

PREM 19/1434



Ministerial Organisation in the Ministry of  
Defence.

DEFENCE

MINIS in MOD

FEBRUARY 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>10.2.81</del>							
<del>21.5.81</del>							
<del>1.6.81</del>							
<del>13.7.81</del>							
<del>17.7.81</del>							
<del>10.11.81</del>							
<del>16.11.81</del>							
<del>11.2.82</del>							
July 1982							
March 83							
<del>Feb 83</del>							
25.7.83							

PREM 19/1434



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Paper 22 I: Second  
Report from the Defence Committee,  
Session 1981-82: Ministry of Defence  
Organisation and Procurement  
HMSO, 22 July 1982

Signed AWayland Date 19 November 2013

**PREM Records Team**



Pinehurst:

4

D/MINIS/1

MINIS IN MOD

Mr Heseltine  
sent this note on  
how he is proposing  
to introduce MINIS  
in MOD.

Introduction

1. MINIS (Management Information System for Ministers) is a management technique introduced into the Department of the Environment by Mr Heseltine, when he was Secretary of State for the Environment.

2. A form of MINIS is now to be introduced in the MOD. Replying to a parliamentary question, the Secretary of State has said, "I intend to introduce a Management Information System for Ministers into my Department very soon. The Ministry of Defence is a large and complex executive Department and I have not yet decided on the detailed application of the system. But it will complement and link with the management control, information and accounting systems which already exist in the Department."

3. The purpose of this paper is to explain what MINIS is and how it is planned that such a system will be developed for the MOD, in accordance with the Secretary of State's directions.

What is MINIS?

4. In brief, the purpose of MINIS is to record detailed



information about a Department's activities, costs and performance to provide a basis for Ministers and senior officials to review the work of the Department and to decide on future action, including studies leading to changes in organisation and the deployment of departmental manpower and other resources.

5. It seeks to achieve these aims by calling on all the senior officers in an organisation to set out information about their organisation, staff numbers and costs, functions, objectives and performance in a broadly standard form and in a significant degree of detail. The Senior Officers are then questioned by Ministers and other top managers to ensure that their objectives and priorities are reflected in the objectives, priorities and activities of the organisation itself. The process enables top management to manage positively rather than reactively.

#### MINIS in the MOD

6. The Secretary of State wishes MINIS in the MOD to be concerned not only with administration and staff costs, but to take account also of programme expenditure where relevant. It should thus bond together and link existing information and control systems rather than simply overlay them. It should be an integrated system across the board but also be capable of adaptation to the needs of the different line management areas.



7. The MINIS cycle falls broadly into three parts:
- a. The collection of information, on a series of forms, about the work of all management areas (normally headed at 2-star level);
  - b. The review of this information, including meetings between the Secretary of State, senior management and the officials in charge of particular areas of departmental work; and
  - c. the preparation and approval of future action plans, including the commissioning of studies, consultations with Trade Unions where necessary, and the timetable for final decisions, as appropriate, by the Secretary of State.
8. We may separate out the initial objectives of "MINIS 1" from probable future developments:

MINIS 1: To prove the system, and introduce the MINIS style of management to the Department;

To start the necessary data collection within Directorates and Divisions;



To provide a systematic source of information to the Secretary of State on Departmental organisation and responsibilities;

To identify areas of work for further study, particularly with a view to privatising or contracting out, reorganising or abandoning tasks.

MINIS 2 and subsequent rounds: To integrate the MINIS system with existing departmental planning procedures (including those for Service and civilian manpower); and in particular to link the MINIS system to Responsibility Budgets, and other cost and management accounts.

9. Some of the objectives set out above may be for the longer term: the immediate objective is to record detailed information about the Department's activities.

#### Who is covered by MINIS?

10. The MINIS system must go deep enough down into the Department and away from MOD Headquarters to ensure that Ministers are aware of the full range of departmental activities - in other words, until a discrete and relatively homogeneous area of work is reached. For Headquarters staff this will normally be the Branch or Division; for



outstations, it will be the Line Management Unit (dockyard, hospital, depot, R&D establishment etc). The "subject" of MINIS - the "Senior Officer", as we propose to call him in the MOD - is the 2-star officer or Under Secretary (or, in a few rare cases a 3-star or 1-star officer). The Senior Officer will be responsible for providing to the Secretary of State a description of his organisation, staff, responsibilities, objectives, broken down in sufficient detail to enable the Secretary of State (or other senior management) to have a meaningful discussion with the Senior Officer about his tasks.

