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PREM 19/1432

Part 2

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Confidential Filing

Internal Situation
UK/Cypriot Relations

CYPRUS

Part 1 February 1980

Part 2 December 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
1.12.83		15/6/84		27.11.84		20/3/85	
1.12.83		19.6.84		28.11.84		27.3.85	
7.12.83		2.7.84		10.12.84		12.4.85	
6.12.83		12.7.84		11.12.84		24.4.85	
13.12.83		24.7.84		12.12.84		15.5.85	
13.12.83		28.8.84		31.85		31.5.85	
15.12.83		10.9.84		18.1.85		ENDS	
20.12.83		11.9.84		21.1.85			
9.1.84		13.9.84		22.1.85			
15.1.84		19.9.84		24.1.85			
		20.9.84		26.1.85			
17.2.84		25.9.84		29.1.85			
22.2.84		27/9/84		30.1.85			
5.3.84		10.10.84		31.1.85			
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1.5.84		23.10.84		12.2.85			
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17.5.84		26.10.84		22.2.85			
21.5.84		12.11.84		25.2.85			
		15.11.84		12.3.85			
		20.11.84		14.3.85			

PART 2 ends:-

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to pm 31.5.85

PART 3 begins:-

Lady Young to FCS 4.7.85.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(85) 3 rd Meeting, item 2	24/01/1985
CC(84) 41 st Meeting, item 2	13/12/1984
CC(84) 19 th Meeting, item 2	17/05/1984
CC(84) 18 th Meeting, item 2	10/05/1984
CC(84) 17 th Meeting, item 2	03/05/1984
CC(84) 16 th Meeting, item 2	26/04/1984
CC(83) 36 th Meeting, item 2	08/12/1983
CC(83) 35 th Meeting, item 2	01/12/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 08/01/2014

PREM Records Team

Office of The London Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus



Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti
Londra Temsilciliği

28 Cockspur Street, London, SW1Y 5BN
Tel. 01-839 5217, 01-839 5530
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Date: 31st May, 1985

Our Ref: 153/186/TF/yhi


Your Ref:

R7/6

Dear
Prime Minister,

Please copy to
FCO under my comp.
Do NOT acknowledge or
otherwise reply. CDT 10/6

Enclosed please find text of a letter by H.E. Mr. Necati
Munir Ertekun, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, dated 17th May, 1985 and
addressed to the U.N. Secretary General, outlining the Turkish
Cypriot viewpoint on the recent constitutional referendum of the
TRNC as well as the forthcoming Presidential and General Elections
due in June, 1985.


Tansel Fikri,

London Representative,
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

ENCS.

17 May, 1985

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 3 May 1985, addressed to you by Mr. George Iacovou, the "Minister for Foreign Affairs" of the Greek Cypriot administration, and its attachments, circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/39/893-S/17150).

The said letter, addressed to you on the eve of the constitutional referendum, recently held in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on 5th May 1985, levels unfounded and unwarranted accusations against the Turkish Cypriot side, and attempts to discredit, in the eyes of the world public opinion, the internal democratic processes which are taking place in north Cyprus. These Greek Cypriot charges include, among other things, the alleged "illegality" of our internal actions and in fact put particular emphasis on this unfounded claim. It is ironic that the Greek Cypriot administration should bring up this subject at all, as it is clearly the least eligible institution to question the legality of others, both with its past record and present standing.

It is evident that the Greek Cypriots never had and still do not have any constitutional, legal or legitimate right whatsoever to claim to represent the Turkish Cypriot people. All attempts to the contrary are devoid of any legitimacy or legality. It is also evident that in the absence of a joint Federal Government, the Turkish Cypriot people can only be represented by the authorities and organs elected freely by themselves.

In this connection, I wish to reiterate to Your Excellency, once more, that the Greek Cypriot administration's claim to be the sole and legitimate "Government of Cyprus" is incompatible with :

(a) the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, which provided for the participation of both peoples of Cyprus in the governmental process and the entire state machinery, and which has been abrogated and utterly destroyed by the Greek Cypriots themselves since 1963, for the purpose of annexing Cyprus to Greece.

(b) the existence, after 1963, of two separate, autonomous administrations in the island, following the expulsion by force of arms of the Turkish Cypriot element from the legitimate bi-national Cyprus government.

(c) the Geneva declaration of 30 July 1974, made jointly by Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom (the three guarantors of Cyprus' independence), which recognized the existence of two separate, autonomous administrations in the island.

(d) the summit agreements of 1977 and 1979, reached between the leaders of the two peoples, which envisage the establishment in the island of an independent, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic, and

(e) the present realities prevailing in Cyprus, i.e. the existence of two separate, independent states, each exercising control and jurisdiction over its own people and in its own territory in the island, pending the establishment of a

bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic.

The Turkish Cypriot side is not only committed to the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, within the above framework, but it has also demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill in this respect, again, most recently, at the 17-20 January summit held in New York under Your Excellency's auspices, I would like to reiterate here, that this commitment of the Turkish Cypriot side to a bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal solution in Cyprus has not changed.

It is unfortunate, that the sincerity and goodwill demonstrated by the Turkish Cypriot side in regard to a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal solution, has not been reciprocated by the Greek Cypriot side, as it has also become very clear from the internal political crisis, which has developed on the Greek Cypriot side following the New York summit, although the internal political developments which are taking place on the Greek Cypriot side are not the concern of the Turkish Cypriot side, it appears that Mr. Kyprianou has lost the confidence and support of the political parties which represent the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot people in the Greek Cypriot "House of Representatives". Naturally, this raises questions as to whether Mr. Kyprianou or, for that matter, anybody else, on the Greek Cypriot side, has the authority or the competence to represent the Greek Cypriot people vis-a-vis the Turkish Cypriot side.

On the other hand, in Greece, the government of Prime Minister Papandreou, has decided on early elections, citing the Cyprus issue as the reason. Replying to Mr. Papandreou's letter asking for the dissolution of the Greek Parliament and the holding of General Elections, the Greek President, Mr. Sartzetakis, is reported to have said that the renewal of the popular mandate would serve the more effective advancement of their "national positions on the Cyprus issue" which was of vital significance for "the future of Hellenism".

At a time when the internal political climate on the Greek Cypriot side is in a state of confusion and uncertainty, it is difficult to understand why the Greek Cypriot administration, instead of trying to put its own house in order, tries to raise question about the internal democratic processes which are taking place on the Turkish Cypriot side. What the Turkish Cypriot people are currently engaged in, is no more than an internal matter for them, of electing the people who will be authorized to represent them in all matters of state, including the negotiations aimed at finding a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. As Your Excellency is well aware, the right of each community in Cyprus to hold separate elections was provided for, even by the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, and is, therefore, not a new phenomenon in Cyprus. Both communities have exercised this right separately, before and after 1974. As far as the Turkish Cypriot side is concerned, this right was exercised twice before 1974, once in 1960 and once in 1970, and twice after 1974, once in 1976 and once in 1981, in presidential as well as general elections. In addition, a constitutional referendum was held on the constitution of the then "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975.

I would like to point out that, if the Greek Cypriot side insists, via third parties, on interfering with these internal democratic procedures in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it only lends more weight to questions about whether there is anyone on the Greek Cypriot side with the full mandate of the Greek Cypriot people to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots, with a view to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. Indeed, questions raised by the political and constitutional turmoil which exists amongst the Greek Cypriot side, have also been expressed by the world press.- For example, "The Times" of London, in its issue of 4 May 1985, dealt with this subject in article entitled "one island, two constitutions", stating that the "Greek Cypriots, in any case, are ill-placed to criticize the draft (Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) since on their side of the island the constitution has produced political deadlock".

In spite of the above, and the internationally acknowledged fact that it was Mr. Kyprianou who was solely responsible for the breakdown of the 17 January summit and the squandering of a historic opportunity for a solution in Cyprus, the temptation, on the part of the Greek Cypriot side, to push ahead with its international campaign of deceitful propaganda, appears to be too difficult to resist. This is evidenced by the references in Mr. Iacovou's above-mentioned letter, among others, to the alleged "separatist independence" and "tacit moratorium" as well as by his lip-service to the "high-level agreements" of 1977 and 1979 and to Your Excellency's Mission of Good Offices. It was Mr. Kyprianou himself, who prevented the reconfirmation of the 1977 and 1979 summit agreements and the creation of an atmosphere of "political truce" between the two sides, together with all other aspects of the "draft agreement", by rejecting this agreement in toto at the summit meeting of 17 January. It was also he, who hindered and undermined the efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General, which the Secretary-General has undertaken within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the U.N. Security Council.

Now, Mr. Kyprianou, just because he feels it is politically convenient for him, is trying to separate certain elements of the "draft agreement", which was an integrated whole, from that indivisible whole and use them against the Turkish Cypriot side. These and the other factors which I have explained above, clearly show that Mr. Kyprianou has not at all recovered from the malady which has afflicted him all along, namely, his preference for international propaganda rather than serious dialogue. In fact, in a revealing statement to the "Tanjug" Press Agency of Yugoslavia, reported by the Greek Cypriot Press on 11 February 1985, Mr. Kyprianou attempted to justify his rejection of the "draft agreement" in January by pointing out that his acceptance would have diminished and weakened Greek Cypriot propaganda.

The Greek Cypriot side has to make a choice between honesty and false propaganda. It cannot go on exploiting the Cyprus question, as it has been doing, and continues to do, in the international fora such as the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, Unesco, European Commission on Human Rights and the non-aligned meetings, and still claim that it is the Turkish Cypriot side which is harming the atmosphere between the two peoples of Cyprus. It cannot continue to enforce its inhuman

economic and political embargo on the Turkish Cypriot side, under its false and pretentious title, as the "Government" of the whole Cyprus, and still pretend that it is seeking rapprochement and ultimately a federal solution with the Turkish Cypriots, this short-sighted and self-destructive policy removes any vestiges of trust and confidence between the two communities and does not at all enhance prospects for a final solution.

As I had also amply explained in my letter dated 3 January 1985, addressed to Your Excellency (Appendix 1), the democratic institutionalisation process currently taking place in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, does not hinder, but rather enhances prospects for a bi-zonal federal solution in Cyprus, as a concrete manifestation of this reality, the constituent assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the very same day that it had adopted the new draft constitution, had simultaneously passed a resolution, on 12 March 1985, stressing that the new draft constitution left the door open to a bi-zonal federal solution. Appendix 11). The Turkish Cypriot side's firm commitment to a bi-zonal federal solution in Cyprus has also been repeatedly stressed at the highest level, by the statements made by President Rauf Denktas on numerous occasions, and has, therefore, been reconfirmed as the official policy of the Turkish Cypriot side.

I should be grateful if this letter was circulated as a document of the Thirty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly, under Item 42, and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Necati Munir Ertekun
Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Defence".



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 May 1985

Dear Charles,

Cyprus

The Foreign Secretary recently spoke to the Prime Minister about Cyprus. You may find the following round-up helpful.

As explained in the Foreign Secretary's note of 24 April to the Prime Minister (copy attached), UN Secretariat attention has now turned again to Denktash, in the wake of Kyprianou's acceptance of the Secretary-General's revised "documentation" on 6 April.

This "documentation" is, of course, the basis on which Sr Perez de Cuellar hopes to restart the process stalled at the January New York meeting. The UN appear to accept that Denktash is unlikely to accept the documentation unconditionally before the completion of his elections ("Presidential" on 9 June, "Parliamentary" on 23 June). But the Secretary-General has told him that he wants to be able to record at least some progress in his six-monthly report to the Security Council prior to the UNFICYP mandate renewal on 15 June.

Denktash, if not explicitly cooperating with this approach, at least seems not actually to be seeking to sabotage it. Instead of carrying out his threat not to engage in any negotiations until after 23 June, he has written to the Secretary-General seeking "clarification" of some points in the new documentation. There must be an element of gamesmanship in this but there is also reason to believe that Denktash is genuinely uncertain as to whether he and Kyprianou are being invited to address the same documents.

While the new documents (none of which we have officially seen) appear to be substantially similar to those submitted to the January high-level meeting, we believe there is enough that is different in them to provide useful ammunition for Denktash, should he wish to make difficulties. In particular the status and content of a draft statement (an entirely new

/document



document) which the Secretary-General would make on the announcement of an agreement is still not clear to us nor, apparently, to the Greek or Turkish Cypriots.

Meanwhile Denktash has pressed forward with his constitution-building. The referendum on his new draft constitution was held on 5 May. The 70 per cent turn-out and 70 per cent approval of the draft was something of a disappointment to him, a fact being pressed hard by the Greek Cypriots. But their overall reaction to the Referendum has been restrained. Hints of recourse to the Security Council have been made only to be dismissed. They welcomed our comments on the referendum while complaining that the US reaction should have been "clearer". Our line was essentially that as we did not recognise the TRNC we would not recognise any new constitution, and we repeated our support for the UN Secretary-General.

Since the Foreign Secretary minuted to the Prime Minister on 24 April we have at the Secretary-General's request told the Turks that we hoped Denktash would be encouraged to give the Secretary-General a helpful response to his request for early progress. We made a similar approach to Denktash, who took it well. The Secretary-General has since asked us, the US and the FRG for support in his efforts to convince the Turks that the changes made in the documentation are balanced and do not alter the principles previously agreed. We do not believe we can credibly carry out this request without having seen the documents, even if we wanted to become engaged in points of detail, which we do not. The Foreign Secretary plans to send a message during the course of next week to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Halefoglu, to prepare the ground for a meeting with him in Lisbon on 6-7 June.

While the Turks are arguing in public that nothing more can be done until after 23 June, we believe they are also encouraging Denktash to keep lines open to the Secretary-General. They have hinted to us that after June Denktash will behave. Despite an outburst by the new Greek President, Sartzetakis, to our retiring Ambassador, Cyprus still has not emerged as an issue in the Greek elections (due on 2 June). There is thus a reasonable chance of some progress after 23 June.


*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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15 MAY 1985





PM/85/36

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
 C.D.P. 24/7.
 (2)

mr

Cyprus

1. Following our recent discussion about developments in the UN Secretary-General's initiative on Cyprus, I thought I should let you know how I propose to take matters forward in the light of President Kyprianou's private acceptance of the Secretary-General's revised documentation.

2. The Secretary-General has told the Americans, Germans and ourselves that he expects "soon" to ask us to help in ensuring that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side now accept the slight revisions to the documentation which he has negotiated with the Greek Cypriots following their rejection of the original documentation in January. This would enable Perez de Cuellar's initiative to proceed. The Turks' initial reaction appears reasonably positive. But they have made plain that Denktash cannot be expected to take substantive decisions until after his round of referendum and elections, designed to consolidate the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", are completed in late June. The Secretary-General, we and the Americans agree that it would be very difficult to prevail on either the Turks or Denktash to postpone or cancel these plans. Indeed I consider that pressure on them to do so would be likely to be counter-productive. But there is a risk that Kyprianou will use these constitutional developments to engage in criticism of Denktash which itself could jeopardise the process, or even more damaging, possibly seek to re-open his own acceptance of the new documentation.

He has
 now
 asked
 C.D.P.



3. Thus the considered Turkish response to the revised documentation and Kyprianou's reaction to the developments in the north are likely to colour the Secretary-General's plans on how next to proceed. His current preference is for working groups of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to meet under UN auspices before the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections on 23 June and for another high-level meeting to take place shortly thereafter. But he may consider it prudent to proceed even more slowly until after 23 June, with just the minimum activity to avoid a vacuum.

4. Against this background, another approach to the Turks or Denktash will need to be carefully handled if it is to be effective. This may be a factor in the Secretary-General's own delay in making a specific request for us for support.

5. But, depending on the Secretary-General's request and on other developments, I have in mind sending a personal message to the Turkish Foreign Minister, couched in friendly terms, expressing our appreciation of the Turks' constructive role so far, and seeking confirmation of their willingness to press Denktash not to resile on earlier agreement. I would then follow up with him when I see Halefoglu in Lisbon at the North Atlantic Council on 6-7 June.

6. Depending on Kyprianou's reaction to events, it may also prove necessary to encourage him again to avoid actions threatening Perez de Cuellar's game plan. Indeed, the Secretary-General may ask us to do so. Certainly whilst it is welcome

/that

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that he has finally accepted the revised documentation
we are a long way from the stage at which we can
consider any sort of congratulatory message to him.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
24 April, 1985

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 17 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA

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YOUR TELNO 126: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. MR RENTON SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TODAY. CYPRUS OCCUPIED MORE THAN HALF OF THE DISCUSSION.

DETAIL

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE A SHORT ACCOUNT OF HIS EFFORTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR. NOW THAT KYPRIANOU HAD FINALLY ACCEPTED THE DOCUMENTATION DENKTASH, WHO WAS IN A COMFORTABLE POSITION, WAS LIKELY TO REFUSE TO CONFIRM HIS OWN ACCEPTANCE OF LAST JANUARY. IN ANY CASE HE WOULD NOT WANT TO DO SO UNTIL THE REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS IN THE 'TRNC' HAD BEEN COMPLETED. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WANTED, WITH HELP FROM THE UK, US AND FRG, TO PERSUADE DENKTASH TO LEAVE HIS CONCESSIONS OF JANUARY ON THE TABLE, COMPLETE HIS CYCLE OF REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS, AND THEN AGREE TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IN WORKING GROUPS. ONE OF THE POINTS ON WHICH REAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES WAS STILL NECESSARY WAS THE QUALITY OF THE LAND TO BE RESTORED TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR INDICATED THAT SOME OF THE DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUPS MIGHT BEGIN BEFORE THE REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS, BUT THAT A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER THAT.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HAD NO REACTION SO FAR FROM TURKMEN FOLLOWING HIS APPEAL TO OZAL DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR, WHO WAS IN A BULLISH MOOD, EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS ON CYPRUS. GIVEN THE EFFORT THAT HE HAD MADE WITH KYPRIANOU OVER THE LAST 14 MONTHS, THE FACT THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED IN CYPRUS ITSELF SINCE DENKTASH'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCUMENTATION, AND THE FACT THAT FAILURE WOULD

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UNDERMINE HIS EFFORTS HE WAS DETERMINED NOT TO LET DENKTASH OFF THE HOOK. A CYPRUS SOLUTION HAD NEVER BEEN CLOSER. HE REITERATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO VISIT CYPRUS, BUT NOT IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD SIMPLY MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT.

5. MR RENTON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SPOKE EXTREMELY WARMLY OF THE UK'S ASSISTANCE, BOTH DIPLOMATICALLY AND THROUGH UNFICYP. WHEN ASKED BY MR RENTON SPECIFICALLY IF THERE WAS ANYTHING MORE THAT WE SHOULD DO HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED OURSELVES, THE US AND THE FRG FOR HELP. THIS IS AT VARIANCE WITH HIS LINE WITH ME ON 12 APRIL (MY TELNO 292). WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED WITH HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT, DE SOTO, WHO WAS PRESENT ON BOTH OCCASIONS, THAT WE SHALL INDEED BE RECEIVING THE WRITTEN DETAILS HE PROMISED ME ON 12 APRIL AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO BAT WITH THE TURKS UNTIL WE RECEIVE THEM.

THOMSON

CYPRUS

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PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR WESTON

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UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 292: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

DENKTASH'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPROACH THROUGH HOLGER.

1. HOLGER CALLED ON DENKTASH THIS MORNING (16 APRIL) ON INSTRUCTIONS TO HAND OVER A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL ENCLOSED THE TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE LETTER WAS DRAFTED TACTFULLY TO AVOID DIRECT REFERENDE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS AND SO AS NOT TO APPEAR TO IMPOSE DEADLINES. ON PROCEDURE HT SUGGESTED THAT IF THE TWO SIDES NOW ACCEPTED THE DOCUMENTATION - HT MADE CLEAR THAT THE GREEK SHIDE HAD DONE SO - WORKING GROUPS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN ADVANCE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD REPORT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN DUE COURSE AND REGULAR SUCH MEETINGS COULD FOLLOW AS REQUIRED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MEANWHILE HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD AVOID MEASURES THAT MIGHT PREJUDICE THE CHANCES OF PROGRESS.

OF PROGRESS.

2. AFTER READING THE PAPERS THROUGH HIS SILENCE, DENKTASH'S FIRST RESPONSE WAS THAT "HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW HIS FRIEND THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD TREAT HIM IN THIS WAY". IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR HIM TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS AIDES BEFORE HIS OWN ELECTIONS (HOLGER HAD MENTIONED THAT FEHSEL AND PICCO WERE READY TO COME TO CYPRUS FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH THE TWO SIDES). HE WOULD NOT INSULT THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY REJECTING THE PAPERS AND SO WOULD "PUT THEM IN HIS DRAWER" AND RECONSIDER THEM AFTER THE ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS LEAKED THE TEXT OF THE NEW DOCUMENTATION OR ANNOUNCED THEIR OWN ACCEPTANCE OF IT, HE WOULD REJECT IT PUBLICLY.

3. HOLGER WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO RAISE WITH DENKTASH THE DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT IN ADDITION TO PUBLISHING THE AGREEMENT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INTENDED TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS, INCLUDING THAT:-

- (A) THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS DID NOT A PRIORI EXCLUDE ANY TIME-TABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-CYPRIOT TROOPS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DID NOT EXCLUDE ANY COUNTRY AS GUARANTOR
- (B) ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY WOULD LIE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
- (C) RESIDUAL POWERS WOULD LIE WITH THE PROVINCES
- (D) THE QUALITY OF TERRITORY TO BE RETURNED WAS FOR NEGOTIATION.

DENKTASH HOWEVER, HAVING GIVEN HIS INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE LETTER, DID NOT ALLOW HOLGER TO GO ON TO RAISE THESE POINTS.

COMMENT

4. THERE IS NO DOUBT AN ELEMENT OF POSTURING IN DENKTASH'S REACTION AND HOLGER DETECTED NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITH THE AUTHORITY OF ANKARA CONSEQUENT ON TURKISH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPROACH TO HIM. BUT IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT DENKTASH WILL TAKE AS HARD A LINE AS HE CAN GET AWAY WITH AND IS DETERMINED TO AVOID RISK OF POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT AMONG HIS OWN ELECTORATE FROM APPEARING TO BE FORCED INTO WHAT CAN BE REPRESENTED BY OPPONENTS AS NEW CONCESSIONS. HE MAY HAVE REAL CONCERNS (WITH WHICH ANKARA MAY SYMPATHISE) THAT, IF HE IS PUSHED TOO FAR, IT COULD DAMAGE HIS STANDING WITH THE RIGHT. BUT, EVEN IF IT IS ACCEPTED THAT DENKTASH IS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT HIMSELF FURTHER ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE BEFORE ELECTIONS, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RIDE HIM OFF REFUSING CONTACT WITH UN EMISSARIES BEFORE THEN, THOUGH SUCH CONTACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY ARRANGED AND DISCREETLY PRESENTED. ONE OPPORTUNITY MAY LIE IN AN EARLY ORIENTATION VISIT BY FEHSEL, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND FROM HOLGER HAS BEEN ENVISAGED FOR SOME TIME.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130055Z APR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 292 OF 12 APRIL 1985

INFO PRIORITY BONN WASHINGTON NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA

INFO ROUTINE ROME PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO

MODUK (SEC (O) (C))

YOUR TELNO 116: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS CONVINCED THAT A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS AS CLOSE AS IT HAS EVER BEEN, BUT IS AFRAID THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WILL NOW MAKE 'FICULTY': HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME FORMALLY NEXT WEEK TO ASK FOR OUR INTERVENTION WITH THE TURKS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS EVENING, 12 APRIL, HE TOLD ME THAT THE TURKISH AMBASSADORS IMMEDIATE REACTION EARLIER TODAY TO THE REVISED DOCUMENTATION HAD BEEN LESS THAN ENCOURAGING. ALTHOUGH TURKMEN HAD NOT BEEN SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS AFRAID THAT THE TURKS WERE LIKELY TO BE 'RATHER DIFFICULT' NOW. HE HAD TOLD TURKMEN THAT NO ONE WOULD UNDERSTAND THE REJECTION IN APRIL OF A PAPER ACCEPTED IN JANUARY BECAUSE OF CHANGES THAT WERE ONLY COSMETIC.

3. I TRIED TO ESTABLISH WHAT PARTICULAR POINTS OF DIFFICULTY TURKMEN HAD IDENTIFIED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO WAS CLEARLY SUFFERING THE AFTER EFFECTS OF HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST) WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR AND UNDERTOOK TO ASK HIS STAFF TO LET ME AND MY AMERICAN AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES HAVE DETAILS IN WRITING OF THE POINTS THAT NEEDED TO BE TAKEN UP WITH THE TURKS. BUT HE MENTIONED THE QUESTIONS OF THE VETO POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER.

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT A DULPICATE OF THE DOCUMENTATION HE HAD HANDED TO TURKMEN WOULD BE PASSED TO DENKTASH BY HOLGER IN NICOSIA ON MONDAY, 15 APRIL. HE HOPED THAT A COMBINATION OF AMERICAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN PRESSURE WOULD KEEP DENKTASH ON BOARD. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE REFERENDUM ON 5 MAY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD LIKE TO STOP BOTH THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELECTIONS THESE DID NOT IN FACT PREJUDICE A SOLUTION AND THEY SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH THE ASSURANCES THEY HAD HAD ON THAT POINT. IN HIS VIEW SUCH CHANGES WITHIN THE TRNC DID NOT AFFECT THE FINAL OBJECTIVE. IN THIS, HE HAD TOLD TURKMEN THAT 'WE HAVE NEVER BEEN NEARER' AND THAT THE TURKISH SIDES WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF THEIR ANSWER WAS NEGATIVE. I ASKED WHAT TURKMEN HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DO. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS ON THE DOCUMENTATION TO ANKARA WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPEAL TO EVREN AND OZAL FOR SUPPORT ON THE BASIS THAT A BETTER DEAL WAS NOT OBTAINABLE.

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5. WHEN I ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY GENERALS ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIFFERENCES ON VAROSHA HE REPLIED IN A WAY WHICH SEEMED MILDLY ENCOURAGING. HE NOTED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD VERY DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF THE AREA COMPRISING VAROSHA BUT HE ADDED THAT IT WAS A MATTER WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT IN DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THEM. THE IMPLICATION SEEMED TO BE THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE. I WAS DISQUIETED, HOWEVER, BY HIS SUGGESTION THAT APART FROM VAROSHA A LOT OF NEGOTIATION LAY AHEAD ON THE 'QUALITY' OF THE LAND TO BE RESTORED.

6. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN WHAT HE WAS DOING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE FROM MR LUCE AND WAS GRATEFUL. HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH NEXT WEEK WHEN HE WAS READY TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST TO US TO INTERVENE WITH THE TURKISH SIDE.

THOMSON

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19.11.8

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DESKBY 280930Z FCO

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272359Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 243 OF 27 MARCH 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, LISBON (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

ROUTINE ROME, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,
MODUK (SEC(OC)).

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY.

MY TELNO 237 AND NICOSIA TELNO 063 (NEITHER TO LISBON): CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MAKES CLEAR THAT HE IS EXASPERATED BY PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU'S BARGAINING TACTICS AND CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS WRITTEN TO HIM TO SAY THAT HE WILL NOW REPORT FAILURE.

DETAIL

2. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SUMMONS TO ME THIS AFTERNOON ON THE FALKLANDS (REPORTED SEPARATELY) TO ASK HIM ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON CYPRUS. WITH A SHRUG OF HIS SHOULDERS THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT THANKS TO KYPRIANOU'S INDECISION HE HAD LOST A MARVELLOUS OPPORTUNITY. INSTEAD OF BEING IN A POSITION TO TELL THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER (WHOM HE WAS SEEING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ME) THAT THERE WAS A BASIS FOR A DEAL HE WOULD BE EMPTY HANDED. ALL HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO WOULD BE TO TRY TO PERSUADE OZAL TO MAINTAIN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION. HE HAD TOLD KYPRIANOU THAT HE WOULD NEED SOMETHING BEFORE HE SAW OZAL BUT KYPRIANOU WANTED TO BARGAIN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OR EVEN BEYOND. THE END

TO TRY TO PERSUADE OZAL TO MAINTAIN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION. HE HAD TOLD KYPRIANOU THAT HE WOULD NEED SOMETHING BEFORE HE SAW OZAL BUT KYPRIANOU WANTED TO BARGAIN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OR EVEN BEYOND. THE END RESULT WAS THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ASK EITHER OURSELVES OR THE AMERICANS FOR HELP.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD TOLD MAVROMMATIS THAT HE CONSIDERED THIS EXERCISE CLOSED AND THAT HE HAD WRITTEN TO KYPRIANOU. THE WORLD WOULD HAVE TO BE TOLD THAT THE MISSION HAD FAILED. IT ALL SOUNDED "RATHER TRAGIC" SINCE KYPRIANOU MUST BE IN DEEP POLITICAL TROUBLE AT HOME. THE WHOLE THING WAS "SO DISCOURAGING".

4. WHEN HE REPEATED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE EXERCISE CONCLUDED, I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD COME NEXT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HEADS WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT TOGETHER TO DEVISE "A FRESH NEW APPROACH". HE COULD NOT OF COURSE WASH HIS HANDS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM MUCH THOUGH HE WOULD LIKE TO. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO COME UP WITH SUCH AN APPROACH. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AGREED THAT HIS BEST TACTIC FOR THE MOMENT WOULD BE TO TRY TO KEEP THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION IN HIS POCKET AND PREVENT TURKISH ENDORSEMENT OF A MOVE BY DENKTASH TO WITHDRAW HIS AGREEMENT TO IT.

5. FROM AN ACCOUNT GIVEN TO US BY THE U.S. MISSION OF THE HAAS TALKS WITH THE SECRETARIAT, IT SEEMS THAT HE GOT RATHER LESS OUT OF PICCO AND FEISSEL THAN I GOT OUT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT:

(A) THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA WILL BE SEEING KYPRIANOU TOMORROW IN A LAST DITCH EFFORT TO PERSUADE HIM TO ACCEPT THE REVISED DOCUMENTATION.

(B) THE AMERICANS HAVE AGREED TO STRESS TO OZAL IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO KEEPING DENKTASH ON BOARD.

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FM NICOSIA 271000Z MAR 85
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 083 OF 27 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON
ROUTINE PARIS BONN ROME UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS
MODUK (SEC O C) CBFC

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 237: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

MAVROMMATHIS' TALKS IN NEW YORK APPARENTLY FRUITLESS. LIKELY
POLITICAL CRISIS FOR KYPRIANOU.

1. HOLGER WAS TOLD IN A GUARDED TELEPHONE CALL OVERNIGHT FROM
FRIESEL THAT THE TALKS WITH MAVROMMATHIS HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE
AGREEMENT ON DOCUMENTS WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE
PREPARED TO TRY TO SELL TO DENKTASH. MAVROMMATHIS APPEARED TO
HAVE REACHED THE END OF HIS NEGOTIATING BRIEF AND HOLGER WAS
GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARIAT CONSIDERED THE DIS-
CUSSIONS CONCLUDED. HOLGER WAS GIVEN NO INDICATION WHAT THE
SECRETARY GENERAL INTENDED TO DO NEXT, FOR EXAMPLE IN MAKING
ANY PUBLIC COMMENTS.

2. IF THIS IS CONFIRMED, THE PROSPECT IS FOR A TROUBLED PERIOD
IN GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN OF ANY DECREASE
IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES TO FORCE
KYPRIANOU TO CHANGE POSITION. HE WILL COME UNDER RENEWED ATTACK
IN THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 28 MARCH,
WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE SPECIALLY ACRIMONIOUS IF, AS SEEMS
INEVITABLE, THE FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN NEW YORK BECOMES
KNOWN BY THEN. A LETTER PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S PRESS (27 MARCH)

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FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE LEADERS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES CALLED FOR NEW CONSULTATIONS WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING A COMMON LINE ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND RESTORING INTERNAL UNITY. AKEL'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS TO REPEAT HIS PRECONDITION THAT KYPRIOFOLLOWS TO THE EARLIER RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE. CLERMIDES, DESCRIBING THE LETTER AS A PROPAGANDA DEVICE, PROMISED HIS REPLY DURING THE DEBATE.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 210001Z MAR 85

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 223 OF 20 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,

MODUK (SEC OC)

CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS THAT HE WILL NEED OUR HELP WITH THE TURKS IN THE NEXT STAGE.

DETAIL

2. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MY MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS EVENING (MAINLY ON IRAN/IRAQ) TO ASK HIM WHERE THINGS STOOD ON CYPRUS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE WAS HARD AT WORK ON THIS. IF HE COULD PERSUADE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ACCEPT THE DOCUMENTATION HE WOULD HAVE TO TURN HIS FACE TO THE OTHER SIDE. HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DENKTASH VIEW THAT THE 17 JANUARY PAPER WAS NO LONGER ON THE TABLE. HE HAD WARNED THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR THAT IF THIS LINE WAS NOT (NOT) CHANGED HE WOULD GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. I SAID THAT, AS HE KNEW, WE STRONGLY SUPPORTED HIS EFFORTS. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE DOCUMENTATION WITH COSMETIC CHANGES SINCE HE REALLY HAD NO OTHER OPTION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AGREED THAT KYPRIANOU HAD PROBABLY LEARNED HIS LESSON (AND MENTIONED HIS EXTREME GRATITUDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER PART IN TEACHING HIM) AND WOULD BE A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBLE. BUT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE A PROBLEM. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY NEED OUR HELP.

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4. MEANWHILE, MAVROMMATIS HAS BEEN CONTINUING HIS TALKS HERE ABOUT THE DOCUMENTATION AND HAD A DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARIAT THIS MORNING (HUMFREY'S TELELETTER OF 19 MARCH NOT TO ALL).

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19.11.84

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FM NICOSIA 141040Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 076 OF 14 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON ATHENS ANKARA
INFO ROUTINE PARIS BONN ROME

SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO

UKMIS GENEVA TEL 118: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

ACCOUNT FROM MAVROMMATIS OF THE GENEVA MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND OF GREEK CYPRIOT OBJECTIVES. GLOSSES ON THIS BY HOLGER (UN9, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S UNREALISTIC PLAN FOR A STOPOVER IN CYPRUS ON 28/29 MARCH TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT, AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL ACCEPT THAT THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD BE HELD BY A TURKISH CYPRIOT. HOLGER STILL NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT KYPRIANOU HAS YET BEEN BROUGHT TO FACE REALITIES.

1. AT HIS MEETING WITH JENKINS ON THE EVENING OF 13 MARCH MAVROMMATIS EXPLAINED THAT LARGELY BECAUSE OF KYPRIANOU'S ILLNESS (WHICH MEANS ALSO THAT JENKINS WILL NOT NOW BE ABLE TO SEE HIM ON 15 MARCH) THE DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA HAD NOT GONE INTO THE DEGREE OF SUBSTANCE EXPECTED AND HE HAD NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER IN DEPTH WITH THE PRESIDENT THE WAY AHEAD. SO HE WAS FOR THE MOST PART ONLY GIVING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS. WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOW AIMING TO DO WAS AGREE WITH PEREZ DE QUELLAR THE DOCUMENTATION, IN A FORM THEY COULD ACCEPT, TOGETHER WITH "SIDE AGREEMENTS" ON PROCEDURE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD THEN AIM TO SELL THE PACKAGE TO DENKTASH AND THE TURKS WITH THE HELP, HE HAD SAID, OF OUTSIDE PERSUADERS. MAVROMMATIS EXPECTED TO GO TO NEW YORK ABOUT 23 MARCH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE BUSINESS AND CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT THEN (HE COULD NOT GO EARLIER, BUT IF NECESSARY SOMEONE ELSE COULD). THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT EXERCISE IN CLEARING THE GROUND. UNLIKE THE JANUARY EPISODE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT GO TO ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL

EPISODE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT GO TO ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS.

2. MAVROMMATHIS RECOGNISED THE NEED TO GET AN AGREEMENT IN PLACE EARLY, AS THE ONLY WAY OF RESTRAINING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH. BUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OBJECTIVE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN MARCH WAS NOW UNREAL. APRIL MIGHT JUST BE PRACTICABLE, THOUGH, IF THE TWO SIDES COULD AGREE ON THE TRIPTYCH OF DOCUMENTATION, PROCEDURE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUPS, THE LAST COULD GET UNDER WAY WITHOUT DELAY AND THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THUS BE STARTED IN ADVANCE OF A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING. SUCH A MEETING COULD FOLLOW LATER WHEN THE WORKING GROUPS HAD SHOWN SOME PROGRESS.

3. MAVROMMATHIS SAID THAT OF THE FOUR MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN NEW YORK IN JANUARY, ON WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION AND ON WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS STILL NEEDED CLARIFICATION, TERRITORY SEEMED TO HIM THE MOST IMMEDIATELY IMPORTANT PROBLEM. THE PRESIDENT REGARDED IT AS TOO RISKY TO ACCEPT A PERCENTAGE FIGURE WITHOUT ASSURANCES ON THE QUALITY OF LAND TO BE RETURNED AND NUMBERS OF REFUGEES SETTLED. IT WAS VITAL FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO PRESERVE "NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY" AND THE ABILITY IF NECESSARY TO TRADE OFF QUANTITY FOR QUALITY AND ALSO TO CONSTRUCT BRIDGES BETWEEN SUBJECTS COVERED BY DIFFERENT WORKING GROUPS, WHICH SHOULD ACCORDINGLY NOT BE SEEN AS WATER-TIGHT COMPARTMENTS. AT ONE STAGE MAVROMMATHIS SEEMED TO SUGGEST GETTING AWAY FROM THE FIGURE OF 29 PERCENT IN FAVOUR OF A BRACKET OF "27-30 PERCENT". WE TOLD HIM THAT REOPENING ISSUES IN THIS WAY WAS PRECISELY WHAT HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF THE NEW YORK MEETING. OUR VIEW REMAINED THAT THE BEST WAY OF PROCEEDING WAS TO GIVE EARLY ENDORSEMENT TO THE DOCUMENTATION ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ANYTHING AGREED AT THIS STAGE REMAINED SUBJECT TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND TO LOOK TO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS AND AT FUTURE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS TO OBTAIN IMPROVEMENTS REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. NO OTHER APPROACH WAS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO DENKTASH.

4. HE WENT OVER ALL THIS WITH HOLGER THIS MORNING (WHOM JENKINS WILL SEE TOMORROW). HE ADDED SOME GLOSSES. SO FAR FROM KYPRIANOU APPEARING READY TO ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION, HIS MAIN INTEREST HAD SEEMED TO LIE IN BUYING TIME WHILE HE RESCUED HIMSELF FROM HIS PRESENT POLITICAL PREDICAMENT THROUGH KEEPING UP THE APPEARANCE OF ACTIVITY. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD RESISTED STRONGLY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TWO WEEK DEADLINE FOR KYPRIANOU'S RESPONSE. IT HAD TAKEN 45 MINUTES TO NEGOTIATE THE FORMULA IN PARASIO OF THE TUR. HOLGER ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE DEADLINE BY MENTIONING IT TO THE TURKISH SIDE.

5. HOLGER EXPLAINED THAT MAVROMMATHIS'S REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OBJECTIVE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN MARCH COULD BE MISLEADING. WHAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD IN MIND WAS NOT A STRUCTURED HIGH LEVEL MEETING FOR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION. IN LINE WITH HIS VERY STRONG URGING OF THE NEED NOT TO LOSE TIME, HE HAD PUT TO KYPRIANOU THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH OZAL IN NEW YORK ON 27 MARCH HE MIGHT HIMSELF STOP OVER IN CYPRUS ON 28/29 MARCH WITH A VIEW TO HOLDING A LUNCHEON OF THE TWO LEADERS WHICH WOULD SIMPLY BE THE OCCASION FOR ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON HIS DOCUMENTATION AND ON HIS INTERPRETATIVE SIDE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUPS. HOLGER SAID THAT HE HAD WARNED PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM QUITE UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT THE AGREEMENT OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO THE REVISED DOCUMENTS COULD BE OBTAINED

SEEMED TO HIM QUITE UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT THE AGREEMENT OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO THE REVISED DOCUMENTS COULD BE OBTAINED IN SUCH A TIMESCALE.

6. ALTHOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN GENEVA HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION OF RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THAT ACCOUNT. KYPRIANOU WARNED HOWEVER THAT IN THE EVENT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS BREAKING DOWN HE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A LAST RESORT.

7. AN INTERESTING DETAIL WAS THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR APPARENTLY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING KYPRIANOU TO CONFIRM (WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE) THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAD PASSED AT THE NEW YORK HIGH LEVEL MEETING, HE HAD A "MORAL COMMITMENT" TO THE PROPOSAL BY DENKTASH THAT THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD ALWAYS BE HELD BY A TURKISH CYPRIOT. THIS WAS HOWEVER STILL QUALIFIED BY THE STATEMENT THAT THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY STUDIED.

8. IN GENERAL, HOLGER WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. ALTHOUGH HE ADMIRERD THE FORTHRIGHT LINE TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, HE STILL DID NOT BELIEVE THAT KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN BROUGHT (OR PERHAPS COULD EVER BE BROUGHT) TO FACE UP TO THE REALITIES. INSTEAD, AND TYPICALLY, HE WAS TRYING TO WRIGGLE HIS WAY THROUGH AND AVOID COMMITMENT TO A SET OF PROPOSALS WHICH RAN COUNTER TO HIS OWN LONGSTANDING POSITIONS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

9. HE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL OF CARE COULD BE TAKEN IN NEW YORK TO RESPECT HOLGER'S CONFIDENCE SINCE HE SEEMS TO HAVE GONE SOME WAY BEYOND THE ACCOUNT GIVEN THERE BY FEHSEL (REPORTED IN HUMFREY'S TELELETTER OF 13 MARCH, WHICH WE HAVE ONLY JUST SEEN).

10. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 March 1985

CYPRUS

The Cyprus High Commissioner telephoned me this morning with a message from President Kyprianou for the Prime Minister. This was to the effect that the President had met the UN Secretary General for some two and a half hours. The meeting had been useful and constructive and they had discussed several formulae to get out of the present deadlock. It was agreed that they would have a further exchange in 15 days' time, although this would not necessarily be at the level of the President and the Secretary General themselves. As a result of the meeting with the Secretary General, the President was a little more optimistic than he had been at the conclusion of his discussions with the Prime Minister in London.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GRS 415

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FM NICOSIA 020950Z
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO
TELEGRAM NO 57 OF 2 MARCH 85
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, MODUK (SEC (O) AND (C)), CBFC
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO

FOR RESIDENT CLERK TO INFORM SED DUTY OFFICER

MY TEL 64: GREEK CYPRIOT INTERNAL POLITICS

SUMMARY

KYPRIANOU REJECTS CALLS FOR HIS RESIGNATION.

1. IN HIS TELEVISED ADDRESS ON 1 MARCH, PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU SPRANG NO SURPRISES. IN A MEASURED AND SOLEMN RESTATEMENT OF HIS POSITION HE STUCK TO HIS GUNS ON ALL ISSUES. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAD OFFERED HIM THE CHOICE OF COMPLYING WITH ITS RESOLUTION OR RESIGNING AND CALLING ELECTIONS. THE FORMER WOULD CREATE A DAMAGING CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT. THE LATTER WOULD NOT SOLVE THE CRISIS BUT ONLY LEAD TO NEW DANGERS.

2. KYPRIANOU AGAIN REJECTED ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WAS NOT SEEKING A SOLUTION; BUT HE WAS DETERMINED THAT ANY SOLUTION SHOULD BE VIABLE. THE PRESENT CRISIS, CREATED BY THE MAIN PARTIES, THREATENED THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS. AFTER CAREFUL DELIBERATION HE HAD DECIDED HIS DUTY WAS TO CONTINUE AS PRESIDENT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL REGULARITY AND TO WORK FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT. HE CALLED ON THE PARTY LEADERS TO RENEW CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM IN PREPARATION FOR THE QUOTE NEW PHASE UNQUOTE REPRESENTED BY HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON 11 MARCH. HE VALUED THE SEUPPORT OF GREECE AND CALLED FOR SIMILAR UNANIMITY WITHIN CYPRUS.

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3. INITIAL REACTIONS IN THE COMMUNIST AND RIGHT-WING PRESS WERE CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARGUMENTS. HEADLINES IN HARAVGHI (COMMUNIST) ON 2 MARCH DESCRIBED HIS SPEECH AS A QUOTE CHALLENGE TO THE PEOPLE UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT HAD INVOKED NONEXISTENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND OMITTED ANY REFERENCE TO THE ALLIANCE WITH AKEL WHICH HAD SECURED HIS ELECTION. AN EDITORIAL IN SIMERINI (RIGHT-WING) SAID THAT DESPITE THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS, THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM REMAINED; THE PEOPLE BELIEVED A MINORITY PARTY WAS IN GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES REPRESENTING THE MAJORITY DEMANDED THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 222340Z FEB 85

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 22 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS (NEILSON), NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING ROME, BONN, MODUK SEC (O)(C), UKREP BRUSSELS,
UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: C Y P R U S

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NON-PAPER
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IF THE THREADS OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE ARE TO BE PICKED UP AGAIN.
THE MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 11 MARCH IN GENEVA IS THEREFORE
CRUCIAL, BOTH WITH REGARD TO TIME AND SUBSTANCE. THE PASSAGE
OF TIME MAY PLACE THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM BEYOND OUR GRASP
WITH ALL THE DANGERS THAT ENTAILS. IF THE PRESIDENT COULD
AGREE IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXISTING DOCUMENTATION, IT WOULD
GREATLY ASSIST COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN A SOLUTION TO THE
CYPRUS PROBLEM TO URGE THE EARLY CONVENING OF A NEW JOINT
HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE DOCUMENTATION IS
PART OF AN INTEGRATED WHOLE ON WHICH FURTHER NEGOTIATION
WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THEREFORE, ACCEPTANCE
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION IS IMPLICITLY
QUALIFIED BY THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD BE CONCLUDED TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH SIDES.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 22 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS (NEILSON), NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING ROME, BONN, MODUK (SEC)(O)(C), UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL

NATO.

MY TELNO 124: CYPRUS

[Meeting with Kyprianou now postponed at his request until 11 March] CDP

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1. SECRETARY-GENERAL SPECIFIES WHAT HE HOPES THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT SAY TO KYPRIANOU.

DETAIL

2. PICCO HAS NOW GIVEN US THE TEXT (IN MIFT) OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S 'NON-PAPER' SETTING OUT THE LINE WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HOPES THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT TAKE WITH KYPRIANOU ON 26 FEBRUARY. IT NEEDS TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IT IS A CONSIDERABLE STEP FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PUT IN WRITING (EVEN THOUGH IT IS DENIABLE) THE LINE HE HOPES TO HAVE ENFORCED WITH ANOTHER HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. IN PRACTICE IT WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO BE A BIT BLUNTER WITH KYPRIANOU THAN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CAREFUL PHRASEOLOGY SUGGESTS. KYPRIANOU NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS THE BEST DEAL HE IS GOING TO BE OFFERED.

3. PICCO SAID THAT THE THE SECRETARIAT WERE IN TOUCH WITH MAVROMMATIS, WITH KYPRIANOU'S APPROVAL, TO TRY TO GET AGREEMENT BEFORE 11 MARCH ON TWO THINGS. FIRST ON THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION AS CONSOLIDATED IN A SINGLE PAPER (THIS WOULD HAVE JUST THE ONE AMENDMENT ON THE LEGISLATURE ALREADY DISCUSSED AT THE 17 JANUARY MEETING). SECONDLY ON A FORMULA WHICH WOULD COVER KYPRIANOU'S WISH TO HAVE A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE FOUR SUBJECTS OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS, GUARANTEES, TERRITORY AND THE THREE FREEDOMS. THIS FORMULA WOULD HAVE TO BE PHRASED IN TERMS WHICH THE TURKS WERE LIKELY TO ACCEPT. AGREEMENT TO THE DOCUMENTATION TOGETHER WITH THE FORMULA WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

4. PICCO UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF GETTING KYPRIANOU'S AGREEMENT ON 11 MARCH TO THIS TWO PART PACKAGE SO THAT THERE WOULD BE TIME TO TRY TO BRING DENKTASH TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BEFORE THE END OF MARCH. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WANTED TO HOLD THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING BEFORE OZAL WENT TO WASHINGTON AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD GIVE THE TURKS AN INCENTIVE TO MAKE IT A SUCCESS. PICCO

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ALSO SAID THAT HE FEARED THAT AFTER APRIL THE PROCESS COULD BECOME ENTANGLED WITH CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON AID TO TURKEY (THIS DOES NOT SEEM A PARTICULARLY STRONG ARGUMENT) WE POINTED OUT THAT THE NEWS FROM CYPRUS WAS NOT ENCOURAGING ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AN EARLY HIGH LEVEL MEETING. PICCO ACKNOWLEDGED THIS RELUCTANTLY, BUT STUCK TO HIS GUNS.

5. PICCO THOUGHT THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE BROUGHT THROUGH MAVROMMATIS TO AGREE TO ALMOST ALL THE POINTS IN THE DOCUMENTATION BEFORE THE 11 MARCH MEETING. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO USE THE MEETING TO GET HIM TO ACCEPT THE REMAINING POINTS ON WHICH HE STILL HAD RESERVATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN GETTING KYPRIANOU INTO THE RIGHT FRAME OF MIND FOR THIS.

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Prime Minister
You are seeing
Kyprianou on
28 February.
CDP.

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FROM WASHINGTON 220118Z FEB 85

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 622 OF 21 FEB

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA UKRIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ: CYPRUS

1. SHULTZ AND BURT GAVE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 21 FEBRUARY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION OVER TALKS ON CYPRUS. DESPITE THE FAILURE IN NEW YORK - ON WHICH THE US WERE INCLINED TO ASCRIBE SOME BLAME TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL - THERE WERE SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS. BEFORE AND AT NEW YORK, DENKTASH HAD MOVED A LITTLE. THE AMERICANS WERE NOW URGING THE TURKS NOT TO STEP BACK. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT THE MAIN OUTSIDE EFFORT SHOULD NOW BE DIRECTED TO PERSUADING KYPRIANOU THAT HIS TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT SOMETHING VERY CLOSE TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEW YORK DOCUMENTATION.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH THE TURKS THEY WOULD NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PRESS DENKTASH TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS, OR EVEN TO PRESS HIM EXPLICITLY NOT TO WITHDRAW THOSE HE HAD ALREADY MADE, NEVERTHELESS THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BRINGING HIM ALONG AND WERE IN FACT DISCOURAGING ANY BACKWARD MOVEMENT BY HIM. NOR HAD THEY CLOSED THE DOOR ON HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS BEFORE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ELECTIONS IN JUNE. KYPRIANOU WOULD SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIM IN LONDON ON 28 FEBRUARY, AND WOULD BE TOLD THAT HIS TACTICS SO FAR APPEARED TO HAVE PLAYED INTO DENKTASH'S HANDS, AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO SETTLE FOR SOMETHING LIKE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION, AND FAIRLY SOON, IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER COULD ISSUE BEFORE KYPRIANOU CAME TO LONDON.

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3. SHULTZ AGREED, ADDING THAT HE SAW NO ADVANTAGE WHATSOEVER IN KYPRIANOU'S IDEAS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP, OR A NATO GUARANTEE, FOR CYPRUS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THESE IDEAS HAS SO FAR BEEN DISCREETLY HANDLED: BUT CERTAINLY THE LESS HEARD OF THEM THE BETTER.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.121 OF 20 FEBRUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

PRIORITY NICOSIA,ATHENS,ANKARA,
ROUTINE ROME PARIS BONN MODUK(SEC(O)(C)) UKREP BRUSSELS
UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO.116 : CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL CONFIRMS HIS INTENTION IS FIRST TO PRESS FOR KYPRIANOU'S AGREEMENT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION AND THEN GET DENKTASH TO ACCEPT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. HE WILL MAKE FURTHER SUGGESTIONS ABOUT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT SAY TO KYPRIANOU. HE HOPES SHE WILL ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THEIR PART ON CYPRUS.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON(20 FEBRUARY). URQUHART AND PICCO WERE WITH HIM. AFTER BRIEFLY RECAPITULATING THE RESULTS OF YOUR VISIT TO ANKARA, I UNDERLINED OUR CONTINUED BELIEF IN HIS CHANCES OF OBTAINING A SETTLEMENT AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT HIM.

3. HE THANKED YOU WARMLY FOR SPEAKING TO THE TURKS. THE INFORMATION YOU HAD GOT FROM THEM WAS IMPORTANT. FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THEY HAD NOT SAID THAT THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION WAS NO LONGER ON THE TABLE.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE WAS ALREADY TAKING ACTION WITH THE TWO SIDES. THERE WAS NO TIME TO LOSE. HE AGREED THAT HE STILL HAD A CHANCE. IT WAS IN ANY CASE HIS DUTY TO PERSEVERE AND TRY TO BRING THE TWO SIDES TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. PREVIOUSLY HE HAD CONCENTRATED HIS ENERGIES ON THE TURKS AND HAD GOT SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS FROM THEM. THIS TIME HE HAD TO CONCENTRATE ON KYPRIANOU.

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HE WOULD SEEK FROM HIM SOME KIND OF ENDORSEMENT OF THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION WITH NO MORE THAN COSMETIC CHANGES TO IT TO SAVE HIS FACE. IF HE COULD TELL THE TURKS SECRETLY THAT KYPRIANOU ENDORSED THE DOCUMENTATION HE WOULD THEN PRESS THEM TO AGREE TO COSMETIC CHANGES AND TO FORCE DENKTASH TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. INDEED HE HAD IN MIND NOT ONE BUT TWO HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. THE FIRST WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE ABOUT THE END OF MARCH, WOULD APPROVE THE DOCUMENTATION AND TAKE A DECISION ON A FURTHER MEETING TOWARDS END JUNE/BEGINNING JULY WHICH WOULD BE TO DISCUSS THOSE SUBJECTS WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN ADDRESSED. IF WORKING GROUPS COULD BE SET UP AFTER THE NEXT HIGH LEVEL MEETING, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

5. I SAID THAT HIS THINKING WAS VERY CLOSE TO OURS. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO KYPRIANOU ON 28 FEBRUARY. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT SHE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THE SAME THINGS TO KYPRIANOU. I SUGGESTED THAT HIS STAFF SHOULD LET US HAVE A NON-PAPER SETTING OUT EXACTLY WHAT HE HOPED SHE MIGHT SAY. HE ASKED PICCO TO ARRANGE THIS.

6. I ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CONSIDERING TRAVELLING TO CYPRUS. HE SAID NOT. HE WAS HOWEVER PREPARED TO SEE KYPRIANOU SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE (HE WILL BE GOING TO GENEVA IN MARCH) BUT ONLY IF HE HAD PRIOR ASSURANCES THAT KYPRIANOU WAS SERIOUS. I POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A MEETING COULD BE HELPFUL TO KYPRIANOU IN SAVING FACE. HE AGREED. URQUHART UNDERLINED THAT KYPRIANOU HAD TO ACCEPT THE DOCUMENTATION FIRST. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT ANY COSMETIC CHANGES TO THE DOCUMENTATION WOULD HAVE TO GIVE THE GREEKS NO ROOM FOR RE-INTERPRETING THE SUBSTANCE.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS NOT JUST THROUGH HOLGER BUT DIRECTLY. THE SECRETARIAT'S INTERLOCUTOR WAS MAVROMMATIS WHO THEY REGARDED AS A KEY MAN AND WITH WHOM THEY WERE IN CONSTANT TOUCH. (THIS INFORMATION IS ESPECIALLY CONFIDENTIAL).

8. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE. URQUHART AND PICCO HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICANS NOW WANTED TO STAND BACK FROM THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND NOT GET INVOLVED THEMSELVES. HE ASKED IF THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HER VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS NOT TO FORGET

/ABOUT

ABOUT CYPRUS AND TO MAINTAIN THEIR INVOLVEMENT. HE WAS NOT ASKING THEM TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE TURKS AT THIS POINT (I AGREED THAT THAT WOULD BE A MISTAKE) BUT RATHER TO USE THEIR LEVERAGE WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE KEEPING UP THEIR INTEREST IN CYPRUS AND WERE BEING OF ASSISTANCE THROUGH AKEL. PICCO ADDED THAT WASHINGTON COULD HELP ALSO BY ENCOURAGING ANKARA TO STOP DENKTASH BEING SO RIGID ABOUT THE TIMING OF ANY FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID NOT REACT TO THIS. HIS PRIMARY CONCERN WAS CLEARLY THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH KYPRIANOU ON THE QUESTION OF THE DOCUMENTATION.

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cc: Sir P. Craddock

10 DOWNING STREET

18 February 1985

From the Private Secretary

CYPRUS: MEMBERSHIP OF NATO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Thank you for your letter of 15 February enclosing an analysis of the Cyprus Government's suggestion that Cyprus might become a full member of both NATO and the European Community.

The Prime Minister agrees that this analysis should be discussed with the Americans in confidence before her own meeting with President Kyprianou.

Charles Powell

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Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister
 The attached paper
 argues that the
 obstacles to Cyprus joining
 NATO & the EC are insuperable: but
 we should welcome signs of an
 intention to pursue a
 more western-oriented foreign policy.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 London SW1A 2AH
 15 February 1985

Dear Charles,

Agree that FCO should
 discuss this analysis with the
 Americans? Yes/No CDP 15/2.

Cyprus: Membership of NATO and the European Community

You will recall that at the Prime Minister's last meeting with President Kyprianou on 14 January (record enclosed) he floated on an informal and personal basis the idea of Cyprus becoming a full member of both NATO and the European Community. The Prime Minister has agreed to see Kyprianou on 28 February and he may well raise the issue again. You may therefore like to see the enclosed analysis which has been prepared within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the implications of Kyprianou's suggestions.

We have heard from the Embassy in Washington that a Cypriot politician close to President Kyprianou has broached the same subject with the Americans. He subsequently made a similar approach to us. We therefore consider that it would be appropriate to discuss the Cypriot ideas in confidence with the Americans. It would be useful if we could do so before the Prime Minister's meeting: in the event that President Kyprianou should make his ideas public, it would be very desirable that key NATO members should react in a similar fashion. These consultations could be conducted in such a way as to avoid compromising the confidence of President Kyprianou himself. We would be grateful for the Prime Minister's endorsement for such an approach.

Yours ever,
 Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP OF CYPRUS IN NATO AND EC

1. At his meeting with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State on 14 January, Kyprianou floated (informally and personally) the idea that Cypriot full membership of NATO or the EC might offer the best guarantee for a settlement on the island. This paper examines Kyprianou's motives; the attitudes of those who would be affected if the idea were made formal and public; and HMG's own interests.

Kyprianou's motives

2. Kyprianou said at the meeting that such a step might help to create unity in Cyprus and avoid the need for specific guarantees. We believe Kyprianou is genuinely casting about for ideas on guarantees which would obviate the need for a Turkish military presence in the north of the island. His recent thinking seems to have developed on the following lines:

- a) Greek Cypriots do not want a Turkish military presence on the island;
- b) Turkey will never agree to withdraw completely unless the Turkish Cypriot community is adequately protected by other means;
- c) Turkey might trust certain European countries as guarantors;
- d) All those countries would be members of NATO and the EC;
- e) Thus the long term solution to the problem of guarantees may be to take Cyprus fully into the western camp by joining both EC and NATO.

3. This pattern is substantiated by:

a) Kyprianou's recent distancing of himself from the Communist party AKEL with whom he has broken his alliance and a general rightward shift currently apparent in Cypriot politics;

b) recent conversations with Mr Wilberforce in Nicosia where Kyprianou has referred on a number of occasions to the involvement of western countries in new guarantee arrangements.

4. Another and complementary interpretation of Kyprianou's motives is that, along with his determination to remove all Turkish troops from the island, his greatest foreign policy objective is to secure entry of Cyprus into the EC. He may believe that NATO membership would facilitate EC membership. He may in any case hope that one effect of an application for membership would be to put steam behind the talks on customs union, for which the present outlook is poor.

5. But neither membership of NATO or the EC would per se:

a) provide a guarantee against inter-communal conflict;

b) provide a guarantee of Cyprus' security against Turkey.

Kyprianou may not yet accept this and may be content to accept that in a general sense such moves would diminish the grounds for concern about further inter-communal tension.

Constitutional/

Constitutional position

6. There is no reason why Cyprus, currently non-aligned, should not apply to join either the EC or NATO at any time. There is no Treaty obstacle to NATO increasing its membership, as in the case of Greece and Turkey in 1951, the FRG in 1954 or Spain which joined in May 1982. There is some room for doubt as to whether the North Atlantic area, as currently defined in the Treaty, covers Cyprus, but this would be no obstacle if there was a consensus in the Alliance on Cypriot membership. The Treaty has already been modified once to take account of Turkish membership. On the EC side, Cyprus currently has an Association Agreement with the EC which is intended to lead to the establishment of a full customs union. Unlike the EC/Turkey Association Agreement there is no article providing for the possibility of eventual membership. However under the terms of the Treaty of Rome there is no obstacle to Cyprus membership so long as everyone agrees that Cyprus is a "European State". There are no constitutional barriers to further enlargements.

Implications for NATO

7. NATO arguments for Cyprus membership are:

- a) southern flank strengthened by acquisition of strategically placed island (see American attitude below);
- b) would enhance its reputation and be a feather in its cap (in contrast to Warsaw Pact, nations actually want to join);
- c) credit to NATO might be given if settlement finally achieved under its umbrella - might lead to rapprochement between Greece and Turkey;

d)

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8. NATO arguments against Cyprus membership are:

- a) would introduce a further southern flank problem into its arena; the impact on the Allies of any subsequent Turkish intervention if the situation deteriorated on the island could be grave;
- b) could badly affect east/west relations if Soviets regarded entry as upsetting status quo on zones of influence;
- c) the necessary unanimous agreement unlikely given above and Greece and Turkey's likely reactions (see below);
- d) Cypriot forces would make no significant contribution to the military strength of the Alliance;
- e) Cypriot government and security services vulnerable to Soviet penetration: might prove threat to NATO Security.

Implications for EC

9. EC arguments for Cyprus membership are:

- a) might help secure stability and democracy in Cyprus (argument used to justify Greek, Spanish and Portuguese entry);
- b) an application might provide leverage to get Greece to agree to unblock EC/Turkey relations: (particularly on aid).

10. EC arguments against Cyprus membership are:

- a) Likely to be strongly resisted by Mediterranean producers as introducing more competition on agricultural products already in surplus;

b)/

- b) Might encourage Turkey to apply for full membership: EC wants to discourage such an application so soon after Spanish and Portuguese entry; difficult to admit Cyprus without giving at least prospect of membership to Turkey;
- c) Cyprus would expect to be net recipient of own resources;
- d) Would further strengthen 'southern bloc' within EC, with its prodigal attitude to Community spending (Mediterranean agriculture, IMPs etc);
- e) Would make it even more difficult for the Community to be even-handed in its approach to the Cyprus problem.

American Attitude

11. NATO idea might have strong appeal to some sectors in Washington because:

- a) history of enthusiasm for a NATO role in Cyprus settlement;
- b) attractions of access to an island of such strategic importance especially with regard to American activities in the Middle east;
- c) attraction, greater for Americans than Europeans, of 'snubbing' the eastern bloc and the non aligned movement by bringing Cyprus into the western fold.

UN/Soviet/Non-aligned attitudes

12. Soviet Union and non-aligned countries in Security Council have placed great stress on call on all states to respect Cyprus'

non- /

non-alignment in a succession of Security Council resolutions. There would be an outcry at a departure from this commitment. This rules out any encouragement by the Secretary General (even if the idea found any favour with him) to include membership of the EC and NATO in a Cyprus settlement. Any suggestion that the Secretary General might act in this way could seriously complicate his efforts to achieve a Cyprus solution. It would probably also mean looking outside the UN for a mediator.

13. The Soviet Union and eastern bloc would inevitably react badly to any idea of a NATO role in Cyprus. Their support for a settlement derives entirely from their concern to see Cyprus remain non-aligned. While Cyprus membership of NATO could therefore be seen as 'coup' against that policy, it risks:

- a) some deterioration of relations between east/west.
- b) possible negative and meddling activities by the Soviets in Cyprus and in the eastern Mediterranean, an already potentially unstable region.

Attitude of Greece and Turkey

14. It is unlikely that Turkey would support Cypriot membership of NATO which it might see as a ploy to make her give up her right to maintain (under the Treaty of Alliance) a residual military presence on the island, and (under the Treaty of Guarantee) the right to intervene. There are no grounds to suppose that the Turks would be willing to give up that right under any circumstances. The Turks might also suspect the Greek/Greek Cypriots of exploiting NATO membership to station more Greek troops on the island. In east/west terms the Turks would fear that Cypriot membership of NATO would adversely affect their currently improving relations with the Soviet Union.

15. On the EC, Turkey would no doubt demand that if Cypriot membership were contemplated, her own case was pursued at the same time and same pace. We do not regard Turkish membership as possible in economic terms, or negotiable in political terms, in the immediately foreseeable future. But for the EC to let Cyprus in and keep Turkey out would be seen by Turkey as a fresh rebuff.

16. In principle if Kyprianou were determined to pursue his application to join NATO, Papandreou would find it difficult to oppose him. But it is hard to imagine his being enthusiastic given the difficulties he made over Spanish entry. But this would not apply in the case of the EC.

Could Kyprianou deliver?

17. Kyprianou is relatively secure at home on an issue of this nature. He has recently ended his alliance with the Communist party AKEL (which takes approximately 30% of the popular vote) and now governs independently. We believe that he has discussed in general terms the subject of guarantees with the leader of the centre right party, Democratic Rally.

18. Of the two main opposition parties, Democratic Rally might show cautious interest in the idea whereas AKEL would for obvious reasons be opposed. Kyprianou would therefore need to have solid backing both from his own party, DIKO (20% of the popular vote), Rally (approximately 30%) and, if possible, from the smaller parties. The small socialist party EDEK (8% popular support) would be expected to follow the Greek line on the issue.

19. Given AKEL's popularity, the possibility of a left-wing President gaining power in the future exists. His main plank would be to reverse this policy. There is a traditional anti-American and anti-NATO feeling among Cypriots, although the post has detected recently less popular attachment to the principle of non-alignment

than/

than in the past. Such a risk in itself should not influence our assessment of where our interest lies.

20. If membership of NATO would not secure the withdrawal of all Turkish troops, it is difficult to see what other advantages membership of NATO would have for Cyprus except in a general political sense if Kyprianou's objective is to throw his lot in with the west. Cypriots appear to believe that membership of the EC, on the other hand, would bring enormous economic benefit to Cyprus through the CAP. (We believe their industry could not cope with Customs Union, let alone full membership). They might judge it politically and economically worthwhile to join NATO in order to improve their acceptability as member of the EC.

HMG interests

21. [REDACTED]

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

22. [REDACTED]

23./

23. There are no outstanding HMG interests in Cyprus joining the EC not covered in paragraphs 9 and 10 other than the view we take at that time of the value of our bilateral relations with Cyprus. From a UK view, the balance of advantage in strictly community terms would be strongly against having Cyprus as a member.

Conclusions and possible future action

24. There is no certainty that Kyprianou is doing any more than casting around for ideas on guarantees and testing in a general way our likely reaction to Cypriot overtures for a more western-orientated foreign policy. We should want to welcome the latter unreservedly. Entry into NATO and the EC poses a number of difficulties however. It may be that:

- a) if we or others do not react he will drop the idea;
- b) if he pursues it, he will find the Turks will insist on keeping a military presence and then may drop it.

25. If the Cypriots persist and make the idea public:

- a) the Americans might welcome the NATO idea;
- b) the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries are likely to react very badly to both, particularly NATO;
- c) NATO countries are likely to be very cautious; EC countries are most unlikely to want Cyprus as a member;
- d) Turkey would probably reject the NATO idea and Greece would probably be secretly relieved if they did. Turkey would insist on her own right to apply to join the EC; Greece might at least publicly support the Cypriot move.

26. There would probably only be a marginal advantage for the security of the SBA's by having Cyprus in NATO. There are however significant advantages in a NATO presence on Cyprus which we should want to weigh very carefully against the disadvantages. We should want to think very carefully before publicly opposing Cypriot membership of the EC.

27. In present circumstances, we should:

- a) consult when the opportunity arises with the Americans, FRG, French and Italians to see whether they have been approached and to gauge their initial reactions while indicating our own doubts;
- b) (if it is raised again with us) say that we have thought seriously about his ideas and have come to the conclusion that given the likely Turkish reaction it would seriously complicate rather than facilitate a solution to the Cyprus problem. Go on to counsel firmly in private against applying for either body, but in recognition of the problem of Turkish military presence, offer to explore ideas in paragraph 29 below. In the meantime, stress the importance of pressing on with negotiations and the difficulties of moving away from present guarantees in the short term;
- c) make clear to Kyprianou that we would welcome any more general orientation of his foreign policy towards the west.

28. If Kyprianou makes his intentions public we should:

- a) consult with our NATO partners to find if unanimity is likely;
- b) consult our EC partners, but if (as is likely) the idea is clearly a non starter, leave them to make the running in opposing it;

c)/

c) gauge the UN Secretary General's reaction to both;

d) make a judgement then in the light of circumstances of the desirability of our supporting or trying to dissuade Kyprianou on either issue.

29. If it emerges that NATO and EC membership looks impossible we could explore other avenues which might meet favour with Kyprianou:

a) involve other western countries (in a non NATO role) in the guaranteeing of Cyprus. We know that at present the Turks oppose any extension of the guarantee arrangements. But they may as part of a final settlement be prepared to consider the involvement of Islamic and Western states; possibly imagining at present that Kyprianou is thinking of Soviet bloc involvement;

b) pursue the (Greek Cypriot) idea that the military presence of certain muslim countries in northern Cyprus might obviate or minimise the need for a Turkish military presence.

15 FEB 1985



CYPRUS

PS (2)

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)


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RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

19.11.8

FM ANKARA 131630Z FEB 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 121 OF 13 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, NICOSIA, UKMS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON.

INFO PRIORITY ROME, PARIS, BONN, MODUK (SEC(O) AND (C)).

MY TWO IPT'S CYPRUS: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS IN ANKARA

COMMENT

1. THE DEGREE OF TURKISH DISENCHANTMENT WAS CLEAR BOTH WITH KYPRIANOU AND WITH PAPANDREOU WHOM THEY REGARD AS DETERMINED TO MAKE AS MUCH DIFFICULTY FOR THEM AS POSSIBLE. BUT NEITHER HALEFOGLY NOR EVREN SLAMMED THE DOOR ON THE SEARCH FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. INDEED BOTH REAFFIRMED THAT IT WAS TURKEY'S POLICY TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT AND TO SUPPORT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

2. THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE TURKISH POSITION NOW SEEM TO BE:-

(A) THEY WILL ALLOW DENKTASH TO GO AHEAD WITH HIS ELECTIONS AND WITH SOME AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTIONS (BUT SEE PARA 3. BELOW).

(B) THEY HAVE NEITHER WITHDRAWN FROM NOR CONFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE 17 JANUARY PROPOSALS, BUT IN PRACTICE THEY APPEAR TO ACCEPT THAT WHAT HAS BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE CANNOT CREDIBLY BE WITHDRAWN.

ADVANCE COPY

WITHDRAWN.

(C) THEY DECLINE TO BE DRAWN FURTHER ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS BUT THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY STAND BY THE 17 JANUARY FORMULA.

(D) ALTHOUGH DENKTASH HAS NOW STAKED OUT HIS POSITION THAT NEITHER HIGH LEVEL NOR LOWER LEVEL MEETINGS WILL BE POSSIBLE BEFORE 23 JUNE, EVREN'S COMMENT THAT WHILE A SUMMIT BEFORE THEN IS NOT ON, CONTACTS MAY BE POSSIBLE SEEMS A MORE LIKELY FORMULA. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HOLGER CAN ARRANGE "CONTACTS", DENKTASH MIGHT WRIGGLE BUT WOULD NO DOUBT GO ALONG WITH PRESSURE FROM ANKARA.

3. REFERENCE (A) ABOVE, WE HAVE ONE FURTHER GLOSS. IN THE MARGINS OF YESTERDAY'S TALKS ULUCEVIK TOLD MY HEAD OF CHANCERY THAT TURKEY WANTED A MORE EFFICIENT AND STRONGER SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN CYPRUS, OF WHICH INCREASED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS WOULD ONLY BE A PART. HE SEEMED TO BE IMPLYING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ENVISAGED MIGHT BE WIDER RANGING THAN JUST CHANGES TO ENABLE DENKTASH TO STAND FOR A THIRD TERM.

4. MY IMPRESSION FROM YOUR TALKS IS THAT SIR JOHN THOMSON WAS RIGHT WHEN HE SUGGESTED THAT KYPRIANOU IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE BROUGHT TO AGREE ON THE 17 JANUARY PROPOSALS OR SOMETHING VERY CLOSE TO THEM IF A SETTLEMENT IS TO REMAIN ON THE CARDS. ANKARA ARE GOING TO DO LITTLE OR NOTHING TO HELP HIM REACH THAT POSITION. THE TIMESCALE NOW ENVISAGED BY THE TURKS FOR ANY RETURN TO THE SUMMIT PROVIDES AN UNCOMFORTABLY LONG TIME IN WHICH ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS COULD ONLY TOO EASILY TAKE PLACE

RUSSELL

BT

PP 2122

PP 2058

NNNN



From the Honourable
Francis Noel-Baker

N&P
CD 10/2
Nicosia 12/11/85

Dear Margaret,

18 pps. CF

Many thanks for your letter - 4/2/85.

Yes - I will be closely in touch with the UN here in Cyprus.
Our Team is in close touch, too, with the Secretary General.

Best wishes for your 10 years - 10 more, I hope.

Yours ever

Francis

For Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Downing Street.

Cyprus: Int Sit Pt 2.



Handwritten notes in the top right corner, including the words "Cyprus" and "Int Sit Pt 2".

N° 10 ✓

FILE

FOCAB 002/12

DD NO 10 DOWNING STREET DESKBY 121400Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO RETRACT 102
OF 121351Z FEB 85
AND TO IMMEDIATE NO TEN

FOR FCO NEWS DEPT - ATTN COLLIS
FCO ID - ATTN EDMONDS BROWN
NO TEN PRESS OFFICE - ATTN MURRAY

ITEM: WIDE-RANGING HOWE-HALEFOGLU TALKS IN ANKARA.
BY GARY HICKS, LPS CHIEF DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

ANKARA (LPS): WIDE-RANGING TALKS LASTING NEARLY THREE HOURS WERE HELD BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER MR VAHIT HALEFOGLU HERE TODAY (TUESDAY 12 FEBRUARY) ON THE SECOND DAY OF SIR GEOFFREY'S VISIT TO TURKEY, BRITISH SOURCES AFTERWARDS DESCRIBED THE DISCUSSION AS 'FRIENDLY, USEFUL AND SUBSTANTIAL.'

