


SECRET

# 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

S  
810

(ANNEX : 1967 SPACE TREATY, 72 SALT I & II TREATY & NITZE LECTURE)

FILE TITLE: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND		SERIES  DEFENCE
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS (CTB + SALT)		
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)		PART: 6(A)
PART BEGINS: 15 <sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER 1984	PART ENDS: 31 <sup>ST</sup> JULY 1985	CAB ONE: 

~~\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_~~

PART  
CLOSED

PREM 19/1442

SECRET



**PART**

**CLOSED**







TED STEVENS, ALASKA, COCHAIRMAN  
SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, COCHAIRMAN  
RICHARD LUGAR, INDIANA, COCHAIRMAN  
CLAIBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND, COCHAIRMAN

MICHAEL WALLOP, WYOMING  
JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA  
DON NICKLES, OKLAHOMA  
ROBERT K. DOLE, KANSAS, *ex officio*

TED KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS  
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, NEW YORK  
ALBERT GORE, JR., TENNESSEE  
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, *ex officio*

## United States Senate

ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

*Prime Minister*  
*JW*  
*7/8*  
*mr*

*R7*

July 29, 1985


Dear Prime Minister Thatcher:

We deeply appreciated the opportunity of being able to meet with you during our recent visit to London and discuss a number of topics of mutual concern. Members of our group were particularly interested in hearing your perspective on the interrelationship of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the French "Eureka" research initiative. Our discussions underscored the value of a continuing dialogue between the United States and your Government on the role that the SDI might play in strengthening the Alliance's deterrent posture.


Again, we appreciated your taking the time to meet with us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Sam Nunn  
Co-Chairman



Ted Stevens  
Co-Chairman

The Honorable Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland



D. R.

PRIME MINISTER

*ms*

The Russians have announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing from 5 August until 1 January. (Surprise, surprise, they themselves have just conducted an abnormally large number of tests).

I attach the Americans' first reaction which notes the absence of any proposals on compliance and verification.

I think that we should avoid rubbishing the proposal too promptly. We might point out that we have long supported a comprehensive

CHARLES POWELL

test ban; but note that the Soviet proposal seems to have nothing to offer on verification.

29 July 1985

We shall look at it carefully.

In fact, I think it is the beginning of the propaganda offensive of which you spoke. C.D.P.



WE REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO ENTER INTO CONCRETE AND DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE SUCH REDUCTIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT VERIFIABLE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING CAN PLAY A USEFUL, THOUGH MORE MODEST ROLE. LIMITS ON TESTING DO NOT ABOLISH THE HUGE STOCKPILES OF EXISTING WEAPONS BUT THEY CAN HELP TO LIMIT THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NEW WEAPONS, IF SUCH LIMITS ARE VERIFIABLE.

FOR THAT REASON, THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS TESTING VERIFICATION PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 24, 1984. THE PRESIDENT SAW THIS INITIATIVE AS A WAY TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN VERIFIABLE LIMITS ON TESTING. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE NOTED, THE SOVIET UNION TO DATE HAS REFUSED TO AGREE TO THIS FAIR AND PRACTICAL APPROACH.

THE TYPE OF MORATORIUM PROPOSAL WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS DECIDED TO MAKE IS OF COURSE NOT NEW. SUCH A MORATORIUM WAS IN EFFECT FROM 1958 TO 1961.

WHILE WE WILL EXAMINE THE SOVIET DECISION CAREFULLY, WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF AN UNINSPECTED TESTING MORATORIUM, AND THE VERIFIABILITY OF RESTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR TESTS, UNLESS THERE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS.

AN UNINSPECTED MORATORIUM WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY ADDRESS OUR VERY REAL COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

CONCERNS. WE RECALL THAT IT WAS THE SOVIETS WHO FIRST RESUMED TESTING AFTER SUCH A DECLARED MORATORIUM IN 1961 WITH THE LARGEST SERIES OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN HISTORY. PRESIDENT KENNEDY NOTED THEN: "WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW...NEVER AGAIN TO OFFER AN UNINSPECTED MORATORIUM."

WE HAVE NOTED IN RECENT WEEKS A SUBSTANTIAL ACCELERATION IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS -- IN THE PAST WEEK ALONE WE HAVE DETECTED THREE SUCH TESTS. OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS DESIGNED TO PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN A POSITION NOT TO NEED TO TEST OVER THE NEXT FIVE MONTHS.

WE WOULD WELCOME SOVIET INTEREST IN PUTTING INTO PLACE VERIFIABLE AND DURABLE LIMITS ON WEAPONS TESTING. WE BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT'S NEW INITIATIVE IS THE MOST PRACTICAL APPROACH TO BEGIN ADDRESSING THIS SERIOUS PROBLEM. SINCE THERE ARE NO CONDITIONS IN THIS OFFER, WE LOOK FORWARD TO A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE.

WE ARE SURE THAT YOU SHARE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT ANY UNVERIFIABLE MORATORIUM SUCH AS THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED UPON. WHEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS ACTUALLY MADE, WE THUS URGE YOU TO EXPRESS THOSE CONCERNS TO THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS PUBLICLY. SHULTZ

BT

#1316

*to invite the Soviet Union to join in an exchange of experts to measure the yields of nuclear weapon tests*





PM/85/73

THE PRIME MINISTER

MBFR

1. On the instructions of the Defence Secretary and myself, our officials have been engaged in a review of Western policy at MBFR, over which negotiations have made no significant progress after twelve years. It soon became clear that decisions over the place of MBFR in the wider scheme of Conventional Arms Control should only take place when the outcome of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament (CDE I) was known, and when the current NATO Military Committee Study of the Military Implications of an MBFR agreement had been completed. As a result, efforts were concentrated on what to do between now and the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting in November 1986, to which CDE I reports.

2. The last Western proposal at MBFR was tabled in April 1984. A hastily concocted initiative, reluctantly agreed to by the European allies, it was a good example of how political pressure for activity across the Atlantic can distort the Alliance decision-making process. The annex on verification was never tabled (owing to major disagreements on details); the Benelux countries were offended by the lack of prior consultation; and

Agreed  
CMB

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister  
Agree that the  
Foreign Secretary  
should approach the  
Americans to try  
to get MBFR  
negotiations re-launched,  
on the basis of minimal  
amendments to the latest

Soviet  
proposals?  
CMB  
25/7





CONFIDENTIAL

significant frictions~~x~~ arose between ourselves and the Germans because of German misconceptions about our previous contacts with the Americans. The initiative was never seriously considered by the East and, on 14 February of this year, they tabled a new proposal, for an interim agreement lasting three years, comprising initial US and Soviet withdrawals (13,000/20,000 troops) from the reductions zone followed by a collective and national no-increase commitment. In putting forward this initiative, the East made it clear that either comprehensive proposals (involving reductions down to the agreed level of parity at 900,000/700,000 (Ground and Air Forces/Ground Forces)) or any insisting upon data agreement before initial reductions were unnegotiable.

3. Officials therefore began to look at options for a possible Western response, with a view to restoring our previously close relationship with the Germans on MBFR and to denying the East the initiative at the talks. Michael Alexander, with whom I discussed this when I visited Vienna on 14/15 May, has played an important part in elaborating our package and fully supports its present shape. UK/FRG exchanges have now led to agreement at Ministerial level in both London and Bonn on the UK's preferred option; that of minimal amendments to the latest Eastern text to take account of Western security interests. I attach a copy of the Eastern text, incorporating the amendments we would propose. We have also reached agreement with the Germans

/on





CONFIDENTIAL

on verification: a breakthrough which will almost certainly lead to an Alliance-wide consensus.

4. Building on the Eastern text would have a number of significant advantages. It would be easier to negotiate in Brussels than a completely new initiative. And, the verification problem having already been resolved, it ought to be feasible to table the counter-proposal before the end of the year. It would present the East with unpalatable choices regarding its previous duplicity on force levels. It makes the presentationally (but not militarily) important concession of postponing prior agreed data to future, and major reductions. And it would force the East, were it to reject its own text (albeit amended) to justify its continuing intransigence in the face of the removal of the two obstacles claimed by them to have been blocking progress up to now.

5. The chances of the East accepting such a proposal are slim. The verification package, up to three times as intrusive (in terms, for instance, of frequency of inspection) as anything previously tabled, would be liable to expose significant variations from data filed after initial reductions. There would in any case be reluctance over setting intrusive verification precedents for other arms control negotiations. From the West's point of view the main risks are that 13,000 US troops would go home across the Atlantic; and the East might cheat without being found out via the verification





CONFIDENTIAL

package, though these risks are common to any MBFR proposal. Having taken the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Secretary and I are satisfied that these risks are relatively small, and worth taking.

6. The next step is to approach the Americans, the other member of the trilateral group that has traditionally set the lines of Western policy on MBFR. This I intend to do, if you are content, in the margins of the Helsinki Anniversary Meeting at the end of this month. The internal US review of MBFR is still some way from completion; precious little attention is being given to conventional arms control now that the Geneva talks are underway and the Department of Defense are known to be opposed to doing anything in MBFR. The prospects for moving them are consequently doubtful - and it may not be worth expending much capital on the effort. But an approach now will remind them that MBFR remains of importance to the European direct participants, and that any repeat of the 1984 performance can only harm Alliance management.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



7. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
25 July, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ILLUSTRATIVE AMENDMENTS TO EASTERN TALKS

(Proposed deletions in square brackets;  
additions to text underlined)

BASIC PROVISIONS

of an Agreement on the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the US of ground forces and armaments in Central Europe and a subsequent non-increase in the levels of the armed forces and armaments of the sides in this area

---

The German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, on one side,

The Kingdom of Belgium, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United States of America, on the other side,

proceeding from the task of strengthening peace and stabilising the military-political situation in Central Europe without diminishing the security of the sides,

striving to initiate the process of gradually lowering the level of military confrontation in this area, and also desiring to promote the creation of a favourable atmosphere for proceeding subsequently towards more substantial reductions in armed forces and armaments on a mutual basis,

have agreed as follows:

1. For the purposes of this Agreement the area of Central Europe or the area of reduction is considered to be the whole of the territories of the Kingdom of Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

CONFIDENTIAL



The USSR and the US shall notify each other and the remaining parties to the Agreement through ~~[diplomatic]~~ agreed channels about the start, not later than one month after entry into force of the Agreement, of the practical arrangements to reduce their ground forces in Central Europe, and about their completion.

~~[For]~~ From the beginning of the period of the withdrawal of the Soviet and American forces to be reduced, in the Eastern and Western parts of the area of reductions there shall be established ~~[three-four observation]~~ an agreed number of permanent exit/entry points on each side ~~[in localities through which this withdrawal will take place]~~ Each side shall determine independently the location of these points. The ~~[observation]~~ exit/entry points shall be staffed by representatives of the USSR and of the US and of the country on whose territory such point or points will be located. ~~[The]~~ All ground force units ~~[to be reduced shall leave the area of reduction]~~ entering and leaving the area of reduction shall pass through these designated points to enable withdrawals to be monitored and to confirm compliance with the subsequent no-increase commitment.

Together with the above-mentioned measures to ensure the fulfilment of the Agreement the sides shall use the national technical means of verification at their disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of the international law. Each side undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other side operating in accordance with generally recognised principles of international law.



CONFIDENTIAL

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America undertake within one year from the time of the entry into force of this Agreement to reduce their ground forces in Central Europe by respectively: the USSR ~~[20,000]~~<sup>30,000</sup> men, the US 13,000 men.

3. The said reductions in Soviet and American ground forces shall be implemented in combat military units ~~[together with their organic armaments and combat equipment and]~~ with up to 10% of these reductions as individuals.

The combat military units of the USSR and of the US to be reduced shall be withdrawn to within their national boundaries ~~[together with their organic armaments and combat equipment]~~ and shall be deployed in new locations in such a way as not to diminish the security of any States - participants in the negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, including participants with special status, as this is defined in the Record of the Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Consultations in Vienna on 14 May 1983 and in the Final Communiqué of these consultations on 28 June 1983.

4. (Para 5 in Eastern Proposal). For the purposes of ensuring the fulfilment of this Agreement, at the time of signature of the Agreement the USSR and the US shall exchange lists of the combat military units to be reduced and withdrawn by them from the area of Central Europe, with an indication of their actual designation, numerical strengths, and location ~~[and the number of basic types of armaments to be reduced]~~. These lists must also contain general indications about the contingent of military personnel to be reduced as individuals.



5. (Para 4 in Eastern Proposal) Upon the completion of the reductions of Soviet and American forces indicated in Article 2 of this Agreement; the US and USSR shall undertake not to increase the residual level of their forces in the reductions area for the duration of this Agreement. Additionally all States parties to the Agreement on either side shall undertake on a collective [~~and national~~] basis not to increase the level of their armed forces [~~and armaments~~] in Central Europe for the duration of this Agreement. Furthermore, it is envisaged that routine replacement of armed forces personnel will be carried out by all parties to the Agreement in conformity with this obligation but agreed exceptions for routine military exercises will be permitted. Upon entry into force of the no-increase commitment, the following measures shall take effect to ensure the effective verification of residual strengths:

- a. Exchange of information on both sides' forces in the area of reduction by garrison and down to battalion level, including their numerical strength, in an agreed format.
- b. Verification arrangements:
  - prior notification of out-of-garrison activities above an agreed level;
  - exchange of observers at notified activities;
  - prior notification of the movement of ground forces above an agreed level into the area of reductions;
  - each side shall be allowed up to 30 inspections in each of the first two years of the agreement

C. CONFIDENTIAL



and 25 in the third.

There will be two types of inspection: a ground inspection, lasting up to 60 hours, whose primary task will be to focus on manpower and a ground/air inspection, lasting up to 24 hours, whose primary task will be to verify compliance with other Treaty provisions.

6. The sides undertake to continue the negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces [~~and armaments~~] in Central Europe with the object that the total numerical strength of the armed forces of each side (Alliance) should be reduced to equal collective levels - up to 900,000 men, including up to 700,000 men in ground forces. The sides undertake also to consider the question of armaments at a later stage in the negotiations.

7. This Agreement shall enter into force from the day of its signature and shall be of three years' duration, but is subject to extension by mutual agreement.





PM/85/72

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister  
CDP  
24/7.

*Put in  
Washington  
before*

Soviet Compliance with Arms Control Agreements:  
Implications for British Policy

1. I thought you might like to have a note before your visit to Washington this week about the implications of the JIC assessment (JIC(85)(N)65 of 11 July) that by no means all the American charges of widespread Soviet breaches of Treaty obligations are substantiated. The JIC conclude that the main trouble is that the Russians use loopholes in loosely-drafted agreements, not clear-cut violations.

2. This difference of interpretation is, I know, familiar to you. In any case, whatever the strict scientific facts and legalities, the US Administration feel strongly that Soviet exploitation of ambiguous Treaties and refusal to respond adequately to US concerns undermines the spirit and objectives of arms control. I can quite understand the US sense of frustration. There is, however, a risk that, if the Administration try to push their arguments too far, the Russians will get new opportunities for wedge-driving in NATO (not least because some other allies are less sensitive than we are to the Americans' anxieties). Some US officials want to go still further and to use accusations of Soviet non-compliance to justify an approach to the SDI programme which takes no account of the arms control dimension, and in some cases to undermine the entire arms control process. Neither outcome would be in our interests.

3. I think it was a considerable achievement that, thanks in large part to your own message, President Reagan decided to maintain the SALT II constraints. But officials have been tasked

/ to report





to report by November on "proportionate US responses" to uncorrected Soviet non-compliance. This means that the US definition of the extent to which the Soviet Union is complying with the Treaty will have a crucial effect on the wider decisions to be taken by President Reagan. By then the context in which discussion will take place will be the Reagan/Gorbachev Summit, in which arms control will inevitably be the primary focus. The fact that the Soviets certainly continue to observe the bulk of their obligations, and the ambiguous nature of the evidence on the disputed cases, indicate that the Russians still see it as in their long-term interests to adhere to arms control agreements. I think this underlines the need to strengthen the arms control structure rather than to see it eroded.

4. As the debate continues the Russians are bound to attack the US's own record. They will allege double standards over the Midgetman ICBM, whose testing or deployment would (we all agree) be a breach of SALT II, and over the SDI programme, which they will say runs contrary to the spirit of the ABM Treaty and would be contrary to the letter if it moved beyond research. Accusations over modernisation of the Fylingdales BMEW radar are likely to involve us directly in the debate.

5. My judgement, against this background, is that our public line should remain that the siting and characteristics of the Krasnoyarsk radar give rise to serious questions in connection with the ABM Treaty which will need resolution if the Treaty is to be protected from erosion and progress is to be made towards further arms control agreements. We should concentrate on welcoming the President's decision to observe the limits imposed by arms control agreements. Meanwhile, we should be robust with the Russians and continue to press them on the major issues of concern, particularly Krasnoyarsk.

/ 6.





6. With our Allies we should take the line that the Russians have a serious case to answer, but should not go further than our own assessment of the evidence leads us. With the Americans themselves we should make it clear that we will join in pressing the Soviets to answer the US case. Nevertheless, we believe that the Americans would be wise to avoid exaggerated accusations which can only damage their argument, and should persevere in their efforts to achieve practical solutions which build on existing agreements, rather than discard them. We should also underline the difficulties which US abandonment of arms control would pose for Alliance management at a time when unilateralist pressures still need to be resisted strongly in most NATO countries.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to Michael Heseltine and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
24 July 1985







ADVANCE COPIES

16

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS(2)  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
~~MR GOODALL~~  
~~MR JENKINS~~  
MR ~~WESLEY~~ DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST  
MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
~~MR NPS~~ }  
DACU

HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK



**IMMEDIATE**

15.1.85

GRS 1850

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 171609Z JUL 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 195 OF 17 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK(DACU), WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW,  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA,  
TOKYO.

*ADVANCE COPY* *mt*

YOUR TELNO 124

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL - BRIEFING ON US/SOVIET/GENEVA TALKS

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, TOWER AND GLITMAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL TO-DAY. PROGRESS WAS SLOW AS EXPECTED, WITH NO MOVEMENT IN FORMAL SOVIET POSITIONS. THE SOVIET POSITION ON INF HAS BECOME INCREASINLY POLEMICAL AND HARDLINE, BUT THERE HAS BEEN SOME SUCCESS IN ENGAGING THE RUSSIANS IN DISCUSSION ON QUOTE THE U S AGENDA UNQUOTE ON SPACE AND DEFENCE AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE SUGGESTED SOME MOVEMENT IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. LINKAGE STILL STRESSED. SOME DISCUSSION IN COUNCIL OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN THE LIGHT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. A U.S. TEAM WILL BRIEF THE COUNCIL ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OVERVIEW KAMPELMAN SAID THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN SLOW AND THAT SOVIET TACTICS HAD VARIED IN EACH OF THE THREE GROUPS. PROGRESS IN EACH GROUP CONTINUED TO BE HELD HOSTAGE (KARPOV'S WORD) TO THE OTHERS. INSISTENCE ON A BAN ON RESEARCH INTO SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS REMAINED THEIR FORMAL POSITION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME ECHO OF THE VEILED THREAT OF A WALK-OUT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF



VEILED THREAT OF A WALK-OUT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR TACTICS WAS BECOMING CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS. THIS, AND THE FORTHCOMING HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS IN HELSINKI AND GENEVA MIGHT PROVIDE THE STIMULUS FOR MORE PROGRESS IN ROUND 3.

3. ON THE STRATEGIC GROUP TOWER REPORTED THAT A BAN ON SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS AND AN INF SOLUTION (ON SOVIET TERMS) CONTINUED TO BE SOVIET PREREQUISITES FOR PROGRESS. HOWEVER THEY HAD REVEALED SOME MORE ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION.

4. TOWER CONFIRMED TO THE COUNCIL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET SUGGESTION REPORTED TO US BILATERALLY (WASHINGTON TELNO 2110 OF 12 JULY). THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATED THEIR INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING 2 AGGREGATES, ONE FOR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND ONE FOR WARHEADS ON DELIVERY VEHICLES. THEY HAD ALSO SUGGESTED A JOINT OBLIGATION TO HAVE NO MORE THAN A PREDETERMINED PERCENTAGE OF ANY ONE TYPE OF DEFENSIVE WEAPON WITHIN THE AGGREGATE (THE PERCENTAGE FIGURE FOR ALL TYPES). THEY HAD DECLINED TO PUT NUMBERS TO ANY OF THESE SUGGESTIONS. THEY HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WERE A SOLUTION TO INF, CUTS OF MORE THAN 25 PERCENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

5. TOWER PLAYED DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS. THEY WERE TOO SKETCHY TO JUDGE THEIR FULL IMPLICATION. THEY MIGHT STILL LEAVE THE SOVIET PROMPT HARD TARGET CAPABILITY UNTOUCHED, WHILE DEGRADING THE U.S. SECOND STRIKE FORCE. THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO REJECT THE LEGITIMACY OF U.S. CONCERNS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT.

6. THE U.S. HAD CONCENTRATED ON REJECTING SOVIET CRITICISM OF THEIR FORMAL POSITION, FOR EXAMPLE, ON TRADE-OFFS.

7. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE OR NO EVOLUTION ON THE SOVIET SIDE SINCE THE INTERIM REPORT ON 19 JUNE. (UKDEL NATO TELNO 169.) IN FACT IN A POLEMICAL PLENARY STATEMENT ON 20 JUNE THEY HAD REASSERTED THAT THE U.S., THROUGH ITS QUOTE ILLEGAL UNQUOTE LRINF DEPLOYMENTS, WAS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. THEY REPEATED THEIR DEMAND THAT THE SS20'S SHOULD BE OFFSET AGAINST BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILE SYSTEMS. THEY CLAIMED THAT THEIR FAR EASTERN DEPLOYMENTS WERE REQUIRED TO COUNTER U.S. NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. THEIR DEMANDS ON AIRCRAFT REMAINED MAXIMALIST.

8. THE U.S. HAD CHALLENGED SOVIET ASSERTIONS ON DATA BUT DETECTED NO SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS OTHER THAN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. GLITMAN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE CRITERIA (AGREED IN 1979) FOR INF AGREEMENT AND SAID THAT CHANGES TO THE SOVIET POSITION COULD NOT BE RULED OUT.

9. IN A DETAILED REPORT KAMPELMAN RECALLED THAT THE U.S. HAD DEVOTED THE EARLY PART OF THE SESSION ON SPACE AND DEFENCE TO EXPLAINING THE CONSISTENCY OF SDI RESEARCH WITH THE ABM TREATY. IN THE SECOND HALF THEY HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN TERMS OF THE



CONSISTENCY OF SDI RESEARCH WITH THE ABM TREATY. IN THE SECOND HALF THEY HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN TERMS OF THE PROHIBITION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AND A POSSIBLE NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

10. CONFIRMING THAT THE SOVIET TEAM HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY ABRAHAMSON ON THE SDI, OVER AN INFORMAL LUNCH, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT KARPOV HAD BEEN APPRECIATIVE BUT HAD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD CONFIRMED HIS VIEW THAT THE U.S. WAS DEVELOPING A PROHIBITED TERRITORIAL DEFENCE. SOVIET QUESTIONING OF ABRAHAMSON HAD BEEN WELL PREPARED. THE SOVIET SIDE OUTLINED SOME POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO SDI, INCLUDING QUANTITATIVE BUILD-UP AND IMPROVEMENT OF OFFENSIVE FORCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED SOVIET ABM TECHNOLOGIES, BUT ACCOMPANIED BY THE WARNING THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD QUOTE COPY UNQUOTE THE U.S. SDI PROGRAMME. THE U.S. HAD REPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF THEIR CRITERIA FOR DEPLOYMENT (SURVIVABILITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS AT THE MARGIN), PROLIFERATION OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE A REASONABLE RESPONSE. THEY HAD EMPHASISED THE RELATIONSHIP IN ANY TRANSITION TO A STRATEGY WITH A GREATER EMPHASIS ON DEFENCE, BETWEEN DEFENSIVE FORCES AND REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES. STABILITY WOULD BE INCREASED BY SURVIVABLE DEFENCES AND SURVIVABLE OFFENSIVE FORCES SO LONG AS THESE WERE REQUIRED FOR DETERRENCE. REDUCTIONS IN DESTABILISING SYSTEMS THEREFORE STOOD ON THEIR OWN MERITS. DEFENCES SUPPORTED THE CASE FOR REDUCTIONS WHILE REDUCING THE VALUE OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND PROVIDING ASSURANCE AGAINST NON-COMPLIANCE.

11. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CHARACTERISED THESE ARGUMENTS AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT PROVIDING A FIRM PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY THEY HAD LAID MORE STRESS ON THE PROHIBITION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE (ART 1(2) OF THE ABM TREATY) THAN IN THE PAST. THE U.S. HAD RESPONDED THAT PART 1 WAS NOT RELEVANT TO RESEARCH AND THAT THE ABM TREATY NEGOTIATING RECORD SHOWED THAT RESEARCH WAS NOT PROHIBITED. THEY HAD ALSO POINTED TO KRASNOYARSK. THE RUSSIANS HAD CLAIMED THAT ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN SDI WOULD BE A FLAGRANT VIOLATION AND HAD GIVEN PROMINENCE TO AN ASAT BAN. THE U.S. SIDE HAD RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY ASAT BAN WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE AND VERIFIABLE THAT WAS SHORT OF A COMPREHENSIVE BAN AND HAD REFERRED TO THE 1978/79 ASAT TALKS WHEN THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID A COMPREHENSIVE BAN WAS IMPOSSIBLE, A POSITION WITH WHICH THE U.S. NOW AGREED. BUT KAMPELMAN HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO FURTHER SOVIET IDEAS.

12. IN SUMMARY THE RUSSIANS WERE BEGINNING TO DISCUSS SPACE AND DEFENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE U S AGENDA ALTHOUGH THEIR FORMAL POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED.

13. IN DISCUSSION SEVERAL PERMREPS ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY INFORMAL INDICATIONS OR INTUITIONS OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVEMENTS, OR POSSIBLY OF AN OFFER DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, AS A RESULT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. BOBCH (DENMARK) ASKED



POSSIBLY OF AN OFFER DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, AS A RESULT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. BORCH (DENMARK) ASKED IN PARTICULAR WHAT SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE GIVEN TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS WHICH HAD NOT EXPLICITLY CALLED FOR A BAN ON SDI RESEARCH. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ALLIANCE UNITY AND THE IMPORTANT EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION OF THE RECENT DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF DEBATE ON SDI AND FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY FOR ARMS CONTROL. HE ALSO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF KAMPELMAN'S REFERENCE ON 19 JUNE TO THE SALT II NEGOTIATING RECORD PROVIDING A DEFINITION OF THE LINE BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. KAMPELMAN PROMISED TO SEND ME DETAILS. 14. \* KAMPELMAN SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY SPECULATE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN UNAWARE OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT. THEY HAD LITTLE OR NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR NEW FOREIGN MINISTER. LEADERSHIP CHANGES APPEARED TO OVERSHADOW THE SITUATION BUT NOT TO GUIDE IT. KARPOV HAD INVITED HIM TO READ GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO THE UCS QUOTE CAREFULL UNQUOTE, BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RESPOND TO SUBSEQUENT REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION. HE HAD HOWEVER STRESSED THAT THE LETTER WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH A CONTINUED DEMAND FOR A BAN ON RESEARCH (THE RUSSIAN TERM FOR QUOTE CREATION UNQUOTE ENCOMPASSED RESEARCH) AND THAT THIS REMAINED HIS FORMAL INSTRUCTION. BUT KAMPELMAN DID NOT DISMISS ALTOGETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE. HE ADDED THAT THE U S HAD EXPECTED AN ATTRACTIVE PUBLIC SOVIET OFFICE TO BE TRADED AGAINST SDI. BUT THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED: THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE CONCERNED ABOUT COMING UNDER PRESSURE TO LIVE UP TO AN OFFER OF SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS.

15. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION SENATOR TOWER DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET SUFFICIENT U S CONCERNS BY NOVEMBER FOR A VLADIVOSTOK TYPE DECLARATION. THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE SOLARZ/CHEROV CONVERSATION WHICH ADDED TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET POSITION. ANY PUBLIC SOVIET OFFER WOULD NEED TO BE ANALYSED IN THE GREATEST DETAIL. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WAS IMPORTANT BUT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. HE SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT WANT TO AMALGAMATE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS. GLITMAN WAS MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THIS, BUT ADDED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS GOT WHAT THEY WANTED ON SDI THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ANY CONCESSION ON INF. THE SAME MIGHT APPLY TO INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS (TOWER INDICATED ASSENT.)

16. FULL TEXTS OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOWED BY BAG FOR FCO, MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN AND MOSCOW.

GRAHAM  
BT



SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 122340Z JUL 85

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2110 OF 12 JUL

AND TO MODUK (FOR DACU), UKDEL NATO

ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN

US/SOVIET GENEVA TALKS: START

SUMMARY

1. SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAVE NOW PUT FORWARD A VERSION OF THE 25 PCNT REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL.

DETAIL

2. SOURCES IN POL-MIL (PLEASE PROTECT) TOLD US ON 10 AND 11 JULY THAT, DURING AN INFORMAL SESSION OF THE START GROUP IN LATE JUNE, THE RUSSIANS PUT FORWARD A SUGGESTION FOR MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF 25 PCNT IN THE NUMBERS OF BOTH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WEAPONS (IE WARHEADS, HOWEVER DELIVERED). THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT EQUAL PERCENTAGE SUBLIMITS (NUMBERS UNSPECIFIED) MIGHT BE DEvised TO CAP NUMBERS OF PARTICULAR TYPES (AGAIN UNSPECIFIED) OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IN A PLENARY SESSION EARLY THIS MONTH, THE SOVIET TEAM APPARENTLY TOUCHED ON THE IDEA AGAIN.
3. OUR SOURCES REGARD THIS MOVE AS SIGNIFICANT IN TWO RESPECTS. FIRST, IT REPRESENTS A SHIFT FROM THE IMMOBILITY OF ROUND 1 AND THE FIRST HALF OF ROUND 2 (PARA 5 OF UKDEL NATO TELNO 169). SECONDLY, THE CONFIRMATION THAT THE GORBACHEV 25 PCNT REDUCTIONS OFFER WOULD APPLY TO WARHEADS AS WELL AS TO SNDVS MAKES IT MUCH MORE INTERESTING. US NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROBE FURTHER, AND TO TRY TO OBTAIN MORE DETAIL: BUT HAVE APPARENTLY NOT AS YET MADE PROGRESS
4. STATE DO NOT WANT NEWS OF THIS MOVE TO GET ABOUT JUST YET. IN COMMENTING ON STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVE SOLARZ THAT CHERVOV TOLD HIM IN MOSCOW ON 3 JULY THAT THE 25 PCNT REDUCTIONS OFFER APPLIED TO WARHEADS AS WELL AS SNDVS, OFFICIALS HERE HAVE SAID ONLY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAVE NOT YET MADE A FORMAL PRESENTATION ON THE GORBACHEV OFFER. THIS IS CLEARLY TRUE, BUT NOT THE WHOLE TRUTH.
5. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER, AND IN WHAT TERMS, THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL BE DESCRIBED IN NEXT WEEK'S NAC BRIEFING. THE CONCERN IN STATE IS THAT ITS SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE EXAGGERATED BY SOME: WE HAVE OF COURSE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE RISK THAT ITS OMISSION WOULD SURPRISE THE ALLIES IF AND WHEN THE RUSSIANS SUBSEQUENTLY PLAY IT UP, A LA CHERVOV. BUT IT WILL CLEARLY BE IMPORTANT THAT UK REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD NOT NEXT WEEK REVEAL FOREKNOWLEDGE.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS



SECRET



JA  
27.  
53  
cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 July 1985

**SALT INTERIM RESTRAINTS AND SDI**

Thank you for your letter of 8 July enclosing a draft reply to President Reagan's letter to the Prime Minister on SALT interim restraints and the SDI.

Since the draft contained nothing of substance, the Prime Minister decided not to send it. I have however added the point about letting the President have views on the Summit to the separate message on terrorism and hijacking.

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This seems to me  
a perfectly pointless  
message to what was  
only a circuler letter.

You have already  
thanked the President for  
the SALT II decision.

I have incorporated the  
only action point - that  
you will write in due course  
about the summit - in  
another message on terrorism.

Agree not to send this?

CDA

Yes -  
agree  
note to  
President  
not





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 July, 1985

*Dear Charles,*SALT Interim Restraints and SDI

You sent me on 26 June a copy of President Reagan's letter to the Prime Minister, together with a new US text on the SDI.

Following the Vice-President's talks this week, Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that a brief acknowledgement might be useful, pointing to a more substantive exchange of views in the run-up to the US-Soviet Summit to which you referred in your letter of 3 July.

I enclose a short draft which the Prime Minister might care to send.

*Yours ever,**Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



DEFENCE: Arms Control

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

DATE: 1/15/70

BY: [Signature]



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Reagan

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I wanted to let you know how much I appreciated your letter of 24 June, and the warm personal sentiments you expressed there.

George Bush's visit here last week gave me an opportunity to reaffirm our welcome for your wise decision on SALT interim restraints, and our support for your commitment to achieve real results at Geneva. I agree wholeheartedly with your view that success can only be built upon maintaining an Alliance consensus, and I believe that your recent approach could not be more helpful in that regard. In your letter you spoke of the need for a "quiet and candid dialogue" as the best means of consensus-building. My sentiments exactly!

