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PREM 19/1433

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SECRET

Confidential filing

Visits of President Kyprianou of Cyprus in  
Feb 1980; December 1980; July 1981 Jan 84.


CYPRUS

PART 1

December 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>12.12.79</del>		22.5.84					
<del>19.12.79</del>		<del>18.6.84</del>					
<del>24.2.80</del>		<del>19/11/84</del>					
<del>12.3.80</del>		21.9.84					
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24.11.80		12.11.84					
<del>17.12.80</del>		<del>13.11.84</del>					
<del>22.12.80</del>		15.11.84					
25.6.81		19.11.84					
<del>28.7.81</del>		24.11.84					
<del>29.2.83</del>		<del>3.1.85</del>					
1.7.83		14.1.85					
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<del>29.7.83</del>							
17.11.83							
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<del>6.1.84</del>							
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<del>16.1.84</del>							

BRIEFING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT KYRIANOU ARE  
TO BE FOUND ~~IN THE~~ FOLDER AT THE  
BOTTOM OF THIS FILE



incorporated into  
his main file

● PART 1 ends:-

COP to FCO

14/1/85

PART 2 begins:-

FCO to COP

6/3/85



10 DOWNING STREET

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u MASTER SET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 January 1985

Dear Colin,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU AT  
10 DOWNING STREET ON 14 JANUARY 1985 AT 1630 HOURS

The Prime Minister saw President Kyprianou this afternoon. He was accompanied by Mr. Iacovu and the Cyprus High Commissioner. Sir Geoffrey Howe was also present.

The Prime Minister invited President Kyprianou to let her have his assessment of the prospects for the high level meeting in New York on 17 January. She knew that the United Nations Secretary General had high hopes of it. She was convinced that the Turkish Government wanted a settlement. However, President Kyprianou clearly had a difficult hand to play tactically. President Kyprianou asked whether the Prime Minister was convinced that the Turkish Government had taken the political decision to go for a settlement. The Prime Minister said that she took the view that Turkey wanted a settlement and had so indicated to Denktash. This was not necessarily the same as saying that Denktash himself wanted a settlement.

President Kyprianou said that he had encouraged the Secretary General to convene the high level meeting even though many important issues had not been resolved in advance of it. His hope was that there could be a constructive dialogue on all the issues at the meeting. The aim should be to agree upon the framework for a settlement, though plainly it would not be possible to settle all the points of substance. Significant progress had been made both on the constitution and on the territorial aspects of a settlement. There were still points upon which the Turkish Cypriot position was not clear. For instance, they talked of giving special status to some areas but had not explained what this meant or how large the areas would be. They might, for instance, have in mind federal areas on the model of Washington D.C. Then there was the question of Famagusta and Varosha. Their 1981 proposals were not the last word: the Turkish Cypriots appeared ready to discuss these further. On the constitution, the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned their demand to have a rotating Presidency, and had agreed that the Executive should be as under the 1960 constitution. They had wanted a veto or weighted voting on all decisions of the Executive, but might be ready to limit this to matters of special concern to the Turkish Cypriot community.

They had demanded that the Foreign Minister should always be a Turkish Cypriot. But this was patently unreasonable and unnecessary and was probably a negotiating position. The Greek Cypriots were perfectly prepared to discuss allocation of ministerial portfolios. On the legislature, the Turkish Cypriots had not moved from their earlier positions but there were grounds to hope for some flexibility here on the principle of special rights for special matters.

President Kyprianou continued that his principal worry was that he would face serious difficulties with Denktash on withdrawal of Turkish troops, on guarantees and on the fundamental freedoms. Denktash had apparently reiterated that day in Ankara that there would be no agreement unless Turkey remained a guarantor power. He was also on record as saying that if the Greek Cypriots thought that they would achieve full freedom of movement and of settlement, they would be disillusioned. President Kyprianou said that he would have to make clear that it was inconceivable to have an agreement which would allow Turkish troops to remain in Cyprus. Indeed he wanted to see all troops out. Otherwise a single incident could create a new Cyprus problem as had happened in 1963. The more that Greece and Turkey disengaged, the better for Cyprus.

President Kyprianou continued, emphasising that he was now speaking personally, and thinking aloud, that he wondered whether the best guarantee of a settlement might not be to have Cyprus a full member both of the European Community and of NATO. He thought this would both help create unity in Cyprus and avoid the need for specific guarantees.

The Prime Minister said that she thought that President Kyprianou had done brilliantly so far in a very difficult situation. She could well understand his trepidation in advance of what could be a critical meeting. She was sure he would have worked out how he intended to handle the discussions under the Secretary General's auspices. She sympathised with the difficulties of dealing with Mr. Denktash with his liking for posturing. She hoped that President Kyprianou would speak frankly to Senor Perez de Cuellar before the high level talks to give him a clear understanding of what were the Greek Cypriots' basic demands and the areas in which they might be able to consider concessions. Her advice would be to concentrate in the first instance on settling constitutional and territorial problems, leaving the question of troop withdrawals until later. It would of course have to be made clear that agreement on some points depended on agreement upon all. This was the tactic which Britain had pursued in the Hong Kong negotiations. It would be a tremendous feather in President Kyprianou's cap to get agreement on a return to a unitary state of Cyprus.

President Kyprianou said that if sufficient progress were made at the high level meeting later this week, he would prefer to hold further such meetings rather than remit problems to working groups. The latter was a recipe for delay. The Prime Minister agreed that it was important to keep Senor Perez de Cuellar directly involved. President Kyprianou continued that he hoped the Prime Minister would consider informally his

suggestions about Cyprus' membership of the European Community and NATO. He realised that this might seem unrealistic but he was persuaded that it offered the best long term hope for a lasting solution. He stressed that he had no intention of proposing this to the Secretary General at this stage. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that there was a risk that floating these ideas would create fresh complications. It was quite clear that Turkey would insist upon remaining a guarantor power. The Prime Minister agreed that it would be difficult to move away from the existing arrangements for guarantees.

President Kyprianou said that he noted the Prime Minister's advice that the question of troop withdrawals should be put on one side for the time being. He was not sure about this. It was unrealistic to expect the Cyprus Government to relinquish its authority before Turkish troops were withdrawn. The Prime Minister said that if agreement could be reached on territorial and constitutional problems it would create an incentive to agree subsequently upon the most difficult points such as troop withdrawals. Agreement on territory and the constitution would bind Denktash into a settlement and make it more difficult for him to backslide. It was very important to avoid a Turkish Cypriot walkout with the blame pinned on the Greek Cypriots. The fact was that Denktash had built up rather a strong tactical position by appearing to have accepted the Secretary General's text in full. Mr. Iacovu said that the question of Turkish troops was the Greek Cypriots' strongest card. They had international support for getting them out. If the negotiations were to fail - President Kyprianou intervened to say that he would be doing everything possible to prevent this - then it was to the Greek Cypriots' advantage that they should do so on the issues of withdrawal of troops and the international status of Cyprus. President Kyprianou said that withdrawal was so important and so much linked to all other issues that it had to be raised at the first stage, though guarantees might be left until later. The Prime Minister again urged that the less difficult problems be addressed first with agreement on them contingent upon agreement on all issues. Mr. Iacovu said that the fact that the issue of troop withdrawals was raised at an early stage would not necessarily mean that the Greek Cypriots expected to make progress on it. Several issues would no doubt have to be left for later.

The Prime Minister said that President Kyprianou should not take too gloomy a view of Denktash's intentions. He would surely not have agreed to the high level meeting had he not wanted to negotiate. He was clearly under pressure from Turkey. Outsiders could often play a helpful role in such negotiations. She recalled the part played by President Machel of Mozambique in securing progress over Rhodesia. We had been in touch with the Turkish Government and she was prepared to go on urging Turkey to press Denktash to negotiate. President Kyprianou welcomed this and asked again whether the Prime Minister would give consideration to his ideas about the European Community and NATO. The Prime Minister said that she would study them but they would not be easy. Sir Geoffrey Howe pointed out the considerable difficulties which the European Community already faced in enlargement negotiations.


President Kyprianou repeated that he believed that membership of the Community could contribute to solving the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister pointed out that raising this issue might only encourage Turkey to apply for membership. The involvement of the Secretary General meant that the United Nations' authority would be fully engaged in sustaining any settlement achieved. She came back always to the question of priorities. She wanted to urge President Kyprianou not to try to force the question of withdrawal of Turkish troops too early in the discussions. To do so would risk a breakdown.

Mr. Iacovu said that a point to be remembered in relation to territory was that the issue went beyond area to the number of Greek Cypriots who would be allowed to return home. Perhaps the special status areas mentioned by Denktash would help deal with this.

The Prime Minister said that she recognised President Kyprianou's predicament. But he had done very well so far and must go on. If the negotiations were to fail it must be clear that it was not his fault. During the Hong Kong negotiations she had often wondered whether a solution was attainable. One simply had to go on trying. President Kyprianou urged the Prime Minister to press on the Turkish Government the importance of being reasonable on troop withdrawals. The Prime Minister undertook to do this but repeated that she thought that the problem was only soluble if others were settled first. President Kyprianou should make clear that there would be no overall settlement unless there was agreement on troop withdrawals but should be ready to discuss other problems in the first instance.

At the end of the meeting President Kyprianou said that he had been advised to raise the problems of grants for Cyprus' students. The Prime Minister proposed that this should be pursued by the High Commissioner with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



QM

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IMMEDIATE<sup>15</sup>

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JENKINS

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HD/SED

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DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 24 OF 14 JANUARY 1985

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, NICOSIA, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

CYPRUS

1. PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU VISITED ATHENS OVER THE WEEKEND FOR TALKS WITH PAPANDEOU AND KARAMANLIS. IN A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS YESTERDAY PAPANDEOU AND KYPRIANOU REFERRED IN RITUAL TERMS TO THE UNANIMITY BETWEEN THEM, AND REITERATED THEIR "RESERVED OPTIMISM". PAPANDEOU SAID THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD GO TO NEW YORK ARMED WITH "NATIONAL UNANIMITY" WHICH WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE CRITICAL AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD. HE SAID THAT EVERYONE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE WOULD BE FRUITFUL SEMI COLON EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR A JUST AND VIABLE SOLUTION. KYPRIANOU SUPPORTED THESE REMARKS, ADDING THAT ALTHOUGH RESTRAINED OPTIMISM WAS JUSTIFIED, THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT A SOLUTION HAD BEEN FOUND FOR THERE WAS STILL A LONG WAY TO GO. HE HOPED THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WOULD DISPLAY THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL.

R H O D E S

PRIME MINISTER

Meeting with President Kyprianou

You are seeing him on Monday  
afternoon. He will be accompanied by his  
Foreign Minister (Mr. Iacovu) and High  
Commissioner.

The Foreign Secretary will also attend.  
The FCO would like to send an official:  
you have previously tried to keep your  
meetings with Kyprianou very small and  
this has worked well. Agree to limit it  
to Ministers and note-takers?

I attach a card.

*Yes not*

*C.D.P.*

C. D. POWELL

11 January, 1985

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

1. Encouraged by progress since last meeting. Recognise your statesmanship. Turks and Denktash also seem ready for concessions. Time to clinch.
2. ? Prospects for high-level meeting.
3. Suggest you focus on the really indispensable points: veto powers and quality of territory to be restored. Leave troop withdrawals till later.
4. Confident that Secretary-General will handle fairly. We support him.
5. See risks in reopening question of guarantees. No doubt that Turks will insist on remaining a Guarantor Power.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 January 1985

*CM*

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Meeting with President Kyprianou: 14 January

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou at 4.30 pm on 14 January.

The brief is rather fuller than usual. We believe that this is unavoidable on this occasion given the important stage the Cyprus question has reached, its complexity, and the fact that Kyprianou may go into detail.

I enclose a copy of the recent JIC assessment for ease of reference.

*Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU:  
14 JANUARY

STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. The meeting is at President Kyprianou's request. He is stopping over on his way to New York for the high level meeting with Denktash on 17 January. We are not aware that he is seeing any other European or American leaders.
2. Last year the Prime Minister met President Kyprianou in January, June, September and on 19 November. A record of the November meeting is at Annex A.
3. The United Nations Secretary General announced the agreement to a high level meeting on 12 December. The Greek Cypriots maintain that there are a number of important issues to be discussed before the draft high level agreement [redacted] is signed. Denktash and the Turks insist that the purpose of the meeting is merely to fill in certain blanks left for dates in the agreement and that there can be no further negotiation on the text.
4. Just as Ozal in his message to the Prime Minister sought understanding for Denktash's position President Kyprianou will want to seek support and understanding for his. His purpose in so doing will be partly that in the event of breakdown less blame will attach to him. He may also want us to intercede with the Secretary General and to put pressure on the Turks to ensure that he is not forced into signing an unsatisfactory document on 17 January. He has told the High Commissioner in Nicosia he wants to discuss Turkish troop withdrawals and guarantees for a settlement.

*Passage deleted and retained  
under Section 3(4)*

British/

*Wayland  
15 July 2014*



British Objectives

5. a) To show our concern about the problem in order to protect our interests in Cyprus and to avoid Greek Cypriot blame in the event of breakdown.

b) To encourage Kyprianou to show the courage, realism and statesmanship necessary to seize what may be a unique opportunity.

c) To re-emphasise our support for the United Nations Secretary General, reminding Kyprianou of our efforts up to now and resisting attempts to cast us as mediator.

Cypriot Objectives

6. a) To present and justify Kyprianou's position.

b) Possibly to urge us to press the Secretary General and/or the Turks to bring about the scenario Kyprianou wants.

c) To discuss troop withdrawals and guarantees for a settlement.

Background

7. The attached JIC assessment, "Cyprus: High level meeting to be a turning point?" approved on 10 January, provides much of the background.

8. We understand that Kyprianou greatly values his meetings with the Prime Minister. Her suggestions for flexibility and moderation appear to have been heeded in the past.

9. The opportunities for a settlement now seem better than at any time since the Turkish invasion of 1974. This is because:

a) following 'UDI', the Greek Cypriots seem at last to have understood that the passage of time works to Turkish Cypriot advantage: failure to reach a settlement would probably swiftly be followed by consolidation of the 'TRNC' and permanent partition.

b) Denktash has responded to Turkish pressure and wants to avoid blame for a breakdown.

Passages deleted and retained  
under Section 3(4). C. Wayland  
15 July 2014

c) the Turks and, even more unusually, the Greeks are acting positively on Cyprus at present. - Papandreou has gone as far as to recognise publically the significance of Denktash's concessions during the proximity talks.

d) The Secretary-General holds over the heads of both parties the threat of making public where he believe blame lies in the event of a breakdown.

10. While we believe that we have a good understanding of the current situation, we are not certain of all the details, some of which appear to have been conveyed orally and some of which may be tactically crucial. The UN Secretary General is keeping his own counsel: even his closest UN advisers have not been fully briefed on his plans. He may have more than one round of high level talks in mind. And we believe there is at least one document put forward by each side (there may be others) / \_\_\_\_\_ which will be considered at the meeting.

11. In these circumstances, \_\_\_\_\_ we should not give specific advice to Kyprianou. We should not, for instance, urge him to sign the draft agreement as it stands. This would risk cutting across what we believe to be a deliberate policy by the Secretary-General to blur the issues to ensure a meeting takes place.

12. We could nonetheless suggest how he might pursue some of his concerns. The Secretary-General has told Sir J Thomson that he hopes the Greek Cypriots will concentrate at the meeting on matters that are 'really indispensable' for them, for example, the extent of the Turkish Cypriot veto and the quality of territory to be restored to them. He feels he might be able to obtain concessions from the Turkish Cypriots on these points.

13. The Greeks have recently stressed the prime importance of early Turkish troop withdrawals. The Secretary General believes that immediate pressure for this would cause the talks to collapse.



14. The Greek Cypriots attach importance to establishing new guarantees for a settlement in addition to or instead of the present Treaty (Annex B), bringing in other Western countries (rather than Eastern bloc or non-aligned). The Turks want to retain the present guarantee arrangements.

15. A preliminary FCO study of this concludes our interests also lie in preserving the status quo. Change would open up the possibility, inter alia, of a Soviet toe-hold in Cyprus. See also Essential Facts.

16. President Kyprianou has just completed a government reshuffle in which he replaced ministers regarded as close to the Communist Party (AKEL). The only surprise was the departure of Veniamin, a heavyweight who ran the defence and interior ministeries and who had made extensive contingency plans for arms purchases. Kyprianou's political position at home remains secure with all-party support for his position on the negotiations.

Tactics and the likely course of the meeting

17. The Prime Minister might congratulate Kyprianou on progress so far and invite his views on the prospects for the high level meeting.

18. Kyprianou will probably explain his views on how the meeting should be conducted, stressing the need for further Turkish Cypriot movement and clarifications. He may ask for the Prime Minister's support and intervention with the Secretary-General (whom he may criticise) or with the Turks.

19. We should avoid any commitment to intervene. We should express support for the Secretary General and confidence in his intention to work for a balanced outcome.

20. If appropriate, we should explain that we are not aware of all the details of the negotiations nor do we know how the Secretary General plans to run the meeting.





21. But we should say that Turkish Cypriot feeling on Turkish troop withdrawals appears to be very strong. As Kyprianou wants to see substantive negotiations on a number of subjects, it might be prudent to leave this question to the latest stage of the meeting or to a subsequent occasion. We should suggest that Kyprianou would do best to concentrate on issues where there may still be Turkish Cypriot flexibility eg on the extent of a Turkish Cypriot veto power and quality of territory to be returned.
22. We should emphasise that the high level meeting is a unique opportunity to lay the basis for a permanent settlement to the Cyprus problem. Realistically the status quo ante Turkish Cypriot "UDI" is no longer an option. We know it will require courage and statemanship and that difficult negotiations lie ahead. But it is very important for the people of Cyprus and for stability in southern Europe that a breakdown is avoided.
23. When Kyprianou raises the question of guarantees for a settlement we should avoid making commitments, but remind him of Turkish insistence on remaining a Guarantor Power.
24. Kyprianou may probe our reaction to a breakdown and suggest a British initiative. The best hope remains with the Secretary General. A breakdown must be avoided.
25. Detailed briefing is attached.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1433</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Briefing for meeting with Prime          Minister on 14 January 1985          (Report)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>15 July 2014          M Wayland</i>
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POINTS TO MAKE

1. Encouraged by progress made in third round of proximity talks. Recognise statesmanship you have shown. Also that many difficult questions still to be resolved. Important both sides approach high level meeting in positive spirit. Risk of leaving tactical advantage with Denktash. Need to maintain the international support you currently enjoy.
2. Understand Denktash may have made some important concessions. You have too. Appears both Denktash and Turks are more prepared than ever before to achieve a settlement. Must not miss this unique opportunity.
3. How do you see prospect of successful high level meeting?
4. (When Kyprianou has described his concerns) Troop withdrawals likely to be most difficult for Denktash. Would need careful handling and might best be dealt with last or postponed. Suggest concentrating initially on other issues, say, clarification of the extent of Turkish Cypriot veto powers and quality of territory to be restored.
5. (If necessary) Breakdown could mean lost opportunity to regain significant territory. Turkish Cypriots would be tempted to move fast to consolidate "TRNC".

Pressure on Secretary General and/or Turks (if raised)

6. Do not have details of negotiations. Confident that the Secretary General will handle the meeting fairly. We have been in touch with all the parties and have strongly urged the Turks at all stages to be positive.

Guarantees

7. Realise how important this matter is to both sides. Believe that Turks could insist on remaining a Guarantor Power. Would want to work closely with Secretary General on any ideas.



British initiative in the event of breakdown (if raised)

8. Still firmly convinced that United Nations Secretary General's initiative remains best way forward. Would not want to do anything which could cut across his efforts. Hope you remain committed to support him.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1433</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Briefing for meeting with Prime          Minister on 14 January 1985          ("Essential facts")</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus<sup>(1)</sup> signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ADVANCE COPIES

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CYPRUS

PS (2)

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/~~MR JENKINS~~

PS/PUS

MR ~~DEREK THOMAS~~

MR JENKINS

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HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM 14 OF 11 JANUARY 85.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSLES, UKDEL NATO,

MODUK (DSC AND DS11), CBFC.

CYPRUS PROBLEM.

SUMMARY.

KYPRIANOU PLANNING TO DISCUSS IN ATHENS AND LONDON THE SUBJECTS OF MAINLAND TROOP CONTINGENTS AND OF GUARANTEES. ENCOURAGING GREEK CYPRIOT PERCEPTION OF A NEW POSITIVE INTEREST BY PAPANDEOU IN A SETTLEMENT. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT DENKTASH'S OWN MOTIVES AND HOW BEST TO HANDLE HIM. HOPE MORE OF KEEPING THE PROCESS GOING THAN OF ACHIEVING A CLEAR-CUT RESULT IN TWO DAYS IN NEW YORK. WORRIES ABOUT POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF A SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH.

DETAIL.

1. I HAD A SHORT TALK WITH KYPRIANOU AND A LONGER ONE WITH IACOVOU ON 10 JANUARY AS A CURTAIN-RAISER FOR THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF ON 14 JANUARY. I THOUGHT KYPRIANOU LOOKED RATHER RELAXED AND PLEASED WITH HIMSELF, HAVING SCRAPPED HIS ALLIANCE WITH AKEL, RESHUFFLED HIS GOVERNMENT AND GENERALLY ASSERTED HIS LEADERSHIP. HE WAS NOT AS APPREHENSIVE IN ADVANCE OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING AS I WOULD FORMERLY HAVE EXPECTED HIM TO BE.

2. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD IN LONDON TO GOING OVER THE MAIN POINTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (IACOVOU LATER PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE CONSTITUTION TO BE WORKABLE, WHICH HE SAID THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERSTOOD PARTICULARLY WELL). KYPRIANOU ADDED HOWEVER

MINISTER UNDERSTOOD PARTICULARLY WELL). KYPRIANOU ADDED HOWEVER THAT BOTH IN ATHENS AND IN LONDON HE WISED TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECTS OF MAINLAND TROOP CONTINGENTS AND OF GUARANTEES, WITH WHICH GREECE AND BRITAIN HAD A PARTICULAR INVOLVEMENT UNDER THE 1960 TREATIES. KYPRIANOU CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED RELUCTANTLY TO ACCEPT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF GREEK AND TURKISH TROOP CONTINGENTS (AS UNDER THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE) FOR A LIMITED PERIOD. ON GUARANTEES HIS POSITION REMAINED AS IN MY LAST CONVERSATION WITH HIM (MY TEL NO 565). MACOVU TOOK THE LINE THAT THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES WENT OUTSIDE THE INTERCOMMUNAL SCOPE OF THE TALKS IN NEW YORK AND COULD NOT BE SETTLED THERE. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE RAISED BUT HE HOPED IT COULD BE SET ASIDE. AT ONE POINT MACOVU, STRESSING THAT THE EVENTUAL PACKAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AS A WHOLE, GAVE A HINT THAT IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD BE SATISFIED THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD PROVE WORKABLE, THEY WOULD BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT GUARANTEES THERE WERE.

3. IN DISCUSSING THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF OPTIMISM WITH WHICH TO APPROACH THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING, KYPRIANOU REMARKED LAUGHINGLY THAT PAPANDREOU APPEARED TO BE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN HIMSELF AND HAD CLAIMED ON THE TELEPHONE TO HAVE SOME UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS VIEW. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT BOTH PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS AND PAPANDREOU RECOGNISED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SINCE, UNTIL THIS WAS OUT OF THE WAY, OTHER ISSUES BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY COULD NOT BE TACKLED. MACOVU PUT IT IN TERMS THAT PAPANDREOU WAS NOW APPROACHING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT WITH ALL THE ENTHUSIASM OF THE RECENT CONVERT. MACOVU CLAIMED TO HAVE POINTED OUT TO PAPANDREOU THE POTENTIAL ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE TO HIMSELF OF A SETTLEMENT, AND TO HAVE HEARD FROM PASOK SOURCES THAT THIS PENNY HAD DROPPED.

4. ON THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING MACOVU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD KEEP A FIRM GRIP AND PREVENT LONG AND ACRIMONIOUS GENERAL STATEMENTS. MACOVU LOOKED FORWARD TO A STRUCTURED DISCUSSION ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE POINTS EACH SIDE HAD TO RAISE, LEAVING THE SECOND DAY FREE TO TREAT THE PACKAGE AS A WHOLE. HE DOUBTED IF FULL AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED IN TWO DAYS, BUT CLEARLY HOPED FOR A SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION AND, ABOVE ALL, FOR THE PROCESS TO BE KEPT GOING. THE GREEK CYPRIOT APPROACH DOES NOT THEREFORE APPEAR TO BE MUCH OUT OF LINE WITH THAT OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 10). ALTHOUGH MACOVU RECOGNISED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN IMPROVED TONE IN SOME OF DENKTASH'S RECENT STATEMENTS (MY TEL 13), HE STILL REMAINED SCEPTICAL OF HIS REAL INTENTIONS, SAYING THAT, NOW THAT HE HAD HAD TO GIVE UP THE IDEA OF A ROTATING PRESIDENCY, HE COULD NOT SEE THAT DENKTASH HAD ANY PERSONAL REASON LEFT FOR WANTING A SETTLEMENT. MACOVU WAS ALSO MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT HOW TO COUNTER DENKTASH'S TENDENCY TO HISTORIONICS. (HE HAD EVEN COMMISSIONED A PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THIS). MACOVU HAD TWO PERSONAL THOUGHTS ABOUT IT. THE FIRST WAS THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO MEET WITH THE TWO LEADERS ALONE, IN ORDER TO DEPRIVE DENKTASH OF A GALLERY TO PLAY TO. SECONDLY HE HOPED THAT, AS DURING THE THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE A SENIOR OFFICIAL ON THE SPOT IN NEW YORK AS A



WOULD HAVE A SENIOR OFFICIAL ON THE SPOT IN NEW YORK AS A DIRECT LINK WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS WAS VITAL, BECAUSE (AS HALEFOGLU HAD TOLD HIM) DENKTASH WAS ALL TOO PROMPT TO SEND MISLEADING REPORTS TO ANKARA WHO ANYWAY (BECAUSE OF THE TIME FACTOR) WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GUIDE HIM FROM A DISTANCE.

5. I AM SURE THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL STRESS IN NEW YORK THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUALITY OF THE TERRITORY TO BE RESTORED TO THEM (PARA 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TUR). MACOVOU WAS PARTICULARLY EMPHATIC ABOUT THIS. HE SAID THAT A MAP COULD BE DRAWN, LEAVING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WITH 29%, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PERMIT AS MANY AS 90 TO 100,000 GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR OWN HOMES, OR AS FEW AS 40,000. THE FORMER WAS NECESSARY IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE 160,000 REFUGEES (ALMOST ONE-THIRD OF THE POPULATION FOR A SETTLEMENT. THEY WERE THE PEOPLE WITH MOST AT STAKE. A LOT OF OTHER PEOPLE HAD NO REAL INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT AT ALL AND WOULD BE FINANCIALLY WORSE OFF FROM ONE, BECAUSE OF THE LIKELY DROP IN PROPERTY VALUES ELSEWHERE IF FAMAGUSTA WERE REOPENED AND BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY COST OF SUPPORTING THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ECONOMY. (MACOVOU INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD REFUSED TO ALLOW A STUDY OF THE LATTER FOR FEAR THAT IT WOULD ALARM HIS COLLEAGUES TOO MUCH). IN THE SAME POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A SETTLEMENT MACOVOU ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THREE FREEDOMS. ON THE MOST DIFFICULT ONE, FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT, HE TOOK THE LINE THAT AT LEAST THE PRINCIPAL MUST BE PRESERVED, EVEN IF ITS IMPLEMENTATION WERE DELAYED FOR AS LONG AS 20 YEARS, WITH PEOPLE HAVING THE OPTION OF TAKING COMPENSATION FOR THEIR PROPERTY IF THEY DID NOT WISH TO WAIT THAT LONG. MACOVOU REMARKED THAT KYPRIANOU HAD NOW PUT HIMSELF IN FRONT OF THE OTHER PARTY LEADERS, BOTH BY TAKING THE DECISION TO GO TO THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT HIS PRECONDITIONS HAVING BEEN FULLY SATISFIED, AND BY TAKING A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH THAN THE OTHERS TO PEREX DE CUELLAR'S DRAFT AGREEMENT. MACOVOU FEARED THAT IF HE CAME BACK WITH AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS OPEN TO SERIOUS CRITICISM KYPRIANOU WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RELY ON THE SUPPORT EITHER OF AKEL (WHO WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION OF "FOREIGN BASES") OR OF CLERIDES, WHO WAS ALREADY BECOMING INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WILBERFOCE

NNNN

SECRET \* KACOVOU CONSIDERED THAT HE HAD DONE THE BEST HE COULD TO  
GIVE THE GREEKS THE BEST POSSIBLE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT AND THE  
DETERMINED TO GO TO THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT HIS PRECONDITIONS  
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THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January 1985

REQUEST BY THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS TO MEET THE  
PRIME MINISTER

BF | Thank you for your letter of 2 January about President Kyprianou's request to see the Prime Minister on 14 January.

The Prime Minister agrees to see him at 4.30 p.m. that day. She is grateful for the Foreign Secretary's offer to be present, which she accepts. I should be grateful if you could pass this on to the Cypriot High Commission here, as well as to our High Commission Nicosia, since the former have been pestering us about it.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 January 1985

Dear David,

CCPC  
①  
Prime Minister  
Agree to see him (yet again?)

M/S M

CD? 2/i

Request by the President of Cyprus to meet the Prime Minister

President Kyprianou has asked the High Commissioner in Nicosia to seek a meeting for him with the Prime Minister on 14 January. He will be travelling through London to New York for his meeting with Mr Denktash on 17 January as part of the UN Secretary-General's initiative on Cyprus.

Sir Geoffrey recommends that the Prime Minister should if at all possible agree to meet President Kyprianou. Following three rounds of proximity talks, the agreement on 10 December by both sides to take part in a high-level meeting was a considerable achievement. But the chances of success remain slim. Much will depend on President Kyprianou's attitude: he has been wrong-footed by Mr Denktash's acceptance in toto of the Secretary-General's draft agreement and apparently wishes to obtain more concessions. A meeting with the Prime Minister would enable us to give further support for the Secretary-General's efforts at a timely moment.

I understand that the Prime Minister's diary may allow a meeting at 4.30 pm on 14 January. I should be grateful if you would let me know the Prime Minister's view.

If the Prime Minister is willing to meet Kyprianou, Sir Geoffrey would also like to be present. Alternatively, he would naturally be prepared to see Kyprianou on his own and thus relieve the Prime Minister of the burden, which she has of course carried twice already in recent months.

Yours sincerely,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Subject



10 DOWNING STREET

21 November 1984

*From the Private Secretary*

CYPRUS

In my letter of 19 November reporting the Prime Minister's discussion with President Kyprianou, I said that President Kyprianou had promised to telephone the Prime Minister today, following a further meeting with the United States Ambassador.

President Kyprianou duly telephoned this morning. He had seen the United States Ambassador, but the latter had not had very much to add to President Reagan's letter. In particular he was not armed with any specific proposals. He had said only that the United States were exerting strong pressure on the "other side" to make substantial territorial concessions. President Kyprianou said that he had told the American Ambassador that he had briefed the Prime Minister fully. The Ambassador had said that he thought the Americans would themselves be briefing HMG either in New York or Washington. The Prime Minister said that she welcomed this. Once we were fully in the picture, we could see how we could best help.

President Kyprianou said that he would ensure that Sir John Thomson was kept informed of developments in New York. He thanked the Prime Minister for all her help and encouragement.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*Prime Minister* 2  
*You may want to read*  
*His briefing overnight since it*  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office looks as  
London SW1A 2AH *if President Kyprianou*  
*is to telephone you*  
*tomorrow.*

20 November 1984

*FCRS*  
*20.11.*

*Dear Charles,*

*GM*

Prime Minister's Meeting with President Kyprianou

Thank you for your record of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou on 19 November. You asked for advice on President Kyprianou's ideas and on what the Prime Minister might say when he contacts her by telephone on Wednesday 21 November.

President Kyprianou seems to have read rather more into President Reagan's message than was intended. The first that we in the FCO knew of the contents of the President's message was on 20 November when the US Embassy in London outlined its content to the Head of Southern European Department. It was quite clear from that telephone call that, as we have always understood, the intention of the Presidential message was simply to encourage Kyprianou to approach the third round of proximity talks in a positive manner. Similar messages have been passed from President Reagan to President Evren; from Shultz to the Greek Foreign Minister; and orally via the American Embassy in Nicosia to Denktash. It is these to whom the President refers as "the parties directly involved ...", and not, as Kyprianou half surmised, ourselves.

Kyprianou's misunderstanding is potentially dangerous, since:

- (a) he may feel the Americans are ready with a diplomatic solution to all his problems without him having to make any significant concessions to Denktash;
- (b) if (as he well may) he leaks his misinterpretation the Turks could be angered and the outcome of the proximity talks jeopardised.

We were therefore glad that the Prime Minister took the line that she did about the improbability of any significant new ideas of substance from the US Administration and continued to stress the need for the Cyprus Government to make concessions on constitutional matters in return for territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriots.

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It may well be that when President Kyprianou telephones the Prime Minister tomorrow, having obtained additional information from the US Ambassador in Nicosia, he will seem a disappointed man. In these circumstances it would seem most important that the Prime Minister should repeat her view on the need for constructive negotiations in the third round of talks. But she may also want to offer some balm to Kyprianou by suggesting that the personal attention given to the matter by President Reagan and herself is the surest guarantee that there is no question of Kyprianou being called upon to make unilateral concessions. She will also want to dismiss from Kyprianou's mind that the Americans are seeking something special from Cyprus in terms of the Western Alliance.

If Kyprianou returns to his original reason for seeking a meeting with the Prime Minister, the question of guarantees for Cyprus, we recommend that the Prime Minister should speak on the lines of her original briefing (copy enclosed for ease of reference) - ie that it is rather too early in the process to make definite suggestions but that we would be prepared to consider the question in close consultation with the Secretary-General and all other parties.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Subject

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ECLAUSD. cc Haddley

bc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 November 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

President Kyprianou called on the Prime Minister at his own request this evening, on what he described as a private matter.

President Kyprianou said that his original grounds for seeking a meeting had been overtaken by an important new development. This was that the US Ambassador in Nicosia had asked to see him urgently on 16 November to hand over a message from President Reagan. The Ambassador had said that the message was very confidential and should not be shown to anyone else. President Kyprianou said that he had nonetheless insisted that he must brief the Prime Minister.

President Kyprianou continued that he regarded the letter as highly significant. It was the first time for ages that the Americans had taken an initiative over Cyprus. However, he was at a bit of a loss to understand exactly what the initiative was. The letter simply promised that the Americans would discuss with him further detailed ideas on what might be done to assure the success of the proximity talks. So far, no more had been forthcoming, though he was due to meet the American Ambassador again on 21 November. The letter appeared to suggest some sort of talks in parallel with the proximity talks.

President Kyprianou continued that he was in the dark both about the procedures envisaged by the Americans, the content of their eventual proposals and the motives for their initiative. On the last point, he wondered whether the Americans wanted something special from Cyprus in terms of the western alliance. There had been some strange rumours on this and a curious article in the Sunday Telegraph. More generally he was anxious lest the US should try to lean more heavily on the Cyprus Government than on the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey, given their close relations with the latter. He would hand over a copy of the letter

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(enclosed) to the Prime Minister in the strictest confidence. Did the Prime Minister know what the Americans were up to? Had Britain received any similar message? Did we know which other countries had? How should he reply? Would the UK agree to become involved in his discussions with the Americans, given our much greater knowledge and experience of the Cyprus problem?

The Prime Minister said that so far as she knew we had received no letter from the Americans. Clearly much would depend on the detail of the American proposals. But her reaction was that the American involvement was to be welcomed. It was very helpful that President Reagan was interesting himself personally. It was unlikely that the Americans would have any very new ideas: most of the options were well known. They would probably stress the need for the Cyprus Government to make concessions on the constitution in return for territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriots. But she was certain that they would not exert one-sided pressure. And they might be able to offer inducements for a settlement, though she had no information to sustain this.

The Prime Minister continued that it would be important to ensure that the American proposals supported rather than cut across the Secretary-General's efforts. As regards possible British involvement, she thought it was premature to consider this. The first step was for President Kyprianou to find out the details of the US proposals. President Kyprianou said that he would do so and telephone the Prime Minister or me on Wednesday. Meanwhile he urged her to keep the information secret. The Prime Minister agreed and repeated that she thought the American intervention was to be welcomed.

President Kyprianou said that his original reason for seeking a meeting had been to discuss guarantees. He had been casting round for ideas for what to do if the proximity talks reached deadlock. All he could think of was that the 1960 situation should be restored and Cyprus invited to become a member of NATO. He wondered what the response to this would be. He also wondered whether to revive the idea of consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee. He thought that it might be possible to bring the Greek Government round to this. Would the idea find favour?

The Prime Minister said that this was not the time to consider these matters. The priority must be to make progress in the proximity talks and explore the American initiative. She would not wish to do anything which cut across these or made them more difficult, although she would of course reflect on what President Kyprianou had said. Meanwhile she hoped that he would approach the next round of

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proximity talks realistically and be ready to make concessions on the constitution in order to unlock progress on land. Otherwise there was a real risk that the Turkish Cypriot entity would establish itself and become an accepted fact.

It was left that President Kyprianou would contact the Prime Minister once he had further details of the American proposals. In the meantime, at President Kyprianou's request, the Prime Minister agreed not to feed this information into normal diplomatic channels, though she urged him to use Sir John Thomson as a channel of communication once he went to New York.

It would be helpful to have advice on President Kyprianou's ideas and what the Prime Minister might most usefully say when he contacts her again on Wednesday.

Charles Powell

C R Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 November, 1984

Dear Charles,

Visit of President Kyprianou

I attach as requested a short brief for the Prime Minister's use at her meeting with President Kyprianou at 1800 on Monday 19 November. I understand no FCO representation is required.

The High Commission in Nicosia have elicited the response that the 'strictly private matter' which President Kyprianou wishes to discuss with the Prime Minister is the Treaty of Guarantee "although Kyprianou would not expect any answer from the Prime Minister at this meeting". The attached brief takes account of that information. It also covers the Cyprus vote against us in the UNGA on the Falklands Islands resolution about which the Cypriots have shown belated sensitivity.

The third round of the United Nations Secretary General's proximity talks on Cyprus to start on 26 November. The Prime Minister's meeting provides a most timely opportunity to promote the Secretary General's initiative and to influence President Kyprianou's thinking at the highest level. Our Permanent Representative has told the Secretary General about the meeting and his account of Perez de Cuellar's thoughts on what line the Prime Minister could take is attached to the brief as Annex A.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister  
You have agreed  
to see him  
briefly on Monday  
evening.

CDP  
16 xi



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS: 19  
NOVEMBER

POINTS TO MAKE

Third round of proximity talks

1. Important that you approach third (and perhaps final) round in positive spirit. Otherwise tactical advantage lost to Denktash. Risk of forfeiting international support you currently enjoy.
2. Despite the difficulties there remain some indications of a serious commitment to the negotiating process by Denktash. He might have some flexibility on territory. Progress to a High Level Meeting is still possible.
3. Understand the importance of territory to you. Constitutional matters equally important to Denktash. A clear expression of your willingness to negotiate could increase chance of progress and give you tactical advantage.
4. Failure to reach a settlement now could mean loss of last opportunity to regain significant territory. Turkish Cypriots would be tempted to move fast in 1985 to consolidate 'TRNC'.
5. Realise difficulty of having Turkish Cypriot interference in day to day running of administration. Could this be overcome by strong provincial authority with correspondingly limited federal powers.
6. 'Political equality' is important for Turkish Cypriots. Could you meet some of their aspirations symbolically?

Pressure on Turkey [If raised]

7. Have spoken to all the parties involved. Both sides must be prepared to make concessions.

Guarantor/



Guarantor Power Consultations [If raised]

8. Remain ready to hold tripartite consultations with Greece and Turkey that are envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey agreed to our invitation to such consultations after the purported declaration of independence in November 1983 but Greece declined. If the United Nations Secretary General (whose efforts we support and do not wish to complicate) felt it would be helpful for us to issue a further invitation to tripartite consultations, we would give this serious consideration.

British initiative in event of breakdown of talks [If raised]

9. Still firmly convinced that UN Secretary General's initiative remains the best way forward. Would not want to do anything that might cut across his efforts.

10. Hope you too remain committed to support the Secretary General's initiative. Realise you have had two difficult rounds of talks. But this still seems the best way forward.

Guarantees in the event of a settlement [If raised]

11. Prepared to consider. But would want to work closely with Secretary General and with all parties. Too early in the process to make definite suggestions.

Falkland Islands Vote

12. Disappointed you voted against us in the UN. Hoped in view of our good relations that you would feel able at least to be absent from the vote as last year. [If raised] Accept however you gave me no undertaking at our last meeting.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 The second round of proximity talks involving Kyprianou and Denktash under the UN Secretary General's chairmanship lasted from 15-26 October. No real progress was made. The Secretary-General took a harder line with both parties especially at tête à tête meetings, telling them on the first day that he would make a report at the end of the round to the Security Council (he did not do so). He gave them a draft High Level Agreement which contained a number of blanks, most importantly for the number of Greek Cypriots to be resettled in territory which the Turkish Cypriots should hand over. He is now planning to produce a further draft agreement for the third and perhaps final round in which all the blanks on constitution and territory will be filled.

2 The Secretary General regards the third round beginning on 26 November as crucial: he has said he will not arrange a high level meeting (between Kyprianou and Denktash face to face) without real progress. He has again made it clear he will report to the Security Council although he must do so in any case by 30 November as part of the UNFICYP mandate renewal.

3 The Greek Cypriot attitude during the talks has been consistent: there can be no further progress until Denktash gives some concrete indication on new territorial concessions. Denktash hinted throughout the second round at future concessions but they never emerged. However, he has maintained the appearance since then of being committed to the negotiating process. He has given numerous hints, including to our High Commissioner, that he will go below 30% for the Turkish Cypriot share of territory. Kyprianou seems to be unaware of this possible flexibility. We should do no more than hint at it. The Secretary General regards it as his 'trump card' which he wants to keep until a critical moment. But the Greek Cypriot attitude seems to be hardening and they are predicting failure at the third round. The meeting offers the opportunity to underline the importance of a positive response to the Secretary General and to any concessions Denktash may make in the third round. Otherwise Denktash may lay failure at the Greek Cypriot door.



4 At a meeting with Sir J Thomson on 15 November (reporting telegram attached as Annex A) the Secretary General said he was impatient with Kyprianou about his 'single idea' that success depends on pressure on Turkey. He believes the Greek Cypriots regard bizonality as merely theoretical and that it has still not hit home that a return to the status quo before the Turkish invasion is simply not on the table.

5 The outlook for the next round of talks is still discouraging, but since neither side wants to be blamed for failure, a High Level Meeting may yet come about. The Secretary General has expressed gratitude for our activity with all the parties (Prime Minister/Kyprianou 24 September, Secretary of State/Halefoglu, 27 September, High Commissioner at Nicosia/ Denktash and Kyprianou 8 and 9 October respectively, Ambassador at Athens/Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, 11 October, Prime Minister's message to Turks delivered 12 October). He told Sir John Thomson on 19 October that we were his "only real, real supporters".

6 Our offer of help to the Secretary General remains. We are considering a message from the Secretary of State to Halefoglu before the third round. The US have decided to send messages from President Reagan to Evren and Kyprianou. We are hoping that the FRG, French and Italians will act similarly where their influence is greatest.

Guarantor Power Consultations (Treaty of Guarantee attached as Annex B)

7 Following the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence Sir G Howe proposed to his Turkish and Greek colleagues consultations together under the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turks accepted, but the Greeks declined. We remain ready to hold tripartite consultations if we and the Secretary General think it helpful.

8 There are however risks and few comparable advantages for us if they take place. They would be likely to break down in mutual recriminations between Greeks and Turks with both sides blaming us.



We therefore prefer to see the UN Secretary General continue his mediatory role.

9 The Greeks have in the past suggested parallel or "double bilateral" talks conducted by us with Greece and Turkey. This would cast us in the role of mediator. We wish to avoid this and have no treaty obligation to conduct this form of negotiation.

#### Separate British Initiative

10 Such an idea is occasionally propounded as an extension of our Guarantor role. The UN Secretary General remains the most viable mediator. We should aim to ensure his continued role.

#### Guarantees in the event of a settlement

11 President Kyprianou may wish to discuss the status of the Treaty of Guarantee and of alternative forms of guarantee if a settlement is achieved. We should listen to his suggestions without commitment. This question has not so far been thoroughly addressed in the proximity talks.

#### Falkland Islands vote (if raised)

12 Cyprus voted in favour of the Latin American resolution on the Falkland Islands at the UN on 1 November. Last year they absented themselves: in 1982 they also voted with Argentina. There appear to have been some suggestions in the Cyprus High Commission that we believed President Kyprianou gave the Prime Minister an undertaking on this point at their last meeting. He did not give such an undertaking. We have informed the High Commission that we do not consider there has been a breach of faith, but are disappointed that Cyprus voted against a friend. The meeting offers the opportunity for the Prime Minister to express regret about Cyprus' vote.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1352 OF 15 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,  
ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 664 : CYPRUS : UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL SOME SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ON 19 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW ME THIS EVENING, 15 NOVEMBER, DESPITE HIS MANY OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS ON HIS RETURN FROM ADDIS ABABA. I EXPLAINED THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER ON 19 NOVEMBER AT HIS OWN REQUEST. I STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT HER INTENTION TO GET INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT KYPRIANOU WAS PRESENTING HIMSELF AS A TARGET AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ADVICE ON HOW SHE MIGHT MAKE USE OF THIS UNEXPECTED OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THE DETAILS OF THE CYPRUS DOSSIER SINCE HIS RETURN. BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF HOME TRUTHS THAT NEEDED TO BE BORNE IN ON KYPRIANOU:

(A) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' SINGLE IDEA WAS THAT ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED WAS PRESSURE ON TURKEY BECAUSE ONLY THEY HAD MADE CONCESSIONS: THIS WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE AND IT WOULD HELP IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD CONVEY TO HIM THAT HE HAD TO DO SOMETHING ON THIS SIDE:

(B) AT THE BACK OF GREEK CYPRIOT MINDS WAS THE THOUGHT THAT A BIZONAL SOLUTION NEED ONLY BE THEORETICAL: IN FACT THEY HAD TO REALISE THAT THEY WERE COMPLETELY WRONG IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE THE TURKISH INVASION:

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(D) THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE TURKISH SIDE: THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD FIND THEMSELVES IN TROUBLE IF THEY TURNED OUT TO BE THE MORE INTRANSIGENT PARTY AT THE NEXT ROUND (I MENTIONED THAT MR WILBERFORCE HAD WARNED IACOVOU THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT BE LEFT HIGH AND DRY).

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MR WESTON

MR EGERTON

MR RENWICK

MR J THOMAS

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

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APPENDIX B

DRAFT TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

CYPRUS: ADVANCED COPIES 14

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PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR JONES

PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET  
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INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

1. HAASS (STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD MINISTER ON 15 NOVEMBER THAT A DECISION HAD NOW BEEN TAKEN TO SEND MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT TO EVREN AND KYPRIANOU. SHULTZ WILL BE SENDING MESSAGES TO OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED, INCLUDING ONE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL PLEDGING CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS. HAASS ASKED MOST PARTICULARLY THAT WE SHOULD BE DISCREET ABOUT THIS INFORMATION, PARTLY BECAUSE THE MESSAGES MIGHT NOT YET HAVE BEEN DELIVERED AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE ONE TO EVREN, WHICH WAS COINED IN PRETTY FIRM LANGUAGE, WOULD BE JEOPARDISED IF PREMATURE PUBLICITY WERE GIVEN TO IT. HAASS INDICATED THAT THE DECISION TO SEND HIGH LEVEL MESSAGES HAD BEEN AS MUCH AS ANYTHING PRECIPITATED BY RUMOURS BEING PUT ABOUT BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THAT THE PROBABLE FAILURE OF THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WAS DUE TO U.S. UNWILLINGNESS TO WEIGH IN WITH EVREN.

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ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 664 : CYPRUS : UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL  
SOME SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ON 19 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW ME THIS EVENING, 15 NOVEMBER,  
DESPITE HIS MANY OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS ON HIS RETURN FROM ADDIS  
ABABA. I EXPLAINED THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE SEEING THE PRIME  
MINISTER ON 19 NOVEMBER AT HIS OWN REQUEST. I STRESSED THAT IT  
WAS NOT HER INTENTION TO GET INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT  
KYPRIANOU WAS PRESENTING HIMSELF AS A TARGET AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT  
AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ADVICE ON HOW SHE MIGHT MAKE USE OF  
THIS UNEXPECTED OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET  
TO GRIPS WITH THE DETAILS OF THE CYPRUS DOSSIER SINCE HIS  
RETURN. BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF HOME TRUTHS THAT NEEDED TO BE  
BORNE IN ON KYPRIANOU:

(A) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' SINGLE IDEA WAS THAT ALL THAT WAS  
REQUIRED WAS PRESSURE ON TURKEY BECAUSE ONLY THEY HAD MADE  
CONCESSIONS: THIS WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE AND IT WOULD HELP IF THE  
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(I MENTIONED THAT MR WILBERFORCE HAD WARNED TACOVOU THAT THE  
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MR EGERTON

MR RENWICK

MR J THOMAS

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

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~~CR~~

Rough to  
Langdon.

CR-13111

Could you please  
call the Cyprus High  
Commissioner & confirm the  
appointment for Kyprianou  
at 6 p.m. on 19 November.

