions?

The Prime Minister: I thought that I had noticed that a number of Opposition Members were now in agreement that members of trade unions should have the right to cast their votes, directly and secretly, in leadership elections. If that is so, I hope that they will welcome the Bill that we shall introduce in this Session of Parliament to give more trade unionists the right to cast their votes secretly and directly.

Mr. William Ross: Will the Prime Minister take time during her busy day to take a careful look at the report of the Select Committee on Education, Science and Arts on further and higher education in Northern Ireland, especially in the light of the decision taken by the court of the New University of Ulster in Coleraine yesterday? Will the Government look again at the proposed merger between the New University of Ulster and the polytechnic college, taking particular account of the real costs, which have been concealed until now, and especially having regard to the funding of the pension arrangements for the teaching staff and the cost of the salaries due to the different principles in the incremental scales of the two institutions?

The Prime Minister: Of course, I will look at the hon. Gentleman's point and consult my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Q3. Mr. Simon Hughes asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 28 June.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Hughes: What mandate does the Prime Minister have—[HON. MEMBERS: "Reading."]—for reviving the undemocratic and unjustified practice of appointing not only one hon. Member to the other place but the untested, untried and, for all she knows, unsuitable children of such appointees, and for reviving the practice of hereditary peerages, therefore adding yet another unjustified element to our legislature, which is supposed to be democratic?

The Prime Minister: The party that the hon. Gentleman represents is well represented in another place.

I am surprised that he should be so critical of it. With regard to hereditary peerages, I have said that in exceptional cases they should continue to be awarded.

Viscount Cranborne: Has my right hon. Friend noticed the report—[*interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I want to hear this.

Viscount Cranborne: I am grateful Mr. Speaker. I was under the impression that my hon. Friends wanted to hear it too. Has my right hon. Friend by any chance noticed the press report about the United States Supreme Court's decision on unitary taxation? Does she agree that it is likely to lead to all sorts of disadvantages for foreign companies in the United States? Does she intend to make representations to our American allies about the consequences of that decision?

The Prime Minister: Representations to our allies on taxation matters are usually made through the vehicle of the double taxation agreement. We shall continue to make those representations and others, when appropriate. I note that my hon. Friend followed the previous question with a question on a matter that is not discussable in the other place.

Mr. Foot: Will the right hon. Lady tell us how many job losses have been announced since the election to add to the record total that she and her Government have already achieved?

The Prime Minister: I think that the right hon. Gentleman will realise that the unemployment figures come out once a month and that the next lot are due out on 30 June. The last crude total was about 3,049,000.

Mr. Foot: Have there not been announcements that about 10,000 people have lost their jobs since the election, for example 2,800 in Merseyside? Those are serious developments. Did not the right hon. Lady discuss this matter with the CBI when she had a meeting yesterday? Did she not agree then with the statement made by the CBI that the signs of recovery were "patchy and thin"? How does that accord with what she said on the same subject in her election manifesto?

The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman follows my speeches, he will realise that, when I spoke to the CBI at its annual dinner, the expression that there were signs of a recovery, but that it was patchy, came from me. That is so. It is bound to be so in each and every recovery, as some firms go ahead faster than others, some have obsolete products and some have uncompetitive products. With regard to the talk that I had with the CBI yesterday, the right hon. Gentleman will agree that those firms prosper that have a product that is both well designed and competitively produced.

Mr. Foot: Did the right hon. Lady say in her election manifesto that the recovery was patchy and thin?

Mrs. Renée Short: No, she did not.

The Prime Minister: No, I had a brief election manifesto, but the right hon. Gentleman will have found many speeches with the reference to the word "patchy", which I have said originated from me.

4. Mr. Roy Hughes asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 28 June.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

continue to do what we can for the people of Poland within the resources available and will likewise maintain our efforts to persuade the Polish authorities to re-establish civil liberties and the process of reform in Poland.

Universities and Polytechnics (Research Work)

Mr. Batiste asked the Prime Minister if she will set up an interdepartmental body to co-ordinate the commercial exploitation of research work in universities and polytechnics without the intervention of the British technology group; and if she will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry will make a statement in due course on the future of the British technology group and on the arrangements for exploitation of research work in universities and polytechnics.

South Africa

Mr. George Robertson asked the Prime Minister if she will publish a breakdown of the 150,000 British jobs dependent on exports to South Africa referred to by her in Prime Minister's questions on 28 June, *Official Report*, c. 458.

The Prime Minister: The jobs concerned are mainly in mechanical and electrical engineering, vehicle components, chemicals and plastics.

Devon (Road Improvement Schemes)

Mr. Steen asked the Prime Minister what funds are being made available to the Devon county council from European Community sources through Her Majesty's Government for road improvement schemes to facilitate movement during the tourist season; and to what other purposes.

The Prime Minister: Devon receives aid from the European regional development fund towards various types of infrastructure projects intended to promote the economic development, including tourism, of the assisted areas within the county.

The county council received grant commitments for tourist road schemes of £723,800 in 1982 and a further £876,900 for industrial roads schemes.

This year an application is being made to the Commission for a £750,000 grant for the A379 Exminster bypass.

Among the road schemes which received ERDF grant last year are the Totnes inner relief road and the A38 Maradon interchange.

EMPLOYMENT

Labour Statistics

Mr. Fisher asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many young persons aged 16 to 18 years were unemployed in the Stoke on Trent travel-to-work area during the last month for which statistics were available; and what were the comparable figures in the same month in 1982, 1981, 1980 and 1979.

Mr. Gummer: The following table gives the numbers of young people aged 18 years and under registered as unemployed in the Stoke on Trent travel-to-work area at

April each year from 1979 to 1982 and the corresponding figure for the unemployed claimants at April 1983, the latest available.

Registered unemployed	Numbers
April 1979	653
April 1980	1,578
April 1981	2,502
April 1982	3,534
<i>Unemployed claimants</i>	
April 1983	3,550

Mr. Fisher asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many men and women have been unemployed for more than 12 months in the Stoke on Trent travel-to-work area; and what were the comparable figures in 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982.

Mr. Gummer: The following table gives the numbers of males and females registered as unemployed for over 52 weeks in the Stoke on Trent travel-to-work area at April each year from 1979 to 1982 and the corresponding figures for unemployed claimants at April 1983, the latest available.

Registered unemployed	Male	Female
April 1979	1,758	236
April 1980	1,917	313
April 1981	3,227	756
April 1982	7,202	2,032
<i>Unemployed claimants</i>		
April 1983	8,887	2,424

Mr. Parry asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will make a statement on the latest unemployment figures.

Mr. Gummer: The seasonally adjusted figures for June show a slight increase in unemployment over the previous month. Vacancies notified to jobcentres have, however, increased by 8,000 over the previous month.

Wandsworth

Mr. Dubs asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many people are now unemployed in Wandsworth; and how many of these are under 21 years.

Mr. Gummer: In June, there were 14,732 unemployed claimants in the area covered by the Balham, Clapham Junction and Tooting jobcentres, which corresponds closely to Wandsworth. This figure does not include 233 unemployed school leavers under 18 years of age registered at careers offices in the area who are not yet entitled to benefit. In April, the latest date for which an analysis by age is available, out of a total of 15,324 unemployed claimants in the area, 2,471 were under 20 years of age. Separate figures for those aged 20 years are not available.

Nationalised Industries

Mr. McQuarrie asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will list in the *Official Report* all nationalised industries, whether statutory corporations, companies, or trading bodies of any sort, in which the Government now have any financial interest or for which

PLEASE CHECK
AGAINST DELIVERY

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON
5 JUNE

WITH PERMISSION, MR SPEAKER, I SHALL MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT
ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME
MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ON SATURDAY, 2 JUNE.

WE HAD OVER FIVE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
MY RT HON AND LEARNED FRIEND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY
AND MY HON FRIEND, THE MINISTER OF STATE.

THE MEETING WAS A WORKING ONE, AND THE DISCUSSIONS
WERE COMPREHENSIVE AND CANDID.

THEY COVERED THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A
WHOLE, INCLUDING NAMIBIA.

THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

I MADE CLEAR TO MR. BOTHA OUR DESIRE TO SEE
PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO ALL THE REGION'S PROBLEMS.

ON NAMIBIA, WE AGREED THAT EARLY INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA
WAS DESIRABLE AND SHOULD BE ACHIEVED AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE UNDER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS.

/ WE ALSO

WE ALSO AGREED THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA SO THAT THEIR PEOPLES CAN SETTLE THEIR DESTINIES WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA IS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS.

ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, I EXPRESSED OUR STRONGLY-HELD VIEWS ON APARTHEID.

I TOLD MR. BOTHA OF MY PARTICULAR CONCERN AT THE PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF MR. NELSON MANDELA. MR. BOTHA GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AND OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A CABINET COMMITTEE TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE BLACK POPULATION OUTSIDE THE HOMELANDS.

I BELIEVE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER NOW UNDERSTANDS MUCH MORE CLEARLY WHERE HM GOVERNMENT STANDS ON ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES.

MY TALKS WITH MR. BOTHA ARE PART OF THE PROCESS THROUGH WHICH WE AND OTHER WESTERN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE SORT OF CHANGES WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

Both sides expressed their strong desire to help Namibia achieve its independence as soon as possible. This is essential not only for Namibia itself, but also for the peace and stability of the region as a whole. They also considered it of the highest importance that all foreign forces should be withdrawn ~~from the area~~ without delay so that the peoples of the country ^{is} concerned can settle their own destinies without interference. The disengagement agreement between South Africa and Angola is an encouraging first step in this process.

NOT a joint communique. But would it cause

Mr Botha any difficulty if we said something

along these lines in answer to press questions

or in Parliament.

NB We need to put mention of Namibia first and not to mention Angola / Cubans in explicit terms to avoid suggestion we are interfering in Angola's affairs.

Both sides expressed their strong desire to help Namibia achieve its independence as soon as possible. ^{under normal conditions} This is essential not only for Namibia itself, but also for the peace and stability of the region as a whole. They also considered it ~~of the highest importance~~ that all foreign forces should be withdrawn ~~from the area~~ ^{from the region} without delay ^{so that} the peoples of the country ¹⁰⁰ concerned can settle their own destinies without interference. The disengagement agreement between South Africa and Angola is an encouraging first step in this process.

Wish to see an early

CONFIDENTIAL



File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
VISIT


During the Plenary talks with Mr. Botha, he handed to the Prime Minister a chart to illustrate the financial contribution made by the South African Government to Namibia. I enclose a copy of this chart.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

REVENUE
 1983/84 FINANCIAL YEAR
 FIGURES UNDERLINED RELATE TO
 1984/85 FINANCIAL YEAR.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister.

Agree attached message to
Mugabe, Kaunda, Nyerere, Buhari,
Machel, Masire and Moi?

6 June 1984

/s/ John

A.S.C. 76.

Yes no

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Before Mr Botha's visit, the Prime Minister sent messages to Mr Mugabe, President Kaunda, President Nyerere, General Buhari and President Machel explaining her reasons for inviting the South African Prime Minister to the UK. These were valuable. Mr Mugabe appreciated the message to him and expressed understanding. There has been no reaction from President Kaunda. President Machel was not critical of the visit but asked our Ambassador to convey his concern that we should condemn apartheid. The Prime Minister's message to General Buhari crossed with a message from him protesting about this visit and asking her to rescind the invitation; the Prime Minister subsequently sent a further message to General Buhari explaining the reasons for maintaining the visit. President Nyerere also sent a message to the Prime Minister, expressing concern at the invitation. For ease of reference I enclose copies of all these messages.

Given the deep interest, and in some cases concern, of these major African leaders about Mr Botha's visit, the Foreign Secretary recommends that it would be valuable if the Prime Minister could now send further messages to these leaders, reporting the outcome. I enclose a draft accordingly. This has been personalised where necessary and desirable.

The Prime Minister did not send a message to President Masire of Botswana in view of his call on her on 14 May which gave an opportunity to discuss the visit personally. However, the Foreign Secretary recommends a message on the outcome of the visit should now go to President Masire, in view of the pressures which Botswana is at present under to sign a security agreement with South Africa, on which we have been asked to intervene with the South Africans. He also favours one to

/President Moi



President Moi, because he is now taking a closer interest in Southern African affairs and because of his importance in the Commonwealth and as a former Chairman of the OAU. I enclose a draft accordingly.

The instructions to our Ambassador in Maputo suggest that the Ambassador should, orally, convey the Prime Minister's condolences to President Machel on the death of his father.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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7	TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	AND TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI
10	INFO ROUTINE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
11	CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA, HARARE
12	VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK
13	1. I should be grateful if you and HC Nairobi would
14	deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to
15	President Masire and President Moi as soon as possible:
16	Quote
17	(For President Masire: When we met on 14 May, we discussed
18	briefly the visit by the South African Prime Minister to
19	Britain.) (For President Moi: As you know, the South
20	African Prime Minister came to Britain on 2 June for a
21	working meeting with me.) I thought I should now give you
22	my impressions of my meeting with Mr Botha.
23	I made clear at the outset that I wanted a frank and wide-
24	ranging discussion. Indeed, the meeting lasted for over
25	five hours and covered the full range of regional problems.

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File number	Dept	Distribution Southern Africa Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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1 <<<<
 2 We focussed particularly on Namibia and the internal
 3 situation in South Africa.
 4 Mr Botha gave me the impression of being personally
 5 committed to Namibian independence as soon as possible.
 6 But he also stressed the importance to South Africa of an
 7 acceptable arrangement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces
 8 from Angola, since he did not believe that fair and free
 9 elections could take place in Namibia while they were
 10 still there. I explained that, while I believed foreign
 11 forces should be withdrawn from the countries of Southern
 12 Africa (including South African forces from Angola and
 13 Namibia, and Cuban forces from Angola) we could not accept
 14 any formal link between the withdrawal of Cuban forces and
 15 a Namibia settlement, for which SCR 435 provides the
 16 internationally acceptable basis.
 17 We had a long discussion on the internal situation in South
 18 Africa. I made it very clear that I condemned apartheid and
 19 would continue to do so. I laid particular stress on the
 20 need to find ways of satisfying the political aspirations of
 21 the black population as soon as possible. I referred to
 22 Nelson Mandela's continued detention and said that I hoped
 23 there would be progress on this soon. I spoke, too, about
 24 the appalling practice of forced removals of black peoples
 25 in South Africa.
 26 We also discussed South Africa's relations with neighbouring
 27 countries. Mr Botha should now be well aware of our views
 28 that the only agreements that are likely to have lasting
 29 value are those which are entered into freely and without
 30 a sense of duress. (For Masire: I hope that as a result
 31 of my discussion, South Africa's approach to Botswana, as
 32 to other countries, will have been moderated.)
 33 In conclusion, I have no doubt that it was right to try to
 34 influence Mr Botha's perceptions at first hand. I do not

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword expect
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3

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2 expect quick results, but I see this meeting as part of a
3 process through which African leaders, and European leaders
4 and others must continue to push for the sort of changes
5 we all want to see in South African policies. Unquote.

6 2. In delivering this message, you should stress orally
7 that this meeting with Mr Botha should certainly not be
8 regarded, least of all by the South Africans, as condoning
9 apartheid; nor as representing any change in British policy.
10 If asked, you should add that the Prime Minister made clear
11 the Government's resolve to uphold fully its obligations
12 under the UN Arms Embargo, and under the Gleneagles
13 Agreement.

14 3. Separate messages are being sent to Mr Mugabe,
15 Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere and Machel, and to General
16 Buhari.

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18 HOWE

19 NNNN

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NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM

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	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, MAPUTO
	10	INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, GABORONE, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON,
	11	UKMIS NEW YORK, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA
	12	VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK
	13	1. I should be grateful if action addressees would
	14	deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to
	15	Mr Mugabe, President Kaunda, President Nyerere, General
	16	Buhari, and President Machel as soon as possible.
	17	Quote
	18	I wrote to you in May to tell you of my decision to invite
	19	the South African Prime Minister to Britain for a brief
	20	working visit, and my reasons for this. (For Buhari:
	21	we have since exchanged further letters about this.)
///	22	(For Nyerere; you subsequently wrote to me expressing
//	23	your concern.) (For Machel; I was glad to have your
/	24	views through our Ambassador before the visit.)
	25	I am now writing to give you my impressions of my meeting

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File number	Dept	Distribution Southern Africa Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
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2 with Mr Botha.
3 I made clear at the outset that I wanted a frank and wide-
4 ranging discussion. Indeed, the meeting lasted for over
5 five hours and covered the full range of regional problems.
6 We focussed particularly on Namibia and the internal
7 situation in South Africa.
8 Mr Botha gave me the impression of being personally
9 committed to Namibian independence as soon as possible.
10 But he also stressed the importance to South Africa of an
11 acceptable arrangement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces
12 from Angola, since he did not believe that fair and free
13 elections could take place in Namibia while they were still
14 there. I explained that, while I believed foreign forces
15 should be withdrawn from the countries of Southern Africa
16 (including South African forces from Angola and Namibia,
17 and Cuban forces from Angola) we could not accept any
18 formal link between the withdrawal of Cuban forces and a
19 Namibia settlement, for which SCR 435 provides the inter-
20 nationally acceptable basis. (For Kaunda: Mr Botha
21 stressed that, in his view, Cuban forces would not be with-
22 drawn from Angola until there was a reconciliation between
23 the MPLA Government and UNITA. I should be very
24 interested to know whether you yourself see any prospect
25 of this happening.)
26 We had a long discussion on the internal situation in South
27 Africa. I made it very clear that I condemned apartheid
28 and would continue to do so. I laid particular stress on
29 the need to find ways of satisfying the political aspir-
30 ations of the black population as soon as possible. I
31 referred to Nelson Mandela's continued detention and said
32 that I hoped there would be progress on this soon. I
33 spoke, too, about the appalling practice of forced
34 removals of black peoples in South Africa.

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2 We also discussed South Africa's relations with neigh-
3 bouring countries. Mr Botha should now be well aware of
4 our view that the only agreements that are likely to have
5 lasting value are those which are entered into freely and
6 without a sense of duress. (For Mugabe: I stressed our
7 strong desire to see South Africa approach its relations
8 with Zimbabwe in a positive spirit and told Mr Botha of my
9 high regard for you.) (For Machel: We talked at some
10 length about Mozambique's economic needs and what might be
11 done to meet these. This is something to which I shall be
12 giving further thought.)
13 In conclusion, I have no doubt that it was right to try to
14 influence Mr Botha's perceptions at first hand. I do not
15 expect quick results, but I see this meeting as part of a
16 process through which African leaders, and European
17 leaders and others must continue to push for the sort of
18 changes we all want to see in South African policies.
19 (For Buhari; Sir Geoffrey Howe looks forward to the
20 opportunity to discuss this with you further when he visits
21 Lagos.)
22 Unquote
23 2. In delivering this message you should stress orally
24 that this meeting with Mr Botha should certainly not be
25 regarded, least of all by the South Africans, as condoning
26 apartheid; nor as representing any change in British
27 policy. If asked, you should add that the Prime Minister
28 made clear the Government's resolve to uphold fully its
29 obligations under the UN Arms Embargo and under the
30 Gleneagles Agreement.
31 3. For Maputo: When delivering the message you should
32 also say that the Prime Minister was saddened to learn of
33 the death of Machel's father (your telno 203) and has
34 asked you to convey her sympathy.

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 4. Separate messages are being sent to President Masire
 and President Moi.
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FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Front Line States' Summit Meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, on Sunday 29th April 1984 to consider the recent developments in Southern Africa. The Heads of State and Government Present were: President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the People's Republic of Angola; President Quett Masire of the Republic of Botswana; President Samora Machel of People's Republic of Mozambique; President Julius K. Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania; President Kenneth Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Also in attendance were: Comrade Oliver Tambo, President of A.N.C.; Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO of Namibia.

The leaders stood for one minute of silence in tribute to the late Edward Moringe Sokoine, whose very valuable and practical contributions to the liberation struggle of Southern Africa will be greatly missed by the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of Liberation Movements reaffirmed their total and unqualified commitment to the liberation struggles of the people of Namibia against colonialism and of the people of South Africa against apartheid. They reasserted their conviction, and that of the Organization of African Unity, that the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is essential for the security of all the independent states of the continent and in particular of the Front Line States.

Further, they reiterated that the root cause of the problems in South Africa is apartheid itself; apartheid is the cause of Africa's hostility to the South Africa racist regime and of the existence of South African and Namibian refugees. None of these things is caused by

the Front Line or other States neighbouring South Africa. Apartheid has been condemned in categorical terms by the United Nations, and by the leaders of Europe, America, Australasia and Asia as well as by Africa. It cannot be made acceptable by the use of South Africa's military power and economic strength, nor by the use of mercenaries and traitors.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements discussed the understanding reached by the People's Republic of Angola and the Pretoria Regime, and they hoped that South Africa will honour its commitment to withdraw its troops from Angola. This withdrawal will constitute an opportunity for the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. They welcomed Angola's reaffirmation of its continued commitment to the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO. The Heads of State and Government expressed their support for the Angolan actions against the externally supported armed bandits who are causing death and misery to the Angolan people and destruction of the economic infrastructure of the State.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and the South African Government. They expressed the hope that the South African Government will live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilisation of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits, and gave their support to the Mozambican actions aimed at the total elimination of these vicious bandits. They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political, and diplomatic support for the A.N.C. in the struggle against apartheid and for majority rule in South Africa.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements declared that the immediate objective for Namibia is and must be the rapid implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, in order that Namibia may attain full and internationally recognised independence on the basis of self-determination by all people of that country. They reiterated the continuing role of the U.N. Security Council and Secretary-General in the implementation of Resolution 435. The leaders of the Front Line States again reaffirmed their support for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

For South Africa, the objective of the Front Line States and Liberation Movements is the abolition of apartheid by whatever means are necessary. The Leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means. This can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa who are unrepresented in the present government structure of that country. A prerequisite for any such discussions would be the unconditional release from prison, detention, house arrest or 'banning' of Nelson Mandela and all other political leaders. Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African Government, there is no way to peace in Southern Africa except through discussions between the South African Government and the African people of South Africa.

To avoid any misunderstanding, they stressed that the phrase "African People" includes all those who have been classified as being citizens of the so-called independent Homelands in South Africa; the denial of their South African citizenship is not recognised in international law, nor by any independent state apart from South Africa.

The alternative to free negotiations within South Africa aimed at the ending of apartheid will inevitably be continued struggle against that system by other means, including armed struggle. This struggle is being and will be conducted and led by the people of South Africa themselves, on their own initiative and within their own country. However, their struggle is, and is seen by Africa to be, a struggle for the freedom and security of all the peoples of this continent, and for the human dignity of all men and women regardless of colour. It therefore receives, and will continue to receive, the full support of the peoples and the nations represented by the Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States.

Involved in this struggle for the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is the consolidation of the freedom and the security of the states which have already achieved independence. To that end, and in the light of the difficult circumstances which do from time to time confront such states, the leaders of the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements reaffirmed their understanding of steps which are taken for this purpose by states which are fully committed to the

liberation struggles. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the internationally recognised boundaries in Southern Africa as these were defined when the free states achieved their political independence.

The Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States and the leaders of the Liberation Movements condemned without reservation the open and the covert aggressive actions of South Africa directed at the de-stabilisation of African states, and those aimed against refugees from Namibia and apartheid South Africa. There is no excuse in international law or civilised practice for these actions. The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements also repeated their rejection of the attempt to link the freedom of Namibia with any Angolan Government decisions relating to its security requirements and its internal political structures.

The political and the armed struggles being waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa led by SWAPO and A.N.C. respectively, are taking place inside those two countries. The struggle is between the people of Namibia and the occupying power, and between the people of South Africa and the apartheid regime. Therefore, the strategy of the Liberation Movements is that of internal struggle, firmly based on the people's will and determination.

As the denial of human rights, and the ruthlessness of the oppressor, has made it impossible for many active leaders of the Liberation Movements to live and work inside their own countries, it has been necessary for both SWAPO and A.N.C. to have an external wing. The international implications of the problems

For the Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States and the leaders of the Liberation Movements repeat a truism. Peace is incompatible with racism and with colonialism. Man is so constituted that men and women will die for freedom and human dignity if they are prevented from the peaceful pursuit of these basic human rights. Neither military might nor devious political machinations, whether directed against the peoples inside Namibia and South Africa or against the free States of Africa, can defeat the idea of freedom and racial equality.

The struggle will be long and hard. It will be carried on until final victory.

A luta continua.

Bishop Trevor HUDDLESTON



15/6

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Bishop Trevor Huddleston and others on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. This letter was handed in simultaneously at Chequers and Downing Street on Saturday 2 June, and I believe that a copy has already been passed to you via the Resident Clerk.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach this office by Friday 15 June.

(David Barclay)

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc MASTER SET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

Visit of South African Prime Minister

I enclose a record of the plenary discussion which took place at Chequers on 2 June.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

AJC

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA AT 1230 PM ON SATURDAY 2 JUNE
1984 AT CHEQUERS

Present:

The Prime Minister
The Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary
Mr. Malcolm Rifkind
Sir Antony Acland
Sir John Leahy
Mr. John Coles

The Honourable P.W. Botha
Prime Minister
The Honourable R.F. Botha
Foreign Minister
Mr. J.H. van Dalsen
Director General, DFA
Mr. C. von Hirschberg
Deputy Director General, DFA
Dr. L.D. Barnard
Head of National Intelligence
Service
The Charge d'Affaires of the
Republic of South Africa
(Mr. L.H. Evans)
Mr. A.L. Manley
Private Secretary

After formally welcoming the South African delegation, the Prime Minister said that she hoped that the discussions could be frank. There were differences between us about which we should talk. At the end of the talks we could agree jointly on what should be said to the press.

Many people in Britain had relatives in South Africa. So that was a natural reservoir of goodwill. But our political attitude was affected by one enormous problem: we felt strongly that peoples' rights should not be determined by the colour of

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their skin. Particular repugnance was felt at the forced removal of blacks to new areas. We appreciated the great strategic importance of South Africa. Nor did we wish Communism to spread in Africa or elsewhere because to us Communism represented denial of human dignity.

We welcomed the agreements reached between South Africa and some of its neighbours. We were trying to help on aid to Mozambique. We felt strongly that the people of Mozambique must see and feel the benefits of their agreement with South Africa. The Machel Government was still concerned about the activities of RENAMO which they had hoped would cease when the agreement was signed. We welcomed South Africa's withdrawal from Angola. Finally, we had taken note of Mr. Botha's advice to South Africa - "adapt or die", and were also aware of the speech he had made the previous night in Zurich.

Mr. P.W. Botha said that he wanted to speak as candidly as he had done in the earlier tete-a-tete conversation. With regard to South West Africa or Namibia, it was well-known that he had opposed United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 when, as Minister of Defence, he had been present at the relevant Cabinet discussion. But when the Cabinet had decided to accept the Resolution he had said that he would do too. On becoming Prime Minister, he had felt it his duty to adhere to the undertaking given by his predecessor. There was no real obstacle to achieving implementation of Resolution 435 except that South Africa supported the United States view that as long as there was a Cuban presence in Angola, there was no chance of fair elections in Namibia.

South Africa was being criticised for its position on Namibia. But it did not want Namibia as a part of its territory. His own political party had been founded following a rebellion in South Africa against the occupation of Namibia.

South Africa was responsible for the security of Namibia

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and at present was also responsible for its development. This year's budget showed that South Africa would guarantee loans of 180 million rands in the current financial year, that it would contribute 318 million rands to the budgetary deficit and that it would make a further contribution of 250 million rands through customs and excise. This gave a total of more than 600 million rands which did not take into account the cost of security. The idea that Namibia was rich was a myth. He assumed that as soon as South Africa withdrew troops and Namibia became independent, South Africa would be blamed if it cut off its financial assistance. The Prime Minister commented that a cut in aid was surely unlikely. Namibia would continue to depend on South Africa. We understood the need to get the Cubans out of Angola though we made no specific linkage with a Namibia settlement. We also understood that the situation was complex (in parenthesis the Prime Minister thanked Mr. Botha for the help given by the South African Government to Sir John Leahy during his recent visit in connection with the British citizens held by UNITA).

Mr. P.W. Botha said that either the world acknowledged that South Africa had a contribution to make to Namibia or it did not. He could use the funds he had described for a variety of projects within South Africa - or even in Mozambique. He now wished to work out an arrangement with the five states in the Contact Group that South Africa should look after the security of Namibia until Resolution 435 was implemented but that the five should make a contribution to the cost of administration and development of Namibia.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. R.F. Botha described the progress of the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. They were now only some 30 kilometres from the border which might be reached next week. The Lusaka Agreement provided that the Joint Monitoring Commission would last for only 30 days after that point had been reached. There could be a dangerous vacuum. He had therefore suggested that

when the Monitoring Commission expired, a peace-keeping organisation should be substituted.

It was noteworthy that South African and Angolan forces were now acting jointly, even in skirmishes with SWAPO. Angola had even asked South Africa to operate outside the area defined in the agreement in order to deal with SWAPO. But if, after the 30 day deadline, there was no peace-keeping organisation in place, SWAPO activity might force South Africa to re-enter Angola. He was now awaiting a response to his proposal. Mr. Crocker had strongly urged its acceptance.

South Africa had also suggested that the Government of Angola should join with it in issuing a joint declaration to the effect that neither territory would be used for launching attacks on the other.

He had argued strongly that President Dos Santos and Savimbi should meet. President Machel supported this idea and had sent an emissary to Lusaka to urge it upon President Kaunda. The latter also supported the idea but was afraid to say so publicly. Other African countries were similarly reluctant to make public their support.

UNITA was in a very strong position. Savimbi could now take almost any town at random. Of course, if the MPLA agreed to meet Savimbi this would in effect be a victory for the latter. But he would probably take MPLA members into his Government.

The recent meeting in Lusaka between SWAPO and the Multi-Party Conference had progressed well for a few days. But suddenly Njoma had gone berserk and lashed out at the MPC leaders. President Kaunda had said that he was flabbergasted by this development. Later the South Africans had learnt that a certain diplomat, who was no doubt Russian, had visited Njoma just before he had made his outburst.

The Prime Minister said that the irony was that the more successful Savimbi was the less likely the Cubans were to leave Angola. Mr. P.W. Botha said that the weaker the MPLA became, the more intolerable the position of the Cubans would be. They were not liked by the local population. Sir John Leahy commented that those African leaders who favoured reconciliation between the MPLA and Savimbi were not prepared to say so - but neither we nor the South Africans were in a position to persuade SWAPO to talk. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether it was being suggested that the MPLA could reach the conclusion that the only way of getting rid of the Cubans was to talk to Savimbi. Mr. R.F. Botha said that, according to South African information, a majority of the Politburo in Luanda wished to talk. Sir John Leahy recalled the Prime Minister hinting in New Delhi that the African Front Line States themselves had a role in promoting reconciliation. Mr. P.W. Botha pointed out that for Zambia a settlement in Angola would mean that it could again use the Benguela railway. The Prime Minister asked whether there were any African leaders who would be strong enough to give a lead in promoting reconciliation. Mr. R.F. Botha named President Machel and President Houphouet-Boigny.

Mr. P.W. Botha then added in confidence that President Machel had promised him that he would speak to Dos Santos about the possibility of talks with Savimbi. It was noteworthy that not only the Politburo but the Angolan Defence Force was split on the desirability of talks.

The economic deterioration now taking place in Southern Africa was so rapid that the countries concerned would be forced by the facts to deal with each other. Hunger was striking down hundreds of thousands of children. Unless something was done quickly, the area was heading for disaster.

The discussion then turned to Zimbabwe. Mr. Rifkind said that the country was in great difficulty after three years of

drought. Mr. P.W. Botha said that his latest information was that Zimbabwe might be prepared to conclude a security agreement with South Africa. The Harare Government feared that some 20 - 30 leading industrialists were about to leave Zimbabwe; if they did, the country was finished. He had even been asked to try to persuade Ian Smith not to leave Zimbabwe.

The Prime Minister said that for some time she had found it difficult to have a reasonable relationship with Mr. Mugabe, particularly because of the issue of the detained Air Force officers. But when they had met in New Delhi at CHOGM, Mugabe had explained that the officers would be released if a review tribunal so recommended. This had occurred - and indeed Mugabe had kept his word on all that he had said on that occasion. Zimbabwe wanted BMATT to stay. She understood that the North Koreans were no longer training the Zimbabwe army. BMATT also provided a sign of hope to the white community. She hoped that South Africa would also discover that Mr. Mugabe could be relied upon. Mr. P.W. Botha said that he was dealing with Mugabe in a low key because the latter preferred it that way. Mr. R.F. Botha said that he had little difficulty in dealing with Zimbabwe. He had sent Mugabe a message to the effect that though he did not approve of him he recognised that he was the leader with whom South Africa must deal. And no sooner had he said in the South African Parliament that South Africa did not need a security agreement with Zimbabwe, than he had received a complaint that Zimbabwe was being left in the cold.

At this point in the discussion the participants moved to lunch. The discussion continued over lunch.

Mr. R.F. Botha reverted to the situation in Angola. The moment that Dos Santos and Savimbi came together, the Cubans would have to leave. Mr. P.W. Botha commented that if they did not come together, Angola would disintegrate. Sir John Leahy observed that President Dos Santos must feel that as soon as he began to negotiate with Savimbi he would be politically dead.

Mr. R.F. Botha agreed - Savimbi knew that and that was his aim. But he would take MPLA members into his Government. Mr. P.W. Botha described Savimbi as a personal friend. He saw him often. Savimbi had recently told him that he was more optimistic than ever before. In response to a question, Sir John Leahy said that judging from the UNITA headquarters which he had visited, Savimbi's force was well organised and well disciplined with a good public relations structure.

The Prime Minister asked what the next steps should be on Namibia if Resolution 435 was to be implemented. Sir John Leahy replied that both South Africa and the United States said that the implementation of Resolution 435 was not possible while the Cubans remained in Angola - and that was not possible until the contending parties in Angola had become reconciled. Mr. P.W. Botha said that he believed that President Kaunda could play a crucial role in reconciliation.

Mr. R.F. Botha said that Savimbi was going to win the war and the present Angolan Government must capitulate. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled that only recently the South African judgement was that neither side could win. Sir John Leahy commented that Savimbi had given him the same assessment. Mr. R.F. Botha replied that things had changed. Savimbi could now take any town he liked though he did not have the administrative resources to hold on to his conquests and administer the area. Mr. Rifkind asked whether the South African side were saying that Savimbi had the military capability to win the war. Mr. R.F. Botha said that we could expect very interesting developments in the next two or three months. The Portuguese Government entirely agreed with the South African view. Incidentally, President Eanes had also congratulated South Africa on the recent constitutional changes.

At this point, Mr. R.F. Botha appeared to change his ground. He said that stalemate in Angola was inevitable. In response to questions, he then stated that as a result of

stalemate the population of Angola would give their support to Savimbi rather than the MPLA.

Mr. Rifkind asked whether, if SWAPO and the Multi-Party Conference reached agreement with regard to Namibia, South Africa would still insist on Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Mr. P.W. Botha said that this was a hypothetical situation. But if it came about internal dissention would break out within SWAPO. Mr. R.F. Botha said that whatever the Namibian parties decided, South Africa would insist on a Cuban withdrawal. This alien presence in its immediate vicinity was not to be tolerated. If necessary, South Africa, which was a regional power, would go to war. The Prime Minister said that it would be much better if that could be avoided. Namibia might cost South Africa a lot now - but such a war would cost a lot more. Mr. P.W. Botha agreed and said that he was doing all in his power to avoid such a step, but in the last instance South Africa was prepared for it.

Mozambique had requested South Africa to provide helicopters to protect the transmission line on which it depended for its power supplies. South Africa had declined to supply such helicopters while the arms embargo was maintained. He had told President Machel that while he behaved as Father Christmas in Namibia, he was not prepared to do so in Mozambique. He had also told him that if he wanted South African support and co-operation he must create the opportunities for the South African private sector to invest in profitable projects in Mozambique. Mr. R.F. Botha asked whether Europe could put together a co-ordinated aid programme of perhaps \$40-50 million to help President Machel and to create employment for RENAMO. Mr. P.W. Botha commented that Africa was tired of conventional aid as distinct from joint projects which enabled Africans to utilise their soil, exploit their seas and educate themselves.

Mr. R.F. Botha observed that 20% of Africa was now a desert

and that experts predicted that the uncultivable area would increase to some 40% within 20 years. This was largely due to the wrong use of land. Mr. Rifkind suggested that it was also due to the southward drift of the Sahara and to climatic changes.

Reverting to Angola, the Prime Minister said that she was still pre-occupied with the question of what should happen next. Mr. R.F. Botha replied that Angola should accept the South African proposal for a peace-keeping organisation after the expiry of the 30 day period to which he had referred. Mr. Crocker had said in Luanda last week that the time for decisions was running out. South Africa agreed. Either the MPLA undertook to talk to Savimbi or the latter would continue until he had forced talks upon Luanda. The Cubans would not withdraw without an agreement between the two. Or, Mr. P.W. Botha added, the total collapse of Luanda.

Sir John Leahy asked whether there was any information about an increase in the number of Cubans in Angola. Dr. Barnard said that there were suggestions that some Cubans had entered Angola from Ethiopia but this information had not yet been confirmed.

Mr. P.W. Botha then suggested that a conference of Southern African states would be useful. He believed that the possibility of this was now greater. The conference could draw up a list of priorities for the area. Much preparation would be needed. He would like to see the private sector playing a role. The main purpose would be to discuss economic questions. People throughout the area were becoming more aware of the fact that children were short of food and that health facilities were poor. These were the matters to tackle first. The political solutions could come later.

At the invitation of Mr. P.W. Botha, Mr. R.F. Botha described recent exchanges between South Africa and Botswana. A

classified information showing that 36 ANC members were operating from Gaborone and other places in Botswana. He had also warned him about attempts by some people to work with the opposition to President Masire whom South Africa wished to see stay in power. Mr. Mogwe had thanked him for this information and had said that Botswana would at last be able to take action against the ANC. Nothing further had been heard. South Africa had then suggested co-operation between the police forces of the two countries. Mr. Mogwe had welcomed this but the Botswanan Cabinet had not backed him. More recently, South Africa had arrested some SWAPO terrorists who admitted that they had entered South Africa through Botswana. Until that point there had been no pressure upon Botswana to sign a security agreement. Then Mr. Mogwe had said that BP wished to erect a soda-ash plant and hoped that South Africa would take much of the product, perhaps ceasing to take supplies from other foreign suppliers. He had responded to the effect that, if South Africa was to depend on Botswana in this way, police co-operation was essential. He had given Mr. Mogwe a copy of the Nkomati Accord but Botswana had not responded favourably to this. He had then told Mr. Mogwe that provided there was adequate police co-operation to guarantee security for the plant, this would be acceptable. South Africa was not insisting that Botswana should sign a security agreement. It was a sovereign state.

The discussion was continued after lunch.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to refer to the internal situation in South Africa. She had indicated earlier that there were international dimensions to this matter because it appeared to the outside world that in South Africa political rights depended on the colour of a person's skin. That was totally unacceptable. But she recognised the complexity of the South African situation and the significance of the recent constitutional measures. The matter of greatest concern was the forced movement of blacks.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the existence of institutions which differentiated between people on the basis of race were regarded by the overwhelming majority of opinion in Britain as unacceptable, as were such manifestations as the forced movement of blacks. At the same time, we understood that some people in South Africa were seeking to move in a different direction. One of the roles that the British Prime Minister played within the Commonwealth was to ensure that the condemnation of South Africa did not exceed rational limits. We very often found in Commonwealth circles that we were fighting South Africa's battle because we believed that the maintenance of economic contacts between South Africa and the rest of the world were essential. The South African Government might regard the arms embargo and the Gleneagles Agreement as unattractive but they helped to ward off more extreme measures. We had given a certain welcome to the recent constitutional changes.

The Prime Minister said that on the question of forced removals there had recently been some publicity in Britain for the case of the Ngema community. Its representatives had written to The Queen. The Prime Minister read out extracts from the letter.

Mr. P.W. Botha said that he would not shirk his responsibility to comment on South Africa's internal policies on the condition that it was no-one's intention to interfere in his country's internal affairs. No two countries in the world could agree on the internal policies of the other - the European Community provided an outstanding example of differing internal policies.

It was not the aim of South Africa's internal policy to satisfy international opinion. The latter required one man one vote in a unitary state. South Africa could not accept that. He was not just talking about the white population. In essence South Africa was a country of minorities - white, coloured,

Indian and various black minorities. The problem was to build a structure under which different minorities could retain their own rights and their own way of life and have a say in the future of the country as a whole. That was the dilemma.

It was necessary to solve the problem of the domination of one minority by another. When a solution to this had been solved, 60-70% of South Africa's current difficulties would be removed.

He saw a good deal in the system of the Swiss confederation from which South Africa could draw conclusions. The aim might be a Confederation of States. When South Africa had accepted the Westminster system, rights had not been provided either for blacks or for most of the coloureds. But it had become clear to him and his colleagues - who believed that South Africa must move with the times - that the Westminster system would have to be changed in such a way as not to destroy its good points. That was why the recent measures with regard to coloureds and Indians had been adopted. To a great extent, South Africa now had a system where people would have a say and would, under a system of devolution, be able to deal with their own affairs as much as possible. He had to reject the idea that South Africa was composed of a small minority of whites and the vast majority of blacks. It was made up of a number of minority groups, including black minority groups. Some of the latter would never accept domination by the Zulus.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that the decision-taking power was in the hands of the white minority - for example the decisions which had resulted in the forced removal of some two million people. Mr. P.W. Botha replied that South Africa still had the Westminster system which it was seeking to change. The Transkei had obtained self-government because it had asked for it - much as Lesotho had sought self-government from the United Kingdom. Mr. Rifkind observed that the vast majority of black people did not live in the homelands.

Mr. Botha asked that he should be allowed to finish his case. The Transkei had wanted independence but would never accept Zulu domination. Nor would other black minorities accept such domination. Some eight million blacks had flocked to the urban areas. He believed that a way must be found to give these communities third tier government so that they could build up a democratic system on a local basis. It was also necessary to find ways of linking these communities with their natural homes. Structures had to be created and serve as agencies for leadership i.e. they would produce people to whom he could talk as leaders.

