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PREM 19/1395

NEW FILE COVER

PART 1

C

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

UK / Sri Lanka Relations

Aid to Sri Lanka

Internal Situation

SRI LANKA

PART 1

MAY 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~13.9.84~~							
~~14.9.84~~							
~~17.9.84~~							
~~25.9.84~~							
~~8.10.84~~							
~~15.10.84~~							
~~22.10.84~~							
~~5.11.84~~							
~~12.11.84~~							
22.10.84							
PART ENDS.							

PART 1 ends:-

CP to FCO 22.10.84

PART 2 begins:-

CP to FCO 5.11.84

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
OD(84) / 13	13/08/1984
CC(83) 26th Meeting, item 2	28/07/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 4/10/2013

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Cmnd. 8253 - Treaty Series No 35 (1981). Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka concerning the extension to Hong Kong of the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed at Colombo on 13 February 1980. Published by HMSO. ISBN 0 10 182530 7

Signed S. Gray Date 4/10/2013

PREM Records Team

file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

22 October 1984

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

Thank you for your letter of 19 October, suggesting what Lady Young should say to President Jaywardene about the interpretation we place on the UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement.

The Prime Minister did not find either the line proposed for Lady Young or the draft letter which it is suggested that she herself should subsequently send to President Jaywardene very clear. I enclose a revised version, in the form of a draft letter from the Prime Minister. The gist of it might also serve as Lady Young's speaking note.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CST

13

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

Lady Young will be in Sri Lanka next week and will, as agreed by OD, be telling President Jayewardene that we shall not be able to provide military assistance under the UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement in any circumstances connected with the internal situation in Sri Lanka. It is envisaged that you would then write to confirm this.

I do not find the line proposed for Lady Young or for your letter in the attached FCO draft very clear. I attach an alternative version which might, if you agree, form the basis for Lady Young's remarks and your subsequent letter.

Agree?

Yes mt

C.D.P.

Thank you - your version is much better and it is clear mt

20 October 1984

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE OF SRI LANKA

Janet Young has reported to me on her recent visit to Sri Lanka during which she had some most interesting talks with you. I am most grateful to you for receiving her.

I feel it would be right to repeat to you in a more formal but still confidential way what Janet Young said to you about the UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement of 1947.

You will recall that the Agreement provides for the Governments to give each other such military assistance as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. But the Agreement dates from a time when the military resources available to this country ~~including posts overseas~~ were, the relationship between Britain and Ceylon (as it then was), and public and Parliamentary attitudes towards military commitments overseas unconnected with our own security or that of our dependencies were all very different to what they are today.

I should not wish to leave you in any doubt, therefore, that in today's conditions Britain would not be able to provide any military assistance under the Agreement in any circumstances connected with the internal situation in Sri Lanka. This covers also response to an external threat arising from that situation.

What I have said does not affect our willingness to continue to provide help where we can with military and police training in the United Kingdom. I hope that you will let me know if there is any further help you would like from us in this field.

I well understand that this is a sensitive matter for you. It is not my intention to make any public comment on it or ~~to~~ otherwise to draw attention to it.

VC2AAJ

12
cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 October, 1984

Dear Charles,

UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement

I wrote to you on 14 September to say that the Foreign Secretary would ask Lady Young to make clear to President Jayewardene during her visit to Sri Lanka in October the interpretation we intend placing henceforth on the 1947 Defence Agreement. Lady Young will be in Sri Lanka from 23-26 October and will call on President Jayewardene on the afternoon of 25 October. The Foreign Secretary thinks that the Prime Minister and Mr Heseltine should be aware of the line which Lady Young will be briefed to take at the meeting.

After explaining the changes in public and parliamentary attitudes since the Agreement was signed in 1947, Lady Young would draw on the following:

> "As with other Agreements or similar obligations which we have with friendly countries outside NATO, we would wish to consult you about matters arising from the Agreement. We therefore felt we should let you know that we would find it very difficult to justify to international or domestic parliamentary/public opinion any provision of military assistance, other than training, under the Agreement in any circumstances, including external threat, connected with the internal situation in Sri Lanka".

We have proposed (my letter to you of 14 September) that Lady Young's conversation with President Jayewardene should be followed up by a letter to him from the Prime Minister. This would set out the interpretation we would apply in future to the Agreement. The contents of the letter may need to be adjusted to take into account President Jayewardene's reaction. But the Prime Minister might like to be aware of the broad lines we would intend the letter to follow. I therefore enclose a draft. Subject to President Jayewardene's reaction, we envisage sending this letter as soon as possible after Lady Young's discussion with the President.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Confidential

~~Restricted~~

~~Unclassified~~

TO:

President Jayewardene of
Sri Lanka

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Lady Young has told me how much she enjoyed her recent visit to Sri Lanka and how much she appreciated your ~~the~~ kind hospitality ~~that you extended to her~~.

~~One of the subjects that~~ Lady Young raised with you ~~was~~ the UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement of 1947. As you know, parliamentary and public attitudes in Britain to military involvement in problems not directly related to our own security or that of our dependencies have changed substantially since the Agreement was concluded. I think it right therefore that I should let you know ~~In view of this change of attitudes~~, I have to tell you that we would find it difficult to justify any provision of military assistance, other than training, under the Agreement in any circumstances, including external threat, connected with the internal situation in Sri Lanka.

You will recall, of course, that the Agreement provides for the Governments to give each other such military assistance as it may be in their mutual interest to provide.

I fully understand the sensitivity of this issue. But I thought it right to make our position clear. Of course, we remain very willing to continue to provide help

/where

Enclosures—flag(s).....

CONFIDENTIAL

Sri Lanka Refugees May 79

where we can with military and police training in the United Kingdom. Please let me know if there is any further help you would like from us in this field.

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

CONFIDENTIAL

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OO COLOMBO
GRS 211
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 151400Z OCT 84
TO IMMEDIATE COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 15 OCTOBER
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SRI LANKA

1. THE SRI LANKAN HIGH COMMISSIONER CALLED AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE RENEWING HIS INVITATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT SRI LANKA FOR THE INAUGURATION OF THE VICTORIA DAM. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE VISIT MIGHT TAKE PLACE EARLY NEXT YEAR.

2. DECISIONS ON THIS AND THE RELATED VISITS WILL NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE NOVEMBER. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE.

BEGINS: THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 20 SEPTEMBER CONVEYED THROUGH YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER. I MUCH APPRECIATE THE RENEWAL OF YOUR INVITATION TO ME AND MY HUSBAND TO VISIT SRI LANKA FOR THE INAUGURATION OF THE VICTORIA DAM. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO FIND A CONVENIENT TIME: AND IT WAS KIND OF YOU TO INCLUDE TIMOTHY RAISON IN THE INVITATION.

AS YOU KNOW, I AM LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO MY VISIT TO SRI LANKA. BUT IT IS UNFORTUNATELY NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO MAKE FIRM TRAVEL PLANS FOR THE COMING MONTHS WHILE THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION HERE REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

I SHALL OF COURSE BE IN TOUCH AS SOON AS THE PROSPECTS ARE CLEARER.

WITH KIND REGARDS, MARGARET THATCHER. ENDS.

HOWE

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION		COPIES TO:
LIMITED	PS/LADY YOUNG	PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.
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NEWS D	PS/PUS	
SEAD	SIR W HARDING	
PS	MR BOYD	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HS SH

cc: SPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October, 1984

Sri Lanka: Opening of the Victoria Dam

Thank you for your letter of 10 October enclosing a draft reply to President Jayewardene's message to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agrees the proposed reply and I should be grateful if it could now be despatched.

C. D. POWELL

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPL ①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 October 1984

Prime Minister
Agree message?
CDP
10/x.

Yes pm

Dear Charles,

Sri Lanka: Opening of the Victoria Dam

Your letter of 25 September asked for a draft reply to the message to the Prime Minister from President Jayewardene delivered by the Sri Lanka High Commissioner.

President Jayewardene clearly still hopes that the Prime Minister will be able to visit Sri Lanka early next year. He has made it plain that he is willing to adjust the timing of the Victoria Dam inauguration to suit the Prime Minister's convenience. But as you made clear in your letter of 4 October to Len Appleyard on the signature of the Hong Kong Agreement, decisions on this will need to wait until the beginning of November. Meanwhile, you have told Mr Monerawela that the Prime Minister is not able to commit herself at this stage.

The enclosed draft reply to President Jayewardene is therefore a holding one.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

ZCZC
GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SRI LANKA

1. The Sri Lankan High Commissioner called at No 10 Downing Street on 25 September to deliver a message from President Jayewardene renewing his invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Sri Lanka for the inauguration of the Victoria Dam. He suggested that the visit might take place early next year.

2. Decisions on this and the related visits will not take place before November. Grateful if you would deliver the following reply to President Jayewardene.

BEGINS: Thank you for your message of 20 September conveyed through your High Commissioner. I much appreciate the renewal of your invitation to me and my husband to visit Sri Lanka for the inauguration of the Victoria Dam. I am most grateful for your efforts to find a convenient time; and it was kind of you to include Timothy Raison in the invitation.

As you know, I am looking forward very much to my visit to Sri Lanka. But it is unfortunately not possible for me to make

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: firm
File number	Dept: Private Office	Distribution: LIMITED PS PS/LADY YOUNG PS/MR RENTON PS/PUS Sir W HARDING MR BOYD SAD PROTOCOL DEPT NEWS DEPT SEAD PS/MR RAISON CC: No 10 Mr Vereker Mr Benjamin Cabinet Office
Drafted by (Block capitals): P F RICKETTS		
Telephone number: 233-4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 48

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	CONFIDENTIAL		2

<<<<

firm travel plans for the coming months while the industrial situation here remains uncertain.

I shall of course be in touch as soon as the prospects are clearer.

With kind regards, Margaret Thatcher. ENDS.

HOWE

NNNN

///

//

/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October, 1984

NBPM

CDP 8/x.

Dear Charles,

Sri Lanka

I enclose a sealed letter from President Jayewardene of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister. It is likely to be the signed copy of the message conveyed by HE Mr Monerawela to No 10 on 24 September.

We shall let you have advice and a draft reply to the letter of 24 September shortly; we have held this back so as to be able to offer the Prime Minister advice on the question of reinstating each part of her postponed visit to Asia.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

FILE (AMENDED)

cc: P.C

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 September, 1984

SRI LANKA: OPENING OF THE VICTORIA DAM

The Sri Lankan High Commissioner called on me this morning to deliver the enclosed message to the Prime Minister from President Jayewardene. As you will see, it refers to the possibility of a visit by the Prime Minister early next year and the intention of the Sri Lankan Government to delay the commissioning of the Victoria Dam project until then. I told the High Commissioner that the Prime Minister had no firm plans for future visits abroad and would be unable to take any decisions about this as long as the present industrial situation lasted. She would not therefore, at this stage, be able to commit herself in replying to President Jayewardene. The High Commissioner said that he thought this was well understood and that his government were simply getting their bid in.

The High Commissioner thought that the initiative for postponing the commissioning of the project had in fact come from Balfour Beatty Limited, the project managers, who particularly wanted the Prime Minister to be present.

I should be grateful for a draft reply.

(Charles Powell)

C. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT.

Prime Minister cc OPS. Master.

The Sri Lankans are delaying the commissioning of the Victoria Dam in the hope of catching you early next year. Reply in preparation.

CDP.

25/9

(2)

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T163A/84.

24 September 1984

My Dear Prime Minister,

I have been directed by His Excellency J. R. Jayewardene, President of Sri Lanka to convey the following message to you.

"20 September 1984

My dear Prime Minister,

We had decided to commission the Victoria Project on September 27th, though the scheme was not completed and only one of the three units was operational, as you were to visit Sri Lanka during this period. It was my desire that the commissioning should be done by you, as the Victoria Project will change the course of Sri Lanka's economic development and is a monument to the generosity of the United Kingdom.

When I heard of the possibility that you may make your visit to Sri Lanka early next year, I had the matter reviewed. The technical authorities are of the view that it would be preferable to commission the project, when it is fully operational and completed. That would be early next year.

I look forward to your visit and your personal presence with Mr. Dennis Thatcher for the inauguration ceremonies, which we now propose to have early next year to coincide with your visit. We would appreciate if the Rt. Hon. Timothy Raison, MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Overseas Development, whom you so kindly nominated to deputise for you, could be associated with the inauguration ceremonies as a member of your delegation.

With all good wishes and my personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J. R. Jayewardene."

Yours Sincerely

C. MONERAWELA.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T163A/84

President of Sri Lanka

20th September 1984.

My dear Prime Minister,

We had decided to commission the Victoria Project on September 27th, though the scheme was not completed and only one of the three units was operational, as you were to visit Sri lanka during this period. It was my desire that the commissioning should be done by you, as the Victoria Project will change the course of Sri Lanka's economic development and is a monument to the generosity of the United Kingdom.

When I heard of the possibility that you may make your visit to Sri Lanka early next year, I had the matter reviewed. The technical authorities are of the view that it would be preferable to commission the Project, when it is fully operational and completed. That would be early next year.

I look forward to your visit and your personal presence with Mr.Denis Thatcher for the inauguration ceremonies, which we now propose to have early next year to coincide with your visit. We would appreciate if the Rt.Hon.Timothy Rjiyon, M.P. Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Overseas Development, whom you so kindly nominated to deputise for you, could be associated with the inauguration ceremonies as a member of your Delegation.

With all good wishes and my personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Jayewardene

The Rt.Hon.Mrs.Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
UNITED KINGDOM.

RESTRICTED hLE da

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 September 1984

Conference of Attorneys-General, Colombo

Thank you for your letter of 14 September conveying the Lord Advocate's recommendation that a British contribution should be made to the proposed Legal Research Centre in Sri Lanka.

The Prime Minister agrees that a gift of books from the Books Presentation Scheme administered by the ODA would be appropriate.

Charles Powell

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

KR

010

RESTRICTED

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Agree to
gift of books?
CDP 14/9

14 September 1984

Yes pls.

Dear Charles,

Conference of Attorneys-General, Colombo, 8-12 August 1984

The Lord Advocate, accompanied by Lady Cameron, attended this Conference which was held to mark the centenary of the appointment of an Attorney-General in Sri Lanka. The Conference passed a Draft Resolution (copy attached) proposing the establishment in Sri Lanka of a Legal Research Centre (Asia and Pacific Region). This would operate under the direction of the Attorney-General or Sri Lanka who was authorised by the Conference to take the necessary steps, including "utilisation of any financial assistance voluntarily received from countries and areas of the region".

The Lord Advocate subsequently commented:

"It might be advisable that the Prime Minister know of this Resolution - if accepted by the Delegates - perhaps with a view to making some English contribution to it."

We consider there is a good case for making a contribution, given the long historical connection and the continuing close relationship between Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom. The Lord Advocate considered that text books might be an appropriate way of registering our interest. If agreed, then this might be provided from the 'Books Presentation Scheme' administered by ODA, who would be happy to make available five hundred pounds for this purpose.

I would be grateful if you could let me know whether the Prime Minister agrees.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

20

373/1

D R A F T R E S O L U T I O N

Whereas the countries of the Asia and Pacific region represented by the Honourable Attorneys-General or their nominees at the "Conference of Attorneys-General (Asia and Pacific Region) to Commemorate One hundred Years of the Institution of Attorney-General of Sri Lanka" held from the 8th to the 12th of August, 1984 at Colombo in Sri Lanka, have during their deliberations given expression to numerous matters of mutual interest and concern;

and whereas it is the desire of such countries to foster better understanding amongst each other and to further their knowledge concerning all aspects of the law, legal learning and legal practice by, inter alia, the collection, collation and exchange of legal material of mutual interest;

and whereas it is agreed between all participants present, by consensus, that a LEGAL RESEARCH CENTRE (ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION) be established in Sri Lanka to give effect to such purpose;

and whereas the Honourable Attorney-General of Sri Lanka has already been assured of the initial financial assistance for the establishment of such LEGAL RESEARCH CENTRE (ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION) in Sri Lanka,

the participants here assembled, recognising the fact that the necessity for such LEGAL RESEARCH CENTRE (ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION) does exist in the region, and being fortified in their belief that such Centre will play a useful role in the sphere of law in the Asia and Pacific Region, do hereby agree to the establishment of the aforementioned LEGAL RESEARCH CENTRE (ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION) under the general direction of the Honourable Attorney-General of Sri Lanka, and do hereby authorize him to take all necessary steps for the fulfilment of such purpose including the holding of discussions among the nations of the region and the utilization of any financial assistance voluntarily received from countries of the region.

CDC
11

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 September 1984

NBPM
CDD
14/9

Dear Charles,

UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement

The Foreign Secretary is grateful for the agreement of the Prime Minister and other OD colleagues to the proposal in his memorandum (OD(84)/13) of 13 August that we should make clear to President Jayewardene our inability to provide military assistance in circumstances arising from Sri Lanka's inter-communal problems.

The Prime Minister has suggested that, in the light of the postponement of her visit to Sri Lanka, our High Commissioner at Colombo should be instructed to approach President Jayewardene about this in October. Lady Young will, however, be visiting the Pacific region in October and will stop over in Sri Lanka on her return journey. This would provide an opportunity to explain HMG's views on the lines proposed in the Foreign Secretary's memorandum in a way which is likely to make more of an impact on the President. Sir Geoffrey proposes to ask Lady Young to act accordingly. Her discussions could be followed up shortly thereafter with a letter from the Prime Minister to President Jayewardene formally stating HMG's position.

The Lord Privy Seal has raised the possibility that the situation in Sri Lanka might deteriorate with such rapidity that there would be a risk of the Sri Lankan Government's invoking the Agreement before we could take action with President Jayewardene. This is indeed a risk. The Foreign Secretary agrees therefore that if a major explosion of inter-communal violence on the scale of the riots in July 1983 appeared imminent, we should consider instructing our High Commissioner to convey to President Jayewardene the view which would otherwise be conveyed by Lady Young. While the current situation in Sri Lanka is uncertain, Sir Geoffrey Howe does not think that it warrants instructing our High Commissioner to make an initial approach to President Jayewardene now. Apart from the risk that this might be ill-received coming so soon after the postponement of the Prime Minister's visit, it would also reduce the impact of Lady Young's approach in October.

/I am

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to Members of OD, and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Sri Lanka
UK Relats.
5/79

NBPM
CDD
13/9.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 5/17

13th September 1984

Dear Geoffrey

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

I have seen the memorandum which you circulated on the future of the UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement (OD(84)/13), and Mr Powell's letter of 29th August to your Private Secretary.

I share your view that it would be awkward if the Agreement were to be invoked in a future crisis, especially in circumstances which might involve us in a confrontation with the Indian Government. I therefore agree that we should tell President Jayewardene that we interpret the 'mutual interests' clause as making the Agreement essentially consultative, and warn him that we would have difficulty in responding to a request for help in any circumstances, including external intervention, arising from Sri Lanka's inter-communal problems.

So far as the timing of an approach is concerned, I agree with the Prime Minister that it would be indelicate to inform President Jayewardene too soon after the postponement of her visit, but that the matter should not remain in suspense for long. The precise handling of the approach is of course largely a matter for you.

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP

I am copying this letter to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Heseltine

SRI LANKA
UK Relations
5/79

(4)

R 18/9
CF PPS.

Prime Minister
CDP
18/9

LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION
PARLIAMENT SRI JAYEWARDENEPURA KOTTE SRI LANKA

ANURA BANDARANAIKE M.P.

11th September, 1984

Rt.Hon.Mrs.Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of England
No.10, Downing Street
London SW 1
England

CDP
24/9

Dear Prime Minister,

I write to thank you very much for receiving me in London last month at a time you were quite busy. I appreciate the kind gesture very much. I was looking forward to the meeting and to the cordial exchange of views we had which was most useful to me. I have conveyed your best wishes to Felix who is recuperating at the moment from a heart attack in Bangkok. I saw him on my way back from the United States and he was delighted that you had remembered him.

I was looking forward to meeting you in Sri Lanka and was sorry to know that you had postponed your visit. However, we hope that you would be able to visit Sri Lanka in the near future.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Anura Bandaranaike

Anura Bandaranaike
Leader of the Opposition

MCS

file the retro

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 September 1984

Thank you for your letter of 16 August to the Prime Minister.

As you will know, the Prime Minister has, with great reluctance, had to postpone her visit to Sri Lanka. But it was good of you to let us know of your interest in Sri Lanka. Mrs. Thatcher has asked me to say that she was most grateful for your kind wishes.

CHARLES POWELL

J. H. K. Trevaskis, Esq.

RM

a PC

A BF

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 September 1984

Dear David,

Sri Lanka: Military and Police Training

Your letter of 20 August asked for a draft Private Secretary reply to a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Trevaskis of Falconstar Ltd. I enclose a reply.

The Sri Lankan security forces have proved woefully inadequate in dealing with Tamil terrorist activities. In an effort to make good these deficiencies, the Sri Lankan Government have engaged another British company, KMS Ltd, to provide training in counter-terrorist techniques. The Sri Lankans have also sought Israeli advice on counter-insurgency matters. In addition, they have asked us to provide a variety of police training courses in the UK. We are currently considering how we might assist with this request.

The presence of KMS employees, including some ex-SAS personnel, in Sri Lanka has aroused controversy in India, and the Indian Government have expressed concern to us about the firm's involvement. We have made it clear that this is a purely commercial matter and that HMG are not involved. Although we have little knowledge of Falconstar Ltd's capabilities in counter-insurgency or police training, we would have no objection to their seeking to obtain business in Sri Lanka. But that is a matter for them to pursue. If the firm succeed in their bid to secure a consultancy it is important for us to be able to maintain that any contract between Falconstar Ltd and the Sri Lankan Government is a purely commercial arrangement with which HMG has no connexion. The draft reply to Mr Trevaskis is therefore non-committal.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq
10 Downing Street

Sri Lanka
Reports
5/79

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM CDP
PS/No 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

TO: J H K Trevaskis Esq
Falconstar Ltd
40 Catherine Place
LONDON SW1E 6HL

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 16 August to the Prime Minister.

As you will know, the Prime Minister has, with great reluctance had to postpone her visit to Sri Lanka. But it was good of you to let us know of your interest in Sri Lanka. Mrs Thatcher has asked me to say that she was most grateful for your kind wishes.

CD

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

cc PC

WRPM
CDP
079.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

4 September 1984

P Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
LONDON
SW1.

Dear Peter

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

The Chief Secretary has seen the Foreign Secretary's memorandum of 13 August (OD(84)/13) and the comments of the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Prime Minister. He agrees with the Foreign Secretary's recommendation and with the arrangements for handling suggested by the Prime Minister.

2 I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Members of OD and to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely

John Gieve

JOHN GIEVE

Sri Lanka: Relations May 79

GRS 175

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
FM COLOMBO 030855Z SEP 84
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 3 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE MODUK (FOR DI4C) AND NEW DELHI
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON (FCO PLEASE PASS)

SRI LANKA : INTERNAL SECURITY

1. MY DA HAS ALREADY REPORTED ON THE DEFENCE NET THE AMBUSH OF A POLICE CONVOY ON 1 SEPTEMBER AND SOME OF THE REACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THESE REACTIONS FROM A TAMIL JOURNALIST WHOM WE CONSIDER RELIABLE AND WHO VISITED POINT PEDRO ON 2 SEPTEMBER.

2. TEN CIVILIANS WERE SHOT DEAD BY POLICE COMMANDOS WHO CAME FROM THEIR CAMP AT PALALY ON HEARING OF THE KILLING OF THEIR COMRADES AT TIKKAM. THERE WAS RANDOM SHOOTING AT POINT PEDRO TOWN. AN ARMY UNIT LATER SET FIRE TO 30 MEDIUM SIZE SHOPS AND 25 SMALL BOUTIQUES IN POINT PEDRO TOWN AND ALSO SET FIRE TO THE NETS AND THE HUTS OF FISHERMEN ALONG THE COAST OF TIKKAM. THE ARMY ALSO SET FIRE TO AND COMPLETELY DESTROYED HARTLEY COLLEGE LIBRARY AT POINT PEDRO. A LARGE NUMBER OF FAMILIES IN TIKKAM HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM THEIR HOMES.

3. OUR SOURCE SAYS THAT TODAY, 3 SEPTEMBER, JAFFNA TOWN IS BACK TO NORMAL: SCHOOLS, GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES ARE OPEN.

4. IF THE SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO REACT IN THIS UNDISCIPLINED WAY EVERY TIME THAEY ARE AMBUSHED, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO LOSE OUT IN THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

NICHOLAS

LIMITED
SAD
SCU
DEF D
PUSD
RES D
CONS D
CCD
NEWS D
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/MR RAISON
PS/PUS

SIR W HARDING
MR BOYD

COPIES TO
SAD/ODA
DI4/MOD
PS/NO 10 D ST

RESTRICTED

cc PC

NBGM
CDP
3/9.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

3 September 1984

Dear Len,

UNITED KINGDOM/SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

The Home Secretary has now been able to consider your Secretary of State's memorandum OD(84)/13.

Although the arguments of substance in the paper tend to point to the termination of the Agreement, the Home Secretary is ready to support the preferred alternative if it is sufficient to leave no doubt about the clear practical and political objections to any United Kingdom military involvement being considered.

Copies of this letter go to the members of OD.

Yours ever,

Hugh Taylor

H H TAYLOR

L V Appleyard, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sri Lanka relations

(4)

10 DOWNING STREET

pp. CR

Prime Minister

You might like to see the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the photograph (a very good one).

A reply is in preparation.

MCDP 30/8.

FCS 84

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 August, 1984

Letter from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, written before the decision to postpone the Prime Minister's visit there. I should be grateful for a draft reply.

BF1

C. D. POWELL

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FILE

RW

c LCO. CSL
MOD CO.
HMT DTI
LPO Sir P.C.
LPSO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 August, 1984

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

The Prime Minister has seen the memorandum circulated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to OD on the future of the UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement (OD(84)/13).

The Prime Minister agrees with the conclusion of the paper that we should tell President Jayewardene that in interpreting the 'mutual interests' clause, we would have difficulty in responding to a request for assistance in any circumstances, including external intervention, arising from Sri Lanka's inter-communal problems. Unless colleagues have differing views, the Prime Minister does not therefore consider that discussion in OD is necessary.

There will remain, however, the question of how and when President Jayewardene should be informed now that the Prime Minister's visit to Sri Lanka is postponed. The Prime Minister's view is that it would be indelicate to inform him too soon after the news of the postponement of her visit but that equally it would not be appropriate to allow the matter to remain in suspense until her visit is eventually re-instated. Subject to the views of colleagues she thinks that our High Commissioner at Colombo should be instructed to inform President Jayewardene of HMG's conclusions, first orally and then in writing, in October.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc/C 9

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

Await views of colleagues

C.D.P.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

with PM

I entirely agree with the recommendation in your paper of 13 August to OD. May I make two additional points.

First The sentence in the Agreement, which immediately follows the one you quote and which relates to the stationing of British Forces in Ceylon, also incorporates much the same qualifying phrase (viz "as may be mutually agreed"). The Sri Lanka Government no doubt based their request for the withdrawal of British troops on this phrase. It provides therefore a very useful precedent for our relying on the corresponding phrase in relation to the "external aggression" provision.

Second The record of the Indian Government in the field of armed intervention is not a reassuring one. Are we exerting diplomatic pressure on them not to intervene in Sri Lanka? If we are not, are there considerations making it unwise or unproductive to do so?

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A.C.

A C

29 August 1984

Sri Lanka: Relations May 1979.

8

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

mt

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

You will recall that the FCS recommended shortly before President Jayewardene's visit here in June that you should tell him that we proposed to abrogate the UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement. You declined to do this until the matter had been properly considered by Ministers collectively.

The FCS has now circulated the attached note to OD. It concludes that we should tell the Sri Lankans confidentially that in interpreting the "mutual interests" clause of the agreement, we would have difficulty in responding to a request for assistance in any circumstances, including external intervention, arising from Sri Lanka's inter-communal problems.

On substance I suggest that you agree to the recommendation subject to the views of colleagues. In that case, discussion by OD is unlikely to be necessary.

There remains a problem of timing. It was suggested that you should speak to President Jayewardene. But your visit is now postponed. It seems rather hard to inflict two bits of bad news on him (i.e. postponement of your visit and abrogation of the UK-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement) in quick succession. On the other hand if the situation in Sri Lanka gets worse the risk of the agreement being invoked could increase, which argues against delaying informing the Sri Lankans of our decision until you do eventually go there. The best course might therefore be for our High Commissioner to speak to President Jayewardene in about a month's time.

Agree?

C.D.P.

Yes mt

28 August, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPC 7

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

23 August 1984

WBPM

Dear Geoffrey

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

I have seen your memorandum to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee and agree in general that we should proceed as you suggest on the basis of your second option. I do, however, have some little doubt about the timing which you propose. Are we sure that the situation will remain stable for sufficiently long to permit the Prime Minister to raise this matter on her visit at the end of September? Would it perhaps not be preferable to have a contingency plan whereby the High Commissioner could make suitable warning noises if the situation seemed to be deteriorating to an extent where the Sri Lankans might be thinking about invoking the Agreement? Only you can provide the answers to these questions, but I think that they do require to be asked.

The second point I should like to make is that if we come through this crisis without having to speak to the Sri Lankans (because the situation has improved) or even if we do need to take the action which you suggest, very serious thought should be given to the termination of the Agreement as soon as the situation in Sri Lanka has returned to something like normal. I am sure that communal strife in that country will continue to plague it for some time to come and we might well find ourselves in the same situation in a few years time.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister, other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours
John Biffen

JOHN BIFFEN

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Sri Lanka, May 79

Relations.

CEPC

CABINET OFFICE
70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 5838

N03604

22 August 1984

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street
SW1

Agd Clerk.

OD(84) 13 apparently cleared

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

You will have seen the memorandum on this subject by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, circulated on 13 August as OD(84)13.

2. Because it seemed sensible to clear this paper out of Committee, we suggested to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the drafting stage that a specific request for such clearance should be included in the text. This they were reluctant to do because of a desire not to pre-empt the Prime Minister's decision. As a result, Departments have sought our advice on whether their Ministers should assume that clearance out of Committee is required; and we have told them that we will advise them on the point as soon as the Prime Minister has had the chance to decide.

3. I would be grateful if you would let me know how she wishes to handle the matter. I suppose that she may wish to discuss the matter at an OD meeting in the week before her departure on 14 September although no provision has been made for this.

Cab. Off. Have made tentative arrangements 10/9/84. Duty Clerk

4. A final point. Although not mentioned in paragraph 5 of the paper, there is of course a third option - do nothing.

Yours ever

D H COLVIN

CEPC

CABINET OFFICE
70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 5838

N03604

22 August 1984

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street
SW1

CP o/r

Agree Clerk.

UK-SRI LANKA DEFENCE AGREEMENT

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Cab. Off. Have made tentative arrangements 10/9/84. Duty Clerk.

4. A final point. Although not mentioned in paragraph 5 of the paper, there is of course a third option - do nothing.

Yours ever

D H COLVIN

UK. Rel. SRI LANKA. May 79

PRIME MINISTER

of

The Democratic Socialist Republic of

SRI LANKA

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VISITOR FROM COLOMBO - SRI LANKA

Mr R PREMADASA

Opposition Chief Whip, United National Party.

The above visitor is in Britain for ten days as the guest of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and is following a programme of arrangements made by the Central Office of Information.

The picture shows Mr R Premadasa, (left) presenting a silver tray to the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, Leader of the Opposition, when he attended a Conservative Party Rally, at Fairfield Hall, Croydon.

S01458/A/Nov/75.



Victoria Reservoir

Constructed with British Assistance under the Mahaweli Ganga Development Programme of Sri Lanka.

August 1984

R. PREMADASA, M.P.
Prime Minister

Subject a matter
eft

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T146 B/84

**DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA**

20th August, 1984

My dear Prime Minister,

I am extremely happy that you have accepted our invitation to visit Sri Lanka from Tuesday, the 25th of September to Thursday, the 27th of September 1984. We, in Sri Lanka, feel honoured that you are visiting us, even though your stay is going to be rather brief.

As for me personally, your visit will provide an opportunity of renewing our friendship which is now nearly 10 years old. You might recall that in 1975 when you were the Leader of the Opposition, on your invitation I participated in a Conservative Party Rally in Croydon when I visited Britain in my capacity as the Chief Opposition Whip in Sri Lanka. I am sending herewith a copy of a photograph that was taken by the Central Office of Information on that occasion. I remember your forthright speech on that day in which you spelt out the policies and programmes for the future. At that time, I was the Chairman of the Policy and Programme Committee of our Party - the United National Party, which was also preparing for the General Elections of 1977. As I mentioned to you, on that occasion, we were more or less chartering the same course. Since then, both Britain and Sri Lanka have effectively implemented the policies and programmes that were placed before our people.

I am glad that we were able to continue a meaningful dialogue between us, as well as between our two countries since you assumed the onerous and prestigious office of Prime Minister of Great Britain. I recall with high esteem, your positive approach to my request for the British Government Grant of £.100 Million towards the Victoria Project in Sri Lanka. We, in Sri Lanka, consider this a magnanimous gesture on your part, as the economic climate in your country at that period of time, was not at all conducive to the granting of aid.

You might recall that I met you in London on my way to Lusaka and made a personal request to you for British assistance for the Victoria Project and you gave me a positive reply a couple of days later in Lusaka. We are in fact overjoyed that you are in a position to personally inaugurate the massive Victoria Reservoir Project on Wednesday, the 26th of September 1984. I am sure you will derive tremendous personal satisfaction by not only seeing the fruits of your generous decision, but also by observing that the British taxpayers monies have been well spent. I am sending herewith a photocopy of the note which you gave me in Lusaka, confirming the availability of British aid for the Victoria Project. The original of this note is with me and I value it a great deal.

During your visit to Sri Lanka, you will no doubt be able to see the results of our common endeavours for the improvement of the quality of life of the Sri Lankan people. Apart from Mahaweli, we have embarked on a number of other projects for the development of infrastructure, urban renewal and housing development by the Ministries under my charge. During the early years of the implementation of the 100,000 Houses Programme which was successfully concluded in 1983, the Overseas Development Ministry of Great Britian provided the National Housing Development Authority of Sri Lanka with the services of several experts. The assistance and encouragement we received from them, have proved to be of immense value in formulating a new strategy for the Million Houses Programme.

I am sending herewith for your perusal, a copy of the report of the ODM experts on our housing strategy, together with some literature on our Housing, Urban Development and Model Village Programmes.

With warm personal regards to Mr Denis Thatcher and yourself from Mrs Premadasa and myself, and looking forward to your visit to Sri Lanka,

Yours sincerely,

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, FRS. M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain
10, Downing Street
LONDON, U.K.

encls.

Prime Minister to President

SRI LANKA

I am glad to be able to tell you that we are now in a position to offer a UK contribution to the Victoria Dam Scheme. This would be in the form of a grant of up to £100 million over six years towards the costs of the design and construction of the Dam and power station. It would, of course, be subject to normal UK grant conditions.

Margaret Thatcher

Lusaka 6th Aug. 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1984

Sri Lanka: Military & Police Training

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister dated 16 August from Mr. Jeremy Trevaskis, a Director of Falconstar Limited.

In view of the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit, I should be grateful for urgent advice on the contents of Mr. Trevaskis' letter, and for a draft reply for Private Secretary signature.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

(David Barclay)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1984

I am writing in the Prime Minister's absence overseas to acknowledge your letter of 16 August. I will place this before the Prime Minister and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

(David Barclay)

Jeremy Trevaskis, Esq.

GRS 900

CONFIDENTIAL
FM COLOMBO 170525Z AUG 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 363 OF 17 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

PA
2nd B
17/8

OUR TELNO 353 : SRI LANKA : INTERNAL SECURITY

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT IS GREATLY CONCERNED AT INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO SRI LANKA'S PROBLEMS AND WANTS FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO BE AWARE OF REAL POSITION. THERE HAVE BEEN ARMY EXCESSES BUT THEY WILL BE PUNISHED. TERRORIST ACTIVITES HAVE ESCALTATED AND THERE IS NO QUESTION THEY ARE RECEIVING AID FROM INDIA. PRESIDENT IS WRITING STRONG LETTER TO MRS GANDHI ABOUT HER SPEECH IN LOK SABHA. ANTI-SRI LANKAN BIAS OF INDIAN PRESS IS ALSO CAUSING CONCERN. AN INDIAN INVASION COULD NOT BE RESISTED MILITARLY BUT WOULD LEAD TO A TAMIL BLOODBATH. PRESIDENT INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROPOSALS FOR A SECOND CHAMBER BUT HOPES THAT TULF WILL AGREE TO CO-OPERATE.

DETAIL

2. AT HIS REQUEST I SAW THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING: LALITH ATHULATHMUDALI AND HAMEED WERE PRESENT. THE PRESIDENT STARTED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECENT EVENTS IN SRI LANKA AND REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO MRS GANDHI'S SPEECH IN THE LOK SABHA. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NO MATTER WHAT VIEW THE INDIANS TOOK, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PURSUE THEIR PRESENT LINE OF COMBATING TERRORISM WHILE STILL SEEKING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM.

3. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT DENY THAT THERE HAD BEEN EXCESSES BY THE SECURITY FORCES, MOST PARTICULARLY IN MANNAR WHEN SOME 100 HOUSES WERE BURNED DOWN. IT SO HAPPENED THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THESE SHOPS/HOUSES WERE MUSLIM-OWNED: MUSLIMS FORM 50 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF MANNAR. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE STERN ACTION AGAINST THE GUILTY ARMY MEN: IT SEEMED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE ARMY WHO MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS SABOTEURS.

4. HE DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IN SPITE OF THE INCREASED ATTACKS BY TERRORISTS ON THE SECURITY FORCES THERE HAD BEEN NO REPITITION OF THE VIOLENCE OF JULY LAST YEAR IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ISLAND WHICH HAD REMAINED ENTIRELY PEACEFUL. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD BE SEEN AS A VERY CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT.

