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Cabinet Two. M1

PART 2

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UK/Soviet Relations

SOVIET UNION

Part 1: May 1979

Part 2: April 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~22.4.81~~		~~17.10.83~~					
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~~8.9.82~~		~~10.11.83~~					
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Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on military and Civil Affairs. Sir Solly Zuckerman

Published by Hamish Hamilton 1966

The Nuclear Hostages, Bernard J O'Keefe

Published by Houghton Mifflin Company 1983
ISBN 0-395-34072-1

What we Ought to do About the Soviet Threat

Published by the Centre for Policy Studies October 1983
ISBN 0-905880-52- 8

Signed _____ Date 26/9/18

PREM Records Team

PART 2 ends:-

Keston College Note (Undated)

PART 3 begins:-

FCO to AJC 4.6.84

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(82) 49th Conclusions, Minute 2	18/11/82
CC(82) 50th Conclusions, Minute 2	25/11/81
CC(83) 5th Conclusions, Minute 2	17/02/83
CC(83) 13th Conclusions, Minute 2	21/04/83
CC(83) 14th Conclusions, Minute 2	28/04/83
CC(84) 6th Conclusions, Minute 3	16/02/84
JIC(84)(N) 45	23/03/84
CC(84) 13th Conclusions, Minute 2	29/03/84
CC(84) 14th Conclusions, Minute 2	05/04/84

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed CWayland Date 30 October 2013

PREM Records Team

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Telex KESCOL 897684

Soviet Relations with Arg.

Mr Coles : to see

BR 23/5 f.a.

with compliments

R 23/5

ANDROPOV'S DEATH-BED LEGISLATION

Fear is the cornerstone of every totalitarian state, therefore, in order to ensure their further existence, totalitarian regimes must constantly invent new punitive measures until, finally, they are left with no option but undisguised terror tactics. A glance through recent issues of the Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR) draws a picture of a situation which is becoming increasingly reminiscent of Stalinist times.

For example, on 13 September 1983 (a week after the ending of the Madrid Helsinki review conference!) the Gazette published a decree with an amendment to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. This was article 188^3, the text of which is as follows:

Malicious disobedience of the orders given by administrative personnel of a penal-reform establishment.

" The malicious disobedience of orders given by administrative personnel of a penal-reform establishment, or any other form of opposing the administration by an individual serving a term of punishment in an institution for those deprived of liberty, if said individual has, in the course of a year been transferred to solitary confinement or transferred to prison for violating regime conditions, -

shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 3 years.

The same actions carried out by an especially dangerous recidivist or an individual sentenced for a serious crime,-

shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a period from 1 to 5 years. "

This amendment went into force of law on 1 October 1983.

Until that time, the rearrest of prisoners after their release from camps and prisons necessarily involved bringing new charges, conducting new trials, etc. Now that the Criminal Code has been enriched by article 188^3 the matter becomes considerably easier for the authorities. The prisoner need only be accused of "violating the regime" a few times, and his sentence can be prolonged by years without his being released.

On 11 January 1984 the ailing Andropov signed a number of new decrees. As well as appointing "comrade Sizenko E.I. to the post of minister for the meat and dairy industry," there are also several amendments to the Criminal Code. in the section dealing with crimes against the state. One of these, article 76^1 concerns :

"The passing, or collection with intent of passing to foreign organizations or their representatives of economic, technical, scientific or other "official use only information" by a person to whom this information was entrusted in the course of his duties, or which he learned by any other means".

The punishment is up to 3 years' deprivation of freedom. The wording of this article is not so much vague, as all-embracing. For example, an outraged shopper may discover stocks of food hidden in a supposedly empty shop (economic information), defective refrigeration equipment (scientific and technical information) is abused by the manager of the shop (other information) , moreover, he comes across all this information not as a member of a "people's control" inspection group (work) but because he pushed his way into the shop despite the protests of the serving staff (other means). That evening, he might go and visit some friends and there encounter a

Bulgarian art critic who has been posted on assignment to the USSR by his Academy of Sciences (representative of a foreign organization) - and note, this article means any foreign organization - and, over a glass of vodka tells the foreign visitor about his highly upsetting day's experiences i.e. passes on to him the information he has collected.

Note also, that it is not publication or the use of "official use only information" by sinister "foreign organizations" that is a necessary condition for a crime to be considered committed: it will be so considered should the Bulgarian visitor prove timid (or zealous) and inform "the comrades in plain clothes" about his conversation.

Obviously, the above example is an exercise in the absurd, but it is easy to envisage a much more serious scenario, the more so that the nature of "official use only information" is nowhere defined. For example, is passing on information about a sentence brought down at a trial held behind closed doors "official use only information"? Or does that already constitute a "state secret"? What about lists of names of prisoners in this or that camp or prison? What about the ecological crisis and food shortages? Or statistics on crime, drug-addiction, suicide - in a word, all those things which are never mentioned on the pages of the Soviet press?

This article is clearly aimed at stifling any exchange of information whatsoever and is a clear violation of the guarantees of the Helsinki Agreements and other international legislation which is binding on the signatory states and which, in accord with international practice, must supercede national legislation should the two conflict.

Simultaneously with the above, another amendment went into law: this time to the frequently invoked article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"). Full of repressive potential, it is a fitting note for the last weeks of the temporal life of the former head of the KGB.

Previously this article had consisted of two parts. First offenders were liable to a sentence of deprivation of freedom for a period of 6 months to 7 years with or without additional (internal) exile for a period of 2 to 5 years. Subsequent offences under this article raised the sentence to deprivation of freedom for a period of 3 to 10 years, with or without additional exile for 2 to 5 years. As of 1 February 1984 the article has been expanded to include:

" Actions carried out with the use of moneys or other material goods received from foreign organizations or from persons acting in the interests of such organizations".

The punishment or this additional infringement can bring the sentence up to 10 years' deprivation of freedom with or without additional exile for 5 years. In other words, material aid of any kind from abroad can be considered an aggravating circumstance in the crime. It could be extended to cover even something as trivial as receiving a pair of Western jeans. (N.B. material aid is going to be very hard to get through anyway as of 1 August 1984. The Soviet agency handling parcels with duty prepaid for addressees in the USSR (Vneshposyltorg) has officially served notice that from that date no more duty prepaid parcels will be allowed into the Soviet Union).

Please note: Compiled by Alyona for staff info only, not for publication! The article numbers cited are all as they appear in the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and will have other numbers in the Codes of the other republics.

26 April 1984

MAB from AK

I learned yesterday evening that the Soviet Union will not, as of 1 August, accept any more parcels sent through Western companies (such as those used by ARC) where duty is prepaid: written notification of this will reach the companies concerned within the next few days. The measure extends to such organizations in all Western countries, not just the U.K.

This means that the only way left to send parcels will be on an individual basis, through the post, with the recipient paying all duties upon receipt. In practice, this will mean no parcels, because you know yourself what monstrous duties are levied for the most simple things. It also means that one will no longer be able to use fictitious names as senders, because if the parcel is returned, it would be to a non-existent person, whereas earlier they were returned to the despatching company for handing over to the "sender".

Effectively, this will mean no parcels to dissidents (or anyone else, for that matter!) I do not see what could be done to counter this, for the companies involved are really ad hoc creations resulting from the unnatural situation in the USSR, and it is unlikely that this measure by the Soviets could be interpreted as a breach of international trade or postal agreements.

Sending money with travellers so that X or Y could pay the duty upon receipt of a parcel from the West could also be very chancy: apart from the fact that this would involve very large sums, it could also place the Soviet citizen in question in a very dicey situation because of the recent amendment to the "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" article of the Criminal Code.

It seems to me that a further tightening up is on the way, and we'll have to watch events with extra care. For instance, I saw in the apares the other day that Chebrikov has been made a marshal: this is the first time since Beria that the chairman of the KGB has also held marshal's rank. I don't like the implications....

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May, 1984

Contacts with the Soviet Union

Thank you for your letter of 10 May, the contents of which the Prime Minister has noted.

I take it that you will be in touch with us again when you are in a position to recommend whether and how an invitation to visit this country might be extended to Mr. Gorbachev or to other full members of the Politburo.

A. J. COLES

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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T O P S E C R E T UMBRA GAMMA
FOLLOWING FOR THOMAS FROM WRIGHT
YOUR JICTEL NO 96: SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT A SURPRISE NATO ATTACK.

A.J.C. 14/5
p.a.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW AGREED THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS A PAPER WE HAVE PREPARED ON POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES COVERING NUCLEAR COMMAND POST EXERCISES. THIS DOES NOT (NOT) DWELL ON THE SPECIFIC SOVIET RESPONSE TO ABLE ARCHER, BUT IS INTENDED TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR GENERAL POLICY DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS IN PARALLEL WITH CONTINUED EXCHANGES ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT CONTAINED IN JIC(84)(N)45.

2. MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK PROVIDES A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR HANDING OVER THIS PAPER TO BURT. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT A DETAILED AMERICAN RESPONSE AT THAT STAGE. INSTEAD, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT ONCE THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HAD TIME TO DIGEST OUR PAPER, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER: AS YOU KNOW, CARTLEDGE AND WESTON WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF MAY AND WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE THE MATTER FURTHER THEN, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD NOT ALLOW US TO MEET OUR TARGET OF HOLDING DETAILED TALKS BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISES IT WITH SHULTZ IN THE MARGINS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING.
£0000

cc. PS
PS-PUS
Sir J. Bullard
Mr. Cartledge
Mr. Crabbie, Defence
→ Mr. Coles - NWD
Mr O'Neill - C. Office
Mr Fewtrell - DS17 Mo

CC PE
BT

Prime Minister.
To be aware.
AR 11/5.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1984

Dear John,

Contacts with the Soviet Union

In your letter of 10 April you recorded a brief discussion between Ministers about our forward programme of contacts with the Soviet Union. It might be helpful if I set out our current plans.

At the Ministerial level, in addition to the Foreign Secretary's meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm in January and the Prime Minister's with Mr Chernenko in Moscow in February, we have recently had a two-day visit by Mr Kornienko, the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, for discussions in London. The next Ministerial event on the political calendar will be Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to Moscow for talks with Mr Gromyko on 2/3 July. We have also proposed to the Russians that there should be a series of meetings at senior official level to discuss a number of regional and other questions.

On the technical side, Mr Channon will be visiting Moscow at the end of May for the annual meeting of the Joint Anglo/Soviet Economic Commission chaired on the Soviet side by Mr Brezhnev. Mr Walker may also be visiting the Soviet Union in the autumn. In addition, Sir Campbell Fraser, President of the CBI, visited Moscow in April and Lord Jellicoe, President of the British Overseas Trade Board, will be visiting Moscow in November for talks with a number of Soviet Ministers. Mr Bratchenko, the Soviet Minister for Coal, has been invited to visit the UK and we also hope that ICI's plan to invite Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev (who has general responsibility for the agricultural sector) will bear fruit. Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev would call on a number of senior British Ministers.

The range of Anglo/Soviet contacts set out above is considerably wider than anything that has taken place since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It is as well developed as anything our major allies are contemplating, and a good deal more so than for some of them.

/It is

It is against this background that we have looked at the question of inviting a senior member of the Politburo to visit the UK later in the year. Sir Geoffrey Howe will in any case invite Mr Gromyko to pay a return visit to the UK but that visit would probably take place next spring or summer. As to other possible names, Gorbachev visited Canada in 1983 as Head of a Parliamentary Delegation. He has now been elected to be Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of one of the Chambers of the Supreme Soviet. It might therefore be best to extend an invitation on a Parliamentary basis, and we are looking at how this might best be done, perhaps as part of the follow-up to the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow in July. Others from the new generation of Soviet leaders with whom it would be useful to have contact are Romanov, Vorotnikov and Aliev, all full members of the Politburo. Romanov would be the most difficult to invite since he holds no Government post and it would be difficult to find a British counterpart. Although Vorotnikov has a Government hat as Prime Minister of the Russian Federated Republic, the most important of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union, it would again be difficult to find a British equivalent. Aliev, as a First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR with economic responsibilities, would perhaps be more easily matched to a Minister in our own administration, although we could not exclude the possibility that the Russians would accept the invitation in principle but in place of Aliev seek to send Arkhipov, another First Deputy Prime Minister who normally deals with trade with capitalist countries.

On the East European side, Sir Geoffrey Howe hopes to visit Romania and Bulgaria during the autumn, possibly in September. We have a regular programme of annual political consultations at Deputy Foreign Minister level with the East Europeans: the Romanians will be here in May and the Czechoslovaks in the autumn. In 1985 we shall invite the Hungarian Foreign Minister to Britain, and Mr Lazar already has an invitation from the Prime Minister. The East Europeans do not, of course, carry the same weight as the Russians. But, as the Prime Minister's visit to Budapest demonstrated, they are sometimes of interest in their own right, they provide an indirect channel to Moscow and they can have valuable things to say about Soviet policy and concerns. We shall be considering further the right sequence for the Russians and will keep you posted.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Soviet Union PT 2
Relations

Prime Minister

You will remember having a talk with Nicholas Soames about his recent visit to the Soviet Union, and the impression he got from talking to a number of senior Soviet officials.

I enclose a report which he has made of the visit which I have copied to John Coles.

MA

MICHAEL ALISON
10.5.84

REPORT ON A VISIT TO MOSCOW

From the 23rd to the 26th April I accompanied Professor John Erickson and Group Captain David Bolton (RAF retired) on a visit to Moscow to attend preliminary meetings prior to the 'Edinburgh Conversations' which are to be held in Moscow in September this year. A log of the meetings I attended is attached.

From these discussions I have drawn a number of personal conclusions:

1. The Soviet system is entirely reactive. I do not believe they are capable of coming forward with innovative and radical ideas of their own to break out of the present log-jam of ideology.
2. They suffer from a deep-seated sense of insecurity which together with a massive inferiority complex leads to a real fear on their part that to concede at certain levels is to be humiliated.
3. I think they believe that the Americans are seeking superiority and they have serious problems finding the money to cope with such developments of their own.
4. They have substantial internal problems (the reasons for which are well known) and this obviously has a profound effect on their thinking internationally.
5. Their system enables them to take a much longer term view of world affairs than does a democracy where emphases are constantly changing and evolving.
6. The present hard line taken in Moscow is a mechanism for avoiding any serious discussions before the American Presidential Elections.

Contd../

7. I believe there are substantial misconceptions on both sides which further exacerbates an already highly difficult situation.

8. The trading of formal insults is part of the conventional proceedings in these matters but I am in doubt that recent American pronouncements questionning the very legitimacy of the Soviet Union and its system have been damaging. This they regard as much more serious than the normal line of abuse.

At the present time they believe that the Americans do not want a deal - this is quite apart from the considerations of an American Election. If there was to be evidence of 'good political intent' as they see it then I believe that progress could be made. I think that the most important areas that we should concentrate on are the confidence building measures which if successful could lead to momentum for other agreements. MBFR is an area where I am sure that an accommodation could be arrived at given the right circumstances. But it is unlikely there will be any deals unless the atmosphere changes for the better.

Whatever future progress is to be made, it is crucial that we arrive at a long term plan which can be carefully laid out step by step. This is of particular importance bearing in mind the long term view that the Russians take.

Contd../

At the end of the day it will be, of necessity, the West that comes up with the bold initiatives and the original ideas since the Russians fear of perceived humiliation and latent 'chippiness' prohibits them from having any realistic capacity in this direction. The more mature and sophisticated Democracies will have to make the running.

The most striking perception that I came away with was that despite their great power, they are obsessed by their sense of insecurity. I believe that we should constantly emphasise to them that despite the differences between East and West, it should not be a bar to the achievement of a realistic, frank, long-term relationship.

I am convinced that Britain has a much larger role to play in these matters then we at present believe. The Prime Minister has a strong personal card to play but we also have an obligation to try to wean the Americans away from the damaging, unhelpful and simple rhetoric which has become so much part of the conventional dialogue.

In conclusion I am convinced that it is the democracies that must take the initiative. Whatever the Americans may say the Russians believe at the moment that they do not want to arrive at an accommodation and this in itself represents a failure of East/West relations.

Contd../

I do not believe that the Russians have any intention of having a confrontation in Europe but I fear greatly the possibility of a collision in the Middle East, Africa or elsewhere. It is for this reason that we really must break out of the sterile format of proceedings and look for a new realistic, long-term plan. At the very least we should seek to try to narrow the differences between our respective points of view before moving on to talks over as broad a field as possible.

MEETINGS LOG

Institute of USA and Canada Studies:	G. ARBATOV GENERAL MILSTEIN
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:	V. P. SUSLOV V. M. SEMENOV
Institute of World Economy and International Relations: (I.M.E.M.O.)	PROF. AN YAKOLEV
PRAVDA:	VICTOR AFANASYEV (Editor-in-Chief)
The Military:	MAJ. GEN. R. F. MIKAILOV (General Staff) COL. SEMEIKO

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 May 1984

Soviet Concern about a Surprise NATO Attack

Thank you for your letter of 4 May to Robin Butler.

The Prime Minister agrees that the paper enclosed with your letter may be passed to the US Government.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Sir Robert Armstrong and 'C'.

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 May 1984

Prime Minister.
Agree that the attached paper should be passed to the Americans?
A.J.C. 4/5.

Dear Robin,

Soviet Concern about a Surprise NATO Attack

Your letter of 10 April recorded the Prime Minister's agreement that officials should urgently consider how to approach the Americans on the question of possible Soviet misapprehensions about a surprise NATO attack.

Sir Oliver Wright has now had a preliminary discussion with Mr Eagleburger (Under Secretary of State), who confirmed that US intelligence officials are urgently analysing the unusual Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83. It is fair to say that these analysts expressed initial scepticism about the conclusions reached in JIC Report (JIC(84)(N)45), and we need to ensure that we are not perceived in Washington as being the victim of a disinformation exercise designed to cause US allies unjustified concern about the effect of American policies on Soviet fears. But a full US intelligence assessment has now been commissioned, and it may be significant that as a consequence of the JIC report, the Americans deemed it wise to notify the Russians earlier this month of a series of their own nuclear exercises.

We now need to put the discussion on to a more political level. Whatever the reliability of the judgement in the JIC assessment, its paper has served as a catalyst for consideration of the inherent advantages of agreeing some confidence-building measures relating to nuclear command post exercises along lines similar to those which already cover some nuclear and conventional field exercises. FCO and MOD officials have therefore agreed the attached paper setting out a number of themes which would serve as a basis for more detailed discussion with the Americans.

If the Prime Minister agrees, it is our intention to pass this paper urgently to the Americans and to aim at a detailed discussion with US officials in mid-May, ideally before the Foreign Secretary raises the matter himself with Shultz during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington at the end of the month.

/I am

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram, Sir Robert Armstrong and 'C'.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

F E R Butler Esq
10 Downing Street

MS

SOVIET UNION: CONCERN ABOUT A SURPRISE NATO ATTACK

I INTRODUCTION

1. This paper considers whether specific options exist for minimising the risk of Soviet misinterpretation of NATO Command Post Exercises (CPXs), particularly nuclear ones. Although it has been prepared in the context of an unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 and other reports of alleged concern about a surprise NATO attack (JIC(84)(N)45), the paper examines the inherent advantages and disadvantages of prior notification of nuclear CPXs as an overall Confidence Building Measure (CBM).

2. Account is taken (see paragraph 8 below) of the possibility that the Russians may be using disinformation to cause US allies concern about the effect of overall American policy on the Soviet Union, to inhibit NATO activities or to condition Warsaw Pact allies to the 'counter-deployment' of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe.

3. Although the JIC reached no firm conclusion, we cannot discount the possibility that at least some Soviet officials/ officers may have misinterpreted Able Archer 83 and possibly other nuclear CPXs as posing a real threat. Quite apart from their reaction to Able Archer and human intelligence about alleged concern among certain Soviet leaders, the Russians have introduced a new state of alert in the last year or two defined as "Danger of sudden attack with weapons of mass destruction". If their response involves the taking of actual precautions against what

/they

they judge to be threatening and ambiguous warning indicators, should we seek to establish a system which makes the holding of high level nuclear CPXs subject to an obligation to notify in advance? Should the practice of promoting military transparency through Confidence Building Measures be extended from field exercises and the movement of actual forces to CPXs themselves? Provided a proposal can be assembled which does not constrain nuclear CPX activity, (which is militarily vital for the training of commanders and their staffs in extremely complicated procedures), could there be advantage in exploring this with the Russians? If they are misleading us about their concerns, a properly balanced Western proposal may simply be rejected at no cost to ourselves, while if they are genuinely concerned they will presumably be anxious to negotiate CBMs which could effectively alleviate mutual fears. Recent Soviet notification of the testing of the SS17 emergency communications system (CIA NID 12 April) may be a significant indication of Russian interest.

II SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION

4. While an element of uncertainty is implicit in the concept of deterrence, it is assumed that there is mutual benefit in ensuring that each side does not misconstrue the other's CPXs as posing a real threat. Since certain notification measures relating to test ICBM launches already exist for reducing the possibility of misinterpretation (eg SALT II, Article XVI) there seems no inherent reason why similar procedures could not be devised which extended to certain nuclear CPXs as well. Prior warning of field exercises has become an accepted feature of the conventional arms control process, and as such, could be capable

not noted

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of expansion, although not perhaps within existing fora (see paragraph 7 below). It is for discussion whether notification of nuclear CPXs would have to be balanced (the reciprocal nature of conventional notification is an important factor which needs to be taken into account) or whether notification might be asymmetric or even unilateral.

5. It is also for discussion what CPXs might be notified and the extent of information which might be provided. It may for example be asked whether awareness of the existence of a nuclear CPX would of itself generate confidence. In our view simple notification could indeed be effective in reassuring the other side if it was given sufficiently far in advance to make it clear that such exercises formed a normal pattern of activity and took place in relative isolation from the changing temperature of political relationships between the major powers. It might prove possible to construct notification in such a way as to avoid giving details of particular scenarios or inhibit in any way US or NATO exercises.

6. Although the Russians appear to have reacted in an unprecedented way to the NATO exercise Able Archer 83, their concern, if indeed it exists, is likely to be about the American ingredient of any perceived threat rather than its general NATO-wide context. This, coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union is the only nuclear power in the Warsaw Pact, indicates that super-power nuclear CPXs should form the centrepiece of any notification procedure, supplemented perhaps on the West's side with notification of NATO-wide exercises involving a substantial American nuclear role. We do not consider that every exercise

/involving

involving simulated nuclear release would require notification since both sides regularly practice such releases at a low level in a whole range of exercises. In the immediate future it might be enough to attempt early discussions with the Russians, and possibly to notify as an earnest of our intent this year's Able Archer (November 84) andthe NATO-wide WINTEX exercise early in 1985. Consideration would however need to be given to the risk that in notifying in this way one might set a precedent from which it would be difficult to retreat subsequently if the Russians refused to reciprocate.

III FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION

7. If it is accepted that there would be advantage in reducingpossible misapprehension about nuclear attack, and that substantive proposals could be devised, consideration needs to be given to appropriate frameworks for discussion. There may be a requirement for speed (Able Archer November 84, WINTEX early 85). This effectively rules out most of the existing arms control negotiations as suitable fora since discussion of CBMs in any of these is likely to be unduly prolonged (MBFR), complicated by an involvement of extraneous participants (CDE, CSCE) or indefinitely delayed (START). A number of existing bilateral US/USSR agreements theoretically provide a framework ('hotline' agreements 1963/71, Article XVI of SALT II or Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement 1973), but none of them seem easily adaptable to current requirements.

8. An ad hoc forum may therefore be required. A special contact between the US and the USSR seems the most practical

option in terms of speed, simplicity and security. Although it was a NATO CPX about which the Soviets appear to have been concerned, prior consultation within a NATO forum, no matter how restricted, would inevitably be insecure and cause public speculation about a highly sensitive matter. Although we could fully justify attempts to increase confidence about nuclear matters and anticipate considerable support for such efforts, on balance the search for CBMs is likely to be more effectively pursued in secret since the refocussing of public attention on the issue of "nuclear survival" is in general unlikely to prove helpful. However recent experience suggests that a bilateral discussion involving possible notification of NATO and US national nuclear CPXs is unlikely to cause problems within the Alliance provided it is subsequently or simultaneously explained to a number of selected NATO Permanent Representatives in restricted session that such contacts were designed to promote a greater sense of confidence between the two superpowers. Soviet attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies, and the possibility that their alleged fears about a surprise attack may comprise disinformation, strengthen the case for discussion of CBMs relating to Command Post Exercises, specifically nuclear ones, to be conducted bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. This would also reduce opportunities for the Russians to put pressure on American policy through US allies.

9. The President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Report, 21 March 1984) proposes a bilateral exchange

/of

information between US and Soviet Defence officials about steps which could be misconstrued as indications of an attack. The Report proposes that a variety of measures should be constructed to improve communication and predictability which would 'contribute to stability by improving mutual understanding and reducing surprise and misinterpretation'. It is our view that General Scowcroft's recommendations should be acted upon as soon as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

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cc. Sir P. Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1984

UK/Soviet Relations and Ministerial Contacts with the Soviet Union

The Prime Minister saw over the Easter weekend your letter of 16 April to John Coles about UK/Soviet relations, together with your letter of the same date about Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister has noted with approval what is proposed.

DAVID BARCLAY

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 April 1984

Soviet concern about a surprise NATO attack

The Prime Minister has seen and noted the contents of your letter to John Coles on the above subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

(David Barclay)

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MK

CC PC (4)

Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 16/4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1984

MT.

Dear John,

Ministerial Contacts with the Soviet Union

Following Ministerial discussion earlier this year of the future conduct of our policy on East/West relations and our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, we have been re-examining some aspects of our post-Afghanistan guidelines. As regards social and business contacts between Ministers and the Russians in London, the Foreign Secretary hopes that colleagues will observe the following modified guidelines (this supersedes Paul Lever's letter to Michael Alexander of 8 January 1980, copied to Private Secretaries to Members of the Cabinet):

(i) purely social contacts should continue to be avoided, but where in Ministers' views such contacts serve British interests, no obstacles should be placed in their way. In practice this means that Ministers may accept invitations to meals or receptions from the Soviet Embassy provided the occasion could reasonably, and if necessary publicly, be described as an occasion on which serious business was discussed or which was directly concerned with important British commercial or other interests. The same criteria would apply to any invitation to a senior Soviet official to a British function. Except in doubtful cases, the Foreign Secretary hopes that colleagues will take their own decisions, but would be grateful if the FCO could invariably be informed of any invitation received or extended and of the response to it;

(ii) Soviet National Day (beginning of November): we will seek to equate the level of senior representation in London to that at our Queen's Birthday Party in Moscow, judged against the background of the prevailing state of Anglo/Soviet relations. Similar considerations would apply to other Soviet anniversaries celebrated in London (except Soviet Armed Forces Day - see below). In all such cases the Foreign Secretary would be grateful if colleagues would consult the FCO before any response is given.

/(iii)

(iii) Soviet Armed Forces Day: so long as the current level of Soviet military activity in Afghanistan is maintained, the Foreign Secretary believes that our practice should remain in line with that of our major allies, ie token representation only (we are also in contact separately with the MOD about other military contacts in London);

(iv) Soviet Cultural Events in London: on the rare occasions when these occur, the Foreign Secretary would be content that Ministers with responsibilities relating to the Arts should attend if they see advantage in doing so. However, for the present, the general rule should be that such events should be avoided. The Foreign Secretary would be grateful if the FCO could be notified of all invitations received. A case in point is a number of invitations received by Ministers from a British impresario, Mr Brightman, to a season of ballet given by the Moscow Classical Ballet in May. Although this is an entirely British commercially sponsored event, it will be seen as a Soviet manifestation, and the Foreign Secretary therefore believes that the above criteria should apply.

As regards Ministerial visits to the Soviet Union, there is already a practice by which the concurrence of the Foreign Secretary is sought before any commitment is entered into. We should be grateful to be told as early as possible of any invitations which are extended, by the Soviet Ambassador or by visiting Soviet Ministers.

We shall be sending instructions to our Posts abroad setting out guidelines for contacts with Soviet Embassies and representatives in third countries.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to all Ministers in charge of Departments with the request that they circulate it as necessary.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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cc ft (4)

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C. 16/4

16 April 1984

MO.

Dear John,

UK/Soviet Relations

I am sending to you separately, and copied to all Ministerial offices, revised guidelines for contacts between British Ministers and Soviet representatives in London. The general aim of these is to permit a gradual expansion of the level and range of our contacts with the Russians - who have since the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow been distinctly more forthcoming with invitations - while maintaining a certain reserve appropriate to the fact that Soviet military activity in Afghanistan continues unabated.

The Prime Minister may also wish to know of other areas where we are moving forward, bearing in mind the goal of working for a programme of increased contacts at all levels of which she spoke in Moscow.

Social Contacts with the Russians Abroad

For third countries, our guidelines will reflect those in my separate letter to you governing contacts in London. Wider discretion will be given in Moscow, where contacts are more difficult to make, and all can be said to serve our national interests.

Military Contacts

While Soviet activity in Afghanistan remains at the present level, this will continue to be a difficult area. The following considerations apply:

(a) we need to be in a position to do business with the Russians over military matters and should ensure that there are adequate contacts at all levels to facilitate this;

(b) however, the Foreign Secretary believes that we should stay closely in step with our major allies on attendance at public Soviet manifestations with obvious military connotations. At present there is no indication of a disposition to move from the present position of token representation at Soviet Armed Forces Day and at the military parades associated with the October Revolution.

We shall be in separate correspondence with the MOD about how to put (a) into practice.

/Technical

Technical Co-operation

Activities under our four Technical Co-operation Agreements with the Soviet Union were reduced following the imposition of martial law in Poland. Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that these political constrants should now be lifted, but that the criterion of national interest should in future be more rigorously applied. We should therefore avoid meetings for meetings' sake at Soviet behest.

Trade

Bearing in mind the criteria set out in the annex to the Foreign Secretary's paper on East/West relations (I enclose a copy) we should seek to expand trade with the Soviet Union. Mr Channon will be going to Moscow and possibly Kiev in May for the Annual Joint Commission, accompanied by a party of businessmen. Mr Walker is likely to be taking up his invitation from Mr Kostandov later this year. Mr Channon has invited Mr Bratchenko, the Coal Minister, to Britain this year, and ICI are hoping to extend an invitation to the Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev (who has general responsibility for the agricultural sector). If he accepts then like deputy Prime Minister Kostandov, we would envisage Nuriev calling on British Ministers.

It would not be the Foreign Secretary's intention to recommend any formal announcement of these modifications to our existing guidelines. We shall, however, keep in close touch with our NATO allies and Community partners, a number of whom are already considering, or have put into effect, similar modifications with the general goal of expanding contacts with the Soviet Union.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence and Trade and Industry, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

 attachment to PS letter to Mr Coles

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might invite Mr Gromyko to visit the UK during 1984.

Information

6. The most effective means of getting information into the Soviet Union at present is by radio transmissions. The role of the BBC External Services should be re-examined.

7. Other opportunities arising from our bilateral cultural agreement and the CSCE process for exposing Soviet people to Western ideas and ideals should be exploited.

Economy

8. Western policy should be guided by the following:

(a) East/West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests;

(b) The nature of the Western free market system and the widespread availability of technology rule out a total ban on the transfer of technology;

(c) Strategically significant exports should continue to be identified and embargoed under effective COCOM procedures;

(d) Governments should exercise financial prudence in trading with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and avoid granting preferential treatment;

(e) The West should avoid over-dependence on imports from or exports to the Soviet Union in all trade sectors, including energy (imports) and grain (exports);

(f) Although trade may have certain desirable political effects (eg contacts with Western methods and standards) this can seldom justify conducting trade on economic or commercial terms disadvantageous to the Western partner.

Eastern Europe

9. We should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania).

10. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available.

11. The British Council's programme of exchanges, particularly academic and youth exchanges, should be maintained. Other major cultural exchanges should be considered selectively.

12. Economic assistance is what the Eastern Europeans most want. But this will be hard to provide. Access to Western economic institutions, in particular the IMF, might be one of the best ways of introducing Western standards and ideas into the Eastern economies.

Third World

13. Western policy should be guided by the following:

(a) The Russians are facing increasing problems in responding to developing countries' real needs. Even where Soviet/Cuban influence has been established (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) countries are increasingly turning to the West for assistance. We should take advantage of this;

Department of Political and Security Council Affairs

EFFECTS OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS

Report of the Secretary-General
transmitting the study
of his consultative group

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1968

FIGURE VI. ESTIMATED FALL-OUT CONTAMINATION AREA AFTER 20-MEGATON NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON HAMBURG. RADIATION DOSE IS GIVEN FOR 48 HOURS AFTER DETONATION

EFFECTS ARISING FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN FIELD WARFARE

31. In certain quarters it is still military doctrine that any disparity in the conventional strength of opposing forces could be redressed by using nuclear weapons in the zone of battle. This proposition needs to be considered first in the context that both sides possess these weapons, and second when the situation is asymmetrical and only one side is a nuclear weapons Power. Section III of this report deals with the latter case. In the former, where the situation is symmetrical, carefully conducted and dispassionate theoretical studies of the use of nuclear weapons in field warfare, including analyses of an extensive series of "war games" relating to the European theatre, have led to the clear conclusion that this military doctrine could lead to the use of hundreds, and not of tens, of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield area, given that both sides resort to their use. Without going into the details of these studies, it can be firmly stated that, were nuclear weapons to be used in this way, they could lead to the devastation of the whole battle zone.

FIGURE VII. ESTIMATED FALL-OUT CONTAMINATION AREA AFTER A 15-MEGATON NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON LONDON. RADIATION DOSE IS GIVEN FOR 36 HOURS AFTER DETONATION



Almost everything would be destroyed; forests would be razed to the ground and only the strongest buildings would escape total destruction. Fires would be raging everywhere. Circumstances such as these would be incompatible with the continued conduct of military operations within the zones of devastation.

32. An offensive on the scale to which all these studies point, over a land battle area with a front of, say, 250 km and 50 km deep, would render hundreds of thousands, even millions, homeless. Such a level of destruction could be achieved with only 100 small nuclear weapons in a European battle area chosen because it did not contain any large towns. With 400 weapons, which is not an unreasonably large number if both sides used nuclear weapons in a battle zone, the physical damage caused would correspond to something like six times that caused by all the bombing of the Second World War—and all sustained in a few days rather than a few years. If one sets aside the profound, even if unquantifiable psychological effects of such an exchange, the resulting chaos would still be beyond imagination.

33. The estimates show that with 100 weapons having an average yield of thirty kilotons (range 5 to 50 kilotons) about one tenth of the assumed typical European battle area would be completely devastated, and about one quarter severely damaged. With 200 weapons about one fifth would be devastated and half of it severely damaged; and with 400 weapons about one third of the area would be devastated and all severely

damaged. Even for only 100 strikes, this represents destruction on an unimaginable scale over an area of about 12,500 sq. km. In another European "war-game" study, a battle was envisaged in which the two opposing sides together used weapons whose total yield was between twenty and twenty-five megatons, in not fewer than 500 and in not more than 1,000 strikes. The nuclear weapons were supposed to have been used against military targets only, in an area of about 25,000 sq. km. In this engagement about 3.5 million people would have had their homes destroyed if the weapons had been air-burst, and 1.5 million if the weapons had been ground-burst. In the former case, at least half of the people concerned would have been fatally or seriously injured. In the case of ground-burst weapons, 1.5 million would have been exposed to lethal doses of radiation and a further 5 million to the hazard of considerable although non-lethal doses of radiation.

34. A question which immediately poses itself is whether military operations would be compatible with destruction of the scale indicated by estimates such as these. A vast civilian population would be involved unless the battle took place in desert conditions. The number of casualties, civilian and military, cannot be easily related, in any precise way, to the population actually in the area at the time of the battle. Because the need to reduce the level of military casualties would dictate tactics of dispersal, the number of nuclear strikes necessary to produce assumed military results would go up very rapidly. Fear and terror, both in the civil and military population, might overwhelm the situation.

35. Military planners have no past experience on which to call for any guide as to how military operations could proceed in circumstances such as these. When such levels of physical destruction are reached, one might well ask what would determine the course of a nuclear battle? Would it be the number of enemy casualties? Would it be the violent psychological reaction, fear and terror, to the horror of widespread instantaneous destruction? Would the chaos immediately bring all military operations to a halt? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is clear enough that the destruction and disruption which would result from so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effects of strategic war in the area concerned. The concept of escalation from tactical to strategic nuclear war could have no possible meaning in an area within which field warfare was being waged with nuclear weapons.

36. This picture is not altered if one postulates so-called "clean" nuclear weapons, in place of those which formed the basis of the foregoing studies. Claims have been made about the possibilities of providing, for battlefield use, low yield weapons (say 1 to 10 kilotons) which would release an abnormally high proportion of their energy in blast and nuclear radiation, while producing virtually no radio-active fall-out. "Clean", in this context, is a matter of degree. These suggested weapons would basically rely on a fission reaction so that radio-active fall-out

could never be completely avoided.[3] In any case, the foregoing studies postulated nuclear explosions which yielded minimal radio-active contamination from normal fission weapons. The resulting chaos in the battlefield area was brought about, not by fall-out, but primarily through blast effects. Thus, if "clean" weapons were available for battlefield use it is difficult to believe that similar chaos would not ultimately be produced. Sooner or later the battlefield situation must be expected to become similar to that which the foregoing studies have indicated.

Interdiction targets

37. Were such weapons ever to be used in a war, it is also quite certain that they would not be restricted to the battle zone itself—even if it were assumed that there would not be what is usually referred to as a strategic exchange. It is part of the concept of tactical nuclear warfare that in a purely military campaign they would also be used outside the area of contact in order to impede the movement of enemy forces, the operation of air forces and so on. The objectives which would be attacked in order to achieve these effects are generally called interdiction targets. Theoretical studies of operations of this kind provide a picture of "deep" nuclear strikes whose effects would be hardly distinguishable from a strategic nuclear exchange in which both sides set out from the start to destroy each other's major centres of population. To illustrate what is implied, reference can be made to a single strike in one such study in which it was assumed that the railway installations in a major transport centre were attacked by a single twenty-kiloton bomb, or a single 100-kiloton bomb, in order to make the centre impassable to troops and supplies, and thereby to assist the land battle elsewhere. The railway centre chosen for this study was a city with 70,000 inhabitants living in 23,000 houses in an area of some fifty sq. km. The bomb was assumed to be burst at ground level so as to maximize the effects on the railway lines. This mode of attack, unlike that used against the Japanese cities, would at the same time also maximize local fall-out damage. With the twenty-kiloton bomb, railway tracks would be demolished over a length of about 100 metres, a large amount of spoil from the crater would cover all lines in the vicinity, blockage would be caused by the collapse of road bridges, rail flyovers and buildings out to about a half-mile from the burst. All fuel depots and servicing sheds would be destroyed. With a 100-kiloton bomb the scale of damage would, of course, be greater; about one mile of track would be destroyed or blocked by heavy debris, and the main roads through the town would be completely blocked. The problem of reopening a road or railway would be hampered by a vast

[3] The same would apply to larger so-called "clean" weapons used in a strategic role. In this case there would in addition be considerable induced radio-activity caused by the capture of neutrons in atmospheric nitrogen, thus producing very long-lived radio-active carbon-14. So far as long-range and long-term fall-out is concerned, this radio-active hazard from so-called "clean" weapons is comparable in importance to that from less "clean" weapons. (The foot-note to annex I, para. 7, applies also to "clean" weapons.)

amount of radio-active debris. It would indeed be so great that it would almost certainly be easier to build a new by-pass round the town. If such attacks formed part of a general "interdiction" programme of bombing, it stands to reason that the transport communication system of a country could be totally wrecked in a very short time, and with it much more as well.

38. The estimated inescapable collateral effects of bombing a single railway centre in such a programme of attacks indicate that most of the industrial and commercial property in the middle of the town would have been destroyed. Fire would have consumed not only houses but also the larger buildings and factories not immediately destroyed by the explosion. A twenty-kiloton bomb in an "interdiction" attack on a town which was a communications centre—and few, if any communication centres are not towns—would kill about a quarter of the 70,000 inhabitants, while a 100-kiloton attack would kill about half. The survivors would have to contend with the same kind of situation as has been depicted in the case of the two Japanese cities bombed in 1945, or the larger city attacked by a one-megaton weapon which has been described above. A programme of "interdiction" attacks on targets behind the zone of contact of opposing armies, if such a programme included communication centres as well as airfields, supply depots, armament factories and so on, would be no different in its effects from those of a widespread so-called strategic nuclear exchange between two opposing Powers.

Deterrence of war

39. Nuclear weapons constitute one of the dominant facts of modern world politics. They are at present deployed in thousands by the nuclear weapon Powers, with warheads ranging from kilotons to megatons. We have already witnessed the experimental explosion of a fifty to sixty-megaton bomb, i.e., of a weapon with about 3,000 times the power of the bomb used in 1945 against Japan. Hundred-megaton devices, weapons about 5,000 times the size of those used in 1945, are no more difficult to devise. They could be exploded just outside the atmosphere of any country, in order utterly to destroy hundreds, even thousands, of square kilometres by means of blast and spreading fire. It has been suggested on good authority that in certain geographical circumstances multi-megaton weapons could also be exploded in ships near coastlines in order to create enormous tidal waves which would engulf the coastal belt.

40. The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They themselves would have to suffer the immediate kind of destruction and the immediate and more enduring lethal fall-out whose effects have already been described. But neighbouring countries, and even countries in parts of the world remote from the actual conflict, could soon become exposed to the hazards of radio-active fall-out precipitated at great dis-

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April, 1984

SOVIET "PEACE" LETTERS

Thank you for your letter of 9 April. The Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation that we should not attempt to pursue the correspondence in Pravda.