A Cabinet Committee of senior Ministers had now been appointed whose terms of reference included talking to, among others, the leaders of urban communities and discovering what could be done to create structures under which they could deal with their own affairs and combine to discuss matters of common concern. The eventual aim was a Confederation of States with permanent secretariats working together on mutual interests. There could be a Southern African Development Bank and annual meetings on issues of mutual concern.

Mr. Rifkind asked whether, if this goal was attained, the black communities would be represented in the Government of the Confederation. Mr. P.W. Botha said that he foresaw such representatives coming together in permanent institutions. But it would be wrong to expect South Africa to do in five years what Switzerland had taken three or four centuries to accomplish.

The Prime Minister pressed further on this point. If and when a Confederation was established would there be black representatives in the South African Government? Mr. P.W. Botha said that at the end of the road there would be a Confederation of Southern African States joining in common discussion. Mr. R.F. Botha said that for at least a year there had been eight joint committees, on a whole range of

matters, on which the South African Government had only very limited representation. This was a move towards joint decision making on matters of common concern. The Prime Minister asked why there was not more publicity for this. Mr. R.F. Botha said that too much propaganda caused trouble from the right wing and criticism from the rest of the world. He was much encouraged by the new pattern in Southern Africa where black and white leaders were talking together. The new Cabinet Committee would try to consult and negotiate agreements with black leaders.

Reverting to the case of the Ngema community, which the Prime Minister had raised, he attributed the difficulties to a dispute between two black leaders. The South African Prime Minister had said publicly that he was not in favour of forced removals. But circumstances sometimes made voluntary departures necessary. Following a detailed explanation of several cases, he added that it was fully appreciated that one of the most painful experiences was for people to move. And he knew how bad this was for South Africa's image abroad. But South Africa's enemies were now attacking on the new front of "forced removals". The South African Government would handle these matters carefully and hoped to proceed only by voluntary moves.

The Prime Minister recalled that during her last visit to South Africa she had met a person in District 6 of Cape Town who had told her that he was obliged to move for the second time because land was being cleared for whites. Was Mr. Botha saying that the object of the removals was not to make way for whites? Mr. P.W. Botha said that he was not saying this but many whites had had to move to make way for others. His own party was under attack for giving away white land. Mr. Rifkind asked how many whites had been obliged to move. Mr. P.W. Botha replied - hundreds and thousands. Compensation was given amounting to the market value of the land plus 20% of that value as a hardship grant. Mr. R.F. Botha said that the Government well understood people's attachment to land. Mr. P.W. Botha said that that was

why it was working with local leaders to persuade them of the advantages of voluntary movement. The Prime Minister asked whether that meant that if they were not persuaded they did not have to leave. Mr. P.W. Botha replied that one continued until they were persuaded, though one or two cases of stubbornness did arise.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the key point seemed to be that the people who were being moved did not have a voice in Government. Mr. P.W. Botha said that he would gladly accept that the blacks should have the land owned and occupied by the whites at present, if the whites could have the land owned by the blacks. He had said this publicly.

Mr. R.F. Botha said that of course the South African Government, like any Government, had made mistakes. But the South African Prime Minister had allowed his party to split because of his policies. At a constituency meeting in Transvaal next week he expected to be told that he was a kaffir lover who was giving away white land to blacks. It should be recognised that the present Government could be replaced only by a Government to its right. It was hurtful that while he had received telegrams from several heads of African states congratulating the Government on the outcome of the constitutional referendum, none had been received from the West. The Prime Minister suggested that South Africa did not always explain itself to the outside world in the best possible way. This was perhaps one of the dangers of isolation. People in this country had seen on television the scenes of large numbers of people being moved to apparently poor land. Mr. P.W. Botha said that he could not recall people being removed in large numbers to worse conditions. Mr. R.F. Botha recalled that he had been present in Cabinet when the Prime Minister had instructed that no-one should be moved until adequate amenities existed. Mr. Rifkind suggested that most of the removals occurred because of the Group Areas Act. Mr. P.W. Botha contested this. The removals were based on other acts such as

contested this. The removals were based on other acts such as legislation introduced by Smuts in 1936. The South African Government had purchased large areas of good land from whites in order to resettle blacks. The outside world did not hear about the successful movement of people from conditions of squalor, it heard only of the mistakes. Mr. R.F. Botha pointed out that Britain had given independence to Lesotho which had 140,000 male workers permanently in South Africa who were remitting about half of Lesotho's income. The Prime Minister said that it might be helpful if the South African Embassy would provide more facts about this question.

Mr. R.F. Botha reiterated that the task of the new Cabinet Committee was to tackle the future of South Africa together with leaders of the black communities. Mr. P.W. Botha added that if he were to state that he was in favour of one man one vote he would lose the next election disastrously. Not only would whites not accept this - nor would minorities among the blacks. The only way forward was to seek a solution under which minorities could live together.

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any other matters which should be discussed before the talks were concluded.

Mr. P.W. Botha said that he wished to reiterate that South Africa would not be able to provide helicopters to Mozambique to enable it to guard the power line on their side of the border. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the South African Foreign Minister had explained the background to this.

With regard to sporting contacts, Mr. R.F. Botha asked why it was not possible to remove individual sports from the boycott list when we were convinced that integration in that sport had been achieved. The Prime Minister said that this was a matter for the Commonwealth to consider. Mr. R.F. Botha observed that Mozambique was about to begin soccer matches with South Africa.

Mr. P.W. Botha said that he had a different point to make. British Government spokesmen often referred to South African policies in objectionable ways. He instanced a recent speech by the Chairman of the Conservative Party. If we did not like South African policies, no-one could blame us for saying so. But the use of such descriptions as "abhorrent" went too far. The Prime Minister commented that the basic difficulty was that South African policies discriminated on the basis of colour. Mr. P.W. Botha pointed out that a process had begun of permitting blacks to attend white universities and vice versa. Moreover, in a few months time, non-whites would join the South African Government. But if it was suggested that South Africa should move to a one man one vote system he would utterly oppose it and would take the international consequences.

Following a further discussion of the practice of segregation, Mr. P.W. Botha said that many of the problems had been dealt with quietly. The more the South African Government was shouted at, the harder it became to act. Mr. R.F. Botha said that the South African Government was portrayed as animated by racial hatred. The duty of a Government was to maintain social conditions which avoided racial confrontation. There was no comparison between the South Africa of today and the South Africa of fifteen years ago. Mr. P.W. Botha observed that if he lived in the United Kingdom his attitude would be the same as that expressed by the Prime Minister. But South Africa's history and circumstances were different. The same strict standards could not be applied. He was doing his best to apply civilised standards where possible.

The discussion ended at 1630.

4 June 1984

John Bles

re: Wages to Q.H. Employees
(Black, Indian & Coloured in
South Africa)

1. No one is paid below S.L.L.
and have not been for 1983/84
2. 220 are currently paid below
M.L.L.
3. By 30 June '84 some 150 will
be below M.L.L. These are
made up by
 - (a) women doing sepihiti
assembly
 - (b) Young and recent recruits

4 June '84

John Bles

Personal + Confidential.

ST. JAMES'S CHURCH
197 PICCADILLY
LONDON W1V 9LF

01-734 5244
01-734 0956

Sunday June 3rd 1984

dfps. mk

Prime Minister.

From Bishop
Huddleston.

15/6

A.J.C. 6/6.

Dear Prime Minister,

It is impossible for me to thank you adequately for both the generosity of your reception to me and Mr. Abdul Minty last Thursday and for your patience in listening. But at least I must put on record my gratitude personally. At the same time I need hardly say how much your public statement on Television after the fateful meeting with Mr. Botha has done to give me encouragement and hope. It was truly all I could have wished for. I write personally, of course. I am (as you are) aware of the immense diversity of motive within the Anti-Apartheid Movement across the world. It is not always easy to be sure of one's own integrity in the act and tenor of the struggle. But I have tried to base what I have done - & shall continue to do for so long as I have strength - on very

Christian belief in the infinite dignity of man as redeemed. Apartheid is a total denial of this.

Obviously I am unopposed to the freedom of the African people in their own land, for I have been involved with them for over forty years in their struggle. And for the most part it has been a non-violent struggle against a very violent state.

Now can I perhaps friends like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu & others in life imprisonment; nor great Christians like Oliver Tambo of the ANC, Beyers Naudé of the Christian Literature and Demand Tutu (a child of thirteen when I first knew him!) of the South African Council of Churches.

Obviously, too, we cannot agree on everything either concerning S. Africa or Great Britain!

But I know you respect my integrity as indeed I respect yours; I am deeply thankful.

Yours most sincerely & gratefully

† Inverhuedden CR.

Triveni,
Ascot Road,
Maidenhead, SL6 2HT
(0628) 25408

off ps

2. 6. 84

Dear Prime Minister,

15/6

Thank you
for seeing Bishop Huddleston
and Abiel Maitij. Those of
us who are deeply concerned
about the situation within
South Africa are grateful to
you for making time for this
meeting.

I had a long conversation
with Mr Maitij afterwards and
he was full of praises for

SOUTH AFRICA: Visit of Mr Botha Apr 24

Your courtesy and the attention
with which you listened to
what they had to say to you.

Yours sincerely

Shirley Fletcher

Ms SHIRLEY FLETCHER
member CWNC

SECRET



74 30
5

cc MASTER 867

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 June, 1984.

Visit of South African Prime Minister

The Prime Minister's talks with Mr. Botha began with a tete-a-tete conversation which lasted some 40 minutes. No notetakers were present.

The Prime Minister said afterwards that Mr. Botha had stated that it was never possible for South Africa to satisfy international opinion. No credit was given for the country's rapid rate of growth, nor for the advance in the social conditions of the blacks, particularly in the education and health fields. He was trying to create new political structures which would facilitate change while maintaining stability. This effort was attracting considerable criticism from right-wing political opinion.

Mr. Botha then said that South Africa possessed a good deal of information about Soviet behaviour in the area of Southern Africa - Soviet activity was at a high level. With regard to the security of the Cape, the Shackleton Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft had nearly reached the end of their life. Without suitable aircraft, South Africa could not maintain surveillance of the Southern Atlantic or the Indian Ocean. But it would be prepared to provide airfields and other facilities if Western countries wished to use their own aircraft for this task. The Prime Minister made no comment on this suggestion, nor did Mr. Botha state that South Africa wished to purchase replacement aircraft. He did, however, say that aircraft of this kind would only be used for reconnaissance purposes. South Africa could produce everything it needed for the maintenance of internal security.

Mr. Botha asked that the ANC office in London should be closed. The Prime Minister said that we could not do this under our law, and there was no evidence that the office personnel had been guilty of illegal activity.

SECRET

/ The

The South African Prime Minister then raised the case of the South African citizens who had been arrested in this country on a charge of contravening the arms embargo. The Prime Minister explained that this was a matter for the courts, and there was nothing that the Government could do.

With regard to sporting contacts, the Prime Minister took the line that the Gleneagles Agreement, which was a matter for the Commonwealth, would continue to apply.

Mr. Botha said that he had made it plain in the South African Parliament that he was against the forced removal of blacks. The Prime Minister made it clear that this was one of the aspects of South Africa's internal policy which caused most concern in this country. She took the opportunity to raise the case of Nelson Mandela. Mr. Botha said that he noted the Prime Minister's remarks, but that he was not able to interfere with the South African judicial process.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), and Hugh Taylor (Home Office). Its contents should be closely protected.

JOHN COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Anti-Apartheid Movement 13 Selous Street, London NW1 0DW

01-387 7966 (3 lines)

For freedom in Southern Africa

RB (FO) PM
Copy handed in at
Chq. use. Copy
sent to Pro
President Clerk +

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP,
The Prime Minister
10 Downing St,
London SW1

2nd June 1984

Pres & off.

PE
216

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

The presence of the Prime Minister of apartheid South Africa in Britain - the seat of the Commonwealth - must be a great source of comfort for the apartheid regime.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the thousands of our supporters who have joined our demonstrations today are deeply angered that despite widespread national and international protests you have decided to persist with your invitation to P.W.Botha. This visit represents the first ever by a Prime Minister of South Africa since it was excluded from the Commonwealth in 1961.

P.W.Botha's tour is primarily designed to overcome international isolation, obtain respectability for the apartheid system, and to sabotage the mandatory United Nations arms embargo. At the same time he is seeking increased western support for his "Pax Pretoriana" policy for the region.

It is because of this that British and world public opinion is so anxious about the implications of your meeting with P.W.Botha. The Nigerian Government and other members of the Commonwealth have expressed their grave concern, as have the Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity and the Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid who both urged you to cancel the invitation.

In addition, by coincidence or design, the English Rugby team plays its first test match against South Africa today in open defiance of the Gleneagles Agreement.

We are particularly concerned that during the past month the Anti-Apartheid Movement has failed to secure assurances from your Government that it will honour the UN mandatory arms embargo by refusing to permit the export of replacements for the Shackleton surveillance aircraft. Indeed, despite reports that British Aerospace has discussed a request for Coastguarder aircraft by South Africa, your Government insists this is a hypothetical question, thus making us even more anxious that Britain is contemplating relaxing the arms embargo.

.... /cont.

We should like to take this opportunity of requesting once more the assurances we have sought, namely that Britain will honour its obligations under the arms embargo and refuse to grant export licences for replacements for the Shackleton fleet.

Similarly we need an assurance that Britain remains committed to the decisions of the Commonwealth Summit at New Delhi in November 1983; in particular:

1. that it will strive for the "speedy and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)" on Namibia,
2. that everything possible will be done to restrain South Africa in its aggressive role towards its neighbours,
3. and that the basis for a just and lasting solution to the situation in Southern Africa is "the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people of South Africa in a united and non-fragmented South Africa".

This week the appeal by the Kwa Ngema community to Her Majesty the Queen, recalling the sacred trust deed for their land granted in the name of King Edward VII, vividly highlights Britain's unique and continuing responsibility towards the peoples of Southern Africa.

Britain has, to date, failed to discharge this responsibility honourably. To do so, surely, it must side with those who are striving for freedom.

We look forward to receiving your assurances.

Yours sincerely,

+ Trevor Huddleston C.R.

+ Trevor Huddleston CR

President



DISCUSSION BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, AND SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR R F (PIK) BOTHA AT CHEQUERS 11.45 AM, SATURDAY, 2 JUNE 1984

Present

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe
Mr Malcolm Rifkind
Sir Antony Acland
Sir John Leahy

Mr Pik Botha
Mr H van Dalsen
Dr N Barnard
Mr C von Hirschberg
Mr L Evans
Mr L Manley

1. While the two Prime Ministers were having a private talk at the start of the meeting, there was a separate discussion between the Foreign Ministers about South Africa's relations with Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The following is a brief resumé.

Mozambique

2. Mr Botha stated several times that South Africa was not giving any support to the RENAMO rebels. All contact with them had been broken off since 16 March. The South African Government (SAG) had assured the Mozambique Government that they abided both in the letter and spirit by their undertaking to this effect in the agreement they had signed. He agreed, in answer to persistent questions, that the rebels (whom he estimated to number about 15,000) seemed to be well supplied and to be getting arms etc from somewhere, but apart from saying that they already had big stocks and offering a tentative suggestion that they might be getting supplies through Malawi he could give no explanation for this.

3. Mr Botha went on to say that RENAMO would have to be offered an inducement if they were to stop their campaign. It was important that they should do so if Mozambique was to receive the injection of economic assistance and investment that was necessary to demonstrate the correctness of President Machel's decision to turn to the West. The Portuguese and South African Governments had agreed to consider whether they might offer the rebels a joint guarantee that if they put down their arms no harm would come to them and they would be helped to obtain employment. It would of course be necessary to persuade President Machel to accept this. South Africa might be able to take some 2,000 of the men to work in South African mines (in addition to the 40,000 Mozambicans already there). But a pump-priming fund of \$30-40 million should also be established to

/provide



provide employment in Mozambique itself, create training centres, enable roads to be built etc. For this purpose European countries should set up a joint fund in cooperation with the United States; Britain's contribution, he suggested, might be of the order of \$5 million. Sir Geoffrey Howe explained that following President Machel's visit to London we had already increased our Governmental aid, but Mr Botha said that bilateral aid was not enough: what was needed to make the right impact was a highly visible joint Western effort. Mr Rifkind said that the best inducement to RENAMO to stop fighting would be the cessation of their supplies of arms. It might be possible, perhaps, to upgrade European Development Fund assistance, but he did not know whether it could be done on the sort of scale suggested by Mr Botha. Sir J Leahy pointed out that apart from Governmental aid there could be some British private investment: Lonrho, for example, were interested in re-establishing certain tourist resorts in Mozambique. Mr Botha indicated that a South African hotel group would be doing that as well. Amongst other things South Africa would also be providing a line of credit for consumer and capital goods, helping rebuild the railways, furnishing a new citrus fruit cooling plant, and giving assistance in the medical field and with the fisheries. But their resources were limited and he wanted to repeat his plea for a joint Western effort. Dr Crocker had told him that the US Government would give it their serious attention. Mr Botha added that President Machel had agreed to promulgate new legislation on the protection of investments and property rights.

4. Mr Botha made a special point of Mozambique's need for helicopters to protect the 700 kms of electricity transmission lines from the Cabora Bassa power station to the South African border against sabotage. With the arms embargo still in force people in South Africa would not understand it if the SAG were to supply these and they would not do so, but Mozambique would have to get them from somewhere. He had discussed this in Lisbon and the Portuguese understood the problem well. [Mr Botha did not say it in so many words, but the clear implication of what he said was that we should talk to the Portuguese about it.]

Zimbabwe

5. Sir Geoffrey Howe invited Mr Botha to speak about South Africa's current relations with Zimbabwe. Mr Botha said he had come to the conclusion that the CIO in Harare must have been feeding Mr Mugabe with information which caused him to adopt an emotional attitude against South Africa. He (Botha) had had lunch in Cape Town recently with Mr Mugabe's Ghanaian brother-in-law, who had told him that Mr Mugabe had a fixation that the SAG were training "enemy units" in the Northern Transvaal and were out to destroy him. He had sent back a message via this same man to the effect that while the SAG did not like him (Mugabe) they accepted the fact that he was the elected Prime Minister and that anyone else would be worse. (Mr Botha

/explained



explained that he had couched his message in these frank terms to give it greater credibility.) Even more recently he had received another visitor from Zimbabwe, who had told him that the Zimbabwe Government wanted to know why the SAG had left them out of their recent approaches to their neighbours. Further than that he had gone on to say that the Zimbabwe Government would now be willing to consider a security agreement with South Africa. He (Botha) believed that the Zimbabweans were beginning to feel desperate because there was a distinct possibility that 20 or 30 big industrial concerns might decide to pack up and leave the country. They knew that if that happened the economy would collapse completely.

6. At this point the meeting ended and the participants joined the two principals.

DISTRIBUTION

PS
PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr Squire
Mr Thorpe (SAfD)
Mr Lewty (CAfD)
Mr Wallis (PUSD)
ECD(E)

Chanceries: Cape Town
Maputo
Harare
Lisbon
Washington
UKMIS New York

PS/No.10

F.R.

Mr. John Coles

MR. THATCHER

We have been warned that Labour Members of Parliament may raise, in the context of the South African Prime Minister's visit, the question of violations by British firms of the EEC Code of Conduct in South Africa. There is just the chance that Quinton Hazell will be mentioned in this context.

We can deal easily enough with the general question. And we do not have to answer officially for Quinton Hazell. But if you have any information which you would like to pass on to us about the wages paid by Quinton Hazell, this might be useful (I remember that you told me that before you went on your last visit to South Africa you had asked for some facts on this).

A. J. Coles.

1. Thank you

2. See information re Q.H.
in South Africa obtained this

1 June 1984

am. (attached)

D 5/6.



Trevor Huddleston file *TH*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1984

VISIT OF MR. BOTHA

I should report that Mr. Abdul Minty, the Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, rang me this afternoon and asked, with reference to the Prime Minister's meeting with Bishop Trevor Huddleston the other day, whether I could give him an assurance that we should maintain the arms embargo against South Africa and not agree to the South African request for coastguard surveillance aircraft.

I told him that the British Government did not adopt a position on hypothetical cases. No request for an export licence for the equipment he had mentioned had been received.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TH



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1984

VISIT OF MR. BOTHA

We have been warned that there is a possibility that the question of violations by British firms of the EEC Code of Conduct in South Africa may be raised in the House of Commons next week in the context of Mr. Botha's visit. It is possible that we may have to have a line ready by the afternoon of Monday, 4 June. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would make sure that it is available. We shall, in any case, need it for Prime Minister's Questions on Tuesday, 5 June.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MR FRISSTER ✓

Dr 4/6

SOUTHERN AFRICA: ADVANCE COPIES 14

PS

PS/Mr RIFKIND

PS/PUS,

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

MR ADAMS

HD/SAFD ✓

HD/CAFØ

HD/UNØ

HD/NEWS D

HD/SED

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADV. Rm. WH216

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR A J S GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO.10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY



GRS 680

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 010940Z JUN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

DESKBY 011100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 191 OF 01 JUNE 1984

AND TO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, LUANDA, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS,
VIENNA, BRUSSELS

SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PORTUGAL.

1. P W BOTHA MADE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO LISBON FROM 29-31 MAY AT THE INVITATION OF MARIO SOARES. LISBON WAS TO HAVE BEEN LAST STOP ON BOTHA'S EUROPEAN TOUR BUT WAS APPARENTLY BROUGHT FORWARD AT SOUTH AFRICAN REQUEST AS OFFERING LAUNCH ON BASIS OF A FORMAL INVITATION.
2. AT THE CLOSING PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD CHANGED HIS ATTITUDE TO APARTHEID, SOARES SAID THAT HE HADN'T. HE DID, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT A VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PORTUGUESE STATE. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT-BESIDES, PORTUGUESE FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND HER COMMUNITY OF 700,000 LIVING IN SOUTH AFRICA GAVE SUBSTANCE TO THE TALKS.
3. P W BOTHA WAS ASKED WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD SIGN A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH ANGOLA ON THE SAME LINES AS NKOMATI. HE REPLIED "YES, ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES, NAMELY THAT NO COUNTRY ALLOWS ITSELF TO BE USED AS A SPRINGBOARD BY OTHER FORCES AGAINST ANY OTHER ONE. S. AFRICA IS NOT ALLOWING ANY OF ITS FORCES TO ACT AGAINST ANGOLA, EXCEPT PROTECTING INNOCENT NAMIBIANS BY ATTACKING SWAPO. WE HAVE NO FIGHT AGAINST ANGOLA. WE ARE PREPARED TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES AS MOZAMBIQUE".

~~W~~ ~~SUCH AN AGREEMENT ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES AS MOZAMBIQUE~~.
BOTH A ALSO STRESSED THE COST TO SAG OF SUPPORTING THE NAMIBIAN
ADMINISTRATION AND BALANCING THE NAMIBIAN BUDGET. IN ADDITION TO
THE HEAVY COSTS OF POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES.

4. AT HIS DINNER FOR MARIO SOARES P W BOTH A TOLD ME HE WAS
LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING MRS THATCHER. HE REMEMBERED HER VISIT
TO SOUTH AFRICA AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION WHEN HE
HAD MADE A JOURNEY WITH HER BY HELICOPTER.

5. AT SAME FUNCTION PIK BOTH A TOLD ME THAT VISIT TO PORTUGAL HAD
GONE " MOST SUCCESSFULLY". SIX MONTHS AGO PRESIDENT EANES HAD
DESCRIBED UNITA TO HIM AS "BRIGANDS". NOW EANES HAD TOLD P W
BOTH A HE BELIEVED DOS SANTOS MUST COME TO SOME POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
WITH SAVIMBI. PIK BOTH A SAID THAT SAVIMBI HIMSELF WOULD NOT
ACCEPT EXCLUSION FROM ANY MPLA/UNITA COALITION ARRANGEMENT.
IN TALKS WITH THE PORTUGUESE IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT SC435 COULD
BE CONTINUING BASIS FOR NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, BUT ON CONDITION THE
CUBANS WITHDREW FROM ANGOLA. "IT'S AS SIMPLE AS THAT, AND THE
AMERICANS AGREE". (SEPARATELY VAN DALSEN MADE THE SAME POINT
SUGGESTING THAT THE CUBAN MILITARY MUST BE WITHDRAWN BY THE POINT
AT WHICH SADF IS REDUCED TO 1,500 IN NAMIBIA UNDER SC435).

6. THE PORTUGUESE MFA HAVE TOLD US THAT AT TIMES THE SOUTH
AFRICANS SEEMED COMPLACENT ABOUT MOZAMBIQUE-THE MAJOR PROBLEMS
WERE SOLVED. BUT PIK ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT ANGOLA ALTHOUGH
POTENTIALLY VERY RICH, WAS LESS IMPORTANT TO SOUTH AFRICA THAN
MOZAMBIQUE. AFTER SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM NAMIBIA THERE
WOULD BE NO COMMON BORDER WITH ANGOLA. HE DESCRIBED THE PRESENT
EUROPEAN JOURNEY AS INTERESTING, BUT SOUTH AFRICA WAS WORKING OUT
ITS OWN SOLUTIONS AND "WE DON'T NEED EUROPE ANY MORE".

7. HOWEVER OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION HERE
HAVE SHOWN CLEARLY HOW IMPORTANT P W BOTH A'S JOURNEY IS SEEN TO
BE IN TERMS OF BREAKING OUT OF ISOLATION. A JUNIOR MEMBER OF
P W BOTH A'S DELEGATION ALSO SAID TO ME "THIS JOURNEY RESULTS
FROM KOOMATIPOORT, PERHAPS WE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE ANOTHER IF
WE CAN PULL SOMETHING OFF WITH THE ANGOLANS".

8. PORTUGUESE PRESS COVERAGE HAS BEEN RESERVED. THERE WERE NO
DEMONSTRATIONS. SOARES HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO MAKE A
RETURN VISIT.

BYATT

NNNN

SENT AT 011026Z LW

74 58
MR. THATCHER

We have been warned that Labour Members of Parliament may raise, in the context of the South African Prime Minister's visit, the question of violations by British firms of the EEC Code of Conduct in South Africa. There is just the chance that Quinton Hazell will be mentioned in this context.

We can deal easily enough with the general question. And we do not have to answer officially for Quinton Hazell. But if you have any information which you would like to pass on to us about the wages paid by Quinton Hazell, this might be useful (I remember that you told me that before you went on your last visit to South Africa you had asked for some facts on this).

A. J. COLES

1 June 1984



cc 720 JP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 24 May about the forthcoming visit by the South African Prime Minister and South Africa's relations with Botswana.

The Prime Minister is watching developments in Southern Africa with close attention. We have long taken the view that relations between countries in the region must be based on non-violence, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for borders and acknowledgement of the responsibilities of statehood. We have encouraged dialogue and negotiation, and made clear that discussions between South Africa's neighbours and South Africa need involve no sacrifice of principle. But in encouraging dialogue, we are naturally concerned that any agreements arrived at between South Africa and neighbouring countries should be freely entered into and bring benefits to both parties. We have made this clear on many occasions, while underlining that the decision as to whether or not to enter into such agreements must be a matter for the countries concerned.

You ask if the Prime Minister will take the opportunity of her meeting with Mr. Botha to make certain points about South Africa's relations with Botswana. The general subject of South Africa's relations with its neighbours is, of course, likely to come up during the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Botha. You will understand that I cannot make any commitment about a specific issue, but I can assure you that the Prime Minister is fully conscious of the close relationship which the United Kingdom enjoys with Botswana and that your points have been carefully noted.

A. J. COLES

Miss E. J. Emery, CMG.



cc Sir PC
BI

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 May 1984

Dear John,

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: 2 June

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with the South African Prime Minister on 2 June. A copy of the briefing has been sent to the Foreign Secretary in Washington. He has not been able to comment on it yet, although he will be able to do so at the briefing meeting which the Prime Minister is holding at 9.45am on 1 June.

The briefing covers all the major topics which Mr Botha is likely to raise with the Prime Minister, as well as the subjects on which the Prime Minister will wish to speak to him. We expect the South African side to focus purely on bilateral issues and the regional problems of Southern Africa, and do not expect them to wish to discuss other international issues such as the Middle East, or the Iran/Iraq war. We have, however, included a brief on current Soviet policy, particularly Soviet policy on Africa, since there is a serious difference of perceptions between us and the South Africans on this subject.

As you will know from the press, Mr Botha has now started his European tour with a visit to Portugal. This is the only official visit he is paying to a European capital. The others are working visits. His itinerary includes, as far as we know, Berne, UK, Bonn, Brussels, Rome, Vienna and possibly Madrid. He is also paying a private visit to France where he will lay a memorial stone on 7 June to South African forces who died in the first world war. Mr Botha is also holding a meeting with prominent European businessmen, almost certainly in Rome. Some major British companies have been approached and a few including BP, are expected to be represented; others are reluctant to attend such a meeting with their competitors outside this country.

Arrangements for Mr Botha's visit to the UK are now almost complete. His party will arrive at about 11am at Heathrow, where they will be met by a representative of Sir Geoffrey Howe (Sir Derek Dodson) and Sir John Leahy. The seven South Africans who are invited to the lunch will then travel by helicopter to Chequers, accompanied by Sir John Leahy. A Special Branch officer and a South African security officer (Mr J Malan) will also travel with them. (The possibility of a back-up helicopter

/in addition

CONFIDENTIAL



in addition is being urgently explored.) The other South Africans going to Chequers (I enclose a list of the complete South African party) will travel by road, but in time to be on hand for the main talks beginning after the private meeting which the Prime Minister has agreed to have with Mr Botha first. The South Africans will return from Chequers using the same methods of transport. Mr Botha plans to make a press statement at Heathrow before his departure, which will be at some time between 4.30 and 5pm. It has been agreed separately that Mr Rifkind will brief the press soon after the meeting finishes, probably at RAF Halton.

You will note that there are now six additional South Africans travelling to Chequers, including Mr Malan.

I am copying this letter, with a set of the briefs, to Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*For ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

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Mr van Dalsen
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VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 1

STEERING BRIEF

Agenda

1. There has been no prior consultation about a formal agenda but both sides are agreed on the likely range of subjects. The preliminary tête à tête might usefully serve to break the ice and enable the Prime Minister to indicate the importance we attach to Mr Botha's visit and the creation of better understanding between the two Governments. It would also be the occasion to dispose of the two sensitive and related issues of the ANC office in London and improper activities by South African intelligence officers (Brief No 3). The South Africans are already aware of our preference to handle the ANC question in this way: Mr Botha can be expected to raise it himself.
2. The main session might begin with an exchange on UK/South Africa relations (Brief Nos 2 and 3). This could lead on to a full discussion of regional issues, particularly South Africa's relations with her neighbours post-Nkomati (Brief No 6), Zimbabwe (Brief no 6) and Namibia/Angola (Brief No 7). Our views, which differ markedly from those of the South Africans, on Soviet policy in Southern Africa (Brief No 9)



could be usefully worked in here too.

3. At a suitable stage when the atmosphere is relaxed we should put on record our views of South Africa's racial policies (Brief No 8) and our wish to see further reform, particularly involving the blacks. We have no specific bilateral human rights issues to raise but, rather than passing a general censure on human rights abuses, the Prime Minister might express concern about forced removals and detentions, including that of Mandela (Brief No 8). Apart from the ANC the South Africans are likely to raise sport (Brief No 4), the UN Arms Embargo (including perhaps a request for the UK to supply maritime surveillance aircraft (Brief No 3)) and, possibly, the current arms case involving 4 South Africans (Brief No 3).

4. A joint press statement would be inappropriate but it would be useful to agree on what should be said to the Press immediately after the meeting, particularly if Mr Botha gives a press briefing at Heathrow before he leaves.

UK Objectives

1. It is a basic assumption that our policy towards South Africa should be so balanced as to safeguard our trade and other links there at the same time as our political and commercial interests elsewhere in Africa and the third world generally.

2. Against this background our specific objectives during this visit are to:-

a) assure the South Africans that it remains our policy to have as fruitful a relationship as the constraints resulting from South African policies will permit;

b) persuade the South Africans that while we understand their racial policies and are ready to acknowledge positive developments, only demonstrable progress in meeting the aspirations of the black population can form the basis for a genuinely warmer relationship between South Africa and the West and assure South Africa's own stability in the long term;

c) convince the South Africans that only an internationally agreed settlement of the Namibia problem will be durable and that an early conclusion of it will reduce rather than enhance Soviet influence in the Region;



d) encourage the South Africans to go on improving their relations with their neighbours including Zimbabwe; and

e) register the concern felt here about human rights abuses in South Africa, particularly forced removals.



South African Objectives

These are likely to be:

1. To emphasise the strategic importance of South Africa to the West.
2. To convince us that South Africa is a staunch bastion against terrorism and communism and that therefore the West should be more supportive.
3. To seek to persuade us that in determining our policy towards South Africa we should pay less attention to the views of African and Commonwealth countries.
4. To persuade us that South Africa needs time and that the policy of separate development offers a solution combining white control with acceptable power-sharing for the other races.


Mr Botha

1. Mr Botha has had no career other than politics. He has a reputation as a ruthless and determined leader who is willing to take political risks (as when splitting the Afrikaner community over the new constitution) to achieve his objectives. He is often domineering towards colleagues and opponents alike and has a formidable temper. Having experienced the tension of the Second World War and the turbulent post-war conflict between the National Party and the United Party, Mr Botha has, in common with most Afrikaners of his generation, an emotional and ambivalent attitude towards Britain. Although keenly interested in defence strategy he has little experience of global issues and tends to see Africa in isolation. He believes Europe has lost interest in South Africa and he has several times expressed his anger and disappointment to non-governmental British visitors at what he considers the lack of understanding in London of his government's policies. He is acutely sensitive to criticism from Britain, however mild, and appears to take little account of the political constraints which must necessarily govern our attitude to his country.

2. Mr Botha has the typical Afrikaner sense of justice and honour. He is a Cape politician and his determination to restore political rights to the (Cape) Coloureds stems in part from an uneasy conscience over the shabby way in which

they were deprived of them. On the other hand he has given no hint of any blue-print for absorbing the blacks into the political mainstream and is probably mainly concerned that when he retires in a few years it should not be said of him that he started South Africa down the slippery slope to black domination. Meanwhile he speaks from a position of unassailable domestic political strength.

3. Mr Botha's background suggests that he will be much more at home on South African internal and external affairs than on wider international issues. His approach is forthright and he will expect the Prime Minister to be similarly direct and frank. The way he reacts will depend largely on whether he thinks Mrs Thatcher is basically sympathetic or out to criticise. He is likely to react strongly to any perceived preaching or over-simplification of the complex problems of South Africa. He has accused British Ministers of both these 'heresies' and is said to believe that the Prime Minister's personal attitude towards South Africa has hardened since the controversy over South African arms supplies to Argentina during the Falklands War. If all this is right, Mr Botha is likely to respond well to assurances of the importance we attach to his visit and of our wish to clear the air. He will welcome a thorough exchange on all issues in which we have common, though not necessarily the same, interests. For our part we want to try to get him to understand better than he does the constraints that must necessarily continue to affect our bilateral relations.



VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 1

STEERING BRIEF

BACKGROUND

1. Britain has substantial material, and some strategic, interests in South Africa. Our policy towards South Africa is designed to protect these interests without putting at risk our major interests elsewhere. It aims at the promotion of stability in order to maintain broader Western interests and influence in the region generally against Soviet efforts to damage these.



The key material and strategic factors in this equation are:

a) Trade. In 1983 South Africa was the UK's 13th largest export market. Statistics are as follows:

Britain's Trade with Africa South of the Sahara

	UK Exports		UK Imports	
	£m	£m	£m	£m
	1982	1983	1982	1983
1. <u>Black Africa</u>				
Nigeria	1,225	<u>798</u>	357	388
Others	<u>893</u>	<u>817</u>	<u>806</u>	<u>1,029</u>
TOTAL	2,118	1,615	1,163	1,417
2. <u>South Africa</u>	<u>1,193</u>	<u>1,109</u>	746	765
ALL	<u>3,311</u>	<u>2,724</u>	1,909	2,182

SA as % of sub-Saharan Africa

36% 40%

b) British investment. South Africa is a major area for British investment. The book value at the end of 1981 of direct investment (including oil, banks and insurance companies) was:

	£m
Black Africa	2,317.2 —
[of which Nigeria	653.8] —
South Africa	<u>2,826.0</u> —



c) Strategic minerals. We depend on imports from South Africa for 95% of our chemical chrome, 48% of ferro-chrome, 48% of manganese, and 48% of vanadium. The use of South African ports is essential for the export from Southern Africa of these and other strategic minerals. Remaining resources of chrome, manganese and vanadium lie almost entirely within the Soviet Union, although substantial stocks are held in the West (stockholders are mainly the major industrial users). In 1982 HMG decided to establish stockpiles equal to 6 months supplies to reduce our vulnerability to interruption in supply. Other Western countries also maintain stockpiles; US holds 3 years stocks, France 2 months and Japan 2 months. There has also been progress in substitution.

d) Strategic importance of the Cape route. In 1981 over 90% of Western oil supplies from the Gulf passed round the Cape of Good Hope. Although quantities have changed, the proportion is roughly the same today. It is clearly important to maintain the capability of sea traffic to move freely between the Gulf and the Indian Ocean on the one hand and Western Europe and North America on the other. Although the Soviet Union maintains no significant naval forces in the region, it is possible that in a time of prolonged war it might deploy naval forces to the South Atlantic, concentrating them at focal points, such as the Cape, where shipping lanes converge. But the South Atlantic would not be the obvious choice should the Soviet Union decide to attack



oil tankers from the Gulf. Any Soviet effort to do this would be more likely to take place in the Indian Ocean, which is nearer to existing Soviet bases than the South Atlantic and where sea lanes can also be congested either side of the Straits of Hormuz. The Soviet Union has not increased its access to ports or facilities in the South Atlantic in recent years, and though there are no Western bases there (Britain terminated the Simonstown Agreement in 1975) in time of widespread hostilities including the Soviet Union, naval facilities in South Africa would probably be made available to Western countries.

3. Stability. British and Western interests in Southern Africa require stability. In South Africa itself violent revolution cannot be good for us; peaceful evolution is. Instability in the region has already provided opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence. This happened, for example, during the turbulence surrounding Angola's and Mozambique's attainment of independence and later when ZAPU needed help during the Rhodesian war, Zambia also afforded an opening in this context. Today the Russians are able to exert influence on the ANC and SWAPO. South Africa's racial policies, its continued occupation of Namibia, and up to recently its uncompromising behaviour towards neighbouring countries have been a greater cause of tension and instability in the region than anything else. They are the reason why nationalist movements have taken up arms to bring about change in Namibia and South Africa itself and why South

Africa has in turn supported armed dissidents in Mozambique,
Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

4. South African policies are also an immediate source of international embarrassment to Western states, especially to Britain (because of the extent of our interests in Africa and our membership of the Commonwealth). They regularly lead to calls for sanctions. We have been able to fend these off, but the price we have had to pay is continued application of the arms embargo and the Gleneagles agreement on sport.

Striking the Balance

5. Against this background, we have sought a low profile, low-risk governmental relationship with South Africa. The main components of our policy have been:

a) a clear public condemnation of apartheid, accompanied by advocacy of the need for peaceful, evolutionary change in South Africa;

b) active involvement in the search for a peaceful and internationally acceptable Namibia settlement;

c) a low key role in helping to stabilise South Africa's relations with its neighbours;

d) fulfilment of our international obligations (arms embargo, Gleneagles); and

e) opposition to pressure for further sanctions against South Africa which would be inconsistent with our publicly avowed belief in contact and dialogue as the best means to promote change; appropriate votes in eg the UN, and efforts to urge more realistic approach to South Africa amongst Commonwealth countries.

6. The South Africans believed that the advent of a Conservative administration in Britain in 1979 would bring a more positive approach and better understanding of South Africa's problems. They make no secret of their disappointment that this has not been so. They were particularly disappointed because of our failure, as they see it, to deliver the right sort of settlement in Zimbabwe. They have contrasted our general approach unfavourably with that of the Reagan administration (during the Carter administration they took a very different view). Their disappointment is greater because they think we ought to know better. Underneath, there is a fundamental difference of perceptions. South Africa sees itself as a Western country fighting for the common cause against Communism in Southern Africa. It regards Western European countries, especially Britain, as hypocritical since they depend on South Africa to secure the strategic Cape region, and exploit its strategic minerals, but weakly bow to third world pressure, organised by communists, to attack South Africa's policies. The South Africans resent it that we are willing to trade with South Africa to our clear advantage but deny her political



respectability. For our part, we believe South Africa's policies are based on a serious misconception of Soviet priorities and policies and that, as described above, South Africa's internal policies, its continued occupation of Namibia, and the aggressive tactics it has so often used against its neighbours are sources of instability providing opportunities for Communist expansion and likely to produce the very results the South Africans wish to prevent.

7. The fundamental inhibitions that militate against a closer relationship between the two Governments derive from South Africa itself. In conducting our relations our major priority is to remove the obstacles by trying to influence South African policies in the right direction. To this end we have recently sought to put our relations on a more workmanlike footing and to increase the opportunities for discussion with the South African leadership. The South African Foreign Minister met the Secretary of State in London in December 1983, Mr Rifkind visited South Africa in November 1983 and official level talks were held on Soviet policy in September 1983. Mr Botha's current visit is the most important step in this process.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 2

BILATERAL RELATIONS: GENERAL

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Recall our one previous meeting during my 1973 visit to Cape Town. Welcome this meeting. Important that we should discuss Southern African issues together and achieve a better understanding of each other's viewpoints.

2. Grateful for your assistance in getting our envoy (Sir J Leahy) to UNITA base recently.

3. Value our relations with SA. Wish to have fruitful and workmanlike relationship. Believe SA can play major positive role in Southern Africa, to advantage of all. Played this on Zimbabwe. Welcome recent actions (withdrawal from Angola, Nkomati).

