

S
810

PREM 19/1408/1

Part 1 of 2

SECRET
PART 7 A

MI

NEW FILE COVER

602

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

MEETINGS WITH THE TADISEACH
ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES
ANGLO-IRISH SUMMITS
£

IRELAND

PART 1: MAY 1979

PART 7: November 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
22.11.84 23/11/84 X ENDS							
PREM 19 / 1408							

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 8 November 1983, columns 147 to 153: Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting

Signed J. Gray Date 4/9/2013

PREM Records Team



FLE

69

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1984

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

Thank you for your letter of 24 October asking whether Sir Ewart Bell may attend the Anglo-Irish Summit.

The Prime Minister is content for him to do so.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

G.K. Sandiford, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CST

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

24 October 1984

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister
Agree to
include Sir
Ewart Bell?

Yes
no

CDP 24/10.

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

The Secretary of State has seen Len Appleyard's letter to you of 23 October about the arrangements for the forthcoming Summit. He is generally content with what is proposed; but he would very much like to be accompanied by Sir Ewart Bell, the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, as well as by Mr Andrew. Sir Ewart, who has now been brought into the restricted group, would be the only person present who actually lives in Northern Ireland and Mr Hurd believes that it would be particularly useful to have his advice.

I understand that Sir Ewart Bell attended the last Summit in addition to Sir Philip Woodfield (Mr Andrew's predecessor) and, while appreciating the need to keep the official party as small as possible, Mr Hurd hopes that the Prime Minister will agree that he should again be included.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard, Richard Hatfield and David Peretz.

Yours sincerely,

Graham Sandiford

G K SANDIFORD

ssd

CONFIDENTIAL

meetings with Taoisead. IRELAND. Pt 7.

PROPERTY RECORDS
PROPERTY
PROPERTY



1984

2 1 2 3 4

CONFIDENTIAL



file to

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 October, 1984.

Anglo-Irish Summit: Ashford Castle, Republic of Ireland

Thank you for your letter of 23 October about the arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit.

A final decision on whether to go to Ashford Castle waits on a security assessment being prepared by the Cabinet Office.

I agree with your proposed list of participants including the Ambassador at Dublin and, subject to confirmation, the Head of Republic of Ireland Department.

I do not exclude the possibility that, for tactical and presentational reasons, we may want to have some discussion of Community affairs at the Summit. This could require the addition of one or two further officials. But there is no need for a decision on this yet.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office), Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office), and David Peretz (HM Treasury).

C.D. Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 October 1984

Dear Charles,

Anglo-Irish Summit: Ashford Castle, Republic of Ireland

Thank you for your letter of 5 October. I understand that despite the IRA bomb outrage in Brighton the Prime Minister wishes the Summit to go ahead, and that she is still willing to accept the Irish invitation to Ashford Castle. In accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Cabinet Office, I am therefore writing to make proposals on participation by Ministers and officials at the meeting.

The main purpose of the Summit will be to discuss Anglo-Irish relations, with particular reference to Northern Ireland. You have already told me that the Prime Minister wishes to be accompanied, as at the last Summit, by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; and that she would like the official team to be kept as small as possible. We suggest that the latter should comprise one Private Secretary for each of the Ministers concerned, plus Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Robert Andrew, Mr David Goodall and Mr Bernard Ingham. Dr FitzGerald will almost certainly be accompanied by the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Barry, and by Mr Spring, the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister). The Irish official team will also include their Ambassador in London, Mr Noel Dorr, and I hope that it can be agreed that the Ambassador at Dublin, Mr Alan Goodison, should be present on our side. You may also like to consider whether the Head of Republic of Ireland Department here (whose predecessor attended the 1983 Summit) should attend as record taker. He is a member of the restricted group and it would certainly be helpful to him in regard to follow-up action.

As it is possible that no solution will have been reached by then on the question of European Community budgetary discipline, it seems desirable to make contingency arrangements for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to attend the Summit meeting also, but this may well not prove necessary in the event. As far as can be foreseen now, there are no other major bilateral issues which would necessitate any further ministerial presence on the British side.

/In view

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



In view of the restriction of the agenda to Anglo-Irish relations and possibly Community affairs we shall carry out a much more restricted briefing exercise than usual.

We have asked the Irish authorities to prepare a draft programme.

Briefing for the press last year was undertaken by the Press Secretary at No 10. I assume that Mr Ingham will take charge of these arrangements again this year.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office), Graham Sandiford (NIO) and David Peretz (Treasury).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard


(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland: Meetings with the Taoiseach

A 7



New York
for delivery

7

CONFIDENTIAL



CDP
-
22/K.

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

20th October, 1984

attached Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 18th October, which has been laid before The Queen. Her Majesty is pleased to give her approval to the Prime Minister's proposed visit to the Republic of Ireland for a bilateral Anglo/Irish summit on 18th/19th November.

*Your ever
Robert*

C.D. Powell, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL



IRELAND: 2/12-4/12
File (Original on PM Tours: Anglo/
German summit 2/11)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October, 1984

Thank you for your letter of 17 October informing me that The Queen has been pleased to give approval to the Prime Minister's proposed absences in November and December.

The Prime Minister also proposes to go to the Republic of Ireland for a bilateral Anglo/Irish summit on 18/19 November. News of this is being held very closely, and it is probable that no announcement will be made until after the meeting has taken place.

I should be grateful if you would seek The Queen's permission for the Prime Minister to be absent from the country on these days as well.

(C.D. Powell)

R. Fellowes, Esq., MVO.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

MKJAFQ

cpc.

file

From the Private Secretary

5 October 1984

Dear Sir,

Anglo/Irish Summit


It was agreed when Dr. Fitzgerald visited London on 3 September that the next Anglo/Irish Summit should be held on 19 November. The venue was left open.

I understand from Sir Robert Armstrong that the Irish Government propose that the Summit should be held at Ashford Castle, where President Reagan stayed during his visit to the Republic. The Prime Minister is agreeable to this. I should be grateful if, in consultation with the Cabinet Office, you could arrange for the Irish authorities to be informed.

We also need to decide the detailed arrangements. The Prime Minister would prefer if possible to go there and back on 19 November. But she would be ready if necessary to fly to Ireland on the evening of 18 November for a dinner. In that case she would expect the Summit to finish at lunchtime on 19 November and to return immediately thereafter to the United Kingdom. I should be grateful if this could be explored further with the Irish Government. We shall also need to settle the composition of the UK delegation for the Summit. I should be grateful for a recommendation in due course.

Knowledge of the precise date of the Summit should be held very closely and no announcement made without consulting the Prime Minister.

I am sending copies of this letter to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

6

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister
Agree?
C.D.P.
4/K

Ref. A084/2624

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Summit

I understand that the venue which the Irish Government have in mind for the Anglo-Irish Summit on 19 November is Ashford Castle, which is where President Reagan stayed on his visit to Ireland. It will involve flying to Shannon Airport and taking helicopters from there to Ashford Castle. I am assured that it would make a very agreeable venue; and of course it would avoid the Prime Minister having to pay two visits to Dublin in quick succession.

R

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence.

4 October 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



bc PC JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

IRISH SAILORS' AND SOLDIERS' LAND TRUST

The Prime Minister has seen the Northern Ireland Secretary's minute of 17 September.

The Prime Minister continues to believe that it is perfectly reasonable to restrict the benefits of a "soldiers' and sailors'" trust to ex-servicemen. She would wish the Irish Government to be steered firmly in this direction. She agrees, however, that if the proposal encounters stiff resistance, we should, as a fall-back, agree that the funds could go to other genuine charities.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Appleyard (FCO), Mr. Peretz (HM Treasury) and Mr. Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office).

(C.D. POWELL)
21 September 1984

SS

E.R.

Prime Minister

①

Prime Minister

IRISH SAILORS' AND SOLDIERS' LAND TRUST

It is not unreasonable for the benefits of a "Soldiers + Sailors" Trust to benefit ex-servicemen. We should surely press this pretty firmly on the Irish. But agree, as a final fallback, that the surpluses

I have seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to you of 6 September and your Private Secretary's reply of 10 September.

could go to other genuine charities? CD 19/9.

2. I agree that the Irish Government should be approached on the lines you suggest. The Irish Government may not be attracted to the proposal that the charitable beneficiaries should be confined to those favouring ex-servicemen in view of the sensitivities on the role of the security forces in Northern Ireland. In that case, I doubt if we should press them too hard and I would hope we could agree to the proposal by the majority of members of the Trust that it should be empowered to use future surpluses to assist charities operating in any part of Ireland. But I would not myself favour extending the beneficiaries further to bodies seeking to

approve improve?

3. I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson and Sir Robert Armstrong.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURA)

SS/N10

D.H.

17 September 1984

Ireland A7

Mtgs with TADISEACT

19 SEP 1964

11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

000
AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place

SW1X 7HR

10th September 1984

CRK
1
COH

Dear Private Secretary,

I have been asked by the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, to arrange for transmission to the Prime Minister of the enclosed letter expressing his thanks to her for the hospitality offered to him and to his delegation on the occasion of the meeting with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street on 3rd September.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to bring the letter to the attention of the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely
Noel Dorr

Noel Dorr
Ambassador

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Encl.



Soe

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Irish Sailors' and Soldiers' Land Trust

The Prime Minister has considered your minute of 6 September on this subject. Subject to the views of colleagues, she is content that the Irish Government should be approached on the basis outlined in paragraph 7, except that if future surpluses are to be distributed to charities, the distribution should be confined to those benefiting ex-servicemen.

I am sending copies of this minute to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), David Peretz (HM Treasury) and Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office).

C.D. Powell
10 September 1984

rw

①

Prime Minister

The solution proposed by Sir D. Armstrong in para. 7 is admirable. Agree? Yes or No

C.D.P. 7/19

Ref. A084/2400

PRIME MINISTER

Irish Sailors' and Soldiers' Land Trust

During the 1914-18 War (after the Easter Rising in 1916), Lord Ypres (formerly Sir John French, and himself an Irishman) went about Ireland to encourage Irishmen to join the British forces. In doing so he gave what amounted to a pledge that those who joined would be provided with housing after the War was over. In pursuance of his pledge the British Government (whose writ still covered the whole of Ireland) after the War undertook the building of cottages in Ireland for Irish ex-servicemen. When the Irish Free State was set up, it was agreed between the three Governments concerned (in Westminster, Belfast and Dublin) that the responsibility for providing and maintaining this housing should be devolved upon a body to be known as the Irish Sailors' and Soldiers' Land Trust. This Trust was to be a non-political Anglo-Irish body, with members appointed by the Governments. The Government of the Irish Free State made over to the Trust the stock of houses then already built or under construction in the Irish Free State; the Government of Northern Ireland did likewise with houses in Northern Ireland; and the British Government provided the Trust with an endowment in the form of a grant of money. The Trust was set up under a British statute of 1922 which made various provisions for partition; its establishment was subject to ratification in the legislation of the Irish Free State and also the Parliament of Northern Ireland. This was duly done, so that the Government of the Republic, as the successor to the Irish Free State, and the Government of Northern Ireland are in this sense a party to the establishment of the Trust in 1924.

2. The Trust was later empowered to provide housing for ex-servicemen and their widows. The legislation setting it up made no provision for winding it up. Over the years the Trust

has continued to provide and maintain accommodation for the ex-service beneficiaries and their widows at very low or (in the Republic) no rent. More recently, where tenants have been prepared to buy, the Trust has been selling houses to sitting tenants for a small sum. Where houses have fallen vacant upon the departure or death of sitting tenants or their widows, the Trust has disposed of houses on the market. As a result of this policy the Trust's stock of houses is down to 30 in the Irish Republic and 170 in Northern Ireland; and the Trust has surplus funds held in British Government stocks and Treasury Bills amounting to about £5 million. The remaining tenants are all more or less elderly, and many of them widows, but it could be 10 years or more before the last house is vacated.

3. The members of the Trust (whose Chairman, appointed by the Treasury, is Sir Edmund Compton and who include Lord Killanin, appointed by the Taoiseach) have been considering the future of the Trust. They do not need to hold the whole of the surplus funds they now have, though they need to retain not less than £1½ million to provide them with an income with which to maintain the properties they still hold. Accordingly they have proposed that they should return £1,626,000 of the surplus to the British Government and £754,000 to the Irish Government: these figures correspond to the original stakes of the British and Northern Irish Governments on the one hand and the Government of the Irish Free State on the other. This proposal has been agreed among the British Government Departments concerned, save that it is envisaged that of the £1,626,000 payable to the United Kingdom £40,000 should be paid into the Northern Ireland Exchequer. This proposal is also acceptable to the Irish Government.

4. There is, however, a disagreement as to how the Trust should dispose of future surpluses, which will arise as the remaining houses are sold. These surpluses will not be very large: perhaps of the order of £100,000 a year to begin with, rising towards £500,000. Four proposals have been made:




(1) A majority of the members of the Trust have proposed that the Trust should be open ended and empowered to use future surpluses to assist charities operating in (any part of) Ireland.

(2) One member of the Trust questions the use of surpluses for charitable purposes, but anyway believes that the assistance to be given should be confined to charities devoted to the welfare of ex-servicemen in Ireland.

(3) I have suggested that the purposes might be widened to include not only charities operating in (any part of) Ireland but also bodies or groups operating in the United Kingdom or in the Republic of Ireland or in both for the improvement of understanding and social and cultural relations between the people of the United Kingdom and the people of the Republic of Ireland. My thought was that one use for these funds might be to support the Anglo-Irish Encounter set up with the blessing of the two Governments. If support was provided this way, any direct UK Government contribution to such a body could be reduced *pari passu*. The risk inherent in this extension of the possible purposes is that, the wider the areas permitted, the greater the possibility of the funds being used for a purpose which proves to be politically controversial.

(4) The Treasury have proposed that future surpluses should be paid to the Governments in proportion to their original stakes. They argue in effect that the surpluses arise from activities wholly financed from public funds, and the Exchequers which provided the money should be beneficially entitled to the returns. The surpluses should in their view be regarded as public money, and their use should be determined by Government policies not by the Trust. They point out that the existing members, all now elderly, were not chosen to fulfil a wider purpose, and suggest that they might need to be differently



constituted if they were to take it on. They see any use of surpluses by way of distribution to charities or other bodies as a potential source of continuing political controversy.

5. Clearly the sums of money involved are neither here nor there in relation to the PSBR. The issue is one of principle, and of political choice. In principle the Treasury proposal to return not only the existing but also future surpluses to the two Governments is a logical and straightforward course. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office, however, think - and I am inclined to agree - that to follow the course recommended by the Treasury would lose an opportunity of making the imaginative political gesture of enabling this Trust to operate in a small way as a positive force promoting Anglo-Irish relations. We know that the Taoiseach is aware of the proposals made by the Trust (para 4(1)), and that he finds them reasonable. There would be political advantages in being able to respond positively to ideas of this kind.

6. The proposals put forward by members of the Trust suggest that the Trust should be open-ended in time. None of the British Government Departments concerned sees merit in that. It is generally agreed that, once the original purposes of the Trust have been fully discharged and all its houses disposed of, the Trust should be wound up and its remaining capital distributed to Governments, and to any private contributors who can be shown to have contributed to the original purposes.

7. I therefore seek Ministerial authority for an approach to the Irish Government as follows:

(1) The proposal by members of the Trust to return £2,380,000 of the accumulated surplus in the Trust to the Governments concerned should be accepted.

(2) Provision should now be made for the Trust to be wound up, once its purposes have been fully discharged and all its houses disposed of, and its remaining assets distributed to Governments (and any private contributors).



(3) In the meantime, Her Majesty's Government would in principle be willing to see future surpluses either:

(a) distributed to Governments pro rata to the Governments' original contributions; or

(b) distributed by the Trust to charities operating in any part of Ireland.

(4) If it is decided to go for distribution to charities:

(a) we should consider with the Irish Government whether to confine the distribution to charities benefiting ex-servicemen, or to extend it to cover other bodies contributing to the improvement of Anglo-Irish relations;

(b) the Trust should be asked to tell the Governments in advance which bodies they propose to support, so that potentially sensitive areas can be avoided.

ex-servicemen only

8. Whatever Ministers decide about the distribution of future surpluses, legislation will be required at Westminster, and perhaps in Dublin, to authorise the Trust to repay £2,380,000 to the Governments, to distribute future surpluses (whether to Governments or to charities), and to provide for the winding up of the Trust as soon as the last house has been sold and its original purposes have been discharged. A small Bill would be necessary, sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with any necessary assistance from the Treasury.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

6 September 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



*file No.
Adrian P. Cadogan*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH, 3 SEPTEMBER 1984:
COMMUNITY BUSINESS

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach on 3 September on European Community affairs.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to David Peretz (H.M. Treasury), Adrian Ellis (Economic Secretary's Office, H.M. Treasury), Ivor Llewelyn (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

AS

SUBJECT
Master

CONFIDENTIAL

RFJ

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
TAOISEACH AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY 3 SEPTEMBER AT
MID-DAY

Present:

Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary
Economic Secretary
Sir Robert Armstrong
H.E. Sir Michael Butler
H.E. Mr. A.C. Goodison,
HM Ambassador, Dublin
Mr. Williamson
Mr. Powell

The Taoiseach
Mr. J. O'Keefe, Minister of
State, Department of
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. N. Dorr
Mr. D. Nally, Secretary to
the Government
Mr. C.P. Fogarty, DFA
Mr. M. Lillis, DFA
Mr. M. O'Donohue,
Department of Finance

European Community Affairs

The Taoiseach commented that the Irish Presidency had the task of clearing up problems left over from the European Council at Fontainebleau. Over the past year or so the Community had become introverted, with its heavy pre-occupation with budgetary matters. If the Irish Presidency could succeed in settling the outstanding financial problems, their successors could encourage the Community to look outwards once again.

The Taoiseach continued that he had recently met President Mitterrand. His main concern had been with enlargement of the Community and particularly the problem of

CONFIDENTIAL

wine. But he had also raised the problem of the 1984 budget overrun and had expressed particular concern about the blocking of the UK's 1983 refund by the European Parliament. He had volunteered to speak to M. Pflimlin about this. The Taoiseach said that he had subsequently seen Chancellor Kohl and found him particularly negative on the question of advancing the date of introduction of new own resources to the last quarter of 1985. His main argument appeared to be that, were he to agree to this, it would remove any incentive for others to make progress in the enlargement negotiations.

The Prime Minister observed that Chancellor Kohl had always said that the sole justification for an increase in own resources was enlargement. Sir Geoffrey Howe wondered whether the German Government's position on the timing of introduction of new own resources was quite as firm as the Taoiseach suggested. Linkage could be preserved in terms of ratification of new own resources and of the outcome of the accession negotiations, with a target date of July or September 1985. The Taoiseach said that he found it difficult to assess whether the German position would change if the accession negotiations reached a successful conclusion. For the moment he had found himself facing a blank wall on the issue.

Enlargement

The Taoiseach said that this was the other main problem facing the Irish Presidency. As he had mentioned earlier, President Mitterrand was very concerned about the difficulty of applying the existing wine regime to an enlarged Community. If Spain joined the Community without changes in the wine regime, there would be serious unrest in the South of France. The problem would need to be resolved by limits on production. In President Mitterrand's judgment Spain and even Italy would accept this. He was inclined to

put the blame on the Commission for failure to bring forward suitable proposals. The Taoiseach said that M. Thorn had just told him that proposals would be put to the Commission this week, which meant there should be a proposal on wine for the next Foreign Affairs Council. He (the Taoiseach) would be ready to go to Rome to try to secure Italian agreement, though it would not be at all easy. It was also necessary to involve the Spaniards diplomatically in discussion of changes to the wine regime, so that they would not feel that the *acquis* was being altered without regard for their interests (as had happened to the UK and Ireland over fish).

The other main outstanding problems were the time-tables for the agricultural and industrial transition and fish. The industrial tariff transition was a question of horse-trading and there was no fundamental problem. He hoped that neither side would take too hard a line. On fish, the Council was still awaiting a proposal from the Commission. The Prime Minister observed that fish would be very difficult for both the UK and Ireland. Sir Michael Butler said that the Commission were likely to propose that certain species which were not being fished by the UK and Irish fleets in their waters should be opened to Spanish fishing. The Prime Minister said the problem was that the Spaniards would not observe the restriction to particular species.

The Taoiseach said that, all in all, it was going to be very difficult to reach a conclusion by the end of the year. The Prime Minister said that it would be easier with Portugal than with Spain. The Taoiseach agreed, noting that Portugal wanted an constat d'accord that all the major issues had been overcome. It would be important to agree some wording that could be used to give them reassurance. For the longer term, however, he was worried that the Portuguese would have to start seeking renegotiation of

their terms soon after entry into the Community. The Prime Minister repeated that it was very important to the Portuguese to enter within a reasonable time scale. It was perhaps not quite so important for Spain. She had noted a recent study which suggested that, under the terms so far negotiated, Spain would be a net contributor to the Community budget for eight years after entry. The Taoiseach said that this was worrying if it implied an eight year transition. Sir Michael Butler pointed out that there was as yet no Commission proposal on the budgetary aspects of Spanish membership. The Taoiseach said that this was usually the last chapter to be negotiated.

Community Budget

The Prime Minister said that the time was past for botched solutions. All the outstanding problems on the budget needed to be solved together as a package. There needed to be agreement on budgetary discipline, the text of the new own resources regulation, the date of introduction of new own resources, reduction in the size of the 1984 budget over-run and the release of the UK's 1983 refunds. There was an incontrovertible link between guaranteed budgetary discipline and introduction of new own resources.

The Taoiseach said that a clear and explicit text on budget discipline had been agreed at the European Council in Brussels. It should not prove too difficult to translate it into precise legal form. The special High Level Group charged with this had already held two meetings, another was being held this week and progress would be reviewed at the informal ECOFIN meeting. There was no question of fudging the issue. The Prime Minister repeated the need for precision. It was not enough to express budgetary discipline as an aspiration or a hope. It must be guaranteed. Sir Michael Butler said that, in practice, this meant there must be a regulation. But other Member States

were arguing that a declaration would be sufficient. This would actually be less strong than the text agreed at the Brussels European Council. The Taoiseach said that there was no disagreement on the aim: differences arose on how to implement it. He referred to the 1979 precedent on the rate of growth in non-obligatory expenditure. This had stood the test of time even though it was not incorporated in a regulation.

1984 Supplementary Budget

The Taoiseach noted that UK had made proposals for further savings in 1984. The question of supplementary financing had to be resolved soon as there were complex Parliamentary procedures to be completed before any agreement could be implemented.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to make absolutely clear that the UK was not prepared to approach the issues piecemeal. All the outstanding problems had to be solved together. It was also extremely important not to undermine the treaty. If agreement could be reached on budgetary discipline, on implementing the Fontainebleau agreements and on our 1983 refund, then it might be possible to agree a solution to the 1984 budget overrun on an exceptional basis. But it would be essential first to do more to reduce the size of the overrun. Mr O'Keefe agreed on the need for long term reforms. But in the meantime emergency action was needed to find the necessary funds for the 1984 budget. Without such action the Community would be damaged. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that it was better to get all the elements of a long term solution into place before deciding how to treat the problem of 1984. Mr O'Keefe said that the problem with this was that it might then be too late to deal with the emergency. The Prime Minister observed that if it was made too easy to get out of emergencies we should be confronted with a lot more of them.

The Taoiseach acknowledged the importance of settling all outstanding issues. But time was pressing and a solution had to be found for 1984. It would be very difficult to get agreement on advancing the date of introduction of new own resources while the enlargement negotiations were continuing. However he could envisage sorting out the other main elements such as budgetary discipline provided it was clear that a means would be found to provide additional funds for 1984. The Prime Minister repeated that there had to be agreement on everything or nothing. The Presidency should increase the pace of work on budget discipline. Further efforts would have to be made to convince Chancellor Kohl of the importance of bringing forward the date of new own resources. The Taoiseach said that the problems must be resolved in October if the Community was not to run out of money. The Prime Minister said, in that case, solutions must be found to all the problems in October. Mr O'Keefe noted that all Member States except the UK were prepared to agree to a supplementary budget. The Prime Minister said that this would be a very exceptional measure which could only be considered once there was agreement on other measures to prevent the situation arising again. The Taoiseach said that he noted the Prime Minister's readiness to consider a package which would settle all outstanding issues though he remained sceptical whether it could be pulled off in six weeks.

The meeting ended at 1310.

3 September 1984

SUBJECT

C. Thastor Set



File DSG 21

c. Dr P. Cadogan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September 1984

Dear Len,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH AT
NO. 10 ON MONDAY 3 SEPTEMBER: NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach held a restricted meeting after lunch today to discuss Northern Ireland matters. Mr. Nally (Secretary to the Government) and Mr. Lillis (Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs) accompanied the Taoiseach. Sir Robert Armstrong and I were also present.

The Taoiseach said that his Government had taken pains to cultivate opinion in Northern Ireland. He thought that they had now got the trust and support of those nationalists who were not supporters of Sinn Fein. If anything was to come out of the discussions between the British and Irish Governments, it would be important for the Irish Government to be able to take the bulk of nationalist opinion with it. The discussions so far between Mr. Nally and Sir Robert Armstrong had been constructive. He recognised that it was going to be difficult to arrive at an outcome that would both be tolerable to the unionists and would end the alienation of the nationalists. But he was particularly encouraged by the spirit in which the discussions had proceeded. It was increasingly clear that the British and Irish Governments shared a perception of the problems and were trying to tease out together how to deal with them. He wished to put on record his appreciation of this. The Irish Government would in due course have to consult its own public opinion by means of a referendum. There were risks in this. It was difficult to see how his Government could survive defeat in a referendum. But, he had consulted his Ministers who were ready to take the risk. As to future procedure, he believed it had been suggested that there might be several days of intensive talks to see whether outstanding problems could be solved and common ground found.

The Prime Minister said that she had absorbed the results of the talks between Mr. Nally and Sir Robert Armstrong. She had been in politics long enough to know that often one started off with an idea but the real difficulty came in translating it into practical politics. The basic problem had been laid bare in all its difficulties. If it was something which could be resolved by reason and common sense, then it would be easy. But in Northern Ireland one was dealing with folklore, resentment and suspicion. This made a solution infinitely more difficult. There was a constant risk that what would help one community would induce hatred and bitterness in the other. She and the Taoiseach had to assess whether they could envisage steps which would satisfy both communities without blowing up in their faces.

The Prime Minister continued that it was important that the Taoiseach should understand that the suggestion of giving the Republic a right to be consulted about Northern Ireland affairs would be an enormous step with considerable risks. Any mention of joint authority had to be absolutely excluded. The Unionists would say it was tantamount to handing over Northern Ireland to the Republic, even if the other side of the bargain was recognition of the border. Nor could there be any question of disarming the RUC or the UDR as had been suggested in the course of the discussions. This would undermine confidence fatally. But she agreed with the Taoiseach that the Armstrong/Nally discussions should continue.

The Taoiseach said that on security matters there were really two aspects: a political aspect, what was the least that could be done and still bring along nationalist opinion; and a security aspect, what would actually improve security. The Prime Minister commented that one must not gain one and lose the other. There had to be a visible balance. For instance, security co-operation or joint policing would have to apply on both sides of the border. The Taoiseach contested this. It would only add an enormous complication and be unnecessary. The problem was the alienation of the minority community in the North, and the need to find a security system which would resolve it. He did not pretend to know the answer. There were various possible solutions. The present arrangements had to be changed in ways to make them acceptable to both sides in the North.

The Taoiseach said that he wished to stress again that his Government was prepared to face up to solutions which no previous Irish Government had contemplated. The Prime Minister acknowledged this but repeated that there could be

no prospect of joint authority. Any such notion would immediately lose the Government Unionist support. The Taoiseach should recognise what a very big step the offer of a right to be consulted on Northern Ireland affairs was. The Taoiseach agreed that arrangements must be found that did not destabilise the Unionists. Discussions should continue to see if such solutions could be teased out. The Prime Minister said that she could agree to this. But it would be a mistake to expect too much. She repeated that the offer of consultations was a major concession. The Taoiseach said that the two sides should work together as far as they could, and then it would be for each party to make a judgement as to whether the result justified taking the steps which would be required. He would have to consider whether his Government could survive. His Cabinet had many worries but had instructed him to continue the talks.

The Prime Minister asked how much longer the talks could be kept secret. Sir Robert Armstrong said that secrecy was fraying, but could probably be maintained for a bit longer. The Taoiseach said that it had been possible to disguise the current round satisfactorily under the cover of their discussion of Community business.

The Prime Minister asked what should be said to the press. The Taoiseach observed that as little as possible should be said. The best way to block off speculation would be to set a date for an Anglo-Irish Summit. The Prime Minister said that she would be going to Dublin for the European Council in early December. Was it really necessary for her to come to Dublin for a bilateral as well? Perhaps there could be a meeting at Chequers in November and a further meeting in the Republic next spring. The Taoiseach pointed out that both the last bilateral summits had been in the UK. If the next were held in the Republic it need not necessarily be in Dublin. Moreover, it was important to maintain the tempo of negotiations if there was to be a positive outcome before the local government elections in Northern Ireland next May. The Prime Minister doubted whether it was realistic to think in terms of moving this fast. After some further discussion, it was agreed that the meeting would be held on 19 November with the place to be determined. The annexed press statement was also agreed.

The Taoiseach asked whether any arrangement which the two sides agreed upon would be presented as the outcome of an inter-Governmental meeting or whether the parties in Northern Ireland would also be brought in. He saw advantage in the latter, particularly in involving the SDLP. This would enable them to support his Government in a referendum in the Republic. The Prime Minister said it was premature to try to settle this sort of question yet.

I am sending copies of this letter to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRESS STATEMENT

The Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, TD, who was accompanied by Mr. Jim O'Keefe, TD, Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs with special responsibility for European Community budgetary matters, came to see the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP, who was accompanied by the Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Mr. Ian Stewart, MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, at 10 Downing Street on 3 September 1984, as one of a series of contacts he has been holding with Heads of State or Government of Member countries of the European Community on current Community business, including enlargement and the Community Budget. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed to hold the next of their regular bilateral meetings on Anglo-Irish affairs later in the year, probably in November.

20

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD, 3 SEPTEMBER:
NORTHERN IRELAND

You will want a private talk after lunch with Dr. FitzGerald on Northern Ireland. As at Fontainebleau, I suggest that only Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr. Nally and I attend. The brief is attached.

← You will want to settle with Dr. FitzGerald what is said to the press afterwards. This should be to the effect that the main purpose of his visit was to discuss Community business in his role as current President of the Council. You touched only briefly on Irish matters. These will be discussed more fully at an Anglo/Irish Summit later in the autumn.

You will also need to discuss the timing of an Anglo/Irish Summit (in the light of whether progress on Monday seems to warrant it). You have agreed to propose 19 November. Dr. FitzGerald will press you hard to go to Dublin: you are most reluctant. You will want to handle this delicately with him - the last two summits have been in the UK so he may well feel strongly that it is Dublin's turn. You will want to point out that you are going there anyway for the European Council: and that Chequers would make a very conveniently discreet setting.

C.D.P.

31 August, 1984

SECRET

COMMUNITY BUSINESS

EC BUDGET

1. MUST TRY TO GET ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES TIED UP AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
2. EFFECTIVE BUDGET DISCIPLINE IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL. ESSENTIAL TO MAKE VERY EARLY PROGRESS ON THIS.
3. ALSO SCOPE TO REDUCE FURTHER SIZE OF 1984 BUDGET OVERRUN.
4. AND TO GET OUR 1983 REFUNDS RELEASED.
5. OUR ATTITUDE TO SOLUTION OF 1984 OVERRUN WILL DEPEND VERY HEAVILY ON WHAT HAPPENS ON THESE OTHER ISSUES. ABSOLUTELY NO OBLIGATION ON US TO GO OUTSIDE THE TREATY. SIMPLY NOT GOING TO BE PRESSURED INTO CHANGING OUR POSITION.
- 6.

6. WHAT DID KOHL AND MITTERRAND HAVE TO SAY ON ALL THIS?

AD HOC COMMITTEE

1. SUPPORT DOOGE FOR CHAIRMAN, BUT COULD ALSO SUPPORT CARSTENS IF YOU AGREED. REALLY UP TO YOU AND GERMANS TO SORT OUT.
2. WHO WILL CHAIR THE SECOND COMMITTEE?

FUTURE OF EUROPE

1. NEED TO IDENTIFY SUBJECTS WHICH THE COMMITTEE WILL DEAL WITH.
2. FIRST OBJECTIVE IS TO MAKE A REALITY OF EXISTING OBLIGATIONS UNDER TREATY OF ROME.
3. ABOVE ALL COMPLETE COMMON MARKET, TACKLE

/SURPRISES

SURPLUSES; AND BRING SPENDING UNDER CONTROL.

ENLARGEMENT

1. MAJOR EFFORT NEEDED TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS BY END OF THE YEAR.
2. TARIFF TRANSITION VITAL QUESTION FOR US. VERY HIGH SPANISH TARIFFS (OVER 20%) MUST BE DEALT WITH.
3. MUST ALSO BE CLEAR THAT EXISTING OLIVE OIL REGIME WILL NOT APPLY TO ENLARGED COMMUNITY. MUST BE A NEW SYSTEM WITH LIMITATIONS ON PRODUCTION. OTHERWISE COST WILL GO OUT OF CONTROL.

CP 31.8 -84



FILE

Rej

cc: PC
CR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 August, 1984

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

Dublin telegram No. 415 about the Prime Minister's forthcoming meeting with Dr. FitzGerald predicts that the Taoiseach will want to agree a date for an Anglo-Irish Summit this autumn, and will hope to persuade the Prime Minister to come to Ireland for it.

I have consulted the Prime Minister about this. The best, indeed virtually the only available date from her point of view is Monday, 19 November and she will be ready to propose this to Dr. FitzGerald. The Prime Minister is emphatic, however, that she does not wish to go to Dublin for the meeting, bearing in mind that she will anyway have to go there shortly afterwards for the European Council. The Prime Minister will herself make this clear to Dr. FitzGerald but it would be helpful if HM Ambassador at Dublin could prepare the ground.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

C. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

de



SECRET AND PERSONAL
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August, 1984.

C.D. Powell, Esq.,
10 Downing St.

19
Prime Minister.
This is the brief for
the very restricted
meeting with Dr.
Fitzgerald after
lunch. Main points are
on cards
C.D.P.
3/1

Dear Charles,

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: NORTHERN IRELAND

At the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach on 3 September on community matters, half an hour has been set aside after lunch for a private talk on Anglo-Irish bilateral questions. This is at the Taoiseach's request, and will provide an opportunity to take stock of the secret exchanges between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally, the latest of which was in London on 30 July (Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to the Prime Minister on 3 August, on which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland commented in his minute of 14 August).

2. Sir Robert Armstrong is away until 3 September. But the Prime Minister will have seen from his minute that although Mr. Nally and Mr. Lillis have been pushed some way towards accepting that joint authority is not available and that the most that the Irish can look for is institutionalised consultation between the two Governments on Northern Ireland affairs, the Taoiseach himself is still looking for a measure of shared authority, particularly in the security field. There is evidence that he believes that this is necessary if he is to have any chance of carrying a referendum to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. The Irish also believe that the alienation of the minority community in Northern Ireland from the forces of law and order in the Province cannot be reversed without some change in the structure of the Security Forces to give them a nationalist as well as a unionist identity. At the same time, it is clear that the Taoiseach is strongly committed to continuing the present dialogue with the British Government and does not want it broken off.

3. In the limited time available, it will be best for the Prime Minister to concentrate on a few main points. She might begin by welcoming the constructive spirit in which the Taoiseach is approaching the problem of Northern Ireland and by noting that there is a wide measure of common ground between the British and Irish Governments on the subject: both are

/concerned

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 5 (1)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

concerned to defeat terrorism, to halt the political advance of Sinn Fein and to find ways of integrating the minority community into the political life of the Province. We recognise that these objectives cannot be achieved without the Irish Government's cooperation; and in the exploratory talks between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally both sides have been looking for ways in which, consistent with Northern Ireland's position as part of the United Kingdom, expression can be given to the Irish Government's legitimate interest in the affairs of the Province. This task will be greatly assisted if the Irish can bring themselves to waive their territorial claim, since as long as the claim is maintained any formal involvement of the Republic in the Province's affairs is bound to be seen by Unionists as a concession to that claim and a step down the road towards the incorporation of Northern Ireland into the Republic.

4. In this context, we recognise the magnitude in Irish terms of their offer to amend Articles 2 and 3 of their Constitution, and we realise that this can only be done on the basis of a commensurate British response. As has been made clear, in the Armstrong/Nally talks, we cannot entertain proposals which would involve sharing actual authority in Northern Ireland with the Government of the Republic either in political or security matters. Arrangements of that kind would be unworkable in practice and unacceptable to Parliament as well as to majority opinion in Northern Ireland. What we are prepared to offer the Irish Government however is a means of exercising direct influence over the affairs of the Province through institutionalised consultative arrangements about political and security matters.

5. It will be important to ensure that Dr. Fitzgerald understands just how big a move this would be from the British side, in that it would involve for the first time a formal British acknowledgement of the Irish Government's right to a say in Northern Ireland's internal affairs. Such a major change would be vehemently, and perhaps violently, attacked by Unionist opinion in Northern Ireland (with some sympathy in Great Britain) as well as by the IRA. The political risks for us would be no less than those the Irish Government would face in a referendum. If we are to go down this road, both sides must be sure that any agreement is robust enough to withstand the wrecking efforts of extremists and terrorists, and that it is not undermined when the crisis comes by each Government putting a different interpretation on what the agreement means.

6. It would also be desirable to make it clear to Dr. Fitzgerald that the ideas put forward by Mr. Nally on 30 July in relation to security are unrealistic. In particular, the breakup and disarming of the RUC would bring a violent reaction and have disastrous consequences for the morale of the force. Any attempt to share operational control over a police force would

/prove

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

✓ prove unworkable. (The arguments are set out in detail in Mr. Prior's minute to you of 14 August.) But we recognise that there is a serious problem about the acceptability of the RUC and the UDR to the minority community, and it is for this reason that we would be prepared to offer the Republic a say in Northern Ireland security at the top level - including the opportunity to develop new arrangements for working together and to look for ways of involving the minority in policing. We cannot offer the Irish a veto on Northern Ireland security decisions; nor can we demoralise the RUC, scrap it, and start again. But we are prepared to consult, and be seen to consult, the Irish closely about security policy through the medium of a Joint Security Commission.

7. It would be unwise at this stage for the Prime Minister to be drawn into a detailed discussion of what the hypothetical consultative arrangements might look like, or how they would dovetail with a greater measure of devolved government in Northern Ireland, should it prove possible to bring this about. If the Irish accept the principle of consultation, the details will need to be explored in further official discussions; but official talks will get nowhere if the Irish keep trying to manoeuvre them in the direction of joint authority. I suggest therefore that the main aim of the Prime Minister's talk with Dr. Fitzgerald should be to establish whether he would be prepared to consider implementing his Government's offer to seek amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution as part of a package providing for institutionalised consultation. If he believes there is scope for progress on this basis, it might be appropriate for the two Heads of Government to mandate Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally to examine the scope and nature of the consultative arrangements which would be needed and to report before the next Anglo-Irish bilateral summit (which it was agreed at Fontainebleau should be held in the autumn but for which no date has yet been fixed).

8. As the discussions between Sir Robert and Mr. Nally cease to be exploratory and start to focus in detail on structures, it will be necessary to broaden the representation on either side to bring in people with expert knowledge. Mr. Prior's speech in Parliament on 2 July stating that he would have discussions with the Irish Government, together with leaks from the Irish side and from Mr. John Hume as well as intelligent press speculation, probably make it unnecessary and unrealistic to deny that official discussions are taking place in preparation for a bilateral summit meeting in the autumn. The Prime Minister may therefore wish to discuss with Dr. Fitzgerald how best to acknowledge that the talks are taking place.

/9.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

9. The approach suggested in this letter has been approved by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who will as you know be seeing Mr. Barry and the Taoiseach in Dublin on 31 August. Arrangements are being made for the Prime Minister to be given an account of any significant points which may emerge from Mr. Prior's meeting before she sees Dr. Fitzgerald.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and to Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Acland, Mr. Robert Andrew and Sir Philip Woodfield.

Yours ever

David Goodall

(A.D.S. Goodall)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(1000000000)

30 AUG 1984

12 12 12
12 12 12
12 12 12
12 12 12
12 12 12



PRIME MINISTER

When you see Dr FitzGerald next week he is likely to try to get you to agree a date for an Anglo/Irish Summit this Autumn (see attached telegram). He will want this to be in Dublin. The Northern Ireland Secretary has said publicly that a Summit will take place before the end of this year.

Looking at your diary the possible dates would be:

Monday 19 November

Friday 23 November (but the Carlton Lecture is on 26 November)

Wednesday 5 December (but right after the European Council on 3/4 December)

Monday 19 November looks the best bet. Agree?

*Yes - but I do not want to go to Dublin -
because in mind I shall
be there for the
L.E.C. Summit.
not*

C.D.P.

29 August 1984

Mr POWELL
10 DOWNING ST



With the compliments of
Mr E Squires.
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
DEPARTMENT
EMNS 22.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

OUT TELEGRAM

14

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Despatch
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
GRS 2 GRS
CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS 4
DESKBY 5
FM FCO 6 FM FCO 290945Z AUG 84
PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 TELECON CLARK/GOODISON

NLE 070/10
 RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 75
 29 AUG 1984
 DEPT. OF...
 TELE. NO. ...

From Clark

10 YOUR TELNO 415: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

11 1. The Prime Minister does not like the arrangements proposed

12 by the Taoiseach in your paragraph 2. She accepted the

13 proposed meeting because she was persuaded of the advantage of

14 discussing the Community budget with him at this stage. She

15 would therefore like him and herself to be present for all the

16 discussions on Community business. She would also like to take

17 Community matters first.

18 2. We therefore hope that the Irish can agree that the meeting

19 will open at 12 noon with full delegations present with the

20 Community items of the agenda. Half an hour has been set aside

21 beginning at 3 for a restricted meeting on Anglo-Irish relations.

22 The Prime Minister will be accompanied by Sir Robert Armstrong.

23 She has however agreed that you should take part in the session

24 on Community business.

25 3. The UK team will therefore consist of the Prime Minister,

13

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword the Secretary
File number	Dept RID	Distribution NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED	
Drafted by (Block capitals) G E CLARK		MR GOODALL MR CLARK, RID	
Telephone number 253 3994		PS PS/PUS ECD(I)	
Communication reference		Time of departure	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

<<<< 1 <<<< ...
2 the Secretary of State, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury
3 (Mr Stewart), Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Williamson (MAFF)
4 and yourself.

5
6 HOWE
7 NNNN

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

///
//
/

NNNN end
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

GRS 300
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 281400Z
FM DUBLIN 281200Z AUG 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 415 OF 28 AUGUST 1984

YOUR TELNO 156: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

1. THE TAOISEACH AGREES THAT HIS VISIT SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED ON 29 AUGUST. THE WORDS "THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC" IN YOUR DRAFT TEXT SHOULD BE REPLACED BY "THE TAOISEACH".
2. THE TAOISEACH PROPOSES THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER, PERHAPS EACH ACCOMPANIED BY ONE OFFICIAL, SHOULD DISCUSS ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS FOR AN HOUR FROM NOON ONWARDS. MEANWHILE, THE REST OF HIS PARTY WOULD DISCUSS COMMUNITY MATTERS WITH THE BRITISH SIDE, WHICH WOULD BE PURSUED FURTHER AT LUNCH. THE HOPE HERE IS THAT THE COMMUNITY BUSINESS COULD BE DISPOSED OF FAIRLY EXPEDITIOUSLY.
3. DURING THE DISCUSSION ON ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS THE TAOISEACH HOPES THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FIX A DATE FOR A SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR. HE HOPES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL AGREE THAT THE MONTH IN WHICH THE SUMMIT IS TO TAKE PLACE WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT ONCE. (I AM SURE HE ALSO HOPES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL COMMIT HERSELF TO COMING TO IRELAND FOR THE SUMMIT.)
4. THE IRISH TEAM WILL CONSIST OF THE FINANCE MINISTER, MR DUKES, IF THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER IS TO BE PRESENT, OR THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CHAIRMAN OF THE EC BUDGET COMMITTEE, MR O'KEEFE, IF WE ARE NOT FIELDING A CABINET MINISTER, AND NALLY, DONLON, FOGARTY, LILLIS, AND THE IRISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, DORR.
5. GRATEFUL FOR INFORMATION ON OUR TEAM.

GOODISON

LIMITED

ECB (1)

RID

PROTOCOL D

HD. NEWS D

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR CTICKELL

MR GOODALL

MR RENWICK

MA JENKINS

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO

PS/TREASURY

PS/NO 10 D ST.

CONFIDENTIAL



File
CCPC
18

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 August 1984

Arrangements for the Taoiseach visit on 3 September

You wrote to Tim Flesher about this on 24 August. The Prime Minister agrees that half an hour should be set aside at the end of the discussion of Community business for a talk with Dr FitzGerald on Anglo/Irish matters. She will wish to be accompanied only by Sir Robert Armstrong and by me (to take the record).

The Prime Minister agrees that Her Majesty's Ambassador Dublin should be present for the discussion of Community business.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office).

C D Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

mg.

17



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 August, 1984

Dear Tim,

Yes

Prime Minister?

*Do you wish to set aside
30 minutes during your
meeting with Dr Fitzgerald for
a discussion on Anglo-Irish*

Arrangements for the Taoiseach Visit on 3 September *matters*

I am writing to confirm the provisional arrangement which we have made by telephone that the Prime Minister should be asked to set aside the period 3.00 - 3.30 pm for a private talk with Dr FitzGerald on Anglo/Irish matters, after the conclusion of the Community business which will be the prime subject of the talks during his visit.

24/8

The Prime Minister may wish to keep this part of the meeting tete-a-tete, or to be accompanied at it only by Sir Robert Armstrong. But we have made contingency arrangements for HM Ambassador in Dublin to be present if the Prime Minister wishes. There would in any case clearly be advantage if HM Ambassador were present for the discussion of Community business, as he will be the channel through which much of our negotiations with the Presidency will be carried out over the next few months, and we hope that the Prime Minister will consider including Mr Goodison on the British side for the Anglo/Irish discussions also.

ajud

Briefing on Anglo/Irish matters will be submitted separately from the main briefing.

I am copying this to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Mr G Sandiford (NIO).

*Yours Sincerely,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

*file 507
CFO*

MRS. GOODCHILD

Meeting and Lunch with Dr. FitzGerald:
3 September

Further to my letter of 8 August to Peter Ricketts about attendance at the above meeting, I have now heard from the Northern Ireland Office that Mr. Prior thinks it sensible for him not to be present.

David Barclay
15 August 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

65T



file
a SG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 August 1984

Dear Peter,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Dr. FitzGerald:
3 September

I have now seen a copy of Dublin telegram 379 proposing that the Taoiseach's party on 3 September should consist of Mr. Nally, Mr. Donlon and Mr. Fogarty, plus possibly Mr. Barry.

Before this news was received, the Prime Minister had reached the provisional view that on our side those present should be the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor or the Economic Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. David Williamson.

At the Prime Minister's request, we are consulting the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (via Mr. Robert Andrew) to ascertain whether he too would wish to be present.

Yours ever,
David

Peter Ricketts, Esq., (David Barclay)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 200
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 071545Z AUG 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 379 OF 7 AUGUST 1984
INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELNO 151: MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD

1. DONLON HAS NOW CONFIRMED DR FITZGERALD'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO A MEETING AT 12.00 NOON ON 3 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWED BY LUNCH. DR FITZGERALD INTENDS TO MEET PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING HIS CURRENT HOLIDAY IN FRANCE TOWARDS THE END OF AUGUST. HE WILL ALSO CALL ON CHANCELLOR KOHL TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEMENT ON BUDGETARY MATTERS BEFORE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. I ASKED WHOM THE TAOISEACH WOULD BRING WITH HIM: HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NALLY, DONLON AND FOGARTY, TOGETHER WITH MR BARRY IF AVAILABLE. I EMPHASISED THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISH THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE VERY RESTRICTED. I HAD NO INDICATION THAT IT WAS PROPOSED THAT YOU SHOULD BE PRESENT. DONLON REPLIED THAT THEY WERE IN OUR HANDS AND THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WE WOULD SUGGEST THE FORMAT OF THE ENCOUNTER.

3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO REPLY. I SHOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU WISH ME TO BE IN LONDON ON THIS OCCASION.

GOODISON

LIMITED
ECD (1)
RID
PROTOCOL D
HD NEWS D
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIAKIND
PS/PUS
SIR C TICKELL
MR GOODALL
MR RENWICK
MR JENKINS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

LUNCH FOR DR. FITZGERALD

You have agreed to see Dr. FitzGerald for a talk on EC budget questions on 3 September and to give him lunch. I suggest that you make it a small working lunch ^{with} Geoffrey Howe, ~~will be in Brussels for a special Foreign Affairs Council so you might have Mr. Rifkind from the FCO, the Chancellor or the Economic Secretary, Robert Armstrong and David Williamson.~~ To avoid speculation that the purpose of the visit is to discuss Irish matters, it might be better not to have Mr. Prior (Robert Armstrong could, of course, advise on any Irish questions).

Agree a list on these lines?

Provided he agrees that is wise. He may prefer to come.

Yes

C.D.P.

020
●●

16

Prime Minister

In practice it will be difficult for Mr. Prior to visit Dublin except late August/early September. Agree to let him go, with careful attention to press handling?

Ref. A084/2246

MR POWELL

Before it was known that the Taoiseach would be coming to see the Prime Minister on 3 September, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had received an invitation from Mr Barry, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to visit Dublin before he leaves office. The Secretary of State would like to accept this invitation and make a day trip to Dublin on 31 August.

2. The Taoiseach's visit to the Prime Minister is being presented as for the purpose of discussing European Community business, and may well primarily be about that, though there will no doubt be some discussion of Anglo-Irish affairs. If the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland visits Dublin either shortly before or shortly after the Taoiseach's visit, there is perhaps a danger that more significance will be read into it than it warrants, and there could be speculation that European Community business is a cover for a visit by the Taoiseach to discuss other matters such as Northern Ireland.

3. In the circumstances the safest course would be to ask the Secretary of State not to pay a farewell visit to Dublin shortly before or after the Taoiseach's visit. But the Prime Minister may think that it is unnecessary to be as cautious as that: it might be possible to agree that the Secretary of State's visit to Dublin should go ahead on 31 August, provided that it is clearly presented as a courtesy farewell visit and has no significance in relation to the Taoiseach's visit to the Prime Minister.

careful attention to press handling? CJD 3/8.

Yes - it can't be called a

Jawoll visit because other arrangements will still be in train

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

3 August 1984

May with
Taroach



CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A084/2203

MR POWELL

When I was talking to Mr Nally yesterday on other business, he reverted to the Taoiseach's wish for a meeting with the Prime Minister in late August or early September.

2. The proposition had been that the Taoiseach might come and the Prime Minister for an informal talk on his way back to Ireland from a holiday in France, in the last week of August. It was suggested that European Community business might provide the cover for such a visit, though in practice the Taoiseach would want to talk mainly about Anglo-Irish affairs.

3. I said to Mr Nally that I doubted whether a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on Anglo-Irish affairs would be useful as soon as that. I also indicated that the Prime Minister would have many other preoccupations at the end of August and in early September, before she left for her overseas trip.

4. Mr Nally was clearly inclined to agree that the time had not yet come for a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on Anglo-Irish business; but he said that, in view of recent developments in the Council of Ministers on the budget issues, the Taoiseach now believed it essential that he should have a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss European Community business before the meeting of the Budget Council on 6 and 7 September. The Taoiseach is keen to do everything possible to see that the problems are resolved at that meeting and do not fester through the autumn, and intends to have a series of meetings with Community Heads of Government in the days immediately before the meeting in the hope of making that possible. He would be prepared to come either on this way back from France or as part of a whistle stop tour of Community capitals or on a special trip

from Dublin. If he came, he would no doubt also want to talk about Anglo-Irish affairs.

5. I was asked to tell the Prime Minister of the Taoiseach's thoughts on this, and to convey a indication of the Prime Minister's response to Dublin before the Taoiseach leaves for his holiday on Thursday 2 August.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

31 July 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Could you
please say whether
you agree to
postponing a meeting
with the Taoiseach
until late August /
early September?

Yes Mr

C D P
10/7.



file
bc R

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has noted with interest your minute (Ref. A084/2035) regarding your conversation with the Taoiseach in Dublin on 16 July.

The Prime Minister would not wish to see the Taoiseach as early as next week but would prefer to leave the contact until very late August or early September, or possibly even later than that. It would be helpful if you could convey this reaction to Mr. Nally.

C.D. POWELL
20 July 1984

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Ref. A084/2035

PRIME MINISTER

Mr Goodall and I visited Dublin on 16 July. I shall be reporting in detail on the conversations which we had with our counterparts on Anglo-Irish business.

2. While we were in Dublin I was invited to go and see the Taoiseach, and had about half an hour with him. He made the following points:

1. On Anglo-Irish affairs, he thought that it would be useful to take advantage of the Irish Presidency of the European Community to arrange meetings between himself and you which, while ostensibly to deal with Community business, could also extend to Anglo-Irish affairs. Specifically, the Taoiseach said that he was going to Strasbourg from 24 to 26 July, and could come and see you in London either on his way to or on his way back from Strasbourg (for instance on 27 July). I said that I would report this to you. This was, however, a very busy time of year for you, and I said that my impression was that there was room for one or two further discussions between Mr Nally and me before matters were taken to a higher level. The Taoiseach accepted that it might well be appropriate to leave a contact until (say) very late August or early September, but he clearly remains anxious to have a further opportunity of talking to you privately before very long.

2. The Taoiseach hoped that you might be able to find an opportunity to receive Mr Dick Spring, the Leader of the Irish Labour Party and the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister). He thought that it would be useful ^{for you} to hear at first hand Mr Spring's commitment to the kind of policies which the Taoiseach was himself following in relation to Northern Ireland. It would not surprise me if domestic Irish politics had something to do with this: there are

suggestions that the Fine Gael - Labour coalition has been under strain, and Dr FitzGerald may feel that your receiving Mr Spring would help to buttress it.

3. The Taoiseach emphasised that the new Irish Ambassador, Mr Noel Dorr, enjoyed his total confidence and could be regarded as speaking with his authority on Anglo-Irish affairs.

4. The Taoiseach was clearly worried about the resolution of European Community budget problems (having just had a meeting with Monsieur Ortoli), and hoped that we should be playing a constructive part at the Budget Council later in the week.

5. On the Presidency of the European Commission, Dr FitzGerald said that the enquiries he had been making suggested that there would be a consensus around the Community in favour of Monsieur Delors (the only outstanding country being Greece, which still supported Monsieur Cheysson). It was clear that other countries would not accept Monseieur Cheysson, and would prefer Vicomte Davignon to that. The Taoiseach said that he had noted your strong support for Vicomte Davignon; but he had also noted that you spoke warmly in personal terms about Monsieur Delors, and he hoped that you would be willing to support Monsieur Delors's candidacy.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

16 July 1984



182 and
Steps

with
Tasbeeh

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

182 and
Steps

SECRET
AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

ce MASTER
From the Private Secretary

FHE JP
cc: Sir P. Creadock
Sir A. Adland
26 June 1984

Dear John,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH: 26 JUNE

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach met at the Chateau de Fontainebleau today. Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr. Nally and Mr. C.D. Powell were also present.

The Taoiseach recalled that he looked forward to hearing in due course the Government's reply to the proposals which the Irish Government had put forward in strict confidence on 11 May, following the Government's proposals in March. In essence, the Irish Government were prepared to face up to the problem of amending Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, provided that in return it could be assured of a package of measures in the North which would allow a durable solution. In reply to the Prime Minister's question whether he thought a referendum on the Constitution could be won, the Taoiseach said that the Forum Report had been a valuable educational exercise. It had been the first time that Irish opinion in the Republic had been properly exposed to the Unionist viewpoint. When he had subsequently stated publicly that "joint authority" (as defined in the Forum Report) would not affect British sovereignty, no-one had come forward to protest that he was foresaking the Nationalist viewpoint. This showed that opinion had moved. The Prime Minister wondered whether such a change of opinion would stand up to the pressures of a referendum campaign. The Taoiseach thought that, provided that there was a solution which was supported by the SDLP, it would be very hard for any of the parties in the Republic to oppose it successfully. There was a widespread desire for a moderate solution. He had taken encouragement from the recent referendum in which there had been a 3:1 majority for extending voting rights to British citizens, without any preliminary campaign.

The Prime Minister asked whether she had correctly understood that Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution would be eliminated. The Taoiseach replied that they would be radically changed. He needed to think about the precise formulation.

/ But the *JK*

But the territorial claim would become an aspiration for unity dependent upon the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland. The important point was to reassure the Unionists that there was no current claim against British sovereignty. Some risks had to be taken if a solution was to be found. The Prime Minister observed that "joint authority" inevitably involved a derogation from sovereignty. The Taoiseach contested this. It was up to Her Majesty's Government to decide, within its sovereignty, how to conduct the administration of the North. He had been struck by how vigorously the SDLP had insisted upon the concept of "joint authority" because it offered the prospect of immediate progress.

The Prime Minister asked the Taoiseach how he saw the way forward. They were due to have bilateral discussions later in the year. Fundamental decisions were involved for which time was needed. Sir Robert Armstrong said that he and Mr. Nally might meet in the meantime to pursue their confidential discussions.

In a brief discussion about what should be said to the press about the meeting, the Taoiseach said that he had been careful not to build up expectations. It was very important, and would be even more so in future, to preserve the confidentiality of exchanges. He had been disturbed by a recent article in the Boston Globe. A brief text for use with the press was agreed (copy annexed).

The Taoiseach said that he wished the Prime Minister to know that he would be pursuing direct contacts with the Official Unionists, which they had been seeking. There had also been some indirect contacts with the Reverend Ian Paisley for the first time in many years, though he did not know how authoritative the channel of communication was. The Prime Minister thanked the Taoiseach for keeping her informed, while observing that it would be very difficult to hold confidential contacts in London.

The Taoiseach said that he had read the Unionist document, "The Way Forward" very carefully and considered it positive. In several ways it was in tune with the Forum Report. He handed over a note analysing it (copy annexed). He asked how the Government would approach next week's debate in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister said that it would largely be by amplifying the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's immediate comments following publication of the Forum Report. The specific proposals in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in the Report were not a basis for progress. But there were a lot of new elements to look at. The Government would not wish at this stage to go on to examine the fundamental equation: how to reassure Unionist opinion while at the same time providing for the Republic to be -involved in the North, for instance in security. The

/ Taoiseach

Taoiseach said that he had been disappointed that the Government's first reaction had been dismissive of "joint authority". He had gone out of his way to underline that "joint authority" would not affect sovereignty. The Prime Minister asked what would be the reaction of opinion in the South if the Government were to say there should be joint authority over security 25 miles South of the Border? The Taoiseach said it would obviously be ill-received, and would be regarded as unnecessary. It would create three borders instead of one. It was important not to tar "joint authority" with the joint sovereignty brush. As regards joint security, anything in this field would have to be linked in some way with a political arrangement. The Prime Minister observed that this was exactly where one ran up against the problem of joint sovereignty. That was the argument with which the Government would be faced by the Unionists. The Taoiseach said that he felt strongly that whatever was agreed must be once and for all. The Unionists must not fear that it was the first step in a creeping erosion of their position.

The Taoiseach said that he would be seeing Opposition Leaders in London on 27 June. He would not, of course, mention the contents of his discussion with the Prime Minister. He would draw attention to the Forum Report and encourage them to be receptive.

There was a brief exchange on the problem of personation of elections, during which the Prime Minister thanked the Taoiseach for having warned us of the likelihood of attempts by Sinn Fein supporters in the South to vote in the European Elections in the North.

Finally, the Taoiseach enquired how the Prime Minister saw matters developing in the longer term. For his part, he saw advantage in a conference rather than an intergovernmental meeting. One could not be sure that all Parties would attend. But as many as possible should be involved. The Prime Minister noted several questions which needed to be answered. At what stage should consultations be enlarged? How did one sell conclusions reached in intergovernmental discussions? The Taoiseach said that he thought that a joint declaration of principles could be a useful way of starting. The Prime Minister did not comment directly on this, and the discussion had to break off at this point.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (FCO), Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Bryan Cartledge (Cabinet Office)

you surely, *C.D. Powell*

(C.D. POWELL)

Notes on common ground between Forum Report and Unionist "Way Forward"

1. OUP refers to need for us to provide blueprint for pluralist society: one that would accommodate unionists in a quite new way, not consistent with an existing ethos or Constitution.

Note This is met in Forum Report by reference to [redacted] non-denominational Constitution.

2. OUP stress on need for acceptance that for those seeking United Ireland "consent" must include the logical corollary, viz. right of unionists to refuse consent to transfer of sovereignty.

Note This is met in Forum Report by statement that "arrangements for a new and sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated and agreed by the people of the North and by the people of the South; also by the inclusion in the Report of the concept of joint authority which does not have implications for sovereignty".

3. Recognition by OUP of "two senses of national and political identity and allegiance."
4. Recognition by OUP of need for acceptance "by both communities of each others' hopes and fears".
5. Recognition by OUP of "responsibility of the majority to persuade the minority that the province is also theirs".
6. The expressed willingness of the OUP to "accept an Irish dimension in the form of "State recognition of the legitimacy of fostering and financing distinctively Irish cultural activities in Northern Ireland".
7. Recognition by OUP of case for establishment of citizens' rights as component of package for devolved government.
8. OUP statement - most significant - "every effort should be made to provide for a devolved administration in which majority and minority representatives can participate without prejudice to their position on the constitutional question."

The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP, and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, TD, met this morning in the margins of the European Council at Fontainebleau. They had a general discussion of Anglo-Irish relations following the publication of the Report of the New Ireland Forum, and agreed to hold a bilateral meeting later in the year.



Prime Minister

CDP
22/6

Ref. A084/1815

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

As instructed at your meeting on Ireland on 21 June, I
--- now submit a draft speaking note for you to use with
Dr FitzGerald at Fontainebleau.

2. I am sending copies to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
Sir Antony Acland and Mr Robert Andrew.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 June 1984

DRAFT SPEAKING NOTEAnglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

When we last discussed Northern Ireland together (at Chequers in November 1983) you explained the importance of the New Ireland Forum and the time and effort you were investing in it. Although there is much in its report with which you would not expect us to agree, I know that it represents a considerable political achievement. We welcome the fact that all elements of constitutional nationalism have agreed on the need to take a fresh look at the Northern Ireland question, and that for the first time all have formally recognised the right of the Unionists as well as the Nationalists to maintain their own loyalties and cultural identity.

2. None of the "solutions" canvassed in the report is attractive from the British point of view; but we appreciate that the report is careful not to close the door on other possible approaches to the problem; and the examination in Chapter 5.2 of the framework within which progress might be made suggests that there is a good deal of common ground on which we ought to be able to build. I know this is your wish; and it is also mine.

3. It will not be easy. Although we have a common interest in ensuring peace and stability throughout

*Forum Rpt.
Considerable
Political
achievement.*

the island of Ireland, our domestic political requirements are different and to some extent conflicting. Any new initiatives on Northern Ireland will attract passionate criticism and misrepresentation. It is therefore important that we should be quite clear about the limits of what is possible for each of us and about the practical effects on the ground of any new measures which might be taken. From the British point of view it is a cardinal principle that there can be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of its inhabitants. I know this is also your position. At the same time we recognise your interest in what happens in Northern Ireland and your desire to find ways of helping to re-integrate the minority community into the political life of the Province. We are willing to continue to search with you for ways in which your interest can be given practical effect, while maintaining British sovereignty so long as that is the wish of the majority.

4. It is against that background that we have authorised the exchanges that have taken place between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Dermot Nally. The ideas floated by Sir Robert Armstrong in Dublin in March were based on our understanding that you would like to explore with us ways of reassuring Unionist opinion about Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom in return for arrangements which would associate

the Republic in some visible way with law enforcement in the Province. But the proposals put forward by Mr Nally in May go well beyond this. I know that they were put forward as being without prejudice to the constitutional sovereignty of the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland; but in our view they would be seen, particularly in Northern Ireland, as amounting in practice to a significant erosion of sovereignty in very sensitive areas, notably security. That would not only be totally unacceptable to Unionists in Northern Ireland; it would also be unacceptable at Westminster.

5. At the same time we have taken very seriously the indications you have given us through Peter Barry and through your Ambassador in London that you are prepared to consider seeking to amend the territorial provisions of the Irish Constitution. I understand the historical background to those provisions. But the fact is that they constitute a serious obstacle to closer relations between the two parts of Ireland. As long as they remain part of your Constitution it is very difficult to promote any sort of closer relationship between the North and South without appearing to be making concessions to a claim of one state upon the territory of another.

6. I fully recognise the magnitude of the step which you would be taking in domestic political terms if you were to seek to have the territorial provisions of



of your Constitution removed; and I realise that you could attempt this with any prospect of success only if it were part of a package which included a significant element of an "Irish dimension" in the North.

7. From our point of view there are two problems about this. The first is whether there is in fact a realistic prospect of being able to carry a referendum in favour of deleting the territorial provisions from the Irish Constitution. I should be very interested to hear your view on this. It would not help either of us if you were to proceed with a referendum only to have the package rejected by the Irish electorate. That would make the task of reconciliation in Northern Ireland even more difficult than it is now.

8. The other problem is a practical and political one. Is it possible to devise new arrangements in Northern Ireland which we could accept, which would be enough to enable you to carry your referendum and which would at the same time command the support of both communities in Northern Ireland?

9. We have not yet reached any firm conclusions about this. The British Cabinet has not yet taken stock of the position we have now reached, and a good deal more work has still to be done. We shall also want to take account of the views expressed in our forthcoming Parliamentary debate on the Forum Report on 2 July. After that I think it would be helpful if there could be another talk between Sir Robert Armstrong and



Mr Nally in which the postions of both sides could be further explored. I hope that we shall by then have developed further ideas which could be put to you. If you agree that this is the right way to proceed, I would hope to be able to authorise Sir Robert Armstrong to come to Dublin for this purpose within the next two or three weeks.

10. Until this process of discussion of practicable possibilities is further advanced, it would in my judgment be premature to think in terms of a joint statement of principles. I should prefer to see more clearly, and in more specific detail, where we expect to be going before committing myself to a statement of principles to be followed in getting there.

11. I know that we both agree that it is of paramount importance that the confidentiality of these exchanges should be maintained. We warmly appreciate all you have done on your side to ensure this. We will continue to do the same.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 340

CONFIDENTIAL

FRAME GENERAL

FM DUBLIN 191508Z JUN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 19 JUNE 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

INFO SAVING ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS UKREP BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG AND ROME

MY TELNO 260 PARA 3: THE TAOISEACH'S VISIT TO PARIS

1. SEAN O'HEIGEARTAIGH, DEPT OF THE TAOISEACH, (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS GIVEN US AN INFORMAL (SECOND-HAND) ACCOUNT OF THE TAOISEACH'S TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, EMPHASISING THAT THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CONSISTED OF AN EXCHANGE OF GENERALITIES. (AMBASSADOR DILLON HAD BEEN THE NOTE-TAKER). THE FOLLOWING IS THE GIST OF THE TAOISEACH'S SUBSEQUENT REMARKS TO O'HEIGEARTAIGH.

2. BUDGETARY IMBALANCES: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND GAVE NO HINTS THAT THE FRENCH WERE WILLING TO MOVE FROM 1000 MECU BUT HAD TOLD THE TAOISEACH THAT THERE HAD BEEN LONG DETAILED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY AND THE UK WHICH WERE BEING CONTINUED IN LUXEMBOURG BETWEEN M. CHEYSSON AND YOURSELF. THE MODALITIES WERE COMPLEX AND A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES WERE STILL BEING DISCUSSED. (FRENCH OFFICIALS IN THE MARGINS WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN THEY HAD BEEN AND PUT THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT AT 50:50.)