5. THIS RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY WAS ON A GREATER SCALE THAN

/IN THE

IN THE PAST. THERE WERE MORE FREQUENT ATTACKS AND THEY WERE OPERATING IN GANGS OF UP TO 50. MOST OF THEM WORE UNIFORMS AND WERE ARMED WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE MAINLY WEAPONS STOLEN WITHIN SRI LANKA. THERE WAS NO DOUBT HOWEVER THAT THE EXPLOSIVES WHICH WERE USED WERE OF INDIAN ORIGIN. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE OF THE TAMILS TRYING TO BUY ARMS FROM OVERSEAS. NOR WAS THERE ANY QUESTION THAT THE TERRORISTS WERE RECEIVING A GREAT DEAL OF AID AND HELP FROM INDIA: HE WOULD NOT SAY FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN DELHI, NOR WOULD HE SAY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU, BUT UNDOUBTEDLY THE HELP WAS BEING GIVEN.

6. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT MRS GANDHI'S SPEECH AND HE WAS SENDING HER A STRONG LETTER PROTESTING AT MANY OF THE STATEMENTS IN HER SPEECH WHICH WERE QUITE UNTRUE. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT SHE HAD HER OWN POLITICAL PROBLEMS BUT SHE WAS ALSO SERIOUSLY MISINFORMED ABOUT MUCH THAT WAS HAPPENING IN SRI LANKA.

7. HE WENT ON TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE STRONG BIAS OF THE INDIAN PRESS AND THE ANTI-SRI LANKAN LINE THAT IT TOOK ON ALL OCCASIONS. HE WAS SHOWN A COPY OF A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN THE HINDU ABOUT THE VIOLENCE IN MANNAR AND A NUMBER OF SERIOUS FACTUAL ERRORS WERE POINTED OUT TO ME. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SAID THAT ONLY 4 OF 5 HOUSES REMAINED STANDING IN MANNAR. THIS WAS QUITE RIDICULOUS.

8. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT HE FULLY REALISED THAT IF INDIA INVADED, THERE WAS NO WAY THEY COULD BE STOPPED MILITARILY BUT THE SRI LANKANS WOULD NEVER GIVE IN. BUT IF THE INDIANS DID INVADE NO GOVERNMENT IN SRI LANKA COULD PREVENT A TAMIL BLOODBATH. IN ALL PARTS OF THE ISLAND THE SINHALA WOULD RISE UP IN ANGER.

9. HE THEN MOVEED ON TO THE ALL PARTY CONFERENCE WHICH IS DUE TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW FRIDAY 17 AUGUST. HE SAID THAT HE HAD INDICATIONS THERE WAS SOME APPRECIATION OF HIS SUGGESTED SECOND CHAMBER WHICH COULD BE USED TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THOSE WHO WISHED TO RETAIN ONLY DDCS AND THOSE WHO WISHED TO HAVE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS. HE ENLARGED ON HIS PROPOSALS (ALREADY REPORTED TO YOU) AND EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD APPOINT PROVINCIAL MINISTERS FROM THE SECOND CHAMBER WITH EXECUTIVE POWERS. THE DDCS WOULD REMAIN BUT HE WOULD GIVE THEM MORE POWERS AND WOULD PERMIT THEM TO COME TOGETHER FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES IN ''ZONAL COUNCILS''. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION HE SAID THAT BY ''ZONAL'' HE

 /DID NOT

DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN ALL THE COUNCILS OF THE PROVINCE: IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE FOR, SAY, THREE OF THE DDCS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE TO COME TOGETHER AND NOT ALL FIVE. HE SAID HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE EXECUTIVE POWERS TO A PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY. HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS FACING MRS GANDHI WITH HER VARIOUS STATE ASSEMBLIES AND STATE CHIEF MINISTERS. HE HOPED THAT TULF WOULD ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS AND HE WAS HAVING INFORMAL TALKS WITH THEM BEFORE THE APC. IF THEY DID SO, IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO RENOUNCE EELAM AND TO TAKE OATH IN ORDER TO SIT IN PARLIAMENT OR IN THE SECOND CHAMBER. BUT IF HE COULD NOT GET AGREEMENT AT THE APC, HE COULD NOT ALLOW THE MATTER TO DRIFT ANY LONGER AND HE WOULD IMPOSE THE GOVERNMENT'S SOLUTION BY LEGISLATION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IF THESE PROPOSALS WERE CARRIED THROUGH IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THE END OF TERRORISM AND THAT SRI LANKA MIGHT HAVE TO FACE A LONG STRUGGLE. NEVERTHELESS, IF TULF ACCEPTED THE PROPOSALS AND CO-OPERATED, AND IF INDIA ACCEPTED THEM, THEN IT WOULD SURELY BE TIME FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST SRI LANKA BY CONTROLLING THE TERRORISTS IN TAMIL NADU.

10. FINALLY HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WRITING TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THESE LINES. HE WANTED TO MAKE QUITE SURE THAT ''FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS'' AND ESPECIALLY BRITAIN WERE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE SITUATION IN SRI LANKA.

NICHOLAS

LIMITED
SAD
SCU
DEF D
PUSD
RES D
CONS D
CCD
NEWS D
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS | LADY YOUNG
PS | MR WHITNEY
PS | MR RAISON
PS | PUS
SIR W HARDING

COPIES TO:
SAD | ODA
DIA C MOD
PS | No 10 DOWNING ST

FALCONSTAR LIMITED

40 CATHERINE PLACE, LONDON SW1E 6HL
Telephone: 01-828 7425
Telex: 8951203 DAF G

16 August 1984

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

You may remember that I wrote to you on 30 September 1983 to tell you about my organisation which provides military and police training teams to friendly countries worldwide. Since then, Peter Le Marchand and I have been joined on the board by two more directors. One is Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, KCMG, OBE, my father, whose last appointment was Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Aden, and whose diplomatic background will be known to you.

The other is Major General Corran Purdon, CBE, MC, CPM, a former Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces, GOC Near East Land Forces, and, after retiring from the Army, Deputy Commissioner the Royal Hong Kong Police Force. He is well known to Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall, and to Lord MacLehose.

I write, not only to wish you every success in your forthcoming visit to Sri Lanka, but to tell you in confidence that we have been approached by certain senior personalities in Sri Lanka with a view to possibly providing consultancy at a high level, in counter insurgency and, perhaps, the provision of personnel to carry out certain training commitments which are not already catered for by the small K.M.S. team with the Sri Lankan Police, and by the Israelis on the Intelligence side. I felt you would wish to be apprised in advance of your visit as to the possibility of our being involved, and to inform you that Peter Le Marchand returned from Sri Lanka only last week, from an exploratory visit during which he had a meeting with the Minister of National Security, Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, at which he was given to understand that we may be called upon to visit Sri Lanka again in a month or so.

I would like you to know that we are ready to provide high calibre advisers and instructors from the rank of Major General and Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police downwards.

/..

With my warmest good wishes for your visit to Sri Lanka next month, and our great admiration for your leadership of this country.

Yours Sincerely

Jeremy Trevaskis

JEREMY TREVASKIS

file SH

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 August, 1984

Dear Mr. Bandaranaike,

I was delighted with the beautiful tray which you brought me yesterday. It was a most kind and generous thought. I am greatly looking forward to my visit to Sri Lanka and to the opportunity to meet you again.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Anura Bandaranaike, M.P.

ECL

CONFIDENTIAL

ECE JAHACR

MASTER

SRI LANKA: Relations: May 79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 August, 1984

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr. Anura Bandaranaike, Leader of the Sri Lankan Opposition at 10 Downing Street on 6 August, 1984

The Prime Minister received Mr. Bandaranaike for a brief talk at 1730 today.

The Prime Minister said that she was looking forward to her visit to Sri Lanka. She asked how Mr. Bandaranaike saw the inter-communal problem. Mr. Bandaranaike said the problem was pretty bad. But matters had reached an interesting stage. President Jayewardene had made a new proposal for an upper chamber. The President had recently told him that he would go through with implementing the proposal, even if the Tamils did not accept it. The Prime Minister said that it was very important to do everything possible to bring about reconciliation. Mr. Bandaranaike said that opinion was hardening and the number of those supporting a separate state had grown. The Prime Minister asked whether those who argued for separatism really reflected Tamil opinion. Mr. Bandaranaike replied that the separatists had indeed been only a small minority but were now growing in strength. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister about President Jayewardene's meeting with Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Bandaranaike said the meeting had clearly not been as successful as the President had hoped. It seemed that Mrs. Gandhi had not been very co-operative, for instance over suppression of terrorist activity directed from Southern India.

Mr. Bandaranaike said that the Prime Minister would be formally welcomed on her visit in the Sri Lankan Parliament. The Prime Minister asked how long she would be expected to speak. Mr. Bandaranaike said that the Prime Minister should express whatever she wanted to say, however long it took (but subsequently agreed that 20 minutes would be about right).

The Prime Minister enquired after Felix Bandaranaike.

CONFIDENTIAL

84

Mr. Bandaranaike said that he had also been disenfranchised and had now turned to religion. The Prime Minister recalled that she had once entertained Mr. Bandaranaike's mother.

Mr. Bandaranaike said that he was visiting the United States after London and hoped to see something of the election campaign. The Prime Minister and Mr. Bandaranaike discussed some of the differences between American and British politics.

C. D. POWELL

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr Powell

Confirmed for
1730 on 6 Aug.

DMB
3/8

P. Gn.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 August, 1984

Prime Minister

ACS

CDP 3/8.

Dear Charles,

Call by Mr Anura Bandaranaike, Leader of the Sri Lankan Opposition

You asked for a letter providing background for the call on the Prime Minister by Mr Anura Bandaranaike on Monday, 6 August.

I enclose personality notes on Mr Bandaranaike; his mother, the former Prime Minister, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike; and on the Sri Lankan High Commissioner, (who is likely to be present during the call) and a fact sheet on Sri Lanka.

Mrs Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) suffered a landslide defeat in 1977 by the United National Party (UNP) led by Mr Jayewardene. The SLFP was left with only eight seats out 168 in Parliament. The election result reflected widespread disenchantment with state socialism and left the SLFP and their communist electoral allies in disarray. In 1980, Mrs Bandaranaike was deprived of her civil rights for 7 years following allegations that she had abused power when Prime Minister. She is ineligible to stand for Parliament or hold public office, but still retains a firm grip on the SLFP, of which she is the President.

Mr Bandaranaike's Party

Mr Anura Bandaranaike now leads the SLFP in Parliament, where he is leader of the Opposition. The Party is now less stridently socialist than in the past, and its hopes of attracting popular support have improved as the authority of the UNP, under the 78 year-old President Jayewardene, has been weakened by the endemic inter-communal problem and continuing economic troubles.

The Inter-Communal Problem

President Jayewardene mentioned to the Prime Miniter in June his plan to create a second Parliamentary Chamber elected on a provincial basis. This proposal, designed to win over the Tamil minority, was put forward at the All-Party Conference in July. Discussion will continue when the Conference reconvenes in the middle of this month. However, there is little to suggest that President Jayewardene's proposal will satisfy the Tamil demand for provincial autonomy. For as long

as the Conference continues, a further major explosion of inter-communal violence is unlikely, but if it collapses the risk of a repetition of the violence of July 1983 would be high. We have consistently urged the Sri Lankan Government to adopt a policy of reconciliation and have argued that any solution must be acceptable to all communities.

The Sri Lankan Freedom Party withdrew from the All-Party Conference at an early stage and there is no sign of their returning to the table. Given the lack of progress they would probably regard it as a mistake to do so and have said little except to criticise the efforts of the Government. They claim that if they were in power they would solve the problem in six months, but have not said how. The Prime Minister may wish to seek Mr Bandaranaike's views on the problem and reiterate our hope that a peaceful settlement will be possible.

The Prime Minister might also ask Mr Bandaranaike:-

(a) how he sees the present attitude of the Indian Government to the inter-communal problem, and about relations with India in general (Mrs Bandaranaike has long-standing contacts with Mrs Gandhi);

(b) for his assessment of his Party's chances in four by-elections due later this year;

(c) for his views on the more open and liberal economy established by the present government, and the changes the SLFP would like to see made if they came to power.

Mr Bandaranaike will probably be well aware of the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Sri Lanka (25-27 September) for the opening of the Victoria Dam. As Leader of the Opposition he will undoubtedly meet Mrs Thatcher when she addresses Parliament in Colombo. If he should ask for the Prime Minsiter to make time during her visit to meet his mother the Prime Minsiter may wish to explain that she will be in Sri Lanka as the guest of the Government and that such a request should be put to the Sri Lankan authorities who are organising the programme.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

FACT SHEET

THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

DEMOGRAPHY

Population	:	15.6 million (1983 estimate)
Distribution	:	74% Sinhalese, 18 Tamils, 7% Muslims
Population Increase	:	2% per annum (1.7% allowing for net migration)
Religion	:	Buddhist (67%), Hindu (18%), Christian (8%), Muslim (7%)
Language	:	Sinhalese (official language) Tamil (national language) and English

GEOGRAPHY

Area	:	25,332 sq miles (65,600 sq km)
Capital	:	Colombo (population 585,776 in 1981)

GOVERNMENT

Government	:	Executive President directly elected for 6 year term. Unicameral Parliament elected 6-yearly by proportional representation.
Ruling Party	:	United National Party (since July 1977)
President	:	Junius Jayewardene

ECONOMY

Basis	:	Agriculture
Gross Domestic Produce 1983	:	US $5,199 million
Per capita income 1982	:	US $320

TRADE

Total exports 1983	:	US $1,354 million
Total imports 1983	:	US $2,136 million

TRADE WITH BRITAIN

Exports to Britain 1983	:	£39.8 million
Imports from Britain 1983	:	£70.1 million

AUGUST 1984

BA[illegible]ARANAIKE, ANURA PRIADASSI SOLOMON DIAS, MP (SLFP)

Second MP for Nuwara Eliya-Maskeliya.

Sinhalese Buddhist. Goigama caste. Born 1949. Upper second class degree at University College, London 1973. Active in publicising Sri Lankan politics in London. On return appointed head of SLFP Youth Leagues (in which he was not very successful) and made (unpaid) adviser on Youth Affairs to Ministry of Planning 1975. Obtained a controlling interest in the 'Times' newspaper group together with some business associates 1975. This together with a Sinhalese newspaper 'Adha', which he founded, served as a public voice for him until the UNP victory at the 1977 election, shortly after which the new Government took over the 'Times' group which was in financial trouble. Elected for first time 1977. Professes a special interest in Latin America. Has travelled widely.

Since both his parents have been Prime Ministers and he is one of only 8 SLFP MPs he is clearly regarded as a possible heir apparent in the SLFP. He is to the right of his party and had a hand in the expulsion of the LSSP from the coalition in 1975. He is not liked by many to his left including his sister and brother-in-law, while the Deputy Leader of the SLFP, Mathripala Senanayake, sees him as a rival. He did better than expected in his multi-member constituency. Joined Maithripala Senanayake in 1982 attempt to oust his mother from party leadership, but later returned to the fold. Showed little enthusiasm in supporting Kobbekaduwa the SLFP candidate in the 1982 Presidential election. Has obvious ambitions to lead SLFP and Sri Lanka. He has been compared with the late Sanjay Gandhi but the similarity is superficial.

Inclined to be stout, he is amiable socially and enjoys the table. Not a good listner. His voice is hoarse and causes him problems at political meetings especially since, like his mother, he speaks very fast. He is unmarried.

BANDARANAIKE, MRS SIRIMAVO RATWATTE DIAS (NEE RATWATTE) MP (SLFP)

President of SLFP. Former Prime Minister.

Sinhalese (Kandyan). Buddhist. Goigama caste. Born 1916. Educated Ferguson's High School, Ratnapura and St Bridget's Convent, Colombo. Mrs Bandaranaike comes from a leading family of the Kandyan aristocracy and was married in 1940 to Mr S W R D Bandaranaike, then Minister of Local Government and later Prime Minister 1956-9; in April 1960, after her husband's assassination in September 1959 she became President of the SLFP. Sworn in as Prime Minister July 1960 and appointed a Senator. Leader of the Opposition 1965-70 and Prime Minister again 1970-77.

When she became Prime Minister, though sensible and pragmatic, Mrs Bandaranaike was essentially a family woman lacking the necessary education and intellect required. However, a certain personal magnetism coupled with the liberal advice from her family saw her through her first years of office.

A believer in the non-aligned movement and the Commonwealth, her main foreign affairs initiative was the promotion of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

Accused by many of nepotism, she became less popular during the succeeding ten years and in October 1980 lost her seat and her civic rights through misuse of power. Torn between her right-wing son Anura and her left-wing daughter, Chandrike, she has since failed to hold together a gradually disintegrating SLFP

MR L B C [CHANDRA] MONERAWELA

High Commissioner for Sri Lanka in London since May 1984.

	Born in September 1937; obtained a BA in Economics from the University of Ceylon
1961:	Joined Foreign Service Held diplomatic assignments in Peking, Washington and Bangkok
1971 - 1974:	Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1074 - 1980:	Permanent Representative to the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
1980 - 1983:	Director, Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
January 1984:	High Commissioner to Singapore

Mr Monerawela is married with three children. Pleasant but somewhat colourless personality.

Prime Minister
Mr. Bandaranaike is leader of the Opposition in Sri Lanka. He has asked to see you and FCO suggest that you agree. I really don't think it is necessary to suggest that I write a very polite letter explaining that you are otherwise engaged and offering a call on an FCO Minister.

Agree?
CDP
2/8.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 August 1984

Dear Charles,

Visit of the Leader of the Opposition in Sri Lanka

Thank you for your letter of 30 July asking whether the Prime Minister should agree to see Mr Anura Bandaranaike during his forthcoming private visit to London.

We consider that a short courtesy call would be appropriate. Our High Commissioner in Colombo, whom we have consulted, agrees. Mr Bandaranaike is the son of Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the former Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, and at present leads the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in Parliament.

I'm clear I shall want to see him briefly MT

Against the background of the recent visits here by President Jayewardene and the Sri Lankan Minister of National Security and the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Sri Lanka, a meeting would help demonstrate that we are ready to take account of the views of the Sri Lankan opposition. It would also provide an opportunity to urge on Mr Bandaranaike the importance of the SLFP participating in the All-Party Conference. We have no reason to fear an adverse reaction by the Sri Lankan Government; their High Commission has apparently been asked to assist with arrangements for the visit.

We shall provide a brief for the Prime Minister's use, when a call has been arranged.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 July, 1984.

Sri Lanka: Letter from Mrs. Gandhi

Thank you for your letter of 30 July enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mrs. Gandhi's message about Sri Lanka.

I enclose a signed original of the reply. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its delivery.

C.D. Powell

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Ops
Master

cc FCO VC
PC

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 July, 1984.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T138/84

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 14 July.

I was grateful for this detailed account of your conversations with President Jayewardene during his recent visit to New Delhi.

I understand that the President has now made public his proposals for constitutional reform, in particular the creation of a second Chamber constituted on a provincial basis. It appears that these proposals are for discussion and may be adjusted in the light of comments by Tamils and others. I am sure you were right to urge the Tamil leaders to attend the All Party Conference. It would be unfortunate if the dialogue were cut short prematurely. I very much hope that the President's proposals will be considered fully at the Conference and will contribute to an eventual solution acceptable to all communities in Sri Lanka.

We have given your High Commission here an account of the recent visit to London by Mr. Athulathmudali. We took the opportunity provided by his visit to urge yet again the importance of pursuing a policy of reconciliation so as to

achieve a settlement acceptable to both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. I shall of course have a further opportunity to discuss these matters with President Jayewardene in September.

With best wishes,

Warm regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi

Aus 84

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 July, 1984

Visit of the Leader of the Opposition in Sri Lanka

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition in Sri Lanka, Mr. Bandaranaike, asking whether the Prime Minister would see Mr. Bandaranaike between 3-14 August. I should be grateful for advice on whether the Prime Minister should agree.

C. D. POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CDP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1984

Dear Charles,

Sri Lanka: Letter from Mrs Gandhi

Thank you for your letter of 17 July enclosing a letter from Mrs Gandhi to the Prime Minister about Sri Lanka.

I enclose a draft reply which takes into account the visit by the Sri Lankan Minister of National Security, Mr Athulathmudali, the week before last, and the Prime Minister's previous exchange of correspondence with Mrs Gandhi on this subject in June.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Shrimati Indira Gandhi
Prime Minister of India

Your Reference

Copies to:

NSCAEP

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 14 July.

I was grateful for this detailed account of your conversations with President Jayewardene during his recent visit to New Delhi.

I understand that the President has now made public his proposals for constitutional reform, in particular the creation of a second Chamber constituted on a provincial basis. It appears that these proposals are for discussion and may be adjusted in the light of comments by Tamils and others. I am sure you were right to urge the Tamil leaders to attend the All Party Conference. It would be ~~very~~ unfortunate if the dialogue were cut short prematurely. I very much hope that the President's proposals will be considered fully at the Conference and will contribute to an eventual solution acceptable to all communities in Sri Lanka.

We have given your High Commission here an account of the recent visit to London by Mr Athulathmudali. We took the opportunity provided by his visit to urge yet again the importance of pursuing a policy of reconciliation so as to achieve a settlement acceptable to both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. I shall of course have a further opportunity to discuss these matters with President Jayewardene in September.

With best wishes. CR.

Enclosures–flag(s).....

SRI LANKA: Relations: May 79

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

දුරකථන
தொலைபேசி
Telephone
කාර්යාලය
அலுவலகம்
Office
564262
564263
ලේකම්
செயலாளர்
Secretary
564257

විපක්ෂ නායක කාර්යාලය
எதிர்க்கட்சி முதல்வர் அலுவலகம்
OFFICE OF THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

පාර්ලිමේන්තුව
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பாராளுமன்றம்
ஸ்ரீ ஜயவர்தனபுர கோட்டே
Parliament
Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte, SRI LANKA

මගේ අංකය
எனது எண்
My No. LO/S/1.

ඔබේ අංකය
உமது எண்
Your No.

26th July, 1984.

Charles Powell
PL. with you deal.
FCRB
30.7.

Dear Sir,

The Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament of Sri Lanka, Hon.Mr.Anura Bandaranaike, M.P. will be on an unofficial visit to the United Kingdom shortly. He wishes to avail himself of this opportunity to pay a courtesy call on the British Prime Minister, Rt.Hon. Margret Thatcher, M.P. on any date convenient to her, between the 3rd and the 14th of August 1984.

The Sri Lankan High Commissioner in London will also get in touch with you regarding this. Hon.Mr.Anura Bandaranaike will be pleased if you could kindly arrange to enable him to call on the Rt.Hon.Prime Minister of the United Kingdom during his visit to Britain please.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

R. Perinpanayakam

(R.Perinpanayakam)
Secretary
to the Leader of the Opposition

Mr.F.E.R.Butler,
Principal Private Secretary,
Prime Minister's Office,
10, Downing Street,
London SW-1,
ENGLAND.

SECRET

8

Pushkar Johari
Deputy High Commissioner

INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.

No. 480/DHC/84

July 19, 1984

Prime Minister has already seen a copy. FCO are preparing reply.
PA.
CDP 19/7

Dear Mr Powell,

In continuation of my letter No. 476/DHC/84 dated July 17, 1984 I am enclosing the sealed cover containing the signed letter from Prime Minister of India to The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Yours sincerely,

(Pushkar Johari)

Mr Charles Powell,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

Encl: as above

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 July 1984

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM MRS. GANDHI

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mrs. Gandhi, delivered today. I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply if appropriate.

BFI

(C.D. POWELL)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 July 1984

I am writing to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 17 July, enclosing a message from Mrs. Gandhi to the Prime Minister.

(C.D. POWELL)

Shri Pushkar Johari

SECRET

7

Pushkar Johari
Deputy High Commissioner.

भारत का हाई कमीशन
लन्दन
THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA,
.....DEPARTMENT,
INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON WC2B 4NA

cc PC

सत्यमेव जयते

TELEPHONE: 01-836 8484 EXT.....
TELEGRAMS: HICOMIND, LONDON, W.C.2.

No. 476/DHC/84

July 17, 1984

Dear Mr Powell,

I am enclosing the text of a letter dated July 14, 1984 from the Prime Minister of India, Shrimati Indira Gandhi to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, with the request that it may kindly be placed before the Prime Minister urgently.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Pushkar Johari)

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SWI

Encl: As above.

(2)

SECRET

भारत का हाई कमीशन
लन्दन
THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA,
.....DEPARTMENT.
INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON WC2B 4NA

Pushkar Johari
Deputy High Commissioner.

TELEPHONE: 01-836 8484 EXT.....
TELEGRAMS: HICOMIND, LONDON, W.C.2.

Prime Minister

No. 476/DHC/84 I have asked FCO for advice and a draft reply. C.D.P. 17/7 July 17, 1984

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I am enclosing the text of a letter dated July 14, 1984 from the Prime Minister of India, Shrimati Indira Gandhi to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, with the request that it may kindly be placed before the Prime Minister urgently.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Pushkar Johari)

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SWI

Encl: As above.

cc Master
Ops

SECRET

6

SUBJECT

Text of letter dated July 14, 1984 from
the Prime Minister of India,
Shrimati Indira Gandhi to the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T123B/84

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message on your talks with President Jayawardene.

As you know, President Jayawardene stopped over in Delhi on his way back and we had detailed discussions with him and Minister Athulathmudali. In Washington and London the President is reported to have said that he was carrying some fresh proposals for a political solution of Sri Lanka's ethnic problem. He explained to us what he had in mind.

In essence the new scheme still focusses on the District Development Councils. Contiguous District Councils, within a province, which want to have a common executive could decide on a merger on the basis of a referendum in each district. After such a decision, the individual Executive Committees of these District Councils, would cease to exist and would be replaced by a common executive at the provincial level. The President made it clear that while there could be a common executive, the District Councils themselves would not merge but would continue as separate entities.

A second chamber of 50 members, consisting of two members elected by each District Council, would be constituted. The President could nominate provincial Ministers from this Chamber to form a common executive for those District Councils which decide to merge.

There are many loopholes in this scheme. For instance, the District Councils which decide to merge but continue to have their separate identities would have no executive powers. On the other hand the provincial Ministers would not be responsible to any legislature at the provincial level. When we sought clarification from the Sri Lankans regarding the role of the provincial Ministers, we were told that they would be responsible to the President. Moreover, if the unit of devolution continues to be the District Council, the powers transferred cannot be substantial. At the best the provincial Ministers can act only as coordinators.

Therefore, we stressed the need for a provincial legislature. President Jayawardene eventually agreed that some form of committee or council at the provincial level

be considered, but again he indicated that such a committee would consist only of members elected to the proposed second Chamber by District Councils within a province. Under this arrangement the largest provincial committee would only have ten members of whom three would be Ministers. The President's view was that even such an idea would have to emerge from discussions at the all parties conference and that the Sri Lankan Government itself would not take the initiative.

President Jayawardene suggested that we should discuss these ideas with the TULF leaders. This we have done. On our urging they have agreed to attend the deliberations of the conference later this month. However, they are still very pessimistic about the outcome since this scheme is much less in concept as well as in content than the proposals which President Jayawardene had agreed to in November 1983. The essence of the matter is that the Sri Lankan Government does not seem to be willing to concede any meaningful autonomy to the Tamils.

It is our assessment that some form of institutional mechanism at the provincial level, with substantial devolution of powers, could be a basis for discussion. This would form a via media between the TULF position that the Tamil majority northern and eastern provinces should be amalgamated into one region, and the government position that it cannot go beyond the district as a unit of devolution. Actually, councils at the provincial level have been proposed by the Christian and Moslem minority groups at the all parties conference. This idea would also have the support of the Lanka Sama Samaj party and the Communist party of Sri Lanka. All these are parties and groups which were invited to participate in the all parties conference called by the President.

As regards the Sri Lankan complaint about the activities of Sri Lankan refugees in our state of Tamil Nadu, we reaffirmed our support to Sri Lanka's unity and our firm opposition to all forms of violence. We assured them that within our constraints we are taking all steps to curb these activities.

The Sri Lankan government seems to be concentrating on security measures. In the absence of any meaningful political initiative, this is not likely to help in resolving the problem.

Your High Commission has informed us that Mr Athulathmudali is visiting the U.K. at his own request. Hence I thought I should keep you posted with the trend of discussions in New Delhi.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

INDIRA GANGHI

Sri Lanka relevs 5/75

PRIME MINISTER

New Delhi
July 14, 1984

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Your High Commission has informed us that Mr. Athulathmudali is visiting the U.K. at his own request. Hence I thought I should keep you posted with the trend of discussions in New Delhi.

With warm regards

Sincerely

Indira Gandhi

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
London.

CDP 5A
3/7

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~218 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/17

3rd July 1984

Dear Len

SRI LANKA

You kindly sent a copy to Richard Mottram here of your letter of 22nd June to Charles Powell, on the future of the UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement of 1947.

Although the Defence Secretary did not have an opportunity to see your letter, or the reply from No 10, before the meeting between the Prime Minister and President Jayewardene took place, the MOD does of course have a strong interest in this subject. As your letter pointed out there would be very severe practical difficulties in providing military help to Sri Lanka and the Defence Secretary therefore supports Sir Geoffrey Howe's view that it would be desirable to persuade the President that the 1947 Agreement should be regarded as essentially consultative.

He has noted that the matter will now come before OD, and our officials will no doubt be in touch over the preparation of a paper.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10).

Yours sincerely

SHLowe

(S H LOWE)

L V Appleyard Esq

Cc India relations Pt4

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T118/84

CONFIDENTIAL

29555 - 1

DD 301000Z NEW DELHI
GRS 800
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 301000Z
FM FCO 291630Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 483 OF 30 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY COLOMBO

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO MRS GANDHI'S LETTERS OF 9 AND 14 JUNE ABOUT SRI LANKA AND THE PUNJAB TROUBLES. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DELIVER TEXT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BEARING IN MIND MRS GANDHI'S FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE.

'THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 14 JUNE ABOUT THE PROBLEMS IN THE PUNJAB. THESE HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS WEEKS FOR YOU, INVOLVING DIFFICULT DECISIONS. I HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY YOUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE CALM THERE, AND I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE 'HEALING TOUCH' FOR WHICH YOU HAVE CALLED WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR THAT TROUBLED REGION. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FULLY SUPPORT INDIA'S UNITY.

'I WELL APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL SECURITY THREAT POSED BY EXTREMISTS OUTSIDE INDIA. WE ARE DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW OUR TRADITIONAL FREEDOMS TO BE ABUSED BY THOSE WHO SEEK TO USE VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS. I KNOW THAT CERTAIN REMARKS CARRIED BY THE MEDIA IN BRITAIN HAVE CAUSED DISTRESS IN INDIA. WE HAVE MADE SURE THE POLICE ARE AWARE OF THESE STATEMENTS, AND THEY ARE INVESTIGATING THEM. AS YOU KNOW, THE MEDIA ARE INDEPENDENT IN BRITAIN, AS THEY ARE IN INDIA. THIS MEANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTERVENE IN MEDIA DECISIONS, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY PERSONALLY REGRET THEM.

'I KNOW THAT YOU ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S PERSONNEL AND PREMISES IN THIS COUNTRY. WE FIRMLY INTEND TO FULFIL OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THEM. THE POLICE ARE DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES TO THIS TASK. THEY WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO NEED THE FULLEST CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE FROM YOUR PEOPLE.

'I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR LETTER OF 9 JUNE ABOUT SRI LANKA. THE SITUATION THERE REMAINS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. WHEN I SAW PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE ON 27 JUNE HE EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES HE FACES IN RECONCILING THE CONFLICTING CONCERNS OF THE SINHALESE MAJORITY AND THE TAMIL MINORITY, BUT SAID HE WAS REFLECTING ON FURTHER POSSIBLE PROPOSALS TO MEET THE TAMIL WISH FOR A GREATER DEGREE OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY. NO DOUBT HE WILL GIVE YOU A SIMILAR ACCOUNT WHEN HE PASSES THROUGH DELHI. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE IT WAS NOT FOR ME TO SUGGEST HOW HE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM, I THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO FIND WAYS TO RECONCILE TAMIL ASPIRATIONS WITH THOSE OF THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY, SO AS TO SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF ALL COMMUNITIES IN THE ISLAND: AN ISSUE ABOUT WHICH THERE IS MUCH PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC CONCERN HERE.

'THE PRESIDENT LAID GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE TERRORIST PROBLEM IN THE ISLAND. BUT AS MR ATHULATHMUDALI HAS SAID THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION TO THIS THROUGH MILITARY MEANS ALONE, AND THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT'S RECENT DECISION TO RELAX SOME OF THE MORE STRINGENT ASPECTS OF THEIR EMERGENCY REGULATIONS APPEARS TO REFLECT AWARENESS OF THIS.

'I AM SURE YOU ARE RIGHT TO COUNSEL THE GREATEST POSSIBLE RESTRAINT ON THE TAMIL EMIGRES IN INDIA. THIS WILL HELP TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTION IN VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL IF PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE IS TO PERSUADE THE SINHALESE COMMUNITY THAT CONCESSIONS MUST BE MADE TO THE TAMILS.

'I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE AGAIN, WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR LETTER, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE NOT PROVIDING ANY COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING IN SRI LANKA.

'FINALLY, I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW THAT I HAVE ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE TO ATTEND THE INAUGURATION OF THE VICTORIA DAM, FOR WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE AID FUNDS, IN SEPTEMBER. THIS WILL BE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY IN DUE COURSE.'

HOWE

INDIA - TERRORISM
LIMITED

SAD

MAED
SEC D
PUSD
PROTOCOL D
NEWS D
CONS D
CCD
MVD
NAD
COD
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File

bc: Sir P. Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 June 1984

SRI LANKA

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation, conveyed in your letter to me of 22 June, that President Jayewardene should be informed that, in the event of an external threat to Sri Lanka arising from inter-communal problems, the United Kingdom would not consider itself obliged to provide assistance under the 1974 UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement.

The Prime Minister has commented that it would not be right simply to abrogate an agreement unilaterally - which is what both the options set out in your letter would in practice amount to - without discussion.

This would mean that while the subject should be raised with President Jayewardene, the problems explained and he could be given an indication of our intentions, it would be right also to undertake to consider his views before reaching a definite conclusion.

I should be grateful if you would ensure that the briefing for the Prime Minister's discussion with President Jayewardene takes full account of her comment.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Not a very happy story: waiting until a commitment might be called before deciding to revoke it.

There is also the aspect of your visit. It won't exactly improve the atmosphere: though equally the visit might soften the blow.

We shall need to keep the situation in Sri Lanka under very careful scrutiny in the run-up to your visit.

CDP

CC PC

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

22 June 1984

Agree to tell President Jayewardene next week that we do not regard ourselves as bound by the 1947 Defence Agreement to provide assistance against an external threat?

CDP 22/6.

Dear Charles.

Sri Lanka

As you know, President Jayewardene of Sri Lanka will be visiting London from 23 to 29 June, and the Prime Minister will be hosting a dinner for him on 27 June preceded by talks. The Foreign Secretary thinks that the Prime Minister should be aware of the consideration we have given on a contingency basis to our response to a serious deterioration of the inter-communal situation in Sri Lanka, leading in the worst case to an Indian military intervention. There is also a particular operational problem which needs to be considered in advance, arising out of the continued existence in force of a UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement dating from 1947.

No - you can't just abrogate an agreement unilaterally without some discussion

Relations with the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka remain tense following the major outburst of inter-communal violence in July last year. The All-Party Conference, convened by President Jayewardene in January, following mediation by the Indian Government, has made little progress in reconciling the Tamil demand for greater regional autonomy with the reluctance of the Sinhalese majority to make concessions in the face of continued terrorist violence. Should the Conference collapse, there is a real risk that there will be a further major explosion of violence between the two communities. We have been giving consideration to the various contingencies which might arise. Our conclusions are set out in the enclosed paper.

The UK-Ceylon Defence Agreement of 1947, of which I enclose a copy, was concluded when Sri Lanka obtained independence. It provides that the two governments "will give each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide." Neither Government has ever invoked this provision of the Agreement. The underlined words represent a qualification to the undertaking since we remain the judges of our interests, though acting always in good faith. British troops left the island

/between

between 1957 and 1962 at the request of the Sri Lankan Government. In 1960 the Sri Lankan Prime Minister stated that the Agreement was still in existence and spoke in terms which did not limit the Agreement's duration to the time required for the final withdrawal of British troops. In July 1983, the Government of Sri Lanka made informal enquiries about a measure of military help from us. They did not refer to the Agreement but since it refers only to external aggression this was not necessarily significant. We were able to forestall a formal request emphasising that our military resources world-wide were under strain. In October 1983, the Sri Lankan Finance Minister mentioned the Agreement to our Ministers, but only in passing.

On 7 April this year, against the background of considerable public speculation in Sri Lanka about a possible Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka's communal problem, President Jayewardene referred publicly to the Agreement as follows: "That Agreement is still there. We did not abrogate it. Even today, if an enemy tries to attack us, Britain will help us". However, although the President referred to the Agreement when speaking in his own language, he did not mention it in a parallel speech in English on the same occasion. Nor did he mention it to our High Commissioner when they met for an hour the following day, although the President mentioned the possibility of Indian aggression against Sri Lanka. It is possible therefore that the President may have hoped, rather naively, to brandish the Agreement as a deterrent to the Indians without provoking any reaction from us. Following President Jayewardene's statement, we instructed our High Commissioner at Colombo to seek an interview with him on 10 April to make clear the constraints on our ability to provide assistance under the Agreement. President Jayewardene told Sir John Nicholas that he wished to assure the British Government that there would never be any question of Sri Lanka invoking the Defence Agreement.