4. Conscious of strains in our relations. Wish to reduce these. Some simply due to misunderstanding and can, I hope, be dispelled. Others reflect real differences which we shall have to learn to live with and to manage as best we can. Opportunity now to speak frankly, clear air.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 3

UK/SOUTH AFRICA BILATERAL RELATIONS: SPECIFIC ISSUES

POINTS TO MAKE

ANC in London

1. Fully appreciate your feelings about ANC; do not condone their violence or have dealings with them. We in Britain have suffered much from terrorism and have been staunch in combatting it. No question of allowing London to become a base for international terrorism (see action on Libyans). Keep foreign groups under scrutiny. Rigorously exclude those with known personal involvement in terrorism. Fully uphold international obligations. Will not tolerate abuse of our laws from any quarter.

2. At same time we cannot abandon our long tradition of admitting political exiles. Free to engage in political activities provided they do not break the law. No legislation to ban foreign political groups as such.

South African démarche (if raised)

3. Exhaustively studied your representations on ANC;



disclosed no grounds for legal action. Ready to look at any fresh evidence of illegal activity, and to take appropriate action.

Joe Slovo (if raised)

4. Know Slovo is of special concern to you. Apply our criteria to him as to others.

ANC/IRA (if pressed)

5. Opposed to terrorism by either. But there is a significant difference: IRA could if they wished work through the ballot box like the rest of the population. As it is, they use violence to try to obtain what they know they cannot achieve through legitimate political activity. Naturally would expect friendly Governments to act, in the context of their own laws, against known IRA terrorists in their countries. But we have not called on US Government to close down IRA/NORAIID offices there.

Failure to return British terrorists to South Africa 1981/2

(if raised)

6. We are not in a position to return fugitives to a foreign state in the absence of extradition arrangements. Moreover it is not at all clear that people in question committed any



offence under British law.

South African Intelligence Activities

7. Continuing concern is expressed both in parliament and press about intelligence activities by South Africa in Britain. We cannot permit improper or otherwise unacceptable activities by members of foreign missions. Have recently demonstrated in the Libyan case our readiness to take exemplary action against offending missions.

8. It is our responsibility to ensure that ANC and others opposed to South Africa do not break the law. Provided they behave it is equally our responsibility to give them the protection of the law.

9. In January 1983 made representations about Stefanus Botha, first Secretary Embassy. His activities remain a cause of concern. [If asked: we have evidence of involvement by him and other intelligence officers in the break-in at AAM offices in May 1983]

10. Wish to remove this cause of friction from our relations. Hope no further cause to complain.

Arms Embargo Violations: UK Court Case (if raised)

11. Have no wish to make issue of this; not of our making.



Matter is sub judice. Have to enforce our laws impartially.
Hope new bail conditions will lessen public concern in South
Africa.

UK Policy on Arms Embargo (If raised)

12. No prospect of change; UK must honour its international
obligations.

If pressed: the underlying concerns which occasioned the
embargo remain.

'Dual Purpose' and Humanitarian equipment

13. Willing, in principle, to permit such exports when we
are satisfied equipment is for civil use. (Agreed to Plessey
and Marconi air traffic control radar contracts; also radar
for Super Frelon air/sea rescue helicopters). Decisions to
supply dual purpose equipment have been widely criticised,
but we have taken you at your word on civil applications.

Replacement for Shackleton Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft

14. Individual export licence applications considered on
their merits, but likelihood is replacement would be caught
by arms embargo regulations.

If pressed: will study any application carefully but would



not wish to raise false hopes. A government-to-government undertaking unlikely to be applicable in this case.

Military Collaboration (if raised)

15. Delicate matter for us. Military relations necessarily constrained. Nonetheless value military intelligence and attaché relationship. Want it to continue on reasonable working basis.

Media Coverage (Defensive)

16. Always regret lack of impartiality, objectivity. Indeed fairly often suffer from this ourselves. But Government cannot direct IBA and BBC what to broadcast or not broadcast. Realise that people outside this country do not always believe that and that practice elsewhere may be different, but please take it from me that it is so. I try to be philosophical about it myself, however difficult it may be sometimes.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 3

UK/SOUTH AFRICA BILATERAL RELATIONS: SPECIFIC ISSUES

BACKGROUND

1. The management of our relationship with South Africa is inherently difficult. Our efforts to put relations on a more workmanlike basis have been marred by a series of bilateral issues (dealt with below). Ministers' statements on policy, (including the Prime Minister's correspondence with Ian Lloyd MP, and the Secretary of State's speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society in November 1983) have also irritated the South Africans.

African National Congress: London (not for use)

2. Neutralisation of ANC key target of South African foreign policy. ANC office in London said by South African Government to be nerve centre of terrorist activities. Our tolerance of this has recently been the object of a fierce campaign in South African press and parliament. Belief that our position on terrorism incompatible with our toleration of ANC presence.

3. The ANC was banned in South Africa in 1960; it has



subsequently mounted limited guerilla campaign, concentrating on high profile targets to make a political impact domestically and internationally. With one principal exception - a car bomb in Pretoria in 1983 possibly a mistake or unauthorized - it has avoided indiscriminate terrorism. The ANC is heavily but not solely dependent on communist aid.

4. In September 1983 the South African government sought the closure of the London ANC office and the exclusion of ANC officers here, who the South Africans alleged were involved with terrorist operations. The South Africans provided material to justify this claim. Our considered response underlined our strong stand on terrorism, pointed out that our law did not provide for the proscription of organisations (other than the IRA, PIRA etc) and noted that the evidence submitted gave no grounds for action against individual ANC members.

5. A thorough examination of all available information has revealed no evidence to support allegations of unlawful activity by ANC members here, including the linking of the London ANC office with active terrorism. Its main function remains what it has always been; publicity and propaganda. Its role may be enhanced following the restriction of ANC activity in Mozambique but we have seen no evidence of this so far. The question remains, therefore, why the South Africans, who have long tolerated the ANC presence here and



have been content to keep a weather eye on it, should now find it so intolerable. Perhaps Mr Botha will explain this.

6. Existing legislation provides no powers to act against any organisation such as the ANC, and there are clear limitations on the legal powers against individuals planning acts of violence abroad. Out of general concern (and before Libyan People's Bureau incident) FCO has approached the Home Office about the possibility of introducing tighter control over the activities of exile movements here.

Joe Slovo

7. Top of the South African hit list. Operating (at any rate up until the Nkomati Accord) usually from Maputo/Slovo (who is a White European of Lithuanian origin) is reputed to have been the mastermind behind ANC sabotage and to be a KGB officer. Slovo has indefinite leave to remain in Britain, and holds a current Home Office travel document (though he is seldom here). FCO has asked the Home Office to review these facilities critically.

Aug. 87

UK Nationals allegedly implicated in ANC attack 1981

8. This case was mentioned by the South African Minister of Law and Order in Parliament in May 1984 when he suggested (we believe, erroneously) that it pointed to proof that attacks on South Africa are planned in London. In 1982 the South



African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) alleged that three British nationals had provided a house and transport in South Africa for three ANC guerillas who had attacked a South African military camp. The British nationals left South Africa before they could be detained. The PUS-equivalent in the DFA told our Ambassador that he assumed in the absence of an extradition treaty, their extradition was out of the question. We later confirmed that there were no provisions under which they could be sent back to South Africa; we also said that we could not give information about their whereabouts. There were no further approaches. The South Africans have in the past been annoyed at our refusal to consider having an extradition treaty with them, but given the unpopularity in this country of the South African regime, the political disadvantages have always seemed to outweigh the advantages.

South African Intelligence activities

9. Directed primarily against the ANC and SWAPO, and a constant source of political embarrassment. We have repeatedly made clear in public and to the South Africans that we will not tolerate improper activities by their Embassy here. In the past 18 months alone we have made 4 representations, two in 1983 concerning Warrant Officer Klue, a member of the technical staff of the Embassy, found to be the instigator of criminal acts (a break-in) against ANC/SWAPO offices here and withdrawn by the South Africans



following our approaches; and two in January 1983, one about the probable involvement of the Embassy in arms embargo violations, the other about intelligence activities by a First Secretary at the Embassy, Mr Stefanus Botha.

10. The South Africans regard our firm approach as inconsistent with our general approach on terrorism. They also feel that we should give them credit for the fact their activities are not directed against us. Evidence that has recently become available to us implicates a number of South African officials (of whom only one, Botha, is still here) in a break-in in May 1983 at the Anti-Apartheid Movement's headquarters. We cannot feel confident that they had taken our earlier warnings to heart. FCO and Home Office Ministers are, therefore, agreed that a general warning should be repeated during Mr P W Botha's visit.

Arms Embargo Violations

11. The South Africans are acutely embarrassed by this case; and at the same time angry at our strict observation of the UN Arms Embargo. On 29 March, 4 South Africans were arrested in London and subsequently charged, with 4 UK nationals, under our Arms Embargo legislation for the illegal export of military components and ordnance. The South Africans are believed to be employees (directly or indirectly) of the South African publicly owned armaments manufacturer ARMSCOR. There is no doubt they they were engaged on business



sanctioned by the South African Government, although the quantities of materiel that have come to light so far as having been involved are not great. The South African Ambassador was recalled for consultations about the arrests; and the South Africans have on three occasions sought our intervention in the case. First for the release on bail of the South Africans accused (the Ambassador was advised to pursue the matter through defence Counsel who subsequently succeeded in securing the Court's agreement to this). Secondly, and explicitly linking the resolution of this affair with Mr Botha's visit, they asked that the case be resolved by executive action (compounding proceedings) outside the courts. Thirdly, they looked to us to help arrange for the four defendants to be permitted to go back to South Africa pending trial. On appeal a judge has now agreed to this, stiffening the bail terms on the basis of a South African undertaking that the four men would return for the hearing. This is likely to be in the autumn. Ministers considered it would be wrong to influence the handling of the case by Customs and Excise, who were most reluctant to compound proceedings; since the case involved three companies which had already had previous offences dealt with by compounding.

UK Policy on Arms Embargo

12. From 1963 the UK operated a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa, the main purpose of which was to



prevent the supply of weapons which could be used for internal repression. In 1977, following widespread unrest in South Africa and the death at police hands of the Black activist Steve Biko, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, approved Resolution 418 prohibiting the supply to South Africa of arms and related materiel of all types; enforcement orders were introduced here.

13. In the face of the embargo, the South Africans have achieved a substantial measure of self-sufficiency in arms but still lack the capacity to make sophisticated aircraft, some naval vessels, specialised radar, computer and other equipment.

Dual Purpose and humanitarian equipment

14. We enforce the Arms Embargo strictly (and believe our major partners, in general, do likewise) but have been willing to sell to South Africa equipment with a dual civil/military purpose where we believe the equipment involved is not primarily for military use. Particular controversy has surrounded the sale of Plessey AR3-D mobile radar equipment for the South African airforce (contract originally placed in 1976; sets still being delivered; South Africans accepted diversion of two to meet an urgent Falklands requirement). The sale of static air traffic control Marconi radar equipment (contract 1981/2, deliveries



continue) has also been criticised, in both cases, as 'military' equipment. In March 1984, we agreed to the supply of Decca Doppler radar equipment for Super Frelon helicopters operated by the SADF on the basis of a confidential written assurance from the South Africans that the equipment would be used in helicopters used exclusively for air/sea rescue.

Replacements for Shackletons

15. The South Africans are this year withdrawing their aged Shackleton maritime surveillance aircraft. They are lobbying for the right to purchase replacement aircraft in the West making the most of the loss to the West of intelligence about Soviet shipping, if new aircraft are not made available. In fact the South Africans have passed little information to us of value and the loss would be minimal. The Americans have so far refused to supply Orions. There have been indications the South Africans might wish to purchase the BAe HS 748 Coastguarder aircraft. This is a military aircraft and its supply would be widely interpreted as a breach of the arms embargo. In response to public enquiries we have made clear that while any application would be dealt with on its merits the arms embargo would probably rule out supply.

Military Collaboration

16. Since the termination of the Simonstown Agreement in



1975 our bilateral military relations with South Africa have been confined essentially to the exchange of military attachés. SADF personnel, other than attachés are not allowed to come here in their official capacity. A discreet exchange of non-sensitive intelligence continues. In December 1982 the South Africans called into question the value of our military liaison. We reaffirmed our support for a military attaché relationship, whilst noting the constraint against wider military links. As a gesture, we agreed that requests previously blocked for three visits by South African attachés to certain military establishments here would be considered sympathetically. They have now taken place. We will continue to look at individual requests on their merits. Our approach is now governed by Ministerially approved confidential guidelines as well as by our public policy of no military collaboration.

South African Ambassador's Complaints Over Television Programmes

17. British media coverage of South Africa is a long running sore in Anglo-South African relations. Most recently, on 14 May, the South African Ambassador, Mr Steyn, complained formally (but seemingly not on instructions) about what he described as a 'campaign' by the BBC and ITV against South Africa. Mr Steyn mentioned 10 programmes screened in the past 4 months on both BBC/ITV which, he said, were prejudiced against South Africa. These were eroding good



Anglo-South African relations and must have serious consequences for cooperation between us. Ambassador Steyn said the Government had a responsibility to ensure that legislation laying down standards to be followed by TV companies is adhered to. Having consulted FCO Ministers officials have now told Mr Steyn:

- a) broadcasting authorities have responsibility for everything they broadcast;
- b) Ministers traditionally do not comment on or intervene in the broadcasting authorities' decisions;
- c) his complaints have been passed to the Home Office and the broadcasting authorities.



VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 4

SPORTING CONTACTS

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Understand your resentment at Gleneagles and your wish to be accepted back into international sport, but believe that differences over sport should not be allowed to loom too large in our relationship and predominate over more important things.

2. The so-called Gleneagles agreement is a commitment which as a government we have inherited and which reflects deep feelings in the Commonwealth about South Africa.

3. As a politician you will understand how difficult it is to go back on commitments and the inheritance of the past. Frankly the political cost of unilateral withdrawal from our Gleneagles commitment would outweigh any political advantages for us. It would provoke a major row in the Commonwealth and might end up by doing more damage to UK/South Africa relations than the status quo. As the MCC vote showed, decisions on sporting contacts rest with the sportsmen



themselves who naturally take full account of their own wider interests. So we must as a government.

4. Gleneagles can only be changed by the consent of the Commonwealth. See little hope of agreement on this until we can point critically to general movement towards civil and political rights for blacks in addition to desegregation of particular sports. Progress depends on you. Meanwhile we will continue to oppose moves to tighten the Gleneagles agreement and, as at New Delhi, will stand up in defence of our belief in contact and dialogue, even at some cost to our own popularity and the dictates of expediency.



VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 4

SPORTING CONTACTS

BACKGROUND

1. South Africa's continued isolation from international sport infuriates most white South Africans. South Africa has made a major effort to entice foreign sportsmen to South Africa (the present RFU tour, the West Indies touring Cricket XI, the attempt to get the MCC to tour). It has also worked hard to demonstrate that fundamental changes in sport have been made, removing discrimination and increasing the opportunity for non-whites. We monitor progress through our Embassy in South Africa. Some sports have gone further than others. In general the most progress has been made at senior representative, ie international and provincial, level. At school and club level segregation remains the rule and discrimination continues in sporting opportunity and in the allocation of resources.

2. The Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport ('Gleneagles Agreement') was agreed in 1977 and Commonwealth support for it has been reaffirmed in successive Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings, most recently in New Delhi in November 1983. Government have repeatedly expressed their



support for it.

3. The interpretation of the agreement by Commonwealth countries generally has hardened since 1977, so that today it has come to mean that irrespective of the progress made in individual sports 'normal sport is not possible in an abnormal society'. The chances of changing the agreement at last in a more positive sense, are therefore remote and our policy is one of damage limitation: showing that we abide by the obligation to discourage and dissuade but cannot force our sportsmen to accept our advice. Like the UN arms embargo the Gleneagles agreement has proved to be a relatively low-cost (to us) measure which makes it that much easier for us to resist calls for more damaging economic sanctions. Any attempt to tamper with the Gleneagles agreement in present circumstances would probably rebound on us.

RFU Tour

4. The English Rugby Football Union travelled to South Africa on 15 May and played their first match on 19 May. Their first test (international) is on 2 June in Port Elizabeth.

Zola Budd

5. Miss Budd's father is a British citizen with the right to live and work in the country. Zola Budd came here as a minor



and with her parents' permission applied to the Home Secretary for registration as a British citizen. She is now taking part in pre-Olympic trials. The Home Secretary dealt with her application quickly so as to enable her to participate in those trials. The Government played no role in encouraging Zola Budd to come to Britain, even though her great talent was widely acknowledged. Sir David English and the Daily Mail did, however, play a crucial role in getting her to come here rather than go to eg the USA, and have since been sponsoring her. The South Africans tend to see the whole business as a cynical action on our part which confirms their belief in the British propensity for hypocrisy.

Olympic Games

6. South Africa was expelled from the International Olympic Committee in 1970 because of apartheid.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 5

TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Trade an important element in our relationship. We value it. Steadfastly oppose political constraints on normal civil trade.

2. We are determined to remain a major supplier to South Africa. Believe British companies are now more competitive than in the past. Information technology, hospital equipment, low-cost housing, capital goods and projects field (eg GEC's hope to supply new generation of locomotives) are examples of fields in which we hope to do well.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 5

TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

BACKGROUND

Trade Policy

1. Civil trade with all countries determined only by commercial considerations and not by their political systems. Constrained in the case of South Africa by the UN Security Council's mandatory arms embargo, as a result of which we steer well clear of helping South Africa's nuclear capability, whether civil or military.
2. We adopt low-profile, low risk approach: to protect our trading assets without unnecessarily exposing them to criticism and attack elsewhere, eg in Nigeria.

Investment in South Africa

3. Book value of direct investment in South Africa in 1981 estimated at £2,826 million, including oil, banking and insurance. Total current market value perhaps in excess of £12,000 million, between 7% and 10% of Britain's total overseas investments, and more than one-third of total



foreign investments in South Africa. Current rate of investment (largely re-investment from retained profits) each year about 7% of our total overseas investment. A few British companies have sold out in recent years; mainly for commercial rather than political reasons. Over 90% of British companies comply with the EC's voluntary Code of Conduct for Companies with Interests in South Africa, which seeks to improve the conditions of black African workers. Performance of British companies good by comparison with those from other EC countries. No indication that South Africa seriously resents what could be regarded as interference in internal affairs.

Trade Barriers

4. Britain operates one of the most open of world markets, but South African exports of wine and citrus fruits declined sharply after our accession to EC. Further problems likely over South African sherry after Spanish accession. South Africa recognises the inevitability of such protection, but resents high tariff barriers in EC. We usually advocate favourable treatment for South Africa in EC, and try to be helpful where we can, eg on quotas for cotton textiles.

Opposition in the UK to trade with South Africa

5. Several local Councils (eg GLC, Sheffield, Newcastle),



and other pressure groups seek to discourage imports from South Africa and investment in companies with links with South Africa. Little significant effect. Similar policy on trade with South Africa has been followed by successive Governments (though Labour Party currently in favour of trade sanctions).

Publicity and Possible Visit by Trade Minister

6. Usual BOTB services available for trade with South Africa, but publicity avoided to minimise criticism. Have accordingly avoided visits to South Africa by Trade Ministers. However, Lord Jellicoe (Chairman, BOTB) visited South Africa (as well as Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland) during February/March 1984.

Trade Statistics

	<u>£ Million</u>		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
UK Exports	1220	1193	1109
UK Imports	649	746	765
UK share of South African Imports	11.7%	11.9%	Not yet available

South Africa was Britain's 13th largest market in 1983, and the 2nd after European and North American countries. In 1982 Britain was South Africa's third largest supplier, after



Germany and the USA.

Principal British exports: electrical equipment, machinery,
transport equipment, chemical and
related products and manufactured
goods.

Principal British imports: raw materials (metalliferous
ores), fruits and vegetables and
manufactures.

Major projects: In recent years, South Africa's
power generation programme has
been the largest in the world,
and both GEC and Babcock have won
valuable orders. GEC expect to
tender for 50 new railway
locomotives for South Africa,
worth about £25 million, and
success could lead to orders for
1200 locomotives, worth about
£1,000 million, with customers in
other countries too.

Information technology, hospital equipment, low-cost housing
and water distribution are all sectors with significant
potential for development in South Africa and opportunities
for British companies.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 6

SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Welcome recent developments (Lusaka Agreement on South African withdrawal from Angola, Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique). Have long worked for peaceful resolution of the region's problems and have encouraged your neighbours to talk directly to you.
2. Long term stability in the region will be influenced by the progress of change in all countries, notably South Africa itself. It is very much in both our interests. Instability provides opportunities for Soviet involvement.
3. Britain and SA have common interest in rolling back communist influence. We have made our contribution to this through aid to the region, exercise of political influence (for example in Lesotho and Zimbabwe) and development of links with Mozambique and Angola.
4. Understand your concern about the ANC. Have condemned



cross-border violence, from whatever source.

5. Mozambique and Angola in particular present great opportunities for West. Essential that we take them.

Zimbabwe

6. We have stood by Mugabe despite the obvious difficulties. In long-term Western interests to ensure that he and his colleagues remain resistant to Russian influence.

7. Zimbabwe faces serious internal problems (drought, dissidents). Recent regional developments have left Mugabe feeling isolated and vulnerable.

8. Mugabe deeply suspicious of South African intentions. He needs to be given the confidence to take step towards better relationship with SA. Believe he would welcome this provided it can be managed in a low-key way. Dramatic signing ceremonies are not for him.

9. Aware you have been helpful to Zimbabwe (eg over transportation for maize shipments). Now good psychological moment for a follow-up gesture. Cessation of anti-Zimbabwe government propaganda on 'Radio Truth' broadcasts would be seen by Zimbabweans as a clear sign of goodwill.

10. We will go on encouraging Zimbabwe to be responsive

and not to refuse all Ministerial contact, even between technical Ministers, eg of Transport.

Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique

11. Test case. Wide implications. Must be seen by Africans to bring benefits to Mozambique, and not as one-sided agreement in South Africa's advantage.

12. Britain's support for agreement clear. We will contribute where we can to make it work. But the principal role is yours.

13. Know that Mozambique concerned about RENAMO. Any evidence of continued South African support would cut ground from under Machel's feet.

Other Countries

14. We support positive progress in your relations with neighbours. It is not to be expected that all of them will want to commit themselves in the same way as Mozambique. Nkomati pattern may not be appropriate form of agreement in all cases. Concerned that undue pressures should not be put on countries like Botswana and Lesotho.

15. President Masire recently assured me of his wish for correct relations with your government. But undue pressure on Botswana could threaten Masire's position and the stability of an exemplary African democracy.

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 6

SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS

BACKGROUND

General

1. South Africa a regional superpower. Feels isolated and threatened. It believes it faces a communist threat in which the African National Congress (ANC) operating from neighbouring states, is the Soviet Union's chosen instrument to bring down white rule in South Africa. South Africa's regional policy is therefore based on the need to contain/eliminate ANC operations, to push back communist influence, and to assert South African dominance in Southern Africa. A further, sequential objective is to enable white South Africa to manage an appropriate process of reform with the least possible external interference.

2. South African anxiety to protect itself increased sharply with the fall of the Portuguese colonial regimes (Angola 1974, Mozambique 1975). Under Prime Minister Vorster South Africa sought a 'constellation of states' friendly to/dominated by South Africa. Zimbabwe's independence and the advent of Mugabe to power shook South Africa badly. It strengthened the hand of those in the South African establishment - particularly the military - who favoured an



aggressive policy designed to secure South Africa's goals through military and economic pressures rather than through negotiations. 'Destabilisation' characterised South African policy from 1981 to 1983 (economic pressures, overt military raids eg Maseru 1982, Maputo 1983, covert acts of sabotage, covert support for armed dissident groups in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and especially in Mozambique). Met with international condemnation but confirmed South Africa's military as well as economic supremacy in the region. Recently, South Africa has put down the stick for the carrot, albeit from a position of great strength. Negotiations with Angola (Lusaka agreement February 1984 on withdrawal of South African forces from Angola), Mozambique (Nkomati Accord March 1984 - non-aggression pact), dialogue with most other countries in region. Prime South African requirement is formal non-aggression arrangements that will deny ANC facilities in neighbouring countries.

Britain's Attitude

3. We have repeatedly condemned violence from whatever quarter and called for relations between States based on non-violence, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for borders. Intervened several times to urge restraint on South Africa, publicly condemned Maseru and Maputo military raids. Believe South African policies based on a serious misconception of Soviet policy in Southern Africa (see separate brief). South African aggressive



tactics most likely to engender fear and hatred in neighbours' leadership. Moreover, contrary to South Africa's own interests in the longer term by generating instability which creates opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence and by causing lasting damage to South Africa's relations with major Western countries.

4. We have encouraged South Africa to negotiate, urged neighbours to accept that dialogue involves no sacrifice of principle; have ourselves sought better relations with Mozambique and Angola, and tried to induce Mugabe to show more flexibility.

5. South Africans believe their tough stance has paid off, at least in the short term. But it is likely that a number of factors have played a role in bringing about recent agreements: Western (particularly American, Portuguese and British) approaches to Angola and Mozambique; economic disarray in Mozambique following the abject failure of socialist policies; unwillingness or inability of Soviet and other communist countries to provide economic assistance; the pragmatism of African nationalist leaders in spite of marxist influence; and South African concern over future relations with Western countries, especially the United States.

Nkomati Accord

6. On 16 March President Machel and Mr P W Botha signed the Nkomati Accord. Its main point is that neither country will serve as a base for acts of violence against the other, or use the territory of a third state for this purpose. A joint security commission has been set up to supervise implementation. This has met three times to date.

7. The accord represented a difficult decision for Machel. He knew it would not be popular with other African countries, particularly because of the suppression of the ANC to which he had had to agree. But the real test for him lies in the implementation of the accord. Already there are signs that Mozambicans are unhappy over certain features. Large scale operations by the Mozambican resistance movement, RENAMO, in reaction to the accord were predictable, but increase in incidents and severity of RENAMO actions have clearly worried Machel. Although Mozambicans realised that it could take two years to bring RENAMO under control because of arms caches put in place before signature, they had not expected it to carry on more or less as before. They suspect that South Africa continues to give RENAMO support and have taken up specific complaints with South Africans (eg unauthorized flights into Mozambique, guerillas permitted to travel to South Africa, training camps giving assistance to RENAMO). Mozambicans have suggested that RENAMO's arms could fall into



ANC hands and be used against South Africa itself. Machel has now asked (interview with HM Ambassador on 17 May) that we should put pressure on Botha to implement spirit as well as letter of Nkomati.

8. South Africa and Mozambique also developing economic relations. Trilateral agreement (Portugal, South Africa, Mozambique) on Cabora Bassa Hydro Electric Plant signed on 2 May. Provision for joint South African and Mozambican protection of transmission lines against sabotage attacks. Committees set up to discuss economic affairs and tourism.

Zimbabwe

9. Both countries remain deeply suspicious of each other. But the Zimbabweans feel left out of current regional negotiations and are aware of their increased vulnerability to South African pressure in Matabeleland and over drought relief (they are dependent on South Africa for transportation of maize imports). The South Africans may be looking for improvement in relations with Zimbabwe and have apparently reduced their encouragement of subversive activities for the time being. Have also been helpful over maize imports. Mr Pik Botha told SA parliament recently that he wanted to see an improvement in relations ('already normal, realistic, correct') with Zimbabwe. South Africans should feel satisfied that Zimbabwean authorities continue to inhibit ANC

operations from Zimbabwean territory. Also recognise that any probable successor to Mugabe is likely to be more difficult to deal with. May have concluded that now is the time to use carrot rather than stick.

10. A number of Zimbabwean Ministers (though perhaps not Mugabe) may be disposed to review the question of SA/Zimbabwe ministerial contact, at least on technical matters. South Africans attach importance to this as a sign of political commitment to better relations.

Other Countries

11. The Front Line States understand the pressures Mozambique has been under, but are deeply mistrustful of South African intentions and suspicious that Nkomati is a one sided agreement. They fear similar pressures will be exerted to secure further bilateral agreements. One already exists with Swaziland (since 1982); Lesotho and Botswana (President Masire raised this with PM on 14 May) under pressure to sign.

12. Of South Africa's neighbours only Mozambique and Lesotho have in past given ANC regular facilities to mount military operations against South Africa from their territory. Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have all taken a restrictive attitude to ANC presence and have pursued pragmatic, workmanlike, if minimalist, relations with South



Africa. They pose no threat to South Africa other than
through their publicly stated opposition to apartheid.

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 7

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Early settlement in all our interests. Will improve South Africa's relations with the West and reduce opportunities for Russians to exert influence in area, eg in Angola. Further delay will only perpetuate South Africa's isolation, make it difficult for Western countries to help you and offer scope for Soviet mischief-making. You can be sure that the Russians do not want an agreement.

SWAPO Government in Windhoek?

2. I certainly do not want a communist government in Namibia. But if SWAPO form the government they are likely, in practice, to be more pragmatic than might be expected in theory. I have no illusions about Soviet determination to extend their influence in the area whenever they can - and they certainly have links with SWAPO. But a SWAPO Government would be constrained by Namibia's massive dependence on South Africa. SWAPO recognise that and the Nkomati agreement



should encourage them to take a realistic view of what can be achieved by adopting a positive attitude towards their powerful neighbour.

Cubans

3. Americans determined to get deal on Cubans. We share this goal, even if we do not consider it to be a legitimate pre-condition for Namibian independence. How important is Cuban withdrawal to you? Are there any circumstances in which you could contemplate the independence of Namibia without it?

Disengagement

4. We fully support present process. Disengagement a courageous and correct decision. Dos Santos has also taken a risk. His courage in controlling SWAPO has to be acknowledged. But we cannot expect him to maintain permanent curbs on SWAPO. Need to build quickly on disengagement. Difficult time ahead. We will do all we can to help.

UN Plan

5. SCR 435 remains only plan for Namibian independence which guarantees international recognition. In our view it is unlikely that any alternative would get FLS/SWAPO support, let alone more general approval. Any settlement that all the



parties, including SWAPO, could subscribe to would be all right by us provided it brings a durable solution of the conflict.

UNITA

6. We understand the significance of UNITA. But the irony is that the more successful they are the less likely it is that the Angolan government will agree to Cuban withdrawal.

MPLA/UNITA - Chances of reconciliation

7. UNITA posing increasingly serious military and economic threat. Determined to discourage expatriates from working in Angola and thus stem flow of foreign exchange to Government. Continuing determined push to force MPLA to negotiating table.

8. Outright military victory by either side unlikely. Russians unlikely to let MPLA government sink below a certain level and will be counselling Dos Santos against making concessions.

9. Difficult to judge how far UNITA can exert increasing military pressure without pushing MPLA into a corner and making reconciliation more difficult. Moderates in MPLA interested in reconciliation need first to demonstrate returns for policy of accommodation with South Africa. They



will need to demonstrate that you are serious about reaching a regional settlement. This suggests reconciliation more likely to follow than open way, to implementation of the Namibia agreement. Implications for timing of Cuban withdrawal.

10. Unrealistic to propose UNITA/MPLA reconciliation as pre-condition for Namibia settlement. Would provoke international outcry. Simply increase Soviet opportunities and, confirm worst fears of many countries that South Africa is continuing to play for time.



VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 7

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

BACKGROUND

A. BRITISH INTEREST

1 Our objectives are:

(i) to defuse the Namibia problem as a source of tension and Russian meddling in the region;

(ii) to relieve constant pressure on us to take punitive action against South Africa.

Successive British governments have invested much diplomatic effort in achieving these objectives, mainly through our participation in the Contact Group. We have no interest whatsoever in helping to put SWAPO into power. But an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia - even under a SWAPO government - is preferable to having Namibia remain a source of international tension that provides opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence and endangers our interests in South Africa.



2. The South African presence in Namibia is one justification for continued presence in Angola of 20,000-30,000 Cuban troops. An internationally recognised and enduring settlement in Namibia would help to create conditions that would permit Cuban withdrawal. But sooner rather than later the patience of the international community is going to snap. If that happens the chances of achieving a negotiated settlement will rapidly disappear.

The Contact Group

3. Contact Group involvement in the search for a settlement provides a vehicle for influencing attitudes of all the parties, while avoiding too prominent a role for the United Kingdom in a problem which obviously affects our interests but for which we do not have direct responsibility. Although the French have said they will not participate for the present, their officials occasionally join in informal meetings of the Five in capitals. We believe the French would participate fully once again if there were a clear role for the Five.

UN SCR 435

4. The Western Contact Group settlement proposal in 1978 was accepted by SWAPO and the South African Government and endorsed by the UN Security Council in SCR 435. To this date no party has repudiated the resolution, although South Africa



has at various times raised obstacles to delay implementation. It would be difficult, though not impossible, for any new plan to command the confidence of all of the parties and achieve the necessary measure of international approval.

Alternatives to SCR 435?

5. The South Africans do not like SCR 435 since they see it as an instrument to put SWAPO in power. (They also dislike the UN role). They still hanker after alternatives that might avoid this and at the same time attract international acceptability. There is no good reason for us to be doctrinaire about SCR 435 if a realistic alternative emerges. Our interest is in early independence for Namibia in a form that is acceptable to the international community; if some alternative route to a settlement were acceptable to SWAPO and to most of the Front Line States as well as to South Africa and the internal Namibian parties, there would be no good reason for us to oppose it. The South Africans may believe that SWAPO can be induced to accept a share of early power rather than waiting longer against a background of declining military effectiveness for the eventual exercise of power on its own. But so far SWAPO have shown no readiness to compromise on SCR 435 and any alternative cannot be imposed by the South Africans. It still seems unlikely to succeed. We and our Western partners have agreed to go on supporting SCR 435 unless and until the parties themselves



are able to reach agreement on something else. It would certainly be a mistake for the Contact Group to take the lead in canvassing a non-SCR 435 settlement if it means leading the way down a blind alley.

B. SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDE

6. On the face of it Mr P W Botha is personally committed to a Namibia settlement. He said in Parliament on 31 January that South Africa would not carry the economic and military burden of Namibia indefinitely. South Africa's interests must come first, those of Namibia second. He probably feels more confident following referendum success and Nkomati accord that he could cope with prospect of SWAPO in power. But this does not mean that he is committed to any particular timing for going through with a settlement.

7. Economic and military pressures, and public disillusionment with war, may be factors in Mr Botha's calculations, but their importance should not be exaggerated. In any case the government will take care to keep their options open, seeking either SCR 435 settlement along with agreement on Cuban withdrawal, or a settlement outside the UN Plan that would restrict SWAPO's exercise of power but not secure Cuban withdrawal. Foreign Minister Pik Botha proposed in March a round-table conference with SWAPO, Namibian internal parties, Angolan government and UNITA to discuss problems of Namibia/Angola on regional basis. This was



immediately rejected by SWAPO and the Angolans. But could resurface.

C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

8. Progress towards implementation of SCR 435 still depends on agreement on Cuban withdrawal from Angola. US active in seeking this but prospects uncertain. FLS (especially Kaunda) anxious for early progress. South Africans keen to promote internal Namibian parties and possibly a settlement without UN participation.

Disengagement

9. US/Angola/SAG talks in Lusaka on 16 February sealed agreement on SA withdrawal from Southern Angola. Parties described their meeting as "important and constructive step towards peaceful resolution of the problems of the region, including the question of SCR 435". Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) established to monitor SADF disengagement and ensure SWAPO did not take advantage of SA withdrawal to increase infiltration into Namibia. Despite earlier SAG allegations of SWAPO movement (and Angolan accusations of UNITA movement) in disengagement zone, JMC functioning quite well and should reach Namibian border by end of May. SAG/Angola have cooperated well. SADF and Angolan soldiers have fought together in JMC against renegade SWAPO. But continued SWAPO cooperation cannot be taken for granted. US



and SAG concerned that JMC mechanism remain in being after disengagement complete; Angolan attitude uncertain.

Attitudes of Front Line States

10. Leaders of Front Line States (+ SWAPO and ANC) met in Arusha (Tanzania) on 28-29 April. Communiqué called for rapid implementation of SCR 435 and expressed usual support for SWAPO. But implicit support for disengagement and stress on SWAPO's campaign as an 'internal struggle' suggested concern that present negotiating process should continue.

11. President Kaunda has played important role recently in search for a settlement. Helpful in setting up Lusaka meeting in February and mainly responsible for MPC/SWAPO meeting in May. Has called for summit meeting between FLS and South Africa. But has also described Nkomati Accord as 'a setback for all of us' and has accused West of moving away from commitment to SCR 435. We believe he remains committed to SCR 435, despite South African claims to the contrary. Other FLS views important: President Nyerere distrustful but so far acquiescent. President Machel more enthusiastic (understandably). Mr Mugabe aloof.

12. South Africans recognise they would need African support for any alternative settlement in order to achieve international respectability. Thus stress on (supposed) support of Kaunda for alternative paths. But no sign that



FLS or SWAPO seriously willing to consider deal on South African terms.

SWAPO/MPC Meeting in Lusaka: 11-13 May

13. President Kaunda arranged conference in Lusaka on 11-13 May between SWAPO and Namibian Internal Parties of Multi-Party Conference (MPC). South Africa's Administrator General for the territory was co-Chairman. Meeting did not reach any agreement on way forward and parties did not commit themselves to further meeting.

14. Agreement was reported to have been fairly close on a declaration that would have called for immediate ceasefire and implementation of SCR 435. But MPC parties would not agree to unequivocal rejection of Cuban linkage and also complained about UN partiality for SWAPO. SWAPO for their part were reluctant to commit themselves to immediate ceasefire without guarantee of immediate implementation of UN Plan. Pik Botha later alleged that SWAPO were dissuaded by Soviet diplomats in Lusaka from signifying their agreement. Whether this is true or not, the MPC, who were divided, were also unwilling to sign.

15. The South Africans have derived much satisfaction from the equal status the Conference appeared to confer on SWAPO and the MPC. It may be that they will now seek an interim coalition government, including SWAPO and the MPC, to



administer the country until a settlement. But there is no sign as yet that SWAPO are willing to cooperate.

D. ANGOLA

US/Angola Dialogue (Not for Use)

16. Prospect of Cuban withdrawal from Angola necessary to retain US involvement in search for settlement; at present satisfactory arrangement still necessary to secure SAG agreement to implementation. US requirement is for prior agreement on withdrawal of troops, not complete withdrawal in advance of implementation. They have suggested to the Angolans illustrative timetables for phased and partial withdrawal. We do not know exactly what arrangement would meet the South African Government's concerns, but the Americans would try hard to bring them along if the Angolans offered a reasonable 'package'.

17. The Angolans agreed at Cape Verde in January that they would discuss bilaterally with the Americans the broader questions of Cuban withdrawal, US recognition and a Namibia settlement as the disengagement of SADF forces from Southern Angola proceeded. They now say they will tackle this 'second agenda' as soon as disengagement is complete. Our Ambassador in Luanda has played a major role as go-between in the US/Angola dialogue. (The Americans met an Angolan delegation in Lusaka on 28 May).



Angolan Attitude

18. Angolans have made serious attempt to control SWAPO and are committed to disengagement arrangements. There may be Angolan interest in prolonged military stand-off. But without progress towards Namibia settlement this would be inherently unstable. SWAPO unlikely to cooperate indefinitely and Angolan army (FAPLA) could not easily control SWAPO over a long period. We still believe forthcoming Angolan attitude on Cubans necessary to keep momentum going.

19. Dos Santos has laid down four conditions for Cuban withdrawal: South African withdrawal from Angola, end to South African attacks, end to SA military/logistic support for UNITA, implementation of SCR 435. These conditions should be compatible with American and South African desiderata provided the package is carefully assembled and presented. But continued UNITA successes complicate matters.

Prospects for MPLA/UNITA Reconciliation

20. Angola still virtually on war footing. Marked increase in recent months in level and range of UNITA's military capabilities. Central Government cannot provide effective administration outside the towns in about one-third of country. Serious economic dislocation.



21. Moscow appears determined to keep MPLA in power and to pay the (so far modest) price. Soviet Union has progressively expanded military supplies in quantity and sophistication to meet threats to Angolan Government. The result is military and political stalemate.

22. UNITA's declared aim is to force MPLA to negotiate, in the expectation that Savimbi could eventually take over a government of national unity. MPLA as a whole continue to resist this strongly at present. Those MPLA moderates who would like to negotiate would have their hand strengthened if they could demonstrate that South Africa is serious about reaching a regional settlement. This suggests that reconciliation with UNITA is more likely to follow implementation of the Namibia agreement than to precede it.

UNITA/UK

23. We have had contact with UNITA at official level in order to secure the release of the Britons held by UNITA. They were released on 12 May to our envoy, Sir J Leahy, who went to UNITA's base. The South African Defence Force provided a helicopter for the final leg of the journey into the base.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 8

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

POINTS TO MAKE

South Africa's future

1. Do not seek to prescribe solutions. For South Africans to decide. Recognise complexity of situation and no simple solutions. Very much in favour of a peaceful and evolutionary process of change. Want to hear what you envisage in next few years and longer run.
2. Specifically how do you see progress being made towards political and civil rights for blacks on basis agreed by them? Tangible evidence of advance in this domain would be the most convincing answer to South Africa's critics in other countries. Progress made externally (Nkomati) points up need to make parallel progress internally.
3. I believe economic growth will assist black advancement; we want to help in this. But permanent stability requires black acquiescence in the system. See the problem of how to offer blacks an alternative they can accept without creating serious white back lash.



4. Homelands. Must tell you frankly that seen from this distance an imposed homelands system never likely to be acceptable to majority of blacks. Understand tribal diversity but no need to accentuate it. In fact this could be positively harmful to prospects of gaining widespread acceptance by blacks of any new constitutional arrangements.

Forced Movement of People

5. Feelings here very strong on such matters. Visual impact terrible. Not a question of double standards. Separation of races by forced movement of population, uprooting of communities, leave nasty taste in the mouth. Cuts ground from under would-be friends of South Africa internationally.

Particular concern about resettlement plans announced for Cape Town region.