THE 'TETE A TETE', DUE TO LAST 10 MINUTES, CONTINUED FOR TWO HOURS. SIR GEOFFREY VOICED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE JANUARY HIGH LEVEL TALKS ON CYPRUS HAD NOT SUCCEEDED AND THANKED HIS HOST FOR THE ROLE TURKEY CONTINUES TO PLAY IN THE ISSUE. HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT LETTING SLIP THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE UN GENERAL SECRETARY PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INITIATIVE.

MR HALEFOGLU, AGREEING IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE GOING, SAID HE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. FOR IF THERE WERE TO BE A SOLUTION IT MUST BE BY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

THEY DISCUSSED ALSO TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THE TEN-NATION EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. SIR GEOFFREY SAID HIS COUNTRY WANTED TO SEE SUPPORT FOR CLOSER EC-TURKISH COOPERATION, REFLECTING PROGRESS MADE IN TURKEY TOWARD DEMOCRACY. AND HE RECALLED BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO GET THE QUESTION OF AID TO TURKEY UNBLOCKED. MR HALEFOGLU REPLIED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT HELP IN THE EC AND ALSO FOR THE SUPPORT LENT BY BRITISH PARLIAMENTARIANS. HE MADE IT PLAIN THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARISING FROM TURKEY'S TREATY OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMUNITY.

AFTER SIR GEOFFREY HAD MENTIONED EC PUBLIC OPINION OVER THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN TURKEY AS ONE FACTOR IN THE ISSUE, IT WAS STRESSED THAT TURKEY WAS MAKING AS RAPID PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE AND THAT MANY OF THE CRITICISMS WERE MISINFORMED.

THE 50-MINUTE PLENARY SESSION, INVOLVING OFFICIALS, REVIEWED THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ON IRAN-IRAQ, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO END THE LONG WAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DISCUSSING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID IF ISRAEL WITHDREW ON 18 FEBRUARY AS INTENDED, THE MOVE SHOULD NOT LEAD TO DISORDER. HE THOUGHT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL) HAD A ROLE TO PLAY.

ON THE BROADER ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE. MR HALEFOGLU SAID THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS THE KEY. VIEWS WERE EXCHANGED ON THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION'S (PLO) RELATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT.

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SIR GEOFFREY REITERATED WELL-KNOWN BRITISH POSITIONS ON THE US-USSR GENEVA TALKS DUE TO START IN MARCH, AGAIN DESCRIBING THEM AS 'THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING'. HE ALSO GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS VISIT TO BUCHAREST AND SOFIA, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF ETHNIC TURKS IN BULGARIA WHICH HAD COME UP IN HIS TALKS WITH WITH BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV.

AS REQUESTED, HE CONVEYED TO MR HALEFOGLU THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY MR MLADENOV FOR THE CONTINUATION OF GOOD TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS (LPS)

ENDS

COI LONDON

ADVANCE COPIES

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CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS.

MR JENKINS

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HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

19.11.

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DESKBY FCO AND ANKARA 112030Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM 44 OF 11 FEBRUARY 85.

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY ANKARA.

INFO IMMEDIATE UK MIS NEW YORK.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, WASHINGTON.

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME.

INFO SAVING MODUK, CBFC, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM SED DUTY OFFICER.

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 98 : CYPRUS.

SUMMARY.

A PROMPT NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM DENKTASH TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS FOR NEW MEETINGS. A TEMPORISING REPLY

FROM PRESIDENT KYRIAKOU

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

mf

mf

GENERAL'S PROPOSALS FOR NEW MEETINGS. A TEMPORISING REPLY
FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.

1. ACTING ON HIS INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH FOLLOW THE LINES OF UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 70 BUT APPEAR TO BE RATHER LESS DETAILED, HOLGER SAW MAVROMMATIS ON 8 FEBRUARY AND ERTEKUN ON 11 FEBRUARY (THE LATTER NOT HAVING BEEN AVAILABLE EARLIER). HOLGER ASKED FOR VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN THE LATTER PART OF MARCH, TO BE PRECEDED BY A LOWER LEVEL MEETING IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH PROBABLY IN GENEVA, WHICH WOULD CONSIDER A NEW DRAFT AGREEMENT. (ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS THE LOWER LEVEL MEETING WOULD BE ATTENDED ON THE UN SIDE BY HOLGER SUPPORTED FROM NEW YORK BY FEISSEL AND PICCO). BOTH MAVROMMATIS AND ERTEKUN SAID THEY WOULD REFER UPWARDS.

2. DENKTASH WAS THE FIRST TO RESPOND. IN A TELEPHONE CALL TO HOLGER SHORTLY AFTER THE APPROACH HE SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF HIM OR ERTEKUN ATTENDING SUCH MEETINGS IN ADVANCE OF ELECTIONS. THE ELECTIONS WERE TO OBTAIN A MANDATE FOR JUST THAT PURPOSE : TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE TO "INSULT HIS PEOPLE". HE HOPED THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD NOT PLACE HIM IN THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF HAVING TO REPLY NEGATIVELY TO A FORMAL INVITATION.

3. MAVROMMATIS, TO WHRMEHOLGER SAID NOTHING OF DENKTASH'S RESPONSE, SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD HOLGER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD GIVE A REPLY AFTER HE HAD SEEN THE NEW DRAFT AGREEMENT. MAVROMMATIS SOMEWHAT APOLOGETICALLY ALLUDED TO THE SEVERE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS KYPRIANOU NOW FACED. HOLGER IS ASKING NEW YORK TO EXPEDITE THE DRAFT.

4. KYPRIANOU'S VACILLATION IS UNHELPFUL, AND IT MAY IN DUE COURSE BE NECESSARY TO URGE ON HIM A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE IF THE INTERNAL PRESSURES DO NOT THEMSELVES DO THE TRICK. BUT THE FIRST NEED SEEMS TO BE FOR DENKTASH TO BE SHIFTED FROM HIS PRESENT RIGID POSITION ON WHICH THERE IS A RISK THAT HE WILL GO PUBLIC. NOTHING HE OR ERTEKUN SAID TO HOLGER SUGGESTED THAT IT HAD ANKARA+S BACKING, THOUGH ERTEKUN REFERRED TO THE POWERFUL INTERNAL PRESSURES ON DENKTASH, ESPECIALLY FROM HIS FORMER ALLIES ON THE RIGHT.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RESTRICTED



me

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 February 1985

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of the Turkish Prime Minister's reply to the Prime Minister's message about the failure of the high-level talks on Cyprus. I assume that this was available to the Foreign Secretary before he left for Ankara: if not you will no doubt wish to telegraph it. I do not think a reply is called for.

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

JR

TURKISH EMBASSY
LONDON

37-85

CPC

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. presents his compliments to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to request that the enclosed text of a message by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Turgut Özal, to the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, may be forwarded to its high destination.

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurance of his highest consideration.

London, 9th February 1985.



Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
LONDON, SW1A 2AL.

cc .ops
master

SERIAL NO. T 22/85
PERSONAL MESSAGE
PRIME MINISTER'S

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE TO THE RT.HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, MR. TURGUT ÖZAL.

see pm's message
at flap

"Dear Prime Minister,

I share your disappointment over the failure of the summit meeting in New York on the Cyprus question. As a matter of fact, due to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side the meeting did not result in the conclusion of an agreement despite the constructive efforts and the maximum flexibility President Denktas has shown during the proximity negotiations that preceded the summit. President Denktas had gone to the New York summit with the expectation that an agreement would be concluded to pave the way to a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. I believe that this was a legitimate expectation on the part of President Denktas, after five months of hard bargaining. I understand that the Greek Cypriot side tried to re-open negotiations virtually on all the points of the Secretary General's documentation presented as an integrated whole.

The New York experience points again to the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side alone can not secure the breakthrough for a negotiated settlement. The Turkish Cypriot side made the maximum possible effort while the Greek Cypriot side contested even agreed concepts and principles. As I already pointed out in my earlier message to you before the New York summit, my Government has done its utmost to encourage Mr. Denktas to show the maximum flexibility. This, he has done. It is clearly the Greek Cypriot side that should now be made aware of the adverse implications of their policies and tactics and convinced of the necessity to adopt a constructive attitude. I am sure you would appreciate the fact that the establishment of a climate of mutual confidence, as has always been emphasized by the U.N. Secretary General, is of paramount importance in the search for an agreed solution. For this reason, the Greek Cypriot side must understand that the tactic of pocketing what is offered and then asking for more, can not but lead to a further loss of trust on the part of the Turkish Cypriots towards their Greek counterparts.

We understand that the Turkish Cypriots are at present engaged in the process of assessing the situation. As for the decision of the Turkish Cypriots to address their internal political problems through usual democratic procedures, I am sure you will agree that this is an internal affair of the Turkish Cypriots and a part of the democratic way of life they have chosen for themselves.

./..

There is no doubt that a solution in Cyprus can only be achieved through negotiations between the two sides. President Denktas has not closed the door to further meetings with Mr. Kyprianou as and when the conditions justify such a meeting.

We continue to support the U.N. Secretary General's good offices mission and remain committed to a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus."

Cypress
Int Site Pt. 2

GR 400

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DESKBY 080930Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 072318Z FEB 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE MODUK (SEC (O) (C))

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, ROME.

MIPT: **CYPRUS**

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR OUR ASSISTANCE WITH THE TURKS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE ASSURANCE GIVEN TO HIM BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON ON 23 JANUARY THAT HE COULD COUNT ON OUR SUPPORT IN CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS. HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN, AS HE STATED PUBLICLY IN HIS REPORT ON THE FAILED HIGH-LEVEL MEETING, IS THAT THE ADVANCES THAT WERE MADE UP TO 17 JANUARY SHOULD BE PRESERVED AND THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD TAKE STEPS IN THE WAKE OF THE FAILURE OF THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING THAT WOULD MAKE A RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER HIS AUSPICES MORE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

2. SO FAR AS THE TURKISH SIDE IS CONCERNED, THIS MEANS THAT DENKTASH CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO RESILE FROM HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCUMENTATION PREPARED FOR THE JANUARY MEETING. NOR CAN HE BE ALLOWED TO EXCLUDE AN EARLY SECOND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE MUST HOLD ELECTIONS IN JUNE FIRST. TURKMEN'S COMMENTS ON THIS ASPECT ARE ENCOURAGING BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT WANT TO URGE THE TURKS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL NOT TO LET DENKTASH OFF THE LEASH. HIS PREVIOUS RECORD IS SUCH THAT WE CANNOT COUNT ON HIS ESCHEWING THE CREATION OF FAITS ACCOMPLIS WHICH WILL GIVE THE GREEK SIDE THE EXCUSE EITHER TO DEMAND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WHOLE NEW BASIS FOR A SECOND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OR TO BRING THE ISSUE BACK THE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. 'INTERNATIONALISATION' WOULD BE THE KISS OF DEATH FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS.

3. THIS LATTER CONSIDERATION, COMBINED WITH THE PRESENT DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON KYPRIANOU TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, SUGGESTS THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS RIGHT TO THINK IN TERMS OF A NEW HIGH-LEVEL MEETING SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. HE IS ALSO RIGHT TO PLAN ON GETTING ASSURANCES OF SUCCESS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH A MEETING. ANOTHER FAILED SUMMIT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. HIS SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC TURKISH UNDERTAKING ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS HAS TO BE SEEN AS PART OF A TACTICAL SITUATION IN WHICH KYPRIANOU HAS TO BE INDUCED TO CLIMB DOWN GRACEFULLY AGAINST THE RISK (VERY MUCH EVIDENT IN TURKISH MINDS) THAT KYPRIANOU WILL SIMPLY POCKET ANY TURKISH CONCESSION. IT MAY BE THAT EVEN TO SUGGEST THAT THE TURKS MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD COMPROMISE OUR INFLUENCE IN ANKARA. IF SO, PERHAPS THE MOST YOU COULD AIM FOR WOULD BE A PRIVATE ASSURANCE TO YOURSELF THAT YOU MIGHT PASS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

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4. I SHARE THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE DOCUMENTATION PREPARED FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN JANUARY WAS, IF NOT IDEAL, VERY NEARLY THE BEST KYPRIANOU COULD GET. I THINK THE ONLY CHANCE, HOWEVER SLIM, OF GETTING SETTLEMENT LIES IN HIS ACCEPTING THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT DOCUMENTATION. HE APPEARS TO HAVE COME CLOSE TO DOING SO AT THE END OF THE MEETING THOUGH BY THAT TIME HE HAD LOST THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE AND GIVEN DENKTASH THE EXCUSE TO STAND PAT. EQUALLY, SINCE HE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SIGN EXACTLY WHAT HE REJECTED, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME COSMETIC CHANGES TO THE DOCUMENTATION. IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME TURKMEN DID NOT RULE OUT SOME COSMETIC REPACKAGING. THIS IS ALSO A POINT WHICH YOU MIGHT WANT TO PURSUE IN ANKARA.

FCO PSE PASS [✓] SAVING

THOMSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR WESTON

MR RENWICK

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

MR BRAITHWAITE

SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

BUCKINGHAM PALACE 2

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10 DOWNING STREET

6 February 1985

From the Private Secretary

CYPRUS

As you are aware, President Kyprianou is pressing for a further meeting with the Prime Minister and has proposed 14 or 15 February.

The Cyprus High Commissioner telephoned me about this this morning. I explained to him that there was no prospect of the Prime Minister being able to see President Kyprianou before her visit to Washington. He accepted this but said he needed to be able to reassure the President that there had not been a change of mood in London and the Prime Minister's invitation to the President to keep in close touch with her withdrawn. I said that this was an absurd theory which I did not believe could be held by President Kyprianou. The Prime Minister had devoted a great deal of time to him and of course remained ready to see him at times convenient to both of them. I said I would be in touch to suggest a date on which the Prime Minister could see the President.

br-f I should be grateful if you could now offer a meeting with the Prime Minister on Thursday 28 February from 1700 hours to 1800 hours.

C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ea



10 DOWNING STREET

Charles,

Colin Budd
telephoned:

"Only reaction from
the Cypriots was a
stunned silence".

He said you would
understand!

SUE

5.2.85.

File

JR

~~For I.H.A.~~



cc: MA (for info)

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 February 1985

Dear Francis,

Many thanks for your letter of 28 January. The outcome of the high-level talks between President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash was indeed disappointing. We continue to support the UN Secretary General's efforts and he is clearly determined to try to organise a further meeting between the parties. I have encouraged him in this and hope that nothing will be done which cuts across his activities. I was pleased, therefore, to see from your letter that you have offered your services to him.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable Francis Noel-Baker

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CDP
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 January, 1985

Dear Charles,

Cyprus

Mr Prime Minister
CDP

31/1

In the No 10 press office bulletin issued after the visit of Kyprianou on 14 January (attached) it was reported that "the Prime Minister repeated our support for a unitary Cyprus".

The word "unitary", although, as far as an English dictionary is concerned, synonymous with "unified", appears to upset the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. They interpret it as implying the very opposite of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation as proposed in the UN Secretary General's draft high level agreement. We understand that, constitutionally, a "unitary" state does imply a concentration of authority in central government which would be inconsistent with those proposals. The Turks have complained to us in London, New York and Nicosia, finding it difficult to accept that all we mean by it is a single state of Cyprus.

As far as we are aware, the first time "unitary" was used in relation to our aspirations for Cyprus was by the Prime Minister during questions in the House on 12 June 1984 (extract attached). Since then we have adopted the word in contacts with Parliament and the Press. However, in view of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sensitivities and the current delicate situation in Cyprus, we believe it would be prudent to substitute the word "unified" for "unitary" in any future statements we may make.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

date:

14/1/85

*Copies all rec
dt.*

NO 2

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

The PM had a further exchange with President Kyprianou on the Cyprus issue, for just over one hour on Monday 14 January. Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Cyprus High Commissioner were also present.

The President brought her up-to-date on the preparations for the high level meeting scheduled to take place in New York on 17 January. The Prime Minister repeated our support for a unitary Cyprus, and expressed her full confidence in the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring about a solution to the problem. The two agreed to keep in close touch.

IRM

DATE : 12. 6. 84.

COL: 757-8

VOL: 61

Mr. Atkinson: Is the Prime Minister aware that Mr. Denktash and some other Turkish-speaking Cypriots are shortly to host a dinner at the Savoy hotel which 40 or 50 of the Prime Minister's Back Benchers will attend and which will be addressed by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) who will associate the Tory party with the Turkish annexation of Cyprus? Will she dissociate herself from that annexation and assure the House that no Government facilities will be made available for any trade negotiations during Mr. Denktash's visit to the United Kingdom?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman is aware, the Government have condemned the attempts to declare

an independent northern Cyprus. The Government wish there to be a unitary state of Cyprus and have supported and will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring both sides together to achieve the restoration of a unitary state of Cyprus. With regard to other matters, right hon. and hon. Members are free to do as they wish.

ADVANCE COPIES

15

CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No. 10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

19.11.84

IMMEDIATE

GRS 780

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY

FM ANKARA 311500Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 31 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND
MODUK (SEC (O) (C)).

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, PARIS AND BONN

MY TELNO 065: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE TURKISH POSITION IS PRETTY UNYIELDING. IN SUMMARY
ULUCEVIK HAS SAID THAT THEY ENDORSE THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN
JUNE, DENKTASH'S WITHDRAWAL OF THE 'CONCESSIONS' IN THE DRAFT
AGREEMENT AND HIS REFUSAL TO RESUME FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL
AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

DETAIL

2. AS FOLLOW UP TO MY CALL ON HALEFOGLU ON 25 JANUARY MY
COUNSELLOR CALLED YESTERDAY ON ULUCEVIK FOR AN INFORMAL BUT
FULL (75 MINUTES) DISCUSSION ON HOW THE TURKS SEE NEXT STEPS.

3. ULUCEVIK, WHO WAS CLEARLY DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND DISAPPOINTED AT THE OUTCOME, WAS VERY BITTER AT WHAT HE TERMED
KYPRIANOU'S OBVIOUS LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.
HE DESCRIBED THE GREEK CYPRIOT TACTICS AS BEING TO ACHIEVE ONE SET
OF CONCESSIONS FROM DENKTASH AND THEN TO USE THESE AS A
SPRING-BOARD FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE YET FURTHER ADVANTAGES.
THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TURKISH SIDE WHO HAD TAKEN SERIOUSLY
THE EARLIER ADVICE OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY SHOULD ASSEMBLE
A REASONABLE AND FINAL NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH WOULD EITHER BE
SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OR, IF THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING,
A DEFENSIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR GOODWILL.

4. ULUCEVIK ADMITTED THAT DENKTASH HAD HIMSELF DECIDED TO CALL
ELECTIONS BEFORE INFORMING ANKARA. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF BOTH THE
NEED FOR DENKTASH TO SECURE A NEW MANDATE FOR FRESH NEGOTIATIONS
AND OF THE STRONG CRITICISMS BOTH IN NORTHERN CYPRUS AND IN TURKEY
OF THE CONCESSIONS ALREADY GRANTED, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD

NEED FOR DENKTASH TO SECURE A NEW MANDATE FOR FRESH NEGOTIATIONS AND OF THE STRONG CRITICISMS BOTH IN NORTHERN CYPRUS AND IN TURKEY OF THE CONCESSIONS ALREADY GRANTED, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD ONLY ENDORSE HIS DECISION. IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY TO CONVINCE DENKTASH TO GO AS FAR AS HE HAD: HE FELT HIS OWN SCEPTICISM OF GREEK CYPRIOT INTENTIONS HAD BEEN JUSTIFIED AND IN ANY CASE THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION IN ANKARA TO PUSH HIM FURTHER NOW. VARCOE REFERRED TO THE NEED TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE RESUMPTION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE, BUT ULUCEVIK BRUSHED THIS ASIDE SAYING THAT EARLIER CONSTITUTIONAL MOVES HAD NOT IN PRACTICE PREVENTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL FROM MOUNTING HIS GOOD OFFICES OPERATION AND THAT THE STATEHOOD PROCESS COULD BE HALTED AT ANY TIME IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS PROSPECT OF ESTABLISHING A BI-ZONAL BI-COMUNAL FEDERATION. THE JUNE ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE HELD UNDER THE 1975 CONSTITUTION AS IT STOOD AND ULUCEVIK THOUGHT IT QUITE PROBABLE THAT EITHER AMENDMENTS WOULD BE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THE 1983 CHANGES (HE OVER THE PRESIDENCY) OR A NEW CONSTITUTION MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT BEFORE THE ELECTIONS.

5. AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON 26 JANUARY CYPRUS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF TURCO-GREEK RELATIONS. THE MEETING HAD IN EFFECT ENDORSED DECISIONS TAKEN EARLIER "AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL" WHICH WAS FULLY TO SUPPORT DENKTASH IN WITHDRAWING THE CONCESSIONS INCORPORATED INTO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SUMMIT DOCUMENTATION. ANKARA ALSO SUPPORTED DENKTASH'S REFUSAL TO HOLD ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION THOUGH THIS DID NOT RULE OUT INFORMAL CONTACTS, DIRECT OR THROUGH THE UN, WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE (CF PARA 3 OF NICOSIA TELNO 27).

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE TURKISH POSITION ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, ULUCEVIK WAS VAGUE. HE SAID THAT THIS, LIKE ALL THE OTHER ISSUES, COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH IN ISOLATION BUT WERE RELATED TO AN OVERALL PACKAGE. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL, OR FIGURES, UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR AS TO PRECISELY THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE REACHED WHEN TROOPS HAD TO BE WITHDRAWN. SIMILARLY HE REJECTED THE IDEA THAT LIMITED MEASURES FOR DE-CONFRONTATION (SUCH AS THE DRAWING BACK OF MILITARY POSTS WHICH VARCOE SAID DENKTASH HAD MENTIONED TO MR WILBERFORCE DURING THEIR LAST MEETING) COULD BE PURSUED IN ADVANCE AND INDEPENDENTLY OF WIDER NEGOTIATIONS AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING MOMENTUM DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.

7. ULUCEVIK REITERATED THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TO PUT PRESSURE ON KYPRIANOU TO DEMONSTRATE WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE REALISTICALLY. BUT HIS GOVERNMENT REMAINED COMMITTED TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT AND THEREFORE HOPED THAT HIGH LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE RESUMED ONCE ELECTIONS WERE OVER.

8. ULUCEVIK SAID THAT OZAL'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (FCO TELNO 33) HAD BEEN PREPARED AND WOULD SOON BE CONVEYED TO US.

9. FOR COMMENT SEE MIFT.

RUSSELL
BT

NNNNW

CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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~~HD/SED~~

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

DESKBY 301230Z FCO.

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE



CONFIDENTIAL

FM NICOSIA 301110Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 29 OF 30 JANUARY 85.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
MODUK (SEC(O)(C)).

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, PARIS, BONN.

YOUR TEL 19 : CALL ON KYPRIANOU : 30 JANUARY.

SUMMARY.

KYPRIANOU KEEN TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM BY PURSUING HIS PROPOSAL FOR A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH WOULD DISCUSS THE FOUR MAIN ISSUES AND REMIT CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS TO A WORKING GROUP. SUGGESTION OF DISCUSSING THE THREE FREEDOMS IN CONJUNCTION WITH TERRITORY, AND GUARANTEES IN CONJUNCTION WITH TROOP WITHDRAWALS. PROBLEM OVER THE VENUE OF A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING. POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH IN NICOSIA TO SORT OUT THE BASIS OF ONE.

DETAIL.

1. ALTHOUGH KYPRIANOU IS COMING IN FOR CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CRITICISM, HE DID NOT FIND HIM PARTICULARLY TENSE OR ANXIOUS. AFTER HE HAD GIVEN HIM MY IMPRESSION OF DENKTASH'S REASONS FOR HOLDING ELECTIONS AND OF HIS CURRENT GENERAL APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, KYPRIANOU DID NOT UTTER A WORD OF THE WORRIES WHICH PANAYIDES EXPRESSED IN LONDON ABOUT THE DECISION ON ELECTIONS. INSTEAD, OUR DISCUSSION FOCUSED IN A POSITIVE WAY ON HOW TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM OF NEGOTIATIONS. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADVICE IN HER RECENT MESSAGE (YOUR TEL 16), TO WHICH HE WOULD BE REPLYING, WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH HIS OWN THINKING.

2. KYPRIANOU ARGUED THAT PROGRESS ON THE MAIN ISSUES COULD ONLY COME IN NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LEVEL OF DENKTASH AND HIMSELF, AND HE WAS THEREFORE KEEN TO PURSUE THE PROPOSAL HE HAD PUT FORWARD IN NEW YORK FOR A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH WOULD TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE FOUR MAIN ISSUES AND AGREE TO REMIT CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS TO A WORKING GROUP. HE DID NOT THINK THAT HOLGER WAS CAPABLE OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE DELICATE ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE THROUGH A UN SHUTTLE IN NICOSIA. (BOTH MACOVOU AND MAVROMMATIS HAVE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT TO US ON LEARNING THAT THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL DID NOT INTEND AT PRESENT TO APPOINT A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE). WITHOUT COMMITMENT, KYPRIANOU VOICED THE IDEA THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE EASIER IF THE SUBJECT OF THE THREE FREEDOMS WERE DISCUSSED IN CONJUNCTION WITH TERRITORY, AND GUARANTEES IN CONJUNCTION

IN CONJUNCTION WITH TERRITORY, AND GUARANTEES IN CONJUNCTION WITH TROOP WITHDRAWALS (EVEN THOUGH IN PRINCIPLE HE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THERE WAS A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE LATTER TWO). THIS IDEA WOULD FIT IN WITH THE INTEGRATED WHOLE APPROACH. HE ENCOURAGED HIM IN THIS.

3. DESPITE MY WARNING KYPRIANOU REPEATEDLY THAT HE DID NOT THINK DENKTASH WOULD GO, BEFORE HIS ELECTION, TO A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN NEW YORK, THOUGH HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN NICOSIA, KYPRIANOU APPEARED ADAMANT THAT NEW YORK SHOULD BE THE VENUE. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP PRIVATE THE CONTENT OF ANY MEETING IN CYPRUS (THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THE SAME APPLIED TO NEW YORK) AND THAT IF A MEETING WERE HELD HERE BOTH HE AND DENKTASH WOULD FIND THEMSELVES THE PRISONER OF POLITICAL FORCES. (ON 29 JANUARY, HOWEVER, MAVROMMATIS HAD ACTUALLY ADVANCED TO ME THE SUGGESTION THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHOULD COME TO NICOSIA FOR A SHORT HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITH A LIMITED AGENDA, WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO AROUSE UNDUE EXPECTATIONS : SO THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT KYPRIANOU MIGHT BE BROUGHT ROUND TO THIS). IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, KYPRIANOU DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PREPARATORY MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND DENKTASH IN NICOSIA TO SORT OUT THE BASIS FOR A SUBSTANTIVE HIGH LEVEL MEETING. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HE HAD NO FIXED VIEWS ON THE TIMING OF THE LATTER, BUT THE SOONER THE BETTER.

4. WE AGREED GOOD-HUMOUREDLY NOT TO RAKE OVER THE ASHES OF THE NEW YORK MEETING, SINCE PLENTY OF OTHER PEOPLE WERE DOING THAT. BUT AT ONE POINT, WHEN KYPRIANOU STARTED SPECULATING ABOUT THE REASONS FOR TURKISH INFLEXIBILITY, HE GAVE HIM MY VIEW THAT, AFTER THEIR TWO MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN NOVEMBER THE REPEATED TURKISH MESSAGES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS REPRESENTED A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT IT WAS NOW KYPRIANOU'S TURN TO MOVE AND THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WHEN HE HAD FAILED TO DO SO. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WANTED THE NEGOTIATIONS EITHER TO STOP OR TO FAIL. KYPRIANOU DID NOT PROTEST AT ANY OF THIS. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT REGARD THE NEW YORK MEETING AS A COMPLETE FAILURE SINCE A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP HAD PREVAILED THROUGHOUT BETWEEN DENKTASH AND HIMSELF. HE EVEN PAID TRIBUTE TO DENKTASH FOR HIS CONCILIATORY AND EASY MANNER. HE DID NOT APPEAR, HOWEVER, TO HAVE ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION OF FOLLOWING UP DENKTASH'S SUGGESTION FOR INFORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM IN NICOSIA.

CONCLUSION.

5. IT WILL TAKE MORE TIME AND CONTACTS (ESPECIALLY BY THE UN) BEFORE IT BECOMES CLEAR HOW BEST THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS CAN BE CARRIED FORWARD. BUT I AM NOT TOO DISCOURAGED BY THE MEETINGS I HAVE HAD WITH DENKTASH AND KYPRIANOU.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WILBERFORCE
BT

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15

CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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HD/SED

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DEP HD/PUSD (2)

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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE



IMMEDIATE

GR 870

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKEY 291600Z (FCO)

FM NICOSIA 291415Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 27 OF 29 JANUARY 85.

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (SEC (U)(C)).

INFO SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG, ROME, PARIS, BONN.

YOUR TEL 18 : MEETING WITH DENKTASH : 29 JANUARY.

SUMMARY.

DENKTASH INSISTENT THAT ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE BEFORE A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING, BUT OPEN TO CONTINUED CONTACTS IN NICOSIA EITHER DIRECT OR THROUGH THE UN. HIS READINESS TO STUDY THE MODALITIES OF DEMILITARISATION AND TO CONSIDER STARTING MEASURES FOR MILITARY DECONFRONTATION.

1. I DECIDED TO GIVE THE POINTS IN PARAS 3 TO 5 OF YOUR TUR TO DENKTASH IN WRITING. HE TOOK THEM KINDLY, DESCRIBING THEM AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND APPRECIATIVE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PARTIES WERE IN A SENSE CLOSER TOGETHER THAN PREVIOUSLY. INSOFAR AS THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS THE MAIN ISSUES, THOUGH HE CHARGED THAT KYPRIANOU'S IDEAS ABOUT THE THREE FREEDOMS TOTALLY UNDERMINED THE PRINCIPLE OF BI-ZONALITY.

2. AS I EXPECTED, DENKTASH SAID THAT HE HAD WARNED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IN KYPRIANOU'S PRESENCE, THAT BECAUSE

SECRETARY GENERAL, IN KYPRIANOU'S PRESENCE, THAT BECAUSE OF THE POPULAR MISGIVINGS WHICH HAD BEEN WHIPPED UP (INCLUDING BY SOME MEMBERS OF HIS OWN PARTY, WHOM HE HAD JUST BEEN TICKING OFF) ABOUT THE KIND OF SETTLEMENT HE WAS PURSUING, HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN ORDER TO CLEAR THE AIR AND GET A PROPER MANDATE. HE SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD IMMEDIATELY COMMENTED TO KYPRIANOU THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE MIGHT NEED TO DO THE SAME, TO WHICH KYPRIANOU HAD ASSENTED. THIS, DENKTASH THOUGHT, ACCOUNTED FOR THE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE NORTH. DENKTASH EXPLAINED THAT THE REASONS FOR THE CHOICE OF JUNE WERE THAT THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS (EG FOR VOTER REGISTRATION) MEANT THAT ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE HELD BEFORE 15 MAY AT THE EARLIEST, AND THAT IT WAS ONLY SENSIBLE TO WAIT UNTIL JUNE SO THAT THE FOUR THOUSAND CYPRIOT STUDENTS IN TURKEY COULD RETURN AND VOTE. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE INTENDED TO RUN AS AN INDEPENDENT FOR THE PRESIDENCY BUT WITH THE SUPPORT, HE HOPED, OF MORE THAN ONE PARTY.

3. ALTHOUGH DENKTASH MAINTAINED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL AGITATION IN THE NORTH, HE COULD NOT ATTEND A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING BEFORE THE ELECTIONS AND THAT IN ANY CASE THERE WAS NO POINT IN HAVING A RE-RUN OF THE NEW YORK MEETING, HE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD ASSURED KYPRIANOU THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO REMAIN IN CONTACT IN NICOSIA EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH A SHUTTLE CONDUCTED BY HOLGER (I DETECTED A POLITICAL PREFERENCE FOR THE LATTER, AS BEING LOWER PROFILE). IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, DENKTASH CONFIRMED THAT, EVEN DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, HE WOULD BE READY TO ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM THROUGH SUCH CONTACTS. THE PERIOD NEED NOT THEREFORE BE WASTED.

4. WHEN I INVITED DENKTASH TO DEFINE THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH SIDE ON THE LEVEL OF FORCES WHICH TURKEY WOULD NEED TO RETAIN IN CYPRUS, HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. THE FOCUS HAD BEEN RATHER ON THE NECESSITY FOR RETAINING THE TURKISH GUARANTEE. HE ASKED ABOUT THE BRITISH POSITION ON REMAINING A GUARANTOR POWER. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS A FORMAL POSITION ON THIS YET BUT I THOUGHT THERE WAS A CLEAR CONSENSUS AMONG OFFICIALS IN FAVOUR OF STICKING WITH THE 1960 TREATY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY, IF NOT IMPOSSIBILITY, OF THE PARTIES REACHING AGREEMENT ON ANYTHING ELSE.

D W F 6 214/27

5. WHEN I MENTIONED TO DENKTASH THE GREAT PROMINENCE GIVEN BY GREEK CYPRIOTS TO THE TROOP WITHDRAWALS ISSUE AND SUGGESTED, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, THAT IT MIGHT BE POLITICALLY HELPFUL IF HE INVITED THE UN TO PRODUCE AN OUTLINE SCHEME OF ALL THE VARIOUS STEPS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN IN A CAREFULLY PHASED PROGRAMME OF DEMILITARISATION, HE SAID THAT HE FEARED THIS WOULD LEAK AND ONLY INCREASE THE POPULAR MISGIVINGS IN THE NORTH ABOUT ANY WEAKENING OF TURKEY'S ABILITY TO PROTECT THEM. HE ASKED ME TO KEEP CONFIDENTIAL THE FACT THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED HIS OWN MILITARY PEOPLE TO STUDY THE MODALITIES OF DEMILITARISATION. HE WAS HOWEVER MORE FORTHCOMING ON TWO OTHER THINGS THAT MIGHT BE DONE IN THIS FIELD:-

WOULD LEAK AND ONLY INCREASE THE POPULAR MISGIVINGS IN THE NORTH ABOUT ANY WEAKENING OF TURKEY'S ABILITY TO PROTECT THEM. HE ASKED ME TO KEEP CONFIDENTIAL THE FACT THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED HIS OWN MILITARY PEOPLE TO STUDY THE MODALITIES OF DEMILITARISATION. HE WAS HOWEVER MORE FORTHCOMING ON TWO OTHER THINGS THAT MIGHT BE DONE IN THIS FIELD:-

(A) HE SEEMED UNAWARE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH MINES HAS BEEN LAID BY BOTH SIDES IN FRONT OF AND ALONG THEIR CEASE-FIRE LINES, AND OF THE PRACTICAL DELAY WHICH THIS COULD IMPOSE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT. HE UNDERTOOK TO FOLLOW UP WITH HIS MILITARY PEOPLE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A PROPOSAL TO START LIFTING THESE MINES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

(B) HE HIMSELF SUGGESTED THAT UNFICYP SHOULD PURSUE THEIR IDEAS FOR DECONFRONTATION MEASURES, PARTICULARLY BY THE DRAWING BACK OF MILITARY POSTS IN NICOSIA, WHERE THEY ARE SO DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TOGETHER. HE MIGHT INCLUDE THIS SUGGESTION, AS A GESTURE OF GOODWILL, IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

6. I HAVE DEBRIEFED HOLGER (UN), WHO IS RESUMING HIS OWN CONTACTS, AS IS MY U.S. COLLEAGUE. KYPRIANOU HAS GIVEN ME AN APPOINTMENT FOR TOMORROW, AND I WILL REPORT AGAIN THEREAFTER.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WILBERFORCE

BT

NNNND

SECRET
NO J. P. 1954



10 DOWNING STREET

MA

Do you want to
reply to this? I

can do you a

draft. Or should the
PM reply?

COP

Charles - Michael thinks that the Prime Minister should sign the letter. He is seeing Francis Noel-Baker on 12th February and could take any letter with him.

1.2.85

Tessa

R30

From the Honourable
Francis Noel-Baker

London 28: 85

Mr Powell

Dear Margaret,

May we tell you about our Team of neutrals which is still 'in the wings' for Cyprus? We are: Ludwig Steiner MP (probably next Austrian Foreign Minister), Auguste Lindt (ex-UN High Commissioner for Refugees), Sverker Åström (ex-head of the Swedish Foreign Office) and Nias Disdarević (Member of the Yugoslav Central Committee and brother of the Foreign Minister), and myself.

We have offered our services to the Secretary General to Cyprianos and Denktas, and I hope to meet Perez in London next month... and perhaps yourself at the Speaker's reception for him.

Sadly, my predictions about the failure of the 'proximity talks' was right. What is needed is an unpublicised shuttle until all points are settled.

With all good wishes

Yours ever

Francis

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MB

ADVANCE COPIES

520

CYPRUS

PS (C)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR JENKINS

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

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IMMEDIATE



CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260900Z

FM ANKARA 260900Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 065 OF 26 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY FIRST CONTACT) TO NICOSIA, ATHENS UKMIS
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.
ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (SEC(O)(C)), PARIS,
BOKN, ROME STRASBOURG.

YOUR TELNO 033: CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE

SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE DELIVERED THROUGH HALEFOGLU.
HE WAS FRIENDLY BUT GAVE NOTHING AWAY. DENKTASH HAS ANNOUNCED
ELECTIONS FOR 23 JUNE. BUT ANKARA MAY NOT HAVE MADE UP THEIR
MIND HOW TO PLAY THEIR HAND. THERE IS A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY.

DETAIL

2. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MR OZAL THROUGH
HALEFOGLU YESTERDAY EVENING. IN DOING SO I EXPLAINED THAT MRS
THATCHER'S MESSAGE WAS THE RESULT OF TALKS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY
GENERAL, THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF IN LONDON ON 23 JANUARY.
THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD UNDERLINED HIS DETERMINATION TO CARRY
ON WITH HIS EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.
PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO NEITHER
SIDE DOING ANYTHING MEANWHILE WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PROCESS OF
REACHING AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. WE RECOGNISED THE HELPFUL
INFLUENCE WHICH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR ON
DENKTASH BEFORE THE NEW YORK SUMMIT. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS
ASKING MR OZAL THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE
THEIR INFLUENCE. SPECIFICALLY IT WAS VITAL THAT MR DENKTASH
SHOULD NOT TAKE FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION
OF NORTHERN CYPRUS. MRS THATCHER HAD ALSO WRITTEN TO KYPRIANOU.

3. HALEFOGLU SAID THAT THE POSITION IN CYPRUS WAS NOT EQUAL.
THE GREEKS HAD RECOGNITION AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. THE TURKS
HAD NEITHER. THEY COULD NOT GO ON INDEFINITELY LIVING WITH THIS
UNEQUAL STATUS. MOREOVER DENKTASH PERSONALLY WAS IN A VERY
DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION AT HOME. HE NEEDED TO DO SOMETHING.
TURKEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO SEE HIM "HANG HIMSELF". HIS
LEADERSHIP WAS INDISPENSIBLE. IF HE WERE TO BE POLITICALLY
DEFEATED IT WOULD BE A MAJOR SET BACK. NO ALTERNATIVE TO HIM WAS
IN SIGHT. FURTHERMORE DENKTASH HAD ACCEPTED EVERY ONE OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS. OUR DEMARCHE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
TO THE MAN WHO HAD RAISED "19 OBJECTIONS TO 14 ARTICLES" OF
THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASK

TO THE MAN WHO HAD RAISED '19 OBJECTIONS TO 14 ARTICLES' OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASK OF DENKTASH MORE THAN HE COULD DELIVER. HE MUST HAVE ELECTIONS AND HAD SAID THAT THESE WOULD BE IN JUNE. (DENKTASH'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF ELECTIONS ON 23 JUNE IS FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN THE TURKISH PRESS TODAY.) HALEFOGLU CLAIMED THAT DENKTASH HAD SAID AS MUCH TO KYPRIANOU AND THAT NEITHER KYPRIANOU NOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD OBJECTED.

4. HALEFOGLU THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT A FUTURE SUMMIT IN HIS VIEW SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN NEW YORK BUT CYPRUS. APART FROM THE EXPENSE WHICH A NEW YORK VENUE IMPOSED ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, IT WAS ABSURD FOR THE PRINCIPALS TO TRAVEL 6,000 MILES TO NEW YORK WHEN THEY LIVED HALF A MILE APART. HALEFOGLU UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT A HOT LINE BETWEEN THEM MIGHT BE ARRANGED. HALEFOGLU CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IN HIS VIEW A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY BE REACHED BY THE TWO COMMUNITIES. IT COULD NOT BE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH CONDITIONS WHICH ONE SIDE FOUND UNACCEPTABLE.

5. I REPEATED THAT IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEW AND OUR OWN IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE WHICH WOULD WIDEN THE GAP SEMI COLON ALSO THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD WRITTEN TO KYPRIANOU. I THEN REFERRED TO DENKTASH'S RECENT REMARKS THAT ANY NEW NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO START FROM SCRATCH. WAS THAT REALLY THE CASE IN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW? HALEFOGLU SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION. HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO INTERPRET DENKTASH'S THINKING. DENKTASH HAD SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT HIS PARLIAMENT. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A MANDATE FOR HIS PREVIOUS STAND. HALEFOGLU THOUGHT IT PREMATURE TO TRY TO ASSESS HIS FUTURE INTENTIONS. OUR DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH MY REPEATING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU ATTACHED TO AVOIDING ANY PROVOCATIVE ACTION.

COMMENT

6. I WAS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED IN MY CALL ON HALEFOGLU BY MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE. I HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO COMPARE NOTES, BUT HALEFOGLU REMARKED THAT WE SHOULD PERHAPS HAVE HAD A TRI-PARTITE MEETING. SO I TAKE IT THAT STRAUZ-HUPE'S MESSAGE WAS THE SAME.

7. AS YOU WILL SEE HALEFOGLU GAVE NOTHING AWAY. HE WAS BLAND AND AFFABLE BUT UNYIELDING. THIS MAY REFLECT THE FACT THAT ANKARA ARE KEEPING AN OPEN MIND AS TO HOW TO PLAY THE HAND IN THE NEW

7. AS YOU WILL SEE HALEFOGLU GAVE NOTHING AWAY. HE WAS BLAND AND AFFABLE BUT UNYIELDING. THIS MAY REFLECT THE FACT THAT ANKARA ARE KEEPING AN OPEN MIND AS TO HOW TO PLAY THE HAND IN THE NEW SITUATION. HALEFOGLU SAID THERE WOULD BE A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY AND WE MAY BE ABLE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT TURKISH INTENTIONS THEREAFTER. WHAT DID COME ACROSS WAS THAT HALEFOGLU FELT NO NEED FOR THE TURKS TO BE DEFENSIVE ABOUT THE BREAK-DOWN IN NEW YORK. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY COULD NOT HOLD BACK DENKTASH ENTIRELY AND INDEED MAY HAVE SEEN ADVANTAGE IN SIGNALLING CLEARLY THE CONSEQUENCES IF KYPRIANOU CONTINUED TO "MISS THE BOAT", IE THE OTHER LANE OF THE TWIN TRACK. AT THE SAME TIME THE ADVANTAGES TO THEM OF A SETTLEMENT REMAIN AS THEY WERE BEFORE NEW YORK. THE FACT THAT DENKTASH IS NOT CALLING FOR ELECTIONS BEFORE MID SUMMER SUGGEST THAT THE TURKS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL A LITTLE MORE TIME. ALSO NO DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN AS YET ON THE TIMING OF ANY REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION. THIS SEEMS TO BE IN LINE WITH HAKTANIR'S RECENT COMMENTS TO HUMPHREY IN NEW YORK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE IT TILL THE SUMMER BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. BUT I DOUBT WHETHER THE TURKS ARE GOING TO INSIST THAT KYPRIANOU SHOULD COME TO THEM AND EXTRACTING ANY FURTHER CONCESSIONS OR EVEN NUANCES FROM THEM TO FACILITATE THIS IS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT.

RUSSELL

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With my best compliments

Tasos Panayides

High Commissioner for Cyprus

93 Park Street
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CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION

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PRESS RELEASE

Saturday 26 January, 1985

President Kyprianou makes a statement on recent developments
in the Cyprus problem, at a press conference in Nicosia

The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, speaking at a press conference in Nicosia today, Saturday, made the following statement:

" It was quite natural that various questions should be raised following the failure of the high-level meeting in New York. I consider it my duty to give replies to these questions in order to inform the people of Cyprus as best as I can.

The question was raised, inter alia, whether I should have accepted to participate in the high-level meeting. I have no doubt whatsoever that this had to be done basically for two reasons: First, because we were sincerely seeking, within the framework of the U.N. Secretary-General's initiative, a constructive dialogue for the finding of a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. Secondly, because if we refused to participate we would torpedo ourselves the Secretary-General's initiative and condemn ourselves to complete isolation internationally. Nor was it possible for me to refuse to attend the high-level meeting convened by the U.N. Secretary-General in the light of the progress achieved during the third round of proximity talks. The Secretary-General himself considered that the degree of the progress made justified the convening of a high-level meeting. Therefore, I have no doubt at all that we rightly accepted to participate in the high-level meeting in the same way that we rightly accepted to participate previously in the proximity talks.

Another question is what was the reason for the climate of optimism created. This was natural because it was the first time in ten years that there had been some shifting of the

Turkish positions, and, therefore, some progress. This fact too justified cautious optimism. But, when I talked about cautious optimism, at the same time I stressed the need for restraint because of our past experience. And I also stressed that the progress made did not mean automatically a solution to the Cyprus problem and that there was still a long way to go.

It is natural that now, following the failure of the high-level meeting, there should be disappointment. This disappointment, however, should not turn either into defeatism or fatalism which are unquestionably the worst counsel at difficult times, nor should it halt our struggle for the salvation and vindication of the country and our effort for a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

Not much effort is need to seek the reasons for the failure of the high-level meeting. This meeting did not prove productive simply because the Turkish side refused to negotiate or to discuss anything and stubbornly insisted on the signing of the documents as they stood. We accepted those documents as a basis for the holding of negotiations to find a framework for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

We went to New York with all goodwill for a constructive dialogue. But we were instead asked in an ultimatum-like manner to sign texts the most basic points of which had not been agreed while others were vague or unclear and others incomplete.

The Turkish side opposed any negotiation, and all these despite the assurances continuously given to us, both privately and publicly, that there would be a substantive dialogue at the high-level meeting. The Secretary-General himself had designated the high-level meeting to last three days and if necessary he would devote another day, delaying his scheduled departure from New York. It would, to say the least, be ridiculous to claim that we would need three or four days for a signing ceremony, if the purpose of the high-level meeting was simply to sign some texts without discussion, as demanded by Mr. Denktash.

I could, in this respect, refer to a series of statements by the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretariat regarding the purpose of the high-level meeting. It suffices, at the present state, to recall the Secretary-General's statement made at his press conference on 19 December, 1984, in which he stressed that he did not see the high-level meeting as a mere formality and that what he expected at the meeting was constructive discussion, during which the two sides would set out their views on his own presentation. Even two days ago, in an interview with the B.B.C., the U.N. Secretary-General reiterated that the documents were not put on the negotiating table on a "take it or leave it" basis.

As I have already said, repeated assurances were given regarding the purpose of the meeting, both by the U.N. Secretary-General and the Secretariat and by various Governments which were in a position to know. And these assurances were given when we continuously asked for information in the light of repeated statements by Mr. Denktash between the conclusion of the third round of the proximity talks and the day of the high-level meeting. Therefore, everything that could be done was done by our side in this matter too.

But the most characteristic element which proves that the object of the high-level meeting was the dialogue and not a mere signing are some provisions of the texts themselves which, according to Mr. Denktash, we were supposed simply to sign. Apart from the fact that the substantive matters needed negotiation - and this nobody can dispute - there is concrete reference to negotiation in the texts themselves.

For example, in the preliminary draft agreement or the agenda - since both terms are used - it is stressed that territorial readjustments, in addition to the areas referred to in the Turkish proposals of 5 August, 1981, would be agreed at the high-level meeting and that the extent of these readjustments and the number of refugees who would return to their homes would be defined in the agreement that would emerge. Another example is the question of withdrawal of foreign troops referred to in the same document. Regarding this question, it is explicitly explained in the so-called non-paper that an agreement on the timing of withdrawal of foreign troops would be discussed at the high-level meeting. Matters are, I think, very clear.

Even on the question of the working groups the relevant paragraph in the text says that the working group or the groups will be set up in the light of the political decisions to be agreed upon at the high-level meeting so that the details of the agreements may be elaborated. That is to say, decisions had to be taken first on the various issues, particularly the important ones, and then the committees would undertake to work out the details on the basis of terms of reference to be given them by the high-level meeting. The taking of the decisions and the preparation of the terms or reference certainly presuppose discussion and a dialogue. The Turkish side refused to discuss and rejected the dialogue insisting on its demand for signing. But sign what? The texts could not, as they stood, become a framework of an agreement for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Consequently what would be signed? An agenda or texts with many blanks and vague points, the signing of which, in addition to being paradoxical would adversely affect our negotiating possibilities later. The texts were such that they could be used only as a basis for negotiation or dialogue.

If these texts were signed, anyone could very well ask me what I agreed to by signing, for example in connection with the territorial issue of the withdrawal of troops or the fundamental freedoms or the guarantees or other matters. And my answer to these logical questions would be "I do not know what I have signed". But it would be irresponsible on my part to sign texts without the basic issues contained in them having been discussed and agreed upon.

And while this was the situation, Mr. Denktash for four whole days insisted that nothing at all should be discussed and that the texts should be signed as they stood and outstanding matters be referred to working groups. However, the most serious of these matters were not matters for working groups but for serious political decisions at a high-level meeting, as I have already said.

In the face of this situation, I would be justified walking out of the meeting or denouncing the pressing, to say the least, tactics of the other side. Instead, I stayed until the end trying by formulas and proposals and in other ways to contribute to averting a deadlock.

My last proposal, which was made as a final effort to avert the deadlock, contained the element of reconciliation of opposite views and its rejection was in no way justified. But this too was rejected by Mr. Denktash. I recall that, in accordance with that proposal, I suggested that a new high-level meeting be fixed soon to deal with four basic issues, i.e. the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the territorial issue, the fundamental freedoms and the guarantees, suggesting at the same time, even though this was a departure from a basic principle, the immediate setting up of a working group to start studying the constitutional aspect and submit its finding to the high-level meeting.

It was obvious that no matter how many proposals were made, the Turkish side was not prepared either to discuss anything or to accept a formula to avert the deadlock, insisting immutably on its demand that the texts should be signed as they stood or nothing would be done.

In the light of the situation, the U.N. Secretary-General invited us to a new high-level meeting by the end of next February. His proposal has been accepted by our side at once. I sincerely hope that the Turkish side will respond positively to the U.N. Secretary-General's proposal and that it will not finally decide to neutralize the Secretary-General's continuing initiative for a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. This, after all, is the only way to prove that it sincerely wants real negotiation for a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem and that it does not use the various procedures, as for example the high-level meeting, merely for the creation of impressions as part of time delaying ^{tactics and} / promote its policy of faits accomplis.

While we on our part are studying developments very carefully and with sang froid, I consider it necessary to repeat that we shall continue our cooperation with the U.N. Secretary-General with sincerity in the effort for a comprehensive, just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem within the framework of his mission as defined by the Security Council. At this point too I repeat that we are ready for substantial negotiation and for an honourable compromise that would secure a just and viable solution. But, at the same time, I should once again declare that we shall not become party to anything that would aim at arrangements that would be unfair and non-viable or would be tantamount to abandonment

of the rights of Cyprus and its people. Our targets are firm and our efforts will be continuous. At these difficult hours, it is necessary, more than ever, that the national interest alone should prevail in the minds of all of us.

I wish to express once more our gratitude to the Greek Government for our harmonious cooperation and its valuable help and also to the opposition in Greece for the support it has been providing to our efforts in these hard time. "

Replies given by President Kyprianou to journalists'
questions during his press conference today, Saturday

1. In an answer to a question about a possible meeting between him and President Reagan next month and what was expected from this meeting, the President of the Republic said: "As you know, I attach great importance to those high-level meetings. There is absolutely no doubt that one of the countries that can play a substantive role in the Cyprus developments, without this meaning that I suggest that the U.N. Secretary-General's initiative should be substituted, in any way is the United States and also Britain and other countries. Not because I underestimate any other factor. And it is a fact that in view of the developments I asked for a meeting with President Reagan without fixing a time. This does not mean that we are not in touch with the U.S. Government and also with all Governments but I feel that there are certain things which it will be useful to discuss at this level."

2. Replying to a question why we did not proceed with the ratification of what had been agreed, leaving the outstanding issues to working committees or to be discussed at the new high-level meeting, given that our insistence would lead to a breakdown of the negotiations, Mr. Kyprianou replied: "Mr. Denktash was against our signing half of the paragraphs of the texts. He wanted the texts to be signed as they were. And then I am wondering to what agreed matters you refer unless you talk about details. Because there was no agreement reached regarding the timing of the withdrawal of troops. There was no agreement on that matter because it had not yet been discussed. There was no agreement on the issues of guarantees, the territorial issue and the fundamental freedoms. Even regarding the constitutional issue, in which there was some narrowing down of the differences - hence I made the proposal that this matter should be referred immediately to a working group - there was no agreement on this matter. Neither the Turkish side nor we can claim that we reached agreement."

But you must bear in mind the following: when one handles such a matter - I imagine this is true in other cases too - one handles it with the thought that everything constitutes one integrated whole and the Turkish side said so repeatedly. Everything we proposed was subject to a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. If something was accepted, if there was something to be accepted, for it is my position that of all the serious issues there was nothing about which one could say "this has been agreed, let's set it aside for signing". I ask you to indicate to me any such matter, constitutional, territorial, fundamental freedoms, troops? Which of the basic aspect of the Cyprus problem, Varoshia? You yourselves might ask me: "What did you sign concerning Varoshia? My answer would be: "I don't know" and this would be entirely irresponsible on my part. There was no substantive issue on which agreement had been reached. There may have been progress on certain issues, but progress is one thing and agreement is another. Progress is not something to sign. One signs an agreement. For, even progress is subject to other things.

To come back to something I said at the beginning suggestion should in such a case have been made to sign an agenda. But this would have had no meaning. What was meaningful, and I think this was accepted and appreciated, irrespective of the fact that some foreign newspapers, misled by other sides, gave a wrong picture of the situation, was that we were ready for a constructive dialogue".

3. Asked whether there was a real danger of De Cuellar's initiative being torpedoed by the decision taken for general elections to be held in the occupied areas next June, President Kyprianou said: "This is covered in my opening statement. Nevertheless I must say that the Secretary-General has assured us that he is acting in the direction of averting any developments that would impede his task and that in this connection as he has told us, he has the support of many Governments. As I have said, we on our part are monitoring the situation

with coolheadedness and I think I can tell you from now that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has today made various representations on the matter".

4. In reply to a question whether after the breakdown of the high-level meeting and Mr. Denktash's response with new faits accomplis, the Greek Cypriot side contemplated to reviving Security Council Resolution 550, which, inter alia, refers to the taking of urgent measures, and whether the Greek Cypriot side intended to call for such measures, President Kyprianou said: "First of all I must tell you that no Security Council Resolution has even been abandoned by our side, nor can it be abandoned. The resolutions in question constitute the framework within which we have been moving. They are the framework in which we also view the role of the Secretary-General. Any other steps besides those taken today by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be announced. The matter will be considered by our side, by the Government, but it will also be one of the subjects on which there will be an exchange of views with party leaders next Friday. This is one of the matters that I shall raise for discussion. Beyond this, before taking any decisions regarding any possible additional actions on our part, we must have the Secretary-General's assessment regarding the results of his own steps. Therefore, we shall be able in a few days to see how we shall handle the matter further.

Of course, one might say that in view of the danger that the Turkish side would hold elections, the documentation should have been signed in order to avert this action. My answer to this is unquestionably no. I rule this out. My view is that this is not the way to negotiate. Nor do I believe that the Turkish side has decided to do what it is going to do, responding to our own actions, in the same way that it was not in response to our actions that it decided to declare the so-called state in the past. It is a policy of its own that it is implementing. What must be done on our part, beyond what has been done so far, we shall see in a few days".

5. Asked if there was truth in information given by U.N. circles, in any case not the U.N. Secretariat, that Mr. Kyprianou's introductory speech at the start of the high-level meeting was full of extreme positions which did not allow the holding of the negotiations the President himself wanted to take place at the high-level meeting, Mr. Kyprianou replied: "The opening of the discussion was very simple.

The Secretary-General made an introductory statement and asked for our comments and of course our comments on the texts. Our comments on the texts were, naturally, the same as those made during the proximity talks. Our comments did not in any way prejudge the manner in which the negotiations would be conducted. Proof of this is the fact that when I said I accepted that only four issues should be discussed at the next high-level meeting and the working group on the constitutional aspect should start work immediately, my suggestion was rejected. I do not think that if you were there and you heard my statement you would be distressed as Cypriots. I believe you would rather feel satisfied. At this point I wish to stress that when something does not go as well as we expect, our national cause is not served when we try to find scapegoats in our own front".

6. To a question about the prospects of success of a new high-level meeting, Mr. Kyprianou said: "I do not know if you suggest that we should not have gone to the high-level meeting. I covered this point in my opening statement. / ^{In my view we had to go to the meeting.} In any case, I mention here that in the third round of the proximity talks there was progress in the constitutional aspect, substantive progress in the executive, but there was no progress in the legislative issue. At the same time there was progress in the territorial issue, without this meaning that this problem was solved. When there is progress in these two issues with a prospect for progress in more issues, while at the same time it is accepted to discuss at the high-level meeting the timing of withdrawal of the Turkish troops and the territorial issue not only from the point of view of percentages but also from the point of view of defining areas and numbers of refugees and other matters, I think

it is reasonable to attend the meeting with cautious optimism. What I supported then, I also support now. The facts were such that they absolutely justified that position. Consequently no one objects to seeking responsibilities, if any, or levelling criticism. But it is not fair to attempt to invent responsibilities. The national cause is not served in this way. I believe that we rightly went to the high-level meeting both because we wanted to negotiate reasonably and honestly and because if we had not gone we would have been isolated internationally. We rightly judged that cautious optimism was justified. For, the Secretary-General himself should not have convened the meeting if he himself had not been cautiously optimistic. His was more than cautious optimism. Also the shifting in positions in the third round of the proximity talks were of such a nature both in the territorial and the constitutional issue as to justify this cautious optimism, particularly in view of the prospect of discussion, at the high-level meeting of other basic issues, such as a the question of withdrawal of the Turkish troops, regarding the timing of which the text says an agreement should be reached. Therefore, we went to the high-level meeting for substantive discussion and justifiably with cautious optimism."

7. Asked whether the proposal made at the high-level meeting for discussion of the four issues continues to be valid whether the elections to be held by Mr. Denktash neutralize Mr. De Cuellar's initiative and whether the talks would be carried on from where they have been left, if the Secretary-General calls for a new high-level meeting before Mr. Denktash carries out the elections, President Kyprianou said: "My proposal for the four points continues to be valid. As to what should be done in the light of the declared intention of the Turkish side to go ahead with new faits accomplis, I will say nothing more than what I have already said, pending the results of consultations with the U.N. Secretary-General and with various Governments".

8. In answer to a remark that there has been a change in our positions as regards a meeting with Mr. Denktash given that whereas in the past we said there would be no meeting and no discussion with Denktash if he did not revoke the "state" he had declared in the occupied area, a meeting finally took place, President Kyprianou said: "The answer is simple. The high-level meeting with Mr. Denktash does not mean acceptance of the faits accomplis and it has taken place within the framework of the United Nations resolutions and the framework of the Secretary-General's initiative. I should also like to recall that the Resolution 550 has basically two provisions, (a) revocation of the pseudostate and efforts for its revocation and (b) a mandate to the U.N.

Secretary-General for a definite solution of the Cyprus problem. The Secretary-General chose the second course of action and we are cooperating with him within the framework of his initiative and it is within the framework of this initiative that we have accepted the high-level meeting. This development has nothing to do with our past positions which were based on other data. Therefore, I think we have done the right thing. Besides, things did not take place suddenly and you all know the developments which led to the recent high-level meeting.

9. To a remark that in his written statement he had said that there were blancs in the high-level meeting document and to a question whether Mr. Denktash had proposed anything at all to fill in these blancs or submitted any substantive proposal on the territorial aspect in order to fill in these blancs, President Kyprianou said: "No substantive discussion was carried out at the high-level meeting in New York. Whatever has been achieved was achieved at the proximity talks and the result of those talks was a preliminary draft agreement and two non-papers which together make up the so-called documentation. As I have said, no substantive discussion took place at the high-level meeting. All that happened in the 3-4 days was that Mr. Denktash was refusing to discuss and I was trying to convince him that discussion had to take place. As I pointed out to some of my interlocutors, the whole

problem at the high-level meeting was not an attempt to cheat each other, but clearly a question of disagreement. Mr. Denktash insisted that the documentation should be signed as it stood, while I took the position that a constructive dialogue should be carried out".

10. Asked what guarantees he would ask for in order to take part in a new high-level meeting or whether he would go to such a meeting if he was simply invited by the Secretary-General, President Kyprianou said: "To be absolutely honest, if the Secretary-General invites me to a new high-level meeting, I shall participate. I believe, however, that it would not be right for the Secretary-General to do so. The Secretary-General should first make sure that there will be a really constructive dialogue at the meeting that will take place. There should be a constructive dialogue, so that what happened at the latest meeting may not be repeated. And as I understand, this is his intention, that is to make sure that the meeting will be 'productive'".

11. Finally, asked whether he pointed out to Mr. Denktash that paragraph of his own document in which he himself supports that the most serious question of troops should be referred to an agreement at the high-level meeting and what Mr. Denktash's reaction was and, if this was so, should not this by itself have put an end to the controversy, the President of the Republic said: "As I told you earlier, I put forward our arguments on all issues and I used the necessary examples regarding this matter to prove that negotiations should be carried out. I should like to observe that as these two documents, besides the agenda or the preliminary draft agreement, are called non-papers, they are not presented as documents coming from Mr. Denktash or anyone else. Therefore, it could not be said "this document is yours". It was a non-paper containing Mr. Denktash's views. In any case, besides the other provisions mentioned in the agenda he had this in mind too. The whole concept, the whole formulation of the documents and the whole meaning of everything that took place previously was that the high-level meeting was intended for negotiations.

It is reasonable and natural that we should concern ourselves with our arguments in support of our position for negotiation. Let me in my turn, put a question, to which of course I do not expect you to reply. My question is since the Turkish side wants a solution to the Cyprus problem, why did it not accept a constructive dialogue on the basis of these documents? Was what we asked, which in any case was justified by the facts, documents, previous consultations, so unreasonable? Let us assume that Denktash did not understand things correctly, that there was a misunderstanding in his consultations with the Secretary-General. Was it unreasonable for us to propose to him a constructive dialogue on all issues included in the said document, or at least at a first stage, on the serious matters, the four points, as proposed by me and even to go ahead with the setting up of working committees? Honestly I do not think this was an irrational thing. to propose in such a serious matter. When one has to handle the future of a country, the future of a people, is it objectionable to want free and constructive negotiations? For the other side wanted to sign certain points, as they stood, which some called "draft agreement", others "agenda" and others "preliminary" but no one can call it "agreement". "

SUBJECT
ccops
Master

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.11A/85

CONFIDENTIAL

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OO NICOSIA

OO ANKARA

OO ATHENS

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 16 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO, MODUK (SEC(O)(C))

SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG ROME PARIS BONN

CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAD WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL ON 23 JANUARY, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MR OZAL (MY TELNO TO ANKARA). KYPRIANOU MUST BEAR A GOOD SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION NOW REACHED AND OZAL WILL IN ANY CASE BE LIKELY TO ASK WHAT ACTION WE PROPOSE WITH THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT. PLEASE THEREFORE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KYPRIANOU.

BEGINS: I WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT IT PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS AT THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN NEW YORK. GEOFFREY HOWE AND I SAW THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL YESTERDAY MORNING AND I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT HE SHOWED EVERY DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES. THERE ARE GREAT DANGERS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WHICH WE MUST ALL TRY TO AVERT.

YOU WILL BE THINKING HARD ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED IN THESE VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. TO THE EXTENT THAT OUTSIDE ADVICE CAN BE HELPFUL, MY OWN VIEW REMAINS THAT THE MOST PROMISING WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS IN ANY RESUMED DISCUSSIONS WILL BE TO TRY IN THE EARLY STAGES TO ESTABLISH THE BROADEST POSSIBLE AREA OF AGREEMENT BEFORE MOVING ON TO THE MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES, BUT ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY POINTS THAT CAN BE FIRMLY

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SETTLED IN THIS WAY MUST REMAIN CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES TO THE ULTIMATE PACKAGE AS A WHOLE. ENDS.

2. IF ASKED, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS IN TOUCH WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR WESTON

MR RENWICK

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

MR BRAITHWAITE

SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
CYPRUS

2.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT
cc ops
Master

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.118/85.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 24 JANUARY 1985

AND SAVING TO STRASBOURG, ROME, PARIS, BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (SEC (O)(C))

CYPRUS

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME ON 23 JANUARY, THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL SAID HE THOUGHT THE GREATEST RISK TO HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES LAY IN ACTIONS BY DENKTASH TO TRY TO CONSOLIDATE THE TRNC. HE ASKED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ASSISTANCE IN DISSUADING DENKTASH AND SAID THAT HE WOULD INVITE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S AND CHANCELLOR KOHL'S COOPERATION ALONG SIMILAR LINES. THE PRIME MINISTER ACCEPTS THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO HELP. PLEASE ACCORDINGLY DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR OZAL.

BEGINS: AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, SENOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR, HAS JUST PAID A BRIEF VISIT TO LONDON. I HAD A TALK WITH HIM AND DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE VERY GRAVE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN THE TALKS WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE IN NEW YORK UNDER HIS AUSPICES BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS. I AM WRITING TO YOU IN THE LIGHT OF MY DISCUSSION WITH SENOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO LET YOU KNOW MY THOUGHTS.

I WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED, AS I AM SURE YOU WERE, THAT THE TALKS IN NEW YORK DID NOT REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. I KNOW THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TO ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE TO WORK FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME TO THE TALKS AND I SHARE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEW THAT AT HIS OPENING OF THE TALKS THE TWO SIDES IN THIS TRAGIC DISPUTE HAD NEVER BEEN CLOSER, AT ANY RATE SINCE 1974. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A TERRIBLE MISTAKE TO ALLOW THE GROUND WHICH HAD BEEN GAINED TO BE LOST.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ASSURED ME THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO REACH A CONCLUSION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

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I HAVE WARMLY WELCOMED THIS. BUT I THINK THAT IF THERE IS TO BE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS, IT WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD TO AVOID ACTIONS ON EITHER SIDE THAT WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE OTHER AS CHANGING THE STATUS QUO. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL SHARE THIS VIEW AND THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY. IF THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED, I THINK IT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS MORE SECURE AND MORE STABLE ARRANGEMENTS IN CYPRUS ON THE BASIS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS.

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE IS MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TO ANKARA NEXT MONTH, WHEN HE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN GREATER DETAIL WITH MR HALEFOGLU. ENDS.

2. IF ASKED, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON HIS PART ALSO.

3. FOR UKMIS NEW YORK. PLEASE INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GIST OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND THOSE CONTAINED IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 TO NICOSIA.

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
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 46 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, ATHENS, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON.

CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT WITHOUT HOPE THAT THE SITUATION CAN BE SALVAGED PROVIDED PRESSURE IS PUT ON KYPRIANOU TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TEXT, PERHAPS WITH SOME PRESENTATIONAL CHANGES.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON MY TURKISH COLLEAGUE TO SAY GOODBYE (HE LEAVES ON 29 JANUARY AND TURKMEN ARRIVES THE NEXT DAY) AND TO ASK FOR HIS ASSESSMENT.

3. KIRCA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S POLICY OF 'CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY' HAD NOT WORKED AND THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY ROOM FOR AMBIGUITY. KYPRIANOU HAD MADE DENKTASH EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD EVEN SAID IN FRONT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT HE AND DENKTASH UNDERSTOOD DIFFERENT THINGS BY THE WORD 'ENDORSE'. IF DENKTASH WAS NOW ASKED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OR EVEN COSMETIC CHANGES IN THE DOCUMENT IT WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD RESPOND WITH PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN FOR CHANGES. AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE THERE WAS NOW NO ROOM FOR ANY ALTERATION BUT THERE COULD STILL BE A BIT OF FLEXIBILITY IN PRESENTATION TO SAVE KYPRIANOU'S FACE.

4. KIRCA SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE TO HOLD ANOTHER SUMMIT UNLESS IT HAD BEEN SECURELY DETERMINED IN ADVANCE THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD ENDORSE THE PAPER AS IT STOOD. KIRCA WAS NOT WITHOUT HOPE THAT HE MIGHT DO THIS ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD MADE IT UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR IN THE PRIVATE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH THAT THERE COULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE PAPER UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED AND THAT SINCE DENKTASH DID NOT AGREE THE TEXT WAS ALREADY FIXED. IT WAS A PITY AND DANGEROUS THAT HE PUSSYFOOTED IN PUBLIC BUT KIRCA BELIEVED THAT KYPRIANOU COULD NOT REALLY BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION NOW. IF A CAREFULLY PREPARED SUMMIT AT THE END OF FEBRUARY ENDORSED THE PAPER KIRCA BELIEVED THAT DENKTASH WOULD AGREE TO A PRESENTATION WHICH WOULD NOT RUB KYPRIANOU'S NOSE IN A CLIMB DOWN. THE ENDORSEMENT WOULD NOT INVOLVE A KYPRIANOU SIGNATURE. THE PAPER WOULD BE ANNEXED TO AN AGREED REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FURTHERMORE,

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IT COULD BE AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD MAKE AN UNCONTESTED UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT HE WAS ASKING HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MONITOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS VERY CAREFULLY AND TO REPORT BACK TO HIM AT A FIXED TIME, SAY THE END OF JUNE. THE STATEMENT WOULD CONTINUE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD CONSIDER IN THE LIGHT OF THAT REPORT WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HOLD A FURTHER SUMMIT MEETING AND IF SO HE WOULD PROPOSE A TIME, PLACE AND AGENDA. HOWEVER, IT WAS KIRCA'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO HOLD A SECOND SUMMIT MEETING QUICKLY AND IT TOO MUST BE PREPARED CAREFULLY IN ADVANCE.

5. AS REGARDS THE INTERNAL TURKISH POSITION, KIRCA SAID THAT DENKTASH WAS IN SOME DIFFICULTY. HIS POSITION ON THE PAPER WAS SUPPORTED BY HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES AND ATTACKED STRONGLY BY SOME OF HIS FRIENDS. IN ANKARA THE GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO IN DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION CHARGES AND WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE A CYPRUS ROW TO GET CORRUPTION OFF THE FRONT PAGES. HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT PRESIDENT EVREN AND THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF HAD NOT YET CHANGED THEIR VIEW AND IT WAS UNDER THEIR PRESSURE THAT DENKTASH HAD BEEN READY TO ACCEPT THE DEAL. NEVERTHELESS, ANKARA WAS DISQUIETED BY THE RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENT WHICH APPEARED TO ATTRIBUTE BLAME EQUALLY TO BOTH SIDES. HE UNDERSTOOD THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS NOW TRYING TO ROW BACK A BIT. THE PUBLIC REFERENCES IN LONDON TO 'UNITARY' CYPRUS INSTEAD OF TO A 'UNIFIED' CYPRUS HAD ALSO CAUSED DISQUIET. DESPITE ALL THIS KIRCA THOUGHT THE TURKS WERE STILL READY FOR AN AGREEMENT BUT HE STRONGLY URGED RAPID ACTION BEFORE THIS SITUATION CHANGED. NOW WAS THE TIME FOR THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS TO CONVINCING KYPRIANOU THAT HE MUST ENDORSE THE PAPER AND GIVE SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, HOWEVER PRIVATELY, IN ADVANCE OF A RENEWED SUMMIT AT THE END OF FEBRUARY.

6. I ASKED WHAT THE CHANCES WERE THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD AGREE AND WHY HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE HE DID AT THE FAILED SUMMIT. KIRCA SAID HE WAS NOT WITHOUT HOPE. THE VERY FACT THAT KYPRIANOU HAD UNINTELLIGENTLY ATTACKED EVERY ASPECT OF THE PAPER MADE THE SITUATION RATHER EASIER THAN IF HE HAD SINGLE OUT 3 OR 4

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WELL CHOSEN POINTS ON WHICH TO CONCENTRATE. THE REASONS WHY KYPRIANOU HAD BAULKED AT ENDORSING THE PAPER WERE:

(A) IT WAS, OF COURSE, BASICALLY A TURKISH PLAN AND IT WOULD END THE GREEK CYPRIOT MONOPOLY OF REPRESENTING CYPRUS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(B) IN THE LONG TERM, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BELIEVED THAT TURKEY WOULD FALL APART UNDER SECTARIAN DIFFERENCES.

7. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY BY TELELETTER SEVERAL OF KIRCA'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE FAILED SUMMIT. AS TO THE FUTURE, I AM INCLINED TO TAKE SERIOUSLY HIS ADVICE THAT PRESSURE IS NEEDED ON KYPRIANOU BEFORE THE TURKISH ATTITUDE CHANGES.

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MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

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19.11.84

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FM ANKARA 241025Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 059 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MOD SEC (O)(C), PARIS
BONN, ROME, UKDEL STRASBOURG, ISTANBUL.

YOUR TELNO 14 TO NICOSIA: CYPRUS SYG'S INITIATIVE

1. THE RISK, RAISED BY PANAYIDES, THAT THE TURKISH ASSEMBLY WILL PASS AN UNHELPFUL RESOLUTION ON CYPRUS, HAS NOT MATERIALISED. THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING CARE TO KEEP THE ATMOSPHERE UNDER CONTROL AND PARLIAMENTARY HARD-LINE CRITICS OF THE 'CONCESSIONARY APPROACH' WERE DISSUADED FROM TAKING MATTERS FURTHER AFTER A PLACATORY SPEECH BY HALEFOGLU IN THE ASSEMBLY ON 22 JANUARY. THERE WILL NOW BE A FURTHER PARLIAMENTARY BREATHING SPACE WHILE THE ASSMEBLY GOES INTO A PLANNED 2 WEEK RECESS FROM 25 JANUARY.

2. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GREEK EMBASSY HERE, TO WHOM I AND MY COUNSELLOR HAVE SPOKEN, IS ALSO RELEVANT IN THIS CONTEXT. WHILE MAINTAINING THAT PAPANDREOU DID INDICATE TO KYPRIANOU THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT, THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S

HE WAS INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT, THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TACTICS HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL AND THAT DENKTASH WAS UNDULY OBDURATE. THEY RECOGNISED THAT KYPRIANOU MUST TAKE PART OF THE BLAME FOR FAILING TO RISE ABOVE HIS DOMESTIC PRE-OCCUPATIONS. THE GREEK AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT HE TOOK SOME ENCOURAGEMENT IN THE WAY IN WHICH ANKARA WERE EVIDENTLY SEEKING TO AVOID EXACERBATING THE SITUATION. KONSTANTOPOULOS SAID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT HE HAS ADVISED ATHENS TO BEHAVE SIMILARLY IN KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN, ALSO THAT IT WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THAT FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE THE TRNC SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT THIS STAGE. AT THE SAME TIME HE RECOGNISED THAT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ANKARA TO RESTRAIN DENKTASH.

3. THESE LATTER CONCERNS ARE TO AN EXTENT UNDER-SCORED BY REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO DENKTASH AT ISTANBUL AIRPORT WHILE RETURNING TO CYPRUS YESTERDAY. ALTHOUGH HE SEEMS TO HAVE SPOKEN ELSEWHERE IN RATHER MORE RESTRAINED TERMS (NOTABLY TO THE BBC WORLD SERVICE AND TO THE ENGLISH DAILY NEWS HERE). HE IS QUOTED IN THE LEADING QUALITY DAILY PAPER MILLIYET AS FOLLOWS: 'IT WOULD NOT BE AN INTELLIGENT MOVE ON OUR PART TO SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE WITH THIS PACKAGE AND DISCUSS EVERYTHING WITH THEM. THAT PART OF THE GAME IS OVER. THIS PACKAGE IS DEAD. HOLDING ANOTHER SUMMIT IN FEBRUARY AS PROPOSED BY DE CUELLAR IS OUT OF THE QUESTION AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE WE HAVE TO MAKE A POLITICAL EVALUATION, AND WE WILL'. IT IS HOWEVER SOME COMFORT THAT THERE ARE NO REPORTS HERE OF DENKTASH HAVING REJECTED ANY FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT OR OF HAVING COMMITTED HIMSELF (YET) TO FURTHER STATE-BUILDING ACTIVITY.

RUSSELL

BT

NNNN



file

10 DOWNING STREET

cc JPC

From the Private Secretary

24 January 1985

CYPRUS: MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

BF

Thank you for your letter of 24 January enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to Prime Minister Ozal and President Kyprianou.

The Prime Minister has approved the two messages (with some minor amendments, which I enclose, to the first page of the first telegram) as well as the instructions to Washington. She has commented that the message to Kyprianou is pointless in itself, but accepts the tactical need to be able to say to the Turks that we are also taking action with the Greek Cypriots.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SWH



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 January 1985

*Dear Charles,*Cyprus: Messages from the Prime Minister

Following the talks which the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had yesterday with the Secretary General of the United Nations, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that it would be right to act on Sr Perez de Cuellar's advice and send messages quickly to the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Governments:

- (a) to seek to forestall any action by Denktash which might lead to the consolidation of the "TRNC" in northern Cyprus;
- (b) to encourage Kyprianou to a greater sense of realism.

The Foreign Secretary believes that the most effective level for such messages would be from the Prime Minister. The message to Ozal would be all the better received by the Turkish Government if they were told that the Prime Minister had also contacted President Kyprianou.

/ I enclose two draft telegrams which, subject to the Prime Minister's approval, might best be despatched to Ankara and Nicosia as soon as possible today. I also enclose / a draft telegram to Washington designed to make sure that we and the Americans do not get inadvertently out of step on this issue.

*Yours ever,**Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA

TELEGRAM NUMBER

AND SAVING TO STRASBOURG, ROME, PARIS, BONN

RFI IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,

ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, MOD SEC (O) (C)

CYPRUS

1. In conversation with the Prime Minister and me on 23 January, the UN Secretary General said he thought the greatest risk to his mission of good offices lay in actions by Denktash to try to consolidate the TRNC. He asked for the Prime Minister's assistance in dissuading Denktash and said that he would invite President Reagan's and Chancellor Kohl's cooperation along similar lines. The Prime Minister accepts that we should try to help. Please accordingly deliver the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Ozal:

BEGINS:

As you may know, the Secretary General of the UN, Senor Perez de Cuellar, has just paid a brief visit to London. I had a talk with him and discussed, among other things, the very grave situation which has developed in the talks which were taking

/ place

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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 2 place in New York under his auspices between the leaders of the two
 3 communities in Cyprus. I am writing to you in the light of my
 4 discussion with Senor Perez de Cuellar to let you know my thoughts.
 5 I was very disappointed, as I am sure you were, that the
 6 talks in New York did not reach a successful conclusion. I know
 7 that your Government had done a great deal to encourage the
 8 Turkish Cypriot side to work for a positive outcome to the talks
 9 and I share the Secretary General's view that at his opening of
 10 the talks the two sides in this tragic dispute had never been
 11 closer, at any rate since 1974. I believe it would be a terrible
 12 mistake to allow the ground which had been gained to be lost.
 13 The Secretary General has assured me that he is determined
 14 to continue his efforts to reach a conclusion acceptable to both
 15 sides. I have warmly welcomed this. But I think that if there is
 16 to be a chance of success, it will be very important in the
 17 period immediately ahead to avoid a actions on either side that
 18 would be regarded by the other as changing the status quo. I
 19 hope very much that you will share this view and that you will
 20 continue to encourage the Turkish Cypriot side to act
 21 constructively. If this can be achieved, I think it may still
 22 be possible to make progress towards more secure and more stable
 23 arrangements in Cyprus on the basis of the Secretary General's
 24 documentation. I believe that this would be in the best interests
 25 of all the people of Cyprus.
 26 Sir Geoffrey Howe is much looking forward to his visit to
 27 Ankara next month, when he will have the opportunity to discuss
 28 this question in greater detail with Mr Halefoglu. ENDS. *MS*
 29 2. If asked, you may say that the Prime Minister has sent a
 30 message to President Kyprianou to encourage a positive attitude
 31 on his part also.
 32 3. For UKMis New York. Please inform the Secretary General of
 33 the gist of these instructions and those contained in my telegram
 34 no to Nicosia.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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	11	SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG ROME PARIS BONN
	12	CYPRUS
	13	1. Following discussions which the Prime Minister and I had
	14	with the United Nations Secretary General on 23 January, the
	15	Prime Minister has sent a personal message to Mr Ozal (my telno
	16	to Ankara). Kyprianou must bear a good share of the
	17	responsibility for the situation now reached and Ozal will in any
	18	case be likely to ask <u>what action we propose with the Cyprus</u>
	19	Government. Please therefore convey the following message to
	20	Kyprianou.
	21	BEGINS: I was very disappointed that it proved impossible to make
///	22	further progress at the high-level meeting in New York. Geoffrey
//	23	Howe and I saw the United Nations Secretary General yesterday
/	24	morning and I am glad to say that he showed every determination to
	25	continue his mission of good offices. There are great dangers

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 2 in the present situation which we must all try to avert.
 3 You will be thinking hard about how to proceed in these
 4 very difficult circumstances. To the extent that outside advice
 5 can be helpful, my own view remains that the most promising way
 6 of making progress in any resumed discussions will be to try in
 7 the early stages to establish the broadest possible area of
 8 agreement before moving on to the more difficult issues, but on
 9 the clear understanding that any points that can be firmly
 10 settled in this way must remain conditional on agreement by both
 11 sides to the ultimate package as a whole. ENDS.
 12 2. If asked, you may say that the Prime Minister is in touch
 13 with the Turkish Government.

15 HOWE
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
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	9	RFI IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA UKMIS NEW YORK
	10	CYPRUS
	11	MY TELEGRAMS AND TO NICOSIA AND ANKARA
	12	1. Please keep in close touch with the US Administration about
	13	this. You may tell the Americans of the action we are taking
	14	and give them the gist of the Prime Minister's messages. Please
	15	report their eventual response to the Secretary General's approach.
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24 JAN 1985



With my best compliments

© ● Tasos Panayides

High Commissioner for Cyprus

93 Park Street
London W1

CDP

Tel. 499-2810



CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION

93, PARK STREET,
LONDON, W1Y 4ET

TEL.: 01-499 8272

CPC

Statement by the Government Spokesman

It is obvious that an orchestrated effort is being made by certain circles of the U.N. Secretariat to put the blame on the Greek Cypriot side for the failure of the High Level Meeting. This is gathered also from the sources quoted by International News Agencies and certain papers abroad.

This effort was noticed by us while the High Level Talks were still in progress and the President of the Republic, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, protested about this to the U.N. Secretary-General who undertook to investigate the matter.

After the failure of the Meeting, these attempts to shift responsibility were intensified and yesterday a very strong protest was made by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to Mr. Pico and through him to the U.N. Secretary-General who is now in Great Britain.

The answer officially given by the U.N. Secretariat was that all these reports, that our side was to blame for the failure of the meeting, were entirely unfounded and wrong and in no way projected the real image of the situation.

Another member of the Secretariat expressed deep regret and dismay about the associated press dispatch which he described as sheer invention and containing gross mistakes about the position of the U.N. Secretary-General which remained that "we are closer than ever before".

It is also known that the U.N. Secretary-General himself, who was informed of the matter in Edinburgh and was asked if he blamed the Greek Cypriot side, said "No it would be unfair to put the blame on the Greek Cypriot side".

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Regardless of the inspired reports and dispatches, I want to repeat emphatically that in no case were we told or given the impression either by the U.N. Secretary-General or anybody else that the High Level Meeting would be a mere formality. The contrary was the case. Publicly and otherwise both we and third parties were told that the High Level Meeting would be a meeting for substantive discussions and negotiations on the basis of what had been exchanged at the Proximity Talks and of all existing documents with a view to finding a framework for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. On 19.12.84 the Secretary-General replying to a question at a Press Conference clearly said:

"I don't, as you can imagine, see the meeting as a mere formality. What I expect from the meeting is a constructive discussion, in which the two parties will present their views on my presentation".

On other occasions also, it was made clear by other sides and interested Governments that everybody expected discussions and negotiations at the meeting with the purpose of reaching an agreement on a framework for a comprehensive, just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

With this firm belief we attended the High Level Meeting with goodwill, ready for a constructive dialogue to deal with basic outstanding issues in order to go ahead with our effort to seek and find a framework for a solution.

For four days nothing was left undone, there was no formula that was not proposed, no effort that was not made to get Mr. Denktash to accept to discuss the basic outstanding issues which make up the Cyprus problem. None produced results. Up to the last moment efforts were made for a compromise formula and the President of the Republic, as he himself said at his Press Conference last Sunday, in a final effort to

avert a deadlock, submitted a specific proposal for discussion, at a new High Level Meeting to be held on a date to be fixed in advance, of four basic aspects of the Cyprus problem, i.e. the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops, the guarantees, the three fundamental freedoms and the territorial issue and at the same time for the immediate establishment of a working group to deal with the constitutional aspect and report back to the High Level Meeting on its findings. This proposal too was rejected.

Mr. Halefoglou, in a statement yesterday, repeated that a historic opportunity for a solution to the Cyprus problem has been lost through the fault of the Greek Cypriot side. I repeat what I said in my statement yesterday in reply to the Turkish Government's statement. If this High Level Meeting has not proved productive, this is due to the refusal of the Turkish side to accept even to discuss anything. However, neither we, nor the Secretary-General, as he himself has said, consider that the efforts to find a just solution to the Cyprus problem have come or can come to an end. We are ready for a constructive dialogue and the Secretary-General has invited the two sides to a new meeting. If there is a political will on the part of the Turkish side it will then be possible to carry out a real dialogue with a view to finding a fair solution to the Cyprus problem the soonest possible. I repeat that we are the first to want such a solution to be found, because it is we who are primarily and more than anybody else, experiencing the hardships from the protraction of the Cyprus problem.

Asked to comment on Denktash's charge that President Kyprianou asked that everything should be negotiated, the Government Spokesman said: "This is entirely untrue. The President of the Republic made general comments on the Cyprus problem at the start of the meeting, but made it clear that he was ready to negotiate on the basis of the existing documents and the exchanges at the Proximity Talks, while his proposal

to resolve the deadlock showed clearly that, far from wanting everything to be renegotiated, his aim was to discuss only outstanding basic issues and that he was ready to refer the constitutional issue to a working group."

Asked whether the Kyprianou formula for breaking the deadlock was binding, the Spokesman said:" The Secretary-General has called for a new High Level Meeting. We shall go to this new meeting to discuss and seek, once again, on the basis of what has taken place so far a framework for a solution to the Cyprus problem. A proposal to this end was made to us and was rejected by Mr. Denktash. If this new meeting is held, we expect that there will be a constructive dialogue and we are ready to discuss everything that has been exchanged, including, of course, our own presentation."

In reply to a question why the High Level Meeting was held since nothing had been decided, the Spokesman said:
"At the Proximity Talks progress, but no solution was achieved. As the Secretary-General said, there was sufficient progress justifying the convening of a High Level Meeting, i.e. the meeting between the President of the Republic and Mr. Denktash in the presence of the Secretary-General, so that the two of them, on the basis of the progress achieved at the Proximity Talks could hold discussions and negotiations and agree on a framework for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem!"

In reply to another question, the Government Spokesman said that "throughout this period, whenever a new statement was made by Mr. Denktash that the meeting would be a mere formality, we notified the UN and others, publicly and otherwise, who assured us that the meeting would not be a mere formality but a substantive one. Even at the Geneva meeting which dealt with preliminary procedural matters relating to the High Level Meeting, we were given the same assurances."

Answering a relevant question, the Government Spokesman said: There were various documents. The document about which there is so much talk had as title "Draft Agenda" and as sub-title "preliminary draft agreement". There was no agreement to sign, but a draft agenda intended to be, and was, the preliminary draft agreement.

The President of the Republic and Mr. Denktash were invited to New York to discuss and negotiate so that the preliminary draft agreement might, if possible, become the framework for an agreement which would define basic elements of a solution to the Cyprus problem, to be elaborated by Committees at a later stage. These Committees, however, had to be given guidelines and terms of reference which would emanate from the framework for an agreement that would be reached by the President of the Republic and Mr. Denktash following a substantive dialogue. There were gaps and outstanding matters of substance in the preliminary draft agreement.

In reply to a question if our side went to New York after being given assurances and if this meant that we endorsed the charges against the Secretary-General, the Spokesman said: As I stated, we went to the meeting on assurances that there would be substantive dialogue there. This does not mean that we endorse the charges against the Secretary-General. The fact is that when Mr. Denktash went to New York he refused to discuss any point whatsoever.

23.1.1985

CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

.....

HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

19.11.84

IMMEDIATE

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FROM WASHINGTON 222352Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 190 OF 22 JAN

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA UKMIS NEW YORK

NICOSIA TELNO 20: CYPRUS

ADVANCE COPY

SUMMARY

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF RESTRAINING DENKTASH.

DETAIL.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT KYPRIANOU MISPLAYED HIS HAND IN NEW YORK AND THAT IT WILL NOW BE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO DETER DENKTASH FROM FURTHER QUOTE STATE-BUILDING UNQUOTE. THEY HAVE INDICATIONS THAT THE TURKS ARE REVIEWING THEIR WHOLE CYPRUS POLICY AND BELIEVE THAT THEY MAY WELL CONCLUDE THAT, HAVING FAILED IN AN HONEST EFFORT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, THEIR RESTRAINTS ON DENKTASH SHOULD BE EASED.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTAND FROM URQUHART THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL MAY HAVE IT IN MIND TO SEND A MESSAGE TO SHULTZ

SECRETARY GENERAL MAY HAVE IT IN MIND TO SEND A MESSAGE TO SHULTZ WHICH THEY ASSUME WILL ASK THE US TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE TURKS TO TRY TO RESTRAIN DENKTASH. THEIR PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO A LITTLE LONGER TO ALLOW THE DUST TO SETTLE BEFORE DECIDING WHAT ACTION TO TAKE. THEY WANT TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH US AND WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF YOUR TALK WITH PERES DE CUELLAR ON 23 JANUARY.

4. HAASS (CYPRUS COORDINATOR) HAS MEANWHILE POSTPONED, PROBABLY UNTIL MID-FEBRUARY, HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS AND LONDON IN ORDER TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICANS ARE RUSHING IN TO PICK UP THE PIECES.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TODAY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ENDED WITHOUT POSITIVE RESULTS. THE US BELIEVED THAT PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION MUST CONTINUE AND THAT THE CYPRIOT PARTIES HELD THE KEY TO THEIR OWN FUTURE. THEY CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS ROLE UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL GOOD OFFICES MANDATE.

WRIGHT

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
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MONLO JONES

7/0/01



CCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1985

Dear Charles,
Cyprus

NBPR
(This adds nothing to
the telegrams which
she has seen).

Thank you for your letter of 21 January, and for your account of the line which you, in concert with the FCO, put across over the weekend to the Cypriot High Commission.

CDP
22/i

As you know, the high-level meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash appears, despite the Secretary-General's resolute confidence, to have ended on Sunday evening pretty much in failure. Whilst there remains a chance that further direct contact between the two leaders will take place, there will almost certainly need to be some active diplomacy to achieve this.

During the meeting, Denktash as expected sat tight on the acceptance of the Secretary-General's documentation in toto. Kyprianou went to the other extreme in for a long time appearing to want to re-open every issue. The UN Secretariat were critical of his performance which they saw as pressing for too much for too long, and as a result putting at risk all that had been achieved. It was only at the last moment that Kyprianou edged towards the more limited objectives which the Prime Minister had advised him to adopt on 14 January. He was apparently prepared at that stage to accept the Secretary-General's documentation (if only as a basis for negotiation) and establish a working group on the Constitution, but only in return for a fixed date for the next high-level meeting and an agenda of items limited to points of prime importance to the Greek Cypriots. The proposal, not altogether surprisingly in our eyes, was rejected by Denktash. The UN Secretariat considered the proposal to have 'real merit', but said it simply came too late.

In fairness to both parties, it may be that the Secretary-General over-estimated the degree of understanding and willingness to cooperate between the two sides at the end of the third round of proximity talks in December, and that the high-level meeting was in consequence doomed to at the most very limited success.

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During the weekend, as you say, we consistently made clear to the Secretary-General our willingness to assist him if he thought an intervention might be useful. Although he felt such help was not called for, our Mission in New York nevertheless kept close with both sides, urging the Greek Cypriots to follow the Prime Minister's advice given to Kyprianou on 14 January and encouraging the Turkish Cypriots and Turks to seize any openings offered by Kyprianou. We told both sides and the Secretariat of the importance British Ministers attached to a successful outcome to the high-level meeting. All appeared grateful for our activity. Interestingly, the Americans, despite regular requests from the Greek Cypriots, refused to intervene. They indicated to us that they wanted to keep their powder dry for the period ahead.

The outlook is uncertain. We shall need to give Perez de Cuellar every encouragement to keep the negotiating process going when he meets the Prime Minister and Secretary of State on Wednesday. But our first need is to listen to his own assessment and, in the light of that, consider what other steps might be appropriate. The briefing will reflect this. Publicly he has done his best to salvage what he can, saying that the gap between the two sides has never been so narrow and that he will try to achieve another high-level meeting if possible before the end of February (UKMIS New York telegram No 37). Privately, he will be very disappointed. His reputation may have taken a knock.

G. James


Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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CYPRUS: Internal situation: Pt 2



London
22 Jan 1985

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DEP HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
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DESKBY 221530Z

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FM NICOSIA 221405Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 20 OF 22 JANUARY 85.

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA.

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, CBFC, MODUK(JOC AND SEC(O)(C).

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO.

MIPT : CYPRUS PROBLEM.

SUMMARY.

GREEK CYPRIOT REACTIONS, REFLECTING RECENT CHANGES IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES, SUGGEST THAT PROGRESS MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE. THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS ARE TO RESTRAIN TURKISH REACTIONS AND RE-ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE UN POLITICAL PRESENCE IN NICOSIA.

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PRINCIPALS ON BOTH SIDES AND OF A UN POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE COMMENT FROM HERE IS DIFFICULT IN PARTICULAR IT IS HARD TO JUDGE WHAT REALLY LAY AT THE ROOT OF KYPRIANOU'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE DOCUMENTATION PUT FORWARD BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT OF THE FOUR ISSUES THAT KYPRIANOU PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION AT A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING, HE SINGLED OUT IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESS TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE INDICATIONS HERE OF THE PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY FOR GREEK CYPRIOT OPINION OF GUARANTEES AND THE LINKED QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS.

2. FROM PUBLIC COMMENT IT IS EVIDENT THAT KYPRIANOU AND MOST GREEK CYPRIOTS PREFER TO REGARD THE EVENTS IN NEW YORK AS A SETBACK RATHER THAN A FAILURE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. THE EMPHASIS ON BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT ON THE VALUE OF CONTINUED EFFORTS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT IS STRIKING. OF THE NEWSPAPERS ONLY LYSSARIDES' CHOSE TO SEE THE SOLE SURVIVOR OF THE "WRECK" AS CYPRUS ITSELF. ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE THE SENSE OF RELIEF, ALMOST SATISFACTION, IS WORRYING. THERE IS A RISK OF DENKTASH ONCE AGAIN ADDUCING PUBLIC OPINION TO SUPPORT DECISIONS TO GO AHEAD WITH FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.

3. THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS SEEM TO ME TO BE :

3. THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS SEEM TO ME TO BE :

-A) TO PERSUADE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT NOT TO LOSE PATIENCE AND TO CONTINUE TO KEEP DENKTASH ON A TIGHT REIN.

B) FOR A SENIOR UN POLITICAL PRESENCE TO BE RE-ESTABLISHED HERE, PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. A UN REPRESENTATIVE IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH THE TWO SIDES AND AWARE OF THE PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD REACHED WITH THEM MIGHT HAVE FOREARMED PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGAINST THE ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THE TWO SIDES AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING. HE COULD NOW HELP PURSUE THE PROSPECTS OF RENEWED CONTACTS (INCLUDING IN NICOSIA, AS DENKTASH HAS APPARENTLY ADVOCATED).

4. THERE IS CLEARLY A DANGER (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL40) THAT THE FRUITS OF PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS MAY NOW BE LOST, ESPECIALLY IF DENKTASH EMBARKS ON NEW AND UNHELPFUL MANOEUVRES. BUT THE CONTINUED CONSENSUS AMONG THE MAIN PARTIES ON THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE THAT EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON KYPRIANOU AND AGAIN, IT SEEMS TO ME, REFLECTS THE CHANGE IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES HERE OVER THE LAST YEAR. PROVIDED BOTH SIDES CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACT (AND SPEAK) WITH RESTRAINT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WHILE MORE GROUNDWORK IS UNDERTAKEN (BY THE UN WITH US AND OTHERS IN SUPPORT), I CONSIDER THERE TO BE A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF GETTING THINGS BACK ON THE RAILS.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FM U K MISSION NEW YORK 212335Z JAN'85

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.40 OF 21 JANUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NICOSIA,ATHENS, ANKARA,VIENNA (FOR P/S
TO LADY YOUNG)ROUTINE PARIS,BONN,ROME,UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK(SEC(O)(C))
SAVING TO UKDEL STRASBOURG.

MY TELS NOS 35-37 : CYPRUS : HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

1. YOU WILL WISH TO HAVE, IN TIME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 23 JANUARY, MY IMPRESSIONS OF WHY THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING FAILED:

2. ITS FAILURE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE GENUINELY BELIEVED THAT HE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM THE TWO SIDES. HE HAD REASON TO BE HOPEFUL. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS SEEMED MORE FAVOURABLE THAN EVER BEFORE. UDI HAD BROKEN THE MOULD AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS APPEARED AT LAST TO HAVE REALISED THAT TIME WAS WORKING AGAINST THEM. ANKARA HAD GIVEN ITS SUPPORT AND HAD INDUCED DENKTASH TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS. THE GREEK ATTITUDE TOO SEEMED TO HAVE CHANGED WITH AN ENCOURAGING STATEMENT BY PAPANDREOU. THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE IN FULL SUPPORT OF HIS EFFORTS. HE COULD REASONABLY FEEL THAT THIS WAS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY SINCE 1974 TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SOLUTION.

3. THE BREAKTHROUGH CAME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. UNDER PRESSURE FROM ANKARA, DENKTASH MADE SOME SURPRISINGLY HELPFUL CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORY. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE AND LEFT THE RUNNING TO DENKTASH AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAW HIS OPPORTUNITY AND PRESSED DENKTASH FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS WHICH HE EVENTUALLY GAVE BUT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD PRESENT THEM AS PART OF HIS OWN PROPOSAL FOR A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS SET THE DIE. THE TURKS AND DENKTASH FELT THEY HAD REACHED THE LIMIT OF THEIR CONCESSIONS AND HAD A DEAL WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT HE STILL HAD TO SELL IT TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

4. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, WHO HAD STOOD BACK FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDED THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH EMERGED AS INSUFFICIENT. BUT THEY DID NOT FEEL THEY COULD REJECT IT, INsofar AS IT WAS PUT TO THEM AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OWN PROPOSAL - THE SO-CALLED 'PRESENTATION' OF 27 NOVEMBER. AT THE SAME TIME THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD NOT GET KYPRIANOU TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT. THUS THE

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/ SECRETARY

SECRETARY GENERAL WAS, I BELIEVE, ONLY ABLE TO SAVE THE THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS AND GET AGREEMENT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BY DELIBERATELY LEAVING IT AMBIGUOUS WHETHER THE TWO SIDES WERE, AS DENKTASH MAINTAINED, COMING TO SIGN AN ALREADY PREPARED DRAFT AGREEMENT OR, AS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MAINTAINED, TO ENTER INTO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS WAVED BETWEEN THE TWO INTERPRETATIONS. PRIVATELY HIS STAFF RECOGNISED THAT IT WAS A CALCULATED GAMBLE. HE AND THEY PINNED THEIR HOPES ON THE TWO SIDES RISING TO THE OCCASION AND BEING PREPARED TO MAKE MUTUAL CONCESSIONS RATHER THAN RISK PUBLIC BLAME FOR A FAILURE.

5. WHAT HAPPENED ESSENTIALLY AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING FROM 17 - 20 JANUARY WAS THAT NEITHER SIDE BUDGED FROM ITS STATED POSITION. KYPRIANOU MADE MATTERS AS BAD AS THEY COULD BE BY HIS OPENING STATEMENT IN WHICH HE TRIED TO RESERVE HIS POSITION ON A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE CONCEPTS OF BIZONALITY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS THOUGHT HE HAD ACCEPTED. HE REFUSED TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS ANYTHING MORE THAN A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND MAINTAINED THIS POSITION UNTIL THE LAST AFTERNOON. FOR 3 DAYS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TRIED OUT A SERIES OF DIFFERENT FORMULAS WITHOUT SUCCESS. WHEN KYPRIANOU FINALLY AGREED TO ONE ON THE LAST AFTERNOON IT WAS TOO LATE TO PIN DENKTASH DOWN.

6. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART STUCK TO HIS POSITION THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST FIRST BE SIGNED AND WORKING GROUPS ESTABLISHED BEFORE THERE COULD BE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. AS LONG AS KYPRIANOU REFUSED TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OR TO REDUCE THE SCOPE OF HIS DEMANDS THERE WAS NO NEED FOR DENKTASH TO LIFT A FINGER. HE WAS POLITE BUT UNYIELDING. KYPRIANOU, HE ARGUED, WAS SEEKING A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING SIMPLY TO RENEGOTIATE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT INTEND TO AGREE TO THIS.

7. WHEN HIS FINAL EFFORT ON THE LAST AFTERNOON FAILED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SOUGHT TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON A DATE FOR A FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL MEETING BUT DENKTASH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENT HE WOULD NOT SET A DATE FOR A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING. ALL THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD DO IN HIS CLOSING STATEMENT WAS TO EMPHASISE THE NEED TO PERSEVERE AND SAY THAT HE WOULD TRY TO CONVENE A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HIS STAFF PROFESS TO BE OPTIMISTIC ON THIS SCORE, THOUGH THEY SAY FEBRUARY MAY BE TOO EARLY. DENKTASH HOWEVER MADE IT BRUTALLY CLEAR TO THE PRESS THAT HE HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT AND THAT THERE WAS NOW A "NEW POLITICAL SITUATION" IN WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE TO REVIEW THEIR OPTIONS. THE CHANCES OF THE BALL OF STRING UNRAVELLING MUST BE GREAT.

8. SO WHO WAS TO BLAME? KYPRIANOU, WHO HAD MOST AT STAKE IN THE MEETING, MUST TAKE A LARGE SHARE. AS IN THE SECOND ROUND OF

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/ PROXIMITY

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PROXIMITY TALKS HE FAILED TO RISE TO THE OCCASION. HE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED TO US BY THE SECRETARIAT AS "THE PRISONER OF HIS MANNER AND HIS BRIEF" HIS ATTEMPT TO RESERVE HIS POSITION ON AS MANY POINTS AS POSSIBLE AND LEAVE THEM OPEN FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION, PLAYED INTO DENKTASH'S HANDS. PRESUMABLY HE THOUGHT THAT IF HE KEPT THE PROCESS GOING HE COULD, WITH THE HELP OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, EVENTUALLY RE-NEGOTIATE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT INTO SOMETHING WHICH BETTER REFLECTED TRADITIONAL GREEK CYPRIOT ASPIRATIONS. BY DOING SO HE LOST THE CHANCE TO PIN DENKTASH DOWN TO AN IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT. HIS CONSTANT MANOEUVRING GAVE DENKTASH AMPLE REASON TO DISTRUST HIS INTENTIONS AND AMPLE JUSTIFICATION FOR STANDING FIRM.

9. DENKTASH HIMSELF APPEARED QUITE CONTENT TO DO NOTHING. THE SECRETARIAT ARE CONVINCED THAT HE FELT HE HAD BEEN FORCED BY ANKARA INTO MAKING THE CONCESSIONS WHICH OPENED THE WAY TO THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING AND THAT HE HIMSELF WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER TO PROMOTE AN AGREEMENT. AND BY THE SAME TOKEN ANKARA SAW NO REASON TO PRESS HIM, TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. BECAUSE OF KYRPIANOU'S TACTICAL INEPTITUDE THE TURKISH SIDE'S INTENTIONS WERE NOT REALLY TESTED.

10. FOR ALL HIS UNTIRING EFFORTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL MUST BE FAULTED FOR RELYING TOO MUCH ON CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY. BOTH SIDES COULD POINT TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH HE HAD MADE AND PRIVATE ASSURANCES WHICH HE HAD GIVEN THEM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIS ON WHICH THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WAS BEING HELD. HIS OPTIMISM THAT WITH THE SPOTLIGHT OF WORLD ATTENTION ON THEM HE COULD PREVAIL ON THE TWO LEADERS TO COME TO TERMS WAS MISPLACED.

11. AMBIGUITY IS ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE IF YOU SUCCEED. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FAILURE WILL INEVITABLY DAMAGE HIS PRESTIGE HERE. WE MUST WAIT TO SEE WHAT EFFECT IT HAS ON HIS STANDING WITH THE TWO SIDES BUT ALREADY THEIR PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF CONTINUED TRUST ARE BEING UNDERMINED BY PRIVATE CRITICISM. HE HIMSELF IS SAID BY HIS STAFF TO BE "DISAPPOINTED BUT PHILOSOPHICAL".

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12. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS HOWEVER WE MUST ASK OURSELVES IF A GENUINE AND DURABLE AGREEMENT WAS EVER POSSIBLE - AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THAT IS TO SAY, TO SUBMERGE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO LIVE TOGETHER IN A FEDERATION. I MUST CONFESS THAT I DO NOT THINK THE NECESSARY DEGREE OF POLITICAL WILL WAS THERE. THE BASIC ASPIRATIONS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS REMAIN TOO FAR APART. MORE ADROIT DIPLOMACY MIGHT JUST HAVE SECURED AN AGREEMENT ON PAPER. BUT THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE SEEN WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE EMERGED SUBSEQUENTLY ONCE THE WORKING GROUPS WENT INTO THE DETAILS. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM REMAINS, I FEAR, AS INTRACTABLE AS EVER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL STRASBOURG.

MAXEY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR WESTON

MR RENWICK

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

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SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1985

CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of 19 January.

Between lunch-time on 19 January and the evening of 20 January, the Greek Cypriots contacted me a further nine times. I discussed most of these approaches with you or with Dick Neilson at the time and shall not record them all here. Their substance, on the Greek Cypriot side, is in any case fully reflected in the reporting from New York. The points which I made to them can be summarised as follows:

- (i) we were taking a close and sympathetic interest in developments; but
- (ii) we could not intervene directly in fast-moving negotiations in New York without a direct request from the Secretary-General. Although we had checked on several occasions with him, he had not asked for any action from us.
- (iii) in any case, we had to take account of the fact that President Kyprianou had chosen to ignore the careful advice which the Prime Minister had given him about the tactical handling of the negotiations. While this was his right, the consequences for the negotiations of doing so were as the Prime Minister predicted.
- (iv) an adjournment sine die of the talks carried enormous risks for the Greek Cypriots. They would do far better to leave New York with some agreement even if an incomplete one. Their negotiating position should be flexible enough to accommodate this. Otherwise it must be likely that Denktash would move ahead to consolidate UDI; but
- (v) (this when it became clear that no substantive agreement was possible) we would be ready to press the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to set a date for new high-level talks.

The Greek Cypriots were consistently grateful for our interest and encouragement, while paying virtually no attention to what we said. They lamented the absence of Sir J. Thomson from New York, believing that he might have played a crucial role. It would in fact have been helpful to know that he was not going to be there before the Prime Minister and Secretary of State advised Kyprianou to stay in close touch.

C.D. POWELL

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 210305Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 36 OF 20 JANUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS BONN PARIS ROME

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL STRASBOURG MODUK (SEC(O)(C))

MY TELNO 35 (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL MEETING

SUMMARY

1. THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING ENDED IN FAILURE THIS EVENING. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH BOTH SIDES ABOUT A FURTHER MEETING BUT DENKTASH HAS GIVEN NO COMMITMENT AND INSISTS THAT THERE IS NOW A NEW POLITICAL SITUATION. BOTH SIDES HAD GIVEN PREDICTABLY SELF SERVING ACCOUNTS TO THE PRESS.

DETAIL

2. KYPRIANOUS FINAL PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS IN RETURN FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING LIMITED TO 4 ISSUES (MY TUR) WAS REJECTED BY DENKTASH. ACCORDING TO SHERRY, DENKTASH CONSULTED THE TURKS BEFORE TURNING IT DOWN.

3. IT REMAINED FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SALVAGE WHAT LITTLE HE COULD. THE FINAL SESSION THIS AFTERNOON WAS DEVOTED TO DRAWING UP A STATEMENT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL EMERGED ABOUT 5.00PM TO READ IT OUT TO A PRESS CONFERENCE. THE TEXT IS IN MIFT. IT STATES THAT THE PARTIES ARE READY TO CONTINUE THEIR DIRECT CONTACTS AND THAT HE WILL REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH A VIEW TO THEIR MEETING AGAIN AT A JOINT HIGH LEVEL MEETING, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE THE END OF FEBRUARY.

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL STAYED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS AND WAS FOLLOWED BY DENKTASH AND THEN BY KYPRIANOU. A FULL ACCOUNT IS IN MY SECOND IFT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SOUNDED DISAPPOINTED AND DEFENSIVE. HE STRESSED HIS DUTY TO CONTINUE WITH HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES AND TO TRY TO CONVENE A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

5. DENKTASH WAS SELF CONFIDENT AND FORCEFUL. HE REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION THAT HE WAS COMMITTED TO A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING. HE SAID THAT THE FAILURE OF THE SUMMIT MEANT THAT THERE WAS NOW A NEW POLITICAL SITUATION AND HE HINTED THAT ELECTIONS MIGHT BE HELD. HE PLACED THE BLAME FIRMLY ON KYPRIANOU FOR TRYING TO RE-NEGOTIATE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. HE WAS WILLING HOWEVER TO CONTINUE CONTACTS WITH KYPRIANOU IN CYPRUS.

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6. KYPRIANOU WAS SKILFUL, IF DEFENSIVE, IN SEEKING TO AVOID BLAME FOR THE FAILURE. HE INSISTED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND 'MANY GOVERNMENTS' THAT THE SUMMIT WAS INTENDED TO BE A NEGOTIATION. HE HAD DONE HIS BEST TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. IT WAS DENKTASH WHO WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE. HE REMAINED READY TO WORK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO FIND A WAY FORWARD AND WOULD GLADLY ATTEND A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

7. WE HAD A BRIEF WORD WITH SHERRY AFTERWARDS. HE SAID THAT KYPRIANOUS FINAL PROPOSAL HAD REAL MERIT BUT IT WAS SIMPLY TOO LATE. IF ONLY HE HAD MADE THE OFFER RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING INSTEAD OF TRYING TO PRESS FOR TOO MUCH FOR TOO LONG, THINGS MIGHT HAVE TURNED OUT DIFFERENTLY. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN INCREDIBLY INEPT. AS A RESULT THEY HAD PROBABLY LOST EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN ON OFFER TO THEM FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. DENKTASH WOULD PRESUMABLY GO TO EVREN AND SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN FORCED BY HIM INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS TO NO USEFUL PROPOSE. AFTER THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY GO FOR BROKE ON UDI. THE SECRETARY GENERALS STATEMENT ABOUT A FURTHER MEETING WAS LITTLE MORE THAN AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE.

8. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS DUE TO FLY TO LONDON THIS EVENING. HE WILL GIVE YOU HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED. HE WILL NEED ALL THE ENCOURAGEMENT HE CAN GET AS HE STARTS DOWN THE LONG ROAD OF PICKING UP THE PIECES. I FEAR THAT HE IS NOT THE LEAST AMONG THE LOSERS FROM THIS SORRY EPISODE.

MAXEY

CYPRUS

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NEWS D

PUSD

PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR WESTON
MR RENWICK
MR JENKINS
MR BARRINGTON
MR BRAITHWAITE
SIR W HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION CYPRUS

2
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Mufaxed 19/1/85.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 January 1985

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10

CD
19/1

Dear Powell,

CYPRUS

1. Thank you for your letter of 18 January describing the Cypriot High Commissioner's telephone call last night.
2. We have discussed the matter with the Foreign Secretary. He has sent instructions to New York that Mr Maxey (the Acting Permanent Representative to the UN) should speak personally to the Secretary-General emphasising our continued support for his efforts, our concern at recent developments and indicating that we stand ready to help if the Secretary-General considers an intervention by us would be useful. The Mission will also reaffirm to the Greek Cypriots the advice the Prime Minister gave to Kyprianou on 14 January. Washington has been instructed to keep the State Department posted.
3. At close of play last night in New York the talks were still deadlocked on substance, but did not appear on the verge of collapse. A further round will take place today.
4. We will keep very much in mind the question of a message from the Prime Minister to one or more of the parties and in the light of reports from New York and Washington will be in touch if this appears necessary.

Yours sincerely,

P. L. Hunt

L V Appleyard

PP. (Private Secretary)

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1520

CYPRUS

PS (6)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR JENKINS

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

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HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK



19.11.85

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FM UKMTS NEW YORK 200350Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 34 OF 19 JANUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS BONN PARIS ROME
INFO SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG

MY TELNO 33 AND TELECONS WITH NEILSON: CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL MEETING

SUMMARY

1. THE TALKS REACHED A CRISIS POINT THIS EVENING BUT WILL CONTINUE TOMORROW MORNING (20 JANUARY). THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS TO PUT YET ANOTHER COMPROMISE FORMULA TO THE TWO SIDES BUT HIS CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING DO NOT LOOK GOOD.

DETAIL

2. THIS AFTERNOONS SESSION OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING STARTED AT 4.30 AND CONTINUED UNTIL AFTER 8.00PM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW THE TWO SIDES SEPARATELY FOR MOST OF THE TIME, THUS REVERTING IN EFFECT TO PROXIMITY TALKS.
3. ABOUT 6.00PM IACOVOU TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION WAS CRITICAL. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD PROPOSED A SECOND HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH WOULD HAVE A LIMITED AGENDA AND ESTABLISH WORKING GROUPS. THIS HAD BEEN REJECTED OUT OF HAND BY DENKTASH. HE WAS ALSO IMPOSING ALL SORTS OF TOUGH CONDITIONS ON THE SECRETARY GENERALS PROPOSAL TO HOLD A SECOND MEETING AT THE END OF FEBRUARY TO ADOPT HIS PROPOSAL OF THIS MORNING (IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO WHICH PROPOSAL IACOVOU WAS REFERRING). THESE CONDITIONS INCLUDED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER

MUST BE A TURKISH CYPRIOT, THAT ALL THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD HAVE TO START IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING, THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF TWO STAGES NOT TWO PROVINCES AND THAT THE QUESTIONS OF DEFENCE AND QUARANTEES WOULD HAVE TO BE FIRMLY LINKED. DENKTASH, ACCORDING TO IACOVOU, SEEMED TO BE WORKING FOR A BREAK-DOWN: IN FACT HE WAS PROPOSING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN A FAILURE. IF THE MEETING COLLAPSED THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD NOT CONVENE IT THEY WOULD DO SO THEMSELVES. IACOVOU CONCLUDED BY ASKING FOR HELP: IN PARTICULAR HE APPEARED TO THINK THAT AN INTERVENTION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HELP TO SECURE A SECOND HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

4. WE IMMEDIATELY GOT IN TOUCH WITH PICCO WHO CONFIRMED THAT THINGS WERE AT A CRISIS. HE HEARD THAT THE WHOLE THING WAS OVER BUT DID NOT SEE HOW ANYONE COULD HELP FROM THE OUTSIDE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD NOT KNOW WHAT TO ASK OF US. HE WAS TRYING TO SAVE WHAT HE COULD FROM THE MESS, BUT IT WOULD ONLY BE "CRUMBS". HE DECLINED TO GO INTO DETAIL, COMMENTING ONLY THAT IT HAD BEEN "ABSOLUTE MADNESS" AND HE WOULD TELL US THE WHOLE STORY LATER.

5. IACOVOU TOLD ME THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON TO CONVEY HIS ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION TO HMG AND THE US GOVERNMENT. AS WE LEARNED FROM THE HEAD OF SED AND ALSO FROM THE US MISSION, LATER REPORTS THROUGH THE SAME CHANNELS INDICATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION. WHEN DENKTASH LEFT THE MEETING THIS EVENING HE ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS THAT THE TALKS WOULD RESUME AT 0930 TOMORROW MORNING FOR WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A "LAST ATTEMPT".

6. WE SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO SHERRY WHO DESCRIBED THE EVENINGS SESSION AS "PRETTY GROTESQUE". HE SAID THE OUTLOOK WAS NOT GOOD. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS GOING TO TRY ONE MORE FORMULA ON THE TWO SIDES TOMORROW. THIS WOULD STATE THAT THE TWO PARTIES "ENDORSED THE DOCUMENTATIONS PRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS OPENING STATEMENT AS GUIDELINES FOR PROCEEDING IN CONFORMITE WITH THE INTEGRATED WHOLE APPROACH TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM." HE DID NOT KNOW IF THIS WOULD WORK. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN ADAMENT THAT THEY WOULD ONLY SAT THAT THEY ENDORSED THE DOCUMENTATION AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART WANTED JUST ENDORSEMENT. SHERRY EXCLAIMED THAT IT WAS UNBELIEVABLE THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE APPARENTLY WILLING TO LET THE WHOLE THING COLLAPSE RATHER THAN ACCEPT THE SECRETARY GENERALS FORMULA. IN DOING SO THEY WOULD THROW AWAY EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN GAINED SO FAR.

7. WE ALSO SPOKE BRIEFLY TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. THEY HELD OUT LITTLE HOPE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA. THEY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ATTEMPTS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY KYPRIANOU, ADDING THAT THESE WERE NOT VERY PALATABLE FOR THEM EITHER. THINGS, THEY SAID, HAD PRACTICALLY COME TO A FULL STOP.

COMMENT

8. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE MEETING IS ON THE EDGE OF COLLAPSE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL BE HARD PUT EVEN TO GET AGREEMENT TO A DATE FOR A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING. I HAVE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING ELSE WE CAN DO TO FURTHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS BUT THERE CONTINUES TO BE NO SUGGESTION FROM HIS STAFF THAT THEY THINK THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN DO. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE POWERFUL REASONS IN TERMS OF THE PARTIES OWN INTERESTS FOR REACHING SOME AGREEMENT NOW ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DO THE TRICK, FURTHER INTERVENTION BY US AT THIS VERY LATE STAGE COULD NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME.

C WA IN CONFORMITY (PARA 6)

FCO PASS SAVING

MAXEY

NNNN

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 January 1985

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10

Dear Powell,

CYPRUS

1. Thank you for your letter of 18 January describing the Cypriot High Commissioner's telephone call last night.
2. We have discussed the matter with the Foreign Secretary. He has sent instructions to New York that Mr Maxey (the Acting Permanent Representative to the UN) should speak personally to the Secretary-General emphasising our continued support for his efforts, our concern at recent developments and indicating that we stand ready to help if the Secretary-General considers an intervention by us would be useful. The Mission will also reaffirm to the Greek Cypriots the advice the Prime Minister gave to Kyprianou on 14 January. Washington has been instructed to keep the State Department posted.
3. At close of play last night in New York the talks were still deadlocked on substance, but did not appear on the verge of collapse. A further round will take place today.
4. We will keep very much in mind the question of a message from the Prime Minister to one or more of the parties and in the light of reports from New York and Washington will be in touch if this appears necessary.

Yours sincerely,

P. L. Hunt

L V Appleyard
PP. (Private Secretary)

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

✓ Cyprus

Q.

I attach telegrams describing the
state of play on Cyprus.

We have let the Secretary-

General know that we stand
ready to help if and when
he wants us to.

C D P

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RR ANKARA

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 182330Z JAN 85

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 18 JANUARY

INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA

YOUR TELNO 16 AND 17 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: CYPRUS

1. THE CYPRUS AMBASSADOR HAS TELEPHONED THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPEATEDLY OVER THE LAST 24 HOURS WITH SIMILAR GLOOMY MESSAGES. STATE ARE AWAITING A FULL ACCOUNT FROM NEW YORK. BUT, AS OF THIS EVENING, THE AMERICANS DO NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE WITH THE PARTIES, OR THE GREEKS OR TURKS, UNLESS THE UN SECRETARIAT SPECIFICALLY ASK THEM TO DO SO.

WRIGHT

NNNNL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1985

Prime Minister
You should
be aware of this.
CDP
107;

Dear Sir,

CYPRUS


The Cypriot High Commissioner telephoned me at 8.45 pm this evening on President Kyprianou's instructions. Matters were not developing at all well in New York, and the meeting with Mr. Denktash under the Secretary-General's auspices had virtually reached an impasse. Kyprianou had subsequently met very privately with Denktash alone. The purpose had been to find out whether Denktash was ready to discuss even some of the items in the Secretary-General's paper with which the Greek Cypriots had problems. The answer had been that he had been unwilling to add one comma or full-stop. There was to be a further meeting this afternoon under the Secretary-General's auspices. But President Kyprianou was not optimistic at all. All that seemed possible was to find a formula for adjourning the talks. The situation was critical.

I said that our own reports from New York had revealed that difficulties had arisen but had not cast them in quite such a serious light. It seemed that President Kyprianou himself had raised a very large number of points on the draft agreement. This might have provoked Denktash to be even more unreasonable. Panayides said that President Kyprianou had done this for the record: it did not mean that he wished to re-open all the points. I said that it seemed to me that there was a risk that adjournment of the talks might be treated by the Turkish Cypriots as definitive and as an excuse for no further effort. Could not the Greek Cypriots find some way to keep the talks going? Panayides was dubious. I urged him to advise President Kyprianou to speak to Sir J. Thomson who might be able to influence developments on the spot. Panayides said that unfortunately he was absent from New York. He hoped that HMG would consider what they could do to help retrieve the situation.

* Sir J. Thomson.

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You will no doubt want to find out how far Panayides' account tallies with the information available to our mission in New York; also how the Secretary-General and the Americans see things. If Panayides is right, and given the time-scale, any action with the Turks and Turkish Cypriots would presumably have to be in New York and might best be coordinated with the Americans. But if it is thought that a message from the Prime Minister could be useful, please let me know. I am sure that she would wish us to take any action we can to avoid a breakdown.

yours sincerely,


(C.D. POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK
ZZ WASHINGTON
GRS 220
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 182253Z JAN 85
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 18 JANUARY
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE NICOSIA ANKARA ATHENS UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO SAVING ROME PARIS BONN
CYPRUS.



1. FOLLOWING AN EARLIER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH NEILSON, CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS SPOKEN TO NO 10 ON KYPRIANOU'S BEHALF.
2. HE SAID THAT THE TALKS HAD CONTINUED TO BE DEADLOCKED AND DENKTASH IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH KYPRIANOU HAD INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT WILLING TO CHANGE THE DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE SLIGHTEST RESPECT.
3. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE OF KYPRIANOU BEING ABLE TO SHOW THE KIND OF FLEXIBILITY OR OFFER CONCESSIONS WHICH MIGHT PERSUADE DENKTASH TO CONTINUE THE MEETING IN ANY MEANINGFUL SENSE. HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO INTERVENE IN A POSITIVE FASHION.
4. GRATEFUL FOR UKMIS NEW YORK ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION HAVING CONSULTED SECRETARIAT, US DELEGATIONS AND WHERE POSSIBLE THE PARTIES. GRATEFUL IF WASHINGTON WOULD ESTABLISH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION, IN DOING SO THEY MAY DRAW ON THE FOREGOING AND FOR THEIR OWN INFORMATION SHOULD KNOW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF APPROPRIATE PERSONAL MESSAGES.
5. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 192330Z JAN 85
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 18 JANUARY
INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA

YOUR TELNO 16 AND 17 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: CYPRUS
1. THE CYPRUS AMBASSADOR HAS TELEPHONED THE STATE DEPARTMENT
REPEATEDLY OVER THE LAST 24 HOURS WITH SIMILAR GLOOMY MESSAGES.
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EVENING, THE AMERICANS DO NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE WITH
THE PARTIES, OR THE GREEKS OR TURKS, UNLESS THE UN SECRETARIAT
SPECIFICALLY ASK THEM TO DO SO.

WRIGHT

NNNNL

CYPRUS

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR RENTON
 PS/PUS
 MR DEREK THOMAS
 MR JENKINS

PS/No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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 PP ROME
 GPS 350

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IMMEDIATE

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190327Z JAN 85
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 32 OF 18 JANUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA
 INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS BOWN PARIS ROME

NY TELS NOS 29-31: CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL MEETING

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S COMMITMENTS AT THIS EVENING'S SESSION OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING AND THEREAFTER MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SPEAK TO HIM. BUT WE WERE ABLE TO SPEAK TO BOTH SHERRY AND PICCO AFTER THE SESSION WAS OVER.
2. SHERRY SAID THAT KYPRIANOU HAD INSISTED THAT HE WAS NOT WILLING TO ENDORSE ANY AGREEMENT AT THIS STAGE AND WANTED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AT FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. DENKTASH HAD SAID THAT HE WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH KYPRIANOU BUT THAT THE FIRST STEP WAS TO SIGN THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED POSITIONS EG ON ROTATION OF THE PRESIDENCY MIGHT BE BEGINNING TO UNRAVEL.
3. BY THE END OF THE SESSION THE TWO SIDES HAD COME DOWN TO NEGOTIATING LANGUAGE THAT WOULD SAY LITTLE MORE THAN THAT THEY HAD MET AND WOULD MEET AGAIN IN MARCH. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS A FAILURE AND WOULD REPORT ACCORDINGLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SHERRY THOUGHT IT CONCEIVABLE THAT BOTH SIDES WERE BLUFFING. THEY SEEMED QUITE AMICABLE, BUT HE WAS INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY DID NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT.
4. PICCO SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD GOT MY MESSAGE DURING THE SESSION AND WAS MADE AWARE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS INTEREST. BUT HE HAD BEEN BOXED IN WITH THE TWO LEADERS. PICCO WAS NOT SURE THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD HAVE FOUND IT EASY TO KNOW WHAT TO HAVE ASKED OF US - OTHER THAN A "MIRACLE". THE WHOLE SITUATION WAS CONFUSED AND MESSY.

THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD HAVE FOUND IT EASY TO KNOW WHAT TO HAVE
ASKED OF US - OTHER THAN A "MIRACLE". THE WHOLE SITUATION WAS
CONFUSED AND MESSY.

5. PICCO WAS LESS COMMUNICATIVE THAN SHERRY ABOUT THE LIKELY
OUTCOME. PARTLY HE WAS NOT SURE OF PEREZ DE CUELLARS OWN THINKING
AND PARTLY HE FELT THAT THERE WERE A "FEW MORE HOURS" TO GO.

6. THE TWO LEADERS ARE DUE TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW AFTERNOON (19
JANUARY) AFTER CONTACTS BETWEEN OFFICIALS. IN THE MEANTIME THE
SECRETARY GENERAL REMAINS AWARE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS INTEREST
AND OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE. HE WILL NO DOUBT LET
US KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN USEFULLY DO IN WHAT LOOKS AN
UNPROMISING SITUATION.

MAXEY

NNNN

CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

19.11.84



CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190032Z JAN 85

TO FLASH FCO

TEL NO 31 OF 18 JANUARY 1985

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ANKARA ATHENS

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS ROME

FLASH

ADVANCE COPIES

NY TWO IPTS: CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL MEETING

1. FOLLOWING IS A RECORD OF MY CONVERSATION WITH
MAVROMMATIS THIS AFTERNOON (18 JANUARY).

2. MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE ENTIRELY AT CROSS
PURPOSES ABOUT THE MEETING. DENKTASH HAD COME WITH JUST ONE INTEN-
 TION WHICH WAS TO SIGN WHAT HE CONSIDERED WAS A PRE-EXISTING AGREE-
 MENT. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BY CONTRAST HAD COME TO FIND SOLUTIONS
 TO THE REMAINING ISSUES. THEY HAD TWO SORTS OF DIFFICULTIES. THE
 FIRST RELATED TO THE SECRETARY GENERALS DOCUMENTATION WHERE THEY
 WISHED FOR CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS. THE SECOND RELATED TO VARIOUS OTHER
 MATTERS WHICH NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED AT HIGH LEVEL BETWEEN THE TWO
 SIDES FOR EXAMPLE THE THREE FREEDOMS, TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND GUARAN-
 TEES. UNFORTUNATELY DENKTASH WAS INSISTING BOTH IN PLENARY AND IN
 PRIVATE THAT ALL HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT WAS SIGNING AND THAT WHILE
 HE WOULD LISTEN TO WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD TO SAY HE WOULD NOT
 ENTER INTO DISCUSSION. THIS SEEMED CONTRARY TO THE LINE WHICH
 THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD TAKEN WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BEFOREHAND.
 HE ASSURED THEM HE HAD TOLD ANKARA THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE A
 SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

3. MAVROMMATIS DENIED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT PREPARED
 TO AGREE TO ANYTHING OR WERE RE-OPENING EVERYTHING. THEY HAD
 TALKED WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT

TO AGREE TO ANYTHING OR WERE RE-OPENING EVERYTHING. THEY HAD SIMPLY SOUGHT TO REMIND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT INTERPRETATION OF SUCH MATTERS AS BIZONALITY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY IN PREPARATION FOR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES IN THE WORKING GROUPS. WHAT THEY WANTED TO DISCUSS AT THE PRESENT MEETING WERE THE HARDCORE ISSUES SUCH AS VEToes, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT CLAIM TO THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE VOTING PATTERN IN THE LEGISLATURE. ON THE LAST THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT A BLANKET VOTE BUT COULD ACCEPT WEIGHTED VOTING ON CERTAIN ISSUES.

4. I SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD GIVEN US THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO LIMIT DISCUSSION TO CRUCIAL AREAS. IT WOULD SEEM PRUDENT TO FOCUS ON SUCH ISSUES AND NOT PUSH OTHER POINTS TOO FAR. IT WAS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT DOCUMENTATION. WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER TO TRY TO SUCCEED ON SOME KEY ISSUES NOW, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SUGGESTED TO KYPRIANOU, AND LEAVE OTHERS SUCH AS TROOP WITHDRAWALS UNTIL LATER.

5. MAVROMMATIS STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED TO DISCUSS TROOP WITHDRAWALS NOW. THERE HAD TO BE SOME SEMBLANCE OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SINCE IT WAS A SINE QUA NON FOR SIGNING AN AGREEMENT. WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED WAS A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COVER THE WHOLE SPECTRUM IN THE TIME REMAINING AT THIS MEETING. A FORMULA SHOULD BE FOUND FOR ADJOURNING THE MEETING AND CONVENING ANOTHER ONE LATER TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION. BOTH SIDES APPEARED TO WANT THE PROCESS TO CONTINUE. THERE WAS EVIDENT GOODWILL AND A GOOD ATMOSPHERE. GIVEN TIME AND A PROPER DISCUSSION OF THE

ISSUES, MAVROMMATIS WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD REACH A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT.

6. I REITERATED THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS AT THIS STAGE. THE AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD DEPEND ON BUILDING UP CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD SEEM REASONABLE TO SUGGEST THAT IT COULD BE LEFT UNTIL LATER TO RESOLVE. MAVROMMATIS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. HE SAID THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WERE ALSO NEEDED ON TERRITORY FOR EXAMPLE TO EXPLORE WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL MEANT BY SPECIAL STATUS AREAS. IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT VIEW THE AGENDA HAD ALWAYS ENVISAGED SUCH DISCUSSION.

7. I SAID THAT IT WOULD SEEM IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO SIDES TO SIGN A DOCUMENT AT THIS MEETING EVEN IF IT CONTAINED LESS THAN ORIGINALLY HOPED FOR IN ORDER TO MARK PROGRESS AND CARRY THE PROCESS FORWARD. MAVROMMATIS AGAIN INDICATED HIS RELUCTANCE FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO SIGN ANY DOCUMENT AT THIS STAGE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY MY SUGGESTION ABOUT FOCUSING ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF ISSUES TO KYPRIANOU. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED WE COULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT GETTING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE.

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CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

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MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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PS/No.10 DOWLING STREET

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19.11.84

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190040Z JAN 85

TO FLASH FCO

TEL NO 29 OF 18 JANUARY 1985

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YOUR TELNO 17: CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL MEETING

1. THE DEADLOCK IN THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING HAS CONTINUED TODAY. THE SECRETARIAT ARE VERY CONCERNED. THEY SEE NO LIKELIHOOD OF AN AGREEMENT BEING REACHED WITHOUT A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE BY THE PARTIES AND BY KYPRIANOU IN PARTICULAR. THE ONLY BRIGHT SPOT IS THAT THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS REASONABLY GOOD AND NEITHER SHOWS SIGNS OF WALKING OUT.
2. THE SECRETARIAT ASKED TO SEE US AND THE AMERICANS THIS AFTERNOON. MIFT CONTAINS A FULL ACCOUNT. THEY TOLD US THAT KYPRIANOU SEEMED COMPLETELY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY GENERALS DOCUMENTATION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT. INSTEAD HE HAD BROUGHT UP A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO KYPRIANOU TO DO SO TOO.
3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS BEEN MAKING VARIOUS EFFORTS TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. HE SOUGHT THIS MORNING TO LINK ENDORSEMENT BY THE TWO SIDES OF THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT AND RELATED UNDERSTANDINGS TO AGREEMENT AT A SUBSEQUENT HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON MUTUALLY AGREEABLE GUIDE LINES FOR THE WORKING GROUPS WHICH WOULD COVER THE ISSUES OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. KYPRIANOU WOULD NOT AGREE TO THIS COMPROMISE. DENKTASH HAD RESERVATIONS.
4. MAVRÖNNATIS TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE ENTIRELY AT CROSS PURPOSES. HE SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED TO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE KEY ISSUES WITH DENKTASH. HE INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO SIGN DOCUMENTS AT THIS MEETING

~~WTCU THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO SIGN DOCUMENTS AT THIS MEETING~~
BUT TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD BE CONTINUED AT A FURTHER HIGH
LEVEL MEETING WITH THE AIN OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
TWO SIDES COVERING THE KEY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS
INCLUDING TROOPS WITHDRAWALS. MY SECOND IFT GIVES A FULL ACCOUNT
OF OUR MEETING.

5. THE TURKS PREDICTABLY PLACE ALL THE BLAME ON KYPRIANOU FOR THE
IMPASSE. THEIR DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS EMPHASISED TO
ME THAT DENKTASH IS PREPARED TO FALL IN WITH THE SECRETARY GENERALS
PROPOSALS, TO ENTRUST THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO WORKING GROUPS AND
TO HAVE FURTHER MEETINGS WITH KYPRIANOU WHENEVER NECESSARY TO
RESOLVE SUCH DIFFICULTIES AS MIGHT ARISE.

6. THE US MISSION HAVE TOLD US THAT WASHINGTON IS TREATING
GREEK CYPRIOT APPEALS FOR HELP WITH CAUTION AND ARE RELUCTANT
TO BECOME INVOLVED. CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS HAASS, THE US SPECIAL
COORDINATOR ON CYPRUS, HAS REMAINED IN WASHINGTON.

7. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT KYPRIANOU HAS IGNORED
THE PRIME MINISTERS ADVICE AND SOUGHT TO
ENGAGE IN AN OPEN ENDED DISCUSSION ON ALL THE MATTERS AT ISSUE
RATHER THAN CONCENTRATE ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE KEY ISSUES OF
TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION USING THE SECRETARY GENERALS DOCUMENTATION
AND LEAVE THE OTHER KEY QUESTIONS SUCH AS TROOP WITHDRAWALS UNTIL
LATER. THE SECRETARY GENERALS SUGGESTED COMPROMISE IN PARAGRAPH
3 ABOVE SEEMS EMINENTLY SENSIBLE AND IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT
KYPRIANOU SHOULD HAVE REJECTED IT. BY TRYING TO AVOID AGREEMENT
AT THIS MEETING AND LEAVING EVERYTHING OPEN IN THE HOPE OF
REACHING AGREEMENT AT SOME SUBSEQUENT HIGH LEVEL MEETING OR
MEETINGS, HE IS TAKING A CONSIDERABLE RISK THAT THE WHOLE PROCESS
WILL LOSE MOMENTUM AND BEGIN TO UNRAVEL.

8. I HESITATE TO MAKE A FIRM RECOMMENDATION AS TO THE ACTION THE
PRIME MINISTER MIGHT TAKE UNTIL I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO THE
SECRETARY GENERAL WHOSE VIEW ON THE SITUATION REACHED AT THE MEETING
AND ON WHAT ACTION WOULD BE HELPFUL ARE CRUCIAL. AS FAR AS I KNOW HE
IS STILL ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE TWO SIDES AND MAY
BE MAKING PROGRESS. ONCE I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO HIM I WILL
REPORT FURTHER.

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CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/FUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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HD/UND

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TO FLASH FCO

TEL NO 00 OF 16 JANUARY 1985

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MY IPT:

CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT SHERRY HAD TO SAY WHEN HE ASKED TO SEE US AND THE AMERICANS THIS AFTERNOON (18 JANUARY).

2. THE SECRETARIAT WERE IN TROUBLE. KYPRIANOU HAD COME THROUGH THE DRAFT AGREEMENT LISTING OBJECTION AFTER OBJECTION. THESE WERE NOT NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DRAFT (WITH ONE EXCEPTION) BUT REPRESENTED ADDITIONAL DEMANDS. IT WAS NOW BEGINNING TO LOOK AS THOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY GENERALS DOCUMENTATION AS A FRAMEWORK. THE SECRETARIAT DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF KYPRIANOUS PERFORMANCE. IT COULD BE THAT HE WAS JUST PLAYING HARD TO GET FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES AND WOULD IN THE END COME TO SOME AGREEMENT. ALTERNATIVELY, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME TOTAL MISUNDERSTANDING OVER THE SECRETARIATS ASSUMPTION

4016 TOTAL PERIODS TRADING OVER THE SECRETARIATS ACCOUNTS
THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DOCUMENTATION.

3. DENKTASH'S REACTION HAD BEEN RESTRAINED. HE CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO KYPRIANOU TO DO THE SAME. ALL ADDITIONAL POINTS, HE SAID, SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE WORKING GROUPS. KYPRIANOU IN RETURN, RIGHTLY IN SHERRY'S VIEW, ARGUED THAT THE WORKING GROUPS COULD NOT TAKE MAJOR POLITICAL DECISIONS AND THAT THE TWO LEADERS NEEDED TO AGREE GUIDE LINES ON THESE IN ADVANCE.

4. THIS MORNING THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK HAD GIVEN THE TWO SIDES A NON-PAPER. SHERRY ALLOWED US TO TAKE NOTES OF THIS PAPER WHICH TOOK THE FORM OF A DRAFT DOCUMENT TO BE AGREED BY THE TWO SIDES. IT SAID THAT THE PARTIES ENDORSED THE DOCUMENT (IE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT) WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD GIVEN THEM, HIS PRESENTATION OF 27 NOVEMBER AND THE 'UNDERSTANDINGS'. IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT FURTHER MUTUALLY AGREEABLE GUIDELINES FOR THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD BE PREPARED AT A RESUMED JOINT HIGH LEVEL MEETING BEGINNING ON (DATE LEFT BLANK) AND THAT THESE WOULD CONSTITUTE PART OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THE GUIDE LINES FOR THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD COVER ISSUES SUCH AS MATTERS SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT VOTING SYSTEMS IN THE LEGISLATURE, MATTERS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ON THE EXECUTIVE, THE THREE FREEDOMS, THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-CYPRIOT TROOPS, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS AND SPECIAL STATUS AREAS.

5. TO THE SECRETARIATS DISMAY KYPRIANOU TURNED THIS DOWN FLAT SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT ENDORSE THE DOCUMENTATION TO WHICH THIS REFERRED. DENKTASH WAS ALSO, FOR OPPOSITE REASONS, NOT KEEN ON 'ENDORSE' BUT SAID THAT HE COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL PROVIDING IT STOPPED AFTER THE MENTION OF A DATE AND SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE GUIDE LINES CONSTITUTING PART OF AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OR WHAT ISSUES THEY WOULD COVER. HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE IMPLICATION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCUMENTATION WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON THE GUIDE LINES.

6. SHERRY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE TRYING A DIFFERENT TACK AT A SECOND MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS AFTERNOON. HE WAS PLANNING TO MODIFY THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AT THREE POINTS (SHERRY REFUSED TO SAY WHAT THESE ARE BUT HINTED THAT TWO OF THEM WERE LEGISLATURE AND THE THREE FREEDOMS). IF KYPRIANOU WOULD ENDORSE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH THESE CHANGES, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD THEN TRY TO SELL IT TO DENKTASH.

7. SHERRY ADDRESSED A LOW KEY REQUEST TO US AND THE AMERICANS TO HELP. HE SAID THE TIME HAD COME FOR ACTION. IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE VERY CLEAR TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THE RISK WHICH THEY WERE FACING. NEVER HAD THE TWO SIDES GONE SO FAR TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. BY PRESSING FOR ALL THAT THEY WERE PRESSING FOR THEY WERE JEOPARDISING THE CHANCE OF AN AGREEMENT AND MIGHT NEVER HAVE ANOTHER CHANCE.

8. SHERRY CONCLUDED THAT THE ONE BRIGHT POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS WAS THAT THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS REMARKABLY GOOD. THEY WERE TALKING TO EACH OTHER QUITE AMICABLY AND SHOWED

9. SHERRY CONCLUDED THAT THE ONE BRIGHT POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS WAS THAT THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS REMARKABLY GOOD. THEY WERE TALKING TO EACH OTHER QUITE AMICABLY AND SHOWED NO WISH TO END THE DIALOGUE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME NEITHER SIDE WAS PREPARED TO BUDGE FROM ITS POSITION.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1985

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bcPCCYPRUS

The Cypriot High Commissioner telephoned me at 8.45 pm this evening on President Kyprianou's instructions. Matters were not developing at all well in New York, and the meeting with Mr. Denktash under the Secretary-General's auspices had virtually reached an impasse. Kyprianou had subsequently met very privately with Denktash alone. The purpose had been to find out whether Denktash was ready to discuss even some of the items in the Secretary-General's paper with which the Greek Cypriots had problems. The answer had been that he had been unwilling to add one comma or full-stop. There was to be a further meeting this afternoon under the Secretary-General's auspices. But President Kyprianou was not optimistic at all. All that seemed possible was to find a formula for adjourning the talks. The situation was critical.

I said that our own reports from New York had revealed that difficulties had arisen but had not cast them in quite such a serious light. It seemed that President Kyprianou himself had raised a very large number of points on the draft agreement. This might have provoked Denktash to be even more unreasonable. Panayides said that President Kyprianou had done this for the record: it did not mean that he wished to re-open all the points. I said that it seemed to me that there was a risk that adjournment of the talks might be treated by the Turkish Cypriots as definitive and as an excuse for no further effort. Could not the Greek Cypriots find some way to keep the talks going? Panayides was dubious. I urged him to advise President Kyprianou to speak to Sir J. Thomson who might be able to influence developments on the spot. Panayides said that unfortunately he was absent from New York. He hoped that HMG would consider what they could do to help retrieve the situation.

You will no doubt want to find out how far Panayides' account tallies with the information available to our mission in New York; also how the Secretary-General and the Americans see things. If Panayides is right, and given the time-scale, any action with the Turks and Turkish Cypriots would presumably have to be in New York and might best be coordinated with the Americans. But if it is thought that a message from the Prime Minister could be useful, please let me know. I am sure that she would wish us to take any action we can to avoid a breakdown.

(C.D. POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 25 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN (DESKBY 180645Z FOR ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT),

NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK

INFO SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG

MY TELNO 22: CYPRUS: HIGH LEVEL MEETING

SUMMARY

1. THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING HAS GOT OFF TO A DIFFICULT START WITH THE TWO SIDES IN APPARENT DEADLOCK.

DETAIL

2. THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING BEGAN THIS MORNING (17 JANUARY) WITH A SYMBOLIC PUBLIC HANDSHAKE BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS WHICH DENKTASH WITH A TOUCH OF HYPERBOLE DESCRIBED AS 'THE HANDSHAKE OF THE CENTURY'. BOTH LEADERS, ACCOMPANIED BY OFFICIALS, MET TOGETHER FOR OVER AN HOUR THIS MORNING AND FOR A FURTHER HOUR LATE THIS AFTERNOON. KYPRIANOU WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MAVROMMATIS, SOULIOTI AND POLYVIOU; DENKTASH BY ERTEKUN, ONAN AND ATALAY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD PICCO AND SHERRY WITH HIM. KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH ALSO HAD A SECRET PRIVATE MEETING ALONE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DURING THE AFTERNOON. THE TWO SIDES WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING (18 JANUARY).

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OPENED THE MEETING WITH A PREPARED STATEMENT ON THE LINES OF HIS STATEMENT ON TUESDAY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS TUR). THE TEXT OF THIS WAS RELEASED TO THE PRESS AND IS IN MIFT (SAVING TO CERTAIN ADDRESSEES). THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS SPOKESMAN SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE ASSERTED, WITH QUOTES FROM THE STATEMENT, THAT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WOULD NOT BE A SIGNING CEREMONY BUT A 'NEGOTIATING SESSION' INTENDED TO LEAD TO THE FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT. HE DENIED THAT THERE WAS A SINGLE DOCUMENT WAITING TO BE SIGNED SAYING THAT THE MEETING HAD 'SEVERAL DOCUMENTS' BEFORE IT.

4. AS AGREED IN TELECON NEILSON/HUMFREY, I CONTACTED THE CYPRIOT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THIS MORNING TO ASK FOR A MEETING TO CONVEY THE GIST OF ANKARA TELNO 34 AND TO BE BRIEFED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS. IT WAS ARRANGED THAT MAVROMMATIS WILL SEE ME TOMORROW.

5. BOTH SIDES WERE TIGHT LIPPED AFTER THIS MORNING'S MEETING. THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THINGS HAD NOT GONE WELL CAME TO US FROM THE US MISSION WHO HAD BEEN TOLD BY WASHINGTON THAT THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR THERE HAD JUST BEEN INTO THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO SAY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM KYPRIANOU THAT THE MORNING HAD GONE BADLY AND THAT US HELP WAS NEEDED. THE US MISSION IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED SHERRY WHO TOLD THEM THAT HE THOUGHT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE OVER-REACTING AND THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE US TO DO ANYTHING. SHERRY

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/SAID.

SAID THAT KYPRIANOU HAD GONE THROUGH THE AGENDA PAPER IN DETAIL AND TAKEN A HARD LINE. HE HAD FOR EXAMPLE CALLED FOR TURKISH SETTLERS TO LEAVE CYPRUS AND SET OUT HIS VIEWS ON BI-ZONALITY AT LENGTH. SHERRY CONSIDERED THAT THIS HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL AND THAT KYPRIANOU HAD GONE TOO FAR. WHEN DENKTASH HAD STARTED TO APPEAR ANGRY KYPRIANOU HAD LOOKED NERVOUS.

6. SHERRY WAS UNABLE TO SEE US AND THE AMERICANS AS PROMISED THIS EVENING. HE DID HOWEVER SPEAK TO THE US MISSION BY TELEPHONE AND ASKED THEM TO PASS ON TO US WHAT HE HAD SAID WITH THE CAVEAT THAT HE HAD GONE FURTHER THAN HE WAS AUTHORISED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A 'LOUSY DAY' AND ADMITTED THAT HE WAS DISCOURAGED. THE SITUATION WAS 'SORT OF DEADLOCKED'. DENKTASH WAS SITTING PRETTY AND SAYING THAT ALL WAS SETTLED AND THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WAITING TO BE SIGNED. KYPRIANOU FOR HIS PART WAS TRYING NOT JUST TO MODIFY THE DRAFT BUT TO INTRODUCE CONTROVERSIAL NEW ELEMENTS (SHERRY DID NOT ENLARGE ON THESE). ATTEMPTS TO GET KYPRIANOU TO LIMIT HIS DEMANDS TO THE ESSENTIALS HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. THE PRIVATE MEETING WITH JUST THE TWO LEADERS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. THE SECRETARIAT WERE NOW TRYING TO BUILD ON A SUGGESTION FROM DENKTASH ABOUT DRAFTING GUIDELINES FOR THE WORKING GROUPS. THIS WORK MIGHT BE PUT INTO A SECOND DOCUMENT. IF THIS FAILED, SHERRY WAS NOT SURE HOW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY FORWARD.

7. WE SPOKE THIS EVENING TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WHO SOUNDED GLOOMY. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THINGS WERE NOT GOING WELL AND COMPLAINED THAT KYPRIANOU APPEARED TO WANT TO START FROM SCRATCH AND RE-NEGOTIATE THE WHOLE AGREEMENT.