11. Between 140 and 150 MINIS Senior Officers have now been identified, covering all the MOD HQ "managers" in the Centre, Service Departments, PE, Naval Home Command and RAF Support Command. Lists of these Senior Officers are given (Annexes A - E), together with lists of the main line management units and executive operations for which they will be expected to provide certain key summary information as part of the MINIS process (see para 13 below).

12. Initially, the MINIS system will extend laterally to cover all MOD Headquarters, and the major Headquarters controlling support organisations, but not the Headquarters of Front Line Units (ie not the HQs of CINCFLEET, UKLF, or Strike Command, nor the HQs in BFG and their combat arms).



What will MINIS tell us?

13. The information will be presented to the Secretary of State in a series of forms.

Form 1 This will contain basic data on the anatomy of the organisation, including an organisational chart, and making clear the MINIS Senior Officers's responsibilities for staff (with Servicemen and civilians shown separately), money (in its various forms including SFO/vote management, vote coordination, requirement scrutiny etc); and making clear the responsibility of the Senior Officers, if any, for "executive operations" such as outstations, establishments, training areas etc. For Senior Officers with a responsibility for executive operations, a separate sheet of form 1 will be provided, so that basic management information can be recorded, including the nature of the responsibility for the unit (military command, administration, functional responsibility, tasking of the unit etc); the size and cost of the unit; the availability of accounts or other management information.

Form 1 will also contain for each subject, the total numbers in post in immediately preceding



years, and a planning guideline of the numbers expected to be in post at the beginning of the next and immediately succeeding financial years.

Form 2 will list the Senior Officer's major objectives. This is intended as a summary of the major strategic objectives that these (mainly) 2-star officers propose to achieve with the resources deployed, in order of priority where possible, including comments on manpower or any other constraints which have affected the framing of objectives. The aim is to produce a list of about 4 or 5 objectives (which will normally reflect the Senior Officer's main divisional/branch/unit activities).

Form 3 is intended as a detailed description of the functions and tasks of the area, probably arranged by directorate, division, or unit. It should be possible to achieve this with not more than 6 or so functions/tasks per subsidiary Division or Directorate. For each function/task the form will show the associated costs in the immediately preceding period (the 12 month period, 1982-83, for MINIS 1), and the associated Vote/expenditure responsibilities



over the current financial year; an assessment of performance to be expected during the period covered by the MINIS round; and the planned performance (including proposed new functions or tasks) for a convenient period ahead.

Form 4 will contain additional summary information relevant to project managers in the PE.

#### The MINIS Timetable

14. The Secretary of State has decided that, once MINIS is established, there should be a MINIS "round" annually, rather than twice a year.

15. The intention is that the MINIS system should be fully operational on the second round. In order to achieve this, an experimental MINIS cycle (MINIS 1) will start shortly. The issue of forms and detailed guidance notes will not be until March/April, but a great deal of preparatory work will be required beforehand (much of which should be unnecessary for subsequent rounds).

16. In practice, a full MINIS round - issue and completion of forms, briefings and meetings, and preparation of action plans - lasts about six months. MINIS 1 is likely to be shorter. The "live" MINIS 2 would then start in September/October 1983, and be completed by the end of March 1984.



17. The timing has implications for the gathering of data, and detailed instructions will be issued. However, it may be worth noting at this stage that MINIS 1 will be designed to record a performance assessment for the financial year 1982/83; to indicate planned performance and objectives for the remainder of the financial year 1983/84; and to look forward to FY 1984/85. For MINIS 2 and subsequent rounds, the timespan is likely to be more restricted. MINIS 2 may thus review performance for the first half of FY 1983/84, taking account of the results of MINIS; and look forward to the remainder of FY 1983/84 and FY 1984/85.

18. The DGMA is responsible for the development of MINIS under the Secretary of State. A small, permanent MINIS Unit has been established initially in the Management Services (Organisation) Division. It will be augmented as necessary with other staff from that Division and the Inspectorates of Establishments.