Political Prisoners

6. Understand sensitive issue but progress towards freeing Mandela and others like him would be widely welcomed as evidence of Government's desire for reconciliation in South Africa. Glad you have felt able to release Mr Kitson: also Toivo Ja Toivo and other Namibian detainees.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 8

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

BACKGROUND

1. Mr Botha is sharply critical of what he perceives as the failure of Britain (and the West generally) to support his 'reformist' policies, in particular the introduction of the new constitution (see para 4 below). He believes that we criticise South African policies from afar and in ignorance, failing to recognise the complexity of their problems and adopting double standards. He urges the need for South Africa to be given time, stressing that this is in the interests of everyone. He is conscious of the need for change, but anxious that this should be 'managed'. Like nearly all whites he is opposed to any reform that would give black majority rule over the white minority.

2. Despite their irritation the South Africans would like to have Britain's support and approbation above that of anyone else (including the Americans). We should underline our long experience of African affairs, our recognition of the complexities of South Africa's problems, our commitment to a constructive approach towards them and belief that it is for the people of South Africa as a whole to choose their future.



At the same time Mr Botha should be under no misapprehension of the strength of feeling here across the political spectrum, about South Africa's racial policies.

Internal Developments

3. In recent months internal matters have taken second place to South Africa's initiatives vis-à-vis its neighbours. Internally the government, buoyed up by its victory in the constitutional referendum and by its successes abroad, is riding high with the majority of the white electorate - apart that is from the increasingly vociferous right-wing extremists - and presently faces no significant threat from the politically and physically divided blacks. There is progress in dismantling petty apartheid (the term 'apartheid' is no longer used in official circles in South Africa but otherwise remains in wide circulation) but the fundamentals of the system (homelands; group areas; exclusion of Africans from national politics) remain, and in the view of many, especially blacks, it is more solidly entrenched than ever. The key to further reform lies in the ability of the majority of the white electorate to recognise that far-reaching change, steady but controlled, is essential in their own long-term self-interests. There is little evidence that this is yet generally accepted.

New Constitution

4. In November 1983, constitutional changes, of which Mr Botha was a principal architect, were decisively approved by the white electorate. These provide for a powerful executive president (certain to be Mr Botha) and for a tri-cameral parliament (separate chambers for coloureds, Indians, and whites; size based on population, whites dominant). The African majority is excluded. Elections for the Coloured and Indian chambers will be in August; the new arrangements will be implemented in September 1984. They have provoked controversy in all communities and black leaders in South Africa have been almost unanimous in their criticism. The new constitution was also widely condemned abroad for entrenching apartheid and white supremacy, but we (along with the Americans and Germans) refrained from doing so (we ran into trouble at New Delhi over this). We judged it preferable to withhold substantive comment until we could see how the proposals worked in practice and what was to follow for the blacks. In a public statement following the referendum result we took note of the South African Prime Minister's comment that the referendum result was a 'vote in favour of evolutionary reform' adding that we had made clear on a number of occasions that we were looking for progress towards constitutional arrangements acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole and naturally hoped that the outcome of the referendum would facilitate the process of change that we wanted to see. It is by no means certain that the new dispensation will satisfy the majority of the Coloureds and Indians (the time allowed for registration of



voters has had to be extended). Even if it does, they will remain very much subordinate to the decision-making powers of the Whites. In general, however, the new arrangements have introduced some fluidity into the situation. Should this result in the repeal of some objectionable legislation, in particular the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts as is possible, it would be a distinct advance.

Blacks

5. The Black (African) population, now 23 million, is projected to exceed 30 million by 2000 and the White population, now 4.6m, 5.5m. The South African government seems uncertain what to do to meet rising black aspirations. They still cling, if less confidently than hitherto, to the homelands system (paras 6-8) as offering the appropriate outlet for black political expression. But at the end of last year they established a cabinet committee to look in particular at the question of the political future of non-homeland ('urban') blacks. It is not clear what progress is has made. The government seem disposed to give limited 'concessions' to the 'urban' blacks eg giving additional powers to homeland administrations to act for blacks in the urban areas or the establishing of black 'city' states, while imposing rigorous controls to minimise the flow of blacks from the rural to urban areas, except as migrant workers.

Homelands

6. The South African Government argue that their society does not consist of a white minority and a black majority but a white 'nation' (linked with Asians and Coloureds) and ten separate black 'nations', each with its own homeland. Their aim is to make all the black 'nations' 'independent' eventually in a confederation with white South Africa. Four homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) are now 'independent'.

7. The homelands system is fundamental to apartheid. It is open to criticism on many counts:

a) despite various superficial forms of consultation of the peoples concerned prior to 'independence', the blacks have never been consulted about the system as a whole, doubtless because it was realised that if they were they would reject it;

b) it is grossly unjust in the division of land, blacks are allocated 13% of South Africa; whites virtually all the rest;

c) it causes serious social problems. Breadwinners are generally obliged to work elsewhere; families are divided, the homelands left to the very young, the old and mothers;

d) it is unworkable. Homelands, which are often fragmented



into many pockets, are already in many areas overpopulated and quite unable to support existing population levels. With the exception of Bophuthatswana they are not viable economically and are heavily dependent on the remittances of wages from migrant workers. The situation will get steadily worse with the rapid population growth.

e) on 'independence' the blacks deemed to belong to the tribal grouping in question lose their South African nationality;

f) the South African Government have exploited and exaggerated black ethnic differences, fearful of black unity.

Forced Removals

8. An independent study in South Africa last year suggested that nearly 3½ million people had been 'relocated' in South Africa since 1960 many to the homelands, and that up to 2 million more remained under threat of removal. This is one of the most unpleasant aspects of apartheid. The South African Government have put the number of removals at about 2 million. They have admitted that there has been 'an element of force in some removals' but claim that 'relocation' is now 'development-orientated' and that the Government are 'trying not to have to move people by force as far as this is humanly possible'. The removals mostly involve Africans, though some Indians and Coloureds have also been affected. There are



numerous categories of people who have been subject to removal eg those living in 'black spots' (black areas surrounded by white ones), surplus farm workers, 'legal' and 'illegal' residents of urban squatter camps and other townships. Whilst occasionally better services may be available at the new centres than those from which the people have come, more generally this has not been the case. Many have experienced great hardship and communities have been broken up. Intimidation during the actual process of removal is commonplace.

Mogopa

9. The most recent example to attract international attention, in 1983/4, was at Mogopa, an area of farmland in the Transvaal, purchased by tribal leaders in 1906 with a population of about 3,000. Residents were given notice of removal in 1964. The Government did not seek to put this into effect until 1980, at which time pressure was increased on the community to move. Schools were demolished and water pumps removed. The villagers took legal action but when this failed the village was declared an 'operational area' and sealed off by the police. The villagers were obliged to leave. There is little doubt that coercion was used. South African Government suggestions that the land to which the Mogopa residents were moved was more fertile is widely disputed. We have publicly voiced our opposition to removals



on several occasions, most recently in the context of Mogopa, where we were associated with an EC demarche to the South African authorities in December 1983.

Crossroads

10. Events in Crossroads near Cape Town are also a cause of much international concern. This shanty town settlement has been subject to frequent and brutal raids by the authorities over several years. Shacks are destroyed; families and possessions left to the elements; people 'endorsed out' to 'their' homelands. The government plan eventually to move virtually all blacks (as distinct from Coloureds) in the Western Cape to a new township, Khayelitsha, being established some 15 miles from Cape Town. Development of existing black areas has been frozen.

Human Rights

11. The political and personal freedoms, of the non-white population remain severely curtailed. Those who offend against the system or are seen as a threat to it face severe punishment. Arbitrary acts by the police remain relatively commonplace. However the number of people subjected to banning orders and held in detention at any one time without charge has sharply reduced in the last few years (though there has been a significant increase in short term detentions).



Political Prisoners

12. The imprisonment of people for political offences (often but not always associated with terrorism) attracts widespread international condemnation. There is particular concern about the ANC leader, Nelson Mandela jailed for life in 1964 for campaigning to overthrow the Government, and his wife, Winnie Mandela, who has been subject to successive banning orders. We have supported calls for Mandela's release. His standing amongst blacks in South Africa is unrivalled.

13. Two political prisoners with British connections were released recently, David Rabkin (UK national) was released in December 1983, 3 years early, and David Kitson (dual UK/SA national) was released this month, 6 months before the end of a 20 year sentence.



VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 9

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (INCLUDING PARTICULARLY SOVIET POLICY
IN AFRICA)

POINTS TO MAKE

East/West: Overall Picture

1. Tone from Moscow now consistently hostile to US.
Strained super-power relations attributed by Russians to INF deployment and to alleged anti-Sovietism of Reagan administration. Onus placed on US to make first move.
2. Soviet aim to worry Western (especially European) opinion; encourage fissures in Alliance; put pressure on US to make concessions in arms talks. Little likelihood of Russians making early change in this position.
3. In longer term Soviet leadership needs more substantial super-power relationship and negotiations on arms control. But for the present these concerns are subordinated to the unrestrained urge to spite Reagan, with little apparent concern for consequences.
4. In face of this, important that West should react with



moderation and patience. We are ensuring close coordination in NATO; Allies recognise need for cohesive long term policy. We also recognise the importance of talking to the Russians and East Europeans. Andreotti in Moscow in April, Genscher 21-23 May, probably Mitterrand in summer. UK playing full part: First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko here in March; Mr Channon at Anglo/Soviet Joint Commission (20-22 May); Sir G Howe to Moscow in July.

Soviet Withdrawal from Olympics (If raised)

5. Much regret what now seems final decision by Soviet National Olympics Committee not to participate. Of a piece with their general attitude towards US.

Africa

6. Soviet policy remains one of involvement, but with careful assessment of economic and political cost. Soviet inability to offer substantial economic relationship major limiting factor.

7. Tide appears to be turning against Soviet interests in Southern Africa. They see agreements with South Africa as major setback to their long term interests, but limited in what they can do to maintain their influence.



8. Caught in dilemma by recent Angola/South Africa and Mozambique/South Africa agreements. Grudgingly recognise reasons, but do not wish to see any diminution of Soviet influence. Trying to cast doubt on South African bona fides and therefore whether agreements offer real security guarantees, and have betrayed concern that political orientation of Angola and Mozambique will change. Soviet Union has so far avoided direct criticism of Angola and Mozambique. Probably less alarmed by Nkomati agreement than by prospect of premature Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola. Your view of Soviet options?

9. Some strains in Soviet/Ethiopian relations. Mengistu appears to have obtained some additional promises of economic assistance during recent visit to Moscow; at same time evidence that Russians not prepared to meet larger part of Ethiopia's requests. But little prospect that Mengistu's ties with Moscow will weaken significantly.

10. Russians have shown some political interest in Seychelles. Soviet naval visits in past two years signal of support for President René. But we are playing part in efforts to offset this. RN port visit in January highly successful. Also recent visits by US and (regularly) by French vessels. Important demonstration of Western interest.

Soviet Aid

11. Soviet aid record throughout Africa very poor. We lose no opportunity to draw attention to this.

Other Aspects of Soviet External Policies

12. No evidence of any readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan (on contrary Russians have launched major offensive and resorted to high level bombing against resistance stronghold in Panjshir valley). Have persisted in efforts to 'normalise' relations with China, but without any expectation of dramatic break; but recent coolness (primarily over Sino/Vietnamese border clashes and Reagan's visit) signalled by postponement of visit to Peking by First Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov (would have been highest level of exchange for 15 years).



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 9

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (INCLUDING PARTICULARLY SOVIET POLICY
IN AFRICA)

BACKGROUND

East/West: Overall Picture

1. Despite earlier hints of flexibility, Soviet leadership now appear to have decided to sit 1984 out on key issues of nuclear arms control and relations with US. Claim it is impossible to do serious business with current US Administration. Unwilling to 'help' Reagan in election year. Action over Los Angeles Olympics consistent with this. Political nature of division illustrated by parallel action by other Warsaw Pact countries.
2. Soviet approach to Europeans more careful. But continued emphasis on wedge-driving between US and rest of Alliance (eg during Andreotti's visit to Moscow on 22-24 April). Russians are also keeping pressure on INF-base countries; recent criticism of 'revanchism' in FRG and announcement of additional missile deployments in East Germany prelude to Genscher's visit (20-22 May).

Africa

3. Soviet interests and relations focussed on few client states (Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique) dependent on Soviet arms. Social and economic problems faced by region require aid and economic assistance that Soviet Union is not prepared or able to supply. (Andropov made clear in June 1983 Plenum speech that countries of 'socialist orientation' would in the main have to be economically self-sufficient). No evidence that Chernenko intends different approach to Africa, although recent developments in Southern Africa (see below) will have necessitated reappraisal by Soviet Union of its policies towards region.

Southern Africa

4. Less important to Soviet interests than (for instance) Middle East. But Russians have clear stakes in Angola and to lesser extent in Mozambique.

5. In Angola, Soviet Union has progressively expanded military supplies in quantity and sophistication to meet mounting threat to MPLA. Presence of Cuban troops useful means of consolidating Soviet influence, but Russians would not wish to become directly involved (would not send own troops).



6. Consequently Russians in dilemma:

a) main priority to keep MPLA government dependent on close links with both Soviet Union and Cuban;

b) unlikely to favour MPLA/UNITA reconciliation;

c) but cannot afford to be seen opposing a settlement which MPLA government wants and may realise that MPLA will have to make some compromise if it is to survive.

7. Have therefore shown discomfort at latest developments. Reluctantly recognised reasons for Angolan/South African agreement, but have tried to cast doubt on South African and US motives and intentions.

8. Approach to Namibia equally conditional. Would favour independence under SWAPO, but in no hurry as they would not wish to see settlement which excluded Soviet influence.

Mozambique

9. Soviet Union has shown similar reservations about Nkomati Accord. As authoritative Soviet press comment made clear, Russians acknowledge reasons for Accord, but are trying to stimulate doubt (in Mozambique and in other Front Line States) as to whether it will be in practice in Mozambique's political or security interests.



Ethiopia

10. Continuing substantial Soviet presence in Ethiopia. Reportedly 1,700 Russian military advisers and about 11,000 Cuban troops. Rumours that significant numbers of Cubans are being withdrawn, probably because of high cost of keeping them there (thought to be over \$70m pa). Mengistu in considerable debt to Soviet Union for arms (\$2-3 billion); his visit to Moscow (29-31 March) not entirely satisfactory, centred on economic issues, and may have achieved some rescheduling of Ethiopia's debt. Any difficulties likely to be played down in run-up to 10th Anniversary celebrations in September, which will also see the long-awaited creation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party.

Seychelles

11. Soviet aid and influence are growing, but Seychelles dependent economically on West. Soviet Union accounts for less than 1% of Seychelles trade. Fears of internal dissent and external attack, aggravated by previous attempts to overthrow his government, have caused René to rely on Tanzanian and North Korean 'military instructors' and carefully timed visits by Soviet vessels particularly during René's absences abroad. But René has maintained diversified approach in keeping open contacts with the West as shown by French, British and US ship visits.



Soviet Aid

12. In total the recipients of Soviet aid pay more in repayments to the Soviet Union for previous loans than they receive in new disbursements. Total Soviet economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa in the 27 years 1954-81 was only \$534.5m; Western aid disbursements in 1981 alone were worth \$6,016m.

Other Aspects of Soviet External Policies

13. No change of course under Chernenko.

South African Perceptions of the Soviet threat

14. The South African Government believes that Southern Africa is accorded a high priority in Soviet foreign policy objectives and that the Soviet Union is determined to see the end of white supremacy in South Africa. We believe the South African perception of the Soviet threat in the region to be exaggerated.

15. The South African Government holds to the view that it faces a "total onslaught" from the Soviet Union and its surrogates (deemed to include the ANC). The South Africans have at least till lately seen the Marxist Governments in Angola and Mozambique as virtual prisoners and puppets of Moscow. There is some sign that this unduly rigid perception



may be beginning to evolve in the light of the approach of the United States and European Governments to leaders like President Machel of Mozambique.



VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: 2 JUNE

BRIEF NO 10

SOUTHERN AFRICA: ECONOMIC ISSUES

BACKGROUND

1. Southern Africa faces its third year of drought. This has compounded economic difficulties in many African countries arising from continuing conflicts (eg in Angola and Mozambique) and failure of economic policies. Disruption of transport links in Mozambique has affected other neighbouring countries dependent on these. Zimbabwe's recovery from UDI impeded by these factors. Although South Africans are concerned at economic disarray of region, they have helped to cause it to some extent and want to exploit it to their political advantage, since many countries depend on them for export routes (eg Botswana and Zimbabwe, and even Zambia) and for food imports. South Africa's own economy in recession, hit by low gold price, international recession, and successive years of drought. For first time in many years South Africa has had to import maize. South Africans now in a mood to take regional action to improve situation. In particular they are anxious to build on the Nkomati Accord and ensure economic assistance at appropriate levels to Mozambique.



2. Earlier this year Pik Botha urged need for major Western aid effort for Southern African countries, especially Mozambique and Angola. He called a meeting for this purpose with the Ambassadors of the Seven Economic Summit countries. He also told us that the South African Prime Minister was interested in meeting the seven Summit leaders during his European tour in order to promote same idea. Was discouraged from this, and in the preparatory discussions for the summit it was agreed that it would not be appropriate to devote special attention to one region/group of countries to the exclusion of others.

3. No doubt about economic difficulties in Southern Africa, though no worse than in Africa as a whole or third world generally. South Africans have good point on Mozambique: general Western interest in ensuring that benefits of Nkomati accord are realised, Machel's policy vindicated and communists cannot tell Machel 'we told you so'.

4. Western countries interested in assisting Southern Africa, especially Mozambique. Problem is lack of resources. Britain's bilateral aid to nine countries of Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania - SADCC formed to reduce economic dependence on South Africa) in 1983-84 already totals about £85 million. British aid pledged to SADCC itself is £12m.

Mozambique

5. Most of the aid pledged to SADCC goes in fact to Mozambique (£10.2m) for improvements to transport: Limpopo Railway, Maputo Port.
6. Our bilateral aid to Mozambique will increase in 1985/86 from £3m to £6.5m. Compared with our aid to other African countries this is a large programme and it is being increased at a time when others are being cut back. Further increases are constrained by Mozambique's ability to absorb aid. The programme includes technical cooperation projects (Landrover reconditioning scheme, construction and maintenance of 200 Leyland buses), assistance with the Pemba Power Station in northern Mozambique and scholarships for 35 Mozambican students in Britain. The level of aid after 1985/86 is at present planned to be about £3m per annum. This may be increased if the 1985/86 programme succeeds.
7. Mozambique applied to the Paris Club in February 1984 for a re-scheduling of her Western debts. A task force of four principal creditors has just completed a mission to collect economic data to present to the creditor nations. Machel's application for membership of IMF/IBRD and the successor to Lomé 2 should make the Paris Club sympathetic. ECGD cover (both sections I and II) has been withdrawn pending re-scheduling discussions. This has some impact on our aid



programme.

8. Large-scale disaster relief from EC, international organisations, Britain, Italy and Scandinavia has been provided to meet the effects of recent natural disasters (drought and cyclones).

9. There is a major role for the private sector in Mozambique. Lonrho have just taken over the Polana Hotel in Maputo. Other companies may follow. South African businessmen are being encouraged by their government.



FACT SHEET

SOUTH AFRICA

DEMOGRAPHY

Population (1982) : 31.0m (Blacks 23m; Whites 4.6m;
Coloureds 2.7m; Asians 0.8m)

Distribution : Cape Province 17%; Natal 9%;
Transvaal 29%; Orange Free State
7%; Homelands 38%

Religion : Christian 74%; Hindu 2.5%;
Islam 1%; not otherwise classified
22.5%

Languages (official) : Afrikaans and English

Principal political
parties/groups : National Party (Government);
Progressive Federal Party (white
opposition); Labour Party (coloured);
Natal/Transvaal Indian Congress;
Solidarity (Indian). United Democratic
Front, Inkatha (African),
African National Congress (banned)

GEOGRAPHY

Area : 472,348 square miles (including
homelands)

Neighbours : Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique
Swaziland, Lesotho.



Gross Official reserves
 (Dec 1983) : \$3.5277 bn (inc gold at market prices)
 Budgetary deficit : R3,280m (for 1983)
 Real growth in GDP : -2.9% (1983)

[NB 1 rand = £0.47]

TRADE

Principal Exports : Gold, diamonds; mineral products; base metals; vegetable products; prepared foodstuffs
 Principal Imports : Machinery and mechanical appliances; vehicles, aircraft and vessels; chemical industry products; base metals.

<u>TRADE WITH BRITAIN</u>	:	1981	1982	1983
Exports to Britain	:	649	746	765
Imports from Britain	:	1220	1193	1109

DEFENCE

In the March 1984 Budget, defence expenditure was increased to R3755m, 21.4% above the 1983/4 level.



Rivers : Orange, Vaal, Tugela, Great Fish,
Olifants

Provinces : Cape Province, Orange Free State, Natal,
Transvaal

Homelands : 'Independent' - Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei.
Others - Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdbele,
Kwazulu, Lebowa, Qwa Qwa

Capital : Pretoria (Seat of Government)(pop 0.8m)
Cape Town (seat of legislative)(pop1.2m)
Bloemfontein (Seat of Judiciary)(pop0.2m)

Principal Cities : Johannesburg (pop 4m), Durban (pop 1m)
Port Elizabeth (pop 0.7m)

Principal Ports : Cape Town, Durban

ECONOMY

Basis : Mining (gold and diamonds)

GDP per capita : \$2,541 (1983)

Balance of Trade
(R million) : 935.2 (1982) 4345.9 (1983)

Balance of Payments on
current account
(R million) : -3704 (1981) -3037 (1982) +275 (1983)

BOTHA, THE HON PIETER WILLEM (P W) DMS

Prime Minister since September 1978.

Born Orange Free State 1916. Studied law at the University of the Orange Free State. MP for George, Cape Province since 1948, and the longest serving Member of Parliament. Deputy Minister of Interior 1958, Minister of Housing and of Community Development and Coloured Affairs 1961, Minister of Public Works 1964 (retaining also the Community Development and Coloured Affairs portfolio), Minister of Defence 1966-80. He became Cape leader of the National Party in 1966.

A hard, dour and belligerent professional Afrikaner politician. (In the Second World War he only just avoided being detained as a Nazi sympathiser). He has a reputation for a quick temper, and intolerance of criticism. He is not an intellectual; his success has been due to his total control of the National Party in the Cape, a reputation as a good administrator and the confidence of the SADF built up during 12 hawkish years as Minister of Defence. He was responsible for the South African campaign in Angola in 1976, and personally selected able young officers such as General Malan and General Viljoen for the highest appointments, and they continue to enjoy his confidence. He relies heavily on military advice. In the field of external relations he is critical of the general weakness of the West in the face of what he regards as the world-wide Marxist threat, and instinctively favours a tough independent go-it-alone policy for South Africa in association with such Southern African



BOTHA, THE HON ROELOF FREDERICK (PIK) DMS

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information. MP for Westdene Transvaal.

Born Rustenburg 1932. BA and LLB from Pretoria University. Joined the Department of Foreign Affairs as legal adviser in 1953, where the ambition that still dominates him quickly became apparent. After a successful career in diplomacy he entered politics, being elected to Parliament in 1970 as a member for Wonderboom, Pretoria. He gave up his seat when he was appointed South African Ambassador to the UN in 1974 (and concurrently to the USA in 1975). Mr Vorster chose him as Foreign Minister while he was still Ambassador. He took up his appointment on 1 April 1977, being elected to Parliament a month later. In September 1978 he stood as a candidate in the Prime Ministerial election with the support of the Transvaal verligte group but secured a rather ignominious 22 votes in the first ballot; in the second ballot his supporters transferred their votes to Mr P W Botha and effectively secured the latter's election. Was given the additional portfolio of Information in 1980 following the 'Muldergate' affair. The most popular NP politician in the country. Since 1983, Deputy Leader of Transvaal National Party. Contender for Premiership in New Constitution.

Pik Botha is one of the few South African Ministers with charisma. He is good on television, combining robust defence



of South African interests with sincerity and occasional wit. He adopts at times an aggressive manner to avoid damaging criticism of being 'soft'. His influence is however probably on the side of reason and realism in discussions in Cabinet and the State Security Council. He has a disconcerting tendency to conduct a private conversation as if it were a public meeting and he is not a good listener. At times he allows himself - perhaps deliberately - to get carried away by his own performance and by his emotions. But just when you think he is going over the edge he switches, equally disconcertingly, to sweet reason.

His wife Helena is quiet but friendly. Two sons, two daughters.



VAN DALSEN, JOHANNES (HANS)

Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

Born 1920 in Klerksdorp, Transvaal. Educated in Pietersburg and at Pretoria University (history and law). Joined Department of Foreign Affairs in 1945. Service in Elizabethville, Washington, The Hague, Rome, London (Minister from 1964 to 1969), Brussels (Ambassador from 1969 to 1971) and Paris (Ambassador from 1980 to 1981). Previous to his appointment as Ambassador in Paris he was Deputy Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs for eight years. He was a member of the South African delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1951, 1955 and 1961.

Brought back prematurely from Paris in order to take over from Dr Brand Fourie as Director-General of the DFAI on 1 May 1982, his wide experience made him a natural candidate to succeed Dr Fourie, but he has not seemed to be particularly close to Pik Botha and has been a weak and ineffective head of the DFAI. He is friendly and approachable and enjoyed his service in London.

His wife is a nice person, a good deal younger. Two grown-up sons.



BARNARD, DR LUKAS DANIEL (NEIL)

Director-General of the National Intelligence Service. (NIS is the current name of the Old Bureau of State Security (BOSS)).

Born Otjiwarongo, South West Africa, 1949. Entered University of Orange Free State in 1968. Appointed lecturer in 1972. Promoted to be Professor in International Relations and head of the Department of Political Science at the University of the Orange Free State in 1978, at the early age of 29. A prolific writer on subjects such as the 'total onslaught against South Africa', published in 1978 and was a member of the Commission charged with the investigation of security and legislation. He became head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in mid-1980 after six months grooming as deputy head.

His appointment to the top security intelligence post in the country at the early age of 30 was a great surprise and appeared to be due to his having views close to those of the Prime Minister. Rather cold, calculating and self-confident.

He is married with two sons.



cc J. J. C.
B1

Members of the South African Party travelling to Chequers by helicopter

Mr P W Botha	Prime Minister
Mr R F Botha	Foreign Minister
Mr H van Dalsen	Director-General, DFA
Dr L D Barnard	Director-General of the National Intelligence Service
Mr Von Hirschberg	Deputy Director-General, DFA
Mr Manley	DFA
Mr L H Evans	Charge d'Affaires, South African Embassy

Also travelling in the helicopter, but not a member of the lunch party:

Mr J Malan	Security Officer
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Travelling by road

Mr W P H Ehlers	PS to Prime Minister
Mr V Zazeray	PS to Foreign Minister
Mr A T Kellerman	Security Officer
Mr F A Claassen	Security Officer
Dr A G Jones	Prime Minister's doctor

} These will not be at the table - and they will lunch separately.
A. J. C. 21/5



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 May, 1984

Dear John,

Type letter pl.
ARJ

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: Botswana

Thank you for your letter of 29 May about the letter which the Prime Minister has received from Miss Eleanor Emery, the Chairman of the United Kingdom/Botswana Society. I attach a draft reply which we suggest you might send on behalf of the Prime Minister.

Miss Emery is a former member of the diplomatic service, and her last post was as High Commissioner in Gaborone. Her letter asks that the Prime Minister should urge Mr P W Botha not to put unreasonable pressures on Botswana to sign a non-aggression pact. We know, from President Masire's recent call on the Prime Minister (on 14 May), from discussions between Mr Rifkind and the Botswana Foreign Minister on the same day, and from reports from our post in Gaborone, that Botswana is being pressed by the South Africans to sign a security agreement on the lines of that recently signed between South African and Mozambique. Our information suggests that the South Africans have put economic pressures on Botswana to encourage the Botswana Government to accede to this proposal. Similar pressures are at present being exerted on Lesotho. In an aide-memoire left by President Masire's Private Secretary after the call on the Prime Minister on 14 May, the Botswana Government asked for our intervention with the South African authorities. We have accordingly instructed our High Commissioner in Gaborone to make clear to the Botswana Government the general principles underlying our approach to relations between South Africa and its neighbours, to stress that it is for Botswana to determine whether an agreement with South Africa is in its national interests, but that we are naturally concerned that any agreement should be freely entered into and should bring benefits to both parties; and that the question of South Africa's relations with its neighbours will be on the agenda for the Prime Minister's talks with Mr Botha, and Mr Botha will be left in no doubt of where we stand.

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: ~~XXXXXX~~letter/~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Private Secretary

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TEL. NO:

No 10 Downing Street

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Miss E J Emery CMG
17 Winchmore Drive
Trumpington
Cambridge
CB2 2LW

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 24 May about the forthcoming visit by the South African Prime Minister and South Africa's relations with Botswana.


CAVEAT.....

The Prime Minister is watching developments in Southern Africa with close attention. We have long taken the view that relations between countries in the region must be based on non-violence, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for borders and acknowledgement of the responsibilities of statehood. We have encouraged dialogue and negotiation, and made clear that discussions between South Africa's neighbours and South Africa need involve no sacrifice of principle. But in encouraging dialogue, we are naturally concerned that any agreements arrived at between South Africa and neighbouring countries should be freely entered into and bring benefits to both parties. We have made this clear on many occasions, while the underlining that/decision as to whether or not to enter into such agreements must be a matter for the countries concerned.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/You

You ask if the Prime Minister will take the opportunity of her meeting with Mr Botha to make certain points about South Africa's relations with Botswana. The general subject of South Africa's relations with its neighbours is, of course, likely to come up during the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Botha. You will understand that I cannot make any commitment about a specific issue, but I can assure ^{you} that the Prime Minister is fully conscious of the close relationship which the United Kingdom enjoys with Botswana, and that your points have been carefully noted and brought to her attention.



S. M. M. M.
B. M. A. V. S. R.
4/84

PRIME MINISTER

The points suggested by Sir Laurens van der Post for your general approach to Mr. Botha were:

- A - Welcome South Africa's establishment of contacts with the rest of Africa - anything that breaks isolation is good.
- B - In the United Kingdom - and the West generally - there is a great potential reservoir of goodwill towards South Africa.
- C - But the internal situation in South Africa makes it impossible to manifest this.
- D - South Africa's internal affairs have become a matter of international concern. So our foreign policy is dependent on internal liberalisation.
- E - In a way, South Africa still had to catch up with 1949 - in recent years they have only been repairing the damage they have inflicted on themselves (I am not sure this is a good point to make).
- F - What we can do depends on what they can do by way of reform. Recall Botha's statement "adapt or die".

In addition, you made the point that it was never possible to carry along with you an extremist group - the aim had to be to secure the assent of the great majority.

A-J-C-

31 May 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. ATTFIELD

The Prime Minister is presenting Mr. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, with a small Crown Derby bowl on Friday. The value I have on my file is £162.50 +VAT.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'C. Ryder'.

(CAROLINE RYDER)
31 May 1984

FILE

da



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 May 1984

Visit of South African Prime Minister

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 24 May about the security arrangements for Mr. Botha's visit.

A. J. COLES

Hugh Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office.



Press & Public Relations
Department.

Phone: 01-222 0151/8
01-222 9000

xref.
Conservative Central
Office.
32 Smith Square,
London SW1P 3HH

Prime Minister.

A. J. C. 31/5

MR. JOHN SELWYN GUMMER MP

Release Time: 20.15hrs / 31 May 1984
411/84

Extract from a speech by Mr. John Selwyn Gummer MP (Suffolk Coastal) at Paddocks Number 2 Hall, Long Rd. Canvey Island at 8.15pm

On Saturday, Mr. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, lands in London for talks with the British Government. By then he will have visited Portugal and Switzerland. So he has not flown to Europe especially for talks in Britain. Far from it, Mr. Botha is on a tour of Europe to meet dozens of politicians of several political complexions including Mr. Mario Soares, the Socialist Prime Minister of Portugal, who invited him to Lisbon earlier in the week.

Many of my generation were profoundly influenced by Bishop Trevor Huddleston's book "Nought for Your Comfort". It remains the great indictment of South Africa's apartheid policy. That policy depends for its justification on a belief that some men are superior to others because of the colour of their skin. Nothing in the subsequent history of South Africa has fundamentally changed the attitude of Mr. Botha's ruling Party.

They see in so-called "separate development" the perpetuation of the power of the whites and the continuation of the subservience of the blacks. It is a view of human beings which cannot be justified, an attitude to individuals which must be abhorrent to us all.

And it is particularly abhorrent to Conservatives. We are after all the Party which considers people not as classes, groups, or races but as individuals; each worthy of consideration; each equal before the law; each with a right to make his own decisions and a responsibility to bear their consequences. A Party founded upon the principle of

./.

one nation cannot condone a constitution founded upon the principle of a superior race. A Party dedicated in its opposition to the class war cannot accept a nation divided into two classes distinguished by the colour of their skins.

The system of apartheid cannot be squared with the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, with reason or with morality.

There ought to be no dispute as to the nature of this system. The question is how best to change it, how to encourage effectively real change and avoid bloodshed and disaster.

Here too, Conservatives have a clear duty. We who are the friends of South Africa, Black and White, cannot stand by and do nothing as she moves inexorably towards disaster. We cannot take the leftist view, which believes it to be moral to wash their hands of the problem and satisfy our consciences in protest and boycott. Our duty is to seek for peaceful change, to work for real improvement, and to dirty our hands in the business of influence and encouragement.

The Pontius Pilate act of the extreme left a demonstration paid for by the GLC, out of the rates, has also nothing to do with the brotherhood of man nor with the fatherhood of God. Instead it is intended to provoke a warm and comfortable feeling that at no cost to ourselves we can show how upright and moral we are in our judgements. Ken Livingstone, who is happy to talk to the IRA, finds it immoral to talk to the Prime Minister of South Africa. His attitudes have nothing to do with morality, but a great deal to do with expediency. It is expedient for the extreme left to see that South Africa remains a suitable case for continual protest.

However, we have to deal not only with the real Labour Party of Mr. Livingstone and Mr. Scargill. We also have the stage army of Mr. Kinnock. If he and his erratic straight man, Mr. Healey, endorse the British Government's policy of talking with Mr. Chernenko, why can't they support discussions with Mr. Botha? The answer lies in Mr. Kinnock's double standards, and worse still his ignorance of foreign affairs.

3.

mmmer
411/84

It is all very well, in Mr. Kinnock's little red book, for him to condemn and ostracise far right wing Governments. But in Mr. Kinnock's little red book far left-wing Governments, like the Soviet Union, require flattery and deference. This British Government, and this Prime Minister, neither flatter nor defer to Governments of any extreme.

We Conservatives are totally opposed to racism whether it is practiced in South Africa, or as anti-semitism in the Soviet Union. Why is it that if Mr. Kinnock was in Government he would hold talks with the Soviets but not the South Africans?

Mr. Kinnock's flannel of words is no substitute for policies. Indeed his behaviour throughout the European Election Campaign confirms what people, even in his own party, have long suspected that here is a ham actor moonlighting as leader of the Labour Party.

That is Mr. Kinnock - all ham and no beef. His antics do little credit to the acting profession and none to the need for serious political debate.

Nonetheless, there are good-hearted people who listen to Mr. Kinnock's words. They must face the double standard these words reveal. Sakharov, Sharansky, and Zonner can be shackled by the Soviet system but Mr. Chernenko is free to be met, welcomed and influenced.

The shackling of Nelson Mandela, Helen Susman and Bishop Tutu demand Mr. Botha's isolation.

Yet that is not the view of Mozambique or Angola. They have both signed treaties with the very Botha who must not talk to British Prime Ministers.

As the tanks roll in the streets of Kabul the cry goes up from the left that we must strive to influence the Soviet Union - a nation driven to these lengths by fear and encirclement. Yet those same philosophers condemn any discussion with South Africa, a nation equally haunted by fear and encirclement. The difference between these two cases

Gummer

11/84
not one of principle it is simply a question of power. In the eyes of the soft left, the USSR is too powerful to be ignored. They dare do nothing else but seek a dialogue. South Africa on the other hand is an easy target. Its isolation makes the protesters feel good at no cost and no danger to themselves.

What humbug, what hypocrisy for Mr Kinnock to salve his conscience at the expense of the deprived and downtrodden in South Africa. The truth is that South Africa must not be left to go her own way, driven back into the laager- resentful and resented, pursuing her deeply offensive policies, cut off from the real world. We in Europe have a responsibility placed upon us by history. The Portugese who first sailed to the Cape of Good Hope; the French Huguenots who landed and settled; the Germans, the Dutch, and the British, the nations who built the Union and South West Africa. We the countries of the European Community cannot ignore our duty and our trust.

That is an insight clear to all Conservatives and shared by sensible people throughout our continent. It is no accident that Mario Soares, Socialist Prime Minister of Portugal, entertained Mr Botha, condemning his regime, Mr Soares sought to influence and affect his policies.

In these European Elections we are seeking a strong voice for Britain in Europe. We are seeking a strong voice for Europe in the World. It is the countries of Europe who are trying to find the solution in Namibia. It ought to be the countries of Europe who are seeking to bring South Africa, by example and encouragement, more into the stream of world affairs. Only in that way will she see how damaging and devastatingly self-destructive her policies have become. In the real world South Africa can begin to understand that there is no place for apartheid.

End.

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GPS 1600
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FM CAPE TOWN 301400Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 403 OF 30 MAY
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT : VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER : THE INTERNAL SCENE

SUMMARY

1. THE INTERNAL SCENE IS CHANGING IN SOUTH AFRICA. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES WILL GIVE COLOURED AND INDIANS SOME SAY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY BUT WHITES WILL CONTINUE TO RETAIN CONTROL. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (SAG) CONTINUE TO REGARD THE HOMELANDS AS THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLES FOR BLACK POLITICAL EXPRESSION. THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS FOR NON-HOMELAND BLACKS ARE NOT YET CLEAR, BUT THE LONG-TERM AIM OF THE SAG REMAINS THE LINKING OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN SOME FORM OF CONFEDERATION. THE GULF BETWEEN GOVERNMENT PLANS AND BLACK ASPIRATIONS REMAINS WIDE. EVEN THE GOVERNMENT'S LIMITED REFORM PLANS ARE UNDER ATTACK FROM RIGHT-WING AFRIKANERS. FALLING ECONOMIC GROWTH IMPEDES POLITICAL REFORM. THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION REMAINS QUIET BUT THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IS ALWAYS THERE.

DETAIL

2. INTERNAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS TAKING PLACE AT A MORE RAPID PACE THAN FOR MANY YEARS PAST. THE MOULD OF EXCLUSIVE WHITE POLITICAL CONTROL IS UNDER STRAIN. A NEW PARLIAMENT WITH SEPARATE CHAMBERS FOR WHITES, COLOURED AND INDIANS WILL BE ELECTED IN AUGUST AND WILL HOLD ITS FIRST SESSION IN SEPTEMBER. COLOURED AND INDIANS WILL HAVE NOT ONLY CONTROL OVER THE EXCLUSIVE CONCERNS OF THEIR OWN COMMUNITIES BUT ALSO A SAY IN QUOTE GENERAL UNQUOTE MATTERS CONCERNING ALL THE POPULATION GROUPS (EG DEFENCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY, TRANSPORT, ETC). THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL ENSURE THAT WHITES RETAIN CONTROL OF THE IMPORTANT LEVERS OF GOVERNMENT. BUT THE SUCCESS OF THE SYSTEM WILL DEPEND UPON CONSENSUS AND COOPERATION, WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONCESSIONS FROM WHITES AS WELL AS FROM COLOURED AND INDIANS. THE TERRAIN ON WHICH THE POLITICAL BATTLE WILL BE FOUGHT HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY BROADENED.

3. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE BLACKS, OVER 70% OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, IS LESS PROMISING. THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO PART IN THE NEW PARLIAMENTARY STRUCTURES AND THE SAG CONTINUE TO REGARD THE VARIOUS HOMELANDS AS THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLES FOR BLACK POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. SOME EIGHT MILLION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S TWENTY-TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

MILLION

MILLION BLACKS HAVE BEEN ARBITRARILY DEPRIVED OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP SINCE THE QUOTE INDEPENDENCE UNQUOTE OF TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, VENDA AND CISCHEI (TBVC). HOWEVER THE SAG HAVE RECOGNISED THAT THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SIX AND A HALF MILLION BLACKS WHO LIVE OUTSIDE THE HOMELANDS, LARGELY IN URBAN AREAS, REMAINS THE GREATEST UNRESOLVED QUESTION. BLACK LOCAL GOVERNMENT RIGHTS GRANTED IN 1983 ARE IN THEORY EQUAL TO THOSE OF WHITES, BUT IN PRACTICE LIMITED BY THE ABSENCE OF AN URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AS A BASIS FOR FINANCIAL AUTONOMY. A SPECIAL CABINET COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN 1983 TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM OF NON-HOMELAND BLACKS HAS HELD PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH MOST HOMELAND LEADERS (BOTH INDEPENDENT AND SELF-GOVERNING) AND MEETINGS ARE PLANNED WITH NON-HOMELAND BLACK LEADERS BOTH OFFICIAL (RECENTLY ELECTED BLACK MAYORS) AND UNOFFICIAL (EG MOTLANA OF SOWETO). BUT OTHER BLACK LEADERS, LIKE MANDELA, HAVE NOT BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE.