However, in spite of these assurances, we cannot be certain that the Sri Lankans will not revert to the Agreement in a further crisis. This would be very awkward in view firstly of the enormous practical difficulties - both in terms of cost and logistics - in providing military help at a time when our resources are already fully stretched. Secondly any military involvement would be seen as taking sides with the governing Sinhalese majority in a dispute which has already aroused strong emotions in this country, in particular in Parliament and among the substantial Tamil community. It might also put us in direct confrontation with the Indian Government, who have frequently expressed the hope that we would not provide any form of security assistance to the Sri Lankan Government at a time of severe inter-communal

/tension;

tension; Mrs Gandhi's latest letter to the Prime Minister on this subject echoes the same thought.

Moreover, the Agreement is anachronistic. It is our only bilateral defence agreement still in being with an independent country (although we have confidential arrangements with Belize and Kenya) which is more than just a commitment to consult; although the phrase "as it may be in their mutual interest to provide" can be accurately interpreted only as meaning that we are not obliged to assist if we regard it as not in our interests to do so. Indeed, until President Jayewardene's recent reference to the Agreement, we had regarded it as effectively defunct. Since then, however, we have confirmed in answer to Parliamentary questions that the Agreement still exists.

Accordingly, there would seem to be every advantage in our taking an early opportunity to divest ourselves of the Agreement, or to make clear that we do not consider it places any mandatory obligations on us to respond to a Sri Lankan request for assistance. President Jayewardene's visit from 23-29 June provides us with such an opportunity. There are two basic options. We could tell President Jayewardene either:

(a) that we wished to terminate the Agreement; or

(b) that in the event of an external threat arising from inter-communal problems, we would not consider ourselves obliged to provide assistance under it, but were prepared for it to remain formally in existence for the time being on the understanding that henceforth it would be regarded as essentially consultative.

Neither of these options is ideal. Both involve some risk of souring our relations with Sri Lanka, which would undoubtedly interpret our action as an attempt to renege on a long-standing agreement, at just the time at which the Sri Lankans might have needed it. President Jayewardene might also charge us with displaying considerable insensitivity to the delicate situation in which he finds himself. On the other hand, we are bound to look very closely at the terms of an Agreement entered into 37 years ago, now that the chances have increased that the Sri Lankans might invoke it. President Jayewardene's visit represents the best opportunity to put the point to the Sri Lankans in a sympathetic way.

If our approach were to come public, it would be seen as a vote of no-confidence in the President and could expose him to further pressures, both internal and external. This risk

/would

would be particularly acute with the first option, since it would be impossible to conceal formal termination of the Agreement. The second option would be easier to keep confidential, but would lack the degree of formality provided by the first, unless an oral approach to President Jayewardene were followed up by a confidential written communication setting out our attitude to the Agreement.

On balance, the Foreign Secretary inclines to the second option. Knowledge of an oral exchange between the Prime Minister and President Jayewardene, followed up with a letter to the President or one of his close advisers, could be kept to a limited circle within the Sri Lankan Government and would thus be less likely to leak. It would of course be in the Sri Lankans' own interest to keep the matter confidential. It would also appear less of a formal rejection of our close and long-standing relationship with Sri Lanka than would abrogation.

Sir Geoffrey Howe therefore suggests that the Prime Minister should raise the matter with President Jayewardene during their talks on 27 June on the lines suggested above, emphasising that Parliamentary and public opinion in this country would render it impossible for us to respond to a request for military assistance in any circumstances arising directly from the inter-communal troubles in Sri Lanka. This might be followed up with a confidential letter to the President himself or to one of his advisers, recapitulating the points made orally by the Prime Minister. This exchange would serve to place on record our understanding of our undertakings under the Agreement and could be drawn on if in the future there were any public controversy about our commitments under the Agreement, necessitating a public clarification by the government.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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SRI LANKA: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

CONCLUSIONS

1. (i) In the event of a serious recurrent of inter-communal violence in Sri Lanka, even one leading to Indian military intervention, no major direct British interests are likely to be involved. Our interests in Sri Lanka are slight. On the other hand, we have major long-term interests in India. Furthermore, both countries are old friends and members of the Commonwealth and we have had fairly frequent discussions with both Governments about the problem, particularly over the past year.

(ii) We should avoid being drawn into the substance of the dispute because: firstly, it is intractable, with right and wrong on both sides; secondly, if we took sides against India we would place our major interests there at risk; and thirdly there would be conflicting parliamentary and public pressures reflecting the views of the rival communities in this country.

(iii) Our reasons for declining to provide limited military assistance to Sri Lanka in 1983 would remain valid. Furthermore, the provision of assistance at such a great distance would be expensive, would present major logistical problems, and would also be to the detriment of our defence commitments elsewhere. We should take early pre-emptive action to deter the Sri Lankans from invoking the 1947 Defence Agreement even at a time of desperation.

(iv) In a situation short of an overt Indian military intervention we should limit our actions to the sending of high-level messages urging restraint and the provision of humanitarian assistance as necessary. The objective should be to prevent an escalation.

(v) Even short of Indian intervention, there could be a role for the UN Secretary-General and/or the Commonwealth Secretary-General. We should propose that any action we took

/should

should be duplicated by the Ten who made a useful demarche in 1983.

(vi) If a direct Indian military intervention occurred we might need to go further. We should be prepared to put forward a draft UN resolution taking a balanced position between the two countries.

(vii) A prolonged Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka could lead to pressures for the aid programme to India to be used as a lever to bring about an Indian withdrawal and for military supplies to be cut off. There would be difficult decisions to take which cannot adequately be predetermined now. We should bear in mind our long term interests in India. Also that the Indian justification for intervening might have some validity.

BACKGROUND

2. The situation in Sri Lanka is precarious. In recent weeks tension has increased between the Tamil minority and Sinhala majority. So have incidents of Tamil terrorist attacks against the security forces. The kidnapping for ransom of an American couple, who were subsequently released, was an ugly new development. Considerable mutual suspicion exists between India and Sri Lanka. The Indians criticise the actions of the Sri Lankan security forces and (for example in Mrs Gandhi's recent message to the Prime Minister) place little faith in President Jayewardene's ability to control his extremists and push through a political solution. The Sri Lankans condemn Indian support for Tamil extremism which they consider was firmly established by the messages coming from Tamil Nadu which resolved the recent kidnapping and the equivocal role of the State Government.

3. The All-Party Conference reconvened in Colombo on 9 May and is due to remain in session at least until 1 June when its sub-committees will report back to the Conference plenary.

/However

However, it is unlikely to make any real progress on the central issue of regional autonomy and might collapse if the Tamils maintain their present refusal to participate in the work of the sub-committees.

4. The possibility of Indian military intervention in the event of a major outburst of violence was assessed in a JIC paper circulated in mid-April (not attached for ease of handling). Mrs Gandhi could come under great pressure from the 50 million Tamil community in South India to take action in support of Sri Lankan Tamils. With a general election in India imminent it is possible she might see some attraction in a brief and successful military operation. But a relatively small-scale military intervention, with the limited objective of securing the Jaffna peninsula on the tip of the island, would involve formidable risks and problems. Furthermore the international, political, logistic and financial costs of such an action would be very severe. These last factors would be likely to weigh heavily against any temptation to intervene overtly.

British Interests

5. British commercial interests in Sri Lanka are not large. The British community is small and concentrated in the south of the island well away from the troubled areas. Our relations with the Sri Lankan Government are good and they have occasionally proved helpful in international affairs, particularly over the Falklands.

6. A 1947 Defence Agreement between the UK and Sri Lanka
A (attached) is still valid although it has never been invoked by either side. It provides for the two Governments 'to give each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide'. However after President Jayewardene had referred publicly to the Treaty on 7 April 1984 Sir J Nicholas made it clear to President

/Jayewardene

Jayewardene on instructions that he should not assume that we would be able to provide military assistance under the Agreement. The President said that there would never be any question of Sri Lanka invoking the Agreement. But we cannot assume that the Sri Lankans would abide by this assurance if Indian intervention faced them with a desperate situation.

7. An informal request for assistance to maintain internal order was put to us in July 1983 at the height of the inter-communal troubles. The Sri Lankans enquired tentatively whether we would be prepared to provide Gurkha troops to assist with internal security duties. Ministers decided that we should refuse on the grounds that to send troops would embroil us directly in Sri Lankan internal affairs, expose us to Parliamentary criticism in the UK, and bring us into direct confrontation with the Indian Government. Accordingly we replied that our military resources world-wide were under strain and that the terms of our agreement with the Nepalese precluded our supplying Gurkha troops. We also turned down a request for transport facilities to ferry Tamil refugees from the Colombo area to relative safety in the north of the island; we pleaded practical difficulties and our desire to avoid direct involvement. In neither case did the Sri Lankans refer to the Defence Agreement.

8. Since any inter-communal violence in Sri Lanka and our reactions to it would have repercussions in India any response on our part needs to take account of our interests in India. Our commercial interests there are very substantial. It is a large and growing market for both commercial and defence sales. British exports in 1983 exceeded £800 million and since 1975 India has bought British defence equipment worth over £1.25 billion. Sales of defence equipment worth a further £1.6 billion are currently under discussion. Although the UK and India differ on many important international issues, it is a

/major

major Western interest to prevent India, which is by far the most important country in the region, from coming further under Soviet influence. On the Sri Lanka question the Indians have shown themselves to be extremely sensitive to inaccurate reports of our providing military assistance or training to the Sri Lankans. They are of course aware of the 1947 Defence Agreement.

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING OUR RESPONSE

9. These are as follows:

(a) Parliamentary and public pressure in this country. Tamils form the majority of the 26,000 strong Sri Lankan community in this country. Many are professional people. They are well-organised and vocal. A number of MPs from all parties have been sympathetic to their approaches. There is also a small number of MPs on the Left of the Labour Party who espouse their cause on the grounds of Marxist workers' solidarity. On the other hand, the Anglo-Sri Lankan Parliamentary Group is broadly supportive of the Sri Lankan Government (ie the Sinhalese); an all-party group of ten is due to visit Sri Lanka at the beginning of June. There would probably be general support for HMG providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of further inter-communal violence in Sri Lanka and exerting its influence to reduce tension both in Sri Lanka and between Sri Lanka and India.

(b) The Ten made a demarche to the Sri Lankan Government, at the suggestion of the French, at the time of the July 1983 riots. This proved a useful action to refer to subsequently in response to MPs' letters enquiring whether HMG had urged restraint on the Sri Lankan Government.

(c) We have kept in close touch with the US Government and should continue to do so. Apart from the Prime Minister, President Reagan was the only other recipient of a recent message from Mrs Gandhi. President

/Jayewardene

Jayewardene is due to visit Washington in June (calling in London on his way back) and will undoubtedly hope to extract some overt demonstration of American support in order to strengthen his hand. The Indians are apprehensive (without reason as far as we know) about the Americans seeking base facilities in Sri Lanka in exchange.

(d) The Soviet Union has not been directly involved. But President Jayewardene insinuated, not very convincingly, that there were communist influences behind last year's disturbances. If the Indians went to the length of intervening, the Russians would give them political support which they could then contrast with any even-handed or 'anti-Indian' response by the West. They would probably support India in any debate in the Security Council.

(e) Since the Commonwealth Secretary-General had discussions with President Jayewardene and Mrs Gandhi in the margins of the 1983 CHOGM an early opportunity should be taken to discuss our concern with him and sound out whether he would be prepared to take a more active role if the need arose.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY HMG

10. We list below three possible scenarios covering escalating violence and Indian responses together with a list of actions we might consider taking in each case. Our actual response would of course have to be decided in the light of circumstances at the time. The objective at each stage should be to prevent the situation deteriorating further in the direction of the next scenario. Under all three scenarios it would almost certainly be necessary to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees in Sri Lanka and possibly India; this would be financed in the first instance from the ODA's disaster relief funds but if the problem persisted separate arrangements might have to be made.

/(a)

(a) A major explosion of inter-communal violence similar to that in July 1983 precipitated by Tamil terrorist activity. There might be attacks on Tamil communities in the centre and south of the island and in Colombo, as well as action by the security forces in the north. There would also be large numbers of Tamil refugees fleeing both to the north of Sri Lanka and across the north into India. There would be a major need for humanitarian assistance.

Possible Actions

(i) In the unlikely event of our receiving intelligence that such an outbreak was imminent we should, if possible, intervene with the Sri Lankan Government and, if appropriate, the Indian Government to head it off.

(ii) Prime Minister should send a message to President Jayewardene urging him to use his best efforts to contain the violence: Parliament would be informed.

(iii) We should consult our EC partners with a view to a co-ordinated demarche to the Sri Lankan Government on similar lines to the Prime Minister's message to President Jayewardene.

(iv) We should follow up the recent exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and Mrs Gandhi with a further approach urging that India exercise restraint in any response it might contemplate.

(b) A major inter-communal outbreak of violence as in (a) above followed by a major increase in Tamil terrorist activity in the north. Tamil terrorists already in the island would be reinforced by para-military trained compatriots from India and possibly also by Indian Government para-military or military forces operating clandestinely out-of-uniform who would join the terrorists in guerilla activities in an attempt to push Sri Lankan Government forces out of the north of the island. Over time such action might take on the

/character

character of a popular Tamil rising against the Sinhala-dominated government.

Possible Actions

(i) Further stronger messages from the Prime Minister to President Jayewardene and Mrs Gandhi urging restraint; the message to Mrs Gandhi should reiterate the need to restrain Tamil extremists from operating in India.

(ii) A further joint demarche by the Ten both to Sri Lanka (if appropriate) and India.

(iii) Parliament to be informed that we were actively urging restraint on both sides and that the Prime Minister was in contact with President Jayewardene and Mrs Gandhi.

(iv) Discussion with Commonwealth Secretary-General on the possibility of his exercising a mediatory role between Sri Lanka and India depending on the outcome of the soundings referred to in paragraph 9(e) above.

(c) A major inter-communal outburst followed by overt Indian military intervention. This could be an invasion of brigade-size forces, which are to hand and could be deployed at short notice but would be risky unless rapidly reinforced. Or a larger scale invasion requiring considerable preparation which would be difficult to conceal. The Indian Government would almost certainly seek to justify such a move by asserting that their intervention was primarily to protect Tamils of Indian nationality, of whom there are many in Sri Lanka. The Indians might also point to the parallel of US intervention in Grenada and the reason given for it. If the intervention followed large scale killings of Tamils it might well attract some measure of public sympathy in Britain.

Possible Actions

(i) If, as would be probable, we obtained advance intelligence

/of

of India's intention to intervene, we should, if possible, approach the Indian Government bilaterally to persuade them to hold back, co-ordinating our action as necessary with the US and (less valuable and harder to organise quickly) our EC partners. Any Old Commonwealth countries in possession of the same intelligence should also be consulted with a view to similar intervention.

(ii) Once knowledge of the Indian intervention became public we should call publicly (eg in a Parliamentary statement) on the Indian Government to withdraw its forces, balancing this with a call on the Sri Lankan Government to restore law and order and to respect human rights.

(iii) We should propose that the Ten make a statement on parallel lines. In consultation with the Commonwealth Secretary-General we might also propose that selected Commonwealth countries (for example Jamaica, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Canada, New Zealand) should take action individually along similar lines.

(iv) Action at the UN. If we decide to raise the matter at the Security Council or it were raised by one of the parties (or another country on Sri Lanka's behalf) - bearing in mind that India is currently on the Security Council - we should be ready with a draft resolution (text attached) including a request for the Secretary-General to use his good offices. Such an approach to the Secretary-General might be appropriate even if the Security Council had not debated the question. There might be a role for an observer mission.

(v) India and Sri Lanka should be encouraged to explore other means of restoring peace and security, for example, some mediation mechanism involving the Non-Aligned Movement or South Asian Regional Co-operation (SARC).

/(vi)

(vi) We should take steps to pre-empt the Sri Lankans appealing to us for military assistance under the 1947 Defence Agreement by drawing their attention again to the provision in it that military assistance must be in the 'mutual interests' of the two Governments. In this way we would hope to avoid having to reject a formal Sri Lankan request for help (which would have to refer to the same provision). There is a strong case for taking such pre-emptive action with President Jayewardene at a high level when he visits London in June. (This is being considered separately).

(vii) If the Indian military presence in Sri Lanka became prolonged there could be pressure for the continuation of our bilateral aid programme to be used as a lever to get them out. This should be resisted since it would be ineffective with the Indians (who might have real problems in extricating themselves) and would do long term damage to our bilateral relations.

(viii) There might also be pressure for us to withhold supplies of defence equipment for India. If by then the general Memorandum of Understanding governing our supply of defence equipment to India had been signed it would be very difficult for us to impose an embargo. The existence of the MOU (which has been referred to in the press) could be given as the reason for our not doing so. Alternatively, particularly if it seemed that Indian intervention would be short term, we might be able to finesse the question by delaying certain key supplies on some technical pretext. If Indian intervention were prolonged and their pretext flimsy, we might be forced to consider an embargo. In doing so we should have to take account of the fact that such an action would do lasting damage to our prospects for selling defence equipment to India. We should therefore seek to ensure, if possible, that any embargo resulted from collective action either in the EC (difficult to achieve because of likely

/French

French eagerness to continue arms sales to India) or the Security Council (difficult with India at present on the Council and the Soviet Union likely to use their veto in India's interests).

DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The Security Council

Having considered the request .....

Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of the sovereign equality of all its members, peaceful settlement of disputes, abstention from the threat or use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;

1. Affirm that the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Sri Lanka must be fully respected;

2. Calls also for the early withdrawal of foreign forces and other elements, the cessation of all forms of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Sri Lanka, and the exercise of restraint by all parties;

3. Also calls on all parties to respect the human rights of the peoples of Sri Lanka;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the countries concerned, to keep the situation under review, and to use his good offices to seek the early withdrawal of foreign forces;

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by .....

6. Decides to remain seized of the question.

(2) B.

COLONIAL OFFICE

CEYLON

Proposals for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations

Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty
November 1947.

LONDON
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
ONE [illegible] NET

Cmd. 7257

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CEYLON

In a statement in Parliament on the 18th June, 1947, it was indicated that when Agreements on a number of subjects had been concluded on terms satisfactory to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Ceylon Government, steps would be taken to amend the Constitution so as to confer upon Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

2. Agreements (of which the texts appear in Appendices I, II and III of this paper) have now been concluded on the following matters of mutual concern:—

(*a*) Defence;

(*b*) External Affairs;

(*c*) certain matters affecting Public Officers.

3. The steps necessary to confer upon Ceylon the new status mentioned above are:—

(*a*) the enactment of an Act of Parliament on the lines of the Bill the text of which has now been published; and

(*b*) the amendment of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, so as to bring it into a form suitable for a fully self-governing member of the British Commonwealth.

4. The principal alterations proposed in the Order in Council are as follows:—

(*a*) in place of the Governor, there will be a Governor-General who, in the exercise of his powers and functions, will, generally speaking, act in accordance with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of similar powers and functions in the United Kingdom by His Majesty;

(*b*) the powers reserved to His Majesty to make laws for Ceylon in matters relating to Defence and External Affairs, and to amend and revoke the Order in Council, will be abolished;

(*c*) the provisions for the reservation of bills for His Majesty's pleasure will be revoked.

APPENDIX I.

UNITED KINGDOM—CEYLON

DEFENCE AGREEMENT

Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown;

And whereas it is in the mutual interest of Ceylon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the necessary measures should be taken for the effectual protection and defence of the territories of both and that the necessary facilities should be afforded for this purpose;

Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows:—

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The Government of the United Kingdom may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed.

(2) The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually agreed. These facilities will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities, and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said Forces as they exercise at present.

(3) The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of Ceylon with such military assistance as may from time to time be required towards the training and development of Ceylonese armed forces.

(4) The two Governments will establish such administrative machinery as they may agree to be desirable for the purpose of co-operation in regard to defence matters, and to co-ordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments.

(5) This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

Done in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

HENRY MOORE.

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

D. S. SENANAYAKE.

APPENDIX II.

UNITED KINGDOM—CEYLON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT

Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown;

And whereas the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ceylon are desirous of entering into an agreement to provide for certain matters relating to external affairs;

Therefore the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows:—

(1) The Government of Ceylon declares the readiness of Ceylon to adopt and follow the resolutions of past Imperial Conferences.

(2) In regard to external affairs generally, and in particular to the communication of information and consultation, the Government of the United Kingdom will, in relation to Ceylon observe the principles and practice now observed by the Members of the Commonwealth, and the Ceylon Government will for its part observe these same principles and practice.

(3) The Ceylon Government will be represented in London by a High Commissioner for Ceylon, and the Government of the United Kingdom will be represented in Colombo by a High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

(4) If the Government of Ceylon so requests, the Government of the United Kingdom will communicate to the Governments of the foreign countries with which Ceylon wishes to exchange diplomatic representatives proposals for such exchange. In any foreign country where Ceylon has no diplomatic representative the Government of the United Kingdom will, if so requested by the Government of Ceylon, arrange for its representatives to act on behalf of Ceylon.

(5) The Government of the United Kingdom will lend its full support to any application by Ceylon for membership of the United Nations, or of any specialised international agency as described in Article 57 of the United Nations Charter.

(6) All obligations and responsibilities heretofore devolving on the Government of the United Kingdom which arise from any valid international instrument shall henceforth insofar as such instrument may be held to have application to Ceylon devolve upon the Government of Ceylon. The reciprocal rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of the application of any such international instrument to Ceylon shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of Ceylon.

(7) This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

Done in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great [illegible] and Northern Ireland.

HENRY [illegible]

Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

D. S. [illegible]

APPENDIX III

UNITED KINGDOM—CEYLON

PUBLIC OFFICERS' AGREEMENT

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows:—

(1) In this Agreement:—

"officer" means a person holding office in the public service of Ceylon immediately before the appointed day, being an officer—

(*a*) who at any time before the 17th day of July, 1928, was appointed or selected for appointment to an office, appointment to which was subject to the approval of a Secretary of State, or who, before that day, had entered into an agreement with the Crown Agents for the Colonies to serve in any public office for a specified period; or

(*b*) who on or after the 17th day of July, 1928, has been or is appointed or selected for appointment (otherwise than on agreement for a specific period) to an office, appointment to which is subject to the approval of a Secretary of State; or

(*c*) who, on or after the 17th day of July, 1928, has entered or enters into an agreement with the Crown Agents for the Colonies to serve for a specific period in an office, appointment to which is not subject to the approval of a Secretary of State, and who, on the appointed day, either has been confirmed in a permanent and pensionable office or is a European member of the Police Force;

"the appointed day" means the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force;

"pension" includes a gratuity and other like allowance.

(2) An officer who continues on and after the appointed day to serve in Ceylon shall be entitled to receive from the Government of Ceylon the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of office, or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as he was entitled to immediately before the appointed day, and he shall be entitled to leave passages in accordance with the practice now followed; but he shall not be entitled to exemption from any general revision of salaries which the Government of Ceylon may find it necessary to make.

(3) Any officer who does not wish to continue to serve in Ceylon, being an officer described in paragraph (*a*) of the definition of "officer" in Clause 1, may retire from the service at any time; and in any other case may retire from the service within two years of the appointed day. On such retirement he shall be entitled to receive from the Government of Ceylon a compensatory pension in accordance with the special regulations made under Section 88 of the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, in force on the appointed day; but an officer who leaves the Ceylon service on transfer to the Public Service in any colony, protectorate or mandated or trust territory shall not be entitled to receive such a pension.

(4) Pensions which have been or may be granted to any persons who have been, and have ceased to be, in the public service of Ceylon at any time before the appointed day, or to the widows, children or dependants of such persons, shall be paid in accordance with the law under which they were granted, or if granted after that day, in accordance with the law in force on that day, or in either case in accordance with any law made thereafter which is not less favourable.

(5) The Government of Ceylon will comply with any reasonable request which may at any time be made by the Government of the United Kingdom for the release of a public officer for employment in the public service elsewhere.

(6) This agreement will take effect on the appointed day.

Done in duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947.

Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

HENRY MOORE.

Signed [illegible] Government of Ceylon.

D. S. SENANAYAKE.

File

089

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June 1984

LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA

I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister from Mrs. Gandhi, received today, in reply to the Prime Minister's own letter despatched in early May about the situation in Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister has not yet seen it. I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply. You will wish to consider in particular whether it would be better to despatch the reply before or after President Jayewardene's forthcoming visit.

BF

Charles Powell

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

File

085

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June 1984

Thank you for your letter of 13 June to John Coles with which you forwarded a letter from Mrs. Gandhi to the Prime Minister.

I will place this before Mrs. Thatcher at the earliest opportunity.

Charles Powell

Shri Pushkar Johari.

NR

Pushkar Johari
Acting High Commissioner

INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.

No. LON/POL/123/1/84 June 13, 1984

Dear Mr. Coles,

I am enclosing a sealed envelope containing a letter from the Prime Minister of India, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, to The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, with the request that it may kindly be forwarded to its high destination.

message dated 9/6/84

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Pushkar Johari)

Mr. A.J. Coles,
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW-1.

SUBJECT a master ofs

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T95A/84

PRIME MINISTER
INDIA

New Delhi,
June 9, 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

See ho letter of 30/4

Thank you for your letter which I received on the 3rd May. In many respects our appreciation of the situation in Sri Lanka is similar. We have to consider how best countries like ours can help the Sri Lankan Government to move forward in working out a political settlement.

Of course there are difficulties, but we should not lose sight of the basic issues to be resolved. When we discussed this problem in Goa, we had reasonable expectations of a political settlement. But subsequent developments have belied our hopes.

In my last letter I wrote of the course of the discussions at the All Parties Conference. Since then the Sri Lankan Minister for National Security has visited India at our initiative. We told him how urgent it was to avoid an atmosphere of confrontation between the communities as this could vitiate the political dialogue. We also urged the desirability of some visible progress in the talks. Mr. Athulathmudali agreed that the problem could not be resolved through military means and that a solution had to be found politically.

It is regrettable that all reports from Sri Lanka indicate that the Government there is not prepared to go much beyond the District Development Council schemes. Unless a measure of genuine autonomy is conceded to the Tamils, I am afraid there will be no solution.

....2

Today, there is a virtual deadlock at the Conference, and the army offensive in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is taking its toll of human lives. Hundreds have been arrested. As a result, moderate Tamil leaders are being increasingly pressurised to disassociate themselves from negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government. They have taken our advice, albeit reluctantly, to remain in the Conference. Continuing stalemate is making them lose credibility with their people, so that leadership of the Tamil movement will inevitably pass to the radical elements. This is dangerous.

It seems to us that Tamil militant activity is being fuelled by the failure so far of the Sri Lankan Government to offer a suitable political alternative to the Tamils. You may have noticed that so long as some prospect of an early solution at the All Parties Conference was in sight, there was a respite in the sort of incidents which we have witnessed of late. In all this we must not ignore the traumatic effect of last July's ethnic disturbances on the Tamil community.

Your letter urges restraint on Tamil expatriates and suggests that the Indian Government could help in this area. We are opposed to secessionism and have repeatedly affirmed our commitment to Sri Lanka's unity and integrity. We do not encourage or support any form of violence. The recent kidnapping of the Allens in Jaffna, which to everyone's great relief was successfully resolved, serves to illustrate our attitude.

Unfortunately, however, we find that the Sri Lankan Government has used this incident as a pretext to launch a campaign against us. Government leaders such as the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka have made such utterly irresponsible and astounding statements that they are creating a war psychosis. I am sure you have been informed of this motivated campaign which seems to us to be designed to jettison the peace process.

.....3

We are still burdened with more than 30,000 persons who have come to India from Sri Lanka since the ethnic violence there last July. They are apprehensive about their security and are afraid of returning to their own country. We have given them shelter on humanitarian grounds. They suffer from acute frustration and are not easy to deal with. Nevertheless we are doing all we can to counsel the utmost restraint. However, we do not see how this problem can be overcome unless the root causes of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka are resolved politically through the All Parties Conference.

This issue is bound to be discussed during President Jayewardene's visit to the United Kingdom. Britain occupies a special position in Sri Lanka. We realize it is not easy to exercise influence, beyond a point, on a sovereign nation. Nevertheless, we do feel that at this crucial juncture ethnic tensions will be aggravated and severe problems created not only for Sri Lanka but also for us unless meaningful progress is made soon.

We hope that you will use your influence to persuade President Jayewardene to give a positive lead by making constructive suggestions at the All Parties Conference. Military aid and anti-insurgency assistance are not enough to overcome a political crisis which has to be faced and resolved.

With warm regards,

Indira Gandhi

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1984

BF

Await letter F.C.O. advice

15/5

Dear David,

Sri Lanka

Thank you for your letter of 27 April enclosing a copy of a letter from President Jayewardene to the Prime Minister. The President customarily writes such a letter to heads of donor governments as a prelude to the annual meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group.

As you know (from my letter of 14 May) the President has now written inviting the Prime Minister to the commissioning of the Victoria Dam. We shall be letting you have advice on this very shortly and I therefore suggest that the attached draft is held until a decision has been taken and is then amended accordingly, since it would be odd for it to contain no reference to the President's invitation: I attach a draft which could form the basis of the reply in due course.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER

To:
HE Mr J R Jayewardene
President of Sri Lanka

Thank you for your letter of 10 April about the meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group which will take place in Paris on 21 June.

As your letter records, Sri Lanka has had to face difficult economic and political decisions during the past year, and it is helpful to us to have your account of the steps you have taken in response to these problems and the considerations that will guide your Government's policy in the years ahead.

For our part, as you know, we have responded during the past year to Sri Lanka's needs by increasing our support for the Victoria project, and I was glad to note that it has continued to progress well. We are also naturally pleased that a consortium of British firms was successful in winning the contract for Colombo Airport utilities.

My Government looks forward to participating in next month's Aid Group Meeting. Our aid programme continues to be constrained by our tight control on public spending, but I can assure you that we shall look for opportunities of continuing to support Sri Lanka's economic development within the resources at our disposal. For this purpose we should like to send a team of people to Sri Lanka later this year to discuss with your officials potential future projects in sectors which we both regard as important.

You wrote also of the present ethnic problems in Sri Lanka. We share your concern to see peace and stability restored in Sri Lanka, and strongly support your efforts to achieve this. As our High Commissioner, Sir John Nicholas, has recently mentioned to you, we hope that progress can be made at the all-party conference which is meeting again this month. We believe that all the communities will need to show understanding of each others' concerns if a peaceful and democratic solution is to be achieved.

CC PK

Victoria Dam

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 May, 1984

Await further F/C.O advice.

AR 14/5.

Dear John,

Sri Lanka

I enclose a letter dated 23/4 from President Jayewardene of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister, in which he invites her and Mr Thatcher to attend the commissioning of the Victoria Dam. This project is a major example of British engineering skills and has been funded from our aid programme to the tune of £113 million. President Jayewardene suggests that the ceremony might be held in the last week of September or in the first half of October on dates convenient to the Prime Minister.

We shall let you have advice shortly on this proposal, and on how a visit by the Prime Minister to Sri Lanka might be fitted into a programme of overseas visits in the latter half of September.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 May 1984

Sri Lanka

Thank you for your letter of 30 April. The Prime Minister agrees with the telegrams containing a reply from herself to Mrs Gandhi's letter of 4 April and instructions to the High Commissioners in New Delhi and Colombo.

BF for copies of final version

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

3

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 April 1984

Prime Minister:
Agree this response to Mrs Gandhi and the telegrams of instruction?
30/4

Dear John,

Sri Lanka

Your letter of 11 April asked for a draft reply from the Prime Minister to a letter from Mrs Gandhi which she received through the High Commission.

It is not entirely clear what is the point of Mrs Gandhi's letter, which on the face of it goes into the affairs of another country in rather surprising detail. A similar letter has gone to President Reagan who, to our knowledge, is the only other world leader to have been approached. The Americans have even considered the possibility that the letters might be intended to provide some prior justification for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and detect a similarity with the letters Mrs Gandhi circulated (far more widely) just before the Indian invasion of Bangladesh in 1971; however they have stopped short of concluding that the parallel is entirely valid. Our own view is that an Indian invasion is unlikely in view of the international political consequences, the financial costs and the logistic difficulties involved.

Mrs Gandhi's categorical assurance that Tamil extremists are not being trained or armed in India is somewhat disingenuous. You will be aware from the JIC Assessment of recent developments in Sri Lanka dated 12 April (Part III of the Weekly Survey on Intelligence) that inter-communal tension in Sri Lanka is increasing rapidly following an upsurge in the activity of Tamil terrorists. Many of these are from South India and there is now clear evidence from secret sources as well as a number of press reports that Tamil emigres in India are receiving para-military training. Although the Indian Government have denied that this is happening, it is hard to believe that Indian Ministers, particularly Mrs Gandhi, are unaware at least in general terms that the Indian intelligence agencies are supporting Tamil terrorist groups. The Indian attitude is particularly hard to take in the light of the difficulty encountered by Lady Young during her visit to Delhi last month in getting the Indians to accept our denials that the SAS were involved in training the Sri Lankan army.

/Mrs Gandhi

Mrs Gandhi is nevertheless right in pointing out that the situation in Sri Lanka is very serious. The straightforward explanation for her letter - which we think is probably the right one - is that the Indians consider that we and the Americans have some influence over President Jayewardene and that now is the time we should use it to get him to exert his authority to make the All-Party Conference (APC) succeeds, on the basis of granting the Tamils a greater measure of regional autonomy. So far the Conference has made little progress and the prospects of success when it reconvenes in early May are slender. But it is certain that these negotiations stand no chance if Tamil terrorist violence continues to increase, reinforcing in turn the intransigent elements in the majority Sinhala community. Since only the Indian Government has the capability to control and limit the activities of the Tamils we consider there is a strong case for using the opportunity provided by Mrs Gandhi's letter to urge the Indian Government to do what it can in this respect.

Our conclusion is that our approach should be even-handed between India and Sri Lanka and we should avoid being drawn into the details of the dispute and the counter-claims made by either side. As regards India, the Prime Minister's reply should confirm our readiness to urge President Jayewardene once again to work for progress at the reconvened APC but it should not address the specific point made by Mrs Gandhi about the need to persuade him to go beyond the District Development Council scheme. It is in any case not our business to press any particular institutional proposal on the Sri Lankans. To balance this the reply should make a general reference to the importance of tackling the terrorist problem and our High Commissioner should be instructed to elaborate on this point orally when delivering the message. As regards the Sri Lankans, our High Commissioner in Colombo should be instructed to tell President Jayewardene of our concern at the dangers of the present situation and the prime importance of the APC making progress when it reconvenes; for this to be possible both communities will have to make concessions.

I enclose draft telegrams containing a reply to to Mrs Gandhi's letter (in which we have included a cross reference to the Prime Minister's recent exchange of messages with Mrs Gandhi about the Libyan crisis), and instructions to Sir R Wade-Gery in New Delhi and Sir J Nicholas in Colombo.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER
OF
RFI IMMEDIATE COLOMBO, WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNOS 314 AND 320 AND COLOMBO TELNO 132: INDIA/SRI LANKA

1. We would be grateful if you would deliver the letter in MIFT from the Prime Minister to Mrs Gandhi. We would have no objection to your handing it to Alexander, which might indeed be most appropriate.

2. We find the categorical assurance in Mrs Gandhi's letter that Tamil extremists are not being trained or armed in India a little hard to take in the light of all the evidence to the contrary as well as the Indians' strong reluctance to accept our own repeated denials of SAS involvement in Sri Lanka. We therefore think it important not to let the Indians believe that we go along with their one-sided analysis of the problem in Sri Lanka and the measures needed to resolve it. Our main consideration however must be to avoid getting caught in the crossfire between India and Sri Lanka on this intractable problem and to follow an even-handed policy.

3. Ministers have therefore decided that the right course is for the reply to Mrs Gandhi's letter to confirm our readiness to urge President Jayewardene to work for progress at the reconvened all-party conference but without addressing directly Mrs Gandhi's point about the need to persuade him to go beyond

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		Catchword: the District	
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the District Development Council scheme. We agree with Sir J Nicholas that it is not our business to press any particular institutional proposal on the Sri Lankans. We are sending him separate instructions for speaking to President Jayewardene.

4. At the same time we should like you to follow up orally the balancing reference to the terrorist problem in the Prime Minister's reply to Mrs Gandhi. In spite of Parthasarathy's account to you of Athulathmudali's visit we tend to doubt whether the Sri Lankans will really have accepted the Indians' claimed inability to control the Tamil extremists. We realise that the point will have to be put over with great care in order to avoid giving the Indians the impression that we disbelieve Mrs Gandhi's assurances which would clearly give great offence. You have discretion to put across the burden of the message as you think best, but we suggest something along the following lines:

We welcomed Mrs Gandhi's clear statement that Tamil militants are not being trained in India. We are however concerned at persistent reports that Tamil extremists are crossing into Sri Lanka from India and move freely in South India. We believe President Jayewardene is genuinely seeking a political solution in Sri Lanka acceptable to both communities. However his ability to convince the hardliners in the Sinhala majority will diminish as terrorist violence increases. We accept that the Sri Lankan Government must play its part in this by ensuring restraint by its security forces in the North of the island. But if the resumed APC is to have any chance of success terrorist activity must be curtailed. We hope that the Indian Government will exercise whatever influence it may have with the Tamil ex-patriate community to urge it in the direction of moderation and to make the movement of extremists into Sri Lanka as hard as possible. We for our part will urge on the Sri Lankan

Classification and Caveats		Page
CONFIDENTIAL		3

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Government the need both for a solution satisfactory to both communities and for positive movement when the all-party conference reconvenes. We make these points as a friend of both countries and without any wish to interfere.

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TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER

RFI IMMEDIATE COLOMBO, WASHINGTON
MIPT: LETTER TO MRS GANDHI FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
Following is text:
BEGINS: Thank you for your recent letter conveyed on 11 April through your High Commission in London. I share your concern about the situation in Sri Lanka, which we discussed when we met during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting last November. I was grateful therefore for this further clear and detailed exposition of your views.

