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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Visit of President Mobutu
of Zaire.

ZAIRE

DECEMBER 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<p>File Series closed -</p> <p>See Zaire -</p> <p>PREM 19/1407</p>							
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TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA DESKBY 031200Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 3 DECEMBER
PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 204/84

1. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE PASSED TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU IN TIME FOR HIS INVESTITURE ON 5 DECEMBER.

BEGINS

ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR REINVESTITURE AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE I SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE SHALL MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP FURTHER THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I RECALL WITH PLEASURE OUR MEETING IN LONDON THIS SEPTEMBER. YOU THEN DESCRIBED THE VIGOROUS POLICIES YOU HAD ADOPTED AND WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE IN ORDER TO PUT YOUR COUNTRY'S ECONOMY ON A FIRM BASIS. I REALISE THAT IT IS NOT EASY TO TAKE THE ROBUST MEASURES WHICH ARE SO NECESSARY FOR RECOVERY, AND I WISH YOU WELL IN THE CHALLENGING TASK THAT YOU FACE. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING OF THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION BY YOU OF A SUCCESSOR PROGRAMME WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. WE SHALL, AS I TOLD YOU, BE READY TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP, BOTH IN THE PARIS CLUB AND THROUGH OUR AID UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND AND UNDER OUR BILATERAL PROGRAMME.

ENDS.

2. TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WHEN HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE, THAT IT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE ZAIREAN REQUEST ON DEBTS WAS RECEIVED (KINSHASA TELNOS 310 AND 314).

3. YOU MAY INFORM THE PRESS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT

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A MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS.

4. INVITATION TO INAUGURATION CEREMONY (YOUR TELNO 307). YOU SHOULD INFORM THE ZAIREANS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REPRESENT HMG AT THE CEREMONY

HOWE

NNNN

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CCPK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1984

Dear Colin,

Zaire: Message to President Mobutu

Thank you for your letter of 29 November enclosing a draft message to President Mobutu.

The Prime Minister has agreed to send a message and I enclose the text. I should be grateful if it could be telegraphed to Kinshasa for delivery.

*Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell*

C D Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. Please arrange for the following message from the Prime Minister to be passed to President Mobutu in time for his investiture on 5 December.

Begins.

On the occasion of your reinvestiture as President of the Republic of Zaire I send you my warm congratulations and best wishes. I am confident that we shall maintain and develop further the friendly relations which exist between our two countries.

I recall with pleasure our meeting in London this September. You then described the vigorous policies you had adopted and would continue to pursue in order to put your country's economy on a firm basis. I realise that it is not easy to take the robust measures which are so necessary for recovery, and I wish you well in the challenging task that you face. I look forward to hearing of the successful negotiation by you of a successor programme with the International Monetary Fund. We shall, as I told you, be ready to do all we can to help, both in the Paris Club and through our aid under the auspices of the European Development Fund and under our bilateral programme.

Ends.

You may inform the press that the Prime Minister has sent a message of congratulation.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister (1)

29 November 1984

Agree to send the
attached message?

Dear Charles,

JMS
30/11

Yes MS

Zaire: Possible Message to President Mobutu

During the Prime Minister's discussion with President Mobutu on 27 September she undertook to study carefully the letter he left with her on Zaire's economic problems. Although there is little to add to what the Prime Minister said at the time, a message in response would seem courteous. The main point to be made, apart from a general expression of sympathy and continuing support, would be the need for President Mobutu to maintain his programme of economic reform under IMF guidance.

A further argument in favour of a message from the Prime Minister is the fact that President Mobutu's investiture ceremony for his third term of office will take place on 5 December. At the time of his re-election France and Belgium sent messages of congratulation, and the investiture ceremony will be attended by a number of emissaries from Zaire's neighbours and Western countries including the US, France, Belgium, FRG and Portugal. (We propose to be represented by our Ambassador.) On the occasion of President Mobutu's investiture in 1977 both The Queen and Mr Callaghan sent messages of congratulation. (It would not be appropriate for The Queen to send a second message.)

We remain keen to see more substance in our relations with this large and strategically important pro-Western country, in which we have sizeable investments. For the Prime Minister not to send a message would leave us out of step with our Western allies and would contrast strangely with the 1977 precedent.

We do not think that the arguments for a message from the Prime Minister are invalidated by Zaire's disappointing vote in the UN General Assembly on the Falklands despite a personal appeal when President Mobutu called on the Prime Minister. However regrettable this was, we are more likely to be able to win back Zaire's vote next year if the Prime Minister send a message than if we, alone among Zaire's main

/Western

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Western allies, fail to make any gesture to mark the President's re-election.

We therefore propose that the Prime Minister should send a message, on the lines of the enclosed draft.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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File No. JCG 027/4

Department CAFD

OUTWARD

Drafted by MISS T A H SOLESBY
(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn. 233 4176

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
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[TEXT]

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. Please arrange for the following message from the Prime Minister to be passed to President Mobutu in time for his investiture on 5 December.

Begins.


On the occasion of your reinvestiture as President of the Republic of Zaire I send my warm congratulations and best wishes. I am confident that we shall maintain and develop further the friendly relations which exist between our two countries. [new paragraph] I recall with pleasure our meeting in London this September. You then described the vigorous policies you had adopted and would continue to pursue in order to put your country's economy

on a firm basis. I realise that it is not easy to take the robust measures which are so necessary for recovery, and I shall ^{wish you well in the difficult} continue to watch your efforts ^{challenging} with much sympathy. ^{task that you face.} I look forward to hearing of

the successful negotiation by you of a successor programme with the International Monetary Fund. We shall, as I told you, be ready to do all we can to help, both in the Paris Club and through our aid under the auspices of the European Development Fund and under our bilateral programme.

Ends.

2. You may inform the press that the Prime Minister has sent a message of congratulation.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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10 DOWNING STREET

27 September, 1984


From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU, 27 SEPTEMBER

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Mobutu, together with a copy of the aide-memoire on Zaire's problems which he left.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to David Peretz (HM Treasury) and to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF
ZAIRE ON THURSDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	President Mobutu
Mr. J. Johnson	State Commissioner Umba
Mr. C.D. Powell	Zairean Ambassador

The Prime Minister offered President Mobutu a warm welcome and invited him to tell her about his recent travels and the situation in Zaire.

Zaire Economy

President Mobutu said that the Prime Minister would know the main facts about Zaire's current situation. OECD Ambassadors in Kinshasa had recently been briefed. He had imposed two years of austerity on his people, and this would have to continue. A significant turn-around in the economy had already been achieved. For instance inflation had been brought down from over 100 per cent to 15 per cent, and the target was 10 per cent. But substantial problems remained. Communications in Zaire were poor: there were shortages of essential equipment and supplies, particularly medicines. Foreign exchange was desperately short. For instance the Ambassador in London and his staff had not been paid for eight months. Zaire's most pressing need was for a breathing space. This meant generous terms for further debt rescheduling. Zaire could not afford to make available more than U.S. \$250 million a year for debt repayment in each of the next two years. Zaire needed the help and understanding

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of its partners. The President handed over a letter (enclosed) detailing what Zaire had already done and its future needs.

President Mobutu continued that he had been very well received by President Mitterrand, who had complimented him on Zaire's efforts and undertook to study how France could help. President Reagan had said that Zaire could count on American help, provided it was part of a concerted Western effort. Chancellor Kohl had been sympathetic. President Mobutu concluded that Zaire would prefer to stand on its own feet but had no option but to appeal for help from outside. His country had always paid its debts and always would, but needed and deserved generous treatment over future rescheduling.

The Prime Minister acknowledged President Mobutu's reputation as a firm leader. Zaire's agreement with the IMF had been an important step. When a country imposed self-discipline as Zaire had, there was more incentive for others to help. The UK/Zaire debt rescheduling agreement had recently been initialled and provided generous terms. We would consider sympathetically any application for debt rescheduling in 1985. We would also be able to provide a little more aid next year. Was Zaire affected by food shortages? How had copper prices affected prospects?

President Mobutu said that copper prices had been weak, far below the levels estimated by the IMF. This had increased the difficulties of meeting the IMF's conditions. There were no food shortages as such, since he had given priority to agricultural development and food self-sufficiency. The problem lay rather in poor communications which meant that surpluses in some areas could not be moved to areas of shortage. President Mobutu continued that he regretted that the UK was no longer providing aid on the same scale as in the past for

communications. Mr. Johnson explained the projects to which UK aid was going, which seemed to surprise President Mobutu.

The Prime Minister complimented President Mobutu on his recent election results. President Mobutu conceded that they had gone very well. He had been idolised wherever he had travelled in the country.