4. THERE IS AS YET NO INDICATION OF WHAT WILL EMERGE. A FOURTH CHAMBER FOR BLACKS HAS BEEN DEFINITELY RULED OUT AND THE SAG SAY THAT ANY POLITICAL DISPENSATION FOR BLACKS MUST BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE POLICY OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT. WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF A QUOTE HIDDEN AGENDA UNQUOTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE AFRIKANERS' ABILITY TO MANAGE CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE LOGIC OF BLACK NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY. THE SAG MAY BE PLANNING TO CONVERT BLACK URBAN AREAS COMPOSED PREDOMINANTLY OF ONE TRIBAL GROUP INTO HOMELAND QUOTE CONSTITUENCIES UNQUOTE WHILE SOWETO AND OTHER URBAN AREAS NOT LINKED WITH ANY ONE HOMELAND MIGHT BE GRANTED AUTONOMOUS QUOTE CITY STATE UNQUOTE STATUS. SUCH STRUCTURES MIGHT BRIDGE AT NATIONAL LEVEL WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WHITE, COLOURED AND INDIAN COMMUNITIES IN SOME KIND OF CONFEDERAL COUNCIL. NONE OF THESE IDEAS HOWEVER SEEMS LIKELY TO MEET THE GENERAL BLACK ASPIRATION TO SHARE IN POLITICAL POWER AT THE CENTRE. THE GULF BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK EXPECTATIONS IS NOT TOTALLY UNBRIDGEABLE, BUT IS LIKELY TO WIDEN THE LONGER THE QUESTION REMAINS UNRESOLVED. DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS ARE ON THE SIDE OF THE BLACKS. BLACK SKILLS ARE URGENTLY NEEDED TO DEVELOP THE ECONOMY AND BY THE YEAR 1990 THERE WILL BE TWICE AS MANY BLACKS LIVING IN URBAN AREAS IN SOUTH AFRICA AS THE COMBINED TOTAL OF WHITES, COLOURED AND INDIANS.

5. A FURTHER COMPLICATION IS THAT P W BOTHA, AS THE HEAD OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED WHITE GOVERNMENT (ALBEIT BY A MINORITY OF THE POPULATION) IS SUBJECT TO THE WILL OF HIS WHITE ELECTORATE. EVEN THE LIMITED REFORMS THAT HE HAS INTRODUCED HAVE CAUSED THE RIGHT WING OF THE RULING NATIONAL PARTY (NP) TO HIVE OFF TO FORM THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (CP) AND THE RIFT IS STILL WORKING ITS WAY THROUGH AFRIKANERDOM. P W BOTHA IS ACCUSED BY THE CP OF QUOTE BETRAYING UNQUOTE THE AFRIKANER CAUSE. THE COLOURED AND INDIAN VOTE IS SEEN BY THE CP AS THE THIN END OF THE WEDGE.

THE NP IS SEEN TO BE INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON ENGLISH-SPEAKING SUPPORT AND THE CP CLAIMS TO HAVE DISPLACED THE NP AS THE AUTHENTIC VOICE OF AFRIKANERDOM. THE MOST WORRYING POLITICAL OPPOSITION FOR THE SAG AT PRESENT IS FROM THOSE WHO ADVOCATE A RETURN TO VERWOERDIAN VALUES AND NOT FURTHER CONCESSIONS.

6. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC STAGNATION IS CONTRIBUTING TO POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY. THE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NON-WHITE POPULATION, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES REQUIRED TO KEEP AFLOAT ECONOMICALLY NON-VIABLE QUOTE INDEPENDENT UNQUOTE HOMELANDS AND TO PROMOTE INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION THE COSTS OF STAYING IN NAMIBIA AND THE ECONOMIC DEMANDS OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHER NEIGHBOURS ALL INCREASE THE DEMANDS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN TREASURY. THE CONSISTENT ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES OF THE 1950S AND 1960S HAVE GIVEN WAY TO NEGATIVE GROWTH RATES IN 1982 AND 1983. THIS YEAR SOUTH AFRICA WOULD DO WELL TO RESTORE THE ECONOMY TO THE 1981 LEVEL. THE POPULATION MEANWHILE HAS INCREASED, SO GNP PER HEAD WILL BE LESS. A CONTINUING DROUGHT, ADVERSE TRADING CONDITIONS AND A WEAKENED GOLD PRICE SEEM BOUND TO DEPRESS THE ECONOMY THROUGHOUT 1984. AN UPTURN IS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL 1985. THE RECENT BUDGET LACKED CREDIBILITY AND WAS WIDELY CRITICISED. THOUGH VERY MANY SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS ENJOY A HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING, THERE ARE MILLIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS, PARTICULARLY IN THE HOMELANDS, WHO ARE ON THE SAME SUBSISTENCE LEVEL AS BLACKS ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. THE SITUATION IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE IN THE SHORT-TERM. WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS FACE A DECLINING STANDARD OF LIVING. BLACK ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS TOO HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK IS GLOOMY IN THE SHORT-TERM. BUT AN INCREASE IN THE GOLD PRICE AND A BREAK IN THE CONTINUING DROUGHT COULD ONCE AGAIN COME TO THE RESCUE.

7. THE PRINCIPAL INEQUALITIES WITH WHICH THE BLACK COMMUNITY (AND TO SOME EXTENT COLOURED AND INDIAN COMMUNITIES) HAVE TO CONTEND ARE:

(A) THE SAG, THOUGH REPRESENTING ONLY THE ONE-SIXTH OF THE POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA WHICH IS WHITE, HAVE BEEN STEADILY DEPRIVING BLACKS WHO REPRESENT OVER 70% OF THE POPULATION OF THEIR SA CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE CREATION OF SO-CALLED QUOTE INDEPENDENT UNQUOTE STATES.

(B) THE SEPARATE FACILITIES FOR BLACKS (SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, SPORTS CENTRES ETC) ARE MARKEDLY THOUGH AT PRESENT INEVITABLY INFERIOR THAN THOSE FOR WHITES. BLACKS HAVE TO LIVE IN SETTLEMENTS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE MAIN TOWNS, HAVE TO TRAVEL MUCH FURTHER TO WORK THAN WHITES, HAVE MUCH LESS OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THEIR COMMERCIAL, ARTISTIC AND INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL.

(C) BLACKS HAVE NO VOTE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

(D) TREATMENT OF BLACKS IS DISCRIMINATORY: THEY HAVE TO CARRY THEIR PASS BOOKS AT ALL TIMES, WHILE WHITES, COLOUREDS AND INDIANS DO NOT.

(E) INFLUX CONTROL AND FORCED REMOVALS CAN BE APPLIED RUTHLESSLY, CAUSING WIDESPREAD DISTRESS AND SEPARATION OF FAMILIES (THOUGH THE SAG ARE PLEDGED TO THE REMOVAL OF QUOTE HURTFUL UNNECESSARY DISCRIMINATION UNQUOTE). WHITES ARE OCCASIONALLY SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY PURCHASE ORDERS BUT ARE NEVER TREATED AS BADLY AS THE BLACKS ARE.

(F) BLACKS MAY MARRY COLOUREDS, INDIANS AS WELL AS AMONG THEMSELVES, BUT NOT WHITES: SEXUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES ARE ILLEGAL.

8. THE SAG ARE EXAMINING MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS. WHILE LIMITATIONS OF RESOURCES ARE BOUND TO INHIBIT EFFORTS TO PROVIDE EQUAL FACILITIES FOR A VERY LONG TIME TO COME, THE WEST CAN REASONABLY CALL ON THE SAG TO REMOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS AND DISCRIMINATION WHICH ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON INCREASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH HAVE AN INHIBITING ECONOMIC EFFECT. SUCH MEASURES COULD INCLUDE A MORE HUMANE POLICY ON INFLUX CONTROL, ACCESS FOR BLACK ENTREPRENEURS TO CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICTS, THE REPEAL OF THE MIXED MARRIAGES PROHIBITION ACT AND PARTS OF THE IMMORALITY ACT, A RELAXATION OF THE RIGID ENFORCEMENT OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT AND A SUSPENSION OF ANY FURTHER FORCED REMOVALS.

9. THE SITUATION MIGHT APPEAR TO BE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE EXPLOSION IS ABOUT TO OCCUR. THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET FOR SOME YEARS ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN INCREASING SPORADIC INCIDENTS THIS YEAR IN BLACK AND COLOURED SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES. THE SAG POSSESS A FORMIDABLE ARRAY OF DRACONIAN SECURITY LAWS BUT THEIR APPLICATION HAS IN RECENT YEARS BEEN RELAXED. THE NUMBERS OF BANNINGS AND DETENTIONS REMAINS LOW. BUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT VIOLENCE COULD ERUPT AT ANY TIME CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING.

FERGUSSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

S AF D	WED
OADS	ECD
MCAD	SOV D
UND	EED
NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

4
CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 May 1984

Mrs. Ryder.
A bowl?

Dear Caroline,

M 30
5.

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 25 May about a gift for Mr Botha. In the absence of a suitable print of Chequers, we recommend [redacted] a print of some other English scene, perhaps a scene of an appropriate historic building in London. Alternatively a piece of fine English china (such as a bowl), or a cut glass decanter might be appropriate.

Yours ever,
Alison

(Alison Walters)

Mrs Caroline Ryder
10 Downing Street

South Africa: Visit of Mr. Kotze

4/1

Printed and Published by
London: SWIA 1881



MEMORANDUM TO THE PRIME MINISTER

ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT
13 MANDELA STREET
LONDON NW1 0DW

30TH MAY 1984

INTRODUCTION

The Anti-Apartheid Movement deeply regrets the decision to invite the South African Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, to visit Britain during his tour of Western Europe. He is reported to have said that he is trying "to find a place for South Africa in the international community of nations". We do not believe that South Africa can be accepted into the international community until the system of apartheid has been eliminated. We are particularly concerned about the implications of the visit and the effect it may have on the future of British policy towards Southern Africa.

NAMIBIA

Britain has voted for a series of Security Council Resolutions on Namibia, in particular 385 (1976), 35 (1978), and 539 (1983). In supporting these resolutions Britain has accepted a special responsibility for the situation in Namibia. Furthermore, the communique of the Commonwealth Heads of Government New Delhi summit stated:

"In support of Security Council Resolution 539 (1983), Heads of Government urged members of the Contact Group to exercise their influence to secure the speedy and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). If South Africa continues to obstruct the implementation of Resolution 435 the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations will have to be considered."

In the period since November 1983, although there have been important developments in the region, South Africa has continued to obstruct the implementation of Resolution 435. There is widespread concern that South Africa may seek to impose its own settlement on the people of Namibia. The British Government needs to reaffirm explicitly that it supports the "speedy and unconditional implementation of SCR 435" and moreover, that it is prepared to apply effective pressure on South Africa to secure its implementation.

THE ARMS EMBARGO

Britain is obliged, under international law, to implement the UN Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa. Indeed, the British Government has gone further. At the New Delhi Commonwealth summit:

"Heads of Government called for a stricter enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo so as to ensure that there are no loopholes in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 418 of 1977"

We have been particularly concerned that the UK has not strictly enforced this embargo and that export licences have been granted for items of strategic use to South Africa. In this context we are particularly concerned about reports that British Aerospace and South Africa are discussing the possible delivery of Coastguarder aircraft as a replacement for the South African Air Force Shackleton fleet. We would welcome an assurance that export licences will not be granted for any replacement aircraft for the Shackleton fleet, and that the Government will ensure that the arms embargo is strengthened and strictly implemented.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

A major breach of the Gleneagles Agreement is occurring at this time, with the Rugby Football Union's English rugby tour of South Africa. We regret that the Prime Minister felt unable to follow her earlier example when she intervened personally last summer to oppose the proposed MCC tour of South Africa. It is regrettable that the meeting between the British and South African Prime Ministers which coincides with the first Test Match, will clearly give rise to widespread scepticism with regard to the seriousness of the British Government's commitment to the Gleneagles Agreement.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

The South African regime openly proclaims that its recent "accords and agreements" with some African states are a direct result of its military aggression. It is no basis for peace.

To support this process is both short-sighted and dangerous because it will only encourage those elements in South Africa which are determined to impose a "Pax Pretoria" over the entire region. Britain and the Western countries should restrain South Africa in its aggressive role and therefore support those African States which are resisting powerful pressure to succumb to it.

ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID

We are particularly concerned about the attitude of the British Government towards developments within South Africa itself. Certain recent statements by Government Ministers have caused us anxiety since they convey the impression that the position adopted at the Commonwealth summit in New Delhi in November 1983, is no longer held. The Commonwealth communique stated:

"Heads of Government were of the view that only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa."

We would welcome an assurance that the British Government policy remains unchanged and that it is committed to the eradication of apartheid and the adoption of "universal adult suffrage" for a "united and non-fragmented South Africa". We totally reject the so-called constitutional reforms being introduced by the South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha. They are designed to strengthen and entrench both the system of apartheid and the policy of bantustanisation.

The African majority are excluded from the political process and are being denied citizenship of the land of their birth. We are aware of widespread opposition to these proposals amongst the Indian and Coloured communities and we believe it is significant that referenda were not held amongst these communities, but only among the whites.

CONCLUSION

The visit by the South African Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, to Britain on June 2nd will be the first such visit to Britain since South Africa was forced out of the Commonwealth in 1961. Prior to 1961 Britain enjoyed the most cordial relations with South Africa and it was during this period that South Africa's unique system of racial tyranny was being imposed on the people of South Africa. Britain has taken a few important measures - though limited - to put pressure on South Africa. We want Britain to strengthen this aspect of its policy and work towards a programme of sanctions, as a peaceful instrument of change in order to prevent an impending racial catastrophe.

The Arusha meeting of the Heads of State and Governments of the Front Line States and the Presidents of SWAPO of Namibia and the ANC of South Africa, on 29th April 1984, provides the basis for a peaceful solution to the problem of apartheid:

"The Leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means. This can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa who are unrepresented in the present government structure of that country. A prerequisite for any such discussions would be the unconditional release from prison, detention, house arrest or 'banning' of Nelson Mandela and all other political leaders. Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African Government, there is no way to peace in Southern Africa except through discussions between the South African Government and the African people of South Africa."

The Botha regime has so far taken no steps in this direction and there is no indication that it will voluntarily do so in the future. This is why international action against apartheid should be stepped up: the present tour of P.W. Botha is intended to rehabilitate the apartheid system rather than destroy it.

subject

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cc
ccMaster

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 May 1984

Dear Sir,

Call on the Prime Minister by a Delegation
from the Anti-Apartheid Movement

Thank you for your letter of 29 May.

In the event, the delegation from the Anti-Apartheid Movement which called on the Prime Minister today consisted solely of Bishop Trevor Huddleston and Mr. Abdul Minty. The Bishop explained that in the time available the other prospective members of the delegation had not been able to alter their engagements in order to attend.

I enclose a record of the discussion.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

Yours ever
P.R.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AT 1730 HOURS ON
WEDNESDAY 30 MAY 1984 AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	Bishop Trevor Huddleston
Sir John Leahy	Mr. Abdul Minty
Mr. Coles	

The Prime Minister opened the conversation by saying that it was not necessary to attempt to convince her that apartheid was wrong. That was knocking at an open door. She hoped that Bishop Huddleston would speak freely.

Bishop Huddleston said that he was deeply grateful that the Prime Minister had agreed to receive the delegation. This was the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. In itself that was a sad story. He had hoped to see the end of apartheid in his lifetime.

It was clear from the Prime Minister's statements in New Delhi and elsewhere that her opposition to apartheid was unambiguous. She had also played a major role in bringing Zimbabwe to independence. But he was worried about the consequences for the future of the South African Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Britain. He himself had lived in South Africa during the period when the basic legislation enshrining apartheid was adopted. He had protested against these laws from inside South Africa. So naturally his own feelings were strong.

Mr. Botha had made clear that his main aim was to bring South Africa back into the international community. But he was not prepared to dismantle apartheid in any way. So the

cost of the endeavour to re-enter the international community would be paid by the Africans of South Africa. It could not be accepted that Mr. Botha should achieve this success without paying any price. It was a very grave error to give him this opportunity.

The desire to talk rather than fight was praiseworthy. But Mr. Botha had never attempted to talk to African leaders in South Africa.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement were concerned with the impact of the visit both on Africans in South Africa and on neighbouring states who had suffered from the South African policy of destabilization. The Nkomati Accord and other similar agreements had been achieved by a policy of massive aggression. South Africa had occupied a province of Angola and continued its illegal occupation of Namibia. Nor was it just a matter of occupation. The South African Government had committed very serious crimes against ordinary people in these territories.

The gravamen of his opposition to Western policy was that we had never effectively checked the South African policy of aggression. Lesotho was facing a terrible situation. Totally dependent on South Africa, it had been told to sign an agreement or else ... Similar pressure had been put on Botswana. The desperate economic situation in Mozambique, which he had visited in January, had been a powerful cause of the Nkomati Accord.

South Africa's policy was the policy of a bully. Massive aggression was applied to bring countries to their knees and force them to do a deal. As Tacitus had said "they make a desert and make it peace". Botha claimed in his propaganda that he was asking for peace but there could be no peace until apartheid was destroyed - and it could be destroyed if the will was there.

The Prime Minister said that Botswana was not economically weak nor had South Africa applied the same methods to it as it had used with other countries. Bishop Huddleston appeared to agree. He then said that he was deeply concerned that there might be some relaxation of the arms embargo. He would be grateful for a reassurance to the contrary. He also sought a reassurance that the British Government would not go back on UN Security Council Resolution 435 and its implementation in Namibia.

The basic issue was that Mr. Botha should not achieve credibility as a man of peace. Nor should South Africa be allowed to re-enter the international community until it changed its internal policies. The constitutional changes recently introduced had the effect of entrenching apartheid - four-fifths of the population would still be excluded from political rights. There was no democratic way of preventing the white minority Government from forcibly moving massive numbers of Africans.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Bishop Huddleston said that he had not been allowed back to South Africa since 1956. But he kept in close touch with, for example, the President of the African National Congress.

The Prime Minister said that industrialists informed her that industrial growth was helping to break down apartheid. The practice of job reservation had been much reduced. Bishop Huddleston said that he did not claim that nothing had changed. But the basic institutional fabric of apartheid had become more firmly entrenched.

The Prime Minister said that she was always concerned with the practical question of how one made progress - how one moved from an existing situation to the situation which was desired. It had to be remembered that countries elsewhere in Africa had been unsuccessful in the practice of democracy.

Taking up a reference by Bishop Huddleston to Tanzania, the Prime Minister said that its economic policy had been disastrous. Bishop Huddleston said that he was very prejudiced in favour of President Nimeiri. The West behaved very arrogantly towards the Third World. Since Nimeiri had tried to implement his policy of "villagisation", which was an essential policy in Tanzania, he had been accused of collectivisation and forced removals. At the same time he had been faced with world economic recession. He had worked hard for four years to secure an IMF loan but had been faced with impossible conditions. He had tried to lay the foundations for a sane society. He had also had to cope with Amin but had received no thanks for or help in that.

Returning to the Prime Minister's question as to the practical way forward, he believed that progress was infinitely easier in South Africa than it had been in former British colonies. There was a mature, reasonable African leadership. If people like Mr. Mandela and Mr. Tambo had been given an opportunity to share in Government, the country could have progressed. The real horror of apartheid was its total waste of human talent. The first step which Botha should take was to talk to his own African leadership and get these leaders out of prison and back from exile.

The Prime Minister suggested that something more sophisticated than merely talking to Mandela and Tambo would be needed. It was regrettable that South Africa had left the Commonwealth. That action had isolated them from useful influences. Bishop Huddleston said that after the Second World War Smuts could have introduced a liberal regime. But he did nothing. And the British Government had done nothing. What was the point of saying now that progress would be made through dialogue? The main step taken by the West had been to invest billions in support of the regime. When would we be prepared to say "thus far and no farther" over Namibia? The Prime Minister said that we were in no position to say this.

She recalled that we could never have brought Zimbabwe to independence without help from South Africa and from President Machel who had greatly impressed those who met him during his visit to the United Kingdom. A number of African leaders were now talking to Mr. Botha. Bishop Huddleston said that they had to. He was a bully, with massive forces. The Prime Minister said that she talked to representatives of a number of regimes of which she did not approve. The aim was to avoid the worsening of conflict in the world. She understood the point Bishop Huddleston had made about the constitutional changes. But it was not possible to solve all problems in the world at a stroke. She always preferred to look for the next practical steps. There was some movement in the right direction in South Africa.

Bishop Huddleston said that if Mr. Botha would agree to the implementation of Resolution 435 on Namibia, he would be very happy. The Prime Minister said that the South African Government did appear ready to envisage some movement. Bishop Huddleston suggested that they should be pushed further. The Prime Minister commented that the withdrawal of South African troops from Southern Angola was another helpful sign.

Bishop Huddleston said that he hoped our policy of non-recognition of the Bantustans would be maintained. The Prime Minister said that she knew of no proposal to change that policy.

Sir John Leahy, recalling his own experience of South Africa, said that that country's isolation gave it an odd perspective on the world. The only country that Mr. Botha had visited in recent years was Taiwan. The Prime Minister commented that such a situation was not healthy.

Mr. Abdul Minty said that industrial progress did present opportunities for Africans to better themselves - but this progress was not translated into political rights and the net

result was greater frustration. Each Prime Minister of South Africa was always said to be more liberal than the last. In fact, he was more oppressive. In the last two years there had been more treason trials than ever before.

The Prime Minister said that she believed that South Africa's isolation had meant that it was not exposed to influences which might make it more likely to move. It was desirable to maintain a dialogue. Bishop Huddleston said that he respected this view but he did not share it. The sports boycott had been immensely effective and had made South Africa feel that it must adjust. The real trouble was that the West was never prepared to invoke mandatory sanctions. The Prime Minister said that it would never do this. Bishop Huddleston commented that sanctions had been invoked in respect of Argentina. The Prime Minister said that that had been in a situation of war and the sanctions did not appear to have been watertight.

At the end of the meeting, Mr. Abdul Minty handed over a memorandum, a copy of which is annexed to this record.

A. J. C.

30 May 1984

GR 1200
S E C R E T
FM LUSAKA 290610Z MAY
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 310 OF 29 MAY
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON NEW YORK CAPE TOWN PRETORIA

SECRET

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Prime Minister.

A useful statement
of American views
about the Botha
visit.

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER, DATED 26 MAY AND CLASSIFIED
SECRET, FROM THE US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, DR CROCKER TO MR SQUIRE:

A.S.C. 29.
5

BEGINS

I WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU AGAIN IN
LONDON AND BONN. I KNOW THAT THE P. W. BOTHA VISIT IS NOW
OCCUPYING MUCH OF YOUR ATTENTION. I WANT TO PASS ALONG OUR
THOUGHTS -- SOME OF WHICH WE DISCUSSED IN BONN -- ON HOW THE
VISIT FITS INTO THE BROADER NEGOTIATING PICTURE IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA.

IN OUR VIEW, P W'S VISIT TO WESTERN EUROPE REPRESENTS IN
PART THE EMERGENCE OF BOTH SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTHA HIMSELF FROM
ISOLATION INTO A BROADER AND MORE OPEN WORKABLE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. IN OUR VIEW, THE NEW RELATIONSHIP
CUTS BOTH WAYS. IN A SENSE IT CONSTITUTES A SORT OF FRESH
START FOR SOUTH AFRICA INTERNATIONALLY. AT THE SAME TIME, ALTHOUGH
THERE IS SOME SENSE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS
TAKEN SOME POSITIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE EARNED IT AN IMPROVED HEARING
BY THE REST OF THE WORLD, THAT NEW RELATIONSHIP CAN ONLY DEVELOP
FURTHER IF SOUTH AFRICA RECOGNIZES THE RENEWED RESPONSIBILITY
ON ITS OWN PART TO THE REST OF THE WORLD. ACCEPTING THAT PREMISE,
IT IS INCUMBENT NOW ON US TO NOTE WHAT WE BELIEVE SOUTH AFRICA
HAS ACCOMPLISHED AND TO POINT ITS LEADERS -- STARTING WITH
P W BOTHA -- TOWARD WHAT WE BELIEVE MIGHT BE USEFUL NEXT STEPS.

IN THAT REGARD, WE HAVE RECENTLY HAD AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
BETWEEN P W BOTHA AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. IN HIS LETTER OUR
PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED FOUR POINTS: (1) OUR STRONG CONVICTION
THAT U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA (DESPITE SOME DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY)
IS THE RIGHT ONE AND OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE
SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF REGIONAL SECURITY
AND THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA,
(2) OUR VIEW OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING FIRM ON RESOLUTION
435 AND THE PARALLEL NECESSITY FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, (3)
OUR RESPECT FOR BOTSWANA'S LONG-STANDING POSITION ON CO-EXISTENCE
WITH THE SAG AND OUR HOPE THAT THE SAG WOULD NOT OVERDO ARM-
TWISTING FOR A WRITTEN PACT, AND (4) OUR STRONG CONCERN ABOUT
THE INTERNAL POLICY OF FORCED REMOVALS. (BY THE WAY, THE TERM
'FORCED REMOVALS' IS BECOMING A TRAP FOR US SINCE THE SAG MAY
BE MOVING TOWARD 'NON-COERCIVE' MEANS OF FORCING THE SAME RESULT).

SECRET

/BY

BY NOW, THE SAG-BOTSWANA TALKS APPEAR (AS OF FRIDAY, MAY 25) TO BE ON A MORE SOLID FOOTING. BUT THERE REMAINS A GENERAL POINT THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO MAKE: WE CONGRATULATE THE SAG ON THE WILL AND DETERMINATION SHOWN IN NEGOTIATING THE NKOMATI PACT AND IN MAKING IT WORK, WE HOPE OTHER NEIGHBORLY RELATIONSHIPS WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP ON A STRONG AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL FOOTING, WE URGE THE SAG TO RECOGNIZE THAT DIFFERENT FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING MAY BE APPROPRIATE WITH EACH NEIGHBOR AND WE HOPE THEY DO NOT HUG THEIR NEIGHBORS SO HARD THAT THEY TURN BLUE OR THEIR EYES POP OUT, AND WE SHARE KAUNDA'S CONCERN THAT THE SAG NOT UNDERMINE ITS OWN CREDIBILITY BY TACTICS OF THREAT AND HUMILIATION.

ON SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, WE SEE THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS A STEP FORWARD IN THE SENSE THAT THEY BROADEN PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY DO NOT DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE BLACK AFRICAN MAJORITY. WHAT DOES THE PRIME MINISTER PLAN TO DO ABOUT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY THE URBAN AFRICANS? THE RURAL AFRICANS? 'HOMELANDS' WILL NOT DO: EVEN IF ONE ACCEPTED THE PREMISE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED -- AND WE DO NOT -- THEY FUNCTION VERY BADLY. THE CISKEI IS A PRIME EXAMPLE. AND THE HOMELANDS DO NOT DEAL WITH THE FACT THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE INTEGRATED ECONOMICALLY. WE, IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SAG, DO NOT OFFER SPECIFIC PRESCRIPTION AND WE STRESS OUR CONVICTION THAT SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE A RIGHT TO SHAPE THEIR OWN FUTURE FREE FROM FOREIGN INTERVENTION. WE ALSO INDICATE THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SOME FORM OF CLEAR SIGNAL ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF BLACK POLITICAL-LEGAL RIGHTS.

YOU WILL FIND, I BELIEVE, THAT THE BOTHAS HAVE COME TO SELL AND TO ASSERT THEMSELVES, NOT TO LISTEN MEEKLY. SOME OF THIS IS STANDARD FORM. IF IT GETS OUT OF HAND, NONE OF US SHOULD LET THEM FORGET THAT THEIR CURRENT OPENINGS, REGIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF A COURAGEOUS STRATEGIC STANCE TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA BEING TAKEN BY WASHINGTON, LONDON AND SOME OTHER WESTERN CAPITALS. IN ITS CURRENT ASSERTIVE BULLISHNESS

THE SAG LEADERSHIP MAY NEED TO BE REMINDED THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED THESE THINGS ALONE AND CANNOT MAINTAIN THEM EXCEPT BY ENABLING US TO CONTINUE TO BACK AND LEGITIMIZE THE 'PEACE PROCESS'.

YOU WILL ALSO FIND THE BOTHAS IN A FUND-RAISING MOOD. THEY ARE FINDING THEIR PEACE DIPLOMACY COSTLY AND WILL PUSH FOR INDICATIONS THAT WESTERN NATIONS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT BACKING THE PROCESS ECONOMICALLY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE FOR MOZAMBIQUE ABOUT WHICH I FOUND PIK GENUINELY CONCERNED IN OUR MAY 25 MEETING. THE PORTUGUESE SHARE THAT CONCERN. YOU MAY FIND PIK AND P W PROPOSING A COORDINATED WESTERN ECONOMIC PLAN TO BOLSTER SOUTHERN AFRICA'S ECONOMIES AND SUPPORT PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. SUCH AMBITIOUS THOUGHTS PROBABLY NEED TO BE HANDLED WITH DEXTERITY SO WE DO NOT CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE ONLY IN IT FOR THE RIDE.

SECRET -2

/ 1 found.

SECRET

I FOUND PIK QUITE RELAXED ABOUT THE BLS RELATIONSHIPS AND SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE ON ZIMBABWE. THE CURRENT SAG LINE ON ZIMBABWE APPEARS ABOUT RIGHT BUT IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO PROBE IN HOPE THAT THE RIGHT THINGS ARE REITERATED.

ON NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA, I SUSPECT YOU WILL FIND THE BOTHAS FULLY ENMESHED IN THE LOGIC OF OUR EFFORT. THAT IS, THEY TOO RECOGNIZE THAT THE MPLA IS CAUGHT IN A SERIES OF VICIOUS CIRCLES WHICH CAN ONLY BE BROKEN WHEN AND IF THEY OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH UNITA. THEY ARE FAR LESS IMAGINATIVE IN THINKING ABOUT HOW TO HELP THE MPLA DEAL WITH THE DILEMNA, BUT APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE FULLY THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE DISENGAGEMENT. I BELIEVE WITH SOME CAREFUL STAGE MANAGEMENT ON OUR PART THEY ARE PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARD A NAMIBIA CESSATION OF FIGHTING AS WELL. WHILE PRESSURES MOUNT, THEY ARE NOT UNHAPPY AT CONTINUING THE MPC/SWAPO MINUET. I FOUND PI SOLID ON THE CONCEPT OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND REALISTIC ABOUT THE NEED FOR ANY NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT TO BE "ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONALLY", BUT PERHAPS LESS REALISTIC ON WHAT THAT MEANS IN PRACTICE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO REMIND THE SAG ONCE AGAIN OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING MOVEMENT THAT IS CONSISTENT (AND SEEM TO BE CONSISTENT) WITH RESOLUTION 435 WHILE WE WAIT FOR THE BIGGER PIECES TO FALL INTO PLACE. I WILL OF COURSE LET YOU KNOW HOW WE STAND WITH THE MPLA AFTER LUSAKA IN THE EVENT THERE ARE FURTHER POINTS TO BE MADE ON HOW THE SAG CAN HELP TRIGGER THE NECESSARY DECISIONS IN LUANDA. I SENSED THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THE LIMITS OF SIMPLY CONTINUING TO PRESS THE MPLA'S BACK AGAINST THE WALL, BUT DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR SENSE OF WHAT ELSE TO DO AND THAT APPROACH COMES NATURALLY.

ENDS.

JOHNSON

LIMITED

SAFD

PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

³
SECRET

B.R.

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of South African Prime Minister

As you know, he has asked for a private talk of 15 minutes at the outset.

You will wish to consider whether there should be a notetaker present. Mr. Botha clearly wants a completely private talk. I see no objection to that provided it is reasonably short. You could be embarrassed afterwards if you had a long private talk and the South Africans revealed this as evidence of the friendliness of the occasion.

Content to have a private talk of some 15 minutes without notetakers?

Yes not

A.P.C.

f.a.

[Signature] 20
5.

29 May 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 May, 1984

Dear John,

A.J.C. 20/5

p.a.

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: Anti-Apartheid
Movement

Thank you for your letter of 24 May informing us that a delegation from the Anti-Apartheid Movement may call on the Prime Minister at 5 pm on 30 May. I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister accordingly.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement have fiercely opposed Mr Botha's visit. The delegation will no doubt wish to reiterate their disagreement with the invitation to Mr Botha, and then present their own view of the key issues, possibly seeking commitments for the Prime Minister about the line she will take. We recommend that the Prime Minister should in general avoid giving any commitments, while leaving the delegation in no doubt of the firmness of her resolve.

Sir John Leahy or Mr Squire are ready to attend if an adviser is required.

I am copying this letter and brief to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE
ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: 5PM ON 30 MAY

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Understand your concern at Mr Botha's visit. But no sense in which this visit condones apartheid or confers respectability on South Africa's racial policies.
2. The Government's commitment to racial equality in the UK is unquestionable. Mr Botha's visit does not diminish this.
3. Firmly believe in dialogue. Important issues on which we wish to influence South Africa: Namibia, South Africa's relations with its neighbours, internal policies. Wrong not to take this opportunity to put our views across to Mr Botha. Sanctions, further isolation, will not produce the results we all want.
4. Exposure to views of number of Western countries very important: will dispel any doubts Mr Botha has about Western attitudes to apartheid.

Namibia

5. Government's commitment to an early settlement on the basis of SCR 435 is clear.
6. South African disengagement from Angola almost complete. Meets immediate Angolan security concern. Indispensable



first step towards Namibia settlement.

7. Vital that other issues blocking settlement are now tackled. May not like South African/US demand for agreement on Cuban withdrawal, but the issue cannot be ducked.

8. An enduring settlement must ^{be} negotiated: cannot be imposed.

South Africa's Relations with its Neighbours

9. Encouraged by Nkomati Accord (SA/Mozambique security agreement). Condemn violence, believe in dialogue. Long made this clear to South Africans.

10. Important that benefits flow to both sides. Watching implementation closely.

11. South Africans aware of our concern that neighbours must not be pressed into agreements.

SA Internal

12. Firm belief in need for progress towards system of government which has support of majority of South Africans.

13. New constitution: recognise serious shortcoming (no role for South African blacks). But think it wrong to condemn. Better to judge after new constitution has been put to the test.

Human Rights

14. South Africans in no doubt of our repugnance for human rights abuses involved in apartheid system.
15. Nelson Mandela: deplore imprisonment of people for their political views. Mandela's release would be an important gesture of national reconciliation.
16. Forced relocations: deeply repugnant aspect of apartheid.

Arms Sales: Coastguarder Aircraft

17. General: have honoured and will continue to honour our obligations under Arms Embargo.

18. Coastguarders: not our practice to give decisions on hypothetical proposals. No approach from South African Government or British Aerospace for an export licence for Coastguarders. Will consider any application on its merits. But will fully honour our obligations under Arms Embargo.

ANC Office in London

19. ANC members are free to live and work here providing they observe our laws.

Improper Activities by the South African Embassy

20. Concerned at improper or illegal activities by members of any diplomatic mission in London.

21. Where allegations of improper activity are supported by evidence, they will be investigated. Where the evidence is



substantiated, appropriate action will be taken.



THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE
ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: 5PM ON 30 MAY

BACKGROUND

1. The Anti-Apartheid Movement are opposed to Mr Botha's visit to the UK. They believe it confers respectability on South African policies, and condones apartheid. They regard it as an insult to the UK's own black community. In seeking a meeting with the Prime Minister, their concern, now that they know the Prime Minister will not recind the invitation, is probably to seek commitments about the line she will take on key issues. They may urge the need for economic sanctions. The Prime Minister will probably wish to avoid making any commitments, though she may wish to stress the firmness of her approach on the issues which concern the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and to indicate in general terms her attitude to them.

Namibia

2. The Anti-Apartheid Movement will regard Namibia as at an impasse, and be extremely sceptical about the motives for the current withdrawal of South African forces from Angola; they are vehemently opposed to any linkage with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. In contrast, we regard the South African withdrawal as meeting an immediate Angolan security concern and as an indispensable first step towards the implementation of SCR 435. While we do not condone linkage, we also believe that this issue cannot be avoided.



3. South African withdrawal from Angola is expected to be completed in the next few days. Diplomatic activity concerning Namibia is at a high level: the US/Angola dialogue is very much alive and well (NOT FOR USE: The US and Angolans met in Lusaka on 28 May), SWAPO and the Namibian Internal Parties met in Lusaka under President Kaunda's chairmanship in mid-May, and the South Africans and Angolans met in Lusaka on 21 May. There is considerable suspicion between the parties, and the Cuban issue remains a major obstacle to further progress. The US/Angola dialogue seems to hold out the best hope of further movement.

South Africa's Relations with its Neighbours

4. The AAM regard the Nkomati Accord (South Africa/Mozambique security agreement) as an unequal agreement forced on Mozambique after a period of South African-stimulated destabilisation. They are concerned that similar agreements will be exacted from other countries in the region. We believe that although South African pressures play an important part in persuading Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord, other factors (the failure of Mozambique's economic policies, the lack of substantial Soviet economic aid, Western pressures on South Africa to change policies and negotiate not bully) also played their role. Our concern now is that Nkomati should be made to work, and bring clear benefits to Mozambique. We are also anxious South Africa should exercise restraint in its policies towards other neighbours (eg: Botswana, Lesotho) and not impose unreasonable pressures to exact similar security agreements.

South Africa Internal

5. The AAM believe that far from initiating reform Mr P W Botha has strengthened the apartheid system. They condemn the new South African constitution (which brings Indians and Coloureds into a new tricameral parliament, and creates a powerful Executive Presidency, without diminishing white control - there are no concessions to political rights for blacks). We fully recognise the serious shortcomings of the new constitution, and have acknowledged these publicly. But we have declined to condemn it, believing that it should be judged only after it has been put to the test.

Human Rights

6. Nelson Mandela is the imprisoned leader of the banned African National Congress (ANC).

7. Forced relocations: independent studies suggest that nearly 3½ million people have been relocated in South Africa since 1960, many to the homelands. The South African Government itself puts the number of removals at about 2 million, and have admitted that there has been an element of force in some. Removals mostly involve Africans, though some Indians and Coloureds have also been affected. This is one of the most unpleasant aspects of apartheid. There are numerous categories of people who have been subject to removal eg those living in black spots (black areas surrounded by white ones), surplus farm workers, "legal" and "illegal" residents of urban squatter camps and other townships. Recent examples to attract publicity are Magopa



and the recently announced plans to remove the blacks settled
in the squatter camp at Crossroads near Cape Town to a new
black township in the Western Cape.

Arms Sales: Supply of Coastguarder Aircraft

8. Press reports have recently suggested that the South Africans are interested in purchasing British Aerospace Coastguarder aircraft to replace their aging fleet of Shackleton maritime surveillance aircraft. British Aerospace have reportedly confirmed that discussions have taken place with the South Africans about the purchase of a number of Coastguarders. No export licence application has been submitted.

9. Mr Robert Hughes MP, chairman of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, wrote to Mr Rifkind recently seeking a commitment that the Coastguarders would not be supplied. Mr Rifkind responded that it was not the Government's practice to give decisions on hypothetical cases, and that any export licence application would be considered on its merits, while stressing the Government's determination to honour fully its obligations under the UN Arms Embargo.

10. Mr Hughes has since written again, pressing for the commitment he sought. He and other members of the AAM are doubtful of the Government's commitment to the Arms Embargo. They believe the recent supply of Marconi and Plessey radar equipment (in both cases for civil air traffic control) represented a breach of the Embargo. The Government has repeatedly affirmed that supply of this equipment did not



represent any such breach.

ANC Office in London

11. The South African press has recently been highly critical of our tolerance of an office of the ANC in London. The South Africans allege this is the centre for the planning of terrorist activity in South Africa. (NOT FOR USE: The South African Government last year formally approached us to seek closure of the ANC office and expulsion of ANC members from the UK. Ministers declined to do this.) The AAM may seek a commitment that the Prime Minister will reject any proposal from Mr Botha to close the ANC office here.

Improper Activities by the South African Embassy

12. The AAM believe that the South African Embassy in London is a centre for intelligence operations against the ANC and SWAPO offices here, and against members of the AAM itself; it is also a centre for improper propoganda and other activities. Robert Hughes MP, chairman of the AAM, recently wrote to the Secretary of State enclosing two memoranda on such activities and referring to allegations made in an ITV programme "The British Desk" broadcast earlier this month. Although there was nothing new in the material supplied by Mr Hughes, in reply to him the Secretary of State has reaffirmed the Government's determination not to tolerate improper activities by members of the South African or other embassies, and its readiness to take appropriate action where the evidence justifies this. (NOT FOR USE: The Secretary of State has recommended that the Prime Minister should raise the question of improper activities by members of the South African Embassy with Mr Botha during his visit.)

2



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

Prime Minister.

Dear Mr. Coles,

A.S.C. 29/5

mo

VISIT BY MR P W BOTHA

I attach a copy of an extract from the House of Lords Official Report for Tuesday, 22 May. As you can see from the passage indicated in column 142, Lord Elton undertook to draw to the Prime Minister's attention the point made by Lord Hatch of Lusby on the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Botha.

Yours sincerely,

P. J. Goulden

PATRICK GOULDER
Assistant Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq.



FILE
da

cc PJ

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 May 1984

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 24 May about the additional members of the South African Prime Minister's party who wish to be on hand at Chequers.

There is no difficulty about this. We shall be glad to make suitable arrangements and a separate lunch will be provided. It would, however, be helpful if we could have names of all those concerned.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RB



file ECL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 May 1984

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Chairman of the United Kingdom-Botswana Society. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply as soon as possible.

SF |

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NW

SOUTHERN AFRICA: ADVANCE COPIES 14

PS

MR A J S GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

PS/Mr RIFKIND

PS/NO.10 DOWNING STREET

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

MR ADAMS

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFØ

HD/UNØ

HD/NEWS D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADV. Rm. WH216

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 650

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 281700Z

MASERU 290800Z

CAPETOWN 290800Z

FM GABORONE 281500Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 117 OF 28 MAY 1984

AND TO IMMEDIATE MASERU AND CAPETOWN.

MY TELNO 115: BOTSWANA AIDE MEMOIRE ON RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

S U M M A R Y

1. AT THE BOTSWANA/SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 24 MAY ON SECURITY QUESTIONS BOTSWANA AGAIN FENDED OFF DEMANDS FOR A FORMAL TREATY BUT RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN PRESSURE IS POSSIBLE.

D E T A I L

2. THE FOLLOWING POINTS COME FROM A DISCUSSION TODAY WITH GAREBAMONO, PERMANENT SECRETARY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING ON 24 MAY.