C.D.P.





file to  
cc Caroline Lyder  
Sir P Crook

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 November 1984

PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

BF1

President Kyprianou has asked to see the Prime Minister briefly on 19 November on a strictly private matter. The Prime Minister has agreed and an appointment has been made for 1800 hours. I should be grateful for a brief note summarising the state of play over the UN Secretary General's initiative by 1700 hours on 16 November.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

CDA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office 20/9

London SW1A 2AH

21 September 1984

Dear Charles,

Visit of President Kyprianou

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting over lunch at Chequers with President Kyprianou at 12.45 p.m. on 24 September.

As you will know, we have agreed with the Cyprus High Commission that the following will accompany the President:

Mr Tasos Panayides, Cyprus High Commissioner

Mr Haris Vovides, Director of President Kyprianou's Office

Mr Jenkins will attend from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

UKMIS New York will be telegraphing separately a report of a meeting between Sir John Thomson and the UN Secretary General which is due to take place before the Prime Minister's meeting. I understand that this would be MUFAXED from No 10 to Chequers if necessary.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS: 24  
SEPTEMBER

STEERING BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1 The meeting is at President Kyprianou's request. He will wish to brief the Prime Minister on the United Nations Secretary General's proximity talks with President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash. President Kyprianou is due to see President Mitterrand on 25 September and will return to New York where he is to see Mr Shultz on 27 September and Mr Gromyko on 28 September. We know of no other official engagements while he is in London. He will have attended the Arsenal v. Stoke football match on Saturday.

2 The proximity talks started on 10 September and ended on 20 September. We understand from United Nations Secretariat that, as expected, they became difficult as the parties tackled substance, and little progress was made. A further round begins on 15 October. President Kyprianou will no doubt wish to seek support and understanding for his position and may want us to put pressure on the Turkish side. He is under political pressure at home and may be nervous and agitated.

3 President Kyprianou saw the Prime Minister in London in November 1983 immediately after the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. They met again in New Delhi at CHOGM later in November, in London in January and again in June. The record of the June meeting is attached as Annex A.

British Objectives

- 4 a. To help protect our interests in Cyprus (principally the Sovereign Base Areas) by listening sympathetically to Kyprianou;
- b. To help prevent a deterioration of the situation and to encourage Kyprianou to show the flexibility which will be necessary if progress is to be made;
- c. To re-emphasise our support for the United Nations

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/Secretary-General



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Secretary-General, remind Kyprianou of our efforts up to now and resist attempts to cast us as mediator;

d. To ask for Cypriot support on the Falklands UN debate.

#### Cypriot Objectives

- 5 a. To persuade us that pressure on Turkey is the only way to make Denktash serious about a settlement;
- b. To present Kyprianou's own reactions to the United Nations Secretary-General's initiative and to justify the stance he is taking;
- c. Possibly to press us to deny EC preferential access for goods from northern Cyprus, and to urge us to press for a customs union with the EC;
- d. Possibly to ask us to hold double bilateral talks with Greece and Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee, if the talks fail;

#### Background

6 The proximity talks in New York have been based on "talking points" the Secretary-General put to representatives of the two communities in Vienna in early August. The talking points were given in strict confidence and the talks are confidential. Although there was leakage by the Greek Cypriot Communist Party and we have received reports from the UN Secretariat and on other channels, we should not reveal that we are aware of the details.

7 Sir J Thomson is due to see Sr Perez de Cuellar soon before the Prime Minister's meeting and will be telegraphing a report separately. The Secretary-General's proposals are ambitious: the re-opening of Nicosia Airport would effectively end the Greek Cypriot trade embargo on the north and would be difficult for the Greek Cypriots.

8 Kyprianou came under heavy pressure from the Greek Cypriot Communist Party AKEL and from the Centre Right Party Rally to accept the Secretary-General's invitation to the talks. Kyprianou's lukewarm response to the Secretary-General's last initiative in August 1983 had appeared to play into Turkish Cypriot hands, leaving the way open for "UDI".

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9 The UN Secretariat have told us that the going has been difficult, particularly with Denktash. Kyprianou has demanded that more territory than Varosha be returned and has asked for more details on the re-opening of the Airport. Denktash has said that he will only consider handing over Varosha and not six additional areas which the Greek Cypriots would need to balance to a concession on the Airport. More worryingly Denktash wants to reserve the right if he judges the Greek Cypriots have failed to keep any part of the bargain to withdraw completely from the process and re-occupy Varosha. This would be entirely unacceptable to the Secretary-General. On constitutional matters, Denktash has insisted on equality of status between the two communities. Despite the difficulties, we judge that neither side is likely to want to break up the talks. The Secretary-General has already asked the Americans to put pressure on Turkey. Further details are in the Essential Facts below.

Tactics and the course of the meeting

10 The Prime Minister may wish to reiterate our concern at recent events in Cyprus and emphasise our support for the Secretary-General in his current initiative. The reactions to the initiative of the two leaders have been encouraging. She could then invite Kyprianou to give his assessment.

11 Kyprianou will probably paint a highly subjective picture of the negotiations with the Greek Cypriots appearing reasonable and constructive on all points and Denktash obstructive at every turn. He will want the UK and others to put pressure on the Turks and on Denktash; to prepare Western opinion if the talks break down; and seek to put the blame on Denktash.

12 We should listen sympathetically, but avoid making commitments. We should stress the importance of the current initiative. Continuation of the status quo before the Turkish Cypriot UDI is no longer possible. Flexibility is needed and a breakdown must be avoided.

13 We can reassure him that if he can reach agreement we will support him in the face of possible criticism for making

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concessions.

14 In response to criticism from Kyprianou, we should emphasise our activity and interest: we have urged flexibility and moderation on the Turks and, so far as we have been able, the Turkish Cypriots. We will continue to do so in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General. We should avoid being dragged into the details of negotiation and from making commitments which might enable the Greek Cypriots to shift to us the blame for lack of progress.

15 Kyprianou may probe our likely reaction to a breakdown and explore the possibility of a British initiative. We should stress that the best hope lies with the Secretary-General and counsel restraint: more Greek troops or arms purchases would be likely to lead to greater tension and risk violence.

16 Kyprianou may raise the questions of Cyprus/EC trade (although his government have apparently decided to postpone action against us and the Germans in the European Court) and of customs union (this is opposed by the French and Italians).

17 The Prime Minister may want to explain our position on the forthcoming Falklands debate.

18 Detailed briefing is attached.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
21 September 1984

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS: 24  
SEPTEMBER

POINTS TO MAKE

- 1 Continue to be most concerned about the situation in Cyprus. Most important it does not get worse.
- 2 Much encouraged by your positive reaction to the Secretary-General's initiative. Heavy burden for you as President in the last ten months: you have shown statesmanship and restraint in the face of provocation. Hope you will continue to do so despite the difficulties and frustrations that lie ahead.
- 3 The present talks should be given every opportunity to succeed. Breakdown could lead to a sharp deterioration of the situation. Denktash would be likely to consolidate further his new so-called state.
- 4 We have made clear to the Secretary-General that we will do all we can to support him. We stand ready to assist him in whatever way we can.
- 5 We have been active in promoting peaceful, just and lasting settlement. We have taken a consistent and strong line with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots over "UDI", the "Exchange of Ambassadors" and Varosha both in the United Nations and elsewhere. We drafted the Security Council Resolution deploring "UDI". We continue to make a major contribution to UNFICYP.

Pressure on Turkey

- 6 Have taken every opportunity to make clear to Turkey and to Turkish Cypriots our position on Cyprus. Will continue to do so in consultation with Secretary-General.

Guarantor Power Consultations (if raised)

- 7 We remain ready to hold tripartite consultations with Greece and Turkey that are envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee. At present they would be inappropriate. Turkey agreed to such

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consultations after the purported declaration of independence but Greece declined. If the United Nations Secretary-General felt it would be helpful for us to issue a further invitation to tripartite consultations, we would give this serious consideration. But would be wrong for us to try to mediate and cut across Secretary-General's efforts.

EC/Cyprus [If raised]

8 Given our substantial interests and association with Cyprus have naturally thought seriously about Cyprus' relations with the EC. Would not be sensible time to withdraw Community preference from Turkish Cypriot exports while the Turkish Cypriots are at the negotiating table. We should not give Denktash a pretext to withdraw and consolidate the 'TRNC'. Community preference is one of the very few pieces of real leverage that the Ten have over the "TRNC".

9 (If necessary). Neither we, nor the majority of member states, believe that the circulation by the Commission of new Cypriot customs documentation obliges us to cease extending preferential treatment to northern Cypriot goods.

Customs Union

10 Shall go on pressing Community to agree on realistic proposals which will permit early Customs Union while safeguarding Cyprus' industries. But it has, as you know, been heavy going.

Falklands at the UN

11 Disappointed that Cyprus supported Argentina in General Assembly in 1982. This encourages view that aggression pays. Argentine invasion ruled out discussions of sovereignty. Argentines make clear negotiations can only have one outcome: transfer of sovereignty regardless of wishes of islanders. Hope Cyprus will not support Argentine resolution which calls for negotiations on sovereignty and fails to recognise importance of islanders' wishes.

BILATERAL ISSUES

"Money for the Bases" [Defensive]

12 Ready to continue discussions if you want. Worth looking again

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/at





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at our £7.5m loan offer made in 1978.

Students' Fees [Defensive]

13 Glad we were able to provide £1m for three years 1983-86. No decision yet on continuance of scheme but those already studying will not suffer.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

The Cyprus Problem

1 The situation in Cyprus is delicate and dangerous. After the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in November 1983 the Security Council passed a UK draft resolution deploring the declaration (SCR 541: 13-1-(Pakistan)-1-(Jordan)). The UN Secretary-General's 'five-point plan', produced after proposals were made by both Kyprianou and Denktash early in the year, met a lukewarm response from Kyprianou and outright rejection from Denktash.

2 On 17 April Turkey and the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' exchanged 'Ambassadors' (when the UN special representative was visiting Cyprus). This was a slap in the face for the Secretary General. The Greek Cypriots, greatly angered, protested to the UN Security Council at Turkey's 'flagrant violation' of the Security Council resolution. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on 11 May (SCR 550: 13-1-(Pakistan)-1-(US)) condemning the exchange of 'Ambassadors' and reaffirming SCR 541. The resolution also reaffirmed the UN Secretary General's mission of good offices.

3 The political situation deteriorated further with moves by Denktash to consolidate the 'TRNC', an apparent start of resettlement in Varosha (which was halted after our and other protests) and a threat by Denktash to disrupt the operation of UNFICYP at its renewal in mid June.

4 In June the UN Secretary General said he would make a fresh initiative. Preliminary talks took place in Vienna on 6-7 August

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between Ertekun, the Turkish Cypriot 'Foreign Minister' and Mavromattis, Political Director of the Greek Cypriot MFA. The Secretary General is aiming for a meeting between the two leaders, possibly in the early New Year, to agree on the first stages of a settlement.

5 The Secretary General's "talking points" put to the parties in Vienna were confidential but immediately leaked to the Greek Cypriot press. They followed a "staged" approach. They began with confidence building measures: the placing of Varosha and six other smaller areas on the buffer zone under UN interim administration; a moratorium on actions tending to prejudice the Secretary General's efforts, and the re-opening of Nicosia Airport under UN interim administration with free access from both sides.

6 The next stage was establishing a governmental structure: working groups would be set up to discuss the whole range of government activity from foreign affairs to posts and telecommunications, and including one on defence and security. The Secretary General suggested a legislature of two chambers with 70:30 proportion in the lower chamber and 50:50 in the upper. A working group was to be established to negotiate further territorial adjustments in favour of the Greek Cypriots. This would lead to a transitional federal government.

7 Working groups would also be set up to discuss freedom of movement, settlement and right of property (the "three freedoms"); demilitarisation of the Republic with initial limited deconfrontation measures; and a timetable for achieving a federal system.

8 After internal consultations, Kyprianou and Denktash personally participated in proximity talks in New York which started on 10 September and ended on 20 September. The two sides have re-committed themselves to earlier (1977 and 1979) high level agreements. The Secretary-General tackled the principle of a federal state, and the substance of his talking points. As expected, the going became harder when substance was encountered, especially with Denktash. The Secretary-General has announced a

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second round beginning on 15 October. There may then be a meeting between the two leaders, possibly in the early New Year, to agree on the first stages of a settlement.

9 It is welcome that the talks have continued so far without a breakdown: but there are few substantive grounds for optimism. Denktash appears to be sitting pretty.

#### Trade with northern Cyprus

10 The Cypriots have repeatedly sought to persuade the EC to end preferential access for exports from northern Cyprus; the UK takes over 70% of all northern Cyprus' exports. Earlier this year, the EC Commission circulated new customs stamps for Cyprus but did not instruct member states to refuse to accept Turkish Cypriot stamps. While the Greeks interpreted the Commission's action as an instruction not to give preferential access to goods for northern Cyprus unless accompanied by Greek Cypriot customs stamps, other member states took the view that the status quo had not been altered. We have never thought it wise (or in our interests as northern Cyprus' major trading partner) for the EC to take precipitate action to cut off Turkish Cypriot preferences. But given our other interests in Cyprus we have not wanted to be any more prominent than we have in opposing Greek Cypriot wishes. President Kyprianou did not raise this at his last meeting with the Prime Minister and may not do so on this occasion. But he may (as he did last time) refer to our differences on the subject in speaking to the press.

#### Customs Union

11 President Kyprianou may seek UK support for early progress on Customs Union with the Community as enshrined in the 1973 EC/Cyprus Association Agreement. Progress beyond the initial stage has been repeatedly blocked by Italian (supported by French) reluctance to make any further concessions on imports of Mediterranean agricultural products. Although exploratory talks on a direct transition to Customs Union are now in hand there is little prospect of early progress. We have always felt that full Customs Union might not be in the Cypriots' own best interests (their industries will be vulnerable) but it is not for us to tell them so and we have

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gained some credit with the Cyprus Government for our steadfast support on this issue.

#### Falklands at the UN

12 Cyprus (and Greece) voted in favour of the Argentine resolution at the General Assembly in 1982 but did not participate in the vote in 1983 (Greece abstained). Non-participation contributed to a reduction (from 90 to 87) in numbers of those who supported Argentina. Cyprus has a number of loyalties: to Greece, to the non-aligned movement and to the Commonwealth. Further non-participation would be much appreciated by us.

#### Money for the Bases

13 Since 1965 Cypriots have pressed us for aid (£250m) they allege to be due under the 1960 Treaties setting up the Republic of Cyprus and Sovereign Base Areas. They have also maintained that HMG should pay for the facilities we enjoy there. Appendix R of the Treaties provide for aid to be paid until 1965 and consultations thereafter, with the final decision left to the UK.

14 We maintain that there is no legal obligation to pay after 1965. We help in other ways: our contribution to UNFICYP is the largest (£22m per year and 800 men). In 1978 we offered a £7.5m loan: the Cypriots have not taken this up, partly because we said we would see it as fulfilling any obligations to date.

#### Students' Fees

15 Ministers agreed at the end of June that students currently on the fee support scheme (cost £1m a year) should be able to finish their studies. The scheme is due to end in 1985/86. The Cyprus Government attaches great importance to the scheme; the possibility of extending it for at least one year is currently being considered.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
21 September 1984

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10



PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: PERSONALITY NOTE

KYPRIANOU, Spyros

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Educated locally and then in London.

Barrister (Grays Inn). Represented Makarios in London 1952-54.

Attended the UN General Assembly in 1956 as Representative of the Ethnarchy Council. Returned to Cyprus in 1959 and, on

Independence, was briefly Minister of Justice, then

Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1972. In 1976 launched new

pro-Makarios party of the centre-right DEKO. Following

elections that year became President of the House of

Representatives and thus Acting President on the death of

Makarios in 1977. Subsequently elected President by acclaim

and re-elected unopposed in February 1978. Re-elected for a

second term in February 1983 gaining a clear majority on the

first ballot over his two opponents.

Has had health problems. Serious heart attack in March 1969

and subsequent troubles. But his health appears to have

improved more recently. Speaks English well.

## SUPPLEMENTARY SPEAKING NOTE

1. We have had a quick contact with the Secretary General after the end of the first round. It is clear that he has put in a tremendous personal effort. His concern over the general lack of progress is also clear.

2. What is your assessment of the prospects for progress in the light of the Secretary General's working points? Do the working points provide a reasonable way forward if they could be accepted by each side?

3. Do you see any prospect of a trade-off between constitutional flexibility and territory? If you can be flexible on the constitution, we are ready to press the other side to be flexible on territory.

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4. The Turkish side is giving us in confidence what we suspect may be an incorrect account of your position in respect of certain of the Secretary General's working points. If you can confirm that this account is not accurate, it would give the Secretary General and ourselves useful ammunition to use with the other side. For example, as regards the constitutional proposals:

i. Powers and functions of the federal government

They say that you seem to reject the suggestion by the Secretary General that a list be drawn up to specify the powers and functions of the federal government and that you are talking about devolving some powers from the centre rather than establishing a bizonal federation.

ii. Legislature

They say you reject the proposals for a bi-cameral legislature [can you accept 50:50 representation in the upper chamber?].

iii. Executive

They say that the role of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-Presidency would be diminished even compared with the powers set out in the 1960 Constitution, the implication being that the Turkish Cypriots could always be overborne in the Executive. Is this so?

5. As regards the confidence building measures, it is alleged that you are opposed to the re-opening of Nicosia airport, at least by implication, because of problems over sovereignty. Could you in fact accept the opening of the airport in exchange for an acceptable territorial package?

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250602Z SEP 84  
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA ANKARA THENS EC POSTS WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

CYPRUS

1. AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S LUNCH WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY THERE WAS A DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS A KEY COUNTRY IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE, COULD DO TO HELP HIM SECURE A CONSTRUCTIVE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. HE HOPED HE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM THE TURKISH SIDE TO BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE IN THE STRONGER POSITION AND IT WAS FOR THEM TO MAKE A GESTURE BY OFFERING TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD BE BALANCED BY CONSTITUTIONAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS. HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HERR GENSCHER TO MAKE PERSONAL APPEALS FOR FLEXIBILITY ON THE TURKISH SIDE. HE WAS MAKING THE SAME REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE DID NOT EXPECT A SOLUTION WITHIN 3 - 4 MONTHS BUT IF SOMETHING COULD BE SALVAGED FROM THE OCTOBER ROUND THIS WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ANY SPECIFIC, LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN MIND. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE TURKISH SIDE MUST GIVE BACK TO THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE GROUND FOR RESETTLEMENT AND FORGET THEIR IDEA OF EQUAL POWER, WHICH WAS A RECIPE FOR TOTAL PARALYSIS. ON THEIR SIDE THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS HAD TO REALISE THAT IT WAS NONSENSE TO GO BACK TO THE 1960 CONSTITUTION.

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4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THESE WERE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS. WERE THERE NO MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVES WHICH COULD BE ACHIEVED? PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT IF THE TURKS COULD HAVE LESS THAN 30 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY, EVEN A TINY BIT LESS, AND IF THERE COULD BE A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITH ENOUGH POWER TO RUN THE COUNTRY, BUT NOT IN THE SAME PROPORTION AS THE POPULATION THESE WOULD BE MORE LIMITED AND ACHIEVABLE OBJECTIVES. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT BOTH SIDES THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MADE ENORMOUS CONCESSIONS. SIR JOHN THOMSON SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A QUALITATIVE CHANGE SINCE TURKISH- CYPRIOT UDI. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THIS WAS WHY HE WAS SEEKING A GLOBAL SOLUTION, WHICH SOMEHOW BY-PASSED UDI.

THOMSON

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PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR. RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
SIR C TICKELL  
MR O'NEILL  
MR WESTON  
MR EGERTON  
MR RENWICK  
MR J THOMAS  
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IMMEDIATE 251330 Z

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TEL NO

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5 251330 Z  
6 FM FCO 250945 Z SEPTEMBER 84  
7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA  
10 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK (DS11)  
11 INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG  
12 CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU  
13 For the Secretary of State's Party  
14 1 Discussion between the Prime Minister and President  
15 Kyprianou on 24 September lasted some two hours. The main points  
16 are in my second IFT.  
17 2 During the discussion the Prime Minister was able to clarify  
18 the Greek Cypriot position on a number of questions at this stage  
19 in the proximity talks. Kyprianou professed to be uncertain as  
20 to whether either Turkey or Denktash wanted any settlement at  
21 all. The Prime Minister said that in all logic they should do so.  
22 Turkey would not wish to sustain the economic and political  
23 burden of supporting ~~it~~ definitely an isolated Turkish Cypriot  
24 state. Moreover, Denktash's prestige and influence would surely  
25 be greatly increased if he were Vice-President of a united and

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Telephone number 233 4189					
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Comcen reference		Time of despatch			

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 2 internationally recognised Cyprus.  
 3 3 As regards the three constitutional issues on which the  
 4 Turks have given their own account of the Greek Cypriot position  
 5 (your telno 877), Kyprianou explained that:  
 6 a he accepted that a list should be drawn up to specify the  
 7 powers and functions of the federal government. Equally,  
 8 however, the powers of the provincial administrations should  
 9 be similarly defined. It was not enough to list only the  
 10 federal powers, with all residual powers automatically lying  
 11 with the provinces.  
 12 b he could accept that there should be no retreat from the  
 13 roles of the President and Vice-President as set out in the  
 14 1980 Constitution. But Denktash was asking for considerably  
 15 more. Kyprianou thought it unacceptable that the Presidency  
 16 should alternate between Greek and Turkish Cypriots given  
 17 the population balance in Cyprus. He argued that the  
 18 election of the President by the population as a whole,  
 19 could give the Turkish Cypriot community significant  
 20 opportunities in a multi-party state, in the ~~main~~ choice  
 21 of President.  
 22 c he could accept a bi-cameral legislature while maintaining a  
 23 preference for a unicameral system. He was also ready to  
 24 discuss the proportionate representation of the communities  
 25 in each chamber taking account of what the Secretary-General  
 26 had proposed.  
 27 4 On the confidence building measures, Kyprianou was sceptical  
 28 as to whether a deal could be done on the basis of opening  
 29 Nicosia airport in exchange for a territorial offer. It was in  
 30 any case far from clear what territorial offer Denktash could be  
 31 induced to make on this basis. Nicosia airport covered wider  
 32 issues, eg the ending of the embargo, which were more appropriate  
 33 to the overall settlement.  
 34 5 The Prime Minister told Kyprianou that we would be seeking

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Classification and Caveats  
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2 to clarify the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions in the same  
3 way as she had sought to clarify his. She emphasised the  
4 importance of avoiding a breakdown of the talks and expressed  
5 strong support for the efforts which the Secretary-General was  
6 making.

7 6 In the light of the above the Secretary of State may wish to  
8 ensure that he has an adequate opportunity to speak to Halefoglu.  
9 In doing so, he may wish to emphasise the following points:

10 a The Secretary-General has made clear to us that he is  
11 concerned about the lack of progress in the proximity talks  
12 so far. He has put in a tremendous personal effort. The  
13 maximum flexibility will be required at the next round.

14 b We assume that Turkey is in favour of a unitary federal  
15 state of Cyprus. But the Greek Cypriots profess to believe  
16 that Denktash is simply playing for time. It would be a  
17 great help if Denktash could find ways of making his support  
18 for the overall objective of a settlement on the basis of a  
19 unitary federal state explicitly clear, both publicly and  
20 privately.

21 c If the talks break down the Turks will have to contend with  
22 the continuing economic and political dependence of the  
23 Turkish Cypriots on Turkey. We shall <sup>au</sup> be faced with the  
24 prospect of rising tension in Cyprus. This situation can be  
25 in the interests of neither the West, nor of Turkey:

26 d The Greek Cypriot position over the Secretary General's  
27 working points does not appear to be as negative as the  
28 Turkish Permanent Representative has indicated to Sir J  
29 Thomson. For example, they have told us that they can  
30 accept powers for a Turkish Vice-President similar to those  
31 set out in the 1960 Constitution. They can also accept a  
32 bi-cameral legislature and are open to discussion about  
33 representation of the communities within the chambers. On  
34 the other hand, we are concerned about the lack of precision

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in Denktash's position. There needs to be more clarity and flexibility in particular on his territorial proposals if the Secretary-General is to have a chance in the next round.

~~HOWE~~ **YOUNG HOWE**

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	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE 251330 Z</b>
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DESKBY	5	251330
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PRE/ADD	7	IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA
	10	INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC MODUK (DS11)
	11	INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG
	12	<b>MIPT:</b> CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU <b>MIPT</b>
	13	1 1 You should give the Secretary-General an account in
	14	confidence of the discussion between Kyprianou and the Prime
	15	Minister and explain, subject to the agreement of the Secretary
	16	of State, the line we propose to take with the Turks. It would
	17	also be helpful if, in the light of Kyprianou's remarks, the
	18	Secretary-General could indicate more precisely the points on
	19	which he would like to see constitutional concessions from the
	20	Greek Cypriots.
	21	2 Please pass copy to Secretary of State's party for
///	22	information.
//	23	3 For Washington: Please also inform the State Department at
/	24	a senior level while emphasising the need for discretion over the
	25	discussion between the Prime Minister and Kyprianou. It would be

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
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Page  
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2 ~~helpful~~ *useful* to know what action the Americans are proposing to take  
3 between now and 15 October with the parties concerned.  
4 4 We may wish subsequently to take further action in Athens,  
5 Ankara and Nicosia. It would be helpful to have Nicosia's views  
6 on the timing of an approach to Denktash and the line to take  
7 with him.

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9 **YOUNG HOWE**  
10 **NNNN**

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 CLASS 3 **CONFIDENTIAL**  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
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 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 AND FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY  
 10 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA  
 11 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK(DS11)  
 12 ~~INFO SAYING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG~~  
 13 ~~REF: 2~~ CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU  
 14 1. President Kyprianou said that he thought the interval  
 15 between the two rounds of proximity talks could most profitably be  
 16 used for private diplomacy. Indeed, this was a condition of  
 17 progress. So far exchanges through the UN Secretary-General had  
 18 been limited to generalities. The Turkish Cypriots had been  
 19 dilatory and unready to move on substance. It had only been at  
 20 his (Kyprianou's) insistence that the talks had run into a second  
 21 week, and Denktash had wanted to delay the second round until the  
 22 end of October. The Secretary-General had tried to play down  
 23 Turkish Cypriot intransigence as tactical. He had held out the  
 24 prospect of some movement in the next round and promised in the  
 25 meantime to talk to the Turkish, United States and other  
 governments. There was no doubt, however, that Perez de Cuellar

*My two  
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File number	Dept SED	Distribution  Cyprus Limited (Additional Distribution)
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

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2 was disappointed with the lack of progress.

3 2. On constitutional issues, the Turkish Cypriot position was  
4 unchanged. They were demanding full equality. On the  
5 territorial matters, the Secretary-General had proposed that the  
6 Turkish Cypriots hand back the territories offered in 1981 as a  
7 first step but it seemed that they were not prepared to do even  
8 this. The Secretary-General had tried an alternative tack, that  
9 of agreeing the number of refugees to be resettled rather than the  
10 area of land. But Denktash would not accept this either. It was  
11 quite clear that his goal was two entirely separate territories  
12 divided on ethnic criteria. So, in summary, the Turkish Cypriots  
13 would not move on constitutional issues and had actually gone  
14 backwards on territorial questions and the return of refugees.  
15 Moreover, they were now saying that the withdrawal of Turkish  
16 forces would commence only after the implementation of a settle-  
17 ment had begun. His firm impression was that Denktash was not  
18 interested in a settlement.

19 3. The Prime Minister asked whether the powers and functions of  
20 the proposed federal government had been discussed. Kyprianou  
21 said that they had. He accepted that a list should be drawn up to  
22 specify the powers and functions of the federal government.  
23 Equally, however, the powers of the provincial administrations  
24 should be similarly defined. It was not enough, as Denktash  
25 seemed to wish, to list only the federal powers with all residual  
26 powers lying automatically with the provinces.

27 4. <sup>As regards</sup> ~~When it came to~~ the executive, the Turkish Cypriots insisted  
28 that the Presidency should be held by each community in rotation.  
29 This was unacceptable given the population balance in Cyprus. The  
30 Greek Cypriot view was that the roles of the President and the  
31 Vice-President should be maintained as set out in the 1960  
32 constitution. If the President was elected by the population as a  
33 whole, this could give the Turkish Cypriots significant  
34 opportunities in a multiparty state to influence the actual choice

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Classification and Caveats  
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Page  
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2 of President.

3 5. As regards the legislature, he had said to Perez de Cuellar  
 4 that he preferred a unicameral system but would not reject a bi-  
 5 cameral one. In reply to a question whether he could accept a  
 6 50:50 representation in the Upper Chamber, President Kyprianou  
 7 said that he had spoken only of "increased" Turkish Cypriot  
 8 representation. He could not show his hand on all points at this  
 9 stage. Otherwise the Turkish Cypriots just swallowed his  
 10 concessions without giving anything in return.

11 6. In reply to a question, President Kyprianou said that he was  
 12 willing to offer Turkish Cypriots a role in Cyprus's overseas  
 13 representation.

14 7. The Prime Minister suggested that President Kyprianou's  
 15 bottom line was that a unitary state, even with very limited  
 16 powers for the federal government, was better than total  
 17 separation. There was a risk that Denktash would calculate that  
 18 time was on his side and if he just sat tight he would achieve his  
 19 goal of a separate state. A great deal therefore depended on  
 20 finding a solution to the constitutional issues and particularly  
 21 the Presidency. ~~President~~ Kyprianou said that the Turkish  
 22 Cypriots could not ask for too much. The 1960 constitution  
 23 already gave the Vice-President substantial powers. Now, in  
 24 addition, the Turkish Cypriots were being offered full autonomy  
 25 and a bi-cameral legislature. He was prepared to agree that the  
 26 Vice-President rather than the President of the House of  
 27 Representatives should deputise for the President. It was hard to  
 28 see what more he could offer. The Prime Minister asked whether  
 29 President Kyprianou could envisage minor changes to the 1960  
 30 constitution. President Kyprianou said that he was ready to show  
 31 flexibility but so far had met with no matching response. One had  
 32 to remember that federation used to be unthinkable. The Greek  
 33 Cypriots had moved a long way. The Turkish Cypriots were now  
 34 being offered a very privileged position.

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2 8. The Prime Minister asked about the prospects of re-opening  
3 Nicosia airport as a confidence-building measure. President  
4 Kyprianou doubted whether a deal could be done on the basis of  
5 opening Nicosia airport in return for a territorial offer. It was  
6 first necessary to remove the obstacles to re-opening. Wider  
7 issues were involved which were more appropriate to an overall  
8 settlement.

9 9. President Kyprianou repeated his conviction that basically  
10 Denktash was not interested in a settlement and that at the end of  
11 October matters would be where they were now. But he was ready to  
12 keep on trying. He hoped very much that the United Kingdom and  
13 others would take action with the Turkish Government before the  
14 resumption of talks in mid-October. The Prime Minister said that  
15 she doubted whether Turkey wanted the burden, economic and  
16 political, of supporting an isolated Turkish Cypriot state.  
17 Denktash's prestige would be greatly increased if he were Vice-  
18 President of a united and internationally recognised Cyprus.  
19 Sir G Howe would be seeing his Turkish colleague in New York.  
20 We would seek to clarify Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions.

21 10. The Prime Minister continued that she wanted to be sure  
22 that she had understood President Kyprianou's position properly.  
23 He was ready to have a bizonal country with a federal government  
24 and a bi-cameral legislature, and to negotiate on the distribution  
25 of powers in the executive. Was this a fair summary? President  
26 Kyprianou confirmed that it was. But he doubted even so whether  
27 there would be an adequate response from Denktash. The situation  
28 would be very difficult if the talks failed.

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30 ~~HOWE~~ **YOUING HOWE**

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Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM

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Classification and Caveats  
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PRE ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (and for Security of State's party)  
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA  
10 FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM JENKINS  
11 YOUR TELNO 895: CYPRUS

12 1. President Kyprianou telephoned the Private Secretary at  
13 No 10 on 25 September, following his discussion with the Prime  
14 Minister the previous day.

15 2. Kyprianou said that his Foreign Minister had telephoned from  
16 New York to report that Perez de Cuellar had told President Reagan  
17 that unless the United States and other major Western countries  
18 were ready to exert pressure on Turkey at the highest level, by  
19 which he meant President Evren, there was no prospect at all of  
20 progress in the proximity talks. Kyprianou said that he wanted  
21 the Prime Minister to be aware of this and hoped that she would  
22 take it into account in deciding how to follow up her talks with  
23 him yesterday. Iacovu would be briefing Sir G Howe in the same  
24 sense. The point he wanted to emphasise was that any approach to  
25 the Turks had to be at the highest level.

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File number	Dept SED	Distribution  Cyprus Limited (Additional Distribution)
Drafted by (Block capitals) M R H Jenkins		
Telephone number 233 - 6034		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
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2 3. The Private Secretary undertook to pass this onto the  
3 Prime Minister. He said that the Secretary of State would be  
4 seeing the Turkish Foreign Minister in New York shortly. We  
5 would also be comparing notes with the Americans. The Prime  
6 Minister would <sup>surely</sup> ~~no doubt~~ want to consider what more, if anything,  
7 we could usefully do in the light of the results of these  
8 discussions.

9 4. ~~In my view, we will also need to~~ <sup>The Secretary of State will no doubt feel that we will need</sup> concert our tactics  
10 further with the Secretary-General and the Americans before  
11 deciding whether to advise the Prime Minister to make an approach  
12 to President Evren. There will also be a number of other  
13 factors to take into account, including our wider relations with  
14 Turkey.

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16 HOWE

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
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Catchword

25 SEP 1984



MKJAER ✓  
Re a PC

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 September 1984

Cyprus

The Cyprus High Commissioner telephoned me this morning to pass a message on President Kyprianou's instructions. Before he could do so, President Kyprianou himself came on the line.

The President said that his Foreign Minister had telephoned from New York to say that he had learned from a very reliable source that Perez de Cuellar had told President Reagan that unless the United States and other major western countries were ready to exert pressure on Turkey at the highest level, by which he meant President Evren, there was no prospect at all of progress in the proximity talks. President Kyprianou said that he wanted the Prime Minister to be aware of this and hoped that she would take it into account in deciding how to follow up her talks with him yesterday. Mr. Iacovu would be briefing Sir Geoffrey Howe in the same sense. The point he wanted to emphasise was that any approach to the Turks had to be at the highest level.

I said that I would pass this on to the Prime Minister. I knew that Sir Geoffrey Howe was seeing the Turkey Foreign Minister shortly. We would also be comparing notes with the Americans. The Prime Minister would no doubt want to consider what more if anything we could usefully do in the light of the results of these discussions.

President Kyprianou said that he had been very well satisfied with his meeting with the Prime Minister

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yesterday. It had been reported very favourably on Cyprus television, particularly the repetition of our commitment to a unitary state of Cyprus.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CC MASTER SET



*Re*  
*ccpc* ✓

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 September 1984

*Dear Colin,*

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU AT CHEQUERS  
ON MONDAY 24 SEPTEMBER

The Prime Minister gave lunch for President Kyprianou at Chequers today. The President was accompanied by the Cyprus High Commissioner and Mr. Vovides. Mr. Michael Jenkins (FCO) and I were also present.

This letter records the main points in a long and often repetitive discussion of the proximity talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in New York and the prospects for progress in them. President Kyprianou was in a lugubrious mood and repeated on several occasions that he was convinced that Denktash was not seriously interested in making progress.

President Kyprianou introduced discussion by saying that he had thought the Prime Minister would find it useful to be briefed between the two rounds of proximity talks. The interval between them could most profitably be used for private diplomacy: indeed he thought this was a condition of progress. So far exchanges through the UN Secretary-General had been limited to generalities. The Turkish Cypriots had been dilatory and unready to move on substance. It had only been at his (Kyprianou's) insistence that the talks had run into a second week; and Denktash had wanted to delay the second round until the end of October. The Secretary-General had tried to play down Turkish Cypriot intransigence as tactical. He had held out the prospect of some movement in the next round and promised in the meantime to talk to the Turkish, United States and other governments. There was no doubt, however, that Perez de Cuellar was disappointed with the lack of progress.

On constitutional issues, the Turkish Cypriot position was unchanged. They were demanding full equality. On the

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territorial matters, the Secretary-General had proposed that the Turkish Cypriots hand back the territories offered in 1981 as a first step but it seemed that they were not prepared to do even this. The Secretary-General had tried an alternative tack, that of agreeing the number of refugees to be resettled rather than the area of land. But Denktash would not accept this either. It was quite clear that his goal was two entirely separate territories divided on ethnic criteria. So, in summary, the Turkish Cypriots would not move on constitutional issues and had actually gone backwards on territorial questions and the return of refugees. Moreover, they were now saying that the withdrawal of Turkish forces would commence only after the implementation of a settlement had begun. His firm impression was that Denktash was not interested in a settlement.

The Prime Minister asked whether the powers and functions of the proposed federal government had been discussed. President Kyprianou said that they had. He accepted that a list should be drawn up to specify the powers and functions of the federal government. Equally, however, the powers of the provincial administrations should be similarly defined. It was not enough, as Denktash seemed to wish, to list only the federal powers with all residual powers lying automatically with the provinces.

When it came to the executive, the Turkish Cypriots insisted that the Presidency should be held by each community in rotation. This was unacceptable given the population balance in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot view was that the roles of the President and the Vice-President should be maintained as set out in the 1960 constitution. If the President was elected by the population as a whole, this could give the Turkish Cypriots significant opportunities in a multiparty state to influence the actual choice of President.

As regards the legislature, he had said to Perez de Cuellar that he preferred a unicameral system but would not reject a bicameral one. In reply to a question from Mr. Jenkins whether he could accept a fifty:fifty representation in the Upper Chamber, President Kyprianou said that he had spoken only of "increased" Turkish Cypriot representation. He could not show his hand on all points at this stage. Otherwise the Turkish Cypriots just swallowed his concessions without giving anything in return.

In reply to a question from Mr. Jenkins, President Kyprianou said that he was willing to offer Turkish Cypriots a role in Cyprus's overseas representation.

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The Prime Minister said that Denktash's calculation seemed to be that time was on his side and if he just sat tight he would achieve his goal of a separate state. It seemed to her that President Kyprianou's bottom line was that a unitary state, even with very limited powers for the federal government, was better than total separation. A great deal therefore depended on finding a solution to the constitutional issues and particularly the Presidency. President Kyprianou said that the Turkish Cypriots could not ask for too much. The 1960 constitution already gave the Vice-President substantial powers. Now, in addition, the Turkish Cypriots were being offered full autonomy and a bicameral legislature. He was prepared to agree that the Vice-President rather than the President of the House of Representatives should deputize for the President. It was hard to see what more he could offer. The Prime Minister asked whether President Kyprianou could envisage minor changes to the 1960 constitution. President Kyprianou said that he was ready to show flexibility but so far had met with no matching response. One had to remember that federation used to be unthinkable. The Greek Cypriots had moved a long way. The Turkish Cypriots were now being offered a very privileged position.

The Prime Minister asked about the prospects of re-opening Nicosia airport as a confidence-building measure. President Kyprianou doubted whether a deal could be done on the basis of opening Nicosia airport in return for a territorial offer. It was first necessary to remove the obstacles to re-opening. Wider issues were involved which were more appropriate to an overall settlement.

President Kyprianou repeated his conviction that basically Denktash was not interested in a settlement and that at the end of October matters would be where they were now. But he was ready to keep on trying. He hoped very much that the United Kingdom and others would take action with the Turkish Government before the resumption of talks in mid-October. The Prime Minister said that she doubted whether Turkey wanted the burden, economic and political, of supporting an isolated Turkish Cypriot state. Sir Geoffrey Howe would be seeing his Turkish colleague in New York. We would seek to clarify Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions. The Prime Minister continued that the crucial question concerned Denktash's real intentions. Had he decided to go the federal route and hold out for the most favourable possible arrangements? Or was he just wasting time in the belief that every day brought him nearer the goal of a separate Turkish Cypriot state? It seemed to her that the question of the Presidency/Vice-President was probably crucial in this respect. Denktash's prestige would be greatly increased if he were Vice-President of a united and internationally recognised Cyprus.

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
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The Prime Minister continued that she wanted to be sure that she had understood President Kyprianou's position properly. He was ready to have a bizonal country with a federal government and a bicameral legislature, and to negotiate on the distribution of powers in the executive. Was this a fair summary? President Kyprianou confirmed that it was. But he doubted even so whether there would be an adequate response from Denktash. The situation would be very difficult if the talks failed. The Prime Minister said that it was very important to avoid a breakdown. She was confident that Perez de Cuellar would make every effort to take matters a stage further, even if only a small step. Perez de Cuellar had our full support and we would do all we could to prevent failure. President Kyprianou said that he was convinced that the arrangements which he was prepared to offer would actually be better for the Turkish Cypriots than independence. The problems between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities themselves were relatively minor. He himself would never be an obstacle to a settlement: he would step down if necessary. But there would not be a settlement unless some pressure could be brought to bear on the Turkish Government. That was the only way to move Denktash, who appeared to be losing support in the Turkish Cypriot community itself.

As President Kyprianou prepared to leave, the Prime Minister said that she hoped she could count on Cyprus not to support an Argentine resolution on the Falklands at the United Nations. President Kyprianou appeared to take the point.

The Prime Minister instructed afterwards that Sir Geoffrey Howe be given a full account of this discussion before he sees the Turkish Foreign Minister. Perez de Cuellar should also be briefed on it by Sir J. Thomson and the Americans informed at a high level. In both cases, it was important to preserve confidentiality.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*yours sincerely,*  


(C.D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES.

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ES/LADY IDDIG  
ES/MB ~~RENTON~~

ES/FUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JONES

PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 220003Z SEP 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 875 OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1984

AND TO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 873: TALKS WITH THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I HAD AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH IACOVOU TODAY, 21 SEPTEMBER. HE WILL BE STAYING HERE UNTIL OCTOBER 2 AND WILL NOT THEREFORE BE ACCOMPANYING KYPRIANOUT TO LONDON.
2. IACOVOU'S ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS NATURALLY CONCENTRATED ON DENKTASH'S INTRANSIGENCE. HE ADMITTED THAT DENKTASH HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD MAKE MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION. HOWEVER, IACOVOU STRONGLY DOUBTED THAT THESE WOULD AMOUNT TO ANYTHING SUBSTANTIAL. HE GAVE STRONG SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEA THAT THE TURKISH TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE MEASURED IN THE NUMBER OF GREEK-CYPRIOTS WHO COULD BE RE-SETTLED RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF LAND. THE LATTER WAS BASED ON THE OLD-FASHIONED IDEA THAT THE CYPRIOT ECONOMY WAS PREDOMINANTLY AGRICULTURAL. HE SAID THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS WERE LOOKING FOR THE RE-SETTLEMENT OF ABOUT 100,000 OUT OF THE 180,000 ODD WHO HAD BEEN DISPLACED.
3. APART FROM THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION, THE OTHER TWO BIG ISSUES ACCORDING TO IACOVOU WERE THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE

ISSUES ACCORDING TO IACOVOU WERE THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES. EVERYTHING ELSE HE THOUGHT, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, WAS A SUBSIDIARY MATTER WHICH WOULD FALL INTO PLACE IF THE THREE MAIN ISSUES COULD BE SETTLED. HE INDICATED THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS WERE WILLING TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE FIELDS IN EXCHANGE FOR TURKISH CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORIAL ISSUES.

4. IACOVOU SAID DENKTASH HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO RESUME THE TALKS AS EARLY AS OCTOBER AND WAS SHOWING EVERY SIGN OF WANTING TO PROCRASTINATE. THE GREEKS ON THE OTHER HAND WANTED AN EARLY SETTLEMENT. DENKTASH WOULD MOVE ONLY IF ANKARA TOLD HIM TO.

5. I AM CONSCIOUS THAT THE ACCOUNT GIVEN TO ME BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS A DIFFERENT SLANT FROM THE DAILY BRIEFINGS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM SHERRY. THE LATTER PUT THE MAIN BLAME FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON DENKTASH WHEREAS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS MORE EVEN-HANDED AND INDEED IF ANYTHING PUT THE MAIN BLAME ON KYPRIANOU. NEVERTHELESS MY FEELING IS THAT KYPRIANOU HAS AT LAST REALISED THAT TIME IS AGAINST HIM AND I BELIEVE HE MAY THEREFORE BE PERSUADED TO MAKE GREATER CONCESSIONS THAN HITHERTO ON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND PUBLIC REPRESENTATION WOULD BE SHARED WITH THE TURKISH-CYPRIOTS. ANY INDICATION WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER COULD EXTRACT THAT THIS WAS SO WOULD OBVIOUSLY HELP GREATLY WITH ANY HIGH LEVEL APPROACHES WE MIGHT DECIDE TO MAKE IN ANKARA.

THOMSON

NNNN

CYPRUS: ADVANCED OFFICES ~~18~~ 19

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PS/ADY ~~RENTON~~

PS/EUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JONES

PS/NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

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~~SECRETARY GENERAL~~

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 874 OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1984

MIPT: CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

BACKGROUND

1. ON 6/7 AUGUST, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN PURSUANCE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES MISSION, MET SEPARATELY WITH THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS TURKISH CYPRIOT COUNTERPART IN VIENNA WHERE HE PUT TO THEM A SET OF ORAL 'WORKING POINTS' AND INVITED THE TWO SIDES TO PROXIMITY TALKS.
2. THE 'WORKING POINTS' CALLED FOR:
  - (A) A RECOMMITMENT TO THE 1977 AND 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES, AND A COMMITMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL REPUBLIC WHICH WOULD BE 'BICOMMUNAL AS REGARDS THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND BIZONAL AS REGARDS TERRITORY'.
  - (B) 3 SETS OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES COMPRISING:
    - (I) GREEK-CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT UNDER INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION OF VAROSHA AND THE SIX ADDITIONAL AREAS DELINEATED ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOT MAP OF 5 AUGUST 1981;
    - (II) A MORATORIUM ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS TENDING TO PREJUDICE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS;
    - (III) THE REOPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT UNDER UN AUSPICES.
  - (C) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF MINISTRIES, A TWO HOUSE LEGISLATURE WITH EQUAL REPRESENTATION FOR BOTH COMMUNITIES IN THE UPPER HOUSE, JOINT WORKING GROUPS TO PLAN THE INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENTAL

JOINT WORKING GROUPS TO PLAN THE INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS.

(D) FURTHER TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS (UNSPECIFIED)

(E) PROGRESS ON DEMILITARISATION OF THE REPUBLIC AND ON FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT AND PROPERTY.

3. THE TWO SIDES ACCEPTED THESE WORKING POINTS AS A BASIS FOR PROXIMITY TALKS AIMED AT WORKING TOWARDS A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN THEIR TWO LEADERS.

4. THE PROXIMITY TALKS TOOK PLACE IN NEW YORK FROM 10 - 20 SEPTEMBER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD A NUMBER OF SEPARATE SESSIONS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH SEEKING THEIR DETAILED REACTIONS TO THE WORKING POINTS.

5. ACCORDING TO BRIEFING WE RECEIVED FROM THE UN SECRETARIAT, KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH QUICKLY AGREED TO THE COMMITMENTS AT 2(A) ABOVE, BUT THEREAFTER MAJOR DIFFICULTIES AROSE AS THE TALKS GOT DOWN TO SUBSTANCE.

6. DENKTASH APARENTLY TOOK A HARD LINE ON BOTH CONSTITUTION AND TERRITORY. ON CONSTITUTION HE PRESSED FOR AN EQUALITY VIRTUALLY AMOUNTING TO GOVERNMENT ONLY BY CONSENSUS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. ON TERRITORY HE REFUSED TO CONSIDER GIVING ANYTHING MORE THAN SOME UNSPECIFIED ENLARGEMENT OF THE 'SIX' AREAS (IE. NO NEW AREAS AND NO ENLARGEMENT OF VAROSHA). HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH TROOPS BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND SOUGHT THE RIGHT AT ANY STAGE TO REOCCUPY ANY TERRITORY HANDED OVER IF IN HIS VIEW THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT KEEPING THEIR SIDE OF THE BARGAINING.

7. KYPRIANOU FOR HIS PART APPARENTLY SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY, NOTABLY IN ACCEPTING BIZONIALITY (THOUGH WITHOUT ACCEPTING THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD NOT RETURN IN SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS TO THE NORTH) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND IN NOT INSISTING ON IMMEDIATE TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWAL. FOR THE REST HE LARGELY RESTATED KNOWN GREEK-CYPRIOT POSITIONS WHILE EXPLORING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS, EG. ON NICOSIA AIRPORT, IN GREATER DETAIL.

8. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PRESSED DENKTASH TO INDICATE SOME CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY WHICH WOULD FACILITATE MATCHING GREEK-CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS ON CONSTITUTION. HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL AND THE TALKS ENDED WITH NO PROGRESS ON THESE TWO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS ASKED BOTH LEADERS TO DO 'SUBSTANTIVE HOMEWORK' BEFORE 15 OCTOBER WHEN THE TALKS RECONVENE, AND TO RETURN PREPARED TO GIVE HIM 'CONCRETE INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY' PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS TERRITORY AND THE EXECUTIVE. IN PUBLIC HE HAS DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS 'THOROUGH AND BUSINESSLIKE' WHILE HINTING CLEARLY AT THEIR LACK OF PROGRESS.