A. J. COLES

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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Prime Minister.

for information.

AR 16/4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1984

Dear John

Soviet concern about a surprise NATO attack

Your letter of 10 April recorded the agreement of the Prime Minister and her colleagues that officials should proceed urgently to consider how to approach the Americans. The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that FCO and MOD officials have already begun preliminary work and will be looking at detailed options in the next few days with the aim of discussing a paper with the Americans soon after Easter. Sir Geoffrey Howe has meanwhile asked Sir Oliver Wright to raise our concerns with Larry Eagleburger in order to ensure that our own thoughts take due account of American views: I attach a telegram which has just been sent to Washington.

I should also clarify a point raised during the Prime Minster's meeting on 10 April about recent Russian notification of some ICBM flights within the Soviet Union. Subsequent investigation by the Americans and ourselves now shows that although such notification is rare, it is not, as had earlier been thought, entirely unprecedented. Similar notification was given in 1980/81. We should not, therefore, want too much importance to be attached to the event, although of course it does indicate that at a certain level the Soviets attach importance to minimising the possibility for misinterpretation by the other side.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Sir Robert Armstrong and 'C'.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

XY 42

File No. .....

Department DEFENCE

Drafted by (Block Capitals) C D CRABBIE

Tel. Extn. .....

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification: TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

DESKBY ..... Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE — Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/ Privacy marking) DEYOU

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) WASHINGTON (post) Tel. No. ..... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:–

NO DISTRIBUTION

Copies to:–

PS
PS/PUS
Mr Wright
Mr Cartledge
Mr Weston
Mr Macgregor (Soviet Dept)
Mr Blelloch, DUS(P), MOD
Mr Fewtrell, DS17, MOD
Mr Goodall, Cabinet Office

[TEXT]

ABLE ARCHER

1. The Prime Minister has agreed that UK officials should urgently consider what options may exist for reducing the possibility of Soviet misinterpretation of NATO Command Post Exercises (CPX), especially nuclear ones. Work on this is in hand, but it may take a short while to agree on what detailed ideas we might put to the Americans. I intend to speak to Shultz about this next month, but in the meanwhile I should like you to speak personally to Eagleburger.

2. You should say that the JIC Report has raised a number of important questions to which we are giving careful consideration. We do not totally exclude a possible element of Soviet disinformation (though /the

the [illegible]K reports referred to in the JIC report are of a high degree of reliability), and are well aware of Soivet traditional caution in nuclear matters. However we cannot afford to ignore the possibility that at least some Russians in responsible positions may be reacting to what they mistakenly perceive as a real threat posed by NATO Command Post Exercises. Whatever the Soviet response really was, we need to consider whether there are ways open to us for avoiding possible misunderstandings in future.

3. FCO and MOD officials are therefore studying what if any confidence building measures might be devised to cover nuclear (and possibly conventional) CPX. We are approaching this with an open mind and have not at this stage reached any firm conclusions. However before we go much further it will be important to take full account of American views as to the significance of the JIC Report and whether it is advisable or possible to take some follow up action. We hope therefore to be in a position to have a preliminary exchange of views with appropriate US officials before the end of April.

4. I would not (not) like you to go into any further detail about our thoughts at this stage. STrictly for your own information, we are considering whether there would be advantage in encouraging the Alliance to propose a confidence building measure covering Command Post Exercises in the CDE: this might involve, for example, prior notification of such exercises. Another /possible

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

possible course might be for the Americans to discusss the matter on a purely bilateral basis with the Soviet Union, possibly using as a basis the working group on CBMs which they evidently established last year during the START negotiations.

5. I am particularly anxious that we should not (not) give the Americans the impression that we are pressing them into precipitate action. It is important that we act closely in concert with one another. However the Prime Minister and I do not think we can overlook the potentially serious consequences which could arise from Soviet misapprehensions, and we should do everything possible to prevent those from arising. In the light of your discussion with Eagleburger, I would welcome your advice on the best way to pursue the exchange of views envisaged in paragraph 3 above.

13/4

File

Rw

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 April, 1984

VISITS TO MOSCOW

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 10 April and the minute of 11 April by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Mrs. Thatcher has asked me to convey her view that the coal strike must take top priority and that everything else must wait. She therefore believes that your Secretary of State should postpone his plan to visit Moscow until later in the year.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

M. Reidy, Esq.,
Department of Energy

Prime Minister.

Mr. Walker (attached minute) wants to go to Moscow in early May.

The Foreign Secretary would prefer him to wait till the autumn.

I think Sir Geoffrey would like to be the first Cabinet Minister to go.

Should I say that an autumn visit by Mr. Walker would best fit in with the gradual building up of contacts which AD envisaged?

A.J.C. 11/4.

PM/84/63

PRIME MINISTER

Proposed Visit to the Soviet Union by the Secretary of State for Energy

1. I have seen a copy of Peter Walker's minute to you of 10 April.

2. I think it would be a very good idea for Peter Walker to go to the Soviet Union, but I have three reasons for suggesting that May is perhaps not the ideal time:

- Kostandov has had a heart attack and may well not be fit by early May when Peter proposes to go;

- Paul Channon will be in Moscow later in May for the annual meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission with a large party of businessmen; and the Chairman of ICI will be there during the same month, and also calling on Soviet Ministers;

- we have not yet had the serious collective discussion among Ministers about future UK gas supplies, with which the question of possible Soviet gas exports is connected.

3. My preference would be for Peter to go to Russia in the autumn, when the three difficulties mentioned above will not arise and when there will no doubt be points arising from the meeting of the Joint Commission to follow up.

4. I am sending a copy of this minute to Peter Walker.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 April 1984

Peter No. The coal strike must take top priority. Only urgent or vital matters can displace that. Everything else must wait. MT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Towards the end of last year the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Kostandov, invited me to visit Moscow to discuss energy issues of mutual interest. In recent weeks the Soviets have made further approaches. The Soviet Ambassador has now told me that his Government sees advantage in early discussions, and has made detailed proposals for a visit between the Soviet public holidays on 2 and 9 May. Subject to the state of play in the coal dispute I propose to accept, and indeed the Soviets are pressing for quick confirmation that the visit will go ahead.

In tactical terms there are strong energy policy reasons for a visit. Soviet oil and gas production and export policies are of significance, both in regard to the Middle East and to the overall European gas supply situation. When I was in Washington last month the Americans expressed keen interest in the result of an early dialogue, and I undertook to let Kenneth Dam have a note if the visit went ahead. There are of course a range of other issues which could, with advantage, be discussed, not the least of these being the prospects for energy trade. Paul Channon will visit Moscow a little later on to deal with specific trade issues. Our visits could be a useful precursor to Geoffrey Howe's discussions in July.

I would be grateful for your agreement in principle that I should go ahead with this visit, preferably on the dates identified by the Soviets, assuming the situation in the coal industry so permits.

I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe.

Peter Walker

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY
10 April 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

cc Master

17 file KB

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 April 1984

SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT A SURPRISE NATO ATTACK

The Prime Minister held an ad hoc meeting today which was attended by the Lord President, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr. Patrick Wright and "C".

The purpose of the meeting was to consider what action should be taken about the conclusions of the Joint Intelligence Committee in JIC(84)(N)45 of 23 March, 1984 and in particular the Committee's conclusion that the available evidence appeared "to reflect a disturbing state of mind in the Soviet leadership which seems to accept the possibility that the United States might initiate nuclear war, and that this might be done through a surprise attack, perhaps under cover of an exercise".

The Prime Minister recalled that in her conversations with Communist leaders, especially during her visit to Hungary, she had tried to impress upon them the sincerity of the desire of the West for disarmament and the fact that NATO was a defensive organisation which threatened no one. The leaders in question seemed to find it hard to accept these points. This attitude, taken together with the JIC report, presented a disturbing picture. We should consider what could be done to remove the danger that, by mis-calculating Western intentions, the Soviet Union would over-react.

Mr. Wright explained that there had been some difference of view in the JIC on the weight to be put on the Soviet reaction to exercise Able Archer. Those reactions did not contain elements which could be expected to have been present if the Soviet bloc were really nervous about Western intentions.

/The Foreign and Commonwealth

CST

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, taking account of the evidence and having weighed the possibility that we were the object of a Soviet disinformation exercise, he felt that the JIC conclusions must be accepted. It was desirable to discuss the conclusions with the US Government, making it clear that we had considered but were inclined to dismiss the idea that we were witness to a Soviet attempt at disinformation. The United States had considered the various reports and had apparently taken them into account in deciding recently to announce publicly a Naval exercise which would be starting this week.

It was noted that the reports appeared to date increased Soviet apprehension of Western intentions to at least as far back as spring 1981. It might be that the main cause of Soviet fears was the succession of rather threatening statements made by President Reagan after he had taken office.

Attention was drawn to the recent large-scale Soviet Naval exercise; also to the Soviet decision not to receive, at an appropriate level in Moscow, General Scowcroft of the US Administration (the Prime Minister felt that insufficient attention might have been paid to the significance of the latter point). On the other hand, it was pointed out that the Russians had just notified the United States for the first time of ICBM flights within the Soviet Union.

Discussion then turned to the action to be taken on the JIC report. It was agreed that officials should meet urgently to consider the nature of an approach to the United States, including the question of how the Americans might be advised to handle this matter with the Soviet Union. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would discuss our concerns with Mr. Shultz at the two meetings he expected to have with him in May. In preparation for this, HM Ambassador, Washington, would be instructed to go over the ground with the US State Department.

There was a more general need to continue and perhaps intensify HMG's efforts to promote an atmosphere of greater confidence between East and West. The Minister for Trade would visit Moscow in May. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would go there in July for discussions with Mr. Gromyko and planned to visit some of the Eastern European countries in September. It was for consideration whether the Prime Minister should invite a senior member of the Politbureau, perhaps Mr. Gorbachev, to visit this country later in the year. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was invited to consider whether it would be wise to accelerate our programme of contacts with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister stressed that we should seek to maintain the momentum created by her own visit to Hungary and the Soviet Union.

I am copying this letter to Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr. Wright and "C".

A. J. COLES

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(4)

Mr. Coles,
Extract attached.
David Marshall.

MR. MURRAY

The Prime Minister would like to see a copy of Mr. George Urban's interview with Zinoviev in the current issue of "Encounter".

Could you please let me have one.

A.S.C.

Prime Minister.

A.S.C. 12/4

9 ~~March~~ April 1984

ENCOUNTER, April 1984

George Urban

Portrait of a Dissenter as a Soviet Man

A Conversation with Alexander Zinoviev

1. Truth & the "Inside Dopester"



URBAN: YOU HAVE *challenged in your books and lectures virtually all Western interpretations of the Soviet system, offering a variety of arguments to show where they went wrong and why they proved inadequate. Your most spectacular challenge, however, is not to any particular scholarly reading of Soviet society, but to the Western observer's generic (as it were) ability to understand the Soviet system at all. Again and again you insist that, no matter how well a Western scholar may have immersed himself in Soviet history and ideology, no matter how sharp his wit or fertile his historical imagination, the Soviet system will for ever remain a closed book to him. To understand it and deal with it, you suggest, one has to be "part" of the Soviet system. Only "from inside" will it yield the necessary clues to truthful analysis.*

ZINOVIEV: The terms of reference appropriate for the understanding of Western society are inadequate when it comes to analysing other types of society. A scholar using a Western conceptual framework may find it very difficult to make sense of Indian society in the 12th century, or Chinese society 500 years B.C. Soviet society, I contend, is basically different from Western society. Trying to understand it with any chance of success presupposes a specific conceptual framework, fresh mental models, and a new vocabulary. In other words, it postulates an entirely new theory and methodology.

Let me make this clear by giving you some examples. Take the word "*party*." On the face of it, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a "party." So is the Social Democratic Party in Germany or the Conservative Party in Britain. Yet the two are fundamentally different phenomena. The CPSU is not a "party" in any Western sense of the word. It is not a political phenomenon. It is the motor and overseer of the ruling system. Nor can we say that the Soviet system is a "*political*" phenomenon.

—*Not a political phenomenon?*

ZINOVIEV: No. Communist society is not a political phenomenon, because "politics", as that word is understood outside the Soviet Union, does not exist there. Politics, for a simple definition, may be described as a web of contentious relationships between largely independent actors for a slice of power or the whole of state power. The Communist Parties of Western Europe *are* political parties, at least while they are in opposition. It is also true to say that the relations of the USSR with the outside world are political relations. But once a Communist Party takes power, its political character is dissipated and the party assumes a social character. It restructures the whole of society, eliminating the very notion of any struggle for power or any possibility of independent forces arising (or surviving) to conduct such a struggle.

Now, it is for me axiomatic that for any scientific understanding of social phenomena to be possible you have to place yourself inside the society you are investigating. You have to identify with the conditions obtaining in it and adopt its terms of reference. What is more, you have to go back to its smallest unit and deduce your conclusions from what you have found there. A self-contained feudal estate or a capitalist unit of production is the only true nucleus for understanding feudal or capitalist society. The same goes for the Soviet system. You must understand its basic unit—the autonomous "collective", which may be a working group in a university, a farming community, a school or whatever—before you can say anything useful about the Soviet system. And that, as I say, requires inside knowledge, a new set of conceptual tools, and a new vocabulary.

—I am a little unhappy about the idea that you have to possess "inside knowledge" in order to understand Soviet reality. It is a claim which has been made in too many bad causes to be acceptable without further explanation. Nazi ideologists claimed that the special spirituality that made the German people ripe for a National-Socialist renewal was inaccessible to the minds of non-Germans. Similar claims were made by the Italian Fascists and a great many other prophets and defenders of the alleged uniqueness of this-or-that social order or "national psyche."

Nor does your emphasis on "inside knowledge" quite accord with your claim that you are seeking a strictly scientific understanding of Soviet society. A chemist or physicist who claimed that his theory could only be understood and tested by dark-haired males, 179 centimetres tall, born in the village of Cuckfield in the year 1947 would be given short shrift by his colleagues.

ZINOVIEV: Your analogies do not stand. Communism is a new type of society, because it has fundamentally changed the character of social relations. Fascism and Nazism did not do that. Those were political régimes of a certain kind, but not new types of societies. It is therefore perfectly possible for, say, a British capitalist scholar to understand the nature of Italian Fascism without any special empathy; but he cannot, as long as he remains an outsider, understand Communist society.

—But you have said that "political" society requires several independent actors vying with one another for political power. Now, in Hitler's National-Socialist society, or in Italy under Mussolini, there were no such independent actors. The Nazi and to a lesser degree the Fascist Parties were the motors and overseers of everything that went on in the state, exactly as the Communist Party is in the Soviet Union. No opposition was tolerated.

Why, then, do you say that Nazism and Fascism were "political régimes" rather than societies comparable in many ways to Soviet Communism? What you appear to be clearly implying is the orthodox Soviet position: that Capitalism, Nazism, and Fascism belong, so to speak, to the same species, whereas Communism does not. The view in the West is, of course, the opposite. Many believe that Communist society, Nazi society, and Fascist society have much more in common with one another, precisely because they are One-Party totalitarian systems, than any of them has with, say, British parliamentary democracy or the French republic.

ZINOVIEV: Fascism was a "political" phenomenon, even though it was a single-party phenomenon, because it did not involve the structural overhaul of society. It did not lead to a fundamental reorganisation of social relations despite the egalitarian, anti-aristocratic tendencies which were undeniably present in both the German and Italian variety. . . .

— . . . an old Soviet cliché! (if I may interrupt you for a moment) . . . .

ZINOVIEV: Every society, whether ancient or modern, can only be understood within its own terms of reference. Our tools of analysis which are appropriate for the comprehension of ancient Egypt are not appropriate for the comprehension of feudal society in, shall we say, France in the 13th century. That is all I am saying.

Soviet society, too, demands a specific approach and a specific language, because it has brought about a qualitative transformation in the whole of society. I base my insistence on the need to understand Soviet society from within on certain post-Kantian and post-Hegelian ideas which stress the importance of identifying with the objects of your observation before comparing them with other phenomena or imposing value-judgments on them.

—No doubt you are thinking of Dilthey and his notion of "Verstehen"...

ZINOVIEV: Yes, among others. We must first understand from within the basic cell of Soviet society—the autonomous com-

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ALEXANDER ZINOVIEV *(b. 1922) is one of the Soviet Union's leading philosophers and the author of many specialised works in the field of mathematical logic, several of them translated into Western languages. He held research appointments in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and for fourteen years was a member of the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Moscow, where from 1970–78 he was Professor of Logic and Methodology of Science.*

In 1977, after publication (in Russian) in the West of his celebrated satire "The Yawning Heights", Professor Zinoviev was deprived of all his appointments and expelled from the Communist Party. A decree revoking his Soviet citizenship for "behaviour damaging to Soviet prestige" was signed by President Brezhnev in 1978 while Professor Zinoviev was attending a Philosophy Congress in West Germany. Condemned to permanent exile from the Soviet Union, he now lives in Munich.

AMONG HIS BOOKS *published in Russian by L'Age d'Homme in Lausanne are: "Notes of a Nightwatchman", "In the Antechamber of Paradise", "Without Illusions" (all 1979), and "The Yellow House" (1980); two volumes of essays, broadcasts, etc., "We and the West" (1981) and "Neither Freedom nor Equality nor Brotherhood" (1983); a volume of poems, "Home, My Foreign Country" (1982); "Homo Sovieticus" (1982); and "The Flight of our Youth" (1983), a memoir of his life under Stalin. English translations of "The Yawning Heights" and "The Radiant Future" were published in 1979 and 1981 by Bodley Head (London) and Random House (New York); "The Reality of Communism" was brought out this year by Victor Gollancz in London and Schocken Books, New York, in a translation by Charles Janson.*

ONE OF THE *earliest discussions of his work to be published in the West—Helen von Ssachno's "News from Nowhere in Ibansk", which reviewed the Russian edition of "The Yawning Heights", appeared in the May 1977 issue of* ENCOUNTER. *This was followed by her interview with Professor Zinoviev in February 1979; by a "samizdat" review of "The Yawning Heights" by Raisa Lert, who lives in Moscow and was associated with Roy Medvedev's journal, "Twentieth Century"; and by Judy Dempsey's conversation with him in February 1979. An extract from "The Radiant Future" appeared in the April 1981 issue.*

GEORGE URBAN'S *recent contributions to* ENCOUNTER *include conversations with Jeane Kirkpatrick (November 1983), Eugene V. Rostow (April 1983), Daniel Bell (February 1983), W. Averell Harriman (November 1981), Zbigniew Brzezinski (May 1981), Leszek Kolakowski (January 1981), and Milovan Djilas (December 1979).*

munity, or collective. Having done that, we must try to identify the laws that govern its interaction with other cells. We do, of course, start with those most easily identified and then proceed only gradually to the more complicated ones. The essential rule to remember is that we must not be side-tracked into premature comparisons. We must anchor our thinking in the basic characteristics of the Soviet system as self-contained, immanent phenomena. Having done that, we can at a later stage make historical comparisons with Fascist Italy, or whatever.

—I take your point. But why do you contend that a competent scholar in France or the USA cannot summon sufficient intellectual or imaginative power to get within the skin of the Soviet system? One of the very best histories of English literature was written by two Frenchmen (Legouis and Cazamian). Is it reasonable to claim that scholars like George Kennan, Merle Fainsod, Leonard Schapiro and Ronald Hingley have shown themselves incapable of making the intellectual-imaginative leap?

ZINOVIEV: The Soviet system is *sui generis*. It is extremely difficult to understand, even for people who have been born and bred in it. Please bear in mind that the time-lag between physical or social phenomena and the scientific understanding of these phenomena can be unconscionably long. People existed for millions of years without understanding the nature of gravitation. Newtonian mechanics are a very recent discovery, and Einstein's relativity theory is even more recent. Capitalist society had existed for many centuries, but it was only in the 19th century that social science began to decipher the structure and describe the regularities of capitalist society. Communist society is very young indeed. Its whole history spans a mere 66 years. It is, therefore, difficult to take it in from the outside. Moreover, Western scholars approach it with their own educational background, their own values and mental models. All of this makes for distortions and incomprehension.

Consider, by contrast, my own fitness to comprehend Soviet reality. I was born in the Soviet system a few years after the October Revolution. I went to Soviet schools and universities and served in the Red Air Force during the War. I spent 30 years of my life studying Soviet society, designing my own logic and method to make that study profitable. I am probably the only man in the world who has developed his own sociological framework for the comprehension of Soviet society based on the experience of having lived in that society, met people at every rung of the social ladder—for several years I worked in a factory—and watched their mobility horizontally and vertically.

—And how would you summarise your theory?

ZINOVIEV: I do not claim that I have produced a complete and testable theory. I have merely laid the foundations of what might, in perhaps two or three centuries, be an overall scientific theory with a descriptive and prescriptive potential. An outline of my theory is given in my book *The Reality of Communism*.

NO DOUBT YOU WILL, *nevertheless, want to give me some skeletal indication of your hypothesis as we go along. Let me, in the meantime, underline my unease at hearing you say that in order to comprehend and deal with Soviet society you have to be a part of it. I'm reminded of the absurd criminological argument that no judge who has not himself committed murder has the right to pass sentence on a murderer, because he cannot possibly identify with the psychological predicaments that turn a law-abiding citizen to homicide. A rough and ready analogy, you may well say; but it makes my point.*

ZINOVIEV: Communist society is an empirical fact. Scientific investigation requires that we observe empirical facts for what they are. In Soviet society these can only be experienced from within.

—You are saying that they are not accessible to Western scholarship . . . that Western scholars cannot, because of the remoteness of their point of observation, write authentically about Soviet society.

ZINOVIEV: Perhaps they can—but so far they have not done so. Take, for example, the favourite Western reading of Soviet society, which comes direct from Solzhenitsyn—namely that the Soviet people regard the Party and Government as an alien system which they hate and are anxious to overthrow. It just does not correspond to the facts.

—Is Solzhenitsyn, in your view, entirely wrong in saying what he does . . . and what many Western observers have also been saying quite independently from and well before him?

ZINOVIEV: Of course he is.

—What, then, are the real facts, as you see them, about the Soviet people's attitude to the Communist system? Do they support the system as one of their own choosing?

ZINOVIEV: It is not for me to make political judgments of that sort. Certainly, the system is accepted. My job as a scientist is to describe the system and make sense of it. If you want to find out how the Soviet people really relate to the Party and Government, you have to examine the structure of Soviet society; and that is what I have done.

I describe and analyse the empirical facts as I find them. Take a primary social group, a cell, for your starting point; and let your particular example be a scientific institute. You'll find that this primary group is itself an extremely complicated phenomenon. It'll have a director, assisted by a deputy director, and a group of senior collaborators. The institute will be divided into, let's say, five departments. Each of these will fall into several sub-groups, each with its own leader, staff, Party secretary and other functionaries. Furthermore, you will find that numbers will put certain restrictions on the effectiveness of each group. If your whole staff runs to one hundred, you will probably need ten groups to make the division of work, control, and leadership manageable. If several major groups cooperate for the attainment of some social or productive achievement, you will find that control retreats to

small cabals within each group; and eventually a hierarchy of élites will come into existence, with specific characteristics and laws governing their relationship. These laws are tricky to determine, but they exist.

WHAT YOU ARE IMPLYING, *I think, is that, far from Solzhenitsyn being right, the structure of Soviet society is in reality in substantial harmony with the wishes and mentality of the Soviet people.*

ZINOVIEV: No. It is not a question of people's wishes but of social laws. The structures and correlations I observe do not depend on the human characteristics of the participants. The correlations I establish have the force of natural laws. They apply to every people and to any number of people—everywhere.

—You mean all Communist societies of the Soviet type?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, they apply wherever private property has been abolished and both industry and agriculture have been nationalised. Wherever these conditions really obtain, social structures identical with those we find in the USSR will inevitably come into being.

—A universal law?

ZINOVIEV: Yes—all laws of Communist society are universal laws, wherever Communism is reality.

—Are you comfortable with so Stalinoid an assertion?

ZINOVIEV: I am and have always been an anti-Stalinist. You know that. But I make this statement not as a Stalinist or anti-Stalinist, but as a scientist relying for my conclusions on empirical evidence.

—Whatever its scientific truth, I'm a little wary of your "universal law", because Stalin's tyranny over East-Central Europe and his claim to the leadership of the world Communist movement were based on the assertion that the Soviet model of Communism was a universal model for Socialist/Communist societies. This entitles us to handle your "law" with a measure of caution.

ZINOVIEV: The laws of Communism as expressed in Soviet society are universal laws, but their application and the results springing from them may vary. If you compare Communism as it is actually practised in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia you will find great differences. Indeed, Georgian Communism is more distant from the Muscovite variety than, shall we say, Polish Communism; and it stands to reason that the differences are explained by climate, national history, and other characteristics peculiar to a nation or a region. But if you disregard the accretions and consider Communist society in its pure, if you like, laboratory condition, the laws of Communism will be seen to be valid at all times and everywhere. This does not invalidate the fact that life for the ordinary man is much better in Georgia than in Russia, or that a Hungarian is substantially better off in terms of housing, food supplies, culture and so on, than his opposite number in Czechoslovakia. But if you compare the organisation of a factory in Georgia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Russia, you will find that they are structurally identical and that the social relations they generate are identical too.

YOU SEEM TO BE STRESSING *the importance of an abstraction: that under laboratory conditions Communism would assume identical forms wherever it was applied. To most of us, however, this abstraction is not very important, because we know well enough that, as long as society is made up of human beings (rather than robots or genetically engineered hominids), laboratory conditions will never be obtained. The human element will always intrude—diluting, corrupting, and rendering ridiculous any "pure" form of Communism. Even Mao's abhorrently pure form of social engineering, the "Cultural Revolution", did not escape that fate.*

Personally I would put the emphasis on what you have said about Hungary, where food is plentiful, housing is (by Communist standards) in tolerable supply, culture is freer than in any other Communist country, and even some foreign travel is permitted. But these gains are due not, as you suggest, to national characteristics being imposed on Communist social structures (though Magyar know-how and sophistication do play a role)—but to the Hungarians' quiet determination to amend the Soviet book, revise the Soviet "laws", and indeed turn their backs on both without openly saying so. And as my concern, and I take it your concern, is the welfare and happiness of the maximum number of men and women, and not the realisation of an abstract form of seamless Communism, I applaud the Hungarian experiment because it seems to me to be proof that the key to the success of Communism is—the **abandonment** *of Communism.*

ZINOVIEV: Naturally, if you take human society in the round, you have to take into account and allow for an almost infinite number of complications. But I am not concerned with the legacy of history, with culture or religion. As a logician and sociologist I describe, in abstract form, certain phenomena I have found to exist in Communist society. I describe Communism in its ideal state. I do not dispute that its realisation can be different in different countries. But my business is to construct a model, and for that to be possible I have to proceed step by step. In *The Reality of Communism* I attempt to describe my method.

I contend that any analysis of the Soviet system has to begin with generalisations. I posit certain general laws, and posit them in a language and logical order peculiar to my method. Having established these, I refine them by taking on board empirical evidence, so that I end up by obtaining a more or less complete picture of how Soviet society works—a painstakingly slow procedure.

Now, Western students of the Soviet Union, especially those hostile to the Soviet system, are in a hurry. They are ready with instant analyses and judgments. They variously allege that the Soviet system is "totalitarian" in the sense of Nazi Germany;

that it is "unstable"; that it will fall prey to its inner contradictions, and so on. But these are opinions based on guesswork, incomplete knowledge or straightforward incomprehension. They reflect the needs of journalism and political propaganda. They do not accord with the reality as it appears to the eyes of a competent scholar. Mine is a scientific method which seeks to ferret out facts, not pass value judgments.

2. *The Very Model of a Model Methodology*

All this raises a very large question which we cannot tackle in this conversation: whether social science is a "science", and whether any scholarship dealing with human beings can be or should be "value-free." Without stumbling into that particular jungle, let me say that many of your readers will doubtless regard your scientific neutrality towards the Soviet system as a tacit vindication of that system—on the not unreasonable argument that any value-free investigation of a system which has caused the violent death of millions, and the occupation and suppression of half the European continent, is a typical case of la trahison des clercs*—and thus, in reality, not value-free at all. One might as well, they would argue, make a "systems-analysis" of the Nazi concentration camps—their social structure, hierarchical organisation, their links with other organs of the National-Socialist system, etc.—without spilling ink on the unpleasant (and "value-heavy") fact that the camps were there to gas, burn, starve, shoot, hang, and otherwise exterminate human beings.*

I respect your insistence on the integrity and neutrality of "science." Nevertheless your dispassionate approach to a topic so heavy with suffering puts me slightly on my guard. In 1984 can one say "Soviet" without muttering "Gulag" in the same breath?

Zinoviev: You are not the first to make this sort of accusation. But your criticism betrays a certain philistinism and is unjustified. The charges against me are usually couched in this form. In my scientific work I describe Soviet society as a normal phenomenon. My critics say (exactly as you have just said) that this implies approval of the Soviet system. But the inference is nonsensical. The concept of "norm" carries no value-judgment. It is totally neutral. It stands for "a standard for measure" . . . .

— . . . it does, in a general sense. But it also stands for "rule for proper conduct" in ethics, and in axiology for "standard for judging value" . . .

Zinoviev: But as I have clearly ruled out ethics and axiology from my investigations, we need not waste time on secondary meanings. "Norm" in science is a neutral notion. When I say that Soviet society is a normal phenomenon, all I'm saying is that, *given the nature of Communist society*, Soviet society *is* a normal society; it is, after 66 years, in perfect harmony with the pure model of Communist society. Would my critics have raised their eyebrows if I had said: "a poison snake with its fangs intact in the South Asian jungle is a normal phenomenon"? Clearly they would not. A poison snake in the streets of London would be an abnormal phenomenon, but not in India. Yet my statement about Soviet society is of the same sort. I discuss all this in more detail in *The Reality of Communism*, so I will explain it no further.

—Does "normal" Communist society, then, require mass violence by the state as a normal condition of its existence?

Zinoviev: I am not concerned with the chaotic origins of Soviet society or the peculiarly Russian conditions between the two World Wars which coloured the emergence of Soviet society. I describe the structure of Soviet society as it is—not its accretions.

—If mass violence is an accretion, it is one that matters to ordinary human beings more than any other feature of Soviet society. However this may be, your comments on the alleged ineptitude of Western students of the Soviet Union nettle me. Take one of the most reliable (and respected) studies of the day-to-day workings of Soviet society, Merle Fainsod's "Smolensk under Soviet Rule." Here is a painstaking analysis of the Soviet system based on a mass of Soviet documents and written by an American scholar deeply versed in the culture of the Soviet Union and the Russian language. Would you say that Fainsod's picture of the Soviet system is inadequate or misleading?

Zinoviev: Factology is not enough. It is one thing to be versed in facts; it is another to discern social laws. Facts exist in abundance. The task of science is not to collect facts but to interpret them. In Newton's day everybody knew about apples falling, and everybody knew that there was some force keeping the planets moving about the sun and the moon in motion around the earth. But the force itself was invisible. Newton, however, could see behind these seemingly unrelated facts and showed that it was one and the same force—universal gravitation—that causes them all to happen. In trying to understand Soviet society, too, you have to start with a hypothesis and turn it into a scientific theory with a predictive potential as firm as Newton's law of mechanics.

Now, I ask you, how do the works of American Sovietologists measure up to these requirements? Can you show me a single Western book that has been able to predict any development in Soviet society—even the most primitive? People in the West who concern themselves with the Soviet Union are not scientists in the proper sense of the word, and therefore understand nothing.

—This is a sweeping statement. I don't want to argue with you on

a point where your knowledge is extensive, but I do know that even the most dedicated quantifiers and model-builders among Western social scientists would hesitate to claim that any "law" concerning the behaviour of human beings could have the predictive force of Newton's law of gravitation.

ZINOVIEV: In principle it can. I am concerned with the pure model of Communist society. The Western interpretations of Soviet reality are based on personal impressions, historical analogies, moral predilections, and other non-scientific factors. I reject these.

YOU HAVE INTIMATED *that the Western interpretation of Soviet society as "totalitarian" occupies a prominent place on your blacklist. Yet this is a notion that people like George Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carl J. Friedrich, Hannah Arendt, Karl Deutsch (to name but a few) have spent a long time thinking and writing about. And none had any doubt that Soviet society was "totalitarian." Were they all in error?*

ZINOVIEV: Error is a strong word. They may not have been in error by their own standards; but I do not accept those standards. My theory leads me to a mathematical model of Communist society. Admittedly it will take hundreds of specially trained researchers to substantiate it over a long period of time, and even when it is completed, the gap between abstract truth and concrete application may well be a large one. Nevertheless, the laws emerging from my theory have the force of the laws of physics. They are objective universal laws.

—There appears to me to be an interesting contradiction in what you are saying. First you insist that Soviet society can only be understood from within. At the same time you claim that Soviet society is governed by testable universal laws. Doesn't your second claim make nonsense of the first? For what sort of a testable universal law is it that is accessible only to a group of privileged observers—those who, like yourself, have been born and nurtured in the Soviet system?

ZINOVIEV: I do not say that you have to have any special intuition to unearth the clues to Soviet reality, but I do say that you cannot get a handle on empirical evidence unless you are part and parcel of Soviet society.

—But isn't the net effect the same? It means that non-Soviet scholars are, by definition, debarred from understanding Soviet society. Would a Western scholar be able to understand it if he adopted your methodology but worked from **outside** *the Soviet system?*

ZINOVIEV: My theory requires that the point of observation must be within Soviet society.

—Western scholars, then, have to take your theory on trust?

ZINOVIEV: No, my method is open to them, but whether they use that or some other method, they will have to take, for their starting point, a disinterested, empirical view of Soviet reality with the eyes of an insider. I have no dogmatic views about this. Experience will tell whether it is or is not possible. So far, I can see no indication that any Western scholar would be inclined to undergo a methodological sea-change. The methods they now use, if indeed they use any, are deplorable. Their judgments are chaotic.

Let me give you one example. Before the Second World War, Hitler's leadership had studied the facts. They understood the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union better than the Soviet leadership itself. The Germans had the most excellent information services and thorough evaluation: they knew everything about Soviet industrial capacity; they knew the number of tanks and guns and aircraft we had and could produce; the nature of our supply system; the state of our railways and roads; the readiness of our units in the Red Army and Air Force; the size of our food reserves, and so on. Yet, when it came to estimating our military potential and our ability to resist, Hitler and his lieutenants made some very fundamental mistakes which cost them the War.

HOW WOULD YOU *define those mistakes?*

ZINOVIEV: Well, they knew facts, but facts, as I said a moment ago, are not enough. They had no method for understanding and correlating the facts they had.

—Do you mean they failed to allow for certain intangibles such as the "spirit of resistance" of the Russian people when attacked by an aggressor?

ZINOVIEV: Not at all. They failed to work out a scientific method whereby the facts about Russia's military and industrial potential could be correlated with a host of other factors and integrated in an overall formula. That could have given the Germans a reliable picture of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. They didn't do it. The Western countries, even Western Intelligence, make the same mistakes in our own time.

Missing Person

MOSCOW

The Kremlin's list of Soviet leaders does not include Georgi Malenkov who was party and government leader for one week in March, 1953, and looked as if he would succeed Stalin, but lost overall control of the Communist party in a power struggle with Nikita Khrushchev.

Malenkov was banished to the provinces in 1957, but is now living out his last years as an old-age pensioner in Moscow. He was 82 last month.

Official Soviet leaders since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution have been:

VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN *(1917–1924)*
JOSEF STALIN *(1924–1953)*
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV *(1953–1964)*
LEONID BREZHNEV *(1964–1982)*
YURI ANDROPOV *(1982–1984)*

REUTER

Soon after my expulsion from the Soviet Union, three Western gentlemen came to see me. "Zinoviev", they said, "we have read your books and articles, and we admire your insights. We want you to give us your formula for the destruction of the Soviet system."

Well, I told them: "I don't object to being used by you. Anybody and everybody can use me. I'm politically indifferent. I could work for the Soviet authorities, and I could equally work for you. I'm a scientist, a university professor. I have spent thirty years investigating Soviet society; I have obtained results. My sole ambition is that these results should be known in the world as 'Zinoviev results' and my theory as 'Zinoviev's theory of the Soviet system.' You can use my theory in any way you like but, believe me, I don't want to destroy the Soviet system any more than I do the West. Now, if you want to know my theory, give me ten or fifteen gifted students. Arrange for them to spend three years under my guidance and make it possible that, in due course, these students can pass on their knowledge to further groups of young scholars. One of these will eventually work out a computer-model of the Soviet citizen and perhaps even of Soviet society."

None of this pleased my three interlocutors. "How long will all this take?", they asked. "About five years", I replied. This was far too long for them. They were in a hurry. They wanted me to produce a magic formula—at once. So they packed their bags and left. They failed to understand, as the Nazis had failed to understand before them, that obtaining a reliable formula requires a long, painstaking, scientific effort.

THIS IS A REMARKABLE STORY. *Your "scientific" neutralism is in line with the thinking of the wartime German missile-experts. Some of them chose to go to the USA to continue their work, while others went to the Soviet Union to do the same. That the Soviet Union was as unfree a society as Hitler's had been did not bother them. Their sole interest was to construct bigger and better missiles.*

But, to return to the Nazis' faulty assessment of the Soviet Union, Hitler was not alone in underestimating Soviet staying-power. In Britain and the USA, too, there were fears (many of them openly expressed) that the Soviet Union would prove no match for Hitler's superbly equipped and led forces. Nor were these fears unreasonable, seeing that the mighty USSR could barely, and then only at enormous cost, impose its will on tiny Finland in the 1939–40 Winter Campaign. But when Stalin eventually turned the tables on Germany, his successes were ascribed to Russian patriotism, his personal leadership, and US and British war supplies. Nobody, except Western Communists and other admirers of the Soviet system, said that Hitler or the West had underestimated the strength of Soviet society.

ZINOVIEV: Patriotism cuts both ways—it can carry a negative or positive charge. By the same token, the size of the Soviet war machine could have assumed negative as well as positive roles. Everything depends on a large number of non-military variables which flow from the nature of the Soviet system and are not easily understood and quantified. Hitler had no formula for their incorporation in his assessments of Soviet power. That is why he miscalculated. Today, Western Sovietologists make the same mistakes. Lacking an adequate method, they are incapable of forming a reliable estimate of the USSR's *overall* military potential.

BUT LET US, PLEASE, *stay with my example for a moment. Western historians say that the USSR won the War for three main reasons. First, Hitler alienated a friendly Russian and Ukrainian population. When the German troops arrived in the Ukraine (so runs the argument) they were greeted as liberators. It was the general beastliness of Nazi policies towards the Slavs, and the particular brutality of the German occupation authorities on Soviet territory, that eventually stiffened Soviet resistance. Would you accept that?*

ZINOVIEV: No, this factor played no role at all.

—The second factor is said to have been Stalin's appeal to Russian patriotism and nationalism; his enlistment of the spiritual power of the Orthodox Church; his evocations of Russia's great military feats in the past and the restoration of military ranks and insignia.

And the third factor is said to have been the massive contribution which the USA and Britain made to the Soviet war effort in the form of trucks, tanks, guns, aircraft, raw materials and other supplies.

Would you allow that these factors played a part?

ZINOVIEV: No—all these explanations are extremely wide of the mark to the extent that they are not nonsensical. The historical process during the War was extremely complicated. Hitler made mistakes, Stalin made mistakes, Roosevelt made mistakes, and Churchill made mistakes. But, confining ourselves to the Soviet-German war, the mistakes made by those two sides broadly speaking cancelled out each other. What mattered (to repeat) was Hitler's misreading of the character and overall potential of the Soviet system. The tragedy is that Western observers and Western governments are now repeating Hitler's errors.

Recently I was invited to attend a conference on the nature of Soviet power. One of my co-participants was a distinguished Western military specialist. He knew every Soviet general's name in the higher echelons of the armed forces. He knew their functions, their departmental jealousies, the equipment of the various Red Army units, their peace-time and mobilisation strengths—he knew everything. The only thing he could not compute out of all this impressive information was the one thing that mattered: the overall power of the Soviet Union.

I assured him that if he lived in the Soviet Union he would find that most Soviet scholars were unable to name the members of the *Politburo*, much less the Central Committee. Yet they'd have a very precise idea of what the system was about. Why? Because they would understand that individuals did not matter in the Soviet system. What matters is the system itself, and that can be understood only through scientific study.

Western Sovietologists have written volumes about the question of succession in the Soviet leadership. Yet, in the months preceding Khrushchev's dismissal they were unable to detect the slightest tremor in the Soviet landscape. Nor could they tell us anything useful about Brezhnev's succession. They widely tipped Chernenko as the most likely successor. The hallmark of science is its ability to predict. Western Sovietology is the work of charlatans.

—Have **you** *been able to predict the behaviour of the Soviet system?*

ZINOVIEV: Yes, I have. I cannot make mathematically precise predictions, but I can predict certain tendencies.

—For example?

ZINOVIEV: Let us suppose that the NATO countries or the USA alone occupy Iran or intervene in certain African countries. I can, by using my mathematical model of the Soviet Union as a world power, forecast the kind of countermeasures the Kremlin will take, such as moving into Pakistan, activating the Soviet-Syrian treaty, stepping up the pressure on South Africa, and so on.