3. NEW COMMISSION: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS TO HAVE 17 COMMISSIONERS SHARING AT MOST 8 OR 9 JOBS BUT HE WOULD ACQUIESCE IF THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS INSISTED ON SENDING TWO COMMISSIONERS FROM EACH OF THE LARGER MEMBER STATES. IT WAS THE GERMAN TURN TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION BUT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD NOT YET PROPOSED A CANDIDATE ALTHOUGH BIEDENKOPF'S NAME HAD BEEN FLOATED.

4. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD REFERRED TO THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO ENLARGEMENT AND HAD SPOKEN VAGUELY AND INCONCLUSIVELY ABOUT PREPARATIONS FOR A CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN UNION. GENERALITIES WERE SIMILARLY EXCHANGED ON CENTRAL AMERICA, WEU AND THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT.

FCO PLEASES PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GOODISON

FRAME GENERAL

ECD (1)

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

CONFIDENTIAL

o/w Euro Pol. Euro Council

Prime Minister (2)

CDP
19/6



ms

Ref. A084/1786

MR POWELL

The Irish Ambassador rang this afternoon with two messages:

(1) The Taoiseach will (as the Prime Minister already knows) be staying in London overnight on Tuesday 26 June, after the meeting of the European Council at Fontainebleau. The Taoiseach wanted the Prime Minister to know that on the morning of 27 June he and Mr Spring, by whom he will be accompanied, will be seeing Opposition leaders: Mr Kinnock, Dr Owen and Mr Steel.


(2) The Taoiseach was anxious that the Prime Minister should know that he would be arriving in Paris on Sunday 24 June, and going on to Fontainebleau on Monday 25 June. I said that I understood that the Prime Minister was planning to leave London on the morning of 25 June so as to arrive in time for lunch at Fontainebleau on that day. As in the past, early after lunch on 25 June either you or I would be in touch with Mr Nally with a view to arranging a time for the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach.

RA


ROBERT ARMSTRONG

19 June 1984

EURO PO: Fontainebleau



COMPTON



file 504



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

European Council:
Meeting with the Taoiseach

The Prime Minister has confirmed that she would prefer to see the Taoiseach at Fontainebleau rather than in London. I agree that arrangements for the meeting can be made on the spot.

The Prime Minister agrees that you should join the party for Fontainebleau.

C.D. Powell
14 June 1984

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.

PRIME MINISTER

Sir Robert Armstrong has had an enquiry from Mr. Nally whether you would prefer to meet the Taoiseach at Fontainebleau or in London on the way back from the European Council. You noted on the papers about Mr. Spring's visit to London that you expected to see the Taoiseach at Fontainebleau. Sir Robert Armstrong proposes to confirm this. Agree?

Yes not

Assuming you agree this, Sir Robert Armstrong proposes to join the party for Fontainebleau. Agree?

C.D.P.

13 June 1984

SUBJECT FILED ON:

IRELAND:

Situation Pt 16

Ref. A084/1717

MR POWELL

European Council: Meeting with the Taoiseach

Mr Nally has been in touch today about arrangements for a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in the margins of the European Council. He said that the Taoiseach would be happy to meet the Prime Minister at Fontainebleau, or to come and see her on his way back from Fontainebleau in London.

2. In the light of Mr Coles's minute of 11 June and of a brief conversation with you I rang Mr Nally to say that the Prime Minister was looking forward to seeing the Taoiseach at Fontainebleau. Arrangements could be made on the spot when both concerned were there.

3. Mr Nally said that the Taoiseach would be perfectly content with that. He would hope, however, that there could be somewhat longer time for the meeting than on previous occasions, since he was likely to want to have some "substantive" discussion. Mr Nally did not tell me any more about that, but said that the Irish Ambassador would be coming in to tell me what was in mind.

4. I have not been expecting to go to the European Council on this occasion; but in view of this development on the Irish side I think that it would be helpful if I could be present (as Mr Nally certainly will be) when the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach meet. I hope that the Prime Minister will agree that I can be added to the Fontainebleau party.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13 June 1984



Copy to PC withdrawn
on instructions
from ASE

Ref. A084/1066

MR COLES

A.S.C. 6/4
h.a.

Anglo-Irish Relations

I have now spoken to Mr Nally about possible dates for an informal call by the Taoiseach.

2. I said that 6 June would be impossible for the Prime Minister.
3. I queried 26 June, as that was the day on which the European Council were meeting. Mr Nally said that he thought that what the Taoiseach had in mind was an informal talk with the Prime Minister in London, on his way back from the European Council to Dublin.
4. We agreed that it was really impossible to go any further forward until the report of the Forum had been published. Mr Nally said that he thought that, in the light of that, the Taoiseach might even want to suggest an informal call on the Prime Minister sometime in the middle of May. I said that I knew that the Prime Minister's diary was very full at that time, but I would obviously take advice so that, if and when Mr Nally rang back after the Forum had reported, I was in a position to say how the Prime Minister would respond.
5. Mr Nally made it clear that he envisaged a further meeting between him and me before the next talk between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, whenever that might be held.
6. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr Appleyard and Mr Lyon.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

5 April 1984

Ref.A084/917

MR COLES

A.C. 22/3.
J.A.

I should report two further exchanges which I had in the margins of the European Council in Brussels on Tuesday 20 March.

2. First, Mr Nally said that, if the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach managed to exchange a few words on Anglo/Irish matters, the Taoiseach hoped that the Prime Minister would not express any thanks for the extradition of Mr McGlinchey. Something he said made me think that perhaps the operation had not gone entirely according to plan, though the outcome was satisfactory.

3. Secondly, during the course of the evening I ran into the Taoiseach himself. This was after he had walked out of the meeting of the European Council. He said that he doubted whether it would now be possible for the Prime Minister and him to have a talk on Anglo/Irish matters; both of them were (as he put it) "un peu distrait". I said that I understood that he might be in London on other business in June; he suggested that he could probably, if it seemed desirable, manufacture an excuse to come to London on other business before then. I said that I did not doubt that Mr Nally and I could have another meeting in the meantime, if that seemed appropriate.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 March 1984

HU



cc FCO
NIO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo/Irish relations

In your minute of 19 March you gave an account of your conversation with Mr. Dermot Nally in the margins of the European Council on that day. I have since seen John Lyon's letter of 22 March.

I have not yet put to the Prime Minister the suggestion that the Taoiseach should call on the Prime Minister during one of the two visits which he may be making to London in June. As you say, 6 June would be extremely difficult because the Prime Minister will be very pre-occupied with preparations for the London Economic Summit which begins the next day. But can it really be the case that the Taoiseach is also coming to London on 26 June? This is the day on which the European Council meets. You may care to check the date with Mr. Nally since it would be very much easier to arrange a meeting between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister after the Economic Summit than before it.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr. Lyon (Northern Ireland Office).

A. J. COLES

23 March 1984

NR

STRICTLY PERSONAL
AND CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ



John Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
SW1

22 March 1984

Dear John,

Mr Prior has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 19 March about his conversation with Mr Nally.

Mr Prior thinks it helpful that Dr FitzGerald should not be looking for a formal summit before the Autumn, and that it would be advantageous if the Prime Minister were able to meet his wish to let him call upon her informally when visiting London for other purposes in June. It is very much in the UK interest to move from formal summit meetings which inevitably arouse high expectations and pressure for substantial comminqués to informal low-key meetings which present Anglo-Irish relations as natural and routine.

Mr Prior has had several meetings with Mr Barry with both parties saying nothing substantial to the press. Unlike some of his predecessors, Mr Barry has kept to his undertakings not to undermine the privacy of the discussions by informal briefings. While recognising that a Prime Ministerial meeting, however informal, attracts a different scale of attention, he hopes it may be possible to edge further towards informality by meeting Dr FitzGerald's request for a call in June.

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

STRICTLY PERSONAL
AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

John Lyon

J M LYON

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

162 Ans
Mtg with
Tanserch
Pt 7

DD UKREP BRUSSELS 191400Z

PS to P.M
(2)

GRS 235

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 191400 Z

FM FCO 191245Z MAR 84

TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 19 MARCH

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK, DUBLIN

FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER

TELECON GOODALL (CABINET OFFICE)/COLES:

DOMINIC MCGLINCHEY'S EXTRADITION FROM THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

1. WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY OCCURS, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WISH TO THANK DR FITZGERALD FOR THE SPEED WITH WHICH INLA LEADER DOMINIC MCGLINCHEY WAS EXTRADITED TO NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER HIS CAPTURE IN THE REPUBLIC ON 17 MARCH. SHE MAY ALSO WISH TO CONGRATULATE HIM ON THE SUCCESSFUL GARDA OPERATION AND EXTEND HER SYMPATHIES TO THE OFFICER WHO WAS INJURED.

2. THE INLA HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A SERIES OF PARTICULARLY ATROCIOUS CRIMES INCLUDING THE MURDER OF AIREY NEAVE IN 1979 AND WAS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DARKLEY MURDERS IN NOVEMBER.

3. MCGLINCHEY'S EXTRADITION SETS AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE FOLLOWED IN FUTURE CASES. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HOWEVER WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THE SENSITIVITY OF EXTRADITION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE REPUBLIC, AND THE TAOISEACH'S CONCERN NOT TO BE SEEN TO BE INFLUENCING THE OUTCOME OF THE OTHER CASES AT PRESENT BEFORE THE COURTS.

~~Prime Minister.~~

A. J. C. 19/3

HOWE

NNNK

SENT AT 191324Z MAD

MR COLES

A.S.C. 19.
3

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

I spoke to Mr. Dermot Nally in the margins of the meeting of the European Council at Brussels on Monday, 19 March at 3.45 pm.

He asked when it would be convenient for the Prime Minister to talk to the Taoiseach. I said that the Prime Minister was anxious to keep free as much time as possible on the morning of Tuesday, 20 March to prepare herself for the day's proceedings in the European Council, and was likely therefore to have her conversation with the Taoiseach in the course of their informal gatherings, perhaps at dinner time this evening. I supposed that at this stage the Taoiseach would not want to do much more than give her a preliminary reaction to the ideas which I had recently put to Mr. Nally, and that the next stage on that was likely to be a second round of discussions between us.

Mr. Nally confirmed that that was likely to be the Taoiseach's position on those matters, although he would also want to give the Prime Minister some account of where the proceedings on the Forum for a New Ireland now stood. The present expectation still was that the report of the Forum would be published in the second week of April, and there was no reason to expect any surprises on its contents, though that could still change. I said that, if the report talked about "joint authority", it might be helpful if it could distinguish "joint authority" from "joint responsibility" as clearly as possible.

Mr. Nally said that, with the European Elections coming in June, and the 12 July and 12 August dates coming up, the Irish Government were likely to want to play the Forum report long and low: they would not want it to feature strongly in the European Elections. Thus it seemed unlikely that the time would be ripe for a further bilateral summit between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach before the autumn. Nonetheless the Taoiseach attached importance

STRICTLY PERSONAL
AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

to being able to talk to the Prime Minister about Anglo-Irish matters in the margins of this meeting of the European Council and next June's meeting. He would be coming to London to give a lecture on Wednesday, 6 June. I said that might be a very difficult date for the Prime Minister; not only was it very shortly before the European Elections, but it was the day before the London Economic Summit. Mr. Nally said that the Taoiseach might also be coming to London for a function at the Inner (or Middle) Temple on 26 June; that might provide another occasion on which he could meet the Prime Minister for an informal exchange.

I am sending copies of this minute to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Derek Hill (Northern Ireland Office).

REA

19 March, 1984

STRICTLY PERSONAL
AND CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

16 March 1984

Dear John

McGOVERN CASE

Thank you for your letter of 12 March in which you asked for briefing on the McGovern case in preparation for the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach in Brussels next week.

For the reasons that will be clear from the attached material we think the chances of the Taoiseach raising this are a good deal less than in the past. You may however wish to draw the attached background note and line to take to the Prime Minister's attention.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Peter Ricketts (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office.)

Yours ever

Derek Hill

D A HILL

KL

E.R.

McGOVERN CASE

Line To Take

I know that Mr Prior and Mr Noonan discussed the case on 10 January. Mr Prior said the UK authorities had taken the matter as far as they could on the material supplied. Mr Noonan agreed that the matter was essentially for the police and not for government.

2. I very much welcome direct communication between Mr Prior and Mr Noonan and hope it will continue. This will provide an opportunity for Mr Prior and Mr Noonan to discuss any difficulties in their respective areas of responsibility.

3. NIO officials have had recent discussion with officials in the Department of Justice. For our part we are very anxious that these exchanges should continue. I am sure these meetings would be a good place in which to tackle at an early stage any misunderstandings which might arise from time to time.

McGOVERN CASEBackground

James McGovern was arrested by the RUC on 27 September 1982 when he was due to give evidence at Dowra District Court, County Leitrim, in the trial of Garda Thomas Nangle for assault. Garda Nangle was the brother-in-law of the then Minister for Justice, Sean Doherty, and his acquittal by the court on the non-appearance of McGovern gave rise to suspicions of collusion between the RUC and the Garda.

2. On Dr FitzGerald's return to power in late 1982 the Garda Commissioner and his deputy, Mr Ainsworth, resigned. The new Commissioner, Mr Wren, initiated inquiries with the RUC who followed up all the original leads without result. On May 1983 the Garda Commissioner supplied further information which purported to implicate an Assistant Chief Constable of the RUC. The Chief Constable treated this as a formal complaint, which necessitated the initiation of a formal investigation, and asked the Garda Commissioner to supply formal statements to provide the basis for any inquiry.

3. The Commissioner failed to come up with the information and eventually wrote to the Chief Constable at the beginning of October 1983 in a conciliatory tone, explaining that he had not wished to make a complaint against the RUC and simply sought information to enable the Garda to assess whether there had been any impropriety

in their force. In the absence of any requirement for a formal inquiry the Chief Constable was able to pursue his own investigations. The Irish were informed of the outcome on 2 November 1983 when the Chief Constable made it clear to the Commissioner that there were no grounds for any suspicion that the RUC had acted improperly.

4. The Taoiseach raised the affair with the Prime Minister at the Summit meeting on 7 November 1983, indicating that the Chief Constable's reply was unsatisfactory and attributing a lack of confidence between the two police forces at a senior level to the incident. In an effort to clarify the misunderstandings the Ambassador saw Mr Nally on 23 November. Although Mr Goodison emphasised the need for continued security co-operation and suggested that the matter would be best pursued between the two forces, rather than at senior government levels, the matter was not allowed to rest.

5. Against the background of increased terrorist activity and heightened media speculation about the significance of the incident in contributing to a major rift between the two police forces, Mr Prior met Mr Barry in Brussels on 29 November 1983. Both agreed on the necessity to allay doubts about the state of security co-operation and agreed to a meeting between the two Chief Police Officers to be followed, at a more propitious time, by a meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Noonan. Mr Barry made it clear that the Dowra Affair could be regarded as closed.

6. The Taoiseach raised the issue again with the Prime Minister in the margins of the European Council meeting in Athens on 5 December 1983. The matter had assumed a domestic political

dimension in the Republic and was allied to a wish by the new Commissioner to distance himself from the regime of his predecessor. While the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach both agreed that every effort should be made to resolve the issue Commissioner Wren refused however to agree to a meeting with the Chief Constable. Mr Prior and Mr Noonan discussed it further on 10 January. Mr Prior expressed the hope that Mr Noonan would appreciate that the United Kingdom authorities had taken the matter as far as they could on the material with which they had been supplied, and that the Irish would not feel it necessary to raise this matter in general terms at senior levels of government. Mr Noonan said that this was essentially a matter for the police and not for the Government, and this appears to have been borne out in the subsequent security discussions between officials where the issue has not taken on any great significance.

7. We have no reason to believe that the Irish will wish to bring the matter up again at government level at this stage. Reports of an internal Garda inquiry held on 7 and 8 February, accompanied by speculation that disciplinary charges might be laid against a senior officer, indicate that the Irish may finally accept that the RUC is not in a position to supply firm evidence to assist them in putting their own house in order. Mr McGovern has taken legal proceedings against the Chief Constable and the Secretary of State. The Irish are aware that the papers relating to Mr McGovern's parallel complaint against the police are with the DPP and will, after his decision, go to the Police Complaints Board.

16 MAR 1984



1

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS



13

Ref. A084/847

PRIME MINISTER

Bilateral Meeting with Dr FitzGerald on 19-20 March 1984
Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

--- You have agreed to a request from Dr FitzGerald for a short bilateral meeting with him in the margins of next week's European Council meeting in Brussels. The main purpose of Dr Fitzgerald's request is to enable him to talk to you about the approach which I made to the Secretary of the Irish Government on the Cabinet's instructions on 1 March. I submit a brief for your use in talking to Dr FitzGerald which has been agreed with the small group of senior officials who have been involved in preparing the approach to the Irish Government.

2. I do not think that there is any other briefing on bilateral matters required for your meeting with Dr FitzGerald, apart from the brief on the McGovern case requested in Mr Coles's letter to Mr Lyon of 12 March, which you will be receiving direct from the Northern Ireland Office.

3. I am sending copies of this minute and its attachments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Sir Antony Acland and Mr Robert Andrew.

Rea

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

15 March 1984

BILATERAL MEETING WITH DR FITZGERALD ON 19/20 MARCH 1984

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

LINE TO TAKE

1. Recognise threat of Sinn Fein, alienation of minority in Northern Ireland, constructive attitude of Dr Fitzgerald. Ready to take risks if real progress possible. Hence Sir Robert Armstrong's recent suggestions. Now await considered Irish response. Hope this can be as clear and specific as the ideas we have put on the table.
2. Recognise political difficulties within the Republic. Major political difficulties in the United Kingdom too. Constitutional position of the North as part of the United Kingdom must be seen to be secured. Only on this basis would a new situation be created with opportunity for flexibility on our part. Republic's ability to waive its territorial claim and formally acknowledge the union for the foreseeable future is therefore the cornerstone of our suggestions. But these would in return involve the Republic in the North for the first time.
3. Agree on danger of leaks and need for absolute discretion on both sides.
4. Forum's report awaited with interest. Important it should not foreclose any options, or concentrate on solutions known to be unacceptable to the United Kingdom. Nor must it make it harder for London and Dublin to pursue the ideas we have been discussing. Joint sovereignty not a starter. "Joint authority" has been canvassed as an alternative, but what would be the difference in practice?

BACKGROUND

5. The package of proposals approved by Ministers as a basis for exploring the Irish position (summary at Annex) was put to Mr Nally by Sir Robert Armstrong on 1 March and

SECRET AND PERSONAL

the Taoiseach's initial response was conveyed by Mr Lillis to Mr Goodall on 5 March. The Irish have undertaken to give us a more considered response soon but have said they do not expect the Taoiseach to be able to do this at his meeting with you in Brussels. (He has spent the intervening period in the United States.)

6. The initial Irish reaction to our approach has been a mixture of gratification that we have taken their concerns seriously, surprise at our readiness to put specific (although still only tentative) ideas on the table, and dismay at being confronted with the need to move from rhetoric to reality and produce specific proposals of their own. The Taoiseach, and his very small group of advisers on these issues, have been heavily preoccupied with bringing the Forum for a New Ireland to a successful conclusion (i.e. a consensus report) and were unprepared to deal with the British initiative. The Irish clearly understand that the ball is now in their court and Dr Fitzgerald may be somewhat on the defensive as a result. Although the Irish have welcomed the fact that we have made positive proposals, they have serious difficulty with the idea of joint security arrangements unless set in a wider political context; and in particular with the idea of a border strip which would incorporate territory on the Republic's side of the border; and they are predictably finding it extremely difficult and uncomfortable to decide how, if at all, they might be able to cash their original tentative offer to waive their territorial claim and acknowledge the union.

7. It would be inappropriate for us either to modify or elaborate our proposals until we have the considered Irish response. You can therefore be content to let Dr Fitzgerald explain his thinking. But two points which need to be impressed on him at this stage are that all the ideas we have floated are based on the assumption that the Irish

side would be willing and able to deliver a formal commitment to accept the union; and to discourage any wishful thinking on the Taoiseach's part that "joint sovereignty", either under that or any other name, might have attractions for the British Government.

8. Dr Fitzgerald will no doubt want to update you on the state of play in the Forum, which is not now expected to publish its report before early April after the forthcoming Fianna Fail Party Conference. The shape of the report and its conclusions are still the subject of intense negotiation between the political parties. Dr Fitzgerald and Mr John Hume are doing their best to ensure that it will be in a form which they hope will enable the British Government to make a constructive response; but the signs are that Mr Haughey is playing hard to get and that the Republican wing of the SDLP (led by Mr Seamus Mallon) are siding with him in an attempt to give the report a traditionally nationalist slant. Dr Fitzgerald is hoping to be able to send you an advance copy of the report when it has been agreed but this is unlikely to be more than one or two days ahead of publication.

(i) A solemn declaration of commitment by the Irish Government to respect the union, and to give expression to such a commitment either by seeking amendment of the territorial clauses in the Irish Constitution or by taking steps to ensure that the declaration would not be found unconstitutional by the Irish Supreme Court; the implementation of the other elements in the package to be dependent on the fulfilment of this commitment.

(ii) A commitment by the British Government to work towards the introduction of joint policing arrangements in areas on both sides of the Irish border, possibly extending to other areas of major terrorist activity in the North; and for this purpose the establishment of a joint Anglo-Irish Security Commission tasked (a) to reach early agreement on the modalities (including unified arrangements for the administration of criminal justice in the area) and perhaps (b) to examine the possibilities for moving eventually towards the establishment of a joint police force operating throughout the same areas.

(iii) A commitment by the British Government to examine the possibilities for the progressive harmonisation of criminal law throughout Ireland and arrangements for associating Judges from each jurisdiction with criminal trials conducted in the other (i.e. steps towards an all-Ireland law enforcement area); and, for this purpose, the establishment of a joint Anglo-Irish Law Commission (for which the post-Sunningdale Joint Commission would provide a precedent) tasked to investigate these matters.

(iv) The introduction by the British Government of measures to meet certain nationalist concerns in the North (e.g. repeal of the Flags & Emblems (Display) Act, Irish citizens to be allowed (subject to a residence qualification) to vote in local elections in Northern Ireland).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Annex cont'd

(v) Enhanced responsibilities for local government in Northern Ireland, which could include a regional council based on the Assembly, with a committee system; and a new local authority structure with some councils having nationalist majorities.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

1862 And
Meetings with
The Tacticians
Part 7



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 March 1984

As you may know, the Prime Minister has agreed to hold a meeting with the Taoiseach in the margins of the European Council in Brussels.

The usual briefing is doubtless being prepared. The purpose of this letter is simply to ask that the briefs should include an account of the latest position on the McGovern case. It would be helpful if the factual background could be fairly detailed. You will recall that Dr. FitzGerald raised the matter with some emphasis at his meeting with the Prime Minister in Athens on Monday 5 December (my letter of that day).

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

John Lyon Esq
Northern Ireland Office.

BF
for Brussels

6

NR

*cc ll*

12

Ref. A084/807

MR COLES ✓

*A. & C. By**f.c.*Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

Thank you for your minute of 6 March.

2. I have sent a message to Mr Nally saying that, while the Prime Minister looks forward to a meeting with the Taoiseach in the margins of the European Council in Brussels next week, the amount of time they will be able to spend on Anglo-Irish business will inevitably depend upon the time required for the main purpose of the meeting, which could be considerable. I have suggested that Mr Nally should be in touch when we are in Brussels.

Al

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence

12 March 1984

IRELAND: Int Sit



51 95 Pt 15

COMPTROLLER

1915

S E C R E T



Filed on:
→ 1) Inland: mtgs
with the Taoiseach
PT6
2) European Councils:
Athens PT 13

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December, 1983

Dear John,

Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach
in Athens on Monday, 5 December

The Prime Minister and Dr. FitzGerald had a short meeting in the margins of the European Council in Athens today. I enclose a record of the conversation. I also enclose a note of my subsequent conversation with Mr. Nally.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
John Lyon.

J. Lyon, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

S E C R E T

Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach
at 0920 hrs on Monday, 5 December at the Zappeion Hall in Athens

Present: Prime Minister Dr. FitzGerald
 Mr. A.J.Coles Mr. Nally

The Prime Minister referred to the state of discussion in the European Council and in particular to the question of milk. A super levy would cause just as much trouble for the United Kingdom as for Ireland. She could accept a super levy only if all the others agreed to it. The base year should be 1983. She could envisage special structural measures for Ireland. Dr. FitzGerald said that he had visited all the Member States and had found that there was much sympathy for the Irish problem. The Prime Minister observed that milk production in Ireland had increased by 50 per cent since Ireland had joined the Community. Dr. FitzGerald replied that Irish milk production was still well below the British and Danish levels. Much of the justification for Irish membership of the Community related to milk. It was impossible for him to agree to a super levy without dérogation for Ireland. The press had apparently been told that Britain was blocking an agreement of the kind Ireland wanted. This would be very unhelpful to him domestically.

The Prime Minister then said that she understood that the Taoiseach wished to discuss security co-operation. Mr. Prior had recently discussed the McGovern case with Mr. Barry who had said that he would regard the matter as closed. Dr. FitzGerald said that the situation had worsened considerably as a result of press comment.

The Irish Police Commissioner was not prepared to talk at this stage with the Chief Constable in Northern Ireland. This was very bad for the general relationship between the two police authorities. He recalled that the Chief Constable had said in May that he would appoint someone to examine the McGovern case. Thus when he (Dr. FitzGerald) had discussed the matter with the Prime Minister in Stuttgart in June he had said that the trend was in the right direction. On several occasions we had promised to let the Irish know the results of our thinking but had failed to do so. There had been an arrangement that Sir Philip Woodfield should talk to Mr. Nally in August but this conversation had not happened. The replies that had been received from the North to questions from the South were inadequate and were seen by the Commissioner as a cover-up.

Police co-operation had deteriorated. Until May, 1982, there had been regular meetings on the border. Press leaks at that time had lead to the termination, by agreement, of these meetings. Then during 1983 co-operation on the border had further deteriorated. At operational level it was reasonably good but there was no overall direction. The Joint Co-ordinating Committee had not been re-established. The Garda Commissioner had been promised co-operation by the Chief Constable in May but had received none and, having taken delivery of a totally unsatisfactory letter, now felt that he could not deal with the Chief Constable. The press were full of this matter. We could not go on like this.

S E C R E T

- 3 -

Mr. Prior was to see the Irish Minister of Justice in January. It was essential to get police co-operation back on the rails. There should be an investigation, perhaps a joint investigation, of the McGovern case.

The Prime Minister suggested that Mr. Coles and Mr. Nally should meet while in Athens and go over the ground again. It was essential that security co-operation was maintained.

The discussion ended at 0935 hrs.

A.S.C.

5 December, 1983

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Filed on:
→ 1) European Council
Athens Pt 12
2) Includ: Sit 14

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. COLES AND MR. NALLY ON MONDAY,
5 DECEMBER; 1983 AT THE ZAPPEION HALL, ATHENS

Mr. Nally gave me a detailed account of the McGovern case from December 1981 onwards.

Having rehearsed the history as he saw it, Mr. Nally said that the Taoiseach still hoped that an investigation of the McGovern case would be carried out in Northern Ireland (as the Chief Constable had promised in May). Dr. FitzGerald's only objective in all this was to get police co-operation back to its proper level. This meant re-establishing the Joint Co-ordinating Committee and healing the breach between the two police chiefs. The best course now might be to work for a successful meeting between Mr. Prior and the Irish Minister of Justice in January. That meeting could agree to re-constitute the Joint Co-ordinating Committee. We should also contemplate the possibility of the meeting being attended by the Commissioner and the Chief Constable. However, while these steps would be welcomed, they might not be sufficient. Press comment in Ireland was beginning to take an ugly turn. There was a suspicion that the Irish Government was involved in a cover-up. Possibly only an enquiry could clear the air. The other possibility was that the pending court cases in both the North and the South should go ahead - and that might remove the need for an enquiry.

I said that I would report these observations, that I thought the Prime Minister might well wish to discuss the matter again with Mr. Prior and that we would consider the extent to which we could use the January meeting to resolve the problems created by the McGovern case.

A. J. Coles.

5 December 1983

S E C R E T

SECRET



10
Sub

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: McGOVERN CASE

Thank you for your letter of 17 November which the Prime Minister saw over the weekend.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that our Ambassador in Dublin should call upon Mr. Nally and speak as suggested in your letter.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Lyon, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

SLY



da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1983

Thank you for your letter of 17 November and for the letter from the Taoiseach which you enclosed. I shall bring both to the attention of the Prime Minister this weekend.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. Noel Dorr



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place

SW1X 7HR

17th November 1983

Prime Minister.

A J C. 18/a.

Dear Mr. Coles,

I should be most grateful if you would be kind enough to convey to the Prime Minister the enclosed letter of thanks from the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, following the meeting of 7th November.

May I also as Ambassador take this opportunity to express to the Prime Minister my own thanks for the hospitality extended to me and to the Irish Delegation on the occasion of the meeting at Chequers on Monday, 7th November.

Yours sincerely
Noel Dorr

Noel Dorr
Ambassador

Mr A J Coles
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Encl

Rebours
Mtg with
Taoiseach



THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

3. We detect a sense of frustration in Dublin that having so far been unable to 'nail' their predecessors over the McGovern affair we - or, more specifically, the Chief Constable - have not been able to do the job for them. As far as we are concerned, evidence of a conspiracy is lacking. However, suggests that an investigation by the Republic's Ministry of Justice (of which we were not previously aware) will show collusion between a senior Garda officer - who, it is said, will lose his job, - and an identifiable RUC officer. We can but continue to make it plain to the Garda that the Chief Constable cannot deal with any alleged impropriety by the RUC unless the allegation is supported by evidence.
4. The handling of the affair has been bedevilled by its political background in the South which has contributed to misunderstandings over procedure, and failures of communication, the responsibility for which rests at least as much with the Garda as the RUC. The RUC followed up all the original leads without result. Then, in May, the Garda Commissioner wrote with further information which purported to implicate one of the Assistant Chief Constables of the RUC but which was unsupported by first-hand evidence to that effect. The Chief Constable quite rightly treated this as a formal complaint which of necessity involved the Police Authority, and in July the Commissioner conceded the Chief Constable's point that it would have to be so handled. It was made plain to him that a formal investigation by the Police Authority - which would involve calling in a Chief Constable from another force - could not rest on circumstantial allegations but would require the provision of formal statements; but these the Commissioner failed to supply.
5. Eventually, at the beginning of October the Garda Commissioner wrote in a conciliatory tone saying that he had not wished to make a complaint, acknowledging that the RUC had not, as he had earlier supposed, been shown a note by the Irish DPP which would have made this clear, and explaining that he only wanted certain information so that the Garda could assess what really happened on their side, and whether there had been any impropriety in their force. This

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

9



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL

Prime Minister.

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Hope that our Ambassador in
 Dublin should call on Mr. Nally
 to take him through the sequence
 of events.

17th November 1983

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

A.C. 1/4

Yes

Dear John,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: McGOVERN CASE

- In your letter of 7 November to Brian Fall about the summit tete a tete you said that the Prime Minister would be glad of comments on Dr FitzGerald's remarks about the McGovern case. This matter falls mainly our way, and by agreement with the FCO I am replying.
- In the South, the McGovern case is viewed as one of several examples of senior officers in the Garda using their powers to do improper "favours" for Mr Haughey and his Government. Shortly after Dr FitzGerald returned to power, the Garda Commissioner and his deputy, Mr Ainsworth (who was particularly close to Mr Haughey) resigned. There are understandable political reasons for Dr FitzGerald to wish to secure public evidence of malpractice by Mr Ainsworth. The allegation in the McGovern case is that Mr Ainsworth arranged for the RUC to arrest McGovern in order to prevent his appearing as scheduled in court in the South as the principal witness against the brother-in-law of the then Minister of Justice. Those wanting evidence against Ainsworth were hoping the RUC would say that McGovern's arrest was based on a request for information from him. The disappointment to which Dr FitzGerald refers is likely to be because in the very full reply which the Chief Constable of the RUC has now provided to the Garda Commissioner it is stated that McGovern's arrest was based entirely on information obtained by the RUC and was not prompted by Mr Ainsworth or the Garda.

SECRET

SECRET



enabled the Chief Constable to make inquiries free of the formalities of the complaints' procedure, and he responded on 13 October saying that he would do so. He replied, fully on 2 November explaining that McGovern had been under suspicion for some time in Northern Ireland and had been arrested on the basis of RUC intelligence alone. He explained in detail the sequence of events, and pointed out that the Garda were informed as soon as McGovern himself revealed that he was due to appear before a court in the Republic. He said that the Assistant Chief Constable previously implicated had known nothing of the McGovern arrest until an hour after he passed a telephone message to the Garda which had appeared to incriminate him. When arrangements for delivering this letter were being made it emerged the Garda had never received the Chief Constable's interim letter of 13 October although the Garda had been told during that day that this acknowledgement was coming and had themselves made enquiries later on 13 October about when it could be expected to arrive. They had said nothing previously to suggest it had not arrived at all.

6. We cannot be sure whether Dr FitzGerald is right in suggesting that the McGovern case is a substantial cause of friction between senior officers in the Garda and the RUC or whether Mr Wren is right in assuring Sir Jack Hermon (in confidence) that he does not want to inflate its significance but that Dr FitzGerald is pressing him. Now that the Chief Constable has completed his enquiries and written fully to the Commissioner, the way is open for the two Chief Officers to talk directly to remove any misunderstandings which may remain between them. In parallel, the Ambassador will, if the Prime Minister agrees, call upon Mr Nally to go over the sequence of events and to make it plain that if the Irish can support any continuing suspicions with evidence the Chief Constable will, of course, consider it. While emphasising the RUC's wish for full co-operation and confidence, he will challenge any implication that it is the conduct of the RUC in this case which calls for apology. Even if it turned out that some of the muddles and misunderstandings were more their fault than it now appears, it would be wrong for individual incidents of

SECRET

SECRET



this kind to be used as justification for retreating from security co-operation.

7. I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (FCO) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

John

J M LYON

GLK

SECRET

1 rebound Mtgs with
Taoiseach p 7

6
5
4
3
2
1 12

NOV 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

file

da



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 November 1983

Anglo-Irish Summit: Records

Thank you for your letter of 16 November. In my view, it would be consistent with views which the Prime Minister has expressed on the recording of discussions at the Anglo-Irish Summit if the draft record which you enclosed were either given no distribution or an extremely restricted one (perhaps to Private Offices only).

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 November 1983

Dear John,

Anglo-Irish Summit: Records

/ Thank you for your letter of 14 November. As requested I enclose a copy of the draft record of the session between the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on our side, and Mr Spring and Mr Barry on the Irish side. This draft incorporates amendments suggested by the Northern Ireland Office.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT MEETING: RECORD OF MINISTERIAL
DISCUSSIONS ON 7 NOVEMBER 1983 AT CHEQUERS

Present:

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP	Mr Dick Spring TD
Rt Hon James Prior MP	Mr Peter Barry TD
Mr P H C Eyers	Mr Michael Lillis

Super-levy

1. Mr Barry said that from Ireland's point of view it was of great importance that the milk industry should be allowed to develop. Milk was as important to the Irish economy as oil to that of Great Britain. The dairy industry generated between 6% and 9% of their GNP. If the super-levy was introduced it would not allow the dairy industry to develop as it otherwise could. The Irish Government understood the UK concern about the cost of CAP but it was not in the Community's interest to prevent the development of an industry of such importance to a member country. Ireland had had no previous possibility of developing its dairy industry. It was in the Community interest that the dairy industry should develop. Sir G Howe said that he understood the importance of the dairy industry both to Northern Ireland and to the south. But there was a real problem: the tremendous over-production of milk within the Community. Milk absorbed approximately one-third of the cost of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Agricultural

Ps (Mr. Richetts
NIO amendments
now incorporated.

Patrick Eyers
(6) 11

Policy absorbed two-thirds of the Community's total own resources. The question was how the Community should address the milk surplus. Clearly it would be necessary to be tough on price. The super-levy was not an alternative but a supplement to pressure on price. He thought the premise must be that there should be a tough policy on price. The present situation could not last.

2. Mr Barry said that the problem was that the surplus was not generated by traditional farms. It came largely from intensive producers in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark. This intensive production required the import of cheap cereals, for instance from Thailand, and this produced a knock-on effect since the Community's own grain cereals were not used and the consequent surpluses increased the cost of the CAP.

Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the increase in milk production reflected the price levels and also technical advances in production techniques. He thought Ireland's milk production had increased 50% since its entry into the Community. It was not possible not to address the question of price even if the social question must also be addressed. Over-production would otherwise go up further.

3. Mr Prior said that it was ridiculous to allow the cheap import of manioc. It was not possible to deal with the over-production of milk simply by the super-levy which had great disadvantages for both Ireland and Northern Ireland, though the disadvantages would not be

DSR 11C

quite as serious if the Community moved away from taking 1981 as the base to taking 1983, as seemed to be happening. There was no alternative to operating on price. He was not sure about the possibility of an increase in the co-responsibility levy. Mr Barry said that the co-responsibility levy was something which the Irish did not like but it was better than the other courses under discussion. Mr Prior noted that it would increase prices. Mr Barry said that that would be fairer. The whole aim of the CAP was to stop the flow of people into the cities and to retain people on the land. Sir Geoffrey Howe said he thought that if the case for a tough price policy was accepted Irish producers would not be at a disadvantage. Mr Barry said that this was true in view of the quality of the land. The problem was created by the surpluses. One would have to look at how those could be eliminated. It was the view of the Irish Department of Agriculture that the exclusion of the import of dairy products into the Community and of cheap cereals such as manioc would of itself solve the problem. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that New Zealand exports had already been very substantially reduced. It was not possible to go further.

4. Mr Prior said that Britain was a net importer of dairy products. We shared the Irish concern about the super-levy. Measures with a greater impact on prices were necessary. If the price increased until the United Kingdom became self-sufficient the Irish would lose our market. Mr Barry pointed out that agriculture employed

3% of the British electorate. It employed 30% of the Irish. Mr Spring said that the Irish Labour Party was also concerned. The percentage of workers in the dairy industry in Ireland was very high.

5. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he was concerned that even if the negotiations at Athens were successful there would be pressure from European colleagues for the imposition of the super-levy. The UK and the Republic both disliked the super-levy but for different reasons. For our part we thought that it would lead to the distortion of the market and that there was too much scope for evasion. It would be difficult to construct a fair super-levy mechanism. It did present a theoretical supplement to control by price but it would be difficult to arrange it so that it was not evaded. Mr Prior said that French farmers were sure to find some way of evading it. Mr Barry noted that the Northern Ireland farmers had been in touch with the Irish Department of Agriculture to press them to oppose the super-levy. Mr Prior said that Northern Ireland milk production was very high. An increase in the levy would be relatively disadvantageous to Northern Ireland. The super-levy, calculated taking 1983 as a base, would cost the province £25 million. Sir G Howe said the 1981 baseline would have very harsh effects. It would have the same effect as a 12% price cut if price alone were operating. Mr Prior said that the right approach might be to operate partly on price and partly a quota system. Action would also have to be taken against cheap cereal imports. Mr Barry said the

DSR 11C

trouble was that the Danes and the Dutch would argue that the Community ought to continue to support third world countries who supplied the cheap cereals. Mr Prior said they should keep it at home as they used to do.

Progress at Athens

6. Turning to the question of progress at Athens, Sir G Howe said that talking to the French ten days before he had agreed on the very great importance of cracking the Community's outstanding problems at Athens. Failure to solve the current agricultural problems would be a negative signal for the future of the European Community as a whole. There was now general agreement that there was a financial and budgetary problem to be solved (that had not been so apparent four years ago). Some were inclined to say that the solution should be sought on the revenue side, among them Denmark, France, Germany and the Commission itself. The UK believed that this approach was right if there was an appropriate safety net. The safety net should take care of Ireland's position (and also those of Portugal and Spain in due course). It should produce an answer which met the UK's needs without harming Ireland's interests. It was necessary to have a logical arrangement which would run for years ahead. The new German ideas for a safety net adopted a number of our ideas. Mr Barry said that his first impression was that the Irish could live with it. Sir G Howe said that it did not go far enough. In the end a safety net would be needed. It ought to be possible between now and the meeting at the end of

November to work out a plan for a framework on which Heads of Government could take a decision at the European Council. Mr Barry said that although it was hard to see how new policies might benefit Ireland they were necessary to avoid cynicism about the Community.

7. Sir G Howe said that it would be useful to announce a date for the cut-off of lead in petrol. This would be of interest to Ireland both because of its effect on the environment and because it should encourage the development of the European motor industry. Measures of this kind helped people understand the direction one was taking. A more important area - about which it would be possible at the moment only to give a signal - would be action on air transport. A positive commitment to reduce protectionism in this field would be widely popular.

Mr Barry suggested it would have also the advantage that it would encourage people to take holidays in Europe rather than outside Europe. He asked if Sir G Howe was thinking of a combined European airline. Sir G Howe said he was not sure what might be done but competitive subsidisation clearly raised prices. The United States had now gone through the deregulation process. There had been occasional bumps but on the whole deregulation had helped the development of the airline industry. Mr Barry wondered whether there was not a feeling among some countries that they needed their own commercial airlines as a back-up in case of war. Sir G Howe said that competitive pressure could be very useful: pressure generated by British Caledonian had now brought British

DSR 11C

Airways from loss-making to profit-making. Mr Barry said that low fares on the transatlantic routes were bleeding Aer Lingus dry. He thought a general transport policy might be needed. Sir G Howe said that transport restrictions raised the cost of European products. Similar problems existed in the field of insurance. The problems had existed for more than ten years. Mr Barry said that it was important that the Heads of Government should give the 15 million unemployed in Europe some hope. Sir G Howe said that it was important to get away from endless public squabbling.

8. Mr Prior asked why Irish farmers who appeared to do well on Ireland's entry into the Community now seemed to do badly. Mr Barry said that on first entry into the Community the prices they got for their produce were high against the background of their earlier poverty. But many were still not up to European standards. Many had invested their money sensibly but standards were still not as good as they could be. Mr Prior said that he could see no alternative to a squeeze on agricultural prices to control production.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. Sir G Howe said that the European Parliament's report on agriculture was potentially explosive. The huge surpluses in the Community were preventing progress in under-developed countries. Europe was producing too much. Mr Barry said that the history of agriculture

suggested that production was cyclical. It could not be treated like cars or tyres. Sir G Howe said that the problem was that the Community had put in place support arrangements which pretty well guaranteed a surplus of output and a growing one at that. Mr Barry said that the CAP had originally been designed to make Europe self-sufficient in agricultural produce. Mr Prior said that the situation was made worse by the fact that the United States Government was subsidising food production to an enormous extent - some \$35 billion a year in price support, compensation for structural change and payment in kind.

Windscale

10. Mr Spring said that since the TV programme a few days before about Windscale considerable concern had arisen in Ireland, particularly in the Dublin area. Mr Prior said that HMG had ordered an enquiry by a distinguished scientist.

Grenada

11. Sir G Howe noted that all now wanted to see a return to proper democratic arrangements in Grenada.

Sheepmeat Subsidy Regions

12. Mr Barry said that he understood that the Commission had proposed a little while ago that the whole island of Ireland should be treated as a single region for the purpose of sheepmeat subsidy. Mr Jopling had however written to the Commission opposing this arrangement. The

Irish authorities regretted this. Sir G Howe said that the reason for which Mr Jopling had written was HMG's wish to prevent what was a technical issue becoming controversial. HMG were concerned that to detach Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and to integrate it with Ireland for this purpose would be politically controversial. Mr Barry suggested that this line was in contradiction with what both sides were trying to do in the Anglo-Irish context. Sir G Howe said that the Commission's action would have created strains which would have been counter-productive. Mr Prior said that the proposal contained no advantage for Northern Ireland farmers. He understood that the question was no longer at issue. M. Thorn had decided that Northern Ireland and Republic should continue as separate regions for the the next two years. Mr Barry said that where such steps were not economically disadvantageous to either side, the Irish position was that they should go ahead. Mr Prior agreed generally but said that the implication had been that a political framework was being imposed by the European Community. That would have raised problems and set back sensible arrangements. It would have stirred up those hostile to better Anglo-Irish relations without doing any good. Mr Jopling's letter had in any case now been overtaken by events. He wondered whether this was not a storm in a teacup. HMG's view was that the more we did together the better, especially in the field of agriculture. He had not himself been associated with the decision. He would keep in mind what Mr Barry had said when the issue came up again. He would have gone into it

in more detail by the time they next met. But it was important to avoid an appearance of European Community intervention in the affairs of Northern Ireland against the background of the row which there had been over the actions of the European Parliament.

Northern Ireland

13. Mr Spring said that the Irish Government felt grave concern about the deterioration of the situation in Northern Ireland, and in particular about the alienation of the minority community from the security forces and from law and order. Mr Prior said that he had found no deterioration for instance in Catholic participation in such bodies as health boards. But as far as nationalist politicians were concerned there had been a change. Sinn Fein were taking control of the nationalist vote and there was a greater sense of despair in the SDLP. He wondered what was going to happen to the SDLP and how they might be helped. There were few signs of their helping themselves. There was a good deal of talk in the press about joint sovereignty. It was difficult to see how in practice that would work. The question of a role for the Republic in the policing of West Belfast had been raised. He wondered what would happen when the first Garda was killed. It would be useful to have his Irish colleagues' view on what we could do to help the SDLP. John Hume seemed to see security as the minority community's first concern.

14. Mr Barry said that he was surprised that John Hume

should think security came before political structure. He did not see how nationalists could support the security forces without a degree of political control from Dublin. They looked to Dublin in their difficulties. Mr Prior said he did not see how you could have a part of the United Kingdom policed even in part by men with responsibility to another country. Sir G Howe said that he understood the political force of the nationalist perception but what practical proposal did it lead to? Mr Barry said that it was necessary to set about the reconciliation of the two groups. The first step must be the elimination of violence. Nationalists historically and by their voting had shown that they wanted some sort of say for Dublin in the north. He agreed that joint sovereignty amounted very nearly to a contradiction in terms. But without political development which allowed the nationalists to take a political and constitutional role in Northern Ireland violence would continue. Mr Prior said that he agreed entirely. It was essential that the nationalists be seen to exercise a political and governmental role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. But that was not what he understood was now being suggested, which was that somehow there should be a police force in Catholic areas under the control of an institution outside Northern Ireland. It might be possible to start from the bottom developing cooperation between police forces on the border, perhaps with elements of a common force under the control of the authorities in the north when in the north, and under the control of the authorities in the

when in the South
south. But he did not see how police in the north could be under the control of the Republic. Mr Barry said this was true unless there were a political institution in the north which had a Dublin dimension. The nationalists felt as isolated in the north as unionists would feel in the south. What was needed was some role for Dublin in running the north so that the nationalists saw their interests protected and their aspirations taken into account. The only hope for the future was some degree of involvement of Dublin. Mr Prior asked: if one could go that far how would the unionists concerns be met? Would this be by a change in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution? Mr Barry said that if one got as far as that, an entirely new Constitution would, he thought, be necessary, though he had not thought out the matter. Mr Spring said that it would certainly be necessary to examine Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

15. *in fact* Sir G Howe said that what offered assurance to the nationalists was the existing political structure. If one went on to say that the minority would like to see the involvement of Dublin, and to visualise the insertion in the political structures of representation from Dublin, with the Garda alongside the RUC or at least a police presence owing loyalty to Dublin, the question would be raised of the democratic legitimacy of Dublin's involvement. There was a practical question also: what reaction would there be to the presence on the ground of representatives of Dublin's involvement? They would be a focus which attracted violence. Did the Irish have ideas

on how this could be avoided? Mr Barry said that he did not see that the Garda uniform would get more than a temporary welcome unless there was also a political element. He did not see how the minority community could identify or support Gardai in the north unless they were directed by a group with whom they could identify (though he was aware that John Hume did not necessarily agree with this view). Mr Prior noted that the existing police authority had Catholics on it. It might be possible to contemplate a [redacted] committee with representation on it from the minority, the majority and the British Government. But to include Dublin participation would be to stir up a hornet's nest. It would seem a direct path to Irish unity. What quid pro quo might there be? Action on Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution might be one possibility. A simple statement like that made at Sunningdale could be challenged in the courts. He could not see how anything approaching joint sovereignty could be made to work.

16. Mr Spring said that alienation continued to grow. Sinn Fein and the IRA had growing influence and other nationalists were unable to compete. The Provisionals did all the constituency work and prevented others from doing so by intimidation. The Provisionals were not going to work within the existing Northern Ireland system. The problem was to give the nationalists politics in which they felt they could participate. Mr Prior said that he did not disagree. The question was how did you give sufficient to enable them to recover

from PSF the supporters they had lost. They had forfeited support by losing the Fitts and the Devlins. The party had lost its way. Mr Barry said that they were tired men but they were the bravest politicians he knew, and they were the only representatives of constitutional nationalism. Mr Prior said that Mr Hume's view was that without security there could be no progress on the political side. To improve security it would be necessary to recruit a new police force in the Catholic areas in which Catholics could have confidence. It would have to be answerable to some organisation involving Dublin and representatives of nationalist opinion in the north. How could it be possible in constitutional politics for the police force not to be answerable to the sovereign power? Sir G Howe said that all agreed on the analysis and on the need for disalienation of the community. HMG's inclination was to try to get the minority to look at the structures in the north. To introduce an element of Dublin involvement might take the minority community still further away from structures which we were trying to foster. Mr Barry said that if Dublin and London agreed what needed to be done, it should be possible to find a way.

17. Mr Prior said that the problem was security and the difficulty of associating the minority community with the forces of law and order. Instead of starting at the top with ideas of joint sovereignty it might be better to start at the bottom and try cooperation, allowing police from the south to operate under the RUC and vice versa,

with a joint police authority to whom problems could be referred. Mr Barry said that he had asked nationalists by whom they would wish to be stopped on a dark night. They had given as order of preference: by British troops, by the RUC and by the UDR. Mr Prior said that he had been struck by this remark when Mr Barry had made it to him earlier. He had sought the views of priests in West Belfast. All had said that Catholics there would prefer in such circumstances to be stopped by the RUC rather than by British troops. Mr Barry recognised that the RUC was a changed force but said that the Provisionals had mounted an effective campaign against it. Mr Prior said that the UDR had had 20% of Catholics when it was started up. The Provisionals had reduced this to a tiny number. He thought that there were probably vast numbers of Catholics in police forces in Great Britain who would wish to serve in Northern Ireland if it were possible.

Elections in Northern Ireland

18. Mr Barry asked whether Mr Prior would be able to do anything about personation before the European election. Mr Prior said that it would not be possible to introduce new laws by then but the authorities in Northern Ireland were doing what they could to tighten up the electoral register. HMG hoped to introduce a Bill in time for the local elections in 1985. There were problems in amending the Representation of the People Act. The tightening up necessary in Northern Ireland went entirely against the present trend in Great Britain. He was worried about the 1984 election. The Provisional Sinn Fein might do better

than the SDLP. Adams might well stand in the European election. He thought that the support for Sinn Fein was not a question of endorsement for violence, or even of nationalism, but arose from bread and butter issues. Sinn Fein operated very competently on the ground in the running of their clinics. Mr Spring commented that the SDLP were not being allowed to do this because of intimidation. Sir G Howe said that there was a curious contradiction implicit in the use made by violent men of the democratic system.

19. Mr Spring said he found it particularly disturbing that young people were turning to Sinn Fein. The two separate identities in the north needed some vehicle for expression. Nationalists generally accepted the unionists' desire for a British connection but nationalists in the north needed to be able to express their Irishness. Mr Prior said that HMG accepted this and had written it into their White Papers for some years. The problem was finding an acceptable means for expressing it. He was prepared to push the unionists but needed to have something clear and positive to go for. He thought joint sovereignty was no more than a catch phrase. What did it imply? Mr Barry said that he thought it meant simply a role for Dublin in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Mr Prior asked how one could in practice put that into operation. Would the criminal law of West Belfast be that of Northern Ireland or of the south? Mr Barry suggested that the laws of Great Britain did not apply in Northern Ireland - a parallel could be

drawn here. Mr Prior said that the statute books in Northern Ireland and Great Britain were different but the common law and the general law were the same. But how could you operate in West Belfast a different law from that in East Belfast? Mr Barry said that it would have to be the same. Sir G Howe said that if, entirely hypothetically, one postulated a presence from the south in the administration of the north, according Dublin a right to be consulted would not increase democratic legitimacy in the nationalist community; but it would raise the fury of the unionists. Mr Spring said that this was true unless the change brought a peaceful situation which allowed people to live ordinary daily lives. Sir G Howe said that such a change might be seen as the result of popular support for Sinn Fein and therefore increase that support in the minority community. Mr Barry conceded that there would be a rump of nationalists opposed to such a development but the majority would be in favour.

20. Mr Prior said that to look towards joint policing, perhaps involving ideas such as a joint authority, would be more fruitful than looking for joint sovereignty. There was no possibility of joint sovereignty without a total change of the Constitution in the south. Indeed he noted that when such suggestions first came up there had been talk about a change in the Constitution. Mr Barry said that if violence could be eliminated by joint policing he would be all for it, but he thought that the Gardai would be the first target of the Provos and INLA.

Mr Prior said that he did not understand what was being suggested. The idea seemed to be that one would have policing in the north in Catholic areas controlled by the Dublin government. Mr Barry said that you would have to have such policing all over the north. He had in mind a force in the north controlled by Dublin and London which included both nationalists and unionists. Mr Prior asked of whom this force would be comprised. Mr Barry said that it would not be possible to sack the RUC.

Sir G Howe said he found it hard to visualise a Catholic component in the north based in the south. He suspected the appearance in the north of southern Catholics in this role would provoke a sharp reaction. Mr Prior said that if you had a joint police force it would have to be reciprocal and cover the island of Ireland as a whole.

Mr Barry said that this would not be so if you set up a completely new force operating in the north only. Mr Prior said that an all-Ireland police force would be more logical.

21. Mr Barry asked what Mr Prior would envisage.

Mr Prior said he thought in practice there would have to be one force mainly in the north and one mainly in the south with a degree of reciprocity. Mr Barry asked how this might be controlled. Mr Prior said he thought there could be joint control by the United Kingdom and Dublin governments working together. This idea was fraught with difficulties but it might be possible to look at it.

Sir G Howe said the objective was easy to identify, it

was the means that were difficult. Mr Barry said that a solution would require structures in which the nationalist community could have confidence.

Falklands at the UN

22. Sir G Howe said that he understood the Irish would be abstaining in the UN General Assembly debate on the Falklands. Mr Barry said that he thought this was so, but would confirm it.

Ireland : Mags with Taoiseach
Pt 7

1416 NOV 1983

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1983

Anglo-Irish Summit

I enclose the record of the plenary session held at Chequers on 7 November.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1983

Dear Peter,

Anglo/Irish Summit: Records

Thank you for your letter of 14 November. We shall distribute the plenary record to the Private Offices of those Ministers who were present. I have no objection to you distributing it further to members of the Cabinet official Committee on Anglo/Irish relations.

It is kind of you to offer to let me see before distribution the record of the meeting which the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had with Mr. Spring and Mr. Barry. In view of the sensitivity of some matters which were discussed at the Summit I should like on this occasion, exceptionally, to take advantage of your offer.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. L. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PR

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November, 1983

Dear John,

AS → 15.
" "

Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting, 7 November 1983: Records

/ I enclose a draft record of the plenary discussion which the Prime Minister had with the Taoiseach at Chequers on 7 November. I should be grateful to know if you are content that it should be distributed to members of the Cabinet official Committee on Anglo-Irish Relations (AI). We have meanwhile sent a telegram to Dublin, copied to EC Posts summarising the EC element in the Prime Minister's and Sir G Howe's discussions with the Irish (copy enclosed). /

A record of the meeting which the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had with Mr Spring and Mr Barry has been prepared. If you wished to see this before distribution, I shall send it for you as soon as we hear from the Northern Ireland Office that Mr Prior is content with it.

I am copying this letter with enclosures, to John Lyon at the Northern Ireland Office and Richard Hatfield at the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely
P F Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

12/22/42

Back yr with
Tanner 1/4 7

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 1HJ



RECORD OF PLENARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, AN TAOISEACH, HELD AT
CHEQUERS ON MONDAY 7 NOVEMBER 1983

Present:

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP	An Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD
The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP	
The Rt Hon James Prior MP	An Tánaiste, Mr Dick Spring TD
Sir Robert Armstrong	Mr Peter Barry TD
Sir Philip Woodfield	Mr Noel Dorr
Sir Julian Bullard	Mr Dermot Nally
Sir Ewart Bell	Mr Sean Donlon
Mr A C Goodison	Mr Paul Dempsey
Mr A D S Goodall	Mr Peter Prendergast
Mr A J E Brennan	Mr Michael Lillis
Mr A J Coles	Mr Brian McCarthy
Mr P H C Eyers	Mr Declan Kelly
Mr D Barclay	Miss Orla O'Hanrahan

1. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach took note of the Steering Committee's Joint Report. At the Prime Minister's invitation, Sir Geoffrey Howe gave a summary account of the discussions which the Ministers had had immediately before the plenary meeting. The Ministers had considered European Community questions in the context of the coming Athens Summit. They had agreed that it was necessary for the Summit to reach conclusions on the agenda and that the consequences of a failure to reach agreement would be very serious. The budgetary

question was seen as a key issue and the UK ideas for a safety net had been discussed. Mr Barry had referred to the German proposals on future financing and said that it was possible that these would recommend themselves to the Irish. He and Mr Prior had said that they would not go far enough. The Ministers had agreed that discussion of the CAP at Athens would be most important. Mr Barry had stressed the importance of milk for Irish agriculture but had recognised that the surplus could not go on rising. There was agreement that price control was necessary, though he thought that a difference of view would have emerged between the two sides if this question had been pressed further than it was. The Irish side had expressed their extreme concern at the prospect of a super-levy on milk production.

2. The Irish side had raised the Commission's proposal for treating the island of Ireland as a single region for the purpose of the sheepmeat regime, and expressed concern at the letter which Mr Jopling had written opposing this. The UK side had explained their wish to avoid problems of a political sort. Both sides had taken note that the proposal had been withdrawn and that the existing arrangements were to continue for the next two years. Mr Prior had undertaken to examine the question further.

3. Sir G Howe continued that Mr Spring had raised the question of possible radioactive pollution originating at Windscale. Both sides recognised that this was a cause

for genuine anxiety and had undertaken to keep in touch.

4. The Ministers had also touched on international issues and noted that it was important that a democratic government should now be seen to emerge in Grenada. He had himself mentioned the importance of the Irish vote in the General Assembly on the Falklands issue.

5. Mr Barry said that the Ministers had also discussed "new policies" and stressed the importance of these for the development of the Community. The Community must give the impression of planning for employment.

Sir G Howe said that lead-free petrol and air transport had been touched on in this connection.

6. The Prime Minister asked the Taoiseach how he saw the Community developing. She was concerned that ~~the~~ ^{current negotiations} ~~discussions~~ had not yet proceeded far enough. The important issues must be settled at Athens.

The Taoiseach said that he had been worried ten days before but had noted the unexpectedly sudden agreement on the Mediterranean acquis. He was not sure what conclusion to draw from that. It could be an indication that the French thought that it might be better to make progress at Athens so that they did not come under pressure to make progress during their Presidency. The nearer the European elections came the less attraction there would be for Paris in solving agricultural problems. And the Germans were unwilling to agree to additional own resources without acceptance of

enlargement, but for others enlargement created problems. The Prime Minister said that she had found the French position much stronger than she had expected. President Mitterrand saw the European elections as likely to be the expression of a verdict on his period in office so far. *He said that* The nearer the elections came the harder it would be for him to make compromises. The French therefore wanted problems sorted out at Athens or deferred until after the European elections. Sir G Howe said that much was now coming to the boil and he was sure that it was right to suppose that the French perceived the need for greater urgency. The UK side had found Mr Papandreou also anxious that the main outstanding problems should be settled at Athens. Unless they were solved there would be increasing disorder within the Community and Community leaders would become a laughing stock for the electorate. The Prime Minister said that when Mr Papandreou was in London it had seemed that he had no detailed ideas for an approach to a solution. He thought there would have to be a grand compromise at Athens. But the issues were so important that unless the main work was done beforehand there was no hope of a compromise at Athens. Mr Barry interjected that in practice the Foreign Ministers had five days to do what was necessary before Athens. The Taoiseach said that he had had rather a different impression talking to Mr Papandreou and Mr Varfis. They thought that they had worked out a way of identifying the problems and of providing a framework for discussion. He hoped that they would produce this. Sir G Howe said he thought that the Taoiseach's impression was correct. The

question was whether the framework which the Greeks had in mind was the right one. Mr Papandreou might be looking for a compromise, which would not solve the problem. But Mr Papandreou had said that he recognised that any solution would have to get ten votes. The Prime Minister thought that Mr Papandreou was listening to all his partners now and hoped to formulate a grand view which would emerge at Athens. But the general lines of the solution were needed before then. The Taoiseach commented that any framework would contain unsatisfactory elements but he was a little more optimistic than he had been. Sir G Howe said that he too was optimistic that what needed to be done could be done if all concentrated on obtaining a solution at Athens. The Taoiseach said that it was likely that one or two problems would remain which could only be settled at Athens. The Prime Minister noted that there were points on which the UK side could not compromise. The Taoiseach said that the Irish recognised the British problem. But milk was much larger in terms of impact on GNP for the Irish. There had to be a solution which did not freeze the position left in Ireland by the long relationship of dependency on Great Britain. The single issue offsetting the industrial disadvantages to Ireland of Community membership was the possibility of recovering from that earlier situation. Freezing of their milk industry would create an unacceptable situation. That said, he recognised that it was not possible to go on producing milk at the present rate as a community.

7. The Prime Minister said that she was aware of the Irish problem. She understood that the Spanish would require a definitive statement on enlargement following the Athens Summit. They had delayed their referendum on membership of NATO to enable them, she thought, to link the two issues in the electorate's mind. The Taoiseach said that if the French were able to agree to the principle of enlargement and fix a date for concluding the negotiations, even a long way ahead, that would help both the Germans and the Spaniards, who wanted to see early progress in the enlargement negotiations; though he could imagine that the French would not wish to do that before the European election. The Prime Minister thought much depended on the length of the transitional period. People were talking in terms of very long periods. Everyone agreed that it would be good from the general political point of view to have Spain and Portugal within the Community. That said, enlargement raised difficult problems. The southern states would want some sort of arrangements for agriculture comparable to those in the north. The Taoiseach said that he was surprised that the Mediterranean acquis had been agreed. He shared the Prime Minister's concern about Spain and Portugal. He was also concerned about the question of increasing own resources. For his part he was prepared to accept the increased cost of enlargement but he would be unhappy if the limitation on own resources implied that there were insufficient resources to maintain the existing CAP albeit reformed. If the additional costs arising from enlargement and from new policies and from the commitment

to double the size of the Regional Fund were taken into account, by 1986 1.2% or 1.25% own resources would be necessary as a starter; this might need to rise to 1.4% later. If the Commission's proposals for modifying this figure through the European Parliament were not accepted but the need for reference to all twelve Parliaments retained, the Community would find itself facing further rows every two or three years. The Prime Minister said she found the prospect of 1.4% horrific for a net contributor. She thought that it might not be necessary: VAT and levies were buoyant and should increase as Europe came out of the recession. As a net contributor the UK would look with great hostility at any increase. The Taoiseach suggested that, even making stringent assumptions about the CAP, Europe would be faced with a very serious problem. The Prime Minister said that without serious restraint there would be rows every year. Sir G Howe said that the sensitivity in the UK Parliament on the question of an increase in own resources was now very great. It would only be possible to carry Parliament if there was a satisfactory conclusion on the UK budget share and on the CAP. The Commission's proposal that modification should be decided by the European Parliament would break the camel's back not with a straw but a log.

8. The Taoiseach said that he thought that the UK and the Republic would find themselves on different sides on the way which the CAP was to be limited. This was something which would have to be fought out at Athens. He asked the Prime Minister whether UK thinking on EMS

had evolved. The Prime Minister said that it had not yet done so. There had been times when the UK had been glad not to be tied to the Deutschmark. She wondered what currency would be devalued next. Would it be the French? When there was a devaluation the EMS needed someone from outside to take the chair. The horse-trading at previous devaluations had been quite horrifying. The time had not yet arrived for UK entry. One problem was that any change in the world energy position moved the rate for the pound up and down very sharply.

9. The Prime Minister noted that the Kinsale gas deal seemed very fair. There was good in it for both sides. The Taoiseach said that given the quantity of gas available the Republic could have used the whole field itself but it seemed right to share it as a symbol of cooperation.

Checked to

10. The Prime Minister asked how the Irish saw the Lebanese situation and in particular the question of UNIFIL. Mr Barry said that he thought that UNIFIL was performing a useful function in Lebanon even though it was not the function which they had been sent to carry out in the first place. The Irish were not hopeful of anything very favourable emerging from Geneva but they had sent out a new battalion only the previous week. The Irish had not been asked by the Syrians to take part as observers and thought this just as well. The Prime Minister noted that there were no observers in position yet. She had understood from Mr Papandreou that no

observers would go in until there was an agreement on political reconciliation. Sir G Howe said that there was a general point which ought to be stressed. There were now more than 10,000 troops in the Lebanon from outside the Middle East. This represented the price which had to be paid for failure to reach agreement on the ground. Foreign troops could not stay indefinitely. Nor were they deployed in the most rational place. It was important that the reconciliation talks should get on. But he was uncertain whether the Syrians in fact wanted a settlement. It was necessary to work towards the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

11. The Taoiseach said that he had noted in the press the suggestion that the United States might retaliate for the bombing of their headquarters in Lebanon. This was clearly a source for concern. He asked if the UK side thought it likely to happen. Sir G Howe said that the UK side was also concerned. Retaliation was not the right policy. Firm action against identified groups who had initiated attacks was justified but broader retaliatory action could not be wise. The Taoiseach said he thought such action would be dangerous for those concerned. The Lebanon was not an area in which it was wise to get more deeply involved. He noted that there did not seem total cohesion of the Multi-national Force. The Prime Minister pointed out that the different national components of the force had different rules of engagement. The Taoiseach noted that in the case of UNIFIL the Irish rules of engagement differed from those of other contributors.

Mr Donlon said that the Irish had lost in all 29 men in the connection with UNIFIL. Mr Dorr said that half of these had been killed in hostile engagements and half had died from traffic accidents and so on. The Prime Minister said that Lebanon was a unique problem. It was now complicated by the fighting in Tripoli. The terms of reference of the Multi-National Force related to Beirut only, though clearly if they were attacked from outside Beirut they might have to reply simply as a matter of self-defence. The UK's contribution was purely symbolic. There were ~~only 100~~ ^{only a hundred hundred or so} men. They did not normally guard a fixed point (although they were guarding the security talks) but carried out patrols. She thought all concerned were aware that they were up against something which had been unexpected in the form of suicide attacks. Guerillas always had the advantage of the element of surprise. Self-defence was certainly warranted for all members of the MNF but what that entitled them to do was not always clear. The Taoiseach said that he was not happy about the position of Irish forces in UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. They were surrounded by the Israelis. At the moment their only useful function was that they gave refugees who had returned to their homes in the area a sense of security. But the possible effect of withdrawing the Irish contingent was a matter of concern.