19. The MINIS Unit is responsible for planning and developing the application of MINIS to the MOD. The Unit will issue detailed guidance on the completion of MINIS forms, advise further as necessary and ensure that the forms are suitably presented in a consistent format. The DGMA will also brief the Secretary of State when the completed MINIS forms are submitted to him, in preparation for MINIS meetings, copying his brief to the Senior Officers concerned.



20. While the Senior Officer has the final responsibility for the content of his MINIS forms, experience elsewhere suggests that it is convenient for him to delegate many of the associated tasks to a MINIS Liaison Officer (LO), probably at Colonel or equivalent/Principal level. The latter acts as the main point of contact with the MINIS Unit, represents the Senior Officer where possible and may play an important role in consultation/liaison with the Senior Officer's Directorates/Divisions/ executive operations. In particular, he coordinates the provision of the information that is required on manpower, by grade, devoted to particular functions, so that it can be costed to a common format by the MINIS Unit. Quite frequent discussions with the MINIS Unit may be required, depending on the complexity of the problems encountered. Since all concerned will be on a learning curve in MINIS 1, it is important that the LO should be carefully selected. It would be preferable for the same LO to be available for MINIS 2, or to train his successor.

21. In order to achieve the timetable for MINIS 1, it will be crucial to reach early decisions on the break-down of functions, since much of the material to be provided on the forms depends on it. Judgements will have to be made by the Senior Officers and proposals cleared with the MINIS Unit, to ensure consistency of presentation to the Secretary of State. Guidance will be issued shortly.



## Conclusion

22. For some parts of the MOD, the MINIS style of management will not be new; for others, perhaps the majority, it will imply considerable changes. The successful operation of MINIS will take time and trouble. MINIS 1 is experimental and part of its purpose is to test the basic mechanics. The more smoothly they can be made to function, the better for all concerned. However, the proving of the system will be the use made of MINIS by Ministers and management at all levels.





Defence  
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Cfu

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

11 February 1982

Dear Sir,

HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION

Thank you for your letter of 10 February 1982 with which you sent me a copy of your Secretary of State's letter to Mr Cranley Onslow MP about changes in the higher Defence organisation.

I have shown this to the Prime Minister and she has taken note of it.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Whitmore.

David Omand Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

AA





2.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
 Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)  
 01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 20

*Copy to Mr. Jeffrey*  
*[Signature]*

10th February 1982

*Prime Minister*

*To note -*

*AW*

*10.2.82*

*Dear Sir,*

HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION

In your letter to me of 10th November you conveyed the Prime Minister's authority for my Secretary of State to set in hand detailed work on organisational changes affecting the Chiefs of Staff. The Defence Secretary did, as he had indicated, mention the matter to the Select Committee and has agreed the changes with the Chiefs of Staff. To complete the story may I now send you a copy of the letter which he has sent to Cranley Onslow MP as Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence. We will be arranging for the defence correspondents to be made aware of the changes, in a low key.

*Yours ever,*

*[Signature]*

(D B OMAND)





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000

DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 20

10th February 1982

Dear Cranley,

In my evidence to the Committee on 11th November 1981, I told you that I was working on some evolutionary changes in the military area with the aim of giving the Chief of Defence Staff a rather stronger voice whilst at the same time maintaining the authority of the single-Service Chiefs of Staff. I promised to keep you in touch with progress. The decisions I have now made, which I shall be announcing today, and which will take effect immediately are:

- a. The Chief of Defence Staff, as the Secretary of State's principal military adviser, will be responsible for offering independent military advice as well as seeing that the views of the Chiefs of Staff are properly reflected.
- b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee will be the forum where the Chief of the Defence Staff seeks the views of his single-Service colleagues.
- c. The single-Service Chiefs of Staff will continue to be the professional Heads of their own Services, responsible for the morale and efficiency of their Service and the conduct of single-Service operations.





