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FILE TITLE:

EAST / WEST RELATIONS

SERIES

FOREIGN

POLICY

PART:

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PART BEGINS:

NOVEMBER 1983.

PART ENDS:

JUNE 1985.

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PREM 19/1494

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PART 4 ends:-

Washington Tel 1991 29.6.85

PART 5 begins:-

~~FCS Press Conference 1.8.85~~
CDP to FCO 31/7/85

NATO Document

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Document Date: 11 May 1984

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Signed _____ *J. Gray* _____

Date _____ *6/12/2013* _____

PREM Records Team

Prime Minister

CDP
29/6

FOMIL 011/29

OO UKDEL MILAN

GRS200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 291447Z JUN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1991 OF 29 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MILAN

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, AND ROME

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS AND TOKYO

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. THE WASHINGTON POST OF 29 JUNE REPORTS THAT WESTERN SOURCES IN MOSCOW ARE SAYING THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A US/SOVIET SUMMIT TO BE HELD IN GENEVA IN LATE NOVEMBER.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT (SIMONS) HAVE TOLD US THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED TENTATIVE OR OTHERWISE THOUGH THE TIME AND PLACE ARE INDEED IN LINE WITH WHAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED. THEY ARE MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC LINE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED A SUMMIT WOULD BE USEFUL. THEY REMAIN IN TOUCH BUT TIME AND PLACE HAVE NOT YET BEEN AGREED.

FCO PASS SAVING TO ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OTTAWA OSLO REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE UKDEL VIENNA AND TOKYO

WRIGHT

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 281512Z JUN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 28 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MILAN (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) WASHINGTON BONN PARIS
ROME MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, TOKYO UKMIS NEW YORK

VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH'S ADDRESS TO NAC, 28 JUNE.

SUMMARY

1. VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH TODAY ADDRESSED THE NAC ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL, SDI, CDI AND TERRORISM. ALL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDED, PRIORITY BEING GIVEN TO THOSE NATIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S CURRENT TOUR.

DETAIL

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

2. BUSH SAID THAT THE MEETINGS THAT HE, SHULTZ AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAD HAD WITH GORBACHEV LED THEM TO ANTICIPATE CONTINUITY IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE WEST. THERE HAD BEEN NO DRAMATIC SHIFT AND NO EVIDENCE OF A NEW ERA. PRESIDENT REAGAN GENUINELY WANTED TO GET ON ~~WITH~~ THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RUSSIANS KNEW IT. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT MEETING, THE BALL WAS NOW FIRMLY IN THE SOVIET COURT.

ARMS CONTROL: SDI: CDI.

3. ON ARMS CONTROL, BUSH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED UNITY IN BRINGING THE RUSSIANS BACK TO GENEVA. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT NOW MAKE THE MISTAKE OF BEING TEMPTED BY ATTRACTIVE SOVIET RE-PACKAGING OF PREVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP KNEW THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO ESTABLISH A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. BUT IT WAS NOW FOR THEM TO RESPOND. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS HAD BEEN RIGHT AND COURAGEOUS, BUT CONTINUED RESTRAINT REQUIRED A RESPONSE. THE U S SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO CLOSE ITS EYES TO VIOLATIONS (HE CITED TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION, THE SS-X-25, AND KRASNOYARSK). BUSH WOULD MEET THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA ON 29 JUNE IN ORDER TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE THE U S ATTACHED TO THE PROCESS, NOT TO PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS.

4. ON SDI, BUSH SAID THAT U S FLEXIBILITY WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATED. HE COMMENDED THE CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, HE STRESSED THAT EVALUATION OF RESEARCH WAS STILL SOME YEARS AWAY. SHOULD THIS SUGGEST DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS, THERE WOULD BE FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES BEFORE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT. THE U S REMAINED FLEXIBLE ON ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH AND DID NOT SEE EUREKA AS A CHALLENGE.