I should also tell you how much I valued the latest State Department text on the Strategic Defence Initiative, which seemed to me to reflect many of the points which we had previously discussed between us, and to steer the current debate in very much the right direction.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/You



You will already know how warmly we have welcomed, both privately and publicly, the news of your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev in November. I fully endorse the thought in George Shultz's statement that leaders must find a way for two different systems to co-exist in our small world; and that our efforts to reduce tensions and lower the dangers of confrontation should be redoubled.

George Bush mentioned that you would be interested in any views I had ahead of Geneva. I will let you have some nearer the time.

With warm personal regards.



Subject as master



JDABM  
duplicate copy sent out  
as line left off  
penultimate para

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 July, 1985.

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE US SENATE ARMS CONTROL GROUP**

The Prime Minister met the members of the US Senate's Arms Control Group this evening. Senators Ted Stevens, Charles Mathias, Gary Hart, Dan Moynihan, Sam Nunn and Albert Gore were present, together with the US Ambassador. Sir Oliver Wright also took part.

The following summarises the discussion in headline form:-

On ARMS CONTROL, the Prime Minister did not expect much progress to be made in the Geneva negotiations ahead of the US/Soviet Summit. We should have to be wary of Soviet attempts to divide Europe from the United States. It would be important to preserve the existing Agreements, particularly SALT II and the ABM Treaty. Senator Mathias asked whether the Senate should give attention to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The Prime Minister thought this could be useful. She underlined the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

On the US/SOVIET SUMMIT, The Prime Minister said that it would be a mistake to build up expectations, although inevitably many hopes would be pinned on the Summit. She thought that President Reagan's main task would be to convince Mr. Gorbachev that the US had no aggressive designs on the Soviet Union, and was not seeking a first strike capability. We should be letting President Reagan have our considered views about the Summit. She hoped that the subject of chemical weapons might be raised there.

On EAST/WEST RELATIONS, Senator Nunn said that he and his colleagues believed that important changes were taking place in the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that there was undoubtedly a different style under Mr. Gorbachev, but one had to remember that he had only ever known Communism. Any economic reform would be modest, although he must succeed in increasing the productivity of Soviet agriculture. This would limit the scope for disposing of American and European surpluses.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 2 -

There was no discussion of the ALLIANCE as such. But Senator Hart developed an argument to the effect that unless the industrial democracies could re-build the productivity of their manufacturing industry the West's ability to sustain conventional defence would be lost. The Prime Minister thought this an unnecessarily gloomy view, and pointed to the success of the high technology sector in the US economy.

On TERRORISM, the Prime Minister said that she agreed with President Reagan on the need to take firm action against hijacking and to ensure the security of aircraft and airports. Many international commitments had been accepted on these subjects, but were not being implemented.

On the MIDDLE EAST, the Prime Minister spoke of the importance of supporting King Hussein's initiative. She also referred approvingly to Mr. Peres's speech in the Knesset on 11 June.

On the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, the Prime Minister urged the Senators not to be perturbed by the failure to reach agreement at the recent European Council. It was just the way the Community worked.

Senator Mathias raised UNITARY TAXATION. The Prime Minister emphasised the importance of this issue, and the likelihood that the Grylls amendment would pass the House of Commons.

The Prime Minister extolled the PTARMIGAN Mobile Subscriber Exchange System, and pointed out that the UK was already a major purchaser of defence equipment in the US, referring in particular to Trident. Senator Nunn referred to his efforts to promote technological cooperation in the military field. In his view, the West was disarming inadvertently because each country tried to maintain a separate manufacturing base.

On JAPAN the Prime Minister urged the importance of cooperation between Europe and the US in putting pressure on Japan and upon its markets, and letting the Yen rise.

Finally, the Prime Minister asked for the Senators assessment of the prospects for the US ECONOMY. Senator Gore expected that growth would be somewhat under the 4.4 per cent projected by the Administration. He thought that there would be agreement to reduce the budget deficit by some \$50 billion. He was dubious as to how long international confidence in the dollar would hold. The Prime Minister gave an account of developments in the UK's economy. She regretted that the US now seemed to be borrowing capital to pay interest. This was not a situation

RESTRICTED



in which the US should have found itself.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



E. R.

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF US SENATE ARMS CONTROL GROUP

The group (six of them) will come at 5 pm tomorrow for an hour. I suggest that you greet them outside the Cabinet Room and have a photograph there, with the meeting in the Cabinet Room afterwards.

The members of the Group are:

Republicans

Ted Stevens (Alaska)  
Charles Mathias (Maryland)

Democrats

Gary Hart (Colorado)  
Dan Moynihan (New York)  
Sam Nunn (Georgia)  
Albert Gore (Tennessee)

Both Nunn and Stevens have in the past introduced resolutions calling for reduction in US forces in Europe. Nunn has also criticised our decision not to maintain 3 per cent growth in the defence budget.

The task of the Group is to observe the Geneva negotiations. They are just completing a round of visits to Geneva and Bonn.

The subjects you might raise are:

- (i) Arms control and SDI. They will want your assessment of the prospects in Geneva and for the US/Soviet Summit. You will want to emphasise the importance of reversing erosion of the ABM Treaty and of a dialogue with the Russians on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.
- (ii) Alliance Issues. They are likely to ask you about the trend in UK defence spending and the consequences for our conventional contribution to the Alliance.



- (iii) Ptarmigan. You will want to press its claims hard: developed to full NATO standards: gives interoperability with Allies: technically and operationally superior to the French competitor (RITA). You might also say that against the background of our helpfulness over the hostages/Beirut we would think it a bit much if the contract went to the French.
- (iv) Terrorism. You should know that the Bonn meeting has been postponed to 25/26 July.
- (v) EC/US Trade Issues. You will want to urge on them the need to avoid protectionism and cooperation with Europe in putting pressure on Japan. You will also want to remind them that they are less than Simon pure on trade, though we acknowledge gratefully the boost which their imports have given to our economies.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

5 July 1985



CONFIDENTIAL

cc BLDG  
R



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July, 1985

*Dear Charles,*

Meeting with the US Senate Arms Control Observer Group:

5 July

Your letter of 26 June to Colin Budd conveyed the Prime Minister's agreement to a meeting with members of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group at 1700 on Friday, 5 July. I enclose briefing notes for this meeting.

The delegation will not now include Senators Pell and Kennedy. It will be led by co-Chairman Ted Stevens (Rep-Alaska) and Sam Nunn (Dem-Georgia). Others in the delegation are Senators Charles M C C Matthias Jr (Rep-Maryland), Gary Hart (Dem-Colorado), Daniel P Moynihan (Dem-New York) and Albert Gore Jr (Dem-Tennessee).

The delegation will previously have had a meeting at 1230 hours with the Foreign Secretary, followed by a luncheon hosted by Sir Geoffrey Howe and joined by the Secretary of State for Defence.

This letter and enclosures are copied to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Defence and Cabinet Secretary.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





VISIT OF US SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP: 5 JULY

I OUR OBJECTIVES

Arms Control

(a) Reaffirm our commitment to arms control and value of Alliance dialogue with US on Geneva/SDI.

Alliance Issues

(b) To reinforce American commitment to defence of Europe and argue against reduction of US forces (Nunn Amendment).

(c) Welcome Nunn Co-Development Fund.

(d) Urge merits of Ptarmigan for US Army contract for mobile subscriber equipment.

EC/US trade

(e) To persuade group of need to preserve climate in which EC and US can co-operate in preparing new GATT round, the success of which is more important to both than individual trade problems.

Terrorism

(f) To reaffirm our determination, together with the United States and our other Allies, to take any measures necessary to counter international terrorism and to strengthen international cooperation to prevent hijacking.

(g) To argue for caution in retaliation and particularly against any plans for retaliatory action against the TWA hijackers or others which might involve the use of the SBA's or Diego Garcia.





## II OUR ARGUMENTS

Arms Control/SDI

(a) Encouraged by degree of Alliance support for US position at Geneva (eg Lisbon NAC). Talks will be long and hard. UK Government statements designed to support US cause. Hope Autumn Summit will provide impetus.

(b) SDI long-term project. Need for clarity and consistency about aims. Camp David Four Points remains basis for UK views.

(c) But no advantage to West in spotlighting SDI issues. Better to lower level of public debate on SDI and concentrate on practical possibilities in near term for arms control.

(d) ABM Treaty: Attach great importance (in President's words) to reversing erosion of ABM Treaty, and clarifying grey areas. Welcome Secretary Shultz's public statement at Lisbon: that US will discuss current ABM Treaty regime with Russians seeking to bring their behaviour into line with US understanding of Treaty's structure.

(e) Compliance/Arms Control Regime: Warmly welcome President's 9 June decisions on SALT II constraints. Positive contribution to Geneva talks; increases public confidence in NATO's commitment to arms control; allows West to maintain moral high ground. Recognise grounds for US concern about Krasnoyarsk radar. Has been raised with Gromyko.

(f) Offence/Defence: Recognise value of debate US trying to stimulate with Russians on relationship between offensive and defensive forces. UK believes new US thinking needs thorough explanation to them, to draw out their own views and explore ways ahead. Issue of central importance to Allies; value highly Alliance consultations on this.



Alliance Issues

- (a) Transatlantic unity basis for security of all Allies.
- (b) Political unity requires continuous and thorough consultations. Their value underlined by Lisbon Ministerial.
- (c) Must be backed by sufficient military strength to maintain credibility of deterrent strategy.
- (d) Recognise need to improve conventional defence. Full UK support for Alliance work on this. Must be guided by:
- clear conception of threat
  - no need to match Warsaw Pact man for man, weapon for weapon
  - conventional defence no substitute for nuclear weapons
  - budgetary constraints we all face. Focus on output and clear priorities
- (e) Initiatives to improve armaments co-operation (at European and trans-Atlantic level) important move in right direction. UK playing full part. Welcome Nunn Co-Development Fund. Note he won't reintroduce 1984 Amendment this year.
- (f) Ptarmigan developed to full NATO standards and demonstrated successfully to US experts. Gives vital interoperability between Allies. Technically and operationally superior to its main competitor RITA.

EC/US Trade Relations

- (g) Recognise protectionist pressures in US: understand Administration's need to be seen to defend US interests;
- (i) But trade confrontations will damage Western solidarity, and jeopardise our ability to work together for new trade round, success of which is essential for preserving open trading system, on which US and EC prosperity depends.





- (ii) Each individual trade problem may seem separate to Congress and industry: but Europe sees US actions as a single whole.
- (iii) Hence disproportionate political effect, and need for coherent management. We will do what we can to promote this on EC side.
  
- (h) Growing consensus in favour of serious preparatory talks for a new GATT round.
  
- (i) Some developing countries still hostile but opposition by no means monolithic: signs that some sceptics (even Brazil) may be prepared to take more flexible line.
- (ii) Preparatory GATT meeting in September/October likely; good chance of a launch in 1986.
  
- (i) Must all sustain political pressure on Japan to reduce trade surpluses.
  
- (i) 29 June European Council endorsed tough 19 June Foreign Affairs Council Declaration.
- (ii) Recent Japanese tariff cut proposals appear quite inadequate.
- (iii) Japanese speak of subsuming more tariff cuts in a new round: we may never have a new round if Japanese cannot move more quickly, because of strength of protectionist pressures.
- (iv) Japanese problems threaten viability of open trading system: our common interest.
- (v) EC and US need to ensure our approaches eg in multilateral fora, are mutually content (without 'ganging up').

#### Terrorism

- (j) Warm congratulations to President Reagan for securing the release of all the hostages and crew of the TWA aircraft, without making any concessions to the demands of the hi-jackers. Regret loss of life which occurred.
  
- (k) We share entirely your objective of stamping out this evil, and agree it calls for highest degree of international action.





(l) We circulated at Milan a number of positive proposals for action amongst the Ten. These draw heavily on UK/US exchanges of views.

(m) We are ready to act at once to suspend all flights to the UK by Middle East Airlines, in company with the rest of the Seven, in accordance with the Bonn Declaration. Asking the Federal Government to carry out necessary co-ordination urgently.

*[Meeting new prepared to 25/26 July]*  
(n) Discussed with Vice-President Bush proposals regarding action to deny use of Beirut airport to possible terrorists. Sympathetic to US aims.

(o) Ready to take very early decisions within the Seven on other action to combat air hi-jacking.

(p) Terrorism must be seen not to succeed, but profound doubts about retaliation by armed force in Lebanon at present time. Only too likely to bring about further cycle of violence, and to set back peace process prospects in the Middle East.

(q) Lives of the remaining hostages must also not be forgotten. Direct British interest (Collett).

### III TACTICAL ARGUMENTS

#### Alliance/Arms Control

(a) Divisions over conventional defence can have repercussions on Alliance cohesion in other areas; East/West relations and arms control.

#### EC/US trade

(b) Recent US announcement of subsidised agricultural sales under export bonus scheme, targetted to traditional EC markets, suggests US want confrontation on agriculture.





- (i) All the more vital to avoid confrontation elsewhere (eg footwear, on which we hope the President will not agree to quotas - or steel, on which it is vital that negotiations currently under way reach an agreed settlement - or textiles, on which Import Quota Bill currently before Congress gives EC serious concern).
- (ii) US acknowledged political importance of EC's Mediterranean preferences as long ago as 1973, in Soames/Casey understanding: economic and political security of Israel, Tunisia, Cyprus and Morocco should be of major concern to US as well as EC.

#### Terrorism

(c) Important to get Beirut airport under effective control, on behalf of Lebanese Government, rather than destroy it.

(d) Important not to lose heart in Summit Seven discussions. Adoption of original Bonn Declaration on Hi-jacking (1978) and subsequent agreements on terrorism, shows that progress can be made when the threat is immediate.

#### IV THEIR OBJECTIVES

##### Arms Control

(a) To probe HMG's attitudes towards arms control, particularly any differences with the US over Geneva/SDI.

##### Alliance issues

(b) To urge need for European Allies to do still more for common defence.

(c) (Senator Nunn at least) to argue that, if Europeans are only prepared to pay for 'tripwire' defence, 300,000 US troops not necessary; and to reserve right to reintroduce 1984 Amendment next year if NATO decisions on conventional defence do not bear fruit.





(d) To express regret at UK decision not to retain 3% real growth target.

#### EC/US trade

(e) Likely to emphasise current protectionist pressures (recent 'New York Times' poll showed 70% of Americans support import controls).

- (i) Will argue that most Americans associate imports with job issues.
- (ii) May point to US impatience with EC failure to reform CAP, scepticism of some Member States on new round (particularly inclusion of agriculture).

(f) May also contest that pasta restrictions justified because of EC refusal to adopt GATT Panel report finding that EC Mediterranean agreements had damaged US trade in oranges and lemons.

#### Terrorism

(g) To raise the general threat posed by international terrorism, probably with specific reference to Shi'ite groups in the Lebanon, and state sponsored terrorism in countries such as Iran, Libya and Syria.

(h) To press for further immediate action against terrorism on international basis, particularly against hi-jacking.

### V OUR RESPONSE

#### Arms control

(a) To reaffirm Alliance solidarity on Geneva aims, putting SDI in perspective.

(b) [If raised] SDI Participation: Have said since February; UK wishes to share in SDI research. Continuing bilateral contacts valuable in assessing practical possibilities.





(c) Third Party Forces/INF [If raised]: US has consistently rejected Soviet demands for inclusion of third country forces in Geneva talks. We have made it clear that only if US and Soviet strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would review her position. We have never said never.

(d) Conventional Arms Control [If raised]:

- (i) MBFR At MBFR continue to seek parity at lower levels. Currently considering Eastern proposal of 14 February.
- (ii) CDE At Stockholm CDE Conference, working for agreement on practical Confidence Building Measures substantially better than Helsinki Final Act Measures. Progress slow; no Soviet response to US President's Non Use of Force (NUF) offers.
- (iii) CW Note US moves toward modernisation could underline to Russians benefits of reaching early agreement to a global ban.

#### Alliance issues

(e) Must not underestimate strength of NATO conventional defence.

(f) Overall European record impressive; but room for some Allies (eg Denmark and Norway) to do more. In all our interests to encourage this. Europe not undifferentiated mass.

(g) By 1985/86, UK defence budget (£18 billion) £3 billion higher in real terms than 1978/79. No reason why we should not carry through planned programme. Contain cost pressures through efficient management, competition and collaboration;

(h) Amendment threatening troop withdrawals no way to deal with Allies. Only Russians would gain.

#### EC/US trade

(i) Of course protectionist pressures will grow as US approaches another election year.





- (i) We have elections too: and heavy job losses in sensitive industrial sectors (250,000 lost in textiles since 1980).
- (ii) But EC exports neither only, nor major, cause of US problems: strong dollar also has an important responsibility.
- (iii) Explicitly protectionist measures can only reinforce any scepticism about new round in (and outside) EC.
- (iv) As well as being wholly inconsistent with repeated commitments to roll back protectionism.

(j) US impatience on CAP reform understandable. We have been pressing for that.

- (i) 1984/85 price fixing and budget discipline agreements serious beginning.
- (ii) US action against EC exports markets only gives alibis to those who wish to resist reform of serious discussion of agriculture in new round.

(k) US action on pasta cannot be considered retaliation: GATT Panel report not adopted by Contracting Parties, therefore US not entitled to retaliate.

- (i) UK fully supports proposals for EC retaliation against any unilateral US action.
- (ii) Counter-retaliation by US against wine (as proposed by Senator Wilson) would be especially provocative).

#### Terrorism

(l) Agree on the need for very close consultation on the general terrorist threat. Intelligence co-operation has a vital part to play in this.

#### BACKGROUND

#### Alliance Issues

(a) Senator Stevens introduced an Amendment in 1982 calling for US troops in Europe to be frozen at 1980 levels - effectively a





reduction of 20,000;

(b) Senator Nunn introduced an Amendment in 1984 calling for the withdrawal of 90,000 US troops between 1978/89 unless European Allies took steps to improve conventional defence;

(c) December 1984 meeting of NATO Defence Ministers agreed to double NATO Infrastructure funding for period 1985/90 and to meet NATO 30 day target in key munitions - 2 areas singled out by Nunn;

(d) Initial results of further work on improving NATO conventional defence submitted to Defence Ministers in May. Identified deficiencies to be highlighted in next Force Goals cycle, 3% growth target reaffirmed as 'general guide'. Emphasis on output welcome to UK;

(e) Nunn unsympathetic to UK decision to abandon 3%. Will have noted House of Commons Defence Committee view that we will be unable to accommodate conventional re-equipment programmes within anticipated future spending levels. Has reserved right to reintroduce 1984 Amendment if plans for NATO conventional defence improvements not implemented;

(f) This year, Nunn introduced Amendment (expected to pass into law) earmarking \$200 million for the research, development, testing and evaluation of projects involving joint participation of US and other Allies. \$50 million also available for 'side by side' testing of US and European equipment. Welcomed by Sir Geoffrey Howe at Lisbon;

(g) Secretary Weinberger issued Memorandum in June calling for reciprocal access to advanced technology, deployment of common equipment, incentive to Allies to make greater investments, and economies of scale;

(h) Ptarmigan contract value: \$4.3 billion. Value to UK: \$1.3 billion. Principal competitor French RITA (Thomson CSF with American partner, GTE). Contract award due end of July. Congress must first be notified of equipment selected. Prime Minister raised with President Reagan in Washington in February; and with Mr Bush on





3 July. Mr Heseltine raised with Mr Weinberger in February and Sir Geoffrey Howe with US Ambassador on 11 June.

### Major EC/US Trade Disputes

Steel: US call for EC restraint on 17 'consultation' products not covered by 1982 export restraint arrangement (including semi-finished products, of concern to BSC's joint venture with Tuscaloosa Steel, Alabama involving US imports of 1,250,000 tonnes of semis over 5 years.

- Linking this to demands for early renegotiation of arrangement (due to expire end 1985) and EC requests for admission of pipes and tubes (mainly French) in short supply in US.
- Two rounds of EC/US negotiations but US still threatens to impose unilateral restraints if no agreement by 15 July.
- US also insist that talks about renewal or extension of 1982 arrangement should be concluded by end October.

Agriculture: \$2 billion US Export Commodity bonus scheme announced on 15 May.

- Allows for export payment-in-kind (eg sales of poultry to be subsidised by gift of wheat from current stocks).
- Designed to secure additional US sales on world market.
- Targetted to markets identified as those taken over by competing nations trading 'unfairly'.
- EC prime target.
- First sales announced: up to 1 million tonnes of wheat to Algeria and 600,000 tonnes of wheat flour to Egypt (traditional French markets) - likely to be provocative to France.

### GATT Citrus Panel

Following US complaints that EC tariff preferential agreements with certain Mediterranean countries adversely affected by US citrus exports, a GATT Panel concluded in December 1984 that there was some impairment of trade on oranges and lemons.





- EC object to adopting this report: concerned to avoid eroding Mediterranean preferences that at a time when those countries are scouting for this access to EC following Spanish accession.
- Other Contracting Parties also doubtful about Panel's findings.
- US have now announced intention to retaliate by raising tariffs on EC pasta exports.
- EC have warned US that they will counter-retaliate if US takes unilateral (and in GATT terms illegal) action: retaliation likely to hit US citrus producers.
- Bill now introduced in Congress by Senator Wilson of California requiring counter-retaliation by US: wine mentioned as target.

#### Footwear

On 22 May, US International Trade Commission (ITC) found that imports (which accounted for 71.5% of 1984 US consumption) were causing injury to domestic industry.

- President has yet to decide whether to approve ITC recommendation of five year import restrictions.

#### Textiles

Bill introduced on 19 March imposing quotas on most exporting countries: not EC - but importers would still have to obtain import licences.

- EC concerned about possible trade diversion, and pressure on US Administration to agree tougher successor to present Multi-Fibre Arrangement.
- Administration now lobbying against Bill: but possibly too late to avoid a veto-proof two-thirds Congress majority.





## BACKGROUND

Terrorism

1. We have a wide degree of intelligence sharing on terrorism with the Americans. (Americans have expressed gratitude at degree of co-operation over TWA hi-jacking). There are frequent meetings of intelligence and technical experts with US counterparts. Eg Americans sent expert team at short notice on long delay timing devices following Brighton bombing. Six monthly policy meetings between FCO/Cabinet Office and National Security Council/State Department (latest on 27 June).
2. President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz have expressed the thanks of the US Government for the help given by HM Government over the TWA incident in message to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State.
3. Further message from Mr Shultz dated 1 July called for joint actions:
  - (a) to suspend landing rights for MEA services between Beirut and the United Kingdom;
  - (b) to prevent the use of Beirut airport by terrorists, eg through refusal by flight information regions to accept Beirut traffic, the denial of aviation fuel to Beirut, and strict controls over any aircraft, passengers, baggage and crew coming from Beirut;
  - (c) early agreement amongst the Summit Seven on additional measures (already under discussion) to counter hi-jacking.
4. Action against Beirut airport will be pursued urgently with Summit Seven partners (though FRG Chairmanship of the group) but consideration will need to be given to likely repercussions against UK interests in the Middle East.
5. Discussion in the Summit Seven of American proposals to supplement the Bonn Declaration and make it a more flexible and effective instrument has moved slowly. Broad agreement was reached at experts meeting on 12/13 March with a further understanding that





the proposals relating to international conference International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) should be discussed by representatives of the Seven at ICAO. Due to French procedural objections and a lack of drive on the part of the FRG (Chairman) these discussions are not yet complete. The American proposals in summary are:

Preventative:

- (i) Inclusion of security clauses in all air agreements;
- (ii) Offers of training and technical assistance to vulnerable foreign countries to increase airline security;

Responses to Hi-jacking

- (iii) Co-ordinated demarches to countries not applying adequate levels of security;
- (iv) Possible advice to travellers to avoid named airports;
- (v) Reduction in the number and frequency of flights to such airports;
- (vi) Cutting off technical assistance to countries not co-operating;
- (vii) Supporting pilot boycotts of such countries;
- (viii) Fixed term penalties against foreign countries which do not take action against hi-jacking or to improve airport security;
- (ix) Concerned ICAO action against such countries.

6. A meeting will now take place in Bonn in late July.

7. The case against armed retaliation in Lebanon at the present time needs to be put again to the Americans, not least as regards the implications for the remaining hostages (including Mr Collett).

8. During Vice-President Bush's meeting with the Prime Minister on 3 July agreement was reached on a joint approach (with others) to action against Beirut airport and for improved international co-operation against terrorism (copy attached).



1  
Vice President Bush and I have considered carefully the

subject of terrorism and the threat it poses  
to civilized and democratic peoples.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the  
United States of America declare their  
determination to work together with all like  
minded states in combating this evil.

In particular, terrorism against  
international civil aviation and those  
millions of innocent passengers who today  
travel by air must be stopped.

As an immediate first step, the Governments of the  
United Kingdom and the United States of  
America will seek the agreement of all those



states which share their concern for the security of civil aviation, to suspend all air services between their countries and Beirut International Airport.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America will also work to enhance the security of civil aviation through all appropriate multinational institutions including the ICAO.

In particular, they endorse the importance of action:

- strengthen the international Civil Aviation organisation to enhance its



ability to deal with terrorism directed against civil aviation.

- to bring pressure to bear on those states which, directly or indirectly, support terrorism to cease that support.
  
- to improve co-operation among law enforcement authorities to increase their effectiveness to combat terrorists.
  
- to seek firmer commitments to enforce existing conventions dealing with crimes against civil aviation; and



- to work to revitalize the Bonn  
Declaration of 1978.

3 July 1985



**SENATOR TED STEVENS (REPUBLICAN - ALASKA)**

Born in 1923 in Indianapolis, Stevens was educated at the University of California (BA 1947) and Harvard Law School (LL B 1950) after serving in China in the US Air Force during World War II.

He moved to Anchorage in the early 1950s to practice law, and was appointed US Attorney in Fairbanks in 1953. During the Eisenhower Administration he moved to Washington to serve as Assistant to the Secretary of Interior (1958) and later as Solicitor of the Interior Department. He returned to private law practice in Anchorage in 1961 and was elected Alaska's first Republican Senator. He is a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee), the Committee on Governmental Affairs (Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Civil Service), the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and Rules and Administration Committee. Re-elected November 1984.

Stevens was critical of the European refusal to heed US concerns over the Siberian pipeline. Stubborn but pragmatic, Stevens is generally thought something of a maverick.

A widower (his wife died in an air crash). Five children.

North America Department  
4 July 1985



**SENATOR CHARLES McC MATTHIAS JR (REPUBLICAN-MARYLAND)**

Born 1922. Educated at Yale. Lawyer. First elected to the Senate in 1968. Previously served in the Navy (World War II); as Assistant to the Attorney-General of Maryland; as a member of the Maryland House of Delegates; and as a Member of Congress (1961-9).

Senator Matthias is one of the most respected members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle but, because he is a liberal within his own party and is not a determined in-fighter, he has not had the success or carried the clout that he deserves.

Chairman Senate Rules and Administration Committee and member of Senate Committees on Foreign Relations (Chairman, Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy, Oceans and Environment), Governmental Affairs and the Judiciary (Chairman, Sub-Committee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks).

A strong supporter of Anglo/US relations. Up for re-election 1986. Married with two children.

North America Department  
4 July 1985



**SENATOR GARY HART (DEMOCRAT-COLORADO)**

Born in Ottawa, Kansas in 1936. He graduated from Bethany College. Oklahoma and Yale Law School in 1964. Hart worked as an Attorney for the Department of Justice for a year, then became Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior. In 1967 he returned to Denver to practice law.

Hart's political career began as a student volunteer in J F Kennedy's 1960 campaign. He was also a volunteer organiser in Robert F Kennedy's 1968 campaign, and in 1972 he was National Campaign Director for Senator McGovern. In 1974 Hart himself entered the Senate by defeating the right-wing Republican, Senator Dominick. He serves on the Armed Services, Budget and the Environment and Public Works Committees.

His 1984 campaign for the Democratic Presidential nomination, in which he scored some surprise upsets over Mondale in the early primaries, has brought him to national attention. As the standard-bearer of the young urban professionals ('Yuppies') and sunbelt neoliberals, he could be a strong contender for the nomination if he runs again in 1988. He is expected to retire from the Senate in 1986 in order to prepare for the campaign.

In the Senate, his main interests have been defence, intelligence and environmental problems. A strong critic of the Pentagon, he is also firmly against reducing America's naval strength in particular. He is a proponent of more mobile and flexible weapons systems.

On Northern Ireland, he is a member of the Friends of Ireland. But his statements during the 1984 Presidential campaign went well beyond the standard Friends' positions, and he was endorsed by the Irish-American Unity Conference as the candidate who would do most to secure British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.

Has attended Ditchley Conference, and cultivates links with the British Liberal/SDP Alliance.

Married with two children.



**SENATOR DANIEL MOYNIHAN (DEMOCRAT-NEW YORK)**

Born in 1927 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Educated at Tufts University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and LSE (of which he is an Honorary Fellow). He served on the staff of the Governor of New York in the 1950s, and as an Assistant Secretary of Labour under President Kennedy. Under President Nixon he served as House Assistant for Urban Affairs and later as US Ambassador to India. President Ford appointed him Ambassador to the United Nations in 1975. He resigned from the position to return briefly to his faculty position at Harvard, before running successfully for Senator from New York in 1976. He was until recently Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and is a member of the Finance, Budget and Environment and Public Works Committees.

Moynihan's outspoken manner has often placed him at the centre of national controversy. He is generally regarded as one of the cleverest and most combative Senators but not necessarily the most effective. Earlier regarded as a neo-conservative, particularly on foreign policy issues, he has now shifted towards a more liberal line. At the UN, he was a militant anti-Communist and an equally strong defender of Israel; he was also disliked by Third World representatives for his firm line on US aid policies. On domestic issues, he is a relentless opponent of the Reagan Administration's efforts to reduce social spending. Moynihan has also worked hard for New York, and won a landslide re-election to the Senate in 1982. A firm friend of Britain, he was one of the first to come out in public support of us during the Falklands War.

On Northern Ireland, he is a leading member of the Friends of Ireland (although not the most active). He has co-sponsored resolutions on baton rounds and the UDA, and in 1983 introduced the resolution calling for the appointment of a US Special Envoy. He boycotted the 1983 St Patrick's Day Parade in New York because of Michael Flannery's election as Grand Marshal. As a member of the 1984 Democratic Platform Committee, he resisted attempts to make the



RESTRICTED



platform section on Northern Ireland more critical of HMG.

A prolific writer, his most famous book is 'Beyond the Melting Pot' (1965), a study of ethnic groups in New York City. Apart from his Honorary Fellowship of LSE, he has Honorary Degrees from 42 other Universities and several prestigious awards.

Married (Elizabeth). Three children (2 sons, 1 daughter).  
Roman Catholic.

North America Department

4 July 1985

RESTRICTED



**SENATOR SAM NUNN (DEMOCRAT-GEORGIA)**

Born 1938. Lawyer and cattle farmer. Elected to the Senate in 1972. Has come to be regarded as one of the Senate's leading experts on defence matters. Concerned particularly about improving NATO's conventional capability. His proposal to start withdrawing US troops from Europe if the Europeans fail to meet certain defence expenditure targets was defeated on the floor of the Senate in 1984, and he has decided not to reintroduce it in 1985. Member of Armed Services Committee, Government Affairs Committee, the Selecte Committee on Intelligence and the Small Business Committee.

Married with two children.

North America Department  
4 July 1985



**SENATOR ALBERT GORE (D-TENNESSEE)**

Born 1948. Educated Harvard (BA 1969) and Vanderbilt Law School (1974-6). Army service in Vietnam (1969-71). Son of a well-known former Congressman and Senator from Tennessee, he worked as a journalist and ran a building business for five years before being elected to his father's former seat in the House of Representatives in 1976.

In the House, Gore made a name for himself as an arms control expert. He was one of a small group of democrats in Congress (others included Senator Nunn and Congressman Aspin, now Chairman of the Armed Services Committee) who agreed to support the MX missile in exchange for modifications in the Reagan Administration's strategic arms negotiating position (the 'build-down' proposal).

In the November 1984 Election, on the strength of his name and reputation, and against the national swing to the republicans, he easily captured the Senate seat of the retiring Republican Majority Leader, Senator Howard Baker. Gore's Senate Committee assignments are commerce, science and transportation, and government affairs. He is also keeping up his arms control interests through his membership of the Senate Group monitoring the Geneva negotiations. He is well thought of in Congress and is said to have a bright political future. Baptist.

Married with three children.

North America Department

3 July 1985





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01 ~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

CPK

MO 11/9/4

1st July 1985

NBM  
CM

Dear Colin

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 25th June to Charles Powell about the Senate Arms Control Observer Group's visit to London.

My Secretary of State would be content to see the delegation over the working lunch which the Foreign Secretary is planning for Friday 5th July.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10) and to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, Home Department, Trade and Industry, Energy, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister for Agriculture and Cabinet Secretary.