12. Turning to Northern Ireland Mr Prior said that the Ministers' conversation which had no doubt covered the same ground as the conversation between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister. Both sides were deeply concerned at

the continuing violence in Northern Ireland and at the reduction in support for constitutional nationalists. They were concerned at the growth of support for the Provisional Sinn Fein and at the alienation of Catholics from constitutional government. He expressed concern that journalists - and he had in mind in particular the Weekend World programme broadcast the day before - had raised issues which had not been discussed between the two sides in any depth nor worked through by anyone to see if they were practical. There was a grave danger if such speculation was allowed to continue without proper examination of what was practical. The Prime Minister noted that the work of the Forum was still in progress but that the kind of language used in the Weekend World programme was not helpful. The Taoiseach thought it extremely unhelpful. It was premature to raise such questions when they had not been discussed between the Republic and the United Kingdom. That the programme had attributed proposals to him personally was a setback. Indeed Mary Holland had thought it necessary to dissociate herself from the programme, considering it too distorted.

13. The Taoiseach said that he thought that both sides needed to reflect carefully how to cope with alienation of the minority community in Northern Ireland. For their part the Irish Government would have to see how the Forum went. Discussion there concentrated on the rights of the unionists as well as on the rights of the minority. He hoped that this would result in a wide degree of

consensus on future long term structures which would go far beyond the traditional nationalist approach of a unitary state into which the unionists would have to fit. The process was going well though that did not mean that all would agree with the conclusions at the end. The Forum had developed its own dynamic and was generating new thinking. One problem was that few politicians in southern Ireland knew anything about the north. The Forum's method of working had been designed to reduce disagreement. It was the function of the Chairman after discussion to put forward what he thought might be an agreed analysis or an account of the different ideas held by the various sides. If necessary he could record differences of view. This device should exclude separate minority reports. It remained to be seen how much dissent there would be. The way in to the discussion had been a basic document, a partly correct version of which had been leaked to the press, which set out the basic questions both about nationalism and about unionist that the Irish needed to ask themselves. Having agreed the questions, they would try to go forward from there. But much diplomacy was needed. He saw it as the Irish Government's duty to make sure that the analysis was as fundamental as possible but also to make it easier for the opposition to come along with them. This was why they were bending over backwards to avoid contention. The Prime Minister said that she would be interested to see the outcome.


15. Turning to the communiqué, the Prime Minister said

DSR 11C

that the text as amended following their discussion seemed acceptable. The Taoiseach agreed but thought it desirable that the communiqué should mention their ~~next~~ meeting ~~again~~ though he had no wish to be specific. The Prime Minister preferred not to fix a date now. They would be meeting in Athens and elsewhere. To announce a date would give rise to problems if for any reason it proved impossible to keep. She thought that June and July next year would be very difficult for her because of the heavy press of business. Mr Barry pointed out that the Irish Presidency started in July; the Taoiseach said that he thought that September would be rather late. The Prime Minister said that she would not wish to say so in the communiqué but thought they might plan for a meeting in the middle of next year. But it was important not to announce it. If there were an increase of violence beforehand they would be blamed. The Taoiseach said that he much regretted that news of their present meeting had become public in advance. He hoped that next time the Prime Minister would come to Dublin. The Prime Minister said that ~~going into Dublin Castle in one of three helicopters had made her feel criminal.~~ *the security arrangements necessary for a meeting at Dublin Castle created an uncomfortable atmosphere.*

The Taoiseach had said that security would be easier if there was no advance announcement of the date. Mr Barry said that there would need to be a meeting fairly soon after the Forum had reported in order to discuss its conclusions. The Prime Minister agreed that it would be appropriate to plan on having the next meeting around the middle of 1984. The Taoiseach said that the tradition established between them of saying nothing about their

discussion of Northern Ireland issues seemed to him a good one. The Prime Minister agreed.

 14
11.

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL FRAME ECONOMIC

Precedence/Deskby
ROUTINE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
GRS 2 GRS
CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS 4 FRAME ECONOMIC
DESKBY 5
FM FCO 6 FM FCO 111100Z NOVEMBER 1983
PRE/ADD 7 TO ROUTINE DUBLIN
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 RFI ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, ATHENS
10 RFI INFO OTHER EC POSTS
11 YOUR TELNO 343: ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT: COMMUNITY TOPICS
12 1 Following is a summary of Community points discussed in the
13 Prime Minister's meeting with Dr Fitzgerald and in separate talks
14 which I and Mr Prior held with the Irish Deputy Prime Minister
15 (Spring) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Barry).
16 (a) Milk
17 The Irish agreed that the Community could not go on producing
18 milk at present levels but agriculture employed 30% of the Irish
19 workforce and milk production was a major element in Irish GNP
20 and the super-levy was unacceptable. I pointed out that we too
21 disliked the super-levy but for different reasons. We were not
22 convinced that it would be fair or effective. Nor would it
23 adequately curb over production unless accompanied by rigorous
24 price controls. We agreed that the 1981 base line as proposed
25 by the Commission would have very harsh effects. Barry said that

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword one
File number	Dept ECD(I)	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) J S WALL		Frame Economic
Telephone number 233-5629		
Authorised for despatch <i>R. K. Kellett</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL FRAME ECONOMIC	Page 2
--	---	-----------

<<<<

1 <<<<
 2 one way of dealing with surpluses would be to curb the import of
 3 dairy products into the Community. I replied that New Zealand
 4 exports had already been very substantially reduced and it was
 5 not possible to go further.
 6 (b) Future Financing
 7 The Irish were attracted by the German ideas as a possible basis
 8 for compromise. We made clear that the German ideas did not go
 9 far enough and that in the end the safety net would be needed.
 10 It ought to be possible between now and the Special Council at
 11 the end of November to work out a plan on which Heads of
 12 Government could take a decision.
 13 (c) New own Resources
 14 Dr Fitzgerald thought that additional costs arising from enlarge-
 15 ment, from new policies and from what he called the commitment to
 16 double the size of the regional fund would require an increase
 17 in new own resources to 1.2 or 1.25% as a starter, possibly ris-
 18 ing to 1.4% later. The Prime Minister pointed to the adverse
 19 impact on the UK (as a net contributor) of a rise to 1.4%.
 20 (d) EMS
 21 In response to a question from Dr Fitzgerald, the Prime Minister
 22 indicated that the time had not yet arrived for UK entry. One
 23 problem was that any change in the world energy position moved
 24 the rate for the pound up and down very sharply.
 25 (e) New Policies
 26 The Irish, while attaching no great intrinsic importance to new
 27 policies, thought that they were necessary to give general impe-
 28 tus to the Community. We argued in favour of the priorities
 29 suggested by the UK. The Irish agreed on the advantages of
 30 liberalisation of air transport. Barry asked if we were thinking
 31 of a combined European airline. I said that we were thinking
 32 more of the benefits of de-regulation which would, as the US
 33 example had shown, help the development of the airline indus-
 34 try.

///
 //
 /

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword (f) Enlargement
-----------------------	-------	------------------------------

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL FRAME ECONOMIC

Page
3

<<<<

1	<<<<
2	(f) Enlargement
3	We and the Irish agreed on the importance of giving a positive
4	signal to Spain and Portugal at the Athens Summit.
5	(g) Greek Presidency
6	Dr Fitzgerald said that, following his talks with Papandreou and
7	Varfis, he thought the Greeks had worked out a way of identifying
8	the main problems and a framework for discussion. I agreed; but
9	the question remained whether the framework which the Greeks had
10	in mind was the right one. We pointed to the dangers of waiting
11	until the Athens Summit in the hope that some grand compromise
12	could emerge. The general lines of a solution were needed
13	before then if, as we thought necessary, decisions were to be
14	taken at Athens.
15	
16	HOWE
17	NNNN
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	
32	
33	
34	

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------

Subject

Mr. M. J. J.



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T181 AA/83

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

11 November, 1983.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister.

Dear Prime Minister,

I should like, on my own behalf and on behalf of those with me at our recent meeting, to express our appreciation of the facilities and services made available to us and my thanks to you personally for all you did to make the meeting constructive and useful.

I hope to be able to reciprocate when our turn comes in the not too distant future.

Kind regards
Yours

James FitzGerald

Amblinoh
Sub X pt. 7. - with TE

FLE

67

MR ALISON

As you will see from the attached extract from the official report, Mr. McNair-Wilson asked John Biffen during Business Questions this week why there was a statement following the Anglo/Irish Bilateral and not after the Anglo/German Bilateral. I am not sure what his motive was for the question but you might like to consider whether to have a word with him to the effect that such a statement is expected by Northern Ireland members. Not to make one would cause more trouble than it is worth even if it is a little inconsistent with normal practice.

T. FLESHER

11 November, 1983

RESTRICTED

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Timothy Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

11th November 1983

John

1) Mr. Flesher.

Is this draft OK? I
do not like to sentence
in brackets.
JF.

2) Type letter pl.

df/a.

Dear Tim

Thank you for your letter of 7 November to Derek Hill with which you enclosed the letter sent to the Prime Minister on 7 November by the three DUP MPs, Dr Paisley, Peter Robinson and the Rev William McCrea. I attach a draft reply.

The letter is part of the DUP's campaign to whip up feeling in Northern Ireland against the development of contact and co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic. The draft reply follows the line taken by the Prime Minister in her recent letter to Mr Molyneux and in answer to questions in the House following her statement about the Summit on 8 November.

I am sending a copy of this letter and Dr Paisley's letter to Brian Fall.

Yours ever,

John

J M LYON

Enc

RESTRICTED

SA

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

<p>To</p> <p>The Rev Dr I R K Paisley MP</p> <p>House of Commons</p> <p>LONDON</p> <p>SW1A 0AA</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p> <p>MP</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p>hidden copies:</p> <p>Mr D A Hill - NIO</p> <p>PS/Sir G Howe</p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
---	-----------------------------	---

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY The Prime Minister
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 7 November which was co-signed by your parliamentary party colleagues.

The Government's position on the fundamental question of Northern Ireland's status as a part of the United Kingdom is absolutely clear ~~out~~. The Joint Studies, the work of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council since then, and my discussions with Dr FitzGerald are all entirely consistent with that position and do not undermine it in any way. Your suggestion that they are somehow intended to "ease and tease" Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom is completely without foundation.

~~Nor do terrorist outrages depend on such meetings.~~

The recent exchanges with the Government of the Republic are normal aspects of dealings between neighbouring friendly States with a number of common interests. ~~and the Government will not be deterred from pursuing such exchanges~~ ~~these matters by the sort of suspicions to which you refer.~~

A. J. C. - 14/11

ER



JWP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. GOODALL

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

Thank you for your minute of 9 November.

The Prime Minister agrees that the documents to which you refer should be published as a White Paper.

A. J. COLES

11 November 1983

RW

Ref: B06897

MR COLEScc Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Brennan, NIO
Mr Evers, FCOPrime MinisterAgree that these documents
should be published as a

Yes no White Paper?

A. J. C. 10/11

Anglo-Irish Summit on 7 November 1983

In his minute to you of 3 November reporting his talks with Mr Dermot Nally in Dublin on 2 November, Sir Robert Armstrong pointed out that, if precedent were followed, the documents approved by the Summit would be subsequently reproduced as a White Paper. This reflected a provisional agreement with the Irish to that effect. The documents concerned are -

- i. The Summit communique
- ii. The Joint Report of the Steering Committee.
- iii. Anglo-Irish Studies: Review of Activity since November 1981.

2. The Irish have now confirmed that they are publishing the three documents in their Parliamentary series, the equivalent of our White Papers. It therefore seems right that we should follow suit.

3. In 1981, the White Paper on the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies (Cmnd 8414) was presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister. I should be grateful for confirmation that it will be in order for us to follow the same procedure on this occasion.

Daniel Goodall

9 November 1983

A D S GOODALL

Ireland Summits Pt 7



GRS 330

UNCLASSIFIED

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 9 NOVEMBER 1983

FM DUBLIN 081805Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 342 OF 8 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 340: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: DAIL STATEMENT

1. THE TAOISEACH MADE A STATEMENT IN THE DAIL TODAY ON HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. HE SAID THAT ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO IMPROVE AND DEEPEN THE RELATIONSHIP ORIGINALLY DEVELOPED SOME YEARS AGO. THE DOCUMENTS DESCRIBING THE WORK OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL WERE A RECORD OF CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT. HE HAD STRESSED THE VERY REAL DANGERS ARISING FROM ALIENATION AMONG THE MINORITY POPULATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND URGED DEEP AND URGENT REFLECTION ON HOW THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE TACKLED. THE CHALLENGE TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS WAS TO ASK:

' ' NOT WHAT WE WANT, BUT WHAT WORKABLE ARRANGEMENTS CAN WE DEVISE TOGETHER WHICH WILL GIVE TO THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WHAT THEY WANT AND WHAT THEY NEED. THEIR FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT IS FOR STABILITY AND ORDER. THE TEST OF ANY SOLUTION MUST BE THAT IT BE REALISTIC AND ANSWER THE BASIC NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH IS THE VERY BASIS OF SOCIETY. ' '

3. CONCLUDING, THE TAOISEACH SAID HE HAD GONE TO LONDON WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DIALOGUE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE BELIEVED THIS OBJECTIVE WAS ACHIEVED.

14

4. MR HAUGHEY IN A LONG BUT SUBDUED REPLY SAID THAT THE SUMMIT WAS A NON-EVENT: NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAD EMERGED. THE TAOISEACH HAD MADE A LONG EXPOSITION BUT THERE WAS NO SIGN THAT HE HAD MADE ANY IMPRESSION ON MRS THATCHER, OR THAT SHE REALISED THE COST TO THE REPUBLIC OF SECURITY MEASURES. DR FITZGERALD WAS TOO READY TO PLAY THE ROLE OF JUNIOR PARTNER AND HIS REMARKS CAME CLOSE TO APOLOGISING FOR IRELAND'S STANCE DURING THE FALKLANDS WAR. ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THERE WAS NO SIGN THAT BRITAIN RECOGNISED IRISH CONCERNS. BRITAIN HAD AN ENORMOUS TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE REPUBLIC BUT THE TAOISEACH HAD FAILED TO MAKE ANY USE OF THIS TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS. ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WOULD NEVER BE NORMAL UNTIL BRITAIN ACCEPTED THE WISHES OF FOUR-FIFTHS OF THE IRISH PEOPLE AND WITHDREW FROM NORTHERN IRELAND.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

TATHAM

NORTHERN IRELAND
LIMITED

RID
NAD
INFO D
WED
MAED
NEWS D
FUSD
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR GIFFARD
MR ADAMS
MR URE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

UNCLASSIFIED

30342 - 1

PP WASHINGTON
PP BIS NEW YORK

GRS 567
UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 081200Z NOV 83
PO PRIORITY DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 8 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING BONN, PARIS

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: TAOISEACH'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. DR FITZGERALD GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE IRISH EMBASSY ON THE EVENING OF 7 NOVEMBER FOLLOWING THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT MEETING AT CHEQUERS. HIS REMARKS HAVE BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN THE BRITISH AND IRISH DAILY NEWSPAPERS AS WELL AS ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. HE AVOIDED REVEALING THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN GOOD AND THAT ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS HAD BEEN RESTORED TO THE STATE THEY WERE IN FOLLOWING THE LAST SUMMIT MEETING IN NOVEMBER 1981. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE WORTH RECORDING.

JOINT SOVEREIGNTY

2. THE TAOISEACH WAS PRESSED REPEATEDLY ABOUT WHETHER HE HAD RAISED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT SOVEREIGNTY PROVIDING THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM. HE EMPHATICALLY DENIED THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND WHEN ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT JOINT SOVEREIGNTY MEANT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE. DR FITZGERALD POINTED OUT THAT JOINT SOVEREIGNTY HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE NEW IRELAND FORUM, ALTHOUGH HE HOPED THAT THE FORUM WOULD QUOTE IN DUE COURSE TURN ITS MIND TO ALTERNATIVE MODELS UNQUOTE.

NEW IRELAND FORUM

3. THE TAOISEACH SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER HOW THE NEW IRELAND FORUM WAS ORGANISED AND WHAT IT WAS DOING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF ITS DELIBERATIONS AND HAD NOT

*Dr. Fitz Gerald seems to
have handled this fairly.*

A. J. C. 9.11

MS

UNCLASSIFIED

30342 - 1

ASKED FOR A REACTION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAD SIMPLY LISTENED WITH INTEREST. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT. DR FITZGERALD HOPED THAT THE FINAL REPORT OF THE FORUM WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FUTURE ANGLO-IRISH COOPERATION. NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL SITUATION

4. DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD QUOTE REFLECTED TOGETHER ON THE PROBLEM UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT THE VALUE OF THE MEETING LAY IN THE OPPORTUNITY IT HAD GIVEN FOR A RELAXED DISCUSSION WITHOUT THE PRESSURE TO REACH DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS. THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE HAD BUILT UP WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE MEETING HER IN 1975 WOULD BE HELPFUL IN RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM THOUGH QUOTE INTRANSIGENT FACTS UNQUOTE WOULD NOT GO AWAY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE ALIENATION OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY FROM THE FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER QUOTE IS AND MUST BE A MATTER OF CONCERN UNQUOTE AND WAS SOMETHING WHICH QUOTE WE MUST APPLY OURSELVES TO UNQUOTE. ASKED WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER WAS PREPARED TO GIVE A HIGHER PRIORITY TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, DR FITZGERALD DECLINED TO COMMENT BUT SAID THAT WHEN, IN 1973 AT SUNNINGDALE, QUOTE WE ONCE CAME CLOSE TO FINDING A WAY THROUGH THE MORASS UNQUOTE, IT WAS THE RESULT OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS GIVING THE MATTER A HIGH PRIORITY. HE HOPED THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD DO THE SAME IN THE COMING YEAR OR SO.

SUPERGRASSES

5. ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE USE OF SUPERGRASSES, DR FITZGERALD GAVE A LONG AND SOMEWHAT CONFUSED REPLY BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT DID RAISE SOME PROBLEMS. IN PARTICULAR HE SAID THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT SUPERGRASSES HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE ALIENATION OF BOTH COMMUNITIES FROM THE FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HAD BEEN USEFUL IN CONVICTING TERRORISTS.

HOWE

NORTHERN IRELAND

LIMITED

RID	PS/MR WHITNEY
NAD	PS/FUS
INFO D	SIR J BULLARD
WED	MR WRIGHT
MAED	LORD N GORDON LENNOX
NEWS D	MR GIFFARD
FUSD	MR ADAMS
PS	MR JAMES
PS/LADY YOUNG	MR URE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NORTHERN IRELAND

re Press

PLEASE CHECK AGAINST
DELIVERY

I SHOULD LIKE, WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, TO MAKE A

BRIEF STATEMENT ON THE DISCUSSIONS THAT I HELD

WITH THE TAOISEACH ON 7 NOVEMBER.

I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY RT. HON. FRIENDS THE

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH

AFFAIRS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN

IRELAND.

DR. FITZGERALD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. SPRING,

THE TANAISTE, AND BY MR. BARRY, THE IRISH

FOREIGN MINISTER.

/THIS WAS OUR

THIS WAS OUR FIRST MEETING FOR TWO YEARS, OTHER THAN IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

IT TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL WHICH WE SET UP AT OUR MEETING ON 6 NOVEMBER 1981.

THE MEETING PROVIDED THE OCCASION FOR A USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND REFLECTED THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

WE REVIEWED THE STATE OF WORK OF THE
COUNCIL AT BOTH MINISTERIAL AND OFFICIAL LEVELS.

WE APPROVED A JOINT REPORT DESCRIBING THE
CO-OPERATION WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF THE
ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES IN NOVEMBER 1981.

WE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE SATISFACTORY
CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF
KINSALE GAS TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE REPORT AND THE REVIEW ANNEXED TO IT,
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SECTION ON SECURITY
MATTERS, HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE LIBRARY OF THE
HOUSE.

/WE ALSO DISCUSSED

WE ALSO DISCUSSED OTHER ISSUES IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS,

INCLUDING THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

WE REAFFIRMED OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT CONTINUING

VIOLENCE AND OUR JOINT DETERMINATION TO TAKE ALL

POSSIBLE MEANS TO END IT.

DR. FITZGERALD SPOKE OF THE WORK OF THE NEW IRELAND

FORUM.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL

ISSUES, INCLUDING THE LEBANON.

WE GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO COMMUNITY ISSUES

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN

COUNCIL IN ATHENS.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER MEETINGS OF THE

ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL AT HEADS

OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL AT REGULAR INTERVALS.

COMMUNIQUE

1. The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP, and the Taoiseach, Dr Garret Fitzgerald, TD, met at Chequers today in the first meeting of the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Council to be held at the level of Heads of Government. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon James Prior, MP. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste, Mr Dick Spring, TD and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peter Barry, TD.

2. They recalled the Joint Communique issued after their meeting of 6 November, 1981, which announced the setting up of the AIIC, and which they agreed formed the framework for the continuing development of the relationship between their two Governments.

3. The two Heads of Government discussed current issues in Anglo-Irish relations including the situation in Northern Ireland. They expressed their deep concern about continuing violence and their joint determination to take all possible means to end it. The Taoiseach briefed the Prime Minister in relation to the work of the New Ireland Forum.

4. They reviewed the state of work in the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Council at both Ministerial and official levels. In this connection they considered a joint report reviewing co-operation between the two countries since the publication of the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies in November 1981. They approved this report which deals with institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. They agreed that the report, with the exception of the section on security matters, should be issued as an annex to this Communique.

5. They welcomed the recent establishment of the Encounter Organisation which they believe will contribute to the improvement of relations between their peoples in the interests of peace, reconciliation and stability.

6. They welcomed the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for the supply of Kinsale gas to Northern Ireland.

7. The two Heads of Government also discussed a wide range of international issues. In particular, they reviewed the main issues current in the Community discussions notably the future financing of the Community, the Community budget, the Common Agriculture Policy and the enlargement of the Community.

8. They looked forward to further meetings of the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Council at Heads of Government level at regular intervals.

Issued by:

Press Office
10 Downing Street
Whitehall, SW1

7 November 1983

ve Master

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject

RECORD OF PLENARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
IRISH PRIME MINISTER, AN TAOISEACH, HELD AT CHEQUERS ON
MONDAY 7 NOVEMBER 1983

Present:

Prime Minister	Dr Garret FitzGerald
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary	Mr Dick Spring
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	Mr Peter Barry
Sir Robert Armstrong	Mr Noel Dorr
Sir Philip Woodfield	Mr Dermot Nally
Sir Julian Bullard	Mr Sean Donlon
Sir Ewart Bell	Mr Paul Dempsey
Mr A C Goodison	Mr Peter Prendergast
Mr A D S Goodall	Mr Michael Lillis
Mr A J E Brennan	Mr Brian McCarthy
Mr A J Coles	Mr Declan Kelly
Mr P H C Eyers	Miss Orla O'Hanrahan
Mr D Barclay	

* * * * *

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach took note of the Steering Committee's Joint Report. At the Prime Minister's invitation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave a summary account of the discussions which the Ministers had had immediately before the plenary meeting. The Ministers had considered European Community questions in the context of the coming Athens Summit. They had agreed that it was necessary for the Summit to reach conclusions on the agenda and that the consequences of a failure to reach agreement would be very serious. The budgetary question was seen as a key issue and the UK ideas for a safety net had been discussed. Mr. Barry had referred to the German proposals on future financing and said that it was possible that these would recommend themselves to the Irish. He and Mr. Prior had said that they would not go far enough. The Ministers had agreed that discussion of the CAP at Athens would be most important. Mr. Barry had stressed the importance of milk for Irish agriculture but had recognised that the surplus could not go on

/ rising

rising. There was agreement that price control was necessary, though he thought that a difference of view would have emerged between the two sides if this question had been pressed further than it was. The Irish side had expressed their extreme concern at the prospect of a super-levy on milk production.

The Irish side had raised the Commission's proposal for treating the island of Ireland as a single region for the purpose of the sheepmeat regime, and expressed concern at the letter which Mr. Jopling had written opposing this. The UK side had explained their wish to avoid problems of a political sort. Both sides had taken note that the proposal had been withdrawn and that the existing arrangements were to continue for the next two years. Mr. Prior had undertaken to examine the question further.

Sir Geoffrey Howe continued that Mr. Spring had raised the question of possible radioactive pollution originating at Windscale. Both sides recognised that this was a cause for genuine anxiety and had undertaken to keep in touch.

The Ministers had also touched on international issues and noted that it was important that a democratic government should now been seen to emerge in Grenada. He had himself mentioned the importance of the Irish vote in the General Assembly on the Falklands issue.

Mr. Barry said that the Ministers had also discussed "new policies" and stressed the importance of these for the development of the Community. The Community must give the impression of planning for employment. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that lead-free petrol and air transport had been touched on in this connection.

The Prime Minister asked the Taoiseach how he saw the Community developing. She was concerned that the current negotiations had not yet proceeded far enough. The important issues must be settled at Athens. The Taoiseach said that he had been worried ten days before but had noted the unexpectedly sudden agreement on the Mediterranean acquis. He was not sure what conclusion to draw from that. It could be an indication that the French thought that it might be better to make progress at Athens so that they did not come under

/ pressure

pressure to make progress during their Presidency. The nearer the European elections came the less attraction there would be for Paris in solving agricultural problems. And the Germans were unwilling to agree to additional own resources without acceptance of enlargement but for others enlargement created problems. The Prime Minister said that she had found the French position much stronger than she had expected. President Mitterrand saw the European elections as likely to be the expression of a verdict on his period in office so far. He said that the nearer the elections came the harder it would be for him to make compromises. The French therefore wanted problems sorted out at Athens or deferred until after the European elections. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that much was now coming to the boil and he was sure that it was right to suppose that the French perceived the need for greater urgency. The UK side had found Mr. Papandreou also anxious that the main outstanding problems should be settled at Athens. Unless they were solved there would be increasing disorder within the Community and Community leaders would become a laughing stock for the electorate. The Prime Minister said that when Mr. Papandreou was in London it had seemed that he had no detailed ideas for an approach to a solution. He thought there would have to be a grand compromise at Athens. But the issues were so important that unless the main work was done beforehand there was no hope of a compromise at Athens. Mr. Barry interjected that in practice the Foreign Ministers had five days to do what was necessary before Athens. The Taoiseach said that he had had rather a different impression talking to Mr. Papandreou and Mr. Varfis. They thought that they had worked out a way of identifying the problems and of providing a framework for discussion. He hoped that they would produce this. Sir Geoffrey Howe said he thought that the Taoiseach's impression was correct. The question was whether the framework which the Greeks had in mind was the right one. Mr. Papandreou might be looking for a compromise, which would not solve the problem. But Mr. Papandreou had said that he recognised that any solution would have to get ten votes. The Prime Minister thought that Mr. Papandreou was listening to all his partners now and hoped to formulate a grand view which would emerge at Athens. But the general lines of the solution were needed before then. The Taoiseach commented that any framework would contain unsatisfactory elements but he was a little more optimistic than he had been. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he too was optimistic that

/ what

what needed to be done could be done if all concentrated on obtaining a solution at Athens. The Taoiseach said that it was likely that one or two problems would remain which could only be settled at Athens. The Prime Minister noted that there were points on which the UK side could not compromise. The Taoiseach said that the Irish recognised the British problem. But milk was much larger in terms of impact on GNP for the Irish. There had to be a solution which did not freeze the position left in Ireland by the long relationship of dependency on Great Britain. The single issue offsetting the industrial disadvantages to Ireland of Community membership was the possibility of recovering from that earlier situation. Freezing of their milk industry would create an unacceptable situation. That said, he recognised that it was not possible to go on producing milk at the present rate as a community.

The Prime Minister said that she was aware of the Irish problem. She understood that the Spanish would require a definitive statement on enlargement following the Athens Summit. They had delayed their referendum on membership of NATO to enable them, she thought, to link the two issues in the electorate's mind. The Taoiseach said that if the French were able to agree to the principle of enlargement and fix a date for concluding the negotiations, even a long way ahead, that would help both the Germans and the Spaniards, who wanted to see early progress in the enlargement negotiations, though he could imagine that the French would not wish to do that before the European election. The Prime Minister thought much depended on the length of the transitional period. People were talking in terms of very long periods. Everyone agreed that it would be good from the general political point of view to have Spain and Portugal within the Community. That said, enlargement raised difficult problems. The southern states would want some sort of arrangements for agriculture comparable to those in the north. The Taoiseach said that he was surprised that the Mediterranean acquis had been agreed. He shared the Prime Minister's concern about Spain and Portugal. He was also concerned about the question of increasing own resources. For his part he was prepared to accept the increased cost of enlargement but he would be unhappy if the limitation on own resources implied that there were insufficient resources to maintain the existing CAP albeit reformed. If the additional costs arising from enlargement and from new policies and from the commitment to double the size of the Regional Fund were taken into account, by 1986 1.2% or 1.25% own resources would be

/ necessary

necessary as a starter; this might need to rise to 1.4% later. If the Commission's proposals for modifying this figure through the European Parliament were not accepted but the need for reference to all twelve Parliaments retained, the Community would find itself facing further rows every two or three years. The Prime Minister said she found the prospect of 1.4% horrific for a net contributor. She thought it might not be necessary: VAT and levies were buoyant and should increase as Europe came out of the recession. As a net contributor the UK would look with great hostility at any increase. The Taoiseach suggested that, even making stringent assumptions about the CAP, Europe would be faced with a very serious problem. The Prime Minister said that without serious restraint there would be rows every year. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the sensitivity in the UK Parliament on the question of an increase in own resources was now very great. It would only be possible to carry Parliament if there was a satisfactory conclusion on the UK budget share and on the CAP. The Commission's proposal that modification should be decided by the European Parliament would break the camel's back not with a straw but a log.

The Taoiseach said that he thought that the UK and the Republic would find themselves on different sides on the way which the CAP was to be limited. This was something which would have to be fought out at Athens. He asked the Prime Minister whether UK thinking on EMS had evolved. The Prime Minister said that it had not yet done so. There had been times when the UK had been glad not to be tied to the Deutschmark. She wondered what currency would be devalued next. Would it be the French? When there was a devaluation the EMS needed someone from outside to take the chair. The horse-trading at previous devaluations had been quite horrifying. The time had not yet arrived for UK entry. One problem was that any change in the world energy position moved the rate for the pound up and down very sharply.

The Prime Minister noted that the Kinsale gas deal seemed very fair. There was good in it for both sides. The Taoiseach said that given the quantity of gas available the Republic could have used the whole field itself but it seemed right to share it as a symbol of cooperation.

The Prime Minister asked how the Irish saw the Lebanese situation and in particular the question of UNIFIL. Mr. Barry said that he thought that UNIFIL was performing a useful function in Lebanon even though it was not the function which they had been sent to carry out in the first place. The Irish were not hopeful of anything very favourable emerging from Geneva but they had sent out a new battalion only the previous week. The Irish had not been asked by the Syrians to take part as observers and thought this just as well. The Prime Minister noted that there were no observers in position yet. She had understood from Mr. Papandreou that no observers would go in until there was an agreement on political reconciliation. Sir G Howe said that there was a general point which ought to be stressed. There were now more than 10,000 troops in the Lebanon from outside the Middle East. This represented the price which had to be paid for failure to reach agreement on the ground. Foreign troops could not stay indefinitely. Nor were they deployed in the most rational place. It was important that the reconciliation talks should get on. But he was uncertain whether the Syrians in fact wanted a settlement. It was necessary to work towards the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

The Taoiseach said that he had noted in the press the suggestion that the United States might retaliate for the bombing of their headquarters in Lebanon. This was clearly a source for concern. He asked if the UK side thought it likely to happen. Sir G Howe said that the UK side was also concerned. Retaliation was not the right policy. Firm action against identified groups who had initiated attacks was justified but broader retaliatory action could not be wise. The Taoiseach said he thought such action would be dangerous for those concerned. The Lebanon was not an area in which it was wise to get more deeply involved. He noted that there did not seem total cohesion of the Multi-national Force. The Prime Minister pointed out that the different national components of the force had different rules of engagement. The Taoiseach noted that in the case of UNIFIL the Irish rules of

/engagement

engagement differed from those of other contributors. Mr. Donlon said that the Irish had lost in all 29 men in the connection with UNIFIL. Mr. Dorr said that half of these had been killed in hostile engagements and half had died from traffic accidents and so on. The Prime Minister said that Lebanon was a unique problem. It was now complicated by the fighting in Tripoli. The terms of reference of the Multi-National Force related to Beirut only, though clearly if they were attacked from outside Beirut they might have to reply simply as a matter of self-defence. The UK's contribution was purely symbolic. There were only a hundred or so men. They did not normally guard a fixed point (although they were guarding the security talks) but carried out patrols. She thought all concerned were aware that they were up against something which had been unexpected in the form of suicide attacks. Guerillas always had the advantage of the element of surprise. Self-defence was certainly warranted for all members of the MNF but what that entitled them to do was not always clear. The Taoiseach said that he was not happy about the position of Irish forces in UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. They were surrounded by the Israelis. At the moment their only useful function was that they gave refugees who had returned to their homes in the area a sense of security. But the possible effect of withdrawing the Irish contingent was a matter of concern.

Turning to Northern Ireland Mr. Prior said that the Ministers' conversation ~~had~~ had no doubt covered the same ground as the conversation between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister. Both sides were deeply concerned at the continuing violence in Northern Ireland/^{and} at the reduction in support for constitutional nationalists. They were concerned at the growth of support for the Provisional Sinn Fein and at the alienation of Catholics from constitutional government. He expressed concern that journalists - and he had in mind in particular the Weekend World programme broadcast the day before - had raised issues which had not been discussed between

/the two sides

the two sides in any depth nor worked through by anyone to see if they were practical. There was a grave danger if such speculation was allowed to continue without proper examination of what was practical. The Prime Minister noted that the work of the Forum was still in progress but that the kind of language used in the Weekend World programme was not helpful. The Taoiseach thought it extremely unhelpful. It was premature to raise such questions when they had not been discussed between the Republic and the United Kingdom. That the programme had attributed proposals to him personally was a setback. Indeed Mary Holland had thought it necessary to dissociate herself from the programme, considering it too distorted.

The Taoiseach said that he thought that both sides needed to reflect carefully how to cope with alienation of the minority community in Northern Ireland. For their part the Irish Government would have to see how the Forum went. Discussion there concentrated on the rights of the unionists as well as on the rights of the minority. He hoped that this would result in a wide degree of consensus on future long term structures which would go far beyond the traditional nationalist approach of a unitary state into which the unionists would have to fit. The process was going well though that did not mean that all would agree with the conclusions at the end. The Forum had developed its own dynamic and was generating new thinking. One problem was that few politicians in southern Ireland knew anything about the north. The Forum's method of working had been designed to reduce disagreement. It was the function of the Chairman after discussion to put forward what he thought might be an agreed analysis or an account of the different ideas held by the various sides. If necessary he could record differences of view. This device should exclude separate minority reports. It remained to be seen how much dissent there would be. The way in to the discussion had been a basic document, a partly correct version of which had been leaked to the press, which set out the basic questions both about nationalism and about unionist that the Irish needed to ask themselves. Having agreed the questions, they would try to go forward from there.

But much diplomacy was needed. He saw it as the Irish Government's duty to make sure that the analysis was as fundamental as possible but also to make it easier for the opposition to come along with them. This was why they were bending over backwards to avoid contention. The Prime Minister said that she would be interested to see the outcome.

Turning to the communique, the Prime Minister said that the text as amended following their discussion seemed acceptable. The Taoiseach agreed but thought it desirable that the communique should mention their next meeting though he had no wish to be specific. The Prime Minister preferred not to fix a date now. They would be meeting in Athens and elsewhere. To announce a date would give rise to problems if for any reason it proved impossible to keep. She thought that June and July next year would be very difficult for her because of the heavy press of business. Mr. Barry pointed out that the Irish Presidency started in July; the Taoiseach said that he thought that September would be rather late. The Prime Minister said that she would not wish to say so in the communique but thought they might plan for a meeting in the middle of next year. But it was important not to announce it. If there were an increase of violence beforehand they would be blamed. The Taoiseach said that he much regretted that news of their present meeting had become public in advance. He hoped that next time the Prime Minister would come to Dublin. The Prime Minister said that the security arrangements necessary for a meeting at Dublin Castle created an uncomfortable atmosphere. The Taoiseach had said that security would be easier if there was no advance announcement of the date. Mr. Barry said that there would need to be a meeting fairly soon after the Forum had reported in order to discuss its conclusions. The Prime Minister agreed that it would be appropriate to plan on having the next meeting around the middle of 1984. The Taoiseach said that the tradition established between them of saying nothing about their discussion of Northern Ireland issues seemed to him a good one. The Prime Minister agreed

A.S.C.

Res- Ian PAISLEY

14/11

BPP



file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has today received from the Revd. Ian Paisley MP and two co-signatories.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a suitable draft reply which the Prime Minister might send as soon as possible.

BPP

(Timothy Flesher)

Derek Hill, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

h



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 7 November.

I will place this before the Prime Minister at once and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

(Timothy Flesher)

The Rev. Ian Paisley, M.P.

So

BR
Jee



M

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Here is the letter which
Ian Paisley handed in at Downing
Street today about the Summit.

No doubt Mr. Paisley will be
raising these points during your
statement tomorrow.

J

7 November 1983

ms.
Prime Minister has seen.

A.S.C. 7
u
p.a.

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE REVEREND IAN PAISLEY - 7 NOVEMBER 1983

As representatives of the Unionist population in Northern Ireland we wish to protest most strongly at the new Irish summit meeting to be ^{held} today and request that you reconsider the ill-advised path which you are following concerning the external relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

We believe that such meetings as these are only an encouragement to the IRA terrorists in Northern Ireland and would point to the recent upsurge in violence this week in which three RUC men have been brutally murdered, numerous people injured and thousands of pounds worth of damage caused as evidence that the IRA use such summit meetings for a reason to launch spectacular acts of violence. This has been the case in the past and will continue to be the case. We therefore ask in the name of those who have died and inevitably will die as a result of this policy, that you call off today's meeting and any further meetings in the future.

We must inform you that in Northern Ireland your actions are regarded as part of the plan to ease and tease Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom. Through these joint studies and summit meetings it is believed that your Government is seeking to make the two parts of Ireland so dependent upon each other that the case for Irish unity will be fostered and the goal of Irish unification will be achieved. You are seen to be doing by political negotiation and intrigue the work which the IRA is seeking to do by murder and destruction.

As representatives of a party which is in touch with the grass routes of Unionist opinion we warn you that such actions and objectives will be opposed by all the strengths at our disposal if that is necessary.

Many times you have told us that Northern Ireland will

/remain

remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority wish it. Your party is regarded as the party which stands most strongly on the union. Prove it by renouncing the present path which is viewed by the Unionist electorate as a sell-out of your principles.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach discussed the situation in Northern Ireland.

They expressed their deep concern about continuing violence and their joint determination to defeat terrorism.

With regard to other matters the Taoiseach explained that while the Forum was continuing its deliberations he had no specific proposals to put forward.

MS

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach discussed the situation in Northern Ireland.

They expressed their deep concern about continuing violence and their joint determination to take all possible measures to end it.

[With regard to other matters the Taoiseach and Prime Minister exchanged views.]

The Taoiseach briefed the Prime Minister in relation to the work of the Forum.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

Dear Sir,

Anglo/Irish Summit

I enclose a record of the tete-a-tete conversation between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at Chequers today.

You will note that in the course of the conversation Dr. FitzGerald complained about the handling of the McGovern case. The Prime Minister would be grateful for comments on Dr. FitzGerald's remarks.

The Prime Minister has asked that this record should not be circulated beyond Private Offices except whether this is operationally essential.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*you see
for file.*

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

NR

*Subject
a matter*

SECRET

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH
AT 1050 HOURS ON MONDAY 7 NOVEMBER 1983 AT CHEQUERS

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. Coles

Dr. FitzGerald
Mr. Nally

Dr. FitzGerald said that a year ago it would have been thought that the British and Irish Governments, with at least four years to run in office, could tackle the problems of Northern Ireland at a steady pace, taking such time as was necessary. But he felt that the situation had been significantly altered by Sinn Fein's successes in the recent General Election. Those successes had been exaggerated (impersonation had been a factor). But Sinn Fein had succeeded in securing over one third of the Nationalist vote. They now had the resources to man full time advice centres. Dynamism and a sense of history were on their side and they were capturing the young. On the other hand, the SDLP's constituency organisation had never been strong, except in specific areas. As a constitutional party it was always liable to be outflanked. Its members were part-time and had to struggle to earn a living. The party did not have the resources to be effective.

There was a strong danger that in the 1985 local elections, unless the SDLP could make visible progress towards a constructive goal, Sinn Fein would become the majority party among the Nationalists. That would be a new situation, never contemplated in the past. Its effects were difficult to assess. But his own party's position in the Republic could be put at risk. The support for Sinn Fein, which was now minimal in the Republic, could increase. Atavistic, nationalist emotions in Irish society, which were present under the surface, could be released with the danger of domestic de-stabilisation. Externally, the possibilities of making progress with the British Government could be severely restricted. His own

/ Government's

SECRET

Government's authority to speak to the Irish/American audience would be eroded. The consequences of all this were unknowable but were very worrying. He therefore believed that it would be necessary to make progress in a shorter time than had originally been envisaged. Sinn Fein's successes also reflected the alienation of the people which had been growing over the years. This was creating social anarchy and was breaking down the structure of family life in a way no-one would have thought possible. People were beginning to look to IRA vigilantes rather than to the police as a source of law and order. There had been one or two incidents in Dublin in recent years which suggested that this trend could grow there. People would only support the police if they had clearly legitimate authority. In Northern Ireland, many people had never seen the existing police force as wholly legitimate. It was doubtful whether the police in their present form could command loyalty.

So it was necessary to find a way in which the nationalist population could focus their loyalty on the police. This was the minimum necessary to retrieve the situation and prevent slippage in the May 1985 elections. It would be necessary to work out improved police arrangements by then, though he did not know how this could be done. The Irish Government would reflect; they hoped we would too and that there could be further discussions.

There was a parallel process, represented by the new Ireland Forum, by which preconceptions were being reexamined. The Forum was having a significant additional effect in awakening people to the realities of Unionism and in putting forward possibilities of resolving the Northern Ireland problem other than the simplistic idea of Irish unity. The Forum would be looking at ideas of federation, confederation and joint sovereignty. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he emphasised that it was the Forum that was discussing these ideas. The Irish Government had not yet considered them. But in order to move people away from the simplistic ideas of the past, new thoughts of this kind would have to be considered. He hoped that the outcome of the Forum would be constructive in that three or perhaps even four political parties would commit themselves to an agreed analysis and to proposals with which the Unionists could live. It was necessary to

sensitise people in the South to Unionist concerns. That message was coming through very clearly in the Forum.

He had hoped that the Forum would complete its work by the end of the year. But it would take longer, largely because the Opposition had dragged its feet in the early stages. He now hoped, but was not sure, that the work could be completed by the end of January or at worst in February or March. It had to come to some conclusions. There had been suggestions that the Forum might continue even after it had presented its conclusions. He himself had initially been resistant to this but he would not pre-judge the matter. The Forum would report on the costs of violence, on economic prospects for the future and on political structures.

The Prime Minister asked what the terms of reference of the Forum were. Dr. FitzGerald said that the purpose of the Forum was to seek the means of peace and stability in Northern Ireland. There were no political pre-conditions and the wording contained no reference to Irish unity. Any solution could be considered.

The Prime Minister said that she understood from the Taoiseach that the Forum's proceedings had come as a revelation to some people in the Irish Republic. Dr. FitzGerald said that this was so. The Forum had at first been dismissed as a public relations exercise to help the SDLP. But when it had reached the point of public discussion, people were taken aback. They heard the Unionist view-point being expressed. Mr. John Biggs Davison, MP, had given very effective evidence (though the Taoiseach disagreed with him about almost everything). The Prime Minister commented that there was now a new awareness of the problem and that the facile solution of a united Ireland was no longer the sole solution under discussion. Dr. FitzGerald said that people sensed that Unionist opinion had to be accommodated if a solution was to be found. It was realised that there were two identities which could not be changed and which had to be reconciled. It was necessary to provide channels to permit two communities, while living together, to be able to express their loyalty in two different directions. So attitudes were changing but that did not mean that

/ everyone

everyone would accept the trend. The main point was that the centre of gravity of Irish thinking had shifted.

Commenting on the "World This Weekend" TV programme of 6 November, Dr. FitzGerald said that he was very concerned about its effects. The Irish Government had decided not to give interviews about the Forum. The programme had not even mentioned confederation as an idea which had merit. It had identified joint sovereignty as his own policy which he would visit London to present. This was a most unexpected development. He had not come to put forward any policy. He had informed the Irish press in advance that this Summit was an occasion for reflection. There would be no decisions.

Turning to another matter, he asked whether it would be possible to do something about the problem of impersonation before there were further elections in Northern Ireland. The SDLP had apparently been told by the British Government that because of lack of Parliamentary time it was difficult to do anything before the European elections. He wished to urge the Prime Minister to find time for this relatively simple legislative measure.

He wished to raise one further problem, namely the Dowra District Court case. After briefly rehearsing the details, he explained that he had raised this matter with the Prime Minister when he had met her at the European Council last June. A long time had transpired before the Irish Government had received any information from Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland authorities had taken the line that if the Republic presented evidence it would investigate. But the Garda were not prepared to make a formal complaint. The matter had been discussed again in September but nothing further had happened. Then the Garda Commissioner wrote another letter. The Irish Government were informed on 14 October than no reply had been received. Then last Thursday a letter had arrived claiming that a letter had been sent on 14 October. A notable lack of concern had been shown as to the whereabouts of the missing letter which was surprising in view of its delicacy. At first sight neither the Garda Commissioner nor the Department of

/ Justice

SECRET

-5-

Justice were satisfied with the reply that had been received. There was a problem of mutual confidence between the respective police authorities at the highest level.

The Prime Minister said that she noted the Taoiseach's concern.

The discussion ended at 1135.

A.J.C.

7 November 1983

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1408</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Note from Armstrong to PM dated 5 November 1983 with attachments</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>4/9/13</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister.

(2)

AD 4/11.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

4th November 1983

Dear John,

NORTHERN IRELAND: ULSTER POLYTECHNIC BOMB EXPLOSION

I am writing to report on today's bomb explosion at the Ulster Polytechnic, Jordanstown, County Antrim.

The explosion occurred shortly before 12 noon on 4 November in a partition between two second floor class-rooms. An HNC course, attended by a number of police officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was in progress in one of the class-rooms at the time. The explosion blew out the partition wall onto the adjoining class-room, trapping a number of civilian students.

The casualty figures as at 5.30pm on 4 November were 2 policemen dead (Inspector Martin and Sergeant Fife), 13 policemen injured, of whom two are in a particularly critical condition and others are seriously injured, and 17 civilians injured, but apparently none seriously. No-one has yet claimed responsibility.

Mr Adam Butler, the Minister of State, was in Northern Ireland at the time. He visited the Polytechnic and met senior academic staff and RUC officers at the scene. He also spoke to the press condemning the out-rage and expressing sympathy to the injured and the families of the bereaved.

Dr FitzGerald may refer to this out-rage when he sees the Prime Minister, and you may therefore wish to reflect this report in briefing. We shall telephone you with anymore up-to-date information on Monday morning.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

John Lyon

J M LYON

KL

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE
NO. 10 PERMIT NO. 1000
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10108



NOV 12 1988
- 7 NOV 1988



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1983

John [unclear]

Anglo-Irish Summit: Milk Super-Levy

The Irish have warned us that they will be raising the subject of milk with the Prime Minister on Monday. I understand that this was discussed at the Prime Minister's meeting this morning. While we, like the Irish, have expressed reservations about the super-levy, our respective positions are based on diametrically opposite strategic objectives. The UK is determined that the Community must control milk production (ideally through price reductions). The Irish want to continue to increase their production by 5% a year for the next decade or so.

In these circumstances we must be very careful not to suggest even a tactical alliance in opposition to the super-levy. At the same time it is probably premature to tell the Irish that we would be ready to consider the super-levy on certain strict conditions.

We thought it might be helpful to draw the threads together a little more clearly in a revised speaking note. I enclose some points to make, cleared with the MAFF. They have not been seen by the Secretary of State. I shall be showing him copies in tonight's box.

I am copying this letter to Robert Lowson (MAFF).

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]
(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

THE SUPER LEVY

Points to Make

1. Something radical has got to be done about the EC milk surplus. Production is about 25% above consumption, and milk absorbs over 30% of CAP spending. [Irish production has risen by 50% since they joined the EC, compared with a rise of 20% or so in the rest of the Community.]

2. The Irish paper against the super-levy offers no solutions: (they call for being tough on NZ, getting rid of our butter subsidy etc but these are marginal to the central problem).

3. The Irish paper expresses support for "Community principles of free trade, comparative advantage ... etc". We hope the Irish will support us in urging for price reductions to bring the milk sector into balance and to allow them to exploit their comparative advantage.

4. As for Irish claims about the impact which a super-levy would have on them:

a) the parallel Dr Fitzgerald has drawn with the British budget problem is not valid. We suffer a net budgetary burden, while the Irish gain more than any other single member state in terms of budget receipts per capita: (350% of the EC average, to our 50%);

b) the Irish claim 5% of their GNP would be lost if a super-levy were introduced. We do not accept this figure which is based on rosy estimates of future milk production increases which must, in any case, be frustrated.


5. If a super levy is introduced (and we would prefer action on price) there must be no question of exemptions or discrimination against certain types of producer.

6. (Defensive point)

Acknowledge Irish concern that price reductions and effective control of the milk surplus could bear heavily on their (small) producers. But it is wrong to use the common price mechanism to address this problem.

10/1/88

- 4 NOV 1985



... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

The arrangements are as follows.

The Irish team will arrive at Chequers at 0950.

Your tete-a-tete will begin at 1000 and we have said that we envisage it continuing until 1115. After a break for coffee, the plenary would follow at 1130. During the tete-a-tete other Ministers and officials will meet elsewhere.

We have told the Irish that you will wish to have a notetaker present. I will be available for this if you wish. David Barclay will also be at Chequers to look after everybody else.

We have arranged for a photocall outside the house between the plenary session and lunch.

The guest list for lunch is being put to you separately. Vera is arranging for six people who cannot be accommodated at the main table to lunch in a side room.

The plan is that the Irish would leave at 1430. They have said that they hope this is not inflexible if there is still more work to be done. We have made no comment on this except to say that you have engagements back at No.10 later in the day.

A.J.C.

4 November 1983

Ref: B06892

MR COLES

Anglo- Irish Summit:
Possible Statement to the House of Commons

We have been considering with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office whether the Prime Minister should be advised to make a statement to the House following the Anglo- Irish Summit on 7 November. As you know, statements are not normally made after bilateral summit meetings with Community partners and we do not want to give this particular summit meeting undue prominence. But an exception was made after the last Anglo- Irish Summit (on 6 November 1981) and there will certainly be pressure for that precedent to be followed on this occasion. This will be the first Anglo- Irish Summit for two years, following a particularly difficult period in Anglo- Irish relations. It has already attracted critical attention: Mr James Molyneux of the Ulster Unionist Council wrote to the Prime Minister on 22 October to warn that it would bring "disastrous consequences" to Northern Ireland. It seems to me that the absence of a statement by the Prime Minister is likely to give rise to greater criticism and wilder speculation about what took place than a clear statement accompanied by publication of the joint report and review of the work of the AIIC since November 1981. I attach an illustrative first draft which draws on the language of the draft communique. It will of course need expansion and amendment in the light of what actually happens.

2. I am copying this minute to the private secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Northern Ireland, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

David Goodall

4 November 1983

A D S GOODALL

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS

I should like, with permission, Mr Speaker, to make a statement on the discussions that I held with the Taoiseach on 7 November. I was accompanied by my Rt Hon Friends, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Dr FitzGerald was accompanied by Mr Spring, the Tanaiste, and by Dr Barry, the Irish Foreign Minister.

2. This was our first meeting for two years. It took place within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council which we set up at our meeting on 6 November 1981 in order to assist the continuing development of the relationship between the two Governments. Rt Hon and Hon Members will be glad to know that the meeting provided the occasion for a useful and constructive exchange of views and demonstrated that relations between our two countries have returned to normal after the difficulties of last year.

3. The Taoiseach and I reviewed the state of work of the AIIC at both Ministerial and official levels. In this connection, we approved a joint report describing the co-operation which has taken place between the two countries since the publication of the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies in November 1981. We particularly welcomed the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for the supply of Kinsale Gas to Northern Ireland. We agreed that the report and the review annexed to it, with the exception of the section on security matters, should be published; copies have already been placed in the Library of the House.

4. Dr FitzGerald and I also discussed other issues in Anglo-Irish relations, including the situation in Northern Ireland. We reaffirmed our steadfast opposition to violence and expressed satisfaction with the co-operation between the security forces of the two countries. We also discussed a wide range of international issues, notably current issues in the European Community.

E4 H...J



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Fletcher
for info.

[Handwritten initials]

From the Private Secretary

MR. GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

Thank you for your minute of 4 November.

The Prime Minister has decided to make a Statement on the Anglo-Irish Summit on 8 November before she leaves for Bonn. I shall be grateful if you would arrange for the draft Statement which you attached to your minute to be revised after the Summit and sent to me, together with Notes for Supplementaries, for the Prime Minister's box on Monday night.

I am copying this minute to Peter Ricketts (FCO) and John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office).

A. J. COLES

4 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

ADL 4/11.

27582 CABOFF G
2741 83-11-04 13:01

748059 DUP NI G

4 NOVEMBER 1983

TO: THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP
PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

IN VIEW OF THE DEATHS AND MANY INJURIES RESULTING FROM
THE REPUBLICAN TERRORIST BOMB AT THE ULSTER POLYTECHNIC,
IN THE NAME OF THE ULSTER PEOPLE I WOULD CALL FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ANGLO IRISH SUMMIT ON MONDAY.

THE PREVIOUS SUMMIT MEETINGS HAVE ONLY ENCOURAGED MURDEROUS
TERRORIST ACTS.

YOURS SINCERELY
DR IAN R K PAISLEY MP MEP MPA
(LEADER OF THE ULSTER DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY)

748059 DUP NI G

27582 CABOFF G
748059 DUP NI G

27582 CABOFF G

2741 83-11-04 13:01

748059 DUP NI G

4 NOVEMBER 1983

TO: THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP
PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

IN VIEW OF THE DEATHS AND MANY INJURIES RESULTING FROM
THE REPUBLICAN TERRORIST BOMB AT THE ULSTER POLYTECHNIC,
IN THE NAME OF THE ULSTER PEOPLE I WOULD CALL FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ANGLO IRISH SUMMIT ON MONDAY.

THE PREVIOUS SUMMIT MEETINGS HAVE ONLY ENCOURAGED MURDEROUS
TERRORIST ACTS.

YOURS SINCERELY
DR IAN R K PAISLEY MP MEP MPA
(LEADER OF THE ULSTER DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY)

748059 DUP NI G

27582 CABOFF G

748059 DUP NI G




PRIME MINISTER

IRISH BILATERAL

I am to brief the media after the bilateral. I propose to prepare a briefing line at Chequers while you are having lunch and then leave after clearing my approach with you.

However, you should be aware of one point in any discussion of the media with Dr Fitzgerald. He proposes to brief the press at 5.30pm according to the latest information. I would like, if at all possible, to deal with the bilateral at my normal 4.00pm briefing. I think we should be open about this with Dr Fitzgerald so that he does not think we are trying to get in first.

I shall of course brief non-attributably. What I say will be relayed to journalists attending his briefings and he may be asked to react. But our objective is to have a low key bilateral and I shall be making every effort not to create controversy.



B. INGHAM

4 November 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

JH
7/11

4th November 1983

Dear Jim,

I am writing to apologise for the fact that a letter which the Prime Minister wrote to you on 31st October, concerning the meeting between her and Dr Fitzgerald, appeared in the Press before you had actually received the letter.

When letters written by the Prime Minister are to be issued to the Press, the office here goes to great lengths to ensure that sufficient time is allowed for the original letter to reach the addressee before publication is made.

However, in this instance, I fear that an error crept in because the Prime Minister's letter was sent to you at your address in Ireland (from where you had written to her), while the Press Office here assumed that the reply had in fact been sent to you at the House of Commons. Therefore, the extra time which should have been allowed to take account of posting the letter to Ireland rather than delivering it in London was not accounted for, and publication went ahead.

Once again, I apologise for this error on our part.

Yours ever
Michael

MICHAEL ALISON

James H Molyneaux Esq JP MP

MR. COLES

cc: Mr. Butler

You might not have been aware that following the last Anglo-Irish bilateral, the Prime Minister made a Parliamentary statement. The Hansard extract is attached. You will see that the Prime Minister said that that meeting was exceptional in the sense that the Taoiseach and she had received the joint studies commissioned at her meeting in Dublin in 1980. I do not imagine that we will want to make a statement this time but you ought to be aware of the possibility that we will be pressed for one.

TF

TIM FLESHER

4 November, 1983

Anglo-Irish Bilateral Talks

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement—

Rev. Ian Paisley (Antrim, North): On behalf of the people of Ulster—*[Interruption.]*

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that the kindest thing for us to do is to continue.

The Prime Minister: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement—

Mr. Peter Robinson (Belfast, East): On behalf of the people of Ulster—*[Interruption.]*

The Prime Minister:—about the meeting which I had with the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, in London on 6 November.

This meeting was one in a regular series. It was held on a similar basis to those which take place with other Heads of State and of Government of the European Community. However, it was—*[Interruption.]*

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister should be heard.

The Prime Minister: However, it was exceptional in that on this occasion the Taoiseach and I received the joint studies commissioned at my meeting with the then Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December 1980.

The House will recall my undertaking to place before it the recommendations on matters of policy arising out of the studies. The studies, other than that on security matters, will be laid before the House tomorrow. They deal with possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. I have already placed in the Library of the House copies of the joint report of senior officials on the studies and of the communiqué which the Taoiseach and I issued on Friday.

At our meeting the Taoiseach and I affirmed our agreement on a number of points which are fundamental to relations between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic.

We were agreed on the benefits of close relations between our two countries. We are determined to work for a deepening and strengthening of those relations.

We were agreed on the need to find ways to reduce the tensions between and to reconcile the peoples of the two parts of Ireland.

We were agreed on the need to intensify economic co-operation between both countries and in particular between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Such co-operation should assist the economies of both countries as well as encouraging further co-operation in other fields.

We were agreed in our resolute opposition to violence and terrorism. We are determined to maintain the very high level of co-operation between the security forces of both countries. As the communiqué states, we noted with approval the efforts being made to ensure that those who commit crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other.

We were agreed, finally, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This is a fact which both the present Taoiseach and his two predecessors have publicly accepted.

It is against this background that the joint studies must be seen. Many of the suggestions in the joint studies are for further consideration, but the Taoiseach and I agreed that an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council should be established. It will provide a framework which will facilitate more regular and more frequent contacts between Ministers and officials. It involves no change whatever in the constitutional position as regards relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic.

In the same context, there was agreement to work towards the establishment of an advisory committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation. Closer co-operation and friendship are not matters for Governments only. I hope that this committee will have a wide membership, representative of a broad cross-section of ordinary people and organisations with interests in this country and in the Republic of Ireland.

The suggestion was made in the studies that an Anglo-Irish interparliamentary body might be established at an appropriate time. It was envisaged that the members of such a body would be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach and I agreed that this would be a matter for the two Parliaments themselves to pursue.

This was a friendly and constructive meeting. It has helped to consolidate the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Government's objective is to create a situation in which meetings between the British Prime Minister and the Taoiseach are seen to be routine. We took a significant step in that direction on Friday.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): The Opposition agree that there should be continuous and close meetings and discussions between the Government of this country and the Government in Dublin. Therefore, we greatly welcome these discussions, as well as those which have preceded them. Our criticism previously was that the results of discussions were not made public to the House. We are glad that there has been a change of feeling on that subject and that full reports are now to be made to the House.

We ask that the new Anglo-Irish Council should report persistently to the House on any discussions it may have.

We especially welcome the statement to which the right hon. Lady drew attention—that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. We accept that principle of consent, and we wish the whole future of our two countries to be based upon it. The Opposition have put forward proposals for advancing towards a united Ireland. We believe that that is the right course that we should travel. There can be fruitful discussions about that. That view is one that is generally in accordance with that of the present Taoiseach in Dublin. He takes much the same view. But I emphasise again that we believe that his emphasis on the process of consent is of great importance.

In view of the major matters that have arisen in these discussions and are presented to the House and the country by them, may the House have an early debate on the matter?

Another matter has arisen today, on a similar subject. Representations were made this morning by many of my hon. Friends in respect of the breakdown of the arrangements about the Belfast-Liverpool ferry. This

Member is of great concern to people in Northern Ireland. Many people's jobs are involved. Does the right hon. Lady not consider it wise, particularly in these circumstances, to take special action on this matter, which could assist the general atmosphere in Ireland and the general approach to fresh arrangements for Ireland generally?

The Prime Minister: First, I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his welcome for the meeting and for the statement.

Secondly, the joint studies will be published in full tomorrow. I hope that they will give rise to discussion and debate. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will pursue the matter of a debate at some appropriate time with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House.

Thirdly, the constitutional position of Northern Ireland is set out in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, under which Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom unless the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wish otherwise, as shown by a poll conducted in a way set out in that Act. That guarantee is enshrined in our law and totally remains and will remain.

With regard to P & O, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland saw a group of people about the matter this morning. I must, however, tell the right hon. Gentleman that it is not the Government's intention to provide a subsidy or to intervene in the dispute.

Mr. James Kilfedder (Down, North): Regardless of what the Prime Minister has said, the cold reality is that the terms of the communiqué and the consequential events that will flow from it represent a significant first step by a Tory Government towards easing Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom with the consequent betrayal of the birthright of Ulster Loyalists.

Does the Prime Minister now realise, following the further sickening, cowardly murders of Protestants in Northern Ireland by the vile sectarian Provisional IRA, that her talks with the Dublin Prime Minister will not stop the Republican atrocities in Northern Ireland particularly as the Dublin Government refuse to extradite the terrorists who seek sanctuary in the Republic and especially as Cardinal O'Fiaich, shedding corcodile tears over the victims of these atrocious thugs, refuses to excommunicate the terrorists?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised that I disagree with much of what he says. The reality is that the guarantee to Northern Ireland remains. It is a part of the United Kingdom and will stay a part of the United Kingdom unless its people both wish and consent to do otherwise.

With regard to security and the combating of terrorism and crime, our security forces—the Army, the police and the Ulster Defence Regiment—do a superlative job that I am sure the hon. Gentleman would wish to acknowledge. I might also remind him that we are receiving wonderful co-operation across the border concerned with catching terrorists wherever they commit their offences and trying them either in the North or in the South. That co-operation is very valuable in enabling us to combat terrorism.

Mr. James Molyneux (Antrim, South): Can the Prime Minister not begin to understand the feelings of ordinary people in Northern Ireland who are experiencing a sense of betrayal that no amount of explanation or denial can remove?

The Prime Minister: I try all the time to understand the feelings of the people in Northern Ireland. I remind the hon. Gentleman that this Taoiseach and the two previous Taoiseachs have both accepted publicly that any change could come about only with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. That in itself is a great advance on the position that used to be taken up. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), sitting next to the hon. Gentleman, says, "No, no." In the meantime, the guarantee that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom is enshrined in the 1973 Act, and it remains.

Mr. Stephen Ross (Isle of Wight): Is the right hon. Lady aware that we on the Liberal Benches assure her of our support for these tangible signs of closer co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Dublin Government? May we impress on the right hon. Lady the fact that she should not be put off, in her determination to pursue the talks, by noises on or off the stage in this Parliament? Was any further progress made during the talks on extradition and also on the subject of the inter-parliamentary grouping that has been suggested? How will that proceed from now on? What talks will take place on that subject?

The Prime Minister: With regard to the hon. Gentleman's first question, it seems to me reasonable to try to have friendly relations with an adjacent State. I am sure that this is the right policy to pursue and that it is in the interests of the people of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, and also in the interests of the people of the Republic.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, we in this country abide by the extradition treaties. We extradite people even to the Republic should the circumstances warrant it. The hon. Gentleman is right in his assertion that the Republic does not have extradition. I doubt very much whether we shall succeed in persuading the Republic to have extradition but the matter is pursued with it from time to time. Inter-parliamentary proceedings are a matter for this House and for the similar House in the Republic of Ireland. I would not wish to interfere. Now that the idea has been put up, I hope that it will be discussed in the appropriate forum here.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury): In consideration of parliamentary or possible parliamentary representation on the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council, has my right hon. Friend given thought to the possibility that it could change the constitutional relationship between two friendly nations? Has she also given thought in particular to the possibility that if she goes ahead with such a proposal some of the parliamentary representation might come from Northern Ireland?

The Prime Minister: There must be a slight misunderstanding. It is not expected that there would be any parliamentary representation on the intergovernmental council except insofar as Ministers are themselves Members of Parliament. There is co-operation at three levels—first, at the level of Government and officials, all of whom are associated with Government. That is the intergovernmental council. Secondly, it is for consideration whether Members of Parliament of this House and Members of Parliament of the House in the Republic of Ireland should think it right to have co-operation between

[The Prime Minister]

themselves. That would be co-operation at the parliamentary level. The third level would be at advisory committee level where people who are neither members of Governments nor Members of Parliament wish to take part in closer relations. There are three distinct levels.

Mr. Gerard Fitt (Belfast, West): Will the Prime Minister accept that the vast majority of people in the island of Ireland and in this island will welcome these talks for what they are—an attempt to cement friendly relations? Is she aware that the secrecy that surrounded the talks with the previous Taoiseach has left one party to the talks in the position where a debate is taking place today in the Irish Parliament with the intention of sabotaging the talks that took place between the right hon. Lady and the Taoiseach last week?

Will she also appreciate that there needs to be a sense of urgency about the creation of the parliamentary forum as agreed at the Downing Street talks? Will she accept that there would be very few objections from the Opposition side of the House to the setting up of that parliamentary forum? There might even be a number of supporters on her own Benches.

The Prime Minister: I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he says. With regard to the parliamentary aspect, I believe that there is an Anglo-Irish all-party group, which could perhaps consider these matters further. A sense of urgency would have to come from hon. Members on both sides of the House. I do not think it is necessarily right that the Government themselves should interfere in these things.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): Have not these exchanges shown how important it is to carry Ulster Unionists with the Government's endeavours and to show them that they will not be abandoned to the embraces of so-called loyalist extremists and exhibitionists?

The Prime Minister: I agree totally with my hon. Friend about this matter. That is why we have always stressed the importance and the significance of the guarantee. We hope thereby to retain the confidence of our Ulster Unionist friends.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): Does the Prime Minister not recognise that a nation cannot secure its own peace and security by entering into arrangements which its own people rightly regard as a conspiracy against them with their enemies?

The Prime Minister: The people I represent are all the people of the United Kingdom. I do not think that they would take the view that the right hon. Gentleman takes.

Several Hon. Members *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I propose to call three more hon. Members from either side before moving onto the next business.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield): Although one appreciates the frankness of my right hon. Friend's statement, how can she explain the fact that so many IRA confirmations of their involvement in atrocities come from Dublin if we are getting so much co-operation from the Dublin Government? Will she confirm that the party that we both represent still remains the Conservative and Unionist Party?

The Prime Minister: Yes, indeed. That is one reason why the guarantee was enshrined in an Act of Parliament. That guarantee wholly remains. With regard to the IRA and activities south of the border, the Government of the Republic are very active indeed in trying to trace all people who commit acts of terrorism or crime. They recognise that those people are enemies of democracy and are a menace to the Government of the Republic as well as to the Government and the people of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Neville Sandelson (Hayes and Harlington): I welcome the initiatives that have been taken by the Government, which will have our firm support, but what consideration has been given by the right hon. Lady and Dr. FitzGerald to the introduction of a wider dimension as an aid to further progress? Is it not possible that the European Community and its agencies can be of great practical assistance, and that an international solution, universally accepted as disinterested, is more likely to succeed than is a purely British solution?