THOMSON



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ES/LADY IDDIG  
RENTON

ES/FUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JONES

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 220001Z SEP 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 673 OF 21 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ANKARA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON

CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

1. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AT FIRST HAND HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS IN ADVANCE OF MRS THATCHER'S LUNCH WITH KYPRIANOU ON 24 SEPTEMBER I ARRANGED TO CALL ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL LATE THIS AFTERNOON, 21 SEPTEMBER.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. ALTHOUGH HE HAD ACCEPTED A TREMENDOUS BURDEN ON HIS EVERY DAY SCHEDULE OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS IN ORDER TO KEEP KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH IN NEW YORK AND HAD BEEN EXTREMELY PATIENT IN LISTENING TO THEIR VIEWS SEVERAL TIMES OVER HE HAD TO ADMIT HONESTLY THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN VERY SMALL. THEY BOTH AFFECTED TO HAVE MADE CONCESSIONS BUT THE REALITY WAS RATHER DIFFERENT. HIS EFFORTS WERE IN DANGER OF COLLAPSING BECAUSE OF THE UNWILLINGNESS OF EITHER SIDE TO PUT FORWARD REASONABLE, NEGOTIABLE POSITIONS. HE HOPED THAT THE NEXT MEETING IN OCTOBER (WHICH HE CONFIRMED WOULD BE AT THE SAME LEVEL) MIGHT PRODUCE SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE RESULTS TO JUSTIFY HIS GOING TO CYPRUS BUT "SO FAR THERE IS NOT ENOUGH MEAT AND I DO NOT INTEND TO GO WITHOUT SOMETHING IN MY POCKET".
3. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING PARTICULAR THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD LIKE MRS THATCHER TO SAY TO KYPRIANOU. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE KYPRIANOU TO FEEL UNDER UK PRESSURE TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY. IT WAS NO GOOD PRETENDING THAT OFFERING SOMETHING ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THE 1960 CONSTITUTION (TO WHICH ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO SEEK AMENDMENTS) AMOUNTED TO A TREMENDOUS CONCESSION. IN FACT IT WAS IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT INTEREST

MAKARIOS HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO SEEK AMENDMENTS) AMOUNTED TO A TREMENDOUS CONCESSION. IN FACT IT WAS IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT INTEREST TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON THE CONSTITUTION SINCE EVERY YEAR THEY WERE LOSING GROUND AND THE TRNC WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE ROOTED.

IF HIS PRESENT EXERCISE FAILED IN A DRAMATIC WAY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD START COLLECTING RECOGNITIONS AND UDI WOULD BECOME MORE AND MORE IRREVERSIBLE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT KYPRIANOU WAS NOT A STRONG MAN. HE WAS AFRAID OF THE SMALLEST SHADOW AND OF COURSE OF PAPANDEOU WHO WAS MOST UNHELPFUL IN THE BACKGROUND.

4. SO FAR AS THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE CONCERNED, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL, HE DID THINK THAT THEY HAD MADE A CONCRETE CONCESSION BY AGREEING TO DISCUSS SOME ENLARGEMENT OF THE 'SIX AREAS' AND A PRESIDENTIAL/VICE-PRESIDENTIAL STRUCTURE RATHER THAN A FEDERAL COUNCIL. HE ACCEPTED THEIR CASE FOR ADEQUATE, NEGOTIABLE SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND THROUGH APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE (IT WAS 'REALLY A MOCKERY' THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE ELECTED BY THE WHOLE COUNTRY). SYMBOLIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURKISH CYPRIOT INCLUSION IN CYPRUS' OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION WERE ALSO 'ONLY FAIR'. BUT CLEARLY DENKTASH'S CONCEPT OF 'EQUAL POLITICAL STATUS' WAS UNREASONABLE IF THIS MEANT A TOTAL VETO ON ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES. THIS WOULD MAKE ANY CONSTITUTION UNWORKABLE. HE THOUGHT (WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY CORRECTED TO HOPED) THAT THIS WAS A NEGOTIATING POSITION. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT DENKTASH WANTED AS WEAK A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AS POSSIBLE WITH TWO STRONG FEDERAL STRUCTURES. IF THE NEXT ROUND WAS TO MAKE PROGRESS DENKTASH WOULD HAVE CLARIFY HIS POSITION ON 'FURTHER TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS' BEYOND THOSE IN THE 5 AUGUST 1981 MAP.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED THAT WE BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE TURKISH SIDE AS WELL AS ON THE GREEK SIDE. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE IN ANKARA AND ASKED WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HE WOULD USE WITH THE TURKS BEYOND THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US AND UK. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE TURKS HAD TO BE MADE TO REALISE THAT IT WAS NOT IN THEIR INTERESTS AS A EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO BE SO ISOLATED NOR IN THEIR DOMESTIC INTEREST TO CARRY SUCH A LARGE ECONOMIC BURDEN.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE TROUBLE WAS THAT BOTH GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE RIGHT AND WRONG. IT IS CLEAR, THOUGH THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL HAVE TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY OVER THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE DENKTASH WILL BE PERSUADED TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORY. I KNOW THAT HE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE ANY HELP THAT MRS THATCHER CAN GIVE HIM IN PERSUADING KYPRIANOU TO COME UP WITH NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS.

7. AS REQUESTED BY THE DEPARTMENT MIFT (NOT REPEATED) CONTAINS A SELF-STANDING BRIEF OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE BACKGROUND TO LATEST TALKS. MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS AN ACCOUNT OF MY CONVERSATION WITH THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER AND SOME COMMENT.

THOMSON

E.R.

PRIME MINISTER

Spoken to PM who  
wants me & Mr. Jenkins  
only. CDD 20/9

LUNCH FOR PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU AT CHEQUERS, 24 SEPTEMBER

President Kyprianou will be accompanied only by an adviser and his High Commissioner.

Geoffrey Howe will be away in New York. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office offer Lady Young and Michael Jenkins (the Under-Secretary dealing with Cyprus). Agree to invite them? (Alternative would be to make it very small with just me as note-taker).

CDD

19 September 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 September 1984

Visit of President Kyprianou

We had a further word about President Kyprianou's visit. You told me that the only date which he could in fact manage was 24 September. The Prime Minister is at Chequers that day. She has, however, agreed to see President Kyprianou and give him lunch. I should be grateful if you could convey this invitation to President Kyprianou. I suggest that he and his party should arrive at 1230 pm at Chequers and leave after lunch.

It would be helpful if you could find out who will accompany him. I hope that it can be limited to the President plus three, including the High Commissioner. It would also be helpful to know who you would wish to attend from the Foreign Office. I suggest a Minister and an official.

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SSG

PRIME MINISTER

President Kyprianou

He has now been in touch to say that, because the talks in New York are going on longer than planned, the only day he can manage is 24 September.

You plan to be at Chequers that day.

Agree to see him at Chequers and give him lunch there? Small working lunch (10/12 people)?

C.D.P.

Yes mb.

14 September 1984

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089

File



cc: Sir P. Coadock.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 September 1984

REQUEST BY THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS TO MEET THE  
PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 13 September about President Kyprianou's request to call on the Prime Minister and to brief her on the current talks with the United Nations Secretary General. You have subsequently told me that President Kyprianou could not after all manage the dates mentioned in your letter, but has asked to come on 27 September.

The Prime Minister would be ready to see President Kyprianou and indeed would like to entertain him to lunch, given that we have very little else to offer him. However, she cannot manage lunch on 27 September and could only see him at 5.30 p.m. I should be grateful if this suggestion could be put to President Kyprianou. If there is some flexibility in his programme which would enable him to come on another day, we could look again at the question of lunch.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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089ABP

5.30

(1)



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

President Kyprianou.

The FCO want you to see

him, but:

- what he will be looking for is endorsement of his position in the proximity talks which the UN Secretary-General is conducting. We don't want to make the Secretary-General's task more difficult than it is already

- you have anyway seen him three times in the past 10 months

- you will be in Chester on 21 ~~September~~ September and Chequers on 24 September (which he is also now

offering). We could  
say that you are out  
of London on the  
date suggested & hope  
that he does not  
press his request.

But if he persists  
and offers a date you  
can manage, agree to  
tell him?

Will see him

C D P on 26<sup>th</sup>  
13/9 Sept. int

Of course I will meet  
him - and we must  
entertain him to lunch -  
especially as we can give  
him very little else in the way  
of what he wants





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September 1984

*Dear Charles,*Request by the President of Cyprus to meet the Prime Minister

The Cyprus High Commissioner has requested on instructions that President Kyprianou should call on the Prime Minister on 21 September in order to brief Mrs Thatcher on the talks which the United Nations Secretary General is currently holding with President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. President Kyprianou plans to leave New York on 20 September during a break in the talks, return to Cyprus for a few days and then go back to New York. On his way back he is due to see President Mitterrand (on 24 September), and then Mr Shultz in New York. We understand from the United Nations Secretariat that the Secretary General's talks have become much more difficult now that they have started to tackle substance. President Kyprianou will no doubt wish to stimulate support and understanding for his position.

Sir Geoffrey recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to meet President Kyprianou if at all possible. In view of our interests in the Sovereign Base Areas, our obligations under the 1969 Treaties and our long-standing association with Cyprus, it is important that we should maintain the goodwill of the Cyprus Government and demonstrate a continuing interest in a settlement of the Cyprus question.

President Kyprianou called on the Prime Minister immediately after the Turkish Cypriot purported declaration of independence last November, in January this year and again on 18 June.

I understand the Prime Minister may be on the point of deciding upon other plans for 21 September which might not allow a meeting with President Kyprianou on the day he has requested. Although we have not mentioned this to the Cyprus High Commissioner, we think that President Kyprianou may well be able to leave New York earlier than he had planned to allow a meeting with the Prime Minister on 20 September if necessary.

/I should

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I should be grateful if you would let me know  
whether the Prime Minister is able to meet this request.

*Yours ever,  
CR Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

19 SEP 1984

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1984

cc MASTER SET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1984

Dear Peter

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou this afternoon. You will note the suggestion that there should be further talks between the Cyprus Foreign Minister and Sir Geoffrey Howe on the details of the new Turkish Cypriot proposals, once these are available. You will also note that the Prime Minister promised that we would bring the Cypriot Government up to date on the latest stage of play on discussions in the Community on customs union with Cyprus and promised to speak to Mr Papandreou at Fontainebleau on the subject of tripartite consultations.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and enclosure, to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,  
Chris Hunt

P F Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

6

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS ON 18 JUNE 1984 AT  
10 DOWNING STREET

Present

Prime Minister  
Sir J Bullard  
Mr C D Powell

President Kyprianou  
Mr George Iakovu  
Cyprus High Commissioner  
Mr Vantias Markidies

The Prime Minister said that she was relieved to hear that UNFICYP's mandate had been renewed on 15 June. President Kyprianou said that he had been thinking what ought to be done in the wake of Security Council Resolution 550. His Foreign Minister had had some exchanges with the UN Secretary General. He understood that the Turkish side had very recently given the Secretary General some new proposals. He had no details. The Prime Minister said that she had no details either. But the Secretary General had asked her to tell President Kyprianou that he was turning his personal attention to the Cyprus issue and would be putting forward new ideas which he hoped would receive serious consideration.

Mr Iakovu said that he had gained the impression from the UN Secretary General that he would not be in a position to move ahead until July or even August. He appeared to be developing ideas for a comprehensive settlement. At the same time he stood by the need for the Turkish side to give tangible proof of their good faith as a first step. This might take the form of a freeze on constitutional actions for the handing over of Varosha to UN Administration pending a final settlement. President Kyprianou added that it was essential for the Turkish side to show good faith if there was to be any hope of an overall solution. The Secretary General's hand would be strengthened by the fact that the transfer of Varosha to United Nations administration was the only specific action point in Security Council Resolution 550.

President Kyprianou continued that more generally he feared the Turkish side were not seriously interested in a solution. He himself would support a new initiative by the UN Secretary General. But the Secretary General could not get very far on his own. He hoped therefore that HMG would get together with the United States and with the FRG to persuade the Turkish side to be more forthcoming. Chancellor Kohl had been receptive to such a suggestion. The longer the present situation lasted the more difficult it would become to reach a solution. It was unrealistic to expect Greek Cypriots to live with the present situation indefinitely.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Kyprianou expected the Turkish side's proposals recently put forward to the Secretary General to be new or simply an amalgam of earlier proposals. President Kyprianou thought the latter more probable. The Prime Minister observed that the Turkish side appeared to have behaved more reasonably than expected over renewal of UNFICYP's mandate and also to have retreated somewhat on Varosha. Mr Iakovu conceded that they had at least agreed not to interfere with the deployment of UNFICYP. They had also withdrawn settlers from a number of houses in Varosha. But the threat to Varosha remained. The Prime Minister said that she had the impression that the Turkish Government had put the Turkish Cypriots under pressure on this, by making it clear that their actions over Varosha had only put them in a bad light. Sir Julian Bullard noted that HMG had been very active with the Turkish Government. Sir Geoffrey Howe had seen the Turkish Foreign Minister twice recently. He had the impression that this had contributed to the Turkish Government's speaking more helpfully to Denktash.

The Prime Minister asked about the state of political feeling among the Greek Cypriots. President Kyprianou said he thought there was a general feeling that progress might be possible. The Prime Minister asked whether they were really concerned about the technicalities of how to get talks started. Would they really mind if President Kyprianou dropped his

insistence that Denktash reverse UDI? President Kyprianou replied that he must be able to convince his people that there were good chances for success. This was where some tangible proof that the Turkish side was in good faith was essential. He feared that the Turkish side wanted talks to resume only in order to reduce the pressure on them.

The Prime Minister asked whether she had correctly understood that President Kyprianou was prepared to start talks without implementing the letter of Security Council Resolution No 541 provided that the Turkish side gave an earnest of their good intentions? Mr Iakovu interjected that the Cypriot Government had to guard against erosion of its position. The old style talks had been used by the Turkish side simply to consolidate its position. Sir Julian Bullard asked whether the existence of private contacts between the two communities might not tie Mr Denktash's hands? President Kyprianou asked what kind of contacts? Sir Julian Bullard said that it would be for the Cyprus Government to propose. Mr Iakovu said that it would be difficult. The democratic process in the Turkish part of the island had been subverted by the influx of settlers from Turkey.

The Prime Minister said that she recognised that President Kyprianou had been very statesmanlike. She could well understand why he wanted some earnest of good intention from the Turkish side. She urged President Kyprianou to keep the high ground and not change tack just when the United Nations Secretary General was about to come back into the act. Meanwhile, it would be useful if there could be more detailed exchanges on the new Turkish Cypriot proposals, when they were available, between the Cyprus Foreign Minister and Sir Geoffrey Howe.

#### Scholarships

President Kyprianou said that he intended to raise the subject but perhaps it could be discussed between Foreign Ministers. Sir Julian Bullard observed that the matter had been settled up to 1986.

EC/Cyprus - Customs Union

President Kyprianou regretted that the Commission had not yet made a formal proposal to the Council on Customs Union. Mr Iakovu added that the Cyprus Government had the impression that the Commission was deliberately dragging its feet, claiming that it had to wait for the Council to issue a mandate. The Prime Minister said that she would ensure that President Kyprianou was informed of the latest position.

Treaty of Guarantee

President Kyprianou said that he was not clear where matters stood on the possibility of consultations under the Treaty. It might help the Secretary General's efforts if consultations could start on a bilateral basis. The Prime Minister said that the United Nations Secretary General must be the mediator. We would not get in his way and were certainly not prepared to take on the role of mediator. She had spoken to Mr Papandreou last December and had put it to him that refusing to participate in a tripartite conference placed Greece in an invidious position. She would be ready to speak to him again at the European Council at Fontainebleau next week. But every instinct told her that the right course was to stick with the United Nations Secretary General. President Kyprianou commented that there was some feeling in Cyprus that the instrument offered by the Treaty of Guarantee was not being used.

The meeting ended at 1605 hours.

18 June 1984



CJPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 June, 1984

PDD  
ifg.

Dear Charles,

Cyprus: Prime Minister's Meeting with President Kyprianou

As foreshadowed in my letter of 15 June there were developments over the weekend that the Prime Minister will wish to be aware of before her meeting this afternoon with President Kyprianou.

The mandate for the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was extended for a further six months by unanimous vote in the Security Council on 15 June. The Turkish Cypriots have now put forward their new proposals in confidence to the UN Secretary-General. We have received a copy (UKMIS New York telegram number 630 - copy attached) from the Americans, but cannot reveal the extent of our knowledge to President Kyprianou who may not have learned of the contents of the proposals by the time he meets the Prime Minister.

The Turkish Cypriot proposals are largely a collation of previous proposals. They reiterate earlier proposals on Varosha: express willingness to co-operate with the Secretary-General and take part in a summit meeting with the Greek Cypriots: propose 'non-internationalisation' of the Cyprus problem: insist on equal partnership for the Turkish Cypriots: and suggest negotiations of the re-opening of Nicosia airport and the lifting of the Greek Cypriot economic embargo.

The Turkish Cypriots have almost certainly put forward these proposals under Turkish pressure, mainly for propaganda effect and to ease their relations with the US Congress. We recommend that the Prime Minister should take the following line:

'We have not seen details of proposals which the Turkish Cypriots have put forward. But we were struck by the more constructive tone of the Turkish Cypriot contribution to UNFICYP mandate renewal debate and heartened by the fact that the mandate was renewed without undue difficulty.

the Turkish-Cypriots have  
Whatever motives Kyprianou believes/we hope that he will study them carefully, as we will. Kyprianou should take the high ground. To reject them out of hand would give Denktash the diplomatic advantage, make the Secretary-General's task more difficult, and also make it more difficult for us to exercise the sort of pressure we have been putting on the Turkish Government - to some effect'.



Sir John Thomson saw the UN Secretary-General on Friday evening. The Secretary-General said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would feel able to say to President Kyprianou that he was turning his personal attention to the Cyprus issue following his return from the Middle East and would be putting forward new ideas which deserved serious consideration without preconditions. He said that unless President Kyprianou came off the position that the reversal of UDI was a precondition for a resumption of intercommunal talks, the Greek Cypriot position would continue to be eroded. Point 4 of the Point to Make in the Prime Minister's brief reflects this point in more general terms, but the Prime Minister may wish to quote Perez de Cuellar more specifically.

*Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 630 OF 15 JUNE 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS BONN ROME UKDEL NATO

CBF CYPRUS

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL STRASBOURG

MY TWO IPTS: CYPRUS: UNFICYP MANDATE RENEWAL

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON 15 JUNE AS RELAYED PRIVATELY BY SHERRY TO THE US MISSION (PLEASE PROTECT).

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE EXERCISE OF THE SECRETARY GENERALS GOOD OFFICES, THE TRNC WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH UNFICYP ON THE SAME BASIS AS THAT ANNOUNCED LAST DECEMBER:

THE TRNC HAS NO INTENTION OF ALTERING THE STATUS QUO IN VAROSHA:

THE TRNC IS READY TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF GREEK CYPRIOTS IN VAROSHA ON THE BASIS OF THE MAP PRESENTED BY THE TURKISH SIDE ON AUGUST 5, 1981, AND THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED IN NOVEMBER OF 1983, AND AUGMENTED IN JANUARY AND APRIL OF 1984. THE TRNC WOULD WELCOME COUNTER PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD:

THE TRNC ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS, AND TO ENCOURAGE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON THE EXISTING BASIS (SPECIFIC REFERENCE WAS MADE HERE TO THE 1977 AGREEMENT, THE EVALUATION DOCUMENT AND THE TURKISH MAP OF AUGUST 5, 1981. HOWEVER MENTION OF THE 1979 AGREEMENT AND THE 1980 OPENING STATEMENT WERE CONSPICUOUSLY, AND INEXPLICABLY, ABSENT):

THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS MUST BE SEEN AS AN EQUAL PARTNER IN ANY GOVERNMENT ON CYPRUS. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS DO NOT INSIST ON NUMERICALLY EQUAW REPRESENTATION IN ALL BRANCHES OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, BUT INSIST ON "INFLUENCE AND SAY" WHICH ARE COMMENSURATE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES:

BOTH SIDES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM TAKING THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS TO OUTSIDE FORA, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHERE BOTH COMMUNITIES ARE NOT REPRESENTED:

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/ THE

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THE TRNC WOULD PARTICULARLY WELCOME DISCUSSIONS TOWARDS REOPENING OF NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND WOULD ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEE IF HE COULD GET THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO BE LIFTED:

THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ATTEND A SUMMIT MEETING UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

FCO PASS SAVING

THOMSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1984

*CDP 15/6*

*Jon Austin*

Visit of President Kyprianou

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou at 1500 on 18 June.

We have agreed with the Cyprus High Commission that the following will accompany the President:

- Mr George Iakovou, Foreign Minister
- Mr Tasos Panayides, Cyprus High Commissioner
- Mr Haris Vovides, Private Secretary.

As agreed, Sir J Bullard will attend from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The briefing refers to the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate and new proposals which we expect the Turkish Cypriots to make in New York later today. New York will report them by telegram over the weekend. I will write again on Monday morning with an analysis of the new proposals and, if necessary, a suggested line to take for the Prime Minister.

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF  
CYPRUS: 18 JUNE

STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. The meeting is at Kyprianou's request. Without being specific he has said that he wants to discuss the Cyprus problem following the passage by the UN Security Council of resolution 550. He will be in London from 16-21 June. He will also attend a meeting of the Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus (India, Australia, Guyana, Nigeria, Zambia) on 20 June. Australia was opposed to the group's meeting with one of the parties to the dispute present. But they have given way to the other members of the group. Kyprianou will no doubt be seeing representatives of the Greek Cypriot community in London but we know of no other official engagements.

2. Kyprianou saw the Prime Minister in London in November 1983, immediately after the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. They met again in New Delhi at CHOGM and in London in January.

British Objectives

3. (a) To help protect our interests in Cyprus (principally the Sovereign Base Areas) by listening sympathetically to Kyprianou;
- (b) to prevent a deterioration of the situation in Cyprus which would be detrimental to the interests of Britain, the West and Cyprus;
- (c) to re-emphasise our support for the UN Secretary-General and remind Kyprianou of the efforts we have made to help Sr Perez de Cuellar in his mission of good offices reaffirmed by SCR 550.

(d)/



- (d) to resist attempts to cast us as mediator;
- (e) to satisfy Kyprianou that we are doing all we can to help implement relevant Security Council Resolutions particularly SCR 541 (which we drafted);
- (f) to remind Kyprianou of our major contribution to UNFICYP;
- (g) to encourage Kyprianou to show the courage, flexibility and imagination necessary to make progress.

#### Cypriot Objectives

- 4. (a) To press the UK to act with other permanent members of the Security Council for action to help implement SCR 550 - ie. to put pressure on Turkey;
- (b) to urge the UK to deny EC preferential access for goods from northern Cyprus;
- (c) possibly to ask the UK to hold double bilateral talks with Greece and Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee;
- (d) to present Kyprianou's own ideas for a solution to the Cyprus problem;
- (e) to demonstrate to public opinion in Cyprus that Kyprianou is being active in his efforts to solve the Cyprus problem (without making the concessions necessary to get one).

#### Background

5. President Kyprianou is an effective operator locally, and despite his lack of charisma and success on the "national issue" there remains no serious contender to him for the presidency. He was re-elected in February 1983 with an absolute majority of the popular vote over his two opponents. But since then he has seen the  
Cyprus/



Cyprus problem develop in a way which has been entirely unhelpful to the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence represented the culmination, for the Greek Cypriots, of a disastrous policy of internationalisation which has yielded big majorities in the UN General Assembly and elsewhere for one-sided motions in favour of the Greek Cypriots but no tangible advantage to them.

6. Meanwhile Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot Leader, has outmanoeuvred Kyprianou at every stage by a series of provocative steps which we and our allies have challenged or sought to contain. Since Kyprianou last saw the Prime Minister in January he has effectively rejected the Secretary General's five-point plan, exchanged 'Ambassadors' with Turkey, pressed ahead with the development of his 'state' and made some tentative moves into Varosha (the formerly Greek Cypriot suburb of Famagusta which has been under Turkish Cypriot control but deserted since 1974) although the latest information is that these moves may have been at least temporarily suspended.

7. Against this background there are signs that Kyprianou is becoming increasingly worried and casting around for virtually any ideas which might help his community. Some of his proposals are likely to be borne of this frustration and for lack of any coherent ideas as to how matters may be advanced. There is no real sign yet that his political future is under threat, but he must be aware that continued lack of results could harm his long-term prospects.

#### UK Tactics

8. We should give Kyprianou as much encouragement as we can without promising anything which

- (a) we cannot deliver;
- (b) would lead us into difficulties, eg. by enabling the parties to shift to us the blame for lack of progress;
- (c) would damage other UK or Western interests;
- (d)/





- (d) Kyprianou could represent as a "concession" wrested from us.

9. In sum we can make clear to him that in our view the best course is to continue to pursue active diplomatic efforts in support of the UN Secretary General. We can take a conciliatory line on EC/Cyprus without making any concessions at this stage. We cannot agree to act as mediator or to unspecified 'action' by the permanent members of the Security Council. If Kyprianou presents a specific new idea for UK action we can listen politely and agree to consider it.

Likely Cypriot tactics and course of meeting

10. The Prime Minister may wish to begin by reiterating our concern at recent events in Cyprus and pointing out what we have done over recent months to help the Secretary General. She could then invite Kyprianou to say how he sees the future (thus trying to discourage him from his usual discursive account of the history of the problem.)

11. Kyprianou will probably then make specific requests for UK assistance. He is likely to press for UK action to follow up SCR 550. The Cyprus Foreign Minister approached the Chargé d'Affaires in Nicosia in this sense as part of a series of approaches to permanent members of the Security Council. We also believe he was planning to suggest that the UK should hold parallel bilateral consultations under the Treaty: although our latest information is that the Greeks may have successfully opposed this for their own reasons. He is almost certain to press us on EC preferences for northern Cyprus.

12. Because of our interests in Cyprus (including the SBAS) we want to appear sympathetic within the limits of para 8 above. If we can satisfy Kyprianou with our response, this should enable us to get across some advice on his future handling of the Cyprus problem. We should urge him to show restraint and to avoid being provoked into actions - eg. a move of Greek troops into Cyprus or arms purchases - which/



- which would not be in the long term interests of anyone - least of all the Greek Cypriots. We should stress that the Secretary-General needs to be given the maximum opportunity successfully to launch a new approach which he has said he will do once the UNFICYP mandate is renewed.

13. Detailed Points to Make, Background and supporting documents - including a personality note - are attached.



## POINTS TO MAKE

1. We continue to be most concerned about the situation in Cyprus and to be anxious to do all we can to prevent it getting worse.
2. We have been very active recently in helping the UN Secretary General who we believe to be best placed to help make progress towards a settlement. We have put our views across to the Turkish Government and to Mr Denktash. For example, Sir G Howe has twice seen the Turkish Foreign Minister Mr Halefoglu in the last month. Cyprus dominated both conversations. You will have seen our recent statement on Varosha. We voted for SCR 550. Our Ambassador intervened strongly in Ankara immediately prior to Denktash's arrival there last week to seek Turkish understanding of the need to restrain him. We continue to be the major contributor to UNFICYP. In short, we are doing all we can to work for a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.
3. The last six months have been an extraordinarily difficult time for the people of Cyprus. You have borne a heavy burden as President. You have shown statesmanship and restraint in the face of overwhelming provocation. I hope that you will continue to do so despite the difficulties and frustrations that lie ahead since this policy will eventually offer the best chance of success.
4. The Secretary-General said in his report to the Security Council that he intends to make another effort now that the UNFICYP mandate has been renewed. He should be given the maximum opportunity to do this successfully.

Action by Permanent Members of Security Council

5. The UK have been very active in supporting the UN Secretary General. We are always ready to study further specific suggestions.
6. We agreed to the Secretary General's idea for a 5-power démarche by the Permanent Members during the recent Security Council debate/



debate in New York, but this foundered for lack of Soviet and Chinese support.

7. We are anxious to avoid cutting across the UN Secretary General's efforts.

8. {If specific action is proposed} We will consider this proposal carefully.

#### EC/Cyprus

9. As you will be aware, this question has been and continues to be under discussion in the Community. Our substantial interests in this question, including our trade with northern Cyprus, have naturally meant that we have given the problem very serious thought.

10. We think there may come a time when events make it appropriate to withdraw Community preference from Turkish Cypriot exports. But we believe that this time has not yet come, because Community preference is one of the very few pieces of real leverage that the Ten have over the "TRNC". Its withdrawal would tend further to deepen the divisions between the two halves of Cyprus, which we both want to avoid. Nor do we wish to make a move which in the present context could give Mr Denktash a pretext for a further unwelcome move.

#### Guarantor Power Consultations

11. We remain ready to hold the consultations with Greece and Turkey that are envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee.

12. Turkey has agreed to such consultations but Greece has declined. The Cyprus Government should therefore first suggest to the Greek Government that they reconsider their position.

13. The sort of double bilateral consultations envisaged by President Kyprianou are not provided for in the Treaty. The Turks would be within their rights should they decline to enter into them.

They/



They would be unlikely to lead to progress and would simply risk cutting across and frustrating the efforts of the UN Secretary General who has the backing of the whole international community.

14. It would therefore be better for both the British and Cyprus governments to maintain their support for Sr Perez de Cuellar's efforts. As part of our support for those efforts we will of course maintain diplomatic contacts with both the Greek and Turkish governments.

15. {If pressed} The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is ready to consult the UN Secretary General to establish whether it would be helpful for him, in present circumstance, to issue a further invitation to tripartite consultations.

#### Denktash's Visit

16. Denktash's planned private visit was postponed. We made sure no ministers or officials attended Savoy dinner on 13 June.

{If necessary} For MPs to make up own minds. We advised them of government policy.

#### Defensive: Bilateral issues

##### "Money for the Bases"

17. Ready to continue discussions if you want. Worth looking again at our £7.5m loan offer made in 1978.

##### Students Fees

18. Glad we were able to provide flm for three years 1983-6. No decision yet on continuance of scheme. But those already studying will not suffer.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The situation in Cyprus is delicate and dangerous. Since the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in November 1983 the UN Secretary General's efforts to promote a political dialogue have been unsuccessful. Following proposals earlier this year from both Kyprianou and Denktash, Perez de Cuellar put forward a "five-point plan", of which the elements were:-

(i) The Greek Cypriots would abandon internationalisation of the Cyprus problem.

(ii) The Turkish Cypriots would freeze development of the "TRNC";

(iii) Inter-communal contact would be resumed;

(iv) Varosha, a deserted suburb of Famagusta, would be handed over to the United Nations for Greek Cypriot re-settlement;

(v) There would be a freeze of military enhancements by both sides.

Kyprianou broadly accepted these ideas, although on the understanding that 'Varosha' was taken to mean the whole of 'Greek Famagusta' (a much wider area). Denktash, however, rejected the proposals. Instead, he put forward some new ideas of his own, including that Varosha would be handed over for Greek Cypriot re-settlement only after a year in which the Greek Cypriots had forgone 'internationalisation'.

2. On 17 April Turkey and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" exchanged "Ambassadors". This move, made when the UN Special Representative Dr Gobbi was visiting Cyprus, was a slap in the face for the Secretary General and greatly angered the Greek Cypriots. The following day they announced their intention to protest to the UN Security Council at Turkey's "flagrant violation"

of/



of Security Council resolutions. After a long debate the UN Security Council passed a resolution (SCR 550) on 11 May by 13-1(Pakistan)-1(US) condemning the exchange of "Ambassadors" and re-affirming SCR 541, which had condemned UDI and which we had drafted. The resolution also reaffirmed the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices. We voted for the resolution despite some reservations explained in our Explanation of Vote.

3. During the debate the UN Secretary General tried to persuade the five permanent members of the Security Council to make a joint appeal to the parties. We responded positively to this idea, in line with our general policy of support for the Secretary General. France, and with less enthusiasm the US, also agreed. But the Soviet Union and China declined to become involved and the idea therefore lapsed. Kyprianou appears to be reverting to action by the permanent members but without any clear ideas as to what this should be or whether it should be joint or individual action.

4. Following the Security Council resolution, which was predictably rejected by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, Denktash is continuing to consolidate the "TRNC". A draft constitution was published on 8 June. It is modelled on the 1975 "TFSC" constitution but omits any reference to federation with the Greek Cypriots. It also allows the "President" to serve for an unlimited number of terms, provides for a "Republican Security Council" on which a Turkish General would sit and for simultaneous legislative assembly and presidential elections. Denktash appears to be pressing ahead with plans for a referendum in August and elections in the Autumn.

5. There have also been moves by the Turkish Cypriots into Varosha. Both we and the Americans have issued statements regretting such moves. Latest reports from Nicosia indicate that the Turkish Cypriots have now taken steps to prevent access to the recently occupied part of Varosha. But we are continuing to watch the situation there closely. The Turkish Cypriots say that the part of Varosha into which moves have been made has never been offered back to the Greek Cypriots. But it remains an emotional and sensitive issue.



6. Denktash has also threatened to interfere with the operation of UNFICYP if the mandate, which expires on 15 June, is not renewed on his terms. He would like a reference to the government of the "TRNC" in the resolution. At present the UK Permanent Representative in New York, as President of the Security Council, is broking a text which is similar to the last mandate renewal, ie. with no reference to Denktash's government. This text has been agreed by all members of the Security Council and welcomed by Greece and Cyprus.

7. Denktash visited Ankara from 12-14 June for talks with the Turkish Government. There are some signs that they will restrain him from some of the moves described in paras 4-6, at least to the extent of keeping the Secretary-General's mission alive and allowing UNFICYP to continue its operations.

8. Denktash said in Ankara that his "Foreign Minister", who is attending the UNFICYP mandate renewal debate in New York, will put forward some "new views" designed to help the Secretary-General's mission. They are likely to be a development of earlier Turkish Cypriot proposals.

9. The UN Secretary-General has told us that, after the mandate renewal, he intends to take a fresh initiative on Cyprus. We have suggested that he might consider a limited package. But the indications are that he will make some comprehensive proposals, possibly including for the establishment of a provisional government. (Kyprianou is aware only that the Secretary-General intends to make a fresh move and we should not reveal to him what we know of the Secretary-General's plans).

#### Guarantor Power Consultations

10. Following the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence Sir G Howe proposed to his Turkish and Greek colleagues consultations together under the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turks accepted, but the Greeks declined and have maintained this position ever since. We now think it less likely that Kyprianou will raise the possibility of the UK holding double bi-lateral consultations with the Greeks  
and/





and Turks.

EC/Cyprus

11. Shortly after the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence the Greeks proposed that the EC should cease giving preferential access to goods from northern Cyprus. After protracted discussion the EC commission on 22 February circulated new customs stamps for Cyprus but did not instruct member states to refuse to accept Turkish Cypriot stamps.

12. The Greeks and French have interpreted this Commission action as an instruction not to give preferential access to goods from northern Cyprus unless accompanied by Greek Cypriot customs stamps (in practice this amounts to a denial of preferential access). Other member states, of whom only ourselves and the FRG have substantial trade with northern Cyprus, have taken the view that the Commission action does not alter the status quo. The Commission is unlikely to take further early action to clarify the situation.

13. We have never thought it wise (or in our commercial interest as northern Cyprus' major trading partner) for the EC to take precipitate action to cut off Turkish Cypriot preferences. But given our other interests in Cyprus (above all the SBAs) we have not wanted to be any more prominent than we have to in opposing Greek Cypriot wishes. In the initial round of discussion in the Community we were obliged to stick our necks out more than we liked, because other member states looked to us for a lead, and we came under pressure from the Greek Cypriots as a result. In subsequent discussion we have let others make the running, but the Greek Cypriots still see us (not unjustifiably) as the key to a change in the Community position. President Kyprianou is likely to raise the subject as he did on his last visit. But there is no good reason to take action against the Turkish Cypriots at the moment. Such a move would be unlikely to restrain Denktash from further provocative action. Indeed, the contrary could be the case. It would be better for the EC to retain its only effective leverage with him until it could be shown that some positive good would result, or some specific harmful development be averted, by our using it.



### Denktash's Visit

14. Denktash was to have visited the UK in the week beginning 11 June to attend a dinner on 13 June at the Savoy Hotel. It was organised by the "TRNC" chamber of commerce to promote trade between the UK and northern Cyprus. The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP was a guest speaker. The FCO advised government ministers and officials to decline invitations and advised MPs of HMG's policy. In the event Denktash went to Ankara (the dinner went ahead as planned). We heard that Denktash might visit the UK on 16 June but Nicosia have no information about this visit.

### Money for the Bases

15. Since 1965 Cypriots have pressed us for aid (£250m) they allege to be due under the 1960 Treaties setting up the Republic of Cyprus and Sovereign Base Areas. They have also maintained that HMG should pay for the facilities we enjoy there. Appendix R of the Treaties provide for aid to be paid until 1965 and consultations thereafter, with the final decision left to the UK.

16. We maintain that there is no legal obligation to pay after 1965. We help in other ways: our contribution to UNFICYP is the largest (£22m per year and 800 men). In 1978 we offered a £7.5m loan: the Cypriots have not taken this up, partly because we said we would see it as fulfilling any obligations to date.

### Students Fees


17. In 1983 the British Government decided to make £1m available for each of the three financial years 1983/86 to help students from Cyprus continue to come to the UK to study. It is not yet known whether there will be sufficient funds for this scheme to continue after 1986, but it will certainly be possible to allow students already in the scheme to benefit during a "winding down" period. A final decision on allocation of funds after 1986 is unlikely for some time.

Supporting/



Supporting Documents

- A Treaty of Guarantee
- B SCR 541 (November 1983: drafted by UK)
- C SCR 544 (Renewal of UNFICYP mandate in December 1983) C/
- D SCR 550 (May 1984: non-aligned draft)
- E UK Explanation of Vote on SCR 550
- F Record of PM's conversation in January
- G Kyprianou's "framework proposals".
- H Draft resolution renewing UNFICYP mandate.



KYPRIANOU, Spyros

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Educated locally and then in London. Barrister (Grays Inn). Represented Makarios in London 1952-54. Attended the UN General Assembly in 1956 as Representative of the Ethnarchy Council. Returned to Cyprus in 1959 and, on Independence, was briefly Minister of Justice, then Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1972. In 1976 launched new pro-Makarios party of the centre-right DEKO. Following elections that year became President of the House of Representatives and thus Acting President on the death of Makarios in 1977. Subsequently elected President by acclaim and re-elected unopposed in February 1978.. Re-elected for a second term in February this year gaining a clear majority on the first ballot over his two opponents.

Has had health problems. Serious heart attack in March 1969 and subsequent troubles. But his health appears to have improved more recently. Speaks English well.

## TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus<sup>(1)</sup> signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

### ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

### ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.



Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/541 (1983)  
18 November 1983

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RESOLUTION 541 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2500th meeting,  
on 18 November 1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,

Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),

Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;

2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;

3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);
  4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
  5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;
  6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
  7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus;
  8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;
  9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.
-

SED

UNITED  
NATIONS

Mr Perks.  
for appropriate  
action

S



Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/544 (1983)  
15 December 1983

RESOLUTION 544 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2503rd meeting  
on 15 December 1983

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus of 1 December 1983 (S/16192 and Add.1),

Noting also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1983,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 June 1984;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1984;
3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.





Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/550 (1984)  
11 May 1984

RESOLUTION 550 (1984)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2539th meeting  
on 11 May 1984

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus at the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/16519),

Recalling its resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983) and 544 (1983),

Deeply regretting the non-implementation of its resolutions, in particular resolution 541 (1983),

Gravely concerned by the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541 (1983), namely, the purported "exchange of ambassadors" between Turkey and the legally invalid "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and the contemplated holding of a "constitutional referendum" and "elections", as well as by other actions or threats of actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent State and the division of Cyprus,

Deeply concerned by recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants,

Reaffirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation;

2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal;

3. Reiterates the call upon all States not to recognize the purported State of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" set up by secessionist acts and calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity;

4. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;

5. Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations;

6. Considers any attempts to interfere with the status or the deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the urgent implementation of Security Council resolution 541 (1983);

8. Reaffirms its mandate of good offices given to the Secretary-General and requests him to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution;

9. Calls upon all parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;

10. Decides to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking, in the event of non-implementation of its resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution, urgent and appropriate measures;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council as developments require.

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GRS 500  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DESKBY 121000Z FCO  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120250Z MAY 84  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 489 OF 11 MAY 1984  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA  
PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL STRASBOURG,  
ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, CBFC.

WSC 012/2		
RECEIVED		
15 MAY 1984		
WORK OFFICER		
PA	PA	Action Taken
		AP/S

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MIPT: CYPRUS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON SCR 550 OF 11 MAY.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE:

MY DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED. WE DID SO BECAUSE WRONG HAS BEEN DONE AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN IT. IN ITS RESOLUTION 541 LAST NOVEMBER THE COUNCIL DEPLORED THE DECLARATION BY THE TURKISH-CYPRIOI AUTHORITIES OF THE PURPORTED SECESSION OF PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THAT WRONG HAS NOW BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE PURPORTED EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS AND THAT THE COUNCIL HAS NOW RIGHTLY CONDEMNED.

ALTHOUGH WE VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION WE DO NOT REGARD IT AS IDEAL. IT HAS SEVERAL DRAWBACKS WHICH I WILL COME TO IN A MOMENT. FIRST, HOWEVER, I MUST RE-EMPHASISE THE MAIN POINTS I MADE IN MY INTERVENTION IN THE DEBATE THIS MORNING. THE FUNDAMENTAL AND LONG TERMS ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS ARE COMPLICATED. WE SHALL NOT MAKE THEM SIMPLER OR EASIER OF SOLUTION BY OVER-EMPHASISING THE PARTICULAR WRONG-DOING WHICH WE ARE NOW CONDEMNING. NO PARTY TO THE DISPUTE HAS A MONOPOLY OF VIRTUE. ALL PARTIES HAVE MADE MISTAKES. ALL PARTIES HAVE ACTED IN CONTRAVENTION OF AGREEMENTS. IF ACTIONS OR THREAT OF ACTION OF THIS SORT PERSIST IT INEVITABLY MEANS A SERIOUS WORSENING OF THE SITUATION.

THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF EVENTS TOWARDS CATASTROPHE MUST BE HALTED. INDEED IT MUST BE REVERSED. WE MUST CREATE AN UPWARD SPIRAL. THE WAY TO DO THIS IS FIRST AND FOREMOST, THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES. WE APPLAUD THAT PART OF OUR PRESENT RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO SUPPORT THIS. WE WILL JUDGE THE MERITS AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT WHICH IS DUE TO EACH PARTY BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY OBEY THIS INJUNCTION.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEM IN ALL ITS COMPLEXITIES AND WE EXPECT HIM TO STRIVE HIS UTMOST TO SECURE AGREEMENT. BUT HE CANNOT DO THIS WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES. WE HAVE A PROVERB IN ENGLISH THAT WHILE YOU CAN BRING A HORSE TO WATER YOU CANNOT MAKE HIM DRINK. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE SHOULD EXPRESS THEIR READINESS TO DRINK. I WOULD OBSERVE IN PARENTHESIS THAT

/THE

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT DRINKING ARE DRASTIC. IF THE PARTIES WILL PUT ASIDE PASSION AND THINK OF THEIR OWN FUTURE IN REALISTIC AND UNEMOTIONAL TERMS, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL FIND ACCEPTABLE AND INDEED SENSIBLE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH I ENUNCIATED AT THE END OF MY STATEMENT THIS MORNING.

I NOW TURN TO THE DRAWBACKS WE FOUND IN THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. THE FIRST IS THAT IT SEEMS EITHER TO GO TOO FAR OR NOT TO GO FAR ENOUGH. THERE IS A CERTAIN CONFUSION BETWEEN THE SHORT TERM AND THE LONG TERM. WE REGRET THAT IT DOES NOT SAY SOME OF THE THINGS CONTAINED IN MY SPEECH THIS MORNING. WE REGRET THAT IT LOOKS FORWARD IN SOME RESPECT AND NOT OTHERS. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT IN A PRACTICAL SENSE IT IS POLITICALLY HELPFUL TO INCLUDE IN THE RESOLUTION OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6. WE ALSO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 10. AS FOR OPERATIVE PARA 8, WE REGARD ITS CORRECT INTERPRETATION AS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. WE ARE MUCH CONCERNED THAT MIS-INTERPRETATION OF IT MIGHT WORSEN THE SITUATION. I HAVE VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE UNDERSTANDING DERIVED FROM THE CO-SPONSORS THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8 MEANS THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MANDATE SET OUT IN SCR 367 (1975) REMAINS WHOLLY VALID. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS A FREE HAND. HE WILL OF COURSE TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND OF RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS BUT THAT IS ALL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AS FREE AFTER THE RESOLUTION AS HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN IN THE PAST. THE LATTER PART OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8 IS MEANT TO RELATE TO THE EVENTUAL OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, NOT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE.

ON THAT UNDERSTANDING MR. PRESIDENT, AND WITHOUT BELIEVING THAT THE RESOLUTION IS PERFECT WE SUPPORT IT BECAUSE IT HAS SOME GOOD THINGS IN IT. WE WISH TO MAKE IT VERY PLAIN THAT THE PASSAGE OF THIS RESOLUTION IS NOT TO BE TAKEN AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER WRONGS. NOR FOR THE ADOPTION OF INTRANSIGENT POSITIONS ON ANY SIDE. MESSAGE WE INTEND TO CONVEY THROUGH THIS RESOLUTION IS THAT THE FUTURE OF BOTH COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS IS AT RISK AND THAT THE WAY FOR THEM TO SUPPORT THEIR OWN FUTURE SECURITY AND WELL BEING IS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARYGENERAL IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES. THOSE WHO DO NOT WILL LOSE FRIENDS.

THOMSON

LIMITED  
SED  
UND  
CCD  
LEGAL ADVS  
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CONS D  
ECD (E)  
ERD  
CLAIMS D  
WED  
INFO D  
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PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
TRED  
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PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
MR MILES

PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
SIR C TICKELL  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR ADAMS  
MR CARTLEDGE  
MR EGERTON  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
MR RENWICK  
MR J THOMAS  
MR JENKINS  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTN:  
CYPRUS

GRS 250  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DESKBY 140830Z FCO  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132201Z JUN 84  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 616 OF 13 JUNE 1984  
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,  
PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
UKDEL STRASBOURG, CBF CYPRUS.

MIPT: CYPRUS: UNF ICYP MANDATE RENEWAL

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO BE  
PUT TO THE VOTE ON 15 JUNE.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

NOTING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
OPERATION IN CYPRUS OF 1 JUNE 1984 (S/16596 AND CORR.1 AND 2 AND  
ADD.1).

NOTING ALSO THE RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL EXTEND THE STATIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-  
KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS FOR A FUTURE PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS,

NOTING FURTHER THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS HAS AGREED THAT IN  
VIEW OF THE PREVAILING CONDITIONS IN THE ISLAND IT IS NECESSARY  
TO KEEP THE FORCE IN CYPRUS BEYOND 15 JUNE 1984,

REAFFIRMING THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 186 (1964) OF 4 MARCH  
1964 AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS,

1. EXTENDS ONCE MORE THE STATIONING IN CYPRUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
PEACE-KEEPING FORCE ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 186 (1964) FOR A  
FURTHER PERIOD ENDING 15 DECEMBER 1984:

/ 2. REQUESTS

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES, TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS MADE AND TO SUBMIT A REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION BY 30 NOVEMBER 1984;

3. CALLS UPON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE FORCE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT MANDATE.  
ENDS

THOMSON

LIMITED

SED	MAED	PS/MR WHITNEY
UND	NENAD	PS/PUS
CCD	MED	SIR J BULLARD
LEGAL ADVISERS	NEWS D	MR WRIGHT
DEF D	FUSD	SIR C TICKELL
CONS D	PLANNING STAFF	SIR J LEAHY
ECD(E)	TRED	MR ADAMS
ERD	EED	MR WESTON
CLAIMS D	SOV D	MR EGERTON
WED	PS	MR RENWICK
INFO D	PS/LADY YOUNG	MR J THOMAS
CRD	PS/MR RIFKIND	MR JENKINS
APD	PS/MR LUCE	MR MILES
NAD		BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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File No  
cc Mrs MUDGER cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

FRS (S) CHILD

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1984

CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of  
21 May. The Prime Minister could  
see President Kyprianou at ~~1700~~ hours  
on Thursday, 14 June.

now 1500 on  
18 June

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

He comes too often - but it is London SW1A 2AH  
hard to turn down.

Agree to see him at 1700 hrs on 21 May, 1984

Thursday, 14 June.

Jan L.H.

A.D.C. 24/5.

Yes not

Possible Meeting between President Kyprianou and Mrs Thatcher:

11 - 14 June

The Cyprus High Commissioner has requested on instructions that President Kyprianou should call on the Prime Minister some time between 11 and 14 June inclusive. President Kyprianou would like a general discussion of the Cyprus problem in the aftermath of the UN Security Council debate.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to such a meeting. Our interests in Sovereign Base Areas and our obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee suggest that we should maintain the goodwill of the Cyprus Government.

President Kyprianou called on Mrs Thatcher immediately after the purported Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence last November and again in January. He will no doubt want to discuss the way ahead on the Cyprus problem, and suggest that the United Kingdom and other Western countries should do more to put pressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. There are some reports that he is considering approaching the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with this end in view: he might well raise this idea in advance at his meeting with Mrs Thatcher.

The meeting would come at an important time since the UN Security Council will have to renew the mandate of the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus, UNFICYP, on or before 15 June.

I would be grateful if you would let me know if Mrs Thatcher is able to agree to a meeting and if so for a time we might put to President Kyprianou.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary



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*no fom*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 January 1984

*Dear Peter,*

CYPRUS

I enclose the record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of Cyprus which took place here this morning.

*Yours ever*

*John Cole.*

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  
OF CYPRUS AT 0900 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 18 JANUARY 1984 AT 10 DOWNING STREET

## Present:

Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Constantinos Michaelides
Dr. Wilson	Mr. Tasos Panayides
Mr. Coles	Mr. Haris Vovides

\*\*\*\*\*

President Kyprianou said that since his last meeting with the Prime Minister the Government of Cyprus had been considering the next steps which they should take in relation to the problem created by the Turkish Cypriot declaration of UDI. They had been exploring all possibilities both in relation to activity by the UN Secretary General and to the Treaty of Guarantee. He had<sup>had</sup> a long meeting in Athens with Mr. Papandreou of which the Prime Minister would be aware.

With regard to the United Nations, Cyprus was continuing to press for the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 541. They did not underestimate the difficulty of achieving a simple reversal of UDI but had no alternative but to press for this. Otherwise, the Turkish side would do nothing and simply seek to gain time.