As Heads of their own Service they will continue to give advice on strategy, military operations and the military implications of defence policy. They will continue to have right of access to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister.

d. The Central Defence Staff will be accountable to the Chief of Defence Staff who will be responsible for directing their work. They will provide support for the Chief of Defence Staff to enable him to proffer independent military advice.

e. The Chief of Defence Staff will chair a Senior Appointments Committee with the single-Service Chiefs of Staff as members. This Committee will review all Service 3 and 4-star promotions and appointments and all those 2-star appointments accountable to, or directly responsible to, the Chief of Defence Staff.

The Chief of Defence Staff has always had the responsibility of rendering both his own advice as the Secretary of State's principal military adviser and the collective advice of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as its Chairman. The changes set out in this letter are largely a matter of emphasis - placing greater stress on CDS's own advice and the machinery needed to formulate it. The changes reflect as much as anything the ever-increasing importance in our affairs of resource allocation and balance of investment questions, where I need to look to the Chief of Defence Staff for independent advice on military priorities across all the UK's defence commitments and programmes. The Senior Appointments Committee will involve the Chief of Defence Staff formally in the process of selecting officers for senior appointments across the three Services.





There will be a number of consequential changes in organisation and working processes and these are now being worked out. I will keep you informed as we progress.

I am not making changes in Ministerial duties or in the Service Boards.

*Yours ever  
John*

John Nott



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Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

PERSONAL  
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

DEFENCE ORGANISATION

Thank you for your minute AO5944 of 11 November 1981 about defence organisation.

Mr Nott was anxious to obtain the Prime Minister's approval for his proposals quickly since he wished to mention them at a meeting with the Select Committee on Defence on Wednesday of last week, and she accordingly gave her agreement to them the day before. I attach a ✓ copy of my letter to Mr Nott's Private Secretary conveying the Prime Minister's approval, and I apologise for not letting you have a copy of this at the time.

Although the Prime Minister had already dealt with Mr Nott's proposals, I nonetheless showed her your minute, which she noted. As regards the attendance of the Chiefs of Staff at OD and Cabinet, she agrees that it is likely to become the normal procedure that only the Chief of the Defence Staff is invited to attend, but she thinks that we can leave Mr Nott to make the running on this.

AW.

16 November 1981

AA



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1434</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Armstrong to Whitmore dated 11 November 1981</i>	
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

10 November 1981

PERSONAL  
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

Dear David,

DEFENCE ORGANISATION

As you know, your Secretary of State was unable to see the Prime Minister this morning and therefore did not have an opportunity to raise the question of higher defence organisation about which he had minuted her on 6 November 1981.

I subsequently told the Prime Minister that Mr Nott was anxious to get her early clearance for his proposals and she authorised me to say that she is content for him to go ahead on the lines set out in his minute.

We shall be in touch with you to arrange another time for the Prime Minister and Mr Nott to discuss Chiefs of Staff appointments.

Yours truly,

— Anne Whiston

David Omand Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

AH





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~2367028~~ 218 2111/3

MO 20

6th November 1981

Dear Clive,

ML

DEFENCE ORGANISATION

The attached minute from my Secretary of State is relevant to the meeting he is to have with the Prime Minister after E Committee on 10th November, concerning the 'top plot'. I should add that the Chief of the Defence Staff is aware and fully supports the proposals in the attached minute, and the Chief of the General Staff is also in favour of a move in this direction. The other two Chiefs of Staff are not as yet fully in the picture - but it is the intention that this be done early next week. I make this last remark in the knowledge that the Prime Minister is likely to meet all the Chiefs of Staff at or following Sunday's Remembrance Ceremony.

Yours ever,

David Owen

Prime Minister.

(D B OMAND)

The changes Mr NOK is proposing to make could have a substantial effect for the better on the way the MOD does its business. The core of them is described in paragraph 3c of the Annex to his minute. They should have been made years ago, and I hope that you will give Mr NOK your full backing in introducing them.

C A Whitmore Esq I also enclose a minute from Sir Robert Armstrong about changes in the personalities in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Mr NOK will be raising them too.

ML 6 xi





MO 20

PRIME MINISTERDEFENCE ORGANISATION

I am coming to see you on 10th November about Chiefs of Staff appointments. I would welcome a word then about higher defence organisation.

2. I am not attracted towards a major reorganisation which would be disruptive and time-wasting when we have massive tasks in front of us as a result of the policy decisions taken earlier this year. Radical change would in any case be politically contentious.