5. THE U S WAS PLEASED WITH WORK IN ALLIANCE PARTICULARLY CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IMPROVEMENTS. ARMS CONTROL WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR UPGRADING BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE. BUT THE U S DID NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

TERRORISM

6. BUSH NOTED THAT TERRORISM HAD BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE ALLIANCE AS IT RELATED TO NATO'S OWN SECURITY. THE CURRENT BEIRUT HOSTAGE EPISODE HAD CRYSTALLISED OPINION IN THE U S: WHILE CONTINUING TO TRY TO GAIN THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE THE U S WAS INTENSIFYING ITS ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS DOMESTICALLY AND WANTED TO WORK WITH AS MANY GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE TO COMBAT TERRORISM INTERNATIONALLY. THIS WAS NO EASY TASK AND REQUIRED A LOT OF TIME AND RESOURCES.

7. OLCAY (TURKEY, SPEAKING FIRST AS DEAN) HOPED THAT BUSH WOULD TAKE BACK AN IMPRESSION OF A STRONG ALLIANCE, UNITED IN PURPOSE AND BASIC PRINCIPLES IF OCCASIONALLY DISAGREEING ON METHODS, TIMING OR VOCABULARY. HE EMPHASISED THE TRUST THAT ALL ALLIES PLACED IN THE U S, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. SPEAKING FOR TURKEY, HE REMARKED THAT HE HAD ONCE FELT ALONE IN RAISING TERRORISM AT NATO. BUT IT HAD NOW BECOME A MATTER OF COMMON CONCERN. TURKEY HOPED THAT THE PRESENT WAVE OF TERRORISM WOULD BE SEEN AS A TURNING POINT IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

8. BERG (NORWAY) EMPHASISED NORWAY'S READINESS TO PLAY A FULL PART IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. NORWAY WELCOMED THE GENEVA RESUMPTION QUOTE WITH REALISM UNQUOTE. BUT WE MIGHT HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS NEXT YEAR BEFORE WE SAW ANY REAL PROGRESS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE HAD TO BEWARE OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS AT WEDGE-DRIVING. ON SDI, BERG WAS PLEASED TO HEAR FROM BUSH THAT THE U S RESEARCH, WHICH SHOULD BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY WITHIN EXISTING AGREEMENTS, DID NOT IMPLY A U S DESIRE FOR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. NORWAY SUPPORTED THE SALT II DECISION WHICH SHOWED THE BENEFIT OF THOROUGH CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND STRENGTHENED THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL.

9. BORCH (DENMARK) SAID THE OVERALL POSITION OF THE ALLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE EAST WAS SOUND. THE RHETORIC WAS BEING MODERATED AND THE CSCE PROCESS CONTINUED (THOUGH OTTAWA HAD NOT BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL). ARMS CONTROL WAS THE ISSUE OF MOST IMMEDIATE PUBLIC CONCERN. THE DECISION ON SALT II HAD BEEN A MODEL OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON AN ISSUE WHICH THOUGH BI-LATERAL HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL. DENMARK WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE IMPRESSIVE CONSULTATION BY THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS AND HOPED THE U S WOULD CONTINUE THIS. ON TERRORISM, DENMARK WAS READY TO SUPPORT COOPERATION IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA.

10. WAGNER (LUXEMBOURG) SAID U S RESEARCH ON SDI WAS JUSTIFIED IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET RESEARCH, THOUGH THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT HAD TO BE PRECEDED BY US-SOVIET AND US-ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS. LUXEMBOURG BELIEVED THAT NATO STRATEGY MUST REMAIN SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE.

11. VASSILICOS (GREECE) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FOLLOWED ALL ALLIANCE ISSUES CLOSELY AS THEY HAD A DECISIVE IMPACT ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY. GREECE HAD ALWAYS CONDEMNED TERRORISM AND WOULD CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HER QUOTE BEST EFFORTS UNQUOTE TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

12. VAZ PEREIRA (PORTUGAL) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDED ALLIANCE CONSULTATION AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE AND ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE GENEVA TALKS. SOVIET SIGNALS WERE SO FAR NOT POSITIVE BUT WE SHOULD EXPLORE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS. PORTUGAL WAS READY TO CONSIDER ANY NEW INITIATIVES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM.