He thought it would be helpful to the Secretary General if he produced a framework for an overall solution. He had done this and now wished to hand over the text to the Prime Minister (copy enclosed).

The proposals consisted of six basic points.

The first called for the withdrawal of all troops from Cyprus; the withdrawal would take place in two stages, the second stage involving the troops provided for under the Treaty of Alliance.

/ In the second

In the second stage, also, the Cyprus National Guard and the so-called Turkish Cypriot Security Force should be disbanded.

The second point of the plan called for a United Nations force whose composition and terms of reference would be subject to negotiation. The Cyprus Government had an open mind as to its composition. The Prime Minister commented that the definition of the role of this force, which included the words "to secure ... external defence", appeared to embody a new departure. President Kyprianou confirmed that the existing mandate would have to be changed. But an idea similar to the one which he was now putting forward had been discussed at the United Nations in 1964 though it had then been abandoned.

The third point dealt with guarantees for an overall solution. The Cyprus Government believed that the Treaty of Guarantee, as it stood, was not a guarantee. In the new arrangements, Greece and Turkey could not be guarantors - otherwise problems similar to the present ones would continue to arise. In view of the United Kingdom's specific interests in Cyprus, it should remain a guarantor.

Under the fourth point of the plan, the Cyprus Government formally accepted the concept of federation.

Turning to the fifth point which dealt with the territorial aspect, he wished to stress the opening words: "Despite the inherent dangers and constitutional difficulties involved in the concept of two regions or two provinces, yet this concept has been accepted". The plan stated for the first time on paper the maximum concession which the Cyprus Government was prepared to make to the Turkish Cypriot side in respect of territory. They had decided that it was best to inform the United Nations Secretary General that 25% of the territory of Cyprus could be under Turkish Cypriot administration, even though the Turkish Cypriots constituted only 18% of the total population. He was aware that there were considerations relating to the viability of any territory but these arguments applied equally to the Greek Cypriot region. Makarios had indicated many years ago that he might be able to envisage rather more than 20% of the

/ territory

territory of Cyprus being placed under Turkish Cypriot administration. In September the UN Secretary General had been told that the Greek Cypriots could envisage a figure of 23%. The 25% now proposed was an absolute maximum and it was conditional on areas which were thickly populated by Greek Cypriots coming under Greek Cypriot administration. This proposal, among others, gave the lie to the apparent comment of Mr. Denktash in Casablanca to the UN Secretary General that the Greek Cypriot side was offering nothing new. The fact was that a loose federation was being offered. This was dangerous in the case of Cyprus and any advance on this offer would mean, effectively, separation.

Point six of the plan dealt with the constitutional aspect. The constitutional structure would be broadly as under previous agreements. With regard to the legislature there were two alternatives. A single Chamber system would be the more appropriate for Cyprus - and there could be safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots. The alternative would be to have two Chambers - a lower Chamber on the basis of the ratio of the two populations, the upper Chamber providing for increased Turkish Cypriot representation. With regard to the judiciary, the two communities would be equally represented in the Federal Supreme Court.

Turning to the distribution of powers and functions between the centre and the provinces, the plan indicated those powers which must be kept by the central government. It was not an exhaustive list. The plan stated that a list of extensive provincial powers was to be agreed.

The Prime Minister commented that the allocation of powers between the centre and the provinces was very important in any federal constitution. President Kyprianou said that he wanted to begin discussing all these ideas with the UN Secretary General. But his impression was that the Turkish Cypriots would not accept them. He had heard from his Foreign Minister that in Casablanca both Mr. Evren and Mr. Denktash had taken a negative attitude to the proposals.

/ Point five

Point 6(5) of the plan dealt with human rights and fundamental freedoms. These matters were dealt with in the way provided for in earlier high-level agreements. The Prime Minister commented that it would be difficult to negotiate the details of this section. President Kyprianou said that the Turkish side was seeking permanent separation. That was not the aim of the Cyprus Government which continued to work for unification.

Point 6(6) of the plan was of great importance. Provided the unity of Cyprus was respected, the Greek Cypriots were ready to take all necessary measures to promote a high standard of living for everyone, especially the Turkish Cypriots whose standard of living was low. In effect, the Turkish Cypriots would be subsidised. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether these arrangements would include the possibility of something close to economic autonomy for the two regions. President Kyprianou said that this was a possibility but it would not be to the advantage of the Turkish Cypriots. The creation of common economic interests between the two regions would help unity. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Foreign Minister of Cyprus had given him a rather different impression of Cypriot thinking in Stockholm on 17 January.

President Kyprianou said that it was impossible for anyone to go beyond this framework. The Greek Cypriot side was accepting:

- a) A bi-regional federation, despite its dangers for Cyprus
- b) Strong powers for the two separate regions
- c) The idea of economic help for the Turkish Cypriots
- d) The allocation of 25% of the land area to Turkish Cypriot administration.

The Prime Minister said that good will could bring about an end to polarisation. But tension increased it. The prospects for the future depended very much on the underlying feelings and the way in which any negotiations were conducted. President Kyprianou commented that all depended on what the leaders wanted. If Mr. Denktash and Mr. Evren were seeking separation no progress would be made.

/ As regards

As regards procedure, he had put two proposals to the UN Secretary General. First, he had told him that if Security Council Resolution 541 were implemented (and he recognised that a face-saving way of doing this would have to be found) he was ready to engage in a determined and sustained negotiation with Mr. Denktash either in New York or elsewhere in order to reach a solution. He had made this proposal public. Secondly, the United Nations Secretary General might carry out shuttle diplomacy. Mr. Perez de Cuellar had this in mind and had said that he wished to go to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia and London.

There was then the question of whether it was right to pursue the proposals he had set out or, alternatively, to try to settle one or two specific problems eg Varosha. It was important to avoid protracted discussion of specific matters. He had agreed with the UN Secretary General and Mr. Shultz that both approaches should be conducted in parallel ie the Secretary General would work for an overall solution but if he found a specific device for improving the climate this could be discussed too.

In response to a question by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about procedures, President Kyprianou handed over a copy of a statement which he had made on this subject on 11 January (copy enclosed). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Greek Cypriots were ready to discuss Mr. Denktash's offer about Varosha. President Kyprianou said that he did not regard this as a proposal. It was worse than earlier ideas. The Secretary General was thinking more along the lines of proposals discussed with Mr. Denktash in 1979. There was some confusion about Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 January. It seemed to have been made primarily to create an impression of good will before the Islamic Conference. No-one who understood the problem would be taken in. It was clear that Denktash was not interested in an overall solution, at least for the present.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if Mr. Denktash was working for a bi-zonal federation, was there not a common objective? President Kyprianou said that if his concept of two

/ regions

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regions was the same as the Greek Cypriot concept, there was no difficulty. But in fact Mr. Denktash attached a special meaning to the word "bi-zonal". At this point he handed over a document commenting on Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 January (copy enclosed). He asked that this should be carefully considered because there was an impression that HMG found Denktash's statement constructive. This was surprising in view of Britain's knowledge of the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister said that any glimmer of light was welcome. President Kyprianou said that this proposal did not provide a glimmer of light. He believed it had been put forward both because of the imminence of the Islamic Conference and because Denktash knew that he himself was about to go to New York to present his proposals to the Secretary General. Denktash's approach to the problem of Varosha was complicated and could never work. As the Secretary General had said, if he had really wanted to demonstrate good will he would simply have said that Varosha should be handed to the United Nations so that people could be returned to their homes.

As to the next steps, more information would shortly be received on the Secretary General's meetings in Casablanca with Mr. Evren and Mr. Denktash. Then, he would visit Athens. The Prime Minister recalled that she had had a brief meeting with Mr. Papandreou during the European Council in Athens and had raised with him the question of tripartite consultations. Mr. Papandreou had said that he had not yet taken a decision on this matter. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stated that Mr. Papandreou had said publicly on 11 January that Greece would not take part in tripartite consultations and nor would the Greek Cypriots. President Kyprianou said that his own approach had been that bilateral consultations would be useful in order to ascertain the possibilities of progress. If the possibilities existed, the form of talks could be reconsidered. The Prime Minister said that we had no wish to be put in the position of mediator. It was better for the UN Secretary General to take on this role. We should put all our weight behind him. Lines should not be crossed. The Commonwealth Group on Cyprus had not got very far.

/ President Kyprianou

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President Kyprianou said that if the Turkish Cypriots adopted a position which made it impossible for the UN Secretary General to make progress, some other means would have to be found. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that even if there were agreement on tripartite consultations, we should be arguing in those consultations that the important thing was to promote the Secretary General's initiative. President Kyprianou commented that legal advice had been to the effect that the Treaty of Guarantee was a regional arrangement under the United Nations Charter. If there were a difficulty about consultations under the Treaty, the good offices of the Secretary General could be invoked. The Prime Minister again commented that wires should not be crossed. President Kyprianou had put forward a skilled framework for a solution which he had obviously thought about in a statesmanlike way. The best course now was for the Secretary General to pursue his efforts.

President Kyprianou said that he also wished to raise some points about the European Community.

Greece was seeking the finalisation of agreement on a customs union with the Community. The European Council was still awaiting a mandate from the Council of Ministers. The delay was unnecessary and it affected overall progress on the Cyprus problem. He had reached agreement with M. Cheysson as to how this matter should be pursued.

Secondly, there was the question of attitudes of member states towards the area of Cyprus which had allegedly been declared independent. The Commission had taken a stand which was that it dealt only with the legal government of Cyprus; it would do nothing to sanctify UDI. Although it was not necessary to obtain a supporting view from the Council of Ministers, the Cyprus Mission in Brussels had reported some unwillingness on the part of certain delegations to support the Commission. At this point he read out the text of a Commission decision, apparently contained in a message from the Cyprus Mission in Brussels, which also stated that the British delegation there was raising certain objections. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that this matter had been discussed



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in COREPER since the beginning of the year. The concern of the United Kingdom and others was that nothing should be done to entrench the division in Cyprus. The Association agreement between the Community and Cyprus was for the benefit of the entire island. But there was a danger of ending up with a situation where the Turkish Cypriot area sent all its exports through Turkey.

President Kyprianou said that if Britain took a view opposite to that of the Commission, this would create problems. If we changed our mind, so would others. Cyprus was prepared to facilitate exports from the Turkish Cypriot area provided the legal ports were used. The Prime Minister commented that our aims were the same. We did not want to create a permanent association in this respect between the Turkish Cypriot area and Turkey. Would it not be easier to impose conditions, which the Turkish Cypriot side could accept, for export of their goods? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if we presented the Turkish Cypriots with the choice of sending their exports through Greek Cypriot ports or Turkish ports, they would opt for the latter. The Prime Minister suggested that it would be consistent with the Greek Cypriot and our own attitude towards the unity of Cyprus to regard the ports in the Turkish Cypriot area as legal ports. President Kyprianou said that those ports were not under the control of the Cyprus Government. We should not allow the Turkish Cypriots to have the best of both worlds. There would then be no incentive for them to reverse UDI. This was a very serious matter. After his talks on Friday with the European Commission, he would send us a note. He would also let us know, after his forthcoming talks in Athens, of any new ideas which had arisen about the Treaty of Guarantee.

The discussion ended at 1010 hours.

A. S. C.

18 January 1984

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10 DOWNING STREET

AJC -

The attached two pieces arrived late last night, and as they seemed very relevant to the meeting with President Kyprianou I took the liberty of including them in the PM's briefing folder.

Cameron 18/1

GVA/FO 6/17

00 FCO (DESKBY 0730Z 18 JANUARY)

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP ATHENS

PP NICOSIA

PP ANKARA

PP WASHINGTON

GPS 530

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DESKBY (0730Z 18 JAN)

FM UKMIS GENEVA 171940Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 12 OF 17 JANUARY 1984

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, NICOSIA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 64: CYPRUS

1. AS ARRANGED BY UKMIS NEW YORK PICCO (MEMBER OF SECRETARY - GENERAL'S CABINET RESPONSIBLE FOR CYPRUS) TELEPHONED HEAD OF CHANCERY THIS EVENING (17 JANUARY) TO OFFER BRIEFING ON SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVREN OF TURKEY EARLIER TODAY IN CASABLANCA.

2. PICCO SAID THAT CYPRUS HAD BEEN ONE OF A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WITH EVREN. SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPLAINED THAT HIS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE HAD BEEN CIRCUMSCRIBED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS NUMBERS 541 AND 544. BUT HE WAS STILL PREPARED TO TRY TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION ON CYPRUS, IF NECESSARY ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY. HE (PEREZ) WOULD BE WILLING TO GO HIMSELF TO NICOSIA, ATHENS AND ANKARA FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT A MEETING OF THE "LOCAL LEADERS" (HE MEANT DENKTASH AND KYPRIANOU). BUT BEFORE THEN STEPS NEEDED TO BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE. (PICCO ADDED THAT PEREZ PUT FORWARD SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR THIS BUT HE DECLINED TO GO INTO DETAIL). ALSO THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR "IMAGINATION" AT THE MEETING OF THE LOCAL LEADERS IF THE ICE WAS TO BE BROKEN. PEREZ IMPLIED THAT IF THESE TWO CONDITIONS (IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE AND WILLINGNESS TO USE IMAGINATION) WERE NOT MET THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN HIS GOING TO THE AREA.

3. EVREN HAD CLEARLY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO STRIKING UP A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PEREZ. HE SAID THAT HE (PEREZ) WAS THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. BUT EVREN'S RESPONSE ON SUBSTANCE WAS GUARDED. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER WHAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SAID AND TO LET HIM HAVE A REACTION LATER. MEANWHILE HE DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR ON ANY OF PEREZ'S IDEAS. EVREN ALSO SAID THAT ATHENS WERE A BAD INFLUENCE

no 10 DS

RC

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

A REACTION LATER. MEANWHILE HE DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR ON ANY OF PEREZ'S IDEAS. EVREN ALSO SAID THAT ATHENS WERE A BAD INFLUENCE ON KYPRIANOU.

4. ACCORDING TO PICCO THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE DENKTASH OFFER OF 2 JANUARY OR OF KYPRIANOU'S PROPOSALS OF 11 JANUARY. PEREZ HAD SAID THAT BOTH WERE "INSUFFICIENT". THERE WAS NO POINT IN ENTERING INTO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SUCH PROPOSALS UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THAT BOTH SIDES WERE PREPARED TO SHOW "GOOD WILL". WITHOUT THIS ANY TALKS WERE BOUND TO BREAK DOWN.
5. PICCO THOUGHT THAT THE BALL WAS NOW IN THE TURKS' COURT. HE DOUBTED WHETHER PEREZ WOULD DO ANYTHING MORE UNTIL HE RECEIVED A CONSIDERED TURKISH RESPONSE. MEANWHILE "BAD SIGNALS" FROM EITHER SIDE COULD CAUSE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PUTATIVE INITIATIVE TO FOUNDER. PEREZ HOPED THAT ALL CONCERNED WOULD SHOW RESTRAINT.
6. PICCO SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO CLEAR HIS LINES WITH PEREZ ABOUT HOW TO REPORT THE MEETING TO HMG. HE WAS THEREFORE BRIEFING US WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT PEREZ HIMSELF HAD THOUGHT OF THE TALKS WITH EVREN. PEREZ'S INITIAL REACTION HAD BEEN "NOW LET US WAIT AND SEE".
7. PICCO ADDED THAT PEREZ INTENDS TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH EVREN TO KYPRIANOU WHEN THE DEMANDS OF HIS AFRICAN JOURNEY PERMIT. HE MAY ALSO GIVE HMG A MORE CONSIDERED VERSION. PICCO EMPHASISED THAT MEANWHILE HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HARM PEREZ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH KYPRIANOU IF HMG SHOWED AWARENESS TOMORROW OF THE CONTENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TALKS WITH EVREN.
8. FCO RESIDENT CLERK. THE PRIME MINISTER IS SEEING KYPRIANOU FIRST THING TOMORROW (18 JANUARY). A COPY OF THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD BE ADVANCED TO NO 10 IN TIME TO BE SEEN THERE BEFORE THIS MEETING TAKES PLACE.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 172042Z MD/MTS


Mr Wilson, SED

Cyprus

The Secretary of State had a discussion with the Cypriot Foreign Minister Iacovou in the margins of the CDE lunch in Stockholm on 17 January.

Iacovou said that he was sorry not to be able to be present with President Kyprianou during the latter's visit to London on 18 January. He said that the Cypriot Government was not convinced that Perez de Cuellar was taking his own initiative on the Cyprus problem seriously, given that he had been unwilling to appoint a successor to Gobbi. Kyprianou and he, Iacovou, were anxious to try to make a bigger breakthrough on the Cyprus problem. That was why they had been reluctant to respond to Denktash's proposal with much enthusiasm. They took the view that Denktash mainly wished to make a strong presentational pitch aimed at winning favour from the forthcoming Islamic Council. The Secretary of State asked why the content of Denktash's proposal was unacceptable. Iacovou said that Cyprus needed a much more credible commitment to phased withdrawal of Turkish troops. Cyprus would therefore present Turkey with two negotiating alternatives: either a sustained, secret, diplomatic initiative to see whether differences could be resolved: or a public commitment to engage in intensive negotiations, coupled with public expressions of determination to get a breakthrough. The Cyprus Government felt that a solution could only consist of the maximum possible degree of autonomy for the two parts of Cyprus, including full economic autonomy for the Turkish sector, so that there could be no accusation of economic exploitation of the Turkish sector by the Greek Cypriots in the south.

Iacovou added that the new Turkish Foreign Minister and he had been in Bonn together as Ambassadors, and knew each other well. He recollected that he and his Turkish opposite number often used to say that if only they personally had the opportunity to tackle the Cyprus problem, it would soon be sorted out. He had recently reminded his Turkish colleague of this, and had elicited the response that perhaps their capacity to change the situation was, after all, rather minimal.



(~~R. B. Bone~~)

17 January 1984

cc: PS  
 PS/Lady Young cc: Mr Coles, No 10 ✓  
 PS/PUS  
 Sir J Bullard  
 Mr Jenkins

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 January 1984

*Dear John*

Cyprus: Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou:  
18 January, 9 a.m.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use during President Kyprianou's call. We understand from the Cyprus High Commission that President Kyprianou will be accompanied by:

Mr Constantinos Michaelides, Minister to the President

Mr Tasos Panayides, Cyprus High Commissioner

Mr Haris Vovides, Director of the President's Office.

The Foreign Secretary would like to attend, and would propose to be accompanied by Dr Wilson, Head of Southern European Department.

*Yours ever*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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## MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS: 18 JANUARY

## STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. The meeting is at Kyprianou's request and forms part of a tour of consultations with Mitterrand (as President of the European Council), Cheysson, Shultz and Perez de Cuellar. It follows discussions with Papandreou on 23 December. Kyprianou arrived in London on 15 January. He will also be seeing Sir S Ramphal. He saw the Prime Minister for two hours on 17 November, two days after the Turkish Cypriot UDI and immediately prior to the adoption of a UK draft Security Council Resolution condemning UDI. They met again in New Delhi during CHOGM.

British Objectives

- 2.(a) To help preserve our position in Cyprus (essentially the Sovereign Base Areas) by listening sympathetically to Kyprianou's concerns;
- (b) to emphasize the key role of the UN Secretary General in dealing with the Cyprus problem;
- (c) to discourage Kyprianou from boxing himself in or impeding the Secretary General by, for instance, setting unattainable preconditions or reacting too negatively to possible avenues for progress; and
- (d) to confirm our readiness to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee but avoid being cast as mediators or involved in parallel consultations if, as is currently the case, tripartite consultations are impossible.

Cypriot objectives

- 3.(a) To present and seek support for Kyprianou's ideas for a comprehensive settlement;
- (b) to encourage renewed efforts to reverse UDI and to embarrass Denktash;
- (c) to demonstrate, for home consumption, that he is actively engaged in seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem (but without making any of the concessions necessary to achieve one);

- (d) to make us assume a special responsibility in the pursuit of Guarantor Power consultations; and
- (e) to press us to agree to the Community excluding northern Cyprus from trade benefits under the EC/Cyprus Association Agreement.

#### Tactics

4. We should start by emphasising our continuing concern about the situation in Cyprus. The Prime Minister may wish to point out that we have been successful in achieving widespread condemnation of Denktash's action and preventing any further recognition of his new "state". In emphasising that it is now the time for active and genuine progress towards a settlement, she could ask Kyprianou to give an account of his discussions in New York and Washington.

5. Kyprianou may be expected to describe his proposal for a comprehensive settlement and hand over the framework which he has already given Shultz and Perez de Cuellar (Annex D). We should take note, and enquire about Perez de Cuellar's reactions. Kyprianou may also criticise Denktash's "goodwill proposals" and discourage us from giving them any significance.

6. As regards the way forward, we should avoid detailed comment on either set of proposals and suggest that there is now a good opportunity for the Secretary General to use the proposals made to resume his work for a settlement. He should be allowed to do so without being impeded by pre-conditions. We should not take a stand on whether progress is best achieved by a series of steps or through a comprehensive package; but we should emphasise the importance of a flexible approach which will allow for either method.

7. Kyprianou may seek our ideas on the form and content of Guarantor Power talks. We should respond in general terms, confirming that we stand by our obligations but pointing out that these are no greater than those of the other Guarantor Powers (Greece and Turkey). If pressed, we can offer general ideas about the objective of consultations (see brief). But we



should not be drawn on detailed matters like an agenda. Given the Greek attitude to tripartite talks, they are unlikely to take place; we do not wish to give the Greeks an excuse to wrangle about a hypothetical agenda.

8. Because of the risks of assuming the role of mediator and of being blamed by both sides if a satisfactory solution cannot be found, we should make clear that we are not prepared to engage in parallel negotiations as a substitute for the consultations together envisaged by the Treaty; that we do not consider that the Treaty of Guarantee (Annex B) obliges us to do so; and that, if the Greeks continue to reject tripartite consultations, it will soon be necessary to make the present position about Guarantor Power talks clear in public.

9. We should allow ourselves to be drawn as little as possible on EC/Cyprus, pointing to the discussions underway in the Community (in which we are being careful not to take the lead in resisting Cypriot demands) and to the complexity of the issues.

10. To conclude the discussion, we should emphasise the key role of the Secretary General and the importance of giving him room for manoeuvre. He needs the backing of interested states and we fully accept our own part in this. But the leading role must be played by the Secretary-General. In assisting him all concerned must now look ahead and explore every avenue both in order to avoid a deterioration in the situation and to make progress towards a settlement.

11. Kyprianou may complain that the UK is not being tough enough in opposing Denktash's declaration of independence. He may ask why we are not taking a stronger line in the EC on preferential treatment for Turkish Cypriot exports (see brief). We can point to the considerable efforts we have made so far, including over the UN Security Council Resolution, but gently emphasise that, having condemned UDI, it is now necessary to look for opportunities for progress.



12. Points to Make and detailed Background are attached.

Documents

SCR 541 on Cyprus	Annex A
Treaty of Guarantee	Annex B
Kyprianou's statement to the Press, 11 Jan	Annex C
Kyprianou's proposals	Annex D
Denktash's proposals	Annex E
FCO Spokesman's comment on Denktash's proposals	Annex F
Record of talks with Kyprianou, 17 Nov	Annex G
Kyprianou's message to the Prime Minister, 20 Dec	Annex H

CALL BY PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 18 JANUARY

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Pleased that cooperation together in immediate aftermath of Denktash's declaration produced good results. Widespread condemnation of UDI and no recognition except by Turkey. We will continue our efforts to prevent further recognition. Now time to look ahead. Must have progress towards settlement. Understand that you have put proposals to UN Secretary General. Grateful to know your ideas.
2. [Following Kyprianou's account of his proposals] Very interested: will study carefully. Welcome your efforts and your wish for a solution. What was Secretary General's reaction?
3. Secretary General best placed to take matters forward. Assume this was your intention in putting proposals to him. We will give him our full support. Understand Denktash has also made some, more limited, proposals. Aware of your Government's initial reaction. Can understand your suspicions. But best to give Secretary General opportunity to build on those proposals also. We have pressed Turks to have Denktash do more. Flexibility needed on all sides.
4. Believe progress would be facilitated if neither side imposes impossible preconditions. Share your wish that UDI should be reversed as envisaged in SCR 541 (which we drafted). But unrealistic to expect this soon. Should allow Secretary General to work towards new negotiations between the two communities without making them conditional on prior reversal of UDI: talks need not imply recognition.
5. Understand Secretary General thinks further discussion in UN General Assembly at this stage would cause difficulties for him in his good offices mission. We agree.

The President's Proposals.

Do not underestimate difficulties of  
reversal

Framework for overall solution



Guarantor Talks

6. Note that Papandreou has repeated publicly on 11 January that he could not accept our proposal for tripartite talks.

7. We still stand ready to participate if all parties agree to consult "together" as envisaged by the Treaty of Guarantee. But we have no special status different from other two Guarantors. If tripartite consultations are not possible see no value in attempting to conduct parallel negotiations (nor are these envisaged by Treaty). Best to allow full scope to Secretary General and not complicate his efforts.

8. [If pressed on form and objectives of consultations] First requirement is for all sides to agree to meet together. Little advantage in being specific or considering an agenda until then: nor is it for us to impose our ideas on the other Guarantor Powers.

9. We had a Treaty obligation to propose consultations. We envisaged that they would bring the parties together and provide a springboard for the UN Secretary General to pursue his mandate of good offices in working for an intercommunal settlement. We foresee Secretary General following up on any progress made by Guarantor Power consultations.

EC/Cyprus

10. This is under discussion in the Community now, and I would not want to predict the outcome. Discussion so far has only served to emphasise how very complex this question is, both legally and politically. We well understand your views, and we, like other member states, recognise that it is essential to do nothing which would imply recognition of northern Cyprus or appear to condone Denktash's action. But equally, as you know, member states are anxious not to reinforce the division of the island, and moreover cannot ignore the fact that the Association Agreement was intended to benefit the population of the island as a whole.



11. [If necessary] This is not just a matter for the Commission to decide. The 1977 arrangements were established by COREPER, and any change in them would require further decision by COREPER and the Council.

Troop withdrawals

12. Welcome Turkish intention to pull out 1,500 troops. Recognise this is only small proportion of total and not easily verifiable. But hope it will serve to reduce tension and lead to further withdrawals. We will continue to press Turks to make moves which might help towards settlement.

13. [If necessary] Our suggestion that Greece might propose some troop withdrawals was intended to reduce tension and to bring about larger Turkish withdrawals. No question of eroding Greek rights under the Treaty of Alliance. [If necessary] Is it really the case that the number of Greek personnel does not exceed that specified in the Treaty (ie 950)?

Money for The Bases

14. [If necessary] Ready to continue discussions if you want. Worth looking again at our £7.5m loan offer made in 1978.

Kyprianou's message of 20 December [Annex H]

15. [If appropriate] Many thanks. There was some delay in delivery to our people in Nicosia. I think our talks have covered the ground.

## BACKGROUND

1. On 2 January Denktash issued a wide ranging statement containing "proposals of goodwill". Although very limited in scope they had some helpful features:
  - (a) a positive tone;
  - (b) the delinking and development of earlier proposals about the suburb of Varosha and Nicosia airport;
  - (c) a commitment to the re-activation of the Committee of Missing Persons.
  
2. On 3 January, in a clearly co-ordinated move, the Turkish MFA announced the intention to withdraw 1500 Turkish troops from Cyprus during January and February. Greek Cypriot reactions to these moves have been cool. They have criticised the cautious welcome that the FCO gave Denktash's proposals (Annex F).
  
3. Following his meeting with Papandreou on 23 December, Kyprianou has visited Paris, Washington and New York. In Paris he met Mitterrand and Cheysson. He saw Shultz and the UN Secretary General on 9 January and the latter again on 11 January. He came to London on 15 January and, besides calling on the Prime Minister, will also see the Commonwealth Secretary General.
  
4. In meeting with Shultz and with Perez de Cuellar, Kyprianou outlined his ideas for a comprehensive rather than step by step solution. We were given details in confidence by the Americans. Main features are:
  - (a) complete demilitarisation;
  - (b) UN force to secure external defence and internal security;
  - (c) treaty to provide international guarantees of Cypriot independence;
  - (d) imprecise details about a federal structure;
  - (e) possibility that Turkish Cypriot administration might extend to 25% of territory; and
  - (f) agreement that Committee on Missing Persons should reconvene.



5. In talks on 11 January with UN Secretary General, Kyprianou confirmed he wanted Secretary General to arrange for him to meet with Denktash. But this was conditional upon implementation of SCR 541 (ie withdrawal of the declaration of independence), which will clearly be unacceptable to Denktash.
6. Kyprianou has told press of existence of his proposals without revealing their content. But they are already beginning to leak and will probably be condemned by the Turkish Cypriots as inadequate and unrealistic.
7. Perez de Cuellar considers Denktash's proposals disappointing but has told us that they were something on which he could work. He thought it important to start with Varosha and expected to get the present offer improved. He told Kyprianou he would urge Evren, at a meeting with him in Casablanca on 15 January, to press Denktash for more substantive concessions on Varosha. The UN Secretariat are pessimistic about the prospects. [Not for use] The Secretary General had earlier conducted private negotiations with the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to try to extract a viable offer on Varosha.
8. Perez de Cuellar expressed readiness to follow up meeting with Evren with a visit by himself to the area if there seemed a basis for serious negotiations. He told Kyprianou that he would not welcome General Assembly debate on Cyprus. Kyprianou replied that if there was no progress he would be forced to go to the General Assembly.
9. Kyprianou's proposals do little more than set out Greek Cypriots' long standing desiderata. Any concessions (eg an advance on previous publicly stated position on extent of a Turkish Cypriot zone) are negated by counterbalancing conditions (eg certain areas of economic importance to the Turkish Cypriots which must be returned to the Greek Cypriot zone). They represent at best a starting position for negotiations; and, at worst, simply an attempt to give an appearance of willingness to work towards a settlement without any real will to do so.





10. Despite their obvious shortcomings, both the Kyprianou and Denktash proposals provide material on which the Secretary General can work. We are continuing to persuade him of the need to be seen to be actively involved. The appointment of a successor to Dr Gobbi as Special Representative in Cyprus would help in this.

#### Guarantor Power Consultations

11. In a speech on 11 January Papandreou said that our proposal for trilateral talks had been rejected by both the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. In fact the Greek Cypriots have been careful to leave the question open, primarily in order to keep us in play. But the speech appears to remove former uncertainty about the Greek position (eg during Mrs Thatcher's meeting with Papandreou during the Athens summit).

12. We see it as a treaty obligation to call for consultations. We should continue to say that we are willing to take part if the others also agree. But there are considerable risks, and no comparable advantages, for us if they actually take place. They would be likely to break down in mutual recriminations between Greeks and Turks with both sides seeking to use, and then blame, us. Furthermore the Guarantor Power mechanism has the disadvantage that while Turkey is directly involved in Cyprus and can, in the last resort, deliver Denktash, Greece has no similar position or power and is likely to play a spoiling role. Guarantor Power consultations are no substitute for the role of the UN Secretary General.

13. The Greek suggestion of parallel talks would cast us in the role of mediator and has similar but stronger disadvantages for us. We have no treaty obligation to take the lead in conducting separate, parallel, negotiations with the Greeks and Turks if the tripartite consultations envisaged by the 1960 Treaty cannot take place. Equally, of course, there is nothing to stop us doing so if we so wished and both other Guarantor Powers agreed.



14. Kyprianou is likely to ask how we envisage that Guarantor Power talks should proceed. Given the present Greek attitude the question is hypothetical. We should not be drawn on detail since the Greeks will then have an opportunity to claim that it is our ideas that make Greek participation impossible and thus to pass the blame to us. The obligation to consult "together" rests with all 3 Guarantor Powers (Turkey has said she will participate if Greece does).

#### EC/Cyprus

15. Under a 1977 decision by COREPER, Turkish Cypriot exports have continued to benefit from preferential access to Community markets under the EC/Cyprus Association Agreement. For this purpose, certificates of origin from local chambers of commerce, with customs stamps issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities but similar in form to normal Cypriot stamps and without any mention of the name of the Turkish Cypriot "state", have been accepted by customs authorities in the Community.

16. Following the Turkish Cypriot UDI, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots have demanded an end to these arrangements. A number of member states (including ourselves) believe that to abandon the status quo would be politically undesirable since it would give the Greek Cypriots effective control for the future over whether or not the Turkish Cypriot population should benefit from the Association Agreement and would serve to harden inter-communal divisions. Moreover as North Cyprus's main trading partner we have a vested interest in things staying as they are. But given the importance for our interests there (SBAs) of good relations with the Greek Cypriots, we have tried not to take the lead in resisting their demands. If there is a consensus amongst member states that the present arrangements should be changed we would go along with it.

17. Following an injudicious performance by Haferkamp during a visit to Cyprus early in December, the Commission found themselves committed to supporting President Kyprianou's demands not only that Cyprus Government (ie Greek Cypriot) stamps should



in future be taken as the only documents entitling Cypriot exports to preferential treatment, but also that all such exports should pass through specified ports in southern Cyprus. They have sought to implement these arrangements, superseding those agreed in 1977, without reference to Council or COREPER.

18. In COREPER on 12 January a clear majority of member states took the view that only COREPER or the Council could change these arrangements, and that the status quo should be maintained. The UK remained in the middle of the pack, but the Greeks and Greek Cypriots have shown signs of dissatisfaction that we have not supported them.

#### Troop Withdrawals

19. Speaking to the Greeks and Greek Cypriots just before the Papandreou/Kyprianou meeting on 23 December, we suggested, inter alia, that the Greeks might consider offering to withdraw some troops if the Turks did the same. This would put pressure on the Turks and lower tension. We made this move in the knowledge that the Greeks have more troops in Cyprus than allowed by treaty. We calculated that, even if the Greeks were not prepared to remove any, such an approach would constitute additional pressure to prevent them moving in reinforcements.

20. The Greeks have expressed surprise at our suggestion and claimed that they have no more troops than the 950 allowed by the Treaty of Alliance (we think they have about 1,800 but cannot prove it from overt sources). They claim the Turks have 35,000 (we think 17,500), while being allowed only 650. The Greeks appear to have misunderstood the intention behind our suggestion, and to be determined (with Greek Cypriot concurrence) to deny that they have any additional troops beyond those allowed by treaty.

#### Commonwealth Action Group

21. The Group was set up at CHOGM and consists of the Commonwealth Secretary General, Australia, India, Guyana, Nigeria and Zambia. Its aim is to promote the implementation of



SCR 541. They have had one meeting with Sr Perez de Cuellar who clearly feels that they are more likely to harm than good. They have since been inactive.

#### Money for the Bases

22. Since 1965 Cypriots have pressed us for aid (£250m) they allege is due under the 1960 Treaties setting up the Republic of Cyprus and Sovereign Base Areas. They have also maintained that HMG should pay for the facilities we enjoy there. Appendix R of the Treaties provide for aid to be paid until 1965 and consultations thereafter, with the final decision left to the UK.

23. We maintain that there is no legal obligation to pay after 1965. We help in other ways: our contribution to UNFICYP is the largest (£22 million per year and 800 men). In 1978 we offered a £7.5m loan: the Cypriots have not taken this up, partly because we said we would see it as fulfilling any obligations to date.

#### 20 December Message to Prime Minister [Annex H]

24. Delivered to our High Commission in Nicosia on 3 January and sent by bag: similar messages sent to many other Heads of Government. Does not call for a reply but might be mentioned.

#### Southern Conveyor Project

25. The Southern Conveyor Project is the largest development ever undertaken in Cyprus. Four British contractors have pre-qualified for the Kouris Dam, the first stage of the development. But there is strong competition from the French, who are rumoured to be going to offer an attractive mixed credit package. Support for the project from the Aid and Trade Provision has just been agreed by Departments on a conditional matching basis. This decision has not yet been conveyed to the Cypriots since it is dependent upon an increase (not yet agreed, but likely to be agreed during the next 10 days) in ECGD's existing export credit ceiling for Cyprus.

Southern European Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
16 January 1984

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ;

18 JANUARY 1984

- |    |   |         |
|----|---|---------|
| 1. | SCR 451 on Cyprus   | Annex A |
| 2. | Treaty of Guarantee                                       | Annex B |
| 3. | Kyprianou's statement to the Press,<br>11 January         | Annex C |
| 4. | Kyprianou's proposals                                     | Annex D |
| 5. | Denktash's proposals                                      | Annex E |
| 6. | FCO Spokesman's comment on Denktash's<br>proposals        | Annex F |
| 7. | Record of talks with Kyprianou,<br>17 November            | Annex G |
| 8. | Kyprianou's message to the Prime<br>Minister, 20 December | Annex H |

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Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/541 (1983)  
18 November 1983

RESOLUTION 541 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2500th meeting,  
on 18 November 1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,

Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),

Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;
2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;

3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;

5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;

6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;

7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus;

8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

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## TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus<sup>(1)</sup> signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

### ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

### ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.



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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 11 JANUARY 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE: ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON  
PRIORITY: PARIS, BONN, ROME

MIPT: CYPRUS: MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND PRESIDENT  
KYPRIANOU.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS  
TODAY (11 JANUARY):

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS IS MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE ANXIOUS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL, JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, IN THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS AS A WHOLE, GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS ALIKE. FOR THIS PURPOSE I HAVE THIS MORNING SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH IS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS OF 1977 AND 1979, PROVIDES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE WAY FOR A SPEEDY SOLUTION ENSURING AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN, TERRITORIAL INTEGRAL, UNITED, PEACEFUL AND NON-ALIGNED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, WITHOUT OCCUPATION TROOPS AND EXTERNAL INTERFERENCES. THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THIS FRAMEWORK WOULD FULLY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY AND FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM OF FEDERATION WHILST ENSURING THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ALL THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EARLY RESULTS I PROPOSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT AFTER COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541 IN ALL ITS ASPECTS THERE SHOULD BE A MEETING BETWEEN MYSELF AND MR. DENKTASH IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS MEETING WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE ANYWHERE, PREFERABLY IN CYPRUS OR AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS SHOULD LAST FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY IN A DETERMINED AND SUSTAINED EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THIS OF COURSE DEPENDS ON THE GOODWILL BOTH OF ANKARA AND OF MR. DENKTASH, AND WHETHER THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL DOES NOW EXIST ON THEIR PART. ANY ATTEMPTS AND PLANS FOR SECESSION AND PARTITION MUST GENUINELY BE ABANDONED FOR GOOD.

/THE

THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERALL SETTLEMENT THAT I HAVE TODAY SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF RAISING AND DISCUSSING AT THE MEETING ANY OTHER SPECIFIC ISSUE EITHER TO BE RAISED BY MR. DENKTASH OR MYSELF OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE PROPOSAL TO MEET WITH MR. DENKTASH, AS I HAVE OUTLINED IT, IS IN ADDITION TO MY SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL BE MAKING IN PURSUANCE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541 IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WHICH I HAVE TODAY REQUESTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE UP MY FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL.

I CALL UPON THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND MR. DENKTASH TO RESPOND POSITIVELY AND WITH GOODWILL WITH A VIEW TO TERMINATING THE TRAGEDY OF CYPRUS AND ITS PEOPLE AND RENDERING A REAL SERVICE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA.

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
SIR C TICKELL  
SIR J LEAHY  
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MR HANNAY  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA UKMIS ~~NEW YORK PRIORITY PARIS~~  
BONN ROME

MIPT: CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S SPEAKING NOTES:

BEGINS: 1. A BASIC PREREQUISITE TO A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO BE COMPLETELY DEMILITARISED. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ALL TURKISH OCCUPATION TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN TOGETHER WITH THE COLONIZERS IMPORTED FROM TURKEY. AT A LATER STAGE ALL TROOPS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE (GREEK AND TURKISH CONTINGENTS) SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND THE CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD THE SO-CALLED QUOTE TURKISH CYPRIOT SECURITY FORCE UNQUOTE SHOULD BE DISBANDED. DEMILITARISATION IS INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE AS AN ELEMENT OF INTERNAL STABILITY BUT ALSO ALLEVIATE TURKEY'S PARADOXICAL QUOTE FEARS UNQUOTE THAT CYPRUS MAY BE USED AGAINST HER MILITARILY.

2. AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPRISING MEN FROM COUNTRIES WITH NO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD BE STATIONED IN CYPRUS TO SECURE ITS EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN POLICE DUTIES COULD BE ALLOCATED TO IT FOR AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS NOT ONLY ESSENTIAL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BUT IT WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS CONSOLIDATING A PEACEFUL SITUATION AND CREATING THE APPROPRIATE CLIMATE AND CONDITIONS FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

3. THE QUESTION OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST. THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY (AND NON-ALIGNMENT) OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD BE GUARANTEED BY INTERNATIONAL TREATY. INTERESTED POWERS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE TREATY. THE DUTY OF THE GUARANTORS SHOULD BE A COLLECTIVE ONE AND THE USE OF FORCE SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE TREATY.

4. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD BE A FEDERAL STATE. IN CONSIDERING THE TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF A FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE BASIS FOR SOLVING THESE ISSUES, AS IN FACT ALL OTHER ISSUES AND ASPECTS,

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1 ARE

ARE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE HIGH-LEVEL AGREEMENTS (MAKARIOS-DENKTASH 1977 AND KYPRIANOU-DENKTASH 1979). IN DETERMINING THE TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES THE COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS MUST ALWAYS BE BORN IN MIND. AN OUTLINE OF THE SOLUTION ENVISAGED FOLLOWS.

#### 5. TERRITORIAL ASPECT

DESPITE THE INHERENT DANGERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONCEPT OF TWO REGIONS OR TWO PROVINCES, YET THIS CONCEPT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED.

IT MUST OF COURSE BE EMPHASISED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONSTITUTE THE 18 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS. COLONIZERS FROM TURKEY AND ANY OTHER PERSONS IMPORTED INTO CYPRUS SINCE THE INVASION IN 1974 CAN UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED AS CYPRIOTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RATIO OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POPULATION IS ONLY 18 PER CENT, YET IT HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 30TH SEPTEMBER 1983 THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF 23 PER CENT FOR THE REGION OR PROVINCE TO BE UNDER TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING WITHOUT DELAY AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER AGREEING THAT 25 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC BE UNDER TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, PROVIDED THAT AREAS SUCH AS FAMAGUSTA AND MORPHOU, WHICH WERE THICKLY POPULATED BY GREEK CYPRIOTS, BEFORE THEY WERE FORCIBLY UPROOTED FROM THEIR HOMES BY THE TURKISH INVADING FORCES, WOULD BE UNDER GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION.

#### 6. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT

IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, UNDER A FEDERAL SYSTEM, THE REGIONS OR PROVINCES WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE AUTONOMY AND POWERS. THEREFORE, ANY CHECKS AND BALANCES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL SHOULD BE RESTRICTED AND BE OF SUCH A NATURE AS NOT TO IMPEDE THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANS OR LEAD TO IMPASSES AND DEADLOCKS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SINCE, IN A FEDERATION, THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL ORGANS ARE THOSE WHICH SAFEGUARD THE UNITY OF THE STATE: AND, THEREFORE, IF THESE FUNCTIONS ARE DISRUPTED THE STATE RUNS THE DANGER OF DISSOLUTION.

##### (1) EXECUTIVE

THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM PROVIDED UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE PRESERVED:

- (A) THERE SHOULD BE A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, WHO SHOULD BE A GREEK CYPRIOT, AND A VICE-PRESIDENT WHO SHOULD BE A TURKISH CYPRIOT.

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1(3)

(1) PROVIDED THAT THE PROCESS OF TAKING DECISIONS IS SUCH AS NOT TO LEAD TO IMPASSES AND TO THE DISRUPTION OF THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE, THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COULD INCLUDE A HIGHER PROPORTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAN THEIR POPULATION RATIO, NAMELY THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WOULD BE COMPOSED OF 70 PER CENT GREEK CYPRIOTS MINISTERS AND 30 PER CENT TURKISH CYPRIOTS MINISTERS.

(2) LEGISLATURE

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CYPRUS, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT A UNICAMERAL SYSTEM IS MORE APPROPRIATE. MECHANISMS WOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENSURE SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF ANY PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE.

ALTERNATIVELY, THERE COULD BE A BI-CAMERAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF:

A LOWER CHAMBER: REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO BE ON THE BASIS OF POPULATION RATIO: AND  
AN UPPER CHAMBER: REPRESENTATION IN THE UPPER CHAMBER WOULD DEPEND ON THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SUCH CHAMBER AND ON THE PROVISION OF DEADLOCK-RESOLVING MECHANISMS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IS NOT IMPEDED.

3. JUDICIARY

EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT IN RESPECT OF ALL FEDERAL MATTERS.

4. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL POWERS

THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE THE UNITY OF THE STATE.

INDICATIVELY, THESE SHOULD INCLUDE:

- (I) FOREIGN AFFAIRS (INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP, BUT CERTAIN FUNCTIONS MAY BE PROVINCIALY DELEGATED):
- (II) FEDERAL FINANCE (INCLUDING CUSTOMS):
- (III) DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
- (IV) INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS (AIR AND SEA):
- (V) INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
- (VI) APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL OFFICERS:
- (VII) NATURAL RESOURCES:
- (VIII) FEDERAL JUSTICE
- (IX) CO-ORDINATION, HARMONISATION, STANDARD SETTING AND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS:
- (X) PROVISION FOR TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM FEDERATION TO PROVINCES AND VICE-VERSA IF AGREED.

LIST OF EXTENSIVE PROVINCIAL POWERS TO BE AGREED.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (INCLUDING THE THREE FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT AND RIGHT OF PROPERTY) SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED BOTH AT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS, AND SHOULD FORM PART OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE THREE FREEDOMS (OF MOVEMENTS, SETTLEMENT AND RIGHT OF PROPERTY) SHOULD RELATE SOLELY TO OVERCOMING CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION AND SHOULD NOT NEGATE OR RESTRICT THEM.

6. ECONOMIC MATTERS

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD ENSURE THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CYPRUS AS A WHOLE AND SHOULD SAFEGUARD FOR ALL CITIZENS OF CYPRUS AN EQUAL STANDARD OF LIVING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO PROGRESS, DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE. SUITABLE MACHINERY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE POPULATION. THUS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL BE GIVEN TO LESS ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED AREAS. FURTHERMORE, MEASURES COULD BE DISCUSSED OF A TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL NATURE, IN RESPECT OF THE ECONOMY, TO TAKE EFFECT AFTER A SOLUTION.

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CYPRUS : DENKTASH'S GOODWILL PROPOSALS

1. ON 2 JANUARY DENKTASH ISSUED A STATEMENT CONTAINING '' PROPOSALS OF GOODWILL, SO THAT THE FIRST STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION''. HE WAS ALSO INFORMING THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, REQUESTING HIM TO HELP BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES, SO THAT THE PROPOSALS COULD MATERIALISE.

2. AFTER A PREAMBLE TAKING AS STARTING POINT THE DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD, BUT SPEAKING OF RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE AND OF THE NEED FOR A ''FEDERAL SOLUTION'' REACHED BETWEEN THE ''TWO PEOPLES'' IN CYPRUS, THE MAIN PROPOSALS ARE :

1 VAROSHA: ''THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE REITERATES ITS READINESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON ITS PROPOSALS OF 17 NOVEMBER CONCERNING VAROSHA AND NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE''. NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF THE SIDES REGARDING EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL STATUS. VAROSHA AND THE AIRPORT ARE ''SEPARATE ISSUES NEITHER OF WHICH CONSTITUTES A PRECONDITION FOR THE OTHER''. AS PROOF OF ITS DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE VAROSHA ISSUE, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE TO PLACE THE ''VAROSHA AREA AS DEFINED IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT MAP OF 5 AUGUST 1961 UNDER INTERIM UN SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION'' . THE MODALITIES AND CONDITIONS SHALL BE DETERMINED BETWEEN THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THE UN. THIS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHALL NOT PREJUDICE THE FINAL POLITICAL STATUS OF THE AREA AND SHALL CONTINUE UNTIL A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION. THE QUESTION OF GREEK CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT IN THE AREA SHALL BE CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. AFTER AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON RESETTLEMENT UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION, THE AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. OPENING THE AREA TO GREEK CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT SHALL NOT PREJUDICE ITS FINAL POLITICAL STATUS. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE READY TO DISCUSS DETAILS WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND WITH THE UN.

II NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE ACCEPTS HANDING OVER THE AIRPORT TO INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT INSISTING THAT IT BE ADMINISTERED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY''. OPENING THE AIRPORT WILL BE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE TWO SIDES AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GOODWILL AND TRUST. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE READY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, OR FAILING THAT WITH THE UN. THE PROPOSAL IS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR OTHER STEPS AIMED AT CREATING GOOD WILL.

III COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS: TURKISH CYPRIOTS PROPOSE THAT THEY CMP BE REACTIVATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES (THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVING AGREED IN NOVEMBER TO THE REMOVAL OF PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES). PILLOUD IS REQUESTED TO COME TO CYPRUS AT AN EARLY DATE. THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS INVITED TO DECLARE ITS READINESS TO PARTICIPATE.

3. 1 THE STATEMENT INCORPORATES A PROPOSED TEXT FOR A ''COMMON UNDERSTANDING'', WHICH WOULD BE ''WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RESPECTIVE POSITIONS REGARDING EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL STATUS'', INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

(A) BOTH SIDES RESOLVE TO WORK FOR RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE  
C ''BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES'' SO THAT THEY MAY PURSUE A ''FEDERAL UNION'' AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. TO ACHIEVE THIS THEY MIGHT ESTABLISH AS ''COMMON GROUND'' : AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BY PEACEFUL MEANS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN: RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL EQUALITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS: SUPPORT FOR THE OPENING STATEMENT OF AUGUST 1980: AND THE AIM OF A ''BIZONAL FEDERATION'' BASED ON PARTNERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION.