I fully agree with you that it is essential to maintain a united Sri Lanka and therefore to achieve a political settlement acceptable to all the communities in Sri Lanka. Without such a solution violence betwen the communities is certain to continue and could, as you suggest, lead to a repetition of the horrifying events of last summer.

I am sure that President Jayewardene, with whom we keep in close contact, is well aware of the importance we place on an equitable solution. I believe that he is fully conscious of the /// need to make progress towards this, particularly in the all-party // conference which will meet again early in May. I very much / hope that these negotiations will succeed and will continue to let President Jayewardene know of the importance we place upon

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Classification and Caveats		Page
CONFIDENTIAL		2

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his efforts. I am therefore instructing our High Commissioner in Colombo to seek an early meeting with the President to reiterate our concern.

It is clear, however, that President Jayewardene's task is complicated by the terrorist violence in the North of the island. It would certainly make it easier for him to convince the majority Sinhala community to accept the desirability of making concessions to the Tamil majority if he could point to a reduction in terrorist activities. I think it important therefore that all concerned should urge restraint on the more extreme elements among the Tamil ex-patriates. I am sure this is an area in which the Indian Government could help, building upon the extremely constructive role played by your special representative Mr Parthasarathy.

At this troubled time the greatest need is for restraint by all parties so that the Sri Lankans themselves can work out a solution to their problems peacefully and democratically.

I hope we can continue to keep in touch on this important and urgent issue.

I should also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your thoughtful message of 21 April about the incident at the Libyan People's Bureau in London and for the helpful way in which your officials have spoken to the Libyans. We have since arranged the departure of the Libyans from London in strict accordance with the Vienna Convention. We shall of course continue to act in accordance with the Convention and have no wish to exacerbate the present difficult situation. We expect the Libyans to exercise similar restraint and in particular to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety at British citizens in Libya.

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Agreed ms

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TO IMMEDIATE COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER

RFI IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON

FCO TELNO TO NEW DELHI: INDIA/SRI LANKA

1. We would be grateful if you would seek an early opportunity to speak to President Jayewardene.

2. You should say that we sympathise with his efforts to grapple with the present immensely difficult internal problem, in particular the growth of terrorist violence in the north. We hope that this will not impede progress at the all-party conference when it reconvenes in May. We share the President's concern to see peace and stability restored. We believe that for this to be possible both communities must be prevailed upon to make concessions. We would not presume to suggest how this might be achieved, but consider that the minority will only be weaned from their increasing resort to violence by guarantees for their security and self-respect. At this time the greatest need is for restraint by all parties - a point we are also making to the Indian Government - so that Sri Lankans can themselves achieve a peaceful and democratic solution.

/// 3. We hope that this hint that we are also speaking to the
// Indians will help you to convey the necessary message.

/ HOWE

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Private Office

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SRI LANKA : Relations
May 79

File (BF 30 9) BH 11/5 DSG

CF

27 April 1984

,I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka which was received in this office on 26 April.

I should be grateful if you would provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach this office by Friday, 11 May.

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

DSG

27 April 1984

Thank you for your letter of 25 April to my colleague John Coles, who is away from the office this week.

I shall place the President's letter before the Prime Minister immediately.

David Barclay

His Excellency Mr. A. T. Moorthy.

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

25 April 1984

Dear John

I enclose herewith a letter addressed to The Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister by H.E. J. R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

The letter relates to the forthcoming 20th Meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group, which will be held in Paris on the 21st of June, 1984.

I should be grateful if you would kindly submit the letter to the Prime Minister as early as possible.

I would also be thankful to have your confirmation, in due course, when this has been done.

All good wishes and warm regards

Yours sincerely

(A. T. Moorthy)

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

SRI LANKA: Relations : May 79
MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T64AA/84.

President of Sri Lanka

25th April 1984.

My dear Prime Minister,

I am happy to inform you that the Victoria Project is now nearing completion. I take great pleasure in extending an invitation to you to visit Sri Lanka to commission this Project.

The Victoria Project has been made possible by the generous grant given by the U.K. Government. Its completion within the short period of four years is a tribute to the expertise and engineering skills made available from Britain. The Government and people of Sri Lanka are most appreciative of your country's signal contribution to this Project, symbolising as it does the close friendship between our two countries.

The Project will generate 210 megawatts of power, which is almost half the total power now generated in Sri Lanka. It will also provide irrigation to about 150,000 acres of land and will settle about 60,000 families.

The Victoria Project will be a landmark in the economic development of Sri Lanka. It will therefore be fitting if you could commission this Project, which will be a monument to the generous assistance and technical skills of your country.

I sincerely hope that you and your husband will find it possible to visit Sri Lanka for the commissioning of this Project. Dates in the last week of September or in the first half of October this year, which are convenient to you, will be acceptable to us.

My wife and I look forward to receiving you both in Sri Lanka and assure you of a very warm welcome.

Yours sincerely,

J R Jayewardene

(J. R. Jayewardene)
PRESIDENT

The Rt.Hon.Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
LONDON

File

DSG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 April 1984

Thank you for your letter of 18 April to my colleague, Mr. Coles, with which you enclosed a signed letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of India.

Mrs. Thatcher is presently in Portugal, but I will place your Prime Minister's letter before her immediately upon her return.

David Barclay

Shri Pushkar Johari.

Pushkar Johari
Deputy High Commissioner

सत्यमेव जयते

TELEPHONE: 01-836 8484 EXT.....
TELEGRAMS: HICOMIND, LONDON, W.C.2.

CONFIDENTIAL
BY HAND

भारत का हाई कमीशन
लन्दन
THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA,
.....DEPARTMENT,
INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON WC2B 4NA

No.283 /DHC/S/84 April 18, 1984

Dear Mr. Coles,

Please refer to my letter No. 267/DHC/S/84 dated April 11, 1984 regarding a message from Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India to The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I am enclosing the signed letter in a sealed cover with the request that this may kindly be forwarded immediately to its high destination.

With regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Pushkar Johari)

Mr. A.J. Coles,
Private Secretary to P.M.
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Encl: as above

RESTRICTED

MJ

cc Sir P Bradock

File

11 April 1984

Sri Lanka

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from the Deputy High Commissioner of India. This contains the text of a message from Mrs. Gandhi to the Prime Minister.about the situation in Sri Lanka. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

BF

AJC

Peter Ricketts Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

MJ

cc Sir P Cradock

File

11 April 1984

Thank you for your letter of 11 April enclosing the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of India. I shall convey this to Mrs. Thatcher.

A. J. COLES

Shri Pushkar Johari

SUBJECT

cc Ops Master

cc P.C

CONFIDENTIAL
BY HAND

भारत का हाई कमीशन
लन्दन

Pushkar Johari
Deputy High Commissioner

THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA,
.....DEPARTMENT,
INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON WC2B 4NA

सत्यमेव जयते

TELEPHONE: 01-836 8484 EXT.....
TELEGRAMS: HICOMIND, LONDON, W.C.2.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T58/84

No.267 /DHC/S/84 April 11, 1984

See also the attached.

Dear Mr. Coles,

I shall be grateful if the following message from Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India to The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and the Minister for the Civil Service, of the United Kingdom is transmitted to its high destination:-

BEGINS.

My dear Prime Minister,

In Goa we spoke of the situation in Sri Lanka. You had commended our efforts to promote a political settlement and communal harmony. Since then we have also had talks with Lady Young, your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs during her visit to New Delhi last month.

As you know my special envoy has had discussions over several months with President Jayewardene, and separately with leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front. On the basis of these discussions a paper was prepared setting out the common ground between the position of the Sri Lankan President and that of the Tamil Party. This paper contained specific proposals, and was finalised when President Jayewardene was in New Delhi for the CHOGM conference last November. The proposals envisaged the setting up of regional councils through direct elections.

...2/-

Substantial powers were to devolve upon these councils so that the Tamils could be responsible for the government in their own area. At the same time the unitary framework of Sri Lanka and the powers of the central government would be preserved. This would have satisfied the concerns of both the Sinhala and Tamil communities. These proposals were to be discussed at a conference of all political parties.

President Jayewardene convened an all parties conference in January this year. We welcomed this step in the hope that it would lead to a viable political settlement. However, we find that no serious effort has been made by the Sri Lankan government to use this conference to try for a lasting solution of the Tamil problem. On the contrary, after months of desultory discussions, the ruling party has put forward a proposal which, in some respects, offers even less than the district development council scheme which was in existence prior to the ethnic violence in July last year. The district development councils have functioned in actual practice as local advisory committees since they have neither legislative, executive or financial powers, nor is the unit of administration large enough to be viable. The TULF has repeatedly stressed the inadequacy of this scheme for fulfilling the aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Failure to make progress in the political dialogue has led to mounting ethnic tensions, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces. At the same time a series of measures have been undertaken by the government and a major security offensive is being launched in these two provinces. Innocent people have been killed and bitterness and hatred between the two communities are growing.

...3/-

This is bound to lead to an ever-escalating spiral of violence, and counter-violence on the part of Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan armed forces, and may well trigger another communal holocaust.

There are allegations in Sri Lanka that Tamil militants are being trained in India. These are totally false. We have conducted investigations and there is absolutely no evidence of caches of arms or any training camps. It is, unfortunately, true that over 30,000 persons have sought refuge in India since July 1983 and more continue to come. The very presence of such a large number of displaced persons in India can create conditions of instability and turmoil, specially as the failure to reach a viable political settlement is adding to their frustration. We have no desire to keep these people in India and we would be relieved if some political settlement could be worked out so that they return to Sri Lanka to live in security and honour.

We have affirmed again and again that we are for a united Sri Lanka, that we are against secessionism and all forms of violence. However, developments in Sri Lanka do affect us because of the close ties of history and kinship between the Tamil peoples of India and Sri Lanka. We are also seriously concerned at the prospect of a large scale influx of refugees which will certainly result from continued disturbances there. Thus, we have a special interest in the restoration of stability and national harmony and you can appreciate our concern over recent developments.

The escalating situation in Sri Lanka calls for immediate action and it would be good if you could

...4/-

use your great influence to persuade President Jayewardene to make a serious effort to go beyond the district development council scheme and to reach an agreement which would be acceptable to all communities. We believe that the proposals worked out in New Delhi between President Jayewardene and the Tamil United Liberation Front through our good offices provide a basis for such an agreement.

I should like to mention to you that it was with considerable difficulty that we could persuade the Tamil United Liberation Front to give up its demand for separation if a viable political alternative could be worked out.

The situation in Sri Lanka is very tense and unless early steps are taken to pursue negotiations with seriousness it may well get out of control. If this happens it would be very difficult to contain reactions in India.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(Indira Gandhi)

ENDS.

The signed letter from my Prime Minister is being despatched from India and I shall forward it to you as soon as I receive it.

With regards.

Yours sincerely,

(Pushkar Johari)

Mr. A.J. Coles,
Private Secretary to P.M.
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T58/84

PRIME MINISTER
INDIA

cc Master
OPS

New Delhi
April 4, 1984

My dear Prime Minister,

In Goa we spoke of the situation in Sri Lanka. You had commended our efforts to promote a political settlement and communal harmony. Since then we have also had talks with Lady Young, your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs during her visit to New Delhi last month.

As you know my Special Envoy has had discussions over several months with President Jayewardene, and separately with leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front. On the basis of these discussions a paper was prepared setting out the common ground between the position of the Sri Lankan President and that of the Tamil Party. This paper contained specific proposals, and was finalised when President Jayewardene was in New Delhi for the CHOGM Conference last November. The proposals envisaged the setting up of Regional Councils through direct elections. Substantial powers were to devolve upon these Councils so that the Tamils could be responsible for the government in their own area. At the same time the unitary framework of Sri Lanka and the powers of the Central Government

.....2

would be preserved. This would have satisfied the concerns of both the Sinhala and Tamil communities. These proposals were to be discussed at a conference of all political parties.

President Jayewardene convened an All Parties Conference in January this year. We welcomed this step in the hope that it would lead to a viable political settlement. However, we find that no serious effort has been made by the Sri Lankan Government to use this conference to try for a lasting solution of the Tamil problem. On the contrary, after months of desultory discussions, the ruling party has put forward a proposal which, in some respects, offers even less than the District Development Council scheme which was in existence prior to the ethnic violence in July last year. The District Development Councils have functioned in actual practice as local advisory committees since they have neither legislative, executive or financial powers, nor is the unit of administration large enough to be viable. The TULF has repeatedly stressed the inadequacy of this scheme for fulfilling the aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Failure to make progress in the political dialogue has led to mounting ethnic tensions, particularly

in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. At the same time a series of measures have been undertaken by the Government and a major security offensive is being launched in these two Provinces. Innocent people have been killed and bitterness and hatred between the two communities are growing. This is bound to lead to an ever-escalating spiral of violence, and counter-violence on the part of Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan armed forces, and may well trigger another communal holocaust.

There are allegations in Sri Lanka that Tamil militants are being trained in India. These are totally false. We have conducted investigations and there is absolutely no evidence of caches of arms or any training camps. It is, unfortunately, true that over 30,000 persons have sought refuge in India since July 1983 and more continue to come. The very presence of such a large number of displaced persons in India can create conditions of instability and turmoil, specially as the failure to reach a viable political settlement is adding to their frustration. We have no desire to keep these people in India and we would be relieved if some political settlement could be worked out so that they return to Sri Lanka to live in security and honour.

...4

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The escalating situation in Sri Lanka calls for immediate action and it would be good if you could use your great influence to persuade President Jayewardene to make a serious effort to go beyond the District Development Council scheme and to reach an agreement which would be acceptable to all communities. We believe that the proposals worked out in New Delhi between President Jayewardene and the Tamil United Liberation Front through our good offices provide a basis for such an agreement.

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...5

The situation in Sri Lanka is very tense and unless early steps are taken to pursue negotiations with seriousness it may well get out of control. If this happens it would be very difficult to contain reactions in India.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Indira Gandhi

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
London.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S PC
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: TS7A184

President of Sri Lanka

10 April 1984

My dear Prime Minister,

The 20th meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group will be held in Paris on the 21st of June this year. I would like to thank you and your Government for the special interest you have shown in our development programmes in the past and the very generous assistance you have provided in support of these programmes. The intention of this letter is to keep you personally informed of the impact of recent economic trends on our development strategy and our external assistance needs. I hope that this will help you to formulate your Development Assistance Programme to Sri Lanka in the light of our present needs.

Sri Lanka's economy continued to be under pressure from large deficits in the balance of payments. Inflationary trends worsened in 1983 and the external debt increased. We responded to these developments by means of a series of stabilisation measures which were intended to reverse these trends. I do not wish to enumerate in detail the measures which were taken by us since these documents already available would describe the measures taken. 1983 was not a particularly happy year as far as we are concerned. Our economy expanded by around 4.9 per cent as against the previous year's growth rate of 5.1 per cent. The two major contributory factors were the reduction in agricultural production and processing as a result of the prolonged drought that prevailed in the first half of that year and even continued into the 3rd quarter in certain areas and the unfortunate dislocation of the economy caused by the

/ethnic dis.....

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, PC., MP.,
Prime Minister,
London.

ethnic disturbances in July, 1983. As a result of the massive development programme undertaken by this Government in 1977, major expenditures on development began to peak in 1982 and continued to do so in 1983. In order to prevent further deterioration of this situation, the Government decided that no new development projects should be started in 1984 and it is the intention of my Gobernment that this period be treated as a period of consolidation.

On the political front, we could seek to restore political stability and strive to find a reasonable solution to the ethnic problems which surfaced in July last year in order that there would be no recurrence of much events and that all communities in this country could lead a life of amity and peace.

In the years to come we would be giving high priority to projects that conform to the following guidelines:-

1. Quick-yielding production oriented projects.
2. Export-oriented and efficient import substitution projects that would improve the balance of payments.
3. Essential infra-structure needs in power, irrigation, transport and communications, and
4. Provision of basic needs and improvement of the nutritional standards of the people.

The key area in the export sector is still the plantation sector. The performance of this sector in recent times has been unsatisfactory. Production in tea, rubber and coconut has been sluggish over the past few years and there has been a considerable decline from the production levels of the 1960's. Insufficient investment on re-planting maintenance costs and inadequate liquidity have been the major contributory factors. There is an over-riding need to rehabilitate the plantation sector in view of its present and potential contribution to export earnings. It is with this idea in mind that we have prepared a medium-term investment programme for the State-owned plantations managed by two Government Corporations. These plantations account for around 70 per cent of the tea production and

/30 per cent....

30 per cent of the rubber production of the country. This project will be treated as one of the lead projects in the next few years and we would welcome assistance in order to enable us to successfully implement this project. A brief summary of this project was made available to the donor community at last year's Aid Group meeting and this year we would be providing further details. In fact, a team from the World Bank has already assessed the feasibility of this project and it is hoped that we would be able to launch it by the beginning of 1985.

It was felt that we would achieve self-sufficiency in our staple food, namely, rice, last year, but, unfortunately the severe drought which prevailed in the rice-producing areas thwarted our efforts. Taken as a whole, however, the increase in agricultural production, especially rice, has been one of the success stories of the period after 1977.

Over the past few years the Government has had to take some difficult policy decisions, but we are most anxious that these decisions sould not, in any way, reduce the physical quality of life enjoyed by our people. It is our intention that these levels be at least maintained, if not enhanced, in the years to come. To make this possible, I must once again urge donor countries such as yours, who have been most generous to us in the past, to assist us in overcoming the difficulties which we are confronted with at the moment. In particular, I would urge you to consider increasing your support to on-going projects, some of which are now under-financed due to cost overruns. In view of the fact that Government will not undertake any new projects in 1984 and will be only able to accommodate a few in 1985, you may also consider increases in quick-disbursing Food and Commodity Aid.

With my warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J.R. JAYEWARDENE
President of Sri Lanka.

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h-a.

Memorandum submitted to the Commonwealth Heads of Governments

Respected delegates of CHOGM, H.E. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,

The Eelam people's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) would like to draw the attention of the Commonwealth leaders the plight of 3.7 million Tamil speaking people in the Island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in the hands of the Sinhala Chauvinists, and the Tamil people's desire and aspirations for self determination, an inalienable right. Since the Tamil speaking people were put into this situation at or soon after independence, the Commonwealth and especially Britain has a special responsibility to restore to the Tamil people their due right.

Before the advent of colonial rule in the Island, as observed by the European rulers and the Sinhalese leaders, Tamils constituted a separate and identifiable nation. Even as late as 1920, they observed the existence of two major communities viz. Sinhalese and Tamils inhabiting clearly defined territories. Nearly one third of the land-mass, mainly in the Northern and Eastern parts of the Island is the traditional homeland of the Tamil people, called the Eelam nation. Administration of the Island was separate untill 1833 when the British colonial rulers brought the two communities together for administrative purposes.

When the British granted the Island dominian Status in 1948, Tamils in good faith accepted the unitary framework and made proposals to safeguard the rights of Tamils (these were rejected) with the understanding that there would be a true partnership for the betterment of both communities. Their fears were vindicated within a few months of independence, when over a million Tamil people were rendered stateless and disenfranchised. At the same time a sinister colonisation policy was pursued with the only objective of making the Tamil areas Sinhalese majority areas. From 1948 onwards the oppression by the Sinhala chauvinists escalated resulting in the loss of basic human rights of Tamils and culminating in military occupation of the Tamil areas and periodic racial pogroms.

To mention a few,

- ★ About 3,000 sq. miles (1/3 of the Eelam Territory) has been colonised with Sinhalese settlers, thus attempting to deprive the Tamils of their territorial integrity. These settlements have been the launching pads for several of the pogroms.
- ★ Over a million people were made Stateless and their franchise withdrawn.
- ★ Sinhala has been made the only official language.
- ★ Buddhism has been made the state religion, when all the Tamil speaking people profess the Hindu, [redacted] or Christian faiths.

★ Opportunities in the fields of education, employment and development etc., were denied.

★ Pogroms have become an annual event and the harrasment by the State armed forces is a daily experience.

★ Each pogrom resulted in the loss of properties belonging to the Tamils worth several billions of rupees, thus destroying the economic base of the Tamils.

In short over the last 3½ decades Tamils have been subjected to gross humiliation and made second class citizens. What was conceived as a partnership has in reality turned out to be a relationship of the oppressed and the oppressor. Tamils have been portrayed as the enemy of the Sinhalese people, and told that they have no right to be in the Island. In schools and in the media a vicious anti-Tamil and anti-Indian stance was promoted. From independence and particularly from 1956 onwards communalism has been politically institutionalised. Sinhala Chauvinist leadership found in the Tamil people a scapegoat for all political and economic ills. Thus all sections of the sinhala body politic capitulated to go one up on the other party on the question of being pro-Sinhala.

Meanwhile the Tamil leadership, eventhough having reservations on the independent constitution put forward various demands to solve the Tamil problem, first under the concept of a unitary state and later under a federal concept and now a separate state. The recent history is strewn with pacts which were abrogated and promises that were broken The 40's witnessed the rejection of the demand by the Tamils for equal representation, 50's and 60's saw the demand for a federal form of Government ignored. Having witnessed the failure of the preceding years Tamil people in the 70's realised that the restoration of the Eelam Nation was inevitable and resolved to attain it to protect themselves from the Sinhala chauvinist onslaught and assert their right of self determination.

Events of July 1983 & their implications

The shattering events of July this year does not need any explanations. But it is necessary to note that the July events were significantly different from the earlier pogroms of 1956, 1958, 1977 & 1981. Eventhough there has been an increasing level of active government and armed forces participation in the earlier pograms, in July they rode a perfect tandum in their involvement. Contrary to the government claims that the whole event was engineered by the anti-government left forces, they have yet to prove anything concrete despite several arrests of left leaders. At the same time there is ample evidence to show that several government ministers were involved and that the whole government machinery was used to wage war on unarmed innocent Tamil people. But so far the government of Mr. J. R. Jayewardane has failed to bring any of those involved to task.

Given this back ground, important questions arise when the Tamil people are asked to negotiate. Is there a possibility of a negotiated settlement with a government which only months earlier had engineered the massacre of thousands of Tamils? Can the Tamil people be expected to trust a man like J. R. Jayewardane who throughout his political career has been anti-Tamil? How sincere is the government when it says it wants a lasting settlement, when even mere Tamil language policy itself was not properly implemented?

Past Pacts and their failure

To recapitulate the fate that befell the earlier agreements between the parliamentary leadership of the Tamil people and the successive governments :— Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam entered into a pact with Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (B-C Pact) in 1957 to solve the Tamil problem as they saw it at that time. The pact, amongst other things was to provide the setting up of regional councils. It was the present President Mr. J. R. Jayewardane who was in the forefront of the opposition to this pact, and led the infamous Kandy march. Consequent to this opposition, the pact was abrogated without seeing daylight.

In 1965 Chelvanayagam entered into a pact with Mr. Dudley Senanayake (D-C Pact) which also provided for the formation of district councils. This time it was the turn of the SLFP to launch a campaign in opposition to this pact which also resulted in the unilateral abrogation of it by the UNP.

In 1977 the UNP government said in its election manifesto that it would call an all-party conference to solve the grivances of the Tamils. Seven years lapsed and nothing was done. But in the meanwhile the TULF held several rounds of talks with the government. But at each talks there was nothing positive arrived at, except the humiliation of the TULF. The District Development Councils which were seen as an instrument which would go part of the way towards settling some of the issues was never given the powers but made a mockery of. They remained glorified village councils. This even led Mr. Amirthalingam to comment in parliament that talks with the UNP had achieved nothing but unpopularity to the TULF for going into such talks.

Present Talks

In the aftermath of the July pogrom the government has agreed to talks with the Indian initiative. The history of talks shows that it has been used as a delaying tactic. But even if the Tamils are asked to take this seriously, the sincerity of the Sri Lanka government is still in question. One example of this insincerity is the post July illegal colonisation of the Vadamunai area in the Batticaloa district where 45,000 Sinhalese people have been settled with the active connivance of the government, using government resources. At the same time Tamil people who have settled following periodic pogroms in the Northern and Eastern provinces have been evicted while only lip service is given to the question of eviction of the recent illegal Sinhalese colonists.

While President Jayewardene has been preparing for talks to settle the Tamil problem he has been giving assurances to Sinhala Buddhist leaders that colonisation everywhere will be on the basis of the ethnic ratios of communities. Surely, this is only to make the Sinhalese the majority in the Tamil homeland.

We submit this memorandum with the objective of clarifying to the international community, particularly to the Commonwealth heads of governments the issues which provide the background to the talks. On behalf of the Tamil community we urge you to raise these matters in the fora available to you.

We urge a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Tamil speaking people in the Island of Ceylon, a solution nothing less than the exercise of the right of self determination.

Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front

November, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Sri Lanka: Int Sitn

cc: Sir R. Armstrong
High Commissioner
Sir A. Acland

Vcc CHGM A7

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 November, 1983

Sri Lanka

During the retreat for Commonwealth Heads of Government in Goa, the Prime Minister had a talk with the President of Sri Lanka about the Tamil problem.

The Prime Minister told me afterwards that she had raised the subject largely with a view to being helpful to Indian efforts to bring about a solution. The main point which she made to President Jayewardene was that it was desirable to offer proposals which would separate the moderates from the extremists. But that implied a proposal which the moderates could accept. Mrs. Thatcher did not get the impression that President Jayewardene had in mind any clear ideas on this point. He was very worried about his own position and said that both his Cabinet and many of his people were opposed to his position on the Tamils.

The Prime Minister advised him informally to keep talking and play the issue long. President Jayewardene appeared to accept this advice but the Prime Minister was conscious of having put the words in his mouth.

Also during the Goa retreat the Prime Minister had a brief discussion with Mr. Parthasarathy and Mr. Natwar Singh. I do not know how much she told them of her talk with President Jayewardene but she commented to me afterwards that she had found Mr. Parthasarathy's approach reasonable.

AJC

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

MR COLES A.J.C. 27/11

cc Sir Antony Acland
Sir John Leahy

Sri Lanka

I was approached yesterday evening by Mr Bajpai, who said that he was speaking on Mrs Gandhi's behalf.

2. The Indian Government are very worried about the lack of progress in Sri Lanka in sorting out the problems on the Tamils, the more so because of their fear of a major influx of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka into India.

3. They fear that Mr Jayewardene is under extreme pressure from the Sinhalese hardliners, though they regard him as the only hope for a reasonably satisfactory settlement of the Tamil problem.

4. They would hope that, if the Prime Minister has an opportunity of talking to Mr Jayewardene in Goa, she would urge him to keep open the dialogue with the Tamils, but also to realise that there is not indefinite time for dealing with the problem.

5. The Tamils in Sri Lanka are prepared to abandon their demands for a separate Tamil state, or for a federation, and are prepared to accept some kind of autonomous region within a unitary Sri Lanka, and (according to Mr Bajpai) the points at issue are now reduced to a comparatively narrow question of the number of provinces in which a measure of Tamil autonomy should be granted. The problem will not be quickly sorted out, and it would therefore be important to keep the dialogue with the Tamils going, so as to provide some time in which to sort it out.

6. The Indians are prepared to continue to "use their good offices" so far as may be needed for relations between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamils, but are deeply worried about the implications within India of any breakdown in the discussions between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, partly because of the possibility of a further influx of Tamil refugees and partly because of fears of the growth of a Tamil separatist movement within India.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

24 November 1983

2

Mr Samuel

cc: Mr Coles
Sir A Acland

SRI LANKA

1. When Mrs Thatcher called on her yesterday afternoon, Mrs Gandhi took a markedly more pessimistic line on the prospects for a Sri Lanka settlement than we had had from Mr Parthasarthi last week; in particular, she suggested that President Jayewardene no longer had any chance of being able to carry his Sinhala colleagues with him if he accepted a settlement. Mrs Thatcher remarked to me afterwards about the contrast between these remarks and what I had earlier told her about GP's hopes.

2. This morning, when Sir Antony Acland and I were talking to GP, he continued to sound optimistic about the possibility of a settlement, though he identified one new major area of difficulty (Jayewardene is insisting on two separate regional councils, one in the Tamil north and the other in the 40% Tamil east, and he is refusing to concede a Tulf demand for a single regional council embracing both the north and those parts of the east where the Tamils remain a majority). I told him that his line contrasted with Mrs Gandhi's gloomier one yesterday and quoted her remarks about Jayewardene. But GP stuck to his guns; Mrs Gandhi's meeting with Jayewardene yesterday evening had gone well in atmospheric terms and it remained possible that he could ~~deal~~ delivers on a moderate settlement if one could be reached. Given GP's habitual pessimism, and the tendency of Indian officials to avoid contradicting anything Mrs Gandhi has said, I regard this as encouraging. I reported the conversation to Mr Butler and was able briefly to introduce him to GP.

Robert Wade-Gery

23 November 1983

No reply
CHOGM Del distribute

EALAM TAMIL ASSOCIATION OF ALBERTA

P.O. BOX 35, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, EDMONTON, ALBERTA, CANADA T6E 2E0

The Representatives,
Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference,
New Delhi,
India.

November 11th, 1983.

Honourable Delegates,

Please accept our good wishes to each of you attending this important international gathering. We are an association of Tamils from Sri Lanka and we wish to place the following for your kind consideration.

It has taken a long time for the persecution of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka to be noted by the outside world until violence of genocidal proportions was unleashed on our community since July this year. This is certainly not the first time such carnage has taken place and it is not likely to be the last either unless responsible members of the international community such as yourselves, use your good offices to defuse such a situation in Sri Lanka.

Till the advent of the Portuguese, Ceylon as Sri Lanka was then known consisted of two separate kingdoms with distinct boundaries, language, religion and culture for more than 2000 years. The Portuguese administered the two states separately and so did the Dutch to whom the control of the island passed. Even for several years after the British took over, the administration was separate before it was amalgamated by them only for reasons of expediency and economy.

When the British handed over the government to the majority Sinhalese, meagre provisions for the protection of minorities were left behind in the British drafted constitution. But no sooner than the British left all the Tamils working on the tea plantations were disenfranchised and made stateless thus depriving one million Tamils of basic rights commonly afforded in any civilised country. These people are the backbone of the economy being the major foreign exchange earners for Sri Lanka, but they are subject to some of the worst living and working conditions in the world. Thus the seeds were sown for neo-colonisation in Sri Lanka with the minorities

becoming a subject race in their own country.

Shortly thereafter, the Sinhalese Governments commenced their planned and systematic persecution of the Tamil minority. Traditional Tamil homelands were subject to colonisation by mass movement of Sinhalese people into these areas ostensibly to provide land for landless people. But the fact of the matter is that there were landless Tamils and Moslems in these project areas who still continue to be landless. These colonisation schemes settled by convicted Sinhalese criminals and hoodlums were the centres of racial violence in 1956 and frequently thereafter and have drastically increased the ethnic tensions prevalent now. We are very sad to say that aid donor countries have not paid any attention to social impacts and that the projects they funded especially in the last few years have exacerbated these tensions even further.

When it became clear that the Sinhalese majority were stepping up their discriminatory treatment, the Tamils sought a federal form of Government within which they could hope to live as equal partners enjoying some regional autonomy. The Sinhalese majority have always spurned away any political propositions made by the Tamils. Even as early as 1956, peaceful and democratic campaigns by Tamil political leaders for a federal form of Government were met with brutal violence by the Sinhalese hoodlums under the protection and patronage of the Sinhalese leadership of all political persuasions.

The Sinhalese went even further to consolidate their discrimination against the Tamils by disestablishing English as the official language and making Sinhalese the *only* official language. With the stroke of a pen, the Tamils were disadvantaged overnight. This was only a small beginning in a long series of measures designed to ostracise the Tamil community from any active or meaningful participation in the life of the country.

In 1972, formal ties with Britain were severed by the adoption of a republican constitution thus preventing the Tamils from having access to the Privy Council and other recourses to justice. The Tamils boycotted the deliberations leading up to this constitution which was one in a series of constitutional manipulations which successive

Sri Lankan Governments have adopted in order to carry out their policies of annihilating the Tamil minority. The constitution adopted by the Jayawardene Government in 1978 has accelerated this process much further by even abandoning the secular nature of previous constitutions in declaring Buddhism as the State religion in addition to Sinhalese as the official language. The most disturbing nature of this is that in Sri Lanka today, it is *Government by amendment, not by constitution.* By the time you, honoured delegates, read this, the constitution may have undergone the eighth amendment, in six years! This time to further oppress the parliamentary participation of the Tamils. Does not this speak for itself?

Sucessive Sri Lankan Governments, most notably that of President Jayawardene since 1977 have devised subtle ways under the guise of parliamentary democracy to deny the Tamil minority avenues for advancement in education, employment and in areas of language rights, culture and religion. We give below in brief form a list, by no means exhaustive, of the more blatant acts by the Jayawardene Government against the Tamil people :

1. Constitutionally endorsing the adoption of a Sinhala Buddhist society without any real place for other groups.
2. Adoption of highly discriminatory admission procedures shutting out even well qualified Tamil students from higher education at the universities.
3. Denial of equal employment opportunities for Tamils.
4. Deprivation of development funds for Tamil areas.
5. Distressingly retrograde legislations permitting arbitrary arrests, torture and murder by the armed forces.
6. Use of violence against the Tamils under the protection and patronage of Cabinet Ministers by the armed forces as happened in Jaffna during the summer of 1981.
7. Encouraging violence by the Sinhalese hoodlums under the aegies of armed forces in Tamil areas such as Trincomalee this year, and other areas in the south for many years now.
8. Colonising traditionally Tamil homelands with Sinhalese clearly intended to eventually drive all the Tamils out completely.

9. Giving a *carte blanche* for the armed forces to inflict State terrorism against the Tamil minority resulting in looting, rape, burnings and murder by these so-called guardians of law themselves.

10. Encouraging the burning of Hindu temples and other cultural institutions of the Tamils.

The list could go on and on.

Is it little wonder that with all this track record, the Government of Sri Lanka wants the international community to regard these as internal affairs? When does it assume international significance? Had the world waited longer for reasons of not "meddling" in internal affairs, would not there have been more Adolf Hitlers and Idi Amins in this world?

With all its penchant for preventing the internationalisation of the Tamil plight, the Sri Lankan Government is nevertheless anxious to internationalise its economic woes, most of which were brought about by its own making. We urge every country in the world at large and the members of the Commonwealth in particular, to question this double standard which the Sri Lankan Government is seeking to impose on the international community. If Sri Lanka wants to belong to the international brotherhood of nations, it too, must be expected to pay its subscription out of its own pocket, not by dipping its hand into someone else's.

As a nation of people in distress, we earnestly appeal to you esteemed delegates, to take up the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and prevail upon the Sri Lankan Government to address the Tamil grievances in a just manner. The continued oppression of the Tamil speaking people in Sri Lanka will eventually be a destabilizing influence in the region. It is with the interest of regional peace in mind that we make this fervent appeal to you.

We wish the meeting every success.

Yours truly,

Secretary,

The Eelam Tamil Association of Alberta.

File

DSG

cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 October 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 1 October requesting an appointment for Mr. Appapillai Amirthalingum.

I regret that the Prime Minister's particularly heavy engagements in the foreseeable future make this impossible.

I understand, however, that it has already been proposed that Mr. Amirthalingum should call on a senior official at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Sydney Giffard, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State responsible for Asia. I know that Mr. Giffard would still welcome the opportunity of a discussion with Mr. Amirthalingum if a fresh appointment could be arranged at a mutually convenient time.

A. J. COLES

Pat Mylvaganam, Esq.

Bd

CR?
not CF

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 October, 1983

Dear John,

Type letter pl.
DR 7/10.

Sri Lanka

Thank you for your letter of 5 October about the request from the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) for the Prime Minister to receive Mr Amirthalingum.

Mr Amirthalingum's supporters in this country approached the FCO last month asking that he should be received by Ministers. It was decided that this would not be appropriate for several reasons. Firstly we had not at that stage had an account from Sri Lankan Ministers of the causes of the recent communal disturbances in Sri Lanka and their intentions for the future; it would therefore have been likely to be misunderstood by the Sri Lankans if Mr Amirthalingum, the main Tamil leader, had been received first. Secondly, the political and security situation in Sri Lanka remained sensitive and care needed to be taken to avoid HMG becoming a focus of criticism for either of the two communities. It was however agreed that a senior official would offer to see Mr Amirthalingum. Two appointments were made: Mr Amirthalingum failed to make the first by being delayed in Scotland and did not turn up for the second. We have heard nothing from him since.

The Foreign Secretary has since had a short discussion with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Mr Hameed, in New York, but the Sri Lankan Government would certainly not consider this balanced a call by Mr Amirthalingum on the Prime Minister. Mr Amirthalingum has been seen by officials rather than Ministers in both the United States and Canada.

In these circumstances, the Foreign Secretary does not think the Prime Minister should see Mr Amirthalingum. You may wish to reply along the lines of the attached draft which uses the coincidence of the Conservative Party Conference as a convenient excuse and steers Mr Amirthalingum back in the direction of Mr Giffard.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DS 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: Pat Mylvaganam
Public Relations Officer
Tamil United Liberation Front
10 Harefields
Summertown
Oxford OX2 8NS

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 1 October requesting an appointment for Mr Appapillai Amirthalingum.

I regret that the Prime Minister ~~does not~~ [illegible]

~~Unfortunately this will not be possible.~~ The dates in question fall within the week of the Conservative Party Conference when the Prime Minister as well as other Government Ministers have particularly heavy engagements.

particularly heavy engagements in the fortnight before make this impossible.

I understand however that it has already been proposed that Mr Amirthalingum should call on a senior official at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Sydney Giffard, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State responsible for Asia. I know that Mr Giffard would still welcome the opportunity of a discussion with Mr Amirthalingum if a fresh appointment could be arranged at a mutually convenient time.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

AR 7/10

THAMIL United Liberation Front 7/10

fa No

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1983

SRI LANKA

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Public Relations Officer of the Thamil United Liberation Front and which requests that the Prime Minister should receive, between 10 and 14 October, Mr. Amirthalingum, Leader of the Opposition in Sri Lanka and Secretary General of the Thamil United Liberation Front Party.

