

PREM 19/1394

PART 3

MT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Confidential filing

UK / Soviet Relations

SOVIET

UNION

PE 1: MAY 1979

PE 3: JUNE 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
5.6.84		10.12.84					
8.6.84		20.12.84					
23.6.84		31.8.84					
29.6.84		22.12.84					
4.7.84							
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14.12.84							
20.11.84							
21.11.84							
1.12.84							
4.12.84							
6.12.84							

- PART ENDS -

PREM 19/1394



BRIEFING FOR PM'S Meeting
WITH GOVERNMENT ATTACHED.

GOVERNMENT'S MEETINGS
WITH OTHER MINISTERS -
RECORDS ATTACHED.

PART 3 ends:-

FCO to MUD 22/12/84

PART 4 begins:-

~~A Jace Note for file~~ 3/1/85

Visit of a Supreme Soviet Delegation

3/1/85

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 4 July 1984, columns 318 to 328: Foreign Secretary (Moscow Visit)

Signed

J. Gray

Date

12/9/2013

PREM Records Team

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 December 1984

R Mottram Esq
PS/SofS for Defence
Ministry of Defence

NRPM

CDP 237 mi

Dear Mottram,

DEATH OF MARSHAL USTINOV

Mr Gorbachev informed Mr Younger on arrival in Edinburgh on 21 December that he would be returning early to Moscow because of the death of Marshal Ustinov. Mr Gorbachev asked us to keep this information confidential until a formal announcement was made in Moscow, but as you will know one has now been made.

As far as the protocol aspects of Ustinov's death are concerned, we consider that we should follow the precedents set at the time of the death of Marshal Grechko, Ustinov's predecessor, in 1976. On that occasion the then British Defence Secretary did not send a message of condolence. It was also agreed that the Soviet Embassy's book of condolence should be signed by an MOD official. However, on this occasion, on being informed of Ustinov's death by Gorbachev, Mr Younger said that, on behalf of HMG, he wished to convey our condolences on the death of Marshal Ustinov. He asked that Gorbachev should convey them to the Soviet leadership.

We are not able to trace from our papers whether Western Embassies were invited to attend the laying in state or funeral. We consider that in principle attendance should be at the level of Defence Attache, but subject to coordination in Moscow among the Ten and NATO representatives and any views that might be expressed in NATO. Instructions in this sense have been sent to Moscow after clearance with MOD officials.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tim Flesher (No 10) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

*Sherrill Cooper-Coles
Resident Clerk*

for C R Budd
Private Secretary

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Ushov

1984

22 DEC 1984

copied
to: FOR. POL.
PMS visit to China, HK, Kyoto WMA
11/84

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P/ enter
on file
(given to
White House on
22XII)
CJP

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: GORBACHEV

I spent about five hours with Gorbachev last Sunday. He gives the impression of confidence and authority. He is relatively open in manner and intelligent. He is affable and has some charm and humour. He listens carefully to what the other person says. He talks readily and, in contrast to the stultified manner of Soviet leaders, does not just stick to prepared statements. He picks up points made in discussion and responds to them. He was clearly not used to the sort of rigorous questioning which he got from me on things like human rights in the Soviet Union and Soviet payments to our mine-workers' union. But he kept cool and avoided the usual Soviet reaction of reciting lengthy positions of principle. He went to great pains to invoke Chernenko's name frequently in discussion as a source of authority for his remarks. I certainly found him a man one could do business with. I actually rather liked him - there is no doubt that he is completely loyal to the Soviet system but he is prepared to listen and have a genuine dialogue and make up his own mind.

I got the impression that in some ways he was using me as a stalking horse for you. He questioned me very closely on American motives and intentions for the Geneva talks and was clearly interested to obtain a first hand and informed impression of you and your main colleagues and of your policies. At the same time, he was on the look-out for possible divergences of view between us which might be exploited to Soviet advantage. I made it absolutely clear to him that we are loyal members of the Alliance and right behind you.

On the substance of my talks with him - and those which Geoffrey Howe had the following day - the most striking point was the amount of time devoted to the threat of an arms race in outer space. His line was that if you go ahead with the SDI, the Russians would either have to develop their own or, more probably, develop nuclear weapons that would get past your SDI defences. He made much of the role of the ABM treaty as the key stone to arms control negotiations and said that if events proceeded to the point where the ABM treaty was irrevocably undermined, the prospect of any further agreements thereafter would be minimal.

/ He was not

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He was not very precise on the scope of the negotiations which he expected to emerge from the Geneva meeting, but seemed to expect them to cover space, strategic nuclear weapons and INF. He made much of the difficulties which the Soviet Union had faced in deciding to go to Geneva.

On the other hand, he showed a keen awareness of the penalties of spending yet more resources on defence and agreed with the concept of achieving balanced security at lower levels of weapons. He claimed that the Russians would be ready to come to Geneva with serious new proposals and referred to Chernenko's remark that the Soviet Union would be ready to agree to the most radical measures. He appeared at one point to be saying that the SDI was simply an attempt by the United States to establish a bargaining position and that if that was the case, the Soviets could play the game and bargain as well as anyone. But the over-riding impression left was that the Russians are genuinely fearful of the immense cost of having to keep up with a further American technological advance and are therefore prepared to negotiate seriously on nuclear weapons if they believe that you are politically committed to reductions.

I left him in no doubt that we did not see SDI in the same light as he does: still less did we see it as linked in any way to a US first strike strategy. I stressed your profound sincerity in the search for balanced arms control and a reduction in nuclear weapons. I warned him of trying to drive wedges between the Allies: we were at one on this issue.

These were the main points which arose in his talk with me. He also saw Geoffrey Howe the next day and I understand that Geoffrey will be sending George Shultz a message giving his impressions and details of other steps which they discussed in rather more formal surroundings.

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File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Department

TELEGRAM

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

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PREAMBLE

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[TEXT]

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

VISIT OF MR GORBACHEV: MESSAGE TO SHULTZ

1. Grateful if you would pass the following personal message from the Secretary of State to Shultz after the Prime Minister's meeting with President Reagan has taken place.

Copies to:—

BEGINS When we met at Chevening, I said I would let you have my own impression of our meetings with Gorbachev. As you know, I have been in China so that I am afraid I have not been able to send you my views before now. You will have had an account of course from the Prime Minister of how the visit went. Nevertheless, you may still find it helpful to have my impressions which may add /something

something to what the Prime Minister told the President.

The Prime Minister and I saw him for lunch and talks at Chequers for about five hours altogether on 16 December. I had three hours of formal talks with him the next day followed by lunch. So we saw a great deal of him in a fairly short space of time.

First, the man. He is relatively open, confident in manner and intelligent. He has a quick sense of humour and he listens carefully to what the other person says. He behaved considerately towards his colleagues and allowed them to contribute to the discussion without diminishing his own authority. His wife is far from being the usual Soviet woman. Her Doctorate of Philosophy could not conceal a forthcoming and attractive personality with a surprisingly wide knowledge of classical and modern English literature.

Although clearly not used to the sort of fundamental questioning he got from the Prime Minister, he kept cool and avoided the ~~usual~~ ^{Standard} Soviet reaction of reciting lengthy positions of principle. He was extremely well briefed, and spoke easily and impromptu on most subjects.

He does not have Gromyko's polemical, gramophonic style in argument and was much less inclined to point-scoring for its own sake. But he did not fail to get in a quick and generally well-judged response when opportunity arose. On substance he stuck pretty well to the accepted Soviet line. The impression he left was of a man

/who

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

who is completely loyal to the Soviet system, is prepared to listen, to have a genuine dialogue and to make up his own mind. In short, someone with whom it should not be impossible to do business.

At Chequers, he questioned the Prime Minister very closely on US motives and intentions at Geneva, which gave her the opportunity to make some strongly supportive remarks about the President personally, as well as to stress our solidarity with you. He was clearly interested to gain a first hand and informed impression of US personalities and policies.

On the content of the exchanges, the most striking point was the length of time devoted to outer space. The Russians said they would if necessary go ahead with their own version of SDI or, more probably, the development of nuclear weapons that would get past the US SDI defences. The Russians, Gorbachev argued, regard the ABM Treaty as the keystone to the arms control negotiations. Hence their insistence on the need for agreement on restraining SDI as an essential element for wider talks. Gorbachev emphasised more than once that, if events proceeded to the point where the ABM Treaty was irrevocably undermined, the prospect of any further agreements thereafter would be minimal. When we suggested that it was in ~~our~~^{none} of our interests to spend yet more of our resources on defence, there was vigorous assent from Gorbachev. The fact that they were prepared to discuss arms control issues seriously was reflected both in Gorbachev's careful preparation of his arms control material and in the inclusion of General Chervov in the team. Chervov, argued that a first strike strategy was an integral part of the SDI approach.

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I put the case firmly to him that we did not see SDI in the same light, still less did we see it as linked in any way to a US first strike strategy. We urged Gorbachev to study carefully recent speeches by the President and yourself and stressed the President's profound sincerity in the search for balanced arms control and a reduction in nuclear weapons. He quoted critically from your New York speech the point that power and diplomacy must always go together. I replied by referring him to the balance of your Los Angeles speech: strength alone will never achieve a durable peace.

Gorbachev said that the Russians attached great importance to the Geneva talks. He added that there had been voices in the Soviet Government against agreeing to these, but they had decided to go ahead with this major step in a genuine effort to resume the search for agreement on arms control. I told him that the surest way for the Russians to bring about a failure of the talks would be to try to use them to drive wedges between the Allies. We were at one on this issue. Gorbachev said he recognised this. He stressed that the Russians see the Geneva talks as a completely new round which will cover the whole range of nuclear weapons including space, strategic and intermediate. The framework and agenda would be worked out at Geneva.

Gorbachev also raised the customary issue of counting in the UK and French systems at some point, while saying that the Russians did not expect us to disarm now, or to reduce our weapons in an unbalanced fashion. I replied along familiar lines that if substantial progress was achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union, we would review our position.

At Chevening I said I would take up the Nicaragua issue.

/I

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I made plain to Gorbachev our commitment to the Contadora process and our conviction of the legitimacy of US interests in the region. I underlined the unwisdom of a continuing build-up of arms in Nicaragua. Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would do nothing to increase tension in the area, but that they would maintain their support for the 'newly independent' state of Nicaragua.

On VE day, I emphasised the need to avoid isolating the FRG. I raised the idea that the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act might be the right forum for celebrating the achievements of 40 years of peace. Unfortunately we ran out of time before Gorbachev had a chance to respond. ~~The issue was however discussed at a meeting of British and Soviet officials later in the day, and we will let your people know the content of that exchange.~~

I raised both human rights and Afghanistan. The interesting point was that Gorbachev responded in some detail to both points (in contrast for instance to Gromyko, on every occasion when I have raised these points with him). He managed, while not departing from the Soviet official line, nevertheless to find some original turns of phrase.

I am very much aware that when you get to Geneva next month you will still have the same old Gromyko to deal with. It is hard to say how much of the apparently more open approach presented by Gorbachev will see the light of day in what Gromyko says to you. But I was left with the clear impression that the bulk of the Soviet leadership take the Geneva talks very seriously and that the decision to go was not taken without a good deal of thought on their part. Gorbachev stressed more than once their opinion that the world is at a very critical point in the search for

/possible

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possible progress on arms control. Good luck. ENDS

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1394</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2529 OF 20 DECEMBER 1984

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY FROM PRIVATE OFFICE
GORBACHEV'S VISIT

1. AT THE DINNER WHICH THE SPEAKER GAVE FOR THE DELEGATION ON 18 DECEMBER, MR LUCE SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH TO GORBACHEV. THE LATTER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH IT MIGHT BE WORTH BRINGING TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENTION BEFORE HER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.
2. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED INDEED WITH HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD ARRIVED WITH PRECONCEIVED IDEAS ABOUT HER ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. THESE HAD BEEN PROVED WRONG, AND, TO HIS GREAT PLEASURE, HE HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH HER. THEIR MEETING HAD GONE WELL - HER ROBUST DEFENCE OF WESTERN INTERESTS HAD BEEN MATCHED BY A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ITS OWN INTERESTS TO DEFEND, IN WHICH THE WEST HAD AS LITTLE RIGHT TO INTERFERE AS THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN OURS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION HAD BEEN CLEAR AND FIRM. ON SUCH A BASIS, PEOPLE COULD DO BUSINESS.
3. GORBACHEV SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE BELIEVED THAT A CRITICAL TURNING POINT HAD BEEN REACHED ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. OUTER SPACE WEAPONS WERE THE KEY ELEMENT BUT HE BELIEVED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO TACKLE THE ARMS RACE ON ALL FRONTS.
4. ON AT LEAST THREE OCCASIONS GORBACHEV SAID THAT LESSONS SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE FACT THAT BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL IN THE PAST - HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO SALT I AND TO THE ABM TREATY. IF IT HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE, IT COULD BE DONE AGAIN. MR LUCE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO RESTORE THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF TRUST IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. GORBACHEV AGREED, ADDING THAT THIS WAS A FURTHER REASON FOR MOVING FAST AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

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5. GORBACHEV WAS CRITICAL OF US ARMS POLICIES AND MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN VERY DISSATISFIED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FIRST TERM OF OFFICE. DESPITE THE IMPRESSION WHICH THOSE FOUR YEARS HAD LEFT, HE SAID, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE DETERMINED TO WORK FOR AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WITH THE US. WHEN MR LUCE ASKED WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT HE WISHED TO SEE, GORBACHEV USED BOTH HANDS IN A GESTURE ILLUSTRATING THAT HIS AIM WAS TO REDUCE ARMS LEVELS DRAMATICALLY, ON BOTH SIDES AND IN PARALLEL, FROM THEIR DANGEROUSLY HIGH PRESENT LEVEL.

6. AFTER THE DINNER, LORD HOME GAVE MR LUCE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV. HE COMMENTED THAT, WHILE ONE SHOULD NOT OVER-REACT TO THE PERSISTENTLY CHEERFUL DEMEANOUR OF GORBACHEV, HE HAD FOUND HIM CALMER, MORE CIVILISED AND MORE BALANCED THAN, SAY, KRUSHCHEV. HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV WAS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE FOR AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

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Passed to FCO
for reply.

20/12

HEKFO 045/20

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FM HONG KONG 201220Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3839 OF 20 DECEMBER

PERSONAL FOR FLESHER (10 DOWING STREET) FROM POWELL

YOUR TELNO 2519 : MR WAREING'S PQ

1. PROPOSED ANSWER SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: 'I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO REPLY. MY RT HON FRIEND GAVE A LUNCH FOLLOWED BY TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV ON 16 DECEMBER. THE TALKS LASTED SOME TWO AND THREE QUARTER HOURS AND WERE BUSINESS-LIKE AND FRIENDLY. THEY DEALT MOST WITH CURRENT ISSUES IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. THERE WAS ALSO A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ANGLO/SOVIET TRADE.

MR GORBACHEV BROUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CHERNENKO. IN THANKING HIM FOR THIS, THE PRIME MINISTER RECALLED HER USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE TALK WITH MR CHERNENKO LAST FEBRUARY.

THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR INCREASED CONTACTS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION AS A STEP TOWARDS DIMINISHING MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND CREATING THE INCREASED CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. THE PRIME MINISTER IMPRESSED ON MR GORBACHEV THE SINCERITY OF THE WEST'S THE WISH TO ACHIEVE SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS, WITH THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS OF BALANCE AND ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

2. AGREED THAT MR RIFKIND SHOULD ANSWER ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S BEHALF.

YOUDE

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Mr Flesher (now)
[with 28]

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

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31/12

Mr Powell of

MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD AND MR GORBACHEV: 18 DECEMBER 1984

Present

The Minister
 Parliamentary Secretary
 Sir Michael Franklin
 Professor Bell
 Mr Hadley
 Mr Boswell
 Mr Cocking
 Mr Llewelyn
 Sir Iain Sutherland (HM Ambassador,
 Moscow)
 Miss Young (FCO)

Mr Gorbachev
 Mr Komarov
 Mrs Parschina
 Mr Ivanov
 Mr Popov

Prime Minister

ADD
23/12

1. In welcoming Mr Gorbachev, the Minister said that he was delighted that he had found time to visit the Ministry of Agriculture. He was glad that later in his visit Mr Gorbachev would actually see a farm, as we were very proud of our agriculture in the United Kingdom.

2. Mr Gorbachev said that there was a growing interest in UK agriculture in the USSR. This was connected to their desire to restructure their own agriculture. Their current plan for agriculture and food covered a large number of sectors and included an extensive programme of mechanisation. They had studied agricultural practices in a number of countries (they were particularly interested in those in Canada); and they were interested in the use of agricultural machinery in the UK, because conditions there were similar to those in some parts of the USSR. Other aspects of UK agriculture that they found of interest were sub-soiling and the widespread cultivation of winter wheat; there were plans to grow the latter intensively, on an experimental basis, on 10 million hectares. The USSR also needed improved fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides and so were building up a modernised agro-chemical industry. They were therefore interested in UK experience in the production and application of pesticides, with particular reference to environmental safeguards, and thought it would be helpful if officials from their respective Ministries of agriculture could look into this further, within the framework of Anglo-Russian relations. They would also like to develop an exchange of scientific experts in the pesticide sector. On the industrial side, they had placed a preliminary order for an integrated plant for the production of a wide range of pesticides and herbicides. They intended this plant, for which they were formulating detailed specifications, to be a turn key project. Another area where they would welcome an exchange of information with the UK was that of plant breeding, where they had embarked on a wideranging programme to select improved varieties and hoped to make major steps forward in the use of genetic engineering. Another area where they were expanding

was applied and fundamental research, where they were making efforts to improve supplies of basic equipment. To sum up, they were making a major effort to develop their agriculture, and for the second year it had proved profitable due to the introduction of a new pricing structure. To continue this improvement, they were in favour of increased co-operation between the two countries in this intrinsically peaceful area of activity.

3. Mr Gorbachev continued that to complement its agricultural programme, the USSR needed to improve its food processing facilities, in particular those for storage and packing. They were already negotiating with a number of countries with this in mind, and had now found that the UK had something to offer too; his visit to John Brown Limited had demonstrated this, particularly in the field of packaging. The USSR was already considering orders in this and in other sectors of agriculture; it was worth bearing in mind that over the next five years some 240-250 billion roubles had been allocated to agriculture.

4. Mr Gorbachev then briefly compared Russian and UK productivity in the cereals and dairy sectors. He added that the USSR had a protein deficiency; as they were unable to grow soya, they were concentrating on increasing areas of field beans, peas and lucerne. As a result they had managed to increase their cattle numbers. He ended his exposition by reciting from memory, an impressive list of per capita food consumption figures and by explaining, very briefly, the social and economic principals underlying Soviet agricultural policy. This completed, in his words, a frank report on the Soviet agricultural scene. This frankness was characteristic of the agricultural sector; farmers spent time in the open air and so did not develop "sick fantasies", in contrast to those who spent their life behind desks!

5. The Minister replied that he had listened with great interest to this account of Soviet agriculture. He had never had the opportunity to see it at first hand, but he had hoped that the Parliamentary Secretary would be able to see something of their agriculture and food industries when she visited Moscow to open the BRITAGROPROM in February. Mr Gorbachev interjected that if Mrs Fenner would get in touch on the eve of her departure, they would be pleased to work out an appropriate programme. It was clear, the Minister continued, that Russia took pride in her agriculture, as we did in this country. So far as our own farming industry was concerned. He was sure that there was much that the UK could contribute to the development of Soviet agriculture, both by means of trade and by exchanges of technology and information. In the UK we had progressively restructured our entire agricultural industry since the war, and it was now barely recognisable to those, like him, who had started farming in the 1950s. We now produced in the UK 80% of our temperate food requirements, although the agriculture sector employed only 2.6% of the working population. Since

1970 our cereals production had risen from 14 million tonnes to 26.5 million tonnes - Mr Gorbachev commented that this was a most impressive achievement - and we now had 9 million tonnes of grain to export. We were now, in fact, the seventh largest food exporter in the world and would be only too happy to sell more to Russia.

6. Mr Komarov pointed out that the USSR had already bought half a million tonnes of wheat this year. Mr Gorbachev added that it was much more convenient to buy from the UK than from the USA, but asked whether the Community would permit the UK to export freely to the USSR. The Minister replied that, because of the large surpluses in many sectors, the Community gave substantial inducements to encourage exports. Mr Komarov, however, said that in his experience other Member States tended to complain that it was the UK that tried hardest to frustrate exports to the USSR. The Minister denied this. We only opposed exports which took place at excessively low price levels. Mr Komarov was inclined to dispute this; the sales had been at world prices, which depended solely on demand on the world market (he added that internal prices within a country were its own business). The Minister repeated that we had no objection to sales at world prices; our objection was to sales at specially reduced price levels.

7. The Minister said that he had been interested to hear of the move to winter wheat cultivation in the USSR. This had been the main reason for the increase in cereals production in the UK and he wondered whether some of the winter wheat varieties developed here might be of interest to them. He had noted what had been said about the need for increased production of herbicides and pesticides; this was another area where we had much experience and had developed very effective technologies. He had also noted what Mr Gorbachev had said about the need to increase production of protein crops. The Community was moving in the same direction and he had started growing field peas, very profitably, on his own farm. Here again we might have varieties that would be of interest to the USSR. There followed a discussion on the cultivation of field peas between Mr Gorbachev and the Minister.

8. Picking up Mr Gorbachev's remarks on the social aspects of Soviet agricultural policy, the Minister explained our own views, with particular reference to our policies for the Less Favoured Areas. Mr Gorbachev asked what the average farmers' income was in the UK and what was the average level of indebtedness. The Minister gave some examples of net farm income, drawn from the 1984 Annual Review White Paper. He handed a copy of this to Mr Gorbachev, offering to send him a copy of the 1985 White Paper when it was published in January.

9. The Minister said that he had been interested to note what had been said about the Soviet food processing sector. He was glad that the existing arrangements for co-operation there were working so well.

10. Mr Gorbachev said that the meeting (which had overrun by some 30 minutes) had provided the opportunity for a most useful exchange of views. The section responsible for agriculture in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade would now be seeking to ~~expand~~ on these, within the framework of the UK/USSR Joint Commission; he hoped that this would lead to further development in trade and co-operation between the UK and the USSR.

CHK

C I LLEWELYN
20 December 1984.

Distribution

Private Offices
Mr Andrews
Mr Hadley
Professor Bell
Mr Cocking
PS/Foreign Secretary
PS/S of S for Trade and Industry
Mr Powell/No.10
H M Ambassador (Moscow)
Miss Young (FCO)

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DESKBY 210001Z (210800 HK Time)

FM FCO 201700Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2529 OF 20 DECEMBER 1984

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY FROM PRIVATE OFFICE
GORBACHEV'S VISIT

1. AT THE DINNER WHICH THE SPEAKER GAVE FOR THE DELEGATION ON 18 DECEMBER, MR LUCE SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH TO GORBACHEV. THE LATTER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH IT MIGHT BE WORTH BRINGING TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENTION BEFORE HER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.
2. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED INDEED WITH HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD ARRIVED WITH PRECONCEIVED IDEAS ABOUT HER ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. THESE HAD BEEN PROVED WRONG, AND, TO HIS GREAT PLEASURE, HE HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH HER. THEIR MEETING HAD GONE WELL - HER ROBUST DEFENCE OF WESTERN INTERESTS HAD BEEN MATCHED BY A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ITS OWN INTERESTS TO DEFEND, IN WHICH THE WEST HAD AS LITTLE RIGHT TO INTERFERE AS THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN OURS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION HAD BEEN CLEAR AND FIRM. ON SUCH A BASIS, PEOPLE COULD DO BUSINESS.
3. GORBACHEV SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE BELIEVED THAT A CRITICAL TURNING POINT HAD BEEN REACHED ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. OUTER SPACE WEAPONS WERE THE KEY ELEMENT BUT HE BELIEVED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO TACKLE THE ARMS RACE ON ALL FRONTS.
4. ON AT LEAST THREE OCCASIONS GORBACHEV SAID THAT LESSONS SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE FACT THAT BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL IN THE PAST - HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO SALT I AND TO THE ABM TREATY. IF IT HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE, IT COULD BE DONE AGAIN. MR LUCE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO RESTORE THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF TRUST IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. GORBACHEV AGREED, ADDING THAT THIS WAS A FURTHER REASON FOR MOVING FAST AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

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5. GORBACHEV WAS CRITICAL OF US ARMS POLICIES AND MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN VERY DISSATISFIED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FIRST TERM OF OFFICE. DESPITE THE IMPRESSION WHICH THOSE FOUR YEARS HAD LEFT, HE SAID, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE DETERMINED TO WORK FOR AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WITH THE US. WHEN MR LUCE ASKED WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT HE WISHED TO SEE, GORBACHEV USED BOTH HANDS IN A GESTURE ILLUSTRATING THAT HIS AIM WAS TO REDUCE ARMS LEVELS DRAMATICALLY, ON BOTH SIDES AND IN PARALLEL, FROM THEIR DANGEROUSLY HIGH PRESENT LEVEL.

6. AFTER THE DINNER, LORD HOME GAVE MR LUCE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV. HE COMMENTED THAT, WHILE ONE SHOULD NOT OVER-REACT TO THE PERSISTENTLY CHEERFUL DEMEANOUR OF GORBACHEV, HE HAD FOUND HIM CALMER, MORE CIVILISED AND MORE BALANCED THAN, SAY, KRUSHCHEV. HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV WAS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE FOR AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

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COMMS OFFICE REF NO.....
D.T.R. 20th DECEMBER 1984 1220HRS.

FM WASHINGTON 192345Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3806 OF 19 DECEMBER

MW

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)
MOSCOW UKDEL NATO ROUTINE BONN PARIS TOKYO ROME

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: US PRESS COVERAGE

1. SUMMARY

HEADLINE TREATMENT IN US PRESS, BUT LITTLE COMMENT SO FAR. COVERAGE FOCUSED ON AUGURIES FOR THE GENEVA TALKS AND THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN ON SPACE WEAPONS. BRITISH ROLE IN PROMOTING BROADER EAST/WEST CONTACTS NOTED.

2. DETAIL

GORBACHEV'S VISIT HAS BEEN FRONT PAGE NEWS IN ALL THE MAJOR US DAILIES FOR THE LAST FOUR DAYS. REPORTING HAS BEEN BASED PRE-
DOMINANTLY ON BRITISH OFFICIAL BRIEFING, WITH LITTLE COMMENT BY LOCAL CORRESPONDENTS. ONLY THE QUOTE BALTIMORE SUN UNQUOTE HAS SO FAR OFFERED EDITORIAL COMMENT (SEE PARA 5 BELOW). THE EXTENT OF COVERAGE REFLECTS THE INTENSE INTEREST HERE IN THE VISIT AS AN INDICATOR OF THE TEMPERATURE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AN AUGURY OF THE GENEVA TALKS, AND A GLIMPSE OF THE PRESUMED SUCCESSOR TO CHERNENKO.

3. ALL NEWSPAPERS REFLECTED THE BRITISH VIEW THAT CONTACTS WITH SOVIET UNION AT ALL LEVELS WAS NECESSARY TO BUILD A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN WHICH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS COULD PROSPER. THEY NOTED THAT BRITAIN'S FIRST OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROCESS, BUT THAT THE VISIT WAS ALSO SEEN IN LONDON AS A POTENTIAL TURNING POINT IN BILATERAL ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE UNUSUAL LENGTH OF THE VISIT, THE EXTENDED OFFICIAL TALKS, AND THE RELAXED AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE WERE FREQUENTLY MENTIONED AS WERE BRITISH HOPES FOR AN INCREASE IN ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE.

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4. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF COVERAGE HAS BEEN ON ARMS CONTROL AND PARTICULARLY THE DISCUSSION OF QUOTE SPACE WEAPONS UNQUOTE. EARLY COVERAGE GAVE PROMINENCE TO COMMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO BRITISH SOURCES THAT THERE WAS A SHARED BRITISH AND SOVIET CONCERN TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE, AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD RAISE THIS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT CAMP DAVID. THERE HAVE BEEN FREQUENT REFERENCES TO GENERAL EUROPEAN CONCERN ABOUT SDI. LATER COVERAGE INCLUDED YOUR INTERVIEW ON 17 DECEMBER AND OFFICIAL COMMENT STRESSING THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD NOT BECOME A WEDGE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT THAT QUOTE OBVIOUSLY YOU CAN'T STOP RESEARCH FROM GOING AHEAD, BUT I THINK ONE DOES NOT WANT TO GO INTO A HIGHER AND HIGHER LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS UNQUOTE HAS BEEN WIDELY QUOTED.

5. IN AN EDITORIAL ENTITLED QUOTE STAR WARS OVER EUROPE UNQUOTE THE QUOTE BALTIMORE SUN UNQUOTE SAID THAT THIS STATEMENT, AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S RECENT CRITICISM OF THE SDI CONCEPT INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE GREATER SUCCESS IN DIVIDING THE ALLIES ON THIS ISSUE THAN THEY DID OVER INF, BECAUSE UNLIKE INF, SDI HAD DECOUPLING IMPLICATIONS AND THREATENED TO UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF BRITISH AND FRENCH INDEPENDENT DETERRENTS.

6. THE QUOTE WASHINGTON POST UNQUOTE SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S FIRM REMARKS ON ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE INDICATED THAT THE ISSUE COULD BECOME AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IN THE FORTHCOMING GENEVA TALKS. IT REPORTED THE STRONG LINK WHICH GORBACHEV MADE BETWEEN MAINTAINING THE ABM TREATY AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL. AND VELHIKOV'S THREAT THAT COMPLICATIONS COULD DEVELOP IF THE US PROCEEDED WITH ASAT TESTING IN MARCH. BUT IT ALSO CARRIED GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS OF PREPAREDNESS FOR QUOTE RADICAL UNQUOTE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE GENERAL CONCLUSION, IS THAT, WHILE VERY DIFFERENT IN HIS PRESENTATION, GORBACHEV HAD OFFERED NOTHING NEW OF SUBSTANCE, AND BRITISH SOURCES WERE QUOTED AS WARNING THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH.

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/7. ALL PAPERS.....

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7. ALL PAPERS NOTED GORBACHEV'S COMBINATION OF AUTHORITY AND INFORMALITY. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR SUMMED HIM UP AS QUOTE CHARMING BUT A FORMIDABLE NEGOTIATOR UNQUOTE. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE BRITISH QUOTE GAVE HIM HIGH MARKS UNQUOTE AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENT QUOTE I LIKE MR GORBACHEV: WE CAN DO BUSINESS TOGETHER UNQUOTE WAS WIDELY REPORTED.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF SOVIET JEWRY, YOUR OWN MENTION OF SAKHAROV, AND THE EXCHANGE WITH MR ST JOHN STEVAS IN THE MEETING WITH THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS WERE ALSO PROMINENTLY REPORTED, THE LATTER BEING SEEN AS A USEFUL COUNTERPOINT TO THE ATMOSPHERE OF SWEETNESS AND LIGHT WHICH GORBACHEV WAS SAID TO BE TRYING TO CONVEY.

9. THE US PRESS HAS NOT YET ATTEMPTED TO MAKE AN OVERALL JUDGEMENT ON THE VISIT. IT IS BOUND TO FEATURE AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE HERE ON 22 DECEMBER - SEE MY TEL NO 15 TO PEKING: (NOT TO ALL)

10. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY A MAJOR SPEECH BY WEINBERGER TODAY ON THE SDI.

FCO PASS SAVING: ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG OTTAWA OSLO ROME REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE UKDEL VIENNA

A: PM'S PARTY
D: NIL
dw

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COMMS OFFICE REG NO.....
D.T.R. 20th DECEMBER 1984 0830HRS.

DESKBY 200300Z 201100 H.K TIME

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2520 OF 19 DEC

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY (PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)
FROM BARCLAY (NO 10)

GORBACHEV VISIT

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF A CURIOUS EPISODE INVOLVING MR GORBACHEV.
2. SHORTLY AFTER 1700 LOCAL TIME TODAY (WEDNESDAY), GORBACHEV PLUS PARTY WERE PASSING DOWN WHITEHALL BY CAR FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN MEETING DAVID STEEL AND OTHERS. APPARENTLY, AS HE PASSED DOWNING STREET, HE EXPRESSED A WISH TO SEE THE OUTSIDE OF NO 10.
3. THE ACCOMPANYING SPECIAL BRANCH OFFICER NEGOTIATED ACCESS TO THE STREET DIRECT WITH THE POLICEMAN AT THE BARRIER (WITHOUT INFORMING US) AND GORBACHEV AND PARTY WALKED UP. THEY WERE ADMITTED BY THE POLICEMAN ON THE DOOR TO THE FRONT HALL (ONLY). THEY HAD GONE BEFORE ANY PRIVATE SECRETARY REACHED THE SPOT - REPORTEDLY IN GOOD HUMOUR.
4. SO FAR AS WE KNOW THERE WERE NO PHOTOGRAPHERS AND NO PRESS.
5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER, SAY, MR THATCHER MIGHT BE ASKED TO INVITE GORBACHEV TO MAKE A PROPER TOUR OF THE STATE ROOMS, IF THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED. BUT FCO ADVICE IS RATHER AGAINST: HE LEAVES LONDON FOR SCOTLAND EARLY ON FRIDAY, AND WAS PROBABLY NOT SHOWING MORE THAN A 'PASSING INTEREST'.

A: PSTC PM'S PARTY
D NIL
dw

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

CF

Original of the

oral message for

Chamberlain which ~~is~~

Grubbever handed to

PM. Please file.

CM

К. У. ЧЕРНЕНКО ПРОСИЛ ПЕРЕДАТЬ ГОСПОЖЕ ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ, ЧТО ОН ХОРОШО ПОМНИТ СВОЮ БЕСЕДУ С НЕЙ 14 ФЕВРАЛЯ ЭТОГО ГОДА. ОН НАМЕРЕН В ОБЛАСТИ СОВЕТСКО-БРИТАНСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ ДЕЙСТВОВАТЬ В ТОМ ДУХЕ, КАК ТОГДА ГОВОРИЛОСЬ, ТО ЕСТЬ ПООЩРЯТЬ АКТИВНЫЙ И СЕРЬЕЗНЫЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ ДИАЛОГ, ДОБИВАТЬСЯ БОЛЕЕ ШИРОКОГО ВЗАИМОПОНИМАНИЯ, СОТРУДНИЧАТЬ НА ОСНОВЕ ВЗАИМНОЙ ВЫГОДЫ.

К. У. ЧЕРНЕНКО ХОТЕЛ БЫ НАДЕЯТЬСЯ, ЧТО ТАКОЙ ЖЕ БУДЕТ И ЛИНИЯ БРИТАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА. В СЛОЖИВШЕЙСЯ СЕЙЧАС МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ОБСТАНОВКЕ НЕОБХОДИМОСТЬ В УСТАНОВЛЕНИИ ОПРЕДЕЛЕННОГО ВЗАИМОПОНИМАНИЯ МЕЖДУ НАШИМИ СТРАНАМИ ОСОБЕННО ВЕЛИКА.

СОВЕТСКОЕ РУКОВОДСТВО ПРИДАЕТ ВЕСЬМА СЕРЬЕЗНОЕ ЗНАЧЕНИЕ ПРЕДСТОЯЩИМ ПЕРЕГОВОРАМ С США ПО ВСЕМУ КОМПЛЕКСУ КОСМИЧЕСКИХ И ЯДЕРНЫХ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ. ОДНАКО В МОСКВЕ ОПАСАЮТСЯ, ЧТО ВОЗМОЖНОСТЬ, КОТОРАЯ ВОЗНИКАЕТ С НАЧАЛОМ ЭТИХ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ, МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ УПУЩЕНА, ЕСЛИ ВАШИНГТОН СНОВА ПОПЫТАЕТСЯ ДОБИВАТЬСЯ ОДНОСТОРОННИХ ПРЕИМУЩЕСТВ И ОДНОСТОРОННЕГО РАЗОРУЖЕНИЯ СССР.

В СОВРЕМЕННЫХ УСЛОВИЯХ ОСОБЕННО ВАЖНО ПРЕДОТВРАТИТЬ ГОНКУ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ В КОСМОСЕ. ЕСЛИ НЕ УДАСТСЯ ЭТО, ТО НЕРЕАЛЬНО НАДЕЯТЬСЯ НА ПРЕКРАЩЕНИЕ ГОНКИ ЯДЕРНЫХ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ. ПО НАШЕМУ ГЛУБОКОМУ УБЕЖДЕНИЮ, КОСМОС КАК ИСТОЧНИК СМЕРТИ, ИСТОЧНИК ВОЙНЫ НЕ НУЖЕН НИ ОДНОМУ НАРОДУ.

К. У. ЧЕРНЕНКО ПРОСИЛ ТАКЖЕ ПЕРЕДАТЬ, ЧТО СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ В ПОЛНОЙ МЕРЕ ОСТАЕТСЯ ПРИВЕРЖЕН ЦЕЛЯМ И ПУТЯМ МИРНОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИХ ГОСУДАРСТВ, ЧТО ЗАФИКСИРОВАНО И В ХЕЛЬСИНКСКОМ ЗАКЛЮЧИТЕЛЬНОМ АКТЕ.

К. У. ЧЕРНЕНКО ШЛЕТ ГОСПОЖЕ ТЭТЧЕР ПРИВЕТ И САМЫЕ ДОБРЫЕ ПОЖЕЛАНИЯ.

K.U.Chernenko asked to convey to madame Prime Minister that he recalls very well his talk with her on February 14, this year. In the sphere of Soviet-British relations he intends to act in the spirit which was then discussed, that is to promote an active and serious political dialogue, to strive for a wider mutual understanding, to cooperate on the basis of mutual benefit.

K.U.Chernenko would like to hope that the line taken by the British government will be the same. In the present international situation as it has shaped up now, the need to establish certain mutual understanding between our countries is especially great.

The Soviet leadership attaches quite a serious importance to the forthcoming talks with the USA on the whole range of space and nuclear weapons. However there is a concern in Moscow that the opportunity arising with the start of these talks can be missed if Washington tries again to seek unilateral advantages and the unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

In present circumstances it is especially important to avert the arms race in outer space. If it is not achieved it would be unreal to hope to stop the nuclear arms race. In our deep conviction no nation, no people needs an outer space as a source of death, a source of war.

K.U.Chernenko also asked to convey that the Soviet Union remains fully devoted to the aims and ways of peaceful cooperation of European states as it has been layed down in the Helsinki Final Act.

K.U.Chernenko sends to madame M.Thatcher his greetings and greetings and sincere good wishes.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1394</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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10 DOWNING STREET

JKRAQE

bc PC ✓

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1984

GORBACHEV'S VISIT

Your letter of 10 December asked for an early indication of what might be said to our Allies about Mr. Gorbachev's visit in confidential briefing. My letter of 16 December reported the Prime Minister's instruction that only a limited briefing should be given. I imagine that any such briefing will also take in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev today.

I enclose a copy of the notes prepared for Bernard Ingham's use in briefing the press last night on the Gorbachev talks. I suggest that these should form the basis of briefing of our European Community partners and other members of the Alliance (for the Americans see below) on the Prime Minister's talks. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of my letter of 16 December could also be drawn upon.

In addition, one could say that Mr. Gorbachev conveyed an impression of confidence, authority and fluency, and even some charm. He was affable. He was evidently keen for his meeting with the Prime Minister to be a success, though not prepared to concede anything to achieve that. He talked readily and did not stick to prepared statements, picking up points made in discussion and responding to them. He referred occasionally to some manuscript notes in a small book but looked to his advisers for support only when it came to using American names (National Security Council, New York Times). He was at pains to bring President Chernenko's name into the discussions as a source of authority for his remarks, usually giving him his full title. He did not become riled, even when tackled quite directly on a number of points which he considered internal Soviet matters, responding firmly but reasonably. The overall impression was of no great change in substance but a considerable improvement in style over some of the hackneyed exchanges which characterize talks with other Soviet leaders. A man one can do business with. The Prime Minister liked him.

It should be emphasised that the discussions were not, and not intended to be, a negotiation, and the only substantive conclusions from them were recognition that we were at a crucial point in East/West relations, on the need to seek security at a lower level of armaments, and on the importance of developing contacts and discussions between East and West. Nor did the Prime Minister seek to cast herself in the role of an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the Americans. Indeed, she went out of her way to stress our solidarity with the Americans. It was evident, however, that Gorbachev was keen to have from her a first-hand impression of American policies and the likely outcome of the present ferment in Washington on arms control issues. Equally, the Prime Minister will of course be passing on her impressions to President Reagan.

Particular care should be taken in dealing with any suggestions that the Prime Minister distanced herself from President Reagan over the question of arms control in space. The line should be that the Prime Minister held to the position which she has set out in a number of major speeches recently. It could be recalled that she has consistently recognised the need for research into ballistic missile defence to guard against the Soviet Union obtaining a lead in this area, and recognises the importance of the SDI as a factor in bringing the Soviet Union back to the arms control negotiating table.

In briefing the Americans, you will need to steer a careful course between stealing the Prime Minister's thunder (her own briefing of President Reagan next Saturday) and sharing information with them on the usual privileged basis. To the extent possible, I think you should stick to the general line proposed in this letter, augmented by the promise of a fuller account from the Prime Minister herself on Saturday. But you might also emphasise the very close attention with which Mr. Gorbachev questioned the Prime Minister on American motives and intentions at Geneva, and the Prime Minister's strongly supportive remarks about President Reagan in reply.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

T.M.

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Mr. Thatcher's press briefing. Sunday 16 December
PM's talks with Mr. Gorbachev.

Could I apologise to you firstly for being an hour and a half late, the reason for this of course is that the talks went on longer than one had expected. Now can I make clear the basis of this meeting, it is of course unattributable, you use British sources. I recognise that because of the time some of you may wish to get away and therefore I will give you immediately a broad outline shorn of a lot of the detail, which I can go into later, of the talks. Mr Gorbachev and the Party arrived at Chequers at 12.30, sat down for lunch at about 1.25 after cocktails and of course a photocall. They had luncheon till just before 3. It was very much an informal lunch at which the Prime Minister had Mr Gorbachev on her right and Mr Zamyatin on her left and she spent much of the time during lunch talking to Mr Gorbachev. They then adjourned and the talks that took place subsequently were as between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, on the one hand and Mr Gorbachev, Mr Zamyatin and Mr Yakovlev on the Russian side with of course interpreters' consecutive translation. The discussion which lasted for two and three quarter hours was conducted as indeed the lunch was in very friendly basis, it was a business-like discussion but in a relaxed atmosphere and I think that the Prime Minister would feel that it was an excellent start for her to an important week in international diplomacy. At the end I think both the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev agreed that it had been a very constructive discussion and perhaps that is indicated by the fact that Mr Gorbachev in fact did not leave Chequers until the time he was supposed to be at the Russian Embassy, namely about 6 o'clock. Now as for substance, virtually the whole of the two and three quarter hours were devoted to East/West relations and arms control and there was a brief discussion at the end of Anglo/Soviet trade. Mr Gorbachev brought with him a personal message for the Prime Minister from Mr Chernenko.

This message which must of course remain confidential set out the positive attitude with which Mr Chernenko says the Soviet Union approaches both Anglo/Soviet relations and international issues, particularly the talks which are to be held in Geneva in January. The Prime Minister recalled her useful and constructive discussion with Mr Chernenko after Mr Andropov's funeral in February. She asked Mr Gorbachev to convey her greetings to Mr Chernenko. She received the message warmly and Mr Gorbachev actually read it out to her; it is relatively short and the Prime Minister indicated that she will reply to it in detail.

Now throughout the discussions the Prime Minister sought to impress Mr Gorbachev with the sincerity of the British, NATO and not least the American approach to arms control talks. She emphasised that the West wished to achieve security at a lower level of armaments, while of course recognising that balance was essential. Both recognised that each had different outlooks and the meeting was in fact a useful opportunity to get over strongly held points of view about each others' way of life and political systems. Each recognised, I think, that what the other wants is security within their own boundaries at a much lower level of armaments. Now this was not a negotiating session at all, therefore there were no conclusions reached. In so far as there was an outcome, it was, I think, it was complete agreement on the need for much more contact at this and other levels as a means of building the confidence necessary for successful negotiations on arms control. That I suppose implies a long haul, obviously I cannot dissent from that. I think Mr Gorbachev conveyed the impression that if for example the UK and the Soviet Union could establish a better relationship then the effect would spread. While these talks were going on Mrs Gorbacheva was given an extensive and indeed intensive tour of Chequers. In fact she spent 2 hours looking round the house, which she found very interesting and not least the library where she spent quite a lot of time looking at the collection. So, that I think in essence is what I have to say. I can of course go into more detail for those who would wish it about the arrangements and whatever but I suggest that for those who have editions to catch should we have a natural break here and then I'll take questions?



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 December, 1984.

My dear Mr Gorbachev.

I write to thank you and Madame Gorbacheva most warmly for the beautiful gifts which I have now been able to unpack and admire properly. It was most kind and generous of you both, and my husband is equally delighted with his gift.

I enjoyed your visit to Chequers, and found our talks very useful.

I hope very much that the remainder of your visit is successful and that we shall have another opportunity to meet in due course.

With best wishes to you both for the New Year.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

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MASTER

SUBJECT: SOVIET UNION
Relations

MR. BISHOP'S
RECORD

RECORD OF PRIVATE LUNCHTIME CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FIRST
MINISTER AND MR GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS ON SUNDAY 16 DECEMBER
1984

Mr Gorbachev said that he had spent a good morning at the Headquarters of John Brown. The First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade had been with him. Some of the proposals made by John Brown had been very interesting. This was an important time for considering possible lines of cooperation. He would be having further discussions during the week with British businessmen. The Prime Minister said that John Brown were doing well now. After a strike-prone period some years ago, they had been free of strikes for some 12 years now. Their orders were being produced on time and they had a very good record. Like other British companies, they honoured their contracts. Mr Gorbachev said that John Brown had good knowledge of Soviet conditions and problems. Certain points raised in their presentation that morning deserved further and immediate study, notably those for chemical plants, food processing and packaging systems etc. The Prime Minister said she understood that it was important for the Soviet Union to increase the shelf life of products. Mr Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union was losing or wasting a great deal because such infrastructure was lacking.

Mr Gorbachev said he would later be conveying to the Prime Minister a special message from Mr Chernenko. This would deal with arms control and space and with opportunities for extending the bilateral dialogue started in Moscow at the time of Mr Andropov's funeral.

In response to the Prime Minister's question about his previous visits, including his visit to Canada, Mr Gorbachev said that he had liked Canada a great deal. It was a very wealthy country in terms of both finances and resources. Canada and the Soviet Union had much in common as countries. It had therefore been rather difficult to find areas of cooperation for boosting bilateral trade. Several companies

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in Canada which had expressed an interest in doing business with the Soviet Union were found to have their bosses in the United States. Some were 90% American.

The Prime Minister said that all countries had their own national feelings and pride. This applied very much to both parts of Europe. Mr Gorbachev said that to regard the interests of other countries as inferior to those of one's own was not a moral basis for policy. The national income of the CMEA countries was rising faster than that of the Soviet Union. This demonstrated the Soviet Union's selflessness. The Prime Minister asked whether the Soviet Union was well placed for hard currency. Mr Gorbachev said it was, though this was not true for all of the socialist countries. Hungary for example, was not in a particularly easy situation. Modernisation was now under way and if credits and finance were available on suitable terms, there should be no great problem. But intergovernmental organisations in the West, and the COCOM list, which was 90% governed by the United States, as well as EEC restrictions, caused some difficulty. The Prime Minister said that the IMF was a most useful organisation. What people wanted was to be able to raise their own standard of living by their own efforts. This was true for all countries. Politicians could help in this by the line that they took. But governments themselves had no money and needed to help people to earn more. How could this be achieved in a centralised and rigid economy? Mr Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would be in an extremely difficult situation if it were unable to settle in a satisfactory way the key questions of social and economic levelling. When asked by the Prime Minister whether the Soviet Union would ever successfully achieve such a levelling out, Mr Gorbachev said that on the whole this had already been achieved. The problem of availability of jobs was already solved. The Soviet approach of course was very different from that of the West and of Britain in particular. In the Soviet Union, the numbers of workers were reduced before the workers themselves were retrained. The opposite simply would not work. They had already achieved a standard educational system. Things were

on the move. There was of course much to be taken into account, and running the country was no easy matter. The planners had to cater for all 15 Republics, and the Republics themselves had to consent. The birth rate in some of the Republics, particularly those in Central Asia, was much higher than elsewhere. The danger here was excessive working capacity. The problem however was now being overcome. Decisions had been taken over the last 10 years with the Southern Republics particularly in mind. There were complex programmes for the development of Azerbaidjan, etc, where there was still a strong attachment to agriculture. Earlier ideas of providing large industrial plants there in order to attract the young had not been correct. They were now going for smaller enterprises, light industry and so forth in rural areas in order to absorb the numbers of young people. Hundreds of billions of roubles were being earmarked for irrigation schemes.

The Prime Minister wondered whether this might not all be easier if it were attempted on a free enterprise basis, with the provision of incentives and a free hand for local enterprises to run their own show, rather than being directed from the centre. Mr Gorbachev said he did not think she could really believe that everything in the USSR was run from the centre. Was it even feasible to try to do so? The Prime Minister said that Soviet 5-year plans were produced by a central agency and handed down to other governmental agencies. But unless people received incentives and could profit from their own efforts and raise their own standard of living, wealth would not be created and new products would not be generated. Under the Western system, everyone ultimately received more than they would from a system which depended simply on redistribution. In Britain we were attempting, through reduction in taxation, to increase incentives and stimulate new designs, new ventures, in order to raise wealth and to compete in world markets. She herself did not wish to have the power to direct everyone where he or she should work and what he or she should receive. That seemed a totally rigid system. It was better that people should be responsible

for their own actions.

Mr Gorbachev said that his own responsibilities increasingly centred in the economic field, which was also a hobby of his. He understood the British system, but the Soviet system was superior. He would not list all the arguments in favour of this view but believed that the history of the Soviet Union spoke volumes. Before the Revolution the country had been semi-colonial. Then a new approach had been tried and had revived the country. If there had been no World War II and if the Soviet Union had had a correspondingly developed industrial base, who knows what they would not have achieved by now. Churchill had said that it would take the Soviet Union a quarter of a century or more after the war to get back on its feet. In fact this had been achieved very much faster. Nor had the Soviet Union had the benefit of American help such as the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. They had had to do it by themselves, in a situation of virtual blockade. The Soviet Union's choice of system had not been accidental. It produced higher growth rates. Svetlana Alliluyeva had recently returned to Moscow after an absence of 17 years. She had been amazed at the changes in that time. Western Communists, including the Head of CPGB, often had reservations about the Soviet system. They were simply told to send their Communists to the USSR and see for themselves. British, West German and other Western Communists had come by the train load to the Soviet Union in the autumn. They had travelled about by train and had seen for themselves. He hoped that the Prime Minister too would "some day obtain a fuller first-hand view for herself". She would see how Soviet people lived - joyfully. Of course there were great problems, but they were being solved.

The Prime Minister asked why the Soviet authorities did not allow people to leave the Soviet Union as easily as they could leave Britain. She did not retain anyone who wished to leave. Svetlana had wished to leave and had been free to do so. So had the two Soviet soldiers who had come to Britain after fighting in Afghanistan. Their right to leave had been

entirely unrestricted, like everyone else'. Britain's difficulty was perhaps that too many people wished to come and live here! But the Soviet authorities were placing great restrictions on people like Sakharov, Shcharansky, and numbers of Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union. Their names were well known. Any Ukrainians, Georgians and so forth living in the UK were entirely free to leave. Why were they restricted in the Soviet Union?

Mr Gorbachev said that they had not completed their discussion of the two economic systems. The Soviet Union was undertaking a reform and giving incentives. It was envisaging more rights but also more responsibilities and independence for local enterprises and regional authorities. The matter was complex because there were 15 Republics as well as a number of autonomous areas. But the process was well under way. Centralisation would certainly continue and even be strengthened but only as regards certain key decision-making areas. The Prime Minister asked who decided what should be produced in the economy. Mr Gorbachev said that the central planning authorities gave instructions to the various outlying areas. The Prime Minister said that this differed markedly from the British system. She did not tell companies what to produce. They competed and did their own R and D.

The Prime Minister then spoke of the current miners' strike in Britain. More than one-third of miners were working hard. They had good wages, good conditions and good hours. The remainder were on strike. There was much intimidation of those who were working or wished to work - by force, violence, beatings-up, and even recently a murder. Communism was synonymous with getting one's way by violence. Its slogan was: "Brothers - when you are free, you will do as you are told". This was the ultimate socialist idea and explained the reputation which Communists, including those behind the miners' strike, enjoyed in the United Kingdom. People like Scargill and McGahey gave Soviet Communism a bad name.

Mr Gorbachev asked whether the Prime Minister really

believed that Soviet Communists were so strong as to be able to keep the British miners out on strike for over 10 months. The Prime Minister said that the miners' leaders had refused to conduct a ballot within their trade union. Where a ballot had been held, the vote had been to return to work. Some Communists and Communist sympathizers within the trade union leadership had not liked this and had thus approved intimidation to put workers willing to work back on strike. Mr Gorbachev said that the Prime Minister could speak to him in this way only because she placed such confidence in him. The problem was purely a British one. The Prime Minister said that in Britain, Communists could stand for election to Parliament but knew that they would never be elected. They had thus decided to try to take over trade unions, under Labour colours, and to infiltrate the Labour Party in the hope of getting elected. Mr Gorbachev said this was the first he had heard of this. Did the Prime Minister really think that the Soviet Union have such influence in other countries as to be able to manipulate local Communist Parties and public opinion? He could assure her that the Soviet leaders were not trying to do so and were not involved. The causes were entirely local. The Soviet Union had a firm policy: no export of Revolution and no export of Counter-Revolution. This was clear and a firm matter of principle for the Soviet Union. They should simply observe and see which system proved better. The Soviet Union did not refuse the right of the capitalist system to exist.

The Prime Minister said that such was the total freedom in Britain that Britain was open to propaganda for other alien systems. She did not seek to prevent this. She could prove that the British system was better. But the Soviet Union's fellow-Communists who could not get their own way through the ballot box were opting for violence. They were also being helped with finance from outside. Mr Gorbachev said it was not the Soviet Union who was helping in this way. The Soviet Union had transferred no funds to the NUM. (After a sideways glance from Mr Zamyatin, he amended this to: "as far as I am aware..."). The Prime Minister should blame Britain and not

Foreign Communists for the situation. Das Kapital had been written in London. The Prime Minister interjected that in a free society it was entirely possible to do so and to get it published. Mr Gorbachev said that he was aware that the Prime Minister was capable of defending herself. But the Second Congress of the RSDRP had also been held in London. The Prime Minister asked when she might contemplate the holding of British Party Congresses in Moscow. Lenin had set a tragic example of resorting to violence when unable to win through the ballot box, when he had overthrown the people's representative Kerensky.

Mr Gorbachev appealed to the Prime Minister to deal with realities. He recalled that Mr Churchill, a "dyed in the wool anti-communist", had nevertheless been sufficiently wise to join forces with the Soviet Union in certain historical circumstances. The Soviet Union's ideology was its own and was not being thrust on others. Perhaps the matter should be left there. He was not out to persuade the Prime Minister to his ideological views.

The Prime Minister said that she would doubtless be asked by several people what Mr Gorbachev's response had been about emigration possibilities for Jews, for Sakharov, Shcharansky and so forth. How should she reply? She would never restrain anyone in the United Kingdom by force. Mr Gorbachev expressed incredulity at this, adding that in other circumstances Britain certainly did use force. The Soviet Union simply abided by its own laws. It did not interfere with others and had no wish to do so, Britain should reciprocate. The Prime Minister said that she would answer press enquiries by saying that she had raised the question of people who wished to leave the Soviet Union and that Mr Gorbachev had referred to the differences between the two systems. Mr Gorbachev asked that she should reply that this was a matter within the competence of the Soviet authorities acting on the basis of Soviet laws. These matters were all governed by Soviet legislation. In fact, 89% of all who had expressed the wish to leave the Soviet Union over the last 10 years had done so. The number

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of requests to leave was constantly falling, and this was natural. Sometimes, people who were initially not permitted to leave were later allowed to do so. The reason for initial refusal was generally that they had been working in areas affecting national security. Pressed further by the Prime Minister on the matter, Mr Gorbachev said it was up to her how she spoke to the press. He had explained the situation. Mr Gorbachev said that the present discussion was a private one. The Soviet position remained unchanged. She would be best to say that Mr Gorbachev "had added nothing new to the known Soviet position and had referred to existing Soviet laws".

The Prime Minister asked what she should say if asked about Mr Gorbachev's views concerning the miners' strike. Mr Gorbachev said this was entirely an internal UK matter and not relevant to inter-state relations. The Prime Minister said that some might point out that it was impossible to get money out of the Soviet Union without the agreement of the Soviet authorities. Mr Gorbachev said that he could state firmly that as far as he was aware no money had been transferred to the British miners from the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister said that the difficult part of their discussion was now over. Mr Gorbachev welcomed this and recalled good examples of cooperation between the two countries, including the honouring of contracts in the energy field.

In a brief toast at the end of the meal, Mr Gorbachev expressed "great satisfaction" at this opportunity for a discussion with the Prime Minister and her colleagues. He welcomed the "domestic ambience" and the good atmosphere prevailing around the table. He was indebted to the Prime Minister for this. The Soviet aim in accepting the invitation to Britain was to develop the dialogue between the two countries, extend mutual understanding and find points of contact and convergence on important international issues. Neither side should be obliged to renounce its own principles

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or act to the detriment of third countries. He referred briefly to the message he was carrying for the Prime Minister from Mr Chernenko, expressing as it did readiness to continue to act in the spirit of the meeting in Moscow at the time of Mr Andropov's funeral.

7 January 1985

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MIKHAIL SERGEEVICH GORBACHEV: A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MAN DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, 15-21 DECEMBER 1984.

1. Gorbachev's performance in the UK will at least in part have been dictated by the political purpose of the visit. He described his underlying purpose in an aside to The Speaker after only five minutes on British soil - "We accept Britain as it is, and hope that you will accept us similarly; I have come to clear away the obstacles (razgrebat zavaly) in the way of improving Anglo/Soviet relations." It became ever clearer as the visit proceeded that fulfilment of this purpose required a man who could realistically sell optimism; appeal convincingly to British economic and political self-interest; sustain a long, diverse and very demanding programme; and show the acceptable face of Communism to a wide range of governmental, parliamentary, business and media representatives. (Success in this was necessary to him in his accompanying, unstated, purpose - that of exploiting the contacts and timing of the visit to the benefit of the Soviet position on the non-militarisation of outer space.)
2. My close observation of him as his interpreter throughout his official programme leaves me in no doubt that Gorbachev was eminently the right man for the job. Of course he fitted his face to the tasks in hand, refusing for example to let himself be provoked by persistent demonstrators, by the Prime Minister's challenging and probing examination of him, by the clamorous and potentially embarrassing attentions of the media, by speculative questions from Members of Parliament and others about his standing in the Soviet hierarchy. The man, however, proved not just equal to but bigger than the task, and left some strong impressions also of his real self. Also revealed were some new biographical details, including certain likes and dislikes and the intriguing fact that he was baptised (Annex B).
3. There was about his movements and his utterances an unaffected, self-assured and un-self-conscious air of competence and confidence. One was conscious of great resources of energy in him, well-harnessed, Although he joked about his heavy programme - "we'll fulfil it if it kills us" - he never flagged nor faltered. He spoke as a rule in simple, generally short and clear sentences. While showing on occasion that he could trade if necessary in the language of the dialectic, he kept his remarks throughout the week notably free of the familiar Marxist/Leninist jargon, bombast, "preachiness" or cliches.
4. He would listen, immobile, with concentration and great attentiveness, and would almost invariably answer all questions put to him - in his own time, of course, and only in the degree of detail which suited him. He had a knack of doing so in a disarmingly straightforward, unpolemical manner and of finding apt, often humorous turns of phrase to register his point or defuse unwanted tension. He was aided in this by a ready smile and occasional laughter. A roguish twinkle was never far from his eye (he even once winked at me over his shoulder as I interpreted a neat parry of his to one of the Prime Minister's verbal thrusts). He often spoke without notes, confidently, steadily, and in a manner
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which inspired confidence in his audience.