(B) BEST ENDEAVOURS TO PREVENT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

(C) PRACTICAL MEASURES TO ''RESTORE AND HARMONISE RELATIONS'' INCLUDING PRIORITY TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON VAROSHA: CO-OPERATION FOR REOPENING NICOSIA AIRPORT: RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MISSING PERSONS: REFRAINING FROM HARASSING EACH OTHER IN TRADE, TOURISM, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS ETC: MUTUAL BENEFIT FROM ALL ECONOMIC FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR CYPRUS: ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COMMISSION AND A JOINT HEALTH COMMISSION: JOINT ENDEAVOURS IN THE CULTURAL FIELD INCLUDING GREEK AND TURKISH SECOND LANGUAGE TEACHING, A FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A UNIVERSITY, JOINT CULTURAL AND SPORTING ACTIVITIES, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL MEETINGS: AND A SEMINAR ON FEDERALISM AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE IN THE CYPRUS CONTEXT.



(D) UNDERTAKINGS TO REFRAIN FROM PROVOCATIONS OF ALL KINDS  
E AND TO AVOID THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE.

(E) AGREEMENT TODAY HIGH LEVEL MEETING UNDER UN AUSPICES.

(F) AGREEMENT FOR BOTH SIDES TO CALL ON TURKEY AND GREECE  
TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST THEIR EFFORTS IN THE SEARCH  
S FOR A SETTLEMENT BASED ON PREVIOUS HIGH LEVEL  
AGREEMENTS, THE 1908 OPENING STATEMENT AND THE  
EVALUATION DOCUMENT.

4. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

5. SEE MIFT.

5-6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

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STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

We welcome any steps which serve to lower tension in Cyprus and in this context have noted with satisfaction Turkey's announced intention to reduce the number of their troops in Cyprus. But it is also of great importance that real progress should be made towards a peaceful, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. In this regard, we are carefully studying Mr Denktash's statement of 2 January and the proposals contained in it and hope that these may be able to contribute to such progress. For our part, we remain ready to assist the UN Secretary-General's efforts in whatever way he considers appropriate. We have also over the past few weeks been in close contact with the parties concerned.

5 January 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

John ✓

You sent a copy of  
Denktash's 2 Jan  
statement to FCO  
today. They would  
like to know if  
the "top secret"  
classification is  
the equivalent of ours.

Nicky

No - it is the  
classification of the  
Cyprus fact. I suggest  
downgrade to  
"Confidential".

*[Signature]* 14.  
1

Fett:

Bi-regional

Shapman for

FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Amend 541  
on second point.

Help Turkish economy  
with the army

Procedures

1. A Basic prerequisite to a solution of the Cyprus problem is for the Republic of Cyprus to be completely demilitarised. In the first instance all Turkish occupation troops should be withdrawn together with the colonizers imported from Turkey. At a later stage all troops provided for under the Treaty of Alliance (Greek and Turkish contingents) should be withdrawn, and the Cyprus National Guard and the so-called "Turkish Cypriot Security Force" should be disbanded. Demilitarisation is intended to contribute as an element of internal stability but also alleviate Turkey's paradoxical "fears" that Cyprus may be used against her militarily.
2. An International force under the auspices of the United Nations comprising men from countries with no direct involvement in the Cyprus problem should be stationed in Cyprus to secure its external defence and internal security. In addition, certain police duties could be allocated to it for an agreed period of time. This arrangement is not only essential for a solution to the Cyprus problem but it would also contribute towards consolidating a peaceful situation and creating the appropriate climate and conditions for the reunification of the country and the people. In such circumstances reconciliation and cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be possible in a very short period of time.
3. The question of effective international guarantees is of great significance in view of the bitter experience of the past. The independence, territorial integrity, unity (and non-alignment) of the Republic of Cyprus should be guaranteed by International Treaty. Interested powers should be excluded from participating in the Treaty. The duty of the guarantors should be a collective one and the use of force should be specifically excluded from the possible courses of action in the enforcement of the Treaty.

4. The Republic of Cyprus should be a Federal State. In considering the territorial and constitutional arrangements of a Federal Republic of Cyprus, the basis for solving these issues, as in fact all other issues and aspects, are the Resolutions of the United Nations and the High-level Agreements (Makarios-Denktash 1977 and Kyprianou-Denktash 1979). In determining the territorial and constitutional issues the composition of the population of Cyprus must always be born in mind. An outline of the solution envisaged follows.

5. Territorial Aspect

Despite the inherent dangers and constitutional difficulties involved in the concept of two regions or two provinces, yet this concept has been accepted.

It must of course be emphasised that the Turkish Cypriots constitute the 18% of the population of Cyprus. Colonizers from Turkey and any other persons imported into Cyprus since the invasion in 1974 can under no circumstances be regarded as Cypriots. Despite the fact that the ratio of the Turkish Cypriot population is only 18%, yet it has already been stated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30th September 1983 that the Greek Cypriot side is willing to negotiate on the basis of 23% for the region or province to be under Turkish Cypriot administration. However, for the purpose of securing without delay an overall solution of the Cyprus problem, it would be possible to consider agreeing that 25% of the territory of the Republic be under Turkish Cypriot administration, provided that areas such as Famağusta and Morphou, which were thickly populated by Greek Cypriots, before they were forcibly uprooted from their homes by the Turkish

25% b.

invading forces, would be under Greek Cypriot administration.

6. Constitutional Aspect

*Turkish  
the President  
Council of Ministers  
70:30.  
Unicameral  
legislature*

It should be borne in mind that, under a Federal system, the regions or provinces will have considerable autonomy and powers. Therefore, any checks and balances at the Federal level should be restricted and be of such a nature as not to impede the smooth functioning of the Federal Government organs or lead to impasses and deadlocks. This is particularly important since, in a Federation, the powers and functions of the Federal organs are those which safeguard the unity of the State; and, therefore, if these functions are disrupted the State runs the danger of dissolution.

(1) Executive

The Presidential system provided under the 1960 Constitution is considered appropriate and should be preserved:

- (a) There should be a President of the Republic, who should be a Greek Cypriot, and a Vice-President who should be a Turkish Cypriot.
- (b) Provided that the process of taking decisions is such as not to lead to impasses and to the disruption of the smooth functioning of the State, the Federal Council of Ministers could include a higher proportion of membership of Turkish Cypriots than their population ratio, namely the Federal Council of Ministers would be composed of 70% Greek Cypriots Ministers and 30% Turkish Cypriots Ministers.

(2) Legislature

In the circumstances of Cyprus, it is considered that a Unicameral System is more appropriate. Mechanisms would be provided to ensure speedy resolution of any problems that might arise.

.../4.

Alternatively, there could be a Bi-cameral system  
consisting of:

a Lower Chamber: representation of the two Communities  
to be on the basis of population ratio; and

an Upper Chamber: representation in the Upper  
Chamber would depend on the powers and functions  
of such Chamber and on the provision of deadlock-  
resolving mechanisms so as to ensure that the  
legislative process is not impeded.

3. Judiciary

Equal representation of the two Communities in the  
Federal Supreme Court in respect of all federal matters.

4. Powers and Functions of Federal Government and Provincial  
Powers

The powers and functions of the Federal Government to  
be such as to ensure the unity of the state.

Indicatively, these should include:

- (i) Foreign Affairs (including Citizenship, but  
certain functions may be Provincially delegated);
- (ii) Federal Finance (including Customs);
- (iii) Defence and National Security;
- (iv) International Communications (air and sea);
- (v) International Telecommunications;
- (vi) Appointment of Federal Officers;
- (vii) Natural Resources;
- (viii) Federal Justice
- (ix) Co-ordination, harmonisation, standard setting  
and advisory functions;
- (x) Provision for transfer of powers from Federation  
to Provinces and vice-versa if agreed.

List of extensive Provincial Powers to be agreed.

5. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including the three freedoms of Movement, Settlement and Right of Property) should be safeguarded both at Federal and Provincial levels, and should form part of the Federal Constitution.

Any arrangements with regard to the three freedoms (of Movement, Settlement and Right of Property) should relate solely to overcoming certain practical difficulties in their implementation and should not negate or restrict them.

6. Economic Matters

The Economic and social policy of the Federal Republic of Cyprus should ensure the economic progress and development of Cyprus as a whole and should safeguard for all citizens of Cyprus an equal standard of living and equal opportunities to progress, development and welfare. Suitable machinery should be established to implement this policy for the benefit of the whole population. Thus, economic assistance will be given to less economically developed areas. Furthermore, measures could be discussed of a temporary, transitional nature, in respect of the economy, to take effect after a solution.

11 January, 1994.





SOME COMMENTS ON MR. DENKTASH'S  
STATEMENT OF 2ND JANUARY 1984.  
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The leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community Mr. Denktash has decided for reasons of his own to make certain proposals in a statement published on 2 January 1984, under conditions of maximum publicity. As the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has already declared; Mr. Denktash must certainly have known that this was not the appropriate method for the creation of prerequisites for substantive progress in the Cyprus problem, beyond the fact that in essence he has said nothing new. This was admitted by Mr. Denktash himself when, answering reporters' questions on the same date, he stated that he brought together, "into a single package", earlier "offers" which "were made piecemeal on many occasions and which, because of the piecemeal nature, were lost ..."

2. The motives which prompted Mr. Denktash to take this action and the aims which are discernible from the content of his public proposals are, on the one hand, the creation of misleading impressions internationally and, on the other, the attainment of concrete targets to facilitate the survival of the occupied part of Cyprus as a separate entity. This was also revealed by Mr. Denktash, when he publicly stated on the same date that he chose this particular time because, as he put it, "the Greek Cypriots declared the start of a campaign" and therefore he thought "of a method of drawing the world's attention ..."

3. It is pointed out that the so-called "Goodwill Measures Proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side" is merely a misleading document devoid of good will, combined with an attempt to extort more concessions from the Greek Cypriot side. Buried under the ostensibly "generous" suggestions

are a large number of issues and matters which will, should the proposals be accepted, give the Turkish Cypriot side all that it has been demanding by way of consolidating and legalizing the unacceptable situation created in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus.

4. References to "two Peoples" and "two nations" are scattered throughout the proposals. If the Greek Cypriot side accepts these references it will be conceding that the Turkish Cypriot Community has a separate self-determination right, whereas, according to international law and morality, Cyprus as a whole is the unit of self-determination.

5. If the Turkish demands that the two sides should refrain from hampering each other's interests in the fields of trade, tourism, transportations, communication, etc. are accepted, the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the Republic will achieve in practice the capacity of and all benefits accorded to an independent state, without any adverse consequences arising from its illegality. It should be emphasised that the proposed steps would effectively grant the area under Turkish occupation the attributes of a de facto independent state. Such "arrangements" would in reality remove any inducement for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriot side would have achieved all it seeks without having made any effective concession to the Greek Cypriot side and the Republic of Cyprus would have limited its international power and responsibilities and effectively have consolidated Turkey's control over Cyprus.

6. If the Turkish proposals for "each other's political equality" are accepted, then an unacceptable situation may arise, in view of Denktash's interpretation of "equality", which goes to power and to participation-



shares, as opposed to status, and which ignores all the internationally recognized democratic aspects of the issue. This applies also to the Turkish side's definition of "bizonality" in the sense of "partnership ... of these two Peoples", as clearly expressed in the above proposals.

7. As regards the Turkish side's reservation to the effect that "holding of negotiations on these issues will be without prejudice to the respective positions of the two sides with regard to each other's political status", it should be noted, and this was repeatedly declared by Mr. Denktash, that the Turkish side plans to use the negotiating process as a means to get recognition for its fictitious "state" by the Cyprus Government and other states.

8. The adoption of proposals envisaged in Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 January 1984, particularly those on trade, tourism, transportations, communication, assistance etc., would be tantamount to adoption of much of the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals as put forward earlier, which lead to the creation of two independent states under a confederation, contrary to the provisions of the February 1977 and May 1979 Agreements.

9. As regards the purported offer of Varosha, it is evident that, under the misleading title "Turkish Cypriot proposal on Varosha", there is a proposal to enter into protracted and conditional negotiations about an interim arrangement for a small part of Varosha. In particular, it should be noted that, according to the Turkish position, a) there will be negotiations concerning Varosha (and the Nicosia International Airport) on Mr. Denktash's proposals of 17 November 1983, b) "the modalities and conditions of this transfer (to interim U.N. supervision) shall be determined between the Turkish Cypriot side and the U.N.",



c) the area will not be returned to the Greek Cypriot side, but its final status awaits an ultimate solution, i.e. it may be Turkish Cypriot, or it may be Federal. Furthermore, according to the Turkish side's proposals of 17 November 1983 on Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, it is spelled out that there must be "progress towards a final comprehensive solution to the Cyprus question through intercommunal talks.

10. According to the Turkish position, negotiations for Varosha are to be complex and long-drawn-out, because first, there must be discussion and agreement on the interim U.N. supervision and administration between both sides and the U.N., then there must be the beginning of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, and only then, simultaneously, can "the question of Greek Cypriot resettlement in the Varosha area" "be considered". The resettlement as an interim measure can begin after agreement is achieved on above issues.

11. On the opening of the Nicosia International Airport, it is clear that the Turkish side, by referring to "the handing over of the Airport by the parties to the interim U.N. administration", insists that they are equally entitled to the Airport.

12. The Turkish proposals are significantly silent about any return of any territory (other than the offer to negotiate about part of Varosha under interim U.N. auspices), despite the occupation of 36.4% of the island by the Turkish ~~zones~~ <sup>forces</sup>. Instead, there is evidence that this unacceptable situation will continue, a situation which Turkey has exploited by bringing in thousands of Anatolian settlers from Turkey, as well as the Turkish Army of 25,000 men and their families. Furthermore, on 21st December 1983, steps



began to be taken in the occupied area to give to the Turkish soldiers land, in order to encourage their permanent settlement (Yeniduzen, 21/12/83).

13. The absence of serious intent, on the part of the Turkish side, towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem is indicative of Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 January 1984. All that the current proposals do is to refer to "first steps" or to "short term" matters capable of resolution or to facilitating "progress" or to "the process of steadily moving towards a federal arrangement", or to the ability "to proceed towards a federal solution". The proposals for a Commission "to study" economic matters and the proposal for "a seminar on Federalism in general" show that after so many years of negotiations for a federal solution the Turkish side is not committed to taking any decisions on the issue, but is either looking at the question as an academic debate or as a delaying tactic.

14. With regard to the intercommunal talks, the Turkish side and Mr. Denktash have given the answer themselves. Mr. Denktash declared that the reason he wanted the negotiations was because he believed that in that way the Cyprus Government should recognise him and his fictitious "state". It should be stressed that the Cyprus Government will do nothing directly or indirectly that would mean recognition.

15. The Secretary-General is well aware that the purported declaration of "independence" in the occupied areas of the Republic took place when he was about to enter into substantive consultations for the purpose of preparing the ground for a meeting between President



Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash, as proposed by Mr. Denktash himself. This was another indication that it was not the intention of the Turkish side to genuinely negotiate. Their intention now is first of all to gain time to have the world accept what has happened, to have the Cyprus Government either directly or indirectly recognize their "state", and to follow the same method they were pursuing so far, for over nine years now, by pretending to negotiate and at the same time consolidating the faits accomplis.

16. Regardless of the motives and the aims of the Turkish side, which prompted them to make the above public proposals, there remains the imperative need for reversal of their secessionist move. If the "declaration of independence" is withdrawn, then the road will be opened for the finding of an early, just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

17. The Government of the Republic feels that the United Nations, and especially the Secretary-General, should examine specific measures for the promotion of the implementation of all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 541 (1983). In the first place it is necessary for all states to exert influence on Turkey for the withdrawal of the secessionist declaration; it is also imperative to call upon Turkey to abandon its designs against the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, opening thus the way for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

9 January 1984.



STATEMENT BY H.E. SPYROS KYPRIANOU  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is more than anyone else anxious to secure a peaceful, just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem as quickly as possible, in the interest of the people of Cyprus as a whole, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. For this purpose I have this morning submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a framework for such a settlement of the Cyprus problem. I strongly believe that this proposal, which is in full conformity with the Resolutions of the United Nations and the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, provides in the circumstances the way for a speedy solution ensuring an independent, sovereign, territorial integral, united, peaceful and non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, without occupation troops and external interferences. The principles laid down within the context of this framework would fully meet the requirements for internal and external security and for a workable system of federation whilst ensuring the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus.

In order to achieve early results I proposed to the Secretary-General that after compliance with Security Council Resolution 541 in all its aspects there should be a meeting between myself and Mr. Denktash in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This meeting which may take place anywhere, preferably in Cyprus or at the United Nations Headquarters should last for as long as necessary in a determined and sustained effort to achieve an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. This of course depends on the goodwill both of Ankara and of Mr. Denktash, and whether the necessary political will does now exist on their part. Any attempts and plans for secession and partition must genuinely be abandoned for good. The framework for the overall settlement that I have today submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations does not exclude the possibility of raising and discussing at the meeting any other specific issue either to be raised by Mr. Denktash or myself or the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



- 2 -

The proposal to meet with Mr. Denktash, as I have outlined it, is in addition to my support for the efforts that the Secretary-General will be making in pursuance of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 541 in all its aspects, and within the context of which I have today requested the Secretary-General to take up my framework proposal.

I call upon the Turkish Government and Mr. Denktash to respond positively and with goodwill with a view to terminating the tragedy of Cyprus and its people and rendering a real service to the cause of peace and security in the area.

11 January 1984.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 January, 1984

*plw meeting folder  
for 18 January.*

*A.J.C. 1/1.*

*Joe John*

Message from the President of Cyprus

I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister from President Kyprianou of Cyprus. Although the letter is dated 20 December, it was only on 3 January that the President's office delivered it to the High Commissioner in Nicosia and asked him to forward it. It arrived in the FCO by bag.

We understand that President Kyprianou has sent similar letters to most other Heads of Government. In the circumstances, we consider that it would be sufficient for the Prime Minister simply to acknowledge the letter personally when she sees President Kyprianou on 18 January: the brief for that meeting will cover the point.

*Joe John*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

11 JAN 1984

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FORNISH AND COMPANY

1000 W. 10th St.



PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

Nicosia, 20th December, 1983.

*Madama Prime Minister,*

I would like during this festive season to extend to you and your country every good wish and to express my appreciation for the support and assistance rendered by you to my country and my government at this most critical moment in the history of Cyprus.

I should also like to take this opportunity to acquaint you with recent serious developments concerning Cyprus since my last message to you following the purported "Declaration of Independence" of the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus on 15th November, 1983, and since our last meeting at Goa and New Delhi. In complete disregard and contempt of the Security Council Resolution 541 of 18 November, 1983, demanding the reversal of that action and calling on the parties not to exacerbate the situation, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have, with the cooperation of the Turkish army of occupation, taken a series of measures to consolidate and perpetuate the division of my country. Even more serious, indeed potentially explosive, was the Turkish side's negative attitude towards the Security Council Resolution 544 (1983) in respect of the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP and its refusal to concur in such renewal, in defiance of Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), combined with threats that the UN force will have to be withdrawn. The aforesaid actions are indicative of the real intentions of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Considering that your country, being one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and in its capacity as Guarantor Power, has special responsibility towards the Republic of Cyprus, we request you to take effective measures to secure compliance with the Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) for the restoration of the territorial integrity and unity of the independent and sovereign Republic of Cyprus, by the reversal of all illegal secessionist and partitionist actions, thereby opening the road to a peaceful and final settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the UN Resolutions on Cyprus.

The present moment and the climate which has been created around the Cyprus problem afford the opportunity for determined efforts towards the achievement of this end.

Whilst thanking you in anticipation for your continued understanding and assistance, may I reiterate my best wishes for happiness and prosperity for you and the British people.

*Yours sincerely,*

(Spyros Kyprianou)

President of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
10, Downing Str.,  
London.

deve



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 January 1984

Call by President Kyprianou

Thank you for your letter of 3 January. You subsequently told me that President Kyprianou had changed his plans and sought to call on the Prime Minister on 18 or 19 January.

B/F.1  
There is considerable difficulty about both days. But the Prime Minister has agreed to see President Kyprianou for one hour at 9 o'clock on Wednesday, 18 January. I should be grateful if you could so inform the Cypriots.

In agreeing to this request, the Prime Minister has minuted that in the meantime we must pursue our obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. Mrs Thatcher considers that it is time we asked the Greeks whether they are prepared to join in consultations with the Turks and ourselves or whether they wish it to be known that they have refused.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a note on this point in the next day or two.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9.00-10.00  
Wed, 18 JAN.  
entered in diary  
CR.  
9/1

PRIME MINISTER

President Kyprianou

The above is on another tour (see attached FCO letter) and has asked to see you.

Despite the attached letter, he would now like to see you on either 18 or 19 January. You have virtually no time on Thursday, 19 January. 18 January is not easy either since the afternoon is full and you speak to the Lobby Centenary Lunch that day. Caroline has kept the whole morning free for the speech - as well as some of the previous evening.

Would you prefer to see Kyprianou at 0900 on 18 January (we shall make it clear that one hour is the maximum) or at the end of the day at, say, 1815?

A.S.C.

Yes - but - In the meantime we must pursue our obligations under the Treaty. It is true we asked the Greeks whether they will sit together with the Turks ourselves or whether they wish to do known what they have refused. No

6 January, 1984



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree to see Kyprianou

London SW1A 2AH

for 1 hour at 16.15 on 16

3 January 1984

January?

A.F.C.  $\frac{5}{1}$

18 or 19

John Saker,

Possible Meeting Between President Kyprianou and  
Mrs Thatcher: Monday 16 January

The Cyprus High Commissioner has asked on instructions whether President Kyprianou could call on the Prime Minister on 16 January, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Mr Iakovou. If this is not possible, President Kyprianou could call the following day without Mr Iakovou (who has to go to Stockholm for the CDE Conference). President Kyprianou is going to New York in the second week of January to meet the UN Secretary General. He may stop over in Paris on the way there (probably because the French will just have assumed the Presidency of the EC). He would like to see the Prime Minister on the way back to discuss Cyprus in light of his meetings with Mr Papandreou on 23 December and in New York with Sr Perez de Cuellar. I understand that the Prime Minister might be free early on 16 January.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to such a meeting in view of the United Kingdom's interests in the Sovereign Base Areas and our obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Greek Cypriot goodwill is a crucial factor in our trouble-free use of the bases.

President Kyprianou will probably want to discuss the way ahead on the Cyprus problem in the aftermath of the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence on 15 November, continuing the conversations he had with Mrs Thatcher at their meetings in London on 17 November and in New Delhi. It is in our interests to encourage him to pursue policies which will minimise the damage caused by UDI and allow for progress in solving the Cyprus problem. A meeting would also serve to demonstrate our interest in Cyprus and our readiness to pursue our obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee.

/If

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If Mrs Thatcher is able to agree to this meeting  
we shall provide briefing nearer the time.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

fw



*cy master*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

29 November 1983

*Dear Roger,*

CYPRUS

The Prime Minister said today that she had had a further conversation in the margins of CHOGM with President Kyprianou.

Kyprianou said that Papandreou had suggested to him that he (Kyprianou) should put forward a proposal to Papandreou for a series of bilateral talks between the guarantors. Kyprianou had asked the Prime Minister for her opinion on this idea - and he floated the thought that Papandreou might in some way tie it in with the despatch of Greek troops to Cyprus. The Prime Minister said to Kyprianou that in her view he should have nothing to do with this suggestion. It was for each of the three guarantors to make up their own minds about consultations under the Treaty.

*Yours*

*John Gles.*

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 November 1983

*In reply,*

PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou which took place when the latter called at No. 10 Downing Street this evening.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*for use  
for Col.*

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AT 1815 HOURS ON THURSDAY,  
17 NOVEMBER 1983 AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET

---

Present

Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
Sir Julian Bullard	Mr. Michaelides
Mr. Wilson	Cyprus High Commissioner
Mr. Coles	Mr. Vovides

\* \* \*

The Prime Minister said that she was pleased to see President Kyprianou. We were deeply concerned at the situation in Cyprus following the Turkish-Cypriot declaration of independence.

Mr. Kyprianou thanked the Prime Minister for seeing him at short notice. There were certain matters which he wished to explain in the strictest confidence. It was important to achieve a short resolution at the UN Security Council condemning the Turkish-Cypriot move and calling for its reversal. Following the adoption of that resolution, the debate could continue and a further, more detailed, resolution could be discussed.

He had just visited Athens where he had seen both the President and the Prime Minister. They were shocked and felt deceived by Turkey. There was a strong feeling in Greece that, following Greece's inadequate response to the events of 1974, inaction or indifference on the part of the present Greek Government would not be tolerated by public opinion. He was not suggesting that the Greeks felt stronger than the Greek-Cypriots but if the quick reversal of the Turkish-Cypriot move was not achieved, it was apparent from his talks with the Greek Government that they were seriously considering severing diplomatic relations with Turkey. Furthermore, he had been told that if he felt that Greek troops should go to Cyprus, and he so requested, the Greek Government was ready to meet his request. The Prime Minister commented that this would be a very big decision. Mr. Kyprianou said that he had replied to the effect that he would remain in consultation with the Greek Government and accelerate efforts at the Security Council. But if knowledge of this exchange

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/leaked

leaked, there could be great difficulties. It might appear that Greece was prepared to go to the bitter end.

The Greek Government had also made it clear that they were not prepared to join in direct discussions with Turkey. He had first learned of the Greek position on this point when still in Cyprus. He had therefore suggested to the Prime Minister that urgent consultations should take place, in the first instance, on a triangular basis. The Treaty permitted this. Sir Julian Bullard pointed out that the Treaty referred to an undertaking by the parties "to consult together". Mr. Kyprianou said that it went on to refer to the right of each guarantor to take action individually. Thus, individual consultations could not be excluded. The United Kingdom could be at the centre of the triangle. Mr. Papandreou said that he was ready to conduct consultations in this way, in the knowledge that Britain would be consulting with Turkey at the same time. At what level did we envisage consultations taking place? Sir Julian Bullard said that we had had messages from Athens and Ankara which set incompatible conditions for consultations. The Turks apparently wished to discuss the whole problem of Cyprus, not just the events of the last few days. But we had not yet received formal replies. We had not therefore taken a final decision.

Mr. Kyprianou enquired about the prospective visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister. Sir Julian Bullard explained that he was visiting London at his own request, en route to New York. It was possible that he would be bringing the formal Turkish response with regard to consultations.

Mr. Kyprianou said that if action was not taken quickly to reverse the UDI, we could be in for a very dangerous period. Sir Julian Bullard said that the debate in New York had begun this afternoon. We had received the text of amendments which the Cyprus Government wished to see made to our draft resolution. Our aim was to secure a convincing vote and the question arose of what was the best text to achieve that. Mr. Kyprianou said that the situation was complicated by the fact that our draft resolution incorporated matters which needed detailed discussion. The first essential step was that the Security Council should

condemn and reverse the situation. If that were achieved, Cyprus would of course be ready to pursue the debate. Sir Julian Bullard commented that we thought it desirable to secure the adoption of a constructive and forward-looking resolution. Mr. Kyprianou said that the immediate question was the action taken by Mr. Denktash and the attitude of the Turkish Government. The need was to restore the situation to that which obtained before 15 November. The representative of the UN Secretary General had made it plain to him yesterday that when Mr. Denktash made his move he was already aware of the intention of the UN Secretary General to conduct substantive negotiations. Mr. Perez de Cuellar's intentions had been embodied in a letter which he had just received (he handed over a copy).

The Prime Minister asked whether the imminence of the Secretary General's initiative had perhaps precipitated the Turkish-Cypriot move. Mr. Kyprianou said he had been under the impression that the Secretary General's initiative would have a contrary effect and the American Ambassador in Nicosia had claimed to have assurances in this direction.

Sir Julian Bullard said that our impression was that the UDI had come as a surprise to the Foreign Ministry in Turkey. Mr. Kyprianou said that that was possible. But he was certain that the Turkish military were privy to the move.

Sir Julian Bullard asked whether Mr. Kyprianou was saying that the Secretary General's initiative could not be pursued unless the declaration was rescinded. Mr. Kyprianou replied affirmatively. Nothing would change otherwise. If negotiations continued, regardless of UDI, the situation in Northern Cyprus would become a fait accompli. It was impossible for him to agree to negotiations in present circumstances.

Hence, he believed that a step by step procedure should be adopted. A short resolution should be urgently adopted. Then a Security Council debate could continue. He would have talks with the UN Secretary General. He had asked to see President Reagan or, failing the President, Mr. Shultz who had given an assurance in September that he would exercise influence in Ankara. While the Security Council debate continued,

consultations between the guarantor powers could be pursued.

The Prime Minister asked what mechanism was envisaged for reversing the situation. Would Mr. Denktash and his Assembly have to take a new decision? Would those states which had recognised the new entity have to withdraw recognition?

Mr. Kyprianou said that one course would be for Denktash to resign. Alternatively, perhaps a face-saving device could be arranged whereby it was agreed that the UN Secretary General should proceed with his initiative. Another approach was for the Turkish-Cypriots to take a decision of principle reversing the situation subject to further discussion of the modalities. Contrary to some reports, Bangladesh had not decided on recognition. The Commonwealth Secretary General had sent a message saying he was trying to prevent this.

The Prime Minister said that the Treaty laid down a maximum number of troops which Greece and Turkey might station in Cyprus. Could we attempt to return to the Treaty?

Mr. Kyprianou said that he favoured the withdrawal of all foreign troops. But as a first step the levels provided for in the Treaty could be restored.

The Prime Minister enquired what the likely voting pattern in the Security Council was. Mr. Wilson said that Turkey and some of Turkey's friends had strongly criticised our draft resolution on the grounds that it was too antagonistic to Northern Cyprus. Mr. Kyprianou said that he believed that a resolution on the lines he had suggested would secure approval without much difficulty. Sir Julian Bullard commented that any resolution which implied that the UN Secretary General's efforts had come to an end would be very unfortunate. Mr. Kyprianou stated that could be dealt with in the detailed resolution which he envisaged being adopted at a later stage. The Prime Minister observed that a provision calling on the Secretary General to use his good offices was almost standard in such cases.

Mr. Kyprianou asked what the United Kingdom's real objective was. The Prime Minister said that it was to restore the unitary

ate of Cyprus. Sir Julian Bullard said that we were trying to turn recent events to the advantage of Cyprus.

The Prime Minister asked what the mood in Northern Cyprus was. It would not be surprising if the initial euphoria began to evaporate. Mr. Kyprianou said that there was a lack of news from the North. Martial law prevented the many people who wished to oppose the move from speaking out. Few people in Northern Cyprus had wanted it. Sir Julian Bullard observed that this situation might change if Greek troops moved to Cyprus. The effect of this might be to consolidate Turkish/Cypriot opinion. The Prime Minister said that the hazards of military intervention should be avoided. Mr. Kyprianou said he was trying to be helpful. He said he could have invited the United Kingdom to intervene militarily. If the news leaked that the Greek Prime Minister had offered to send troops to Cyprus - and he then had to say that he was still studying the offer - he would be forced to resign. So he was taking the line with his own public opinion that his first step was to see what could be obtained from the Security Council. It was possible that another country might put forward the simple resolution that he envisaged. Sir Julian Bullard pointed out that our resolution would have priority for voting purposes if we so wished. Mr. Kyprianou agreed but said that it would not be logical for the UK to object if the non-aligned countries were to table a resolution. Guyana might be persuaded to do so. Sir Julian Bullard said it was all a question of securing a convincing vote. He reiterated that we should be most reluctant to lose altogether a reference to the Secretary General's good offices. Which countries, apart from the US, might have influence on Denktash and on the Turkish Government? Mr. Kyprianou said that Saudi Arabia was a possibility. The Saudis had assured Cyprus that they would not agree to partition. The Federal Republic of Germany was another possibility. Mr. Genscher had given them an assurance that he would support the UK initiative. Certain Muslim countries were under pressure from Turkey. They would like a simple resolution to be rapidly adopted so that they could take refuge in its terms. He had already been asked by the British press whether he favoured military action and he had replied in the negative.

The Prime Minister said that the turn of events had been most upsetting. We had felt that we were making some progress through the UN Secretary General and President Kyprianou had agreed to meet Denktash. Mr. Kyprianou recalled his last meeting with the Prime Minister which had been a starting point for the Secretary General's initiative. Twenty days ago both he and Denktash had agreed to consultations with Mr. Perez de Cuellar.

The Prime Minister enquired whether President Kyprianou would feel able to attend CHOGM. Mr. Kyprianou said that he was not sure. Commonwealth support was important to him. He might attend for a day or so. He wished to solve the situation by peaceful means. If a solution was not possible, Cyprus could be destroyed. In some ways the latest situation was worse than that of 1974 because it appeared to make the 1974 situation permanent. A further worry was that until now he had kept Cyprus outside the East/West conflict. But if there was a further deterioration, particularly given events in the Middle East, he did not know what would happen. The situation in the Lebanon had caused questions to be asked about the facilities provided in the sovereign base areas. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he said that the majority of members of the Communist Party in Cyprus were Cypriots first and Communists second.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister said that our two delegations would be in touch in New York. We wanted a resolution which would command the greatest possible number of votes. The question of consultations would be pursued. Perhaps she and President Kyprianou could meet again at CHOGM.

The discussion ended at 1930.

A.J.C.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November 1983

*Dear Sir,*

President Kyprianou: Sanctions on Turkish  
Cypriots

I enclose, as requested, a  
/ supplementary brief for the Prime Minister's  
use this evening.

*Yours faithfully,*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS, 17 NOVEMBER

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF: SANCTIONS ON TURKISH CYPRIOTS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Question of possible sanctions raises difficult issues. Need to consider carefully. In interests of all concerned that the situation on the ground does not deteriorate.
2. Sanctions on Turkish Cypriots would have the effect of increasing their dependence on Turkey. This does not seem desirable.
3. Although we recognise prospects are slight, we are still attempting to encourage Turkey to help secure a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration. Sanctions against Turkey are quite inappropriate.
4. EC reaction to efforts is due to be discussed in extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on 18 November. Question of EC aid to Turkish Cypriots will no doubt be discussed there. Would not want to pre-empt that discussion.
5. Can assure that we deplore Turkish Cypriot action. But we wish to avoid complicating prospect of settlement between the two communities in future.
6. Our attitude to sanctions is coloured by these considerations, not by any sympathy with Turkish Cypriot cause. But we recognise that individual countries will wish to demonstrate their disapproval of the Turkish Cypriot action in ways which they consider most appropriate.
7. [If necessary] Situation is not comparable with Afghanistan or Argentina. Military force is not being used, hence no question of our 'subsidising' military activities.

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/BACKGROUND



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BACKGROUND

8. Kyprianou is very likely to raise this question. His main wish will be to secure highly visible and widely shared indications of condemnation of Turkish Cypriot action. He will be less interested in protecting the prospects for some future settlement.

9. Our own interests, in addition to pursuing our treaty obligations and hence deploring the Turkish Cypriot action, lie in keeping the temperature down and encouraging a settlement, preferably under UN auspices.

10. This militates against widespread and significant sanctions.

11. Possible action by the EC is likely to be discussed in the foreign ministers meeting on 18 November. The Greeks will press strongly for some tangible gesture by the EC and are likely to receive much support. For technical as well as political reasons (described below), it would be hard to oppose an EC action. To do so would probably reduce our ability effectively to oppose more significant sanctions.

12. There are three options:

(a) Suspension of EC aid. Cyprus gets 10 mecu in grants, 6 mecu special loans and 28 mecu in EIB loans under the Financial Protocol to the Association Agreement. The Community seeks to apportion this aid fairly between both communities, but there is nothing binding in the Protocol about this. There would be no legal obstacle to announcing that no aid under the Protocol should go to northern Cyprus.

(b) Suspension of preferential trade benefits under the EC/Cyprus Association Agreement. Northern Cyprus has benefited up to now from the preferential access to the EC market accorded to Cyprus. The Community has accepted Certificates of Origin on the authority of the Chambers of Commerce in northern Cyprus but not by the so-called Turkish

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/Cypriot



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Cypriot Government. There would be no legal obstacle to a refusal to recognise the Certificates of Origin provided by the Turkish Cypriot Chambers of Commerce stating that only Certificates of Origin authorised by the Government of Cyprus would be accepted. This would have the effect of suspending Turkish Cypriot benefits at least directly; the Turkish Cypriots could divert their exports (citrus fruits and vegetables) through Turkey, and get the benefits of Turkey's preferential arrangements. We are looking into the differences between the Turkish and Cypriot arrangements to see how far this would be beneficial to northern Cyprus or damaging to Turkey's own entitlements.

- (c) A partial or full import ban such as those imposed on Argentina (full) or the Soviet Union in respect of Poland (partial). Many constituents exist which might justify this action by the EC: the special status of the UK and Greece as Member States and guarantor powers, the breach of the Treaty and (prospectively) a UN Security Council resolution (but not a Chapter 7 one). There could be no question of imposing a trade ban on Turkey (on the analogy of the ban on the Soviet Union or Poland): we need Turkish help in trying to restore the status quo; a trade ban was not thought desirable at the time of the Turkish invasion of 1974; an import ban would ensure the total integration of the northern Cyprus economy into that of Turkey itself, thus assuring also that it would be ineffective; for wider political reasons (NATO) we do not want to alienate Turkey from the west at a critical time for Turkey's democracy.

13. Our partners are likely to look to the UK and Greece as the powers with special responsibility. It would be difficult to shelter behind others' reluctance to take effective measures. We should agree if necessary to suspend aid to northern Cyprus and probably to suspend preferential trade access under Greek pressure, despite the likelihood of diversion. But we should resist a trade ban which would not work and would indeed have the effect of fully integrating Turkish Cypriot and Turkish economies.

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14. We should not, however, explore the above considerations fully with Kyprianou.

15. British exports to northern Cyprus are about £10m, imports about £14m. The UK is easily northern Cyprus' largest trading partner.

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MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 17 NOVEMBER, 6.15 PM

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome this opportunity to exchange views. How do you view the situation? What is the mood in Cyprus? Thank you for your messages to me on 15 November.

2. For our part, as you know, we deplore the Turkish Cypriot declaration of statehood. It is incompatible with the 1960 treaties and was made despite our repeated efforts in Cyprus and in Ankara to dissuade them from such action. I sent a message on 15 November to President Evren urging him to secure reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration. We have also called for a meeting of the UN Security Council and circulated informally a draft resolution, keeping in close touch with your own delegation in New York.

3. We have called for consultations between the guarantor powers. The initial Turkish response was to agree in principle, but with certain conditions. The initial Greek response is opposed to tripartite discussions. We are awaiting considered replies and will then decide whether consultations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee are possible.

4. Our objectives are to secure a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration if that is at all possible; to avoid a

/deterioration

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deterioration of the situation in Cyprus; and to encourage, if possible, a resumption of the intercommunal talks and renewed progress towards a settlement.

5. [If necessary] We are very conscious of our obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. Our activity up to now has been guided by this consideration.

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BACKGROUND

1. Although the threat had been present for some months the timing of the Turkish Cypriot declaration of UDI was a surprise. Turks also seem to have been taken by surprise.
2. Diplomatic action now well under way. UN Security Council met informally on 15 November at our suggestion to consider a UK draft Resolution. This is intended in part to forestall inflammatory action by other countries and so avoid further deterioration of the situation.
3. In accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, we have called for consultations with the other Guarantor Powers, Greece and Turkey. The Turks have agreed provided the Greeks attend also and provided the discussions cover general aspects of the Cyprus problem as well as the declaration of independence. The Greek 'Minister to the Prime Minister' told Sir G Howe on 16 November that the Greeks would not sit down with the Turks. A formal reply would follow. We are not making these responses public.
4. The situation on the ground in Cyprus has remained calm. There appears to be no direct threat to the Sovereign Base Areas. A threat would only arise if general tension in the island rose significantly.

/5.

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5. We are in close touch with the Cyprus, Greek and Turkish governments. We are also working closely with our main allies who share our general approach to the problem.

6. President Kyprianou sent three messages to the Prime Minister on 15 November. Copies are attached. A draft reply to the letter delivered by the High Commissioner has been submitted separately. The reply could be handed over during the call.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 November 1983

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November 1983

*John P. ...*

Cyprus: Call by President Kyprianou

/ I enclose, as requested, a draft  
press release for this evening's call.

*John P. ...*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



The Prime Minister saw the President of the Republic of Cyprus this evening at President Kyprianou's request. Talks lasted half an hour. Discussions centred on the Cyprus problem, in light of the recent purported declaration of an independent state in northern Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriot community. President Kyprianou attached importance to consultations with the British government, bearing in mind that the UK is a co-signatory of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The Prime Minister reiterated that the British Government deplored the declaration and recognised only one Republic of Cyprus, that which is now under the Government of President Kyprianou. HMG deeply regretted the decision of the Turkish Government to extend recognition ~~of the State~~ and hoped that other Governments would not follow suit.

The Prime Minister emphasised the UK's support for the UN Secretary-General in pursuing his mission of good offices in order to achieve a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. The Prime Minister and President Kyprianou also discussed future policy, including action in the United Nations Security Council, and agreed on the need to avoid anything which might lead to an increase in tension or further deterioration in the situation in Cyprus.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 November 1983

*Joe S...*

Cyprus

/ I enclose a brief for President Kyprianou's call  
/ on the Prime Minister tomorrow. I also enclose, as  
requested in your letter of 15 November, a draft reply  
to a message from the President which was  
delivered by the Cyprus High Commissioner on 15 November.  
You may feel that the reply could be handed over during  
President Kyprianou's call. I am submitting the brief  
and draft message in parallel to the Foreign Secretary  
this evening, and will let you know first thing tomorrow  
if he has any comments.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard  
Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield  
(Cabinet Office).

*Yours*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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COPY FOR  
BRIEF

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SEJ  
- f draft reply  
✓  
DS  
DS / King Yong  
15 November 1983  
DS / DS  
S. S. Dillard

Dear Roger,

CYPRUS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Cyprus High Commissioner which contains the text of a message from the President of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply to President Kyprianou, for signature by the Prime Minister, in due course.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
for Col.

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION

93, PARK STREET,  
LONDON, W1Y 4ET

TEL.: 01-499 8272

15th November, 1983

The Right Honourable  
The Prime Minister  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have the honour to set out herein-below the following urgent request by the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Spyros Kyprianou for your consideration.

Text Begins

"On 15th November, 1983, the so-called Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris purported to declare independence in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus now occupied by Turkey, thereby attempting to secede from the Republic of Cyprus and to destroy the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, a Member State of the United Nations.

Such illegal activities are contrary to the numerous U.N. Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, the U.N. Charter, to International Treaties registered with the United Nations and to peremptory norms of International Law. Such illegal activities are made possible by the presence of a large Turkish occupation force and by the economic maintenance of the illegal Turkish Cypriot regime by Turkish Financial support.

The purported proclamation of independence and secession by the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" involves international aggression, direct and indirect, attacks on the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, violation of its frontiers and interference in its domestic jurisdiction. The action constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and creates a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area.

We seek your assistance in helping the Republic of Cyprus both within the U.N. and in all other spheres


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to demand of the Government of Turkey to take all effective measures to eliminate any authority of the usurpers and to bring the illegal Turkish Cypriot regime in the Turkish occupied area of Cyprus to an immediate end.

Spyros Kyprianou."

Text Ends

Yours Sincerely,



(Tasos Panayides)  
High Commissioner

10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

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MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 17 NOVEMBER, 6.15 PM

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome this opportunity to exchange views. How do you view the situation? What is the mood in Cyprus? Thank you for your messages to me on 15 November.
2. For our part, as you know, we deplore the Turkish Cypriot declaration of statehood. It is incompatible with the 1960 treaties and was made despite our repeated efforts in Cyprus and in Ankara to dissuade them from such action. I sent a message on 15 November to President Evren urging him to secure reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration. We have also called for a meeting of the UN Security Council and circulated informally a draft resolution, keeping in close touch with your own delegation in New York.
3. We have called for consultations between the guarantor powers. The initial Turkish response was to agree in principle, but with certain conditions. The initial Greek response is opposed to tripartite discussions. We are awaiting considered replies and will then decide whether consultations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee are possible.
4. Our objectives are to secure a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration if that is at all possible; to avoid a  
/deterioration

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deterioration of the situation in Cyprus; and to encourage, if possible, a resumption of the intercommunal talks and renewed progress towards a settlement.

5. [If necessary] We are very conscious of our obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. Our activity up to now has been guided by this consideration.

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BACKGROUND

1. Although the threat had been present for some months the timing of the Turkish Cypriot declaration of UDI was a surprise. Turks also seem to have been taken by surprise.
2. Diplomatic action now well under way. UN Security Council met informally on 15 November at our suggestion to consider a UK draft Resolution. This is intended in part to forestall inflammatory action by other countries and so avoid further deterioration of the situation.
3. In accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, we have called for consultations with the other Guarantor Powers, Greece and Turkey. The Turks have agreed provided the Greeks attend also and provided the discussions cover general aspects of the Cyprus problem as well as the declaration of independence. The Greek 'Minister to the Prime Minister' told Sir G Howe on 16 November that the Greeks would not sit down with the Turks. A formal reply would follow. We are not making these responses public.
4. The situation on the ground in Cyprus has remained calm. There appears to be no direct threat to the Sovereign Base Areas. A threat would only arise if general tension in the island rose significantly.

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5. We are in close touch with the Cyprus, Greek and Turkish governments. We are also working closely with our main allies who share our general approach to the problem.

6. President Kyprianou sent three messages to the Prime Minister on 15 November. Copies are attached. A draft reply to the letter delivered by the High Commissioner has been submitted separately. The reply could be handed over during the call.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 November 1983

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FM NICOSIA 151725Z

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 290 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK AND CBFC.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 16		
16 NOV 1983		
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY	
	A	Action Taken

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MY TEL 288 : TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S SECOND MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 15 NOVEMBER.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WARMLY WELCOMES THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO THE PURPORTED SECESSION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE TURKISH OCCUPIED PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC FURTHER WISHES TO THANK HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PROMPT RESPONSE.

WILBERFORCE.

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TELEGRAM NO 289 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK AND CBFC.

29A

MIPT : TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S FIRST MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 15 NOVEMBER.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, REFERRING TO HIS CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, WISHES FORMALLY TO DRAW HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION TO THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENT TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS NOW OCCUPIED BY TURKEY.

THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS, IN TERMS OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, UNDERTAKEN TO GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND ALSO THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ESTABLISHED BY THE BASIC ARTICLES OF ITS CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 135 INTER ALIA EXCLUDING SEPARATIST INDEPENDENCE AND PROVIDING THAT THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE.

THE REPUBLIC NOW CALLS UPON HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO ACT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ITS GUARANTEE, INCLUDING CALLING UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY, AS A CO-GUARANTOR OCCUPYING AND IN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY WHERE THE PURPORTED DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAS OCCURRED, TO RESTORE THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ESTABLISHED BY THE BASIC ARTICLES OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION.

FURTHERMORE, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IS PARTY TO THE TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 1, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS COMPRISES THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS.

IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 3, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, GREECE AND TURKEY ARE BOUND TO CONSULT AND CO-OPERATE IN THE COMMON DEFENCE OF CYPRUS.

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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC CALLS UPON HER MAJESTY'S  
GOVERNMENT TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO CONSULT AND CO-OPERATE  
IN SUCH DEFENCE, CYPRUS BEING THE VICTIM OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT  
AGGRESSION.

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FM FCO 151646Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 746 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, BONN, ROME, PARIS,  
WASHINGTON, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, ISTANBUL,  
MOSCOW

MIPT: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

CONCERNED AT THE DECLARATION BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES  
ISSUED ON 15 NOVEMBER 1983 WHICH PURPORTS TO CREATE AN  
INDEPENDENT STATE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS,

CONSIDERING THAT THIS DECLARATION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE 1960  
TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND  
THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE,

CONSIDERING THEREFORE THAT THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A 'TURKISH  
REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS' IS INVALID, AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A  
WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 365 (1974) AND 367 (1975),

AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BASED ON  
THE MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES UNDERTAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

1. DEPLORES THE DECLARATION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES

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OF THE PURPORTED SECESSION OF PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

2. CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DECLARATION REFERRED TO ABOVE:

3. CALLS FOR THE URGENT AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTIONS 365 (1974) AND 367 (1975):

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PURSUE HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES AND TO DISCUSS URGENTLY WITH THE TWO COMMUNITIES AND WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WAYS BY WHICH THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE RESUMED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS:

5. CALLS UPON THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES:

6. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

7. CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECOGNISE ANY CYPRIOT STATE OTHER THAN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

8. CALLS UPON ALL STATES AND THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION:

9. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

29 July 1983

Cyprus

Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 28 July. The Prime Minister is content for you to instruct UKMIS New York on the lines set out in the draft telegram attached to your letter.

W. F. S. RICKETT

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Prime Minister  
Are you content with  
this draft? FERB

Foreign and Commonwealth Office 28.7

London SW1A 2AH

28 July 1983

Jew Tehu,

Cyprus

Following the Prime Minister's talk with President Kyprianou on 26 July, we should like to send a telegram to UKMIS New York instructing our Representative there to brief the UN Secretary General on some of the points that arose on the Cyprus problem. You will recall that the Prime Minister undertook to press for greater personal involvement by the Secretary General and to let the latter know the general formula which Kyprianou said would be acceptable.