Falklands

The Prime Minister thanked President Mobutu for Zaire's understanding attitude over the Falklands at the UN. We hoped for a further Zairean abstention this year. President Mobutu said that he had come under strong pressure from Argentina and others in the non-aligned movement to change Zaire's vote. He noted the Prime Minister's request.

Chad

The Prime Minister asked if Zaire would follow France and Libya in withdrawing its forces from Chad. President Mobutu said that he had not been consulted about the French and Libyan withdrawal. Others could not commit Zaire. He would shortly visit Chad and draw his own conclusions. But it was clear as a practical matter that Zairean troops could not stay once the French and Libyans left.

Southern Africa

The Prime Minister recalled President Botha's visit to London, on which she had sent President Mobutu a message. She thought it had done President Botha good to be exposed to our views, though there were no concrete results from the visit. Our relations with South Africa were currently very difficult because of the detainees in our Consulate in Durban. President Mobutu said that he was following the

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situation.

The Prime Minister concluded that there were no problems between Britain and Zaire. She would study the letter very carefully and follow with great interest all that President Mobutu was doing to deal with his country's economic problems. She would ensure that we looked sympathetically at rescheduling for 1985 and provided a little more aid for next year. President Mobutu thanked the Prime Minister for receiving him.

The meeting ended at 1900 hrs.

C.D.P.

27 September, 1984

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POINTS FOR PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. Congratulations on re-election. Recall 1981 visit.
2. Impressed by re-adjustment measures.
3. Glad to have reached agreement on debt rescheduling. Will consider sympathetically request for re-scheduling in 1985.
4. Increased our aid by £½ million. Hope to have further £1 million next year.
5. Please abstain again on Falklands resolution.
6. Prospects in Angola/Namibia.
7. Withdraw Zairean forces from Chad?
8. Describe problem in Durban.
9. Still intend to invite Botha to Zaire?



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 September 1984

Dear Charles,

Call by President Mobutu on the Prime Minister

Since I wrote to you on 24 September, we have heard that President Mobutu will be arriving in the late morning of Thursday 27 September and leaving early the following day. A Special Representative of the Foreign Secretary will meet him and see him off.

I now enclose three copies of the briefing, and of Personality Notes on the President, the State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and the new Zairean Ambassador. President Mobutu has asked that Umba and Mukamba should both be present too. Umba will have called on Mr Renton in the FCO immediately beforehand. John Johnson (AUSS for Africa) will represent the FCO. The interpreter will be Mrs Taylor.

President Mobutu last called on the Prime Minister during his official visit in December 1981, although there have been a number of messages between them since then, the most recent of which was the Prime Minister's message on the visit of Mr P W Botha to London. The present call on the Prime Minister will follow calls on President Mitterrand in Paris on 20 September and on President Reagan in New York on 23 September. We believe President Mobutu also hopes to visit Paris (again), Bonn and Rome after London before returning to Zaire. His purpose is likely to be to seek additional financial support, in the form of further debt rescheduling and increased bilateral aid, for his economic policies in 1985, the first year of his new term as President. This would enable him to maintain his structural adjustment efforts under IMF guidance.

The Prime Minister will be able to respond sympathetically to these concerns, within the limits of our resources, and inform him that we hope to have a further flm in aid for next year. She will also be able to urge the Zaireans to abstain on the Falklands' Resolution in the General Assembly as

/they

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they did in 1982 and 1983. If time permits, the Prime Minister may wish to discuss briefly current Southern African issues.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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26 SEP 1984

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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF ZAIRE

18.15 HOURS ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1984

POINTS TO MAKE

BILATERAL

1. Congratulations on President Mobutu's re-election (in July).
2. Recall visits of President Mobutu in December 1981 and State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in February 1984. (Regret unable to see the State Commissioner at that time). Relations good; very few problems.

IMF/Zaire

3. Sympathy for difficulties Zairean economy has suffered in recent years. Most impressed by courageous adjustment remedies taken. Hope Zaire will press ahead with these efforts - necessary for keeping IMF programme on track.

4. UK/Zaire Debt Rescheduling Agreement

Initialled in London very recently; to be signed very shortly. Provides exceptionally generous terms for debt repayment. Working well so far. [If necessary]. Prepared to consider sympathetically any application for further debt rescheduling in 1985.

5. Aid

Increased our pledge in 1984 by £½m. Hope to have a further £1m for next year. Of course this is in addition to contributions we are making for Zaire via the IDA (US\$ 6.6m in 1984) and the EDF (£20m 1981-1985).

6. Falklands

Much appreciated Zaire's abstention on the Falklands resolution in 1982 and 1983. The 1984 draft much more prejudicial - complete disregard for islanders' rights to self-determination. Hope you can at least again abstain.

7. Military Training [if raised]

Glad to be able to allot a place at Sandhurst under our Military Technical Assistance Scheme. Places very limited, and our forces fully committed [but will look into possibility of meeting further requests].

INTERNATIONAL

8. Southern Africa

(a) Namibia/Angola. Zairean assessment of prospects for progress on:

- (i) Namibian independence? US diplomacy active.
- (ii) UNITA/MFLA reconciliation in Angola? Neither side can win militarily.

(b) Mozambique/South Africa. Greatly welcomed Nkomati Accord (10 March). Important for both sides to honour it as stressed to Mr Botha in June (Prime Minister's message to Mobutu). Mr Rifkind in Mozambique 20-22 September.

(c) Durban Consulate. [If raised].

- (i) The six opposition leaders remain at the Consulate. In the present circumstances we will not require them to leave against their will, but clearly cannot go on indefinitely.
- (ii) We cannot act as an intermediary. It is for the six to negotiate with the South African Government through their legal representatives. They have access at all times to their lawyers. We continue to hope conditions will be created which will enable

/the



the six to leave voluntarily.

- (iii) We deplore the decision of the South African Government to go back on a clear undertaking given to a British court to return the four defendants in the Armscor case. We cannot accept any link between this and the situation at the Consulate in Durban.
- (iv) UK/SA Relations: a difficult period. But we wish to contain this problem. No change in our general policy.

9. CHAD

Hope Franco-Libyan agreement will bring about a Libyan withdrawal.
Have welcomed Zairean contribution to stemming Libyan aggression.
Your troops to be withdrawn too?

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF ZAIRE

18.15 HOURS ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1984

ESSENTIAL FACTS


INTERNAL

1. President Mobutu has been in power for 19 years and faces no significant challenge to his authority. In elections held on 28-29 July 1984, Mobutu was re-elected for a third 7-year term. Voting was obligatory and tightly controlled. There were no other candidates.
2. Mobutu governs through the sole legal party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). Careful control of the armed forces and security services as well as frequent government reshuffles help to preserve the Mobutu regime.
3. Zaire is a country richly endowed with natural resources including substantial mineral reserves and a sizeable hydroelectric and agricultural potential. It is a leading producer of cobalt and industrial diamonds and the world's sixth largest copper producer. But despite this large and diverse resource base, the years since 1975 have been characterised by prolonged economic crisis and there are few grounds for optimism about the immediate future.

BILATERAL

4. Trade. Our main exports to Zaire are transport equipment, textile yarns and chemicals. Main imports are minerals, coffee, cocoa and timber. UK exports are increasing considerably despite Zaire's serious economic problems and cut-backs in imports.


/In 1983



In 1983 they were £21m, and imports were £11.2m. The January-June figures for 1984 were £17.2m against imports of £4.9m.

5. Political. Our bilateral relations although not substantial are friendly and we have very few problems. Despite Mobutu's profession of non-aligned views, he has in general been anti-communist. American influence, which did so much to raise him to power, is now less exclusive and he looks to France, Portugal and the UK as well as to Belgium. The Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978 and the Cuban presence in Angola confirmed his distrust of Soviet intentions.

6. IMF/Zaire Zaire has been facing serious economic difficulties for several years due to deteriorating copper prices (Zaire's major export) compounded by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. In December 1983 the IMF Executive Board approved Zaire's Special Borrowing Agreement and Compensatory Finance Facility request for SDR 342.5 million. The SBA was reviewed on 8th August. Executive Directors commended Zaire for progress achieved in some sectors (eg reform of foreign exchange policy, tightening fiscal policy, controlling inflation, control of Bank of Zaire). But some problems remain, particularly the financial position of public enterprises. The Fund's view is that Zaire's prospects remain uncertain, depending on commodity prices. The programme leaves little room for slippage, and rectifying the deep seated problems will take many years. An IMF 'Permanent Representative' will arrive in Kinshasa at the end of October.