3. As you know, I already have a good deal of work in hand about changes on the financial side and in the procurement field. I propose now to introduce progressively some changes on the military side which will take us further along the road which was started in the 1963/64 reorganisation.

4. The essence of the changes I propose are simple, but their long-term effects would be significant. They are aimed essentially at getting better military advice for the Government than is provided by the current Chiefs of Staff machinery. This is particularly necessary in the resource allocation field. In future, the Chief of the Defence Staff should be seen to be the Principal Military Adviser. The individual Chiefs of Staff should be recognised as the professional heads of their Services giving their own professional





advice rather than being collectively responsible for advising Ministers on overall defence matters. Recommendations to me on appointments and promotions of all three and four-star officers (and the appointment of some two-star officers) would become the responsibility of a Senior Appointments Board chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff and with the three Service Chiefs of Staff as members.

5. A more detailed note comparing these proposals with the current position is attached. The most sensitive part of the changes involved would be that affecting the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This would continue, but on the basis of providing a forum for the Chief of the Defence Staff to gather his advice rather than as a body offering collective advice. The jobs of the single-Service Chiefs of Staff individually - and their stature - would remain essentially unchanged; they would retain their ultimate right of direct access to you and to me. But the Chief of the Defence Staff would be better placed to give me and other Ministers across-the-board and objective advice.

6. I propose to set work in hand now on working out the detailed arrangements, starting with the Senior Appointments Board. I feel that it would be better to play these changes in low key, and not to make a special public announcement. I am however giving evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee on the morning of Wednesday 11th November, and if you are in agreement I would intend to indicate to them that there are a number of internal evolutionary changes in hand, in line with the new Ministerial organisation.

7. I would be glad to know if you are content that I should proceed accordingly.

Ministry of Defence

6th November 1981

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*Do LP  
- Private Secretary  
approved by the Secretary of State  
and signed in his  
name.*



HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION

1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) was established on a permanent basis in 1924 following the Salisbury Committee's recommendation (Cmnd 2029) that "each of the three Chiefs of Staff should have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole".

2. During the 1950s the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence acted as an independent Chairman to the Committee, and in 1958 these posts were combined to form the post of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). With the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence in 1964, his role was set out in the White Paper "Central Organisation for Defence" (Cmnd 2097), but not enshrined in legislation.

3. The following table shows the current proposals alongside the current practice deriving from the 1963 model:

<u>Proposal</u>	<u>Current Position</u>
<p>a. CDS should be the principal military adviser to the Secretary of State. In tendering his advice he should take into account the views of the single-Service Chiefs of Staff. Service Chiefs of Staff will continue to have direct access to the Secretary of State as at present.</p>	<p>"The collective advice of the Chiefs of Staff Committee will be tendered by the CDS ... When there is divergence of view between the COS, the CDS will submit the alternatives ... CDS, as the principal military adviser to the Secretary of State, will tender his own advice to the Minister in the light of the views expressed."</p>
<p>b. The single-Service Chiefs of Staff will continue to be the professional Heads of the individual Services. They should give professional advice on single-Service matters and on strategy and military operations and on the military implications of defence policy.</p>	<p>"The Chiefs of Naval, General and Air Staffs will continue to be professional Heads of their own Service."</p>
<p>c. The Chiefs of Staff Committee should be the forum in which the CDS seeks the advice of the single-Service Chiefs of Staff.</p>	<p>"The Chiefs of Staff Committee are collectively responsible to the Government for professional advice on strategy and military operations of defence policy."</p>





d. The central Defence Staff should be directly accountable to the CDS; and CDS should have the responsibility for directing their work and reporting it to the Secretary of State to the individual Chiefs of Staff. The CDS and the central Defence Staff should have right of access to the staffs of the single-Service departments.

e. Recommendation to the Secretary of State on appointments and promotion to all four- and three-star posts (and appointments to some two-star posts) should be made by a Senior Appointments Board under the Chief of the Defence Staff with the other Chiefs of Staff as members.