I enclose a draft telegram and would be grateful for confirmation that you are content with it. I should add that in the time available the draft has not been seen by Sir Geoffrey Howe. I shall be submitting a copy to him in tonight's box.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
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AVEATS  
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- 1 ZCZC
- 2 GRS
- 3 CONFIDENTIAL
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- 6 FM FCO
- 7 TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
- 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA  
 10 INFO ROUTINE, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BONN.  
 11 CYPRUS: PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.  
 12 1. When the Prime Minister saw <sup>on 26 July</sup> President Kyprianou during the  
 13 course of a private visit to London, she reiterated our support  
 14 for UN efforts to promote a settlement of the Cyprus problem.  
 15 She emphasised our endorsement of the Secretary General's declared  
 16 intention to strengthen his personal involvement. The Cyprus  
 17 Government should determine what it could accept by way of a sol-  
 18 ution in terms of the basic equation between constitutional arran-  
 19 gements for the Turkish Cypriots in return for suitable territor-  
 20 ial arrangements. If the Secretary General proposed territorial  
 21 adjustments, a measure of Turkish autonomy and demilitarisation of  
 22 the Republic on the lines suggested by Kyprianou (ie no Turkish  
 23 or Greek troops, possibility of National Guard being replaced by  
 24 some international force) would that be acceptable?  
 25 2. Kyprianou confirmed that he welcomed greater personal involve-

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /ment
File number	Dept SED	Distribution Cyprus standard Add Cyprus
Drafted by (Block capitals) D C Wilson		
Telephone number 233 4031		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Page 2
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1 <<<<

2 ment by the Secretary General. That did not mean that he was  
 3 abandoning the intercommunal talks now being boycotted by  
 4 Denktash. If the Secretary General made progress this would  
 5 provide food for the talks. The sort of package summarised by  
 6 the Prime Minister would be acceptable as a framework subject to  
 7 discussion of detail. He had already outlined such a framework  
 8 to the Secretary General on an unofficial basis. Territory and  
 9 constitutional rights should be discussed together. When he  
 10 knew what the territorial arrangements would be he could envisage  
 11 a different approach to the question of autonomy. But unity and  
 12 fundamental rights must be safeguarded.

13 3. The Prime Minister asked whether we could indicate to the  
 14 Secretary General the general formula Kyprianou had described.  
 15 Kyprianou confirmed that we could and added that the Cyprus  
 16 Government would be prepared to tell the Secretary General how far  
 17 it could go on territorial arrangements and the extent of ~~the~~ its  
 18 flexibility on constitutional arrangements. He hoped it would be  
 19 possible to make progress before the Commonwealth Heads of  
 20 Government Conference in New Delhi. We pointed out to Kyprianou  
 21 that the Secretary General would need something substantial to  
 22 work with.

23 4. Please take an early opportunity to brief the Secretary Gener-  
 24 al on this conversation. You should add that the Prime Minister  
 25 hopes that he will indeed intensify his personal efforts to deal  
 26 with the Cyprus problem. She fully understands the difficulties  
 27 but believes that an effort must be made now before present  
 28 divisions become permanent. The Secretary General, with his  
 29 personal knowledge of Cyprus and great skills in negotiation, is  
 30 ideally placed to make the attempt.

/// 31 5. ~~Turkmen is here on an official visit for the latter part of~~  
 // 32 ~~this week. You may tell the Secretary General that we will be~~  
 / 33 ~~urging on him the necessity of the Turkish Cypriots cooperating~~  
 34 ~~fully with the Secretary General, returning to the intercommunal~~

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

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2 dialogue and avoiding disruptive moves such as a declaration of  
3 independence or a referendum)

4 5. For your own information the discussion showed no sign of  
5 movement on well known Greek Cypriot positions. We believe it is  
6 now up to the Secretary General to probe further both their  
7 position and that of the Turkish Cypriots. We assume that this  
8 will be a two stage process first using Gobbi and then involving  
9 the Secretary General more directly.

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6. Tankmen is here on an official visit  
for the latter part of this week. We will  
belogough separately the main points covered in  
his calls on the Prime Minister and on  
myself.

*Amend me*

///

//


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telegram

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Catchword

28 JUL 1983





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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 July 1983

Mr. Rauf Denktash

Thank you for your letter of 25 July about the telegram which the Prime Minister has received from the above. We accept your advice that she should not reply.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CC MASTER



File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 July 1983

Dear Roger,

VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou of Cyprus at No.10 this morning.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Robert Lowson (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).

Yours ever  
John Galsworthy

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS AT 0930 HOURS ON TUESDAY 26 JULY  
AT 10 DOWNING STREET

---

Present:

Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
Mr. James	Mr. Nicos Rolandis
Mr. Wilberforce	Mr. Tasos Panayides
Mr. Wilson	Mr. Constantinos Michaelides
Sir Anthony Parsons	Mr. Alecos Siambos
Mr. Coles	

\* \* \* \* \*

President Kyprianou said that, in his talks with the Prime Minister, he would like to concentrate on the Cyprus problem, but also deal with the question of finalising Cyprus's Association Agreement with the European Community and two or three other items.

With regard to the Cyprus problems, the intercommunal talks had been proceeding for some time without substantial progress. Cyprus had welcomed the intention of the United Nations Secretary General to involve himself personally and undertake a new effort. This was not to say that Cyprus was abandoning intercommunal talks. But it believed that the Secretary General, because of his knowledge of Cyprus and his previous service there, would be able to help.

He had discussed the matter with Mr. Perez de Cuellar in New Delhi in February. No conclusions had been reached at that time. When he had met him again in Paris on 24 April, the Secretary General had said that he wanted to begin a new approach based on consultations with the parties involved and with other governments in order to promote a solution. In essence, he wished to practice the kind of quiet diplomacy that he had employed with regard to Afghanistan.

/ There had

There had then been threats from the Turkish side. Superficially, these had been a reaction to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. But he personally believed that the Turks had simply used that as a pretext to create new tension. It was doubtful whether Denktash, who had always been in favour of partition, wanted a solution. So efforts should be directed even more than before at Ankara. Turkey must decide what it wanted.

It was now nine years since the unprecedented crime committed against Cyprus in 1974. Despite all efforts, there had been no progress. Cyprus had always favoured a peaceful solution. In 1977 it had put forward proposals for a bi-regional federation, although the idea of federation had always been ruled out in the past. However, it was federation which was envisaged, not partition. For so long as the occupation continued, Cyprus could not be asked to stop trying to secure international support. Everyone accepted that the United Nations had a role in the matter.

Denktash was obstructing the resumption of intercommunal talks. Cyprus believed that the possibility of such talks must be kept alive for if the Secretary General made progress, this would provide food for the talks. But Denktash now said that it must be accepted that Cyprus was inhabited by two peoples. By that he meant two peoples with separate rights, including the right of self-determination. For thirty years it had been pointed out that if the right of self-determination was applied to every community in the world, the whole map of the world would change. Cyprus was too small for this concept. Denktash had also referred to "equality of political status". By this he appeared to mean equality in every respect. In effect, the Turks were seeking their own solution.

Denktash complained that the Cyprus Government was receiving international recognition. But that was a fact of life. The area of Cyprus in which Denktash lived was under occupation by a foreign country.

/ Denktash

Denktash also asked for a "moratorium". By this he envisaged a unilateral moratorium so that he was free to do what he liked while the Cyprus Government did nothing to promote a solution.

In 1974 everyone had cast doubt on the decision to seek negotiations before Turkish troops withdrew. But it had been decided that it would be unrealistic to stick to this condition. His Government possessed the will to solve the problem. The situation could not go on indefinitely. A solution had to be found in the interests of peace and security in the area. Any solution must ensure a lasting peace and the smooth running of the country. He could not accept a solution that was based on the results of the invasion. Thus, partition and confederation were ruled out. But geographical reality would have to be accepted. Cyprus would always remain close to Turkey. Any eventual federation must be based on elements which contributed to unity. In the final analysis that would be very much in the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The "free area" of Cyprus was developing economically while the economy in the occupied area was stagnant. The Turkish Cypriots had little in common with the Turkish immigrants or the Turkish troops. If the latter were replaced by an international force the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots would want good relations with the Greek Cypriots. The territorial arrangements for a federation must be based on reality. The smaller the area under Turkish Cypriot administration within a federation, the larger the number of Greek Cypriot refugees who would return to their homes under the Greek Cypriot administration. Turkish Cypriots would not need to return to the area of Greek Cypriot administration - the principle of freedom of movement must be ensured.

As to the constitutional aspect, the Turkish Cypriots spoke of federation but in reality sought a confederation or two separate states with a loose link. That would be the end of Cyprus. There had to be a change of attitude in Ankara. There was no doubt that every detail of Denktash's approach in the

/ negotiations

negotiations had to be approved in advance by the Turkish Government.

There could be no solution without the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Some time ago he had proposed the replacement of all troops with an international force which would police Cyprus for as long as necessary until there were no longer any security problems. If there was to be a lasting solution there must be no Greek or Turkish military presence in Cyprus. The Greek Government agreed with that. In the context of a solution, even Cypriot troops should be dismantled and replaced by an international police force or some other kind of force with internal security duties.

The Prime Minister said that we agreed that partition was beginning to look permanent. That was bad for Cyprus. We had told the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Government that we could not agree to independence for the area under Turkish occupation. Cyprus was a unit. Unless an initiative were taken soon, it would appear that we were contributing towards partition.

It seemed desirable that the Cyprus Government should first determine what it could accept in the way of a solution. There would then be the problem of how to start negotiations. There had long been the basic equation - certain constitutional arrangements for the Turkish Cypriots in return for suitable territorial arrangements. President Kyprianou now seemed to be adding the idea of the demilitarisation of Cyprus.

President Kyprianou said that he agreed that a determined effort was now needed. All should do what they could to assist the United Nations Secretary General. If we simply confined ourselves to urging the resumption of intercommunal talks we would get nowhere. The United Nations Secretary General was the best instrument for making progress. The new effort should be based on the concept of federation, but it had to be a workable federation. The territorial aspect and constitutional rights

/ should

should be discussed together. Once he knew what the territorial arrangements would be, he could envisage a different approach to the question of autonomy. Any suggestion with regard to constitutional rights could be considered provided it did not promote further divisions and ensured unity and the fundamental rights of everyone. It was absolutely essential that the territorial aspect should be clarified, but Turkey had given no indication of its views.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if the Secretary General proposed territorial adjustments, a measure of Turkish autonomy and demilitarisation on the lines suggested by President Kyprianou, that would be acceptable. President Kyprianou said that it would be acceptable as a framework, subject to discussion of detail. The Prime Minister asked whether the Turkish Government was aware of that. President Kyprianou said that he had arrived at an understanding with the United Nations Secretary General that when he was ready to begin his effort, the views of the Cyprus Government would be conveyed to him.

The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Perez de Cuellar, by virtue of his service in Cyprus, must know the problem unusually well. It might be helpful if we tried to persuade him to involve himself to a greater degree. President Kyprianou said that Mr. Perez de Cuellar was present at all the discussions he had had with Mr. Denktash in 1979, when the ten-point agreement had been secured. He had outlined to the Secretary General the framework suggested above but on an unofficial basis. It had been agreed that substance would be discussed later. At this stage the Secretary General did not wish to put forward any proposals of his own. He had said that he wanted to discuss the problem not just with the parties directly concerned, but with others who might be able to help. He had even mentioned the United States. The Prime Minister said that time was passing. It was necessary to seek agreement on a framework and get on with discussing the details. President Kyprianou said that he could repeat his own formula. But the Secretary General was

/ worried

worried that anything he put forward would be rejected out of hand by the Turks. The Prime Minister said that it was our impression that Turkey did not want partition. President Kyprianou said that this was the line taken by Turkey. But a series of measures were being adopted in the occupied area which appeared to promote partition.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, President Kyprianou said that it would be helpful if we urged the Secretary General to make a particular effort now to bring new impetus for a solution. Mr. Wilberforce commented that in reply the Secretary General would say that it would be helpful if President Kyprianou would give him more to work with. President Kyprianou said that the Secretary General must also obtain some movement from the other side. History would say that his Government had been wrong to make its proposals in 1977 for it had then abandoned the basic concept of a unitary state and accepted the idea of federation, but had obtained nothing in response, despite a promise by Mr. Clark Clifford that Turkey would respond immediately.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister asked whether the Cyprus Government had agreed internally on the kind of territorial adjustment and constitutional arrangements which it could accept. President Kyprianou said that it would be possible to reach such agreement. But his problem was that he did not know what kind of solution the Turkish Government desired. If he had to negotiate with the Prime Minister, having watched her performance on Zimbabwe, he would put all his demands on the table. But the Turks indulged in oriental bargaining - they pocketed whatever was put on the table. President Kyprianou said that he had two suggestions to make - first, that we encouraged the Secretary General as much as possible; second, that we made further approaches in Ankara. The Prime Minister asked whether we could indicate to the Secretary General the general formula described by President Kyprianou. President Kyprianou said that we could do so and added that the Cyprus Government was ready to describe to him the extent to which it could go on territorial arrangements and the extent of its flexibility on constitutional arrangements.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that he believed that the Secretary General would be concerned that if he became more involved all his prestige would be at stake. Any proposal he put forward would be liable to be disliked by both sides. He would want to be sure that neither party would adopt a disruptive attitude. President Kyprianou commented that if he were in the Secretary General's position he would try to find out from both parties how far they could go. Cyprus attached great importance to the help of the United Kingdom as a Commonwealth partner and a guarantor power. Britain could have taken a firmer attitude at the time of the Turkish invasion. He now urged us to take an active interest. The Prime Minister assured him that we attached great importance to Cyprus. President Kyprianou said that he hoped that the Secretary General could begin work in late August. It might be possible to register some progress by the time of the Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi where the matter would be raised.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister congratulated President Kyprianou on his Government's handling of Arab terrorism and, in particular, the recent hi-jacking incident at Larnaca.

President Kyprianou then raised the question of the Association Agreement between Cyprus and the European Community. He had discussed this question recently in Rome, Paris and Brussels. He had agreed with the President of the Commission that the time had come for the Commission to seek directives from the Council of Ministers for the negotiation of the final stage of the Agreement, i.e. a customs union. He understood that the Council expected to deal with this problem in September. Since the United Kingdom had entered the Community, Cyprus had had various economic problems. But that was not the actual reason why it wished to complete its Association Agreement. There was also the political consideration that Cyprus wished to be as close as possible to Europe where it properly belonged. It had been a member of the Council of Europe from the outset. It was understood that Cyprus could not obtain full membership of the Community. It was mainly the objections of France and Italy with regard to certain agricultural products which were holding up progress towards a customs union. He had received certain assurances from France and Italy that they would do what they could to help. So he hoped that the difficulties could now be overcome. M. Thorn had said he would do all he could.

The Prime Minister said that we wanted to be helpful (President Kyprianou interjected that we had been and he was grateful). Cyprus would doubtless press its case hard during the Greek Presidency. It was important that, while keeping in mind the objective of full customs union, Cyprus should do all it could to protect its interests in the Mediterranean acquis.

President Kyprianou said that there were three matters which he would discuss with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary later in the day. First, there was the question of "payment for the bases". He wondered whether it might be

/ possible



possible for some sum to be conceded without prejudice to the final solution. The Prime Minister said that our differences on this point would continue but we understood that there was a political imperative which made the President raise the matter.

President Kyprianou said that the other two matters which he would mention to Sir Geoffrey Howe were the treatment of Cypriot refugees who had come to the United Kingdom after 1974 and for which the Cyprus Government was generally grateful; and the possibility of some further effort to encourage Cypriot students to come to the United Kingdom.

President Kyprianou asked whether the Prime Minister had any plans to attend this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Prime Minister said that she had no plans to do so unless Mrs. Gandhi's initiative came to fruition. She saw no point in a gathering of Heads of Government unless Mr. Andropov was able to attend.

The discussion ended at 1025.

26 July 1983



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 July 1983

CYPRUS

I enclose messages which the Prime Minister has received from

- (a) Mr. Denktas
- (b) The Secretary General of the Council of Turkish Cypriot Associations in the UK
- (c) The Chairman of the Cyprus/Turkish Association.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for suitable replies to be sent.

ASL

R. B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LM

NNNN

23 JUL 1983/1428

*Rash*

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THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING  
STREET LONDONSW1

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TURKISH CYPRIOT NORTH CYPRUS  
OBJECTS TO THE RECEPTION OF MR. SPRIOS KYPRIANOU AS THE LEGITIMATE  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WHOLE OF CYPRUS MR. KYPRIANOU HAS  
NO MANDATE TO REPRESENT OR SPEAK FOR THE TURKISH PEOPLE  
OF CYPRUS AND

COL 10 1

PAGE 2/028

CANNOT BIND IN ANY WAY THE PEOPLE OF THE TURKISH FEDERATED STATE  
IN THE NORTH WHO OWE HIM NO ALLEGIANCE  
WHATSOEVER RAIF R. DENKTAS SPOKESMAN FOR SDP  
NORTH CYPRUS

COL NIL

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NS

24 July 1983

TELEMESSAGE  
THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1

R2517

THE CYPRUS-TURKISH ASSOCIATION WHICH REPRESENTS MORE THAN 60,000 TURKISH CYPRIOTS LIVING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM VEHEMENTLY PROTESTS AGAINST YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF TREATING THE GREEK CYPRIOT LEADER MR. KYPRIANOU AS SO-CALLED PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS. WE DO NOT RECOGNISE MR. KYPRIANOU NOR DO WE ATTACH ANY VALUE OR IMPORTANCE TO THE RESOLUTIONS HIS PURELY GREEK-CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION EXTRACTS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. ONLY THE TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF CYPRUS CAN RIGHTFULLY REPRESENTS OUR EXISTENCE AND OPINIONS. IT IS AN UNFORTUNATE FACT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE 1960 TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE CREATED THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS HAS ONCE AGAIN VIOLATED THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THOSE AGREEMENTS BY GIVING RECOGNITION TO THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION AND BY DISCUSSING WITH MR. KYPRIANOU MANY ISSUES INCLUDING THE SOVEREIGN BRITISH BASES ON THE ISLAND. THESE ISSUES ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE TURKISH PEOPLE OF CYPRUS AND ANY DISCUSSION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVES ARE DESTINED TO BE CONSIDERED BY US NULL AND VOID

MUSTAFA GENCSOY (CHAIRMAN)

24 July 1983

TELEMESSAGE  
PRIME MINISTER OF HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON  
SW1

*225/17*

MADAM,

WE, THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF TURKISH CYPRIOT ASSOCIATIONS IN UK, MOST RESPECTIVELY BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION AND THEREFORE TO HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT THE DISMAY FELT BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS UPON THE NEWS OF MR KIPRIANUS PROPOSED VISIT TO LONDON.

IT THE CONTENTION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AS IN CYPRUS THAT MR KIPRIANU DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS EITHER KNOWN AS THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS OR ITS CONSTITUENT, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT NATION.

SECONDLY, TURKISH CYPRIOTS BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM IS THE ONE THAT WILL BE REACHED AS DIRECT RESULT OF A EQUITABLE SOLUTION. IF THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE ACCEPTED AND TREATED AS PRESIDENT OF NON EXISTING STATE, THEN THAT COMMUNITY WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND BE CONTENTED TO OFFER MINORITY RIGHTS TO THE CO-FOUNDERS OF A STATE. THE MORAL RESPONSIBILTY FOR THE PERPETUATION OF HUMAN SUFFERING BY DELAYING NEGOTIATIONS, WILL BE UPON THOSE WHO PROVIDE SUCH ENCOURAGMENT TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS. THAT WE ALSO PROTEST THE U.N. RESOLUTION RECENTLY TAKEN IN VIEW OF TOTAL IGNORANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REALITIES CYPRUS.

FINALLY, THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ORGANISATION REPRESENTING THEIR RIGHTS THEREFORE ANY NEGOTIATION OR THE REARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN BASES IN CYPRUS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS.

YOURS RESPECTFULLY,  
AHMET MUSTAFA AND OSAL,  
THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF COUNCIL OF TURKISH CYPRIOT ASSOCIATIONS  
IN UK, 389 UPLAND ROAD LONDON SE22 0TH

02



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

To note.

London SW1A 2AH

A.S.C. 25/7.

25 July 1983

John Smith

Thank you for your letter of today's date enclosing a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from Mr Rauf Denktash. You asked for advice by this evening.

Our advice is that the Prime Minister should not reply to Mr Denktash's message. Mr Denktash has signed himself as "President" of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" which we do not recognise. He has sent a number of messages to the Prime Minister in the past using this title. We have never replied. He will not expect a reply this time.

Mr Denktash has complained in the past that we (and others) deal only with the Greek Cypriot Government of President Kyprianou as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as a whole. But this is the first time he has made such a protest in the context of a Prime Ministerial meeting, at least since 1978 (when only an oral protest was made). The reason that he has sent the protest is probably because one of the conditions he has put forward for a return to the intercommunal talks, which have been adjourned since before the recent UN debate, is that the Greek Cypriots should regard the Turkish Cypriots as "equal partners". He is driving home the message whenever he can. Latest indications are that the Greek Cypriot side are unlikely to accede to his demand, or even meet him half way. President Kyrianou, in a speech on 20 July (referred to in Mr Denktash's telegram) accused Denktash of trying to insist on a partitionist solution to the Cyprus problem by making this demand.

/Denktash's



Denktash's telegram demonstrates how difficult it is increasingly becoming to make any progress in the Cyprus problem. It reinforces the need for flexibility on both sides if the present impasse is to be overcome and the intercommunal talks resumed. We do not however consider that the Prime Minister's briefing for her meeting with President Kyprianou needs updating in this respect.

In the time available, Sir Geoffrey Howe has not seen these papers. I shall be showing him a copy of this letter this evening.

*Yes*

*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

MJ

25 July 1983

Cyprus

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from Mr. Rauf Denktash. This takes exception to the Prime Minister's meeting with the President of Cyprus tomorrow being described as a meeting between Governments of Great Britain and Cyprus.

34 | I should be grateful if you could let me have advice by tonight on how we should react to this message.

AJC

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SH



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23 JUL 1983/2010

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LEFKOSE 881/844 23 1500 PAGE/1

TXF0047

*2577*

*MR COLTS*

*From Rauf Denktaş*

THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P  
PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDONSW1

YOUR MEETING WITH MR SPYROS KYPRIANOU AND HIS ASSOCIATES  
IS BEING PROJECTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS AS A MEETING BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

THIS IS TO PUT ON RECORD THAT MR KYPRIANOU AND HIS ASSOCIATES  
HAVE NO LEGAL CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL OR ANY OTHER RIGHT

10 1

PAGE 2/50

TO SPEAK FOR ANYONE EXCEPT THE GREEK CYPRIOT PEOPLE OF CYPRUS  
AND THESE GENTLEMEN CAN IF NO WAY SPEAK FOR THE TURKISH PEOPLE OF  
CYPRUS NOR FOR CYPRUS AS A WHOLE

GREAT BRITAIN IS THE GUARANTOR OF A BI-NATIONAL STATE CALLED  
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND HAS GUARANTEED THE LEGITIMATE

PAGE 3/50

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RIGHTS AND STATUS OF THE TWO PEOPLES WHO MAKE UP THIS STATE WHOSE  
GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMACY DEPENDS ON THE CONTINUATION OF ITA  
BI-NATIONAL SET UP THE TWO PEOPLES OF CYPRUS WHO ELECT THEIR  
LEADERS AND REPRESENTATIVES ON SEPARATE NATIONAL ROLLS ONE  
ALLEGIANCE TO A CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WHICH IS COMPOSED OF THE

PAGE 4/50

ELECTED COUNTER PARTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES IN THE ISLAND ALLEGIANCE  
IS OWED TO SUCH A BI-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND TO NO ONE ELSE

TURKISH CYPRIOT WING OF THIS BI-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS  
EJECTED BY ARMED FORCES FROM THE BI-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN  
DECEMBER 1963 ALL EFFORTS TO SET UP THE BI-NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP  
GOVERNMENT

PAGE 5/50

SINCE THEN HAVE NOT BROUGHT ANY RESULT BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL  
FORA UNAWARE OF THE TRUE POSITION IN CYPRUS CONTINUED TO TREAT THE  
GREEK CYPRIOT WING OF THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT AS ITS LEGITIMATE  
GOVERNMENT INSPITE OF THE CONTINUING AND SUCCESAFUL RESISTANCE  
OF THE TURKISH PEOPLE OF CYPRUS TO THE USURPERS OF

COLL NIL

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23 JUL 1983/2017

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LEFKOSE 881/844 23 1500 PAGE/6

TH ERT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P  
PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDONSW1

POWER IN THE ISLAND THAT GREEK CYPRIOT WRIT HAS NOT RUN IN TURKISH  
AREAS SINCE 1963 GREEK CYPRIOT ONSLAUGHT IS A RECORDED FACT IN THE  
REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF UN AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS  
CONTINUED TO DEFEND THEIR PARTNERSHIP STATUS AND EQUALITY AS ONE  
OF THE TWO PEOPLES

PAGE7/50

THE CO-FOUNDERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS FOR TWENTY YEARS  
WITHOUT YIELDING TO GREEK CYPRIOT OPPRESSIVE AND INHUMAN MEASURES  
WHILE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WIELDED ALL THE FRUITS OF FALSELY  
PRESENTING ITSELF TO THE WORLD AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF  
CYPRUS

WE THEREFORE REITERATE OUR LEGAL MORAL AND FACTUAL POSITON  
AS

PART 2.

TXF0046

ONE OF THE CO-FOUNDER PEOPLES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WHICH  
CONTINUED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AS A RESULT OF  
THE CONSENT OF BOTH PEOPLES IN 1960 AS FOLLOWS

TURKISH PEOPLE OF CYPRUS OWE NO ALLEGIANCE TO THE GREEK  
CYPRIOT WING OF A BI-NATIONAL STATE AND

COLL 1960 ✓

PAGE 9/50

SHALL OWE THEM NO ALLEGIANCE UNTIL THE BI-NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP  
IS RE-ESTABLISHED ON THE AGREED TERMS OF 1977 BETWEEN MYSELF AND  
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SOVEREIGN  
PEOPLES OF CYPRUS

WE REJECT MR KYPRIANOU'S PRESENTATION OF HIMSELF AS THE  
PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS AND THE EXECUTIVE HEAD OF THE

COLL 1977 ✓

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PAGE 10/50

GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS AND DECLARE THAT NO POWER ON EARTH CAN FORCE THE TURKISH PEOPLE OF CYPRUS TO BOW IN ALLEGIANCE TO THE USURPERS OF POWER IN CYPRUS WHO HAVE FOR TWENTY YEARS ESTABLISHED A RECORD OF BYZANTINE DOUBLE-DEAL INORDER TO DIVEST THE TURKISH PEOPLE OF THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS

PAGE 11/50

WE DEPLORE MR KYPRIANOU'S PROJECTION OF THE STATUS OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS AS A MINORITY OR AN ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS GROUP WITHIN A GREEK CYPRIOT NATION AND WE HOPE YOU WILL NOT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERLINE TO HIM THAT WHAT GREAT BRITAIN GUARANTEED IN CYPRUS IS A BI-NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN

COLL NIL

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THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P  
PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1

THE TWO PEOPLES OF CYPRUS AND THAT BRITAIN HAS NO POWER TO ASK THE  
TURKISH PEOPLE OF CYPRUS TO SUBMIT ITS ALLEGIANCE TO THE GREEK  
CYPRIOT LEADERS OR THEIR ADMINISTRATION IN THE SELECTION OF  
WHICH TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE NO SAY FOR TWENTY YEARS TURKISH  
CYPRIOTS HAVE BEEN

PAGE 13/50

WAITING FOR THE RE-ZSTABLISHMENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP GOVERNMENT  
WHICH WAS DESTROYED BY ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS INORDER TO ACHIEVE  
ENOSIS OR HELLENIZE A BI-NATIONAL STATE BY AROGATING THE 1960  
TEATIES DURING THESE TWO DECADES GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE BEEN ENJOYING  
THE FRUITS OF THEIR FALSE PRETENCE THAT THEY ARE THE LEGITIMATE  
GOVERNMENT OF

COLL 1960

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CYPRUS ENJOYING TO THE FULL THE STATELESS POSITION IN WHICH  
THEY LEFT ONE-FOURTH OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS

OUR QUESTION TO MR KYPRIANOU PUBLICLY AND THROUGH MR DE  
QUELLAR THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF UN WHETHER OUR EQUALITY AS ONE  
OF THE CO-FOUNDER PEOPLES OF CYPRUS IS RECOGNIZED OR NOT HAS

PAGE 15/50

BEEN ANSWERED BY WAY OF RIDICULE BY MR KYPRIANOU IN HIS 20 JULY  
SPEECH I HOPE YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL BE ABLE TO POINT OUT TO MR  
KYPRIANOU WHAT ALTERNATIVE THIS STATEMENT LEAVES TO THE TURKISH  
CYPRIOTS WHOSE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES HAVE BEEN  
CONSISTENTLY DENIED BY THE GREEK SIDE WHO

COLL 20 JULY+

PAGE 16/50

MAKE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT THEY LOOK UPON CYPRUS AS GREEK  
LAND I SINCERELY HOPE THAT MR KYPRIANOU WILL NOT BE ENCOURAGED  
TO BELIEVE THAT TURKISH PEOPLE OF CYPRUS CAN IN ANY WAY BE MADE  
TO BOW TO GREEK CYPRIOT USURPERS OF POWER AND THAT HE IS LEGALLY

PAGE 17/38

OR MORALLY RIGHT IN EXPECTING MY PEOPLE TO OWE TO HIS ILLICIT  
ADMINISTRATION ANY ALLEGIANCE WHATSOEVER

PLEASE ACCEPT YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST  
CONSIDERATION

(RAUF R. DENKTAS)  
PRESIDENT OF THE  
TURKISH FEDERATED STATE  
OF KIBRIS

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PRIME MINISTER

TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

I suggest that you meet him at the door and that we have talks in the Cabinet Room. His party will be as follows:

Mr. Nicos Rolandis	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Tasos Panayides	Cyprus High Commissioner
Mr. Constantinos Michaelides	Minister to the President
Mr. Alecos Siambos	Private Secretary

On our side there will be Mr. James (our former Ambassador in Poland and now the Under-Secretary dealing with Europe), Mr. Wilberforce (our High Commissioner), David Wilson and myself.

It might be wise to stop the talks at 1025 so that the President can leave before everyone congregates for Cabinet at 1030.

AJC

25 July 1983



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 July 1983

*Jan 26*

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use during her meeting with President Kyprianou on Tuesday 26 July at 9.30am. I understand that the Cypriot party will consist of:

Mr Spyros Kyprianou	President of the Republic of Cyprus
Mr Nicos Rolandis	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr Tasos Panayides	Cyprus High Commissioner
Mr Constantinos Michaelides	Minister to the President
Mr Alecos Siambos	Private Secretary

On our side Mr Wilberforce (British High Commissioner, Nicosia) and Dr Wilson (Head of Southern European Department) are available to attend if the Prime Minister wishes.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 26 JULY 1983

Introduction

1. President Kyprianou is visiting London privately from 24-29 July and calling on the Prime Minister at his own request. This will be their first meeting since elections in both countries. (Kyprianou was re-elected in February). The Prime Minister last met Kyprianou in July 1981 when he attended the Royal Wedding.
  
2. Kyprianou had planned to visit London in May as part of a tour of European capitals following his re-election and the recent UN debate on Cyprus. This visit was postponed because of the General Election.

UK Objectives

3. (a) To strengthen the present good bilateral relationship and so protect our long-term interests in the Sovereign Base Areas;
- (b) To encourage a greater commitment to real progress in the intercommunal talks on the Cyprus problem;
- (c) To resist demands for 'money for the bases'.

Likely Cypriot Objectives

4. (a) To further Kyprianou's campaign to 'internationalise' the Cyprus problem as a means of putting pressure on the Turks;
- (b) To enlist British help to bring Cyprus to eventual customs union with the EC;
- (c) To show domestic opinion that efforts are being made to obtain money for the use of the SBAs;
- (d) (Possibly) To obtain further funds for Cypriot students.

/Background

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Background and Tactics

5. Kyprianou is a successful operator in the limited field of Greek Cypriot politics. But he is a man of limited vision. He may feel that potentially unpopular progress on the Cyprus problem would threaten his political position. The status quo suits him, although he would never say so. He will be accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Nicos Rolandis who combines realism and charm but lacks political clout (personality notes attached). Our High Commissioner in Nicosia, Mr John Wilberforce, will also attend the talks.

6. Kyprianou will probably start by expounding his views on the Cyprus problem (Annex 1). Superficially he is in a strong position: the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to return to the Intercommunal Talks and threats to declare independence make them appear intransigent. But, although it is probably for the Turkish Cypriots to make the next move, Kyprianou may face difficult decisions in the longer term. The present division of the island is becoming increasingly permanent. The Greek Cypriots do virtually nothing realistically to change this trend. We should probe his thinking on the type of settlement that might be acceptable to both communities (drawing him out by using ideas in Annex 1); stress that time is running out; and encourage realism and flexibility (making clear that we take a similar line with the Turks). We should resist suggestions for a British initiative. We can confirm that we have told the Turks and Turkish Cypriots of our opposition to independence for northern Cyprus.

7. Kyprianou will probably seek support for customs union with the EC (Annex 2). While reassuring him that we remain (with Greece) Cyprus' main champions in the EC, we should sound a note of caution.



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8. The Cypriot press have portrayed Money for the Bases (Annex 3) as a main purpose of the visit. It was last discussed substantively during Rolandis' visit to London in May 1982, since when the issue has been virtually dormant. Kyprianou should be made aware that our position is firm.

9. On Students Fees (Annex 4) Kyprianou may ask for "home fee" status. He will probably not expect to get it.

10. If time allows it would be useful to broaden the discussion to refer to the Falklands and East/West relations. This would help put the Cyprus problem in perspective. Although discussion of the Falklands risks provoking contrasts with our alleged failure to live up to our obligations as a guarantor power in 1974 (see Annex 1), discussion might pave the way for seeking Cypriot support at the next UN General Assembly debate.

11. On Bilateral issues (Annex 5), the Prime Minister might express thanks for Cypriot cooperation over threats of Arab terrorist action against our facilities in Cyprus and compliment him on dealing with the hijacking at Larnaca. Other subjects will be left to Kyprianou's separate meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe at 5.00pm on 26 July.

12. After his call, Kyprianou, like Mrs Thatcher, is attending the William Wilberforce memorial service in Westminster Abbey. (Our High Commissioner at Nicosia is a descendent.)

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KYPRIANOU, Spyros

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Educated locally and then in London. Barrister (Grays Inn). Represented Makarios in London 1952-54. Attended the UN General Assembly in 1956 as Representative of the Ethnarchy Council. Returned to Cyprus in 1959 and, on Independence, was briefly Minister of Justice, then Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1972. In 1976 launched new pro-Makarios party of the centre-right DEKO. Following elections that year became President of the House of Representatives and thus Acting President on the death of Makarios in 1977. Subsequently elected President by acclaim and re-elected unopposed in February 1978. Re-elected for a second term in February this year gaining a clear majority on the first ballot over his two opponents.

Has had health problems. Serious heart attack in March 1969 and subsequent troubles. But his health appears to have improved more recently. Speaks English well.

---



ROLANDIS, NICOS A

Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1978.

Born Limassol 1934. Educated locally and in London (Middle Temple). Barrister 1956. Practiced law in Cyprus before turning to business and becoming the Managing Director and major shareholder in one of the biggest industrial groups in Cyprus, well known locally as the manufacturers of Seven-Up. On boards of other companies.

Charming. Speaks fluent English.



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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 26 JULY, 1983

ANNEX 1: THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We have had a long and friendly association with Cyprus. Deep concern about present divisions and lack of progress. Want to see a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Intercommunal talks offer best, and only realistic, way forward. Ready to do anything that UN consider might help. Have endorsed Secretary General's intention to increase his own involvement.

2. But time may be running out. Is there a danger of de facto consolidation of present division, making it even more difficult to find acceptable solution? Turkish Cypriots' moves towards declaring independence point to this. (We shall continue to restrain Turks and Turkish Cypriots).

3. What type of solution do you see as realistic and practicable? If Secretary General concluded that demilitarisation of Republic and territorial adjustment in return for a measure of Turkish Cypriot autonomy (within a Federal Republic) was best solution, would you be ready to accept it?

UN Vote [If raised]

4. Abstained on UN Resolution because we did not believe it would bring a solution to the Cyprus problem any nearer.

British/EC Initiative [If raised]

5. Bad memories of last initiative in 1978. Separate initiative would only cut across UN efforts. Unrealistic to expect EC initiative in view of differences of opinion within EC.

Cyprus/Falklands [If raised]

6. Do not see parallel between Falklands in 1982 and Cyprus in 1974. Falklands clear case of British territory invaded, without any justification by foreign aggressor, against unanimous wishes of people. British obligations of Cyprus derive from Treaty of Guarantee. Government of day satisfied that they fulfilled them.

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/Declaration



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Declaration of Independence for northern Cyprus [If raised]

7. Have made clear to Turks and Turkish Cypriots our opposition to this. Will, continue to try to restrain them. Perhaps in part a consequence of recent UN debate. [If necessary] Do not recognise so called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Naturally would not recognise a self proclaimed independent state in North. W

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### ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Intercommunal process is at a low ebb. Any settlement probably needs a compromise in which Greek Cypriots make concessions on constitution and Turks yield some territory (especially in town of Varosha left empty since 1974). Agreement on a Constitution would need to allow Turks to run their own affairs in cooperation with Greek Cypriots but not under their control; and to live in their own zone with only a limited number of Greek Cypriots. This would require the Greek Cypriots to abandon the hopes that all refugees might return to their homes and for complete freedom of movement throughout the Republic. In return, the Greek Cypriots could reasonably expect ultimately the demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus (ie not the SBAs), including the withdrawal of Turkish troops. But Kyprianou is unlikely to make the difficult decisions that such a solution would require. The Cypriots tend to assume that others must solve their problems for them.

### Prospects

2. When and if intercommunal talks are resumed Perez de Cuellar intends, as promised, to increase his own involvement in the search for a solution. He may decide to visit Cyprus. His Representative in Cyprus, Dr Gobbi, had hoped to launch ideas for a 'staged' solution to the problem. But the Secretary General has instructed him to lie low and let the dust settle for the time being. Gobbi's ideas have only been floated informally with the two sides. We should not reveal that we know them in detail.

### Recent developments

3. The intercommunal talks went well between November 1981 (when Waldheim launched his 'evaluation') and the end of 1982. Kyprianou's decision after his election in February to take the question to the UN General Assembly was a major set-back. (We warned him that it would be.) A pro-Greek Cypriot resolution was carried by an overwhelming majority on 13 May. The United Kingdom, United States and most of our major allies abstained because we did not believe that the resolution would facilitate a solution. But we endorsed part of the resolution which

CONFIDENTIAL /referred



CONFIDENTIAL

referred to the Secretary General's intention to increase his own involvement.

4. The Turkish Cypriots reacted angrily. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, refused to return to the negotiating table in May as originally agreed and threatened a unilateral declaration of statehood (a long cherished aim). Following restraining moves by Ankara (possibly encouraged by UK and US démarches), a declaration was deferred. But legislation enabling a referendum to take place has been tabled in the Turkish Cypriot 'Parliament' and may be debated in the autumn. The issue is still live.

5. At talks on 4 July with Perez de Cuellar, Denktash refused to resume the talks until the Greek Cypriots treated him as an 'equal partner'. The Turkish Cypriots may also want a moratorium on internationalisation of the Cyprus issue, but the extent of support for this is not clear. The intercommunal talks are therefore not likely to resume quickly.

6. In recent months our aims have been to stop a declaration of independence in northern Cyprus, or a referendum, and to urge both parties to return to the intercommunal talks (in practice this means the Turkish Cypriots). At the moment, the Greek Cypriots' moral position is good. But in the longer term they will have to make difficult decisions, if the present division of the island is not to become permanent, to their disadvantage.

#### Treaty of Guarantee

7. Under the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960 the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey guaranteed 'the independence territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.' In the event of a breach of this provision they undertook to 'consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary' to ensure its observance. If concerted action was not possible the three powers reserved the right (but had no obligation) to act independently. In practice, Greece refused to join tripartite action before the Turkish invasion in 1974 and Turkey refused to do so afterwards.

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/UNFICYP



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UNFICYP

8. Following a Lebanese request last December to contribute to the MNF we sent an armoured scout car squadron from UNFICYP to the Lebanon. Originally a 3-month deployment, it was later extended until 7 August. Explained decision to Cyprus Government at the time and asked for their understanding. Have now told Cypriots of our decision to restore UNFICYP to full strength

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 26 JULY 1983

ANNEX 2: EC/CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Want to be as helpful as we can. Agree EC should live up to its obligations and work towards full Customs Union. You can be assured of our support.

---

2. Have you taken views of other EC members? For some of them Customs Union will present many practical problems. And for EC to work out with Cyprus Government full implications will inevitably take time.

3. Any view on how long negotiations would take? Our impression is that you would be wise to continue, while pressing ahead on Customs Union front, to protect your interests in the context of the reform of the Community's Mediterranean acquis. Otherwise you could greatly weaken your negotiating position on Customs Union.

4. Suggest you co-ordinate closely with Greek Presidency over coming months on tactics and stay in touch with us.

---

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. EC/Cyprus Association Agreement originally signed in 1972. Second stage of agreement aimed at progressive removal of trade barriers between Cyprus and Community leading to Customs Union. Cyprus Government have agreed trade regime for 1983, which we and they consider inadequate, in return for promise of early progress on Customs Union. But such progress in practice unattainable because of French and Italian opposition. UK and Greece are Cyprus' main champions in the EC. We are sceptical that Cyprus is yet ready for full Customs Union and could fulfil, for example, obligations on agricultural production discipline; but given French and Italian views this problem is academic. Community currently negotiating regime for new Mediterranean agriculture (reform of Mediterranean acquis) to take effect after enlargement and which could include increased protection against third country Mediterranean producers. Cypriots unconcerned by this as they say they will have full Customs Union by then. This is unrealistic. We are opposed to increased protection; but Cypriots should also lobby to defend their own interests.

2. Financial Protocol recently agreed. Worth a total of 44 mecu (£28m) of aid to Cyprus.

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 26 JULY, 1983

ANNEX 3: AID: 'MONEY FOR THE BASES'

POINTS TO MAKE [If raised]

1. 1960 Treaties make no provision for payment in respect of the Sovereign Base Areas or for facilities we enjoy as of right in the Republic. All claims have been honoured in full for those facilities for which payment is specifically required by the Treaty of Establishment.
2. We have helped Cyprus in different ways, eg through UNFICYP (which currently costs us more than £20m a year).
3. Worth looking again at £7.5m loan offer made in 1978. We regard this as discharging any obligation up to the date on which the loan is taken up.
4. Ready to continue discussions if you want.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Intermittently since 1965 Cypriots have presented us with claims for large sums (£250m) of aid they allege are due under the 1960 Treaties setting up the Republic of Cyprus and Sovereign Base Areas. At times they have also based their claims on what they regard as HMG's responsibility to pay for the facilities we enjoy on the island. 'Appendix R' of the Treaties provided for aid to be paid to 1965 and consultations thereafter with the final decision left to the UK.

2. We maintain that there is no legal obligation to pay after 1965. We help in other ways: our contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is the largest (£22 million per year and 800 men). In 1978 we offered a £7.5m loan, which the Cypriots have not taken up partly because we said we would see it as fulfilling any obligations to date.

3. The subject was the main point discussed at Rolandis' visit to the UK in May 1982. (He saw Mr Pym and Lord Belstead). Since then the Cyprus Government have only raised it in passing. Kyprianou will wish to raise it because of recent publicity in the Greek Cypriot press and so he can say that he has done so. But he is unlikely to be under any illusions that we will change our minds.

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU: 26 JULY

ANNEX 4: STUDENTS FEES

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Glad that we were able to make available £1m in each of the next three financial years to help students from Cyprus continue to come to the United Kingdom.
  
2. [If 'home fee status' is raised]. Looked at this carefully. But concluded that there could be no return to our pre-1979 policy of home fee status for overseas students. Obvious difficulty of making exceptions. Have treated Cyprus generously.
  
3. [If asked what will happen after 1985/86]. Decision taken for 3 years initially because of public expenditure accounting period.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS.

1. Cyprus was particularly hard-hit by our decision in 1979 to charge overseas students the full cost of their tuition. Cyprus has no university, and students from both communities have traditionally come to the UK for their higher education. About 1400 came to the UK before 1979 and this figure fell by over 25%.
2. Because of Britain's special ties to Cyprus (our bases; Commonwealth; associate membership of the EC), HMG decided to make £1m available for each of the next 3 years for subsidies. The scheme starts in the academic year 1983/84. There will be a flat rate subsidy to all students, (reducing the difference between home and overseas fees by about half in the first year). We expect about 1000 students to take advantage of the scheme at first.
3. The scheme was welcomed by the Cypriots and has won us much goodwill. There is naturally interest in whether it will continue beyond 3 years. We cannot make any firm commitment now.
4. Cyprus will also stand to benefit under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan (our contribution is increasing by £6m total over the next three years); and continues to receive discretionary awards from technical cooperation funds (£20,000 for Cyprus in 1984/85).

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO LONDON: 26 JULY

ANNEX 5: TERRORIST COOPERATION

POINTS TO MAKE

Arab Terrorist Threat against UK Installation

1. Grateful for your wholehearted cooperation in meeting recent Arab threat to British military facilities in Cyprus. Hope similar cooperation will be possible in future.
2. Congratulations on successful handling of recent hijack at Larnaca. Hope that the hijackers will be charged and tried in due course.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. We received information from the Cyprus Government, and other sources, that an Arab terrorist attack on British installations in the Troodos mountains was planned for June/July. The installations, which are not in the Sovereign Base Areas but part of one of the retained sites in the Republic, were immediately made the subject of a security alert. This was explained to Cyprus public opinion as a routine testing of security. The Cypriot authorities know the real reason and were very cooperative. It would be helpful if such cooperation could continue.

Hijacking

2. The Cypriots recently had to handle at Larnaca the hijacking of a Romanian aircraft leased to Libyan Airlines. The aircraft had been hijacked by Lebanese Shi'ites on a flight from Athens to Tripoli. After being refuelled in Rome, the aircraft landed at Larnaca on 23 June. Following 6 hours of negotiations with the Cypriot authorities the hijackers gave themselves up.

3. Cyprus is a party to the Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, which obliges them either to extradite the hijackers or to submit the case to the competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution. The Cypriot Government has not yet made a statement about the trial of the hijackers following their arrest: we should encourage them to discharge their international obligations under the Hague Convention.

CONFIDENTIAL

M.T

cc Tim Flesher

11 July 1983

CO

Cyprus: Visit by President Kyprianou

The Prime Minister agrees to hold talks  
with President Kyprianou at 1030 on 26 July.

AJC

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

Tim

Is it really the case that  
the S.R. cannot be heard  
around this time?

A. J. C. 8/7.

Jon

22 July lunch in industrialists  
25 July lunch in colleagues  
26 July Questions  
27 July Navy Court  
28 July Questions?  
29 July Cranwell  
You could either drop lunch  
in colleagues or take a chance as  
to have rising in due to permit  
no Questions on Thursday PM.

17 8/7



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 July, 1983

The only opportunity to give  
him lunch would be on 25 ~~June~~ July  
when you have your lunch with  
colleagues.

Agree just to hold talks at

Dear John,

1030 on 26 July? A.J.C. 8/7

Yes not

Cyprus: Visit by President Kyprianou

Thank you for your letter of 27 June in which you said that the Prime Minister would be able to give a working lunch for President Kyprianou on 20 July. We have now put this date to President Kyprianou. Unfortunately, although the Cyprus High Commissioner had originally told us that Kyprianou would be free to come to London any time in July, he now wishes to stay in Nicosia until 21 July for meetings to mark the ninth anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. He will be free to come to London on 22 July or any day thereafter.

I understand that the Prime Minister is not able to offer Kyprianou lunch on any other date than 20 July. Since we have already made the gesture of offering him lunch, this should not cause too much disappointment. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should offer to receive President Kyprianou some time on or after 22 July. I understand that 1030 on 26 July may be convenient, and Sir Geoffrey Howe has pencilled this into his diary.

Yours ever

John

pp (R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

Cyprus, Dec 79  
Visit of Kyprianos



1 JUL 1983



Cyprus



10 DOWNING STREET

~~John~~ SA 1/2.

FICO name added.

President Kyprianou  
has cancelled his  
visit of 20/7.

July  
1/7





8-nd

bc. Caroline  
Sue Good-  
child

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

27 June 1983

CYPRUS: VISIT BY  
PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

Thank you for your letter of 23 June. The Prime Minister would be glad to give a working lunch for President Kyprianou on 20 July. This would be at 1 p.m. for 1.15 p.m. Mrs. Thatcher would also be prepared to receive the President of Cyprus for 15 minutes before the lunch.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft guest list for not more than 12 people (to include the Prime Minister and a Private Secretary from No. 10).

A. J. COLES.

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

28



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree to receive President  
of Cyprus for 15 minutes followed  
by working lunch?

23 June 1983

A.F.C.  $\frac{24}{6}$ 

Yes no

Jen T. L.

Cyprus: Visit by President Kyprianou

The Cyprus High Commission have told us that President Kyprianou is anxious to reinstate the visit to London which had to be postponed because of the Election campaign. Kyprianou had been due to see the Prime Minister on 17 May.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that, if convenient, the Prime Minister should receive President Kyprianou briefly and offer him a working lunch. We understand that the date of 20 July might be convenient for the Prime Minister. In offering lunch the Prime Minister would be going further than we envisaged when Kyprianou originally asked to come to London. But our substantial interests in Cyprus (particularly in the Sovereign Base Areas) make it important to give President Kyprianou good treatment. A working lunch will make up for the disappointment we caused by the cancellation of the earlier meeting. It will also match the treatment President Kyprianou was given when he first met the Prime Minister in 1980.

Kyprianou did not specify the purpose of his discussions with the Prime Minister when he originally proposed that he should call on her. During his recent European tour, in which London was to have been included, he has concentrated mainly on the Cyprus problem. He will probably also wish to raise bilateral matters with the Prime Minister, including 'money for the bases' (a longstanding claim for aid, which we dispute, under the terms of the 1960 treaties). In addition, the Cyprus Foreign Minister has said that he wishes to discuss the EC/Cyprus Association agreement.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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UNITED STATES



23 JUN 1993



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

da

CYPRUS

28 February 1983

Thank you for your letter of 24 February about the forthcoming visit to London of President Kyprianou of Cyprus. The Prime Minister has agreed to see President Kyprianou at 9.30 a.m. on Tuesday 17 May.