13. TAYLOR (CANADA) EMPHASISED ALLIANCE UNITY ON GENEVA, WHICH COULD ONLY BE MAINTAINED BY THOROUGH CONSULTATION. CANADA HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED THERE WAS A POLITICAL DIMENSION TO COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM WHICH COULD BE PURSUED IN NATO. WE HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON CDI AND IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT GOVERNMENTS WERE STILL ABLE TO FIND MONEY TO SPEND ON DEFENCE, DESPITE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS.

14. OJEDA (SPAIN) EMPHASISED THAT SPAIN STOOD FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE WEST WHILE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. ON TERRORISM, SPAIN MAINTAINED THAT INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO LEGAL AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS.

15. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLAND) REFERRED TO THE PROGRESS MADE RECENTLY BY THE IEPG MINISTERS. EUROPEAN EFFORTS SHOULD COMPLEMENT U S INITIATIVES ON USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN ARMAMENTS.

16. CURIEN (FRANCE) SPOKE DELPHICALLY ON THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY (APPARENTLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE NEW COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE ALLIANCE.) THESE COULD LEAD TO CALLS FOR RIGID ORGANISATION AND CONTROL AND POSED A THREAT TO ALLIANCE DIVERSITY.

17. POINTING OUT THAT BUSH WAS GOING TO LONDON I SPOKE BRIEFLY ON TERRORISM DRAWING ON MATERIAL FROM SCD, AND COMMENDING PARTICULARLY THE RECENT US/UK EXTRADITION AGREEMENT.

18. WIECK (GERMANY) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. WE WERE AN ALLIANCE OF EQUALS DEDICATED TO PEACE AND FREEDOM, SOMETHING WHICH COULD NOT BE SECURED BY MONEY ALONE. HE REFERRED TO THE GERMAN DECISION TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF MILITARY SERVICE, AND TO THE SUCCESS OF THE INF DECISION, REPEATED GERMAN SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND FORWARD DEFENCE AND PRAISED THE CDI AND MONTEBELLO DECISIONS. SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE WOULD NOT LAST FOR EVER: THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE HARMEL CONCEPT WERE IMPORTANT TOOLS FOR THE ALLIANCE.

19. TOMASSON (ICELAND), KADIJK (BELGIUM) AND ROMANO (ITALY) FINALLY ROUNDED OFF THE MEETING WITH BRIEF, APPRECIATIVE, COMMENT ON THE CONTINUING CONSULTATION PROCESS WHICH BUSH'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNCIL REPRESENTED.

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FM WASHINGTON 212344Z JUN 85

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1934 OF 21 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN

INFO ROUTINE ROME, TOKYO, UKMIS NEW YORK

MOSCOW TEL NO 846: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. AN EARLY SUMMIT NOW UNLIKELY. BUT THE PICTURE ON BILATERAL ISSUES NOT ALL BAD.

DETAIL

2. AT HIS 18 JUNE PRESS CONFERENCE PRESIDENT REAGAN, ASKED ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN AUTUMN US/SOVIET SUMMIT, SAID QUOTE I HAVE TO BE OPTIMISTIC, AND THINK THERE WILL BE BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS A SUMMIT END SQUARE BRACKETS... I ISSUED THE INVITATION ... AND THERE HAS BEEN EXPRESSIONS THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING, AND DISCUSSIONS ARE GOING ON WITH REGARD TO TIME AND PLACE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMEN, ASKED ON 20 JUNE ABOUT REPORTS THAT DOBRYNIN THIS WEEK TOLD DR ARMAND HAMMER (IN MOSCOW) THAT GORBACHEV WOULD DEFINITELY NOT VISIT THE UNGA THIS AUTUMN, CONFIRMED THAT QUOTE THIS IS WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN TELLING US FOR THE PAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS UNQUOTE. BUT A SUMMIT LATER IN THE AUTUMN WAS NOT TO BE ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS THIS WEEK SAY THAT THEY NOW EXPECT GORBACHEV'S FIRST WESTERN VISIT TO BE TO PARIS, PROBABLY IN OCTOBER, PRESUMABLY TO REWARD AND ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH STANCE ON SDI. STATE ADD THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL RESISTING THE IDEA THAT GORBACHEV'S FIRST MEETING WITH REAGAN SHOULD BE IN WASHINGTON. THEY HOWEVER CONFIRM THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE STILL CONTINUING.