I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply by close of play on 7 ~~6~~ October.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

lo

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 October, 1983.

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter to her of 30 September with with you kindly sent her a copy of your brochure.

Mrs. Thatcher was most interested to read about Falconstar's services, and sends her best wishes for continued success.

13

J.H.K. Trevaskis, Esq.

dg

THAMIL UNITED LIBERATION FRONT

(Ceylon Thamils Official Party — H.Q. Jaffna, Sri Lanka)

— ENGLAND BRANCH —

Telephone: 0865/514544

Please reply to:

10 Harefields,
Summertown,
Oxford OX2 8NS,

1st Oct. '83

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London.

Meeting with Mr A. Amirthalingum, Leader of the Opposition, Sri Lanka

Dear Prime Minister,

Mr Appapillai Amirthalingum, Leader of the Opposition and Secretary-General of the Tamil United Liberation Front Party, requests a meeting with you on any day between the 10th October and 14th October 1983. He will be in London during that week on his way back to the East from the United States.

The enclosed ~~book~~ booklet " Genocide in Sri Lanka " will give you the horrific details of the manner in which State Terrorism operates in our country. You, who are the champion of the 269 people killed in the Korean air disaster will no doubt wish to express your horror at the bestial and cannibalistic killing of over 2000 Tamils in Sri Lanka and chastise the guilty President and his equally ~~Ministers~~ guilty Ministers - particularly when they come to you with a begging bowl for more money for arms and military equipment.

I rang the Conservative Party's Headquarters last month and spoke to the Chief Executive's assistant as he was out. I requested that the information I gave should be passed to you and to your Foreign Secretary. Unfortunately, to this day I have had no response.

I look forward very much to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Pat Mylvaganam

Pat Mylvaganam
Public Relations Officer.

FALCONSTAR LIMITED

40 CATHERINE PLACE, LONDON SW1E 6HL
Telephone: 01-828 7425
Telex: 8951203 DAF G

30 September 1983

GR
friendly tick please

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

I am enclosing the brochure of a successful company which was started over three years ago with the aim of providing a politically very important service from Britain to friendly foreign and Commonwealth countries.

British military and police training is much respected throughout the free world, and many more requests are received by the FCO and MoD for British Training Teams than our Armed Forces have the manpower to supply. Falconstar provides teams comprising officers and NCOs who have recently left military service, but who are keen to continue military life abroad. They operate under precisely the same codes of conduct and discipline as if they were still serving, and all work undertaken by the company is discussed freely with the FCO to ensure that Britain's interests are not in any way jeapordised. No operational work whatever is contemplated.

After 10 years commissioned service myself in the Scots Guards and SAS, I am well aware of the enormously good influence of British military training teams abroad, and what excellent ambassadors they make. Falconstar provides a service which it is not always possible for the Government to provide for a number of reasons. I must emphasise that there is no conflict of interest with official British Army Training Teams, and we do not see ourselves as being in competition with them. However, there are times when it is either not appropriate or not possible for a BATT to be sent to a foreign country; on these occasions, a Falconstar team can achieve much the same results both in terms of practical training and of international goodwill.

We are in the process now of completing a major contract with the Government of Uganda, where we have trained over 1,500 Special Force constables in two years. This has made a large contribution to internal security and to foreign investors' confidence in Uganda. We maintain close unofficial links with the Commonwealth Training Team which is working with the Uganda Army.

/...

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP 27 September 1983

I wish you to be informed of the service that we provide because of your support for the Armed Forces and the work which they do. We see much potential in extending Britain's influence in the world by sending training teams abroad under an organisation such as Falconstar which is prepared to work within Government guidelines, and hope that we can be of service to Her Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,

Jeremy Trevaskis

JEREMY H.K. TREVASKIS

Enclosure

SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 121/83

cc MCDS + Ops

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 August 1983

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 4 August about the recent tragic events in Sri Lanka. It was most useful to have your views.

I appreciate your concern. I too have been following the situation closely and I am relieved that it now appears to be calm. I very much hope that the problems can be solved peacefully.

Kind regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi

Sri Lanka relations

cc Algeria UK relations
PA

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
WILLIE RICKETT

STARTS

THE FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE SLOT IN THE DIARY RELINQUISHED BY PRESIDENT JAYAWARDENE TO ANOTHER FOREIGN HEAD OF GOVERNMENT FOR A QUOTE GUEST OF GOVERNMENT QUOTE VISIT V(RATHER THAN A FULL BLOWN STATE VISIT).

THEY WOULD LIKE TO APPROACH FIRST THE PRESIDENT OF ALGERIA. IF HE DOES NOT ACCEPT, THEY WOULD LIKE TO APPROACH THE KING AND QUEEN OF TONGA (WHO MAY WELL BE COMING TO THE COUNTRY FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE).

A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF ALGERIA WOULD INVOLVE YOU IN TALKS AND LUNCH ON 26 OCTOBER. A VISIT BY THE KING AND QUEEN OF TONGA WOULD ONLY INVOLVE LUNCH.

CONTENT FOR THE FCO TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS?

ENDS

PRIME MINISTER

You may like to know that President Jayewardene has asked that his State Visit in October should be postponed.

Wise decision!
MT

TF

17 August 1983

BF 24/8

090

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 August 1983

Dear Tim,

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Indian High Commission conveying a message from Mrs Gandhi to the Prime Minister about the situation in Sri Lanka. We have already telegraphed the text to our High Commission in New Delhi and Sri Lanka.

Given the Indian government's sensitivity about the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Sri Lankan government's sensitivity about any hint of Indian interference, any reply from the Prime Minister would best be in the blandest terms. I attach a draft reply in the form of a telegram to Delhi. There is no particular need for a reply to be despatched urgently and you may prefer not to bother the Prime Minister at this stage. If so, I would be grateful if we could be given a chance to look at the terms of the reply again before it issues.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq
10 Downing St

XY 42

File No. .....

Department .....

Drafted by (Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. .....

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification
Precedence
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Security Class.).....RESTRICTED.....

(Codeword).....

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Caveat/ Privacy marking).....

(Deskby).....Z

TO.....PRIORITY DELHI..... Tel. No. .....of.....
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....PRIORITY COLOMBO.....

INFO SAVING.....

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
MR DONALD
MR GIFFARD

Copies to:–

[TEXT]

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MRS GANDHI

1. Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to Mrs Gandhi:

Begins. Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 4 August about the recent tragic events in Sri Lanka. It was most useful to have your views.

I appreciate your concern. I too have been following the situation closely, and I am relieved that the situation now appears to be calm. I very much hope that the problems can be solved peacefully.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Ends

MOST IMMEDIATE/BY HAND

R. S. Kalha,
Minister (Political) and
Financial Adviser

सत्यमेव जयते

TELEPHONE: 01-836 8484 EXT.
TELEGRAMS: HICOMIND, LONDON, W.C.2.

भारत का हाइ कमीशन
लन्दन

THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA,
POLITCAL DEPARTMENT,
INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.

PRIME MINISTER'S
Copy of PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T118/83

No.Lon/Pol/104/17/83 AUGUST 11, 1983

My dear Michael,

I am desired to convey the text of the following letter from our Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom with the request that this may kindly be placed before the Prime Minister -

Begins:

New Delhi
August 4, 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

Yesterday our Finance Minister, Mr. P. K. MUKHERJEE spoke to your Foreign Secretary, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, about Sri Lanka.

The lives and properties of Indian citizens and persons of Indian origin have been affected. Many of the Tamils, even of Sri Lanka citizenship, are asking for our help and wanting to come to India. President JAYEWARDENE agreed to my suggestion that my Foreign Minister should go to Colombo to meet him. But the report Mr. RAO brought back about the ability or even the willingness of the Sri Lanka Government to deal firmly with the situation and to restore confidence among the minority community was not very convincing.

We regret that the Sri Lanka Government is spreading an entirely fictitious story about threats of Foreign, particularly Indian, invasion. We appreciate the British Government's decision not to encourage these rumours by declining to send military assistance. We have assured the Sri Lanka Government of our willingness to extend any help it may need.

As you know we do not believe in interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But I am terribly worried about the recent tragic developments in Sri Lanka. They are having grave repercussions for us. Our people are greatly agitated.

I hope you don't mind my burdening you with this brief explanation of my Government's attitude towards the events in Sri Lanka at a time when you are indisposed.

.....2.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Sd/-

(INDIRA GANDHI)

The RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,
LONDON.

Ends.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

(R. S. Kalha)

Mr. Michael St. E. Burton,
Head of the South Asian Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
King Charles Street,
LONDON SW 1

SUBJECT

cc Ops Master

PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T118/83

New Delhi,
August 4, 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

Yesterday our Finance Minister, Mr. P.K. Mukherjee, spoke to your Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, about Sri Lanka.

The lives and properties of Indian citizens and persons of Indian origin have been affected. Many of the Tamils, even of Sri Lanka citizenship, are asking for our help and wanting to come to India. President Jayewardene agreed to my suggestion that my Foreign Minister should go to Colombo to meet him. But the report Mr. Rao brought back about the ability or even the willingness of the Sri Lanka Government to deal firmly with the situation and to restore confidence among the minority community was not very convincing.

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the Sri Lanka Government of our willingness to extend any help it may need.

As you know we do not believe in interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But I am terribly worried about the recent tragic developments in Sri Lanka. They are having grave repercussions for us. Our people are greatly agitated.

I hope you don't mind my burdening you with this brief explanation of my Government's attitude towards the events in Sri Lanka at a time when you are indisposed.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely

Indira Gandhi.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
London

Prime Minister

2

IMMEDIATE

COLFO 010/29

00 F C O DESKBY 291300Z

D/By
[Rec'd 291327Z]
Hd's
[Hd SAD,] Defence Dept
MAED, News Dept,
Planning Staff, Security Dept,
PS, PS/Lady Young, PS/Mr. Whitney
Mr. Wright, Mr. Donald
(XRE) Mr. Castledge
PS/No 10 Downing St
(3)
(Then to Digests)

PP NEW DELHI

PP KATHMANDU

PP MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 250

SECRET

DESKBY 291300Z

FM COLOMBO 291125Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 188 OF 29 JULY

INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, KATHMANDU, MODUK (DS11, DI4C AND DEPUTY CDS)

YOUR TELNO 144 : SRI LANKA : POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR MILITARY AID

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED TO SEE THE DHC THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT THIS MATTER AND YOUR TUR ARRIVED IN THE MEANTIME. NASON TOOK THE LINES: (attached)

A. OUR MILITARY RESOURCES WORLDWIDE WERE UNDER STRAIN, AND

B. THAT WE ARE PRECLUDED BY THE TERMS OF OUR CONFIDENTIAL AGREEMENT FROM PROVIDING GURKHA TROOPS.

HE DID NOT REFER TO THE SRI LANKAN COMMUNITY IN UK NOR TO THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE THAT GURKHAS MAY NOT BE USED AGAINST UNARMED HINDU MOBS.

2. HAMEED WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED. FIRST HE ASKED WHETHER, IF THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT OBTAINED THE AGREEMENT OF THE INDIAN AND NEPALESE GOVERNMENTS, HMG WOULD PROVIDE THE GURKHAS. NASON

IF THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT OBTAINED THE AGREEMENT OF THE INDIAN AND NEPALESE GOVERNMENTS, HMG WOULD PROVIDE THE GURKHAS. NASON REPLIED THAT WE THOUGHT IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD AGREE, BUT THAT IN ANY CASE THE OVERRIDING QUESTION OF OUR WORLDWIDE COMMITMENTS WOULD PREVENT US FROM PROVIDING THEM ANYWAY. HAMEED THEN ALLEGED THAT WE HAD PROVIDED TROOPS FOR MRS BANDARANAIKE DURING THE 1971 INSURRECTION. NASON CORRECTED HIM, POINTING OUT THAT WE ONLY SUPPLIED ARMS. THEN HAMEED ENQUIRED WHEN WE HAD LAST PROVIDED A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT WITH TROOPS IN THIS SORT OF SITUATION. NASON REPLIED THAT SPEAKING OFF THE CUFF THE LAST TIME HE COULD REMEMBER OUR PROVIDING TROOPS IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION WAS IN 1963 OR 1964 IN EAST AFRICA, AND REMINDED HAMEED THAT THIS WAS TWENTY YEARS AGO AND THAT TIMES HAD CHANGED.

3. HAMEED CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT HE WILL INFORM THE PRESIDENT OF OUR REPLY.

NICHOLAS

NNNN

SENT // RECD AT 291315Z RJ/LRD

GRS 460
SECRET

DESKBY 290330Z
FM FCO 281915Z JULY 83
TO IMMEDIATE COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 28 JULY
INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, KATHMANDU
INFO MODUK (DS11 AND DI4C AND DEPUTY CDS).
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 183 (NOT TO ALL): SRI LAKA: POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR MILITARY AID

1. AS YOU SURMISE A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE SRI LANKANS FOR US TO PROVIDE GURKHA TROOPS FROM HONG KONG WOULD PRESENT SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO REBUFF THE SRI LANKANS UNDULY AT SUCH A DIFFICULT TIME AND IN VIEW OF PAST HELP THEY HAVE GIVEN US, EG THEIR UN VOTE ON THE FALKLANDS. WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN YOUR TAKING ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FORESTALL FURTHER PRESSURE AND PREVENT POSSIBLE LEAKS (IF HAMEED'S INTEREST IS IN THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THE GURKHAS, HE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO LEAK HIS APPROACH TO US).

2. ALTHOUGH HAMEED REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE GURKHAS (ON WHOM SEE BELOW) HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER ARMY UNITS AS WELL. IT IS IMPORTANT IN GIVING OUR NEGATIVE ANSWER TO PREEMPT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FURTHER UNACCEPTABLE SRI LANKAN REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. (YOUR ANSWER WILL ALSO BE A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE KNOWN OUR CONCERN OVER CURRENT EVENTS IN A CONVENIENTLY INDIRECT WAY.) YOU SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE CLEAR TO HAMEED THAT QUITE APART FROM THE CURRENT STRAIN ON OUR MILITARY RESOURCES WORLDWIDE, EXACERBATED BY THE FALKLANDS, WHICH MAKES ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS VERY DIFFICULT INDEED TO CONTEMPLATE, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR US, NOT LEAST IN PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY TERMS, TO PLACE BRITISH TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE OF INTER-COMMUNAL STRIFE OF THE SORT THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE.
MOREOVER, THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL SRI LANKAN COMMUNITY IN THIS COUNTRY INCLUDING TAMILS WHO ARE NATURALLY FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS

WITH THE CLOSEST ATTENTION. WE DO NOT WISH TO INFLUENCE EMOTIONS HERE. THERE IS ALSO THE INDIAN DIMENSION (DELHI TELNO 505), ALTHOUGH YOU MAY THINK IT BEST TO LEAVE THIS OUT.

3. AS FAR AS THE GURKHAS ARE CONCERNED, WE ARE IN ANY CASE EXCLUDED FROM USING THEM BY THE 1947 TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON GURKHA RECRUITMENT (UK, INDIA AND NEPAL) WHICH CONTAINS AN EXCLUSION CLAUSE THAT GURKHAS MAY NOT BE USED AGAINST UNARMED HINDU MOBS. SINCE THE TAMILS ARE LARGELY HINDU, THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE WHOLLY OPPOSED TO THE USE OF GURKHAS AND MIGHT WELL HOLD US TO OUR AGREEMENT. THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE NO LESS OPPOSED.

4. THE TERMS OF THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND WE WOULD NOT WISH TO DISCLOSE THEM NOW, BUT YOU SHOULD SAY TO HAMEED ON THE GURKHAS ONLY THAT WHILE WE HAVE GREAT SYMPATHY FOR THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT IN THEIR PRESENT PREDICAMENT WE ARE PRECLUDED BY THE TERMS OF OUR CONFIDENTIAL AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL GOVERNING GURKHA RECRUITMENT FROM PROVIDING GURKHA TROOPS IF REQUESTED IN THIS CASE.

HOWE

NNNN

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SECURITY D.		

HL

14 July 1983

Sri Lanka

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in which Mr. Premadasa reiterates his invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Sri Lanka.

I also enclose a reply signed by the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its delivery.

JOHN COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc Ops
Master

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T105/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 July 1983

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much indeed for your kind letter of 29 June.

I indeed recall with pleasure our previous meetings. I should very much like to find an opportunity to accept your invitation to visit Sri Lanka. I am afraid that my diary for the rest of this year is already very full. May I keep your kind invitation in mind until a later date?

I send you my very best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable R. Premadasa, M.P.

From the High Commissioner

Ackd 13/7.

High Commission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

John
See attached

13 July 1983

~~Did~~ we receive an earlier message of congratulation from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka?

A.J.C. 13/7.

My dear John

I have pleasure in enclosing a letter addressed to the Prime Minister, which I have received, for transmission, from my Prime Minister.

Warm regards

Yours sincerely

A. T. Moorthy.

Mr. John Coles,
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

cc Ops
Master

R. PREMADASA, M.P.
Prime Minister

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T96A/83

**DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA**

PM/1/01/83

June 29, 1983

My dear Prime Minister,

May I say how delighted Mrs Premadasa and I were at your outstanding success at the elections on June 9th. It is truly a fine endorsement by your people of the policies, both domestic and foreign that Britain has followed under your inspired leadership. Your new term of office will enable you to see the fulfilment of your plans and we wish you every success in your efforts.

I recall at this time our meetings in London and the invitation which I extended to you to visit Sri Lanka and to see for yourself, the manner in which we have tried to use the aid which Britain has so generously given us. I am happy that you will now have the time to accept our invitation.

Once again, our warmest congratulations on your great victory and our best wishes for a very successful term of office.

Yours sincerely,

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher,M.P.
Prime Minister
No. 10, Downing Street
LONDON

6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 June 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your two letters of 10 June conveying messages to Mrs. Thatcher from His Excellency, the President of Sri Lanka and from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

The Prime Minister will be replying to these messages shortly but has asked me to thank you for your own best wishes.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy.

6

file BPP

8 June 1983

Thank you for your letter of 8 June.

The Pfime Minister was grateful to receive the greetings card on the occasion of Wesak from the Hon. R. Premadasa, M.P., Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

A.J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy

Communications on this subject should be addressed to:

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA.

Our Reference

Your Reference

HIGH COMMISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA.

13 HYDE PARK GARDENS
LONDON W2 2LU

Telephone: 01-262 1841 (7 lines) Ext
Telegrams: Lankacom, London
Telex: 25844

Date 8 June 1983

My dear John

I would be grateful if you would find it possible to submit to The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain the enclosed card, with Greetings on the occasion of Wesak, from the Hon. R. Premadasa, MP., Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

Warm regards

Yours sincerely

A. T. Moorthy.

John Coles Esq.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
of Great Britain,
10, Downing Street,
London SWI.

වෙසක් පැතුම — ලෝක සිදුවෙස ....

வெசாக் வாழ்த்துக்கள் – மனிதகுலத்திற்கு ஒரு செய்தி....

Wesak Greetings — a message to mankind ....



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ආර්. ප්‍රේමදාස මැතිණිය, සජිත් සහ දුලාංජලී ගෙන්

இலங்கைப் பிரதமர்,

திருமதி பிரேமதாச, சஜித், துலாஞ்சலி

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF SRI LANKA,
MRS. R. PREMADASA, SAJITH & DULANJALEE

සිතිවිල්ල අපි ම වෙමු
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— ධම්මපද

உள்ளத்துச் சிந்தனையே எமது தோற்றம்
உலகெமது சிந்தனையின் பிரதியாக்கம்
கள்ளமுறு சிந்தனையால் தொடரும் தீமை
கானியினைத் தொடர்வண்டிச் சகடம் போல

உள்ளத்துச் சிந்தனையே எமது தோற்றம்
உலகெமது சிந்தனையின் பிரதியாக்கம்
கள்ளமிலாச் சிந்தனையால் தொடரும் நன்மை
காசினியில் நிழல் உடலைத் தொடர்தல் போல

— தம்மபதம்

We are what we think
All that we are arises with our thoughts
With our thoughts we make the world
Speak or act with an impure mind
And trouble will follow you
As the wheel follows the ox that draws the cart

We are what we think
All that we are arises with our thoughts
With our thoughts we make the world
Speak or act with a pure mind
And happiness will follow you
As your shadow unshakable

-Dhammapada-

ශ්‍රී ලංකා අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ වෙසක් ඉහ පැතුම 1983

බුදුරදුන් විසින් දෙසන ලද බුද්ධ ධර්මය තමැති ගංගාව අනොතත්ත විලෙන් සතර දිශාවන් වූ හස්ති අශ්ව සිංහ සහ ගව මුඛවලින් නැගෙනගිය බටහිර උතුර සහ දකුණු දිශාවන් බලා ගලා ගිය වගයි බුදුරදුන් සක් දෙවි අසුත මත (මහාමේරු පර්වතයෙහි) වැඩ හිඳ බුද්ධ ධර්මය දඹදිව සිට ලොව පංච මහාද්වීපයන්ට පැතිර වූ වගයි

புத்தர் போதித்த பகையின்மை (தர்மம்) என்ற நதி அநோதத்த என்ற வாவியிலிருந்து ஆரம்பித்து யானை குதிரை சிங்கம் எருதுமுக வாயிலாக கிழக்கு மேற்கு வடக்கு தெற்குத் திசைகளுக்குச் செறிகிறது புத்தர் சக்ராசனத்தில் (மகாமேரு) வீற்றிருந்த வண்ணம் தம்செய்தியை இந்திய சமவெளி ஊடாக உலகின் ஐந்து கண்டங்களுக்கும் பரப்புகிறார்

The river of the Dhamma as preached by the Buddha commences from the lake of Anotatta and flows through the directional spouts of the elephant, horse, lion and bull towards the East, West, North and South
The Buddha on the seat of Sakra (Mount Meru) spreads his message across the Indian plain to the five continents of the world.

විතු සිතුවම : දඹුල්ල 18 සියවස
தம்புள்ளை 18 ம் நூற்றாண்டு
Mural : Dambulla 18th Century
GOVERNMENT PRESS, SRI LANKA.

අරලියගහ මන්දිරය, කොළඹ 3, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව.
அலரி மாளிகை, கொழும்பு 3, இலங்கை.
Temple Trees, Colombo–3, SRI LANKA.

නිර්මාණය : කුසාන් මංජුශ්‍රී
வடிவமைப்பாளர் : குஷான் மஞ்ஜுஸ்ரீ
Designed by : Kusan Manjusri

SL105EC

cc Ops
Master
cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 April 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T52/83

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 4 April about the next meeting of the Sri Lankan Aid Group.

As you say, the difficulties faced by Sri Lanka are common to many other non-oil developing countries and we understand them well. I am glad that you have been so successful so far in surmounting them. You will, I know, understand that we have many calls on our resources, and it will not be easy to strike a balance between the needs of Sri Lanka and those of other countries in a similar predicament. But we shall take fully into account the needs of Sri Lanka as you have so convincingly described them and shall do all that we can within the resources available.

Since you wrote, I have seen Mr. Premadasa and received his letter of 25 March asking for further assistance with the Victoria Dam project. We are looking urgently into the possibilities.

It will be a great pleasure to see you again during your State Visit in June.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1983

Type please.
A.J.C. 22/4.

Dear John,

Sri Lanka Aid Group

Thank you for your letter of 11 April enclosing a letter from the President of Sri Lanka. This is the latest in a series of circulars which he sends at about this time every year to the heads of donor governments. I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature. Because of the financial difficulties in the aid programme the draft has been cast in rather pessimistic terms.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~telegram~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

HE Mr J R Jayewardene
President of Sri Lanka

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 4 April about the next meeting of the Sri Lankan Aid Group.

As you say the difficulties faced by Sri Lanka are common to many other non-oil developing countries and we understand them well. I am glad that you have been so successful so far in surmounting them. You will, I know, ~~Our aid~~ understand that our aid programme, ~~as you will realise,~~ cannot be exempted from our policy of tight control on public spending, and it will not be easy to strike a balance between the needs of Sri Lanka and those of many other countries in a similar predicament. ~~All that I can promise is that~~ but the needs of Sri Lanka, as you have so convincingly described them, ~~will be fully taken into account.~~ we shall take fully into account We shall do all that we can for Sri Lanka within the resources available.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Since you wrote, I have ~~of course~~ seen Mr Premadasa and received his letter of 25 March asking for ~~more money~~ further assistance ~~for~~ with the Victoria Dam project. We are looking urgently into the possibilities.

/I look

It will be a great pleasure to see you again

~~I look forward to discussing all this with you~~ during your State Visit in June.

MR 21/4

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1983

SRI LANKA AID GROUP

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the President of Sri Lanka appealing to donor countries which have helped Sri Lanka in the past to assist it in overcoming its present difficulties. I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sri L

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1983

Thank you for your letter of 11 April enclosing a letter from the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister. I shall place this before the Prime Minister shortly.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

11 April 1983

My dear John

I enclose herewith a letter addressed to The Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister by H.E. J.R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

The letter relates to the forthcoming 19th Meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group, which will be held in Paris on the 17th of June, 1983.

I should be grateful if you would kindly submit the letter to the Prime Minister as early as possible.

I would also be thankful to have your confirmation, in due course, when this has been done.

all good wishes

Yours sincerely

(A.T. Moorthy)

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

SUBJECT

cc master
Ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 440A/83

President of Sri Lanka

4th April, 1983

My dear Prime Minister,

The 19th Meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group convenes in Paris on the 17th June 1983. This meeting is held every year under the auspices of the World Bank. At this meeting the donor countries and representatives of my Government participate in a frank exchange of views on Sri Lanka's economic situation and its external needs.

May I once again take this opportunity to thank you and your Government for the close interest you have always shown in our development efforts and the most generous assistance you have rendered in support of them in the past.

This letter is to keep you personally informed of the impact of the external economic environment on our development strategy and our priorities for 1983. I trust this will help you to formulate your own development assistance programme to Sri Lanka in the light of our changing needs.

Sri Lanka, like many other non-oil developing countries, continues to be affected by the extremely adverse international economic situation. The demand for our exports has been falling and their prices have been low. We have had to pay high prices for our imports.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Gritain & Northern Ireland,

London.

Our terms of trade have deteriorated by over 30 per cent during the last 5 years. It is indeed remarkable that, despite this unfavourable situation, Sri Lanka has been able to maintain a growth rate in real terms of over 6 per cent during the last 5 years. We have also been able to reduce inflation from 35 per cent to 5 per cent in two years while giving considerable employment at the same time. Our economic successes have been due in no small measure to the generous support we have received from donor countries.

Our investment programme for 1983 and 1984 however shows a peaking of expenditure for these two years. This has placed a great strain on our domestic and external resources. To prevent overheating the economy, the Government has decided that no new projects will be commenced in 1983 and 1984. We are, however, at the same time anxious to ensure that the momentum of our development effort does not slacken. As we have amply demonstrated in the past, we are prepared to make adjustments as are necessary and we have done so in our Budget for 1983. There are limits to which we could impose hardships on our people, the majority of whom are at the barest minimum standard of living. We are also determined to maintain our liberal trade and payments system.

I would therefore once again appeal to donor countries who have steadfastly stood by us in the past, to assist us in overcoming our present difficulties. In particular, I would urge increasing support for on-going projects which have now become underfinanced due to cost escalations mainly on account of factors completely beyond our control. Sri Lanka also requires increased quantities of quick disbursing commodity and food aid. We would be particularly grateful for any untied assistance that can be provided.

With my warm personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Jayewardene

FILE SW

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 December, 1982

Thank you for your letter of 6 December.

I shall pass to the Prime Minister the message from His Excellency, the President of Sri Lanka.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A. T. Moorthy

(4)

cc. Master sec
ops.

From the High Commissioner

SUBJECT

High Commission of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

PRO/MISC/3-75/Vol.II

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 231/82

6 December 1982

Prime Minister,

AR 6/12

My dear John

I have received, for transmission to the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, the following message from His Excellency J.R. Jayewardene, President of Sri Lanka.

" I should like to thank you sincerely for your kind message of felicitations and good wishes on my election as President of Sri Lanka for a further term.

I look forward to working closely with you in the years ahead, in our common endeavour to further consolidate and strengthen the close ties of friendship which happily exist between our two countries and peoples.

J.R. Jayewardene
President of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka "

I will be most thankful if you will find it possible to submit the message to the Prime Minister.

All good wishes

Yours sincerely

A.T. Moorthy

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW 1

See Lanka : UK Sri Lanka relations
May 78

Sri Lanka

12

SUBJECT.

Top Copy

CONFIDENTAIL

29932 - 1

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 195A/82.

PP COLOMBO
GRS 109
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 181245Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 18 OCTOBER

1. PROVIDED THAT HE WINS, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE AS SOON AS YOU JUDGE IT SEEMLY.

BEGINS: PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR RE-ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA FOR A FURTHER PERIOD. I AM CONFIDENT THAT UNDER YOUR CONTINUED WISE LEADERSHIP OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BUILD ON THE FIRM FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS EXISTED BETWEEN THEM FOR SO LONG, AND I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN THE FULFILMENT OF YOUR HIGH OFFICE. MARGARET THATCHER. ENDS

2. PLEASE CONFIRM BY TELEGRAM WHEN THIS MESSAGE HAS BEER DELIVERED.

PYM

cc. Master set
ogs.

FSC 011/1.
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 61
19 OCT 1982

DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	

NNNN
DIST LIMITED
SAD
PCD
CCD
PS/MR HURD
MR GIFFARD
MR DONALD

The President was duly re-elected on 20/10/82, the message was delivered on the same day.

cc
25/10/82.

CONFIDENTAIL

hd VS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1982

B/F for let

Sri Lanka: Presidential Elections

Thank you for your letter of 15 October.

Provided that Jayewardene wins on 20 October, the Prime Minister agrees that she should send a quick message of congratulations. She has approved the draft you enclosed, subject to the following amendments:

(a) in line 15 delete "warm feelings of mutual regard" and substitute "firm friendship";

(b) in line 16 substitute "has" for "have" and end the sentence at "long". Then the final sentence would begin "I wish you".

A.J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 October 1982

Prime Minister

Agree to send message?

Yes please.

A.J.C. 15/10.

Dear John,

Sri Lanka: Presidential Election

President Jayewardene has called a Presidential Election in Sri Lanka and voting is due to take place on Wednesday 20 October. There are six candidates and the campaign is in full swing. It will benefit UK interests for Jayewardene to win. If he does so we would advise that the Prime Minister sends a quick message of congratulation. I enclose a draft.

Mr Jayewardene and his United National Party Government assumed power after a landslide general election victory in 1977 over Mrs Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). This reflected widespread disenchantment with Mrs Bandaranaike's version of state socialism in Sri Lanka. Jayewardene was subsequently elected executive President under an amended constitution. His objective has been to revitalise the economy by liberalising trade, encouraging the private sector and by large scale development. He has also made considerable progress in encouraging industrial development, tighter management of the public sector and in the reduction of excessive Government expenditure on welfare services and commodity subsidies. President Jayewardene's Government, though remaining firmly non-aligned, have conducted a foreign policy which is generally helpful to Western interests and places Sri Lanka among the more moderate members of the Commonwealth and NAM. Bilateral relations remain close and friendly and Sri Lankan Ministers are frequent visitors to London.

/Present

Present indications are that President Jayewardene will win comfortably. The only rival personality in Sri Lanka, Mrs Bandaranaike, is prevented from taking part in the election in any way under the terms of the seven years' 'civic disability' imposed on her for 'abuse of power' during her last term in office. The SLFP candidate is Mr Hector Kobbekaduwa (a former Minister of Agriculture in her government and 'left winger' responsible for nationalising the tea estates). He is, however, a compromise candidate of a divided party and may not command full support from the more moderate sections of the SLFP. Four other candidates represent the much divided extreme left of Sri Lanka. The main parliamentary opposition party, the Tamil United Liberation Front, is boycotting the election on the grounds that it is a Singhalese affair. President Jayewardene nevertheless hopes to pick up votes from among the Tamils.

Yours ever

for Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	PRIORITY

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

ZCZC
GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO PRIORITY COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER

1. Provided that he wins, please deliver the following message of congratulation from the Prime Minister to President Jayewardene as soon as you judge it seemly.

BEGINS: Please accept my warmest congratulations on your re-election as President of Sri Lanka for a further period. I am confident that under your continued wise leadership our two countries will build on the ~~warm feelings of mutual regard~~ firm friendship which ~~have~~ has existed between them for so long, ~~and~~ I wish you every success in the fulfilment of your high office. Margaret Thatcher. ENDS

2. Please confirm by telegram when this message has been delivered.

/// PYM
// NNNN
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		SAD PCD CCD PS/Mr Hurd Mr Giffard Mr Donald
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

HL

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 October 1982

Thank you for your letter of 29 September enclosing a draft reply to the message from the Prime Minister is Sri Lanka about the International Year for the Homeless. The Prime Minister has now approved and signed the draft which I attach. I should be grateful if you could make arrangements for its transmission.

T. FLESHER

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

cc Master
OPS

cc FCO

B

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T188/82

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 October 1982

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 10 September about the proposed International Year for the Homeless.

Like you, I welcome the attention that the International Year will focus on the plight of the homeless in the world. We continue to respond to requests for assistance in this area from developing countries.

As you know, in addition to the assistance we provide bilaterally, Britain is a major contributor to multilateral agencies within the UN system. At a time when there are already many heavy demands on our aid programme, including of course such major projects as the Victoria Dam, I am afraid that we are unlikely to be able to make an additional contribution towards the costs of an International Year. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more helpful reply.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. R. Premadasa, M.P.

HU

3

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister:

Attached is a draft reply and an explanatory note on the message you received for the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka about the International Year of the Homeless.

TF
29/9

Sri Lanka

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 September, 1982

pse type & PM signature
JA.
29/9

Dear John,

In response to your letter of 10 September enclosing one which the Prime Minister had received from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka about the International Year for the Homeless, I enclose a draft reply. I also attach a background note for information.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

BACKGROUND

In July 1982, the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) endorsed the recommendations of the Executive Director of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT) in respect of the proposed International Year of Shelter for the Homeless in 1987, but on the understanding that the programme for the Year will be financed, in principle, by voluntary contributions and that sufficient pledges to ensure its viability will be obtained before the Year is actually proclaimed. ECOSOC passed an appropriate recommendation to the 37th Session of the General Assembly (now sitting).

2. In general we are against the proliferation of "International Years" as we believe that they tend to devalue the idea and to absorb resources for administration which could be better spent directly meeting a relevant need. It is not our general practice to contribute to the voluntary funds set up to finance these Years as they are often poorly administered and we have no control over funds so contributed.

3. If the UN system goes ahead with the year, our response will depend on the level of public interest. We are unlikely to be able to do more than seek to maximise our response to requests for bilateral assistance for housing projects in the International Year.

Bilateral Coordination Department
ODA
28 September 1982

DSR (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: Mr Premadasa
Prime Minister of Sri Lanka

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 10 September about the proposed International Year for the Homeless.

Like you I welcome the attention that the International Year will focus on the plight of the homeless in the world. We continue to respond to requests for assistance in this area from developing countries.

As you know, in addition to the assistance we provide bilaterally, Britain is a major contributor to multilateral agencies within the UN system. At a time when there are already many heavy demands on our aid programme, including of course such major projects as the Victoria Dam, I am afraid that we are unlikely to be able to make an additional contribution towards the costs of an International Year. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more helpful reply.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

vb

10 September 1982

International Year for the Homeless

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. I should be grateful if you could let me have in due course a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

vb

10 September 1982

Thank you for your letter of 10 September enclosing a letter from the Prime Minister of Sir Lanka to Mrs Thatcher about the International Year for the Homeless.

I shall place Mr. Premadasa's letter before the Prime Minister who I am sure will wish to reply as soon as possible.

AJC

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy

T175/82

Mr Mosses
Ops

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

ECON/INT/AID

10 September 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T175/82

My dear John

I have pleasure in enclosing a communication from the Hon. R. Premadasa, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, addressed to the Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher.

I would be most thankful if you would find it possible to submit it to the Prime Minister.

All good wishes

Yours sincerely

A.T. Moorthy

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

R. PREMADASA, M.P.
Prime Minister

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 161AA/82

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA

✓ Master
Ops

No. PM/4/24/165/3/L
16th August, 1982.

Your Excellency,

INTERNATIONAL YEAR FOR THE HOMELESS.

I write to express my deep appreciation for the generous manner in which you personally and your country's delegation have responded to and supported the idea of the International Year. I am indeed grateful to you for the personal concern you have shown in the matter, and your own commitment to the cause of the homeless, will undoubtedly contribute to the eventual success of the International Year.

I am happy to inform you that further progress was made last month in July at the United Nations Economic and Social Council Meeting held in Geneva. The Economic and Social Council Meeting has very positively recommended to the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly that 1987 be declared as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

Both at the Geneva Meeting last month and at early discussions, it had been noted that certain country delegations had a misconception that the developed countries were being called upon to contribute large sums of money towards housing programmes and projects of a national character during the International Year. This is certainly not the intention as Your Excellency will doubtless appreciate. The primary purpose of the International Year is to focus the attention of the world community on the basic need for housing, and each country will undoubtedly finance housing for its people by mobilizing available resources at the national level. Also, wherever feasible resources available under bi-lateral and multi-lateral assistance will no doubt be made use of for programmes of housing in agreement with donor countries and multi-lateral agencies.

Under the programme for the International Year, certain expenditure will necessarily be required for such activities as secretarial services, preparation of information booklets, publicity material and provision of expert assistance by the UN Agencies for developing countries to mobilize national resources and initiate national programmes in keeping with

national needs and policies. It is expected that the provision of expert assistance would require a sum of US $ 2.5 million. A further US $ 3.5 million has been estimated for secretarial services, information and co-ordinative and allied expenses. The total requirement for the International Year in this regard is expected to be approximately US $ 6 million.