8. THE TURKISH DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO WHOM WE ALSO SPOKE TOOK A SLIGHTLY LESS GLOOMY VIEW. HE SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS STILL VERY FLUID. THIS MORNING'S MEETING HAD BEEN A 'NEAR TRAGEDY' BUT BY THIS EVENING IT HAD REVERTED TO 'MELODRAMA'.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL STRASBOURG.

MAXEY

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 January 1985

*NBPM
CDP 17/1*

Dear Charles

Cyprus

attached,

Thank you for your letter of 16 January about the telephone call from the Cyprus High Commissioner on behalf of President Kyprianou.

We immediately asked the Ambassador in Ankara to establish the truth of these reports and I attach an advance copy of his reporting telegram (which you will see has also been sent flash to UKMIS New York for use by Sir J Thomson). Fortunately, it emerges that the situation is much less polarised than President Kyprianou had thought, but it is quite understandable that he should have reacted with concern to the first reports reaching him. We have asked our mission in New York to pass the information to the Cypriots and we are speaking to the Cyprus High Commission here.

Yours ever

John Biddell

BR

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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17 JAN 1995

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TO FLASH FCG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 034 OF 17 JANUARY
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK AND NICOSIA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS.

YOUR TELNO 010 TO NICOSIA AND TELECON NEILSON/SELF: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. IN STRESSING THE NEED FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR THE TURKISH MINORITY, HALEFOGLU HAS SAID TO THE PRESS THAT SOME TURKISH TROOPS WILL NEED TO REMAIN, AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE 1960 GUARANTEE AGREEMENT. FAIRLY CLEAR THAT THIS WAS INTENDED AS REASSURANCE IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT AND TO ALLAY MEDIA CRITICISM THAT TOO MANY CONCESSIONS WERE BEING MADE.

DETAIL

2. THE HURRIYET REPORT OF 15 JANUARY IS MAINLY ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TURKISH GUARANTEES FOR THE MINORITY IN CYPRUS. AFTER REFERRING TO THE NEED FOR A SYSTEM IN WHICH BOTH COMMUNITIES CAN LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, HALEFOGLU IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WHEN THE FINAL SOLUTION IS ACHIEVED, TURKISH TROOPS WILL NOT BE COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN FROM THE ISLAND. "THIS WAS NOT A CONDITION EVEN IN THE 1960 AGREEMENT. THEREFORE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE TURKISH/CYPRIOI COMMUNITY TO EXIST WITHOUT TURKEY'S DIRECT GUARANTEES. THIS DIRECT GUARANTEE WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES IN CYPRUS". THE HURRIYET HEADLINE, WHICH IS NOT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH HALEFOGLU'S REMARKS, WAS "THE TURKISH FORCES WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM CYPRUS".

3. THE TURCUMAN ARTICLE OF 14 JANUARY IS A MORE SPECULATIVE PIECE BASED ON DENKTASH'S PRESS CONFERENCE (REPORTED IN MY TELNO 021). THIS CONFIRMS THE KNOWN TURKISH POSITION THAT NONE OF THEIR FORCES COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE ISLAND BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THIS IS OF COURSE WHAT ULUCEVIK TOLD US (PARA 3 OF OUR TELNO 015) IN SAYING THAT A FULL AGREEMENT HAD TO BE IN PLACE BEFORE THE TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL COULD BEGIN TO OPERATE. (

4. HALEFOGLU'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAS NOW CONFIRMED THAT THE HURRIYET REPORT IS BOTH A FULL AND ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF WHAT HIS MINISTER HAD SAID. HE DECLINED TO CLARIFY THE STATEMENT BEYOND POINTING OUT THAT THE HEADLINE HAD BEEN MISLEADING AND THAT THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR DISCUSSION OF BOTH GUARANTEES AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, THE CYPRUS DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA HAVE SEPARATELY TOLD US THAT DESPITE THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE, IT HAD BEEN THOUGHT NECESSARY FOR THE MINISTER PUBLICLY TO REBUT REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO IACOVOU IN THE TURKISH PRESS OF 11 JANUARY, THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD NOT AGREE

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TO ANY TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE TURKISH TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN.

COMMENT

5. WHILST GREEK JITTERINESS AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE IS UNDERSTANDABLE, I BELIEVE THAT CONCERN ABOUT TURKISH MOTIVES IS ON THIS OCCASION EXAGGERATED. HALEFOGLU'S COMMENTS NEED TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF:-

(A) THE TURKISH POSITION THAT, AT LEAST IN THEORY, THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE ARE STILL IN EFFECT. MOREOVER THE TURKS REGARD THEIR CONTINUED ROLE AS GUARANTOR AS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR ANY SETTLEMENT. SINCE THE 1960 TREATY PROVIDED FOR THE PRESENCE ON CYPRUS OF 650 TURKISH TROOPS (TO OFFSET THE GREEK NATIONAL GUARD) IT FOLLOWS THAT THE TURKS TODAY STILL CONSIDER THEY HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO SOME RESIDUAL MILITARY PRESENCE, AND

(B) AS HALEFOGLU'S PS TOLD MY COUNSELLOR THE WHOLE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND GUARANTEES WILL BE NEGOTIATED BY ONE OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND IT IS THEREFORE NOT SURPRISING THAT HALEFOGLU SHOULD NOW BE STAKING OUT A TURKISH POSITION SEMI COLON

(C) THE TURKISH NEED, AS THE MFA HAVE EXPLAINED, TO PROVIDE PUBLIC REASSURANCE THAT THE INTERESTS OF THEIR COMMUNITY WOULD BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY ANY SETTLEMENT. APART FROM IACOVOU'S COMMENTS THERE HAVE IN RECENT DAYS BEEN A NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN THE PRESS HERE CRITICISING THE GOVERNMENT FOR HAVING ALREADY MADE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS TO THE GREEK SIDE.

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER THE TURKS WOULD BE READY TO AGREE, AFTER A SUITABLY PHASED WITHDRAWAL, TO ACCEPT A RESIDUAL FORCE OF THE SAME ORDER AS PROVIDED FOR IN 1960. I SUSPECT THAT THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TROOPS IN THE AREA TO DETER THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FROM DEPARTING FROM THE EXACT TERMS OF ANY NEW AGREEMENT. WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS SO, I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT MOMENT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE TURKS HERE. SOME RISK

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OF OUR FINDING OURSELVES IN THE MIDDLE OF AN ACRIMONIOUS ARGUMENT BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES WOULD BE CLEAR. BUT TO ALLAY GREEK AND CYPRIOT FEARS SIR JOHN THOMSON MAY WISH TO PASS ON OUR INTERPRETATION OF HALEFOGLU'S COMMENTS AND PARTICULARLY THE GLOSS PUT ON THEM BY THE TURKISH MFA. I WOULD ALSO NOT RULE OUT THE NEED FOR A HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHE HERE IF THINGS LOOKED LIKE COMING APART ON THIS ISSUE IN NEW YORK.

RUSSELL

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PLANNING STAFF

PS.

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR WESTON

MR RENWICK

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

MR BRAITHWAITE

SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

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Pile DSC

bcc: PC ✓ DG2ABN

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 January 1985

CYPRUS

The Cyprus High Commissioner telephoned me this morning to say that President Kyprianou had rung him from New York to express great concern at statements by the Turkish Foreign Minister that Turkey would insist on keeping troops in Cyprus as the only real guarantee for the Turkish Cypriot population; and by Denktash to the effect that the high level meeting was purely ceremonial. In the light of these statements, Kyprianou was fearful that the high level meeting would be a fiasco.

I said that I thought it would be a mistake for President Kyprianou to allow himself to be rattled by statements such as these. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots no doubt saw themselves as engaged in a war of nerves and would be seeking to put maximum pressure on Kyprianou. He would recall what the Prime Minister had said at their meeting about Denktash's penchant for posturing.

The High Commissioner said that President Kyprianou wanted to keep in direct touch with No. 10. I did not feel that I could turn this down, but again encouraged him to make Sir John Thomson his point of contact.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DSG

File



cc: Sir P. Cadock.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January 1985

CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of 2 January enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the message from the Turkish Prime Minister about Cyprus.

The Prime Minister agrees to the draft message enclosed with your letter and also that we should first discuss it with the Americans and with Mr. Perez de Cuellar.

Charles Powell

CP

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

① GSC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

Agree:

(i) The rather bland but probably wise reply to Ozal; 2 January, 1985

(ii) That we should check with the Americans before sending it, whether they have had a similar message and how they propose to reply? - Yes - with John Hammond.

CDP 2/i

Dear Charles,

As you know, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Ozal has sent a message to the Prime Minister (copy attached). This purports to be an assessment of the prospects for a lasting Cyprus settlement prior to the meeting between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash which is due to begin under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General in New York on 17 January. In fact, the message contains total support for the Turkish Cypriot case, a request for pressure on the Greek Cypriots, and a complaint about a "new" defence doctrine announced by Papandreou which has been the subject of a Turkish approach to the FCO.

I attach a draft telegram to Ankara containing a proposed reply from the Prime Minister.

The announcement by the UN Secretary-General on 10 December (at the end of a third round of "proximity talks") that agreement had been secured to a "high-level meeting" represented a considerable diplomatic achievement for Perez de Cuellar, and offers some (albeit limited) hope that a settlement of the Cyprus issue may be attainable.

There is little doubt that the Turks impressed upon Denktash the need to adopt a positive attitude in the proximity talks. Denktash duly made the concessions sought by the Secretary-General (most notably on the percentage of territory to remain under Turkish Cypriot control). Seizing the political advantage Denktash also announced his acceptance in toto of the Secretary-General's draft agreement. President Kyprianou was disconcerted by this tactic and returned to Nicosia for consultations before indicating his agreement. However it is clear that Kyprianou considers that the high level meeting will involve further discussion of questions of substance, including those covered by the existing texts (this seems also to be the Secretary-General's view). Denktash and the Turks are trying to press home their advantage by insisting that Kyprianou accepts the agreement without further ado. Ozal's message must be seen as part of this process. The Turkish aim will be to transfer to the Greek Cypriots any odium for failure at the summit.

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In our view the Prime Minister should avoid being drawn into this dispute in her reply to Mr Ozal. It would be in keeping with our support for the Secretary-General for her to continue to urge both sides to adopt a positive attitude, thus maximising the chance, which may be unique, to make real progress towards a settlement. The Prime Minister could take a similar line if she agrees to meet President Kyprianou on 14 January, immediately before the high-level talks begin.

✓ It is probable that Mr Ozal has sent a similar message to President Reagan. It would be helpful to our close consultations with the Americans on Cyprus if the Prime Minister would agree to our discussing Ozal's message and the proposed reply with the State Department before any reply is sent. It would also be useful to Mr Perez de Cuellar in his role of mediator if Sir J Thomson were authorised to discuss the messages on the same basis with him.

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
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6	FM FCO JANUARY 85
7	TO IMMEDIAT ANKARA
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	PRIORITY NICOSIA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
10	INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK (DS11), PARIS, ROME, BONN
11	FCO TELEGRAM NO 277: OZAL'S MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
12	1. Please pass to Ozal the following reply from the Prime
13	Minister.
14	BEGINS
15	Dear Prime Minister,
16	Thank you very much for your message conveying your
17	assessment of the Cyprus situation following the proximity
18	talks and in advance of the high-level meeting due to start
19	on 17 January.
20	I have been following developments very closely and I share
21	your pleasure at the progress already made. There are now
22	grounds for hoping that a peaceful, just and lasting settlement
23	might be achieved. I have indeed taken note of the role
24	played by Mr Denktash during the proximity talks. I am sure
25	you will agree that the leaders of both communities in Cyprus

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Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	2

<<<< 1 >>>>

2 must continue to show courage, patience and flexibility if

3 success is to crown their and the Secretary-General's

4 efforts. There can be no doubt about Mr Perez de Cuellar's

5 personal commitment to a successful resolution of the problem.

6 He knows that he has the continued confidence of the British

7 Government. We shall take every opportunity to support his

8 efforts with all the parties. The opportunity is too great

9 to miss.

10 ENDS

11 2. (For Washington). You may discuss Ozal's message and the

12 Prime Minister's reply in confidence with the Americans. You

13 should ask if they have received a similar approach. If they

14 have what reply will they be sending?

15 3. (For UKMIS New York). You may also discuss the exchange

16 with the UN Secretary-General in confidence.

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18 HOWE

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TURKISH EMBASSY

LONDON

274-84

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to request him to be so kind as to forward to its high destination the enclosed message by His Excellency Mr. Turgut Özal, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to the Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurances of his highest consideration.

London, 26 November 1984



Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
S W 1.

Text of the message of His Excellency
Mr. Turgut ÖZAL, Prime Minister of the
Republic of Turkey, to the Rt. Honourable
Margaret THATCHER M.P., Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom.

"The Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London

A Dear Madame Prime Minister,

I deem it opportune to share with you our assessment
of the newly-created prospects for a lasting Cyprus
settlement.

We are happy to note that the proximity talks ended
with a decision to hold a high-level meeting in January.
As you know by now, this promising state of affairs has
been mostly the fruit of the conciliatory and flexible
attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side throughout the
proximity talks and their constructive cooperation with
the Secretary General. President Denktaş once again
proved his commitment to a negotiated settlement by being
fully responsive to the Secretary General's efforts at
every turn, often at the cost of taking considerable
risks as a political leader. The Turkish Cypriots, though
not satisfied with it in every instance and had in fact
many difficulties, accepted all the elements put forward
by the Secretary General as a draft agreement and look
forward to its signature at the forthcoming high-level
meeting.

The Turkish Cypriots have told us and we agree with them that they have done all that is possible for them to do and that anything more on their part would be tantamount to outright surrender.

We believe there is today a new and unprecedented opportunity for the two sides to resolve the Cyprus problem. The basis already exists. What is needed now is for the Greek Cypriot side to come to the high-level meeting in good faith.

If the high-level meeting is turned into still another round of open-ended negotiations, this major opportunity would be lost and might, we are afraid, lead to reconsideration of established positions.

It is of vital importance, therefore, to impress on the Greek side the crucial meaning of obtaining full agreement at the high-level meeting on the draft as presented by the Secretary General after his extensive contacts with both sides during the past five months. The Greek side must be urged to match the demonstrated goodwill of the Turkish Cypriots and to allow the next step toward a mutual settlement. Whereas success would remove this source of friction with beneficial effects, failure will surely have negative consequences and repercussions.

I would also like to make a few related observations on the subject. The attempt by the Greek side to present to world public opinion the Cyprus breakthrough as the product of outside "pressure", is no doubt designed to subvert the Secretary General's initiative. Furthermore, the haste with which the Greek Government announced a new defense "doctrine" based on the imaginary Turkish threat at a time when a promising threshold has just been reached on Cyprus can not be viewed purely accidental. The

perpetuation of the Cyprus question unresolved except on exclusively Greek terms is part of the present Greek strategy against Turkey.

We expect that Greece will not be allowed to indulge in this dangerous game to the detriment of the interests of the western alliance.

With best regards.

Turgut Özal" 2

ADVANCE COPIES

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
CYPRUS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR JENKINS

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1579 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, VIENNA, COPENHAGEN,

STOCKHOLM, MODUK (DSC, DS11), CBFC

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG

MY TELNO 1566: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. UNFICYP MANDATE RENEWED SAFELY THIS AFTERNOON (14 DECEMBER). BUT SUBSEQUENT UNCOMPROMISING STATEMENTS BY TURKISH SIDE ARE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. BOTH DENKTASH AND TURKS INSIST THAT KYPRIANOU MUST ACCEPT DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT WITH NO FURTHER CHANGES. RESULTING GLOOM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT CAMP.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT DINNER LAST NIGHT (13 DECEMBER). PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED WHAT PICCO HAD TOLD US (MY TUR) ABOUT DENKTASH'S REPRESENTATIONS. HE WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT THINGS MIGHT START GOING WRONG. WE AGREED BETWEEN THE THREE OF US THAT THE BEST THING WOULD BE TO TRY TO PERSUADE DENKTASH AND THE TURKS NOT TO SPEAK AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING BUT TO CIRCULATE THEIR CUSTOMARY RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION BY LETTER. KHALIL, AS PRESIDENT, WOULD OPEN THE PROCEEDINGS WITH A BRIEF POSITIVE STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL AND WE WOULD THEN ADOPT THE RESOLUTION WITH NO FURTHER SPEECHES.

3. LATER THAT EVENING I HAD A WORRIED TELEPHONE CALL FROM MAVROMMATIS URGING ME TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE COUNCIL. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE TURKS MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE THEIR RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION ORALLY, BUT SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT OBJECT AS LONG AS THIS WAS DONE REASONABLY.

4. I SAW THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING TO PRESS THESE POINTS ON HIM. KIRCA REPLIED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK AND THAT DENKTASH WOULD DO SO ALSO. THERE WAS NO WAY THIS COULD BE AVOIDED. IN ADDITION TO MAKING THE USUAL RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION THEY WOULD MAKE THREE EMPHATIC POINTS. THESE WERE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE; THAT THERE COULD BE NO AMENDMENTS TO IT; AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO LEGALLY BINDING RESERVATIONS TO IT. HE ADDED AS A SMALL CONCESSION THAT THERE COULD PERHAPS BE RESERVATIONS IN A CONVERSATIONAL SENSE BUT THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS SUBSTANCE. MY EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO CHANGE

WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS SUBSTANCE. MY EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO CHANGE THIS POSITION WERE UNAVAILING. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL KNEW WHAT HE AND DENKTASH INTENDED. THEY WERE NOT HOWEVER INTENDING TO "BUST" THE AGREEMENT. I SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD AT LEAST FOREWARN THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE DECLINED BUT INDICATED THAT I COULD.

5. IT WAS TOO LATE TO SPEAK TO MAVROMMATIS WHO HAD ALREADY LEFT WITH KYPRIANOU BY CONCORDE EN ROUTE TO CYPRUS. I SPOKE TO THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR WHO SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH KYPRIANOU BY TELEPHONE. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD TRIED BUT FAILED TO RESTRAIN THE TURKS FROM MAKING MORE THAN THEIR CUSTOMARY RESERVATIONS. I AGREED THAT HE SHOULD CONVEY TO KYPRIANOU THE GIST OF WHAT KIRCA HAD TOLD ME ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WAS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAKS IN NICOSIA.

6. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE AGAIN TO KHALIL WHO SAW ALL FOUR PARTIES THIS MORNING TO SHOW THEM THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. KHALIL MADE FURTHER EFFORTS OF HIS OWN TO TRY TO STOP THE TURKISH SIDE FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR STATED INTENTION, THESE TOO PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL.

7. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET BRIEFLY IN THE AFTERNOON FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND AGREED THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS FOR THE PREVIOUS MANDATE RENEWAL (SCR 553). KHALIL SAID THAT HE HAD EMPHASISED TO THE PARTIES HIS HOPE AS PRESIDENT THAT THEY WOULD MAKE NO STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT DETRACT FROM THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FORTHCOMING HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT HE SHOULD MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT AS PRESIDENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FORMAL MEETING.

8. THE COUNCIL THEN PROCEEDED TO A FORMAL MEETING WHERE KHALIL MADE HIS STATEMENT AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RENEWING UNFICYP'S MANDATE FOR A FURTHER SIX MONTHS. PAKISTAN, PERU AND CANADA MADE STATEMENTS.

9. MOUSHOUTAS (CYPRUS) SPOKE FIRST FOR THE PARTIES AND MADE A RESTRAINED AND GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT. DOUNTAS (GREECE) FOLLOWED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING AND FOR THE "CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM" THAT HAD BEEN VOICED BY KYPRIANOU.

10. DENKTASH THEN SPOKE TERSELY AND IN UNCOMPROMISING TERMS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT AS IT STOOD AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO RESERVATIONS OF ANY KIND ON IT. IT WAS A STEELY PERFORMANCE WHICH HIS EXPRESSIONS OF TRUST IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HOPE FOR A SETTLEMENT DID LITTLE TO OFFSET.

11. KIRCA REITERATED THE SAME MESSAGE WITH EQUAL CLARITY. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH DENKTASH ON THE MATTER. THE OTHER SIDE HAD NOW UNEQUIVOCALLY TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME HE UNDERLINED TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SETTLEMENT.

12. MOUSHOUTAS AND DOUNTAS RESPONDED IN RIGHT OF REPLY. MOUSHOUTAS DID SO IN AN ADMIRABLY DIGNIFIED AND RESTRAINED WAY. DOUNTAS SHOWED NO SUCH RESERVE. HE UNDERLINED THAT KYPRIANOU WAS BEING ASKED TO GO TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" BASIS. KIRCA AND DENKTASH REPLIED SHARPLY.

13. IT WAS A MOST DEPRESSING OCCASION. I HAD PASSED ON TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING THE DEBATE THE CONGRATULATIONS THAT YOU HAD SENT HIM IN YOUR TEL 779. BUT HIS HEAD HUNG LOWER AS THE SPEECHES WENT ON. AFTERWARDS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE IN A STATE OF MIXED SHOCK AND GLOOM, ALL TOO CONSCIOUS OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS IN CYPRUS. DOUNTAS WAS BUSY BRIEFING GREEK CORRESPONDENTS WITH RELISH.

WENT ON. AFTERWARDS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE IN A STATE OF MIXED SHOCK AND GLOOM, ALL TOO CONSCIOUS OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS IN CYPRUS. DOUTAS WAS BUSY BRIEFING GREEK CORRESPONDENTS WITH RELISH.

14. NIFT CONTAINS A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE DEBATE AND MY SECOND IFT (NOT TO ALL) THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 559.

15. I SHALL SEND YOU MY COMMENTS AND FURTHER BACKGROUND OVER THE WEEKEND.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING

THOMSON

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GRS 1200

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130215Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1557 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIPT: CYPRUS : SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. IACOVOU SAYS THAT KYPRIANOU HAD DECIDED TO TAKE THE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISK OF GOING TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HE WILL TRY TO NEGOTIATE CHANGES TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS DIRECTLY WITH DENKTASH.

DETAIL

2. THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE ME A READOUT THIS EVENING JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR THE AIRPORT. IACOVOU SAID THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY DURING THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS. THE OUTCOME WAS NOT WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD ORIGINALLY AIMED FOR. KYPRIANOU HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN CYPRUS THAT HE WOULD ONLY AGREE TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IF HE HAD OBTAINED SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO TAKE AN ENORMOUS POLITICAL RISK WHICH IACOVOU THOUGHT SHOWED CONSIDERABLE COURAGE.

3. IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE TO AGREE THE TEXT OF A DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. INSTEAD THE PARTIES NOW HAD TWO DOCUMENTS. THE FIRST WAS THE AGENDA WHICH AFTER A LITTLE 'FINE POLISHING' COULD BE RETITLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD WANTED TO INTRODUCE INTO IT THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HELD THAT THIS WAS AN INTERNATIONAL MATTER NOT A BICOMMUNAL ONE. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN THE LIST OF FEDERAL SUBJECTS. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WANTED TO LINK DEFENCE WITH A TREATY OF GUARANTEE. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE THINKING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING DEFENCE OFF THE LIST AND HAVING INSTEAD A 'MINISTRY OF DEMILITARISATION'. WITH MORE TIME AND INGENUITY A SUITABLE FORMULA MIGHT BE FOUND. THE SECOND PAPER (HUMFREYS TELELETTER OF 29 NOVEMBER TO NEILSON) CONTAINED IDEAS FOR FILLING IN THE BLANKS IN THE AGENDA.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL DESCRIBED THE PAPER AS BEING NOT HIS IDEAS OR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS' IDEAS BUT THE BEST COMPILATION OF WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLE. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD PRESSED HIM PARTICULARLY ON THE SUBJECTS OF VAROSHA AND OF VETOES. IF THEY COULD HAVE GOT CONCESSIONS ON THIS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO FILL IN THE BLANKS. THERE WAS AN ADDENDUM TO THE SECOND PAPER IN WHICH DENKTASH SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF VETOES IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD HAVE THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER.

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4. THE POSITION NOW WAS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD DEPOSIT THESE PAPERS AND THE RESERVATION ON THEM AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHERE THEY WOULD FORM THE BASIC DOCUMENTATION. THE TWO SIDES WOULD THEN START FROM THERE. BUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD RESERVED THEIR POSITION.

5. DESCRIBING THE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS IACOVOU SAID THAT WHENEVER A QUESTION SUCH AS VETOES HAD COME UP IT HAD BEEN LIKE DEALING WITH A BALLOON. IF YOU SQUEEZED IT IN ONE PLACE IT BULGED IN ANOTHER. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD REALISED THAT IF THEY HAD TRIED TO SQUEEZE TOO HARD THE BALLOON MIGHT HAVE BURST. THEY CONSIDERED THAT ON THE MATTERS THAT STILL WORRIED THEM IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE CAKE BIGGER OR TO SUGGEST TRADE OFFS. AS HE HAD TOLD ME BEFORE, THEY HOPED THAT AN ATTRACTIVE ECONOMIC PACKAGE MIGHT GET AT LEAST A MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT ON TERRITORY FROM DENKTASH. SINCE DENKTASH HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ANY CHANGES AT THIS STAGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY THING TO DO WAS TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIM FACE TO FACE TO SEE IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED. THEY WOULD EXPLAIN TO HIM THEIR REAL CONCERNS. IACOVOU FELT THAT THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF SCOPE FOR ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING OURSELVS TO HELP WITH WISE COUNSEL. HE REALISED THE DIFFICULTIES FOR US IN GOING INTO DETAILS WITH THE PARTIES BUT HE THOUGHT WE COULD GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO 'ANY REASONABLE PROPOSALS'.

6. IACOVOU ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHETHER DENKTASH HIMSELF REALLY WANTED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. PERSONALLY IACOVOU DOUBTED IT. BUT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WOULD REVEAL THE ANSWER. HE HOPED THE MEETING WOULD NOT BE A CONFRONTATION. THERE WOULD BE NO TIME TO INVOLVE OTHERS IN WHAT PASSED. IT WOULD MEAN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH DENKTASH.

7. I CONGRATULATED IACOVOU WARMLY ON THE DECISION TO GO TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. WE WELCOMED AND APPRECIATED THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHICH IT SHOWED. WE BELIEVED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN ANKARA TO TRY AND ACHIEVE A SOLUTION. THIS WOULD NOT BE A SOLUTION AT ANY PRICE BUT WE THOUGHT THE WISH WAS SINCERE. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD PERSIST UNTIL THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

8. I SAID THAT I FELT SURE THAT WE WOULD GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT WISH TO SAY TO US. IT WAS ABOUT THE BEST THING THAT HAD HAPPENED SINCE I HAD BEEN AT THE UN. I WAS VERY PLEASED ALSO FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE MUST BRING THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

9. IACOVOU SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD DECIDED NOT TO DISCUSS CERTAIN THINGS AT THIS STAGE IN CASE IT DERAILED THE TALKS. THEY WERE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR EXAMPLE ABOUT TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THEY WOULD BE MUCH MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT WIDE-RANGING SAFEGUARDS ON THE CONSTITUTION IF THE TURKS SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS QUICKLY. THERE WAS ALSO THE SENSITIVE MATTER OF THE THREE FREEDOMS. THESE MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUPS AFTER THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING,

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FOR WHICH THREE DAYS OUGHT TO BE ENOUGH. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS INTENDED TO GO TO THE MEETING 'VERY READY TO NEGOTIATE'. I REPEATED THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO SUPPORT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. I AGREED THAT SOME THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE REMITTED TO TE WORKING GROUPS. BUT I THOUGHT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD NOT BE PUT OFF BY THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT DENKTASH. IT WAS THE POSITION OF ANKARA WHICH WAS OVERRIDING.

10. IACOVOU SAID THAT DENKTASH HAD ALREADY MADE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE VENUE. WHEN THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK HE HAD DELIBERATELY WITHHELD HIS AGREEMENT INSISTING ON GENEVA INSTEAD.

11. DESPITE THIS LAST COMMENT IACOVOU SAID THAT HE WAS ALREADY TURNING HIS THOUGHTS TOWARDS PREPARING CONSTRUCTIVELY FOR THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

12. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KYPRIANOU TOLD THE PRESS THIS EVENING THAT 'CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM WAS JUSTIFIED FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1974'.

COMMENT

13. IT IS OF COURSE A PITY THAT THE GAPS HAVE NOT BEE FILLED IN ADVANCE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE BALL OF STRING MAY YET UNRAVEL. BUT THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN CRAWLED ALL OVER AND I THINK PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S ASSESSMENT THAT THIS IS A SUCCESS IS RIGHT. CERTAINLY MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT DESPITE HIS CARPING REMARKS ABOUT DENKTASH IACOVOU WAS ACTUALLY REALLY PLEASE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130050Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1556 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ROME PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

UKDEL STRASBOURG MODUK.

MY TELNO 1551 (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS OBTAINED AGREEMENT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH ON 17 JANUARY.

DETAIL.

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS THIS AFTERNOON 12 DECEMBER THAT ENOUGH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE TWO PARTIES TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVENING A HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

IT WOULD TAKE PLACE ON 17 JANUARY BUT HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER IN NEW YORK OR EUROPE. IT WAS A 'VERY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD'.

THE PARTIES WOULD BE WORKING AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL RANG THIS EVENING TO LET ME KNOW PERSONALLY THAT HE HAD ACHIEVED 'SUCCESS'.

4. I ASKED WHAT HAD BEEN DONE ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE SCENARIO DESCRIBED IN MY TUR. HE REPLIED THAT TEN MINUTES BEFORE THE PRESS CONFERENCE HE HAD WITHDRAWN HIS PAPER DESCRIBING THE SCENARIO FOR THE SUMMIT AND HAD APPEALED TO BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT THAT HE AS SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD MANAGE THINGS FAIRLY. THEY HAD AGREED.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT BOTH SIDES HAD ACCEPTED THE ARRANGEMENTS HE HAD PROPOSED FOR TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION. HE SAID 'THAT IS MY UNDERSTANDING'. HE ADDED 'BUT YOU NEVER KNOW'. HE SAID THAT A 'TOTAL TEXT' HAD BEEN AGREED, THOUGH THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS HAD SOME RESERVATIONS. HE THEN QUALIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT 'RESERVATION' WAS TOO RIGID A WORD FOR THE GREEK-CYPRriot ATTITUDE.

6. I ASKED WHETHER THE MEETING ON 17 JANUARY WOULD BE IN NEW YORK. HE SAID THAT ALL CONCERNED AT PRESENT THOUGHT IT WOULD. HOWEVER, SPEAKING VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, HE HIMSELF MIGHT ASK FOR IT TO TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA, IN ORDER TO MAKE IT EASIER OR EVEN POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO FULFIL ENGAGEMENTS IN EDINBURGH OR LONDON (THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE KNOWN TO THE DEPARTMENT). HE ASKED ME NOT TO TELL ANYBODY ABOUT THIS.

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17.

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7. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE WAS RINGING US FIRST FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL AND INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE WE HAD GIVEN. ' ' I MAY NEED YOUR ASSISTANCE TO MAKE SOMETHING OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING. ' ' I THANKED PEREZ DE CUELLAR, CONGRATULATED HIM AND SAID THAT ONLY HE COULD HAVE ACHIEVED THIS MUCH.

8. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE ME A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE POSITION, FOR WHICH SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 110110Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1543 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 758: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

IACOVOU HAS STRESSED TO ME THE NEED FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS BUT INDICATED THAT THIS COULD TAKE PLACE AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING. I UNDERLINED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE NEED FOR THE GREEK-CYPRIOIS NOT TO MISS THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING (10 DECEMBER) AT HIS REQUEST. IACOVOU SAID THAT HE WISHED TO BRIEF US ON THE LATEST POSITION.

3. WHEN KYPRIANOU HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL PRIVATELY ON SATURDAY (8 DECEMBER) THERE HAD BEEN PRESSURES FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ACCEPT A DEADLINE OF THIS WEDNESDAY FOR REACHING CONCLUSIONS. BUT IT WAS UNFAIR TO TRY TO RESTRICTED THE TIME FOR NEGOTIATION. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS CONTINUED TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE CONCERNS PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE PROPOSED VETOS IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE AND ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES WERE AGREED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE A BASIS FOR A SOLUTION ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE. KYPRIANOU HAD THEREFORE PROPOSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT EITHER THE NEGOTIATION CONTINUED UNTIL CHRISTMAS TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES OR ALTERNATIVELY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD GO TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING AND DISCUSS THE ISSUES THERE. THE LATTER SUGGESTION WAS A SHIFT FROM THE PREVIOUS GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON ALL THE MAIN MATTERS BEFORE A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. IN THE MEANTIME THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD DISENGAGE THE QUESTION OF UNFICYP FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. HIS REPORT COULD REFER TO THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING BUT SHOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS FOR THE THIRD ROUND HAD BEEN A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THERE WERE NOW POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE GAPS WERE "BRIDGEABLE". WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS FURTHER SERIOUS NEGOTIATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS, EITHER NOW OR AT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE VERY CONCERNED HOWEVER TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS AFLOAT.

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5. I SAID THAT WE WERE EXTREMELY CONCERNED NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR INTERESTS IN RELATION TO CYPRUS BUT BECAUSE WE BELIEVED THAT THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS BRIDGEABLE AND THAT THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF A WORKABLE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD NOT PERSIST FOR LONG. WE BELIEVED THAT THE TURKS WERE SINCERE IN THEIR PRESENT APPROACH. AT THE SAME TIME WE CONSIDERED THAT THEY CONTINUED TO FOLLOW A TWO TRACK POLICY AND IF THE PRESENT TRACK FAILED THEY WOULD GO DOWN THE OTHER ONE OF CONSOLIDATING UDI. THEY WERE PREPARED TO BE TOUGH BECAUSE THEY FELT THEY NOW HAD A POSITION ON WHICH THEY COULD STAND AND FOR WHICH THEY WOULD GET A FAIR AMOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IF TALKS COLLAPSED. WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION IN RELATION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS TO PRONOUNCE ON EXACTLY WHAT THE TWO SIDES OUGHT TO DO OR ACCPET. WE KNEW THAT HE BELIEVED THIS WEEK WAS CRITICAL AND THAT HE INTENDED TO MAKE A 'VERY HONEST' REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE FULLY SUPPORTED HIM.

6. I UNDERLINED TO IACOVOU THAT THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SOLUTION WHICH MUST NOT BE MISSED. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED THIS WEEK. THE TURKISH CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY WERE 'A LITTLE BETTER THAN WE ANTICIPATED' AND IT WOULD BE WISE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEM. WE WERE KEEN THAT ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE WORKABLE BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE TO BE BETTER THAN IN THE 1960 CONSTITUTION. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN THE TURKISH POSITION. IF THERE WAS ANY, IT WAS PROBABLY JUST AT THE MARGINS. NEVERTHELESS IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THERE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO OBTAIN SOMETHING VERY CONSIDERABLE BY WAY OF A SETTLEMENT. IT WOULD LEAVE CYPRUS AS A UNITARY STATE, CAUSE THE WITHDRAWAL OF A LOT OF TURKISH TROOPS, RESTORE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TERRITORY, PRODUCE WITH THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL, A WORKABLE SYSTEM AND ENSURE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS OF INTERNATIONAL PLAUDITS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD BECOME BORED WITH THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND I THOUGHT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD TAKE THE TIDE WHILE THEY HAD IT. WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO MAKE A SOLUTION WORK.

6. IACOVOU STRESSED THAT ANY SOLUTION HAD TO BE WORKABLE AND TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF GREEK CYPRIOTS OTHERWISE THIS WOULD DAMAGE THE POLITICAL FABRIC OF GREEK CYPRUS AND RISK THE GROWTH OF EXTREMISM. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT REJECTING WHAT WAS PROPOSED BUT WISHED TO NEGOTIATE IT. THEY BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE POSSIBILITIES FOR 'CROSS-NEGOTIATING' CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE. THEY WONDERED WHETHER FOR EXAMPLE A MORE GENEROUS ECONOMIC PACKAGE COULD BE USED TO INDUCE FURTHER TURKISH CYPRIOT DISCUSSION OF THE TERRITORIAL ASPECT. THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE TERMS OF THE TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THERE WERE REPORTS

[Point which Kyprianou was hinting at to gen. He had in mind the Americas]

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THAT

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THAT THE TURKS WERE THINKING OF 5 - 10 YEARS FOR SUCH WITHDRAWALS WHICH WAS QUITE UNACCEPTABLE. THERE OUGHT TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION. IT WAS UNFAIR THAT TURKISH PROPOSALS WERE BEING REPRESENTED AS BEING PROPOSALS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. DENKTASH HAD ALWAYS INSISTED IN THE PAST THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS NOT A MEDIATOR AND COULD NOT MAKE PROPOSALS. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE PREPARED TO REGARD THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS IN GOOD FAITH AND GO ON TO NEGOTIATE THEM EITHER NOW OR AT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. IN MANY RESPECTS THE TWO SIDES WERE VERY CLOSE AND IACOVOU HAD GATHERED THAT THERE MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION ON THE EXECUTIVE.

7. I EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP WHILE UNDERLINING THE NEED TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP. I REITERATED THAT THIS WAS A CRUCIAL WEEK. FOR OUR PART WE WOULD NOT SEEK TO BECOME PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD STICK WITH OUR POLICY OF FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 110115Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1544 OF 10 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ATHENS, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON.

MIPT: CYPRUS

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE:

1. AFTER THE TALK WITH IACOVOU, I TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GIVE HIM THE MAIN POINTS OF MY TALK WITH IACOVOU BEFORE HE SAW KYPRIANOU LATE THIS AFTERNOON.

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN DENKTASH THIS MORNING. ON LEAVING THE LATTER HAD APPARENTLY TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC AND THAT PLANS FOR HIM TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE CONCLUDED TOMORROW. HE HAD INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE OF AN AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN TELLING ME THIS IN NO WAY CRITICISED DENKTASH. HE SEEMED TO THINK IT WAS A REASONABLY FAIR STATEMENT AND IACOVOU, WHO HAD HEARD OF IT BY THE TIME I SAW HIM, SPOKE OF IT AS ENCOURAGING.

IT BY THE TIME I SAW HIM, SPOKE OF IT AS ENCOURAGING.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE SITUATION HAD IN SOME WAYS IMPROVED A LOT. IN PARTICULAR HE HAD EXTRACTED FROM DENKTASH A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBILITY ON 'THE EXECUTIVE'. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS PLUS THE TURKS PREPAREDNESS TO DISCUSS THE SPECIAL STATUS AREAS MIGHT BE ENOUGH TO GET KYPRIANOU TO AGREE TO MOVE FORWARD. (IACOVOU GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS WERE CONSIDERABLY INTERESTED IN THE SPECIAL STATUS AREA IDEA).

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS WERE TRYING TO DELAY THINGS HE WAS PUSHING HARD. HE WAS AIMING FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING 'BEFORE 15 JANUARY'. HE HAD REFUSED TO MAKE AN ANODYNE REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS KYPRIANOU HAD WANTED. HE AGREED WITH MY COMMENT THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT OF LEVERAGE. HE WAS DETERMINED TO PUSH ON: 'IF I DO NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, I AM LOST.'

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS INTERESTED IN IACOVOU'S COMMENT ABOUT ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR TERRITORY BUT HE DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD CUT MUCH IF ANY ICE WITH THE TURKS.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SOUNDED MORE BUOYANT THAN USUAL. HE UNDERTOOK TO TELEPHONE ME TOMORROW TO LET ME KNOW HOW HE HAD GOT ON WITH KYPRIANOU.

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

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FM FCO 101500Z DEC 84
 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 761 OF 10 DEC 1984
 INFO TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA.

NICOSIA TELNO 549: CYPRUS: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU
 TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
 MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU IN RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE IN
 TUR (NOW REPEATED TO YOU).

BEGINS

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER GIVING ME
 YOUR VIEWS ON THE POSITION REACHED IN DISCUSSION OF THE UN
 SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS.

I HAVE CONTINUED TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY SINCE WE
 LAST MET. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS OUR FULL SUPPORT IN THE
 EFFORTS HE IS MAKING. I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE RELATIVE
 IMPROVEMENT IN THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO WHICH YOU
 REFER: YOUR OWN DETERMINATION TO PERSEVERE WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS
 UNTIL A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS REACHED: AND YOUR JUDGMENT
 THAT PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION ARE BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME
 SINCE 1974. I QUITE AGREE THAT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING MUST HAVE
 A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. I KNOW THAT PATIENCE AND COURAGE WILL
 BE NEEDED ON ALL SIDES OVER THE COMING WEEKS. BUT I
 BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SOLUTION WHICH
 MUST NOT BE MISSED. YOU HAVE MY EVERY GOOD WISH FOR YOUR
 EFFORTS TO MAKE THE MOST OF THAT OPPORTUNITY.

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From the Private Secretary

10 December 1984

Cyprus

Thank you for your letter of 6 December enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Kyprianou's earlier message.

The Prime Minister has approved the reply in slightly amended form. I enclose the revised version and should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CST

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

Thank you very much for your letter of 5 December giving me your views on the position reached in discussion of the UN Secretary General's proposals.

I have continued to follow developments closely since we last met. The Secretary General has our full support in the efforts he is making. I have been encouraged by the relative improvement in the position of the Turkish side to which you refer; your own determination to persevere with the negotiations until a substantive agreement is reached; and your judgement that prospects for a solution are better than at any time since 1974. I quite agree that a high level meeting must have a successful outcome. I know that patience and courage will be needed on all sides over the coming weeks. But I believe that there is an opportunity for a solution which must not be missed. You have my every good wish for your efforts to make the most of that opportunity.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1984

Prime Minister

The proposed draft
reply to Kyprianou is
very bland. That may be
wise: we do not want to
get drawn in too deeply.

Dear Charles,

I have sharpened
up the draft a bit.
Cyprus

Agall revised
draft?CJP
6/xii

I enclose a copy of a 'Personal and Confidential' letter dated 5 December from President Kyprianou to the Prime Minister, contained in Nicosia telegram No 549 of 5 December which has been copied to you.

President Kyprianou's letter should be seen against the background of a set of proposals put to both sides by the UN Secretary General for a high level agreement. Following representations by the Americans and ourselves, the Turkish Cypriots have claimed that they are ready to accept the Secretary General's draft in toto. But, as his letter makes clear, President Kyprianou is still worried about several areas: he has therefore been placed in a difficult tactical position. Acceptance of the Secretary General's proposals as they stand risks leading to strong criticism at home (since they would certainly not satisfy all the various pressure groups); while pressing for modifications would make him appear to international opinion (on which he sets great store) to be less flexible than the Turkish Cypriots. The third round of proximity talks is now in recess to enable President Kyprianou to consult in Nicosia and in Athens. His letter is evidently intended to ensure that we are aware of the problems he faces and to improve the position into which the Turkish Cypriots have manoeuvred him.

We would agree that some of the Secretary General's proposals pose genuine difficulties for the Greek Cypriots: particularly, for example, the proposed Turkish Cypriot veto powers which, unless there is considerable political will on both sides, could make any future federal government unworkable. But we should avoid comment in detail: our views might well become known and we might be drawn into the role of mediator. A swift reply would facilitate this. I accordingly enclose a draft reply in the form of a telegram to Nicosia which alludes to the positive parts of President Kyprianou's message and gives him general encouragement to pursue the process.

/I would

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I would be grateful for approval to inform selected posts, including UKMIS New York, of the contents of President Kyprianou's message and to authorise Sir J Thomson to give a general account of the letter and of the Prime Minister's reply in confidence to the UN Secretary General as he would be likely to find this valuable in conducting his negotiations.

*Yours ever,
L V Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

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 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5
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 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 YOUR TELNO 549: CYPRUS: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU
 10 TO THE PRIME MINISTER
 11 1. Please convey the following message from the Prime Minister
 12 to President Kyprianou in response to his message in TUR.
 13 BEGINS
 14 Thank you very much for your letter of 5 December giving
 15 me your views on the position reached in discussion of the UN
 16 Secretary General's proposals.
 17 I have ^{continued to} been following developments closely since we last
 18 met. ~~Difficult problems have had to be faced and it is clear~~
 19 ~~that more remains to be done.~~ The Secretary General has our full
 20 support in the efforts he is making. I have been encouraged by
 21 the relative improvement in the position of the Turkish side to
 22 which you refer; your own determination to persevere with the
 23 negotiations until a substantive agreement is reached; and your
 24 judgement that prospects for a solution are better than at any
 25 time since 1974. I quite agree that a high level meeting must

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 have a successful outcome. ~~I shall of course continue~~
~~to keep in close touch with developments.~~ I know that
 patience and courage will be needed on all sides over
 the coming weeks. You have my every good wish for your
 efforts to ~~secure our common objective of real progress~~
~~towards a settlement.~~ ENDS

*But I believe that there is
 an opportunity for a solution
 which must not be missed*

*Need -
 not*

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 549 OF 5 DECEMBER 84.

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CYPRUS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER HANDED ME THIS MORNING (5 DECEMBER) A 'PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL' LETTER OF THE SAME DATE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THIS PROBABLY SHOWS WHAT KYPRIANOU HAD ORIGINALLY WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BY TELEPHONE ON 4 DECEMBER (MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH POWELL OF NO 10).

2. TEST IS AS FOLLOWS :

'DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I FELT THAT I MUST FIRST OF ALL EXPRESS TO YOU MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR KEEN PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULTIES WHICH WAS VERY CLEAR TO ME IN THE COURSE OF OUR SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS.

I TRUST THAT YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING IN LONDON. I HAD ASKED OUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO KEEP YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR JOHN THOMSON, FULLY INFORMED OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD ROUND OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS IN NEW YORK.

I FEEL THAT THE RELATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH SIDE CANNOT BE UNRELATED TO YOUR EFFORTS. ALTHOUGH, THIS IMPROVEMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A BREAKTHROUGHT, I MUST SAY THAT I AM ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT PROSPECTS FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ARE NOW BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME BEFORE SINCE 1974.

IN VIEW OF THIS CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE INITIATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND FURTHER TO OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF OUR CONCERNS AND THOUGHTS.

THERE CANNOT BE ANY DOUBT OF YOUR SPECIAL INTEREST IN A REASONABLE AND WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, AS WELL AS OF BRITAIN'S UNIQUE EXPERIENCE IN THE WORKINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WERE FACED WITH PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF CYPRUS.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ENSURE STABILITY. GOOD SENSE, TOLERANCE AND COOPERATION WILL CLEARLY BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, A POWER OF VETO ON ALL DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE, APART FROM BEING OBJECTIONABLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PRINCIPLE AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS, IT WOULD CERTAINLY RENDER THE SYSTEM TOTALLY UNWORKABLE AND WILL UNAVOIDABLY LEAD TO FRICTION, DISUNITY AND INSTABILITY WITH PREDICATBLY DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. WE RECONGISE THAT A SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AND WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THIS EFFECT. WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE A LIST OF SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS ON MATTERS WHICH MAY BE REASONABLY CONSIDERED AS OE SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

AS REGARDS THE TERRITORIAL ASPECT WE STRESSED THE NEED THAT AREAS THAT ARE "RETURNED" SHOULD INCLUDE SUCH POPULATION CENTRES AS WOULD ALLOW SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES UNDER GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION. YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE THE BITTERNESS OF THOSE OF OUR FELLOW CITIZENS WHO WILL BE UNABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES UNDER THEIR OWN REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION. APART FROM OBVIOUS CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE, WE ARE PREOCCUPIED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SUCH DISSATISFIED DISPLACED PERSONS. THE LARGER THEIR NUMBER THE LARGER THE PERMANENT DAMAGE TO THE POLITICAL FABRIC OF OUR COUNTRY AND THE GREATER THE PROBABILITY OF INSTABILITY IN THE FUTURE.

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT POPULATION CENTRES IS VAROSHA. ACCORDING TO THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ONLY ABOUT 15,000 PEOPLE OR ONE THIRD OF THE TOWN WILL BE "RETURNED" FOR RESETTLEMENT BY ITS INHABITANTS. IN STATEMENTS MADE IN THE PAST BY MR DENKTASH ON ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN A FIGURE OF 35,000 WAS USED. MR. EDJEVIT IN A STATEMENT IN JUNE, 1978, STATED THAT THE NUMBER OF FORMER INHABITANTS RETURNING WOULD BE 30,000. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN-CANADIAN PROPOSAL OF 1978 IMPLIED THE RETURN OF 32,000. THE RETURN OF THE INHABITANTS OF VAROSHA WAS PART OF THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT OF MAY, 1979, THE VALIDITY OF WHICH WAS RECENTLY RE-AFFIRMED IN NEW YORK BY BOTH SIDED. I RECALL WELL THAT THE THEN SECRETARY-GENERAL DR. KURT WALDHEIM IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRESENT SECRETARY-GENERAL (THEN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE) MR. DE CUELLAR REBUKED MR. DENTASH FOR DARING TO SUGGEST ANOTHER DIVIDED CITY. EXCUSES, SUCH AS "SECURITY", ARE INADMISSIBLE AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A FEDERAL SOLUTION MUST BE BASED. BY MAKING THIS SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VAROSHA IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT OTHER POPULATION CENTRES ARE NOT IMPORTANT.

WE ARE VERY CONCERNED AT THE DISINCLINATION OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO COMMIT ITSELF FIRMLY TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH OCCUPATION TROOPS TO AT LEAST COINCIDE WITH THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND DEFINITELY BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY IS TAKEN OVER BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ANY TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. ALL SETTLERS FROM TURKEY MUST ALSO LEAVE CYPRUS.

WE ARE ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN THE UNITY OF OUR COUNTRY UNDER A FEDERAL STRUCTURE. WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT SHOULD GUARANTEE THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ALL CITIZENS INCLUDING THE FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY.

I STRONGLY FEEL THAT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD HAVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME : FAILURE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND WE MUST THEREFORE TAKE EVERY CARE TO AVOID SUCH FAILURE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO PERSEVERE WITH THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNTIL A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

I WISH TO EXPRESS ONCE AGAIN MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR DEEP CONCERN FOR CYPRUS AND MY EARNEST HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE YOUR ENDEAVOURS UNTIL A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION IS REACHED.

WITH MY BEST WISHES,
SPYROS KYPRIANOU
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. ''

3. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO AUTHORISE ANY REPETITION. THE ORIGINAL LETTER IS IN TODAY'S BAG FROM HERE.

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CYPRUS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR JENKINS

.....
/ HD/SED
HD/UND
DEF HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T206/84

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 051200Z

FM NICOSIA 051045Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 549 OF 5 DECEMBER 84.

CYPRUS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER HANDED ME THIS MORNING (5 DECEMBER) A "PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" LETTER OF THE SAME DATE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THIS PROBABLY SHOWS WHAT KYPRIANOU HAD ORIGINALLY WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BY TELEPHONE ON 4 DECEMBER (MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH POWELL OF NO 10).

2. TEST IS AS FOLLOWS :

"DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I FELT THAT I MUST FIRST OF ALL EXPRESS TO YOU MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR KEEN PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULTIES WHICH WAS VERY CLEAR TO ME IN THE COURSE OF OUR SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS.

I TRUST THAT YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING IN LONDON. I HAD ASKED OUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO KEEP YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR JOHN THOMSON, FULLY INFORMED OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD ROUND OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS IN NEW YORK.

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WITH MY BEST WISHES,
SPYROS KYPRIANOU
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. "

3. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO AUTHORISE ANY REPETITION. THE ORIGINAL LETTER IS IN TODAY'S BAG FROM HERE.

WILBERFORCE

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PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

PRIME MINISTER'S

Personal and Confidential

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T206/84

Nicosia, 5th December, 1984. OPS

Already seen
by PM

17/12

Dear Prime Minister,

I feel that I must first of all express to you my gratitude for your keen personal interest in the Cyprus problem and for your understanding of our difficulties which was very clear to me in the course of our several meetings over the past 18 months.

I trust that you have been informed of developments since our last meeting in London. I had asked our Foreign Minister to keep your Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Sir John Thomson, fully informed of the developments in the third round of the proximity talks in New York.

I feel that the relative improvement in the position of the Turkish side cannot be unrelated to your efforts. Although, this improvement cannot be regarded as a breakthrough, I must say that I am encouraged to believe that prospects for positive developments for a solution to the Cyprus problem are now better than at any time before since 1974.

In view of this crucial stage in the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and further to our previous discussions I would like to share with you some of our concerns and thoughts.

There cannot be any doubt of your special interest in a reasonable and workable solution to the Cyprus problem, as well as of Britain's unique experience in the workings of constitutional arrangements of other countries which were faced with problems similar to those of Cyprus.

We are particularly concerned that any constitutional arrangements should ensure stability. Good sense, tolerance and cooperation will clearly be of great importance in the functioning of the constitution. However, I feel strongly that what is, in effect, a power of veto on all decisions of the federal executive and the federal legislature, apart from being objectionable from the point of view of principle and unacceptable to the vast majority of the people of Cyprus, it would certainly render the system totally unworkable and will unavoidably lead to friction, disunity and instability with predictably disastrous consequences. We recognise that a system of safeguards should be worked out and we have made specific proposals to this effect. We are ready to negotiate a list of specific safeguards on matters which may be reasonably considered as of special concern to the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland,
10, Downing Street,
London.

.../2.



PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

- 2 -

As regards the territorial aspect we stressed the need that the areas that are "returned" should include such population centres as would allow substantial numbers of displaced persons to return to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration. You can well imagine the bitterness of those of our fellow citizens who will be unable to return to their homes under their own regional administration. Apart from obvious considerations of justice, we are preoccupied by the consequences of large numbers of such dissatisfied displaced persons. The larger their number the larger the permanent damage to the political fabric of our country and the greater the probability of instability in the future.

One of the important population centres is Varosha. According to the Turkish proposals only about 15,000 people or 1/3 of the town will be "returned" for resettlement by its inhabitants. In statements made in the past by Mr. Denktash on about the return of the inhabitants of the town a figure of 35,000 was used. Mr. Edjevit in a statement in June, 1978, stated that the number of former inhabitants returning would be 30,000. The Anglo-American-Canadian proposal of 1978 implied the return of 32,000. The return of the inhabitants of Varosha was part of the high level agreement of May, 1979, the validity of which was recently re-affirmed in New York by both sides. I recall well that the then Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim in the presence of the present Secretary-General (then Special Representative) Mr. de Cuellar rebuked Mr. Denktash for daring to suggest another divided city. Excuses, such as "security", are inadmissible and are contrary to the principles on which a federal solution must be based. By making this special reference to Varosha it does not mean that other population centres are not important.

We are very concerned at the disinclination of the Turkish side to commit itself firmly to the withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops to at least coincide with the entry into force of the new agreement and definitely before the administration of the country is taken over by the federal government or any transitional government. All settlers from Turkey must also leave Cyprus.

We are anxious to maintain the unity of our country under a federal structure. We feel strongly that the federal arrangement should guarantee the fundamental freedoms of all citizens including the freedoms of movement, settlement and the right to property.

I strongly feel that a high level meeting should have a successful outcome; failure of a high level meeting would be extremely dangerous and we must therefore take every care to avoid such failure. We are determined to persevere with the present negotiating process until a substantive agreement is reached.

.../3.



PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

- 3 -

I wish to express once again my gratitude for your deep concern for Cyprus and my earnest hope that you will continue your endeavours until a just and lasting solution is reached.

With my best wishes,

Spyros Kyprianou

(Spyros Kyprianou)
President of the Republic of Cyprus.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 290100Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 1416 OF 26 NOVEMBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ROME PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS MODUK (DSC) MODUK (DS11)

CBF CYPRUS

MY TELNO 1411: CYPRUS: MEETING WITH IACOVOU

SUMMARY

1. THE INITIAL GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION TO THE TURKISH SIDES NEW PROPOSALS IS ONE OF INTEREST BUT ALSO CONCERN. ACCORDING TO IACOVOU THIS CONCERN IS PARTLY ABOUT TERRITORY BUT MAINLY THAT THE SAFEGUARDS BEING SOUGHT WOULD MAKE THE CONSTITUTION UNWORKABLE. KYPRIANOU IS RETURNING TO CYPRUS FOR A TEN DAY RECESS IN THE TALKS.

DETAIL

2. IACOVOU ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON (26 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT HE WAS RETURNING TO CYPRUS VIA LONDON TOMORROW BUT WANTED TO BRIEF ME IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTERS REQUEST TO PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO BE KEPT INFORMED. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SEEN KYPRIANOU YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND HAD PUT TO HIM CERTAIN PROPOSALS WHICH HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT DENKTASH AND TURKEY COULD ACCEPT. IT APPEARED THAT THESE PROPOSALS HAD EMERGED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE TURKS AND THAT DENKTASH HAD CONCURRED WITH THEM. KYPRIANOU WAS SEEING THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON TO GIVE HIS PRELIMINARY REACTIONS.

3. IACOVOU SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT NOW BE PREPARED TO GO INTO HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITH SEVERAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT LEFT VAGUE. HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE TURKS TO MOVE ANY FURTHER AND THAT THESE POINTS SHOULD THEREFORE BE THRASHED OUT AT THE MEETING ITSELF. HOWEVER, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THOUGHT IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD BE VERY CAREFULLY PREPARED IF IT WERE TO SUCCEED. A FAILURE WOULD BE DISASTROUS.

4. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MAIN WORRY ABOUT THE TURKISH SIDES NEW PROPOSALS WAS THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT WHAT WAS BEING PROPOSED FOR THE CONSTITUTION WAS UNWORKABLE. IACOVOU NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TOLD KYPRIANOU THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO CREATE A STABLE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. ON THE GOVERNMENT, THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WERE FOR VICE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWERS IN EXCESS OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION AND FOR A CABINET OF 10 (7 GREEK CYPRIOTS AND 3 TURKISH CYPRIOTS) IN WHICH ALL DECISIONS WOULD REQUIRE THE VOTE OF AT LEAST ONE TURKISH

CYPRIOI MINISTER. ON THE LEGISLATURE, SEPARATE MAJORITIES FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES WOULD BE NEEDED IN BOTH HOUSES FOR LEGISLATION IN 10 OUT OF THE 12 FEDERAL AREAS. IN THE OTHER TWO AREAS - HEALTH AND STANDARD SETTING - IT WOULD REQUIRE THE VOTE OF AT LEAST 30 PERCENT OF EACH COMMUNITY. THERE WOULD BE A PROVISION FOR A DECISION WHICH WAS VETOED BY ONE COMMUNITY TO BE PUT TO A REFERENDUM OF THE PEOPLE OF THAT COMMUNITY. THERE WOULD ALSO BE PROVISION FOR RECOURSE TO THE TRIPARTITE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. IACOVOU STRESSED THAT THESE PROVISIONS FOR VETOES AND SEPARATE MAJORITIES IF APPLIED ACROSS THE BOARD WOULD MAKE A GOVERNMENT UNWORKABLE.

5. ON TERRITORY, IACOVOU ACCEPTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION. DENKTASH WOULD ACCEPT 29 PERCENT. BUT HE WAS ADAMANT ON THE AREA OF VAROSHA. HE ALSO WOULD NOT SAY HOW MANY GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES WOULD BE ENABLED TO RETURN. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DRAW A MAP SO THAT THE AREAS TO BE RETURNED WERE MAINLY ARID LAND ACCOMMODATING ONLY 35,000 REFUGEES. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED TO BE SURE THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF HANDING OVER ONLY SUCH AREAS.

6. IACOVOU SAID THAT HE HOPED WE COULD PERSUADE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WHAT THE TURKISH SIDE WAS PROPOSING HAD TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AND SHOULD NOT BE PUT TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS BECAUSE THAT WAS WHAT DENKTASH WANTED. DENKTASH HAD BEEN THREATENING TO CALL A PRESS CONFERENCE AND GO PUBLIC ON HIS OFFER BUT KYPRIANOU HAD INTERVENED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ASK HIM NOT TO.

7. I SAID THAT THE TURKISH SIDE APPEARED TO HAVE MADE A CONSIDERABLE STEP FORWARD IN THE TALKS. WE WOULD STRONGLY URGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD MOVED FORWARD IN PARTICULAR IN THE AREA ON WHICH WE HAD BEEN PRESSING THEM MOST I.E. TERRITORY. WE WERE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE TURKISH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEIR HAVING "EQUAL POLITICAL STATUS" AND OF A BETTER POSITION IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENT THAN THEY HAD UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION. AGREEMENT WAS NOT LIKELY WITHOUT THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND I ACCEPTED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOULD NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO INTERFERE CONSTANTLY WITH THE DAY TO DAY RUNNING OF GOVERNMENT. PERSONALLY I THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST IF AS MUCH POWER AS POSSIBLE WAS DEVOTED TO THE TWO PROVINCES. I ALSO THOUGHT THE IDEA OF DEADLOCK BREAKING MACHINERY WAS A REASONABLE ONE AND I WOULD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE A POSSIBLE USE FOR REFERENDA. THERE MIGHT NEED TO BE DIFFERENT DEADLOCK BREAKING MACHINERY FOR DIFFERENT SUBJECTS. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT FAIRLY SOON THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS WOULD GET WORSE. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD NOW STOLEN A MARCH BY PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS AND IT WAS FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO TAKE STEPS TO MATCH THEM.

8. IACOVOU SAID THAT THEY WERE DEFINITELY PREPARED TO GO FURTHER THAN IN THE PAST ON MATTER OF SAFEGUARDS AND DEADLOCK BREAKING

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MACHINERY. THEY HAD VARIOUS IDEAS FOR EXAMPLE JOINT COMMITTEES OF THE TWO HOUSES. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL AREAS OF FRICTION TO A MINIMUM SO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BREAKDOWN IN THE CONSTITUTION WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN A NEW TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS. (HE ADDED THAT THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTORS WOULD PROBABLY NEED TO BE LEFT TO A CONFERENCE OF THE 1960 GUARANTOR POWERS. I TOLD HIM FIRMLY THAT TURKEY WOULD HAVE TO BE A GUARANTOR).

9. IACOVOU SAID THE GREEK CYPRIOTS NOW NEEDED SOME TIME FOR REFLECTION. KYPRIANOU WOULD BE SUGGESTING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL EITHER THAT THERE SHOULD BE A RECESS IN THE PRESENT ROUND AND THE TALKS RESUMED JUST BEFORE OR AFTER CHRISTMAS OR THAT THIS ROUND SHOULD BE CONTINUED FOR RATHER LONGER IN ORDER TO CLARIFY POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES. IF THE TALKS WERE RECESSED THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD FORMALISE PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CONTINUE THE TALKS NOW FOR A LONGER TIME SO THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT FORWARD A NEW MORE ADVANCED POSITION. PERSONALLY I DID NOT THINK THE TURKS HAD GIVEN THEIR LAST WORD ON EVERYTHING. BUT DELAY RISKED THEIR GOING DOWN THE UDI TRACK AGAIN. IACOVOU SAID THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THE DANGERS BUT DID NOT WANT TO BE RUSHED. THEY MIGHT NEED A HELPING HAND (FROM US) OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. I TOOK NOTE AND SAID THAT I WOULD BE REPORTING SYMPATHETICALLY EVERYTHING HE HAD HAD TO SAY.

10. WE HEARD THIS EVENING FROM SHERRY THAT KYPRIANOU WILL IN FACT BE RETURNING TO CYPRUS TOMORROW FOR WHAT IS TO BE A TEN DAY RECESS IN THE TALKS. HE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TURKISH SIDES PROPOSALS BUT HAD BEEN FAIRLY NON-COMMITAL ON SUBSTANCE WHEN TALKING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADVANCE HAD CAUGHT HIM OFF BALANCE AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOW GOING BACK TO REASSESS THEIR POSITION. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD PREPARE COUNTER PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD GIVEN HIM A NEW REVISED VERSION OF THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT.

FCO PASS SAVING

THOMSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

WITH THE "THIRD AND FINAL" ROUND OF "PROXIMITY TALKS" ON CYPRUS COMMENCING ON 26 NOVEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CAG HAVE ASKED ME TO ENCOURAGE ALL COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS TO USE THEIR CONTACTS WITH PARTIES TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE URGING ON THEM THE NEED TO KEEP THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION ALIVE AND OPEN. I AM ALSO SURE THAT AN EXPRESSION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITIVE SUPPORT OF THE UN S-G'S CONTINUING GOOD OFFICES ROLE WOULD BE BOTH TIMELY AND WELCOME. I HAVE WRITTEN TO MR DE CUELLAR ON BEHALF OF CAG TO THIS EFFECT.

I HAVE ALSO WRITTEN TO YOU TODAY MORE FULLY ALONG THESE LINES.

WITH DEEP RESPECT,
SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL

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19.11.84

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1402 OF 26 NOVEMBER
 INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO
 INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK (DSC AND DS11), CBF CYPRUS.

MY TELNOS 1382 - 1384: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS HAS BEGUN. SOME MOVEMENT BY DENKTASH.

DETAIL

2. THE THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS BEGAN TODAY, 26 NOVEMBER. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW KYPRIANOU THIS MORNING, PARTLY IN PRIVATE, AND DENKTASH THIS AFTERNOON.
3. SHERRY BRIEFING US AND THE AMERICANS THIS EVENING SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN 'SOME INTERESTING MOVEMENT'. HE ATTRIBUTED IT IN PART TO THE INTERVENTIONS BY THE US AND OURSELVES. THE MOVEMENT HAD COME IN THE MEETING WITH DENKTASH. THE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU HAD LARGELY BEEN CONFINED TO 'GENERALITIES'.
4. DENKTASH HAD GIVEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL A NON-PAPER BASED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REVISED HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT OF 22 OCTOBER. (THIS MAY BE THE TURKISH TEXT IN MY TELNO 1384.) HE ACCEPTED THE BULK OF THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT ('AGENDA'). IN PARTICULAR HE ACCEPTED THREE LINKED CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION MACHINERY, FOR PERMITTING CONTINUING LEGISLATION IN CASES OF DEADLOCK AND FOR A TRIPARTITE COURT WHICH WOULD FUNCTION AS A 'CONSEIL D'ETAT'. (SHERRY NOTED THAT NOT ALL THESE POINTS WERE ACTUALLY WRITTEN INTO THE AGENDA.) HE WAS HOWEVER PRESSING FOR A NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS EG TO HAVE A TURKISH-

FOR A NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS EG TO HAVE A TURKISH-CYPRIOU FOREIGN MINISTER IF THERE WAS A GREEK CYPRIOT PRESIDENT AND FOR ALL CABINET DECISIONS TO NEED THE AGREEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE TURKISH-CYPRIOU MINISTER. ON TERRITORY DENKTASH HAD COME DOWN AND WAS 'STRADDLING 30 PERCENT'. IT WAS ASSUMED THAT HE WOULD EVENTUALLY AGREE TO LESS THAN 30 PERCENT BUT THERE WAS UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW MUCH LESS.

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL SEE BOTH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH AGAIN TOMORROW (27 NOVEMBER). SHERRY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WANTED TO FINISH THIS ROUND OF TALKS BY THE END OF THE WEEK AND IF POSSIBLE BY THURSDAY.

6. SHERRY INCIDENTALLY HAS BEEN IN A SPOT OF HOT WATER OVER REMARKS HE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE AT A UNIVERSITY SEMINAR HERE CRITICISING THE GREEK AND GREEK-CYPRIOU FOR INTRANSIGENCE AND SUGGESTING THAT IF THE GREEK-CYPRIOU WERE NOT MORE CONCILIATORY IT WOULD BE THEIR FAULT IF THE TALKS COLLAPSED. THESE REMARKS WERE APPARENTLY PICKED UP IN A DISTORTED FORM AT SECONDHAND (ACCORDING TO SHERRY) AND HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF HEADLINE ARTICLES IN THE PAPERS IN NICOSIA AND ATHENS SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR SHERRY'S REMOVAL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN ISSUED A STATEMENT TODAY SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS IN FACT FOR THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO SHERRY AND THE REPORTS WERE A GROSS DISTORTION OF WHAT HE HAD SAID.

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 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NO 532 OF 20 NOVEMBER 84
 INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
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FOLLOWING FROM SIR P RHODES

CYPRUS: IMPRESSIONS AFTER 2 AND A HALF YEARS

SUMMARY

1. **MAIN IMPRESSION INCREASED REALISM ON THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE TOGETHER WITH RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING THE PROCESS STARTED BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR. HOPE BUT NO OPTIMISM ON THE PART OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS: GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF ENSURING WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH TROOPS IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED. CONCERN OVER TURKISH CYPRIOT ATTITUDE ON EQUALITY WITHIN A NEW CONSTITUTION. AGREEMENT THAT THE GREEKS ARE STANDING BACK.**

2. **VITAL IMPORTANCE OF GETTING A SERIOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT OFFER ON TERRITORY ON THE TABLE.**

DETAIL

3. IN A BRIEF VISIT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SEE A BROAD SECTION OF GREEK CYPRIOTS. WHAT FOLLOWS IS NECESSARILY IMPRESSIONISTIC.

4. MY MAIN IMPRESSION IS OF GREATER REALISM. IACOVOU AND STELLA SOULIOTIS, ATTORNEY-GENERAL BUT ALSO STILL LEGAL ADVISER TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT DELEGATION TO THE PROXIMITY TALKS, AND DINOS LORDOS PRESIDENT OF THE FAMAGUSTA REFUGEE ASSOCIATION ALL CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION. MRS SOULIOTIS SAID THAT PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU HIMSELF WAS BOTH MORE SELF CONFIDENT AND MORE REALISTIC THAN SHE HAD KNOWN HIM: ALL THE GREEK CYPRIOT DELEGATION HAD FOUND THIS. HE HAD GROWN INTO THE JOB. ALL SAID, WITHOUT PROMPTING, THAT TIME WAS NOT ON THE GREEK SIDE. IACOVOU EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROCESS. THE ACTING UN REPRESENTATIVE TOLD THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND MYSELF THAT MAVROMMATIS HAD MADE A STRONG PLEA FOR THE TALKS TO BE CONTINUED IF THERE WAS THE "SLIGHTEST GLIMMER" OF HOPE.

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5. BOTH IACOVOU AND MRS SOULIOTIS CONFIRMED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS TAKING A BACK SEAT. BOTH WERE CLEARLY PLEASED AT THIS AND BOTH REALISED THE DANGERS OF TOO CLOSE GREEK INVOLVEMENT. IACOVOU REFERRED TO HIS NEED TO WORK TO "KEEP THE GREEKS HAPPY".

6. ON SUBSTANCE TWO MAIN POINTS EMERGED:-

- (A) THERE WAS GENERAL WORRY ABOUT THE TURKISH SIDE'S INSISTENCE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY THROUGHOUT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSTITUTION. MRS SOULIOTIS MADE MUCH OF THE POINT THAT THE TURKISH SIDE'S IDEAS, SO FAR AS THESE WERE UNDERSTOOD, APPEARED TO BE A FURTHER RECIPE FOR A BREAKDOWN OF THE ADMINISTRATION UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION:
- (B) THERE WAS GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THE MEANS TO ENSURE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL TURKISH TROOPS. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAD GONE BACK ON "UNDERTAKINGS" IN THE PAST TO WITHDRAW ONCE AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. IACOVOU AND MAVROMMATIS WORRIED ABOUT THE FACT THAT, ONCE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC WAS DISSOLVED, THERE WOULD BE NO MEANS OF EFFECTIVE RESORT EG. TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE SAID THAT MEANS COULD SURELY BE FOUND TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM EG. A DIRECT UNDERTAKING BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL. THE GREEK AMBASSADOR (WHO PREDICTABLY EXPRESSED THE STRONGEST PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE TALKS) SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE THE UN SENDING FORCES IN "TO DRIVE THE TURKS OUT".

7. DESPITE THEIR LACK OF OPTIMISM AND THE CONCENTRATION OF POINTS (A) AND (B) IN PARA 6 ABOVE, ALL AGREED THAT A KEY POINT WOULD BE TABLING BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF A REASONABLE OFFER ON TERRITORY. THEY WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS WOULD COME BUT ACCEPTED THAT IF THE FIRST DIGIT WERE "TWO" INSTEAD OF "THREE" THIS WOULD BE BOUND TO AFFECT BOTH THE ATMOSPHERE AND PROSPECTS FAVOURABLY. IACOVOU SAID THAT THIS WOULD ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT PROCESS.

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8. THE ABOVE UNDERLINES THE POINT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 515 FROM ATHENS URGING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TELL THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THE TURKISH SIDE'S WILLINGNESS TO MOVE AT LEAST AS FAR AS TO 30%.

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November 15, 1984

Dear Mr. President:

As I said in my address to the UN General Assembly in September, my Government strongly supports Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's efforts to assist your Government and the Turkish Cypriot community in finding a solution to the partition of Cyprus.

As the date approaches on which you will again meet with the Secretary General in New York, I want to reiterate to you our concern and hope that the process will succeed. Constructive negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual respect and confidentiality are essential. The present partition of Cyprus, and the long delay in finding viable solutions to that situation, are to the advantage of no one.

As the opening of the third round of proximity talks approaches, statesmanship and courage are necessities for both sides. Constitutional provisions to meet the legitimate needs of the Turkish community for security and access to decision-making under an eventual federal system must be given attention, as must the equally pressing need for significant territorial concessions. We will be discussing more fully with your Government detailed ideas on what we believe might be done in the proximity talks to assure their success.

We continue to hope sufficient compromise may be achieved in those meetings whereby the holding of a high-level meeting would be possible. We would hope those meetings could lead, in turn, to a reunited Cyprus under a government acceptable to all Cypriots and under which all can prosper with security.

Mr. President, as I and my Government have said to you on many occasions, we greatly value the friendship and goodwill which exists between Cyprus and the United States. We stand ready to assist you and the Turkish Cypriots in any way possible to facilitate that fair and final solution we all desire. Indeed, it is for this

His Excellency
Mr. Spyros Kyprianou,
President of the Republic of Cyprus,
Nicosia.

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reason that in May of this year I proposed the creation of the "Cyprus Peace and Reconstruction Fund."

We are sending messages to all the parties directly involved in the Cyprus question, urging that this opportunity for progress not be lost. The world will be watching what takes place in New York when you convene again later this month. It is the Cypriot people above all who should be rewarded with substantial progress toward a united Cyprus.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ronald Reagan

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 TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO
 TELEGRAM NO 523 OF 15 NOVEMBER 84
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TEL 664 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: **KYPRIANOU'S MEETING**
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

1. AFTER ENQUIRING THROUGH VOVIDES, I WAS SENT WORD BY KYPRIANOU YESTERDAY EVENING THAT THE 'STRICTLY PRIVATE MATTER' WHICH HE WISHES TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IS THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE. I COULD NOT OBTAIN ANYMORE DETAIL EXCEPT THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD NOT (NOT) EXPECT ANY ANSWER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AT THIS MEETING, WHICH MEANT ACCORDING TO VOVIDES THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PREPARATION OF THE GROUND (AS I HAD SUGGESTED).