5. While not an intellectual, he clearly has a very good memory and a disciplined head. He was also thoroughly in control of his brief. I found him - especially for someone so little acquainted with the ways of the West - notably quick to size up a political situation or take a hint, indeed generally quick on the uptake. Even at 'Cosi Fan Tutte' he was much quicker than his more "intellectual" wife to get the point of an unfamiliar plot and to appreciate the spirit and humour of the production. His demeanour in addressing others, either singly or in large numbers, and regardless of whether they were British or Soviet, can be summed up in the word "naturalness". If, as occurred once or twice, he was less than totally fluent, that too seemed natural and bothered him not at all. He appeared at these times (when searching for a word or phrase) to prefer to be "sound" and to feel right with his answer before giving voice. If his message was unsurprising, even predictable, and rarely if ever strayed far from orthodox Soviet positions, the style was often lightened with a touch of humour, irony or with colloquialisms. It was refreshing for example to hear a Soviet leader (in conversation with the Secretary of State) use such words as chepukha (nonsense/twaddle) rather than some cant equivalent from Pravda. Such examples were far from infrequent. But the message remained, in Soviet terms, irreproachably sound, even if the style and lexicon had the ring of relative modernity.

6. Without ever for a moment suggesting ideological unsoundness or indifference (indeed, his conviction about the rightness and superiority of the Soviet system seemed heartfelt), he came across to many as a pragmatist. In official talks with the Prime Minister, Secretary of State, Mr Jopling and Mr Channon, as well as in the visits to industrial/agricultural companies and plants, he spoke as a man at ease with the capabilities of robotics, computer technology and new management techniques, and certainly not afraid of them. He regularly produced a stream of apt, often detailed comments, and of penetrating questions. His enthusiasm for airing his knowledge was marked, notably in his beloved fields of economic management and agriculture. Everywhere he seemed interested in and impressed by what our American cousins would call a "can do mentality". His unscheduled and unannounced visit to a 10 Downing Street empty of its principal resident was probably less a caprice and more an example of his confidence and decisiveness (of which there were several other instances) and his apparent conviction that problems exist to be solved. His confidence in the power of technology harnessed to sound organisation was several times expressed in terms of evident pride in Soviet power. He told one of his parliamentary hosts that the Soviet Union had told the Americans: "We can perfectly well nowadays live without you and you without us, though cooperation would be preferable"; he spoke with obvious pride to the Prime Minister about Soviet scientific and technological achievements; he showed (not for the first or last time during his visit) a strong streak of nationalistic pride, even touchiness, in telling Mr Channon that people who regarded the Russians as technological "backwoodsmen" were both arrogant and ignorant and would learn better. "Send us your smallest British flea and we'll make shoes for it!" This, though accompanied with a disarming chuckle, was said with deep feeling.

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7. The strain of Russian/Slav nationalism in him came through also in private conversation about art and music (with Mr Rifkind and Lord Gowrie), where Gorbachev sang the praises of several Soviet painters of the strongly Russian nationalist (and realist) school - notably Ilya Glazunov. He even suggested to Lord Gowrie that Britain should put on a Glazunov exhibition. At the same time he poured gentle ridicule on modernist paintings of the "nothing but a plain rectangle" variety and was amused at people who could stand in front of them for hours in rapt concentration and awe. In music, too, his pride in Russian national achievements was evident. It prompted him to recommend visitors to Moscow to go to a church in Fili, on the city's outskirts, (Sobor Svyatogo Pokrova), where 15th and 16th century Russian chants were "brilliantly" and "wonderfully" performed by an unaccompanied choir. Although the evidence is inconclusive (he guffawed at an anti-Polish bon mot by his host at a parliamentary dinner), I very much suspect that his Russian pride is tinged with racism or, at the very least, condescension towards other races. He told several people that without the firm grip at the centre in Moscow, the many races in the Soviet Union would have flown apart and produced chaos. He also remarked favourably on the pragmatic British approach towards his very demanding programme in the UK, remarking that with the Germans the programme ruled - it was "programme first, second and last". (He said he had learned some German in his youth but it was now broken and rusty). Taking an intelligent interest in everything around him, he seemed genuinely impressed both by the British sense of tradition and by examples of British technical innovation (automated insertion of windscreens in cars etc).

8. On two noteworthy occasions the unemotional mask slipped - in both cases on the issue of human rights. It slipped slightly when Mr St John-Stevens harried him, in the meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, about the Soviet Union's failure to honour its human rights commitments. Prevented from changing the subject, Gorbachev threatened retaliation by vigorous "exposure" of British sins in this field. The mask slipped badly at the Official Opposition lunch, when Mr Kinnock privately pressed the same issue. This provoked an intemperate outburst of obscenities and threats by Gorbachev against "turds" and spies like Shchavansky, who was in prison "and that is where he will stay". He warned, with appropriate gestures, that Britain would get it "right in the teeth" in a "merciless" denunciation of its human rights crimes if that was the game it wanted to play. With his usual adroitness, however, Gorbachev collected himself and told Mr Kinnock that he had never spoken so undiplomatically on the subject to anyone else during the visit, and that such frankness was possible only between people who referred to each other as "comrade"! He sought a no less disarming escape route from a sharp exchange of views in private with the Prime Minister by remarking that her candour was a mark of her confidence in him. Nimbleness of foot was a feature of Gorbachev's performance throughout his stay. But the chill impression left by these instances remains: we had glimpsed beneath the surface a man conscious of power and ready if need be to exploit it ruthlessly.

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9. As remarked above, Gorbachev came to the UK to present the acceptable face of Communism and was outwardly pretty successful in his mission. He repeatedly stated his satisfaction with his programme and was visibly gratified at the length and substantive nature of his talks, notably with the Prime Minister and Secretary of State. Without evidently trying too hard, indeed quite naturally and unemotionally, he evoked a sense of confidence in virtually all his interlocutors. He struck them as approachable and, because unaffected, as also sincere or least as someone with whom it was possible to have a rational dialogue. Members of his own Delegation also seemed to find him sympathetic and approachable. The Delegation's loquacious and self-conscious "card", the poet Isaev, spoke to me in terms of admiration, even adulation, for Gorbachev's "peasant simplicity, unaffectedness and closeness to people", his "wisdom even more than his brain". His Delegation as a whole seemed to have easy access to him and to be prepared to confide in him. Their attitude, though one of natural deference and admiration, was nothing approaching awe. He not infrequently gave members of his team the floor to speak on subjects close to themselves. He was never seen to give himself airs, "pull rank" or reprimand them (not even the embarrassingly florid Isaev nor the miner, Strelchenko, who worked himself into a shouting militaristic rage at the Speaker's dinner). He was attentive to others' needs (sympathising with his interpreters as they worked, un-fed, through his mealtime conversations).

10. Gorbachev displayed generally during the visit the kind of unostentatious personal magnetism and political soundness of touch which, were he a Western politician, would swing many voters behind him. He handled the British media like a "natural" - with patience, decisiveness and winning touches of humour. I saw no signs of vanity in him (though several in his wife). There is certainly some steel behind the surface smoothness; some fire and deep convictions behind the "cool customer" exterior. There is a disarming directness in him, and some human sympathy along with evident drive, determination and national pride. He has strong nerves (and could even swap jokes just before his departure from Edinburgh, about doctors and death, though he had only just broken the news of Ustinov's demise to his hosts). I am sure he could be utterly ruthless if necessary.

11. What these qualities and the others described above will do for him in the Soviet political arena, it is hard to predict. If the Soviet Union one day needs the kind of leader who, like a General on the eve of battle, can put new heart into his troops simply by going quietly and reassuringly among them, then Gorbachev could be their man. In this event the West would need to recall not only Gorbachev's best behaviour but also those moments when the urbane mask slipped. The combination of cleverness, modern-mindedness, Slav nationalism, energy, charm, self-assurance and single-mindedness would make him at worst a formidable adversary and at best an interlocutor to be treated with the utmost respect and circumspection.

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K.A. Bishop
3 January 1985

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 December 1984

Dear Len,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's conversation this afternoon with Mr. Gorbachev, together with a copy of an oral message from President Chernenko which Mr. Gorbachev delivered. The Prime Minister undertook to reply to this and I should be grateful for a draft in due course, after her visit to the United States.

After the meeting, the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev agreed that they would say to the press that they had had lengthy and valuable talks on a very friendly and constructive basis. Both had different outlooks on some matters but shared particular concern with securing peace and arms reductions on the basis of balance and mutual security. Mr. Gorbachev had conveyed to the Prime Minister a message from President Chernenko which set out the Soviet Union's attitude to the positive development of Soviet/British relations and to problems of international concern, as well as an invitation to a dialogue. The Prime Minister had thanked Mr. Gorbachev warmly for the message and recalled the constructive atmosphere of her talks in Moscow with President Chernenko last February. She had asked Mr. Gorbachev to convey her greetings to President Chernenko and to say that she would be replying in detail to his message. Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev were anxious to cooperate to achieve the mutual trust and confidence that would be needed to make progress on arms control and other international issues.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev had a lively discussion over lunch, of which Mr. Bishop will be making a record. The Prime Minister raised the question of people such as Sakharov, Shcharansky and Soviet Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union. She and Mr. Gorbachev agreed that, if asked by the press about this, she would confirm that the matter had been raised and that Mr. Gorbachev had referred to existing Soviet legislation but had nothing new to add on the subject.

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
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The Prime Minister also raised the question of the miners' strike and assistance to the National Union of Mineworkers from the Soviet Union. It was agreed that if the press enquired about this, they should be told that Mr. Gorbachev had replied that, so far as he was aware, no money whatsoever had been transferred from the Soviet Union to the NUM. This was an internal matter for the United Kingdom and had nothing to do with inter-state relations.

You asked me to indicate to what extent we could brief our European partners on the Prime Minister's talks. The Prime Minister herself has instructed that only a very limited briefing should be given. I shall write to you further about this as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence, and to Richard Hatfield and Bryan Cartledge in the Cabinet Office. I am also copying the section on bilateral issues to Steve Nicklen in the Department of Trade and Industry.

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT
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RECORD OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
MR. M.S. GORBACHEV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARY OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, AT CHEQUERS ON SUNDAY
16 DECEMBER AT 3.00 PM

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Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. M.S. Gorbachev
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. L.M. Zamyatin
Mr. C.D. Powell	Mr. A.N. Yakovlev
Interpreter	Interpreter

The Prime Minister said that she wished to extend a formal welcome to Mr. Gorbachev. She had been delighted when she heard that he had accepted her invitation.

East/West Relations and Arms Control

The Prime Minister said that she earnestly believed that the present generation of political leaders had an opportunity to make progress on arms control and related issues which might not be repeated. Although the Soviet Union and the West had different political systems, they also had important interests in common. The last two or three years had not been happy ones for relations between East and West. But, the Prime Minister continued, she had decided following a seminar on East/West relations some 15 months ago that she must try to do something to end the difficult situation between East and West. Subsequently she had paid a visit to Hungary. She had hoped that views which she expressed there would also find their way to the Soviet Union. Then tragedy had intervened with the death of Mr. Andropov and she had visited Moscow for the funeral. She had been encouraged to find that she had got on very

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well with Mr. Chernenko.

The Prime Minister continued that both she and Mr. Gorbachev well knew that there was no point in trying to convert the other away from their respective political systems. These were different and would remain so. The right course was to deal with each other on the basis of mutual respect and acknowledgement of the differences which existed. The Communist system in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries would remain. Any changes would come about only if people in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe wanted it. It was not a matter for anyone else. Similarly, the political system in Western countries would remain the same as it was now. We were convinced that our system suited us best. The Soviet system no doubt suited them best. Accepting all this, it was essential in the interests of both peoples to try to diminish hostility and the level of armaments. Both sides were spending too large a proportion of their national income on armaments which both had in abundance. It was vital that both sides should feel secure within their own borders. But with that achieved, she hoped that there could be an increase in contacts across borders between peoples.

The Prime Minister said that when she had visited Hungary, she had found the Hungarian Government concerned that she might try to undermine their position as a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact. They had gone to some lengths to make clear that they were and would continue to be a loyal Socialist country. She had understood that. In the same way Britain and the United States were very close and Britain was a loyal member of the Western Alliance. Our unique relations with the United States gave us a bigger influence within the Alliance than any member except the United States itself, as well as a capacity to speak more easily and frankly to the United States than other governments were able to do.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he had found the Prime Minister's introduction interesting and a good basis for discussion. He was grateful for the welcome given to him and the trouble taken over his programme. He particularly appreciated the fact that he was starting his visit with talks with the Prime Minister. This would set the tone for the visit as a whole and gave rise to hopes that it would be useful as well as interesting.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he had met with Mr. Chernenko shortly before his departure and had been asked to convey an oral message to the Prime Minister. He then read it out. I enclose a copy.

The Prime Minister said that she was very appreciative of the message. She had felt that her talk with Mr. Chernenko in February had offered a basis for future contacts. Picking up a point from Mr. Chernenko's message, the Prime Minister said that the West would not be seeking unilateral advantage at the meeting between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz in Geneva. Our aim would be to achieve a balance which offered security to both sides. The West feared that the Soviet Union would get a scientific and technological lead in a particular area of weapons development and that the balance would be upset. No doubt the Soviet Union had the mirror image of this perception. For example, the Soviet Union had been the first country to develop an ASAT capability. The United States had responded with the Homing Overlay Experiment. The risk now was that, unless the two sides could agree on how to deal with the problem of weapons in outer space, there would be a new spiral in the arms race. This would take resources which ought to go to improving the standard of living of people. The Prime Minister continued that it was clearly not feasible to think in terms of stopping research into space-based systems. The critical stage came with translating the results of research

into the production of weapons on a large scale.

The Prime Minister said that she would be interested to hear how Mr. Gorbachev saw the Geneva talks shaping up. Clearly it would be necessary to settle questions of procedure at the beginning. An umbrella concept seemed to be envisaged which would link negotiations about weapons in space with talks on strategic nuclear weapons and INF.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he would deal first with some of the Prime Minister's general points. He had found it interesting to hear the Prime Minister's ideas on the international situation and the requirements which it imposed upon leaders on both sides. He and the Prime Minister would have different assessments for the reasons which led to the present situation. Each knew the other's views on this and there was no point in repeating them. The important fact was that both of them assessed it as complex and dangerous. If the present opportunity was lost, it would be enormously difficult subsequently to improve the situation. If decisions were to be taken they must be taken now. Otherwise there would be serious negative consequences for all concerned. His impression was that the Prime Minister accepted this basic premise.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he had studied the Prime Minister's recent speeches. He did not agree with all she said. But he did agree in recognising the importance of the point which had been reached in world affairs. It was necessary to analyse meticulously all the factors which affected the international situation and to try to bring together respective views. Upon this turned the prospects of avoiding a holocaust. He had recently been reminded of Palmerston's remark that Britain had no eternal friends or enemies but only eternal interests. He agreed with the philosophy behind this. But it carried the corollary that other countries had their own interests as well. There

had been a time when the interests of other countries were disregarded. But we were no longer in the 1950s and 1960s: it was a different world. The Socialist countries had their interests, the West theirs, the developing countries their own aspirations. This was a fact of international life. It was hard to pursue an international policy if one flouted the interests of others. He found himself in agreement therefore with the Prime Minister on the need for dialogue, contact and discussions. The process would not be easy. But we had to learn to live in the real world, not the world of illusions.

Mr. Gorbachev recalled that in the 1970s the Soviet Union and the United States had been able to get along together. Important agreements had been achieved in those years to limit the arms race and to complete the settlement of problems left over from the Second World War at the Helsinki Conference. East and West had co-operated to find solutions of benefit to both. He recalled Mr. Brezhnev's speech at the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. One needed to get back to that sort of atmosphere, which was why he found the Prime Minister's ideas on the necessity for a political dialogue consistent with Soviet thinking.

Mr. Gorbachev said he wanted to move on to deal with the arms race and what needed to be done to curb it. The Prime Minister had set out her ideas in her speeches, including that at the Lord Mayor's Banquet. She had shown that she recognised the devastating nature of modern weapons. He would like to show the Prime Minister something which his advisers had found for him, a full page diagram from the New York Times of 22 February 1984; this compared the three million tonnes of explosives used in World War II with the fifteen billion tonnes of explosive power now available to the Super Powers. Only a fraction of this amount would be needed to bring about a nuclear winter. So he agreed with the Prime Minister that there were far more

nuclear weapons than necessary.

The Prime Minister said that she was not sure how relevant the concept of nuclear winter was when set against the destruction, incineration and death which would precede it. The purpose of nuclear weapons was to deter war. She felt that they had given us a greater degree of protection from war than we had ever before known. But we could have that safety at a far lower level of weaponry than we had now.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he wanted to express the thought that if both sides continued to pile up weapons in ever increasing quantities it could lead to accidents or unforeseen circumstances. With the present generation of weapons, decision making time could be counted in minutes. There was a Russian proverb that said: "Once in a year even an unloaded gun can go off". If one had to have nuclear weapons it must be at the lowest possible level.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that, as regards the forthcoming talks in Geneva, he could say that it had not been an easy decision for the Soviet leadership to attend. He would add that in certain circles questions were asked whether it was right for the Soviet Union to go. But the most fundamental question was whether or not to trust the Americans. If one took the four years of the first Reagan administration, it had to be acknowledged that not a single step forward had been taken in Soviet/US relations. Rather, much that had been created with such great effort under earlier Republican Administrations led by President Nixon and President Ford had been dismantled. Political dialogue, trade and economic relations, cultural relations, had all been reduced to a minimum or curtailed altogether. The United States had demonstrated that it could not be trusted, for instance by its failure to ratify SALT II. But despite all this, when the Soviet leadership had come to

consider how to respond it had, on the initiative of Mr. Chernenko, given priority to the loftier ideal of preserving peace. The Soviet Union would be ready to come to the talks in Geneva with serious new proposals. He asked the Prime Minister particularly to heed the words of Mr. Chernenko when he said that the Soviet Union would be ready to agree to the most radical measures. But once one allowed an arms race in outer space, the consequences would be unpredictable and control virtually impossible.

So, to sum up, the Soviet Union would go to the new talks with a great deal of constructiveness. That was the unanimous wish of the Soviet leadership. It was difficult, however, for them to judge what was going on in the Reagan Administration. Much of what they heard was a source of concern, especially the activities of the group round Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle. They were not just commentators, they were members of the US government. The Prime Minister had said earlier that she believed that the Americans wanted changes for the better in Soviet/US relations. He wanted to put a question to the Prime Minister: what was the basis of her assessment? Her knowledge of US policies and the details of them? Or was it just a general political assessment?

The Prime Minister said that it was a mixture of these. Mr. Gorbachev had mentioned the question of trust. This was something which concerned both sides. Each wanted to be convinced that the other was sincere. It was not enough simply to make a bald assertion of sincerity. One had to look to history and the record of the countries concerned. The United States had never shown any desire to dominate the world. Moreover, at a period when they had enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, they had never used that monopoly to threaten others. They had used their power sparingly. They had shown outstanding generosity to other countries. There had followed the traumatic experience of

Vietnam, a war impossible to win and one which the United States should never have got into. Mr. Gorbachev had quoted the failure to ratify the SALT II Agreement as evidence of American untrustworthiness. The actual reason for failure to ratify had been the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This had been the first time since the Second World War that one of the great powers had simply marched into an independent country. It had been an event of a totally different nature to anything else experienced up until then.

The Prime Minister continued that President Reagan had restored confidence to America. At the same time he saw the Soviet Union as a country combining immense patriotism with the aim of the world-wide victory of the Communist system. She was being very candid but one had to recognise that the aim of extending Communism throughout the world inevitably caused fears and suspicions.

The Prime Minister continued that she knew President Reagan very well and could talk frankly about him. The last thing he would ever want was a war. He was a passionate believer in the right of people to be free to pursue their own lives in their own way. His first priority was to restore America's confidence and ensure that she was strong enough to defend her way of life. He had achieved that and his goal now was to make certain that there was never another war. He had been bitterly disappointed during his first term at the failure of Mr. Brezhnev to respond appropriately to the handwritten message which he had sent him setting out his views and wish for a meeting. He had pinned all his hopes on that letter and had looked for a bold response. But she felt that President Reagan was now ready to have another go. He had four more years in office and he would want to show early progress during them towards reducing the risk of war. He had public opinion behind him in this. It was also true that he had a dream, expressed through the Strategic Defence Initiative,

of being able to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Sadly, it was not a viable dream because the process of acquiring a ballistic missile defence would inevitably lead to a fresh twist in the arms race spiral and encourage the development of other types of offensive nuclear weapons. In any case, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons could not be disinvented.

The Prime Minister said that she thought that progress in reducing East/West tension and in achieving arms control would be the main objective of President Reagan's second Administration. She agreed with him in believing that a reduction in armaments could be achieved, despite all the problems of linkages. But there must be more than just armaments talks. There had to be more contacts which enabled each side to make its own assessment of the sincerity of the other and to build up confidence and trust. Sir Geoffrey Howe recalled hearing President Reagan say that there was nothing he would like better than to see peace prevail. He had felt that the President had been speaking from the heart. He had subsequently heard President Chernenko say the same thing in Moscow and once again had felt that he too had been speaking from the heart. He knew that the Prime Minister shared this same desire. As she had said in a speech at a Party Conference: no-one could be as close to the control of these dreadful weapons without showing the desire for peace.

Mr. Gorbachev took issue with the Prime Minister's assessment of United States' intentions. For instance, National Security Council documents recently published revealed that the Americans had plans to destroy large numbers of Soviet cities at the time when they had enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. The fact that it had not happened was owed to the Soviet decision to acquire nuclear weapons rather than any peace-loving characteristics of the Americans. One could not view the US record through rose-

tinted spectacles. The Prime Minister said that no-one should use rose-tinted spectacles. The essence of security was balance and mutual respect. Each side had to make its own judgement of the other. We might have better assessments of each other if there were more meetings like the present one and more visits at many different levels. Mr. Gorbachev said that he accepted this point. He recalled that over lunch he and the Prime Minister had come to the realistic conclusion that each nation must be allowed to have the ideology and political system of its choice and left to solve its own problems. There should be no export of revolution or of counter-revolution. But he was not sure that the United States shared this perception. A recent speech by Mr. Shultz appeared to say that diplomacy should go hand in hand with force. The United States seemed to claim the right to use force even where they had no specific interests. With the Soviet Union and the United States standing at the threshold of very important talks, a constructive approach was needed to enable them to be conducted in a business-like spirit and lead to progress.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he was worried by what the Prime Minister said about President Reagan's daydreams in connection with space-based systems. Things were being said in the United States which caused alarm and concern. The Prime Minister would have noted that in his message, President Chernenko had singled out the need to avoid the militarisation of outer space as a priority. If the hullabaloo about the Strategic Defence Initiative in the United States was just an attempt to set up a bargaining situation, then there was no problem. The Soviet Union could bargain and compromises could be found on the basis of equality of security. But if, on the other hand, talks on space were held without a proper sense of responsibility and without the interests of both sides being taken into account, then it would be another matter. He wished to point out that the interests of the West European countries

were also affected. The United States' position, vis-a-vis Western Europe, on the Strategic Defence Initiative was an egotistic one.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he would sum up thus. We were living at a very significant moment in history. The preliminary talks between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz would determine the framework and the subject matter of further talks. Success would depend on whether both sides went to Geneva ready for responsible political decisions and with constructive proposals.

Bilateral Relations

Mr. Gorbachev proposed a brief discussion of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union wished for wider exchanges in the trade and economic field and in cultural, scientific and technological relations. Britain had once been the Soviet Union's first trading partner but was now reduced to seventh or eighth. Good relations with some British companies continued. But he believed that there was scope for expansion and that the volume of trade could be increased by forty or fifty per cent, even in quite a short time. To achieve this it was necessary to take account of the specific characteristics of the Soviet economy, which was a planned economy. The Soviet Union was now working on plans for its trade and economic relations with other countries for the next ten years. It needed to modernise the equipment and technology of its factories, alongside the reform of industrial management and control. They were now at a crucial point in this process. Some of their technical needs would certainly be satisfied from abroad, both from Socialist countries and from the West. There were particular interests such as gas turbines, on which they had had good experience with John Brown. Special attention would be given to development of the chemical industry. The Soviet Union valued British experience in this field.

Proposals should be worked out.

The Prime Minister said that she had studied the trade figures and welcomed the increase in British exports to the Soviet Union in recent months. She agreed that the two countries should work together to increase these further. To do so could make an important contribution to increasing trust and confidence. She had heard that the Soviet Union might have a particular interest in turn-key contracts. Mr. Gorbachev confirmed this. The Prime Minister continued that Mr. Gorbachev would be seeing Mr. Channon later in the week and she hoped he would pursue the discussion with him. Mr. Gorbachev concluded that he and the Prime Minister had reached understanding on this point and should proceed on the basis he had outlined.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he feared that he had wrecked the Prime Minister's Sunday afternoon by speaking so long. There was a custom of hospitality in the northern caucasus from where he came and a proverb which said: "Mountain folk cannot live without guests any more than they can live without air. But if the guests stay longer than necessary, they choke." The Prime Minister asked Mr. Gorbachev to thank President Chernenko warmly for his message, to which she would be replying. The conclusion which she drew from their meeting was that Britain and the Soviet Union should seek greater co-operation and friendship on the basis of mutual respect and mutual security.

The meeting ended at 5.50 pm.

C.D.P.

16 December 1984



TPM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER

GORBACHEV

I don't know if you intend to make any sort of speech at lunch, but I attach some notes which might serve as a basis.

I'm not sure jokes will be appropriate. But in one of his letters to Engels (written in May 1868) Marx recalled that his mother once said: "If only Karl had made Capital ... instead of just writing about it".

C.D.R.

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR MR. GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS ON
SUNDAY 16 DECEMBER

SPEAKING NOTE FOR LUNCHTIME REMARKS

Warmly welcome Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev and those accompanying them today to UK and to Chequers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe will formally and publicly welcome you on behalf of the Government tomorrow. For today, in this private forum, would like to make some more informal remarks.

Looking forward greatly to opportunity to have more detailed and thorough discussion with representatives of Soviet leadership than brief visit to Moscow in February allowed.

Glad it has been possible to arrange our meeting so soon after your arrival - before you make your mind up! Chance for me to steer you in the right direction.

You told our Ambassador the week before last you wanted to dispense with diplomatic formalities and get straight down to business. Share this view completely. Hope we can get down to some brass tacks.

Gone through a period when East/West relations poor. Things have not worked out as the optimists hoped in the 1970s. Instead of diminished tension, reduced levels of arms, constructive co-operation we have seen increase in

tension, no progress on arms control and the minimum of working together over the last few years.

Many reasons for this. Would not be honest of me if I did not say that certain Soviet actions have been among them. Not the moment for retrospection, but try to learn from the past and create a more stable future.

I decided Britain should do everything it could to try to move things back to more constructive path; embark on slow and painful business of rebuilding trust and confidence. No illusions that anything but long process requiring patience and persistence.

But how? First and most important, get to know each other. The confidence that comes from familiar faces, points of view fully understood if not necessarily agreed with. This means more contacts at all levels. Straightforward talking needed in all circumstances.

Personal experience important. See that wide-ranging programme has been arranged. Will enable you to see a real slice of British life.

Particularly glad that your wife could accompany you. Hope she will enjoy her programme. Her presence will add a special dimension to your visit.

Glad that you will be seeing something of our agriculture as well as industry. Could hardly be greater contrast between your homeland of northern Caucasus and Britain. You have rolling prairies; much of Britain still quite small fields bounded by hedgerows. As a result of scale on which we have to operate much ingenuity has gone into maximising production per acre, use of mechanisation.

Here and in other fields, scope for exploring whether there are things we can usefully learn from each other.

/ William

William Shakespeare, who knew most things, also knew of the Caucasus and in his Richard II wrote:

"O who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?"

What he meant was that images are not enough, we must have reality. That is what we need and our peoples want in our relations: reality and substance not stereotypes and outdated images of each other. Let us start on that process today.



GR
 Please type on medium
 size lined cards.
 COP

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR MR GORBACHEV: SUNDAY, 16 DECEMBER
 AT CHEQUERS

~~DRAFT~~ SPEAKING NOTE FOR LUNCHTIME REMARKS

Done
 21

1. Warmly welcome Mr and Mrs Gorbachev and those accompanying them today to UK and to Chequers.
2. Sir Geoffrey Howe will formally and publicly welcome you on behalf of the Government tomorrow. For today, in this private forum, would like to make some more personal and informal remarks.
3. Frankly, have been looking forward greatly to opportunity to have more detailed and thorough discussion with representatives of Soviet leadership than brief visit to Moscow in February allowed.
4. Glad it has been possible to arrange our meeting so soon after your arrival - before you make your mind up! Chance for me to steer you in the right direction.
5. You told our Ambassador the week before last you wanted to dispense with diplomatic formalities and get straight down to business. Share this view completely. Hope we can get down to some brass tacks ~~this afternoon~~. ~~Wide differences between us, obviously. But also common interests on which we can build, if we will.~~
6. ^{Good} Have been through a period when East/West relations poor. Things have not worked out as the optimists hoped in the 1970s. Instead of diminished tension, reduced levels of arms, constructive co-operation we have seen increase in tension, no progress on arms control and the minimum of



working together over last few years.

7. Many reasons for this. Would not be honest of me if I did not say that certain Soviet actions have been among them. Not the moment for retrospection, but try to learn from the past and create a more stable future.

8. I decided after ~~last general election moment had come~~ for Britain ^{to} do everything it could to try to move things back to more constructive path; embark on slow and painful business of rebuilding trust and confidence.

9. No illusions that anything but long process requiring patience and persistence.

10. But how? First and most important, get to know each other. The confidence that comes from familiar faces, points of view fully understood if not necessarily agreed with. This means more contacts at all levels. A fuller relationship. ~~Talks at expert level between officials just as important as high level contacts.~~ Straightforward talking needed in all circumstances.

11. Has been considerable increase in Anglo/Soviet contact this year. Your visit an appropriate note on which to end 1984. Look forward to continuing growth of this process next year.

12. Personal experience important. See that wide-ranging programme has been arranged. Will enable you to see a real slice of British life.

13. Want you to understand at first hand our pride in our traditions and history as well as our determination to adapt to change, our loyalty to our Allies in NATO and Partners in the Ten, as well as our own individual approach to problems,



our specific concerns with our future in Europe as well as our links with many parts of the developing world.

14. Particularly glad that your wife could accompany you. Hope she will enjoy her programme. Her presence will add a special dimension to your visit.

15. Glad that you will be seeing something of our agriculture as well as industry. Could hardly be greater contrast between your homeland of northern Caucasus and Britain. You have rolling prairies; much of Britain still quite small fields bounded by hedgerows. As a result of scale on which we have to operate much ingenuity has gone into maximising production per acre, use of mechanisation. ~~Some food for thought for your conversation with Michael Jopling.~~

16. Here and in other fields, scope for exploring whether there are things we can usefully learn from each other.

17. All part of wider process of greater understanding, being clear about differences and about common interests. The right recipe for a better relationship between East and West.

William Shakespeare, who knew more things, also knew of the ~~Caucasus~~ ^{Caucasus} and in his Richard III wrote:

"O who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus."

What he meant was that images are not enough, we must have reality. That is what we need

and our peoples want reality & substance not stereotypes and ~~related~~ outdated images in our relations: ~~process~~ process today. Let us start on that

Statement for the press on arrival in
London, December 15, 1984

As we set foot on British soil, we express our gratitude to the governing bodies of the British Parliament for inviting a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to make this official visit to your country, which is a follow-up to the mutually beneficial practice of interparliamentary exchanges between the USSR and Britain. It is our intention to gain a glimpse of your country's life, meet our colleagues in Parliament, and members of the British Government, and to have a frank exchange of opinion with them on ways to overcome the present dangerous development of the international situation and make things in the world healthier again. We intend to discuss likewise the prospects ahead for bilateral Soviet-British relations in various fields.

We attach great importance to relations with Great Britain. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Konstantin Chernenko, has recently reaffirmed the Soviet Union's sincere desire to have good-neighbourly relations with Great Britain and to cooperate with her on terms of equality and mutual benefit. This is important also on a larger international plane, especially now that the world situation has become seriously complicated.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the conviction that however complex the international situation, opportunities for the prevention of nuclear war exist. And these opportunities must be used to the full, not missed. That is the concern of Soviet foreign policy. Our country has never sought, nor is it seeking military superiority. It has never been, nor will it ever

be the one to start any new round in the arms race. There are no types of armaments that the USSR would not agree to see limited and eventually banned in agreement with other States on a reciprocal basis.

It is our conviction that parliaments have quite an important part to play in making the international situation healthier and in promoting peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation. We expect the forthcoming meetings and conversations in the course of this visit to pass off in a constructive spirit and to contribute to better understanding between our peoples.

We take this opportunity to convey our wishes of peace and prosperity to the British people.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 December 1984

CB 14/12

Dear Charles,

Visit of Mr Gorbachev: Lunch and Discussions with the
Prime Minister at Chequers: 16 December

*in folder
attached
to file*

We have gone through the briefs which we prepared last week for the Prime Minister to see whether any up-dating is required. There are minimal changes, and I am enclosing two pages only:

- (a) East/West relations (regional issues): a new version of the first page of the Essential Facts which takes account of the confirmation of Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov's visit to China;
- (b) UK/Soviet relations: an additional paragraph at the end of the Essential Facts on the 1975 "Protocol on Consultations", in case Mr Gorbachev should mention it.

in folder

I am also attaching two documents which may be of interest to the Prime Minister for this meeting:

- (a) the text of the communique issues from the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting today;
- (b) a copy of Mr Gorbachev's speech on ideology of 11 December, together with two telegrams from our Ambassador in Moscow giving the main points of the speech and a short commentary on it.

✓

Finally, I attach two copies of the official programme for Mr Gorbachev and, for information, a copy of the speech which the Secretary of State will deliver at his lunch for Mr Gorbachev on 17 December.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

Far East

1. Soviet Union publicly critical of increases in Japanese defence spending, accusations of militarism. Russians refuse to discuss territorial dispute over Northern Territories; as a result Japanese cannot envisage progress on bilateral issues. Japanese face half of all SS20s targetable against East Asia.
2. Russians concerned by increased Chinese links with West. Talks on "normalisation" of relations (fifth round held in October), but no progress so far - no sign of Soviet readiness to make concessions on three "obstacles" of greatest concern to China: Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; Afghanistan; and Soviet troops and SS20s on Chinese border and troops in Mongolia.
3. Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov due to visit Peking in May, but postponed at last minute by Russians, probably because of Chinese military action against Vietnamese. Now announced that visit will take place from 21 December. Economic co-operation likely to be main subject of discussion.

Central America

4. Supply of Soviet/East European arms to Nicaragua continues to increase. Americans have made clear to Russians they will destroy any MIGs delivered.
5. Russians state they support Contadora process; see guarantee for Nicaragua on non-aggression by US as most important element. Criticise US for policy of "state



[final page of
Essential facts:
UK/Soviet relations
brief]

8. 1975 Protocol on Consultations: Gorbachev may refer to this. Agreement to consult at official level on wide range of international and bilateral issues and for regular meetings between Foreign Ministers or their representatives. Russians regard it as formal basis for Anglo-Soviet political contacts. We take a more pragmatic approach. But certainly in 1984 its provisions had been reflected in practice.

SPEECH BY THE RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE QC MP
AT A LUNCH IN HONOUR OF MR GORBACHEV
AT HAMPTON COURT ON 17 DECEMBER 1984

It gives me very great pleasure
formally to welcome Mr Gorbachev to this
country on behalf of the British
Government.

We first met yesterday at the lunch
and talks with the Prime Minister at
Chequers. And we held further talks this
morning.

In this relatively short period, we have covered a lot of ground. We have each put forward rather different views. And there have been points of disagreement. But the atmosphere has been businesslike throughout. And I am grateful for Mr Gorbachev's part in making it so.

East/West relations has been one of the major preoccupations of this Government since I became Foreign Secretary. It is a subject on which much has been spoken and written in the West. Rightly so. Because it impinges on us all. On our security, our future, our prosperity, with greater effect than any other single aspect of foreign policy.

I would like to mention today two or three thoughts which relate to this theme. These thoughts formed part of the talks which Mr Gorbachev has had with myself and the Prime Minister and which he will have in Parliament tomorrow.

A convenient starting point is the recognition that we have different policies and governmental systems. This distinction between the way our two systems work in practice can give rise to different perceptions of what we are aiming to achieve.

However, in spite of the differences between us, we both recognise the fundamental fact that we all live on one planet.

Mrs Thatcher said it in Washington last year; Mr Chernenko used much the same words in an interview with NBC last month. This recognition compels us to get down to the business of living together in the most constructive way possible. In mutual respect. In awareness of each other's legitimate interests.

And this planet is becoming smaller in almost every respect except the purely physical!

Technology is accelerating the pace of change; transport and electronic communications are faster. Trends of trade and economic development are making us more interdependent. This creates new links between us. But it also makes us more aware that many of our problems are not soluble through purely national action.

The British are an island race. This makes us more aware of the need not to be insular, or insulated from the world outside. Our recent history shows this. Since the last war Britain has committed itself increasingly and wholeheartedly to the building of a united Western Europe.

We have contributed greatly, in every field. We have learned much, too. Above all we have learned the value of working together with our partners in the European Community. This is not only a way to achieve better results than any of us could achieve individually; it is a way to safeguard the peace. The founders of the European Community saw that the way to prevent war from breaking out between the nation states of Europe was to break down barriers, encouraging the free flow of trade and people. This principle has made great progress since then throughout the whole of Western Europe. We have virtually abandoned tariff frontiers between the Community and the countries of the European Free Trade Association.

I would hope to see trading, political and other links of all kinds between the Western and Eastern Europe increase. This need not mean trespassing on anyone's rights. Or challenging any nations' individual achievements.

Britain and the Soviet Union have both experienced the horrors of war. Both know what it is to make real sacrifices. The scale of the sacrifices made by the Soviet Union has been very much in our minds this year. But the anniversaries of the end of the war will have been pointless if they merely glory in past heroism. Equally pointless if they attempt to reopen the wounds of that time.

We have something real to celebrate - 40 years of peace in Europe; Europe at peace for longer than at any time this century. A time of reconciliation. A time to look forward, rather than to look back. It has bred a determination, which is shared by both our countries, that war and the terrible destruction it brings must not be allowed to happen again. Let us use that determination to goad us on to more active steps to reduce tension.

And it is not simply the reduction of tension, but the reduction of numbers of weapons that we would wish to see.

Economic commonsense alone argues that there must be better ways to proceed than to go on living with arms at their present levels. With every year, weapons - conventional or nuclear - are becoming more sophisticated, and more expensive. The man in the street, whether in London or Leningrad, meets the bill. There are pressures therefore - operating differently - but real pressures all the same, to release money spent on defence for more constructive investment.

The awesome responsibilities that flow from the possession of nuclear weapons increase these pressures. We in the West need no more reminding of the uniquely terrible destruction such weapons can wreak than you do in the East.

There can be no real winners in a nuclear conflict. So we share an urgent and common interest in working together to find ways to reduce our dependence on large nuclear forces, to preserve security but at less risk and at lower cost.

In certain fundamental respects our basic objectives are the same. The CMEA Declaration in June said that "no world problem, including the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, can be resolved militarily". I would not challenge a word of that.

And yet progress in arms control over the last few years has been frustratingly small. The vital ingredient missing is confidence. That confidence can be built. It will come through the better mutual understanding that can arise from more frequent contact between East and West. It will come through the certainty that each side will act in the way it says it will. Only thus can we hope to achieve verifiable agreements, in which each side's security is guaranteed.

This is why we have welcomed warmly the news that Mr Gromyko and Mr Shultz are to meet next month. I hope this will be just the first of many steps along the path towards greater East/West confidence and security at reduced levels of weapons.

I have spoken of the need for states to live together, to work together more closely, to reduce international tensions. But what of the quality of life itself?

It is a feature of the last quarter of the 20th century that more people probably know more about the rest of the world than ever before. Radio and television are able to bring culture of the highest quality into all our homes. Our people have been able for example to see the treasures of the Hermitage. They have been inside the Kremlin. We are right to welcome and encourage this trend. It can only make people better educated, more aware as both national and international citizens.

But it is one of the mistakes of our time to believe that the image is as good as the real thing. The performance of the symphony is in the concert hall, not on the gramophone record; the play in the theatre, not on the TV screen. When human contact is absent, a vital element is missing.

One could not fail to be touched by the meeting a couple of months ago in this country between an 80 year old Soviet citizen, Mr Terletskiy, and his son, who is now a Member of our Parliament. They were reunited for the first time in over 40 years. I am grateful to Mr Gromyko and the Soviet authorities for making this visit possible.

But I ask myself why this number could not be multiplied by hundreds or thousands. I hope that one of the fruits of better relations will be a considerable increase in the number of contacts between ordinary individuals, as well as politicians and diplomats.

The Helsinki Final Act is a good and important document. One of its great virtues is the effort to bring policy down to human level. It made clear that human rights, economic relations, security, the freer flow of information are all part of the same picture, a picture that focuses on the rights and needs of the human individual.

As the Final Act itself says:

"all the principles set forth above are of primary significance and accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied".

Policy without people is an empty shell. And relations between governments can only be of limited depth, if there are no relations between individuals to support them. Contacts between their Parliamentary representatives are also important. So I hope that, while continuing to fill out our bilateral relations - and your visit, Mr Gorbachev, is a significant step in that process - we can also seek to expand the human part of that relationship. We must strive for much freer contact between ordinary people and families throughout Eastern and Western Europe.

My main purpose at this moment, however, is to welcome Mr Gorbachev to Britain. I am glad that Mrs Gorbacheva has also been able to come. I hope that your visit will enable both of you to meet a wide range of people here. I hope that you will carry back a picture of Britain as a country ready to do more business with you, interested in what goes on in the Soviet Union, and keen to fill out the relations between us into something both substantial and long-lasting. Certainly that is the hope of the Government. I am sure it was also that of the Parliamentarians who invited you and your delegation here.

We are most grateful to the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union for providing the occasion for us all to meet. It is with great pleasure therefore that I welcome you all to the United Kingdom.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 December 1984

cc. PC.
CDP 13/12

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Lunch for Mr Gorbachev

I attach some Speaking Notes on which the Prime Minister could draw in any remarks she decides to make at her lunch for Mr Gorbachev on 16 December. The Notes are longer than the Prime Minister will need, but they are intended for you to use as a quarry. Consecutive interpretation into Russian will be needed, and Mr Bishop, who will be attending the lunch as the British interpreter, will stand ready to provide this.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

Introduction

1. Want to set out general hopes for East/West and UK/Soviet relations.
2. End 1984 with more hope. Communication has been restored. Increase in high-level contact. Need to move on to better mutual understanding of each other's problems and attitudes. Look forward to Gromyko/Schultz meeting.
3. 1985 offers opportunities. Getting to know each other and building mutual confidence is first priority. My personal commitment and that of HMG to

search for better relations. Reagan also sincere in this.

4. Study of public statements by both sides shows interesting similarities : wish for peace and stability, desire for greater prosperity, help development in third world.

5. Don't hide behind old ideas. Want to convince yo we are not threatening Soviet Union. Our weapons are defensive.

6. Suggest agenda of East/West, arms control and bilateral relations

2.

East/West

1. Want more consultation between Ministers and experts. Purpose: to understand each other's intentions and interests: build confidence: and co-operate in solving problems.

2. Regional problems. Central America - avoid delivery of major new weapons systems. Afghanistan - need negotiation and timetable for withdrawal. Middle East - welcome our consultations: international conference premature.

Far East - prospects for Arkhipov's discussions in China.

3.

Arms Control

1. Welcome renewed talks with US on nuclear weapons. Soviet objectives/priorities in Geneva? Case for interim agreements?
2. Genuine commitment to halt/reverse NATO INF deployments if right agreement. But moratorium on NATO programme unacceptable.
3. Impression that US/Soviet negotiating positions on strategic nuclear weapons far from irreconcilable.
4. Particular importance of discussion of weapons in space. Glad Soviets now recognise logical link

between space-based defensive weapons and offensive nuclear forces.

5. Total CW ban needed. Must be adequately verifiable.

4.

NUM

1. Reports in British press of contacts between Scargill and other NUM officials and Soviet Embassy. Also reports from Swiss sources of Soviet activities to transfer funds to NUM through Swiss banking channels. Take a very serious view of such activities as unfriendly and unwarrantable interference in British affairs. Urge not to make or allow such transfers.

5.

UK/SOVIET

1. Welcome Ministerial and Parliamentary contacts, also in cultural/educational field. More freedom of travel for individuals.
2. Trade: Welcome upturn but we need substantial contracts in next 5-year plan if upward trend to be maintained. Discuss with Mr Channon.
3. Further moves on human rights would do immeasurable good to Soviet reputation. Affects climate of opinion for intergovernmental relations.

PRIME MINISTER

GORBACHEV VISIT: MEETING WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS

You are meeting the experts at 1700 hours for 1/1½ hours.
Geoffrey Howe and Percy Cradock will also be present.

You have already read my brief (A). You might also like to see:

- Times article on Gorbachev (B)
- Paper circulated by Mr Wooding of Courtaulds (C)
- the official briefing for the talks with Gorbachev (D).

① Under my. Spgs
becoming thousands in.
Recommendations: Gorbachev
New York Times - Percy L.L. 11.11.84
Tuesdays -
Recommendation summary
1) Gorbachev's reaction
- other views with experience
2) Gorbachev's reaction
- conditions of
- Miller etc
P.D.
3) Under the line

C.D. Powell
13 December 1984

12% rise in the railway (2)

Budget

New ballistic missiles.

New mine

Auto-schedule - space

Limit auto-schedule wages
which will give a return.

Politics of the 80s - 90s

Post-party?

E.E.C. // Common
negotiations

EW ec. relations

Chancellor Kohl

Ec.

Response - not demonstrating weakness. (1)

Must observe the rules of the Kremlin.

Gorbachev - E.C. reform.

Need in procurement living standards

Mass control - person who really wants it.

Confidence building measures
- standard work
- political work program

How difficult to change
social system

Cherov reform

Performance/revival

Political bureau committee
on E.C. reform

What P's does

Opp - to reform - lower down

President - S.A.L.T. Balance

Recognition - Party - Legitimacy

Two views from the East: Richard Owen assesses Mikhail Gorbachov, about to visit Britain, and Roger Boyes reports on the continuing strains in post-Solidarity Poland

The golden boy's first challenge

Moscow

When he steps onto British soil on Saturday for his talks with Mrs Thatcher, Mikhail Gorbachov will be stepping out of the Kremlin shadows and into the full glare of international publicity - and he knows it. "Our second general secretary", as officials here call him, is clocking up experience as Russia's probable future leader. He will have one eye on Mrs Thatcher and the television cameras, and the other on reaction back home.

Why have we not seen Gorbachov at recent meetings of the Soviet leadership. I asked one Soviet adviser the other day. Why did he not meet Neil Kinnock in Moscow? Is Gorbachov's position in the Politburo slipping? Not at all, came the reply: Mikhail Sergeevich is preparing for London.

To those who have watched his rise, Mikhail Gorbachov is the golden boy of Soviet politics. Still only 53 in a leadership of septuagenarians, Gorbachov was propelled into the central committee secretariat in 1978 from Provincial Stavropol, and into the Politburo itself only two years later, with a ready-made reputation for style and pragmatism.

Where most Soviet leaders can barely muster an evening class diploma between them Gorbachov has two degrees, one in law (from Moscow) and one in agronomy (Stavropol). When he went to Canada last year, on his first major foray westwards, Pierre Trudeau and his aides found Gorbachov "very impressive". Since then Gorbachov has consolidated his position as the Kremlin's second-in-command, standing at President Chernenko's elbow and acquiring control over the economy, ideology, internal appointments and some aspects of foreign affairs.

Sir Iain Sutherland, our man in Moscow, met Gorbachov for 40 minutes as part of preparations for London. All diplomats who have met Gorbachov describe him as brisk, businesslike, pleasant and well-informed. But does this make him a liberal, a modernizer, a man the West can do business with?

Most members of the Soviet apparatus are men of the older generation who made ruthless careers under Stalin. Even if they allowed a representative of the new post-war generation like Gorbachov to reach the top, resistance to change would still be deeply entrenched. Gorbachov is a fervent protégé of the late Yuri Andropov, and intends to revive the innovative, decentralizing ideas of his brief era.



Andropov found the bureau-crazy immovable, however, and so might Gorbachov, even if he has 15 years rather than 15 months in power.

The road to supreme power in Russia is in any case littered with foregone conclusions. Gorbachov has powerful rivals, including Grigory Romanov, who is thought to appeal to hardliners more than the urbane Gorbachov. There is still a questionmark over his failure to speak at the October plenum on agriculture, or attend the key November Politburo meeting at which Chernenko circumvented the central committee and laid down economic policy. Gorbachov has reappeared at the Supreme Soviet, and his major speech this week on ideology has confirmed his powerful position in the leadership.

If Gorbachov does make it to the top it will be because he can combine urbane politeness with ruthlessness and hardline as anything Romanov can think up - if

necessary. Gorbachov is a child of the apparatus he hopes to reform. He was a boy during the war, and still a student when Stalin died, but he inherits a system which is still fundamentally Stalinist.

Gorbachov made his career exclusively as a Komsomol and party apparatchik in Stavropol before his ability brought him to the notice of Mikhail Suslov and to Moscow.

He shares many of the attitudes held by the old guard with whom he rubs shoulders. He supports Chernenko's drive to reduce arms costs (the defence budget has just gone up by 12 per cent), releasing resources to "meet the needs of the people", as Gorbachov put it this week in his address on ideology. But in the same speech he demanded "class vigilance" against bourgeois propaganda. During his visit to Canada he praised detente, but also attacked what he called Nato's insatiable war machine and the "feverish" deploy-

ment of missiles against a purely defensive Soviet arsenal.

He seemed baffled and angered by what had to be explained as the normal "give and take" of debate, and seemed to resent questions from parliamentarians on Jewish emigration or Afghanistan.

He exploded when asked why Russia maintained such a large number of KGB agents in Soviet embassies in the West. "You are prisoners of the spy mania America is whipping up", he retorted in a flash of true feeling. "Do you think we are simpletons? This is calculated ideological sabotage to discredit the Soviet Union, to strike a blow at her prestige and authority."

An aberration, or had the mask slipped? In discussing arms control and East-West issues Gorbachov usually shows an impressive grasp of detail, and his ideas on home and foreign policy are often sharp and imaginative. In a key speech at Simolensk during the summer - long before the Politburo made its historic decision to attempt a rapprochement with a re-elected Ronald Reagan - Gorbachov urged a return to detente. In Sofia in September he again showed the way forward by remarking that a "constructive dialogue" and a "change for the better" in East-West relations were on the cards, provided there was "goodwill and determination" on both sides.

But the same man, perhaps with the need to keep Moscow's allies in line uppermost in his mind, lashed out at American imperialism, spoke of feverish western warmongering, attacked "revaneffism" in West Germany and accused the West of trying to "loosen" the Warsaw Pact by differentiating between liberal and hardline Soviet-bloc states.

Seen from Moscow, the reality appears to be that Gorbachov combines the world view of a Chernenko or Gromyko with a sharp mind and potential freshness of thought, even political vision. He and his generation are now feeling their way forward. Whether the conservative or the reformer in Gorbachov comes to the fore, suspicion or trust, hostility or dialogue, could very largely depend on how he reacts to the West, and how the West reacts to him.

"The London visit is important not only because of the Gromyko and Shultz meeting in January, about restarting arms talks", commented a Soviet source. "It is not just a question of immediate results. It is also a question of sowing the seeds of future relations - perhaps for the next 20 years."

MS

Past and projected Soviet GNP

Percentage annual growth

	1961-5	1971-5		1981-5		1990-5	
		1966-70	1976-80			A	B
Labour input in manhours	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.1	0.7	0.3	0.3
Capital input	2.9	2.2	2.5	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.7
Capital and labour productivity	0.6	1.1	-0.5	-0.8	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7
Gross national product	5.1	5.3	3.7	2.6	2.6	1.5	1.3
Population	1.6	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8
GNP per capita	3.5	4.3	2.8	1.7	1.7	0.7	0.5

Labour is the population of working age adjusted to date for actual changes in working hours. From 1981-5 to 1990-5 input declines in the 'industrial areas' (RSRSR, Ukraine, Baltic States), assuming negligible migration from the non-industrial areas (Transcaucasia, Central Asia), where input continues to rise.

Capital input is reduced below trend (column A) in B by the transfer of resources from investment to defence equivalent to 0.2 percent p.a. (the effect of the budget rise of 17 percent for 1985 applied to all defence expenditure and continued throughout; a further fall is applied in 1990-5 to allow for reduced imports of equipment (up to one-third of equipment invested) due both to CoCom restrictions and to the reduced hard-currency earnings from oil sales.

Productivity declines from 1971-5 because each unit of investment yields a smaller return as more natural resources have to be extracted in remote regions, as more capital has to be put into infrastructure such as transport and into environmental protection, and because bureaucratic planning (assumed unchanged) inhibits adaptive innovation. As GNP per capita increments decline, the supply of consumer goods and services rises more slowly and labour, farming and managerial incentives weaken. Productivity also falls because capital has to be invested in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, where natural resources, existing capital and an industrially-skilled labour force are scarcer than in the 'industrial areas', but where job creation is politically essential to avoid unemployment. In the 'industrial areas' some capital has to replace labour because the manpower supply is falling (though it will rise again from 1996-2000).

Population in aggregate rises in the projection faster than working-age manpower because of the more rapid rise in dependents (children in the non-industrial and the retired in the industrial areas).

St. Antony's College, 14 December 1984

M. C. Kaser

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FROM MOSCOW 121535Z DECEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1420 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN , PARIS AND UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 1385 : US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

1. AS YOU WILL , I IMAGINE , HAVE HEARD FROM SHULTZ IN LONDON, THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CHERNENKO WAS DELIVERED ON 8 DECEMBER IN WASHINGTON THE DAY AFTER THE LAST SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING SEMICLN THIS PERSONAL FROM HARTMAN WHO HAS REMAINED IN MOSCOW BUT WILL SEE SHULTZ AND NITZE OVER THE WEEKEND BEFORE THEIR MEETING WITH KOHL. AT MEETING OF THE FOUR ON 12 DECEMBER HARTMAN DID NOT GIVE DETAILS OF EITHER THE MESSAGE OR THE MEETING BUT SAID THAT IN VARIOUS EXCHANGES IN PREPARATION FOR GENEVA ,SPACE HAD FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN THE US COMMUNICATIONS AND THAT THE SIGNALS FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAD ALL BEEN THAT THEY WISH TO GET DOWN TO SUBSTANCE AND WERE ' ' PREPARED FOR RADICAL SOLUTIONS ' ' (CF PUBLIC MESSAGE FROM CHERNENKO QUOTED IN MY TELNO 1402). THE RUSSIANS WERE SENDING A LARGE DELEGATION FOR THE FOUR MEETINGS NOW ARRANGED DURING 7 AND 8 JANUARY, WITH KARPOV (THE START NEGOTIATOR) TO MATCH NITZE. THE PREPARATORY EXCHANGES DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET OVER THE HURDLE OF DEFINING OBJECTIVES, BUT OTHERWISE THE SIGNS WERE RATHER POSITIVE.

2. ON THE DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES, HARTMAN SAID THAT SENATOR DESMOND GORE WHO HAD HAD DETAILED SESSIONS EARLIER THIS WEEK IN MOSCOW WITH KORNIENKO ,KARPOV AND GENERAL CHERVOV HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT RESPOND TO PROPOSALS WHICH SET AS AN OBJECTIVE THE ATTAINMENT OF A BALANCE IN FORCE STRUCTURES FOR ABOUT TEN YEARS HENCE. GORE HAD FOUND THE RUSSIANS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE PROBLEM OF VULNERABILITY OF LAND-BASED STRATEGIC FORCES, RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE CHANGES IN THEIR OWN DISPOSITIONS, BUT CONSCIOUS OF THE PROBLEMS THIS CREATED FOR THE WEST IN ACHIEVING AN ACCEPTABLE BALANCE. THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON SPACE WEAPONS.

3. HARTMAN MENTIONED THAT DOBRYNIN HAD BEEN TOLD THAT, IN THE MARGINS OF GENEVA, SHULTZ WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS THE CELEBRATION NEXT YEAR OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR. THE AMERICANS WISH TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO HEAD THE RUSSIANS OFF FROM USING THE OCCASION FOR ANTI REVANCHIST PROPAGANDA WHICH COULD CLOUD ANY ONGOING ARMS CONTROL. HARTMAN HINTED THAT IF SUCCESSFUL, THE AMERICANS MIGHT CONSIDER ALLIED PARTICIPATION .

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4. IN BRIEF ACCOUNT OF RECENT VISIT TO THE US BY MESYATS THE SOVIET MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE , HARTMAN SAID HE HAD SEEN ALL HE WISHED TO SEE IN A VERY FULL PROGRAMME. HE HAD SHOWN GREAT INTEREST IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WHICH THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE TO SOVIET CONDITIONS AND HAD BEEN VERY DEFENSIVE IN DISCUSSING SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PLANS. HE HAD MAINTAINED AGAINST ALL THE EVIDENCE THAT THIS YEAR'S HARVEST WAS BETTER THAN LAST. THE AMERICANS WILL BE INTERESTED TO KNOW IF WE DO BETTER WITH GORBACHEV.

SUTHERLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED

SOVIET D
DEFENCE D
RESEARCH D
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
WED FED
ACDD
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

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Prime Minister

CB

MR POWELL

11 December 1984

TALKING TO GORBACHEV

It would be worth first examining what we think Gorbachev himself will want out of the visit. As I see it, he will want to establish personal contact with an important Western leader, whom the Russians will regard with a mixture of respect and curiosity, because of her personal qualities, her recent activity in East/West relations and her close relationship with President Reagan. Secondly, he will want to put over to her the Soviet view on East/West relations and arms control and from her responses help prepare the Soviet position in the January talks between Shultz and Gromyko. Thirdly, he will offer improved bilateral relations with the inducement of more trade. He will probably assume that this last is our main objective. He will be very alive to any indications of European/American differences. Much of what he says will be carefully prepared and formally presented, and he will be determined to say it, if need be regardless of the context.

2. We, for our part, have certain general aims. We want to project our confidence in our political and economic systems and in the solidarity of our alliances; our awareness of the deep gulf between our world and that of the Russians; but despite that our profound desire for stability and better

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East/West communication and understanding; also our
knowledge of US pacific intentions. All this has to be
conveyed without giving any impression of being over-anxious
or of wanting to run after the Russians.

3. However much we want to break the mould and have a
free-ranging discussion, the talks are likely to follow an
orthodox pattern. The Russians will want it so and we too
have our obligations: we shall have to address the general
state of East/West relations and we shall have to address
arms control. On the latter we should bear in mind that for
the Russians space will be the key. They will want to stave
off run-away American technological advances and if possible
leave themselves in an advantageous position over Asats. In
return for assurances on space they may be ready to
negotiate on offensive missiles. The Americans will be
particularly interested in our reports of this part of the
talks.

4. I do not recommend the Prime Minister spends much time
on trade. This has been too much the theme of the past, eg
the Wilson visit - a high level visit oiled by credits and
promise of contracts. It suits the Russians; it encourages
them to think that they can divide and rule. I suggest that
trade should be pusued later in the week by Mr Channon and
that the Prime Minister should concentrate on the central
international security issues.