As your Excellency would agree our objective for the realization of a successful International Year will be greatly enhanced if we could collectively at the time of the next Sessions of the General Assembly or before, announce on the basis of a pledge, the voluntary contribution that our countries intend to make towards meeting the extimated expenditure of approximately US $ 6 million for the International Year.

I am confident that Your Excellency's Government will, in accordance with the enthusiastic support you have already given for the concept of the International Year, endorse that concern and commitment by an appropriate pledge for the above expenditure.

The Government of Sri Lanka and I personally would greatly appreciate your kind consideration of this request.

With the assurances of my highest consideration,

Yours sincerely,



Her Excellency The Rt. Hon Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
The United Kingdom of Gr. Britain & Northern Ireland.

Alan
Would you reconsider keeping this in CF?
Kay 29/7

Thank you
27/7
FILE

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 July, 1982

SRI LANKA: LETTER FROM MRS BANDARANAIKE

Thank you for your letter of 20 July. I shall be writing to Mrs Bandaranaike, broadly in the terms proposed. The Prime Minister agrees that our High Commissioner in Colombo should be instructed to speak in accordance with the last paragraph of your letter when the reply has been delivered.

A I COLES

Brian Fall, Esq,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FILE

RM

cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 July, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 11 June. It has been carefully considered, but the conclusion has been reached that it would not be appropriate for the British Government to take the matter up in the way you propose.

A. J. COLES

Mrs Sirima R.D. Bandaranaike,

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

Mrs. Bandaranaike

I am sorry to trouble you with this again. We cannot, as you suggest, rest on the point that Sri Lanka has not signed the protocol. The fact that she is a party to the Covenant, and that we and Sri Lanka have recognised under Article 41 of the Covenant the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive inter-State claims, means that we are entitled to bring forward a complaint against Sri Lanka.

I think the only reply we can give to Mrs. Bandaranaike is that we have decided that it would not be appropriate for us to take up her case.

We do not need to do anything more than this. But if you felt that we ought to make some effort on her behalf, we could suggest orally to the Sri Lankan Government that they look into her allegations.

Agree that I should write as proposed? Yes MT

Do you also want us to speak to the Sri Lankan Government as proposed?

Yes

MT

A.J.C.

23 July 1982

PRIME MINISTER

Mrs. Bandaranaike

The above, who was Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in the 1960s, and again between 1970 and 1977, wrote to you on 11 June asking that the British Government should refer to the United Nations Human Rights Committee the fact that, as she believes, her human rights have been violated.

Technically, it is open to us to take this action. But if we do, we shall certainly offend the present Sri Lankan Government. President Jayewardene is friendly to Britain; Mrs. Bandaranaike was not.

I therefore propose to reply on your behalf to Mrs. Bandaranaike saying simply that we have reached the conclusion that it would not be appropriate for us to take up her case. We would also get our High Commission in Colombo to point out to the Sri Lankan Government that other countries (for example, the Scandinavians) may not decline to take action if approached by Mrs. Bandaranaike, and that they may therefore care to look into her allegations.

Agree that we should act in this way?

It is a very strong letter to write - "we don't" but "others may"!

A.J.C.

21 July, 1982.

Can we not rest on the point that Sri Lanka has ratified the protocol? If there nothing we can do with Sri Lanka [illegible]

GR
PPs ?
c/r

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 July 1982

Dear John,

Sri Lanka: Letter from Mrs Bandaranaike to The Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 24 June asking for advice on who should reply to Mrs Bandaranaike's letter and in what terms.

Mrs Bandaranaike was Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in the 1960s and again between 1970 and 1977. You will recall that in 1977 she suffered a landslide defeat at the hands of Mr Jayewardene when Mrs Bandaranaike's SLFP was left with only 7 out of 168 seats in Parliament. She was later found guilty of abuse and misuse of power by a Special Presidential Commission established by President Jayewardene under legislation enacted in 1978 to enable him to bring her to book for the alleged abuses of her period of Prime Ministership.

Mrs Bandaranaike alleges that her deprivation of civil rights and the legislation under which she was charged are in contravention of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) to which Sri Lanka is a party. She is debarred from holding public office and from voting but not (until an election is called) from electioneering or public speaking. She is however correct in saying that she cannot take her case to the UN Human Rights Committee (the body which monitors the Covenant) since Sri Lanka, though a State Party to the Covenant, is not a Party to the Optional Protocol which enables individuals to bring claims before the Committee. She is also correct in suggesting that Britain may on her behalf bring an inter-state claim against Sri Lanka, since both states have agreed to recognise, under Article 41 of the CCPR, the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider such communications.

Mrs Bandaranaike faces us with a difficult choice. There is little doubt that her claim is elegible for consideration by the Committee and that we are entitled to bring it to the Committee on her behalf. On the other hand, Mrs Bandaranaike's deprivation of civil rights is a highly political issue in Sri Lanka where manoeuvring is already beginning for the general elections due next year. Any indication that HMG has a sympathy for Mrs Bandaranaike would undoubtedly cause grave offence to the Sri Lanka Government and to President Jayewardene himself. Moreover Mrs Bandaranaike was not notably friendly towards Britain or British interests; President Jayewardene undoubtedly is.

/We should

We should therefore turn down Mrs Bandaranaike's request. Given that she is a former Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and could conceivably be Prime Minister again it would be useful to have some legal excuse for our refusal. Unfortunately no such excuse is available. We therefore suggest a polite rejection on the lines of the attached draft. Given that Mrs Bandaranaike is a former Prime Minister of a Commonwealth country it would be appropriate for the reply to issue from No 10, but it would be better to come from you rather than from the Prime Minister herself.

In order to protect our position on human rights we propose discreetly to inform the Sri Lankan Government of Mrs Bandaranaike's request and of our rejection of it, pointing out that we are aware how sensitive the issue is domestically in Sri Lanka. We would go on to say that other parties to the Covenant (eg the Scandinavians) may not take the same view of a similar request by Mrs Bandaranaike. It might therefore spare future embarrassment if the Sri Lankans were to look at Mrs Bandaranaike's allegations with regard to their obligations under the UN Covenant. If the Prime Minister agrees, we shall instruct our High Commissioner to speak in these terms once the reply to Mrs Bandaranaike has been delivered.

Yours ever,

Julian

for (J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~letter~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

A J COLES

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mrs Sirimavo R D Bandaranaike
65 Rosmead Place
COLOMBO 7
Sri Lanka

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 11 June. It has been carefully considered, but the ~~Prime Minister has concluded~~ conclusion has been reached that it would not be appropriate for the British Government to take the matter up in the way you propose.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

(2) Chased FCO again today - ringing back K.D. 13/7

MRS. BANDARANAIKE

12/7

(1) Rang FCO today. We should get advice early next week. 9/7

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June, 1982.

(3) Chased FCO. This is a difficult case, Dept had to consult the lawyers. Draft going to Douglas Hurd tonight. Should be here on Monday 19/7. KD. 16/7

(4) Reminder first chase on 19/7 DSG.

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mrs. Bandaranaike, President of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. I should be grateful for advice on whether a reply should be sent to this communication and, if so, who should sign it.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SIRIMA R. D. BANDARANAIKE

65, ROSMEAD PLACE,
COLOMBO 7,
SRI LANKA.

Mr Coles
A letter from Mrs Bandaranaike.
? how to deal
JB
23/6

R 22/6

11th June, 1982.

Your Excellency,

1. I am addressing this communication to you in view of the fact that Great Britain, being a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has made a declaration under Article 41 of that Covenant recognising the competence of the Human Rights Committee established under that Covenant to receive and consider communications from other States Parties to the effect that it is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.

2. My country, Sri Lanka, being a State Party to the aforesaid Covenant, has also made a declaration under Article 41. It is, however, not a State Party to the Optional Protocol which enables individuals who claim to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant to communicate directly with the Human Rights Committee. Therefore, a citizen of Sri Lanka whose rights under the Covenant have been violated can reach the Human Rights Committee only through the intervention of a State Party which, like Sri Lanka, has made a declaration under Article 41. This communication is being addressed to Your Excellency in the hope and belief that Your Excellency's Government, in the exercise and discharge of its responsibilities to the international community and to the cause of freedom and democracy, will consider it fit and proper to refer to the Human Rights Committee the facts and circumstances set out below.

3. I am the President of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, having been elected to that office in 1960 and been re-elected regularly thereafter. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party are the two major national political parties in Sri Lanka, and since 1952, these two Parties have, alternatively, been elected to office by the free votes of the people, cast freely at periodic general elections. I have served as Prime Minister from 1960 to 1965 and from 1970 to 1977, and as Leader of the Opposition from 1965 to 1970. At the last general election held in July 1977,

contd.

contd.

my Party was defeated, but I was elected to Parliament from the electoral district of Attanagalla which I had represented continuously from 1965.

4. In February 1978, my successor as Prime Minister, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene, secured the passage through Parliament of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, No.7 of 1978, which sought to establish a Special Presidential Commission with power to inquire into the conduct of public officers; to find whether any person has been guilty of any act of "political victimisation", "misuse or abuse of power", "corruption" or any "fraudulent act"; and to recommend whether such person should be made subject to "civic disability". Civic disability was defined in that law to mean the disqualification of a person -

(a) from being an elector and from voting at any election of the President of the Republic or of Members of Parliament;

(b) from being nominated as a candidate at any such election;

(c) from being elected or appointed as the President of the Republic or as a Member of Parliament;

(d) from holding any public office.

A constitutional provision which came into force in September of that year, empowered Parliament to impose the penalty of civic disability for a period not exceeding seven years on any person who had been found guilty by a Special Presidential Commission. The aforesaid offences were hitherto unknown to the law of Sri Lanka, and were being made punishable for the first time. For the first time, too, Parliament was being empowered to determine and impose penalties on named individuals.

5. In August 1978, a Special Presidential Commission consisting of three Judges appointed by President Jayewardene (who by then had assumed office as President of the Republic by means of an amendment to the Constitution which deemed him to be the first executive President with authority to exercise the powers of both offices of President and Prime Minister) commenced at ex parte sittings to record evidence relating to my Administration from 1970 to 1977. Within one month, by a constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court was reconstituted,

contd.

contd.

and eight Judges who were senior in office to two of the Commissioners were excluded by President Jayewardene from that Court. At the same time, the third Commissioner received from President Jayewardene an unprecedented promotion from the District Court to the Court of Appeal, by-passing the High Court.

6. On 9th November 1978, on my application, the Court of Appeal held that the Special Presidential Commission had no jurisdiction to inquire into, or report on, or make recommendations in relation to, my Administration between 1970 and 1977 since that was a period prior to the date of enactment of the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, and accordingly that Court issued a Writ of Prohibition against the aforesaid Commission. On 20th November, the Government of President Jayewardene rushed two Bills through Parliament. The first of these, the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry (Special Provisions) Act, No.4 of 1978, declared the judgment of the Court of Appeal to be null and void and the Writ of Prohibition issued by it to be of no force or effect in law, and gave retroactive effect to the offences referred to in paragraph 4 above. The second was a constitutional amendment which stripped the Court of Appeal of its writ jurisdiction in so far as a Special Presidential Commission was concerned.

7. In May 1980, I was summoned by the Special Presidential Commission to appear before it and to explain and justify to it certain action alleged to have been taken by me as Prime Minister during the period 1970-1977. I appeared before the Commission, but declined to submit to its jurisdiction since, inter alia, I considered that, in a parliamentary democracy, a Prime Minister and her Cabinet are collectively responsible and answerable for the government of the country only to Parliament, and ultimately to the people at a general election. I pointed out that if it was alleged that I had in any way contravened the law as it then existed, the Government was free to institute the appropriate proceedings before the regular courts. A copy of the statement made by me to the Special Presidential Commission on that occasion is annexed hereto.

contd.

contd.

8. After further ex parte proceedings, the Special Presidential Commission, on 25th September 1980, issued an interim report in which it held me guilty of the offence of "abuse and/or misuse of power". Two weeks previously, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had entered into force for Sri Lanka.

9. On 16th October, President Jayewardene caused two resolutions to be introduced in Parliament, and by utilising his parliamentary majority secured their passage on the same day. By the first resolution, Parliament imposed civic disability on me for a term of seven years. By the second resolution, Parliament expelled me from its membership.

10. On 17th October, President Jayewardene caused amendments to be moved to two Bills which were on the Order Paper of Parliament, and by utilising his parliamentary majority secured their passage into law. These two laws, the Parliamentary Elections Act, No.1 of 1981 and the Presidential Elections Act, No.15 of 1981, prohibited me from canvassing for, or acting as agent of, or speaking on behalf of, a candidate, or in any way participating in an election. These prohibitions are enforceable with fine and imprisonment.

11. In August 1981, President Jayewardene, purporting to act in the exercise of his powers under the Public Security Ordinance, took possession and control of the headquarters of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, and has so far failed to hand it back to me or to my Party.

12. No legal remedy is available to me, in terms of the present laws of Sri Lanka, against any of the Acts and resolutions of Parliament, the findings of the Special Presidential Commission, or the executive actions of President Jayewardene. In fact, in respect of each of the matters referred to above, the jurisdiction of the Courts to inquire into and pronounce upon, has been expressly taken away by law.

13. It has now been officially announced that the Parliamentary Elections Act will be further amended to disqualify all the candidates nominated by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and to strike out all the votes cast for all such candidates if I, as the leader of that Party, were to

contd.

do any act to further their candidatures, whether before or after an election is called. By this amendment to the law, President Jayewardene seeks to ensure that only the candidates of his Party will be qualified to be elected to Parliament.

14. In terms of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, a general election of Members of Parliament as well as the first national election of a President of the Republic are due to be held within the next eighteen months. By means of the aforesaid Acts and resolutions which President Jayewardene, the leader of the United National Party, has caused Parliament to pass with the aid of his parliamentary majority, he has ensured that I, as leader of the chief Opposition Party, will be disqualified from contesting him when he seeks election for the first time to the office of President of the Republic, and that I will also be disqualified from canvassing, speaking and in other ways participating in the general election campaign on behalf of the Party of which I am the elected leader. Consequently, President Jayewardene has eliminated his chief rival for presidential office and has deprived the main political Party in opposition to his own of effective leadership. Parliamentary democracy which has thrived in Sri Lanka for over three decades will thus be replaced by an autocratic one-Party system of government.

15. I submit that:

(a) The Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, No.7 of 1978, as amended by the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry (Special Provisions) Act, No.4 of 1978, under which I was found guilty of abuse and/or misuse of power in September 1980, and in terms of which civic disability was imposed on me in October 1980, is in violation of Article 15 of the Covenant, in that I have been held guilty of an offence on account of an act or omission which did not constitute an offence, under national or international law, at the time it was alleged to have been committed, and a penalty has been imposed on me when no such penalty was applicable to such act or omission at the time it was alleged to have been committed.

contd.

(b) The rsolution of Parliament imposing civic disability on me for a period of seven years and expelling me from Parliament to which I had been duly elected, constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in violation of Article 7.

(c) The provisions of the Parliamentary Elections Act, No.1 of 1981 and of the Presidential Elections Act, No.15 of 1981, under which I am prohibited from canvassing, speaking or in any way participating in an election, deprives me of my right to freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly, in violation of Articles 19 and 20.

(d) The aforesaid Acts and resolutions of Parliament and the proposed further amendment to the law relating to parliamentary elections, discriminate against me on the basis of my political opinions, contrary to Articles 2 and 26, and deny me the right and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote, and to be elected to public office, and deprive the millions of citizens of Sri Lanka who have and still support the Sri Lanka Freedom Party from giving free expression to their will at parliamentary and presidential elections, in violation of Article 25.

(e) the Special Presidential Commission, constituted as it was of Judges who had been hand-picked and promoted in advance by my chief political opponent; who derived their authority to determine the charges against me on a warrant issued by my chief political opponent; and who reported their findings and recommendations to my chief political opponent; was therefore, neither competent, independent, nor impartial, and was accordingly acting in violation of Article 14.

(f) The imposition on me of a penalty, not by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, but by Parliament, was in violation of Article 14.

contd.

(g) The seizure by President Jayewardene of the headquarters of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the proposed further amendment of the Parliamentary Elections Act, are acts calculated to interfere with the right to genuine elections, and are therefore in violation of Article 25.

16. I shall be glad to clarify, or submit further documentary material in support of, the statements made above, if Your Excellency should so require.

Yours sincerely,

Sirima R D Bandaranaike

Mrs. Sirima R. D. Bandaranaike.
President, Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

H. E. The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
United Kingdom of Great Britain.

STATEMENT

Made by

Mrs. Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike

M. P. for Attanagalla

and

President of the

Sri Lanka Freedom Party

before

THE SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

on 7th May 1980

INTRODUCTION

The appointment of Commissions of Inquiry to investigate matters of public concern, after a general election that has led to a change of government, has become a familiar phenomenon in Sri Lankan politics in the recent past. It has had in some cases a limited value to the extent that it has genuinely helped to inform the public of certain facts and circumstances that were unknown to them at the time of their occurrence. It has thus enabled people to form a proper judgement upon matters which may have been the subject of suspicions and apprehensions which had lend to undermine confidence in the working of public institutions and the conduct of public men. These advantages and benefits were achieved only when such inquiries were free from any partisan political interests and an objective and impartial investigation was made possible. It was for this reason only that in Parliament I welcomed the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry and was ready to participate in such an independent and unbiased inquiry.

The present Government of the United National Party has however shrewdly recognised its potentialities as an instrument for a very different purpose, namely, the non-violent yet cold-blooded liquidation of chosen political opponents, while seeking to maintain an illusion of legality and the appearance of a regular judicial process. With this objective in view in March 1978 it enacted the Special Presidential Commissions Law and later its amendment in the same year when certain legal infirmities in it were exposed, by using its steam-roller majority in Parliament. Both Bills were rushed through Parliament in order to conceal the Government's sinister purposes.

Its diabolic character became evident within a few months of the passing of the law. Its subsequent history in the ensuing two years, which I have set out in the pages that follow, reveals the true nature of these proceedings. This law has very dangerous portents for the future of democracy and has tragical consequences for the independence of the judiciary in Sri Lanka. It will in due time most certainly lead to the establishment of a dictatorship through the technique of disenfranchising political opponents. When noticed to appear before it by the Special Presidential Commission I made the following statement as I considered it my duty to warn the People and protest against this act of calculated political victimisation, even if in so doing this Government would, no doubt, vengefully proceed to impose civic disabilities upon me in ex-parte proceedings.

Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike

May 1980.

Honourable Members of the Commission, I am here today in response to the notice issued to me, requiring my attendance for the purpose of being heard on the matters set out therein. It has become necessary to explain my position in regard to the Special Presidential Commission Law and the proceedings so far had, considering what had happened during the past two years since its enactment. I do this in order to make my position clear, not only to the Members of the Commission and the Government that has been responsible for its establishment, but also to the People of this Country whose Prime Minister I have been for the longest period in our nation's history. It is especially my duty and responsibility to set out as fully as I can the reasons which have impelled me to take this stand to the vast numbers of my countrymen, who still continue to have their trust and confidence in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party which I have been privileged to lead for the last twenty years.

That task of leadership of the Party I undertook, in order to fulfil the great aspirations and carry forward the principles and policies of its founder, the late Prime Minister, Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who was struck down while engaged in the liberation of the down-trodden masses of our land from the economic and social oppressions of that time. In continuance of that noble endeavour I have sought to follow the path which he foreshadowed and have had, from time to time in that undertaking, to encounter strong opposition and obstacles of every kind, ranging from criminal acts of conspiracy to overthrow the government, defections and acts of betrayal within the Party, armed insurrection and the plots of certain reactionary elements both within the country and outside it. I am now confronted by a conspiracy of a different kind—one which cunningly wears the external cloak of the law but which is in reality both undemocratic, unlawful and unconstitutional and is the very negation of fairness and justice.

I want to make it clear to all concerned that the decision which I have taken is a carefuly considered response to a calculated political manoeuvre by the United National Party to force me into a period of political exile, in order that they may continue to rule this country without fear of challenge to their political hegemony and proceed in their unprincipled exploitation of the People of this country. I have taken this decision with a full awareness of the consequences which may follow if the Government decides to carry through its ill-conceived plan of enforcing my expulsion from Parliament. Confident in the support of the People of this country, I am prepared to face the consequences of this undemocratic act of the Government in seeking my disenfranchisement, the consequent deprivation of

my other civic rights and the denial of my right to participate fully in the political life of this Country by holding the highest public office in the land as the elected representative of the People and as the President of the Republic. I shall now proceed to explain the reasons for this decision and the grounds upon which I make this charge against the Government.

The Special Presidential Commission Law is in truth a legislative scheme, designed ex post facto, to disqualify selected political opponents on arbitrary grounds and is motivated by considerations of personal revenge and political expediency. It is a law which has as its ostensible object the creation of high standards in public life but which is really aimed at advancing the partisan political interests of the U.N.P. by undermining, if not destroying ,the possibility of effective political leadership in the S.L.F.P. It seeks thereby to assure for the present Government a further term of office with the help of certain political elements whom they hope to win over. It is aimed at removing from the political arena those who have always adopted an uncompromising attitude of opposition to the U.N.P. and who have refused to be inveigled into office in collaboration with the U.N.P. but have firmly stood outside it in the interests of vast numbers of people who oppose the U.N.P. and its reactionary policies. This law is aimed at creating a one-party state by arbitrarily disqualifying those who can provide an effective political challenge to the U.N.P. and who have the capacity to form an alternative government.

Despite its thin veneer of legality it is in reality an unscrupulous act of naked political victimisation and its fundamentally undemocratic action which reveals the authoritarian character of this Government, despite its pretensions of fairplay and justice. It follows the pattern of other legislation introduced by this Government, such as the Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities) Law Nos. 38 and 39 of 1978 which have in the most arbitrary fashion disqualified a large number of persons in the sphere of local government politics in this country. By this means the Government through its five-sixth majority in Parliament is seeking to ensconce itself permanently in office by systematically depriving their political opponents of their civic rights, a tactic well known among totalitarian governments.

Before the introduction of the Special Presidential Commission Law a citizen of Sri Lanka lost his civic rights, forfeiting his right to become a member of the Legislature upon a strictly judicial finding of the regular courts wich have been established for the judicial determination of disputes and controversies. The grounds on which a person could be so denied his civic rights were known in advance; they were precisely defined in the relevant laws, they had to be proved accoding to a strictly judicial procedure and everybody had a clear idea of the circumstances in which such consequences would follow.

The only laws which prescribed this penalty of forfeiture of civic rights were (a) the Bribery Act (b) the Public Bodies (Prevention of Corruption) Ordinance and (c) the Ceylon Parliamentary Elections (Order-in-Council). Under the first and second named laws, the offence was bribery and this offence was precisely defined. In the case of the first law the form of trial was the same as in any other criminal trial and the findings of the trial court were subject to appeal. Under the second named law the findings could be that of a court or a Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act. But even the decision of a Commission was subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior Courts. Under the Elections Law a person lost his civic rights only when an Election Judge found a person guilty of an election offence. These were either corrupt practices or illegal practices which were closely defined and from the findings of an Election Judge, who followed a strictly judicial procedure, there was a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The normal rules of evidence were observed in all these cases and every accused person or respondent had every opportunity of properly defending himself.

In contrast, the Special Presidential Commissions Law does not provide for any of these customary safeguards. A person aggrieved by its findings has no right of appeal. This Law says very clearly that any report, finding, order, determination, ruling or recommendation made by the Commission under that law shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any court or tribunal, by way of writ of otherwise. Findings of fact or law cannot therefore be questioned. Even manifest errors of law which vitiate the findings, especially when concepts are not defined, cannot be questioned. These are some of the disabilities and disadvantages which a person brought under it has to suffer even though the most far-reaching consequences follow upon its findings and recommendations.

The law does not define any of the terms of abuse of power, misuse of power, political victimisation, fraud or corruption. Although their general signification may be known, by reason of the absence of a clear definition there are no recognisable limits to the acts or forms of conduct or behaviour which the Commission can find as coming within these expressions. The Commission has not in any of the reports published so far sought to explain these concepts nor has it interpreted them in the manner of judicial exposition. Its findings are of an ad hoc nature and they do not afford much guidance to a person facing an inquiry. However erroneous the views of the Commission may be, however unsustainable on the evidence they may be shown to be, a person aggrieved by such a finding has no remedy.

The difficulty created thereby is increased by reason of the fact that the Commission has adopted a practice of not designating in the notice issued on a party, any particular allegation of fact as constituting any

specific offence or the prescribed form of statutory conduct. It is further aggravated by the practice adopted by the Commission of not informing a party-noticed even at a later stage of the specific offence that is alleged against such person. This is a denial of that elementary rule of natural justice of informing a person who is to suffer a penalty on the findings of a tribunal, of the exact nature or description of the offence charged. How can a person who has himself to speculate on whether he is being accused of abuse of power, misuse of power, corruption, fraud, political victimisation or a plain contravention of a law properly defend himself?

Although at the commencement of the inquiry when the Commission does not know what material will transpire in the course of the investigation it may not be able to specify the offence, yet at the end of this inquisitorial stage of the inquiry before the party-noticed is asked to explain and before the Commission embarks on the process of adjudication it must in all fairness inform the party-noticed of the charge of which he may be found guilty. This is the right of every accused person. This the Commission has signally failed to do in the inquiries so far concluded and has thereby violated the rules of natural justice.

The whole object behind the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry is to ascertain the truth in regard to any matter of public concern when by reason of the existence of rumours and suspicions of illegality or irregularity there is a crisis of confidence. It is absolutely essential that such an inquiry should be conducted with objectivity and fairness, free from any preconceived theories, any particular view point or political bias. In order that there should be such a scrupulous regard for fairness and truth, eminent jurists have considered it necessary, in a well-known report that has been published on the working of Commissions of Inquiry Act in the United Kingdom (often referred to as the Salmon Commission Report) that leading of evidence before the Tribunal should be undertaken by independent counsel, unaffected by any particular political affiliations.

But what has happened here? The Government has in the most flagrant manner disregarded this principle. The work of investigation has been done by lawyers who have strong political ties with the United National Party and the investigations have been conducted in a manner directed to subserve the partisan political purposes of the U.N.P. Senior Counsel leading the team of lawyers leading evidence before the Commission is none other than Mr. A. C. de Soyza, a member of the Working Committee of the U.N.P. who campaigned for the Party. So right from the start the Government was not interested in finding out the turth, but in presenting to the public its own view of what was the truth. Thus the entire proceedings before the Commission became an extravaganza of political propaganda against me and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

In a properly conducted Commission of Inquiry which has as its object the ascertainment of all the relevant facts, Counsel leading the evidence of a witness before the Commission must be completely open-minded in the conduct of the inquiry. In an inquisitorial proceeding he is expected after the preliminary examination-in-chief of each witness to test the veracity and accuracy of their testimony, by himself cross-examining them in order to expose any contradictions and exaggerations in the evidence. Nothing like that has happened before the Commission. Instead Counsel leading evidence has not sought to elicit from the witnesses what happened but has through leading questions quite openly suggested to each and every witness the answers expected of them. Since no attempt has been made by the Commission to stop this practice one must assume that it had the full approval of the Commission. In the result the very object of a Commission of Inquiry has been defeated. It has assumed the character of an ex parte prosecution even at the inquisitorial stage of the inquiry and has thereby negatived the very purpose and object of this stage of the inquiry.

The procedure that has in fact been adopted during the investigatory stage of the inquiry is contrary to the basic principle of the inquisitorial method. The Commission which is invested by law with this responsibility has left the direction and conduct of the investigation in the hands of a team of lawyers who, though they have been euphemistically described as counsel assisting the Commission, are in truth a team of prosecuting counsel who have conducted themselves regardless of the ordinary restraints expected of those who participate responsibly in a judicial proceeding. Senior Counsel who led evidence at this inquiry was permitted an unrestricted freedom to indulge himself in an orgy of character assassination and villification of myself and other members of my party which was calculated to cause maximum prejudice and has in fact destroyed in advance the possibility of an impartial and dispassionate consideration of the evidence. This was given the widest publicity in the press and repeatedly broadcast over the State radio, presumably as entertainment for supporters of the Party.

I have read the record of proceedings furnished to me and from the opening speech made by Senior Counsel for the State, and the selective manner in which witnesses have been called, it is clear that the preliminary stage of the inquiry which is expected to be of an exploratory nature has been undertaken not by the Commission but by a group of politically motivated lawyers who have not been interested in discovering the facts but in procuring evidence to give the Commission's findings the required political slant. Judging by what appears in the Report of the inquiry against Mr. Nihal Jayawickreme, the former Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, they certainly have achieved their ends.

From the record of proceedings of the inquiry held ɹo parte against me it is patent that evidence has been led in a thoroughly prejudicial manner. The record contains page after page of leading questions that leave no room for a voluntary or spontaneous answer from the witness. In permitting evidence to be led in this slanted fashion, the Commission has abdicated its primary responsibility of executing the terms of the Warrant which requires it to investigate the facts itself. Instead it has passively allowed itself to be led along the path of familiar accusations made against me by my political opponents.

This is not all. The Commission has been subjected to such a continuous torrent of prejudicial comments by the Government lawyers, while the evidence of witnesses was being led, in order to condition its thinking that it would require a superhuman effort for the Commission to rid itself of these preconceptions and approach the evidence objectively. The interruptions by Counsel made while witnesses were giving evidence, the numerous promptings and suggestions made quite openly while the evidence was being led make it a difficult matter to discern what the real evidence in the case is and leaves no room for doubt as to what has taken place in the private chambers of counsel who led the evidence of these witnesses.

The answers given by witnesses in their cross-examintion by Mr. S. Nadesan, Q.C. in Mr. Jayawickreme's inquiry reveals the manner in which these witnesses came to give evidence and clearly shows that the entire direction of the inquiry has been left to the initiative of the Government lawyers. This has led to a wholly distorted picture of the facts being placed before the Commission.

On the other hand the Commission was under a duty to direct the inquiry and not allow itself to be guided along a selected path. But that is not what happened and in the result a person in my position has neither the benefits of a truly inquisitorial proceedings which it should have been up to the stage that I was noticed, nor the advantage of an adversary proceeding which the inquiry should now assume—the chief of which is a specific charge with sufficient particulars as will enable a person to be properly defended. Neither requirement has been satisfied and the result will inevitably be a denial of elementary justice.

The preliminary inquiry before notice was issued on me has been so controlled by the Government lawyers that vital witnesses, whose evidence would have struck anyone as being material, have not been examined. It is indeed surprising how any inquiry into the regularity of the land transactions referred to in the annexe could have been undertaken by the Commission without examining either the Minister of Agriculture and Lands who was in charge of this subject and who made a statement in the National State Assembly when the matter was debated or the Chairman of the

Land Reform Commission on the question of the alleged evasion of the law. Is it because the highly profitable exercise of exchanging poor quality lands for excellent estate lands made by the leading members of the present Government would come to light?

In regard to the first five matters set out in the annexe, which are charges of a personal nature, my position is simply this. If I have contravened any law of this country, unlike the President who apparently needs a cloak of immunity, I am prepared to face any charge before the regular courts of the land. If it is alleged that I have defrauded the Government or that I am guilty of any act of corruption, caused damage or injury to any person, I invite the Government to institute appropriate legal proceedings before a court having jurisdiction where I can properly defend myself, where I shall at least be informed of the charges against me and the law which I have contravened, where the prosecutor will not be permitted to exert undue influence on the mind of the judge or the witnesses while the case is proceeding. I refuse to be tried by a Special Tribunal selected by my chief political opponent which is called upon to report to him, so that he and his party can decide on the punishment, namely, the period of my disenfranchisement.

Why is the Government reluctant to go before the established courts? It is simply because the Government can find no law under which they can punish me. They have therefore decided to create new offences and a new tribunal free to adopt its own procedure. Any act of the previous Government which the U.N.P. have opposed or criticised when in the opposition they wish to designate as an abuse of power or as a misuse of power or by some other nebulous term and prescribe a period of exile from office for those whom they allege are guilty of such conduct. It is thus a plain and simple case of political revenge and political victimisation under the guise of law.

It is the supreme irony that this law which is aimed at punishing abuse of power and political victimisation is itself a collossal act of abuse of parliamentary power and is the very instrument for the victimisation of their strongest political oppponent. It is no more and no less than a Machiavellian plan to exclude me from the political arena by securing my disenfranchisement and disqualification from political office for the next seven years, in the vain hope that the Government will thereby assure for itself another term of office.

Has the Government forgotten its own Constitution about which it boasts so much? This Constitution claims to guarantee persons from being found guilty of acts or omissions which at the time they took place did not constitute offences and against the infliction of punishment for acts which were not so punishable. The Special Presidential Law contradicts this very principle. The protection of the Constitution evidently does

not extend to the Government's political opponents. Perhaps they should have put that in a proviso, if they were honest about it.

The so-called object of this law has been said to be to ensure purity in public life. Nobody would argue about such a high moral purpose. But what is the reality? If the Government is honest in its professed objective, why was the warrant issued to this Commision restricted to the period 1970-77? Did the abuse of power or the misuse of power occur in the history of this country only during this period? Has it now ceased to exist? Is corruption in public life a thing of the past? Is political victimisation an obsolete concept? Is nepotism no more? Why has the Government despite allegations of unprecedented acts of corruption in the highest echelons of power refrained from appointing a Commission to inquire into its own misdeeds? The increase in corruption today is proportionate to the phenomenal increase in public expenditure. No doubt the Government feels secure thinking that since the imposition of civic disability requires a two-thirds majority, a future Government is unlikely to secure it with the new sysem of proportional representation. So the Government desires to use its five-sixths majority in order to extinguish any threat to its own position, through the medium of the deprivation of civic rights without any real fear of reprisal. Does the Government really believe that it can hoodwink the people of this country by this piece of chicanery? Already the people of this country have during the past three years seen through the hollow pretensions of this Government and their total incapacity to solve their problems. No doubt the Government is aware of this and thinks it is time that I should be banished from the political scene.

Why am I being brought before the Commission at this juncture? Long before I was noticed to appear on the 27th February 1980 several months ago last year, there were five others on whom notices had been served (according to the Commission's Second Interim Report) whose inquiries would have preceded mine. No doubt it would be convenient for the Government if I was disenfranchised at this time and expelled from Parliament. No doubt the Government is getting ready to impose on the People greater burdens and hardships which are the inevitable results of their reactionary policies, inefficiency and the collossal corruption. It is clear that despite its massive majority in Parliament the Government feels that it is daily becoming more and more unpopular because it has swiftly belied the expectations of those who fondly believed that the United National Party would usher in the millennium.

In regard to the allegations of a political nature which have been framed against me, my reply is that by virtue of my position as Prime Minister, I was vested with full executive power to carry on the administration of the Government which I had been elected to lead and the power and

authority which I held under the respective Constitutions then in force enabled me to govern this country together with the Cabinet of Ministers under a system of collective responsibility to the House of Representatives and thereafter to the National State Assembly, each of which was the respository of the sovereignty of the People. I must therefore quite plainly decline to explain, be answerable or be accountable in respect of the acts of my Government to any non-sovereign body or tribunal which has no constitutional authority to override or supersede the sovereign legislature, which alone had power and authority to question my actions or that of my Government and to which alone I was responsible.

Both under the 1946 Constitution Order-in-Council and the First Republican Constitution adopted in 1972, as the Prime Minister of a democratically elected Government, along with my Cabinet of Ministers, I was responsible to the Legislature and answerable to it for the government of the Country. Under both Constitutions the Legislature was supreme over all other organs of Government and especially under the Republican Constitution of 1972 there was no doubt about it and it was expressly provided that sovereignty was in the People and was inalienable. That sovereignty was exercised through the National State Assembly. My responsibility and the responsibility of my Cabinet of Ministers was to the National State Assembly which was the supreme instrument of State power and was the symbol of the People's sovereignty decreed by the Constitution to be inalienable. The National State Assembly was therefore inherently incapable of delegating its exclusive right and authority and the correlative duty vested in it to any other body or institution and certainly not to a non-sovereign body outside Parliament such as the Special Presidential Commission and which was not rcognised as having any such power or authority by the Constitution of 1972. If sovereignty means anything it means that the decisions, authority or approval granted by such sovereign body cannot be overridden or superseded or otherwise questioned, by a non-sovereign body. Throughout the period of my stewardship as Prime Minister the conduct of my Government was subject to questions and debate in Parliament. My directions to public officers and the administration of the departments under my immediate control were subject to question and debate in Parliament. So were the declarations of the state of emergency brought into force by the Governor-General and later the President, on my advice in consultation with my Cabinet of Ministers. Is this Government seeking to introduce a new principle of the vicarious liability of a Prime Minister for the collective decision and responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers? I am not prepared to violate the principle of Cabinet secrecy even if my case has to go by default. The Public Security Act has provided Parliament as the only body which has cognizance over the question of an emergency and

expressly declares that the fact of the existence or imminence of a State of public emergency shall not be called in question in any court. How can this Commission presume to inquire into the question of the declaration of the emergency when the law says it is not justiciable and that law remains unamended? The attempt made to question the need for the emergency through the evidence of a disgruntled policeman now in retirement and a self-confessed insurgent is hilarious indeed. Even the matters affecting my personal conduct such as the land transactions were the subject of debate in the National State Assembly and the Assembly on that occasion rejected the vote of no-confidence sought to be made against me by the opposition. If the N.S.A. as a sovereign body rejected that motion and rejected the allegations of impropriety on that occasion, a later Parliament cannot usurp that power, determine otherwise and seek to make me accountable or answerable to it now. Just as much as one Parliament cannot bind a future Parliament, the present Parliament cannot assume a jurisdiction or power that was once vested in a former Parliament that was itself a sovereign body. If what was properly a matter for the former Parliament cannot be usurped by the present Parliament, how can it possibly be assumed by a non-sovereign body like the Special Presidential Commission?