UK/Zaire Debt Rescheduling Agreement

7. The fifth Agreement was initialled in London on 21 June 1984. Formal signing is to take place in Kinshasa on a date still to be agreed. Under the four previous Agreements the debt relief provided covered all long-term maturities falling due between 1976 and 1981, as well as arrears of same at end 1975 and short-term arrears as at 30 June 1979. The debt involved totalled approximately £37m.

8. During the period 1982/3 the payment experience of all creditor countries was generally poor and by end 1983 all were reporting significant arrears under their bilateral Agreements. Given that there was little prospect of the payments being brought up-to-date, the Paris Club agreed in December 1983 to a further major restructuring exercise. The package of debt relief agreed covered not only new long term maturities falling due during the period 1981-4 but also the repayments of all previously rescheduled debt due and unpaid at end 1984 as well as all unpaid moratorium interest due and unpaid at end 1983. For most categories of debt the repayment terms were set at 12 years including a grace period of 6 years.

9. The latest UK/Zaire Agreement reflects these exceptionally generous terms and to date our payment experience has been good with over £3.25m having so far been received. Zaire has indicated recently that a further generous debt rescheduling was essential for 1985. Our response was that we would be prepared to consider sympathetically any application they may make.

/Aid

AID

10. A grant for £2m was agreed in 1976 and increased in 1979. A further £3m pledged in 1981 was increased to £3.5m in 1984. The Aid Framework for 1976 grant was used to supply Bailey Bridging to Office des Routes, for use mainly in Western Zaire and also for use in Kivu province on the Uvira-Fizi Road which runs down the west shore of Lake Tanganyika, at cost of £2.4m. Since 1981 £0.9m was spent on the provision of river ferries, pontoons and spare parts for Office des Routes; about £0.3m of equipment was provided for ONATRA, a transport parastatal for railway rehabilitation; equipment and spares were also provided for INZAL (Industrie Nationale Zairoise des Automobiles Leyland) to a value of £0.7m.

11. The UK contributes indirectly to support for Zaire through the International Development Association and the European Development Fund. It is hoped that Zaire's external transport problems may be partially solved through participation in the European Community's proposed East African Northern and Central Corridor projects.

12. Under the technical cooperation programme the UK contributes to the cost of an OXFAM rural development team who provide medical and agricultural advice at village level. Our contribution to this project is £50,000 in 1983/84 with a similar amount envisaged for 1984/85. We also support the English Language Centre at Kinshasa (£25,000 pa) but intend from 1985/86 to restrict its finance to students who are sponsored by the UK Government. Training in the UK is the largest element in the programme (£165,000 out of a total allocation of £250,000) and we provided 25 new awards in 1983/84. However this has been reduced to £150,000 in 1984/85 and we shall probably finance 15 awards.

13. HMG has financed the cost of a Zairean at Sandhurst in 1983 and again in 1984. Competition for places is fierce and the Zairean candidates for 1985/86 have been unsuccessful (but are on a waiting list). Bids for 1986/87 should be submitted by January 1985, via HM Ambassador.

INTERNATIONAL

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Prime Minister's Message


14. The Prime Minister sent a message (copy attached) to President Mobutu following the visit of P W Botha. It was handed over by HM Ambassador on 3 July. Mobutu commented that the Prime Minister had spoken very firmly with Mr Botha. He said that Mr Botha had asked to visit Zaire also. But Mobutu had seen problems at this juncture and had sent a temporising answer. But he had not said no.

Zaire/Namibia/Angola

15. In 1978 Zaire signed a Tripartite agreement with Angola and Zambia agreeing to respect national frontiers and not to support rebel movements operating from each other's territories. Despite this, Mobutu retains considerable sympathy for Savimbi and allows an active UNITA office to operate in Kinshasa.

16. Mobutu told HM Ambassador on 3 July that Zaire's position on Cuban withdrawal from Angola was exactly the same as ours. There was a nuance in that he could not take this position publicly, because the Cubans had been freely invited by a legally recognised government. But he considered it in Zaire's interest that the Cubans should go.

17. Mobutu considered that Cuban withdrawal depended on MPLA/UNITA reconciliation. If the Cubans left, the Luanda Government would collapse under pressure from UNITA. He thought that reconciliation would come eventually but it would take time.



He gave no indication that he contemplated trying to bring the MPLA and UNITA together at this stage or that he was in close touch with Savimbi.

18. Mobutu is careful not to reveal publicly his realistic attitude to Angola and South Africa, but could in the future play a useful role in the search for MPLA/UNITA reconciliation. The amount of assistance he decided to give UNITA could be significant in determining UNITA's fate, above all after Namibian independence.

Namibia: US Diplomacy

19. Remains active. Currently aimed at:

- (a) Completion of South African disengagement from Angola. (SA forces now 60km from border). Neither side anxious to see process completed until arrangements worked out over post-withdrawal monitoring. Angola also wants evidence of further moves towards SCR 435.
- (b) Ceasefire between SWAPO and SAG. Last ceasefire talks broke down over SWAPO insistence that SAG should also fix a date for implementation of SCR 435. More recently SWAPO seem to have softened their line.
- (c) Agreement with Angola on Cuban withdrawal. Americans described recent contacts as encouraging. [Not for use. Americans have told us that the Angolans have now produced a timetable for Cuban withdrawal linked to implementation of SCR 435. The US suggested some amendments to ensure proposal would be acceptable to SAG. Angolans have now considered these and invited the Americans to further talks in Angola].

CHAD

20. On 17 September, France and Libya announced their agreement for the mutual withdrawal of French and Libyan forces from Chad beginning on 25 September. The withdrawal is to be completed in 45 days, ending on 15 November.

21. It is not clear why Qadhafi decided that it was now time to withdraw; the military stalemate, the unpopularity and cost of the occupation, Libyan internal political difficulties, and Qadhafi's feeling of international isolation were all probable factors. It is not clear what role Morocco, newly "united" with Libya, played in the search for a settlement.

22. President Mobutu has already welcomed the French-Libyan agreement. After a meeting with Mitterand on 20 September, Mobutu stated that his troops (which were sent in to support the regime of Hissene Habre) could not stay in Chad forever. But he has also promised to send an envoy to Ndjamena to discuss with Habre the fate of the Zairean contingent.

SOUTH AFRICA: DURBAN CONSULATE INCIDENT

21. The six leaders of the United Democratic Front and Natal Congress entered the British Consulate in Durban on 13 September. Detention orders re-issued by the South African Government on 10 September have yet to be served on them.

22. A lawyer representing the six met the FCO Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa on 17 September. A request for a Ministerial meeting was refused.

23. On 24 September the South African Government announced that they felt absolved from their commitment to ensure the return to the UK of four South Africans charged with offences relating to the illegal export of arms to South Africa (the Armscor case) and due to appear in court in the UK on 22 October.



The South African Government made it clear that this was in retaliation for the continued presence of the six in the Durban Consulate which the South African Government sees as a violation of the Vienna Convention.

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FM FCO 211300Z JUNE 1984
TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 21 JUNE
YOUR TELNO 71: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS :
'YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER VISITED THE UK ON 2 JUNE.

I AM NOW WRITING PERSONALLY TO GIVE YOU MY IMPRESSIONS OF THIS MEETING. I MADE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT I WANTED A FRANK AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION. INDEED, THE MEETING LASTED FOR OVER FIVE HOURS AND COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS. WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. MR BOTHA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA OF AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA, SINCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN NAMIBIA WHILE THEY WERE STILL THERE. I EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE I BELIEVED FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA, AND CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA) WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, FOR WHICH SCR 435 PROVIDES THE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. FOR HIS PART MR BOTHA SAID HE COULD SEE NO PROSPECT OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THERE WAS RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA. I SHOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW YOU SEE THIS. WE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. I MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT I CONDEMNED APARTHEID AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE NEED TO FIND WAYS OF SATISFYING THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BLACK

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POPULATION. I REFERRED TO NELSON MANDELA'S CONTINUED DETENTION AND SAID THAT I HOPED THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON THIS SOON. I SPOKE TOO, ABOUT THE APPALLING PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS OF BLACK PEOPLES IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. MR BOTHA SHOULD NOW BE WELL AWARE OF OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE LASTING VALUE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE ENTERED INTO FREELY AND WITHOUT A SENSE OF DURESS.

AS YOU KNOW I AM ANXIOUS TO PUSH BACK COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT BELIEVE SOME SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES RUN COUNTER TO THIS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE MR BOTHA'S PERCEPTIONS AT FIRST HAND. I DO NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS, BUT I SEE THIS MEETING AS PART OF A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH WE MUST ALL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR THE SORT OF CHANGES WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES.' ENDS.

2. IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD STRESS ORALLY THAT THIS MEETING WITH MR BOTHA SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE REGARDED, LEAST OF ALL BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AS CONDONING APARTHEID: NOR AS REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY.

HOWE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

He's not your
favorite person : and
it's already a difficult
week.

But long-term it's an
important country : and both
President Reagan & President
Mitterand have seen him.

Agree to brief
meeting?

CDP 24/9
Yes mt



MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU wa za BANGA

President of the Republic and Marshal of Zaire

1. Mobutu deposed President Kasavubu in a bloodless coup in 1965 and assumed Presidential power. He visited the UK in December 1973, (State Visit) and as a guest of HMG in December 1981, when he called on the Prime Minister.
2. Mobutu's power initially rested on the Army. He still surrounds himself with tight security and a network of informers, but Mobutu is respected by many Zaireans, often grudgingly, for the energy and single-mindedness with which he has successfully restored peace, stability and unity to the country, thanks largely to his ability to steer the internal politics of Zaire, which are complicated by diverse tribal and regional aspirations.
3. In the early years of his Presidency, Mobutu often felt insecure and this led him to extreme policies internally. His personal authority has greatly increased and he now rules supreme. He is extremely corrupt (and one of the richest men in the world). A nepotist who finds it impossible to deny advancement to his relatives and fellow tribesmen. He is surrounded by people from his own region (Equateur).
4. Despite his profession of non-aligned views, he has in general been anti-communist. He is well versed in European culture and politics, an effective writer and orator. Despite his nationalist convictions, he is amenable to foreign, basically Western influence, while insisting on his right to differ. Since 1983 he has shown himself increasingly aware of the need for economic and financial discipline and has become, for lack of an alternative, very responsive to proposals of the IMF.



5. He was re-elected for a 7-year term as President on 29 July 1984. (He was the sole candidate). Now aged 53, his health has been the subject of some speculation in recent years.

6. Speaks no English.

UMBA di LUTETE

1. State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since November 1983. Member of MPR Central Committee. Born 1939 in Zaire.

2. Graduated in law from Lovanium University, Kinshasa and in International Maritime Law in Brussels. Has served, since 1967, in a number of Ministerial positions and has long experience both as Foreign Minister and as Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He is close to President Mobutu, and an able and effective exponent of the President's thinking. Can be a tough and sometimes difficult negotiator. Personally affable, but vain. Understands English if spoken slowly, but prefers not to speak it. He visited UK officially in February 1984 and called on the Secretary of State and Mr Rifkind.

3. Thought likely to lose his post in the next reshuffle, not least because the Zairean Government was embarrassed by the discovery of drugs in the luggage of a member of his party during a recent official visit to Europe.



CIToyEN MUKAMBA KADIATA NZEMBA, Zairean Ambassador to London
Appointed September 1984

1. Citoyen Mukamba was born in 1930 in Tshikapa, Zaire. He completed his primary and secondary education in Kabwe (Zaire) and studied Administration, Political Science and Diplomacy at Lovanium (campus name for Kinshasa) University.
2. He began his public service career in 1955 in Kinshasa. His early career was spent in regional government. He served as Governor in three provinces.
3. Citoyen Mukamba's diplomatic career began 12 years ago when he was appointed Ambassador to Uganda in 1972. Since then he has served successively as Ambassador in Sudan, Italy and Switzerland.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU, 27 SEPTEMBER

He is coming at 6.15 p.m. for half
an hour. Accompanied by his Foreign
Minister and Ambassador.

John Johnson, new Under-Secretary
for Africa, will come from the FCO.

I suggest the White Drawing Room.
Card attached.

Math. Lawer Duty Clerk
pp. C.D.P.

26 September 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



file Mo
of P Cason

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 September 1984

ZAIRE: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU

Thank you for your letter of 24 September, about President Mobutu's request to call on the Prime Minister later this week.

The Prime Minister agrees to see President Mobutu for a brief meeting and can manage 1815-1845 on Thursday, 27 September. I should be grateful if an invitation in this sense could be conveyed through the Zaire Ambassador.

Would you please let me have briefing by tomorrow evening and arrange for an experienced interpreter to be present. I should also be grateful if the Department could ensure that the numbers attending on this Zairean side are restricted to President Mobutu himself, his Foreign Minister (if present) and the Ambassador.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CST



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 September 1984

*Dear Charles,*Zaire: Visit of President Mobutu

The Zairean authorities informed us today that President Mobutu intends to pay a brief private visit to London on Thursday 27 September on his way back to Zaire from the United States. The Zairean Embassy have asked if a call on the Prime Minister could be arranged for the afternoon of Thursday 27 September or, depending on the President's time of arrival in London, the morning of Friday 28 September.

This very short notice is deplorable, especially as the Foreign Secretary will be in New York for the UN General Assembly at the time. There are, however, some arguments in favour of a positive response. The Foreign Secretary is keen to see more substance in our relations with this large and strategically important pro-Western country (in which we have investments of some £80m). It was against that background that the Prime Minister, as you may recall, sent a message to President Mobutu following Mr Botha's visit in June. Mobutu has played a useful role in supporting the objectives of the West in Chad, and because of his good relations with Savimbi may have a role to play in the Angola/Namibia problem.

It would therefore be most useful if the Prime Minister could spare the time to see him. A 30 minute call would suffice.

On his way to the USA, where he was received by President Reagan, Mobutu stopped over in Paris, also at very short notice, and called on President Mitterrand. We believe that he also plans to visit Bonn and Rome before returning to Zaire. Earlier this year he paid an official visit to Belgium. He last visited the UK, as the guest of HM Government, in 1981.

If the Prime Minister agrees to receive him, we will, of course, forward briefing in the normal way.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq³
10 Downing Street

République du Zaïre



Le Président

Kinshasa, le 18 septembre 1984.

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T 161^A/84**

CC MASTER
OPS

A Son Excellence
Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni
de Grande-Bretagne

L O N D R E S.

Madame le Premier Ministre,

La République du Zaïre s'est résolument engagée à déployer tous les efforts qui lui sont possibles afin de gagner le pari de l'assainissement de ses finances publiques et le redressement général de son économie.

Ce combat, le Zaïre entend le mener avec le concours de tous ses partenaires de bonne volonté.

Vous trouverez en annexe un aide-mémoire relatif à cette question et qui constitue, pour mon pays, un appel pressant à la compréhension et à la solidarité de tous nos partenaires extérieurs.

Vu l'excellence des relations de coopération entre nos deux pays, nous comptons sur le concours actif de la Grande-Bretagne.

Je vous prie de croire, Madame le Premier Ministre, à l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

LE PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR DU MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE
DE LA REVOLUTION, PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,

MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA

M a r é c h a l.



A I D E - M E M O I R E

- Le Zaïre, grand partenaire de la Grande-Bretagne, est conscient du rôle politique et stratégique qu'il a à jouer au coeur du continent africain et dans le concert des nations du monde libre. Il a toujours constitué un exemple de stabilité politique en Afrique, facteur majeur de paix et de sécurité pour sa population.
- Le Zaïre mettra tout en oeuvre pour que soit renforcée sa crédibilité tant à l'intérieur de ses frontières que vis-à-vis de ses partenaires extérieurs.

Aussi, le Zaïre s'est-il engagé, depuis spécialement ces trois dernières années, à créer toutes les conditions d'un progrès économique et social durable.

- Et pour que l'ensemble des efforts déjà entrepris et qui restent à entreprendre produisent les effets les plus bénéfiques au peuple zaïrois, le Zaïre croit devoir solliciter un large soutien et une grande compréhension de la part des pays amis et de la communauté internationale en général.

En effet, qu'a fait le Zaïre à ce jour ?