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5. There remains the question of additional conversational
themes, particularly over lunch. I think mutual perceptions
of security, the impact of technological change on society;
the future of the Soviet economy; and allocation of
resources, to defence or elsewhere, are all themes that are
good in themselves and might open up interesting avenues

6. We should not expect too much from the encounter: time
will be short; courtesies and interpreters will make their
inroads. There may be some interesting insights but there
will be no conversions. Much of the value will lie in a
mutual sizing-up and putting of faces to names.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

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GM

PRIME MINISTER

Gorbachev's Visit

You might find it helpful to have in advance of the formal briefing from the Foreign Office:

- i) a note by Percy Cradock on Talking to Gorbachev (Flag A);
- ii) a note by me on the meeting which you are to have with outside experts on Friday (Flag B).

CDP

C. D. POWELL

11 December, 1984

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RR WASHINGTON

RR UKDEL NATO

GR 730

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 111510Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1414 OF 11TH DEC 84

INFO PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING EAST EUROPEAN POSTS.

MIPT: SPEECH BY GORBACHEV AT CONFERENCE ON IDEOLOGY

1. GORBACHEV DELIVERED THE MAIN ADDRESS AT AN ALL-UNION CONFERENCE ON 'DEVELOPED SOCIALISM AND THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN THE LIGHT OF THE JUNE 1983 PLENUM', WHICH BEGAN IN MOSCOW ON 10 DECEMBER. CHERNENKO WAS NOT PRESENT BUT A MESSAGE FROM HIM TO THE PARTICIPANTS WAS READ OUT BY ZIMYANIN. OF THE PARTY HIERARCHY ALL THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIES EXCEPT CHERNENKO ATTENDED, PLUS THE MOSCOW PARTY SECRETARY GRISHIN AND THE MINISTER OF CULTURE DEMICHEV.

2. THE FOLLOWING WERE GORBACHEV'S MAIN POINTS:

A) THE CONFERENCE WAS A MILESTONE IN THE WORK OF FULFILLING THE DECISIONS OF THE JUNE 1981 PLENUM ON IDEOLOGY AND AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 27TH CONGRESS.

B) THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF AN HISTORICALLY LENGTHY PERIOD OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIATED AND ON THIS BASIS THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE PARTY'S CONCEPT OF A DEVELOPED SOCIALIST SOCIETY WERE BEING WORKED OUT.

C) DESPITE SOME USEFUL WORK, SOVIET ECONOMIC SCIENCE HAD NOT YET PROVIDED ANY CLEAR CONCEPT OF THE TRANSITION TO A DYNAMIC HIGHLY EFFICIENT ECONOMY AND AN IMPROVED ECONOMIC MECHANISM. DOGMATIC IDEAS 'WHICH AT TIMES HAVE DONE AN ILL-SERVICE TO OUR THEORY AND PRACTICE' HAD NOT BEEN FULLY OVERCOME.

D) GORBACHEV CALLED FOR SERIOUS WORK ON THE THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST SELF-MANAGEMENT WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A PROFOUND IDEA OF THE FOUNDERS OF MARXISM-LENINISM.

E) THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO INTENSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY ON THE MOST MODERN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BASIS AS THE MEANS OF IMPROVING THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE, STRENGTHENING

G

THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND ENABLING IT TO ENTER THE NEXT MILLENIUM AS A GREAT AND PROSPEROUS POWER. THIS PROCESS OF INTENSIFICATION SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME KIND OF POLITICAL IMPETUS AS INDUSTRIALISATION HAD BEEN GIVEN AT AN EARLIER PERIOD IN THE SOVIET UNION'S HISTORY. GORBACHEV REFERRED IN THIS CONTEXT TO THE FORTHCOMING PLENUM ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. (FOR WHICH A DATE HAS NOT YET BEEN SET BUT WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE HELD NEXT APRIL)

F) ONE OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA WAS THE

RC

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

HD SOVD

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NEWSD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

PS/SOFS SCOTTISH OFFICE

PS/MINISTER DTI

PS/MINISTER MAFF

(X9)

F) ONE OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA WAS THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE FORMS AND METHODS OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND THE CREATION OF AN ECONOMIC MECHANISM APPROPRIATE TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM. THE SEARCH FOR THE BEST MEANS OF ACCOMMODATING THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF SOCIETY, OF THE LABOUR COLLECTIVES, AND THE INDIVIDUAL WORKER SHOULD BE PURSUED STILL MORE ENERGETICALLY.

G) ON SOCIAL JUSTICE GORBACHEV SAID THAT DEVIATIONS FROM "SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT" COULD AND DID GIVE RISE TO PASSIVITY, PARASITISM, MORAL NIHILISM AND "HIDDEN FORMS OF REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND BENEFITS". THE LAW WOULD BE INVOKED AGAINST THOSE WHO FAILED TO RESPOND TO ARGUMENTS OF REASON, CONSCIENCE AND DUTY.

H) THE PARTY WOULD INCREASE ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SERVICES SECTOR. THE COMPLEX PROGRAMME FOR DEVELOPING THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND THE SERVICES SECTOR WAS NEARING COMPLETION.

I) ECHOING A STATEMENT BY ANDROPOV, GORBACHEV SAID THAT SOCIALISM EXERTED ITS MAIN INFLUENCE ON WORLD DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ITS ECONOMIC POLICY AND SUCCESSES. "EVERY NEW STEP FORWARD ON THIS ROAD IS THE MOST CONVINCING ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND THE SOVIET WAY OF LIFE".

J) IN A RELATIVELY BRIEF PASSAGE ON THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM WAS NOT ONLY THE AGGRAVATION OF ITS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS BUT A SPIRITUAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL CRISIS. AT THE SAME TIME THE ADVERSARY HAD SHARPLY STEPPED UP ITS IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY IN RECENT YEARS AND CREATED A HUGE PROPAGANDA MACHINE, USING COMPLEX TECHNICAL RESOURCES, SABOTAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVICES. "IN ITS INTENSITY, CONTENT AND METHODS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY IMPERIALISM REPRESENTS A SPECIAL VARIETY OF AGGRESSION WHICH TRAMPLES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF OTHER COUNTRIES".

K) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PARTY REQUIRED POLITICAL VIGILANCE, AN IRRECONCILABLE ATTITUDE TO ALIEN VIEWS, - CREATIVE, VIGOROUS IDEOLOGICAL WORK WHICH WAS BUSINESS-LIKE BOLD AND PERSISTANT.

L) IN IDEOLOGICAL WORK THE PARTY MUST GIVE TIMELY AND SUBSTANTIAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSING SYSTEMS SEMI COLON AND MAKE IN GOOD TIME CERTAIN CORRECTIONS IN ITS CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE WHEN LIFE REQUIRED THIS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

RR UKDEL NATO

GR 260

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 111530Z DEC 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1413 OF 11TH DEC 84

INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

SPEECH BY GORBACHEV

SUMMARY

1. VIRTUALLY ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON, GORBACHEV HAS DELIVERED A MAJOR DOMESTIC SPEECH ON CONTEMPORARY SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND PROBLEMS OF THE LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY. ON BOTH FRONTS HIS WATCHWORD IS CONTINUITY RATHER THAN CHANGE. (THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S LACK OF INNOVATIVE THOUGHTS IS IN CONTRAST WITH WHAT DENG XIAOPING HAS RECENTLY BEEN SAYING IN PEKING.) ALTHOUGH CONFIDENT IN TONE AND ORTHODOX IN EXPRESSION, GORBACHEV DISPLAYS ANXIETY AT THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN GALVANISING THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND SOME IMPATIENCE WITH THE INFLUENCE OF DOGMA.

DETAIL

2. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME GORBACHEV HAS DELIVERED THE MAIN ADDRESS ON AN IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL OCCASION SINCE THE LENIN ANNIVERSARY IN APRIL 1983. IT UNDERLINES HIS STATUS AS THE SENIOR SECRETARY AFTER CHERNENKO, AND THE BREADTH OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. CHERNENKO'S ABSENCE WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF HIS OWN CLOSE INTEREST IN AND EARLIER RESPONSIBILITY FOR IDEOLOGY. HOWEVER A MESSAGE FROM HIM WHICH CONTAINED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE, WAS GIVEN A STANDING OVATION LED BY GORBACHEV WHO ALSO QUOTED HIM FREQUENTLY IN HIS SPEECH.

RC

Mr DEREK THOMAS.

Mr JENKINS

HD SOVD

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PS / MINISTER DTI

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GORBACHEV WHO ALSO QUOTED HIM FREQUENTLY IN HIS SPEECH.

3. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH (PRINCIPAL POINTS IN MIFT) REFLECTED THE THEMES AND LANGUAGE OF THE JUNE 1983 PLENUM ON IDEOLOGY AND THE SESSION IN APRIL THIS YEAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMMISSION PREPARING THE REVISED EDITION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN A SPECIFICALLY GORBACHEVIAN GLOSS ON THE PARTY LINE. BUT THE EMPHASIS IS ON PRACTICAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES RATHER THAN THE IDEOLOGICAL THREAT FROM IMPERIALISM. HIS REFERENCE TO THE PERSISTENCE OF DOGMATIC IDEAS, BY IMPLICATION HINDERING ECONOMIC REFORMS, AND TO THE NEED TO MAKE TIMELY CORRECTIONS TO IDEAS AND PRACTICE "WHEN LIFE SO DICTATES," MAY REFLECT HIS PERSONAL PRAGMATIC APPROACH SEMI COLON BUT SUCH FORMULATIONS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE SPEECHES OF CHERNENKO AS WELL AS ANDROPOV.

4. THE PRAVDA TEXT SUMMARISED IN MIPT IS ITSELF A SUMMARY AND

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF THE MORE INTERESTING PASSAGES WERE OMITTED.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES INCLUDING MIFT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY (NO10) AND PRIVATE SECRETARIS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND AND THE MINISTERS FOR TRADE AND AGRICULTRE FISHERIES AND FOOD.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

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DRAFT MINUTE TO MR POWELL

11 December 1984

GORBACHEV'S VISIT

Your draft brief for Friday. This is an excellent brief and I have nothing to add. The experts' suggestions will, of course, cover a very wide range and we shall have to be selective. As indicated in my piece on talking to Gorbachev, we shall have to concentrate on the central issues ie East/West relations and arms control.



PERCY CRADOCK

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A

PRIME MINISTER

GORBACHEV VISIT: MEETING WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS

You are to have a session on Friday evening with outside experts, as part of the preparations for the Gorbachev visit. The experts and their expertise are:

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| Archie Brown | - internal workings of the
<u>Kremlin, structure of power</u> |
| Malcolm Mackintosh | - historical; <u>general Soviet strategy</u> |
| Michael Kaser | - Soviet economy and five-year
<u>plan</u> |
| Alec Nove | - <u>Soviet agriculture</u> |
| Lawrence Freedman | - <u>defence</u> |
| Norman Wooding | - <u>trade</u> |

You might ask each of them to speak for a maxim of five minutes on what they think you can most usefully try to get out of the meeting. Some points are:

(1) Gorbachev himself. You have read the biography and will recall President Koivisto's account of him ("a man who would get on in any political system"). Invite Archie Brown to give his assessment of where Gorbachev fits into the structure. What are his relations with his other politburo colleagues? How far will it be productive for you to explore with Gorbachev how the Soviet system works? A day in the life of Gorbachev? What sort of questions on the Soviet system can you most usefully put to him? How do the Soviet leadership obtain feedback from their people on the effects of their policies?

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(2) Gorbachev's perceptions of the West and his expectations of you. This might be a subject for Malcolm Mackintosh. What is Gorbachev looking for from this visit? What questions will best elicit his world view? Is it as narrow and stereotyped as the recent JIC paper on the perceptions of Soviet leaders suggested? ('Predatory' West) How does he read Western objectives vis-a-vis Eastern Europe?

(3) What are the key questions to put to Gorbachev on the Soviet economy? This is an area for Michael Kaser. How do Soviet leaders plan to raise productivity? How does the Soviet Union reconcile the growing need for mobility of labour with apparently strict control of the movement of population? How does central planning cope with the complexity of a modern consumer economy?

(4) You might next turn to agriculture which is Gorbachev's particular responsibility and ask Alec Nove which are the areas where Gorbachev might be probed. Given the persistent failure of Soviet agriculture to come up to scratch, how far is responsibility for it a fatal weakness in Gorbachev's position, in his presumed competition with Romanov? What are the prospects for Soviet harvests? How do Soviet agricultural planners see the way ahead?

(5) On defence, Lawrence Freedman could be asked to identify questions to put to Gorbachev in the defence and arms control area. A particular point of interest will be to see how far Gorbachev simply disgorges the normal Soviet shibboleths, which would indicate that the whole strategic area is in the hands of Gromyko, Ustinov and the generals: or whether he appears to have some direct influence/ideas. Given that Gorbachev appears to chair a Committee dealing with allocation of resources, it might be useful to tackle him on the problem of the scale of resources going to defence and their impact on other priorities.

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(6) Finally, Norman Wooding could be asked to speak on trade prospects. Which particular big contracts are in the air? Which of them might Gorbachev be planning to hold to the UK as carrots?

CDP

10 December 1984



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of 2 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has seen the Security Service Report reference
As I mentioned to you this evening, she would be grateful for advice on any steps which might be taken to discourage the Russian Government's provision of funds indicated in that Report, perhaps by using the evident wish of the Russians to avoid publicity. She has asked in particular whether the visit of Mr. Gorbachev could be used to achieve this purpose, perhaps by her mentioning to him that the British Government was aware that such transactions were going on and regarded them as unfriendly.

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10 December 1984

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SIR P. CRADOCK

Mr Powell *AD.*
Thank you. See spoke

11/12

GORBACHEV'S VISIT: MEETING WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS

I attach a draft brief for the Prime Minister's meeting with outside experts to discuss Gorbachev's visit. I should be grateful for any additional ideas and questions.

C.D.P.

(C.D. POWELL)

10 December 1984

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FROM MOSCOW 101455Z DECEMBER
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1405 OF 10 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DTI
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN AND PARIS

GORBACHEV'S VISIT.

1. AS MY DISCUSSION LAST WEEK WITH GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR (MY TELNO 1382), HE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP GENERALLY ARE TAKING VERY SERIOUSLY THIS FIRST MAJOR VISIT TO THE UK FOR NEARLY A DECADE. WE SHALL PROBABLY NEVER KNOW WHETHER ITS GOOD TIMING, SHORTLY BEFORE GROMYKO AND SHULTZ ARE TO MEET IN A RENEWED EFFORT TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS, IS PURELY FORTUITOUS, OR WHETHER THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD ALREADY MAPPED OUT THEIR COURSE AS FAR BACK AS OCTOBER, WHEN GORBACHEV ACCEPTED THE INVITATION. THE FACT REMAINS THAT THIS IS A PROPITIOUS MOMENT TO MAKE AN INPUT IN THE WESTERN CAUSE, OTHER THAN THROUGH THE TRADITIONAL CHANNEL OF GROMYKO.
2. THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MINISTERS RECEIVING GORBACHEV WILL FIND HIM MORE OPEN IN MANNER THAN THE TRADITIONALLY STONY-FACED SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND HIS YOUTH AND VIGOUR MAKE A REFERESHING CHANGE FROM THE AGEING AND SICK FIGURES OF RECENT YEARS. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IN MIND THAT HE IS, NO LESS THAN THEY, A PRODUCT OF THE PARTY MACHINE AND IT WOULD BE WRONG TO IMAGINE THAT HE WANTS TO CHANGE THE SOVIET STRUCTURE RATHER THAN TO OPERATE IT MORE EFFICIENTLY.
3. THE FORMAL OCCASION FOR THE VISIT - THE PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES - SHOULD HOWEVER HAVE AN APPEAL FOR GORBACHEV AS A MAN WITH LEGAL TRAINING (AND INCIDENTALLY THE FIRST POST-WAR MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO TO HAVE ATTENDED UNIVERSITY) AND ONE WHO HAS EVINCED AN INTEREST IN THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT. HIS AIDES IN THE PARTY APPARATUS WILL HAVE BRIEFED HIM TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO HIS MEETINGS WITH THE OPPOSITION LEADERS. BUT HIS PRIORITIES WILL BE A THOROUGH AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION ON EAST WEST RELATIONS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS AND A GLIMPSE OF OUR AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES. ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, HE WILL SEE US AS A NUCLEAR POWER CLOSE TO THE UNITED STATES AND PROBABLY MORE INFLUENTIAL WITH THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION THAN OTHERS, AND WILL LOOK FOR INSIGHTS INTO AMERICAN INTENTIONS AND SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE. OUR MESSAGE TO HIM SHOULD BE THAT THE WEST UNQUESTIONABLY WANTS BETTER RELATIONS, BUT NOT ANY ANY PRICE. THE WORLD IS NOT, AS SOVIET PROPAGANDA FREQUENTLY MAINTAINS, ON THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. BUT WE DO ALL SPEND MORE ON ARMS THAN WE CAN READILY AFFORD AND SHOULD RATIONALLY PUT OUR RESOURCES TO BETTER USE. GEOGRAPHY MAY CREATE NUANCES BETWEEN AMERICAN POSITIONS AND THOSE OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS, BUT THERE IS SOLIDARITY IN ALL THE ESSENTIALS. ALTHOUGH IT NATURALLY FALLS TO THE AMERICANS, AS A SUPER-POWER, TO TAKE THE MAIN WEIGHT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, THEY REPRESENT A COLLECTIVE WESTERN INTEREST. IN ADDITION, WE SHALL BE READY TO PLAY OUR PART AS THE SITUATION DEMANDS.

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(NONE)

NONE OF US LOOKS FOR A SPECTACULAR BREAKTHROUGH, BUT RATHER FOR STEADY PROGRESS OVER THE LONGER TERM IN FINDING WAYS IN WHICH TWO FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS CAN LIVE TOGETHER WITHOUT FRICTION.

4. ALTHOUGH IT IS THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP WHICH MONOPOLISES SOVIET ATTENTION, IT WILL ALSO BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS WITH HIM REGIONAL ISSUES ESPECIALLY THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO UNDERLINE THAT, IN THESE TOO, THE WEST SEEKS TO ELIMINATE SOURCES OF CONFRONTATION.

5. ON THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL FRONT, WE SHOULD AIM TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, DESPITE PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND A WORLD IN WHICH THE GEOGRAPHICAL BALANCE OF INDUSTRIAL POWER IS RAPIDLY EVOLVING, THERE IS MUCH WE HAVE TO OFFER THE SOVIET UNION :

(I) IN AGRICULTURE, WE SHOULD DRUM IN OUR OVERWHELMING COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY (USING ONLY 3 PERCENT OF OUR WORKING POPULATION, ON A TOTAL ARABLE LAND AREA ONLY ONE FIFTIETH OF THE USSR, WE PRODUCE TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE FOOD REQUIREMENTS OF A BETTER-FED POPULATION). THE RUSSIANS WOULD DO BETTER TO INVEST IN THE ACQUISITION OF OUR AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY (PLANT AND LIVESTOCK BREEDING, PEST AND DISEASE CONTROL, WATER AND LAND MANAGEMENT), THAN TO GO ON SPENDING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN MAKING GOOD RECURRING GRAIN DEFICITS :

(II) INDUSTRIALLY, WE ARE PROVEN SUPPLIERS OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, ABOVE ALL IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING (SEE MY IFT NOT TO ALL).

AS THE SOVIET UNION GEARS UP TO THE NEXT FIVE YEAR PLAN, IT WOULD DO WELL TO LOOK TO US. THE PRESENCE ON THE SUPREMEFSOVIET DELEGATION OF KOMAROV, EFFECTIVELY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN TRADE, GIVES THE COMMERCIAL COMPONENT IN THE PROGRAMME PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE.

6. MY SECOND IFT (ALSO NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS SUGGESTIONS FOR BILATERAL QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT AND THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIVE GOODWILL.

7. FCO ADVANCE TO PRIVATE SECRETARY (NO.10), AND PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND AND THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD, AND IN DTI TO PS MINISTER FOR TRADE, ROBERTS, CORLEY AND GEORGE OT4.

FCO PLEASE ALSO PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1984

Dear Charles,

Gorbachev's Visit: Briefing

In your letter of 29 November you said that the Prime Minister agreed with the suggestions we had made for the organisation of her meeting with Mr Gorbachev on 16 December and for the subjects to be covered.

I enclose briefing which comprises:

- (a) general themes for conversation at lunch;
- (b) elements of an opening statement before the more structured discussions after lunch;
- (c) detailed briefs covering East/West relations, arms control, and bilateral relations.

The briefs will be updated as necessary to take account of Sir Geoffrey Howe's meeting with Mr Shultz on 11 December and the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting on 13/14 December.

The points covered in the notes on the general themes are those which are currently under active consideration in the Soviet Union. The Russians will expect the Prime Minister either to start the after-lunch discussion with a formal statement or to respond to the statement that Mr Gorbachev will certainly make. What the Prime Minister will say in her opening statement will be carefully noted.

Sir Iain Sutherland called on Mr Gorbachev on 4 December and was told that he hoped for frank political discussions with the Prime Minister. The main task was to find "a key to the major problems of the international situation". This means from the Soviet point of view the current state of East/West relations and in particular arms control (space and nuclear weapons).

/There

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*in folder
attached/
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CJP 16/12/84

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There is intense interest in the visit, in particular in the discussions which Mr Gorbachev will be having with the Prime Minister and Sir Geoffrey Howe. Oliver Wright has already passed on a request from the Americans for an early briefing. The Prime Minister will of course be able to give her assessment personally to President Reagan on 22 December. It would, nevertheless, be very helpful if, in your record of the meeting, you could indicate which points might be passed on to our Allies and partners in a confidential briefing which we will be giving on 19 or 20 December.

Finally, a point on which the Soviet Embassy have shown some sensitivity. Mr Gorbachev pronounces his name GorbaCHOFF, with the accent on the last syllable. His wife pronounces her name GorbachOVA.

I am sending copies of this letter and the briefs to the Private Secretaries of the Ministers and to the officials who have been invited to the lunch.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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From the
New York

VISIT TO THE UK BY A DELEGATION OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET
LED BY MR M S GORBACHEV: 15-22 DECEMBER 1984

LUNCH AT CHEQUERS AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER: 16 DECEMBER 1984

LIST OF BRIEFS

Lunchtime Themes

1. General Mutual Perceptions
2. Mutual Perceptions of Security
3. Economic and Social Themes
4. Opening Remarks before discussion after lunch.

Specific Topics for Discussion

5. East/West Relations, including their effect on the Third World
6. Arms Control Questions
7. Bilateral Relations

Personality Notes

8. Personality notes on the Russians attending the talks.



PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV: 16 DECEMBER

General Mutual Perceptions

1. Although Mr Gorbachev is unlikely to put his questions in such direct form, some of the more basic aspects of Western social and political life which the Russians find hardest to understand are as follows:

- a. the load of responsibility placed on individual citizens in planning their lives;
- b. the openness of the exercise of power by government, the availability of sensitive information and the scrutiny of executive acts, all of which have to take place within a superior framework of law;
- c. the ability of Western governments and societies to tolerate differing views without becoming fatally weakened;
- d. the concept of a loyal opposition and periodic transfer of political power.

2. Mr Gorbachev might be asked how Soviet leaders obtain feed-back from their people about the effects of the policies adopted.

3. He might also be asked how the Soviet Union encourages technological initiative and its translation into useful production.



PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV: 16 DECEMBER

Mutual Perceptions of SecurityGeneral Points to Make

1. Accept historic Russian and Soviet concern about secure frontiers.
2. As seen from the West, lessons of last war appear to have led Soviet leaders to policy of military over-insurance.
3. We say our forces necessary for our security. You say same. But appearance to us and to public opinion is of Soviet preponderance and threat. We see present position as disturbing. Relative imbalance in Soviet favour increasing rather than decreasing.
4. Soviet leaders have criticised Western desire to negotiate from "positions of strength" implying that this means superiority. Not so. Do not seek superiority. What we mean is position of firmness and confidence in our security.
5. Must always be a fair balance of interest and advantage in any bargain. Absolute security for one side would imply absolute insecurity for the other. Also need adequate verification. As technology and therefore agreements become more complex, more elaborate measures involving greater cooperation will be required.
6. Money ultimately the great arms controller. Neither East nor West wants its economies broken on the wheel of an endless arms cycle. Better use can be made of resources. Need for self-denying ordinances by agreement.



7. NATO purely defensive, none of our weapons, either conventional or nuclear, will ever be used except in response to attack.

8. Europe, including Britain, firm pillar in the arch of the Atlantic Alliance. Any suspicion that arms control is being pursued not in its own right, but in order to prise Europe politically from her allegiances will only further strengthen those links and Europe's own political will.

9. Return of President Reagan presents unusually promising opportunities for US Administration to deliver ratification of any arms control agreement negotiated in good faith.

10. We believe real prospects for progress in arms control between Superpowers both on nuclear weapons and in space. In the latter case particularly, moment to be seized before mutual suspicion drives events past the point of no return. Non-nuclear (including CW) forces account for 90% of global military spending. Arms control should have a place here too, both in practical confidence-building and in force reductions.

11. Go into more detail after lunch.

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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV: 16 DECEMBER

Economic and Social Themes

1. How do Soviet leaders intend to raise productivity in their economy in the next five year plan?
2. Does the introduction of new technology cause problems in the relocation and retraining of labour?
3. How does central planning cope with the complexity of a modern consumer economy?
4. Agriculture is a constant problem throughout the world with overproduction in some years and underproduction in others. Our system is based largely on guaranteed prices. What do Soviet planners envisage as way ahead?
5. With increased mobility, the need for retraining and to change jobs several times in a working life, social strains have risen in the West. Discipline in its widest sense is more difficult to maintain. What is Soviet experience?



Essential Facts

1. Mr Gorbachev's responsibilities as one of the senior Party Secretaries range from ideology and foreign policy to the economy, agriculture and Party organisation. One of his major current preoccupations will be the next Party Congress, due early in 1986. Soviet Party Congresses take place only once every 5 years and are thus major landmarks. They approve the new 5 Year Plan. The next Congress will additionally approve a new edition of the Party Programme and amend the Party Statutes.

2. The next 5 Year Plan (1986-90) will have to take account of the continuing slow-down in Soviet growth rates (growth in national income has fallen steadily from about 6% in the 1960s to 4% by the mid-70s and a little over 3% in recent years), which has exacerbated competition between the rival claims of military and consumer spending and increased investment. The period when the Russians could exploit abundant reserves of cheap and easily accessible raw materials and labour has come to an end: they are now having to develop at great cost energy and mineral deposits in Siberia, where there is a lack of labour and infrastructure. The labour force has also been growing more slowly in the developed regions of European Russia. The population growth is highest in Central Asia, but the people there are reluctant to migrate.

3. The Party's answer to these problems is "intensification", ie increased labour and capital productivity; reconstruction and retooling of existing facilities (instead of building new factories); and economies in energy and raw materials - an "initiative" recently announced by Chernenko for next year's plan calls for each labour collective to work for 2 days in the year on materials and fuels reclaimed as a result of economies. Stress is also being laid on the introduction of new

technology in industry. Mr Chernenko has announced that the next Party Plenum will be devoted to it. The Soviet Union is relatively backward in the application of computer technology to industry.

e | 4. There is also widespread acknowledgement that the traditional centralised system of economic planning and management can no longer cope with the complexities of modern production and is due for overhaul. But there is much less agreement among Soviet economists about how initiative and decision-making can be shifted outwards and downwards without risk of damage to the very concept of central planning and, ultimately, overall control by the Party. The Party's current answer lies in a limited experiment to increase the autonomy of enterprises by giving them a greater interest in fulfilling planned contracts (rather than simply fulfilling and overfulfilling a plan expressed in physical units of production, irrespective of whether they are needed or not) and greater freedom to dispose of the income thus obtained. The experiment is to be expanded next year and will form the basis of a general programme to improve economic management, to be unveiled at the Party Congress. A Politburo Commission, which is said to be chaired by Mr Gorbachev, has been tasked with seeing this through.

5. Agriculture has been the object of greatly increased investment since 1965, but it is still subject to the vagaries of the weather, and recent grain harvests have been disappointing. The Party's latest scheme to deal with the problem is a recently adopted programme to improve drainage and irrigation and thereby create zones of stable grain production. Some irrigation projects are causing concern to environmentalists in the Soviet Union (they require flooding to create reservoirs). A major project, the diversion of some of the waters of the great north-flowing Siberian rivers, has not yet been finally approved and is unlikely to



be built before the turn of the century. The Russians maintain that its impact on the flow of water into the Arctic Sea and hence on the world's climate will be negligible.

6. An endemic problem in managing the economy and agriculture is the parallel Party and Government functions in the Soviet Union. The Party is primarily concerned with laying down policies and selecting the people to carry them out, but it invariably gets drawn into the day-to-day business of management. This parallelism goes right to the top, where, for example, all Mr Gorbachev's Party functions are replicated in the Government machinery. Mr Chernenko has recently called for another effort to ensure that the separation of Party and Government functions is maintained.

7. Discipline in its widest sense is one of the main social problems faced by the leadership. The continuing discipline campaign is aimed principally at improving economic performance by making managers fulfil their contracts conscientiously and by preventing the workforce as a whole idling, pilfering or turning up for work drunk (alcoholism is a major social and demographical problem). The campaign is closely linked with a campaign to stamp out widespread corruption, including in the Party. There is concern that there are too many Party members who have joined to improve their career prospects and to enjoy the associated privileges. Amendments to the Party Statutes will probably aim at tightening conditions of entry.

8. All these questions will have to be addressed in a new edition of the Party Programme, now being drafted (Mr Gorbachev spoke at a meeting of the Drafting Commission in April this year). It will replace Khrushchev's 1961 programme, which contained unrealisable targets (overtaking the United States in production per head of the population by 1970 and building the basis of communism by 1980). The



current leadership have to draft a programme which will be sufficiently forward-looking to mobilise the population without falling into the same trap as Khrushchev. They are currently being very cautious claiming to be at a half-way stage ("developed socialism") between socialism and full communism. To date no one has ventured a definition of how long developed socialism will last, except that it will be a long stage. As Mr Chernenko acknowledged in a recent speech, this has led to the Party Leadership being taxed by some loyal communists with "postponing" the communist future.

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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV

OPENING REMARKS

1. [Invite Mr Gorbachev to make his remarks] Welcome.
2. Before discussion of specific points, would like to set out in general terms hopes for East/West and UK/Soviet relations.
3. End 1984 with a little more hope than I began it: at the beginning East/West relations seemed to be marked by general unwillingness to talk. Danger of misunderstandings through lack of communication.
4. With this background in mind, I urged on Mr Chernenko the need for better mutual understanding of each other's problems and attitudes; to achieve this, more contacts at all levels; without these it would be difficult to make progress on key issues, notably arms control.
5. During 1984 has been an increase in high-level contacts between Soviet Union and West. A welcome trend. Cannot pretend that much was achieved in the sense of movement of position or agreement on major issues. But at least channels of communication have been opened.
6. Lack of any proper contact between you and the US corrected by Gromyko's visit to Washington in September. Welcome fact that this will be followed by Gromyko/Shultz in January.
7. 1985 offers opportunities; but will not be able to solve world's problems at one go. Have always recognised that process of getting to know each other was first priority and

that gradually building mutual confidence would take time. And that substantive progress in negotiations would take longer.

8. Want to make clear to you my personal commitment and that of HMG to search for better relations. Not alone in this. Can tell you from my many conversations with President Reagan that he is completely genuine in his stated desire for better US/Soviet relations and form arms control agreements. Has unanimous backing of NATO in this. (Refer to NATO communique of 14 December).

9. Study of statements by Eastern and Western leaders shows striking similarities between our public positions:

- a) wish for peace and stability, without threats, recognising legitimate interests of each other;
- b) recognition of deep difference in political beliefs but also acceptance of wider common interest in peace and survival in our world;
- c) desire to bring greater prosperity to our peoples (hard to reconcile with ever expanding spending on arms);
- d) wish to help development in the Third World and leave reserves to meet crises there (brought home by terrible effects of Sahelian zone drought).

10. Courage and imagination needed, not hiding behind old ideas. Hope to convince you over course of our talks that West not threatening Soviet Union, not seeking superiority over you. You are too strong to be threatened in the way you claim you are; moment has come to take us at our word - our weapons are defensive. if we can overcome mutual distrust there is real scope for wider understanding and in the long term cooperation.

11. For the rest of our discussion, suggest we turn to:

- 1) East/West relations, including aspects of these which



impinge on problems in the Third World;

- 2) Arms control questions;
- 3) Bilateral relations.

S40AAG



PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV, 16 DECEMBER

EAST/WEST RELATIONS (REGIONAL ISSUES)

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Have mentioned in my introductory remarks my general hopes for East/West relations. Arms control a central, but not the only element.
2. Soviet Union and the UK have interests in many parts of the world. Do not always coincide. Sometimes differ strongly. But in either case necessary for us to discuss problems. Should not make local difficulties worse by adding East/West clash.
3. Hope to see practice of consultation and exchange of views increase both at level of Ministers and experts. These serve three purposes.
4. First, to see if we can cooperate in resolving problems. Second, to ensure that when crisis occurs we have clear knowledge of each other's intentions and interests. Too late to acquire this when crisis is on us. Third, process of consultation can help build general confidence and trust which is essential for tackling our own mutual security problems.
5. Would like to mention one or two regional problems.

Far East

6. One of the most rapidly developing areas in the world. Technological advances in Japan, South Korea and other countries remarkable. On security Japan exemplifies attitudes in Europe.

7. Japan felt threatened by Soviet build-up of forces in Far East. Began marginally to increase its defence expenditure, still much less than 2% of GNP, and was attacked for doing so by Soviet Union. Japan views spread of Soviet SS20s in Far East in same way as Europeans did in Western Soviet Union.

8. Example of where Soviet over-insurance on its own defence leads to cycle of reaction and counter-reaction in its neighbours.

9. Our contacts with China reveal same unease and concern at Soviet intentions behind military build up. Hope that First Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov's visit later this month will help to increase understanding and reduce tension.

Central America

10. Another area where basic social and economic problems are complex and difficult. Adding an extra East/West dimension makes them much more acute.

11. Pre-eminently an area where restraint and caution should be exercised. Deliveries of major new weapons systems would prove destabilising and inflammatory. In all of our interests that this should be avoided. Economic assistance is by far the most necessary help for area, together with encouragement of local self-help and



solidarity like the Contadora process.

Afghanistan

12. No desire to dwell at length. But recent overwhelming UNGA vote does in fact reflect widespread public concern at effects of continuing Soviet occupation. Accounts of damage to villages and casualties to civilians attract wide attention. Largest refugee problem in the world.

13. Only way to resolve problem is by negotiation and agreeing timetable for withdrawal. West fully accepts that Soviet Union has security interest in countries bordering it. But will never accept that Soviet security interests extend to dictating form of government in those countries.

14. External interference (if raised). Resistance to Soviet occupation so widespread can only be spontaneous expression of popular feeling. Also demonstrated by exodus of up to 4 million refugees.

Middle East [If appropriate and time permits]

15. Area of many deep local problems where crises frequent. Each of these problems has own roots and causes. Outside powers also have interests in the area. Essential that these interests should not distort or make impossible solution of local problems.

16. Glad that UK and Soviet Union have consultations about Middle East. Should continue.

17. Soviet proposals for Middle East conference (if raised). Studied your proposals with interest. Much common ground, but not for outsiders to prescribe terms of a settlement. Role for international community at some stage, but parties too far apart at present.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

Far East

1. Soviet Union publicly critical of increases in Japanese defence spending, accusations of militarism. Russians refuse to discuss territorial dispute over Northern Territories; as a result Japanese cannot envisage progress on bilateral issues. Japanese face half of all SS20s targetable against East Asia.
2. Russians concerned by increased Chinese links with West. Talks on "normalisation" of relations (fifth round held in October), but no progress so far - no sign of Soviet readiness to make concessions on three "obstacles" of greatest concern to China: Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; Afghanistan; and Soviet troops and SS20s on Chinese border and troops in Mongolia.
3. Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov due to visit Peking in May, but postponed at last minute by Russians, probably because of Chinese military action against Vietnamese. Soviet and Chinese officials have both said visit will take place from 21 December, but no public announcement. Economic co-operation likely to be main subject of discussion.

Central America

4. Supply of Soviet/East European arms to Nicaragua continues to increase. Americans have made clear to Russians they will destroy any MIGs delivered.
5. Russians state they support Contadora process; see guarantee for Nicaragua on non-aggression by US as most important element. Criticise US for policy of "state



terrorism" in supporting contras and putting other military pressure on Nicaragua. Wish to consolidate Sandinista regime, important foothold in area, and unlikely to take action which would provoke US to try to overthrow it.

Afghanistan

6. UNGA resolution on Afghanistan approved in November by record majority. Pakistan forthcoming at August Geneva talks on question of non-interference. No evidence of Soviet flexibility on issue of troop withdrawal. Russians claim that troop withdrawal can only take place after "external interference" by Pakistan, Iran and West has ceased.

Middle East

7. Soviet Union keen to re-establish role. Soviet proposals of 29 July 1984 for international conference part of this. Arab reaction lukewarm. But idea of international conference has appeal.

8. But Soviet Union has limited influence. Syria only reliable ally. Had some recent successes (eg arms sales to Kuwait, resumption of full diplomatic relations with Egypt). Unlikely to lead to significant increase in presence in short-term, but Russians will continue to exploit Arab disillusion with US.

9. UK/Soviet consultations at Under-Secretary level in 1983 and 1984.

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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV: 16 DECEMBER

ARMS CONTROL

POINTS TO MAKE

OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL

1. No justification for arms race in outer space. Soviet call for complete "demilitarisation" unrealistic. But US/Soviet talks offer opportunity to agree serious and concrete measures to enhance stability.
2. Welcome if belated Soviet recognition of logical link between (space-based) defensive weapons and offensive nuclear forces. This could improve prospects for constraints on both.

NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

3. Welcome renewed effort on nuclear weapons. We have shared interest in increasing security and reducing nuclear weapons. Soviet objectives/priorities at Geneva? Relationship between intermediate range/strategic systems? Is there a case for interim agreements?
4. Genuine commitment to halt/reverse NATO/INF deployments if right agreement. No preconditions: moratorium on NATO programme not acceptable. Nor will we trade NATO INF against Soviet shorter range systems in Eastern Europe.
5. Hope to see early progress on resumed negotiations over US and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. These are the heart of the matter. British assessment is that existing US and Soviet negotiating positions are far from irreconcilable. But important also to maintain confidence that existing arms control agreements are being honoured.
6. (If raised). British nuclear forces discussed at length
/between

between Foreign Secretary/Gromyko. Sure Soviet Union understands British views. A strategic force: irreducible minimum for credible deterrent. Insignificant percentage (less than 3%) of Soviet strategic forces. If/when US and Soviet Union agree to major reductions and if no significant change in Soviet defence, UK would want to review this position.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

7. Total CW ban needed. Must be confident that ban adequately verifiable. Welcome Soviet move last February but disappointing failure to negotiate seriously since then. Need agreement on other equally important verification issues. Urge Soviet Union to produce own proposals, vague statements of interest no substitute.

NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

8. Must work together to defend Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) against critics, not allow it to be hostage to progress on CTB. Adequate verification essential first step towards latter.



PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH MR M S GORBACHEV: 16 DECEMBER

ARMS CONTROL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL

1. January meeting to address outer space arms control as well as limits on offensive nuclear forces. Russians finally accepted linkage, which could improve prospects for agreements on both. Present meeting opportunity to urge need for mutual restraint in military competition in space. Russians want ASAT testing moratorium before substantive talks begin, US might consider it once they start. US reluctant to contemplate constraining SDI, though willing to discuss research programmes. But Russians will almost certainly not accept limits or reductions on nuclear weapons, without some prospect of limits on strategic defences against ballistic missiles.

NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

2. Russians let off hook on INF by "umbrella" device. Seem to accept possible need for INF/strategic merger. No hint of change on substance. No indication of future negotiating position. Have not set preconditions but likely to press for moratorium on NATO INF deployments. Will probably also raise British and French systems. One possible complication is recurrent worry that Russians may be in breach of some existing obligations. Of these the single most worrying example is the large Phased Array Radar at Abalakovo which it is difficult to reconcile with the ABM Treaty. Congress will have to be reassured of this if no new agreements are to be ratified.

NON PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

3. Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) depositories (UK/US/USSR) share common objective of preservation of treaty, which will
/expire



expire in 10 years time, if majority does not agree to extend it.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

4. Although Russians have accepted principle of continuous international on-site inspections of CW stockpile destruction, they have rejected US draft Treaty Article X ("no refusals" challenge inspection regime), on which we also have security difficulties.



PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MR GORBACHEV, 16 DECEMBER 1984

UK/SOVIET RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Have made clear wish to see improvement in East/West relations. Actively sought to increase frequency and variety of contacts. Best way to better mutual understanding and greater confidence.
2. Pleased that you were able to accept IPU invitation to come to Britain. Part of this process.
3. Hope full and varied programme has been drawn up to meet your interest both in discussions with Government Ministers and a substantial trade element, in addition to your meetings with your Parliamentary hosts.
4. Have made clear interest in substantial and realistic UK/Soviet dialogue, as I told President Chernenko in February.
5. Considerable increase in contacts at political level over past year. Several meetings between Sir G Howe and Mr Gromyko, including first visit for several years at that level to Moscow in July. Glad that Mr Gromyko has accepted invitation to pay return visit to London in 1985. Mr Rifkind also had useful talks with Mr Kornienko in March, and looks forward to visiting Moscow again.
6. But contacts not only matter for Governments. Renewal of Parliamentary contacts, which your visit represents, brings together elected representatives and enable exchanges about concerns and problems of the ordinary citizen. Contacts in cultural and educational fields also have



valuable part to play in creating better understanding. Not just a question of official exchanges under inter-governmental agreements. Freedom of private individuals to travel to each others' country important part of Helsinki process.

Trade

7. Welcome upturn in UK/Soviet trade this year. Relative decline in level of UK/Soviet trade in recent years compared with your trade with other Western European countries must be reversed. We need substantial contracts in next 5 year plan if upward trend is to be maintained. Mr Channon will discuss detail later this week. Two very substantial contracts for which John Brown and ICI/Davy preparing bids are examples of what we mean.

Personal Cases/Human Rights

8. Recent decision of Soviet authorities to grant exit visas to three individual cases raised by Sir G Howe with Mr Gromyko in July very welcome. Made considerable impression on public opinion in Britain. Further moves of this kind on the human rights front would do immeasurable good to Soviet reputation in West. Names of Sakharov and others are widely known in West. Way they are treated genuinely affects climate of opinion in which inter-Governmental relations are pursued. Undermines confidence.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

Political Contacts

1. The last full summit-level meeting was in 1975 when Mr Wilson visited Moscow. The invitations extended in 1975 to Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin were not renewed after the change of government and have not been extended to their successors. The Prime Minister met Mr Kosygin briefly in Moscow in June 1979, on her way to Tokyo. The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary visited Moscow in February to attend the funeral of President Andropov. Sir G Howe's visit to Moscow in July was first in the sequence of visits by Foreign Ministers since Dr Owen visited Moscow in October 1977. A list of Ministerial contacts and high level visits to and from the Soviet Union in 1984 is at Annex A.

2. We have now proposed 28-29 May 1985 for Mr Gromyko's return visit to London and await the Soviet response.

Trade

3. The Soviet Union accounts for more than half the UK's trade with CMEA countries and approximately 1% of our total world trade. The UK share of Soviet market has been steadily declining since the 1960s. Between 1970 and 1983 our share of total OECD exports to the USSR fell from 9.2% to 3%. The UK is now the 9th largest trading partner of the Soviet Union in the OECD in 1983 (6th in 1970).

4. UK exports to the USSR increased by 26% in 1983 and in the first 9 months of 1984 by a further 51% to £525 million. Two-thirds of this increase results from a sharp increase in exports of non-ferrous metals, which may not continue in 1985.



5. Gorbachev has made clear his interest in a substantial commercial element in his programme. He will have talks and dinner with Mr Channon on 20 December and visit a number of firms (including ICI, John Brown and new Shell plant at Mossmorran). The Soviet Union is now finalising its Five Year Plan for 1986-90, and British firms hope to be able to participate in it. In particular we hope that at least one major contract will be awarded to a British firm (the last was John Brown's contract for equipment for the Siberian gas pipeline in 1981). Lord Jellicoe and DTI officials visited Moscow from 3-7 December. Several areas where business might be done were identified. (See Annex B.)

Personal cases/human rights

6. Since Gorbachev holds no Government position it would not be appropriate to go into these questions in detail, but it would be a useful opportunity to mention the three personal cases who were given exit visas after Sir G Howe's visit. They were Mr Aleksey Terletskiy who wished to visit his son, Mr Stefan Terlezki MP; Miss Flora Leipman-Kaplan, a British subject who wished to return to the country of her birth; and Miss Lyudmila Kuzmina who wished to visit her then fiancé who is a British subject. Mr Terletskiy made a short visit to see his son; Miss Leipman-Kaplan was granted an exit visa for permanent settlement; and Miss Kuzmina has married her fiancé in Britain and has applied for permanent settlement here.

7. On the general subject of human rights, Soviet performance has consistently failed to live up to its Helsinki and Madrid CSCE commitments. Figures for Jewish emigration have continued to fall. In 1983 1315 Jews left the Soviet Union and the figure for 1984 is expected to be well below 1000. This is the lowest figure since 1970. Other types of human rights abuse including detention in psychiatric hospitals remains widespread. There are no indications of any improvement.



ANNEX A

1. Ministerial Contacts and high level visits to and from the Soviet Union: 1984

- (i) Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko, in margins of Conference on Disarmament in Europe: Stockholm 19 January;
- (ii) Visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to attend President Andropov's funeral: 13-14 February;
- (iii) Visit to London of Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr G M Kornienko: 28-29 March;
- (iv) Visit to Moscow by Minister for Trade, Mr Channon for UK/Soviet Joint Commission: 21-23 May;
- (v) Visit to Moscow by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary: 2-3 July;
- (vi) Visit to Farnborough of Soviet Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, Mr L M Shkadov: 1-10 September;
- (vii) Meeting between Sir G Howe and Mr Gromyko in margins of UN General Assembly: New York, 27 September.
- (viii) Visit to Moscow by the Governor of the Bank of England: 15-22 November;
- (ix) Visit to Moscow by the Leader of the Opposition and Mr Healey: 21-27 November;



- (x) Visit by Lord Jellicoe, Chairman BOTB, to Moscow:
3-7 December;
- (xi) Visit to UK by Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign
Trade, Mr Ivanov at the invitation of Louis Dreyfus
Ltd: end November;
- (xii) Visit to UK by the Soviet Deputy Minister for Food
Industries, Mr Belichenko, for talks at the DTI:
9-12 December.

Outstanding invitations

- (i) Mr Channon to Mr Lein, Minister for the Food
Industry;
- (ii) Mr Channon to Mr Bratchenko, Minister for the Coal
Industry;
- (iii) ICI to Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev.

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RESTRICTED

COMMERCIAL-IN-CONFIDENCE
 DESKBY DTI AND FCO 050900Z DECEMBER
 FROM MOSCOW 050530Z DECEMBER
 TO IMMEDIATE DTI LONDON
 TELEGRAM NUMBER OTTER 165 OF 5 DECEMBER
 INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

FOLLOWING FROM ROBERTS.
 TRADE ASPECTS OF GORBACHEV VISIT.

1. THE FOLLOWING POINTS AROSE DURING MEETINGS TODAY WITH LORD JELlicoe AND HIS TEAM.

POLYOLEFINS AND POLYESTER FIBRE PROJECTS.

2. AT THE MEETING WITH PATOLICHEV THE SOVIET TEAM INDICATED THAT THEY WANTED BOTH PROJECTS COMMISSIONED IN 1988. THEY WERE THEREFORE CONCERNED TO HAVE PRESENTATIONS FROM THE BRITISH COMPANIES EARLIER THAN APRIL/MAY 1985 AS HAD BEEN PROPOSED. WE UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON THIS MESSAGE, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT THE SCHEMES WERE HIGHLY COMPLEX AND DETAILED PROPOSALS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO DEVELOP. WE ALSO UNDERTOOK THAT ON THESE TWO PROJECTS THE COMPANIES CONCERNED WOULD HAVE A BASIC OUTLINE PRESENTATION READY BY THE TIME OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT.

3. PLEASE PASS THIS TO GORMLEY (JOHN BROWN) AND RAPEP (DAVY). I WILL SPEAK SIMILARLY TO BRUCE OF JOHN BROWN HERE AND TO THE LOCAL DAVY REPRESENTATIVE. WE DO NOT ENVISAGE MORE THAN THE BASIC OUTLINE OF CAPABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE POSSIBLE IN THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE, BUT A STATEMENT WHICH GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF KEENNESS AND PROFESSIONALISM SHOULD PAY DIVIDENDS. THIS FITS IN WITH OUR OWN PLANS FOR WORKING OUT OUR OPENING POSITION ON CREDIT TERMS OVER THE SAME PERIOD.

4. ON CREDIT, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE ARE LOOKING FOR SEVEN-AND-A-HALF PERCENT INTEREST RATE. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH OUR POSITION UNDER THE CONSENSUS, BUT ANY DEAL HAD TO BE PROFITABLE FOR BOTH SIDES. ON COUNTER TRADE, NO DETAILS WERE AVAILABLE BUT THIS WILL CLEARLY BE REQUIRED.

AGRICULTURE.

AGRICULTURE.

5. AT THE SUBSEQUENT LUNCH SUSHKOV (DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE) SUGGESTED VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS WHICH GORBACHEV MIGHT WELL WANT TO PURSUE IN LONDON. THESE INCLUDED STORAGE (THE SOVIET UNION WANT TO REDUCE GREATLY THE LOSS OF POTATOES AND OTHER PRODUCE IN STORAGE), TRANSPORTATION, FRUIT PRESERVATION (APPLES, PEARS AND PLUMS WERE MENTIONED) AND PACKAGING. YOU WILL WANT TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN BRIEFING, AND WARN ANY COMPANIES WITH AN INTEREST IN THIS AREA WHOM GORBACHEV IS LIKELY TO MEET.

TECHNICAL COLLABORATION.

6. WHEN ASKED FOR HIS ADVICE ON ISSUES WHICH GORBACHEV MIGHT RAISE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MARCHUK) SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO EXPLORE WITH GORBACHEV THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING PARTIES COVERING THE DEEP REFINING OF OIL (CRACKING) SEMICLN MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS SEMICLN ROBOTICS SEMICLN AND PERSONAL COMPUTERS. THESE MAY WELL BE PARTICULAR INTERESTS OF MARCHUK ON WHICH HE HAS BEEN BRIEFING GORBACHEV, SO WE NEED TO BE READY WITH AT LEAST DEFENSIVE BRIEFING. ANY NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS KIND SHOULD PRESUMABLY BE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE JOINT COMMISSION AND BE DIRECTED TOWARDS TRADE OPPORTUNITIES RATHER THAN TO AN EXCHANGE OF RESEARCH.

7. I ALSO LEARNED THAT MIKHEYEV AND PETROV (HIS DEPUTY) WILL BE ACCOMPANYING KOMAROV ON THE GORBACHEV TEAM, AND WILL BE ARRIVING IN LONDON ON 11 DECEMBER AHEAD OF THE REST OF THE PARTY. YOU MAY LIKE TO ARRANGE FOR CORLEY OR ME TO MEET THEM IN THE SECOND HALF OF NEXT WEEK TO GO OVER THE TRADE SIDE OF THE GORBACHEV PROGRAMME.

8. ADVANCE COPIES TO GEORGE (OT4,DTI) MISS NEVILL-ROLFE (PEP2,DTI) BROOMFIELD (SOVIET DEPARTMENT,FCO) AND MISS HARDING (ECGD).

SUTHERLAND

NNNN



(i) Mikhail Sergeevich GORBACHEV (GOR-BA-CHÓFF)

Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC CPSU;
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of
the Union.

Gorbachev (53) who comes of peasant stock, spent his early career in the Stavropol region in the North Caucasus, a major grain-producing area. After graduating in law at Moscow University - where he joined the Party - he returned to Stavropol and rose steadily through the local Party organisation, becoming a First Secretary in 1970. In 1978 he was transferred to Moscow as CC CPSU Secretary responsible for agriculture, and rose rapidly to full membership of the Politburo in 1980. His responsibilities as a Party Secretary have expanded under Chernenko. As well as agriculture he supervises ideology and foreign policy; and he oversees economic questions and Party organisation.

A Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1970, Gorbachev was a member of the Environmental Protection and Youth Commissions, and Chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission before becoming Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union (an office which traditionally goes with the Party responsibility for ideology and foreign affairs).

Gorbachev has visited a number of Western countries (Belgium, the FRG, France, Canada, Portugal and Italy) but is not known to speak any foreign languages. He has impressed Western interlocutors with his intelligence and urbanity. His wife Raisa is elegant and well-dressed; they are thought to have a daughter and a young granddaughter.



(ii) Victor Ivanovich POPOV (PÓ-POV)
Soviet Ambassador

Born Astrakhan 1918. Graduated Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature. Professor of History. Lectured in late 1950s at Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Pro-Rector of the Higher Diplomatic School (later the Diplomatic Academy) of the Soviet MFA in 1957. Spent six months at St Antony's College, Oxford in 1958.

In early 1960s worked on Australian desk of the Soviet MFA before serving as Counsellor in Canberra, 1966-68. In July 1968, took up post of Minister-Counsellor in London. His wife became seriously ill in London and they both returned to Moscow after only three months so that wife could have treatment. She died shortly afterwards. There are two sons of the marriage.

Popov was then appointed Rector of Diplomatic Academy, a post he held until his appointment to London. He has remarried, and is accompanied.



(iii) Leonid Mitrofanovich ZAMYATIN (ZAM-YÁ-TIN)

Head of the CC CPSU's International Information Department

Zamyatin (62) is a former diplomat who for many years headed the MFA's Press Department. He was Director-General of TASS from 1970 until 1978 when he was appointed head of the newly formed Central Committee Department for International Information. He has travelled widely in the West, particularly in West Germany, putting over the Soviet view on questions of international relations, but has occasionally startled or enraged his audiences by his aggressive and undiplomatic approach.

He is a member of the CC CPSU, and speaks English. He and his wife visited London in 1978 as guests of the previous Soviet Ambassador, Mr Lunkov.

Zamyatin is Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of Nationalities.



(iv) Aleksandr Nikolaevich YAKOVLEV (YÁKOV-LEV)

Director, Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Yakovlev (60) is a former Party official, and was First Deputy Head of the CC CPSU's Agitation and Propaganda Department in the 1960's. In 1973, following the publication of a controversial article by Yakovlev on aspects of Russian nationalism, he was transferred out of Party work to become Ambassador in Canada, a post he held until mid 1983. On his return to Moscow he became Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

In Canada Yakovlev proved a professional and effective diplomat, developing a wide range of contacts, including Trudeau. He struck the Canadians as astute, shrewd and personable. He and Gorbachev are thought to have known each other for many years and to get on well. He is a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of Nationalities.

C. IDEOLOGICAL WORK CONFERENCE

Report by Gorbachev. "The People's Living Creativity"

'Pravda' 11 Dec 84

Text as published of Tass account of report by M.S. Gorbachev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, headed as above:

The message of greetings from Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to conference participants expresses profound and principled propositions on the key problems of improving developed socialism and formulates the main tasks on the ideological front arising from the resolutions of the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, taking account of the present moment and the broad historical perspective. We must be guided strictly by these propositions and conclusions.

The 18 months which have elapsed have shown convincingly what a timely and major event the June Central Committee plenum was. Bringing ideological work to the fore and establishing a broad social view of ideology as a sphere of thought, action and education, the plenum elaborated an innovative and long-term concept of ideological work and opened a new chapter in the Party's ideological life.

Today, it is necessary once again to check the pulse of ideological activity against the high social criteria of its effectiveness and against the country's general labour rhythm.

The Central Committee regards the holding of the present conference as a definite milestone in work to implement the June plenum's resolutions and an important link in preparations for the next, 27th Party Congress

Our society is living through a crucial period. Bearing in mind the main results of past years, we may say with certainty that the Party and people, steadily following the course of the 26th CPSU Congress, are confidently advancing along the path of improving all aspects of Soviet society's life, the path of peace and progress.

The Central Committee plenums held during these years have given concrete form to the strategy for our forward movement and have developed it creatively. The Party's ideological arsenal has been enriched with new propositions and conclusions.

The Central Committee and its Politburo headed by Comrade K.U. Chernenko carry out multifaceted theoretical, political and organisational work aimed at further strengthening our motherland's economic and defence power. This work is permeated by the spirit of collectivity and a high sense of responsibility to the people.

A realistic, sober and creative approach to the cause and implacability towards shortcomings are becoming ever more firmly established in the activity of Party organisations and state, local government and economic bodies. There was universal approval for the struggle launched by the Party to establish order, organisation and discipline everywhere and to enhance cadres' responsibility at all levels of management.

The implementation of a series of important measures in the economic, social and ideological spheres made it possible to break the unfavourable trends in the economy and accelerate its growth rate, and had a beneficial effect on the moral and political atmosphere in the country. As a result, the Party's prestige rose still higher and its links with the masses were strengthened.

The Party Central Committee, guided by the June plenum's instructions, increased demands on Party committees with regard to the state of affairs on the

ideological front and adopted measures to improve the activity of the mass media and strengthen the communist education of young people and patriotic and atheistic work among the working people, as well as on a number of other topical problems. The ideological activity of Party organisations and institutions is becoming more relevant, being ever more closely linked with the implementation of socio-economic tasks. Changes for the better have taken place in the training and education of cadres and in the forms, methods and style of ideological work.

Large-scale and complex tasks lie ahead of us. The forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress will open up historic new horizons for the country. As is known it will adopt a new revised edition of the Party Programme - a programme for improving developed socialism - and will set tasks for the next Five-Year Plan period.

The fundamental basis for the Party's strategic line and for further improving ideological work and all Party political work is provided by the theoretical principles and propositions put forward by Comrade K.U. Chernenko concerning the level of social maturity achieved in Soviet society. The conclusion that we are at the start of the historically lengthy stage of developed socialism was substantiated in depth. On this basis the concept of the developed socialist society elaborated by the Party is being given concrete form.

The evaluations and conclusions which have been drawn warn against running ahead too fast and confusing what is with what must be achieved. At the same time they clearly indicate that we must not be sluggish in practical actions, in dealing with urgent problems, or in overcoming shortcomings.

Profound transformations must be carried out in the economy and in the entire system of social relations and a qualitatively higher standard of living must be ensured for Soviet people. As a result, socialism will rise to a new degree of maturity.

The speaker stressed that tremendous potential for accelerating society's socio-economic development lies in the combination of the masses' initiative and enterprise with a scientifically substantiated and creative approach to the resolution of urgent problems.

Since the June plenum, the Central Committee has adopted important measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the social sciences. They are already yielding some results. But social scientists are still too slow and timid in setting about the resolution of the key theoretical problems of our development.

Crucial tasks face economic science. The state of affairs here was analysed critically and in detail in the CPSU Central Committee resolution on enhancing the role of the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the study of theoretical problems of the economy of developed socialism. Much useful work has appeared in recent years. At the same time, the science of economics has not yet provided a detailed concept of the ways of making the transition to a dynamic and highly efficient economy and creating improved economic machinery.

Let us turn to such a vital and topical problem as that of the interaction between modern production forces and socialist production relations. Dogmatic ideas which sometimes do a disservice to our theory and practice have by no means been entirely overcome in the interpretation of this problem.