"The Naval, General and Air Staffs, with the joint Service staffs of the ... MOD, will together constitute the Defence Staff ... They will be responsible to the COS Committee and through its Chairman to the Secretary of State." At present, the COS Committee collectively directs the work of the central Defence Staff (successors to joint Service staffs). Individual Chiefs of Staff direct their single-Service staffs.

"Arrangements will be made to refer to the Secretary of State for decision proposals for the promotion and appointment of senior officers ..."

At present the career of an officer up to the highest ranks is in the hands of his own Service. The single-Service Chiefs of Staff make the recommendations even for key central staff and rotational appointments (eg Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) and UK Military Representative to NATO).

Note: Extracts from Cmnd 2097 are shown in quotation marks.





File AH

Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 July 1981

Dear Sir Ronald,

Thank you for your very interesting letter of 1 July about Lord Mountbatten's ideas for the future development of defence organisation. I know that nobody is better qualified than yourself to reflect his thinking on these matters.

The Defence Secretary and I will be considering whether any further changes in higher defence organisation might be called for following the Ministerial restructuring you mention, with the aim both of improving the decision making process and reducing overheads. If we are satisfied that changes, however radical, are needed to achieve those objectives, we shall certainly see that they are made.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Vice-Admiral Sir Ronald Brockman KCB CSI CIE CVO CBE DL

AH





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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

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The reply letter for you  
to send to Admiral Boreham  
has been approved by MV NSH.

plw

4/11



Defence



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~8307822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 20

13th July 1981

Dear Clive,

Willie Rickett sent Jonathan Dawson on 2nd July a copy of a letter from Vice Admiral Sir Ronald Brockman to the Prime Minister about Lord Mountbatten's ideas for defence organisation. I attach the draft of the reply my Secretary of State suggests should be sent.

By way of background, Admiral Brockman served as Secretary to Lord Mountbatten in all appointments from 1943 until his retirement in 1965. He may therefore be expected to be well acquainted with Lord Mountbatten's thinking, and it is fairly well known that Lord Mountbatten's ultimate objective was something like that set out in Sir Ronald's letter, although in so far as he may have envisaged "Inspectors General" it was not always clear whether they would entirely replace the Chiefs of Staff or co-exist alongside an attenuated version of them.

As the Admiral says, the changes actually implemented in 1964 did not go as far as Lord Mountbatten envisaged. The 1963 White Paper 'Central Organisation for Defence' (Cmd 2097), which heralded the changes made in the following year, retained the Chiefs of Staff Committee without giving the Chief of Defence Staff the power to take initiatives (as distinct from tendering advice in the event of disagreement) in his own right rather than as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. There have, however, been a number of developments since then designed to enhance his formal authority to act in his own right.

My Secretary of State has been giving some thought to changes in higher defence organisation to improve efficiency and reduce

C A Whitmore Esq





overheads. He is inclined at present to take the view that the CDS already has all the powers he needs in relation to the Chiefs of Staff if he chooses to exercise them; that, so long as the three Services are retained, they will each have to have a professional head who will speak for his Service in much the same way, whatever he is called; that changing the names would not change the reality and would risk giving rise to public opposition for no worthwhile return; and that the abolition of the single Service Chiefs of Staff or the Chiefs of Staff Committee is therefore neither necessary nor desirable. But he will be returning to the subject after the Recess. If he concludes that more radical changes are essential, he will not hesitate to put them forward.

I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Vice Admiral Brockman.

*Yours and  
B M*

(B M NORBURY)



DRAFT

From: The Prime Minister  
To: Vice-Admiral Sir R Brockman

Thank you for your very interesting letter of 1st July about Lord Mountbatten's ideas for the future development of defence organisation. I know that nobody is better qualified than yourself to reflect his thinking on these matters.

The Defence Secretary and I will be considering whether any further changes in higher defence organisation might be called for following the Ministerial restructuring you mention, with the aim both of improving the decision making process and reducing overheads. If we are satisfied that changes, however radical, are needed to achieve those objectives, we shall certainly see that they are made.



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16/7

V-Admiral Sir Ronald BROCKMAN

2 July 1981

I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister from Vice-Admiral Sir Ronald Brockman. He suggests that the Government should now consider moving to having only one Chief of Staff, as apparently envisaged by Lord Mountbatten.