Yours etc,

*Richard Mottram*

(R C MOTTRAM)

C R Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Defence; Arms Control; Pt 6



25

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST  
MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
~~MR~~ NPS }  
DACU

HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D  
RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

15.1.85

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

FM UKDEL NATO 281707Z JUN 85  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 175 OF 28 JUNE

ADVANCE COPY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK,  
AND TO PRIORITY THE HAGUE BONN PARIS ROME BRUSSELS WASHINGTON MOSCOW

SCG MEETING OF INNER GROUP OF COUNTRIES  
SUMMARY

1. NO NEW DEVELOPMENT AT GENEVA. SOVIET ATTITUDE HARDENING. REDUCED PRESSURE FOR MOVE BY WEST ON NUMBERS BUT CONTINUED EUROPEAN INTEREST IN DISCUSSING OPTIONS. INCREASE IN SS20 NUMBERS TO 423. INTERESTING ACCOUNT BY DANOVJ OF DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW.
2. DETAIL. DOBBINS (U S CHAIRMAN) SAID THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS ON INF AT GENEVA THERE HAD BEEN TWO IMPORTANT INDIRECTLY RELATED DECISIONS IN WASHINGTON, BOTH OF WHICH HAD BEEN PERSONALLY ENDORSED BY THE PRESIDENT. ONE HAD BEEN THE DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS WHICH REFLECTED ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AT THE LISBON NAC. THE ISSUE WAS NOT PUT TO REST HOWEVER. THE OTHER DECISION WAS TO ISSUE THE FACT SHEET ON SDI WHICH SET OUT AT LENGTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE SDI PROGRAMME. THIS ALSO REFLECTED ALLIANCE VIEWS BY INCORPORATING THE CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS AND IN OTHER WAYS. BOTH WERE SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATION. TURNING TO INF, THE FRG PAPER RAISED TWO QUESTIONS, WHEN WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MOVE, AND IN WHAT DIRECTION SHOULD IT THEN BE? THE U S WAS OF THE VIEW THAT A MOVE WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE NOW IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. HE WOULD BE HAPPY FOR THE SCG TO DISCUSS WHAT SORT OF MOVE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE WHEN THE TIME CAME, AND HE BELIEVED THE FRG PAPER WAS CIRCULATED IN THAT SPIRIT.
3. ALL DELEGATIONS WELCOMED THE DECISION ON SALT. DELA BARRE (BELGIUM) STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY VOS (NL) SAID THAT MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE VERY SENSITIVE ON THIS ISSUE. A DECISION THE OTHER WAY WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE INF ISSUE BACK TO THE SURFACE AGAIN. ALSTON (UK) ADDED THAT THE U S DECISION HAD COME UP TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL QUITE QUICKLY. IT HAD BEEN FORTUNATE THAT A MINISTERIAL NAC HAPPENED TO BE SCHEDULED TO PROVIDE FOR CONSULTATIONS. EARLY CONSULTATION ON FUTURE ISSUES WAS DESIRABLE. THE UK RECOGNISED THE



HAPPENED TO BE SCHEDULED TO PROVIDE FOR CONSULTATIONS. EARLY CONSULTATION ON FUTURE ISSUES WAS DESIRABLE. THE UK RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES AND HAD RAISED KRASNOYARSK WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT THE BALANCE OF ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF CONTINUED OBSERVANCE OF CONSTRAINTS WAS LIKELY TO BE THE SAME IN FUTURE AS THIS TIME.

4. ALL DELEGATIONS ACCEPTED THAT THE HARDENING SOVIET ATTITUDE ON INF AFFECTED THE TIMING OF ANY FORWARD MOVE, AND REDUCED THE URGENCY OF PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A MOVE. HARTMAN (FRG) SAID THAT THE INTERRELATIONSHIP ISSUE WAS THE KEY TO THE TALKS, NOT INF. THE SOVIETS MIGHT SHUT THEM OUT FOR SOME TIME. THIS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS INF NUMBERS NOW, WHICH IS WHY THE FRG PAPER HAD ADDRESSED ITSELF TO CONSIDERATIONS THAT NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED WHEN THE TIME CAME. IF NUMBERS WERE TO BE DISCUSSED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE A RANGE RATHER THAN GET TOO FIXED ON ONE NUMBER. ALSTON SAID THAT WE SHOULD NONETHELESS USE THE TIME WE HAD TO THINK CONSTRUCTIVELY. DID WE EXPECT A SOVIET PROPAGANDISTIC MOVE OVER THE NEXT MONTHS? WAS THERE A DANGER OF A SOVIET CLAIM THAT WITHOUT U S FORWARD MOVES THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE AT RISK AGAIN? IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE WERE NOT READY TO RESPOND TO SUCH MOVES. VOS SAID THAT THE INF ISSUE WAS QUIET IN THE NETHERLANDS. THE SITUATION ON SS20 NUMBERS, AND LEARNING MORE ABOUT THOSE IN TRANSIT, WERE VERY HELPFUL. WHILE HE AGREED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAD PERHAPS HARDENED AND THEY COULD BE SITTING IT OUT DID THIS MEAN THAT WE SHOULD TOO? NOW WAS NOT THE RIGHT TIME FOR A NEW INITIATIVE BUT THE GROUP SHOULD DO SOME WORK ON THE NUMBERS ISSUE. THE QUINT HAD A VERY SUCCESSFUL RECORD OF CONFIDENTIALITY.

5. DANOVII (ITALY) GAVE AN INTERESTING ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE HAD HAD TWO INTERESTING DISCUSSIONS. PETROVSKY HAD STUCK TO THE OFFICIAL LINE SEMICLN INF SEEMED TO BE A MINOR ISSUE, AND HE DECLINED TO DISCUSS IT SEMICLN HE COMMENTED ON THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND HIS DESIRE TO REACH COMMON GROUND WITH ITALIAN VIEWS ON THE WAYS OUT OF IT. PETROVSKY CONSTANTLY SHIFTED HIS ARGUMENT TO TRY TO DEFEND THE SOVIET POSITION. HE CITED THE DIFFERENT MEANING OF THE WORD FOR RESEARCH (MEANING QUOTE CREATE UNQUOTE) - IN THE RUSSIAN TEXT OF THE TREATY, (WHICH DID NOT AFFECT THE ISSUE) SEMICLN DANOVII HAD POINTED OUT THE PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY FOR AGREEING ON LIMITATIONS ON NEW TYPES OF ABM SYSTEMS. PETROVSKY HAD GONE ON TO CLAIM THAT THE U S POLICY ON SDI RAN AGAINST THE AGREED PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. DANOVII HAD POINTED OUT THAT DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS RELEVANT TO THE AGREED TEXT WERE MANY YEARS AWAY. BANNING SDI WAS NOT THE ONLY WAY OF PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. PETROVSKY HAD SAID IT WAS THE ONLY WAY FOR THE USSR. WHEN DANOVII HAD TURNED TO KRASNOYARSK AND ASKED IF THE DOBRININ OFFER OF AN INSPECTION WOULD BE CONFIRMED HE HAD RAISED HIS EYES TO THE CEILING, DECLARED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE AS IT WOULD OPEN UP MORE PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITIES FOR WEST, ANGRILY REPEATED THAT KRASNOYARSK WAS NOT A BMEWS RADAR, AND ACCUSED DANOVII OF PEDDLING U S POSITIONS. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SDI WOULD BE CAPABLE OF KNOCKING OUT SOVIET MISSILES IN THEIR SILOS. DANOVII OVERALL AIM IN THEIR TALK HAD BEEN TO DEMONSTRATE THE LACK OF CREDIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITIONS AND ALSO THEREFORE OF THEIR VEILED THREATS OF A WALK OUT. DANOVII ADDED THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT SOVIET REFERENCES TO THE U S USING THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A SMOKE SCREEN WHICH WOULD REQUIRE APPROPRIATE ACTION FROM THE SOVIET SIDE WAS A REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES RATHER THAN A WALKOUT.

6. DANOVII'S OTHER CONVERSATION HAD BEEN WITH ADOMISHIN OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT (OF THE MFA?), WHO HAD SOUGHT HIM OUT FOR AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION. ADOMISHIN HAD SAID THAT THE SDI ISSUE HAD BEEN NOT SO MUCH AN INCENTIVE FOR THE USSR TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A JUSTIFICATION. THEY NEEDED TO BE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE WEST, AND WHERE THEY COULD USE THREATS TO WALK OUT. THE CURRENT SITUATION...



HAD BEEN NOT SO MUCH AN INCENTIVE FOR THE USSR TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A JUSTIFICATION. THEY NEEDED TO BE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE WEST, AND WHERE THEY COULD USE THREATS TO WALK OUT. THE CURRENT SITUATION THEREFORE SUITED THEM. HE HAD ASKED, HOWEVER, WHAT SCOPE THERE MIGHT BE FOR RECONCILING THEIR POSITION WITH THE U S APPROACH, AND HOW THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP ISSUE MIGHT BE HANDLED. HYPOTHESES MIGHT BE EXPLORED WITHOUT GIVING UP PRINCIPLES. DANOVICH HAD CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INDEED THINKING OVER THEIR POSITION, PERHAPS IN VIEW OF A POSSIBLE SUMMIT, BUT THEY WERE IN NO HURRY ABOUT IT.

7. ALSTON ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY PROGRESS IN THE SCC ON THE COMPLIANCE ISSUE. DOBBINS SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS, BUT THE U S WOULD NOT GIVE UP. TWO AGREEMENTS OF A TECHNICAL NATURE, NOT DIRECTLY RELATING TO ISSUES IN THE U S REPORT, HAD BEEN AGREED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM HARTMAN DOBBINS AGREED THAT ONE OF THE AGREEMENTS CLOSED A LOOPHOLE IN THE ABM TREATY.

8. THE U S DEPUTY INF NEGOTIATOR, AMBASSADOR WOODWORTH GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE NAC BRIEFING ON 19 JUNE. THERE HAD BEEN AN INF PLENARY ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE U S HAD QUESTIONED THE IMPLICATIONS BEHIND GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ON 26 JUNE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS REVIEWING ITS POSITION, BUT THEY REFUSED TO BE DRAWN. THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED AND CONFIRMED THE START DATE FOR THE THIRD ROUND (19 SEPTEMBER) AND THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ANY SOVIET INTENTION NOT TO KEEP IT. THE OVERALL SOVIET APPROACH HAD BEEN IF ANYTHING EVEN MORE POLEMICAL - A PLENARY STATEMENT TWO WEEKS BEFORE HAD BEEN THE MOST POLEMICAL AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE THAT THE U S SIDE COULD RECALL THEM MAKING IN THESE OR THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WERE INDULGING IN LONG MONOLOGUES AND ACCUSATORY DEBATE, DELIBERATELY AVOIDING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WOODWORTH ADDED THAT THE U S HAD RAISED THE SRINF ISSUE, BUT THE SOVIETS HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO PURPOSE IN DISCUSSING IT UNTIL THE PRIMARY ISSUE WAS RESOLVED. DOBBINS ADDED THAT THE U S HAD PROPOSED AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF DATA BUT THIS HAD ALSO BEEN REJECTED.

9. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SS20 NUMBERS IT WAS AGREED THAT THE 423 FIGURE WOULD BE RELEASED AT THAT AFTERNOON'S PRESS CONFERENCE. IT WAS BECOMING AN ESTABLISHED PRACTICE THAT SS20 NUMBERS WERE RELEASED AT SCG PRESS CONFERENCES AND THIS WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE.

10. DOBBINS SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS DRAFTED BEFORE GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. THEY MIGHT WELL BE REVIEWING THEM. THE OBVIOUS ALTERNATIVES WERE MORE PROPAGANDA INITIATIVES OR TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HE SUSPECTED THAT THEY WOULD GO FOR ONE OR THE OTHER, THAT WE MIGHT KNOW BY THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT PROBABLY NOT BEFORE. THERE HAD BEEN HINTS THAT THEY MIGHT COME UP WITH FURTHER MORATORIUM TYPE PROPOSALS. HE DISCOUNTED SOVIET HINTS OF A POSSIBLE WALK OUT BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF THEIR POSITION AND THEIR EXPERIENCE LAST TIME.

GRAHAM

NNNN  
SENT AT 281842Z ET

SECRET



SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 June 1985

*✓*  
*24.*  
*CDP*  
*has message*

SALT INTERIM RESTRAINTS AND SDI

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Regan about SALT interim restraints and SDI. I assume that the State Department Fact Sheet to which it refers will be available to you.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET





File mt

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 June 1985

Dear Ambassador,

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 26 June with which you enclosed a letter from President Reagan and a State Department Fact Sheet on the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Yours sincerely  
Charles Powell

Charles Powell

His Excellency the Honourable Charles H Price II

hr



RESTRICTED

ECh



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 June 1985

**VISIT TO LONDON BY SENATE ARMS  
CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP**

Thank you for your letter of 25 June about the forthcoming visit of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group.

The Prime Minister would be ready to see the Group at 1700 on Friday 5 July for one hour. I should be grateful for appropriate briefing from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence.

BF

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

CST





EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON

June 26, 1985

*up*  
CDP  
246.

Dear Prime Minister:

President Reagan has asked me to pass along to you the enclosed letter which was received at the Embassy this morning.

In addition, I am enclosing a copy of the State Department's Fact Sheet on The Strategic Defense Initiative which the President mentions in his letter.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosures:

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW 1.



00

1700  
a.s

RESTRICTED

CCPC  
①



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

An important and influential Group. You could see them on 5 July. There is a space in the diary. But you may think it's enough

On the whole I think you ought to Agree to see them?

25 June 1985

Dear Charles, for Foreign Sec, Defence Sec } to see them.

Yes not CDP 25/6

Visit to London by Senate Arms Control Observer Group

We have been informed by the US Embassy that a Senate Arms Control Observer Group will visit Geneva, Bonn and London during the forthcoming Congressional recess. They have asked to call on the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defence.

The delegation will land in London at 0925 on Friday 5 July and depart at 1400 on Sunday 7 July. It will be led by co-Chairmen Ted Stevans (Rep-Alaska), Sam Nunn (Dem-Georgia) and Claiborne Pell (Dem-Rhode Island). Others in the delegation are Senators Edward M Kennedy (Dem-Massachusetts), Charles M C C Mathias Jr (Rep-Maryland), Gary Hart (Dem-Colorado), Daniel P Moynihan (Dem-New York) and Albert Gore Jr (Dem-Tennessee). Senators Stevens, Nunn, Pell and Gore will be accompanied by their wives.

This standing group observed the INF negotiations and now observes the Geneva talks. They are regarded by the Administration as helpful given their close involvement in and understanding of the issues, and their potentially valuable role if Senate ratification of any agreement were required.

We strongly recommend that both the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary meet the Group if they are able to do so. This is a top-ranking delegation, including Senators with Presidential potential as well as wide-ranging current interests and considerable influence. The Embassy in Washington advise that it would be in our interests to accord them every courtesy.

The Foreign Secretary proposes to host a small working lunch for the Group on 5 July, and we understand that the US Ambassador proposes to host a reception in their honour later in the day.

I should be grateful to know your views and those of the PS/Defence Secretary.

/The

RESTRICTED





The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that Senator Deconcini (Dem-Arizona), will also visit London for discussions on Northern Ireland and bilateral issues from 4-8 July. He is likely to call on Mr Hurd and FCO and NIO officials. A delegation from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (led by its chairman Rep Dante Fascell) will pass through London from the afternoon of 5 July to Sunday 7 July en route back to Washington from visits to Oslo and CDE meetings in Stockholm. The Delegation has not requested any officials calls and is rather more junior in composition than the Senate Group, but we are informing the British-American Parliamentary Group and are considering whether there are any appropriate social events to which the delegation might be invited.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence, Northern Ireland, Home Department, Trade and Industry, Energy, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister for Agriculture and Cabinet Secretary.

*Yours ever,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



# US Declassified

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1985

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your messages on SALT interim restraints and your gracious remarks about, what I must say, was a difficult decision. Your comments, as always, were constructive and very much to the point. George Shultz also reported to me on his useful meeting with you in London, as well as his extensive discussions with Geoffrey Howe and other Foreign Ministers in Lisbon. Allied views played a key role in my decision.

I especially appreciate your personal support for my efforts to achieve meaningful and significant arms reductions in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Alliance solidarity, as you recognize, is key if we are to convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously. Thank you as well for your kind remarks about my willingness to go the extra mile in pursuit of real arms reductions. It is clearly time for the Soviets to reciprocate.

My Strategic Defense Initiative continues to attract great attention. I firmly believe, as you know from our discussions, that exploratory research into the future potential of strategic defense is critical to ensuring Western security over the long term. In addition to holding open the possibility of a more stable and reliable strategic balance, simple prudence dictates that we pursue such research in light of the vigorous activities of the Soviet Union in strategic defense -- including advanced research.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR



In the long term, the strategic challenges that we will collectively face over the coming years are such that we cannot allow ourselves as an Alliance to delay the exploration of possible new alternatives. Allow me to underline that we have made no decision to go beyond research. I assure you that the United States will not seek to pursue solutions to strategic problems without reference to the special concerns of each of our Allies. We also pledge to take into account Great Britain's special concerns as a nuclear power.

We fully recognize that, given the unprecedented scope and complexity of our research into new defensive technologies, building and sustaining an Alliance consensus will require both great care and patience. With this in mind, I recently issued a new National Security Decision Directive that sets forth a more detailed and definitive presentation of our rationale and strategy in pursuing our SDI research program. In doing so, I have drawn directly upon your comments and advice about what to underscore in our discussions of SDI within the Alliance, and publicly.

As part of our efforts to make clear to U.S. and Allied publics our SDI policy and the strategic context in which that policy has been developed, we have released a very detailed public summary of my policy directive. This "Fact Sheet" has been made available to your government, and I am asking Ambassador Price to ensure that you personally receive a copy. I would, of course, welcome your views on it.

Quiet and candid dialogue represents the best means of consensus-building. To that end, I have asked George Bush to visit London and a number of other European capitals to continue



our close consultations. I am writing you separately about my request that George discuss in detail practical steps we might take to combat international terrorism. Again, thank you for your thoughtful counsel, which I highly value. Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

*Ron*

The Right Honorable  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister  
London



Action

cc ops  
master

SECRET

Prime Minister ②

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T119C/85

Nothing very new  
here, although the  
enclosed fact sheet

June 24, 1985

is a very thorough  
piece of work.

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your message on SALT interim restraints and your gracious remarks about, what I must say, was a difficult decision. Your comments, as always, were constructive and very much to the point. George Shultz also reported to me on his useful meeting with you in London, as well as his extensive discussions with Geoffrey Howe and other Foreign Ministers in Lisbon. Allied views played a key role in my decision.

CDP  
26/6

I especially appreciate your personal support for my efforts to achieve meaningful and significant arms reductions in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Alliance solidarity, as you recognize, is key if we are to convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously. Thank you as well for your kind remarks about my willingness to go the extra mile in pursuit of real arms reductions. It is clearly time for the Soviets to reciprocate.

My Strategic Defense Initiative continues to attract great attention. I firmly believe, as you know from our discussions, that exploratory research into the future potential of strategic defense is critical to ensuring Western security over the long term. In addition to holding open the possibility of a more stable and reliable strategic balance, simple prudence dictates that we pursue such research in light of the vigorous activities of the Soviet Union in strategic defense -- including advanced research.

In the long term, the strategic challenges that we will collectively face over the coming years are such that we cannot allow ourselves as an Alliance to delay the exploration of possible new alternatives. Allow me to underline that we have made no decision to go beyond research. I assure you that the United States will not seek to pursue solutions to strategic problems without reference to the special concerns of each of our allies. We also pledge to take into account Great Britain's special concerns as a nuclear power.

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

We fully recognize that, given the unprecedented scope and complexity of our research into new defensive technologies, building and sustaining an Alliance consensus will require both great care and patience. With this in mind, I recently issued a new National Security Decision Directive that sets forth a more detailed and definitive presentation of our rationale and strategy in pursuing our SDI research program. In doing so, I have drawn directly upon your comments and advice about what to underscore in our discussions of SDI within the Alliance, and publicly.

As part of our efforts to make clear to US and Allied publics our SDI policy and the strategic context in which that policy has been developed, we have released a very detailed public summary of my policy directive. This "fact sheet" has been made available to your Government, and I am asking Ambassador Price to insure that you personally receive a copy. I would, of course, welcome your views on it.

Quiet and candid dialogue represents the best means of consensus-building. To that end, I have asked George Bush to visit London and a number of other European capitals to continue our close consultations. I am writing you separately about my request that George discuss in detail practical steps we might take to combat international terrorism. Again, thank you for your thoughtful counsel, which I highly value.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

/S/

Ron

SECRET



RESTRICTED

GRS 550

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 210043Z JUN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1913 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO, BONN, UKDIS GENEVA

ROUTINE PARIS, ROME

SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

CW: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VOTE

SUMMARY

1. THE HOUSE VOTES FOR RESUMED CW PRODUCTION.

DETAIL

2. IN EACH OF THE LAST THREE YEARS THE HOUSE KILLED ATTEMPTS APPROVED BY THE SENATE TO RESUME CW PRODUCTION. BUT IN A VOTE ON 19 JUNE ON AN AMENDMENT TO THE FY 86 DEFENCE AUTHORISATION BILL, THE HOUSE DECIDED BY 223 TO 195 TO AUTHORISE DOLLARS 124 MILLION FOR BINARY CW PRODUCTION AFTER 30 SEPTEMBER 1987

(REPEAT 1987) PROVIDED THAT

(A) THE US HAS NOT ENTERED INTO ANY VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON CW BY THAT DATE, AND

(B) THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES AFTER THAT DATE THAT, INTER ALIA, NATO HAS FORMALLY AGREED QUOTE

(I) THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS CURRENTLY STORED AND DEPLOYED IN NATO COUNTRIES NEED TO BE MODERNISED IN ORDER TO SERVE AS AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT,

(II) THAT SUCH MODERNISATION SHOULD BE EFFECTED BY REPLACEMENT OF CURRENT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WITH BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, AND

(III) THAT THE EUROPEAN MEMBER NATIONS OF NATO WHERE SUCH CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ARE TO BE STORED OR DEPLOYED ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT STORAGE AND DEPLOYMENT OF BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIES. UNQUOTE.

3. THE SENATE HAD EARLIER VOTED TO APPROVE CW FUNDING WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS (OUR TELNO 1781, PARA 5(B)) AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE HOUSE AND SENATE POSITIONS WILL NOW NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN CONFERENCE. IN PARTICULAR THE CONFERENCE WILL CONSIDER WHETHER THE NATO CONDITIONS, AND PARTICULARLY POINT (III) ABOVE, SHOULD BE RETAINED IN THE FINAL LEGISLATION. BUT THE PRESIDENTIAL CW REVIEW COMMISSION'S REPORT SPECIFICALLY CONCLUDED ON THIS POINT THAT QUOTE: IN RECOMMENDING PRODUCTION OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS,

<sup>1</sup>  
RESTRICTED

THE.



## RESTRICTED

THE COMMISSION DOES NOT DEEM IT ESSENTIAL THAT THEY NOW  
BE DEPLOYED IN FOREIGN TERRITORY. UNQUOTE

### COMMENT

4. THE VOTE IS A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.  
THE PRINCIPLE OF RESUMING CW PRODUCTION (AFTER 16 YEARS) HAS BEEN  
APPROVED, AND LEVERAGE ON THE RUSSIANS IN CD DISCUSSIONS THEREBY  
ENHANCED. THE OVERALL THRUST OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, AND  
WHITE HOUSE LOBBYING BASED ON IT, HAS CLEARLY HAD CONSIDERABLE  
IMPACT.

5. ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN WILL NO DOUBT BE REMINDING HOUSE/  
SENATE CONFEREES OF THE REPORT'S CONCLUSION QUOTED AT PARA 3  
ABOVE, AND URGING REMOVAL OF ANY CONDITION RELATING TO EUROPEAN  
BASING. WE DETECT SOME CONFIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATION CIRCLES THAT  
CONDITION (III) WILL INDEED BE REMOVED.

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN,  
OTTAWA, BRUSSELS, LISBON, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL VIENNA.

[REPEATED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

HANNAY

LIMITED

ACDD

DEFENCE DEPT.

NAD

NEWS DEPT.

PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/RUS

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

MR DAVID THOMAS

<sup>2</sup>  
RESTRICTED



GRS 2000A  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM UKDEL NATO 191630Z JUN 85  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 19 JUNE  
AND TO MODUK (FOR DACU), WASHINGTON PARIS BONN MOSCOW  
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON  
LUXEMBOURG OSLO MADRID REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA UKDEL STOCKHOLM  
OTTAWA ANKARA ATHENS ROME BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST  
EAST BERLIN PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW

YOUR TELNO 116:  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL - BRIEFING ON US/SOVIET GENEVA TALKS.

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, GLITMAN, AND LEHMAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON THE SECOND ROUND OF THE US SOVIET TALKS IN GENEVA. THE US HAD CONTINUED TO EXPLORE AND PROBE ON THE BASIS OF POSITIONS SET OUT IN THE FIRST ROUND, STRESSING FLEXIBILITY. THEY HAD SET OUT IN DETAIL THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SDI RESEARCH AND RESPONDED TO SOVIET PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS ABOUT THEIR APPROACH TO SDI IN GENEVA. THE SOVIET POSITION HAD HARDENED, WAS MORE POLEMICAL, AND DELIBERATELY DILATORY. THE MORATORIUM PROPOSALS WERE REPEATED AND THE LINKAGE OF ALL AREAS FIRMLY STRESSED, (GOING BACK ON SOME INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIRST ROUND). THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO HAVE EITHER NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS, OR INSTRUCTIONS TO STALL. KAMPELMAN EXPECTED LITTLE PROGRESS UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP TOOK NEW DECISIONS BUT HE WAS NOT DISCOURAGED. THE RUSSIANS WERE CONFORMING TO THEIR NORMAL NEGOTIATIONS PATTERN. MOVEMENT COULD BE SUDDEN WHEN IT CAME. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION OF A WALKOUT. EMPHASIS ON BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WAS GREATER.

DETAIL

2. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPEARED TO BE SLOWING DOWN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD NOT RESPONDED TO US WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE VARIOUS METHODS OF REACHING AN EQUITABLE VERIFIABLE BALANCE AND HAD STRESSED A FIRM LINKAGE WITH AGREEMENT ON SPACE. THE PREVIOUS SOVIET SUGGESTION OF A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN OPENLY REPUDIATED, TO THE EXTENT THAT EVEN US ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET INF POSITION WOULD NOT RESULT IN A TREATY UNLESS AGREEMENTS WERE ALSO REACHED (ON SOVIET TERMS) ON SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS.

3. EMPHASIS ON UK AND FRENCH WEAPONS HAD BECOME A KEY POINT. THE RUSSIANS INDICATED THAT THEY SOUGHT A BALANCE BETWEEN THE SS20 AND ALL UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT FUTURE UK/FRENCH MODERNISATION PLANS WOULD JUSTIFY INCREASE NOT A REDUCTION IN SS20 NUMBERS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A REFERENCE TO MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT.

14. THE

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE THREE MORATORIA PROPOSALS WERE REPEATED BUT ANY IMPLICIT SANCTIONING OF US DEPLOYMENTS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED. IN THE SOVIET VIEW THESE WERE A CIRCUMVENTION OF SALT III. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE USING ALLIED INTEREST IN INF TO PRODUCE LEVERAGE ON SPACE. THIS WAS A GLOOMY ASSESSMENT, BUT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SHIFTED THEIR EMPHASIS DURING THE FIRST ROUND AND MIGHT YET DO SO IN THE SECOND.

5. ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS LEHMAN, DEPUTISING FOR TOWER, SAID THAT THE US HAD USED THEIR BROAD AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE WAYS OF REDUCING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IN CONTRAST SOVIET STATEMENTS HAD BEEN GENERAL AND REPETITIOUS EMPHASISING THAT PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGIC AREA WAS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON INF. THEY HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET INTO DETAIL UNTIL THEIR SPACE AND INF CONDITIONS WERE MET. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH OF 31 MAY HAD BEEN EMPHASISED, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL TO TABLE IDEAS FOR REDUCTIONS WITHIN ONE OR TWO MONTHS OF AGREEMENT ON A MORATORIUM. THEY HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE SUGGESTION OF A 25 PER CENT REDUCTION WAS ANOTHER VERSION OF THEIR 1982 OFFER OF A CEILING OF 1,800 SNDV'S.

6. THE US HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER REASONABLE SOVIET ALTERNATIVES TO THEIR OWN PROPOSALS IN PARTICULAR ON THE TIMING OF REDUCTIONS AND ON TRADE-OFFS. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE, ALTHOUGH SOME INFORMAL INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN TRADE-OFFS. THE US SIDE HAD RAISED IN GENERAL TERMS THE QUESTION OF THE SS25 MISSILE.

7. THERE HAD BEEN 3 MEETINGS OF THE SPACE AND DEFENCE GROUP, WHICH THE US SIDE HAD USED TO SET OUT FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON THEIR APPROACH TO A MANAGED TRANSITION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND THE ABM TREATY. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INSISTED YET AGAIN ON A BAN ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS. THE US HAD ALSO ADDRESSED A NUMBER OF SOVIET STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE US'S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SPACE. THEY HAD REMINDED THE SOVIET SIDE OF THEIR REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO JOIN IN A DIALOGUE AND RENEWED THE OFFER OF A TECHNICAL BRIEFING BY ABRAHAMSON (KAMPELMAN WILL GIVE THIS ON LAST TRY SHORTLY). IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF SOVIET CLAIMS ABOUT AMERICAN REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SDI, IN RELATION TO CRAXI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, KAMPELMAN OBSERVED THAT GORBACHEV SOMETIMES APPEARED ILL-INFORMED OR MIS-INFORMED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED IN GENEVA AND HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS COMPLAINT WHEN CHALLENGED BY CRAXI.)



## CONFIDENTIAL

8. THE US HAD DEVOTED ONE SESSION TO THE LEGAL BASIS OF THEIR POSITION ON SDW. THEY RECALLED MARSHAL GRECHKO'S STATEMENT OF 1972 THAT THE ABM TREATY DID NOT LIMIT RESEARCH, AND THE SALT II NEGOTIATING RECORD WHICH SHOWED THAT THE BEGINNING OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITY FOR SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS WHICH WERE NOT FIXED AND LAND-BASED, WAS CONSTRUCTION OR TESTING OF FIRST PROTOTYPES. THEY HAD ALSO STRESSED THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO PERMIT ITS ADAPTATION TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CITED EXAMPLES.

9. SUMMING UP KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH HAD BEEN NEGATIVE AND DISAPPOINTING, REPEATING AND REEMPHASISING PREVIOUS AND UNACCEPTABLE POSITIONS. HOWEVER HE WAS NOT DISCOURAGED, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONFORMING TO TYPE AND THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO PROBE AND EXPLORE. HE HOPED TO HAVE MORE TO SAY AT THE END OF THE ROUND.

10. ALL THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE WELCOMED THE BRIEFING AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET TACTICS. HE STRESSED THAT EVEN IF THE ACCOUNT GIVEN WAS DISCOURAGING THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN CHANGE ALWAYS EXISTED AND WE MUST BE READY FOR IT. WE MUST NOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL ITSELF. THE SOVIET TACTICS SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE INDEED HOPING BY PROPAGANDA AND WEDGE-DRAWING TO SPLIT THE ALLIES: IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT FOR ALLIES TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR US POSITIONS. HE REPEATED HMG'S POSITION ON SD RESEARCH IN STANDARD FORM. HE ASKED IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH AIRCRAFT IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT (PARA 3 ABOVE) AND HOW THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO JUSTIFY THEIR INCLUSION AND THE EXCLUSION OF EQUIVALENT SOVIET AIRCRAFT.

11. OTHER DETAILED QUESTIONS CONCERNED THE EFFECT OF THE NAC LISBON COMMUNIQUE (THE FRENCH PR INTERVENED TO EMPHASISE THE UNDERLYING SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE DESPITE THE DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION): WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE HAD GIVEN MORE DETAIL ON THEIR INF MORATORIUM: WHETHER THEY HAD REACTED TO US CLAIMS ABOUT SOVIET BMD RESEARCH: WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN THREATS OF A WALK-OUT (AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BY ARBATOV TO THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW): AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF COMPLIANCE ISSUES (SS25 AND KRASNOYARSK).

CONFIDENTIAL

112. IN



# CONFIDENTIAL

12. IN RESPONSE KAMPELMAN STRESSED THE IMPRESSION OF TOTAL INFLEXIBILITY GIVEN BY THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS. ANY EFFECT OF THE LISBON COMMUNIQUE WOULD NOT BE FELT THIS EARLY, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGN OF IT. HE WELCOMED THE FRENCH PR'S STATEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR OWN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES IN BMD, BUT THERE HAD BEEN LESS DENIAL. THEY HAD CLAIMED THAT SOVIET RESEARCH WAS QUOTE NOT PURPOSEFUL UNQUOTE. NON-COMPLIANCE HAD BEEN RAISED IN GENERAL TERMS BUT THE DETAIL WAS DEALT WITH IN THE SCC. THERE HAD BEEN NO REFLECTION OF ARBATOV'S VEILED THREAT IN THE TALKS. IN 1983 THERE HAD BEEN SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON AIRCRAFT BUT IN THE FIRST ROUND THIS YEAR THEY HAD SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE BRITISH TORNADO (WHICH HAD EARLIER BEEN DROPPED FROM THE SOVIET COUNT), BUT HAD GIVEN NO DETAIL. IN GENERAL THE SOVIET SIDE HAD USED CONTRADICTIONARY ARGUMENTS ACCORDING TO THE CONTEXT: AND IN RELATION TO THIRD PARTY FORCES HAD ARGUED THAT IN ASSESSING THE NATO/WP INF MISSILE BALANCE ONLY BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE NATO SIDE (BY IMPLICATION ARGUING THAT U.S. LRINF WERE STRATEGIC AND ILLEGITIMATE (SEE PARA 4 ABOVE)).

13. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT WHILE THE NEGOTIATORS WERE CONSTRAINED BY NEEDS OF CONFIDENTIALITY OTHER REPRESENTATIVES, PARTICULARLY EUROPEAN POLITICIANS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. WHILE THERE WAS GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN THE US POSITION, THIS WAS DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE IN THE FACE OF THE TOTAL SOVIET REFUSAL TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION: IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR THE US TO PRODUCE NEW POSITIONS, MERELY IN ORDER TO COUNTER ANY PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF INFLEXIBILITY. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE A BRIEFING AT THE END OF THE ROUND, PROBABLY WITH AN EXPERTS SESSION.

14. FULL TEXTS OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOWED BY BAG FOR FCO, MOD UK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS.

GRAHAM  
BT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS  
LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

-4-  
CONFIDENTIAL



11/6/85

cc Master  
ops

(22)

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T111/85

O 111459Z JUN 85  
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
BT

S E C R E T  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
DEAR RON,

I WAS MOST GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE YESTERDAY ON THE QUESTION OF SALT II. I WARMLY WELCOME YOUR CHARACTERISTICALLY WISE AND HONOURABLE DECISION THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE CONSTRAINTS SET BY EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROCEDURE YOU OUTLINE FOR HANDLING THE DEACTIVATION OF THE EXISTING POSEIDON SSBN WILL PLACE THE US, AND THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, IN THE BEST POSSIBLE POSITION AS FAR AS THE GENEVA TALKS ARE CONCERNED.

IT IS NOW UP TO THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS THEM TO RESPECT THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING ARMS AGREEMENTS. WE MUST NOT LET THE RUSSIANS BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE A BLANK CHEQUE TO SET THEIR OWN STANDARDS OVER COMPLIANCE. AND IT MUST CLEARLY BE RIGHT THAT RUSSIAN BEHAVIOUR SHOULD BE A FACTOR IN FUTURE DECISIONS ABOUT US STRATEGIC MODERNISATION.

I AM SURE THAT THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE WILL SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE QUOTE EXTRA MILE UNQUOTE THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO GO IS EXACTLY THE RIGHT APPROACH. THE WEST IS BEING SEEN YET AGAIN TO HOLD THE MORAL HIGH GROUND IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH YOU AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS UNFOLD, AND SEND YOU MY WARMEST BEST WISHES.

YOUR SINCERELY,

MARGARET.

NNNN

SENT AT 11:1528Z BY PRC



Secret. 0-11.14592 [To go on direct line]

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1397

Misc 211

VIA WATTHOUSES

Dear Ron,

I was most grateful to receive your message yesterday on the question of SALT II. I warmly welcome your characteristically wise and honourable decision that the US will continue to observe the constraints set by existing strategic arms agreements. In particular, I believe that the procedure you outline for handling the deactivation of the existing Poseidon SSBN will place the US, and the Alliance as a whole, in the best possible position as far as the Geneva talks are concerned.

It is now up to the Soviet Union to show its good faith. We shall continue to press them to respect their obligations under existing arms agreements. We must not let the Russians believe that they have a blank cheque to set their own standards over compliance. And it must clearly be right that Russian behaviour should be a factor in future decisions about US strategic modernisation.

I am sure that the rest of the Alliance will share my view that the "extra mile" that you are prepared to go is exactly the right approach. The West is being seen yet again to hold the moral high ground in the arms control process.

I look forward to continued close contacts with you as the Geneva negotiations unfold, and send you my warmest best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret



cc pg



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 June 1985

*Dear Charles,*SALT II Constraints

In your letter of 10 June you asked for a draft reply to President Reagan's message to the Prime Minister on the US Administration's decision on SALT II constraints.

The President's decision to stick to the letter of the Treaty by dismantling a Poseidon SSBN when the 7th US Trident SSBN begins its sea trials later this year is good news. It indicates that the President has taken due regard for the weight of Alliance opinion expressed at Lisbon last week and in the Prime Minister's own message to him. In Alliance terms, the decision should enable the Americans to reverse the recent trend for some allies to question US strategy at Geneva. It will also allow the Alliance to hold firm as further Soviet propaganda moves are made. In terms of public presentation, the US will retain what we have argued all along is vital in arms control, the moral high ground.

The President outlined in his message how the Administration intends to tackle similar "milestones" in the future. Here the message is less clear cut. American policy will be conditioned by Soviet compliance or otherwise with arms control obligations and by consequent need to take security factors into account. It will also take account of the Soviet attitude at Geneva. The President points to the Midget-man programme as a specific example of where an appropriate response to an alleged Soviet violation, the SSX25, might be required. For the moment this poses no difficulties to us, and we have in principle regarded the concept of a small mobile single warhead missile as contributing to strategic stability. But the President has clearly warned that when the moment comes (which may not be for two years or more in terms of specific SALT provisions) he is likely to authorise development even if this involves undercutting SALT II, if there has been no progress in Geneva in the meantime.

/In



SECRET



In the meantime the Foreign Secretary has no doubt that the Prime Minister will wish to send a warm message to President Reagan welcoming his decision and assuring him of full British support both as regards Geneva and American attempts to get Soviet compliance. I enclose a draft.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*  
*Le Appleyard*  
(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET



Semapw

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Ron,

I was most grateful to receive your message yesterday on the question of SALT II. I warmly welcome your characteristically wise and honourable decision that the US will continue to observe the constraints set by existing strategic arms agreements. In particular, I believe that the procedure you outline for handling the deactivation of the existing Poseidon SSBN will place the US, and the Alliance as a whole, in the best possible position as far as the Geneva talks are concerned.

It is now up to the Soviet Union to show its good faith. We shall continue to press them to respect their obligations under existing arms agreements. We must not let the Russians believe that they have a blank cheque to set their own standards over compliance. And it must clearly be right that Russian behaviour should be a factor in future decisions about US strategic modernisation.

I am sure that the rest of the Alliance will share my view that the "extra mile" that you are prepared to go is exactly the right approach. The West is being seen yet again to hold the moral high ground in the arms control process.

I look forward to continued close contacts with you as the Geneva negotiations unfold, and send you my warmest best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
President Reagan

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

*Dear Ron,*

I was most grateful to receive your message yesterday on the question of SALT II constraints. I warmly welcome your decision that the US will continue to ~~refrain from under-cutting existing strategic arms agreements.~~ *observe the limitations established in constraints set by* In particular, I believe that the procedure you outline for handling the deactivation of the existing Poseidon SSBN will place the US, and the Alliance as a whole, in the best possible position as far as the Geneva talks are concerned.

CAVEAT.....

*States the characteristics wise and honorable*

It is now up to the Soviet Union to ~~respond to your farsighted decision.~~ *show its good faith* For our part, we shall continue to press them to respect their obligations under existing arms agreements. Geoffrey Howe mentioned our concern to Gromyko about the radar at Krasnoyarsk. We must not let the Russians believe that they have a blank cheque to set their own standards over compliance. And it must clearly be right that Russian behaviour should be a factor in future decisions about US strategic modernisation.

*match response to the high standards which your decision has set*

I am sure that the rest of the Alliance will share my view that the "extra mile" that you are prepared to go is exactly the right approach. The West is being seen yet again to hold the moral high ground in the arms control process. ~~I am sure this is where we should continue to aim to be.~~ I look forward to continued close contacts with you as this ~~unfolds~~ *unfolds* at Geneva negotiations.

*and send you my warmest best wishes yours sincerely Margaret*

Enclosures—flag(s).....

*report to you*



DEFENCE : Arms Control : Pt 6

attachments to Appleyard to Powell  
11/6/85



Charles Powell



*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

L. V. Appleyard

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH



CONFIDENTIAL

From: P J Weston

Date: 10 June 1985

cc: PS/Mr Luce  
PS/PUS  
Mr Goodall  
Mr Derek Thomas  
Mr Pakenham, ACDD  
Mr Alston, Defence Dept  
Miss Neville-Jones,  
Planning Staff  
Mr Kenyon, NED  
Mr Broomfield, Soviet Dept  
Mr D Nicholls  
DUS(P), MOD  
Mr Mallaby, Cabinet Office

Private ~~Secretary~~

#### FAREWELL TO ARMS CONTROL

("Either this man is dead or my watch has stopped" - Groucho Marx)

1. It has become the practice for incumbents of this job to offer one or two reflections about arms control on their departure; and I have been urged to do the same. It is clear from last week's Heads of Mission Conference that this whole area is well-beaten ground. Looking back on Mr Cartledge's valedictory thoughts a year ago I see no need to re-trace it extensively. Nevertheless, if the moment of departure permits a degree of licence, I offer the following assertions for what they may be worth.
2. The tocsin is sounding for arms control. For the next two or three years the smart money would be on no break-through at Geneva, continuing deadlock on CW, further stalemate at MBFR, and at most a minor key conclusion to CDE.
3. On present trends the SALT agreements and the ABM Treaty will over the same period cease to function as effective Treaty obligations. There will then be no agreed limits on the strategic forces of the two military superpowers. Regional rivalry will intensify pressure on one or two third world states to acquire overtly nuclear status.
4. The Soviet Union will judge that the SDI is going ahead and will take major planning decisions to expand its strategic offensive and defensive forces. Its Third World policies will not moderate: the conditions will exist for regional instability to generate all too easily another US/Soviet crisis of Cuba proportions.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. Such trends will have major repercussions on intra-Alliance unity; and implications for domestic political support for Western security policy, of which negotiated arms control has so far formed an integral part.

6. If we judge that this depressing prospect is even half-way likely, we should take steps now to try to mitigate the effects. There are two possible courses of action which come uncomfortably close to being mutually exclusive:

- (a) drastically reduce the whole level of public expectations about arms control and revert to a more classical approach to international diplomacy, based on sufficiency and firmness in defence, coupled with political crisis management; the accent being on political process rather than pseudo-technical negotiations. Non-results by 1987 in arms control would thus have been rendered less obtrusive;
- (b) a major renewed attempt to inject momentum, imagination and a clear sense of direction into Alliance arms control policy. This would probably require a greater measure of European coordination vis-a-vis the United States, and some difficult judgements about how far such pressure would be compatible with the wider cause of Alliance unity, given other problems confronting us all, eg protectionism. It might also require more active European diplomacy on arms control matters with the East.

7. The above observations are based on the following personal opinions of a diagnostic kind:

- (i) In arms control as in other matters the Russians do not normally behave like gentlemen, and their motives in pursuing arms control agreements are of course self-interested. But the case against Moscow on non-compliance does not sustain the weight currently given it in Washington. We have not helped inculcate rigorous standards in the Russians by a Western policy on arms control which has been woefully inconsistent in practice and principle over the last decade (cf Kissinger). The last three Treaties signed with Moscow by the Americans remain unratified. If we are to get agreements with the Russians it is no use constructing proposals which offer them nothing in return.
- (ii) Those most active in Washington in the formulation of current policy are not those who see value in arms control agreements with the Russians. "The power of thought is often actually increased by the small number of those actually expressing it. The word of a strong-

/minded


CONFIDENTIAL



minded man which alone reaches to the passions of a mute assembly has more power than the confused cries of a thousand orators" (de Tocqueville - Democracy in America);

- (iii) The SDI has become a badge of political loyalty in Washington. Seldom have US policy circles been so overtly ideological in their approach to strategic matters. This severely inhibits the kind of free Alliance discussion that should underpin good decisions. A world of unlimited strategic defences will not be a safer world to live in.

8. In July 1979 we predicted from Washington in a despatch on the signing of the SALT II Treaty that enough votes would be found in the US Senate to draw back from the consequences of rejecting that Treaty. Although SALT II was never put to a full vote in the event, our prediction then proved wide of the mark. I only hope these predictions do too.



10 June 1985

P J Weston



MR. C. POWELL

No 10



NSPM  
CDP

11/6

*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

LEN APLEYARD

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH



SECRET

20

June 10, 1985

Dear Geoffrey:

The President is conveying the substance of his recent decision on US policy vis-a-vis the expired SALT I and unratified SALT II Agreements by a separate message to your Government. I am writing to underscore for you the importance and the value that we attach to your own views on this issue. I was particularly pleased that last week's NAC in Lisbon provided the opportunity for a full and frank exchange of views within the Alliance on the problems of responding to the poor Soviet record of compliance with these agreements.

In deciding to go the extra mile to create conditions which might be conducive for negotiating progress in Geneva, the President weighed a number of factors. Not the least was the need to continue to ensure a strong and credible deterrent capability on the part of the United States and our Allies. Alliance solidarity is central to that end. In recent years, coherent and consistent policies on the part of the Western democracies have succeeded in supporting NATO's 1979 dual-track decision through the difficult first stages of INF deployment and in bringing the Soviets back to the negotiating table after their unjustified walk-out. In the months to come, our unity as Allies will be tested again as we pursue in Geneva the difficult task of seeking to go beyond the SALT Agreements to achieve more meaningful and equitable reductions in nuclear arms. For its part, the United States will remain committed to continuing close consultations as an integral part of that process.

As always, I will welcome your further thoughts and support on this issue.

Sincerely,

/s/

George P. Shultz

SECRET



AKW-5 Central.





SECRET



*lin*

19

*Sec*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 June 1985

SALT II CONSTRAINTS

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan received this morning, conveying the US Administration's decision on continued observance of SALT II constraints. Could I please have a draft reply as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



MS Control



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

June 10, 1985

Prime Minister

The President's reply on  
SALT II constraints. Basically  
he's going to go on observing  
them for the time being, and will  
break up the Poseidon submarine.  
But his patience is not infinite.

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you the enclosed  
letter from President Reagan, which was received at the  
Embassy this morning.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

*Charles H. Price, II*

Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

I have  
asked  
for a  
drip reply.

CDP  
10/0

*MP*

Attachment: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW 1.



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1442</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>message from US President to PM          (T.109/85), 10 June 1985</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>28 November 2013          Wayland</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



1158/7.

XX

LISF0004/07

OO F C O

OO WASHINGTON

PP UKDEL NATO

PP MOD UK

RR ANKARA

RR ATHENS

RR BONN

RR BRUSSELS

RR COPENHAGEN

RR THE HAGUE

RR LUXEMBOURG

RR MADRID

RR OSLO

RR OTTAWA

RR PARTS

RR REYKJAVIK

RR ROME

RR UKDEL VIENNA

RR UKDEL STOCKHOLM

GRS 1600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 070652Z JUN 85

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 7 JUNE.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO AND MOD UK

INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS.

MY TELNO 301: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 6 JUNE:

SALT II INTERIM RESTRAINTS

SUMMARY

SHULTZ EXPLAINS BACKGROUND TO DILEMMA FACING U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND

COURSES OPEN TO IT. MINISTERS VIEWS OF ALLIES. ALL URGE CONTINUED

U.S. OBSERVANCE OF SALT II RESTRAINTS WITH INCREASED EMPHASIS ON

SOVIET VIOLATIONS.

*Reykjavik*  
Repetition to .....  
Retained for Departmental decision;  
repeated as requested to other posts.

*W*



DETAIL

1. AT THE END OF HIS GENERAL STATEMENT, SHULTZ SAID THAT HE WISHED TO SOUND ALLIES BEFORE THE PRESIDENT TOOK A DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF INTERIM RESTRAINTS. THE PROBLEM NEEDED TO BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF:

- A) THE FACT THAT IN THE 6 YEARS SINCE THE SALT II TREATY HAD BEEN SIGNED, THE SOVIET UNION HAD ADDED 4,000 WARHEADS TO ITS INVENTORY WHICH WAS NOT AN IMPRESSIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE VALUE OF THE TREATY:
- B) THE INTERIM RESTRAINT MEASURE WAS DESIGNED TO BE RECIPROCAL AND CONTINGENT ON THE SOVIET UNION OBSERVING SIMILAR RESTRAINTS:
- C) A PATTERN OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS: AND
- D) THE IMMINENT LAUNCH OF A NEW U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE WHICH WOULD BRING THE U.S. UP AGAINST THE LIMITS.

2. SOVIET VIOLATIONS INCLUDED (NOT A COMPREHENSIVE LIST):

- A) DEVELOPMENT OF A SECOND TYPE OF NEW MISSILE: THIS WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE IT WAS MOBILE AND VERY ACCURATE:
- B) THE HEAVY USE OF ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY AND
- C) THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHASED ARRAY RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK, A VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH WAS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE SINCE IT WOULD PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT AN EARLY BREAKOUT FROM THAT TREATY.

THESE VIOLATIONS NATURALLY TENDED TO UNDERMINE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE VALUE OF TREATIES. SHULTZ ADDED THAT THERE WAS PROVISION IN THE SALT II AND ABM TREATIES FOR CONSULTATION. THE U.S. HAD DISCUSSED THESE VIOLATIONS THROUGH THE PROPER MACHINERY REPEATEDLY BUT HAD GOT NOWHERE.



3. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT FACED ROUGHLY 3 COURSES:
- A) IT WOULD BE ARGUED THAT THE TREATY NETWORK, THOUGH NOT RATIFIED, WAS IMPORTANT AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPLAIN BUT TAKE NO ACTION:
  - B) THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPLAIN AND SHOULD USE SOVIET VIOLATIONS TO EXTRACT MORE MONEY FROM CONGRESS FOR THE DEFENCE BUDGET (THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DO THAT WITHOUT GREAT SUCCESS):
  - C) WHILE CONTINUING THE DEVELOPMENT (NO DEPLOYMENT) OF THE MIDGETMAN MISSILE WITH ITS MOBILITY AND SINGLE WARHEADS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO STABILITY BUYT FOR WHICH NO OPERATION DECISION WAS NECESSARY AS YET, THEY MIGHT CONSIDER TAKING OUT OF SERVICE SOME EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF MISSILES, SPECIFICALLY A POSEIDON SUBMARINE. AND WITHIN THIS OPTION, THERE WERE 5 VARIANTS:
    - I) IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT II LIMITS, THEY SHOULD TAKE THE BOAT OUT OF SERVICE AND CUT IT UP (SHULTZ NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD DONE THIS WITH ONE EQUIVALENT SUBMARINE BUT HAD RECONSTRUCTED IT SO AS TO CARRY CRUISE MISSILES):
    - II) THEY COULD LAY UP THE BOAT, WITH A CREW ON BOARD, REMOVING THE MISSLES AND LEAVING THE HATCHES OPEN. IN THAT CASE IT COULD BE PUT BACK INTO SERVICE RAPIDLY:
    - III) THEY COULD PUT THE BOAT IN FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD BEOUT OF ACTION FOR 18 MONTHS BUT, BECAUSE ONE WOULD NOT SPEND MONEY OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE THEIR CLEAR INTENTION TO BRING IT BACK INTO SERVICE IN DUE COURSE:
    - IV) THEY COULD LAY UP THE BOAT WITHOUT A CREW, AND LET THE REACTOR COOL DOWN IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD TAKE SOME 9 MONTHS TO PUT INTO SERVICE: OR
    - V) THEY COULD TREAT THE SOVIET VIOLATIONS AS JUSTIFICATION OF A DECISION NOT TO CONTINUE OBSERVANCE OF THE RESTRAINTS. (SHULTZ NOTED THAT IN THAT CASE OF COURSE BUDGETARY AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WOULD STILL CONTINUE TO APPLY SOME UNILATERAL CONSTRAINTS.)
- HE INVITED THE VIEWS OF ALLIES WHICH HE WOULD REPORT FAITHFULLY.



4. VAN DEN BROEK ARGUED FOR CLOSE COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, AN ABSOLUTE PRE-REQUISITE. BREACH OF IT WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA OF THE SDI. IF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE TO BE FACED WITH THE PRECEPTION THAT EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WERE BEING BROKEN, IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WHOLE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS WHICH WAS NOT ONLY THE BASIS FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS BUT ALSO IMPORTANT FOR THE MAINTAINANCE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT. HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT ABOUT SOVIET VIOLATIONS BUT THE NETHERLANDS HAD WELCOMED THE SALT II TREATY AND THE U S DECISION TO OBSERVE THE LIMITS UNILATERALLY. HE WAS CERTAINLY NOT CALLING FOR UNILATERAL U S COMPLIANCE BUT, ALTHOUGH HE MIGHT BE WRONG, HE DID NOT JUDGE THAT SOVIET VIOLATIONS YET AMOUNTED TO SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR ABANDONING THE RESTRAINTS. HE BELIEVED THAT ABANDONMENT ALTOGETHER OF THESE RESTRAINTS WOULD HAVE A VERY DISASTEROUS EFFECT ON DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION.

5. GENSCHER, WHO HAD SPOKEN IN HIS PUBLIC SPEECH AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE NEED TO OBSERVE EXISITING TREATIES, SAID THAT THE CLOSER THE US COULD COME TO FULL ADHERENCE TO SALT II RESTRAINTS, THE BETTER. IT WAS UP TO THE ALLIES HOWEVER TO HELP THE U S AND WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE IT TO THEM ALONE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS. HE HAD REFERRED TO THIS IN HIS OPENING SPEECH: WE SHOULD ALSO DEMAND SOVIET OBSERVANCE OF THE RESTRAINTS, COUPLING THIS WITH FULL SUPORT FOR THE U S NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA.

6. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT ITALY WAS FOLLOWING THE PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT SALT II RESTRAINTS WITH FEAR. THE SALT TREATIES WERE SEEN IN ITALY AS A MAJOR STEP IN ARMS CONTROL. ITALY HAD APPROVED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO OBSERVE THE LIMITS. ANY DECISION NOT TO CONTINUE THAT WOULD HAVE VERY NEGATIVE EFFECTS IN ITALY AND FOR THE WHOLE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, AS WELL AS FOR THE ALLIANCE.



7. IN THE COURSE OF YOUR STATEMENT, YOU ACKNOWLEDGED THE LEGITIMATE CASE FOR WESTERN MODERNISATION. YOU ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A CASE TO ANSWER ON VIOLATIONS. BUT WE NEEDED TO REMEMBER THAT EVEN THE SOVIET UNION RECOGNISED THAT THERE WERE SOME RULES WITH WHICH THEY HAD TO COMPLY, OR PURPORT TO COMPLY, AND WE NEEDED TO TAKE GREAT CARE NOT TO UNDERMINE THAT. YOU AGREED THEREFORE WITH VAN DEN BROEK AND GENSCHER. IF POSSIBLE THE U S DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN ON THE BASIS THAT THE SALT II RESTRAINTS WOULD BE UPHeld. (THIS FITTED INTO THE ARGUMENT YOU DEVELOPED IN THE REST OF YOUR STATEMENT (SEE MY TELNO 303) THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS MUST BE PRESERVED). EVEN AS IT WAS, THE SOVIET UNION INCLINED TO ARGUE THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT RATIFIED THE SALT II TREATY AND WERE NOT THEREFORE SINCERE IN THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL: WE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THEM THE FURTHER ARGUMENT THAT THE U S HAD REPUDIATED THE LIMITS CONTAINED IN THE TREATY.

8. DUMAS SAID THAT SALT II DID NOT DESERVE EITHER AN EXCESS OF HONOUR OR AN EXCESS OF INDIGNITY. HE REFERRED TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS BUT SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD CONTAINED SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS TO SOME EXTENT. HE COULD NOT SPEAK OF THE TECHNICAL OR LEGAL ASPECTS BUT THE PROBLEM WAS POLITICAL. WITHOUT PUBLIC OPINION OR PARLIAMENT, THE SOVIET UNION COULD EXPLOIT UNCERTAINTIES IN THE WESTERN BASE. RENUNCIATION THEREFORE, PURE AND SIMPLE OF SALT II LIMITS WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND THE ABM TREATY (IT WAS INCONSISTENT TO RENOUNCE THE ONE ON THE GROUNDS OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS WHILE MAINTAINING THE OTHER ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN VIOLATED). RENUNCIATION WOULD PUT US ON THE DEFENSIVE AND WOULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY THE PUBLIC. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TRY TO TURN THE TABLES ON THE SOVIET UNION BY CHALLENGING THEM TO OBSERVE THE EXISTING LIMITATIONS IN SPACE AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE ON THEM TO OBSERVE ALSO THE ABM.



9. SHULTZ INTERVENED TO SAY THAT ONE REFINEMENT THAT WAS BEING CONSIDERED IN THE ADMINISTRATION WAS TO LAY UP A POSEIDEN BOAT FOR ONE YEAR, MAKING CLEAR THAT IF THE SITUATION REMAINED AS IT WAS, SHE WOULD BE PUT BACK IN COMMISSION. BUT IF VIOLATIONS CEASED OR THERE WERE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, SHE WOULD BE BROKEN UP. WAS THAT THE SORT OF THING THAT DUMAS HAD IN MIND ? DUMAS SAID THAT HE COULD NOT FOLLOW SHULTZ IN THE TECHNICALITIES: HIS IDEA WAS TO DENOUNCE SOVIET VIOLATION AND TO PUT THEM TO THE TEST OF SINCERITY IN ARMS CONTROL.

10. ALL THE OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS, INCLUDING STRAY (NORWAY), POOS (LUXEMBOURG), ELLEMANN-JENSEN (DENMARK), CLARK (CANADA), HALEFOGLU (TURKEY), TINDEMANS (BELGIUM), HALLGRIMSSON (ICELAND), GAMA (PORTUGAL) AND MORAN (SPAIN) ARGUED FOR CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT LIMITATIONS. STRAY SAID THAT A U S DECISION NOT TO OBSERVE WOULD HAVE A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT: MINOR BREACHES WOULD BE BETTER. POOS SAID THAT LUXEMBOURG'S BASIC PREMISE WAS THAT ALL TREATIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED. THE WEST SHOULD NOT PUT ITSELF IN A POSITION OF BEING NUMBERED AMONG THOSE WHO DID NOT COMPLY WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS. ELLEMANN-JENSEN ARGUED THAT ARMS CONTROL WAS LIKE A LADDER: YOU DID REMOVE THE RUNGS AS YOU CLIMBED UP IT. THE U S POLICY TO REJECT THE SALT II RESTRAINTS AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION DID, WAS WISE. CLARK THOUGHT THAT BY CONTINUING ITSELF TO OBSERVE THE LIMITS AND BY EXPOSING SOVIET LIMITATIONS THE U S WOULD BE QUOTE STAYING ON THE DEFENSIVE UNQUOTE, WHILE RENUNCIATION WOULD PUT US ON THE DEFENSIVE. TINDEMANS SAID THAT SALT II WAS ONE OF THE FEW TREATIES WHICH HAD GIVEN SOME STABILITY. THE US SHOULD CRITICISE SOVIET BREACHES BUT NOT ABANDON IT. MORAN HOPED THAT THE U S WOULD NOT DENOUNCE THE SALT II LIMITS SO LONG AS THEY COULD BE MAINTAINED.

11. IN A SEPERATE STATEMENT, THE GREEK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SAID, ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FAVOURED THE CONTINUED OBSERVANCE OF THE SALT II LIMITS.

BYATT



GRS 400  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 070005Z JUN 85

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 301 OF 6 JUNE.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, MOD UK

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, TOKYO, HELSINKI, WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST,  
SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, AND ALL OTHER NATO POSTS.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, RESTRICTED SESSION

6 JUNE 1985:

GENERAL

1. THE MEETING STARTED AT 11.00 AM WITH A GENERAL STATEMENT BY SHULTZ (FULL RECORD SEPARATELY). THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS COVERED BOTH BY HIM AND BY ALL THE OTHER SPEAKERS WERE EAST/WEST RELATIONS (MAINLY GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS UNDER GORBACHEV), ARMS CONTROL, SDI, THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING IN HELSINKI. AT THE END OF HIS STATEMENT SHULTZ SPECIFICALLY INVITED VIEWS ON THE CONTINUED OBSERVANCE BY THE US OF SALT II RESTRAINTS.

2. AT THE END OF THE RESTRICTED MEETING THERE WAS SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT THE DISPUTED PASSAGE FOR THE COMMUNIQUE ON SDI, SHULTZ AND DUMAS HAVING REACHED THE CONCLUSION OVER BREAKFAST THIS MORNING THAT THEIR VIEWS OF WHAT WERE ACCEPTABLE WERE TOO FAR APART AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DROP THE PASSAGE ALTOGETHER. THIS WAS DISPUTED BY SEVERAL, ESPECIALLY THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO ARGUED THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO SDI WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE PICKED UP BY THE PRESS AND WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN GENEVA AND IN ITS PROPAGANDA IN THE WEST. SOME ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BUT DUMAS, TAXED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING WHICH HE HAD FOUND ATTRACTIVE. IT WAS LEFT THEREFORE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REFERENCE TO SDI IN PARA 6 OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. SHULTZ SAID THAT IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS HE WOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE:

- A) THE SUBJECT HAD OF COURSE BEEN DISCUSSED:
- B) THERE WERE DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW:
- C) HE DETECTED NO OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. CARRYING ON RESEARCH:  
INDEED IT WAS A COMMONLY ACCEPTED ASSUMPTION THAT THEY WOULD DO SO:

CONFIDENTIAL

(D) PARTICIPATION



# CONFIDENTIAL

- D) PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH WAS UP TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES:  
THE U.S. HAD NO VIEW EITHER WAY:
- E) THERE WERE LOTS OF IMPORTANT SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED, OF WHICH  
SDI WAS ONE, BUT IT SHOULD NOT RECEIVE MORE THAN ITS SHARE.
3. MY FOUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS (NOT TO ALL) CONTAIN  
MORE DETAILED REPORTS ON THE DISCUSSION OF SALT II LIMITS: SDI: THE  
10TH ANNIVERSARY: AND THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT.

BYATT

( Repetition to REYKJAVIK.  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts. )

## LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
FUSD  
ESSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

-2-  
CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 1100  
SECRET  
BURNING BUSH  
DESKBY 060800Z  
FM LISBON 060200Z JUN 85  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 5 JUNE.

SECRET

*Important for  
your talk with  
George Shultz*

18

*CDP*

FOLLOWING TO PRIVATE OFFICE FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL MEETING: SALT II CONSTRAINTS  
SUMMARY

SHULTZ ASKED FOR THE COMMENTS OF THE THREE OTHER MINISTERS ON THE  
OPTIONS FACING PRESIDENT REAGAN. GENSCHER, DUMAS AND SECRETARY OF  
STATE ALL ARGUED FOR RESPECT OF EXISTING CONSTRAINTS. SHULTZ WILL  
REPORT THERE REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. DECISION LIKELY ON  
SUNDAY.

*mt*

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ BEGAN BY ASKING THE OTHER MINISTERS FOR THEIR COMMENTS  
ON THE DECISIONS NOW FACING PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SALT II CONSTRAINTS.  
IN AN INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT, HE OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF SALT II  
AND WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PERSISTENTLY VIOLATED  
THE INTERIM CONSTRAINTS, PARTICULARLY OVER THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR  
STATION, SSX24 MISSILES AND THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMTRY DATA. THE  
U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED ON MANY OCCASIONS TO DISCUSS THIS WITH  
THE SOVIET UNION BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE.  
THEY HAD TRIED TO DISCUSS KRASNOYARSK RADAR IN THE SPACE DEFENCE  
GROUP AT GENEVA. THEY HAD NOT SIMPLY CRITICISED THE RUSSIANS BUT  
HAD ASKED HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO RESTORE THE ABM REGIME. THE  
RUSSIANS HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.

3. SHULTZ SAID THAT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION  
THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN NOT TO UNDERCUT THE SALT II CONSTRAINTS.  
BUT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOW IN A POSITION WHERE HE WOULD HAVE TO  
DECIDE VERY SHORTLY WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE LAUNCHER NUMBERS WHEN  
THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE STARTED ITS SEA TRIALS. HE IDENTIFIED FIVE  
BROAD OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- (A) STRICT U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE INTERIM SALT II CONSTRAINTS AND  
CONTINUED CRITICISM OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS
- (B) TO ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET VIOLATIONS CALLED FOR SELECTED  
INCREASES IN THE CONGRESS APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE RELEVANT  
DEFENCE PROGRAMMES:
- (C) TO MAINTAIN THE IDEA OF INTERIM RESTRAINTS BUT TO TAKE  
ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET VIOLATIONS IN ORDER TO  
PRESERVE THE U.S. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. AT THE PRESENT  
STAGE THIS DID NOT INVOLVE PUTTING MIDGETMAN INTO  
OPERATION, BUT IF THE RUSSIANS PRODUCED AND DEPLOYED THE SSX24,  
THE U.S. COULD TAKE COUNTER-ACTION. THE MORE LIKELY OPTION  
WOULD BE ONE OF SEVERAL INVOLVING TAKING OUT A POSEIDON  
SUBMARINE AND PUTTING IT IN DRY DOCK. THE RANGE OF CHOICES  
WOULD INVOLVE TAKING OUT THE MISSILES AND POSSIBLY THE REACTOR  
IN WAYS WHICH WOULD TAKE IT OUT OF SERVICE FOR PERIODS OF FROM  
ONE WEEK TO TWO YEARS. OR THE SUBMARINE COULD BE SCRAPPED.

SECRET

/ (D)



- (D) DENOUNCING THE SALT II TREATY AS FATALLY FLAWED BUT CONTINUING THE REST OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
- (E) ABANDONING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AND TAKING ONLY RESTRAINT MEASURES WHEN THIS WAS OPERATIONALLY APPROPRIATE.