- Soucieux de créer un cadre permettant à l'initiative privée de s'exprimer et de contribuer au développement, le Zaïre :
 - . a opté pour l'initiative privée comme base du développement ;
 - . a proclamé et a mis en oeuvre le libéralisme économique ;
 - . a organisé l'accès libre au marché des devises ;
 - . a supprimé toute restriction en matière de change et de commerce ;
 - . a libéralisé le transfert des dividendes et des revenus ;
 - . a pris de courageuses mesures monétaires allant de la forte dévaluation à la libéralisation des taux de change devant aboutir à la convertibilité du zaïre-monnaie, facteur de renforcement des échanges commerciaux ;

- . a réduit le taux d'inflation qui était de 80 % en 1983 à moins de 20 % en 1984 ;
 - . a créé un marché de change interbancaire et un marché monétaire animé par les BONS DU TRESOR et dont le but est de mobiliser l'épargne intérieure ;
 - . a pris, sur le plan budgétaire, des mesures de saine gestion se traduisant par la rigueur et la transparence, mesures qui ont permis de contenir le niveau des dépenses publiques à ce jour et le financement monétaire dans les limites compatibles avec les besoins des agents économiques et des exigences du programme de redressement financier et de la relance économique ;
 - . a honoré ses engagements concernant le service de la dette extérieure.
- Certes, ces mesures ont été couronnées de succès à ce jour, mais ces résultats n'ont pas résolu tous les problèmes qui se posent au pays, d'autant plus que le poids de la dette extérieure amenuise considérablement les possibilités de financer les actions favorables à la relance et au progrès social de la population.
- D'où cet appel du Zaïre à la compréhension et à la solidarité de certains pays amis.
- Voilà pourquoi, dans le cadre du prochain septennat, spécialement en 1985 et 1986, le Zaïre se propose d'entreprendre d'urgence des actions, même modestes, visant à améliorer les conditions sociales des populations zaïroises notamment par :
- . la réhabilitation des infrastructures de santé publique (hôpitaux, dispensaires, vaccinations, produits pharmaceutiques) ;
 - . la réhabilitation minimum des transports et des voies de communication afin d'assurer l'évacuation des produits qui, actuellement, pourrissent à l'intérieur du pays et risquent de décourager les efforts des paysans producteurs.
- D'autres actions seront également entreprises dans les secteurs de l'éducation, de l'énergie et des mines.

Qu'attend le Zaïre de ses partenaires ?

- Le Zaïre attend de ses partenaires notamment :

1. les meilleures conditions de rééchelonnement de la dette extérieure.

Le Zaïre paiera toujours ses dettes. Le problème n'est pas là. Mais il ne saura payer que ce qui lui est possible de payer. Question de sauvegarder d'abord sa crédibilité dans ses engagements et la confiance de ses partenaires, de dégager ensuite des ressources supplémentaires pour la réalisation des actions sociales indispensables et urgentes pour sa population.

- C'est ainsi qu'une somme de 250 millions de dollars est considérée par le Zaïre comme étant le montant maximum qu'il serait à même de mettre chaque fois à la disposition de son service de la dette extérieure en 1985 et en 1986.

2. l'aide à la balance des paiements pour assurer un approvisionnement suffisant en biens d'équipement et de consommation courante ;
3. des interventions budgétaires susceptibles de dégager du budget zaïrois les ressources disponibles pour financer les échéances de la dette publique (par exemple : munitions, armes, etc ...).

- L'on pourrait utilement noter que :

- . en 1983 : le Zaïre a entrepris seul, dans la rigueur, l'assainissement financier ;
- . en 1984 : le Zaïre, avec le concours du F.M.I., a poursuivi ce travail d'assainissement, toujours dans la rigueur ;
- . en 1984 : le Zaïre, avec le F.M.I., toujours dans la rigueur, voudrait compter aussi sur une plus grande solidarité et une meilleure compréhension des autres partenaires, ses créanciers les plus importants.

- Il n'est nul doute qu'avec ses efforts propres et le concours actif de ses partenaires, le Zaïre réussira le pari du redressement économique et son succès sera celui du monde libre - et pourquoi pas celui de la tradition du F.M.I. en matière de programmes d'ajustement.

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R M

Zaire.

Q

10 December, 1981

Visit of the President of Zaire

I enclose, for such action as you think fit, a brief which seems to have been left behind when the President called on the Prime Minister the other day.

A. J. COLES

Roderic Lyne, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE
MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION
DEPARTEMENT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
ET DE LA COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE

CABINET DU COMMISSAIRE D'ETAT

NOTE A LA BIENVEILLANTE ET TRES HAUTE ATTENTION DU PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR
DU MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION, PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE SUR
LA COOPERATION ENTRE LE ZAIRE ET LA GRANDE BRETAGNE.

I. Base de la Coopération.

Existence de plusieurs accords de coopération dont la Convention Générale de Coopération de 1976 et plusieurs protocoles à cette Convention Générale signés à Londres le 13 février 1978.

II. Domaines concernés par la Coopération.

1. Militaires (fourniture d'un corps d'instructeurs militaires notamment)
2. Economiques (travaux publics, transports et communications, chemins de fer de Benguela)
3. Financiers (subventions, absence de double taxation des revenus en matière maritime et aérienne).
4. Culturels et scientifiques

III. Evaluation?

D'un caractère modeste, cette coopération peut encore être améliorée en quantité et en qualité.

Une aide de deux millions de livres sterling débloquée depuis l'an dernier est mise à la disposition des sociétés à intérêts britanniques (tels que Unilever, P.L.Z., C.P.A., Inzal, B.A.T. et autres) pour l'importation des matières premières).

Etat d'esprit en Grande Bretagne.

Milieux d'affaires - quelque peu traumatisés par l'expérience de la zairianisation. Peu intéressés pour investir au Zaïre.

.../...

Opinion générale : tendance à considérer le Zaïre un peu comme une sorte de chasse gardée de la Belgique.

La presse britannique est généralement assez critique à l'égard du Zaïre (influence sans doute dans une certaine mesure de l'Amnesty qui a son siège à Londres)

Points sur lesquels il importe d'insister.

Le caractère ouvert du Zaïre à la Coopération avec les pays, en particulier les pays du monde libre ou occidental.

- souligner que le Zaïre n'est la chasse gardée d'aucun pays.
- mettre un accent particulier sur la politique de privatisation du Zaïre en matière économique.
- il est à noter que le Gouvernement britannique actuel pratique une politique de denationalisation en matière économique
- il faudrait sans doute pas perdre de vue d'attirer l'attention des autorités britanniques sur la nature excellente des relations qui existent entre le Zaïre et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique (ainsi qu'en fait foi la visite récente du Président-Fondateur.
- de même sur le rôle constructif du Zaïre en Afrique comme le montre l'intervention du Zaïre au Tchad ainsi que le concours que le Zaïre a apporté hier à la solution pacifique du problème rhodésien.
- et de demander à notre tour à la Grande Bretagne de soutenir nos positions auprès de la Banque Mondiale et du F.M.I. à l'instar des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Problème en suspens - Transfert des recettes réalisées par British Calendoniam, qui a cessé toutes activités au Zaïre.

Il a été convenu d'effectuer mensuellement un montant de 80.000.000 Z soit 6.351.223 FB

SUBJECT



Zaire

10 DOWNING STREET

cc Maste

From the Private Secretary

9 December, 1981.

Visit of President Mobutu

The President of Zaire called on the Prime Minister at 1545 today. He was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, M. Yoka, and the Zairean Ambassador to London, M. Matangulu. Mr. Richard Luce was also present.

The conversation lasted for 45 minutes, but was fairly insubstantial (there was consecutive interpretation). It consisted largely of an extended plea by President Mobutu for increased UK assistance to Zaire, followed by discussion of the situation in Chad.

Mobutu said he understood our problems. Britain could not do everything. But in the view of Zaire, co-operation between the two countries was not at a sufficiently high level. A Convention of 1976 had been reinforced by a series of agreements in 1978. A particular Protocol on military co-operation had envisaged the despatch of instructors to Zaire, but none had arrived. Despite an agreement on cultural matters, there was not a single Zairean student in the UK. It was true that there were 25 Zaireans here on courses, but they were all teachers of English. That was not sufficient to strengthen co-operation between the two countries.

Britain had recently promised £3 m in aid over the next three years, but this was largely to reinforce the efforts of British firms in Zaire. There was a time when Zaire sent officers to Sandhurst for training, and Royal Engineers visited Zaire and provided assistance.

The Prime Minister explained that, in addition to our bilateral aid, we were contributing about £12.5 m as our share of the European Development Fund's programme, and were supporting other multilateral agencies which helped Zaire. An ODA Mission would be visiting Zaire in the New Year to discuss how our bilateral aid could best be spent. She was not aware of the agreement requiring us to send military instructors to Zaire. The precise terms should be looked at. It might be possible to do more about placing Zairean students in Britain, but it would depend on finding the right applicants and, to derive full benefit, they would need to be thoroughly proficient in English.

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/ President Mobutu

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President Mobutu briefly explained how the earlier policy of a state-controlled economy had been replaced by wide scope for free enterprise. On his recent visit to the United States he had made contact with many businessmen, some of whom would be visiting Zaire. Mr. Luce said that this was an area where we might do more. An investment protection agreement would be useful. A draft of such an agreement had been handed to the Zairean Government recently.