Life teaches us to examine with the greatest possible sense of responsibility the objective dialectic of the development of productive forces and production relations as a most important source of accelerating society's socio-economic development. This makes it incumbent on us to uncover in good time the contradictions which arise here and resolve them.

The requirements of the improvement of developed socialism dictate the need for the substantial enrichment of our ideas on many other major problems in the social sciences, too.

Let us turn to matters of the development of our society's political system. The profound idea of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on self-government is well known, for instance. They saw the main content of this idea in ensuring real and practical participation by an ever larger mass of working people in management and the elaboration, discussion, adoption and implementation of socio-economic decisions. Lenin never counterposed Soviet state power to self-government by the people. He valued the soviets highly, because they combine both these qualities and because they are the organs of power of the workers and peasants and ensure their unification and cohesion.

Now that much work is in progress to enhance the role and prestige of the soviets and improve our political system and all the forms and means of involving the masses in state and public affairs, we particularly need a serious study of the theoretical problems of the development of socialist self-government by the people. Such research would help the Party to resolve more successfully the practical tasks arising along this path.

M.S. Gorbachev went on to dwell on the problem of taking into account the interests of various social groups within our political system and on the scientific elaboration of the principle of democratic centralism in present-day conditions.

The development of Marxist-Leninist theory, he stressed, is a matter with which the CPSU is constantly concerned, in close co-operation with the communist and workers' parties of other countries, especially the socialist countries. Party documents - materials of congresses and central committee plenums and the speeches of Party leaders - embody the key theoretical problems and new conclusions and propositions which generalise the experience of historical development.

A very important field for the application of forces in ideological work, as in all the Party's and people's activity, was and is the economy, the speaker said. The experience of the last two years has once again shown convincingly what significant results can be achieved through the intensification of political, organisational and ideological work among the masses.

In his speech at the 15th November 1984 meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K.U. Chernenko stressed that positive developments in the economy must be not only consolidated but also augmented. We must do everything possible to ensure that the lagging sectors catch up in the time remaining before the end of the Five-Year Plan and ensure the completion of the 11th Five-Year Plan in a fitting manner.

At the same time, we must today think about the prospects for the country's development. Life sets us a task of tremendous political significance, that of bringing the national economy up to a qualitatively new scientific, technical, organisational and economic level and achieving decisive progress in the intensification of social production and improving its efficiency.

The course of intensification is dictated by objective conditions and by the entire course of the country's development. There is no alternative. Only an intensive economy, developing on the latest scientific and technical basis, can serve as a reliable material base for increasing the working people's prosperity and ensure the strengthening of the country's position in the international arena, enabling it to enter the new millennium fittingly, as a great and prosperous power.

The speaker stressed that the process of intensification of the economy must be given truly nation-wide character and must have the same political resonance as the industrialisation of the country once had.

Today, the main element making it possible to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the intensification of the economy and in increasing the pace of the country's economic and social development is the substantial acceleration of scientific and technical progress. This is an exceptionally large-scale and multifaceted task.

As is well known, matters to do with accelerating scientific and technical progress will be discussed at the next plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Paramount importance is attached to the strategy for further developing scientific technical and production potential. Priority must be given to fundamentally new and really revolutionary scientific and technical solutions capable of increasing labour productivity many times over.

There are many enterprises and scientific institutions in the country where scientific and technical problems are resolved up to the standards of the world's top achievements. But there are collectives which are satisfied with repeating what has long since been outstripped in world practice. This situation must be the target of critical analysis by the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences and of course, sector leaders.

Scientific and technical progress requires enhanced attention towards the cultural and technical standard of the working class and the peasantry and a radical improvement in the training and perfecting of society's main productive force. This sets the task of a major restructuring of the cadre training system from schools and vocational and technical colleges to higher education establishments. This work is already under way, and it must acquire large-scale character. In the near future, we must implement measures to strengthen the moral and material prerequisites for a significant increase in the creative output of technical specialists and for enhancing the role and prestige of the engineer.

We must take a fresh new look at many aspects of socialist competition and rid ourselves of obsolete approaches and methods. The main aims of competition today are an efficient labour rhythm, prompt fulfilment of contractual commitments, high product quality, the introduction and assimilation of new technology and the thrifty use of every minute of working time, every ton of raw material and every rouble. It is important to support by all ideological means the mass movement which is developing in the country to work for two days a year on materials, raw materials and fuel which have been saved.

Next year we shall be marking the 50th anniversary of the Stakhanovite movement, which played an outstanding role in the history of socialist construction. Continuing the traditions of the Stakhanovites means channelling the masses' energy and initiative into the resolution of the key tasks in increasing the economy's efficiency.

One of the main items on the agenda today is the restructuring of the forms and methods of economic management. The aim of this work is to create an economic machinery which meets the requirements of developed socialism. An important milestone along this path is the large-scale economic experiment in industry. It is necessary to continue still more energetically the quest for the most expedient forms and methods of combining the economic interests of society, labour collectives and every worker. Here, much can be done by all components on our ideological front.

The highest purpose of the party's activity, the speaker stressed, was and is concern for the people's good and for the more complete implementation of the principles of social justice. The consistent realisation of these goals strengthens confidence in the Party amongst the broadest masses of the people and promotes the growth of their labour and political activeness.

Tremendous prospects for enhancing man's social role are inherent in the improvement of the Soviet political system and in the further development of socialist democracy. Naturally, the development of all aspects of the soviets' work is of the first importance here. Working people must know well how their soviet works and how it carries out voters' instructions and reflects and defends their interests. At the same time, it is important to ensure the strict implementation of the constitutional principles of accountability of all executive bodies as an effective means of monitoring by all the people of the state of affairs in various sectors of state, economic and cultural construction. Particular significance is attached to the concern of the soviets, state bodies of people's control and our public to ensure the strictest observance of Soviet laws by all officials and citizens.

Importance is attached to the further involvement of working people in the day-to-day discussion and resolution of matter to do with the work of enterprises, construction sites and collective and state farms. Broad scope for this is opened up by the Law on Labour Collectives. Its skilful application offers the opportunity to really galvanise people's energy and will promote the better use of all production reserves - technical, economic and social. It is necessary to arrange organisational and educational work everywhere in such a way that every collective has an active influence on the development of the creative forces of the individual. This must be the aim of the work of Party and trade union organisations and the Komsomol.

Publicity is an integral part of socialist democracy and a norm of all public life. Wide, prompt and frank information is evidence of confidence in people and respect for their intelligence and feelings and their ability to understand events for themselves. It enhances the working people's activeness. Publicity in the work of Party and state bodies is an effective means of combating bureaucratic distortions and obliges us to be more thoughtful in our approach to taking decisions and organising monitoring of their implementation, and to the rectification of shortcomings and omissions. The extent to which propaganda is convincing, the effectiveness of education and the guaranteeing of the unity of word and deed depend largely on this.

Distribution relations are of tremendous significance in the implementation of the principles of social justice. Much has been done in recent years to impose due order in this sphere, too. But there are still many problems, and they must be resolved through the joint efforts of state and economic bodies and the broad public. Comrade K.U. Chernenko spoke about this at the all-union conference of people's controllers.

Life has taught us that any deviations from the socialist principles of distribution and economic management may and do engender such serious phenomena as labour and social passivity, parasitism, moral nihilism and covert forms of redistribution of income and goods. The inescapable force of law must be placed in the path of those who are not susceptible to the arguments of reason or the voice of conscience and civic duty. And the problem of distribution relations, the speaker noted, concerns not only wages, but the entire system of satisfying people's requirements, which takes place to a considerable degree on the basis of the social consumption funds.

Everyone's interests are involved in, for instance, health care. A genuinely democratic health care system has been created in our country. At the same time, it must be observed that medical services do not meet present-day requirements in every respect. Party and local government bodies must step up their attention to the work of health care institutions.

The service sphere has acquired great social weight in recent years. The Party will step up efforts to bring the service sphere into line with present-day requirements. To this end the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for the development of consumer goods production and the service sphere is being completed.

It is not only production and daily life which offer scope for man's development, but also leisure. I think the time has come to increase the responsibility of local organs for resolving issues of social and cultural construction. They now have substantial rights. But when you analyse working people's letters to the Central Committee, you can see that some people not only do not know how to take advantage of these rights, but do not want to. The proper order must be imposed here.

The Party Central Committee believes that unflagging attention to social questions, whatever aspects of life they may concern, must be the law for all state, economic and public organisations and central and local bodies. No references to objective circumstances can serve to justify a lack of attention to people's needs. This is a matter of principle for us communists.

The speaker went on to note that socialism's main influence on world development was and is exercised through its economic policy and through successes in

the socio-economic sphere. Every new step forward along this path is the most convincing argument in favour of the socialist system and the Soviet way of life. Socialist ideology incorporates the truly humanistic ideals of social progress, the development of the human personality and a world without weapons or wars, without exploitation or oppression.

It is not we but capitalism which has to manoeuvre and disguise itself, resorting to war and terror, falsification and subversion in order to ward off the implacable onslaught of time. The general crisis of capitalism is not only an exacerbation of its economic, social and political contradictions, it is also a spiritual crisis, an ideological and moral crisis.

At the same time, the ideological activity of the monopoly bourgeoisie has increased sharply in recent years. Our opponent has created a vast propaganda machine for ideological confrontation and uses sophisticated technical means and subversive and psychological methods. In its intensiveness, content and methods, the "psychological warfare" being waged by imperialism today constitutes a special kind of aggression which flouts other countries' sovereignty.

In these conditions, adherence to Party principles, a consistent class approach to the evaluation of current events and phenomena, political vigilance and intolerance of alien views, ideological work of a creative, attacking nature, effectiveness, boldness and persistence are more necessary than ever.

An attacking role on the part of our ideology does not just mean debunking bourgeois ideological myths and stereotypes. It means, first and foremost, asserting our ideals, the socialist norms of public life and genuine freedom and democracy and propagandising the historical achievement of real socialism.

An attacking role on the part of our ideology means the most active propagandisation of the peace-loving international policy of the CPSU, the Soviet state and the socialist community countries.

In the struggle for the cause of peace and social progress, the CPSU pursues a consistent course of rallying in every way the forces of the international communist and workers' movement. We uphold the historical correctness of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and come out together with all mankind's revolutionary and peace-loving forces for social progress, the cause of peace and security for all the peoples.

Finally, an attacking role on the part of our ideology means adherence to Party principles and promptness of information. We must answer promptly and substantively the questions raised by world developments and the course of the struggle and rivalry between the two opposing systems, and make the necessary adjustments to our ideas and practice in good time, when life demands it.

In view of the acuteness and complexity of the present-day ideological struggle, the June plenum set the task of improving counter-propaganda both inside the country and for the foreign audience. Party committees and the mass media must continue to deepen the content of this work and make it more up-to-the-minute.

The report devoted an important place to improving the level of Party leadership of all spheres of public life and radically improving the style of work in the light of the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee's June plenum.

The Central Committee, the speaker said, attaches tremendous significance to the mastery of a Leninist work style by all our cadres. Only by observing a political approach, critically comparing the efforts made with the practical results and engaging in a constant creative quest is it possible to resolve questions not "bureaucratically", as Lenin put it, but in a statesmanlike way.

The facts indicate that the ability - and sometimes the persistence - to organise matters in practice is not yet in plentiful supply everywhere by a long way. The fierce

enemy of lively thought and lively action was and is formalism, whose manifestations are multifarious. Its essence is incompetence, indifference and the replacement of a Party political approach with a bureaucratic approach, when importance is attached not to getting things done but to looking good.

Of course, there are no ready-made formulas for combating formalism in every case, but the Party has always had an immutable Bolshevik principle: Judge people by their deeds, not their words, and judge work by results, not by "measures" adopted. We shall continue to follow this tried and tested principle.

The vast majority of our cadres do their Party, official and professional duty honestly and enjoy well-earned respect and prestige among the working people for their selflessness in work, personal modesty, fairness and attention to people.

Our Party will become still more cohesive and authoritative if we continue to rid ourselves of those who do not value Party principles and Party honour and get rid of moral degenerates, to this end using the CPSU Rules, the law and public opinion.

The mass media have a major role in all the matters we are discussing today. The Party values highly journalists' work, which requires profound knowledge, creative intensity, principles and sometimes boldness. Many constructive and effective items in the press, television and radio on vital issues of the economy, education and culture could be cited. At the same time, many publications and programmes still suffer from uniformity, anonymity and superficiality. The Party counts on a still more significant contribution from the mass media to the implementation of plans for socio-economic progress and for improving communist education.

The CPSU Central Committee values the labour and efforts of our whole ideological corps - agitators and propagandists, lecturers, public teachers and cultural enlightenment workers. The scientific and artistic intelligentsia do great service in forming a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, a high sense of civic-mindedness and patriotic pride in the socialist motherland and in enriching people's lives with new spiritual assets. Our intelligentsia may rest assured that everything significant, honest and truthful that their talent creates will be supported by the Party and will find a grateful response in Soviet people's hearts.

We are approaching the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Fatherland War. Each new generation, setting out on life, looks to the sources of that victory, since civic and political maturity are inseparable from the country's history and its heroic past. Soviet patriotism was and is one of the greatest spiritual gains of our system, and we shall preserve and augment this asset with special care and Party attention, since there is no higher feeling than love for the fatherland and loyalty to internationalist duty.

The guarantee of success for all our initiatives M.S. Gorbachev said in conclusion, is the people's living creativity. We must do substantial work to raise the socialist society to a new and higher level and greet the 27th Congress of Lenin's Party in a fitting manner.

[Note: Extracts from Gorbachev's report were broadcast by Soviet television (1530), Moscow home service (1200 and 1600) and Tass (in Russian for abroad 1210 and in English 1143 gmt) on 10th December.]

Final Proceedings. Speech by Gorbachev and Message to Central Committee

(a) Moscow home service (i) 1600 gmt 10 and (ii) 1200 gmt 11 Dec 84

(i) Excerpt from report of proceedings on 10th December:

Speaking at the conference were Slyunkov, First Secretary of the CP of Belorussian Central Committee; Afanasyev, Editor-in-Chief of 'Pravda'; Rogonov,

GR 260

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FM MOSCOW 111530Z DEC 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1413 OF 11TH DEC 84

INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

SPEECH BY GORBACHEV

SUMMARY

1. VIRTUALLY ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON, GORBACHEV HAS DELIVERED A MAJOR DOMESTIC SPEECH ON CONTEMPORARY SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND PROBLEMS OF THE LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY. ON BOTH FRONTS HIS WATCHWORD IS CONTINUITY RATHER THAN CHANGE. (THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S LACK OF INNOVATIVE THOUGHTS IS IN CONTRAST WITH WHAT DENG XIAOPING HAS RECENTLY BEEN SAYING IN PEKING.) ALTHOUGH CONFIDENT IN TONE AND ORTHODOX IN EXPRESSION, GORBACHEV DISPLAYS ANXIETY AT THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN GALVANISING THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND SOME IMPATIENCE WITH THE INFLUENCE OF DOGMA.

DETAIL

2. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME GORBACHEV HAS DELIVERED THE MAIN ADDRESS ON AN IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL OCCASION SINCE THE LENIN ANNIVERSARY IN APRIL 1983. IT UNDERLINES HIS STATUS AS THE SENIOR SECRETARY AFTER CHERNENKO, AND THE BREADTH OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. CHERNENKO'S ABSENCE WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF HIS OWN CLOSE INTEREST IN AND EARLIER RESPONSIBILITY FOR IDEOLOGY. HOWEVER A MESSAGE FROM HIM WHICH CONTAINED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE, WAS GIVEN A STANDING OVATION LED BY GORBACHEV WHO ALSO QUOTED HIM FREQUENTLY IN HIS SPEECH.

3. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH (PRINCIPAL POINTS IN MIFT) REFLECTED THE THEMES AND LANGUAGE OF THE JUNE 1983 PLENUM ON IDEOLOGY AND THE SESSION IN APRIL THIS YEAR OF THE CENTAL COMMITTEE COMMISSION PREPARING THE REVISED EDITION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN A SPECIFICALLY GORBACHEVIAN GLOSS ON THE PARTY LINE. BUT THE EMPHASIS IS ON PRACTICAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES RATHER THAN THE IDEOLOGICAL THREAT FROM IMPERIALISM. HIS REFERENCE TO THE PERSISTENCE OF DOGMATIC IDEAS, BY IMPLICATION HINDERING ECONOMIC REFORMS, AND TO THE NEED TO MAKE TIMELY CORRECTIONS TO IDEAS AND PRACTICE 'WHEN LIFE SO DICTATES,' MAY REFLECT HIS PERSONAL PRAGMATIC APPROACH SEMI COLON BUT SUCH FORMULATIONS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE SPEECHES OF CHERNENKO AS WELL AS ANDROPOV.

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4. THE PRAVDA TEXT SUMMARISED IN MIPT IS ITSELF A SUMMARY AND
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF THE MORE INTERESTING PASSAGES WERE
OMITTED.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES INCLUDING MIFT TO PRIVATE
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1414 OF 11TH DEC 84

INFO PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING EAST EUROPEAN POSTS.

MIPT: SPEECH BY GORBACHEV AT CONFERENCE ON IDEOLOGY

1. GORBACHEV DELIVERED THE MAIN ADDRESS AT AN ALL-UNION CONFERENCE ON 'DEVELOPED SOCIALISM AND THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN THE LIGHT OF THE JUNE 1983 PLENUM', WHICH BEGAN IN MOSCOW ON 10 DECEMBER. CHERNENKO WAS NOT PRESENT BUT A MESSAGE FROM HIM TO THE PARTICIPANTS WAS READ OUT BY ZIMYANIN. OF THE PARTY HIERARCHY ALL THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIES EXCEPT CHERNENKO ATTENDED, PLUS THE MOSCOW PARTY SECRETARY GRISHIN AND THE MINISTER OF CULTURE DEMICHEV.
2. THE FOLLOWING WERE GORBACHEV'S MAIN POINTS:
 - A) THE CONFERENCE WAS A MILESTONE IN THE WORK OF FULFILLING THE DECISIONS OF THE JUNE 1981 PLENUM ON IDEOLOGY AND AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 27TH CONGRESS.
 - B) THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF AN HISTORICALLY LENGTHY PERIOD OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIATED AND ON THIS BASIS THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE PARTY'S CONCEPT OF A DEVELOPED SOCIALIST SOCIETY WERE BEING WORKED OUT.
 - C) DESPITE SOME USEFUL WORK, SOVIET ECONOMIC SCIENCE HAD NOT YET PROVIDED ANY CLEAR CONCEPT OF THE TRANSITION TO A DYNAMIC HIGHLY EFFICIENT ECONOMY AND AN IMPROVED ECONOMIC MECHANISM. DOGMATIC IDEAS 'WHICH AT TIMES HAVE DONE AN ILL-SERVICE TO OUR THEORY AND PRACTICE' HAD NOT BEEN FULLY OVERCOME.
 - D) GORBACHEV CALLED FOR SERIOUS WORK ON THE THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST SELF-MANAGEMENT WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A PROFOUND IDEA OF THE FOUNDERS OF MARXISM-LENINISM.
 - E) THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO INTENSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY ON THE MOST MODERN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BASIS AS THE MEANS OF IMPROVING THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE, STRENGTHENING THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND ENABLING IT TO ENTER THE NEXT MILLENIUM AS A GREAT AND PROSPEROUS POWER. THIS PROCESS OF INTENSIFICATION SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME KIND OF POLITICAL IMPETUS AS INDUSTRIALISATION HAD BEEN GIVEN AT AN EARLIER PERIOD IN THE SOVIET UNION'S HISTORY. GORBACHEV REFERRED IN THIS CONTEXT TO THE FORTHCOMING PLENUM ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. (FOR WHICH A DATE HAS NOT YET BEEN SET BUT WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE HELD NEXT APRIL)

(F)

F) ONE OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA WAS THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE FORMS AND METHODS OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND THE CREATION OF AN ECONOMIC MECHANISM APPROPRIATE TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM. THE SEARCH FOR THE BEST MEANS OF ACCOMMODATING THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF SOCIETY, OF THE LABOUR COLLECTIVES, AND THE INDIVIDUAL WORKER SHOULD BE PURSUED STILL MORE ENERGETICALLY.

G) ON SOCIAL JUSTICE GORBACHEV SAID THAT DEVIATIONS FROM 'SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT' COULD AND DID GIVE RISE TO PASSIVITY, PARASITISM, MORAL NIHILISM AND 'HIDDEN FORMS OF REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND BENEFITS'. THE LAW WOULD BE INVOKED AGAINST THOSE WHO FAILED TO RESPOND TO ARGUMENTS OF REASON, CONSCIENCE AND DUTY.

H) THE PARTY WOULD INCREASE ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SERVICES SECTOR. THE COMPLEX PROGRAMME FOR DEVELOPING THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND THE SERVICES SECTOR WAS NEARING COMPLETION.

I) ECHOING A STATEMENT BY ANDROPOV, GORBACHEV SAID THAT SOCIALISM EXERTED ITS MAIN INFLUENCE ON WORLD DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ITS ECONOMIC POLICY AND SUCCESSES. 'EVERY NEW STEP FORWARD ON THIS ROAD IS THE MOST CONVINCING ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND THE SOVIET WAY OF LIFE'.

J) IN A RELATIVELY BRIEF PASSAGE ON THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM WAS NOT ONLY THE AGGRAVATION OF ITS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS BUT A SPIRITUAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL CRISIS. AT THE SAME TIME THE ADVERSARY HAD SHARPLY STEPPED UP ITS IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY IN RECENT YEARS AND CREATED A HUGE PROPAGANDA MACHINE, USING COMPLEX TECHNICAL RESOURCES, SABOTAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVICES. 'IN ITS INTENSITY, CONTENT AND METHODS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY IMPERIALISM REPRESENTS A SPECIAL VARIETY OF AGGRESSION WHICH TRAMPLES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF OTHER COUNTRIES'.

K) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PARTY REQUIRED POLITICAL VIGILANCE, AN IRRECONCILABLE ATTITUDE TO ALIEN VIEWS, - CREATIVE, VIGOROUS IDEOLOGICAL WORK WHICH WAS BUSINESS-LIKE BOLD AND PERSISTANT.

L) IN IDEOLOGICAL WORK THE PARTY MUST GIVE TIMELY AND SUBSTANTIAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSING SYSTEMS SEMI COLON AND MAKE IN GOOD TIME CERTAIN CORRECTIONS IN ITS CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE WHEN LIFE REQUIRED THIS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 435 OF 14 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DS12, DS17 AND DPR)

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NAC COMMUNIQUE.

1. FOREIGN MINISTERS TODAY AGREED THE FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL:

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION IN BRUSSELS ON 13TH AND 14TH DECEMBER 1984. MINISTERS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT ONES FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE DIFFICULTIES HAVE NOT BEEN OF OUR MAKING. IN PARTICULAR, THE CONSTANT SOVIET BUILD-UP OF ARMS OF ALL KINDS REQUIRES US TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FORCES TO GUARANTEE OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. THE ALLIANCE HAS CONTINUED TO SHOW STRENGTH AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY, WHICH REMAIN THE BASIS FOR OUR SECURITY.

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE QUOTE WASHINGTON STATEMENT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS UNQUOTE OF MAY 1984, WHICH REAFFIRMS OUR COMMITMENT TO THE HARMEL REPORT, CONTINUE TO GUIDE THE ALLIANCE. DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE, COMBINED WITH ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, AS WELL AS CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST, ARE FOR US INTEGRAL PARTS OF A COHERENT POLICY FOR STABLE PEACE. WE REMAIN READY TO PLAY OUR FULL PART IN A REALISTIC EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AND INCREASED CO-OPERATION. REGULAR BILATERAL HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES. WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES TO ADOPT A SIMILARLY POSITIVE APPROACH TOWARDS GENUINE DETENTE.

3. WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON ALL MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. AS WE APPROACH WHAT MAY BE A NEW PHASE IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT REMAIN OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

4. WE WELCOME THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO DISCUSS NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING INTERCONTINENTAL AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS IN OUTER SPACE.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION LEADING TO EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AND BALANCED AGREEMENTS IN WHICH ALL CONCERNED CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE.

5. THE ALLIES CONCERNED ARE WILLING TO REVERSE, HALT OR MODIFY THE LONGER RANGE INF (LRINF) DEPLOYMENTS - INCLUDING THE REMOVAL AND DISMANTLING OF MISSILES ALREADY DEPLOYED - UPON ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCED, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT CALLING FOR SUCH ACTION. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONCRETE NEGOTIATED RESULT OBTAINING THE NEED FOR SUCH DEPLOYMENT, THE ALLIES CONCERNED EMPHASISED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES AS SCHEDULED. (DENMARK AND GREECE RESERVE THEIR POSITIONS ON PARAGRAPH 5)

6. THE BEST APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS THE MOST RADICAL: THEY SHOULD BE ELIMINATED WORLD-WIDE. WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS. WE CALL ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO WORK FOR THE OBJECTIVE OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ATTACH HIGH PRIORITY TO THE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA.

7. CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY ARE COMPLEMENTARY. IN STOCKHOLM (CDE), WE SEEK AGREEMENT ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND CONCRETE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES TO BE APPLIED IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE THEREBY GIVING NEW EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE EXISTING DUTY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. IN VIENNA, THE ALLIES PARTICIPATING IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE ACTIVELY WORKING TOWARDS A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT INVOLVING REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO PARITY AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY ENHANCING CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVING MILITARY STABILITY IN EUROPE.

8. WE REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THE EXPERTS MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN OTTAWA IN MAY 1985 WILL BE ONE IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS PROCESS. FULL IMPLEMENTATION BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS MADE IN HELSINKI AND MADRID IS ESSENTIAL. THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE FINAL ACT IN AUGUST 1985 SHOULD BE COMMEMORATED BY A MEETING OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES AT POLITICAL LEVEL, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE MAKE THIS APPROPRIATE. THE CSCE PROCESS COULD THEREBY RECEIVE A NEW IMPULSE.

9. IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION, IN DISREGARD OF ITS OBLIGATION NOT TO THREATEN OR USE FORCE, CONTINUES TO VIOLATE THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN.

OTHER ISSUES ALSO REMAIN OF DEEP CONCERN TO US. RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND AGAIN DEMONSTRATE THE NEED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

WE, FOR OUR PART, RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES. WE WILL REMAIN VIGILANT AND WILL CONSULT ON EVENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA WHICH MIGHT THREATEN OUR COMMON SECURITY.

10. THE MAINTENANCE OF A CALM SITUATION IN AND AROUND BERLIN REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN THIS REGARD UNIMPEDED TRAFFIC ON ALL ACCESS ROUTES IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.

WE SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO CONTINUE AND DEVELOP DIALOGUE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AS A CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE IN EUROPE AND TO OBTAIN FURTHER PRACTICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO BENEFIT THE GERMAN PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THE BERLINERS. ON THE QUESTION OF THE DIVISION OF GERMANY, WE REAFFIRM OUR WASHINGTON STATEMENT OF 31ST MAY 1984.

11. WE SEEK TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE PEACE. AS A COMMUNITY OF FREE NATIONS SHARING COMMON VALUES, WE REMAIN FULLY COMMITTED TO STRENGTHENING FREE INSTITUTIONS AND TO PROMOTING STABILITY, WELL-BEING AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

WE REMAIN DETERMINED TO PREVENT AND SUPPRESS TERRORISM, WHICH
●KS TO UNDERMINE STABILITY AND DESTROY OUR DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS.

12. THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POTENTIAL REMAINS
A MAJOR ALLIED CONCERN. WE ARE THEREFORE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN
A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES TO
ENSURE THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE. THOSE ALLIES PARTICIPATING
IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE ALLIANCE WILL WORK IN PARTICULAR
TO STRENGTHEN THEIR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES.

THE SECURITY WE SEEK FOR OURSELVES IS NOT SECURITY AT THE EXPENSE
OF THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY ONE ELSE. NONE OF OUR WEAPONS WILL
EVER BE USED EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK. OUR ALLIANCE IS
DESIGNED TO PREVENT WAR AND TO PRESERVE PEACE IN FREEDOM.

13. THE SPRING 1985 MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL
SESSION WILL BE HELD IN LISBON IN JUNE.

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SPAIN RESERVES HIS GOVERNMENT'S
POSITION ON THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE.

GRAHAM

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 December 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

Since Mr. Thatcher will be present at Chequers on 16 December, the Prime Minister would wish to invite Mrs. Gorbachev also to attend the lunch. I should be grateful if the invitation could be conveyed to the Soviet Embassy.

As regards the handling of the meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, the Prime Minister envisages a generalised discussion before and during lunch. Her preference after lunch would be to withdraw with Mr. Gorbachev, plus one other Soviet official, Sir Geoffrey Howe and a notetaker on each side (plus of course two interpreters). I should be grateful if the Soviet Embassy could be put on notice that this is her intention.

As regards the meeting with academics on 14 December at 1700 hours, the time available is, unfortunately, very limited and I think we must make it as small a meeting as possible. Sir Geoffrey Howe is, of course, very welcome to attend but I do not propose to extend it beyond that.

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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COURTAULDS PLC

ccpc

18 Hanover Square
London W1A 2BB
Telephone 01-629 9080
Telex 28788

Mr. C.D. Powell
10 Downing Street
London SW1

10th December 1984.

Edm

Dear Mr. Powell,

mb

In advance of the meeting at 5.0 pm on Friday 14th December, I am enclosing some notes. These include some personal views and some outline facts about Courtaulds, which may help to save time on Friday.

Yours sincerely,

Newman Wooding.

N.S. Wooding.

Registered in London No 128124
Registered Office
18 Hanover Square London W1A 2BB

10th December 1984.

COURTAULDS PLC

ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE

The welcome increase in exports from the UK to the Soviet Union which has taken place this year has to be viewed against the steady decline in the relative volume of Anglo-Soviet trade as compared with other Western European countries. Much has been said and written about the possible reasons for this state of affairs, but those companies in the UK who have ongoing business with the USSR would all subscribe to the following points:

- (1) With few exceptions the USSR is not interested in companies who wish to make opportunistic sales.

Stemming largely from the centralised state planning system, goods, whether they be raw materials, semi-manufactured goods or finished products, are bought against some longer term plan.

Again, because of the centrally planned economy, those taking commercial decisions are vulnerable. Thus, in developing business, a new supplier must recognise that it will be necessary to spend a great deal of time and effort in establishing product quality and suitability, credibility as a supplier of integrity and competitiveness as against other alternative suppliers. This process can take several years.

Those not prepared to invest the time and effort required do well not to become involved, not only because of the wasted effort, but because lack of persistence reflects adversely on other UK businessmen.

The other side of this coin of course is that once established, and providing the USSR continues to buy a particular product, a supplier is unlikely to lose the business unless there is a gross failure to perform.

- (2) Selection of staff dealing with the USSR is crucial. Whilst a knowledge of the language is not essential, it is very desirable; but even more important is ability and personality. A salesman will not be taken seriously unless he is seen to know his product, unless he is seen to have a mandate to take decisions on the spot and unless he is tough and articulate. The soft sell, the timid approach, the assumption of modesty are all despised by those with whom he will be dealing.
- (3) Clearly the market is a tough one but once a deal is struck, the customer honours his commitments. This, combined with the continuity which can be expected and the unspoken willingness to see that the supplier does not trade unprofitably, make the USSR a good market for those who have the right product to sell.

contd....

(4) In the case of capital contracts winning business is even more protracted. The USSR shops in the world market and seeks the latest technology. Moreover, the client is one of the industrial Ministries and that client takes great pains and a great deal of time both to shop around and to ensure that the technology, the plant and equipment and the product are all specified very precisely. However, once that stage is completed, commercial negotiations are conducted separately by one of the Foreign Trade Organisations, all of which are departments of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

(5) During the years of the current 'Five Year Plan' emphasis has repeatedly been placed upon the rebuilding and modernising of existing plants. This is a messy and complicated business and much less straightforward than building new plants on greenfield sites. As a consequence, the Ministries concerned are showing considerable indecision in firming up plans with prospective suppliers. Our Embassy, UK officials, and individual businessmen have repeatedly stressed that as a consequence of our own major industrial reconstruction and modernisation, the USSR is able to draw on this solid experience by contracting with UK firms.

(6) Up to and including the session of the Joint Commission in May we were being told repeatedly that, with the exception of oil and gas exploration and extraction, the number of new major capital contracts was very limited. In recent months, however, the emphasis on this seems to have changed. A number of British businessmen have been told that in the next Five Year Plan there is likely to be a significant number of new plants. There has also appeared recently a new emphasis on true turnkey contracts. This seems to have been sparked off by widespread dissatisfaction at senior level with the length of time taken to build plants (which were in the existing plan) and the slow and faulty commissioning of some of those plants. This is being contrasted with the Russians' recent experience with an Austrian company, Voest-Alpine, which built and commissioned a large steel mill on a turnkey basis. The mill was completed within schedule and started up faultlessly. It is an example which has been quoted to some of us several times by different organisations in the USSR.

These changes of emphasis may create an additional opportunity for capital contracts, not just for the UK but for other countries; but it also presents novel problems, since to carry out a true turnkey operation in the USSR will not be simple. By turnkey, the Soviets mean not only the provision of all the buildings, plant and equipment, but also the temporary importation of labour to carry out the total job. Voest-Alpine used mainly Yugoslavian workers for their project.

(7) The USSR maintains those in senior appointments for many years, which causes problems for the UK and for most other developed countries, since under our system both officials and businessmen change their positions relatively frequently. This often provokes adverse comment from the USSR, linked primarily with the sensitivity

contd....

which everyone up to the highest level has about his or her vulnerability. Whilst under our system it is not easy to take account of such comment, if continuity can be maintained it is of great advantage in commercial dealings.

COURTAULDS' EXPERIENCE

- (1) Courtaulds has traded with the Soviet Union for 31 years. The business carried out is of two kinds. Firstly, the sale of semi-manufactured products; principally fibres, chemicals, packaging films, fabrics and marine paints. This business, which has grown steadily, is conducted on a cash basis with orders being firmed up for three months or six months ahead. Extended credit is not involved and sales are made in sterling. The recent annual sales by Courtaulds to the Soviet Union are:

1982	£30.6mn
1983	£64.1mn
1984	£32.3mn (first half year)

Secondly, Courtaulds has in earlier years supplied seven complete factories with a total present day value of £270mn. Two of these plants were erected and commissioned by the USSR; the other five were erected under our supervision and commissioned by us. All factories are reported to be operating satisfactorily, and at or above design parameters.

- (2) The last capital contract was commissioned in 1978. Discussions are currently in progress on the modernisation of two acrylic plants provided by Courtaulds, and a third built by the USSR copying our technology. Tenders for the work at two of these plants were submitted nearly one year ago and we have been told that we shall receive an answer within the next month. If all these three projects go ahead, the total contract will be worth £40-50mn. Discussions are also in progress on the possible modernisation of other man-made fibre plants, some of which were provided by Courtaulds, others constructed by the USSR.
- (3) None of the business which Courtaulds does, or has done in the past, is linked with buy back or counter trade. However, we do purchase from the Soviet Union raw cotton (very much smaller in volume now than in previous years) and also from time to time chemicals such as acrylonitrile, the raw material for acrylic fibres. The size of our purchases in recent years is:

1982	£6.5mn
1983	£2.7mn
1984	£5.5mn

contd....

- (4) With the exception of marine paint (where the business, which is highly specialised, is linked with technical service at the major ports) all commercial dealings are transacted by Courtaulds Central Trading, an in-house trading company. The staff of this company, which handles all our business with Eastern Europe and China, are commercially experienced and fluent in at least one additional language.

We do not find it necessary to maintain an office in Moscow because the two specialist staff responsible for the USSR visit at least monthly and are accompanied as necessary by experts from the producing divisions.

By this means we match the centralised USSR structure with a Courtaulds 'centralised' entity (which is in total contrast to the way Courtaulds is organised for all other business).

- (5) As noted, continuity is extremely important. Specialist personnel are changed as little as possible and never without overlap of many months. The senior executive responsible for Courtaulds Central Trading visits the USSR at least every six months; there have been only four holders of this position in 31 years. During that time contact and negotiation at the most senior level in Courtaulds has been the responsibility of Lord Kearton (up to 1974) and since then of NSW. I have no doubt that this has been helpful.

N.S. Wooding.



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister
The Russians don't yet
know formally of
Mr. Cartledge's proposed
appointment as Ambassador
to Moscow - so better
not to mention it
to Gorbachev - CDP

MR POWELL

I am very grateful to the Prime Minister for including me in her lunch for Gorbachev at Chequers on 16 December. This will be most valuable not only for the intrinsic interest of the occasion but also, in the context of my eventual work in Moscow, for my having been seen by the Russians to be present.

2. You may however wish to make sure that the Prime Minister is aware that agrément for my appointment to Moscow has not yet been sought from the Soviet Government (this will not be done until March next year). The Russians are sensitive about protocol and would react adversely to any appearance that agrément was being taken for granted. It would therefore be preferable for any explanation of my presence, for example in the initial introductions, to be purely in terms of my present job without any reference to my prospective posting.

Bryan Cartledge

B G Cartledge

10 December 1984

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

MRS. GOODCHILD

NB

Lunch for Mr. Gorbachev

The Prime Minister has decided
to add DT and Mrs. Gorbachev.

C.D. Powell
10 December 1984

E. R.

PRIME MINISTER

Gorbachev Lunch

I understand that DT is likely to be at Chequers on
16 December. Will he attend the lunch for Gorbachev?

At present you have not invited Mrs. Gorbachev, but the
Russians might be put out if DT was present but Mrs. Gorbachev
not.

Ask Mrs Gorbachev

no

CDP

7 December 1984

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PRIME MINISTER

Meeting with Gorbachev

We need to decide how to handle the talks with Gorbachev after lunch.

In many ways, it would be best if you were able just to go off with him and two interpreters. But I doubt if he will be ready for this. Equally, talks involving all the guests at lunch (18) would be pretty cumbersome. You might therefore suggest that Gorbachev plus the Soviet Ambassador and one official should meet with you, Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Ambassador in Moscow, to make the occasion more manageable. Alternatively, you might like to do it without either of the two Ambassadors present, though I think there should be a notetaker on each side, since the Russian intention appears to be to get some business done. I see some advantage in the latter format.

Agree?

EDP

Yes

7 December, 1984.

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UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW



Professor A. Nove

ADAM SMITH BUILDING
GLASGOW G12 8RT
TEL: 041-339 8855
EXTENSION:

CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

6th December, 1984.

[Handwritten initials]

The Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Dear Mr. Powell,

Thank you for your letter of 1st December.
May I confirm that I would be glad to attend the
meeting between 5 and 6 p.m. on 14th December to
discuss Mr. Gorbachev's visit.

Yours sincerely,

Alec Nove

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40000
M. J. ...

King's College London

CM

Strand, London WC2R 2LS

Telephone 01-836 5454

Department of War Studies

Professor Lawrence Freedman

5 December 1984

D. Chi

Thanks for your letter of 1 December. I'm very pleased to accept the invitation to attend the meeting at Downing Street at 5 pm on 14 December.

Yours sincerely
L. Freedman

Mr C.D. Powell,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON

CF

COURTAULDS PLC

18 Hanover Square
London W1A 2BB
Telephone 01-629 9080
Telex 28788

Mr C.D. Powell,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

EDD
5th December 1984.

Dear Mr. Powell

Thank you for your letter of December 1st. I confirm that I will attend the meeting at 5.0 pm on Friday 14th December. I have it in mind to send a brief note in advance of the meeting which may save time.

Malcolm
Macintosh
mtg.

Neuman Wooding.

N.S. Wooding.

Registered in London No 128124
Registered Office
18 Hanover Square London W1A 2BB

Soviet Union: Relations R3

COURTALD'S PLC

15 Mark Lane
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Telex 84 28

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LONDON

7 DEC 1984

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Prime Minister. (4)



Pl. resubmit
13 December
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CD
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4 December, 1984

Dear Charles,

MS.

Gorbachev's Visit

In your letter of 29 November you confirmed that the Prime Minister would hold a meeting with outside experts on 14 December to discuss Gorbachev's visit.

In advance of that meeting I enclose a biographical note on Gorbachev which has been prepared by our Research Department.

I am sending copies of this letter and the note to the Private Secretaries of Ministers who will be attending the Prime Minister's lunch for Gorbachev on 16 December.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Summary

I. Early years; 1931-1949

Gorbachev was born in 1931 into a peasant family in the agricultural area of Stavropol (North Caucasus), which was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943. After working as an assistant to a combine harvester operator (probably part-time while he did his secondary education), Gorbachev entered Moscow University (paragraphs 1 to 4).

II. Moscow University, 1950-1955

Gorbachev studied law, but Moscow University was of decisive importance in his political career. He joined the Party in 1952 and was probably secretary of the University's Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) organisation (paragraphs 5 to 6).

III. Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

Immediately after university Gorbachev started his career as a Komsomol and Party official in his home region (paragraph 7).

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

Gorbachev's first years as a Party official coincided with Khrushchev's last. He benefited from Khrushchev's numerous reorganisations of the Party apparatus, but also took a hand in returning the local Party organisation to its traditional form under Brezhnev (paragraph 8). He got an agricultural degree by correspondence (paragraph 9). He rose steadily in the Stavropol Party organisation, probably helped by the promotion to the centre of his former boss, Kulakov, and by the decline under Brezhnev of his immediate superior in the Stavropol regional party organisation (paragraphs 10 to 12).

V. First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

On election as First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom in 1970, Gorbachev became one of the regional Party Secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole (paragraph 13). Locally he supported schemes to improve incentives for farm workers and greater mechanisation of the harvesting process. Nationally, he became a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and a

member of the Party's Central Committee. As such he began to lead Party delegations abroad (paragraphs 14 to 15).

VI. To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

Gorbachev's crucial promotion to Party Secretary for Agriculture in 1978 probably came about through a mixture of luck (the sudden death of Kulakov), connections with the leadership (Suslov's interest in the region, and its resorts, frequented by the leadership) and ability (noted by Brezhnev). (Paragraphs 16 to 18.)

VII. Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be made a Party Secretary, but his rise to full membership of the Politburo by 1980 was exceptionally rapid and was probably due in particular to Brezhnev's approval (paragraphs 19 to 20). Gorbachev's personal contribution to agricultural policies is hard to discern: this is probably to his advantage (paragraph 21). He rose steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries until he stood third after Andropov and Chernenko. With both sick in 1983, much of the burden of running Party affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev (paragraphs 22 to 23). In May 1983 he visited the West for the first time as a representative of the Soviet State (paragraph 24).

VIII. Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

Gorbachev is unlikely to have challenged Chernenko for the leadership when Andropov died in February 1984. He retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership, as shown by the exceptional breadth of his current responsibilities as a Party Secretary: he supervises ideology and foreign policy, agriculture and general economic questions, and Party organisation. He is the natural choice as General Secretary when Chernenko dies, if his age (53) is not held against him (paragraphs 25 to 27).

IX. Personality, Family

Gorbachev is intelligent and urbane; nor is his wife a Soviet stereotype (paragraph 28).

X Conclusions

Gorbachev has had a successful Party career, a prerequisite for the highest political office, and one that is less narrow than it appears at first sight (paragraph 29). As the first Politburo member not old enough to have fought in the War or to have held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university education, Gorbachev belongs to a new generation. The generational gap should not be exaggerated:

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Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose discipline and suspicion of individualism have not been relaxed. But he reached political maturity under Brezhnev, when the Party came to recognise the complexity of the issues it was dealing with, sought specialist advice and strove for solutions that satisfied all interests. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere (paragraph 30). Gorbachev himself probably holds progressive views on economic management, but would have no interest in a radical dilution of Party control. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, though his youth would of itself affect the style of leadership. On external affairs he has so far reflected the Party line (paragraph 31).

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M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I Early years; 1931-1949

1. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born into a peasant family on 2 March 1931 in the village of Privolnoe in the Krasnogvardeisky district of Stavropol region. This is an important grain growing and sheep rearing area of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the North Caucasus. Gorbachev's birth place is in the north west of the region, bordering the neighbouring Rostov region.
2. Gorbachev was born after the forcible collectivisation of the peasants had largely been achieved, but just before one of its immediate consequences, the great famine of 1932-1934, which affected the north Caucasus as well as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
3. Gorbachev presumably went to school in his home village, but there is no record of what happened to him when the region was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943.
4. Gorbachev's official biography maintains that he started work in 1946 (at the age of 15) as an assistant to a combine harvester operator in a Motor-tractor Station (these were state run enterprises which from 1930-1958 served as agricultural machinery pools for collective farms and also as centres of political control). But a local biography which was seen by a Western scholar indicates that he did this work only during the summer while he was going to secondary school. This seems more likely, both because work with the combine harvester would be largely confined to the summer months, and because it is difficult to see how without secondary education Gorbachev could have gained even the minimum qualifications to enter Moscow University.

II Moscow University, 1950-1955

5. Gorbachev entered the Law Faculty of Moscow University in 1950 (aged 19) and studied till 1955, the standard length of that course at the time. His elevation from the provinces to the most prestigious seat of learning in the Soviet Union was clearly of decisive importance for his later career, but there is no information about how it was achieved. Gorbachev may have benefited from the reconstitution and expansion of the Soviet higher education system after the war. Stalin's campaign against the Jews from 1949 to his death may also be relevant. A high proportion of Soviet lawyers were Jewish and there may have been a requirement to replace Jewish law students with Russians.
6. Gorbachev was evidently exempted from military service through being at university, though he will probably have done a reserve officer's course concurrently. Moscow University was the starting point of Gorbachev's political career. In 1952, at the age of 21, he joined the Communist Party. According to one Western scholar, Gorbachev was secretary of the Moscow University Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) from 1954 to 1955 (it is normal for leading Komsomol officials to be Party members).

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III Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

7. It was evidently Gorbachev's Komsomol and Party credentials, rather than his degree in law, which determined his next steps, and indeed his whole subsequent career. From 1956 to 1962 he was a Komsomol official in his home region of Stavropol. He was First Secretary of the Stavropol Town Committee (Gorkom) from 1956 to 1958. He then moved upwards into the Regional Committee (Kraikom) of the Komsomol, where between 1958 and 1962 he was successively: Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Second and then First Secretary of the Kraikom Komsomol organisation. In 1961, as a Komsomol representative, he was a voting delegate to the 22nd Party Congress, a historic occasion, when it was decided to remove Stalin's body from the Mausoleum, following a further demunciation of the former dictator by Khrushchev.

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

8. The start of Gorbachev's career as a Party official coincided with the last 2½ years of Khrushchev's regime, with its constant administrative reorganisations, which seem to have worked in Gorbachev's favour. In the spring of 1962 Khrushchev reorganised the administration of agriculture with the creation of "Territorial-Production Administrations", bodies which covered several districts and administered collective and state farms. This reorganisation gave Gorbachev his first Party post as Party Organiser of the Stavropol Territorial-Production Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz Administration. The end of that same year saw another reorganisation: the splitting of the Party into separate industrial and agricultural structures. This meant that there were now 2 Stavropol regional party organisations, one for industry and one for agriculture. As a result of the reorganisation, in December 1962, Gorbachev was advanced to the politically sensitive post of Head of the Department of Party Organs of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee (Kraikom). (This was presumably the agricultural Kraikom, which in Stavropol was the more important.) In this post, under the supervision of the second secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, Gorbachev will have been in charge of all the relevant party organisational matters and appointments throughout the region. Gorbachev's nomination for such a sensitive post could only have been made with the full approval, if not at the instigation of the then first secretary of the Kraikom, F D Kulakov (see paragraph 10 below). He remained in this job until September 1966 and thus will have been in charge of implementing in the Stavropol region the post-Khrushchev leadership's decision in November 1964 to restore a unitary party structure.

9. During these years Gorbachev was doing a correspondence course at the Stavropol Agricultural Institute, from which he graduated in 1967. The Party has always encouraged its officials to further their education. The purpose of Gorbachev's further qualification - in academic terms worth much less than his degree from Moscow University - will have been to enhance his authority as a Party official in a largely agricultural region.

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10. Between 1966 and 1978 Gorbachev rose steadily as a local party official, mirroring his rise a decade earlier as a Komsomol official. From 1966 to 1968 he was First Secretary of Stavropol Town Party Committee (Gorkom), from August 1968 to April 1970 he was Second Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee (Kraikom) and from 1970 to 1978 First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom. While it is impossible to say whether his connections played a greater part in this rise than his talent, it is undoubtedly relevant that his former superior, Kulakov (see paragraph 8 above), was transferred to Moscow and promoted in late 1964 after the fall of Khrushchev first to Head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee and then to Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, from which position he could undoubtedly influence appointments in his former region.

11. It is also relevant that Kulakov's replacement as First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom was L N Efremov, a politician on a downward trend. He had been a Candidate Member of the Politburo under Khrushchev, but was shunted aside to Stavropol by the new leadership and lost his Politburo status in 1966. Thus Gorbachev as Second Secretary from 1968 was serving under someone who was politically doomed and whom he may already have been earmarked to succeed.

12. The timing of Gorbachev's promotion to First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom in April 1970, after less than 2 years as Second Secretary and at the early age of 39, may have been dictated by the approach of the elections to the Supreme Soviet in June 1970 and the 24th Party Congress in April 1971 and the leadership's wish to deprive Efremov of his status as a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and full member of the Central Committee, to which he had the unspoken right as Party leader of an important region. At all events, it was Gorbachev who acquired this status (see paragraph 15 below).

V First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

13. Gorbachev thus became a significant political figure at local and national level. He was now one of the regional Party secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole. His own region of Stavropol ranks high in importance because of its agricultural potential. As a Krai it also ranks in status above most other regions (oblasts) because it includes within its borders one of the regions set aside for national minorities within the Russian Republic - the Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast.

14. As the Party boss of a major agricultural area Gorbachev was in a position to put his weight behind various agricultural schemes which had proved successful in his own region. In 1976 he advocated the "link" system of farming (whereby small teams are allocated specific areas of farmland to cultivate round the year and paid by results), which has now won Politburo approval (see paragraph 21 below). He also supported the "Ipatovo method" of harvesting by highly mechanised harvesting columns complete with their own

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transport, spare parts, canteens etc, which toured the farms completing the full harvesting and reploughing process in a single operation. Gorbachev acknowledged in a Pravda article in 1978 that this Ipatovo method (named after the district where it was evolved, which is also Gorbachev's Supreme Soviet constituency) cut across the link system and was not everywhere greeted with enthusiasm. It nonetheless met the Party's requirement for more intensive and mechanised cultivation and was recommended by a Central Committee decree and by a personal message from Brezhnev for wider application. As with so many similar initiatives, whatever its intrinsic local merits, its wider and frequently thoughtless application has led to the Ipatovo method being somewhat discredited.

15. Gorbachev's debut as a national figure came with his election in June 1970 as a Deputy to the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1970 he was also elected a member of its Environmental Protection Commission and in 1974 of its Youth Affairs Commission. More importantly, he was elected to full membership of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the 24th Party Congress in April 1971. This did not in itself confer any significant central decision making role on Gorbachev (there were 240 other full Central Committee members), but gave him status in the Party. It also gave him the opportunity to travel abroad as a leading Party representative. His first recorded trip abroad had been as a member of a Party delegation to Czechoslovakia in November 1969 to discuss youth work (a difficult assignment in the atmosphere following the Soviet invasion). As a member of the Central Committee he began to lead Party delegations: to Brussels in 1972, the FRG in 1975 and France in 1976.

VI To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

16. In July 1978 Kulakov, by then a Full Member of the Politburo, died suddenly, aged 60. Gorbachev was one of the speakers at his funeral. At the next routine Party Plenum on 28 November 1978 Gorbachev (then 47) was elected a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. (Though, as is customary, his responsibilities were not disclosed, it was clear that he was to supervise agriculture in place of Kulakov.)

17. There was a large element of luck for Gorbachev in this crucial promotion. Had Kulakov lived, Gorbachev might well have stayed on in Stavropol until at least Brezhnev's death, since movement of Party officials was becoming more and more sluggish. The choice of Gorbachev was probably dictated partly by his connections with the top leadership and partly by his ability. Gorbachev's connections will have been enhanced by having his former chief, Kulakov, in the centre, but the latter could obviously not have contributed directly to his promotion to Secretary. Gorbachev also had an unusual advantage in that his region includes the famous spas of Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk to which members of the leadership (Andropov regularly) repaired. Gorbachev will undoubtedly have seen to their comforts and visited them there. Gorbachev may also have had the backing of Suslov, who had been first secretary of the Stavropol

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Kraikom during the war and whose continuing interest in Stavropol was signalled by his representing the Politburo at the 100th anniversary celebrations of the town of Stavropol in May 1978. Finally, Gorbachev seems to have enjoyed Brezhnev's confidence, and this confidence was probably based to a large extent on Brezhnev's assessment of Gorbachev's ability, since it was not in Brezhnev's interest to choose anyone less than competent for the difficult post of agricultural Secretary. There were other regional Party Secretaries closer to Brezhnev who could have been chosen. Brezhnev showed particular warmth when presenting Gorbachev with an award in December 1978 for "working in one of the main granaries in the country, Stavropol". Brezhnev hoped that "in his new, responsible post of Central Committee Secretary, Mikhail Sergeevich will display his characteristic qualities of initiative and selflessness".

18. Gorbachev inherited Kulakov's personal aide, A P Lushchikov (born 1917) a former Deputy Head of the Agriculture Department of the Central Committee, who remains with him to this day.

VII Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

19. At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be elected a Central Committee Secretary. Katushev had been made a Secretary in 1968 at the age of 41, Dolgikh in 1972 aged 48 and Ryabov in 1976 aged 44. But Katushev lost his place on the Secretariat after 9 years and Ryabov after 3, while Dolgikh spent 10 years as a junior Secretary before being promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo in 1982, where he remains. Gorbachev, by contrast, rose exceptionally quickly in the Party hierarchy. He was made a Candidate Member of the Politburo in November 1979, one year after becoming a Secretary, and a full member a year later in October 1980. He thus became one of the select group of Party Secretaries who are also members of the Party's top decision making body, the Politburo, and thus at the apex of the power structure of the Soviet Union.

20. Gorbachev's initial rise was not accompanied by any broadening of his responsibilities and must be attributed to his general acceptability to the rest of the Politburo and in particular to Brezhnev's desire to fill the gap in the Politburo left by Kulakov's death with a competent lieutenant overseeing the ever difficult agricultural sphere. This much can be deduced from Brezhnev's commendation of Gorbachev when presenting him in March 1981 with the Order of Lenin which he had (routinely) been awarded on his 50th birthday:

"This is an energetic and go-ahead man, who knows the economy. But the sector of the Party's management entrusted to him by the Politburo does indeed demand great energy, initiative and the search for effective solutions. I am talking about agriculture, the agro-industrial complex as a whole."

21. The nature and effect of Gorbachev's contribution to Soviet agricultural policy (and to other political matters) is hard to

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discern. Under Brezhnev and since, all initiatives have been ascribed to the General Secretary and little room has been left for the public display of the political talents of other leaders. Gorbachev will undoubtedly have played a large part in formulating the major agricultural policy document of Brezhnev's latter years, the Food Programme, adopted in May 1982, but he is unlikely to have been equally involved in all aspects of this wide-ranging programme. In publicising the programme, he said little about the reorganisation of agriculture at the local level into agro-industrial associations (RAPO's), the organisation of which may have been left to Chernenko, then Brezhnev's Party Secretary in charge of Party and government administration. Gorbachev does seem to be an advocate of the "link", or "collective contract" system, as it is now called, which has always met with some reservation in Party circles because of the spectre of peasant private enterprise which it raises. It may be significant that the system was not endorsed at the May 1982 Plenum, but only by the Politburo after Brezhnev's death, and that it was Gorbachev who explained its advantages authoritatively and cogently at a provincial conference in March 1983. The fact that Gorbachev cannot be firmly identified with any particular agricultural (or other policy) is probably to his advantage, however. He will still be among the best known of the Party Secretaries in the country at large through his fairly frequent travels round the country's agricultural areas.

22. As Gorbachev has risen in the Party, so he has accumulated status in the Supreme Soviet. Having served as a member of 2 Commissions (Environmental Protection and Youth), he was made Chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission in 1979 (the only formal use that has been made of his legal training) and of the Foreign Affairs Commission in 1984 (see paragraph 26 below for the political significance of this move). In 1980, in common with the other Politburo members, he was also elected a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR for another, but less successful agricultural region, the Altai Krai in Southern Siberia.

23. Thanks to the death and retirement of his seniors, Gorbachev has risen steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries. From the beginning of 1982, with the successive departure of Suslov and Brezhnev through death, and Kirilenko through retirement, Gorbachev's position improved, although in May 1982 Andropov was brought in from the KGB and placed ahead of the other senior Secretaries (probably because of his having served in the Secretariat earlier). When Andropov took over as General Secretary in November 1982 Gorbachev was third in line after Chernenko. The latter was absent for much of the Summer of 1983, and though a new secretary (Romanov) was brought in in June, Gorbachev's status and the breadth of his responsibilities increased correspondingly. There were indications that he had taken on broader economic responsibilities and had some role in supervising Party organisation. Thus, whether or not stories that he enjoyed the particular confidence of the ailing Andropov are true, much of the burden of running the Party's affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev in the summer of 1983.

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24. As a Senior Party Secretary, Gorbachev represented the CPSU at the Mongolian and Vietnamese Party Congresses in 1981 and 1982, at the Portuguese Communist Party Congress in 1983 and at the Italian Communist leader Berlinguer's funeral in 1984 (after which Gorbachev was received by President Pertini). More importantly, in May 1983 he visited Canada at the head of a Supreme Soviet delegation, his first visit to the West as a representative of the Soviet State, rather than Party. He had talks with Prime Minister Trudeau and toured Canadian agricultural enterprises, impressing his hosts with his detailed knowledge of the subject. He also appeared before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons, at which he replied to questions, some hostile, while a verbatim record was taken. For a Soviet politician this is an unusual ordeal, and for Gorbachev to have agreed to submit to it reflects not only his own self-confidence but his knowledge of having the confidence of his Politburo colleagues.

VIII Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

25. Andropov died in February in 1984, and Chernenko, the next in line of the Party Secretaries, succeeded him as General Secretary. This was a safe and, in terms of precedence and protocol, an uncontroversial choice. Nonetheless, it looked very much like the "old guard" choosing one of their own generation, an impression strengthened by the fact that Chernenko was proposed for the office by Prime Minister Tikhonov and not, as had been the case in the previous succession, by the next most senior Party Secretary, who on this occasion would have been Gorbachev. There were rumours of a disputed succession and indications of some dismay in Party circles that another elderly General Secretary had been chosen in preference to Gorbachev. The Plenum proceedings published in booklet form a few days later contained Gorbachev's previously unpublished speech closing the Plenum, in which he had duly supported the choice of Chernenko; this was presumably done to dispel such rumours within the Party.

26. It is in fact unlikely that Gorbachev would have squandered his accumulated political capital by mounting a premature challenge to Chernenko, and his subsequent rise indicates that he retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership. When Chernenko was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984 and thus relinquished his chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev was elected in his place. This post, which of itself accords Gorbachev status, not power, indicates that he has taken over the responsibility in the Party Secretariat for the broad area of ideology and foreign policy, particularly towards with the "Socialist" countries, exercised by Chernenko, Andropov and Suslov before him. (The fact that in the 2 previous successions this position has been the stepping stone to the General Secretaryship does not of itself provide any guarantee for the next succession.) In addition, Gorbachev has maintained his supervision of agriculture; of general economic questions (he is said to be Chairman of the Politburo Commission tasked with working out a plan for the improvement of the whole economic mechanism); and of Party

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organisation. This is an exceptionally broad range of responsibilities, which is partly dictated by there being only 2 senior Party Secretaries, Gorbachev and Romanov, apart from the General Secretary himself.