MAY I SAY THAT SYSTEMS-ANALYSTS *have a wonderful way of predicting the obvious. "How will the US Federal Government allocate certain funds set aside for welfare programmes in disadvantaged areas?"—this was the subject of an expensive team-research project in my time at the University of Southern California. Two years and several hundred thousand dollars later, the research team came up with the astounding forecast that the Federal Government would build schools in black neighbourhoods where schools were in short supply, and hospitals in areas where medical care was insufficient! When the Federal Government did, eventually, announce its plan to build schools and hospitals where these were most needed, my systems-analyst colleagues had a knowing smile on their faces: "We told you so. . . ."*

Your forecast strikes me as being of the same sort. Any junior foreign-service officer in Britain or France **failing** *to forecast the*

Tweedledum, Tweedledee, & Cleopatra's Nose

THE *succession of Konstantin Chernenko to Mr Andropov put paid to the speculations about the possible prospects of any significant internal reform. Chernenko, the protégé of Brezhnev, is similarly disinclined to tinker with the Soviet system.*

In his role as spokesman on ideology Chernenko expressed his basic attitude to the problem of economic reform in a speech (at the June 1983 Party plenum) in which he stressed that:

> **"there exist truths which are not subject to revision, problems that were solved long ago and without further ramifications . . ."**

His zeal included even music as a target of his censure, castigating "musical ensembles whose repertoires are of a dubious nature" causing "ideological and aesthetic harm" to the Soviet people.

This does not leave much room for the hopes so widely expressed in the Western Press on Andropov's assumption of power about the latter's "liberalism" and "sophistication" as allegedly manifested in the devotion to English whisky and all that Western jazz. . . .

Mr Chernenko is going to cling to his familiar ways, even though he might make some cosmetic economic changes in the face of the same intractable problems which confronted his predecessor (low productivity, falling rate of growth, agricultural backwardness, inefficient system of incentives due to the absence of market mechanisms, corruption and social immobility).

THE SIMPLE CONTRAST **between Soviet "conservatives" and "reformers", just like the contrast between "hawks" and "doves" so beloved by Western commentators, is of course quite misleading.**

There are no "liberals", "reformers" or "doves" in the present Politburo. The fact that Chernenko was chosen does not indicate that either Romanov or Gorbachev would have been inclined to challenge the Party apparatus of which Chernenko is a spokesman. Nor has Mr Chernenko any chance in his Brezhnevian comeback to stop the generational change in the Soviet élite.

THE GENERAL INCLINATION *in the West is to see a silver lining on the occasion of each and every Soviet succession, hoping for a change in the basic Soviet policy. Hope springs eternal in Western breasts at the funeral of each successive Soviet leader, in spite of the lessons of the 66 years of Soviet history which testify to the continuity of Soviet foreign policy.*

The nomination of Chernenko may perhaps slightly dampen such euphoric hopes, which were invariably expressed on such occasions. Stalin was considered a "moderate" in contrast to the "flaming revolutionary" Trotsky; Malenkov and Beria were presented as "liberals." Khrushchev was supposed to be compelled to turn inwards because of "de-Stalinisation." Brezhnev was "pragmatic", promoting "détente" (until Afghanistan and Poland), Andropov was a "closet liberal" (in spite of his role in Hungary in 1956 and his mental prisons for Soviet dissidents). Now it is the turn of Chernenko: one can already hear the usual chorus of Western commentators discovering the hitherto unknown liberal virtues of the "new" man.

IN THE PAST *the record of Kremlinologists was not very impressive: no one thought of Stalin as a successor to Lenin, or of Khrushchev as a successor to Stalin. The ousting of Khrushchev in 1964 was predicted only in the astrological yearbook, "Old Moore's Almanac." With Andropov and Chernenko the forecasting record is a bit better, but the political significance of it is less exciting.*

IN THE **administrative greyness of Soviet officialdom the victory of a bureaucratic Tweedledum over a bureaucratic Tweedledee is now less significant than in the past.**

All the present Soviet Cleopatras have, so to say, very similar noses.

Leopold Labedz

Editor, *Survey Magazine*
in the DAILY TELEGRAPH (London)

kind of Soviet moves you have predicted would have his chances of promotion seriously jeopardised.

ZINOVIEV: You make it sound all too simple. Building a mathematical model is a highly skilled and complicated business. I could teach you my method if we had a couple of years at our disposal—

—Are you implying that I'd be a slow or a fast learner?

ZINOVIEV: At two years you'd have to be a fast one.

—Could we, on the strength of your method, for example, understand French society before the French Revolution—or after?

ZINOVIEV: You could use my scientific method for devising a theory about French society. But my own theory does not apply to French society. It applies to Communist society only.

—Will it, then, explain Chinese Communist society?

ZINOVIEV: No, it will not. Chinese society is not a purely Communist society. Soviet society is the classical pattern. Some of my theorems will, of course, cover China, Hungary, Romania and the other East European countries, but in general my theory applies to Soviet society only.

—But would you not agree that ten years of the Maoist Cultural Revolution brought China closer to the egalitarian Communist model than anything that has happened in the Soviet Union in its 66 years of history?

ZINOVIEV: I don't know Chinese society, so I will not talk about it. But there is yet another reason why my theory cannot be applied to China. According to my theory, every social system has limitations of scale. If the size of a system outstrips those limitations, two things can happen: it will either develop its own sub-systems of viable size and thus survive; or it will not, in which case it will destroy itself. I can prove with the certainty of a mathematical theorem that China cannot become an effective world power precisely because it has too large a population. A society of 1,000 million people is too unmanageable and unwieldy.

—What would you say is the optimal size for a society to be effective?

ZINOVIEV: About 200 million is enough. China could become a great state if it killed off at least half its population. There are certain hard, testable mathematical correlations which give us the upper (and lower) limits of an effective society. There are, of course, many other mathematical correlations too, which I could teach you if you chose to become my student for a while. For example the calculus of the system's decision-making ability, of its stability, the parameters of risk-taking by the leadership, and so on. Unfortunately, some weaknesses remain in my theory so that I cannot adequately explain everything I'd like to explain.

—Did you predict the Soviet move into Afghanistan on the strength of your computations?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, I did, in a talk to the American Club in Munich.

—Why was the world not alerted to your prediction?

ZINOVIEV: That I cannot tell you.

WHAT YOU HAVE, THEN, GIVEN US *is a theory that is (1) essentially accessible to Soviet residents only; (2) specific to the Soviet type of Communist society; and (3) specific to the size of Communist society that happens to be the size of existing Soviet society. All this puts me on my guard—especially as your claim to be "scientific" has an old ring of 19th-century scientism about it.*

You have, as a Soviet man, observed Soviet society with enormous empathy—and wit—for 30 odd years, and written about it in great detail with mordant humour and great sophistication. I would have thought **that** *was your great contribution to the debate about Soviet society—not some mathematical model specific to the Soviet Union, to Soviet men, and in the last analysis, perhaps only to one Soviet man: yourself.*

ZINOVIEV: You are absolutely wrong there. Mine is a rigorous theory based on first-hand experience; and I feel I have the right to speak in terms of my theory because it concerns the life and death of mankind. The Soviet Union has become a very serious enemy of the Western world and we have to spend time, energy, and money to perfect our understanding of that enemy. It may well be that the uses of my theory will be limited to one single occasion. That would not upset me in the slightest.

The Soviet Union resembles in most of its features a mechanical system. Most facts about Soviet society can be counted and fed into a computer. When the danger of war arises, we are, on the strength of my theory, in the fortunate position of being able to "take the measure" of the Soviet system in the literal sense. Suppose the next war were to be a nuclear war: it is of fundamental importance for us to know whether the Soviet or the Western system has the greater capacity for survival.

—And you can tell us which. . . .

ZINOVIEV: It can be done. Oh yes, it can. Our contemporary computers are not equal to the task, but as soon as we have one that can digest several hundred variables—it will be done.

—How do you quantify morale, dedication, the force of nationalism?

ZINOVIEV: It is difficult, but it can be done.

3. Of Russian Pride & Ethnic Prejudice



TAKE A PRACTICAL *example. General Sir John Hackett, in his well-known book "The Third World War", predicts that, after a limited nuclear exchange and a stalemated conventional war in Central Europe, the Soviet Union will break up into its constituent parts under the impact of national separatism. Now, how would you quantify the Ukrainian, or Lithuanian, or Uzbek wish for national independence?*

ZINOVIEV: This is a ridiculous scenario. General Hackett wants the Soviet Union to disintegrate, and he predicts events in accordance with his own wish.

—Are you saying that the spirit of national independence does not exist in the non-Russian parts of the USSR?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, I am.

—That it does not exist at all?

ZINOVIEV: It exists, but it is too weak to matter. You have to see things as they really are. With the sole exception of the small Baltic republics, which (especially Estonia and Latvia) are in fact German by tradition and culture, the other non-Russian nations and nationalities are net *beneficiaries* of the Russian connection. Offer an ordinary Ukrainian or Azerbaidzhani the possibility of secession from the Soviet Union—he will refuse it! You will, of course, always find tiny minorities of nationalists and dissidents who think otherwise, but the vast majority will have nothing to do with national independence. It would cost them too dear.

—You sound like a Habsburg defender of the status quo in, shall we say, 1914.

ZINOVIEV: Not at all. I speak of a status quo which is genuinely accepted. Take the Azerbaidzhanis. Many of them live in Moscow and Leningrad, holding down privileged positions, occupying sumptuous homes, sending their children to privileged schools, and so on. They "live off the land" of the Russians. For them Russia is a colony.

—Is the Russification of the non-Russian republics, of which so much has been written, also a myth in your view?

ZINOVIEV: Absolutely. The non-Russian republics have not been "Russified" in the old imperial sense of the word. On the contrary: one of the most significant features of the October Revolution was the colonisation of *Russia* and the Russian nation. The Bolsheviks were afraid of the submerged masses of the Russian people. They found it more convenient to uproot groups of Ukrainians, Tatars, Georgians, and so on, and base their rule on these much more manipulable *déraciné* minorities. Even today when this anti-Russian trend is being reversed, in Moscow, Leningrad, and the other major Russian cities you will find that at least half the senior élite in the Party, Government, and public administration are not Russians. If you look at the list of Soviet writers, generals, or academicians rather few of the names will be Russian. The rest will be typical names of Ukrainians and so on.

Until not so many years ago the Russian people were the underdogs of the Soviet empire, as indeed they had been underdogs under the Czars too. They were peasants bound to the villages, tilling the land, supplying the armed forces with cannon-fodder and, generally speaking, performing the lowly, menial tasks at servitors' rates. The result is that the great majority of people running our country and setting the tone of its culture—whether in literature, music, jurisprudence or science—come from non-Russian ethnic stock. After the Revolution some three million of the Russian intelligentsia were slaughtered. Then, with the 1928–32 Collectivisation campaign, about 15 million Russian peasants—the basic stock of our nation—perished. It is only now that the Russian people are being slowly emancipated and allowed to compete for the more influential posts. But, until quite recently, the Governments of Russia were not *Russian* Governments. There have, in fact, been no Russian Governments in Russia (or the Soviet Union) since Peter the Great. Our Czars since Peter were, to say the very least, Germanised by marriage.

It is, then, safe to conclude that every minority nation or nationality has been enjoying a privileged position in comparison with the Russian people—that they have regarded Russia as their colony. For example, every nation and nationality has its Academy of Sciences. There is no Russian Academy of Sciences.

—This is true of the Communist Party too. All Republics have their own Communist Parties, but there is no Russian Communist Party.

ZINOVIEV: Yes, perfectly true.

—But then knowledgeable scholars like Leonard Schapiro have argued that this is because the dominant organisation, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is in fact the **Russian** *Communist Party.*

ZINOVIEV: This is quite untrue. The *CPSU* has never been a Russian phenomenon.

Today in the Soviet Academy of Sciences only about 10% of the Academicians are Russian, whereas Russians make up half the total Soviet population. The same goes for the Central Committee, the *KGB*, the Army, and so on. Right through the Soviet élite, the Russian people is badly under-represented. So is its culture in the Soviet Union as a whole.

THIS CERTAINLY RUNS COUNTER *to almost all the written and spoken evidence I have seen on the subject. For ten years under Brezhnev all members of the Secretariat of the*

Central Committee were Russian, even though Russians account for only about 60% of the Party's membership. Volumes have been written about the Russification of the Central Asian Republics, the Baltic States, the Ukraine. I will not review the evidence, for it is too well known. Would you say it is **all** *nonsensical?*

ZINOVIEV: Indeed I would, and I do. These republics have not been "Russified" in any meaningful sense of the word.

—Is the reverse, then, the case?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, it is. If you go to the Soviet Union with certain *a priori* conceptions in mind, you will always find evidence to endorse them.

—But isn't it also true that if you come **from** *the Soviet system with a certain mathematical model in mind, you will always find facts to endorse* **that***?*

ZINOVIEV: If your *a priori* conception is that national conflicts will destroy the Soviet system, you will come back with a thick file of "evidence" showing that those conflicts actually exist. Some Western scholars believe that alcoholism will be the death of the Soviet Union. One nonsense is as good as another.

—But you will surely allow that linguistic Russification exists?

ZINOVIEV: Absolutely not. All Soviet citizens are indeed taught Russian. But this cannot be called "Russification." You may have been misled by a recent demonstration in Georgia which is now widely quoted as showing that there is widespread resentment among Georgians of the Russian language and of the Russian people. But this is not true. It is now established that only some of those demonstrators had any command of the Georgian language. All Georgians, however, speak Russian—and so they should, in their own interest. For when a Georgian goes to Moscow to sell his produce, or speculate on the black market, or publish his book, he needs Russian, not Georgian. Georgia is a small republic. Russian is the *lingua franca* of the Soviet Union.

—As you seem to be speaking with the authentic voice of imperialism, let me point out that in British India too—where the English language was genuinely accepted both as lingua franca *among Indian tribes and nationalities, and as a passport to education, professional advancement, and business success—it was widely argued by the British that good public administration and India's own economic interests were better served within the British Empire than they would be outside it. Yet, when the chips were down, the British-educated Indian intelligentsia preferred Independence to economic advantage and good administration, and caused the British to leave.*

What I am saying is that no matter how persuasive the economic or cultural self-interests of your Georgians may be, you cannot expect them not to want to assert their national independence just because, on sober calculation, they might be economically better off under Russian rule, going to Russian schools, etc., than they would be under their own. Nations do not act so rationally—as we well know from the disintegration of the colonial empires after the War.

ZINOVIEV: But your assertions about Russification are absurd. The Russian language is generally accepted in the Soviet Union—

—So was (and is) English in India. . . .

ZINOVIEV: —but the adoption of Russian is not Russification. I can confidently assert that the opposite is closer to the mark. Take the Ukraine, which I know well (I was a frequent visitor there as an examiner of doctoral candidates). All educated Ukrainians speak Russian; they also speak Ukrainian. Russians have not colonised the Ukraine. Indeed, it is virtually impossible for a Russian to get a job in the Ukraine, whereas in Russia about 60% of leading posts are held by Ukrainians. There was a time when 70% of Soviet academicians were Jews, whereas Jews account for only about 1% of the Soviet population. When I was suggested for election to the Academy as a Russian, the Academy's official line was that in principle more Russians should now be admitted. I was closely questioned by an interview board as to whether I was a Jew or a Russian. I am, as you know, a Russian, but despite the Academy's official line, a Jew was elected. And I'm inclined to ascribe this to what I have already told you: the Soviet leaders are at heart afraid of the Russian people. They are more at home with uprooted minorities.

HOW, THEN, DO YOU EXPLAIN *Stalin's Great-Russian chauvinism which earned him Lenin's memorable warning in 1922? Lenin feared, you will remember, that the Constitution of the Union would not protect the non-Russians "from invasion of their rights by this typical Russian man, the chauvinist, whose basic nature is that of a scoundrel and repressor, the classical type of Russian bureaucrat. . . ."*

ZINOVIEV: In the first place, Stalin was neither Russian nor did he become "a typical Russian man." Secondly, Lenin was a sick man at the time and uttered much that was nonsensical. In any case, his warning had a specific meaning in the context of the early 1920s which it does not have for us. It is useless to compare like with unlike.

—What about Stalin's famous tribute, at a victory celebration on 24 May 1945, to the "Russian people" without whose endurance the USSR might have lost the war?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, Stalin proposed that memorable toast. It was a typical instance of his inspired ideological opportunism. It was a memorable occasion for me, too, because it prompted me to write a satirical poem (now reprinted in my book *The Radiant Future*) which got me into prison. But whatever Stalin said in praise of the Russian people in 1945, it was not long before the repression of the Russian nation was resumed. Once again, the camps were filled with Russian officers, soldiers, intellectuals, and colonial status was clamped down on the Russian people.

There is a tendency, too, in the Soviet Union for the small nations and minority groups to spread the word around that they are being hard done by—that there is "prejudice" against them because they are Georgians, or Azerbaidzhanis, or Jews. But this is a myth. Let me tell you a story.

Two Soviet Jews meet in a street in Moscow. "Well, how's life treating you?", the first asks his friend.

"N-n-n-not . . . t-t-too . . . w-w-well", says the second with a heavy stutter.

"But why? What's happened?"

"I . . . I . . . I've . . . app-app-applied . . . f-f-for a j-j-job . . . as TV ann-ann-announ-announcer on Sov-Sov-Soviet TV and . . . I . . . I . . . I've b-b-been . . . re-re-refused be-be-be-because I . . . am . . . a-a-a . . . J-J-Jew."

—Are you saying that all prejudice and all anti-Semitism is of this imaginary character?

ZINOVIEV: No. The Soviet Union is a very large country. Here and there spots of prejudice exist—against Muslims, Armenians, Jews, what-have-you, but anti-Jewism (which we should keep separate from anti-Semitism) is largely a phenomenon of the last two or three decades and has grown parallel with the slow but increasing emancipation of the Russian people. As their ability to compete for jobs has grown, so has the feeling that the Jewish grip on the more worthwhile types of employment is out of proportion with the number of Soviet Jews. Before the Second World War, Jews were privileged people in our country, and they are in some respects still privileged people today: they can emigrate if they want to badly enough, whereas a Russian or Tadzhik cannot.

SURELY I DON'T HAVE TO REMIND *you of the history of Russian pogroms; Stalin's anti-Semitism; the "Doctors' Plot"; the real thrust of the "Anti-Zionist" campaigns, the penalties of Jewish emigration, and the discrimination and personal animus the ordinary Soviet Jew has to pocket from the ordinary Russian or Ukrainian every day of his life. The mere fact that his internal passport classifies him as a Jew by "nationality" tells much of the story.*

ZINOVIEV: The Russian people have never been anti-Semitic. In fact, in many ways they always preferred Jewish people to their own kind. Whenever Russians had a chance to elect a man as a leader of some group or director of some enterprise and had a choice between a Russian and a Jew, they would elect a Jew. This was an old Russian tradition, the reason being that the Russian people *were not much inclined to rule*. The Jews were, and they were very good at it because they were competent, had will-power and brains. Since the Second World War the emancipation of Russians has advanced apace, and the predominance of Jews has come to be resented. Hence the talk about Russian anti-Semitism. But, as I say, before the War virtually all the professorial chairs in Moscow, Leningrad, and the major provincial cities were held by Jewish scholars, and the Academy too was an almost exclusively Jewish preserve. In those days, however, the number of worthwhile academic appointments ran to no more than a few dozen, whereas today these and the parallel posts in industrial research and development are counted in their tens of thousand. There just aren't enough qualified Jews to compete with 100 million Russians.

—Do you, then, clearly ascribe anti-Semitism to this growing competition for well-endowed appointments and prestige?

ZINOVIEV: No. This is not only a Jewish question. The "Mafias" come into it, for the Russian people are faced with a number of what one might call "mafias" which they naturally dislike. The Armenians have a mafia-like group-loyalty wherever they may live; so have the Tatars; so have the Georgians; and so have the Jews. The October Revolution in a sense legitimised these with its emphasis on the equality of all peoples and cultures. The only nation which was not allowed to proclaim its special cohesion and individuality was the Russian people. As soon as the Russian nation tried to speak with its own distinctive voice, up went the cry of "nationalism", "chauvinism", even "fascism." Part of today's anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union is due to the mafia-like character of the special cohesion and transnational ties of the Soviet Jews. They, like the Armenians and other minority nationalities, enjoy special privileges which are denied to Russians. This breeds anti-Jewish feeling, which I personally abominate.

—Would you say that the US emphasis on Jewish emigration as an element of American economic policy has helped or harmed Soviet Jewry?

ZINOVIEV: It has added to anti-Semitism and, one must say, made things more difficult for that great majority of Jews who cannot, or do not want to, emigrate. If the Americans, and American Jewish interests, supported the claims of dissident Tatars, Armenians, Ukrainians and Russians with a fraction of the urgency with which they have supported Jewish emigration, the situation of Soviet Jews might be very different.

Functionaries come and go, but the Apparatus remains. . . .

DO YOU THINK THE *Soviet leaders would quietly allow Soviet Jews to leave if no American pressure were applied? Wouldn't they be losing a convenient domestic psychological scapegoat as well as a useful bargaining counter* vis-à-vis *the USA?*

ZINOVIEV: I cannot confidently answer that question. What I can say is that our Jews should be allowed to emigrate if they want to, if only because the great usefulness of Soviet Jews as carriers of learning, culture, and expertise is now exhausted. The Soviet Union has enough doctors, scientists, and teachers to be able to do without the specifically Jewish contribution. But if emigration were not to prove possible, perhaps our Jews ought to be given a chance to relocate themselves more evenly throughout the Soviet Union and cease to form compact minorities. This would perhaps ameliorate the odious phenomenon of anti-Semitism.

—"Full assimilation" . . . despite the German experience?

ZINOVIEV: That is a difficult subject on which I'm not competent to talk. Suffice it to say that, in the Soviet Union, the importance of national exclusiveness is happily on the decline. I call myself a Russian, and I am—as you have noticed—deeply concerned with the well-being and culture of the Russian people, because it has been for centuries a badly underprivileged people. But at the same time I am equally conscious that I have, as a "Russian", not a drop of Slavic blood in my veins. So I cannot be a Russian racialist. My ancestors came to Russia from Sweden and Finland, adopted Russian as their language, and were Christianised as "Russians." I do not, therefore, hold that the perpetuation of nationally or racially pure groups, whether Jewish or Swedish or whatever, is a great moral imperative, or for that matter historically possible or desirable. Many of our Jews regard themselves as more Russian than the Russians. I have no quarrel with that sentiment.

—One of Marx's more spectacular failures was the failure to foresee the significance of race and nationalism. Aren't you committing, as one nurtured on Marxism, the same "ethnic" error? Aren't you, in fact, contradicting yourself, arguing as you are for the emancipation of the Russian nation while at the same time downplaying the importance of national homogeneity?

ZINOVIEV: No. There is no contradiction. I do not seek national homogeneity. My preoccupation with the future of the Russian nation is a profound concern for the welfare and culture of the Russian people as human beings who entered the 20th century with a specific background and history. It is not racial. Think of that perhaps greatest of names in Russian literature, Pushkin, who came on his maternal side from Abyssinian stock and was so dark-skinned that he could be taken for an African. Or think of Dostoevsky, with his Polish ancestry. There are no pure races today in the civilised world—nor, I would suggest, should there be any. My suggestion, therefore, that our own Jewish population, having brilliantly performed its cultural mission, may now usefully dilute its identity by voluntary emigration and assimilation is no more anti-Semitic than my concern for a racially mixed Russian nation is anti-Russian.

4. Confessions of a Child of the Revolution



ALL IN ALL—*to return to our main theme—you regard the Russian people as the victims rather than the beneficiaries of the Soviet system?*

ZINOVIEV: Not in every respect, and not throughout the régime's 66 years of history. Before the Revolution 80%, if not 90%, of the Russian population were peasants living at subsistence level at the bottom of the social pyramid. They lived miserable lives, only an iota above the level of serfs. The Revolution did produce changes. Take my own family, who were peasants. As a result of the collectivisation of agriculture my parents lost everything they had. But my elder brother eventually rose to be a factory manager; the next one to him in age made it to the rank of colonel; three of my other brothers qualified as engineers; and I became a professor at Moscow University. At the same time millions of Russian peasants were given a formal education and some became professional men and women.

—But surely you moved to these positions over the dead bodies of those many millions of peasants who had been systematically starved in the 1929–32 period?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, if you want to put it that way. I would simply say that the collectivisation of agriculture created many new opportunities. The whole life of the country was radically changed.

—But that is not very different from saying that the gassing of Jews and gypsies in Auschwitz was a radical piece of social engineering which "created many new opportunities". . . .

ZINOVIEV: The collectivisation of agriculture was an essential phase of the Bolshevik Revolution. Without it our country would have disintegrated. The Russian revolution began in 1861 and climaxed in 1917. It *happened*; and its only possible aftermath was collectivisation.

—So even now, speaking as a dissident on West European soil, you approve of the collectivisation with its fifteen million victims?

ZINOVIEV: Of course I do. I approve of it completely.

—Despite the awesome sacrifices?

ZINOVIEV: Despite the sacrifices. Collectivisation gave industry many millions of workers. And industry meant opportunity.

—Is "gave" the right verb, I wonder? Weren't they being starved into leaving their villages or made to do so by brute force?

ZINOVIEV: They were not "forced" to go into industry. Of course, the kulaks were liquidated. But it was quite possible for ordinary peasants to stay on the land. Life in the big cities, however, offered irresistible temptations. Country life was primitive and boring. My family lived on the land. We had a large and comfortable house. In Moscow the ten of us had to make do with a single room of ten square metres—one square metre per head. Can you imagine?! Yet, we *preferred* life in Moscow.

—But surely, if your parents' land had not been taken away from them they would not have left your village. Their move was a response to an act of arbitrary expropriation.

ZINOVIEV: I don't know. It was certainly not any lack of food that made them leave. They moved because better opportunities beckoned in Moscow. Historians now tell us that the exodus from the villages was due to starvation and other pressures. Some may have left for those reasons, but the majority left in search of a better life—a collective life within Soviet institutions.

—But collective life, if that is what they were after, could be had on the land too. Some of us in the West have been under the impression that it was collective life they were **running away from**.

ZINOVIEV: Ah, but at that time collective life had not been properly organised in the countryside. *Now* it is—but in the 1920s and early 1930s agricultural collectivisation was a halfway house between the old system and the new. But, quite apart from that, in the towns people could visit libraries, go to cinemas, learn languages, meet one another. There was variety, entertainment, and culture to be had—and better wages. Don't forget that the Revolution was a great cultural revolution too. The enormous tragedies you have mentioned were accompanied by improved life-chances.

—All in all, you seem to be approving of Lenin's dictum that a generation had to be sacrificed. . . .

ZINOVIEV: I don't approve or disapprove. I take a scientific position which is neutral. What happened, happened. My job is to deal with consequential reality as it is now, not to pass judgment.

—But you **are** *passing judgment, for when you say that the Soviet system would have disintegrated if collectivisation had not been set in train, you are in fact upholding "the Soviet system" as worth saving even at the cost of fifteen million lives.*

ZINOVIEV: Every bit of progress exacts a price and carries certain consequences. Some of these are positive, others negative. I was, as you know, an anti-Stalinist. I was arrested and imprisoned under Stalin because of my opposition to Stalin. Yet, as a scientist I can, and do, make a point of explaining why the Russian people supported Stalin. I was an anti-Stalinist; yet I must tell you that it was in Stalin's prison that I had a bed of my own for the first time in my life, three meals a day, and decent clothing. Before that I was permanently hungry. After my release I was hungry again.

Think of the dreadful paradox: an anti-Stalinist who must nevertheless insist that Stalin's time was a great epoch in human history! And I was not alone in feeling that. My mother, who hated Stalin and all his works, kept a picture of Stalin in her Bible right up to her death. Millions of Russians did likewise.

—A hangover from Czarist times . . . Stalin replacing The-Little-Father-of-all-Russians?

ZINOVIEV: I don't know about that. Stalin represented the dynamism of life. He stood for the ordinary people's power. When he died, the people's power died with him. Without the Revolution my own family would have stayed stuck in the village as peasants. As it was, they had the chance to participate in the people's power.

—Would you consider your officer's commission in the Air Force another beneficial aspect of the "dynamism of life" under Stalin?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, I would. Stalin purged the Red Army. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the trials of Tukhachevsky and his colleagues (and Tukhachevsky himself was certainly a very able soldier), the purge did away with the old class of ill-educated and undermotivated officers and made way for a completely new intake. I was one of the latter—a young lieutenant infinitely (I can assure you) more competent than the officer I replaced when he was arrested.

—Military historians tell us that if Tukhachevsky and the other generals had not been shot, Stalin's 1940 Winter Campaign against Finland wouldn't have fared so miserably.

ZINOVIEV: That is nonsense. I can tell you something else: if Stalin had *not* purged the Red Army, the Soviet Union would have suffered defeat in its war with Hitler. Our country was saved by the Red Army's new and superior leadership and the spirit and competence of the new officer class.

—"Life has become better, life has become gayer." Who would ever have thought one would meet, fifty years on, a Soviet dissident ready to support Stalin's famous boast?

ZINOVIEV: Well, life was extraordinarily fascinating, even if it was hard. I knew many people who realised that they were about to be shot—yet they praised Stalin. Stalin was a symbol of hope and vigour. A relative of mine, who knew that he was due to start a long prison sentence in a year's time, was (as people often were under Stalin) suddenly appointed to run a large factory. He grabbed the opportunity because, for him, the challenge of that single glorious year was worth more than a thousand years spent in uneventful living. "I know they will kill me—but this year is going to be *my* year", he said. He was filled with the consciousness of making history.

—Would you have felt the same, and acted as he did?

ZINOVIEV: Oh yes, and I still feel the same today. Forty years now separate me from my wartime experiences as an officer of the Soviet Air Force. I would willingly exchange those forty years for one week of my earlier life as a fighter-pilot.

I am a child of the Revolution—you must always remember that—I'm a product of the Revolution. I went to school in the 1930s and I was brought up on the romanticism of the Revolution. For me the Revolution and everything that went with it make up the whole sense of life. This does not mean, however, that I support the present Soviet régime. No: I'm a man of the 1920s and 1930s.

YOU ARE, PROFESSOR ZINOVIEV, *a typical Soviet Man, even though you are a dissident*—**Homo Sovieticus**, *to quote the title of your recent book. . . .*

ZINOVIEV: Absolutely. I am a Soviet Man. I spent 60 odd years of my life in Soviet society, and always did my best to serve it: I was, I believe, a good soldier, a good Air Force officer, a good professor, and a good and hard-working member of my collective. From that point of view I am Soviet Man *par excellence*.

—Yet your merciless exposure of the psychology of Soviet Man and Soviet society earned you your expulsion. I must, therefore, assume that in some important respects you are not Soviet Man after all.

ZINOVIEV: Oh, but I am. That does not mean that I do not criticise the system. Throughout the Soviet Union the system is always being criticised at all levels—but these criticisms come from within the system. They do not question its legitimacy.

People in the West tend to think that Soviet society is, in effect, a vast concentration camp. That just isn't true. Some of my satirical writings were first given in Russia as public lectures. For example, I delivered a chapter from *The Yawning Heights*—on leadership, of all things—as a lecture at the Military Academy. I had 200 generals in the audience, and they applauded. You can't do that in a concentration camp.

I regard the existence of the Soviet system as a natural fact. My problem is how to live within that given society.

—Suppose your post as a professor at Moscow University were made available to you again, and your unorthodoxies were quietly forgiven. Would you return to the Soviet Union?

ZINOVIEV: I'd return at once. But please understand: I was (as I've now repeatedly said) bitterly opposed to Stalin and Stalinism; yet that environment was my whole life. I fought for the Soviet society of which Stalin was the leader, and I fought for it willingly. At the same time I was so thoroughly alienated from Stalin himself that I was planning to assassinate him.

—You were?

ZINOVIEV: Oh, yes. Yet, whenever I was ordered by my superiors to put my life on the line for Stalin, I did so without hesitation.

SUPPOSE YOU DID GO BACK *to the USSR to rejoin your "collective", but fell foul of the system again and were confined to a psychiatric institution. Would you consider yourself to be a psychologically normal person wrongly declared to be abnormal or insane?*

ZINOVIEV: No, I would not. I *would be* abnormal.

—Ah, but we must not be caught again on the horns of the "normality" dilemma. You could be considered to be "abnormal" only in the sense in which anyone who wants to reform Soviet society is declared to be "abnormal" by the Soviet authorities. But surely **you** *would not accept that standard. You would feel that* **you** *were perfectly normal and it was the* **system** *that was abnormal, would you not?*

ZINOVIEV: But don't you see: I *would be* abnormal in a system in which the norm is to accept the system as it is. I'd be deviant from it.

—But would **you**, *in your heart of hearts, regard yourself as psychologically ill?*

ZINOVIEV: I would recognise the fact that from the system's point of view I was abnormal. And as there can be no other point of view *within* the Soviet system, I would accept and live with the fact that I was deviant.

—You are echoing Nikita Khrushchev. "A crime", Khrushchev said, "is a deviation from generally recognised standards of behaviour, frequently called mental disorder. The mental state of people who start calling for opposition to Communism is clearly not normal." I hate to labour this point, but for us it is the "abnormality" which made you write "Yawning Heights" and your other famous satires of Soviet society that guarantees your normality. We admire your wit and courage, because you wrote these satires despite the pressures of the Soviet environment and it is that environment we regard as sick. Can I induce you to say, in plain language, that you really feel the same as we do? For otherwise I'd have to assume that you cannot differentiate between yourself and the subject of your study.

ZINOVIEV: Soviet society is both the subject of my study and my natural habitat. My books and their author are abnormal phenomena in the context of Soviet life.

—But would you regard yourself as ill, and therefore rightly confined?

ZINOVIEV: In the given and only possible context, yes, I would.

—But we are now talking in the West, in Scotland, a long way away from that context. You are here precisely because you rejected that context.

ZINOVIEV: Your question has no meaning outside the context of Soviet society—therefore I cannot give you an answer outside the context of the Soviet system. Scotland is not the Soviet Union.

—An independent morality—one outside the system—does not, then, exist for you?

ZINOVIEV: It does not once you find yourself living in the system. "Morality" depends on the total impact of your environment. The poor cannot be very "moral." Nor can Soviet Man, in your sense of the word.

—A time-honoured Leninist principle?

ZINOVIEV: Simply a description of Soviet reality which is an immoral reality when seen from outside. Western morality does not belong to the Soviet system.

I'M BEGINNING TO WILT *under the pressure of your dialectic. You hated Stalin, yet you loved him. You were ready to kill him, yet you were also ready to die for him. Andrei Amalrik once said to me that the whole of Soviet society is psychologically abnormal. I can see what he meant.*

ZINOVIEV: I'm describing a very normal *Soviet* phenomenon. I fought for Stalin when my duties as an officer so demanded. I was ready to sacrifice my life for Stalin, for my military superiors and my comrades. When you have the privilege of being an officer in the Air Force, you want to be a good officer.

—There is, I suppose, a sense in which a young man—keen, vigorous and anxious to take on whatever may come his way—enjoys being a good soldier no matter what political leadership he may serve under. To be fully stretched in a fine corps of young men is an ambition we have all probably had. I suppose it was that sort of ambition that motivated you under Stalin.

ZINOVIEV: Yes, it was.

—Did you ever ask yourself whether it was Russia you were fighting for, or for Communism as represented by Stalin?

ZINOVIEV: No. It was my duty to do as I was being ordered. The Germans were my enemies. It was my job to fight them, and I enjoyed fighting them.

—Would you agree that you have, in that case, no moral grounds for condemning the great majority of **German** *soldiers who fought for Hitler arguing exactly what you have just put to me: that in war you obey orders, and you obey them willingly because your first duty is to your country, your superiors, and your comrades—no matter whether you approve or disapprove of your leaders?*

ZINOVIEV: The two are not comparable. In any case, as soon as the War was over I began to criticise the Soviet system, and developed the sharpest criticism yet seen in the Soviet Union.

But you must understand that my strictures came from within the system. The Soviet system was my home; my family; my life. Good or bad, I was part of it. It was beyond my power to change it. I have a daughter. She may be good or bad, brilliant or stupid—but do I love her less if she *is* stupid or disappoints my expectations? Of course I don't.

—Clearly, then, you don't want to see the Soviet system overthrown.

ZINOVIEV: That is not my concern. At the same time, I can see the grave danger that the Soviet system represents for the Western world, and I want to help in averting that danger. I am a Russian first and foremost, and I want to see the Russian people happy and prosperous. That requires the disintegration of the Soviet *empire*. I know that.

—You want to see the **empire** *destroyed but not the Communist system.*

ZINOVIEV: As I want the Russian people to attain independence as a sovereign state, I must logically hope for the destruction of the Soviet empire. The Communist system is another matter.

—Would your Russia incorporate the Ukraine?

ZINOVIEV: No, I would allow the Ukrainians to take care of their own problems in whatever framework they wished.

My sole concern is the future of the Russian people. I write my books as a Russian writer for Russian readers. I should like my contemporaries to read my books. I want the Russian people to be educated, cultured, and self-confident so that they can share the treasures of world culture and contribute to them. I want to lift the Russians out of their centuries-old backwardness and subjection. It is impossible for the Russian people to attain any of these things within the Soviet empire.

—You said "the system is another matter." Are you suggesting that the Communist system would survive even if the Soviet empire were destroyed or fell apart for internal reasons?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, my forecast is that the system would survive. I am sure that the Communist system has a future. More than that, I feel confident that the Communist system will eventually embrace the whole of mankind. But the Soviet empire will perish.

WOULD YOU, IN FACT, *want to see the Soviet empire defeated in war as a step towards the liberation of the Russian people and an independent Russian nation-state?*

ZINOVIEV: It is not a matter of what I would want to happen. But I am as certain as anyone can be that in a Third World War both the Soviet Union and the USA would, in their different ways, suffer defeat. The Soviet Union would inevitably fall apart into a number of small and medium-size states; and I am convinced that this would be beneficial not only to the peoples concerned, but to the rest of mankind.

The Soviet empire in its present form is highly dangerous to the West. I keep coming back to this theme because the Western countries seem to underestimate the staying power of the Soviet system. As a war-making machine, the USSR

compares very favourably with the Western world, because it is an empire in a state of permanent mobilisation. It can destroy Western Europe. It can destroy the USA—even though it, too, will be destroyed in the process.

—You seem to be talking as though a Third World War were inevitable.

ZINOVIEV: I'm sure that it is inevitable.

—Within a time-frame of, shall we say, ten years?

ZINOVIEV: I cannot predict the time-frame, but one thing I *can* say: the Soviet Union will be the initiator of any future World War. I use the word "initiator" advisedly. I'm not saying the USSR will *start* the war "cold", as it were—but it will cause it to happen by stirring up trouble in one place, supporting anti-Western resentment in another, and so on. The policies the Soviet Union has been pursuing in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and more recently in Central America, are stations on the road to war. At the time of the Iranian crisis the Kremlin had an incomparable chance to hammer the West from a position of strength. It missed that chance.

Now it will need at least five years to concentrate its various advantages over the West at a point of maximum Western vulnerability. The rapid rearmament of the USA and the growing Western consciousness of the reality of the Soviet threat may, of course, throw the Kremlin's calculations out of gear. But let me at once tell you: the Soviet government can wait. If the correlation of forces does not suit the Soviet book in, let us say, five years from now, the Soviet leaders will bide their time until some crisis in the Western world provides the necessary opening. The Soviet empire is not an *ad hoc* aggressor. Its expansionism springs from the nature of its philosophy and is not susceptible to change—tactical delays, yes; permanent change, no.

A concluding part of this conversation will be published in the May issue.

To Norman Nicholson, Rising Seventy-one

As you avowedly have served your time
under the edged, striding shadow of Long Willie,
so we, soft-footed sidesmen
in the working nave of your plenty,
continually must check our données
—images, diction, ways of seeing—
against the definitive, northern tang.
So, should a line find us about the beck
and it's fizzing like ginger pop,
we can smirk but need to look further,
to the name on the bottle . . .
most times yours, of course.
And we'll have done it once more—
echoed, overheard, slipped
in the living scree of that voice—
and be at the bottom again,
rubbing ruefully, looking up.
But at least have stumbled on reality—
what's more, recognised it as such—
giving it Wigan, unearthed Normandy.

Normandy. Cartographers try to con us
it's over there, over "t' girt beck."
They can ship their la di da somewhere else.
Because here's where it simmers,
the map behind the map. And starts at Millom;
that sea lion brandishing the thrilling rest
on the prodigious tip of its nose.
If you didn't invent it, you logged it between you
—you and that canny off-comer Wainwright—
he walking compasses, you words.

Whatever—it's done now, the work, the welding:
paraded solid on umpteen shelves.
As for your pet ambition, to see Halley's Comet—
here's hoping you'll notch up sight of it yet
and when it scalds your eye it sees you
—like Magritte's eagle in "The Domain Of Arnheim"—
spliced into the very rock: what else but Black Combe—
indestructible, snowy sideburns and all.

Geoffrey Holloway

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXX XXXX~~ 218 2111/3

Prime Minister.

You asked for some papers which Lord Zuckerman showed you before I came to No. 10. We are not having much success in finding them. Can you give me any more guidance?

A. J. C. 10/4

MO 14/10

9th April 1984

Dear John

SOVIET FEARS OF A PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR ATTACK

You wrote to me on 26th March about some American studies on the likely course of developments on the ground in the early stages of a nuclear war. We have had some difficulty in locating precisely what the Prime Minister recalled. I therefore asked Lord Zuckerman's office whether they could recall what the Prime Minister has in mind and Lord Zuckerman in turn himself contacted me. I attach a copy of a self-explanatory letter from him of 3rd April together with its enclosures. I do not believe, however, that this is what the Prime Minister wanted: if she wishes to pursue the point, would it be possible to give me some further details?

My apologies for not being more helpful.