The Prime Minister: The future of Northern Ireland is a matter for the United Kingdom, because Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom. That is a matter wholly for the United Kingdom, for the people of Northern Ireland and for this Parliament. In answer to what the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. Sandelson) said about the wider dimension, the talks take place against the background of bilateral discussions that we have with our partners in the EEC. That is precisely how this set of bilateral discussions started.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington): Will my right hon. Friend confirm that it is not the Government's policy to encourage the concept of a united Ireland, even in the long term?

The Prime Minister: It is not for me to say what the people of Northern Ireland may wish to do. I take the view that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. It is accepted that it is part of the union. It will remain so unless they wish to the contrary.

Mr. Kevin McNamara (Kingston upon Hull, Central): The right hon. Lady will recall that the Labour Party conference voted in favour of a united Ireland and to campaign vigorously for that by consent. Will the intergovernmental council which is to be established be statutory or conventional? Will it publish agendas? How often will it meet? What are the topics on the agenda likely to be? Can the right hon. Lady confirm or deny the rumours that there will be certain appeasement to Unionists, by giving powers to local authorities, and in particular, will she deny the canard that it is intended to give planning powers back to local authorities in Northern Ireland?

The Prime Minister: The intergovernmental council is an informal organisation which will not publish agendas. It is a framework against which many ministerial meetings and meetings of officials will take place. Some of those meetings already take place. Now they will perhaps take place more often against that general framework. Secondly, on the question of any future devolution of government in Northern Ireland or greater powers for local authorities, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is constantly seeking a way to return more responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland to

the people of Northern Ireland. That search will continue. Thirdly, planning powers would also be part of that process.

Mr. Christopher Murphy (Welwyn and Hatfield): Will my right hon. Friend confirm that she is satisfied with the rate of progress in the Republic towards reciprocal arrangements for voting in its general elections for British citizens?

The Prime Minister: I understand from the Taoiseach that he is likely to bring forward a measure to his own Parliament shortly.

Mr. Harold McCusker (Armagh): In view of the Prime Minister's studied neutrality at her press conference on the matter of Irish unification, of which we have heard some echoes here today, can she repeat with the same sense of personal conviction as she did in Belfast three years ago that she still stands rock firm for the Union?

The Prime Minister: I find it difficult to understand the precise point of the hon. Gentleman's question. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom—as much as my constituency is.

Mr. Robert Parry (Liverpool, Scotland Exchange): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Before the hon. Gentleman puts his point of order, may I make it clear that I shall take a very dim view of it if it is not a point of order, but only a question that would have been asked if I had called any hon. Member.

Mr. Parry: My point of order, Mr. Speaker, is that the Prime Minister, in an earlier reply to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, said that her right hon. Friend the Secretary of State this morning met a group of people to discuss the P and O ferry closure. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman met seven right hon. and hon. Members of the House—

Mr. Speaker: Order. That cannot be a point of order for me. I cannot rule on it.

Mr. Michael English (Nottinghamshire, West): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise a point of order which was not the question that I intended to ask. Do you think that only one Labour Back Bencher is a disproportionately small number to call?

Mr. Speaker: No I do not, or I should have done otherwise.

Mr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the constitutional aspect of the Prime Minister's statement and the fact that it occupied less than 30 minutes, I hope that you will look at the list of speakers that you have called, in which case you might think that it is not as balanced as usual. You might at least have called those hon. Members who were on their feet. That would have occupied only another five minutes.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand—

Mr. Gerard Fitt (Belfast, West) *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Very well.

Mr. Fitt: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. When the Prime Minister rose this afternoon to make her statement, you will no doubt have heard the voice of Ulster from the Side Gallery. It happened to be two Members the House. Can I ask whether you will take any sanction against those two Members, who are Members of this House, who interrupted from the Gallery?

Mr. Speaker: Order. Obviously, the hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension. Any hon. Member is entitled to call his question from the Side Galleries. It is a long-established custom, and it has been done, but not before during my Speakership. I have not named people for interrupting, or I should have been kept very busy.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I understand the reply that you made a moment ago, and I do not question your ruling, but I invite you to look afresh at the number of Labour Members who were called from the Back Benches. If you do so, you may think that it will help the House to make a further statement. It is an extremely important matter, and one on which we have not had debates in the House in the past. Surely, it would not exceed normal time to have half an hour on a statement of such significance. I hope, therefore, that you will look at the matter afresh and perhaps make a further statement. [*Interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall answer the Leader of the Opposition. I regret to say that I do not think that I ought to give further consideration to the matter, having dealt with it before the whole House this afternoon. It is unfair that any Speaker should be subjected to such pressure.

Mr. Norman Atkinson (Tottenham) *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: I shall listen if it is a genuine point of order.

Mr. Atkinson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In a reply just now, the Prime Minister stated that Northern Ireland is as much an integral part of the United Kingdom as her own constituency. If that is so, how is it that people can be repatriated to Northern Ireland, which happens at the moment—

Mr. Speaker: Order. With every respect, that is not a point of order. It is a point of debate in reply to what the Prime Minister said.

Statutory Instruments, &c.

Mr. Speaker: By leave of the House I shall put together the three questions on the motions relating to Statutory Instruments.

Ordered,

That the C. K. Marr Educational Trust Scheme 1981 (S.I., 1981, No. 857) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Rating (Repayment Procedures etc.) (Scotland) Regulations 1981 (S.I., 1981, No. 1045) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Rating (Timetable and Procedures) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1981 (S.I., 1981, No. 1046) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[*Mr. Pym.*]

pl. let me have
the paper tonight.

MR. COLES ✓

WJ 25
" "

Settled.

WJ 3
" "

Anglo-Irish Summit on Monday

In a letter which we had from the Foreign Office, of which you received a copy, Sir Ewart Bell is not included in the delegation of people attending the above Summit. Sir Philip Woodfield's office have rung us to recommend that Sir Ewart should be included. Please may I have your views on this.

Lindsay Wilkinson
Cabinet Office

3 November 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

Press Notice

ANGLO-IRISH BILATERAL

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP, will have discussions with the Taoiseach, Dr Garret Fitzgerald, TD, on Monday 7 November. Dr Fitzgerald will be accompanied by the Tanaiste, Mr Dick Spring, TD, and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peter Barry, TD.

The Prime Minister will be joined by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon James Prior, MP.

3 November 1983

NOTES FOR EDITORS

The last Anglo-Irish bilateral was held on 6 November 1981. Since then there have been a number of meetings at official and Ministerial level between the two countries, including two informal meetings between Mrs Thatcher and Dr Fitzgerald, in March 1983 at Brussels and June 1983 at Stuttgart.

Prime Minister.

5

We shall have to be very careful about the suggestion in para. 10.

Ref. A083/3128

PRIME MINISTER

mt

A & C. 3/11.

** in the briefing papers*

I am reporting to you separately on the outcome of my meeting in Dublin yesterday with Mr Dermot Nally, in which we agreed texts for submission to you and the Taoiseach for next Monday's Summit meeting.

2. I am also submitting separately the assessment for which you asked of the ideas being floated by the Irish for a new approach to the situation in Ireland.

3. Before my meeting with Mr Nally started, I was taken privately to see the Taoiseach. I had a quarter of an hour with him; the only other person present was Mr Nally. So far as I am aware, no one else (except I think Mr Lillis) knew that I had this meeting with the Taoiseach.

4. The Taoiseach told me about his visit to Athens from which he had just returned. He said that he thought that the Greek Presidency were making a real attempt to achieve progress at the European Council in Athens. He looked forward to discussing with you the various issues which would come up. He said that he would particularly wish to stress that the super levy proposed by the Commission would be completely unacceptable in Ireland; indeed, he said that it would be disastrous (I gather that it would be hardly less disastrous in Northern Ireland).

5. Dr FitzGerald then went on to the main purpose for his summoning me. He said that he hoped to take the opportunity of his meeting with the Prime Minister to tell her how things were going in the Forum for a New Ireland, which he was seeking to use as a means of educating those concerned in the realities of the situation. It would, however, be very important to him that nothing should be said to the press about this aspect of their conversations.

6. This led Dr FitzGerald on to his thoughts about "a new approach" on Northern Ireland. He said that he was very worried about the alienation of the minority in Northern Ireland, not only from the forces of law and order there but from the SDLP. If this was not



checked, there would be a great danger that by the time of the local elections in 1985 Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) would have established an ascendancy, that they would oust the SDLP in the elections, and that the SDLP would disintegrate. That would immensely strengthen the position of, the PSF, and would be very bad news for us in Northern Ireland, but it would also be very bad news for the Republic, because this sort of political victory in Northern Ireland would strengthen the PSF's position in the Republic as well. So time could be working against us, because of the electoral deadline.

7. What was needed was to create something upon which the loyalty of the minority in Northern Ireland could focus. He thought that there was greater realism on both sides of the border about the aspiration to Irish unity. It was now recognised that that was not going to come for a very long time indeed, and that the union of Northern Ireland with Great Britain was an established fact which was not going to be overturned within the foreseeable future. There was scope for giving public expression to this greater sense of realism (though the Taoiseach did not make it clear whether he meant by that an amendment to the constitution or something less formal).

8. In exchange for that, the minority in Northern Ireland should be given law and order institutions on which it could focus confidence and "loyalty" (his word). The Taoiseach did not produce any specific ideas in this field, indeed, he said more than once that he had no specific ideas to suggest. He appeared to be thinking of special courts (with judges from the Republic as well as from Northern Ireland) which would deal with cases of violation of human rights, criminality and subversion. He seemed to think that some measure of joint policing would not be sufficient to focus the loyalty of the minority, if it was thought the police were merely operating under the existing system of law in Northern Ireland.

9. The Taoiseach asked how I thought you were likely to react to these ideas. I said that I thought that you would want not to exclude from consideration anything that might hold out the



possibility of reducing the level of violence, but that, with ideas still so very vague and unformed, your reaction would be bound to be cautious. You clearly would not want there to be any suggestion that you were considering possibilities which could affect the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and it would be important to avoid any suggestion that "joint sovereignty" was at issue. Dr FitzGerald recognised the sensitivity of that from your point of view, though he reverted to the need (in his view) to provide the minority in Northern Ireland with some factor or presence in the law and order institutions which would provide a focus for their loyalty and thus prevent the PSF from gaining ground.

10. The Taoiseach said that he would be suggesting that it would be very useful if there could be private discussions of these matters between his people and your people. If the two sides pursued their own thinking separately over a period of months, there would be a danger that they would end up with two very different sets of ideas, and the process of reconciling them would be long. Thus time would be doubly wasted, It would be better if our thinking could be shared as we went along. Very few people in Dublin were privy to the sort of ideas he was mentioning to me: only a small group of Irish Ministers was involved and he had said nothing to the rest of his Cabinet. The discussions would have to be kept to a very restricted group of people, and some suitable umbrella would have to be found for them (perhaps the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council). He would not want the Foreign Offices involved on either side, because one never knew what got on to diplomatic telexes; and he would not want the Northern Ireland Office involved, because if they were what was being discussed would become known about all over Northern Ireland. He specifically spoke of discussions involving Mr Nally and Mr Lillis on the Irish side and Mr David Goodall and me on the British side, though he recognised that at some stage it would be necessary to bring in his Minister of Justice, if questions of courts were involved, and that we should need a similar input on our side.

11. I said that I would report this conversation to you.



12. I am not sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in view of the nature and subject of the discussion.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

3 November 1983

conqueror

Prime Minister.

4

Ref. A083/3130

MR COLES *ASL 7/11.*Anglo-Irish Summit

At my meeting with Mr Dermot Nally in Dublin yesterday, we agreed upon a final text of the report of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council on the state of play on the various matters covered in the Joint Studies.

2. On the three matters referred to in your minute of 1 November: the Irish were keen to retain the reference back to the sentence in the Joint Studies which said that the Anglo-Irish Encounter organisation was intended as an interim measure, pending the creation of an Advisory Committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation; but they agreed to the inclusion of the word "eventual" before "creation" as an indication that the Advisory Committee was some way off. They agreed to water down the reference to North-South co-operation on the preparation of tourist maps of the border area, so that it referred now simply to preparation of maps for tourists. By bringing all the educational references into one section we improved the balance as between North and South.

3. The detailed report, and the joint report by Mr Nally and me to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach which covers it, are therefore agreed documents, suitable for being annexed to the communique, if that is what is decided. If precedent is followed, they would be issued in typed form with the communique and then subsequently reproduced as a White Paper.

4. We also considered a draft communique, and reached agreement upon a text which is attached. Both of us made the point that this text was very much ad referendum to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, and could well need to be amended in the light of the discussion. It will, however, form the basis upon which we can do whatever work is required on the day.



5. I am sending copies of this minute and the draft communique to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

3 November 1983

CONQUEROR

RTA

Communique: Draft Outline

1. The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald TD, met at today in the first meeting of the AIIC to be held at the level of Heads of Government. The Prime Minister was accompanied by

The Taoiseach was accompanied by

2. They recalled the Joint Communique issued after their meeting of 6 November, 1981, which announced the setting up of the AIIC, and which they agreed formed the framework for the continuing development of the relationship between their two Governments.

3. The two Heads of Government discussed current issues in Anglo-Irish relations including the situation in Northern Ireland.

4. They reviewed the state of work in the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council at both Ministerial and official levels. In this connection they considered a joint report reviewing co-operation between the two countries since the publication of the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies in November, 1981. They approved this report which deals with institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. They agreed that the report, with the exception of the section on security matters, should be issued as an annex to this communique.

5. They welcomed the recent establishment of the Encounter Organisation which they believe will contribute to the improvement of relations between their peoples in the interests of peace, reconciliation and stability.

~~6. They reaffirmed their steadfast opposition to violence and expressed satisfaction with the co-operation between the security forces of the two countries.~~

36. They welcomed the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for the supply of Kinsale Gas to Northern Ireland.

7. The two Heads of Government also discussed a wide range of international issues. In particular, they reviewed the main issues current in Community discussions notably the future financing of the Community, the Community budget, the Common Agriculture Policy and the enlargement of the Community.

John,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
BRIEFING MEETING

Sir Anthony Ireland will
be unable to attend,
but there will be FCo
representation from
J. Bullard and P. Ayles.

It is doubtful that
The Angel from Northern
Ireland Office will be
able to attend.

Susan
3.11.83.

CVO



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 November 1983

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO
 Secretary of the Cabinet
 70 Whitehall
 LONDON SW1

*cc- Mr. Coles (5 Copies)
 Mr. Goodall*

CABINET OFFICE	
A	9255
3 NOV 1983	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE No.	

My dear Robert

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT, 7 NOVEMBER 1983

1. I enclose a draft Game Plan for the Anglo-Irish Summit in preparation for the Prime Minister's briefing meeting on 4 November at 1600. The Game Plan will be revised immediately after that meeting by the Cabinet Office in consultation with the FCO.
2. Enclosed with the Game Plan are copies of the scene-setting telegram from Dublin, the Joint Report on Bilateral Relations agreed at the meeting of the Steering Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council on 2 November, and the draft communiqué.
3. I am copying this letter to Philip Woodfield.

Yours ever

Jwb can

Julian Bullard

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT, 7 NOVEMBER 1983

GAME PLAN (DRAFT)

/ 1. Dublin telno 326 sets the scene for the Summit. The
Joint Report by the Steering Committee of the Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Council reviews Anglo-Irish cooperation
and bilateral relations in general. Dublin telno 324
/ reports Dr FitzGerald's views on how he wishes to
/ approach the forthcoming meeting. Dublin telno 325
reports Dr FitzGerald's views on the forthcoming Athens
Summit and on the milk super-levy. All are attached.

Tête-a-tête with Dr FitzGerald (0930-?1115)

2. The Prime Minister might begin by welcoming the fact
that Anglo-Irish relations are back to normal following
the difficulties which arose in 1982. She will wish to
give Dr FitzGerald an opportunity to express his views
about the current situation in Northern Ireland.
Dr FitzGerald may voice his concern at the alienation of
the minority community from the forces of law and order.
He may discuss the possibilities for improving security,
and brief the Prime Minister on the work of the New
Ireland Forum. Dr FitzGerald may also broach with the
Prime Minister the suggestions recently put forward by
Mr Lillis. It will be essential for the Prime Minister
to agree with Dr FitzGerald what if anything should be
said publicly after the meeting on these questions.

Other meetings

7. During the tête-a-tête, a meeting will take place between the other Ministers. This will provide an opportunity to discuss Northern Ireland and a range of bilateral matters. The Ministers will report on their discussions at the plenary meeting.

GRS 440

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 021100Z

FM DUBLIN 020940Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 021100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 324 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983

MY TELNO 314: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: CALL ON THE TAOISEACH

1. I CALLED ON THE TAOISEACH ON 1 NOVEMBER AND ASKED HOW HE SAW HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.
2. HE SAID THAT SUMMITS IN THE PAST HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO SPEND TOO MUCH TIME DISCUSSING THE COMMUNIQUE. THIS WAS NOT GOING TO BE NECESSARY THIS TIME. FURTHERMORE, THE NEW IRELAND FORUM HAD NOT CONCLUDED ITS CONSIDERATIONS. HE SAW THE SUMMIT, THEREFORE, AS AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR HIMSELF AND MRS THATCHER TO EXCHANGE IDEAS IN A RELAXED WAY WITHOUT CONSTRAINT. HE WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED AT THE ALIENATION OF THE MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND - IN PARTICULAR THEIR ALIENATION FROM THE SECURITY FORCES. BUT HE WAS ALSO NATURALLY VERY CONCERNED AT THE POLITICAL ADVANCE OF SINN FEIN. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE ANSWERS TO THESE PROBLEMS WERE, BUT THEY MUST BE DISCUSSED. HE GAVE NO IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD CLEAR-CUT IDEAS UP HIS SLEEVE. NEITHER OF US MADE ANY REFERENCE TO THE SUGGESTIONS WHICH LILLIS HAS PUT FORWARD. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE DIRECTLY ON HIS MIND.
3. HE ASKED ME WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT ABOUT THESE MATTERS. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. I WAS SURE THAT SHE WOULD WANT TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO ANY IDEAS HE PUT FORWARD. I THOUGHT SHE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO TALK ABOUT SECURITY MATTERS AND PERHAPS SHE WOULD WISH TO ASK WHETHER HE SAW A WAY FORWARD THROUGH THE SDLP JOINING THE ASSEMBLY AND SOMEHOW BEING MORE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH DECISION-MAKING IN THE PROVINCE. HE SAID HE FELT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME REVERSAL IN OUR PREOCCUPATIONS, IN THAT HE WAS NOW MORE CONCERNED WITH SECURITY THAN POLITICS, CONTRARY TO THE IRISH TRADITION. HE DID NOT COMMENT DIRECTLY ON MY REFERENCE TO THE ASSEMBLY. HE DID SAY THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS WAS THAT IN THE SDLP WE HAD HAD A MINORITY PARTY WHICH WAS NOT COMMITTED TO NATIONALIST IDEAS SIMPLICITER (UNDERLINED), BUT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO CHANGE WITHOUT CONSENT. IT WAS VITAL TO PRESERVE THIS. MEANWHILE, THE FORUM WAS EMPHASISING THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE UNIONIST POSITION.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. HE SAID

CONFIDENTIAL

4. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE IRISH PRESS HAD MADE SUCH A FUSS ABOUT HIS STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES OPERATION IN GRENADA WAS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE HAD, HE FELT, TAKEN THE SAME VIEW AS MRS THATCHER. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESS ALWAYS REGARDED IRISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS SENSITIVE. HE SAID WRYLY THAT PERHAPS THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THEY WERE BOUND TO CRITICISE HIM WHEN HE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH MRS THATCHER. WE AGREED THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT WISH TO SPEND THEIR TETE-A-TETE ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, WHICH WOULD BE LEFT TO THE 2 FOREIGN MINISTERS OR FOR DISCUSSION AT LUNCH.

5. SEE MIFT FOR DISCUSSION OF COMMUNITY TOPICS.

GOODISON

LIMITED

R I D

PROTOCOL. D.

HO/NEWS. D.

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

SIR. J. BULLARD

COPIES TO:

SIR. R. ARMSTRONG } CABINET
MR. GOODALL } OFFICE
MR. COLVIN }

PS/S OF S

PS/SIR. P. WOODFIELD } N.I.O
MR. BRENNAN }
MR. ANGEL }
MR. BEYS SMITH }

2
CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 220

CONFIDENTIAL

FRAME GENERAL

DESKBY 021100Z

FM DUBLIN 021000Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 021100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO UKREP BRUSSELS, ATHENS

INFO SAVING ALL OTHER EC POSTS

CONFIDENTIAL

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: CALL ON THE TAOISEACH

1. WHEN I CALLED ON THE TAOISEACH ON 1 NOVEMBER HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ATHENS. HE HAD FOUND MR PAPANDEOU SYMPATHETIC PERSONALLY AND UNDERSTANDING OF IRELAND'S PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT THAT PAPANDEOU WOULD MAKE A VERY CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE THE POST-STUTTGART NEGOTIATION IN ATHENS. DR FITZGERALD HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE FRENCH HAD IN THE PAST BEEN INCLINED TO LEAVE PROBLEMS FOR SOLUTION BY THE SUCCEEDING IRISH PRESIDENCY AND THAT WE COULD NOT LET THE MATTER DRAG ON. HE FELT THE GREEKS, NOTABLY VARFIS, WERE BUSINESS-LIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH.

2. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE REGARDED THE IRISH PROBLEM AS SIMPLY THE QUESTION OF THE SUPER LEVY ON MILK OR REFORM OF THE CAP AS A WHOLE. HE SAID THAT THE SUPER LEVY WAS HIS ONLY MAJOR CONCERN. OF COURSE, HE WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF A STRICT FINANCIAL GUIDELINE IMPOSED AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUT NEITHER WERE THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBER STATES. HE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT MILK. HE BELIEVED THAT AN EARLY SETTLEMENT WAS POSSIBLE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRIMARY CONCERNS OF EACH OF THE MEMBER STATES. HE SYMPATHISED WITH OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE SIZE OF OUR CONTRIBUTION. MILK WAS VITAL TO HIM. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE SUPER LEVY TOO.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GOODISON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

FRAME GENERAL

RID
ECD (E)
ECD (I)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 470

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 021100Z

FM DUBLIN 021020Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 021100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: 7 NOVEMBER

1. DR FITZGERALD IS APPROACHING THE SUMMIT WITH THREE PRINCIPAL AIMS:

(A) HE WANTS TO CONVINCING THE IRISH PUBLIC THAT HE HAS BROUGHT ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS BACK TO NORMAL AND THAT, UNLIKE HIS PREDECESSOR, HE CAN CONDUCT A DIALOGUE WITH HMGT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN WHICH ALL PROBLEMS CAN BE DISCUSSED.

(B) HE WANTS TO EXPLORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL THINKING ON NORTHERN IRELAND, IN ADVANCE OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM, SO THAT WHEN THE FORUM HAS REPORTED HE CAN, IF HE WISHES, PUT PROPOSALS TO HER WITH SOME IDEA OF THEIR ACCEPTABILITY. HE WANTS TO DO THIS COMPLETELY IN CONFIDENCE, BOTH BECAUSE HIS IDEAS ARE BY NO MEANS CUT AND DRIED AND BECAUSE HE CANNOT AND MUST NOT BE SEEN TO ANTICIPATE THE REPORT OF THE FORUM OR TO OFFER THE PRIME MINISTER A SAY IN IT. HE IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MINORITY IN THE NORTH AND THE SECURITY FORCES. HE MAY ASK THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE TO BE PLAYED IN THE NORTH BY THE GARDA. HE HOPES THAT THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE FORUM WILL DISPEL WHAT HE CALLS THE NATIONALIST MYTHS, THAT IS TO SAY THAT ITS REPORT WILL INCLUDE A RECOGNITION THAT THE UNIONISTS IN THE NORTH HOLD LEGITIMATE VIEWS AND THAT THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OUGHT NOT TO BE OVERRULED. HE IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ADVANCE OF PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN, WHICH HOLDS DANGERS FOR HIM AS WELL AS THE SDLP. HE IS LOOKING FOR WAYS OF HELPING THE SDLP.

(C) HE WANTS THE PRIME MINISTER'S HELP IN THE EC TO DEFEAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A MILK SUPER LEVY. HE KNOWS WE ARE NOT ADVOCATING IT. MEANWHILE, HE ACCEPTS IN PRINCIPLE OUR CASE FOR SOME KIND OF SAFETY-NET, AND NO DOUBT HOPES TO MAKE A BARGAIN ON THAT BASIS. IT IS VITAL FOR HIM DOMESTICALLY TO AVERT THE THREAT OF A CLAMP-DOWN ON THE GROWTH OF IRISH MILK PRODUCTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/2

CONFIDENTIAL

2. IN COMING TO LONDON HE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF A SUCCESSFUL PARTY CONFERENCE BEHIND HIM, IN WHICH HE REUNITED FINE GAEL UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP AFTER THE STRAINS TO WHICH IT HAD BEEN SUBJECTED OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM ON ABORTION. HIS COALITION PARTNERS, THE LABOUR PARTY, UNHAPPY THOUGH THEY ARE WITH HIS RESTRICTIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, HAVE NOWHERE ELSE TO GO AND ARE UNLIKELY TO DESERT HIM. MR SPRING, THEIR LEADER, NEEDS TO BE SEEN TO BE PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT BUT NEITHER HE NOR DR FITZGERALD EXPECTS HIM TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE ROLE TO PLAY. MR HAUGHEY IS TRYING TO SPLIT THE COALITION BY CALLING FOR 'SELF FINANCING' TAX CUTS. THERE IS A GENERAL RECOGNITION HERE THAT THIS IS ECONOMIC NONSENSE AND A POLITICAL GAME. MR HAUGHEY HAS SUFFERED FURTHER FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR TO RUN HIS FAVOURITE INSURANCE COMPANY IN VIEW OF ITS INABILITY TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS. THERE ARE DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR DR FITZGERALD TO MAKE OVER NEXT YEAR'S BUDGET, BUT NOT YET.

3. WHILE THE TAOISEACH WILL WISH TO TRY HIS IDEAS OUT ON THE PRIME MINISTER, HE WILL, I THINK, BE CONTENT WITH GENERAL REACTIONS RATHER THAN SPECIFIC RESPONSES OVER NORTHERN IRELAND. ON THE EC HE WILL HOPE FOR SOMETHING MORE.

GOODISON

LIMITED

RID

ECOD(1)

INFO D

NEWS D

PUSD

PS

PS | LADY YOUNG

PS | MR WHITNEY

PS | MR RIFKIND

PS | PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR HANNAY

CONFIDENTIAL



2

H

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1983

Anglo/Irish Summit: Arrangements

Thank you for your letter of 2 November. I can now let you have the Prime Minister's decisions on the arrangements for the Summit. I should be grateful if you could take action, where appropriate, to let the Irish know how we propose to arrange the Summit.

The Prime Minister's tête-à-tête with Dr. FitzGerald will begin at 1000 hours. In response to the Irish request that we should allow adequate time, the Prime Minister envisages it continuing to 1115. After a break for coffee, the plenary would follow at 1130. During the tête-à-tête other Ministers and officials will meet in another room.

The Prime Minister would prefer to follow the usual practice of having note-takers present throughout the tête-à-tête. But it will be possible for either of the Principals to indicate that they do not wish particular passages to be recorded.

The Prime Minister agrees that the official element in the UK delegation should be as described in your letter. I should be grateful if Mr. Evers would take the record at the plenary session and let me have a draft afterwards.

As regards the lunch, the arrangements described in your letter are acceptable. David Barclay from No. 10 will be present and will lunch in the separate room with those officials for whom there is not room at the main lunch.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Agc

sf

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

I have minuted to you separately about the media arrangements. It would be very helpful to have your decisions tonight on the following points.

Dr. FitzGerald is expected to arrive at 0950 hours, accompanied by the Tanaiste and the Foreign Minister. Your tête-à-tête would begin at 1000 hours and the other Ministers and officials would meet in another room (I suggest the Long Gallery). The Irish are hoping that the tête-à-tête will be long. May we say that you envisage it continuing until 1115 and that after a break for coffee plenary would follow at 1130?

Yes

The Irish have also said that they hope at least part of the tête-à-tête could be conducted without note-takers. You will wish to say what you want but given the sensitivity of these meetings and the fact that Dr. FitzGerald will personally brief his own press afterwards, my suggestion is that we should tell the Irish that we think it would be better to follow the usual practice of having note-takers there throughout, but for the principals to indicate if they wish particular passages not to be recorded. Agree?

Yes

The Irish are bringing eight officials. I propose that you should be accompanied by Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Philip Woodfield, Sir Julian Bullard, our Ambassador in Dublin, Mr. Brennan (Northern Ireland Office), David Goodall and Mr. Evers from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (to record the plenary session). Agree?

Yes mt

Taking account of the Ministers present, we would then have eighteen for lunch - and I will ask Vera to make separate arrangements for the half-dozen or so other officials who cannot eat at the main table.

/ The Irish

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

The Irish will have their press spokesman present at the plenary session. Agree that Bernard should be there too?

Yes
mt

A.J.C.

2 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November 1983

Dear John,

Anglo-Irish Summit: Arrangements

We have been informed by the Irish that the Taoiseach and Mrs FitzGerald plan to arrive in the UK on Friday 4 November. They will be flying into Heathrow. The Tanaiste, Mr Spring, and the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Barry, will be arriving separately on Sunday 6 November at Heathrow. The Taoiseach and Mrs FitzGerald, accompanied by the Tanaiste, will be departing together on Tuesday 8 November from Heathrow. Mr Barry will probably wish to depart on his own on Monday 7 November, again from Heathrow. We recommend that the Foreign Secretary's Special Representative should greet the Taoiseach and Mrs FitzGerald on arrival and see them off, together with the Tanaiste, when they go on Tuesday 8 November. We also propose that an FCO Greeter should meet the Tanaiste and Mr Barry on arrival and see off Mr Barry. These proposals are in line with standard EC protocol procedure. If the meeting went particularly well, it might be appropriate to raise the level at which the Irish party were seen off.

It may also be worth recording the following decisions concerning points raised by the Irish regarding practical arrangements (Dublin telegram number 313 of 27 October).

The Tanaiste

You will recall that Dermot Nally, the Secretary to the Irish Government, told HM Ambassador, Dublin, that the Tanaiste hoped to see Mr Kinnock on the morning of 7 November and would therefore arrive at Chequers with the Taoiseach and Mr Barry.

Delegations

There is now agreement that the official element in the UK delegation should comprise Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Philip Woodfield, Sir Julian Bullard, HM Ambassador Dublin, Tony Brennan (NIO), David Goodall (Cabinet Office), yourself and Patrick Eyers (FCO).

/Lunch

Lunch

As you know, it is not possible to sit more than 18 in the dining room at Chequers. I understand that you have said that the Prime Minister would wish the following officials to be present on the UK side at lunch: Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Philip Woodfield, Sir Julian Bullard, HM Ambassador Dublin, David Goodall and yourself. The Irish have asked that Dempsey, the Minister at the Irish Embassy, should be included in the principal lunch. Their officials attending would therefore be Nally, Donlon, Dorr, Lillis, Prendergast and Dempsey. McCarthy and Kelly would lunch in another room with Tony Brennan and Patrick Evers.

Tete-a-tete

I understand that you wish the Irish to be told that we shall be planning provisionally on having a coffee break at 11.15 a.m., followed by the plenary at 11.30 a.m., though if at the time both Prime Ministers find it useful, their tete-a-tete could go on longer; and that the Prime Minister wishes to have a note-taker present during the tete-a-tete; it would be possible to agree if necessary that no record was made of particular parts of the exchanges.

I am copying this letter to John Lyon at the Northern Ireland Office and Richard Hatfield at the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Ireland: meetings with the Taoiseach
A6



-- 2 NOV 1983 --

CONFIDENTIAL

TWP

File



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT: JOINT STUDIES REVIEW

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 28 October and its attachments.

She is content with the proposals in paragraphs 6 and 7 of your minute, subject to the following comments on the review annexed to the draft joint report of the Steering Committee of the AIIC.

In sections 1.3 and 1.4 the Encounter organisation is presented, in effect, as a precursor to an Advisory Committee, the latter to be "associated with the AIIC". But the scope proposed for the independent development of Encounter, with emphasis on independence of Government control, fits rather uneasily into (apparently) the more "official" status of the Advisory Committee.

In sections 3.19 and 3.20, the Prime Minister feels that the last paragraph could cause difficulty. The border areas are the most sensitive in security terms and many isolated farmsteads have been the targets for PIRA and INLA cross-border terrorist attacks - with a number of Protestant farmers in Northern Ireland being driven to evacuate border farm lands. A lot of local controversy on the Northern Ireland side is directed at the issue of the closure of cross-border roads for the setting up of road blocks, regularity of patrols, etc. The paragraph referred to might provoke both derision and anger if read out in the Northern Ireland Assembly. The new tourist maps might be seen, however unjustifiable, as an aid to terrorism. In section 4.4, the Prime Minister has observed that secondary education in Northern Ireland is a touchy topic. The sectarian divide in schooling is regarded as the root cause of the persistence of much of the present troubles. The section in question seems to portray very much a one-way traffic in exchanges, i.e. from South to North and could be seen by some as almost a subversive flow.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if you could take into account the above comments in further drafting.

I am copying this minute to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. Cole.

1 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL


855

PART 6 ends:-

AJC to PM + attached 31/10/83.

PART 7 begins:-

AJC to RTA 1/11/83.



S
810

PREM 19 | 1408/2

Part 2 of 2

SECRET
PART 7 B

MT

NEW FILE COVER

602

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

MEETINGS WITH THE TADISEACH

ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMITS

£

IRELAND

PART 1: MAY 1979

PART 7: November 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
2-11-81 2/11/84 X ENDS							

PART

pc 7

ends:-

Dublin tel no 686 of 23/11

PART

pc 8

begins:-

RVA to PM (A004/3160) 27/11/84

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons HANSARD, 20 November 1984, columns 150 to 159: Anglo-Irish Summit


Northern Ireland. Report of an Independent Inquiry, Chairman: Lord Kilbrandon. Published by The Independent Inquiry November 1984

Signed S. Gray Date 7/10/2013

PREM Records Team

KEEP AT TOP OF FILE

Please note that NOBODY
(incl. Sir PC) other than
AJC^{CP} should see papers
on Anglo-Irish relations and
visit by the Taoiseach.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'M. G. P.' or similar, written in a cursive style.

* amended 14/2/50

14/2/50

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

COPY NO

1

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

NOVEMBER 1984

*Master set of
HMV(84) held in
CAB 133. This set
destroyed.*

LIST OF BRIEFS ISSUED IN THE HMV(84) SERIES

*R. Pinner
21 Nov 13*

1. GENERAL BRIEF
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 2. REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 3. THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL (AIIC)
Brief by the Cabinet Office
- NORTHERN IRELAND:
4. EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS
Brief by Law Officers' Department
 5. NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL SCENE
Brief by the Northern Ireland Office
 6. SECURITY:
Briefs by the Northern Ireland Office
 - a. SECURITY CO-OPERATION
 - b. BORDER INCURSIONS BY THE SECURITY FORCES
 - c. BORDER ROAD CLOSURES
 - d. PLASTIC BATON ROUNDS
 - e. THE JUDICIARY IN NORTHERN IRELAND
 - f. STRIP-SEARCHING AT HMP ARMAGH
 - g. LENGTHY REMANDS
 - h. GAELIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (GAA) PITCH AT CROSSMAGLEN
 - i. CROSS-BORDER BRIDGES

CONFIDENTIAL

- j. PRISON SEGREGATION
- k. JOHN McVEIGH: PRISONER IN THE MAZE
- l. SUPERGRASSES
- m. HOME MADE EXPLOSIVES

7. ENERGY:

- a. KINSALE GAS
- b. LIGNITE

Brief by the Northern Ireland Office

8. NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Brief by the Northern Ireland Office

9. CARLINGFORD LOUGH AND LOUGH FOYLE (Defensive)

Brief by the Northern Ireland Office

10. EC MATTERS: PROSPECTS FOR THE DECEMBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11. BILATERAL ISSUES (Defensive):

a. SELLAFIELD DISCHARGES INTO IRISH SEA
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

b. CONTINENTAL SHELF DELIMITATION (Defensive)
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

c. IRISH LIGHTS
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

d. ANGLO-IRISH ENCOUNTER
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

e. IRISH SAILORS' AND SOLDIERS' LAND TRUST
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

f. MV SHARELGA
Brief by Ministry of Defence

12.(a) CENTRAL AMERICA

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (for defensive use only)

13. EC RESPONSE TO ETHIOPIAN FAMINE

Brief by Overseas Development Administration

Cabinet Office

14 November 1984

SECRET AND PERSONAL

NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH STATEMENT OF POSITION

1. The agreed purpose of the current confidential discussions between British and Irish officials is to see whether it is possible hypothetically to identify a set of proposals on which both sides might agree as a means of promoting lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland and, as a necessary element in that process, helping to strengthen the confidence of the minority community in the forces of law and order and in the political institutions of Northern Ireland. It is agreed that this will necessarily involve the strengthening of Anglo-Irish relations within the existing institutional framework.
2. It is accepted by both sides that the discussions are exploratory, and are being conducted without commitment; and that any set of proposals which may be identified will be for consideration by the two Governments, each of which will have to make its own judgement on whether and, if so, on the extent to which the set of proposals may be acceptable.
3. It is also accepted by both sides that any set of proposals which might be agreed upon should be adequate to achieve the objectives set out in para. 1; should be durable and thus remove uncertainty; and transparent, in the sense that it should contain no hidden provisions and no features which might generate suspicions on either side of the border that there were hidden provisions.
4. A fundamental idea emerging from the discussions is that the proposals might be built on two central and reciprocal elements: on the one hand, action by the United Kingdom Government to accord the Irish Government a right to contribute, on a systematic and institutionalised basis, to the consideration by the United Kingdom Government of a range of policy matters including security as a means of strengthening the confidence of the minority community in Northern Ireland in the institutions of

government; on the other hand, action by the Irish Government formally to reassure the majority community in Northern Ireland: to achieve this, the Irish Government would be prepared as part of a balanced set of proposals to change the present Irish Constitution so as to make it plain that although there is an aspiration to Irish unity there is no territorial claim on Northern Ireland. It is also a part of the central concept that the UK Government would seek to introduce a measure of devolved government in Northern Ireland [based on an elected Assembly and a Northern Ireland Executive,] and that this would have the support of the Irish Government.

5. As the Prime Minister made clear in her conversation with the Taoiseach on 3 September, any question of joint authority is excluded: what might be envisaged is a formal obligation on the UK Government to consult and a right for the Irish Government to be consulted. The Irish side, while accepting the British position that the ultimate power of decision would continue to lie with the UK Government, believes that any arrangements for involving the Irish Government in the affairs of Northern Ireland must be such as to give it opportunities for making a substantive contribution to the formulation of policy, including security policy. The British side envisages that the UK Government could accept a formal obligation to allow the Irish Government a right to contribute to the formulation of policy on an agreed range of matters and would give full weight to the Irish Government's views.

Irish territorial claim

6. The Irish side envisages that the Irish Government would, if the balance in this set of measures were right, be prepared to embark on a referendum to repeal Articles 2 and 3 of the present Irish Constitution and to replace these two articles with wording which would: substitute an aspiration to unity for what is now seen as a territorial claim; confirm that violence in pursuit of that aspiration was absolutely abjured; and emphasise that the aspiration could not be realised without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

Consultative arrangements

7. There is agreement that consultation as a matter of right would not apply to external defence, foreign affairs or finance, which would continue to be the sole responsibility of the UK Government. The Irish side hopes that the possibility of informal consultation on occasion and on request on these matters would not be excluded. Similarly the right of consultation would not apply to matters which had been devolved to a Northern Ireland Assembly or Executive. In addition to security (which is treated separately - see paragraphs 11-13 below), the right of consultation would in principle apply to all areas of government and administration which do not fall into either of the two foregoing categories (defence, foreign affairs and finance on the one hand; devolved matters on the other) and which fall within the executive responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Examples advanced by the Irish side to which the right of consultation should apply include nominations by the Secretary of State to public bodies and institutions and to any bodies set up to give effect to these arrangements; nominations to a devolved Executive; issues affecting the identity of the two communities in Northern Ireland (flags and emblems, the use of the Irish language etc.); and broadcasting, posts and communications.

8. Both sides agree that a system of devolved government commanding widespread acceptance throughout the community of Northern Ireland should be integral to the set of proposals. The Irish side, however, would not wish the introduction of the consultative arrangements to be blocked if it should prove impossible to get devolved government under way.

9. Both sides accept that the process by which the Irish Government participated in consideration of matters falling within the arrangements envisaged would be within the framework of the existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC). But there is a divergence of view about the institutional machinery to be created for the purpose. The Irish side would wish to see a Ministerial Commission for Northern Ireland, comprising the Secretary of State for

Northern Ireland and a member of the Irish Government; and see this Commission as having overall responsibility for considering all the areas of policy envisaged, including security. The British side would not wish to see the institutional structure described as a Commission. It accepts, however, that the Government of the Republic would appoint a representative in Northern Ireland (whose style and title would be for further consideration) who would have supporting staff and with whom the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and any officials acting on his behalf or subject to his direction, would consult on relevant matters. A liaison unit would be established at Stormont to monitor, coordinate and encourage contacts with the Irish representative and to act as a channel for communication with him. He would, however, be free to contact Northern Ireland Office Ministers or Departments on his own initiative.

10. The Irish side has pointed out that, in the event that an Executive were formed, it would be of practical benefit to have a mechanism whereby the Executive and the Irish Government could consult on practical matters of mutual interest.

Security

11. It is agreed that there should be a Joint Security Commission (JSC) comprising the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and an Irish Minister, assisted as necessary by advisers who might include the Chief Constable of Northern Ireland and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana or other appropriate senior police officers. It is also agreed that the JSC should have no operational responsibilities: responsibility for police operations would remain with the heads of the respective police forces.

12. The Irish side sees the functions of the JSC as limited to Northern Ireland; the British side, while accepting that measures discussed in the JSC would relate primarily to

Northern Ireland, believes that there should be scope for the application by the Republic of some such measures where that would enhance security cooperation. The divergence here, however, relates only to the question whether the JSC would be the appropriate forum in which to discuss issues of cross-border cooperation. The Irish side agrees that arrangements for such discussions are appropriate (though not within the JSC) and agrees also that measures discussed in the JSC in relation to Northern Ireland might at times be such that they could appropriately and usefully be applied also in the South either in the interests of security cooperation or for other reasons. The Irish side sees the Ministerial component in the JSC as comprising their proposed Ministerial Commission for Northern Ireland (i.e. the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland plus the Irish representative in Northern Ireland) and the JSC itself as having an important role in the establishment of security policy guidelines, including operational guidelines for the security forces and the prison services in Northern Ireland, in the appointment of the principal officers of the police force and the prison service in Northern Ireland, and the recruitment and training of police and prison officers, and in the appointment of members of Boards of Visitors for the prisons in Northern Ireland.

13. The British side, while accepting that the JSC would be within the framework of the AIIC, sees its Ministerial component as comprising the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish Minister for Justice (who is responsible in the Republic for law and order) and its primary function as being to improve security cooperation between the two sides in the fight against terrorism. The British side has proposed that the JSC's initial work programme should cover such matters as e.g. the exchange of intelligence, technical cooperation (in training, forensic matters and the control of explosives), the exchange of personnel, joint inspection arrangements, the planning of coordinated operations and the development of a programme of action designed to affirm the position of the police as an accepted part of the whole community. (This work programme overlaps to some extent with the propositions put forward by the Irish side and requires further discussion.)

Practical Policing Measures

14. Both sides accept that (a) the operational effectiveness of policing arrangements in Northern Ireland should not be impaired; and (b) measures are in principle needed to help the minority community to identify with and support the police to a greater extent than at present. The British side has proposed a number of practical measures designed to improve the recruitment of Catholics into the RUC and improve relations between the RUC and local communities. While welcoming these proposals, the Irish side is strongly of the view that they do not go far enough, and that early and visible measures, including some change in the RUC, are needed in order to attract support from the minority community. One suggestion that they have put forward to that end is the idea that predominantly nationalist areas should be policed primarily by people drawn from the nationalist community and, more broadly, the establishment of locally based police forces in Northern Ireland. In response to British objections, the Irish have asked whether arrangements of this kind might be introduced and announced as being on a temporary basis - e.g. for a period of five to ten years - with the avowed purpose of restoring minority confidence in the police force. A suggestion from the British side to establish joint regional crime squads which could be employed in either jurisdiction has not found favour with the Irish side as part of the initial proposals; but the Irish would not object to it as a possible subject for study by the proposed Joint Security Commission at some time in the future.

15. In general, it is accepted by both sides that practical policing arrangements would be one of the key areas in any set of proposals but that further discussion, involving experts on both sides, is needed in order to establish whether mutually acceptable arrangements could be worked out.

Mixed Law Courts

16. The Irish side has suggested that persons tried whether in Northern Ireland or in the Republic for terrorist crimes might be tried by a single court comprising three judges for each case. These would be drawn from a panel of judges half of whom would be from each jurisdiction. When sitting in Northern Ireland, one of the three judges would be from the Republic and the Court would exercise its jurisdiction under the law of the United Kingdom. When sitting in the Republic, one of the three judges would be from Northern Ireland and the Court would exercise its jurisdiction under the law of the Republic. The British side has agreed that the feasibility of mixed courts should be examined and a number of implications have been tentatively explored. Both sides agree that the study of these ideas should continue, but the British side has emphasised that the formulation and operation of any scheme would require the cooperation of the Northern Ireland judiciary, which has not yet been consulted.

All-Ireland Law Commission

17. The British side has suggested the establishment of an All-Ireland Law Commission to examine whether there are areas of the criminal law, applying respectively in Northern Ireland and the Republic, which could be harmonised with advantage to both countries. The British proposals envisage that the Commission's first task would be to define the areas to which harmonisation would apply and thereafter to agree on joint machinery for studying those areas and putting forward recommendations for reform. The Irish side has welcomed the British suggestions and has proposed in addition that the Commission would be required to devise proposals for the steps to be taken to establish the following:

- a single criminal court with the possibility of a jury which could be selected on an all-Ireland basis;

- a single court both for the North and for the South which would have sole jurisdiction in relation to human rights in both jurisdictions;
- a common legal regime in the area of human rights;
- a single appellate division of the All-Ireland Court;
- a uniform criminal law for the two jurisdictions.

The British side has expressed reservations about these proposals particularly so far as they relate to human rights.

An Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Body

18. The Irish side believes that a joint Parliamentary body of the kind adumbrated in the Anglo-Irish Studies Report of November 1981 could be a useful element in any set of proposals. The British side believes that any such body should evolve pragmatically from the existing Anglo-Irish Parliamentary contacts. There has been no detailed discussion of the possibilities; but the Irish side has expressed general agreement with the idea that a start could be made by systematising the existing contacts and making provision for more regular meetings leading to the establishment of a consultative body; this could receive reports from each Government on the progress of Anglo-Irish relations; and could itself make recommendations to the two Governments or the two sovereign Parliaments which, together with the Northern Ireland Assembly, would then be free to act on them.

Bill of Rights

18. The Irish side wishes to see the enactment of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and believes that this would be of significant symbolic and political value in securing the support of the minority community and the SDLP for any agreed set of measures. The Irish side has drawn attention to the fact that all the Unionist parties in Northern Ireland and the

SDLP now favour such a proposal; and suggest that the most practical way to proceed would be to incorporate the European Convention of Human Rights into Northern Ireland law. The British side has taken note of the Irish proposal, while drawing attention to the practical difficulties including the implications for the rest of the United Kingdom.

Devolution

20. As noted above, both sides are agreed that a system of devolved government in Northern Ireland based on an elected Assembly and on a Northern Ireland Executive would be integral to the proposals discussed in this note. Such a system would have to be acceptable to both communities in Northern Ireland and would depend upon the cooperation of the Northern Ireland political parties and the support of the Irish Government. The Irish side believes that the SDLP and the minority community would require this system to be established on a power-sharing basis. The British side believes that the Unionists would oppose this; that they would be most unlikely to participate in power-sharing arrangements; and that involving the Republic in the affairs of the Province on the basis proposed would intensify the hostility of the Unionists to any form of power-sharing. The Irish side has suggested that Unionist objections might be overcome if the functions of Chief Executive in a devolved government in which both communities were represented were to be exercised by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or by another Minister, who would thus provide a visible assurance of continuing United Kingdom authority over the government of the Province. The British side has expressed serious reservations about this proposal, which, however, remains on the table for further study.

Legal basis for any accord between the two countries

21. The British side has said that detailed discussion of this question is premature. It has been assumed for purposes of the discussion, however, that the measures agreed on would

be spelt out in a formal agreement between the two Governments, which would incorporate a statement of objectives and would provide for the establishment and implementation of the measures agreed on. The agreement would have to be ratified by both Parliaments and registered with the United Nations; and it would enter into force only after Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution had been amended following a referendum. Legislation would be required in both countries.

NORTHERN IRELAND

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID

Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

CABINET OFFICE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

14.11.84

GRS 520

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ RESTRICTED

FM DUBLIN 231400Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 686 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO NIO (BELFAST) NIO (LONDON)

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

ANGLO IRISH DIFFERENCES AFTER THE SUMMIT CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE IRISH MEDIA, MTHOUGH THERE ARE SIGNS OF AN AWARENESS THAT THE TIME MAY HAVE COME FOR THE PIECES TO BE PUT BACK TOGETHER.

2. THE HEADLINES IN TODAY'S DUBLIN PAPERS ARE "SUMMIT ROW, BID TO COOL TEMPER" (INDEPENDENT); "BRITISH MOVE TO COOL TALKS NOW" (PRESS) AND "DUBLIN PESSIMISTIC OF ANY PROGRESS WITH THATCHER" (TIMES). MY CALL ON THE TAOISEACH YESTERDAY IS PROMINENTLY REPORTED: THE 'TIMES' AND THE 'PRESS' ARE UNSURE WHETHER IT TOOK PLACE AT MY OR HIS REQUEST. THE 'INDEPENDENT' REPORTS THAT I WAS CALLED IN, AND QUOTES A 'GOVERNMENT SOURCE' AS SAYING THAT THE MEETING "INDICATES HOW BADLY THINGS HAVE DRIFTED IN THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS".

3. THE PRIME MINISTERS REMARKS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY ARE ALSO PROMINENTLY REPORTED. THE 'TIMES' COMMENTS THAT "THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS PERSONALLY GENUINELY MYSTIFIED BY THE TAOISEACHS COMMENT. CERTAINLY BRITISH OBSERVERS AGREE THAT SHE HAD SAID NOTHING THAT WAS UNCHARACTERISTIC FOR HER". ON AN INSIDE PAGE, IN AN ARTICLE HEADED "MISTAKES AND CONFUSION LED TO SUMMIT DEBACLE", DAVID MCKITTRICK DEVELOPS THIS THEME FURTHER. HE SAYS THAT IT WAS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TONE OF THE TWO CONFERENCES WHICH LED TO PROBLEMS AND THAT THIS OCCURRED

TWO CONFERENCES WHICH LED TO PROBLEMS AND THAT THIS OCCURRED BECAUSE THE TAOISEACH DID NOT HAVE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID: 'EVERY VIEWER IN THE REPUBLIC THIS KNEW MORE ABOUT HER ATTITUDE THAN HE DID'. (THIS IS NOT QUITE SO. HE TOLD ME HE HAD HEARD THE BROADCAST. BUT OF COURSE HE DID NOT SEE THE IRISH LIVE TELEVISION).

4. ALL THREE PAPERS AGAIN CARRY EDITORIAL COMMENT. THE 'IRISH TIMES' SAYS 'INSTEAD OF PROLONGING THE BICKERING ... ALL LEINSTER HOUSE POLITICIANS SHOULD NOW BE GETTING DOWN TO A RETHINK OF THE COMMON APPROACH TO OUR BIG PROBLEM MR HAUGHEY IS NOT GOING TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT OVER THIS: HE MAY SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE IRISH CAUSE AS A WHOLE'. IT CONCLUDES 'WHAT OF UNEMPLOYMENT? WHAT OF THE PUBLIC WAGE DEMANDS? WHAT OF A DOZEN OTHER ISSUES THAT WEIGH ON US ONE AND ALL? THERE IS A NEED TO PRESS ON ''.

5. THE 'IRISH PRESS' UNDER THE HEADING 'BOLTING THE STABLE DOOR' SAYS THAT 'IT IS QUITE CLEAR BOTH FROM WHAT HAS LEAKED FROM THE FINE GAEL PARLIAMENTARY PARTY MEETING AND FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY MR BARRY YESTERDAY (SEE MIFT) THAT WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT THE MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER ... IN NO WAY REFLECTED THE REAL BITTERNESS FELT IN GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES ABOUT THE TREATMENT AFFORDED THE FORUM REPORT'. THE GOVERNMENT HAD BENT OVER SO FAR BACKWARDS IN ORDER TO SALVAGE SOMETHING FOR THE SDLP THAT IT HAD BEEN 'ALMOST HORIZONTAL GOING INTO CHEQUERS'. AS A RESULT OF THIS AND OF 'BEING SO NAIVE VIS-A - VIS MRS THATCHER' IT HAD HIT THE BOTTOM LINE: 'WE ARE NOW BACK AT SQUARE MINUS ONE, AND AS THE OPINION POLLS WILL SHORTLY SHOW, TALKING TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IS GOING TO DO NOTHING TO RESTORE THE GOVERNMENTS LOSS OF FACE''.

6. THE 'INDEPENDENT' HOWEVER SAYS THAT 'WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL TO SEPARATE THE LONG TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN DR FITZGERALD AND MRS THATCHER FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH FOLLOWED IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE TWO COULD AGREE TO MEET AGAIN SOON IF THEY HAD NOT DECIDED ON CERTAIN WORTHWHILE AVENUES TO EXPLORE. THE TALKING MUST CONTINUE, DESPITE THAT PRESS CONFERENCE AND DESPITE MR HURDS UNGAINLY INTERVENTION THE NORTHERN PROBLEM WILL ONLY BE SOLVED BY TALKING. THIS WE KNOW. WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE TO LEARN, AGAIN, IT SEEMS, IS THAT IT WILL ALWAYS HAVE A NORTHERN PROBLEM ON ITS HANDS UNLESS IT BACKS AWAY FROM ITS PRESENT APPARENTLY ENTRENCHED POSITION ON A DUBLIN INVOLVEMENT IN THE NORTH.''

CCN: PARA 3, LINE 11 : 'EVERY VIEWER IN THE REPUBLIC THUS

GOODISON

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1984

NBPM
ADP
28xi

Dear Charles,

Anglo/Irish Summit: 18-19 November 1984

I wrote yesterday summarising the Irish press line on 20 and 21 November. This covers the line on 22 November.

All the dailies led with the story about the Taoiseach's private meeting with his Fine Gael parliamentary party. Prominence was also given to Mr Hurd's press conference in Belfast the day before and of Mr Spring's description of the Northern Ireland Secretary's remarks as "astonishing and unacceptable". The leader writers joined the condemnation. The 'Irish Times' claimed that Mr Hurd was "hardly an expert so soon" to be laying down the limits of Irish interest in the affairs of Northern Ireland, and said that his and Mrs Thatcher's comments call "for stronger words from the Irish Government than have so far been issued". The "Irish Press" (generally pro Fianna Fail) demanded that "the Taoiseach should make it clear that if there is to be no cooperation on the political front there can be no cooperation on policing".

In a piece on the meeting of the Fine Gael parliamentary party the same paper reported that some Fine Gael TDs had said that Dr FitzGerald should have asserted himself much more strongly after the Summit. It noted that the Fine Gael TDs were united in the criticism of Mrs Thatcher's "behaviour". The Government Chief Whip is reported to have said that a great deal of anger had been expressed about Mrs Thatcher's press conference, particularly "her dismissal of the alienation of the nationalists in the North and the manner and tone of her dismissal of the Forum options". Fine Gael TDs "strongly expressed the view that Dr FitzGerald should present Mrs Thatcher with an ultimatum at the Summit in the Spring and should publicly attack her if she again failed to come up with any response to the Irish position".

On the prospects for continuing contacts at official level, the 'Irish Independent' (generally supportive of the Coalition Government) reported that the "Anglo-Irish slanging match is causing serious problems for the Irish negotiating team", but the paper says that the Irish side

/"remained



"remained adamant that real progress along the road to equalising the Nationalist and Unionist identities within Northern Ireland had been made at Chequers".

It is worth adding as a post-script to all this vituperation that our Dublin Embassy have told us that the DFA have expressed hopes to them that the public furore will now die away.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



23 NOV 1984

11 12 1 2 3 4

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS (2)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID
Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
RESIDENT CLERK

SIR R ARMSTRONG }
DIO } CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

14.11.84

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 22
FM DUBLIN 221840Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 682 OF 22 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (B) NIO(L)

mt

DUBLIN TELNO 677: ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS IN CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES WITH ITS SUPPORTERS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE OVER ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AFTER WHAT ARE SEEN AS UNHELPFUL ELEMENTS IN THE PRIME MINISTERS PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT OF 19 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. THE Taoiseach sent a message to my London home on the morning of 22 November asking me to return to Dublin as quickly as possible. I saw him for over an hour this afternoon. MR SPRING AND NALLY WERE ALSO PRESENT.

??

3. DR FITZGERALD HANDED ME A COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH I UNDERSTAND HAS BEEN DELIVERED BY THE IRISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. HE SAID THAT WE FACED A CONSIDERABLE CRISIS IN OUR RELATIONS. HE FEARED THAT THE DEPTH OF FEELING IN THE REPUBLIC MIGHT NOT BE EASILY APPRECIATED IN LONDON. HE THEN WENT THROUGH THE MATERIAL IN THE LETTER. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTERS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 19 NOVEMBER WHICH HAD GIVEN RISE TO PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES HERE. FIRST THE PRIME MINISTERS REJECTION OF THE FORUM REPORT HAD GIVEN OFFENCE. THE PUBLIC HAD FOUND IT TOO SUMMARY AND THE GOVERNMENT FELT THAT SHE HAD FOCUSED ON THE WRONG ASPECTS OF THE REPORT INSTEAD OF THE SECTION DEALING WITH PRINCIPLES AND REALITIES. SECONDLY THEY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HER APPARENT REFUSAL NOT ONLY TO ACCEPT THE WORD 'ALIENATION' BUT ALSO TO ACCEPT THERE WAS

ONLY TO ACCEPT THE WORD 'ALIENATION' BUT ALSO TO ACCEPT THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF THIS KIND. IT SEEMED TO THEM THAT THE WHOLE BASIS FOR THE SUMMIT TALKS HAD BEEN THAT THE MINORITY HAD LITTLE FAITH IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS HAD BEEN RECOGNISED BY MR PRIOR IN HIS SPEECH OF 2 JULY AND ON THIS BASIS HE HAD FELT HIMSELF PERSONALLY JUSTIFIED IN REFERRING IN PUBLIC TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA BY HMG. THE REPUDIATION OF THIS WAS EXTRAORDINARILY DAMAGING TO HIM.

4. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN AWARE OF THESE POINTS ON THE EVENING OF 19 NOVEMBER BUT HAD DECIDED TO REJECT ANY THOUGHT OF REBUTTING THE PRIME MINISTERS VIEWS. THE RESULT HAD BEEN THAT HIS PERFORMANCE AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND IN THE IRISH PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN UNIMPRESSIVE AND POLITICALLY DAMAGING. HE HAD TRIED TO PRESERVE ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS BUT THE ONLY RESULT HAD BEEN A SEVERE BLOW TO HIM. THIS WAS DISASTROUS WHEN AN OPINION POLL PUBLISHED ON 15 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 655) HAD SHOWN THAT THE GOVERNMENTS POLICY OF PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT INTERNAL TO NORTHERN IRELAND WAS GAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT. MINISTERS HAD BEEN BITTERLY CRITICISED AT PARTY MEETINGS. SEVERAL SPEAKERS HAD SAID THAT THE MORALE OF THE IRA HAD BEEN BOOSTED. HE BELIEVED THE MORALE OF THE SDLP WAS VERY LOW.

5. THE CABINET HAD DECIDED THAT THERE MUST BE AN IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF THEIR NORTHERN IRELAND POLICY AND OFFICIALS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONDUCT THIS AT ONCE. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO HOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS IN THE NORTH AND THAT THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN THE IRA.

6. IN A SOMEWHAT THEATRICAL MANNER, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE WAS THEN BROUGHT IN TO GIVE US AN UP-TO-DATE APPRECIATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION. HE SAID THAT THE PIRA AND SINN FEIN HAD BEEN CAREFULLY BALANCING THE APPEAL OF THE BALLOT AND THE ARMALITE. THEY WERE WELL AWARE THAT TOO MANY VIOLENT ACTS COULD AFFECT THEIR ELECTORAL SUPPORT. THE EFFECT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS WAS THAT WIDE SECTIONS OF THE PUBLIC WERE ANGRY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PUBLIC TOLERANCE OF IRA ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCREASED. THERE WOULD BE AN INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF SAFE HOUSES, THE FLOW OF INFORMATION WOULD BE REDUCED, THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DIMINISHED IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE IRA AND HENCE ITS CAPACITY TO COPE WITH TERRORISM. THE PROBLEMS HE FACED WERE MORE SERIOUS THAN AT ANY PREVIOUS MOMENT SINCE HE HAD TAKEN OFFICE. MR NOONAN THEN WITHDREW.

7. MR SPRING SAID HE COULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE DAMAGE WHICH HAD BEEN DONE. THERE WAS A COUNTRY-WIDE FEELING OF ANNOYANCE AND FRUSTRATION. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO PURSUE GOOD ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS AND HAD WORKED HARD TO COOPERATE WITH US IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. HE STRESSED THEIR EFFORTS ON EXTRADITION. IT WAS NOW VERY DIFFICULT TO PURSUE THESE EFFORTS. SOMETHING WHICH HAD LAIN JUST BENEATH THE SURFACE HAD BEEN SCRATCHED AGAIN.

8. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT CAREFULLY WHAT THEY HAD SAID. I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT I FELT BOUND TO SAY THAT I DID NOT THINK THERE COULD BE ANY EXCUSE FOR PERSONAL ABUSE OF THE KIND I HAD SEEN

COULD BE ANY EXCUSE FOR PERSONAL ABUSE OF THE KIND I HAD SEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS. IN RESPONSE TO MY CHALLENGE, THE TAOISEACH SAID THAT MR BARRY HAD NOT DESCRIBED THE PRIME MINISTERS WORDS AS 'DISGRACEFUL'. HE DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT CERTAIN PHRASES HAD BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO HIMSELF. HE DID NOT THINK THAT HE HAD USED THEM. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INJUDICIOUS HAD HE DONE SO, THOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE SAID THIS KIND OF THING.

9. I SAID I DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY REASON FOR THEM TO BE SURPRISED AT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY. WE HAD FROM THE FIRST REJECTED THE THREE OPTIONS IN THE FORUM REPORT AND WE HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE WORD 'ALIENATION' ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. THE MINISTERS AND I THEN WENT BACK OVER MUCH OF THE GROUND AGAIN.

10. DR FITZGERALD ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT COULD BE DONE. HE SAID HE WAS DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PATH, WHICH MEANT THE PATH OF DIALOGUE. I SAID I KNEW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY WHAT HE HAD SAID TO HER AT THE SUMMIT. I ASSUMED THAT HE WANTED HER TO MAKE A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HIM. I THOUGHT THAT ANY SUCH STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO SAY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED REGRET FOR THE REPORTS OF CERTAIN EXPRESSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO AUTHORISE HER TO SAY THIS AT PRESENT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO VERIFY PRECISELY WHAT HAD BEEN SAID. HE WAS HORRIFIED THAT THESE WORDS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED, THOUGH HE WAS NOT UNHAPPY THAT THE MOOD OF THE PARTY MEETING HAD EMERGED TO THE PRESS.

11. IN CONCLUSION BOTH MR SPRING AND THE TAOISEACH STRESSED THEIR HOPES THAT THIS CRISIS COULD BE OVERCOME AND THEIR ANXIETY TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE.

COMMENT

12. DR FITZGERALD AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH THEIR PARTY, PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC. THIS TROUBLE IS LARGELY DUE TO THE WIDESPREAD IMPRESSION THAT DR FITZGERALD HAS BEEN SUBSERVIENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HAS FAILED TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING BY IT. RESENTMENT HAS FOCUSED ON THE PRIME MINISTERS PRESS CONFERENCE. I HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER WILL FEEL ABLE TO SEND DR FITZGERALD A SOOTHING REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE STRESSING THAT SHE IS COMMITTED TO A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE. BUT I DO NOT THINK WE CAN DO MUCH TO HELP HIM WITH HIS DOMESTIC CRISIS SINCE WE HAVE NO SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS TO OFFER THE IRISH AT THIS TIME. I THINK WE ARE IN FOR A BAD PERIOD. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COOPERATE WITH US IN ANY FIELD PARTICULARLY OVER SECURITY. I THINK DR FITZGERALD CAN WEATHER HIS DOMESTIC STORM ONLY AT THE PRICE OF BEING SEEN TO TREAT US WITH SOME COLDNESS. I DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE IN HIS INTERESTS OR OURS FOR US TO RESPOND WITH ANYTHING BUT PATIENCE.

GOODISON



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1984

ms
Prime Minister

CDP
22/xi

Dear Charles,

Anglo/Irish Summit: 18-19 November 1984

Dublin Press Reaction

In view of the fuss in Dublin following Dr FitzGerald's return from the Chequers Summit, you may wish to have the following summary of the reaction of the Dublin dailies on 20 and 21 November.

Press reactions on the morning after the Summit (20 November), with the notable exception of the "Irish Independent", took Mr Haughey's cue to declare the Summit a failure and to blame the Prime Minister (see Dublin telno 675 attached).

Press coverage on the following day (21 November) centred on Mr Haughey's scathing attack on the Taoiseach in the Dail the evening before. In his statement to the Dail the Taoiseach had acknowledged that important differences remained to be overcome but he had argued that it was possible to build something on the principles shared by the two Governments in the areas of accommodating both identities and providing a system of security acceptable to both nationalists and Unionists. Mr Haughey's response has been prominently reported: he accused Dr FitzGerald of "abject capitulation to a new British intransigence and a craven desertion of the principles of the Forum Report" and said that the Prime Minister had brutally rejected the Forum's principles and had "trampled nationalist aspirations into the ground". He accused the Taoiseach of incompetence, misjudgment, ineffectiveness and of pathetic behaviour. He pledged himself "to continue to fight at home and abroad for the only solution that would bring lasting peace and justice to this island of ours".

In commenting on the exchange the "Irish Independent" (which is generally supportive of the Coalition Government) said that Mr Haughey's invective had floored a "far too gentle Taoiseach". Mr Haughey had convincingly "hammered home the image of a muddled, incoherent leader incapable of standing up to Mrs Thatcher". The same paper noted that when he began his statement the Taoiseach had the Ministerial

/support



support of only Mr Spring and Ruairi Quinn. The 'Irish Press' (generally pro-Fianna Fail) reported that there was considerable disillusion on the Government side of the House, particularly at Dr FitzGerald's "lacklustre performance" at his post-Summit press conference and the "gloss" he had placed on the meeting with the Prime Minister. The paper claimed that there was embarrassment at the Prime Minister's dismissal of the word "alienation" and unease at her unwillingness to endorse Mr Barry's claim that Britain has recognised the right of the Irish Government to speak for the nationalists in the North. Above all, it reports, there seems to be anger and dismay over the Prime Minister's outright rejection of the three Forum models.