27. In the Party Secretariat Gorbachev ranks immediately below Chernenko and is therefore the natural choice as successor when Chernenko dies, if his age (at 53 he is still the youngest member of the Politburo) is not held against him. In the hierarchy of the Politburo as a whole he still ranks below the "old guard" of Prime Minister Tikhonov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defence Minister Ustinov. But none of these is a likely successor to Chernenko.

IX Personality, Family

28. Gorbachev is stocky and bald, with a prominent birthmark on his head, which is airbrushed out of his official photographs. He is not known to speak any foreign language. He has impressed his Western interlocutors with his intelligence and his urbanity. As with all the Soviet leadership, little has been revealed about Gorbachev's private life. His wife, however, was well to the fore at the Women's Day reception in March 1984, where she emerged as well dressed to the point of elegance, bejewelled and altogether unlike the Soviet stereotype. She is just under a year younger than her husband. They are thought to have a daughter and granddaughter.

X. Conclusions

29. In the Soviet Union a successful Party career is the prerequisite for the highest political office. Gorbachev has so far travelled this road extremely successfully. He has spent all his working life as a Komsomol and Party official. He rose steadily through the ranks as a local official to become an important regional First Party Secretary. He was transferred to Moscow as a Central Committee Secretary and he achieved early elevation to the Politburo. The relative narrowness of his experience is probably not a handicap. Since the upheavals of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, and the war, Party officials have been moved around less energetically, and in future there will be few aspiring leaders who have had the varied experience of earlier generations. Nor is Gorbachev's close association with agriculture necessarily to his disadvantage, despite its continuing problems. In Party terms it is more important that Gorbachev has had broad experience as a Party manager at various levels. He has, however, no direct experience of military affairs, and his role as overlord of sector which absorbs a significant slice of capital investment would not seem to make him a natural ally of the military.

30. Much has been made of Gorbachev as a leader of the new generation. He became the first Politburo member who was not old enough to fight in the war and had not held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university degree rather than a technical education. This generational gap should not be exaggerated. If too young to fight in the war,

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Gorbachev was certainly directly affected by it. If he did not hold political office under Stalin, his first political steps were taken in the last and most obscurantist years of Stalin. Most significantly, Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose tradition of strict discipline and suspicion of "individualism" has not been relaxed with the years. This said, Gorbachev does represent a new type among Soviet politicians. He reached political maturity in the Brezhnev years when, in contrast to the Stalin and Khrushchev years, the Party leadership recognised the complexity of the domestic and foreign issues it was dealing with, sought and listened to specialist advice and attempted to come up with solutions that as nearly as possible satisfied all the interests involved. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere, where his intellectual capacity seems to have stood him in good stead. Moreover, after Brezhnev's death, the requirement for a Soviet leader to surround himself with his own coterie seems to have declined somewhat, again to the benefit of Gorbachev, who seems to have won broad respect in the Party for his ability. It may be a combination of these factors that has allowed Gorbachev to dispense with the hectoring manner characteristic of Soviet Party officials, particularly in the regions (and typified by his rival, Romanov).

31. It remains hard to discern whether Gorbachev has any far reaching political ideas which he would like to put into practice if he became Party leader. There is little doubt that in Western terms his views on the economy and agriculture tend towards the "progressive", ie more stress on economic stimuli and less on exhortation and campaigning. But this does not make him a radical. He would have no interest in a dilution of Party control over all spheres of Soviet life, and it seems almost inconceivable that he could be brought to concede, for example, that the forcible collectivisation of the peasants, which most Western observers consider still to be at the root of Soviet agricultural problems, was a mistake. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, at least for a number of years. But his youth and energy would be bound to affect his style of leadership and might do something to revivify the Party apparatus at all levels. As regards the Soviet Union's external policy, there is little evidence of his doing other than reflect the general Party line. Despite his newly acquired status as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union he has not hitherto been any more accessible to Western interlocutors in Moscow or particularly forthcoming when approached.

Soviet Section
Research Department
November 1984

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DESKBY 041515Z DECEMBER
FROM MOSCOW 041400Z DECEMBER
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1382 OF 4 DECEMBER

MY TELNO 1381 : GORBACHEV'S VISIT.

1. FOR MY CALL THIS AFTERNOON ,4 DECEMBER, GORBACHEV WAS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY A CENTRAL COMMITTEE AIDE AND USPENSKY OF THE MFA WHO WILL GO WITH HIM TO LONDON AS INTERPRETER.

IMPORTANCE OF THE VISIT.

2. I SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION TO LEAD THE SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION HAD BEEN WELCOMED IN LONDON AS AN EVENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. YOU, THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MINISTERS HOPED IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE INVITATION. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHARED THE HOPE THAT THE VISIT SHOULD MARK A NEW STEP IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION OF A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

TRADE.

3. I POINTED OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC COMPONENT IN GORBACHEV'S PROGRAMME. WE WISHED TO SEE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE. THE PROGRAMME SHOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO DRAW MAXIMUM BENEFITS FROM MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF PARLIAMENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND VARIOUS BRANCHES OF BRITISH PUBLIC LIFE, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITISH BUSINESS. GORBACHEV COMMENTED THAT HE WAS VERY READY TO DISCUSS TRADE AS WELL AS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. AS HE WOULD SAY AGAIN IN LONDON, ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE WAS AT A VERY LOW LEVEL AND THERE WERE POSSIBILITIES FOR IT TO RISE TO NEW LEVELS.

PROGRAMME AND SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION.

4. INVITED TO COMMENT ON THE PROGRAMME, GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALREADY TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO COMMENT AND THAT HE CONSIDERED THE PROGRAMME AGREED. IT WAS A GOOD ONE : IT WAS VERY TIGHT, BUT AS THERE HAD BEEN NO SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION IN BRITAIN FOR OVER 10 YEARS, THERE WAS A LOT OF GROUND TO COVER.

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15.

5. ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR SUBJECTS HE WOULD WISH TO RAISE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OR MINISTERS, GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE PROGRAMME PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS. HE WANTED FRANK POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, WITH NO DIPLOMATIC FORMALITIES, ON THE CURRENT WORLD SITUATION. HE MIGHT SEE THE REASONS FOR CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TENSION DIFFERENTLY FROM THE BRITISH, BUT THE PRIME TASK WAS TO FIND "A KEY TO THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION". THIS ISSUE TOOK FIRST PLACE AND WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, WITH YOU AND WITH PARLIAMENT. HE HOPED THERE WOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSION WITH PARLIAMENT ON HOW PARLIAMENT WORKED AND OF INTERNAL POLICIES IN BOTH BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE WOULD ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU THE NEW INITIATIVES LEADING TO TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON NEW TALKS AFTER "A COMPLICATED PERIOD". POLITICAL WILL WAS NEEDED IF THEY WERE TO PRODUCE REAL RESULTS. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED SERIOUS TALKS. GORBACHEV WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT VALUED THE BRITISH ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD WORK TOGETHER TO FIND THE KEY TO THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A PLACE FOR DISCUSSION OF EUROPE AND BILATERAL AFFAIRS. IN CONFIRMING THAT THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF YOUR AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S MINDS I REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT SHULTZ WOULD BE IN LONDON JUST BEFORE THE VISIT. GORBACHEV REFLECTED THAT THE WORLD SITUATION WORRIED EVERYBODY HOWEVER ONE SAW THE CAUSES. WE HAD DIFFERING VIEWS, BUT THESE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. IN GENERAL, A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS COULD BE COVERED.

6. WHEN THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, I REFERRED TO HER INTEREST IN HOW SOCIETY COULD ADAPT TO A WORLD OF RAPIDLY CHANGING TECHNOLOGY. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS: "EXTERNAL POLICY IS A CONTINUATION OF INTERNAL POLICY". THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NO DOUBT BE AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIET SIDE PLACED ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS.

MRS GORBACHOVA.

7. ON MRS GORBACHOVA'S PROGRAMME, GORBACHEV SAID THAT ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE SENT VIA THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON.

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH.

8. I PASSED ON TO GORBACHEV THE POINTS ON ATTENDANCE AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH AND YOUR MEETING ON 17 DECEMBER (PARA 3(A) AND (B) OF YOUR TELNO 382 TO DUBLIN). HE ACCEPTED WITH THANKS.

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SECURITY

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

9. IN RESPONSE TO THE POINTS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS (YOUR PARA 3(C) - (H)), GORBACHEV SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST HE HAD HEARD OF THIS PROBLEM. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT A GROUP FROM THE SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES LED BY GENERAL ROGOV WOULD TRAVEL IN ADVANCE TO DISCUSS ARRANGMENTS WITH THE BRITISH SECURITY SERVICES. HE WOULD RELY ON THE ARRANGMENTS THAT THEY AND HIS BRITISH HOSTS WOULD MAKE. HE REMARKED SUBSEQUENTLY OF THE SECURITY SERVICES THAT " THEY DO THEIR BUSINESS AND WE DO OURS". HE SEEMED ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THE EXPLANATION I GAVE OF OUR POSITION.

GENERAL.

10. GORBACHEV ALSO SPOKE OF HIS INTEREST IN ENGLISH HISTORY AND THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, WHICH HE HAD STUDIED. HE SAID HE WOULD BE SEEING SOMETHING OF CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN , AND MIGHT GET IMPRESSIONS OR IDEAS WHICH COULD LEAD TO FURTHER EXCHANGES IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BRITAIN TO TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR SOVIET CITIZENS TO SEE THE UK.

POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS.

11. FINALLY, GORBACHEV OFFERED ONE QUESTION WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD POSE TO YOU , NAMELY YOUR OPINION ON THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE 1975 PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATIONS . WOULD WE USE THE PROTOCOL MORE FRUITFULLY ? HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS A PROBLEM. YOU WOULD BE LOOKING FORWARD BOTH TO GORBACHEV' VISIT AND TO GROMYKO'S FOR WHICH DATES HAD BEEN PROPOSED AT THE END OF MAY 1985. WE WISHED TO SEE PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT OTHER LEVELS TOO. THE MFA WOULD NO DOUBT BRIEF GORBACHEV ON THE LIST OF FORTHCOMING ANGLO-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS .

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
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B/ Mr Rytkind
B/ Rus.
Mr. Jenkins.
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Dr. Hq. PUSO
Hq. Info.
Hq. PCU.
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Mr. Powell

LLD 667/04

ZZ FCO

ZZ DUBLIN

GR 116

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FROM MOSCOW 041110Z DECEMBER

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1381 OF 4 DECEMBER

INFO FLASH DUBLIN (FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER , AND SECRETARY OF STATE).

DUBLIN TELNO 1 TO MOSCOW OF 4 DECEMBER.

GORBACHEV VISIT.

1. I WAS RECEIVED BY GORBACHEV FOR 40 MINUTES AT NOON TODAY, 4 DECEMBER, IN HIS OFFICE IN THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUILDING. HE WAS BRISK, BUSINESSLIKE AND CORDIAL. HE HAD NO WISH TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE PROGRAMME FOR HIS VISIT WHICH HE CONSIDERED ADMIRABLE. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND YOUR AGREEMENT TO INCREASING THE NUMBERS AT THE CHEQUERS LUNCH AND THE TALKS WITH YOU. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEM OF SIDE-ARMS FOR HIS BODYGUARDS AND DID NOT CONTEST THE POINTS IN PARA 3D TO G OF YOUR TELNO 382 TO DUBLIN.

2. FOR FULLER ACCOUNT OF MEETING , SEE MIFT

SUTHERLAND



pa Dub 5/12

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Barclay

Mr Butler o/v

Thanks. I agree with your view.

FERB

You have already thanked 5.12 Mr Clements for his letter.

I am not sure that the FCO points are worth making in this context. But you will wish to consider.

Dub 4/12

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December, 1984

Dear David,

Visit of the Supreme Soviet Delegation

In your letter of 30 November you asked if there were any points which we would wish to suggest you might make in reply to Richard Clements' letter of 29 November to Robin Butler.

It might be worth pointing out to Clements that formally speaking the visit is a Parliamentary event. Mr Gorbachev's delegation will be coming at the invitation of the British Group of the INter-Parliamentary Union. The Government does, however, attach considerable importance to Mr Gorbachev's presence as the leader of the delegation. We regard it as, to some extent, an acknowledgement of the efforts made by the Government to improve UK/Soviet relations and in part as a recognition of the fact that both the Prime Minister and Secretary of State have visited the Soviet Union this year.

As far as the question of demonstrations are concerned, we agree with the line taken by Mr Kinnock that peaceful demonstrations are a traditional part of British political life and that there is no way in which, provided they remain peaceful, that they could or should be stopped. As for the possibility of suggesting to the Soviet delegation that they might wish to appoint one of their members to be a spokesman and to receive petitions from various groups in this country who might want to make points about civil rights in the Soviet Union, this has been under consideration; we will see whether this or any variation on this theme might be accepted by the Russians.

Yours Sincerely
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq
10 Downing Street

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UK / Soviet Rel. Soviet Union 143.

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13 DEC 1984

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10 DOWNING STREET

~~EDP~~

~~Caroline,~~

Mr. M. Kasser's secretary
phoned to say that
he will be able to
attend the meeting on
14.12.84 at 1700.

SUE

Colbath

3.12.84.

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htc
ccpc ✓

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1984

East/West Relations:
Call by Soviet Ambassador

Thank you for your letter of 27 November about the Soviet Ambassador's call on Mr Luce.

The Prime Minister has noted this.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C D Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

file
SS
staad

Deputy Chairman
Courtaulds Ltd.,
18 Hanover Square
London W1



10 DOWNING STREET

1 December 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Dr. Wooding.

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

Yours sincerely,
C D Powell

C D POWELL

Dr Norman Wooding

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

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50. 0m.
10/6

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

C/O St Antony's College
Oxford



10 DOWNING STREET

1 December 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Dr. Brown,

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

*Yours sincerely,
Chris Powell*

C D POWELL

Dr Archie Brown

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PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

7 Chadlington Rd
Oxford



10 DOWNING STREET

1 December 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Michael,

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

C D POWELL

Professor Michael Kaser

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

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Vols

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

7 Chadlington Rd
Oxford



10 DOWNING STREET

1 December 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Michael,

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

*Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell*

C D POWELL

Professor Michael Kaser

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

*File
slzaad*

slzaad

Dept of War Studies
King's College
Strand,
London,
WC2R 2LS

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE



10 DOWNING STREET

1 December 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Lawrence,

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

*Yours sincerely,
Chris Powell*

C D POWELL

Professor Lawrence Freedman

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

5 Division
Cabinet Office
Whitehall



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 December 1984

Dear Malcolm,

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

*Yours sincerely
C D Powell*

C D POWELL

Malcolm Mackintosh, Esq., CMG

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

hite *sl*
slzaad

sl

55 Hamilton Drive
Glasgow,
G12 8DP

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE



10 DOWNING STREET

1 December 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Professor Nove,

I write to confirm that the Prime Minister would be grateful if you could attend a short meeting at 10 Downing Street between 5 and 6 pm on 14 December to discuss Mr Gorbachev's visit. The purpose is to enable the Prime Minister to consult a small number of experts in Soviet affairs and in the issues most likely to come up during Mr Gorbachev's visit, as part of her preparation for her meeting with him. I hope very much that you will be able to attend.

We shall, of course, take responsibility for any travel costs within the United Kingdom which you incur in attending the meeting. I should be grateful if you could let Mrs Goodchild in this office have a note of them in due course.

*Yours sincerely,
C D Powell*

C D POWELL

Professor Alec Nove

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

late *SN*
slzaad

SN



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

30 November 1984

Many thanks for your letter of
29 November and for conveying the message
which Mr. Tolkunov gave to Mr. Kinnock
about the forthcoming visit of Mr. Gorbachev.
This is very useful.

E. E. R. BUTLER

Richard Clements, Esq.

RM

MR. POWELL

GORBACHEV'S VISIT

I have set up the meeting as you requested. I think it would be a good idea if letters of confirmation were written to the five Professors.

Dr. Wooding made the point that he is not 100 per cent knowledgeable on all aspects of trade and would like you (or Malcolm Mackintosh in the Cabinet Office) to consider inviting either Dr. Raper, the Deputy Chairman of the Davey Corporation, or Mr. Gormley, the Managing Director of John Brown. Either of these two gentlemen can cover the ground that Dr. Wooding cannot.

CP

30 November 1984

cc. Ferb L

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 November, 1984.

see R. Clements to Ferb 29/11/84



I enclose a copy of a letter to Robin Butler from Richard Clements who works in the Office of the Leader of the Opposition.

BF
||

I should be grateful to know by close of play on Monday, 3 December, whether there are any points which you would like us to make in reply.

David Barclay

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc MAW
FERB

CONFIDENTIAL



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

The Office of the Leader of
the Opposition

November 29th 1984

Dear Robin

At Mr Kinnock's meeting on Monday, November 26th, with Mr L Tolkunov, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, there was a discussion of the forthcoming visit to Britain of Mr Gorbachev. Mr Tolkunov asked that we should pass on to the Prime Minister his view that Mr Gorbachev's visit would be "a new opening towards good relations" between the USSR and the UK. He particularly hoped that the UK Government would help in setting a tone for the visit of the delegation led by Mr Gorbachev which would build on sincere Soviet intentions in this field.

Mr Tolkunov hoped that the delegation's visit would not be unnecessarily disturbed by hostile demonstrations. Mr Kinnock made it clear that peaceful demonstrations had long been a traditional part of British political life and that there was no way in which they could or should be stopped. He did, however, suggest in conversation with Mr Chernyaev and Mr Zagladin that one way of reducing the possibility of such demonstration was that the Soviet delegation would be willing to appoint one of its members a spokesman, in order to speak to various groups in this country who want to make points about civil rights in the Soviet Union. They said that they would consider that suggestion.

I informed David Ratford, the Minister at the British Embassy, of Mr Kinnock's talk with Mr Tolkunov.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Richard Clements
Executive Officer

Robin Butler
Principal Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

de

MRS. GOODCHILD

Gorbachev Lunch

I enclose a guest list approved by
the Prime Minister.

CAP

29 November 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR MR. GORBACHEV ON 16 DECEMBER AT CHEQUERS

GUEST LIST

Prime Minister	Gorbachev + 3
Lord President	
Foreign Secretary	
Defence Secretary	
Mr. Jopling	
Mr. Rifkind	
Mr. Channon	
Sir Antony Acland	
Sir Percy Cradock	
Sir Iain Sutherland	
Mr. Cartledge	
Private Secretary	

Total 16

MRS. RYDER

Gorbachev's Visit

Could you please invite the following to a short meeting at No.10 between 5.00 and 6.00 pm on 14 December to discuss Gorbachev's visit:

- ✓ Mr. Malcolm Mackintosh (Cabinet Office) *cmg*
- ✓ Dr. Archie Brown (St. Antony's College, Oxford)
- ✓ *Professor* Dr. Lawrence Freedman (King's College, London)
- ✓ Professor Alec Nove (Glasgow University) *Rogierback*
- ✓ Dr. Norman Wooding (Deputy Chairman of Courtaulds)
- ✓ Professor Michael Kaser (St. Antony's College, Oxford)

C.D.P.

- (ii) Member of Politburo
- (iii) Sec. of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.
- (iii) Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

29 November 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



berc JG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November 1984

GORBACHEV'S VISIT

Thank you for your letter of 28 November about the preparations for Gorbachev's visit.

The Prime Minister is content with the suggestions in your letter for the organisation of this meeting and for the subjects to be covered.

The Prime Minister will hold a short meeting with outside experts to discuss the visit at 5.00 p.m. on 14 December. We shall invite those listed in your letter with the addition of Professor Michael Kaser. We shall issue the invitations from here.

Finally, I enclose a guest list for the Gorbachev lunch at Chequers as approved by the Prime Minister.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Steve Nicklen (Department of Trade and Industry), Ivor Llewelyn (MAFF) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CST

PRIME MINISTER

Gorbachev

Sorry to come back on this. But both Robin and I feel that to include the Chairmen of the CBI and TUC would very significantly change the nature of the occasion. The same is, sadly, true of including Lord Carrington whom the Russians are bound to regard as Head Demon of a hostile alliance. Agree the attached list?

CDP.

Yes not

28 November 1984

Prime Minister
Lord President
Foreign Secretary
Defence Secretary
Mr Jopling
Mr Rifkind
Mr Channon
Sir Antony Acland
Sir Percy Cradock .
Sir Iain Sutherland .
Mr Cartledge .
Private Secretary

Gorbachev + 3

Total 16

DRAFT GUEST LIST:

Prime Minister	Mr Gorbachev
Private Secretary	Soviet Ambassador
Secretary of State	2 Advisers
<i>Defence Secretary</i> Mr Rifkind	
Sir Iain Sutherland	
Sir Antony Acland	
<i>Sir Percy Cradock</i> Mr Bishop (Interpreter)	

Prime Minister

Agree list with addition of Sir P. Cradock and Mr. Cuthbert (as Ambassador - elect to Moscow)?

Would you want to substitute Michael Bessette for Malcolm Rifkind?

CDP

27/xi

Add M.H.

Plus 4 more to make a better fall.
William Whitlam? Peter Campbell?
Chairman CBI. (James Harrison)
Chairman ILL. (Mr. Butler)

CONFIDENTIAL

5-6 Senior
14
CCPC



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree to

London SW1A 2AH

invite those listed
to a discussion for
an hour over a
drink? (There are no
free lunches except the
day before the
Gorbachev lunch,
at Chequers)

28 November 1984

Agree to proposed
structure of discussion?

C.D.P. 20/11

Dear Charles,
Gorbachev's Visit

In your letter of 21 November you said that the Prime Minister would like to have a meeting with four or five Soviet experts before her talks with Mr Gorbachev on 16 December.

The choice of experts will depend to some extent on how widely the Prime Minister wishes to range. We would suggest the following names:

- (a) Mr Malcolm Mackintosh (Cabinet Office);
- (b) Dr Archie Brown (St Antony's College, Oxford. Recently returned from a month in Moscow. Expert on Soviet political personalities. Attended the Prime Minister's discussions on East/West relations at Chequers in 1983);
- (c) Dr Lawrence Freedman (Expert on strategic studies, in particular arms control. Professor of War Studies at King's College, London. Took part in a television debate on arms control in Moscow in June this year);
- (d) Professor Alec Nove (Glasgow University. Attended the Prime Minister's meeting at Chequers last year);
- (e) Dr Norman Wooding (Deputy Chairman of Courtaulds. Long experience of trading in the Soviet Union).

Richard Harris

In considering the handling of the talks it will be important to bear in mind that Gorbachev will come with a prepared statement which he will wish to make at some point. It would be helpful, therefore, if at an early stage the Prime Minister would indicate to him in general terms how she wishes to use the time available. Our suggestion for this would be that she might wish to use the lunch for discussion of general themes and as a way of establishing personal contact. After lunch there might be a rather more structured discussion covering a short agenda.

/The sort

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The sort of general points which might be discussed over lunch would be mutual perceptions. Mr Gorbachev might be asked what struck him most about the West (Belgium 1972, FRG 1975, France 1976, Canada and Portugal in 1983 and Italy early this year); general economic and social developments in a rapidly evolving technological world up to the end of this century. (This could provide the opportunity to ask Mr Gorbachev about some subjects which are his responsibility e.g. how the Soviet Union intends to deal with its internal economic problems including its agriculture.) The Prime Minister might also touch on the question of mutual perceptions of threat. She could deal with the standard Soviet allegation that the West, and the US in particular, wish to conduct their relations with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength" which the Russians always interpret as meaning military superiority while we mean equal security.

After lunch the Prime Minister might wish to concentrate more formally on three points:

- (a) East/West relations generally (our desire for better relations, our sincerity and willingness to discuss a wide range of international questions and our desire, notwithstanding fundamental political differences, to look for mutually acceptable solutions or at least the avoidance of military conflict);
- (b) Arms Control (to indicate the areas in which we hope progress might be made and to welcome US/Soviet agreement that their Foreign Ministers should meet at Geneva in January);
- (c) Bilateral relations (the Soviet suggestion that Komarov should accompany Gorbachev may indicate some interest in discussing trade).

Gorbachev does not speak English although he may understand some. Discussion will therefore be slowed down by interpretation.

The Soviet Embassy have been told that Gorbachev can be accompanied by two or at the most three advisers (your letter of 29 October). They have indicated that they expect Gorbachev to be accompanied by the Ambassador (Popov), Zamyatin, Head of the International Information Department of the Central Committee and an interpreter. I enclose their CVs. The Embassy have asked that Komarov (First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade) should also accompany Mr Gorbachev. We have told them that it is for Gorbachev to choose the party but that the limit is four.

/If the

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If the Russians decide that Komarov should accompany Mr Gorbachev, then the Prime Minister may wish to invite Mr Channon to join the lunch. If not, the Foreign Secretary recommends the enclosed guest list for the British side. If the Prime Minister is content with these suggestions we will set briefing in hand to cover some of the general points that she might wish to raise over lunch and the detailed issues for discussion after lunch.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD), Steve Nickelen (DTI), Ivor Llewellyn (MAFF) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR MR GORBACHEV ON 16 DECEMBER
AT CHEQUERS

POSSIBLE GUEST LIST:

Prime Minister

Mr Gorbachev

Private Secretary

Soviet Ambassador

Secretary of State

2 Advisers

Mr Rifkind

Sir I Sutherland

Sir A Acland

Mr Bishop (Interpreter)



GORBACHEV Mikhail Sergeevich

Secretary of the CC CPSU 1978; Member of the Politburo 1980; Member of the CC CPSU 1971; Deputy to USSR Supreme Soviet 1980; Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission, Council of the Union, Supreme Soviet 1984.

Gorbachev was born in February 1931 in the Stavropol region of southern Russia. He began work at the age of 15 as an agricultural machinery assistant in the Stavropol region (a major grain-producing area north of the Caucasus), and at 19 achieved the unusual distinction of entry to Moscow University, where he graduated in law and joined the Party. After two or three years' further legal training he returned to Stavropol in 1956 to run the town's, then the region's, Komsomol organisation, then the regional Party organisation (First Secretary of Stavropol krai Committee), at the same time taking a correspondence course at Stavropol Agricultural Institute. Gorbachev's predecessor as First Secretary of the Stavropol regional Party organisation, F D Kulakov, had by 1971 become a full member of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretary responsible for agriculture. Following Kulakov's death in 1978, Gorbachev himself, at the unusually early age of 47, was made CC Secretary for agriculture in his place, becoming a member of the Politburo in 1980.

While he is still the Party Secretary in overall charge of agriculture, Gorbachev has acquired further Party responsibilities in the economic field, together with foreign relations, cultural and ideological questions. In April this year he was elected Chairman of one of the two Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Supreme Soviet, and it is in this capacity that he will lead the Supreme Soviet delegation to the UK.

Gorbachev holds three Orders of Lenin and the Order of the October Revolution. He has visited Belgium (1972), West Germany (1975), France (1976), Vietnam (1982), Canada and Portugal (1983) and Italy (1984).

CONFIDENTIAL



ZAMYATIN, Leonid Mitrofanovich
Head of the CC CPSU's International Information Department

Zamyatin (62) is a former diplomat who for many years headed the MFA's Press Department. He was Director-General of TASS from 1970 until 1978 when he was appointed head of the newly formed Central Committee Department for International Information. He has travelled widely in the West, particularly in the FRG putting over the Soviet view on questions of international relations, but has occasionally startled or enraged his audiences by his aggressive and undiplomatic approach.

He is a member of the CC CPSU, and speaks English. He and his wife visited London in 1978 as guests of the previous Soviet Ambassador, Mr Lunkov.

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KOVALEV, Anatoly Gavrilovich
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kovalev (61) has specialised in Western Europe for most of his career, and has been a Deputy Foreign Minister since 1971. He is also responsible for CSCE, and led the Soviet side at the Madrid Conference in 1983. Kovalev also supervises the MFA's Policy Planning Directorate. He speaks little English.

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KOMAROV, Nikolai Dmitrievich
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade

Komarov (66) has spent many years in the Ministry of Foreign Trade; he was a Deputy Minister from 1965, and became a First Deputy Minister in 1980. He is responsible for business with Western countries, and has often been a member of the Soviet delegation to the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission; it appears that he is to replace Yuri Brezhnev as the head of the Soviet side at next year's session. He is a candidate member of the CC CPSU.

Komarov is a formidable figure, well-briefed and tough, occasionally to the point of arrogance. He speaks little English.

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POPOV, Viktor Ivanovich
Ambassador to the UK

Popov (66) is a Doctor of History. He taught at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and spent a year at St Antony's College, Oxford, doing research work (1957-1958). He served in Canberra, then London, returning to Moscow in 1968 to become Rector of the MFA's Diplomatic Academy. In 1980 he was appointed Ambassador to London. He is not a member of the CC CPSU, but is a member of the CPSU's Revision Commission.

Popov has been married twice (his first wife died), and has two sons. He speaks good English, and has an affable manner.

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Soviet Union PT 3

Relatives

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28 NOV 1984

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cc/c
②
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

27 November 1984

CDP
27/xi

Dear Charles,

Mr

East/West Relations: Call by Soviet Ambassador

The Soviet Ambassador called on Mr Luce on 26 November. He had originally asked to see the Prime Minister but agreed that, in the light of his request for an urgent meeting, Mr Luce should see him on her behalf.

The Ambassador said he had been instructed to explain further details of the recent announcement that Mr Shultz and Mr Gromyko would meet on 7-8 January. The new talks which the United States and Soviet Union were entering would be aimed at resolving problems relating to the entire complex of nuclear (both strategic and medium range) and space questions. The Geneva meeting's purpose would be to decide how the talks should take place. Popov went on to stress that:

- (a) the initiative for the Geneva meeting had come from the Russians. The Americans had agreed to the talks, which would aim to secure real progress by reducing the risks of nuclear war, stopping the arms race, and improving international relations;
- (b) they were "absolutely new talks". Both sides attached importance to having a clear understanding of the aims and subjects of the negotiations. These would be all-embracing, as was dictated by the need to avoid further destabilisation and a new round of the arms race;
- (c) the key was a solution of space questions. A space race would prevent any serious talks on a reduction in strategic weapons. It would also be a catalyst for a race in other directions. The matters for discussion in Geneva were organically related and this was how they should be taken at the talks.

Popov added that the Soviet Union was prepared to seek radical solutions. It remained to be seen if the US would take a more realistic position than in the past. The Soviet Government hoped the British Government would try to influence American policy on arms control questions, which had a central

/importance

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importance for the Europeans. If the United States was seeking to maintain military superiority rather than equality, which was the Soviet aim, there would be no positive results from the negotiations.

Mr Luce said the British Government welcomed the announcement of the January meeting. They were concerned to see agreement on constraints on outer space weapons and reductions in nuclear arms. He assumed there were no preconditions for the talks. The British Government also hoped that there could also be progress in the other arms control negotiations, including CDE, MBFR and CW. He referred to the forthcoming visits by Mr Gorbachev and Mr Gromyko, when arms control would in both cases be high on the agenda. Popov agreed that the Gorbachev visit would be important for the development of UK/Soviet relations.

Popov clearly had specific instructions on how to present the Shultz/Gromyko meeting. He read carefully from prepared notes. He did not refer (even in response to Mr Luce's reference to preconditions) to the Soviet demand for a removal of Cruise and Pershing II, nor to the START and INF talks as such. It seems the Russians now intend to present these as a thing of the past and, whatever the cause of the breakdown of the talks, as having been superseded by their own new initiative.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram at the MOD and Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



From the Minister for Trade

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5144
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

CONFIDENTIAL

Len Appleyard Esq
Private Secretary to
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street West
LONDON
SW1

27 November 1984

Dear her

MR GORBACHEV'S VISIT: UK OBJECTIVES

Charles Powell sent me a copy of his letter to you of 21 November.

2. We have noted that the Prime Minister has said that she would find it helpful to have a meeting before Mr Gorbachev's visit with a small number of experts to prepare for her meeting with him. In view of the fact that Mr Gorbachev will be meeting a number of British companies during his visit and discussing with Mr Channon the prospects for British-Soviet trade generally, we suggest that an experienced industrialist might be included.

3. Should this be the case, the following would, in Mr Channon's view, be strong candidates for consideration:

- 1 Dr N S Wooding, Deputy Chairman of Courtaulds plc
- 2 Mr A G Gormly, Deputy Chairman of John Brown plc
- 3 Dr A G Raper, Deputy Chairman of Davy Corporation plc

4. All were members of the UK delegation at the May session of the British-Soviet Joint Commission and are therefore personally known to Mr Channon. Mr Channon considers that all three would be very suitable to advise the Prime Minister on doing business with the Soviet Union but Dr Wooding would be his clear first choice. He has many years experience of doing business in the Soviet market and is well-known to leading Soviet personalities involved in trade with the West. His company is the largest UK exporter to the USSR: he is a member of the East European Trade Council; and last, but not least, he has an open and relaxed approach which Mr Channon feels sure would be appreciated by the Prime Minister.

NBP
28/11



CONFIDENTIAL

5. Mr Channon would be grateful therefore if you would consider including Dr Wooding in your list of suggested participants for the meeting requested by the Prime Minister.

6. I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Ivor Llewellyn (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
SN

STEPHEN NICKLEN
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (PAUL CHANNON)

Soviet Union: Relations Pt 3.

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28 NOV 1984



SCOTTISH OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AU

CM

C R Budd Esq
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

21 November 1984

Dear Colin,

MR GORBACHEV'S VISIT

You copied to me your letter of 19 November to Charles Powell. I can confirm that the Secretary of State will be content for Mrs Younger to accompany him at the proposed dinner on Friday 21 December.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10) and Steve Nicklen (DTI).


*Yours sincerely,
John Graham*

J S GRAHAM
Private Secretary

SOVIET UNION
News P3

22 NOV 1991

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CONFIDENTIAL

file
bc PC ✓

BM,



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1984

Mr. Gorbachev's Visit: UK Objectives

Thank you for your letter of 19 November setting out suggested objectives for Mr. Gorbachev's visit. The Prime Minister is content with these.

The question of the presence in the Supreme Soviet delegation of a coal-pit foreman is being dealt with in separate correspondence. You will doubtless let me know in due course the outcome of the discussions with the Soviet Embassy on this.

The Prime Minister would find it helpful to have a meeting before Mr. Gorbachev's visit with a small number of experts, perhaps including outside experts, to prepare for her meeting with him. She has mentioned the name of Mr. Malcolm Mackintosh. I should be grateful if you could let me have suggestions for four or five such experts who might be invited to a meeting.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Steve Nicklen (Department of Trade and Industry), Ivor Llewellyn (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

SMH

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File

285

20 November 1984

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT

Thank you for your letter of 19 November about the Prime Minister's lunch for Mr. Gorbachev.

The Prime Minister agrees that it would not be appropriate to invite Mrs. Gorbachev to the Chequers lunch.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Would you like
to meeting with experts
such as Malcolm
Mackintosh which I
suggest, to prepare for
the Gorbachev visit?

CDP

25/ki

Yes please
no

010

CONFIDENTIAL

cc/c
cc/ST



Prime Minister
Agree to these
general objectives
for Gorbachev's visit?
Agree to small
preparatory meeting with
Malcolm Macintosh & other
outside experts?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1984

Dear Charles,

CDD 19/xi

Yes
mk

Gorbachev's Visit: UK Objectives

We have been giving some thought to our objectives for Gorbachev's visit in December and have identified both specific and general aims. I am writing to you separately about the visit of George Shultz to Chevening which will be taking place just beforehand.

Gorbachev is 53. He is the youngest member of the Politburo but at the moment looks to be the most likely successor to Chernenko as General Secretary of the Party. His comparative youth is, however, a disadvantage and he will have to fight his corner skilfully if he is ultimately to take over. But if he does, he could well be the man who leads the Soviet Union into the 21st Century. The week he spends in the UK may therefore prove a valuable investment in his understanding of the West generally and of the UK in particular.

What we know of Gorbachev from the Canadians and others who have met him is that he is intelligent and confident. To have reached his present position at his age he must also be able, fortunate in his earlier patronage and as tough as the Party's internal system of preference demands. He has been labelled a reformer, mainly on the grounds that he has criticised the manifest failings in the way the Soviet economy functions. But there is nothing to suggest he is not a convinced communist or that he intends (or would be able) to make fundamental alterations to the system itself.

The visit to London as leader of a Parliamentary delegation represents opportunities and risks for Gorbachev. We should bear both in mind. It is an opportunity to visit an important Western nuclear power with worldwide interests and influence and the US's closest ally. Gorbachev will no doubt hope to gain valuable experience of Western views and publicity in Soviet and Western media as playing a prominent role in the Soviet leadership.

The risks are that he might be trapped into an unguarded comment or publicly embarrassed in some way or even that he might be given such publicity in the UK as the Soviet Union's "next leader" that Romanov and other rivals could accuse him

/of

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of deliberately inflating his position. We should treat him as he is, and not refer publicly to what he might become. We can expect a tough intelligent listener who will note carefully what is said to him but who must be expected to stick to basic Soviet positions on all important points. We should not expect any immediate modifications in Soviet positions.

Against this background, we suggest that our general objectives should be:

- a. to teach him something about how a Western democracy works and what a free market economy can achieve;
- b. to establish personal and political links with Gorbachev on which we can build;
- c. to raise the profile of the UK in Soviet eyes and to show that we have a distinctive view of our own on international questions which is not, as the Russians have a tendency to assume, just a reflection of US policies.

Our specific objectives might be:

- a. to emphasise the sincerity and willingness of the West in general and President Reagan in particular to discuss a wide range of questions with the Soviet Union and to negotiate substantial arms control agreements;
- b. to indicate the areas - nuclear and chemical weapons, outer space systems - where we think progress can and should be made: to explain that the first two years of the second Reagan Administration provide a major opportunity for making progress which should not be missed;
- c. to make full use of the commercial opportunities in pressing particular contracts as well as general areas of industrial and agricultural interest to us during Gorbachev's visits to firms and factories (in a programme which is being co-ordinated by the DTI and which includes calls on Mr Jopling and Mr Channon);
- d. to use the visit to expose the Soviet delegation to a wide range of influential Parliamentary, industrial, press and other leaders, and so to arrange the rest of Gorbachev's programme as to show him a wide cross-section of Britain and British national life;

/(e)

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- e. to get an insight into Gorbachev's personality and qualities and through him into current Soviet problems, priorities and intentions.

If the Prime Minister agrees with these objectives, we will make some suggestions about the preparation for and the actual handling of her discussions with Gorbachev. There might, for example, be advantage in a meeting beforehand with two or three experts who could brief on Gorbachev's background and personality. We will also be considering the public relations aspects of his visit. It will attract a great deal of attention and publicity and not be without its potential problems, as the selection of a Donetsk coal-pit foreman as a member of the Supreme Soviet delegation has already made clear. Arthur Scargill's call at the Soviet Embassy on 15 November underlines this point.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD), Steve Nicklen (DTI), Ivor Llewellyn (MAFF), and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L. V. Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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cc/c

010



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Agree not to
include Mrs. Gorbachev
in the Chequer's
lunch?

19 November, 1984

Dear Charles,

CDP 19/xi

Yes

mt

Mr Gorbachev's Visit

I enclose a copy of the list of names in the Supreme Soviet delegation which Mr Gorbachev will be leading on a visit from 15-22 December. The Soviet Embassy passed the list to the IPU on 13 November.

As you see, the Russians have suggested that Mrs Gorbachev should accompany her husband. We see some advantage in this, and could arrange a separate programme for her, taking account of her wishes and interests. The question arises, however, as to whether Mrs Gorbachev should be included in the various official meals that will be offered by the Government during the visit.

Given the views expressed in your letter of 29 October about the Prime Minister's desire to keep her guest list as restricted as possible on the Soviet side, we assume that the Prime Minister would not wish to invite Mrs Gorbachev to Chequers on 16 December. We would see no problem in explaining this to the Russians, who would probably not expect Mrs Gorbachev to be included.

The Foreign Secretary proposes to include Mrs Gorbachev in the dinner he is hosting on 17 December with Lady Howe as the hostess on the British side (but no other wives). Mrs Gorbachev would also be invited to the evening entertainment on 19 December. We would hope that Mr Channon and Mr Younger would be prepared to invite Mrs Gorbachev to the dinners they are hosting on 20 and 21 December, perhaps on the same basis as the dinner given by Sir Geoffrey Howe, ie balanced by Mrs Channon and Mrs Younger but not necessarily including other wives. I should be grateful for confirmation from Steve Nicklen and John Graham that their Ministers are content. We would then plan on this basis and so inform the Russians.

Copies of this letter go to Steve Nicklen (DTI) and John Graham (Scottish Office).

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

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1/13/11

GORBACHEV Michail Sergeevich /leader of the delegation/ -

- Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Member of Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Union

with wife GORBACHEVA Raisa Maximovna

VELIKHOV Evgeni Pavlovich -

- Chairman of the Energy Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Science

ZAMYATIN Leonid Mitrofanovich -

- Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, Head of International Information Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU

ISAEV Egor Alexandrovich -

- member of the Legislative Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, poet, Secretary of the Board of the Writers' Union of the USSR

KOMAROV Nickolai Dmitrievich -

- member of the Consumer Goods and Services Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, First Deputy minister of Foreign Trade

PARSHINA, Valentina Romanovna -

- member of the housing-communal and town services Commission of the Soviet of Union, brigade-leader of the vegetable growers of the specialized production complex of the state farms "Detskoslensk" in Leningrad area

STRELCHENKO Ivan Ivanovich -

- member of the Commission on Youth Affairs of the Soviet of Union, foreman of the Pit "Trudovskaya" of the production complex "Donetskugol"

YAKOVLEV Alexandr Nickolaevich -

- member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, director of the Institute of World economy and international relations of the USSR Academy of Science

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PP MOSCOW
GRS 209
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 141200Z NOV 84
TO PRIORITY MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 963 OF 14 NOVEMBER
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO PARIS BONN
VISIT OF GORBACHEV

1. ON 13 NOVEMBER SOVIET EMBASSY GAVE US DETAILS OF THE DELEGATION ACCOMPANYING GORBACHEV.
2. GORBACHEV WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WILL BE: (IN RUSSIAN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)
- I) ACADEMICIAN YEVGENI VELIKHOV, A LEADING SOVIET SCIENTIST AND EXPERT ON ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE.
 - II) LEONID ZAMYATIN, HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND A PROMINENT OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
 - III) YEGOR ISAEV, AN ELDERLY ESTABLISHMENT POET AND SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF THE WRITERS' UNION.
 - IV) NIKOLAI KOMAROV, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE.
 - V) VALENTINA PARSHINA, LEADER OF VEGETABLE GROWERS BRIGADE IN LENINGRAD REGION.
 - VI) IVAN STRELCHENKO, PIT FOREMAN, DONETSK.
 - VII) ALEXANDR YAKOVLEV, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO CANADA, NOW HEAD OF AN INFLUENTIAL SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE.

HOWE

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INFO DEPT	MR JENKINS	MR MCRAN, SCOTTISH INFORMATION OFF. ST. ANDREWS HOUSE
PLANNING STAFF		MR ORME ERD MAFF

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J1377



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5144
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

COMMERCIAL-IN-CONFIDENCE

C R Budd Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON
SW1

NBPN

CDP

13/xi

7 November 1984

New Coli

VISIT OF MR GORBACHEV

I am writing in response to your letter of 24 October addressed to Callum McCarthy here and your subsequent letter to me of 2 November about the proposed visit to the UK of Mr Gorbachev.

We are of course delighted that Mr Gorbachev has expressed an interest in pursuing UK/Soviet trade and commercial matters while he is here. This Department will want to play a full and active part in the visit and we shall be pleased to act as the contact point for all the trade and commercial aspects.

As you know, it is now clear that Mr Tebbit will not be well enough to return to his duties before Christmas and in his absence Mr Channon would expect to receive Mr Gorbachev. The nature and form of this meeting will of course depend to some extent on who Mr Gorbachev brings with him, but in any event we would envisage something considerably more substantial than a mere courtesy call. From our point of view, the afternoon of Thursday 20 December would be the most convenient time for the meeting, one consideration being that a meeting then, rather than earlier in the programme, would enable Mr Channon and Mr Gorbachev to review the outcome of trade policy talks due to take place in London at the beginning of the same week. The visit of the Chairman of the BOTB, Lord Jellicoe, and Christopher Roberts, the Chief Executive to Moscow, in the first week of December should provide an ideal opportunity to pave the way for the meeting and for the trade and commercial aspects of the visit in general. We are consulting the Embassy on how this might best be achieved.

- will request if required



COMMERCIAL-IN-CONFIDENCE

In addition to the formal meeting mentioned above, Mr Channon would welcome the opportunity of hosting a meal for Mr Gorbachev and his party. I understand that the evening of 20 December is currently free and a dinner then, shortly after the formal meeting mentioned above, would be ideal. We hope very much that it will be possible to include this event in Mr Gorbachev's programme as it would provide an opportunity to widen his exposure to British industry beyond the select group of companies on which he has already expressed an interest in calling.

As requested in your letter to me, we have also been giving careful consideration to the Soviet suggestions for company involvement in the programme and in particular to the possibilities for the proposed visit to Scotland. I understand that officials in this Department have been in close touch with the FCO about this and that discussions are continuing. However, I believe that the present intention is as follows:

John Brown A meeting will take place at the company's head office in Paddington on the morning of Sunday 16 December followed by luncheon for those members of the delegation who will not be accompanying Mr Gorbachev to Chequers.

ICI We were most grateful to the IPU for agreeing to move the GB/USSR Association luncheon which had been planned for Monday 17 December. Now that Mr Gorbachev and his party will be free at that time, ICI propose to receive the delegation at their Millbank headquarters immediately after Mr Gorbachev's meeting with the Foreign Secretary. Following a short meeting with the Chairman, Mr John Harvey-Jones, the party will then be flown by helicopter to their Jeallots Hill laboratory for lunch and discussions with ICI directors and other senior staff. A visit to the company's Plant Protection Division at Fernhurst might also be included if time allows and the party will then be flown back to London in time for the Foreign Secretary's dinner that evening.

BL BL would be pleased to receive Mr Gorbachev and his party at Cowley (not Slough - where they do not have a plant) on the morning of Thursday 20 December to see their company's flexible manufacturing facilities (assuming that the present industrial dispute has by then been resolved).

ICI We propose that the delegation might then return to ICL's head office in Putney for lunch, hosted by the Chairman (Mr Robb Wilmott) or Managing Director (Mr Peter Bonfield), and discussions before proceeding to the meeting with Mr Channon here (see above).

Milk Marketing Board (MMB) We understand that the MMB have no major installations near Central London. The nearest facility which might be of interest to Mr Gorbachev is a central control laboratory at Thames Ditton. From a commercial point of view we would not attach a high priority to this visit, but if it can be fitted into the programme and Mr Gorbachev is particularly keen, we could not object, as long as such a visit would not interfere with the company visits mentioned above.



COMMERCIAL-IN-CONFIDENCE

Norwich We have not been able to identify any agricultural machinery plants of any size in Norwich. However, Howard Machinery and Ransomes, Sims and Jefferies manufacture cultivating equipment at Ipswich. Again we could not attach a very high priority to a visit of either of these companies, although Howard Machinery, at least, is pursuing equipment sales and licensing deals in the Soviet Union.

Scotland We suggest that on Friday 21 December Mr Gorbachev and his delegation should travel to Aberdeen where calls on the following companies could be arranged: UDI (a subsidiary of John Brown which manufactures underwater equipment and diving systems); Seaforth Maritime (who again manufacture diving systems and would be able to take the party on board an offshore support vessel); and the John Wood Group (which manufactures oilfield and downhole equipment). We hope that one of these companies will be prepared to fly the delegation to Aberdeen from Edinburgh and back by helicopter.

For Saturday 22 December we are considering a number of possible company visits in the Strathclyde Region, including Shell, Davy McKee and Prestwick Circuits. There will certainly be no difficulty in putting together an interesting programme for Mr Gorbachev on this day also.

We look forward to receiving further details of the programme and an indication as soon as possible of which Ministers and officials will be accompanying Mr Gorbachev. If any spaces remain in the London part of the programme we should have no difficulty in putting forward some further suggestions for visits to companies with an important interest in the Soviet market. I suggest that officials in this Department and your's should continue to liaise on the details of the trade and commercial aspects referred to above and that we should get in touch again once these have been finalised.

Yours sincerely
Sten

STEPHEN NICKLEN
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (PAUL CHANNON)

SOVIET UNION : Rev

Pt 3

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ECLAAT
cc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1984

STALIN'S DAUGHTER

Thank you for your letter of 2 November and enclosures about Svetlana Alliluyeva's return to the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister has noted the information.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

Charles Powell

C R Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November, 1984

Dear Charles,

Stalin's Daughter

Handwritten initials

Prime Minister

CDP 4/xi

You may have seen reports in today's press that Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, may have returned with her daughter to Moscow.

I enclose copies of three telegrams which give the text of the original article in the Cambridge Evening News, background and instructions to certain posts, and the initial US reaction.

You will wish to be aware that the Home Office have just informed us that Mrs Peters and her daughter Olga left Terminal 2 at Heathrow on 23 October. An embarkation card does not require the destination to be stated, and she could therefore have gone anywhere in Europe. There was, however, an Aeroflot flight to Moscow that day.

We will telegraph any further information that may emerge to New Delhi. I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PS Curious coincidence:

Svetlana defected in Delhi
in 1967.

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GRS 65

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FM WASHINGTON 020016Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3256 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW AND PRIORITY TO HELSINKI, BERNE AND STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 1872 AND 1873:

STALIN'S DAUGHTER.

1. MINISTER SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO PALMER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND SENT HIM THE TEXT OF THE CAMBRIDGE EVENING NEWS ARTICLE.
2. PALMER SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD HEARD NOTHING OF THE RUMOURS THAT MRS PETERS MIGHT RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE WOULD WARN SHULTZ, WHO WAS ON HIS WAY TO DELHI.

~~WEIGHT~~

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PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

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MR BONE, RESEARCH D

MR WALLACE, PUSD

MR SHORT, PUSD

MR HAYDEN PHILLIPS,
HOME OFFICE,
LUNAR HOUSE

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14311 - 2

GRS 300

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FM FCO 012030Z NOVEMBER 1984

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1872 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PRIORITY HELSINKI, BERNE STOCKHOLM

STALIN'S DAUGHTER

1. MIFT GIVES THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE IN THE CAMBRIDGE EVENING NEWS TODAY.
2. YOU SHOULD PASS A COPY OF THE ARTICLE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT MAKING IT CLEAR THAT AT THIS STAGE WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THAT MRS PETERS HAS RETURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE MAKING CHECKS AT THE OBVIOUS POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND WILL INFORM YOU IF THESE CONFIRM THE STORY. FOR THE TIME BEING NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT WE ARE AWARE OF THIS REPORT BUT HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF IT. THEY WILL GO ON TO SAY THAT AS A PRIVATE US CITIZEN MRS PETERS WAS FREE TO COME AND GO AS SHE WISHED.
3. YOU SHOULD TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT, FOLLOWING AN INDICATION BY VICTOR LOUIS IN MOSCOW EARLIER THIS MONTH (MOSCOW TELNO 1112) THAT MRS PETERS WISHED TO RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION, WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING DISCREET ENQUIRIES AS TO HER REAL INTENTIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT ON 8 OCTOBER THE DAILY TELEGRAPH CARRIED A REPORT DENYING THAT MRS PETERS HAD ANY INTENTION OF RETURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION. OUR INITIAL ENQUIRIES CONFIRMED THAT MRS PETERS WAS CAPABLE OF SUDDEN CHANGES OF MOOD, BUT NOT THAT SHE HAD ANY INTENTION OF RETURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION. (YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE AMERICANS ON OTHER CHANNELS.)
4. GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY REPORT OF US REACTIONS.

1

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14311 - 2

5. (COPY ADDRESSEES) YOU SHOULD REPORT ANY INFORMATION THAT COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION LOCALLY IN CONNECTION WITH MRS PETERS' WHEREABOUTS. WE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, WANT YOU AT THIS STAGE TO APPROACH YOUR LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

HOWE

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MR. JENKINS

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14312 - 2

DD WASHINGTON 012200

GRS 500

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DESKBY 012200Z

FM FCO 012030Z NOVEMBER 1984

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1873 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PRIORITY HELSINKI, BERNE, STOCKHOLM

MIPT: STALIN'S DAUGHTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE IN CAMBRIDGE EVENING NEWS OF 1 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS:

RIDDLE OF CALL TO SAFFRON WALDEN SCHOOL
STALIN'S DAUGHTER MYSTERY

SVETLANA STALIN, DAUGHTER OF JOSEF STALIN, IS BELIEVED TO HAVE MADE AN INCREDIBLE RETURN TO RUSSIA WITH HER 13 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER OLGA, WHO HAS NOT RETURNED TO HER SAFFRON WALDEN SCHOOL.

THE MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE WAS REVEALED TODAY WHEN THE HEADMASTER OF THE SCHOOL, MR JOHN WOODS, TODAY TOLD THE NEWS EXCLUSIVELY HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM MRS PETERS, FORMERLY SVETLANA ALLEUVENA STALIN, SAYING OLGA WOULD BE GOING ABROAD - AND MENTIONING MOSCOW.

MRS PETERS DEFECTED TO THE WEST IN 1967 - AND CAME TO ENGLAND IN AUGUST 1982, LIVING IN A FLAT AT THE HOME OF PROFESSOR DONALD DENMAN IN CHAUCER ROAD, CAMBRIDGE, UNTIL EARLY THIS SUMMER.

THE DEFECTOR HAS A SON STILL LIVING IN THE SOVIET UNION. MRS PETERS HAD BEEN DUE TO VISIT PROFESSOR DENMAN'S WIFE, JESSIE, IN CAMBRIDGE TODAY, BUT BY MID MORNING SHE HAD NOT TELEPHONED TO CONFIRM WHETHER SHE WOULD ARRIVE. MR WOODS SAID TODAY 'I KNOW OLGA HAS LEFT THE COUNTRY BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT HER MOTHER SAID - AND MOSCOW WAS MENTIONED. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE MOTHER IS STILL

1

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14312 - 2

IN THIS COUNTRY, BUT I WOULD DOUBT IT. SHE GAVE NO INDICATION WHEN OLGA WOULD BE COMING BACK, AND DID NOT EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF THE VISIT', SAID MR WOODS. THE SURPRISE TELEPHONE CALL WAS MADE DURING THE HALF-TERM HOLIDAY.

OLGA, 13, LEFT THE 100-YEAR-OLD FRIENDS SCHOOL AS NORMAL ON OCTOBER 20TH. SHE IS STILL OFFICIALLY A PUPIL. THE FEES OF MORE THAN POUNDS STERLING 1000 A TERM ARE PAID IN ADVANCE.

MR WOODS SAID OLGA, WHO BECAME A PUPIL AT THE SCHOOL LAST YEAR, HAD SETTLED IN WELL AND SEEMED VERY HAPPY. BUT MRS DENMAN, WHO WITH HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN SWORN TO SECRECY OVER MRS PETERS' NEW ADDRESS, WAS SURPRISED BY THE DISAPPEARANCE.

'I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS THE LAST THING SHE WOULD HAVE DONE' SHE SAID.

MRS DENMAN, WHO HAD BECOME FIRM FRIENDS WITH THE DAUGHTER OF THE FORMER SOVIET DICTATOR, ADDED, HOWEVER, 'SHE IS THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO WOULD DO ANYTHING ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT.

SHE COULD EASILY HAVE GONE ANYWHERE ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT. SHE HAS GOT MANY FRIENDS IN SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND. SHE WAS GOING TO COME AND SEE ME TODAY AND WAS GOING TO CALL ME. SHE HASN'T. BUT SHE SAID I'LL COME AND SEE YOU AT SOME TIME. IT WASN'T A DEFINITE ARRANGEMENT', MRS DENMAN SAID.

MRS PETERS' DEFECTION TO THE WEST CREATED A SENSATION IN THE LATE 1960S.

SHE FLEW TO INDIA IN 1967 TO SCATTER THE ASHES OF HER DEAD FOURTH HUSBAND, BRIESH SINGH, IN THE GANGES - AND SOUGHT ASYLUM AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY.

OLGA IS THE DAUGHREER OF A SHORT-LIVED MARRIAGE BETWEEN MRS PETERS AND AMERICAN LAWYER WILLIAM PETERS. THEY WERE WED IN 1970 BUT SEPARATED IN 1971.

NEITHER THE RUSSIAN OR AMERICAN EMBASSIES ADMITTED TO KNOWING ANYTHING ABOUT OLGA'S VISIT TO RUSSIA.
ENDS.

HOWE

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MR. ALISON

Visit of Gorbachev

He is coming in December as the guest of the IPU and will meet the Prime Minister. Amazingly, news of his visit has been kept quiet so far. We are hoping that the Prime Minister can unveil it in her speech in the Debate on the Address. But we shall need Mr. Temple-Morris' agreement. Could you be kind enough to seek this? It would be best to wait until Monday before doing so.

C. D. POWELL

31 October, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



RUE

(W)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October, 1984

LUNCH FOR GORBACHEV

You will want to know that the Prime Minister wishes her lunch for Gorbachev to be on Sunday, 16 December at Chequers. She envisages it as a small working occasion with only about 12/14 people present. On the Soviet side, I hope it can be restricted to Gorbachev, the Soviet Ambassador and one other (at most, two). The nature of the occasion will need to be explained carefully to Gorbachev, so that he does not see any slight in such a small-scale event. I assume that Sir Geoffrey Howe's lunch will be a more lavish event.

(C.D. Powell)

L. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

LUNCH FOR MR. GORBACHEV

The Foreign Office need some guidance as to what sort of occasion you intend this to be. It seems to me that it will be a unique opportunity to try to get inside the minds of the next generation of Soviet leaders. This points to a rather small lunch to allow a real discussion rather than any sort of social or ceremonial occasion. Geoffrey Howe will be giving him lunch the next day at Lancaster House and that can be the protocol event.

If you agree, we might think in terms of a small lunch for 12/14 people including the Lord President, Geoffrey Howe, Michael Heseltine, Antony Acland, Clive Whitmore, HM Ambassador, Moscow and Sir Percy Cradock.

Agree?

Yes

EDP

26 October, 1984

Cabinet plus
Law Officers
CWO H/C
CWO H/L
Lord Adv.

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file
CC PC
SM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 October 1984

Dear Colin,

Soviet National Day Reception

Thank you for your letter of 25 October giving the Foreign Secretary's recommendations about the appropriate level of attendance at the Soviet National Day Reception.

The Prime Minister agrees with what the Foreign Secretary proposes.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to all Ministers in charge of Departments.

Yours sincerely,
Chris Powell

C D Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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afe

010



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Prime Minister
Agree attendance
on the lines*

25 October 1984

*Dear Charles, suggested?
CDP 25/10.*

Yes not

Soviet National Day Reception

Mr Popov, the Soviet Ambassador, will be holding his annual reception on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution in early November. Given the virtual certainty of a high level Soviet visit to the UK later this year (details of which are known to you, but which remain confidential for the time being) the Foreign Secretary believes that Cabinet level attendance would be appropriate this year. He hopes to attend himself.

It is likely, however, that Mr Popov will scatter his invitations widely, and in order to avoid the risk of disproportionate attendance (bearing in mind that no Cabinet Minister has attended in recent years and the number of senior Russians who attend the Queen's Birthday Party in Moscow is very limited) the Foreign Secretary would be grateful if his colleagues' Private Secretaries would get in touch with this office if invitations are received which their Ministers would hope in principle to accept before any reply is sent to the Soviet Embassy. I will write again when we have a clearer picture of the overall numbers involved. In principle we shall be seeking to limit attendance to one or two Cabinet Ministers plus those junior ministers who have substantive business with the Russians.

I am copying this to Private Secretaries of all Ministers in charge of Departments with the request that they circulate it as necessary.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FWK

WJ
cc: PG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1984

VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

Thank you for your letter of 24 October about the arrangements proposed for Mr. Gorbachev's visit.