I think that the Prime Minister will want to reply to this letter herself and I should be grateful if you could provide a suitable draft by Thursday 16 July. I should draw your attention to Sir Ronald's wish that his letter should not be given wide circulation.

WR

Jonathan Dawson, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

JD



file

BK

2 July 1981

I am writing on behalf of the  
Prime Minister to thank you for your  
letter of 1 July.

This is receiving attention and  
a reply will be sent to you as soon  
as possible.

W F S RICKETT



Vice-Admiral Sir Ronald Brockman, K.C.B.,  
C.S.I., C.I.E., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.L.



From: Vice-Admiral Sir Ronald Brockman, KCB, CSI, CIE, CVO, CBE, DL,

GLENHOLME,  
WEST HILL,  
BUDLEIGH SALTERTON,  
DEVON EX9 6BS  
Tel: 03954 2687

1 July, 1981.

My dear Prime Minister, *20/7*

I was very interested in the political changes you have made recently in the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps I should say my interest stems from my service with Lord Louis from 1943-1965. For many years he discussed with me the re-organization of the Ministry of Defence for which he hoped, and indeed the first draft of what became the Thorneycroft/Mountbatten Paper was prepared by me.

I write because I know that Lord Louis always visualized in the future - particularly as the three Services decreased in size - that the CDS should be the sole Chief of Staff and that the three Service Chiefs should become Inspectors General of their own Services - the First Sea Lord retaining his title for historical reasons but dropping the CNS title. In the event the changes did not go as far as this, as it was thought that the major amalgamation in the Ministry of Defence was sufficient for the time being. I expect Peter Thorneycroft will well remember these talks.

May I suggest that the time has now come when you ought to be considering this final move of having the CDS alone? With it, I am sure, goes Lord Louis's view that Vice Admirals and

/Admirals



Admirals, together with their equivalents in the other two Services, should be on a common list, and that the CDS should be selected from this list - there is no need to perpetuate "buggins's turn".

I hope you will consider this letter as personal to you, as I would not wish my own Service to consider me as a traitor to the cause!

Yours sincerely,

Ronald Brothman



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Prime Minister.  
*Defence*  
2m

From  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY  
  
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Thorneycroft C.H.

CONSERVATIVE & UNIONIST CENTRAL OFFICE,  
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PT/SO

1st June 1981

To/....  
The Prime Minister  
*Deen Margaret*

*mb*

I did mean to say this morning, though we were  
diverted into other more pressing topics, how  
much I agreed with what you have done in the  
Ministry of Defence. It was always a mistake  
to have the Ministers representing the separate  
Services and bound to lead to trouble sooner or  
later. Only the strong lobbying of the  
individual Services really prevented us from  
attempting the kind of set-up, you have got now,  
from the very start.

*Yours. J.*

*Optimum*





*Deputy  
Prime Minister.*

MO 2/4

PRIME MINISTER

*In organization news I  
think the NCB is absolutely right  
in what he is saying. It is  
more difficult when we get to  
personnel. I have spoken to the  
Chief Whip who is ready to come  
over for a work session morning.  
May I arrange this?*

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

*AKL  
21.1.*

I consider there would be great advantage in taking the opportunity afforded by Keith Speed's departure to make a fundamental re-organisation of Ministerial responsibilities in the Ministry of Defence.

2. From my point of view changes would best be made sooner rather than later if I am to be able successfully to carry forward the reshaping of the Defence programme on which I am now embarked; and you may also consider - if you agree that changes should be made - that they might conveniently be announced during next week's Recess, possibly on Wednesday or Thursday. We got through this week's Defence Debate quite well but we must, I would suggest, keep the initiative.

3. What I think would make much more sense than the present structure here would be two Ministers of State, one for the Armed Services (primarily personnel and logistics, and who would run the Service Boards) and one for Defence Procurement, each of them supported by a single Parliamentary Under-Secretary. ~~This would reduce my Ministers by one, but upgrade one of them.~~

4. I could rehearse the arguments for such a structure, but you will, I think, be familiar with them. In essence they are that it would be easier to formulate a 'defence', as opposed





to a 'single Service' view, and to keep this large Department under better political control and direction, than the present structure allows. A change would have to be properly presented to the Service Boards, but if it were, I would foresee no real problems on that front.