The 'Irish Times' reported the emergency debate the previous day in the Northern Ireland Assembly giving prominence to DUP Deputy leader Peter Robinson's remark that the proposals of the new Ireland Forum are "now in a burial plot somewhere near Chequers".

On the prospects for future inter-governmental talks the 'Irish Times' carried a report claiming that it had "learned" that the division at the Summit had centred on whether or not the Republic would have any "executive role" in Northern Ireland affairs and that "if no substantial progress is made on the division which emerged at the Summit, the talks will be broken off, most likely at the next Summit planned for February". British refusal to grant anything more than a consultative role, it went on to say, makes a breakdown more probable. It claimed that Irish Government sources had said that "responsibility without power would be unacceptable".

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

GRS 400
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 201300Z
FM DUBLIN 201255Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 675 OF 20 NOVEMBER 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (BELFAST) AND NIO (LONDON)
AND TO BIS NY + WASHINGTON.
ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: IMMEDIATE REACTIONS

1. THE FIANNA FAIL LEADER, MR HAUGHEY, WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF THE SUMMIT'S OUTCOME, EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT THAT "NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE" HAD EMERGED AND THAT THERE WAS "NO AGREEMENT ON ANY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE FORUM REPORT". HE SAID THAT "A UNIONIST VETO OVER ANY KIND OF POLITICAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN A NEW AND WIDELY EXTENDED FORM WHICH PRECLUDES ANY POSSIBLE PROGRESS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE".

2. EDITORIAL COMMENT IS MIXED. TODAY'S IRISH TIMES AND IRISH PRESS EXPRESS STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE APPARENT OUTCOME OF THE TALKS, WHILE THE IRISH INDEPENDENT TAKES A MUCH MORE POSITIVE LINE.

3. THE IRISH TIMES, IN A POORLY REASONED LEADER REPEATEDLY BLAMING THE PRIME MINISTER, SAYS:

"THE MOST OPTIMISTIC READING OF THE COMMUNIQUE CANNOT DISPEL THE INSTINCTIVE FEELING OF GLOOM AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT, AFTER SO MANY HOURS OF TALKING, MRS THATCHER'S VIEW OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION SHOULD REMAIN SO FAR AND SO FIRMLY APART FROM THE CONSENSUS OF NATIONALIST IRELAND AS EXPRESSED IN THE FORUM REPORT".

IT GOES ON TO QUESTION WHETHER THE TAOISEACH WAS WISE TO HOLD TALKS AT ALL AT THIS TIME.

4. THE IRISH PRESS PREDICTABLY LETS FLY. IN AN ANGRY BUT MORE COHERENT EDITORIAL, IT ACCUSES THE TAOISEACH OF HAVING LET DOWN THE IRISH NATION:

"CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM FELL FLAT ON ITS FACE. MRS THATCHER FLATLY STATED THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WAS BRITISH AND THAT WAS THAT. NOT A BLIND BIT ABOUT THE INADEQUACIES OF THE NORTHERN STATE OR ITS AWFUL IMPACTS ON OUR OWN SOCIETY WERE EVEN HINTED AT."

THE EDITORIAL DESPAIRINGLY CONCLUDES

"WE ARE NOW BACK AT SQUARE MINUS ONE...."

AND THAT:

1 we

'WE HAVE NO SOLUTION AND DR FITZGERALD MUST KNOW IN HIS HEART THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE ENTITLED TO FEEL LITTLE OF EITHER PRIDE, COMFORT OR REPUTATION.'

5. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT STRIKES A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, ARGUING THAT DR FITZGERALD HAS RETURNED TO DUBLIN WITH THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN MOVED MUCH HIGHER ON MRS THATCHER'S PERSONAL LIST OF PRIORITIES THAN IT HAS EVER BEEN, AND POINTS OUT THAT IT WAS NEVER ON TO BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS WOULD PRODUCE 'A MAGIC FORMULA WHICH COULD DISSOLVE THE NORTHERN PROBLEM BEFORE OUR EYES.' THE EDITORIAL NOTES THAT THE COMMUNIQUE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT A SEARCH IS TO BE MADE FOR STRUCTURES IN THE NORTH WHICH WILL REFLECT AND RESPECT THE IDENTITIES OF BOTH COMMUNITIES THERE. 'MR HAUGHEY IS ENTITLED TO BELIEVE THAT NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AT THE TALKS ONLY IF HE CAN SHOW THAT HE KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT WAS TALKED ABOUT BETWEEN THE TWO HEADS OF STATE.' THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES BY OBSERVING THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO REFRAIN FROM COMPARING SUMMIT MEETINGS TO FOOTBALL MATCHES. 'THIS IS NOT A CONTEST OF WILLS BETWEEN ENEMIES. IT IS AND MUST BE A COOPERATIVE EFFORT. THE TALKS HAVE MOST LIKELY RESULTED IN LONDON AND DUBLIN UNDERSTANDING ONE ANOTHER BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE RECENT PAST.'

STIMSON

NORTHERN IRELAND

LIMITED

ID

AD

NFO D

ED

AED

EWS D

JSD

JU

S

3/LADY YOUNG

3/MR RENTON

3/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR GOODALL
MR BARRINGTON
MR O'NEILL
MR JENKINS
MR D C THOMAS
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID

Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO } CABINET OFFICE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

IMMEDIATE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

14.11.84

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 220930Z

FM DUBLIN 220910Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 677 OF 22 NOVEMBER 1984

TELECON RESIDENT CLERK/STIMSON AND MY TELELETTER OF 21 NOVEMBER TO CLARK, RID.

IRISH REACTIONS TO ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. THE IRISH FEELING OF GLOOM AND DEPRESSION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SUMMIT HAS DEEPENED.
2. THE TAOISEACH IS REGARDED AS HAVING GONE OUT OF HIS WAY AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND IN ADDRESSING THE DAIL NOT TO BE DRAWN ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS AND NOT TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATIONS IN THE LONGER TERM INTEREST OF ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONS.
3. HOWEVER, IN A PRIVATE MEETING YESTERDAY OF HIS OWN PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, AND IN RESPONSE TO FIERCE CRITICISM FROM HIS OWN BACK BENCHERS, HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE AGREED TO A SUGGESTION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S BEHAVIOUR AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE WAS "GRATUITOUSLY OFFENSIVE" AND MR BARRY IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE VOLUNTEERED THAT HER BEHAVIOUR WAS "DISGRACEFUL". THESE REMARKS HAVE NATURALLY LEAKED AND MAKE THE HEADLINES IN ALL THIS MORNING'S DUBLIN PAPERS.
4. THE TANAISTE YESTERDAY ISSUED A STATEMENT DESCRIBING AS "ASTONISHING AND UNACCEPTABLE" MR HURD'S "SELF-DENYING"...

4. THE TANAISTE YESTERDAY ISSUED A STATEMENT DESCRIBING AS "ASTONISHING AND UNACCEPTABLE" MR HURD'S "SELECTIVE" REFERENCE TO "SOME OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE COURSE OF A CONFIDENTIAL MEETING." RTE RADIO NEWS HEADLINE THIS MORNING IS THAT THE TAOISEACH, MR BARRY, MR SPRING, MR HAUGHEY AND MR HUME ARE NOW ALL CRITICAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND MR HURD'S STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS.

5. WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT THE PRESSURE ON THE TAOISEACH FROM THE OPPOSITION TOGETHER WITH FEELINGS OF ANGER AND FRUSTRATION AMONGST COALITION BACK BENCHERS HAVE COMBINED TO OVERCOME HIS NATURAL AND INSTINCTIVE COURTESY. THE SENSE OF HUMILIATION AND WOUNDED PRIDE AMONGST IRISH TD'S, ALREADY APPARENT BEFORE MR HURD'S PRESS CONFERENCE IS NOW WIDESPREAD-AND OVERT. BUT DESPITE SPECULATION AMONGST OPPOSITION TD'S THAT THE TAOISEACH'S OWN POSITION AS LEADER OF THE COALITION MAY NOW BE IN QUESTION, FINE GAEL TD'S APPEAR FOR THE MOMENT TO BE CLOSING RANKS IN HIS SUPPORT.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO 10.

STIMSON

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

Ireland

We have had an indirect message from the Taoiseach via Michael Lillis to say that he is very worried and upset by the reports which are coming out. He does not deny that he spoke as reported but is anxious that the Prime Minister should understand that it was at a private meeting and that he had come under very heavy fire indeed from his own party. He wants to keep the situation under control and to maintain the further discussions agreed at Chequers. He will be sending you a message today through the Irish Embassy here. He has also asked our Ambassador - who is on leave in this country - to return to Dublin today so that he can try to explain things.

C. D. POWELL

22 November, 1984



Ref. A084/3109

PRIME MINISTER

if time
not

Prime Minister
Agree to a
meeting tomorrow
to consider how
to respond?
CJP
22/11

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

The Irish Ambassador came to see me this afternoon. He left with me the attached personal letter from the Taoiseach to you. He also left with me an aide memoire to which he spoke during the course of our meeting; I also attach a copy of the aide memoire.

2. In handing these documents over, the Irish Ambassador stressed that the observations which the Taoiseach had felt obliged to make reflected the seriousness of the political position in which he found himself at home. The Ambassador stressed that the Taoiseach had been reasonably content with the meeting at Chequers and the communique which was agreed at the end of the meeting. In his initial press conference he had sought to stick closely to the line reflected in the communique and agreed between him and the Prime Minister at Chequers. Three subsequent developments had, however, made his position very difficult at home:

- (1) The Prime Minister's apparent dismissal of the phenomenon of "alienation" of the minority community in Northern Ireland in her press conference.
- (2) The Prime Minister's apparent rejection of the whole of the Forum Report (not just of the three "options") in her press conference.
- (3) The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's subsequent press conference in Belfast, in which he disclosed some of the details discussed at Chequers - notably the idea of a Joint Security Commission - and appeared to dismiss anything going beyond that.



The result, in Dublin, had been to play into the hands of the Leader of the Opposition, who had made the most of his opportunity in and outside the Dail to claim that the outcome of the Summit and the subsequent comments justified all that he had said about the impossibility of dealing with the British and the unreality of the Taoiseach's approach.

3. As regards the Forum Report, the Taoiseach has constantly sought to divert attention from the three "models" towards the end of the Report - the unitary state, the federal state and joint authority - to the statement of realities and requirements at the end of Chapter 4 and the beginning of Chapter 5 of the Report. It is these paragraphs of the Report to which he refers in the fifth paragraph of his message: for ease of reference I am attaching a copy of the relevant paragraphs.

4. The Ambassador also referred to the very bad press which the Taoiseach had got in Dublin, and left with me the attached copies of leading articles: I am afraid not very legible in their present form.

5. What the Taoiseach's message and aide memoire is seeking is not entirely clear. He appears, however, to be hoping that you will be able to find an early opportunity of making a public statement which makes it clear that, though the three "models" are unacceptable, the sections of the Forum Report on realities and requirements constitute a basis for further useful discussion between the British and Irish Governments and are consistent with the position taken up in the communique from Chequers.

6. The aide memoire suggests that the Irish Government are also looking for an up-to-date statement of the British position, in the light of the Chequers meeting and what has happened subsequently, as a basis on which the Irish Government can review their own policy on Northern Ireland.



7. I shall be discussing this as a matter of urgency with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office and will submit early advice as to how we might respond to these approaches. My immediate inclination is to suggest that we should, as a matter of urgency, prepare for ourselves an up-to-date statement of the British position, for you to discuss with the Secretaries of State. Once such a statement was agreed, we should have to consider how best to convey the position to the Irish Government: whether in some kind of aide memoire through diplomatic channels, or in a personal message from you to the Taoiseach, or in a further meeting of the Armstrong/Nally group.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Northern Ireland.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 November 1984

Text of letter to the Prime Minister from the Taoiseach

SECRET AND PERSONAL

22nd November 1984

Dear Margaret

I appreciate very much the fact that in your Press Conference you sought to make the points which it was understood between us you would make with a view to avoiding any embarrassment for my position. You will have noted that in my own presentation, both at my Press Conference and in the Dail, I was extremely careful to avoid creating any difficulty for your position.

Two very serious problems have emerged, however, and have created a sense of resentment on the part of public opinion in this State and, particularly, on the part of nationalists in Northern Ireland.

The first relates to the New Ireland Forum Report. At all times we have tried to avoid damaging Anglo-Irish relations in working to secure a report which, far from creating any difficulties in our relations, would rather create common ground. We have in our contacts with your authorities repeatedly pointed to the Realities and Requirements set out in the Forum Report (Paras 1 and 2 of Chapter 5) as containing the essence of the Report, we have repeatedly explained that the Requirements (para. 2) constitute its only proposals, and we have pointed out that the three illustrative models contained in the Report are not proposals.

The fact that in your Press Conference you referred to this part only of the Forum Report, and in the most dismissive terms, ignoring the actual proposals in the Report, and ignoring our stated willingness to discuss "other views", created a strongly negative reaction on the part of nationalists in Ireland, North and South, and has also contributed to the very misunderstanding of the Report itself which the Government here have worked so hard and as long to eliminate - starting on the day it was published.

I attach for your information a list of the 'Requirements' as set out in the Forum Report. These Requirements are, I believe, highly consistent with the positions that our two Governments share on the problem of Northern Ireland.

It would be a tragedy if, through a misunderstanding, an impression were maintained that you totally rejected the essence of the Forum Report which is contained in these paragraphs. The effect of that would be that people here would feel that there was no appreciation of the fact that a major and successful effort had been made to face

/...

the difficult reality of unionism and to acknowledge the rights of unionists. Should that position remain uncorrected, it would contribute to the recurring feeling on the part of nationalists in Ireland that no effort on our part to work towards peace and stability will ever be appreciated. That such a sad state of affairs has, alas, been created is evident from the triumphalist tone both of unionist politicians and the unionist press in their reaction to our meeting.

In the interests of our relations, and of creating an atmosphere conducive to progress, I ask you to find an early opportunity to acknowledge that the central core of the Forum Report does involve very considerable progress and is by and large consistent with our shared appreciation as reflected in our joint communique.

The second serious difficulty stems from your dismissal of the reality of alienation as a major problem affecting the minority community in Northern Ireland. Alienation as it now presents itself is not a problem which has always existed. People here are, furthermore, greatly confused by the fact that both Jim Prior and Douglas Hurd have publicly accepted that this specific problem exists. You say that you dislike the word: we, of course, do not set any particular store by that specific word. Any alternative word or words which describe the reality whereby many thousands of people are estranged in a fundamental way from the whole system of authority, security and justice in Northern Ireland would serve. It would be extremely helpful in the difficult situation that has now arisen were you to acknowledge the existence of this problem, as your apparent denial of its existence has in the minds of all people of goodwill in this State - and they are very numerous as the recent poll showed - undermined the sense that had been developing of common ground between our Governments and has thus suggested to our public opinion that there is little or no point in the Irish Government making any effort to find a common approach with yours.

Yours sincerely

Garret FitzGerald

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
No.10 Downing Street
London SW1

AIDE MEMOIRE

For use by Ambassador Dorr in speaking to Sir Robert Armstrong,
Secretary to the Cabinet

It may not be understood in Britain how profoundly the Anglo-Irish relationship has been altered for the worse, in a manner that may be very difficult indeed to recover, by two aspects of the Prime Minister's presentation of the results of the Chequers Meeting at her Press Conference. The positive tone with which the Prime Minister opened the Press Conference, along the lines that had been indicated at Chequers, and indeed other positive references at various points in reply to questions, have in Ireland been totally overshadowed and obscured by two other features of the Press Conference:

First, the manner in which the Prime Minister appeared to dismiss the problem of the alienation of a large part of the people of Northern Ireland from the political, security and judicial systems there.

Second, the tone with which the three 'options' mooted in the Forum Report were dismissed.

So far as the first point is concerned, we have, throughout, understood that it has been the appreciation on the British side of the profundity of this alienation, and the dangers it carries for the stability not only of Northern Ireland but of the whole island - and of the consequences of this for Britain itself - that has lain behind the sense of urgency with which the British side, as well as the Irish side, have tackled the problem of finding a way forward in Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach, both in November, 1983 and at this recent meeting has laid the strongest possible emphasis on this aspect, and has explained that it is because of the threats that it poses that he and his Government have been willing to contemplate the most fundamental decisions, never hitherto considered by an Irish Government.

The Taoiseach read and noted the words used by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on 2nd July last, when the Prime Minister was sitting beside him and, as we understood it, was thus giving her personal endorsement to her Minister's words, spoken on behalf of her Government.

The Secretary of State then spoke of 'the need for assurance and countering alienation', the character of which, as it affects a large part of the nationalist population, he graphically described in terms of the absence on their part of any sense of identification with many aspects of Government or with those whose job it is to uphold law and order; their resentment at the fact that there is so little scope for the expression of their Irish identity; and their exclusion from the effective exercise of political power. Following this authoritative statement of the British Government's position, the Taoiseach felt he was justified in recording in several speeches the fact that this alienation had now been recognised by the British Government. After

/...

the Prime Minister's Press Conference reference to alienation, he has now been accused of misleading the Irish people as to the British Government's position.

Against this background the Taoiseach heard with a profound sense of dismay - which he has publicly concealed at his Press Conference and in Dail Eireann at great political cost - the Prime Minister repudiate this factor of alienation in the words she used at her Press Conference, where her remarks about the word 'alienation' were not accompanied by anything to suggest that her objection to its use was merely semantic, and that she recognised the reality of what had been described so graphically to the Commons by her Secretary of State.

On the question of the Forum Report, the manner and tone in which the Prime Minister dismissed the three options, unaccompanied even by a reference to other parts of the Report such as the sections on Realities and the Framework for a solution - which contrary to the Prime Minister's statement in the Commons contains the only proposals in the Report - or the reference in Par. 5.10 to a willingness of the parties to take other views into account, has profoundly shocked the whole of Irish opinion.

These two elements in her Press Conference left the Taoiseach with the dilemma in his meeting with the Press and in a dozen radio and TV interviews shortly afterwards, of either rebutting or challenging the Prime Minister - a course which he unhesitatingly rejected - or of appearing in the worst possible light as apparently accepting the interpretation given by the Prime Minister. As is evident from the overwhelming reaction of press and public and political opinion in Ireland, the result of this has been a severe blow to the capacity of our Government to make further progress with the Northern Ireland issue, on which it had up to that point led public opinion so courageously and so successfully.

I understand that at their Party meetings on 21 November, the Taoiseach and the Tanaiste came under the most severe criticism from their Parties, which have hitherto been totally supportive of their approach to the Northern Ireland problem. Members whose bitter hostility to the Provisional IRA is a by-word described the effect of what had happened as being one of recruiting for the IRA, and, I understand, one member told of being informed by a factory owner in Northern Ireland of an approach by moderate anti-IRA Catholic members of his work-force - the only such approach he has ever had - to say that unless there was something positive behind all this that would emerge rapidly, they could not bear to think of the extent to which it would have strengthened the IRA. At the same time the morale of the SDLP, our sole bulwark against Sinn Fein/IRA in the North, has been shattered.

In the light of these reactions, the reasons for which and the significance of which may not be fully appreciated in London, the Government have asked that an early opportunity be provided to it for further consideration of its Northern Ireland policy. It would appear

/...

that the situation that now exists has overnight transformed the very favourable background to the talks illustrated by the public opinion poll published last Thursday.

An urgent review, at official level, of the new situation thus created, and of what possibilities may now remain for constructive action, now seems necessary here in order to enable the Government review to be carried out with, as a potentially crucial element, an assessment of how in the British view, the situation that now exists can be improved.

Consideration of the impact of these developments on the internal political balance within the Republic has been omitted from the above account of the situation. This should not be construed as suggesting that the impact has not been of major proportions.

Finally the Government has had no alternative but to criticise publicly the selective revelation by the Secretary of State of some proposals put by the British side in the discussions at Chequers, which has raised serious questions about the possibility of such crucial matters being discussed in confidence in future.

4.15 The solution to both the historic problem and the current crisis of Northern Ireland and the continuing problem of relations between Ireland and Britain necessarily requires new structures that will accommodate together two sets of legitimate rights:

- the right of nationalists to effective political, symbolic and administrative expression of their identity; and
- the right of unionists to effective political, symbolic and administrative expression of their identity, their ethos and their way of life.

So long as the legitimate rights of both unionists and nationalists are not accommodated together in new political structures acceptable to both, that situation will continue to give rise to conflict and instability. The starting point of genuine reconciliation and dialogue is mutual recognition and acceptance of the legitimate rights of both. The Forum is convinced that dialogue which fully respects both traditions can overcome the fears and divisions of the past and create an atmosphere in which peace and stability can be achieved.

4.16 A settlement which recognises the legitimate rights of nationalists and unionists must transcend the context of Northern Ireland. Both London and Dublin have a responsibility to respond to the continuing suffering of the people of Northern Ireland. This requires priority attention and urgent action to halt and reverse the constant drift into more violence, anarchy and chaos. It requires a common will to alleviate the plight of the people, both nationalists and unionists. It requires a political framework within which urgent efforts can be undertaken to resolve the underlying causes of the problem. It requires a common determination to provide conditions for peace, stability and justice so as to overcome the inevitable and destructive reactions of extremists on both sides. Both Governments, in co-operation with representatives of democratic nationalist and unionist opinion in Northern Ireland, must recognise and discharge their responsibilities.

CHAPTER 5

FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW IRELAND: PRESENT REALITIES AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

5.1 The major realities identified in the Forum's analysis of the problem, as set out in earlier chapters, may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) Existing structures and practices in Northern Ireland have failed to provide either peace, stability or reconciliation. The failure to recognise and accommodate the identity of Northern nationalists has resulted in deep and growing alienation on their part from the system of political authority.
- (2) The conflict of nationalist and unionist identities has been concentrated within the narrow ground of Northern Ireland. This has prevented constructive interaction between the two traditions and fostered fears, suspicions and misunderstandings.
- (3) One effect of the division of Ireland is that civil law and administration in the South are seen, particularly by unionists, as being unduly influenced by the majority ethos on issues which Protestants consider to be a matter for private conscience and there is a widespread perception that the South in its laws, attitudes and values does not reflect a regard for the ethos of Protestants. On the other hand, Protestant values are seen to be reflected in the laws and practices in the North.
- (4) The present formal position of the British Government, namely the guarantee, contained in Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, has in its practical application had the effect of inhibiting the dialogue necessary for political progress. It has had the additional effect of removing the incentive which would otherwise exist on all sides to seek a political solution.

- (5) The above factors have contributed to conflict and instability with disastrous consequences involving violence and loss of life on a large scale in Northern Ireland.
- (6) The absence of political consensus, together with the erosion of the North's economy and social fabric, threatens to make irreversible the drift into more widespread civil conflict with catastrophic consequences.
- (7) The resulting situation has inhibited and placed under strain the development of normal relations between Britain and Ireland.
- (8) The nationalist identity and ethos comprise a sense of national Irish identity and a democratically founded wish to have that identity institutionalised in a sovereign Ireland united by consent.
- (9) The unionist identity and ethos comprise a sense of Britishness, allied to their particular sense of Irishness and a set of values comprising a Protestant ethos which they believe to be under threat from a Catholic ethos, perceived as reflecting different and often opposing values.
- (10) Irish nationalist attitudes have hitherto in their public expression tended to underestimate the full dimension of the unionist identity and ethos. On the other hand, unionist attitudes and practices have denied the right of nationalists to meaningful political expression of their identity and ethos.
- (11) The basic approach of British policy has created negative consequences. It has shown a disregard of the identity and ethos of nationalists. In effect, it has underwritten the supremacy in Northern Ireland of the unionist identity. Before there can be fundamental progress Britain must reassess its position and responsibility.

5.2 Having considered these realities, the Forum proposes the following as necessary elements of a framework within which a new Ireland could emerge:—

- (1) A fundamental criterion of any new structures and processes must be that they will provide lasting peace and stability.

- (2) Attempts from any quarter to impose a particular solution through violence must be rejected along with the proponents of such methods. It must be recognised that the new Ireland which the Forum seeks can come about only through agreement and must have a democratic basis.
- (3) Agreement means that the political arrangements for a new and sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated and agreed to by the people of the North and by the people of the South.
- (4) The validity of both the nationalist and unionist identities in Ireland and the democratic rights of every citizen on this island must be accepted; both of these identities must have equally satisfactory, secure and durable, political, administrative and symbolic expression and protection.
- (5) Lasting stability can be found only in the context of new structures in which no tradition will be allowed to dominate the other, in which there will be equal rights and opportunities for all, and in which there will be provision for formal and effective guarantees for the protection of individual human rights and of the communal and cultural rights of both nationalists and unionists.
- (6) Civil and religious liberties and rights must be guaranteed and there can be no discrimination or preference in laws or administrative practices, on grounds of religious belief or affiliation; government and administration must be sensitive to minority beliefs and attitudes and seek consensus.
- (7) New arrangements must provide structures and institutions including security structures with which both nationalists and unionists can identify on the basis of political consensus; such arrangements must overcome alienation in Northern Ireland and strengthen stability and security for all the people of Ireland.
- (8) New arrangements must ensure the maintenance of economic and social standards and facilitate, where appropriate, integrated economic development, North and South. The macro-economic and financial implications are dealt with in the study by DKM Economic Consultants published with this Report, which is based on a range of assumptions with regard to the availability of external financial transfers.

- (9) The cultural and linguistic diversity of the people of all traditions, North and South, must be preserved and fostered as a source of enrichment and vitality.
- (10) Political action is urgently required to halt disillusionment with democratic politics and the slide towards further violence. Britain has a duty to respond *now* in order to ensure that the people of Northern Ireland are not condemned to yet another generation of violence and sterility. The parties in the Forum by their participation in its work have already committed themselves to join in a process directed towards that end.

22/1/84

"Insulting"

"GRATUITUOUSLY INSULTING" — we now know the extent of the Taoiseach's feelings when he heard or saw Mrs. Thatcher's press conference this week. He kept quiet for the country's sake, he said, but the comments of Mr. Hurd seem to have been the final straw as far as his patience was concerned.

We have to remember that Dr. FitzGerald is a naturally courteous man, slow to use personal comments about anyone and by nature disposed to take the optimistic view. The fact that after a long close session of personal talks with Mrs. Thatcher which he hopes will lead somewhere he sees fit to tell the British Prime Minister what he thinks of her public performance speaks volumes.

London may feign surprise over his comments but those with some savvy over there must know that a wide chasm has now opened between London and Dublin — and all because Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Hurd showed an insensitivity to feelings here which is almost incomprehensible.

It has been obvious from the end of the talks that anger in this country was directed not so much at their outcome but at the personal attitude of Mrs. Thatcher when she spoke to newsmen afterwards.

Compounding this anger has been the impenetrable stance of Mr. Hurd when he was questioned. Either the man does not understand the complexities of the problem he has been sent to oversee or he has simply parroted the comments made by Mrs. Thatcher in London. He got his answer from the Tanaiste.

While officials are meant to be getting down to working out a way in which the minority can become more involved in decisions affecting their lives in the North, British political leaders have been throwing out the window every potential solution offered to them.

Does Mr. Hurd actually believe that if his government throws in enough police and soldiers and improves security (to use that old phrase) then after a time the problem will go away? Worse still does Mrs. Thatcher believe this? If she does then God help the North. For London has learned nothing.

No Wonder every party in this country has become infuriated. No wonder the Taoiseach finally said what he had to say. No wonder Mr. Barry described the press conference as "disgraceful". The IRA have never had such a success in their lives before.

The Irish Times 22/11/84

Falling Back

So this is the new British initiative: first Mrs Thatcher's "out . . . out . . . out" foray, then Mr Hurd's laying down, on Irish soil, for the Government of the Republic, the limits of interest it is to be permitted to take in the affairs of Northern Ireland.

Mr Hurd is, incidentally, too clever by half talking of people from the Republic who don't go North and therefore do not know what's going on. He is hardly an expert so soon.

And that he and Mrs Thatcher lay down the law to the Taoiseach in the manner they have done, calls for stronger words from the Irish Government than have so far been issued.

A thin time indeed for nationalism, the last few days. Are the Unionists wise enough to understand that a downfacing of Nationalists — as they see the Chequers meeting — is not necessarily entirely a good thing for their cause? Certainly not something to be overweening about.

* * *

For among the consequences of the events of the past few days are that old images and arguments have been invoked to take on new life and once again become the stock-in-trade of political debate. Is it now clearly back to talk of colonialism, to planters and native Irish? Mrs Thatcher seems to see it in Kiplingesque light, when the majority people of Ireland are "England's oldest foe."

In fact, what Irish nationalism has been trying to say in the Forum — and elsewhere all down the years — is that England's nearest neighbour can be England's close friend, but not in a subservient role and not easily while Ireland is split.

The attitude of the Provisional IRA and other subversives will be predictable, but the reaction from moderate Nationalists in the North may be even further despondency and a feeling of isolation not only from the Northern establishment but also from Dublin.

Politicians always have to pick up the pieces and get on with the job. It seems that the North is now back to about the year 1926.

HIS MASTER'S VOICE

THE IRISH PRESS 22/11/84
THE BRITISH Government's position on the North, stated bluntly by Mrs. Thatcher on Monday, was underlined yesterday by Mr. Douglas Hurd.

The Northern Ireland Secretary was even less accommodating to nationalist opinion than his Prime Minister. Mrs. Thatcher rejected all three options from the report of the New Ireland Forum. Mr. Hurd declared that the Republic can have no say at all in the governance of the North.

The Government will be pleased to learn however, that "if from time to time, Ministers from the Republic wish to put forward points of view to us about Northern Ireland . . . we should be ready to discuss that advice calmly with them."

And the SDLP must be delighted to know that Mr. Hurd will have no objection if the party continues to cherish an aspiration towards Irish unity—just as long as it learns the political realities.

With a condescending swipe at the Dublin visits of Mr. John Hume, the Northern Secretary went on to spell out his version of those realities: that there must be dialogue between the parties in the North and that the Official Unionist document, *The Way Forward*, might, with a few amendments, provide the blueprint for future development.

There is a close similarity between Mr. Hurd's remarks and a recent controversial speech in which the Unionist leader, Mr. James Molyneux, advised nationalists to forget about Irish unity since it would never come about in any of their lifetimes.

We warned then that British Government thinking was moving dangerously close to that of the Unionists. The truth of that warning has now been confirmed by Hurd.

Does Mr. Hurd know anything about even the recent history of Northern Ireland? Has he any appreciation of grassroot unionist attitudes?

If he does, he must know that it was the unionists, with their sectarian policies and cultural apartheid, who ensured that Northern Ireland could not function as a political unit; that it was unionists who wrecked the power-sharing assembly; that unionists have never accepted any form of institutionalised power-sharing; that local government powers were removed because unionists could not be trusted to use them fairly and that, at grassroots level, there has never been the slightest indication of a change of heart on the part of unionists.

Mr. Hurd wants to turn back the clock and restore some form of Stormont parliament. It cannot be done. Too much has happened since the days of Stormont. Northern Ireland will not be reformed by internal tinkering—constitutional change is necessary.

Mr. Hurd believes that too much is being made of nationalist alienation from the Northern system. Has he no eyes to see? Ten years ago Sinn Fein was a political non-entity. Today it is the fourth largest party in the North and is pressing the SDLP for the lion's share of the nationalist vote. That is the measure of alienation and Mr. Hurd's latest remarks will ensure that the process continues.

It is now clear that Dr. FitzGerald was unwise to participate in the Chequers summit and should certainly have had no part in the charade of an agreed communique which agreed nothing of any value to constitutional Irish nationalism.

Yesterday the Taoiseach rebuked Mr. Hurd. The rebuke should have come on Monday—from the Taoiseach to Mrs. Thatcher.

Mr. Hurd believes that the fight against terrorism "depends to a considerable extent" on co-operation with the Republic. Mrs. Thatcher takes the same view.

Our Government must make it clear to the British that the fight against terrorism depends, first and foremost, on realistic political progress.

The Republic has, of course, its own security needs. But these do not necessarily coincide with those of Britain and the Taoiseach should now make it clear that if there is to be no co-operation on the political front then there can be no co-operation on policing.

If the British Government wants to walk the unionist road, let it walk it alone.

Haughey waving all Forum flags in brilliant bid to reach summit

THE SPEECH which Charles Haughey made in the exchange of statements on the Anglo-Irish summit at Cbequers was the most important he has made in the present Dail.

Indeed, it could be argued that it was the most important he has made since he became leader of Fianna Fail. Its significance is widely spread, but above all it represents a psychological watershed for the man himself.

Its echoes go directly back to that period prior to December, 1979, and the well-judged seriousness with which he viewed his own career at that time. He was free, then, from the arrogance, duplicity and weakness which have characterised both his periods in power and in opposition since taking over the leadership of the Fianna Fail Party.

And on Tuesday it was as if he recognised this, and decided to take action about it.

In taking action, he seized the initiative from Garret FitzGerald. He did so in circumstances where plainly he was right. Everything he said in his speech is borne out by the facts, such as we know them. And unless the Taoiseach can come up with very convincing answers to the contrary answers which would be clearly and emphatically at odds with the 'things which both he and Margaret Thatcher have put firmly on the public record—then that initiative must remain in the hands of the Opposition leader.

ISSUES ONLY

He also took the initiative in an entirely political mould. Contrary to wide interpretations of the speech itself, no word of it represents a personal attack on the Taoiseach. It is entirely concerned with the issues, and it is devastating in the quotations it uses.

It represents an irreversible breach in bipartisanship. But was not that breached already? And it signals an all-out political attack on the Taoiseach and Government, which up to now was implicit in everything that Charles Haughey said about their performance, but generally incoherent in presentation.

Nothing about Tuesday evening's speech was incoherent. It was a brilliant tour-de-force, sustained, economical, very carefully balanced.

NEWS ANALYSIS

BRUCE ARNOLD assesses Charles Haughey's response to the weekend Summit and reckons it was one of the most important speeches the leader of the Opposition has made.



Charles Haughey . . . using an opportunity to the full.

of the community can identify".

And in citing the Forum Report, and the fact that in the dialogue between the two Governments started with the summit "we will not be found wanting in our openness to any ideas that may further the objectives of the Forum Report as I cited them . . ."

Garret FitzGerald is referring back to an interpretation of the Forum Report limited to one single paragraph on fundamental criteria.

That paragraph (5.2), which refers to the need for any new process or structure to take into account the need to provide lasting peace and stability, can be used to make a nonsense of the three Forum options, as well as of any other options involving political movement. And, on the face of it, this is precisely the interpretation that has to be placed on everything so far said by the Taoiseach, and certainly everything said by the British Prime Minister.

an equally compelling gloss on the Forum Report, and the responses and interpretations of it made by the Taoiseach and other ministers.

Central to it, he claimed, was the same idea contained in the election speech by FitzGerald, in November 1982, that there had to be a radical rethinking of British policy. In other words, the rejection of the British idea that there was greater risk in action, than in doing nothing.

National politicians of all parties believe the reverse, and are committed to that belief. On it pivots the proper interpretation of the achievement of peace and stability. That this can not be done through security, or within the confines of Northern Ireland itself. Hence the options.

But to all appearances that position has been abandoned by Garret FitzGerald. It has certainly been rejected by Margaret Thatcher.

It is politically fashionable now to reject the Forum options as belonging to the past, and to put a substantial part of the blame for this situation on Charles Haughey's head, because of the stance he adopted in the closing months of the Forum debates, and then immediately after the publication of the report.

In military terminology, Charles Haughey, in the aftermath of the publication of the Forum Report, was in possession of an isolated patch of ground over which flew the tattered flag of Irish unity. Garret FitzGerald was in possession of all the other political territory, with new standards flying over it, the Confederal flag, the flag of a new federation, and the flag of joint authority.

ALL THE FLAGS

These have been surrendered in favour of a single Forum banner of peace and stability within Northern Ireland.

Never slow on the uptake, Charles Haughey has taken over the other options, and now flies all the Forum flags which all of us have been led to recognise by the missionary zeal of the Taoiseach and his many Forum Report exponents.

A final judgment, as is the case with any realm of confidentiality surrounding the aftermath of a summit, can only be made in qualified terms.

What Charles Haughey achieved on Tuesday was control of the terms. He said that the Taoiseach had been humiliated. This must seem to have been the case unless and until Garret FitzGerald can show the opposite.

Three other general points should be made about it.

In timing it comes at a crucial period from the Government's point of view, when they are facing a most difficult series of challenges on economic and social issues, and when their popularity has received a number of adverse blows which are likely to have a demoralising effect on the fringes of each party, the less stable of the backbenchers and those who hold grudges against leadership or against the Coalition idea itself.

Equally crucially, the speech comes at a point in Fianna Fail's affairs when that party, having accepted, with an insignificant handful of exceptions, the democratic will in favour of the present leader, finds itself, mid-term in this Dail, like an empty barrel, noisy, echoing, and waiting for something to fill the space.

Since the barrel is a political party, leadership is the necessary ingredient. And the speech gives that. It provides a positive focus.

Thirdly, the speech shifts the ground, for the first time in this Dail, from Garret FitzGerald to Charles Haughey. And the onus is on the Taoiseach to recover it. He has given no indication that he can.

STEPS FORWARD

Garret FitzGerald is claiming important steps forward as a result of the talks, and asserting that a process has begun, between Britain and the Republic of Ireland, through which "a system of security must be provided, deriving its authority from a political system with which those sections

They are neither of them interested in political movement outside the framework of Northern Ireland itself. And while this is legitimate enough for Margaret Thatcher, in Garret FitzGerald's case on a very narrow interpretation of what is important in the Forum Report in order to justify his position.

SKILFUL

No one can blame Charles Haughey for seizing avidly on the obvious opportunity offered by this. What is surprising is the skilful way in which he has done it.

He gives a logical chronology of Government thinking on the North: Garret FitzGerald, in November, 1962, during the general election, calling for a complete and radical rethink of British policy in order to avoid "chaos" in Northern Ireland; Michael Noonan, last August, claiming that the British Government "share our sense of urgency"; Peter Barry, in July, claiming "Britain is now more interested in solving the Northern Ireland problem than at any time in the past ten years".

Garret FitzGerald again, in September, claiming that Britain recognised alienation as the problem, and that both governments were approaching "from the same perspective"; in the same month, Peter Barry claiming that relations between the two countries were about to be "transformed".

Charles Haughey gives

Charles Haughey claimed that Garret FitzGerald had failed to deliver any of the things which he had repeatedly claimed, over the previous two years, needed to be delivered if peace and stability were to be brought to Northern Ireland. This also must be the perception unless and until an alternative interpretation can be offered.

Charles Haughey claimed that Garret FitzGerald had done grievous damage to our national political interests and our pride. On the face of it Margaret Thatcher's unequivocal rejection of every Forum option, and her rejection of a political role by the Republic in Northern Ireland affairs, certainly damages our pride, and, if it leads to a continuation of violence and instability in the North, will continue to damage our nearest and most telling interests as well.

The onus is on FitzGerald to put this right.

And yet he has locked himself into a situation where he can not really say any more than he has said until the next summit with Margaret Thatcher, in the new year.

That is a wonderful restraint to be under. If it coincides with the kind of seriousness in attack — and, politically at least, the no-holds-barred approach — which Charles Haughey signalled on Tuesday...

In domestic political terms a new level of battle has been joined. No one should underestimate the seriousness involved on Charles Haughey's side. Once again, he is fighting for his own political life, and it is the only life he knows or loves.

The Irish Independent 22/1/84



10 DOWNING STREET

21 November 1984

THE PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister
subsequently decided
not to read this
letter. Please retain
on file. CDP 22/04

Dear Garret,

I know you realise how much I appreciated your readiness to come to Chequers over the weekend instead of my going to Dublin as we had originally intended. I am particularly glad that we were able to go over the ground together so thoroughly and so frankly, and our talks have given me a much clearer understanding of your position than I had before.

I am well aware how much personal effort and commitment you have put into the search for an acceptable way forward. We shall not let that go unmatched on the British side. Neither of us, I think, underestimates the difficulties; but our talks at Chequers have helped to clarify the problems and the good-will between us is a solid foundation on which to build. I can assure you that I shall be taking a close personal interest in the continuing discussions between our two governments over the coming months.

Every good wish
Yours ever

Margaret

Dr. Garret FitzGerald, TD.

P.S. John Hume really was difficult in the
House of Commons on Tuesday. not.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 Nov '84

Dear Colin,

I enclose a personal message from the Prime Minister to Dr. Fitzgerald - somewhat amended from your draft! I should be grateful if you could have it delivered. Better not telegraph it, I think.

Yours sincerely
John

Colin Budd, Esq.,
F.C.O.

088

NI4232 4 XXX 100

FITZGERALD CRITICISES THATCHER

IRISH PREMIER DR GARRET FITZGERALD TONIGHT SAID MRS THATCHER'S ATTITUDE AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THIS WEEK'S ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT WAS "GRATUITOUSLY OFFENSIVE".

HIS COMMENT, TO A PRIVATE MEETING OF HIS FINE GAEL PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, CAME AT THE END OF A DAY OF STINGING CLASHES BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN.

SOME POLITICAL COMMENTATORS IN DUBLIN WERE QUESTIONING THE FUTURE OF THE CURRENT ANGLO-IRISH POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE WAKE OF THE ROW.

IT WAS ARGUED THAT MANY FENCES WOULD HAVE TO BE MENDED BEFORE ANOTHER SUMMIT COULD BE HELD.

--

212313 NOV 84

SECRET AND PERSONAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 November 1984

Dear Charles,

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

It seems clear from the tone of the comments in the Irish media on Monday's bilateral meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach and from Mr Haughey's predictably hostile reaction that the Taoiseach will be facing strong domestic criticism for his failure to bring back any concrete results from Chequers. Some of this criticism will come from the "greener" elements in his own party. At least part of the explanation for this lies in the Taoiseach's own expectations for the Summit, which were unrealistically high.

He will now need time to digest the outcome of the discussions and it seems reasonable to hope that, when the official contacts resume, the Irish side will approach them in a more realistic frame of mind than hitherto. Meanwhile, however, it would be a pity if Dr FitzGerald's mood of discouragement were to colour Irish reactions to the Summit too deeply.

The Foreign Secretary wonders whether, with this in mind, the Prime Minister might consider sending the Taoiseach a short personal message reaffirming the value of yesterday's discussions and her intention to take a close personal interest in the continuing contacts between the two governments. I enclose a possible draft for the Prime Minister's consideration.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: The Taoiseach

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

ABL

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Pl. type for PM's signature.

I ^{know} ~~think~~ you realise how much I appreciated your readiness to come to Chequers over the weekend instead of my going to Dublin as we had originally intended. I am particularly glad that we were able to go over the ground together so thoroughly and so frankly, and ~~I want you to know that our talks have given me a much clearer understanding of your position than I had before and a clearer understanding too of certain aspects of the situation in Northern Ireland.~~

am well aware

I ~~know~~ how much personal effort and commitment you have put into the search for an acceptable way forward. We shall try to ~~match that~~ ^{let that go unmatched} on the British side. Neither of us, I think, underestimates the difficulties; but our talks at Chequers have helped to clarify the problems and the good-will between us is a solid foundation on which to build. I can assure you that I shall be taking a close personal interest in the continuing discussions between our two governments over the coming months.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



FILE

207

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November, 1984

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

I enclose records, prepared by Gerald Clark, of the discussions at Chequers on 19 November which did not involve the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful if they could be distributed as suggested on the cover sheets.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

L. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 November 1984

Dear Charles,

I enclose a record of the meeting of which I took a note at the Anglo-Irish Summit at Chequers on 19 November. I have divided it into two parts as what was said on European Community matters should be distributed to a wider audience than the bilateral discussion on Northern Ireland. I attach a suggested distribution list for each of the two records.

Yours sincerely

Gerald

G E Clark
Republic of Ireland Dept

IMMEDIATE

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/PUS
 MR GOODALL

HD/RID

Dep. HD/PUSD (2)

HD/INFO DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK



PS/ S of S
 PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
 MR BRENNAN
 MR BURNS
 MR J LYON

NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
 DIO

CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

14.11.84

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 201300Z

FM DUBLIN 201255Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 675 OF 20 NOVEMBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (BELFAST) AND NIO (LONDON)

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: IMMEDIATE REACTIONS

1. THE FIANNA FAIL LEADER, MR HAUGHEY, WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF THE SUMMIT'S OUTCOME, EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT THAT "NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE" HAD EMERGED AND THAT THERE WAS "NO AGREEMENT ON ANY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE FORUM REPORT". HE SAID THAT "A UNIONIST VETO OVER ANY KIND OF POLITICAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN A NEW AND WIDELY EXTENDED FORM WHICH PRECLUDES ANY POSSIBLE PROGRESS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE".
2. EDITORIAL COMMENT IS MIXED. TODAY'S IRISH TIMES AND IRISH PRESS EXPRESS STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE APPARENT OUTCOME OF THE TALKS, WHILE THE IRISH INDEPENDENT TAKES A MUCH MORE POSITIVE LINE.
3. THE IRISH TIMES, IN A POORLY REASONED LEADER REPEATEDLY BLAMING THE PRIME MINISTER, SAYS:

"THE MOST OPTIMISTIC READING OF THE COMMUNIQUE CANNOT DISPEL THE INSTINCTIVE FEELING OF GLOOM AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT, AFTER SO MANY HOURS OF TALKING, MRS THATCHER'S VIEW OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION SHOULD REMAIN SO FAR AND SO FIRMLY APART FROM THE CONSENSUS OF NATIONALIST IRELAND AS EXPRESSED IN THE FORUM REPORT".
- IT GOES ON TO QUESTION WHETHER THE TAOISEACH WAS WISE TO HOLD TALKS AT ALL AT THIS TIME.
4. THE IRISH PRESS PREDICTABLY LETS FLY. IN AN ANGRY BUT MORE COHERENT EDITORIAL, IT ACCUSES THE TAOISEACH OF HAVING LET DOWN THE IRISH NATION:

"CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM FELL FLAT ON ITS FACE. MRS THATCHER

COHERENT EDITORIAL, IT ACCUSES THE TAOISEACH OF HAVING LET DOWN THE IRISH NATION:

"CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM FELL FLAT ON ITS FACE. MRS THATCHER FLATLY STATED THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WAS BRITISH AND THAT WAS THAT. NOT A BLIND BIT ABOUT THE INADEQUACIES OF THE NORTHERN STATE OR ITS AWFUL IMPACTS ON OUR OWN SOCIETY WERE EVEN HINTED AT."

THE EDITORIAL DESPAIRINGLY CONCLUDES

"WE ARE NOW BACK AT SQUARE MINUS ONE...."

AND THAT:

"WE HAVE NO SOLUTION AND DR FITZGERALD MUST KNOW IN HIS HEART THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE ENTITLED TO FEEL LITTLE OF EITHER PRIDE, COMFORT OR REPUTATION."

5. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT STRIKES A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, ARGUING THAT DR FITZGERALD HAS RETURNED TO DUBLIN WITH THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN MOVED MUCH HIGHER ON MRS THATCHER'S PERSONAL LIST OF PRIORITIES THAN IT HAS EVER BEEN, AND POINTS OUT THAT IT WAS NEVER ON TO BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS WOULD PRODUCE "A MAGIC FORMULA WHICH COULD DISSOLVE THE NORTHERN PROBLEM BEFORE OUR EYES." THE EDITORIAL NOTES THAT THE COMMUNIQUE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT A SEARCH IS TO BE MADE FOR STRUCTURES IN THE NORTH WHICH WILL REFLECT AND RESPECT THE IDENTITIES OF BOTH COMMUNITIES THERE. "MR HAUGHEY IS ENTITLED TO BELIEVE THAT NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AT THE TALKS ONLY IF HE CAN SHOW THAT HE KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT WAS TALKED ABOUT BETWEEN THE TWO HEADS OF STATE." THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES BY OBSERVING THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO REFRAIN FROM COMPARING SUMMIT MEETINGS TO FOOTBALL MATCHES. "THIS IS NOT A CONTEST OF WILLS BETWEEN ENEMIES. IT IS AND MUST BE A COOPERATIVE EFFORT. THE TALKS HAVE MOST LIKELY RESULTED IN LONDON AND DUBLIN UNDERSTANDING ONE ANOTHER BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE RECENT PAST."

STIMSON

NNNN

WITH PERMISSION, MR SPEAKER, I WILL MAKE A STATEMENT ON MY

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TAOISEACH ON 18 AND 19 NOVEMBER.

I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIENDS THE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND.

DR FITZGERALD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR SPRING, THE ^{Tánaiste} TANAISTE,

AND BY MR BARRY, THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER.

THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER OUR MEETING HAS
BEEN PLACED IN THE LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE.

THIS WAS OUR SECOND BILATERAL MEETING IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE

ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL.

WE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MATTERS AND
ON OTHER CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

WE ALSO REVIEWED THE WORK DONE OVER THE YEAR UNDER

THE AUSPICES OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL

COUNCIL AT BOTH MINISTERIAL AND OFFICIAL LEVELS ON A

WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS.

/WE HAD A

WE HAD A THOROUGH AND REALISTIC EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS; THE REPORT OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM; AND THE PROPOSALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS SET OUT IN DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED IN RECENT MONTHS.

WE AGREED THAT IT WAS A MAJOR INTEREST OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS BOTH THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THAT THERE SHOULD BE LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY THERE.

THE TAOISEACH AND I FURTHER AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EFFORTS TO DIMINISH THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND TO RECONCILE THE TWO MAJOR TRADITIONS THAT EXIST IN THE TWO PARTS OF IRELAND.

I AFFIRMED YET AGAIN THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WAS PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THAT IT WILL REMAIN SO UNLESS THE MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND WISH OTHERWISE.

THE TAOISEACH FOR HIS PART, WHILE REAFFIRMING THE IRISH ASPIRATION TO A UNITED IRELAND, RECOGNISED THAT ANY CHANGE

/IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL

- 5 -

IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD ONLY COME ABOUT WITH THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

WE ALSO AGREED THAT:

- (I) ANY ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR BY THREAT OF VIOLENCE MUST BE REJECTED, AS MUST THOSE WHO ADOPT OR SUPPORT SUCH METHODS;
- (II) THE IDENTITIES OF BOTH THE MAJORITY AND THE MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND SHOULD BE RECOGNISED AND RESPECTED, AND REFLECTED IN THE STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES OF NORTHERN IRELAND IN WAYS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH COMMUNITIES;
- (III) THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO PROVIDE THE PEOPLE OF BOTH COMMUNITIES WITH THE CONFIDENCE THAT THEIR RIGHTS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED;
- (IV) COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IN MATTERS OF SECURITY SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND WHERE POSSIBLE IMPROVED.

/WE ALSO

WE ALSO AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE
MAJORITY AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES.

WE RECOGNISED THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT WITH
THE FULL CO-OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL
PARTIES THEMSELVES,

MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE CONTINUING HIS DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PARTIES WITH THIS
IN VIEW,

THE TAOISEACH AND I AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLOSE AND
CONTINUING DISCUSSION ON THESE SUBJECTS BETWEEN THE
TWO GOVERNMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANGLO-IRISH
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL,

WE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO MEET
AGAIN IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF NEXT YEAR TO TAKE STOCK
OF PROGRESS AND TO PURSUE OUR ESTABLISHED AIM OF
PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND,



mt

Prime Minister
Re: is Mr. Gorbali's
depr.
COP 19/11

~~I should like~~, with permission, Mr Speaker, ~~to~~ ^{I will} make a statement on my discussions with the Taoiseach on 18 and 19 November. I was accompanied by my Right Honourable Friends the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Dr FitzGerald was accompanied by Mr Spring, the Tánaiste, and by Mr Barry, the Irish Foreign Minister. The text of the Communique issued after our meeting has been placed in the Library of the House.

This was our second bilateral meeting in the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. We exchanged views on European Community matters and on other current issues in international affairs. We also reviewed the work done over the year under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council at both Ministerial and official levels on a wide range of matters.

thorough and realistic

We had a ~~serious~~ ^{serious} and thorough exchange of views on developments in relation to Northern Ireland taking into account the positions of the two Governments; the Report of the New Ireland Forum; and the proposals of constitutional democratic parties in Northern Ireland as set out in documents published in recent months. We agreed that it was a major interest of both our countries, as well as both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland, that there should be lasting peace and stability there.

The Taoiseach and I further agreed on the need for efforts to diminish the division between the two communities in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland. ~~I made it clear that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and that the majority in Northern Ireland wanted it to remain so.~~ ^{I affirmed yet again I affirmed yet again} ~~the majority in Northern Ireland~~ ^{would only come} The Taoiseach for his part, while reaffirming the Irish aspiration to a united Ireland, recognised that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom ~~would~~ ^{to would} only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

it will remain so unless the majority in Northern Ireland wish otherwise.



W. M.

The Taoiseach and I also agreed that:

- i) any attempt to promote political objectives by means of violence or by threat of violence must be rejected, as must those who adopt or support such methods;
- ii) the identities of both the majority and the minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected, and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland in ways acceptable to both communities;
- iii) the process of government in Northern Ireland should be such as to provide the people of both communities with the confidence that their rights will be safeguarded;
- iv) cooperation between our two Governments in matters of security should be maintained and where possible improved.

We also agreed on the importance of creating a political framework in Northern Ireland in which ^{both the majority and} ~~would participate~~ minority communities ~~would participate~~. We recognised that the responsibility for bringing this about lay principally with the Northern Ireland political parties themselves. My Right Honourable Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will be continuing his discussions with the Northern Ireland political parties with this in view.

The Taoiseach and I agreed that ~~in the light of our~~ ^{discussion} ~~discussion there~~ should be close and continuing dialogue on these subjects between the two Governments in the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. We decided that it would be useful for us to meet again in the ^{early months of next year} ~~New Year~~ to take stock of progress and to pursue our established aim of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

early months of next year

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:

European Matters

FCO -

PS
PS/PUS
Mr Goodall
Mr Derek Thomas
Mr Jenkins
Heads of ECD(I)
ECD(E)

Cabinet Office -

Sir R Armstrong
Mr Cartledge
Mr Williamson
Mr Colvin

Northern Ireland Office -

PS/SofS
Mr Andrew

MEETING RECORD: FCS + TANAISTE

CONFIDENTIAL

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: CHEQUERS: 18/19 NOVEMBER 1984

RECORD OF A MEETING IN THE LONG GALLERY AT 9.30 am, 19 NOVEMBER

Present:

UK Side

The Secretary of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

The Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland

Mr Robert Andrew

Sir Ewart Bell

HM Ambassador Dublin

Mr Robin Butler

Mr David Goodall

Mr Gerald Clark

Irish Side

The Tánaiste (Mr Spring)
Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Mr Barry)

Mr Andrew Ward

Irish Ambassador in London

Mr Michael Lillis

1. Sir Geoffrey Howe opened the meeting by suggesting that they cover European Community matters and bilateral questions which may not have come into the main discussion. Mr Barry spoke of the slow progress that the enlargement negotiations were making. It had been intended to complete them by the end of September. The Ten had not yet even reached a common position for Spain except for one small package on olive oil and related products, which both Spain and Portugal had turned down. The more difficult questions of wine and fisheries remained. He was worried about the consequences of delay: documentation would take about 12 months, and approval by each of the Parliaments of the Ten a further 12 months. He was pessimistic about completing the negotiations by the end of the year. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he was baffled how to push matters forward. The British were not holding this negotiation up, the only point of difficulty for us was the question of high industrial tariffs. He had a growing sense of the importance of the timetable. In some ways the EC behaved as if it were already enlarged but all the important issues remained unresolved. Mr Barry said that the fishing countries within the Ten were all more or less in line, and he hoped there might be the possibility of a small trade-off there. He had tried the previous week to get fish and agriculture into

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

one package as he was always being asked to make more packages, but the Italians had blocked it as they wanted wine included as well. He thought the next week's Community discussions would be very important. The Spanish would be very tough on fish: they had 1100 fishing boats of which they claimed only 315 were in Community water, but he believed that if conditions were made easier for them the others would come rushing back from distant fishing grounds. The Spanish proposed solution was for the Community to increase the size of allowable catches and to give all the increase to Spain. They appear to have no understanding of conservation matters. The Portuguese were a little easier to deal with. Mr Barry thought the Community could give something on sardines if the Italians obtained a concession on wine. He thought the British could help by giving way on a matter of importance to us. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that high industrial tariffs and fish were the only subjects in the enlargement negotiations of real importance to us. Mr Barry said he thought the Germans and Danes were more or less in line with the British. He regretted that the agricultural Ministers had failed to agree on wine. That would be coming back to the Foreign Ministers Council on 20 November along with ACP and Political Cooperation.

2. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he had asked Mr Rifkind and Mr Raison to cover enlargement and ACP respectively. Mr Barry said the Germans needed to resolve their position on ACP. There was some confusion about what Mr Genscher had meant. He appeared to be saying that the FRG wanted to stick to the \$7 billion ^{2.5} limit but were willing to agree to others paying up to 7.3 billion if they wished. Genscher had yet to agree his position with Ruhfus. Mr Barry continued that the differences involved only very small sums: for example the United Kingdom would only be asked to pay \$7 million ^{2.5} more (under the 7.3 billion formula) and that not until 1991. It would be a pity to embitter discussion for the sake of such small sums.

3. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that under the Political Cooperation item he thought there would be discussion of the Middle East, and preparations for the European Council. Mr Barry asked whether an American initiative on the Middle East was likely before the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

formal re-inauguration of President Reagan in January.

Sir Geoffrey Howe thought that the US would move slowly, and for that reason he favoured the Community moving cautiously step by step as well. He believed that a big initiative by the Community would make it more difficult to bring the United States along.

Mr Barry agreed: any Community move should help the situation and not be action for action's sake.

4. Mr Barry mentioned the South Lebanon where Irish contingents were involved in UNIFIL. He was surprised that the Gemayel Government had lasted so long as it had. Sir Geoffrey Howe said Gemayel faced real problems which explained why the Lebanese talks with Israel were moving so slowly. Syria was in practice exercising authoritative surveillance over Lebanese affairs.

5. Sir Geoffrey Howe expressed admiration and gratitude for the efforts which Mr Barry and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs had put into the Presidency. It was a terrible burden. He added that relations with the European Parliament were very important: the Parliament must not be given room to make any further changes in the Budget. Mr Barry said that he expected a rough ride the following week. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the key was that the Germans were now willing to advance implementation of the own resources decision into 1985. He thought there was an important link between "own resources" and enlargement.

6. Mr Barry said that the Dooge Committee would be meeting on 20 November. It would have an interim report ready for the European Council in Dublin, and would produce a final report probably in March 1985. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that it was important that they should not pretend to reach conclusions they had not. He hoped that Senator Dooge would remain in the Chair even after the Presidency changed. Mr Barry confirmed that the other members were agreeable to that.

7. Both agreed that enlargement of the Community will be one of the main topics at the Dublin Summit. Mr Barry said it would be intolerable if the Heads of Government have to deal with the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

detail of the negotiations. It was a characteristic and growing fault of the Community that no-one took decisions at the proper level. He wondered how to reverse this tendency. He had tried repeatedly at Foreign Affairs Councils without much success. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he was anxious headway should be made on Political Cooperation too. He believed that small practical measures were better than declarations of principle which served merely to distract the public. A useful idea was to improve the continuity between Presidencies. Mr Barry said the Irish believed that economic and social unity must precede political unity. The low polls in the 1983 European Parliament elections indicated public apathy. A higher poll had been obtained in 1979 because it had reflected direct domestic political interest.

8. Finally both agreed that M. Jacques Delors' presence at the European Council dinner was a good idea. It was difficult to give him a formal part in the talks as that would upset the present President of the Commission.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland Office -	Mr Andrew Mr Brennan PS/SofS
FCO -	PS Mr Goodall PS/PUS Head of RID
Cabinet Office -	Sir R Armstrong Mr Cartledge

MEETING RECORD: FCS + TANALSTE

SECRET

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: CHEQUERS: 18/19 NOVEMBER 1984
RECORD OF A MEETING IN THE LONG GALLERY: 10.15am, 19 NOVEMBER

Present:

UK Side

The Secretary of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs
The Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland
Mr Robert Andrew
Sir Ewart Bell
HM Ambassador Dublin
Mr Robin Butler
Mr David Goodall
Mr Gerald Clark

Irish Side

The Tánaiste (Mr Spring)
Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Mr Barry)
Mr Andrew Ward
Irish Ambassador in London
Mr Michael Lillis

1. The meeting then turned to Northern Ireland. Mr Hurd said there were two main areas he would like to discuss: firstly those subjects where the Irish Government wanted to issue warnings or suggestions about Northern Ireland policing, or activity on the borders; and secondly cooperation in the broadest sense, where both sides needed to work closely together. He would start by mentioning some of the subjects raised by Mr Barry at their last meeting in Dublin on 25 October.

2. On the Crossmaglen Athletic Ground there were to be meetings later in the week where proposals for cross-purchase of land would be examined further. On the border bridges a number of pedestrian bridges were now under construction. Our aim was to find a compromise which met Irish concerns about the convenience of local access and at the same time did not detract too much from security.

3. Mr Barry said that this was very helpful. He wondered whether the Northern Ireland Secretary could also review the cases of youths whose crimes had been committed when they were under age and who therefore were detained without a fixed sentence. Mr Hurd said that five of these had already been

SECRET

SECRET

released, and the NIO were looking at the cases of the others. He was also examining the length of time that prisoners were kept on remand before being brought to trial. One of his forthcoming tasks would be to study the Baker report on the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. There would have to be a debate in the House of Commons on it soon, at which he would have a number of decisions to announce. This would not be easy for HMG as some of the issues involved were very prickly within Northern Ireland. Mr Hurd also said that officials would be meeting about home-made explosives. The Prime Minister would not raise it at this meeting. It was however important that action should be taken. Mr Barry emphasised that the British would have to act too. Closing fertilizer factories in the Republic alone was not enough, or acceptable.

4. Mr Hurd then turned to police cooperation. He said that the relationship between the Garda and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch had been fine before the Glenholmes affair. This had been very damaging. He hoped that it would be a passing phase. Mr Barry would have noticed that the rest of the press were now attacking the "Sunday Times". Mr Barry agreed that it was damaging. He said the Garda would not understand the motives of those who leaked the story in the terms which had appeared.

5. Mr Hurd then referred to RUC/Garda relations. He thought that Mr Noonan's remarks on 25 October had been extremely interesting. The antipathies between the men at the top were well known. He was worried that the Chief Superintendants had not met either. He thought this kind of difficulty was a suitable subject for the Joint Security Commission which had been proposed. He promised to do his best with Sir John Hermon with a view to mending fences with the Garda Commissioner. Mr Andrew said that Sir John Hermon was thinking of writing to Mr Wren. He asked whether that would help matters or would it be counter-productive. Mr Barry encouraged Sir John Hermon to write if he believed it could improve his relationship with Mr Wren.

6. Mr Barry returned to the question of prisoners. He said that more than 100,000 people in Northern Ireland had a relative in

SECRET

SECRET

prison. In relation to the size of the population this was a huge number. It would have an important political effect if some of those in prison could be released, especially where their crimes were committed when they were under age, and where they showed clear signs of having recognised the error of their ways. Mr Hurd said that the criterion for such release would have to be an assessment of whether the prisoner might commit similar crimes again. One misjudged release would have a very serious effect in the other direction. Mr Barry said that the prisoners' chaplains could offer reliable advice on the prisoners' state of mind. Mr Hurd said that prison policy was a great worry. The paramilitaries had made great efforts to bring the present prison population under their control. There was an unholy conspiracy to suborn the prison staff by paramilitaries of both sides. The situation required constant vigilance. He had resisted segregation at Magilligan prison. He did not envy prison governors their job. Over 20 prison officers had been murdered by the terrorists. Mr Andrew mentioned that there were some 2,500 people in prison now. The numbers were slowly declining. Violence had peaked in the early/mid 1970s, and many convicted then were reaching the end of their sentences. He referred to the young boys mentioned earlier who had been released by the Secretary of State. British policy was now to give release dates some way in advance. These releases were making an increasing impact.

7. Mr Barry in this discussion referred to Mr Hurd's acknowledgement of the Irish need to make representations. Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, and this acknowledgement of the Republic's representations was unique in the world. Any solution to the Anglo-Irish question must reflect that unique situation: otherwise it would harden further.

8. Mr Hurd said that the security authorities were planning gradually to relax existing controls in city centres. There had been a move planned for 1 November but owing to a leak it had been postponed. The authorities did not wish the PIRA to take advantage of any publicity about these relaxations by striking at commercial premises. He hoped that Londonderry would be the next

SECRET

SECRET

area for relaxation. These relaxations had a very beneficial effect in that they gave encouragement to commercial life and investment. Marks and Spencers had recently doubled the size of their Belfast store.

9. Mr Barry referred to the proposed new road from Dundalk to Newry. Mr Hurd said that Mr Patten and Mr Kavanagh would be meeting in the following week to discuss this. Sir Ewart Bell said that the key to the new road was the Dundalk by-pass. The Northern Ireland authorities had agreed to build the by-pass round Newry which was of greater importance to its inhabitants than the new road itself and for the scheme to work it was essential that the Dundalk by-pass section should also be built. He explained that our "additionality" rules meant that European funding was of no great help to us. The real problem was that a lot of new roads had been built in Northern Ireland and under the impact of Government expenditure cuts the budget had now shrunk drastically and it was difficult to fit major jobs like the Newry/Dundalk road into the small budget now remaining.

10. Mr Spring said that at dinner the previous evening the focus of discussion had been the opportunity which both Governments had, as they had long terms of office remaining to them before the next elections, to keep the momentum of Anglo-Irish cooperation going. Sir Geoffrey Howe acknowledged the force of that, and suggested that there were three specific areas which they might explore: improved institutional arrangements on security (it was up to the political leaders to encourage their policemen to cooperate with each other); consultations outside the security field; and measures to deal with alienation. Mr Barry said that there was a security problem because there was a political problem. If the political problem were dealt with effectively the security problem would gradually wither away. As there was no proper role for the nationalists in Northern Ireland the British Government had a foreign government representing their interests, which must be intolerable for the British Government. For its part the Irish Government spent comparatively huge sums on security in the border areas. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the clue lay in the fact that the

SECRET

SECRET

Irish Government raised such questions. Mr Hurd said that the process started by the previous Summit in 1983 had been beneficial. It should continue. The question arose of the level of ambition of our exchanges. Some suggestions were of very high risk for both sides: for the Irish Government in relation to the outcome of a possible referendum, and for the British Government in relation to the reaction of the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland. We had to balance these factors. The Joint Security Commission could be narrow or broad in scope. It was possible to treat it on its own immediate merits as a contribution to security without taking steps to include any political pay-off. But it could have wider use: it could be a forum for the sort of advice and warnings which Mr Barry had given him and before him Mr Prior. Ideas about devolution tended to get mixed up in this discussion. The local politicians would have to be brought in. There was as yet no real dialogue between them, and this would be needed before the Cabinet could produce a blueprint.

Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the main political disadvantage of a Joint Security Commission surely only arose if it dealt only with security, even if within its own terms it would have a beneficial effect. He thought that a Joint Security Commission however could enable the Irish to make an input to policing policy in the North. It would also disclose the unusual nature of the relationship between the two countries. It could help to develop structures of local Government which would give a greater chance of achieving something that worked, and which fell somewhere between majority rule and power sharing, and it would give scope for an input from the Irish Government to areas which strictly lay outside security. A step by step approach based on a process of this kind, encouraged and maintained over a long period, might be easier than the package for each side to sell to its clients.