The Prime Minister is content with these.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

L. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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copy ⑦



*Prime Minister
Agree to proposed
arrangements?*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 October 1984

*Should we not
press to go out
of London and*

Dear Charles, see something of British life?

*Dec. is
not a good
time
for
this
mb*

Visit by Mr Gorbachev

C.D.P. 24/10

In your letter of 17 October you indicated that the Prime Minister's inclination was to invite Mr Gorbachev to lunch at Chequers on 15 or 16 December.

As you know, the Speaker has written to the Soviet Ambassador accepting the dates proposed by the Soviet side, i.e. a visit of a week starting on 15 December. Sir Geoffrey Howe has considered what the Government's input into the visit might be, apart from the Parliamentary events which will be organised by Peter Temple-Morris and Sir Anthony Kershaw.

Sir Geoffrey recommends that, in addition to the lunch at Chequers to be given by the Prime Minister (probably on 16 December, since Gorbachev is unlikely to arrive until the evening of 15 December), he should have a full session of talks with Gorbachev at the FCO on the morning of 17 December. These talks would be followed by a lunch given by the Government to which both Parliamentary delegations would be invited, together with some other prominent figures in the Anglo-Soviet field. Later in the week, and depending on Gorbachev's interests, we might arrange for talks with another senior Minister with trade and industry or agricultural responsibilities. A Cabinet Minister or Malcolm Rifkind might also offer an entertainment (opera/concert) to which a smaller number of people might be invited.

While the Prime Minister's lunch on 16 December and Sir Geoffrey's talks and formal lunch on 17 December might be thought to be putting a rather strong Governmental accent on the early stages of what is, in principle, intended to be an IPU exchange, it has the advantage of leaving the remainder of that week free for a visit to Peking and Hong Kong should the Prime Minister decide that this was the most convenient time for such a visit.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Relatives : SOVIET UNION A3.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AA



24 OCT 1984



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Speaker's House Westminster London SW1A 0AA

18th October 1984


It was kind of you to call upon me earlier this week, with the welcome news that Mr M S Gorbachev, the distinguished Chairman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, would be leading the Delegation of the USSR Branch of the Inter-Parliamentary Union this December.

You proposed a visit of about seven days, commencing on 15th December 1984. This is very acceptable, and I have no doubt that a very useful and hard working programme can be arranged from the first day. I understand that the Prime Minister is looking forward to meeting Mr Gorbachev at a time which can be arranged in the light of the agreed programme for the Delegation.

I can only add that I am looking forward to meeting Mr Gorbachev and the other Members of the Delegation, and I am certain many of my Parliamentary colleagues will also wish to do so.

Speaker

H E the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
13 Kensington Palace Gardens
London W8 4QX



Mr Speaker

Speaker's Office House of Commons London SW1A 0AA

Message telephoned
through to Mr.
Beaumont's secretary

18th October 1984

FERB

19.10.

~~FERB~~

Agreed.

aq.

Dear Robin,

I wondered if you would be with the Prime Minister when she came over this afternoon, because I would like the enclosed letter to be in the hands of the Soviet Ambassador on Friday afternoon, as he is calling on Mr Gorbachev over the weekend in Moscow.

Is it agreeable to you in its present form? Perhaps you could give me a ring in the morning?

Yours Ever,

FERB

F E R Butler Esq
Principal Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

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JKR



bc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary


17 October 1984

Dear Len,

CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Thank you for your undated letter about the invitations extended to Gorbachev, Aliyev and Gromyko. The Prime Minister welcomes the fact that Gorbachev has accepted an invitation to come here in December. Her inclination is to invite him to lunch at Chequers on 15 or 16 December. I should be grateful if this could be borne in mind when discussing his programme.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C.D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ea

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CSFC (f)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16.10.84

*hand at the press
pub.*

Prime Minister

*Will you see him
here? Or invite him to
your dacha? (15/16 December
is a week-end).*

Dear Charles,

Contacts with the Soviet Union

In your letter of 5 June you conveyed the Prime Minister's agreement that invitations should be extended to Gorbachev, Aliyev and Gromyko in the ways proposed by Sir Geoffrey Howe. You also informed us that the Prime Minister agreed to see the three visitors if the invitations were accepted.

*CIP
16/x*

The present position is that Mr Gromyko has agreed in principle to visit this country in 1985. In discussion with Sir Geoffrey Howe in New York recently he said that the second half of May might be about the right time. We will be proposing precise dates to the Russians in due course.

As far as the invitation to Mr Gorbachev is concerned, the Soviet Ambassador told Sir Geoffrey yesterday that Mr Gorbachev had accepted the invitation to lead a delegation from the Supreme Soviet in December. He looked forward to meeting British Parliamentarians, and seeing senior political figures including the Prime Minister. The dates suggested by the Soviet side are for the visit to take place starting on either 15, 16 or 17 December. (The invitation had originally been extended for the week beginning 3 December.) Popov also took the opportunity of expressing his condolences and sincere sympathy for those afflicted by the bomb attack at Brighton. He mentioned Mr and Mrs Tebbit in particular.

The Soviet Ambassador will be calling on the Speaker on 17 October to inform him of Mr Gorbachev's acceptance. Thereafter the detailed arrangements will be for Mr Temple-Morris, Sir Anthony Kershaw and ourselves to discuss and settle with the Russians. We will in due course be making recommendations to the Prime Minister about the timing of Mr Gorbachev's call on her. For the time being, however, we have urged those involved on the Parliamentary side to keep the fact and the dates of the visit confidential until more detailed arrangements have been worked out and agreed.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Gannover,
Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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Soviet Union Relations but 3

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AA



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16 OCT 1984



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10088 - 1

OO MOSCOW

GRS 600

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FM FCO 151800Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 893 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CALL 15 OCTOBER: UK/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. FOLLOWING HIS DEMARCHE ON JAPAN, POPOV RAISED UK/SOVIET RELATIONS.
2. POPOV REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S CHARACTERISATION OF UK/SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS AS 'SATISFACTORY' IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF US MISSILES IN BRITAIN. THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT MORE ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE UK. POPOV REFERRED TO THE NPT AND ANTARCTICA AS SPECIFIC EXAMPLES. BUT BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE US POSITION ON THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE WAS A NEGATIVE FACTOR. THE US CLEARLY DID NOT WANT TALKS ABOUT THIS.
3. THERE WAS SCOPE FOR A FURTHER INCREASE IN UK/SOVIET TRADE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ALREADY RECORDED IN 1983. THERE WERE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FIELDS OF CHEMICALS, PETROCHEMICALS, MACHINE TOOLS AND FOOD PROCESSING. THE SOVIET SIDE HOPED THAT ITS PRESENCE AT FARNBOROUGH THIS YEAR COULD LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS. CULTURAL COOPERATION WAS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. OTHER COUNTRIES HAD ACCEPTED VISITS FROM MAJOR SOVIET GROUPS. POPOV MENTIONED THE BOLSHOI BALLET AND THE MOSCOW ARTS THEATRE. IF THESE GROUPS VISITED THE UK THERE COULD BE AN OVERALL BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.
4. POPOV REFERRED TO CHRNRNENKO'S DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN FEBRUARY. THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO IMPROVING RELATIONS WAS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WORDS. HE WAS AUTHORISED TO SAY THAT MR GORBACHEV HAD ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO VISIT THE UK IN DECEMBER AT THE HEAD OF A DELEGATION FROM THE SUPREME SOVIET. THE VISIT COULD START ON 15,16 OR 17 DECEMBER. GORBACHEV LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURES INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER. POPOV SAID THAT HE WOULD BE INFORMING

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LEADERS OF PARLIAMENT ABOUT THIS VERY SOON.

5. I AGREED WITH POPOV THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR EXPANSION IN BILATERAL TRADE. WE LOOKED FOR INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SOVIET MARKET. THE BALANCE WAS STILL IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE LOOKED FOR A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR CULTURAL RELATIONS FLOWING FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW CULTURAL AGREEMENT TO BE HELD IN MOSCOW IN JANUARY.
6. WE WERE GLAD THAT MR GORBACHEV COULD VISIT LONDON IN DECEMBER POPOV WOULD HAVE NOTED THE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE MENTION IN MY SPEECH IN BRIGHTON THAT MR GROMYKO WOULD BE VISITING BRITAIN NEXT YEAR. (POPOV SAID HE HAD NOTED AND REPORTED THIS). POPOV WAS UNAWARE THAT ANY PRECISE DATES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. I SAID THAT PRECISE DATES HAD NOT BEEN FIXED BUT THAT MR GROMYKO APPEARED TO THINK THAT THE SECOND HALF OF MAY WAS ABOUT THE RIGHT TIME. DETAILED PROPOSALS WOULD BE MADE IN DUE COURSE.
7. I THEN TOOK POPOV THROUGH THE SAME LIST OF BILATERAL VISITS AND CONSULTATIONS AS YOU HAD DONE WITH RYZHOV (YOUR TELNO 1163). POPOV AGREED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO ASSIST THESE.
8. AT THE END OF THIS PART OF OUR CONVERSATION I TOLD POPOV THAT I HOPED THAT THE SAME SORT OF ACCESS TO SOVIET MINISTERS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO YOU AS POPOV ENJOYED HERE. POPOV SAID HE HAD NOTED THE POINT.
9. COMMENT. THE INFORMATION ABOUT GORBACHEV'S VISIT SHOULD, AT THIS STAGE, BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. IT WILL BE FOR THE IPU TOGETHER WITH THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO NEGOTIATE THE TIMING AND TERMS OF ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. WE WILL INFORM YOU AND OTHERS CONCERNED AS SOON AS THIS HAS BEEN AGREED.
10. SEE MIFT FOR US/SOVIET RELATIONS.
11. NEWS DEPARTMENT HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE CALL LASTED FOR 45 MINUTES AND THAT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS WERE DISCUSSED INCLUDING MR GROMYKO'S RECENT VISIT TO THE US.

HOWE

DIST: LIMITED
SOVIET DEPT
RESEARCH DEPT
EED
PLANNING STAFF
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
CRD
MAED

TRED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON

COPIES TO: MR CARTLEDGE,
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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Seen by PM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Something which I think
will interest you:

GORBACHEV has just
accepted an invitation to
the UK to come in
December.

EDP

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 October 1984

*NBP 7
CDP
4/11.*

*will request
if required.*

Dear Richard.

Ministerial Contacts with the Soviet Union

Thank you for letting me know in your letter of 19 September about the Soviet Ambassador's invitation to Mr Heseltine.

As Roger Bone's letter of 16 April to John Coles made clear, it is in general for Ministers themselves to decide whether an invitation could be described as an occasion on which serious business was discussed, or which was directly concerned with important British commercial or other functions.

Soviet heavy-handedness can however give rise to presentational as well as substantive problems. In this instance, the Soviet Ambassador has also issued invitations to the Home Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Trefgarne, Mr Lamont and the Paymaster-General, for the second half of October. Sir Geoffrey Howe would therefore be grateful if Mr Heseltine and other colleagues would allow him to suggest a batting order, and some appropriate spacing out of acceptances, bearing in mind not only the constraints mentioned in Roger Bone's letter of 16 April, but also the limited access which Sir Iain Sutherland enjoys in Moscow. An element of reciprocity in Moscow must plainly be a relevant factor.

For the rest of this year, he would suggest that only three lunch invitations of this kind be accepted. (There may well be other social events organised by the Soviet Embassy, for instance in connection with incoming visits by Soviet Ministers and dignitaries and also to celebrate the October revolution on 7 November, but these can be considered separately and on their own merits). An appropriate order might be:

Mr Heseltine in October

Mr Lamont in November

The Lord Privy Seal in December

/He

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He would be grateful if other colleagues, if they see some justification and advantage in accepting, would reply in a positive sense but referring to the possibility of looking at dates next year. In certain cases where the invitation seems inappropriate, such as that to the Home Secretary (in the light of Bitov's allegations about mistreatment in the United Kingdom) or to Lord Trefgarne (which clearly duplicates that to your Minister) a less forthcoming reply might be more suitable.

I would be grateful if David Morris and Elizabeth Hibden would take this letter as replying to theirs, both of 11 September. I am in addition copying this letter to all recipients of Roger Bone's letter of 16 April and to Charles Powell at No 10.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)

Richard Mottram Esq
PS/Defence Secretary
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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SOVIET UNION: News Pt 3

OCT 1984

1 2 3

TELEPHONE: 01-897 7741

CAVENHAM HOUSE
PARK LANE
CRANFORD
MIDDX TW5 9RW

5th September 1984

Mrs. Caroline Ryder,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

Dear Mrs. Ryder,

Following yesterday's telephone conversation please find enclosed a copy of a statement I made at the National Strategy Forum in Washington. The subject for discussion is connected with this matter and as you can imagine is of a somewhat sensitive nature.

Unless I hear to the contrary I will be at Number 10 at 10.30am on Monday 17th September.

Yours sincerely,



James Goldsmith

Enc.

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES V. THE FREE PRESS

A European Perspective

Address by

Sir James Goldsmith

**Publisher of *L'Express* Newsmagazine
Paris**

to the

Defense Strategy Forum

of the National Strategy Information Center

in cooperation with

**National Security Studies Program of
Georgetown University**

**Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies,
George Washington University**

**Washington, D.C.
May 22, 1984**

Freedom of the press is fundamental to the protection of the citizen against the power of the State. It is a prerequisite to liberty. Unconditionally we must fight for it.

But how should we react when allies of a totalitarian system try to use the freedom of our press as a protective screen behind which they can conspire to destroy freedom itself? Is the remedy to inhibit freedom of expression? No. The contrary is the case. The remedy is more investigation, more information and more publication of the truth. And for each of us in our own way to draw attention to the facts. That is my purpose today.

There are lessons to be learned from the conflict between Carthage and Rome. The Carthaginians were a great semitic people. When they needed to, they knew how to fight. Their greatest general, Hannibal, led his troops to victory in battles against Rome. But the Carthaginians were a mercantile civilisation. They were traders and merchants and they interpreted the motives of the Romans, according to mercantile logic. Rome was different. Rome's purpose was military conquest and imperial expansion. This, the Carthaginians were never able to understand and so ultimately Carthage was destroyed.

Today in the West we are like Carthage and Moscow like Rome. We seem incapable of understanding Moscow's way of thinking. We are mercantile and want to conduct our affairs in peace. We try to set our policies on the premise that the Soviets want to do the same. Everytime the Soviets embark on a new "peace" offensive, too many of us are pitifully eager to forget that this is no more than a modulation of Soviet tactics, not a change in their fundamental strategy.

Yet this should not be difficult for us to perceive. The 1977 Brezhnev constitution states quite officially that it is Soviet Russia's aim, indeed duty, to spread the Communist system to all countries of the world without exception. The Brezhnev Doctrine holds that once Communism is established in a country, it becomes irreversible. The U.S.S.R. would use military means to intervene in any country where Communist rule is threatened. On the other hand, Communist rule must be established in non-Communist countries. To achieve this, the Soviet Union would support "wars of national liberation" by harnessing genuine local revolutionary forces and guiding them to Marxist/Leninism. The Brezhnev Doctrine means that the movement can only go one way.

Nonetheless, many of us still want to believe that the problems that separate us are problems that can be resolved by negotiation and mutual goodwill. But unfortunately we must realise that we cannot find lasting peace through negotiation because what the Soviets really want we cannot negotiate. We cannot cede to them the right to progressive imperial conquest. We cannot negotiate away our freedom. We must face the fact that the antagonism between our two civilisations is not superficial but fundamental and that we are condemned to this state of affairs for the long term. There is no easy solution, no quick fix. The only way to peace is by doing whatever is necessary for both sides to realise that war cannot be won.

As a result of the West's defensive power, the Soviets recognise that their most effective current strategy is not armed conflict but instead to weaken us from within.

If they can make us lose our confidence, confuse our sense of purpose, weaken our resolve to defend ourselves, then they can win without armed conflict.

That has been their strategy in Europe. Their plan is clear:

- obtain overwhelming military, including nuclear, superiority so as to be able to exercise political blackmail.
- attempt to separate the USA and Europe and thereby encourage the withdrawal of US troops from Europe. This would eliminate automatic US involvement in a European war and isolate Europe.
- achieve substantial political power in each European country either through local Communist parties, or by infiltrating local socialist parties.
- penetrate and if possible dominate the key centres of power and more particularly the Trade Unions, the media, the Civil Service, etc.

If this can be accomplished, Europe would fall like a rotten fruit.

Their methods have been equally clear. Politically they have established Communist parties in each country. In Italy, France, Greece and Portugal, for example, these have grown to a substantial size, gaining between 12% and 30% of the vote. But whenever candidates, standing under the Communist party label, are unable to succeed at the ballot box, they switch labels and adopt the camouflage of Socialism. They penetrate local Socialist parties.

Recently in Great Britain, the Cabinet papers for Clement Attlee's period in office as Prime-Minister were declassified. They show that Attlee, a moderate Socialist leader, understood and stated clearly, as early as 1950, that as a result of the lack of electoral support, the Communist Party of the UK had changed its strategy from trying to obtain parliamentary representation to infiltrating the Socialist Party and other centres of power.

At the same time the Soviets, through skillful and coordinated use of their political allies and agents of influence, have worked to mould public opinion. Their major propaganda thrusts have been to encourage:—

- unilateral disarmament
- neutralism
- increased trade with the Soviet bloc
- anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism has a double benefit for the Soviets. Its impact in Europe is obvious. But also it encourages isolationism in America. If anti-American demonstrations are orchestrated every time a high profile American official visits Europe, and if the U.S. media give suitable prominence to the demonstrations, then resentment and isolationism are encouraged among Americans. Of course there will always be some anti-Americanism and some xenophobia just as there is always some temptation to seek peace by unilateral disarmament. The object of Soviet measures is to use these naturally occurring sentiments and to distort them, exaggerate them and manipulate them so as to serve Soviet purposes. One of their principal tools is propaganda. So they need the media.

Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Prize winner, smuggled out of Russia what he called his testament to the West. In it he described agents of influence working in the West for Soviet agencies. He wrote “these include some political figures, businessmen and a great many writers and journalists, Government advisers and heads of press and T.V.”

Also we have the testimony of a number of defectors who have held key positions in Soviet bloc intelligence. Men like Ladislav Bittman who was Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department (Department Eight) of the Czech Intelligence Service. He spent eight years

abroad directing and recruiting spies under the control of the KGB. And Stanislav Levchenko who worked as a journalist on the New Times but, in fact, was an important member of the KGB assigned to Tokyo with responsibilities for penetrating the Japanese media. There are many others.

Each one of these men has testified to the importance of recruiting journalists as their agents. Let me quote some extracts from Bittman's testimony. Bittman stated that he "focused on political figures and journalists". "The primary responsibility of these journalists was to publish articles and stories, but their pieces did not emphasize support for Soviet policy. Rather, the major focus concentrated on undermining the United States and NATO, and on creating rifts between West Germany and France or between the United States and its allies."

"I provided guidelines for the agents to follow. These consisted of a two or three page outline of objectives and themes to be covered. . . ."

"A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. A journalist operating in Great Britain, West Germany or the United States is a great asset to Communist Intelligence. He can be investigative, professionally curious, it is his job to get important and even highly sensitive information."

"There are many journalists who are agents. There are important newspapers around the world penetrated by Communist Intelligence Services. There are one or two journalists working for a particular paper and who are agents and who receive from time to time instructions to publish this story or that story. . . ."

Levchenko has stated:—

"In my own case, the most important influence agents I directed were journalists."

“A KGB officer generally focuses on recruiting two kinds of journalists. One type is the specialist in a particular subject area who possesses both sensitive information and connections with key individuals. . . . The second type of desired journalist is the individual with a wide following, or one associated with a newspaper with a wide distribution.”

“In general you provide guidelines, themes and objectives. You make suggestions and discuss how the agent might implement and accomplish the objective.”

These intelligence officials backed up their statements by supplying the names of those whom they had employed as agents of influence. Recently, there have been further defectors from Soviet Intelligence who were closely connected with the Soviet propaganda apparatus. They have confirmed the testimony of Bittman and Levchenko and have provided substantial further information.

Sometimes an apparently independent newspaper publishes with regularity articles which must cast doubt on the publication's claimed independence. Such a newspaper is Ethnos, Greece's largest daily tabloid.

Here are some examples of its reportings:

- On Poland:—Solidarity is a union working for the CIA and the Vatican which receives funds from the Mafia. The Pope's historical visit to Poland from 16th June to 23rd June 1983 was not reported.
- Afghanistan:—Afghanistan's resistants are described as a group of bandits whose crimes are similar to those of the Nazis. According to Ethnos there is no Afghan problem. It was artificially created to serve U.S. strategy.
- The Berlin Wall:—Ethnos describes this as the wall of peace which was built to prevent a

- planned Western attack against East Germany.
- Soviet Russia:—is described as the world's leading peace loving country.
 - The United States:—according to Ethnos, Reagan, with the FBI, have muzzled the American people; political liberty in the United States has never been under greater threat; the country is plunging into totalitarianism.
 - The Korean Airlines Jumbo Jet:—according to Ethnos the incident was a deliberate provocation by the CIA to spy on Soviet Russia.
 - Grenada:—Ethnos announced that 2,000 people were killed during the first day of the invasion.

A young Greek journalist, Paul Anastasi, carried out an investigation into Ethnos. He published a book in which he alleged that he had uncovered links between the publishers of Ethnos and two important Soviet agents, Boris Pankin, a senior KGB officer, and Vassili Sitnikov, a leading Soviet agent of disinformation operating in Europe. The publishers of Ethnos have sued Paul Anastasi for criminal libel. He has been convicted to a prison sentence which is subject to appeal before the Greek courts. Mr. Anastasi has counter-sued Ethnos. Let us hope that the Western press will watch these cases with interest and concern.

I realize that for a number of people in the audience, the facts that I am describing are commonplace. Their academic, government or journalistic work has made them familiar with these problems. Nonetheless, I hope that they will bear with me while I cover the generalities before reaching a conclusion.

The apparatus in Moscow which is responsible for propaganda is extensive. The leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) regards

propaganda as an indispensable adjunct to Soviet foreign policy and military strategy. Evidence is available which indicates that the investment by the Soviets in propaganda is between \$3 and \$4 billion per annum. In addition to this there are the investments made by those countries which the Soviets use as a secondary instrument in their propaganda effort and more particularly the European satellite countries and Libya and Cuba. There are three major organisations under the Politburo that direct the propaganda apparatus. First, is the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) headed by Boris Ponomarev, an alternative member of the Politburo. Second, is the CPSU's International Information Department (IID) headed by Leonid Zamyatin, the former director of the Soviet news agency, Tass. Working alongside the IID is the KGB controlled covert propaganda organisation called Service A which is part of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Service A plans, coordinates and supports secret operations which are designed to back-up overt Soviet propaganda. Service A supports KGB residencies in every Western Capital in planting rumours, forgeries, agents of influence in the media and government. It is estimated that as many as 15,000 Soviet officials are working in these organisations. In addition, Moscow coordinates similar organisations run by its Eastern European, Cuban and Vietnamese allies. The campaign orchestrated by this apparatus are known by the Soviets as "Active Measures."

An analysis of the principal Soviet front organisations illustrates the breadth of the active measures effort. One of the major organisations is the "World Peace Council" (WPC). It originated in 1949 from the "World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace." The WPC owns a

number of publications which are published in English, French, Spanish and German. Its principal propaganda objective is to encourage the West to disarm. The WPC conducts its operations on a worldwide basis and it has spawned regional and national peace committees.

The "World Federation of Trade Unions" (WFTU) established in 1945 is another Communist front. Its objective is described as the comprehensive support and defence of the world socialist system and it orchestrates campaigns against multi-national companies and in favour of union power. It has been granted Category A status by the United Nations along with UNESCO and the Food and Agricultural Organisation.

The "World Federation of Democratic Youth" (WFDY) and the "International Union of Students" has the task of influencing youth.

The "International Organisation of Journalists" (IOJ) has as an avowed aim the defence "of freedom of the press and journalists". A major activity of the IOJ is the training of journalists in the IOJ's main schools which are located in Budapest, East Berlin, Prague and Sofia and further schools are planned in Havana and Algiers.

The "Christian Peace Conference" (CPC) claims to be a "forum at which Christians from all over the world will meet together and search for God's will concerning current political, social and economic problems."

The "Women's International Democratic Federation" (WIDF) has as avowed goals "to unite women regardless of race, nationality, religion or political opinions so that they may win and defend their rights as citizens, mothers and workers . . ."

You will notice that each of these organisations plays on genuine matters of concern in our society: peace; trade unions; education of the young; freedom of the

press; freedom of worship; women's rights. I mentioned earlier that in the Third World, the Soviets harness genuine revolutionary sentiments so as to guide "wars of national liberation" to Marxist/Leninism. So in the West, they try to harness genuine issues to use them to promote the interests of Marxist/Leninism.

There are a multitude of other major Communist front organisations, such as the "International Association of Democratic Lawyers" (IADL), the "International Radio and Television Organisation" (ORIT), the "World Federation of Scientific Workers" (WFSW) and the "International Federation of Resistance Fighters" (IFRF), etc., etc.

Each of these organisations has sponsored sub-organisations at international, national and local level and publishes magazines, bulletins, etc. Each of these organisations can be shown to be a Communist front with links to Moscow.

As is normal with the Soviet structure, these organisations are supplemented by another layer of front organisations, which pose as independent western charities and institutes.

An example of a Soviet propaganda campaign was the campaign against the neutron warhead. It was part of the Soviet general campaign aimed at preventing NATO from modernising its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF).

The campaign was lead by the World Peace Council who declared the 6th to 13th August, 1977, as an international "week of action". It then became a coordinated effort of the whole propaganda apparatus including the use of agitprop. The sequence of events was:—

- Peace councils in various East European States held protest meetings.

- In Istanbul, a peace committee demonstrated in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- In Accra, a group delivered a protest letter to the U.S. Embassy.
- In Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, front groups organised demonstrations in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- Similar agitation was carried out by front groups in Lima and Tanzania, as well as a Peruvian protest to the United Nations.
- Other major international fronts such as the "World Federation of Trade Unions" participated in the international week of action.

Also there were the series of Communist-planned conferences in Europe. The target of this effort was the United Nations "Special Session on Disarmament" (SSOD) to be held in New York from 23rd May to 28th June. Three conferences were organised to provide psychological momentum to the SSOD. The World Peace Council, through one of its sub-fronts, the "International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces", organised a symposium from the 6th to 8th February in Vienna on "Nuclear Energy and the Arms Race" in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body. A larger meeting was staged in Geneva from 22nd February to 2nd March under the group calling itself the "Special Non-Government Organisations Committee for Disarmament." In fact the real organiser was the World Peace Council aided by the Swiss peace movement. Then there was the "International Forum on the Neutron Bomb" held from the 18th to 20th March in Amsterdam. Sympathisers from all over Europe were brought in for the meeting which culminated on 19th March in a demonstration by some 40,000 people.

There were many other meetings used for the same purpose and organised by the World Peace Council, including one in Mexico City from the 1st to 4th February and another from the 9th to 12th February in Athens.

All this activity was picked up in the Western media. NATO Secretary-General Luns described this Press comment as all consisting of "half truths, untruths and ignorance."

On 8th April 1978 it was announced that President Carter had decided to delay the production and deployment of the neutron warhead.

The chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Bercz, wrote that the "political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War II."

Another type of propaganda campaign is the type which attempts to discredit an individual.

A good example was the campaign to discredit Franz Josef Strauss. Strauss was a young up and coming Minister in Adenauer's Government. In 1956, aged 41, he was promoted to Minister of Defense. As such he made a major speech in the Bundestag calling for the deployment on German soil of U.S. controlled nuclear weapons so as to counter-balance the growing Soviet threat. The disarming and neutering of Europe had already become a primary Soviet strategy. So Strauss became a prime target.

The campaign, which was intensive and long lasting, followed traditional lines:

- photos, subsequently proven to be fabrications, depicting Strauss in sexually compromising situations, were published in the East European Communist press and distributed to West Germany.

- efforts were made to smear Strauss by linking him to a murder trial, the Praun affair. Praun was a dentist charged with a double murder. A journalist ran a story associating Strauss with the case. Strauss took legal action and won the case.
- efforts were made to impugn Strauss's honesty. In 1962 he was accused by a leftist publication of recommending to the US, for a major development project on U.S. bases in Germany, an apartment designer Lothar Schoss who was connected to the company Finanzbau A.G. (Fibag). It was suggested that Strauss was to share in the Fibag profits. Judicial and Parliamentary investigations followed and both cleared Strauss of misusing influence. Strauss also won a libel action before the Nuremberg courts.
- It was also suggested that Strauss secretly negotiated to buy for \$375,000 cash the Casa Rocca-vispa villa in Switzerland. The real estate agent testified in court that he had been surprised to read the entirely false story but he welcomed the publicity.
- efforts were made to link Strauss with the Lockheed scandal. Compromising documents were circulated and these were subsequently shown to be forgeries.

Strauss was forced to sue for libel on many occasions and won case after case. And there was the Fallex affair. This was Germany's equivalent of the Pentagon Papers. Top secret military information was passed to a major German weekly by a Defence Ministry employee, Colonel Martin. This included details of the NATO evaluation of the military exercise known as Fallex—62.

The article which followed was specific and published such information as: Hamburg would not be defended; the timetable for plans to move NATO aircraft to bases that were not normally used; troop transport timetables; plans for mining Bavarian forests to free US troops there for combat, etc.

Adenauer, in Parliament, called the publication of the article an "abyss of treason". Following a formal complaint of treason, the police raided the offices of the publication at 10 p.m. October 26th 1962 on orders of the Federal Prosecutor. The editor was arrested. But it was Strauss who was punished. He was accused of over-reacting against the press.

He resigned from the Adenauer Government on November 30th. It was subsequently written that "almost everyone concedes that one of the most brilliant post war political careers in West Germany is in ruins" and that some particularly hostile journalists had "expended time, effort, and money, risking jail and credibility with unsubstantiated charges to prevent Strauss from becoming Chancellor and had won".

General Sejna, the high ranking Czech intelligence defector, testified that the campaign to discredit Franz Josef Strauss was orchestrated by the KGB. This does not mean that the publications or journalists involved knowingly participated or realised that their views were being manipulated and used by the Soviets for their purposes.

It is important to understand how such campaigns gather momentum. The overwhelming majority of the journalists who get caught up in such a campaign do not understand the origins or purpose of the campaign. Those responsible for the publications that are used as platforms usually do not realise that they are being used.

The campaigns often begin as a result of a clear policy decision taken by the Soviet propaganda apparatus. The apparatus brings into play all its assets, both overt and covert. You will find that most of the major themes are developed in a coordinated way in that part of the media which is directly controlled by Communist organisations throughout the world, as well as by the Front organisations and the covert network.

As explained by the defectors such as Levchenko, Bittman and others, the covert activities are initiated by general instructions being given to KGB agents of influence. They start by publishing articles reflecting these instructions. The work of the inner core of agents and front organisations then influences a far larger group of sympathetic left leaning journalists. Those are the people described by Lenin as "useful idiots". They do not realise that they are an extension to the Soviet propaganda apparatus and would indignantly and sincerely reject any such suggestion.

Then comes the outer layer consisting of those who follow fashion and seek easy praise.

Responsible journalists can also be disinformed by these campaigns. When a journalist works on an article, he refers to the press cuttings file which covers the subject about which he is writing. Information included in these files, particularly when it originates from responsible publications and has not been corrected, will be used over and over again. So, once the press cuttings files have been polluted by propaganda, the false information will be repeated quite innocently and as it is repeated will gather further credibility and momentum. Responsible journalists go to great lengths to check a statement in cuttings, but inevitably even they can become victims of disinformation.

So, the media faces a major challenge. How can it

defend itself from these campaigns without restricting freedom of expression. Here are some thoughts. We need more information, more disclosure, wider publication of the facts. In other words more and better journalism. The better informed the public, the better equipped it is to be able to distinguish between news and active measures that distort the news. Therefore the media is central to the solution.

I do not have a list of measures which would solve all our problems. Rather I will propose general ideas that need discussion and which concern all propaganda whatever its origins. The implementation of such ideas has both advantages and disadvantages and these need to be assessed. But they all have a common objective—to increase the flow of information so as to enable the media to better inform the public.

1. The Role of the Executive branch of Government

The last thing that we want is any form of Government control, direct or indirect, of the media. That way lies disaster. The Government can have a useful role as a provider of information. In the last years of the Carter Administration, the U.S. government decided to make available details of major Soviet active measures including forgeries, disinformation, etc. The media could then analyse this information and draw its own conclusions. The Reagan administration has continued the practice.

European Governments should do likewise. So far they have failed to find the courage.

Furthermore Governments should set up a system for objective worldwide monitoring of Communist controlled media to identify major propaganda themes and possible agents of influence. The results, without editorial comment, should be made available to the media.

Major Soviet active measures and themes can be identified in several ways. One is to study the statements of the leading Soviet bloc propagandists. The interviews and public writings of Ponomarev, Zamyatin, and their deputies such as Fallin, Zagladin, Bovin, etc. tell us a great deal. When senior propagandists make coordinated statements, it almost always reflects Politburo policy.

A second technique that can be used to identify themes objectively is by making a computer analysis of the content of overtly controlled Communist media. Techniques have been developed to examine, systematically, the substance of mass communications. This involves analysing the content of data over a specified period of time by classification and statistical tabulation. To complement this, quantitative content analysis should also be combined with descriptive textual analysis. This allows objective identification of major thematic trends and the focus of Soviet foreign propaganda.

Having identified the Soviet themes, it is possible to compare them with the editorial record of newspapers, TV programs, journals, newsletters, or that of particular journalists. If there is consistent harmony over a period of time, this should be cause for concern. Of course, it is not, ipso facto, proof of conscious collaboration. But it does deserve analysis.

These measures are part of the flow of information which a free country should consider normal.

2. The Role of Legislation

European Parliaments should enact legislation similar to your Foreign Agents Registration Act, perhaps eliminating certain of its exemptions. The purpose is to ensure that nationals employed as agents by foreign countries would need to disclose the identity of their

employers and their terms of employment. But this is not sufficient. Today there are too many front organisations which are apparently local and independent. So a more global system is necessary. What we need is a system that supplies the media with as much information as possible so as to help it defend itself against covert influence and which does so without either restricting freedom of expression or unduly invading privacy. The principle of disclosure of interests is now generally accepted with regards to public servants. In business, this is also true. It does not yet apply to the media. But the media faces problems which call for some form of disclosure. For example, in Britain there is a hard left newspaper called *Militant*. It has achieved substantial influence and is the organ of a powerful group of hard left politicians. Its sources of finance have often been questioned but few answers have been supplied. Is this right? Obviously in a free society journals of all political persuasions, even the most obnoxious, must be as free as any other publication. But should they be able to promote their ideas without the public knowing who they represent and who are their paymasters? My own view is that those sections of the media that are part of the political process should publish detailed statements of their sources of funding.

Institutes, councils and so forth, many of which present themselves as charities or institutes of learning, can also pose a problem. Some of them are propaganda organisations which have the clear vocation of influencing the political process.

Should we have the right to know from whom they raise money and to whom they disburse it? Again I believe that we should.

Then there are those who work in the media and who daily affect the political life of their communities.

Should they be asked to disclose their interests? Obviously the idea of invasion of privacy is odious to us all. But are journalists less influential than public servants or businessmen? I think not. Here is a recent example which gives rise to differences of opinion among reasonable men. Alexander Coburn is a political journalist who writes, inter alia, for The Village Voice and for The Wall Street Journal. He often comments on world affairs. Some months ago it was discovered that he had received a grant from the Institute for Palestine Studies. I have no knowledge of this Institute nor of Mr. Coburn's relationship with it. So I can pass no judgement. But obviously there must be room for different opinions as to whether or not this payment was professionally appropriate. That is proven by the fact that the editors of The Village Voice and of The Wall Street Journal, both of whom were taken by surprise, reacted differently. The Village Voice severed its relationship with Mr. Coburn whereas The Wall Street Journal maintained it. That is a genuine difference in the assessment of the facts. But how do editors make these judgements if they do not have the facts to assess?

3. The Role of Owner/Publishers and Editors

Toqueville in his book "The Origins of the French Revolution" analysed the question as to why the French Revolution should have taken place in France rather than elsewhere in Europe. He pointed out that, at the time, French peasants had a better standard of living than in neighbouring countries. His conclusion was that the French aristocracy failed because they wanted privilege without responsibility.

Today in Europe, owner/publishers enjoy the glamour and influence of press ownership but when it comes to hard decisions they often like to hide behind their editors. In other words they want the privileges without

the responsibilities. Such men and women forfeit the moral right to own.

Owner/publishers and editors must work as a true partnership. Neither has a monopoly of virtue. Both have a responsibility for whatsoever is published in their journal. It is their responsibility to set the standards. Among those standards, they need to consider a requirement to disclose, when desirable, the sources and bias of the material that is published. This concerns both op-ed pages and news pages.

The op-ed pages publish opinions. The question is how much information do readers need about the person who is expressing the opinions. In commercial matters this is simple. If a newspaper publishes an opinion on the quality of airlines, the editor would consider it appropriate to disclose to his readers the fact that the author is the Chairman of Pan Am. But what about politics and philosophy? Regularly I see pieces published on the op-ed pages of journals of reference written by authors who are sponsored, for example, by the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. Sometimes that connection remains undisclosed. Sometimes the name of the Institute is published but without explanation. The name of the Institute on its own means little to the average reader. Yet all of us who study these matters know that the Institute for Policy Studies is a powerful leftist propaganda organisation in contact with the Communist bloc. We in Europe know it through its European associate, the Transnational Institute. Of course there can be no objection to the publication of articles sponsored by them. But how far should the editor go to inform his readers as to the sources and bias of the opinions he is publishing? That is a question that needs debate.

Editors can have similar problems on their news

pages. In London the other day, I read a copy of The Sunday Times which published on its front page an article by Mr. Martin Kettle analysing the current coal miners strike. This strike is a direct political challenge to the Government. The leader of the National Union of Mine Workers is Mr. Arthur Scargill who is a Marxist. His Vice-President is Mr. Mick McGahey who is a leading member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Mr. Kettle is a regular contributor to the publication, Marxism Today. This is published by the Communist Party of Great Britain and describes itself as the "theoretical and discussion journal of the Communist Party". Further on in the same issue of the Sunday Times, there was a long article on America and Nicaragua. It was co-authored by Mr. Mark Hosenball. Mr. Hosenball has been closely connected for many years with Mr. Philip Agee, the CIA defector who cooperated with the Communist bloc. The British Government, under Prime Minister James Callaghan, took steps to expel from Britain both Mr. Agee and Mr. Hosenball on grounds of national security.

None of this would matter if the articles had been published in a journal well known for publishing the work of far left authors. But The Sunday Times is a great national institution. Most of its readers would expect the articles they read in The Sunday Times to be objective journalism written by objective journalists. Unfortunately over the past decade, The Sunday Times recruited a number of people from a different culture to that of the paper's heritage. Lord Thomson, who owned the paper at the time, recognised this but felt too old to do anything about it. In any case he was more interested in commerce than in issues. The result can best be illustrated by quoting from a book called

“Journey into Journalism” written by the well known playwright, Arnold Wesker. This is a book about Mr. Wesker’s experience in The Sunday Times when he was gathering background material for his play “The Journalists.” The Sunday Times attempted to stop its publication. In it Mr. Wesker describes his visit to the Business Section of The Sunday Times and his talks with some of their financial journalists. This is what he says and how he quotes them:—“Far from being pillars of capitalist society they seem to me an army of very bright urban saboteurs.” “You see” Mr. Wesker quotes them as saying “it is a question of the credibility of The Sunday Times, which, as an old conservative family newspaper, commands more respect than, say The Observer, which is known for its liberal policies, and therefore we are a better journal through which to infiltrate radical views—more people will believe us.”

How do you handle this problem? What disclosures are necessary? The trouble with today’s intellectual environment is that few dare discuss the problem. It attracts accusations of McCarthyism. It is taboo. That must be wrong. It is a genuine problem which needs free and open discussion.

4. The Role of Schools of Journalism

Part of the curriculum for training journalists should be a course on propaganda and Active Measures. It should teach how to identify them and how to defend against them. Of course, this should not be restricted to Soviet or far left propaganda. It should cover the whole spectrum. The enactment of your Foreign Agents Registration Act was a reaction against pre-war Nazi propaganda.

5. The Role of Journalists

My whole thesis is that in a free country the best remedy is wide publication of the true facts. According

to the best traditions of the free press, journalists should investigate and publish. But they face a problem. There is a tradition of forbidden areas. Dog must not eat dog. Not only is it unpopular to expose a colleague or a journal but it is also difficult to find papers who would publish your material. Investigation should not be concentrated on the unpopular. It takes no courage to be fashionable, to express conventional wisdom and comfortably to join the pack in attacking the same wounded stag. Courage resides in saying the truth that does not please and which can make you a pariah in the eyes of your peers. That precisely is the duty of the press and one of the great justifications for the freedom of the press.

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CEPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August 1984

Dear Charles,

"USSR in Crisis"

/ You said recently that the Prime Minister would like to see a copy of this book (by Marshall Goldman). I enclose one, which you will note comes from the University of London library: the FCO copy is out on loan to HM Ambassador in Vienna!

/ I also enclose a copy of a review of the book by Dr Hanson (a leading British commentator on the Soviet economy at Birmingham University).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



Florence
M

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister.

Yes no

I don't want to
inflict too many of our
Ambassadors on you.

But Ian Sutherland
is back on leave from
Moscow.

If you would like to
see him there is a half-
hour slot next Tuesday.

C.D.P. 29/8

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file JFM
CCPCV

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 August 1984

Mr Kinnock's Visit to Moscow: November 1984

Thank you for your letter of 3 August about Mr Kinnock's visit to Moscow in late November.

The Prime Minister has commented that we should give all help possible. She approves specifically the various proposals listed in (a) to (f) in your letter.

C D Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Agree that Mr.

3 August 1984

Dear Charles,

Yes - please give all help possible

Kinnock's visit should be handled in this way?

CDP
3/8.

Mr Kinnock's Visit to Moscow: November 1984

You may like to know that a member of Mr Kinnock's office called at the FCO on 27 July to discuss this visit, planned for late November (either 19-23 or 21-27). The plan is for Messrs Kinnock and Healey to call on Gromyko and Chernenko, although the arrangements have not yet been confirmed on the Soviet side.

Against that background we have been considering how far the Embassy should go in helping these visitors. We propose:

- ✓ (a) that HM Ambassador should offer to accommodate Messrs Kinnock and Healey;
- ✓ (b) that he should be at the airport to meet the party;
- ✓ (c) that he should give some form of entertainment for Mr Kinnock to include Russian guests;
- ✓ (d) that the Embassy should in general offer administrative assistance to ensure that the visit is properly organised and that Mr Kinnock gets a well-balanced view of the Moscow scene;
- ✓ (e) that we should offer a Counsellor or the Minister to attend the main calls ;
- ✓ (f) that we should offer the party a briefing at the FCO before their departure.

It would be helpful if you could let me know at an early stage whether you have any comments on these proposals.

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



House of Lords

ms

Prime Minister

an

I thought you might like to see
the enclosed note about my visit
to Russia with the Anglo Soviet
round table in May

Angus Thomas
Aug 2, 1984

Box

A Journey to Russia and Finland

P R O G R A M M E

of the Eighth Soviet-British Round Table symposium on the
problems of security and cooperation in Europe, Moscow,

16-17 May 1984

∟This is a transcription of the Russian programme∟

- Tuesday - 17.40 - Arrival of participants at the
May 15 'Sheremetyevo-2' Airport
- 20.00 - Dinner. Discussing the programme of
Symposium
- Wednesday - 8.45 - Breakfast at the Hotel
May 16 - 9.30 - Leaving for IMEMO
- 10.00-11.30 - Opening session
- 11.30-12.00 - Coffee break
- 12.00-13.00 - Plenary session
- 13.30-15.00 - Lunch
- 15.00-17.00 - Evening session
- Evening: attending performance at Bolshoi Theatre
- Thursday - 8.45-9.20 - Breakfast at the Hotel
May 17 - 9.30 - Leaving for IMEMO
- 10.00-11.30 - Plenary session
- 11.30- 12.00 - Coffee break
- 12.00-13.30 - Plenary session
- 13.30-15.00 - Lunch
- 15.00-17.00 - Final session
- 20.00 - Reception at the Embassy of Great Britain
- Friday - 8.45-9.20 - Breakfast at the Hotel
May 18 - 9.30 - 13.30 - Reserved time
- 14.00 -16.00 - Lunch party
- 17.55 - Departure of the foreign (Sic; who were the
rest?) participants.
(ie Sir F. Bolton, Lord Chalfont, Lord Harlech,
J. Robertson)

- 23.53 - Leaving for Leningrad

Saturday - Arriving in Leningrad

May 19 - Breakfast

- Sightseeing of Leningrad

- Visiting Hermitage Museum

- Visiting Isaak Cathedral

- Evening: attending performance at a Leningrad
theatre

Sunday - 11.25 - Departure to London by air from Leningrad

May 20

15 May 1984

I accepted an invitation to go on the British group attending the Anglo-Soviet round table in Moscow, May 1984. The British group were Admiral Sir James Eberle, the new director of Chatham House; David Harlech, the retiring chairman of the same; Alun Chalfont; John Roper also now in Chatham House; Andrew Knight, editor of the Economist; Sir Fred Bolton, chairman of the British Council of Shipping; George Robertson, a deputy to Healey, Labour MP for Hamilton; a secretary, Caroline Adams; and Michael Kaser, who alone of the above speaks Russian and who is Reader in Soviet economics at St Anthony's.

May 15

We are just setting off from London to Moscow in a Russian version of a VC 10. The Russian air hostess is telling us how to put on the lifejacket. Apart from letters in cyrillic, and the Russian preceding English in all instructions, there is little difference between this journey hitherto than any other such expedition. The 'team' assembled rather sporadically at Heathrow with the bonhomie normal on such occasions: I had coffee before departure in the departure lounge with Andrew Knight and David Harlech. The latter explained that he would not be too unhappy if the plane were to leave without us.

London was grey when we left - the sun of the last few weeks has gone and Ladbroke Square was deserted except for Webber digging in the circle by the blackbird's house. He made a gesture with his hands to indicate good wishes. The paths were heavy with fallen may and cherry blossom.

Huysmans' famous nineteenth century "journey" to London in A Rebours (which he cancelled at the last minute because he could not stand the idea of London's fogs, steam etc, as reported by Verlaine) rather influenced my reaction to this Moscow journey. When I thought of the obfuscation, the tedium, the dishonesty, the evasion of modern Russia, not to speak of the hideous new building, at the last minute I was half inclined not to go. When to this craven hesitation is added the fact that I am very happy when I am sitting in my own library in Ladbroke Grove, especially in May when I can have the door open into the garden, and I always think of such journeys as a waste of time from my book, I am surprised that I gathered the decision to go at all.

My chief difficulty hitherto has been self-induced. I wrote to Francis Haskell saying I was going to Moscow and Leningrad and he said "good, go and see my friends in the Hermitage and could you take the catalogue of the Romanesque exhibition? I said, of course, and a very heavy book arrived - 3½ pounds! It would not go into my well arranged bag. It adds much to my troubles.

The journey was effortless. George Robertson, and the Admiral exchanged jokes. There was lunch. A glass of "wine": could it have been parsnip wine? In the lavatory there was a shoebrush as well as a clothes brush. The plane was half full of a tour, but we had the first two rows in the economy class section and were more comfortable than in Concorde. In the first class compartment a group of aparachiks kept to themselves. A woman in a long brown leather coat looked like an agent in an early Grahame Greene novel. Desultory conversation. The admiral had prepared a few briefs which I did not read.

At Moscow airport, Sheremetyevo, built for the Olympics in 1980, we arrived at 5.40 their time - I think 2.40 ours. On time and indeed not much longer than the Concorde to New York two weeks ago. Russia lay beneath - fields and woodland. Very green. On arrival, it was warm and I was glad not to have a coat, as everyone else did. We were welcomed by a secretary from the Embassy (red haired Mr Meyer) and three members of the "hosts' organisation" - Mr Bykov, Mr Martynov and Mr Perenosov of IMEMO. They greeted us warmly, took our passports and luggage tags (I had none). We waited with them over coffee in the VIP lounge. Chalfont said later that Karpov the chess champion was being met also. If so, I did not see him. There was a friendly atmosphere and we chatted, but it took a very long time, at least an hour, other delegates passing us by, for us to get clearance. I had met Bykov and Martynov before in London, at last year's round table. Tall, smooth, executive, excellent English, Bykov could easily be an American and I recalled that another Bykov had played some part in the Hiss case: his father? However, Michael Kaser says Bykov is a very common name in Russia. Bykov said to me "of course your Prime Minister has said some harsh things about us but personally I must admit to admiration for her."

At the bar in the front lounge a Russian looking exactly like Rafael Alberti sat and talked. I asked him if he was Alberti. He refused the compliment but seemed to know about whom I was talking. Perhaps because of this intrusion of normality, Martynov suggested that we should go to a better VIP lounge, which we did. Here there were no windows, plenty of chairs, but no other delegations. It was much duller. We sat there and chatted on a bit more. Mr Bykov told me that he could recognise "a Brit from a very long way off" - something about his stance, skin, clothes combined. I said the Russians were often physically indistinguishable from us. Bykov disagreed.

Eventually the luggage came and we left, again waiting outside this time in the warm evening. (Alun Chalfont in his article in the Daily Telegraph on June 7 said it was a sparkling May morning. I find it hard to understand how he could have made that mistake.) A bus took us to Moscow. I took special, and I suppose absurd, care not to allow anyone to handle my own bag. Each of our team sat in separate seats with his luggage, and there was also the 3 hosts. The Embassy secretary vanished. Michael Kaser sensibly had an up-to-date guidebook and told us something of the route. My 1914 Baedeker was useless. The journey was first past birch woods, remarkably similar to

those of Maryland two weeks ago. Fresh green young trees. Less traffic than in Maryland though, and instead there is a VIP lane (if that's what it was). We passed the memorial - a tank trap - to where the Germans had got on their drive to Moscow in 1941 and then crossed into Moscow proper, still driving along a long straight avenue which lay next the Moscow River. A few pre-war blocks were to be seen, several tower blocks and the Peter Palace where Napoleon stayed in 1812 on his abortive effort to conquer Russia and where Czar Nicholas had fled to during the execution of the Decembrists in 1825. This was then well outside Moscow in that section of the surrounding park which is still a public one. Now the Dynamo football ground is close by, and we passed that also. The park, according to a quotation in Laurence Kelly's excellent guide, was "once fashionable."

We reached the hotel, Sovietskaya, where we were to stay. A pale freckled worried guide called Alexei, looking left and right continuously, joined us. I saw him outside the bus and concluded that he was also from the Embassy. His features were deceptive. He is a young Russian with adequate English and not much knowledge of how his system of government works. The hotel is a large building built before 1914 I think, pillars, high ceilings, broad staircase and frequent chandeliers. The bedrooms are the size of a stable, the walls hung with green cloth, furniture heavy and wooden, the beds vast. I had two bathrooms and a large separate writing room, with an (upright) piano in my room, a setback special sofa section, huge french windows onto balconies, one of which opens onto what appears to be woodland. Clearly our hosts want to make us happy. John Roper said had I been a hereditary peer I might have had a grand piano.

After a very short unpacking and washing time, we met downstairs at 8.15 and went to dine in the restaurant which, Michael Kaser says, was where Rasputin made a famous scene in 1915. But it is not quite clear whether this is exactly the same Yar restaurant, where the gypsies used to dance, or that it is another one on the same site. The 1914 guidebook says, among restaurants, "Yar, much frequented in the evening (not cheap)". The large restaurant anyway had a feeling of China, with a band and innumerable tables and a few dancers in the swirling gloom. We dined apart, in a separate room, I had vodka and Bulgarian wine, with smoked salmon and other smoked fishes as well as some meat. Good vodka, bad wine. Fairly quiet dinner. I sat between the Admiral and Perenosov. The latter told me about the joys of Sussex University where he'd been in 1966. (It subsequently turned out that Pereonosov is not only the chief administartor of our hosts, the Institute for the Study of the World Economy - IMEMO - but he is also its chief policeman: the man who can get things done. Opposite was David Harlech who told me why he is not planning to write a memoir about his time in Washington during the Kennedy days. (Too many people still alive: Harold Macmillan in particular). One brief toast from Bykov who wished us "comfort and rest" in Moscow. No one answered. First black mark to the Admiral, I thought.

After dinner a small group of us went on a brief walk in the nearby park. It looked pretty and seemed untroubled. George Robertson, whom I did not know before this journey, made many jokes in his broad cheerful Scots accent. He seems sensible, on the Right of his party, lively as well. We reached the Dynamo underground, but nobody had any money so we returned home on foot. Alun Chalfont was last seen asking patiently if he could have breakfast in his room. A very obvious lady of the night in furs patrolled the woods.

May 16th


I slept well though it was as well to have arranged to be called since otherwise, despite daylight, I should not have been able to wake up at five o'clock English time. Michael Kaser fixed this. All the instructions in the room were in Russian except for the very urgent and explicit fire instructions. There are bath plugs.

Breakfast. 3 lightly fried eggs. I arrived later than the others and ate at a table on the side at which sat two Russians, one of whom was reading Smiley's People, in English. At the other table there was a group of Indians. Alexei the guide worried whether I would like something else than eggs. Then he said, "Please, Lord Thomas, do not be late. Be in the bus by 9.30".

The bus drove us past the Warsaw station to the IMEMO building. Trams. Streets fairly full of quite well dressed pedestrians: not much difference from the West in dress in the street - women's clothes notably superior to what I remember from 1960. The trees being out, Moscow also presented a rather appealing impression, with many more old buildings than I recalled. We saw the queue lining up already, near the tomb of Lenin curling down into Alexander Gardens. We saw Red Square in the distance, and a group of red hatted little "pioneers" waiting to go into the Kremlin. We passed the Manège, which used to be the Tsar's stable and the Kremlin car park. I imagined Stalin's car being summoned and shooting out at uncontrollable speed. It is now an exhibition hall. We passed the Lenin Library and a famous grey 1920ish apartment block where the names of Mikoyan and of Tukhachevsky were on the outside to proclaim the fact that they'd lived there - presumably Tukhachevsky had gone from there to his execution. We also passed the "house of the people" from which it seems Lenin once addressed the people.

We had not started from the hotel at exactly 9.30 and so we were a little late (not my fault). The soberly dressed Soviet group looked decidedly cross, though they all stood up. This was perhaps the fault of Alexei, who looked perplexed, not sorry

The conference room in IMEMO is about 100 feet long and 40 feet broad. At the right, as we came in there is a large tapestry commemorating the history of Moscow. Facing us were three large windows with ruched lace curtains and two or three layers of desks and chairs thus



The tables are heavy pinewood, the brown chairs leather, tipped. We had in front of us little identity cards with our Russian names one one side ("АОПА ТОМАС") and English on the other. There are 3 trays of potted flowers between us. The room is high and lit by a chandelier.

Introduction and presentation of the Soviet group by Mr Yakovlev, who looked very oriental. The cardinal problem of our time was the nuclear threat. The use of our talks was to remove the obstacles to disarmament. Yakovlev introduced his colleagues and they introduced themselves:

Mr Falin; a wild looking journalist on Izvestia, actually ex-ambassador to, and apparently specialist in disinformation in, Bonn.

Menshikov, son of the ambassador to the US in the 50's, in the Central Committee, heavy, who looked like a disagreeable Jimmy Goldsmith.

Martynov, with whom we dined last night and met us.

General Mikhailov; in uniform and medals; major general, 6 rows of ribbons.

Mr Trifomenko; US/Canada institute.

Dr Skorov: " " " " very good English, slight.

Mordinov: Gosplan - heavy.

Semyonov: Foreign Office.

We introduced ourselves also.

The admiral then made a brisk and good statement of what we took to be the western position to urgent problems. While he spoke, the Russians all took notes, occasionally sitting back and sighing. Like the bus which brought us to IMEMO, the microphone and equipment for interpreters (impeccable, from the end of the room) were made in Hungary. The admiral, who had sometimes seemed out of his depth up to now, made a good firm statement, but thereafter his control over the proceedings slipped. We none of us had any agenda. It was Yakovlev who decided whether we should discuss disarmament, Middle East, or what. A lack of leadership, I'm afraid, characterised our group, all the worse since we included people who were quite good at leading groups of this sort (Harlech, Chalfont).

Mr Yakovlev, who is quite Asiatic in appearance and therefore perhaps not related to Herzen's father of that name, replied that he was glad to see the admiral worried. So too were the Democrats in the US. The Reagan administration aimed at superiority in nuclear weapons and these were not aimed at the USSR alone. US missiles in Western Europe added an extra dimension. He then continued with a long onslaught against President Reagan. With the Pershings, he said, the arms race had entered a qualitatively new stage. The Americans were seeking ever more destructive means of war. The Pershings were only one side of the matter. 100s of millions were spent on first strike weapons and chemical weapons. Washington could afford anything for war nothing for peace. But the USSR could do anything to resist superiority. He was glad Eberle recognised that the USSR might feel encircled. The USSR was prepared to tackle production of nuclear weapons in disarmament discussions: "That we support a better international atmosphere ought to be well known to you. See Mr Chernenko's recent plans for eg a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in space, troop cuts in Europe, cuts in strategic weapons. The prevention of nuclear war should be the cornerstone of our policies."

Harlech then made a good speech easily delivered if a trifle degagé for the mood of the discussion. Yakovlev, he said, had exaggerated: we'd all be better off to have equal security at a lower level.

Mr Falin, the ex-ambassador in Bonn, now Izvestia, then spoke. Could it really be that the Pershings and Cruise were introduced to counter SS20! What nonsense! We should look back to 1977. General Haig had then said that the targets for the Pershings should be bases in Russia, communication centres etc. He was convinced from reading statements by Gene Rostow, Reagan, Haig etc, that the US is seeking superiority. Falin took a long time and was gloomy as befitted his physique. Alun Chalfont then made a firm statement saying that neither Pershing nor Cruise could be looked upon as a first strike weapon.

Yakovlev replied:

"We showed restraint over the Cuban missile crisis, for example. We withdrew then. We didn't complain when Senator Jackson intervened in Soviet affairs over the issue of Jewish

immigration. In Vietnam we showed restraint. We now ask the USA to do so for once."

Menshikov spoke next. He did so in excellent English, rather lazily and arrogantly, without any apology to his own colleagues who, of course, had to listen to the interpreter. He also recalled the missile crisis. (His father had been ambassador to the US and he himself is a member of the international secretariat in the Central Committee). Suppose the rockets remained there? Would they have constituted a danger to the US? No. But the missiles were thought to be a danger by the US. Perceptions were important. Now these new US missiles were perceived by the USSR as dangerous. He then returned to a heavy castigation of the West and the US on the missile issue. He thought the West needed education and was now receiving that education at Geneva in the fact that the USSR were not present!

George Robertson spoke next. He said he was different from the rest of us because he had to appeal to an electorate. That made things simpler for him. He thought questions of nuclear superiority profoundly academic. There was something of an attitude of "plague on both your houses" in Britain. He could not understand why the USSR did not return to Geneva. Also, why was Mr Falin so gloomy?

Mr Falin replied that he was a realistic optimist, not a pessimist.

Yakovlev: We are ready tomorrow to sit down at Geneva if we get the word.

General Mikhailov (K F Mikhailov):

I'm not a pessimist. A man with my past cannot be so (He did not explain what he meant). But the position in Europe is very dangerous. There are grounds for pessimism. We have withdrawn lots of troops from East Germany, we've put a moratorium on intermediate range nuclear forces, and we've made undertakings not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In reply, the West has insisted on war preparations. The US seeks to dominate the world and then dictate conditions. This is a purely military position. The US has not abandoned its first strike policy, it is developing chemical weapons and it is seeking to put nuclear weapons into outer space. The US seeks intervention in internal affairs of other states. That is mere terrorism. The US has 1500 military bases encircling the USSR. We had manoeuvres involving 100,000 men for the first time - whilst NATO countries have that every year. We have three aircraft carriers but they have antisubmarines. The US corps of marines outnumbers Soviet marines sixteen times.