4. SHULTZ WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEBATE IN WASHINGTON, OPTION (A) WAS A NON-STARTER. OPTION (B) MIGHT HAVE SOME APPEAL. OPTION (D) AND (E) WOULD MEAN ABANDONING THE ARMS CONTROL REGIME WHICH HE, AND MANY OTHERS, WOULD FEEL WAS A GREAT MISTAKE. ONE OF THE VARIANTS OF OPTION (C) MIGHT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF ATTRACTION.

5. IN RESPONSE, GENSCHER SAID THAT HIS REACTION MUST BE TO ARGUE FOR RESPECTING EXISTING TREATIES. EVEN IN THE FACE OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS, THE SUBSTANCE AND PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATIES SHOULD NOT BE CALLED INTO QUESTION. HE WAS THEREFORE PLEASED THAT THE LAST TWO OPTIONS DID NOT FIND FAVOUR WITH SHULTZ. THEY WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ALLIANCE. BEYOND THAT, HE COULD NOT COMMENT OFF THE CUFF ON PARTICULAR CHOICES.

6. DUMAS SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS CAUGHT BETWEEN A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONS. THE TREATY HAD BEEN OBSERVED BUT WAS NOT RATIFIED. IT WAS APPARENTLY BEING VIOLATED BY THE OTHER SIDE. SINCE HE HAD BEEN ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS, HIS ADVICE WAS THAT FOR OVERRIDING POLITICAL REASONS THE TREATY SHOULD BE RESPECTED, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT RATIFIED. HE THOUGHT IT INEVITABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO PROLONG THE TREATY. IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE THAT THE BEST TACTIC FOR THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE RAPIDLY TO ANNOUNCE THAT IT WOULD PROLONG THE TREATY. BUT, DUMAS SAID CAREFULLY, THIS WAS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SINCE WE LIVED IN AN OPEN SOCIETY, WE WERE BOUND TO HANDLE THESE THINGS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. THE RUSSIANS COULD CYNICALLY VIOLATE THE TREATY WHILE PROCLAIMING ADHERENCE. AT THE VERY HEART OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY WAS THE BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD RESPECT TREATIES. WE DID NOT CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT WHETHER THE TREATY WAS RATIFIED OR NOT. WE ALSO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD BE DAMAGED BY ANY DECISION WHICH APPEARED TO UNRAVEL EXISTING ARRANGMENTS.

8. HENCE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RIGHT TO REJECT THE LAST TWO OPTIONS FROM THE ALLIANCE STANDPOINT ADHERENCE TO THE SALT II CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE THE RIGHT POLICY. AT THE VERY LEAST THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION OUGHT TO AIM TO END UP AS CLOSE TO OPTION (A) AS POSSIBLE. PRESENTATION OF ANY DECISION WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. IF THE U.S. PROCLAIMED THAT IT WAS VIOLATING THE SALT II CONSTRAINTS, THIS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

**SECRET** (2)



SECRET

9. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT SOME PEOPLE HAD SUMMED UP THE BEST DECISION AS MAINTAINING RESPECT FOR THE REGIME, LAYING UP THE SUBMARINE BUT NOT SCRAPPING IT. THIS WOULD STILL, HE WARNED, NOT BE IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD BEGIN FOCUSING ON THIS QUESTION ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY THIS WEEK AND WOULD TAKE A DECISION ON SUNDAY. SHULTZ WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM THIS EVENING RECORDING THE REACTIONS OF THE THREE MINISTERS. HE WOULD INTRODUCE A SIMILAR, BUT MUCH MORE GENERALISED, DISCUSSION AT THE NAC SESSION TOMORROW AND WOULD REPORT THE REACTION OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

10. I SUGGEST YOU CONSULT DAVID GOODALL OR ROBERT ALSTON ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THIS TELEGRAM. IT SHOULD CERTAINLY GO TO NO 10.

BYATT

LIMITED

HEAD/DEFENCE D  
HEAD/ACDD  
HEAD/NAD  
HEAD/SOVIET D  
PS  
PS/MR LUCE  
MR GOODALL  
MR DEREK THOMAS

COPIES TO:

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY

[My own  
White House  
source  
claims  
that this  
has already  
been  
decided]



ADVANCE COPIES

17

HS/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
~~MR NPS~~ }  
DACU }

HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

*Prime Minister  
You will certainly want  
to raise this with  
Mr. Shultz on 7 June.  
EDP 4/6.*

15.1.85

PP UKDEL NATO

IMMEDIATE

PP MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 032200Z JUN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1744 OF 3 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (FOR DUSP AND DACU).

MY TELNO 1716: INTERIM RESTRAINTS

*[i.e. SALT II]*

1. AS EXPECTED, MCFARLANE HAS NOTIFIED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS (BY LETTER, DATED 31 MAY) THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT WILL BE DELAYED AND SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON 10 JUNE. ALL OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS NOW BELIEVE THAT THE 10 JUNE REPORT WILL CONTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM A MEDIA REPORT THAT THERE WILL BE A SECOND NSC MEETING TO CONSIDER THE MATTER ON 8 JUNE, AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY SUCH MEETING IS NECESSARY. BUT THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE PURPOSE OF SELECTING 10 JUNE AS THE DATE FOR SUBMISSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT IS TO ALLOW TIME FOR SHULTZ TO REPORT BACK ON HIS MEETINGS WITH NATO COLLEAGUES IN LISBON THIS WEEK BEFORE THE PRESIDENT TAKES HIS DECISIONS.

WRIGHT



US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR LUCE  
 PS/PUS  
 MR DEREK THOMAS  
 MR GOODALL  
 MR JENKINS  
 MR WESTON  
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
 3. NPS( ) }  
 DACU }

HD/DEFENCE D  
 HD/ACDD  
 HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

**IMMEDIATE****ADVANCE COPY**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 170255Z MAY 85  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1588 OF 16 MAY  
 AND TO MOD (FOR DUS (P) AND DACU)  
 INFO UKDEL NATO

OUR TELS NOS 1517 AND 1548: SALT ROMAN TWO INTERIM RESTRAINTS

## SUMMARY

1. THE US DECISION-POINT, ON WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO RESPECT THE SAL LIMITS, WHEN THE NEXT TRIDENT SUBMARINE STARTS SEA-TRIALS, HAS BEEN ADVANCED, AND MAY NOW BE IMMINENT. CASE FOR A MESSAGE WARNING OF LIKELY ADVERSE EUROPEAN REACTIONS, IF THE DECISION WERE TO IGNORE THE LIMIT.

## DETAIL

2. PERLE'S 7 MAY TESTIMONY (MY TELNO 1517) HAS TOUCHED OFF A SHARP PUBLIC DEBATE HERE. STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES CONFIRM PRESS REPORTS THAT THE FOCAL QUESTION IS WHAT THE US SHOULD DO WHEN THE NEXT TRIDENT SUBMARINE (THE ALASKA) STARTS SEA TRIALS IN SEPTEMBER. FOUR OPTIONS ARE UNDER DISCUSSION, VIZ:

(I) TO DECOMMISSION, AND DISMANTLE THE MISSILE TUBES ON, ONE POSEIDON SUBMARINE IN COMPENSATION:

(II) TO PUT ONE POSEIDON SUBMARINE IN DRY DOCK, OPENING UP, BUT NOT DISMANTLING, THE MISSILE TUBES:

(III) TO DELAY THE ALASKA'S TRIALS:

(IV) TO PROCEED WITH THE ALASKA'S TRIALS, AND EFFECT NO COMPENSATION.

3. PERLE OF COURSE FAVOURS (IV), AND THIS APPEARS TO BE THE



3. PERLE OF COURSE FAVOURS (IV), AND THIS APPEARS TO BE THE GENERAL OSD PREFERENCE. SHULTZ DEFINITELY OPPOSES (IV): SOME OF HIS ADVISERS (POL-MIL) FAVOUR (II): SOME (EUR) (I). (III) SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE SUPPORT, EVEN IN STATE, FOR IT INVOLVES DIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH THE TRIDENT PROGRAMME, WHICH WOULD MAXIMISE CRITICISM FROM THE RIGHT, EG ON THE HILL. (BUT PERLE CLAIMS THAT IT IS HIS PREFERRED FALL-BACK, PERHAPS BECAUSE HE WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE, WHEN WIDER DECISIONS HAVE TO BE TAKEN (AS THE SAL II REGIME RUNS OUT ON 31 DECEMBER) IN HAVING ACCENTUATED THE OPERATIONAL PENALTIES OF FURTHER STRICT US COMPLIANCE.)

4. BURT (WHO FAVOURS (I) TOLD THE PUS ON 16 MAY THAT DECISIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN RATHER QUICKLY. BURT BELIEVES THAT THIS WOULD BE BEST, SINCE PERLE HAVING GONE PUBLIC, HE SEES NO ADVANTAGE IN LETTING THE DEBATE DRAG ON, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION TRYING TO MAINTAIN A HOLDING LINE (EG THE PRESIDENT'S IN LISBON: MY TELNO 1548). HE ALSO TOLD THE PUS THAT HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE LIKELY EUROPEAN REACTION IF OPTION (IV) WERE CHOSEN. THE PUS CONFIRMED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE BELIEVED THAT THE IMPACT IN EUROPE WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING IF, WHILE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS APPEARED TO BE MAKING LITTLE PROGRESS, THE EXISTING ARMS CONTROL REGIME STARTED TO UNRAVEL.

5. BURT HINTED THAT AN EARLY AND HIGH LEVEL UK MESSAGE MIGHT BE TIMELY. WE AGREE. IT NEED NOT, IN OUR VIEW, REFER TO OPTIONS (II) OR (III): THE KEY POINT IS TO WARN THAT (IV) WOULD HAVE A VERY BAD EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE, AND TO URGE THAT THE US BE SEEN TO MAINTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY OF NOT UNDERCUTTING THE SALT II LIMITS.

6. THERE ARE OF COURSE MANY IN THE ADMINISTRATION WHO MAINTAIN THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN UNDERCUTTING THE ARMS CONTROL REGIME: THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD BE COMPLAINING ABOUT THE SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE RECORD: AND THAT THE US SHOULD NOW TAKE A LEAF OUT OF THE SOVIET BOOK. FOR MAXIMUM EFFICACY, A UK MESSAGE SHOULD THEREFORE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE SOVIET RECORD IS INDEED NOT BLEMISH-FREE, AND REFER TO WHAT YOU SAID TO GROMYKO ON 15 MAY ABOUT KRASNOYARSK (FCO TEL NO 509 TO MOSCOW).

7. MY RECOMENDATION, WITH WHICH THE PUS AGREES, IS THAT YOU SHOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO SHULTZ MAKING THE ESSENTIAL POINTS ABOUT LIKELY EUROPEAN AND ALLIED REACTIONS, BUT ADDING THAT YOU HOPE THAT NO U.S. DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER IF NECESSARY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF PLACING HER VIEWS ON RECORD WITH THE PRESIDENT.

WRIGHT

NNNN



GRS 250  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM WASHINGTON 132130Z MAY 85  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1548 OF 13 MAY  
INFO BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK (FOR DACU)

*Not very  
reassuring  
CDD.*

MY TELNO 1517: SALT II INTERIM RESTRAINTS.

1. AT HIS FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE IN LISBON ON 10 MAY, THE PRESIDENT WAS ASKED ABOUT THE OPINION EXPRESSED BY PERLE TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE THAT THE US SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE SALT II AGREEMENT AFTER ITS EXPIRY AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. HAVING DEFENDED PERLE'S RIGHT TO EXPRESS HIS OPINIONS, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED:

QUOTE

WE HAVE TRIED ON WHAT SEEMED TO BE A VERBAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR SOME TIME THAT EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NOT RATIFIED THAT TREATY, IT HAD BEEN BEEN SIGNED BY THE NEGOTIATORS, THAT WE WOULD BOTH SEEK TO ABIDE BY THE TERMS. THERE'S CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE NOW THAT THAT HAS BEEN RATHER ONE-SIDED. AND IF IT HAS BEEN, THEN THERE'S NO NEED FOR US TO CONTINUE.

BUT WHETHER WE DO OR NOT, THAT'S A DECISION TO BE MADE DOWN THE ROAD. ACTUALLY WE HAVE NOT COME TO A POINT IN WHICH WE IN ANY WAY IN OUR OWN BUILDUP ARE VIOLATING OR GOING BEYOND THE TERMS OF THAT TREATY. IT IS POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO ONE SYSTEM OF WEAPONS THAT WE MIGHT COME TO SUCH A POINT. AND WE'LL MAKE THAT DECISION THEN. AND IF WE DO WE'LL DO IT OPENLY AND WE WILL DO IT WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
FUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/FUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 650

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 082309Z MAY 85

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1517 OF 8 MAY

INFO BONN PARIS UKDEL NATO MOSCOW MODUK (FOR DACU)

*mf*

SALT II INTERIM RESTRAINTS

1. IN TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON 7 MAY, PERLE GAVE IT AS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE US SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO OBSERVE SALT II BEYOND ITS EXPIRATION DATE ON 31 DECEMBER. PERLE ARGUED THAT, IF SALT II LIMITS REMAINED IN EFFECT AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR, THE US WOULD HAVE TO RETIRE A SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER NUMBER OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAN WOULD THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT 2-3 YEARS AS MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES PROCEEDED. PERLE ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD GROW ANY FASTER WITHOUT SALT II THAN WITH SALT II, AND THAT CONTINUED US OBSERVANCE OF SALT II AFTER 1985 WOULD AMOUNT TO ABANDONING COMPLIANCE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT SECURING ANY CORRECTIVE SOVIET ACTION. PERLE ADDED THAT QUOTE IF THE SENATE IS TO CONSERVE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO RATIFY TREATIES, THEN IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO PERMIT THE DE FACTO CONSTRUCTION OF TREATIES IN THE ABSENCE OF RATIFICATION UNQUOTE.

2. ON COMPLIANCE, PERLE ALSO FLOATED (FOR THE SECOND TIME) HIS IDEA OF CREATING A DOLLARS 5 BILLION PENTAGON TRUST FUND OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS WHICH WOULD NOT BE DRAWN DOWN BY THE ADMINISTRATION UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION FURTHER VIOLATED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, WHEN IT WOULD BE USED TO FUND FURTHER US WEAPONS PROCUREMENT. THE AIM WOULD BE TO CREATE A DISINCENTIVE TO SOVIET CHEATING. ON THIS TOO PERLE DOES NOT PURPORT TO EXPRESS AN AGREED ADMINISTRATION VIEW.

CONFIDENTIAL

*/comment*



SALT, Arms Control

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT

3. THE DEBATE IS NOW HOTTING UP ON WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE SALT II LIMITS AFTER DECEMBER, AND ON THE PRIOR QUESTION OF WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO RESPECT THEM WHEN THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE ALASKA THIS YEAR BEGINS SEA TRIALS, THEREBY REQUIRING (UNDER SALT II) THE DISMANTLING OF AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF AN EARLIER SYSTEM. PERLE STRONGLY OPPOSES SUCH DISMANTLING. HIS VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN: BUT ARE VERY MUCH AT ONE END OF THE ADMINISTRATION SPECTRUM. OTHERS (EG NITZE: SEE KERR'S LETTER OF 6 MAY TO WESTON) TEND TO FAVOUR CONTINUING TO OBSERVE THE SALT II LIMITS, AND BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL BE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE AN EARLY PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER: PERLE PRIVATELY ADMITS THAT THE ALASKA DECISION CAN BE POSTPONED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, LEAVING THE REAL DECISION DEADLINE AS DECEMBER.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

- 2 -  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 291400Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 29 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY : WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE : BONN, PARIS, UKDIS GENEVA, MODUK.

WASHINGTON TELNO 970 : AMERICAN/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN GENEVA

1. AT A MEETING AT COUNSELLOR LEVEL ON 27 MARCH AT WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF MOST OTHER NATO MISSIONS IN MOSCOW WERE PRESENT, THE AMERICAN SAID THAT THE GENEVA MEETING WAS ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO GET BEYOND THE STAGE OF OPENING STATEMENTS ON PREDICTABLE LINES. BUT THE US REPRESENTATIVE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM IN ALL THREE AREAS. ON SPACE, THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL EXTENDED NOT ONLY TO DEPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION BUT ALSO TO RESEARCH. THE MORATORIUM ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROPOSED A FREEZE AT CURRENT LEVELS WITH AN IMPLICATION THAT NEW TYPES OF WEAPONRY WOULD BE EXCLUDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSED MORATORIUM. THE INF FREEZE WOULD BE AT CURRENT LEVELS. THE SPACE MORATORIUM HAD BEEN PROPOSED IN SUCH A WAY AS WOULD PERMIT WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS CONVENTIONAL ABM SYSTEMS.

2. THERE HAD AS YET BEEN NO FORMAL US REPLY, NOR HAD THE US MADE ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL THEMSELVES.

3. I HAVE SEEN NO REFERENCE TO A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SUCH A MORATORIUM IN REPORTING ON GENEVA COPIED TO MOSCOW. HAVE THE AMERICANS REPORTED THIS ELSEWHERE? DECLINING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, THE US REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MEETING REFERRED TO ABOVE, GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE EXCEEDED HIS BRIEF IN SAYING AS MUCH AS HE DID.

SUTHERLAND

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

CONFIDENTIAL





MO 14/7

N 687

CDP  
35/3

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING WITH SENATORE SPADOLINI  
AT 1430 HOURS ON TUESDAY 26TH MARCH 1985  
IN THE MARGINS OF THE NPG MEETING, LUXEMBOURG

## Those present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP  
Secretary of State for Defence

Mr Giovanni Spadolini  
Minister of Defence

Sir John Graham  
UK Permanent Representative  
to NATO

Mr Sergio Romano  
Ambassador, Permanent  
Representative to NATO

Mr D A Nicholls  
DUS(P)

Lt General Lamberto Bartolucci  
Chief of Defence General Staff

Mr R C Mottram  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State

Colonel Nicola Petrucci  
Interpreter

Strategic Defence Initiative

1. Senatore Spadolini asked about the British Government's attitude to the SDI, following the discussion in that morning's NPG session. The Secretary of State said that the British Government supported SDI research. He was, however, cautious about going beyond this in the communique to talk about the benefits that would arise from deployment. The risk was that this would be the first part of a process of strengthening the Alliance commitment to the SDI at each succeeding NPG. Senatore Spadolini agreed that to talk of the benefits of a new equilibrium between offensive and defensive weapons implied that the present equilibrium was not satisfactory, but this was not the case. Senatore Spadolini referred to the letter which Mr Weinberger had circulated to his colleagues at lunchtime about participation in SDI research and asked whether the British Government had been consulted in advance over its terms. The Secretary of State said that the British Government not only had not been consulted in advance: we had also yet to receive our copy of the letter! He recalled the previous US record on consultation over the SDI. Before Senatore Spadolini took on the defence portfolio, there had been an NPG meeting in Portugal at which there had been no hint of an initiative of this kind. On the evening of his return from the meeting, he had been telephoned by Mr Weinberger to be informed of the President's speech about "Star Wars"! It would be very interesting to see how events developed at Geneva. The SDI had clearly had a most positive effect in bringing the Russians back to the negotiating table and could be used in pursuit of a package deal involving significant reductions in the START and INF areas. He did not see





how the three areas of the negotiations could be pursued separately. Equally, if he were in the US negotiating team, he would wish to play his cards very close to his chest and would not want to convey the impression that the SDI was a negotiating card since to do so weakened its effect. The allies therefore had to accept largely on trust that the United States would strenuously seek an arms control agreement. It was important for the European allies to keep in close touch and to articulate their own concerns to the Americans in private.

#### European Fighter Aircraft

2. Senatore Spadolini asked whether we were content with the date for the next EFA meeting and how we saw the French position. The Secretary of State said that he was most grateful for the arrangements that had been made for the meeting. The problem was to try to get Dassault to talk to the industries in the other four countries and, in particular, to British Aerospace. He was himself bringing pressure to bear on the British companies. He would be talking to M. Hernu the following week to see how he might get a proper dialogue going. He was being advised that Dassault believed that they could secure a French national programme and so there was no point in their getting into a European relationship, except on their own terms. He also understood there was a feeling he was himself so keen to achieve a collaborative solution that he would press British industry to accept whatever was on offer. He was not willing to do this, and, even if he were, other members of the British Government would not let him.

3. Senatore Spadolini asked whether the French Government was capable of bringing its industry into a collaborative arrangement. The Secretary of State said that he had the impression that Dassault was not in sympathy with the Government and there were other powerful forces at work for a national solution including the Trade Unions. The only satisfactory basis on which to proceed was one where there were no winners or losers from the industrial point of view - that there was a true partnership as in the Tornado programme. The solution put forward by Dassault would represent a French victory and was not acceptable. When he had spoken to M. Hernu he would contact Senatore Spadolini to let him know the outcome and perhaps he might in turn speak to M. Hernu. Senatore Spadolini said that he would do what he could. He had been in contact with M. Hernu already. He had the impression that forces were involved that were stronger than those which the French Minister of Defence could muster.

4. Senatore Spadolini said that the attitude that had to be verified very well was that of the German Government. The Secretary of State said that he had talked to Dr Woerner that morning and had no reason to doubt that he wanted a genuinely





collaborative programme: what he did not know was how he would react if that proved impossible. There were a number of alternatives also open to the British Government in those circumstances, including going it alone, or a European solution without France. But he refused to become involved in any of these fall-back positions until he had explored in every way possible the preferred option of a five-nation programme. Senatore Spadolini said that he too was committed to the success of the EFA programme.

5. The meeting ended at 1455.

*RM*  
Ministry of Defence  
29th March 1985


Distribution:

PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	PS/Minister (AF)
PS/Secretary of State for Trade and Industry	PS/Minister (DP)
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet	PS/US of S (AF)
Lord Bridges, Rome	PS/US of S (DP)
Sir J Graham, UKDEL NATO	PSO/CDS
	PS/PUS
	PS/CAS
	PS/CDEC
	PS/CDP
	PS/CSA
	PS/CA
	DUS (P)
	DUS (DP)
	DUS (RP)
	DCA
	DCSA
	AUS (IP)
	AUS (Air) (PE)
	ACDS (Pol/Nuc)
	Hd of DACU
	Hd of IP2
	Hd of Sec (NATO/UK) (P)





29 MAR 1985



CORPORATION

NEW YORK





MO 14/3

ce/c  
NBDM  
CDP  
35/3.

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING WITH DR WOERNER  
AT 0830 HOURS ON TUESDAY 26TH MARCH 1985  
IN THE MARGINS OF THE NPG MEETING, LUXEMBOURG

## Those present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP  
Secretary of State for Defence

Dr Manfred Woerner  
Federal Minister of Defence

Sir John Graham  
UK Permanent Representative  
to NATO

Dr Hans-Georg Wieck  
Ambassador, Permanent Represen-  
tative

Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall  
Chief of the Defence Staff

General Wolfgang Altenburg  
Chief of Staff, Federal Armed  
Forces

Mr D A Nicholls  
DUS(P)

Dr Hans Ruhle  
Chief Planning Staff

Mr R C Mottram  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State

Major General Rolf Huttel  
Assistant Chief of Staff

Colonel Dr Klaus Reinhard  
Principal Staff Officer

Colonel Dieter Stoeckmann  
Chief of Personnel Staff of  
Chief of Staff, Federal Armed  
Forces

European Fighter Aircraft

1. In reply to a question from the Secretary of State about the French attitude to EFA, Dr Woerner said that the French appeared to be keeping their options open; there was even speculation that they would take part in both EFA and their own separate national programme. His impression was that M. Hernu was genuinely and strongly interested in a collaborative solution. This had obvious financial advantages for him, given the other pressures on the French defence budget particularly to fund their nuclear programme. When he had talked with M. Hernu he had impressed upon him the importance of seeking a compromise and had not indicated any willingness to fall in with French leadership. He had made it clear that, if a truly European solution were not possible, all German options would be open. The German Government had sufficient flexibility in their





requirement to fall in with any sensible compromise. The Secretary of State said that his problem was that the French at an industrial level might believe that his commitment to collaboration was such that he would eventually be forced to accept a solution on their terms in order to get an agreement at all. Dassault in particular might believe that all they had to do was to sit tight and refuse to compromise. The reality was that, if an agreement was to be reached, he had to persuade a whole range of very sceptical people on his own side. French dominance was not the same as European co-operation. Dr Woerner emphasised that he was unwilling to accept French dominance in any programme with which he was associated. He repeated that he had not given M. Hernu any signal to suggest that this would be acceptable. His own industrialists would prefer the British solution if they had to choose.

2. The Secretary of State said that at the heart of the problem was a lack of contact between Dassault and British Aerospace. He would himself be visiting the Dassault factory the following Tuesday and he had encouraged the Chief Executive of British Aerospace to make contact himself with his opposite number in Dassault. Ultimately, in order to achieve a compromise it might be necessary for him to apply pressure on Sir Raymond Lygo while M. Hernu applied similar pressure on M. Vallieres. He felt that M. Hernu had the will to do this. The question was whether he had the clout within the French system to override the industrial interest. Dr Woerner agreed that that was indeed an imponderable issue. Subsequently he emphasised that this was not simply an Anglo-French problem or a matter which could be settled by contact between the two countries. There must be a European solution in which Germany was fully involved.

3. In discussion of the engine for the new aircraft, the German side expressed concern over the suitability of the RB199 or a derivative of it for an air superiority aircraft. The Secretary of State emphasised that our interest was to agree an engine size for EFA which was also appropriate for the re-engining of our Tornado ADV force. This was also in the interest of our partners since it increased total orders for the new engine. Given this, it made sense to use the RB199 as the engine for the prototype aircraft; but he had given an absolute commitment that there was no suggestion of using the RB199 for production aircraft.

4. In discussion of the timing of a decision, Dr Woerner emphasised the importance of reaching a view on the feasibility of the EFA solution at the next Ministerial meeting. On the basis of the outcome of the meeting, he would need to take his own follow-on decisions before the Summer break. Should agreement not be possible on a five-nation solution, his Government would wish urgently to address a number of other options including collaboration with France, collaboration with Britain or building a US aircraft in Germany under licence. It would take three months to assess these





options. He wanted any decision to be out of the way before the Autumn when Parliament resumed and when the focus of attention would be on the extension of the period of compulsory military service. An early decision was also needed for industrial reasons. He had told his industry not themselves to engage in research or development work while the EFA approach was on the table, but they needed soon to know the way ahead. The Secretary of State said that he had himself envisaged the need for two Ministerial meetings before agreement was likely to be secured. He had anticipated that after the meeting which had now slipped into May, there would be one final meeting in the Summer. If it were to be apparent at the first meeting that a deal was not possible, this would be a tragedy for Europe and for the process of equipment collaboration. He wondered whether the right approach then would be to elevate the problem to the level of the Prime Minister, the Federal Chancellor and the President. Dr Woerner said that he would not oppose such an approach, but he doubted whether it would do much good. M. Hernu kept closely alongside President Mitterand on matters of this kind, and was likely to have cleared his lines in advance. On the German side, were the decision to be elevated to a higher level, more political considerations could well determine the outcome. It might be preferable for any approach of this kind to be a bilateral one between the Prime Minister and the French President.

5. The Secretary of State said that the next step was perhaps to discuss with M. Hernu the French position to get a feel for the possibility of a compromise. After his meeting on 2nd April, he would telephone Dr Woerner about the outcome.

#### Strategic Defence Initiative

6. The Secretary of State asked if Dr Woerner had any views on the paragraph in the draft NPG communique about the strategic defence initiative. Dr Woerner said that his position was that research on the SDI was legitimate and he was looking for some form of German participation in it. Options should be kept open for what happened after the research phase. It was important that handling of the SDI should focus not only on the technological aspects, but that there should also be a dialogue about the strategic and political implications. Two of these wider considerations were particularly important for Germany: that there should be no de-coupling of America from Europe and that pursuit of the SDI should not appear morally to disqualify the role of nuclear weapons in present NATO strategy. We must not undermine the validity of flexible response. The Secretary of State said that the British Government also supported research, but any SDI-related deployments should be the subject of negotiation under the ABM Treaty. His concern was that the communique should not imply that the Alliance saw benefits in SDI deployments, since he foresaw language of this kind gradually being strengthened over a period of years to produce an Alliance commitment to the SDI. He was not himself persuaded at present that there would be any





benefits of the kind envisaged. Dr Woerner said that he was not opposed to a reference in the communique to the possible benefits of strategic defences. He could see that there could be an increase in stability under certain conditions and that the SDI had theoretical advantages. It was, however, too soon to make final judgements. He recognised also the problems that could arise in the transitional phase. The Secretary of State commented that his difficulty was that all experience suggested that the outcome of an initiative of this kind would be a process of escalation on both sides. Dr Woerner said that, if there were no possible benefits from the deployment of an SDI system, it might be difficult to justify SDI research. The Secretary of State said that the justification for the research was that we could not leave the field to the Russians and there was no way of placing verifiable limits on research on both sides. He felt that research on defensive systems could be justified in itself without getting into the question of the ultimate benefits of the SDI.

7. The meeting ended at 0920.

*Rm*

Ministry of Defence  
29th March 1985


Distribution:

PS/Prime Minister  
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary  
PS/Secretary of State for Trade  
and Industry  
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet  
Sir J Bullard, Bonn  
Sir J Fretwell, Paris  
Sir J Graham, UKDEL NATO

PS/Minister (AF) Hd of DACU  
PS/Minister (DP) D Nuc Pol Sy  
PS/US of S (AF) AS Air PE1  
PS/US of S (DP) Hd of IP2  
PSO/CDS Hd of Sec  
PS/PUS (NATO/UK) (P)  
PS/CAS  
PS/CDEC  
PS/CDP  
PS/CSA  
PS/CERN  
PS/CA  
DUS (P)  
DUS (DP)  
DUS (RP)  
DCA  
DCSA  
AUS (IP)  
AUS (Air) (PE)  
ACDS (Pol/Nuc)



29 MAR 1967



COMMUNICATIONS

1967

1967



cc: Mr Roberts.

[As prepared for delivery]

Please copy *[initials]*

IMMEDIATE to  
PS [Mr. Budd]  
Mr. Weston  
PS / Mr. Luce  
Mr. Crabbie

THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL  
AMBASSADOR PAUL H. NITZE  
THE 1985 ALASTAIR BUCHAN MEMORIAL LECTURE  
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES  
LONDON, MARCH 28, 1985

2 Return

mp 27.3

*This is by and large helpful. It restates Mr. Nitze's familiar views on the SA process, takes in the Phil'phis points, and is good deal more sensible on the "total elimination of nuclear weapons" than I detect in his recent speeches.*

*M. Fakenham*

Introduction

It is a privilege for me to deliver the 1985 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture.

In the 1950s, during the transition from the Truman Administration to the Eisenhower Administration, Alastair was the Washington correspondent for the Observer. He had a clear, wide-ranging mind. He was both a skeptic and an idealist. He had high aims for the West; he was troubled by the manifest shortcomings of Western policy.

At one point it became evident that he was under deep intellectual strain. For a time he came to live with my wife Phyllis and me in Washington. Over many discussions, the nature of his strain became evident.

Embargoed until delivery at about 18:30 GMT, March 28, 1985.



During his youth his father had been Governor General of Canada, and Alastair had developed a deep affection for Canada. However, he was English by ancestry and had been educated at Oxford. Later he had come to the United States during the Truman years and had been deeply impressed by the generosity and wisdom of American policy of those days.

As a result, he had difficulty making up his mind which was his primary loyalty, and which were his secondary loyalties. He finally settled the matter with a clear decision; his primary loyalty was to England.

It was then that his great days at Oxford and as the founder of the Institute of International Strategic Studies began. He has made an immense contribution to the wisdom and the coherence of Western thought and policy.

One of the subjects which Alastair and I used to discuss was the question of the proper aims and objectives of arms control. It is that subject which I propose to address this evening. I will begin with a summary of my views, then attempt to illuminate the principal issues by reviewing my recollections of how they arose in the past, and conclude with a look toward the future.



### Arms Control Objectives

The primary security objective of the United States and, I believe, of the Western Alliance in general is to reduce the risk of war while maintaining our right to live in freedom. Consistent with this objective, we have long based our security policy on deterrence, that is, prevention of conflict by convincing a potential opponent that the problems, risks and costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible gains he might hope to achieve.

In this context, arms control should be viewed as one element of our security policy. It complements the measures that we must take unilaterally, such as maintaining weapons and forces necessary for an adequate deterrent.

Arms control is not a substitute or replacement for adequate defenses. Indeed, experience indicates that, while arms control hopefully can play an important role in enhancing our security and bringing about a more stable strategic relationship, what we are able and willing to do for ourselves is more important. It provides the necessary foundation on which effective deterrence and arms control must rest. I remember one Soviet negotiator during SALT I saying, "We will do whatever is necessary to deter you; whether you are able to deter us is up to you."



The objective of reducing the risk of war is intrinsically linked to deterrence. Whether or not we have arms control agreements, it is necessary that the United States and its allies have sufficient military forces, both conventional and nuclear, to deter an armed attack by the Soviet Union and its associates.

Likewise, the Soviet Union undoubtedly is determined to have what they assess to be fully adequate military capabilities, whether or not there are arms control agreements between us. It has been and is our belief, however, that a relationship of offsetting deterrent capabilities can be made more secure, stable and reliable -- and perhaps less costly -- if we and the Soviets can agree on effective, equal and verifiable arms control constraints.

There are two important corollaries to the objective of reducing the risk of war through effective deterrence. These are the objectives of assuring parity, or at least rough equivalence between the capabilities of the two sides, and of assuring crisis stability, that is, reducing the incentives that a side might have in a crisis to strike first, or in peacetime to provoke a crisis that might lead to a military confrontation.