Turning to African issues, the Prime Minister expressed gratitude for Zaire's help during the negotiations over the future of Zimbabwe, and sought Mobutu's views on the present situation in Chad, where Zaire had acted with admirable despatch in supplying troops. Mobutu said that Zaire and like-minded countries had long wanted to get Libya out of Chad and replace it with an African force. When the opportunity arose, the response had been very slow. Zaire had therefore supplied troops without budgetary provision, and was paying a heavy price. The United States had now offered help for the contingent including the second battalion which had recently been provided. The Prime Minister said that we had been asked by Nigeria to give help, and we were trying to meet this request. It was important that we should all succeed in our efforts. It would be very serious if Goukouni invited Libya back.

The meeting ended at 4.30 p.m.

*You will
file*

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

PRESIDENT OF ZAIRE

President Mobutu is calling on you at 1545 on Wednesday.

He will be accompanied by:

the Foreign Minister - M. Yoka; and
the Zairian Ambassador - M. Matangulu.

On our side, I have agreed that the following should attend:

Mr. Richard Luce (who visited Zaire in June); and
Mr. John Snodgrass, our Ambassador in Kinshasa.

President Mobutu speaks little or no English. Mr. Peers Carter will attend to interpret. Since we have allotted only 30 minutes for the call, we shall not get through much business. However, for President Mobutu the main point is a political one - to be able to show by his current round of visits to Western capitals, that he has international support at a time of continued domestic insecurity and economic difficulties.

A photo has been arranged. In view of the numbers, I suggest we use the Cabinet Room.

A.S.C. 9/12.

8 December 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 December 1981

Dear John,

Visit of President Mobutu

President Mobutu is to call on the Prime Minister at 1545 on 9 December. We understand that he will be accompanied by his Foreign Minister, M. Yoka, and the Zairean Ambassador to London, M. Matangulu. Mr Luce will attend.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use which includes personality notes. You will have seen Washington telno 3701 giving an account of the President's visit to the US (a copy is attached for ease of reference).

President Mobutu speaks little or no English. We have therefore arranged for Mr Peers Carter to attend as interpreter.

President Mobutu is to be received by The Queen on the morning of 10 December. The Lord Privy Seal will host a lunch in his honour on the same day.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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CALL BY PRESIDENT OF ZAIRE ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 9 DECEMBER 1981

POINTS TO MAKE

BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. Grateful for Zairean support during Rhodesian negotiations and constructive attitude over Namibia. Congratulate Zaire on becoming member of Security Council 1982/3, at a time when Council will have serious decisions to make on African problems.

2. Mr Luce has warm recollections of his reception in Kinshasa last June. Recall President's honeymoon in Scotland in May 1980.

3. Pleased we could offer Zaire a further grant (£3 million over next three years) as Programme Aid.

[If asked for more aid. We are also contributing about £12.5 m. as our share of the European Development Fund's programme and supporting other multilateral agencies helping Zaire. We cannot increase our bilateral aid in present circumstances.]

NAMIBIA

4. Attach great importance to early settlement of Namibian problem. Present conflict is a source of instability in the region, which I know is of concern to you.

5. Initial reactions to African tour last month by senior officials of the Five were generally encouraging. Formal replies now received from both sides provide good basis for progress. Aim is still to negotiate remaining issues (eg impartiality of electoral progress, composition of UN force) in time for ceasefire and beginning of implementation of UN Plan during 1982.

CHAD

6. Congratulate Zaire on prompt despatch of contingent to Chad on 15 November. We are examining with Nigerians way of



- 2 -

helping with their contingent. [If asked. We cannot add to the aid already offered for Zairean contingent by USA and France.]

7. Essential OAU efforts succeed. If Libyans are invited back by Goukouni, it will be very difficult to dislodge them a second time.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
7 December 1981

CALL BY PRESIDENT OF ZAIRE ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 9 DECEMBER 1981

ESSENTIAL FACTS

PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. Born 1930. Trained as a journalist. Appointed Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army after independence in 1960. Deposed President Kasavubu in bloodless coup and assumed presidency in 1965. Has maintained power since, despite chaotic upheavals of the 1960s and recurrent serious economic difficulties. Has shown great political skill in controlling ~~complet~~ inter-tribal and secessionist forces. But ruthless, corrupt, and increasingly isolated from realistic ~~advice~~.
2. Made a State Visit to Britain in 1973 and in May 1980 went to Scotland on honeymoon with his second wife.

FOREIGN MINISTER (M. YOKA)

3. Born 1939. A leading lawyer and member of the Central Committee of the Party. No previous Ministerial experience prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister in October 1981. This is believed to be his first visit to Britain.

ZAIREAN AMBASSADOR (M. MATANGULU)

4. Born 1940. Ambassador to Britain since September 1979. Previously Ambassador to Kenya, Portugal and Switzerland.

REASONS FOR VISIT

5. President Mobutu has just returned from Washington, where he had talks with President Reagan. He attended the Franco-African Summit in Paris last month where he met President Mitterand. His visits to Western capitals reflect need for support at a time of increasing economic difficulty in Zaire

and some political unrest. He can be expected to refer to the communist threat to Zaire from neighbouring countries, but we believe he exaggerates the dangers. Other aspects of Mobutu's current diplomatic initiative include the sending of troops to Chad (see Paras 13-16 below) and Zaire's election as a member of the Security Council 1982/83.

UK/ZAIRE RELATIONS

6. Reasonably cordial but with little content. Our aid is small - Belgium, France and the United States shoulder most of the burden. In recent years we have supplied bridging equipment (£2.4 million) and under an agreement of 1980, £2 million of foreign exchange for the purchase in Britain of spare parts and raw materials for subsidiaries of firms operating in Zaire (including British Leyland, Tootal, British American Tobacco and Unilever).

7. For the future we have promised a grant of £3 million to be spent in the next three years. The ODA plan to send a mission to Zaire in the New Year to discuss how this will be spent. We also contribute an 18% share (about £12.4 million) of EC's European Development Programme in Zaire.

8. British exports to Zaire last year were £27.6 million (transport equipment, textile yarns, minerals) and imports were £52.6 million (minerals, coffee, cocoa, timber). British firms experience mounting difficulties in Zaire because of shortage of foreign exchange. ECGD cover is restricted to short term (180 days).

9. Last British Minister to visit Zaire was Mr Luce in June 1981. He was received by President Mobutu. Previous Zairean Foreign Minister, Bomboko, visited London and lunched with Lord Carrington in June; but was replaced by Yoka in October.

ZAIRE: ECONOMY

10. Zaire is world's largest producer of cobalt and industrial diamonds and a major producer of copper. But economy continues to deteriorate rapidly. Acute shortage of domestic and foreign exchange and inflation. Agriculture is a very poor way. Problems explained partly by commodity prices but also by administrative mismanagement and corruption. Total Zaire debts are about \$4.5 billion. IMF granted an Extended Fund Facility of \$1.1 billion in June, but Zaireans will have difficulty in meeting strongest performance criteria in July/September quarter. Production of diamonds and copper has fallen and cobalt stocks are proving hard to sell.

POLITICAL

11. There are signs of increasing unrest. President Mobutu frequently changes his Ministers - two major reshuffles this year. His Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-i-Bond resigned in April when in Belgium, thus joining other political figures in exile. Security situation will continue to remain unstable and there remains a continuing risk of a coup, although President Mobutu has proved extraordinary powers of survival.

12. Amnesty International has expressed concern at reported infringements of human rights. At Zaire's invitation, a two-man team visited Kinshasa in July 1981, but their report has not yet been published.

NAMIBIA

13. Having received formal responses from both sides to our proposed Constitutional Principles, the Five hope to secure an agreed text this year, ending Phase 1 of the negotiations. Senior officials met in Ottawa on 7-8 December to determine a strategy for Phase 2, which is to be devoted to the size,



- 4 -

composition and deployment of UNTAG; and the impartiality of the electoral process. Zaire's attitude in general moderate, but Mobutu does not carry much weight with other African states.

CHAD

14. Zaire was first country to respond to President Moi's (OAU Chairman) peace-keeping initiative: on 15 November 700 Zairean paratroops arrived in the capital Ndjamena. President Mobutu in Washington on 2 December is reported to have secured US\$15 million assistance for Zairean contingent. Press reports suggest Mobutu will increase contingent to 2,000 (possibly larger than Nigerian force). Only Zaireans, about 150 Senegalese and advance guard of Nigerians, so far in Ndjamena (other contributors are supposed to be Guinea, Togo and Benin).