3. AT THE MEETING PIK BOTHA WAS INITIALLY EXTREMELY AGGRESSIVE AND THREATENING BUT AFTER THE THEATRICALS (THE TERM USED SUBSEQUENTLY BY SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS) IT WAS AGREED THAT MEETINGS WOULD RESUME ON SECURITY QUESTIONS BETWEEN OFFICIALS TO WORK OUT SOME PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE BOTSWANA DREW SOME COMFORT FROM BOTHA'S AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS PRACTICAL RESULTS THAT MATTERED RATHER THAN WRITTEN AGREEMENTS, BUT THEY DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT AS AT THE LAST MEETING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN APRIL THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL COME UP WITH A PROPOSAL FOR A WRITTEN AGREEMENT.

~~BY THE LAST MEETING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN APRIL THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL COME UP WITH A PROPOSAL FOR A WRITTEN AGREEMENT.~~

IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS PROPOSE THAT ANY AGREEMENT, FORMAL OR INFORMAL, SHOULD INCLUDE THE RIGHT OF INCURSION FOR SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES, IT WILL BE REJECTED.

4. AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING PIK BOTHA THREATENED THAT THE SODA ASH AGREEMENT WAS AT STAKE, THOUGH FORMALLY IT APPEARS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN THE GO AHEAD FOR THE BP PROJECT AT SOAPAN. GAREBANO SAID AS MUCH ABOUT THE GO AHEAD, BUT I HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM BP HERE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT DE VILLIERS, THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER FOR MINERALS, GAVE THE GO AHEAD IN WRITING ON 2 APRIL SAYING THAT THE PROJECT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SYNTHETIC SODA ASH IN SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN SHELVED. THE APPROVAL WAS CONVEYED THROUGH BP SOUTH AFRICA. BP HERE SAY THAT THERE SHOULD NOT NOW BE A SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OBSTACLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT BUT THE BATSWANA REALISTICALLY STILL FEAR THAT SINCE IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE BP WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE ON TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FULL PROJECT AND THE MAJOR INVESTMENT (THEY ARE JUST STARTING THE PILOT PROJECT STAGE), THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT STILL HAVE TIME TO THROW A SPANNER IN THE WORKS.

5. INCIDENTALLY THE BOTSOWANA GOVERNMENT AND BP HERE (QUOTING BP IN SOUTH AFRICA) BELIEVE THAT PIK BOTHA IS THE PRINCIPAL MOVER IN TRYING TO LINK THE SOAPAN PROJECT WITH A SECURITY AGREEMENT. BOTH CLAIM EVIDENCE OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN DE VILLIERS AND PIK BOTHA. BP CLAIM THAT P W BOTHA HIMSELF GAVE THE GO AHEAD TO THE BOTSOWANA PROJECT. THE BP VIEW IS SAID TO BE THAT PIK BOTHA IS ON A PERSONAL AGGRANDISEMENT CAMPAIGN WHICH OTHER MINISTERS ARE HAPPY TO OBSTRUCT. BATSOWANA OFFICIALS THINK THAT IT IS PERHAPS MORE LIKELY THAT PIK BOTHA HAS UNDERTAKEN TO DELIVER ACCORDS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES AND IS VULNERABLE IF HE FAILS.

6. THE BATSOWANA ARE AWARE (FROM NEW YORK) THAT LESOTHO IS LIKELY TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICA VERY SOON. GAREBANO THOUGHT - NATURALLY - THAT SIGNATURE WOULD INCREASE THE PRESSURES ON BOTSOWANA TO SIGN. HE THOUGHT FRONT LINE STATES WOULD SYMPATHISE WITH LESOTHO IN THEIR PREDICAMENT BUT HE THOUGHT NKOMATI-TYPE MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM FLS WERE UNLIKELY (MY TELNO 116 REFERS)..

7. GAREBANO ASKED ME WHETHER THE UK HAD TAKEN ACTION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN RESPONSE TO THE BOTSOWANA REQUEST MADE BY PRESIDENT MASIRE ON 14 MAY. HE SAID THAT AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD SPOKEN TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS. GRATEFUL FOR INFORMATION. THE WORDING OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE VIRTUALLY ASKED FOR THIS TO BE RAISED WITH P W BOTHA.

JONES

MR. COLES

cc Mr. Barclay

South African Briefing Meeting

I shall not be in on Tuesday until 1100.
I could not get anybody in the Foreign Office today so the Foreign Secretary, Rifkind, Acland and Leahy have not been invited.

The Home Office, Department of Trade, and Ministry of Defence are all sending substitutes and they will let us know the names next week.

CS

CR CR.
Alison has this
in hand: FCS
may be a bit late.

25 May 1984

ImB
29/5

Mr. Jarley.

~~Mr. Ryden~~
9.45

Please invite to the
South African briefing meeting:-

Foreign Secretary
Mrs Ryden
Mr. Diphind
Could you please
invite these?
Sir A. Ireland
Sir J. Leahy
I am holding
9.45 on
1 June.

Home Secretary ✓
Dub Trade Secretary as a ✓
24/5
substitute
Paul Channon.

✓ Home Secretary as a
substitute.

A. J. C. $\frac{24}{5}$

MR. COLES

I have spoken to Chequers about a lunch for Mr. Botha's supporting staff.

There is no problem. They will be given a buffet lunch in Vera's sitting room.

CR.

25 May 1984

25 May 1984

Visit of Mr. Botha, South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 24 May regarding a present.

There is no print of Chequers available. Could you ask the South African desk to come up with another idea. It might be wise to warn them that as soon as I put their recommendations to John Coles they may have to make the purchase themselves.

Caroline Ryder

Mrs. Alison Walters,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

h

SECRET

Prime Minister

AJC o/R

A.F.C. 12/5.



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

24 May 1984

3

Dear John,

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for copying to us your letter of 9 May to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about the security arrangements for Mr Botha's visit.

Plans for Mr Botha's personal protection are proceeding on the basis that he will be under a greater threat than are most visiting dignitaries. At this stage there is no known specific threat to Mr Botha's safety. A firmer assessment of the threat against him will be made nearer the date of the visit, taking account of up to the minute intelligence reports.

The detailed arrangements so far made by the police are as follows:

- (a) the South African party will arrive at Heathrow South Side in a specially chartered Boeing aircraft of South African Airways. Those travelling to Chequers will then transfer to a Sikorsky helicopter chartered from Lord Hanson's company, Air Hanson;
- (b) arrangements have been made for a specialist military team to search the helicopter for explosives, after which it will be secured by the police;
- (c) the Special Branch protection team will be backed up by armed officers who will also be available to escort the party to Chequers should weather conditions rule out a helicopter flight. Protected cars will be on hand for this eventuality.
- (d) the Special Branch officer in charge of protection for this visit will fly in the helicopter as will one South African protection officer. The back-up team on the ground will travel to Chequers by road in case a return to Heathrow by helicopter is not possible. I understand

SECRET 1.

2.

that the two officers leading the protection team and making the detailed arrangements for this visit, Detective Superintendent Russell and Detective Inspector Strevens, have performed protection duties for the Prime Minister on previous occasions.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement are planning a major demonstration in London on the afternoon of Saturday, 2 June and have discussed their plans with the Metropolitan Police. At present, the plan is that people should assemble at Speakers' Corner at noon, proceeding to march via Park Lane, Piccadilly, Trafalgar Square, Whitehall, and Westminster Bridge to Jubilee Gardens where there will be a meeting between 1600 and 1700 hours, after which people will disperse. The organisers are expecting about 10,000 supporters. The police are working on information to establish their own estimate, but in any event will devote considerable resources to the operation, not least since the route of the march will pass South Africa House. A petition is to be handed into No 10 during the march's progress down Whitehall.

*In the Sunday Times this weekend!
AD 29.
5*

The Prime Minister asked that the fact that the luncheon is to be at Chequers should be closely protected. We have no evidence that this has become public knowledge. But the organisers of the demonstration, either by their own deduction or that of the media, have made plans to send a contingent to Chequers. They plan to send two coach-loads of their supporters there from London. Thames Valley Police, who are liaising closely with the Metropolitan Police, are fully aware of these plans. Arrangements are being made for an appropriate police operation in the Chequers area. The current police view is that the organisers will not wish to diminish too much the impact of the main event in London and that Chequers will probably attract a "token" demonstration.

Both the Metropolitan Police and Thames Valley will report further next week, and I will inform you immediately of the latest information about the threat assessment, and demonstrators' plans, and the consequential planning by both forces, as well, of course, as being in touch with you about any subsequent developments.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Len Appleyard.

Hugh Taylor

H H TAYLOR

A J Coles, Esq.

GR 200

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242215Z MAY 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 538 OF 24 MAY

INFO CAPE TOWN, BONN

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, BRUSSELS, LISBON, BERNE

FROM MARGETSON

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRIME MINISTER:

VISIT OF MR BOTHA

1. IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCHEON TODAY, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ASKED ME TO PASS A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
2. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN WORRIED BY RECENT SIGNS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE CASTING ABOUT FOR WAYS OF MAKING PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA OTHER THAN BY THOSE ENSHRINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. HE HAD TALKED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAD ADMITTED THAT WHILST MR BOTHA FELT BOUND BY SCR 435, HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE HAPPY IF SOME OTHER MEANS OF DEALING WITH NAMIBIA COULD BE FOUND. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WANTED THEREFORE TO RE-EMPHASISE TO THE PRIME MINISTER THE POINT HE HAD MADE WHEN THEY MET IN LONDON, NAMELY THAT SCR 435 WAS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE AND THAT HE HOPED THAT ALL OUR EFFORTS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THAT RESOLUTION. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE SENDING SIMILAR MESSAGES TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF ALL THE COUNTRIES WHICH MR BOTHA WOULD BE VISITING IN WESTERN EUROPE (HE HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE GERMAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) SO THAT MR BOTHA WOULD BE FACED BY AN UNITED FRONT ON THIS PARTICULAR POINT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO BRUSSELS, LISBON AND BERNE.

THOMSON

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

R 29/5

17 Winchmore Drive
Trumpington
CAMBRIDGE CB2 2LW

Mr Coles
29/5

24 May 1984

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
10, Downing Street
LONDON, S.W.1.

Dear Prime Minister,

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

In view of Mr. P. W. Botha's impending visit to London, I write as Chairman of the United Kingdom-Botswana Society to express concern at recent reports that the South African Government is seeking by means of economic and political pressure to induce the Government of Botswana to sign a non-aggression treaty. As you will be aware, the President of Botswana has stated clearly his view that for Botswana to enter into such a treaty would be unnecessary and inappropriate.

Botswana's foreign policy in the eighteen years since the country's independence has commanded widespread international respect. It has been characterised by two key elements: sustained and consistent opposition to apartheid and minority rule and refusal to allow Botswana's territory to be used as a springboard for armed attacks against its neighbours. President Masire has recently reiterated in the strongest possible terms his denial that the African National Congress or any other anti-South African group is operating from bases in Botswana. South Africa knows very well that its security is in no way threatened by Botswana. We are forced to conclude therefore that South Africa's

/...

objective in pressing the Botswana Government to enter into a non-aggression pact is to undermine the integrity and credibility of Botswana's position. We also understand that South Africa is attempting to use the renegotiation of the Customs Union Agreement with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to secure recognition of the Bantustans.

You have identified the internal situation in South Africa as a cause of tension in the region. We welcome your recent statement in the House of Commons that you will take the opportunity of the visit to London of the South African Prime Minister to repeat the British Government's disapproval of apartheid. Such statements encourage us to hope that in your discussions with Mr. Botha you will find it possible to emphasise the positive role which Botswana plays in the affairs of Southern Africa and to urge him not to take advantage of Botswana's economic dependence on South Africa in an effort to change the political stance of its Government.

Britain and Botswana enjoy close and friendly relations at both governmental and non-governmental levels and the two countries are united by their common belief in democracy and the rule of law and by their opposition to racial injustice. Britain is justly proud of its record in defending the freedom of small countries threatened by powerful neighbours. We hope that the British Government will do all in its power to ensure that Botswana is allowed to conduct its foreign affairs free from intimidation. Botswana's voice of reason and humanity makes an important and positive contribution to the resolution of Southern African problems, and must not be silenced.

Yours sincerely,
Eleanor J. Emery

Miss E. J. Emery, C.M.G.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 May 1984

Dear Caroline .

Your letter of 21 May asked for recommendations about a present for the South African Prime Minister.

We understand that the South Africans have not yet made a firm decision on what gift Mr Botha will present to the Prime Minister, but the Embassy in London have recommended a small piece of jewellery, possibly made from gold of which South Africa is a major producer.

We consider that something less personal would be more appropriate for Mrs Thatcher to give to Mr Botha and recommend a print, preferably of Chequers if one is in existence, or its immediate environs.

Alison J Walters

Alison J Walters (Mrs)
Assistant Private Secretary

Caroline Ryder
10 Downing Street

OLD

cc PC
PJ



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mr. Botha

Could you pl. ask Vera

24 May 1984

whether she can give

these people an office - and

lunch in a side room?

Joe [Signature]

A.D.C. $\frac{26}{5}$

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

The South Africans have asked whether, in addition to the main party of 7 (on which I have written to you separately), five other members of the South African Prime Minister's party could travel to Chequers and be on hand during Mr Botha's lunch with the Prime Minister. The five include 2 private secretaries, 2 security officers, and Mr P W Botha's personal physician.

The South Africans do not of course expect these five to be invited to the lunch. But they wish them to be nearby, and in particular have asked that the private secretaries should be on hand so that Mr Botha or his Foreign Minister can consult them or refer to papers which they will be carrying. We have pointed out that, as we understand it, such an arrangement would be unusual, particularly since the 7 proposed for the main lunch include a private secretary. The South Africans are however insistent and we undertook to consult you further. I should be grateful for your advice.

The South Africans understand that it would not be possible for any additional member of the South African party to travel in the helicopter from Heathrow to Chequers, and accept that such persons must travel by road in the back-up transport which we are arranging, and which will go to Chequers to be on hand for the return journey if needed.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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cc PC

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1984

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 23 May.

The Prime Minister will be glad to have a short private talk with Mr. Botha at the beginning of the Chequers meeting.

We envisage that talk beginning at 1145. We shall allow space in the diary until 1530 in case all this time is required.

There is no difficulty about increasing the South African party at lunch to a total of seven. We are disposed to keep the UK team as it is, i.e. a total of six.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you, the Rt Hon Barbara Castle MEP, the Rt Hon Lord Ennals and the Rt Hon David Steel MP for your letter of 15 May and to say that she would be willing to meet you and the three former Presidents of the Anti-Apartheid Movement before the visit by the South African Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher could receive you at 5 o'clock pm on 30 May. Could you kindly let me know whether this is convenient.

A. J. COLES

The Right Reverend Trevor Huddleston CR

Subject "marke
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Jov.

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OO ADDIS ABABA

RR CAPE TOWN

RR LAGOS

RR NAIROBI

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T86 B/84

GRS 249

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241545Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 24 MAY

INFO CAPE TOWN, LAGOS, NAIROBI, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT MESSAGE TO CHAIRMAN MENGISTU FROM PRIME MINISTER

1. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO
BRITAIN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER. I AM CONCERNED TO
DISPEL ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THIS.

OUR INVITATION WAS ISSUED AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.
LIKE YOU, WE WISH TO SEE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND HAVE
CONSISTENTLY AND FIRMLY OPPOSED THE RACIAL POLICIES THERE. WE
HAVE MADE EQUALLY CLEAR OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE
IN THE REGION FROM ANY QUARTER. WE SHALL BE REITERATING OUR
VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS DURING MR BOTHA'S VISIT.

DIALOGUE AND CONTACT IS CENTRAL TO OUR POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN
AFRICA, AS INDEED ELSEWHERE. WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY WELCOMED THE
RECENT TALKS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS AND BELIEVE
THESE CAN AND SHOULD BRING BENEFITS TO ALL THE COUNTRIES
INVOLVED. THESE DEVELOPMENTS LEND WEIGHT TO OUR BELIEF THAT
IT IS RIGHT FOR US TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF MR BOTHA'S VISIT
TO EUROPE TO EXPLAIN OUR POLICIES TO HIM, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.
WE SHALL BE SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S
THINKING ON ISSUES OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO AFRICA, INCLUDING
INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

21831 - 1

STATES, AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. I HOPE
THAT MY DISCUSSIONS WILL HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THESE ISSUES.
END

HOWE
NNNN
DISTRIBUTION
LIMITED
PS
SAFD
EAD
OAD'S

PUSD
PS/MR RIFKIND
SIR J LEAHY
MR SQUIRE



4:30 PM
JUNE 11 1971

Subject a matter
of

TOP COPY

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21820 - 1

OO LAGOS
RR CAPETOWN
RR HARARE
RR LUSAKA
RR DAR ES SALAAM
RR GABORONE
GRS 480
CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T86C/84

FROM FCO 241500Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 324 OF 24 MAY
INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK, HARARE, LUSAKA,
DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE.

OUR TELNO 307 AND YOUR TELNO 412: MR BOTHA'S VISIT

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BUHARI FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK ON 2 JUNE.

I WAS AWARE THAT MY DECISION TO INVITE MR BOTHA HERE DURING
HIS EUROPEAN TOUR MIGHT BE MISUNDERSTOOD. I HAD THEREFORE
EARLIER WRITTEN TO YOU, AS TO SOME OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS IN
AFRICA, TO EXPLAIN PERSONALLY MY REASONS FOR THIS DECISION.
I KNOW THAT DELIVERY OF THIS LETTER WAS DELAYED BECAUSE YOU WERE
AWAY BUT I HOPE YOU HAVE NOW HAD TIME TO CONSIDER IT. I BELIEVED
THAT MY PERSONAL EXPLANATION OF THE MOTIVES FOR THE INVITATION
WOULD HELP YOU TO UNDERSTAND IT AND REASSURE YOU ABOUT THE
DISCUSSIONS WHICH I SHALL BE HAVING WITH MR BOTHA.

MY ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR.
THERE IS NO SENSE IN WHICH THIS VISIT CAN BE REGARDED AS
CONDONING OR CONFERRING RESPECTABILITY ON THIS POLICY. MOREOVER,
COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HAVE MADE
CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE
SOUTH AFRICA TO CHANGE ITS INTERNAL POLICIES, LIVE IN PEACE WITH
ITS NEIGHBOURS AND AGREE TO THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN

CONFIDENTIAL

21820 - 1

PLAN FOR NAMIBIA. I CAN SEE NO BETTER WAY OF DOING THIS THAN BY SPEAKING APPROPRIATELY TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AT THIS IMPORTANT MOMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS. I CONSIDER IT RIGHT THAT BRITAIN AS AN INFLUENTIAL AND FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH (TO USE YOUR OWN WORDS) SHOULD MAKE USE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANY OF ITS MEMBERS WHO HAVE IN THE PAST SUFFERED FROM SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS.

MR BOTHA HAS TRAVELLED LITTLE OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA. HIS EXPOSURE TO THE VIEWS OF A NUMBER OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THE VISIT TO GERMANY IS NOT A VISIT TO A COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY: BUT SOUTH AFRICA VALUES ITS RELATIONS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL'S GOVERNMENT (AS WITH THE PORTUGUESE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HE WILL SEE), AND WILL FOR THIS REASON BE IMPRESSED BY WHAT THEY SAY.

LASTLY, I HAVE NOTED THAT A NIGERIAN PUBLIC STATEMENT ON MR BOTHA'S VISIT STATES THAT THIS VISIT AND THE ENGLISH RUGBY TOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA ARE PART OF A 'COORDINATED POLICY TO GIVE COMFORT TO APARTHEID'. I ASSURE YOU THAT IS NOT TRUE. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO DISCOURAGE THE ENGLISH RUGBY FOOTBALL UNION FROM THEIR TOUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMMITMENT TO THE COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR INTERNATIONAL SPORT GENERALLY.

I SHALL SPEAK FRANKLY WITH MR BOTHA, AND I HOPE THAT MY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM WILL HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE ISSUES I HAVE MENTIONED.
ENDS.

HOWE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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OADS	ECD
MCAD	SOV D
UND	EED
NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

ECL



cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1984

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER -
ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

Thank you for your letter of 22 May. The Prime Minister has agreed to receive the delegation from the Anti-Apartheid Movement. We shall be offering them the time of 5 o'clock pm on 30 May.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

ALCOLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



xref

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1984

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER:
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from the President of Tanzania about the forthcoming visit of the South African Prime Minister. I shall be grateful for your advice on a reply.

in box

DF

RECEIVED

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. F78AA/84

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

cc Ops
Master.

12th May 1984

Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.,
U.K.

Prime Minister.
We shall let you have
a reply. All ve/s

ms

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

As you will shortly be having discussions about Southern Africa with Prime Minister Botha of South Africa, it occurred to me that the Tanzanian view of recent events in that area might be of interest to you. You may also find relevant the Communique issued at the end of the Front Line States' Summit Meeting held in Arusha at the end of April, a copy of which I am enclosing with this letter.

Our reaction to the Angolan/South African agreement on the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, and to the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa, is of course shaped by our implacable opposition to colonialism in Africa, and to apartheid. The priority we give to these matters, and the intensity of our feelings, are not shared by peoples and nations outside Africa, yet I know that successive British Governments - and you yourself - have condemned apartheid in clear terms, and have taken part in international efforts to bring South Africa's occupation of Namibia to an end. I therefore think that you will understand the anxiety with which we watch the reactions to recent events on the part of our friends in Europe and America, and our concern that these should not be such as to result in further damage to any of the Front Line States or the Liberation Movements.

Angola and Mozambique are independent sovereign states; they are active opponents of apartheid and of the South African occupation of Namibia. As a result they have for years been subjected to ever increasing South African military attacks and to South African organised, armed, and financed destabilisation activities. The suffering of their peoples, and the destruction of their economies, resulting from these South African activities have been almost beyond computation. And they have come on top of the economic problems which now face all Third World countries. In the case of Mozambique, years of drought and finally a cyclone have been additional difficulties.

The resulting burden has been more than any people, or any state, could bear. Angola and Mozambique have been forced to give way to force majeure - to aggression which they were powerless to defeat, and which the rest of the world was allowing to continue. In order to get South African troops out of Southern Angola, the Luanda Government has had to accept conditions which restrict its sovereign rights within its own territory. In order to get South Africa to promise not to repeat its military attacks on Mozambique and not to continue arming and supplying the M.N.R. bandits, the Mozambique Government has been forced to act as policeman for South Africa against the African National Congress and to change its policy as regards the economic boycott of South Africa.

We in Tanzania do not criticise Angola or Mozambique. On the contrary, we sympathise with both these free African countries. But we are concerned that their need to get a respite from South African aggression should not be used as an excuse for the reduction of the Sports Boycott or other pressures on South Africa. For racialism remains the same evil, and the same danger to international peace, that it has always been. And the South African occupation of Namibia remains as illegal and as oppressive as it has always been.

The Angolan agreement means that the South African troops have less far to go when Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia is implemented; but the world still has to force South Africa to begin the implementation. The Nkomati Accord does not reduce the support which the African National Congress receives from the majority of the South African people, nor lessen the likelihood of counter-violence inside that country as the majority of the people try to resist the violence of apartheid and eventually to overthrow that evil.

Thus the real problems in Southern Africa have not been tackled, much less solved, by the Angolan and Mozambican agreements with South Africa. All that has happened is that South African aggression has inflicted a defeat upon two of its much weaker neighbours. There is no reason to suppose that South Africa will now voluntarily desist from either direct or covert attack upon other African states - or even from again attacking Angola and Mozambique. On the contrary, there are already strong indications of increasing pressure from South Africa on Botswana and Lesotho. Aggression, like other evils, grows stronger from what it feeds upon.

In the immediate aftermath of successful actions it is not unusual for the aggressors of this world to seek the approval of respected or powerful leaders, and in order to get it they are not usually unwilling to give assurances about their future behaviour. Hitler himself did this after each new bite into the map of Europe.

P.W. Botha is coming to Europe for that purpose now. He is seeking approval for his 'generosity and statesmanship' in withdrawing his troops from Angola for the time being - albeit on conditions. He is seeking approval for having promised not to continue aggressive actions against Mozambique - again on conditions. His purpose will be achieved if despite these actions he is accepted by you and other European leaders as a respected leader of a respectable country. I therefore take advantage of our friendship and the good relations between our two countries to express a hope. It is that you will be able to prevent Britain's usual courteous reception to foreign leaders from being misunderstood by indicating, both publicly and privately, Britain's strong opposition to South Africa's aggressive policies towards other African states, as well as to apartheid itself. And I hope that it will be possible for you to make a clear call for South Africa's immediate and unconditional compliance with Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia.

This letter comes with my warm personal greetings and good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Front Line States' Summit Meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, on Sunday 29th April 1984 to consider the recent developments in Southern Africa. The Heads of State and Government Present were: President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the People's Republic of Angola; President Quett Masire of the Republic of Botswana; President Samora Machel of People's Republic of Mozambique; President Julius K. Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania; President Kenneth Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Also in attendance were: Comrade Oliver Tambo, President of A.N.C.; Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO of Namibia.

The leaders stood for one minute of silence in tribute to the late Edward Moringe Sokoine, whose very valuable and practical contributions to the liberation struggle of Southern Africa will be greatly missed by the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of Liberation Movements reaffirmed their total and unqualified commitment to the liberation struggles of the people of Namibia against colonialism and of the people of South Africa against apartheid. They reasserted their conviction, and that of the Organization of African Unity, that the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is essential for the security of all the independent states of the continent and in particular of the Front Line States.

Further, they reiterated that the root cause of the problems in South Africa is apartheid itself; apartheid is the cause of Africa's hostility to the South Africa racist regime and of the existence of South African and Namibian refugees. None of these things is caused by

the Front Line or other States neighbouring South Africa. Apartheid has been condemned in categorical terms by the United Nations, and by the leaders of Europe, America, Australasia and Asia as well as by Africa. It cannot be made acceptable by the use of South Africa's military power and economic strength, nor by the use of mercenaries and traitors.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements discussed the understanding reached by the People's Republic of Angola and the Pretoria Regime, and they hoped that South Africa will honour its commitment to withdraw its troops from Angola. This withdrawal will constitute an opportunity for the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. They welcomed Angola's reaffirmation of its continued commitment to the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO. The Heads of State and Government expressed their support for the Angolan actions against the externally supported armed bandits who are causing death and misery to the Angolan people and destruction of the economic infrastructure of the State.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and the South African Government. They expressed the hope that the South African Government will live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilisation of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits, and gave their support to the Mozambican actions aimed at the total elimination of these vicious bandits. They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political, and diplomatic support for the A.N.C. in the struggle against apartheid and for majority rule in South Africa.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements declared that the immediate objective for Namibia is and must be the rapid implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, in order that Namibia may attain full and internationally recognised independence on the basis of self-determination by all people of that country. They reiterated the continuing role of the U.N. Security Council and Secretary-General in the implementation of Resolution 435. The leaders of the Front Line States again reaffirmed their support for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

For South Africa, the objective of the Front Line States and Liberation Movements is the abolition of apartheid by whatever means are necessary. The Leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means. This can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa who are unrepresented in the present government structure of that country. A prerequisite for any such discussions would be the unconditional release from prison, detention, house arrest or 'banning' of Nelson Mandela and all other political leaders. Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African Government, there is no way to peace in Southern Africa except through discussions between the South African Government and the African people of South Africa.

To avoid any misunderstanding, they stressed that the phrase "African People" includes all those who have been classified as being citizens of the so-called independent Homelands in South Africa; the denial of their South African citizenship is not recognised in international law, nor by any independent state apart from South Africa.

The alternative to free negotiations within South Africa aimed at the ending of apartheid will inevitably be continued struggle against that system by other means, including armed struggle. This struggle is being and will be conducted and led by the people of South Africa themselves, on their own initiative and within their own country. However, their struggle is, and is seen by Africa to be, a struggle for the freedom and security of all the peoples of this continent, and for the human dignity of all men and women regardless of colour. It therefore receives, and will continue to receive, the full support of the peoples and the nations represented by the Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States.

Involved in this struggle for the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is the consolidation of the freedom and the security of the states which have already achieved independence. To that end, and in the light of the difficult circumstances which do from time to time confront such states, the leaders of the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements reaffirmed their understanding of steps which are taken for this purpose by states which are fully committed to the

liberation struggles. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the internationally recognised boundaries in Southern Africa as these were defined when the free states achieved their political independence.

The Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States and the leaders of the Liberation Movements condemned without reservation the open and the covert aggressive actions of South Africa directed at the de-stabilisation of African states, and those aimed against refugees from Namibia and apartheid South Africa. There is no excuse in international law or civilised practice for these actions. The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements also repeated their rejection of the attempt to link the freedom of Namibia with any Angolan Government decisions relating to its security requirements and its internal political structures.

The political and the armed struggles being waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa led by SWAPO and A.N.C. respectively, are taking place inside those two countries. The struggle is between the people of Namibia and the occupying power, and between the people of South Africa and the apartheid regime. Therefore, the strategy of the Liberation Movements is that of internal struggle, firmly based on the people's will and determination.

As the denial of human rights, and the ruthlessness of the oppressor, has made it impossible for many active leaders of the Liberation Movements to live and work inside their own countries, it has been necessary for both SWAPO and A.N.C. to have an external wing. The international implications of the problems

with which the Liberation Movements are contending also require international diplomatic and political activity, together with offices and representatives in other countries.

The Front Line States reaffirm their recognition of these external operations of the Movements, and reassert their intention to give shelter to them. The Front Line States also reaffirm their right and duty under international Conventions to accord hospitality to refugees from Namibia and apartheid South Africa. They appeal to the international community for diplomatic and economic support and protection as they carry out these international responsibilities.

The Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States and the leaders of the Liberation Movements represented at the Arusha Meeting, in reasserting their commitment to the struggle for freedom in Namibia and South Africa, also draw attention to the burden they are carrying on behalf of the world conscience and the international condemnation of colonialism and apartheid. They therefore appeal for active participation in the struggle by all other nations, other organisations and institutions, and all people who accept the principles of human dignity and equality.

In particular the leaders of the Front Lines States and Liberation Movements appeal for political, moral, material and diplomatic support to be given to the Liberation Movements. They appeal also for concrete support to be given to the efforts of the Front Line States aimed at the consolidation of their independence and their fragile economies, as these are of direct relevance to their ability to play a constructive role in the search for peace and freedom in Southern Africa.

For the Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States and the leaders of the Liberation Movements repeat a truism. Peace is incompatible with racism and with colonialism. Man is so constituted that men and women will die for freedom and human dignity if they are prevented from the peaceful pursuit of these basic human rights. Neither military might nor devious political machinations, whether directed against the peoples inside Namibia and South Africa or against the free States of Africa, can defeat the idea of freedom and racial equality.

The struggle will be long and hard. It will be carried on until final victory.

A luta continua.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

ECL



bc Sir P Craddock

(BT)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1984

xref

MR BOTHA'S VISIT: MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO MAJOR GENERAL BUHARI AND PRESIDENT MENGISTU

Thank you for your letter of 22 May.

The Prime Minister has approved the message to Chairman Mengistu with the following amendments:

- (a) In lines 21 and 22 on page 1 delete "and look for a frank exchange on them".
- (b) In line 10 on page 2 delete "naturally" and substitute "influence" for "bearing".

The Prime Minister has also approved a message to Major General Buhari. I enclose the text with this letter.

I shall be grateful if you could arrange for the delivery of the two messages.

BT
for you

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF MESSAGE TO MAJOR GENERAL BUHARI

Thank you for your letter about the visit of the South African Prime Minister to the UK on 2 June.

I was aware that my decision to invite Mr Botha here during his European tour might be misunderstood. I had therefore earlier written to you, as to some other Commonwealth leaders in Africa, to explain personally my reasons for this decision. I know that delivery of this letter was delayed because you were away but I hope you have now had time to consider it. I believed that my personal explanation of the motives for the invitation would help you to understand it and reassure you about the discussions which I shall be having with Mr Botha.

My abhorrence of apartheid has been repeatedly made clear. There is no sense in which this visit can be regarded as condoning or conferring respectability on this policy. Moreover, Commonwealth and other countries in Southern Africa have made clear that they expect the British government to try to influence South Africa to change its internal policies, live in peace with its neighbours and agree to the early implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia. I can see no better way of doing this than by speaking appropriately to the South African Prime Minister at this important moment in Southern African affairs. I consider it right that Britain as an influential and founding member of the Commonwealth (to use your own words) should make use of this opportunity for the benefit of many of its members who have in the past suffered from South African actions.

Mr Botha has travelled little outside South Africa. His exposure to the views of a number of Western governments is therefore important. You are, of course, right in saying that the visit to Germany is not a visit to a Commonwealth country: but South Africa values its relations with Chancellor Kohl's government (as with the Portuguese and other governments he will see), and will for this reason be impressed by what they say.

Lastly, I have noted that a Nigerian public statement on Mr Botha's visit states that this visit and the English Rugby tour of South Africa are part of a "coordinated policy to give comfort to /apartheid".

apartheid". I assure you that is not true. The Government have made every effort to discourage the English Rugby Football Union from their tour in accordance with our commitment to the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport and out of concern for international sport generally.

I shall speak frankly with Mr Botha, and I hope that my discussions with him will have a positive influence on the issues I have mentioned.

24 May 1984

South Africa

BF | I enclose a copy of an unnumbered telex of 23 May which contains a letter from the Director of the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa to the Prime Minister. I shall be grateful for your advice on a reply.

AJC

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM WORLD CAMPAIGN AGAINST MILITARY AND NUCLEAR COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, OSLO

TO FCO TELEX U/N OF 23 MAY 1984

URGENT ATTENTION: THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS MARGARET THATCHER,
10 DOWNING STREET, LONDON, SW1.

WE ARE DEEPLY ALARMED TO LEARN THAT SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME HAS HAD TALKS WITH BRITISH AEROSPACE TO SUPPLY THE BA 748 AIRCRAFT WITH COASTGUARDER ELECTRONIC MONITORING SYSTEM AND THAT ^{PRIME MINISTER BOTHA} IS REPORTEDLY DUE TO DISCUSS THIS DEAL WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY IN BRITAIN ON 2ND JUNE 1984.

WE KNOW THAT IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS EMBARGO THE APARTHEID REGIME IS ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE "CIVILIAN AGENCY" FROM ITS AIR FORCE IN ORDER TO APPEAR TO BE PURCHASING "CIVILIAN" EQUIPMENT. IN THE PAST IT HAS DONE SO BY OBTAINING FROM THE USA THE L-100-30 AIRCRAFT, PURCHASED FORMALLY BY A SO-CALLED CIVILIAN COMPANY, SAFAIR, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE REGIME. THE L-110-30 AIRCRAFT HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN USED FOR AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND AGAINST INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES IN THE REGION.

WE KNOW THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM IS COMMITTED TO THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AND APPEAL TO YOU TO ASSURE US THAT:

- 1) THE UK GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PROVIDE LICENCES UNDER THE EXPORT OF GOODS (CONTROL) ORDER 1981 FOR THE BA 748 AIRCRAFT -OR ANY SIMILAR AIRCRAFT- NOR FOR ANY COASTGUARDER OR ANY SIMILAR MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
- 2) THIS MATTER WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH P.W. BOTHA IN BRITAIN ON 2ND JUNE 1984, AND THAT
- 3) NO OTHER MILITARY OR OTHER DEALS WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR EARLY ASSURANCES.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION,
ABDUL SAMAD MINTY
DIRECTOR
WORLD CAMPAIGN AGAINST MILITARY AND NUCLEAR
COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, OSLO.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

MINIMAL
S A F D
DEFENCE D

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

G.P.C.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 May 1984

*John Taylor*Visit of the South African Prime Minister: 2 June

There are a number of points on this visit outstanding.

The South African Prime Minister has indicated that he would welcome a chance to talk privately to the Prime Minister for 15 minutes or so at the beginning of the meeting at Chequers. The Foreign Secretary considers this would indeed be useful - he took the same approach when he met Mr Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, in December last year. It would provide an opportunity to set the right tone for the subsequent fuller meeting. Moreover, it would be an excellent occasion on which to deal with certain sensitive issues which it would be better not to air at the full session. Foremost amongst these issues are the question of the ANC office in London, which the South Africans are sure to raise, and the related question of improper activities by members of the South African Embassy here. The Foreign Secretary considers that, given the increased public concern about the activities of foreign diplomats in London following the Libyan People's Bureau incident, and the particular attention paid to the activities of the South African Embassy in this respect, it would be wrong not to register our concern at the political level. The Foreign Secretary considers this the more important because of certain evidence linking the break-in in May last year at the Anti Apartheid Movement Headquarters with an Intelligence Officer on the staff of the South African Embassy. The Home Secretary also feels strongly that this issue should be addressed during Mr Botha's visit. The Foreign Secretary considers that the point would be well registered, and have the least risk of obstructing the wider objectives of the meeting with Mr Botha, if the Prime Minister could make it during the tete-a-tete.

The Foreign Secretary hopes the Prime Minister will be able to devote three or four hours to the meeting with Mr Botha. On this basis, and bearing in mind the proposal for a short preliminary private conversation, he recommends that the meeting should begin at about 11.45 a.m., and finish between 1500-1530, though this will depend on how discussions go. (The South African party's aircraft is at present scheduled to arrive at Heathrow at about 1100, which should mean arrival at Chequers by helicopter at about 1130 or 1135.)

/Lastly

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Lastly, the South Africans have asked if they can increase their party from 6 to 7. They wish to add the Deputy Director General at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr von Hirschberg, so that the party would comprise: Mr P W Botha, Mr R F Botha, Dr Barnard, Mr Van Dalsen, Mr von Hirschberg, Mr Manley and the Charge d'Affaires at their Embassy, Mr Evans. The South Africans feel strongly that von Hirschberg, who has primary responsibility for Europe, should be included on their side, and there is nobody else who could drop out. The Foreign Secretary recommends that we should agree to this. It is open to us to leave our side at 6 (even though this would give 13 at lunch). If you would like to increase the UK side to seven, perhaps we could have a word on the telephone. The UK side would be: Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Mr Rifkind, Sir Antony Acland, Sir J Leahy, and perhaps one other, plus a Private Secretary.

I should be grateful to have your agreement to these proposals.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor at the Home Office.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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u/p ①



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

If you agree to see this delegation the best time would probably be 5.00 p.m. on 30 May (see attached extract from diary).

22 May 1984

Agree to receive them? Yes

Jon Johns

A.S.C. 275.

Visit of South African Prime Minister - Anti Apartheid

Movement

Thank you for your letter of 21 May enclosing a copy of one which the Prime Minister has received from the President and 3 former Presidents of the Anti Apartheid Movement who seek a meeting with the Prime Minister before Mr Botha's visit. You ask for our advice and for a draft letter of reply to the AAM which I attach.

The Anti Apartheid Movement has predictably reacted vigorously to the decision to invite the South African Prime Minister here, the first such visit since 1961. They have argued that the visit will be interpreted by South Africa as implying some approval of South Africa's policies. This view is shared generally by the Opposition parties though, equally, there has been much understanding here and abroad for our decision to invite Mr Botha.

*Trevor Huddleston
David Steel
David Ennals
Barbara Castle*

The proposed delegation is a very senior one, including three Privy Councillors. To see them would demonstrate to those opposed to the visit the Government's open-handed approach and willingness to take due account of the widespread and strong concerns felt here about South African policies. It would also help the presentation in Parliament of the Government's policy both before and after the Botha visit.

The Foreign Secretary has carefully considered whether a meeting with the Anti Apartheid Movement would be likely to have a seriously unwelcome effect on the South African

/Government

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Government prior to Mr Botha's visit but considers, on balance, that this is unlikely. Moreover, there is purpose in thus showing to the South Africans the seriousness with which the Government takes public opinion in this country about South African policies. A refusal to receive them might serve to send the wrong signals to the South Africans and would be exploited by the AAM and their supporters.

In the past, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers have regularly received delegations from the Anti Apartheid Movement, though we cannot recall their having a meeting with the Prime Minister in recent years. (Neither, of course, has a South African Prime Minister.)

The Foreign Secretary concludes that it would be presentationally advantageous to agree to receive a delegation from the Anti Apartheid Movement. But if the Prime Minister's programme precludes this, or she would prefer not herself to see this group, then Sir Geoffrey Howe would be willing to do so in her stead. The draft reply takes account of either possibility.

In view of the wish expressed by the Home Secretary to be kept informed about preparations for Mr Botha's visit I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

RESTRICTED

SOUTH AFRICA: Visit of PW Botha
April 1984

22 APR 1984



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

The Rt Revd Trevor Huddleston CR
President
Anti Apartheid Movement
13 Selous Street
London NW1 ODW

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 15 May asking for a meeting to discuss developments in Southern Africa prior to the visit here of the South African Prime Minister.

I have already explained in Parliament and elsewhere our approach to the visit here by Mr Botha but understand your concerns and [will be pleased to receive you on at] [would be pleased to see you if my engagements had permitted. Unfortunately they do not. I have asked Geoffrey Howe to meet you instead. His office will be in touch with yours about an appointment.]

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Wednesday 30 May

c0930 Depart Chequers for Banbury
1130 Visit to Banbury market for Sir Henry Plumb +
DT and DH & SS

1230 Arrive Moat House Hotel Banbury for lunch
1345 Depart for No. 10
c1545 Arrive No. 10
1630 MISC 101
1700 Diary Meeting
1800 Mr. Packard - Flat
1900 Depart No. 10 + DH
1945 Arrive St. Mary's Branch
2015 Depart for North Branch
2030 Arrive North Branch
2100 Depart for No. 10



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister.

Agree message to Buhari (Reg C) ✓
 and Mengistu (Reg D) ✓
 22 May, 1984

Jew Sh...

A.F.C. $\frac{23}{5}$

Yes ml

Mr Botha(s Visit: Messages from Major General Buhari and
 President Mengistu

African reactions to the Botha visit have been generally muted. Reports from our African Posts have on the whole recorded some suspicion but general understanding. Responses to the personal messages which the Prime Minister has sent to Mr Mugabe, President Kaunda and President Nyerere have not yet all come in, but Mr Mugabe's reaction was sympathetic. The Prime Minister's own discussions with President Masire of Botswana and the Foreign Secretary's discussions with the Sierra Leone Foreign Minister have also revealed understanding. In contrast to this, the Prime Minister has received messages from Major General Buhari of Nigeria and President Mengistu of Ethiopia which are sharply critical of the visit. Your letter of 14 May asked for advice on the latter.