Some commentators tend to emphasize one of these goals or the other. To my mind they are interrelated; we cannot tolerate either significant inequality or substantial crisis instability.

The greatest strain on deterrence could arise in a crisis, or a series of crises, stemming from a complex of factors difficult to control. In such a period, our military forces as a whole must have the necessary characteristics of effectiveness, flexibility, survivability and diversity to dissuade the Soviet Union from contemplating reckless action.

We cannot be confident that an array of US and allied forces manifestly inferior to those of the Soviet Union would provide an adequate deterrent to reckless action in such a period. Similarly, forces of roughly equal capability could be inadequate if a significant portion of them were vulnerable to destruction in a surprise or preemptive attack.

Consistent with the objectives of promoting stability and rough equality, arms control should aim to achieve sharp reductions in the levels of armaments. Reductions per se may not always be good; for example, reductions in the number of launchers can be destabilizing if they increase the ratio of warheads to vulnerable launchers. But well-conceived proposals embodying reductions which bring about improvements in the proper indices can do much to enhance stability.



Finally, the panoply of arms control agreements should deal with the relationship between offensive and defensive systems. I will return later to this subject in some detail.

For arms control agreements to be effective, there are a number of additional requirements. The agreements should be reasonably precise and unambiguous in their terms. While no agreement can be made completely unambiguous, the less ambiguity, the better.

Moreover, we should have confidence in our ability to verify adherence to an agreement's provisions. And the panoply of arms control agreements should be sufficiently comprehensive so that their constraints cannot be readily circumvented. And finally, we must have confidence that the parties will abide by the agreements into which they have entered, a requirement that has become increasingly important in view of findings of Soviet non-compliance with existing arms control arrangements.



In addition to the foregoing objectives and requirements, our arms control policy must merit the sustained support of Western publics, and of Western Congressional and Parliamentary bodies. In the absence of such support, the Soviets will seek to drive wedges and exploit divisions; indeed, tough Soviet bargaining stances have always been complemented by hard-nosed propaganda and active measures campaigns designed to bring about unilateral Western concessions. Such public and legislative support will also be essential to carrying out the unilateral defense programs that must necessarily proceed in parallel with arms control.

These then -- in my view -- comprise the basic objectives and requirements of arms control policy.

#### History as It Illuminates the Issues Concerning Objectives

Let me review the issues and conflicting views as to the objectives of arms control as they have evolved over the years following the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945.



Immediately after the Japanese surrender, President Truman asked some of us who had been engaged in the Strategic Bombing Survey in Europe to undertake a comparable mission with respect to the war in the Pacific. He asked us not only to report on the effects of air power in the Pacific war, but in particular to survey in detail the effects of the atomic weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We were also asked to offer recommendations for US national security in light of modern weapons, especially nuclear weapons.

We recruited a distinguished team of physicists, engineers and other scientists who measured in minute detail the effects of blast, radiation, heat, and fall-out on people, buildings, and on the Japanese will and ability to continue the war. The general public reaction after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been that the destructiveness of atomic weapons was absolute and immeasurable. We were nevertheless directed to measure precisely what those weapons had done, and what they had not done.



We were all shocked by the devastation of the two cities. The casualties and damage were immense. The destruction at Hiroshima was tremendous; part of Nagasaki survived, as it was shielded by a hill. Even at Hiroshima, however, the destruction was not absolute; trains were running through Hiroshima within forty-eight hours after the attack. Our computations, based on the effects of those relatively primitive bombs, indicated that the advent of atomic weapons had increased the potential power of air attack against undefended cities by 100- to 200-fold.

The policy implications we drew were several. Nuclear weapons provided an increase in the power of offensive weapons by more than a hundred fold, and future technology could be expected to increase it by another order of magnitude. In war the temptation for an aggressor possessing nuclear weapons to employ a preemptive strategy could be immense. The importance of being able to control the relevant air space, which had been of high importance in a war fought with conventional weapons, would be far greater in a world with nuclear arms.

We were faced with a grim realization. Even if we had very good offensive and defensive capabilities and a nuclear war were nevertheless to occur, we could not be sure that some weapons would not get through, and even a few could cause immense damage.



Therefore, our policy should be one of maintaining a deterrent posture adequate to assure that no war would occur. Since we could not guarantee the means fully to protect our society from nuclear attack, we should develop forces that would make clear to a potential opponent that he could not achieve military gains through launching an attack against us or our allies, and that the consequences for him of launching his attack would be so horrible that the potential gains of such aggression would not be worthwhile.

One important issue remained. Some thought the terror of nuclear weapons was such that their very existence would in itself prevent war. This view was held by those who considered the destructiveness of nuclear weapons to be absolute. Bernard Brodie was the first and most eloquent proponent of this position. He also argued that there was an absolute dichotomy between the view that the purpose of military forces was to deter, and the view that their purpose was to deny an aggressor the possibility of military success.

The alternative position was that deterrence would be greatly strengthened by the ability to face an enemy with military capabilities and a strategy that would deny him the ability or perception that he might successfully prosecute a war-winning strategy, and emerge from a war in a predominant military position.



This issue of what is required to assure deterrence -- the mere existence of nuclear weapons or a manifest military capability sufficient to deny the enemy any realistic prospect of achieving his objectives -- remains with us to this day. I believed then and I believe now that the latter position is the sensible one.

The question remains, now as then, how to maintain a sure ability to retaliate with devastating nuclear destruction but concurrently to increase our ability to deny an aggressor the possibility of military success, and thus reduce our dependence on the threat of mutually devastating nuclear destruction.

#### The Interest in Nuclear Disarmament

Shortly after nuclear weapons appeared, strong interest arose in negotiating the elimination of all such arms. Immediately after the war's end, the Acheson-Lilienthal report proposed a world government restricted in its authority to nuclear matters, but including everything to do with those matters. The idea was roughly translated into the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic weapons and technology, and offered to the Soviets. They would have no part of it.



Interest in nuclear disarmament continued however. Some years later, before the United Nations Committee on Disarmament, the Soviets presented a program for what they called "general and complete disarmament." But it soon became clear that their position was purely for propaganda purposes; they offered no practical way to get to their stated end.

While "general and complete disarmament" did not then appear to be a realistic or achievable goal, the Soviets nevertheless were reaping significant benefits in the propaganda field. The United States, the United Kingdom and France in response changed their position to advocate "phased total disarmament," which meant approximately the same thing as "general and complete disarmament," but offered a somewhat more practical approach.

From that point on the propaganda battle was a stand-off. But the talks on the subject had little to do with actual steps toward the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, or toward reducing the risk of war.

#### The Shift Toward Arms Control and Limited Measures

When the Kennedy Administration took office, the debate between the West and the Soviet Union concerning "general and complete disarmament" versus "phased total disarmament" was continuing.



Thought in the Administration began to turn to the possibility of negotiating agreements more limited in their scope, with the hope that success in these agreements would open the possibility of more comprehensive agreements later. In other words, our interest turned toward arms control rather than disarmament.

Instead of total disarmament -- in which security would have been entrusted to something akin to a world government -- we set our sights on a more realistic plane. We accepted the prospect of deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation, and sought to make the strategic balance safer, more stable, and perhaps less costly.

As a result, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty came into being. These agreements were important in their own right, but they were peripheral to the central issue of achieving an agreement which would serve materially to reduce the risk of war.



Up until 1963, thought on arms control had concentrated on multilateral arrangements; it was thought that a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would not be sufficiently comprehensive, and could lead to possible circumvention and undercutting by other nations. But in the spring of 1963, some of us in the Administration came to the conclusion that we weren't apt to get an international agreement on the central issues unless and until we could work out the main issues bilaterally with the Soviets.

We prepared a paper on the issues involved in a bilateral agreement limiting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis suggested that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was not the optimum solution. This was because nuclear technology had become too widely known; the risk of clandestine or third-country production of nuclear weapons was too great. It seemed that a level of perhaps 500 strategic nuclear weapons on each side would provide a more stable and predictable future than none at all.



Then Secretary of Defense McNamara agreed with these conclusions and took them seriously. This helped set the stage for his proposal to Kosygin at Glassboro in June 1967 that we begin bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations. By 1967 the Soviets had come to the conclusion that such negotiations "might not be impossible." The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 temporarily made them impossible; the SALT I negotiations, as such, did not begin until the fall of 1969.

#### SALT I and SALT II

SALT represented what we hoped would be a mutual effort to achieve effective arms control constraints providing for a stable strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union at lower levels of arms.

In the late 1960s, we were completing our intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile deployment programs, and were pursuing an active anti-ballistic missile program. The Soviets also had vigorous -- and growing -- programs in both the offensive and defensive fields. With respect to ABM, however, we in the United States were coming to the conclusion that the state of the technology at the time was such that ABM systems were not very reliable and could be overcome by deploying additional offensive systems at substantially lesser cost.



Deployment of such ABM systems might thus, it was feared, encourage a proliferation of offensive arms. Were defenses limited, on the other hand, it might be possible to work out reductions and tight limitations on offensive nuclear weapons. We therefore were prepared stringently to limit ABM systems.

SALT I produced the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms. We believed that those measures would be helpful to the security of both sides. That belief was based on three principal assumptions:

- first, that the constraints on ballistic missile defenses, particularly those on large phased-array radars, would prevent break-out or circumvention;
- second, that both sides would adhere to the letter and intent of the agreements; and
- third, that with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible in the following few years to negotiate comprehensive limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels.

We believed that those assumptions were shared by both sides.



The ABM Treaty seemed to me to be a useful and equitable agreement. It constrained not only the interceptor launchers, which were relatively simple and cheap, and could be easily stored and rapidly deployed. More significantly, the Treaty limited large phased-array radars -- which were expensive and took years to build; were one side to build such a radar in a manner not permitted by the Treaty, the other side would have considerable warning time to challenge the action and, if necessary, take countermeasures. The ABM Treaty offered promise for enhancing stability by setting the stage for comprehensive limitations on offensive arms.

Unfortunately, a number of Soviet actions since 1972 -- such as the construction of an early warning radar at Krasnoyarsk in violation of constraints on such radars provided by the ABM Treaty -- have undermined the first two assumptions. They call into serious question Soviet intentions with regard to possible break-out, as well as Soviet willingness to comply with arms control arrangements when Soviet military priorities are not consonant with them.

We were also disappointed with regard to the third assumption; we could not get the Soviets to agree to tight limitations on offensive arms comparable to those applied to ABM systems, or reductions in such arms. Indeed, limiting defenses did not appear to have any effect on the Soviet offensive build-up.



Part of the problem was that the Soviets were doing well with respect to offensive systems. We had ceased building new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers some years earlier; we were improving them through qualitative changes. The Soviet Union was actively deploying large numbers and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Momentum thus tended to favor the Soviets; they saw no reason to sign a piece of paper which would cause them to forgo that advantage.

The 1972 SALT Interim Agreement purported to freeze the offensive balance at the then-existing level. In fact, it did no such thing. It froze the number of operational ballistic missile launchers and those the Soviets claimed were under construction; the levels were grossly unequal. Those inequalities continue to the present day, and have become more significant as the Soviets, as some then anticipated, have caught up to us in accuracy, MIRVing, and other pertinent aspects of technology.

Our inability to negotiate tight limits on offensive arms was also in part linked to the relationship between the verifiability of an agreement and its comprehensiveness. It was our view that it would be in the interest of each side to provide sufficient information to the other so that each could verify and have confidence in the other's adherence to the terms of an agreement.



Because the Soviets refused to agree to such a cooperative approach to verification, the limitations of an agreement had to be restricted to large visible items such as missile silos and submarine missile tubes. They could not apply to smaller systems or components. Nor could they apply to the more significant -- but more difficult to monitor -- qualitative characteristics of weapons systems.

The rationale for concluding such a modest and unequal accord as the 1972 Interim Agreement were two expectations, both of which subsequently proved to be ill-founded. First, we thought the two sides could negotiate a more comprehensive agreement within the next two or three years, surely within the five-year duration of that agreement. Second, we underestimated the extent to which, and how quickly, actual Soviet force developments -- particularly MIRVing -- would take advantage of the loose offensive constraints of SALT I. Compounding these weaknesses, SALT II incorporated many of the drawbacks of its predecessor.

It is hard to make a case that the Interim Agreement or SALT II met any of the principal objectives for arms control; one would truly be hard pressed to demonstrate how they embodied rough equivalence, lowered armaments, enhanced crisis stability, or reduced the risk of war.



SALT II, as its predecessor, focused on the wrong indices of power -- launchers -- giving both sides incentives to increase the number of weapons on their missiles, with negative implications for stability. Likewise, it did not provide for rough equivalence, allowing the Soviet Union unilateral rights, such as the right to heavy ballistic missiles.

And by no means has SALT reduced armaments -- the number of warheads on US and Soviet ballistic missiles has increased since 1972; the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles has increased by more than fifty percent since 1979. And taking advantage of their much superior throwweight, the Soviet capability to destroy hard targets has increased by an even greater amount. All of this has taken place within the limitations of SALT.

The shortcomings of SALT II, in particular the fact that it would not provide for significant warhead limitations, came to be widely recognized. In fact, its proponents largely fell back on the rationale that SALT II was "better than no agreement." For some of us who have worked to clarify thinking on the objectives of arms control agreements, this was a defeatist criterion; it suggested loss of confidence in our ability to maintain an adequate deterrent posture without arms control, and implied that we must therefore accept more or less what the Soviets would agree to.



In the START and INF negotiations earlier in this decade, the United States sought to rectify some of the inadequacies of the SALT experience. For example, we made warheads rather than launchers the principal units of account, and tabled positions embodying significant reductions rather than merely legitimizing existing launcher levels and permitting increased warhead levels. Unfortunately, our efforts were largely overshadowed by the Soviet campaign to split NATO over the issue of INF.

The Debate Since the Mid-1970s

From the mid-1970s on, the debate on the question of arms control objectives seems to me to have been confused and confusing.

An issue raised in the 1970s has been the idea that the principal objective of arms control should be to "stop the arms race." Yet from 1972, when the Soviets passed the United States in the number, size and throwweight of offensive missile systems, they proceeded to develop and deploy one generation after another of more modern systems. Meanwhile, we had frozen the number of our weapon systems and restrained our modernization programs.



It was to the Soviet interest to keep things that way. Their propaganda approach was and is keyed to the phrase "stop the arms race." To the extent the Soviets can use such phrases to encourage unilateral Western restraint, they can avoid serious negotiations in which they might have to concede some of their advantages.

To many in the United States, however, it seemed that the Soviets had been merely reacting to what we had done first, that they were merely catching up; if we were to stop, they would stop too. For some ten years this and the trauma and aftereffects of the Vietnam war combined to restrain the United States from responding to continuing Soviet force developments.

Over the years, however, it became increasingly clear that the Soviets were not merely reacting; they were executing a deliberate long-term program to improve their capabilities regardless of what we did. As former Secretary of Defense Brown put it, "When we build, they build; when we don't build, they build."



Today both sides express agreement on "radical reductions" as being an important objective. But, as I noted earlier, those reductions should be such that they improve stability and result in rough equality, and not the reverse. Reductions to low and equal levels of ballistic missile warheads and redressing the imbalance in destructive capability can undoubtedly enhance the strategic situation, particularly if such reductions are structured so as to encourage survivable basing for strategic systems and "de-MIRVing" of forces with a dangerous capability against hard targets. Such reductions would greatly reduce the value -- and therefore the likelihood -- of a first or preemptive strike.

Reduction in the number of launchers alone however -- without regard to the number and power of warheads -- could be grossly destabilizing. It would increase, not decrease the existing inequality between the capabilities of the two sides, and could increase the incentive to go first or preempt in a crisis.

Others began talking in the late 1970s and early 1980s of a verifiable and comprehensive nuclear freeze. If a freeze is not comprehensive, it makes the situation worse, not better, and today's situation is not good. If a freeze is comprehensive, it will both freeze the present unequal situation into the future and not be verifiable.



What has been the basic difficulty with the arms control situation? I believe it goes back to the days before SALT I. We were then ahead in most of the measures of strategic capability. But we came to the conclusion that enough was enough. It was our hope that, when the Soviets pulled even, they also would conclude that enough is enough. The evidence indicates that we were wrong.

Since 1972 the nuclear arms control problem has been one of attempting to square the circle. The Soviet side has been quite frank in saying it would not enter into an agreement which would change the correlation of strategic forces in a manner they deemed adverse to their interests. Once the Soviets judged the military correlation of forces had become favorable, they were adamant in refusing to consider any agreement which would result in rough equality or which would improve crisis stability. But any agreement which would not lead to these results was flawed from the point of view of the West.



My view is that we should get back to fundamentals. The issues are complex, but not too complex. Four really is greater than two. The Soviet leaders are not mad; they look to their interests through eyes trained in the Marxist-Leninist approach. Many of them are excellent logicians, strategists, mathematicians and physicists. Their approach is usually relatively understandable and predictable, more so, perhaps, than the approach of Western governments.

What we must do is give the Soviets grounds for concluding that we in the West are prepared to maintain sufficient political will and military capability to ensure deterrence of any possible aggression, conventional or nuclear. We must bring them to realize that their build-up can not and will not be translated into an exploitable military or political advantage. If it turns out that we have to go for a few more years without a formal agreement limiting offensive nuclear weapons, that is undesirable, but let us not panic; we have been living with that situation for some years.

At the same time, we should hold out a better alternative, one that would produce a more stable and reliable relationship from the perspective of both sides. To this end, let me outline the strategic concept that underlies the US approach to the negotiations that began earlier this month in Geneva.



The US Strategic Concept

As I have explained elsewhere, that concept can be summarized in four sentences:

During the next ten years, the US objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

For the immediate future we will continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation. We have little choice; today's technology provides no alternative. For now and the foreseeable future, we and our allies must therefore continue to maintain a modern and effective nuclear deterrent.



We will continue to press for radical reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, with attention, of course, to the proper indices of limitation. Reductions can be structured so as to produce a more stable balance and reduce the risk of war. In the Geneva talks, we are prepared to consider various means of bridging differences between the US and Soviet positions in an effort to achieve equitable accords that entail real reductions.

We also remain committed to the ABM Treaty and will seek to reverse the erosion that has occurred in that regime as a result of Soviet actions such as the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar. In the longer run, however, we want to consider the possibilities of a more defense-reliant balance.

Fifteen years ago, we concluded that defenses could be overwhelmed -- at relatively less cost -- by additional offensive arms. Technology, however, has advanced considerably since then. We now see the possibility that new defensive systems might lead to a more stable and reliable strategic balance, and ultimately, might provide the means by which we could move with confidence toward the complete elimination of nuclear arms.



In March 1983 President Reagan questioned whether we should confine ourselves to a future in which deterrence rests solely on the threat of offensive nuclear retaliation. His Strategic Defense Initiative research program was therefore given the task of determining the feasibility of effective defenses against nuclear ballistic missiles. This includes possible defenses based both on earth and in space. The President has directed that the program be carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. Its object is to provide the basis for an informed decision, sometime in the next decade, as to the feasibility of providing for a defense of the United States and our allies against ballistic missile attack.

We expect the Soviets will continue their investigation of new defensive technologies. Indeed, the debate over SDI has often lost sight of the fact that the Soviets, besides having the only operational ABM system, have long had a major research effort devoted to advanced ballistic missile defense technologies, including high energy lasers and particle beam weapons.



Should new defensive technologies prove feasible and meet our criteria, we would want at a future date to begin a transition to a balance in which we would place greater reliance on defensive systems for our protection and that of our allies. Such defenses could enhance deterrence by creating excessive complications for an aggressor's planning for a possible first strike, thereby lessening the chance that he might seriously contemplate it.

Let me note that the criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of new technologies will be demanding. They must produce defensive systems that are reasonably survivable; if not, the defenses could themselves be tempting targets for a first strike. This would decrease, rather than enhance, stability.

New defensive systems must also be cost-effective at the margin, that is, it must be cheaper to add additional defensive capability than it is for the other side to add the offensive capability necessary to overcome the defense. If this criterion is not met, the defensive systems could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures and additional offensive weapons to overcome deployed defenses, instead of a redirection of effort from offense to defense.



As I have said, these criteria are demanding. But they are necessary if we are to move toward a more stable balance at lower levels of arms. While our SDI research program will seek technical answers to technical questions, we are simultaneously examining the broader strategic implications of moving toward a more defense-reliant balance.

If the new technologies cannot meet the standards we have set, and thus not contribute to enhancing stability, we would not deploy them. In that event, we would have to continue to base deterrence largely on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation, though hopefully at lower levels of arms. However, we have high expectations that the scientific and technical communities can respond to the challenge.

Let me be clear that SDI is not an attempt to achieve superiority. Through any transition our goal would be to maintain balance. President Reagan has made clear that any future decision to deploy new defenses against ballistic missiles would be a matter for negotiation.



This does not mean a Soviet veto over our defense programs; rather our commitment to negotiation reflects a recognition that we should seek to move forward in a cooperative manner with the Soviets. We have thus offered to begin discussions even now in Geneva with the Soviets as to the implications of new defensive technologies, whether developed by them or by us, and how we might together manage a transition to a more stable and reliable strategic relationship based on an increasing contribution of defensive systems in the mix of offense and defense.

Of course, arms control would play an important role in such a transition. Properly structured cuts in offensive arms are not only worthwhile in their own right, they could also facilitate the shift to a more defense-reliant posture.

Before negotiating such a cooperative transition with the Soviet Union, and throughout the transition period, we would consult fully with our allies. Such a transition would continue for some time, perhaps for decades. As the US and Soviet strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals declined significantly, we would seek to negotiate reductions in other types of nuclear weapons and involve, in some manner, the other nuclear powers.



Given the right technical and political conditions, we would hope to be able to continue the reduction of all nuclear weapons down to zero.

By necessity, this is a very long-term goal. Its realization would, of course, have far-reaching implications for the global military balance at all levels. For example, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons has helped to prevent conventional as well as nuclear conflict. Were we to move to a situation in which nuclear weapons had been eliminated, the need for a stable conventional balance would become even more important than today.

We would have to devote particular attention and effort to how, together with our allies, we might counter and diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both conventional arms improvements and arms control efforts. Clearly, were we able to move cooperatively with the Soviet Union toward a nuclear-free world, that would presuppose a more cooperative overall relationship than exists at present -- one in which efforts to establish a conventional balance at lower levels should also be fruitful.



The global elimination of nuclear weapons, if this were ever to become possible, would need to be accompanied by widespread deployments of effective non-nuclear defenses. These defenses would provide assurance that were some country to cheat, for example, by clandestinely building ICBMs or shorter range systems, such as SS-20s, it would not be able to achieve an exploitable military advantage. To overcome the deployed defenses, cheating would have to be conducted on a large scale -- of too great a magnitude to pass unnoticed before appropriate countermeasures could be taken.

Were we to reach the ultimate phase, deterrence would be based on the ability of the defense to deny success to a potential aggressor's attack -- whether nuclear or conventional. The strategic relationship could then be characterized as one of mutual assured security.

#### Conclusion

Having thus outlined our strategic concept for the future, let me offer some comments.



In the 1950s, total nuclear disarmament was the declared objective of both sides, but it was wholly impractical. Among other reasons, in an uncertain world, neither side could have the confidence necessary seriously to consider abandoning its nuclear weapons; defenses against them seemed impossible. Emerging defensive technologies may provide the hedge that we need to move away from primary reliance on nuclear weapons. I frankly do not see any way in which we could consider eventually moving toward extremely deep cuts in offensive nuclear arms -- and their ultimate elimination -- without some means to protect against cheating and other contingencies.

Let me caution, however, that for the foreseeable future -- that is, in the near term and even in the early and intermediate stages of any possible transition -- offensive nuclear arms and the threat of massive destructive retaliation they embody will be the key element of deterrence. This situation unavoidably will obtain for many many years.

Let me also emphasize that the concept I have outlined is wholly consistent with deterrence. Not only in the near term, but in both the transition and ultimate phases as well, deterrence would continue to provide the basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship.



As I said at the beginning of my remarks, deterrence requires that a potential opponent be convinced that the problems, risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he might hope to achieve. A popular view of deterrence is that it is almost solely a matter of posing to an aggressor high potential costs through the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation.

But deterrence can also function effectively if one has the ability, through defense and other military means, to deny the attacker the gains he might otherwise have hoped to realize. Our hope and intent is to shift the deterrent balance from one which is based primarily on the punitive threat of devastating nuclear retaliation to one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced on both sides and non-nuclear defenses play a greater and greater role. We believe this would provide a far sounder basis for a stable and reliable strategic relationship, and for a real reduction in the risk of war.



The concept I have outlined embodies much that is old and some things that are new. It requires that we rethink some of our strategic policy, and we should not shy away from doing so. Reducing the risk of war is a goal of vital importance to both the West and East. We should examine all ways by which we can advance that goal, with clear, objective and open minds. This includes frank discussion between allies. This is the manner in which our coalition of democracies must work; I am confident that together we will make the right choices.

Thank you.





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 March 1985

US Presidential Chemical Warfare Review Commission

Thank you for your letter of 22 March with which you enclosed a text of a written statement of our views on chemical warfare issues which it is proposed to give to the Commission in strict confidence, together with a form of words which could be used in any published document.

The Prime Minister feels that paragraph 3. of Annex A ducks the question that, in the absence of an effective chemical capability nuclear weapons may be the Alliance's only response to a chemical attack. She would therefore propose that the passage in question be amended as follows:

"Passive defence measures alone while essential are no deterrent. If we are not to be left with a nuclear response as the only response to a chemical attack, it is essential that NATO should have the ability to employ C W agents effectively in retaliation. This is provided by the US C W Retaliatory capability. But given the limited and ageing nature of this capability, there is currently, an important weakness in the spectrum of flexible response which could carry serious military risks."

I hope this is acceptable.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury), Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence



Passive defence measures alone while essential are no deterrent. If we are not to be left with a nuclear response as the only response to a chemical attack, it is essential that NATO should have the ability to employ C W agents effectively in retaliation. This is provided by the US C W Retaliatory capability. But given the limited and ageing nature of this capability, there is currently <sup>an important ~~statement~~ weakness</sup> in the spectrum of flexible response which could carry serious military risks.



17 ①



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~9307822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 26/14

22nd March 1985

*I do not take the point made in para 3. It checks the question that in the absence of chemical capability, modern may be the only response.*

*Prime Minister  
The letter summarises the documents well.  
Agree the proposed line (bearing in mind it may (pals)?)*

US PRESIDENTIAL CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION (PRC) CDP

22/3

In your letter of 10th December 1984 to Colin Budd at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, you recorded the Prime Minister's agreement that we should respond to the expected request from the PRC for a UK view. You noted that she wished to see the proposed line.

The Commission was established by President Reagan on 28th January and formally constituted on 11th March. Its chairman is Walter Stoessel and its members include Alexander Haig and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Contacts between our Embassy in Washington, the State Department and the Pentagon have confirmed that the PRC would welcome our views, and that the Administration would find it useful if we provided them.

The Defence and Foreign Secretaries have agreed that, given the sensitivity of chemical warfare (CW) issues, we should offer a written statement of our views in strict confidence. I enclose at Annex A the proposed text: it offers support for US moves towards modernisation in the context of the negotiations for a total ban, which would usefully increase Western leverage over the Russians at Geneva. It also recognises that, in the absence of an acceptable outcome at Geneva, a limited modernised US capability would act as a deterrent within NATO's strategy of flexible response. The US Administration have confirmed that they would welcome a statement along these lines. It would thus carry forward the remit from the Prime Minister's meeting on 2nd August 1984, while at the same time reflecting the UK's continued commitment to a negotiated ban, as underlined by the Prime Minister in the House on 10th January.

The State Department consider that the PRC will need to acknowledge in the unclassified part of their report that we have responded to a request for views. They have suggested that we should agree a general form of words for this purpose: the proposed text is at Annex B.

C Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street





The PRC have asked to visit Bonn, Paris and (on 29th March) London in the course of a visit to US Forces in Europe and NATO. The party will not include Haig or Brzezinski. The French and Germans have agreed to see them at official level. The Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries agree that we should do likewise.

I would be grateful to know that the Prime Minister is content with the written statement and the line for the PRC's unclassified report. The former would be handed to the team on arrival; officials would follow up any questions arising from the statement. I attach at Annex C a copy of the Question and Answer Brief which the Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries are content officials should use for that purpose.

I am copying this letter and the attachments to Len Appleyard (FCO), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury), Hugh Taylor (Home Office), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)



UK WRITTEN EVIDENCE TO US PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMISSION

1. HMG remains firmly committed to the successful negotiation of a total ban on all aspects of chemical warfare.
2. The Soviet Union maintains a capability to mount large scale chemical warfare operations against targets throughout Allied Command Europe and in the UK. It possesses large stocks of CW agents, which we believe are held forward, a variety of means for their delivery, and a wide range of protective and decontamination equipment enabling Soviet forces to operate in a chemically contaminated environment. It is also currently engaged in extensive research and development, much more extensive than any in the West. It appears that CW remains an important option for the Soviet armed forces.
3. At any time, the threat of use of Soviet chemical weapons could force NATO troops to don protective equipment and to employ appropriate procedures; this would seriously and rapidly degrade their operational effectiveness and could confer on the Soviets a potentially overwhelming tactical advantage. Passive defensive measures alone, while essential, are no deterrent. Nor could the use of nuclear weapons be seen as a credible response in all circumstances. Whilst it might be perceived as a credible response to a massive chemical attack on cities, it could hardly be seen as a credible response to, for example, a limited chemical attack on individual air fields. NATO's strategy, therefore, calls for an ability to employ effectively CW agents in retaliation on a limited scale. This is provided by the US CW retaliatory capability. Given the limited and ageing nature of this capability, there is currently an important weakness in the spectrum of flexible response which could carry serious military risks.
4. The need to wear protective equipment could, particularly if chemical weapons were actually used, significantly weaken NATO's

*But this  
could  
be the  
only  
response*



capability to sustain a cohesive conventional defence and could therefore force the Alliance to resort to the earlier use of nuclear weapons to avoid defeat and to restore deterrence.

5. The best answer to this CW threat, for the NATO alliance, would clearly be a negotiated and adequately verifiable ban on all chemical weapons, on which we could be confident of Soviet compliance. It is still unclear, however, whether the Russians are prepared to abandon their present CW capability, and to accept the required measures of verification. There is clearly a risk that the Soviet Union will attempt to string us along indefinitely at Geneva.

6. HMG takes the view, therefore, that US moves towards modernisation, in the context of sustained preference for a total ban, should usefully increase the Western leverage over the Russians at the Geneva negotiations. Such leverage could only be provided, however, if the Soviet Union perceived a US readiness to move towards modernisation in this field. Given the current substantial Soviet advantage in chemical weapons, it is difficult to see other factors that could exert comparable leverage, and that could enhance, to the same extent, the prospects of a substantive move by the Soviets towards agreement at Geneva. In the absence of an acceptable outcome in Geneva, a limited modernised US capability would diminish the likelihood of Soviet CW use in any East/West conflict by acting as a deterrent within NATO's strategy of flexible response. Even <sup>then</sup> the West would remain committed to the achievement of a CW ban, and there would be increased incentives on the East to meet our concerns over verification, if and when negotiations resumed.

7. The issue remains a most sensitive one in the Alliance and will need careful handling. The key point is that Western Governments should be able to demonstrate convincingly to their publics that, in the face of negotiating failure and a need to modernise, negotiations had been carried on in good faith and on the basis of a



reasonable position; and that any failure must be laid squarely at the door of the Soviet Union.

8. The Alliance's primary objective must therefore be to continue seeking an arms control solution in Geneva, and to keep our defensive measures abreast of the threat. Should we not achieve in Geneva the comprehensive, verifiable and global ban that we want, in the light of the CW threat, it would be for the Alliance to consider what steps should then sensibly be taken to uphold NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response.



US PRESIDENTIAL CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION (PRC):

LINE FOR PUBLIC USE

1. As a major ally of the United States and in view of the United Kingdom's leading role in the negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapon ban at Geneva, the British Government was approached for its views by the PRC.
  
2. In its response the British Government expressed concern about the CW threat from the Warsaw Pact. They also emphasised their view that the Alliance should continue as its first priority to work urgently, in the current negotiations at Geneva, for a total and verifiable ban on all aspects of chemical warfare. They noted that US moves towards modernisation would underline to the Russians the benefits of reaching early agreement on a total ban. In addition, the British Government underlined the need to uphold NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response.



1. THE SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE THREAT?Introduction

1. The Soviet Union maintains a capability to mount large scale chemical warfare operations against targets throughout Allied Command Europe and in the UK. It possesses large stocks of CW agents, a variety of means for their delivery, and a wide range of protective and decontamination equipment enabling Soviet forces to operate effectively in chemically contaminated environments. It is also engaged in extensive research and development of new chemical agents to defeat Western protective equipment. Overall Soviet efforts are much more extensive than any in the West.