15. We have offered to help the Nigerians by providing essential equipment, such as transport, within ceiling of \$1 million. US original offer was US\$12 million to be divided between Nigerian and Zairean contingents. France are helping with contingents from francophone states (whether they are assisting Zaire is not clear).

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
7 December 1981



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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3701 OF 7 DECEMBER 1981,

INFO KINSHASA

RC

VISIT TO U S BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. PRESIDENT MOBUTU VISITED WASHINGTON FROM 29 NOVEMBER TO 2 DECEMBER. HE CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, HAIG, WEINBERGER, AND REGAN, AS WELL AS ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE I M F. WE WERE BRIEFED ON THE VISIT BY LANNON WALKER (STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY) AND OAKLEY (U S AMBASSADOR AT KINSHASA).

2. OAKLEY DESCRIBED THE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE. HE SAID THAT SOME GROUNDWORK HAD BEEN DONE DURING VISITS TO ZAIRE BY LANNON WALKER, GENERAL WALTERS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY WEST INTERNATIONAL-SECURITY ASSISTANT, PENTAGON) SHORTLY BEFORE MOBUTU'S ARRIVAL IN THE U S. THE AMERICANS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THE LOGISTIC ORGANISATION OF THE ZAIROIS MILITARY, AND HAD CONCENTRATED ON DECIDING HOW BEST TO GET BACK INTO OPERATION EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY ALREADY HAD. (THE MILITARY MISSION CHIEFS IN KINSHASA OF THE U S, BELGIUM, FRANCE AND GERMANY HAD JOINTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE ZAIROIS APPALLING LOGISTIC STRUCTURE WAS A REAL THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATE; THEY HAD ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE FLOW OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM WESTERN SOURCES SHOULD BE COORDINATED IN AN OVERALL COLLECTIVE EFFORT.)

3. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT EVIDENCE OF INCREASED ACTIVITY BY THE F L N C IN ANGOLA. TWO TO THREE HUNDRED F L N C PEOPLE SEEM NOW TO BE BACK INSIDE SHABA, POSSIBLY ENGAGED IN PRELIMINARY SUBVERSION, WHILE A FURTHER THOUSAND GENDARMES HAD CROSSED INTO ANGOLA: SOME OF THESE WERE BEING TRAINED IN CUBA AND EAST GERMANY.

IN THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER, WHILE A FURTHER THOUSAND GENDARMES HAD
CROSSED INTO ANGOLOA: SOME OF THESE WERE BEING TRAINED IN CUBA AND
EAST GERMANY, WHILE OTHERS WERE BEING USED BY THE ANGOLANS AGAINST
U N I T A. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS DISCOUNTED SOME INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS THAT AN ATTACK ON ZAIRE MIGHT TAKE PLACE BEFORE FEBRUARY,
THEY WERE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT SIGNS OF GROWING PREPAREDNESS AMONG
THE F L N C AND DIMINISHED ZAIRE'S COMPETENCE TO HANDLE THIS THREAT.

4. DURING HIS VISIT, MOBUTU HAD DISCUSSED THIS SITUATION AND
COMPLAINED THAT HIS OWN OFFICIALS HAD NOT TOLD HIM HOW BAD THE
LOGISTIC STRUCTURE WAS IN HIS ARMED FORCES. HE HAD AGREED WITH
SECRETARY OF DEFENCE WEINBERGER THAT IN FUTURE HE WOULD CHAIR (IN
HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF DEFENCE) A QUARTERLY MEETING WITH THE
AMBASSADORS AND MILITARY MISSION CHIEFS OF GERMANY, U S, FRANCE AND
BELGIUM. HE ALSO AGREED THAT THE U S SHOULD SEND A LOGISTIC
TEAM URGENTLY TO ADVISE ON SOLUTIONS TO THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. THIS
WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN KINSHASA ABOUT 14 DECEMBER, AND THE
AMERICANS WERE ASKING GERMANY, FRANCE AND BELGIUM TO SEND SIMILAR
TEAMS.

5. IN ADDITION TO IMPROVING THE ORGANISATION OF THE ZAIRE'S ARMED
FORCES AND MODERATELY INCREASING THE OVERALL U S MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMME, THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF
EQUIPMENT ALREADY ON ORDER. IT WAS HOPED TO SHORTEN PRESENT DELIVERY
TIMES OF 1 TO 3 YEARS TO A MATTER OF MONTHS ON SOME ITEMS. IN
PARTICULAR THE AMERICANS WERE PLANNING TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT FOR
THE 31ST BRIGADE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE O A U
PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN CHAD.

6. THE AMERICANS WERE URGING THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND BELGIANS TO
INCREASE THEIR OWN MILITARY CREDITS OR ACCELERATE EXISTING ONES, AS
WELL AS GIVING URGENT HELP WITH LOGISTIC RECONSTRUCTION (PARTICULARLY
WELCOME WAS THE STATIONING OF A BELGIAN Z130 IN ZAIRE). A START
HAD BEEN MADE AND THE GERMANS HAD ALREADY SAID THAT THEY WERE
WILLING TO PUT THEIR MILITARY WAREHOUSE IN ZAIRE AT THE DISPOSAL OF
THE FOUR POWERS.

7. LANNON WALKER DISCUSSED THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE TALKS. HE SAID
THAT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN DOWNWARDS, U S OFFICIALS HAD INSISTED
THAT THE I M F AND I B R D AND NOT THE U S OR ITS PARTNERS WERE
ZAIRE'S SALVATION. THE AMERICANS HAD ASSESSED THAT AT CURRENT
RATES, ZAIRE WOULD FALL OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE FUND PROGRAMME
BY THE END OF THE YEAR AND WOULD RISK LOSING THE SCHEDULED I M F
REPLENISHMENT. THERE WAS CONSEQUENTLY A HIGH RISK OF FURTHER ZAIRE'S
DEFAULT ON THE DEBTS. THE AMERICANS HAD DURING THE PRELIMINARY

DEFAULT ON THE DEBTS. THE AMERICANS HAD DURING THE PRELIMINARY MEETINGS MENTIONED IN PARA 1 ABOVE OFFERED TO ADVISE THE ZAIROIS ON ECONOMIC STRATEGIC DECISIONS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING, AND THEY HAD ACCORDINGLY SUBMITTED PROPOSALS FOR ACTION IN THE FORM OF DRAFT LETTERS FROM MOBUTU TO THE PRESIDENT OF I B R D AND MANAGING DIRECTOR OF I M F. THERE WERE THREE FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF ADVICE:

(A) THAT ALTHOUGH THE ZAIROIS GOVERNMENT WOULD SET OVERALL POLICY, GECAMINES WOULD BE RUN BY MR ROBERT CREM. SOZACOM WOULD ALSO BE THOROUGHLY REFORMED.

(B) GECAMINES WOULD IN FUTURE HANDLE THE SALE OF ITS OWN PRODUCTS THROUGH TO THE END, RATHER THAN HAVE SOZACOM HANDLE THESE.

(C) THAT THE CURRENT ZAIROIS ECONOMIC TEAM WOULD REMAIN IN POST UNTIL THE END OF THE FUND PROGRAMME. IN ADDITION, THE MINISTER OF FINANCE WOULD BE THE SOLE POINT OF CONTROL FOR ALL RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, INCLUDING THOSE BY THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.

8. MOBUTU HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE WAS WILLING TO DO THIS BUT WOULD PREFER NOT TO WRITE IT DOWN FOR POLITICAL REASONS. HE HAD ASKED THE AMERICANS TO TELL THE I M F AND BANK PRIVATELY THAT HE WOULD IMPLEMENT SUCH STEPS (WITHOUT REVEALING THAT THE U S HAD SUGGESTED THEM.) HOWEVER, AT AMERICAN URGING, HE EVENTUALLY SENT LETTERS SETTING OUT IN BROAD TERMS HIS INTENTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE I B R D, MANAGING DIRECTOR OF I M F AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE ONLY POINTS LEFT UNMENTIONED WERE THAT AN EXPATRIOT WOULD BE PLACED IN CHARGE OF GECAMINES AND THAT THE ECONOMIC TEAM WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH HE ASSURED THE AMERICANS VERBALLY THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT HAPPEN.

9. THE AMERICANS EMPHASISED THAT ON NO ACCOUNT SHOULD THE ZAIROIS BE TOLD THAT WE WERE AWARE THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED THIS PROGRAMME AND HAD VIRTUALLY FORCED IT UPON MOBUTU.