Buhari

It is unfortunate that Buhari has been away from Lagos and our High Commissioner was unable to deliver the Prime Minister's message about the Botha visit to him personally. The letter was left with the Foreign Ministry for onward transmission.

In the meantime, Buhari himself has written a polite but very firm letter to the Prime Minister urging her to reconsider the decision to invite Mr Botha. I enclose this letter, an advance copy of which was delivered to Mr Rifkind by the Acting Nigerian High Commissioner on 17 May. This letter is no surprise: the initial reaction of the Nigerians to the announced visit was critical, and on 16 May the Nigerian Government issued a tough statement accusing us of a "coordinated policy to give comfort to apartheid". I also enclose a copy of this statement. Buhari's reaction differs from that of the Africans closer to the front line, and reflects domestic political considerations and pressures from within his own administration for a radical approach on Southern African issues. The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should send a firm, polite reply, expressing disappointment at the line Buhari has taken. I enclose a draft.



Mengistu

President Mengistu of Ethiopia is Chairman of the OAU this year. His message (copy enclosed) is sharply critical of Mr Botha's visit. Like Buhari, Mengistu is not in tune with African leaders closer to the issues. But his reaction is also more pro-forma. We have no special relationship with Ethiopia, nor with President Mengistu (whom the Prime Minister has not met). In the circumstances, the Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should respond firmly, taking the opportunity to exploit gently the division of views in Africa about a dialogue with South Africa. I enclose a draft.

Yes

R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



State House
Abuja, Nigeria

15 May, 1984.

Delivered to
Mr. Rijkman by
Nigerian Acting
High Commissioner
17/V.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
No. 10, Downing Street,
London S.W.1

WAD

For note of call
and draft letter to No 1
to cover the original.

cc. PS
Sir J Leach
Mr. Square
SABD

My dear Prime Minister,

As you are no doubt aware, we were looking forward to the visit of Sir Geoffrey Howe on the 8th of May, when we were informed that at Sir Geoffrey's request, the visit is to be rescheduled. We also received the information that Mr. Pieter Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, will be visiting Britain from the 2nd of June. It was further reported that the British Government believed in having dialogue with the South African government in order to be able to exert pressure on her to stop acts of destabilisation of her neighbouring countries, gain her co-operation in the talks on the independence of Namibia, and generally be in a position to influence her apartheid policy.

2. Madam Prime Minister, our country's opposition to apartheid is very well known. South Africa has not renounced it despite its universal condemnation. I have difficulties, therefore, in sharing the optimism that an invitation to the South African Prime Minister to visit Britain would advance the struggle against apartheid or make any appreciable difference to the search for a solution to the problems of Southern Africa or advance the independence of Namibia.

On the contrary, I am inclined to feel that a meeting with the South African Prime Minister will be viewed by a vast majority of people as conferring respectability on the regime, and giving comfort to the policy of apartheid. This will, undoubtedly, inflict damage on the anti-apartheid cause, and weaken the resistance of the many brave and dedicated men and women, young and old, who have given up their lives and, many more, who are still suffering to eliminate this pernicious and evil system.

3. I would, therefore, appeal to you, Madam Prime Minister, to reflect seriously on the effect your invitation to the South African Prime Minister is bound to have. The visit will be viewed with considerable alarm by well meaning and reasonable people irrespective of their races. I would, further urge you to consider most carefully the possible consequences on the Commonwealth of the visit, especially its impact on millions of ordinary men and women who have always found inspiration and meaning in what the Commonwealth stands for.

4. Madam Prime Minister, we are not persuaded by the argument that Germany is also inviting the South African Prime Minister for a visit. Germany is not a member of the Commonwealth. We also cannot accept the analogy of East-West conflict and the fact that the West engages in dialogue with the Soviets. The apartheid system in South Africa is a unique phenomenon which has been universally condemned.


5. You will recall that in 1961, South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth. The decision to expell her was taken after the most careful considerations. Since the expulsion, South Africa has not renounced her policy of apartheid.

On the contrary, she has grown even more arrogant and has become a bully and threat to her neighbouring countries in Southern Africa. Moreover, she has tightened her illegal grip on Namibia.

6. In the face of all these, it becomes very difficult to explain to the ordinary men and women, in and outside the Commonwealth, that the Prime Minister of a country, which was expelled from the Commonwealth and without renouncing her evil policy, is now being invited by an influential and founding member of the Commonwealth to visit Britain, a country in whose capital resides the Head of the Commonwealth. The visit is bound to be seen as an act of discourtesy to the Commonwealth community and perhaps an affront to African and world opinion as a whole.

7. Madam Prime Minister, we believe that the British Government reserves the right to choose her friends and invite anyone she wishes to visit her country. However, I trust you will find it possible to reconsider your decision because of the damage the visit could inflict on the anti-apartheid cause, its negative effect on the entire situation in Southern Africa, as well as its possible consequences on the Commonwealth.

Yours Sincerely,



(Major-General Muhammadu Buhari)
Head of the Federal Military Government
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

GRS 130
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM LAGOS 171300Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 413 OF 17 MAY 84
INFO ROUTINE HARARE, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO,
GABARONE, CAPETOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, KADUNA (ACTIONED)

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FMG'S STATEMENT ON BOTHA'S
VISIT TO BRITAIN :

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS ASTONISHED BY THE
RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT HAS
INVITED MR. PIETER BOTHA, PRIME MINISTER OF THE RACIST REGIME
OF SOUTH AFRICA, TO VISIT BRITAIN NEXT MONTH.

CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS, AS YET,
TAKEN NO DECISIVE STEP TO DISSUADE THE BRITISH RUGBY TEAM
FROM UNDERTAKING THEIR PROPOSED TOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA.

IT WOULD , THEREFORE, APPEAR THAT THE INVITATION TO THE
SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE PROPOSED TOUR TO
SOUTH AFRICA BY THE BRITISH RUGBY TEAM ARE PART OF A
CO-ORDINATED POLICY TO GIVE COMFORT TO APARTHEID.

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS STUDIED VERY CAREFULLY
THE REASONS ADVANCED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE
VISIT OF MR. PIETER BOTHA, BUT REGRETS THAT IT
REMAINS UNPERSUADED AND UNCONVINCED THAT THESE REASONS ARE
SUFFICIENTLY VALID TO JUSTIFY THE DAMAGE THAT WOULD BE
INFLECTED ON THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE AND ON THE
COMMONWEALTH.

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS THEREFORE SENT
STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER URGING
HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER THE DECISION AND
HALT THE VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICA PRIME MINISTER.

WHYTE

SOUTHERN AFRICA [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD (PALACE)
S AF D WED
OADS ECD
MCAD SOV D
UND EED
NAD MR SQUIRE
CABINET OFFICE

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

OUT TELEGRAM

C

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
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PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
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5
6 FM FCO MAY 84
7 TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK, HARARE, LUSAKA,
10 DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE
11 OUR TELNO 307 AND YOUR TELNO 412: MR BOTHA'S VISIT
12 1. Please deliver the following message to Buhari from the
13 Prime Minister as soon as possible:
14 BEGINS
15 Thank you for your letter about the visit of the South African
16 Prime Minister to the UK on 2 June. ~~I am grateful that you felt~~
17 ~~able to express your concerns so frankly and fully.~~
18 I was ~~naturally~~ aware that my decision to invite Mr Botha
19 here during his European tour might be misunderstood. I had
20 therefore earlier written to you, as to some other Commonwealth
21 leaders in Africa, to explain personally ^{well} my reasons for this
22 decision. I know that delivery of this ^{was} was delayed because you
23 were away but I hope you have now had time to consider it. I
24 believed that my personal explanation of the motives for the
25 invitation would help you to understand it and reassure you about

///
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword the
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Southern Africa Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) ROGER BONE		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page

2

1 >>>>

2 the discussions which I shall be having with Mr Botha.

3 ~~I do not wish to repeat all the points made in my earlier~~
 4 ~~letter now.~~ My abhorrence of apartheid has been repeatedly made

5 clear, ~~including in answer to recent questions about Mr Botha's~~
 6 ~~visit.~~ There is no sense in which this visit can be regarded as

7 condoning or conferring respectability on this policy. Moreover,
 8 Commonwealth and other countries in Southern Africa have made

9 clear that they expect the British government to try to
 10 influence South Africa to change ~~the~~ ^{its} internal policies, live in

11 peace with its neighbours and agree to the early implementation
 12 of the UN Plan for Namibia. I can see no better way of doing

13 this than by speaking appropriately to the South African Prime
 14 Minister at this important ~~juncture~~ ^{moment} in Southern African affairs.

15 I consider it right that Britain as an influential and founding
 16 member of the Commonwealth (to use your own words) should make

17 use of this opportunity, for the benefit of many of its members
 18 who have in the past suffered from South African actions.

19 Mr Botha has travelled little outside South Africa. His
 20 exposure to the views of a number of Western governments is

21 therefore important. You are, of course, right in saying that
 22 the visit to Germany is not a visit to a Commonwealth country:

23 but South Africa values its relations with Chancellor Kohl's
 24 government (as with the Portuguese and other governments he will

25 see), and will for this reason be impressed by what they say.

26 Lastly, I have noted that a ^{Nigger} public statement ~~by your Government~~
 27 on Mr Botha's visit ~~alleges~~ ^{states} that this visit and the English

28 Rugby tour of South Africa are part of a "coordinated policy to
 29 give comfort to apartheid". ^{because you state} This is just not true. The

30 Government have made every effort to discourage the English
 31 Rugby Football Union from their tour in ~~full~~ ^{accordance} conformity with our

32 commitment to the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport
 33 and out of concern for international sport generally.

34 ~~I have, I hope, explained clearly my reasons for inviting~~

NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

Mr Botha

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>>>
~~Mr. Botha here~~ I shall speak frankly with ^{Mr. Botha} ~~him~~, and I ^{entirely} ~~entirely~~ hope that my discussions with him will have a positive ^{influence} ~~bearing~~ on the issues I have mentioned.

HOWE
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12 APR 1994 1517

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ADDISABABA 456/440 12 1325 PART ONE PAGE1/36

214/15

ETAT
HER EXCELLENCY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MARGRET TACHER, MP,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LONDON

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

IT IS WITH DEEP CONCERN AND REGRET THAT I HAVE LEARNED THE
IMPEDING VISIT OF MR. PIETER BOTHA TO YOUR GREAT COUNTRY LATER
THIS YEAR.

MR. BOTHA HEADS A REGIME WHICH, THROUGH THE OBNOXIOUS
POLICY OF APARTHEID, DEPRIVES THE VAST MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
POPULATION OF ITS BASIC DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND, INDEED, CONDEMNS
IT TO A LIFE OF PERMANENT SLAVERY AND UNDIGNIFIED EXISTENCE. BY
SUBJECTING ITS AFRICAN POPULATION TO BRUTAL OPPRESSION AND MERCILESS
EXPLOITATION? THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SHOWN A CALLOUS AND CRIMINAL
DISREGARD FOR BASIC HUMAN VALUES AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS.

MR. BOTHA'S VISIT TO YOUR COUNTRY IS, NO DOUBT, DESIGNED TO
ADVANCE HIS IGNOMINIOUS AND TOTALLY DISCREDITED POLICY OF APARTEID
THAT POLICY HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

shown in your dialling instructions

TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions T 1291
Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions
British TELECOM

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Tele

FURTHERMORE, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S INCARCERATION OF THOUSANDS OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS, THE ABUSE AND DEGRADATION TO WHICH ITS BLACK POPULATION IS DAILY SUBJECTED, THE FEROCITY WITH WHICH IT CRUSHES ANY INCIPIENT MOVEMENT FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERTY, HAVE EARNED IT THE UNIVERSAL CONDEMNATION AND CONTEMPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

MR. BOTHA'S ARROGANT DISPLAY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BRUTE MILITARY POWER, HIS INTIMIDATION OF AND BRAZEN AGGRESSIONS AGAINST THE FRONTLINE STATES, HIS WANTON AND SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY, HIS ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, HIS FORCIBLE SEIZURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRITORY OF NAMIBIA AND HIS DEFIANCE OF ALL ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENT, CHARACTERIZE HIS REGIME AS A VERITABLE INTERNATIONAL OUTLAW.

COL CKD

shown in your dialling instructions TELECOM shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

A PERSON, DOES NOT, IN MY OPINION DESERVE THE HOSPITALITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLE. IF MR. BOTHA'S VISIT WERE TO GO AHEAD, IT WOULD AMOUNT TO CONFERRING AN AURA OF RESPECTABILITY AND A SEAL OF APPROVAL UPON HIS MORALLY BANKRUPT AND REPRESSIVE REGIME.

for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM

dial the number or dialling instructions

YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF YOUR GREAT COUNTRY SHOULDER A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY AND HAVE A LEADING ROLE TO PLAY IN THE WORLD-WIDE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE. AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, I STRONGLY APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY TO KINDLY WITHDRAW THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO MR BOTHA TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AND REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY OTHER ACTION WHICH WOULD GIVE AID AND COMFORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT TO TRAMPLE UNDERFOOT THE BASIC AND INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE.

MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM
CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND OF COPWE,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
ARMED FORCES OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA.

COL CKD

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	↓	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	DESKBY
FM FCO	6	FM FCO MAY 84
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK
	10	YOUR TELNO 150: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM MENGISTU
	11	1. MIFT contains text of Prime Minister's reply which you
	12	should please transmit to the Ethiopians without delay at
	13	senior official level.
	14	2. We have no reason to be apologetic to Mengistu, and
	15	the reply is, accordingly, couched in suitably firm tones. But
	16	we have sought to be constructive, having no wish to provoke
	17	further adverse reaction. We do not wish you to mention
	18	Mr Rifkind's forthcoming visit.
	19	3. If the Ethiopians wish to publicise the Prime Minister's
	20	reply we have no objection but would not want to encourage
	21	this.
///	22	4. Whilst Mengistu refers in the text of his message to his
//	23	position as Chairman of the OAU, it is signed in his capacity
/	24	as Chairman of the PMAC. The reply should be addressed accord-
	25	ingly.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution PS PS/Mr Rifkind Sir J Leahy Mr Squire SAfD EAD OADs PUSD
Drafted by (Block capitals) ROGER BONE		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	
		copy to: No 10 Cabinet Office

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OUT TELEGRAM

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		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO MAY 84
7 TO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO CAPE TOWN, LAGOS, NAIROBI, UKMIS NEW YORK
10 MIPT: MESSAGE TO CHAIRMAN MENGISTU FROM PRIME MINISTER
11 1. The text of the message is as follows:
12 **BEGINS**
13 Thank you for your message about the forthcoming visit to
14 Britain by the South African Prime Minister. I am concerned to
15 dispel any misunderstanding about this.
16 Our invitation was issued after the most careful consideration.
17 Like you, we wish to see change in South Africa and have
18 consistently and firmly opposed the racial policies there. We
19 have made equally clear our condemnation of the use of violence
20 in the region from any quarter. We shall be reiterating our
21 views on these matters during Mr Botha's visit, ~~and look for a~~
22 ~~frank exchange on them.~~
23 Dialogue and contact is central to our policy towards Southern
24 Africa, as indeed elsewhere. We have accordingly welcomed the
25 recent talks between South Africa and its neighbours and believe

///
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword these
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution PS PS/Mr Rifkind Sir J Leahy Mr Squire SAfD EAD OADs PUSD
Drafted by (Block capitals) ROGER BONE		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

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1 >>>>
 2 these can and should bring benefits to all the countries
 3 involved. These developments lend weight to our belief that
 4 it is right for us to take the opportunity of Mr Botha's visit
 5 to Europe to explain our policies to him, at the highest level.
 6 We shall be seeking to influence the South African Government's
 7 thinking on issues of vital importance to Africa, including
 8 independence for Namibia, the conduct of relations between
 9 states, and the need for change in South Africa itself. I
 10 ~~naturally~~ hope that my discussions will have a positive ^{influence} ~~bearing~~
 11 on these issues.

12 END

14 HOWE

15 NNNN

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NNNN ends
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Catchword



file. ECL

cc Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1984

South Africa:
Message from Chairman Mengistu

I enclose a copy of a telex message which the Prime Minister has received from the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia which he sends, both on behalf of his own Government and in his capacity as current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity. I should be grateful for your advice on a draft reply.

BC //

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SE



FILE

R07

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 May, 1984

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: ANTI-APARTHEID

MOVEMENT

BF | I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the President and three former presidents of the Anti-Apartheid Movement who seek a meeting with Mrs. Thatcher before Mr. Botha's visit. Since it is possible that the Prime Minister may be asked at Question time on 22 May whether she is prepared to receive representatives of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply by noon tomorrow at the latest.

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CST

FILE

With AIC 2215 R M

21 May, 1984

We spoke on the telephone today about
a present for Mr. Botha.

BT
Could you please let us have your
recommendations as soon as possible. We gather
that Mr. Botha's gift for Mrs. Thatcher is only
a small one.

(Caroline Ryder)

Mrs. Alison Walters,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

c.c. Mr. Coles

MRS. RYDER

Visit of South African Prime Minister
2 June

Mr. Botha will be bringing a small
present to give to the Prime Minister

Sue Goodchild

Mr. Coles:

Do we have to
reciprocate?

CR.

18 May 1984

Mr. Ryder:

I am afraid we must.

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
PRIME MINISTER

South Africa

Following your discussion with Sir John Leahy yesterday, I rang Laurens van der Post in Cape Town this afternoon. I said that any attempt to influence the courts would of course be out of the question. Nor would it help. There had been a new development in the form of a letter seeking that the persons concerned should serve bail in their own country. That was a matter for the courts to decide.

Laurens was grateful for the message. He has said that there was considerable feeling in Cape Town about the issue but he thought that he would be able to calm feelings down. He will ring me again early next week.

A.J.C.



18 May 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 May, 1984.

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 16 May.

The Prime Minister has agreed that Mr. Botha may arrive at Chequers by helicopter. I should be grateful for full details of timings etc., in due course.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

cc MASTER
Ops

23/5 (1/4)

SUBJECT

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T821184

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

20344 - 1

RR CAPE TOWN
GRS 336
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 181400Z
FM FCO 181200Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 159 O.F 18 MAY,
INFO CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LISBON
SAVING TO LUANDA

JCM	020/2
23 MAY 1984	
	0123/s.

VISIT BY SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MACHEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. QUOTE OUR EMBASSY HAS INFORMED YOUR OFFICIALS OF OUR DECISION TO INVITE THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO EUROPE. RECALLING OUR DISCUSSION IN LONDON OF THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, I THOUGHT I SHOULD WRITE PERSONALLY TO YOU TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR THIS DECISION.

THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN A NUMBER OF ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE NKOMATI ACCORD HOLDS OUT HOPE NOT ONLY FOR MOZAMBIQUE BUT FOR ALL THE REGION. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA IS NEARLY COMPLETE. BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IF THESE NEW PROSPECTS OF STABILITY FOR THE REGION ARE TO BE REALISED.

WE WISH TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICA TO WORK IN THIS DIRECTION. WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF, WE CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR SIGNS OF MEANINGFUL CHANGE. WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS IS THROUGH CONTACT AND DIALOGUE.

SINCE MR BOTHA INTENDED TO VISIT EUROPE IN ANY CASE, IT SEEMED WRONG NOT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO HIM. I SHALL PUT CLEARLY TO HIM OUR VIEWS ON THE ISSUES I HAVE MENTIONED AND SHALL DO SO WITH OUR OWN EXCHANGES CLEARLY IN MIND.

MR BOTHA'S VISIT HERE WILL BE A WORKING ONE. I HAVE MADE CLEAR ALREADY IN PARLIAMENT THAT IT IN NO WAY CONSTITUTES APPROVAL OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICIES. BUT I HOPE IT WILL

CONFIDENTIAL

20344 - 1

CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER LESSENING OF TENSIONS IN THE REGION. I
HAVE SPOKEN TO THE PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER AND THE GERMAN
CHANCELLOR ABOUT MR BOTHA'S VISIT AND KNOW THAT THEY SHARE
MY APPROACH. MR BOTHA, WHO HAS TRAVELLED LITTLE OUTSIDE
SOUTH AFRICA, WILL THUS BE EXPOSED TO SIMILARLY EXPRESSED
VIEWS BY A NUMBER OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. I BELIEVE THAT THAT
WILL BE HELPFUL. UNQUOTE.

HOWE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 May, 1984.

Visit of South African Prime Minister: Message
to President Machel

BF
Thank you for your letter of 16 May. The Prime Minister was not entirely content with the draft message to President Machel which you enclosed

She has, however, approved the revised version which is enclosed with this letter. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)
(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)
AND TO (precedence/post) ROUTINE LUANDA

AND SAVING TO CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LISBON
REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

VISIT BY SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

Grateful if you would deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to President Machel as soon as possible.

Quote:

Our Embassy has informed your officials of our decision to invite the South African Prime Minister to the UK during his forthcoming visit to Europe. Recalling our discussion in London of the problems of Southern Africa, I thought I should write personally to you to explain the reasons for this decision.

Copies to:-

/ There

There have recently been a number of encouraging developments in Southern Africa. The Nkomati Accord holds out hope not only for Mozambique but for all the region. The withdrawal of South African forces from Southern Angola is nearly complete. But much remains to be done if these new prospects of stability for the region are to be realised.

We wish to encourage South Africa to work in this direction. Within South Africa itself, we continue to look for signs of meaningful change. We have always believed that the only way to achieve these aims is through contact and dialogue.

Since Mr. Botha intended to visit Europe in any case, it seemed wrong not to take the opportunity to talk to him. I shall put clearly to him our views on the issues I have mentioned and shall do so with our own exchanges clearly in mind.

Mr. Botha's visit here will be a working one. I have made clear already in Parliament that it in no way constitutes approval of South Africa's policies. But I hope it will contribute to further lessening of tensions in the region. I have spoken to the Portuguese Prime Minister and the German Chancellor about Mr. Botha's visit and know that they share my approach. Mr. Botha, who has travelled little outside South Africa, will thus be exposed to similarly expressed views by a number of Western governments. I believe that that will be helpful.

Unquote

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

GPS 960
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 181100Z MAY 84

FM MAPUTO 171500Z MAY

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF 17 MAY

INFO CAPE TOWN, HARARE, LILONGWE, LUSAKA, LUANDA, DAR E S SALAAM,
LISBON.

INFO SAVINGS WASHINGTON, PARIS, PRETORIA, MBABANE, MASERU, GABORONE.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 183, PARAGRAPH 6 : MOZAMBIQUE AND MR BOTHA'S VISIT TO EUROPE.

1. PRESIDENT MACHEL SUMMONED THE PORTUGUESE, WEST GERMAN, FRENCH ITALIAN AMBASSADORS AND MYSELF AT SHORT NOTICE THIS MORNING FOR A ONE AND A HALF HOUR DISCUSSION. AFTER ASKING EACH OF US IN TURN WHY WE THOUGHT OUR GOVERNMENTS WERE INTERESTED IN HEARING MOZAMBIQUE'S VIEWS, HE TURNED ON HIS USUAL LIVELY ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN HISTLRY, ALL OUR COUNTRIES WERE SIGNIFICANTLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA BUT THE BRITISH MOST OF ALL BY HISTORY AND ECONOMICS. MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WERE OUR LEGACY. THE RESULT WAS A STATE, THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHOSE GOVERNMENTN PRACTISING RACISM, REPRESENTED A SMALL MINORITY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY, AND FOR WHOM INDEPENDENCE FROM ITS OWN COLONIALIST POWER, HAD NOT MEANT INDEPENDENCE FOR THE MAJORITY. THIS MINORITY GOVERNMENT WAS THE DESTABILISING FACTOR IN THE REGION BY PRACTISING APARTHEID, CREATING BANUSTANS AND ATTACKING ITS NEIGHBOURS. AS A LEADER OF A MULTI RACIAL STATE, HE, MACHEL RECOGNISED THE WHITE SOUTH AFIRCANS FULLY AS FELLOW AFRICANS AND HAD TOLD PIETER BOTHA SO. WHAT WAS LACKING WAS DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY.

2. AFTER THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS WE WERE ASKED TO CONVEY TO OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING POINTS

A) THAT A N C SHOULD BE RECOGNISED BY US PUBLICLY AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THE PEOPLES FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM IN THE REPUBLIC, AND THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO BOTHA THAT THERE WERE MANY GENUINE ELEMENTS IN THE A N C WHO WERE NOT TERRORISTS OR COMMUNISTS AND WHO MERITED OUR OPEN SUPPORT (I POINTED OUT THAT THE A N C HAD OPERATED IN BRITAIN FOR POLITICAL AND INFORMATION PURPOSES AND THAT MY COLLEAGUE IN PRETORIA HAD ROBUSTLY AND REGULARLY DEFENDED THIS IN PUBLIC THE RE.

B) THAT WE SHOULD EXPRESS TO BOTHA AND PUBLICLY OUR CLEAR ABHORENCE OF APARTHEID AND CONDEMNATION OF THE BANUSTANS.

C) THAT WE SHOULD COORDINATE THESE MESSAGES SO THAT BOTHA WAS IN NO DOUBT OF EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY OVER THESE ISSUES.

CONFIDENTIAL

/D) NAMIBIA

CONFIDENTIAL

D) NAMIBIA SHOULD BE GIVEN EARLY INDEPENDENCE. HE RECALLED HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUE, WHICH HE ACCEPTED, BUT REAL DISCUSSIONS MUST NOW GET UNDER WAY AND OUR INFLUENCE WAS ESSENTIAL.

3. MACHEL ALSO SPOKE ABOUT NKOMATI, THERE WERE NOW PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH QUOTE FASCIST MILITARY UNQUOTE ELEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST IT. SINCE SIGNATURE VIOLENCE BY RENAMO HAD INCREASED AND MORTARS AND ARTILLERY HAD BEEN INTRODUCED. MOZAMBIQUE HAD SHOWN ITS DEDICATION TO THE AGREEMENT BOTH IN LETTER AND SPIRIT, THEIR ACTIONS TO REMOVE THE A N C MILITARY TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND IN GOING OUT TO THE PUBLIC TO EXPLAIN IT IN MEETINGS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANS BEING EXAMPLES. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD COOPERATE ALSO IN SPIRIT.

4. MACHEL WAS UNUSUALLY IMPRESSIVE IN HIS LANGUAGE IN REFERRING TO RENAMO'S OPERATIONS POST NKOMATI AND DREW BACK FROM DIRECTLY ALLEDGING CONTINUING SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT. HE CLEARLY WISHED TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING REPORTED PERSONALLY AS NOT HAVING TRUST IN SOUTH AFRICAN COMMITMENT TO NKOMATI. BUT I HAVE CHECKED THE LANGUAGE WITH MY PORTUGUESE COLEAGUE WHOS IS IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WERE MEANT TO HAVE THE IMPLICATION.

5. MACHEL WAS AS BUOYANT AS ALWAYS, BUT TIRED, WOUND UP RATHER THAN RELAXED. I HOPE I MAY BE AUTHORISED SOON TO GIVE A RESPONSE ON INSTRUCTIONS TO REINFORCE WHAT I HAVE SAID ABOUT HIM HAVING CONFIDENCE IN THE PRIME MINISTER TALKING FRANKLY TO MR BOTHA, PERHAPS BY SPEAKING INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCOMPANY THE PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM HER YOU ARE CONSIDERING (YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 TO HARARE, PARAGRAPH 2) AND WHICH I NOW STRONGLY RECOMMEND.
F C O PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSSES

VINES

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

S AF D	WED
OADS	ECD
MCAD	SOV D
UND	EED
NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

2
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1392</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>James to Armstrong dated 18 May 1984</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>6/9/2013</i> <i>J. Gray</i>
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Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly
e.g.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>GRA 168</i>
PIECE/ITEM <i>49</i> (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

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With the compliments of

EAST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

GRS 249

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 170600Z DAR ES SALAAM

DESKBY 170600Z NAIROBI

DESKBY 170700Z KAMPALA

FM FCO 141330Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 16 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, KAMPALA

NAIROBI TELNO 503 TO FCO (COPIED TO YOU): EAC

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENTS NYERERE, MOI AND OBOTE BEGINS

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR OF YOUR DECISION TO SIGN THE ACCORD MARKING YOUR AGREEMENT ON THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY. WE HAVE LONG AND HISTORIC TIES WITH YOUR THREE COUNTRIES AND WELCOME A MOVE WHICH WILL DRAW THEM CLOSER TOGETHER AND ENABLE YOU TO BUILD ON PAST FOUNDATIONS TO ENCOURAGE NEW AND WIDER COOPERATION IN THE REGION.

WE ARE GLAD TO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROCESS LEADING UP TO THIS ACCORD. AS YOU KNOW, WE INDICATED AT THE MEETING OF EAC COUNTRIES AND CREDITORS IN PARIS IN MARCH THIS YEAR THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAIVING REPAYMENTS ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT LOANS. I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO TELL YOU THAT WE CAN AGREE TO FOREGO ARREARS OF INTEREST AND CAPITAL PAYMENTS AND WAIVE FUTURE REPAYMENTS WHICH TOGETHER AMOUNT TO ALMOST POUNDS STERLING MILLION. I HOPE THAT THIS IS HELPFUL TO YOU IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THIS AGREEMENT.

FOR THE FUTURE, WE ARE READY TO HELP YOU PROMOTE FURTHER REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND WE WILL ENCOURAGE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DONOR COMMUNITY TO REACT IN A POSITIVE MANNER TO THE OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED BY THIS ACCORD.

ENDS

Howe

LIMITED

EAD

ERD

NEWS D

OADS

ODA

PS

PS/MR RAISON

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

COPIES SENT TO No. 10 DOWNING STREET

COPIES TO:

MR BUIST

) ODA

MR PENNINGTON EWAD

) ODA

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Contact that Mr. Botha

London SW1A 2AH

should arrive at Chequersby helicopter?

16 May, 1984

A.J.C. $\frac{17}{5}$.

Yes not

John John,

Visit of the South Africa Prime Minister

Your letter of 9 May recorded the Prime Minister's discussion with the Foreign Secretary about Mr Botha's visit, and in particular the security arrangements. Since we discussed these problems in a preliminary way on the telephone on 11 May, we have been in touch with the Home Office and I understand they wish to reply substantively on the policing issues, which fall into their responsibilities.

Your letter also recorded the Prime Minister's suggestion that Mr Botha should arrive at Chequers by helicopter. The Foreign Secretary agrees that this would indeed be sensible. Normally, since this is a working visit by Mr Botha, arrangements for a helicopter would be a matter for the South Africans. But because of the special political and security considerations in this case the Foreign Secretary believes that exceptionally that we should provide and pay for transport. We are therefore proposing to hire a civil helicopter from a reputable private company called Air Hanson, which Sir Geoffrey Howe uses from time to time. Their discretion and security are dependable.

We have been in contact with your office about arrangements for landing a helicopter at Chequers. They have asked that this should be formally put to you in a letter, which I am now doing.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor.



(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

S. Africa: Botha April 84.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 1AA



11 APR 1984

1A

Mr Thorpe (SAfD)

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER - DEMONSTRATIONS

1. To confirm my telephone call this morning giving additional information from Scotland Yard of planned demonstrations coinciding with the visit viz

a. The Kitson family plan to stage a vigil outside the Embassy - beginning on 26 May and continuing 24 hours a day for the whole week prior to the visit;

b. The Anit-Apartheid Movement intend staging an occupation of South African Airways office (251 Regent Street SW1) - either within the 48 hours immediately before or 48 hours immediately after the visit. They will, obviously, keep their plans secret so preventitive action cannot be taken, but local police will be alerted and will stand ready to take action to evict the demonstrators if the SA Airways Office require them to do so.

c. A letter, purporting to come from Kingsley Napley & Co. Solicitors, has been sent to Islington Police on behalf of 12 women who say they are widows of South African security officers and who want to hold a 'memorial service' outside the ANC Office (Penton Street N1) on Sunday 20 May. The police doubt the authenticity of the letter and are making enquiries of the Solicitors to find out who they are representing and exactly what they intend to do.

2. The police will tell the South African Embassy about the AAM demonstrations planned for 2 June, and the Kitson family vigil, and local police will talk with South African Airways office. But sup para lb. and c. above are for your information only and we should not, at this stage, discuss these matters with the Embassy.



B J Connolly (Miss)
Security Section
Protocol Department

17 May 1984

cc: Mr Capie PUSD

SOUTHERN AFRICA: ADVANCE COPIES 14

PS

PS/Mr RIFKIND

PS/PUS,

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

MR ADAMS

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

HD/UND

HD WAD.

HD/NEWS D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADV. Rm. WH216

RESIDENT CLERK

MR A J S GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

RR KADUNA (ACTIONED)

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 130

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM LAGOS 171300Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 413 OF 17 MAY 84

INFO ROUTINE HARARE, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO,
GABARONE, CAPETOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, KADUNA (ACTIONED)

IMMEDIATE

MIPT

NIGERIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FMG'S STATEMENT ON BOTHA'S
VISIT TO BRITAIN :

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS ASTONISHED BY THE
RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT HAS
INVITED MR. PIETER BOTHA, PRIME MINISTER OF THE RACIST REGIME
OF SOUTH AFRICA, TO VISIT BRITAIN NEXT MONTH.

~~OF SOUTH AFRICA, TO VISIT BRITAIN NEXT MONTH.~~

CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS, AS YET, TAKEN NO DECISIVE STEP TO DISSUADE THE BRITISH RUGBY TEAM FROM UNDERTAKING THEIR PROPOSED TOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA.

IT WOULD, THEREFORE, APPEAR THAT THE INVITATION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE PROPOSED TOUR TO SOUTH AFRICA BY THE BRITISH RUGBY TEAM ARE PART OF A CO-ORDINATED POLICY TO GIVE COMFORT TO APARTHEID.

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS STUDIED VERY CAREFULLY THE REASONS ADVANCED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE VISIT OF MR. PIETER BOTHA, BUT REGRETS THAT IT REMAINS UNPERSUADED AND UNCONVINCED THAT THESE REASONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY VALID TO JUSTIFY THE DAMAGE THAT WOULD BE INFLICTED ON THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE AND ON THE COMMONWEALTH.

THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS THEREFORE SENT STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER URGING HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER THE DECISION AND HALT THE VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICA PRIME MINISTER.

WHYTE

NNNN

No

Prime Minister.

I have redolled the
message to President Rachel.

Content:

A.S.C. $\frac{17}{5}$.

Check notes!
Yes
for

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British TELECOM

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or dialling instructions

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British TELECOM

cc MASTER OPS

CS N/K
GR N/T
CP?

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T82^c/84

cc Sir P Craddock

Part 1
9000b

16 MAY 1984/1649

ZCZC CLM6259 ABL674 AFGC20

GBLM CO ETAD 300

ADDISABABA 549/519 16 1640 P1/50 PART ONE

ETAT

HER EXCELLENCY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

MRS. MARGARET THATCHER MP

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED

KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND

LONDON SW1

R17
PPS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO MY TELEGRAM OF
14 MAY 1984 BY WHICH I STRONGLY APPEALED TO YOUR
EXCELLENCY ON BEHALF OF AFRICA TO KINDLY WITHDRAW
THE INVITATION

R17
PPS

P2/50

EXTENDED TO MR. P. BOTHA, PRIME
MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, TO VISIT LONDON. IN URGING
YOU ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM ANY OTHER ACTION WHICH WOULD
BE TANTAMOUNT TO PUTTING A SEAL OF APPROVAL TO THE
BRUTALITIES OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE ODIOS SYSTEM
OF APARTHEID WHICH HAVE BEEN UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED

P3/50

Teleg

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Telegram

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BY

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, I HAD ENDEAVOURED TO
OUTLINE IN MY TELEGRAM WHY THE ENTIRE CONTINENT OF
AFRICA IS SO STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE IMPENDING VISIT.

BUT EVEN AS I WAS DISPATCHING THAT MESSAGE TO
YOU, I AM FOLLOWING, WITH CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION
AND CONCERN THE NEWS OF THE DEPARTURE OF

P4/50

THE BRITISH
RUGBY FOOTBALL UNION TO SOUTH AFRICA TO HOLD MATCHES THERE.
YOUR EXCELLENCY IS FULLY AWARE THAT THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE ORGANIZATION
OF AFRICAN UNITY HAVE, TIME AGAIN, AOPTED NUMEROUS
RESOLUTIONS OPPOSING AND PROHIBITING SPORTING CONTACTS
WITH RACIST SOUTH AFRICA WHICH, IN UTTER CONTEMPT AND

P5/50

ARROGANT DISREGARD OF THE WISHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, ATTEMPTS TO PERPETUATE THE OBNOXIOUS POLICY
OF APARTHEID, THEREBY RELEGATING THE AFRICAN POPULATION
TO CONDITIONS OF ABYSMAL SLAVERY AND STARK DEGRDATION
FOR NO OTHER CAUSE THAN THE TEXTURE OF THEIR SKIN,
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ALLOWING ITS NATIONAL RUGBY TEAM
TO TRAVEL

P6/50

TO SOUTH AFRICA TO HOLD MATCHES WILL BE
NOTHING LESS THAN A REVERSAL OF POSITION BY THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT WHICH IS PUBLICLY ON THE RECORD AS BEING
OPPOSED TO THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF SOUTH AFRICA. EQUALLY, IT CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION
OF UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS WHICH THE

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T 1291

Telegram

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British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions Telegram

NNNN

16 MAY 1984/1714

ZCZC CLM6291 ABL675 AFGC20

GBXX CX ETAD 549

ADDISABABA 549/519 16 1640 P7/50 PART TWO

ETAT

HER EXCELLENCY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

MRS. MARGARET THATCHER MP

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED

KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND

LONDON SW1

UNITED KINGDOM

HAD, BY AND LARGE, SUPPORTED OVER THE YEARS.

MOREOVER, THIS YEAR HAPPENS TO BE AN OLYMPIC YEAR

WHICH IS COMMEMORATED BY THE ADOPTION OF THE OLYMPIC

CHARTER THAT IS BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

ON THE BASIS OF RACE, COLOUR, POLITICAL BELIEF, CREED OR

RELIGION. THE TOUR

P8/50

OF THE BRITISH RUGBY TEAM TO SOUTH

AFRICA AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME, WILL, OBYIOUSLY, CONSTITUTE

A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS, AS WELL AS THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE OLYMPIC

CHARTER. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING AND IN MY CAPACITY AS

CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE

G.R No Trace
es
off

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions Telegram

P9/50

C.S NO TRACE

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
 AND ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO
 YOUR EXCELLENCY, ONCE AGAIN, TO URGENTLY TAKE WHATEVER
 ACTIONS MAY BE DEEMED APPROPRIATE TO RESTRAIN THE
 BRITISH RUGBY TEAM FROM HOLDING MATCHES IN SOUTH AFRICA.
 I AM CONVINCED THAT BY SO DOING, THE UNITED KINGDOM

P10/69

WILL HAVE UPHELD ITS GREAT TRADITION OF BELIEF IN THE
 EQUALITY OF PEOPLES AND THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
 AS WELL AS CORRECTLY DISCHARGED ITS INTERNATIONAL
 RESPONSIBILITIES AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNITED
 NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.
 PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES
 OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM
 CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY
 ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND OF THE
 COPWE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
 REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF SOCIALIST
 ETHIOPIA

COL 14 1984

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South Africa - Visit of South African PM 4/84

telemun edit laib eshiupne
enolcaufant gnilleib tuoy ni nwe

Teledram

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J.ET.ECCOV/

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telemun edit laib eshiupne
enolcaufant gnilleib tuoy ni nwe

CCPG ①



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree message to

London SW1A 2AH

President Machel?

16 May 1984

A.D.C. 16/5

1) 2nd. Will the shell.
Full of details.
[Signature]

John John

Visit of South African Prime Minister

In my letter of 10 May, I said that we would consider whether the Prime Minister might send messages to President Machel and President Dos Santos on similar lines to those to other African Heads of Government, about Mr Botha's visit.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that a message to President Machel would be worthwhile, given the very good relationship the Prime Minister established with him during his visit last year. He does not think it necessary to send a message to Dos Santos. I enclose a draft.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<
2 look for signs of meaningful change. We wish to influence South
3 African perceptions and South African policies in all of these
4 areas. We have always taken the view that the only way to
5 achieve this is through contact and dialogue.
6 Against that background and given that Mr Botha was coming to
7 Europe in any case it seemed wrong not to take this opportunity
8 to talk to him. I shall be able to speak frankly and firmly on
9 the issues I have described, and will do so with our exchanges
10 clearly in mind. Mr Botha's visit here will be a working one.
11 I have made clear already in Parliament that it in no way
12 constitutes approval of South Africa's policies. But I hope
13 it will contribute to further lessening of tensions in the
14 region. I have spoken to the Portuguese Prime Minister and
15 the German Chancellor about Mr Botha's visit and know that
16 they share my approach. Mr Botha who has travelled little
17 outside South Africa, will thus be exposed to similarly
18 expressed views by a number of Western governments. This
19 must be all to the good. UNQUOTE

Too late

Since
should be put ahead to him or even on the
should

believe that that will be help

21 HOWE

22 NNNN

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/

33

34

NNNN ends telegram

BLANK

Catchword

South Africa

APRIL 24

Visit of Botha



10 APR 1904

Anti-Apartheid Movement 13 Selous Street, London NW1 0DW
01-387 7966 (3 lines)
For freedom in Southern Africa

15 May 1984

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister

We are writing as the President and former Presidents of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, in response to your decision to invite the South African Prime Minister to Britain. You will be aware that we and many others believe that your decision was mistaken. However, our purpose in writing is to ask whether you would be willing to meet with us prior to the visit of Mr. Botha, in order for us to discuss our understanding of developments in Southern Africa and to ensure that you are fully aware of the widespread concern which exists within Britain towards the policies of the South African authorities, both inside South Africa and Namibia, and in relation to its neighbours.