Yours ever,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

The Zoological Society of London

President: Professor Lord Zuckerman, OM, KCB, DSc, FRS

Secretary: Professor J G Phillips, PhD, DSc, FRS

Regent's Park
London NW1 4RY
Tel: 01-722 3333

BFH

3 April 1984

R C Mottram Esq
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1

Dear Mottram

I cannot recall to what precise piece of paper the Prime Minister was referring. Most of the American studies were carried out under the aegis of one of Bob McNamara's Assistant Secretaries called Enthoven during the sixties. We ourselves had done some more direct studies in the days before the 'computer' took over. By direct study, I mean pitting one divisional commander against another in the old-fashioned way when both, with their teams, operated from separate quarters furnished with vast three-dimensional relief models of hundreds of square miles of terrain. At the start of each game, the respective commanders were furnished with a limited amount of intelligence about the other side's dispositions and, once the whistle blew, the various moves which they made with the troops and armour at their disposal, were reported back to the umpires' vast room and map, on which the actual positions of the two sides were plotted from minute to minute. Nuclear weapons were used in these games.

Some years ago, I asked to see some of the reports of these exercises, but it turned out that no one knew where they were. The same applied to some very detailed studies which I directed into the consequences of a nuclear attack on centres of population. All I have now are the references of our studies which appeared first in a book of mine published in 1966 (which embodied the Lees-Knowles lectures of the previous year). I attach a photocopy of the relevant pages. The same material was made available to a UN report, also attached, which was pulled together by an international party on which I was the UK representative.

Continued/.....

More important are two pages from a book recently published in the United States by Bernard O'Keefe. He, as you will see, was one of a small party who witnessed an explosion of the only nuclear shell that was ever fired into the atmosphere. Until I read his book I was unaware of the fact that no more than one such weapon had ever been fired. It is all but impossible to conceive of what the picture would be given that not one, but tens or even hundreds of such weapons, were ever detonated in a zone of battle.

Yours sincerely

Zuckerman

Lord Zuckerman

Encs

(2)

Prime Minister.
The Foreign Secretary thinks you should not carry on the correspondence in Pravda. — Agreed
A.J.C. 9/4.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

9 April, 1984

Dear John,

Soviet 'Peace' Letters

You asked us to consider whether it would be worth the Prime Minister replying to the letter from Mrs Tereshkova which was published alongside her own in Komsomolskaya Pravda last month.

While we believe that Mrs Tereshkova's points should not remain unanswered, and there is no particular problem in producing a convincing retort, we do not think that another letter from the Prime Minister would be the right way to do this. Our Embassy in Moscow have advised that the Russians are most unlikely to publish another letter in this exchange: Komsomolskaya Pravda have already refused to publish a similar letter from Chancellor Kohl. We will not therefore repeat the most significant achievement of the Prime Minister's first letter - that of being read by the Soviet man in the street. And our appearing to try to have the last word in the exchange (as the Russians would see it) would risk impairing the chances of similar publication of a letter from the Prime Minister on some future occasion.

The Foreign Secretary also believes that if we are to continue to be treated as serious interlocutors in the East/West dialogue we need to be careful not to be seen to be operating too much on a purely polemical level, and above all not to risk devaluing in any way the currency of the Prime Minister's involvement (the impact of her appearance in Moscow at Andropov's funeral was considerable). A letter from the Prime Minister to the Soviet Union's first woman astronaut, while it would have publicity value domestically, would nevertheless carry risks on both these counts.

We would, however, be looking for an early opportunity to include a reference to Mrs Tereshkova's letter, and our rebuttal of the points she makes, in a Ministerial speech on arms control, and we are also setting about the preparation of the Prime Minister's exchange with the Soviet 'I Vote for Peace' campaign which will be published in 'Defence and Disarmament Issues', a pamphlet put out by the FCO which receives a wide distribution to the press and to individuals.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 1393 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from Goodall to the Prime Minister dated 9 April 1984	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	26/9/18 Mich
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

The National Archives

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Extract details: Minute from Armstrong to Coles dated 3 April 1984	
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

ATC ✓

Told PT also Yes. Mark. MW 27/3.

A.J.C. 27/3.

10 DOWNING STREET

You have discussed with Cabinet Office the attendance for the meeting on the Soviet Union scheduled for 17.00 hrs on 4/4.

Sir Antony Duff will be in New Zealand on that day and suggests that Patrick Wright should attend in his place.

Agree?

Mark 27/3.

SECRET

file. ECL

14

cc Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1984

SOVIET FEARS OF A PRE-EMPTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKE

You will see from a separate letter which I have written today to Roger Bone that the Prime Minister wishes to hold an early meeting to consider a JIC report on the above subject.

The Prime Minister recalled today that in, she thinks, her first year of office Sir Solly Zuckerman made available to her some American studies on the likely course of developments on the ground in the early stages of a nuclear war. Mrs Thatcher gave me the impression that these studies were on Ministry of Defence files. She would like to see these again - I shall be grateful if you could make them available.

BF

AJC

Richard Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

MRS RYDER

The Prime Minister wishes to hold an early meeting to discuss JIC(84)(N)45. For programme purposes the subject can be described as "Soviet Union".

Would you please invite the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Lord President. The Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary may be accompanied by an official.
Sir Robert Armstrong should also be invited and should be asked, provided he sees no objection, to bring Dr. Nicolson.

A. J. Coles.

26 March 1984

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 4 OF 7

SH/VC.

13

10 DOWNING STREET

c. 2 - MoD
3 - LPO
4 - Ho.
5 - Co.
6 - Sir P. Cradock.

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1984

Dear Roger,

Soviet Union: Concern about a Surprise NATO Attack

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend JIC(84)(N)45 about this subject.

She finds the report disturbing and wishes to hold an early discussion with the Ministers concerned with a view to a possible approach to the United States to establish what steps they intend to take to set at rest Soviet fears of a pre-emptive strike.

We shall be taking steps separately to arrange a meeting attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Lord President, the Home Secretary and suitable officials.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the Ministers concerned and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Tony Coles

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET

hle

Ro7

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 March, 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 2 March.

Mrs. Thatcher has asked me to explain that as a matter of principle she prefers not to supply third parties with the names and addresses of people who write to her, unless she is able to obtain their prior consent. In the case of the letters you refer to from Soviet citizens, it is I am afraid impractical to seek such consent. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister thought that you and your fellow members of the Linlithgow Churches Peace Concern would be interested to know that she received approximately 40,000 printed slips from Soviet citizens. She has asked me to let you have the enclosed translation of the reply which she sent via the Soviet Embassy.

(David Barclay)

W. Ross, Esq.

185

You and many of your Soviet fellow citizens have written to me about your wish for peace. We in Britain share completely your horror of war. That is why our first priority is to avoid the possibility of it ever happening.

I want to make one thing absolutely clear: NATO does not threaten you. It threatens no-one. It is a purely defensive alliance. Together with the other Heads of State and Governments of the NATO countries I declared in June 1982 that 'Our purpose is to prevent war, and while safeguarding democracy, to build the foundations of lasting peace. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack'. I repeat: none of our weapons - nuclear or conventional - will ever be used except in response to attack.

The circular which you sent me asked us to stop the deployment of long-range intermediate missiles in Europe. Let me ask you to put yourself in our place. A year ago we were faced with over a thousand warheads on Soviet medium range missiles. How many did we have in Western Europe? None. That was a profundly disturbing situation, and it explains why our deployments have begun. But I repeat that none of these missiles will ever be used if NATO is not attacked. Not only this; we have offered that all such weapons on both sides should be eliminated by agreement. Agreement cannot be reached without negotiations; and for the moment the Soviet side has walked away from the talks with the Americans. We want negotiations on nuclear disarmament to be resumed as soon as possible, and without preconditions. We are willing to put all our efforts into achieving the sort of reductions that will reduce East/West tensions and give both sides the security which they want, and to which they have a right.

So, I vote for peace too: let us build on this common wish for a safe and prosperous future.

GRS 800
UNCLASSIFIED
FM MOSCOW 130747Z MAR 84
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 330 OF 13 MAR

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MIPT : PEACE LETTERS

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSLATION OF TERESHKOVA'S REPLY AS CARRIED BY TASS IN ENGLISH :

''ESTEEMED MRS. THATCHER,

YOUR LETTER THAT THE 'KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA' EDITORIAL BOARD FAMILIARISED ME WITH IMPELS ME TO SPEAK ON SOME OF THE QUESTIONS TOUCHED UPON BY YOU.

'I ALSO VOTE FOR PEACE,' YOU WRITE. WELL, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO BELIEVE YOU. BUT, I SHALL HONESTLY SAY, MUCH OF WHAT IS NOW TAKING PLACE IN WESTERN TOP ECHELONS HAMPERS THAT.

'NATO DOES NOT THREATEN YOU,' YOU ASSURE, CITING THE DECLARATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN JUNE 1982. WE KNOW ABOUT THAT STATEMENT. WE ALSO KNOW THAT BEFORE ITS ADOPTION ONE OF THE CO-AUTHORS OF THIS STATEMENT -- U.S. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN (SPEAKING, BY THE WAY, IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT) PROCLAIMED A 'CRUSADE' AGAINST SOCIALISM. AND YOU DID NOT DISSOCIATE YOURSELF FROM SUCH AN INTENTION.

MEANWHILE THIS CRUSADE IS UNDERTAKEN NOT ONLY WITH ANTI-COMMUNIST GONFALONS. NEW AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES APPEARED IN YOUR COUNTRY, AND ALSO IN OTHER WEST EUROPEAN STATES. AND YOUR GENERALS DO NOT CONCEAL THAT THEY ARE TARGETED ON OUR COUNTRY. ONE CANNOT, REGRETTABLY, EVALUATE THIS, MUCH AS WE SHOULD LIKE TO, AS A WAY OF 'VOTING FOR PEACE'.

YOU WISHED TO CONVINCE US THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES WAS ONLY A COUNTER-MEASURE TO UPSETTING THE MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM IN EUROPE BY THE SOVIET UNION. YOU EVEN CITE FIGURES, WHICH ARE IMPRESSIVE, IN YOUR OPINION: A YEAR AGO THE USSR HAD 1000 WARHEADS IN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, WHILE THE WEST HAD NONE IN EUROPE. I AM NO NO EXPERT IN THIS FIELD, MRS THATCHER, BUT I KNOW THE BASIC THINGS.

BRITAIN AND FRANCE TOGETHER HAVE 162 MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, HAVEN'T THEY? THEY ALSO EXISTED A YEAR AGO AND THEY EXIST TODAY, TOO. IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE WHY YOU DECIDED TO CONSIDER THEM TO BE NONEXISTENT. YOU ALSO FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NATO MEDIUM-RANGE AIRCRAFT CARRYING ON THEIR BOARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGNED FOR USE CLSO AGAINST THE USSR.

I RECALL: IN THE YEAR OF 1979, THE SAME YEAR WHEN NATO TOOK THE DECISION ON 'ADDITIONAL ARMAMENT' THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, WHICH IS NOT VERY FAR FROM YOUR, MRS. THATCHER, RESIDENCE, NOTED THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE NATO BLOC AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION, INCLUDING NEW SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES.

/you.

YOU REPROACH THE SOVIET UNION WITH ALLEGEDLY 'WALKING OUT' OF THE TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS. FACTS, HOWEVER, TESTIFY TO THE CONTRARY. LITERALLY TO THE LAST DAY OF THE GENEVA TALKS THE USSR STROVE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT, PUT FORWARD VARIOUS VERSIONS, OFFERED ONE COMPROMISE AFTER ANOTHER --WISHING TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. OUR INITIATIVES WENT SO FAR THAT WE PROPOSED NOT TO HAVE IN EUROPE ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ALL -- EITHER TACTICAL, OR MEDIUM-RANGE ONES. ALL THESE ARE KNOWN FACTS. I BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE ALSO FAMILIAR WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. BUT IT IS PRECISELY YOUZ ALLY THAT WAS CARRYING OUT INTENSIVE PREPARATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE TALKS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES AND STARTED SENDING THEM TO EUROPE, WHICH MADE THE TALKS IMPOSSIBLE. SO IT IS NOT THE USSR WHICH +WALKED OUT+ OF THE TALKS, IT IS WASHINGTON, WHICH EXPLODED THEM FOR THE SAKE OF DEPLOYING ITS WEAPONS TARGETED ON THE USSR.

IF YOU, MRS THATCHER, WANT THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO BELIEVE IN NATO'S PEACEBLENESS, I WISH TO ASK: WHY SHOULDN'T THE NATO NUCLEAR COUNTRIES MAKE A COMMITMENT NEVER TO BE THE FIRST TO USE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY DONE ? WHY SHOULDN'T THEY AGREE TO CONCLUDING WITH THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AN AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE? WHY SHOULDN'T THEY DISPLAY TRUE WISDOM, BY GIVING UP A FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES AND WITHDRAWING THOSE, WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN PLACED?

IT DEPENDS ON THE ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS, WHETHER YOUR STATEMENTS ON THE STRIVING FOR PEACE AND OVERCOMING THE FEELING OF HORROR, WHICH WAR CAUSES, WILL SOUND CONVINCING. WE DO NOT DOUBT THE PEACEBLENESS OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE, LIKE THAT OF THE OTHER PEOPLES, AND IT IS THIS PEACEBLENESS THAT GIVES US HOPE FOR THE BETTER.

AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, I DEAL EVERY DAY WITH LETTERS OF MY COUNTRYWOMEN WHO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER THE DARKENING CLOUDS OF WAR THREAT IN THE HORIZON OF OUR PLANET.

SO MANY YEARS PASSED AFTER THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND TILL NOW I AM BEING APPROACHED BY WOMEN, WHO LOST THEIR RELATIVES, WITH THE CALL: TO DO THE UTMOST TO AVERT THE THREAT OF WAR. THE SAME THOUGHT KEYNOTES THE ADDRESSES OF SOVIET YOUTH TO YOU. THOSE LETTERS WERE WRITTEN BY COEVALS OF MY DAUGHTER, I TAKE CLOSE TO HEART AND UNDERSTAND THEIR CONCERNS AND HOPES. TO SEE THEIR HOPES PUT INTO LIFE, EVERYONE OF US SHOULD 'VOTE FOR PEACE' BUT NOT IN WORDS BUT BY A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF CURBING WAR.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

VALENTINA TERESHKOVA ."

SUTHERLAND
LIMITED
SOV.D.
CED
NEWS.D.
MR. JENKINS

No. 10.

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14/3

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FROM MOSCOW 130715Z MARCH

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 13 MARCH

Prime Minister

I have asked the F.C.O. for advice on whether we should continue this correspondence in Pravda.

A.J.C. 14/3

MT

MY TELNO 319 : PEACE LETTERS

1. UNDER THE HEADING '' THEY DO NOT VOTE FOR PEACE WITH CRUISE MISSILES '' KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ON 10 MARCH PUBLISHED PROMINENTLY ON ITS FOREIGN NEWS PAGE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER PRECEDED BY A SHORT INTRODUCTION RECALLING THE POSTCARD CAMPAIGN AND FOLLOWED BY AN OPEN REPLY TO MRS THATCHER. THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER WAS CARRIED IN FULL IN OUR TRANSLATION WITH ONLY A COUPLE OF VERY MINOR CHANGES OF PUNCTUATION AND CASE ENDINGS.

2. THE OPEN REPLY BY VALENTINA TERESHKOVA, COSMONAUT AND NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, QUESTIONED SEVERAL POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER , REFERRING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S '' CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM '', INF DEPLOYMENT AND OUR REFUSAL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INF OR TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET LEAD ON NOFUN. ALTHOUGH AT TIMES RESORTING TO IRONY TERESHKOVA'S LETTER IS NOT PARTICULARLY SHARP BY SOVIET STANDARDS, NOR IS IT AS ACCOMPLISHED A PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET CASE AS RUSSIAN PROPAGANDISTS CAN MANAGE. TEXT IN MIFT.

SUTHERLAND

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No. 10

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10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Barlay

I should prefer the reply to say that we do not, as a matter of principle, supply to third parties the details of people who write to the Prime Minister, except with their consent which we cannot obtain in this case. But he may be interested to see etc....

A.J.C. 13/3.

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr Coles

We could in principle supply the names and addresses of those few to whom the PM wrote personally. But I am not sure that would be wise.

Agree I just send a copy of the english text of the PM's reply, with a suitable covering letter saying that nearly all the slips were unsigned?

DMB
13/3

Prime Minister

9th March 1984

Conversations with the Russians

The following note comes to you from the Soviet Group of the Centre for Policy Studies (Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, Dr. George Urban, Dr. Dominic Lieven, Dr. Anthony Polonsky, Dr. Iain Elliot and Lord Thomas.)

We congratulate you on your firmness during the months of continued agitation against the bringing into place of the Cruise Missiles. The establishment of these missiles and the Pershings in Germany have begun to restore the Western position in Europe. It has shown the Soviet leaders that European public opinion can stand behind decisions taken by its elected leaders in consultation with their American allies.

This strengthening of Britain's international position follows the psychological recovery in the nation on which you have embarked at home.

Given the continuance of public concern over nuclear weapons, and the obvious catastrophe which would ensue were those weapons to be used, we recognise that there are many advantages in your being seen to talk to the new Russian leaders. There may also be future benefit in exposing as much as possible of the Politburo, most of whose members have very little experience of the outside world, to direct contacts with tough-minded and realistic Western leaders. We do not, however, expect the replacement of Andropov by Chernenko to lead to major changes in Soviet foreign policy. Nor do we want either Moscow or Eurpean opinion to believe that British policy towards the USSR is deviating from the calm realism of the last five years.

* In our opinion any meeting with the new Russian leaders would best be in the West or in a neutral country rather than in Moscow. Western visitors to the USSR have in the past been easily presented on Soviet media as supplicants. Meetings have gone wrong at the last minute and have placed visitors in an undignified position (e.g. Mr. Macmillan's visit in 1959).

Western leaders should still not feel inhibited (even if they talk to Russians) about continuing to criticise the Soviet ideology. Western Statesmen are only respected in the Soviet Union if they do not let their ideological guard down. Our Soviet interlocutors will not do so. They will continue to attack us, revile us and denounce capitalism and imperialism etc., whether they believe their own propaganda or not. It is worthwhile to remind Western public opinion of this fact, and of the bad influence of this one-sided propaganda as regards both Soviet public opinion and international peace and order.

Of course, agreement to have discussions with the Soviet Union should not necessitate criticism of the US nor of NATO. You will know from what has happened in the past that there is a danger that public opinion (on the continent as well as in Britain) will feel that your interest in such discussions means:-

(a) that you have come to the conclusion that you were wrong to criticise the Soviet Union in the past; and
(b) that we want to distance ourselves from the US in matters of security.

This presumably will be borne in mind.

Hugh Thomas
March 9 1984

MT

Prime Minister

You may like to know that Mr Malcolm Macintosh concurs with the general line of this paper & in particular the point asterisked *

Hugh

March 9.

SOVIET UNION: Relations: PK

Mark - For the file - to complete the saga! Kay 9/3

MR TAYLOR

Mr. Coles has given the "all clear" for the sacks of letters from Russia, at present in the basement, to be destroyed.

I should be grateful if you would put this in hand.

Kay Davies

9 March 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. No: FA (84)2
Date: 5.3.84

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

A Brief for the Debate on
Relations with the Soviet Union

on Friday 9th March 1984

Conservative Research Department,
32 Smith Square,
London SW1
Tel. 222 9000 x 2506

Enquiries on this brief to:
ROBIN TURNER

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Prime Minister visited Moscow on 13th and 14th February 1984 to attend the funeral of President Andropov and had talks with the new Soviet leader Mr Constantine Chernenko. At the beginning of the month she paid an official visit to Hungary. These talks were the latest steps in moves by the Government to lay the foundations for an improvement in relations between East and West. In a statement in Moscow on 14th February, the Prime Minister explained the background to the current contacts:

> 'It was plain to me and the Foreign Secretary last summer that the time had come for a serious review of relations with the East. The build-up of arms - the increasing number of SS20s and the West's need to respond with Cruise and Pershing had created disquiet. The various arms control negotiations were getting nowhere and contacts between East and West were so limited that the risk of misunderstanding was grave'.

Mrs Thatcher emphasised that the Government's policy does not in any way mean a weakening in its commitment to the defence of the Western way of life. She said that:

> 'I believe as strongly as ever in basic Western freedoms - and I make it plain to all in the East privately and publicly that I will defend them anywhere any time. But we must avoid the terrible dangers that could flow from misunderstandings'.

The Soviet Record. 1983 was a particularly bad year for East-West relations. The Russians did not negotiate seriously in the various disarmament negotiations and in November unjustifiably walked out of the Geneva talks on Intermediate Nuclear Forces. They maintained their oppression in Afghanistan, where over 100,000 Soviet troops still fight to prop up the puppet Karmal regime in the face of fierce popular resistance. They continued to ensure that all vestiges of freedom in Poland were crushed. The international situation became particularly strained in the days following 31st August, when the Soviet Air Force shot down a civilian South Korean airliner, which had strayed into Soviet airspace killing all 269 passengers and crew.

The Madrid Agreement. A modest step towards better East-West relations came on 9th September 1983, with the formal signing by 35 foreign ministers of a document concluding the Madrid review meeting on the implementation of the Helsinki Agreement. The participants undertook once more to implement its provisions, which have all too often been flouted by the Soviet Union and its allies, particularly in the field of human rights and contacts. As the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, commented in his speech at Madrid on 7th September:

> 'Liberty does not consist in mere general declarations of the rights of men. It consists in the translation of these declarations into definite actions'.

Examples of Soviet Violations of Human Rights. Mr Malcom Rifkind, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, gave details of Soviet violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement in a written answer on 30th January 1984:

> 'Human rights activists continue to be persecuted and the resentencing of political prisoners who are nearing the end of their term of imprisonment has become a common practice. A new law, which came into force in October 1983, permits inmates of penal institutions to be punished for periods of up to 5 years' additional confinement for "maliciously disobeying" the administrations of such institutions.
>
> 'Among those sentenced during the period under review were Sergei Grigoryants, sentenced (in October) to two years in prison, five in a strict regime camp and three in internal exile for his part in producing an official bulletin

detailing repression; the Lithuanian priest Father S Tamkevicus, sentenced (in December) to six years in the camps and four in internal exile and Mikhail Rivkin, a member of a group of official Marxists sentenced (in July) to seven years' imprisonment plus five years' internal exile. Academician Andrei Sakharov continued to be attacked in the press and his sanity has been called into question by Soviet officials. Anatoly Shcharansky has finally been allowed a visit from his mother although communication with him by mail remains uncertain. Yuri Orlov continues to be harshly treated in the labour camp at Perm. The refusnik Iosif Begun was finally brought to trial in October and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and five years' internal exile...The Soviet performance in the field of human contacts continues to deteriorate, Jewish, ethnic German and Armenian emigration continues to decline. the final figure for Jewish emigration in 1983 is likely to be less than half of the 1982 figure, which was 2,700. An anti-Zionist committee with local branches was created among other things to discourage would-be emigrants who have reported increasing administrative difficulties and harrassment including dismissal from work, difficulties for children at school and over university admission and premature call-up for military service...' (Hansard, Col. 90-91).

The Stockholm Conference. Various further meetings were arranged for the next few years at the end of the Madrid Conference. The most important of these opened at Stockholm on 16th January 1984. This is now considering military confidence and security building measures, such as observation and inspection of military activities, prior notification of manoeuvres and steps designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack. Although the Conference is concentrating on such specific and detailed questions, its opening provided an opportunity for fresh attempts to improve East-West relations on a wider front. This was particularly important in view of the recent suspension of both the Strategic Arms talks (START) and the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks (INF) at Geneva as well as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) at Vienna.

In his speech at the conference on 20th January 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe said that:

> 'We meet against a background of events which are probably less favourable, less positive than at any time since the CSCE process began. There has been no significant progress in negotiated arms control for the last five years. We must try to draw the right conclusions from this. One is that arms control negotiations alone cannot and should not have to bear the full weight of East-West relations. The dialogue between East and West must be widened and given more substance. We all exist in one world. We have to live together for good or ill and, to achieve that, we need to know and understand each other better. The British Government, for its part, will do all it can to that end'.

At the same time, President Reagan made clear that the United States' 'commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics' (Washington, 16th January 1984).

The Deployment of Cruise Missiles. The Soviet Union alleges that a prime reason for the poor state of East-West relations is the first deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe in accordance with NATO policy, including the first 16 Cruise missiles at Greenham Common. It cannot be repeated too often that this deployment is a response to the massive Soviet deployment of SS20 missiles. 378 of these missiles, each with three warheads, of which two-thirds are aimed at Western Europe, have been deployed since 1977. It is vital that the Soviet Union soon returns to the various arms control talks and negotiates seriously on multilateral

and balanced disarmament. As the Prime Minister said in Budapest on 3rd February:

> 'This is no time for empty chairs in Geneva. This is the time to talk. The time to negotiate. The time to succeed'.

Present Situation on Arms Control Negotiations. The Soviet Union walked out of the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in November and there appears to be no early prospect of a resumption. The Russians left the START negotiations on strategic weapons not long after, declining to set a date for their resumption and leaving it uncertain whether they intended to return to the negotiating table. They followed the same course of action with regard to the MBFR negotiations at Vienna. However, following discussions on the matter at the opening of the Stockhom Conference, it was agreed that the MBFR talks would resume on 16th March.

The only area where negotiations have been proceeding are the Geneva negotiations on Chemical Weapons. On 14th February Mr Richard Luce put forward new proposals in the vital area of verification of a ban on such weapons, whereby any country, which believed that the ban was being broken could challenge the suspect nation to allow a prompt inspection of the area, where the violation was alleged to be taking place. Although the Soviet delegate did not accept the British proposals as they stood, he was quoted as saying at a press conference that 'we are not far from the British' (Guardian, 22nd February 1984). He also announced that the Soviet Union was willing to accept in principle the permament presence of inspectors at special establishments for destoying chemical stocks. As the Foreign Secretary has said:

> 'This is an area where it should be possible to make progress and we hope that the Soviet delegation will adopt a forthcoming approach on all aspects of the negotiations along the lines that we have already discussed' (Hansard, 22nd February 1984, Col. 809).

Political Will and Mutual Respect. Mrs Thatcher outlined in her Budapest speech on 3rd February how disarmament negotiations should be handled in general:

> 'We shall need political will as well as mutual respect. Political will - because arms control agreements do not make themselves. Mutual respect - for it is useless to suppose that East or West will agree to dismantle weapons unless at every stage we are left with a balance which preserves our security'.

> 'We must both be ready to adopt practicable measures. We must both be ready to have them verified. We must each recognise the other's need for security. If all accept this approach, there could be fewer nuclear weapons, fewer conventional weapons, and for a start perhaps chemical weapons could be abolished altogether, as Britain has already done'.

The Prime Minister has emphasied that it would be unrealistic to imagine that there will be a rapid breakthrough in East-West negotiations. As she said in Moscow on 14th February:

> 'It will be at best a long slow task...But I am absolutely sure that all Western leaders are prepared to work for this goal. I am not looking for instant and ephemeral success but steady and sustainable progress'.

The Contrast with Labour. The contrast between the Prime Minister's and Mr Kinnock's recent activities in international affairs could hardly be more marked. While the Prime Minister was engaged in realistic moves to improve East-West relations, the Labour leader was visiting Washington explaining to baffled listeners his support

for total, one-sided nuclear disarmament for Britain and the unconditional removal of all American nuclear bases. Such policies would be profoundly destabilising and would be liable gravely to disturb East-West relations. It should be recalled that last year, when asked whether he considered the Soviet Union a greater threat to world peace than the United States or Britain, Mr Kinnock replied: 'There is an almost miserable equality of threat' (The Times, 29th August 1983).

Conservative Research Dept
32 Smith Square LONDON SW1

RT/CR
5.3.84

ПОСОЛЬСТВО
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК
13, Kensington Palace Gardens,
London, W8

(1) cf. Mr. Coles, No 10

(2) Sov. dept.
cc PS
Prot. dept.

The Rt.Hon.Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP
The Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London

A.to C 7/3
p.a.

March, 1984

Dear Sir Geoffrey,

I have instruction to ask you to use Your good offices to convey to the Prime-Minister The Rt.Hon. Mrs.Thatcher the gratitude of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the condolences, expressed in connection with the passing away of Y.V.Andropov.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

V. Popov

V.Popov,
Ambassador of the USSR

FILE

50

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 March, 1984

I write to acknowledge your letter of 2 March, with which you forwarded, for the attention of the Prime Minister, the speech made on that day by Mr. K. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Council.

ATC

His Excellency Monsieur Victor I. Popov

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 March 1984

Dear John.

Mr Chernenko's Speech on 2 March

In your letter of 2 March, you asked for advice on what reply should be sent to the Soviet Ambassador, who had sent a copy of Mr Chernenko's speech to the Prime Minister. You also asked for a note on the speech.

The Soviet Ambassador makes a practice of giving any statements by the Soviet General Secretary a wide circulation to Ministers and senior officials in London. These do not normally call for a written response. Given the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Chernenko on 14 February, we would advise a short acknowledgement on this occasion.

I enclose a line to take and background note on Mr Chernenko's speech for the Prime Minister's use at Question Time on 6 March.

I am copying this letter and the note for use at Question Time to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Sir Robert Armstrong's office).

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CF

Russian 'Peace' Letters

Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

Calwateg,
Friars Brae,
Linlithgow.
2nd March 1984.

R8

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

I read in today's paper that you recently received a large number of letters from Soviet citizens on the subject of Peace and that you replied personally to many of them

I wonder if you would supply me with the names and addresses of all those who wrote to you as members of the Linlithgow Churches Peace Concern would like to correspond with such people.

I do hope that you will be able to agree to this request.

Yours sincerely,

William Ross.

Note: "Peace" letters.

No. 10 didn't retain copy of Russian text.

Soviet (6)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 February 1984

RBC have seen Mrs K's report - would we pass on Denis this letter?

(1)

Keston College: Mrs Alyona Kojevnikov

With your letter of 16 January you enclosed a copy of a report on her recent trip to the Soviet Union by Mrs Alyona Kojevnikov, a staff member of Keston College. We have circulated this widely, including to our Embassy in Moscow and thought you might be interested to have a short summary of the comments of those who have read it.

SEE (7)

This is undoubtedly a lively, interesting and perceptive account by someone who has real insights into the Soviet mind. It is a partial view of the present situation there, and Mrs Kojevnikov does not pretend otherwise. She visited only Moscow and Leningrad and was in close contact only with the dissident and semi-dissident community.

Inevitably, for a report based largely on the testimony of this kind there are a number of generalisations which should be treated with caution. On the subject of Soviet security preoccupations, for instance, it is worth bearing in mind that Mrs Kojevnikov visited the Soviet Union during the follow-up publicity campaign to Andropov's statement of 24 November 1983 on INF, when the Soviet media were focusing on the theme of the Western nuclear threat even more than usual. Other Western observers in Moscow have not seen evidence to suggest that "the mass of the population ... is almost paralysed with fear" (pp 3 and 4 of the report).

Nor do the Embassy's observations bear out the view that there has been an increase in the "military presence" in Moscow. They have also commented that although there may have been some tightening up to reduce the number of exemptions from military service (linked perhaps to the unfavourable demographic curve) there has been no significant increase in the number of recruits drafted.

The description of developments affecting religious dissidents is one of the most interesting parts of the report. Clearly this is an area in which Mrs Kojevnikov's

/access

access to the dissident world has given her a lot of detail, from which she has been able to create a convincing account of continuing repression and harassment.

Mrs Kojevnikov paints a fairly bleak picture of material shortages. However, as regards Moscow itself, our Embassy have commented that it does not tally with their own observations. The general view of residents is that the food supply to the capital has much improved over the last two years, with fairly plentiful (by Soviet standards)supplies of fruit, vegetables, meat and milk on sale even in the outlying districts. Outside the major cities, the situation is a good deal worse; in some towns visited by Embassy officials there has been little food for sale and in places coupon systems are said to be operating. However, availability in the shops is not the only yardstick of supply: food is sometimes distributed at places of work, a factor which outsiders cannot easily assess.

The Embassy would not agree that the overall picture is one of deteriorating supply. Russians say there are more types of goods on sale, even if they are expensive or hard to get hold of. The quality of some essential articles (e.g. shoes and clothing) remains as poor as ever - and this, rather than supply, is the main reason for the pilfering and black-marketeering in higher quality and foreign goods.

This said, Mrs Kojevnikov offers many real insights into the Soviet situation: the constant harassments of her and her friends (and the sheer numbers involved in these internal security operations); the great bravery of those who are willing to stand up and oppose the system's petty regulations; the examples of double standards and often blatant corruption, like the Armenian traders operating right under the eyes of the KGB (p 2 of the report). It adds up to a picture of a far from monochrome society and one of Byzantine complexity (and morals). It is not a complete picture, but that does not detract from the value of Mrs Kojevnikov's account. She enjoyed access to the dissident community that would not have been possible to an Embassy official or possibly even a foreign journalist. And in bearing witness to the life and state of mind of that community it is a useful contribution to our understanding of the Soviet Union.

Yours ever

Roger

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Bpl

file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1984

"Peace" letters from Soviet citizens

Thank you for your letter of 30 January.

I now enclose some thirty letters signed by the Prime Minister and addressed to named Soviet recipients and should be grateful if you would arrange for these to be delivered through HM Embassy in Moscow.

I also enclose a letter which the Prime Minister has signed (but which is not addressed to any specific person) and should be grateful if, as previously agreed, you would arrange for it to be handed over to a senior member of the Soviet Embassy.

We have considered here whether it is practicable to sort through the various sacks of letters which were received in order to distinguish between those where no senders' addresses were given and those where addresses were provided. But we doubt whether this is worth the considerable effort which would be necessary.
I therefore hope that you could agree to give the Soviet Embassy an oral explanation to the background of the Prime Minister's letter.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc Argentina: Relats
Please speak accordingly to
Lord Thomas.
A.J.C. 21/2
p.a.

PRIME MINISTER

Hugh Thomas rang today with two points.

He has been invited to take part in a round table discussion in Moscow in May. Our side of things is being organised by Chatham House. He wanted to know whether I saw any objection. I said that I thought it would be a good idea to take part, but that I would check with you. Do you have any objection? Good idea - MT

His second point was that the press had reported that he had been invited to visit Buenos Aires. The truth was that some time ago he had been asked to go there next November to deliver a lecture. He had written back to the effect that he might go but he had not made up his mind. There was no more to it than that. I said that at the present time, when we were attempting to take steps towards the improvement of relations, it might be muddling for him to go. The Argentines would probably misinterpret it.

A.J.C. 20/2

MT

20 February 1984

(3).

PRIME MINISTER

"Peace" letters from Soviet citizens

You will recall that you agreed to sign 30 replies to letters which named Soviet citizens had written to you. These will be distributed by the Embassy in Moscow using the normal envelopes employed in the Soviet Union. Your replies are attached. I suggest that you simply put "Margaret Thatcher" at the bottom of each. This will avoid the need to write all the Russian names.

So that you know what you are saying I attach at Flag A the English version.

Secondly, you agreed that the FCO should summon a Soviet Embassy official and hand over a further reply to the very large number of other letters (mostly unsigned) which we received. That reply, which is identical with the others, is at Flag B.

A. J. C.

Good letter MT

17 February 1984

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

You and many of your Soviet fellow citizens have written to me about your wish for peace. We in Britain share completely your horror of war. That is why our first priority is to avoid the possibility of it ever happening.

I want to make one thing absolutely clear: NATO does not threaten you. It threatens no-one. It is a purely defensive alliance. Together with the other Heads of State and Governments of the NATO countries I declared in June 1982 that 'Our purpose is to prevent war, and while safeguarding democracy, to build the foundations of lasting peace. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack.' I repeat: none of our weapons - nuclear or conventional - will ever be used except in response to attack.

The circular which you sent me asked us to stop the deployment of long-range intermediate missiles in Europe. Let me ask you to put yourself in our place. A year ago we were faced with over a thousand warheads on Soviet medium range missiles. How many did we have in Western Europe? None. That was a profoundly disturbing situation, and it explains why our deployments have begun. But I repeat that none of these missiles will ever be used if NATO is not attacked. Not only this; we have offered that all such weapons on both sides should be eliminated by agreement. Agreement cannot be reached without negotiations; and for the

/moment

A.W.O. Ltd. 11.82. 56-3683. 200m.

moment the Soviet side has walked away from the talks with the Americans. We want negotiations on nuclear disarmament to be resumed as soon as possible, and without preconditions. We are willing to put all our efforts into achieving the sort of reductions that will reduce East/West tensions and give both sides the security which they want, and to which they have a right.

So, I vote for peace too: let us build on this common wish for a safe and prosperous future.

UK | Soviet Relations
AJE

Mr. Coles

PEACE LETTERS FROM SOVIET CITIZENS.

You asked ~~what~~ which of the letters would be handed over to the Soviet Embassy.

As I understand it the FCO ~~would~~ will hand over an example of the reply sent to the 30 citizens. Assuming it is the Russian version which is required I attach a copy of the text of the letter ~~but~~ with the recipients name blanked out.

Presumably the FCO's covering letter will explain to the Soviet Diplomat the background to this affair.

Mark
17/2

Coles.

PEACE LETTERS FROM SOVIET CITIZENS.

The FCO have now provided final draft replies, in Russian, for the PM to send in reply to 30 soviet citizens.

The names of the receipients are at the foot of each letter but it is not clear to me how the letters should be addressed. The choice seems to be between 'Dear Sir or Madam' or leaving blank. The latter might be the best course, if the PM agrees, given the way in which the page has been laid out.

All is in hand at the Soviet Dept in the FCO for the letters to be despatched in local style envelopes, addressed by hand, for our Embassy staff in Moscow to post.

We will need to send the rest of the letters / petitions to the FCO to be handed over to a senior member of the Soviet Embassy as outlined in the last paragraph of Mr. Bone's letter of 30 January.

Will you be writing a covering letter?

Mark.
While in the letter to be handed over to the Soviet Embassy?

Mark
16/2.

Mark 10.10. CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Mr Bowyer (Private Office) – Downing St. West 51

"I VOTE FOR PEACE" LETTERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. As requested, I have translated into Russian and typed on No 10 paper in Russian the Prime Minister's intended reply to 30 of the thousands of Soviet citizens who had sent letters to her under a campaign sponsored by Komsomolskaya Pravda. I now enclose the thirty letters, each of which bears the name (but, as instructed, not the full address) of the individual addressee in the bottom left-hand corner. I understand that these letters are now to be signed by the Prime Minister and returned to Soviet Department for forwarding to our Moscow Embassy, where they will be put into Soviet envelopes, hand addressed, and posted locally.

2. I have also prepared in Russian a typed list of the thirty addressees, bearing the full address also. I am sending

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CODE 18-77

this direct to Soviet Department, who will forward it to our Embassy together with the 30 letters signed by the Prime Minister, when received.

3. I ~~enclose~~ ~~also~~ am sending you separately for return to No 10, the total of 50 or so letters from which I selected the final thirty addressees who will be sent the PM's reply.

K.A. Bishop.
Soviet Section,
R.D.
15/2/84

10 DOWNING STREET

~~From the Private Secretary~~

Harvey Bowyer. (FCO)

We spoke. I enclose the letters. I hope you can find 30 names and addresses which can be used. If not we can easily send you another batch – we've got 34,000 to work our way through!

I have spoken to Mr. Coles who has said:

a) The PM will happily sign 30 photocopies provided the typing is 'reasonable'. (Send it to us if you have difficulty deciding.)

and b) all of the ~~remain~~ remainder of the letters will be passed over

to a further number of the Soviet Embassy, with a reply from the PM. We will not be sorting them into those with and those without addresses.

Hopefully this solves any problems. If not we'd have to think again.

You'd need to let us know when you want the sacks of letters for onward transmission to the Soviet Embassy.

Thanks.

Mark Lyall Grant.
1/4/84

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JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 February 1984

'PEACE' LETTERS FROM SOVIET CITIZENS

Thank you for your letter of 30 January.

The Prime Minister agrees both that she should reply to a small number of the letters whose senders supplied addresses and that a senior member of the Soviet Embassy should be summoned to receive a reply to a number of letters with which no senders' addresses were given.

We should prefer the FCO to summon the relevant Soviet diplomat.

Could you now arrange to have the draft reply enclosed with your letter translated and typed out in Russian for signature by the Prime Minister.

AC

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(2)

Soviet Union
Recents P17

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 1/2

(Duty Clerk – spare copy to be taken to Hungary please). must 1/2/84.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 February 1984

Dear John,

!

MT

60th Anniversary of Anglo/Soviet Diplomatic Relations:

Exchange of Messages

We sent you under cover of Peter Ricketts' letter of 10 January the text of Sir Geoffrey Howe's message to Mr Gromyko on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary.

We have now received an advance copy of the return message from the Russians. In accordance with the recent Soviet practice it is from the Foreign Ministry collectively rather than from Mr Gromyko. But it is clearly a carefully considered message, reasonable and constructive in tone, and much in tune with recent calls by the Prime Minister for a realistic and sensible dialogue with the Soviet Union.

It is intended that both messages will be made public in London and Moscow on 2 February, the day of the anniversary.

Yours ever

Robert Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Research Department translation

THE RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE MP
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
LONDON

Sixty years ago, on February 2, 1924, diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The history of the Soviet-British relations since then has witnessed many examples of fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of our two states, which has brought undoubted benefit also to the cause of European and universal peace. A significant, indeed, one might say, historic landmark in this cooperation was our joint struggle against the fascist aggressors during World War II.

Today, in circumstances of increased international tension, especially on the European continent, all states are required to take a realistic approach and concrete measures leading to the elimination of the threat of war and to the improvement of the international situation. The positive development of relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain can be a significant contribution to the solution of these problems. Realism and goodwill, consideration of each other's legitimate interests, and the entire positive experience accumulated in Soviet-British relations, can serve as a sound basis for this.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

1st February 1984

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

Do you want action to be taken as suggested below?

A. J. C. 1/2.

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Agree that (a) we should do both (a) and (b) at X below? Yes MT

(b) we should see the reply from you enclosed with this letter? Yes MT

30 January 1984

Dear John,

A.D.C. 30/1.