10. WALKER HOPES THAT U S ALLIES WOULD NOW TALK DISCREETLY TO THE BANK AND FUND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO MOVE QUICKLY IN PINNING DOWN SPECIFICS NOW THAT MOBUTU HAS TAKEN GENERAL POLITICAL DECISIONS WHICH ALLOWED PROGRESS TO BE MADE.

11. THE ABOVE BRIEFING WAS PRIMARILY INTENDED FOR THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND BELGIANS, AND IT WAS ONLY BY CHANCE THAT WE ALSO ATTENDED.

HENDERSON.

CONFIDENTIAL

*copy with mitterrand
to Mr Coler, No 10.*

RmyL.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1083 OF 8 DECEMBER 1981
INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV KINSHASA WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA

CG NEW YORK TELNO 83: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. VISITING PARIS BEFORE FLYING ON TO LONDON, PRESIDENT MOBUTU SAW PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ON 7 DECEMBER. AFTERWARDS, IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS, HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH HIS VISIT TO THE US ('ZAIRE HAS OBTAINED ALL IT ASKED FOR'). THE US WERE GOING TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY AID FROM THE 10.5 MILLION DOLLARS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO 15 MILLION.
2. ON CHAD HE SAID THAT THE ZAIRE CONTINGENT WOULD BE INCREASED FROM 800 TO 2,000.
3. ASKED ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ZAIRE AND ISRAEL, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NOW NOTHING TO PREVENT GOOD RELATIONS, ADDING, HOWEVER, THAT ZAIRE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO CONSULT OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IN THE CONTEXT OF M. CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO ISRAEL THE FRENCH PRESS HAS REPORTED SPECULATION THAT FRANCE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.
4. THE QUAI D'ORSAY HAVE TOLD US THAT THE DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WAS MOSTLY ABOUT CHAD, BUT THEY DID NOT YET THEMSELVES HAVE DETAILS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ADDIS ABABA.

HIBBERT

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3 December 1981

Visit of President Mobutu

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 2 December. She has agreed to receive President Mobutu for 30 minutes from 1545 on the afternoon of Wednesday 9 December. I should be grateful if you could let John Coles have a brief the previous evening.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You could give him 30 minutes
in the afternoon of Wednesday, 9 Dec? December 1981
Agree?

Dear Michael,

Visit of President Mobutu

In my letter of 20 November I warned that President Mobutu of Zaire was proposing to visit London from 26-28 November. This coincided with the European Summit and, as you know, we managed to put the Zaireans off.

They have now returned to the charge and are proposing a visit on 9-10 December when Mobutu is on his way back from a visit to Washington. Mobutu has asked on this occasion to call on The Queen and the Prime Minister.

We have little useful bilateral work to do with Mobutu: but it would be difficult to put him off for a second time. I set out in my previous letter the reasons why Mobutu is so insistent on being seen to be a welcome visitor in Western capitals at the moment. Particularly in view of Zaire's helpful effort in sending troops to Chad, and imminent membership of the Security Council, it would be as well to accommodate Mobutu as far as is conveniently possible. If the Prime Minister could spare half an hour or so to receive Mobutu he would be more than satisfied.

For the rest of his programme we shall not be setting up formal bilateral talks but the Lord Privy Seal - in Lord Carrington's absence - will give Mobutu lunch. We are enquiring whether The Queen will be prepared to receive him briefly.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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Zaire

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 November 1981

Pres Mobutu is now not coming

Phil 23/x1

Dear Michael,

Visit of President Mobutu

/ As you know (Kinshasa telegram 156, enclosed) HM Ambassador has so far been unable to ride President Mobutu of Zaire off his proposal to visit London from 26 - 28 November. You will wish to have the background in case you receive a direct approach from the Zaireans.

/ President Mobutu's office have been told (FCO telno 105) that such a visit could not come at a more inconvenient moment, and that the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington will be fully occupied with the European Council Summit. We are telegraphing again today to underline the fact that there is no present prospect of either the Prime Minister or Lord Carrington being able to see Mobutu.

The Lord Privy Seal will offer President Mobutu lunch on 27 November, and we hope that Mr Luce may be able to call on him at his hotel; otherwise we are planning no official programme. In answer to any request from the Zaireans for a meeting with the Prime Minister on the morning of Saturday 28 November, HM Ambassador will say that she is out of London.

President Mobutu will be en route for Washington where we (and the US Embassy) assume that he will be meeting President Reagan. Earlier this month, he took a prominent role at the Paris meeting of Francophone Heads of Government and his discussions with President Mitterand were given publicity. His current round of visits to Western capitals reflects his pressing need for international support at a time of continued domestic insecurity and economic difficulties.

/It is also

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



It is also part of a general diplomatic effort which has included Zaire's election as a member of the Security Council in 1982/83, and Zaire's leading role in the African military force in Chad - the Zairean parachute regiment is the only force already to have arrived in Chad.

We have not told the Zaireans that the Prime Minister will be at Chequers, as this could lead to a suggestion (which we assume would be unwelcome) that he should call there en route to the airport.

yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 28 NOVEMBER

YOUR TELNO 105: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU.

1. I SAW NIMI, DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, YESTERDAY EVENING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. NIMI SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO PREFERRED TO AVOID FLYING ON FRIDAYS, WISHED TO ARRIVE IN LONDON, AS A CHANGE FROM PARIS, ON THURSDAY, AND LEAVE FOR THE UNITED STATES ON SATURDAY. HE WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY OFFICIAL HOSPITALITY, JUST "TEN MINUTES" FOR A GENERAL TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. I REPLIED THAT, BOTH FROM MY OWN KNOWLEDGE OF SUMMIT MEETINGS IN LONDON AND FROM MY INSTRUCTIONS, I COULD HOLD OUT NO HOPE OF A SLOT IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME ON 26 OR 27 NOVEMBER. EVERY MINUTE OF THE DAY WOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH THE 10 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. NIMI COMMENTED THAT, EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT HAD 6 HEADS OF STATE AS HIS GUESTS, HE WAS SURE THAT HE WOULD MAKE TIME TO SEE MRS THATCHER IF SHE WERE PASSING THROUGH KINSHASA. I SAID THAT THINGS WERE NOT QUITE THE SAME IN EUROPE, BUT STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE A WELCOME VISITOR ON A LESS HECTIC OCCASION. HE DID NOT RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT ON RETURN FROM THE UNITED STATES, AND I DID NOT HINT AT IT.

3. I EXPECT THE PRESIDENT WILL ACCEPT THE POSITION (WITH EITHER A GOOD OR A BAD GRACE). BUT IF THERE IS ANY GIVE IN YOUR STAND, FOR EXAMPLE A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE MORNING OF SATURDAY 28 NOVEMBER, PLEASE LET ME KNOW BY RETURN.

SNODGRASS

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TO FLASH KINSHASA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 19 NOVEMBER

VISIT TO BRITAIN BY MOBUTU

1. ZAIREAN AMBASSADOR TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT MOBUTU WISHED TO VISIT LONDON NEXT WEEK ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. HE PLANNED TO ARRIVE AT HEATHROW EARLY ON THE MORNING OF THURSDAY 26 NOVEMBER AND LEAVE ON 28 NOVEMBER. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT MOBUTU HOPED THAT THE TWO-DAY VISIT WOULD GIVE TIME FOR TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF.
2. THIS TIMING COULD NOT BE MORE DIFFICULT. IT COINCIDES EXACTLY WITH THE EC SUMMIT MEETING (26/27 NOVEMBER) AND BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND I WILL BE FULLY ENGAGED ON BOTH DAYS WITH THE EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.
3. PLEASE THEREFORE EXPLAIN TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE THAT WITH NINE VISITING HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT HERE AT THAT TIME WE MUCH REGRET THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OFFER MOBUTU APPROPRIATE HOSPITALITY OR BILATERAL MEETINGS AND STRONGLY SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT HE SHOULD NOT PLAN A VISIT TO LONDON THIS TIME. IF THE ZAIREANS SUGGEST THAT THE VISIT COULD BE FITTED IN ON MOBUTU'S RETURN FROM WASHINGTON YOU SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO REPORT THIS SUGGESTION TO US. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND/OR MYSELF TO SEE MOBUTU IN THE WEEK 30 NOVEMBER TO 4 DECEMBER BUT WE CANNOT CONFIRM THIS FOR THE MOMENT.)
4. WE APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULT POSITION THAT THIS MAY PUT YOU IN. BUT WE THINK IT WOULD BE LESS DAMAGING FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS IF THE VISIT WERE CANCELLED THAN FOR MOBUTU TO BE RECEIVED AT AN INAPPROPRIATELY LOW LEVEL.

CARRINGTON

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