General Mikhailov spoke without notes in a rather plaintive voice, insisting on his concern over the world situation. But afterwards he was much the brightest and most jovial of our colleagues.

Admiral Eberle then said that he had to believe the General was entirely sincere. Yet all the things said by

General Mikhailov could be said by the US of the USSR. We are still at the beginning of the dialogue, yet already "We are in a total mirror-image-situation".

With this infelicitous, if I suppose accurate, remark, about 1.30, we adjourned for lunch, walking to the nearby restaurant Tchereymutshki, so called after the village that used to be on that spot before Moscow had grown up around it. As usual, we were not allowed into the restaurant proper but were put into a private room so that we could see nothing of the life of the Muscovites, or of academicians - IMEMO is in the zone of Moscow characterised by institutes etc. (I suppose we were on the road to the Sparrow Hills). Note: I notice that Donald Maclean, in his dull book on foreign policy, offered thanks to IMEMO for their help in his research!

Lunch was much the same mixture as dinner - cold slices of good fish and radishes - vodka - meat and Georgian wine, no 3. I sat between Bykov, rather silent, and Chalfont, quite jolly. We all noticed that the wine did not flow very well. Perhaps this was as well. I walked back to IMEMO with Trifomenko.

After lunch: Andrew Knight started off and talked about mistakes made by the West and the East. He thought that the shooting down of the Korean airliner was an unconscious mistake by the Soviet Union. This caused Chalfont to have apoplexy. The worst Soviet mistake recently has been to try and involve themselves so much in European opposition parties eg social democrats in Germany. He did mention also human rights.

To the latter Yakovlev said the subject of human rights had ceased to irritate him. It now made him laugh. He recalled certain exchanges between the famous writers Sheridan and Cumberland. We were all bemused by this reference. Could he mean Coleridge?

Falin interjected that there were 150 states in the world where there are elections (?) but that we can't devote all our time to worrying about their problems.

We had a great many further exchanges on these diffuse issues with no attempt to organise the debate. I then tried to reflect what I think is the Prime Minister's current view. I thought that I had to do that since they know that I am an adviser to Mrs Thatcher and whatever I was to say would be taken as her policy to some extent. So I then repeated, with a good many additional thoughts of my own, the gist of her remarks to me last Monday afternoon, sandwiched between the Prime Minister of Botswana and the Foreign Minister of Canada. This was approximately as follows (after some preliminary politenesses).

The British Government naturally wishes a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. That is a better word than détente which, besides being French, has connotations of drawing together of doctrines, which looks a little improbable. Mrs Thatcher, as we know, has no intention of abandoning her alliances and her own philosophy. She believes the British way of life is the best in the world and, judging from the

evident enjoyment of certain of our Russian friends when in England (for example at the University of Sussex), this way of life does not always seem disagreeable to some Soviet citizens. Mrs Thatcher wants to continue the argument with the USSR about the merits of our two systems - but by the test of real debate and relative economic success, not by the test of force.

In the meantime, against this background of a desire for modus vivendi, we might do well to consider (outside the arguments previously sustained) certain evident dangers: the risk of war by accident (computer error, for example). "This is a danger which must make us all re-examine our ideologies. Khrushchev said that and he was right". To be conciliatory I recalled that in 1962 on at least one occasion during the missile crisis the USSR had acted responsibly in this kind of matter (when a US reconnaissance aircraft had mistakenly been found over Soviet territory). There was the risk of error developing in an area such as the Middle East where, really, no one desired such a confrontation; and there was the risk that the arms programmes might one day get out of control. Furthermore, one could look back in history and find an occasion when powers which believed that they had superiority had NOT used it. Even in 1982, the Argentine government had misread what they took to be British weakness and then had encountered unexpected British strength - with the tragic consequences which we all know. We also accepted the argument that spending on weapons could be a waste though I had to say that there have been very many occasions in history when there have been unexpected benefits from military expenditures (eg computers themselves). Nor did anyone have to remind the USSR that one could lose a great deal from merely conventional war, as Mrs Thatcher had herself recently said in an interview on television when she recalled Russia's sufferings in World War II (I did not add that many were self-induced or deliberately caused by Stalin).

We could do worse than bear in mind, I added, that Russia and Britain (indeed, the whole West) had many points in common if one looked hard enough: Obviously none of us would benefit from a nuclear exchange; it might be that we both had common apprehensions deriving from the danger of the Iran-Iraqi war; we shared problems arising from certain aspects of negligent policies on environmentalism - acid rain or the famous greenhouse effect, for example. Then there might always be unexpected threats - a new recurrence of religion in an unforeseen guise, for example: who could have foreseen the role of the Ayatollah (and the Pope) ten years ago?

Given that any modus vivendi would have to look at disarmament, we ought all to approach that matter with some degree of humility. Thus the West might admit that the Baruch plan of 1946 contained some weaknesses and that the Soviet proposal of May 10 1955 some benefits. The Soviet Union in turn should recall that Khrushchev had admitted mistakes when, in the last pages of his memoirs, he recalled that he and Zhukov

had been wrong in their policies on inspection. (I'm not at all sure whether this section was interpreted).

The Soviet Government might also like to wonder whether they may have misunderstood President Reagan. I am sure that he is interested in nuclear disarmament. He had the merit of being personally much more secure in himself than several previous presidents. An insecure president - and we had had them - might be less easy to deal with.

What sort of disarmament agreement were we able to aim at? Well, why not think of one which would begin by a simple joint declaration that any East-West war would presumably become nuclear and that that being so, the pursuit of nuclear superiority was vain (despite the intimidation factor). So why not seek a break in the deadlock by withdrawing all battlefield weapons? Then have another look at the zero option. Then take up the idea of START.

I made this speech with some misgivings since I do not have much faith in disarmament agreements, recalling Jules Moch's comment in 1955 (?) that to have disarmament one requires a good system of inspection; but for a good system of inspection one needs such confidence that there would be disarmament without agreement.

After this statement which was listened to in silence, and to which I received no formal reaction, Alun Chalfont said that the Soviet Union would be better understood if Lenin and every other Soviet intellectual hadn't said that they expected to spread Communism throughout the world.

Yakovlev scarcely bothered to deny this. Hadn't the British interfered in the Russian civil war? And often in Asia in the 19th century? Trifomenko then returned to the issue of the first strike and first use: the US was trying to make Western Europe a battlefield between US and USSR. Why don't you educate Reagan? Don't leave it to us. You are nearer to him than us.

There followed some further exchanges, skilfully cleared up by Chalfont who agreed that Pershing and Cruise added to our nuclear capacity but since they could not dismantle the entire Soviet machine, they could not therefore be first strike in the usual sense of the phrase. The difference between first strike and first use should be made clear. It was not apparently clear in the mind of Mr Falin.

I have subsequently given a good deal of thought to the wisdom of my own speech but have reached no conclusion. Did I deliberately offend in it against the rule which I know to be correct normally that with the Russians one should never give way in anything of importance to oneself because that diminishes their respect of one? Just as well I am not in politics proper.

We then set off for the British Embassy in the bus. As ever, Michael Kaser was extremely useful in identifying the buildings which we passed. We saw a statue to Zinoviev. There was a new "Central Committee hotel" - and their families. There was the French Embassy and its fine garden. Arrived at our embassy. Three guards outside ineffectively asked for our passports. They summarily allowed us in, over the large courtyard and into the great mysterious cocoon of the embassy, the onetime private house of a sugar baron pre-1917. Dark, cool, rich and heavy, but plenty of air from the river. Beyond, the Kremlin glimmered.

We then went into the upstairs drawing room. We had been greeted downstairs by Ian Sutherland who is now ambassador. He offered us drinks and we had a short seminar with the long french windows open on to the balcony to the Moscow River. Ian spoke sense but in so low a voice that it was impossible to hear what he was saying without craning forward. The most interesting thing was said by Harlech, who argued that we had no knowledge what the real leaders of the USSR were thinking, and none as to whether the people whom we had been seeing were in touch with the real leaders. The admiral had nothing much to say. We left, I looked into a huge dressing room, and we all set off for the Bolshoi Theatre. On the way we passed the KGB building covered by scaffolding in Dzerzhinsky Square. A statue of Dzerzhinsky himself stands in the middle of the Square looking unthinkingly resolute in an overcoat.

At the Bolshoi we were to see, on the invitation of our hosts, a ballet recently written on the theme of Chekov's Seagull for Mariia Plisetskaya by her husband I Shernin. We were met at the theatre by Alexei, worried, as he was to be throughout the rest of the evening, because of the burden of looking after such a large number of difficult people. He gave out double tickets for seats fairly near each other - and added "Please give me back the tickets so I can claim for them". I sat with Michael Kaser. In the foyer, we were approached by a good-looking blonde in a creamy coloured dress who wondered if we had a spare ticket to sell her. She said that she had been to the 46 occasions on which this ballet had been performed, because she was a great admirer of Plisetskaya. She was an architect. Some of us thought she may have had other professions including, but not confined to, the oldest. (She appeared again at the interval and expressed great satisfaction in meeting three lords).

We went to the auditorium - no coats or briefcases allowed inside. Michael Kaser tried to ensure that Alexei would leave early just before the end of the first act, to secure "snacks" and Soviet champagne in the interval. The theatre has recently been redone. Full, except for two boxes on left. The vast majority seemed Russians except for us, the Indians who are staying in the hotel and Joe Kennedy junior, whom Harlech found sitting next to him.

The ballet was extremely pretty, with delightful impressions of the long exhausting summers of 1895 or so. The scene outside the theatre, top-hats and long dresses, was very gaily done, while Plisetskaya danced beautifully, even though she is 56. Even I, ignorant and indifferent though I really am to ballet could recognise that she is very good. The music was soothing though not very impressive and the plot most confusingly involved. The male lead (can't remember his name) was much younger and danced beautifully with that no nonsense masculine unselfconscious superiority which it seems to me the British male ballet dancers rarely manage.

The impression in Act I of long, summer nights on which the sun scarcely set was well conveyed. That side of XIX th century Russian literature - the white nights - was something which I had not quite realised. I suppose that the labour camps in the Arctic Circle must all have had that eerie quality in summer.

In the interval we had desultory conversation over bad champagne. No "snacks". Reappearance of the "architect". Joe Kennedy Jr was observed pushing towards the buffet. Alexei, whose first visit to the Bolshoi it was, was not very good at managing all this, and he really needed a guide himself.

After the theatre we waited for a long time on the steps of the Bolshoi. Still broad daylight at 9.30 pm. Alexei wanted us to go back to the hotel to dine, but I suggested a restaurant near at hand. This proved an adventure. The obvious choice was the Moscow restaurant just across the square. Alexei thought he'd get us in if a friend of his who works there was on duty. He went away to ring up, returned to say he was not there, because he worked on alternate days. Even so, I managed to persuade him and the team (I think it was I) to go across and try it out. Harlech, Chalfont and I walked - with some difficulty across two broad streets (Okhotni Ryada Place and Bolshaya Dimitrovka in my 1914 map) past the old green and white "Club of the Nobility", and the Little Theatre. The Moscow restaurant was not a bistro (When is a restaurant not a restaurant? When it is like a railway station). We found there were two restaurants. With some trepidation we took the lift to the one on the third floor. Deafening music and dancing. Alexei suddenly reappeared but not the rest of the team. "Stay here please", he said and vanished up to the top floor. Harlech and I sat in huge armchairs and talked again about Kennedy. Chalfont wandered off. Eventually we went up to the seventh floor and sat down in a musical restaurant next to the balcony. Very hot. Dinner delayed, scrappy, enjoyable jokes. We ordered fish soup. This was off. We ordered chicken - it eventually came - very scraggy bones - and it was said there were no vegetables, though Alexei had some. A slightly ribald patriotism took over. After about one hour, vodka and Moldavian wine appeared. Most people drank both without evident harm. Alexei provided

constant themes for entertainment - as he went to telephone his wife, and asked our plump and complacent secretary, Caroline Adams, to dance. George Robinson told numerous jokes, others recited travel experiences in other continents. Clamour for more wine rang through the restaurant, to no effect, since the waitress had to pay the bar with her own money to buy the wine and then be paid back. Alexei paid the bill.

Afterwards, we walked on the balcony. The balcony looked directly over the new square made by Stalin by knocking down many old houses near the Kremlin, along with the Iberian Gate. But on the left Red Square could be entirely seen. A fine night, good floodlights and red stars on the towers of the Kremlin. A red flag too, and I think a fan has been installed to ensure that it floats our bravely. We then walked down, and onto the square. The queue to enter Lenin's tomb which one sees in the day had vanished. We stood in the square and surveyed Russian history. Lenin's tomb was guarded by soldiers, who seemed frozen into a dummy-like immobility.

We walked to the metro; passed the famous stone Lobnoye Mesto on which the Streltsy were killed. The huge statue of Russia saving Moscow against Poland commanded by Prince Sapiieha in 1612, St Basil's cathedral and then passed the hideous new Rossiya hotel. I told John Roper that Sapiieha's defeat was one of the great tragedies of history. "Are you sure Polish power would have been easier to manage than Russia?" he asked. Michael Kaser pointed out the Headquarters of the Communist Party up a side street lined with chestnuts. We got into the underground at Vavarsk Gate and, changing once, returned to the Dynamo Stadium station. The train was fast, clean, light, large (broad guage) and grand: the marble at the stations was impressive. Clean and well dressed people. We returned at about 12.30, the patient Alexei accompanying us.

May 17

Awoke to another bright, warm, sunny morning. Outside as yesterday a priest with a beard was walking with his assistants. On the landing a group of Afghans seemed to be conferring eagerly. Breakfast, in another room to that of yesterday but at the same deathly slow pace. Alun tells the news heard on his radio that Skinner's death in Moscow was attributed by the coroner to "unnatural killing". Alexei very worried that we might again be late: "Please in the bus by 9.30 latest please!" John Roper and Andrew Knight persist in their endeavour to go by underground though Alexei grandly "prohibits". They go, however. At the table when asked "how many eggs?", everyone says two. Three arrive. Still raw. The admiral needing to go to the lavatory, rather oddly quotes Admiral Beatty to justify such eccentricity. Nervous discussion about changing money, which does not occur. No direct word from the admiral as to what to do today: "gently admiral cast your fly ... over the slow deep hover ..."

Through the middle of Moscow. Another guide, another Alexei, tells us information through a loudspeaker: "on the right there is a new hotel for Central Committee guests". Gagarin Square. A gold roof over the new academy of sciences. Long straight streets heavily tree lined - chestnuts, larches. Brezhnev Square, still small, but it will be the centre of an entire Brezhnev neighbourhood.

We arrived at five past ten, John Roper and Andrew Knight having, much to their satisfaction, arrived first. Fairly warm greetings from Yakovlev, Bykov, Mikhailov, Martynov etc. Menshikov had not arrived and the promised arrival of the fat journalist Bovin had not materialised. Nor was Falin there.

Michael Kaser began at the meeting to discuss human rights, recalling that Helsinki meant free movement of peoples - because people who were cooped up would not be able to understand detente. He then embarked on a long discussion of modern economic problems and described the working of the Common Market, the purpose of which baffled everyone. Yakovlev's eyes gently closed.

Mr Martynov made a most friendly beginning to his speech. He agreed with Kaser about human rights (?) but, of course, people sometimes dwell on this subject with "the dirty intention of whipping up anti-Soviet rhetoric." He described how future difficulties would develop in the capitalist economy in 1985-86, perhaps because of "US internal contradictions." He described the present Soviet economic mechanism. (Mr Mordinov openly read PRAVDA). He thought the arms race embarked on by the US was aimed at undermining the Soviet economy.

Mr Skorov spoke next - a very pleasant faced man. He talked about the present state of the Soviet economy, the Cockburn-Douglas formula, and the ratio between intensive and extensive factors. No one understood. Andrew Knight asked to explain. Skorov with great good manners explained in perfect English. But in the end we were no closer to understanding. Mr Skorov continued at great length, charmingly though quite incomprehensively.

Madam Maximova followed with a good impression of European problems: she was interested, she said, because, "After all, we are all Europeans here". (I had not heard Russians say this before. She was it must be said very white in physique). Are there any limits in NATO to spending on armaments? How will you resolve the need to get rid of non-tariff barriers?"

Then there was coffee break in the course of which a newcomer, Professor Peregudov, showed himself uncannily well informed about the structure of the Conservative party. He knew all about Alfred, the Research Department, the Policy Unit, and even, I expect, Hoskyns and Strauss. He had also read my recent article about Conservatism in New Society.

After coffee Alun asked about trade. He is after all a banker and had been concerned in the building in Moscow of Cosmos hotel, which brought in all its materials from the West.

At this stage, Mr Yakovlev had vanished and Mr Mordinov came in, quoting Shaw, and talked about planning. If a plan once conceived is not carried out, it leads to imbalances. For a long time, five year plans have characterised our economic management, directed by GOSPLAN which is the General Staff of the Soviet economy. It is often thought in the West that these targets are handed down from above. But planning in the initial level comes up from the enterprise as well as goes down. Then: "we all hope to return to trade with the West. We desire no hesitations in any trade." The British had showed themselves 'realistic' in relation to President Reagan's desire for a boycott over the pipeline. I asked about Soviet nuclear energy programmes and had the following answer (from clever Mr ...): "in respect of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, we have 23 atomic plants in our country. Our aim is to have 90 m KWH, of which 12-14 of them will be nuclear. We are pioneers in heat producers, especially Odessa, and we've seen they are ecologically safe. We're already involved in environmental matters. We're concerned about pollution, acid rain, pollution of the sea. We've a consistent policy here."

Mr Shenyeu - he repeated the usual accusations against the US which he thought was gradually moving towards its goals, whereas Western Europe has distanced herself a bit. Maybe Western Europe will have to make a quantitative change. Take COCOM! Will Europe be bold enough to defend its interests there? Do you think it's a bad thing that we've refused to take part in the Olympic Games? I think Western Europe should stick up for itself and do the same.

Chalfont asked:

You've said Soviet debts are small: but what about East European?

Khesin

I fully agree that we can agree between us, even though we have different systems. We have both three per cent or so growth rate. Labour productivity increased in Britain 5% last year, exports 11%. The British economy has grown. The competitive prospects of British firms are what matter.

Madame Maximova

We take a broad view of the opportunities of unity in Western Europe. Your summit meetings and talks however could be made more useful. I'm not bold enough to suggest how you should behave. If all events, you shouldn't let the US act without consulting you. Can the Ten speak with one voice? Western Europe should be responsible for its own destinies. We see the EEC as an economic organisation. Margaret Thatcher showed a lot of character when she put her foot down and said Britain would decide for herself what to sell to the Soviet Union. But there are still some problems there. For example,

the US export control bill, which would ban the export of all high technology tools. Anything that could be described as having military value! Suppose a US computer has been bought by Britain! To take that from one country to another, does one have to ask the US? One does. Ridiculous! Our point is that there is too rigid control over US technology. By 1990 anyway the USSR will have produced 10,000 robots - even if you don't sell them to us. So relations between COMECOM could be eventually established with the EEC.

Lunch was at the same Tcheremutshki restaurant where we went yesterday. Unwisely I sat down in the middle of the table in front of Bykov who was again rather withdrawn and gloomy, perhaps thinking of the speech he would deliver later. On my left was Harlech and on the right Mr Skorov, whose tolerant intelligence seemed untested by the Admiral sitting opposite. As usual lunch was very drawn out, and the room airless.

Walking back, I talked briefly with Skorov and Andrew Knight about the personality of Reagan about which I had spoken in public yesterday.

To begin with, in the afternoon, we had Bykov, who spoke primarily about the first use and first strike of nuclear weapons, rather as if he had meant to speak the previous day. This speech describing the dangers of a "global explosion and nuclear war" was repetitious if clear. The first speech after lunch is anyway virtually impossible to listen to. Bykov is the only person to have mentioned "star wars". He hopes the West will consider seriously and completely the recent Helsinki proposals.

"Speaking as a British Socialist, I'd like to say," now said George Robertson, "that I don't think there's any chance of the US launching an attack on the USSR or entering willingly into a conflict." He thought there was "a danger of a mirror image". He complained that both the US and the USSR were supplying weapons to both Iraq and Iran.

C A Trifomenko then sailed into battle, and said he agreed with Robertson; the Middle East was dangerous - especially for the USSR, on whose frontiers the North East is: "The Europeans once tried to be broker and with the Venice Declaration they did something with which I agree. But they have now withdrawn from that and are now following an anti-European line, if I may so call it, it is not just an anti-Soviet line." He praised the Queen for her remarks made in Jordan. Then he said "the British should, as we do, support the principle of the open sea and should denounce the mining of Nicaragua."

Harlech Are the Straits of Hormuz the open seas? Couldn't the USSR agree to give support if we kept them open by force? Harlech also asked whether the USSR couldn't agree not to give weapons to any nation in "danger areas" as the West had tried to do in the Tripartite Declaration in 1950.

Menshikov, speaking in a rather arrogant, throw-away manner, occasionally very loudly, said "Any property which doesn't belong to national territory belongs to everyone, to civilisation. Talks on that matter could be explored. Didn't the British Government complain about the mining of waters in Nicaragua? As to whether we would use force to keep the Straits of Hormuz open, I couldn't say exactly what we would do. I am sure we would be against the blocking of it.

"As to the Middle East in general - it's obvious that Kissinger sought to expel the USSR from there. You can see that from Kissinger's memoirs. I don't blame him. I'd do the same in his place. But we don't think the Middle East can be solved without us. Now the Iranian revolution you know has some advantages for us - it enabled the expulsion of the US citizens who were sitting there watching some of our secret missile activities. No one would like to go back to the Shah's regime, except a few conservatives. Bad conservatives, I mean, for there are bad conservatives and good conservatives. I support real conservatism unlike the Labour Party which I do not support, being a communist. [these words were shouted]. How do you like a speech like that? Now, we must take into account the strong pro-Israeli lobby in the US. We have a problem there. We have to try and solve the Palestinian problem. Even the Saudi foreign minister (with whom we have no diplomatic relations, incidentally) said he was grateful to the USSR for 'accentuating' the Palestinian problem.

"Of course we have some dealings with the US. In the 'sixties, whenever I went to the United States, I used to get requests from Americans to help them get out of Vietnam. Mr Bykov used to get such requests too. I used to say that's not in the Soviet interest. That made them quite angry. In the end, we did help them, Mr Kissinger got his Nobel prize, and the US got out of Vietnam.

"About the danger of nuclear war, there is this idea sold to the US by well or ill-meaning emigrés from this country that by hotting up the arms race they may ruin us. Mr Casey - you know who he is - President of the Central Institute of Intelligence - said in Silicone Valley recently that the Soviet Union has stolen technology from the US. If that were so those who did it would deserve to get many Lenin prizes. But we have our own scientists. They can do what we need. This psychological and technological warfare against us is just silly. Sorry, I got onto the anti-American subject again, but it keeps cropping up.

Yakovlev: What do you think of the US proclaiming their interest in entire areas?

Chalfont: The US will always look on the Middle East and Central America as its areas. We must expect super powers to identify strategic areas and allow them to defend them.

Yakovlev Proclaiming half the world as 'areas of vital interest' leads to very sad thoughts. The Warsaw Pact countries could thus proclaim say Pánama, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal as well as the Hormuz Straits as 'areas of vital significance'.

We then had a fairly pointless discussion about international waterways in which I fear it was I that allowed Menshikov to get into the discussion again. He said: "We understand, I must say, de facto US interests in Central America. They know we also have de facto interests in supporting our allies including Cuba. This has nothing to do with international law.

Chalfont said "there are strategic interests and we seek to preserve them". He added "There is no such thing as a first strike capability. Only in science fiction is there such a thing. If either side is contemplating such, to knock out all enemies, they're insane". No first use of nuclear weapons? But in the event of war, everyone knows that Western deterrent strategy has been based on first use of nuclear weapons since 1945. So declarations about that are pointless. Elimination of all use of nuclear weapons? It is fantasy to suppose these weapons will not be used if war breaks out. Nuclear free zones? Geographical areas in which such weapons won't be used. I don't think it matters what is so declared. The GLC has declared London to be such, so has Milton Keynes. But in practice? No, let's get down to discuss practical, fairly low level proposals, such as proposed by Geoffrey Howe. Confidence building measures should begin on the central front. Let me clarify: the search for the abandonment of a first strike capacity will not lead to peace."

Mikhailov then repeated that the US is seeking world dominance, and had begun by declaring certain areas of the world as her vital interest. But our Russian borders are in close vicinity to a big powder keg: the Middle East. One might ask, has the security of Europe and Britain been consolidated by the possession of nuclear weapons? Of course not. Our anxieties were not born in the fevered minds of academics. Yesterday we heard there were many appeals for talks. Let's not kid ourselves, gentlemen; we must realise there's only one way to begin talks and that is to return to the status quo before the beginning of deployment of the new US missiles. I recall a meeting with Gene Rostow in Edinburgh who asked for a meeting with the USSR - but that won't happen (if it ever will) until those things go away: "Incidentally, I took part in the drafting of Helsinki's final act and was at the Madrid conference. So I disagree specially with Lord Chalfont when he said that the large scale measures are militarily essential.

Chalfont Would the USSR feel more secure if NATO said that it would not use nuclear weapons first? ("Order, order", said Mr Mordinov, to make a joke.)

Mikhailov Yes, if that were to be backed up by corresponding actions. (We never heard what these were). There might then be notification of major military activities etc.

Roper Britain was worried over the deployment of so many SS20s over and above Brezhnev's reckoning of what constituted stability in 1979.

Mordinov Excuse me for butting in at such a late stage but as an economic planner I want to put this question: the British side have tried to defend the US position vis à vis the USSR; but the answer I want is this: suppose we in the USSR said we were concerned to organise a crusade against capitalism?

The Admiral ended the British contribution to the meeting with a measured statement, his voice falling away in courteous sympathy with his "military colleague, the General". I'm struck by the mirror images which echo between us, between West and East ... (Harlech here studied a guidebook) ... We here speak as individuals ... of influence ... I'm sure we'll go away and use that influence and have indeed shown during the past few days ... My fellow Chairman, my final point is in the form of a question: Is it adequate that we should meet only for two days every year? We are all truly internationally minded ... We want to increase the general means of contact between us ..."

Mr Yakovlev then wound up at great length - "Let me give a half answer to your half question ... you have your ambassador here in Moscow. So before you made that proposal you probably took his counsel. I haven't consulted my colleagues. I agree something should be done towards deepening our contacts and hopefully to understand each other better ... I'd like to thank the whole delegation of Great Britain for being here. I particularly thank Sir Eberle ... For him and for me this is a first experience and whatever else it is, a first experience is romantic and interesting. During the war I was a lieutenant of marines. He is an admiral. I had to have some time to fight my inferiority complex. Over two days we have engaged in hostilities in words. God permitting we'll so engage till the end of our lives.

"There exists in the West an error in the strategic analysis. We have counted rifles etc on both sides. Both sides have spoken the language of birds. (?) From 1905 till 1945 we in the USSR lost 45 million in war. The inability of the West to see that entails strategic errors. That is also true of political mythology - the thesis of the "strategic military threat", invented by propagandists. We should be guided by realities, not by political war games. If we were to judge the position of Britain today by her strength in the Crimean War say or in 1919 you would laugh .. we don't think Britain is a military threat and we have no reason to attack Great Britain. These myths are ones for which Western Europe is paying dearly.

"Your philosopher Francis Bacon said we should keep our memory ready not only to recall actions by but also words. Late last century Senator Beveridge wrote 'Our fate has prescribed our policies. World trade shall be ours ... the American civilisation and her flag shall be established on coasts still in quagmire and ignorance ... they shall be made bright and beautiful.'

In 1945 Truman said: 'Whether we like it or not, our victory had given us the responsibility for leading the world.' Reagan has said: 'We have inherited the mission which is one of hope for all the world ... it is with us that guarantees of freedom of peace' ... we would not go to Reagan to guarantee our peace.

"To understand one's opponents one must put oneself into their shoes. The current policies of the US have been compared with an unguided missile. I want you to know my fears. The immigrants into the US divided their spoils as they entered. That can't go on. In this respect, we shall pay special attention to Soviet-Polish relations. We must use our influence to improve our bilateral relations. I thank you all for your sincere efforts to understand one another."

After this, the bus set off once again for the hotel, this time passing by the Intourist money exchange where we all raced to change our £s into roubles, now not so necessary, it seemed, as even during the prescribed "shopping" era tomorrow, English money or American Express cards can (must?) be used.

I have tried to telephone to London: the line was unavailable. On other occasions I could not get through to the exchange.

In the salon of my suite: birds in the trees outside, people walk by to work carrying shopping bags.

The drawing room has elaborate stucco mouldings on the ceiling, cloth representing artichokes on the walls, mahogany doors with window panels covered by tightly drawn lace curtains, a square table in the centre with glasses, a desk with large reading lights and a telephone, a chair there, three large pictures, one of flowers, two of apples against a curtain (much as my mother might have done them) two Russian landscapes, the piano, and a jar on top of it, two vents for air and a Turkey carpet on parquet. There is a balcony onto the street from the two french windows. My bedroom, separated by large mahogany doors, has two beds in heavy brown pine wood, a desk, two empire style chairs, another large turkey carpet and two small ones, parquet, a window on the street and a continuation of the mouldings. The cloth on the wall is green, on which are embroidered white and red roses, all fairly pale, surrounded by wreaths of leaves.

In the night, the telephone in the next room rang. Urgent conversation in what seemed to be Arabic. Palestinians talking to Beirut?

After a bath we went out to an exceptionally well organised dinner at the British Embassy. The Russian guests - all our interlocuters - were already in the courtyard and waited for us to go into the Embassy. Upstairs, into the same drawing room we met in yesterday and then onto the large balcony overlooking the river and Kremlin. Conversation with Skorov, who seemed very western and experienced, as being the Vice President of the US and Canada society he should be. He knows Anthony Sampson and asked to be remembered to him. (Anthony, when I asked about him on my return, said that David Astor had had a long correspondence with him). We discussed Khrushchev's memoirs which accepted as genuine. A "relation of Khrushchev" had told him that, in the memoirs, genuine stories often told by Khrushchev kept cropping up.

At dinner I was well placed between Yakovlev and Menshikov. The first told me how painful it had been for him to be Ambassador in Canada and to be separated from his children for so long. He did have his son and grand daughters for a time, separately, but it was not enough. Ian Sutherland, sitting on his other side, made a graceful speech before dinner. On my other side, Menshikov talked about his time in New York, his father's negative view of Dulles and his judgement that Dulles was the real maker of Ike's policy. We discussed the "new view" of Eisenhower, as expressed in recent books. He said he would have to read them. I reported to him as an illustration of the much easier manners of Allen Dulles, the latter's tale (told to me as to others, I assume) of how in Zurich in 1916 he had preferred to play tennis than meet a group of Russian exiles - among them Lenin, whom, therefore, he failed to meet. Menshikov said that he would hope to leave after lunch for the weekend and work there where he could telephone, but not be telephoned. After dinner I talked with the nuclear physicist and environmentalist and promised to send Menshikov some impressions of this Presidency. Menshikov said his father had written memoirs and parts had been published.

In the course of dinner I remembered Isaiah Berlin's injunction to ask the Russians about their support for terrorism which was such a contrast with normal marxist theory. Menshikov brushed this aside and talked about Reagan, the CIA, Nicaragua etc, and would not be shifted from this unpromising line.

The bus took us all home in a merry mood. Alexei had waited doggedly. He'd asked how long he should wait. I said till 10. It was eleven.

Friday May 18th

At breakfast repeated representations had worked and we were able to have two rather than three fried eggs. They were still very lightly fried, however. Sir F Bolton seemed really upset about this. We were to have a morning's sight seeing in the Kremlin and "shopping". There was actually a

lot of waiting around for the bus at first, the desperate Alexei trying to find some way of deciding on how to satisfy John Roper's desire for tickets for the theatre for the unplanned evening ahead before we took the train to Leningrad. I went into the store next to the hotel and looked at the fairly high prices for indifferent clothes. On the store's musak "Alexander's Rag Time Band" gave a curious illusion of unreality.

We left the bus before the National Hotel, waited at the Manège (since we passed it before I realised that this was the building where in 1962 Khrushchev had a fit about the exhibition of modern art) and walked in to the Kremlin through the Troitskaya Gate. We had a rendezvous with everyone including Harlech and Eberle, who had been giving a press conference at the Embassy, at the Great Bell. (The Kremlin has been open to the public since the end of 1953; though not all of it).

We then decided to separate and meet again at noon, and follow our own devices in the Kremlin. This suggestion was made by me, largely to avoid hearing the fatuous comments of Sir F Bolton, and seeing the complacent features of Caroline Adams, while seeing the historic treasures in the Church of the Archangel, the Uspensky cathedral and elsewhere. However, there were other frustrations. The crowds were large, tourists from every country in the world. To get into the cathedral even, you needed tickets. To get tickets you had to queue. Certain buildings were closed at noon, an hour perilously close. Other buildings including the entire palace, were closed completely. The area behind the reredos in the churches was closed, so, though the coffins of forty tsars or princes were visible in the Church of the Archangel, that of Ivan the Terrible was not. The women who sold tickets or allowed one in (or not) were harsh and unsmiling. Still, I walked round, leaving the others, meeting Alun on going into the Archangel, Harlech and Eberle in the Uspensky, and Roper and Knight on failing to get into the palace itself. Alexei came up from time to time urging activity: "Lord Thomas, Please. Go in the Uspensky cathedral now. Here is a ticket". "No," I replied "I want to go to the Palace". "Please go to the Uspensky now. It will close in five minutes". I duly went. Extraordinary wall paintings and ikons, a fine seat, but curiously difficult to picture the historical importance of the place. Andrew, John Roper and I met, tried to go into the palace, failed, failed also to cross the road leading to the gardens by the walls, being restrained by a very sharp whistle from an officious policeman: one has to cross at the crossing or not at all. In the gardens some gardeners were digging in wallflowers into a little round circle. At noon we met again by the Bell and, while the others went off to the shop for official buying, "for presents for your family", I elected to walk back to where we would lunch. A few Russians were sitting about on wooden benches. Tourists pass and pass, Italians, French, Spaniards. The only English tourists were a British doctor and his wife who were part of "Bristol Doctors Against the Bomb". Earlier Admiral Eberle had dealt with them courteously.

After the team had gone, I was alone in Moscow for the first time. I sat in the gardens, the scent of lilac and the chestnut trees in flower giving the Kremlin almost a pastoral character. I watched black cars being driven up to the yellow palace of the Kremlin on the other side of the Senate Square into the yellow stucco palaces where I suppose all those famous "conversations with Stalin" occurred with Churchill, Djilas, Harriman etc. I identified the place where Lenin's statue (seated) now is with that where once there was a statue of Alexander II. I then set off on a walk around this part of Moscow. No one seemed in the slightest bit interested. No Russian so much as looked at me.

I went out of the Kremlin via the Troitskaya Gate (no others are open) observed the goose-stepping Red Army drilling in the gardens, and turned down along Alexander Gardens and the Kremlin wall to the point where, at the sacred flame to the unknown warrior, bridal couples were being brought to be photographed. There were also some jolly young pioneers (all girls). Then up into Red Square by the historical museum, past Lenin's tomb (presumably closed because there was no queue), where gardeners were hosing the flowers near the graves set into the Kremlin wall. I think I saw the gloomy head of Suslov over his grave. Then to St Basil's cathedral with its rag bag of old rooms, then down along the street which used to be called Varvarka to the House of the Boyar Romanov (as I believe it to be), now not a very interesting museum. The ghastly hotel Rossiya lay behind (or was this museum the old Znamenski monastery and is the house of Romanov gone?) I then walked up Per Rubinc, joined the Ilinka by the site of the old Exchange, and then down to Novaya Place. I walked along this tree-laden avenue as far as the Lubianka, and had a good look at that huge brown building, the Rossiya Insurance Company before 1917, protected by a steel gate, with scaffolding up. I thought of Solhzenitsyn being there on the fifth floor, in another May, in 1945, hearing the 40 gun salute, seeing the fireworks, and so learning the war was at an end: "that victory was not for us." There was another newish, hideous grey building (archives?) behind, on what was once the site of the old St Sophia's Church. Down the Teatralni Proyezd into Bolshoi Square past the old Trinity Church. In this square, very hot, I went into the Metropolitan Hotel, and made my way up to the dingy bar on the first floor (past a concierge who should have prevented me) where two sad, displaced figures sat alone and glowering, one interested, one reading last week's Morning Star. I had a beer for 90 pence. I gave £1 and received change of 1 franc. I crossed the square and turned up the Bolshaya Dmitraka Square, past the club of nobility again (now a workers' club, left down St George's Street past St George's church (deconsecrated) and then into Gorki Street. I turned up in the mews behind this, dirty, sludgy, but quite human with waiters sitting, smirking after their lunch. I soon reached Yuri Dulurov Square, where we were to lunch. The rest arrived just as I did.

We lunched in a private room of a well-known Armenian restaurant, the Aragvi. A good deal of sturgeon shashlik, vodka and short toasts and speeches. I sat between Martynov and Khesin. The former asked me to come to Russian for a time

next year for a two-week tour. "And you could go to Samarkand". "Or Kiev", I said. "Or Kiev", he readily agreed. Khesin asked me some questions about the British economy. Yakovlev made a short speech and so did Eberle (well).

After lunch, we said goodbye to the Russians except for Perenosov and Khesin, who were to accompany us to Leningrad. Bykov said "Give my love to the lady, and I mean it". I suppose he meant the Prime Minister. I also said goodbye to Alun and Harlech who, with Bolton, were returning to London. I decided to continue my walks alone, and undertook to meet them all at the ballet at 7.30 in the Senate Square in the Kremlin, and set off for the Tretyakov Gallery and the Spanish Embassy. I walked down Gorki Street, past the Red Square again, into the GUM stores, very pretty arcades, down into the huge square cleared of old houses by Khrushchev and Bulganin for Stalin in the 30's and walked across the river by the Moscow Bridge. I made for the British Embassy and reached the guards who allowed me in after looking hard at my passport. The Ambassador's secretary kindly got me a car and I drove in it to Tretyakov, where I spent about one hour looking at Russian XIX century paintings.

At 5.30 or so I set off for the Spanish Embassy, where I'd arranged to see the ambassador. In the area around the Tretyakov - the Zamoskvarétchye, once the Tartar Quarter - one has a good sense of late XIXth Russia - wooden houses, yellow and green stucco houses with courtyards behind almost everywhere. It looks as if the horse, much less the bourgeoisie, has only left the afternoon before. More chestnut and lilac. Up across the river past the Menège, once again and up the Znamenka to the pretty quarter (Arbatskaya) where the Spanish Ambassador has his residence, near a small theatre. One guard, very perfunctory, in comparison with the British one.

The ambassador, Xifre de Ocerin and his German wife, received me in a little library filled with English books. The ambassadress went out to walk their dog. Xifre was relaxing after the departure of the King, whose visit had dominated the life of the Embassy, of course, for a long time. We moved into a large salon looking over the square. Still Spanish atmosphere, clocks, tapestries. Xifre's house is not very large but very agreeable. He described to me how much it meant to him to go from Franco's Spain to Oxford to learn English in 1950; what an opening up to humour, to understatement and to law-abidingness! He didn't say much of the King's visit to Moscow save to say that he had been staying in the Kremlin in severe functional rooms, in which, in a wardrobe, he found the 1951 Soviet Encyclopaedia. Xifre had looked up the name of Beria and found the article had two columns in it. As to the Russians: however agreeable they are "there is always a line which one can never cross".

Xifre had several calls on the telephone from Germany, and soon I went off back to the centre of town leaving behind the ambassador to a quiet evening. Photographs of Alfonso XIII and Juan Carlos. His father was killed in the Carcel Modelo in the Civil War, he as a child had been in a Cheka and then the Mexican Embassy, exchanged etc.

I reached the Troitskaya gate in good time and walked in to the Kremlin with Andrew Knight. He explained that he'd been lunching with the American ambassador, Hartmann. Hartmann had said that Ustinov and Gromyko were in fact in control and that all this war scare and apprehension derived from the complete uncertainty among the Russians as to what would happen in the future. They are all nervous: hence the facade of international anxiety to keep people quiet.

Our now depleted party of Eberle, Kaser, Knight and Roper* (and the secretary) to a charming version of what turned out as La Fille Mal Gardée in a huge theatre in the Kremlin which is sometimes used for meetings of the Supreme Soviet. We didn't know what we were seeing till the performance began. It was excused on the programme as being "Rosseuesque". Wonderful leaps by the male lead. Very funny too. My chief memory of this occasion, however, was the surge of the vast audience up the moving staircases in the interval to the top floor where, in a scene reminiscent of an airport, we were offered caviar and sweet champagne. Michael Kaser got upstairs first and made the arrangements. Vast multitudes at dome level. Mass culture.

After this, we went by bus to the hotel, packed, ate caviar and beer in my room and set off for the train to Leningrad from the "Square of the Three Stations". Chilly atmosphere with our hosts, Roper cross that we were not in The Red Star. Goodbye to Alexei. Accompanied by Khesin and Perenosov we set off at 23.59. I shared a sleeper with Michael Kaser. Some engaging drinking of vodka in Admiral Eberle's sleeper, in which we discussed the future of the Foreign Service and who might succeed Anthony Acland. I'm not sure why this came up because Anthony is still only about 53 or 54. Despite endless accounts in Solzhnitsyn and elsewhere about the brutal use of trains in Russia to convey prisoners to camps it is still impossible quite to put Anna Karenina and other train tales in Russian literature out of the mind when travelling thus in Russia.

Saturday May 19th

Awoken by the sound of artificial cockcrow and bird song on Moscow Radio's loudspeaker. Early morning on the Leningrad train. Out of the window, birch trees and pine alongside the straight line constructed by Nicholas I. Occasional wooden houses, one or two towns (Tosco). Kopina still elegant, before the iron works. Michael Kaser got up first and then he and I jointly looked at the landscape. Through Leningrad suburban stations - fishermen mend tools.

At 8.30 we arrived at Leningrad, and were met by Olga, in purple, a tall dark girl with large spectacles. It turned out later that her grandmother, half Russian, half Polish, had been of the minor nobility (so she said). She began in

* Chalfont, Harlech, Bolton and Robertson had left.

rather a maddening manner but, as the long day wore on, we all appreciated her intelligence, persistence and capacity to adapt herself to our - including my - extra demands. She arranged for porters to carry our suitcases and other luggage into a familiar Intourist bus, identical to the one we had had at Moscow. We clambered in, accompanied by the ubiquitous Perenosov and Khesin. Khesin is nice, good on the British economy and his real knowledge of English is perhaps better than Perenosov's but he is less fluent. A more straightforward personality and once or twice in the course of the day one could get through to him. Thus he told Andrew and myself that he was sorry Andropov had died and that things were much less clear now and therefore less easy for people such as he. But this of course could be disinformation.

Olga guided us through Leningrad which unfolded in a marvellous summer haze of great avenues, palaces, churches, ships, towers and domes. The surprise, apart from the beauty of the place, were the canals, though I remembered afterwards that Peter the Great had at first hoped to have his street "the sea there", as Venice has, but later decided to fill them in. John Roper wondered whether the continuing inefficiency of the Russians didn't mean that we should be less worried about the SS20s than we were. I wondered whether the contrary might not be true.

We progressed rather fast through these marvellous prospekts with Olga gabbling a bit - eg that "used to be the church of Saint So and So (? Catherine), it is now a swimming pool." But most of her reflections dwelt lovingly on the remote past and, although there were visible frequent pictures of Lenin, and though the centre of Leningrad was closed to traffic because of "National Pioneers Day", the dominant impression was Tsarist. This was most expressly symbolised by the colossal statue of Nicholas I. I found this statue of that narrow, cruel, bigot in a place of honour more shocking than anything else in Russia. Did the revolutions of 1917 occur on another planet. It seemed improbable actually that the events of either 1905 or 1917 could have been played out in those beautiful if melancholy surroundings.

We drove towards the Admiralty, down Nevsky Prospekt, past the Kazan cathedral and the Stroganov palace, with the spire of the Admiralty glittering in the sun. We turned left into Dvortzovaya Square, where the Alexander Column still stands and then past the green and white Winter Palace, now part of the Hermitage, a fine classical building where again it was difficult to imagine that any pre-revolutionary mob could assemble to rush up stairs - and even more difficult to imagine that a crowd headed by Father Gapon could be shot down there by the imperial artillery, as occurred in 1905. We swished across the Dvortzovi bridge and Micheal Kaser pointed out the whereabouts of the old British Embassy and church. On the right there was the low fortress of St Peter and St Paul, where so many people in the XIXth century served so many long sentences. We stopped for a few minutes on Stryelka to admire the view and then drove down on past many more attractive buildings, almost all XIXth century,

green and white, and bourgeois. Gathering speed, the bus took us at great pace to what must be one of the ugliest groups of buildings in the world, much less Leningrad, and dumped us at the Pribaltyskaia Hotel, which was built by the Swedes for Intourist in the hope, no doubt, of coping with Swedish and Finnish tourism. Vast arrays of buses stood outside, people debouched in hundreds, Germans, Americans, Finns, Swedes marched about in columns clutching cameras, plastic bags, unnecessary raincoats and inadequate guidebooks. The fact that this monstrosity faced the Baltic was no comfort since the sea looked a perfect uniform blue tedium, unruffled by waves, swimmers or ships.

We were checked in by Mr Perenosov, and shot up to the 13th floor where I had a suite in brown which did not seem to have been used before. The Admiral was next door. Mild agrophobia. I did not unpack but swiftly went down to have a coffee and a slice of salami at a bar with Andrew Knight. In a few minutes we were back in the bus and off again, to see first Pavlovsk and Pushkin (Tsarkoye Selo) before going to the Hermitage in the afternoon. This arrangement was undoubtedly the wrong way round but we did nevertheless have a very good, if long day. Olga explained that we were going to these two places rather than to Peterhof because the fountains were not playing at the latter, and one only saw the beauties of Peterhof if they were.

We made our way out of Leningrad which by now seemed more Petersburg than anything and which I imagine will one day return to that: Lenin is well and truly dethroned there, as much as Stalin. On the way, we passed St Nicholas's cathedral and stopped there 15 minutes. It is blue and white in a pretty little park with children playing. The church was open and in what was in fact the crypt (though at ground level), a service was under way, probably a funeral service since there were three bodies well dolled up, but open, in their coffins, in the Russian style. A fourth coffin was brought in as we were there. About a hundred people. The priest was most elaborately dressed and the singing and music were rich and well done. Mostly elderly women, but one soldier, in an open shirt. After finding out the time of the service the next day, we set off again. On the way out of the city we passed the site, according to my old map, of the racecourse where Vronsky presumably supposedly rode in the famous horse race in Anna Karenina. John Roper asked Olga whether it is true that the race course was once there and she replied "Yes, many years ago it was the race course but now it is a milk factory."

On the way out of the city and into the country: some harsh suburbs with huge buildings of the Stalin era, institutes of this and that, war memorials, the observatory and the road to the airport. Much of this was gloomy but it was a fine day. Trees were in leaf and we went along in good spirits. We passed the road to the airport. John Roper observed some effective low level radar, whose efficiency the admiral accepted. Once out in the country one could see signs of agricultural activity but this seemed imagined. There was a lot of activity in allotments on which there was usually

a hut, but even they looked primitive and very ill-weeded. Lots of dandelions on every side. John Roper and I carried on a literary conversation about the benefits which would have ensued to the world had, in 1812, Napoleon conquered Russia, and Britain the USA. I quoted Victor Hugo which just came to my mind on 1812.

About eleven we arrived, via the outskirts of "Pushkin" (clearly now a large town and will be bigger), at Pavlosk, the palace built for the emperor Paul by his mother Catherine. The architect was Cameron who apparently never learned a word of Russian, though he lived here forty years. After a glass of juice etc we moved in to the palace. It is a large yellow building in English palladian style, though bigger, with flying wings, as in Ronnie Tree's house in Barbados. We were required to put on overshoes as if in a mosque. Much of the palace had been destroyed in the war but it had been restored lovingly, if often not very finely (perhaps it was always rough and ready).

Olga guided us through these rooms well, showing the most interesting things and one could always supplement her by looking at the texts written in English. There were many other tourists but she manipulated her way around them - they were mostly Scandinavian. (It appears to be the view of everyone to whom I talk here, that, from the beginning of the Russian Revolution, palaces like this were well kept by the Bolsheviks but I cannot believe it). Anyway, Pavlovsk is now well kept, most rooms having ruched lace curtains in different colours, the rooms in the curved wings being specially pretty. Afterwards, Andrew and I walked round the outside on the lake side. Capability Brown there in spirit - actually Gonzaga. Avenues, lakes, temples of Grace and temples of Apollo.

We drove back to Pushkin or Tsarkoye Selo (village of the Tsar). The palace is a building of colossal size - 326 yards long, built in blue and white and gold. Very successful but on an extraordinary scale. Bigger than the Palace of Westminster? I should think so. Here we had a little time but we did see the Amber room (from which the Germans had robbed the amber), the silver room, the Palace Church, also a bit delapidated because of the war, and the Ball room - 52 feet x 140 feet which seemed bigger because of the mirrors. Windows open on both sides. The interior seemed less interesting than Pavlosk but that doubtless is because we saw so little of it. Andrew and I had some discussion before a picture depicting the battle of Poltava.

The colours of the main building were bright and the park pretty and full of children (Mr Bykov incidentally told me that the Russians had no population policy and hoped for more people, not less). Outside the curved stable buildings we bought beer and buns and ate these in the bus, much to the irritation of Perenosov who desired a good lunch: why else

should one go to the trouble of escorting difficult visitors such as us? I see his point, though there were many things which they had not seen before. I think the Russians never cease to be amazed at the interest we foreigners genuinely have in the details of what we were seeing: they are used only to show interest in things as a matter of party policy.

We drove back to Leningrad by the same way we'd come. Several members of the team dozed. We stopped in the Michael Square in front of the Michael Theatre for Olga to buy tickets for the ballet that night. Khesin pointed out the Church built on the spot where Alexander II had been killed - the Church of the Blood, he described it. Then we went on to the Hermitage, stopping at the director's door.

Here we were received by a certain Sergei, an engineer but an expert in the Scythian Gold. I left the letter I had to the Director with his secretary and above all the guide to Romanesque art which the Haskells had given me. I was very glad to hand over this valuable but weighty jewel.

We were shown the Scythian gold most expertly and interestingly. Afterwards, I left the others and spent one and a half hours in the Hermitage and Winter Palace and apart from picturing Antonov Ovseenko leading the Red Guards up the staircase, saw a great many paintings of distinction and interest. But though the "coverage" was complete, I did not think that the work on anyone was quite of the top level - except perhaps the Murillos and the Van Dycks perhaps - which were on the same scale as those exhibited in the recent London exhibition. Regrettably I did not have time for the Picassos and other modern paintings on the third floor.

Afterwards at 5.20 I walked round the outside of the building into the main square in front of the Palace where large cardboard portraits of the Politburo hung sombrely (and temporarily), having presided over the pioneers do in the morning. No one paid any attention to them. Indeed there was practically no one there. I rejoined the team and managed to persuade Olga to take us to the Smolny Convent - another blue and white Rastrelli building - and the Tauride Palace (Duma). We raced along and Olga managed as fluently with them as she had with Catherine the Great and with as great good humour. I did not think, however, it was quite what she enjoyed doing. Still, she agreed it would have been a mistake to omit from our itinerary the places where the Revolution began.

We returned to our hideous hotel for about forty-five minutes - an entire waste of time - I should have followed my better judgement and walked in Leningrad - but having travelled all night I had desired a bath. This was not to be, since I took the wrong key to the room, an event which led to very great confusion and having to go up and down the appalling lifts unnecessarily, as well as to having to visit the management and identify myself. Innumerable apologies. There was not time for the bath before we set off for the Michael Theatre where we arrived at 7.20.

We had no exact idea as to what we were to see. We thus went into the small, charming theatre (c. 1835) with interest. There are chairs, not seats. Full. It turned out to be a rock opera based on the idea of Orpheus and Euridice. An English-speaking Russian in front turned and explained the plot. The music and the singing was delivered by loud, electric means, while the participants danced badly and vulgarly. It was most disagreeable and crude. The theatre was too hot as well. No one seemed to be enjoying it very much.

At the interval, John Roper, I and Andrew Knight determined not to go back - but in the event only Andrew and I remained outside. Khesin observed us in Michael Square but thought that he could not join us. Feeling a little that we were letting down the team, but that we were showing all how, on another occasion, they could do the same, Andrew and I walked to the Church of the Blood (under repair), hesitated at the Mikailovska Gardens and made our way towards a café which Andrew had seen on the corner of Nevsky Prospekt and Sadovaya. However, the rain which had been hovering for some time began to fall heavily while we were on the south side of the square. We sheltered for a time in a doorway. Before us in the pouring torrent, a man was working with a jack on his car (both sides) - under a dirty old raincoat such as had been seen in the scene of hell in the rock opera. In the rain Andrew confided to me that he believed that if he were running the Round Table we would all be much happier. Lack of leadership by Jim Eberle had upset him as it had me.

After a bit, the rain lifted and we got to the café where we had vodka. Andrew said how much he admired Grandma, who had told him about bran. We observed television with a character looking rather like Norman St John Stevas. We returned, well warmed up, Andrew insisting on paying, with dollars. On our return we met, it being only ten to ten, the hordes who had been to the Rock Opera returning to their buses and hotels. Since we had particularly not wished to be late this set us off at a good pace and we found the others in the bus. I do not think Perenosov was very pleased.

I remember that in May 1953 a lot of attention was paid in the US press to the fact that Beria had not gone to the Ballet. One paper stuffily said "surely Beria may not like Ballet".

Perenosov had his own back with a terrible dinner in the hotel. At a large "international" restaurant, we sat round an inhospitable table and waited the usual half hour to order and another half hour till the dishes came. Roper seemed in good spirits, Michael Kaser his usual equable self. Fortunately we were too late for pudding. Some discussion as to how Andrew could get to church in the morning. Perenosov, scenting power, was quite rough, Eberle apologetic.

After dinner, I went briefly to the first floor with John Roper and Caroline. Full of drunken Finnish tourists clumping about to loud music. A bent Charon, elderly, white-haired, checked to see one had one's key. Much the same as hell in the rock opera. I then went to bed without difficulty in the unused room.

Sunday May 20th

Awoke after a reasonable night, packed, breakfast in café and we were off by 9 in the bus, picking up John Roper, Andrew Knight and the secretary who had been to the mass in the orthodox cathedral of St Nicholas we'd seen yesterday. They stood solemn in coats exactly at the rendezvous point - a reproach to Perenosov's expectations of their unpunctuality. They had got up at 6 and silently put their suitcases into Micheal Kaser's room. People taking dogs for a walk. Misty day. No sign of the Baltic from the hotel windows. John Roper says the mass was full, 500 people, including officers. Apparently the archbishop is on very good terms with the Communist Party. Olga says his predecessor was poisoned.

Arrived at the airport and Olga and Perenosov carefully but fairly brusquely shepherded us through the hoi poloi, back and forward, money changed all right, and into the departure lounge. I was specially glad to be a special guest on this occasion. I stamped on the foot of an elderly German and apologised: "we understand" she replied patiently. The rest all went off at 11.25 for London, I at 11.53 for Helsinki. One final hiccup - crowds in the final departure lounge - and then I was onto the aircraft. Punctual. Some frantic Americans, scientists here for a conference, who had been held up in customs and lost their flight to Paris clapped as we took off - I expect they thought they'd never do it.

Finland

Arrived at 11.45, Sunday May 20th. I was first off and quickly walked through customs to find Alan and Hazel Brook Turner waiting. They drove me to their particularly agreeable embassy. I celebrated this swift transition to the West with a telephone call to London and a gin and tonic in the garden.

I had four nights in Helsinki, the best part of five days. There was the pretty outlook through trees only just in leaf, the sparkle of the sea from Brundtspark and the clean efficiency of the Finns. The Brook Turners were extremely friendly, efficient and easy-going and he is particularly interested in Russia where he had served twice, once in the sixties, once as Minister until appointed here a year or so ago. He is a reflective sort of man who doesn't know Finnish - he tried hard - couldn't learn at fifty-eight. Normally I'd say this was against him but he plainly is very good at his job and his Russian experience evidently a great asset.

We had two lovely maritime trips, one round weekend islands on Sunday afternoon; one on Monday after Vanessa had arrived, in their new sailing boat. If he hasn't learned Finnish, Alan has learned to sail. Hazel, though heavy, is quite good at the tying on of ropes etc which is necessary as crew and she on both occasions had a little champagne on board. On Monday I lunched at the embassy with a deputy inspector of the British Consul, and the local British Council man. On Tuesday I lunched with Max Jakobsen, my host who had invited me to talk about the philosophical and historical background to Mrs Thatcher's "economic policy" in a seminar in a house which bears a distinct similarity to a Scottish country house (and was built as such!)

On Tuesday night an excellent dinner was given in our honour at which several very interesting people were (eg Suommien, the head of the conservative party; ex PM J Virolainen of the Centre party; Dr van Wright who was Wittgenstein's successor at Trinity and biographer; Harry Hekovi of the Bank of Finland who, had been leader of the Conservatives and ran in the recent London marathon; and Professor Penonen who had been at the seminar. I talked to more or less everyone at one time or another except unfortunately Virolainen's powerful looking wife. Von Wright was the most engaging. There were also a couple from the embassy, Peter Harbord and an intelligent girl, Meta Ramsey.

On Wednesday we went off on a boat to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Wartila, the shipping company, and met the President, the Soviet ambassador, Mr Sobolev and his fat wife (he resembled K S Karol) and the head of the KGB Mr Maximov who had the short moustache of Reg Hibbert. Champagne, splendid lunch, music (too much), and not enough air but a pretty bizarre occasion and a very grand one.

In the evening we dined at the yacht club with bankers, a very long drawn out evening which I did not enjoy since I wanted to go to the Café Mante in the grand boulevard. Very agreeable in art nouveau style. In the afternoon I looked at the clean Lutheran cathedral.

To-day Vanessa was feeling sick from too much lobster. I lunched with V Suomminen and afterwards saw the parliament with him, the Finlandia Palace, the underground church and Sibelius's monument in a fine park on the edge on a lake looking like a smaller version of the Winter Palace at Peking.

Specially nice was the embassy itself set in a park by the promontary overlooking the sea, once part of a park and very neatly laid out thus:

The windows were very nice too, thus:

Or something like it. We had a very nice room overlooking the garden.

Tranquil days somewhat disturbed by excessive social life and too much drink; by my desire to escape the dinner at the Yacht Club; and finally by a telephone call late at night which caused Alan to have to see a man who'd arrived at an embassy and "who spoke a language which only he knew". A Russian, who wasn't very important. Over breakfast Alan whispered - and implied he'd been handed back - à la Brimelow. Anxiety over being heard over the bugging. But presumably he'd not be killed. Or perhaps he was just being refused entry.

The journey in the Finlandia was I suppose the really high point of this. To commemorate a 150 year old company anywhere is fairly reasonable. The idea of all this champagne, lobster, duck, etc being sent out with so many hundred people into the Gulf of Finland with the President was extraordinary. The Chairman spoke fast and in English, and the speculation was that the President had danced not once but four times - a record.

We were both very much impressed by Alan Brook Turner as ambassador - efficient, intelligent, friendly and still with a speculative mind.