'Peace' Letters from Soviet Citizens

Thank you for your letter of 11 January in which you recorded the Prime Minister's request that we should consider how best to respond to the thousands of letters the Prime Minister has received from Soviet citizens enclosing the printed 'I vote for peace' circular which was published in the Soviet press.

It seems to us that the most effective way to respond would be:

(a) to select a small number of the letters whose senders supplied addresses and to arrange to send replies in Russian from the Prime Minister through our Embassy in Moscow;

X

(b) for you or a suitable FCO official to call in an appropriately senior member of the Soviet Embassy to hand over a reply from the Prime Minister to a sackful of the letters with which no senders' addresses were given.

For (a) to be effective, the scale of the operation would have to be small. Letters from this country to the Soviet Union would almost certainly be intercepted by the Soviet authorities. The only way of ensuring that there was a reasonable chance of a reply reaching its destination would be to send replies from our Embassy in Moscow. The replies would be put in the standard Soviet printed envelope, and each envelope would be addressed in hand by a Russian-speaking British member of our Embassy staff, who would then personally post the letters, a few at a time, in post boxes around Moscow. The resources of our Embassy are not great enough to do this on a large scale, and in any case a larger operation would be detected by the Soviet authorities who could ensure that the correspondence was intercepted in spite of our efforts. The course proposed, though a token response, is the only workable scheme which would ensure that at least a small number of replies did actually reach Soviet citizens.

/If the

If the Prime Minister is content with this, we would propose that the attached draft reply be submitted to her for approval. We will then arrange to have it translated and typed out in Russian for her signature, and for 20 or 30 of the incoming letters, if possible from different parts of the Soviet Union, to be selected for reply.

As to the summoning of a member of the Soviet Embassy, we would be guided by the Prime Minister as to whether she would prefer you or an FCO official to do this. The line which we might take would be to say that the Prime Minister had received a large number of letters from Soviet citizens who had not given any address to which a reply might be sent, and that we were therefore handing over the Prime Minister's reply with the request that it be made known to the Soviet authorities in case any of these citizens enquire what response may have been given, in which case we would ask that the Prime Minister's reply be made known. We might add that we would arrange for suitable publicity to be given here (we have in mind the BBC external service in Russian in particular), and that we hoped that since the original text which was used by the petitioners had been published in Komsomolskaya Pravda (the official youth paper), that the Prime Minister's reply also might be published in the Soviet Union.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

MJ

20 January 1984

Sixtieth Anniversary of the Establishment of Anglo-Soviet Diplomatic Relations

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 19 January.

AJC

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSG

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FM STOCKHOLM 191900Z JAN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER UKDEL 024 OF 19 JAN 84
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING ALL NATO AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO ON 19 JAN

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MET GROMYKO FOR ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY. AFTER AN INITIAL ATTACK ON THE US, GROMYKO ADOPTED A REASONABLE AND BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH (ALTHOUGH HE REACTED PREDICTABLY WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS). IT WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS BEFORE THE UNGA: DETAILS TO BE SETTLED SEPARATELY.

2. GROMYKO PRESSED THE MAIN POINTS IN HIS CDE SPEECH (UKDEL TELNO 12) (NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NO FIRST USE OF FORCE) AS IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOWERING TENSION AND INCREASING CONFIDENCE. HE DREW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SUSPENDED ARMS CONTROL TALKS. MBFR WAS ONLY IN RECESS. HE THOUGHT A DATE FOR ITS RESUMPTION MIGHT BE IN ABOUT 2 MONTHS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE MIDDLE EAST AND RECEIVED A NOT TOTALLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE. (REPORTED SEPERATELY NOT TO ALL IN MIFT)

DETAIL

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED THE DISCUSSION. OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST WAS IN A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD WITH GREATER PROSPERITY FOR OUR PEOPLE. WE WISHED, ON A LONG TERM BASIS, TO EXPLORE WITH THE SOVIET UNION A VARIETY OF WAYS OF ACHIEVING THIS. AS FAR AS TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS WERE CONCERNED IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO GO BACK OVER THE CAUSES OF THE DISPUTES THAT DIVIDED US. WE WISHED TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS. KOSTANDOV'S VISIT HAD BEEN USEFUL. MR CHANNON WOULD BE VISITING MOSCOW IN MAY. WE ALSO VALUED OUR EXCHANGES AT VARIOUS LEVELS WITH THE MFA. MR RIFKIND'S TALKS LAST YEAR WITH KORNIENKO HAD BEEN VALUABLE. WE HOPED KORNIENKO COULD COME TO LONDON SOON. (GROMYKO CONFIRMED THAT

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/ AN

AN OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE FOUND. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT MEETINGS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD PROCEED AS NORMAL.) THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AT TODAYS MEETING, TIME DID NOT ALLOW, ALL ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. AN OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE TAKEN, NOT JUST IN THE MARGINS OF MEETINGS AT MADRID OR NEW YORK FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION.

5. GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION VALUED ITS TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UK. THEY SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED. IN GENERAL IT WOULD BE GOOD IF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE QUOTE SERIOUSIFIED UNQUOTE (IE PUT ON A MORE SERIOUS FOOTING). DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BRITISH AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE USEFUL. IN LATER DISCUSSION HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE MEETING BEFORE THEIR USUAL MEETING AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER. DETAILS COULD BE ARRANGED TO SUIT BOTH SIDES. DESPITE THE WRECKING OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS BY CRUDE US ACTIONS, THERE WAS MUCH TO DISCUSS AND DIALOGUE MUST BE MAINTAINED.

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

6. GROMYKO MADE A STRONG CONDEMNATION OF US NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR AND THE RECENT DEPLOYMENT OF NEW US MISSILES. THIS WAS A QUOTE SHARPLY NEGATIVE FACT UNQUOTE WHICH COULD NOT BE IGNORED IT WAS BOUND TO AFFECT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE US, UK AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE UK SHOULD DISABUSE ITS US ALLIES FROM THE VIEW THAT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY RESUME AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO BE AN ACCOMPLICE TO SUCH A GAME. WASHINGTON HAD QUOTE EXPLODED UNQUOTE THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WORLD KNEW IT.

ARMS CONTROL

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERLINED THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL EXPRESSED IN HER SPEECH AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN RAISING CONFIDENCE WAS WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS. THE UK REGRETTED THE SOVIET POSITION. THE WEST HAD CONTINUED NEGOTIATING WHILE SOVIET MISSILES WERE BEING DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD ALSO BE RESUMED. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT BROKEN OFF BUT IN RECESS. IT REMAINED ONLY TO AGREE A RESUMPTION DATE, WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD BE IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS' TIME. OF COURSE, IF NEGOTIATING PARTNERS ENGAGED IN OBSTRUCTION, OR NEGOTIATION FOR ITS OWN SAKE, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT HAVE TO THINK AGAIN.

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/ CDE

CDE

8. GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE COULD BE TWO APPROACHES TO THE CDE. IT COULD DEAL EITHER WITH MINOR ISSUES (TRANSLATED AS QUOTE TRIVIAL UNQUOTE) SUCH AS MILITARY EXERCISES, MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, PARAMETERS, AND THE SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS: OR MAJOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS A DECLARATION ON NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NOFUN), AND AGREEMENT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE BETWEEN STATES (NOFUF). THESE WOULD CREATE A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR LATER DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS. HE FAVOURED THE LATTER APPROACH.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST. WE AGREED ON THE NEED TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE. BUT THE PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE NOFUF PROPOSAL WAS ALREADY SUBSCRIBED TO BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE UN. CONFIDENCE WAS LIKE A TREE. IT GREW FROM A RELATIVELY HUMBLE BEGINNING. THE CDE SHOULD DEVELOP IN THE SAME WAY ON THE BASIS OF THE MANDATE AGREED AT MADRID.

HUMAN RIGHTS

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FULFILMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS WAS ONE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT FACTORS AFFECTING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE. THEY WOULD BE GIVEN A GREAT BOOST IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RESPOND FAVOURABLY, PARTICULARLY IN CASES WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL'S HEALTH WAS IN JEOPARDY. MRS BONNER AND SHCHARANSKY WERE ONLY TWO EXAMPLES AMONG MANY. GROMYKO COMMENTED THAT THE MENTION OF THIS SUBJECT HAD LOWERED THE LEVEL OF THE MEETING. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING IT.

COMMENT

11. GROMYKO'S TONE AND APPROACH WAS A LONG WAY FROM HIS BLUSTERING BEHAVIOUR AT MADRID. HE WAS CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN THE SOVIET LINE ON THE MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED, BUT NOT IN A WAY WHICH PRECLUDED FURTHER DISCUSSION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME MOVEMENT IN THE FUTURE. ON BILATERAL CONTACTS THE IMPRESSION WAS OF WANTING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE TO RESUME BUT CONCERN TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF BEING THE DEMANDEUR.

HOWE

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ACDD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
INFO D

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

To be aware.

A. J. C. 19/1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 January 1984

Dear John,

Sixtieth Anniversary of the Establishment of Anglo-Soviet Diplomatic Relations

You may like a note of the way in which we propose to mark the above anniversary.

The anniversary falls on 2 February. The Foreign Secretary has decided that it would be appropriate to exchange messages with Mr Gromyko (our text enclosed) and for Sir I Sutherland to hold a reception in Moscow. The Soviet Ambassador will give a similar reception in London, at which our intention is that Ministerial attendance should be at a level comparable to Soviet Ministerial attendance in Moscow. (Present indications are that Mr Gromyko will not attend our reception in Moscow, but be represented by a Deputy Foreign Minister, but there may be representation from the Council of Ministers.)

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary in 1974, the then Prime Minister sent a message and attended the Soviet Ambassador's reception. Sir Geoffrey does not, however, think this would be appropriate for the sixtieth anniversary.

Yours ever,

Peter Rickets

(P F Rickets)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mr Gromyko

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I send you my personal greetings and those of Her Majesty's Government on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I take this opportunity both to acknowledge the lasting significance of this relationship and to express to you the genuine desire of Her Majesty's Government to develop relations between our countries in the future with the aim of increasing our mutual understanding of each others concerns and interests. On this basis we can hope to build a relationship - politically, economically and in other areas - which will contribute to a safer and more prosperous world, to the common benefit of the British and Soviet peoples and people everywhere.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

THE RT. HON. DAVID STEEL, M.P.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

17th January 1984.

Dear Edward,

I am visiting the Soviet Union next week, and I write to let you know that I propose to sound out the Russians on the possibility of starting up a European contribution to the East / West dialogue at Parliamentary level.

They may well turn down the idea, but I hope you will agree that an exchange of views on detente, arms control and disarmament between, say, thirty parliamentarians from each side might be interesting and helpful at this time. The Western side might be drawn from the seven W.E.U. countries, and the Easterners from the six satellites, together with the European region of the Soviet Union.

The All-Party Council for Arms Control, of which Peter Blaker, Brynmor John and Denzil Davies are members, have let me know that they would be willing to take on the administration.

Obviously if the proposal is to bear fruit it must have the goodwill of all the British Parties, and not be particularly associated with any one of them.

Until we know the Russians' reaction there is not much to be done, but I thought I should let you know what is in my mind. I am writing in similar terms to Neil Kinnock.

Yours,

David

The Rt. Hon Edward du Cann , M.P.,
House of Commons.

File

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 January 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for sending to her recently the report on internal conditions in the Soviet Union. She read it with great interest. We have, as you suggested, also sent a copy to Sir Geoffrey Howe.

A. J. COLES

The Reverend Michael Bourdeaux

DSS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 January, 1984

Dear Roger,

Keston College

As you will see from a separate letter which I have today written to Brian Fall, enclosing a record of yesterday's conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr. Shultz, reference was made during that conversation to a recent document which the Prime Minister had received from Keston College.

I now enclose a copy of that document. It was accompanied by a manuscript note from the Reverend Michael Bordeaux who described it as the best paper he had read on the Soviet Union for a long time. He asked that a copy should be passed to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

The author of the document, Mrs. Kojevnikov, is, I understand, a staff member of Keston College.

I shall be sending a copy of the document separately to the US Embassy.

Yours ever

Colin Lee

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CUS 8H

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 January, 1984

You will recall that during the conversation yesterday between the Prime Minister and Mr. Shultz Mrs. Thatcher referred to a document which she had recently received from the Reverend Michael Bordeaux of Keston College. The Prime Minister promised to make a copy available to Mr. Shultz.

I now enclose this document. I understand that its author, Mrs. Kojevnikov, is a staff member at Keston College.

Incidentally, I have not specifically sought Michael Bordeaux's authority to copy it to you. I am sure he would not mind, but I should be grateful if the fact that I have done so was not revealed to him.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. Charles H. Price II

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

From Michael Bourdeaux.

I have highlighted some points.

A.J.C. 13/1.

It is fascinating — and very depressing.

REPORT ON TRIP TO MOSCOW & LENINGRAD November 26 - December 10, 1983

by Alyona Kojevnikov

See ref. pp. 5-5

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Our group of 27 people arrived in Moscow at 10.30 pm. I was rather disconcerted to be confronted, at Gatwick airport, by a man who had been in the group on my previous visit to the USSR (June 1982) and who had been far too interested in my doings at that time. He recognized me immediately, told me that he had been to the USSR twice since June 1982 and started asking leading questions about my plans for this visit. This was a complication I had not envisaged and his subsequent behaviour makes me certain that he is one of the regular "stooges" who do the Britain-USSR run and keep an eye on what the other people in his group are doing. His name is Gerard Benson. My guess is that he is in his early 50's. He claims that he is unemployed, but does not explain how he manages to pay for all these junkets to the Soviet Union which, he says, he has visited 27 times in the past 10 years. He does not look as if he has private means and makes a point of telling people about the bedsit in which he lives. When we arrived at Sheremetyevo airport, there was nobody from "Intourist" to meet our group through some mix-up, and he immediately (and confidently) set out to confer with airport officials although his spoken Russian is absolutely appalling.

The customs check was very thorough: everyone's luggage was searched with painstakin dedication. I had hoped to ease my own lot a little by placing a personal letter to the ambassador of one of the Western embassies at the very top of my suitcase. Unfortunately, the first item of luggage the customs man looked at was my large shoulder bag in which I had a small short-wave radio and a tape recorder to be passed on to certain people. He entered both items on my customs declaration and added, with ill-concealed malice, that I must take great care to ensure that I "lose" neither "for we shall be checking to ensure that you still have them with you when you leave". They did, too. Luckily, he had not thought to add the make of both items, and I managed to leave the radio in exchange for an ancient little Western short-wave transistor which had long outlived its usefulness. The tape reco I had to bring back, unfortunately. I taped a totally fictitious account of my stay onto the cassette that was in it, and Leningrad customs must have listened to i because when the recorder was returned to me, the tape was at the end of speech, whereas I had wound it back to the beginning when I was packing to leave.

When the Moscow customs official opened my case, he immediately pounced on the letter lying on top of my clothes and demanded to know what it was. As I was hoping that he would read it, and had deliberately left the envelope unsealed, I pointed out encouragingly that it was a personal letter for the gentleman named on t envelope. The customs officer hesitated (probably because I looked unperturbed), half-withdrew the letter, looked at me quickly to see my reaction, and then replaced in the envelope without reading it. Admittedly, after this his search of the case rather less thorough than the search of my shoulder bag and made me wish I had put the radio and tape recorder in the case after all.

Finally (quickly due to Mr Benson's questions) we were told that [illegible]

to the "Kosmos" hotel. A woman who spoke excellent English came bustling up to our group and asked:"Where is your leader?" "Mrs Thatcher wasn't able to come", I ipped, and got a cold, uncomprehending stare for my pains. However, at that moment she spotted Benson, and hurried over to him. A minute later he joined us and said that we should board the bus just outside.

The foyer of the "Kosmos" hotel, despite the relatively late hour, was thronged wit people. On closer examination, most of these appeared to be Georgians and Armenians doing "business" with the tourists, although the hotel is supposed to be (in practice if not in theory) off-limits for the local population. Certainly the outward appearance of security is much more stringent than when I stayed in this sa hotel in June 1982. There are now at least 4 uniformed doormen on duty at all time (last year it was 2) and 2 uniformed militiamen outside the entrance (last year it was 1). Probably the number of plain clothes officials has also increased. Despit this, the number of "locals" doing business with foreigners is quite staggering: th was nothing like this 18 months ago. When I went downstairs to the ground floor ba with 3 of the other women in our group after unpacking, we were immediately approached by a group of 5 young Armenians who turned out to have a smattering of English and German. Their interest was obviously mercantile rather than amorous, although they went through what they obviously felt was an obligatory ritual of paying us extravagant compliments. At the same time, one could almost hear the little wheels turning in their heads as they estimated the street-value of every item of clothing on us. When they proved impervious to snubs, I told them in Russian to clear off. However, this had the reverse effect to the one intended. Obviously delighted to have established a common language, the whole group closed in around us (before that, two had done the talking while the others hung back) and pressed us to accompany them to a restaurant "where they have real Armenian food". They just wanted to "be friends", they added earnestly, and put on a good s of injured innocence when we displayed a degree of scepticism. Seeing that they could not be easily shaken off, I pointed out that they really ought not be talking to us, as the place was probably bristling with plain clothes KGB. After laughing with genuine amusement, they assured us that this was the least of their worries. "They won't touch us", they said with assurance, holding up their hands and rubbing thumb against forefinger in the universally known gesture showing that money had changed hands. I then told them that none of us had yet handed in our passports for the obligatory registration, and they immediately offered to do so for us as they "knew" the clerk on duty (the money sign again). We remained adamant, and only succeeded in getting rid of them by writing down a telephone number and saying that we would get in touch with them later if we had the chance. "Don't worry about the KGB", they assured us as they moved off in search of further business, "we can shake off any tails they might put onto you". As it happens, we saw them again, but the two "courtesy" telephones in the foyer, from which hotel gu can phone any number in Moscow without paying, were virtually inaccessible all the

all Georgians and Armenians engaged in black marketeering: I once sat for an hour close to these phones under the guise of waiting to meet someone and listened in to their conversatuons, which were always commendably brief and to the point and ran something like this:

"Parik? Such-and-such speaking. I've got the goods. Have you got the money? Good. I'll meet you in 15 minutes at....."

The easy access they all seemed to enjoy to the hotel did not extend to the bona fide residents: whereas 18 months ago some of the doormen would let you through without your having to produce the card stating your room number, this time I had to produce my card every time and, judging by meal-time conversations, so did everyone else. Two people in the group who tried to enter the "Intourist" hotel with their "Kosmos" cards were refused entry on the basis that they were not staying at that hotel (and presumably had no business to be there). Unfortunately, neither of them challenged the doorman about this patent absurdity.

The "Beriozka" shop at the "Kosmos" was full of kitsch at even more rapacious prices than last time. Books have been reduced to a minimum - two small shelves - and consist mainly of translations of Dickens and other Western classics. There was one copy of Shukshin's short stories, which I bought as a present for one of my friends. On my last visit, books in the "Beriozka" cost less than the price embossed on the cover. Now they cost more (even allowing for the fact that this time we got 1.15 roubles to the £1.00 as against 1.32 18 months ago). When I expressed disappointment there were so few books and said that I must pay a visit to the "Beriozka" bookshop in the city, I was told that this shop was closed for redecoration and I would have to make do with the "Kosmos" stock.

On the first full day of my stay I went to a flat where a number of people were to meet me. A verbal message about my time of arrival had been conveyed some weeks earlier by another traveller. I arrived at around 11.30 a.m., and from then on people came in dribs and drabs. It would take too much time and space to recount each and every conversation at this meeting, or at subsequent meetings in other places during that week, so I shall limit myself to matters which I consider were of greatest importance and which tended to crop up in discussions, over and over again, although the people concerned were not, in many cases, connected with each other nor even moved in the same social circles.

General atmosphere: It became clear to me that there has been a drastic clamp-down overall, and this impression was affirmed by all the people I met. There is terrible depression not just in dissident circles, but generally. Everyone seems to feel that things are going to get even worse, that "something terrible" is going to happen, even though they don't know what it will be. The general mood was bad enough 18 months ago, but it was nothing by comparison with the mood and general "feel" of things now. The authorities have succeeded in whipping up an almost hysterical fear of war by the West, imminent war. Even in dissident circles this seems to have made an impact, although they tend to take official pronouncements with more than a grain

streets, the mass of the population, however, does not (or cannot) give critical appraisal to the propaganda with which it is being bombarded from morning to night on radio and television (of which more later) and is almost paralysed with fear. Dissidents stressed repeatedly, that Western Russian-language broadcasts should do much more to counter the official propaganda, especially by making specific responses to specific Soviet claims. The feeling is that Western radio is "pussy-footing" far too much, and by doing so inadvertently lends credibility to official Soviet pronouncements. "Our population is not accustomed delicate hints on such subjects", I was told. "If the West wants to be effective, yo have to lay it on the line". When I pointed out that Western stations are constrained by various provisions in their operating instructions, I was told that th is all very well for someone who knows, but the average Soviet listener to Western radio knows nothing of these rules and regulations and is conditioned by his environment to suspect something fishy as soon as he hears hints and evasions. "We have enough to do reading between the lines of the Soviet press, " one person remarked, "without having to play guessing games about the true meaning behind this or that broadcast from the West".

The Soviet media, every time I watched TV or heard radio during my stay, focused almost exclusively on the Western nuclear threat. At times this reached the point of total absurdity such as on one occasion, where a domestic current affairs TV program carried a report about improved storage facilities for cattle fodder on some collective farm, and then passed on to the "peaceful labour" of our staunch kolkhozniks who are determined, at all costs, to preserve the fruits of their labour and keep the world a safe place for coming genetations despite the nefarious schemes of Western warmongers. So-called "overseas" news was (in all the programs I saw) devoted exclusively to anti-nuclear demonstrations by "progressive forces" in the West and/or condemnations of American foreign policy by obscure politicians from run-down third world countries. Nevertheless, all this stultifying rubbish has not fallen on entirely arid soil; the threat of war seems to be the main topic of conversation wherever one goes "among the people". Possibly a contributing factor is the massive military presence in Moscow (and, to a slightly lesser degree, Leningrad On my last visit I was constantly aware of the number of uniformed military around, but put it down mainly to the fact that I was seeing things with a Western eye. This time, the presence has swelled enormously: possibly there has just been a new intake, because last time most of the military seemed older: this lot is, overwhelmi new recruits in brand-new uniforms and squeaky boots. Some of them look as if they don't shave yet. When I raised this matter at a meeting with some friends, I was told that nowadays "everyone" is being drafted once they reach the requisite age. One of the women present told me that her son, who has just turned 16, had been summoned for a medical check-up (although he is only due to be called up in 2 years time) and passed as being medically fit to do army service although he is retarded. This is a truly tragic case, because the boy has a mental development of a 10 year old and will remain so. However, he does not "look" retarded, and was passed as fi

despite all evidence produced from the school he is in (an ordinary school - she does not have the necessary "connections" to get him into a special school) that the boy is retarded. She says that she will spend the next two years desperately trying to get sufficiently weighty evidence from doctors and psychiatrists to keep him out of the army, because she fears what will happen to him there if he is drafted despite anything she can do. As treatment of recruits etc. has already been adequately documented in Soviet samizdat, I shall not repeat what I was told about it, as it merely affirms the accuracy of the samizdat reports. The war in Afghanistan is an ever-present spectre for any parent; there was a great deal of conversation about this as opposed to my last visit, when I was surprised by the relative lack of interest in discussing this matter. Everyone has heard of the radio announcer who shot into prominence some months ago with his surprising "news bulletins", but, unlike Western interpretations, most people seem to feel that he was acting independently and got away with it for so long because of the sloppiness of Soviet bureaucracy which would not, of its own accord, assume that one person would dare do something like that. However, I was told of a number of media workers (and met one of them) who were immediately taken off announcing and similar jobs and relegated to back-room work in the wake of this incident. The people involved, incidentally, all have relatives (or other connections) abroad, though this had not appeared to prejudice their careers heretofore.

Dissident Activity:

Any kind of dissident activity has become almost impossible. The authorities are even more vigilant, and considerable efforts are made to stifle any form of dissent. There has been widespread harassment of people who were not, themselves, involved in dissident activity, or even formed part of any kind of dissident fringe. These days, even knowing someone on the dissident fringe is enough to bring you to the attention of the authorities. Samizdat circulation is down, and it is felt that a crippling blow has been dealt by the arrest of Shikhanovich. When I was in Moscow, nobody knew what was going to happen to him. As I was under constant and heavy surveillance from the beginning to the end of my trip it would have been unforgivably irresponsible for me to try to make any kind of contact with his relatives, but as close friends of theirs knew nothing, the family would probably be in the same position. The attempts to stem samizdat are not, according to certain indications, limited to protests, information about arrests etc. "Writing" of any unsanctioned kind appears to be proscribed. An extremely well-informed source told me about an occurence which shows that position and rank may be no protection. I have passed this story on for investigation to a number of journalist friends, but it is worth placing on record, I feel, in this report.

Briefly, the story is as follows: On July 22 of this year, Brezhnev's friend and protege, admiral Kholostyakov, and his wife, were beaten to death with hammers in their Moscow flat. Shortly before this, it had become known that Kholostyakov, who had known Brezhnev since his Malaya Zemlya days and who rose to such a high rank due to his personal links with Brezhnev, had been publicly voicing discontent with the

new leadership and bragging that he was writing a book of memoirs which would put a [illegible] of highly-placed noses out of joint. The bodies of the admiral and his wife were found by their niece, who had come to call. The door of the flat had been left wide open. Kholostyakov's wife was dead, but he was still breathing. He died in the intensive care ward shortly after being brought to hospital without regaining consciousness. The flat was immediately sealed off, but it is known that although there was a considerable amount of money and jewellery in the flat, nothing was taken, apart from all papers and the admiral's dress-uniform jacket. A clampdown was placed on the issuing of any kind of information (i.e. details) about the whole thing apart from a bald statement about the admiral's death. Some days later two "criminals" were caught who "confessed" to killing the Kholostyakovs "to get the admiral's medals". Two days later, in a totally unexpected development, an Orthodox religious activist of many years' standing was apprehended by the KGB and accused of being the mastermind behind the attack on the Kholostyakovs. The actual killers, she was told, had indicated that it was she who set up the whole thing. Nobody could make head or tail of these accusations, because the woman in question had never met the Kholostyakovs, nor did any of her associates have the remotest links with them. Just as suddenly, the charges were dropped and the case closed two days later. Since then, she has received no further word or intimation about her supposed involvement in the crime.

Religious dissidents are under just as much pressure as the "politicals". I must stress that religious dissidents were my primary interest, and that is why this report concentrates on them: I did not really have the time or opportunity to make a special effort to gather information on the political dissent field. The known members of the Christian Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights are being subjected to constant harassment: some months ago this mainly took the form of "administrative" difficulties, but Fr Nikolai Gainov is increasingly being accused of harbouring anti-Soviet views and feels that his arrest is just a matter of time. Samizdat (and information in other forms) about the continued violations of believers' rights by the authorities continues to reach members of the Committee from all over the coun[illegible] albeit in greatly reduced quantity: from some of the material that does get through it is clear that this is follow-up material to information sent earlier but intercept[illegible] before it got to the addressee. Holding samizdat in one's home has become much more hazardous with the extension of house searches even to the homes of very low-profile activists. Surveillance of various kinds is on the increase: a search located two electronic bugs in one relatively "harmless" flat where I met a group of friends. Nevertheless, it was not all bad news, even though most of the religious dissidents a[illegible] resigned to the fact that they have to curtail a number of their activities for the t[illegible] being. Production of religious literature is going on despite a number of setbacks in recent years, but extra care is being taken to keep the locations of the presses secret and the number of people involved to the barest minimum. It is felt that the debacle with the Orthodox underground publishers of religious literature (Victor Burdyug and his circle) could have been avoided if they had not tried to do too

absolutely charming story about one of the witnesses called at Burdyug's trial and which, at the risk of digressing a little, I would like to put on record.

The witness concerned was an elderly Orthodox woman who had acted as one of the "couriers" of the finished product. She was doing this with the blessing of one of the monks at the Trinity-St Sergius monastery, who had died some time before the operation was uncovered. Upon receiving instructions to present herself as a witness at Burdyug's trial (she had been pointed out by Alexander Sidorov, who had recanted) she immediately went to her priest for advice and a blessing for the road. "Well, Darya", he told her as he blessed her, "behave as behoves a good Christian and do not retreat before the onslaught of the ungodly!" Nor did she. When she was called to the stand, the prosecutor asked her how she had first become engaged in this sort of activity.

"Well, " she said calmly, "I came out of church one Sunday morning, and what did I see but a couple of young men with several sacks, and people gathered around them. So I went up to have a look, and saw that they had Bibles and prayer books. "Well", I said to myself, "fancy that!" As you know, I'm a pensioner, and I always have problems buying gifts for my friends for their birthdays and namesdays. After all, a skimpy little scarf costs three roubles in our village shop, and even then you can't them half the time. And with my 30 roubles a month pension, this is a problem. So I said to myself - why don't I stock up on some of these? After all, they were selling the Bibles and prayer-books for a rouble apiece, when normally you can't get them at any price.... So I bought some, and asked them: do you have anything else, bo They said that this time they didn't, but they would have more later."

At this point the prosecutor asked her why, if this was a chance meeting, the phone numbers of some of the "printers" were found written down on a piece of paper?

"Oh, that! Well, they left me one phone number, so I could ring up and ask if I needed any more Bibles, and after a while I did. But he (Burdyug) wasn't at home when I phoned, but the person who answered said he was visiting a friend, and gave me the phone number. But what do you think? When I rang <u>that</u> number, I was told that h had gone half an hour ago, and was visiting another friend, whose phone number they gave me, too. That's how I came to have all three numbers written down".

(The person who told me this story was present at the trial, and says that by this ti the whole courtroom was having trouble keeping a straight face).

The prosecutor, however, tried again,

"When you were taken in for questioning, you signed a statement saying that you had acted as a courier in disseminating this literature, that you went periodically to the Trinity monastery where the accused passed on clandestinely-produced literatur to you. How do you explain that?"

"Bless you, my dear ("milen'kii") ", she replied with unruffled composure. "I'm sure it's just as you say, but I really don't know. You see, I am illiterate myself, all I know is how to sign my name and write numbers. They told me to sign some papers, so I signed them. They didn't tell me what those papers had written on

The courtroom burst into spontaneous laughter, even the prosecutor and the judge. Alexander Sidorov jumped up, and asked permission to put a question to the witness. "You know that you're telling lies!" he accused her. "Why, didn't we meet on numerous occasions when I gave you books and you gave me the money from the previous batch? You know you were acting on the instructions of Father (he named the dead monk) and were perfectly well aware what you were doing!"

Darya smiled at him limpidly.

"Milen'kii ", she said compassionately, "what on earth are you talking about? I've never seen you in my life - and you don't know me, either!"

Another burst of laughter, and Sidorov flung up his hands in despair before resuming his seat.

There were no further questions from anyone to this formidable little witness. She was allowed to go, secure in the knowledge that she had not, indeed, "retreated before the onslaught of the ungodly".

Surveillance:

The degree of surveillance to which I was subjected has convinced me that I have outl my usefulness as a "traveller" to the Soviet Union. Like Typhoid Mary, I seemed to bring trouble, in varying degrees, to just about all the people with whom I associated. The only ones which did not have any follow-up unpleasantness were a number of elderly persons whose children are friends of mine in the West. Without going into details of every occasion, I shall just mention one nasty "sample case." The first gathering I attended in Moscow consisted of about 10 people: two arrived together, the rest came separately and at different times. At about 10 p.m. the ligh in the flat started going on and off at intervals of several minutes. Nobody paid ar attention at first, thinking it was just some minor fault in the electricity supply (which leaves a great deal to be desired all over Moscow anyway). The hostess got out a few candles, and we continued. However, when the interruptions continued, the host decided to investigate, and went out onto the landing. A few minutes later he came back and told us that there were strangers standing around on the stairs and ne the lift with no obvious reason, so it was fairly certain that it was "them". He h knocked on some of the neighbors' doors and ascertained that nobody else was having trouble with their lights: obviously someone was at the fuse-box downstairs. A look out of the window (this was the 9th floor of a high-rise block of flats) seemed to confirm his suspicions: two black "Volgas" parked on either side of the entrance to the building. After a quick consultation, we decided to leave in ones and twos. As soon as the first one of our group emerged, the headlights of both "Volgas" came and he had to walk through the beams. (Possibly the "operatives" were photographing? I was last to leave with Yuri (not his real name) as I had come by taxi and had no i how to get back to my hotel from this end of Moscow and it was the consensus of opinion that out of everyone there Yuri had the most experience in evading the KGB. We went down, accompanied by our host, who was going to act as yet another "figure" to be followed, thereby depleting the ranks of the "operatives" by at least one. Keeping my face averted from the loungers on the stairs and landing, I got into the

the lift with my two escorts, but nobody made any move to join us. Once we were outside and past the shining headlamps, the reason for this became quite clear; as well as the two cars parked beside the door into the block of flats, another four cars were strategically placed so that it was impossible to either reach the street (the building is set a fair way back from the main road) or to seek shelter behind any nearby building. Our host headed in one direction (later he told us that nobody made any move to follow him) and Yuri and I headed for the main road. Some distance ahead of us we saw L. and P. who had left the flat some minutes before us. One car moved off to follow them as we watched. The road is a large one - four lanes divided by a strip down the centre. Two black "Volgas" were standing on the opposite side of the road, and two on our side. There is no taxi rank for miles, but a taxi with a running motor stood invitingly close, some 10 metres from the "Volgas". We turned and began to walk as briskly as the slippery, icy pavement allowed in the general direction of the metro, which is about 1 kilometre away. As we walked, Yuri said we could try to make a run for it among the blocks of flats stretching on our side of the road if the "Volgas" made no move to follow us once we had gone a hundred metres or so. However, we had not covered even half that distance when one of them revved up its engine, cruised past us, went ahead, turned at the next crossing, double back, turned back onto our side of the road again and pulled up about 20 metres behind us. Realizing that we could not shake them off, we flagged down a passing private car and paid him to take us to the metro station. The "Volga" followed us, and two operatives got out of it when we disembarked at the metro. They followed us without making any attempt to conceal themselves, but when we got on the train, one remained behind; they had obviously determined to their own satisfaction that we were not going to split up. For a while we did a little "metro hopping" (i.e. leaping out at the last moment, changing to trains going in the opposite direction, etc.) but our "tail" was too good for us. By this time it was getting on for midnight, and we were in a part of Moscow which Yuri said he did not know at all. We got off at the next station (as did our "tail") but as there were still a lot of people travelling, managed to get on the escalator to the exit quite a bit ahead of him. Once out of the metro we ran for it, diving down alleys, turning corners, crossing roads and so forth quite at random for about 20 minutes. Eventually we fetched up in a deserted street which seemed to consist of factories or warehouses. There was not a soul in sight. We waited for a while, then set out to look for a larger road in the hope of picking up a cab or at least a private driver out

"moonlighting" to supplement his wages. We came upon such a road very soon, and started to look for a lift. I think we must have ended up qu cle to the metro again, because groups of people appeared periodicall from the same direction. Yuri suddenly said "here is our tail again", and pointed out a man who had stopped a little way from us and was leaning against a telephone pole, also looking as if he was waiting for a taxi (or something). I had my doubts, but being shortsighted and not having that sixth sense which seems to tell every Soviet citizen when the KGB is present, I was probably wrong and Yuri right. After what seemed like an age, an empty taxi appeared, and we flagged him down. There were no other cars in sight and, as we pulled away, the watcher at the lamp-post sprang out into the street. Yuri said that if this was our "tail" then most likely he would have stopped the next car, shown his identity book and ordered the driver to follow us. Except that there was no following car. Breathing a sigh of relief, we went as close as seemed sensible to my hotel and I urged Yuri to keep the taxi and go home in it. Unfortunately he thought this unecessary. We parted quickly, I heading for the "Kosmos", Yuri for the metro which is across the road from the hotel. I only learned of subsequent events two days later, when I saw Yuri again. Having parted company with me, he went to the metro. The first person he saw once he reached the platform was our faithful "tail", waiting patiently on a bench. In other words, they had known all along who I was and where I would be going. From that it was easy enough to deduce that anyone escorting me would head for the nearest metro after seeing me back to the hotel. Yuri decided not to go home, as he lives at an end station on the other side of Moscow, and there are always militia on duty there at this hour to get drunks off the last trains. It would be the work o moment for the KGB man to get the militia to detain Yuri on some pretex before he had a chance to leave the station. So Yuri decided to go and spend the night with some friends who live 3 metro stops away from the "VDNKh" stop where he boarded the train. The KGB operative got into th same carriage: by now there were fewer passengers. He disembarked when Yuri did, and followed at a distance of some 10 paces. As in all stati this one had a "militia room" near the exit. As Yuri neared it, the operative suddenly broke into a run, flung himself on Yuri from behind and started yelling at the top of his voice: "You were behaving in a hooligan manner in the metro! Come into the militia room!" Hearing these yells, two militiamen came running out. Luckily for Yuri, a group of young people had just entered the station, and they stopped and intervened, saying that there must be some mistake, as they had

seen Yuri walking towards them "when he was suddenly attacked by this Ukrishch, who started shouting and pulling at him". Then, instead of moving on, they remained and continued to assert that Yuri had not been doing anything and, generally, showing no disposition to leave. The two militiamen, not understanding what was going on, then rounded on the KGB man in no friendly manner and started demanding to know what he thought he was about? Taking advantage of this, Yuri said with as much dignity as he could muster that he was in a hurry, and walked out unimpeded while the militiamen took the KGB operative into their "room". Still, Yuri guessed that this was only a short respite. He ha to walk two blocks then cross a large vacant lot to reach the block of flats in which his friends lived. As he walked, he shredded several bits of paper which he had on him with notes of things to tell me. When he reached the vacant lot he looked round, and saw two figures running after him: the KGB man and one of the militiamen. There was nothi for it but to run himself. He rushed into the building and, had the lift been on the ground floor, would have got away from them. As it was, the lift was somewhere up top, so he started up the stairs at a dead run. They caught him on the first floor, and flung him bodily to the ground. And here Yuri had his second piece of luck for that night: of the four doors facing onto that landing, two opened and heads poked out to see what was going on. Seeing this, Yuri immediately began to shout, knowing that the KGB prefer not to have witnesses to such activities if possible. Also, as he explained later, he knows from prior experience that it tends to overset them when a potential victim, instead of being cowed, becomes aggressive. "Why are you hounding me?" he demanded at the top of his voice. "First you attack me in the metro for no reason, and now you assault me with no provocation! Who are you and what does this mean?" Another door opened, causing the KGB man to snarl at the unwelcome witnesses that this was none of their busines and they should get back inside. Yuri could hardly believe his good fortune when nobody paid the slightest heed but stayed put to see what other dramatic events might follow.

"Show me your identification", demanded the KGB man, turning back to Yuri, who countered by saying "No, you show me yours! How do I know who you are and what right you have to question me like this?"

The KGB man briefly pulled out his little "book" and flashed it at Yuri without opening. "Is that enough for you?" he challenged but Yuri, bou up by the knowledge of all those avidly-listening witnesses, said no, it was not enough, and that he wanted to see the name and rank inscibed inside the ID book. When the KGB man (who by now had lowered

his "tone" considerably) refused, Yuri turned to the militiaman and asked if he could see his ID.
"Certainly", said the militiamen above the KGB operative's warning hiss, and handed over his ID where he was described as sergeant Abramov etc. etc. Then, to the overt discomfiture of the KGB operative, the young militiaman turned to him and said, pointing at Yuri: "Why are we following him like this, anyway?" Someone sniggered. The KGB man's assurance suddenly seemed to crumble, although Yuri says that he had not expected this at all. Taking advantage of the confusion, Yuri said that he was sick and tired of being plagued, that he was tired and unless the operative had some specific charges to bring against him on the spot, he was going home. Without waiting for an answer he turned and started up the stairs. All the way up the next two flights he expected to hear heavy feet thudding behind him and to be seized. But, incredibly, there was no pursuit. As he waited for his friends to open their door, he heard the KGB operative and the militiaman going down the stairs....
A similar incident occurred in Leningrad, with the difference that there was no dramatic pursuit: when I had parted from my escorts, they were stopped by the KGB operatives who had followed us after spending 3 hours in their "Volgas" outside a block of flats in which I had been conferring with a number of people, and asked to produce evidence of identity. All in all, quite a lot of people had to produce proof of identity before they had gone more than 20 steps after parting with me both in Moscow and Leningrad. The shadowing was really very thorough: in Leningrad KGB operatives even used to go to church with me and stand stoically through liturgies and matins!
Obviously, this made it impossible for me to meet quite a number of people I had intended to see, so the most I could do was make a phone call and try to convey by turns of phrase the fact that I was being watched, and leave it to them to decide whether they wanted me to come to them or not. It is a telling sign of the severity of the clampdown that a number of people, none of whom could be described as cowards in any way, felt it would be unwise to meet "this time". And who can blame them? I was scared stiff just about every minute of that traumatic two weeks. My only fearless day was a trip to the St Sergius-Trinity monastery where I spent the entire time in the Trinity cathedral within a few yards of the tomb housing the relics of the Saint.
Radio Stations:
I estimate that in the two weeks that I was in the Soviet Union, I had what could be termed "serious" conversations with about 50 people which

included discussion of Western Russian-language broadcasts. What surprised me was that although these were people of widely differing interests and social standing (scientists, artists, religious activist: me a workers, middle managers, factory workers and pensioners), dissidents and non-dissidents, the views expressed were remarkable in their similarity even though they were expressed with diverse degrees of eloquence. The essential points to emerge in these discussions were:

1. The station with the greatest number of listeners still appears to be "Voice of America". As one person said, it's "the done thing" to listen to VOA. A young artists in Moscow told me that she had gone camping this summer with a group of friends, and every radio in the campsite was quite openly tuned every day to VOA, and people made no effort to conceal it. In fact, she said you could follow a broadcast almost without a break as you walked through the camping area. Despite this, however, VOA is not considered to be totally"sympathetic" at all times for, people reason, it is presenting the views of the Soviet government's "opposition" and is probably not above resorting to somewh biased propaganda tactics from time to time. But the "Golos" is held in affection for all that, though its lighter programs seem to be more popular than the heavier material, the presentation of which is considered to be of lower "quality" than the BBC.