11. Mr Barry said that the difficulty with the package was that the Irish Government did not have the final say. A referendum was required. If the package was not properly balanced the public would reject it. That would cause a very difficult situation. The PIRA would denounce the Republic's Government for betraying the nationalist cause and would simultaneously provoke

SECRET

SECRET

a Unionist backlash in the North. The package was difficult enough anyway. The official Opposition was likely to oppose it. If the nationalists in Northern Ireland did not view it with enthusiasm and did not support it the Government would lose the referendum.

12. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the package caused formidable difficulties for us too. He wondered whether we had identified the elements in it in sufficient depth. Perhaps it might be easier to take small steps now. Mr Spring said that the Irish understood that the package was risky for both sides. Unfortunately even on the broadest definition a Joint Security Commission would not give cross-community validity. The Irish Government had already made many gestures of this goodwill up front, for example on extradition. It had done this in the face of outrageous happenings in Northern Ireland like the Downes incident and statements from senior judges.

13. Mr Hurd said that his proposal was more complex. A JSC could provide a forum to discuss for example Catholic recruitment to the RUC or police policy with the Chief Constable. Meetings between the Ministers tended to deal with generalities when there were many practical things to be discussed between the technicians. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that in the course of the last ten years British and Irish officials and Ministers knew each other a great deal better as a result of their meetings in the European Community. We should make use of that as well as of the improving security situation. A big package might be too ambitious, although he took the point about both sides having Governments in a strong position. Mr Barry asked whether the proposal was to formalise what the present meeting was doing. Mr Hurd said that it was not exactly that. The body need not be called a Joint Security Commission; others could be added when needed. He was thinking more of thickening and broadening existing contacts. Mr Barry said that such a proposal would be a very high risk one for the Irish Government. It would be accused of helping the British frustrate nationalist aspirations. It would indeed be of higher risk than a referendum on a balanced package. Mr Spring said that the Irish Government were doing as

SECRET

SECRET

much as was practicable under existing conditions already. How could this be improved by a Joint Security Commission on its own? Mr Hurd said he had mentioned three areas for possible improvement: cooperation on home-made explosives; relations between the Garda/RUC; and relations between the Garda and Metropolitan Police Special Branch. Mr Andrew said there were training possibilities and the need to increase resources in the border areas. He referred to the removal of the Garda's special border unit. Mr Barry said that he could also give examples of the RUC reducing its deployment on the border when the opposite might have been more appropriate. Mr Hurd said he would like to hear of such suggestions and comments.

14. Mr Barry said that the UDR was a serious cause of alienation. It used to have some good officers but they had retired. There were signs that former "B Specials" were getting back into the organisation. There was also the question of unreasonable "frisking" of young people. But all this was a matter of security detail. He believed that political moves must come first. Mr Andrew said that he hoped the Irish agreed that political agreement would not of itself abolish the security problem.

15. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that a full analysis was needed. Mr Barry's suggestions about prison policy and the searching of young people went beyond strict security. They were very sensitive politically, and improvements there might have more political effect than direct security gain. Social policy was also important. Housing and education in the rest of the United Kingdom fell not to Ministers but to local authorities for decisions, perhaps there was an undisputed middle here which could be analysed further.

16. Mr Hurd said that HMG were trying to hold off unionist agitation. This was the reason for their Joint Security Commission proposal. It would be difficult for the Unionists to complain about it as they were always accusing the Irish Government of doing insufficient on this score. For that reason it would be worth keeping the JSC title. It was the obverse of

SECRET

the Irish difficulty: a different name would cause alarm among unionists. Mr Barry said that if it was the only thing in the shop he would not enter it to buy. Mr Hurd asked whether that would be so if it had a consultative umbrella covering other subjects. Could not Mr Barry make a speech (which might embarrass the British a bit, but he could wear that) in order to sell it to the Irish public? Mr Barry said others might but not him. In any case he was able to make representations on all these points already to Mr Hurd, though his representations perforce were on the effects of the problem rather than on the cause of it. Mr Hurd said that the present arrangements did not allow them to have deep discussions about for example policing, because neither he nor Mr Barry were policemen and only met sporadically. But a regular forum which included policemen could be much more productive. Mr Barry said there was no reason why that should not happen without a JSC but it would not cure the problem. Mr Hurd agreed but added that it would be defensible against attack from both Unionists and Mr Haughey. It would also improve matters. He believed that the cure lay in working out ways in which both communities in Northern Ireland could work together on subjects of joint concern like housing and education which were not normally central government subjects. Mr Barry said that he did not like the idea of his going to the North every so often with a shopping list of complaints. The important thing was that 40% of the population in Northern Ireland did not accept HMG. Mr Hurd protested that this was not quite true: alienation was more complicated than that, and by no means universal among the Catholic minority. In some areas (eg Derry) the Catholics were in a majority on the local council. He had good relations with them.

17. At this point the discussion was broken off for coffee.

SECRET



Bry/ECH

41

10 DOWNING STREET

19 November 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Len,

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

The Anglo/Irish Consultations were held at Chequers on 18 and 19 November. Much of the discussion took the form of private meetings between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach or of very restricted discussions. I enclose:

- a) a note summarising the private conversation between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach after dinner on 18 November;
- b) a record of the restricted meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on the morning of 19 November;
- c) a record of a meeting between the Ministers on both sides, also on the morning of 19 November.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office), Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Acland, Mr. Goodall and Mr. Andrew.

Yours sincerely,
Chris Powell

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SUBJECT
cc. Master Set.

SECRET

40

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Anglo-Irish Summit : First Evening

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach had a private conversation after dinner on 18 November. The Prime Minister subsequently gave other members of the delegation a brief account of it.

The Taoiseach said that he had spent much of his political life trying to demonstrate that expectations of Irish reunification were wholly unrealistic. Recent opinion polls in the Republic were evidence that he had advanced a long way towards this goal. They showed that a majority of people in the Republic were ready to see Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution modified provided that something was done at the same time to restore nationalist confidence in the North. The question was what and how.

The Prime Minister pressed the Taoiseach on why he thought that the minority in the North were alienated. She could understand that they had, in the past, had good reason to be so. But steps had been taken to eliminate discrimination in all the important aspects of their lives, such as education and housing. They enjoyed a significantly better standard of living than their counterparts in the Republic (the Taoiseach acknowledged this). What was it that still made them feel unfairly treated?

The Taoiseach said that there were a number of irritants such as frisking of Catholic youths by the UDR. But the basic problem was the feeling that the minority would never have any chance of being in government or having a say in decisions. They felt excluded by the system. The Prime Minister pointed out that this was not uncommon internationally. The Ndebele in Zimbabwe had no prospect of holding power, nor did Muslims in India or Chinese in Malaya. It was inevitable when political parties were based on confessional or racial groups. The way for such groups

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

to exercise power had to be to join more widely based parties.

In further pressing his point, the Taoiseach kept coming back to power-sharing in the North as the only way to give the republican minority confidence and some influence over their future. He did not dwell upon institutionalised consultation. The Prime Minister recalled the enormous efforts made in the past to achieve a form of government acceptable to both sides in the North and the insurmountable obstacles encountered.

19 November 1984

SECRET

SUBJECT
u. Master Set

SECRET

39

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
TAOISEACH AT CHEQUERS ON MONDAY 19 NOVEMBER AT MIDDAY

Present:

Prime Minister	The Taoiseach
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary	The Tanaiste Mr. Barry
Northern Ireland Secretary	Mr. Nally
Sir Robert Armstrong	Mr. Donlon
Mr. Powell	

The Prime Minister invited the Taoiseach to report to their colleagues on the discussion which the two of them had had earlier in the morning.

The Taoiseach said that the discussion had worried him. He thought that the British side were falling into the trap of regarding the Northern Ireland problem as only a security problem. In fact the security problem was there because there was a political problem and it was that which had to be solved first. The British side did not seem to him to have accepted that reality. Instead they were focussing on security without seeing it in its wider context. It was simply not possible for an Irish Government to join a Joint

SECRET

Security Commission unless there was also a political dimension with which the minority could identify. The limits of that political dimension were clear. British sovereignty could not be challenged and nothing should be done to destabilise the majority. But there had to be a political dimension. He had come out of the earlier discussion rather depressed because he did not feel that it had got to grips with this aspect.

The Prime Minister said that her understanding was that the Taoiseach needed three things in order to go ahead with the referendum on changes in the Irish constitution and recognition of the Border. The first was co-operation in security matters. We did not see this as directed at battering down the minority, to pick up a phrase used earlier by the Taoiseach. A Joint Security Commission would be a way to help the minority ensure that their legal rights were upheld. The nationalist minority would be able to see the Commission as a forum where any matter affecting them in relation to security could be raised. The Irish Minister of Justice would be a member and would in effect act as an advocate for the minority community.

The second requirement was the need for a political framework in the North. Several models had been tried in the past. An arrangement had to be found which was acceptable to both the majority and the minority. But some impetus was needed to get them to agree. It would be helpful if the Irish side could encourage the SDLP to take part in the discussions.

Thirdly there was the judicial/legal aspect. This had not been discussed at length but she believed that there were no major obstacles to progress, though more work was needed.

The Northern Ireland Secretary said that in our concept

a Joint Security Commission would cover a great deal of ground. It would go beyond policing into penal and legal matters. The advantage of calling it a Joint Security Commission was that it would make it difficult for the Unionists to challenge the Republic's involvement in it since co-operation in security matters was clearly desirable. As regards the political framework, the elected representatives of the two communities had to be brought to talk to each other. The Unionists had a strong tactical position at the moment, since they could claim that they were ready to talk but had no interlocutor. It would be necessary to put pressure on both communities to get involved in discussions. The Prime Minister added that we were barred from holding out to them the prospect of change in the Republic's constitution as an incentive. So the only leverage which we had with them was the urgency of finding a solution and their ambition to govern themselves. What encouragement could the Irish Government give to the SDLP to take part in talks?

The Taoiseach said that the SDLP had been seeking involvement in government since 1971 but the Unionists were determined to exclude them. The Prime Minister said that it was no good returning to power sharing, it simply was not on. Mr. Barry said that all the Unionists had in mind was to allow the Nationalists to hold the chairmanship of committees in the Assembly. This was not enough. The Taoiseach said that history could not be ignored. It was clear that the Unionists wanted to exclude the minority permanently from any power. The Prime Minister said that one had to assume that the Unionists had learnt something from the last ten years. Mr. Barry doubted that they had.

The Northern Ireland Secretary suggested that, given the difficulties over a political framework, the most realistic goal for the current discussions was acceptance of the principle of Irish Government advocacy in an area which

was most sensitive for the minority community, namely policing and security. The British Government were ready to agree to a Joint Security Commission without the quid pro quo of a change in the Irish constitution. At the same time both the British and Irish Governments should lean on the political leaders in the North to re-enter serious discussions. No-one could guarantee that they would clear the fence of agreement. But they must be made to take it again and again. The Foreign Secretary added that the search had to be continued for something which was neither majority rule nor power sharing. As regards the Joint Security Commission the new factor was the perception that it would be a place where the Republic could provide advocacy for the views of the minority on all points where they thought that the present system did not allow them sufficient protection. With this wider remit, the Commission could address itself to the areas of major discontent for the minority. Mr. Barry said that the minority continued to see the RUC as a Unionist police force. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was precisely the sort of point which could be canvassed in the Security Commission.

Mr. Barry said that a way still had to be found to give the nationalists a say in the future of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister pointed out that the minority already exercised power in some areas of Northern Ireland where they constituted the majority. Mr. Barry said that unlike the Unionists, they exercised their power fairly. The Taoiseach read out some statistics about the unsatisfactory record of Unionist Councils. The Prime Minister said that no-one was an advocate of unfair Government by majority.

The Taoiseach returned to the Joint Security Commission. If the minority were to accept it as a significant step it would have to be a bit more than advisory. For instance there might be a convention that no

senior appointments in the police would be made unless they were acceptable to both sides. The Prime Minister objected that this once again smacked of joint authority. The Taoiseach then turned to the political framework and again argued the case for "involvement" of an Irish Minister in the Government of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that she could not accept "involvement". Some phrase such as "making a contribution to" might be acceptable. The Northern Ireland Secretary said that if the Irish Government wanted to go beyond the Joint Security Commission to institutionalised consultation over a wider field of policy, then this step must be accompanied by a referendum on changes to the Irish constitution. The more modest and realisable objective was a Joint Security Commission on its own. This would not require any action from the Irish Government except in the field of security. In any event he was not certain that a change in the Irish constitution would carry enough conviction with the Unionists to persuade them to accept institutionalised consultation. Mr. Barry observed that the Republic had always in the past been told that Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution were the great barrier to progress.

The Taoiseach enquired whether the Prime Minister envisaged a conference of all the parties in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that this had been tried in the past but had not worked very well. The Northern Ireland Secretary added that a conference might come at the end of the day. The Tanaiste said that a Dublin presence would be necessary if such a conference were to make progress. The Prime Minister said that in that event the Unionists would not attend. Mr. Barry suggested that the British Government could threaten to reach a settlement over their heads. The Prime Minister said there was no question of this. We could not overrule the majority. The Taoiseach said that he hoped the idea of an appointed executive, which could not be boycotted, would be kept alive.

The Prime Minister said that she wanted to make one more effort to convince the Taoiseach that it was worth going ahead at least with the Joint Security Commission. This could be a first and exemplary step towards close co-operation between the Northern Ireland Secretary and a Minister from the Republic. Mr. Barry said that if this were the only result of the Anglo/Irish talks it would risk the end of Dr. FitzGerald's Government. The Prime Minister concluded that in that event we could only aim for a very general communiqué. The Taoiseach said that he feared that lack of progress would have an unfortunate effect on the local elections in May. Perhaps he and the Prime Minister could have a further meeting early in the New Year. The Prime Minister said that a meeting without substantive progress could be more damaging than no meeting at all. The timing of a further meeting would have to be judged in the light of the prospects and of progress in the meanwhile in contacts between the parties in the North.

The Taoiseach said that he was disappointed. He feared that the present combination of favourable circumstances for making progress would not recur and could be snuffed out altogether in May next year. It was vital to come up with something which would ensure that the outcome of the local elections in May did not undermine constitutional politics in Northern Ireland. He acknowledged that what the Prime Minister had proposed was a step forward. But it was not enough to achieve a lasting solution. He had reached a point in the Republic where it was possible to envisage amending the constitution. This could in turn release forces in Unionism which would allow further movement. He did not wish to surrender this possibility. The Prime Minister said that the aim of an enduring settlement was worth going for but one had to be realistic. The Taoiseach repeated that he recognised the lesser objective was worthwhile but did not yet wish to give up on the larger one. He asked whether the Prime Minister agreed that the

Nally/Armstrong talks should continue. The Prime Minister confirmed that they could. The Northern Ireland Secretary urged the Taoiseach to encourage the SDLP back into talks with the other parties in the North. The Taoiseach said that he would speak in this sense to Mr. Hume.

The meeting ended at 1345 hours.

19 November 1984

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
TAOISEACH AT CHEQUERS ON MONDAY 19 NOVEMBER AT 0945

Present:

Prime Minister	The Taoiseach
Sir Robert Armstrong	Mr Nally
Mr Powell	Mr Lillis

The Prime Minister welcomed the Taoiseach to this round of Anglo-Irish consultations. Reflecting on their private conversation the evening before, she was struck by the difficulty in translating general propositions into practical results. None the less she was ready to work towards this objective. But some serious questions had to be asked. Was there really a chance of amending the Irish Constitution so as to recognise the border between the Republic and the North for the foreseeable future? Or would that become unattainable in the heat of a referendum campaign? If the latter was a serious risk, it might be better to work for less ambitious objectives, particularly in the field of security co-operation. She noted the emphasis which the Taoiseach had put on measures to give more confidence to the minority in the North. But it was very difficult to translate that into practical policies without so upsetting the majority as to lead to heightened violence. She was worried by the prospects of what might emerge from such violence. The IRA did not represent just an Irish dimension, it had a Marxist and an international terrorist dimension grafted onto it. She was beginning to understand what the United States felt about Nicaragua.

The Taoiseach said that he too was very concerned on this last point. If no action was taken to halt the drift towards violence, the constitutional forces would be unable

to continue and the ground would be left to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein were putting it about that they would not contest the local elections in May. The Irish Government thought this was a tactical ploy to lull others, including the SDLP, into a false sense of security. If real progress could not be made as a result of the Anglo-Irish talks Sinn Fein would take over as the voice of the minority.

The Taoiseach continued that expectations of Irish unity in the Republic had been reduced to a point where changing Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution was feasible. A united Ireland was no longer regarded as a serious prospect. This shift in opinion had taken place amongst the minority in the North of Ireland as well. But the nationalist minority were harrassed by Sinn Fein and intimidated by the IRA with the result that they were utterly demoralised. All they wanted was to live in peace as Irish people in the island of Ireland, maintaining their Irish identity. The Prime Minister wondered whether their grievances really ^{were} so great since direct rule. The Taoiseach said that the nationalists were proud of being Irish. They could not identify with Britain. They could not see why they were not allowed to express their identity and fly their flag, nor why the security forces which policed them were from another community who bullied and intimidated them. They wanted security forces with whom they could identify and political processes in which they could participate.

The Prime Minister said that in a sense these problems were common to minorities in many countries. But what the Taoiseach seemed to be saying was that the minority in Northern Ireland wanted to make its living there but owe its allegiance to the Republic. She did not see how this wish could be granted. The Taoiseach said that nowhere in Europe was there an analogous situation where one-sixth of the people had relatives or close friends in prison or a death

rate from violence which on the mainland of the United Kingdom would be equivalent to 100,000. The Prime Minister replied that there was not another terrorist movement in Europe as active as the IRA. She acknowledged that there was a real problem over policing. It was not proving possible to recruit enough Catholics into the RUC. Part of the problem was that the SDLP would not let them join.

The Prime Minister continued that one conclusion that she drew from this was that priority should be given to a Joint Security Commission. This would be advisory but would also be a forum in which the Irish Minister of Justice could raise the problems and complaints of the minority community. The Taoiseach said that this was not enough. The minority needed to be policed by people from its own community. This was particularly the case in the ghetto areas of West Belfast and Derry. If the police were drawn from the area itself it would be easier to get Catholics to join and serve. As it was there was no policing at all in these areas and Catholics were left at the mercy of the IRA. The RUC needed to be reorganised and strengthened by bringing in members of the minority community. The Prime Minister said that the Chief Constable was happy to recruit Catholics though he would not deploy them in the streets from which they came. The difficulty lay in getting volunteers. The Taoiseach said that more was needed. The minority must be able to identify with their local police. He cited the example of Brussels which had 46 police forces each representing the appropriate balance between Flemings and Walloons.

The Prime Minister said that she was worried by the trend of the conversation. The Taoiseach seemed to be saying that he wanted a Republican enclave in Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach reacted strongly: 85,000 Catholics had been driven out of their homes in the mixed areas into ghettos, the biggest forced population move in Europe since

World War Two. In their ghettos they were terrorized by the IRA and the police would not go in. All he was seeking was effective policing with which the minority community could identify in the areas where it predominated. The Prime Minister asked whether the IRA might not infiltrate the police if more Roman Catholics were recruited. The Taoiseach said that intelligence should be good enough to prevent this. The IRA had never succeeded in penetrating the Garda. The Prime Minister observed that it was more likely that the IRA would terrorize Catholics out of volunteering.

The Taoiseach continued that the police force in the republican areas must derive its authority from a body acceptable to minority opinion. The Republic could provide that legitimacy. The Prime Minister said that to envisage the police deriving authority from outside Northern Ireland was going too far. Was not the right course to start by setting up a Joint Security Commission so that the sort of points raised by the Taoiseach could be thrashed out in detail? Its role would have to be advisory. It might consist of the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Irish Minister of Justice, the two most senior police officials from Northern Ireland and the Republic and two other officials. The Taoiseach said that clarity would be needed about its role. There were at least three important elements with which the Joint Security Commission must deal: appointments, operational guidelines, and complaints. The minority would need to see it playing a significant role on all three. More importantly, the Joint Security Commission would have to be set in a broader political framework. Otherwise his Government would be accused of simply lending its support to British repression. The Prime Minister said that the whole point was to help people living in the nationalist areas whom the Taoiseach said had no effective security. The Taoiseach repeated that the police force must operate in a political framework with which the minority

could identify. At the moment there was both political alienation and security alienation.

The Prime Minister said that the possibilities for co-operation on legal matters should also be looked at. The Taoiseach agreed. He thought that the anti-terrorism laws in the Republic and in the North could be harmonised quite quickly. There was already a schedule of joint offences. Harmonising of criminal law as a whole would be a much longer term undertaking. At the same time a Bill of Rights would be needed for Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister asked why the SDLP continued to refuse to come into the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Taoiseach replied that the reason was simple: the Unionists had always refused to contemplate power sharing. Indeed they insisted on the permanent exclusion of the minority from power. The Prime Minister said that this was the fate of minorities when parties were based on religion or race. But facts had to be faced. She did not know anyone on the Unionist side who would accept power sharing. One had also to try to see things from their point of view. They lived next door to a country which claimed their territory and were naturally reluctant to share power with a minority which owed allegiance to that country. Power sharing simply was not on, which is why the British Government had searched for other solutions.

The Taoiseach said that power-sharing could not be excluded though he recognised it caused serious problems. There were two alternative roads which might be explored. The first was the proposal made by Mr Prior when Northern Ireland Secretary for an executive separate from the Assembly chaired by the Secretary of State who would appoint to it people from both communities. This had been discussed with the parties but never proceeded with. Reactions to it had not been so bad. The second possibility was to give the

Republic some role in the Government of Northern Ireland in conjunction with the Secretary of State. This would at least give the Unionists a strong incentive to move towards devolved Government so as to limit the number of issues on which the Irish Government would have a say.

The Prime Minister said that the Anglo-Irish consultations were not the appropriate place to try to establish a structure of Government in Northern Ireland. The first idea mentioned by the Taoiseach was alien to our tradition under which the executive emerged from legislature. The Prime Minister continued that she agreed that any solution in Northern Ireland had to be generally acceptable to both the majority and minority community. This had been the goal of Sir Humphrey Atkins' efforts and indeed of the 1982 Act. The problem was that it had hitherto proved impossible to find a basis which was acceptable to both communities. One thing was certain: any such basis would only emerge from direct discussions between the two communities. The Taoiseach suggested that this would simply be to give the Unionists a right of veto. The Prime Minister said that rather they would not get the devolved Government that they wanted unless they agreed to arrangements acceptable to both communities. We thought there was a strong incentive there. But one had to ask oneself seriously: was the animosity so fundamental that agreement would never be attained? Or was it just a question of finding the right formula?

The Prime Minister said that she would try to summarise what had been said so far. The Taoiseach had argued that no progress was possible in the North unless security was improved and the minority obtained a structure of law and policing which protected them. She had proposed a Joint Security Commission where these issues could be thrashed out and dealt with. The Taoiseach had said that this could not happen without a political structure. She had pointed out

that HMG had made several attempts at creating such a structure but had never been able to achieve one acceptable to both communities.

The Taoiseach said that he saw some evidence that opinion among the Unionists was shifting. The DUP seemed able to visualise the possibility of going into opposition. The UUP were showing some sensitivity to the Irish identity. He thought these factors made it worthwhile looking closely again at the two ideas he had mentioned: the appointed executive or a role for an Irish Minister. The Prime Minister said that the second smacked of joint authority. The Taoiseach had earlier used the phrase that an Irish Minister would play a role "in conjunction with the Secretary of State". This was absolutely not on. The Taoiseach said that the phrase had been chosen with care. He was not saying exactly what the role would be. He understood the Prime Minister's position on joint authority although he regarded it as unfortunate. Equally he had to make clear that consultation alone was not enough. The Prime Minister repeated that joint authority simply would not work. The Taoiseach said that some relationship which gave the Irish Government a say was required. It simply would not be enough to bolster security co-operation without giving the Republic some wider say. The Prime Minister said that she still could not see why it was not possible to start with the Joint Security Commission. The Taoiseach said that he would explain his position once more. He was prepared to amend the Irish Constitution to make clear that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority. This was a big risk for him. (The Prime Minister said that she recognised that.) He simply had to have a package which would enable the minority in the North to support his Government in the referendum campaign. This had to be sufficient to give the minority hope of being able to live in dignity as Irish people with fair policing and courts and a role in

determining their own future. The Prime Minister said that this still gave her major difficulty. The Taoiseach seemed to be saying that the minority community should have a police force whose allegiance would be to an authority over the border. It seemed to her that what was being sought was to achieve the effect of repartition without actually doing it in geographical terms. The Taoiseach said that there was no question of repartition. It would lead to a West Bank situation. But something had to be done for the minority community. It was a tragedy that so many families in both communities wanted their young to leave Northern Ireland because they saw no future. He and the Prime Minister had a joint duty to create a better future for them.

The Taoiseach said that he would summarise his views. The Nationalists in the North would accept the status quo if they could express their Irishness in the same way that the Unionists express their Britishness. He believed profoundly that matters had reached a point where it was possible to find a way through. But if the opportunity was missed, the Sinn Fein would get on top and there would be a risk of a civil war. There was not much time. The key was to find a way to enable the minority to have a role. Power sharing was one way. If that could not be achieved, some measure of Irish Government involvement would be needed, together with a system of mixed courts and changes in policing arrangements. These three elements would dry up the water in which the terrorists swam and would enable his Government to win a referendum on changes in the Irish Constitution. But if changes were made only in the security field, these efforts would fail. There had to be a political system which the minority could identify with. The Prime Minister repeated that it seemed to her that the price of the Irish Government recognising the border seemed to be their taking over 40 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister continued that Westminster could

not impose anything on Northern Ireland. The two communities there must agree between themselves. The Taoiseach returned to the point that there must be some Irish involvement which was compatible with British sovereignty. Consultation was not enough because the views of the Republic could too easily be ignored. Something had to be found which lay between joint authority and consultation. For instance there might be a commitment by the British Government to "seek to agree" with Irish Ministers. In the event of no agreement, there could be appeal to the two Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister said that this again was joint authority and could not be accepted. The Secretary of State's hands would be fettered. The Taoiseach said that without this the Republic would be asked to change its Constitution on the basis of a right of consultation with no guarantee that such consultation would be serious or that Irish views would carry weight. They must have some assurance that consultation would be meaningful.

The Prime Minister said that it would be ideal if the Republic were to change its Constitution. But the essence was to take a step forward, if necessary a more modest one. It seemed to her that the best prospect lay in security co-operation. At the same time the Northern Ireland Secretary would continue his consultations with the parties in the North and see what progress they could make towards a basis for devolved Government acceptable to both sides.

The meeting adjourned at 11.30.

19 November 1984

COMMUNIQUE

The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher FRS MP, and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald TD, met at Chequers on 18 and 19 November 1984 in the second meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to be held at the level of Heads of Government.

The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd CBE MP. The Taoiseach was accompanied by Mr. Dick Spring TD, Tanaiste and Minister for Energy, and Mr. Peter Barry TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach exchanged views on European Community matters, including enlargement to admit Spain and Portugal, progress in creating the internal market, the economic and social situation, including employment trends, and the future development and financing of the Community.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach also reviewed current issues in international affairs, including the efforts to relieve famine in Ethiopia and other countries in Africa.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reviewed the work done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council at both ministerial and official levels on political, economic, security and cultural matters. They noted that much detailed work was continuing at official level, and looked forward to further meetings of the Council at all levels.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach had an extensive and constructive exchange of views on developments in relation to Northern Ireland since their last major bilateral meeting a year ago. In their discussions they took fully into account the position of the British Government as set out in the debate in the House of Commons on 2 July 1984; the report of the New Ireland Forum; and the proposals of constitutional democratic parties in Northern Ireland as set out in documents published in recent months.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that it was a major interest of both their countries, as well as of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland, that there should be lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the need for efforts to diminish the divisions between the two communities in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland.

/ The Taoiseach

The Taoiseach also reaffirmed that it remained the wish of the Irish Government that the two parts of Ireland should come together by freely negotiated agreement and in peace, but recognised that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister reaffirmed that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and that the majority in Northern Ireland wanted it to remain so. At the same time she confirmed that, if in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wished for and consented to a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom Government would put forward and support legislation to that end in the British Parliament.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that:

- (i) any attempt to promote political objectives by means of violence or the threat of violence must be rejected, as must those who adopt or support such methods;
- (ii) the identities of both the majority and the minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected, and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland

in ways acceptable to both communities;

(iii) the process of government in Northern Ireland should be such as to provide the people of both communities with the confidence that their rights will be safeguarded.

(iv) co-operation between their two Governments in matters of security should be maintained and where possible improved.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that in the light of their discussion there should be close and continuing dialogue on these subjects between the two Governments in the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, with a view to a further meeting between them within the coming months.

OPENING STATEMENT: PRESS CONFERENCE

I HAVE JUST COMPLETED THE FULLEST, FRANKEST AND MOST
CONSTRUCTIVE BILATERAL MEETING AT CHEQUERS I
HAVE HAD WITH THE TAOISEACH.

AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TOOK
PART IN THE BILATERAL ALONG WITH DR SPRING,
THE TANAISTE, AND MR BARRY, THE FOREIGN MINISTER,
FROM DUBLIN.

WE HAVE HAD ABOUT SIX HOURS OF VERY SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS IN
A GOOD SPIRIT BECAUSE, AS THE COMMUNIQUE SHOWS,
WE HAVE A SHARED INTEREST IN LASTING PEACE AND
STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

/ I WOULD LIKE

I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST HOW MUCH I APPRECIATED

DR FITZGERALD'S CONSIDERATION IN OFFERING TO
COME TO LONDON.

HE RECENTLY WROTE TO ME A VERY KIND NOTE
SUGGESTING THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE CONVENIENT FOR
ME IF HE WERE TO COME TO CHEQUERS AND IN AGREEING
I THANKED HIM FOR HIS KIND GESTURE.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE OF COURSE

REAFFIRMED OUR BASIC POSITIONS.

THE TAOISEACH'S - HIS GOVERNMENT'S WISH THAT
THE TWO PARTS OF IRELAND SHOULD COME TOGETHER
BY FREELY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT AND IN PEACE, BUT
HIS RECOGNITION THAT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
WOULD ONLY COME ABOUT WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

/FOR MY PART

FOR MY PART I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A
CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS IF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WERE IN
FUTURE TO WISH FOR AND CONSENT TO SUCH A CHANGE.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE HAVE HAD THE FULLEST AND
FRANKEST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN
RELATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED AND BEEN PUBLISHED SINCE
OUR LAST FORMAL BILATERAL A YEAR AGO.
WE AGREED THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CONTINUE.

OUR CONVERSATION WAS IN PART REFLECTIVE AND ANALYTICAL
AND YOU WILL SEE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE THAT WE
ARE AGREED ON A NUMBER OF THINGS:

- THAT WE SHOULD

- THAT WE SHOULD REJECT UTTERLY THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES BY VIOLENCE, OR BY THREATS OF VIOLENCE AND REJECT THOSE WHO ADOPT OR SUPPORT SUCH METHODS

- THAT SECURITY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED

- THE NEED TO DIMINISH THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND TO RECONCILE THE TWO MAJOR TRADITIONS THAT EXIST IN THE TWO PARTS OF IRELAND

/ - THE IMPORTANCE

- THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECTING THE IDENTITIES OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND OF GIVING THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND CONFIDENCE THAT THEIR RIGHTS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED, AND

- TO PURSUE OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THESE QUESTIONS THROUGH THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL.

WE ALSO AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH BOTH THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES WOULD PARTICIPATE. WE RECOGNISED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THIS ABOUT LAY PRINCIPALLY WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PARTIES THEMSELVES; AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE PURSUING THIS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM.

/ THE TAOISEACH

THE TAOISEACH AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN THE
NEW YEAR TO TAKE STOCK OF PROGRESS AND TO PURSUE
OUR SHARED AIM OF LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN
NORTHERN IRELAND.

I CANNOT OBVIOUSLY AT THIS STAGE INDICATE WHAT, IF ANY,
STEPS MIGHT COME FORWARD THEN.

BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE INTEND TO PURSUE
THE AIM OF LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY - AND
ALSO THE SHARED AIM OF RECONCILIATION - WITH
GOODWILL AND DETERMINATION.

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Bilateral - Press Conference

We are arranging for you and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to give a press conference in No.12 Downing Street at 5.00 pm when we shall release the Communique.

The Irish, off their own bat, have decided to hold their press conference at the Irish Embassy in London at 6.00 pm.

This will be most convenient for journalists. It means that you will control presentation, but that the Irish will have the last word.

Dr. FitzGerald, however, shows considerable anxiety to avoid media wedge driving and his Press Secretary tells me he would welcome a chat with you after lunch on presentation. We shall need to leave Chequers at 3.30.

Mechanics

No.12 will be very crowded and hot. Consequently, we have cut down TV cameras to 3 - BBC, ITN and RTE, Ireland.

The press conference will be filmed and recorded. I propose to end it at 5.45 pm at the very latest to allow journalists to cross the park to the Irish Embassy.

Since the press conference will be filmed and recorded, I see no reason why you should give news interviews. You are, in any case, very tight for time in view of the Kyprianou visit.

Moreover, a single press conference will minimise presentational difficulties in advance of a possible statement to the House tomorrow.

/ Issues

Issues

Presentation will, of course, be governed by the Communique and I attach at Annex I a draft speaking note prepared on the basis of the latest draft Communique.

It is however clear that there are likely to be two main questions:

- have you agreed to continue the dialogue, and if so how frequently and at what levels?
- have you reached, or do you see any prospect of reaching, an agreed analysis of the Northern Ireland problem? [A BBC commentator said this morning that this was crucial and the only basis for making progress.]

Other points which will arise in questioning are:

- tone of discussions; health of relationship?
- how much pressure do you feel under for fear of Sinn Fein progress at next May's elections?
- has Brighton bomb had any effect on the talks other than venue? [I have said that Dr. FitzGerald suggested the change in the aftermath of Brighton as a gesture to you which you much appreciated.]
- are you planning a joint security commission, cross border links between police and armies, strengthening of Anglo Irish Council, Parliamentary tier?
- how much time did security occupy? Was Glenholmes case mentioned?


/- have

- have you discussed or considered the idea of a Belfast-based department of the Irish Government?
- do you see the need for a political initiative, or are you just content to soldier on, keeping the lid on Northern Ireland?
- when are you going to respond formally to the New Ireland Forum report?
- in reiterating the commitment to a majority in the North, do you acknowledge the Nationalist aspiration?
- any common view on, and campaign against, NORaid?
- any reaction to the IRA's threat today of a new wave of trouble?

These questions could form the basis for a pre-press conference briefing.

I think you will agree that we should try to confine the press conference to Anglo/Irish affairs. But you ought to have in your mind the possibility of questions (which I shall discourage) on:

- the Mubarak disclosures and an attempt to link them with Scargill
- the pit situation
- Animal Rights poisoners
- the row with the Bishops.



BERNARD INGHAM

19 November 1984

DRAFT OPENING STATEMENT : PRESS CONFERENCE

~~Dr. FitzGerald~~ and I have just completed ^{the fullest, frankest and ^{most} pleasurable} a friendly ~~and useful~~ bilateral meeting at Chequers. ^{I have ever had ~~with~~ ~~the Taoiseach~~ ~~with~~ ~~the Taoiseach~~ →}

As you probably know the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland took part in the bilateral along with Dr. Spring, the Tanaiste, and Mr. Barry, the Foreign Minister, from Dublin.

We have had about six hours of very serious discussions in a good spirit because, as the Communique shows, we have a shared interest in lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

I would like to say first how much I appreciated Dr. FitzGerald's consideration in offering to come to London. He recently wrote to me a very kind note suggesting that it might be more convenient for me if he were to come to Chequers and in agreeing I thanked him for his kind gesture.

In the course of our discussions we have of course reaffirmed our basic positions. The Taoiseach's - his Government's wish that the two parts of Ireland should ~~in peace and by agreement,~~ come together ^{by/ready negotiated agreements and in peace} but his recognition that any constitutional change would only come about with the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

/ For my part

For my part I have made it clear that the British Government would not stand in the way of a change in Northern Ireland's constitutional status if a majority of the people were in future to wish for and consent to such a change.

Against that background we have had ^{the Fullin and Frankers} a full exchange of views on developments in relations ^{to} ~~with~~ Northern Ireland, taking into account all that has happened and been published since our last formal bilateral a year ago. *We agreed that our discussions should continue.*

Our conversation was in part reflective and analytical and you will see from the Communique that we are agreed on a number of things:

- *that security cooperation between the two governments must be maintained and strengthened*
- the need to diminish the divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland *and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland.*

- that we should reject utterly the promotion of political objectives by violence, or by threats of violence *and reject those who adopt or support such methods*

- ^{respecting} the importance of / the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland ~~in the process of~~

~~government there~~, and of giving the people of Northern Ireland confidence that their rights will be safeguarded, and

- to pursue our discussions of these questions through the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council.

We also agreed on the importance of creating a political framework in Northern Ireland in which both the majority and minority communities would participate. We recognised that the responsibility for bringing this about lay principally with the Northern Ireland political parties themselves; and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will be pursuing this in discussions with them.

The Taoiseach and I have agreed to meet again in the New Year to take stock of progress and to pursue our shared aim of lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

I cannot obviously at this stage indicate what, if any, ~~proposed steps~~ ^{common measures} might come forward then. But I can assure you that we intend to pursue the aim of lasting peace and stability - and also the shared aim of reconciliation - with goodwill and determination.

ADVANCE COPIES

21

For info
sl

18.11.84

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/FUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID
Dep-HD/FUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

SIR R ARMSTRONG } CABINET OFFICE
DIO }
PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

[RESIDENT CLERK]

14.11.84

GRS 650

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 161430Z

FM DUBLIN 181305Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 672 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1984

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

TELECON MILLS/RESIDENT CLERK: ANGL0-IRISH SUMMIT

1. TODAY'S DUBLIN PAPERS CARRY ARTICLES ON THE SUMMIT BY SEVERAL POLITICAL CORRESPONDENTS WHICH APPEAR TO REFLECT PESSIMISTIC OFF-THE-RECORD BRIEFING.

2. GERALDINE KENNEDY (FAMOUS FOR SCOOPS, BUT NOT ALWAYS RIGHT) WRITES IN THE SUNDAY PRESS:

"TAOISEACH WANTS A 20 YEAR TREATY; GOVERNMENT COULD BREAK OFF SUMMIT.

A NEW ANGL0-IRISH TREATY TO RUN THE NORTH FOR 20 YEARS IS WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WANTS FROM THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, MRS THATCHER, THE SUNDAY PRESS HAS LEARNED, AS THE SUMMIT STARTS AT CHEQUERS TONIGHT.

THE TREATY WAS FIRST HOOTED IN THE REPORT OF A SUB-COMMITTEE ON JOINT AUTHORITY IN THE NEW IRELAND FORUM AND CONSIDERED CAUTIOUSLY BY THE KILBRANDON REPORT IN BRITAIN EARLIER THIS MONTH. THE IDEA WAS FLESHED OUT BY IRISH OFFICIALS AND DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE CABINET OFFICE, DURING THE SUMMER.

THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP OR MODIFY ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION IN RETURN FOR SUCH A BINDING SAY IN NORTHERN AFFAIRS. IT WAS ENVISAGED THE TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE TWO-DAY SUMMIT, HOWEVER, OFFERS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DETAILED DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TAOISEACH, MR FITZGERALD, AND MRS THATCHER ON THIS PROPOSITION. A COMMON ANALYSIS OF THE NORTHERN PROBLEM, AKIN TO THE "REALITIES" IN THE FORUM REPORT, HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS FOR THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING TOMORROW.

THE GOVERNMENT WANTS A BRITISH COMMITMENT TO A POLITICAL PROCESS WRITTEN INTO THE COMMUNIQUE OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, TO BE ANNOUNCED BY THE TWO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN THEIR SEPARATE PRESS BRIEFINGS AFTERWARDS. THIS COMMITMENT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S BOTTOM LINE GOING INTO THE SUMMIT.

IF IT IS NOT FORTHCOMING, THE IRISH DELEGATION HAS CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY IN THE LAST THREE DAYS OF NOT ISSUING THE COMMUNIQUE AT ALL AND BREAKING OFF POLITICAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. THIS WOULD, IN EFFECT, AMOUNT TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE SUMMIT BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE FORUM REPORT SIX MONTHS AFTER ITS PUBLICATION.

THE TAOISEACH, TANAISTE, AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE GOING TO THE SUMMIT WITH MRS THATCHER'S PROMISED "CONSIDERED RESPONSE" TO THE FORUM STILL REMAINING "THE GREAT UNKNOWN", EVEN THOUGH INFORMAL TALKS BETWEEN BRITISH AND IRISH OFFICIALS WERE CONSIDERING VARIOUS WAYS OF ADDRESSING THE ALIENATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISTS IN THE NORTH A FEW MONTHS AGO.

THE THINKING OF THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IS THAT A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO START A POLITICAL PROCESS, WITH AN AGREED PRIVATE AGENDA AND OBJECTIVES, ARE THE MINIMUM THAT SHOULD RESULT FROM THE SUMMIT IN ORDER TO HAVE A PROCESS UNDER WAY FOR THE NORTH'S LOCAL ELECTIONS NEXT MAY."

THE INDEPENDENT CARRIES A VERY SIMILAR FRONT PAGE STORY FROM JOSEPH O'MALLEY, HEADED "BREAKDOWN FEARS FOR SUMMIT".

3. IN THE SUNDAY TRIBUNE, UNDER THE HEADING "SUMMIT WILL MAKE NO NEW INITIATIVE", GERALD BARRY SUGGESTS A LESS DRAMATIC IRISH APPROACH:

"SO CAUTIOUS HAVE IRISH OFFICIALS BECOME ABOUT THE MEETING, AND SO WARY OF THE BRITISH RESPONSE, THAT THEY ARE NOT SURE IF THERE WILL EVEN BE A SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ONCE THE MEETING HAS CONCLUDED.

IT APPEARS THAT THE TAOISEACH WILL BE HAPPY IF WHAT EMERGES IS A COMMON ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PROBLEMS AND A SCHEDULE OF FUTURE MEETINGS TO RESOLVE THEM, PROBABLY AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' LEVEL RATHER THAN PRIME MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

ALTHOUGH TALKS BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS SINCE THE REPORT OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM WAS PUBLISHED IN MAY IT SEEMS THAT EVEN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR FUTURE ANGLO-IRISH DEVELOPMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONCLUDED.

DESPITE THE FACT THAT SIX MONTHS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE FORUM REPORT WAS COMPLETED IT NOW SEEMS IMPROBABLE TO IRISH GOVERNMENT SOURCES THAT THERE WILL BE A FORMAL BRITISH RESPONSE AT THIS SUMMIT MEETING. CLEARLY, THE LONGER THE BRITISH EVADE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON THE FORUM THE LOWER DOWN THE AGENDA IT IS LIKELY TO SLIDE.

INITIALLY, HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF THE SUMMIT WERE FUELLED BY BOTH THE TAOISEACH GARRET FITZGERALD AND FOREIGN MINISTER PETER BARRY. MR BARRY ONLY TWO MONTHS AGO WAS TALKING OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BEING "TRANSFORMED". THE TAOISEACH

~~MR BARRY ONLY TWO MONTHS AGO WAS TALKING OF THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BEING "TRANSFORMED". THE TAOISEACH
SPOKE AT HIS PARTY'S ARD FHEIS OF THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR
PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE 60 YEARS SINCE IRISH INDEPENDENCE.~~

NOW THERE IS MUCH MORE TALK OF THE NECESSITY OF ACCOMODATING THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S FEARS OF DEASTABILISING THE UNIONISTS.
BOTH GOVERNMENTS NOW ACCEPT THAT THE UNIONISTS WILL ALMOST
AUTOMATICALLY REJECT ANYTHING WHICH EMERGES - IF ANYTHING OF
SUBSTANCE DOES EMERGE - AND THAT WHATEVER PROCESS IS EVENTUALLY
SET IN TRAIN IT MUST INVOLVE THE UNIONISTS AND THE OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES IN THE NORTH.

THE PICTURE OF THE SUMMIT BEING PAINTED IN DUBLIN IS:

THERE IS AGREEMENT ON ABOUT FIVE-SIXTHS OF AN AGENDA - BUT
NOT YET ON THE FINAL SECTION, WHICH IS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL AND
WILL COMMIT BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO A PATTERN OF FUTURE DECISION
MAKING.

THE BRITISH ARE NOT READY TO DISCUSS VERY SPECIFIC OR RADICAL
POLITICAL OR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WILL
BE UNABLE TO SECURE UNIONISTS CONSENT.

THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ANY IRISH 'CONCESSIONS' IN RELATION TO
CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS IN ARTICLE 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
THAT, IN THE IRISH VIEW, COULD ONLY BE DONE IF NORTHERN
NATIONALISTS GAVE THEIR CONSENT. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO BELIEVES
THAT THE BRITISH WILL NOT PURSUE THAT LINE GIVEN THE OPINION POLL
EVIDENCE THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN THE
REPUBLIC WOULD BE OPPOSED TO SUCH CHANGES."

STIMSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF DR GARRET FITZGERALD TD
AN TAOISEACH 18-19 NOVEMBER 1984

Arrival by Irish Government HS 125 and Beechcraft Aircraft at RAF Northolt at 1800 hrs.

The composition of the Irish and UK Delegations is shown at Annexes 1 and 2.

PROGRAMME

Details are shown at Annex 3.

TRANSPORT

Car seating plans are shown at Annex 4.

HOSPITALITY

The following are also invited to dinner at Chequers on 18 November.

Ireland

Mr Dick Spring
Mr Peter Barry
HE Mr Noel Dorr
Mr Dermot Nally
Mr Sean Donlon
Mr Michael Lillis
Mr Declan Kelly

UK

Sir Geoffrey Howe
Mr Douglas Hurd
Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Robert Andrew
HE Mr Alan Goodison
Mr David Goodall
Mr Charles Powell

The following will dine at The Bell at Aston Clinton.

Mr Peter Prendergast
Mr Andrew Ward
Mr Declan Quigley
Mr Paul Dempsey
Miss Orla O'Hanrahan
Miss Fadian Connolly

Sir Ewart Bell
Mr Gerald Clark
Mr Douglas Gordon

Luncheon 19 November

Buffet luncheon arranged at the Bernard Arms, Great Kimble for officials not lunching at Chequers.
Mr Prendergast and Mr Ingham will join lunch party at Chequers.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS

The RAF Hospital at Halton has accepted medical coverage for the members of both delegations on 18-19 November. The hospital will have a surgeon and consultant physician on call throughout the visit. Telephone number 0296-623535.

/...

USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Useful telephone numbers are shown at Annex 5.
Irish Embassy staff will use Cottage 3.

IRISH DELEGATION

Dr Garret FitzGerald TD An Taoiseach	Staying at Chequers
Mr Dick Spring TD An Tánaiste	"
Mr Peter Barry TD Minister for Foreign Affairs	"
HE Mr Noel Dorr Irish Ambassador	The Bell, Aston Clinton
Mr Dermot Nally Secretary to the Government, Department of the Taoiseach	"
Mr Sean Donlon Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs	"
Mr Michael Lillis Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs	"
Mr Peter Prendergast Government Press Secretary	"

Mr Andrew Ward Permanent Secretary, Department of Justice	"
Mr Declan Quigley Attorney General's Office	"
Mr Declan Kelly Private Secretary to the Taoiseach	"
Mr Paul Dempsey Minister, Irish Embassy	"
Miss Orla O'Hanrahan Irish Embassy	"
Miss Fadian Connolly Irish Embassy	"

UK DELEGATION

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP Prime Minister	Staying at Chequers
The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe MP Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs	"
The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	"
<u>10 Downing Street</u>	
Mr Charles Powell Private Secretary	"
<u>Cabinet Office</u>	
Sir Robert Armstrong Secretary of the Cabinet	The Bell, Aston Clinton
<u>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</u>	
Mr David Goodall Deputy Under Secretary	"
HE Mr Alan Goodison Her Majesty's Ambassador at Dublin	"
Mr Gerald Clark Republic of Ireland Department	"
<u>Northern Ireland Office</u>	
Mr Robert Andrew Permanent Under Secretary of State	"
Sir Ewart Bell Second Permanent Under Secretary of State and Head of Northern Ireland Civil Service	"
<u>In attendance</u>	
Mr Douglas Gordon	"
Group Captain R Thomson	"

PROGRAMMESunday 18 November

- 1800 Ministers and Officials arrive RAF Northolt by special aircraft.
- 1815 approx Depart RAF Northolt for Chequers.
- 1900 - 1915 Arrive Chequers.
- 1915 Working Dinner.

Monday 19 November

- 0915 Photocall.
- 0930 Tete à Tete (Ministers and Officials will hold separate talks)
- 1200 approx Plenary Session.
- 1300 Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government
Host: The Prime Minister
The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP

(Separate luncheon at Bernard Arms)
- 1430 approx Departure for London.
- 1700 Prime Minister's Press Conference at 12 Downing St.
- 1800 approx Taoiseach's Press Conference at the Irish Embassy
17 Grosvenor Place, SW1
- 1945 approx Departure for Heathrow, Hounslow Suite.
- 2045 approx Aircraft Departure.
(Mr Barry will depart by separate aircraft for Brussels)

CAR SEATING PLAN

Car 1 (Daimler Limousine)	An Taoiseach HE Mr Noel Dorr Mr D Nally Special Branch Officer	Registration No PYY 833Y Driver: Mrs Terry Sheen
Car 2 (Daimler Limousine)	An Tánaiste Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr S Donlon Mr M Lillis	Registration No KYH 359X Driver: Charles Borrett
Car 3 (FCO Ford Cortina Estate)	Mr D Kelly Grp-Capt R Thomson	Registration No LYW 913X Driver: Dennis Walden
Car 4 (FCO Ford Cortina Estate)	HE Mr A Goodison Mr G Clark	Registration No LYF 914X Driver: D Kerr
Car 5 (Irish Embassy Car Blue Mercedes)	Mr A Ward Mr D Quigley Mr P Prendergast	Registration No 185 D 163 Driver: William Doyle
Car 6 (Irish Embassy Car Black Mercedes)	Mr P Dempsey Miss O O'Hanrahan Miss F Connolly	Registration No YLN 116X Driver: Arthur Patrick


BRITISH CARS NOT IN CONVOY

(Blue BMW)	Sir R Armstrong (own car) Official Car	Registration No FYE 84V Registration No NYX 687Y Driver: Charlie Webb
(Red Ambassador)	Mr R Andrew Sir E Bell	Registration No PYY 804Y Driver: Terry Baker
(Blue Cortina Estate)	Mr D Goodall Mr G Clark (to Northolt only) Mr D Gordon	Registration No LYW 915X Driver: G Polly Registration No PUU 709Y Driver: Mrs Clark Registration No A143 HLX Driver: Self
Journalists to Photocall (Frames Rickard Bus)		Registration No JNM 757Y Driver: Harold O'Mahoney

USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Government Hospitality 2 Carlton Gardens	01-214-8142
Foreign & Commonwealth Office Protocol Department	01-273-3585 *01-703-5381
Foreign & Commonwealth Office Republic of Ireland Dept	01-233-4804 *01-560-0379
Irish Embassy 17 Grosvenor Place	01-235-2171 01-245-9553 *01-584-2365
10 Downing Street	01-233-3000 and ask for 10 Downing Street
Chequers	01-233-3000 and ask for 10 Downing Street who will connect you with Chequers on the direct line.
The Shoulder of Mutton, Owlswick	0844-44304/5/7
The Bell, Aston Clinton	0296-630252
The Bell, Aylesbury	0296-89835
Bernard Arms, Great Kimble	0844-46173
RAF Northolt	01-845-2300
London Heathrow Airport Hounslow VIP Lounge	01-897-4337

* Home telephone numbers



AYLESBURY

THE BELL
A41 CLINTON TRING

A41(M)

STOKE
MANDEVILLE

RAF
HALTON

HALTON HOUSE

Crossroads at top of hill.
No signposts. Turning is
1 3/4 miles from end of
Wendover Village.




RAF HALTON
HOSPITAL

WENDOVER

Butlers Cross

CHEQUERS AND AREA



OWLSWICK

SHOULDER OF
MUTTON

BERNARD
ARMS

Entrance

KIMBLE
DRIVE

CHEQUERS


ASKETT

LITTLE
HAMPDEN

PRINCES
RISBOROUGH

GREAT
HAMPDEN

GREAT
MISSENDEN





NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister
Two interesting &
important discussions.

16 November 1984

Dear Charles,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

The Secretary of State suggests that, before the Summit, the Prime Minister might like to see the attached note of a discussion which Robert Andrew had with the Chief Constable of the RUC, and the attached note of a discussion which the Secretary of State had this morning with the Irish Ambassador.

The only conclusion which one can reach from Bill's discussion with the Irish Ambassador is that the 'equation' at present on offer does not satisfy either side and cannot be the basis of an agreement.

CDP
16/xi

Copies of this letter and enclosures go to Len Appleyard (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Graham Sandiford

G K SANDIFORD

Encls

SECRET

PERSONAL

Copy no 4 of 5

PUS/L/1225/MLR

229
114 NOV 1984

PS/Secretary of State

cc Mr Brennan
Mr Bourn (L)
Mr BurnsANGLO-IRISH INITIATIVE : VIEWS OF CHIEF CONSTABLE

1. The Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir John Hermon, called to see me at Stormont Castle on 12 November to give his considered reactions to the set of proposals which have emerged from the Armstrong/Nally talks which I had outlined to him in strict confidence on 7 November. Mr Bourn was also present. I suggested that the Chief Constable should deal first with the policing issues and secondly with the public order implications of the proposals as a whole.

2. Sir John said that in general the policing proposals canvassed by the British side did not present him with any difficulties. He would be totally opposed to the Irish proposal to break up the RUC, both because of the adverse effect this would have on effective policing and because of the political symbolism of the force in Unionist eyes. He dismissed as "crazy" the idea of putting Gardai on the streets of West Belfast; they would quickly be shot. High visibility changes of this sort would be bound to create opposition and it would be much better to move towards closer co-operation between the RUC and the Garda in more unobtrusive ways. He could go along with the British concept of a Joint Security Commission, provided that it did not affect operational control of the police. He was ready to increase efforts to recruit more Catholics into the RUC (which would be facilitated if the SDLP gave its support); and he would be prepared to deploy a higher proportion of Catholics in Catholic areas like West Belfast (though not in the streets where individual officers lived). He would welcome co-operation between the RUC and the Garda in fields such as training and the investigation

1-3
PERSONAL

SECRET

SECRET PERSONAL

of crime on a reciprocal basis, and a wider exchange of liaison officers. But what was most needed was a greater deployment of resources by the Garda in the border area, and a more determined effort to arrest known terrorists. At the moment the necessary will seemed to be lacking in Dublin. (Sir John added that he was considering writing a letter to the Commissioner about co-operation between the RUC and the Garda; we agreed that this should be held up until after the Summit).

3. Turning to the likely impact of the proposals as a whole, the Chief Constable said that he thought any agreement between the two governments on the lines proposed would be likely to lead to an intensification of terrorist activity by the PIRA. To deal with this would require a joint effort by the RUC and the Garda, which would depend on the necessary direction being given from Dublin. It might be desirable to introduce selective internment on both sides of the border in order to take out the leaders.

4. As far as the Unionist reaction was concerned Sir John thought that giving Dublin some institutionalised voice in the affairs of the North, even on a consultative basis, would only be acceptable if it were preceded by a change in climate brought about by a greater commitment by Dublin to security which was seen to be producing results. Otherwise he thought that Unionist leaders (and especially the DUP) would be bound to oppose the step, as they had opposed the Council of Ireland proposal which had brought down the Power-Sharing Executive in 1974. As a first step, he believed that both the Unionist parties would withdraw from any participation in the government of the North, forcing the British Government to continue direct rule. If the Government persisted in its policy he believed that street demonstrations would be organised by the DUP. It should be possible for the RUC to deal with these, although resources would be stretched if they were having to deal at the same time with a higher level of PIRA activity and there might be a need for more troops. If very large numbers of Unionists took to the streets it would be difficult to maintain order and there would be a risk of serious violence. Moreover there was a danger that the Unionists

PERSONAL


SECRET

SECRET PERSONAL

would resort to industrial action as they had done in 1974. There was no way in which essential services could be kept going in the face of a mass withdrawal of labour. The Chief Constable added that if an Irish representative were established in Belfast his office would be bound to become a focus for disorder and violence.

5. Sir John Hermon emphasised that political judgements on these matters must be a matter for Ministers and not the police. If decisions were taken which provoked a Unionist reaction the RUC would do all in its power to maintain order. But the proposals which I had outlined to him carried serious risks. His strong advice was that we should not commit ourselves to institutionalised consultation on political matters, at least until we had sought to build up a climate of confidence among the Unionists by developing a dialogue with Dublin on security matters.

14 November 1984


R J ANDREW**PERSONAL SECRET**

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE IRISH
AMBASSADOR OF 16 NOVEMBER 1984

Present: Secretary of State
Mr Dorr
Mr Andrew
Mr Sandiford

1. Mr Dorr noted that this was his first courtesy visit on the Secretary of State, and thanked the Secretary of State for receiving him. He then proceeded to discuss the prospects for the Summit.

2. Mr Dorr said that recent months had seen an unusual and interesting process of discussion at official level which had, perhaps understandably, undergone some turbulence in the period before the Summit. Some months ago, the Irish Government had hoped that the Summit might be the occasion for agreement on major new measures, or at least for agreement on some general statement of principles. Their expectations were now considerably reduced, and Mr Dorr thought that the main question facing the Summit would be how far the previous process of discussion would be endorsed.

3. The Secretary of State agreed that it was understandable if, just before the Summit, each side drew back to assure itself that its position was defensible in all directions. He himself was left with two main thoughts. First, he knew that the Prime Minister saw the discussions as important, and that she had a high personal regard for Dr FitzGerald. The Secretary of State thought that the Prime Minister recognised the disillusion which would follow any break-down in the process of discussion, and the opportunities which any such break-down would give to extremists at each end of the spectrum. For these reasons, and more generally, he knew that the Prime Minister wished to make progress if possible. Secondly, however, the Secretary of State was aware of a feeling on the British side, which the Prime Minister shared, that there had been some change of course during the process of discussion, and that the Irish side now seemed to lay less weight than before on the principle that any arrangement agreed should be reciprocal.

4. Mr Dorr then offered a personal view of the discussions. He thought that, most simply, the joint objective was to persuade Irish nationalists to settle down to an acceptance that Irish unity would not come in the foreseeable future, and to that end - and on the merits - to persuade them that they should feel part of the existing arrangements.

5. Mr Dorr said that the Irish Government had entered into the discussions with the idea of reaching a balanced settlement. He thought that "balance" could be viewed in two senses; first, in the sense that Northern Ireland was in the view of the Irish Government at present unbalanced; and secondly, in the sense that it was desirable to have political balance in the outcome of negotiations. Mr Dorr added, however, that in his view a balanced outcome (in either sense) need not necessarily include arrangements which were reciprocal.

6. Mr Dorr repeatedly assured the Secretary of State that he was not seeking to confute, but merely to give his understanding of the history of the recent unusual exercise of "co-operative negotiation", as Mr Dorr called it, and to explain what had led the Irish to deliver their recent statement of position. The Irish had been disconcerted, in the discussions of 2/3 November, by the thought that the UK side appeared to be saying, suddenly and for the first time, that satisfactory arrangements for devolved government in Northern Ireland must be a part of any settlement reached. This had led the Irish to conclude that there must have been some misunderstanding in the earlier discussions; and that they had better set out their own position clearly. This they had done in their speaking note, and while Mr Dorr saw that this note might be psychologically upsetting (and he understood that it had been), he did not see that logically it need be so. Certainly, the speaking note was not to be seen as a defensive preparation for a break-down in the discussions. The Irish were as keen to make progress as ever.

7. The Secretary of State agreed that some misunderstanding might have arisen. It was not the UK view that agreement on a form of devolved government had to be reached before agreement could be reached on anything else. The UK did, however, share with the Irish a belief that satisfactory arrangements for devolved government were centrally important. The discussions had contemplated three fields of activity; (i) reserved matters such as defence and foreign policy, which would remain the preserve of the UK government, not open to consultative procedures; (ii) devolved matters, also not open to consultative procedures; and (iii) other matters, remaining with the Secretary of State, to which consultative procedures (if agreed) might apply. It followed that it was of central importance to have satisfactory arrangements for devolved government, both for general reasons of good government and because the scope of the consultative procedures would otherwise be so extensive that they would be unworkable.

8. The Secretary of State said that there was a second reason for putting emphasis on the need for arrangements for devolution. This was that any arrangements for institutionalised consultation which were visible and transparent, and which took physical form in the shape of an Irish presence in Belfast, operating under an Irish flag, would inevitably be seen by Unionists as a challenge - indeed they could easily become the subject of hostile attention; it would be difficult to obtain the Unionist acquiescence to such arrangements if there were no concomitant progress towards devolution. The Secretary of State emphasised that there was no particular model for devolution which he would wish to impose on the constitutional representatives of the minority (or the majority); but he did think that Mr Hume had opportunities - which he was not currently taking - to exploit recent conciliatory utterances by Unionists, with a view to reaching agreement on arrangements for devolution. Such arrangements were certainly not a precedent condition for Anglo-Irish agreement, but they did need to be worked at. The Secretary of State added that he had recently discussed matters with Mr Hume, and thought that Mr Hume might now be more interested in such possibilities than he had been.

9. Mr Dorr agreed that the Irish side had, from an early stage, perceived the three categories of matters in the government of Northern Ireland delineated by the Secretary of State. The Irish side had, however, thought that it would be difficult to get devolution going at the same time as new arrangements for Anglo-Irish co-operation. Mr Dorr thought that both sides agreed on the desirability of progress with Anglo-Irish co-operation and with devolved government; but the problem was the sequence of steps needed to get there. If the Irish government announced a constitutional referendum on Articles 2 and 3, the question would arise how the other side of the package would be described. Mr Dorr said that, again without wishing to be controversial, he thought that the UK proposals on institutionalised consultation were not yet sufficiently clear cut to enable the Irish government to embark on a constitutional referendum; and it would add further difficulty if efforts to secure agreement on devolution had to be made at the same time.

10. Secretary of State said that he thought that the matter of balance in the agreement being sought was difficult. He himself recognised that the Irish government's readiness, in given circumstances, to undertake a constitutional referendum on Articles 2 and 3 showed great courage. What was not clear to him was whether the degree of courage which would need to be shown by the Irish Government would be matched by the degree of impact which their action, if undertaken, would have in Northern Ireland. It was difficult to convey tactfully to the Irish Government that the heroism of their proposed action might not count for much, at least in Northern Ireland. A lot would depend on what was said during any constitutional referendum campaign.

11. Mr Dorr said that he understood that Secretary of State's point. The converse was that, while proposals for institutionalised consultation represented a considerable concession for the UK side it was not clear how significant they would be seen as by voters in a referendum in the South.

12. Mr Andrew commented that the principle of balance had also to be applied to the Unionists. The amendment of the Irish constitution might logically offer them some reassurance, but the psychological

impact was difficult to assess. If the other parts of any settlement were some involvement of the Republic as of right, even if only on a consultative basis, and arrangements for devolution which involved some form of power-sharing, then Unionists might feel that this was more than they should be expected to take. They might, perhaps, be more amenable if an Irish dimension were accompanied by arrangements for devolution which included an element of majority rule - if this possibility were pursued it would be necessary to include adequate safeguards to make clear that majority rule did not mean a return to the old Stormont.

13. Mr Dorr said that both the Irish and UK governments were concerned that all legitimate interests should be served. Both sides were therefore looking for arrangements which everybody could live with. Inevitably, however, it would fall to the Irish to deliver the nationalists and to the UK to carry the Unionists.

14. The Secretary of State said that one point which was difficult to express was the desirability and purpose of co-operation of security. During his visit to Dublin, Irish Ministers had explained that, if institutionalised consultation on security matters emerged as a leading result of the Summit, they would be denounced by many nationalists as having agreed to act as "patsy" in support of British security policies. The Secretary of State thought, however, that there was another way of viewing the matter. Institutionalised consultation on security would be particularly hard for Unionists to criticise adversely, given that they continually called for more effective action on security by the Irish government. One could conceive of a Joint Security Commission as having two aspects; first, it could guide practical techniques of co-operation, and secondly it could provide a forum for representations by the Irish government about the operation of security policy in Northern Ireland.

15. Mr Dorr said that the Irish found the distinction between the two aspects interesting. They would, however, see it as more useful to make a constructive suggestion in advance of events, rather than to criticise afterwards; and they thought it important that co-operation

on security should not vary with the fluctuation of political circumstances - it was too important in its own right for that.

16. Mr Dorr ended with a personal question. He wondered whether the Secretary of State found the Irish government's contemplation of constitutional change unsettling; was it too ambitious, and liable to cause too much disruption? The Secretary of State reiterated his dual view. On the one hand, he admired the courage of the Irish government in being prepared to contemplate so hazardous a venture, as being in their view necessary to take the measure of events. On the other hand, he simply did not know whether any such undertaking would produce adequate benefits in its effect of opinion in Northern Ireland, partly because so much would depend on what was said during a referendum campaign. Irish Ministers would be in a difficult position in commending the amendment of the constitution to the electorate.

17. Mr Dorr said, that in his view, a way could be found through that difficulty by emphasising the entirety of the new deal which would have been arrived at if the campaign were to be undertaken. The animating idea for the Irish government throughout recent discussions had been that the situation in Northern Ireland was so serious that historic measures were needed.

Graham Sandiford

G K SANDIFORD
16 November 1984

Distribution
PS/SofS (Lonly)
PS/PUS(L only)
Mr Brennan
Mr Burns
Mr Lyon



Prime Minister
CJP
16/xi

PM/84/171

PRIME MINISTER

ms

1. Before you see Garret FitzGerald this weekend I thought you might find it useful to have a report of conversations which Garret FitzGerald and Peter Barry had with me yesterday in the margins of the EC/ASEAN meeting in Dublin.

2. Garret FitzGerald apparently came especially to the reception yesterday evening to ask me to pass on his latest thinking to you. Peter Barry said much the same. They both emphasised their great concern that the Summit should not result in failure or breakdown. FitzGerald said they do want the cooperative search for improvements to be sustained. They do not want simply to have talks for the sake of talks. So if the talks are to continue, they must be aimed at achieving practical progress. FitzGerald said he was deeply concerned at the risk of a deterioration in the security situation.

3. He went on to argue that he believed the answer must lie in steps, if they can be found, to secure an increasing, and not a diminishing, chance for the minority in the North to identify with the structure of Government in the North. The Irish Government, FitzGerald said, clearly recognise the problems that this search poses for us with Unionist opinion. That is why they are prepared to take steps to reassure Unionist opinion which are for them formidably difficult, however much they will be discounted on the Unionist side. FitzGerald several times stressed the importance of yesterday's opinion poll in the Irish Republic which shows a sizeable majority (54%) of Irish opinion ready to recognise the need to set to one side for the foreseeable future the idea that "Irish unity" is the right way forward and to search instead for a solution which could include



changes in the Irish Constitution as well as changes in the structure of government in the North. He took credit - rightly, I think - for what he has been able to do to lower Irish expectations in this respect. FitzGerald of course recognised that the structure of government in the North in the final analysis is a matter for us. But he clearly believes that we are more likely to achieve what we want in enlisting minority support if we are seen to take account of Irish opinion and advice. The crucial point is that the outcome of our joint consideration must enable us together to persuade Hume and the SDLP to take part.

4. FitzGerald also drew attention to the Irish opinion poll majority - wafer thin - in favour of a change in their constitution. If this was to be made secure, they had to be able to commend to Hume, and so to Irish opinion, anything that might emerge by way of constitutional change in the north.