We cannot believe that you would wish to meet with the South African Prime Minister without the opportunity of listening to our views on an area with which we have all been closely associated for a very long period of time.

We look forward to a positive response.

Yours sincerely,

+ Trevor Huddleston CR

The Rt. Revd. Trevor Huddleston, CR
President

Barbara Castle

The Rt. Hon. Barbara Castle, MEP,
Former President

Lord Ennals

The Rt. Hon. Lord Ennals
Former President

David Steel

The Rt. Hon. David Steel, MP,
Former President

1) Mr Coles
2) Prime Minister

We will give you
a draft reply.

DMS
21/5



889

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1984

Dear Roger,

SOUTH AFRICA/ETHIOPIA

BR

I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from Chairman Mengistu about the forthcoming visit to Britain by the South African Prime Minister. I should be grateful for your advice and a draft reply.

Yours ever

John Cole

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

889

Mr Thorpe
(SAFD)

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

1. To confirm my telephone call on Friday 11 May.
2. The Anti-Apartheid Movement organisers met with Scotland Yard Officers again on Friday afternoon and gave the following additional information about their plans for 2 June demonstrators (my minute to you of 11 May refers).
3. In addition to the march starting at Hyde Park at 12 noon about a dozen AA supporters will stage a static demonstration at the entrance to Downing Street, beginning at about 11 am. They said this is because they want to be sure of a visible presence at Downing Street should the talks take place there. The static demonstrators will be dressed in black.
4. When the marchers reach Trafalgar Square (south) they will march down Whitehall via Parliament Square to Westminster Bridge. (The Charing Cross and Northumberland Avenue route referred to in the first paragraph of my minute of 11 May will only be used in the event of the First Rehearsal of the Trooping of the Colour Parade taking place in the afternoon instead of the morning of 2 June). If, as seems likely, the marchers use the Whitehall route a small group of them - approximately half a dozen - will hand in a petition at No. 10.
5. The AA M. organisers said there is a possibility that they might try to mount a small demonstration in the Chequers area (perhaps two coach loads of demonstrators) but it is their avowed intention to concentrate their main efforts on London. Scotland Yard have nevertheless alerted Thames Valley police to the possibility of action in their area.

Miss B J Connolly
Protocol Department
(43G 273 3526)

14 May 1984

cc: Mr R Capie (PUSD)

Mr Thorpe
(SAFD)

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

1. The Anti-Apartheid Movement met with Metropolitan Police New Scotland Yard on Tuesday 8 May. They have plans to mount an 'assembly/march/rally' on Saturday 2 June. Demonstrators are expected to assemble at Hyde Park Corner at noon, and to march via Park Lane, Piccadilly, Lower Regent Street, Pall Mall, Trafalgar Square (South), Charing Cross, Northumberland Avenue, Westminster Bridge, York Road, to Jubilee Gardens where they will hold their rally. They will not be allowed to enter Trafalgar Square, which has already been booked by the Department of the Environment for a Religious event organised for the United Evangelical Mobile Units Rally.
2. The Anti-Apartheid Movement organisers expect between 5,000 to 10,000 to participate. The march and rally will be fully policed. South African House, regarded by the police as particularly vulnerable, will be cordoned. The police regard the Anti-Apartheid Movement as being generally well behaved and well stewarded. There is a possibility that the 'hooligan element' - the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group, might join in. This group is not expected to be more than twenty to thirty strong. They will not be made welcome by the main body of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.
3. So far the police have no information of any plans to hold demonstrations elsewhere, although the possibility of small groups assembling at eg. Chequers or the airport cannot be ruled out. There is no requirement, in law, for demonstrators to inform the police of their intentions - but police consider that they are likely to concentrate their efforts on trying to make the London march a major event.
4. The Anti-Apartheid Movement organisers are meeting with police again this afternoon. If any fresh information is available after the meeting I will let you know.

B J Connolly (Miss)
Protocol Department
(43G 273 3526)

11 May 1984

cc: Mr R Capie(PUSD)
Mr Gordon, Protocol Dept



With the compliments of

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Miss B J Connolly

273 3526

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH**

059



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1984

Dear Roger,

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

Paragraph 3 of Cape Town telegram no. 352 raises the possibility of the wives of the South African Prime Minister and Foreign Minister being entertained separately at Chequers during Mr. Botha's talks and working lunch on 2 June.

While I would not rule this out entirely, I am not sure that it would be a very satisfactory arrangement. The Prime Minister would be uneasy at the idea of herself entertaining Mr. Botha and the Foreign Minister to lunch while their wives were eating elsewhere in Chequers. Nor is there really an adequate room where a second lunch can be arranged.

No doubt these difficulties could be overcome if there is no better alternative. But I wonder whether it would not be better to think in terms of the two ladies being entertained at a quite separate venue, perhaps by Lady Howe if she is willing. Could you consider this point and let me have your advice so that I may consult the Prime Minister.

Yours ever
John G. Cole

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

059

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British TELECOM

Telegram

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12 MAY 1984/1517
ZC CLM9846 ABL627 AFGC13
GBXX CY ETAD 263
ADDISABABA 456/440 12 1325 PART ONE PAGE1/36

John C. Sles

24/5

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: 778/84**

*u MINISTER
OPC*

ETAT
HER EXCELLENCY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MARGRET TACHER, MP,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LONDON

YOUR EXCELLENCY,
IT IS WITH DEEP CONCERN AND REGRET THAT I HAVE LEARNT THE
IMPEDING VISIT OF MR. PIETER BOTHA TO YOUR GREAT COUNTRY LATER
THIS YEAR.

MR. BOTHA HEADS A REGIME WHICH, THROUGH THE OBNOXIOUS
POLICY OF APARTHEID, DEPRIVES THE VAST MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
POPULATION OF ITS BASIC DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND, INDEED, CONDEMNS
IT TO A LIFE OF PERMANENT SLAVERY AND UNDIGNIFIED EXISTENCE. BY
SUBJECTING ITS AFRICAN POPULATION TO BRUTAL OPPRESSION AND MERCILESS
EXPLOITATION? THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SHOWN A CALLOUS AND CRIMINAL
DISREGARD FOR BASIC HUMAN VALUES AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS.

MR. BOTHA'S VISIT TO YOUR COUNTRY IS, NO DOUBT, DESIGNED TO
ADVANCE HIS IGNOMINIOUS AND TOTALLY DISCREDITED POLICY OF APARTEID
THAT POLICY HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

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British TELECOM

FURTHERMORE, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S INCARCERATION OF THOUSANDS OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS; THE ABUSE AND DEGRADATION TO WHICH ITS BLACK POPULATION IS DAILY SUBJECTED; THE FEROCITY WITH WHICH IT CRUSHES ANY INCIPIENT MOVEMENT FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERTY; HAVE EARNED IT THE UNIVERSAL CONDEMNATION AND CONTEMPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

MR. BOTHA'S ARROGANT DISPLAY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BRUTE MILITARY POWER; HIS INTIMIDATION OF AND BRAZEN AGGRESSIONS AGAINST THE FRONTLINE STATES; HIS WANTON AND SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY; HIS ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA; HIS FORCIBLE SEIZURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRITORY OF NAMIBIA AND HIS DEFIANCE OF ALL ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENT; CHARACTERIZE HIS REGIME AS A VERITABLE INTERNATIONAL OUTLAW.

COL CKD

12 MAY 1984/1521

ZCZC CLM9848 ABL628 AFGC13

GBLR CY ETAD 168

ADDISABABA 456/446 12 1325 PART TWO

ETAT

HER EXCELLENCY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

MARGRET TACHER, MP,

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

AND NORTHERN IRELAND

LONDON

SUCH A PERSON, DOES NOT, IN MY OPINION DESERVE THE HOSPITALITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLE. IF MR. BOTHA'S VISIT WERE TO GO AHEAD, IT WOULD AMOUNT TO CONFERRING AN AURA OF RESPECTABILITY AND A SEAL OF APPROVAL UPON HIS MORALLY BANKRUPT AND REPRESSIVE REGIME.

YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF YOUR GREAT COUNTRY SHOULD A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY AND HAVE A LEADING ROLE TO PLAY IN THE WORLD-WIDE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE. AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, I STRONGLY APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY TO KINDLY WITHDRAW THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO MR BOTHA TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AND REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY OTHER ACTION WHICH WOULD GIVE AID AND COMFORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT TO TRAMPLE UNDERFOOT THE BASIC AND INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE.

MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY

ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND OF COPWE,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY

ARMED FORCES OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA.

COL CKD

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file
BOL
by Sir P. Craddock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 May 1984

Visit of the South African
Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 10 May.

The Prime Minister is content that messages should be sent to Mr. Mugabe, President Kaunda, President Nyerere and General Buhari on the lines proposed - though the words "any of" in line 26 of the second page of the telegram enclosed with your letter should be deleted.

SECRET

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A handwritten signature, possibly 'RB', written in dark ink.

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GRS 560

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBI CAPE TOWN 101415Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 10 MAY

INFO JOHANNESBURG, PRETORIA

YOUR TELNO 203: VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

1. WHEN LEAHY CALLED ON VAN DALSEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY PIK BOTHA TODAY, HE RAISED P W BOTHA'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN.
2. LEAHY TOLD VAN DALSEN THAT THE WORKING LUNCH AT CHEQUERS, WHICH HE ENVISAGED AS A LONGISH SESSION FROM, SAY, 1130 TO 1500, WOULD PROBABLY CONSIST ON THE UK SIDE OF ABOUT SIX PEOPLE - PRIME MINISTER, YOURSELF, MR RIFKIND, PUS, LEAHY, AND PRIVATE SECRETARY. VAN DALSEN SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE SOUTH AFKCAN TEAM WOULD PROBABLY CONSIST OF P W BOTHA, PIK BOTHA, DR BARNARD, VAN DALSEN, SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR (OR MORE PROBABLY CHARGE) AND PRIVATE SECRETARY (PROBABLY CAL VON HIRSCHBERG).
3. LEAHY EXPLAINED THAT P W BOTHA'S AIRCRAFT WOULD VERY PROBABLY ARRIVE AT HEATHROW AIRPORT SOUTH SIDE WHERE THE VIP LOUNGES WERE. VAN DALSEN SAID THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE BRINGING A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PEOPLE, INCLUDING A LARGE PRESS GROUP. HE ASSUMED THAT IN FACT ONLY THE SOUTH AFRICAN TEAM FOR THE WORKING LUNCH WOULD BE GOING TO CHEQUERS. ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE FOR THE OTHER VISITORS. (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY THERE ARE FACILITIES AT CHEQUERS FOR THE WIVES OF P W AND PIK BOTHA ETC TO BE ENTERTAINED SEPARATELY).
4. VAN DALSEN THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE CONVENIENT FOR REASONS OF SPEED AND SECURITY IF THE JOURNEY FROM HEATHROW TO CHEQUERS COULD BE MADE BY HELICOPTER. LEAHY AGREED AND UNDERTOOK TO PUT THIS POINT TO YOU.
5. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH PIK BOTHA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER MADE A PARTICULAR PLEA THAT P W BOTHA SHOULD HAVE A 15MINUTE PRIVATE TALK WITH MRS THATCHER ALONE AT THE START BEFORE THE PRE-LUNCH TALKS BEGAN. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH P W BOTHA WHO VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER COULD AGREE TO THIS. PIK BOTHA ADDED THAT P W BOTHA HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT CONCERNED BY THE HOSTILITY DEMONSTRATED BY THE ANTI-APARTHEID LOBBY IN BRITAIN TOWARDS HIS VISIT. HE HAD HOWEVER ASSURED P W BOTHA THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT IN ANY SENSE THE MOOD OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. LEAHY REASSURED PIK BOTHA THAT P W BOTHA WOULD BE MOST WELCOME IN BRITAIN AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. WE FELT THAT THE MEETING

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/would

CONFIDENTIAL

WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN HELPING TO CLEAR THE AIR IN UK/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS. HE COULD ASSURE P W BOTHA THAT THE MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER WOULD BE HELD IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT. NATURALLY THERE WOULD BE SOME STRAIGHT TALKING ON BOTH SIDES. BUT P W BOTHA NEED HAVE NO ANXIETY ABOUT THE WARMTH OF OUR RECEPTION. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THIS REASSURANCE, WHICH HE WOULD PASS ON TO HIS PRIME MINISTER.

6. BOTH VAN DALSEN AND PIK BOTHA TOOK THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY WERE NOT ON THIS OCCASION TO GO INTO CENTRAL LONDON AND IF THE REST OF THE WEEKEND COULD BE SPENT OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM. VAN DALSEN CONFIRMED THAT, SO FAR, P W BOTHA WOULD VISIT PORTUGAL, SWITZERLAND, BRITAIN, GERMANY AND BELGIUM (ALREADY ANNOUNCED) AS WELL AS AUSTRIA AND ITALY (CONFIRMED BUT NOT YET ANNOUNCED). DISCUSSIONS WERE ALSO BEING HELD WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT A POSSIBLE VISIT TO FRANCE.

FERGUSSON

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

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cc PC. (i)



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1984

Agree message to
Mugabe, Kaunda, Nyerere
and Buhari as in the
attached draft?

A.F.C. '85

John Selous

Yes mt

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

When we discussed this visit yesterday, you suggested that the Prime Minister may wish to send a personal message to Mr Mugabe explaining the reasons for her invitation to Mr Botha. The Foreign Secretary agrees that this would be very useful. He recommends a message on the lines of the enclosed draft.



We have also considered whether messages might be sent to other Front Line States leaders. Sir Geoffrey suggests it would be helpful to send a message to President Kaunda, and also to President Nyerere as leader of the FLS. In addition, Sir Geoffrey would like a message to go to Buhari, given that the Nigerians have expressed particular concern to us about the Botha visit (my letter to you of 3 May refers). The enclosed draft telegram contains appropriate instructions to the capitals concerned.

Other possible candidates for messages might be Presidents Machel and Dos Santos, on which the Department have been asked to advise. The Prime Minister will have an opportunity to talk to President Masire (Botswana) about Botha's visit when she sees him on 14 May.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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TEL NO

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2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
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6	FM FCO MAY 84
7	TO IMMEDIATE HARARE
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS
10	INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON,
11	UKMIS NEW YORK
12	VISIT BY SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK
13	1. Grateful if you, Lusaka, ^{and Harare} and Dar would deliver the following
14	message from the Prime Minister to Mr Mugabe, President Kaunda,
15	President Nyerere and General Buhari as soon as possible.
16	Quote Our High Commission has been in touch with your officials
17	to inform your Government of our decision to invite the South
18	African Prime Minister to the UK during his forthcoming visit
19	to Europe. [(For Mugabe) With our conversation about the
20	problems posed by South Africa at CHOGM in mind] [(For Kaunda)
21	With our discussion about South Africa in London and at CHOGM
22	in mind] [(For Nyerere) With our discussions about South
23	Africa at CHOGM in mind] [(For Buhari) I know Sir Geoffrey
24	Howe has also been in touch with your Foreign Minister, but]
25	I thought I should write personally to you to explain the

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /reasons
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Southern African Dept Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) ROGER BONE		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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Page
2

1 <<<<

2 reasons for this.

3 There have been a number of encouraging developments in
4 Southern Africa recently, in particular the withdrawal of
5 South African forces from Southern Angola which is nearly
6 complete, and the South African decision to negotiate with
7 Mozambique which led to the Nkomati Accord. But much remains
8 to be done, and there is no room for complacency. We need
9 to do what we can to maintain momentum on Namibia, and carry
10 the present process forward to secure implementation of SCR
11 435. We must ensure that Nkomati brings the benefits it
12 promises to Mozambique and that negotiations rather than
13 coercion or subversion should characterise South Africa's
14 relations with its neighbours. Within South Africa itself,
15 we continue to look for signs of meaningful change. We
16 wish to influence South African perceptions and South
17 African policies in all of these areas. We have always
18 taken the view that the only way to achieve this ^{is} ~~was~~ through
19 contact and dialogue. Against that background and given that
20 Mr Botha was coming to Europe in any case it seemed wrong not
21 to take this opportunity to talk to him. I shall be able to
22 speak frankly and firmly on the issues I have described, and
23 will do so with our exchanges at CHOGM clear^{ly} in ~~my~~ mind.

24 Mr Botha's visit here will be a working one. I have made
25 clear already in Parliament that it in no way constitutes
26 approval of ~~any of~~ South Africa's policies. But I hope it
27 will contribute to further lessening of tensions in the
28 region. I have spoken to the Portuguese Prime Minister and
29 the German Chancellor about Mr Botha's visit and know that
30 they share my approach. Mr Botha, who has travelled little
31 outside South Africa, will thus be exposed to similarly
32 expressed views by a number of Western governments. This
33 must be all to the good.

34 I am writing in similar terms to Julius Nyerere, Kenneth

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

Kaunda

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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Page
3

1 <<<<
2 Kaunda and General Buhari (please amend as appropriate).
3 Unquote.
4 2. We are considering whether similar messages should be sent
5 to Machel and Dos Santos. No message is being sent to
6 President Masire, since he will be calling on the Prime
7 Minister on 14 May.

8
9 HOWE
10 NNNN

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NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

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GRS 520

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM LAGOS 091500Z MAY 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 390 OF 09 MAY 84

INFO ROUTINE CAPETOWN, JOHANNESBURG, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA,
DAR ES SALAAM, GABERONE, LUANDA, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, HARARE,
NAIROBI, MASERU, MBABANE, WASHINGTON

MS

YOUR TELNO 126 TO DAR ES SALAAM: VISIT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN
PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

1. THE NIGERIAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING TO EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS AT P W BOTHA'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE UK. HE SAID HE WAS DOING SO ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ASKED ME TO CONVEY THEIR VIEWS TO YOU.
2. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH EXPRESSIONS OF MUTUAL DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE POSTPONEMENT OF YOUR VISIT TO NIGERIA. GAMBARI SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW ABOUT THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE DATES BUT HIS CALENDER WAS BECOMING CROWDED. HAVING RECEIVED FROM MORE THAN ONE OFFICIAL NIGERIAN SOURCE THE MESSAGE THAT YOUR POSPONEMENT WAS SEEN AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE BOTHA INVITATION (EXCLAMATION) I TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN EXPLAINING THAT THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOTHA VISIT AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF YOUR OWN WAS ENTIRELY COINCIDENTAL . ANY SUGGESTION OF A LINK BETWEEN THE TWO WAS QUITE WRONG. GAMBARI CONFIRMED THAT IN THE OFFICIAL NIGERIAN VIEW THERE WAS NO LINKAGE. I HOPED THERE WAS NONE IN THE UNOFFICIAL VIEW EITHER.
3. GAMBARI EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY NIGERIA TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE SPECIAL TIES WITH BRITAIN. HE DID NOT QUESTION THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO INVITE BOTHA BUT EXPECTED HIGHER STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR FROM US THAN FROM THE OTHER EUROPEANS WHO HAD INVITED HIM. SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE COMMONWEALTH IN 1961 BECAUSE HER POLICIES WERE INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMONWEALTH MEMBERSHIP AND PRINCIPLES. NIGERIA'S POLICY, ACCEPTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH, WAS MAXIMUM OSTRACISM OF SOUTH AFRICA IN SPORTS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, ARMS SALES ETC. SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE MADE TO FEEL UNWELCOME IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. GAMBARI WAS ALSO UNHAPPY AT THE ENGLISH RUGBY TOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA AND WISHED THE PRIME MINISTER COULD HAVE DONE MORE TO STOP IT .
4. I EXPLAINED THAT HMG UNDERSTOOD THE VIEWS AND ATTITUDE OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT . WE NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT IT BETTER TO

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/ COMMUNICATE

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COMMUNICATE WITH OTHERS EVEN IF, OR PERHAPS BECAUSE, WE DISAGREED WITH THEM E.G. IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT BE DIFFERENT BECAUSE OF ITS ABHORRENT DOMESTIC POLICIES SEMI COLON BUT OUR CONTACT WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE END OF LAST YEAR HAD POSSIBLY BEEN HELPFUL IN CONVEYING OUR VIEWS ON DESTABILISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN ANGOLA. THE DISENGAGEMENT FROM ANGOLA MIGHT PROVE TO BE A PRELUDE TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. BATTERING AWAY AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING BOTHA HIMSELF, WAS BETTER THAN IGNORING THEM. I MADE THE USUAL POINTS ABOUT THE RUGBY TOUR. I NOTED FINALLY THAT BOTHA WOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRONG FEELINGS ON SOUTH AFRICA THAT WOULD BE AROUSED IN SECTIONS OF THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS DURING HIS VISIT.

5. GAMBARI MADE HIS POINTS FIRMLY BUT QUIETLY AND LARGELY, I THINK, FOR THE RECORD. HOSTILE PRESS COMMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN SMALL BUT WE EXPECT MORE LATER. WE MAY ALSO HEAR MORE ABOUT THE SUPPOSED CONNECTION WITH YOUR POSTPONEMENT (DESIGNED, ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, AS A DELIBERATE SNUB TO NIGERIA (EXCLAMATION)).

WHYTE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 May 1984

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister raised with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, at their meeting today, the question of Mr. Botha's visit and in particular the security arrangements.

As you know, the plan is that the Prime Minister should entertain Mr. Botha to a working lunch at Chequers on Saturday, 2 June. The Prime Minister wishes knowledge of the venue to be closely protected.

There have, however, been suggestions in the press that the organisers of demonstrations against the visit intend to mount these both in central London and at Chequers in case the meeting takes place at the latter venue. The Prime Minister would be grateful for such information as may be available on the likely scale of the demonstrations and the precautions which will be taken.

BF

She has also enquired whether it would not be desirable for Mr. Botha to arrive at Chequers by helicopter.

I should be grateful for such advice as you and Hugh Taylor, to whom I am copying this letter, can offer at this stage.

A. G. GILES

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



cc Sre Goodchild
Sr P. Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 May 1984

Visit of South African Prime Minister:
2 June

The Prime Minister is content with the proposed guest list in your letter of 30 April. We shall issue invitations shortly.

I shall be the Private Secretary present on our side.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

file
da



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 May 1984

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 3 May.

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister agreed that an announcement of Mr. Botha's visit should be made today and our press section duly announced it at 4 p.m. this afternoon. In consultation with the FCO department concerned, we deleted the reference to Chequers in the announcement in order to avoid attracting unwelcome attention on the day.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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NR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree this announcement
tomorrow, at a time to be
settled?

3 May 1984

John [unclear],

AT 315

Yes [unclear]

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

When I wrote to you on 30 April, I said that the Foreign Secretary planned to tell the Nigerian Government of Mr Botha's visit to the UK during his visit to Lagos on 7-9 May. The need for this advance warning was underlined by a comment by the Nigerian Permanent Representative to the UN in London on Monday, when he made a point of expressing to Sir Geoffrey Howe the hope that Mr Botha would not visit the UK. As I think you now know, Sir Geoffrey has decided to postpone his visit to Nigeria. When he informed the Acting Nigerian High Commissioner of this this morning, he thought it right in the circumstances to tell Mr Dimka of Mr Botha's visit, to say that he had hoped to have a word with Dr Gambari in confidence about it, and to ask him to let Dr Gambari know.

Now that the Nigerians and the Germans (who were told during the Anglo-German Summit yesterday) both know of Mr Botha's visit, the Foreign Secretary thinks that news of this may leak quickly. He suggests it would be better to pre-empt this by ourselves making a formal announcement in the very near future. We should also inform other major African governments before an announcement is made.

We have asked our Embassy in Cape Town to consult the South Africans about an early announcement. The Embassy do not expect the South Africans to object: the agreement not to announce was largely at our own request.

If the Prime Minister agrees, I enclose a form of words together with some defensive points which your press office may wish to use. I should be grateful for advice as to when an announcement might be made. Perhaps late tomorrow afternoon might be right (which would enable us to confirm instructions to other African posts first).

I should also let you know that although the South Africans initially told us that Mr Botha and his party would fly in and out of the UK on 2 June, they have now suggested that for logistic and programme reasons, Mr Botha may wish

/to stay



to stay over privately until 4 June. They have asked our advice, and we are urgently considering this. In the meantime, we have carefully phrased the draft announcement so that it refers simply to a visit to Chequers, and not a visit to the UK.

Yes
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT


Mr P W Botha, the South African Prime Minister, will visit Chequers on 2 June for a working lunch with the Prime Minister.

Defensive Points to Make

1. Mr Botha is visiting a number of European capitals. This provides a natural opportunity to explain our policies to the South African Government at the highest level.
2. At whose initiative? The Prime Minister invited Mr Botha to have lunch with her. It would have been wrong not to take this opportunity for a meeting.
3. The Government's policy is to maintain a dialogue with South Africa. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary saw the South African Foreign Minister in London on 2 December 1983; the Minister of State, Mr Rifkind, visited South Africa in November 1983. Mr Botha's visit is fully consistent with this approach.
4. The meeting indicates no change in our policy towards South Africa or the region generally. Our commitment to peaceful internal change in South Africa, a Namibia settlement, and to a reduction of tensions in the region at large is well known.
5. The timing of the visit, close to the Economic Summit, is coincidental.

/6. The

6. The last visit of a South African Prime Minister to the UK was by Dr Verwoerd in 1961 (when he attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and announced South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth). The long gap between that visit and Mr Botha's is not in itself significant. South African Prime Ministers have not been frequent travellers abroad.



1984

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see S. Goodchild



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

As this is to be a working lunch, agree the proposed guest at A & B below:

30 April, 1984

Jan John

A-J-C-3/5

Yes.

Visit of South African Prime Minister: 2 June

You asked for proposals for a guest list for the Prime Minister's lunch for Mr P W Botha at Chequers on 2 June.

A The South Africans have told us that they would like their side to comprise the following: Mr P W Botha; Mr R F (Pik) Botha, the Foreign Minister; Mr H van Dalsen, the Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs; Dr Barnard, the Head of the National Intelligence Service; a Private Secretary; and a representative from the South African Embassy in London (probably the Charge d'Affaires, Mr Evans). The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to these proposals.

B. On our side the Foreign Secretary recommends that he should attend, and that he should be supported by Mr Rifkind, Sir Antony Acland, and Sir John Leahy. On this basis the UK side would not match exactly the South African team on protocol grounds. There is no South African equivalent to Mr Rifkind's position, but Sir Geoffrey Howe believes it is right that Mr Rifkind, as Minister for Africa, and having recently visited Africa himself, should be present. In normal circumstances Sir Geoffrey Howe would recommend that our Ambassador in South Africa should return for this meeting. But Mr Fergusson is at present ill and will in any case be ending his appointment in Cape Town within three weeks of this meeting; in the circumstances there seems little point recalling him specially. Sir Geoffrey Howe also considers that it is right for Sir John Leahy to be present as Deputy Under Secretary responsible for Africa. He should be regarded as matching Dr Barnard on the South African side, who will be present not in his role as Head of the National Intelligence service but as a close adviser to Mr P W Botha.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister is happy with these proposals.

We are in touch with the South African authorities about other arrangements for Mr P W Botha's visit. We are looking particularly at the question of security at Heathrow and at Chequers and the necessary arrangements for meeting the South African party on arrival at the airport.

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We have also discussed with the South African authorities the question of announcing the visit. I understand that your press office would prefer to make no announcement, but simply to confirm the visit once news has emerged or the South Africans themselves have announced it. They do not intend to do this until nearer the date. The Foreign Secretary is however anxious that the visit should be positively presented to major African Governments and he proposes to tell the Nigerian Government of the visit when he visits Lagos on 6-7 May. We shall also explain the visit to other major African governments at about the same time. We in any case expect the news to emerge in mid-May as arrangements for Mr Botha's European tour, of which this visit is part, become more widely known.

[Handwritten signature]

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(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street


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South Africa: visit of no botha


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30 APR 1984



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OO CAPE TOWN
GRS 260
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FROM FCO 181355Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 18 APRIL
YOUR TELNO 306: VISIT BY P W BOTHA

*pa Botha
19/4*

1. WE HAVE INFORMED NUMBER TEN THAT MR BOTHA HAS ACCEPTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION, AND PASSED ON THE DETAILS OF TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AND HIS PARTY GIVEN IN PARAS THREE TO FOUR OF YOUR TUR. WE HAVE ASKED FOR ANY FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE WORKING LUNCH FROM NUMBER TEN AND WILL LET YOU HAVE THESE WHEN THEY ARE AVAILABLE.
2. WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED PIK BOTHA'S SUGGESTION (YOUR TELNO 303) THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER SHOULD PAY A SECOND VISIT TO MEET THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT LEADERS. YOU WERE RIGHT TO DISCOURAGE PIK BOTHA FROM PRESSING THIS, AND WE ARE GLAD TO KNOW THAT VAN DALSEN HAS ALSO PLAYED A HELPFUL ROLE. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SUMMIT ARE NOW SET AND IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO INTERPOSE A MEETING OF THIS KIND, EVEN ASSUMING THAT ALL SEVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE (AND TRUDEAU AND MITTERRAND MAY WELL NOT). MOREOVER, THE SUMMIT IS REALLY AN OCCASION FOR DISCUSSION OF BROADER ISSUES AND DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE SEVEN LEADERS TRADITIONALLY INVOLVED. PLEASE THEREFORE TELL VAN DALSEN ON LEAHY'S BEHALF THAT WE DO NOT THINK IT IS A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION. THIS NEED NOT OF COURSE PREVENT MR BOTHA FROM EXPRESSING HIS CONCERNS TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND IF HE WISHES TO HERR KOHL.
3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ALSO SPEAK TO VAL DALSEN ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF MR BOTHA'S VISIT HERE. NUMBER TEN PRESS OFFICE ARE NOT KEEN TO MAKE A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT THEMSELVES ABOUT THE VISIT AND WOULD PREFER SIMPLY TO CONFIRM IT ONCE IT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS (OR LEAKED). OUR OWN PREFERENCE IS THAT ANY PUBLICITY SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS VISITED NIGERIA (7 TO 9 MAY - HE COULD THEN TELL THE NIGERIANS HIMSELF) EVEN IF THAT DOES NOT CUT MUCH

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ICE IN CAPE TOWN. DELAY ALSO MINIMISES THE TIME FOR OPPOSITION TO THE VISIT HERE TO MOBILISE. BUT WE RECOGNISE DELAY MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE. A PQ FOR EXAMPLE WOULD HAVE TO BE ANSWERED (THOUGH PARLIAMENT IS IN RECESS UNTIL 25 APRIL). IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE VAN DALSEN'S VIEWS ON ALL THIS. IN THE MEANTIME, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DEFLECT ENQUIRIES.

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MR SQUIRE
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Pile *SSM*

MRS GOODCHILD

BF② | Please see the attached letter from the Foreign Office, which confirms that the South African Prime Minister will attend a working lunch at Chequers on Saturday 2 June.

As we discussed, I should be most grateful if you could:

- BF① |
- mention in confidence to Vera Thomas that a working lunch on that day will be required for 12-18 people.
 - ask your contacts in the Foreign Office to compile a draft guest list, to reach us by the end of next week if possible, for the Prime Minister's consideration the following weekend.

DAVID BARCLAY

18 April 1984

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HD/SAID

HD/PROTOCOL D.

HD/NEWS D.

NO 10 D.S.

CF: Papers please
(Botha visit)

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TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 17 APRIL

MY TEL NO 303 : VISIT BY P W BOTHA

1. VAN DALSEN (DG DFA) ASKED ME TO CALL TO CONVEY HIS PRIME MINISTER'S ACCEPTANCE OF MRS THATCHER'S INVITATION TO A WORKING LUNCH AT CHECKERS ON SATURDAY 2 JUNE.
2. VAN DALSEN SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIS MINISTER, PIK BOTHA, THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE OPPORTUNITY (SEE TUR), BUT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT MRS THATCHER'S DIARY CONSTRAINTS WERE VERY REAL AND, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HAD DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THE POINT.
3. VAN DALSEN SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY WOULD ARRIVE ON THE MORNING OF 2 JUNE FROM ZURICH AT HEATHROW, FROM WHERE THEY WOULD PRESUMABLY GO STRAIGHT TO CHEQUERS. AFTER LUNCH, THEIR PROGRAMME WAS TO FLY ON TO BONN IN THE AFTERNOON. VAN DALSEN SUGGESTED THAT A HELICOPTER FLIGHT FROM HEATHROW TO CHEQUERS MIGHT BE MOST CONVENIENT.
4. VAN DALSEN ASKED FOR FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE WORKING LUNCH, INCLUDING TIME AND PARTICIPATION. ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIDE, THE LIKELY COMPOSITION WOULD BE P W BOTHA, PIK BOTHA, VAN DALSEN, BARNARD (DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)

VAN DALSEN, BARNARD (DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) AND PRIVATE SECRETARY. (BARNARD IS A CLOSE ADVISER OF PW BOTHA.) THESE FIVE WOULD BE THE NUCLEUS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY. ONE OR TWO OTHER ADVISERS COULD ATTEND IF NECESSARY.

5. VAN DALSEN SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED PIK BOTHA'S OTHER PROPOSAL TO ME (PARA 3 OF TUR) ABOUT A RETURN VISIT DURING THE SEVEN NATION SUMMIT. VAN DALSEN SAID THAT HE TOO HAD SOUGHT TO DISSUADE PIK BOTHA FROM PURSUING THE IDEA. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I NEED ONLY LET VAN DALSEN KNOW AND THE SUGGESTION WILL BE DROPPED.

6. VAN DALSEN HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO STEYN, WHO IS ACCORDINGLY IN THE PICTURE.

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FM CAPE TOWN 170800Z APR 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 303 OF 17 APRIL

*pa
Dubs
18/4*

FOR LEAHY

MY TEL NO 302 : VISIT BY P W BOTHA TO EUROPE

1. SHORTLY AFTER I HAD SEEN VAN DALSEN AND HANDED OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO A WORKING LUNCH, PIK BOTHA ASKED ME TO CALL TO TALK OVER ONE OR TWO ASPECTS.
2. BOTHA SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION, BUT HE (PIK BOTHA) WONDERED WHETHER THE TIMING WAS SO INFLEXIBLE. HIS PRIME MINISTER HAD ANOTHER INVITATION ON 2 JUNE. IF HE HAD TO CHANGE HIS PROGRAMME, HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO SO. BUT PIK BOTHA ASKED ME TO CONFIRM THAT THERE REALLY WAS NO OTHER OPPORTUNITY. I MADE IT AS CLEAR AS I COULD THAT THE DIARY CONSTRAINTS WERE VERY REAL, BUT I UNDERTOOK AT HIS REQUEST TO PUT THE POINT TO YOU.
3. BOTHA THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE ANOTHER ASPECT WITH ME. (I SUSPECT THAT IT HAD BEEN MOOTED AT THE CABINET MEETING WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON.) THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN LONDON PROVIDED A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR MATTERS OF REAL IMPORTANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA TO ALL SEVEN COUNTRIES TO BE DISCUSSED. THERE WAS FIRSTLY THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO MOZAMBIQUE WHICH HE HAD ALREADY RAISED WITH LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SEVEN (OUR TEL NO 265). THEN THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA WHICH HAD AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC CONTENT: THE FIVE CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES WOULD ALL BE REPRESENTED. WHAT DID I THINK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF P W BOTHA SPEAKING IN THE MARGINS OF THE SEVEN NATION SUMMIT ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS ?
4. I DID MY BEST TO POUR COLD WATER ON THE SUGGESTION THAT P W BOTHA SHOULD PAY A SECOND VISIT TO LONDON DURING THE SUMMIT. I SAID THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE A VERY BUSY TIME INDEED AND THAT THE APPEARANCE OF P W BOTHA AS A KIND OF DEUS EX MACHINA IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE SEEN AS AN UNWELCOME DISTRACTION. THERE WERE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS AROUND THE WORLD WHICH THE SUMMIT HAD TO GRAPPLE WITH AND I THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD WISH TO CONCENTRATE TOO MUCH ON A PARTICULAR ISSUE OR AREA.

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5. AT THIS POINT, BOTHA WAS INTERRUPTED BY A CALL FROM P W BOTHA, WHICH HE TOOK IN ANOTHER ROOM. WHEN HE CAME BACK, HE SWITCHED TO ANOTHER MATTER (SEE HIFT), BUT AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR DISCUSSION SAID THAT HE WOULD NONETHELESS BE GRATEFUL IF I "COULD PUT HIS IDEA TO MY GOOD FRIEND JOHN LEAHY", ON A PURELY PERSONAL BASIS. IT WAS NOT A FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO TEST THE WATER. P W BOTHA AND HE WOULD BE SEEING COUNTRIES INDIVIDUALLY TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS. BUT WHAT A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY TO CATCH ALL THE MAIN PROTAGONISTS TOGETHER AT ONE MEETING.

6. COMMENT: AS REGARDS THE 2 JUNE WORKING LUNCH, PIK BOTHA PROBABLY EXPECTS THE REPLY THAT THE DIARY CONSTRAINTS ARE TOO GREAT FOR MRS THATCHER TO OFFER ANOTHER DATE. AS REGARDS THE IDEA OF A SECOND VISIT TO LONDON, I IMAGINE THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE ENTHUSIASM IN LONDON, OR INDEED ELSEWHERE, FOR THE SUGGESTION. BUT AS BOTHA ASKED THAT I PUT IT TO YOU QUITE INFORMALLY, I FELT BOUND TO AGREE TO DO SO.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 April 1984

MW Coles o/v

John Taylor

Visit of the South African Prime Minister

Your letter of 16 April conveyed the Prime Minister's agreement to extend an invitation to Mr P W Botha to a working lunch at Chequers, ideally on Saturday 2 June. We have been in touch with the South African Government through our Embassy in Cape Town. There was apparently some difficulty on the South African side about timing, but this has now been overcome and the South Africans have confirmed that Mr Botha gratefully accepts Mrs Thatcher's invitation.

Mr Botha's plans are that his party would arrive on the morning of 2 June from Zurich at Heathrow. They presume they would go straight to Chequers from the airport. After lunch, the South African party intend to fly on to Bonn. The South Africans have suggested that transport by helicopter from Heathrow to Chequers and back would obviously be convenient. Such an arrangement would fit in well with our concern to maintain a low profile for the visit. The South African party is likely to comprise, in addition to Mr P W Botha, his Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Van Dalsen), the Director of the National Intelligence Service (Dr Barnard), who is a close adviser of the Prime Minister, and a Private Secretary.

The South Africans are naturally keen to know any further details of arrangements for the Chequers lunch. When these are available we would be glad to convey them to the South African side.

We have told the South Africans that we would hope to make a joint announcement of the visit in due course. We are considering what recommendation we should make on the timing of such an announcement and will be in touch with you further.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April, 1984

POSSIBLE VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN

PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 13 April.

The Prime Minister agrees that an invitation should be extended on her behalf to the South African Prime Minister to a working lunch at Chequers. The best day from our point of view would be Saturday, 2 June. I should be grateful if you could ascertain whether Mr. Botha could accept this invitation.

RF

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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NR

Mr Coles



Yes.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Agree to invite
Mrs Botha to visit
London in June?

(Yes)

Body Clerk

13/4

Mr. Barclay.

Yes

Can the Prime Minister do
a working lunch at Chequers
on either 2 or 3 June?

A.S.C. 16/4.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1984

*Jew John,*Possible visit by the South African Prime Minister

As you will have heard, the FRG Government has announced that the South African Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, is to visit Bonn on 5-6 June, apparently as part of a wider European tour. We have not been approached by the South Africans about a similar visit to London but in the circumstances we thought it right to consider whether a visit would be appropriate.

The arguments are finely balanced. Our overall objective is to move South African foreign policy in the direction of a more political and less military approach towards their neighbours, whilst looking for progress towards constitutional arrangements inside South Africa that are more acceptable to all sections of the population. A team of officials had talks in Cape Town last September; Mr Rifkind paid the first Ministerial visit to South Africa for some time in October 1983; and the Foreign Secretary is himself thinking of a visit at the end of this year. We of course regularly receive South African Ministers in London, including the Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, in early December 1983. It is important to pursue this policy of contact and dialogue without upsetting the balance of our interests more generally. The Prime Minister will be aware of the strong feelings expressed on the subject of South Africa at New Delhi last year.

A visit to this country by the Prime Minister of South Africa would be the first since Dr Verwoerd came for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in 1961 when he announced South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth. It would certainly be open to misinterpretation in many quarters. Such a visit to London might provoke large demonstrations and be difficult to handle.

A visit would nevertheless enable us to make very clear to Mr Botha the strength of feeling in the UK about South African internal and external policies. It would be a good opportunity for some plain speaking. It would also

/provide



provide a chance to inject some momentum into the Namibian negotiations. For his part, Mr Botha would doubtlessly wish to raise some difficult bilateral issues such as the ANC presence in London.

On balance Sir Geoffrey thinks the arguments are in favour of an invitation. Although a visit would provoke strong reaction here, it is in accordance with our policy of dialogue, and would be publicly defensible. It should also be defensible internationally, the more so since President Machel's recent meeting with Mr Botha to sign the South Africa/Mozambique security agreement. A visit by Mr Botha here in early June would clash with the RFU tour in South Africa which begins at the end of May. This may contribute to the controversy of the visit, but the Foreign Secretary does not consider it alters the balance of the arguments.

Sir Geoffrey recommends that, if the Prime Minister should agree to invite him, it should be for a working lunch at Chequers, rather than for talks in London. Mr Botha's visit to Bonn is just before the Economic Summit; but perhaps a visit to Chequers on the weekend of 2-3 June by Mr Botha might still be possible and not clash with the arrival here of leaders of the Summit nations.

We have incidentally also been told by the Americans (Crocker telephoned Malcolm Rifkind last night) that they would not wish to invite Botha themselves, but that they see no disadvantage - from the point of view of the careful diplomacy they are pursuing over Namibia - in our doing so ourselves.


Your
 R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street

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