2. The BBC is, without a doubt, the winner of the popularity stakes, among the intelligentsia in particular. Both in Moscow and in Leningr two broadcasts came up for discussion time and time again: the BBC coverage of the Templeton Prize award to Solzhenitsyn, and Yuri Goligorsky's interview with the two young Soviet soldiers who went ove to the Afghan guerrillas and are now (presumably) in the United States This generated an enormous amount of interest. Literally everyone wanted to know the circumstances in which these two soldiers landed among the Afghan guerrillas. Luckily, I read a full account of their story several days before I went to Moscow and was able to fill in the missing details.* The Templeton award attracted such great interest because there is what might be called a veritable "Solzhenitsyn cult" flourishing in the Soviet Union. In fact, on a nu of occasions I was presented to people as "Solzhenitsyn's interpreter his London press-conference". I swear that several people came within an ames ace of asking me reverently if they could touch me once they h this! Anyone who maintains that Solzhenitsyn has been forgotten or is not rated highly in the Soviet Union is talking nonsense. Quite the

* Exception was taken to their being referred to as "deserters", howev once I had recounted the story. This was seen as a linguistic(and ideological) lapse, very uncharacteristic of the BBC "who ought to know that this word has acquired a definite shade of meaning through officia

contrary, he seems to have acquired an almost mystical aura, he is spoken of as a "true patriot", "who didn't emigrate, but had to be thrown out" (moreover, this latter sentiment was expressed quite sincere even by people who are themselves trying to get permission to emigrate); and great indignation and scorn was voiced about those former Soviet citizens in the West who speak out against him. Emigre squabbles, incidentally, are censured very severely and the journal "Syntaxis" was described in the most unflattering terms by those who had seen it. But this was confined to the intelligentsia: the "simpler" folk know and care nothing about emigre intrigues, nor have they ever heard of "Syntaxis": but Solzhenitsyn they do know and revere. In fact, it was quite touching that all these people, obviously assuming that because I had been Solzhenitsyn's interpreter on one occasion means that I am in constant contact with him, asked me to tell "Aleksandr Isayevich" that he is not forgotten, that they send him their deepest respects and warmest wishes for his well-being and that his work on behalf of his people will not have been done in vain.

The religious program of the BBC was again given a gratifyingly warm response, especially for the coverage given to the case of Zoya Krakhmalnikova. In this particular case the VOA coverage was given a definite "raspberry" for citing the TASS announcement about her, which omits mention of the five year exile to follow the year of confinement. "Surely", said one Moscow priest with gentle reproach,"they know that TASS is not the most reliable of sources?"

The only complaint about the BBC religious program was the coverage of the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Vancouver. However, as the objections raised (and very strongly, at that) are on specific points and addressed directly to Bishop Basil, who did the coverage, I am not including them in this report but will convey them, as requested, in a personal letter to the Bishop.

To sum up, BBC was consistently referred to as the most"reliable" and people who have been listeners for many years have remarked that in recent years the quality of the output is head and shoulders above that of VOA, Radio Liberty and Deutsche Welle (the latter was described as having"degenerated into nothingness").

3. Sadly, the response to Radio Liberty was not good, but I would qualify this immediately by adding that most of the people who were sharpest in their criticism of RL have not, on their own admission, listened to it for periods of up to three years. When I asked why this was, I was told that it was not because of the technical difficulty produced by constant jamming, but because they felt that (and I quote)

"Radio Liberty discredited itself". When I tried to dig deeper, all sorts of reasons were produced which, individually, do not seem to add up to much but which cumulatively probably contributed to the emergence of an unfavourable reaction which made people feel that it was not worth the bother going to the trouble of trying to "catch" RL broadcasts. Among the reasons cited for not listening were: a) RL is "anti-Russian" b) broadcasts on Soviet themes are boring - we get enough boring material on Moscow radio without having to listen to it on jammed short waves c) choice of samizdat materials aired is not always sufficiently "actual" d) some of the programming on labour and economic questions is almost Moscow Radio rubbish e) that the literary programs have never been the same since Professor Weidle died f) that everyone knows RL has been infiltrated by KGB agents and g) that RL showed its true face when it "stopped its religious program". This final accusation rocked me a bit, and I pointed out that RL had reduced, but never completely stopped religious broadcasts. The person who made this particular objection is a dissident who has served a term in the camps for his religious activities, and my answer did not disconcert him: "Why did they cut down the programming, then?" he demanded. "Don't they know what an important issue this is to millions of people here?"

On the positive side, those who do listen to RL expressed satisfaction that on a number of crucial issues (such as the vexed question of missiles) RL seems to be making more of an effort to present an effective counter to Soviet propaganda, even though the feeling is that they could make it a bit stronger still without jeopardising credibility. The only RL staffer mentioned by name was L. Roitman, who was described by a number of regular listeners as "the best interviewer RL has on its staff".

As I have been away from RL for six years, there was little I could say in response to some of the criticism for the simple reason that I am unacquainted with the content of the programs being broadcast. With regard to the religious programming, I took it upon myself to say that as far as I know RL will be expanding its religious coverage quite dramatically next year and, drawing on what I knew of the projected content, gave an outline of "coming attractions". This generated a lot of interest, because it will put RL miles ahead of all the other stations in the "religious stakes". I also took the liberty of telling those interested something about Gleb Rahr, who will be doing this programming, and whom I have known personally for many years. I think it does no harm for people to know something of the person behind the voice they hear on their radios. For old times' sake I did as much PR as I could for Radio Liberty, but I think that it will take some time for it to recover the ground it has obviously lost.

It had been my intention to try to listen to some Western broadcasts while I still had the "good" transistor with me, but I gave it up very quickly as every time I started fiddling with the dial, someone would be knocking on the door of the hotel room within a few minutes wanting to know whether it was I who had reported a dripping tap in the bathroom, asked to have some boiling water brought up, needed to have my bed made, and so forth. By the second day I decided that as I was suppo to dispose of the radio, it might be wiser not to establish a daily pattern of radio listening. Moreover, I was pressed for time every day and simply could not afford to devote several hours a day to this activity.

Churches:

Outwardly, much refurbishing and renovating going on. Inwardly, according to my sources within the church, the general tightening up is felt there too: sermons to be geared to "peace" (in accordance with Party line, naturally). It was confirmed by a number of reliable sources that the Russian Orthodox Church had been promised the return of the Donskoy monastery in Moscow as a reward for "peace activities", but when it came to the crunch, they were fobbed off with the Danilovsky monastery instead. The division between the Orthodox hierarchs and ordinary clergy is becoming even wider: one rather harsh explanation advanced for this by a Moscow priest is that the "top drawer" hierarchs such as the ones regularly seen at various international gatherings have acquired a taste for this sort of thing, and the authorities are playing along, making vague promises as to "rewards" for the church for "good behaviour", and the vladyki have swallowed the bait hook, line and sinker. As a result, they are very intolerant towards any clergy in their dioceses voicing any kind of dissatisfaction with the present status quo of the church. I tested one Western theory that one ought not criticize the hierarchs (for instance, in Western religious broadcasts), but that was laughed out of court. The reply was that bishops such as Filaret of Kiev have already compromised themselves so much in the eyes of their subordinate clergy and lay believers, that to try to smooth over any of their public statements is an insult to the intelligence of the listeners. The image of the senior hierarchy has suffered particularly since the much-bruited "peace" conference in Moscow last year, and the crime was further compounded by the shameful business of the Afghanistan resolution and the reactions to the appeal made by Rusak at the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Vancouver this year. [Specific objections to the way the West has "presented" the hierarchs in radio coverage of Vancouver will be detail

in a separate letter to Bishop Basil in due course.] Interest in the church continues to grow: I saw a lot of young people in the churches 18 months ago, but this time there were more. Allowing for the fact that the St Sergius monastery is a major place of pilgrimage, I was sti pleasantly surprised by the number of under 30's, both men and women, who came to venerate the relics of the saint during the 3 hours I spent in the Trinity cathedral there. Some of them looked as if they had come a long way to get there.

I was told that there are growing sign of greater "courage" among the rank and file clergy, and that some have now taken to wearing their rob openly in the street and on public transport: this would have been unthinkable even two years ago. Apparently this does not provoke any public hostility - people are either sympathetic, or indifferent.

The authorities are turning more attention to the parish priests and other clergy. Several weeks ago, a monk deacon (Fr Seraphim Pechatkov) was expelled from the 3rd year theological course at the Leningrad academy for helping the members of the Christian musical group "Trumpet Call" (of which more later) in their work with young drop-outs and drug-addicts in the Leningrad area. Unfortunately, I was unable to meet Fr Seraphim as he had returned to Moscow several days before I arrived in Leningrad.

The situation in the Protestant-type churches is pretty much the same as regards to relations between the senior representatives and the Soviet authorities. However, I heard a lot of grumbles about the pastors being more willing to compromise with the local authorities tha they were even five years ago. The registered Baptist church in Leningrad is in particularly bad shape, as presbyter Konovalchik is totally subservient to the state authorities, and there is much discord in that church at the moment because Konovalchik has, effectively, excommunicated a number of people for "political" reasons at the behest of the local plenipotentiary for religious affairs and even preaches against these people from the pulpit, forbidding the other members of the congregation to associate with them on pain of expulsion from the church.

Messages passed to me from Pentecostals in Lithuania, and meetings with Pentecostals in Moscow show that the Pentecostal emigration drive is not letting up. The Pentecostal community in Chuguyevka intends to conduct a fast throughout January in protest against the threats of the authorities to withdraw everyone's parental rights. This is a very interesting community: it consists entirely of Pentecostals. Nobody is over 40 years of age. They live rather along the lines of the

early Christian communities, sharing all property, food, labour etc. They do not practice contraception, so there are lots of small children in every family. Some time ago they surrendered their Soviet passports in line with their demand to be allowed to emigrate to any country which would allow them to live as a community in accordance with their religious convictions. The authorities have retaliated with a threat that all the children will be removed to state institutions from such "unfit" parents. The situation is tense, and they ask for maximum Western publicity once they start their hunger strike. The men will fast the whole month, taking no solid food. The women and children (including pregnant women) will fast on certain days of each week.
On the whole, the Pentecostals are much more politically aware than the Baptists, and are taking steps to "link up" with Orthodox activists and with any members of the free trade union association SMOT who are still active. The Baptists (on the whole) are still a bit chary of the Orthodox, but the Pentecostals are very willing to cooperate with them.

Food and Consumer Goods:

Despite what one hears (in the West) about the food situation having improved, I saw no evidence of it. Neither, according to the residents of Moscow and Leningrad, have they. The situation in the provinces is drastic: one person I spoke to had just been to visit relatives in Pkov, and he says that there is literally nothing to eat. The "coupon" system is in operation, but even that is a farce, because if the goods aren't there, your coupons are not worth the paper they are printed on. The shortages even made themselves felt in the hotels in which we foreigners were staying. In the "Kosmos" the English, asking for milk to put in their tea, used to get, with difficulty, about half a teacup of diluted powdered milk to share out between 4 - 6 people. The only vegetables to be served were potatoes and sauerkraut, with the occasional salted cucumber thrown in. Small pieces of carrot were occasionally to be found in soups. Fruit was served only once - a dish of tiny, half-ripe mandarins. Even in the "Beriozka" food shop in Moscow they only had these same mandarins and several bags of rather ancient, flour apples of uncertain origin.
The last year has seen the emergence of two "cheap" vodkas. The better of the two costs 4 roubles 75 kopecks a bottle, and was immediately dubbed "andropovka". The even cheaper one, which apparently only truly dedicated drinkers can bring themselves to imbibe, goes under the nickname "Pershing" : firstly because the shape of the bottle roughly resembles a rocket and secondly because it is said to be made from low-grade rocket fuel! However, it is unlikely that many will be

joking about "andropovka" for much longer if an incident which occurred while I was in Leningrad is any pointer. A workmate of one person I met in Leningrad (a worker from the Kirov factory) was arrested two days earlier in the so-called supermarket of his "micro-raion" when he asked for a bottle of "andropovka". A plain clothes KGB officer who was also in the queue, arrested him on the spot for "anti-Soviet statements". By the time I left Leningrad, it was still not known where the man was and what had happened to him after he was "taken away". Vigilance by the "organs" is on the increase in every sphere of life. The girl who shared my hotel room (a student of Russian) had visited the USSR six months earlier and had met, by chance, a group of students whom she saw on three subsequent occasions before returning home. When she contacted them this time, she learned that one of them, who had escorted her back to the hotel door several times, was later taken in by the militia and beaten up so badly for "associating with a foreigner", that all his ribs were broken and he spent 2½ months in hospital. Luckily, his mother is a doctor and was able to pull some strings to get him adequate care. Instead of becoming afraid, however, these students became defiant, and met my room-mate nearly every day that I was in Leningrad. After the third such meeting, the one who had been beaten up earlier was detained again, this time by the KGB, and was kept and questioned the entire night in the "Big House" before being released with a caution. I saw him the next day and suggested that it might be better for him not to meet this girl again, but he said that he was "going to remember those broken ribs to his dying day" and had no intention of letting them railroad him, because there was no law saying that Soviet citizens cannot socialize with foreigners. That, I suppose, is one way how dissidents are formed...

Consumer goods are in just as short supply as they ever were, but I was told that now this means even trivial things such as salt-shakers are unavailable, and the black market is expanding accordingly, despite the tough measures instituted to cut down illicit trade, pilfering at work etc. The returns are just too lucrative to resist. On my last visit, hotel staff did not (as far as I know) approach the tourists with offers to buy from them (for roubles) goods available from the "Beriozka". This time, just about everyone in our group was approached, especially with requests to buy umbrellas (made in Japan) and blank "Maxell" TAPE cassettes. One waitress in the "Kosmos", we determined later, managed to acquire some 30 umbrellas by courtesy of our group. I was one of the first people she asked (because I'm Russian, I suppose), but I refused because I felt my position was precarious enough without

rendering myself liable for prosecution on charges of black-marketeering. In Leningrad several waiters asked me to get them cassettes and, as I had some money, I bought some, but refused to accept any money for them. The amount of buying and selling that goes on in these hotels is truly staggering. The staff of the "Moskva" hotel in Leningrad also supplement their incomes by providing prostitutes for the large parties of Finns who arrive every Friday night for "vodka weekends". These are really something to see: hordes of Finns, all drunk from morning till night, shouting in the hotel corridors at 3 a.m., banging on doors, breaking the furniture in their rooms and generally making thorough nuisances of themselves (especially to any woman careless enough to come within grabbing distance) have become a standard feature of life in the "Moskva" hotel from Friday until Sunday night. Payment for services rendered, I gathered from a conversation with one of the women on key duty on our floor, is usually in kind rather than money: jeans, pocket torches, tights, cosmetics. No matter how objectionable the behaviour of the Finns may be, the staff are instructed to raise no objections: nothing must be done to jeopardize the flow of money the Finns bring in. The "Beriozka" in the "Moskva" hotel stocks more alcohol than anything else. Finns who are too drunk to stand on their feet are dragged by their arms to their rooms by wooden-faced hotel staff, or are brought in slung over militianen's shoulders like sacks of potatoes.

Miscellaneous:

1. I was told, both in Moscow and in Leningrad, that as of January, a six-day working week is being introduced. Workers in factories have already been told about this at specially-convened meetings.

2. In Leningrad I met a group of young Christians (Orthodox and Baptists) who are doing evangelism work with young drop-outs (they still call them 'hippies' there) and drug addicts. They travel widely in carrying out this work, and have been as far afield as Minsk and Ode This was an extremely interesting meeting, because the scope of the problem is never aired in the Soviet press, and little is known generally of the drop-outs, how they live, how they are treated by the authorities, and so forth. The information I received at this meeting will be written up in a separate report.

3. A Baptist family which has been trying to emigrate for 8 years and which maintains links with people in the West had their phone cut off for 6 months several weeks ago. When they lodged an official complaint they got a letter saying that the phone was cut off because they had

"violated instruction No.74". Just what this "instruction" is was not explained.

3. Krakhmalnikova's husband had his phone cut off because, he was told, he was making "unacceptable" use of it.

4. Censorship of mail on the increase. People with no dissident connections corresponding with relatives or friends abroad are getting about one letter in three by their own estimates.

5. Several religious prisoners who are in "general regime" camps find that younger inmates (usually first offenders under the age of 25) are very interested in religion. One such prisoner has had to write up a version of the New Testament from memory, and this is currently being circulated around the camp.

6. Leningrad customs, through which we had to pass when we were leaving were even more stringent this time. My room-mate and I were immediately separated from the others and taken aside. I was given a very thorough body search. After they made me take off my boots, they even checked the soles of my feet - in case I had made notes on them, I suppose. Every seam of every item of clothing was "felt", but most attention was reserved for the few papers I had on me: map of Moscow and its metro, folders of cards of various museums (these had been given to me, and I tailored my fictitious account of my doings on tape to conform with these folders), "Beriozka" receipts, etc. The pickings were rather meagre, but they took everything away for examination nonetheless. Several more tourist groups were being "processed" at the same time (one flying back to Paris, another to Prague) so the customs area was a veritable beehive of activity. The three woman searching me even apologised that I had to wait for a cabin to be freed so that they could strip me! I was rather amused to recognize one of them as having been a member of the "team" that worked me over 18 months ago.

7. On Monday 28th November, towards evening, the entire Red Square was cordoned off for no apparent reason. I was in the vicinity at the time, and heard the militia giving short shrift to anyone who tried to go into the square. No activity of any kind was going on in the square itself, but the militia ringed it like a human wall. I was later told by some of the foreign correspondents that word had got around that something was going to happen there, then at Pushkin Square, then somewhere else again. They all spent hours of fruitless cruising from one place to another without seeing anything of note.

17 Dec. 1983

Thematic appendices to follow separately.

PLC SH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 16 January, 1984

Soviet Union

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 13 January about the article in The Times of that day by Mr. Richard Owen.

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Ack 84

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 January, 1984

Meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 13 January setting out the factors affecting a meeting in London or Moscow between Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Soviet Foreign Minister.

The Prime Minister has commented that she leaves the decision as to where the meeting should take place to the Foreign Secretary's judgement.

A. J. COLES

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister'

Daily Mail 13/1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 January, 1984

MT

Dear John,

You asked for our views on the article in today's Times by Richard Owen, their Moscow correspondent. I enclose a copy.

We have not been able to check with Owen who his ''informed Russian sources'' were. Some of his previous reports from Moscow have contained inaccuracies and exaggerations.

As far as the substance is concerned, there was no reflection of the idea that ''a senior Kremlin leader could come to London for high-level talks'', nor of any ''feelers for a marked improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations'', when the Soviet Ambassador called on Sir Geoffrey Howe this morning.

The line that Owen reports can serve a number of Soviet purposes. It fits with the present Soviet tactics of wedge-driving between the Europeans and the US, and it reflects the very hard anti-US line which has been a consistent feature of recent Soviet propaganda. For the rest, it is interesting that Owen's sources seem to have suggested that an initiative for the reinstatement of Kornienko's visit might come from the Soviet side: the Russians have so far turned down the invitations extended for him to visit London in both December and January.

Our assessment of the article is, therefore, that it should be treated with some reserve. In choosing a journalist, the Russians must have intended their views to become public. While this could be a signal that they were interested in doing business with us (and this in itself may be a welcome development), the business the Russians most want to do (but on their own terms) is in the areas of strategic arms limitation and INF, and they know that in these fields there is no substitute for the US. On balance, therefore, we see the main element in this as an attempt to put pressure on the Americans prior to the Shultz/Gromyko meeting and to stimulate jealousy and doubts among the Europeans as to who in Europe might be the favoured Soviet interlocutor in place of the Americans. But this need not be the only aim, and the fact that the Russians feel the need to float such ideas may indicate some uncertainty and indecision on their side. This could present us with opportunities to get our own views across and influence their thinking. They will of course have noted and carefully assessed the Prime Minister's recent public statements.

All this points to the continuing need for very close consultation on the Western side, and incidentally to the importance and timeliness of the Prime Minister's and Sir Geoffrey Howe's discussions with Mr Shultz on 15 January.

In the time available Sir Geoffrey Howe has not seen this letter: I shall show him a copy in tonight's box.

Yours ever

Robert Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Kremlin may seek Britain's support

From Richard Owen
Moscow

The Soviet Union is considering an approach to Britain in an effort to revive East-West detente at a time when the superpower dialogue has almost ground to a halt, according to informed Russian sources.

If the Stockholm meeting between Mr Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and Mr George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, proved disappointing, the Kremlin might put out feelers for a marked improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations. A senior Kremlin leader could come to London for high-level talks, sources suggested.

It is understood that Mr Georgy Kornienko, the Deputy Foreign Minister, may visit Britain. Last year's trip was cancelled after the Korean airliner disaster, which brought East-West relations to a new low.

The last British official to visit Russia was Mr Malcolm Rifkind, a Junior Foreign Office Minister, in April last year. Apart from Mr Francis Pym, who attended the funeral of President Brezhnev in November, 1982, no Foreign Secretary has visited Moscow since Dr David Owen in 1977. Sir Geoffrey Howe will meet Mr Gromyko at the Stockholm conference next Tuesday.

The Russians are reportedly encouraged by what they regard as Mrs Thatcher's pragmatic approach to the Kremlin. After powerful attacks on Soviet tyranny, which earned her the label of pathological anti-communist in Moscow, the Prime Minister turned at the end of last year to calls for dialogue.

Soviet sources said an approach to Britain would be strengthened by fears that President Reagan might be reelected in November. Britain held a "unique position" in the Western alliance, since it had an independent deterrent, traditional ties with Washington

Continued back page, col 4

THE TIMES: 13 JANUARY 1984

Kremlin turns to Britain

Continued from page 1

and could act as a channel to the United States.

It is understood that although formal contacts have been minimal recently, Britain has made it clear that it would respond to a Soviet attempt to improve relations. There were reports last October that Mr James Callaghan, the former Prime Minister, was carrying a message from Mrs Thatcher when he visited Moscow for talks with officials, including Mr Gromyko.

Mr Callaghan denied this, but subsequently called for a realistic approach to the Soviet Union at a time of dangerous tension.

President Andropov said yesterday in a written statement that "not a single opportunity" should be missed for reviving the Geneva arms talks and promised to scrap Moscow's threatened retaliatory measures if cruise and Pershing missiles were withdrawn from Europe.

Mr Andropov said the Soviet Union wanted to remove obstacles which had led to the breakdown of the talks, but he blamed the collapse on Washington. He said America had used the Geneva talks as a cover for deploying "new first-strike weapons in Europe". To have continued the talks would have been "tantamount to complicity in deception of the European and world public".

The Warsaw Pact has said it will station new missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and Mr Andropov said in November that Moscow would threaten the United States "from the oceans and the seas".

Mr Gromyko will meet Mr Shultz next Wednesday. Soviet sources said, however, that the Kremlin did not have high expectations of a rapprochement with the Reagan Administration and might seek an "alternative dialogue partner" at a time of East-West confrontation over arms control, as well as regional conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean.

"The situation is very dangerous," one official said. "The Americans have torpedoed the arms talks and Reagan shows no interest in doing business with us."

Sources said Britain was well placed to engage in dialogue with Russia. The history of Anglo-Soviet relations is positive, sources said. Relations were established 60 years ago in February, 1924, and the occasion will be marked by celebrations in Moscow and London next month.

● WASHINGTON: Mr Shultz yesterday said America was prepared for a thaw in its relations with the Soviet Union, but added: "It takes two to thaw" (Mohsin Ali writes).

Stockholm preview, page 4

Prime Minister

Duty Clerk 13/1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 January 1984

I leave the decision to the Foreign Secretary's judgment MT.

Dear John,

Meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister

You recorded in your letter of 11 January to Roger Bone that the Prime Minister would prefer Sir Geoffrey to meet Mr Gromyko in London. Sir Geoffrey would like to have a word with the Prime Minister about this before his meeting with Mr Gromyko in Stockholm on 19 January. The Department have produced the following summary of the factors affecting the choice of venue, which you may find helpful as background. I am submitting it in parallel to the Foreign Secretary.

Factors affecting a meeting in London:

(a) the last full meeting between the British and Soviet Foreign Minister was held in 1977 in Moscow. (Lord Carrington visited Moscow in 1982 for a day, but representing the Presidency of the Ten.) It would, in terms of strict protocol, be the Russians' turn to come to London;

(b) there would be no implication that we were running after the Russians;

(c) the meeting would be on our home ground, and thus more under our control.

As against this:

(d) the timing of the next move would be left very much in Gromyko's hands, and the Russians might seek to extract a price or impose conditions which would be difficult to fulfil;

(e) Gromyko would want an assurance that he would be received by the Prime Minister (in 1973 Sir A Douglas-Home called on President Podgorny and Deputy Prime Minister Lesechko. In 1977 Dr Owen called on Mr Brezhnev);

/(f)

(f) the first bilateral visit since 1977 will attract wide public attention, including human rights activists, who will certainly stage demonstrations. The Government would be obliged to provide hospitality and entertainment against this background.

Factors affecting a meeting in Moscow:

(a) there may be a slight impression of beating a path to the Russians' door (like Mr Callaghan and Mr Steel);

(b) Gromyko would have to be induced to extend an invitation.

As against this:

(c) Gromyko might more readily extend an invitation for a working visit to Moscow than face the known difficulties of a visit to London;

(d) it would allow a wider range of contacts among senior Russians, and a chance to identify some of these as possible future visitors to the UK;

(e) it might offer an opportunity of meeting Andropov;

(f) the process of bilateral visits would have been re-started in a relatively uncontentious manner.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

pa DMB 13/1

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister (2)

Since this has attracted some publicity you may like to see the TGWU's reply to Soviet construction workers.

MT

DMB 12/1

Transport
and General
Workers Union

TRANSPORT HOUSE · SMITH SQUARE · WESTMINSTER · LONDON S.W.1P 3JB.

R 12/1

OUR REF GHP/AP

YOUR REF

TELEPHONE 01-828 7788 TELEGRAMS TRANSUNION LONDON SW1 TELEX No 919009

Building Construction & Civil Engineering Group
National Secretary — G. P. Henderson

9th January, 1984

Mrs. M. Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON

A. & L. 12/1.
1) Mr Coles 2) Mr Fletcher
To see
DMB 12/1
12/1

Dear Prime Minister,

I thought you would like to see copy of the reply I had given to the USSR Construction and Building Materials' Industry Workers' Unions.

I have also sent a copy to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours sincerely,

George Henderson

NATIONAL SECRETARY

Transport
and General
Workers Union

TRANSPORT HOUSE · SMITH SQUARE · WESTMINSTER · LONDON S.W.1P 3JB

OUR REF GPH/AP

TELEPHONE 01-828 7788 TELEGRAMS TRANSUNION LONDON SW1 TELEX No 919009

YOUR REF

Building Construction & Civil Engineering Group
National Secretary — G. P. Henderson

9th January, 1984

Mr. I. Lanshin,
President,
Construction and Building Materials' Industry Workers' Unions,
Central Committee,
42 Lenin Avenue,
MOSCOW B119, USSR

Dear Colleague,

On behalf of the Construction, Civil Engineering and Building Crafts workers of the Transport & General Workers' Union, I should like to thank you for your letter, with enclosures, received on 4th January, 1984, about the disturbing growth in international tension and escalation of the arms race.

The Transport & General Workers' Union is a consistent and vociferous opponent of the arms race and especially of nuclear weapons. From fighting against the H-bomb in the 1950's through to our current campaign against the Cruise, Pershing and Trident missiles, we have remained of the firm opinion that the possession of nuclear weapons brings neither security nor stability but in fact places us all in the greatest peril. We are committed to a policy of nuclear disarmament, an end to the arms race and the strengthening of international peace and co-operation and welcome your commitment to the same objectives.

As workers in the construction industry, we are also very much aware of the harmful effect which high levels of military spending are having on our jobs and living standards. In this country, many construction workers remain unemployed even though we need more homes, schools and hospitals. We believe that if some of the resources currently channelled into armaments were diverted to socially useful production then employment could be increased and living standards improved.

General Secretary MOSS EVANS Deputy General Secretary ALEX KITSON

I am sure that living standards in the Soviet Union could be similarly improved were it possible to reallocate resources in this way. We hope you will find interesting the enclosed booklet which the T&GWU has produced on arms conversion. We must all look forward to the time when construction workers can be fully employed in useful and peaceful projects.

Construction and other workers in the United Kingdom will, therefore, continue to campaign for detente and nuclear disarmament. We share your extreme concern at the deployment of the new Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe and will continue to do all in our power to achieve the reversal of that decision and the dismantlement of these weapons. Like you, we recognise that this deployment signifies another turn in the arms race, a further increase in military budgets and yet another reduction in the resources available to satisfy the needs of working people.

I must, however, be frank with you and say how much those very same considerations cause us to regret the response of the USSR to that deployment. We abhor the dangerous and provocative actions of NATO in placing these missiles in Western Europe. We understand the fears that such actions must give rise to in the USSR. But, we equally abhor the response of the Soviet Union as described by Chairman Y. V. Andropov in his statement of 24th November, 1983. To respond to the NATO escalation of the arms race by proceeding with its own deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, by the deployment of longer-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, and by the redeployment of further sea-based nuclear missiles is for the Soviet Union itself to contribute to an escalation of the arms race which threatens us all.

We must tell you openly that we see such a response, however much it might have been provoked by the actions of the other side, as a serious and dangerous error. It is also, in the age of massive overkill in which we live, totally unneccessary. Nikita Khrushchev once remarked, jokingly but truthfully: "We're satisfied to be able to finish off the United States first time round. Once is quite enough. What good does it do to annihilate a country twice. We're not bloodthirsty people." The Transport and General Workers' Union believes that the comment has considerable relevance. Military balance, in nuclear terms, is meaningless when already a country has the ability to destroy its enemy several times over. This only serves to prolong the arms race, whose rapid and complete demise is something to which we are both committed.

We, therefore, hope that you will feel able to use your influence to achieve a reversal of these decisions to deploy further missiles in favour of a resumption of meaningful and effective discussions at the earliest opportunity.

The T&GWU sends its greetings to Soviet building workers and urges them to continue their struggle for peace and international co-operation in the knowledge that construction workers in

Britain will be continuing that same struggle in their country.

Yours fraternally,

George Henderson

GEORGE HENDERSON,
NATIONAL SECRETARY

ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНЫЙ СОЮЗ РАБОЧИХ СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВА
И ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТИ СТРОИТЕЛЬНЫХ МАТЕРИАЛОВ
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
СССР, Москва, В-119, Ленинский просп., 42

SYNDICAT DES TRAVAILLEURS DU BATIMENT ET DES MATERIAUX DE CONSTRUCTION
Comité Central
42, Avenue Lénine,
Moscou, B-119, URSS

CONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING MATERIALS' INDUSTRY WORKERS' UNIONS
Central Committee
42, Lenin avenue,
Moscow, B-119, USSR

SINDICATO DE TRAVAJADORES DE LA EDIFICACION Y MATERIALES DE CONSTRUCCION
Comite Central
42, Avenida Lenin,
Moscù B-119, URSS

CONSTRUCTION, CIVIL ENGINEERING
AND BUILDING CRAFTS OF THE TRANSPORT
AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION

GREAT BRITAIN

Dear Comrades!

The Soviet building workers, as well as all the people of our country, are deeply concerned with continuous growth of international tension forced by the US Administration and its NATO allies.

Deployment of the American first-strike nuclear missiles which has started in West Germany, Great Britain and Italy is an extremely dangerous and imprudent act immensely aggravating the deadly threat of world disaster. This deployment, undertaken against the will and interests of the peoples, signifies another turn in the arms-race, increase in military budgets and further cut in allocations for social needs of the working people.

The workers and trade unions in construction industries are fully aware that escalation of the arms-race, militarization of economy and stockpiling of nuclear arsenals lead to curtailment of construction works - particularly housing, social and cultural projects -, increased unemployment, reduction in living standards, general deterioration of the working people's conditions and infringement upon their democratic and trade union rights. At the same time the world is short of more than 300 million flats and scores of millions of construction workers can't find a job.

3. 1277—9000

The Soviet construction workers and their trade union wholly and resolutely support the peaceful foreign policy of our state, the decisions set forth in the Statement by Comrade Y.V.Andropov aimed at averting a new war and safeguarding universal security.

The American leadership and its NATO allies have turned down the constructive proposals of the USSR, torpedoed the possibility of mutual accord what forced the Soviet Union to take counter-measures to ensure its security and that of the other countries of the socialist community.

We are fully resolved to join our efforts in struggle for disarmament, switching the means over to peaceful construction and development, provision of jobs for construction workers, satisfaction of their urgent needs and vital requirements.

Documents of the IXth International Trade Conference of Workers of the Building, Wood and Building Materials Industries (Sofia, October 1983), representing over 21 million workers of our trade, stress that "Genuine economic and social progress is possible only in atmosphere of détente, peaceful co-existence and disarmament what requires prospects for lasting and durable peace.

Peace, jobs, social and economic progress - these are the interconnected objectives, and we must unite in struggle for them on both national and international levels".

We are forwarding to you herewith the Statements by Comrade Y.V.Andropov as well as the Statement made by the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions which expounds the position of the Soviet trade unions in connection with deployment of the American missiles in Western Europe and contains concrete proposals on expansion of anti-war collaboration between trade unions of the socialist, capitalist and developing countries.

We do hope that the above Statements will meet understanding and give rise to actions in defence of peace and life on earth thus answering vital interests of the working people of our trade.

Looking forward to your answer,

yours fraternally,

IGOR LANSHIN
President

2597

PEACE

1- 23/1 File

RESTRICTED

17/1 289

GR 19/1

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 January 1984

Reminded FCO 18/1.
Should come over tonight or tomorrow 19/1
Reminded 20/1. Chased again 24/1 18/
Reminded 26/1 with Foreign Secs in Rome.

"PEACE" LETTERS FROM THE SOVIET UNION

In December the Prime Minister received a circular entitled "I vote for peace" signed by over 21,500 citizens of the Soviet Union. In some cases one circular was signed by many persons. In others, individual cards were signed. We now have 21 sacks of these documents at No. 10.

I enclose a copy of a typical example.

We have considered whether to send replies - and would not necessarily have been daunted by the numbers - but in most cases addresses have not been provided. The Prime Minister nevertheless considers that we should consider responding in some way. I should be grateful to know in the next few days whether you see any possibilities for bringing a reply to the attention of the signatories or the Soviet public more generally. It would presumably have to be in Russian.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A J COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

RESTRICTED

P.R.

(1)

Letter to FCO.

AR 11/1.

h.a.

PRIME MINISTER

You asked me whether we could draft a reply to each of the 21,000 "I vote for peace" cuttings which Soviet citizens have sent you.

The problem is that we could not deliver the replies. Most of the cards have come without addresses - and I do not suppose that the Soviet system would allow 21,000 letters from the West to get distributed anyway.

But I agree that we must do something in reply. I shall consult the experts and see what we can do.

A.J.C.

MT

10 January 1984

10 DOWNING STREET

Could I please know where I can see the 21364 cuttings?

10.1

John

Over 21 sacks in the basement - to date.

Kay

10/1/84

I VOTE FOR PEACE!

thank wholeheartedly
supported Yuri Andropov's Statement,
in which he stressed:
"Mankind deserves a better fate
than living in a conflict-torn world,
suffocating under
the burden of deadly weapons."
For the sake of this better fate,
the 70 million
who took part in the
"I Vote for Peace!" referendum,
and all Soviet people,
demand that the government
you head does not turn your people
into hostages of the Washington
politicians who may bring the planet
to the very brink of destruction.

We shall not allow
the world to be blown up!

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher

Prime Minister

of Great Britain

10 Downing Street

London Great Britain

I VOTE FOR PEACE!

Such was the motto of the antiwar youth referendum held in the USSR in 1983 by young peace activists. More than 70 million boys and girls, as well as people of the older generation who lived through the horrors of two world wars, signed the appeal for peace. In this way, all these 70 million voiced their support for the worldwide antiwar movement. In this way, they called for an end to the arms race. In this way, like all honest people on the globe,

I VOTE FOR PEACE!

Such was the motto of the antiwar youth referendum held in the USSR in 1983 by young peace activists. More than 70 million boys and girls, as well as people of the older generation who lived through the horrors of two world wars, signed the appeal for peace. In this way, all these 70 million voiced their support for the worldwide antiwar movement. In this way, they called for an end to the arms race. In this way, like all honest people on the globe,

I VOTE FOR PEACE!

they wholeheartedly supported Yuri Andropov's Statement, in which he stressed: "Mankind deserves a better fate than living in a conflict-torn world, suffocating under the burden of deadly weapons." For the sake of this better fate, the 70 million who took part in the "I Vote for Peace!" referendum, and all Soviet people, demand that the government you head stop the disastrous deployment of deadly American missiles in Europe.

We shall not allow the world to be blown up!

Prime Minister

DMB 9/1

SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL POST

Weeks beginning 19 and 26 December 1983

John - Could we draft and design a reply - and send one back to each of these. It would be worthwhile effort. It would be done in Russian

Approx No	Subject		Comment
21630	Disarmament	21364	"I vote for peace" cuttings from Russia as attached
		212	Anti cruise and nuclear weapons and calls for talks
		28	Comments following film - The Day After
		26	Anti missile letters from USA and New Zealand
394	Harrods Bomb	178	Concern and calls for action
		93	Calls for death penalty for terrorists
		44	Comments on situation in Northern Ireland
		34	Condolences from Republic of Ireland, USA, Australia and New Zealand
		28	Calls for passport control for Irish
		17	Removal of Gerry Adams and banning of Sinn Fein
236	Personal Hardship	39	Miscellaneous
		34	Housing
		34	Money
		34	Employment
		22	Tax
		17	Social Security
		15	Legal
		13	Planning
		10	Pension
		7	Health
		7	Education
		4	Disabled
85	Public Expenditure	40	Anti NHS cuts and hospital closures
		36	Anti education cuts and school closures
		9	Anti waste local authority spending
82	Prime Minister		Letters of support and good wishes
56	Law and Order	32	Anti comments by Judge Gibbens on child sex case
		24	Concern at crime rate and calls for stiffer sentences

47	HM Government	Anti Government policy
41	Gas and Electric Prices	Protests at proposed increases
40	Rates	Calls for rate reform
40	£1 coin	Comments - mainly against
38	Pensions	Plight of old age pensioners with increased prices and heating costs
33	GLC Bus Passes	Concern at proposed withdrawal of OAP concessionary bus passes
29	Videos	Support for Graham Bright MP's Bill and calls for stricter controls
27	Industry	Calls for aid to industry and small businesses
19	Cruelty to Animals	Protests at experiments on animals. Calls for new legislation

Petitions:

Approx 500 signatures for elimination of the inequalities of DES, DHSS and LA pension schemes for women from Administration and Lecturing Staff at Thurrock Technical College

Total for two weeks

2 7 7 0 5

WEEKS BEGINNING

1983	22 Mar	2 2 3 5	
	28	1 8 6 1	
	4 April	2 0 7 4	
	11	2 1 8 5	
	18	2 3 4 2	
	25	2 4 1 4	
	2 May	2 3 5 0	
	9	3 8 0 5	
	16	3 4 3 3	
	23	3 4 5 1	
	31	3 0 6 7	
	6 June	1 2 1 3 2	
	13	8 2 6 3	
	20	4 0 8 3	
	27	3 4 0 7	
	4 July	3 0 7 5	
	11	3 8 1 0	
	18	3 1 4 5	
	25	2 6 5 6	
	1 Aug	3 2 0 1	
	8	2 6 1 6	
	15	1 4 4 1	
	22	1 8 5 2	
	29	1 8 8 0	
	5 Sept	2 4 0 5	
	12	2 7 8 2	
	19	1 9 2 4	
	26	1 9 6 8	
	3 Oct	2 8 5 9	
	10	3 9 1 2	
	17	1 0 1 4 5	
	24	1 2 6 1 1	
	31	5 5 3 4	
	7 Nov	4 0 6 8	
	14	3 5 5 4	
	21	2 7 5 0	
	28	2 1 9 7	
	5 Dec	2 4 2 6	
	12	5 5 4 1	
	19 & 26	2 7 7 0 5	

JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 7 December 1983

SOVIET UNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT

Thank you for your letter of 5 December.

The Prime Minister agrees that the telegram of instructions to HM Ambassador in Moscow should be despatched and further agrees with the proposed press line and your suggestion that the texts of the correspondence between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement should be released.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister: Do you agree to the proposed telegram and press line?

Yes TA 6/12 Yes MT

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December, 1983

Dear John,

Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement

Since I wrote to you on 14 October, the Embassy in Moscow have made several further attempts to hand over the Prime Minister's letter to the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement (also known as the Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA, or the Trust Group). It is now clear that the KGB will not permit members of the group to take delivery of the Prime Minister's letter. Although from the Embassy's account (Moscow telno 1318 enclosed) there may be different views within the group, on balance the views expressed by Mr Dudkin in favour of publicising the correspondence appear to be more reliable and representative.