5. And it is there, as we all know, that the real difficulties lie. FitzGerald expressed himself shocked at our "renewed insistence on majority rule". I responded by saying that we had been shocked by their renewed insistence on joint authority and power-sharing. But I added that this division, which was clearly set out in paragraphs 9 and 20 of our Working Paper, had always been the really crucial gap that had to be bridged and still remained. For the rest, I do not think that FitzGerald wants to create difficulties about co-operation on security matters, where some of the practical and political limitations are increasingly part of the common ground.

6. So far I have concentrated on what FitzGerald told me yesterday. In the light of this, I should like to offer some thoughts of my own.



7. Both sides recognise that the nationalist community in the North has been worked into a fundamentally intractable situation, which was not historically of its own choosing and which makes it very difficult for members of that community to identify with the institutions of government and law enforcement in the Province in their present form. The only gainers from this situation are Sinn Fein and the PIRA, whose political advance is beginning to threaten stability on both sides of the border. Unless this advance can be checked, your own fear of a government of radical extremists in Dublin on the Cuban pattern could one day become a reality.

8. I have no illusions that there can be within our political lifetime any quick or simple "solution" to the Irish problem. It goes far back into history and will be with us for many decades yet. The most that we can hope to do is to look for opportunities of edging it a little way towards eventual resolution, making it easier to manage in the meantime - and at the very least, getting it, if we can, off the Cuban road.

9. It seems to me that the current climate of increased realism both North and South of the border, together with the fact that Garret FitzGerald is there and has shown himself ready to lower the level of nationalist expectations, presents us with just such an opportunity. It is too early to judge whether the Irish can be brought to accept limited joint arrangements of the kind we have been prepared to offer them in the exploratory talks between our officials. It will certainly not be easy. And we ourselves must be ready to recognise that we may not yet have found absolutely the right answer. But I believe that arrangements broadly in line with our present proposals, if they were attainable, would make the problem more manageable at least for this generation. I am sure we should not give up the attempt unless and until we are completely convinced that there is simply no realistic hope of reaching agreement with



Garret FitzGerald and his Government. He made it very plain to me that he is prepared to go on devoting great energy to this search. He made very clear how seriously he would regard the consequences of a break-down at this stage. But he argued - and I agree - that if talks were to continue they could only do so on the basis of the continued shared belief that the efforts would be worthwhile.

10. Even if we can get the Irish to recognise the limits of what we can offer (and I know we still have a long way to go on this), we are bound to run into difficulties with the Unionists. Their own case, that Northern Ireland is British and must remain so so long as that is the majority wish, is unanswerable. But it will be an important advance if the Irish are ready to acknowledge - as they appear to be - that there can be no change without majority consent.

11. But if - and it is a big if - we are able to find workable approaches to the problem of government in the North, I believe that your own standing in the country and in the House is high enough to enable us to move forward. We have to recognise, as I think we do, that some temporary increase in the level of violence may result. But this could also be a consequence of doing nothing. And I believe that there would be a general welcome from reasonable people in all parts of the British Isles for firm action by the British Government to introduce new arrangements in Northern Ireland which were clearly designed to promote reconciliation there and were fully compatible with our responsibility to uphold the Union as long as the majority of the population of Northern Ireland wish to remain part of the United Kingdom. This must sound like too simple a conclusion. God knows, I understand the difficulties. But I felt

SECRET



it right to let you have my personal impressions ahead of what is bound to be a very anxious but important weekend.

12. I am sending a copy of this minute to Douglas Hurd and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
16 November, 1984

SECRET

Internal North solution

Majority have doubts about Irish Unity

By Stephen O'Byrnes

MOST people are not convinced that a united Ireland is the only way to solve the Northern Ireland problem, and therefore they strongly endorse the Government considering other British proposals, along with those in the New Ireland Forum report, at the summit.

We also found in the exclusive Irish Independent opinion poll, conducted as part of this Anglo-Irish summit preview, that over half of the people would back an internal Northern settlement, provided it had the support of the Nationalist minority there.

Asked firstly, if they felt the Irish Government should have a say in constitutional changes affecting the North, 68 p.c. said "Yes"; 20 p.c. "No", while 12 p.c. were undecided.

In a MORI poll in Britain last May, the corresponding figures were 61, 29 and 10, while the same poll in Northern Ireland found a broadly similar response among Nationalists there, with the figures being 61, 23 and 16.

Only Northern Protestants stand out from this consensus. MORI found only 10 p.c. in favour of such Dublin involvement; 86 p.c. were against, and 4 p.c. were undecided.

Getting back to our own poll, conducted by Lansdowne Market Research, the people were next asked if the Summit discussions should be confined to the Forum Report, or embrace other British proposals: 23 p.c. want the Summit confined to the Forum Report; 65 p.c. want discussion of British proposals as well, and 12 p.c. were undecided.

When this issue was further refined to consideration to the Forum's preferred solution of a united Ireland, or other British proposals, opinion was shown to be even more open-minded: 19 p.c. believe the issue of unity only should be on the table; 71 p.c. want all proposals discussed, and 9 p.c. were undecided.

Given the singular adherence of the country's largest party, Fianna Fail, to unity as the only solution, we wanted to test this precise policy. The




The survey was conducted on behalf of Independent Newspapers by Lansdowne Market Research Ltd. Questions were asked of a representative sample of 1,317 electors, in 50 sampling locations throughout the country. The sample was quota controlled to represent the electorate in terms of sex, age, social class, region and area of residence. Interviewing for the survey was carried out between October 2 and November 3, 1984.

poll found that 31 p.c. believe a united Ireland is "the only way" to solve the Northern problem; 57 p.c. believe that "some other option could work as well or better" and 12 p.c. were undecided.


Given the political reality that neither the Unionists, nor — equally crucially — the British Government are even remotely ready to consider unity, and that the Dublin Government's policy is one of focussing on an internal Northern settlement, with a strong Dublin dimension, we next tested the acceptability of this scenario.

The poll asked: "If the Government here reached agreement with Britain on an internal Northern Ireland settlement, in return for the Republic having a significant role in Northern affairs" would they find the following elements of such a settlement acceptable, or not:

- (a) The Government having a say in overall security policy in the North. Acceptable 64 p.c.; not acceptable 23 p.c.; don't know 13 p.c.
- (b) The Government having a say in Northern policing policy. Acceptable 59 p.c.; not acceptable 28 p.c.; don't know 13 p.c.
- (c) A joint Dublin / London — Assembly par-



IF IRISH GOVERNMENT AGREED WITH BRITAIN ON INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND — IN RETURN FOR REPUBLIC HAVING SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN NORTHERN AFFAIRS



liamentary body. Acceptable 68 p.c.; not acceptable 18 p.c.; don't know 14 p.c.

(d) To withdraw the Constitution's territorial claim to the North "entirely". Acceptable 14 p.c.; not acceptable 71 p.c.; don't know 15 p.c.

(e) To replace the territorial claim "with a statement expressing a desire for Irish unity, eventually." Acceptable 43 p.c.; not acceptable 42 p.c.; don't know 15 p.c.

Thus we find that while people are very open-minded to possible Northern solutions, and discussions with Britain, they tend to resist changes in the Constitution — although they may favour particular policies or legislation

which require changes in the Constitution.

This is more dramatically borne out in opinion polls on divorce, where the numbers favouring divorce in certain circumstances always outweighs the support for amending the Constitution to facilitate this. Likewise in our poll, when the claim to the North is changed from a territorial claim to an aspiration to unity, the figures shift dramatically.

The poll's endorsement for such a formal Dublin dimension in the affairs of the North also has fairly equal cross-party support. For instance, a Dublin say in overall Northern security policy

has 66 p.c. FF support; 67 p.c., FG, and 65 p.c. Labour backing.

A say in Northern policing policy has 59 p.c. FF backing; 64 p.c. from FG and 71 p.c. Labour.

And the reluctance to drop the Constitutional claim entirely also revealed a cross-party agreement: 74 p.c. FF were against; and so were 68 p.c. FG and 73 p.c. of Labour backers. The compromise of an aspiration rather than the territorial claim revealed FF 40 p.c. for, 45 p.c. against; FG, 49 p.c. for, 38 p.c. against, and Labour 47 p.c. for, 34 p.c. against.

Having considered the ingredients of a possible Northern settlement, with a strong Dublin dimension, we next asked if

such a emerged, support of Northern "would you to accept or would hold out for land?"

Fifty-four accept; 3 prefer to unity, and undecided

But pessimistic of an in settlement violence a settlem Catholic p.c. of believe would enc it would p.c. were


North solution backed

A UNITED IRELAND


IS IT THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM?

IF SETTLEMENT HAD SUPPORT OF MAJORITY OF CATHOLICS IN NORTH

UNITED IRELAND ONLY WAY



PREFER TO HOLD OUT FOR UNITED IRELAND...



DON'T KNOW


DON'T KNOW

OTHER OPTION COULD WORK AS WELL, OR BETTER

WOULD ACCEPT SETTLEMENT

LANSDOWNE OCT. '84

VIEW IN REPUBLIC



M.O.R.I./LONDON WEEKEND - AUG. '84

VIEW IN BRITAIN



VIEW IN NORTHERN IRELAND




Q. Should the Irish Government here have any say in constitutional changes affecting Northern Ireland, or not?

IF IRISH GOVERNMENT AGREED WITH BRITAIN ON INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND—IN RETURN FOR REPUBLIC HAVING SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN NORTHERN AFFAIRS


ACCEPTABILITY OF TERMS OF AGREEMENT

- The Government here having a say in OVERALL SECURITY policy in Northern Ireland.
- The Government here having a say in POLICING in Northern Ireland.
- A new joint parliamentary body being set up, with representatives from the Dail, the British Parliament and from the Northern Assembly.
- To withdraw our territorial claim to the North in the Constitution entirely.
- To withdraw our territorial claim to the North in the Constitution and replace it with a statement expressing a desire for Irish unity, eventually.




DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH


SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO REPORT OF NEW IRELAND FORUM?



SHOULD GOVERNMENT DISCUSS OTHER PROPOSALS WITH BRITAIN APART FROM UNITED IRELAND?



IF INTERNAL SETTLEMENT HAD SUPPORT OF MAJORITY OF CATHOLICS IN NORTH — WOULD IRA VIOLENCE END?



liamentary body. Acceptable 68 p.c.; not acceptable 18 p.c.; don't know 14 p.c.

(d) To withdraw the Constitution's territorial claim to the North "entirely". Acceptable 14 p.c.; not acceptable 71 p.c.; don't know 15 p.c.

(e) To replace the territorial claim "with a statement expressing a desire for Irish unity, eventually." Acceptable 43 p.c.; not acceptable 42 p.c.; don't know 15 p.c.

Thus we find that while people are very open-minded to possible Northern solutions, and discussions with Britain, they tend to resist changes in the Constitution — although they may favour particular policies or legislation

which require changes in the Constitution.

This is more dramatically borne out in opinion polls on divorce, where the numbers favouring divorce in certain circumstances always outweighs the support for amending the Constitution to facilitate this. Likewise in our poll, when the claim to the North is changed from a territorial claim to an aspiration to unity, the figures shift dramatically.

The poll's endorsement for such a formal Dublin dimension in the affairs of the North also has fairly equal cross-party support. For instance, a Dublin say in overall Northern security policy

has 66 p.c. FF support; 67 p.c. FG, and 65 p.c. Labour backing.

A say in Northern policing policy has 59 p.c. FF backing; 64 p.c. from FG and 71 p.c. Labour.

And the reluctance to drop the Constitutional claim entirely also revealed cross-party agreement: 74 p.c. FF were against; and so were 68 p.c. FG and 73 p.c. of Labour backers. The compromise of an aspiration rather than the territorial claim revealed FF 40 p.c. for 45 p.c. against; FG, 49 p.c. for, 38 p.c. against, and Labour 47 p.c. for, 34 p.c. against.

Having considered the ingredients of a possible Northern settlement, with a strong Dublin dimension, we next asked if

such a settlement emerged, which had the support of a majority of Northern Catholics, "would you be prepared to accept that settlement, or would you prefer to hold out for a united Ireland?"

Fifty-four p.c. would accept; 36 p.c. would prefer to hold out for unity, and 10 p.c. were undecided.

But people are pessimistic about the chances of an internal Northern settlement ending the violence there. Even with a settlement, which has Catholic support, only 22 p.c. of the respondents believe IRA violence would end; 63 p.c. believe it would not end, and 15 p.c. were undecided.



Prime Minister
CDP
16/11

Ref. A084/3043

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

The Co-ordinating Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (which meets at the level of Mr Goodall and Mr Lillis) has submitted to the Steering Committee (Mr Nally and myself) a report on the work of the AIIC and the contacts and co-operation carried out within its framework since the last bilateral Summit.

- 2. I submit the report to you herewith. It is being simultaneously submitted by Mr Nally to the Taoiseach.
3. I believe that you need do no more than take note of it at your forthcoming meeting with the Taoiseach.
4. It is proposed that the report should not be published, but that there should be a brief reference to the work of the Council in the communique: I attach a draft paragraph for this purpose, which has been agreed with the Irish Government.
- 5. I also attach a note of the achievements of the AIIC in the last year which could be drawn upon if there are questions from the press or in Parliament about its achievements in the last year.
6. I am sending copies of this minute and annexes to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

16 November 1984

RESTRICTED

REPORT OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL TO THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON ANGLO-IRISH
CONTACTS AND COOPERATION : 1984

1. At the Anglo-Irish Summit at Chequers on 7 November 1983 the two Heads of Government approved the report on the work of the Coordinating Committee of the AIIC submitted to them by the Steering Committee and authorised the Coordinating Committee to continue its work.

2. Since then there have been a number of meetings at both official and ministerial level. Subjects discussed have covered various aspects of political, economic and cultural relations between the two countries. A total 15 formal ministerial meetings have taken place since the Summit meeting in November last year. A full list, including the topics discussed, is annexed to this report.

3. The Coordinating Committee of the AIIC has met 5 times over the same period. It has proved a useful forum for reviewing existing cooperation and for identifying areas of mutual concern and of possible future cooperation. Progress has been made on a number of subjects under the general heading of Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding. Prominent amongst these are topics related to education and cultural matters.

4. Discussions have taken place both at the Coordinating Committee and in a Working Group established for the purpose on a number of matters in the field of education. An Environmental Studies project has been proposed which would comprise a study of the varied elements that form the composite heritage of Ireland. The general aim of the project would be to help young people understand the social, cultural, economic and technological opportunities and problems facing society. Teaching materials designed for cross-curricula use would be developed and may be used in schools in the Republic, Northern Ireland and Great Britain on a voluntary basis. The Committee Co-Chairmen have instructed the Working Group on Education to continue to pay special attention to this proposal. Work is going forward on a proposal to hold a seminar on teaching of history in schools, which would allow for an exchange of ideas between teachers from the Republic and the United Kingdom. In this connection contacts have been proposed between the Irish Curriculum and Examination Board and the Secondary Examination Council in the United Kingdom. There has been a useful exchange of information on the entry requirements of third level educational establishments in both countries and the possibility of publishing this in some form is being considered. There has been some useful contact on language questions including contact between the Irish Department of Education and the Welsh Office.

5. It has been agreed that existing contacts between Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools and the Irish Inspectors of Schools should continue and, where appropriate and possible, might be extended.

6. A Working Group was also set up to consider cultural exchange and related activities. The Group observed that while numerous activities (concerts, exhibitions, plays) are facilitated by financial support provided by both Governments, these represent only a small part of a much larger whole; contacts in the arts between the two countries are very extensive, and to be welcomed. Ways in which this flow could be further stimulated were examined. An examination was made of the extent of the academic links between institutions in the two countries and the possibilities for increasing them. Some scholarships have already been made available by the British Government and the Irish Government has proposed a scheme for exchange of postgraduate scholarships in science and technology to which the British Government has responded favourably. Substantial youth exchanges take place between the two countries and consideration will be given to ways of further stimulating such exchanges.

7. A Memorandum of Understanding to establish exchanges of civil servants for London and Dublin was signed on 19 October 1984. The scheme was one of the measures discussed by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at last year's Summit meeting as a measure to improve mutual understanding.

8. Voluntary organisations and community groups have continued to do valuable work to encourage understanding between the two countries. The two Governments in line with the policy outlined by the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister in the communiques of 6 November 1981 and 7 November 1983, continued to support and encourage voluntary organisations involved in creating greater understanding and reconciliation between the two countries and the two traditions in the island of Ireland, North and South. These voluntary organisations included;

Encounter

A new Anglo-Irish organisation sponsored by both Governments, it held its first conference in London on 4 April this year on employment opportunities in Britain and Ireland.

The British Irish Association

The BIA holds an important annual conference which is attended by senior Ministers and officials from both countries.

The Corrymeela Community

Corrymeela, which is supported financially by the Northern Ireland authorities, continued its work for reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland.

Cooperation North

Cooperation North, which has received financial assistance from both governments, had another successful year in fostering exchanges between North and South.

Glencree Centre for Reconciliation

Glencree received a further grant from the Irish Government in 1984 to enable it to continue its important work in the reconciliation field.

Between

The Between organisation based in Cork was given a grant by the Irish Government to enable it to intensify its policy of

arranging holidays in the South for children from Northern Ireland.

The Irish School of Ecumenics

This organisation was also grant-aided for the first time by the Irish Government in recognition of its efforts to promote reconciliation through its educational courses and other projects.

9. Other subjects discussed by the Coordinating Committee have included the degree of mutual recognition given by professional bodies to qualifications gained in the two countries. Architects, engineers and pharmacists are not yet subject to agreed EC directives. As a result of the Committee's work, the position in relation to these three professions has been clarified, and ways examined for easing the cross-boundary movement of qualified personnel on a pragmatic basis. Similarly changes arising from the EC development in the rules relating to houseman training in the United Kingdom for newly qualified doctors with Irish qualifications have been examined. In practice the position for Irish citizens and other EC nationals will remain the same. Non-EC nationals will however find that they have to accept "partial registration" as a necessary preliminary step to full registration.
10. At the request of the Irish side the Committee began an examination of the availability of RTE television broadcasts in Northern Ireland. Following a re-examination of the origin and nature of the present constraints of RTE UHF overspill into Northern Ireland, the radio regulating authorities are conferring closely on a study of the practical consequences that any changes in the level of RTE transmission power would have for existing and planned services within the United Kingdom. The results of the study will come forward to the AIIC for consideration. The Committee has noted with regret the deleterious effects on radio reception caused by pirate radio stations operating in the North Sea.
11. The Coordinating Committee noted with approval that a referendum held in the Republic had given national support to a proposal that the constitution be changed to enable voting rights in general elections to be conferred on British citizens resident there. The way was thus clear for the Irish Government to introduce legislation to confer voting rights on resident British citizens in Dail elections. The Irish side expressed the hope that it would be possible to have such legislation passed by the end of 1984.
12. The Committee noted that cooperation on security matters continues to develop but it would be inappropriate to give further details here.
13. The Coordinating Committee welcomed the progress which was made in the negotiations between the Irish Ministry of Communications and the British Department of Transport about the funding of the Commissioners of Irish Lights.
14. The above is a brief outline of the work carried out by the Coordinating Committee of the AIIC and of sub-groups set up under

/its

DRAFT

PARAGRAPH ON AIIC FOR INCLUSION IN THE COMMUNIQUE

The Two Heads of Government reviewed with approval the work done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council at both Ministerial and Official levels on political, economic, security and cultural matters. They noted with satisfaction that much detailed work was continuing at official level. The Heads of Government look forward to further meetings of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council at all levels.

RESTRICTED

its auspices during the past year. Much useful work has been done. Most of it is still in progress. The Coordinating Committee therefore believe that it would not be appropriate this year to append to the communique which will issue after the Anglo-Irish Summit a lengthy detailed report of its activities on the lines of that published in 1983. It therefore recommends to the Steering Group that the two Heads of Government should simply take note of the AIIC's activity by a brief reference in their communique.

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council - Coordinating Committee
12 November 1984

RESTRICTED

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL:
1983/84

1. In the year since the 1983 November Summit there have been a total of 20 formal Ministerial meetings on a range of political, economic and cultural matters. (See list attached).
2. The Co-ordinating Committee of the AIIC has met five times over the same period. Its discussions have concentrated in the main on 'Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding' (as laid out in last year's Communique).
3. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 19 October to establish exchanges of civil servants between London and Dublin.
4. Some useful work has been done to clarify the position relating to the mutual acceptability of qualifications in a number of professions not already covered by EC legislation. University entrance requirements have been collated in each country with reference to the school leaving qualifications of pupils in the other. It is likely that the results will be published.

NO.	DATE	PARTICIPANTS	SUBJECT	VENUE
21	2 November, 1983	Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Minister for Agriculture.	Agriculture	London
22	29 November, 1983	Minister for Transport and Secretary of State for Transport.	Transport	Dublin
23.	10 January, 1984	Minister for Justice and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.	Security	Dublin
24.	20 January, 1984	Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for Education	Education	Belfast
25.	7 February, 1984	Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State, Foreign Office.	EEC Matters	Dublin
26.	17 February, 1984	Secretary of State for the Environment and Tanaiste and Minister for Energy.	Environment	London
27.	21 February, 1984	Minister for the Environment and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office.	Environment	Dublin
28.	22 February, 1984	Minister for Communications and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office.	Transport	Dublin

NO.	DATE	PARTICIPANTS	SUBJECT	VENUE
29.	15 March, 1984	Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs.	Anglo-Irish Relations.	London
30.	16 March, 1984	Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs.	Anglo-Irish Relations.	London
31.	19 April, 1984	Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for Health.	Health and Social Welfare.	Belfast
32.	6 June, 1984	Minister for Communications and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport.	Transport	Dublin
33.	20 June, 1984	Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister of State for the Environment.	Environment	Belfast
34.	20 June, 1984	Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism and Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry.	Trade	Dublin
35.	21 June, 1984	Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry.	Trade	Dublin

104.11.14 14125

FROM 353 1 712110

NO.	DATE	PARTICIPANTS	SUBJECT	VENUE
36.	4 July, 1984	Tanaiste and Minister for Energy and Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office.	Kinsale Gas	Dublin
37.	31 August, 1984	Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.	Anglo-Irish Relations.	Dublin
38.	18 October, 1984	Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.	EEC Issues	London
39.	25 October, 1984	Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.	Anglo-Irish Relations.	Dublin
40.	29 October, 1984	Secretary of State for Transport and Minister for Communications.	Transport	London



Prime Minister 35

This is the draft reply
to the Irish speaking
note. It seems generally
all right, though the end
of para. 5 and para. 6 could
be strengthened.

Ref. A084/3037

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

Discuss with DH
and GH on Sunday at 6.30.

In your letter of 14 November to Mr Appleyard you recalled the Prime Minister's instruction that a vigorous reply should be prepared to the Irish Speaking Note left with Mr Goodall by Mr Lillis on 12 November.

CDP
16/11

- 2. I now attach the draft of such a reply. It is described as a Speaking Note. The draft has been agreed between the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office.
3. If the Prime Minister and her colleagues are content with it, it is proposed that Mr Goodall should hand it over to Mr Lillis on the evening of Sunday 18 November, explaining that the British side had thought it desirable to ensure that there was no misunderstanding as to the British position on the matters referred to in the Irish Speaking Note. He would say that that is the purpose of this Speaking Note, that it should be regarded as part of the Armstrong/Nally exchanges, and that we do not envisage that either the Irish Speaking Note or the British reply need be discussed in the course of the talks between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach.
4. I am sending copies of this minute and the attachment to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

R

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence.

16 November 1984

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DRAFT SPEAKING NOTE

Having studied the communication made on instructions by Mr Lillis to Mr Goodall on 12 November, the British side judges it necessary to clarify its understanding of the position reached between the two sides in Dublin on 3-4 November 1984.

2. The British side remains of the view, which it understands to be the view of the Irish side also, that the objective of the current talks which have been undertaken by officials on an exploratory and non-committal basis, is to identify for submission to Ministers a set of proposals on which both sides might agree as a means of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland and, as a necessary element in that process, helping to strengthen the confidence of the minority community in the forces of law and order and in the political institutions of Northern Ireland.

3. The position of the British side throughout the talks has been and remains that joint authority, or arrangements tantamount to or apparently suggestive of joint authority, are unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government. At no time has the British side accepted the contention that "it was essential that the Irish nationalist role be that of an equal participant in decision-making either at the Ministerial Commission level or at the level of devolved government". Nor has it ever entertained the suggestion that the Irish Government might be a participant in decision-making as part of an interim executive chaired by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

4. It remains the position of the British side that in return for action by the Irish Government to waive its territorial claim and formally to acknowledge this by the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, and to acknowledge that Northern Ireland remains part of the

United Kingdom unless and until the majority of its inhabitants might wish otherwise, the United Kingdom Government could accord the Irish Government a right to contribute, on a systematic and institutionalised basis, to the consideration by the United Kingdom Government of a range of policy matters, including security, as a means of strengthening the confidence of the minority community in Northern Ireland in the institutions of government there. The British side emphasises that to accord the Irish Government an institutionalised role in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland would be a very large step for a United Kingdom Government to take and could only be contemplated in return for the formal acknowledgement by the Irish Government that Northern Ireland is and will remain part of the United Kingdom for the foreseeable future.

5. As regards the conditions on which the proposals under discussion might be implemented, it was agreed between the two sides in Dublin on 3-4 November that a system of devolved government in Northern Ireland would be integral to any new arrangements; that it was part of the central concept under discussion that such a system would need to command the acceptance of both the majority and the minority communities in Northern Ireland; and that the support and encouragement of the Irish Government would be needed in order to bring about the participation of the minority community in such arrangements. It is not the British position that the establishment of devolved government in Northern Ireland on a basis acceptable to both communities would be a necessary condition for the implementation of any of the other proposals under discussion. But the British side believes that if it proved impossible to establish a system of devolved government in Northern Ireland, then the range of matters which could be the subject of institutionalised consultation between the Irish and British Governments would need careful definition in order to ensure that the extent of

such consultation was consistent with the continued good government of Northern Ireland and with securing the acquiescence of the majority in that arrangement. Such acquiescence would be more difficult to obtain in the absence of clear progress towards devolved government.

6. The British side continues to believe that any system of devolved government for Northern Ireland would have to command widespread acceptance throughout the community. But it wishes the Irish side to understand that, if the Irish Government were to be permitted to establish a resident official representative in Northern Ireland with a formal right to be consulted by the United Kingdom Government on matters affecting the lives and well-being of the minority, the Northern majority's refusal to participate in devolved government based on power sharing would be likely to be further entrenched. It is in that context that the United Kingdom Government would wish to examine alternative bases for devolution which, by providing effective safeguards for the minority, might be acceptable to them.

7. The British side places on record that, while the support and encouragement of the Irish Government would be valuable in persuading the minority community in the North to participate in devolved government, at no point has the British side accepted that the Irish Government has a formal locus standi to agree to or dissent from whatever arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland may be decided upon by the Government of the United Kingdom of which Northern Ireland is a part.

8. As regards security arrangements, and a possible Joint Security Commission, the British side wishes to record that it has serious reservations about a dual structure, one part of which would be concerned only with Northern Ireland. In

the British view reciprocity should form an essential feature of the security arrangements. While noting the views on the security forces put forward by the Irish side, the British side emphasises that any changes in the structure of either the RUC or the UDR would be strongly opposed by the majority community. It has hitherto been the position of both sides, and it remains the position of the British side, that any action taken to strengthen the confidence of the minority community in the forces of law and order in Northern Ireland should not diminish the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism.

9. On the basis of the position described in this speaking note, the British side wishes to leave no doubt about its desire to continue the process of seeking jointly to identify a set of measures which would be adequate, durable and transparent in the sense of those words which were agreed between the two sides in Dublin on 3-4 November; and hopes that the Irish side is ready to continue to proceed in the same spirit.

SECRET

cc Miss Caines
Miss Wallace
Mr Murray

34

1. MR POWELL CDT
2. PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

We shall confirm that an Anglo-Irish bilateral is being held at Chequers when Dr Fitzgerald has arrived. We shall give details of the main participants and a broad outline of the programme of talks.

We shall immediately arrange a photocall at Chequers for 9.15am on Monday morning, incorporating both British and Irish media. Mr Murray is in charge of this.

I consider it more sensible to remain at home on Sunday to handle the weight of traffic which will ensue once it is known the Summit is on. I shall arrive at Chequers for 9am, Monday.

I shall need briefing immediately after the dinner on Sunday evening, and Mr Powell has agreed to ring me.

I shall supply briefing to Jean Caines in London for the 11am Lobby on Monday.

We shall organise a press conference in No 12 for 5pm on Monday to be taken by the Prime Minister with Mr Hurd. We shall allow radio and television to record.

I shall prepare a brief for the Prime Minister during Monday. Mr Hurd is very anxious that we have 30 minutes or so before leaving Chequers to prepare for the press conference.

Finally, on Sunday, when asked why the Summit is taking place at Chequers, I shall take this line:

"In the aftermath of Brighton, Dr Fitzgerald very kindly suggested to the Prime Minister that to ease her burdens he would be very willing to come to London for the November 18/19 bilateral. The Prime Minister greatly appreciated this offer and it was agreed that, while

SECRET

SECRET

2.

Mrs Thatcher would normally have gone to the Republic, on this occasion it would be helpful to fall in with the Taoiseach's suggestion."

I have rehearsed this line with Dr Fitzgerald's Press Secretary who is very content.

Ing

BERNARD INGHAM
16 November 1984

SECRET

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID
Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

14.11.84

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED
FM DUBLIN 161125Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 666 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1984

MIPT: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. THE ARTICLE IN THE INDEPENDENT, CARRIED AT THE TOP OF THE FRONT PAGE UNDER THE HEADING 'NEW NORTH BLUEPRINT FOR SUMMIT- AT CHEQUERS' SAYS:

'FEARS OF AN IRA ATTACK ON MRS THATCHER HAVE MEANT A SWITCH OF THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT FROM DUBLIN TO CHEQUERS WHERE A RADICAL BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE AT THE CENTRE OF DISCUSSION. IT PROVIDES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO BE IN DIFFERENT LAYERS WITH THE FINAL AUTHORITY RESTING IN A TRIPARTITE GROUP-REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LONDON AND DUBLIN GOVERNMENTS AND OF A NEW NORTHERN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. THE BLUEPRINT HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR THE SUMMIT BUT AS PREPARATION FOR THE TALKS REACHED A PEAK LAST NIGHT THERE WERE CONFLICTING VIEWS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED.....

POTENTIALLY TOPPED OFF BY THE TRIPARTITE GROUP, SUCH AN ADMINISTRATION WOULD LEAVE THE UNIONISTS WITH THEIR LINK WITH BRITAIN, AND CREATE FOR THE NATIONALIST MINORITY THE FIRST POSITIVE LINK WITH DUBLIN. MEANTIME, A NEWLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE BODY WOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT OUTSIDE SECURITY. GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN DUBLIN HAVE BEEN PLAYING DOWN THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR AGREEMENT EMERGING FROM THE SUMMIT. PROBABLY THE EASIEST AGREEMENT TO REACH WILL BE THAT SUMMITS IN FUTURE WILL BE SCHEDULED TWICE YEARLY''.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Pl. keep his
folder together
CP.

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

You asked for a full set of working papers, including the early ones. I attach:

1. Record of a meeting at Chequers on 4 January 1984;
2. Sir Robert Armstrong's paper of 7 February 1984 setting out the shape of a possible package.
3. Record of your meeting of 10 February 1984 to discuss the paper.
4. Record of Sir Robert Armstrong's first round of exploratory talks with the Irish on 1 March 1984.
5. Record of a meeting in the Cabinet Office on 29 May 1984 to discuss the Irish response.
6. Records of your meetings with Dr. Fitzgerald at Fontainebleau Downing St.

And finally three papers directly relevant to the Summit:

7. The British statement of the position reached in the Armstrong/Nally talks.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

8. The British draft communique for the Summit.
9. The Irish speaking note and draft communique.

C.D.P.

15 November 1984

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

HD/RID

Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/ S of S

PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56

MR BRENNAN

MR BURNS

MR J LYON

NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG

DIO

CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

14.11.84



IMMEDIATE

GRS 200

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 151600Z

FM DUBLIN 151310Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 655 OF 15 NOVEMBER (CORRECTED VERSION)

ADVANCE COPY

MIPT ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. THE SUPPLEMENT IN THE 'INDEPENDENT' ALSO CARRIES AN OPINION POLL CONDUCTED ON 2 AND 3 NOVEMBER WHICH SHOWS THAT ON NORTHERN IRELAND IRISH PUBLIC OPINION IS CLOSER TO DR FITZGERALD THAN TO MR HAUGHEYS POSITION. ONLY 31% OF THE 1317 ELECTORS IN THE SAMPLE MAINTAINED THAT A UNITED IRELAND WAS THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM WHILE 57% THOUGHT THAT SOME OTHER SOLUTION COULD WORK AS WELL OR BETTER.

2. WHEN CANVASSED ON WHAT INGREDIENTS WOULD BE NEEDED TO MAKE A N INTERNAL SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE 71% OPPOSED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM TO NORTHERN IRELAND BUT OPINION WAS MORE CLOSELY DIVIDED ON REPLACING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM BY A STATEMENT 'EXPRESSING A DESIRE FOR IRISH UNITY EVENTUALLY' (43% FOR; 42% AGAINST). OF THE OTHER MEASURES SUGGESTED 68% WOULD FIND A TRIPARTITE PARLIAMENTARY BODY ACCEPTABLE, 64% FAVOURED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVING A SAY ON OVERALL SECURITY POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND 59% FAVOURED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVING A SAY IN POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF THESE FIGURES SHOWS A FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL OF CROSS PARTY CONSENSUS WITH NO MORE THAN ABOUT 5 POINTS SEPARATING FIANNA FAIL AND FINE GAEL SUPPORTERS ON MOST ISSUES.

3. 54% SAID THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WITH A STRONG DUBLIN DIMENSION WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE NORTH, WHILST ONLY 36% SAID THAT THEY WOULD PREFER TO HOLD OUT FOR A UNITED IRELAND. ON THE SUMMIT ITSELF, ONLY 23% THOUGHT THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THE FORUM REPORT (19% THOUGHT THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD BE CONFINED TO A UNITED IRELAND) WHILST 65% THOUGHT THAT BRITISH PROPOSALS AS WELL AS THE FORUM OPTIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED.

4. THE POLL SHOWS, HOWEVER, THAT FEW RESPONDENTS (22%) BELIEVE THAT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF CATHOLICS WOULD BRING AN END TO IRA VIOLENCE:WHILST 63% DID NOT THINK IT WOULD END.

STIMSON

NNNN

RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE
10 OCTOBER 1975
10 OCTOBER 1975
10 OCTOBER 1975

END

1
1

1
1

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID
Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
CABINET OFFICE
PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

RESIDENT CLERK

14.11.84

GRS 300
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 151600Z
FM DUBLIN 151235Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 654 OF 15 NOVEMBER (CORRECTED VERSION)

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. AN EIGHT PAGE SUPPLEMENT ON "THE SUMMIT" PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S IRISH INDEPENDENT CARRIES ARTICLES BY A BROAD SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL FIGURES (INCLUDING GERRY ADAMS), MEMBERS OF THE KILBRANDON COMMISSION, PROFESSOR BOYLE AND DR HEDDON, AND BRITISH AND NORTHERN IRISH JOURNALISTS AS WELL AS "INDEPENDENT" CORRESPONDENTS.

2. THE GENERAL TENOR IS OF LOWERED IRISH GOVERNMENT EXPECTATIONS COUPLED WITH A FIRM BOTTOM LINE. STEPHEN O'BYRNES'S INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE, SAYS:

"WHILE (THE SUMMIT) WON'T DRAMATICALLY UNVEIL ANY SUNNINGDALE - EQUIVALENT FORMULA, IT IS EXPECTED BY DUBLIN TO LAY DOWN THE AGREED PARAMETERS OF A PROCESS AIMED AT TRANSFORMING THE NORTH INTO A DUAL NATIONALITY STATE WITHIN A FAIRLY PRECISE, SHORT-TERM TIMESCALE. NO MATTER HOW MODESTLY COUCHED, THE FORMAL COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THE HISTORIC MEETING CAN BE MEASURED BY REFERENCE TO THIS YARDSTICK. FAILURE BY THE TWO SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO EMBRACE JOINTLY A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PROCESS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE NORTH WOULD BE SEEN IN DUBLIN AS BECKONING THE MORE MALIGN SCENARIO PAINTED BY PETER BARRY" (AT JESUS COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE).

BYRNES ADDS THAT

IF THIS SUMMIT WERE TO DELIVER A KILBRANDON-STYLE SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD LEAVE THE FITZGERALD GOVERNMENT MORE THAN HAPPY. AND RIGHTLY SO.....AS DUBLIN SEES IT, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUMMIT WILL LIE HOPEFULLY IN AN AGREED FITZGERALD/THATCHER ANALYSIS OF THE NORTHERN PROBLEM WHICH, WHILE ENDORSING ITS UK STATUS, WILL SIGNAL AN IMMEDIATE PROCESS TO EQUALISE THE IRISH STATUS THERE OF ITS NATIONALIST MINORITY. THE FINAL SHAPE/MODEL/STRUCTURE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THIS ANGLO-IRISH CONSENSUS (IT WOULD REPRESENT A LEVEL OF JOINT APPROACH UNPARRALLELED SINCE THE RUN-UP TO SUNNINGDALE OVER A DECADE AGO) WOULD BE DETERMINED IN THE INTENSIVE ROUND OF TALKS WHICH WILL CONTINUE BETWEEN THE TWO CAPITALS, AND WILL ALSO EMBRACE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN THE NORTH IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS.

3. BRUCE ARNOLD (PARLIAMENTARY CORRESPONDENT OF THE INDEPENDENT CAUTIONS HOWEVER, THAT :

CAUTIONS HOWEVER, THAT :

"IT WOULD BE PRUDENT IF THE TAOISEACH PREPARED, WELL IN ADVANCE, FOR THE EVENTUALITY OF THE SUMMIT MEETING BEING A FAILURE. IT IS NOT IN HIS NATURE SO TO DO. HE BELIEVES PASSIONATELY IN POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND... HE BELIEVES PROFOUNDLY IN THE WORK OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM AND IN THE PROPOSALS IT CONTAINS.

HE HAS WORKED EXTREMELY HARD IN PRIVATE TO GET THIS GENERAL MESSAGE ACROSS, AND HE HAS DEPLOYED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF PUBLIC SERVICE ENERGY TO THE SAME END. THE WIDESPREAD DEGREE OF SUPPORT WHICH IS TO BE FOUND FOR THE PROCESS, WHICH BEGAN WITH THE FIRST MEETINGS OF THE FORUM, IS LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE GENUINE COMMITMENT AND PERSONAL DRIVING FORCE OF THE TAOISEACH VIRTUE, HOWEVER, MAY HAVE TO BE ITS OWN REWARD. THE BIG PROBLEM FACING GARRET FITZGERALD IN THIS SUMMIT MEETING IS THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE TERMS ON WHICH THEY MEET AT LEAST FROM HIS SIDE OF THE BARGAINING TABLE. PREVIOUS SUMMITS HAVE BEEN OF ADVANTAGE TO THE IRISH PARTICIPANTS ... PRECISELY BECAUSE THE DETERMINANT FACTORS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ON THE BRITISH SIDE. WHAT IS VERY DIFFERENT NOW IS THAT WE HAVE CREATED AND SPELT OUT IN VERY CONSIDERABLE DETAIL, OUR OWN AGENDA. AT THE FORUM REPORTS HEARTY THERE IS A VERY SIMPLE PRINCIPLE, AND IT IS THIS: WITHOUT A MOVEMENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THE SIMPLE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, NO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH WOULD HAVE THE AGREEMENT OR BACKING OF THE NATIONALIST TRADITION, ITS POLITICAL PARTIES AND ITS MAIN DEMOCRATIC BASIS OF POWER, THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE PART OF THE PROGRAMME FOR THE FUTURE. IF IT DOES NOT EMERGE AS SUCH, FROM THE SUMMIT MEETING WITH MARGARET THATCHER, THEN GARRET FITZGERALD HAS FAILED"

4. NICHOLAS LEONARD (LONDON CORRESPONDENT OF THE INDEPENDENT) ALSO COMMENTS THAT "DR FITZGERALD'S BARGAINING POSITION IS NOT A STRONG ONE". HE ARGUES THAT MR HAUGHEY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FORUM REPORT IS LEGALLY MORE CORRECT THAN FITZGERALD'S :

"THE ACTUAL WORDING OF THE REPORT DOES NOT IN FACT MAKE A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT ON THE QUESTION OF MAJORITY CONSENT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE FORUM REPORT WHICH COMMITS THE FOUR CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES THAT SIGNED IT TO GIVING THE UNIONISTS A VETO OVER THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN OVER THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES FOR A 'SOVEREIGN' INDEPENDENT IRISH STATE TO BE ACHIEVED PEACFULLY AND BY CONSENT."

5. FOUR BRITISH JOURNALISTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUPPLEMENT. JOE HAINES (DAILY MIRROR) WRITES ON "WHY IRISH UNITY IS ONLY SOLUTION" MALCOLM RUTHERFORD (FT) ON "BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF IRELAND ARE CHANGING SLOWLY" ; T E UTLEY (DAILY TELEGRAPH) ON "TWO OPPOSING VIEWS - AND INCOMPATIBLE RESULTS", AND BARRY WHITE (BELFAST TELEGRAPH) ON "THATCHER MUST TACKLE UNIONIST VETO".

6. BOTH THE TAOISEACH AND MR HAUGHEY WERE ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUPPLEMENT BUT BOTH DECLINED TO DO SO. SENATOR CATHERINE MCGUINNESS (FG) (A MEMBER OF THE SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND) WRITES THAT "SOUTHERN ATTITUDES ALIENATE PROTESTANTS". FRANK MILLAR (OUP) WRITING ON "THE REALITIES OF THE UNION" DISMISSES THE OPTIONS IN THE FORUM REPORT LISTING HIS PARTYS 'REALITIES', POINTS TO "THE WAY FORWARD" AND CRITISISES THE SDLP'S SILENCE. GERRY ADAMS ARTICLE HEADED "NO PRESSURE ON LONDON FROM DUBLIN FOR A CHANGE OF HEART" STATES PREDICTABLY THAT "SINN FEIN VIEWS THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT WITH A MIXTURE OF CONCERN AND CYNICISM..... BECAUSE THE SUMMIT PARTIES ARE THERE TO UPHOLD PARTITION....."

7. SEE MIFT.

STIMSON

Ref. A084/3038

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

The Irish Ambassador called in to see me this afternoon.

2. The main purpose of this visit was to explain that the Irish Speaking Note left with Mr Goodall by Mr Lillis on 12 November was not intended to represent a hardening of the Irish position or preparation for failure of the discussions at the Summit.

3. Mr Dorr said that I would recall that the Irish Government felt that at the last exchanges between Mr Nally and me the British Government's position appeared to have hardened, both in asserting that a measure of devolution acceptable to both sides in Northern Ireland was an integral part of the proposals without which the rest would fall and in asserting that the only possible basis for devolution was majority rule with safeguards. Some members of the Irish Government had felt that in the light of this apparent hardening of the British position it would be right to restate, in unambiguous terms, the Irish Government's objectives in the discussions. But, as Mr Lillis was at pains to make clear to Mr Goodall, the Irish Government was not to be regarded as committed by the Speaking Note, and the Speaking Note was not intended to to be some sort of Irish "bottom line".

4. I noted, and promised to pass on, what the Ambassador had said. I confirmed that both the substance and the tone of the Irish Speaking Note had affected the view which British Ministers took of the Irish Government's position in the discussion. The British Government might feel it necessary to put the record straight on certain matters in the Irish Speaking Note. I

Prime Minister 33

I would take what Mr. Dorr said with a large pinch of salt!

C.D.P.
16/xiAsks how visit -
how did he know?
me



suggested, that, though there need be no detailed discussion of the Speaking Note between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, the meeting between them would give each of them an opportunity to clarify their positions.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

15 November 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

Quomles

Revised papers for Anglo/Irish Summit. Carol advised me that

you

the Foreign Secretary's comments are in different "typeface" -

Mango

14/11/84

NORTHERN IRELAND

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR J LYON

NIO

HD/RID
Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/SCU

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
CABINET OFFICE
PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 141200Z
FM DUBLIN 141050Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 644 OF 14 NOVEMBER

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. TODAY'S IRISH INDEPENDENT CARRIES THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE ON PAGE 2, UNDER THE HEADING "SUMMIT TO BE HELD AT ENGLISH VENUE".

BEGINS

THERE IS NOW A VERY STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE THIS WEEKEND WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM DUBLIN TO AN ENGLISH VENUE FOR SECURITY REASONS AND THAT IT COULD PROCEED OVER TWO DAYS.

THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE POSSIBLE SWITCH HAS TO DO WITH CONCERN FOR MRS THATCHER'S SAFETY IN THE WAKE OF THE BRIGHTON BOMBING AND THE ASSASSINATION OF THE OTHER STRONG WOMAN ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA, INDIA'S MRS CGANDHI.

ALTHOUGH THE PREVIOUS TWO SUMMITS WERE HELD IN LONDON AND PROTOCOL WOULD SUGGEST THAT THIS MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN IRELAND- AS OPPOSITION LEADER MR HAUGHEY WAS INSISTING IN THE DAIL LAST WEEK - THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT OVERTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS ISSUE.

AS FAR AS DR FITZGERALD AND HIS ADVISERS ARE CONCERNED, WHAT REALLY MATTERS IS NOT THE LOCATION OF THE MEETING WITH THE BRITISH SIDE BUT THE OUTCOME IN TERMS OF WHAT THEY AGREE SHOULD BE THE WAY AHEAD ON THE NORTH.

THE REASONING THEREFORE IS THAT IF A BRITISH VENUE PROVIDES AN ATMOSPHERE MORE CONDUCIVE TO A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT, THAT IS WHAT REALLY MATTERS.

ENDS

STIMSON

PRIME MINISTER

AM

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: BRIEFING MEETING

We have arranged for Douglas Hurd to see you before the briefing meeting this afternoon.

At the briefing meeting, you might first discuss how to handle the discussions at the Summit. I suggest the following:

(a) Working dinner on the Sunday evening. This will involve Ministers and the most senior officials. I suggest that it be used for a general political discussion of Northern Ireland, in which you can explain the constraints on us; and for other major political issues, principally the European Community.

(b) the next morning you might start at 0930 hrs with a tête-à-tête with the Taoiseach (plus notetakers) to deal with the outcome of the Armstrong/Nally talks, and the question whether any statement will issue from the Summit. Simultaneously, other Ministers and officials could discuss the rest of the fairly extensive agenda.

(c) from 1100 - 1200 hrs you might have an 'expanded' tête-à-tête, bringing in DH and GH plus one or two senior officials to continue discussions on the outcome of the Armstrong/Nally talks, and what if anything to do next. The Irish may try to discuss the detailed report drawn up by Armstrong/Nally.

(d) from 1200 - 1245 hrs there could be a concluding plenary, at which the other Ministers could report on their discussions. This would be followed by lunch.

SECRET

-2-

You will also need to settle the question of a press conference (BI remains keen for you to give one).

For the rest of the briefing meeting you will want to consider the main issues of substance. The main ones are, of course, how to deal with the central political question of the Armstrong/Nally talks and whether to continue them, if so whether in the same form or a different one, and the communique. Apart from this, GH and DH might be invited to mention any other points which they think require your attention.

I attach a folder of the main secret papers, together with the briefs.

C.D.P.

14 November, 1984

SECRET



BRMARP

32

u MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1984

Dear Len,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

The Prime Minister held a meeting this evening with the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary to discuss the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Summit. Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr. Goodall, Mr. Andrew, Mr. Cartledge and HM Ambassador, Dublin were also present.

The Prime Minister said that the Armstrong/Nally talks had been based on the principle of symmetry, with the Irish side dropping their territorial claim and recognising the border. However, the latest Irish speaking note put forward a number of unacceptable demands, and suggested that the Irish Government had still not come to terms with the fact that Joint Authority was not on offer. There must be some risk that they had concluded that the talks would not lead to an outcome acceptable to them, and were preparing to leak their position as set out in the speaking note. We should, therefore, prepare a firm reply setting out our own position, which could equally be made public if necessary. We also had to consider seriously whether the present talks could usefully continue. This could only be judged in the light of her discussions with the Taoiseach at the Summit itself. She accepted that the breakdown of the talks would be represented as a victory for the IRA, and could jeopardise our security cooperation with the Republic. But at the same time it was hard to avoid the conclusion that neither side was able to go far enough to satisfy the other's minimum needs, and that in consequence more limited objectives should be sought.

In discussion it was agreed that the first task at the Summit was to find out the Irish bottom line, and establish whether the gap between our positions was unbridgeable. It was recognised that the Irish side might be getting cold feet about the referendum and the difficult campaign which would precede it. An outcome which both sides could regard


as a modest success was not necessarily unattainable. This would be based on a balance of measures established at a lower level than envisaged in the British statement of position. Clearly joint authority would have to be absolutely excluded or any proposal tantamount to it. But consultation remained a possibility if the balance could be got right. A Joint Security Commission could be presented as in the interests of both sides. There would be no commitment, at this stage, on other issues. This would be preferable to a breakdown, which would be very damaging to Dr. FitzGerald's position, remove any serious hope of getting the SDLP back into a devolved Assembly, and could be damaging to the perception of our Northern Ireland policy in the United States. Against this, it was argued that we could not be too sanguine about the prospects for a limited package. Security cooperation would probably only be acceptable to the Irish in return for a substantial quid pro quo.

Concluding the discussion the Prime Minister said that she would have to judge in the light of what Dr. FitzGerald had to say whether the discussions could usefully be taken further and, if so, by what means. She would need to recall the basis on which the talks had been started and disabuse him of all hope of our agreeing to Joint Authority in any guise. But she would make clear our willingness to continue with various forms of cooperation. In the meantime:

- a) The Irish Government should be informed that we could not accept their revised draft communiqué. Our own version represented the furthest which we could go;
- b) A vigorous reply should be prepared, and cleared with her, to the Irish speaking note;
- c) She would give a press conference following the Summit, but not jointly with Dr. FitzGerald.

I am writing separately about the administrative arrangements.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office), Robert Andrew (Northern Ireland Office), David Goodall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

JE REMAIES



C/SJ
PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1984

Dear Len,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

You will have seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 13 November to me recording his conversation with the Irish Ambassador.

I understand that the Taoiseach has now decided not to arrive in the UK until the Sunday evening and has also agreed that no announcement of the Summit should be made until after his arrival at Chequers (though the risk of a leak of course remains).

The Prime Minister will expect the Taoiseach and party at Chequers at 7.15 pm on Sunday. It would be helpful if the British participants in the dinner that night could arrive between 7.00 and 7.15 pm.

Those expected for the dinner are:

a) On the Irish side - the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste, Mr. Barry, the Irish Ambassador, Mr. Nally, Mr. Donlon, Mr. Lillis, Private Secretary.

b) On the British side - the Foreign Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, HM Ambassador Dublin, Mr. Goodall, Mr. Andrew and me.

I understand that arrangements are being made for those not dining at Chequers to have dinner in their hotel.

In principle the same group will have lunch at Chequers on 19 November. I am looking into alternative arrangements for those not included.

The structure of the talks may finally be determined on the spot. But discussions on Monday will begin at 9.30 am

CST,

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL


with a tête-à-tête between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach (plus Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally) while Ministers not involved and officials discuss other matters. At some point, probably between 10.30 and 11.00 am the tête-à-tête will be widened into a restricted session of Ministers and very senior officials. There is likely to be a plenary at about midday.

It would be helpful if Gerald Clark could be added to the delegation to take the record at the 9.30 meeting of "others" and at the plenary.

Press arrangements. The photocall will now be before the start of the Monday morning session, probably at 9.15 am. The Prime Minister will give a press conference after the end of the Summit, at 5 pm at 12 Downing Street.

The Prime Minister will make a statement in the House on 20 November. We shall need a draft by 9 pm on 19 November.

I am copying this letter to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 900
UNCLASSIFIED
FM DUBLIN 131200Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 638 OF 13 NOVEMBER

PS TO PM. NO 10. DOWNING STREET.

MIPT: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN ARTICLE BY LONDON CORRESPONDENT AIDAN HENNIGAN PRINTED IN THE IRISH PRESS OF 13 NOVEMBER 1984, UNDER THE HEADING 'TROUBLES FOR MRS THATCHER AS SUMMIT APPROACHES'.

A TROUBLED AND POTENTIALLY GRAVE INDUSTRIAL SCENE IN BRITAIN IS HARDLY THE MOST PROPITIOUS BACKGROUND FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS THATCHER TO EMBARK ON NEW INITIATIVES AIMED AT SETTLING THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

YET DESPITE ALL THE PRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, MRS THATCHER IS FREELY IMPENDING A SUMMIT WITH DR FITZGERALD IS OF TCRUCIAL IMPORTANCE AND SHE WILL ARGUE HER CASE NOT ONLY BEFORE THE BAR OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH OPINION, BUT WILL ALSO BE UNDER THE CLOSE SCRUTINY OF HER EUROPEAN AND AMEIRICAN ALLIES.

BUT FOR ALL THAT MRS THATCHER IT IS FREELY SUGGESTED IN WESTMINSTER CIRCLES APPROACHES THE SUMMIT IN A MOOD OF UTO MST CAUTION ON THE SINGLE BASIS THAT ANY RADICAL PROPOSALS COULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO REAL EXPECTATION IN BRITISH POLITICAL CIRCLES THAT ANYTHING DRAMATIC WILL FLOW FROM THIS MEETING, BUT IT ISV BEING EMPHASISED TOO THAT THE SUMMIT IS TAKING PLACE IN A CLIMATE OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS NOT EXISTED BETWEEN WESTMINSTER AND DUBLIN FOR MANY YEARS.

SEVEN IF THE BRISH PRIME MINISTER FEELS SHE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE RADICAL CONCESSION S JUST NOW, AT LEAST SHE WOULD OBVIOUSLY WANT TO KEEP THE GOODWILL OF DR FITZGERALD IF ONLY FOR THE VERY GOOD REASON THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENTS COOPERATION ON SECURITY IS VITAL.

CERTAINLY THE RECENT ARMS SEIZURE THE GENERAL COOPERATION ON BORDER SECURITY AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH DR FITZGERALD CONDEMNED THE BRIGHTON BOMING IS A CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION IN THE EYES OF MOST BRITISH POLITICIANS THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO DEFEATIN TERRORISM.

IT IS TRUE THAT MRS THACHER IS STILL IN A STRONG POSITION NATIONALLY IF RECENT OPINION POLLS CAN BE TAKEN AS A REASONABLE GUIDE, SHE IS MAINTAINING HER ELECTORAL SUPPORT.

THE MINERS STRIKE IS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS AT THE MOMENT AT LEAST AND HER COOLNESS AND RESOLUTION AFTER THE BRIGHTON BOMBING HAS IMPROVED HER IMAGE AS A STRONG LEADER.

IT IS TEMPTING TO THINK THAT THE VERY STRENGTH COULD LEAD MRS THATCHER TO UNDERTAKE BOLD IMAGINATIVE INIATIVES WITH DR FITZGERALD BUT THE VIEW HERE IS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS NOT YET READY TO SHAKE OFF THE CONSTRAINTS OF FORMER BRITISH POLITICAL LEADERS AND TO MAKE A REAL BID TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

/MRS THATCHER

MRS THATCHER WILL NOT BE WITHOUT MUCH ADVICE AS SHE PREPARES FOR THE SUMMIT. ALREADY FIVE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED ALL WITH THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS OF HOW THE CRISIS MIGHT BE SOLVED. QUITE APART FROM THE NEW IRELAND FORUM REPORT THERE WAS THE OFFICIAL UNIONIST DOCUMENT, THE WAY FORWARD, WHICH PRECEDED IT BY A FEW DAYS: THE DUP DOCUMENT, THE UNIONIST CASE, A REPORT FROM AN INDEPENDENT STUDY GROUP ENTITLED BRITAINS UNDEFENDED FRONTIER: A POLICY FOR ULSTER, AND YET ANOTHER INDEPENDENT STUDY CONDUCTED BY A TEAM OF 12 POLITICIANS AND ACADEMICS UNDER LORD KILBRANDON. VIRTUALLY ALL THESE DOCUMENTS ADVISE MRS THATCHER THAT SHE CAN ONLY CHANGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND AT HER PERIL NOT THAT SHE NEEDS TO BE TOLD. BOTH SHE, HER FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, JIM PRIOR AND HER PRESENT SECRETARY, DOUGLAS HURD, HAD INDICATED POSITIVELY THAT THERE CAN BE NO CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE MAJORITY THERE.

QUITE APART FROM THAT CENTRAL THEME THERE HAS BEEN A MULTIPLICITY OF PROPOSALS AND OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENTS ON HOW MRS THATCHER SHOULD PROCEED. EQUALLY THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION ABOUT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY OFFER DR FITZGERALD AND WHAT HE MAY DEMAND FROM HERE.

ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN DISMISSED AS FANCIFUL AND UNWORKABLE ONE POSSIBILITY THAT HAS BEEN CANVASSED IS THAT MRS THATCHER MAY ALLOW THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO HAVE AN 'OBSERVER PRESENCE' IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN RETURN FOR THAT SHE WOULD DEMAND A PLEDGE THAT CLAUSES TWO AND THREE OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION WHICH LAYS CLAIM TO NORTHERN IRELAND BE REMOVED.

IN THIS CONTEXT IT IS INTERESTING TO RECALL THAT A MAJORITY OF EIGHT MEMBERS ON THE KILBRANDON TEAM WANTED AN IRISH MINISTER ON A FIVE MAN EXECUTIVE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND ALSO SUGGESTED THAT AN IRISH MINISTER SHOULD SERVE ON A JOINT SECURITY COMMISSION. BUT THOSE IDEAS WERE HOTLY OPPOSED BY THE MINORITY AS THEY WERE INDEED BY THE UNIONISTS AND RIGHT WING TORY BACKBENCH SUPPORTERS. THE CREATION OF A BORDER ZONE TO BE POLICED JOINTLY BY NORTH AND SOUTH SECURITY FORCES HAS ALSO BEEN MOOTED AS WAS AN ALL-IRELAND COURT SYSTEM.

CERTAINLY A 'HOT PURSUIT' SOME HAS BEEN REJECTED BY THE TAOISEACH IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT AND THE FEELING HERE IS THAT A JOINT POLICE FORCE IS AN IDEA THAT MAY NOT GET VERY FAR, CERTAINLY NOT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

WHAT, THEREFORE, CAN MRS THATCHER OFFER TO DR FITZGERALD WITHOUT PROVOKING OUTRAGE AND EVEN WORSE FROM THE LOYALIST POPULATION IN THE NORTH, NOT TO MENTION ANTAGONISING UNIONIST SUPPORTERS ON HER OWN BACK-BENCHES?

IT HAS FOR INSTANCE BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THE WORK OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL COULD BE EXTENDED AND EVEN PROVIDED WITH A PERMANENT SECRETARIAT.

EQUALLY IT IS THOUGHT THAT MRS THATCHER COULD POSITIVELY FAVOUR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PARLIAMENTARY TIER COMPRISED OF MPS AND TDS BUT SHE HAS INDICATED FROM TIME TO TIME THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A BODY WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE MPS AND THE TDS THEMSELVES.

THE INTRODUCTION OF A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND COULD ALSO BE IN THE AGENDA AND MPS HERE HAVE BEEN QUICK TO NOTE THAT THE FIRST REPORT FROM THE DEVOLUTION COMMITTEE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY SUPPORTS JUST SUCH A BILL FOR THE NORTH. AS IT IS BRITISH AND IRISH OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN WORKING TOGETHER FOR THE PAST FIVE MONTHS TO PRODUCE A BLUE PRINT FOR COOPERATION, THE CENTRAL AIM OF WHICH WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH AND GUARANTEE

THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ONCE AGAIN THEY COULD CLEARLY IDENTIFY WITH ALL THE INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

ALTHOUGH A ROLE FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS CONCEDED HERE, WITH THE EXTENT TO WHICH DUBLIN WILL BE GIVEN FREEDOM TO ACT EITHER IN A QUASI-SUPERVISORY CAPACITY ON COMMISSIONS OR IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY TO ATTAIN THESE ENDS REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

MRS THATCHER IS SINGLEMINDED IN HER APPROACH TO MOST PROBLEMS BUT IT IS QUITE CLEAR TOO THAT THE CURRENT CLIMATE IN BRITAIN AS WELL AS THE VOLATILE SITUATION IN THE NORTH WILL INFLUENCE HER IN HER APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT MEETING.

GOODISON

NORTHERN IRELAND
LIMITED

RID
NAD
INFO D
WED
MAED
NEWS D
PUSD
SCU
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR GOODALL
MR BARRINGTON
MR O'NEILL
MR JENKINS
MR D C THOMAS
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

GRS 500

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 131115Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 637 OF 13 NOVEMBER

1. TODAY'S IRISH PRESS CARRIES A LENGTHY AND HARD-HITTING EDITORIAL ON THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT, HEADED ''OUTLOOK GLOOMY''.
TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

OUTLOOK GLOOMY mf

''..... IF ONE BELIEVES THE VOICES IN WHITEHALL THE IRISH FORUM REPORT IS FLATULENT AND IRRELEVANT, BUT LONDON NEEDS TO BEHAVE DIPLOMATICALLY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST PRESENT LEVELS OF SECURITY COOPERATION FROM THE REPUBLIC....''

NO, THE ABOVE QUOTATION WAS NOT TAKEN FROM AN IRISH PRESS LEADING ARTICLE - IT IS FROM AN ARTICLE BY THE BBCS POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT IN THE LISTENER. THE AUTHOR, JOHN COLE, DOUGHTY ULSTER MAN, COMES FROM A VERY DIFFERENT TRADITION TO THAT OF THE IRISH PRESS. BUT MR COLE IS TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MAJOR ISSUE IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS, THE FORUM REPORT AND ITS LIKELY IMPACT OR LACK OF IT ON THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT, BE IT HELD IN DUBLIN OR LONDON OR MRS THATCHERS AEROPLANE.

AS OUR OWN POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT AND OUR LONDON EDITOR HAVE MADE CLEAR IN ARTICLES TODAY AND YESTERDAY THERE IS NO HOPE OF ANYTHING COMING OUT OF THE SUMMIT, NO MATTER HOW MANY DUBLIN CIVIL SERVANTS CONTINUE TO SPEAK KNOWINGLY OUT OF THE SIDE OF THEIR MOUTHS ABOUT A ''PROCESS' BEING AT WORK.

THE FACT IS THAT THE NATIONALIST PEOPLE OF THIS ISLAND HAVE BEEN LED UP THE SWANEE BY THE WHOLE CHARADE OVER THE FORUM. FOR THE BEST PART OF A YEAR AND A VERY CRUCIAL YEAR AT THAT, THE ONE IN WHICH IRISH AMERICAN SENTIMENT WAS EFFECTIVELY DEFUSED DURING THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BY THE FORUM CARROT. INTERESTED PARTIES WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE COSTLY EXERCISE IN DUBLIN CASTLE ACTUALLY HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO WHAT WAS GOING ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

IN FACT NOTHING HAS CHANGED. FOR AS THE IRISH PRESS AT LEAST HAS CONSISTENTLY POINTED-OUT, THE IRISH CONTINUE TO TALK ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BRITISH ABOUT SECURITY. THE ONLY VALID FOEL FOR THE PADDIES IN THIS DIALOGUE, ACCORDING TO WHITEHALL, IS TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO HELP MAINTAIN BRITAINS HOLDING. REGRETTABLY, SOME SECTIONS OF THE PADDIES SEEM INCLINED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS VIEW, SIGNALLING A WILLINGNESS TO TAMPER WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR EXAMPLE AND GOING ALONG WITH THEVE ''SHOOT TO KILL'' POLICY SO DEVASTATINGLY EXPOSED ON BBCS ''PANORAMA'' PROGRAMME LAST NIGHT.

/ DR.

DR FITZGERALD AND THROUGH HIM THE GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY CUT A SORRY FIGURE STEPPING OFF A BRITISH AIRCRAFT LITERALLY IN THE SHADOW OF MRS THATCHER. FOR ALL HE OR WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT HE MIGHT AS WELL COME AND GO TO IT IN RAF TRANSPORT.

GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF HOUSE OF COMMONS OPINION, MRS THATCHER COULD IF SHE WISHED TAKE ANY STEPS TO RESOLVE THE NORTHERN CONFLICT AND BE SURE OF A COMMANDING OVERALL MAJORITY. BUT IF IT WASN'T TO BE SUPPOSED BEFORE BRIGHTON THAT SHE WOULD DO SO AND IT IS TO BE GUARANTEED AFTERWARDS THAT SHE WILL NOT.

APART FROM REASONS OF PRIDE AND A SENSE OF OUTRAGE THE REAL ISSUE FOR MRS THATCHER AND BEYOND HER FOR THE AMERICANS IS THE QUESTION OF NATO AND OF IRISH NEUTRALITY. EVEN IF MRS THATCHER WISHED IT IS NOT TO BE SUPPOSED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD STAND BY UNPROTESTINGLY IF A GAP WAS SUDDENLY TO APPEAR IN THE NATO DEFENCES. YET THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM IS SCARCELY EVER THOUGHT OF OR DEBATED PUBLICLY HERE.

CONSTITUTIONAL IRISH NATIONALISM IS AT PRESENT WAITING IN THE ANTE-CHAMBER OF THE SUMMIT TO BE SHAFTED YET AGAIN. THERE IS A UNIONIST DOCUMENT OF THE MOMENT WHICH STATES THAT THE FORUM REPORT WAS A 'TRAGEDY' FOR AMONG OTHER REASONS THE FACT THAT IT DIDN'T FACE UP TO THE INTRUSION OF 'AN AUTHORITARIAN CHURCH' INTO THE AFFAIRS OF ITS CITIZENS. APART FROM THE FACT THAT THE UNIONISTS HAVE A CHEEK TO MAKE SUCH A CLAIM WHEN ONE OF THEIR MOST STRIDENT AND IMPORTANT POLITICAL PARTIES IS ACTUALLY LED BY A CLERGYMAN, THE REV IAN PAISLEY, AND THEIR ENTIRE SOCIETY IS DOMINATED BY A QUASI-RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION, THE ORANGE ORDER THAT IS NOT THE TRAGEDY.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE FORUM IS THAT IT IS BEING SO SHABBILY TREATED BY MRS THATCHER AND HER ADVISERS WITH ALL THIS IMPLIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM.

THE NORTHERN SITUATION HAS COST THE REPUBLIC ENORMOUSLY. NOT ALONE IS THERE THE QUESTION OF BORDER SECURITY AND THE OVERSPILL OF VIOLENCE DOWN HERE WE ALSO HAVE AS A RESULT OF THE NORTH, A PANOPLY OF LAWS THAT NO DEMOCRAT COULD LOOK UPON WITH EQUANIMITY. WERE IT NOT FOR THE NORTH WE WOULD NOT HAVE THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE ACT, NON JURY COURTS OR THE FORCIBLE ENTRY BILL, FOR EXAMPLE TO SAY NOTHING OF CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE AND AMBIVALENCE SUCH AS THE MEMORIES OF THE 'HEAVY GANG' OR CURRENTLY DISTURBING REPORTS WHICH EMANATE FROM PORTLAOISE.