2. OBVIOUSLY THERE COULD BE TWO ASPECTS TO THIS:-

(A) THE POSSIBILITY OF GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS, OR OF THE UK TAKING THE DIPLOMATIC LEAD IN OUR CAPACITY AS A GUARANTOR POWER, IN THE EVENT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE FAILING:

(B) THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE AND OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF GUARANTEE, UNDER A SETTLEMENT.
 I HAVE NOT HAD ANY FURTHER CONVERSTAION WITH KYPRIANOU ABOUT THIS SINCE 9 OCTOBER (PARA 7 OF MY TEL 488).

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INFO ROUTINE ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. KYPRIANOU HAS BRIEFED THE GREEKS ON THE PROXIMITY TALKS. NO APPARENT CHANGE IN GREEK POSITION.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU RETURNED FROM INDIA WITH PAPANDREOU AND STAYED IN ATHENS ON 5 - 6 NOVEMBER TO BRIEF PAPANDREOU, PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS AND THE LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION NEW DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNIST PARTIES ON THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS. NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAS EMERGED BUT PESSIMISM PREVAILS. LACK OF PROGRESS IS BLAMED ON TURKISH AND TURKISH CYPRIOT INTRANSIGENCE. THERE IS SOME TENDENCY TO BLAME THE AMERICANS (AND OTHERS INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION) FOR FAILURE TO PUT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON THE TURKS. PAPANDREOU REAFFIRMED GREEK SUPPORT FOR KYPRIANOU'S EFFORTS AND FOR THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND KARAMANLIS WERE QUICKLY SQUASHED BUT ALLOWED THE OPPOSITION LEADER, MITSOTAKIS, TO STATE THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS TOO SERIOUS TO ALLOW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES.

3. IACOVOU ALSO HELD SEPARATE TALKS WITH HARALAMBOPOULOS.

4. ON 9 NOVEMBER, MY HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON THE APPROPRIATE ADVISER, HIMSELF A CYPRIOT, IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. NEARCHOU GAVE LITTLE AWAY. HE DID SAY HOWEVER THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE APPROACHING THE THIRD ROUND WITH VERY LITTLE HOPE QUOTE BUT IN A SPIRIT OF GOODWILL UNQUOTE. NEARCHOU SAW NO PROSPECT OF TURKISH CONCESSIONS WITHOUT OUTSIDE PRESSURE. TURKISH INSISTENCE

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ON THE POLITICAL EQUALITY OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES WAS A FORMULA FOR ENSURING WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN EFFECTIVE TURKISH PROTECTORATE OVER ALL OF CYPRUS. NEARCHOU REFUSED TO SPECULATE HOW THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD REACT TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS SEMI COLON THEY WERE STILL PONDERING THE OPTIONS.

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 TELEGRAM NO 550 OF 6 NOVEMBER 84.
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.
 INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON.
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 CBFC.

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 1455 : CYPRUS : SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

SUMMARY.

IACOVOU "VERY ENCOURAGED" BY THE TURKISH MOVEMENT IN THE THIRD ROUND, BUT KYPRIANOU NOT PREPARED TO GIVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR A YES OR NO ANSWER ON A TAKE-IT OR LEAVE-IT BASIS. STILL INSISTENT ON NARROWING THE GAP FURTHER ON ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE BEFORE PROCEEDING TO A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING. WORRIES REPEATED ON YETO POWERE (IN THE EXECUTIVE MORE THAN THE LEGISLATURE), ON THE ACTUAL TERRITORY TO BE RETURNED AND ON TURKISH SETTLERS. TIMING OF TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWALS ANOTHER PROBLEM. SOME ELEMENT OF BARGAINING TACTICS IN THIS POSITION. BUT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL HAVE TO BE FIRM IN WARNING KYPRIANOU NOT TO PUT THE LAST CHANCE OF A SOLUTION AT RISK BY SEEKING MORE THAN THE MARKET WILL STAND.

DETAIL.

1. AT MY REQUEST I HAD HALF-AN-HOUR WITH IACOVOU ON 5 DECEMBER. HE BEGAN BY GIVING ME A LENGTHY "PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" LETTER FROM KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER (MY TEL 549, NOT REPEATED ELSEWHERE), AND HIS SUBSEQUENT REMARKS FOLLOWED THE GENERAL LINE OF THIS.

2. IACOVOU STRESSED THAT HE WAS "VERY ENCOURAGED" BY THE TURKISH MOVEMENT IN THE THIRD ROUND, WHICH OPENED FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PROSPECT OF A FINAL SOLUTION. BUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO TREAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S LATEST PROPOSALS (WHICH CLEARLY EMANATED FROM THE TURKISH SIDE) ON A TAKE-IT OR LEAVE-IT BASIS, OR TO GIVE A YES OR NO ANSWER UNDER TIME PRESSURE. THEY STILL CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO NARROW THE GAP FURTHER ON THE

LEAVE-IT BASIS, OR TO GIVE A YES OR NO ANSWER UNDER TIME PRESSURE. THEY STILL CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO NARROW THE GAP FURTHER ON THE ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE, THOUGH NOT ON ALL THE DETAILS, BEFORE PROCEEDING TO A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING. THEY COULD NOT AFFORD THE RISK OF THE LATTER BREAKING DOWN, WHICH THEY STILL SUSPECT IS DENKTASH'S PERSONAL AIM, IF NOT THAT OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

3. IACOVOU DISAGREED WITH MY SUGGESTION THAT THE PROXIMITY TALKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AS FAR AS THEY COULD BE, AND THAT OUTSTANDING ISSUES COULD NOW BE RESOLVED ONLY THROUGH FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION. IN DISCUSSION IT EMERGED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT ORDER OF PREFERENCE SEEMED TO BE :-

- (A) CONTINUE THE THIRD ROUND FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY OR PRACTICAL AFTER 10 DECEMBER. IACOVOU DID NOT SEE WHY PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHOULD HAVE TO BREAK OFF ON THAT DATE.
- (B) HAVE A FOURTH ROUND IN JANUARY. IACOVOU ARGUED THAT, WHEREAS THE FIRST AND SECOND ROUNDS HAD CERTAINLY JUSTIFIED PEREZ IN NOT ENVISAGING MORE THAN A THIRD AND FINAL ROUND, NOW WAS PRECISELY THE MOMENT WHEN A FOURTH ROUND WOULD BE JUSTIFIABLE.
- (C) HAVE A LOWER-LEVEL PREPARATORY MEETING FOR A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING, BUT WITH THE DATE FOR THE LATTER TO BE FIXED ONLY AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING (PRESUMABLY AS A FUNCTION OF THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS MADE AT IT).

4. CONSTITUTION,

IACOVOU (AS IN UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1418) AGAIN GAVE PRIDE OF PLACE TO HIS FEARS ABOUT THE UNWORKABILITY OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE VETO POWERS CLAIMED BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEGISLATURE (SINCE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS BY ITS NATURE ALLOWED TIME FOR PRENEGOTIATION AND FOR THE RECONCILIATION OF VIEWS, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BECOME MORE PARTY-POLITICALLY THAN ETHNICALLY ORIENTED) THAN ABOUT THE EXECUTIVE (WHERE INSTANT DECISIONS WERE OFTEN NEEDED). HE TOOK PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE VOTE OF ONE TURKISH CYPRIOT MINISTER WOULD BE NEEDED TO VALIDATE ANY DECISION BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HE FEARED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, IF THEY WANTED SOMETHING, WOULD USE THIS PROVISION AS A LICENCE TO VETO ALL OTHER BUSINESS UNTIL THEY GOT IT. BUT HE WAS SURE THAT THE GAP ON SAFEGUARDS WAS BRIDGABLE.

5. IN ANSWER TO MY POINT ABOUT PART OF THE ANSWER LYING IN LEAVING AS MUCH POWER AS POSSIBLE TO THE PROVINCES, IACOVOU MADE TWO POINTS :-

- (A) NOW THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE AREAS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION, WE SHOULD AT THIS MOMENT CONSOLIDATE THAT, RATHER THAN UNRAVEL IT. BUT IF "AT A LATER STAGE" A REDUCTION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION COULD HELP TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS, THIS COULD BE CONSIDERED.
- (B) ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD A FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TO PLACE THINGS LIKE HIGHWAYS UNDER FEDERAL JURISDICTION SO THAT THEY WOULD BE FUNDED FROM THE FEDERAL BUDGET. THIS HAD PROBABLY PLAYED A PART IN DENKTASH'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LIST. IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY TO ENVISAGE AN OPEN GREEK CYPRIOT SUBSIDY TO THINGS LIKE TURKISH CYPRIOT ROADWORKS, IF THESE WERE A PROVINCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

CYPRIOI SUBSIDY TO THINGS LIKE TURKISH CYPRIOI ROADWORKS,
IF THESE WERE A PROVINCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

6. TERRITORY.

IACOVOU WANTED TO TIE THE TURKISH SIDE DOWN TO THE CRITERION OF THE NUMBER REFUGEES WHO WOULD BE RESETTLED, DEFINING THIS NOT IN TERMS OF PEOPLE FOR WHOM HOUSES COULD BE BUILT IN THE AREAS CONCERNED, BUT IN TERMS OF "RETURNEES", IE PEOPLE WHO WERE ACTUALLY LIVING THERE IN 1974, AND WHO COULD RETURN TO THEIR OWN HOMES. THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY UP THE ANTE, AND I WARNED IACOVOU AGAINST IT, POINTING OUT THAT IT WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAD EVEN AGREED TO TALK IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES. THE GREEK CYPRIOI SHOULD NOT PRESS THEIR LUCK TOO FAR.

7. THE OTHER TERRITORIAL ISSUE WAS THE EXTENT OF VAROSHA. (NO MENTION WAS MADE OF MORPHOU). I TOLD IACOVOU THAT HE WOULD NOT STAND A HOPE OF GETTING A CONCESSION ON THE MUNICIPAL AREA OF GREEK FAMAGUSTA AT THIS STAGE, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE FOR HIM TO TRY TO KEEP THE ISSUE OPEN FOR AN EVENTUAL HIGH-LEVEL MEETING. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT DENKTASH WAS KEEPING A POSSIBLE CONCESSION ON FAMAGUSTA AS THE ACE UP HIS SLEEVE (THE GREEK COUNSELLOR HAS HEARD THAT, AFTER KYPRINAKOOU'S DEPARTURE FROM NEW YORK, MAVROMMATIS WAS GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF THIS BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR). IACOVOU INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT BE SATISFIED IF THE TURKISH SIDE CONCEDED THAT THE AREA OF "VAROSHA" WAS NEGOTIABLE.

8. I AM SURE IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE WE RAN OUT OF TIME THAT IACOVOU DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION (COVERED IN KYPRINAKOOU'S LETTER) OF THE TIMING OF TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN RELATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. MY GREEK COLLEAGUE HAD GONE ON ABOUT THIS AT LENGTH TO MY COUNSELLOR AT DINNER ON 4 DECEMBER, SAYING THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE TO SEND A MATCHING FORCE OF GREEK TROOPS HERE TO HOLD THE RING UNTIL A PROCESS OF MATCHING WITHDRAWALS ON BOTH SIDES WAS COMPLETED.

9. AS I WAS LEAVING, I DARED TO TOUCH LIGHTLY ON TWO HITHERTO TABOO SUBJECTS :-

(A) I SAID THAT I FORESAW DIFFICULTIES OVER THE GREEK CYPRIOI DEMAND FOR THE REMOVAL OF TURKISH SETTLERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN TURKISH CYPRIOI CITIZENSHIP. IACOVOU SPLUTTERED A BIT AND SAID THAT :-

(1) THE GRANTING OF TURKISH CYPRIOI CITIZENSHIP HAD BEEN ILLEGAL AND WAS THEREFORE IRRELEVANT.

(1) THE SETTLERS MUST GO IN ORDER TO MAKE ROOM FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOI DISPLACED UNDER THE TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS FOR AT LEAST A LIMITED NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOI TO RESETTLE IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOI AREA. (IACOVOU ADDED, AS HE HAS SAID BEFORE, THAT WHILE HE WAS PREPARED FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE TO BE REGULATED, HE WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THIS TO BE DONE IN A WAY THAT NEGATED IT).

(B) IN THE CONTEXT OF (1) ABOVE AND OF IACOVOU'S EARLIER INVOCATION OF BRITISH EXPERIENCE, AS A FORMER IMPERIAL POWER, IN DEALING WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, I RECALLED TO HIM THAT I THOUGHT THAT IN THE RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT, IN ORDER NOT TO LEAVE A LEGAL VACUUM, WE HAD FOUND OURSELVES OBLIGED TO GRANT A KIND OF

SETTLEMENT, IN ORDER NOT TO LEAVE A LEGAL VACUUM, WE
HAD FOUND OURSELVES OBLIGED TO GRANT A KIND OF
"LEGAL AMNESTY" TO THE ACTS OF THE ILLEGAL SMITH REGIME.
(I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT ON
THIS). IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT THIS HAD NOT ENTERED IN
IACOVOU'S CALCULATIONS IN RELATION TO A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.

CONCLUSION.

10 THIS WAS NOT A PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING CONVERSATION BUT I
WOULD NOT TAKE EVERYTHING THAT IACOVOU SAID AT FACE VALUE. THERE
WAS PROBABLY A TACTICAL ELEMENT IN IT OF GIVING AWAY NOTHING IN
ADVANCE. (FOR EXAMPLE, I AM SURE THAT IACOVOU WOULD NOT HAVE
MENTIONED THE FALLBACK POSITION AT PARA 3(C) ABOVE IF I HAD NOT
SHOWN THAT I HAD HAPPENED ALREADY TO KNOW ABOUT IT). THE GREEK
CYPRIOTS MAY BE READY TO BE MORE REASONABLE THAN APPEARS ON THE
SURFACE. WHILE KYPRIANOU MUST BE SEEN TO BE FIGHTING THE
GOOD FIGHT FOR THE BEST DEAL HE CAN GET, HE CAN ALSO NOT AFFORD
TO BE SEEN AS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR DITCHING THE PROSPECTS OF
THE DEAL. ALL THE SAME, I FEAR THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL
HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME WITH HIM IN NEW YORK THIS WEEKEND AND
THAT HE WILL NEED TO BE VERY FIRM IN WEENING KYPRIANOU AWAY FROM
EXCESSIVE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING.

11. BECAUSE OF GREEK CYPRIOT MAKE-OR-BREAK FEARS ABOUT GOING
TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BEFORE ALL THE MAIN ISSUES HAVE BEEN
BUTTONED UP, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT BEFORE HOLDING A HIGH LEVEL
MEETING WHICH WOULD BE EXPECTED TO FINALISE AN AGREEMENT, IT
MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SUGGEST ONE OR MORE HIGH-LEVEL "DISCUSSION
MEETINGS" UNDER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CHAIRMANSHIP FOR THE
PURPOSE OF FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATION ON THE REMAINING ISSUES.
I WOULD NOT EXPECT MUCH TO RESULT FROM A LOWER-LEVEL
PREPARATORY MEETING (PARA 3(C) ABOVE).

12. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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MR DEREK THOMAS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKNIS NEW YORK 262357Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1229 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY BONN,
PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBF CYPRUS.

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MIPT: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TODAY (26 OCTOBER) FOLLOWING HIS FINAL MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU BUT BEFORE THAT WITH DENKTASH. HE SAID THAT BOTH SIDES CLAIMED TO HAVE MADE CONCESSIONS BUT AS THEY ALWAYS TOOK A STEP BACKWARDS BEFORE TAKING ONE FORWARD, THERE WAS REALLY NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT. HE CONFIRMED THAT DENKTASH'S POSITION HAD HARDENED IN THAT HE WAS NOW MAKING SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS ABOUT TERRITORY. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD NOT MADE ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS EITHER BUT HE BELIEVED KYPRIANOU FINALLY WANTED A SETTLEMENT.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE HAD TOLD BOTH SIDES THAT THE NEXT SESSION ON 26 NOVEMBER MIGHT LAST ONLY ONE DAY. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO THROUGH ANOTHER 2 WEEK SLOG. HE HAD NOT AFTER ALL GIVEN THEM A THIRD REVISE OF HIS PAPER SINCE EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY LEAK IN THE CYPRUS PRESS AND BE ATTACKED. HE WAS PUTTING HIS IDEAS ORALLY TO THE 2 SIDES AND THEY MUST GIVE HIM THEIR RESPONSES ON 26 NOVEMBER. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT NO PROGRESS WOULD EVER BE MADE EXCEPT IN TETE A TETE MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE 2 LEADERS. KYPRIANOU WOULD BE BRINGING THE PARTY LEADERS WITH HIM IN NOVEMBER BUT THEY WOULD BE KEPT IN A BACK ROOM.
3. I TOLD PERZ DE CUELLAR THAT WE CONTINUED TO STAND READY TO HELP. HE CONTINUED TO SHOW MARKED APPRECIATION FOR OUR ATTITUDE BUT SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO SUGGEST AT THE MOMENT.

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PS/LADY YODIG
PS/MB ~~RENTON~~
PS/EUS
MR DEREK THOMAS

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FM UKNIS NEW YORK 270132Z OCT 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCG
TEL NO 1228 OF 26 OCTOBER 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL NATO CBF CYPRUS

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 1213: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERALS INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. SECOND ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS CONCLUDED.
SECRETARIATE GLOOMY AT LACK OF PROGRESS AND DENKTASH'S
PERFORMANCE. A THIRD AND FINAL ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS TO
BEGIN ON 26 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARIAT YESTERDAY (25 OCTOBER) HELD TALKS WITH
OFFICIALS FROM THE TWO SIDES PRESENT IN ADJOINING ROOMS - MAVROMMA-
TIS AND TRIANTAFYLIDIS FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND ERTEKUN AND
ATALAY FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. TODAY THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW
KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH SEPARATELY FOR THE CONCLUDING MEETINGS OF
THIS ROUND. HE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED THE PRESS STATEMENT IN MY SECOND
IFT (NOT TO ALL) REPORTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIVE
PROGRESS BUT THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO HOLD A FINAL ROUND OF
PROXIMITY TALKS BEGINNING ON 26 NOVEMBER.

3. SHERRY THIS EVENING BRIEFED US TOGETHER WITH HAAS WHO HAD COME
UP FROM WASHINGTON. SHERRY SAID THAT LAST FEW DAYS OF THE TALKS HAD
BEEN A "DISGRACEFUL PERFORMANCE". DENKTASH HAD REACTED TO THE
SECRETARY GENERALS REVISED PAPER BY REJECTING EVERY POINT WHERE
AN EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. HE
HAD THEN GONE ON TO RESTATE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION IN MORE
EXTREME TERMS THAN BEFORE. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY UNHELPFUL OVER
THE LIST OF FEDERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LIST HAD

THE LIST OF FEDERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LIST HAD REFERRED TO MONETARY MATTERS. DENKTASH HAD AMENDED THIS TO READ "FEDERAL" MONETARY MATTERS WITH THE OBVIOUS IMPLICATION THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROVINCE MIGHT RETAIN ITS OWN MONETARY SYSTEM. AFTER INDICATING SOME FLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORY AT AN EARLIER STAGE HE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY HARDENED HIS POSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION. HE WAS CONTINUING TO INSIST ON 100 PERCENT POWER SHARING FOR BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE, REJECTING ANY SUGGESTION THAT EVEN CONTINUING LEGISLATION COULD PASS THE LEGISLATURE WITHOUT FULL TURKISH CYPRIOT APPROVAL.

4. SHERRY SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS BEHIND DENKTASH'S INTRANSIGENCE. THE TURKS HAD ALSO BEEN DIFFICULT. HAD THEY PERHAPS GIVEN HIM THE GREEN LIGHT?

5. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR THEIR PART HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING ON CERTAIN POINTS BUT HAD NOT GIVEN NEARLY ENOUGH. THEY WERE HOWEVER TAKING THE LINE THAT THEY COULD NOT GIVE MORE WITHOUT SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY FROM DENKTASH.

6. SHERRY COMPLAINED ABOUT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING ANY SORT OF PAPER WITH THE TWO SIDES. WHENEVER ANYTHING WAS PUT DOWN ON PAPER IT INEVITABLY LEAKED MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO MODIFY FURTHER. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS LEAKED LIKE A SIEVE.

7. SHERRY SAID THAT THE PLAN NOW AS FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PRODUCE A FURTHER DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT IN WHICH HE WOULD FILL IN ALL THE BLANKS ON CONSTITUTION AND TERRITORY. MAVROMMATIS AND ERTEKUN WOULD PROBABLY BE ASKED TO COME TO NEW YORK ABOUT 10 DAYS BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND TO BE GIVEN DETAILS OF THE DRAFT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD NOT HOWEVER PHYSICALLY HAND THEM A PAPER, BUT AS AT VIENNA, DICTATE TO THEM ORALLY WHAT WAS IN IT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO TO A FOURTH ROUND. AFTER THE NEXT ROUND IT WOULD BE A JOINT HIGH LEVEL MEETING OR NOTHING. BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING UNLESS THERE WAS SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE TO ENSURE THAT IT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. SUMMING UP SHERRY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD GIVE THE TWO SIDES HIS COMPLETE PLAN AND TELL THEM TO TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT. IF THEIR REACTION WAS NEGATIVE THEN HE WOULD REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

8. HAAS ALSO SAW IACOVOU TODAY. ACCORDING TO THE US MISSION, IACOVOU WAS BITTER ABOUT THE TALKS AND ABOUT DENKTASH'S PERFORMANCE IN PARTICULAR. HE HAD INSTANCED THE WAY IN WHICH DENKTASH HAD APPARENTLY GONE BACK ON THE LIST OF FEDERAL POWERS CLAIMING THAT HE HAD ONLY PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PRESENTATION OF A LIST, NOT ITS CONTENT. IACOVOU HAD FAULTED SHERRY AND PICCO FOR NOT HAVING COME CLEAN WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR MOST OF THE TALKS AS TO HOW INTRANSIGENT DENKTASH WAS REALLY BEING. HE THOUGHT THAT THE TURKS HAD ALSO BEEN SPREADING DISINFORMATION ABOUT DENKTASH'S WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE ON TERRITORY.

9. IACOVOU TOLD HAAS THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE POSITION, THE LATTER BEING MORE FLEXIBLE. HE CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD BEEN RIGHT NOT TO HAVE GONE PUBLIC ON THEIR PRIVATE POSITION DURING THE TALKS SINCE DENKTASH WOULD HAVE

PRIVATE POSITION, THE LATTER BEING MORE FLEXIBLE. HE
CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD BEEN RIGHT NOT TO HAVE GONE PUBLIC ON
THEIR PRIVATE POSITION DURING THE TALKS SINCE DENKTASH WOULD HAVE
ENDED UP BY MERELY POCKETING THEIR CONCESSIONS. HE SAID THAT HE
WOULD BE QUITE CONTENT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT IN
FULL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAS OPPOSED TO ANY ATTEMPT TO
HOLD A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR ASSURANCES OF ITS SUCCESS.

10. PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR SECRETARY GENERALS COMMENTS.

THOMSON

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PS/LADY TODDIG
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PP CBF CYPRUS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242315Z OCT 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1213 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBF CYPRUS

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MY TELNO 1199: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS TRYING TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE TWO SIDES BUT SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. ACCORDING TO SHERRY, DENKTASH IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (24 OCTOBER) WAS QUITE INTRANSIGENT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW DENKTASH AND KYPRIANOU SEPARATELY AND PRIVATELY ON 22 OCTOBER AND GAVE THEM A REVISED VERSION OF HIS DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. (ACCORDING TO HOLGER THE REVISIONS WERE NOT EXTENSIVE). HE WAS TO SEE THEM AGAIN ON 23 OCTOBER BUT CANCELLED THE MEETINGS. HE SAW BOTH SIDES AGAIN SEPARATELY THIS AFTERNOON, FIRST THE LEADERS ON THEIR OWN AND THEN WITH THEIR OFFICIALS.

3. I SPOKE TWICE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS MORNING. THE FIRST TIME HE TOLD ME THAT NEITHER LEADER WAS GIVING HIM ENOUGH ON SUBSTANCE TO JUSTIFY HIS HOLDING A FURTHER ROUND OR PROXIMITY TALKS. IN ORDER TO "DRAMATISE" HIS CONCERN HE HAD CANCELLED YESTERDAY'S MEETINGS. HE WANTED TO SEND A SIGNAL ESPECIALLY TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WHO WERE BEING COURTEOUS BUT OFFERING HIM NO MORE THAN A "MOUSE" IN THE WAY OF CONCESSIONS. HE HAD NOW PREPARED A THIRD REVISION OF HIS PAPER IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF

"MOUSE" IN THE WAY OF CONCESSIONS. HE HAD NOW PREPARED A THIRD REVISION OF HIS PAPER IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF INFLEXIBILITY. HE HAD TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO AND WHETHER TO SEND BOTH LEADERS BACK TO THEIR CAPITALS. THIS MIGHT HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT ON KYPRIANOU WHO WOULD BE PUT UNDER PRESSURE BY THE AKEL AND CLERIDES. IT WOULD HAVE LESS EFFECT ON DENKTASH WHO WAS NOT UNDER SIMILAR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE, BUT IT MIGHT GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE TURKS TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON HIM.

4. THE SECOND TIME I SPOKE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL HE SAID THAT HE WAS WONDERING HOW FAR TO PUSH HIS THREAT THAT IF THEIR RESPONSES WERE UNSATISFACTORY HE WOULD MAKE A FULL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TURKS AND THE AMERICANS WERE AGAINST HIS DOING THIS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK HE SHOULD DROP THE THREAT BUT IT DID NOT SEEM TO ME THAT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS HAD AS YET BEEN EXHAUSTED. I TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE WHAT KIRCA (THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) HAD TOLD ME ABOUT FURTHER FLEXIBILITY ON DENKTASH'S PART (MY TUR). HE FOUND THIS INTERESTING AND AGREED THAT IT OFFERED FURTHER POSSIBILITIES. I EXPLAINED THAT I DID NOT KNOW WITH WHAT AUTHORITY KIRCA WAS SPEAKING.

5. SHERRY TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETINGS HAD NOT GONE WELL. THE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN RUSHED AND HE HAD ONLY BEEN ABLE TO BEGIN HIS COMMENTS ON THE REVISED DRAFT PAPER. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART HAD BEEN AT HIS 'ARROGANT WORST'. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE BELIEVED THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE GOING TO GET WHAT THEY WANTED AND NOBODY COULD PRESSURE THEM TO DO OTHERWISE. KIRCA HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARIAT AND TAKE A TOUGH LINE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD COMPLETE HIS MEETING WITH THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS TOMORROW (25 OCTOBER), POSSIBLY AT A LOWER LEVEL AND GIVE BOTH SIDES SOMETHING TO PONDER. SHERRY SOUNDED VERY FED UP.

THOMSON

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FM NICOSIA 230930Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 507 OF 23 OCTOBER 84.
INFO PRIORITY UKMS NEW YORK, PARIS, CBFC.
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, ATHENS, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO,
MODUK (DSC, DS11).
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS.

FRENCH ARMS SALES TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

SUMMARY.

UNFCYP'S REPORT ON CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE FRENCH ARMS SALES TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD CONSISTENT WITH OTHER REPORTS OF FRENCH READINESS TO SELL WEAPONS INCLUDING TANKS AND AIR DEFENCE MISSILES. FRENCH ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MILITARY BALANCE FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN ARMS BUILD-UP IN CYPRUS.

1. HOLGER'S COMMENT ABOUT FRENCH ARMS SALES (PARA 6 OF HUMFREY'S TELELETTER OF 19 OCTOBER) WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY PROMPTED BY A REPORT TO NEW YORK ON 17 OCTOBER BY THE UNFCYP FORCE COMMANDER, THE DETAILS OF WHICH WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN IN CONFIDENCE BY AN OFFICER IN THE BRITISH CONTINGENT (PLEASE PROTECT).
2. THE REPORT NOTED THAT 40 FRENCH ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS HAD ARRIVED IN CYPRUS OUT OF A TOTAL ORDER OF 84 AND THAT DELIVERY OF THE REST WAS IMMINENT : ALSO THAT THE FRENCH HAD SOLD THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD (GCNG) A FAST PATROL BOAT EQUIPPED WITH BOFORS GUN, 20MM CANNON AND TWO MACHINE GUNS. THE REPORT WENT ON TO IDENTIFY THREE DEFICIENCIES IN THE GCNG INVENTORY, WHICH THE

BOFORS GUN, 20MM CANNON AND TWO MACHINE GUNS. THE REPORT WENT ON TO IDENTIFY THREE DEFICIENCIES IN THE GCNG INVENTORY, WHICH THE FRENCH WERE BIDDING TO FILL :

- A) ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCE, FOR WHICH THE FRONT RUNNER APPEARED TO BE CROTALE, WHICH GREINDL BELIEVED WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. IN GREINDL'S VIEW IT WOULD TAKE THE GCNG ONE TO TWO YEARS TO DEVELOP A FULLY INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, THOUGH UNITS COULD BE READY TO TAKE THE FIELD WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE EQUIPMENT.
- B) TANKS. AN ORDER FOR 50 WAS BEING CONSIDERED, THE LEADING CONTENDER AGAIN BEING THE FRENCH AMX 30 (WE HAVE ALSO HAD REPORTS OF THE AMX 13 BEING CONSIDERED). IF NOT OBTAINED DIRECT FROM FRANCE, THE TANKS COULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM SUPPLIES HELD BY THE GREEK ARMY. VENIAMIN HAD INDICATED TO GREINDL THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO OBTAIN TANKS "FOR THE TIME BEING" BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT SHORT NOTICE IF IT WAS DECIDED TO OBTAIN THEM.
- C) HELICOPTERS. THE MAIN CONTENDERS FOR THE TWO OR THREE REQUIRED BY THE GCNG WERE THE ITALIAN BELL AND THE FRENCH DAUPLINE 2, THE FRENCH BEING FAVOURITE.

2. GREINDL'S REPORT ADDED THAT THE FORMER FRENCH AMBASSADOR (WHO LEFT EARLY THIS MONTH) MADE NO SECRET IN PRIVATE OF FRANCE'S READINESS TO SUPPLY WHATEVER ARMS WERE REQUESTED SO LONG AS THE BUYER WAS ABLE TO PAY FOR THEM. GREINDL CONCLUDED THAT, WHILE THE ARMS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME HAD ENHANCED GCNG MORALE, IT DID NOT SO FAR THREATEN THE STATUS QUO IN CYPRUS AND IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE TURKISH MILITARY LEADERS IN THE NORTH HE DETECTED A REALISTIC AND TEMPERATE ATTITUDE TO THE SITUATION. BUT IN HIS VIEW THE ACQUISITION BY THE GCNG OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS OR ANTI AIRCRAFT MISSILES CAPABLE OF LIMITING THE PRESENT TURKISH AIR SUPERIORITY WOULD BE LIKELY TO EVOKE A "MORE SERIOUS" RESPONSE FROM THE TURKISH SIDE.

4. GREINDL'S INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER REPORTS THAT THE FRENCH ARE PREPARED TO SUPPLY TANKS AND ANTI AIRCRAFT MISSILES TO THE GCNG, THOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT (AS HOLGER CONSIDERED) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD GO AHEAD WITH PURCHASES OF SUCH WEAPONS ONLY IF THE CURRENT UN INITIATIVE FAILED. THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO DENY THAT NEW FRENCH ARMS SALES COULD BE IN PROSPECT. IN CONVERSATION WITH MY DEFENCE ADVISER ON 18 OCTOBER THE FRENCH ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE, WHILE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF SALES, ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT THERE COULD BE NO MILITARY OBJECTIONS TO ARMS SALES TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, SINCE THESE ONLY IMPROVED THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THE GCNG, WHO STILL HAD A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THEY MATCHED THE TURKS. CAPIDE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ARGUMENTS THAT A BUILD UP OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE SOUTH COULD UPSET THE PRESENT RELATIVELY STABLE SITUATION AND AT THE VERY LEAST WOULD INCREASE INTERCOMMUNAL TENSION AND THE RISK OF PREEMPTIVE OR ADVENTUROUS ACTION BY EITHER SIDE.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS.
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230035Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1199 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBF CYPRUS

MY TELNO 1192 : CYPRUS : SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

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IMMEDIATE

SUMMARY

1. SOME COMMENTS FROM THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PRIVATE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS TO SEE KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH AGAIN PRIVATELY THIS AFTERNOON, 22 OCTOBER. I HOPE TO DEBRIEF HIM ON THE MEETINGS TOMORROW. SHERRY HAS SHOWN US THE TALKING POINTS WHICH WERE PREPARED FOR HIM TO USE IN PRISING OUT THEIR POSITIONS (DETAILS BY TELELETTER). HE CONFIRMED THAT DENKTASH HAD GIVEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A NEW FIGURE ON TERRITORY WITHOUT SAYING WHAT THIS WAS (BUT SEE BELOW).

3. IACOVOU TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EACH LEADER WERE A GOOD IDEA. HE SAID THE KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE AND STILL HAD "A LOT" TO GIVE. HE WOULD ONLY GIVE IT HOWEVER ON CONDITION THAT DENKTASH MADE HIS CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY.

4. I SUBSEQUENTLY SAW THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAD SPOKEN THIS MORNING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. KIRCA (SPEAKING IN STRICT CONFIDENCE) SAID THAT DENKTASH HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY GENERAL HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO DOWN TO "30 PLUS PERCENT" ON TERRITORY. KIRCA ADDED THAT IF PRESSED DENKTASH WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO FIRST TO "APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT" AND ULTIMATELY TO EXACTLY 30 PER CENT. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THIS STILL MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, HE AT FIRST SAID THAT DENKTASH COULD NOT GO BELOW

CENT. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THIS STILL MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, HE AT FIRST SAID THAT DENKTASH COULD NOT GO BELOW 30 PER CENT AND THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT IN DUE COURSE SET PARAMETERS ON TERRITORY FOR THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN 28 AND 31 PER CENT. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE USING THE SAME BASIS FOR CALCULATING THE PERCENTAGES.

5. KIRCA THOUGHT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DONE WELL ON AT LEAST A COUPLE OF POINTS - HIS BICOMMUNAL/BIZONAL FORMULA AND HIS 30:70 AND 50:50 PERCENTAGES FOR THE TWO HOUSES OF THE LEGISLATURE. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME GIVE IN DENKTASH'S POSITION ON CONSTITUTION. DENKTASH WAS PREPARED FOR THERE TO BE NOT VETO OVER SOME (UNSPECIFIED) FEDERAL ACTIONS. ON THE LIST OF FEDERAL POWERS, KIRCA RECOUNTED THE OBVIOUS ONES, SUCH AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FEDERAL FINANCIAL AFFAIRS ETC BUT SAID THAT ANY INCLUSION OF DEFENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED WITH THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE. HE NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD INCLUDED INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT AMONG THE FEDERAL POWERS. DENKTASH NEEDED MORE TIME TO CONSIDER THIS. HE WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF AIR TRANSPORT BUT DID NOT WISH TO HAND OVER CONTROL OF THE PORT OF FAMAGUSTA.

6. KIRCA SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT SECRETARY GENERAL HAD NOW GOT ENOUGH TO PUT TOGETHER AN AGREEMENT AT THIS STAGE. IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR HIM TO SEEK TO PUT IN TOO MUCH DETAIL AS SHERRY APPEARED TO WANT. (THIS HAS OF COURSE LONG BEEN THE TURKISH POSITION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS, HOWEVER RIGHTLY TRYING TO GET BASIC AGREEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTITUTION AND TERRITORY AT THIS STAGE). KIRCA TALKED IN TERMS OF A THIRD ROUND OF TALKS LEADING ON TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING ABOUT A FORTNIGHT AFTER THE END OF THIS ROUND. HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF NOT GIVING THE TWO SIDES TOO MUCH TIME, JUST ENOUGH TO RETURN TO CYPRUS TO CONSULT THEIR PEOPLE AND THE METROPOLITAN POWERS BEFORE RETURNING FOR A SUMMIT. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD URGE DENKTASH TO REACH AN AGREEMENT.

7. THE US MISSION HAVE TOLD SHERRY THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION IS KEEN TO HELP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. SHERRY HAS REPEATED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVES THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR ANY HIGH LEVEL US REPRESENTATIONS. THE MISSION HAVE INDICATED TO US HOWEVER THAT WASHINGTON STILL NEEDS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OTHER BILATERAL US/TURKISH CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE RECOMMENDING A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THEY ALSO WANT TO BE SURE TO HIT ON THE CRUCIAL MOMENT. IN MY VIEW THEY MAY NOW BE RIGHT TO WAIT A LITTLE LONGER TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF THE SECRETARY-GENERALS CURRENT SERIES OF PRIVATE MEETINGS.

THOMSON

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MS

SUPPLEMENTARY SPEAKING NOTE

1. We have had a quick contact with the Secretary General after the end of the first round. It is clear that he has put in a tremendous personal effort. His concern over the general lack of progress is also clear.

2. What is your assessment of the prospects for progress in the light of the Secretary General's working points? Do the working points provide a reasonable way forward if they could be accepted by each side?

3. Do you see any prospect of a trade-off between constitutional flexibility and territory? If you can be flexible on the constitution, we are ready to press the other side to be flexible on territory.

4. The Turkish side is giving us in confidence what we suspect may be an incorrect account of your position in respect of certain of the Secretary General's working points. If you can confirm that this account is not accurate, it would give the Secretary General and ourselves useful ammunition to use with the other side. For example, as regards the constitutional proposals:

i. Powers and functions of the federal government

They say that you seem to reject the suggestion by the Secretary General that a list be drawn up to specify the powers and functions of the federal government and that you are talking about devolving some powers from the centre rather than establishing a bizonal federation.

ii. Legislature

They say you reject the proposals for a bi-cameral legislature [can you accept 50:50 representation in the upper chamber?].

iii. Executive

They say that the role of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-Presidency would be diminished even compared with the powers set out in the 1960 Constitution, the implication being that the Turkish Cypriots could always be overborne in the Executive. Is this so?

5. As regards the confidence building measures, it is alleged that you are opposed to the re-opening of Nicosia airport, at least by implication, because of problems over sovereignty. Could you in fact accept the opening of the airport in exchange for an acceptable territorial package?

PS (6)

PS/LADY YODIG

PS/MR ~~RENTON~~

PS/FUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENNINGS

PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

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FM UKRIS NEW YORK 192335Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1192 OF 19 OCTOBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,
PRIORITY BORN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CEF CYPRUS

mf

NY TELNO 1182: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS WORKING PRIVATELY ON KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH TO TRY TO EXTRACT SOME MOVEMENT. HE WILL SEE THEM AGAIN ON MONDAY (22 OCTOBER)

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH SEPARATELY ON THEIR OWN THIS AFTERNOON (19 OCTOBER).
3. I SPOKE TO HIM AFTERWARDS AND HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD TRIED TO EXTRACT FROM THE TWO LEADERS THEIR REAL POSITIONS. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE WANTED THIS INFORMATION FROM THEM IN CONFIDENCE IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER IT WAS WORTHWHILE PROCEEDING ANY FURTHER. IF THINGS WENT ON AS THEY WERE THE WHOLE PROCESS WOULD BE ENDLESS. BOTH OF THEM PROMISED TO COME TO SEE HIM AGAIN PRIVATELY ON MONDAY TO GIVE CONCRETE ANSWERS. (THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID TO ME THAT THE ANSWERS NEEDED TO BE ON CONSTITUTION AND TERRITORY).
4. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE WAS "RATHER FED-UP" AND THEY HAD BOTH UNDERSTOOD. DENKTASH VERY MUCH WANTED A SUMMIT MEETING BUT HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD NOT HAVE IT UNLESS HE GAVE HIM SOMETHING WHICH WOULD ALLOW SUCH A MEETING TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE PRESTIGE OF HIS OFFICE WAS AT STAKE.
5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADDED CONFIDENTIALLY THAT DENKTASH HAD BEEN A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN FORMERLY BUT NOT TREMENDOUSLY SO. HE HAD BEEN "NOT TOO BAD".
6. I ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WHICH HE WANTED ME TO DO WITH THE TWO SIDES. I WAS NOT SEEKING TO BECOME INVOLVED UNLESS HE REALLY WANTED IT. HE SAID THAT WE WERE HIS ONLY "REAL, REAL SUPPORTERS". THERE WAS NOTHING THAT HE WANTED NOW. BUT IT WAS POSSIBLE HE MIGHT WISH TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME ON MONDAY AFTER HE HAD SEEN THE TWO LEADERS AGAIN.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 182359Z OCT 84
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1182 OF 18 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBF CYPRUS.

NY TELNO 1175: CYPRUS: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

SUMMARY

1. MAVROMMATIS SAYS THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS CAN GO NO FURTHER UNTIL DENKTASH GIVES SOME CONCRETE INDICATION OF NEW TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. DENKTASH MEANWHILE HAS APPARENTLY SOUGHT TO MAKE WIDE-RANGING AMENDMENTS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PAPER.

DETAIL

2. KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS MORNING AND THIS AFTERNOON (18 OCTOBER) RESPECTIVELY. I ARRANGED TO SEE MAVROMMATIS AFTER THE MEETING WITH KYRPIANOU AND ASKED HIM HOW THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SAW THINGS. I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS WERE VERY IMPORTANT AND HAD THEREFORE MADE HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIONS IN ADVANCE TO BOTH SIDES.

3. MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT KYPRIANOU WAS 'EXTREMELY PLEASED' WITH THE UK FOR TAKING THIS ACTION. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE CONSCIOUS THAT WE HAD DONE MORE THAN OTHERS SUCH AS THE U.S.

4. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PAPER HAD BEEN ESSENTIALLY AN ELABORATION OF THE WORKING POINTS BUT IT HAD BEEN 'GROSSLY DISAPPOINTING' ON TERRITORY WHERE NO TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS HAD BEEN INDICATED. THE PAPER HAD ALSO APPEARED TO SUGGEST THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WAS MERELY TO ESTABLISH A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPLAINED TO KYPRIANOU THIS MORNING THAT HIS OBJECTIVE REMAINED A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT AND THAT A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE JUST A STAGE OF SHORT DURATION TOWARDS THIS. HE HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD DELIBERATELY LEFT A BLANK ON TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ELICIT A CONCRETE REPLY FROM DENKTASH PRIVATELY.

5. MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS UNDERSTOOD THIS PLOY, BUT THAT SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNAL FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO INDICATE ANYTHING FURTHER ON TERRITORY. THERE WAS A SUGGESTION THAT THE TURKS HAD GIVEN SOME SIGNAL THROUGH HALEFOGLU'S PEOPLE BUT THIS REMAINED VAGUE (THE SECRETARY GENERAL MAY HAVE GIVEN A HINT ABOUT ULUCEVIK'S TALK WITH SHERRY - HUMFREY'S TELELETTER OF 2 OCTOBER). IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A TURKISH CYPRIOT INDICATION THE SITUATION WAS 'ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE' AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE MORE THAN A VAGUE INDICATION OF THEIR OWN HAND. THEY WERE NOT (NOT) GOING TO REPEAT PAST MISTAKES OF MAKING UNRECIPROCATED CONCESSIONS.

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6. KYPRIANOU HAD HOWEVER TOLD THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT ONCE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD GIVEN THE NECESSARY INDICATION, HE WOULD PRIVATELY GIVE HIM AN INDICATION OF POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCESSIONS BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE HAD HINTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT FURTHER GREEK-CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR EXAMPLE IN RELATION TO THE UPPER HOUSE AND THE PRESIDENCY. BUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD PUT NOTHING DOWN IN BALCK AND WHITE UNTIL THEY KNEW THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION.

7. WHEN I PROBED MAVROMMATIS ON THIS, HE SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD ONLY GO BEYOND THE 1960 CONSTITUTION IN SO FAR AS THE MATTERS CONCERNED WERE NATURALLY IMPLICIT IN A FEDERATION FOR EXAMPLE AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. A FEDERAL STRUCTURE WOULD HOWEVER MEAN THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE POWERS WHICH UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION HAD BELONGED TO A UNITARY STATE WOULD NOW BE DEVOLVED TO THE PROVINCES. ON THE EXECUTIVE, HE STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT (NOT) PREPARED TO ACCEPT A ROTATING PRESIDENCY OR SOME TRANSPLANTATION OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SYSTEM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE EXECUTIVE BE EITHER A SYSTEM DERIVED FROM PART III OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION OR A SYSTEM OF PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY (IE A SYMBOLIC ROTATING PRESIDENT WITH POWER IN THE HANDS OF A PRIME MINISTER AND VICE PRIME MINISTER). THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE. THEY WOULD ACCEPT HOWEVER THAT A TURKISH CYPRIOT VICE-PRESIDENT COULD ACT FOR THE PRESIDENT IN HIS ABSENCE AND HAVE SEPARATE VETO POWERS. THEY WERE ALSO OPEN TO OTHER SUGGESTIONS PROVIDING THESE PRESERVED A PROPER PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE SYSTEM. ON THE LEGISLATURE, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD SAID THAT IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON POWERS AND ON A DEADLOCK RESOLUTION MACHINERY, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION IN THE UPPER HOUSE GREATER THAN 30 PER CENT (THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT MEAN 50:50 AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS PROPOSING) IN GENERAL, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UN IDEAS OF 6 JUNE 1975 ON THE MATTER OF POLITICAL EQUALITY IN THE CONSTITUTION.

8. SUMMING UP MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE PESSIMISTIC AND HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF WAS NOT HOPEFUL OF MOVING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. I SAID THAT NOW WAS THE TIME THAT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT WAS NEEDED IF MATTERS WERE NOT TO GO BACKWARD. I ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO MAKE A CONCESSION ON TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS. I WOULD CONSULT THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND BE PREPARED IF HE SO ADVISED TO SPEAK TO DENKTASH IN ORDER TO EMPHASISE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UK ATTACHED TO THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS AND THE NECESSITY FOR TURKISH CYPRIOT TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. I AGREED WITH MAVBOMMATIS THAT WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

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9. SHERRY TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT DENKTASH, IN HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, HAD COME UP WITH HIS OWN REVISED VERSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERALS PAPER WHICH INTRODUCED 'EVERY CONCEIVABLE ELEMENT OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION RELEVANT OR OTHERWISE'. THE MEETING HAD LEFT THE SECRETARIAT DEPRESSED. BUT THERE WERE SOME HINTS ON TERRITORY WHICH SHERRY WAS NOT AT LIBERTY YET TO DISCUSS.

10. SHERRY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE PRIVATE MEETINGS TOMORROW WITH THE TWO LEADERS IN WHICH HE WOULD BE AS 'THREATENING AND DISAGREEABLE AS POSSIBLE' TO SEE IF HE COULD GET PAST THE STAGE OF THE TWO SIDES ETERNALLY RESTATING THEIR EXISTING POSITIONS.

THOMSON

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TO IMMEDIATE. FCO

TEL NO 1175 OF 17 OCTOBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL NATO CBFC

MY TELNO 1161 (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERALS INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS GIVEN THE TWO SIDES A DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT BASED ON HIS WORKING POINTS. THEY WILL GIVE HIM THEIR INITIAL REACTIONS ON 18 OCTOBER. SOME GREEK AND TURKISH COMMENTS.

DETAIL

2. SHERRY SHOWED US AND THE AMERICANS THIS AFTERNOON, 17 OCTOBER, A COPY OF THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD GIVEN YESTERDAY TO KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. (WE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A CONFIDENTIAL COPY FROM THE AMERICANS WHO GOT IT FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS - COPY BY TELELETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT). THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, AS EXPECTED, FOLLOWS THE FORMAT AND SUBSTANCE OF THE WORKING POINTS. IT CONTAINS HOWEVER A NUMBER OF BLANKS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS FOR THE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOTS WHO WILL HAVE TO BE RESETTLED IN TERRITORY WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOULD HAND OVER IN ADDITION TO THE AREAS DELINEATED IN THEIR 1981 PROPOSALS. OTHER BLANKS ARE FOR THE TIME TABLES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

3. SHERRY SAID THAT IT WAS INTENDED THAT THESE BLANKS SHOULD BE FILLED IN BEFORE THE DOCUMENT BECAME A HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DELIBERATELY LEFT BLANK THE FIGURE FOR THE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOTS TO BE RESETTLED SO THAT HE COULD DISCUSS THE FIGURE PRIVATELY WITH DENKTASH BEFORE HE COMMITTED IT TO PAPER. WHAT HE WANTED FROM DENKTASH ON 18 OCTOBER WAS AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SUCH A FIGURE.

4. SHERRY SAID THAT APART FROM HANDING OVER THE DOCUMENT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE SUBSTANCE TO THE MEETINGS ON 15 AND 16 OCTOBER. KYPRIANOU HAD STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FELT THAT UP UNTIL NOW THEY HAD MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS AND THAT IT WAS NOW TIME FOR DENKTASH TO RECIPROCATE. DENKTASH BEGAN HIS MEETINGS BY EXPRESSING STRONG CONCERN ABOUT THE FRENCH ARMS SALES TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

5. ON THE DRAFT ITSELF, NEITHER SIDE HAD SAID MUCH SO FAR. BUT THE INITIAL GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION WAS ONE OF CONCERN THAT THE PAPER WAS EXPLICIT ON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTION BUT HAD LEFT BLANK THE SPACES FOR THE CORRESPONDING TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY. THEY FEARED THAT THIS WOULD PLACE KYPRIANOU IN A DIFFICULT POSITION IF THE PAPER LEAKED.

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6. SHERRY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORECAST HOW LONG THIS ROUND OF TALKS WOULD CONTINUE. BUT THE DOOR IS OPEN FOR THEM TO CONTINUE INTO THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.

7. THE GREEK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE FELT THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REJECT THE SECRETARY GENERALS PAPER COMPLETELY SINCE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE BEING CALLED ON TO MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT DETAILS BUT APPEARED CONSIDERABLY WORKED UP. GIVEN DOUNTAS'S WELL KNOWN AND UNHELPFUL VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT THIS IS PERHAPS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED.

8. THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY GENERALS PAPER WAS A GOOD ONE BUT THAT MORE TIME WOULD BE NEEDED IN THIS ROUND AND THAT DENKTASH WOULD AGREE TO STAY ON FOR ANOTHER WEEK IF INVITED. KIRCA ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD MADE A TACTICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL MISTAKE IN SUGGESTING THAT THERE WERE SOME FEDERAL SUBJECTS FOR WHICH A VOTE IN THE LOWER HOUSE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. THIS SUGGESTION TENDED TO UNDERCUT HIS OTHERWISE EXCELLENT POSITION ON THE POLITICAL EQUALITY OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. DENKTASH REGARDED ALL FEDERAL SUBJECTS AS MAJOR ONES. THE POSITION WAS DIFFERENT FROM 1960 WHEN THE CONSTITUTION HAD SPECIFIED MAJOR AND MINOR FEDERAL SUBJECTS. IN FACT THE MINOR SUBJECTS IN THE 1960 CONSTITUTION WOULD SIMPLY NOT FIGURE IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION DUE TO THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. KIRCA SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT ALL FEDERAL SUBJECTS REQUIRED AFFIRMATORY VOTES BY BOTH HOUSES. HE COULD ADD HOWEVER THAT A JOINT WORKING GROUP DISCUSS WHAT SORT OF MAJORITIES WERE REQUIRED FOR CERTAIN SUBJECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON SOME SUBJECTS, IT MIGHT BE SPECIFIED THAT 11 OUT OF 20 TURKISH VOTES IN THE UPPER HOUSE WERE REQUIRED. IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOT TO PUT FORWARD A DETAILED SOLUTION HIMSELF BUT TO GET IT ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE TWO SIDES TO WORK OUT DIFFERING VOTING PROCEDURES FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROBLEMS BUT ALWAYS WITHIN THE OVERALL PROVISION THAT THE CONSENT OF BOTH HOUSES WAS REQUIRED FOR FEDERAL SUBJECTS.

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CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

1. THE SECOND ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS BEGAN IN NEW YORK TODAY,
15 OCTOBER.
2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME LATER THAT HE FOUND BOTH
KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH 'QUIETER' THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS MIGHT
BETOKEN A SLIGHTLY GREATER READINESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. HE HAD
TOLD EACH OF THEM THAT THIS THEY MUST NOW DO OR ELSE THEIR
POSITIONS WOULD BE EXPOSED. HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE A REPORT
AT THE END OF THIS ROUND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD SET
OUT HIS PROPOSALS AND THEIR RESPONSES. HE FELT THIS HAD HAD SOME
EFFECT.
3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE WOULD TOMORROW BE PRESENTING
EACH SIDE WITH A WRITTEN DOCUMENT. IT CONTAINED THE IDEAS WHICH HE
HAD MENTIONED AT THE FIRST ROUND AND WHICH WE HAVE SINCE DISCUSSED
WITH THE SECRETARIAT. HE WAS INVITING EACH SIDE TO REPLY ON
THURSDAY, 18 OCTOBER.

THOMSON

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TELECON NEILSON/RUSSELL: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE GIVEN TOHALEFOGLU. IT WILL BE PASSED ON. IN DISCUSSION WITH HALEFOGLU AND YAVUZALP BOTH EMPHASISED TURKEY'S INTEREST IN SEEING A SOLUTION. BOTH UNDERLINED DENKTASH'S GENUINE INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE AND EXPRESSED SCEPTISM ABOUT KYPRIANOU'S INTENTIONS.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, NOR IN THE EVENT HAS IT PROVED POSSIBLE FOR ME TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAS DEPARTED FOR EASTERN TURKEY AND WILL NOW BE LARGELY OUT OF ANKARA FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. IN HIS ABSENCE I HAVE GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 231) TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I EMPHASISED TO HALEFOGLU THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF ATTACHED TO THE NEXT ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS, OUR BELIEF THAT KYPRIANOU WAS PREPARED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND OUR STRONG HOPE THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD URGE MR DENKTASH TO SHOW EQUAL FLEXIBILITY PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORY.

3. HALEFOGLU REPLIED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE HE HAD USED WITH YOU IN NEW YORK. HE HOPED THAT OUR ASSESSMENT OF KYPRIANOU'S INTENTIONS WAS CORRECT. HE HIMSELF REMAINED SCEPTICAL, BELIEVING THAT KYPRIANOU WAS MORE INTERESTED IN THE FORM THAN THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATION. BY RETREATING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BEHIND THE 1960 CONSTITUTION KYPRIANOU WAS TRYING TO USE HIS ADVANCE TO THAT CONSTITUTION AS CONCESSIONS

TRYING TO USE HIS ADVANCE TO THAT CONSTITUTION AS CONCESSIONS WHEN IN REALITY HE MUST BE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER. HE COULD HOWEVER ASSURE ME THAT DENKTASH WAS FLEXIBLE, WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE GENUINELY INCLUDING FURTHER CONCESSIONS OF TERRITORY (THOUGH IF HE WERE ASKED FOR 10% OR MORE THAT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC). THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WERE CONSTANTLY URGING HIM IN THIS DIRECTION. TURKEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND WISHED TO SEE THE PROXIMITY TALKS LEAD TO A SUMMIT BETWEEN THE TWO CYPRIOT LEADERS.

4. I HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD A FULL DISCUSSION WITH YAVUZALP AND SHOWN HIM THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. WITH HIM, IN ADDITION TO EMPHASISING ITS MAIN POINTS, I WENT THROUGH IN MORE DETAIL THE POINTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF MYTEL NO 426 AND ALSO ADDED THOSE IN PARAGRAPH 2(1) OF SIR JOHN THOMSON'S TELEGRAM NO 1113 ON TERRITORY AND DENKTASH NOT INSISTING ON 100% POWER SHARING.

5. YAVUZALP TOO ASSURED ME THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT VERY MUCH WANTED A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. IT WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST AND CERTAINLY NOT TURKEY'S THAT IT SHOULD BE PROLONGED INDEFINITELY. HE WAS INTERESTED BY OUR VIEWS ON KYPRIANOU'S FLEXIBILITY. FROM HIS OWN LONG KNOWLEDGE OF KYPRIANOU HE REMAINED SCEPTICAL. BUT HE HOPED WE WERE RIGHT. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART WAS GOING TO NEW YORK IN A FLEXIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY MR WILBERFORCE'S RECEIPT OF ASSURANCE FROM BOTH DENKTASH AND KYPRIANOU THAT THEY WANTED TO SEE RESULTS. I ALSO SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS NOT ASKING FOR UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. HE ROCOGNISED THAT CONCESSIONS BY BOTH SIDES MUST FORM PART OF AN OVERALL PACKAGE TO BE IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY. I SUGGESTED FINALLY THAT THE TURKS SHOULD NOT PAY TOO MUCH HEED TO ROLANDIS'S VIEWS (THE TURKS CONSTANTLY TROT HIM OUT AS EVIDENCE THAT KYPRIANOU IS NOT SINCERE). WE DID NOT THINK THAT THESE REPRESENTED THE REAL PICTURE. YAVUZALP SAID THAT THE TURKS WOULD BE INTERESTED TO SEE IF THIS WAS RIGHT.

COMMENT

6. YAVUZALP ASSURED ME THAT IN HANDING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HALEFOGLU IT WOULD BE SEEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL (I.E. THE PRESIDENT). TURKISH SCEPTISM ABOUT KYPRIANOU IS STRONGLY HELD BUT I THINK THAT HALEFOGLU AND YAVUZALP ARE PROBABLY GENUINE IN EXPRESSING TURKEY'S WISH TO SEE HEADWAY MADE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. THAT SAID THEY ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE STRENGTH OF THEIR POSITION AND WILL CERTAINLY STRIKE A HARD BARGAIN.

RUSSELL

R-PT
WATE-W/E
649

TOP COPY

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T 171A / 84

CONFIDENTIAL

8838 - 1

OO ANKARA
OO ATHENS
OO NICOSIA
RR ROME
GRS 540

CC MASTER
OPS

wscor/1		
RECEIVED		
11 OCT 1984		
DESK OFFICER	PF	
INDEX		Action Taken
		ll/w

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 101022Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 231 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, BONN, NICOSIA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK(DS11)

CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT EVREN. YOU SHOULD DO YOUR UTMOST
TO DELIVER IT PERSONALLY WITHOUT DELAY BUT, FAILING THAT,
YOU SHOULD DELIVER IT AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. YOU
SHOULD ALSO TRY TO ENSURE THAT OZAL IS MADE AWARE OF OUR
CONCERNS.

QUOTE

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE PROGRESS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL'S CURRENT INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS
VERY CLOSELY. I AM ENCOURAGED THAT THE LEADERS OF BOTH
COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS CONSIDERED THAT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS
HAD BEEN MADE IN THE FIRST ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS IN
NEW YORK TO CONTINUE THEIR WORK ON 15 OCTOBER. I AM
CONVINCED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION OF GOOD
OFFICES REPRESENTS THE BEST WAY FORWARD OVER CYPRUS FOR
ALL OF US, AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLAND.
OUR TWO COUNTRIES BOTH WANT TO ASSIST THE
PROCESS.

AFTER THE FIRST ROUND I SAW PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU
IN LONDON. YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE SIR GEOFFREY
HOWE MORE INFORMATION ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION
WHEN THEY MET ON 27 SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK. I UNDERSTAND
THEIR DISCUSSIONS ALSO COVERED OTHER MATTERS AND KNOW THAT



SIR GEOFFREY IS VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO PAYING A VISIT TO ANKARA BEFORE TOO LONG TO CONTINUE THESE EXCHANGES OVER THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF OUR COMMON GOALS AND INTERESTS.

FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS SO FAR, IT APPEARS THAT A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT EXISTS. BUT IT IS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT THAT AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH IS MADE IN THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS SO THAT THE MOMENTUM IS MAINTAINED. AT MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU I STRESSED THE NEED FOR HIM TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS. I HAVE FORMED THE STRONG IMPRESSION, WHICH I THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT TO CONVEY TO YOU, THAT IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE ABLE TO SHOW SOME NEW FLEXIBILITY, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF TERRITORY, THERE WOULD ALSO BE A READINESS ON THE PART OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO RESPOND ON OTHER ISSUES.

I AM THEREFORE WRITING TO ASK YOU AS A FRIEND AND ALLY TO USE YOUR VERY CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE AND STANDING WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN CYPRUS TO EMPHASISE TO MR DENKTASH THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND ESPECIALLY THE NATO COUNTRIES, ATTACH TO EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND TO URGE THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY ON HIM. I AM SURE THIS NEED INVOLVE NO RISK TO THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF HIS COMMUNITY. IT IS A SOURCE OF ANXIETY TO ALL OF US IN THE ALLIANCE THAT SUCH A DANGEROUS SITUATION SHOULD CONTINUE. NONE OF OUR ALLIES IS ABLE TO JUDGE THE VALIDITY OF THIS BETTER THAN YOU.

NOW THAT THE TWO COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION IS THE MOMENT FOR THOSE OF US TRULY INTERESTED IN FINDING A SETTLEMENT TO URGE THEM TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS. I AM SURE YOU ARE UNIQUELY PLACED TO CONVEY THIS SENTIMENT TO MR DENKTASH. I HAVE, AS I SAID ABOVE, ALREADY SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU IN THIS SENSE BUT AM READY TO DO SO AGAIN IN PARALLEL WITH YOUR TAKING ACTION WITH MR DENKTASH. UNQUOTE.

HOWE

LIMITED

SED	MAED	PS/MR. RENTON	ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUT.
UND	NENAD	PS/FUS	CYPRUS
CCD	MED	MR DEREK THOMAS	
LEGAL ADVISERS	NEWS D	MR GOODALL	
DEF D	PUSD	SIR C TICKELL	
CONS D	PLANNING STAFF		
ECD(E)	TRED	MR O'NEILL	
ERD	EED	MR WESTON	
CLAIMS D	SOV D	MR EGERTON	
WED	PS	MR RENWICK	
INFO D	PS/LADY YOUNG	MR J THOMAS	
CRD	PS/MR RIFKIND	MR JENKINS	
APD	PS/MR LUCE	MR BARRINGTON	
NAD		BUCKINGHAM PALACE	

Dear
Cypri
Kyp
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cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 October, 1984

Cyprus: Possible Message to President Evren of Turkey

Thank you for your letter of 9 October enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Evren of Turkey about the next round of proximity talks on Cyprus.

The Prime Minister agrees to send a message. I enclose a copy of a slightly amended version which can be despatched. The thinking behind the addition to the last paragraph is that President Evren may be more encouraged to act with Denktash if he thinks that the Prime Minister will match his efforts by a further approach to Kyprianou (this would be in the form of a message, not a meeting).

C. D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC
 GRS 2 GRS
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NO
 9 INFORMATION IMMEDIATE ATHENS, BONN, NICOSIA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
 10 WASHINGTON
 11 INFORMATION ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK(DS11)
 12 CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE
 13 1. Please convey the following message from the Prime
 14 Minister to President Evren. You should do your utmost
 15 to deliver it personally without delay but, failing that,
 16 you should deliver it at the highest possible level. You
 17 should also try to ensure that Ozal is made aware of our
 18 concerns.
 19 QUOTE
 20 I have been following the progress of the United
 21 Nations Secretary General's current initiative on Cyprus
 22 very closely. ~~and~~ am encouraged that the leaders of both
 23 communities in Cyprus considered that sufficient progress
 24 had been made in the first round of proximity talks in
 25 New York to continue their work on 15 October. I am

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 //
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword convinced
File number	Dept SED	Distribution CYPRUS LIMITED Additional Cyprus
Drafted by (Block capitals) R BARKER		
Telephone number 233-4189		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 2
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1 <<<<
 2 convinced that the Secretary General's mission of good
 3 offices represents the best way forward over Cyprus for
 4 all of us, and particularly for the people of the island.
 5 Our two countries ^{both want} ~~have a common desire~~ to assist the
 6 process.
 7 After the first round I saw President Kyprianou
 8 in London. Your Foreign Minister gave Sir Geoffrey
 9 Howe more information on the Turkish Cypriot position
 10 when they met on 27 September in New York. I understand
 11 their discussions also covered other matters and know that
 12 Sir Geoffrey is very much looking forward to paying a
 13 visit to Ankara before too long to continue these exchanges
 14 over the broad spectrum of our common goals and interests.
 15 From what I understand of the Secretary General's
 16 talks so far, it appears ^{that a} ~~there is a~~ great basis for a
 17 settlement ^{exists.} But it is crucially important that an early
 18 breakthrough is made in the next round of talks so that
 19 the momentum is maintained. At my meeting with President
 20 Kyprianou I stressed the need for him to show flexibility
 21 on constitutional matters. I have formed the strong
 22 impression, which I think it most important to convey to
 23 you, that if the Turkish Cypriots were able to show some
 24 new flexibility, particularly on the question of territory,
 25 there would also be a readiness on the part of the Greek
 26 Cypriots to respond on other issues.
 27 I am therefore writing to ask you as a friend and
 28 ally to use your very considerable influence and standing
 29 with the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus to emphasise
 30 to Mr Denktash the importance that the entire international
 31 community, and especially the NATO countries, attach to
 32 ^{early progress towards a} ~~a peaceful, just and lasting~~ settlement ^{of} to the Cyprus
 33 problem and to urge the necessary flexibility on him. I
 34 am sure this need involve no risk to the essential

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword requirements
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page
3

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1 <<<<

2 requirements of his community. It is a source of anxiety
3 to all of us in the Alliance that such a dangerous situation
4 should continue. None of our allies is able to judge
5 the validity of this better than you.

6 Now that the two community leaders are engaged in
7 discussion is the moment for those of us truly interested
8 in finding a settlement to urge them to redouble their
9 efforts. I am sure you are uniquely placed to convey this
10 sentiment to Mr Denktash. UNQUOTE

12 HOWE

13 NNNN

I have, as I said above,
already spoken to President
Kyprianou in this sense but
am ready to do so again
in parallel with your taking
action with Mr. Denktash.

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NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

The question is whether to use the weapon of a message to Even now, or leave it up for a later stage.

The FCO view is that, without progress in the next round, there won't be a later stage. This is probably right.

I have added at the end the thought that you might send a further message to Kyprianou if Even is disposed to act with Denktash.

CDP 9/x.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 house
dispatched
CDP 2/12
CC MG
SA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1984

*Yes - as you
have amended
it
not
Prime Minister
Agree with message
to President Evren?
CDP
2/12*

Dear Charles,

Cyprus: Possible Message to President Evren of Turkey

Following the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou of Cyprus on 24 September, Sir Geoffrey Howe had discussions in New York with the Turkish Foreign Minister and with the UN Secretary General. As you know, President Kyprianou asked the Prime Minister to consider making an approach to the Turks at the highest level. Sr Perez de Cuellar also asked Sir Geoffrey Howe to appeal to the Turks for flexibility.

Sr Perez de Cuellar has now asked us, through Sir John Thomson in New York, to make a personal appeal to President Evren. He expressed the view that it was the military in Turkey who made the decisions and it was therefore necessary to get through to President Evren if the Turkish side were to agree to make progress. Sr Perez de Cuellar said that he had also approached President Reagan and Mr Genscher in a similar vein.

Before receiving this new appeal from Sr Perez de Cuellar, we had consulted the Americans and Germans as to their own intentions. Like us, they either have taken, or are about to take, action with the Turks calling for flexibility, particularly over territorial concessions. But they do not at present appear to envisage a personal appeal to President Evren.

Notwithstanding the German and American views, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that we should respond positively to Sr Perez de Cuellar's request. The main reasons for this are, first, because we have consistently told him that we stand ready to do what we can to assist his efforts; second, we are inclined to agree that President Evren is best placed in Turkey to bring about progress by influencing Mr Denktash; third, President Evren has already been impressed by the degree of pressure which has been exerted on Turkey, including by ourselves and the Americans, and appears to be considering the possibility of movement.

/I enclose

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
CONFIDENTIAL
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

CONFIDENTIAL



/ I enclose a draft telegram of instructions to the Ambassador at Ankara setting out the text of a personal message from the Prime Minister for delivering to President Evren personally if possible. If the Prime Minister agrees to this, it should be delivered as soon as possible before the next round of Sr Perez de Cuellar's proximity talks, which start on 15 October. We would inform the Germans and Americans of the action we had decided to take. We see no objection to our acting alone in this matter if necessary, bearing in mind our special relationship with Cyprus, but it is possible that our partners will alter their views in the light of our decision.

I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible if the Prime Minister could agree to this course of action.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NO
	9	INFORMATION IMMEDIATE ATHENS, BONN, NICOSIA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
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	15	to deliver it personally without delay but, failing that,
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	17	should also try to ensure that Ozal is made aware of our
	18	concerns.
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	20	I have been following the progress of the United
	21	Nations Secretary General's current initiative on Cyprus
///	22	very closely. and am encouraged that the leaders of both
//	23	communities in Cyprus considered that sufficient progress
/	24	had been made in the first round of proximity talks in
	25	New York to continue their work on 15 October. I am

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword convinced
File number	Dept SED	Distribution CYPRUS LIMITED Additional Cyprus
Drafted by (Block capitals) R BARKER		
Telephone number 233-4189		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

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1 <<<<

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3 offices represents the best way forward over Cyprus for
4 all of us, and particularly for the people of the island.
5 Our two countries ^{both want} ~~have a common desire~~ to assist the
6 process.

7 After the first round I saw President Kyprianou
8 in London. Your Foreign Minister gave Sir Geoffrey
9 Howe more information on the Turkish Cypriot position
10 when they met on 27 September in New York. I understand
11 their discussions also covered other matters and know that
12 Sir Geoffrey is very much looking forward to paying a
13 visit to Ankara before too long to continue these exchanges
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15 From what I understand of the Secretary General's
16 talks so far, it appears ^{that a} ~~there is a~~ real basis for a
17 settlement ^{exists.} But it is crucially important that an early
18 breakthrough is made in the next round of talks so that
19 the momentum is maintained. At my meeting with President
20 Kyprianou I stressed the need for him to show flexibility
21 on constitutional matters. I have formed the strong
22 impression, which I think it most important to convey to
23 you, that if the Turkish Cypriots were able to show some
24 new flexibility, particularly on the question of territory,
25 there would also be a readiness on the part of the Greek
26 Cypriots to respond on other issues.

27 I am therefore writing to ask you as a friend and
28 ally to use your very considerable influence and standing
29 with the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus to emphasise
30 to Mr Denktash the importance that the entire international
31 community, and especially the NATO countries, attach to
32 ^{early progress towards a} ~~a peaceful, just and lasting~~ settlement ^{of} to the Cyprus
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34 am sure this need involve no risk to the essential

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Catchword

requirements

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 3
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1 <<<<
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11
 12 HOWE
 13 NNNN

I have, as I said above, already spoken to President Kyprianou in this sense but am ready to do so again in parallel with your taking action with Mr. Denktash.

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CY: ADVANCED COPIES

14

ADVANCE COPY
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ES
ES/WDI TDDIG
ES/RENTON

ES/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

ES/FUS
MR DEREK THOMAS

D I D CARTER OFFICE

MR JONES

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.....

ED/ED

ED/ED

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

ED/ED

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 270900Z

FM UKNIS NEW YORK 270651Z SEP 84

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 946 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO A: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL:
CYPRUS.

1. WHEN HE SAW PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS AFTERNOON, THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ON 24 SEPTEMBER, SPELLING OUT POINTS 3(A) (POWERS OF FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION): (B) PRESIDENCY/VICE PRESIDENCY): AND (C) (LEGISLATURE) OF YOUR TELNO 488. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TOMORROW AND WOULD TELL HIM THAT THE POSITION OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DID NOT SEEM AS NEGATIVE AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN REPRESENTED TO THE TURKS.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WHO REVEALED THAT KYPRIANOU WAS RETURNING TO NEW YORK TOMORROW TO SEE HIM YET AGAIN, SAID THAT THE THREE POINTS HAD NOW BECOME PART OF KYPRIANOU'S LINE. ON (A) IT WAS STILL PROVING VERY DIFFICULT TO GET INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE

STILL PROVING VERY DIFFICULT TO GET INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE EXACT FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AS OPPOSED TO THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIONS. KYPRIANOU WANTED A LIST WITH NO RESIDUAL PROVISIONS. ON (B) HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENCY PROBLEM WAS PROBABLY SURMOUNTABLE PROVIDED THE VICE-PRESIDENT WAS GIVEN THE RIGHT OF VETO ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. ON (C) HE THOUGHT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT A BICAMERAL SYSTEM WITH A 70/30 PROPORTION IN THE LOWER HOUSE AND 50/50 IN THE UPPER HOUSE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR POINTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD LIKE HIM TO PUT TO HALEFOGLU. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT PRESSURE MUST BE PUT ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS BY THE TURKS NOT TO INSIST ON A VETO POWER ON ALL DECISIONS. IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT DENKTASH SHOW REAL FLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORY. ONLY A FIGURE BELOW 30 PER CENT EVEN 29.5 PER CENT WOULD BE SALEABLE.

PEREZ DE CUELLAR REPEATED THAT HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENSHOER TO MAKE PERSONAL APPEALS TO EVREN FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY. THE TURKS WOULD NEED TO ACCEPT THE RESETTLEMENT OF A DEFINITE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES, EG 80,000 SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN THE SECRETARIAT TELEPHONED LATER TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS FIGURE WAS SENSITIVE - PLEASE PROTECT). SQUARE BRACKET ENDS.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THE ONLY VALID INTERLOCUTOR ON THE TURKISH SIDE WAS PRESIDENT EVREN. PEREZ DE CUELLAR QUOTED GENSHOER AS SAYING THAT EVREN WAS NO LONGER AS POWERFUL AS BEFORE. THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT CONTAINED SOME "VERY TOUGH PEOPLE". BUT IT WAS VITAL THAT "REAL, REAL PRESSURE" BE EXERTED ON BOTH SIDES BEFORE 15 OCTOBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST.

THOMSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

5404 - 1

DD 251400Z UKMIS NEW YORK
OO WASHINGTON
GRS 301

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 251400Z

FM FCO 251130Z SEP 84

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (AND FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 491 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA
FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM JENKINS
YOUR TELNO 895: CYPRUS

1. PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TELEPHONED THE PRIVATE SECRETARY AT NO 10 ON 25 SEPTEMBER, FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THE PREVIOUS DAY.
2. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TELEPHONED FROM NEW YORK TO REPORT THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE READY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON TURKEY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, BY WHICH HE MEANT PRESIDENT EVREN, THERE WAS NO PROSPECT AT ALL OF PROGRESS IN THE PROXIMITY TALKS. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HE WANTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE AWARE OF THIS AND HOPED THAT SHE WOULD TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING HOW TO FOLLOW UP HER TALKS WITH HIM YESTERDAY. IACOVU WOULD BE BRIEFING SIR G HOWE IN THE SAME SENSE. THE POINT HE WANTED TO EMPHASISE WAS THAT ANY APPROACH TO THE TURKS HAD TO BE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.
3. THE PRIVATE SECRETARY UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS ONTO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE SEEING THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK SHORTLY. WE WOULD ALSO BE COMPARING NOTES WITH THE AMERICANS. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD DOUBT LESS WANT TO CONSIDER WHAT MORE, IF ANYTHING, WE COULD USEFULLY DO IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL NO DOUBT FEEL THAT WE WILL NEED TO CONCERT OUR TACTICS FURTHER WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE AMERICANS BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO ADVISE THE PRIME MINISTER TO MAKE AN APPROACH TO PRESIDENT EVREN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5404 - 1

THERE WILL ALSO BE A NUMBER OF OTHER FACTORS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT,
INCLUDING OUR WIDER RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

HOWE

LIMITED

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LEGAL ADVISERS

DEF D

CONS D

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CLAIMS D

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MED

NEWS D

PUSD

PLANNING STAFF

TRED

EED

SOV D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR . RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

SIR C TICKELL

MR O'NEILL

MR WESTON

MR EGERTON

MR RENWICK

MR J THOMAS

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

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FM UKRIS NEW YORK 250602Z SEP 84
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA ANKARA THENS EC POSTS WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

CYPRUS

1. AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S LUNCH WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY THERE WAS A DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS A KEY COUNTRY IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE, COULD DO TO HELP HIM SECURE A CONSTRUCTIVE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. HE HOPED HE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM THE TURKISH SIDE TO BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE IN THE STRONGER POSITION AND IT WAS FOR THEM TO MAKE A GESTURE BY OFFERING TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD BE BALANCED BY CONSTITUTIONAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS. HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HERR GENSCHER TO MAKE PERSONAL APPEALS FOR FLEXIBILITY ON THE TURKISH SIDE. HE WAS MAKING THE SAME REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE DID NOT EXPECT A SOLUTION WITHIN 3 - 4 MONTHS BUT IF SOMETHING COULD BE SALVAGED FROM THE OCTOBER ROUND THIS WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ANY SPECIFIC, LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN MIND. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE TURKISH SIDE MUST GIVE BACK TO THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE GROUND FOR RESETTLEMENT AND FORGET THEIR IDEA OF EQUAL POWER, WHICH WAS A RECIPE FOR TOTAL PARALYSIS. ON THEIR SIDE THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS HAD TO REALISE THAT IT WAS NONSENSE TO GO BACK TO THE 1960 CONSTITUTION.

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4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THESE WERE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS. WERE THERE NO MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVES WHICH COULD BE ACHIEVED? PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT IF THE TURKS COULD HAVE LESS THAN 30 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY, EVEN A TINY BIT LESS, AND IF THERE COULD BE A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITH ENOUGH POWER TO RUN THE COUNTRY, BUT NOT IN THE SAME PROPORTION AS THE POPULATION THESE WOULD BE MORE LIMITED AND ACHIEVABLE OBJECTIVES. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT BOTH SIDES THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MADE ENORMOUS CONCESSIONS. SIR JOHN THOMSON SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A QUALITATIVE CHANGE SINCE TURKISH-CYPRIOU UDI. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THIS WAS WHY HE WAS SEEKING A GLOBAL SOLUTION, WHICH SOMEHOW BY-PASSED UDI.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 877 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ANKARA, PRIORITY ATHENS, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 875: CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

SUMMARY

1. TURKISH AMBASSADOR HAS GIVEN ME A TENDENTIOUS ACCOUNT OF THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS ALLEGED REACTIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S WORKING POINTS. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD PERHAPS USE THIS TO ADVANTAGE WITH KYPRIANOU.

DETAIL

2. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR HAS SENT ME A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT COMPARING THE TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOT REACTIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S WORKING POINTS. THE DOCUMENT PORTRAYS THE GREEK-CYPRIOT REACTIONS IN A POOR LIGHT AND I BELIEVE AT POINTS MISREPRESENTS THEM.

3. THIS IS A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THE GULF OF MISTRUST BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. (THE AMBASSADOR ALSO SENT ME A COPY OF A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY KYPRIANOU ON FRIDAY STATING THAT 'THE COURSE OF THE TALKS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY' AND BLAMING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS - TO WHICH DENKTASH HAD ISSUED A PREDICTABLE REJOINDER.)

4. HOWEVER, THE DOCUMENT PERHAPS GIVES US AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER COULD PUT TO GOOD USE WITH KYPRIANOU. SHE MIGHT TELL KYPRIANOU OF THESE TURKISH REACTIONS AND SEE IF HE COULD BE BROUGHT TO DENY THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOT POSITION IS AS THE TURKS DESCRIBE IT AND TO STATE IT IN MORE FORTH-COMING TERMS, WE (OR

TURKS DESCRIBE IT AND TO STATE IT IN MORE FORTH-COMING TERMS, WE OR PERHAPS BETTER, THE SECRETARY GENERAL) COULD THEN GO BACK TO THE TURKS AND PRESENT THIS TO THEM AS A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREEK-CYPRIOU POSITION (AND ONE WHICH WARRANTED EQUIVALENT NEW TURKISH CYPRIOT INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY).

5. THE DOCUMENT (COPY BY FACSIMILE TO SED) IS LENGTHY AND DOES NOT BEAR REPEATING IN DETAIL. IT IS ENOUGH HERE TO TAKE FROM IT THE FOLLOWING FOUR ALLEGED GREEK-CYPRIOU REACTIONS TO ELEMENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S WORKING POINTS:

(I) WORKING POINT: PROPOSED REOPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT

ALLEGED GREEK-CYPRIOU REACTION: THE GREEK-CYPRIOU POSITION BY BRINGING IN THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY "AMOUNTS TO AN IMPLIED REJECTION"

(II) WORKING POINT: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS TO BE VESTED IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

ALLEGED GREEK-CYPRIOU REACTION: "THE GREEK-CYPRIOU SIDE SEEMS TO REJECT THE SUGGESTION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT A LIST BE DRAWN UP TO SPECIFY THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ... THEY ARE TALKING BOUT DEVOLVING SOME POWERS FROM THE CENTRE RATHER THAN ESTABLISHING A BIZONAL FEDERATION"

(III) WORKING POINT: LEGISLATURE

ALLEGED GREEK-CYPRIOU REACTION: "THE GREEK-CYPRIOU SIDE REJECTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SUGGESTION THAT A BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE BE ENVISAGED"

(IV) WORKING POINT: EXECUTIVE:

ALLEGED GREEK-CYPRIOU REACTION "....THE ROLE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY WILL BE DIMINISHED EVEN COMPARED WITH THE 1960 CONSTITUTION" (THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WILL ALWAYS BE OVERBORNE IN THE EXECUTIVE).

6. THE SECRETARIAT ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE BY NO MEANS "REJECTED" THE PROPOSALS MENTIONED IN

(I) (II) AND (III) ABOVE. THERE SEEMS TO BE GIVE IN THEIR POSITION ON EACH OF THESE POINTS. AS FOR (IV) WHICH IS PERHAPS THE HEART OF THE MATTER, I SUSPECT THAT THE TURKS ARE AGAIN OVERSTATING THE CASE AND THAT KYPRIANOU COULD BE BROUGHT TO SAY SO.

7. IF KYPRIANOU PROVIDED US WITH A HELPFUL AND USABLE RESPONSE ON ANY OF THESE POINTS, IT WOULD BE FOR CONSIDERATION WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT TRY TO FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THIS TO THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER THIS WEEK AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I WOULD LIKE IN ANY CASE TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO PASS ON KYPRIANOU'S REACTION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 866 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1984.
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA
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MY TELNO 853: CYPRUS: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. FIRST ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS CONCLUDED THIS EVENING. THEY WILL RESUME ON 15 OCTOBER. NO PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE. SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS PRIVATELY ASKED THE TWO SIDES TO RETURN PREPARED TO INDICATE CONCESSIONS. HE HAS ALSO URGED THE AMERICANS TO PRESS THE TURKS FOR TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAW KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH AGAIN TODAY (20 SEPTEMBER) TO CONCLUDE THIS ROUND OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS. AFTERWARDS HE ISSUED THE PRESS STATEMENT IN MIFT ANNOUNCING A SECOND ROUND ON 15 OCTOBER (AND IMPLICITLY INDICATING THAT THE PARTIES HAD NOT BUDGED FROM THEIR EXISTING POSITIONS IN THE PRESENT ROUND).
3. SHERRY BRIEFED US AND THE CANADIANS THIS EVENING. HE SHOWED US THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD READ

US THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD READ OUT TO THE TWO LEADERS TODAY ASKING THEM TO DO 'SUBSTANTIVE HOMEWORK' BEFORE 15 OCTOBER AND TO REFLECT ON THEIR POSITIONS. HE URGED THEM WHEN THEY RETURNED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH 'SOLID POLITICAL GUIDANCE' AND TO BE PREPARED TO GIVE 'CONCRETE INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY' IN PARTICULAR AS REGARDS TERRITORY AND THE EXECUTIVE.

4. SHERRY SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD CONTINUED TO INSIST ON AN EQUALITY WHICH MEANT GOVERNMENT ONLY BY CONSENSUS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THEY HAD NOT BALANCED THIS HARD LINE ON CONSTITUTION WITH ANY GIVE ON TERRITORY. THEY HAD ALSO SAID ON DE-MILITARISATION THAT THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN PLACE BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

5. DENKTASH THIS AFTERNOON HAD PRESENTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH A FURTHER PAPER WHICH HAD YET TO BE STUDIED IN DETAIL BUT WHICH AT FIRST GLANCE MIGHT JUST CONTAIN SOME SLIGHT MODULATION OF THESE POSITIONS. IT REFERRED TO THERE BEING A PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT IN TERMS WHICH MIGHT MEAN THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER HAVING A SYMBOLIC PRESIDENCY. IT ALSO REFERRED TO THE POSSIBLE DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES. ON TERRITORY IT SAID THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE WILLING TO MAKE SOME ENLARGEMENT OF THE SIX AREAS ON THEIR 1981 MAP, BUT GAVE NO INDICATION OF HOW MUCH. (KYPRIANOU HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED SUFFICIENT TERRITORY TO RE-SETTLE 36,000 REFUGEES IN VAROSHA AND THE SIX AREAS AND A FURTHER 66,000 ELSEWHERE).

6. SHERRY SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD LEFT THE TALKS VERY GLOOMY. THEY CLEARLY FELT THAT THEY WERE GOING HOME TO FACE THEIR CRITICS, INCLUDING PAPANDREOU, WITH NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE TO SHOW FROM THE TALKS. DENKTASH HAD LEFT AS HE CAME, SITTING PRETTY.

7. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ASKED TO SEE MRS KIRKPATRICK (US) LAST NIGHT. ACCORDING TO THE US MISSION HE TOLD HER THAT THE TALKS HAD NOW GONE AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO AND IT WAS CRITICAL THAT THE TURKISH SIDE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO MAKE MATCHING CONCESSIONS ON CONSTITUTION. UNLESS THE TWO SIDES WERE PREPARED TO SUGGEST THE KIND OF CONCESSIONS WHICH COULD BREAK THE CURRENT DEADLOCK HIS EFFORTS WOULD BE IN DANGER OF COLLAPSING. HE ASKED THE US TO PUT PRESSURE ON TURKEY.

8. I SHALL SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOMORROW AFTERNOON AND WILL SEND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TALKS, INCLUDING HIS VIEWS ON THE WAY AHEAD, IN TIME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ON MONDAY.

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 FM UKHIS NEW YORK 190100Z SEP 64
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 853 OF 19 SEPTEMBER
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 ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 835: CYPRUS: UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE
 SUMMARY ms

1. THE PROXIMITY TALKS FOR THE PAST TWO DAYS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON TERRITORY, LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS PRESSING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO BE SPECIFIC ABOUT FURTHER TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS.

DETAIL

2. SHERRY BRIEFED US AND THE AMERICANS THIS EVENING (18 SEPTEMBER) ON THE LAST TWO DAYS OF TALKS.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MET WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH YESTERDAY. TODAY'S TALKS WERE AT WORKING LEVEL BETWEEN SHERRY AND MAVROMMATIS AND ERTEKUN.

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD DISCUSSED THREE MAIN POINTS WITH THE TWO LEADERS - THE COMPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE, SAFEGAURDS IN THE LEGISLATURE AND ADDITIONAL TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS. SHERRY HAD PURSUED THESE POINTS AT WORKING LEVEL. ON THE EXECUTIVE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE ASKING FOR A FEDERAL COUNCIL. ON THE LEGISLATURE THEY WANTED ALL ISSUES TO HAVE TO PASS BOTH HOUSES AND SEPARATE MAJORITIES FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES FOR CERTAIN KEY ISSUES. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED ONLY THOSE ISSUES WHICH IN THE 1960 CONSTITUTION HAD REQUIRED SEPARATE MAJORITIES TO HAVE TO PASS BOTH HOUSES.

5. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD PRESSED THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO GIVE SPECIFIC INDICATIONS OF WHAT FURTHER TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER BEYOND VAROSHA AND THE SIX AREAS IN THEIR 1961 MAP. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE BEING VERY RESISTANT AND HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONCEDE ANY NEW AREAS NOR TO ENLARGE WHAT THEY HAD OFFERED ON VAROSHA. THEY WERE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT ENLARGING THE OTHER SIX AREAS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ALL SIX OF THEM. THEY ALSO REJECTED USING THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES TO BE RE-SETTLED AS A CRITERIA FOR THE AMOUNT OF TERRITORY REQUIRED, INSISTING INSTEAD ON THE CRITERIA IN POINT 2 OF THE 1977 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT (IE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR PRODUCTIVITY AND LAND OWNERSHIP). SHERRY HAD URGED ERTEKUN STRONGLY TO GIVE AT LEAST SOME FURTHER, IF NECESSARY VAGUE, INDICATION OF WHAT THEY MIGHT OFFER. SHERRY REGARDS THIS AS A KEY POINT BELIEVING THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS IF ONLY THEY CAN BE SURE OF GAINING SUFFICIENT TERRITORY.

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6. SHERRY THOUGHT THAT HE HAD MADE SOME FURTHER PROGRESS WITH ERTEKUN TODAY ON THE MATTER OF DENKTASH'S RIGHT TO DECIDE UNILATERALLY WHETHER THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE OBSERVING THEIR SIDE OF THE BARGAIN. ERTEKUN HAD NOT OBJECTED WHEN SHERRY HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME MECHANISM TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.

7. SHERRY SAID THAT THE SECRETARIAT HAD NOT YET GOT TO THE POINT OF INVOLVING THE TWO SIDES IN A DRAFTING EXERCISE THOUGH THIS COULD COME LATER THIS WEEK. THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF A DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS BUT SHERRY THOUGHT THAT THESE WOULD BE AROUND 10-15 OCTOBER.

8. THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOLD ME TODAY THAT THERE WAS 'NO PROGRESS' TO RECORD IN THE SENSE OF AGREEMENTS. HE WAS, HOWEVER, CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AND WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AT THE END OF DECEMBER. THE BIGGEST DIFFICULTY AT PRESENT WAS TO KNOW WHAT DENKTASH MEANT BY HIS INSISTENCE ON 'POLITICAL EQUALITY'. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR LATER TOLD ME THAT THIS MEANT THAT IN THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION THERE SHOULD BE A LIST OF SUBJECTS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF BOTH COMMUNITIES. THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE SAME LIST AS IN THE 1960 CONSTITUTION.

9. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH ME AT THE END OF THIS WEEK.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 827 OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1984
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MY TELNO 813: CYPRUS: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE TWO SIDES HAVE ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INVITATION TO CONTINUE THE PROXIMITY TALKS FOR A FURTHER WEEK. DISCUSSION FOR THE PAST TWO DAYS HAS CENTERED ON GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND APPARENTLY GONE REASONABLY WELL.

DETAIL

2. SHERRY BRIEFED US AND THE AMERICANS IN CONFIDENCE AGAIN THIS EVENING (13 SEPTEMBER). HE SAID THAT THE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS HAD GONE REASONABLY WELL WITH NEITHER SIDE RAISING MAJOR DIFFICULTIES. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD INVITED BOTH LEADERS TODAY TO CONTINUE THE PROXIMITY TALKS FOR A FURTHER WEEK AND THEY HAD AGREED. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS PLANNING TO PUT OUT A PRESS STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT TOMORROW. SHERRY SHOWED US A DRAFT DESCRIBING THE TALKS TO DATE AS SERIOUS, BUSINESS-LIKE AND CONDUCTED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. IT WOULD ALSO SAY THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO THE HOLDING OF A FURTHER ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS AT A LATER DATE.

TWO SIDES AGREED TO THE HOLDING OF A FURTHER ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS AT A LATER DATE.

3. THE TALKS DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS HAD DEALT WITH QUESTIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN WORKING LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS ON THE QUESTION OF NICOSIA AIRPORT. KYPRIANOU SEEMED TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BECOME THE NEW INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS AND MARK THE END OF UDI. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUMBER OF JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS TO DETERMINE WAYS OF INTERGRATING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS IN VARIOUS AREAS SUCH AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY, JUSTICE ETC. THEY HAD ALSO RAISED NO MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD CONSIST OF 70:30 REPRESENTATION FOR THE LOWER CHAMBER AND 50:50 FOR THE UPPER CHAMBER. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD HOWEVER PROPOSED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE WITH EQUIVALENT SAFEGUARD SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED. THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENCY AND THE SHARING OF EXECUTIVE POWERS, HAD YET TO BE RAISED.

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE CLEAR TO DENKTASH THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE TURKISH-CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE PROCESS AND REVERSE ANY CONCESSIONS IF THEY SHOULD UNILATERALLY DECIDE THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT KEEPING THEIR SIDE OF THE BARGAIN (PARAS 5 AND 6 OF MY TUR). DENKTASH HAD BACKTRACKED A LITTLE WITHOUT GIVING IN ON THE PRINCIPLE.

5. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD TOUCHED ON THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF FURTHER TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT AND OF THE DE-MILITARISATION OF THE REPUBLIC. THESE WOULD BE DISCUSSED MORE FULLY TOMORROW. SHERRY WAS CLEARLY MORE ENCOURAGED BY THE WAY THINGS WERE GOING WHILE REMAINING VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME. HE FELT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE INCREASINGLY CONSCIOUS THAT TIME WAS NOT ON THEIR SIDE AND THE PRESSURE WAS THEREFORE ON THEM TO MAKE THE BEST DEAL THEY COULD BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. THE DANGER WAS THAT DENKTASH CONVERSELY WOULD FEEL UNDER NO PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THE TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD THE U.S. MISSION TODAY THAT HE THOUGHT THEY HAD THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ON THE RUN.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 813 OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1984

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Summary only.
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MY TELNO 811: CYPRUS: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. AS THE PROXIMITY TALKS HAVE STARTED TO TACKLE SUBSTANCE, THE GOING HAS BECOME CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY WITH DENKTASH.

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DETAIL

2. SHERRY BRIEFED US AND THE AMERICANS IN CONFIDENCE THIS EVENING (11 SEPTEMBER) ON THE PROGRESS OF THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS HELD WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS TAKING THE TWO LEADERS THROUGH A 3 PAGE AGENDA CONTAINING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WORKING POINTS WHICH HE HAD PRESENTED TO THE TWO SIDES IN VIENNA. SO FAR HE HAD GOT THROUGH THE FIRST PAGE. THIS HAD INVOLVED FIRSTLY A PRELIMINARY RECOMMITMENT TO THE 3 POINTS (1977 AND 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS, A FEDERAL STATE AND INTRODUCTORY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS) MENTIONED IN MY TUR AND SECONDLY THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SOUGHT THE REACTIONS OF THE LEADERS TODAY TO THE 3 SETS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CONTAINED IN HIS WORKING POINTS.

THESE WERE:

(I) THE RE-SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION OF VAROSHA AND THE 6 ADDITIONAL AREAS DELINEATED ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOT MAP OF 5 AUGUST 1981,

(II) A MORATORIUM ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS TENDING TO PREJUDICE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS, AND

(III) THE RE-OPENING OF NICOSIA'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT UNDER UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

4. KYPRIANOU'S REACTION HAD BEEN TO SAY THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WANTED NOT JUST VAROSHA BUT ALL OF GREEK FAMAGUSTA RETURNED.

HE HAD ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT AGREEING TO THE RE-OPENING OF THE AIRPORT AND HAS PRESSED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXPLAIN WHAT HE HAD IN MIND IN MORE DETAIL. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT A WORKING LEVEL GROUP WOULD BE SET UP TOMORROW TO ALLOW THE SECRETARIAT TO DO THIS. KYPRIANOU HAD ALSO VOICED A MORE GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT A TRANSITIONAL FEDERATION BECOMING THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS (AND BY IMPLICATION THE GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION SURRENDERING AT THAT STAGE ITS INTERNATIONAL

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RECOGNITION).

5. DENKTASH'S REACTION HAD BEEN TO WELCOME THE INCLUSION OF THE RE-OPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT AMONG THE INITIAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, BUT TO SAY THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD ONLY CONSIDER HANDING OVER VAROSHA TO AN INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION AND NOT THE 6 ADDITIONAL AREAS. (SHERRY NOTED THAT THE 6 ADDITIONAL AREAS WERE NEEDED AS A BALANCE TO THE MAJOR GREEK CYPRIOT CONCESSION ON THE AIRPORT). DENKTASH HAD THEN SAID IN RELATION TO A MORATORIUM THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD WISH TO RESERVE THE RIGHT UNILATERALLY TO DECIDE IF AT ANY POINT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD FAILED TO OBSERVE THEIR SIDE OF THE PROPOSED CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. IN THAT CASE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD BE FREE TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE PROCESS AND RE-OCCUPY VAROSHA.

6. SHERRY SAID THAT THIS LAST CONDITION WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE ONE SIDE RESERVE THE RIGHT UNILATERALLY TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WAS JUSTIFIED IN WITHDRAWING FROM THE PROCESS. THE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME JOINTLY ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF IRONING OUT DISAGREEMENTS OVER IMPLEMENTATION.

7. SHERRY IS DECIDEDLY CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS AFTER TODAY'S ROUND AND EXPRESSED QUIET CONCERN ABOUT DENKTASH'S INTENTIONS. THE PLAN IS FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GO THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE AGENDA WITH THE TWO SIDES IN THE COURSE OF THE WEEK. SHERRY EXPECTS THAT THE TALKS WILL FINISH ON FRIDAY, THOUGH THEY COULD BE CARRIED OVER TO THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK IF THIS PROVED ESSENTIAL.

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SIR C TICKELL

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 811 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS BONN ROME UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 605: CYPRUS: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. OPENING OF PROXIMITY TALKS BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH UNDER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUSPICES.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAW KYPRIANOU THIS MORNING AND DENKTASH THIS AFTERNOON FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF EACH. HE WILL BE SEEING BOTH OF THEM AGAIN TOMORROW.

3. NEITHER THE SECRETARIAT NOR THE TWO SIDES ARE MAKING ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ABOUT TODAY'S TALKS. SHERRY TOLD US PRIVATELY THIS EVENING THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN 'NOT BAD' AND THE TWO SIDES 'CO-OPERATIVE'. SO FAR IT HAD BEEN JUST PRELIMINARIES, BUT THE TWO LEADERS HAD ALREADY RE-COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE 1977 AND 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS, TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL STATE AND TO THE INTRODUCTORY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT WERE LARGELY AGREED UPON AT THE 1981/1982 INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS.

4. SHERRY SAID THAT KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN SUBDUED BUT REASONABLE. HE HAD AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT TIME WAS NOT ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' SIDE. SHERRY EMPHASISED TO US THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND GREEKS THAT MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO WAS NO LONGER AN AVAILABLE OPTION FOR THEM.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 777 OF 28 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA THENS NICOSIA BONN WASHINGTON

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CYPRUS: UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. UN SECRETARY GENERAL ASKS FOR UK, U.S. AND FRG INTERVENTION IN ANKARA.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL DREW ME ASIDE AT LUNCH TODAY AND TOLD ME, IN CONFIDENCE, OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD THAT MORNING WITH THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. KIRCA HAD SAID THAT ANKARA WERE LOOKING ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S POINTS FAVOURABLY, AND THAT ANKARA THOUGHT THE TURKISH-CYPRIOTS WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON TO THE SECOND STAGE OF THE INITIATIVE. KIRCA HAD ASKED THAT THE UK, USA AND FRG SHOULD, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS THROUGH THE USUAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN ANKARA.

3. I COMMENTED THAT WE COULD NOT EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE PARTICULAR

3. I COMMENTED THAT WE COULD NOT EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE PARTICULAR POINTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE AS WE HAD NOT SEEN THEM OFFICIALLY: AND THAT WE WERE ALREADY ON RECORD ON MANY OCCASIONS AS GIVING OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED BUT SAID THAT THREE AMBASSADORS OF MAJOR INTERESTED COUNTRIES SPEAKING IN ANKARA IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF HIS INITIATIVE AT THIS JUNCTURE MIGHT HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT. I PROMISED TO PASS THIS REQUEST TO YOU IMMEDIATELY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID HE WOULD BE SPEAKING IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS LATER TODAY.

4. LATER ON, AND IN EVEN MORE WHISPERED TONES, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM A MOST RELIABLE AND VERY HIGH LEVEL SOURCE THAT PAPANDREOU WAS BECOMING MORE PRAGMATIC IN HIS APPROACH TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: AND THAT HE NOW SEEMED TO REALISE THAT IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE FAILED, BLAME WOULD INEVITABLY BE ATTACHED TO GREECE.

5. HEAD OF CHANCERY ALSO RAISED THE SUBJECT WITH URQUHART TODAY. THE LATTER MENTIONED INTER ALIA THAT PRIME MINISTER PALME OF SWEDEN HAD BEEN SPEAKING TO PAPANDREOU WHO HAD APPEARED 'LESS NEGATIVE' ABOUT CYPRUS. IT WOULD SEEM THEREFORE THAT MR PALME IS THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SOURCE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 696 OF 24 JULY 1984

INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA ANKARA ATHENS

INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS ROME WASHINGTON UKDEL STRASBOURG

UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO CBFC

YOUR TELNO 357: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. UN SECRETARY GENERAL EXPLAINED HIS APPROACH TO FORTHCOMING TALKS IN VIENNA. HE DOES NOT INTEND TO PUT FORWARD A PIECE OF PAPER BUT HOPES TO ESTABLISH WORKING HYPOTHESES ON WHICH IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD. HE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY ASSISTANCE FROM US AT THIS STAGE.

DETAIL

2. MY CALL TODAY, 24 JULY, ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DISCUSS THE FALKLANDS (REPORTED SEPARATELY) GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HIM PERSONALLY FOR AN UP TO DATE ACCOUNT OF HIS THINKING ON CYPRUS.

3. I SAID THAT WE JUDGED THAT HIS EFFORTS WERE THE ONLY ONES THAT STOOD A CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AN IDEA OF HOW HIS MIND WAS WORKING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HIS INTENTION IN VIENNA WOULD BE TO SPEND TWO DAYS WORKING SEPARATELY WITH IACOVOU (IN THE MORNING) AND ERTEKUN (IN THE AFTERNOON). HE DID NOT INTEND TO GIVE EITHER OF THEM ANY PIECE OF PAPER BUT TO GET

NOT INTEND TO GIVE EITHER OF THEM ANY PIECE OF PAPER BUT TO GET INTO A DRAFTING EXERCISE WITH EACH OF THEM. BY WORKING WITH THEM QUIETLY IN THIS WAY HE HOPED IT WOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE FOR EITHER OF THEM TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD MADE SUCH AND SUCH A PROPOSAL AND THEN REJECT IT. HE ENVISAGED GIVING THE TWO PARTIES TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO SEE WHETHER THE GROUND EXISTED FOR A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH HE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF AGREED POINTS OR WORKING HYPOTHESES. WORK ON THE DETAIL COULD BE RESUMED IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS OR ANY OTHER SUITABLE MECHANISM.

4. I SAID THAT THIS APPROACH SEEMED ADMIRABLE. I WONDERED WHETHER THE HYPOTHESES WOULD DEAL WITH GENERAL ISSUES SUCH AS TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION OR SPECIFICS SUCH AS VAROSHA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MIXTURE OF THE TWO. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO GET SOMETHING ON VAROSHA AND SOME CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HIS ASPIRATION, WHICH HE ADMITTED MIGHT PROVE OPTIMISTIC, WAS THAT WITHIN SIX MONTHS OR SO THERE MIGHT BE SOME KIND OF "VERY WEAK, VAGUE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT". THIS WOULD HAVE TO START AS SOMETHING RATHER EMBRYONIC TO WHICH MORE AND MORE FUNCTIONS COULD BE ADDED. BUT IT WOULD GET OVER THE PROBLEM OF THE CREEPING CONSOLIDATION OF UDI.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ACTION THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO TAKE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS AN OPEN MIND ON BOTH SIDES. BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMIT US AND THE AMERICANS (WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS VERY MUCH DISTRUSTED BY BOTH PARTIES) TOO MUCH TO HIS FIRST EFFORTS WHICH HE WOULD PREFER TO PRESENT AS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT ONES OF HIS OWN THOUGH ENJOYING THE GENERAL BACKING OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS. AT A LATER STAGE HE MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, ASK FOR HELP ON A SPECIFIC POINT. I SAID WE WOULD STAND BY.

6. IN THE COURSE OF THE ACCOUNT HE GAVE ME OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOE (REPORTED SEPARATELY) PEREZ DE CUELLAR STRESSED HOW STRUCK HE HAD BEEN BY THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT WHICH GROMYKO HAD EXPRESSED FOR HIS EFFORTS ON CYPRUS. IN AN IMPROVISED SPEECH GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN OF THE NEED TO GIVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL "AUTHORITY AND BACKING". I SAID THAT I THOUGHT OUR SUPPORT WAS PERHAPS MORE SINCERE. IT HAD BEEN THE RUSSIANS AFTER ALL WHO TORPEDOED HIS ATTEMPT TO SET UP FIVE POWER ACTION DURING THE LAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON CYPRUS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE NEVERTHELESS EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO EXERT THE NECESSARY PRESSURE ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THROUGH PAPAIA-
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FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

12 July 1984: London

Personal & Secret/ Cyprus Neutral Group/ CIR 10/ Copy No X

Without seeking to involve you or HMG in our plans for a Cyprus Initiative, I would like you to know that we are making progress.

2. In Vienna last week, Swiss ex-Ambassador Auguste Lindt (Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Austrian ex-Ambassador Dr Ludwig Steiner MP (People's Party International Affairs Spokesman), with Mr Christopher Terry as prospective Administrator in attendance, agreed with me to set up the unofficial Cyprus Neutral Initiative with an inner Fact-Finding Team of us three, backed-up by a Consultative Group of personalities from Canada, Ireland, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia with the approval, but not participation, of their respective governments.
3. Members of the Group would join the Team as required by circumstances or the parties with whom we were in discussion: i.e. a retired Pakistani Genral with the Turks (particularly the Turkish Military), a senior Yugoslav with the Cypriot Left (AKEL), etc.
4. We decided, reluctantly, to wait until the UN Secretary General's current efforts end (in failure, as we think), notwithstanding the dangers inherent in further delay.
5. Nevertheless, I will go to Cyprus on 26 July to suggest that the two Communities should invite us to hear their respective cases, as soon as we are ready to start: probably in September.
6. I am rather confident that we will get a result, with patience and persistence. We don't want to take longer than three months.
7. We do, however, still have a problem of finance. A modest sum to cover the expenses of the participants is all that is needed: chicken-feed compared to the cost of UNFICYP. All suggestions will be gratefully received.
8. We are inviting the participants to write to me indicating agreement.

Yours ever
Francis

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1432</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Powell to Appleyard dated 2 July 1984</i>	
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 667 OF 29 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, CBF

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STRASBOURG

YOUR TELNO 186 TO NICOSIA: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL DETERMINED TO RUN WITH THE CYPRUS BALL HIMSELF, THOUGH NOT UNTIL AFTER 20 JULY. APPROACH WILL BE COMPREHENSIVE NOT PARTIAL BUT VAROSHA MAY BE SINGLED OUT. HE DOES NOT EXCLUDE A VISIT TO CYPRUS.

DETAIL

2. AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL LEAVES TOMORROW FOR A LENGTHY OVERSEAS TRIP THAT WILL KEEP HIM OUT OF NEW YORK UNTIL 19 JULY I ASKED TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING TO TALK ABOUT CYPRUS THOUGH THIS HAD TO BE IN ADVANCE OF YOUR REACTION TO MY TELNO 651 (NOT TO ALL).

3. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS BUT IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF MANY COMMUNICATIONS BOTH FROM AND TO MY CAPITAL. HE HAD SAID HE WANTED TO INVOKE THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UK AND THE US (AND THE RUSSIANS, HE INTERJECTED, BECAUSE OF THEIR LEVERAGE IN NICOSIA). WE WERE VERY KEEN TO COOPERATE WITH HIM. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE INITIATIVE MUST BE HIS AND WE DID NOT WISH TO BE TOO VISIBLE. BUT WE DID WANT TO GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE SUPPORT. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO HAVE HIS TIMETABLE SO THAT WE COULD GEAR OUR APPROACHES TO THE PARTIES TO HIS PROGRAMME.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HIS PLAN WAS TO PUT FORWARD HIS PROPOSALS AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST. THIS WAS LATER THAN HE WOULD HAVE WISHED ('WE HAVE TO RUSH') BUT THERE WAS NO POINT IN DOING ANYTHING BEFORE THE 20 JULY ANNIVERSARY OF THE TURKISH INVASION. ONCE THAT DUST HAD SETTLED HE INTENDED TO SEND MESSAGES TO KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. IF THEIR REACTION WAS SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRUCTIVE HE MIGHT INVITE THEM TO MEET HIM IN PROXIMITY TALKS IN VIENNA (WHERE HE WILL BE AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST FOR THE MEETING OF UNIDO). IF THERE WAS ENOUGH PROGRESS HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO AT A LATER STAGE TO CYPRUS FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A COMMON DECLARATION ON SOME BASIC POINTS (THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THIS SOUNDED LIKE 'A KIND OF DREAM'). HE HAD IN MIND TO PUT FORWARD VERY CONCRETE IDEAS IN TERRITORY AND THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT TRYING TO COVER EVERYTHING.

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5. I SAID THAT HIS THINKING APPEARED TO BE CLOSE TO OURS. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PREVENT THINGS GETTING WORSE. IT WAS FRUITLESS TO TRY TO OBTAIN PROMISES FROM ONE SIDE TO ABSTAIN FROM CONSOLIDATING UDI AND THE OTHER TO ABSTAIN FROM REVERTING TO INTERNATIONALISM. BUT HE COULD SAY THAT HE WAS CONDUCTING HIS GOOD OFFICES IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD SO ABSTAIN. WE THOUGHT THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED GENTLY STARTING WITH THINGS THEY BOTH ACCEPTED, EG THAT THE OUTCOME SHOULD BE A FEDERAL CYPRUS, EDGING OUT FROM THIS TO TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. IT WAS VITAL THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REJECT HIS IDEAS STRAIGHT OFF. ACCORDINGLY HE SHOULD BUILD FROM SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS TO DETAILED PROPOSALS FEELING HIS WAY ABOUT WHICH POINTS TO CONCENTRATE UPON AT ANY GIVEN TIME. BUT THERE WAS NOT A LOT OF TIME BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RECOGNISED THIS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL ON BOTH TIMING AND SUBSTANCE. HE WANTED TO CONSULT THE PARTIES WITHOUT PROVOKING EXTREME COUNTER PROPOSALS. THE FIRST GREAT DIFFICULTY WAS THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRE-CONDITION ABOUT THE REVERSAL OF UDI. HE HAD THE FEELING THAT THERE WERE SOME ELEMENTS ON THE GREEK SIDE, ON BOTH EXTREME LEFT AND EXTREME RIGHT, TRYING TO UNDERMINE HIS PROPOSALS EVEN BEFORE KNOWING WHAT THEY WERE. THE ONLY SUPPORT HE COULD EXPECT WAS FROM THE MODERATE LEFT AND MODERATE RIGHT. BUT HE WOULD TRY TO GET SOMETHING ON VAROSHA IN WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE VERY INTERESTED AND TO WHICH THE ERTEKUN PAPER HAD REFERRED.

7. I ASKED HIM TO TELL US WHEN IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE AND/OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR US TO INTERVENE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ONCE HE PRESENTED HIS PROPOSALS HE MIGHT NEED OUR ASSISTANCE TO HELP PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO REACT POSITIVELY TO THEM. "YOU ARE THE MOST HELPFUL COUNTRY TO US ON CYPRUS".

8. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MANAGE ALL THIS HIMSELF. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT IN ORDER TO DRAMATISE HIS INVOLVEMENT HE WANTED TO BE BOTH AUTHOR AND ACTOR AT LEAST IN THE EARLY STAGES. THEREAFTER HE WOULD APPOINT A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. I COMMENTED THAT HOLGER APPEARED TO BE DOING WELL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED BUT SAID THAT AN ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE REAL THING.

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9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS SHOWING ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF ROBUSTNESS ON THE ISSUE. BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT HE WILL TRY TO GO TOO FAR TOO FAST. HE WILL NEED TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO FRIGHTEN ONE OR OTHER OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES OFF BY BEING TOO PRECISE ON TOO MANY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AT THE BEGINNING.

10. I ASKED MY HEAD OF CHANCERY TO REINFORCE THIS POINT WITH PICCO SUBSEQUENTLY. PICCO TOLD GORE-BOOTH THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO FIND THE RIGHT MIX OF GENERALITIES AND SPECIFICS. HIS REFERENCE TO CONCRETE IDEAS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT HIS PROPOSALS WOULD BE SET IN CONCRETE AT THE OPENING STAGE. THIS WOULD BE A 'PRISE DE CONTACT' AND WOULD BE COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS. THE CONCRETE WOULD BE POURED IN AS HE WENT ALONG. PICCO EMPHASISED THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS WORKING ON THE PROPOSALS HIMSELF AND WOULD BE DEVOTING HIMSELF TO THEM AS MUCH AS HE COULD DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP (ON WHICH PICCO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING HIM).

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1432</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Appleyard to Powell dated 27 June 1984</i>	
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FM UKNIS NEW YORK 192323Z JUN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 639 OF 19 JUNE 1984

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MY TELNOS 628-631: CYPRUS

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SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL SAW ERTEKUN AGAIN THIS MORNING (19 JUNE). SHERRY HAS SHOWN US A SUMMARY OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS BUT SAYS NO DECISION TAKEN YET ON WHETHER TO GIVE THEM TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. THE SECRETARY GENERALS FORTHCOMING INITIATIVE STILL IN EMBRYONIC FORM. SHERRY INTERESTED TO HAVE OUR ADVICE.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW ERTEKUN FOR A SECOND TIME FOR HALF AN HOUR THIS MORNING. SHERRY TOLD US SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE MEETING HAD NOT ADDED MUCH. ERTEKUN HAD NOT ENLARGED ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS. HE HAD RESISTED GIVING ANY INDICATION THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE PREPARED TO FREEZE UDI. USING THE ANALOGY (WHICH HE ALSO USED WITH ME) OF A PLANE ONCE AIRBORNE HAVING TO GO THROUGH WITH ITS FLIGHT, HE GAVE THE STRONG IMPRESSION THA THEY INTENDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS, THOUGH HE DID UNDERTAKE TO REPORT TO DENKTASH THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD

HE ALSO USED WITH ME) OF A PLANE ONCE AIRBORNE HAVING TO GO THROUGH WITH ITS FLIGHT, HE GAVE THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THEY INTENDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS, THOUGH HE DID UNDERTAKE TO REPORT TO DENKTASH THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD APPRECIATE AN APPLICATION OF THE BRAKES IN ORDER TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE PRESENTATION OF HIS OWN PROPOSALS.

3. SHERRY SHOWED US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE HIS SUMMARY OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS. THIS CORRESPONDED CLOSELY TO THE ACCOUNT IN MY TELNO 630 WHICH WE RECEIVED FROM THE US MISSION. THE LAST PROPOSAL ABOUT A SUMMIT MEETING WAS HOWEVER SOMEWHAT MORE DETAILED IN SHERRYS SUMMARY (WHICH IS ITSELF AN ABBREVIATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROPOSALS). IT STATES THAT ALL THE SUBJECTS OF THE PROPOSALS ARE TO BE TAKEN AS IN "INTER-RELATED WHOLE" AND THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD ATTEND A SUMMIT IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL DEEMED IT APPROPRIATE IN ORDER TO "FINALISE" THESE SUBJECT AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE EXISTING STATUS OF THE TWO SIDES. SHERRY SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE TURKISH MEANT BY THE WORD "FINALISE" IN THIS CONTEXT. ON A SEPARATE POINT THE SECRETARIAT WERE INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE DELIBERATE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT AND THE FINAL REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECTS OF THE PROPOSALS BEING AN "INTER-RELATED WHOLE" WERE INTENDED TO AVOID TREATING VAROSHA AS A PRIORITY.

4. SHERRY NOTED THAT THE PROPOSALS SOUGHT THREE CONCESSIONS FROM THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, ON THE RE-OPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT, ON THE LIFTING OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO AND ON FOREGOING INTERNATIONALISATION. BUT THEY MADE NO IMMEDIATE CONCESSION IN RETURN. IN PARTICULAR THEY MADE NO MENTION OF ANY MOVE TOWARDS FREEZING UDI. HE FEARED THAT IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL SIMPLY HANDED THE PROPOSALS OVER TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THE LATTER WOULD REJECT THEM OUT OF HAND AS CONTAINING NOTHING NEW, (THE SECRETARY GENERAL MADE MUCH THE SAME POINT TO ME WHEN I SAW HIM HERE TODAY ON ANOTHER SUBJECT). AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESIST THEIR DEMANDS TO SEE THE PROPOSALS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE SEEING THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR BUT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN AS TO HOW HE WOULD DESCRIBE THE PROPOSALS TO HIM. SHERRYS INCLINATION WAS TO RECOMMEND THAT HE SHOULD DESCRIBE THEM ONLY IN TERMS OF SUBJECT HEADINGS AND NOT GO INTO DETAIL. HE MIGHT SUGGEST TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN RETURN MIGHT WISH TO MAKE CONFIDENTIAL PROPOSALS TO HIM UNDER THESE (AND OTHER) HEADINGS.

5. SHERRY SAID THAT HE WAS NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO PREPARING THE SECRETARY GENERALS PROMISED FORTHCOMING INITIATIVE. (HE IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED TO PREPARE THE DRAFT FOR THIS AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOLD ME THAT HE HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATORY WORK TO BE ACCELERATED). HE WOULD BE WORKING ON IT OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. HIS OWN THINKING WAS STILL AT AN EMBRYONIC STAGE. HE ASSUMED THAT THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL STATES AS INDICATED IN THE SECRETARY GENERALS REPORT OF 1 JUNE. HIS INITIAL THOUGHT WAS THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO HAVE A WEAK FEDERAL SYSTEM. THIS WOULD SUIT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. IT WOULD ALSO BE BETTER FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THAN A STRONG FEDERAL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE VETO POWERS AND

BE BETTER FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THAN A STRONG FEDERAL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE VETO POWERS AND THEREBY INCREASED INFLUENCE OVER GREEK CYPRIOT AFFAIRS. WE ASKED WHAT HE HAD IN MIND FOR VAROSHA. SHERRY SAID THAT HE HAD ALWAYS FAVOURED TRYING TO MAKE EARLY PROGRESS OVER VAROSHA AND WAS A LONG TIME PROPONENT OF THE MMF PACKAGE. BUT HE WAS FEELING VERY DISCOURAGED ON THE SUBJECT. WE TOLD HIM OF THE IMPRESSION RECEIVED DURING SIR P RHODES VISIT TO ANKARA THAT THE TURKS MIGHT STILL BE FORTHCOMING ON VAROSHA (ANKARA TELNO 278). SHERRY WAS INTERESTED BY THIS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL FOR ANY VIEWS OR IDEAS WHICH WE MIGHT BE WILLING TO FEED IN TO HIM WHILE HE WAS PREPARING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

COMMENT

6. FOR THE TIME-BEING, AND ESPECIALLY UNTIL WE KNOW HOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL DESCRIBES THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, WE SHOULD NOT REVEAL OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPOSALS. AT A LUNCH WHICH THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR GAVE FOR ME AND MY GREEK COLLEAGUE TODAY, THE LATTER PRODUCED A PARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH HE CLAIMED CAME FROM A "TURKISH" SOURCE. I DECLINED TO BE DRAWN ON WHAT WE KNEW ABOUT THEM.

7. WE CAN, HOWEVER, MAKE GOOD USE OF THE FACT THAT ERTEKUN HAS TOLD THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND ME THAT THE PROPOSALS ARE NOT ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS BUT THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE OPEN TO COUNTER PROPOSALS. I URGED MY CYPRIOT COLLEAGUE TO VIEW THE FACT OF THE PROPOSALS AS A POSSIBLE IMPORTANT NEW OPENING. I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNWISE NOT TO REACT TO SUCH AN OPENING SINCE THE OVERALL SITUATION WAS MOVING AGAINST THEM. I ASCRIBED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT MOVE TO DOVISH INFLUENCES IN ANKARA AND TO THE EFFECT OF US/UK/FRG REPRESENTATION THERE. MOUSHOUTAS SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT NOT TO ENTER INTO INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO MAINTAIN THIS POSITION ONCE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS BECAME A POSSIBILITY.

8. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST NOW URGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AS ABOVE TO MAKE THE MOST OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FORTHCOMING INITIATIVE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPEATED TO ME THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO NEED OUR ASSISTANCE. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER IN RESPONSE TO SHERRY'S INVITATION WHETHER WE HAVE ANY ADVICE TO OFFER THE SECRETARIAT ON THE FORM AND/OR CONTENT OF THE INITIATIVE. WE SHALL WANT TO GEAR ANY ACTION WE TAKE WITH THE PARTIES TO THE STATE OF PLAY ON THIS (THE SECRETARY GENERAL WARNED ME THAT BECAUSE OF HIS PROGRAMME IN EARLY JULY HE IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO RUN WITH THE BALL HIMSELF UNTIL THE SECOND HALF OF JULY).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

THOMSON

NNNN

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

PS (6)

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/ME WELBY

PS/FUS

PS/J BULLARD

PS/STUBBS

.....
.....

PS/SD

PS/USD

DEP AD/PUSD (2)

PS/NEWS D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

PS/Ed. 10 DOWNING STREET
D I O CANTON OFFICE

FM NICOSIA 151012Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 316 OF 15 JUNE 84.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON,

MODUK (DSC AND DS11) AND CBFC.

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, ROME.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CYPRUS PROBLEM.

SUMMARY.

KYPRIANOU PRODDER TO SHOW SOME APPRECIATION OF HMG'S EFFORTS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. HE HOPES TO HAVE OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM NEW YORK ABOUT DENKTASH'S NEW PROPOSALS IN TIME FOR HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 18 JUNE.

1. WHEN KYPRIANOU RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING, I TOLD HIM, WITH REFERENCE TO STATEMENTS BY GREEK CYPRIOT SPOKESMEN THAT BRITAIN HAD NOT BEEN DOING ENOUGH, THAT YOU HAD TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY THE APPARENT DANGERS IN MAY OF TURKISH ACTIONS OVER VAROSHA AND UNFICYP MAKING THE SITUATION DISTINCTLY WORSE IN THE ISLAND AND THAT IN ADDITION TO OTHER REPRESENTATIONS IN ANKARA YOU YOURSELF HAD TWICE RAISED THESE ISSUES WITH YOUR TURKISH COLLEAGUE. I SAID THAT, IF NOW (AS APPEARED) THE TURKISH SIDE SEEMED TO BE STEPPING BACK FROM UNHELPFUL ACTION OVER VAROSHA AND UNFICYP, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD FEEL SOME SATISFACTION FOR THE EFFORT WE HAD

GOVERNMENT COULD FEEL SOME SATISFACTION FOR THE EFFORT WE HAD EXPENDED. KYPRIANOU TOOK NOTE AND CONCEDED THAT THESE WERE GOOD ELEMENTS, THOUGH ONLY A MATTER OF THE TURKS REFRAINING FROM FURTHER WRONG ACTION. WHETHER HE WILL ACTUALLY BRING HIMSELF TO EXPRESS ANY GRATITUDE WHEN HE SEES THE PRIME MINISTER, I DO NOT KNOW.

3. IN ANSWER TO MY ENQUIRY KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE OBTAINED SOME DETAILS FROM NEW YORK OF DENKTASH'S NEW PROPOSALS IN TIME TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THEM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 18 JUNE. HE REMARKED THAT, IF THERE PROVED TO BE ROOM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO RESUME CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TWO SIDES, IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIS TIME THEY SHOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. PUBLIC NEGOTIATION WAS IMPOSSIBLE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT, JUDGING BY HIS ATTITUDE OVER PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INDICATORS LAST AUTUMN, DENKTASH WOULD AGREE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND THAT I WOULD PURSUE THIS POINT WITH HIM WHEN, AS I INTENDED, I SAW HIM AFTER HIS RETURN FROM ANKARA. KYPRIANOU DID NOT REACT AT ALL AGAINST MY INTENTION TO DO THIS.

4. KYPRIANOU CONFIRMED THAT HE EXPECTED HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONCENTRATE ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM THOUGH IN THAT CONTEXT HE MIGHT "TOUCH ON" EC MATTERS, PRESUMABLY MEANING THE QUESTION OF OUR CONTINUING TO GIVE PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO TURKISH CYPRIOT EXPORTS (ABOUT WHICH IACOVOU HAS AGAIN BEEN COMPLAINING PUBLICLY). KYPRIANOU DID NOT HOWEVER GO INTO THIS SUBJECT WITH ME BUT ONLY COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SLOWNESS OF THE COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF PROGRESS TOWARDS CUSTOM UNION.

5. KYPRIANOU ALSO CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD HAVE A MEETING IN LONDON ON 19 JUNE WITH THE COMMONWEALTH ACTION GROUP (SOME OF WHOSE MINISTERS HE APPARENTLY EXPECTED TO BE THERE). HE ALSO TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD ARRANGED A PRIVATE MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON. HE WILL RETURN HERE ON 21 JUNE.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAYING ADDRESSEES.

WILBERFORCE

BT

PP MODUR

MASTER
OPS

file

RM



cc FO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 May, 1984

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 8514.**

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 2 May about the UN Security Council debate on Cyprus which has just finished.

Like you we recognised that the debate was of great importance for the future of Cyprus and for the welfare of all its people. We also had very much in mind the historical links to which you drew our attention in your letter.

We followed the course of the debate with the closest attention. I am glad that the resolution which was adopted, and for which we voted, endorsed the UN Secretary-General's mandate to pursue his mission of good offices. We continue to believe that he is best placed to make progress towards the peaceful, just and lasting settlement in Cyprus that we all so much want. We shall continue to give him our full support and I feel sure that you will do the same.

Looking to the future I very much hope that all who are in a position to affect the destiny of Cyprus and the welfare of its people will show the determination required to make a positive contribution towards the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

/I hope

ECL

I hope also that all parties will avoid actions which could give rise to new tensions in Cyprus and make the Secretary-General's task more difficult. We will continue to play our part in this.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Andreas Papandreou

OPS
MASTER

file

RM



cc FO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 May, 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T84/84

Dear Mr. President:

I was most grateful for your letter of 19 April. It was helpful to have your views at the beginning of the Security Council debate. We had these very much in mind as the debate progressed. I am glad that we were able to vote in favour of the resolution which you supported.

As you will know from the explanation of vote given by our representative in New York the resolution did cause us some difficulties. But we thought it right to vote for it in response to the developments that precipitated the debate. We particularly welcomed the fact that the resolution endorsed the UN Secretary-General's mandate to pursue his mission of good offices. We continue to believe that he is best placed to make progress towards the peaceful, just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem that we all so much want. We will continue to give him our full support and I know that you will do the same.

There will be a need, in the days ahead, for statesmanship and understanding, which may often mean having to show restraint in the face of frustration and disappointment. We shall continue to play a constructive role in the search for a solution which will restore to the people of Cyprus the tranquillity they desire.

Yours sincerely

His Excellency Mr. Spyros Kyprianou

Margaret Thatcher

ECL

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type letters pl.

17 May 1984

RR 12/5.

John John

Cyprus: Replies to Messages from the President of Cyprus
and the Prime Minister of Greece

Now that the UN Security Council debate on Cyprus is finished, I enclose draft letters for the Prime Minister's signature to President Kyprianou and Mr Papandreou. These are in reply to a message from President Kyprianou contained in Nicosia telno 189, to which the Prime Minister sent an interim reply in our telno 99 to Nicosia, and to a letter from Mr Papandreou enclosed with your letter of 3 May. You will recall that you decided against sending an interim reply to this letter.

The drafts are largely self-explanatory. They focus on two major points, our support for the UN Secretary-General and the need not to exacerbate the situation in the coming months. There is a risk that President Kyprianou will not act with restraint in the face of further possible Turkish Cypriot provocations such as the publication of a draft constitution, the resettlement of part of Varosha, or interference with the work of UNFICYP. Papandreou is even less likely to act with restraint in view of his general tendency to make the most of disputes with Turkey.

Papandreou's letter suggests that the Cyprus problem should be the 'touchstone' for relations between the UK and Greece as well as Cyprus and 'Hellenism in its broader sense'. We cannot accept this any more than that the Turks should make Cyprus the 'litmus test' for relations with them as they have in turn suggested. The draft reply to Papandreou accordingly implies that the correct approach to the Cyprus problem should be one of the concern for the welfare of all the people of the island.

John Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CYPRUS PT 2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Blair

London SW1A 1AA



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

His Excellency
 President Spyros Kyprianou
 President of the Republic of Cyprus

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

As promised in my message of 1 May, I am replying to your letter of 19 April about the situation in Cyprus.

CAVEAT.....


I was most grateful for your letter and it was helpful that you set out your views so fully at the beginning of the Security Council debate. We had these very much in mind as the debate progressed in New York. I am glad that we were able to vote in favour of the resolution which you supported.

As you will know from the ~~E~~Explanation of ~~the~~ vote given by our representative in New York the resolution did cause us some difficulties. But we thought it right to vote for it in response to the developments that precipitated the debate. We particularly welcomed the fact that the resolution endorsed the UN Secretary-General's mandate to pursue his mission of good offices. We continue to believe he is best placed to make progress towards the peaceful, just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem that we all so much want. We will continue to give him our full support and I know that you will do the same.

Enclosures-flag(s).....

In the days ahead I am confident that you

that you will continue to act with statesmanship
and understanding, which may often mean having to show
restraint in the face of frustration and
disappointment. We will continue to play a
constructive role in the search for a solution
which will restore^{to} the people of Cyprus the
tranquillity they desire.

 $\frac{17}{5}$

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
His Excellency
Mr Andreas Papandreou
Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 2 May about the UN Security Council debate on Cyprus which has just finished.

CAVEAT.....

Like you we recognised ^{that} the debate ^{was of} ~~as a matter~~ of great importance for the future of Cyprus and for the welfare of all its people. We also had very much in mind the historical links to which you drew our attention in your letter.

We followed the course of the debate with the closest attention. I am glad that the resolution which was adopted, and for which we voted, endorsed the UN Secretary-General's mandate to pursue his mission of good offices. We continue to believe that he is best placed to make progress towards the peaceful, just and lasting settlement in Cyprus that we all so much want. We shall continue to give him our full support and I feel sure that you will do the same.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Looking to the future I very much hope that all who are in a position to affect the destiny of Cyprus

and the welfare of its people will show the determination required to make a positive contribution towards the settlement of the Cyprus problem. I hope also that all parties will avoid actions which could give rise to new tensions in Cyprus and make the Secretary-General's task more difficult. We will continue to play our part in this.

17 MAY 1984
AOL 17/5

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WEINBERG
PS/FUS
SIR J. BULLARD
MR J. JONES

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET
D I O CABINET OFFICE

ED/SD
ED/UND
DEP HD/PUSD (2)
ED/NEWS D
PRESIDENT CYPUS

*Prime Minister
12.5.84*

and

IMMEDIATE

RR CBFC

GRS 700
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 121000Z FCO
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120120Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 487 OF 11 MAY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA,
PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL STRASBOURG
ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO CBFC.

ADVANCE COPY

MIPT: CYPRUS: SECURITY COUNCIL
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RESOLUTION 550 OF 11 MAY

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING CONSIDERED THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

TAKING NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/16519),

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983) AND 544 (1983),

DEEPLY REGRETTING THE NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTION 541 (1983),

GRAVELY CONCERNED BY THE FURTHER SECESSIONIST ACTS IN THE OCCUPIED PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WHICH ARE IN

~~OCCUPIED PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WHICH ARE IN~~
VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION 541 (1983), NAMELY, THE PURPORTED
"EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS" BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE LEGALLY INVALID
"TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS" AND THE CONTEMPLATED HOLDING
OF A "CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM" AND "ELECTIONS", AS WELL AS
BY OTHER ACTIONS OR THREATS OF ACTIONS AIMED AT FURTHER
CONSOLIDATING THE PURPORTED INDEPENDENT STATE AND
THE DIVISION OF CYPRUS,

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY RECENT THREATS FOR SETTLEMENT OF VAROSHA
BY PEOPLE OTHER THAN ITS INHABITANTS,

REAFFIRMING ITS CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE
KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS,

1. REAFFIRMS ITS RESOLUTION 541 (1983) AND CALLS FOR ITS URGENT
AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION;

2. CONDEMNS ALL SECESSIONIST ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE PURPORTED
EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT
LEADERSHIP, DECALRES THEM ILLEGAL AND INVALID AND CALLS FOR
THEIR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL;

3. REITERATES THE CALL UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECOGNISE THE
PURPORTED STATE OF THE "TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS" SET
UP BY SECESSIONIST ACTS AND CALLS UPON THEM NOT TO FACILITATE OR IN
ANY WAY ASSIST THE AFORESAID SECESSIONIST ENTITY;

4. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CYPRUS;

5. CONSIDERS ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE ANY PART OF VAROSHA
BY PEOPLE OTHER THAN ITS INHABITANTS AND INADMISSABLE AND CALLS FOR
THE TRANSFER OF THIS AREA TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS;

6. CONSIDERS ANY ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE WITH THE STATUS OR THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS
AS CONTRARY TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROMOTE THE URGENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541 (1983);

8. REAFFIRMS ITS MANDATE OF GOOD OFFICES GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY
GENERAL AND REQUESTS HIM TO UNDERTAKE NEW EFFORTS TO ATTAIN AN
OVERALL SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS
FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN IN THE PERTINENT UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541 (1983),
AND THE PRESENT RESOLUTION;

9. CALLS UPON ALL PARTIES TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL IN HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES;

~~10. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE SITUATION WITH A VIEW TO~~

10. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE SITUATION WITH A VIEW TO TAKING, IN THE EVENT OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF UTS RESOLUTION 541 (1983) AND THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, URGENT AND APPROPRIATE MEASURES;

11. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT THEREON TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS DEVELOPMENTS REQUIRE.

THOMSON

NNNN

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WEINER
PS/FUS
MR J WILLIAMS
MR JENKINS

PS/No. 10 DOWNING STREET
D I O CANTON OFFICE

ED/SED
ED/UND
DEP HD/PLSD (2)
ED/NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

*Prime Minister
(Acquies)*
12.5.84

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 121000Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120305Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 486 OF 11 MAY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON NICOSIA ATHENS
INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN ROME UKDEL STRASBOURG
INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO CBFC

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 252: CYPRUS: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED ITS RESOLUTION 550 OF 11 MAY ON CYPRUS BY 13-1(PAKISTAN)-1(US). THE RESOLUTION CONDEMNS THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP AND IS MARKEDLY MORE CRITICAL OF THE TURKISH SIDE THAN SCR 541 ADOPTED LAST NOVEMBER AFTER DENKTASH'S UDF. WE WERE ABLE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR AS A RESULT OF AMENDMENTS INTRODUCED TO THE TEXT AT OUR REQUEST (NOTABLY THE OMISSION OF CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE). BUT AS I MADE CLEAR IN MY EOY THE TEXT RETAINS A NUMBER OF UNSATISFACTORY FEATURES. THESE MAY MAKE IT MORE RATHER THAN LESS DIFFICULT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PURSUE HIS GOOD OFFICES.

DETAIL

RESOLUTION

2. IN LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CO-SPONSORS WE MANAGED TO OBTAIN THE SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS SET OUT IN MY TELNO 250 AS REINFORCED IN YOUR TUR AND MOST OF THE DETAILED ONES TOO. ALTHOUGH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWED ME TO ACCEPT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8, I JOINED THE AMERICANS AND DUTCH IN ASKING FOR THE LINK BETWEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES AND SCR 541/THE NEW RESOLUTION (WHICH WE KNEW WAS LIKELY TO PROVOKE DENKTASH INTO A HOSTILE REACT-

~~SECRETARY GENERALS GOOD OFFICES AND SCR 541/THE NEW RESOLUTION~~
~~(WHICH WE KNEW WAS LIKELY TO PROVOKE DENKTASH INTO A HOSTILE REACT-~~
ION AND WAS UNWELCOME TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THAT REASON) TO
BE BROKEN. BUT, HAVING CONSULTED KYPRIANOU, THE CO-SPONSORS REFUSED
TO DO SO. THEY DID EXPLAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR UNDERSTANDING WAS
THAT THE SECRETARY GENERALS MANDATE REMAINED UNAFFECTED AND THAT
SCR 541 AND THE NEW RESOLUTION REFERRED TO AN OVERALL SOLUTION NOT
TO HIS GOOD OFFICES. THE CO-SPONSORS DECLINED NEVERTHELESS,
AGAIN ON KYPRIANOUS INSISTENCE, TO SAY AS MUCH IN THE COUNCIL SO
I MADE A POINT OF WRITING THIS UNDERSTANDING INTO THE RECORD IN MY
EOV (MY THIRD HFT) WHICH I SHOWED THE SECRETARY GENERAL BEFOREHAND.
THE FRENCH PLAYED NO PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE THEY HAD
ESTABLISHED THAT THE CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE WAS COMING OUT. THE
AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE VOTED IN FAVOUR HAD OPERATIVE PARA B BEEN
AMENDED BUT IN THE END THEY SETTLED, WITH SOME RELIEF, FOR AN
ABSTENTION (WASHINGTON TELNO 1494 NOT TO ALL). THE PAKISTANI VOTE
AGAINST WAS NO SURPRISE AT ALL.

DEBATE

3. THE DEBATE CONCLUDED TODAY, 11 MAY, WITH SPEECHES FROM
MALAYSIA, THE NETHERLANDS, FRANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE UK (TEXT
IN MY SECOND HFT), CHINA, USSR AND MR DENKTASH (TWICE), TURKEY AND
CYPRUS (TWICE). A SUMMARY ACCOUNT WILL FOLLOW AFTER THE
WEEKEND.

4. I SAW DENKTASH AT MY REQUEST IN THE MARGINS TO CARRY OUT YOUR
INSTRUCTIONS ON VAROSHA. STRESSING THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON YOUR DIRECT
INSTRUCTIONS I SAID THAT WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS REPORTED
INTENTION TO SETTLE PART OF VAROSHA. DENKTASH SAID HE HAD NOT
BEEN REPORTED CORRECTLY. VAROSHA HAD A SECURITY BELT TOWARDS
FAMAGUSTA WHICH WAS VACANT AND LITERALLY COLLAPSING. "MY
PEOPLE ARE EXPECTING IT TO BE REHABILITATED". THE AREA IN
QUESTION WAS NOT ON THE THE SECRETARY GENERALS MAP. (IN HIS TWO
INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEBATE TODAY DENKTASH REFERRED TO VAROSHA AS A
MUNICIPAL AFFAIR WITH WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT
BOTHR TO DEAL). THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR KEEPING HIS
PEOPLE OUT. I COUNTERED THAT I MUST NEVERTHELESS SAY THAT THE UK
BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE A SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL
EFFECT AND WOULD ATTRACT OPPOSITION.

5. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO TEST DENKTASH ON HIS ATTITUDE TO THE
SECRETARY GENERALS GOOD OFFICES IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW RESOLUTION.
DENKTASH SAID THAT IF THE BASIS FOR GOOD OFFICES WAS CHANGED FROM
SCR 367 HE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY TALKING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.
"TO IMPLEMENT SCR 541 CANNOT BE GOOD OFFICES". I REPLIED THAT THE
NEW RESOLUTION MIGHT BE A NONSENSE BUT WOULD NOT SUPPLANT THE EXIS-
TING GOOD OFFICES WHICH WAS THE IMPORTANT POINT.

6. I ALSO TACKLED DENKTASH ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS TOWARDS
UNFICYP WHICH COULD MARK ANOTHER POINT ON THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL. THIS
MANDATE HAD BEEN RENEWED MANY TIMES IN THE PAST AND THERE WAS NO
REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE RENEWED AGAIN. DENKTASH SAID THAT THE
PROBLEM WAS THE REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS. IF THE
TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE NON-EXISTENT WHY WAS THEIR CONSENT (TO THE
OPERATION OF UNFICYP) REQUIRED? HE WAS NOT AGAINST UNFICYP BUT "WE
CANNOT HAVE THEM IN OUR PART." I SAID THAT TO TAMPER WITH UNFICYP

OPERATION OF...
CANNOT HAVE THEM ON OUR PART. ~~IT IS SAID THAT TO TAMPER WITH THE FACTS WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS STEP. WE SHOULD RESENT IT IF OUR ACTIONS PUT US IN A DIFFICULT NATIONAL SITUATION. THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD REVERSE THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL WAS THE SECRETARY GENERAL. DENKTASH SAID THAT HE WANTED TO USE THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT NOT OF HIS HANDS AND FEET WERE TIED.~~

~~JACOVOU
7. I ALSO SAW JACOVOU IN THE MARGINS TO CLEAR UP THE MISUNDERSTANDING REPORTED IN MY TELNO 484 (NOT TO ALL). I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN ASTOUNDED TO HEAR THAT THE CYPRIOTS HAD PROTESTED IN LONDON THAT I WAS DELIBERATELY TRYING TO DELAY MATTERS. JACOVOU SAID THAT "A FRIEND" HAD TOLD THE CYPRUS DELEGATION THAT THE UK WAS PROPOSING TO POSTPONE THE RESOLUTION. I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO DISSEMINATE CORRECT INFORMATION. VELEWGENPALVYDO~~

~~THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT NOT OF HIS HANDS AND FEET WERE TIED.~~

JACOVOU
7. I ALSO SAW JACOVOU IN THE MARGINS TO CLEAR UP THE MISUNDERSTANDING REPORTED IN MY TELNO 484 (NOT TO ALL). I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN ASTOUNDED TO HEAR THAT THE CYPRIOTS HAD PROTESTED IN LONDON THAT I WAS DELIBERATELY TRYING TO DELAY MATTERS. JACOVOU SAID THAT "A FRIEND" HAD TOLD THE CYPRUS DELEGATION THAT THE UK WAS PROPOSING TO POSTPONE THE RESOLUTION. I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO DISSEMINATE CORRECT INFORMATION. WE WERE READY TO HAVE A RESOLUTION BUT CONCERNED ABOUT THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL. JACOVOU SAID THAT HE HAD NOTED MY CONCERN AND HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS IT AFTER THE DUST HAD SETTLED. I WONDERED WHETHER THE DUST WOULD IN FACT SETTLE, PARTICULARLY IF DENKTASH WAS PLANNING TO TAKE FURTHER MOVES ON HIS RETURN TO CYPRUS.

SECRETARY GENERAL
8. BEFORE THE VOTE WAS TAKEN I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO EXPLAIN HOW I INTENDED TO HANDLE MY EOY. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK WHAT HE PLANNED TO DO NEXT AND TO SHOW HIM MR DAINIS IDEAS FOR A MINIMALIST APPROACH (NICOSIA TELNO 224). THE SE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT ALL HE COULD DO IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WAS KEEP HIS FINGERS CROSSED AND HOPE THAT OPERATIVE PARA 8 OF THE RESOLUTION DID NOT BRING HIS GOOD OFFICES TO A HALT. HE THOUGHT MY EOY HELPFUL AND SAID THAT HE WAS WORKING ON THE NEXT STEPS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST TO WAIT FOR KYPRIANOU TO DIGEST THE FRUITS OF HIS "VICTORY" BEFORE RESUMING DISCUSSION WITH HIM. IN THE MEANWHILE HE DID NOT WISH TO ANTICIPATE A DECISION ON WHETHER TO GO FOR A MINIMALIST OR MAXIMALIST APPROACH. HIS OWN INCLINATION WAS STILL TO THINK THAT THE LATTER HAD MORE CHANCES OF PROGRESS.

THE GREEKS
9. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT PLAYED A SPOILING ROLE THROUGHOUT. MY GREEK COLLEAGUE HAS MADE PLAIN TO THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN CYPRUS AND TO ME THAT AS FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED WORSE IS BETTER. HE HOLDS THAT ONLY IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES WILL THE WEST PUT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON ANKARA

~~HE HOLDS THAT ONLY IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES WILL THE WEST PUT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON ARKAWA.~~

THE NON-ALIGNED

10. THE FOUR NON-ALIGNED CO-SPONSORS WHO CONDUCTED THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE, WITH THE PARTIAL EXCEPTION OF QNDMA, ALMOST TOTALLY IGNORANT OF CONDITIONS ON CYPRUS. THE MAIN CONSIDERATION FOR THEM WAS TO GET SOMETHING ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS AS A FELLOW MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THIS MADE CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATION DIFFICULT. KYPRIANOU TOLD THE INDIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT HE WAS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT ANY MORE AMENDMENTS BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT THE TURKS WERE MORE LIKELY TO REACT ADVERSELY TO A WEAK TEXT THAN TO A STRONG ONE (WHICH SEEMS TOPSY TURVY TO ME).

11. COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME IS IN MY FOURTH WFT.

12. SEE WFT.

THOMSON

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

Cyprus


There have been a lot of telegrams on this subject recently but none that I needed to bring to your attention.

You should, however, be aware that tension is increasing again. Denktash is threatening to go ahead with Turkish Cypriot settlements of Varosha. The Greek Cypriots are upset by this and other threats. There has been talk of troop movements, but not much evidence that they have happened.

President Reagan has proposed to Congress a \$250m peace and reconstruction fund for Cyprus, partly as a way of persuading Congress to approve the Administration's requests for aid to both Greece and Turkey.

I think we are doing all we can. Sir John Thomson is being very active in New York during the Security Council Meeting which continues. We are asking Dr. Luns, in view of his particular links with Turkey, to try and exercise a moderating influence on the Turks. We are in close touch with the Americans.

A. J. C.



9 May, 1984.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 May 1984

*Agreed with F/C.O. that we
should not send an interim reply.*

A.S.C. 7/5.

John Teh

Cyprus: Message to the Prime Minister from President
Papandreou

/ I enclose a draft telegram to Athens containing an
interim reply from the Prime Minister to the letter from
/ Mr Papandreou which the Greek Ambassador delivered this
morning (copy enclosed for convenience).

The draft follows closely the interim reply to
President Kyprianou's message which I sent you in my
letter of 30 April. We think it better in both cases to
delay a substantive response until after the Security
Council Debate which we expect to begin today.

John Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street


CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, NICOSIA, ANKARA
	10	SAVING BONN, PARIS, ROME
	11	CYPRUS: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT PAPANDREOU
	12	1. Please pass the following message to Papandreou from the
	13	Prime Minister as soon as possible.
	14	BEGINS: Thank you for your letter of 2 May about the forthcoming
	15	Security Council Debate on Cyprus. I am giving very careful
	16	consideration to all that you have said and will have your
	17	views very much in mind as the Debate proceeds. I have asked
	18	our Ambassador in New York to keep in close touch with yours.
	19	ENDS.
	20	
	21	HOWE
///	22	NNNN
//	23	
/	24	
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword .
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Cyprus Limited
Drafted by (Block capitals) P F Ricketts		SED UND ECD(E)
Telephone number 233 4641		PUSD Information Dept News Dept
Authorised for despatch		PS PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney PS/PUS
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	Sir J Bullard Mr Jenkins



The Ambassador

Greek Embassy

London

2 ~~May~~ 1984

No. ~~F.~~ 120

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister Mr. Andreas Papandreou, to transmit the following letter to you:

"

2 ~~May~~ 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

Within the next few hours ~~the~~ Security Council will meet in order to ~~examine~~ the question of Cyprus and particularly the latest violations by Turkey and ~~its~~ total disregard of the provisions of ~~Security~~ Council Resolution No. 541.

This, I believe, shall be ~~one~~ of the most crucial discussions on ~~Cyprus~~ which may strongly influence future ~~developments~~ in the area.

In these crucial moments, ~~I~~ am addressing this letter to you in view of ~~the~~ special and heavy responsibilities which ~~the~~ United Kingdom bears in Cyprus. ~~These~~ responsibilities originate from the period when ~~the~~ United Kingdom was exercising administrative ~~and~~ political authority in Cyprus before ~~independence~~. They continue to remain valid today ~~for~~ the following reasons:

-all-

First and foremost, the United Kingdom remains one of the guarantor powers of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, elements which have been brutally violated by the Turkish invasion and occupation of more than a third of the Island and by the Turkish efforts to cause the secession of this territory from the Republic of Cyprus.

Furthermore, the Republic of Cyprus remains a member of the Commonwealth and I am sure that you will agree with me that it is the political and moral responsibility of all members of the Commonwealth and particularly Great Britain to grant all possible assistance to a fellow member whose very existence is threatened.

Finally, the United Kingdom maintains on the territory of Cyprus its sovereign bases according to the 1960 treaties and has, therefore, a particular interest and responsibility for the maintenance of political stability and the integrity of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

In view of the above, I sincerely hope Her Majesty's Government will give to the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations the necessary instructions so that he may significantly contribute during the forthcoming deliberations in order to ensure the full implementation of Resolution 541 as well as the application of the rule of international law and international order in Cyprus.

I am sure that the United Kingdom will not fail to fulfil all its obligations and its responsibilities, particularly since its


./.

attitude will constitute the touchstone for the future relations between the United Kingdom not only with Cyprus but with Greece as well as with Hellenism in its broader sense.

Yours sincerely,

Andreas Papandreou".

Yours sincerely,



Nikos Kyriazides

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

3 - MAY 1984





Le Ho

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1984

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has just received from the Ambassador of Greece which contains the text of a message to Mrs. Thatcher from the Prime Minister of Greece about the UN Security Council meeting on Cyprus.

I should be grateful for advice in due course as to whether the Prime Minister should reply to Mr. Papandreou's message.

BF/1

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

57



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 2 May enclosing the text of a message to Mrs. Thatcher from the Prime Minister of Greece.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Monsieur Nikos Kyriazides.

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES.