We think it right not to make any further attempts to hand over the Prime Minister's reply, but to give the press in Moscow and London a full account of the background and to release the texts of the group's letter and the Prime Minsiter's reply. You agreed in your letter of 15 July that the press should be told of the contents of the Prime Minister's letter once it had been delivered. Before releasing the texts, we recommend that Sir Iain Sutherland should be instructed to make a strong protest to the Russians.

If you are content we would propose to send instructions to Moscow in the terms of the enclose draft telegram. Thereafter we would propose that the Embassy should release the texts of the two letters to the British press in Moscow. The Embassy and the FCO News Department would also draw on the enclosed draft press line in answering questions.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SOVIET UNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT: DRAFT PRESS LINE

1. Our Embassy in Moscow have been trying for some time to hand over to members of the Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA (also known at the "Trust Group" and the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement) the Prime Minister's reply to the Group's letter of 14 June. Meetings were arranged at the Embassy on 5 September and 12 October but on both occasions representatives of the Group did not arrive. On 5 September a member of the Group telephoned the Embassy to say that the representatives had been arrested near the Embassy. Sir G Howe raised this with Mr Gromyko in Madrid on 7 September. On 12 October, the immediate vicinity of the Embassy was saturated with plain clothes officials and traffic on the road outside the Embassy was restricted by the militia so that access to the building was effectively blocked. A member of the Group telephoned the Embassy shortly after they were due to arrive to say that his colleagues had been detained. After both incidents we made strong representations in Moscow to the Russians and sought an assurance that there would be no further hindrance to the Group receiving the Prime Minister's reply.

2. It is clear from the Embassy's most recent contact with the Group that it will not be possible to hand over the Prime Minister's reply. With the agreement of a member of the Group, we think it right now to make public both the background and the texts of the letters themselves.

3. Our Ambassador in Moscow has made a further strong protest to the Soviet authorities. He has pointed out the clear breach of the commitments the Russians have only just undertaken in the concluding document of the CSCE Review meeting in Madrid to assist access to Diplomatic Missions.

<u>Supplementaries</u>

<u>Why were the letters not published earlier</u>?

We had hoped the Russians would take account of our previous representations. We also wished to make every reasonable effort

/to

to deliver the Prime Minister's letter to the Group. It is now clear that the Group will not be permitted to receive the letter. In these circumstances publication of the letters will draw attention to this regrettable incident and to the need by the Soviet authorities to honour their international commitments.

Is publicity likely to harm members of the group?

The group have consistently sought publicity for their activities. Moreover the Soviet authorities already know of the existence of the correspondence.

What commitments in the Madrid Concluding Document have the Soviet authorities breached?

In the sector on human contacts the Soviet Union undertook to facilitate the normal functioning of diplomatic missions. Specifically they stated that - "Access to these missions will be assured with due regard to the necessary requirements of security of these missions."

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

GR350
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 181110Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1318 OF 18 NOV 83.

YOUR TEL NO 919: SOVIET UNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT.

1. AFTER SEVERAL ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT REITMAN'S GROUP, WE HAVE NOW HAD THREE TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH DUDKIN, WITHIN THE LAST 5 DAYS WHILE THE GROUP REFLECTED AND CONSULTED AMONG THEMSELVES. THE UPSHOT, IS THAT, SINCE WE CANNOT MEET THE GROUP ELSEWHERE AND ACCOMPANY THEM TO THE EMBASSY, THEY DO NOT SEE ANY POINT IN AGAIN ATTEMPTING TO COME TO THE EMBASSY, THE KBG HAVING ON THE LAST OCCASION TOLD THEM IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INTERCEPTED.

2. AFTER THE SECOND CONVERSATION, WHEN THE GROUP'S DECISION WAS CLEAR, WE ASKED DUDKIN WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION OF THEIR LETTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY. AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATION, HE CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, THEY WOULD FAVOUR PUBLICATION. HE COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD OBVIATE THE NEED FOR US TO HAND OVER A TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY. WE MADE CLEAR THAT THE BACKGROUND WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE BRITISH PRESS.

3. ON 17 NOVEMBER, TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER THE LAST OF OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH DUDKIN, WE WERE TELEPHONED BY SOMEONE WHO CLAIMED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE GROUP, AND WHO MAY HAVE BEEN ROSENOER (HE DID NOT CLEARLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF). THIS CALLER SAID THAT IN AGREEING TO PUBLICATION DUDKIN HAD SPOKEN ONLY FOR HIMSELF, NOT FOR THE GROUP AS A WHOLE, WHICH WAS AGAINST PUBLICATION. WHILE WE CANNOT BE SURE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CALLER WAS EITHER AN IMPOSTER OR A MEMBER OF THE GROUP SPEAKING UNDER DURESS. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL CERTAINLY HAVE MONITORED OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH DUDKIN, AND HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTEREST IN TRYING TO FORESTALL PUBLICATION. THE GROUP THEMSELVES, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT PUBLICITY. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAS WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH PUBLICATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 4. IF YOU

4. IF YOU AGREE, I THINK THAT THIS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A MOSCOW, RATHER THAN A LONDON, STORY. IT IS IN FACT POSSIBLE THAT THE GROUP THEMSELVES MAY, AS IN THE PAST, CONTACT LOCAL BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY AUTHORITY TO RELEASE DETAILS BOTH OF THE CORRESPONDENCE AND OF OUR ABORTIVE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE DELIVERY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER.

SUTHERLAND

LIMITED
SOVIET D
NEWS D
RESEARCH D
PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

ZCZC
GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM DECEMBER 83
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER
YOUR TELNO 1318: SOVIET UNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT

1. We agree that the time has now come for publication. The Prime Minister has agreed that before releasing the texts of the letters you should speak at an appropriate level to the MFA leaving the Russians in no doubt of the effect on public and Ministerial attitudes of this incident, and making the following points:

(i) the group has now been prevented on several occasions from reaching the Embassy to receive the Prime Minister's reply to their letter. This is deplorable. I raised this directly with Gromyko in Madrid on 7 September, who undertook to look into the question. We had presumed that no further obstacles would be put in the way of the group receiving the Prime Minister's letter. But this has turned out not to be the case.

(ii) Soviet actions are impossible to reconcile with their

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword recent
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Limited Soviet D News D Research D Info D PS PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Mr Whitney PS/PUS Sir J Bullard Mr Jenkins cc: 10 Downing Street
Drafted by (Block capitals) ROGER BONE		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 48

<<<<

recent commitments at Madrid to assure access by visitors to diplomatic missions.

(iii) The fact that the Soviet authorities have, notwithstanding our representations, repeatedly prevented the transmission of a letter from the Prime Minister in response to one criticising the arrest of members of the peace movement in Britain will inevitably raise serious doubts in the minds of Ministers as well as with public and parliamentary opinion about the value of Soviet commitments to peace as well as towards their commitments in the Madrid and Helsinki Documents.

(iv) We now intend to make public the background to the incident and the texts of the group's letter and the Prime Minister's reply.

2. Following your protest to the MFAyou should release the texts of the two letters to the British press in Moscow and draw on the Press line in MIFT. News Department will respond on the same basis to questions here.

HOWE

NNNN

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//

/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

SOVIET UNION : Relations : Pt 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sub

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 10 November 1983

ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 8 November.

The Prime Minister agrees that the visit of the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko should be re-arranged for the third week of December.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Agree Kornienko's visit should be rearranged for third week of December?
DRUS
9/11

Yes MT

8 November, 1983

Dear John,

Anglo/Soviet Relations

In your letter of 11 July, you said the Prime Minister agreed that there would be advantage in arranging for the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko to pay a return visit to Britain in mid-September for talks with Mr Rifkind.

As you know, the talks fixed for 15/16 September were postponed following the Soviet shooting down of the KAL airliner. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary now intends, if the Prime Minister agrees, to try to re-arrange these talks for the third week in December. This would indicate to the Russians that we were interested in giving some substance to references in the Prime Minister's and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recent public statements about the desirability of increasing our contacts with the Russians and putting our views directly to them. Talks in December would give us a further opportunity of stressing both the firmness of our position on INF deployment, as well as the West's genuine interest in continuing the negotiations in 1984. A visit by Kornienko might also prepare the way for further bilateral meetings in 1984, if the circumstances are right.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Sov. Union

WC | Soviet Relations No. 2

FILE

JR

cc: Constit
(letter returned)
FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 October, 1983

Dear Mr. Campbell-Savours,

Thank you for your letter of 26 September enclosing correspondence from Mrs. Ruth Balogh about the reported arrest of a number of members of the Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA.

A member of the 'Trust Group' wrote to me earlier this year on the question of curbing the nuclear arms race. I do not often reply myself to letters from private individuals overseas. On this occasion, however, I decided that, in view of the personal risks taken by the Soviet citizens involved to deliver their message (they only managed to reach our Embassy at their third attempt, having been detained by the KGB on the first two occasions), it would be right for me to reply.

A meeting had been arranged between a member of the Embassy Staff in Moscow and representatives of the 'Trust Group' on 5 September to hand over my reply to their letter. The representatives did not arrive. If, as a member of the Group has reported, they were prevented from carrying out the appointment by being forcibly detained on their way to the Embassy, that is deplorable. Members of the Group were again prevented from reaching the Embassy to receive my reply on 12 October. We made strong representations to the Russians on both occasions about the harassment of the Group, and sought an assurance that there will be no further hindrance to their receiving my letter.

/ I do not

KW

I do not think it would be right to divulge the contents of my letter to a group of private individuals until it has been successfully delivered or until it is clear that this is not possible. But I can assure you that the first attempt by the Embassy to hand over my letter was certainly not timed to coincide with the planned visit of 'Women for Life on Earth' to the Soviet Union. My reply was in fact sent some weeks earlier, but it had taken our Embassy some time to contact the group.

As to Mrs Balogh's last point, people in this country are free to correspond with anyone they choose, including the Soviet authorities. We do not harass those who hold different views, or deprive them of such elementary rights as freedom of expression and privacy of correspondence. That is one of the crucial differences between democracy and despotism.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Dale Campbell-Savours, Esq., MP.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 October 1983

SIR I. SUTHERLAND

Thank you for your letter of 13 October. The Prime Minister could see Sir Ian Sutherland at 9.30 a.m. on Tuesday, 25 October (for thirty minutes)

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TF

A.J.C. 17

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Is this OK?

14 October 1983

Dear Tim,

Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA

In your letter of 29 September you asked for a draft reply from the Prime Minister to a letter of 26 September from Mr Dale Campbell-Savours MP, enclosing a letter to him from a Mrs Ruth Balogh. — GD?

The Group referred to in Mr Campbell-Savours' letter is also known as the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement. They wrote to the Prime Minister on 14 June about the nuclear arms race. The Prime Minister agreed to send a personal reply in view of the risks they had run in delivering their letter. However, representatives of the Group did not reach the Embassy for an appointment on 5 September to receive Mrs Thatcher's reply. Another member of the Group subsequently reported by telephone that they had been forcibly detained on their way to the Embassy. The same thing happened again yesterday, 12 October (Moscow telno 1149 enclosed). (They were similarly harassed when they initially delivered their own letter to the Embassy; they only succeeded in doing so at the third attempt.) We mave made strong representations to the Russians on both occasions, and sought an assurance that there would be no further hindrance to their receiving the Prime Minister's letter.

In your letter of 15 July you agreed that the Press should be informed of the Prime Minister's reply and given a full account of its contents. We thought it right to delay doing this until every effort had been made to deliver the letter to the Group. The Embassy in Moscow have recommended, and we agree, that they should make one more attempt to get the letter to the Group in a few days' time. The Embassy will also try to check with the Group that publicising the gist of their letter to the Prime Minister would not cause them embarrassment.

We suggest that the Prime Minister should not accede to Mrs Balogh's request to know the contents of the letter.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HDS
SOV DEPT
NEWS DEPT
INFO DEPT
PS
PS / MR RIFKIND
PS / MR WHITNEY
PUS
SIR T. BRELAND
MR JAMES
LORD N. GORDON LENNOX
No 10. D. ST
R.C

XII

DWF G 199

LLD 357/12

OO FCO

GRS 277
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 121414Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1149 OF 12 OCT

UNOFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE GROUP

1. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE AGAIN STOPPED US FROM HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP.

2. AN APPOINTMENT WAS MADE FOR MEMBERS OF THE GROUP TO COME TO THE EMBASSY AT 1500 HOURS TODAY, 12 OCTOBER. APPROXIMATELY HALF AN HOUR BEFORE THE GROUP WAS DUE TO ARRIVE, THE APPROACHES TO, AND IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF, THE EMBASSY WERE SATURATED WITH PLAIN CLOTHES OFFICIALS AND TRAFFIC ALONG THE EMBASSY EMBANKMENT WAS RESTRICTED BY THE MILITIA.

3. A MEMBER OF THE GROUP TELEPHONED SHORTLY AFTER 1500 HOURS TO SAY THAT HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN DETAINED NEAR THE EMBASSY BUT THAT HE HAD MANAGED TO AVOID ARREST AND REACH A CALL BOX. HE ADDED THAT ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING HE HAD BEEN WARNED BY THE KGB THAT THE GROUP WOULD BE STOPPED FROM COMING TO THE EMBASSY AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT MAKE THE ATTEMPT.

4. ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF WERE ON THE LOOKOUT, THEY DID NOT WITNESS THE ARRESTS. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE KGB HAS ONCE AGAIN INTERVENED. I RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, THAT WE SHOULD FIRMLY PROTEST HERE AND IN LONDON AT THE SOVIET FAILURE TO HEED THE REPRESENTATIONS WHICH YOU MADE TO GROMYKO (MADRID TELNO 516) AND I TO THE MFA HERE (MOSCOW TELNO 001 TO UKDEL MADRID). WE ALSO WARNED THE MFA YESTERDAY OF THE APPOINTMENT AND SAID THAT WE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSTACLES WOULD BE PUT IN THE GROUP'S WAY.

5. WE INTEND TO INFORM LOCAL BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED.

RATFORD

SR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teleletter~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~	TYPE: Draft/Final 1+
FROM: Prime Minister DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:	Reference
TO: Dale Campbell-Savours Esq MP House of Commons LONDON SW1A 0AA	Your Reference Copies to:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 26 September enclosing correspondence from Mrs Ruth Balogh about the reported arrest of a number of members of the Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA.

A member of the 'Trust Group' wrote to me earlier this year on the question of curbing the nuclear arms race. I do not often reply myself to letters from private individuals overseas. On this occasion, however, I decided that, in view of the personal risks taken by the Soviet citizens involved to deliver their message (they only managed to reach our Embassy at their third attempt, having been detained by the KGB on the first two occasions), it would be right for me to reply.

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/a

a member of the Group has reported, they were prevented from carrying out the appointment by being forcibly detained on their way to the Embassy, that is deplorable. Members of the Group were again prevented from reaching the Embassy to receive my reply on 12 October. We made strong representations to the Russians on both occasions about the harassment of the Group, and sought an assurance that there will be no further hindrance to their receiving my letter.

I do not think it would be right to divulge the contents of my letter to a group of private individuals until it has been successfully delivered or until it is clear that this is not possible. But I can assure you that the first attempt by the Embassy to hand over my letter was certainly not timed to coincide with the planned visit of 'Women for Life on Earth' to the Soviet Union. My reply was in fact sent some weeks earlier, but it had taken our Embassy some time to contact the group.

As to Mrs Balogh's last point, people in this country are free to correspond with anyone they choose, including the Soviet authorities. We do not harass those who hold different views, or deprive them of such elementary rights as freedom of expression and privacy of correspondence. That is one of the crucial differences between democracy and depotism.

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1987

Prime Minister

Would you like to see our Ambassador in Moscow for 30 minutes on Tuesday, 25 October (at 9.30)?

A.J.C. 14/10.

I don't want to buy a morning. It is our first Cabinet day.

Yes MT

Dear Julian

Possible call by Sir I Sutherland on the Prime Minister

Sir I Sutherland, our Ambassador at Moscow, is at present in London on leave before returning to Moscow on 27 October. He will be calling on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary before he returns to discuss both our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and East/West relations generally.

In view of the attention the Prime Minister has given these questions and her recent discussions in Washington, it would be particularly valuable for Sir I Sutherland if the Prime Minister were able to see him before he returns to Moscow, as she did before he took up his post last year. Sir Iain will be in London on 20/21 October and 24/25 October.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

SENT 12 OCT 1983

DWF G 199

LLO 357/12

OD FCO

HDS
Sov Dept
News Dept
Inf Res Dept
PS / Mr Rifkind
PS / Mr Whitmore
PUS
Sir T. Bolland
Mr James
Lord N. Gordon Lennox
No 10. D. St
R.C

XII

GRS 277
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 121414Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1149 OF 12 OCT

UNOFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE GROUP

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5. WE INTEND TO INFORM LOCAL BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED.

RATFORD

We have protested and shall try again.
MCL
MG

GR . 275

RESTRICTED

PS TO PM . 10.DOWNING ST.

RESTRICTED

FROM MOSCOW 040645Z OCTOBER

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1118 OF 4 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON

SOVIET ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATION.

1. AN OFFICIALLY-SPONSORED AND CAREFULLY ORGANISED DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW ON 1 OCTOBER . WE ESTIMATE THAT 100 - 200 THOUSAND PEOPLE (THOUGH PRAVDA CLAIMED IT WAS 800,000) MARCHED IN AN ORDERLY FASHION AND ASSEMBLED AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CITY TO HEAR SPEECHES. THERE WERE NO DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE EMBASSIES, ALTHOUGH SOME COLUMNS OF MARCHERS WENT PAST THE U S EMBASSY AND SHOUTED SLOGANS AS THEY DID SO. AMONG THE NUMEROUS PLACARDS THERE WAS NO UNDUE EMPHASIS ON ANTI - U S OR NATO THEMES. TWO OF THE MAIN SLOGANS WERE '' NO NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE '' AND '' REDUCE THE EXISTING ARSENALS ''.

2. THE DEMONSTRATORS ISSUED A SHORT STATEMENT, CARRIED PROMINENTLY IN THE PRESS. THIS WAS MAINLY FOCUSSED ON INF AND BROUGHT IN REFERENCES BOTH TO BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES AND TO SOVIET COUNTER-MEASURES.

3. IN PARALLEL WITH THE ABOVE , THE SOVIET PRESS HAVE PUBLISHED LETTERS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. A MAIN THEME OF THESE HAS BEEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION 'S STRIVING FOR PEACE DOES NOT REFLECT WEAKNESS AND THAT IT HAS THE WHEREWITHAL TO REBUFF ANY AGGRESSOR. THE PRESS HAVE ALSO INCREASED THEIR COVERAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE MOVEMENT, GIVING THE SOVIET READER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS NOW IN FULL CRY.

4. THE TIMING OF THE DEMONSTRATION SO SOON AFTER ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT ON U S FOREIGN POLICY (MY TELNO 1091) IS , AS EVER, NO COINCIDENCE. THE INTENTION APPEARS TO BE TO SET THE STATEMENT FIRMLY AGAINST THE BACKGRROUND OF THE SOVIET UNION'S '' PEACE CAMPAIGN ''.

RATFORD

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
EED
NAD
WED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES
SOV D

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START

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MR PASCALL NO 10 DOWNING STREET

RESTRICTED

Dale Campbell-SAVOURS MP

13/10

HL

ACK 29/9.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 September 1983

I enclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours, M.P., with which he encloses one from Mrs. Ruth Balogh.

Contrary to what Mrs. Balogh claims, we have no record of having written to any organisation called the "Group for Trust".

I should be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Dale Campbell-Savours by Thursday 13 October.

WILLIAM RICKETT

Chris Branner, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

6

Loweswater Hall
nr Cockermouth
Cumbria CA13 OSU

tel: Lamplugh 861447

Sept 22nd 1983

Dear Dale,

I am very concerned about the recent arrest of several members of the small Moscow-based group of intellectuals, the "Group for Trust", which as you may know, has established contact with the rather larger, British based "Women for Life on Earth".

The arrest took place when four members were on their way to pick up a letter from the Prime Minister from the British Embassy. I feel that Mrs.Thatcher should be pressed very strongly to reveal the contents of the letter; to be asked whether she makes a habit of communicating with small groups struggling for human rights elsewhere in the world (for instance El Salvador), and to explain why the letter arrived to coincide with the (since postponed) visit of the Women For Life on Earth to the USSR.

I would, of course, also like to know how she would react if the USSR were to send similar letters to the Women For Life on Earth in Britain, but the conservative government's hypocrisy concerning East West relations renders this question purely rhetorical.

I hope you are able to help, and look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Ruth Balogh.

Ruth Balogh

Mr Collis

2726.

P.O

(Hoi-C)

AMCAST 025/28

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 110
SECRET

Prime Minister

FM FCO 281630Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (FOR PS/NO 10), MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIAL

1. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN SUMMONED TO SEE JAMES AT 1230 HOURS ON 29 SEPTEMBER. HE WILL BE INFORMED THAT V V IONOV, AN OFFICIAL AT THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION, HAS ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS POSITION, AND MUST LEAVE THE UK WITHIN SEVEN DAYS.

2. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF ON THE RECORD STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT AT 1500 ON 29 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES.

HOWE

NNNN

NO TRACE

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

26 September 1983

DCS/JG/P.3

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
House of Commons
LONDON
SW1A 0AA

See attached P28
Did we write to the "Group for Trust" this year? NT GR

Dear Mrs Thatcher

I have received the enclosed correspondence from Mrs Ruth Balogh, who is obviously concerned about the arrest of several members of the Moscow based group of intellectuals, the "Group for Trust". She raises a number of questions in the letter and I wonder if you would care to reply to those questions.

Yours sincerely

DALE CAMPBELL-SAVOURS MP

X ref please

PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

Mr. Callaghan's proposed meeting with Mr. Andropov

Following is the FCO line:-

"Mr. Callaghan did, of course, tell us of his plans to visit the Soviet Union when this was first proposed much earlier this year. He has no doubt considered carefully whether he should go ahead with it in the light of the Korean airliner disaster and of the Government's and other reactions to it. His decision to do so is clearly for him to make."

The above has been cleared with the Foreign Secretary.

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 2 OF 2 COPIES

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 September, 1983

Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officer

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 23 September.

A. J. COLES

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10

Prime Minister

A & C. 23/9.

23 September 1983

Dear John,

Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officer

On the recommendation of the Security Service, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has agreed that we should expel V V Ionov, an official of the Soviet Trade Delegation and an identified GRU officer.

Ionov has been here since April 1981. It is his first foreign posting, and he does not have diplomatic status. The fact that he succeeded an identified GRU officer, and associated with other GRU officers, and made considerable use of anti-surveillance techniques, naturally led to suspicions that he was himself a member of the GRU.

These activities - and more especially those summarised in paragraph 2 above - are sufficient to warrant expulsion, particularly in view of our own concerns, and those of the US Government, about technology transfer to the Soviet Union.

/No damage

No damage has been done by Ionov in these particular cases, but Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that we must clearly take action in cases where activity of this kind is detected.

As Ionov is not a diplomat he is the responsibility of the Home Secretary. Papers are being submitted to Mr Brittan this weekend. Subject to his concurrence, we propose that action should be taken in this matter by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Action will be taken as soon as is reasonably possible, and an immediate announcement will be made. We naturally hope that there will be no retaliation, and shall warn the Soviet Ambassador that if there is, we shall respond.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GR 240

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 051615Z SEPTEMBER

FROM MOSCOW 051545Z SEPTEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 973 OF 5 SEPTEMBER

SOVIET UNNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT .

MEYER'S TELELETTER 81/4 OF 25 AUGUST TO EESD.

1. MEMBERS OF THE UNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT WERE APPARENTLY ARRESTED ON 5 SEPTEMBER WHILE EN ROUTE TO THE EMBASSY TO COLLECT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO REITMAN.

2. REITMAN HAD TELEPHONED AND ARRANGED TO CALL AT THE EMBASSY AT 1300 HRS TO COLLECT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. HE DID NOT SHOW UP. AT 1615 HRS MEDVEKOV, ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE GROUP, RANG THE EMBASSY TO SAY THAT REITMAN , TOGETHER WITH MEDVEKOV'S WIFE, OLGA, ROSENAUR AND BUDKIN HAD BEEN ARRESTED NEAR THE EMBASSY AT 1300 HRS . BUDKIN TELEPHONED AN HOUR LATER , SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN RELEASED BUT THAT THE OTHERS WERE STILL BEING HELD.

3. REUTERS HAD SIMULTANEOUSLY RECEIVED SIMILAR TELEPHONE MESSAGES. WE HAVE CONFIRMED IN ANSWER TO PRESS ENQUIRIES THAT WE WERE EXPECTING REITMAN , THAT HE HAD NOT TURNED UP, THAT THE APPOINTMENT WAS TO COLLECT A REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE LETTER SENT BY THE DOVERIYA GROUP IN JUNE .

4. WE ONLY HAVE MEDVDDKOV'S AND BUDKIN'S WORD FOR IT (MEMBERS OF CHANCERY WAITED FOR HALF AN HOUR BY THE EMBASSY GATES AND SAW NOTHING UNTOWARD). IT SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE INDEED DETAINED BY THE KGB. I PROPOSE TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH THE MFA , COMPLAINING AT THE PREVENTION OF REITMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP FROM CARRYING OUT AN APPOINTMENT MADE AT THE EMBASSY IN ORDER TO COLLECT A LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

SUTHERLAND

LIMITED
EESD PS/MR RIFKIND
NEWS D PS/PUS
INFO D SIR J BULLARD
DEFENCE D MR JAMES
PUSD MR CARTLEDGE
PS

COPIED SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

file

CONFIDENTIAL

dr
c Inglham

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 July 1983

Message to the Prime Minister from the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement

Thank you for your letter of 13 July.

The Prime Minister agrees that a reply to the message from the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement should be delivered by our Embassy in Moscow. I enclose a letter signed by Mrs. Thatcher and should be grateful if you would take the necessary action.

We also agree that the press should be informed that the Prime Minister has sent a reply. We believe it would be right to give the press a full account of its contents.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir

File

RM

c FCO
Ingham

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 July 1983

Dear Dr. Reitman.

Thank you for your letter which you delivered through our Embassy in Moscow on 29 June. I think it is very important that ordinary people in every country should have the opportunity to voice their opinions on the vital issues of peace and war. Although I do not agree with everything you say in your letter, I welcome the fact that you have written to me. I endorse your aim of curbing nuclear arms and improving the prospects for continued peace between East and West. No one is a stronger advocate than I of maintaining peace with security.

As regards the specific questions you raise, I think you may be under some misapprehension as to what has been happening in Britain. No action has been taken against participants in peaceful protests against the Government's nuclear defence policy. Large numbers of people have demonstrated and made their views absolutely clear without any action being taken against them. Peaceful demonstrations are legal in Britain. However, some people have been arrested because they have broken the law by obstructing public roads. I have to tell you that it would be quite wrong, and indeed impossible, for the British Government to interfere with the normal process of justice in such cases. In this country, the courts are independent of the Government.

The debate on these issues is open and frank in our Parliament, in the newspapers and on television and through speeches and meetings all over the country. I have always welcomed this open debate.

/It

It has enabled us to put forward our views as clearly as we have heard the views of those who disagree with the current policy of Western Governments. The British people gave a decisive indication of their preference in our recent election.

I should like to hear of an equally open debate in the Warsaw Pact countries about these great issues. I fully understand that this would involve criticisms of some things in Britain such as those you have made, but debate which includes both criticism and the chance of reply to it can only assist the causes of peace and truth.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Reitman

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 July 1983

Prime Minister

If you agree with this, you may like to sign the attached letter.

AC 14/7

Dear John,

Message to the Prime Minister from the Soviet Unofficial Peace Movement

On 29 June, representatives of the Unofficial Soviet Peace Movement delivered to our Embassy in Moscow a message addressed to the Prime Minister of which I enclose the text, together with the Embassy's translation. The group had made two previous attempts to deliver the message, but had been detained by the KGB.

Although we would not normally advise the Prime Minister to reply to a message of this kind, the special circumstances of its delivery and the degree of personal risk taken by the Soviet citizens involved would appear to justify an exception. I therefore enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister.

If the Prime Minister agrees, we will arrange to have this letter delivered by our Embassy in Moscow. Bearing in mind that the delivery to the Embassy of the message was reported by the press and also the publicity given recently to messages from Mr Andropov to individuals in the west, we would propose that once the Embassy have confirmed delivery of the letter, the press should be informed that the Prime Minister has sent a reply and of the gist of its content.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

MOSCOW GROUP FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUST BETWEEN USSR & USA

TO: THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP

Respected Mrs Thatcher!

We, the members of the Moscow peace group "Doveriya" are deeply disturbed by the recent mass arrests of British peace supporters which we heard of in the Soviet press. Our group is certain that the curbing of the nuclear arms race and of disarmament can only be achieved under a climate of international trust between governments and between East and West. We consider that the peaceful activistsof Great Britain are promoting the establishment of such a climate through their actions.

We know several peace supporters in your country personally and count them as friends, recently we received in Moscow Ann Petit, Carmen Cutler and others. You must agree, Mrs Thatcher, that when your friends are thrown in prison, even for just a few days, you cannot remain indifferent.

We know that there is not a national peace movement. There is one movement which has one aim: peace. Both the British movement and the peace movement in our country are parts of a whole. Therefore we do not consider the arrests to be an internal matter for Great Britain. We allow that the arrested peace activists may have committed some petty offences such as trespassing on state property. But it does not seen to us that the harm they caused was in proportion with the harm which they were trying to avert: the threat of global nuclear war.

The "Doveriya" Group intends in future to watch out carefully for any repression whose victims are peace supporters in any country of the West or the East.

МОСКОВСКАЯ ГРУППА ЗА УСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ДОВЕРИЯ
МЕЖДУ СССР И США

Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher M.P.
~~ЕЕ ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ~~ ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ
МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР
ДАУНИНГ СТРИТ,10
ЛОНДОН, ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИЯ

Многоуважаемая госпожа Тэтчер:

Мы - члены московской мирной группы "Доверие" - глубоко озабочены недавними массовыми арестами британских сторонников мира, о которых мы узнали из советской прессы.Наша группа уверена в том, что добиться прекращения гонки ядерных вооружений и последующего разоружения можно только при условии создания климата международного доверия между как правительствами, так и общественностью Востока и Запада.И мы считаем, что мирные активисты Великобритании своими действиями способствуют установлению такого доверия.

Некоторых сторонников мира в вашей стране мы знаем лично и можем назвать своими друзьями - недавно мы принимали в Москве Эни Петит, Кармен Катлер и других.Согласитесь, госпожа Тэтчер, что, когда ваших друзей бросают в тюрьмы - пусть даже на несколько дней - к этому нельзя остаться равнодушным.

Мы уже поняли, что не существует национальных движений за мир.Есть одно движение, у которого одна цель - Мир.И британское движение, и движение за мир в нашей стране - части одного целого. Поэтому мы не считаем аресты внутренним делом Великобритании.

Мы допускаем мысль о том, что арестованные мирные активисты могли совершить некоторые мелкие правонарушения, как например, вторгнуться в частное или государственное владение.Но нам кажется что то зло, которое они при этом причинили, нельзя даже сравнить по своим масштабам с тем злом, которое они пытались предотвратить - угрозой глобальной термоядерной войны.

Группа "Доверие" намерена и в будущем пристально следить за репрессиями, жертвами которых становятся сторонники мира в любой стране Запада или Востока.

Москва 14 июня 1983

MJ

CONFIDENTIAL

11 July 1983

Anglo-Soviet Relations

Thank you for your letter of 7 July. The Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that there would be advantage in arranging for Kornienko to pay a return visit to Britain in mid-September for talks with Mr. Rifkind.

AJC

Brian Fall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

DID

Prime Minister

Agree that Mr. Rifkind should invite Kornienko to pay a return visit in mid-September.

A.J.C. 8/7.

Yes MT

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

7 July 1983

Dear John,

Anglo-Soviet Relations

When Mr Rifkind visited the Soviet Union in late April he invited his Soviet host, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko, to visit Britain. The invitation was accepted in principle.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that there would be advantage in arranging for Kornienko to pay a return visit to Britain in mid-September for talks with Mr Rifkind. Kornienko is an experienced senior member of the Soviet Foreign Ministry whose main concerns are in the strategic field. The talks would enable us to impress on the Russians once again the firmness of our position on INF and our determination to carry through deployment later in the year should this be necessary. A visit by Kornienko in mid-September would also be useful in preparing for the meeting which Sir Geoffrey Howe would expect to have with Gromyko during the session of the UN General Assembly later in the month.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

GR 315

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FROM MOSCOW 170555Z MAY

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 519 OF 17 MAY

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL MADRID AND WASHINGTON

HUMAN RIGHTS.

1. PRAVDA ON 14 MAY CARRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY THE VETERAN COMMENTATOR YURI ZHUKOV (WHO IS ALSO CHAIRMAN OF THE OFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE) ENTITLED '' MRS THATCHER'S GLASS HOUSE ''.

2. THE ARTICLE , RECALLING THE BRITISH PROVERB ABOUT THOSE IN GLASS HOUSES NOT THROWING STONES, CRITICISED MR RIFKIND'S REFERENCE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO HMG'S REPEATED PLEAS FOR '' A RENEGADE CONVICTED IN THE USSR FOR ESPIONAGE FOR THE USA ''. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD NOT DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF THE 5,000 PRISONERS HELD WITHOUT PROPER COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE UK WHICH MR LEWIS MP HAD MENTIONED TO MR RIFKIND. THE SOVIET UNION STRICTLY ADHERED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE WRITTEN INTO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT EVEN THOUGH SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION FELT COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH PROTESTS BY BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST BLATANT INFRINGEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK. ZHUKOV THEN DESCRIBED AT SOME LENGTH ALLEGED INFRINGEMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO WORK (HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT) : AND OF POLITICAL RIGHTS (PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT FORGOTTEN THE ICY INDIFFERENCE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE DYING HUNGER STRIKERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND) : RACIAL DISCRIMINATION : AND '' MOST REPULSIVE OF ALL '', THE SUPPRESSION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PEACE (ARRESTS OF THE WOMEN OF GREENHAM COMMON).

3. IT IS NOT OFTEN THAT A COMMENTATOR OF ZHUKOV'S SENIORITY DEVOTES A FULL LENGTH ARTICLE TO THE UK . IT IS A SHARP RESPONSE TO MR RIFKIND'S APPEAL ON BEHALF OF SHCHARANSKY. BUT SINCE THE LATTER IS NOT ACTUALLY NAMED, THE ARTICLE DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY ANYTHING ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF HIS EVENTUAL RELEASE. TASS AND NOVOSTI HAVE NOT DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE ARTICLE.

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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FM MOSCOW 120604Z MAY 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 497 OF 12 MAY 83

SOVIET COMMENT ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S BBC INTERVIEW OF 8 MAY.

1. AN OTHERWISE ROUTINE ARTICLE BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMENTATOR MATVEYEV IN IZVESTIA OF 10 MAY DEALING WITH EAST/WEST TRADE RELATIONS CONTAINED A SHARP ATTACK ON THE PRIME MINISTER FOR STATEMENTS MADE IN HER BBC INTERVIEW ON 8 MAY.

2. NOTING THE PRIME MINISTER'S PAST RECOGNITION THAT ''ANTI-COMMUNISM HAD BEEN IN HER BLOOD ALMOST SINCE CHILDHOOD'' MATVEYEV COMMENTED THAT NOBODY EXPECTED FROM HER '' A POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION''. BUT IN THE PRESENT AGE IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALL GOVERNMENTS, STATES AND LEADERS ''NOT TO CONDUCT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF IDEOLOGICAL LIKING OR ANTIPATHY BUT RATHER TO PUT THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE FIRST AND FOREMOST ''. HOWEVER, BLINDED BY HOSTILITY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND FROM EXTREME POSITIONS, SHE HAD MADE '' UNRESTRAINED PRONOUNCEMENTS'' ABOUT THE COUNTRY, ITS POLICIES AND ITS LEADERS. UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSORS WITH CONSERVATIVE VIEWS, THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT TAKEN A SINGLE STEP TOWARDS IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST STATES AND IN THE BBC INTERVIEW SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES HAD BEEN DISMISSED OUT OF HAND.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 27 April 1983

Dear Richard,

Meetings between UK and Soviet Officials

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 22 April proposing a meeting later this year between C-in-C BAOR and his Soviet opposite number. She is inclined to think that several more months should elapse before any such meeting takes place. Mr. Heseltine may therefore wish to consult the Prime Minister again later this year.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD.

Yours ever

John Coles.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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da

GR 663

CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM MOSCOW 251615Z APRIL

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 25 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE PARIS , BONN, WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST , BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN , WARSAW, PRAGUE, TOKYO AND PEKING.

VMY TELNO 422 : MR RIFKIND'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

DISCUSSION WITH KORNIENKO ON 25 APRIL : INF.

SUMMARY.

1. MR RIFKIND STRESSED EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION AND FIRMLY REJECTED THE INCLUSION OF BRITISH SYSTEMS. KORNIENKO TOOK A HARD LINE ON THIS LATTER POINT BUT BARELY MENTIONED OTHER ASPECTS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER AGREE NOT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BRITISH WEAPONS. NOR COULD IT BE MOVED ON A QUESTION OF SOVIET MISSILES IN THE FAR EAST. AT NO POINT DID KORNIENKO MENTION THE PRAGUE DECLARATION.

DETAIL.

2. MR RIFKIND OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF INF BY STRESSING THAT THE WEST WAS UNITED . THE EUROPEANS WERE RESOLUTE IN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN POSITION. THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES IF NECESSARY HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO HOPE THAT THE SO-CALLED PEACE MOVEMENTS WOULD CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENTS' ACTIONS . HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO LINK A REDUCTION IN SOVIET MISSILES WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENTS WAS, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE, TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. WE WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS: THE NEED WAS FOR PARITY BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS: THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF INFERIORITY TO THE USSR. THE SOVIET UNION WAS TRYING TO LINK WEAPONS WHICH WERE NOT COMPARABLE. AS THE RUSSIANS HAD RECOGNISED IN THE PAST, BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STRATEGIC. THE WEST WAS ANXIOUS FOR AGREEMENT IN INF, START AND ELSEWHERE, BUT PARITY BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS WAS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

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3. KORNIENKO SAID THAT JUST AS WITH SALT II THE WEST HAD RECOGNISED THE EXISTENCE OF PARITY BUT HAD THEN CHANED ITS MIND SO WITH INF THEIR VIEWS HAD SHIFTED. AT THE TIME OF THE DOUBLE TRACK DECISION IN DECEMBER 1979, AND AS LATE AS MID-1981, NATO LEADERS WERE SAYING THAT THE BALANCE HAD NOT YET BEEN DISRUPTED. A FEW MONTHS LATER WITH THE ZERO OPTION THEY WERE DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET MISSILES WHICH HAD ALREADY EXISTED IN 1979 AND EVEN THOSE WHICH HAD EXISTED IN 1976 BEFORE SS20 DEPLOYMENT BEGAN.

4. MR RIFKIND SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN CONSISTENT. FURTHER SS20 DEPLOYMENT SINCE 1979 HAD EXACERBATED THE IMBALANCE . THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCERNED WITH HOW TO ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE SITUATION.

5. KORNIENKO ARGUED THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WERE MEDIUM-RANGE . HE DENIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AS STRATEGIC IN SALT: THERE WAS NO UNDERSTANDING WITH THE AMERICCANS ON WHAT WAS STRATEGIC EXCEPT FOR LAND-BASED ICBM'S . ASKED BY MR RIFKIND WHETHER IN HIS VIEW OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STRATEGIC OR MEDIUM-RANGE KORNIENKO SAID THAT THIS WAS NO MORE THAN A PLAY ON WORDS. FOR THE SOVIET UNION ANYTHING WHICH COULD HIT THEIR TERRITORY WAS STRATEGIC. IF HYPOTHETICALLY SOME SS20S WERE GIVEN TO OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD THE WEST BE PREPARED TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM THE BALANCE ? (MR RIFKIND RESPONDED THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHO HAS ULTIMAT E
CONTROL OVER THEM , BUT IT WAS A VERY HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION). KORNIENKO CONTINUED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT CLOSE ITS EYES TO BRITISH , FRENCH AND CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. LIKE THOSE OF THE AMERICANS THEY WERE AIMED AT THE USSR, AND THE TOTAL OF THEIR WARHEADS WAS CONSIDERABLE. KORNIENKO MORE THAN ONCE ASKED MR RIFKIND WHETHER BRITISH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN START.

6. MR RIFKIND REPEATED THAT BY ANY MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION OUR WEAPONS WERE STRATEGIC. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT TRY AND COUNT THEM BOTH WAYS: IT COULD NOT ARGUE ONE DAY THAT THEY SHOULD BE COUNTED AS STRATEGIC AND THE NEXT AS MEDIUM-RANGE. NO ONE HAD EVER SUGGESTED THAT THE UK NOR FRANCE WOULD EVER CONTEMPLATE A FIRST STRIKE, WHEREAS THE US AND SOVIET UNION WERE CONCERNED ABOUT EACH OTHER'S CAPABILITY IN THIS RESPECT. STABILITY,8 -, 5E343%943 PARITY, BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS WAS THE KEY TO WORLD PEACE.

7. IN CONCLUSION KORNIENKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER AGREE NOT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR WEAPONS. LIKEWISE IT WOULDNEVER AGREE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET FAR-EASTERN SYSTEMS WHILE THE TALKS WERE ABOUT EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN PRINCIPLE PREPARED TO HAVE SEPARATE TALKS ON SYSTEMS IN ASIA. '' THESE TWO STONES OF SOVIET POLICY CANNOT BE MOVED''.
FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES .

SUTHERLAND

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

LIMITED	PS	MR WRIGHT
DEF.D	PS/MR HURD	MR GILLMORE
ACDD	PS/MR RIFKIND	MR GOODISON
NEWS.D	PS/PUS	
EESD	SIR J BULLARD	
NAD		
WED		

ADDITIONAL DIST:
START

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FROM MOSCOW 251545Z APRIL

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 25 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL MADRID AND STOCKHOLM

INFO SAVING TO OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST BUDAPEST , EAST BERLIN , WARSAW AND PRAGUE

MY TELNO 422 : MR RIFKIND'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

DISCUSSION WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIENKO

ON 25 APRIL : CSCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

1. MR RIFKIND NOTED THAT ATTEMPTS WERE CONTINUING IN MADRID TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. EAST/WEST RELATIONS HAD BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY ACTIONS IN THE SPHERE OF PERSONAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH APPEARED CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. THIS WAS NOT A NEW SUBJECT. THERE WERE EXAMPLES GOING BACK MANY YEARS , SUCH AS THE CASE OF RAOUL WALLENBERG (WHOSE SISTER HAD TELEPHONED HIM JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW). IT WOULD BE VERY WELCOME IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD CLEAR UP THE QUESTION OF WALLENBERG'S FATE TO THE SATISFACTION OF HIS FAMILY.

2. THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN ABOUT PEOPLE WHO HAD TRIED TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT , SUCH AS SHCHARANSKY. MRS SHCHARANSKY HAD VISITED HIM BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON, AND WAS HOPING FOR HER HUSBAND'S RELEASE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.
SHE HAD ALSO MENTIONED THAT SHCHARANSKY'S MOTHER HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO SEE HIM.

3. MR RIFKIND ALSO MENTIONED THE CASES OF BEGUN, NUDEL, ORLOV AND SAKHAROV. HE SAID THE CHARACTER OF EAST / WEST RELATIONS WOULD BE AFFECTED POSITIVELY BY A SOVIET GESTURE ON SUCH CASES.

4. KORNIENKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED A DETAILED AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IN MADRID. THE SOVIET UNION THOUGHT IT PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO TAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING SECURITY IN EUROPE, FOR THIS AFZECTED THE BASIC HUMAN RIGHT TO LIFE. THEY WERE NOT AGAINST DISCUSSING OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

/OTHERS

OTHERS IMPOSED ON THEM ON SUCH QUESTIONS OR TO ACCEPT THAT THEY WERE OBLIGED TO ANSWER ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY COULD RAISE INDIVIDUAL CASES IN THE UK. BUT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE ?

5. MR RIFKIND POINTED OUT THAT SHCHARANSKY HAD BEEN TRYING TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT. KORNIENKO SAID THAT THE CASE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HELSINKI. ALL THE CASES RAISED BY MR RIFKIND CONCERNED SOVIET EMIGRATION RULES. DID MR RIFKING WANT HIM TO RAISE BRITISH IMMIGRATION LAWS ?
'' YOU HAVE YOUR PROBLEMS , WE HAVE OURS ''. MR RIFKIND ASKED IF KORNIENKO COULD HOLD OUT ANY HOPE FOR SHCHARANSKY. KORNIENKO SAID HE HAD NO IDEA, AND HAD NEVER ENQUIRED. IT WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S DOMESTIC BUSINESS.

6. F C O PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

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MR THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
CSCE GENERAL

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

Prime Minister

Agree that C-in-C BAOR should meet his Soviet opposite number later this year?

I should have liked A. & C. 26/4 for French more recent yet - no.

MO 14/10

PRIME MINISTER

As you know, after the invasion of Afghanistan we decided that contact between UK and Soviet officials should be limited to the minimum necessary for the efficient conduct of business. In particular, social contacts have been curtailed.

2. A specific casualty of this hardening of relations with the Soviet Union has been informal meetings between C in C BAOR and C in C Group of Soviet Forces, which used to take place on an infrequent but not irregular basis. C in C BAOR has now requested approval to a meeting with his Soviet opposite number on the grounds that a satisfactory working relationship with the Russians over Berlin is important in Potsdam; and that there are some intelligence advantages to be gained by such links.

3. Such a meeting would not now represent a major breach of our guidelines on contacts with the Soviets. The French have maintained contacts throughout at a higher level than ourselves and, most importantly, the US recently permitted a meeting at C in C level. We are now the ones out of step and there seems no reason to treat the Russians more coldly than our partners do. And, of course, Malcolm Rifkind is currently visiting Moscow.

4. I therefore propose to allow a meeting later in the year after General Bagnall takes up his appointment. There is the question of public presentation should such a meeting become public. I believe that a defensible line would be that such meetings had taken place before, and that the Cs in C were meeting in the interests of a smooth and efficient relationship on certain issues.

5. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to other members of OD.

Ministry of Defence

22nd April 1983

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BTC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1983

Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

Thank you for your letter of 13 April. The Prime Minister has noted, and agrees with, the decision of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to expel a further member of the Soviet Embassy.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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8

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PUSD 7/303/5 (36)

13 April 1983

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C. 14/4.

Dear John,

Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

In my letter of 24 March, which you acknowledged on 25 March, I set out the line which we subsequently took with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on 31 March when informing him of the expulsion of three Soviet intelligence officers. As indicated in paragraph 4 of my letter, Sir J Bullard made it clear to the Soviet Chargé that if the Russians retaliated, we would respond.

On 8 April the British Ambassador was informed by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the expulsion of our Assistant Air Attaché and the Financial Times correspondent in Moscow, both of them allegedly for unacceptable activities. Mr Pym considers that we must now take appropriate action against the Soviet Embassy here. He has, therefore, decided that we should expel A A Chernyayev, Third Secretary and Labour Attaché who is considered to be a member of the KGB.

When informing the Soviet Ambassador of Chernyayev's expulsion, we would make clear that it was in response to the wholly unjustified Soviet action in Moscow. Mr Pym's reasons for not using the normal formula for expulsion (activities incompatible with their official status) is that he does not believe we could credibly maintain in public the artificial position that evidence of espionage activities had come to light between 31 March and now. We would therefore not be reducing the appropriate ceiling on this occasion, since the person concerned would be expelled as retaliation, and not for inadmissible activities. We should however be making it clear that we are prepared, as we said, to match Soviet actions in Moscow.

/We would

We would hope that this response would cause the Russians to draw a line under this present exercise. Nevertheless, when speaking to the Soviet Ambassador we would once again state that there would be a further British move in London if the Russians again retaliated against British personnel or interests in Moscow.

Our Assistant Air Attaché will be leaving Moscow on 14 April. We shall be aiming to take action with the Soviet Ambassador on the following day.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister

FLASH

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GRS 548
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 080959Z APR 83
TO F L A S H FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 8 APR

Hd EESD
Hd PUSD
Hd NEND D
Hd PSD
Hd INFO D.
Hd DEFENCE D
Hd PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/Mr. RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J. BULLARD
Mr. GODDSON
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10 Dst

(+ 11)

YOUR TEL NO 269 EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

1. SUSLOV, HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA ASKED ME TO CALL AT 11.30 HOURS (LOCAL) THIS MORNING. I WAS GIVEN A SPEAKING NOTE WHICH WAS READ OUT. (FULL TEXT IN MIFT).
THIS PROTESTED STRONGLY THE BRITISH EXPULSION OF IVANOV, PRIMAKOV AND TITOV, DISMISSED THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM, AND DESCRIBED AS UNACCEPTABLE THE THREAT OF FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST SOVIET OFFICIALS IN THE UK.

2. THE NOTE WENT ON TO REFER TO THE UNACCEPTABLE ACTIVITIES OF ''SOME'' BRITISH CITIZENS WORKING IN THE SOVIET UNION, IN PARTICULAR MY ASSISTANT AIR ATTACHE, SQN. LDR. DAVID WILLIAMS AND THE FINANCIAL TIMES CORRESPONDENT, ANTHONY ROBINSON. THESE TWO WERE ACCUSED OF SYSTEMATICALLY CONTRAVENING THE NORMS OF CONDUCT FOR FOREIGNERS AND OF ENGAGING IN IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITY. THEY WERE ASKED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN ONE WEEK.

3. I SAID THAT I REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SEEN FIT TO TAKE THIS ACTION. THE EVIDENCE THAT IVANOV, PRIMAKOV AND TITOV HAD ENGAGED IN UNACCEPTABLE ACTIVITIES WAS IRREFUTABLE. I REJECTED THE ALLEGATIONS THAT WILLIAMS AND ROBINSON HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS, RECALLING WHAT I HAD SAID IN DECEMBER WHEN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN ACTION AGAINST MY NAVAL ATTACHE (MY TELNO 845, OF 17 DECEMBER 1982 PARA 3). I REGISTERED A VERY STRONG PROTEST AT THE ACTION AGAINST WILLIAMS AND ROBINSON AS QUITE UNJUSTIFIABLE AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH A WISH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I RECALLED SIR J BULLARD'S REFERENCE TO FURTHER ACTION IN LONDON IN THE EVENT OF RETALIATION (PARA 9 OF YOUR TELNO 270). IN RESPONSE, SUSLOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET ACTION WAS NOT RETALIATORY BUT FORCED UPON THEM. THERE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE AGAINST WILLIAMS AND ROBINSON. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE ''PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE HAD TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE'' WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE BRITISH SIDE. HE DREW MY ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE WORDS IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT REGARDING THREATS BY THE BRITISH SIDE. THESE WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER COMPLICATIONS IN OUR RELATIONS.

RELATIONS.

4. I UNDERSTAND THAT ROBINSON IS IN LONDON BUT MAY BE PLANNING TO RETURN TO MOSCOW OVER THE WEEKEND. ONCE THE DEPARTMENT HAS SPOKEN TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES I WOULD PROPOSE TO TELL THE OTHER BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS HERE ON THE RECORD THAT I HAD BEEN CALLED TO THE MFA: THAT WILLIAMS AND ROBINSON HAD BEEN ASKED TO WITHDRAW WITHIN ONE WEEK: AND THAT I HAD PROTESTED STRONGLY AT THIS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED ACTION. IF ASKED, WE WOULD SAY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD GIVEN UNACCEPTABLE ACTIVITIES AS THE GROUNDS FOR THE EXPULSION, AND THAT THEY HAD REJECTED THE EARLIER EXPULSION OF THE THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS FROM LONDON. WE WOULD DECLINE TO COMMENT FURTHER. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONFIRM BY FLASH TELEGRAM THAT FINANCIAL TIMES HAS BEEN INFORMED AND WHETHER YOU AGREE WITH ACTION PROPOSED WITH THE PRESS.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 March, 1983

Expulsion of Three Soviet Intelligence Officers

Thank you for your letter of 24 March. The Prime Minister has noted that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has agreed that three Soviet intelligence officers should be expelled and that, if the Russians retaliate, we should respond in kind.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

TOP SECRET COPY NO 1 OF 5

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

FUAD 2/103/5 (47)

24 March 1983

Approved by Prime Minister

The Foreign Secretary proposes to expel 3 Soviet intelligence officers, and if the Russians retaliate to respond in kind.

A.J.C. 24/3

Yes Sir.

Expulsion of Three Soviet Intelligence Officers

On the recommendation of the Security Service, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has agreed that we should expel three Soviet intelligence officers. They are Colonel G A Primakov, Assistant Air Attache (GRU); S V Ivanov, Scientific Attache (GRU); and I V Titov, London correspondent of the Soviet magazine 'New Times' (KGB).

All three have been actively involved either in running agents in this country or in attempts to recruit them. [redacted]

Ivanov has used clandestine techniques in seeking information and his pattern of behaviour suggests agent-running or other clandestine activity.

Titov is in a different category. He has been detected only in attempting to recruit [redacted] but his responsibilities as Head of the PR Line of the KGB in London limit his activities outside the Embassy and make him a difficult target. There is no doubt that his presence in the UK is harmful to our national interests and that his removal would disrupt KGB activities here. He is not a diplomat and is therefore the responsibility of the Home Secretary. Mr Whitelaw has, however, agreed that in the circumstances action against all three should be taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Action will be taken on Wednesday 30 March, and we intend to announce the expulsions on the same day.

/There is

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COPY NO 1 OF 5

There is obviously a danger that the Russians will retaliate. The best way to prevent this will be to make it clear to them that if they do, we shall respond in kind. The result could be a series of counter-retaliations which could hamper British activity in Moscow, [redacted] And if it led to the expulsion of British journalists from Moscow, we should no doubt face criticism from the media for mishandling the affair. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary nevertheless believes that it is essential, in the interests of deterring retaliation by the Russians, to take this line, and to carry out the threat if necessary.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Soviet Union

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1983

VISIT OF SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of John Holmes' letter of 18 February.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DS

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(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 February 1983

Prime Minister

A.V.C. 18/2

Dear John,

Visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr N S Ryzhov: 17/18 February

At Cabinet on 17 February, Mr Hurd gave some information about Mr Ryzhov's visit. The Prime Minister asked for further details.

Talks are in principle held annually between a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and the Political Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In practice they have been rather less frequent. They were held in 1978, 1979 and 1981. The talks which had been arranged for March 1982 were postponed because of events in Poland.

Mr Ryzhov's talks were mainly with Sir J Bullard, but he also called on Mr Hurd, Mr Rifkind and Sir A Acland. The talks covered a number of bilateral and international issues: from the British side we also raised human rights questions including certain individual cases, among them Shcharansky. Both Mr Rifkind and Sir J Bullard spoke about the rates owed to Camden Council by the Soviet Trade Delegation, the refusal of a visa to the new BBC correspondent in Moscow, Anglo-Soviet claims and the problem of Embassy sites in London and Moscow. On East/West relations, the British side emphasised once again the continuing adverse impact of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but there was no sign of give in the Soviet position on this. Mr Ryzhov took a standard Soviet line on East/West issues, but with unexpectedly little criticism of the United States.

It became clear that Mr Ryzhov's main objective was to press for a positive response to recent Soviet proposals on arms limitation, especially those contained in the Prague Declaration by the Warsaw Pact countries.

/Mr Hurd's

Mr Hurd's own talks with Mr Ryzhov focussed almost entirely on arms control matters. Mr Ryzhov concentrated on the Prague Declaration, and particularly the proposal for a non-aggression pact. Mr Hurd questioned whether such a pact would add anything to the commitments already contained in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. He emphasised our hope that serious negotiations would begin soon in the Committee on Disarmament to achieve an agreement on the banning of production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Mr Ryzhov said that the Soviet Union were prepared to start such negotiations.

Mr Hurd told Mr Ryzhov that it was unacceptable for the Russians to try to argue that account should be taken of the British and French nuclear weapons in the INF negotiations. He pointed out that our submarines were a small strategic force, and that the Soviet Union had so described them in Salt I. He added that we had said publicly that if the strategic threat to the UK were significantly reduced, we should be willing to look again at our position in relation to arms control. The Russians took careful note of this, although Mr Ryzhov reiterated that if all the SS20s were removed while the British and French nuclear forces remained, the result would not be 'equitable'.

We shall be giving our Community partners details of the talks at a briefing on 21 February, and will also be informing the Americans.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PUSD 7/303/1 (4)

10 January 1983

ASC 8/1

Not seen until our return from the Falklands on 13 January.

AJC 13/1

Dear John,

V A Chernov

With reference to your letter of 1 December, the Prime Minister may wish to know that, with the agreement of the Home Secretary, action to expel Chernov will be taken on 12 January. The Executive Secretary of the IWC is out of contact at present but will be asked to call at the FCO on his return from Belgium. In addition to asking him to secure Chernov's removal, we shall inform the Soviet Embassy and express the Government's concern at Soviet abuse of the IWC. News Department will make the action public the same day.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Robert Lowson (MAFF), and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

Brian

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Soviet Union: UK / Soviet Relations Pt 2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference Diplomatic Report No. 213/82

Description The Brezhnev years: despatch from HM's Ambassador at Moscow

Date 9 December 1982

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed CMWayland Date 30 October 2013

PREM Records Team

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference Diplomatic Report No. 212/82

Description The Andropov Succession – despatch from HM Ambassador at Moscow

Date 2 December 1982

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed OWayland Date 30 October 2013

PREM Records Team

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SOVIET UNION

File KB

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 December 1982

V. A. CHERNOV

Thank you for your letter of 30 November. The Prime Minister has noted Mr. Pym's decision that the above should be expelled.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Robert Lowson (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PUSD 7/303/8 (7)

3.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 November 1982

Prime Minister

A J C. 30/11

Dear John,

V A Chernov

In my letter of 29 November I recorded the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's decision to expel Captain A P Zotov, the Russian Naval Attache.

Mr Pym has now decided that we should expel another Russian, V A Chernov, a translator at the headquarters of the International Wheat Council (IWC) in London. Chernov, an identified KGB officer, has been very active in attempting to recruit agents and to obtain political and economic information in a clandestine manner. There are some questions relevant to Chernov's status as an official of the IWC which will require answers before we inform the Executive Secretary of the IWC that Chernov's continued presence is unacceptable for security reasons and ask him to arrange for his removal; and there may be tactical advantage in allowing a little time between this expulsion and that of Zotov. But action will be taken as soon as our lines are clear. Retaliation seems less likely in Chernov's case than in that of Zotov because of his lower status and because there is no close British equivalent in Moscow. The expulsion would be announced in due course in the form of a written Parliamentary Answer.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Robert Lowson (MAFF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

TOP SECRET

Soviet Union

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 November, 1982

MR 1/12

Dear John,

Possible Messages to New Soviet President

Thank you for your letter of 24 November. As you may meanwhile have learned, the post of President (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet) was not after all filled during the recent Supreme Soviet meeting.

In consultations with our Allies and our partners in the Ten, we learnt that recommendations to send a message of congratulation were to be put to the Presidents of the United States, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Ireland and to the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, The Queen of Denmark and The Queen of the Netherlands.

We need not of course take any further action at present, but will be guided by your letter when a new President is finally elected.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 DowningStreet

UK/Soviet Relations : Soviet Union PR2

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COPY NO. 5 OF 5 COPIES

Soviet Union

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 November, 1982.

Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

Thank you for your letter of 29 November about Captain A.P. Zotov. The Prime Minister has noted that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has agreed with the Security Service's recommendation that Zotov should be declared persona non grata and that Sir Julian Bullard will summon the Soviet Ambassador to ask for his removal from this country.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office), and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A.J. COLES

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TOP SECRET PUSD 7/303/5 (16) 2

Copy no 1 of 6 copies

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

To note.

29 November 1982

A.J.C. 29/11

Dear John

Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

The Security Service have informed us that the Soviet Naval Attache, Captain A P Zotov, has engaged in activities incompatible with his status in this country. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has therefore agreed with the Security Service's recommendation that Zotov should be declared persona non grata. Sir Julian Bullard will summon the Soviet Ambassador shortly to ask for Zotov's removal from this country.

There is, however, a strong possibility of Soviet retaliation, most probably against our own Naval Attache in Moscow. Whether they expel him or, a less likely possibility, curtail his movements,

The Defence Intelligence Staff have considered the implications and accept that we shall have to be prepared to live with them.

In order to try to minimise the Soviet reaction, Sir J Bullard will warn the Soviet Ambassador that we should take

/a

a very serious view of any retaliation. He will not, however, commit us to any specific course of action so as not to tie our hands.

The question of publicity is also connected with that of retaliation. The Russians dislike publicity because it hinders their other intelligence activities. Mr Pym has agreed therefore that we should publicise the expulsion, but, in the hope of moderating the Soviet reaction, we should hold back until the dust has settled. An appropriate device would be a written answer to an inspired PQ just before the Christmas recess. Given the present level of press and parliamentary interest in Soviet intelligence activities in this country, there should be no shortage of publicity once the news does break. Of course, if the Russians do expel a member of our Embassy in Moscow in retaliation, and the news therefore breaks earlier, we shall have to make an earlier announcement.

Mr Pym has considered carefully whether the change of leadership in Moscow should cause us to postpone action on this case. He has concluded, however, that it should be treated on its merits and that we should not tolerate espionage activities once they have been detected. The Soviet authorities may read our action as a sign of hostility, but we shall have to make it clear that we mean to stand up for our own interests and that we, not they, are the aggrieved party.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD), John Halliday (Home Office) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 24 November 1982

POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO THE NEW SOVIET PRESIDENT

Thank you for your letter of 22 November.

The Prime Minister considers that, provided the Presidents of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and France send a message to the new Soviet President, The Queen should be advised to send a message in the following terms:

> "I send you my congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the office of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet".

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1).

PRIME MINISTER

POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO THE NEW SOVIET PRESIDENT

I wonder if I could ask you to look at this again.

I should be surprised if Presidents Reagan, Carstens and Mitterrand (or, indeed, any Western Head of State) do not send a message of congratulations to the new Soviet President. It is really the minimum requirement in the case of a State with which one has diplomatic relations.

If The Queen does not send one, the omission will be conspicuous and could involve her in some controversy. Many people may feel that nothing is to be gained by deliberately withholding a formal message of this kind. Had we broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan or Poland, it would clearly be right not to send a message. But we did not go that far.

I do not think that the message need be so warm as that recommended by the FCO.

My suggestion is that provided Presidents Reagan, Carstens and Mitterrand send a message, The Queen should be advised to send the following:

> "I send you my congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the office of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet".

Agree? Yes

A.J.C.

23 November 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November, 1982

Since 1977 - we have had Afghanistan - Poland. Under those circumstances I do not think we should send a message.

Dear John

Prime Minister:

Do you agree to send a message to the new Soviet President?

Possible Message to the New Soviet President

22/11

It is expected that the Supreme Soviet meeting on 23 November will elect a new Soviet President in succession to Mr Brezhnev. One possibility is that Mr Andropov himself will assume the Presidency in addition to the post of General-Secretary of the Party, thus putting himself in the same position which Mr Brezhnev occupied from 1977 until his death. Other possible candidates are Mr Andropov's defeated rival for the post of General Secretary, Mr Chernenko; the Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko; or conceiveably the present Prime Minister, Mr Tikhonov.

We have been considering whether The Queen should be advised to send a message of congratulation. No such message was sent to Mr Brezhnev when he became President in 1960 (on that occasion he occupied the post until 1964), nor to Mr Mikoyan in 1964, nor to Mr Podgorny in 1965. However, The Queen did send a message to Mr Brezhnev when he became President in 1977. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that it is this last precedent which should be followed both because this is the most recent precedent and because we wish to signal to the new Soviet leaders that a more constructive East/West relationship is availalbe if they are willing to adopt a new approach.

We expect that most if not all of our Allies and partners will send messages; we are checking further on this point.

The text of the message which Mr Pym proposes should be recommended to Her Majesty is as follows:

> 'On the occasion of your assumption of the office of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I send you my congratulations and my best wishes to you and to the people of the Soviet Union'.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister agrees.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

No 10 Moscow

PP MOSCOW
GRS 415
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 181900Z NOV 82
TO PRIORITY MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 691 OF 19 NOVEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
SAVING PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, BELGRADE, UKDEL MADRID, ROME.

UK/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO FLOAT THE IDEA OF A US/SOVIET SUMMIT WITH SHULTZ (MY TELNO 2037 TO WASHINGTON).

2. I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING ALSO FUTURE POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UK AND THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING BOTH TALKS AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVELS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY MR RIFKIND TO MOSCOW. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE TO PUT ACROSS OUR VIEWS CLEARLY ON A RANGE OF SUBJECTS. THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBILITIES:

A. TALKS AT EXPERT LEVEL BETWEEN PLANNING STAFFS (WALDEN) IN MOSCOW AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST (GRINEVSKY) IN LONDON.

B. A VISIT BY GOODISON TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS WITH THE HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT.

C. CONFIRMATION OF THE INVITATION FOR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RYZHOV.

D. VISIT BY MR RIFKIND TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS WITH A FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER (KORNIENKO OR MALTSEV).

3. OUR POLICY OVER CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS SET OUT MOST RECENTLY IN MR HURD'S WRITTEN REPLY TO MR LAWRENCE'S PQ ON 18 JUNE 1981. WE HAD STATED AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THAT HIGH LEVEL AND MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO BE AVOIDED FOR THE TIME BEING. MR HURD WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THERE WERE OCCASIONALLY HIGH LEVEL AND MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WHERE THESE WERE DEEMED ADVANTAGEOUS. THESE GUIDELINES REMAIN IN FORCE. THE IDEAS SUGGESTED ABOVE FALL WITHIN THEM. BUT WE WOULD CLEARLY WISH TO AVOID BUNCHING THEM IN ORDER NOT TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION OF A SUDDEN CHANGE OF

It is a sudden change of policy

DIRECTION OR POLICY. I AM THEREFORE INCLINED FIRST TO PROPOSE PLANNING STAFF TALKS: WALDEN WOULD BE READY FOR THESE SOON, POSSIBLY BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR ADVICE ON THE TIMING AND ORDER OF THE OTHER POSSIBLE EVENTS. (OUR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT RYZHOV MIGHT BE INVITED TO COME IN JANUARY AND THAT THE PROPOSAL COULD THEN BE MADE THAT MRRIFKIND VISIT MOSCOW IN JUNE 1983.)

4. FOR THE TIME BEING ALSO, AND NOTWITHSTANDING WHAT MAY BE THE PRACTICE AND INTENTIONS OF OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, I SHOULD NOT (NOT) WISH TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OR SCALE OF OUR CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. TO DO SO MIGHT CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF TOTAL NORMALITY IN ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS WHICH I WISH TO AVOID.

5. I SHALL WANT TO INFORM THE AMERICANS, AND PROBABLY OUR OTHER CLOSE ALLIES AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, BUT I WOULD NOT WISH YOU TO TAKE ANY SUCH ACTION IN MOSCOW AT THIS STAGE.

PYM

DIST:

LIMITED	ECD(E)	PS/MR RIFKIND
EESD	PLANNING STAFF	PS/PUS
DEFENCE DEPT	CRD	SIR J BULLARD
NENAD	RESEARCH	MR GOODISON
MED	PS	MR THOMAS
SAD	PS/MR HURD	MR. GILLMORE
	PS/LD BELSTEAD	

GR 735

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FROM MOSCOW 100530Z NOV 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 670 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON AND MODUK(FOR DI 3)

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN ,PEKING, ULAN BATOR, HANOI, UKMIS GENEVA UKDEL VIENNA, UKMIS NEW YORK AND ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS.

THE 65TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

1. THIS WAS CELEBRATED IN THE TRADITIONAL MANNER, THE CENTRE-PIECE BEING THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PARADE THROUGH RED SQUARE ON 7 NOVEMBER. BREZHNEV, FLANKED BY MOST OF THE MOSCOW-BASED POLITBURO AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE NINETY MINUTE MARCH-PAST. HE GAVE A SHORT SPEECH AT THE KREMLIN RECEPTION WHICH FOLLOWED TO WHICH AMBASSADORS WERE INVITED WITH LEADING FIGURES OF THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT. ALTHOUGH IN QUITE GOOD VOICE, HE LOOKED FRAIL AND BY THE TIME IT WAS MY TURN TO BE INTRODUCED, HE DID NOT APPEAR TOO AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON AROUND HIM. NO-ONE WAS ENCOURAGED TO ENGAGE HIM IN CONVERSATION.

2. KIRILENKO, ONCE GENERALLY REGARDED AS BREZHNEV'S SUCCESSOR, WAS ABSENT FROM THE PARADE AND HIS PORTRAIT DID NOT APPEAR ON THE PLACARDS. I THINK THAT WE CAN TAKE THIS AS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT , FOR WHATEVER REASON , HE HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM THE LEADERSHIP. ANOTHER POLITBURO MEMBER, THE 83-YEAR OLD PELSHE, WHO IS USUALLY PRESENT ON THESE OCCASIONS, WAS ALSO ABSENT: BUT HE FEATURED ON THE PLACARDS. COMPARED WITH LAST YEAR , CHERNENKO AND ANDROPOV BOTH MOVED UP FOUR PLACES IN THE LINE-UP ON THE LENIN MAUSOLEUM WITH ONLY TIKHONOV (CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) BETWEEN THEM AND BREZHNEV.

3. THREE MAJOR SPEECHES WERE MADE DURING THE CELEBRATIONS: BY GRISHIN POLITBURO MEMBER AND HEAD OF THE MOSCOW PARTY ORGANISATION AT THE CELEBRATORY CEREMONY IN THE KREMLIN ON 5 NOVEMBER: BY USTINOV POLITBURO MEMBER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE FROM THE ROSTRUM AT THE 7 NOVEMBER PARADE : AND THAT BY BREZHNEV AT THE SUBSEQUENT

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/RECEPTION.

RECEPTION . THE COMMON FEATURE OF THE PASSAGES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WAS THE APPEARANCE , IN MORE OBVIOUS COUNTERPOINT THAN IN THE PAST , OF A '' TWO TRACK '' APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. THIS STRESSED IN ALMOST THE SAME BREATH A COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND DETENTE AND A DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES , WITH, IN THE CASE OF GRISHIN AND USTINOV , FULSOME REFERENCES TO BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS ON 27 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 643) WHICH WAS ALSO FEATURED IN ALL THE PRESS AND TELEVISION COMMENTARIES. BREZHNEV , WITHOUT NAMING THE UNITED STATES , SAID THAT '' INEVITABLY A SHATTERING RETALIATORY BLOW '' AWAITED A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR AND THAT SOVIET MIGHT AND VIGILANCE WOULD '' COOL THE OVER- HOT HEADS OF CERTAIN IMPERIALIST POLITICIANS ''. BUT HE QUICKLY FOLLOWED THIS BY A STATEMENT , EXPRESSELY ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES , OF SOVIET PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. GRISHIN AND USTINOV REFERRED TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO REACH UNDERSTANDING AT THE ARMS-CONTROL TALKS IN GENEVA , THE FORMER ADDING THAT , IF THE ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY BY THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF '' HUNDREDS OF NEW AMERICAN NUCLEAR ROCKETS '' OR BY ANY OTHER MEANS , THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES IN RESPONSE. GRISHIN AND USTINOV BOTH PUT THE MAIN BLAME ON THE UNITED STATES FOR THE '' COMPLICATIONS '' IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WHICH WAS DEPICTED IN MORE ALARMIST TERMS THAN LAST NOVEMBER .

4. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS WAS REPRODUCED IN PRAVDA ON 8 NOVEMBER , TOGETHER WITH THOSE FROM THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND THE FRG. THE INDIAN, ETHIOPIAN AND CHINESE MESSAGES WERE PRINTED THE PREVIOUS DAY AND MORE PROMINENTLY THAN LAST YEAR , IN COMPANY WITH THOSE FROM THE EAST EUROPEANS. THE CHINESE MESSAGE WAS IN SIMILAR TERMS TO LAST YEAR BUT MY CHINESE COLLEAGUE ATTENDED THE PARADE AND GRISHIN MADE A PROMINENT REFERENCE IN HIS SPEECH TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NORMALISING SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS '' WITHOUT ANY DAMAGE TO OTHER COUNTRIES '' - PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO VIET-NAM. I WAS ALSO STRUCK BY THE FUSS MADE BY THE RUSSIANS OF THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR AT THE KREMLIN RECEPITON.

/5. GRISHIN'S

5. GRISHIN'S SPEECH CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE ON POLAND, NOTABLE FOR THE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN WARSAW . '' THE POLISH PEOPLE HAVE REAL FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT POLISH COMMUNISTS AND ALL THE SUPPORTERS OF SOCIALISM IN POLAND WILL OVERCOME COUNTERREVOLUTION , DEFEND PEOPLE'S POWER AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS, AND ENSURE THE STABLE AND GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY ALONG THE PATH OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION ''.

6. THE MILITARY COMPONENT IN THIS YEAR'S PARADE WAS NO GREATER THAN IN RECENT YEARS. THE ONLY EQUIPMENT WHICH MY SERVICE ATTACHES NOTED ON DISPLAY FOR THE FIRST TIME WAS A STANDARD ARMOURED PERSONNEL-CARRIER WITH A NEW TURRET AND CANNON AND A NEWER VERSION OF THE SAB AIR-DEFENCE MISSILE SYSTEM.

7. OBSERVERS OF THE PARADE CAME AWAY WITH AN IMPRESSION OF A RATHER PERFUNCTORY OCCASION, REINFORCED BY THE RUSH OF MANY SOVIET SPECTATORS TO GET OUT OF RED SQUARE AS SOON AS THE SHORTER MORE DRAMATIC MILITARY PART WAS OVER .

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FCO/WHITEHALL
EESD

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference Diplomatic Report No. 185/82

Description Valedictory Despatch from HM's Ambassador at Moscow

Date 8 September 1982

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed CMayland Date 30 October 2013

PREM Records Team

Prime Minister

GR 950

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL (AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 2 SEPTEMBER)

FM MOSCOW 010430Z SEP 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 494 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

SAVING FOR INFO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

CALL ON GROMYKO

1. I PAID MY FAREWELL CALL ON GROMYKO ON 31 AUGUST. WE TALKED FOR 45 MINUTES, MAINLY ABOUT THE GENERAL COURSE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS BUT ALSO ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, ARMS CONTROL AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THROUGHOUT GROMYKO SEEMED DISPOSED NOT TO BE CONTENTIOUS, BUT TO BE SEEKING A BETTER RELATIONSHIP, WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO OFFER ANY SIGN OF SUBSTANTIVE POLICIES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY IT.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

2. IN THE COURSE OF INITIAL COURTESIES GROMYKO COMMENTED THAT MY WORK HAD NOT BEEN EASY DURING THE PERIOD OF MY STAY IN MOSCOW. I AGRRED AND COMMENTED THAT THE DIFFICULTIES IN OUR, AND MORE GENERALLY THE WEST'S, RELATIONS WITH THE USSR REFLECTED A LACK OF CONFIDENCE ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES. THIS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY SOVIET ACTIONS IN RECENT YEARS AND BY THE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET POLICIES WERE BASED MORE ON A BELIEF IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM THAN ON ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INTERESTS. IN A LENGTHY RESPONSE GROMYKO SPOKE OF THE HISTORY OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE UPS AND DOWNS, AND THE SOVIET POLICY OF ''PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE''. WE EACH HAD OUR OWN SYSTEM, LAWS, AND IDEOLOGY. DIFFERENCES OF VIEW COULD NOT BE AVOIDED BUT WE MUST WORK THEM OUT AROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN CONDITIONS OF PEACE, NOT TRY TO IMPOSE OUR VIEWS ON EACH OTHER BY FORCE. GROMYKO KEPT RETURNING TO THE NEED TO SEEK A COMMON LANGUAGE. UNFORTUNATELY THERE WERE SOME COUNTRIES THAT DID NOT ACCEPT THE NEED TO DO SO, AND FOR EXAMPLE IN THE LAST YEAR HAD OBJECTED TO EVERY PROPOSAL AIMED AT IMPROVING THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD.

3. I COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROCESS OF ''PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE'' AND ''DETENTE''. MANY IN THE WEST FELT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SAW THIS AS A SPECIFIC FORM OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE WHICH MERELY EXCLUDED THE RECOURSE TO MILITARY POWER (GROMYKO'S OWN DEFINITION IN HIS JANUARY 1981 ARTICLE IN ''KOMMUNIST'').

MIDDLE EAST

4. I THEN TURNED TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS ONE AREA WHERE THERE DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE A DIRECT CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AND WHERE WE COULD SEEK A COMMON LANGUAGE. HOW DID HE SEE THE PROBLEM DEVELOPING ? GROMYKO CONDEMNED THE ISRAELIS IN FAMILIAR

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/TERMS.

TERMS. THEY WERE DRIVEN BY A DESIRE FOR FURTHER ANNEXATIONS. THE ARABS WOULD NOT FORGET FOR CENTURIES THE ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELIS IN THE LEBANON AND THOSE WHOM PROMPTED AND AIDED THEM. GROMYKO GAVE LITTLE AWAY IN REPLY TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:

(A) GEMAYEL: GROMYKO SAID THAT HE WAS KNOWN TO FAVOUR CAMP DAVID AND TO BE PREPARED TO SIGN A SEPARATE DEAL WITH ISRAEL. EFFECTIVELY HE WAS WILLING TO BE AN ALLY OF ISRAEL. HE MADE IT FAIRLY CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT SEE GEMAYEL DEVELOPING INTO A LEADER FOR ALL THE LEBANESE.

(B) PROSPECTS FOR COMPLETE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT HOW THE SITUATION WOULD DEVELOP. ASSUMING THE QUESTION OF THE EVACUATION OF BEIRUT WAS SOLVED OR PARTLY SOLVED THE MAIN ISSUE WAS NOW THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELIS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. AS FOR THE SYRIANS, THEY WERE THERE AS A RESULT OF A WIDER ARAB DECISION WHICH GAVE THEM AN OFFICIAL STATUS. THE ARABS WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER AMONG THEMSELVES.

(C) PALESTINIANS. GROMYKO WOULD SAY NO MORE THAN THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THEIR RIGHTS, INCLUDING THEIR OWN STATE.

ARMS CONTROL

5. ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS GROMYKO SAID THAT HE REFRAINED FROM AN OPTIMISTIC PROGNOSIS. THE TALKS WERE DIFFICULT. HOW COULD THEY NOT BE WHEN ONE SIDE SAID OPENLY THAT THEY DID NOT WANT AGREEMENT. ALL THAT SIDE WANTED WAS NO INTERFERENCE IN THEIR PLANS FOR AN ARMS BUILD UP. THE ZERO OPTION WAS A BAD POLICY WITH NO FUTURE. THE SOVIET UNION HOPED THE UK WOULD EXERT ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE U S. I CHALLENGED GROMYKO'S DISMISSAL OF AMERICAN SERIOUSNESS IN THE TALKS AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE ZERO OPTION BUT HE CLEARLY DID NOT WANT TO PURSUE THIS SUBJECT. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION HE NOTED THAT OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITIES EXISTED FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, BUT ''SOME GOVERNMENTS LACKED THE NECESSARY WILL.''

ANGLO SOVIET RELATIONS

6. GROMYKO AT INTERVALS RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT HE HAD RESPECT FOR BRITISH VIEWS AND HOPED THAT WE WOULD TAKE AN INDEPENDENT LINE RATHER THAN FOLLOW THE U S. GROMYKO SIAD THAT EH WAS ENCOURAGED BY CERTAIN SIGNS THAT THE U K FAVOURED LINKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE THE USSR DID NOT WANT TO COMPLICATE THE UK'S RELATIONS WITH THE U S OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, THEY LIKED TO THINK THAT THESE SIGNS WERE INDICATIVE OF OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO BILATERAL RELATIONS. THEY HOPED THAT THEY WOULD SEE THE SAME ATTITUDE IN THE FUTURE. SPEAKING FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND

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/THEY

FOR MR BREZHNEV PERSONALLY GROMYKO WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UK (AND, HE ADDED, WITH THE U S ALSO BUT ON THE BASIS THAT SOVIET INTERESTS AND SECURITY CONCERNS WERE RECOGNISED).

7. I SAID THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SHOWN, WE TOOK OUR OWN DECISIONS, AND IT WAS A FACT THAT THERE WAS A SOLID COMMUNITY OF INTEREST WITH THE U S . I DID NOT PICK UP WHAT I TOOK TO BE A REFERENCE TO OUR ACTIONS OVER THE EXPORT OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE GAS PIPELINE.

8. I SAID THAT YOU WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN NEW YORK AND AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF SUCH ISSUES AS THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARMS CONTROL. GROMYKO WAS VAGUE ABOUT THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS BUT SAID THAT HE WAS PERFECTLY HAPPEY TO HAVE WHATEVER KIND OF TALK SUITED YOU.

9. GROMYKO SIAD THAT HE WOULD MAINTAIN THE SAME KIND OF BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP WITH MY SUCCESSOR AS WITH MYSELF. IN A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE FORTCHOMING MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SIR I SUTHERLAND BEING ABLE TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS IN GOOD TIME.

10. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT MY SUCCESSORS WOULD CONTINUE TO LIVE IN THE PRESENT EMBASSY BUILDING. (YOUR TEL NO 466) I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO MOVE US OUT. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE FROM GROMYKO.

FCO PLEASE PASS BOTH SAVING ADDRESSEES.

KEEBLE

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FCO/WHITEHALL.
EESD
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

SECR

S. Unw

22 April 1982

Activities of Warsaw Pact Airliners over the UK

Thank you for your letter of 21 April. The Prime Minister has noted its content.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

JOHN COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SPB

Prime Minister
To note.
MR 4/4.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1982

Dear John,

Activities of Warsaw Pact Airliners over the UK

In his minute of 10 December last year the Secretary of State for Defence recorded an incident on 9 November in which an Aeroflot aircraft overflew RAF Boulmer. In the light of the Prime Minister's views, recorded in your letter of 18 December to David Omand, the JIC duly produced an assessment (JIC(82)(N)2 of 14 January). Plans were then set in hand for the FCO to call in the Soviet Ambassador in order to make a protest, and for the Ministry of Defence to brief journalists about the incident. But in the light of subsequent developments it was thought best not to protest about or give publicity to the particular incident. You may find it useful to have a short explanation for the record.

Just before the protest was due to be delivered on 28 January the Ministry of Defence told us that they had re-run the data about the incident through a computer, and that this had shown up an anomaly which might put into doubt the reliability of the evidence. They asked therefore that we should not go through with the protest while the point was looked into. Subsequent re-examination of the evidence led the MOD to conclude that the incident had indeed taken place as they had thought. But they suggested that it would be better not to protest or publicise the incident, but to wait until we could gain maximum public advantage if the Russians tried it again. Because of the length of time that had by then elapsed since the incident took place, we acquiesced in this view.

If another such incident occurs, and we get on to it quickly, we shall be able to take the appropriate action more effectively.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PART 1 ends:-

5.4.82

PART 2 begins:-

21.4.82