Production and Storage

2. Facilities for the production of first generation blister and blood agents, mustard gas and hydrogen cyanide have existed since the 1930s. Second generation nerve agents sarin, soman and thickened soman, which cause death through respiratory failure, are produced at three facilities. Although probably not working at full capacity current production of nerve agents alone is estimated at 12,000 tonnes a year.
3. There are a number of major CW storage depots in the Soviet Union as well as smaller depots with facilities for bulk storage and storage of chemical munitions in the Western part of the country and in Eastern Europe. Storage sites are rail served and special rail transporter cars are used to move agents between them. Since the mid-1970s construction of new storage buildings and holding of chemical associated vehicles and equipment at these sites has increased markedly.
4. It is difficult to calculate precisely the amount of CW material stockpiled at these facilities. Estimates in the US intelligence community have varied between 50,000 and 700,000 tonnes. On the basis of rail movements at storage facilities the UK assesses the total stockpile of nerve agents as 300,000 tonnes. This is probably a



conservative estimate of total CW stocks since it includes no first generation agents; we do not know what methodology American agencies employ.

#### Delivery capability of Soviet forces

5. Soviet forces are equipped and trained to fight in a contaminated environment. Levels of individual and collective protection are high and the Soviet forces could have as many as 90,000 specialist NBC troops deployed down to regimental level. Their role is protective but they are also trained to assist in planning chemical strikes. There is evidence of CW munitions stored in the forward areas; but the lack of evidence of filled munitions storage leads us to believe that these munitions will be filled only when required. Munitions can be fired from artillery pieces, multi-barrelled rocket launchers and surface to surface tactical missiles (FROG, SS21, SCUD, SCALEBOARD, SS22) or used in land mines, bombs or spray tanks in aircraft.

#### New developments

6. There is evidence of Soviet research into penetrating agents, toxins, mycotoxins and other naturally occurring poisons, psychochemicals, incapacitating agents and irritants. They have also shown interest in the binary concept as a means of producing novel agents which are difficult to detect, resistant to present therapeutic drugs or too unstable to be stored in standard munitions. Furthermore, activity at the Shikhany test range has increased considerably in the last few years to reach an intense and almost continuous level, well beyond that required for updating or checking traditional agents and consistent with the testing of new agents. Of greatest concern is the evidence from defectors of the existence of a penetrating agent which is highly toxic and capable of defeating all NATO respirators including the British one.



Soviet intentions

7. The Soviet Union classes CW as a 'weapon of mass destruction' whose use would be controlled at the highest/<sup>political</sup> level. The Americans believe that the nature of the Soviet CW threat has changed in recent years but the intelligence community is divided on the likelihood of its use against NATO and on the extent of the Soviet capability. On the one hand it is argued that Soviet forces have the capability for only relatively limited tactical use, and given the likely advantages occurring from use on this scale they would tend to be deterred by the possibility of a NATO nuclear response unless the decision had already been made to go nuclear. Use in Afghanistan is seen as a special case. On the other hand, and despite the paucity of recent direct evidence of Soviet CW offensive doctrine, the UK and some US agencies believe that Soviet military doctrine indicates a clear readiness to use whatever means are necessary to achieve their objective rapidly, including CW in appropriate circumstances. There is a strong presumption that mycotoxins have been used in South East Asia by Soviet surrogates and that Soviet forces have been using incapacitants in Afghanistan. This, allied with the existing stocks, delivery capability and an expanding R&D programme suggests that CW remains an important option for the Soviet armed forces.



2. What are the UK's views on the absence of any Western retaliatory capability and on the implications for flexible response?

a. At any time the threat of use of Soviet chemical weapons would force NATO troops to don protective equipment and employ appropriate procedures. Although the level of protection can be adjusted to some extent in the light of the threat at any given time, this would still seriously and rapidly degrade their operational effectiveness. In the absence of an adequate retaliatory capability deployed on behalf of NATO, Soviet personnel would not necessarily have to don their own protective equipment (unless advancing through areas contaminated by their own chemical weapons). The Soviets' capability to employ such weapons at a time and place of their own choosing confers on them freedom of action and potentially overwhelming tactical advantage. Thus, unilateral possession of such a capability bestows a substantial military advantage even if the Soviets elect in the event not to use it.

b. To deter Soviet CW use, NATO strategy relies principally on conventional and nuclear weapons backed by an ability to employ effectively CW agents in retaliation, on a limited scale (this latter currently provided by the US CW retaliatory capability). Passive defensive measures alone, while essential, are no deterrent. Nor would the use of nuclear weapons be a credible response in all circumstances. It might be a credible response to a massive chemical attack against the UK and the cities of Europe, but it could hardly be seen as a credible response to a limited attack. Given the limited and ageing nature of the US retaliatory capability, which is not declared to NATO, there is an important weakness in the spectrum of flexible response which would carry serious military risks.



3. Does the absence of any NATO retaliatory CW capability make the early use of nuclear weapons more likely? The need to wear protective equipment would degrade the performance of NATO Servicemen in war. This factor, particularly if chemical weapons were actually used by the Soviets (for example, <sup>by</sup> seriously reducing aircraft sortie rates on attacked airfields and by slowing the essential flows of reinforcements and resupply through contaminated ports) could significantly weaken NATO's capability to sustain a cohesive conventional defence and could, therefore, force the Alliance to resort to the earlier use of nuclear weapons to restore deterrence. Additionally, of course, heavy and widespread use of chemical weapons by the Soviets, which undermined our conventional defence, would leave NATO with little credible alternative other than the use of nuclear weapons.



Question 4:

What are the UK's views on an arms control solution, in particular on

- a. negotiability?
- b. adequacy and verification?

Question 4: (Answer)

A negotiated and adequately verifiable ban, with which the Soviet Union and its allies comply, is the best solution for the NATO Alliance. To assure compliance, the treaty must contain a rigorous regime of on-site inspection to deter cheating. It is still unclear, despite their public and private statements, whether the Russians are prepared to make the necessary concessions to abandon their present CW capability and to accept the required measures of verification. The threat of US modernisation should provide significant leverage over the Russians at the Geneva negotiations. Such leverage could only be provided if the Soviet Union perceived a US readiness to move towards modernisation in this field. Without this leverage there would be less likelihood of achieving a treaty offering more advantage than that already bestowed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning first use.

There is clearly a risk that the Soviet Union will attempt to string us along indefinitely at Geneva. The prospect of an indefinitely prolonged negotiation is unacceptable. Any conclusion that there was no prospect of a satisfactory agreement would remain a matter for high-level political judgement. But this point has not been reached.



Question 5:

What are the UK's views on a "dual approach" to CW negotiations?  
Would the prospects of an arms control solution be enhanced by US modernisation?

Question 5: (Answer)

Clearly there is a connection between the Geneva negotiations and US plans for binary modernisation. The United Kingdom believes that a "dual approach" to CW arms control, would have advantage, in that (as stated in the answer to Question 4) US moves towards modernisation in the context of a sustained preference for a total ban should increase the Western leverage over the Russians at the Geneva negotiations.

Once the US procurement process had been launched the Soviet Union would be increasingly faced with the potential need to choose between, on the one hand, a negotiated ban which ended the prospect of a modernized US CW capability, and, on the other, a revived US chemical deterrent, together with the risk of global CW proliferation. Given the current substantial Soviet advantage in CW it is difficult to see other factors that could exert comparable leverage on the Soviets and that could enhance to the same extent the prospect of a substantive move by the Soviets towards agreement at Geneva.



Question 6(a):

What is the UK's attitude to possible US modernisation in politico/strategic terms (including the effect on East/West relations and arms control)?

Question 6(a): (Answer)

We favour US moves towards modernisation on the grounds that the prospect of this offers new leverage over the Russians in order to achieve a global verifiable ban. In the absence of an acceptable outcome in Geneva, a modernised US capability would diminish the likelihood of Soviet CW use in any East/West conflict. The key point is that Western governments should be able, in the face of negotiating failure and a need to modernise, to demonstrate convincingly to their publics that we have negotiated until now in good faith and on the basis of a reasonable position; and that the failure must be laid squarely at the door of the Soviet Union.

This issue is however a sensitive one in the Alliance and will need careful handling. It should be possible to achieve at least an Alliance commitment not to undermine the US position. Provided this necessary Alliance solidarity could be achieved, we doubt that the inevitably adverse reaction from Third World countries, including China, would do long-term damage to Alliance relations with them. Initial Soviet reaction to a US decision to modernise would be hostile and vociferous. They might well break off the CW talks if these were still in some sort of being. But we doubt that they would allow nuclear/space talks to be interrupted for this reason alone. They would certainly mount a propaganda campaign designed to use Western public pressure to weaken US and Alliance resolve. Provided that the West were able to remain firm and united, we think it unlikely that on this issue alone longer term East/West relations would be significantly damaged. The



West would remain committed to the achievement of a CW ban, and there would be increased incentives for the East to meet our concerns over verification, if and when negotiations resumed.



6b. What is the UK's attitude to possible US modernization in terms of its military value?

a. We understand the current US concerns about the size and nature of her CW retaliatory capability and its limited and diminishing usefulness on the modern battlefield. This applies particularly to their inability to attack the enemy's rear areas with a persistent agent.

b. We believe the proposed US binary stockpile, which would enable US Forces to retaliate against a range of targets from the front line (155mm Non-Persistent artillery round, 23 km range) through follow-on echelons and logistical complexes (MLRS Intermediate Volatility Agent) to the Second Echelon and airfields (BIGEYE Persistent bomb), would meet their military concerns to uprate their retaliatory capability and hence increase the likelihood of deterring Soviet use of chemical weapons.



7. Does the UK consider that forward basing in peacetime is necessary for deterrence or do you agree with SACEUR's view that deployment forward in tension or war would suffice? The primary purpose of a NATO CW retaliatory capability is to deter Soviet use of such weapons. It is the possession of such a capability and a demonstrable ability and willingness to use it if necessary which provides the deterrent effect rather than the location of the stockpile. We agree, therefore, with SACEUR that forward basing in peacetime is not essential, although forward basing might provide a more convincing indication of the ability and willingness to use chemical weapons, and we are conscious of the difficult decision which would face Ministers in a crisis should a modernised US capability not be based forward.



8. Is it sufficient for NATO's deterrent strategy simply to have a modernised US capability?

We consider that a modernised US CW stockpile would provide a limited retaliatory capability sufficient to uphold NATO's deterrent strategy.

9. If so, what release procedures would be required?

If use of a US national capability was contemplated in the context of a NATO/WP confrontation, we would expect that, depending on the time and prevailing circumstances, consultation would take place in the DPC on the nature and extent of any such CW use.

If it was decided that declaration of CW stocks to NATO was required, there would then be a need to consider whether more formal consultation procedures were necessary, along the lines of the Athens guidelines on nuclear weapons, and what detailed military arrangements might be required.



Question 10:

If not, how do you assess the chances of the Alliance as a whole accepting a NATO retaliatory CW capability in terms of:

- a. participation in joint decision making and release procedures?
- b. stockpiling in Europe?
- c. provision of delivery systems for US munitions?
- d. financial support?
- e. European ownership and operation?

Question 10: (Answer)

As stated above, we believe a modernised US capability would meet NATO's deterrent needs. However, Allies would clearly wish to consider carefully what formal consultation procedures might be required, especially if US stocks were declared to NATO. It might conceivably be possible to reach Alliance agreement that some of the associated costs (for support facilities) should fall on the NATO common infrastructure budget. We believe, however, that European allies would find it politically very difficult to accept stockpiling in their territories in peacetime, the dedication of European delivery systems for US CW and the associated training requirement (although in the event of war this might well be more acceptable), or to purchase their own CW deterrent from the US.



11. What is the UK national position on these questions and do you have any plans to acquire a UK national CW capability?

As the Prime Minister has said, the UK abandoned its CW capability in the late 1950s. There has been no change in Government policy since then, nor is any change now proposed. Whilst defence policy is kept under review, we remain fully committed to working for a successful arms control solution in Geneva.

Should we not achieve in Geneva the comprehensive, verifiable and world-wide ban that we seek, given the nature of the CW threat, it would be for the alliance to consider what steps might sensibly be taken to uphold NATO's overall strategy of defence through deterrence. It is not sensible to speculate on the precise arrangements that might be made by members of the Alliance.



12. What plans does the UK have to upgrade her defensive CW capabilities? What are your views of the effectiveness of such measures?

- a. Our current CW protective equipment is designed to counter the agents known to be in the Soviet arsenal and to give a high level of protection. We have recently given new impetus to research and development to improve our defences against the current and emerging threat and are cooperating extensively with the USA under the existing Memorandum of Understanding. We are undertaking specific research into the new penetrating agents, and new filters and closed-circuit breathing apparatus for our respirators are 2 items under examination to effect better protection. We are introducing new equipment, such as NAIAD, the nerve agent detector, and CAM, the Chemical Agent Monitor. Awareness of the threat and individual and unit training to counter it receive a high priority; defensive training is practised extensively, for example on last autumn's Exercise LIONHEART in West Germany. However, we do not underestimate the degradation to our effectiveness which accrues from wearing protective equipment.
- b. At the present time there are no arrangements for the protection of the general civilian population against the effects of chemical attack, although the possibility of such attacks being made against military targets in the UK - and the collateral threat to the civilian population - has been publicly acknowledged by the Government. A study is currently being made of what civil defence measures can be taken against chemical attack and what advice should be given to the population on precautions to be taken in the home. At the same time the Government is examining ways of detecting and monitoring the presence of chemical agents and of warning the population who may be in danger in the event of an attack.



13. In the absence of satisfactory arms control solution, how do you then see way ahead?

As we have said, an arms control solution remains our prime objective. Were this search not to succeed, we would naturally need to consider our position carefully in the prevailing circumstances; beyond this, we would not wish to go at this point.



14. Would not a modernised US capability encourage CW proliferation, already a matter of concern to the US Government?

The US would only be modernising an existing capability and carrying out in public a process which the Russians are continuing on a much greater scale in secret. We do not therefore believe that as a result of a US binary programme there should be any greater incentive than exists at present for other states to acquire chemical weapons.

15. Does the UK believe that progress at Geneva is being stalled through the US Administration's continued insistence on its Article X proposal?

The UK, like the rest of our Western partners at Geneva, give public and overall support to the US draft treaty as a valuable basis for negotiation. The US Administration have made clear that all aspects of the treaty are negotiable. This is welcome. As already indicated (para 7 of written statement) it would be essential to be able to demonstrate to Western public opinion that the blame for any breakdown in negotiations and subsequent need to modernise lay at the Soviet door. We remain in close consultations with the US Administration on the details of the Western negotiating hand. Just as important we continue to expect and require a positive and constructive response from the Soviet Union and its Allies.



Subject



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. TS1/85

Dear Ron

I was most grateful for your letter of 10 March, setting out the US negotiating position at the outset of the Geneva talks, and for the timely briefing which Max Kampelman's team gave to the North Atlantic Council on 11 March. It was also very useful to have had the opportunity to compare notes in Moscow with George Bush and George Shultz before I saw Gorbachev.

This process of consultation between us which you have begun is of the greatest value. The position which you outlined in your letter, and which your negotiators have subsequently deployed in Geneva, has our wholehearted support. The goal of radical reductions in offensive nuclear weapons is one we fully share. The leadership and commitment you have already demonstrated to the Allies and to the rest of the World is already a major step towards achieving our common objective.

I had almost an hour with Gorbachev in Moscow. The prospects for the Geneva talks took up most of the time. Gorbachev spoke predictably of his alleged doubts about American intentions, and expressed concern about the possibility of an arms race in space. He was however no less firm in claiming that the Soviet Union wanted to reach agreement on large-scale and mutually acceptable reductions in weapons; he specifically underlined this point.

Je eu

cto

cc Master  
OPS

vk



I spoke on the lines which I had agreed in advance with George Bush. I told Gorbachev that I shared the hope he had expressed, which I know you also share, for a successful outcome in Geneva; and I emphasised to him your own personal determination to achieve reductions in nuclear weapons. I underlined to him the importance of finding the political will for a way through. I recalled to him the Four Points you and I had agreed at Camp David in December, emphasising that the Western aim in the negotiations was to seek balance, not superiority. These remained the basis for the British Government's policy (as I reminded the House of Commons again this week).

I look forward to keeping in the closest touch with you as the talks proceed. I can assure you of our continuing support. Our position has not changed, whatever you may have heard or read.

With warmest best wishes.

Yours ever  
Margaret

---

The President of the United States of America





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 March 1985

*Dear Charles,*

US/Soviet Arms Control Negotiations in Geneva

With your letter of 11 March you enclosed a copy of a message dated 10 March which the Prime Minister had received from President Reagan on the US negotiating position at Geneva. I enclose a draft reply, reflecting our full support for this position.

We have assumed that, in addition to acknowledging the President's message, the Prime Minister will wish to give the President some account of her discussion with Mr Gorbachev in Moscow on 13 March; and to use this opportunity to point out that in discussion of strategic defence systems she had relied upon the Camp David Four Points.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours we,*

*Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

President Reagan

Copies to:

*ELBAFK*

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I was most grateful for your letter of 10 March, setting out the US negotiating position at the outset of the Geneva talks, and for the timely briefing which Max Kampelman's team gave to the North Atlantic Council on 11 March. It was also very useful to have had the opportunity to compare notes in Moscow with George Bush and George Shultz before I saw Gorbachev.

This process of consultation between us which you have <sup>begun</sup> initiated is of the <sup>greatest</sup> utmost value. The position which you outlined in your letter, and which your negotiators have subsequently <sup>deployed</sup> in Geneva, has our wholehearted support. <sup>The</sup> Your goal of radical reductions in offensive nuclear weapons is one we fully share. ~~I am convinced that~~ <sup>It is already a major step towards</sup> The leadership and commitment you have already demonstrated, ~~will be a key~~ <sup>is already a major step towards</sup> factor in achieving our common objective.

Enclosures-flag(s).....

/I



*in Moscow and spoke*

I had almost an hour with Gorbachev. The prospects for the Geneva talks took up most of the time. Gorbachev spoke in predictable terms of his alleged doubts about American intentions, and he asserted concern about the possibility of an arms race in space. He was however *no less firm* equally assertive in claiming that the Soviet Union wanted to reach agreement on large-scale and mutually acceptable *reductions in weapons* measures; he specifically underlined this point.

*in advice with George Bush*

*Gorbachev*  
I told *him* that I shared the hope he had expressed, which I know you *also* share, for a successful outcome in Geneva; and I emphasized to him your own personal determination to achieve reductions in nuclear weapons. I underlined to him the importance of finding the political will for a way through. I recalled to him the Four Points you and I had agreed at Camp David in December, emphasizing that the Western aim in the negotiations was to seek balance, not superiority. *— and these above —* These remained the basis for the British Government's policy (as I reminded the House of Commons again this week).

It is clear that the negotiations will be long and complex. I believe that on the basis of the position you have outlined the Alliance will remain united and vigorous *in pursuit* of our shared objectives. I look forward to keeping in *the closest* touch with you as the talks proceed, and I can assure you of our continuing ~~advice and full support.~~

*CD.*



# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 192330Z MAR 85

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 970 DATED 19 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, MODUK (FOR DUSP AND DACU),  
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW.

ARMS CONTROL: US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. *mt*

## SUMMARY

1. LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION SO FAR. BUT AGREEMENT THAT THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS SHOULD BEGIN MEETING SEPARATELY NEXT WEEK. ALSO AGREEMENT ON DATES FOR THE END OF THIS ROUND (23 APRIL) AND THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT (30 MAY).

## DETAIL

2. THE US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OPENED AS PLANNED IN GENEVA ON 12 MARCH WITH A MEETING BETWEEN HEADS OF DELEGATION. KARPOV REPRESENTED THE RUSSIANS: KAMPELMAN, TOWER AND GLITMAN WERE PRESENT ON THE US SIDE. OUR STATE DEPARTMENT AND ACDA CONTACTS SAY THAT THIS MEETING WAS LARGELY A FORMALITY.

3. THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING WAS HELD ON 14 MARCH. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KARPOV DELIVERED A TOUGH STATEMENT WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING BEEN APPROVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN MOSCOW. ON DEFENCE/SPACE, KARPOV SAID THAT THE QUOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF SDI DEPLOYMENTS UNQUOTE WOULD RENDER THE NEGOTIATIONS USELESS. ON INF, HE SAID THAT THE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF INF IN EUROPE WOULD PLACE GREAT STRAIN ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES AGREED BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GROHYKO ON 7-8 JANUARY. HIS STATEMENT APPARENTLY CONTAINED NOTHING OF INTEREST ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

4. A SECOND PLENARY MEETING WAS HELD IN GENEVA ON 19 MARCH (WE HAVE NO DETAILS YET) AND A THIRD WILL BE HELD ON 21 JANUARY. THERE ARE AT PRESENT NO PLANS FOR FURTHER PLENARY MEETINGS THEREAFTER.

5. IT WAS AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS ON 14 MARCH THAT THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS SHOULD HOLD THEIR FIRST SEPARATE MEETINGS NEXT WEEK. FINAL DETAILS ARE STILL TO BE AGREED BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT EACH GROUP WILL MEET TWICE A WEEK. FINAL DETAILS ARE STILL TO BE AGREED BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT EACH GROUP WILL MEET TWICE A WEEK. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID THAT THE GROUPS SHOULD NOT MEET SIMULTANEOUSLY.

6. OFFICIALS HERE ARE MILDLY ENCOURAGED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA SO FAR AND, IN PARTICULAR, BY THE RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS SHOULD BEGIN TO MEET

CONFIDENTIAL

/ SEPARATELY



# CONFIDENTIAL

SEPARATELY (THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED 6 PRECEDING PLENARY MEETINGS, THE US DELEGATION PROPOSED NONE, AND A COMPROMISE OF 3 WAS REACHED WITHOUT UNDUE DIFFICULTY). THE ONLY DISCORDANT NOTE SO FAR WAS WHEN SHULTZ EXPRESSED CONCERN IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 17 MARCH ABOUT AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY KARPOV TO SOVIET TELEVISION ON 15 MARCH. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED KARPOV'S INTERVIEW DID NOT MEAN THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT RESPECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULES WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HOPED WOULD GUIDE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. SUBSEQUENT TASS COMMENT ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS ALSO BEEN VIEWED WITH SOME DISAPPOINT, BUT NOT MUCH SURPRISE, HERE.

7. THE DELEGATIONS HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT THE FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FINISH ON 23 APRIL AND THE SECOND ROUND BEGIN ON 30 MAY.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

DEFENCE D  
ACDD  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS (2)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

CONFIDENTIAL



CAS 500  
SECRET

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 130128Z MAR 85  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 OF 12 MARCH  
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, MODUK (FOR DUSP AND DACU)

MIPT AND MY TELS NOS 855 AND 856: US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL  
NEGOTIATIONS: US APPROACH

1. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DOCUMENT, ON WHICH MCFARLANE'S COMMENTS WERE BASED, CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

DEFENCE/SPACE

2. MCFARLANE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE DELEGATION'S INSTRUCTIONS ON DEFENCE/SPACE (PARA 4 OF MIPT) APPARENTLY MIRRORS VERY CLOSELY THE CONTENT OF THE DECISION DOCUMENT. IT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW ON THIS ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

START

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENT NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED ANY OF THE SIX SPECIFIC OPTIONS PUT TO HIM: THIS EXPLAINS MCFARLANE'S REFERENCE TO THE FLEXIBILITY AND LATITUDE GIVEN TO THE NEGOTIATING TEAM. THE NSDD DOES APPARENTLY CONTAIN TWO GENERAL DECISIONS:

- (A) THAT AGGREGATION OF ALCMS AND RVS, AND MISSILES AND BOMBERS, WAS ACCEPTABLE AND
- (B) THAT PARALLEL REDUCTIONS IN SNDVS AND WARHEADS (THE "STATE FRAMEWORK" APPROACH) WAS ACCEPTABLE.

HOWEVER, THE DELEGATION IS NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZED AT THIS STAGE TO TABLE SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS, BUT ONLY TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS INVOLVING ONE OR BOTH OF THESE TWO ELEMENTS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET IDEAS.

INF

4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENT REJECTED THE IDEA OF A 50 PER CENT CUT IN SOVIET AND US LAUNCHERS. HIS DECISION APPEARS TO HAVE INVOLVED THE REJECTION OF ALL APPROACHES INVOLVING EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT SOME PERCENTAGE NUMBERS WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT COUNTER-PROPOSE WOULD INVOLVE OUTCOMES UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US AND TO NATO.

THE NSDD INSTEAD INSTRUCTS THE US DELEGATION TO EXPLAIN AND FLESH OUT POSSIBLE WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING THE US AUTUMN 1983 PROPOSALS (BURT MAY HAVE GIVEN MORE DETAILS AT THE SCG ON 11 MARCH.)

SECRET

/COMMENT



SECRET

COMMENT

5. OPINIONS AT WORKING LEVEL WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ARE DIVIDED ABOUT WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS MEAN, PARTICULARLY ON START. IN SPITE OF THE APPARENT FLEXIBILITY GIVEN TO THE NEGOTIATORS, SOME OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE NEEDED BEFORE SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS CAN BE TABLED IN EITHER START OR INF, AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WILL MERELY STIMULATE ANOTHER ROUND OF INTER-AGENCY INFIGHTING HERE. THOSE WHO INTERPRET THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS IN THIS WAY SEE THEM AS THE UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISE POSITIONS WHICH THEY HAD FEARED (PARA 5 OF MY TEL NO 854). OTHERS TAKE A MORE OPTIMISTIC VIEW, BELIEVING THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO DECIDE BETWEEN SPECIFIC OPTIONS (EXCEPT ON INF) REPRESENTS A REAL DESIRE ON HIS PART TO GIVE HIS NEGOTIATORS MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE, AND THAT THE SENIORITY OF THE NEGOTIATORS WILL ENABLE EFFECTIVE USE TO BE MADE OF THIS FREEDOM. THEY ALSO POINT TO THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON AGGREGATION AND PARALLEL SNDV AND WARHEAD REDUCTIONS IN START.

6. IT IS TOO EARLY TO FORM A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S PREFERENCE ON OVERALL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR MAKING EARLY US MOVES IN ONE OR BOTH OF THE OFFENSIVE NEGOTIATING GROUPS, TO OFFSET THE US POSITION IN THE DEFENCE/SPACE GROUP HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED AT THIS STAGE. STATE MAY HAVE BEEN OVER-AMBITIOUS: AND THE PRESIDENT'S AUTUMN RELUCTANCE TO OFFER THE RUSSIANS ANYTHING TO BRING THEM BACK TO THE TABLE MAY NOW BE MATCHED BY A RELUCTANCE TO "REWARD" THEM AT ONCE FOR RETURNING. UNLESS THE RUSSIANS SPRING A SURPRISE, IT LOOKS LIKE HARD SLOGGING FROM THE START.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

DEFENCE D  
ACDD  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR WESTON  
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

2

SECRET



RESTRICTED



hite  
JH  
(13) bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 March 1985

PROPOSED VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM  
OF MR PAUL NITZE

Thank you for your letter of 11 March about Mr Nitze's visit to the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister could see Mr Nitze at 1730 on 28 March.

C D POWELL

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

h



*SALT FILE*

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR LUCE  
 PS/PUS  
 MR DEREK THOMAS  
 MR GOODALL  
 MR JENKINS  
 MR WESTON  
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
~~MR~~ NPS }  
 DACU }

HD/DEFENCE D  
 HD/ACDD  
 HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

RR REYKJAVIK

**ADVANCE COPY**

RR UKDEL VIENNA

**IMMEDIATE**

RR UKDEL STOCKHOLM

GRS1300

*mb*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKDEL NATO 111349Z MAR 85  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 11 MARCH  
 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DACU) WASHINGTON BONN PARIS MOSCOW  
 INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS UKDIS GENEVA UKDEL STOCKHOLM  
 EAST EUROPEAN POSTS AND TOKYO

**UK/SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS : BRIEFING AT N A COUNCIL  
 BY U S TEAM 11 MARCH**

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, TOWER AND GLITMAN TODAY BRIEFED THE N A C ON THE U S OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH TO THE RENEWED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH START TOMORROW. THE BRIEFING WAS IN GENERAL TERMS. IT INDICATED A TOUGH APPROACH TO SPACE AND DEFENCE WEAPONS AND CONTINUITY, WITH FLEXIBILITY, FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS. EMPHASIS IN DISCUSSION ON SOLIDARITY BUT CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE. NO DELAY EXPECTED BY U S TEAM BECAUSE OF CHERNENKO'S DEATH BUT THEY WOULD ACCOMMODATE THE RUSSIANS IF REQUESTED.

DETAIL

2. INTRODUCING THE OVERALL U S OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD SEEK AN OUTCOME PROVIDING FOR INCREASED STABILITY AND DETERRENCE. THE TEAM HAD BEEN GIVEN FLEXIBILITY TO ACHIEVE THIS AND THE LEADER OF EACH U S GROUP WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.



3. THE U S WAS PREPARED FOR SERIOUS GIVE AND TAKE. IN THE FIRST ROUND THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ULTIMATE AIM WAS THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO SEEK NOW EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS. THE US WOULD MAKE CLEAR ITS CONCERN AT THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY AND SET OUT U S VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR A FUTURE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. THE 3 NEGOTIATING AREAS WERE NATURALLY RELATED BUT THE U S WOULD RESIST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH LINKAGES WHICH COULD BLOCK PROGRESS. SOVIET PROPAGANDA INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT THIS BUT THE U S HOPED TO CONVINCe THEM THAT REDUCTIONS COULD BE MADE WHICH WERE VALID IN THEIR OWN RIGHT.

4. THE U S TEAM WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE IN ORDER TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND OF THE OBSERVATION OF AGREEMENTS.

5. ON SPACE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THE U S WOULD REBUT SOVIET VIEWS OF THE SDI AND ANY ATTEMPT TO CONSTRAIN RESEARCH. IT WAS A MIS-PERCEPTION THAT ONLY THE U S WAS UNDERTAKING RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD: ACTIVE SOVIET INTEREST WAS OF LONGSTANDING, INCLUDING ONE CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY (THE ABALAKOVO RADAR) AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES. THESE WOULD BE RAISED TO POINT OUT THE INACCURACY OF SOVIET CLAIMS ABOUT U S ACTIVITIES. THE U S TEAM WOULD REJECT SOVIET CHARGES THAT THE U S WAS TRYING TO BUILD A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY AND WOULD STRESS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TO DEFENCE COULD NOT BE IGNORED AND THAT IT WAS THE GROWTH AND PROLIFERATION IN LARGE SOVIET MIRVED ICBMS THAT UNDERMINED STRATEGIC STABILITY. SDI RESEARCH WAS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND NEW TECHNOLOGY MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER DETERRENCE AND STABILITY.

6. IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME NOT LEAST FROM GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS IN GENEVA THAT THE PRIMARY SOVIET OBJECTIVE WOULD BE A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS AND THAT THEY WOULD SEEK TO LINK THIS WITH PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS. THE U S SIDE WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PURSUED STRATEGIC DEFENCE FOR DECADES AND THAT THE U S HAD NONETHELESS CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE U S WOULD ALSO POINT TO THE EXISTING BODY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON WEAPONS IN SPACE (LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, OUTER SPACE TREATY, ABM TREATY) ARGUABLY A MORE RESTRICTIVE REGIME THAN EXISTED ON EARTH.

7. SHOULD THE SOVIET PROPOSE A BAN THE U S WOULD PRESS THEM ON POINTS DEALING WITH DEFINITIONS AND VERIFICATION (E.G. HOW TO ELIMINATE THE ASAT CAPABILITY INHERENT IN OTHER SYSTEMS OR TO VERIFY THE ELIMINATION OF THE CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEMS. THE U S EXPECTED THAT A MORATORIUM ON ASAT'S WOULD BE PROPOSED; THEY WOULD REJECT THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT GIVEN THE EXISTING SOVIET SYSTEM, A MORATORIUM WOULD PERPETUATE AN ASYMETRY. OTHER MEASURES OF INTERIM CONSTRAINT WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR MERITS.

8. REFERRING TO NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE SYSTEMS GLITMAN RECALLED THE POSITION REACHED IN NOVEMBER 1983. THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONVERGENCE ON GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND AIRCRAFT BUT NONE ON MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON ICBM SYSTEMS OR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.



SOME CONVERGENCE ON GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND AIRCRAFT BUT NONE ON MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON LRINF SYSTEMS OR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. HOWEVER IN JANUARY 1985 GROMYKO HAD NOT DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF U S LRINF AS A PRECONDITION, BUT HAD CALLED FOR A MORATORIUM TO BE FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREED LIMIT. HE HAD NOT RULED OUT THE SANCTIONING OF SOME U S DEPLOYMENT WHICH SUGGESTED A CHANGE OF HEART. THE U S WOULD EXPLORE THIS. THE SOVIET SIDE WERE LIKELY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AND THE U S WOULD MAINTAIN ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO THEIR INCLUSION.

9. THE U S WOULD AIM TO MOVE INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY WOULD CONFIRM THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION, BUT WOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO BUILD UPON THE AUTUMN 1983 POSITION.

10. THE SOVIETS MIGHT HOWEVER DIG IN AND LAUNCH A NEW PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO DRIVE WEDGES, POSSIBLY BASED UPON THEIR SO-CALLED COUNTER MEASURES. CONTINUING STEADFASTLY IN IMPLEMENTING BOTH PARTS OF THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION WOULD BE THE ALLIANCE'S BEST ASSET.