PS.

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JENKINS

.....

.....

ED/SED

ED/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

ED/NEWS D

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 030830 FCO

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 022355Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 442 OF 2 MAY 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE: NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY: BONN, PARIS, ROME, CBFC, MOSCOW, PEKING.

ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STRASBOURG, UKREP BRUSSELS.

FROM MARGETSON

MIPT: CYPRUS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT HIS REQUEST THIS AFTERNOON, 2 MAY.
2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE UK OCCUPIED A SPECIAL POSITION ON CYPRUS AND THAT HE HAD MUCH APPRECIATED THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND LADY YOUNG IN LONDON RECENTLY. HE WAS NOW FACING A RATHER DIFFICULT SITUATION AT WHICH IT WAS USELESS TO CONCEAL HIS FRUSTRATION. HE HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TO FIND A FORMULA TO PAVE THE WAY TOWARDS A RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL DIALOGUE BUT HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WHO HAD UNDERMINED HIS EFFORTS BY CONSOLIDATING INSTEAD OF FREEZING UDI. HE HAD FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO RESTRAIN HIS TEMPER.
3. WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS VERY STRONG COMMITMENT BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS AND THE PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION OF A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS NOT AN EAST/WEST ISSUE AND IF THERE WAS ONE ISSUE ON WHICH THE FIVE HAD ALWAYS AGREED IT WAS CYPRUS. HE HOPED THAT THE FIVE WOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING A DIRECT APPEAL, WHETHER TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY, TO THE TWO SIDES TO IMPRESS ON THEM BOTH THEIR CONCERN AND THEIR INTEREST IN A RAPID RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON A BASIS WHICH HE HOPED HE COULD FURNISH AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT.

ON THIS THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONFESSED THAT HE HAD EXHAUSTED

~~APPROPRIATE MOMENT.~~

4. ON THIS THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONFESSED THAT HE HAD EXHAUSTED HIS IMAGINATION WITH HIS FIVE POINTS, WHOSE CHANCES OF SUCCESS HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY DENKTASH. NEVERTHELESS HE HAD SEEN NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO OFFER TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES (PARA 23 OF HIS REPORT TELEGRAPHED IN MY TELNO 438 (NOT TO ALL)). "BUT REALLY NEED YOUR SUPPORT". HE HOPED THAT THE FIVE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PIN THE TURKISH SIDE DOWN TO A RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND A FEDERAL SOLUTION, NEITHER OF WHICH THEY HAD EVER ABJURED.
5. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS I SOUGHT TO EXTRACT MORE DETAIL FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I ASKED WHAT THE REACTION OF THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD BEEN. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE FRENCH, RUSSIANS AND CHINESE AND WOULD BE SEEING MRS KIRKPATRICK TOMORROW. THE THREE HE HAD SEEN WERE ALL INTERESTED BUT SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD SOME FORMULA, "WHICH I HONESTLY DO NOT". I ASKED WHAT FORM HE THOUGHT SUCH AN INITIATIVE MIGHT TAKE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF A STATEMENT BY THE FIVE IN THE COUNCIL; INDEED HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO "INTERFERE" WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AT ALL. BUT HE HOPED THAT THE FIVE COULD AGREE ON A DEMARCHE, WHETHER JOINT OR SEVERAL, TO THE PARTIES. IDEALLY THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE WHILE KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH WERE STILL IN NEW YORK AND IDEALLY THE FIVE WOULD EXPRESS "IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLES" APPLICABLE TO CYPRUS, PERHAPS DRAWN FROM THE POINTS THAT HAD BEEN AGREED BY BOTH SIDES IN THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS. SIMILAR DEMARCHES COULD BE MADE TO THE GREEK AND TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES.
6. I THANKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID TO YOU. HE COULD TAKE IT THAT WE WERE FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES AND GRATEFUL FOR HIS REPORT WHICH WHILE FACTUAL AND UNEMOTIONAL LEFT NO DOUBT IN THE MIND OF THE READER AS TO WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT DEADLOCK. ON A PERSONAL BASIS I SUGGESTED THAT THE VALUE OF HIS PROPOSAL LAY IN THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT IT WOULD GIVE TO THOSE GOOD OFFICES WHICH WERE THE ONLY VEHICLE FOR PROGRESS. AS I WAS LEAVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED FOR HELP WITH THE AMERICANS FROM WHOM HE SAID HE EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES.
7. I HAPPENED TO SEE THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AFTER MY MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL "VERY INTERESTING" AND WAS PASSING IT TO MOSCOW.
8. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

THOMSON

CC MASTER
OPS.

cc R. BONE, FCO

cc PC

The Ambassador

Greek Embassy

London

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 72A/84

2 May 1984

No.F.120

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister
Mr. Andreas Papandreou, to transmit the following
letter to you:

"

2 May 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

Within the next few hours the Security
Council will meet in order to examine the
question of Cyprus and particularly the
latest violations by Turkey and its total
disregard of the provisions of Security
Council Resolution No.541.

This, I believe, shall be one of the
most crucial discussions on Cyprus which
may strongly influence future developments
in the area.

In these crucial moments, I am addressing
this letter to you in view of the special
and heavy responsibilities which the United
Kingdom bears in Cyprus. These responsibilities
originate from the period when the United Kingdom
was exercising administrative and political
authority in Cyprus before independence. They
continue to remain valid today for the following
reasons:

./.

First and foremost, the United Kingdom remains one of the guarantor powers of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, elements which have been brutally violated by the Turkish invasion and occupation of more than a third of the Island and by the Turkish efforts to cause the secession of this territory from the Republic of Cyprus.

Furthermore, the Republic of Cyprus remains a member of the Commonwealth and I am sure that you will agree with me that it is the political and moral responsibility of all members of the Commonwealth and particularly Great Britain to grant all possible assistance to a fellow member whose very existence is threatened.

Finally, the United Kingdom maintains on the territory of Cyprus its sovereign bases according to the 1960 treaties and has, therefore, a particular interest and responsibility for the maintenance of political stability and the integrity of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

In view of the above, I sincerely hope Her Majesty's Government will give to the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations the necessary instructions so that he may significantly contribute during the forthcoming deliberations in order to ensure the full implementation of Resolution 541 as well as the application of the rule of international law and international order in Cyprus.

I am sure that the United Kingdom will not fail to fulfil all its obligations and its responsibilities, particularly since its


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attitude will constitute the touchstone for the future relations between the United Kingdom not only with Cyprus but with Greece as well as with Hellenism in its broader sense.

Yours sincerely,

Andreas Papandreou".

Yours sincerely,



Nikos Kyriazides

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

✓ 1) copy to Mr. Howe F/C-O.

2) f.a.

left at No. 10 Downing Street.

M 9
5.

2 May 1984

The recent Greek "confiscation" of our Forest is illegal, unconstitutional and discriminating and conflicts with the Treaty of Rome on four counts.

Lady Young might perhaps send for the Greek Ambassador and HM Ambassador be asked to lodge a formal protest with Mr Simitis, Greek Minister of Agriculture, while a British Commissioner in Brussels might assist with our complaint 97/84 to the Commission.

All necessary legal steps are being taken in Athens.

The Honourable Francis Noel-Baker

May 1984

CIR 1 (7)
Seventh Draft

CYPRUS NEUTRAL GROUP / PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

A Introduction

- 1 The longer the status quo in Cyprus persists, the faster it will freeze. It is potentially exceedingly dangerous, particularly since the threat to send more mainland Greek troops: for the Cypriots: their partners and neighbours, for the whole Middle East, for East West relations, for the UN and for the Commonwealth.
- 2 The UN cannot now act because: (a) it is tied to Security Council Resolution 541 calling for withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot UDI, (b) because the Greek-Cypriots and Greeks were committed to not talking to Turks before that withdrawal. But withdrawal will not occur unless the new Turkish Cypriot Republic ("Republic") federates with the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus - in which case both will automatically renounce the status quo which, however, does constitute a pragmatic basis for Federation.
- 3 Even if the UN could resume the inter-Communal talks, these would produce no better result than before. They would do more harm than good. Sadly, they have become "megaphone diplomacy": the occasion for public and aggressive demagoguery which, on each occasion, leaves the situation worse. (Except in the single case of the last Macarios-Denktaş agreement which, unfortunately, was later aborted.)
- 4 So a new method is necessary and urgent.

B Method might be:

- 1 An unofficial, low-key, secret enquiry by a neutral Team: perhaps including Austrian, Canadian, Irish, Swedish, Swiss, Malasian and Yugoslav participation or close support. (The first four States man UNFICYP; the Swiss provide substantial financial help; and the Yugoslavs enjoy, they say, good relations with all Parties concerned and are non-aligned and federal, the Turks would prefer a Muslim.
- 2 The Team must be acceptable to both Cypriot Communities and, by extension, to Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece.
- 3 It should secure tacit approval from UN and major interested governments.

Cont/...

- 4 It should be given perhaps three months to report on whether or not there is an agreed basis for a federal solution. If not, no harm is done. If so, rapid negotiations should proceed immediately to a settlement. (A retired Swiss Ambassador and former high UN official might undertake preparation of the Report.)
- 5 Preliminary contacts, at a high level, with the two Cypriot Communities and with the Canadian, Irish, Swiss, Austrian, Yugoslav and Turkish Governments appear to indicate serious interest.
- 6 Sympathetic interest but, as requested, not in participation, has also been evinced by representatives of the US and UK Governments and by the Vatican (Archbishop Ferraioli). Ambassador Gobbi has also kindly raised the matter with the UN Secretary General, who has replied that he has no Mandate for this project but raises no objection.
- 7 Retired Attourney General of the Republic of Cyprus Criton Tornarities will act, if required, as one Constitutional Consultant and also, perhaps, Mr Justice Onan (Turkish Cypriot), at a later stage.

C The Basis for a settlement might be:

- 1 The status quo merging into a Federation/Confederation of two "independent" republics to be called Federal States.
- 2 Each State to have maximum autonomy (including security, education etc.) compatible with federation.
- 3 Federal Government with, at first, powers only over Customs, Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Defence (if any) ...
- 4 Readjustment of Turkish State's boundaries.
- 5 Return of Greeks to Varosha, reopening of Nicosia Airport.
- 6 Compensation for lost property.
- 7 Gradual dismantling of Green Line.
- 8 Balanced withdrawal of Foreign Troops from both Federal States.
- 9 International guarantees by UN, Commonwealth etc.

NOTE: C above emerges from persistent private, informal conversations with leaders of both Communities and Turkey since 1956 when Prime Minister Eden sent me to mediate between the Governor and Archbishop and when we came close to a settlement better than any later proposed.

But it should be examined, tested or modified by the Team.

Former MP loses his estate

THE GREEK Government yesterday upheld a forestry commission decision to confiscate a 10,000-acre estate belonging to a former British MP, Sir Francis Noel-Baker.

It ruled that the estate on the island of Euboea, 50 miles from Athens, which was purchased by Sir Francis's great-grandfather in 1832, now belongs to the state.

According to the ruling, the 64-year-old former Labour MP for Swindon, will be permitted to keep his house and 75 acres of farmland that surrounds it.

Sir Francis, who gave up his political career in 1969 to live permanently on the estate, had been fighting a legal battle to keep the family property for almost a decade. — AP.

Noel-Baker to fight

ULLDOZERS have already started opening paths into the 11,000-acre forest estate of Mr Francis Noel-Baker, the former Labour MP for Swindon, which the Greek Socialist Government has decided to take over.

Local farmers in the village of Prokopi, where the estate is located, took to the streets Thursday night to celebrate the Government's announcement. But Mr Noel-Baker's lawyer said he will contest the decision in the Greek courts.

The Greek lawyer, who requested that his name should not be used, said Mr Noel-Baker has "a very good chance" of reversing the decision because it was taken by a very narrow margin.

The Ministry of Agriculture explained on Friday that the Government decided that the estate would henceforth belong to the state and would be exploited by the local forestry department of Limni, the nearest town in Euboea, central Greece.

It said the decision was taken after the Forestry Membership Review Council decided by a narrow four votes

By PAUL ANAST
in Athens

to three that the estate is not private but public forest land, and that Mr Noel-Baker's property titles were therefore invalid.

This means that he will not be able to keep his 12-room home and 50 acres, as he originally hoped. The council's panel consists of three judges and four trade unionists dealing with forestry affairs.

'Feudal landlord'

The Government's decision has not, however, put a final close to the controversy which has raged since 1975. A long legal dispute is expected to ensue, while the issue is also likely to be taken up on a diplomatic level between the Greek and British Governments, Western diplomatic sources said.

The decision came under fire from the Greek conservative press, which described it as a Government move to impress the Left wing of the party and the Communists in view of the June elections for the European Parliament.

Most of the village's 1,500 inhabitants were in the streets rejoicing, while the leaders of the "May 9 Action Committee" made fiery speeches in the central square.

"The land now belongs to the people, and there is no government that would dare take it back," said Mr Prodromos Enotiades, general secretary of the Action Committee and president of the Socialist party's local branch.

"Noel-Baker was a feudal landlord who prevented the development of the area, and is largely responsible for the unemployment prevailing here. His rule is over," Mr Enotiades said a huge rally was planned for May 9.

Greece's conservative Government in 1978 ratified the Noel-Bakers' legal claim to the estate, which they bought from the retreating Ottoman Turks in 1832. But the Socialist Government last year annulled the verdict and forbade the British family from cultivating or exploiting the land, pending the decision that was taken this week.

The estate is jointly owned by Mr Noel-Baker, who is 63, and his two eldest sons, Edward and Martin.

NOEL-BAKER ESTATE SEIZED

By PAUL ANAST in Athens

GREECE'S Socialist government announced yesterday that the State had taken over ownership of the 11,000-acre estate of the former Labour MP Mr Francis Noel-Baker.

The surprise decision, and the lack of details provided, came as the climax to a nine-year controversy and after the Government last year cancelled a 1978 decision recognising Mr Noel-Baker's rightful claim to the land at Prokopi in Euboea island.

A written Press statement by Mr Stathis Yiotas, Under-Secretary for Agriculture, simply said that Mr Noel-Baker's estate is "henceforth the property of the State."

'Action committee'

It gave no further details as to whether any compensation would be offered, or whether Mr Noel-Baker would be able to keep his 12-room home and 50 acres of land around it, as he had once requested.

Yesterday's move is expected to delight the Left-wing of the ruling Socialist party and the Communist party, as well as local villagers who in 1975 formed an "action committee" to demand the Briton's expulsion and distribution of his land to the farmers.

Greeks seize Briton's forest

From Mario Medina
Athens

The Greek Government decided to take over the Achmetaga, the 10,000-acre wooded estate on the island of Euboea, from Mr Francis Noel-Baker, its present British owner, whose 1832 title Athens is refusing to recognize.

Mr Noel-Baker, the former Labour MP for Swindon, who is on his way to Brussels today, told *The Times* here that he had lodged a complaint with the European Commission against the Greek Authorities for violations of basic rights protected by the Treaty of Rome in the case of Community nationals.

"We are demanding from the Greeks full compensation for the damage done to us, which is several millions, and the right to operate our forest and our farm with the full

cooperation of all local authorities, and to live in peace", he said.

Mr Stathis Yiotas, the Greek Under-Secretary for Agriculture, announced yesterday that he had endorsed a ruling by the Supreme Greek Forestry Commission last November rejecting the validity of the Noel-Baker title on the ground that the deeds surrendered usufruct not ownership.

Nonsense, Mr Noel-Baker said: "We do not even need titles. We have been there since 1832 and under Greek law no one can challenge land ownership after 30 years' occupancy."

The Achmetaga estate was sold at the time of Greek independence, by its departing Turkish owner to Mr Noel-Baker's great-grandfather, a relative of Lord Byron's widow, who is said to have lent him the

10,000 gold sovereigns he needed to pay for it.

The Greek Ministry of Agriculture asserts that the deal was a private transaction. A subsequent Greek law set a deadline for the legalization of all such transactions. The Noel-Bakers, like more than 100 other Greek owners of forests, had failed to do so at the time, forfeiting the right to invoke the 30-year statute of limitations.

Mr Yiotas said the local Forestry Commission in Euboea was instructed to take the necessary action for the transfer of the woodland to state management. No compensation would be paid, but the interested parties could appeal to the courts.

Mr Noel-Baker is expected to take his case to the Greek courts since this is the only way of securing an intervention by the European Community.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
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INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, CBFC, PARIS, BONN, ROME

YOUR TELNO 189 CYPRUS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
PRESIDENT KYRIANOU

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KYRIANOU FROM
THE PRIME MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS: I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF 19 APRIL CONCERNING
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS AND YOUR INTENTION TO BRING THE
MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I AM GIVING VERY CAREFUL
CONSIDERATION TO ALL THAT YOU HAVE SAID AND WILL HAVE YOUR VIEWS
VERY MUCH IN MIND AS WE APPROACH THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. I
SHALL LET YOU HAVE A REPLY IN DUE COURSE. MEANWHILE I HOPE THAT
OUR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WILL KEEP IN CLOSE
TOUCH. ENDS

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MR JENKINS

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File 888

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 May 1984

Cyprus

You wrote to Tim Flesher on 30 April about Nicosia telno 189.

The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed interim reply from herself to President Kyprianou should be despatched.

A JC

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

✓



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister:

It would be difficult
to reply substantively to President
Kyprianou until we have seen the

30 April 1984

Security Council Resolution. We ought
however, at least to reassure him that
we have received his message
given the quite inordinate delay
(in Cyprus). Agree interim reply?

Jew

ms

Message to the Prime Minister from President Kyprianou

We discussed this afternoon Nicosia telno 189
containing a message from President Kyrianou (copy enclosed).

As requested, I enclose a short draft telegram to
Nicosia, instructing the High Commission to pass a message
to the Greek Cypriot authorities acknowledging receipt.
We will let you have a substantive draft reply to the
message after the debate in the Security Council, which
we expect - at the earliest - towards the end of this
week.

I shall be showing these papers in parallel to the
Secretary of State in tonight's box.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

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12	YOUR TELNO 189: CYPRUS: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
13	PRESIDENT KYRIANOU
14	1. Please pass the following message to President Kyrianou from
15	the Prime Minister as soon as possible.
16	BEGINS: I have just received your letter of 19 April concerning
17	recent developments in Cyprus and your intention to bring the
18	matter before the Security Council. I am giving very careful
19	consideration to all that you have said and will have your views
20	very much in mind as we approach the meeting of the Council. I
21	shall let you have a more fully considered reply in due course.
22	Meanwhile I hope that our respective representatives in New
23	York will keep in close touch. ENDS
24	
25	HOWE NNNN

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1984

Cyprus: Contingency Planning

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 19 April to John Coles about contingency planning in relation to Cyprus. She has noted this without comment.

DAVID BARCLAY

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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A handwritten signature or mark in the bottom right corner of the page.

cc OPS
Master

SUBJECT

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PRIME MINISTER

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PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO PRIORITY FCO

SERIAL No. T62A187

TELEGRAM NO 189 OF 27 APRIL 1984.

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA.

INFO SAVING CBFC, PARIS, BONN, ROME.

CYPRUS : MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.

1. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE ASKED ME ON 27 APRIL TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU DATED 19 APRIL (ORIGINAL BY BAG).

BEGINS.

I WROTE TO YOU ON NOVEMBER 15 AND DECEMBER 20, 1983, WHEN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT PURPORTEDLY DECLARED AN INDEPENDENT STATE ON THE PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS OCCUPIED BY THE TURKISH ARMY. THIS ILLEGAL ACT OF SECESSION HAS BEEN CONDEMNED BY ALMOST ALL STATES AND BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. BY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 541 (1983) ON NOVEMBER 18, 1983, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERED THE PURPORTED DECLARATION AN ILLEGAL ACT AND CALLED FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. IT FURTHER CALLED UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECONGNISE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION AND UPON ALL PARTIES NOT TO UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

IT IS WITH MUCH REGRET AND CONCERN THAT I WRITE TO YOU TODAY TO REPORT THAT TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP ARE AGAIN PROVOCATIVELY IGNORING THE CALLS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAVE PURSUED THEIR ILLEGAL DESIGNS AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THUS, ON APRIL 11, 1984, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP ANNOUNCED THAT WORK ON THE ILLEGAL ''CONSTITUTION'' WOULD GO ON AND THAT A ''REFERENDUM'' AND ''ELECTIONS'' WOULD TAKE PLACE ON SPECIFIED DATES. THESE STATEMENTS WERE CALCULATED TO UNDERMINE THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHO IS PURSUING HIS GOOD OFFICES MISSION ENTRUSTED HIM BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.

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ON APRIL 17, 1984, AT SIMULTANEOUS CEREMONIES IN ANKARA AND NICOSIA THE ILLEGAL STATE AND ITS PATRON ATTEMPTED TO FURTHER THEIR SECESSIONIST AIMS THROUGH THE EXCHANGE OF 'AMBASSADORS'.

I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS NEW ATTEMPT TO CREATE NEW FAITS ACCOMPLIS AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND UNITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. MY GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES.

TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JEOPARDIZE ITS USEFULNESS AND POSE A THREAT TO ITS VERY EXISTENCE. MY GOVERNMENT WILL, THEREFOR, APPEAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO URGENTLY DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND ADOPT SUCH EFFECTIVE MEASURES AS ARE WARRANTED BY THE SITUATION.

I AM ADDRESSING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU, YOUR EXCELLENCY, REQUESTING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION CREATED IN THE OCCUPIED PART OF CYPRUS AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE RUPUBLIC OF CYPRUS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. ONCE AGAIN WE SEEK YOUR ASSISTANCE IN HELPING THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541 (1983), THEREBY OPENING THE ROAD TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

ENDS.

2. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

DAIN.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Earlier version at flap

Nicosia, 19th April, 1984.

Your Excellency,

I wrote to you on November 15 and December 20, 1983, when the Turkish Cypriot leadership with the connivance of the Turkish Government purportedly declared an independent state on the part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish army. This illegal act of secession has been condemned by almost all states and by the United Nations Security Council. By adopting Resolution 541 (1983) on November 18, 1983, the Security Council considered the purported declaration an illegal act and called for its withdrawal. It further called upon all states not to recognise the purported declaration and upon all parties not to undertake any action that might exacerbate the situation.

It is with much regret and concern that I write to you today to report that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are again provocatively ignoring the calls of the international community and the Security Council and have pursued their illegal designs against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, on April 11, 1984, the Turkish Cypriot leadership announced that work on the illegal "constitution" would go on and that a "referendum" and "elections" would take place on specified dates. These statements were calculated to undermine the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations who is pursuing his good offices mission entrusted him by the United Nations Security Council.

On April 17, 1984, at simultaneous ceremonies in Ankara and Nicosia the illegal state and its patron attempted to further their secessionist aims through the exchange of "ambassadors".

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
10, Downing Str.,
London.



- 2 -

I am deeply concerned about this new attempt to create new facts accomplis against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. My Government has decided to bring the matter before the Security Council. The people of Cyprus would be grateful for your support and solidarity in these difficult times.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership challenge the credibility of the United Nations, jeopardize its usefulness and pose a threat to its very existence. My Government will, therefore, appeal to the Security Council to urgently discharge its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and adopt such effective measures as are warranted by the situation.


I am addressing this message to you, your Excellency, requesting your Government's support for the reversal of the unacceptable situation created in the occupied part of Cyprus and for the restoration of the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus through peaceful means. Once again we seek your assistance in helping the Republic of Cyprus to ensure compliance with Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), thereby opening the road to a peaceful settlement of the problem.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Spyros Kyprianou'.

(Spyros Kyprianou)
President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus - Int Sit + Relats Pt 2.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister ⁽²⁾

19 April 1984

This is very much a piece of contingency planning, and there is no need to read right through the paper.

John Deane,

DMS
19/4

Cyprus: Contingency Planning

In the light of the current delicate situation in Cyprus, we have agreed the enclosed paper which considers possible developments on Cyprus and UK reactions to them. You may wish to be aware of its contents.

One such development, the exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" occurred on 17 April. Sr Perez de Cuellar at once expressed deep regret and concern at the effect on his current efforts. We have issued a supportive statement (copy enclosed). Sir J Bullard summoned the Turkish Ambassador today and parallel action is being taken in Ankara. We have co-ordinated this action with the Americans, who are acting similarly, and are keeping them and our other principal allies informed.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that, while we should be prepared for any eventuality, we should try to prevent the UK being drawn into possibly dangerously exposed positions. It will therefore remain important to keep in close touch with the Americans and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the situation develops.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CYPRUS: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

1. This paper examines possible developments over Cyprus in the near future, including actions by both communities and the UN Secretary General. It considers their likely effects on British interests; action that could be required by the UK and/or others; and possible initiatives for making progress towards a settlement. We must, whilst looking ahead, retain flexibility to react as appropriate in what may well be nuanced situations.

UK Objectives

2. Our objectives are:

- i) to avoid further weakening of the southern flank of NATO by increasing hostility between Greece and Turkey which could lead to estrangement of either or both from the Western Alliance;
- ii) to protect our interests in the Sovereign Base Areas;
- iii) to demonstrate to UK public and Parliamentary opinion that we are fulfilling our responsibilities as a guarantor power and what many see as an historic role .

For these reasons our actions should aim to assist in the process of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem, or, failing that, to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate.

Possible Developments

3. Possible developments can be roughly classified into three groups:

- i) Turkish Cypriot and Turkish actions;
- ii) Greek Cypriot and Greek actions;
- iii) action by the UN Secretary General.

The developments discussed below are inter-related. Some Turkish Cypriot actions seem almost inevitable; some less so; unhelpful Greek Cypriot actions may occur in retaliation for Turkish Cypriot actions or in frustration at lack of progress

of the efforts of the Secretary General. External factors, particularly the activities of the US Congress, would also have a bearing.

A Turkish Cypriot Actions

I The Establishment of a Constitution (with possible timings)

4. It seems highly unlikely that the Turkish Cypriots will freeze any of the following stages towards the adoption of a constitution and election of state officers:

- (1) publication of draft constitution in "Official Gazette" (April);
- (2) adoption of constitution by "TRNC Assembly" and submission to referendum (June);
- (3) approval by referendum and passage of electoral law (July/August);
- (4) elections for "President" and "Assembly" (mid-October). Greek Cypriot reaction is likely to be strongest to (2) and (4).

UK Reaction

5. We should be prepared to make statements containing two elements: (a) a reiteration of our position on UDI; (b) our opposition to anything which could make a settlement to the Cyprus problem more difficult. We should urge the Greek Cypriots to take a restrained position on such developments, as they have done over the "TRNC" flag. We should consider demarches to Denktash, but not under any illusion that they might be successful.

II Manifestations and Consolidation of Statehood

(a) Stepping up of international propaganda campaign

6. The Turkish Cypriots already expend a great deal of effort sending "diplomatic" communications to other governments and the UN, inviting politicians and Parliamentarians to visit the "TRNC" (with some success in the case of the UK) etc. They

could step this up by opening further "TRNC" offices in foreign capitals (there is one in London already) or proposing that Denktash and his "Ministers" should pay formal visits to such capitals.

UK Reaction

7. We should continue to ignore such activities, not answer letters and refuse to extend diplomatic courtesies to "TRNC" representatives. As before, a request to call on Ministers by Denktash would need to be considered in light of circumstances at the time. The Greek Cypriots will continue to ~~be~~ protest sporadically whilst treating such manifestations with contempt.

(b) Diplomatic Developments

8. Diplomatic developments are likely to prompt a strong Greek Cypriot reaction:

(1) Accreditation of Turkish Ambassador to the "TRNC".

UK Reaction

9. We should try to play the event down. We should issue a statement regretting the move and saying that, in line with SCR 541, it did not alter our view of the "TRNC". Mr Wilberforce would be instructed not to treat the "Ambassador" as one (although we would need to retain contact). We should make appropriate demarches in Ankara and to Dentkash but again not in the expectation of success. We should try to calm the Greek Cypriots and keep them informed of our activity.

(2) Recognition by third countries.

UK Reaction

10. We should continue to make strenuous efforts to resist any move, real or imaginary, by third countries towards recognition of the "TRNC". We should keep in close touch with the Greek Cypriots.

(3) Change in name of Turkish Cypriot forces to "Army of TRNC"

UK Reaction

11. This is probably the most emotive of a number of possible changes of nomenclature in northern Cyprus. Whilst we should react as strongly as necessary to satisfy the Greek Cypriots we should play the event down.

III Other Developments in "TRNC"

- 12(1) attempted registration of "TRNC" companies in UK;
- (2) establishment of "TRNC" bank(s)
- (3) issue of currency
- (4) adoption of national anthem;
- (5) change of name of other institutions (most have no doubt already been changed);
- (6) issue of "TRNC" stamps on export documents.
- (7) further obstruction of UNFICYP.

UK Reaction

13. Most of these developments are relatively insignificant in themselves. Their significance and our reaction would depend on our assessment of the real strength of Greek Cypriot reaction to them. Each case should be considered separately in the situation at the time. We should be prepared to condemn them privately and publicly whilst trying to calm the Greek Cypriots. We should try to keep as low a profile as possible consistent with our objectives as defined in paragraph 2. We should normally seek to work with our partners and avoid a Pavlovian situation in which when the Greeks protest we condemn.

IV Turkish Actions

14. Turkey can be expected to support all the actions by the "TRNC" listed above. It would be more serious if they began to make the attitude of third countries towards the "TRNC" a test of their attitude towards Turkey. At present this does not seem to be in their minds, given their specific request to

the US and ourselves for Cyprus to be kept separate from the rest of Turkey's external relations. If it did come about a firm and united response by Turkey's major Western allies would probably convince her that this was foolish policy. But crude or strident pressure on Turkey would be likely to be counterproductive, as it has been in the past.

B Greek Cypriot/Greek Actions (in order of likelihood)

- 15(1) further strengthening of the GCNG (including arms purchases);
- (2) recourse to the UN General Assembly at its resumed session in late May or Security Council and internationalisation of the Cyprus problem in other fora including EC;
- (3) mobilisation of Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) reservists;
- (4) severance of electricity to northern Cyprus;
- (5) reduction or suspension of cooperation with NATO by Greeks.
- (6) a decision to move Greek troops into Cyprus;

16. These actions might be taken either in retaliation to a Turkish Cypriot move or in frustration at the failure of the Secretary General's efforts. All would be significant, particularly as they are likely to arise at a time of already heightened tension. The Turkish Cypriots themselves would probably react to (4) by cutting off water supplies to the South. Ankara might conceivably authorise the use of mainland forces to attack the Dekhalia power station, although this would involve a significant escalation of the crisis and probably lead to (6). The Turks would almost certainly then increase their own forces in Cyprus.

UK Reaction

17. There is nothing that the UK can do about these actions in themselves. Our efforts should be directed to heading them off in advance. If they occur we must direct our attention to the motivation behind the actions and, depending on the

circumstances at the time, the following options should be considered:

- (1) demarches, where possible with others, to the Turkish Cypriots/Turks (at Foreign Minister level if appropriate) calling for the reversal of the actions that had led to the reactions listed above. A message from the Prime Minister to Evren might be considered;
- (2) similar high level demarches to the Greek Cypriots/Greeks calling for restraint (and informing them of our action under (1) above);
- (3) public call for restraint on all parties;
- (4) action where appropriate with any third parties involved (eg with any countries selling arms to the Greek Cypriots in the event of 15(i)). In the case of (5) this would include our stance in the UN where we should try to avoid a veto to protect the Turkish Cypriots.

18.

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

19. If the Greeks and Greek Cypriots put pressure on the EC to deny preferential access for Turkish Cypriot exports we should probably wish to maintain our policy hitherto - to maintain the status quo without taking the lead in opposing Greek/Greek Cypriot demands. But we might be able to exploit the issue as leverage against Denktash at the same time.

C UN Secretary General's Efforts

20. The Secretary General is not an independent figure, since

he is subject to instructions from either the Security Council or the General Assembly and answerable for their execution. Although Sr Perez de Cuellar has been prepared to play a fairly independent role on Cyprus (for which all concerned recognise he is well suited) he has to take account of the views of member states and is bound by the wording of Security Council resolutions from which he derives his mandate. There are two possible scenarios:

- (a) the Secretary General indicates an inclination to take matters no further;
- (b) the Secretary General abandons his efforts (which we believe he will be reluctant to do explicitly). He may do this by presenting a report to the Security Council blaming the Turks/Turkish Cypriots for the lack of progress (he has to report by 31 May before the UNFICYP mandate expires on 15 June).

Scenario A: UK Reaction

21. The UK objective would be to encourage the Secretary General to persist in his efforts. We can pursue this by the following actions (preferably in cooperation with the US, FRG, France and Italy):

- (1) Pressure on Turks/Turkish Cypriots to be more forthcoming. If Denktash's answer threatens to put an end to the Secretary General's role we should consider Ministerial messages to Ankara.
- (2) Urging restraint on Greeks/Greek Cypriots. Again, Ministerial messages may be necessary, but we might make approaches through diplomatic channels first.
- (3) Support to UN Secretary General. The Prime Minister and Lady Young will see Perez de Cuellar later this month and could enquire about his views on the way forward; and offer of help from ourselves or others. We might suggest further meetings with Kyprianou and Denktash in New York. At a later stage, a message from Ministers might be appropriate. Which action we take and in what order must depend on the circumstances.

Scenario B: UK Reaction

22. If the Secretary General can be judged to have abandoned his efforts our long term objective should be to get him back into play. The immediate result would be likely to be a heightening of tension in Cyprus. But we should aim for a "cooling off" period. To the extent that this may not be possible for reasons which include national political expectations and our relations with the protagonists, we should have the possibility of a new initiative, by ourselves and/or others, in reserve. This would be less dangerous or cumbersome than, for example, forming a UN Western "Contact Group" as on Namibia or involving permanent members of the Security Council. Discussion and an outline of possible initiatives are annexed to this paper. We should have to expect the diplomatic "cooling off" to be accompanied by heightened tension, at least initially, in Cyprus.

23. We have hitherto resisted taking such an initiative in the aftermath of UDI for three main reasons: because we judged the chances of success to be minimal, because we wanted to avoid risking a worsening of our relations with Greece and Turkey by involvement in a fruitless exercise, and because we did not wish to undermine the efforts of the Secretary General. The latter element would no longer be so relevant, but we would need to take account of the other two before launching any initiative of our own. We would also need to consider the chances of success where previous plans had failed, and whether such an initiative could achieve at least the basic objective of creating enough diplomatic momentum to reduce tension in Cyprus itself. We should also need to consider whether any plan should be put forward by ourselves alone, or in concert with allies such as the United States.

24. In parallel with such action, we would wish to pursue the primary objective of getting the Secretary General back into play. To this end we would consider the following actions:

- (1) Review in Security Council; possibility of renewing Secretary General's mandate as reaffirmed in SCR 541.

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- (2) Reiterate position on UDI as in November 1983.
- (3) Take appropriate position on Denktash's response to Secretary General's ideas.
- (4) Urge restraint and non-internationalisation on Greeks/Greek Cypriots.
- (5) Approaches to Greek and Turkish Governments.
- (6) Consultations with partners. Ministerial contact may be required.
- (7) Statements in Parliament.

25. When it seemed possible that the Secretary General could re-enter the arena, we might suggest the appointment of new Special Representative.

Annex

Outline of Possible Initiatives

I Comprehensive settlement

1. This could be a "one-off" package or a "staged" approach as devised by Gobbi in 1982. The latter would be unlikely to meet with Perez de Cuellar's approval. Either would need to cover:

- (a) demilitarisation of the Republic
- (b) arrangements to maintain security on the island
- (c) reduction of proportion of territory currently held by Turkish Cypriots
- (d) constitutional proposals, probably including details of:
 - (i) executive
 - (ii) legislative
 - (iii) judiciary
 - (iv) division of powers between Federal Government and "Provinces"
- (e) (possibly) other matters including economic.

2. Such an approach was adopted or inherent in the following attempts at reaching a settlement in the past:

- (a) the 1960 Constitution
- (b) the UK/US/Canada proposals of 1978
- (c) the "Waldheim Evaluation" of 1981
- (d) the UN Secretary General's "Indicators" of August 1983
- (e) President Kyprianou's proposals of January 1984.

3. The main attractions of such an approach are:

- (a) its comprehensive nature
- (b) its proximity to the 1960 approach (for which the UK remains a Guarantor under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee)
- (c) its similarity with the Greek Cypriot preference.

4. Past failures demonstrate the disadvantages. There is little reason to suppose that such an approach would be workable in the circumstances following a failure of the Secretary General's efforts. It could at best serve as a desirable objective within which lesser targets may be

achievable.

II Mini Package

If a comprehensive solution is unattainable it might be possible to save the situation from deteriorating by focussing attention on a Mini Package.

1. The elements from which a "mini package" might be selected on an à la carte but balanced basis are:
 - (a) territorial changes involving Varosha and possibly Morphou
 - (b) the opening of Nicosia Airport
 - (c) lifting of economic embargo on northern Cyprus
 - (d) high level meeting between two communities
 - (e) intercommunal discussions
 - (f) freeze on military enhancements
 - (g) freeze in northern Cyprus on further consolidation of UDI
 - (h) freeze on internationalisation of problem by Greek Cypriots
 - (i) other territorial adjustment
 - (j) freedom of movement by both communities within the island
 - (k) establishment of Federal Republic with, initially, very limited federal powers
 - (l) limited definition of provincial powers
 - (m) withdrawal of troops from the vicinity of the Green Line.

2. In principle, any "mini package" should include Varosha since it was agreed in 1979 by Denktash and Kyprianou that Varosha should be given priority. But the selection would have to be made in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. Any "mini package" launched in the immediate aftermath of the failure of the Secretary General's current efforts should probably initially avoid Varosha since the inadequate response of Denktash on this point will have been a

main reason for the Secretary General's lack of success.

3. Since it is a less ambitious approach it may stand a greater chance of some limited success given adequate political will. But Kyprianou has made clear that it would be difficult for him to sell to domestic public opinion. Acceptance of even a part of a mini package might offer the Secretary General a re-entry card.

4. Three possible "mini packages" are:

(i) "Ambitious Package":

- (a) territorial adjustment (possibly Varosha/Morphou)
- (b) establishment of limited Federal Republic
- (c) high level meeting
- (d) freedom of movement
- (e) withdrawal of troops from the Green Line

(ii) "Unambitious Package"

- (a) Nicosia Airport
- (b) intercommunal discussions
- (c) minor territorial adjustment

(iii) Military disengagement package

- (a) Dismantling of fortifications etc in or near buffer zone and military withdrawal to rear areas.
- (b) Return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots, rest of buffer zone to be divided according to predominant distribution of population before partition.
- (c) Reduction of troops in rear areas.
- (d) Ports and Airports to come under Federal Aviation Authority. Chances of success of such an initiative would be enhanced by support from eg US, FRG, France and Italy. We should not however lobby them at present as we wish to avoid any suggestion of potential failure of the Secretary General's initiative.

FCO STATEMENT OF 18 APRIL

We share the disappointment and concern expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the ceremonies which took place in Ankara and Northern Cyprus on 17 April. This action is inconsistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 541, which we continue to support. We wish to underline our support for Sr Perez de Cuellar's mission of good offices and regret any actions which may impede his chances of success.

19 APR 1984



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FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

PERSONAL

Euboea: 11.4.1984

Dear John,

A.J.C. $\frac{9}{5}$
b-a

Many thanks for your letter of 17 March and for the PM's kind message.

1. Achmetaga Estate: my offer to donate the Forest to the Government of May 1983 was conditional of relief from taxes paid while the Estate was prevented from working and on compensation for damage. This was refused, but the Greek Government offer to purchase it for one-twentieth its taxable value. I then offered to sell one twentieth of the Forest if the Government would donate that to the Village Council. This was also refused, and my offers lapsed.
2. We therefore now wish to go back to the status quo ante: to control and operate the whole Estate with full cooperation from all greek officials and agencies.
3. But if, in future, a new Village Council agrees, I will donate, or let for fifty years, at a nominal rent, an appropriate area of Forest to the Village on condition they surrender any rights over the remainder.
4. On about 1 April, Papandreou, in a speech at Larissa, again threatened expropriation of "Baker-type chiftliks" and monastery lands. I have asked the Ambassador here to obtain a copy of the relevant extract and to ask what Papandreou means. I have also sent a short note about this to the European Commission.
5. Our Submission to the Commission goes ahead as complaint no 97/84 and I hope to see Narjes, the Commissioner concerned on about 27 April.
6. I enclose Papers about Cyprus. I am convinced the UN can do nothing but harm, but that our 'Team' might find a solution. The Swiss, Austrians and Yugoslavs seem particularly keen.
7. Could you spare time for lunch in the first ten days of May? My Secretary will ask yours.
8. Thank you so much for all your help.

All good wishes,
Yours sincerely,

A.J.Coles Esq,
10 Downing Street.

BORREGAARD DIPLOMAT

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FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

P.S. from Athens - 13. 4. 1984.

We have had a further incident in the Village when a small mob*
(led by the local police sargent) drove off a tennant plowing
our field behind the Police Station. The Ambassador kindly
arranged for the Consul General to take me to Gendarmerie HQ where
we protested to Brigadier Dascalakis, Director of Security, and I
am seeing the Public Prosecutor for Euboea today. This is a set-
back. I will keep you informed of developments. All good wishes.
In haste,

NB

A.J.Coles Esq.

* The men were mostly at work in the mines. The atmosphere in
the village remains good.

Nicosia

1. In January, I visited (for the 46th time since Eden sent me to mediate in 1956) and saw the Acting President Ladas (Kyprianou was in New York) and Ambassador Inal Batu and Messrs Onan, Konuk and others (Denktas was in New York also).
2. The response was good from both sides. I discussed this with James Holger, Acting Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Nicosia.
3. I had previously visited Ankara at the invitation of senior Foreign Office Officials, to discuss the Plan. The response was encouraging.
4. I also mentioned the matter to the UK High Commissioner in Nicosia and to the American and Yugoslav Ambassadors, explaining to the first two (as I already had to Monty Stearns, the US Ambassador in Athens and an old friend) that I sought only unofficial approval from their Governments, not participation.
5. In Stockholm on 20 March, I saw Sverker Aström, former Head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Representative at UN, Ambassador at Paris etc., also also Mats Bergquist Assistant Under-Secretary, Political Department and Herman at Trolle Head of Section covering Cyprus. Their view was that tacit UN approval was necessary for any Swedish participation.
6. In Stockholm I also saw the Austrian Ambassador and the Yugoslav Counsellor Iovan Ilić, who made further arrangements (see below).
7. In Bern on 20 and 21 March I had detailed talks with Auguste Lindt former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ambassador at Delhi etc., and amended my Paper on his advice. He urged that the Team be kept small for both efficiency and security.
8. On 23 March, I telephoned Holger in Nicosia who told me Gobbi (whom I had seen in Rome when I asked him to sound out the Secretary-General. I later saw Probst, Statssekretär at the Swiss Foreign Ministry) had been sent as Ambassador to Madrid but was still nominally the S-G's Representative in Cyprus. He suggested deletions in my paper which I had already made.
9. On 25 March, I redrafted Paper CIR 1.
10. In Vienna on 27 March I saw ex-Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch MP now International Secretary of the Socialist Party (an old acquaintance) and Counsellor Helga Konrad Division II 2 for Southern Europe at the Foreign Ministry (her boss had flu).
11. On 28 March, I saw ex-Ambassador Dr Ludwig Steiner MP, international spokesman for the Peoples' Party at the Nationalrat, Vienna, for a long, detailed and most encouraging talk.
12. On 30 March in Sarajevo, I saw ex-Minister and ex-Ambassador Niaz Disdarević, Member of the Praesidium of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists and Chairman of the Federal Foreign Affairs Council. He evinced particular interest in a federal settlement for Cyprus. (He feared the hiving-off of "independent" republics elsewhere as a threat to the Yugoslav federal system.) He seemed keen on active Yugoslav participation. He suggested that former Yugoslav Ambassador in Switzerland Madame Radić might sound out the Secretary General after I had news of Gobbi's offer to do so. He also advised me to consult

March 1984

CIR 1 (6)
Sixth Draft

CYPRUS PROJECT / PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

A. Introduction

The longer the status quo in Cyprus persists, the faster it will freeze. It is potentially exceedingly dangerous: for the Cypriots, their partners and neighbours, for the whole Middle East, for East-West relations, for the UN and for the Commonwealth.

1. The UN cannot now act because: (a) it is tied by General Assembly Resolution calling for withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot UDI, (b) because the Greek-Cypriots and Greeks are committed to not talking to Turks before that withdrawal. But withdrawal will not occur unless the new Turkish Cypriot Republic ("Republic") federates with the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus - in which case both will automatically renounce the status quo which, however, does constitute a pragmatic basis for Federation.
3. Even if the UN could resume the inter-Communal talks, these would produce no better result than before. They would do more harm than good. Sadly, they have become "megaphone diplomacy": the occasion for public and aggressive demagoguery which, on each occasion, leaves the situation worse. (Except in the single case of the last Macarios-Denktaş agreement which, unfortunately, was later aborted.)
4. So a new method is necessary and urgent.

B. Method might be:

1. An unofficial, low-key, secret enquiry by a neutral Team: perhaps including Austrian, Canadian, Irish, Swedish, Swiss and possibly Yugoslav participation or close support. (The first four States man UNFICYP; the Swiss provide substantial financial help; and the Yugoslavs enjoy, I hope, good relations with all Parties concerned and are non-aligned and federal.)
2. The Team must be acceptable to both Cypriot Communities and, by extension, to Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece (which now has little influence).
3. It should secure tacit approval from UN and major interested governments.
4. It should be given perhaps three months to report on whether or not there is an agreed basis for a federal solution. If not, no harm is done. If so, rapid negotiations should proceed immediately to a settlement. (A retired Swiss Ambassador and former high UN official might undertake preparation of the Report.)
5. Preliminary contacts, at a high level, with the two Cypriot Communities and with the Canadian, Irish, Swiss and Turkish Governments appear to indicate serious interest.
6. Sympathetic interest but, as requested, not in participation, has also been evinced by representatives of the US and UK (Mrs Thatcher personally) Governments and by the Vatican (Archbishop Ferraioli). Ambassador Gobbi also kindly agreed to raise the matter with the UN Secretary General.
7. Retired Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus Criton Tornarities will act, if required, as one Constitutional Consultant and also, perhaps, Mr Justice Onan (Turkish Cypriot), at a later stage.

C. The Basis for a settlement might be:

1. The status quo merging into a Federation/Confederation of two "independent" republics to be called Federal States.
2. Each State to have maximum autonomy (including security, education etc.) compatible with federation.
3. Federal Government with, at first, powers only over Customs, Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Defence (if any)...
4. Readjustment of Turkish State's boundaries.
5. Return of Greeks to Varosha, reopening of Nicosia Airport.
6. Compensation for lost property.
7. Gradual dismantling of Green Line.
8. Balanced withdrawal of Foreign Troops from both Federal States.
9. International guarantees by ^{U.N.} Commonwealth etc.

NOTE: C above emerges from persistent private, informal conversations with leaders of both Communities and Turkey since 1956 when Prime Minister Eden sent me to mediate between the Governor and Archbishop and when we came close to a settlement better than any later proposed.

But it should be examined, tested or modified by the Team.

F.N-B.



10 DOWNING STREET

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a fo

From the Private Secretary

5 March 1984

Thank you for your letter of 21 January outlining your ideas on the Cyprus problem and enclosing your paper CIR 1(4). It is good of you to have given us an opportunity to comment on your ideas.

We share your wish that a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem should be found as soon as possible. And we are broadly in agreement with your analysis of the dangers inherent in the present situation. We would not wish to comment in detail on your ideas for the substance of a settlement since that is a matter for the two communities. But, clearly, many of them are likely to find a place in any eventual settlement.

To that end we are supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to make progress through his mission of good offices, which was endorsed by the UN Security Council on 18 November last year just after the Turkish Cypriot declaration. We stand ready to do whatever we can to help him in his efforts. I understand that the Secretary General is in close touch with the parties and is currently exploring possible ways forward. He has recently seen President Kyprianou of Cyprus, and President Evren of Turkey and is soon to meet Mr. Denktash.

In view of the activity now being undertaken by the Secretary General, we believe that a separate initiative at this stage, however well intentioned, would not be appropriate since it would be likely to cut across the Secretary General's efforts and might well prove counterproductive.

A JC

CT

The Hon. Francis Noel-Baker.

CONFIDENTIAL

BF



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 March 1984

Type letter pl.

*MBG
13.*

Gen John.

As requested in your letter of 22 February, I enclose a draft reply to a letter from The Hon Francis Noel-Baker. We are very sceptical about Mr Noel-Baker's ideas. He is clearly pursuing them with vigour. He gave an earlier draft of his paper to our High Commission in Nicosia and appears to have floated them with other governments as well.

*Yours
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM
Mr Coles

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
The Hon Francis Noel-Baker
10 Drayton Gardens
London SW10

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 21 January outlining your ideas on the Cyprus problem and enclosing your paper CIR 1(4). It is ~~very~~ good of you to have given us an opportunity to comment on ~~these~~ ideas. ~~I hope that the following outline of our present thinking is useful to you.~~

CAVEAT.....

We share your wish that a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem should be found as soon as possible. And we are broadly in agreement with your analysis of the dangers inherent in the present situation. We would not wish to comment in detail on your ideas for the substance of a settlement since that is a matter for the two communities. But, clearly, many of them are likely to find a place in any eventual settlement.

Enclosures-flag(s).....

To that end we are supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to make progress through his mission of good offices, which was endorsed by the UN Security

/Council

Council on 18 November last year just after the Turkish Cypriot declaration. We stand ready to do whatever we can to help him in his efforts. I understand that the Secretary General is in close touch with the parties and is currently exploring possible ways forward. He has recently seen President Kyprianou of Cyprus, and President Evren of Turkey and is soon to meet Mr Denktash.

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In view of the activity now being undertaken by the Secretary General, we believe that a separate initiative at this stage, however well intentioned, would not be appropriate since it would be likely to cut across the Secretary General's efforts and might well prove counterproductive.

AR $\frac{6}{3}$

CYPRUS : Int. Sit. : Pt 2

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1432</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Note dated 23 February 1984</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>8/1/2014</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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NUMBER NOT USED	



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1984

CYPRUS

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker called on the Prime Minister yesterday on other business, but raised with her the question of Cyprus. He had a word with me afterwards and has today sent me a letter, a copy of which I enclose.

He is advocating a low-level, unpublicised shuttle to promote a federation of Cyprus. You will see that he is already actively canvassing this idea.

15/2/84
I should be grateful if you would let me have an early draft reply.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ST

Confidential

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FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

London: 21.2 1984

Dear John, (*if I may*)

I will try briefly to summarise and supplement what I said this afternoon about Cyprus, whence I have just returned from my 46th visit since Eden sent me in 1956 to mediate between Harding and Macarios. We got very close to a settlement then: a much better one than any since.

Over many years, the UN method of "megaphone diplomacy" through inter-Communal talks, which often become shouting matches and always leak, have done more harm than good; with the exception of the last Macarios-Denktaş meeting; and even that eventually aborted.

Now the UN is further hamstrung by the Resolution calling on Denktaş to revoke UDI which, of course, he cannot do.

In fact, the existence of an "independent" Turkish-Cypriot State makes federation psychologically easier. Two largely autonomous "Republics" could become Provinces under a federal Government with limited powers, and would, one hopes, gradually and naturally grow together once the security and freedom from exploitation of their respective Communities had been secured.

There is no time to lose. The longer the status quo remains, the more it will freeze: a flashpoint of great danger.

I am utterly convinced that now is the time for a low-level, unpublicised shuttle backed by interested neutrals: Canada, Sweden and perhaps Austria (who provide troops and police) and Switzerland who provides money for the UN Force there.

I have approached Trudeau and Palme and have seen Probst, the head of the Swiss Foreign Ministry. And I have asked Gobbi to get the Secretary General's tacit approval without which the Swedes, in particular, may not play. This may be an obstacle.

For brevity I do not repeat the points in the enclosed paper CIR (4).

But perhaps I should add that we do not seek direct UK (or US) involvement, though their goodwill is, of course, most desirable. I have spoken to the Americans and to Wilberforce in Nicosia.

I can elaborate if you wish.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Francis Noel-Baker

John Coles Esq,
10 Downing Street.

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FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

London 6 February 1984

CYPRUS INTERNATIONAL REPORT - PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The basis for a settlement might be:

1. The status quo merging into a federation of two "independent" republics, to be called Provinces
2. Each province to have maximum autonomy (including security) compatible with Federation
3. Federal Government with, at first, powers only over Customs, Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Defence (if any)...
4. Substantial shrink of Turkish Province
5. Return of Greeks to Varosha, reopening of Nicosia Airport
6. Compensation for lost property
7. Gradual dismantling of Green Line
8. Balanced withdrawal of foreign troops from the Provinces.
9. International guarantees by Commonwealth etc

The method might be:

- a. Team of "researchers": Canadian, Swedish, self plus Yugoslav or Irish.
- b. Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot legal Consultants. Attourney-General will serve (when retired) and, perhaps, Mr Justice Onan
- c. Secretariat and Report under retired Swiss Ambassador
- d. British Administrator/Treasurer
- e. Tacit UN approval: Minister Hugo Gobbi is helping
- f. Austria to provide security, communications
- g. Contact with and approval of friendly governments: US, Vatican (Archbishop Ferraioli will help)

First responses from Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Vatican are favourable.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 February 1984

no reg.

A.J.C. 27/2

t.a.

Jan John,

Thank you for your letter of 13 February, enclosing one that the Prime Minister had received from Mr Denktash. As you surmised, this is a circular letter, which has been sent to a number of members of the Cabinet and presumably to other governments.

As in the past, we recommend that the Prime Minister should not acknowledge letters from Mr Denktash, since that would imply recognition of his status as "President" of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)". It is not our general practice to have any written communication with the "Government" of the "TRNC". But our High Commissioner in Nicosia sees Mr Denktash quite often, and this enables us to put across our views to him as necessary.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Cyprus Int Sit Pt 2

Postage and Communication Office

POST OFFICE, Nicosia



17 JUN 1984



FILE

WJ

(Encs with Fed)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 February, 1984

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Denktash. It appears to be a circular letter and has doubtless been sent to others.

I should be grateful for your advice on how this should be handled.

BU

F. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office .

ls

VISIT OF US SECRETARY OF STATE: 15 JANUARY

CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Turkish declared intention of reducing the numbers of their troops in northern Cyprus is a small but welcome gesture. We hope that it will, at minimum, deter any attempt by the Greeks to increase their troop strength. Denktash's proposals on Varosha are clearly carefully worded and many of them will be understandably unpalatable to the Greek Cypriots. Obviously they could be better. But they contain important positive elements on which it might be possible to build. Tactically unwise of Greek Cypriots to reject them out of hand.

2. Kyprianou's proposals seem to be largely repetition of old positions. We expect him to give us copies when he sees Prime Minister on 18 January. His objective of seeking comprehensive rather than step by step settlement is over-ambitious. But, despite shortcomings, proposals give Secretary General something to work on.

3. Believe that the UN Secretary General remains best placed to take a lead in pursuing progress. Hope US will continue, with us, to persuade him of need for demonstrating active involvement. He should follow up on Denktash and Kyprianou proposals. Appointment of new Special Representative still important. Pleased that Secretary General has undertaken to talk to Evren at Casablanca today (15 January).

4. We have been active with all parties and remain ready to help Secretary General. Prime Minister is seeing Kyprianou on 18 January: I plan to see Turkish Foreign Minister the next day in Stockholm. Will encourage Kyprianou to be flexible; to give Secretary General room for manoeuvre; and not to box himself into a corner with unrealisable preconditions for intercommunal negotiations.

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5. How do Americans see situation? Is Congressional reaction to Denktash's declaration of independence a problem which will affect US relations with Turkey?

6. Guarantor Power consultations [if necessary]. Greeks still refusing to take part in consultations with Turks. We will persist in efforts to set up tripartite talks as required by Treaty. Frankly not hopeful that consultations will take place; nor that they would contribute to a solution if held. We do not wish to be put in false position as mediator between Greece and Turkey in parallel talks. Way to progress is not through Guarantor Power mechanism but through UN.

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BACKGROUND

1. On 2 January Denktash issued a wide ranging statement
A containing "proposals of goodwill" (details in Nicosia telno 3 attached). Although very limited in scope they had some helpful features:
- (a) a positive tone;
 - (b) the delinking and development of earlier proposals about the suburb of Varosha and Nicosia airport;
 - (c) a commitment to the re-activation of the Committee of Missing Persons.
2. On 3 January, in a clearly co-ordinated move, the Turkish MFA announced the intention to withdraw 1500 Turkish troops from Cyprus during January and February.
3. Following his meeting with Papandreou on 23 December, Kyprianou is currently visiting Paris, Washington and New York. He saw Shultz and the UN Secretary General on 9 January and the latter again on 11 January. He comes to London on 15 January and will call on the Prime Minister on 18 January.
4. In meeting with Shultz and with Perez de Cuellar Kyprianou outlined his ideas for a comprehensive rather than step by step solution. We were given details in confidence by the Americans.
B (Washington telno 96 attached). Main features were:
- (a) complete demilitarisation;
 - (b) UN force to secure external defence and internal security;
 - (c) treaty to provide international guarantees of Cypriot independence;
 - (d) imprecise details about a federal structure;
 - (e) possibility that Turkish Cypriot administration might extend to 25% of territory; and
 - (f) agreement that Committee on Missing Persons should reconvene.
5. In 11 January talks with UN Secretary General, Kyprianou confirmed he wanted Secretary General to arrange for him to meet Denktash. But this was conditional upon implementation of

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SCR 541, (ie withdrawal of the declaration of independence) which will clearly be unacceptable to Denktash.

6. Kyprianou has told press of existence of his proposals without revealing their content. They will probably leak and be condemned by the Turkish Cypriots as inadequate and unrealistic.

7. Perez de Cuellar considers Denktash's proposals disappointing but has told us that they were something on which he could work. He thought it important to start with Varosha and expected to get Denktash's offer improved. He told Kyprianou he would urge Evren, at a meeting with him in Casablanca on 15 January, to press Denktash for substantive concession on Varosha.

8. UN Secretariat consider Kyprianou's proposals do little more than set out Greek Cypriots' long-standing desiderata. Secretary General told Kyprianou that he would not welcome General Assembly debate on Cyprus. Kyprianou replied that if there was no progress he would be forced to go to the General Assembly.

9. Perez de Cuellar expressed readiness to follow up meeting with Evren with a visit by himself to the area if there seemed a basis for serious negotiations.

10. Despite the obvious shortcomings, both the Kyprianou and the Denktash proposals provide some material on which the Secretary General can work. We should continue to persuade him of the need for active involvement. The appointment of a successor to Dr Gobbi as Special Representative in Cyprus remains a key element in demonstrating involvement. The Secretary General continues to move very slowly on making the appointment.

11. On Guarantor Power consultations, the Greek position remains that they will not take part unless UDI is reversed. But their views are less categorical than previously, reflecting disagreement with Kyprianou on the value of consultations. We

have a treaty obligation to call for consultations. But there are considerable risks, and no comparable advantages, for us if they actually take place. The Guarantor Power mechanism is no substitute for the role of the UN Secretary General in seeking for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

12. Mr Whitney exchanged views with State Department on 6 January. Our views are similar and we keep in close touch. Like us, the Americans do not want to take a lead; but they claim to have been active in persuading the Turks, as we have, to make concessions. Congressional pressure may oblige the Americans to be more overtly active in future than the Administration would really like.

13. The Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus (set up at New Dehli) has had one meeting with the UN Secretary General. It is otherwise inactive and not a significant factor.

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM NICOSIA 031440Z
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 003 OF 3 JANUARY 04

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, MODUK AND CBFC.
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO.

CYPRUS : DENKTASH'S GOODWILL PROPOSALS

1. ON 2 JANUARY DENKTASH ISSUED A STATEMENT CONTAINING '' PROPOSALS OF GOODWILL, SO THAT THE FIRST STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION''. HE WAS ALSO INFORMING THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, REQUESTING HIM TO HELP BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES, SO THAT THE PROPOSALS COULD MATERIALISE.
2. AFTER A PREAMBLE TAKING AS STARTING POINT THE DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD, BUT SPEAKING OF RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE AND OF THE NEED FOR A ''FEDERAL SOLUTION'' REACHED BETWEEN THE ''TWO PEOPLES'' IN CYPRUS, THE MAIN PROPOSALS ARE :
 - I VAROSHA: ''THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE REITERATES ITS READINESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON ITS PROPOSALS OF 17 NOVEMBER CONCERNING VAPOSHA AND NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE''. NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF THE SIDES REGARDING EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL STATUS. VAROSHA AND THE AIRPORT ARE ''SEPARATE ISSUES NEITHER OF WHICH CONSTITUTES A PRECONDITION FOR THE OTHER''. AS PROOF OF ITS DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE VAROSHA ISSUE, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE TO PLACE THE ''VAROSHA AREA AS DEFINED IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT MAP OF 5 AUGUST 1961 UNDER INTERIM UN SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION'''. THE MODALITIES AND CONDITIONS SHALL BE DETERMINED BETWEEN THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THE UN. THIS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHALL NOT PREJUDICE THE FINAL POLITICAL STATUS OF THE APEA AND SHALL CONTINUE UNTIL A FUNAL COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION. THETO QUESTION OF GREEK CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT IN THE APEA SHALL BE CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE BEGINNING OF NEGITIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. AFTER AGREEMENT HAS BEEN PEACHED ON RESETTLEMENT UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION, THE AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. OPENING THE APEA TO GREEK CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT SHALL NOT PREJUDICE ITS FINAL POLITICAL STATUS. THE PURKISH CYPRIOTS APE READY TO DISCUSS DETAILS WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND WITH THE UN.

II NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE ACCEPTS HANDING OVER THE AIRPORT TO INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT INSISTING THAT IT BE ADMINISTERED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY''. OPENING THE AIRPORT WILL BE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE TWO SIDES AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GOODWILL AND TRUST. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE READY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, OR FAILING THAT WITH THE UN. THE PROPOSAL IS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR OTHER STEPS AIMED AT CREATING GOOD WILL.

III COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS: TURKISH CYPRIOTS PROPOSE THAT THE CMP BE REACTIVATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES (THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVING AGREED IN NOVEMBER TO THE REMOVAL OF PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES). PILLOUD IS REQUESTED TO COME TO CYPRUS AT AN EARLY DATE. THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS INVITED TO DECLARE ITS READINESS TO PARTICIPATE.

3. 1 THE STATEMENT INCORPORATES A PROPOSED TEXT FOR A 'COMMON UNDERSTANDING', WHICH WOULD BE 'WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RESPECTIVE POSITIONS REGARDING EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL STATUS'', INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

- (A) BOTH SIDES RESOLVE TO WORK FOR RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES'' SO THAT THEY MAY PURSUE A 'FEDERAL UNION'' AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. TO ACHIEVE THIS THEY MIGHT ESTABLISH AS 'COMMON GROUND'' : AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BY PEACEFUL MEANS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN; RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL EQUALITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS; SUPPORT FOR THE OPENING STATEMENT OF AUGUST 1980; AND THE AIM OF A 'BIZONAL FEDERATION'' BASED ON PARTNERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION.
- (B) BEST ENDEAVOURS TO PREVENT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.
- (C) PRACTICAL MEASURES TO 'RESTORE AND HARMONISE RELATIONS'' INCLUDING PRIORITY TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON VAROSHA; CO-OPERATION FOR REOPENING NICOSIA AIRPORT; RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MISSING PERSONS; REFRAINING FROM HARASSING EACH OTHER IN TRADE, TOURISM, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS ETC; MUTUAL BENEFIT FROM ALL ECONOMIC FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR CYPRUS; ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COMMISSION AND A JOINT HEALTH COMMISSION; JOINT ENDEAVOURS IN THE CULTURAL FIELD INCLUDING GREEK AND TURKISH SECOND LANGUAGE TEACHING, A FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A UNIVERSITY, JOINT CULTURAL AND SPORTING ACTIVITIES, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL MEETINGS; AND A SEMINAR ON FEDERALISM AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE IN THE CYPRUS CONTEXT.

(D) UNDERTAKINGS TO REFRAIN FROM PROVOCATIONS OF ALL KINDS
E AND TO AVOID THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE.

(E) AGREEMENT TODAY HIGH LEVEL MEETING UNDER UN AUSPICES.

(F) AGREEMENT FOR BOTH SIDES TO CALL ON TURKEY AND GREECE
TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST THEIR EFFORTS IN THE SEARCH
S FOR A SETTLEMENT BASED ON PREVIOUS HIGH LEVEL
AGREEMENTS, THE 1908 OPENING STATEMENT AND THE
EVALUATION DOCUMENT.

4. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

5. SEE MIFT.

6. FCC PLEASE TO PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

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SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 10 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY PARIS
BONN ROME

MIPT: CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S SPEAKING NOTES:

BEGINS: 1. A BASIC PREREQUISITE TO A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO BE COMPLETELY DEMILITARISED. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ALL TURKISH OCCUPATION TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN TOGETHER WITH THE COLONIZERS IMPORTED FROM TURKEY. AT A LATER STAGE ALL TROOPS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE (GREEK AND TURKISH CONTINGENTS) SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND THE CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD THE SO-CALLED QUOTE TURKISH CYPRIOT SECURITY FORCE UNQUOTE SHOULD BE DISBANDED. DEMILITARISATION IS INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE AS AN ELEMENT OF INTERNAL STABILITY BUT ALSO ALLEVIATE TURKEY'S PARADOXICAL QUOTE FEARS UNQUOTE THAT CYPRUS MAY BE USED AGAINST HER MILITARILY.

2. AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPRISING MEN FROM COUNTRIES WITH NO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD BE STATIONED IN CYPRUS TO SECURE ITS EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN POLICE DUTIES COULD BE ALLOCATED TO IT FOR AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS NOT ONLY ESSENTIAL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BUT IT WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS CONSOLIDATING A PEACEFUL SITUATION AND CREATING THE APPROPRIATE CLIMATE AND CONDITIONS FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

3. THE QUESTION OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST. THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY (AND NON-ALIGNMENT) OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD BE GUARANTEED BY INTERNATIONAL TREATY. INTERESTED POWERS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE TREATY. THE DUTY OF THE GUARANTORS SHOULD BE A COLLECTIVE ONE AND THE USE OF FORCE SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE TREATY.

4. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD BE A FEDERAL STATE. IN CONSIDERING THE TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF A FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE BASIS FOR SOLVING THESE ISSUES, AS IN FACT ALL OTHER ISSUES AND ASPECTS,

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ARE

ARE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE HIGH-LEVEL AGREEMENTS (MAKARIOS-DENKTASH 1977 AND KYPRIANOU-DENKTASH 1979). IN DETERMINING THE TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES THE COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS MUST ALWAYS BE BORN IN MIND. AN OUTLINE OF THE SOLUTION ENVISAGED FOLLOWS.

5. TERRITORIAL ASPECT

DESPITE THE INHERENT DANGERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONCEPT OF TWO REGIONS OR TWO PROVINCES, YET THIS CONCEPT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED.

IT MUST OF COURSE BE EMPHASISED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONSTITUTE THE 18 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS. COLONIZERS FROM TURKEY AND ANY OTHER PERSONS IMPORTED INTO CYPRUS SINCE THE INVASION IN 1974 CAN UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED AS CYPRIOTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RATIO OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POPULATION IS ONLY 18 PER CENT, YET IT HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 30TH SEPTEMBER 1983 THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF 23 PER CENT FOR THE REGION OR PROVINCE TO BE UNDER TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING WITHOUT DELAY AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER AGREEING THAT 25 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC BE UNDER TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, PROVIDED THAT AREAS SUCH AS FAMAGUSTA AND MORPHOU, WHICH WERE THICKLY POPULATED BY GREEK CYPRIOTS, BEFORE THEY WERE FORCIBLY UPROOTED FROM THEIR HOMES BY THE TURKISH INVADING FORCES, WOULD BE UNDER GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT

IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, UNDER A FEDERAL SYSTEM, THE REGIONS OR PROVINCES WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE AUTONOMY AND POWERS. THEREFORE, ANY CHECKS AND BALANCES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL SHOULD BE RESTRICTED AND BE OF SUCH A NATURE AS NOT TO IMPEDE THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANS OR LEAD TO IMPASSES AND DEADLOCKS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SINCE, IN A FEDERATION, THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL ORGANS ARE THOSE WHICH SAFEGUARD THE UNITY OF THE STATE: AND, THEREFORE, IF THESE FUNCTIONS ARE DISRUPTED THE STATE RUNS THE DANGER OF DISSOLUTION.

(1) EXECUTIVE

THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM PROVIDED UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE PRESERVED:

- (A) THERE SHOULD BE A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, WHO SHOULD BE A GREEK CYPRIOT, AND A VICE-PRESIDENT WHO SHOULD BE A TURKISH CYPRIOT.

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(D) PROVIDED THAT THE PROCESS OF TAKING DECISIONS IS SUCH AS NOT TO LEAD TO IMPASSES AND TO THE DISRUPTION OF THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE, THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COULD INCLUDE A HIGHER PROPORTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAN THEIR POPULATION RATIO, NAMELY THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WOULD BE COMPOSED OF 70 PER CENT GREEK CYPRIOTS MINISTERS AND 30 PER CENT TURKISH CYPRIOTS MINISTERS.

(2) LEGISLATURE

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CYPRUS, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT A UNICAMERAL SYSTEM IS MORE APPROPRIATE. MECHANISMS WOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENSURE SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF ANY PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE.

ALTERNATIVELY, THERE COULD BE A BI-CAMERAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF:

A LOWER CHAMBER: REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO BE ON THE BASIS OF POPULATION RATIO: AND
AN UPPER CHAMBER: REPRESENTATION IN THE UPPER CHAMBER WOULD DEPEND ON THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SUCH CHAMBER AND ON THE PROVISION OF DEADLOCK-RESOLVING MECHANISMS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IS NOT IMPEDED.

3. JUDICIARY

EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT IN RESPECT OF ALL FEDERAL MATTERS.

4. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL POWERS

THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE THE UNITY OF THE STATE.

INDICATIVELY, THESE SHOULD INCLUDE:

- (I) FOREIGN AFFAIRS (INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP, BUT CERTAIN FUNCTIONS MAY BE PROVINCIALLY DELEGATED):
 - (II) FEDERAL FINANCE (INCLUDING CUSTOMS):
 - (III) DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
 - (IV) INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS (AIR AND SEA):
 - (V) INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
 - (VI) APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL OFFICERS:
 - (VII) NATURAL RESOURCES:
 - (VIII) FEDERAL JUSTICE
 - (IX) CO-ORDINATION, HARMONISATION, STANDARD SETTING AND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS:
 - (X) PROVISION FOR TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM FEDERATION TO PROVINCES AND VICE-VERSA IF AGREED.
- LIST OF EXTENSIVE PROVINCIAL POWERS TO BE AGREED.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (INCLUDING THE THREE FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT AND RIGHT OF PROPERTY) SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED BOTH AT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS, AND SHOULD FORM PART OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE THREE FREEDOMS (OF MOVEMENTS, SETTLEMENT AND RIGHT OF PROPERTY) SHOULD RELATE SOLELY TO OVERCOMING CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION AND SHOULD NOT NEGATE OR RESTRICT THEM.

6. ECONOMIC MATTERS

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD ENSURE THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CYPRUS AS A WHOLE AND SHOULD SAFEGUARD FOR ALL CITIZENS OF CYPRUS AN EQUAL STANDARD OF LIVING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO PROGRESS, DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE. SUITABLE MACHINERY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE POPULATION. THUS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL BE GIVEN TO LESS ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED AREAS. FURTHERMORE, MEASURES COULD BE DISCUSSED OF A TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL NATURE, IN RESPECT OF THE ECONOMY, TO TAKE EFFECT AFTER A SOLUTION.

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PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
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MR WRIGHT
SIR C TICKELL
SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
MR JENKINS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

A.F.C. $\frac{13}{1}$

13 January 1984

Joe John,

M

Cyprus

In your letter of 9 January fixing a time for President Kyprianou to call on the Prime Minister on 18 January, you asked for a note on the question of consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee.

It is clear that there is considerable disagreement between the Greeks and Greek Cypriots about whether Greece should agree to take part in tripartite consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee. The initial Greek reaction was to reject our proposal on the grounds that they would not consult directly with the Turks unless the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence was reversed. The Greek Cypriots however appear to see some advantage in tripartite consultations, in order to ensure that the UK remains actively involved and as a means of putting pressure on us to exert our influence in their favour. This different attitude by the Greek Cypriots led Mr Papandreou to be more equivocal about the Greek view of tripartite consultations when he spoke to the Prime Minister at the Athens Summit. But, more recently, Mr Papandreou has again said in public that Greece cannot accept the proposal for tripartite consultations.


The Foreign Secretary believes it was right to fulfil our obligation under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (copy attached) by proposing tripartite consultations. We should continue to express our willingness to take part in consultations whenever the other two Guarantor Powers are also prepared to do so. But we should not be concerned if, because of the unwillingness of Greece to take part, tripartite consultations are not held. Consultations between the Guarantor Powers would, in practice, be unlikely to contribute significantly towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. They would be more likely to break down in mutual recriminations in which we would find ourselves under attack from both Greeks and Turks. Similarly, it would be unwise for us to take up the alternative Greek suggestion of conducting parallel consultations with both Greeks and Turks. This would inevitably cast us in the role of mediator with the likely consequence that we would be blamed by both sides for failure to make progress. The best means of both making progress on

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

the Cyprus problem, and safeguarding our own interests, is to ensure that the UN Secretary-General is taking the lead in promoting negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus.

Given the difference between the Greeks and Greek Cypriots on Guarantor Power consultations, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes it would be better that we should not say anything further publicly on this issue in advance of President Kyprianou's visit. During that visit we shall need to make it clear to President Kyprianou that we do not see parallel negotiations as a substitute for the consultations together envisaged by the Treaty and that, if the Greeks continue to reject tripartite consultations, it would soon be necessary to confirm in public that it has not, so far, proved possible to arrange for Guarantor Power consultations. We should, however, also make it clear to the Greek Cypriots that we will persist in our efforts with all concerned to promote the cause of a settlement in Cyprus; in particular we shall give our full backing to the activities of the UN Secretary-General.


(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

113 JAN 1984



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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 63/83

TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Lefkoşa, Mersin - 10 TURKEY

9 January, 1984

Dear Madam,

As you are aware on the 15 November 1983 the Turkish People of Cyprus, exercising their inalienable right of self-determination, have declared the establishment of the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This Declaration of Independence was unanimously adopted by the Members of the Turkish Cypriot Parliament, acting for and on behalf of the Turkish People of Cyprus as their freely and democratically elected Representatives. Through this Declaration of Independence the Turkish People of Cyprus have re-emphasized their determination to live in peace and security in their own independent and non-aligned State.