It is therefore plain to see that the Special Presidential Commission Law was ultra vires the First Republican Constitution of 1972 under which it was passed because in setting up a body external to the National State Assembly to examine the conduct of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers it contradicted both the principle of collective responsibility to Parliament provided by Article 92 and the principles that the sovereignty of the People was exercisable by the National State Assembly alone. (Articles 3 and 4). These were fundamental postulates of the system of government under which I functioned as Prime Minister. The present Government could not have validly secured the enactment of this Law No. 7 of 1978 without first amending these Articles of the Constitution, assuming that Articles 3 and 4 could in any event have been amended at all without a Constituent Assembly being summoned. My position is therefore that this Commision had at its very inception no legal or constitutional authority to enquire into my administration whether as Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence and External Affairs.

The constitutional validity of the original Bill could not be properly examined because it was rushed through as an urgent Bill under Article 55 of the 1972 Constitution and the Constitutional Court which was called upon to determine its validity in less than twenty four hours even with the assistance of the Attorney-General failed to detect these vital contradictions. So the Bill was not one passed as a Constitutional amendment as it was erroneously thought to be consistent with it. It did not receive

the Speaker's certificate to the effect that the Bill had been passed by a majority of two-thirds of the Assembly and the law could therefore not have been properly interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution of 1972 which was the fundamental law at the time.

After the Bill was enacted as Law No. 7 of 1978 and after the 1978 Constitution was adopted on the 7th September 1978 I challenged the jurisdiction of the Special Presidential Commission on several grounds. The Court of Appeal granted a Writ of Prohibition against the Commission upholding the contention that the Warrant was invalid as the law was not retrospective in its operation and did not authorise an inquiry in respect of a period prior to the law but did not rule in my favour in respect of the other grounds urged, including the question of the validity of the Law. Although the validity of the Law could not have been challenged as long as Article 48(2) of the 1972 Constitution was in force (i.e. till 7th September 1978) it did not operate as a bar after the repeal of that Constitution. But the judgement of the Court of Appeal erroneously proceeded on the basis that this Article was a bar against the validity of the law being impugned, although the 1972 Constitution had been repealed and was no longer law when the Application for a Writ of Prohibition was filed before the Court.

After the judgement of the Court of Appeal was given, when it was announced in Parliament by the Prime Minister that steps would be taken to amend the law so as to make it restrospective, on the advice of my lawyers, I sought leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against its judgement to the Supreme Court on the grounds decided against me and was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. I could not proceed with the appeal as Parliament was not content merely to amend the law and issue a fresh warrant but took the unprecedented step of declaring the judgement pronounced by the Court of Appeal null and void and of no force or effect whatsoever which left me with no judgement which could be reviewed in appeal. Parliament thereby deprived me of my legal remedy. This was first time in the history of this country when Parliament declared void a judgement of one of the Superior Courts of this country. In the result I was deprived of the right of prosecuting my appeal before the Supreme Court. Although His Excellency the President had publicly stated, even before the case began, that he would abide by the judgement of the Court, the Government went back on this declaration obviously determined to secure my disenfranchisement at any cost. Not only did the Government nullify the judgement, it went on to take away from the Court of Appeal any jurisdiction to deal with such an application, as if to intimidate the Court, in future cases. In view of the transfer of this jurisdiction to the Supreme Court I filed a second application for a Writ of Prohibition on the other grounds which had been

decided against me by the Court of Appeal on the very day the amending law was being debated in Parliament.

The strange events that followed show the implacable desire of Government to secure my enforced exile from politics. Perhaps the People of this country do not know that the amending Bill which the Government brought before Parliament and which was referred to the Supreme Court for its opinion on the 16th November 1978 under Article 122 (1) (b) of the 1978 Constitution was not the same Bill which finally received the Speaker's certificate as the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry (Special Provision) Act No. 4 of 1978. The Bill that was placed before the Supreme Court did not contain a vital and material clause which now appears in the Act as section 21 A which was to all intents and purposes a legislative direction to the Supreme Court as to the interpretation of this law. It provided that the provisions of this law and the warrant issued under it shall be so interpreted as to give the Commission jurisdiction to inquire into my conduct as Prime Minister notwithstanding that the conferment of such jurisdiction may be construed to be or to have been inconsistent with the provisions of section 46 (1) of the Constitution Order-in-Council of 1946 or section 92 or section 106(5) or of any other section of the Constitution of Sri Lanka of 1972. It was a legislative judgement given in advance of the Court hearing. This clause which was expressly and specifically designed to meet the grounds of attack on the law, that were being urged by me in my second application for a Writ of Prohibition then pending before the Supreme Court, did not appear in the Bill that was placed before the Supreme Court for its opinion. Such a provision would clearly have violated Article 4(c) of the Constitution of 1978 which requires the judicial power of the People to be exercised through the courts and not directly by Parliament and since it related to the powers of government which were included in the concept of sovereignty of the People, as provided by Article 3, it would have infringed Article 3 as well and no amendment of Article 3 was possible without the holding of a Referendum in compliance with Article 83.

So the Supreme Court which was specifically invited to consider the question, whether the amending Bill was one which required the approval of the People at a Referendum and compliance with Article 83 of the Constitution, gave its opinion on a Bill which did not contain the all important section 21A that violated Articles 4(c) and 3, the amendment of which would have required a Referendum. This Government has therefore by-passed the Referendum procedure for obvious reasons. It has transgressed its own Constitution because it suited them in their relentless desire to disqualify me. This is no accident as the Government would not have dared to place this issue before the People at a Referendum which the Supreme Court would have held was necessary, had section

21A been included in the Bill on which it gave its opinion. If the Government is sincere in its desire to respect the wishes of the People and its own Constitution, it should even at this stage hold a Refeendum on this question.

Throughout the Second Reading of the amending Bill not one member of the House referred to this section despite a lengthy debate on the Bill simply because it was not there in the Bill. It was not moved as an amendment during the Committee stage of the Bill and this fact is borne out by the only version of Hansard dated 20th November 1978 that is yet available. If this clause was moved on the floor of the House and a copy of the amendment was either read or handed over I could not have failed to see its significance.

Some days later when my lawyers examined the enacted law No. 4 of 1978 they found to their dismay and to my own amazement this new section 21A in the Act which means that Parliament had in effect delivered the judgement in my second application for a Writ of Prohibition even before the case was heard by the Supreme Court. When the case came up before the Supreme Court at my request the case was postponed in order that the question of the authenticity of this section in the Act No. 4 of 1978 be investigated. The regularity of the inclusion of this section in the amending Act was raised in Parliament by the Hon. Leader of the Opposition. The Prime Minister at this stage quite openly stated that he had, while the amending Bill was being debated, received a copy of my second application for a writ from a source which was not identified and by implication admitted that this section had been specifically introduced later to meet the very points raised in my new application before the Supreme Court. The Speaker ruled that the amendment had been duly passed. I then requested the appointment of a Select Committee to go into the extent to which the Government has gone in their single-minded object to secure my disqualification from standng for the office of President in the election due to take palce in 1984. I have been denied the right which every citizen has of going before the highest court for a just determination of my case. After all when this has happened can I have any reasonable expectation of a fair trial?

The Government has in the most unashamed and flagrant manner interfered with the Judiciary of this country. With the inauguration of the new Constitution all the Judges who held office in the former Supreme Court and the High Court Judges ceased to hold office. Some judges of the former Supreme Court were appointed to the Court of Appeal which was in fact a demotion as it was no longer the highest court, while other members of the old Supreme Court were elevated to the new Supreme Court over the heads of Senior Colleagues and yet others found themselves compulsorily retired without any charge being made against them or a word of explanation offered. This is the way the Government respect-

ed the Judiciary of this country. While professing to create an independent judiciary it has in the most cynical and scandalous manner violated the principle of judicial independence and intimidated the Judiciary.

Another instance of the scant respect the Government has for the Judiciary of this country is the way in which its representative before the Commission at its initial stages assailed the conduct of members of the Judiciary including judges of the Supreme Court who enjoyed constitutional protection against such attacks. The Special Presidential Commissions Law before its amendment did not authorise the Commission to inquire into the conduct of a Judge in view of these overriding constitutinal provisions. But the Commission permitted them to be subjected to scandalous attacks notwithstanding these safeguards and notwithstanding the law of contempt of court. This is the extent to which the Government has overawed the Judiciary of this Country. I think the whole country would deplore, as much as I do, the way in which this Government has by this law embroiled the Judiciary in partisan political conflicts. In this way this Government has acused and will continue to cause grave damage to one of our most valued institutions.

There are other reasons why I feel that no useful purpose would be served by participating in these proceedings.

The virtual complainant in respect of some of the matters that are the subject of the inquiry against me is none other than His Excellency the President himself. For example, the charge of prolonging the period of the State of Emergency, approving the disruption of the so-called satyagraha of the U.N.P. in 1973, directing the I.G.P. in regard to inquiries on complaints made by politicians which included a complaint of an alleged threat on the life of Mr. J. R. Jayewardene are criticisms made by the President himself. They are all political criticisms and allegations levelled at my Government and myself by the leader of the U.N.P. both in Parliament and outside it to which replies have been given at the appropriate time. Any finding in my favour on these allegations must by necessity affect the credibility of the President himself who is the virtual complainant though he is not a witness before the Commission and cannot even be summoned to give evidence.

Now it is the President and not the Chief Justice who has chosen the three members of the Commission. In March 1978 the President himself chose them from over fifty members of the judiciary who were eligible under Section 2 of the Law for appointment. No doubt the present members of the Commision were appointed, as the warrant says, by reason of the great trust and confidence the President has reposed in them. But members of the Commission unlike members of the Judiciary have no security of tenure, hold office at the President's pleasure and are in law removable

by him at any time. It is such a Commission which is called upon to examine and report to the President, among other things on the truth of the very complaints which he himself has made against me and my Government on the floor of the National State Assembly and outside it. Is this not a remarkable situation?

I cannot think of any system of justice anywhere in the world where judges are called upon to report to the virtual complainant, upon a matter which personally concerns the complainant, as to whether or not the complaint is true and the person accused is guilty. Yet this is what the Commission is called upon to do. That is not all. On receiving this report it is the President who is the complainant and his political group in Parliament and not an impartial court that will determine the punishment namely, whether or not civic disabilities are to be imposed on their chief political opponent and if so, for how long! It is the complainant and his supporters who will decide on the punishment. Judging by the speed with which the Government acted in the case of Mr. Nihal Jayawickreme I have no doubt as to what the U.N.P. intends to do in my case. The question is, am I expected to co-operate in this conspiracy to bring about my own political destruction?

The President having appointed persons of his choice as Commissioners has at various times at public meetings expressed in no unmistakable language what he considers to be the outcome of these proceedings. Thus he is reported to have stated, according to the Ceylon Daily News of the 7th August 1978, shortly after the Commission began its sittings at a U.N.P. rally held on 5th August at Kotahena, after recounting various atrocities alleged to have been committed by the prevous government:

> "There was no law and order during her regime. One had only to read or listen over the radio to Mr. A. C. de Zoysa's address to the Presidential Commission these days to realise what injustices had been committed during that period."

Can this Commission reject what His Excellency proclaims to be the truth? At the same meeting the Prime Minister is reported to have stated:

> "Mrs. Bandaranaike was trying to make the people forget what she and her Ministers had done during their seven years in office. But they were being exposed before the Presidential Commission appointed to probe their misdeeds."

Neither of these news items have been contradicted. These are unashamed attempts in public to influence the Commission appointed by it.

Ordinarily any person who presumes to interfere with the work of a court or judicial body is liable to be punished for contempt of court and is liable to be deprived of his civic rights under Atricle 116 (2) of the Constitution. But His Excellency is above the law and by Article 35 of the

Constitution he is granted immunity from suit in respect of any thin done by him in his official or private capacity. So he can with impunity interfere in this proceeding in which he is so vitally interested.

I say he is vitally interested in this matter because if I am found gu by his nominees and deprived of my civic rights by his own political party which constitutes five-sixth of the present Parliament he will have ensured that his strongest political opponent eliminated in advance from the contest at the very first election to be held for the election of the President of the Republic. I say this is the whole purpose and object behind this elaborate facade of legality of a Commission of Inquiry.

Having regard to all these matters I have reasonable grounds to believe that my participating in the proceedings of this Commission will serve no useful purpose except to give the U.N.P. an opportunity of humiliating me in the same way that the Government's lawyers sought to denigrate me and my family and indeed everybody else who have fallen foul of the Government. There will begin another carnival of calumny which will be given full publicity in the Government newspapers and then broadcast over the State radio. I shall not be a willing party to such humiliation and a revival of that disgraceful exhibition even if it means the end of my political career. It will be an insult to the People of this country whose Prime Minister I have had the distinguished honour to be. I have always accepted the judgment of the People without bitterness or rancour. If at a fairly held election it is their wish and decision that I should not lead this country again I shall certainly accept that but I shall not bow down to the machinations and ruthless desires of this Government which seeks to destroy me politically and destroy democracy in this country. Even though courts of the land have been barred from giving me relief, I shall take this issue before the People who will ultimately decide our destiny.

I do not honestly believe that in the circumstances, which I have stated, it will be possible for me to have a fair trial and a fair opportunity of exonerating myself. For these reasons I desire to inform the Honourable Members of this Commission that I do not intend to participate further in these proceedings and accordingly I am now withdrawing from it. I thank Your Honours for the patient hearing given to me.

Printed at Sri Lanka Mahajana Newspapers Ltd., 301, *T. B. Jayah Mawatha, Colombo* 10.

File
Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

Thank you for your letter of 26 May enclosing a greeting card from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister. This has been brought to Mrs. Thatcher's attention.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A. T. Moorthy.

File

Sri Lanka

3 June 1982

INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF SHELTER FOR THE HOMELESS

As you know, following your letter of 30 April, the Prime Minister replied to Mr. Premadasa's letter of 16 February.

I now enclose a copy of a further letter from Mr. Premadasa which would appear to bring the correspondence to an end for the time being.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

3 June 1982

Thank you for your letter of 3 June enclosing a letter from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister. I shall indeed place it before Mrs. Thatcher.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A. T. Moorthy.

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

Our Ref: ECON/INT/AID

3 June 1982

My dear John

I have pleasure in enclosing a communication addressed to the Prime Minister. – dated 18/5/82 T 1080A/82

It is from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

I shall be thankful if you will find it possible to let me know, in due course, when you have placed the communication before the Prime Minister.

Warm regards and all good wishes

Yours sincerely

(A.T. Moorthy)

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

From the High Commissioner

010

High Commission of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

26 May 1982.

Dear Mr. Alexander

I would be very grateful if you could kindly submit the enclosed Greeting Card from the Hon'ble R. Premadasa, M.P., Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, to the Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister of Great Britain.

All good wishes

Yours sincerely

A.T. Moorthy.

Mr. Michael Alexander,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
of Great Britain,
10, Downing Street,
London SW 1.

නිර්මාණය : ඇල්. ටී. මන්ජුසිරි
வடிவமைப்பாளர் : எல். ரீ. மஞ்சுஸிறி
Designed by L. T. Manjusiri

Printed at the Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka

"ලිහිණියෝ සතර දෙනෙක් සතර දිශාවන් දිව අවුත්.....

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— පූජාවලිය, 11 වැනි පරිච්ඡේදය —

நான்கு பறவைகள்
நான்கு திசைகளிலிருந்து வந்து
எனது பாதங்களின் அருகில்
தமது முன்னைய நிறங்களைவிட்டு மாறி
வெண்ணிறம் ஆகின.

அதாவது என்னை வந்து சேருபவர்கள்
பல நிறம், பல இனம்,
பல கருத்து, பல தோற்றம்
பெற்றிருந்தாலும் ஒரினமாகி
'அரஹத்' நிலை அடைவார்கள்.

— பூஜாவலிய—அதிகாரம் 11 —

"Four birds from the four directions, having shed their original colours became white. The different colours represent different races, different nationalities, different ideologies, and different philosophies. When they came to me they shed all their differences and became my followers and attained Arahantship."

- Pujavaliya–Chapter 11 -

වෙසක් පැතුම
வெசாக் வாழ்த்துக்கள்
Vesak Greetings

එක්සත් වෙමු
ஒன்றுபடுவோம்
Let us unite

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இலங்கைப் பிரதமர், திருமதி
பிரேமதாச, சஜித், துலாஞ்சலி

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF SRI LANKA,
MRS. R. PREMADASA, SAJITH & DULANJALI

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Great Britain.

from :
THE PRIME MINISTER
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA

SUBJECT

R. PREMADASA, M.P.
Prime Minister

cc Master Ops

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1088/82

My No.PDD/PL/2/17/81
May 18,1982.

Dear Prime Minister,

I thank you very much for your letter dated 4 May,1982 on the subject of the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

I am deeply grateful to you for your great personal interest in this subject and for the kind sentiments expressed in your letter.

I am glad to inform you that the Vth Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements, which concluded recently in Nairobi, had made an unanimous recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly for the adoption of a carefully considered programme of activities prior to and during the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless in 1987.

The United Kingdom, I am aware, has given considerable support at International gatherings for this subject and I am confident of continued support from your Government.

Yours sincerely,

(R. Premadasa)

The Rt.Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 95 P/82

FILE

cc Master
ops

BK

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 May, 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 16 February, drawing attention to the United Nations decision to designate 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

I agree that the provision of shelter for the needy is one of the world's important problems. Your letter is a timely reminder of your valuable initiative in urging the international community to pay greater attention to this issue. We shall look carefully at the comments and recommendations that emerge in the United Nations for measures and activities to be undertaken in relation to the Year.

I am afraid that I cannot guarantee that we shall be able to make a financial contribution but we shall certainly be glad to consider carefully how we in the United Kingdom could most appropriately mark the Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable R. Premadasa, M.P.

RM

EK

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 April 1982

Type letter pl.
A.S.C. 30/4.

Dear John,

International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (1987)

Thank you for your letter of 16 April in which you asked for a draft reply to a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr Premadasa, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, about the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

I enclose a draft reply in sympathetic but non-committal terms. We have no great enthusiasm for international years. With the obvious recent exception of the Year of Disabled Persons, they make little contribution in real terms to their causes. They are by their frequency in danger of becoming devalued.

Still less do we favour contributions to the voluntary funds set up by the United Nations to finance such Years. These funds are not always well administered, nor do we have any say in how the money is disbursed. Where we have in the past chosen to mark the Years by some international action we have done so by earmarking suitable projects from our bilateral Aid Programme.

Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly be interest domestically among voluntary organisations concerned with shelter for the homeless in using the Year to promote their interests. We have accordingly ensured that the Department of the Environment are aware of the event, so that they can consider its implications.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teleletter~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mr R Premadasa
Prime Minister of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF SHELTER FOR THE HOMELESS

Thank you for your letter of 16 February, drawing attention to the United Nations decision to designate 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

I agree that the provision of shelter for the needy is one of the world's ~~real and~~ important problems. Your letter is a timely remainder of your valuable initiative in urging the international community to pay greater attention to this issue. We shall look carefully at the comments and recommendations that emerge in the United Nations for measures and activities to be undertaken in relation to the Year.

I am afraid that I cannot guarantee that we shall be able to make a financial contribution but we shall certainly be glad to consider carefully how we in the United Kingdom could most appropriately mark the Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

MT 30/4.

SUBJECT

Sri Lanka

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 81/82

cc Master
Ops

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1982

Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 29 March.

I have noted with admiration and satisfaction your Government's success in coping with the very serious economic problems which faced you during 1980 and the early months of last year. I was therefore sorry to learn of your fears that an even more difficult period might lie ahead.

So far as British development assistance is concerned, I have been pleased to note that the Victoria Dam project continues to make good progress. We disbursed about £20 million on this in 1981/82, following the £27 million spent in 1980/81. The first inter-governmental review of the project is taking place in Sri Lanka this month, and we shall continue to monitor progress carefully.

You may be sure that the United Kingdom delegation at the Aid Group Meeting in Tokyo in July will be instructed, as usual, to take a constructive part in the discussions, and that we shall continue to work with the World Bank and others to assist Sri Lanka's economic growth and development.

All good wishes,

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

His Excellency Mr. J. R. Jayewardene.

Sri Lanka

R M

16 April,1982

INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF SHELTER FOR THE HOMELESS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka about the above subject. I should be grateful if you could in due course let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

R M

16 April,1982

Thank you for your letter of 16 April enclosing a letter from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister. I have placed this before Mrs Thatcher and a reply will be sent as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr A T Moorthy

T 75/82

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

Our Ref: ECON/INT/AID

16 April 1982

My dear John

I have pleasure in enclosing a communication addressed to the Prime Minister.

It is from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

I should be thankful if you would find it possible to let me know, in due course, when you have placed the communication before the Prime Minister.

All good wishes

Yours sincerely

(A.T. Moorthy)

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1982

Type pl.
APR 19/4.

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 8 April, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter from the President of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister. I now enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

President Jayewardene writes every year at about this time to Heads of donor Governments, to draw attention to his country's needs in the context of the annual meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group. This year, the Group will meet in Tokyo on 8 and 9 July. The President's letter gives an account of Sri Lanka's commendable recent economic restraint, and expresses concern about the problems which lie ahead. He is fully aware of our grant of £100 million for the Victoria Dam project, however, and he will not be expecting anything further from the United Kingdom at this stage. We shall continue to do everything we can to assist Sri Lanka's development and especially to strengthen the country's capacity to operate and maintain the Victoria Dam and its related power station.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Your Reference

His Excellency Mr J R Jayewardene
President of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 29 March.

I have noted with admiration and satisfaction your Government's success in coping with the very serious economic problems which faced you during 1980 and the early months of last year. I was therefore sorry to learn of your fears that an even more difficult period might lie ahead.

So far as British development assistance is concerned, I have been pleased to note that the Victoria Dam project continues to make good progress. We disbursed about £20 million on this in 1981/82, following the £27 million spent in 1980/81. The first inter-governmental review of the project is taking place in Sri Lanka this month, and we shall continue to monitor progress carefully.

/You may

Enclosures—flag(s).....

You may be sure that the United Kingdom delegation at the Aid Group Meeting in Tokyo in July will be instructed, as usual, to take a constructive part in the discussions, and that we shall continue to work with the World Bank and others to assist Sri Lanka's economic growth and development.

BR 19/4

File

289

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 April 1982

BP

SRI LANKA AID GROUP

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the President of Sri Lanka seeking increased assistance from donors at the meeting of the above Group. I should be grateful if you could let me have in due course a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Michael Power (Overseas Development Administration).

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 April 1982

Thank you for your letter of 7 April enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. I shall place this before the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. A. T. Moorthy.

010

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

My No: ECON/AID/1/A

7 April 1982

My dear John

I enclose herewith a letter addressed to The Rt Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister by H.E. J R Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The letter relates to the forthcoming meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group to be held in Tokyo on 8 and 9 July 1982.

I should be grateful if you would kindly place the letter before the Prime Minister as early as possible.

I would also be thankful to have your confirmation, in due course, when this has been done.

All good wishes

Yours sincerely

(A.T. Moorthy)

John Coles Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London SW1

T 64A/82

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 64 A/82

President of Sri Lanka

29th March, 1982

My dear Prime Minister,

The 18th Meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group convenes in Tokyo on July 8th and 9th, 1982. At these meetings, the donor community and representatives of my Government participate in a frank exchange of views on Sri Lanka's economic situation and its external assistance needs. May I take this opportunity to thank you and your Government for the close interest you have shown in our development programs and the generous assistance you have rendered in support of them. We have found the views expressed by your delegation at past meetings very helpful in determining our priorities. This letter is intended to keep you personally informed of the impact of recent economic trends on our development strategy and on our external assistance needs. I trust that this will help you formulate your own development assistance programs to Sri Lanka in the light of our changing needs.

You will recall that during 1980 the economy had come under enormous pressure from a sharp deterioration in our terms of trade just when our development programs were acquiring momentum. Inflation rose sharply and our balance of payments position worsened. We responded to these developments through a series of stabilisation measures designed to reverse the trends that had set in during 1980.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.

I will not burden you with the nature and details of these policies, since these have been described in documents circulated to you by my Government, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. What I do wish to indicate to you is that these stabilisation policies have met with success. The performance of the economy improved considerably during 1981 despite a further deterioration in our terms of trade, particularly in the form of unexpectedly low tea prices. The extent of the adjustment achieved in 1981 has been somewhat larger than we thought it possible to bring about. Strict budgetary discipline combined with substantial reductions in many of our development programs have enabled us to greatly reduce the size of the overall budget deficit and to decrease the dependence of the budget on inflationary bank borrowing. A more desirable budgetary outcome together with strict monetary and fiscal policies enabled a substantial reduction in the rate of inflation and a marked improvement in the balance of payments.

That this was achieved without any sacrifice in terms of economic growth, which recorded an increase of 5.8% was a considerable achievement. This turnaround enabled us to meet the Fund's performance criteria the final purchases under the SDR 260 Mn. arrangement. I understand Sri Lanka is one of the few countries to have successfully completed an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement.

While developments during 1981 are a source of considerable satisfaction to us, we are now entering an even more difficult period and one in which we look to you for understanding and assistance. The major expenditures on development which we have undertaken are beginning to peak in 1982 and 1983. In order to prevent

the overheating of the economy, my Government has decided that no new projects would be commenced until 1984. Only those already in our Investment Programme 1982-86 will be considered. At the same time, however, we are faced with the first serious setback to our food production since 1977. A drought of unprecedented severity affected much of the country in January and February this year. This has had a marked impact on agricultural production in the country. Despite this unforeseen dry spell, we estimate only a modest decline in rice production, which reflects the remarkable success our policies have enjoyed in raising rice yields. Nevertheless, the drought has forced us to abandon our plans not to import any rice during 1982. We have been compelled to import 200,000 tons of rice. At the same time, widespread relief has to be given to hundreds of thousands of farmers whose main source of income has been seriously jeopardized by the drought.

The drought, coinciding as it does with the peaking of expenditures in the public investment programme, has placed a great strain on our domestic and external resources. We are at the same time anxious to ensure that the momentum of our development effort does not slacken. We are, as we have demonstrated in the past, prepared to make whatever adjustments that appear feasible and necessary, short of imposing excessive hardships on our people or of sacrificing our firm commitment to a liberalized economy, free of controls and restrictions.

To make this possible, I must once again urge donor countries who have been generous to us in the past, to assist us in overcoming our present difficulties. In

particular, I would urge you to consider increasing your support to on-going projects which have now become under-financed because of cost over-runs. The quick disbursing food and commodity aid pipeline is rather small at the moment, and needs urgent replenishment. In providing such assistance, I would also urge careful review of procedures so as to permit a quick use of such assistance. We would naturally be particularly grateful for any untied assistance that you are able to provide.

With my warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Jayewardene

(J.R. Jayewardene)
PRESIDENT

R. PREMADASA, M.P.
Prime Minister

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 75/82

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA

cc Maris
Ops

No.PDD/PL.2/17/81

February 16,1982.

My dear Prime Minister,

International Year of Shelter
for the Homeless

As you may be aware the UN General Assembly at its XXXVIth Sessions last year decided to designate in principle 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

This Resolution followed a proposal made by me to the UN General Assembly at its XXXVth Sessions in 1980. On that occasion, I envisaged the provision of adequate housing as a basic concept in the global assault on poverty. The General Assembly then requested the UN Commission on Human Settlements at its IVth Session in Manila in April 1981, to consider and report on this proposal to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. The present Resolution is based on the draft submitted by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of this report. The Resolution has therefore been the subject of careful consideration and meeting of minds. I am deeply gratified that the General Assembly saw fit to adopt this Resolution by consensus.

The problem of Shelter for the Homeless in developing countries particularly, has increased to crisis proportions. It is a humanitarian issue which should evoke the concern of all states, regardless of their levels of development. Furthermore, its magnitude is such that a co-ordinated effort involving the entire international community is called for. As stated in the preamble of the UN Resolution, the declaration of an International Year of Shelter for the Homeless would undoubtedly serve to increase public awareness at local,national,regional and global levels and lead to a significant improvement in the situation.

(2/..)

The Government of Sri Lanka has made the provision of adequate housing an integral part of its development strategy and attaches great importance to the successful implementation of the UN Year and its Programme. This goal would require for its fruition the careful preparation of a specific programme of measures and activities to be undertkan prior to and during the International Year.

The UN General Assembly calls for the funding of this work to be based in principle on voluntary contibutions. I am confident that your Government will readily assist in the financing of this International Year as requested in the Resolution. This would facilitate the task of the Secretary-General of the UN who has undertaken the preparatory work with regard to this aspect as requested by the General Assembly.

The Government of Sri Lanka and I would greatly appreciate your kind consideration of this matter.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

(R. Premadasa)
Prime Minister
of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Her Excellency
The Rt.Hon.Margaret Thatcher M.P.,
Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 22 December 1981

Dear Roderic,

Sri Lanka: Visit of Foreign Minister

Mr. Hameed called on the Prime Minister for 15 minutes this morning. He explained that the Tamil Co-ordinating Committee in London intended to make a unilateral declaration of independence on 14 January and were expected to set up the headquarters of a provisional Government. Sri Lanka found it very difficult to understand their motives. The Tamil Party in the Sri Lankan Parliament, which had originally stood for separatism, had condemned the moves planned by the Tamil Co-ordinating Committee. In Sri Lanka, there were regular monthly meetings between the Government and the TULF. The climate surrounding the Tamil issue, compared with that which obtained five years ago, was positive. There was much understanding on both sides. The Tamil group in London clearly did not want to promote the dialogue. The Sri Lankan Government was worried about the likely repercussions of the moves which were planned.

The Prime Minister agreed that it was difficult to understand the motives for these steps, especially when the President of Sri Lanka was making tremendous efforts to reconcile the two communities. But there were always people for whom reconciliation has no attractions. She doubted whether the Tamil Co-ordinating Committee's plans would have any repercussions. Within the United Kingdom they were not a significant group. Their action would be unlikely to cause HMG any difficulties. We were perfectly prepared to state publicly that the President of Sri Lanka was making valiant efforts to reconcile the two communities. But, of course, as long as the Tamil group's activities fell within the law, there was no action we could take against them.

Mr. Hameed said that the Sri Lankan Government well understood the legal position. They were simply anxious that the excellent relations between our two countries would in no way suffer.

Mr. Hameed said that he might go on to Paris and Bonn. But it was the British reaction which was important.

The Prime Minister sent her greetings to President Jayewardene. She commented that The Queen had had a most wonderful visit to Sri Lanka and had frequently commented on the enthusiastic crowds.

Yours ever,

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sri Lanka

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 December 1981

Dear John,

Sri Lanka: Visit of Foreign Minister

The Prime Minister has agreed to receive Mr Hameed, the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, at 10.15 on 22 December. I attach briefing.

Mr Hameed will have a meeting on 23 December with Mr Hurd (who will be visiting Sri Lanka in January) and will call on Mr Raison at the Home Office the same day.

The Sri Lankans have asked us not to draw attention to the visit. We have explained that callers on the Prime Minister are usually listed for the press; and that if it were to become known that Mr Hameed has called without being listed this would arouse special interest. The Sri Lankan High Commission accepts this. If explanations are necessary, perhaps the Press Office could say that Mr Hameed, a Commonwealth Foreign Minister on a private visit, asked to pay a call and was received briefly as a courtesy. The Sri Lankan High Commissioner, Mr Moorthy, will accompany Mr Hameed.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY FOREIGN MINISTER OF SRI LANKA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh enjoyed very much the 4 day State Visit to Sri Lanka in October. A highly successful visit in friendly and calm atmosphere.

2. Pleased that the violence between Tamil and Sinhalese community in the summer has abated. Admire President Jayewardene's calm and firm handling of situation.

3. Welcome President Jayewardene's continued efforts to reconcile communities and to isolate extremists. Hope that moderate opinions in both communities will prevail.

4. Regret that Tamil Co-ordinating Committee operates in London. We keep a close eye on its activities and shall continue to do sc. Provided they keep within British law, we have no power to prevent their political activities, even when they run counter to the policies of the British Government.

5. Will you visit other capitals in Europe? Suggest important to explain this delicate situation frankly and fully to Government of India.

BACKGROUND

1. President Jayewardene has sent his Foreign Minister urgently to London to deliver a personal message to the Prime Minister about the Tamil problem. We believe it relates to the activities in London of the ''Tamil Coordinating Committee'' (TCC), a small group of Tamil residents in London who produce skilful propaganda but who, according to the Security Service, have little capacity to mount demonstrations. They were originally establised as the mouthpiece of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a moderate Tamil party which constitutes the official opposition in the Sri Lanka parliament and which formally seeks Tamil independence by constitutional means but is probably prepared to accept much less. The son of the leader of the TULF, Amirthaligam, lives in London and has established a UK branch. He has a personal feud with the leader of the TCC, K Vaikunthavasan, although he is also a member of the TCC. K Vaikunthavasan has Communist connections, but there is no evidence of Communist funding of the TCC. (The most likely source is wealthy Tamil businessmen).

2. On 12 December TCC issued a statement in London that on 14 January 1982 they intended to declare an independent Tamil State (Eelam) and form a provisional government in exile. This decision by the London Tamil group seems aimed at gaining international publicity.

3. There has been no mention of the 'Declaration of Independence' in either the UK or Sri Lankan press and the only reference to it has been a subsequent TULF statement dissociating the party from such ''irresponsible moves by overseas Tamils'' and condemning them as being unhelpful to the advancement of the Tamil cause. Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan Government are clearly concerned at this development and its consequences at home and abroad. Given the TULF's attitude, our High Commissioner in Colombo does not believe that it will affect the efforts by the President to seek reconcilation with the Tamils. The danger is that it will lead to further violence by 'Tamil Tigers' and a renewed backlash by Sinhalese chauvinists. Even without further violent incidents by

/Tamils

Tamils this move will tend to inflame Sinhala extremists and may weaken the President's ability, though not his resolve, to isolate them.

4. It would clearly be difficult to meet a request (if one were made) to limit the activities of Tamil exiles in London. While we would wish to be as helpful and sympathetic as possible to the Head of State of this moderate, non-aligned member of the Commonwealth with whom we maintain excellent bilateral relations we can do nothing to prevent the TCC's activities unless they break the law.

5. It would be appropriate however for the Prime Minister to welcome the efforts being made by President Jayewardene to reconcile the two communities in Sri Lanka. The UNP Government was elected overwhelmingly in 1977 with a manifesto which pledged reconciliation and changes to redress the grievances of minority communities. The new 1978 Constitution grants certain fundamental rights: all Sri Lanka citizens are guaranteed equality of status in every field irrespective of race, religion or origin. The Tamil language has been given the status of a 'national' language (though Sinhalese remains the official language), provisions have been made for its more widespread use in business and education, and the Government began earlier this year to bring into operation its plans for strengthened local government which is particularly designed to give the Tamil community a greater local involvement and responsibility for local development.

6. After the violent intercommunal disturbances of last summer, which led to the declaration of the State of Emergency, President Jayewardene formed a joint committee of Government Ministers and the moderate leaders of the TULF under his Chairmanship to consider these problems urgently; particularly ways in which peace could be quickly restored between the communities and progress made toward more longer term development and a lasting reconciliation. These discussions have been in progress throughout the autumn and it is thought that some progress is being made. The State of Emergency continues although press censorship has been lifted. We understand from our High Commission that the country is quiet and that the security forces have the situation well in hand. The Deputy High

Commissioner and Defence Adviser separately visited Jaffna the capital of the Tamil region recently and all appeared quiet.

7. The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh paid a successful 4 day State Visit to Sri Lanka from 21-25 October. No incidents of protest or violence marred the visit during which hundreds of thousands of cheering Sri Lankans lined the route and greeted The Queen wherever she went.

SRI LANKA: THE POSITION OF THE TAMILS

1. The Tamils of Sri Lanka form a significant, and mainly Hindu, minority community in a predominantly Buddhist country. Their community constitutes some 20% of the population of nearly 15 million people and is made up of Indian Tamils (immigrants of the 18th and 19th centuries and predominantly estate workers) and the Ceylon Tamils who are Sri Lankan nationals and live mainly in Jaffna in the North and North-Eastern coastal belt of the island.

2. Under the Indo/Ceylon Agreements of 1964 and 1974 Indian Tamils will either be 'repatriated' or given Sri Lankan citizenship in the proportions of roughly 5:3 under the first agreement (covering 825,000 Tamils) and 1:1 under the second (covering 125,000). The Agreements are still being implemented and 342,658 persons had been repatriated by mid-1980. The Indian Tamils are generally regarded as inferior by the Ceylon Tamils and live and work relatively unassimilated and peacefully on the estates in the hill districts in central Sri Lanka.

3. Long-standing grievances exist, however, among the Ceylon Tamils over their status in the community and have gradually come to the fore since independence in 1948 and a succession of Sri Lankan Governments dominated by the Sinhalese majority. The Tamils, an industrious community, are mostly traders and had achieved considerable influence in the public services and high positions in the academic field under colonial rule in greater proportion than their numbers would indicate. Since Independence, they have been increasingly concerned (and vociferous) about the alleged erosion of their status in Sri Lanka, particularly that of their language, culture, education, employment and on matters of land distribution. The Tamil and Sinhalese communities are not completely divided on sectarian lines but there is much mistrust and ill-feeling between them. This has resulted in communal clashes and violence over a number of years. The position of moderates in both communities has not been helped by Governments in the past who appear to have done little to relieve the problem or by

hardliners within the Sinhalese community, indiscipline within the (mainly Sinhala) police or by the activities of extremist Tamil groups within Sri Lanka - particularly the terrorist group known as 'Tamil Tigers' who are thought to have been responsible for a number of murders (particularly of policemen and soldiers) and bank robberies, particularly in and around Jaffna.

4. Partly as a result of feelings of insecurity, difficulties with education and employment and most of all because of the policies of recent socialist Governments of Sri Lanka many Tamils, particularly middle-class professionals and managers left the country. There are now relatively small, but vociferous, and ardently nationalist communities overseas, particularly in the United States, France and Britain.