4. STATE'S RATIONALISATION OF THE SITUATION IS THAT, AS HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES AND HIS 11 JUNE SPEECH (MOSCOW TEL NO 824) SHOW, ALL GORBACHEV'S MAIN CURRENT PRIORITIES ARE DOMESTIC, PRINCIPALLY ECONOMIC, BUT ALSO NO DOUBT INCLUDING GETTING HIS OWN PEOPLE IN PLACE BEFORE THE FEBRUARY 1986 PARTY CONGRESS. DURING THIS INITIAL PHASE MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE NOT TO BE EXPECTED. BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, GORBACHEV COULD STILL MAKE POLITICAL MILEAGE OUT OF RELATIVELY SMALL MOVES AND GESTURES, AND SIMPLY BY BEING SEEN TO BE IN CHARGE AND DRIVING HARD. GIVEN THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT HAD COME FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE, THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT REAGAN WOULD PAY A PRICE (PROBABLY ON THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD) FOR A MEETING. HOWEVER THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING IN VIENNA IN MAY, AND PROCEEDINGS IN GENEVA, WOULD HAVE DISABUSED THEM OF THAT IDEA. HENCE THE BACKTRACKING OVER SUMMIT TIMING.

5. STATE SAY THAT THE AGENDA FOR SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN HELSINKI HAS NOT YET BEEN DEFINED. THEY ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE A FURTHER SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING AT THE UN, AND TELL US THAT GROMYKO HAS BEEN INVITED TO COME UP TO WASHINGTON THEREAFTER (AS IN 1984), BUT HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED.

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6. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE EUROPEAN AND POL-MIL BUREAU IN STATE CONFIRM THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE IN GENEVA (UKDEL NATO TELNO 169). NOR HAVE PRIVATE SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE PRESIDENT'S SALT II INTERIM RESTRAINTS DECISION BEEN ANY MORE POSITIVE THAN PRAVDA'S. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIET SCIENTISTS, (DURING MEETINGS IN MOSCOW EARLY THIS MONTH OF THE US AND SOVIET ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE), WHILE FOLLOWING THE PARTY LINE WITH ANTI-SDI TIRADES IN PLENARY SESSIONS, WERE UNPOLEMICAL IN PRIVATE (AND, INDEED, APPARENTLY PREPARED IN SOME CASES TO DISCUSS SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH PROGRAMMES.)
7. IN THE AIR SAFETY TALKS, AGREEMENT HAS APPARENTLY BEEN REACHED ON THE MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED, BUT THERE REMAIN PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES OVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. TALKS ON RENEWAL OF AEROFLOT RIGHTS IN THE US AND FOR PAN AM IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE SAID TO BE MAKING PROGRESS, WITH THE RUSSIANS NOW OFFERING BETTER COMMERCIAL CONDITIONS TO PAN AM. DIFFERENCES OVER CULTURAL EXCHANGES WERE BEING NARROWED DOWN. OUR CONTACTS COULD NOT PREDICT, HOWEVER, WHEN ANY OF THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD COME TO FRUITION.
8. STATE CONFIRM PRESS REPORTS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD (FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER) CALLED OFF THE ANNUAL NAVY-TO-NAVY TALKS UNDER THE 1972 INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT. THIS HAD FOLLOWED PENTAGON INSISTENCE, WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH STATE, THAT, IN THE WAKE OF THE NICHOLSON KILLING, SUCH TALKS THIS YEAR MUST BE STRICTLY BUSINESS-ORIENTED, WITH NO ACCOMPANYING COURTESIES OR SOCIAL PROGRAMME.
9. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION AS YET OF ANY NEW GORBACHEV/REAGAN MESSAGE.