THE REPUBLIC IS SIMPLY BEING TREATED WITH CONTEMPT THOUGH NO DOUBT AFTER THE SUMMIT WILL BE TREATED TO PLATITUDES FROM HIGHLY PLACED CIVIL SERVANTS ABOUT 'USEFUL EXCHANGES OF VIEWS' AND THE REST OF IT, BUT THE REALITY IS THAT THE VACUUM IF AND WHEN THIS HAPPENS WILL HAVE BEEN DEEPEMED AND MADE WORSE. THE IRAS HAND WILL HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED AND THE ONLY LOGICAL COURSE OF ACTION FOR ANY DUBLIN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE, IF IT GENUINELY WISHED TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR IN ORDER TO GAIN ITS STATED OBJECTIVES, IS TO LOOK ANEW AT SUCH POTENTIAL BARGAINING POINTS AS CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND THE PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF THE EXTRADITION LAWS. / 2.

2. SEAN O'ROURKE'S ARTICLE REFERRED TO IN THE EDITORIAL WAS SENT TO BARRIE, RID YESTERDAY. AIDAN HENNIGAN'S ARTICLE IS IN MIFT.

GOODISON

NORTHERN IRELAND
LIMITED

RID
NAD
INFO D
WED
MAED
NEWS D
PUSD
SCU
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR GOODALL
MR BARRINGTON
MR O'NEILL
MR JENKINS
MR D C THOMAS
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND



Ref. A084/3017

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Summit

When I met the Irish Ambassador this morning, we had some discussion of arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit.

2. The Ambassador said that Dr FitzGerald might decide to come over on the Saturday, and spend the Saturday night at the Irish Embassy. In that event he might bring his wife and daughter. I suggested that this would need to be considered in the light of the Prime Minister's wish that there should be no announcement until after the Taoiseach had arrived at Chequers. The Ambassador obviously thought that this might lead the Taoiseach to delay his departure from Ireland until the Sunday afternoon.

3. I confirmed that the Prime Minister would entertain the Taoiseach and his two Ministerial colleagues for the night at Chequers. Other members of the party would be found accommodation at a nearby hotel. I said that I thought that the arrangements for that were in hand.

4. I said that the Prime Minister was proposing that the first engagement should be dinner at 7.30 pm on the Sunday evening. The Ambassador asked whether this was 7 o'clock for 7.30 or 7.30 for 8.00. I am afraid that I did not know the answer.

5. The Ambassador and I thought that attendance at the meals (dinner on Sunday night and lunch on Monday) should be restricted to the three Ministers on each side, the two Ambassadors, three senior officials on each side and one Private Secretary on each side. Other members of the delegations would need to be provided with some kind of "out-mess".



6. In response to a question from the Ambassador, I said that I thought that there would be no tete-a-tete on the Sunday evening. I thought it probable that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach would move straight into tete-a-tete at 9.30 am or 10.00 am on Monday morning. We recognised that the Taoiseach might wish the Tanaiste to be in on the tete-a-tete for the first ten minutes. The Tanaiste would be perfectly content to leave after that. Otherwise the only people present for the tete-a-tete would be Mr Nally and me, plus a Private Secretary.

7. I said that the Prime Minister envisaged that there would be a plenary session towards the end of the Monday morning. When that began would depend on the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at the time. We envisaged that the other four Ministers (with accompanying officials) could meet elsewhere in Chequers while the tete-a-tete was going on, to discuss "other matters".

8. I confirmed that the intention was that the meeting should conclude at the end of lunch on Monday. The Ambassador confirmed that the Taoiseach would return to London for a press conference thereafter. I said that I thought that the Prime Minister had not yet decided whether to give a press conference herself; but if she followed past form she might decide not to give a press conference but to make a statement in the House of Commons the following afternoon.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13 November 1984

Prime Minister

EDP
13/11

mb

Ref. A084/3006

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Summit

You sent me a copy of your letter of 13 November to Mr Appleyard about the press arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit.

2. When I saw the Irish Ambassador this morning I was able to tell him that the Prime Minister did not wish for an announcement to be made until after all the participants had arrived at Chequers. The Irish Ambassador made a long face about this: he doubted whether the Taoiseach would be able to leave Ireland without his departure being noticed. The Irish side may want to suggest that the announcement should be made at about the time he leaves Dublin.

3. As to arrangements for the Summit, I confirm that the Taoiseach intends to give a press conference in London on the Monday afternoon. It would be in accordance with past precedents for the Prime Minister not to give a press conference herself, but to make a statement in the House of Commons the following day.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13 November 1984



FUE

30 207

cc: DC
B. Loughan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 November, 1984

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

I wrote to you on 8 November about the arrangements for the Anglo/Irish Summit. I have subsequently consulted the Prime Minister on the press arrangements for the Summit.

Announcement of the Summit

We understand that the Irish are pressing for an announcement to be made in advance, perhaps on Friday evening. The Prime Minister does not wish any announcement to be made, at least until after all the participants have arrived at Chequers i.e. Sunday evening. I should be grateful if this could be made clear to the Irish side.

Press Arrangements

No press will be admitted to Chequers, except that there will be a photocall at the end of the Summit. We understand that Dr. FitzGerald intends to give a press conference in London on the Monday afternoon. The Prime Minister's inclination is not to give a press conference herself, though she has not taken a final decision on this.

I am copying this letter to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET & PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL



cc SC
For 100
widl. folder to
Miss Mulligan
AM

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

PS(84) 26

12 November 1984

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-Irish Summit: November 1984

With my letter of 7 November I attached at Annex A a list of briefs to be prepared for the Anglo-Irish Summit.

--- I now attach a revised list which incorporates additional briefs on Home Made Explosives and Supergrasses and changes to the titles of some of the Security briefs. It also removes from the list the brief on Hong Kong and deletes the subsections (a)-(d) in Brief 10 on Prospects for the December European Council.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Antony Acland, Sir Clive Whitmore, Sir Peter Middleton, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Brian Hayes, Sir Anthony Rawlinson, Sir Kenneth Couzens, Sir Michael Franklin, Sir George Moseley, Mr R J Andrew, Mr D J S Hancock, Mr P E Lazarus, Mr H Steel, Dr R B Nicholson and Charles Powell at No 10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ROSALIND MULLIGAN (MISS)
Assistant Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
NOVEMBER 1984


<u>HMV(84)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	General Brief	FCO NIO Cabinet Office	
2.	Republic of Ireland Political and Economic Situation	FCO Cabinet Office	
3.	Anglo-Irish Inter- governmental Council	FCO Cabinet Office	as appropriate
<u>Northern Ireland</u>			
4.	The Extradition of Terrorists	Law Officers' Dept	as appropriate
5.	The Northern Ireland Political Parties and the General Political Scene	NIO	
6.	Security:	NIO	
	(a) Cross-Border Security Co-operation		
	(b) Border Incursions		
	(c) Border Road Closures		
	(d) Plastic Baton Rounds		
	(e) The Judiciary in Northern Ireland		
	(f) Strip Searching at HMP Armagh		
	(g) Lengthy Remands		
	(h) Gaelic Athletic Association Pitch at Crossmaglen		

<u>HMV(84)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation</u>
	(i) Cross-Border Bridges		
	(j) Prison Segregation		
	(k) John McVeigh - Prisoner in HMP Maze		
	(l) Supergrasses		
	(m) Home Made Explosives		
7.	Energy Matters	NIO	
8.	Current Prospects for North/South Economic Co-operation	NIO	
9.	Carlingford Lough and Lough Foyle (Defensive)	NIO	
10.	Prospects for the December European Council:	FCO	as appropriate
	- Outstanding Issues on Enlargement		
	- The Internal Market		
	- Development of Community (including Dooge and Peoples Europe Committee)		
	- Outstanding Budget Budget Issues		
11.	Bilateral Issues (Defensive):	FCO MOD Transport	as appropriate
	(a) Sellafeld discharges		
	(b) Continental Shelf Delimitation		
	(d) Irish Lights		

<u>HMV(84)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
	(d) Anglo-Irish Encounter		
	(e) Irish Sailors' and Soldiers' Land Trust		
	(f) MV Sharelga		
12.	International Affairs (Defensive) Central America	FCO	
13.	UK International Aid (if necessary) EC Response to Ethopia Famine Disaster	ODA	

PM TOURS Oct 84

Anglo-Inca Summit



PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/VE RENTON

PS/PCS

~~SIR J. BURNES~~

VE JENKINS

PS/S. O'S
PS/ MR R. ANDREW
OAG 1/56

VE BERNAN

VE ~~AND~~ BURNS

J. LYON
VE ~~BOYS~~

NIO

ED/RID

ED/PUSD (2)

ED INFO D

ED/NEWS D

RES. CLERK

SIR B ARMSTRONG

DIO

CABINET

SS/No 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

GRS 520
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 121800Z
FM DUBLIN 121655Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 630 OF 12 NOVEMBER 1984

MB
757/12

YOUR TELNO 305: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. THE PRESENT SUMMIT OCCUPIES A VITAL PLACE IN DR FITZGERALD'S PRIORITIES. WHILST FAILURE WOULD NOT BRING DOWN HIS GOVERNMENT, IT COULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE HIS CREDIBILITY, SINCE HE IS KNOWN TO BE PERSONALLY CONCERNED OVER POLICY TOWARDS NORTHERN IRELAND.
2. SINCE HIS RETURN TO OFFICE IN DECEMBER 1982, DR FITZGERALD HAS DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TO NORTHERN IRELAND. FROM MARCH 1983 TO MAY 1984, HE WAS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE NEW IRELAND FORUM, WHICH ORIGINATED IN AN SDLP MANIFESTO PROPOSAL BUT WAS TAKEN UP BY DR FITZGERALD TO HELP THE SDLP TO BEAT OFF SINN FEIN'S CHALLENGE AND TO TRY AND FOSTER A GREATER REALISM IN THE SOUTH ABOUT THE NORTH. IN THE SHORT TERM, THE FORUM HAS BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN MEETING THE FORMER THAN THE LATTER AIM, BUT BOTH REMAIN CENTRAL PLANKS OF DR FITZGERALD'S POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WITH ITS AGREED LISTS OF "REALITIES" AND "REQUIREMENTS", THE FORUM REPORT PROVIDES HIM WITH THE BEST BASIS HE CAN HOPE FOR IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS THEREFORE BEEN DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW IT TO BE SUBMERGED IN THE WAKE OF MR HAUCHEY'S EARLY DISAVOWAL OF TWO OF ITS PROPOSED OPTIONS AND OUR OWN INITIAL MUTED RESPONSE.
3. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE FINE CAEL ARD FHEIS (PARTY CONFERENCE) IN OCTOBER, DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE CONSIDERED BRITISH RESPONSE SHOULD BE RIGHT THAN THAT IT SHOULD APPEAR WITHIN A GIVEN TIME SPAN. BUT IT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE A MAJOR IRISH OBJECTIVE TO SHOW THAT HMG IS TAKING THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE REPORT SERIOUSLY AND IS NOT JUST HOPING TO AVOID THEM.
4. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NEED FOR ACTIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT "ALIENATION" OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH IS SEEN HERE AS FIRST PRIORITY. THE SORT OF THINGS THE IRISH HAVE IN MIND RANGE FROM

4. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NEED FOR ACTIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT "ALIENATION"

OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH IS SEEN HERE AS FIRST PRIORITY. THE SORT OF THINGS THE IRISH HAVE IN MIND RANGE FROM ALLOWING THE MINORITY GREATER FREEDOM TO EXPRESS THEIR IDENTITY (USE OF THE IRISH LANGUAGE ON THE BBC, ON ROAD SIGNS, OR IN SCHOOLS, AND REPEAL OF THE FLAGS AND EMBLEMS ACT) TO THE NEED AS THEY SEE IT FOR A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO CREATE NEW INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISTS WOULD FEEL ABLE TO TAKE PART. SUCH INSTITUTIONS COULD NOT OFFER THE SDLP LESS THAN SUNNINGDALE. DR FITZGERALD IS HOPING TO SECURE A COMMITMENT TO THEM.

5. FOR A PERIOD IN THE SUMMER, IT SEEMED AS THOUGH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS RAISING EXPECTATIONS OVER-HIGH, POSSIBLY AS A MEANS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON HMG. BUT MORE RECENTLY A DEGREE OF CAUTION HAS BEEN DISCERNIBLE, AT LEAST IN THE TAOISEACH'S PRONOUNCEMENTS. THE GENUINE ANGER FELT BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF IRISH PEOPLE AT THE OUTRAGE IN BRIGHTON HAD A FURTHER SOBERING EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION.

6. DR FITZGERALD CANNOT AFFORD TO COME AWAY FROM THE SUMMIT EMPTY HANDED. HE HAS INVESTED SO MUCH OF HIS TIME AND PERSONAL EFFORT IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY FORWARD ON NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH COULD OFFER SOME ESCAPE FROM THE STERILE AND DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION OF THE LAST 15 YEARS THAT FAILURE WOULD EXPOSE HIS GOVERNMENT, AND HIS LEADERSHIP, TO ACCUSATIONS OF HAVING FORFEITED TRADITIONAL IRISH ASPIRATIONS WITHOUT ANY CONCOMITANT GAINS.

7. IN THIS CONTEXT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT, WHILST BOTH THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND DR FITZGERALD'S LEADERSHIP LOOK SECURE ENOUGH FOR THE TIME BEING, HIS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY IS ONLY SIX, THE OPINION POLLS ARE RUNNING HEAVILY AGAINST BOTH COALITION PARTIES AND FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER RATE MR HAUGHEY A BETTER LEADER THAN THE TAOISEACH. MOREOVER (AND NOT UNRELATED TO HIS POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND), DR FITZGERALD WILL SOON HAVE TO CONFRONT THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT TO ATTEMPT A REFERENDUM ON DIVORCE, STILL A HIGHLY DIVISIVE SUBJECT IN IRELAND. DESPITE SOME INDICATIONS OF EMERGENT CROSS-PARTY CONSENSUS, HE CANNOT RELY ON FIANNA FAIL TO HELP.

NOR ARE THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS LIKELY TO GET ANY EASIER. UNLESS THE WORLD ECONOMY PERFORMS MUCH BETTER THAN MOST COMMENTATORS SEEM TO EXPECT, IT MUST AT BEST BE QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN CAN PRODUCE THE RESULTS PROMISED OVER ITS THREE YEAR SPAN.

8. THUS DR FITZGERALD IS IN NO POSITION TO OFFER ANY UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS (SUCH AS REMOVAL OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION) WHICH, ONE MIGHT ARGUE, WOULD CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE MORE CONDUCTIVE TO A WIDER SETTLEMENT. DR FITZGERALD WILL BE LOOKING FOR BALANCE SOLUTIONS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE CAN ACCOMMODATE THE "IRISH DIMENSION" WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL QUESTION IN IRISH MINDS AT THE SUMMIT.

GOODISON

NNNN

That is not my problem.

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo/Irish Summit: 18/19 November

There are three points on which a decision is needed:

1. Announcement of the Summit. The Irish want to announce it on Friday night or at latest Saturday. We would prefer not to announce it at all, but have to recognise that, realistically, it is likely to leak once police and airport authorities are involved.

Not as early as Friday. It makes no sense at all to announce it before arrival.

Agree that we can have discretion to announce it, but at the last possible moment, to be agreed with the Irish?

2. Press briefing. Clearly no press will be allowed at Chequers, though you may want to agree to a photocall at the end of the meeting. Dr. FitzGerald plans to give a press conference at the Irish Embassy on the Monday afternoon. Bernard thinks that you should give a press conference too. I am less sure that it is desirable.

Agree to photocall at Chequers at the end of the Summit?

Agree to give a press conference in London on the Monday afternoon?

3. Briefing for Bernard. He has not been brought into the talks so far. But it will make his role difficult if he is not fully briefed. (We know that Dr. FitzGerald's press spokesman is fully informed of the Armstrong/Nally talks.)

Yes no Agree that Bernard should be at Chequers for the Summit (though not attending the most restricted meetings)?

Agree that he should attend the briefing meeting for the Summit, even though this will inevitably deal with the Secret talks?

C.D.P. Yes no

27

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Boe



hi

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1984

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

I wrote on 8 November about the arrangements for the Anglo/Irish Summit at Chequers. I omitted to include in the British delegation the name of Sir Ewart Bell.

I am copying this letter to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office).

(C.D. Powell)

TMS

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Blup 15/11

SECRET AND PERSONAL



28^A

Ref. A084/2332

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

We discussed the Prime Minister's comments on the revised draft communique passage attached to my minute of 8 November (Ref. A084/2995).

- 2. I have recast the passage in the light of those comments, and seek authority to transmit the revised text to Mr Nally via the British Ambassador in Dublin. If at all possible, I should like to do this today.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9 November 1984

cc. PS / Foreign Secretary
PS / Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

NORTHERN IRELAND: DRAFT PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN
SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that it was a major interest of both their countries, as well as of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland, that there should be lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

The Taoiseach reaffirmed that it remained the wish of the Irish Government that the two parts of Ireland should come together by freely negotiated agreement and in peace, but recognised that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom could come about only with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister reaffirmed that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and that the majority in Northern Ireland ~~remained~~ ^{wished it to remain so} opposed to a ~~change in its constitutional status.~~ At the same time she confirmed that, if in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wished for and consented to a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom Government would put forward and support legislation in the British Parliament, ~~for its decision.~~

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach further agreed:

- i. Any attempt to promote political objectives by means of violence or the threat of violence

must be rejected, as must those who adopt or support such methods.

ii The identities of both the majority and the minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected.

iii. The process of Government in Northern Ireland should be such as to provide the people of both communities with the confidence that their rights will be safeguarded.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that there should be close and continuing dialogue on these subjects between the two Governments over the coming months in the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council.



Ref. A084/2322

MR POWELL

Prime Minister's Meeting with the Taoiseach

I am afraid that I inadvertently left out of the list of officials to be included in the British party for the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, Sir Ewart Bell.

2. The Prime Minister agreed earlier that he should be included in the party. I think that it would be useful to have him there; and, as you know, it will be his last appearance, because he retires from the public service at the end of the month.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9 November 1984

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/VE RENTON

PS/PCS

~~SIR J. SUDDERS~~

VE JERKINS

PS/S. O. S

PS/MR R. ANDREW
OAB 1/56

VE BRENNAN

VE ~~ANDREW~~ Burns

J. LYON
~~VP BOYD SMITH~~

NIO

D/PIB

D/PCSD (2)

D/INFO D

D/NEWS D

SIR E ARMSTRONG

DIO

CABINET

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

U/C

DESK BY 091200Z

FM DUBLIN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 618 OF 9.11.84

mf



ANGLO - IRISH SUMMIT

IN THE DAIL YESTERDAY MR HAUGHEY ASKED THE TAOISEACH IF THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN A NEWSPAPER SUGGESTION THAT THE NEXT MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN IRELAND.

2. MR HAUGHEY SAID THAT, DESPITE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, PROTOCOL DEMANDED THAT THE MEETING TAKE PLACE HERE. THE LAST TWO MEETINGS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN BRITAIN. DR FITZGERALD REPLIED THAT SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS PREVENTED HIM FROM MAKING ANY ADVANCE ANNOUNCEMENTS.

NNN

SENT AT .11.10 HOURS ON 9.11.84 C

ADVANCE COPIES

FRAME ECONOMIC

25 XEROX COPIES

FCO

PS/MR RIFKIND
~~MR DEREK THOMAS~~
~~MR G TICKELL~~
MR RENWICK

RESIDENT CLERK
HD/ECD(I) (3)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/
HD/
HD/

PLUS FCO

Mr Wallace
Ms Mansden } (CD)

<p><u>CABINET OFFICE</u> MR D WILLIAMSON MR G STAPLETON MISS S J LAMBERT MR T J BURR</p>	<p><u>D T I</u></p>	<p><u>PLUS OED'S</u> MR P KENT HM CUSTOMS & EXCISE <i>Treasury Sec</i></p>
<p><u>H M TREASURY</u> MR J B UNWIN MR J G LITTLER MR J E MORTIMER MR G W HOPEKINSON <i>Mr Fitchew</i> <i>Mr Lennon</i></p>	<p><u>M A F F</u> PERMANENT SECRETARY</p>	<p><i>Mr Weston</i></p>

RESTRICTED
 FRAME ECONOMIC
 DESKBY 091100Z
 FM UKREP BRUSSELS 091032Z NOV 84
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 3664 OF 9 NOVEMBER
 INFO ROUTINE COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, ROME, DUBLIN, PARIS,
 BONN, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS
 INFO SAVING BRUSSELS.

COREPER (AMBASSADORS) 9 NOVEMBER 1984.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT.

SUMMARY

1. COMMISSION CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD NOT PROPOSE AN ARTICLE 235 REGULATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT AND THAT IT COULD BE DONE WITHOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL BASE. FRANCE, GERMANY AND DENMARK INSISTED ON REIMBURSEMENT AND SEVERAL DELEGATIONS REPEATED DOUBTS ABOUT PROCEEDING WITHOUT AN ARTICLE 235 REGULATION. COREPER TO CONSIDER FURTHER NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

2. AT COREPER LUNCH THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF REIMBURSEMENT. DENMARK, FRANCE AND GERMANY SAID THEY WOULD INSIST ON REIMBURSEMENT. THE COMMISSION REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 211.

3. IN COREPER STRASSER INTERVENED AT LENGTH TO JUSTIFY THE COMMISSION'S POSITION. THEY HAD PROPOSED REIMBURSEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF INTEREST-BEARING ADVANCES OF OWN RESOURCES. BOTH BRANCHES OF THE BUDGETARY AUTHORITY HAD REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL. THE COMMISSION AND THE PARLIAMENT HAD NOT WANTED THE ALTERNATIVE IGA SOLUTION. IT PROVIDED NO LEGAL CERTAINTY AS TO THE TIMING OF PAYMENTS - ONLY GREECE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE TELEX INVITING PAYMENTS AND THE UK AND GERMANY HAD REPLIED REFERRING TO THEIR BUDGET DISCIPLINE CONDITION - SO THE COMMISSION DID NOT SEE THE NEED FOR LEGAL CERTAINTY AS TO REIMBURSEMENT. THEY WOULD PREFER MEMBER STATES TO FOREGO REIMBURSEMENT. IF NOT, IT COULD BE DONE THROUGH...



file
276
shafu

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: NORTHERN IRELAND

Your minute A084/2995 of 8 November attached a revised version of the draft communique of the Anglo-Irish Summit. The Prime Minister proposed various amendments to this which I gave to you orally, and were reflected in the subsequent revision attached to your minute A084/2332 of 9 November.

The Prime Minister has considered that further revision and is content with it subject to two further amendments:

- (i) The first sentence of the third paragraph should read: "The Prime Minister reaffirmed that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and that the majority in Northern Ireland wanted it to remain so".
- (ii) The words "for its decision" should be omitted at the end of paragraph three.

I understand that you will be putting the draft as amended to Mr Nally.

C D Powell

9 November 1984

SECRET

27A

GRS 105
SECRET
FM DUBLIN 081310Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 608 OF 8 NOVEMBER 1984

FOLLOWING FPERSONAL FOR CLARK, RID

MIPT: ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

1. LILLIS TELEPHONED ME AT 1820 ON 7 NOVEMBER TO SAY THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM JOURNALISTS QUOTING LONDON SOURCES WHO HAD STATED THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT WAS TO BE HELD IN THE UK. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSULT THE SECRETARY TO THE CABINET ABOUT THESE REPORTS . THEY WERE INTENSELY EMBARRASSING . HE DID NOT ASK ME TO DO ANYTHING. HE SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO MAKE ME FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE. I GAVE HIM NO GRON, FOR THINKING HE HAD SUCCEEDED.

GOODISON

LIMITED
HD/RID
MR GOODALL

COPIES TO:
SIR W ARMSTRONG - CAB.
OFFICE
MR POWELL - No 10
DOWNING ST.

SECRET

NB

CDP returned the original
commenting that Messrs
Williamson, Brennan and
Clark should be omitted.

Ref. A084/2997

MR POWELL

MLK
8/11

Anglo-Irish Summit: Prime Minister's Briefing Meeting
at 4.45 pm on Wednesday 14 November 1984

I should be grateful for approval for the following
Ministers to attend the Prime Minister's briefing meeting for
the Anglo-Irish Summit:

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

2. They should be accompanied by the following officials:

Mr Alan Goodison - British Ambassador to Dublin
Mr Robert Andrew - Northern Ireland Office
~~Mr Tony Brennan - Northern Ireland Office~~
Sir Robert Armstrong - Cabinet Office
Mr Bryan Cartledge - Cabinet Office
~~Mr David Williamson - Cabinet Office~~
Mr David Goodall - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
~~Mr Gerald Clark - Foreign and Commonwealth Office.~~

ROSALIND MULLIGAN

8 November 1984



27
Prime Minister

This is a revised version of the Anglo-Irish summit communique, amended to meet your adverse comments on the earlier version.

Ref. A084/2995

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

It seems to me to be acceptable.

CDP

8/21

Your minute of 5 November conveyed the Prime Minister's comments on the draft communique passage which I had telegraphed to New Delhi.

2. In consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office I have now recast the draft passage to take account of the Prime Minister's comments.

3. If she is content I will telegraph the revised draft to Mr Nally via the British Ambassador in Dublin.

4. I am sending copies of this minute and the draft to the Private Secretaries of the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

8 November 1984



NORTHERN IRELAND: DRAFT PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN
SUMMIT COMUNIQUE

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that it was a major interest of both their countries, as well as of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland, that there should be lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

They agreed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom could come about only with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

The Taoiseach reaffirmed that it remained the wish of the Irish Government that the two parts of Ireland should come together by freely negotiated agreement and in peace. (The Prime Minister, while

noting that the majority in Northern Ireland remained opposed to such a change, confirmed the undertaking

that, if in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland were to express their consent to

a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom Government would accept

that decision and would support legislation in the British Parliament to give effect to it.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach further agreed:

- i. Any attempt to promote political objectives by means of violence or the

is a part of the U.K. de...

re-affirming

And that he recognized

Northern Ireland

at the same time

clearly ~~indicated~~ and consented

prepare

put forward support

for its decision.



threat of violence must be rejected, as must those who adopt or support such methods.

ii. The identities of both the majority and the minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected.

and the ~~institutions~~ of ~~Government~~ Govt.

?
?
iii. The institutions of Government in Northern Ireland should be such as to provide the people of both communities with the confidence that their rights will be safeguarded.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that there should be close and continuing dialogue on these subjects between the two Governments over the coming months in the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council.



de EU
cpc. 76

10 DOWNING STREET

8 November 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Sir,

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: FORTHCOMING SUMMIT

I wrote to you about the arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit on 5 October. Since then there have been changes. This letter sets out the new plan.

The Summit will now be held at Chequers on 18/19 November. It will start with a working dinner at Chequers at 1930 on 18 November and end with a working lunch on 19 November. It is not yet known whether the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach will wish to see the press in London at the end of the Summit. If they do, they will give separate press conferences.


Neither the dates nor the location of the Summit will be announced in advance. Every effort should be made to keep this information confidential.

Attendance at the Summit will be very restricted. The Irish side will, we are told, consist of the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste, Mr Barry, Mr Nally, Mr Donlon, Mr Lillis and the Irish Ambassador. The UK side will consist of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Goodall, Mr Andrew or Mr Brennan and HM Ambassador Dublin. Much of the discussion is likely to be tête-à-tête between the two Prime Ministers, Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally, though the Prime Minister would expect the last part of the Monday morning to be available for a plenary session. A parallel meeting between the two Secretaries of State, the Tanaiste and Mr Barry might be held during the tête-à-tête on the Monday morning to consider matters not being discussed by the two Prime Ministers.

The Prime Minister intends to invite the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and Mr Barry from the Irish side and the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary on the UK side to spend the night at Chequers. Officials will either need

to find accommodation in hotels locally or return to London after dinner on Sunday.

I am copying this letter to Graham Sandiford in the Northern Ireland Office and Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,


Charles Powell

L V Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

PS(84) 25

7 November 1984

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-Irish Summit: November 1984

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit and follows on from the requests for briefing already made to Departments by the FCO.

The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex A. Departments should, in the preparation of briefs, ensure that other Departments are consulted as appropriate.

The list of briefs is narrower in scope than is usual for Summits since this Summit is likely to concentrate more on matters relating to Northern Ireland. Community issues may however also be raised. Copy recipients whose Departments are not involved in producing briefing receive this letter for information only.

Instructions on format are at Annexes B and C. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex B. Departments should therefore aim to ensure that, apart from the General Brief, individual subject briefs do not exceed two sides of paper.

Seventy copies of each brief should be sent direct to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready. In any case, they should reach the Cabinet Office by 12.00 noon on Tuesday 13 November AT THE VERY LATEST. They should be addressed to Mrs M Wagner in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel no 233 7343) about any technical points arising.

/I am

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Antony Acland, Sir Clive Whitmore, Sir Peter Middleton, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Brian Hayes, Sir Anthony Rawlinson, Sir Kenneth Couzens, Sir Michael Franklin, Sir George Moseley, Mr R J Andrew, Mr D J S Hancock, Mr P E Lazarus, Mr H Steel, Dr R B Nicholson at the Cabinet Office and Mr Charles Powell at No 10.

Yours sincerely

(Signed) ROSALIND MULLIGAN (MISS)
Assistant Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
NOVEMBER 1984

<u>HMV(84)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	General Brief	FCO NIO Cabinet Office	
2.	Republic of Ireland Political and Economic Situation	FCO Cabinet Office	
3.	Anglo-Irish Inter- governmental Council	FCO Cabinet Office	as appropriate
<u>Northern Ireland</u>			
4.	The Extradition of Terrorists	Law Officers' Dept	as appropriate
5.	The Northern Ireland Political Parties and the General Political Scene	NIO	
6.	Security:	NIO	
	(a) Cross-Border Security Co-operation		
	(b) Incursions		
	(c) Border Closures		
	(d) Plastic Baton Rounds		
	(e) Judicial Practices		
	(f) Ship Searching		
	(g) Lengthy Remands		
	(h) Gaelic Athletic Association Pitch at Crossmaglen		

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>HMV(84)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
	(i) Cross-Border Bridges		
	(j) Prism Segregation		
	(k) John McVeigh		
7.	Kinsale Gas (defensive)	NIO	
8.	Current prospects for North/South Economic Co-operation	NIO	
9.	Carlingford Lough and Lough Foyle (defensive)	NIO	
10.	Prospects for the December European Council	FCO	as appropriate
	(a) Outstanding issues on enlargement		
	(b) The internal market		
	(c) Development of Community (including Dooge and Peoples Europe Committee)		
	(d) Outstanding budget issues (If necessary)		
11.	Bilateral Issues (Defensive)	FCO MOD Department of Transport	as appropriate
	(a) Sellafield discharges		
	(b) Continental Shelf Delimitation		
	(c) Irish Lights		

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>HMV(84)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
	(d) Anglo-Irish Encounter		
	(e) Irish Sailors' and Soldiers' Land Trust		
	(f) MV Sharelga		
12.	International Affairs (Defensive)	FCO	
	(a) Central America		
	(b) Hong Kong		
13.	UK International Aid (If necessary)	ODA	
	EC Response to Ethiopia Famine disaster		

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED CAREFULLY

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex C. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should whenever possible be no more than two sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise three sections: a very brief statement of the United Kingdom Objective (normally no more than a couple of lines); a concise list of Points to Make; and a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject.

Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex C, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (eg H MV (84) 10) with the date of circulation below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on plain white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex C). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.
- (h) It is important that, on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, a revise should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number amended to show that it is a revise (eg HMV(84) 10 (Revise)). Subsequent revises should be numbered (eg HMV(84) 10 (Revise 2); etc). If it is a question of adding material to the brief rather than revising its existing contents, an addendum may be prepared, in the form described at (e) above with the brief number (eg HMV(84) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when a revise or an addendum is in preparation and also about corrigenda to briefs.

- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex A require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX C

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

HMV(84) [Serial No as specified in Annex A] COPY NO [in red]

[Date]

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
NOVEMBER 1984

[SUBJECT] [Insert subject in capitals]

Brief by [name of originating Department, eg Foreign and
Commonwealth Office]

[At foot of last page on left-hand side:-]

[Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth
Office or Department of Energy, not a subordinate section or
division]

[Date of origin]

[CLASSIFICATION]

[Leave
1 1/2"
margin]

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/VP RENTON

PS/S. DE S
PS/MR R. ANDREW
OAB 1/56

PS/PCS
~~SIR J. BULLOCK~~
VE JENKINS

VE ~~BRENNAN~~
VE ~~ANDERSON~~ BURNS
J. LYON
VE ~~BOYD~~

NIO

ED/ED
ED/PCSD (2)
ED BEC D
ED/NEWS D
HD/NAD

SIR B ARMSTRONG
DIO

CABINET

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080900Z

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

FM WASHINGTON 072350Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE F-C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3324 OF 7 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN

YOUR TELNO 1593: SENATOR HATCH AND NORTHERN IRELAND

1. SENATOR HATCH WILL BE IN DUBLIN FROM 9 TO 12 NOVEMBER WITH THE SENATE DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY. HIS STAFF HAVE JUST TOLD US THAT HE INTENDS TO PAY A SHORT VISIT (WITHOUT THE REST OF THE DELEGATION) TO BELFAST ON 12 NOVEMBER, FOLLOWED BY A NIGHT IN LONDON. HE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET MR HURD EITHER IN BELFAST ON THE MORNING OF 12 NOVEMBER OR IN LONDON LATER THE SAME DAY (OR EARLY ON 13 NOVEMBER). HE HAS ASKED IF HE COULD ALSO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER WHILE IN LONDON.

2. HATCH HAS STILL NOT BEEN FINALLY DISSUADED FROM THE IDEA OF HOLDING A HEARING ON NORTHERN IRELAND. IN THREE SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS I AND MY STAFF HAVE PLANTED SUBSTANTIAL SEEDS OF DOUBT IN HIS MIND (MY TELNO 2654), AND I THINK HE SEES THIS VISIT AS A MEANS OF LETTING HIMSELF OFF THE HOOK. IF WE CAN BRIEF HIM AT A SUITABLY SENIOR LEVEL IN BELFAST AND LONDON, I AM REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THIS WILL DO THE TRICK.

3. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT MR HURD WILL BE ABLE TO SEE HIM AND

3. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT MR HURD WILL BE ABLE TO SEE HIM AND IMPRESS UPON HIM OUR CONCERN THAT HE SHOULD NOT PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS BY HOLDING A PUBLIC HEARING ON NORTHERN IRELAND. HATCH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FLATTERY, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE COULD ALSO BE GIVEN A SUITABLE MILITARY/ INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WHILE HE IS IN BELFAST.

4. I WOULD NOT NORMALLY SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD RECEIVE A SENATOR VISITING LONDON AT HIS OWN SUGGESTION AND ON HIS OWN. BUT IN VIEW OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND ANGLE, AND OF THE FACT THAT HATCH IS AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN HIS OWN RIGHT (CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE LABOUR COMMITTEE AND MEMBER OF THE BUDGET, JUDICIARY AND AGRICULTURE COMMITTEES), I RECOMMEND THAT SHE SHOULD AGREE TO SEE HIM. IT WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FINALLY TO NAIL THE NORTHERN IRELAND POINT (HATCH'S ACCOUNT, OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW CONGRESS MIGHT ALSO BE NOT WITHOUT INTEREST).

5. HATCH WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED IN BELFAST AND DUBLIN BY A SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, MICHAEL PILLSBURY. SINCE THEY ARE LEAVING FOR DUBLIN TOMORROW, PLEASE REPEAT REPLY TO DUBLIN SO THAT ANY MESSAGE CAN BE PASSED ON THERE.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO MARSHALL (NAD) AND CLARK (RID) IN FCO, AND LYON (NIO).

WRIGHT

NNNN

DD 080000 2 0 0

0400 1711



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: FORTHCOMING SUMMIT

The Prime Minister agrees generally with the arrangements for the Summit proposed in your minute A084/2949 of 5 November, notably the need to restrict attendance as closely as possible on both sides.

Subject to building work at Chequers being completed on time (which it should be), the Prime Minister will invite the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and Mr Barry to stay overnight at Chequers, as well as the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. Other members of both delegations will need to find accommodation in hotels locally or return to London.

I have not yet consulted the Prime Minister on whether she will wish to give a press conference on her return to London at the end of the Summit. Mr Ingham's advice is that she should.

I shall be writing to the departments concerned about the arrangements. I attach the letter which I propose to send in case you have any comments.

Charles Powell

7 November 1984

A handwritten signature, possibly 'CP', in the bottom right corner of the page.

CO 8/xi

Prime Minister

25

SECRET AND PERSONAL

MR. POWELL

Agreed me

On this basis, I propose to invite the three Irish Ministers (FitzGerald, Barry + Spring) plus Geoffrey Howe and Douglas Hurd to stay overnight.

Anglo/Irish Summit

CO.D. 7/xi

I had a word with Miss Thomas at Chequers about the accommodation arrangements. She says that the two bathrooms on the top floor should be ready by 18 November. This means that the Prime Minister's three principal guests could be accommodated on the first floor, and the two Secretaries of State on the top floor. The only slight difficulty is that the person staying in the Prison Room has to pass through the Astley Rooms on the way in and out. But I doubt if this minor inconvenience would trouble the two Ministers concerned.

* These are the two top floor rooms.

Dms

Dms 2/3

7 November, 1984.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prison hall 24

1st floor: 3 suites with private bath

Top floor: 1 Prison room + bathroom

Attley Room: 1 bed + private bath

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Summit

It is now agreed that this will be at Chequers.

Sir Robert Armstrong has agreed with the Irish that it should start with a working dinner on the Sunday evening, with discussions on the Monday morning (most of them in highly restricted session), finishing with a working lunch.

Sir Robert Armstrong has also said that he is sure you would wish to invite Dr. FitzGerald to spend the night. The question arises whether you would also wish to invite any other members of the Irish or British delegations to stay overnight. On the Irish side possible candidates are the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister; on our side, Geoffrey Howe and Douglas Hurd.

Would you wish to invite any of them? If not, the Irish can be put up in hotels near-by and the British side can easily go back up to London.

C.D.P.

CDP
- Fiki

As you know - we only have 3 sets of guest rooms which have bath rooms but

One set has 2 bedrooms with one bathroom in between. There is a shower room opposite the

second bedroom of that set if that would be acceptable. Then we could

6 November 1984

Leahy-Doyler - provided a new bath room in complex



23

Ref. A084/2949

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Forthcoming Summit

↓ will attach if required.

As I reported briefly to you in the telegram which I sent to New Delhi, I put to Mr Nally the proposal that the forthcoming Summit meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach should be held at Chequers. They had no problem with this: indeed, my strong impression was that they welcomed it, on the grounds of the strains which a visit to Ireland would have imposed upon the Irish security forces.

2. I said that the Prime Minister proposed that the arrangements should be similar to those which were envisaged if she had visited Ireland. If the Taoiseach would like to come over on the Sunday evening, she would welcome him to a working dinner at Chequers and to stay the night. There could then be discussions on the morning of Monday 19 November, followed by a working lunch, which would conclude the proceedings. I presumed that there would be no joint press conference, though I recognised that the Taoiseach might wish to give his own press conference.

3. I said that the Prime Minister would be accompanied by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and that the officials present (apart from Private Secretaries) would probably be me and Mr Goodall, and Mr Andrew or Mr Brennan from the Northern Ireland Office. Mr Nally said that the Taoiseach would be accompanied by Mr Peter Barry, the Minister for External Affairs, and probably also by the Tanaiste, Mr Dick Spring. His officials would probably be Mr Nally, Mr Donlon and Mr Lillis. No doubt the two Ambassadors would also be present.



4. Mr Nally said that the Taoiseach would undoubtedly hope to spend as much time as possible tete-a-tete with the Prime Minister (tete-a-tete including Mr Nally and me and you). We thought that European Community matters might be discussed mainly between the two Foreign Ministers, and that the two Secretaries of State should meet Mr Spring and Mr Barry while the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach were holding their tete-a-tete meeting. Mr Nally said that for domestic political reasons the Taoiseach might ask that the Tanaiste should be present for the first five or ten minutes of his tete-a-tete with the Prime Minister (this has happened once or twice before); but it might well be that Mr Spring would not insist upon that.

5. I suggest that the organisation of the visit might now be put into the usual channels. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to decide whether she wishes to entertain anybody else at Chequers besides Dr FitzGerald. Mr Donlon indicated to me that they would probably like to put up those who did not stay at Chequers at hotels nearby; but there could be security difficulties about that, I suppose.

Rx
Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence.

5 November 1984

SECRET AND PERSONAL

hie.

ECLAAM

cc PC

22^A



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

Thank you for telegraphing the various documents emerging from your meeting with Mr Nally on 2/3 November to Delhi. The Prime Minister has considered them. I also passed copies to the Taoiseach.

Draft Communique

The Prime Minister is unable to accept points (i) and (iii) in the draft communique.

In her view, point (i) does not adequately reflect the emphasis of HMG's views on the future of Northern Ireland, but by putting the Irish aspiration first reads as though we are positively looking for ways to meet it. If this is the best that can be done by way of an attempt to express the views of the United Kingdom and Irish Governments in a single paragraph, she would prefer to see those views stated separately. The view of HMG that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, unless and until a majority of its inhabitants decide otherwise, which conclusion HMG would accept and implement, should be clearly stated. So too should the wish of the Irish Government that the two parts of Ireland should come together by freely negotiated agreement and in peace. The way matters are presented in your draft would, in the Prime Minister's view, cause resentment and unease among the Unionists which would

SECRET AND PERSONAL

greatly outweigh any benefit from the communique.

The problem with point (iii) is that the first sentence can clearly be interpreted as endorsing power-sharing, whatever it may be intended to mean. The Prime Minister does not wish to put her name to a Communique which appears to contain this implication.

To avoid any misunderstanding before or at the Summit, the Prime Minister would want you to let Mr Nally know straight away that these points are unacceptable to her and that amendments will be required. It is for consideration whether there should be further negotiation on them with the Irish before the Summit, or whether they should be reserved for the two Prime Minister's at the Summit itself.

Statement of Position

The Prime Minister has a number of additional comments on this.

She prefers the use of "United Kingdom Government" in place of "British Government" throughout.

She does not like the notion of informal consultation "on request" on matters where there is no formal right to consultation (paragraph 7).

She sees a risk that the phrase "acceptable system of devolved government" in paragraph 8 as giving a veto to both the Republic and to the Catholic minority.

She objects strongly to some of the ideas put forward by the Irish side, notably on the Ministerial Commission (paragraph 9), on the role of the Joint Security Commission (paragraph 12), and on practical policy measures (paragraph 14). These are of course unilateral Irish statements.

I am copying this minute to Graham Sandiford (Northern Ireland Office) and Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Charles Powell

5 November 1984

original

Copies 1-4
destroyed
CSF 6/11
FEL 6/11

Destroy after		
Register		
Received in Registry - 4 NOV 1984		
Desk Officer	Registry ACTION	
INDEX	PA	
	1	2 NONE
PRIORITY IMMEDIATE		

Handwritten mark

LUK 932/03

FDWGF109/03
DD 040200Z NEW DELHI

GRS 213
D E D I P
SECRET
PERSONAL

DESKBY 040200Z
FM FCO 032059Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 790 OF 3 NOVEMBER
INFO DUBLIN (WITHOUT FTS)
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM
ROBERT ARMSTRONG.

1. MIFTS CONTAIN
 - (1) TEXT OF BRITISH POSITION PAPER ON NORTHERN IRELAND AS AMENDED IN THE LIGHT OF OUR TALKS IN DUBLIN;
 - (2) TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PARAGRAPHS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AS REVISED AND AGREED DURING OUR TALKS IN DUBLIN AND REFERENDUM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH.
2. THE IRISH ARE NOT REPEAT NOT TELEGRAPHING THESE TEXTS TO THE TAOISEACH, BUT HOPE THAT COPIES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO DECLAN KELLY FOR THE TAOISEACH'S USE.
3. WE ARE SENDING THESE TEXTS FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. WE RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE TEXTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD AIT UNTIL THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH HAVE EACH BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS MATTERS FURTHER WITH THEIR OWN COLLEAGUES.
4. I HAVE AGREED WITH THE IRISH AT OFFICIAL LEVEL THE PROPOSED CHANGE OF VENUE FOR THE PPRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH. THE PROPOSAL WAS WELCOMED WITH SOME RELIEF. WE PROPOSED AND THEY AGREED STARTING WITH WORKING DINNER ON SUNDAY NIGHT, STAYING OVERNIGHT, AND CONCLUDING AFTER LUNCH ON MONDAY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY AGREED.

SECRET Prime Minister
Dr. Fitzgerald
has copies.

In the longer one,
I have side-lined the
new passages since you
last saw the document.
You will want to
consider the draft communiqué

CDP
4/11

Taoiseach agrees

HOWE
NNNN

SECRET

FDW F 001/04

Copies 2-5 destroyed
CST b/1
REL 6/11

IMMEDIATE

DD 040200Z NEW DELHI

GRS 3136
SECRET
DEDIP AND PERSONAL
DESKBY 040200Z
FM FCO 032100Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 791 OF 3 NOVEMBER

SECRET

ORIGINAL

Destroy after	
Register	
Received in Registry	
-4 NOV 1984	
Desk Officer	
INDEX	Registry ACTION
PRIORITY	2 NONE

M I P T :

NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH STATEMENT OF POSITION

1. THE AGREED PURPOSE OF THE CURRENT CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BRITISH AND IRISH OFFICIALS IS TO SEE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE HYPOTHETICALLY TO IDENTIFY A SET OF PROPOSALS ON WHICH BOTH SIDES MIGHT AGREE AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND, AS A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN THAT PROCESS, HELPING TO STRENGTHEN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN THE FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER AND IN THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF NORTHERN IRELAND. IT IS AGREED THAT THIS WILL NECESSARILY INVOLVE THE STRENGTHENING OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WITHIN THE EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.

2. IT IS ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES THAT THE DISCUSSIONS ARE EXPLORATORY, AND ARE BEING CONDUCTED WITHOUT COMMITMENT: AND THAT ANY SET OF PROPOSALS WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIED WILL BE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, EACH OF WHICH WILL HAVE TO MAKE ITS OWN JUDGEMENT ON WHETHER AND, IF SO, ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SET OF PROPOSALS MAY BE ACCEPTABLE.

3. IT IS ALSO ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES THAT ANY SET OF PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE AGREED UPON SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN PARA. 1 SEMICLN SHOULD BE DURABLE AND THUS REMOVE UNCERTAINTY SEMICLN AND TRANSPARENT, IN THE SENSE THAT IT SHOULD CONTAIN NO HIDDEN PROVISIONS AND NO FEATURES WHICH MIGHT GENERATE SUSPICIONS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE BORDER THAT THERE WERE HIDDEN PROVISIONS.

4. A FUNDAMENTAL IDEA EMERGING FROM THE DISCUSSIONS IS THAT THE PROPOSALS MIGHT BE BUILT ON TWO CENTRAL AND RECIPROCAL ELEMENTS: ON THE ONE HAND, ACTION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ACCORD THE IRISH GOVERNMENT A RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTE, ON A SYSTEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONALISED BASIS, TO THE CONSIDERATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF A RANGE OF POLICY MATTERS INCLUDING SECURITY AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT SEMICLN ON THE OTHER HAND, ACTION BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT FORMALLY TO REASSURE THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND: TO ACHIEVE THIS, THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED AS PART OF A BALANCED SET OF PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE PRESENT IRISH CONSTITUTION SO AS TO MAKE IT PLAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN ASPIRATION TO IRISH UNITY THERE IS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIM ON NORTHERN IRELAND. IT IS ALSO A PART OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK TO INTRODUCE A MEASURE OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND BASED ON AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY AND A NORTHERN IRELAND EXECUTIVE, AND THAT THIS WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

5. AS THE PRIME MINISTER MADE CLEAR IN HER CONVERSATION WITH THE TAOISEACH ON 3 SEPTEMBER, ANY QUESTION OF JOINT AUTHORITY IS EXCLUDED: WHAT MIGHT BE ENVISAGED IS A FORMAL OBLIGATION ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONSULT AND A RIGHT FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO BE CONSULTED. THE (FOLLOWING TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) IRISH SIDE WHILE ACCEPTING THE BRITISH POSITION THAT THE ULTIMATE POWER OF DECISION WOULD CONTINUE TO LIE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, BELIEVES THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR INVOLVING THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN THE AFFAIRS OF NORTHERN IRELAND MUST BE SUCH AS TO GIVE IT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MAKING A SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMULATION OF POLICY, INCLUDING SECURITY POLICY. THE (FOLLOWING TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) BRITISH SIDE ENVISAGES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT A FORMAL OBLIGATION TO ALLOW THE IRISH GOVERNMENT A RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMULATION OF POLICY ON AN AGREED RANGE OF MATTERS AND WOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS.

SOME
REWORDING
BUT
NO
MAJOR
CHANGES

IRISH TERRITORIAL CLAIM

6. THE IRISH SIDE ENVISAGES THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD, IF THE BALANCE IN THIS SET OF MEASURES WERE RIGHT, BE PREPARED TO EMBARK ON A REFERENDUM TO REPEAL ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE PRESENT IRISH CONSTITUTION AND TO REPLACE THESE TWO ARTICLES WITH WORDING WHICH WOULD: SUBSTITUTE AN ASPIRATION TO UNITY FOR WHAT IS NOW SEEN AS A TERRITORIAL CLAIM SEMICLN CONFIRM THAT VIOLENCE IN PURSUIT OF THAT ASPIRATION WAS ABSOLUTELY ABJURED SEMICLN AND EMPHASISE THAT THE ASPIRATION COULD NOT BE REALISED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY OF THE POEPL E OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

CONSULATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

4/c
7. THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT CONSULTATION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT WOULD NOT APPLY TO EXTERNAL DEFENCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR FINANCE, WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF INFORMAL CONSULTATION ON OCCASION AND ON REQUEST ON THESE MATTERS WOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. SIMILARLY THE RIGHT OF CONSULTATION WOULD NOT APPLY TO MATTERS WHICH HAD BEEN DEVOLVED TO A NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY OR EXECUTIVE. IN ADDITION TO SECURITY (WHICH IS TREATED SEPARATELY - SEE PARAGRAPHS 11-13 BELOW), THE RIGHT OF CONSULTATION WOULD IN PRINCIPLE APPLY TO ALL AREAS OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION WHICH DO NOT FALL INTO EITHER OF THE TWO FOREGOING CATEGORIES (DEFENCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FINANCE ON THE ONE HAND SEMICLN DEVOLVED MATTERS ON THE OTHER) AND WHICH FALL WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. EXAMPLES ADVANCED BY THE (FOLLOWING TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) IRISH SIDE TO WHICH THE RIGHT OF CONSULTATION SHOULD APPLY INCLUDE NOMINATIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO PUBLIC BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS AND TO ANY BODIES SET UP TO GIVE EFFECT TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS SEMICLN NOMINATIONS TO A DEVOLVED EXECUTIVE SEMICLN ISSUES AFFECTING THE IDENTITY OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (FLAGS AND EMBLEMS, THE USE OF THE IRISH LANGUAGE ETC.) SEMICLN AND BROADCASTING, POSTS AND COMMUNICATIONS.

veto?
8. BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT AN ACCEPTABLE SYSTEM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INTEGRAL TO THE SET OF PROPOSALS. THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED), HOWEVER, WOULD NOT WISH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE BLOCKED IF IT SHOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT UNDER WAY.

9. BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THAT THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATED IN CONSIDERATION OF MATTERS FALLING WITHIN THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED WOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL (AIIC). BUT THERE IS A DIVERGENCE OF VIEW ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY TO BE CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE. THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) WOULD WISH TO SEE A MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, COMPRISING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND A MEMBER OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT SEMICLN AND SEE THIS COMMISSION AS HAVING OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSIDERING ALL THE AREAS OF POLICY ENVISAGED, INCLUDING SECURITY. THE BRITISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE DESCRIBED AS A COMMISSION. IT ACCEPTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC WOULD APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (WHOSE STYLE AND TITLE WOULD BE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION) WHO WOULD HAVE SUPPORTING STAFF AND WITH WHOM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, AND ANY OFFICIALS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF OR SUBJECT TO HIS DIRECTION, WOULD CONSULT ON RELEVANT MATTERS. A LIAISON UNIT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT STORMONT TO MONITOR, COORDINATE AND ENCOURAGE CONTACTS WITH THE IRISH REPRESENTATIVE AND TO ACT AS A CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION WITH HIM. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE FREE TO CONTACT NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE MINISTERS OR DEPARTMENTS ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE.

10. THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS POINTED OUT THAT, IN THE EVENT THAT AN EXECUTIVE WERE FORMED, IT WOULD BE OF PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO HAVE A MECHANISM WHEREBY THE EXECUTIVE AND IRISH GOVERNMENT COULD CONSULT ON PRACTICAL MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

SECURITY

11. IT IS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A JOINT SECURITY COMMISSION (JSC) COMPRISING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND AN IRISH MINISTER, ASSISTED AS NECESSARY BY ADVISERS WHO MIGHT INCLUDE THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GARDA SIOCHANA OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS. IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT THE JSC SHOULD HAVE NO OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES: RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICE OPERATIONS WOULD REMAIN WITH THE HEADS OF THE RESPECTIVE POLICE FORCES.

12. THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) SEES THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JSC AS LIMITED TO NORTHERN IRELAND SEMICLN THE BRITISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED), WHILE ACCEPTING THAT MEASURES DISCUSSED IN THE JSC WOULD RELATE PRIMARILY TO NORTHERN IRELAND, BELIEVES THAT THERE SHOULD BE SCOPE FOR THE APPLICATION BY THE REPUBLIC OF SOME SUCH MEASURES WHERE THAT WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY COOPERATION. THE DIVERGENCE HERE, HOWEVER, RELATES ONLY TO THE QUESTION WHETHER JSC WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE FORUM IN WHICH TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION. THE IRISH SIDE (2 =294# 7, #34)8, 3#) AGREES THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE APPROPRIATE (THOUGH NOT WITHIN THE JSC) AND AGREES ALSO THAT MEASURES DISCUSSED IN THE JSC IN RELATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND MIGHT AT TIMES BE SUCH THAT THEY COULD APPROPRIATELY AND USEFULLY BE APPLIED ALSO IN THE SOUTH EITHER IN THE INTERESTS OF SECURITY COOPERATION OR FOR OTHER REASONS. THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) SEES THE MINISTERIAL COMPONENT IN THE JSC AS COMPRISING THEIR PROPOSED MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (I.E. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND PLUS THE IRISH REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND) AND THE JSC ITSELF AS HAVING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY POLICY GUIDELINES, INCLUDING OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE PRISON SERVICES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IN THE APPOINTMENT ON THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE POLICE FORCE AND THE PRISON SERVICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF POLICE AND PRISON OFFICERS, AND IN THE APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF BOARDS OF VISITORS FOR THE PRISONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

13. THE BRITISH SIDE, (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) WHILE ACCEPTING THAT THE JSC WOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AIC, SEES ITS MINISTERIAL COMPONENT AS COMPRISING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRISH MINISTER FOR JUSTICE (WHO IS RESPONSIBLE IN THE REPUBLIC FOR LAW AND ORDER) AND ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION AS BEING TO IMPROVE SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. THE BRITISH SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT THE JSC'S INITIAL WORK PROGRAMME SHOULD COVER SUCH MATTERS AS E.G. THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE, TECHNICAL COOPERATION (IN TRAINING, FORENSIC MATTERS AND THE CONTROL OF EXPLOSIVES), THE EXCHANGE OF PERSONNEL, JOINT INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS, THE PLANNING OF COORDINATED OPERATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION DESIGNED TO AFFIRM THE POSITION OF THE POLICE AS AN ACCEPTED PART OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY. (THIS WORK PROGRAMME OVERLAPS TO SOME EXTENT WITH THE PROPOSITIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) AND REQUIRES FURTHER DISCUSSION.)

PRACTICAL POLICING MEASURES

14. BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THAT (A) THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICING ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND SHOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED SEMICLN AND (B) MEASURES ARE IN PRINCIPLE NEEDED TO HELP THE MINORITY COMMUNITY TO IDENTIFY WITH AND SUPPORT THE POLICE TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN AT PRESENT. THE BRITISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS PROPOSED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE RECRUITMENT OF CATHOLICS INTO THE RUC AND IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RUC AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES. WHILE WELCOMING THESE PROPOSALS, THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) IS STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT THEY DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH, AND THAT EARLY AND VISIBLE MEASURES, INCLUDING SOME CHANGE IN THE RUC, ARE NEEDED IN ORDER TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM THE MINORITY COMMUNITY, ONE SUGGESTION THAT THEY HAVE PUT FORWARD TO THAT END IS THE IDEA THAT PREDOMINANTLY NATIONALIST AREAS SHOULD BE POLICED PRIMARILY BY PEOPLE DRAWN FROM THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY AND, MORE BROADLY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCALLY BASED POLICE FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH OBJECTIONS, THE IRISH HAVE ASKED WHETHER ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS KIND MIGHT BE INTRODUCED AND ANNOUNCED AS BEING ON A TEMPORARY BASIS - E.G. FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE TO TEN YEARS - WITH THE AVOWED PURPOSE OF RESTORING MINORITY CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICE FORCE. A SUGGESTION FROM THE BRITISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) TO ESTABLISH JOINT REGIONAL CRIME SQUADS WHICH WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN EITHER JURISDICTION HAS NOT FOUND FAVOUR WITH THE IRISH SIDE (2 WORDS UNDERLINED) AS PART OF THE INITIAL PROPOSALS SEMICLN BUT THE IRISH WOULD NOT OBJECT TO IT AS A POSSIBLE SUBJECT FOR STUDY BY THE PROPOSED JOINT SECURITY COMMISSION AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE.

15. IN GENERAL, IT IS ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES THAT PRACTICAL POLICING ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ONE OF THE KEY AREAS IN ANY SET OF PROPOSALS BUT THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION, INVOLVING EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES, IS NEEDED IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH WHETHER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT.

MIXED LAW COURTS

16. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS SUGGESTED THAT PERSONS TRIED WHETHER IN NORTHERN IRELAND OR IN THE REPUBLIC FOR TERRORIST CRIMES MIGHT BE TRIED BY A SINGLE COURT COMPRISING THREE JUDGES FOR EACH CASE. THESE WOULD BE DRAWN FROM A PANEL OF JUDGES HALF OF WHOM WOULD BE FROM EACH JURISDICTION. WHEN SITTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ONE OF THE THREE JUDGES WOULD BE FROM THE REPUBLIC AND THE COURT WOULD EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION UNDER THE LAW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. WHEN SITTING IN THE REPUBLIC, ONE OF THE THREE JUDGES WOULD BE FROM NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE COURT WOULD EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION UNDER THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS AGREED THAT THE FEASIBILITY OF MIXED COURTS SHOULD BE EXAMINED AND A NUMBER OF IMPLICATIONS HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY EXPLORED. BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT THE STUDY OF THESE IDEAS SHOULD CONTINUE, BUT THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS EMPHASISED THAT THE FORMULATION AND OPERATION OF ANY SCHEME WOULD REQUIRE THE COOPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND JUDICIARY, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN CONSULTED.

ALL-IRELAND LAW COMMISSION

17. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS SUGGESTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALL-IRELAND LAW COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WHETHER THERE ARE AREAS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, APPLYING RESPECTIVELY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC, WHICH COULD BE HARMONISED WITH ADVANTAGE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. THE BRITISH PROPOSALS ENVISAGE THAT THE COMMISSION'S FIRST TASK WOULD BE TO DEFINE THE AREAS TO WHICH HARMONISATION WOULD APPLY AND THEREAFTER TO AGREE ON JOINT MACHINERY FOR STUDYING THOSE AREAS AND PUTTING FORWARD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS WELCOMED THE BRITISH SUGGESTIONS AND HAS PROPOSED IN ADDITION THAT THE COMMISSION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEVISE PROPOSALS FOR THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH THE FOLLOWING:

- A SINGLE CRIMINAL COURT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A JURY WHICH COULD BE SELECTED ON AN ALL-IRELAND BASIS:
- A SINGLE COURT BOTH FOR THE NORTH AND FOR THE SOUTH WHICH WOULD HAVE SOLE JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOTH JURISDICTIONS:
- A COMMON LEGAL REGIME IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
- A SINGLE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE ALL-IRELAND COURT:
- A UNIFORM CRIMINAL LAW FOR THE TWO JURISDICTIONS.

THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNNERLINED) HAS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS PARTICULARLY SO FAR AS THEY RELATE TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

AN ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY BODY

18. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) BELIEVES THAT A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY BODY OF THE KIND ADUMBRATED IN THE ANGLO-IRISH

THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS PARTICULARLY SO FAR AS THEY RELATE TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

AN ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY BODY

SECRET

18. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) BELIEVES THAT A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY BODY OF THE KIND ADUMBRATED IN THE ANGLO-IRISH STUDIES REPORT OF NOVEMBER 1981 COULD BE A USEFUL ELEMENT IN ANY SET OF PROPOSALS. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) BELIEVES THAT ANY SUCH BODY SHOULD EVOLVE PRAGMATICALLY FROM THE EXISTING ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY CONTACTS. THERE HAS BEEN NO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITIES: BUT THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE IDEA THAT A START COULD BE MADE BY SYSTEMATISING THE EXISTING CONTACTS AND MAKING PROVISION FOR MORE REGULAR MEETINGS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULTATIVE BODY: THIS COULD RECEIVE REPORTS FROM EACH GOVERNMENT ON THE PROGRESS OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: AND COULD ITSELF MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF THE TWO SOVEREIGN PARLIAMENTS WHICH, TOGETHER WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, WOULD THEN BE FREE TO ACT ON THEM.

BILL OF RIGHTS

19. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) WISHES TO SEE THE ENACTMENT OF A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND BELIEVES THAT THIS WOULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT SYMBOLIC AND POLITICAL VALUE IN SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY AND THE SDLP FOR ANY AGREED SET OF MEASURES. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ALL THE UNIONIST PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE SDLP NOW FAVOUR SUCH A PROPOSAL SEMICLN AND SUGGEST THAT THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE TO INCORPORATE THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTO NORTHERN IRELAND LAW. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE IRISH PROPOSAL, WHILE DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES INCLUDING THE IMPLICWTIONS FOR THE REST OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

DEVOLUTION

20. AS NOTED ABOVE, BOTH SIDES ARE AGREED THAT A SYSTEM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND BASED ON AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY AND ON A NORTHERN IRELAND EXECUTIVE WOULD BE INOEGRAL TO THE PROPOSALS DISCUSSED IN THIS NOTE. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND WOULD DEPEND UPON THE COOPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SUPPORT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) BELEIVES THAT THE SDLP AND THE MINORITY COMMUNITY WOULD REQUIRE THIS SYSTEM TO BE ESTABLISHED ON A POWER-SHARING BASIS. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) BELIEVES THAT THE UNIONISTS WOULD OPPOSE THIS SEMICLN THAT THEY WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS SEMICLN AND THAT INVOLVING THE REPUBLIC IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE PROVINCE ON THE BASIS PROPOSED WOULD INTENSIFY THE HOSTILITY OF THE UNIONISTS TO ANY FORM OF POWER-SHARING. THE IRISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS SUGGESTED THAT UNIONIST OBJECTIONS MIGHT BE OVERCOME IF THE FUNCTIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN A DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN WHICH BOTH COMMUNITIES WERE REPRESENTED WERE TO BE EXERCISED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND OR BY ANOTHER MINISTER, WHO WOULD THUS PROVIDE A VISIBLE ASSURANCE OF CONTINUING UNITED KINGDOM AUTHORITY OVER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVICE. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS EXPRESSED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH, HOWEVER, REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR FURTHER STUDY.

SECRET

SECRET

WHO WOULD THUS PROVIDE A VISIBLE ASSURANCE OF CONTINUING UNITED KINGDOM AUTHORITY OVER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS EXPRESSED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH, HOWEVER, REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR FURTHER STUDY.

LEGAL BASIS FOR ANY ACCORD BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

21. THE BRITISH SIDE (WORDS UNDERLINED) HAS SAID THAT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IS PREMATURE. IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED FOR PURPOSES OF THE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, THAT THE MEASURES AGREED ON WOULD BE SPELT OUT IN A FORMAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE A STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES AGREED ON. THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE RATIFIED BY BOTH PARLIAMENTS AND REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND IT WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE ONLY AFTER ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN AMENDED FOLLOWING A REFERENDUM. LEGISLATION WOULD BE REQUIRED IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

HOWE

COMMS NOTE UNDERLINING IS IRISH SIDE OR BRITISH SIDE THROUGHOUT
NNNN

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

November 1984

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: FORTHCOMING SUMMIT

I wrote to you about the arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit on 5 October. Since then there have been changes. This letter sets out the new plan.

The Summit will now be held at Chequers on 18/19 November. It will start with a working dinner at Chequers at 1930 on 18 November and end with a working lunch on 19 November. It is not yet known whether the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach will wish to see the press in London at the end of the Summit. If they do, they will give separate press conferences.

Neither the dates nor the location of the Summit will be announced in advance. Every effort should be made to keep this information confidential.

Attendance at the Summit will be very restricted. The Irish side will, we are told, consist of the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste, Mr Barry, Mr Nally, Mr Donlon, Mr Lillis and the Irish Ambassador. The UK side will consist of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Goodall, Mr Andrew or Mr Brennan and HM Ambassador Dublin. In practice most of the discussions will be tête-à-tête between the two Prime Ministers, Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally. A parallel meeting between the two Secretaries of State, the Tanaiste and Mr Barry might be held on the Monday morning to consider matters not being discussed by the two Prime Ministers.

The Prime Minister intends to invite the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and Mr Barry from the Irish side and the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary on the UK side to spend the night at Chequers. Officials will either need to find accommodation in hotels locally or return to London after dinner on Sunday.

I am copying this letter to Graham Sandiford in the Northern Ireland Office and Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Charles Powell

L V Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SUBJECT

JURANKY

bc PC



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1984

EC/ACP NEGOTIATIONS: SIZE OF EDF VI

The Taoiseach travelled back from Mrs. Gandhi's funeral in Delhi in the Prime Minister's aircraft. During the journey he raised with her the size of EDF VI.

The Taoiseach said that it had always been clear that a settlement with the ACP could not be achieved at a figure of 7bn ecu. But he was confident that with just a small extra effort on the part of the Community the Lomé III negotiations could be concluded satisfactorily and without rancour. The sum he had in mind was 7.3bn ecu. He was confident that all other member states of the Community could accept this. He had discussed the matter with Herr Genscher in Delhi and had been assured that Germany would fall in with a consensus on this figure. He very much hoped, therefore, that the Prime Minister would also agree.

The Prime Minister said that on no account would she agree. She regarded 7bn ecu as a very fair offer to the ACP and saw no reason why it should be improved. If others wanted to give more then they were of course at liberty to do so. But it must be clear that there was absolutely no question of any further increase in the British contribution. Our bilateral aid programme was already under severe strain and we were substantial net contributors to the Community. She was simply not prepared to find more money for the EDF.

The Taoiseach made several gallant attempts to persuade the Prime Minister differently, but without success. The Prime Minister repeated with increasing firmness that there was no question of our paying more. It was up to those countries who wanted to see a bigger EDF to contribute to it if that was how they wished to spend their aid funds. The

tactics employed by the ACP were familiar and there was no reason for the Community to fall for them. The Taoiseach concluded, ruefully, that he now faced a major and very difficult problem.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Peretz (HM Treasury) and to Michael McCulloch (ODA).

(C.D. POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JKRAKY