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-2155422
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JU740

PS/ Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

12 July 1984

cc P.C.
CDP
13/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

R B Bone Esq
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Roger,

CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: PROPOSED INVITATION TO MR ALIEV

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter dated 4 June to John Coles at No 10 about the possibility of inviting a number of senior members of the Soviet Politburo to visit the UK.

2 I understand that the Foreign Secretary has now invited Gromyko to pay a return visit to the UK in 1985 and that an invitation has also been extended to Gorbachev. I believe that it is now proposed that the Soviet Ambassador in London should be approached to discuss the proposed Aliev invitation and whether Mr Tebbit would be the most appropriate host.

3 This is just to confirm that Mr Tebbit is content with what is proposed and would be pleased to act as Aliev's host.

4 I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

RUTH THOMPSON
Private Secretary

Soviet Union : UK Relations
P73

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file

bc PC

SR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1984

Mr. Chernenko

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 6 July, a minute from Mr. Bishop about Mr. Chernenko's appearance and performance at his meeting with the Foreign Secretary.

The Prime Minister was most interested to read this.

C.D. Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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cc/bc (2)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 July 1984

Prime Minister

CDD
6/7

ms

Dear Charles,

Mr Chernenko

The Foreign Secretary thinks that the Prime Minister might be interested to glance at the attached minute from Mr Bishop about Mr Chernenko's appearance and performance at his meeting with the Foreign Secretary. Mr Bishop acted as interpreter for the meeting.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FROM: K A Bishop
Soviet Section
Research Department

DATE: 4 July 1984

cc: Sir J Bullard
Mr Jenkins, AUS
✓ Mr Appleyard, (PS,
Secretary of State)
Mr Hall, RD
Mr Pakenham, ACDD
Mr Crabbie, Defence Dept
Mr Crowley, PUSD
Mr Miller, Assessments Staff
Mr Meyer, Moscow

Mr Broomfield
Soviet Department

A VIEW OF CHERNENKO ON 3 JULY 1984

1. Paragraph 7 of Moscow Telno 826 (attached) contains a description of Chernenko's appearance and performance at yesterday's meeting (3 July) in the Kremlin with the Secretary of State. Telno 826 adds that Chernenko seemed tired and not in the best of health; appeared unfamiliar with much of the detail of his brief, and turned frequently to Gromyko for advice. As another eye-witness, I find these assessments perceptive and accurate.
2. I thought it worthwhile to record one or two additional glosses for completeness of picture and for future comparison as we monitor his physical problems with the passage of time. My observations are inevitably impressionistic.
3. Although showing no visible infirmity when standing and walking, Chernenko appeared slightly more hunched and stiffer in the arms than I recall him being in February (when he received the Prime Minister) and more dessicated in appearance. February's hoarseness of voice and chestiness had largely gone and the shortness of breath was still evident but less pronounced. A few minutes into his written presentation, he had a ten-second coughing fit, which alarmed Aleksandrov and possibly also others. The air of abstraction and occasional bewilderment still clings to him. His reading of his prepared text was, again, disastrously bad - still the same high-speed gabble, the stumblings, the breaking of sentences (in order to breathe) often in mid-phrase; still the mechanical delivery, the lack of light and shade, and the failure to highlight key points. In short, the same apparent lack of conviction and even, it seems at times, of comprehension. These unfortunate defects largely persist when he goes extempore. In his one long unscripted foray yesterday (which he ended with the remark:

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"I seem rather to have run on (Kazhetsya, ya razgovorilsya)", with which Gromyko seemed to agree) he was notably repetitive and disjointed in his sequence of thought. He no doubt suffered partly from lack of deep knowledge of the issues under discussion (INF and the nuclear balance, which he himself raised), but his at times almost incoherent phraseology in Russian points also to some lack of mental discipline.

4. When listening to the Secretary of State, Chernenko persisted in his earlier noted and misleading habit of repeatedly nodding with a slight smile. This appears to be his way of registering his understanding of successive points rather than his agreement with them. Chernenko's own lack of confidence (and of authority on foreign policy matters) was evident. Not only did he frequently turn to Gromyko as though for guidance but, having completed his own scripted remarks and heard the Secretary of State's reply, he sat seemingly non-plussed as to what to do next for what seemed like ten or more uncomfortable seconds. Gromyko's own self-confidence (never in doubt) was much on display. He spoke at some length (unlike at the February meeting), without deference to Chernenko and without feeling it necessary to ask his permission. Aleksandrov, too, interjected a point to cover up for a pause in Chernenko's unfocussed ramblings on the INF issue and to put his master back on track.

5. Chernenko is clearly not his own man in the foreign policy field. On yesterday's performance I doubt his ability to be so in others or to penetrate much deeper than Pravda's poker-work slogans.

K. A. Bishop

K A Bishop

7. SO MUCH FOR THE PLAY: WHAT OF THE SOVIET PLAYERS ?
CHERMENKO LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO WHAT YOU HAD TO SAY.
WALKING TO GREET YOU AND RISING TO SAY GOODBYE, HE SHOWED NO
VISIBLE INFIRMITY. HE WAS LESS BPEATHLESS IN DELIVERY THAN
AT THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER ANDPOPOV'S
FUNERAL. BUT, WITH A PASTY PALLOR, HE LOOKED GENERALLY LESS
HEALTHY AND READ FROM HIS PREPARED TEXT WITHOUT THE FOCUS OF
EVIDENT CONVICTION. BUT HIS SUBSEQUENT APOLOGY FOR
SOME OF HIS PHRASES (IN PARTICULAR THE REFERENCE TO UNCLE
SAM'S PISTOL POINTED AT THE SOVIET UNION) WAS EQUALLY
UNCONVINCING. LEFT ON HIS OWN AFTER GROMYKO HAD SOUGHT TO RESCUE
HIM FROM CONFUSION ON ARMS IN SPACE, HE RESORTED TO THE
LANGUAGE OF EMOTIONAL PROPAGANDA ABOUT AMERICAN ROCKETS IN
EUROPE. IT WAS NOT THE PERFORMANCE OF AN AUTOMATON , BUT IT
WAS PRETTY INEPT AND CONFIRMED THE IMPRESSION THAT, AT LEAST
ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THE CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP LACKS AUTHORITY AND SOPHISTICATION OF THOUGHT.

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FM MOSCOW 032150Z JUL 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 040800Z)

TELEGRAM NR 827 OF 03 JUL 84

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK.

SAVINGS TO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDEL CSCE STOCKHOLM, ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME, THE HAGUE, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW, TOKYO, PEKING, ULAN BATOR.

YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW: 1-3 JULY: GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE FIRST VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1977 BY A BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY IN HIS OWN RIGHT WAS HARD POUNDING. ON THE UNITED STATES AND ARMS CONTROL, CHERMENKO AND GROMYKO WERE AT THEIR MOST UNYIELDING. IN PARTICULAR THE US RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR TALKS ON WEAPONS IN SPACE WAS DISMISSED, SEEMINGLY BY REFLEX ACTION RATHER THAN ON RATIONAL CALCULATION. THERE COULD BE NO BREAKTHROUGH: AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT YOUR INSISTENT URGING THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD TEST WESTERN SINCERITY IN NEGOTIATION HAD STRUCK HOME. BUT NO HIGH-LEVEL WESTERN VISITOR HAS THIS YEAR MORE EFFECTIVELY SHOWN UP THE FALLACIES AND WILFUL PERVERSITY OF THE SOVIET POSITION. DESPITE THE BLUNTNESS OF YOUR EXCHANGES, IT WAS ONLY AT GROMYKO'S LUNCH THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SCURED. THERE WERE FEW DIRECT ATTACKS ON BRITAIN, AND A SOVIET CONTACT HAS ALREADY SPOKEN RESPECTFULLY OF YOUR STYLE. MORE OR LESS WHAT HAD BEEN EXPECTED: BUT USEFUL FOR US, SALUTARY FOR THEM, WITH POSSIBLE LONG-TERM DIVIDENDS.

DETAIL

2. THE OMENS FOR YOUR VISIT WERE NOT GOOD. CHANCE MADE YOU THE LAST IN LINE OF A SERIES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN STATESMAN IN MOSCOW THIS YEAR (VOGEL, ANDREOTTI, GENSCHER AND, IMMEDIATELY BEFOREHAND, MITTERRAND). AS WE ALL WAIT FOR THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS, AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IS DEEP IN A RUT OF ITS OWN MAKING, THERE WAS NO PROSPECT THAT CHERMENKO AND GROMYKO COULD BE SHIFTED FROM THE LINE OF UNCOMPROMISING HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES. AND SO IT PROVED. FIVE HOURS OF FORMAL TALKS WITH GROMYKO, ROUNDED OFF BY OVER AN HOUR WITH CHERMENKO, SHOWED NOT EVEN A HAIRLINE CRACK IN THEIR ARMOUR OF SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS.

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3. NEITHER WAS PREPARED TO GRANT THE LEAST HINT OF SINCERITY TO THE US GOVERNMENT IN ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE LEITMOTIF IN ALL THAT THEY SAID ON ALL INTERNATIONAL TOPICS REMAINED THEIR OBSESSION THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS DRIVEN BY AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR WAY OF LIFE. THIS EMERGED AT ITS HARSHTEST IN GROMYKO'S LUNCHTIME SPEECH ON 2 JULY, AND IN HIS CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD CONCLUDED ON THE DAY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE, THAT THEY COULD NOT DO BUSINESS WITH IT. IT LEFT NO ROOM FOR ANY ILLUSION ENGENDERED BY MITTERRAND'S VISIT THAT A CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE MIGHT BE IN THE WIND.
4. THE CENTRAL PLACE IN YOUR EXCHANGES WAS OCCUPIED BY ARMS CONTROL AND IN PARTICULAR ON ARMS IN SPACE. THESE WERE GIVEN TOPICAL POINT ON THE EVE OF YOUR TALKS BY THE FLURRY OF SOVIET PROPOSAL AND AMERICAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL, CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS IN SEPTEMBER. NOTHING COULD BETTER HAVE ILLUSTRATED THE PRESENT SOVIET DETERMINATION NOT TO BE DRAWN INTO RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON ARMS CONTROL THAN THEIR INSTANT DISMISSAL OF REAGAN'S AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS ARMS IN SPACE, AND RENEWED DECLARATION OF HIS WISH TO RESUME DISCUSSION ON BOTH INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THIS PLAINLY CAUGHT THE RUSSIANS OFF-BALANCE AND LEFT THEM IN THE POSITION OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT YES FOR AN ANSWER TO THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. EVEN THE ORDINARILY IMPASSIVE GROMYKO LOOKED UNCOMFORTABLE AS YOU REPEATEDLY STATED THE ILLOGICALITY. CHERNENKO WAS UNBRIEFED AND PROBABLY ALSO UNCOMPREHENDING, BUT EVIDENTLY READY TO FOLLOW GROMYKO'S ADVICE.
5. THE FACT THAT BRITAIN WAS RARELY A DIRECT TARGET IN GROMYKO'S FIRING LINE WAS NOT A FAVOUR TO YOU. THIS WAS ANOTHER FACET OF THE REAGAN FIXATION WHICH LEADS THE RUSSIANS TO JUDGE US LESS ON OUR MERITS THAN ON OUR CAPACITY TO SERVE AS A CONDUIT TO WASHINGTON. GROMYKO'S EIGHTY-MINUTE MONOLOGUE AT THE FIRST ROUND - WAS ADDRESSED TO REAGAN AND SHULTZ. THIS AND HIS SUBSEQUENT FAILURE TO MEET HEAD-ON THE POINTS WHICH YOU PUT TO HIM ALSO SHOWED THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE HAD LOST, OR DELIBERATELY ABANDONED, THE ART OF GENUINE NEGOTIATION AND DISCUSSION WITH WESTERN INTERLOCUTORS. THIS IMPRESSION WAS REINFORCED BY HIS REFUSAL TO RISE TO YOUR REMARKS EITHER ON HUMAN RIGHTS CASES IN THE SOVIET UNION (THOUGH AT THIS POINT HE FLUSHED ANGRILY) OR AFGHANISTAN.
6. THE PARADOX OF THE VISIT WAS THAT IT WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY HAVE CONFIRMED SOVIET PREJUDICES ABOUT OUR SITTING IN THE AMERICAN POCKET: AND HAVE RAISED YOUR STATURE WITH GROMYKO AS AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR. THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE NOTED WRYLY YOUR ABILITY TO CITE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE IN SUPPORT OF YOUR CONTENTION THAT THE US WILL TALK TO THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS ON WEAPONS IN SPACE. BUT THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT BY THE CLOSING STAGES OF

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THE VISIT, YOU MAY HAVE STARTED TO SCORE TOO MANY POINTS FOR COMFORT. SHORTLY BEFORE YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE, THE FIRST DEPUTY HEAD OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S PRESS DEPARTMENT, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TALKS, HAVE A BRIEFING AT SHORT NOTICE TO BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS. THIS LOOKED LIKE AN ATTEMPT TO PRE-EMPT WHAT THE RUSSIANS RIGHTLY ANTICIPATED WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE PRESS CONFERENCE. A TASS CONTACT, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE FRANKNESS OF THE TALKS, ADMIRED YOUR STYLE.

7. SO MUCH FOR THE PLAY: WHAT OF THE SOVIET PLAYERS ?
CHERNENKO LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO WHAT YOU HAD TO SAY. WALKING TO GREET YOU AND RISING TO SAY GOODBYE, HE SHOWED NO VISIBLE INFIRMITY. HE WAS LESS BREATHLESS IN DELIVERY THAN AT THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL. BUT, WITH A PASTY PALLOR, HE LOOKED GENERALLY LESS HEALTHY AND READ FROM HIS PREPARED TEXT WITHOUT THE FOCUS OF EVIDENT CONVICTION. BUT HIS SUBSEQUENT APOLOGY FOR SOME OF HIS PHRASES (IN PARTICULAR THE REFERENCE TO UNCLE SAM'S PISTOL POINTED AT THE SOVIET UNION) WAS EQUALLY UNCONVINCING. LEFT ON HIS OWN AFTER GROMYKO HAD SOUGHT TO RESCUE HIM FROM CONFUSION ON ARMS IN SPACE, HE RESORTED TO THE LANGUAGE OF EMOTIONAL PROPAGANDA ABOUT AMERICAN ROCKETS IN EUROPE. IT WAS NOT THE PERFORMANCE OF AN AUTOMATON, BUT IT WAS PRETTY INEPT AND CONFIRMED THE IMPRESSION THAT, AT LEAST ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THE CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP LACKS AUTHORITY AND SOPHISTICATION OF THOUGHT.

8. GROMYKO REMAINS AN ADROIT PERFORMER, SPEAKING AT LENGTH AND WITHOUT NOTES. HIS COMMAND OF HIS SUBJECT MATTER, AND CAPACITY FOR DETAIL, IS STILL IMPRESSIVE. THE STRENGTH OF HIS POSITION IN THE FORMULATION OF SOVIET POLICY ON THE QUESTIONS OF CENTRAL INTEREST TO US CAN ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE LAST TWO DAYS HARDLY BE DENIED. BUT HIS AGE IS BEGINNING TO SHOW IN THE TRICK OF RECALLING THE DISTANT PAST, AND IN HIS IMPERVIOUSNESS TO NEW IDEAS. AS HE INSISTENTLY PLAYED HIS ANTI-AMERICAN GRAMOPHONE RECORD, IT SOUNDED MORE AND MORE LIKE THE WELL-WORN 78 IT NOW IS.

9. THE IMPACT OF ANY SINGLE VISIT IS HARD TO MEASURE, EVEN IN MORE IMPRESSIONABLE CAPITALS THAN MOSCOW. THERE WERE DISAPPOINTMENTS IN YOUR PROGRAMME, SUCH AS THE REFUSAL (NOT UNEXPECTED) OF YOUR REQUEST FOR A CALL ON GORBACHEV, AND THE RELATIVELY SPARSE ATTENDANCE AT THE INFORMAL LUNCH I GAVE ON 3 JULY. BUT, EXPLOITING YOUR POSITION AS THE LAST OF A SERIES OF SENIOR WESTERN VISITORS, YOU WERE ABLE THE MORE TELLINGLY TO DEMONSTRATE, BY PATIENT ARGUMENT, THAT THE SOVIET PICTURE OF WESTERN, AND ESPECIALLY AMERICAN, POLICIES AND INTENTIONS IN NO WAY ACCORDS WITH REALITY. EQUALLY, IT WAS SALUTARY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SOVIET HOPES OF HAVING PROVOKED A SPLIT IN WESTERN POSITIONS ARE UNFOUNDED. I CANNOT HONESTLY SAY THAT THIS MADE AN IMPRESSION ON EITHER

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/GROMYKO,

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GROMYKO OR CHERNENKO. BUT WE HAVE NEVER EXPECTED THAT IMPROVEMENT IN THE CLIMATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE CONSEQUENT EASING OF THE PRESENT DANGEROUS LEVELS OF TENSION AND MUTUAL RECRIMINATION COULD BE ANYTHING BUT A LONG UPHILL STRUGGLE. YOU WILL HAVE YOUR OWN VIEW, BUT MEASURED BY THAT YARDSTICK, I THINK YOU CAN BE WELL CONTENT WITH THE OUTCOME. I AM CERTAINLY GRATEFUL TO YOU, AS ALSO TO LADY HOWE - WHOSE OWN PROGRAMME WAS A WORTHWHILE INPUT IN ITS OWN RIGHT - FOR HAVING COME.

10. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGS ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND
BT

FCO/WH (PALACE)
SOV.D.

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FM MOSCOW 031815Z JUL 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 040800Z)

TELEGRAM NR 824 OF 3 JUL 84

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK,
UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE STOCKHOLM.
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, TOKYO.
SAVING TO ULAN BATOR, PEKING, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, CAIRO, ALGIERS,
LUANDA, AND PRETORIA.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 81-1: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: SECOND

SESSION OF TALKS WITH GROMYKO: 3 JULY

SUMMARY

1. A WIDE-RANGING AGENDA, WITH MORE REAL DISCUSSION THAN ON
2 JULY, COVERING ARMS CONTROL, MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER
REGIONAL QUESTIONS, AND BILATERAL MATTERS. MOST
INTERESTING ITEM WAS EXCHANGES ON WEAPONS IN SPACE. GROMYKO
INSISTED, IN TEETH OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S EVIDENCE,
FOLLOWING CONTACTS WITH WASHINGTON OVERNIGHT,
THAT THE US ATTACHED UNACCEPTABLE PRE-CONDITIONS TO THEIR
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSED TALKS. SECRETARY OF STATE STRONGLY
ENCOURAGED HIM TO PURSUE WITH WASHINGTON THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
CHANNEL. ON ARAB/ISRAEL, SECRETARY OF STATE ADVISED GROMYKO
TO ENCOURAGE SYRIA NOT TO SPOIL ANY OPPORTUNITIES ARISING AFTER
ISRAELI ELECTIONS. GROMYKO RESTED ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. NOTHING NEW ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.
GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S
REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN, CHOOSING INSTEAD TO CRITICISE AT
LENGTH US POLICIES IN CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA. GROMYKO
GAVE QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE TO INVITATION TO VISIT
UK, BUT LEFT TIMING OPEN. FOR DETAILS OF DISCUSSION ON
BILATERAL QUESTIONS, SEE MY IFT.

DETAIL

ARMS CONTROL

2. ON MBFR, GROMYKO SAID THE WEST WAS MERELY KILLING TIME AND
THAT WITHOUT CHANGES IN THE WESTERN POSITION, THE PROSPECTS
FOR PROGRESS WERE SLIM. THE WEU'S LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON

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CERTAIN FRG CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRODUCTION SHOWED THAT WESTERN IDEAS RAN COUNTER TO ARMS LIMITATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO WEU TREATY CHANGES AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE LATEST WESTERN PROPOSALS ON M.B.F.R. WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF EASTERN PREOCCUPATIONS.

3. ON CDE STOCKHOLM, GROMYKO SAID HOPES RAISED AT THE OUTSET HAD NOT YET BEEN JUSTIFIED. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NOFUN AND NOFUF WERE SURELY WELCOME TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. BUT THE ATTEMPT, ON GROUNDS OF VERIFICATION, TO OPEN UP SOVIET TERRITORY TO ESPIONAGE, WHILE EXEMPTING US TERRITORY, WAS 'BOGUS'. BUT HE DID NOT REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT ON 'CERTAIN MILITARY TECHNICAL STEPS', PROVIDED THEY WERE NEGOTIATED ALONGSIDE NOFUN AND NOFUF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED THAT THE AGREED MANDATE EXCLUDED US TERRITORY. NOFUN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RE-CONFIRM EXISTING OBLIGATIONS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE.

4. ON ARMS IN SPACE, REVERTING TO DISCUSSION ON 2 JULY (MY TELNO 811 PARA 4), THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT OVERNIGHT HE HAD RE-CHECKED THE WHITE HOUSE POSITION. HE READ OUT THE RELEVANT PASSAGE FROM PARA 1 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 2 TO MOSCOW. THE US POSITION WAS THAT THERE WERE NO AMERICAN PRE-CONDITIONS. THEY WERE READY TO TALK ABOUT THE SOVIET AGENDA AND FOR THEIR PART WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE US AGENDA. BUT THEY SET NO PRE-CONDITIONS. THE SOVIET REACTION - REFUSING TO TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER - WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. HE URGED THE RUSSIANS TO PURSUE THE QUESTION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. GROMYKO PERSISTED IN ARGUING THAT THERE WERE AMERICAN PRE-CONDITIONS, AND THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES RECOGNISED THAT THEIR REPLY HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY FRAMED TO COURT A SOVIET REJECTION. THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN 'SERIOUS AND HONEST' NEGOTIATIONS, NOT PROPAGANDA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BROUGHT THE DISCUSSION TO A CLOSE BY RECOMMENDING THE RUSSIANS TO CLARIFY THE POSITION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE COULD NOT RECOGNISE THE SOVIET PICTURE OF WESTERN, ESPECIALLY AMERICA, INTENTIONS PAINTED IN GROMYKO'S SPEECH ON 2 JULY. THE SOVIET ANALYSIS WAS NOT CONVINCING AND TOOK INADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE ASSESSMENTS OF INDEPENDENT WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT WESTERN SINCERITY AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD 'GIVE PEACE A CHANCE'. GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NECESSARY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A RESUMPTION OF TALKS HAD AGAIN BEEN MADE CLEAR BY CHERNENKO. NO FURTHER STATEMENT WAS NEEDED.

REGIONAL QUESTIONS

6. ARAB/ISRAEL: THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT, AFTER THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES, THERE COULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. BUT HE FEARED THAT IN THAT EVENT THE

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ARAB WORLD MIGHT NOT BE UNITED ENOUGH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE. HE PUT IT TO GROMYKO (AND REPEATED THE POINT LATER IN THE DISCUSSION) THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD STRESS TO THE SYRIANS, WHO SEEMED TO TAKE A LESS URGENT VIEW, THE NEED FOR ARAB UNITY. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS SUGGESTION, BUT SPOKE, IN GENERAL TERMS, OF SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF ARAB EXTREMISM AND SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS, NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MIDDLE EAST STATES, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ARAB STATES UNLESS THEY WERE THERE WITH THE CONSENT OF THOSE STATES THEMSELVES. HE COMMENDED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EASTERN CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS WORTH TRYING, GIVEN THE FAILURE OF OTHER ATTEMPTS TO REACH A SOLUTION. ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES, AND ILLEGAL SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK, COULD NOT EXIST WITHOUT US AND OTHER WESTERN SUPPORT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED OUR RESERVATIONS AT PRESENT ABOUT A CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE AGAIN URGED THAT SYRIA SHOULD NOT BLOCK ARAB UNITY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UK AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD USEFULLY MAINTAIN CONTACT ON THIS QUESTION.

7. **IRAN/IRAQ:** THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW SOME SHARED OBJECTIVES: NO ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, NO IRANIAN VICTORY, AND NO INTERRUPTION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE UK WAS NEUTRAL. WE HAD SUPPLIED NO LETHAL ARMS TO EITHER SIDE. THE RIGHT WAY TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS BY DIPLOMATIC ACTION. IF OBLIGED TO RESORT TO OTHER MEANS, WE WOULD CONSULT THE SOVIET UNION. OUR ACTION WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. GROMYKO AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES: IRAQ WAS READY BUT NOT YET IRAN.

8. **AFGHANISTAN:** THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE KEY TO SOLUTION WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, WHICH WOULD BE WIDELY WELCOMED AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET INTERESTS. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND.

9. **CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA:** IN A LENGTHY INTERVENTION, GROMYKO CONDEMNED 'AGGRESSIVE' US POLICIES AND 'TERRORISM' IN THE AREA, IN FAMILIAR TERMS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REBUTTED THESE ALLEGATIONS, AND GROMYKO CONCLUDED THAT OUR POSITIONS WERE 'POLES APART'.

10. **FAR EAST:** GROMYKO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NEW TRENDS TOWARDS MILITARISM IN JAPAN, EGGED ON BY WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFUTED THIS AND SPOKE OF JAPANESE CONCERN FOR THEIR SECURITY, FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT OF SS 20S IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST.

11. **SOUTHERN AFRICA:** IN A RELATIVELY RESTRAINED INTERVENTION, GROMYKO URGED THAT A FIRMER BRITISH VOICE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION IN ANGOLA WOULD HAVE WEIGHT IN PRETORIA. LIKewise, ON NAMIBIA, WESTERN EFFORTS IN 'A SELF-APPOINTED GROUP,' NOW DEFUNCT, HAD LED TO NOTHING BECAUSE IT HAD HAD NO SERIOUS INTENTION TO PROMOTE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. THOUGH IT WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST ANGOLA AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION, THE SOVIET UNION'S INTENTIONS IN THE AREA WERE PEACEFUL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COUNTERED THAT WE SHARED THE AIM OF EARLY

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/INDEPENDENCE

INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, AND IN RECENT HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES HAD SPOKEN FIRMLY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR MISUNDERSTANDING OUR POSITION. THE CUBAN ROLE WAS ALSO A FACTOR. BUT NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND SECURITY FOR ANGOLA COULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. GROMYKO AGREED THAT RECENT OFFICIAL TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND THAT CONTACTS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

12. CONCLUSION: GROMYKO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL. THERE WERE SOME QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE DIFFERED, IN SOME CASES BEING POLES APART. BUT WE SHOULD TRY TO BUILD ON THE POINTS OF CONVERGENCE. WHILE NOT MINIMISING OUR DIFFERENCES, WE SHOULD ALL WORK FOR PEACE AND DETENTE, EVEN THOUGH SOME NOW FOUND THIS LATTER WORD HARD TO SAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED EXCHANGES.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

CCN READ = MY TELNO 811: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT ETC

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 812 OF 02 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK.

INFO PRIORITY BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA

UKDEL CSCE MADRID.

ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS AND ALL EAST EUROPEAN POSTS.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : GROMYKO'S SPEECH ON
EAST/WEST AND ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS.

SUMMARY.

1. AT HIS LUNCH TODAY IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S HONOUR, GROMYKO DELIVERED A HARSH ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACK WHICH IN PARTICULAR DISMISSED WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE.

DETAIL.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF GROMYKO'S SPEECH :

ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

(I) IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET UNION'S FAULT THAT IN RECENT YEARS ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS HAD STAGNATED AND IN SOME CASES GONE INTO REVERSE.

(II) A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF USEFUL MUTUAL TIES HAD NONETHELESS BEEN PRESERVED. 'WE ARE FAR FROM UNDERESTIMATING THE EXISTING TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH BRITAIN' WHICH HAD PROVED THEIR VITALITY DESPITE SANCTIONS AND OTHER DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES 'RESORTED TO BY THOSE WHO DO NOT FIND TO THEIR LIKING THIS OR THAT ASPECT OF OUR POLICY OF PEACE'.

(III) IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE WHERE THIS MORBID ALLERGY TO DETENTE CAME FROM. IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO RELY UPON TIME ONLY TO CURE THIS DISEASE.

(IV) THE SOVIET UNION WANTED ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS TO DEVELOP ON AN ASCENDING LINE. THIS WAS A PRINCIPLED POSITION OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

(V) THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF THE POLICY OF A GROUP OF COUNTRIES, FIRST OF ALL THE UNITED

STATES. THIS WAS A POLICY OF THE ARMS RACE, OF STOCKPILING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OF PREPARING FOR WAR. THE MAIN THREAT TO PEACE LAY IN WASHINGTON'S DRIVE TO BREAK THE EXISTING MILITARY BALANCE AND TO OBTAIN SUPERIORITY. ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO BIND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES 'BY THIS HOPELESS BUT DANGEROUS COURSE'.

(VI) TRAMPLING UNDERFOOT THE UN CHARTER, FLAGRANTLY THROWING AWAY INTERNATIONAL NORMS, THE USA IS TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS WAYS ON OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERFERE UNSCRUPULOUSLY IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY RESORT TO THE MOST CRIMINAL MEANS AND METHODS NOT STOPPING SHORT OF STATE TERRORISM. THERE IS A SORT OF TERRORISM CULT IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN US POLICY TODAY. THAT IS HOW THEY ACTED AND CONTINUE TO ACT IN LEBANON, GRENADA, WITH REGARD TO NICUAGUA AND IN EL SALVADOR. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE NOT AVERSE TO INDULGE IN FALSE SENTIMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

(VII) TO COVER UP THEIR INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS, THE AMERICANS RESORTED TO GROUNDLESS ANTI-SOVIET ATTACKS. NOBODY WOULD BE ABLE TO BLACKEN SOVIET PEACE POLICY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME FORWARD WITH CONCRETE INITIATIVES ON ARMS CONTROL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION. ALL OF THEM HAD RUN INTO OBSTACLES CREATED BY NATO.

INF.

(VIII) THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS THE MOST BURNING QUESTION OF THE DAY. THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE BY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. 'NEW MISSILES FROM AMERICA CANNOT BRING SECURITY. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE WHO ACCEPT THEM IN THEIR HOMELAND ARE INCREASING THE DANGER'. WASHINGTON DID NOT HAVE A SERIOUS DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT: 'THE WORDMONGERING PRACTISED THERE IN ORDER TO CHASE VOTES DOES NOT HELP MATTERS IN ANY WAY ... BRITAIN COULD DO A USEFUL THING' TO BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF THE ARMS RACE.

SPACE.

(IX) THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ADDRESSED TO THE US FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO PREVENT THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE WAS OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE. NUCLEAR OR OTHER WEAPONS MUST NOT BE DEPLOYED IN OUTER SPACE. 'WE REGRET THAT WASHINGTON GAVE A NEGATIVE REPLY PERMEATED WITH THE SPIRIT OF STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE AND SPREADING IT TO OUTER SPACE. AS A PRE-CONDITION A DEMAND IS MADE TO COMBINE NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTER SPACE WITH TALKS ON MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IN OTHER WORDS TO COMBINE WITH THE TALKS WHICH HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY WASHINGTON'.

(X) THIS WAS A GAME WITH DOCTORED CARDS. NOT MANY PEOPLE IN THE US WOULD FALL FOR THIS ELECTORAL DECEPTION. THE AIM WAS TO CONFUSE PEOPLE. WASHINGTON DID NOT WANT NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS PILING UP PRE-CONDITIONS. 'EVEN TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH WASHINGTON'S REPLY TOUCHES THE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF OUTER SPACE IT BASHFULLY MENTIONS A POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING ONLY SOME SORT OF APPROACH TO THAT SUBJECT WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE

THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD STILL APPROACH THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS IN A MORE SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER WITHOUT BLOCKING THEM WITH PRE-CONDITIONS WHICH MOREOVER HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. WE HOPE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE STAND WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

CTB.

(XI) IT WOULD BE NATURAL TO EXPECT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO TAKE AN ACTIVE STAND IN FAVOUR OF RESUMING TALKS ON A TOTAL AND COMPLETE BAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS WHICH WERE BROKEN OFF BY WASHINGTON.

NUF/NOFUF.

(XII) "THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE WOULD NO DOUBT HELP TO NORMALISE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD". AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON THE NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, OF MILITARY FORCES IN GENERAL.

CDE.

(XIII) AT THE CDE LARGE-SCALE POLITICAL AND LEGAL STEPS AS WELL AS CERTAIN MEASURES OF A MILITARY AND TECHNICAL NATURE WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION. BUT "DISTURBING SYMPTOMS" COULD BE OBSERVED IN THE STOCKHOLM DISCUSSIONS. THERE WERE THOSE CLEARLY SEEKING TO TURN THE CONFERENCE AWAY FROM CREATING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE.

(XIV) THE SOVIET UNION'S AND BRITAIN'S COMMITMENTS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES DID NOT EXCLUDE, BUT PRESUPPOSED, THE NEED FOR JOINT OR PARALLEL EFFORTS TO AVERT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 811 OF 02 JULY

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK,
UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE STOCKHOLM.
PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, TOKYO.
INFO SAVING ULAN BATOR, PEKING.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : FIRST SESSION OF TALKS
WITH GROMYKO.

SUMMARY.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE SINCERE DESIRE OF THE WEST,
INCLUDING, MOST IMPORTANTLY, PRESIDENT REAGAN, FOR BETTER EAST/WEST
RELATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING PEACE AND SECURITY AT THE
LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES. A LONG, STERILE MONOLOGUE FROM
GROMYKO ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE PRESENT
US ADMINISTRATION, WHOSE DEEDS SPOKE LOUDER THAN WORDS. HIS TONE
WAS RESTRAINED, IN MARKED CONTRAST TO HIS SPEECH WHICH FOLLOWED -
SEE MY TELNO B) SESSION CONCLUDED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RAISING OUR CONCERNS OVER POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. (GROMYKO DID NOT
RESPOND, BUT COULD WELL DO SO WHEN TALKS RESUME ON 3 JULY).

DETAIL.

2. INVITED TO OPEN WHAT GROMYKO SAID HE HOPED WOULD BE A
'BUSINESSLIKE' EXCHANGE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE WESTERN
ALLIES HAD DEVOTED MUCH TIME TO CONSIDERATION OF HOW BETTER MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE LONGER-TERM, ON A BASIS
OF RESPECT FOR LEGITIMATE MUTUAL SECURITY CONCERNS, THERE WAS A
COMMON EAST/WEST INTEREST IN THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY
AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL BOTH
BECAUSE OF THE RISKS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND BECAUSE
OF THE ECONOMIC BURDENS IMPOSED BY GROWING MILITARY SPENDING.
ECHOES OF THESE OBJECTIVES WERE ALSO TO BE FOUND IN STATEMENTS BY
THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS PARTNERS, SO WAYS MUST BE FOUND TO OVERCOME
MISTRUST AND MAKE PROGRESS PROVIDE THEM. BOTH HMG AND THE US
ADMINISTRATION WERE WHOLLY SINCERE IN THEIR DESIRE FOR IMPROVED
RELATIONS AND BETTER ARMS CONTROL, ESPECIALLY IN THE NUCLEAR
FIELD.

3. IN A MONOLOGUE LASTING SOME EIGHTY MINUTES, GROMYKO DIFFERED AS
TO THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT COMPLICATED AND DANGEROUS SITUATION.
AGREEMENTS SERVING THE CAUSE OF PEACE HAD BEEN POSSIBLE WITH CARTER.
BUT FROM THE DATE IT TOOK OFFICE, IT WAS CLEAR THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION WAS BENT ON UNDOING PREVIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS. 58343
WERE 'DOZENS' OF AGREEMENTS NOW IN ABEYANCE OR WITHOUT MEANING,

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EVEN THOUGH FORMALLY STILL IN FORCE. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD AT ONCE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT COULD NOT DO BUSINESS WITH REAGAN. IT HAD NONETHELESS PATIENTLY PUT FORWARD MANY PROPOSALS, BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN MULTILATERAL FORA : ALL WERE 'RELENTLESSLY' REJECTED. IT WAS RIGHT TO STRESS BOTH THE DANGER AND THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE ARMS RACE WHICH DAMAGED ALL, ESPECIALLY THE MAJOR STATES WHO HAD TO CONDUCT IT, EVEN IF, LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, OUT OF NECESSITY. THE UK SHOULD RUB IN THESE CONSEQUENCES WITH ITS AMERICAN ALLIES.

4. THERE WERE NO GROUNDS TO TRUST REAGAN'S SINCERITY, EXCEPT IN HIS 'CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM'. THE TEST WAS DEEDS RATHER THAN WORDS : DEEDS SUCH AS THE ABANDONING OF SALT 2, THE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF EAST/WEST AND US/SOVIET RELATIONS, AND THE REFUSAL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN THE INF ARITHMETIC. AFTER A LONG DIGRESSION ABOUT US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BASED ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, GROMYKO TURNED TO THE LATEST EXCHANGES ABOUT ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE. IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, THE AMERICANS HAD SHOWN THEY DID NOT WISH TO HOLD TALKS ON THE NON-MILITARISATION OF SPACE. THEIR OBSTRUCTIONIST LINK WITH THE GENEVA TALKS, BOTH INTERMEDIATE RANGE AND STRATEGIC, WAS A 'CHEAP DEVICE' INTENDED TO CONFUSE. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD MANY TIMES STATED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ITS ATTACHMENT TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE UK SHOULD IMPRESS UPON ITS AMERICAN ALLIES THE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD OF A NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION.

5. IN THE BRIEF REMAINING TIME, THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION AS THE ONLY WAY TO BRIDGE THE GAP. THE SOVIET ABSENCE FROM THE INF AND START STILL CAUSED SURPRISE IN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD RETURN TO THE TABLE. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON ARMS IN SPACE WAS ALSO SURPRISING : THEY HAD ASKED FOR A RAPID RESPONSE TO THEIR PROPOSAL AND, WHEN IT CAME, DISMISSED IT AS 'HASTY'. THE US HAD NOT ATTACHED CONDITIONS AND THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD, AS THE AMERICANS SUGGESTED, PURSUE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AGREEMENT TO OPENING TALKS IN SEPTEMBER : THAT WAS THE TRUE TEST OF SINCERITY.

6. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE CLEAR HMG'S POSITION ON UK STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. HE URGED SOVIET CONSIDERATION OF WESTERN PROPOSALS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND IN THE MBFR. AS REGARDS THE CDE AT STOCKHOLM, THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS RENDERING PROGRESS DIFFICULT - POLAND, WHERE DIALOGUE AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WERE STILL LACKING, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. QUOTING THE RELEVANT PASSAGE FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID ALL SHADES OF OPINION IN THE UK FELT STRONGLY ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS CASES (HE INSTANCED THE SAKHAROV'S,

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/KORYAGIN.

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KORYAGIN, SHCHARANSKY AND YAKUNIN), WHICH COULD NOT BUT AFFECT
ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND BUT SUGGESTED
THAT TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE TOMORROW ON 'REMAINING INTERNATIONAL
QUESTIONS' AND BILATERAL MATTERS.

SUTHERLAND.

Disposition to REYKJAVIK
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 June 1984

UK/SOVIET RELATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 28 June about the arrangements for Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to Moscow. The Prime Minister has noted these and also the text of the speech which Sir Geoffrey will be making on the first day of his visit.

The Prime Minister does not, however, wish Sir Geoffrey Howe to extend to President Chernenko an invitation from her to visit the UK. She feels that it is much too soon for this. She has also commented that it would simply look like copying President Mitterrand.

I should be grateful if you would ensure that the Prime Minister's views are made known to Sir Geoffrey Howe before the start of his visit.

(C.D. POWELL)

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

Sir Geoffrey Howe's Visit to Moscow

Is it really a good idea to issue an invitation at this moment to Chernenko to visit the UK? It is obviously a good idea to invite Gorbachev and Aliev: there is a chance they will come and it would do them good. But no-one seriously expects Chernenko to come for the time being: so it just looks like a routine gesture, made at a moment when such gestures might seem rather offensive against the background of Sakharov and Shcharansky, etc.

I have discussed with Stephen, who shares this view.

You will wish to glance at Sir G. Howe's speech, particularly paragraphs 12, 13, 19, 21 and 22. Any comments?

C D P

No not invite Mr. Chernenko - it is much too soon now.

C. D. POWELL

28 June, 1984

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1984

Dear Charles,

UK/Soviet Relations

The programme and arrangements for Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to Moscow are close to completion.

The visit looks as if it will follow much the same pattern as those for Herr Genscher and Sr Andreotti earlier this year. The main events will be two sessions of talks with Mr Gromyko and a call on President Chernenko. The latter has not yet been put formally into the programme but the Head of Protocol at the Soviet MFA has told Sir I Sutherland that time had been reserved on 3 July for a call on Chernenko.

During the course of the visit, Sir Geoffrey Howe will invite Mr Gromyko to pay a return visit to London in 1985. He will also express the hope that Mr Gorbachev will accept the invitation extended to him recently by Sir A Kershaw to lead a Soviet parliamentary delegation which has been invited to visit London in the first week of December. Following the visit, we will be taking up the question of an invitation to Aliev with the Soviet Ambassador (as envisaged in my letter of 4 June - he has been on sick leave).

No
Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that there would be advantage if, during his call on President Chernenko, he were able to extend to the latter an invitation from the Prime Minister to visit the United Kingdom. President Chernenko has already received an invitation from President Mitterrand, while Chancellor Kohl's 1983 invitation to Andropov has now been extended to Chernenko. His response to an invitation by the Prime Minister would not go further than an acceptance in principle with no suggestion of dates.

It would be for subsequent discussion here when such a visit might be appropriate. Sir Geoffrey Howe would at present not envisage this before 1986, and there is anyway still some uncertainty about Chernenko's health. Presentationally the announcement that an invitation had been extended would be a useful demonstration of the Government's publicly stated intention to establish a broad political

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dialogue at all levels with the Soviet Union. The last formal meeting at Prime Minister/General Secretary level was between Mr Wilson and Mr Brezhnev in 1975 in Moscow. At that time invitations to Mr Brezhnev, Mr Kosygin and Mr Gromyko were extended. Those for Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin have, of course, since lapsed. Mr Gromyko visited London in 1976.

In purely protocol terms, it could be argued that an invitation to Chernenko, which had not been taken up, might inhibit the timing of a visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister. But in practice our view is that if there were sufficient reason for the Prime Minister to visit Moscow at a particular time, these protocol considerations would not present a real problem.

Finally, I enclose a text of the speech which Sir Geoffrey Howe will be making on the first day of his visit at a lunch given by Mr Gromyko. It will serve as the major public statement of the British Government's views during the visit. It is, however, likely that the Russians will omit large sections on, for example, Afghanistan and human rights in any text that they publish in the Soviet press. The deadline for any comments would be that they should reach our Embassy in Moscow by close of play on Saturday.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT SPEECH FOR SECRETARY OF STATE IN MOSCOW

1. Mr Minister it is with great pleasure that I have accepted your invitation this week. It is the fourth time we have met since I became Foreign Secretary. But this is the first time we have been able to sit down to a full and extensive programme of talks. I greatly welcome this. I am also glad to be in Moscow, particularly on this the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. As Pushkin put it in Eugene Onegin: "How pleased I was when all at once the semi-circle of Churches and belfries, of gardens and palaces opened before me". The skyline of Moscow may look different today: but it is still one of the world's greatest cities.

2. Mr Gromyko, six months ago we were both in Stockholm for opening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In my speech, I said that a main aim of the process begun at Helsinki nine years ago should be to foster dialogue and contact; that this in turn should lead to more trust and confidence; and that the need for such trust and confidence was as pressing now as at any time since 1973. I went on to propose that we should give this process a new impetus. We should widen the dialogue between East and West and give it

more substance: that was the only way we could come to know and understand each other better. It is in this spirit that I have come to Moscow. It is in this spirit that I approach our two days of talks.

3. The starting point for greater knowledge and understanding must be realism. We must recognise the world for what it is, not for what we would like it to be. We live in a rapidly changing world where new "industrial revolutions" come and go in a matter of years. Within the memories of most of us round this table, the idea of men walking in space was strictly for science-fiction stories. It is on the way to becoming an everyday event. Computers are still something of a novelty to me: in British schools they are as much part of the furniture as the inkwell used to be. What more will the last sixteen years of this century hold in store? Certainly new advances will have profound economic, social, and, if we choose to use them for those purposes, military implications. These changes will create challenges we all will face in West and East, North and South.

4. How can we begin to tackle these problems? The first prerequisite is peace. A month ago, we remembered the terrible sacrifices which Britain and the Soviet Union shared and suffered in the last great European war. I am convinced those sacrifices were not

made in vain. I am convinced it is in our power to maintain the peace our continent has enjoyed now for the last forty years. I agree entirely with the words of the CMEA Summit two weeks ago: "no world problems, including the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, can be resolved militarily".

5. The question of security is therefore a key issue. New weapons, new technologies are making it a more complex, a more truly global question. Now more than ever, the way in which each country seeks security affects the security of all the others.

6. Now as in the past, no country or Alliance can achieve absolute security. Absolute security for one country would mean absolute insecurity for another. What we can do is to achieve a stable equilibrium. Then we can work to reduce the numbers of weapons on both sides. It would be a major achievement if we could do this. It is also a necessity. We all have more constructive purposes to which to devote our resources. We all wish to bring about greater prosperity and a better life for our people. We know this cannot be done if we have to go on developing ever-newer, ever-dearer weapons programmes. There are therefore good reasons of economics and common sense for agreeing to beat our swords into ploughshares.

7. Security of course has two aspects. The visible one, on which we concentrate in arms control, is the number of missiles or soldiers on each side. The invisible one, which underlies it, is intention. Weapons do not have policies: it is their owners who decide how they shall be used. And if we misunderstand each other's intentions, in a nuclear age, this could have tragic results for civilisation.

8. That is why in our talks this week I want to concentrate on the intentions of our two governments. This is the area of greatest mutual ignorance. Both of our countries, alone or with our allies, have made important statements about it. In Bonn in 1982 the British Prime Minister, with all her NATO colleagues, stated that none of our weapons would ever be used except in response to attack. This important pledge was repeated by NATO Foreign Ministers in Washington just five weeks ago. We also pointed out in Washington that dialogue could only bear fruit if each party was confident of its own security, and prepared to respect the legitimate interests of others.

9. You and your Allies also addressed these matters at the CMEA Summit. You stated afterwards that there was no more important task today than that of safe-guarding world peace and averting nuclear catastrophe. You said that if the principle of

equality and equal security were strictly observed, the nuclear arms build up could be halted. You called for political will, and for honest, equal and constructive dialogue. If you meant what you said, the gap between our intentions is not as wide as the gloom-mongers would have us believe. We for our part are all in favour of an honest, equal and constructive dialogue. Let us talk frankly about our plans: let us turn our joint will for peace into concrete action.

10. That means tackling some of the specific problems of security. There are many places and opportunities for this:

In Stockholm, we have a real chance to agree mutually beneficial measures that would reassure both sides and would give more substance to our shared commitment to the non use of force;

In Vienna, the latest Western proposals are built on some ideas put forward by the East. We must resolve the differences over the balance of forces which have held up these important talks for so long;

In Geneva, the elements for a comprehensive and fully verifiable ban on chemical weapons are now there on the negotiating table. We urge the

Soviet side to join us in a real effort to secure agreement.

But there is one gap which should give everyone in this room cause for great concern. The control of nuclear weapons, the most destructive of all, is not being discussed anywhere at the moment. Logic and self interest on both sides point to the need for an early return to the negotiating tables to resume talks. It is clear that without negotiations these problems will not be resolved. Staying away from the negotiating table is a self-defeating course. The Soviet Union will find that the United States is ready to negotiate at any time without preconditions.

11. And there are other areas of arms control which we cannot neglect. In the context of outer space, you will probably have seen that in Washington in May the Western Allies welcomed US willingness to discuss research programmes on strategic defence: Soviet reluctance to enter such discussions is hard to understand.

12. Security, of course, is not a purely European or North Atlantic concern. All wars since the Second World War have been outside this area. Britain and her Allies have many and diverse interests throughout the world. The Soviet Union and her Allies also have their

legitimate interests in events beyond their borders. East and West have an over-riding common interest in international stability. This means trying to ensure that regional conflicts do not occur: and if they do, that they are not made worse by outside interference. This is an area in which an active East/West dialogue can be helpful. We can establish each others' interests and concerns. We can and should seek ways of co-operating to reduce regional tension.

13. One regional issue that acutely concerns the third world as well as East and West, is Afghanistan. It is three years, almost to the day, since my predecessor Lord Carrington came here to put forward proposals for a political solution, on behalf of the Heads of State and Government of the ten members of the European Community. The views of the Ten have not changed. They are in line with the views of more than two-thirds of the members of the United Nations. We support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General. I believe that there can be a peaceful solution which takes account of the legitimate security interests of your country. But this requires that the people of Afghanistan be free to express their views. That they cannot do in present circumstances, which have lead to a fifth of them are living as refugees in neighbouring countries.

14. Security in all its aspects lies at the heart of our relations. But it is only one element in a wider picture. All participants in the historic agreement of 1975, at Helsinki, agreed that security could not be divorced from economic and human considerations. I would like now briefly to touch on these.

15. On the economic side, there are great and obvious differences of history and achievements between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. But there are certain striking similarities too. We both face the challenges of modernising industry: of making it more efficient: of introducing new technology to increase per capita output. We both recognise the importance of increased trade.

16. As the Madrid Concluding Document pointed out, increased trade is a useful way of adding substance to our relations. There is certainly great scope for this in the case of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. When Deputy Prime Minister Kostandov came to Britain last year, he suggested we should aim to double the present level of our trade. This is an ambitious goal. But let us make the effort.

17. Some useful ground work has been laid. Mr Channon came here in May for our Joint Economic Commission and

was very pleased with the progress made with Mr Patolichev. The Working Group on Agriculture, Food Processing and Packaging had a good meeting last month. I was particularly glad to see a number of smaller British firms in the delegation which came to Moscow. One of my Government's aims is to encourage small and medium sized enterprises. One of the commitments in the Madrid Concluding Document is that we should encourage their wider participation in East/West trade.

18. So we have made some useful progress on the economic side. What of the human and social elements? The challenge for us as politicians is not only to make policy comprehensible to the man in the street, but also relevant to his problems.

19. This is not an easy challenge to meet. Everywhere we see the diversity of human nature: diversity of religion, culture, language and tradition. We should welcome the challenge of this diversity. Indeed all the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to respect it. Governments must protect the rights of individuals. As you know from what I and others have told you, the Soviet Government is not seen to be acting in this field in accordance with the obligations which you have yourselves undertaken.

I say this not at all in a confrontational spirit.

But this surely is a field in which deeds rather than words should be the guiding principle. Without that, real and long lasting trust and confidence between East and West, resting on a broad base of popular consent, will prove, like the Firebird's tail in Russian legend, easier to gaze at than to grasp.

20. But Governments can also play a constructive role in helping to reconcile wide differences of culture, tradition and behaviour. One way in which they can do this is by helping to spread information and to foster more personal contacts. Contacts between individuals are one of the most useful ways in which we can break down the barriers of misunderstanding. At one level this means contact between myself and you, Mr Gromyko. At another it could be the party of Soviet citizens who recently made a visit to Margate in Kent. All have their part in helping to increase East/West understanding.

21. When my Prime Minister saw Mr Chernenko in February she was at pains to stress that she saw her visit as part of a long term policy: a policy designed to increase confidence between East and West. This meant recognising our common interest in peace and security at a lower level of weapons. It also meant working towards a broader understanding and a climate

of confidence, so that we could give our negotiators the instructions they needed for progress.

22. In March this year a collection of Mr Chernenko's speeches were published in Britain. In the introduction he referred to the need for active and fruitful dialogue and for the creation of a climate of trust. He argued that we should multiply our efforts towards mutual understanding, to preserve peace and to guarantee every nation the right to full and independent development. He ended:

"I would like the people of the Soviet Union and Great Britain to be partners in making progress towards these goals."

These words encourage me to hope, Mr Minister, that whatever the ideological differences between us, there should also be important areas of common ground. Let us try to seek these out and build on them.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1984

25th Anniversary of the GB-USSR
Association

Thank you for your letter of 11 June about the intention of the GB-USSR Association to invite the Prime Minister to be the Guest of Honour at a lunch in the autumn to mark the 25th anniversary of the Association's foundation.

It would be difficult for the Prime Minister to find a date for this before December. She already has two important speeches that month. She would therefore prefer Sir Geoffrey Howe to take on this event. I should be grateful if the organisers could be informed in appropriate terms.

C.D. POWELL

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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POWELL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary.

18 June 1984

The Prime Minister has noted Mr. Channon's minute JU545 of 14 June, for which she was grateful.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

C.D. POWELL

Steve Nicklen, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry.

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Prime Minister
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JU545

PRIME MINISTER

1 You talked to Mr Nakasone on Monday about contacts with the Soviet Union. I thought you might like to see a brief report of my visit to the USSR at the end of May to lead the British delegation at the annual meeting of the UK-Soviet Joint Trade Commission. I have already sent a fuller report to Norman Tebbit. It was my first visit to the USSR since you and I went in 1969.

2 Our bilateral trade with the Soviet Union is disappointing. Although our exports grew by 26% in 1983 to £448m, this increase only marked a return to the level of exports achieved in 1980 and we continue to lag behind many other Western countries. We have a large deficit with the USSR but a surplus of some £250m in manufactured goods. This is in part because we take some £450m of their oil, most of which we blend.

3 I took a team of businessmen and we had a series of meetings with Ministers. To my surprise, the Joint Commission was a useful event. The businessmen all told me that they found it useful.

4 Normally the Soviet delegation has been led at First Deputy Minister level. But on this occasion the 75 year old Minister Patolichev presided. This was seen as a sign of particular



favour. He emphasised the need, as the Russians saw it, to redouble efforts and indeed to double the volume of trade.

5 One clear and tangible result from the Joint Commission was Patolichev's promise that two-way direct dialling international telephone links would be restored for resident British businessmen by the end of 1984 and that shopping facilities would be improved.

6 I confined my discussions with Russian Ministers largely to trade matters but I did raise with Patolichev our concern about the current position of the Sakharovs. I was given no information about their current whereabouts or state of health but merely told - somewhat tetchily - that this was a matter for the Soviet authorities.

7 There are undoubtedly prospects for British firms in the Soviet Union in particular in chemicals, food, scientific instruments, agriculture and energy. I shall be following this up with British firms. Other Soviet Ministers were very forthcoming. Whatever the political problems, on the trading side there seems to be considerable good will. But of course time will tell whether orders will materialise.

8 In view of your talk with Mr Nakasone, I ought to report that Japan is doing particularly well in the USSR. Her exports to the USSR have risen from £1,196m in 1980, to £1,849m in 1982, and the



Russians said that they were proposing to develop oil fields in Sakhalin with Japanese assistance.

9 I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe.

P.C.

PAUL CHANNON

14 June 1984

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Difficult to find a date until December. You already have two speeches that month. Ask Sir G. Howe to take it on?

11 June, 1984

John [unclear]

Yes no

C. Durrell
13/6

25th Anniversary of the GB-USSR Association

We have recently been approached by Sir Fitzroy Maclean and Mr Roberts (Past President and Director of the GB-USSR Association) who have informed us that the Association intends to mark the 25th anniversary of its foundation by a lunch at some time during this year. They have asked informally whether the Prime Minister would be willing to be the guest of honour at such a lunch.

The Association was set up by Mr Macmillan with the aim of channelling non-governmental contacts with the Soviet Union through a responsible British body rather than through the GB-USSR Friendship Society, a communist front organisation. The Association, which is very largely funded by the FCO, has done useful work over the years, and its Board consists of a number of distinguished people in the field of Anglo-Soviet contacts (I enclose a list).

Attendance at the Association's lunch would give an opportunity of underlining the Government's support for widening our contacts with the Soviet Union in all fields. It would also be helpful to the Association's standing in the eyes of the Russians. (The Soviet Ambassador is likely to be invited). Sir Geoffrey Howe hopes therefore that the Prime Minister would be willing to accept an invitation to lunch at a date convenient to her later this year. If the Prime Minister agrees and you could let me have a date (the Association have suggested October as a possible month) we will inform the Association, who would then write formally to the Prime Minister extending an invitation. If the Prime Minister would prefer not to do so, Sir Geoffrey Howe would propose to let the organisers know that he would be willing to attend the luncheon himself.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



THE GREAT BRITAIN-USSR ASSOCIATION

President	The Rt Hon Lord Wilson of Rievaulx KG OBE FRS
Past President	Sir Fitzroy Maclean Bt CBE LLD
Vice-Presidents	The Most Rev and Rt Hon the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury Sir Curtis Keeble GCMG Sir Frank Roberts GCMG GCVO The Rt Hon the Lord Shackleton KG OBE
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Hon Treasurer	G F N Reddaway CBE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 June 1984

File No
→ c c p d

CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 4 June. She agrees that invitations should be extended to Gorbachev, Aliev and Gromyko in the ways proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Mrs. Thatcher further agrees that, if the invitations are accepted, she will herself receive all three visitors.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister.

Agree that we should

invite Gorbachev, Aliev, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

on the terms proposed London SW1A 2AH

- and that you should receive them all.

4 June, 1984

John Major,

A.F.C. 4/6.

Yes m

Contacts with the Soviet Union

In your letter of 14 May you asked us to be in touch about the possibility of inviting senior members of the Soviet Politburo to the UK. This matter has now been considered and the Foreign Secretary proposes that we should make a start by inviting Mr Gorbachev in 1984 and Mr Aliev in 1985 or 1986.

Issuing invitations in either case will not be straightforward because both are senior party rather than government figures. Gorbachev as I explained in my letter of 10 May was recently appointed Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union (one of the Chambers of the Soviet Parliament). He therefore has a theoretical opposite number in Sir Anthony Kershaw, as Chairman of the FAC. The invitation would therefore have to issue from Sir A Kershaw and there would (as in Canada which Gorbachev visited in 1983 in a Parliamentary capacity) have to be a meeting between the FAC and Mr Gorbachev.

As to the occasion on which he might be invited, there is conveniently an outstanding invitation from the British Group of the IPU for a delegation of the Supreme Soviet to come to London in December this year. Provided the IPU and Sir A Kershaw agree, an invitation might be sent from the latter suggesting that Mr Gorbachev come as a member, or more likely leader of the Supreme Soviet delegation. When Sir I Sutherland delivers the invitation in Moscow, he would also need to indicate that we envisaged Mr Gorbachev meeting senior British Ministers and the Prime Minister herself. We would hope to deliver this message soon enough for Sir Geoffrey Howe to be in a position to follow it up in Moscow in early July.

Mr Aliev in fact holds a senior Government post. However his economic responsibilities do not appear to include relations with the capitalist countries (which are dealt with by the rather less interesting 75 year old Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov with whom the Russians may try to fob us off). We shall therefore be seeking the Soviet Ambassador's advice as to who the most appropriate host for Mr Aliev might be. We would intend to suggest, if he is agreeable, that it might be Mr Tebbit. We would make clear that it was Mr Aliev personally we were hoping to invite to the UK, not simply an appropriate senior Minister dealing with East/West economic affairs. As in Mr Gorbachev's case we would wish to be in a position to say that the Prime Minister would definitely receive Mr Aliev.

As far as timing is concerned we would make clear to the Ambassador that an invitation to Mr Gorbachev is being extended

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to Mr Gorbachev for 1984. We hoped that in 1985 Mr Gromyko would pay a return visit for Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit this summer. We would also welcome a visit by Mr Aliev in 1985 or 1986 if this was more convenient. The Russians may be surprised to receive in the next few months three invitations for members of the Politburo. But they will ensure that there is no bunching of the visits and the invitations will be a practical demonstration of our desire to increase contacts at a senior political level.

I would be grateful for the Prime Minister's agreement that we should indicate that these three senior Soviet visitors to the UK could expect to call on her.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (DTI) who is aware in general terms of what is planned and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours

R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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SOVIET UNION: Relations Pt 2

● PART 2 ends:-

Keston College Note (Undated)

PART 3 begins:-

FCO to AJC 4, 6, 87