*Meeting cancelled due to  
election.  
@ 16/5*

Timothy Flesher

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SW



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister  
 Agree to see him at 9.30  
 on Tuesday, 17 May?

24 February 1983

A. J. C. 25/2

New John

Visit to London by President Kyprianou

The Cyprus High Commissioner has asked us whether the Prime Minister would be prepared to receive President Kyprianou during the second half of May. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that, if convenient, the Prime Minister should do so.

President Kyprianou has not specified the purpose of discussions with the Prime Minister. He will undoubtedly wish to talk about the Cyprus problem in general, together with certain bilateral matters (including 'money for the bases') and Cyprus/EC relations. We understand that he may be visiting several European capitals over the next few months following his re-election as President on 13 February.

Our interests in Cyprus include continued trouble-free use of the Sovereign Base Areas and our role as one of the guarantors of Cyprus' independence under the 1960 Treaties. We also want to influence Kyprianou to take a positive approach towards making progress in the UN sponsored intercommunal dialogue as the best way of dealing with the Cyprus problem. Mr Pym suggests that there is no need for the Prime Minister to offer him more than about an hour. Mr Pym proposes to offer him lunch, during which additional points could be covered if necessary. If the Prime Minister agrees in principle, perhaps we might have a word about a convenient date in the period 17-20 May.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
 10 Downing Street

25 FEB 1983

0 11 12 1  
9 10 2  
8 4 3  
7 6 5 4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES



SUBJECT

cc Mark



file

## 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1981

Dear Brian,

CALL BY PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

President Kyprianou of Cyprus called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by his High Commissioner and three officials. Mr. Bullard was also present.

Cyprus Problem

After an exchange of courtesies, the Prime Minister asked about the present state of play in the negotiations on the Cyprus problem. President Kyprianou said that he was awaiting proposals from the Turkish side. They had been promised for 5 August, but there was now talk that there might be a delay until 12 August. The future of the dialogue depended on the nature of the Turkish proposals. The dialogue could not continue indefinitely without producing a result. It was said that the Turkish proposals would be constructive and realistic. The Greek Cypriot side were always prepared to do their best to promote a solution. They attached great importance to the territorial aspect. If this were reasonable, it would be possible for a large number of Greeks to return to their property. The remainder of the refugees could return to the area under Turkish Cypriot administration without upsetting the balance of the population there. Similarly, some Turks would, no doubt, return to the Greek Cypriot-administered area. There had to be freedom of movement within the island.

The constitutional aspect was, of course, also important. There were some elements about which the Greek Cypriot side were prepared to be flexible. It was a question of degree. They wanted to ensure the unity of the State but were prepared to discuss the nature of the autonomous regimes in the two regions. Their proposals were already on the table. Assuming the Turkish Cypriot side's proposals on the territorial aspect were reasonable, the Greek Cypriots would be flexible on the constitution. However, the approach had to be reasonable. The Greek Cypriots were already being accused of having abandoned their policy of internationalising the issue and of letting the Turks get away with a fait accompli.

/The Prime Minister

AC

The Prime Minister commented that this seemed to be a good moment to make progress. President Kyprianou said that this depended on whether or not the Turks had the political will. He had learned that Denktash had been upset by comments about his negative attitude made in Ankara during his recent visit there. If a negotiable position on the territorial issue could be got on to the table, this could be taken together with the constitutional aspect. Much would depend on the nature of the territorial concessions on offer.

The Prime Minister asked if the UN Secretary General had been helpful. President Kyprianou commented favourably on Mr. Waldheim's role in pressing the Turks to put forward constructive proposals on the territorial issue. Mr. Bullard said that we regarded Mr. Gobbi as a gifted and energetic negotiator. President Kyprianou said that he had urged that Mr. Gobbi should not take an initiative just now. To do so would give the Turks an alibi for inaction. If the Turkish proposals were positive, Mr. Gobbi would no doubt have an active role. If, on the other hand, their ideas were negative, this would demonstrate an absence of political will and there would then be no point in Mr. Gobbi putting forward his own ideas. Mr. Bullard observed that the Turks might be willing to be pushed in the right direction even if they were unwilling to produce sensible ideas of their own. President Kyprianou said that, in his view, Mr. Gobbi's usefulness would be destroyed if he were to take the initiative. "I do not think a plan of his own will work." The Prime Minister asked whether the Turks did not in fact want a solution. Mr. Bullard said that those in Ankara did and President Kyprianou confirmed that this was his information - though much depended on what sort of solution they wanted. The Prime Minister said that each side must compromise. President Kyprianou observed that the Greek Cypriots felt they had already given a great deal. Cyprus was not made to be a Federal State but the Greeks had conceded the point. Now they had to be very careful lest they create a new round of trouble and end up with partition. The Greek Cypriots had the will to find a viable solution. The Prime Minister agreed that partition would solve nothing and that there had to be a workable solution if the island was not to be left with a new set of problems.

#### The Economy

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, President Kyprianou said that, given the general recession, the economy of the Greek Cypriot region was doing as well as could be expected. But the situation might get worse next year if the Government did not take measures now. The tourist industry was in a healthy state. As regards relations with the Community, Cyprus was experiencing difficulties with the Italians in the new round of talks on the temporary arrangements preceding the full customs union. The Italians wished to cut down imports from Cyprus into

/ the Community.



the Community. The political repercussions, if they succeeded, would be serious. The High Commissioner commented that Britain had been supporting the position of Cyprus. President Kyprianou said that it was important for his Government to be able to show that it paid to be associated with the Community.

Aid to Cyprus

President Kyprianou referred to the Sovereign-base areas. The Prime Minister said that HMG regarded their legal obligation to give aid to Cyprus as fulfilled. We would be offering nothing more. However, if, for political reasons, it would be useful to President Kyprianou to have further meetings, this would be acceptable. President Kyprianou said that he would like to exhaust the political process. His Government had a different view to that of HMG. The Prime Minister repeated her willingness to see further meetings take place. What mattered was that at the end of the process there should be an amicable agreement. President Kyprianou agreed.

CHGM

In response to a question from President Kyprianou about the likely Agenda for the CHGM, the Prime Minister referred to the world economy, Gleneagles, the problems of the Pacific islands and the Mexico Summit. In regard to Gleneagles, the Prime Minister said that she felt very sorry for Mr. Muldoon. He had taken the right decision (President Kyprianou agreed). As a result, he now found himself in a very difficult situation, more particularly since he was facing an election.

*Yours ever*

*Nicholas Alexander*

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS:  
28 JULY 1981

Points to Make

Cyprus Problem

1. Post election period a unique opportunity. Need for sober and flexible diplomacy on both sides. Turks must give on territory. Have asked them to make realistic proposals. Hope you will revise your proposals on constitution. Original positions unrealistic.
2. Present government in Ankara more flexible than predecessors or likely successors. Strong indications of real preparedness to negotiate seriously.
3. Important to keep atmosphere surrounding talks calm: no good to represent particular meetings as make or break: intercommunal talks only possible forum, and negotiation only road to settlement. Outside Governments will be following developments closely and expecting real effort from both sides.
4. Hope you will examine any Turkish ideas calmly. Should put Turks under pressure by making counter proposals - in particular get real dialogue going by presenting revised constitutional proposals.
5. UN proposals will probably be necessary to bridge gap, and winkle Turks further out of their shell on territory. Ideas advanced by UN Secretary General's representative seem ingenious; they, or something like them from UN, will be needed as basis for negotiation. Hope you will encourage UN to help with suggestions as basis for negotiations.

Denktash Statement on territory (Defensive)

6. Denktash's 13 July statement typical bluster: should not be taken too seriously. Not an excuse for no movement on Greek side.

British/Western/European initiative (Defensive)

7. Press speculation ill-founded: not the time to cut across UN efforts. Will give the UN every possible support.

/Aid to Cyprus

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Aid to Cyprus (Defensive)

8. Discussions useful. Our position unlikely to change; all legal obligations discharged. But prepared for further meetings if you want them. Public dispute would benefit neither of us.

EC/Cyprus (If Raised)

9. UK largely responsible for agreement last year that transition to stage two of the association to begin in January 1981: will do all we can to help in this year's negotiation.

Background

10. UK interests in Cyprus | \_\_\_\_\_ arise from:

- (a) *Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4). (Mayland, 15 July 2014)*
- (b) need to preserve peace between Greek and Turkish allies;
- (c) residual role as guarantor power;
- (d) Cypriot community in UK.


Cyprus Problem

11. Between 1963, when bicomunal independence constitution broke down, and 1974, Turkish Cypriots were enclaved and harassed by Greeks. Since Turkish invasion in 1974, de facto partition. The only possible basis for settlement is a loose biregional federation, with Greek Cypriots conceding a constitution giving the Turkish Cypriots effective autonomy (in any case complete control over their own security) and the Turkish Cypriots conceding substantial territory (at present 20% of the population, occupying nearly 40% of Republic).

12. Intercommunal talks resumed in September 1980. Progress slow; both sides set out maximalist bargaining positions. Major omission: Turkish failure to produce any proposals on territory - Greek proposals on constitution detailed, but unrealistic, offering none of security guarantees or effective provincial autonomy required by Turks. UN attempt in Spring to promote "'interim arrangement"' foundered: it involved trade-off between reopening of Nicosia airport (Greek concession, involving partially lifting their economic embargo on Turks) and opening of Varosha for resettlement (Turkish concession: Varosha is former Greek suburb of Famagusta, now empty and in Turkish hands).

13. Talks marked time over Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections in May and Turkish Cypriot elections in June, (Kyprianou's party

/did



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did well, securing 20% of votes: it holds balance between Communists and Right Wing Rally party).

14. Talks now approaching delicate and probably decisive state: widespread acceptance that 'window of opportunity' exists following elections: highly innovative UN representative in Nicosia (Gobbi, an Argentinian); potentially flexible Government in Ankara. But, if no progress, window will close with UN General Assembly (when Greek Cypriots will be tempted to go again for traditional propaganda resolution and Turks will then break talks) and probable Papandreou advance in Greek elections. Crucial that during 'window' period Turks agree to major concessions on territory (eg. 30% or less) and Greek Cypriots agree that constitution will be very loose federation (with Turks controlling own security).

15. Gobbi has drafted guide-lines for constitutional and territorial framework which meet these criteria: would be basis for negotiation in the intercommunal talks. Greeks see them as leaning to the Turks, (inevitable as Turks hold most of the cards, and have to be tempted.) Waldheim hesitant about presentation by UN: he has boxed himself in by giving both sides impression that they have veto on his doing so, and is impatient of Gobbi's independent style. Gobbi called back to New York on 21 July for week's consultations.

16. Kyprianou by temperament intransigent on intercommunal questions, and anxious to avoid difficult choices. Greek Cypriots insisting on no UN move before Turks produce territorial proposals. Would like talks concentrated on criticism of a Turkish territorial offer - avoiding discussion of constitution. Attention focused on 5 August meeting of talks, which will concern territory: Greeks have told Americans in confidence that they will announce failure of talks if no Turkish move then.

17. Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, even more intransigent than usual after poor election showing. Indulged in deliberate wrecking on 13 July, saying that Turks hold land barely sufficient to 'live as human beings': summoned to Ankara for consultations on 21 July. (NOT FOR DISCLOSURE) In reply to demarche by HM Ambassador on 21 July Turkish Foreign Minister said that Turks would make proposals on territory - and would put the necessary pressure on Denktash. But Denktash may yet wriggle out.

/18.

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18. Press speculation on Western initiative: none, but activity in support of Gobbi: lobbying in New York, and in Ankara (NOT FOR DISCLOSURE) Consultation with France, Germany and Italy as well as US on action to help UN.

Aid for Cyprus

19. In 1960 Treaty Britain undertook to grant £12m to Cyprus in the first five years of independence and to determine future amounts of aid, if any, in succeeding five year periods. Cypriots sometimes put this as a continuing obligation to pay for Sovereign Base Areas, or for military facilities enjoyed in Republic: legally they have no case. The £12m was paid but break down of constitution in 1963 removed political rationale for further aid under 'Appendix R'. Nonetheless high British expenditure, particularly on UN Force in Cyprus to which largest contributor (cost £20m in 1981/82): in 1978 offer of £7.5m loan (not yet taken up). Early 1981 under strong pressure from Cyprus Government, which expected electoral trouble, agreed to informal discussions. Two meetings held covering legal aspects. Friendly but inconclusive. (NOT FOR DISCLOSURE) We will do nothing more unless Cyprus Government press further; indications that they are uncertain how to take matter forward, and will not reopen it at present.

EC/Cyprus

20. EC-Cyprus Association Agreement concluded 1972; specifies two stages leading eventually to full customs union. Community delayed movement to stage two because of political division of island, and French and Italian concern about agricultural products. Until Greek accession Britain was Cyprus main supporter in the EC (relatively cost-free insurance for interests in bases: also major customer for Cyprus products, eg. new potatoes). Largely responsible for November Association Council's face-saving agreement that 'process of passage to the second stage' should begin January 1981. Backing Cypriot and Greek attempts to secure improved regime this year.

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KYPRIANOU, SPYROS

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932, educated locally and then in London. Barrister (Gray's Inn). Represented Makarios in London 1952-4. On Independence briefly Minister of Justice, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Serious heart attack in March 1969. He resigned very reluctantly in 1972, after the Greek Military Government had made it clear that his continuance of office would be one of the major obstacles to the restoration of good relations between Athens and Nicosia.

As Foreign Minister was leading advocate of a tough policy and no concessions to the Turks. In dealings with the West he was often prickly, stubborn and narrowly legalistic.

In May 1976 Kyprianou launched a new pro-Makarios party of the Centre-Right, the Democratic Front (DEKO) to fight the House of Representatives elections. By prior agreement with Communists (AKEL) with whom Kyprianou formed an electoral coalition, his Democratic Front was allowed 21 candidates, who were duly voted in. Kyprianou, as leader of the largest party group in the Chamber, was chosen as President of the House, and thus became Acting President on the death of Makarios in August 1977. He was elected second President of the Republic of Cyprus by acclaim on 31 August 1977.

Re-elected President 1978 when only other candidate nominated (Clerides) withdrew as a gesture of 'national unity' when Kyprianou's son was kidnapped.

Kyprianou's performance as President has been weak and indecisive; lacking personal support, he has tried to proceed by consensus. This has laid him open to Right-Wing charges that he is a prisoner of the Left. But, despite large-scale defections from his party in 1980, it did relatively well in the parliamentary elections in May 1981, securing 20% of votes and 8 seats out of 35. It holds the balance between communists and right (12 seats each). Kyprianou seems assured of AKEL support for legislative purposes, and will probably again have their backing in 1983 presidential elections.

\* ~~~~~ \*

His uncertain health (in addition to his heart condition, he is said to have a blood disorder) led to some doubts whether he could survive the physical strains of being President. Following three weeks in England in May 1980 for medical treatment, his health appears to have improved.

Married. 2 sons. His wife, who comes from Northern Greece, is accompanying him in London for the Royal Wedding. Both speak English well.

\* ~~~~~ \*

*\* Passage deleted and temporarily retained under Section 3(4)*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Wayland, 15 July 2014*



CYPRUS: BASIC FACTS

1. Population and Land Area (whole island)

(a) Land Area	9251km <sup>2</sup> of which: Greek Cypriot controlled: 59.2% Turkish Cypriot controlled: 35.1% 2.77% SBAs 3% Buffer Zone
(b) Population	620,000 (approx 505,000 Greek Cypriots) (approx 115,000 Turkish Cypriots)

2. Basic Statistics (Greek Cypriot sector)

Gross National Product

(a) Total (1978)	1,370 US \$m
(b) Growth Rate (1974-77)	12,86% p.a.
(c) Growth Rate (1980)	4.5%
(c) Per Capita (1978)	2,110 US \$

3. Trade with UK 1980 (est.)

UK Exports to Cyprus	£118.8 m
UK Imports from Cyprus	£113.9 m
UK Share of Cyprus imports	20%
UK Share of Cyprus Exports	23%

Position in UK's Export

League Table (1979)	50 (of 150)
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GRS 780

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FM NICOSIA 221200Z JUL 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 22 JULY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE ANKARA,  
ATHENS

INFO SAVING CBFC (ACTIONED NICOSIA), MODUK (FOR DS 11)

VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU FOR THE ROYAL WEDDING

1. IN ANTICIPATION OF HIS VISIT TO LONDON I SAW THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING. HE CONFIRMED THAT DURING HIS TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 28 JULY HE WOULD WISH TO CONCENTRATE ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, THOUGH HE WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME ANY POINTS WHICH MRS THATCHER MIGHT WISH TO MAKE ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

2. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT IT WAS NOW ALL UP TO THE TURKISH SIDE. UNDER THE PROCEDURE AGREED FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS THEY HAD AN OBLIGATION TO SUBMIT A TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL. THIS WAS THE ONE GAP IN THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY BOTH SIDES ON THE TOPICS AGREED FOR DISCUSSION. MOREOVER, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION, AT LEAST FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, THAT THE TURKS HAD PROMISED THAT THERE WOULD BE TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS. KYPRIANOU EMPHASIZED THAT ANY PROPOSAL MUST BE QUOTE REASONABLE UNQUOTE TO ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE. HE REFUSED TO BE SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT HE WOULD REGARD AS REASONABLE, SIMPLY STATING THAT THE PROPOSAL MUST BE QUOTE OBJECTIVELY JUDGED UNQUOTE TO BE REASONABLE.

3. I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT, IF THE TURKISH SIDE MADE WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SAW AS A REASONABLE MOVE ON TERRITORY, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON THE CONSTITUTION. ONE MUST NO DOUBT SEE THE PROPOSALS ALREADY TABLED AS FIRST PROPOSALS TO BE REGARDED AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

4. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION, BUT THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A FIRST MOVE. IT WAS A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. THERE COULD BE SOME ADJUSTMENT TO BE AGREED IN NEGOTIATION.

5. I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD WANT TO TAKE SERIOUSLY ANY PROPOSAL FROM THE TURKISH SIDE AND AVOID A QUICK NEGATIVE REACTION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE THE FUTURE OF THE TALKS. IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS CAME FORWARD WITH SOMETHING WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DID NOT REGARD AS REASONABLE OR IF THERE WERE NO PROPOSALS WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT THINK OF A MOVE BY THE UN?

6. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT ANY PROPOSAL WOULD OF COURSE BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. BUT THE FEELING AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN THAT THE TALKS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DRAG ON JUST FOR THE SAKE OF CONTINUING THEM. IF THE TURKISH SIDE FAILED TO KEEP ITS PROMISES, THE NEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DID

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/NOT



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NOT SEE MUCH VALUE IN A MOVE BY THE UN IF THE TURKS THEMSELVES WERE UNABLE TO COME FORWARD WITH REASONABLE PROPOSALS. WOULD THE TURKISH SIDE ACCEPT ANY UN SUGGESTIONS?

7. I SAID THAT NATURALLY ONE COULD NOT GUARANTEE ACCEPTANCE IN ADVANCE OF ANY UN SUGGESTIONS. BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT, IF THE TALKS WERE TO END AND RECOURSE WERE TO BE MADE TO THE UN AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD BE AT LEAST SOME MONTHS BEFORE ANYTHING FURTHER COULD BE DONE. THE OPPORTUNITY, WHICH MANY SAW AT THE PRESENT TIME, WOULD BE LOST.

8. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE LOST. THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WERE READY TO TAKE UP ANY OPPORTUNITY. IT WOULD NOT BE THEIR FAULT IF THE TURKS FAILED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY MOVE.

COMMENT.

9. THIS DISCUSSION CONFIRMS KYPRIANOU'S APPARENT OPPOSITION TO THE SUBMISSION OF UN PROPOSALS IF THE TURKISH SIDE FAIL TO COME UP WITH ANYTHING WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SEE AS QUOTE REASONABLE UNQUOTE ON TERRITORY. IT IS IN LINE WITH WHAT ROLANDIS TOLD THE U.S. CHARGE (MY TELNO 167). IN GENERAL KYPRIANOU WAS TAKING A VERY HARD LINE.

10. I MENTIONED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE L.P.S. HAD URGED FLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORY ON THE TURKS, BUT DID NOT REPEAT NOT REFER TO H.M. AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH GURUN AND TURKMEN.

11. I ASSUME THAT KYPRIANOU WILL SPEAK ON SIMILAR LINES TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHO MAY WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES IF THERE IS TO BE ANY HOPE OF PROGRESS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MODUK (FOR DS11).

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BRIEF FOR GENERAL USE WITH COMMONWEALTH VISITORS (INCLUDING THOSE FROM AUSTRALIA, BARBADOS, CYPRUS, GUYANA, INDIA, MALAWI, NIGERIA, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA AND ZAMBIA) DURING ROYAL WEDDING

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS

POINTS TO MAKE

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. Looking forward to CHGM. Hope you/your head of government will be present. Relief to have a CHGM no longer dominated by Rhodesian problem. Could be very useful meeting.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (CFMM) (IF RAISED)

2. Regret disruption of Commonwealth business. Sympathise with New Zealand government who did all they believe they properly could to persuade those concerned to call off tour. Saw no justification for a change in venue of CFMM but, in interests of Commonwealth harmony, we shall attend Nassau.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT AND SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA (IF RAISED)

3. Hope Commonwealth will not allow consideration of Gleneagles Agreement to become over intrusive at CHGM. Do not think Agreement's modification warranted. Hope discussion of it can be reserved for informal consideration during (Canberra) weekend retreat.

FOR USE WITH AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER ONLY:

4. Share Australia's concern that CHGM should be a success. Particularly hope that it will not be dominated by Southern African issues.

5. Prime Minister enjoyed previous visits to Australia and much regrets unable to accept invitation to stay on in Australia for a few days after meeting.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS ONLY:

6. (If raised) Inappropriate to convene Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus at a time when it might cut across inter-communal talks.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF INDIA ONLY:

7. Would be delighted if 1983 CHGM were held in Delhi. India has obvious claim.

/8. (If raised)

8. (If raised) Pakistan's renewed Commonwealth membership a matter for Commonwealth as a whole. We for our part would welcome it, but are conscious of Indian caution; we would not wish to see issue promoted in circumstances that could lead to controversy within Commonwealth.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF MALAWI ONLY

9. Very sorry to hear President Banda will not be attending this year's CHGM.

FOR USE WITH PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE ONLY:

10. Look forward to hearing your views at CHGM on international economic issues. Always welcome element of rationality which Singapore customarily injects into such discussions.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA

11. Understand Sri Lanka Exhibition (at Commonwealth Institute) is great success.

## COMMONWEALTH MATTERS

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. In Melbourne 30 September-7 October with weekend retreat in Canberra. Replies due mid-July to Commonwealth Secretary-General's circular letter on agenda. We have recommended that Prime Minister's reply indicate general agreement with Mr Ramphal's ideas and make no substantive new proposals. Next step (probably early August) is circulation by Mr Ramphal of annotated agenda.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (CFMM)

2. Next meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers (CFMM) (22-23 September) will take place in Nassau, Bahamas, following discussion at two meetings (10 and 21 July) of Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa (CCSA) of Nigerian proposal that venue be moved from Auckland if Springbok tour of New Zealand which began 19 July, went ahead. Final decision taken (on 21 July) despite New Zealand Government appeal, which we supported, for its postponement until after Mr Muldoon's arrival in London on 27 July (for Royal Wedding). New Zealand Government will almost certainly not be represented at Nassau, but we shall attend in interests of Commonwealth harmony.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

A 3. Copy annexed: certain to be discussed at CHGM. Four Caribbean Governments (including Barbados) have already indicated their intention of raising it there with a view to securing its more effective implementation; and Nigeria may produce a new draft agreement for consideration. We had hoped that this subject could be reserved for informal discussion by heads of government at weekend retreat, but the furore over the change in CFMM venue, and Mr Muldoon's resulting bitterness, now make this unlikely.

AUSTRALIA

4. CHGM hosts. Immensely keen to make meeting a success and eg

/have

have sent delegations (led by Ministers and senior back-benchers) to all Commonwealth countries attending. Australian Foreign Minister visited UK 10-14 June and had talks with Prime Minister on 12 June when he delivered invitation from Mr Fraser to stay on in Australia for a few days after Meeting (Prime Minister has declined because of Conservative Party Conference, at which Mr Fraser has agreed to speak). On agenda Australians share Pacific, Caribbean (and UK) concern that Southern African issues should not loom too large.

#### BARBADOS

5. Mr Adams attended last CHGM (Lusaka 1979) where he exhibited a special interest in Belize and world economic questions.

#### CYPRUS

6. Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus set up at 1975 CHGM (in Jamaica), a propaganda machine for the Greek Cypriots and, thankfully, dormant since 1977. But communique issued at 1979 CHGM (in Lusaka) included decision (in response to Cypriot pressure) to ask Commonwealth Secretary General to convene Committee at Ministerial level whenever appropriate. Ramphal has however told President Kyprianou that he does not intend to convene Committee unless so requested by President himself. Latter has not since done so.

#### GUYANA

7. Was represented at 1979 CHGM (in Lusaka) by Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

#### INDIA

8. Mr Ramphal has suggested to Mrs Gandhi that India host next (1983) CHGM. Mrs Gandhi responded positively but apparently worried whether offer would be welcome to other heads of government. It will be South Asia's turn in 1983 to host a CHGM. Three possible candidates: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Latter is regionally the most significant, has the most suitable capital and, as the last

/Commonwealth,

- 3 -

Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHGRM)'s successful host, has good claim.

9. President Zia would like to see Pakistan rejoin Commonwealth. Pakistan's readmission in British, Pakistani and Commonwealth interests. Until recently informal soundings have met with strong Indian objections suggesting little prospect of movement before CHGM, but in wake of Indian Foreign Ministers's recent visit to Pakistan and expectation of some improvement in their bilateral relations, Pakistan now seems to be contemplating some form of initiative. Agha Shahi recently approached Secretary of State on matter in New York. Difficult as yet to know likely Indian reaction, which is key. At the least, CHGM could see useful discussion of matter in corridors.

#### MALAWI

10. President Banda has let it be known that he will not attend this year's CHGM. In no way surprising: he appeared only for opening day of Lusaka CHGM.

#### NIGERIA

11. Nigerian delegation to 1979 CHGM was led by (then) Minister for External Affairs.

12. Nigerian Government hold very strong views on issue of sporting contacts with South Africa (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above).

#### SINGAPORE

13. Long standing bilateral tension between Singapore and Australia over latter's protectionism may lead Lee Kuan Yew to take a critical (and thus moderating) view of any Australian rhetoric at CHGM on world economic matters.

#### SRI LANKA

14. As part of their celebrations of 50 years of universal franchise Sri Lanka is mounting major exhibition at Commonwealth Institute

/17 July

17 July-13 September depicting aspects of Sri Lanka's history and culture, and of its social political and economic life. The Queen opened Exhibition on 16 July.

15. The Queen has accepted invitation from President Jayawardene to pay state visit to Sri Lanka on her way back from CHGM in October 1981.

ZAMBIA

16. Hosted 1979 CHGM and President Kaunda apparently regards himself as Chairman of the Commonwealth (no such office) until next CHGM.

## COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Government of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.

*London, June 15 1977.*





Tel.233.4116

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 July 1981

His Excellency  
Mr Tasos Panayides  
High Commissioner for Cyprus  
Cyprus High Commission  
93 Park Street  
LONDON W1Y 4ET

*as seen by e.s.*

*Dear High Commissioner,*

I am writing to confirm arrangements which we have made over the telephone for the meeting between the President of Cyprus and the Prime Minister at No 10 Downing Street next week.

Mrs Thatcher is looking forward to meeting President Kyprianou at 09.15 on Tuesday 28 July for about half an hour. I understand that you are expecting to accompany the President. If you have any questions about the arrangements which have been made, I hope that you will get in touch with Mr Plumbly in Southern European Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Tel.233.4189) or with me.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Duncan Lothian.*

D F Lothian (Miss)  
Private Office

b.c.to:

Miss Stephens (No 10) ✓  
Mr T L A Daunt (SED)  
Mr R M J Lyne (Private Secretary)

20 JUL 1981

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9 8 7 6 5 4

Cyprus.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 December 1980

Call by the President of Cyprus

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place between the Prime Minister and the President of Cyprus on 19 December.

I am sending a copy to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MA

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  
OF CYPRUS AT 10 DOWNING STREET on 19 DECEMBER 1980 at 1000 HRS

see master oct.

Present:-

Prime Minister	President S Kyprianou
Mr J L Bullard	Mr N Rolandis
Mr M O'D B Alexander	Mr H Vovides
Mr T L A Daunt	Mr D Michaelides
	Mr A Chambos

European Community

After an exchange of courtesies, President Kyprianou said that he had just visited Luxembourg for discussion of the problems over Stage II of Cyprus's Association Agreement with the Community; he had met with full understanding. In particular, he wanted the arrangements for 1982/83 to be better than those conceded in 1978; these arrangements would apply prior to completion of the customs union. He looked to the Community to be generous: Cypriot production of the commodities and manufactures which caused difficulty was miniscule by European standards. Mr Rolandis suggested that there should be detailed discussion between Trade Ministers. Arrangements must be made to safeguard the Cypriot position in the British market ahead of customs union; market shares, particularly in sales of wines and sherry, had been falling as a result of the shift in the incidence of duties following British accession to the EC.

President Kyprianou said that he would send the Prime Minister a paper setting out his Government's view of the problems over relations with the EC. These should not be regarded as exclusively economic. There was an important political aspect. Many in Cyprus took the view that association with the EC was undesirable and potentially prejudicial to Cyprus's policy in non-alignment. He took exactly the opposite view: Cyprus is part of Europe and close association with the EC was necessary whatever solution was found to the Cyprus problem. The main trouble was the attitude adopted by France and Italy. He was asking for British help in dealing with those Governments. Mr Rolandis said that he had explained the background to Lord Carrington at their meeting on 24 November. The Cyprus Government was aware of the very helpful line taken by Britain in EC discussions and was suitably grateful. The main stumbling block for the future was the French Government. M. Francois Poncet had in effect admitted in private

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/conversation

conversation that his Government, although pushed into accepting the 24 November agreement, would make difficulties over arrangements for the reduction of specific duties. The Prime Minister said that full support had been given to the Cypriot case and she would be glad to study the promised paper. She welcomed the news that the Cyprus Government would be getting in direct touch with all EC Governments. They should bear in mind that they were not the only people having difficulty with the French; progress on a number of matters was unlikely to be great ahead of the elections in France.

### Cyprus Problem

The Prime Minister said that the next round of inter-communal talks seemed likely to be crucial and a determined effort must be made to secure a successful conclusion. President Kyprianou, agreeing, said that he would have to wait to see what position the Turkish side took. No Turkish offer on territory had been made; the future of the talks would turn on their making realistic proposals.

President Kyprianou outlined the recent history of the inter-communal talks, stressing that his agreement with Mr Denktash in 1979 had made Varosha a separate issue. The Turks were to return it to the Greeks as a gesture of goodwill to enable the negotiation of an overall settlement to take place. The Turks were obstructing progress by insisting that Turkish administration of Varosha should continue after the return of Greek Cypriots. No-one would return on those terms. Although the Turkish side should not ask for concessions in return for Varosha, the Cyprus Government had made a large number of detailed offers over practical measures. So far only two had been agreed: social security payments to those entitled to them (and this despite the fact that those concerned lived under foreign military occupation) and medical services. On the constitutional side, the Turks said that they accepted the principle of federation but they put forward proposals which were unworkable. From the Greek side, the proposals made by President Makarios had not only been reiterated but had been elaborated with the help of British experts (Palley and the Hicks). Meanwhile the Turks had come forward with nothing over territory. They had hinted outside the talks that they might be more positive during the next round but had at one stage said that territory would have to be discussed 'on another level'.


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- 3 -

The Prime Minister said that the world would be watching the next phase of the Cyprus talks. The indications were that the Turkish Government wanted a settlement. Its ability to consider the underlying realities of a situation had been demonstrated over the return of Greece to NATO. The conjuncture at last seemed favourable and it was very important that the opportunity should be seized. There were enough dangerous political problems in the Near East without adding to the instability by neglecting the opportunity to settle one of the area's major disputes. The parties must not stand on words but settle their differences on a realistic basis. President Kyprianou said that he agreed. There must indeed be realism and the outlook might now be better with a military government in Ankara, where the real decisions were taken. The first essential was for the occupiers of Cyprus to indicate their terms. He would not wish to ask for 'pressure' to be exercised in Ankara but outside Governments must be insistent in offering advice to the Turkish Government. He had reliable information that Mr Denktash was doing his best to disrupt the intercommunal talks. He must be curbed by Ankara; the Cyprus Government's request was that a real effort should be made to influence Turkish Government's policy. Mr Bullard said that there seemed little doubt that the influence of Ankara was now being exercised in the right direction. But this might not last if the response on the Greek side was wrong.

The Prime Minister said that Britain would continue to make it very clear to all concerned that the coming phase of the intercommunal talks was crucial and that the parties should show the necessary statesmanship and determination to settle their differences. The conjuncture was right and the moment of decision was rapidly approaching. The Turkish Government would be left in no doubt that this was her view.

The discussion ended at 1045.



22 December, 1980

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Draft to me*

19 December 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Cyprus

I enclose a draft record of the Prime Minister's  
/ conversation this morning with the President of Cyprus.

*Yours as*  
*Paul*  
(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 19 DECEMBER 1980 AT 1000

Present

Prime Minister	President S Kyprianou
Mr J L Bullard	Mr N Rolandis
Mr M O'D B Alexander	Mr H Vovides
Mr T L A Daunt	Mr D Michaelides
	Mr A Chambos

European Community

After an exchange of courtesies, President Kyprianou said that he had just visited Luxembourg for discussion of the problems over Stage II of Cyprus's Association Agreement with the Community; he had met with full understanding. In particular, he wanted <sup>to be better</sup> ~~improved~~ <sup>the</sup> arrangements for 1982/83 than those conceded in 1978; these arrangements would apply prior to completion of the customs union. He looked to the Community to be generous: Cypriot production of the commodities and manufactures which caused difficulty was miniscule by European standards. Mr Rolandis suggested that there should be detailed discussion between Trade Ministers. Arrangements must be made to safeguard the Cypriot position in the British market ahead of customs union; market shares, particularly in sales of wines and sherry, had been falling as a result of the shift in the incidence of duties following British accession to the EC.

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#### Cyprus Problem

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/Government

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Government would be left in no doubt that this was her view.

The discussion ended at 1045.

*Handwritten signature*  
-

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*Cyprus*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*LA. And*

17 December 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Cyprus

I enclose a brief for the call on the Prime Minister by President Kyprianou on 19 December, together with biographical notes on the President and Mr Rolandis. I also enclose a copy of the High Commissioner's scene-setting report in Nicosia telegram no 360; and for ease of reference the record of the Prime Minister's last meeting with President Kyprianou.

The Cypriot party will number six:-

President Kyprianou  
Mr N Rolandis (Foreign Minister)  
Mr T Panayides (High Commissioner)  
Mr H Vovides (Director of the President's Office)  
Ambassador D Michaelides (President's Office)  
Mr A Chambos (Director of the Foreign Minister's  
Private Office)

As agreed, the following will be present from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office:-

Mr Julian Bullard, Deputy Under-Secretary of State  
Mr Timothy Daunt, Head of Southern European Dept

I mentioned to you on the telephone that the Cypriots wish to bring a photographer with them.

*Yours etc*  
*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 19 DECEMBER 1980

Points to Make

Cyprus Problem

1. Delighted at continuation of talks. Congratulations on not pressing issue in UN General Assembly.
2. A unique opportunity may be approaching; present Government in Ankara appear potentially more flexible than any predecessors, or likely successors.
3. But deadlock equally possible. Frankly both sides seem equally inflexible so far.
4. Basic deal remains: Turks must concede territory (we have pressed them hard); Greeks must concede on constitution - at least initially a weak federal government and some constraint on return of refugees etc.
5. Merit in interim package? eg, Varosha/practical measures? You will not get Varosha for nothing; but your recognition problem on practical measures can be solved by simple disclaimer. Surely you can be flexible here?
6. We willing to help; but will not cut across UN initiative while it lasts. Have confidence in Gobbi.

EC/Cyprus

7. UK largely responsible for agreement that transition to Stage II of Association will begin in 1981; will support you further next year.

Aid (Defensive)

8. Considering your Aide Memoire. Our position unlikely to change - we owe you nothing and have no money. But public dispute would benefit neither of us. Foreign Minister to discuss further with Lord Privy Seal?

UNFICYP (Defensive)

9. Heavy burden on troop contributors. In line with UN recommendations, we will make limited cuts in helicopters. Hope Cyprus Government will contribute more.

Visit of the 'Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives'  
(Defensive)

10. Michaelides invited long before his split with you. I received him at Speaker's request as leading figure of friendly Commonwealth country. (Saw Papandreou same week.)

Students Fees (Defensive)

11. Regret decision to raise fees is firm. Recognise problems in many countries, not just Cyprus.

Background

UK Interests in Cyprus

12. These \_\_\_\_\_ arise from:

- (a) *Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4). (Wayland, 15 July 2014)*
- (b) need to preserve peace between Greek and Turkish allies;
- (c) our residual role as guarantor power;
- (d) Cypriot community in UK.

Cyprus Problem

13. Between 1963, when bicomunal constitution broke down, and 1974, Turkish Cypriots were enclaved and harassed by Greeks. Since Turkish invasion in 1974, de facto partition. The only possible basis for settlement is a loose biregional federation, with Greek Cypriots conceding a constitution giving the Turkish Cypriots effective autonomy (in any case complete control over their own security) and the Turkish Cypriots conceding substantial territory (at present 20% of the population, occupying nearly 40% of Republic). UK, with US and Canada, proposed such an outline in 1978. The Greek Cypriots rejected it; but it led indirectly to current UN initiative.

14. Intercommunal talks under UN auspices resumed on 16 September. To avoid a repetition of last year's breakdown, the UN started the talks at a slow pace, with one meeting per week and four agenda items taken weekly in rotation:

- (a) Varosha (Greek suburb of Famagusta, now empty in Turkish hands);



- (b) practical cooperation measures;
- (c) constitution;
- (d) territory.

15. The atmosphere has been generally good; Greek Cypriot restraint in not pursuing their traditional propaganda victory at the UN General Assembly has helped. In the twelve meetings so far, initial bargaining positions have been set out and some common ground identified, but not on essentials. Greek Cypriot constitutional proposals remain maximalist, eg, insisting on complete freedom of movement/settlement immediately. Their suggestions on 'practical measures', which the Turks hope will relieve the effects of the economic embargo, were wholly inadequate, covering only matters such as social security payments. The Greek Cypriot side is reluctant to concede anything which might imply that the Turkish Cypriots run a legitimate Administration - eg for airports. (Not to be disclosed: Dr Waldheim has asked if the Prime Minister would press President Kyprianou over 'practical measures'.) The Turkish Cypriots have so far refused to make any specific territorial proposals at all and Mr Denktash is obviously opposed to doing so. But there are signs that the Turkish military government genuinely wants progress and might push Mr Denktash at least sufficiently to keep talks going. Lord Carrington has pressed the Turkish Foreign Minister both in London (October) and Brussels (December) to get the Turkish Cypriots at least to indicate what <sup>territory</sup> might be on offer if they got a satisfactory constitution.

16. The talks in recess until January. They have so far been handled with great skill by the UN's new representative in Cyprus, Mr Gobbi. Dr Waldheim favours an interim package involving the return of Greek Cypriots to Varosha and a significant easing of the economic blockade on the Turkish Cypriots, enabling them eg to operate an airport with use by international carriers. He recognises that at the same time progress would need to be made in the negotiation of the main points: constitution and territory. The Cyprus Foreign Minister <sup>was</sup> in New York to discuss possibilities with Dr Waldheim immediately before coming to London. Ankara favours an interim package but the Greek Cypriots remain reluctant to make concessions implying recognition of a Turkish Cypriot 'state'.



17. (Not to be disclosed): President Kyprianou's internal position is weak; there have been important defections from his party (including Mr Michaelides the 'Speaker', whom the Prime Minister received recently in London). The Greek Cypriot 'National Council' is ostensibly responsible for major policy decisions but President Kyprianou's own lack of flexibility is thought by the United Nations to be the greatest obstacle to progress at present; but he is widely criticised for the lack of progress and flexibility could help his popular standing.

EC/Cyprus.

18. Britain is Cyprus's main supporter in the EC. The 1972 EC/Cyprus Association Agreement provided for stage two (customs union) to begin in 1977; but repeatedly postponed because French and Italians object (agriculture). In November, the Association Council agreed that the 'process of passage to the second stage' should begin on 1 January 1981. The Foreign Minister told Lord Carrington that President Kyprianou was 'very gratified'. In practice the 'process' is not likely to be short or easy, particularly in the absence of a Cyprus settlement - the Turks make what difficulties they can.

Aid 'Money for Bases'

19. In 1960 Treaty (Appendix R) Britain undertook to grant £12 million to Cyprus in the first five years of independence, and to determine future amounts of aid, if any, each succeeding five years. The Cypriots see this as a continuing obligation to pay for presence of Sovereign Base Areas; we dispute this; and legally they have no case. Britain paid the first £12 million. But the breakdown of the constitution in 1963 removed political rationale for further aid. In 1978 Britain offered a £7.5 million loan, which was to be considered to discharge any past obligations. The Cypriots have not taken it up; for internal political reasons (including communist - largest political party with 25% of votes - opposition) they continue to press a claim which they have set at £250 million. An aide memoire is being 'considered' pending a negative reply; policy is to play the issue long and low; the Cypriots want a committee to consider their claim; it is not necessarily ruled out but has not been conceded as it could merely raise expectations. Thinking Greek Cypriots doubtless know that  
/they





they would be unwise to press too hard ahead of a Cyprus settlement.

UN Force (UNFICYP)

20. UK is the largest contributor. The cost is over £5 million p.a. in addition to basic costs of troops. A UN review of costs was instigated in mid-year. In accordance with its recommendations minor reductions and some cutting of British helicopter support is being made. Officials still working on details. Greek Cypriots, whom UNFICYP defend, are sensitive over cuts. All troop contributors agree that they should pay more, since it is the Greek Cypriots who benefit.

Visit of the 'Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives'

21. (Not to be disclosed) President Kyprianou is reportedly upset that the Prime Minister received Mr Michaelides in November; he had just defected from the President's party to become a leading rival for the Presidency (in 1983).

Student Fees

22. Strong Cypriot protests at the decision to increase overseas students' fees to full cost. The Cypriots claim that they suffer particularly, because there is no university in Cyprus and the educational system is UK-orientated. Efforts to secure special treatment for them have failed.

PRUS: VITAL STATISTICS

1. Population and Land Area (whole island)

(a) Land Area	9251 km <sup>2</sup> of which:
	59.2% Greek Cypriot controlled
	35.1% Turkish Cypriot controlled
	2.77% Sovereign Base Areas
	3% Buffer zone
(b) Population	620,000
	(505,000 Greek Cypriots)
	(115,000 Turkish Cypriots)

2. Political Parties (strength in House of Representatives)

Democratic Party (DEKO) (supporting President Kyprianou)	11
AKEL (communist)	9
New Democracy Party (Mr Michaelides)	6
EDEK (extreme left)	4
Centre Union	3
Independent	1
Democratic Rally (right)	1
	<hr/>
	TOTAL 35
	<hr/>

3. Gross National Product (Greek Cypriot Section)

	<u>1978</u>
(a) Total	US\$1,370m
(b) Growth Rate (1974-79)	11% per annum approx.
(c) Per Capita	US\$2,110

4. Trade with UK

	<u>1980 (est)</u>
UK Exports to Cyprus	£118.8m
UK Imports from Cyprus	£113.9m
UK Share of Cyprus Imports	20%
UK Share of Cyprus Exports	23%
Position in UK's Export League Table (1979)	50th (of 150)

CONFIDENTIAL

KYPRIANOU, SPYROS

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Barrister (Gray's Inn). From 1955 the principal EOKA contact in London. Minister of Foreign Affairs after Independence. Always close to Makarios. Formed artificial centrist electoral coalition (with communist help) to beat right wing in 1976. Was elected President unopposed ('interests of national unity') after Makarios died 1977.

As Foreign Minister advocated tough policy and no concessions to Turks. With the West, often prickly, stubborn, and legalistic. As President, weak, indecisive, and increasingly unpopular. His DEKO coalition is breaking up; communists have deserted him; and Michaelides has split, to form rival centrist party. (Parliamentary elections due spring 1981; Presidential 1983.) But apparently determined to soldier on.

\* ~~~~~ \* Bad health may force early retirement, though recently better. Married, 2 sons. Speaks English well.

\* — \* Passage deleted and temporarily  
retained under Section 3(4)

Wayland  
15 July 2014

December 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

ROLANDIS, NICOS A

Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1978.

Born Limassol 1934. Educated locally and in London (Middle Temple). Barrister 1956. Practised law in Cyprus before turning to business and becoming the Managing Director and major shareholder in one of the biggest industrial groups in Cyprus, well known locally as the manufacturers of Seven-Up. On boards of other companies.

Kyprianou probably chose Rolandis as a loyal supporter who would carry out orders rather than himself shape foreign policy. But Rolandis, who has shown a mind of his own, privately gives every sign of supporting a realistic solution to the intercommunal problem. He exerts influence on the President and helped to persuade him to meet Denktash in May 1979. But in the last resort Rolandis, a relative new comer to politics, does not seem to carry sufficient weight to persuade Kyprianou to change his mind on fundamental issues.

Markedly more pro-Western than Kyprianou, he has been actively reforming the Cyprus Diplomatic Service.

Speaks English fluently. Married, two daughters and one son. His wife, who also speaks good English and was a leading Cypriot tennis player, gives him strong support.

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FM NICOSIA 161000Z DEC

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 OF 16 DECEMBER 1980.

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA AND  
CBFC (ACTIONED).

## VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

1. THE PRESIDENT WILL SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AT A TIME WHEN HIS POLITICAL PROSPECTS ARE UNCLEAR. HIS PARTY (DEKO) HAS SPLIT RETAINING 10 AS AGAINST THE PREVIOUS 19 SEATS IN A HOUSE OF 35. THE COMMUNISTS (AKEL), GENERALLY SEEN AS RETAINING UPWARDS OF A QUARTER OF THE VOTE, HAVE WITHDRAWN THEIR SUPPORT FROM KYPRIANOU. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, DUE NEXT YEAR, WILL PROBABLY BE HELD IN APRIL OR MAY.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND KYPRIANOU IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE HIS PRESENT DIFFICULTIES PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH FLOWING FROM HIS TENURE OF OFFICE. IN ANY CASE HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT IS NOT DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS. (PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE DUE IN 1983). KYPRIANOU WILL NEED SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE TO GET LEGISLATION THROUGH WHEN, AS IS LIKELY, HIS PARTY IS IN AN EVEN WEAKER POSITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. BUT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT HE MAY GET THIS FROM THE COMMUNISTS WHO HAVE RECENTLY MODERATED THEIR ATTACKS ON HIS ADMINISTRATION.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, KYPRIANOU FACES DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON THE INTERCOMMUNAL ISSUE. THE TALKS HAVE MADE MODEST PROGRESS. BUT AFTER 12 MEETINGS THEY HAVE REACHED A STAGE WHERE WITHOUT IMAGINATION AND REALISM ON BOTH SIDES THEY MAY DEGENERATE INTO A STERILE DIALOGUE IN WHICH NO EFFECTIVE ATTEMPT IS MADE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

4. KYPRIANOU HAS NOT SO FAR SHOWN EITHER OF THESE QUALITIES. HIS REACTION SEEMS TO BE A DETERMINATION TO STAND PAT ON THE POSITION THAT ANY MOVE MUST COME FROM THE TURKISH SIDE WHO, AS THE "AGGRESSORS", HAVE A DUTY TO GIVE BACK TERRITORY AND ENABLE GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR PROPERTY. ONLY WHEN THIS IS AGREED CAN CONCESSIONS BE CONSIDERED ON THE STRONG CENTRALISED POWERS PROPOSED BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (SEMI COLON) OR A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH BE ADOPTED TOWARDS THE TURKISH SIDE'S PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL MEASURES TO EASE THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY THEIR ISOLATION. IN SHORT, DESPITE HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF A BIREGIONAL FEDERATION, KYPRIANOU TO ALL APPEARANCES CONTINUES TO INSIST ON A RETURN TO SOMETHING LIKE THE PRE-1974 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. HE THUS DISREGARDS OR MINIMISES THE LEGACY OF DISTRUST RESULTING LARGELY FROM GREEK CYPRIOT ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS DURING THE YEARS BEFORE 1974.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

5. IN TERMS OF HIS OWN POLITICAL INTEREST KYPRIANOU WOULD NO DOUBT JUSTIFY HIS RIGID ATTITUDE AS AVOIDING ACCUSATIONS OF BETRAYAL OF VITAL GREEK CYPRIOT INTERESTS. BUT RECENT SOUNDINGS OF CYPRIOT OPINION HAVE SHOWN THAT EVEN AMONG GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES THERE IS NOT UNIVERSAL SUPPORT FOR AN EXTREME POSITION. BY INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AND (WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS) ON PRACTICAL MEASURES, KYPRIANOU COULD PUT THE TURKISH SIDE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO MOVE ON TERRITORY. I HOPE THAT AN ATTEMPT CAN BE MADE TO GET HIM TO SEE THAT HE CAN IN THIS WAY GIVE A FRESH IMPETUS TO THE TALKS. IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS FLEXIBILITY OF THIS KIND COULD WELL WORK TO HIS ADVANTAGE.

RHODES

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 190005Z DEC 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2039 OF 18 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA

IMMEDIATE

PRENDERGAST'S TELELETTER OF 11 DECEMBER TO PLUMBLY (NOT TO ALL):  
VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.