The enclosed copy of the Declaration of Independence and the Resolution of the Members of the Turkish Cypriot Parliament, unanimously adopting that Declaration, and the documentary and factual evidence disclosed in the enclosed "Appeal by the Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Committee" fully explain why the Turkish Cypriot People had been left with no alternative but to take this vital step based on our equal co-founder status in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. Our aspirations stem from the eternal truths that have guided your country and millions of people around the globe who believe that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

I would like to assure you that the expression of the legitimate and irrepressible will of the Turkish Cypriot People concerning the exercise of the right to self-determination will not in the slightest way hinder the establishment of a genuine federation by two partners having equal political status; on the contrary a prerequisite for such a solution is now fulfilled.

I feel confident that your knowledge, understanding and sense of fair play will contribute to the adoption of an equitable, objective and constructive attitude by the European Parliament.

Please accept, Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Rauf R. DENKTAŞ)
President

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 January 1984

Cyprus : UN Secretary-General's Activities

Thank you for your letter of 5 January about the UN Secretary General's behind-the-scenes negotiations on Cyprus. The Prime Minister has read and noted the contents of your letter.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JK



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.S.C. 6/1.

5 January 1984

Jan John

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UN Secretary-General's Activities

In your letter of 29 December you asked for clarification of a reference in UKMis New York telegram No 1717 of 22 December to the UN Secretary-General being engaged in secret negotiations on Cyprus.

Sr Perez de Cuellar has been in touch with the Turks and Turkish Cypriots since early December, shortly before the Turkish Foreign Minister (who is an old friend of Sr Perez de Cuellar) relinquished his office after the Turkish elections. Our High Commissioner in Nicosia, and the US Embassy there were told of these contacts in strictest confidence by Mr Holger, the acting UN special representative in Cyprus. Neither Sr Perez de Cuellar himself nor the UN Secretariat in New York has referred to them in conversation with UKMis New York and the Greek Cypriots and other interested countries will know nothing about them. Sr Perez de Cuellar's objective appears to have been to build upon an earlier proposal by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Denktash, to hand over Varosha (a sealed off and uninhabited suburb of Famagusta under Turkish control since 1974) to UN administration for Greek Cypriot resettlement as part of a "mini-package which would also have involved the re-opening of Nicosia airport. Sr Perez de Cuellar appeared to have obtained Mr Turkmen's agreement to "de-couple" the Varosha idea from that of Nicosia airport (which is of little attraction to the Greek Cypriots) and to make certain other improvements.

These ideas seemed to be a good basis for progress and we encouraged Mr Holger to pursue them. The departure of Mr Turkmen and intransigence by other elements in the Turkish government and Denktash seemed initially to have run them into the sand. On 2 January, however, Mr Denktash issued a statement which he described as containing "proposals of goodwill, so that first steps could be taken

/towards



towards a comprehensive solution". These reiterated points which have long been matters of contention but included several positive features. The most significant of these related to his earlier proposal about Varosha. It is not clear to what extent these proposals were a direct result of Sr Perez de Cuellar's efforts or of Turkish pressure, but they appear to merit close attention.

Although it would have been helpful to have had more formal and detailed information of the Secretary-General's ideas, these contacts showed that he was in fact being active behind the scenes in a potentially useful way. As you know, we have been urging the UN Secretary-General to take a higher public profile on Cyprus. In particular, we would like him to appoint a new special representative to succeed Dr Hugo Gobbi who has returned to a senior post in his native Argentina. We have persuaded some of our major allies to make similar approaches to Sr Perez de Cuellar and are instructing the UK Mission in New York to pursue this further and encourage him to do his utmost to build upon the positive elements of Mr Denktash's more recent proposals.


A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Cyprus : Internal Sit PART 2.

15 JAN 1984



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*I have asked for an
up-dated version of the
letter which has been
overlaid.*

4 January 1984

John D. M.

A.F.C. 4/1

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UN Secretary-General's Activities

Cyprus int Sr A 2
In your letter of 29 December you asked for clarification of a reference in UKMis New York telegram no 1717 of 22 December to the UN Secretary-General being engaged in secret negotiations on Cyprus.

Sr Perez de Cuellar has been in touch with the Turks and Turkish Cypriots since early December, shortly before the Turkish Foreign Minister (who is an old friend of Sr Perez de Cuellar) relinquished his office after the Turkish elections. Our High Commissioner in Nicosia, and the US Embassy there, were told of these contacts in strictest confidence by Mr Holger, the acting UN special representative in Cyprus. Neither Sr Perez de Cuellar himself nor the UN Secretariat in New York has referred to them in conversation with UKMis New York and the Greek Cypriots and other interested countries will know nothing about them. Sr Perez de Cuellar's objective appears to have been to build upon an earlier proposal by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Denktash, to hand over Varosha (a sealed off and uninhabited suburb of Famagusta under Turkish control since 1974) to UN administration for Greek Cypriot resettlement as part of a 'mini-package' which would also have involved the re-opening of Nicosia airport. Sr Perez de Cuellar appears to have obtained Mr Turkmen's agreement to 'decouple' the Varosha idea from that of Nicosia airport (which is of little attraction to the Greek Cypriots) and to make certain other improvements. Mr Denktash was not told of these negotiations until a relatively late stage.

These ideas seemed to be a good basis for progress and we encouraged Mr Holder to pursue them. But the departure of Mr Turkmen and intransigence by other elements in the Turkish government and Denktash seemed to have run them into the sand. There seems little immediate prospect that the Secretary-General will be able to revive them.

Although it would be helpful to have more formal and detailed information of the Secretary-General's ideas, these contacts showed that he was in fact being active behind the scenes in a potentially useful way. As you know, we have

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been urging the UN Secretary-General to take a higher public profile on Cyprus. In particular, we would like him to appoint a new special representative to succeed Dr Hugo Gobbi who has returned to a senior post in his native Argentina. We have persuaded some of our major allies to make similar approaches to Sr Perez de Cuellar and now have it in mind to make a further approach to him ourselves.

True
Robert Bone


(R B Bone)tts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Telegrams : Internal Set 175.

4 JAN 1984



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DESKBY 230900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230120Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1717 OF 22 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

PRIORITY MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELNO 923 (NOT TO THE HAGUE): LEBANON: ROLE OF UN FORCES

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS ENORMOUSLY BUSY (WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMONGST OTHERS) BUT AT MY URGENT REQUEST HE GAVE ME 20 MINUTES THIS EVENING (22 DECEMBER).
2. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY MINISTERS TO PROBE THE THINKING BEHIND HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS YESTERDAY (THE TEXT OF WHICH I SENT TO YOU EARLIER TODAY AS MY TELNO 1714).
3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING OFFICIAL OR CONCRETE FROM ANY OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS ON THEIR INTEREST IN UN INVOLVEMENT ADDITIONAL TO THE OBSERVER GROUP IN BEIRUT. HE HAD READ OF ITALIAN INTENTIONS IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND HAD HAD AN INFORMAL APPROACH FROM MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE. BUT THESE WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND THE PARTIES. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIANS.
4. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING MORE POSITIVE RECENTLY FROM THE RUSSIANS AND THE SYRIANS. HE SAID NOT. THE ONLY HOPEFUL SIGN WAS THAT, ACCORDING TO MY LIBYAN COLLEAGUE (WHOM HE ALSO SAW THIS AFTERNOON ON ANOTHER MATTER) GEMAYAL HAD HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH QADDAFI WHICH MIGHT IMPROVE THINGS WITH THE SYRIANS.
5. I SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE SITUATION SEEMED VERY SIMILAR TO WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SAW HIM ON 30 SEPTEMBER AND EXPLAINED OUR POSITION (MY TELNO 982, NOT TO ALL). TO DRAW HIM OUT I SAID THAT MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT A GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO FORM PART OF A PACKAGE. IT WAS NOT OVERLY IMPORTANT WHETHER THE INCREASED UN INVOLVEMENT TOOK THE FORM OF MORE OBSERVERS OR UNIFIL UNDER A DIFFERENT MANDATE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MIX THE TWO. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REPLIED THAT FROM THE UN POINT OF VIEW OBSERVERS WOULD BE ADEQUATE BUT HE WAS FLEXIBLE AND WOULD BE READY TO HELP WITH ANY FORMULA WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. HE NOTED THAT FORMALLY SPEAKING THERE WERE SOME SOVIET OFFICERS IN THE U.N. OBSERVER GROUP FOR THE LEBANON BUT IN PRACTICE THEY WERE ALL IN CAIRO OR DAMASCUS. THE LEBANESE DID NOT WANT THEM IN LEBANON BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS ATTITUDE MIGHT BE CHANGING AND IF SO WHETHER IT WOULD HELP. IN TURN I WONDERED WHETHER THE PRESENCE OF A FEW SOVIET OFFICERS WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TO THE SYRIANS. AS I LEFT, PEREZ DE CUELLAR APOLOGISED FOR NOT HAVING BEEN MORE INFORMATIVE AND REMARKED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP THE AMERICANS OUT OF LEBANON IN THE PRESENT SUPERPOWER CLIMATE. HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD.

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6. THE QUESTION OF LEBANON IS VERY MUCH IN PEOPLE'S MINDS HERE. I HAVE HAD FRAGMENTARY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT IT WITH MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE AND AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN (US) AND AM DUE TO SEE MY NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUE TOMORROW MORNING (23 DECEMBER) IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAS SEEN MY SYRIAN, LEBANESE AND RUSSIAN COLLEAGUES: AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM IS IN MIFT. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER WHEN I HAVE SEEN HIM BUT HE HAS ALREADY WARNED ME THAT HIS CONCLUSION FROM HIS SOUNDINGS IS THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A POSSIBLE BREAKTHROUGH ON THE QUESTION OF UN INVOLVEMENT AND THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE THE MATTER ANY FURTHER DURING THE REMAINDER OF HIS PRESIDENCY.

7. I DO NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS ENGAGED IN SOME SECRET NEGOTIATION ON THE LEBANON AS HE HAS BEEN ON CYPRUS. HE IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. BUT HE REMAINS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE AND OF THE DIFFICULTY OF SECURING ONE. AFTER SPEAKING WITH THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR I WILL ATTEMPT AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE MIGHT BUILD ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REMARKS.

8. SEE MIFT.

THOMSON

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

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PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL) CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG) OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

CYPRUS: POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME TURKISH TROOPS AND MR DENKTASH'S
STATEMENT OF 2 JANUARYLine to Take

[For use only if raised]

Welcome any steps to lower tension in Cyprus. Have been in close contact with the parties concerned over the past few weeks. Remain ready to assist the UN Secretary General's efforts in whatever way he considers appropriate.

Carefully studying Mr Denktash's statement and the proposals contained in it. Would not want to comment in detail at this stage.

Background

1. On 3 January the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced the intention of withdrawing 1500 Turkish troops from northern Cyprus over the next two months 'as a goodwill gesture'.
2. On 2 January the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Denktash, issued a statement containing proposals:
 - (a) for the handing over to UN administration of the deserted township of Varosha, currently held by the Turkish Cypriots;
 - (b) for the opening up of Nicosia airport;
 - (c) for the resumption of intercommunal talks.

Original on unsuitable paper

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FM FCO 291800Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 277 OF 29 DEC

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ANKARA, ATHENS
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING MOD UK, CBFC (NICOSIA), ISTANBUL
YOUR TELNO 390: CYPRUS

1. CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSIONER TELEPHONED THE DEPARTMENT THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT, AS REPORTED IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR, KYPRIANOU PLANNED TO VISIT PARIS, NEW YORK AND LONDON IN THAT ORDER IN JANUARY (HE DID NOT MENTION WASHINGTON). PANAYIDES ASKED ON INSTRUCTIONS IF KYPRIANOU COULD CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 19 OR 20 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT KYPRIANOU WAS ANXIOUS TO TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER HIS OTHER DISCUSSIONS AND WOULD REVISE HIS SCHEDULE FOR THAT REASON IF NECESSARY.
2. WE ARE PURSUING THE POSSIBILITY OF A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE DIARY WOULD ALLOW FOR A CALL ON 20 JANUARY.

HOWE

Mr Giles (o/v)
To be aware. No firm date has yet been proposed and the PM has not been consulted. We need a letter.
Dues
30/12

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 PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR RIFKIND
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR WHITNEY
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLAPD
 MR WRIGHT
 SIR C TICKELL
 SIR J LEAHY
 MR ADAMS
 MR CARTLEDGE
 MR EGERTON
 LORD N GORDON LENNOX
 MR HANNAY
 MR THOMAS
 MR JENKINS

ADDITIONAL DISTN

CYPRUS

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GR 850
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FM NICOSIA 201435Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 384 OF 20 DECEMBER 83.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING CBFC, PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO.

CYPRUS PROBLEM.

SUMMARY

1. KYPRIANOU PLANNING VISITS TO LONDON, WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK IN THE NEW YEAR (SUBJECT TO HIS MEETING WITH PAPANDEOU ON 23 DECEMBER). CLAIMS TO BE DETERMINED TO PURSUE ACTIVELY AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REVERSING TURKISH CYPRIOT UDI. BUT THIS REQUIRED PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR PLAIN REVERSAL OF UDI TO BE MAINTAINED. KYPRIANOU APPEARING TO FAVOUR CONSULTATIONS UNDER TREATY OF GUARANTEE IN PARALLEL FORM. PROMISES SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE AFTER HIS MEETING WITH PAPANDEOU.

DETAIL.

2. KYPRIANOU INVITED ME FOR A GENERAL TALK ON THE MORNING OF 20 DECEMBER IN PREPARATION FOR HIS VISIT TO ATHENS ON 22/23 DECEMBER. HE SAID THAT THEREAFTER HE WOULD CONTACT ME ABOUT PLANS (ALREADY TENTATIVELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS HERE) FOR A FUTHER VISIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON ON HIS WAY THROUGH TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

3. KYPRIANOU CLAIMED THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO DO ALL HE COULD TO PURSUE AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT IN PRACTICE OF REVERSING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NORTH. HE THOUGHT THAT, PARADOXICALLY, THE SITUATION NOW PRESENTED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SETTLEMENT. BUT FOR THIS TO BE ACHIEVED, IT WAS INDISPENS-ABLE IN PUBLIC TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON TURKEY FOR REVERSAL OF UDI IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 541. KYPRIANOU ASKED HOW I SAW THINGS.

4. I SAID THAT OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCED THE FORMER TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE ONUS LAY ON THEM TO MAKE A MOVE THAT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT HAD SHOWN NO RESULT. I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER WE COULD EXPECT ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT. (I MENTIONED MR RUSSELL'S PENDING CALL ON THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AND ALSO THE REASONABLY SATISFACTORY RESPONSE WE HAD RECEIVED TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS IN ANKARA AND TO DENKTASH OVER UNFICYP). SO FAR AS CONCERNED THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, RECENT REPORTS I HAD SEEN SUGGESTED THAT SOME PEOPLE IN ATHENS WERE, LIKE KYPRIANOU HIMSELF, WONDERING HOW ADVANTAGE COULD BE TAKEN OF THE PRESENT SITUATION TO SECURE MOVES TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. I ADDED THAT, ON THE QUESTION OF TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, I THOUGHT THAT THE BALL RESTED IN THE GREEK COURT

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| BUT

BUT THAT PAPANDREOU MIGHT BE IN TOUCH WITH US AGAIN AFTER KYPRIANOU'S MEETING WITH HIM ON 23 DECEMBER. MEANWHILE IN NEW YORK THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF THE UNFICYP MANDATE RENEWAL, DID NOT SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE TIME HAD YET ARRIVED FOR HIM TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE, THOUGH WE WANTED HIM TO DO SO.

5. ON TREATY OF GUARANTEE CONSULTATIONS, KYPRIANOU APPEARED TO FAVOUR THESE BEING HELD IN PARALLEL FORM, BECAUSE OF THE RISK THAT ANY TRIPARTITE MEETING WOULD AT ONCE BREAK DOWN. HE SAID THAT IN THEIR PRIVATE TALKS IN NEW DELHI, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT APPEARED TO EXCLUDE PARALLEL CONSULTATIONS.

I ASKED HIM WHAT USEFUL RESULT HE THOUGHT COULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF CONSULTATIONS, IN WHATEVER FORM THEY WERE HELD. AT FIRST HE SAID THAT CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE WERE ESSENTIAL AS A MEANS OF KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE ON TURKEY AND SHOWING THAT THE OTHER TWO GUARANTOR POWERS WERE INVITING HER TO LIVE UP TO HER OBLIGATIONS WITH THE AIM OF SECURING REVERSAL OF UDI. I SAID THAT SUCH A HEAD-ON APPROACH WOULD SURELY RESULT IN RAPID COLLAPSE OF THE CONSULTATIONS. I PROBED KYPRIANOU FURTHER ON WHAT HE THOUGHT THEIR OBJECTIVE COULD BE. HE THEN SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM IN NEW DELHI WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED FOR SOME GREEK AND TURKISH MAINLAND TROOPS TO REMAIN IN CYPRUS. HE HAD ANSWERED THAT HE WOULD PREFER THEM ALL TO GO BUT WOULD BE PREPARED FOR NATIONAL CONTINGENTS TO REMAIN AS UNDER THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS ONE SUBJECT WHICH COULD USEFULLY BE ADDRESSED IN TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS, WHICH HE REGARDED AS AN ESSENTIAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO ANY EFFORTS BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO HE DID NOT THINK WOULD BE ABLE TO GET ANYWHERE ON HIS OWN. HE WAS NOT EXPECTING US TO BECOME MEDIATORS OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN PLACE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. KYPRIANOU ENDED BY PROMISING TO CONTACT ME WITH MORE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM ATHENS.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WILBERFORCE

THIS TELEGRAM
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REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

SIR C TICKELL

SIR J LEAHY

MR ADAMS

MR CARTLEDGE

MR EGERTON

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MR HANNAY

MR THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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RESIDENT CLERK

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 200235Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1690 OF 19 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA,
GEORGETOWN, LAGOS, LUSAKA, NEW DELHI, PARIS, BONN, ROME

MY TELNO 1640: COMMONWEALTH ACTION GROUP

SUMMARY

1. THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND RAMPHAL SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS MORNING (19 DECEMBER). HE URGED THEM TO BE CAUTIOUS AND THEY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS. NOTHING WAS ACHIEVED AND THE MINISTERS, PARTICULARLY HAYDEN, ARE FURIOUS WITH RAMPHAL FOR BRINGING THEM TO NEW YORK. ONLY RAMPHAL IS GOING TO WASHINGTON AS SHULTZ WOULD NOT SEE THE MINISTERS.

DETAIL

2. SHERRY GAVE US A COPY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE MINISTERS (COPY BY BAG). PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD THEM THAT HE HAD STRONGLY URGED ALL THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT SCR 541 IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. HE WAS ACTIVELY EXPLORING POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT HE WAS EXPLORING WITH THE TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DENKTASH'S OFFER ON VAROSHA.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD APPEALED TO ALL THE PARTIES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT. THE COMMONWEALTH ACTION GROUP COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THIS REGARD. IN PARTICULAR HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO INTERNATIONALISE THE PROBLEM. HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE

~~HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO INTERNATIONALISE THE PROBLEM.~~ HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE FROM RAMPHAL'S LETTER TO HIM THAT THE GROUP INTENDED TO PROCEED BY "QUIET DIPLOMACY". APPROACHES TO THE PARTIES WERE BEST KEPT DELICATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE REMAINED READY TO EXCHANGE IDEAS WITH THE GROUP.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS REPLIED IN LOW KEY, ASSURING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS. THEY DID NOT PRESS HIM TO TAKE ANY SPECIFIC ACTION. SHERRY'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER THINKING OF VISITING NICOSIA.

5. ONLY RAMPHAL IS GOING ON TO WASHINGTON. APPARENTLY SHULTZ WAS NOT PREPARED TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO SEE AN OFFICIAL IN HIS PLACE.

6. ACCORDING TO THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION THE MINISTERS' ONLY DECISION HAS BEEN TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER THROUGH THEIR MISSIONS IN LONDON AND NEW YORK. ALL THE MINISTERS ARE FURIOUS WITH RAMPHAL FOR DRAGGING THEM TO NEW YORK TO NO APPARENT PURPOSE. HAYDEN'S COMMENTS IN PRIVATE TO HIS MISSION WERE APPARENTLY QUITE UNPRINTABLE.

7. INDEED THE VISIT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOMETHING OF A NON-EVENT. BUT THIS MAY BE NO BAD THING. THE MINISTERS CAN NOW FAIRLY CLAIM TO HAVE DONE THEIR DUTY, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, AND THE VISIT HAS CAUSED THE MINIMUM OF DAMAGE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPRESSED RELIEF TO ME THAT IT HAD ALL GONE LESS BADLY THAN HE HAD FEARED. HE WAS GLAD THAT, DESPITE THE COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP, NO ONE HAD ARGUED THAT UDI MUST BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE RESUMED. HE COMMENTED THAT IN COMING TO NEW YORK THEY HAD ACTED MUCH TOO SOON AND THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO NEXT.

THOMSON

NNNN

NYFO 009/20

00 FCO

PP NICOSIA

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRem 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1432</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Butler to Armstrong dated 15 December 1983 with attached A083/3428</i>	
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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/MR WHITNEY
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~~SIR J BULLARD~~
MR JENKINS

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 353 OF 8 DECEMBER 83.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMNS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ANKARA, ATHENS.

CYPRUS : TURKISH OFFER ON VAROSHA.

1. AT A MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 8 DECEMBER THE ACTING UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED US AND THE AMERICANS OF A TELEGRAM HE HAD RECEIVED OVERNIGHT FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HOLGER EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS GIVING US THE INFORMATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY AND ASKED THAT IT SHOULD BE PROTECTED AND IN PARTICULAR THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED TO THE SECRETARIAT. IN AN ACCORDINGLY RESTRICTING REPETITIONS OF THIS TELEGRAM.

2. ON 5 DECEMBER PEREZ DE CUELLAR RAISED WITH KIRCA DENKTASH'S OFFER OF 17 NOVEMBER. ON 6 DECEMBER TURKMEN TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SAY THAT KIRCA WOULD SHORTLY BE PUTTING TO HIM IDEAS FOR HANDING OVER VAROSHA TO AN ADMINISTRATION. THE IDEAS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CONVEYED BY KIRCA IN THE FORM OF A NON-PAPER, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS IN MIFT.

3. TURKMEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSALS HAD THE AUTHORITY OF EVREN. HE SAID THAT THE MATTER WOULD NEED TO BE COMPLETED 'WITHIN 6 DAYS', BEFORE THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ANKARA TOOK OFFICE. DENKTASH AT THAT STAGE HAD NOT BEEN SQUARED, BUT ANKARA WOULD SEE TO THIS.

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL GOT KIRCA TO ACCEPT THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD BE BETWEEN THE UN AND THE 'TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES' (THE PHRASE USED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541). HE ALSO OBTAINED ASSURANCE THAT CARRYING FORWARD THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT INVOLVE DEALING WITH OR RECOGNITION OF THE 'TRNC'.

OBTAINED ASSURANCE THAT CARRYING FORWARD THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT INVOLVE DEALING WITH OR RECOGNITION OF THE "TRNC".

5. HOLGER WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH DENKTASH THE TERMS OF A DECLARATION BY THE UN ANNOUNCING THE ARRANGEMENTS. HOLGER WAS TO DELAY SEEING DENKTASH UNTIL 9 DECEMBER, TO ALLOW TIME FOR ANKARA TO PREPARE DENKTASH. AS HE HAD HEARD THAT DENKTASH WAS DUE TO LEAVE CYPRUS EARLY ON 9 DECEMBER (WE UNDERSTAND FOR CONPENHAGEN) HOLGER WAS PROPOSING, UNLESS DENKTASH CHANGED HIS PLANS, TO TRY TO SEE HIM ON THE EVENING OF 8 DECEMBER.

6. PLEASE SEE MY TWO WFTS.

WILBERFORCE.

NNNN

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 25/2/30/2

7th December 1983

Prime Minister

Read in full.

Deutsches Lager

RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

A & C. $\frac{F}{12}$

The Defence Secretary was sitting with Mr Papandreou and Mr Bayulken at the lunch of Defence Ministers during the DPC meeting in Brussels today. I attach a record which he prepared afterwards of his conversation with them.

I am copying this letter and the attachment to John Coles (No 10) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). I have also left copies of the attachment with our Delegation to NATO.

Yours truly,

R. C. Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

R L Bone Esq

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MNT

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF THE DEFENCE SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH MR PAPANDREOU AND MR BAYÜLKEN AT THE DPC MINISTERS' LUNCH ON DECEMBER 7TH 1983

I had lunch with Papandreou and Bayülken at which an extremely cordial relationship appeared to exist. The rather aggressive dialogue in the opening session continued on a "totally different note". Bayülken took the view that what was needed was a top-level bilateral meeting between the Prime Minister of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Greece which he believed would be capable of resolving the outstanding difficulties. On the Cyprus problem, Papandreou suggested at one stage a joint Greek/Turkish force to maintain peace with unified command throughout. Bayülken responded by saying that this had the difficulty that the Turkish Cypriots would need time to gain confidence because of their past experiences.

2. Papandreou told me privately after Bayülken had gone that it could be a moment for a significant British initiative, and having talked to the Prime Minister in Athens, he would be putting proposals forward through Rhodes, HM Ambassador Athens. Papandreou told me that he had tried several times but had never succeeded in finding out what the Turks actually wanted. If he could get a firm answer to that question he would understand how to judge the situation better. It was unthinkable to expect any government to concede the sovereign rights of territory to another. Papandreou again made the point to me privately that the cost of the present tensions between his country and Turkey were extremely expensive in terms of military commitment.

3. These are the significant points that emerged from what was a very cordial dialogue. In terms of any initiative between the two, Papandreou was not prepared to countenance a top-level meeting which might fail unless there had been careful preparation but he recognised the point that unless you got this issue raised to top level such was the attitudes on both sides that you were unlikely to find people prepared to break through the present impasse. I asked him if there was anybody at Bayülken's level that he could produce to talk at the second line level and he said that of course they did have such people.



now filed on
→ 1) Cyprus: Int. Sit
A2
2) European Councils
Athens Pt 13

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. FALL
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

CYPRUS

As you are aware, Mr. Papandreou suggested to the Prime Minister that, owing to the pressure of European Council business, they should not have the formal bilateral meeting which had been arranged for 5 December but should instead have a brief discussion of Cyprus in the course of the dinner for Heads of Government later that day.

The Prime Minister told us afterwards that the exchange had been very brief. She had asked Mr. Papandreou whether he had considered fully the impression which would be created if Greece were thought not to be willing to take part in tripartite consultations. Mr. Papandreou stated in reply that he had not yet taken a final decision about consultations and that he would be discussing the matter with President Kyprianou next week.

A.S.C.

6 December 1983

① Gambon : Please check that PM's party are aware of this..

2005
5/12

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PP ROME

GRS 366

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 041826Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 253 OF 4 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), ANKARA,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BONN PARIS ROME UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO
UKREP BRUSSELS ISTANBUL UKDEL STRASBOURG.

CYPRUS: GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS.

THE CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSIONER TELPHONED THE FCO YESTERDAY ON INSTRUCTIONS TO PASS ON COMMENTS BY PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY 1 DECEMBER, AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT HER ANSWER TO A SUPPLEMENTARY ON CYPRUS FROM MR NORMAN ATKINSON MP.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID: 'IT MAY BE THAT BY GETTING TALKS GOING BETWEEN PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU AND MR DENKTASH ONE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP TO RESTORE THE UNITARY STATE OF CYPRUS.' PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT SEEM TO ENCOURAGE TALKS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MR DENKTASH BEFORE THE PURPORTED TURKISH-CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN REVERSED. HE WOULD BE VERY READY TO TALK TO MR DENKTASH BUT ONLY AFTER REVERSAL.

PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ALSO SAID, IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, THAT HE CONTINUED TO HOLD THE POSITION HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON AND NEW DELHI. HE DID NOT WANT THE POSSIBILITY OF PARALLED EXCHANGES (BETWEEN THE UK AND

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GREECE AND THE UK AND TURKEY) TO BE EXCLUDED, . AT LEAST AT FIRST. BOTH THE PRESENCE OF TURKISH TROOPS IN CYPRUS AND THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE MADE TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS DIFFICULT. PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU WAS WORRIED THAT THESE REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE EXPLOITED IN ATHENS AND NICOSIA. ASKED TO CLARIFY, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER SAID THAT IN ATHENS THE OPPOSITION MIGHT EXPLOIT THESE REMARKS: AND IN NICOSIA AKEL AND OTHERS. (THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AT NO POINT SUGGESTED THAT EITHER THE TURKS OR TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD 'EXPLOIT' THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS.) PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU HOPED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT REPEAT SIMILAR REMARKS. MEANWHILE HE WOULD REFRAIN FROM COMMENTING HIMSELF AND HOPED THEREBY TO MAINTAIN THE GOOD RELATIONS HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS IN LONDON AND NEW DELHI

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MR WRIGHT
SIR C TICKELL
SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
MR JENKINS

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PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET
D I O CABINET OFFICE

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RESIDENT CLERK

FM NICOSIA 031410Z DEC 83
DESKBY 050900Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 342 OF 03 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY ATHENS 041000Z FOR PRIME MINISTER'S
PARTY AND SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
INFO PRIORITY ANKARA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL NATO CBFC

MY TEL 329: DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH CYPRUS: 'CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY'
1. ON 2 DECEMBER THE TURKISH CYPRIOT 'LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY'
MET AND ADOPTED BY 24 VOTES TO 16 A RESOLUTION ON THE FORMATION
OF A 'CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY'. THE 70 MEMBERS OF THE NEW
'ASSEMBLY' WILL INCLUDE THE 40 EXISTING 'DEPUTIES', 10 MEMBERS
APPOINTED BY DENKTASH, AND A FURTHER 20 REPRESENTATIVES OF
TRADES UNIONS, MINOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER
ORGANISATIONS. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE NEW 'ASSEMBLY'
WILL BE SUPPORTERS OF DENKTASH. THE NAMES OF THE 30
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN, BUT THE
'CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY' IS TO HOLD ITS FIRST MEETING ON
6 DECEMBER AND WILL IMMEDIATELY BEGIN WORK ON A NEW
CONSTITUTION.

2. THE OPPOSITION CALLED UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR ANY NECESSARY
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION TO BE MADE BY THE EXISTING
'LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY' (IN WHICH THE 'GOVERNMENT' COMMANDS
LESS THAN THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY NECESSARY TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION).

3. THREE VIEWS ARE HELD IN NORTH CYPRUS ON THE LEGALITY OF
DENKTASH'S ACTIONS IN ORGANISINT THE PREPARATION OF A NEW
CONSTITUTION:

(A) THE UNANIMOUS VOTE OF THE 'LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY' ON INDEPENDENCE IMPLIED A DECISION TO
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION, AND AMOUNTED TO A DELEGATION
OF AUTHORITY TO DENKTASH TO DO THIS AS HE THOUGHT
FIT. THE CONDITION OF A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY WAS
THUS SATISFIED

(B) THE DECLARATION OF 15 NOVEMBER CONSTITUTED A COUP
BY DENKTASH AGAINST THE EXISTING ORDER, LEAVING HIM WSTHE
SOLE DE FACTO A

(B) THE DECLARATION OF 15 NOVEMBER CONSTITUTED A COUP BY DENKTASH AGAINST THE EXISTING ORDER, LEAVING HIM WSTHE SOLE DE FACTO AUTHORITY

(C) CETSHE 15 NOVEMBER DECLARATION DID NO MORE THAN CHANGE THE NAME OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, AND IT LEFT ALL EXISTING AUTHORITIES AND INSTITUTIONS INTACT. FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WOULD THUS REQUIRE A TWO-THIRDS VOTE BY THE 'LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY'.

4. DENKTASH HAS USED (A) TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS. VIEW (B) IS HELD BY SOME OF HIS EXTREME SUPPORTERS. (C) IS THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE LEFT WING OPPOSITION, WHICH ACCUSES DENKTASH OF MOUNTING A 'SECOND COUP' IN CREATING THE 'CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY' WHICH HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO USE TO REALISE HIS OWN OBJECTIVES, MUCH ON THE MODEL OF THE NSC-DIRECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHICH FRAMED THE NEW TURKISH CONSTITUTION.

5. SINCE THE DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD DENKTASH HAS PRESSED ON WITH INCREASING CONFIDENCE AND LITTLE REGARD FOR THE OPPOSITION IN NORTHERN CYPRUS OR FOR INTERNATIONAL OPINION. HE HAS DISMISSED THE COMMONWEALTH ACTION GROUP AS 'NON-EXISTENT', SINCE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD NO PART IN ITS ESTABLISHMENT. THERE ARE NO SIGNS HERE OF ANY INTENTION BY ANKARA TO RESTRAIN DENKTASH FROM HIS PLANS TO CONSOLIDATE THE 'TRNC'.

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FM ATHENS 031015Z DEC 83

TO FLASH FCO.,

TELNO 723 OF 3 DECEMBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO NICOSIA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,

UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO UKREP BRUSSELS, CBFC, MODUK (DS11),

BONN, PARIS AND ROME.,

REPEATED AS ROUTINE INFO TO ISTANBUL.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 722: CYPRUS: GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS

1. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT BRIEF THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE FOR HER DISCUSSION WITH PAPANDEOU (SEMICOLON) BUT I SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND. I START FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANY FORM OF TALKS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE RUN A STRONG RISK OF LEAVING US WITH A GOOD SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR FAILURE. ON THAT BASIS OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO AVOID BECOMING ENGAGED IN ANY SUCH TALKS WHILE ALSO, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, AVOIDING ALLOWING THE GREEKS TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE LETTING THEM DOWN.

2. IF YOU ACCEPT THAT, WITH WHATEVER NUANCE, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD REFUSE TO GO DOWN THE PATH OF PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS, I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD SEE PAPANDEOU LATER RATHER THAN SOONER DURING THE ATHENS COUNCIL. THIS WILL RETAIN FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE THE INCENTIVE FOR PAPANDEOU TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS IN HIS STEERING OF THE COUNCIL.

3. AT LEAST FORMALLY PAPANDEOU WILL EXPECT A REPLY TO HIS QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR OBJECT IN REACTIVATING THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE AND THE SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED (MY TUR). I SUGGEST THAT THE REPLY SHOULD INCLUDE THE THOUGHT THAT OUR AIM IS TO WORK FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION. FOG THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE MAJOR PARTIES (AND OF COURSE ALSO FOR THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ON THE GROUND) TO BE PREPARED TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE GUARANTOR POWERS IS ONE WAY OF FACILITATING THAT AND OF ASSISTING SIMILAR EFFORTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE TOPICS FOG DISCUSSION WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETINGS. BUT WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO INCLUDE MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 541.

4. SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE, I SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BASE HER FURTHER RESPONSE TO PAPANDEOU ON THE FOLLOWING:-

- (A) THE GREEK SUGGESTION OF PARALLEL TALKS WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE. THERE WOULD BE WIDE SCOPE FOR MISUNDERSTANDING RECRIMINATION AND DELAY.

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(B) IN ANY CASE THE NATURAL MEANING OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE (''UNDERTAKE TO CONSULT TOGETHER'') IS FOR THE THREE GUARANTOR POWERS TO MEET TO WORK OUT MEANS OF DEALING WITH BREACHES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1960 TREATY.

(C) BY AGREEING TO TALK UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE THE TURKS HAVE IMPLICITLY RECOGNISED THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THAT TREATY. THE GREEKS, BY ACCEPTING TRIPARTITE TALKS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY, WOULD BE GIVING THEMSELVES THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT THE TURKS WITH THE FACT THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY DENKTASH AND TURKEY'S RECOGNITION OF IT ARE IN BREACH OF THE VERY TREATY WHOSE VALIDITY THE TURKS HAVE RECOGNISED.

(D) (NOT FOG USE IF IT CAN BE AVOIDED). THE TURKISH RESPONSE, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY ACCEPT TRIPARTITE TALKS IF THESE ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH OTHER GUARANTOR POWERS, DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ACCEPTANCE OF PARALLEL TALKS.9

5. I RECOGNISE THAT THE ABOVE POINTS ARE ALL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF GREEK ACCEPTANCE OF TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS AND THEREFORE ON THE FACE OF IT INCONSISTENT WITH OUR AIM OF AVOIDING ANY TALKS (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE). BUT, JUDGING BY WHAT PAPANDREOU SAID TO ME YESTERDAY, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO RISK THAT THE GREEKS WILL BE CONVINCED. FOR THEM THE REFUSAL TO SIT DOWN WITH THE TURKS HAS BEEN MADE INTO A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. MOREOVER THEY HAVE JUST PATCHED UP AN AGREEMENT TO THAT EFFECT WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DURING KYPRIANOU'S RECENT VISIT.

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SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
MR JENKINS

ADDITIONAL DISTN
CYPRUS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1983

Duty Officer
No 10 Downing Street

Dear Duty Clerk,

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The Cyprus High Commissioner telephoned the FCO this afternoon on instructions to pass on comments by President Kyprianou about the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on Thursday 1 December, and in particular about her answer to a Supplementary on Cyprus from Mr Norman Atkinson MP.

The Prime Minister said: 'It may ^{be} that by getting talks going between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash one might be able to help to restore the unitary state of Cyprus.' President Kyprianou was anxious that the British Government should not seem to encourage talks between himself and Mr Denktash before the purported Turkish-Cypriot Declaration of Independence had been reversed. He would be very ready to talk to Mr Denktash but only after reversal.

President Kyprianou also said, in connection with the Prime Minister's remarks about tripartite consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee, that he continued to hold the position he had explained to the Prime Minister in London and New Delhi. He did not want the possibility of parallel exchanges (between the UK and Greece and the UK and Turkey) to be excluded, at least at first. Both the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus and the purported Declaration of Independence made tripartite consultations difficult.

President Kyprianou was worried that these remarks by the Prime Minister might be exploited in Athens and Nicosia. Asked to clarify, the High Commissioner said that in Athens the Opposition might exploit these remarks; and in Nicosia AKEL and others. (The High Commissioner at no point suggested that either the Turks or Turkish Cypriots would 'exploit' the Prime Minister's remarks.) President Kyprianou hoped that the Prime Minister would not repeat similar remarks. Meanwhile he would refrain from commenting himself

/and hoped

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and hoped thereby to maintain the good relations he had established with the Prime Minister at their recent meetings in London and New Delhi.

I have consulted the Department concerned and the Duty Private Secretary. They suggest that this letter should be attached to the Prime Minister's briefing for her meeting with Papandreou on Cyprus. But they do not consider that it affects the line that the Prime Minister has been recommended to take with him. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has not seen this letter but I will be showing him a copy in parallel.

Yours sincerely,

T. P. Hollaway

T P Hollaway
President Clerk

CONFIDENTIAL



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/541 (1983)
/18 November 1983

RESOLUTION 541 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2500th meeting,
on 18 November 1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,

Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),

Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;

2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;

3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;

5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;

6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;

7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus;

8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

DRAFT TREATY OF GUARANTEE (1960)

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS (6)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
~~SIR J BULLARD~~
MR JENKINS

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET
D I O CABINET OFFICE

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RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH



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FM ATHENS 031015Z DEC 83

TO FLASH FCC.,

TELNO 723 OF 3 DECEMBER 1983.,

GEPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO NICOSIA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO UKREP BRUSSELS, CBFC, MODUK (DS11),
BONN, PARIS AND ROME.,

REPEATED AS ROUTINE INFO TO ISTANBUL.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 722: CYPRUS: GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS

1. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT BRIEF THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE FOR HER DISCUSSION WITH PAPANDEU (SEMICOLON) BUT I SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND. I START FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANY FORM OF TALKS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE RUN A STRONG RISK OF LEAVING US WITH A GOOD SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR FAILURE. ON THAT BASIS OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO AVOID BECOMING ENGAGED IN ANY SUCH TALKS WHILE ALSO, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, AVOIDING ALLOWING THE GREEKS TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE LETTING THEM DOWN.

2. IF YOU ACCEPT THAT, WITH WHATEVER NUANCE, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD REFUSE TO GO DOWN THE PATH OF PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS, I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD SEE PAPANDEU LATER RATHER THAN SOONER DURING THE ATHENS COUNCIL. THIS WILL RETAIN FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE THE INCENTIVE FOR PAPANDEU TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS IN HIS STEERING OF THE COUNCIL.

3. AT LEAST FORMALLY PAPANDEU WILL EXPECT A REPLY TO HIS QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR OBJECT IN REACTIVATING THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE AND THE SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED (MY TUR). I SUGGEST THAT THE REPLY

AND THE SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED (MY TUR). I SUGGEST THAT THE REPLY SHOULD INCLUDE THE THOUGHT THAT OUR AIM IS TO WORK FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION. FOG THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE MAJOR PARTIES (AND OF COURSE ALSO FOR THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ON THE GROUND) TO BE PREPARED TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE GUARANTOR POWERS IS ONE WAY OF FACILITATING THAT AND OF ASSISTING SIMILAR EFFORTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE TOPICS FOG DISCUSSION WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETINGS. BUT WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO INCLUDE MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 541.

4. SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE, I SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BASE HER FURTHER RESPONSE TO PAPANDREOU ON THE FOLLOWING:-

- (A) THE GREEK SUGGESTION OF PARALLEL TALKS WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE. THERE WOULD BE WIDE SCOPE FOR MISUNDERSTANDING RECRIMINATION AND DELAY.
- (B) IN ANY CASE THE NATURAL MEANING OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE (''UNDERTAKE TO CONSULT TOGETHER'') IS FOR THE THREE GUARANTOR POWERS TO MEET TO WORK OUT MEANS OF DEALING WITH BREACHES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1960 TREATY.
- (C) BY AGREEING TO TALK UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE THE TURKS HAVE IMPLICITLY RECOGNISED THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THAT TREATY. THE GREEKS, BY ACCEPTING TRIPARTITE TALKS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY, WOULD BE GIVING THEMSELVES THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT THE TURKS WITH THE FACT THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY DENKTASH AND TURKEY'S RECOGNITION OF IT ARE IN BREACH OF THE VERY TREATY WHOSE VALIDITY THE TURKS HAVE RECOGNISED.
- (D) (NOT FOG USE IF IT CAN BE AVOIDED). THE TURKISH RESPONSE, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY ACCEPT TRIPARTITE TALKS IF THESE ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH OTHER GUARANTOR POWERS, DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ACCEPTANCE OF PARALLEL TALKS.9

5. I RECOGNISE THAT THE ABOVE POINTS ARE ALL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF GREEK ACCEPTANCE OF TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS AND THEREFORE ON THE FACE OF IT INCONSISTENT WITH OUR AIM OF AVOIDING ANY TALKS (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE). BUT, JUDGING BY WHAT PAPANDREOU SAID TO ME YESTERDAY, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO RISK THAT THE GREEKS WILL BE CONVINCED. FOR THEM THE REFUSAL TO SIT DOWN WITH THE TURKS HAS BEEN MADE INTO A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. MOREOVER THEY HAVE JUST PATCHED UP AN AGREEMENT TO THAT EFFECT WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DURING KYPRIANOU'S RECENT VISIT.

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PS.
PS. ADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
SIR J BULLARD
SIR C TICKELL
MR GIFFARD
MR HANNAY

RESIDENT CLERK,
HD/ECD(E) (3)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ SEI
HD/
HD/

PLUS FCO

CABINET OFFICE
MR D. WILLIAMSON
MR G STAPLETON
MISS S J LAMBERT

DTI (Victoria St)
MR R GRAY
MR GR SUNDERLAND, OT2

ODA
MR D L STANTON
MR MCCULLOUGH

H.M. TREASURY
MR J G LITTLER
MS JE COURT

M A F F
PERMANENT SECRETARY

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DESKBY 050900Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 03 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY ATHENS 041000Z FOR PRIME MINISTER'S
PARTY AND SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS ANKARA

INFO PRIORITY ODA (FOR MCCULLOUGH)

INFO SAVING BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN
LUXEMBOURG

UKREP BRUSSELS TEL 4292: EC/CYPRUS

1. HAFERKAMP DEBRIEFED COMMUNITY HEADS OF MISSION AFTER HIS TALKS
THIS MORNING WITH KYPRIANOU AND IACOVOU. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE
MAKING AN IMMEDIATE REPORT TO THORN, AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF
POLITICAL DISCUSSION AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN ATHENS. BUT
DETAILED CONSIDERATION WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO AWAIT THE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF 19/29 DECEMBER. THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN UNDER
THREE HEADS.

CUSTOMS UNION

2. THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WISHED TO ACCELERATE THE TECHNICAL
PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BE PROVIDING EARLY

2. THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WISHED TO ACCELERATE THE TECHNICAL PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BE PROVIDING EARLY NEXT WEEK THE ANSWERS TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE COMMISSION. HAFERKAMP HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEREAFTER THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS COULD BE CARRIED FORWARD THROUGH THE DESPATCH OF EXPERT MISSIONS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

TRADE WITH THE NORTH

3. HAFERKAMP REFERRED TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT NOTE VERBALE OF 28 NOVEMBER WHICH HAD OFFICIALLY TRANSMITTED DETAILS OF THE SOLE GREEK CYPRIOT DOCUMENTS AND STAMPS, AND THE EXCLUSIVE LIST OF LEGAL PORTS AND AIRPORTS, THROUGH WHICH TRADE WITH CYPRUS MIGHT BE CONDUCTED SO AS TO BENEFIT FROM THE EC/CYPRUS PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS. HAFERKAMP SAID THAT, IN VIEW OF THE COMMUNITY'S RECOGNITION OF THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT IN CYPRUS, HE HAD POSED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THEIR OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF THE WHOLE ISLAND TO THE EXTENT OF PERMITTING TRADE WITH THE NORTH TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE DOCUMENTATION, AND THROUGH THE LEGAL PORTS AND AIRPORTS, WHICH THEY HAD LAID DOWN. KYPRIANOU HAD FOUND THIS IDEA 'QUITE ATTRACTIVE' AND HAD SAID THAT THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN IT (EG CERTIFICATES OF HEALTH) WOULD BE EXAMINED IMMEDIATELY. THE PROBLEM OF TURKISH CYPRIOT EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND MANUFACTURED GOODS FROM 'STOLEN' GREEK CYPRIOT PROPERTY HAD BEEN MENTIONED. HAFERKAMP SAID THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS OFFERED ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURKISH CYPRIOT TRADE TO PASS THROUGH THE SOUTH, AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS REFUSED, THEN THE LATTER WOULD HAVE ONLY THEMSELVES TO BLAME. I ELICITED FROM HAFERKAMP (FOR WHICH HE PRIVATELY THANKED ME AFTERWARDS) CONFIRMATION THAT HIS IDEAS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED, STILL LESS ENDORSED, IN THE COUNCIL AND THAT HE HAD CLEARLY DESCRIBED THEM TO THE CYPRIOTS AS 'HIS OWN PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION'.

SECOND FINANCIAL PROTOCOL

4. HAFERKAMP ENQUIRED WHETHER THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT REMAINED PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD PROJECTS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE ISLAND OF WHICH THEY WERE THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT. THE CYPRIOTS HAD REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY IN PRINCIPLE BUT HAD SAID THEY WERE NOT READY TO MAKE A DECLARATION TO THIS EFFECT AS THEY HAD DONE FOR THE FIRST FINANCIAL PROTOCOL. HAFERKAMP HAD SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WAS A FIRM UNDERSTANDING ON THIS PRINCIPLE, NO DECLARATION MIGHT BE NECESSARY. BUT IT WOULD

PRINCIPLE, NO DECLARATION MIGHT BE NECESSARY. BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED THAT THE STATEMENT IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT AIDE MEMOIRE OF 28 NOVEMBER THAT THERE WOULD BE 'NO POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AS TO THE UTILISATION OF FUNDS', WAS NOT TO BE TREATED AS A DEROGATION FROM THE PRINCIPLE. ON THE QUESTION OF COMMISSION CONTACTS WITH TURKISH CYPRIOT OFFICES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS, IT WAS LEFT THAT THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED AND DISCUSSED WITH THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS AS AND WHEN THE NEED AROSE (WHICH THE COMMISSION DO NOT EXPECT TO HAPPEN FOR SIX MONTHS). THE QUESTION OF FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NICOSIA SEWERAGE PROJECT WAS NOT RAISED.

COMMENT

5. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SEEMED PLEASED BOTH BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH HAFERKAMP'S VISIT HAD BEEN MOUNTED AND BY ITS CONTENT - AS WELL THEY MIGHT BE, ESPECIALLY PARA 3 ABOVE. ONE OF HAFERKAMP'S STAFF TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT THE CALCULATION HAD BEEN THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD REFUSE TO ALLOW TURKISH CYPRIOT TRADE TO BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE SOUTH, AND THAT IF THEY DID SO THE COMMUNITY WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN TRADING RELATIONS. I SAID (ALSO PRIVATELY) THAT I THOUGHT THIS WAS A SERIOUS MISCALCULATION. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD JUMP AT HAFERKAMP'S IDEA BOTH ON POLITICAL GROUNDS (AS ENDORSING THEIR CLAIM TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE OF THE ISLAND AND ITS RESOURCES, PREJUDGING THE NATURE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT) AND ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS (AS PERMITTING THEM TO TIGHTEN THEIR ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON THE NORTH EG BY SECURING THE EXCLUSION OF ALL CITRUS EXPORTS FROM FORMER GREEK CYPRIOT PROPERTY). CONVERSELY, THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD NEVER TOLERATE THE IDEA BUT WOULD REGARD IT AS A DEADLY ONE-SIDED BLOW AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS. THIS WOULD THROW THEM YET FURTHER INTO THE ARMS OF TURKEY AND WOULD DESTROY THE INFLUENCE WHICH WE NEEDED TO RETAIN ON THE TURKISH SIDE (AS WELL AS ON THE GREEK SIDE) IF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WERE TO RESCUE ANYTHING FROM THE PRESENT CRISIS.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1983

John [unclear]

[Handwritten initials]

Cyprus: Meeting between Mrs Thatcher and the Prime Minister
of Greece

I enclose a brief on Cyprus for the meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Mr Papandreou in the margins of the European Council at Athens. Mr Papandreou is likely to want the UK to assume the role of mediator.

Mr Papandreou's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister followed immediately upon his meeting with President Kyprianou of Cyprus in Athens on 30 November. We have no definitive information about the outcome of that meeting. But press reports indicate that the meeting patched up the earlier disagreement between the two leaders on the question of consultations between the Guarantor Powers: Kyprianou had reportedly favoured these, while the Greeks have taken the line with us and in public that they will not talk to the Turks so long as Turkish troops remain "in occupation" of the north. The Greek position appears largely to have prevailed although press reports suggest that, in public at least, the pre-condition may have changed to one requiring the Turkish Cypriots to rescind their declaration of secession. The Greeks have told us that their earlier reply, refusing to take part in tripartite consultations, still stands. By way of a compromise, both leaders may have agreed to concentrate on the existing Greek proposal that the UK should take a leading role in the search for a settlement by carrying out bilateral UK/Greece and UK/Turkey talks.

There is very little prospect in the present climate of our being able to play a successful leading role either in resolving the present crisis, or in contributing to the longer-term search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Such an approach would also present considerable disadvantages. The Greeks' objective would be to use any such talks to put pressure on the Turks and to blame us for insufficient effort if these tactics failed to produce a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and Turkish recognition of it.

/Our



Our own influence over the Turks is very limited: American pressure in connection with military aid appears to be the most fruitful source of leverage. Such influence as we have on the Turks is better used in conjunction with American efforts. Any suggestion that we were active at Greek behest would doom our activities to failure. Furthermore the Turks would probably maintain their present position that they would only take part in consultations if the Greeks did so too. (The Treaty of Guarantee requires the parties to consult "together". All previous consultations have been tripartite; when one guarantor power has been unwilling to take part there have been no consultations.)

The only advantage in agreeing to take on the role of mediator would be presentational - but these would be short lived if our efforts were seen to fail. At the moment public and Parliamentary opinion, except the pro-Turkish lobby, seems broadly satisfied with our stance and our efforts to get Guarantor Power talks going. If, as now seems likely, tripartite talks under the Treaty prove impossible, we should reinforce the weight we are already putting behind the efforts of the UN Secretary-General as the only sensible way of trying to make progress on the Cyprus problem.

The Prime Minister may therefore think it right to resist pressure from Papandreou for the UK to conduct parallel but separate consultations with both Greece and Turkey. We should say that any Guarantor Power talks under the Treaty must be tripartite. If it proves impossible to arrange these, we shall of course remain in close touch with all involved, including Greece and Turkey. But any such discussions would not be the consultations "together" envisaged in the Treaty. And the main role in promoting a solution to the Cyprus problem would rest with the UN Secretary-General.

The Points to Make on EC/Cyprus updates the main European Council brief to take account of Vice-President Haferkamp's talks with the Cyprus Government on 2 - 3 December. But this does not change the line in the main brief. Haferkamp will still not report to the Foreign Affairs Council until 19 December, and any further discussion of sanctions against northern Cyprus at the European Council remains entirely inappropriate. The High Commissioner in Nicosia, who will see Haferkamp on 3 December, is being asked to send a report of Haferkamp's discussions immediately to Athens.

/The enclosed



The enclosed brief has not been seen by Sir Geoffrey Howe: a copy is being submitted to him in parallel this evening.

*Yours
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

/ PS. I enclose a telegram we have just received from Athens reporting a call by the Ambassador on Papandreou. You may find it useful additional background. It broadly confirms the above account of Papandreou's meeting with Kyprianou.



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BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER

CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Despite the great set-back that UDI represents, we continue to want a solution to the Cyprus problem that will be acceptable to both communities. Also imperative to ensure that situation in Cyprus does not deteriorate further. In particular, military escalation by any of the parties should be avoided. Our actions since UDI have been dictated by these considerations. Hope that you will be guided similarly.

2. We were pleased that the UN Security Council resolution deploring UDI, based on the UK draft and amended in light of discussions in London between President Kyprianou and me, was passed so quickly and overwhelmingly. We made our own position clear immediately after UDI: we deplored the Turkish Cypriot action, wanted it reversed, would not recognise any state in Cyprus other than the Republic of Cyprus and hoped that other states would follow suit. We had earlier told both the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots that we hoped they would not go down the road of independence. Greatly regret that this advice was not heeded.

3. UN SCR 541 mandated the Secretary General to pursue his mission of good offices. Believe that this is the best way forward and strongly support him. Hope that you will too. [If it is suggested that the mission of good offices is dependent on withdrawal of UDI or some other condition] All parts of the Security Council Resolution carry equal weight. Pre-conditions will serve only to delay possibility of progress. Secretary General should be allowed to act quickly while the Turks and Turkish Cypriots still feel on the defensive. New talks between the two communities need not imply recognition of Denktash.



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Consultations between Guarantor Powers

4. Understand that your Government will not join us and the Turkish Government in tripartite talks. Have you considered presentational impact that this will have? Turks will say that your refusal is as much a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee as anything else that has happened. We remain prepared to enter into such consultations as soon as the other two governments concerned are ready to do so.

UK to act as Mediator

5. Would need to consider this proposal carefully. At first sight, most reluctant. Likely to cut across Secretary General's efforts. Have no reason to believe Turks would accept it. Likely to argue that the Treaty of Guarantee obliges them only to enter into tripartite consultations. That indeed is our reading of our obligations under the Treaty. We shall of course stay in close touch with all parties concerned and continue to do what we can to assist in bringing about a solution. This will involve keeping in close touch with you, and also with the Turkish Government. But would see this as different from the 'consultations together' required by the Treaty. Are also in close touch with President Kyprianou. Important that none of our efforts should be used by anyone as an excuse for not making progress.

EC Action against Northern Cyprus [If raised]

6. Matter was discussed fully by Foreign Ministers on 22 and 29 November. Vice President Haferkamp will be reporting to the Foreign Affairs Council on 19 December, following preparatory discussions on Coreper. No new decisions until then.

7. We should be scrupulous in avoiding any action which might prejudice non-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot regime. But the Community's approach should also be consistent with the aim of nullifying effects of Turkish Cypriot decision. Should avoid action which will reinforce existing divisions.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. On 15 November the Turkish Cypriot 'Assembly' issued a declaration purporting to establish an independent state in northern Cyprus. The same day the Secretary of State said in the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Government deplored this action by the Turkish Cypriot community and considered it incompatible with the 1960 Treaties. So far only Turkey has recognised the new 'state'.

2. On 18 November the UN Security Council passed (13-1-1) a resolution (copy attached) deploring the action, calling for its reversal, and instructing the UN Secretary General to pursue attempts to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem through his mission of good offices. The resolution was based on a British draft, amended in light of discussions between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou of Cyprus on 17 November.

3. Immediately after the declaration, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposed to his Turkish and Greek colleagues joint consultations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (copy attached). The Greek Government refused to talk to the Turks while Turkish troops remained in northern Cyprus and have twice confirmed that this is their position. Turkey agreed to consultations provided Greece also took part. Recent statements by Papandreou and President Kyprianou suggest that both the Greek and Cyprus Governments would like the UK to take on the role of mediator. (The Greek Government had earlier proposed UK/Greek and UK/Turkish bilateral discussions).

4. Papandreou sees the Cyprus problem primarily as an element in the dispute between Greece and Turkey. He has little concern for the welfare of either community in Cyprus, and sees UDI as an opportunity to score propaganda victories over the Turks. Before their summit meeting on 30 November he and Kyprianou seemed

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unable to co-ordinate their response to UDI (which may have accounted in part for the fairly complacent attitude of the Turks).

5. If Papandreou suggests that the UK should take on the role of mediator, his motives will probably be to use our efforts as a forum to attack the Turks. indicate that Papandreou has agreed with Kyprianou a strategy whereby, if UK mediation efforts failed to reveal signs of Turkish flexibility, he would move Greek troops into Cyprus. We should strongly discourage any sign of this.

6. Our own perception of the best way forward is to persuade the UN Secretary General actively to pursue his mission of good offices and try to find some means by which the parties can again be brought to negotiate with each other. Inevitably, in the aftermath of Denktash's declaration, this will take time. But the earlier he starts and the less he is fettered by preconditions, or diverted by attempts to set up alternative machinery, the better.

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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

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TELNO 722 OF 2 DECEMBER 1983.,

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BONN, PARIS, ROME.,

REPEATED AS ROUTINE INFO TO ISTANBUL.

M.h.P.T. (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: GUARANTOG POWER CONSULTATIONS

SUMMARY

1. PAPANDEOU EXPLAINS THAT AT HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER HE WOULD WANT TO ASK ABOUT HER INTENTIONS IN PROPOSING REACTIVATION OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE AND ABOUT THE SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED.

2. PAPANDEOU REGRID IN REFUSAL TO TALK DIRECTLY TO TURKS WITHOUT REVOCATION OF TURKISH CYPRIOT UDH.

3. CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT PAPANDEOU IS LOOKING TO US TO PULL HIS CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE AND CALCULATES THAT WE SHOULD TAKE A GOOD SHARE OF BLAME FOR FAILURE.

DETAIL

4. WHEN WE HAD FINISHED DISCUSSING THE ATHENS COUNCIL, PAPANDEOU HIMSELF RAISED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A PRIVATE TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT CYPRUS.

MINISTER ABOUT CYPRUS.

5. HE SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED HIS SUGGESTION AND HAD NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT MRS THATCHER WOULD NOT BE READY TO DISCUSS CYPRUS WITH HIM. IT WOULD HELP IF HE COULD HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE POINTS WHICH HE WISHED TO PUT TO HER.

6. PAPANDEOU SAID THAT HE WOULD PUT THE QUESTION THE OTHER WAY ROUND. WHAT DID THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE IN MIND BY HER PROPOSAL TO REACTIVATE THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE? WHAT SUBJECTS WOULD THOSE CONCERNED BE EXAMINING? HE THEN WENT ON TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

- (A) THE GREEKS WERE VERY FRIGHTENED OF TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE GUARANTOR POWERS. THEY FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE SITUATION WORSE THAN AT PRESENT. THAT WAS TO SAY NOTHING OF THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN WITH THE TURKS AFTER WHAT HAD OCCURRED (SEMICOLON) AND TO APPEAR TO LEGITIMISE A FAIT ACCOMPLI WITH TURKISH TROOPS STILL OCCUPYING NORTH CYPRUS (SEMICOLON)
- (B) THE GREEKS WERE FED UP WITH A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF MAKING CONCESSIONS. THERE HAD TO BE A LIMIT (SEMICOLON) THIS HAD NOW BEEN REACHED (SEMICOLON)
- (C) NEITHER THE GREEKS, NOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, WERE READY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKS, OR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNLESS THE DECLARATION OF UDIH HAD BEEN REVOKED (SEMICOLON)
- (D) IN VIEW OF (A) TO (C) ABOVE, THE GREEKS SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITAIN, COMPLEMENTED BY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND TURKEY. MRS THATCHER COULD PLAY A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE. THE ONLY COURSE FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WAS BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. THE GREEKS SAW THE NEED TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH MILITARY ACTION WAS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE EXPLOSIVE STATE OF THE AREA (SEMICOLON)
- (E) NO GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD EVER DISCUSSED DETAILS OF THE CYPGUS PROBLEM WITH TURKEY. PAPANDEOU WAS NOT GOING TO BREAK THAT RULE.

7. HE SAID THAT HE SUPPOSED THAT IF THERE WERE AN OFFER FROM THE TURKISH SIDE WHICH THE CYPRIOTS JUDGED SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTIVE TO MERIT EXAMINATION, THE GREEK SIDE (HE EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE GREEKS WOULD BE THE ONES TO ASSESS THE MERITS OF ANY TURKISH OFFER OR TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT IT) MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT.

8. PAPANDEOU DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF THE GREEKS WERE ASKED TO 'RATIFY' A PACKAGE DEAL.

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9. PAPANDEOU SAID THAT THE BEST TIME FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE AFTERNOON SESSION OF THE COUNCIL ON 4 DECEMBER.

COMMENT

10. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION OF THE WAY IN WHICH PAPANDEOU SPOKE WAS THAT HE IS AIMING TO GET US TO PULL HIS CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. NO DOUBT HE ALSO CALCULATES THAT IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE WE SHALL BE LANDED WITH A GOOD SHARE OF THE BLAME. HE TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR REALISM, BUT HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY CONTACT WITH THE TURKISH SIDE GIVES NO SIGN OF A WILLINGNESS TO WORK DIRECTLY FOR A SOLUTION WHETHER UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GUARANTEE TREATY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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MY TELNO 1492: CYPRUS

1. TUR REPORTS URQUHART AS SAYING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FROM US FOR CONCERTED ACTION TO BREAK OUT OF THE CURRENT DEADLOCK ON CYPRUS. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING HERE WHAT FORM SUCH A PROPOSAL MIGHT TAKE. WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THERE IS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT WE WILL HAVE TO GOT BACK TO THE LABORIOUS BUSINESS OF PUTTING TOGETHER THE BUILDING BLOCKS FROM THE BEGINNING AND OVER A LONG PERIOD. BUT THERE IS, AS SEEN FROM HERE, A CHANCE THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO SHORT-CUT THIS PROCESS IF WE CAN USE THE PERIOD WHEN THE TURKS ARE STILL FEELING TWINGES OF CONSCIENCE TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM THEM. IF WE COULD DO THIS, IT WOULD SERVE TO LIMIT GREEK CYPRIOT FRUSTRATION AT FAILURE TO SECURE REVERSAL OF UDI, AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR PAPANDEOU TO MOVE ON TO US, THE BLAME FOR FAILURE (SEE ATHENS TELNO 722).
2. I AGREE WITH URQUHART THAT THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM LIES IN PERSUADING KYPRIANOU NOT TO INSIST ON REVERSAL OF UDI BEFORE HE CAN CONTEMPLATE TAKING UP ANY OTHER MOVES BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I SUGGST THAT TO GET HIM OUT OF HIS HOLE WE SHOULD ADOPT A STICK AND CARROT STRATEGY. HE NEEDS TO BE PRESENTED WITH A PACKAGE OF TURKISH CONCESSIONS, BACKED BY THE UN, WHICH WOULD BE GENUINELY ATTRACTIVE ENOUGH FOR HIM TO SELL TO HIS PUBLIC, AND AT THE SAME TIME WITH THE CLEAR WARNING THAT IF HE REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE PACKAGE SERIOUSLY, THE UN WOULD NOT HESITATE TO EXPOSE HIM PUBLICLY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD AIM AT REJECTION NOT REVERSAL OF UDI AND THAT THIS WOULD IN PRACTICE, BE ACHIEVED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INSISTENCE ON DEALING WITH DENKTASH ONLY AS LEADER OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. KYPRIANOU MAY RECOGNISE THAT IT WILL BE A LONG TIME BEFORE HE GETS A BETTER OFFER.
3. OTHERS MAY BE ABLE TO HELP TIGHTEN THE SQUEEZE ON KYPRIANOU. THE WEST COULD TELL HIM THAT THEY CONSIDER THE CONCESSIONS WORTH TAKING UP. CONCEIVABLY, THE NON-ALIGNED CONTACT GROUP MIGHT ENCOURAGE HIM TO STICK TO THE NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLE OF SEEKING SETTLEMENT (THOUGH WE SHOULD NEED TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID A FALKLANDS BACKLASH), OF DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATION. GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICAL PARTIES OR THE VAROSHA

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/ REFUGEES

REFUGEES LOBBY COULD HELP. EVEN GREECE MIGHT PITCH IN IF TROOP WITHDRAWALS WERE INCLUDED IN A PACKAGE. BUT NONE OF THESE COULD HAVE THE SAME IMPACT ON KYPRIANOU AS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO BE CLEARLY IN THE LEAD.

4. THE FOLLOWING MIGHT MAKE UP SUCH A PACKAGE. IN RETURN FOR GREEK CYPRIOT AGREEMENT TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON THE EXISTING AGREED BASIS (BUT WITHOUT NECESSARILY HAVING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE SAME ROOM), AND FOR AN UNDERTAKING BY THEM NOT TO PURSUE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT PRESENT, THE TURKISH SIDE MIGHT BE ASKED TO OFFER:

(A) READINESS TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF THEIR PROPOSAL ON VAROSHA, NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO THE 1981 TERRITORIAL OUTLINE (AND WITHOUT THE NICOSIA AIRPORT ELEMENT):

(B) AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE OTHER TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS PROPOSED IN 1981 COULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE SAME TIME:

(C) AN UNDERTAKING TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION ON TURKISH TROOPS IN CYPRUS: AND

(D) WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SOME RELAXATION OF THE PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH CYPRUS (AS ALREADY HINTED AT IN NICOSIA TELNO 329).

5. IF WE CAN AGREE THAT SUCH A PACKAGE HAS A WORTHWHILE CHANCE OF SUCCESS, WE MUST CONSIDER HOW TO BRING IT ABOUT. THE KIND OF PROPOSAL I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD INCLUDE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW HE AND WE (AND OTHERS PREPARED TO GO ALONG), MIGHT DIVIDE UP THE LABOUR.

6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE MIGHT BRING HOME TO THEM HIS DETERMINATION TO PURSUE HIS MISSION, AND TRY TO WEAR DOWN THEIR RESISTANCE TO ANY CONCRET PROPOSALS HE MAY COME UP WITH. IF POSSIBLE, HE MIGHT EVEN WIN FROM THE ADMITTANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER, IN PAPANDREOU'S WORDS, 'RATIFYING A DEAL'. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WORK ON DENKTASH TO KEEP THE VAROSHA PROPOSAL ON THE BOIL AND PRESS HIM ON THE RELAXATION OF MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS. HE COULD ALSO SEEK TO ENLIST NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR HIS ACTIVITY.

7. IN RETURN WE AND OTHERS, NOTABLY THE AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO ARGUE TOUGHLY TO THE TURKS THAT THEY MUST HELP US TO GET INTERCOMMUNAL EXCHANGES GOING. THIS IS THEIR OWN POLICY BUT IT REQUIRES A CONSIDERABLE EXPANSION OF DENKTASH'S EXISTING OFFERS. URQUHART'S TALK WITH WILSON (SED) ON 1 DECEMBER, SHOWED QUITE CLEARLY THAT THIS IS WHERE THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE INTERESTED IN OUR HELP. DETAILS WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT, PERHAPS BEARING IN MIND PICCO'S COMMENTS IN TUR. BUT IF I CANNOT ASSURE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS I DOUBT WHETHER ANY SCHEME OF THIS KIND WILL BE A STARTER AT THIS TIME.

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18.

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8. IF A SCHEME ON THESE LINES SEEMS TO YOU TO HAVE MERIT I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT IT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD NEED TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS AT LEAST WITH THE U.S. AND THE FRG. THE FRENCH MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO THEIR BIT IN ATHENS. I AGREE WITH URQUHART THAT WE SHOULD NOT START MAKING WAVES UNTIL THE UNFICYP RENEWAL DEBATE IS OUT OF THE WAY. BUT I WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN OUR BEING READY TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. ANKARA TELNO 587 SUGGESTS THAT THE TURKS MAY ALREADY BE SPRINGING BACK.

9. IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMME OF THIS KIND WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SUBSTANTIVE REPLACEMENT FOR GOBBI QUICKLY.

THOMSON

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

LIMITED

SED
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DEFENCE D
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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
SIR C TICKELL
SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
MR JENKINS

ADDITIONAL DISTN
CYPRUS

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Prime Minister

If we reject Papandreu's request for a meeting, our negotiating task will not be easier.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1983

Agree to a meeting on Cyprus?

P.R. has agreed.

A.F.C. 1/12

A.F.C. 2/12

p-a.

John S. ...

Possible Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Papandreu at the European Council

You may have seen from Athens telegram No 711 (copy enclosed) that the Greek Prime Minister would like to have a private meeting on Cyprus with the Prime Minister in the margins of the European Council.

Following the meeting between Mr Papandreu and Mr Kyprianou in Athens, the Greek Government have once again confirmed their refusal to join with us and the Turkish Government in consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee. (They can agree only to bilateral UK/Greek and UK/Turkish consultations.) A meeting with Mr Papandreu would give the Prime Minister an opportunity to press him not to do anything to exacerbate the situation; and it would demonstrate our continuing concern and efforts to ensure that a settlement should be reached, despite the impossibility of arranging consultations in present circumstances.

It would in many ways be better to avoid a bilateral meeting on an issue unrelated to the budget negotiations. Papandreu is nevertheless likely to attach importance to a meeting on this subject. You may therefore consider that the choice lies between giving him a positive answer now, or agreeing to his request once you have arrived in Athens. On balance, you may consider it better to take a positive decision now.

I enclose a draft telegram which, if the Prime Minister agrees, could be despatched in the morning.

John S. ...

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 14

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR JENKINS

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET
D I O CABINET OFFICE

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HD/SED
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DESKBY 011115Z

FM ATHENS 011030Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO.,

TELNO 711 OF 1 DECEMBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO UKREP BRUSSELS, NICOSIA, ANKARA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CBFC, MODUK (DS11), BONN, PARIS, ROME,
UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STRASBOURG AND ISTANBUL.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 700: CYPRUS: GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS

1. THIS MORNING'S PRESS REPORTED THAT FOLLOWING A ONE AND A HALF HOUR MEETING BETWEEN PAPANDREOU AND KYPRIANOU IN THE PRESENCE OF KARAMANLIS THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOT POSITIONS. WE CHECKED WITH THE CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THIS MEETING WAS LIKELY TO BE THE ONLY ONE BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND PAPANDREOU. A FURTHER MEETING BETWEEN THE GREEK AND CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTERS WAS PLANNED.
2. I THEREFORE ASKED CAPSIS WHETHER HE COULD CONFIRM THAT THE GREEK POSITION ON GUARANTOR POWER CONSULTATIONS REMAINED AS IN HIS LETTER TO YOU. AFTER CONSULTING PAPANDREOU, CAPSIS HAS CONFIRMED THIS, ADDING THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD LIKE A PRIVATE MEETING ON CYPRUS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE MARGINS OF THE ATHENS COUNCIL. CAPSIS ALSO SAID THAT THE GREEKS MUCH APPRECIATED OUR CONTINUING INTEREST.
3. THE WAY IS NOW CLEAR FOR US TO PUBLICISE THE GREEK AND TURKISH REPLIES TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR GUARANTOR POWER TALKS. BUT, IF AS I HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER AGREES TO HAVE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH

THIS, ADDING THAT PAPANDEOU WOULD LIKE A PRIVATE MEETING OR OFFERS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE MARGINS OF THE ATHENS COUNCIL. CAPSIS ALSO SAID THAT THE GREEKS MUCH APPRECIATED OUR CONTINUING INTEREST.

3. THE WAY IS NOW CLEAR FOR US TO PUBLICISE THE GREEK AND TURKISH REPLIES TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR GUARANTOR POWER TALKS. BUT, IF AS I HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER AGREES TO HAVE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH PAPANDEOU, YOU MAY WISH TO DEFER PUBLICITY FOR THE TIME BEING. IF THERE IS STRONG PRESSURE TO SAY SOMETHING E.G. IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, I WOULD RECOMMEND A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE TWO SIDES ARE CONTINUING.

4. THE RESPONSE TO PAPANDEOU'S APPROACH COULD WELL BE INCLUDED IN ANY LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE ATHENS COUNCIL (MY TELEGRAM NO. 710). THIS WOULD FURTHER UNDERLINE THE IMPLICATION THAT OUR ATTITUDE ON CYPRUS, PARTICULARLY IF THE GREEKS ARE STILL SEEKING OUR SUPPORT, SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN PAPANDEOU DECIDES HOW TO HANDLE THE ATHENS COUNCIL.

R H O D E S

BT

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File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification

Department

Drafted by

(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Tel. Extn.

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USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z

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(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.)..... (Caveat/ Privacy marking).....

(Codeword)..... (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS Tel. No.of.....
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AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, NICOSIA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, CBFC, MODUK, (DS11), BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO,
UKDEL STRASBOURG, ISTANBUL

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

Cyprus UDI

Additional Cyprus

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 711; CYPRUS

1. Please tell Capsis that the Prime Minister agrees to Papandreou's request for a private meeting on Cyprus in the margins of the Athens Council.

Copies to:-

MR. J. COLES ~~AS~~ ¹/₁₂
FILE p.a.

27582 CABOFF G
917506 GLOTEL G
4126 83-12-01 15:35

139440:

ATTN JOHN COLES NUMBER 10 FOR PRIME MINISTER.

BEG YOU ASK PAPANDREOU TO CLEAR OUR TITLES AND PROTECT RESUMED
WORKING OF ESTATE.

MUCH GRATITUDE.

FRANCIS NOEL-BAKER.

27582 CABOFF G
917506 GLOTEL G

PART 1 ends:-

Athens tel: 704 29/4

PART 2 begins:-

Noel Baker to ASE/pm
1/02