5. In the 1977 election the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), fighting on a separatist platform, had a major victory in the 'Ceylon Tamil' traditional areas in the North and East winning 16 seats in Parliament. They now form the official opposition and their leader (Mr Amurthalingam) has acknowledged that the new Constitution does make improvements in Tamil status though maintaining that these do not go far enough. The TULF are still, officially, committed to separation (which the Government have rejected) but have been working within the constitutional framework to improve matters.

6. This year the deep mistrust between the communities again surfaced and there were some nasty incidents in May when the (Sinhalese) police reacted violently to aggression in Jaffna by a few Tamil extremists. In August trouble spread to various parts of the island and the police reported 7 deaths by violence, 196 incidents of arson and 35 of looting. Two hundred arrests were made. The Government immediately ordered the Armed Forces to the trouble-spots and granted them the same powers of arrest and search and use of firearms as the police. On 17 August a State of Emergency was declared and the Government drew particular attention to provisions which impose the death penalty for arson or looting. Since this was declared (and renewed monthly) there has been little unrest

 /though

though tensions in some areas have remained high. Press censorship has now been relaxed.

HAMEED, ABDUL CADER SAHUL, MP (UNP)

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ceylon Muslim. Born 1929. Educated St Anthony's College, Matale and Zahiri College, Matale. Interested in Adult Education and has organised several Adult Education Centres. Has been President of the Central Ceylon Muslim Educational Society and of the Central Province Muslim Parents' Association., Joined UNP 1956, was elected second MP for Akurana, a largely Sinhalese Buddhist constituency, at the March and July elections in 1960 and 1965. Deputy Leader of the Ceylon Delegation to the UN 1966, when he first made his mark. First MP for Akurana 1970 and 1977 (seat now called Harispattuwa). Active in CPA. Attended London meeting in September 1973 and stayed on as Category III visitor. Also Category III visitor 1975.

This is the first time that the Foreign Minister portfolio has not been held by the Prime Minister and reflects J R Jayewardene's expressed desire to concentrate on domestic affairs. Speaks English, Tamil and Sinhala with equal facility. Despite the general UNP debacle in 1970 he succeeded in improving his position and became an important voice in the party. Was critical in private of some of Mr Jayewardene's tactics while Leader of the Opposition.

Small in stature, he is somewhat pompous and pontifical in his speech. Enjoys the limelight and in particular official visits abroad; would like to cut a dash in world affairs, but has so far not been impressive.

Married with three young children.

SRI LANKA: FACT SHEET

Full Name	:	Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Area	:	25,332 sq miles (65,600 sq km)
Population	:	14.8 million (1981 census) of whom 72% are Sinhalese, 20% Tamils, 7% Muslims
Population increase	:	2% per anuum (1.7% allowing for net migration)
Capital	:	Colombo (population 585,776 in 1981)
Religions	:	Buddhist (67%), Hindu (18%), Christian (8%), Muslim (7%)
Languages	:	Sinhalese (the official language), Tamil (which has the status of a national language) and English
Government	:	Parliamentary democracy. Executive President - Junius Jayewardene; Prime Minister - Ranasinghe Premadasa; and unicameral legislature, the National State Assembly, consisting of 168 elected members
Ruling Party	:	United National Party (since July 1977)
Gross National Product (at market prices)	:	US $ 3433.7 million
Per Capita Income (1980)	:	US $ 231
UK Exports (1980)	:	£76.8 million
UK Imports (1980)	:	£33.6 million
Total Sri Lanka		
Exports	:	£530 million
Imports	:	£1026 million

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Cd. I have the meeting file pl.

GRS 166
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 18 1715Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 290 OF 18 DECEMBER
AND TO NEW DELHI

TAMIL EELAM
YOUR TELNO 417

1. FOREIGN MINISTER HAMEED ARRIVED TODAY AND WE UNDERSTAND IS BOOKED AT INN ON THE PARK UNTIL 24 DECEMBER.

2. HE WILL CALL ON PRIME MINISTER AT 1015, TUESDAY 22 DECEMBER. WE ARE PROPOSING A WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY MR HURD ON WEDNESDAY 23 DECEMBER. MR RAISON (HOME OFFICE) WILL SEE HIM AT 1600 HRS THAT DAY.

3. SRI LANKANS HAVE ASKED PARTICULARLY THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT SHOULD NOT (RPT NOT) BE DISCLOSED. NO 10 PRESS OFFICE WILL PUBLISH HIS NAME AS A CALLER AS USUAL. IF ASKED, THEY WILL SAY THAT MR HAMEED IS IN LONDON ON A PRIVATE VISIT. HE ASKED FOR A COURTESY CALL WHICH, AS A MINISTER OF A COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY WITH WHOM WE HAVE EXCELLENT BILATERAL RELATIONS, IT WOULD BE NORMAL TO GRANT.

4. IF ASKED ABOUT MR HURD'S WORKING LUNCH WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT IT IS AT MR HURD'S REQUEST TO DISCUSS HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO SRI LANKA IN MID-JANUARY.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

CARRINGTON

DIST:
LIMITED
SAD
PCD
NEWS D.
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR GOODISON

COPIES TO:
ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 December 1981

Dear John,

Sri Lanka: Visit of Foreign Minister

The Sri Lankans have told us both in Colombo and in London that President Jayewardene wishes his Foreign Minister Mr Hameed, to visit Britain as soon as possible in order to deliver a personal message to the Prime Minister and to call on Lord Carrington and the Home Secretary. Mr Hameed arrives in London today, and proposes to remain at least until Christmas Day in the hope of securing the desired appointments. The personal message from President Jayewardene will concern a 'declaration of independence' to be made by the so-called Tamil Co-ordinating Committee in London on 14 January.

After community disturbances last summer which led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in Sri Lanka, President Jayewardene formed a joint committee of Ministers and moderate leaders of the Tamil Community whose Tamil United Liberation Front Party forms the official opposition party in Parliament. His aim is to isolate the Tamil extremists and to defuse the demands for an independence Tamil state (Eelam) by increasing the autonomy of local government in Sri Lanka and by finding ways of protecting Tamil interests in matters of language, religion, education and job opportunities. He has apparently made progress and the situation in Sri Lanka remains calm though the State of Emergency continues.

The particular awkwardness from our point of view is that the declaration of Tamil independence is apparently to be made from London by members of the Tamil community. In a statement in October which attracted no attention in the UK, they declared their intention of setting up an independent Tamil state with a provisional government in exile. This move may have been inspired by the extremists precisely because of the progress being made by President Jayewardene with moderate Tamil leaders. The Tamil party in Sri Lanka have issued a statement in Colombo dis-associating themselves from the London group's action in

/strong terms.

strong terms. The President's message is therefore likely to ask us to take measures to control Tamil extremists in the UK. This will not, of course, be possible unless they have broken British law; FCO officials will be consulting the Home Office on this aspect. Nevertheless, the importance to us of Sri Lanka's stability and continued pro-western alignment means that we should take President Jayewardene's approach seriously. Our relations with Sri Lanka have been particularly cordial this year; the President was here for the Royal Wedding; Mrs Thatcher gave a luncheon for the Prime Minister: and The Queen has paid a State Visit to Sri Lanka.

Given the Prime Minister's other commitments and the generous attention which the Sri Lankans have received from us, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is reluctant to press Mr Hameed's case for a meeting at No 10. However on balance we would see advantage if the Prime Minister was able to receive the Sri Lanka Foreign Minister very briefly, so that Mr Hameed could deliver the personal message and report to President Jayewardene that he had seen the Prime Minister.

Mr Hameed will of course be shown appropriate courtesies by the FCO. Lord Carrington also hopes that the Home Secretary will agree to receive Mr Hameed: I am therefore copying this letter to John Halliday in Mr Whitelaw's Office.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SUBJECT
CF to file

DS
Sri Lanka
cfco.

cc Master
Ops

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 June 1981

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T82A/81

Thank you for your letter of 12 May.

I have followed with great interest the efforts of your Government to achieve the developmental targets and the other objectives which it has set itself. I sympathise with you in the difficulties you face, which as you say, are in large measure due to features of the current world economic situation.

Her Majesty's Government has been pleased to be so closely associated with the centre piece of your development strategy, the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme. It is good to know that the construction work on our main project - the Victoria Dam - is now well under way.

As I explained last year, because of our large input to this project, which is in fact our largest commitment to any single project, we shall not be able to make any additional pledge of capital aid at the Aid Group meeting in Tokyo. The British delegation will, of course, play a constructive part in the work of the meeting and will confirm our determination to pursue the satisfactory completion of the projects to which we are committed. We shall also emphasise our continued participation in programmes of technical co-operation and training.

I congratulate you on your success so far and extend my best wishes in your struggle to achieve your objectives.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene

vb

Sri Lanka

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Typed for PM's signature.

29 May 1981

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 22 May with which you enclosed a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of Sri Lanka. I now enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

The letter outlines Sri Lanka's objectives and the various constraints to their achievement. It requests sympathetic consideration of the documents to be circulated by the World Bank in preparation for the forthcoming Aid Group meeting in Tokyo. In view of our agreement to provide £100 million towards the cost of the Victoria Dam project it will not be possible, as we explained last year, to enter into any additional capital aid commitments.

Within these constraints we will continue to give the Sri Lankans every possible advice and assistance with the implementation of their development programme.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

DRAFT

Draft by

Mr Cook 28/5
Mr Hurrell 28/5
Mr Burner
Mr Lyne

File No.	*S/O Letter	Official Letter	Despatch	Minute	Memo
Your Ref.	For signature by PRIME MINISTER				Ext.
	*SECURITY	Unclass.	In Conf.	Restricted	Conf.	Secret	Top Secret

Addressed

HE Mr J R Jayewardene
President of the Democractic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka
~~13 Hyde Park Gardens, London W2 2LU~~

ENCLOSURES

FURTHER ACTION AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Return to Room No.....

REFERENCES AND AMENDMENTS

*Tick as appropriate

Thank you for your letter of 12 May.

I have followed with great interest the efforts of your Government to achieve the developmental targets and the other objectives which it has set itself. I sympathise with you in the difficulties you face, which as you say, are in large measure due to features of the current world economic situation.

Her Majesty's Government has been pleased to be so closely associated with the centre piece of your development strategy, the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme. It is good to know that the construction work on our main project - the Victoria Dam - is now well under way.

As I explained last year, because of our large input to this project, which is in fact our largest commitment to any single project, we shall not be able to make any additional pledge of capital aid at the Aid Group meeting in Tokyo. The British delegation will, of course, play a ~~creative~~ constructive part in the work of the meeting and will confirm our determination to pursue the satisfactory completion of the projects to which we are committed. We shall also emphasise our continued participation in programmes of technical cooperation and training.

I congratulate you on your success so far and extend my best wishes in your struggle to achieve your objectives.

MCR 16948/1/543777 50m 1/79 TCLB

C

Sri Lanka
1/6

HC of SRI LANKA

22 May 1981

I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister from the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka. He forwards a letter from the President, which asks us to give sympathetic consideration to Sri Lanka's needs at the Aid Group meeting in July.

I have acknowledged this letter. Could you please provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send by Monday 1 June.

WR

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

jfh

22 May 1981

Thank you for your letter to the Prime Minister of 21 May forwarding a letter from the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

I have placed this before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

WR

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy.

2

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

X | BF

Prime Minister

Peo to Pm 22/5

In the attached letter, the President of Sri Lanka sets out the problems facing his country's economy. He asks the UK to give "sympathetic consideration" to Sri Lanka's needs at the Aid Group meeting in July. I have asked the FCO to provide a draft reply for you. X |

CDP

22/5

Yes

FILE

VLB

PA after despatch
MAP

CF

21 May 1981

In the absence of my colleague Mr. Alexander, I am writing to thank you for your letter of 20 May, with which you forwarded a greeting card from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to Mrs. Thatcher. I shall, of course, place this before her at once.

M A PATTISON

His Excellency Mr. A. T. Moorthy

Sup

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

My No: ECON/AID/1/A. 21st May, 1981.

Dear Mr. Alexander

I enclose herewith a letter addressed to The Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister by H.E. J R Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The letter relates to the forthcoming meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group to be held in Tokyo on 30 June and 1 July 1981.

I shall be grateful if you would kindly place the letter before the Prime Minister as early as possible.

I shall greatly appreciate confirmation in due course when this has been done.

With Best Wishes

Yours sincerely

(A T Moorthy).

Michael Alexander Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
London SW1.

ENCL:

sp.

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

20 May 1981

Dear Mr. Alexander

I would be very grateful if you would kindly submit the enclosed Greeding Card from The Hon'ble R.Premadasa, M.P., Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, to The Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister of Great Britain.

With Best Wishes
Yours sincerely
A T Moorthy

A.T.Moorthy.

Mr Michael Alexander,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Subject

g Master
opu

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T74A/81

President of Sri Lanka

May 12, 1981.

My dear Prime Minister,

The Aid Group Meeting, which will determine the assistance that Sri Lanka is to receive in the coming year, convenes in Tokyo on June 30th. Let me first thank your Government and you personally for the generous economic aid so far extended to Sri Lanka. I now write to appraise you briefly of the problems that face us today, in the confidence that Sri Lanka's call for assistance will receive from you the same appreciation and consideration as on earlier occasions.

I have in previous years kept you informed of the broad strategy that my Government has adopted for Sri Lanka's economic development, the priorities we have set ourselves, the difficulties we have to contend with, and the results we have been able to achieve. I am happy to say that in the light of our performance and the results achieved, our strategy of development has been endorsed both by the people of this country and by the International Lending Agencies. Furthermore, friendly countries, from whom we have received substantial assistance in the past and to whom we look for assistance in the future, share this confidence.

We continue in our endeavours to create a just and free society, in which social welfare is matched with economic growth, human rights and freedom of the individual are ensured, and employment provided for all. The short and long term objectives are to realise the optimum development of the individual and strengthen the political and economic stability of the country, within the framework of our multi-party democracy.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

2...

In the implementation of our policies of development, we have today reached a critical stage. World inflation has seriously affected Sri Lanka's economy. On the one hand, this is causing much hardship to certain sections of the community, who are particularly affected by the removal of subsidies under the new policy for development. It has also escalated to an unforeseen extent the cost of our development projects, and thereby upset our budgetary plans and the country's balance of payments. Our terms of trade have also been seriously affected, due mainly to the steep increase in the price of imports. In this context, unless increasing assistance and in real terms, is forthcoming, it will not be possible to make substantial progress towards our objective of self sustained economic growth.

Many of the difficulties that we face today are beyond our control. But to contend with what we can, we have re-phased our programme of development, so that my Government will concentrate on the completing of the projects already undertaken. At the same time, every effort is being made to accelerate the completing of these projects, so that they may bring more employment and increased production at an earlier date.

The centre piece of our development strategy is the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme. I am happy to say that we have been successful in securing the bulk of the funding for the headworks. But there is a substantial shortfall in the funding for the down-stream development. It is our hope that the Aid Group Meeting would help to finance these shortfalls for the completing of this programme.

On other development projects also there have been considerable cost over-runs. Our calculations of expenditure have to a considerable extent been upset by the escalating costs of equipment and materials that have to be imported. At the same time the local cost components of these projects have been rising sharply. It is our hope that donor countries would be able to assist us in this area also.

On account of the aggravating balance of payments problems, we find it increasingly difficult to finance our requirements of fertiliser and essential foodstuffs. Both commodity assistance and food aid, which are quick disbursing, will go a long way to assist us in tiding over our immediate difficulties.

3...

The World Bank will be informing all the members of the Consortium of Sri Lanka's requirements of external assistance. We on our part will be circulating a document outlining our investment programme for the period 1981 - 1985.

May I look forward to the same sympathetic consideration you have shown to Sri Lanka in the past at the forthcoming Aid Group Meeting.

With my warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J. R. Jayewardene

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 October, 1980.

Death of Sir John Kotelawela

As I have already told you, the Prime Minister has agreed that the draft message from her on the death of General Sir John Kotelawela in Colombo Tel. No. 188 should issue.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

Prime Minister
Sir John Kotelawela, a former Prime Minister of Ceylon, has died. Agree text of message below?

Mrs 2/X

GRS 80
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 210002
FM COLOMBO 020850Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 2 OCTOBER
MIPT
DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE DEATH OF GENERAL SIR JOHN KOTELAWELA.
IT WAS WITH GREAT REGRET THAT I LEARNT OF THE DEATH OF GENERAL SIR JOHN KOTELAWELA. FOR MANY YEARS BOTH AS SOLDIER AND POLITICIAN HE WAS A DISTINGUISHED FIGURE IN THE LIFE OF SRI LANKA. DURING HIS PERIOD OF OFFICE AS PRIME MINISTER HE MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO COMMONWEALTH UNDERSTANDING. HE WILL BE SADLY MISSED BY HIS MANY BRITISH FRIENDS AS WELL AS BY THE PEOPLE OF SRI LANKA. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES AT THIS TIME OF LOSS.

NICHOLAS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD

SAD
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NEWS D
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SUBJECT.

JMP

cc Master OPS

cifco.

Sri Lanka.

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 111/80

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 May 1980

Dear President,

Thank you for your letter of 23 April. I was interested to read about your Government's economic plans, and it was particularly kind of you to comment in such warm terms on the contribution which United Kingdom aid is making towards Sri Lanka's development.

My Government will, of course, be sending a delegation to the Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting in Paris at the beginning of July, and we shall hope to play a constructive part in the discussions which will take place then. We shall confirm our intention of maintaining a high level of aid disbursements to Sri Lanka throughout the life of the Victoria Dam project, although as I am sure you will understand we shall not be able to make any additional commitments or pledges on this occasion.

I was pleased to learn of the successful inauguration of work on the Victoria Dam during March and was glad that the Minister for Overseas Development, Mr. Neil Marten, was able to visit Sri Lanka for this. There is great interest here in London in this imaginative project, and I look forward to its successful progress and completion.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency J.R. Jayewardene

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Draft to issue

9 May 1980

Dear Michael,

Letter from the President of Sri Lanka

Thank you for your letter of 29 April with which you enclosed a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of Sri Lanka. I now enclose the draft of a reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

Sri Lanka is scheduled to receive a great deal of British aid over the next 5 years, as a consequence of our agreement to provide £100 m towards the cost of building the Victoria Dam. When the Minister for Overseas Development visited the country for the inauguration of work on the Dam in March he made it clear, both to the Government and in a press conference, that disbursements against that grant would take up a large proportion of our available funds during the life of the project, and that we would not be in a position to make any new commitments in Sri Lanka for several years. Lord Carrington thinks it would be as well to reaffirm this in the Prime Minister's letter to President Jayewardene, in order to ensure that the point is clearly understood. We have treated Sri Lanka generously in agreeing to finance the Dam, and we can be proud of the lead which we have given to other donors in so doing.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

HE Mr J R Jayewardene
President of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 23 April. I was interested to read about your Government's economic plans, and it was particularly kind of you to comment in such warm terms on the contribution which United Kingdom aid is making towards Sri Lanka's development.

My Government will, of course, be sending a delegation to the Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting in Paris at the beginning of July, and we shall hope to play a constructive part in the discussions which will take place then. We shall confirm our intention of maintaining a high level of aid disbursements to Sri Lanka throughout the life of the Victoria Dam project, although as I am sure you will understand we shall not be able to make any additional commitments or pledges on this occasion.

I was pleased to learn of the successful inauguration of work on the Victoria Dam during March and was glad that the Minister for Overseas Development, Mr Neil Marten, was able to visit Sri Lanka for this. There is great interest here in London in this imaginative project, and I look forward to its successful progress and completion.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

56-ST Dd 0532078 12/78 H+P Ltd Bly

file

ds

BF 9580

29 April 1980

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of Sri Lanka, Mr. Jayewardene. I should be grateful for a draft text of a reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Jayewardene.

It would be helpful if the draft reply could reach me by close of play on Friday 9 May.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRB

ds

29 April 1980

Thank you for your letter of 29 April. I have, of course, brought the enclosed letter from President Jayewardene to the Prime Minister's immediate attention. I am sure that she will wish in due course to reply.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

His Excellency Mr. Nanediri Wimalasena

From the High Commissioner

High Commission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
13, Hyde Park Gardens,
London W2 2LU

29 April 1980

Dear Mr Alexander,

I am enclosing a letter addressed to The Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister, by my President, H.E. J.R.Jayewardene. I should mention that the letter relates to the forthcoming meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group.

I shall be grateful if you would kindly place this before the Prime Minister at the earliest possible date.

I shall greatly appreciate confirmation, in due course, when this has been done.

Yours Sincerely,
N. Wimalasena

N.Wimalasena.

Michael Alexander Esqr.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London SW1.

SUBJECT

President of Sri Lanka

April 23, 1980.

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you in connection with the meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group which is to be held in Paris in the first week of July, 1980.

In my previous letters on this subject I had set out in some detail the policy of my Government and the programme of economic development which we had embarked upon. Our policy objectives continue to remain the creation of a just and free society, in which social welfare is matched with economic growth, human rights and freedom of the individual are ensured, and adequate employment opportunities provided to the many unemployed youths in our country. The short and long-term projects undertakn by my Government are designed to realise the optimum development of the individual and to further strengthen the political and economic stability of the country, within the framework of our multi-party democracy.

We have taken several measures, including the liberalisation of our economy, towards the fulfilment of these objectives and I am happy to say that, notwithstanding the several constraints which are beyond our control, we have been able to achieve a fair measure of success. The economy of the country has registered a substantial and significant recovery in the past two years.

Our economic policies and programmes have been endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have extended to us substantial assistance during the past two years. This is a tangible demonstration of the confidence the international community has in Sri Lanka's economic policies and prospects.

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

2...

It would not have been possible for us to achieve even the degree of success we have had, if we had not received the generous assistance extended to us by the international institutions and friendly countries like the United Kingdom. I wish to take this opportunity to thank your Government and you personally for the generous economic aid so far extended to Sri Lanka.

The changing international economic situation, however, is causing us great concern, as it is making it increasingly difficult for us to sustain the economic growth achieved in the recent past and to improve on it. World inflation, over which we have no control and with its magnified impact on developing countries like Sri Lanka, is jeopardizing our economic progress. Sri Lanka's terms of trade have deteriorated sharply in 1979 due to the steep increase in import prices, especially of oil.

While we are persevering in our efforts to mobilise our domestic resources to the maximum, it will still not be possible for us to make substantial progress towards economic development, unless continuing and increasing external assistance is forthcoming.

While we need support for the major projects we have undertaken, in the short-term we will need assistance for quick-yielding projects and also balance of payments support or commodity assistance. The World Bank will be informing all members of the Sri Lanka Aid Group of Sri Lanka's minimum requirements of external assistance. We also will be circulating among members a document listing out the projects for which external assistance will be required, arranged in an order of priority.

May I look forward to the same sympathetic consideration you have shown to Sri Lanka in the past at the forthcoming Aid Group Meeting.

With my warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J. R. Jayewardene

J. R. JAYEWARDENE

Sri Lanka

CONFIDENTIAL

File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 December 1979

Sri Lanka: Victoria Dam Scheme

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 30 November on this subject. She has confirmed that she will not be able to attend the inauguration of the Victoria Dam next year. She agrees that Lord Carrington should reply to Mr. Hameed in the terms of the draft enclosed with your letter.

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

Prime Minister
Agree A - again
Yes and Rmb 3/XII

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Sri Lanka: Victoria Dam Scheme

In your letter of 2 October you confirmed that there was no question of the Prime Minister visiting Sri Lanka in February 1980 to attend the inauguration of the Victoria Dam.

The Sri Lankans have returned to the charge in the enclosed letter to Lord Carrington from their Foreign Minister. They apparently accept that the Prince of Wales cannot make the visit at such short notice, but have asked if the Prime Minister could attend the inauguration in February, March, or April.

A Our views remain as stated in my letter of 28 September. The UK has made a major contribution to the dam, which we would be happy to see acknowledged; but we do not think this warrants a special visit by the Prime Minister.

On the assumption that the Prime Minister will not be available, Lord Carrington proposes to reply to Mr Hameed in the terms of the attached draft.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Communications on this subject should be addressed to:
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA.

Our Reference

Your Reference

HIGH COMMISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA.

13 HYDE PARK GARDENS
LONDON W2 2LU

Telephone: 01-262 1841 (7 lines) Ext
Telegrams: Lankacom, London
Telex: 25844

Date 30th October, 1979.

Dear Lord Carrington,

It was a pleasure to have met you. You will remember that I mentioned to you my President's wish to have with us His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales at the inauguration ceremony of the Victoria Project.

I have now been informed by my President that if His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales is not available, I should inquire whether we could arrange an official visit for your Hon'ble Prime Minister, in the first week of February or in any part of March or April, so that in addition to official talks, she could also be present at the inauguration ceremony of the Victoria Project.

I am fully aware how deeply you are engaged in the Lancaster House talks. Therefore, I chose to send this letter rather than to seek a further meeting.

I hope you will be able to steer the talks on Zimbabwe Rhodesia to a successful conclusion.

I am leaving for Colombo tomorrow and I have requested my High Commissioner to keep in touch with you.

Yours sincerely,

A.C.S. Hameed

A.C.S.Hameed,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Sri Lanka.

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC,
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London SW1.

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
THE HON A C S HAMEED MP

Thank you for your letter of 30 October. I am very glad that we were able to meet during your visit to London.

The Prime Minister was pleased to learn of the suggestion that she should pay an official visit to Sri Lanka next spring and of your Government's invitation to her to attend the inauguration of the Victoria Dam project. I am sorry to have to tell you that Mrs Thatcher's Parliamentary and other commitments make it impossible for her to take up your kind invitation. She hopes that there will be an opportunity for her to visit Sri Lanka on a later occasion.

However, I should let you know that the Minister for Overseas Development, Mr Neil Marten, would very much like to visit Sri Lanka next year, perhaps in April. Even if his visit does not coincide with your inaugural ceremony, I know that he would be very interested in seeing something of the site of the dam.

[I must also thank you for your kind wishes for success in the Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia. Although we have not yet reached a conclusion, some progress has been made since you were here. There are still considerable difficulties to be overcome, but we are making every effort to reach the agreed settlement which would contribute so much to Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries.]

Dd 0532000 400M 5/78 HMSO Brocknell

CONFIDENTIAL

Sri Lanka
Tour

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 October 1979

SRI LANKA: VICTORIA DAM SCHEME

You wrote to me on 28 September about the possibility of the Prime Minister visiting Sri Lanka in February 1980 in connection with the "inauguration" of the Victoria Dam.

I can confirm that there could be no question of the Prime Minister visiting Sri Lanka at this time. Apart from anything else the House will be sitting.

There would of course be no objection to your pursuing at some future date the possibility of the Prime Minister making a South Asian tour. It is not obvious that such a tour would have priority over other possible tours that might be proposed.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

TGR

Prime Minister
Agree
MT

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 September 1979

Dear Michael,

Sri Lanka: Victoria Dam Scheme

In his letter of 13 August Bryan Cartledge recorded that the Prime Minister had informed Mr Premadasa of HMG's support for the Victoria Dam scheme during a luncheon in Lusaka on 6 August.

In a statement to the Sri Lanka Parliament, Mr Premadasa has said he has invited Mrs Thatcher to inaugurate the project, and has suggested that the next anniversary of Independence (4 February 1980) would be a good time. This presumably derived from nothing more than the routine courtesies exchanged when Mr Premadasa called at No 10 (Bryan Cartledge's letter of 20 July): no formal invitation has been received. However, an invitation to the Prime Minister is evidently being considered in Colombo.

There will, in fact, be little, if anything, to be "inaugurated" in February. The contracts will not be awarded until January; the successful contractor will need to spend about a year preparing the site before the first concrete is poured (early 1981); and the project will not be completed before the end of 1984. We had not therefore envisaged the Sri Lankan Government coming forward with so early an invitation. We naturally want to extract maximum credit for the UK, and we are keeping in mind the fact that the particular British contribution to the whole scheme - the Victoria Dam - will be perhaps the most evident symbol of progress to the average Sri Lanka citizen. (Other donors are expected to pay for the necessary but less memorable irrigation ditches etc downstream.) The name Victoria is a happy coincidence, and at some stage we will want to make an occasion (perhaps the switching-on of power) as "British" as possible.

In these circumstances we assume you would prefer us to try to fend off any invitation to the Prime Minister for February 1980. We could not exclude the possibility of a high level visit at a later time when there is something worthwhile to inaugurate. But it would be sensible to plan this around a properly considered South Asian tour.

Conclusion: politely to state the Government's settled view

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

R M J Lyne
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DS

Sri Lanka

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 August 1979

Sri Lanka : Victoria Dam Scheme

Modev telegram number 351 to Lusaka asked me to inform the Prime Minister that the way was clear for her to tell the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Premadasa, that final approval has been given to a UK contribution of up to £100 million, as a grant payable over six years, to the Victoria Dam Scheme.

I am now writing to confirm that, at a lunch given by Mr. Premadasa in Lusaka on 6 August (at which no officials were present), the Prime Minister passed a short note to her host based on the first three sentences of your telegram. As Mrs. Thatcher had to leave Mr. Premadasa's lunch early in order to carry out another engagement, there was no discussion of the UK offer on that occasion.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Martin Hall (HM Treasury) and Barry Hilton (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Miss S.E. Unsworth,
Office of the Minister of State for Overseas Development.

CONFIDENTIAL

P.A.

Prime Minister

You are lunching with Mr. Premadasa on Monday, 6 August and could tell him then. CDP 3/8

LQY 817

FDW G123/30

OO LUSAKA

GPS 72/2
CONFIDENTIAL
FM ODA LONDON 39/// 3011615Z HYLY 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
MODEV 351 OF 30 JULY
INFO COLOMBO

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO MRS THATCHER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY.

BEGINS.

VICTORIA DAM SCHEME SRI LANKA. GRATEFUL YOU INFORM MRS THATCHER THAT WE ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO OFFER A UK CONTRIBUTION TO THIS SCHEME. THIS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF A GRANT OF UP TO POUNDS STERLING ONE HUNDRED MILLION OVER SIX YEARS TOWARDS THE COSTS OF THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DAM AND POWER STATION. IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NORMAL UK GRANT CONDITIONS. IF THE PRIME MINISTER SAW FIT SHE COULD INFORM MR PREMADASA OF THIS DECISION. £100 m.

GRATEFUL YOU INFORM US AND BHC COLOMBO IF AND WHEN THIS IS DONE IN ORDER THAT LATTER MAY INFORM PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA, DR JAYEWARDENE. ENDS.

I AM COPYING THIS TO COLOMBO FOR INFORMATION ONLY.
CARRINGTON

NNNN

Agreed

T39A/79T

RESTRICTED

Sri Lanka

4031 - 1

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T39A/79T

RR COLOMBO

GRS 220
RESTRICTED

FM FCO 061630Z 6 JULY 1979
TO ROUTINE COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 125 OF 6 JULY

Copies sent
9/7

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 3 JULY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE:- BEGINS:-
MY DEAR PRESIDENT, THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 21 MAY AND FOR YOUR GOOD WISHES. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR OF THE GREAT PROGRESS THAT YOUR COUNTRY HAS MADE IN THE LIBERALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY. THESE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE ALREADY WIDELY RECOGNISED. I PLEASED THAT BRITAIN HAS BEEN ABLE TO SHARE IN THEM, AND THAT THE PART WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY IS SO MUCH APPRECIATED.
THE LEVEL OF OUR FUTURE SPENDING IN OVERSEAS AID PROGRAMME IS, AS YOU KNOW, AT PRESENT UNDER CONSIDERATION AS PART OF OUR OVERALL REVIEW OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE. BUT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME (AND WE SHALL LET YOUR GOVERNMENT KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE), I DO NOT THINK YOU WILL FIND US UNGENEROUS OR LACKING IN CONFIDENCE IN YOUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE. WE GREATLY VALUE THE LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP WE ENJOY WITH SRI LANKA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH LINK BETWEEN US.
I THANK YOU FOR YOUR COURTESY AND CONSIDERATION IN SENDING TWO OF YOUR MOST SENIOR MINISTERS TO EXPLAIN YOUR PLANS.
I UNDERSTAND WE MAY SEE MR PREMADASA NEXT MONTH: I MYSELF HOPE TO MEET HIM BEFORE THE LUSAKA MEETING.

YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER. ENDS.
2. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE IN BAG DATED 13 JULY.

CARRINGTON
FILES
SAD
PS
MR BLAKER
MR CORMAZZI
MR MURRY

[COPIES PASSED NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO
SEAD
ODA

RESTRICTED

FILE

4 July 1979

I enclose a copy of a letter dated 21 May to the Prime Minister from President Jayewardene of Sri Lanka and the signed original of the Prime Minister's reply. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the reply to be forwarded to Colombo for delivery to the President's office.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HS

SUBJECT

T374A/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T374A/79T

cc LPS
FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 July 1979

My dear President,

Thank you for your letter of 21 May and for your good wishes.

I was glad to hear of the great progress that your country has made in the liberalisation and development of the economy. These achievements are already widely recognised. I am pleased that Britain has been able to share in them, and that the part which we have been able to play is so much appreciated.

The level of our future spending in our overseas aid programme is, as you know, at present under consideration as part of our overall review of public expenditure. But whatever the outcome (and we shall let your Government know as soon as possible), I do not think you will find us ungenerous or lacking in confidence in your country's future. We greatly value the long-standing friendship we enjoy with Sri Lanka, and the Commonwealth link between us.

I thank you for your courtesy and consideration in sending two of your most senior Ministers to explain your plans. I understand we may see Mr. Premadasa next month; I myself hope to meet him before the Lusaka meeting.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, M.P.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1979

Dear Bryan

I sent you on 15 June the original of a message from the President of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister which the Sri Lanka Finance Minister, Mr Ronnie de Mel, left with the Lord Privy Seal when he called last week. I now attach a draft reply, which aims to be reassuring about our continuing interest in Sri Lanka's future developments. The Prime Minister has already sent a message to Mr Premadasa expressing the hope that they might meet before Lusaka.

If Mrs Thatcher agrees with the draft, it could be sent by hand of Mr de Mel, who is in Britain until 24 June.

Yours ever

Stephen Gomersall

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to
the Lord Privy Seal

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11

Registry No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
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PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

From

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

To:- Mr J R Jayewardene MP
President of the Republic of
Sri Lanka
Colombo

Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 21 May and for your good wishes.

I was glad to hear of the great progress that your country has made in the liberalisation and development of the economy. These achievements are already widely recognised. I am pleased that Britain has been able to share in them, and that the part which we have been able to play is so much appreciated.

The level of our future spending in our overseas aid programme is, as you know, at present under consideration as part of our overall review of public expenditure. But whatever the outcome (and we shall let your Government know as soon as possible), I do not think you will find us ungenerous or lacking in confidence in your country's future. We greatly value the long-standing friendship we enjoy with Sri Lanka, and the Commonwealth link between us.

I thank you for your courtesy and consideration in sending two of your most senior Ministers to explain your plans. I understand we may see Mr Premadasa next month; I myself hope to meet him before the Lusaka meeting.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

15 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

SRI LANKA

I enclose the original of a message to the Prime Minister from the President of Sri Lanka which was transmitted to the Lord Privy Seal when he saw the Sri Lankan Finance Minister, Mr Ronnie de Mel this afternoon.

In the course of this call, Mr de Mel emphasised the great progress that his Government had made in the liberalisation and development of the economy. They had achieved a growth rate of over 8% last year. They had also made great strides in integrating minority communities. He echoed the President's warm sentiments about UK economic assistance to Sri Lanka and hoped that we would continue to consider their projects favourably. The Lord Privy Seal, while explaining that we could give no commitment pending the Government's review of expenditure, said that we would continue to give priority to the Commonwealth in the aid programme.

The Lord Privy Seal raised the question of Vietnamese refugees and suggested that the Sri Lankan Government was particularly well placed to use its influence, especially among the non-aligned. Mr de Mel said that he would raise this with his Cabinet and President and that he was sure something could be done.

I will let you have advice on a suitable reply to this message next week.

Yours ever,

Stephen Gomersall

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

B G Cartledge Esq

No 10 Downing Street

TIZA/79T SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. TIZA/79T

President of Sri Lanka

21st May, 1979

My dear Prime Minister,

It gives me much pleasure to be able to send Mr. Ronnie de Mel, Minister of Finance and Planning, and Mr. Gamini Dissanayake, Minister of Mahaveli Development and Minister of Lands and Land Development, as my special envoys to you.

They bring you the good wishes of my Government and of myself for your success in the great responsibilities that have devolved upon you. I would like you to consider their visit to you as an index of the importance that Sri Lanka attaches to the further development of the cordial relations which we have with your country.

Our countries share many common and vital interests, and since coming to office in 1977, my Government has attached special importance to the development of the historical relations which Sri Lanka has had with the United Kingdom - not the least of which is our common link with the Commonwealth.

Apart from the efforts to create a free and just society, our endeavours are to hasten the pace of economic development. The accelerated programme for completing the Mahaveli Scheme, the creation of an Export Promotion Zone, the Development of Greater Colombo, and the liberalization of the economy, are the corner stones in this programme of development. I would very much value your giving an opportunity to my Ministers to outline to you personally our plans for implementing these projects.

Let me take this opportunity to convey to you the appreciation of my Government and myself for what the Government of the United Kingdom has been able to do for Sri Lanka from time to time, especially the generous assistance extended for our development projects. I can think of no better example of your country's concern for mine than the recent waiver of the loans that you have given us - a gesture which my Government and people deeply appreciate.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Jayewardene

J.R. Jayewardene.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
UNITED KINGDOM.

T12A/ SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T12A/797

President of Sri Lanka

21st May, 1979

My dear Prime Minister,

It gives me much pleasure to be able to send Mr. Ronnie de Mel, Minister of Finance and Planning, and Mr. Gamini Dissanayake, Minister of Mahaveli Development and Minister of Lands and Land Development, as my special envoys to you.

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With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Jayewardene

J.R. Jayewardene.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
UNITED KINGDOM.

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

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