1. MANSFIELD HAS DISCUSSED WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL'S TALKS THIS WEEK WITH ROLANDIS AND ATAKOL. GOBBI AND  
SHERRY WERE WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. WALDHEIM APPARENTLY STUCK CLOSELY TO HIS BRIEF (SENT WITH  
PRENDERGAST'S TELELETTER UNDER REFERENCE). HE EMPHASISED THAT THE  
GOOD ATMOSPHERE THAT HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE FIRST THREE ROUNDS OF  
TALKS PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR STARTING TO TACKLE THE  
ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT GO INTO SPECIFIC DETAILS  
ON THE SORT OF CONCESSIONS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY EACH SIDE,  
HE DID SUGGEST THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT SHOW READINESS TO  
EXPLORE PRACTICAL ECONOMIC MEASURES WHILE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS  
PRODUCED SOME IDEAS ABOUT THE RESETTLEMENT OF VAROSHA UNDER U N  
AUSPICES. BUT HE MAINTAINED THE POSITION THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL  
TALKS, OR THEIR MARGINS, RATHER THAN NEW YORK, WAS THE PLACE FOR  
NEW IDEAS TO BE PRODUCED AND DISCUSSED.

3. DE CUELLAR AND GOBBI WERE PLEASED AT THE WAY THE INTERCOMMUNAL  
TALKS HAD GONE SO FAR, BUT THEY SHARED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S  
CONCERN THAT ALTHOUGH THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED,  
IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR SOME  
TANGIBLE PROGRESS TO BE MADE. WALDHEIM THINKS IT WILL BE DISASTROUS

CONCERN THAT ALTHOUGH THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS TO BE MADE. WALDHEIM THINKS IT WILL BE DISASTROUS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE TALKS IF NO DEVELOPMENT EMERGES FROM THE NEXT MEETING SO THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS COME TO BE VIEWED INTERNATIONALLY AS ROUTINE AND STERILE. HE HAD THEREFORE CONCENTRATED IN HIS TALKS WITH ROLANDIS AND ATAKOL ON THE NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEXT ROUND. THE CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN POSITIVE. ROLANDIS HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND HAD APPRECIATED THE NEED FOR REALISM. GOBBI CONTRASTED ROLANDIS' ATTITUDE WITH KYPRIANOU'S REMARK TO HIM BEFORE HE LEFT CYPRUS THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS MUST GIVE UP VAROSHA UNCONDITIONALLY. GOBBI BELIEVES THAT BOTH ROLANDIS AND ICANNIDES RECOGNISE THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ANKARA OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY OF MAKING PROGRESS FOR SOME TIME. BUT THE STUMBLING BLOCK REMAINS KYPRIANOU AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS UPON HIM. ROLANDIS APPEARED PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF PERSUADING HIM TO BE REALISTIC.

4. GOBBI SAID THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME FOR THE U N TO BE QUOTE TOO IMAGINATIVE UNQUOTE. THEY HAD THROWN OUT SOME BROAD IDEAS, BUT MUST NOW WAIT TO SEE HOW THE TALKS DEVELOPED. THEY WANTED TO GIVE THE TWO SIDES THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORKOUT THEIR OWN FORMULATION OF THESE IDEAS BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE A SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO COME UP WITH POSITIVE IDEAS ON PRACTICAL MEASURES AND HAD TOLD ROLANDIS THAT AN OFFER OF THE OPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT IN RETURN FOR VAROSHA WAS NOT ENOUGH. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, GOBBI SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE PROCEDURALLY FLEXIBLE, BUT HE EVIDENTLY IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THE RIGHT STAGE HAS YET BEEN REACHED FOR INFORMAL TALKS IN THE MARGIN ON TERRITORY/CONSTITUTION. HE SEEMS TO PREFER THE PRIOR EXPLORATION OF A MINI-PACKAGE.

5. IN SHORT, THEREFORE, THE MESSAGE WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HOPED WE COULD GET OVER TO KYPRIANOU IN LONDON WAS THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WAS CRUCIAL: THAT THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, BUT THAT IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL TO BE FLEXIBLE AND PRAGMATIC ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE, WHILE THE OMENS IN ANKARA WERE NOT UNFAVOURABLE.

PARSONS



Cyprus



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 November 1980

Miss Stephens to mte

Dear Caroline,

Cyprus: Visit of President Kyprianou

Thank you for your letter of 19 November offering 10.00 a.m. on Friday 19 December for a call on the Prime Minister by President Kyprianou. The Cyprus High Commission has confirmed that this would be convenient to the President; the appointment should therefore be considered as firm. The brief will be sent to you by close of play on 17 December.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

Miss C Stephens  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

28 NOV 1980

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Cyprus

MR. ALEXANDER

*And*

The Foreign Office recommended that the Prime Minister see President Kyprianou of Cyprus.

The Prime Minister has agreed and I have put him in the diary at 10 am on Friday 19 December and have requested a brief from the Foreign Office.

*AS*

24 November 1980

file BK

24 November 1980

BF 17.12.80

Cyprus: Visit of President Kyprianou

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 19 November to Michael Alexander and to confirm that the Prime Minister would be very happy to receive President Kyprianou during his visit to this country. May I please offer you 10 am on Friday 19 December and could your brief please reach this office by close of play on Wednesday 17 December.

C STEPHENS

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CS





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1980

*Dear Michael*

Cyprus: Visit of President Kyprianou

President Kyprianou has asked, through the Cyprus High Commissioner, whether the Prime Minister would agree to receive him for 30 - 45 minutes during a visit he plans to make to London from 18 to 22 December. The President wishes principally to discuss the intercommunal talks and Cyprus association with the European Community. His visit will otherwise be private, to meet the Cypriot community and for medical treatment.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to receive President Kyprianou. He is Head of State and Government of a friendly Commonwealth country, and the United Kingdom has substantial defence interests in Cyprus through the Sovereign Base Areas. It is also relevant that the Prime Minister will, at the Speaker's request, recently have received Mr Alecos Michaelides, who is one of President Kyprianou's main rivals and recently split his parliamentary party. The subjects President Kyprianou wishes to discuss should in any case both be at a point at which high level discussion could be useful.

When President Kyprianou was here in February the Prime Minister gave a working lunch for him after their talks. Lord Carrington does not think it essential that lunch should be offered on this occasion but it would doubtless be very well received if the Prime Minister wished again to offer hospitality.

I should be grateful to know the Prime Minister's decisions, and for an indication of date and time if she agrees to see President Kyprianou.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD).

*Yours etc*


*Paul*

(P Lever)

Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

19 Nov 1980



POSTED BY THE POST OFFICE  
LONDON W1V 3VH



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

13 March 1980

Prime Minister to write

H.F.

Ant - 13/3

Cyprus

20

M.S.

Dear Michael,

University Fees for Cypriot Students

During his call on the Prime Minister on 29 February, President Kyprianou raised the subject of university fees. I enclose the relevant extract from the record for ease of reference. The possibility of using aid funds or of making arrangements within the European Community to ease the students' problems was raised. We have since asked the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to follow up these points with the Government of Cyprus. Unfortunately, neither possibility appears to be a starter. Any arrangements for EC countries are unlikely to be extended to EC Associate members such as Cyprus. The use of aid funds poses obvious problems, above all the general shortage of such funds: Lord Carrington of course told President Kyprianou and Mr Rolandis that he saw no prospect of aid funds being diverted for this purpose, and we shall have to confirm this position.

Mr Rhodes has been given discretion as to how to present these unpalatable facts to the Government of Cyprus.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Shaw in the Department of Education and Science.

yours ever  
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



Would it not be necessary to approach the problem more gradually. Both sides would have to make sacrifices. President Kyprianou said that if an evolutionary approach was adopted it would be the end of Cyprus. The existing divisions would become deeper and deeper. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the divisions already existed. The idea would be to try to move away from them. There would have to be initial compromises by both sides.

The Prime Minister said that any such compromises would have to be prepared before the talks began. They should be prepared in private. Mr. Rolandis commented that no major problem had ever been solved in public. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that, given the lack of confidence between the two sides, it might be possible initially to have the two delegations in the same building with an intermediary going between them. This was a technique which had been used frequently during the Rhodesia Conference. The Prime Minister, re-emphasising the need for careful preparation for any new round of talks, said that all options should be explored. In reply to a request from Mr. Rolandis that HMG should use their good offices, the Prime Minister said that we would do what we could to get the Turks to the table. If the talks were restarted, it would be essential to keep them going and to avoid the kind of adjournment that had occurred last June.

Cypriot students in the UK

President Kyprianou and Mr. Rolandis expressed dismay at the problems which would be faced by Cypriot students in the United Kingdom who had to pay the full cost of their education here. Mr. Rolandis said that there were 2,500 students in the country at the moment. He added that there was no university in Cyprus and that the fees for a university education in the United Kingdom could not be met by even the most prosperous Cypriot parents. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Cypriot Government could not subsidise their students to some extent. Mr. Rolandis said that the left wing parties in Cyprus would never agree to this, particularly as they could point out that many universities in Eastern European countries were only too anxious to educate students free of charge. The Prime Minister said

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/ that

that she was unable to hold out much hope that the Government's position would change. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he saw no prospect of aid funds being diverted to help with the problem.

Mr. Rolandis asked whether it would be possible for any arrangements introduced to benefit students from EEC countries to be extended to cover Cypriot students. Cyprus was after all an associate member of the EEC. Mr. Bullard said that so far as he was aware no scheme had yet been agreed to cover EEC students. However, he undertook to ensure that the possibilities were investigated.

(Part of the above discussion took place over lunch. The lunch was attended by Mr. Pattie and Mr. Knighton in addition to those listed at the beginning of this record.)

The discussion ended at 1420.

*Am*

29 February 1980

file

Cyprus

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

28



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

29 February 1980

*Dear Paul,*

As you know President Kyprianou called on the Prime Minister earlier today. I enclose a record of their discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter together with an extract of the record to Robert Green (Department of Education and Science).

*Yours ever*

*Michael Alexander*

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

copied to Master Set  
@ Cyprus: Internal Set:  
Feb 1980.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  
OF CYPRUS (MR. SPYROS KYPRIANOU), AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON  
29 FEBRUARY 1980 AT 1200 HOURS

Present: Prime Minister  
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary  
Mr. J.L. Bullard  
H.E. Mr. P. Rhodes  
Mr. Alexander

President Kyprianou  
Mr. Rolandis, Foreign Minister  
Mr. Pelagias, Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Vovides, Director of the President's Office  
Mr. Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus

\* \* \* \* \*

The Cyprus problem

President Kyprianou said that although five years had passed since the Turkish invasion and although repeated efforts had been made to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, no progress whatever had been made. He did not know what Turkey wanted. If Turkey was interested in the welfare or security of Turkish Cypriots, a solution could be found; but if they were interested in expansionism or separatism, then no peaceful solution would be possible. No clear answer had ever been forthcoming about Turkish objectives. Until there was one, no progress would be made.

President Kyprianou said that despite the breakdown last June and the subsequent difficulties, his Government still wished to make progress. They wished to take up the talks at the point where they had been left and on the basis of the ten points agreed in May. The Turks however were insisting on preconditions. There would have to be a change in Turkish attitudes if further talks were to be fruitful. The time had come therefore for the countries of Western Europe to bring their influence to bear in Ankara. There was a tendency to argue that because Turkey was an important ally and because it was going through a difficult period, this was a bad time for the West to try to bring pressure to bear. President Kyprianou said that this was not his view. The moment when the Turkish Government needed the West and when they were receiving so much help, was the time to offer them "advice". The problem could not be solved

CONFIDENTIAL

/ without

without the involvement of the major countries that wanted to see a solution. Mr. Rolandis pointed out that the Western world as a whole had an interest in finding a solution. At the moment NATO ended in Italy. Greece and Turkey could not become proper allies so long as the Cyprus problem persisted. The consequences of a persistence of the present situation would also be disastrous for Cyprus. Sooner or later a liberation movement would start. The acceptance of partition, or indeed of double union, would result in guerilla warfare.

President Kyprianou said that Britain had a particular role to play. There were special links between the two countries, both directly as a result of the sovereign base areas and of Britain's status as a guarantor power, and as a result of the Commonwealth relationship. The Cypriots did not expect impartiality from Britain: they expected support. Cyprus was at present under British influence and played a pro-Western role in the non-aligned movement. This might change if no solution could be found. It was therefore both important and appropriate for Britain to seek to take the initiative - not in substitution of the efforts of Mr. Waldheim but to assist him.

The Prime Minister said that HMG wanted to see the inter-communal talks start again. We had said so in Ankara and in London. She recognised the importance of the talks for those directly involved, for the people of Cyprus as a whole, and for the Western world. Britain had done, and would go on doing, everything to encourage progress. Why had the talks broken down in June?

President Kyprianou said that at the time the ten points had been agreed, the atmosphere had been good but subsequently the Turks had given the impression that they had changed their mind. In June they had insisted on the acceptance of bizonality as a precondition for progress. Bizonality, as expressed by the Turks, meant not federation but partition. The Greek/Cypriot side had not refused discussion of bizonality but had only refused to accept it as a precondition. The Turks had also talked about the security of the Turkish/Cypriot community in a way which had led the Greek Cypriots to think they envisaged partition. The Greek Cypriots for their part, wanted to talk about the security of all Cypriots.

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- 3 -

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether it was really the case that bizonality meant partition. If this was the case, there was of course nothing to talk about. But did the Turkish Cypriots not accept the concept of a central authority. While agreeing that they did, President Kyprianou said that it was clear that Mr. Denktash was seeking a form of sovereignty and regarded the relationship between the two parts of Cyprus as essentially an international one. Mr. Rhodes pointed out that the Turks wanted a secure boundary between the two parts of the island with customs and immigration formalities. The Turkish Cypriots' basic worry related to their security. This flowed from what had happened between 1963 and 1974. President Kyprianou said that it was important to differentiate between the attitude of Mr. Denktash and of other Turkish Cypriots, many of whom had made it clear that they would be happy to come to live in "free Cyprus". The Cypriot Government had made proposals for complete demilitarisation. They would be prepared to have an international police force in the country until the sense of insecurity had been removed. In parallel with that there could be a mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police force as there had been in the past. If the worry about security was a genuine one, it could be solved. His concern was that it was in fact an artificial obstacle.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the new Turkish Government was likely to be any more helpful than its predecessor. President Kyprianou thought not. It was the military leaders who took the decisions about Cyprus. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled that during his recent visit to Ankara he had pressed for the resumption of the inter-communal talks. Mr. Demirel had said flatly that his Government had no influence with the Turkish Cypriots. This might suggest that President Kyprianou's analysis was correct.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in the end the problem always came back to the fears of the Turkish Cypriots about their security. Was there no form of reassurance that they could be offered or would accept. Mr. Rhodes expressed doubt about this. They wanted a clear line between the two communities. He

/ saw no

CONFIDENTIAL

C.R.  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 4 -

saw no prospect of an early return of refugees. President Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriot refugees were prepared to live under a Turkish administration if a federal solution could be found. But it was essential to attach precise and agreed meanings to such concepts as federation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was precisely what the negotiations should be about. President Kyprianou said that the Turkish Cypriots could raise anything they liked in renewed talks. The Prime Minister said that it might be dangerous to reopen talks that had broken down without the most careful prior preparation. A further breakdown might be definitive. President Kyprianou said that at present no preparations were in progress, only arguments about concepts. This suited the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community well enough since the longer the deadlock persisted, the more likely it was that the de facto situation would be accepted as de jure. Mr. Denktash and Mr. Caylangil had both made it clear that what they were seeking was the legalisation of what had been "achieved" in 1974. If this was their true objective, no progress would ever be made. The Prime Minister commented that the absence of movement on the Turkish side was depressing.

President Kyprianou said that Cyprus was entitled to justice and to assistance in the achievement of a viable solution. Mistakes might have been made in the past. If so, many people had been responsible. But the real problem was what to do now. The Cypriot Government would like the help of the British Government in resolving the tragedy and in enabling Cyprus to become once more a united country, closely linked with the United Kingdom. Mr. Denktash was not interested in this last point. He had claimed to various Arab countries that while he wanted the British out of the base areas, the Greek Cypriots wanted to keep the bases. Mr. Rhodes commented that Mr. Denktash was probably trying to prove that he was more genuinely non-aligned than President Kyprianou. The Prime Minister repeated Britain's willingness to help but said that the problem seemed to be to give the Turkish Cypriots some assurance that they would be safe in a federal state and that there would be no repetition of earlier events. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Turkish Cypriots would accept nothing that was unsatisfactory to them in relation to security. Was it realistic to suppose that a solution could be found which everyone would welcome at once, i.e. a federal republic with a measure of devolution.

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/ Would

Would it not be necessary to approach the problem more gradually. Both sides would have to make sacrifices. President Kyprianou said that if an evolutionary approach was adopted it would be the end of Cyprus. The existing divisions would become deeper and deeper. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the divisions already existed. The idea would be to try to move away from them. There would have to be initial compromises by both sides.

The Prime Minister said that any such compromises would have to be prepared before the talks began. They should be prepared in private. Mr. Rolandis commented that no major problem had ever been solved in public. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that, given the lack of confidence between the two sides, it might be possible initially to have the two delegations in the same building with an intermediary going between them. This was a technique which had been used frequently during the Rhodesia Conference. The Prime Minister, re-emphasising the need for careful preparation for any new round of talks, said that all options should be explored. In reply to a request from Mr. Rolandis that HMG should use their good offices, the Prime Minister said that we would do what we could to get the Turks to the table. If the talks were restarted, it would be essential to keep them going and to avoid the kind of adjournment that had occurred last June.

#### Cypriot students in the UK

President Kyprianou and Mr. Rolandis expressed dismay at the problems which would be faced by Cypriot students in the United Kingdom who had to pay the full cost of their education here. Mr. Rolandis said that there were 2,500 students in the country at the moment. He added that there was no university in Cyprus and that the fees for a university education in the United Kingdom could not be met by even the most prosperous Cypriot parents. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Cypriot Government could not subsidise their students to some extent. Mr. Rolandis said that the left wing parties in Cyprus would never agree to this, particularly as they could point out that many universities in Eastern European countries were only too anxious to educate students free of charge. The Prime Minister said



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
- 6 -

that she was unable to hold out much hope that the Government's position would change. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he saw no prospect of aid funds being diverted to help with the problem.

Mr. Rolandis asked whether it would be possible for any arrangements introduced to benefit students from EEC countries to be extended to cover Cypriot students. Cyprus was after all an associate member of the EEC. Mr. Bullard said that so far as he was aware no scheme had yet been agreed to cover EEC students. However, he undertook to ensure that the possibilities were investigated.

(Part of the above discussion took place over lunch. The lunch was attended by Mr. Pattie and Mr. Knighton in addition to those listed at the beginning of this record.)

The discussion ended at 1420.



29 February 1980

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Annie Minister*

*Paul*

28 February 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Visit of the President of Cyprus: 29 February

With my letter of 25 February I sent you briefing for President Kyprianou's visit. Since then (on 25 February itself) the Ambassador at Ankara has spoken to the Turkish Government to impress on them that the British Government favour an early resumption of intercommunal talks on Cyprus and to advocate greater flexibility on the part of the Turkish side in discussions of formulae with the UN. The same point was made on 26 February to the Turkish Embassy in London, in particular that there was no merit in trying to pre-negotiate the Secretary-General's opening statement at the resumed talks. Meanwhile, Dr Waldheim has made no request for further British intervention.

All the foregoing points could be made to Mr Kyprianou.

*Yours etc*

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

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28 FEB 1960, 1960.



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CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON

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FM PARIS 281658Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 236 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO ROUTINE NICOSIA ANKARA ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

1. THE DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE GAVE US A BRIEF ACCOUNT ON 28 FEBRUARY OF THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS KYPRIANOU AND GISCARD EARLIER IN THE DAY. LECLERCQ SAID THAT LITTLE OF INTEREST HAD EMERGED. KYPRIANOU HAD PREDICTABLY SOUGHT FRENCH HELP IN RESTARTING THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. HE HAD SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO THE FRIENDS AND ALLIES OF TURKEY TO EXERT PRESSURE IN ANKARA TO MAKE DENKTASH MORE AMENABLE. IF THE WEST DECIDED TO PROVIDE MORE AID TO TURKEY, THIS LEVER SHOULD BE USED TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS. KYPRIANOU HAD DETAILED AT LENGTH TURKISH CYPRIOT INTRANSIGENCE.

2. PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD REPLIED THAT FRANCE WAS READY TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE TURKS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HE HAD NOT HOWEVER SPECIFIED IN WHAT FORM AN APPROACH MIGHT BE MADE, NOR WHETHER FRANCE WOULD WISH TO DO IT ALONE OR IN THE COMPANY OF OTHERS. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT GISCARD CAST A FLY OVER PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ON THE QUESTION OF THE UN COMMITTEE, THE LATTER HAD NOT DWELT ON IT. HE HAD SIMPLY SAID THAT THE TURKISH ATTITUDE WAS "PARADOXICAL" GIVEN THAT ON THE ONE HAND THEY WERE PROCRASTINATING OVER THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS NOW, WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND REJECTING THE IDEA OF A UN COMMITTEE.

HIBBERT



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I fear the briefing is  
somewhat detailed: President  
Kyprianou has made it clear  
that he hopes for an 'in  
Sept' discussion of the Cyprus  
problem.

Ant.  
- 26/2

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

26 February 1980

*As*  
*Paul*  
*26/2*

Dear Michael,

Visit of President Kyprianou

As requested in your letter of 11 January to Roderic Lyne, I enclose briefs for the Prime Minister's use during her meeting with President Kyprianou of Cyprus at 12.00 on Friday 29 February.

The briefs are somewhat long and detailed. But President Kyprianou is likely to expect a detailed discussion and some of the issues involved may not be familiar to the Prime Minister who, apart from a short meeting with President Kyprianou at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka in August 1979, has not hitherto been involved in the Cyprus problem.

Briefs Nos 1 and 3 refer at various points to the important British interests in the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).

\* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)  
*(Wayland, 15 July 2014)* \* Further briefing  
on this subject, if required, is available from the FCO or the Ministry of Defence.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours etc

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET



BRIEF NO 1

## VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 29 FEBRUARY 1980

Objectives

- (i) Maintain good relations with a fellow Commonwealth Head of Government, in order to protect important British interests in Cyprus;
- (ii) Encourage a constructive Greek Cypriot attitude over the intercommunal dispute and discourage the establishment of a new UN Committee on Cyprus;
- (iii) Stress British goodwill towards the Greek Cypriots but discourage ideas of a 'British initiative' to gang up on the Turks;
- (iv) (Defensive). Promote realism over absurd Cypriot aid claims in respect of Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).

Cypriot Objectives

- (i) Seek general British support for the Greek Cypriot case in the light of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence;
- (ii) Secure agreement to put pressure on the Turks to accept Greek Cypriot ideas on the conduct of intercommunal talks;
- (iii) Press Cyprus Government aid claims in respect of SBAs.

Background and Tactics

2. The visit is at President Kyprianou's initiative; every 18 months or so he invites himself to the main Western European capitals to canvass support for the Greek Cypriot cause. He will have seen President Giscard on 28 February and is going on to Rome after a weekend in London with the Greek Cypriot community; he may then visit Bonn but Chancellor Schmidt is reportedly reluctant to see him because of his recent acceptance of an invitation to visit East Germany officially (there has, however, been a recent visit to Bonn by the Director General of the Cyprus Foreign Ministry).

/3.



3. President Kyprianou will probably wish to expound at length the Greek Cypriot ideas for the conduct and content of intercommunal talks, already outlined to Lord Carrington by the Cyprus Foreign Minister on 8 February. He will be looking for a commitment to put pressure on Turkey to make the Turkish Cypriots accept his ideas and, in particular, accept Dr Waldheim's most recent proposals for restarting the talks.
4. The President shows little inclination to adopt realistic policies in search of a settlement of the Cyprus problem. He relies largely on international pressure, eg through the UN General Assembly resolutions the passage of which annually disrupts intercommunal contacts, to force the Turkish Army to leave Cyprus. He has tended to backtrack on Makarios's commitment to a bizonal solution, and still talks of "'safeguards'" for the Turkish "'minority'" in a State the Government of which would be dominated by the Greek Cypriots. He harbours illusions that the mass of Turkish Cypriots would welcome him as the President of all Cypriots if Mr Denktash and the Turkish Army would let them.
5. President Kyprianou's domestic position is weak. He relies heavily on a left-wing coalition in which the Communists are strong. They and moderates such as Foreign Minister Rolandis advocate realism and flexibility in negotiation with the Turkish Cypriots. But there is strong resistance to concessions from the nationalistic left and right wings and particularly from the Cyprus Orthodox Church. And the "'refugee'" lobbies, with particular interests over the contents of any settlement, are influential.
6. Apart from the general British concern for peace in Cyprus and a settlement of Graeco/Turkish differences, the main British interest is in the facilities in the SBAs; they are physically located largely in the Greek Cypriot sector. Their effective use depends much more on the Greek than the Turkish Cypriots.
7. It is desirable that the President, who is vain, should be satisfied that he received a patient and sympathetic hearing for his complaints about the Turks and advocacy of his preferred solutions both to the short term problem of getting worthwhile talks resumed and to the overall Cyprus problem. He will expect \_\_\_\_\_ /at





at least that from a Guarantor Power with strong historical and cultural links. He should be encouraged to be realistic and advised against establishing a new UN Committee on Cyprus; but there is little object in pressing him really hard since the Turkish side is very unlikely to show flexibility in the near future; modest progress might be made but a real breakthrough is improbable.

#### Cyprus Problem (Brief No 2)

8. Mr Rolandis told Lord Carrington this was the "only subject" Mr Kyprianou wished to discuss. The Greek Cypriots are making the most of being the "reasonable" side at present, having accepted the latest Waldheim initiative whilst the Turkish Cypriots continue to stall. But grave doubts remain about Greek Cypriot willingness to make the concessions essential if a settlement was to be reached. The truth is that both sides are unreasonable and inflexible and, even if talks restarted, the prospects for real progress would be poor.

9. Longer-term prospects for a settlement are also poor, barring favourable conjuncture: ie a strong Turkish Government prepared to push the Turkish Cypriots, a strong and moderate Greek Cypriot Government and a helpful line from Athens. At present only the third element is present. Britain can live with the existing reasonably stable de facto situation, which offers little current threat to the SBAs; but a settlement is highly desirable in the interests of stability in Greek-Turkish relations.

#### Varosha

10. There have been reports that the Turkish Cypriots intend to open up hotels in the "sealed-off" area of Varosha, former Greek Cypriot resort quarter of Famagusta, under Turkish military control since 1974. This may be only a tactical move to put pressure on the Greek Cypriots over intercommunal talks; it seems to have succeeded. Recovery of Varosha has assumed high symbolic importance for the Greek Cypriots, who want talks to open with agreement to return it in exchange for economic concessions to the Turkish Cypriots (see Brief No 2).



11. Strong UK and other Western representations have been made to the Turkish Government and Turkish Cypriots warning against action likely to jeopardise the talks; Greek Cypriots have been told of these representations. Turkish Cypriot action on Varosha would, however, be likely if at Greek Cypriot instigation a UN Committee on Cyprus was established (Brief No 2).

#### Cypriot Aid Claims (Brief No 3)

12. Mr Kyprianou discussed payments for the SBAs with the Prime Minister at Lusaka in August 1979 and may return to the charge. He wants £200-300 million. There is nothing new to say; it is as well to discourage any hope that more aid will be forthcoming and to persuade the Cypriots that neither side has anything to gain from public acrimony.

#### Afghanistan

13. Cyprus abstained in disreputable company on the 14 January General Assembly resolution on Soviet intervention, and again on the 14 February resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission. The Cyprus Government say that they cannot afford to alienate Soviet bloc support for their case at the UN, which they claim the Soviets threatened to withdraw. They also argue that their abstention was a protest at Western failure to condemn Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus since 1974. Lord Carrington told Mr Rolandis on 8 February that he would be ill-advised to rely heavily on Eastern bloc support; the price is enforced isolation from non-aligned and Western friends. The Turkey parallel is misleading and irrelevant.

#### EC/Cyprus Relations

14. The Cyprus Government are pressing for early implementation of Stage II of the EC/Cyprus Association Agreement, envisaging a customs union. Talks about the content of Stage II are to start shortly; Stage I has meanwhile been extended for a further transitional period until December 1980. The UK has given consistent general support, and will continue to do so, while maintaining that the benefits of EC association must go to both communities. Obstruction is likely from producers of rival agricultural produce within the Community (France, Italy).

/University Fees

University Fees

15. The recent decision to increase to full cost the fees for overseas students at UK higher education institutions has drawn strong Cypriot protests, some at high official level. The Cypriots argue that their students suffer particularly because there is no university in Cyprus and their educational system is strongly UK-orientated. They also say more Cypriot students will go to Eastern Europe, with consequent damage to Western interests; and the common English language/culture is important to reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots. But they have been told that the decision is firm: there is no prospect of reversal or special treatment for Cyprus.

UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

16. The UK contribution costs £5.5 million per annum in addition to the basic cost of troops' pay. [NOT FOR USE] We are seeking a review by troop contributors. The Greek Cypriots are sensitive to tampering with UNFICYP, which reassures them in face of the Turkish Army and is economically convenient.

Southern European Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
25 February 1980



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BRIEF NO 2

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 29 FEBRUARY 1980

CYPRUS PROBLEM

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome Greek Cypriot acceptance of latest Waldheim proposals for resumption of intercommunal talks; Turkish Cypriots should follow suit. British Government prepared in principle to support Waldheim, eg in speaking to Turkish side (and has told him so). But Cyprus Government themselves make the point that the initiative must remain with the UN.

2. Britain conscious of responsibilities: Guarantor Power, historical links, long and close association. Willingness to help but important not to cut across UN. Hope Cyprus Government will always keep in close touch: be frank with each other even when we disagree.

3. Question utility of further internationalising the dispute. UN General Assembly resolutions little real help. Establishment of a General Assembly Committee on Cyprus particularly unhelpful. Cuba a member? Scope for mischief making. Likely to kill Waldheim initiative and would doubtless provoke Turks to open Varosha hotels.

4. Important to be realistic about what the other side will accept, eg in terms of a quid pro quo for concessions on Varosha: unlikely to give it up except as part of an overall settlement package.

5. Time not on the side of those who genuinely want a settlement. Need for flexibility on both sides. Turks unlikely to look at anything which does not give them complete control of security in their own region; bound to mean restrictions in practice on freedom of movement/settlement, at least initially.

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/BACKGROUND



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BACKGROUND

6. Turkish Cypriots (18% of population), maltreated 1963-74, occupy 40% of the island since 1974 invasion, since when de facto partition. The Greek Cypriots have made a remarkable economic recovery. \_\_\_\_\_

7. Various attempts have been made to promote a negotiated intercommunal settlement. Intercommunal talks have been intermittent and made little progress. In 1978 the US, UK and Canada tabled compromise proposals for resumed negotiation in the form of a framework for a settlement. The Greek Cypriot (who now rather wish they had not) rejected it but the UN was then able to take up the running. In May 1979 they eventually got President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash to meet and agree to resume intercommunal talks. Talks were interrupted after only four meetings, the Turkish Cypriots insisting on first clarifying the concepts of 'bizonality' and 'security'. (these terms both mean in practice Turkish Cypriot determination to protect themselves from the harassment which they faced between 1963 and 1974). UN efforts to restart the talks were hampered by the annual campaign by the Greek Cypriots to drum up international support, starting in Lusaka (mildly pro-Greek Cypriot passage in communiqué) and culminating in the UN General Assembly's strongly pro-Greek Cypriot resolution. This implied that sanctions should be imposed on Turkey, called for the demilitarisation of 'Cyprus' (which would mean not just the Republic but SBAs as well) and provided for a General Assembly Committee if progress was not reported before 31 March. All Western countries (and all UNFICYP troop contributors) except Greece abstained; the UK and many others voted against the Committee. The Turks were indignant, alleging violation of Point 6 of the Kyprianou/Denktash May 1979 agreement, which outlawed action which might jeopardise the talks. But political instability in Turkey and Mr Denktash's own very negative approach were nonetheless major constraints on progress.

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8. Recently there have been signs of a more constructive Greek Cypriot attitude, possibly influenced by Turkish Cypriot threats to reopen hotels in Varosha, the sealed-off former Greek Cypriot resort quarter of Famagusta now under Turkish military control. Mr Kyprianou in January announced 'conciliatory' measures (eg payments of pensions to Turkish Cypriots who had paid in to the State scheme); the Cyprus Government have now confirmed their willingness to resume talks on the basis of a 'non-formula' proposed by the UN. Turkish Cypriot reactions so far have been negative, particularly concerning the proposed opening statement by the UN at the talks, which is not being cleared textually with either side in advance. But Mr Denktash has not rejected a resumption; he and Ankara are likely to stall to avoid being blamed for intransigence.

9. In New York and Washington, and subsequently with Lord Carrington, Mr Rolandis recently canvassed Greek Cypriot ideas for handling the talks. The main (and to Turkish Cypriots most objectionable) feature is that talks should open with a prenegotiated exchange: the Greek Cypriots getting Varosha in return for various forms of aid for the Turkish Cypriots, and possibly the reopening of Nicosia airport. None of these are likely in Turkish Cypriot eyes to compensate for Varosha, which is the main card which they have to play in the overall negotiation and which has considerable symbolic importance for both sides. And Mr Rolandis' suggestion implies either naivety or another deliberate effort to prevent progress while appearing 'reasonable'.

10. Mr Kyprianou will look for commitments to press the Turkish side and may suggest that Western aid to Turkey should be used as a lever. Western Governments have said that they are prepared in principle to use their influence to support the UN initiative. As the US arms embargo in 1975/78 showed, however, the Turks fiercely resent linkage between their relations with the West and the Cyprus problem; the present political situation in Turkey inhibits the Turkish Government from anything other than a cautious policy on Cyprus. But we do point out to both sides the drawbacks of incurring blame

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for lack of progress; linkage of a sort, albeit tenuous, does exist.

11. If talks do not resume within 4-6 weeks, the Greek Cypriots will be tempted to try to get a UN General Assembly Committee set up to 'assist' Dr Waldheim. It would consist of non-aligned countries and doubtless include Cuba. Mischief-making would result. But the Turkish Government are determined not to yield to unwarranted UN resolutions: their response might be the opening of hotels in Varosha and even threats of UDI: the Waldheim initiative would probably not survive.

Southern European Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
25 February 1980

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VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 29 FEBRUARY 1980

AID TO CYPRUS: 'APPENDIX R'

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Aware that our interpretation of UK aid obligations differs from yours. But no prospect whatever of demands for £200 million or more being met. No advantage to either side in public acrimony or in raising unrealistic expectations.
2. Best to concentrate on signing and finding projects for the use of the £7.5 million loan offered in 1978.
3. Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) make a substantial contribution to the economy of the Republic. Appreciate Cyprus Government cooperation over SBAs; understand the pressures on you; but public controversy best avoided.

BACKGROUND

4. Under Appendix 'R' of 1960 Treaty, the UK undertook to provide £12 million over 5 years to 1965, and to consult thereafter before determining the amount of further aid. 1965-78 no aid was offered except technical assistance and refugee relief, because of difficulty of ensuring that aid would get to both communities. The Cyprus Government intermittently claim £200-300 million in aid and for 'use of the bases' and certain facilities in the Republic. The UK considers its aid obligations discharged and does not accept any obligation for payments for the bases, which are sovereign British territory retained after independence in 1960. Services provided are paid for (and spending in Cyprus runs at some £40 million pa). Greek Cyprus has a relatively high GNP per head and is not 'aid-worthy'. Nonetheless in 1978 a £7.5 million soft loan was offered for projects benefiting both communities; the Cyprus Government accepted in principle, reserving its position over larger claims. The loan agreement has not yet been signed and no specific projects for its use have been





agreed.

5. In June 1979 the Cyprus Foreign Minister proposed a joint committee to study the question and undertook to submit a memorandum outlining Cypriot claims. Following further discussion of the subject at Lusaka CHGM between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou, the High Commissioner replied to Mr Rolandis: no further aid was possible in the present economic climate; he suggested that priority be given to concluding the £7.5 million loan agreement. The Cypriot memorandum has not yet been received (and is not wanted!).

6. The Cyprus Government's periodic revival of this question is usually influenced by intermittent left-wing Greek Cypriot campaigns against the SBAs. There is little such pressure at present and the Cypriots are apparently content to play the matter long. And they are generally cooperative over the SBAs, which are located in the southern (Greek Cypriot) part of Cyprus and depend on Cyprus Government goodwill. But recent renewed anti-SBA noises by Mr Denktash may have made Mr Kyprianou nervous that his 'non-aligned' clothes are being stolen and he may be tempted to use the opportunity of his London visit to revive the question.

7. The SBA facilities are of great importance to Britain. There is no intention to withdraw. But the Cyprus Government may not be sure what pressure it would be safe to exert. The SBAs are no longer of vital economic importance but the Cyprus Government must know that, if Britain pulled out of either, the Turks would not just stand back and let the Greek Cypriots take over.

Southern European Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
25 February 1980

CYPRUS: VITAL STATISTICS

1. Population and Land Area (whole island)

(a) Land Area	9251 km <sup>2</sup>
(b) Population	670,000
	(approx 550,000 Greek-Cypriots)
	(approx 120,000 Turkish-Cypriots)

2. Basic Statistics

<u>Gross National Product</u>	<u>1978</u>
(a) Total	1,370 US \$m
(b) Growth Rate (1974-77 GK/CY Part)	12.86%
(c) Per Capita	2,110 US \$

3. Trade with UK

	<u>1978</u>	%
Exports to UK	22.5	
Imports from UK	22.1	

1979

Total Value of Exports to UK	120.1*
Real Growth of Exports (five years ending 1978)	2.3% pa

Position in UK's Export League Table	51 (of 150)
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\* preliminary

PRIANOU, SPYROS

\* ~ \* Passage deleted and temporarily retained under Section 3(4)  
(Wayland, 15 July 2014)

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Educated locally and then in London; Barrister (Gray's Inn). Represented Makarios in London, 1952-54; 1955-59 Representative of the Ethnarchy Council and the principal EOKA contact in London 1955-59. Returned to Cyprus and, on Independence was briefly Minister of Justice, ~~then~~ then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Serious heart attack in March 1969. He resigned, very reluctantly, in 1972 after pressure from the Greek Military Government; but remained close to the Archbishop.

As Foreign Minister he was a leading advocate of a tough policy and no concessions to the Turks. Very much at home in the UN, where he conducted the Cyprus case skilfully, paying particular attention to the non-aligned. In his dealings with the West he was often prickly, stubborn, and narrowly legalistic.

In May 1976 Kyprianou launched a new pro-Makarios party of the Centre-Right, the Democratic Front, to fight the House of Representatives elections; the electoral coalition which he formed with the Communist party, AKEL, and the extreme left-wing party EDEK, polled three-quarters of the votes cast. Appointed President of the House, he thus became Acting President on the death of Makarios on 3 August 1977. Elected second President of the Republic of Cyprus by acclaim on 31 August 1977, following the agreement of all political parties, in the cause of 'national unity', not to oppose him. Re-elected unopposed for full 5-year term in February 1978.

Kyprianou's performance as President has been weak and indecisive. He has lost the confidence of some important elements in his party due to his handling of affairs since becoming President, most recently when he failed in August 1979 to reshuffle his Cabinet to weaken the Left-Wing influence there. Lacking personal support he tries to proceed by consensus and this inevitably lays him open to Right-Wing charges of being a prisoner of the Left.

\* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
\* In 1976 he was taken ill several times and in 1977 some doubted that he could survive the physical strains of being President. Married with 2 sons. Speaks English well.

ROLANDIS, NICOS A

Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1978.

Born Limassol 1934. Educated locally and in London (Middle Temple); Barrister 1956. Practised law in Cyprus before turning to business and becoming the Managing Director and major shareholder in one of the biggest industrial groups in Cyprus.

Kyprianou probably chose Rolandis as a loyal supporter who would carry out orders rather than himself shape foreign policy. But Rolandis, who has shown a mind of his own, privately gives every sign of supporting a realistic solution to the intercommunal problem. But in the last resort Rolandis, a relative newcomer to politics, does not carry sufficient weight to persuade Kyprianou to change his mind on fundamental issues.

Markedly more pro-Western than Kyprianou, he has been actively reforming the Cyprus Diplomatic Service.

Speaks English fluently. Married, two daughters and one son.

PELAGHIAS, GEORGIOS

Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1975).

Born 1924, of a wealthy landowning family. Educated locally and at Athens University (Law); Barrister (Gray's Inn). 1956-7 acted as a go-between for Grivas and Harding, but then moved to Athens; became member of the Greek Diplomatic Service. 1959 returned to Nicosia and joined the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1962-9 Chief of Protocol.

A trusted confidant of Archbishop Makarios, from whom he took his line.

Married. 1 child. Speaks good English. Friendly in manner and basically pro-West. Said to have handled some of Makarios' private business and affairs. Amusing, salacious.

PANAYIDES, TASSOS CHR

High Commissioner for Cyprus in London since 1979.

Born 1934. Educated in Cyprus; diploma in Education at London University (British Council Scholarship). Worked in Cyprus as a teacher 1959-60. Appointed to President Makarios' Office in 1960; Director 1963-69. Ambassador in Bonn 1969-1978.

Courteous and intelligent; but he has not made great mark as High Commissioner. Much of his energies are devoted to the large Cypriot community in Britain.

Married with three children. Speaks good English.

VISIT OF H E PRESIDENT SPYROS KYPRIANOU,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

28 FEBRUARY - 4 MARCH, 1980

*Miss Stephens*  
*Hf.*  
*Miss*

NOTE: This is a private visit and the Cyprus High Commission will be arranging much of the programme for the visit, including engagements with the Cypriot community and a press conference.

Accompanying President Kyprianou will be:

Mr Nicos Rolandis - Foreign Minister  
Mr George Pelagias - Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr H Vovides - Director of the President's Office

Thursday, 28 February

Arrival at Heathrow Airport by flight BA319 from Paris (De Havilland VIP Suite)

1730 hrs

Doors Open.

Met by:

The Lord Hamilton of Dalzell, MC, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen;

H E Mr Tasos Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus;

Sir John Stow GCMG, KCVO, the Special Representative of the Secretary of State

Leave for the Grosvenor House Hotel, Park Lane, W1

Friday, 29 February

1200 hrs

Call on the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP, at No 10 Downing Street

1300 hrs

Lunch at No 10 Downing Street, hosted by the Prime Minister

Monday, 3 March

Private: The Cypriot High Commission are arranging a lunch for UK press at Grosvenor House.

/Tuesday,

Tuesday, 4 March

Departure by flight BA502 for Rome.

At the De Havilland suite the following will bid farewell:

Sir Donald Logan, Special Representative of the Secretary of State;

H E Mr Tasos Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus;

The Lord Somerleyton, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen

0855 hrs

Doors Close.

USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Cyprus High Commission	-	499 8272
Grosvenor House Hotel	-	499 6363
Protocol & Conference Department, FCO (Inward Visits)	-	233 5016
News Department, FCO	-	233 8618/3191
Lord Hamilton of Dalzell	-	0483 892002
Lord Somerleyton	-	821 0496
Sir John Stow	-	370 1921
Sir Donald Logan	-	589 4010
London Heathrow Airport, Special Facilities	-	759 7146

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Mr J L Bullard	W37	(2)
Mr E A J Fergusson	W35	(2)
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Mr Rhodes, British High Commissioner, Nicosia	c/o Heads of Mission Section	(1)
SED	W106	(6)
Resident Clerk		

VISITS SECTION  
PROTOCOL & CONFERENCE DEPT



file

ds<sup>rc</sup> She  
Approved  
Cyprus

19 February 1980

Visit of President Kyprianou, 29 February

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 15 February on this subject. She has approved the proposed lists both for the talks and for the subsequent lunch.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9B

cc *Paul Goodchild* ←



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 February 1980

*Prime Minister*  
*Apce list at A for talks and*  
*overleaf for lunch?*

*Paul*

*Overleaf*

*Dear Michael,*

Visit of President Kyprianou, 29 February

Thank you for your letter of 11 January to Roderic Lyne.

As you now know, the Cypriots will number five:

President Kyprianou

Mr Rolandis, Foreign Minister

Mr Pelagias, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr Vovides, Director of the President's Office

Mr Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus

We understand that the Prime Minister is content that the talks should be five a side, and propose that our 5 should be:

The Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Mr Bullard, DUS, FCO

Mr Rhodes, British High Commissioner, Nicosia

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

*A.)*

I enclose a suggested guest list for the lunch.

Mr Rolandis announced the visit in London last week. After consulting your press office, we did likewise, and informed the Cyprus High Commission and the High Commissioner in Nicosia. No further action on publicity therefore seems needed.

*Yours etc*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street



PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR A LUNCH TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, HE MR SPYROS KYPRIANOU:  
FRIDAY, 29 FEBRUARY: AT 10 DOWNING STREET.

The Prime Minister

---

HE The President of the Republic of Cyprus  
HE Mr Nicos Rolandis, Foreign Minister  
HE Mr Tasos Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus  
Mr George Pelagias, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr H Vovides, Director of the President's Office

---

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
Mr G Pattie, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (RAF), MOD  
Mr W M Knighton, Deputy Secretary, DOT  
Mr J L Bullard, DUSS, FCO  
Mr P A Rhodes, British High Commissioner at Nicosia  
Private Secretary

file

ds

*Gyprus*

cc *Sue Goodchild*

~~1/15/280~~  
A of 26-2-80

11 January 1980

Visit to London by the President of Cyprus

Paul Lever wrote to me on 7 January about the visit next month of President Kyprianou.

The Prime Minister has confirmed that the date of Friday, 29 February is acceptable. She agrees with the other arrangements proposed in Paul Lever's letter. She would like the talks preceding lunch to be four aside and hopes that it may be possible for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to attend.

I should be grateful to have a draft guest list for the lunch by Friday, ~~15 February~~ and to have the briefs by Tuesday, 26 February.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*g*

cc Gue Goodchild



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Miss Stephens  
To note & return to me.*

7 January 1980

*Paul  
Prime Minister: Apoc lunch for 12; talks 4 a  
side (ie. you would have had lunch, one official + me  
with you)? - Yes me Paul 10,*

Dear Michael,

VISIT TO LONDON BY THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

I am writing to confirm recent telephone conversations. Of the three dates offered in your letter of 12 December for talks and lunch with the Prime Minister, President Kyprianou has accepted Friday, 29 February.

Following the pattern of the call by Mr Karamanlis in October, the best arrangements might be talks beginning at 1200, and lunch for 12 people at No 10 at 1300. Please let me know if this is acceptable, and the number of people on each side at the talks preferred by the Prime Minister. (Kyprianou is likely to have his Foreign Minister, Mr Rolandis, and at least two others).


We shall submit a proposed guest list in due course, and provide briefing in the usual way.

Yours ever

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

1-7 JUN 1960



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
DIAFIB

*Cyprus*

RESTRICTED

GRS 120  
RESTRICTED  
FM NICOSIA 190940Z DEC  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 431 OF 19 DECEMBER 79.

MY TEL NO 425: TALK WITH KYPRIANOU

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS NOW TOLD ME THAT PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU WOULD LIKE TO VISIT LONDON ON FRIDAY 29 FEBRUARY. I ASSUME THAT I MAY CONFIRM THAT THIS IS ACCEPTABLE.

2. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AT ANY TIME IN THE SECOND HALF OF MARCH. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD PUT RECOMMENDATIONS TO YOU AND LET HIM KNOW THE OUTCOME. IN VIEW OF THE DATE FOR KYPRIANOU'S VISIT I SUGGEST THAT, SUBJECT TO THE LORD PRIVY SEAL'S OTHER COMMITMENTS, LATE MARCH WOULD BE BEST. I RECOMMEND A VISIT FROM APPROXIMATELY THURSDAY 27 MARCH UNTIL MONDAY 31 MARCH, PREFERABLY LEAVING CYPRUS ON TUESDAY 1 APRIL.

3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

RHODES

F I L E S


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MR FERGUSSON

RESTRICTED

21 DEC 1979





Cyprus  
JS

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 December 1979

CYRPUIS: PROPOSED VISIT BY PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 10 December on this subject. She has agreed, reluctantly, to offer President Kyprianou a meal, preceded by an hour's talk. She has done so on the understanding that she will not be otherwise involved in President Kyprianou's programme.

As regards dates, Monday, Wednesday and Friday in the last week of February are at present free.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1x RPB



*Prime Minister*

*I have reminded everyone of the need to cut down on overseas visitors. But this man is a Head of State. You will not have to meet or farewell him. Agree later & working lunch?*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

10 December 1979

*Dear Michael,*

Cyprus: Proposed Visit to London by President Kyprianou

President Kyprianou wants to visit London as part of a tour of Western European countries in January or February next year. The High Commissioner recommends that we agree. In his conversation with the Cyprus Foreign Minister a date in February, perhaps in the latter part of the month appeared, from the Cyprus side, to look convenient.

A. | The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers that there is little choice but to agree; and hopes the Prime Minister will be able to receive President Kyprianou. The Cyprus problem would probably be the sole topic of discussion. Although there is unlikely to be much of substance to say to President Kyprianou, he is both Head of State and Head of Government of a friendly Commonwealth country, \*

\* Although little practical good can be expected from his visit, therefore, substantial harm could flow from the offence caused by an attempt to put him off, or from a failure to receive him at the appropriate level. Furthermore, it is just conceivable that by February the intercommunal talks may have reached a point where high level advice about flexibility could do some good.

A similar visit took place in June 1978. Using that precedent, the Prime Minister might propose a session of talks, for instance at midday, followed by a working lunch. The rest of his visit would be organised by the Cyprus High Commission, and revolve around the Greek/Cypriot community in Britain.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister can agree in principle to a visit on these lines, and for an indication of possible dates in February, so that we may instruct Mr Rhodes on his reply.

*Yours etc*

*Paul*

(P Lever)

Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

\*~\* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

*Wayland,  
15 July 2014*