5. I understand that the creation of an additional Minister of State might bring you over the top on Minister of State numbers, but I suggest from my previous experience in Trade (and I think that John Biffen would feel as I did) that a compensating reduction could be made there. I would, of course, be delighted to have Cecil Parkinson here. It may also be felt that the Foreign Office has more than the necessary number of Ministers of State.

6. On personalities, I think that Tom Trenchard, in view of his very recent appointment, must remain where he is, although Geoffrey Pattie could do this job well. That means, if you agree, that you would be looking for a Minister of State for the Armed Services. At the top of my own list for this post would be Douglas Hurd, but I know that Peter Carrington, quite understandably, would be reluctant to release him. (I do not think Nicholas Ridley would be a good choice for MOD). I have already mentioned Cecil Parkinson, and among other existing Ministers of State I would be very content with either Tom King or Alick Buchanan-Smith. You will understand that in current circumstances this would be a very delicate and major post.

7. So far as Parliamentary Under Secretaries are concerned I would very much like to see David Hunt advanced, and I know that Michael Jopling would support me in this. Would you be prepared to consider him?





8. If such changes were made Geoffrey Pattie's job would disappear. As I mentioned above I would have been happy to see him as Minister for Defence Procurement, but I do not think that you would wish to displace Tom Trenchard at this juncture; and I do not believe that Geoffrey Pattie would, for various reasons, be acceptable to the Royal Navy as <sup>Parliamentary Secretary</sup> Minister for the Armed Forces. I suggest, therefore, that you might consider transferring him to another Department - perhaps to Trade if John Biffen were to lose a Minister of State where I think that Geoffrey would do very well. The other choice would be to make Geoffrey Pattie the deputy of Tom Trenchard.

9. I am sorry to add yet further to your burdens with such a jigsaw puzzle. This leaves the question of Philip Goodhart. In my view he would be acceptable to the Armed Services as the Parliamentary Secretary but he would be rather less suitable on Procurement. I think you will understand my reasons for making these proposals at this stage. I am, of course, at your disposal should you wish to discuss.

/ 10. I attach an organizational diagram.

11. I am sending a copy of this minute to Michael Jopling, but to no-one else.

Ministry of Defence

21st May 1981



PROPOSED NEW STRUCTURE

Minister for the Armed Services

Minister for Defence Procurement

(Douglas Hurd  
Cecil Parkinson  
Alick Buchanan-Smith  
Tom King)

Tom Trenchard  
(Geoffrey Pattie)

Parliamentary Under Secretary  
for the Armed Services

Parliamentary Under Secretary  
for Defence Procurement

(Philip Goodhart  
David Hunt)

(Geoffrey Pattie  
David Hunt)

*Michael Mann - PC note wri*

*PM NW B-S - needed for press*

*My: Parkinson will be good for the equipment job - arms sales.  
17. Trenchard good or better. Knows industry. Hunt will be best of names mentioned  
my: Hunt will see it is dangerous.  
my: Possible. King will be best. Hunt will probably see it is dangerous.*



Extract by news (M/SS defence 10.2.81)

Subject filed as Defence.  
Oct 79: Future UK Army  
Defence

Ministerial Organisation in the Ministry of Defence

The Defence Secretary said that he would be approaching the Prime Minister in the summer to ask her to abolish single Service Ministers. He wished to move to a Ministerial organisation based on a Minister of State for Procurement, a Minister of State for the Armed Services, and two Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. He would also be seeking changes in personalities: at present he had the worst <sup>(practical)</sup> team in Whitehall.

The Defence Secretary said that he was resisting pressure from CDS to confirm his successor now, and to decide at the same time on the next generation of single Service Chiefs. He had not yet decided whether to build up the role of the CDS or to abolish the post. One or other course was necessary. The Prime Minister counselled the Defence Secretary against building a rival to himself. The Defence Secretary commented that the abolition of the post of CDS would enable him to get rid of a lot of bureaucrats. The Prime Minister enquired about the attitude of The Queen. The Defence Secretary said that he was given to understand the the Palace would not create difficulties.

Paul