11. TOWER REVIEWED THE RESPECTIVE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS AS THEY WERE IN 1983. THE U S POSITION WOULD BE BASED ON CONTINUITY IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE AIMS, THE PRIMARY PURPOSE BEING BIG REDUCTIONS IN DESTABILISING WEAPONS. THEY WOULD PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE REDUCTION OF WARHEADS (INITIALLY TO 5,000 WARHEADS ON MISSILES) AND THE LEVEL OF DESTRUCTIVE POWER. THEY WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THE PACE AND MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS PROVIDED THAT STRATEGIC STABILITY WAS NOT UNDERMINED. THEY WOULD BE READY TO EXPLORE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN AREAS OF RELATIVE ADVANTAGE FOR EXAMPLE, HEAVY MISSILES AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS. THEY WOULD SEEK TO RE-ESTABLISH THE WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

12. IN THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED ALL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE U S NEGOTIATING TEAM, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF CONSULTATIONS IN ACHIEVING THIS. WIECK (FRG) ASKED WHETHER THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE WITH SALT III WOULD BE RAISED AND WHETHER THE DEATH OF CHERNENKO WOULD CASE A DELAY IN THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE U S TEAM REPLIED THAT SALT COMPLIANCE ISSUES WOULD BE RAISED SINCE THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD SEEK A DELAY BUT THE U S WOULD ACCOMMODATE THEM IF THIS AROSE.

13. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS) POINTED TO THE IMPORTANCE TO HIS COUNTRY OF INF RECEIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION AND REFERRED TO THE ISSUE OF SLCMS. HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OBSERVANCE OF THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE ABM TREATY.

14. I ASKED WHETHER A NEW CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS ENVISAGED AND HOPED THAT THE U S WOULD TAKE US INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE. I REITERATED OUR SUPPORT FOR SDI RESEARCH AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PRESENT DETERRENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THEM. I ASKED WHETHER MORE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES COULD BE



SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR USE IN PUBLIC.

15. BERG (NORWAY) SAID THAT RESEARCH INTO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT AIM AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, ADVERSELY EFFECT THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT OR UNDERMINE DETERRENCE. AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE SHOULD BE AVOIDED, THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REVERSED. CURIEN (FRANCE) STRESSED THAT THE U S TEAM SHOULD REMEMBER THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WHICH WOULD REMAIN INDISPENSIBLE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS WAS IMPORTANT ALSO FOR GENERAL POLITICAL REASONS GIVEN THE SOVIET TENDENCY TO MARGINALISE EUROPE IN SUPER POWER RELATIONS. WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE DID NOT CROSS THE IRON CURTAIN. FRANCE ATTACHED THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE ABM TREATY. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) REFERRED TO THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT BE CAUSED FOR DEPLOYING COUNTRIES BY THE REFERENCES TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND STRESSED THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SDI FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRESENT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

16. TAYLOR (CANADA) ASKED FOR THE U S ASSESSMENT OF WHY THE SOVIETS RETURNED TO NEGOTIATIONS SEMICLN WHETHER THERE WAS ANY EVIDENCE THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT TRANSITION TO A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND HOW ONE WOULD JUDGE AT WHAT POINT THE RESULTS OF RESEARCH MIGHT BE EXCHANGED. ROMANO (ITALY) TOOK UP THIS QUESTION AND STRESSED THAT THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABM TREATY SHOULD BE PRESERVED.

17. IN REPLY KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME LACK OF CERTAINTY AS TO WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE OTHER SIDE. THE U S TEAM WOULD ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS ASSUMING GOOD FAITH ON THE SOVIET PART, BUT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO BE CONVINCED OF THIS AT THIS STAGE. THEY WOULD PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE SOVIET REACTION TO THIS WOULD GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THEIR INTENTION.

18. THE U S HOPED TO SOLVE PROCEDURAL ISSUES QUICKLY. THE U S WOULD THEN PROPOSE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BREAK INTO THE 3 GROUPS COVERING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN SUMMARY FASHION. THEY WOULD THEN HOPE TO RETURN TO CAPITALS TO EVALUATE ANY QUOTE SIGNALS UNQUOTE WHICH HAD EMERGED. THEY WOULD CONVEY A TONE OF SERIOUSNESS AND A DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE.

19. KAMPELMAN TOOK SERIOUS NOTE OF THE REQUEST FOR MORE PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET BREAKOUT FROM TNE ABM TREATY. HE WOULD REFER THIS TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES.

20. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE EXTENT OF CONCERN ABOUT ISSUES FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PROBABLY EXCEEDED THE POLITENESS OF OBSERVATIONS MADE. HE UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED THIS CONCERN WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. SOONER OR LATER THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE ISSUE DIRECTLY.

21. IN HIS VIEW THE REASON FOR THE SOVIET RETURN WAS A COMBINATION OF THE REALISATION THAT THEIR WALKOUT HAD DAMAGED THEM AND FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OF U S EMPHASIS ON SDI.



FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OF U S EMPHASIS ON SDI.  
HE RECOGNISED THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET PUBLIC POSITION ON  
SPACE WEAPONS, BUT IN HIS EXPERIENCE IT WOULD BE WISE NOT <sup>TO</sup> BE  
BE OVER-INFLUENCED BY IT. CO-OPERATION IN RESEARCH WOULD HAVE  
TO ARISE OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

22. IN A SURPRISING FINAL STATEMENT TOWER SAID THAT THE CURRENT  
U S INTENTION WAS TO ADHERE TO SALT III CONSTRAINTS BUT TO KEEP  
OPTIONS OPEN. THE U S STRATEGIC INTEREST LAY FIRMLY IN PRESERVING  
OVERALL WESTERN SECURITY AND KEEPING A PRESENCE IN EUROPE.  
THE DEFENCE OF THE U S BEGAN IN EUROPE. THERE SHOULD BE NO FEAR  
OF DECOUPLING. IF THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ACHIEVED THIS WOULD FREE RESOURCES FOR  
INTRODUCING IMPROVED HIGH TECHNOLOGY CONVENTIONAL FORCES.  
IT WAS NATO'S TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD WHICH HAD PRESERVED  
DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. THERE WERE NO COMMENTS BUT KAMPELMAN  
APPEARED DISTINCTLY UNCOMFORTABLE.

23. FULL TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

GRAHAM

CCN PARA 21 LINE FIVE IT WOULD BE WISE NOT TO BE OVER-  
ETC  
BT

NNNN

SENT AT 111725Z ET



ow

17.30 on 28 March

RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~  
①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 March 1985

Prime Minister  
Agree to  
see him?  
CDP 11/3

Yes Mr

Dear Charles,

Proposed Visit to the UK of Mr Paul Nitze

Mr Nitze, Mr Shultz's special adviser on disarmament, will be in London on 28 March to deliver a lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. On his behalf, the American Embassy have requested calls on the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries that day. In putting forward this request, the Embassy noted that during her recent visit to Washington the Prime Minister told Mr Nitze that she hoped he would see her the next time he was passing through London. Unfortunately, the Foreign Secretary will be abroad that week, but I hope that it may be possible to arrange calls on Mr Heseltine and Mr Luce. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that if the Prime Minister can agree to see Mr Nitze, it would be a useful opportunity for her both to keep in touch with US thinking on the Geneva talks and to re-emphasise our own views on the SDI and related matters.

✓

I gather that Mr Nitze might be free on the evening of 27 March if 28 March is not convenient. I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram.

Yours ever,  
*L V Appleyard*  
(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED





MJ2AEK

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 March 1985

US/Soviet Arms Control Negotiations in Geneva

BF // I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has this morning received from President Reagan on the US negotiating position at Geneva. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). It should be given a very restricted distribution.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

mg



COJ



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

March 11, 1985

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you the enclosed letter from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to read "C. Price", is written over the word "Sincerely,".

Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Attachment:  
SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W. 1.



SUBJECT

cc OPS  
MASTER

Prime Minister (2)  
C.D.P.  
11/3

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

March 10, 1985

SERIAL No. T 44185

US DECLASSIFIED

Dear Margaret:

Over the past weeks since our agreement with the Soviet Union to begin new negotiations on nuclear and space arms, we have been actively preparing for the opening round of these talks this March 12th. In this regard, I found our discussions during your most recent visit very useful and timely.

As a basic part of our preparations for Geneva, we have sought to maintain a close dialogue with our Allies. This will continue to be a central element of our overall arms control efforts. I have asked that the senior US negotiators -- Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman -- meet with your representatives at the North Atlantic Council this March 11th to discuss the approaches they will be taking into the negotiations that begin the following day. Their presentation will be immediately followed by a session of the special consultative group to further consider INF questions. As the new Geneva talks unfold, we will, of course, continue to keep you fully informed and look to you for ideas, counsel and support.

As I set out in my letter to you of January 5th and as we have since reaffirmed in both our private and public statements, our immediate objective in these negotiations will be to achieve a radical reduction in the levels of existing and planned offensive nuclear arsenals, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. Though effective nuclear deterrent forces will inevitably remain critically important to the security of the West well into the future, we should nonetheless set as an immediate goal significant and verifiable reductions in US and Soviet offensive nuclear forces, carried out in a manner which also enhances strategic stability.

With the beginning of these new talks, there are, of course, significant differences between our approach to these problems and that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets will be faced with a basic choice at Geneva -- that

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

between serious bargaining at the negotiating table or further political posturing. Although they have spoken much of their readiness to pursue "radical reductions" in offensive nuclear arms, it remains unclear whether the Soviets are prepared to put aside efforts at legitimizing various unilateral advantages, to engage in serious negotiating, and in doing so, to begin to address fundamental Western concerns. They will, moreover, probably continue attempts to establish an artificial procedural linkage between negotiating progress within the three separate areas of the negotiations, threatening overall stalemate in order to extract unilateral restrictions on research into strategic defense on the part of the US. In this regard, the Soviets will try to use the talks to delay or undercut our strategic defense research, thereby maintaining their own advantages in both offense and defense.

For our part, we will be realistic, determined and patient, ready to deal with either course the Soviets choose. I have instructed our negotiators both to offer constructive ideas of our own and to respond to any serious proposals from the Soviet side.

In the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces, our primary objective is to press for early progress consistent with the criteria which we have long enunciated. Our negotiators will build upon the flexibility inherent in the initiatives that the US, based on Alliance consultations, tabled in September 1983. We will be willing to explore a variety of ways to reach the goal of equal global limits on LRINF. Our negotiators will be authorized to probe Soviet interest in equal global entitlements at levels other than those previously proposed. Within such an equal global limit, the US would consider not deploying its full global allotment in Europe. We would further be ready to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union.

As I have indicated to you before, however, we continue to oppose any moratorium or pause in deployments, to reject the inclusion of any third-country systems in these US-Soviet negotiations, and to reaffirm that the Alliance's deployment program decided upon in 1979 can be

SECRET



# SECRET

-3-

altered only as a result of a concrete arms control agreement. Within our basic principles, the US remains prepared to show significant flexibility.

On the question of strategic arms, our primary focus must remain the achievement of significant reductions in the most destabilizing forces, ballistic missiles, and especially MIRVed, land-based ICBMS. Moving away from high concentrations of such destabilizing weapons will be in everyone's interest. To do so, we will continue to place our emphasis on the reduction of warheads and the level of destructive capacity and potential associated with these systems. We will seek an outcome that results in reductions to an equal limit of 5000 ballistic missile warheads on both sides. There can be a number of ways by which such reductions might be accomplished. Some could involve relatively fast reductions. Others could move more slowly to accommodate normal force planning and an improved confidence in the reduction activity over time. Provided that their method of operation ensures enhanced strategic stability and protects the national security of the US and our Allies, we will be flexible. It is the outcome that is of primary importance.

With respect to ballistic missile destructive capability, the US is prepared to consider different ways by which reductions in this area can be achieved. We can agree to either direct or indirect limits in this area, as long as an appropriate outcome results. However, of equal importance to reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and their associated destructive potential is the quality of the stability that results from the specific reductions.

The US recognizes the Soviet interest in dealing with the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, ballistic missiles and bombers. The US delegation will be ready to listen to Soviet ideas in this area. We are prepared to explore trade-offs between areas of relative US advantage and areas of relative Soviet advantage. The US feels that the relative US advantage in bomber forces and the relative Soviet advantage in land-based ballistic missile forces offers the promise for such a potential trade-off.

# SECRET



SECRET

-4-

In short, our negotiators in Geneva will be prepared to be flexible by building upon US proposals previously put forward and to make progress towards an equitable and verifiable agreement if the Soviets are equally prepared to join us in this effort.

In the defense and space forum, we wish to engage the Soviets in a serious and comprehensive discussion of the offense-defense relationship. our specific near term objective is to reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty regime. Our SDI research program is fully consistent with that agreement. We will raise our concerns over Soviet actions -- such as their construction of a large phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk -- which violate the ABM treaty.

But while we will focus for the present on reversing the erosion of the ABM treaty regime, and while we do not believe it appropriate to begin discussing amendments to that agreement, we are prepared to begin discussing with the Soviet Union the implications which emerging defensive technologies may have for strategic stability and arms control over the longer term. In these discussions we will review the contributions which defensive systems can make to mutual security. We will also stress our belief that -- should new defensive technologies prove feasible -- any transition to a more defense-reliant balance should be a cooperative endeavor. We will, of course, also be prepared to hear out Soviet concerns.

In my earlier correspondence with you, I pledged my own efforts to achieve meaningful and equitable agreements that might reduce the threat of nuclear war and in doing so, help to strengthen the security of all nations, both East and West. In the preparations for the new Geneva talks, my decisions have been guided by this personal commitment. I look forward to your continuing advice and support in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

SECRET



**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 090400Z MAR 85

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 854 OF 8 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,  
 INFO ROUTINE ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA,  
 UKMIS NEW YORK, TOKYO, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BELGRADE, WARSAW,  
 PRAGUE, SOFIA.

**U S/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: U S APPROACH****SUMMARY**

1. THE GENEVA TALKS STARTING ON 12 MARCH ARE SEEN AS THE FIRST ROUND (PERHAPS 4 TO 8 WEEKS LONG) IN A LONG PROCESS. BUT THE MOOD HERE IS BUOYANT. U S NEGOTIATING POSITION ON DEFENCE/SPACE SETTLED, BUT PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS AWAITED ON START AND INF POSITIONS.

**DETAIL**

2. THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE U S NEGOTIATING TEAM A WHITE HOUSE SEND-OFF ON 8 MARCH, AND THE TEAM LEAVES FOR GENEVA TONIGHT ON FOUR AIRCRAFT, TWO CARRYING THE OFFICIAL DELEGATION AND TWO CARRYING CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVERS. THE FLAMBOYANCE REFLECTS THE SELF-CONFIDENCE WITH WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION APPROACH THE RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR BELIEF IS THAT, WITH THE ALLIANCE STEADY ON INF, THE SDI WELL LAUNCHED, THE RUSSIANS FORCED BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR MX ON THE HILL FAR BETTER (THANKS TO THE GENEVA PROCESS) THAN SEEMED LIKELY, THE U S HOLDS MANY OF THE NEGOTIATING CARDS, AND THE RUSSIANS ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE.

3. THE GENERAL EUPHORIA IS ACCOMPANIED BY MUCH UNCERTAINTY ABOUT IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS. THE DELEGATION HAS BEEN DESPACHED WITHOUT THE EXPECTED FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT. AND THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON HOW THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY TO PLAY THEIR HAND.

4. THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING ARE UNCLEAR. BUT THE BASIC DECISION HE HAS YET TO TAKE IS WHETHER THE U S SHOULD TABLE AN EARLY NEW PROPOSAL (SPECIFIC IDEAS ARE ON HIS DESK) IN EITHER OR BOTH OF THE STRATEGIC AND INF NEGOTIATING GROUPS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ARGUED THAT THE OVERALL U S STRATEGY SHOULD BE TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN BOTH NEGOTIATING GROUPS IN ORDER BETTER TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER SOVIET PRESSURE ABOUT SDI IN THE THIRD GROUP, AND SOVIET PROPOGANDA ABOUT LINKAGE U S INTRANSIGENCE ON SDI, AND CONTRASTING SOVIET REASONABLENESS. AGAINST

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/THIS,



THIS, THE PENTAGON HAVE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO RUSH INTO TABLING NEW PROPOSALS BEFORE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN TESTED: THAT TO DO SO WOULD AMOUNT TO REWARDING THE RUSSIANS FOR WALKING OUT OF EARLIER START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE FIRST ROUND SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND AIMS.

5. MOST OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE UP HIS MIND OVER THE WEEKEND: SOME FEAR THAT UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISE POSITIONS MAY EMERGE FROM THE RICH MENU OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS BEFORE HIM (SEE MY TWO HFTS, NOT TO ALL).

6. WHILE PRESS ATTENTION HAS FOCUSED ON SDI DEBATES, AGREEMENT ON THE U S POSITION IN THE DEFENCE/SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP HAS IN FACT PROVED EASY AND UN-CONTENTIOUS: NO FURTHER PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS IN THIS AREA ARE REQUIRED. THE PRIMARY U S OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO EXPLAIN THE SDI AND ADMINISTRATION THINKING ON THEIR "STRATEGIC CONCEPT" AND ON THE ROLE OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. A FURTHER U S OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO QUOTE REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY UNQUOTE, WHICH MEANS EXPLORING WITH THE RUSSIANS THE U S COMPLIANCE CONCERNS, AND SEEKING SATISFACTORY EXPLANATIONS. THERE WILL BE NO SPECIFIC NEW U S PROPOSALS (INCLUDING ON ASATS) IN THIS GROUP.

7. AS FOR THE RUSSIANS, SOME OFFICIALS BELIEVE THEY WILL MAKE NO SERIOUS PROPOSALS IN ANY OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS, EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR TABLING A TREATY ON THE QUOTE DEMILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE UNQUOTE, BUILDING ON THEIR 1983 INITIATIVE, AND WILL BE CONTENT TO HUNKER DOWN IN GENEVA WHILE ARGUING IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE THAT NO PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE IN EITHER OF THE OTHER GROUPS UNTIL THE U S SHOWS A SERIOUS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IN THE DEFENCE/SPACE GROUP. OTHERS EXPECT EYE-CATCHING SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE OTHER GROUPS, AND SUGGESTIONS, IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE, THAT AGREEMENTS IN THESE TWO AREAS WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO REACH IF THE BASE-LINE COULD BE ESTABLISHED, THROUGH THE U S ADOPTING A SERIOUS NEGOTIATING POSTURE ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE ALSO PUZZLED BY THE RECENT ABSENCE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA ABOUT ASATS. AND THERE IS WIDESPREAD SCEPTICISM ABOUT SOVIET NEGOTIATORS' ABILITY TO OBTAIN FROM CHERNENKO'S KREMLIN CLEARANCE TO CUT DEALS.

8. THE ADMINISTRATION EXPECT THE FIRST ROUND IN GENEVA TO LAST 4 TO 8 WEEKS, PERHAPS WITH A BREAK IN THE MIDDLE. ON PROCEDURE, THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO MOVE QUICKLY FROM FULL DELEGATION PLENARY MEETINGS TO SEPARATE MEETINGS OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS. BUT SOVIET RESISTANCE, ON LINKAGE GROUNDS, IS EXPECTED.

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

/9. IT IS



## CONFIDENTIAL

9. IT IS UNIVERSALLY AGREED HERE THAT THIS FIRST ROUND IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF A LONG HAUL. THE POLITICAL AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS ARE WELL RECOGNISED.

10. THE PRESIDENT UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS AN AGREEMENT: AND, WITH SHULTZ AND NITZE IN THE ASCENDANT, THOSE WHO DON'T, OR RATHER WANT ONLY ONE SO TOUGH AS TO BE UNNEGOTIABLE, ARE LYING FAIRLY LOW. THE CRUNCH MAY COME IF EVENTS AT GENEVA ERODE THE BELIEF THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE READY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS, DESPITE THEIR CONCERN ABOUT SDI. BUT THERE IS NO TALK YET OF A POSSIBLE CHOICE BETWEEN AN AGREEMENT AND UNCONSTRAINED SDI: THE SHOW HITS THE ROAD IN THE APPARENTLY CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT THE U S SHOULD HAVE, AND CAN HAVE, BOTH.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

DEFENCE D

ACDD

SOVIET D

NEWS D

NAD

EED

WED

PLANNING STAFF

RESEARCH D

INFO D

PUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

MR WESTON

MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

CONFIDENTIAL



SPEAKING NOTES

- A. The Approach to Renewed United States/Soviet  
Arms Control Negotiations
  
  - B. Chemical Weapons
  
  - C. Elements for Public Statement by the  
Prime Minister following White House Meeting,  
20 February 1985
-



A

SECRET

SPEAKING NOTE

THE APPROACH TO RENEWED UNITED STATES/SOVIET  
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

1. Much appreciated McFarlane/Abrahamson briefing in London. Noted your encouragement for United Kingdom ideas on possible United States negotiating positions. Do not wish to re-open Camp David discussions on SDI last December. Re-affirm value and importance of Camp David Four Points, which have now increasingly become basis for wider Alliance stance.
2. As resumption of US/Soviet negotiations at Geneva approaches, we particularly value this opportunity to hear more about your expectations and intentions. You will already be giving consideration to a long-term strategy for the negotiations: expect you share our view that this should
  - serve Western interests;
  - unite the Alliance; and
  - deny Russians the potential for wedge-driving or gaining advantage in negotiations.

Against background of these broad objectives, there are a number of more specific questions which we would like to explore with you. Realise time does not permit in-depth discussion now, but they could serve as reference points for continuing exchanges between us at all levels in coming months.

Negotiating Strategy and Linkage

3. Are we right in assuming that your broad objective will be to achieve during your second term at least the outline of an agreement limiting and reducing offensive nuclear arms?



SECRET

If so, might be useful to try to identify the key elements necessary for the West in any such agreement.

4. Would you agree that the main challenge will be to avoid being impaled on the hook of likely Soviet insistence that any agreement (and perhaps any real negotiations) on the limitation or reduction of offensive nuclear weapons must depend on some US undertaking to restrict SDI-related activities (particularly field testing and/or deployment)?

5. Seems to us that one way to blunt this hook might be to aim for some formal high level re-affirmation of the commitment by both sides to the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty. Have noted with interest that you told Congress in your message of 1 February "our objectives in new negotiations which begin in March are to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty".

Could this best be done by seeking more precise and specific definitions of the scope for permissible research, together with agreed limits on testing and deployment of SDI-related systems or components, drawing on the provisions and mechanisms of the ABM Treaty (e.g. Article V, Article XIII and Agreed Statement D)?

6. If, as we agreed at Camp David, the principal objective of the negotiations is to secure reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides, would there not in any event need to be some kind of joint political understanding that for any such reductions agreement on offensive arms to be successfully implemented, both sides would have to be explicitly agreed about what would and what would not be permissible in terms of strategic defence over the period of the agreement?



SECRET

7. Would you agree that probable Soviet linkage tactics could perhaps be turned back on them by arguing that, unless outline agreement can be reached within the lifetime of this Administration on limitations or reductions on offensive nuclear weapons, the United States might find it politically untenable to abide by the existing legal constraints on the developing, testing or deployment of BMD systems?

8. In attempting to explain to the Russians the rationale for your vision, and to dispel mutual misconceptions about the current level and status of each side's BMD-related research, would it be worth trying to register formal agreement with the Russians now that both sides should review the overall position with respect to offensive and defensive strategic forces at the date on which an offensive force reductions agreement would be due to expire (say 1995) to see whether any major new departures might by then be indicated to maintain or enhance strategic stability?

START

9. Can you give us any idea of what you think a framework START agreement might look like?

Do you envisage an approach combining aggregates of launchers and warheads?

Comparing existing US and Soviet negotiating positions, it seems to us that it should be feasible to construct a package comprising acceptable overall launcher aggregates (ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), matched with overall warhead aggregates, with a sub-limit on ballistic missile warheads [see Background Note].



SECRET

Would this not represent significant reductions by comparison with existing force levels, as well as some reduction in the disparity between ballistic missile throw-weight?

We assume that sea-launched Cruise missiles as well as air-launched Cruise missiles would be covered in such START negotiations. Ground-launched Cruise missiles, of course, would be dealt with in INF.

INF

10. The INF negotiating context seems likely to be particularly tricky. No question of British (or French) systems being included. But Russians seem likely to argue that Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles can only be bargained against Soviet counter deployments, whereas the price for reductions in SS20s is to accept their equivalence with British and French forces.

To spike Russian arguments, do you agree that NATO should continue to work along lines reached when negotiating broke off? [See Background Note.] In particular, do you see scope for US not matching in Europe Soviet global deployments?

ASATS [See also Background Note]

11. Should not a time-limited ban on further testing and deployment of ASATs which respects the principle of balance also be one of our negotiating objectives?

Given Soviet deployments and work in this field, recognise US need to re-establish balance. But West is more dependent and potentially more vulnerable in respect of existing and projected communications, surveillance and navigating satellites in high geo-stationary orbit. Highly destabilising if vulnerable to small scale, high-confidence



SECRET

ASAT attack. SDI space-based assets might themselves then be vulnerable to Soviet ASAT attack.

12. Recognise problems of verification. But on basis of technical exchanges with US, these do not seem to us insuperable, at least in respect of testing of future systems.

Would you, like us, see some advantage in the following possibilities:

- (a) mutual restrictions to one low altitude ASAT system on each side;
- (b) a ban on the development and testing of new ASAT systems, including high altitude ASATs; and
- (c) confidence-building measures, designed to increase the two-way flow of information and to prevent accidents affecting satellites?

13. Recognise problem of inter-relationship with BMD development. But note separate timescales. ASATs now in process of deployment or full-scale testing, whereas decisions to move beyond BMD research unlikely in this decade. If in near term ASAT constraints agreed, always possible at later stage in light of BMD requirements to propose appropriate changes, perhaps in parallel to whatever was relevant in the context of the ABM Treaty.

CONCLUSION

14. Would welcome continuing opportunity for our people to keep in close touch with yours, bilaterally, as your thinking on all this develops. Meanwhile, support US



SECRET

research programme taking account of Soviet developments, as stated at Camp David. Hope British scientists and firms may have a part to play. Would welcome your assurance that any such participation will not be inhibited by US restrictions in scientific exchanges and access to research or the US market [see Background Note].



SECRET

SPEAKING NOTE

CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

1. In the light of serious Soviet threat, UK/US agree negotiated and adequately verifiable ban best answer. Threat of US binary production offers important leverage. Despite political sensitivities, recognise case for modernisation in order to improve negotiating hand. But negotiating position must be sound to enable UK and others to express support for politically controversial move.
2. If negotiations failed, strong case for modernisation. But political sensitivity of issue would not disappear. Again, easier to offer public UK support if we can demonstrate that West had been negotiating seriously and constructively, and that blame for failure must be laid at Soviet door.
3. US draft Treaty generally sound. But Article X proposal, while bold and imaginative, also unrealistic; easily exploited by the Russians; and already produced potential division in Alliance. Most important: it does not offer an effective deterrent to Soviet cheating, even if it could be negotiated.
4. UK concept (explained in paper) builds on US approach. Provides better basis for effective deterrence; or if negotiations fail, better ammunition with which to blame Russians. Urge re-evaluation of US position; UK ready to discuss details further.

/PRC ...



SECRET

Presidential Review Commission (PRC)

5. Note PRC's establishment; possibility of approach to Allies soon. CW politically sensitive issue in UK; no wish to interfere in internal conduct of important US policy review. But prepared for UK to state in strict confidence advantage of "twin-track" approach at Geneva, if approached by PRC and if you consider this would be helpful.

SECRET



C

ELEMENTS FOR PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
FOLLOWING WHITE HOUSE MEETING, 20 FEBRUARY 1985

---

I have had a wide-ranging and extremely useful meeting with the President, during which we reviewed the prospects for resumed arms control negotiations in Geneva on 12 March covering nuclear and space weapons. I re-affirmed my satisfaction that, thanks to United States efforts, negotiations have now been resumed; and my firm support for the United States position. There was full agreement between us on the principles which the West should observe during the negotiations; on the need for the West to show patience and perseverance throughout the process, which could well be lengthy; and on our joint determination to work for a successful outcome.

In our review of the prospects we re-affirmed our attachment to the four basic points which we had earlier agreed at Camp David - the maintenance of balance; the need for SDI-related deployments to be a matter for negotiation; the aim of enhancing deterrence; and the achievement of security at reduced levels of offensive forces. The negotiations in Geneva, the purpose of which is to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides, are bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries account for the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear weapons in the world today. I agreed with the President that British nuclear systems, which constitute a minimum national strategic deterrence of last resort, have no place there. On the other hand, I confirmed that if the two super-powers can achieve substantial reductions in their nuclear forces and



there is no significant change in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would be prepared to review the position and to consider how best she might contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

I spoke to the President of the need, taking account of Soviet developments, for SDI research to continue. I noted that British companies are already involved to some extent in the preliminary stages of the programme, and I would like to believe that they would be enabled to make an appropriate contribution to future work. The continued exploitation of new technology is crucial to Western strength and security. A two-way flow of ideas and business in the defence sector is important for both pillars of the Alliance.



BACKGROUND NOTES AND PAPERS

- A    START
- B    INF
- C    ASATS
- D    Alleged Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Agreements
- E    Background to possible UK participation in SDI Research
- F    Chemical Weapons Paper (already handed over to the Americans)
- G    Chemical Weapons: Presidential Review Commission



BACKGROUND NOTESTART

1. When the START negotiations were discontinued by the Russians in Autumn 1983, negotiations had reached the following point.

The Soviet Position

2. A draft Treaty, amounting essentially to an extrapolation of the SALT II Treaty, proposes reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to:-

1800 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers

of which 1200 could be MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with ALCMs

of which 1080 could be MIRVed ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs)

of which 680 could be MIRVed ICBMs.

In the course of negotiations the Russians relaxed their previous position which would have sought to limit Ohio/Typhoo class SSBNs to only four to six submarines on each side. They have therefore acknowledged that the US Trident submarine programme would go ahead, together with deployment of the D5 missile. The Russians also came to relax their position by allowing that there should be some deployments of ALCMs on the US side, though they remain interested in seeking to ban SLCMs of over 600 kilometers range. Although, as is clear from the above, their primary counting unit continues to be launchers, the Russians have also proposed that there should be a single combined aggregate of ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons on the basis of these launcher ceilings. They have not yet provided a specific figure, but claim that it will be less than the current US total of START-accountable US warheads (around 10,000).



The United States Position

3. Originally the Americans were proposing in their draft Treaty that each side should reduce from the present approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads to 5000 warheads on no more than a limited (850) number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, together with strict sub-limits on heavy and medium ICBM launchers. This would if possible be achieved in such a way as to narrow significantly the existing Soviet advantage in aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight (5.6 versus 1.8 million kilograms). In addition the Americans have proposed a separate sub-limit on heavy bombers (including Backfire and FB111) at 400 on each side with a maximum limit of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber. During the course of negotiations it became clear that this US position would have required of the Soviet side a radical re-structuring of their own strategic force posture of a kind thought unlikely to be unattainable. Accordingly the US negotiation position has evolved over time and on resumption (provided that continuing disagreements between the agencies are resolved and, in particular, if the Pentagon is prepared to accept it) is most likely to be in brief:

- (a) a total of 8,000 to 8,500 ballistic missile warheads and heavy bomber weapons
- (b) a sub-limit of around 6,500 ballistic missile warheads
- (c) these warheads to be deployed on no more than about 1,250 launchers, with a sub-limit of 200 to 250 heavy ICBMs
- (d) a ceiling of 400 heavy bombers, including heavy bombers with ALCMs.

In the past the Americans have refused to aggregate ballistic missile Warheads and bomber weapons in a combined total on the ground that a gravity bomb or slow-flying ALCM cannot be compared with a ballistic missile warhead in terms of the threat it poses. More recently however they seem to have relaxed on



the question of combined total, though they may still wish to argue that bomber weapons should not count against ballistic missile warheads on a one for one basis. More generally the Americans have indicated that they might be prepared to consider trade-offs that would take into account Soviet advantages in missiles and US advantages in bombers (including bombers with ALCMs) in ways providing each side maximum flexibility, so long as they would result in a more stable balance of forces. By stating that all strategic systems are in principle on the table, the Americans have also indicated that they do not exclude limitations on strategic nuclear sea-launched Cruise missiles (SLCMs).

#### Prospects

4. Viewed purely in terms of the nuclear accountancy the distance between the US and Soviet positions should theoretically put an agreement in principle within reach, other things being equal. The essential points to be dealt with are:-

- (i) how to match Soviet launcher numbers with US warhead numbers, in such a way as to ensure that when these figures are combined undesirable anomalies in the force structure of either side are avoided;
- (ii) how to strike the balance between limits on the destructive capabilities of Soviet missiles and limits on current US advantages in heavy bombers (including heavy bombers with ALCMs);
- (iii) how to deal with the Soviet Backfire bomber;
- (iv) how to deal with nuclear long-range SLCMs.

The position is set out below in tabular form.



US/SOVIET START  
APPROACHES



Current Force Levels

<u>Sovs:</u>	2700 SNDVs <sup>1</sup> up to 10000 BM warheads <sup>3</sup> and bomber weapons  up to 9000 BM warheads <sup>3</sup>	<u>US:</u>	1980 <sup>2</sup>  10000   7670
--------------	---	------------	--

Negotiating Approaches

Sovs: Launchers and Heavy Bombers

US: Missile Warheads and Bomber Weapons



Footnotes:

Current force level figures are approximate

- <sup>1</sup> includes Soviet Backfires (@ 240 aircraft)
- <sup>2</sup> excludes mothballed US heavy bombers counted in SALT 2
- <sup>2</sup> it is not possible to tell if Soviet systems are MIRVed to their full capability