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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MR GOODALL
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FM WASHINGTON 172350Z MAY 85
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1605 OF 17 MAY
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

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VIENNA TELNO 94: SHULTZ' MEETING WITH GROMYKO

1. WE HAVE PICKED UP SOME FURTHER DETAILS OF THE MEETING.
2. AT THE PUS'S MEETING WITH ARMACOST ON 16 MAY, BURT CONFIRMED THAT THE OVERALL US ANALYSIS WAS THAT GROMYKO SEEMED PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE MOVES ON RELATIVELY MINOR ASPECTS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BUT HAD NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL. SHULTZ HAD STRESSED TO GROMYKO THAT THE US WANTED TO SEE PROGRESS IN THE SECOND ROUND STARTING IN GENEVA ON 30 MAY, AND HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD COME FORWARD WITH NEW PROPOSALS. BUT THE US GENEVA NEGOTIATORS IN FACT EXPECTED NOTHING TO HAPPEN THERE BEFORE THE AUTUMN.
3. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, BURT SAID THAT GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST HAD BEEN PRECISELY THE MIXTURE AS BEFORE, WITH MUCH DWELLING ON THE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, NOTHING NEW HAD BEEN SAID, THOUGH EXPERTS WOULD MEET ON 30 MAY IN PARIS. ON AFGHANISTAN, EXPERTS WOULD MEET IN JUNE IN WASHINGTON. (WE UNDERSTAND TALKS ON ASIAN ISSUES ARE A POSSIBILITY LATER IN THE YEAR). WHAT WAS NEW WAS THAT GROMYKO HAD RAISED CENTRAL AMERICA AND HAD TAKEN A TOUGHER LINE THAN IN THE PAST. HE HAD BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE US FOR QUOTE INTERFERENCE UNQUOTE IN NICARAGUA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND HAD CALLED FOR A HANDS OFF POLICY. ARMACOST ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO HAVE TALKS WITH THE US ON CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT THE US WERE REFUSING, BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THE SUBJECT WAS BEST TACKLED AT GROMYKO/SHULTZ LEVEL.
4. ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SUMMIT, WE GATHER FROM THE SOVIET DESK IN STATE THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS HERE HAVE, IN RECENT INFORMAL CONTACTS, BEEN TAKING THE LINE THAT AFANASIEV'S PREDICTION OF A MEETING IN THE MARGINS OF THE UN MEETING IN NEW YORK WAS WRONG, AND HINTING THAT THE TIMING MAY SLIP. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THIS, IF CONFIRMED, IS MORE LIKELY TO BE FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL RATHER THAN FOREIGN POLICY.

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5. ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MFN TREATMENT (PARA 11 OF TUR) STATE SAY THAT SHULTZ HAD NOT DRAWN AN EXPLICIT LINK BETWEEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MFN TREATMENT FOR SOVIET TRADE AND IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY . THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING A LEAD IN DOING SUCH A DEAL. HOWEVER THERE WAS SOME DEBATE IN CONGRESS AND IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AT LARGE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE JACKSON/VANIK AMENDMENT, AND SHULTZ' PURPOSE HAD BEEN SIMPLY TO IMPLY THAT, IF SOVIET PRACTICE IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY, THIS MIGHT BENEFIT SOVIET TRADE.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

MR WESTON

MR DAVID THOMAS

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FM WASHINGTON 110100Z MAY 85
 TO PRIORITY F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1543 OF 10 MAY
 INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, MOD (FOR DACU)
 ROUTINE VIENNA, UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO SAVING TOKYO

SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA

1. AMBASSADOR PLATT (SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD MINISTER ON 10 MAY THAT, WHILE THE TONE OF US/SOVIET CONTACTS WAS MARGINALLY LESS FROSTY THAN IT HAD BEEN A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO, NEVERTHELESS THE US SIDE HAD NO EXAGLERATED EXPECTATIONS OF THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING NEXT WEEK. THERE WAS IN ANY CASE A TENDENCY FOR BOTH SIDES TO KEEP ANY INTERESTING CARDS IN THEIR HAND FOR A REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING LATER IN THE YEAR.
2. PLATT SAID THAT THE HANDLING OF THE NICHOLSON AFFAIR WAS GOING TO BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. A QUOTE SENSE OF CONGRESS UNQUOTE RESOLUTION, PASSED BY A LARGE MAJORITY ON 9 MAY, DEMANDED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY APOLOGY FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, DOBRYNIN SHOULD BE EXPELLED. THE RESOLUTION HAD NO OPERATIVE EFFECT BUT THE PRESSURE ON SHULTZ TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE WITH GROMYKO WAS CLEAR. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT GROMYKO WOULD NOT GIVE GROUND ON THE SUBJECT. SO THE RISKS OF A CLASH SIMILAR TO THE POST-KAL ONE IN MADRID IN 1983 WAS VERY REAL.
3. PLATT SAID THAT SHULTZ WOULD GIVE GROMYKO A RESPONSE IN VIENNA TO THE RECENT FORTHCOMING SOVIET COMMUNICATION ON US/SOVIET DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES (HANNAY'S TELELETTER TO JENKINS OF 29 APRIL). HE WAS LIKELY TO WELCOME THE IDEA OF TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN AND ON AFRICA, BUT TO SUGGEST THAT SOUTH EAST ASIA WAS RATHER TOO SENSITIVE TO PROCEED WITH IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT TALKS ON CENTRAL AMERICA WERE APPROPRIATE. HANNAY ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS PICKING OUT THE PLUMS IN THIS WAY MIGHT NOT RESULT IN A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS. WHILE WE SHARED THE US OBJECTIVE OF KEEPING TO THE MINIMUM SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IT WAS NOT EVIDENT TO US THAT THE SORT OF TALKS ENVISAGED IN THIS SERIES CUT ACROSS THAT. PLATT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO GIVE IN THE AMERICAN POSITION ON DISCUSSING CENTRAL AMERICA, IF ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT THEY WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO AGREE AMONGST THEMSELVES WHAT TO SAY TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THEIR OBJECTIVES AND POLICY IN THE REGION.

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East / West Relats.

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4. ON ARMS CONTROL, PLATT SAID THAT SHULTZ WOULD HAVE NO NEW PROPOSALS TO MAKE IN VIENNA. HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO ENCOURAGE GROMYKO TO ENSURE THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WAS MORE BUSINESSLIKE AND LESS DOMINATED BY PROPAGANDA. BUT, REALISTICALLY, THE AMERICANS EXPECTED NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS THIS SIDE OF A REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING. PLATT ADDED HOWEVER THAT THE AMERICANS WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED NOT TO LET THE RUSSIANS HOLD THE PROPAGANDA STAGE DURING THIS PERIOD. THAT EXPLAINED THE PRESIDENT'S RE-STATEMENT AT STRASBOURG OF HIS EARLIER IDEAS ON NO FIRST USE OF FORCE AND ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. THERE MIGHT WELL BE FURTHER PUBLIC RE-FORMULATIONS OF EXISTING WESTERN POSITIONS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. BUT THE AMERICANS SAW NO CASE FOR PUTTING FORWARD GENUINELY NEW PROPOSALS WHILE THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL TROTTING OUT THEIR OLD POSITIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TOKYO.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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MR GOODALL
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TO IMMEDIATE F C C

TELEGRAM NUMBER 676 OF 9 MAY

INFO PRIORITY : WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 469 (NOT TO ALL) : MR HEALEY'S MEETINGS WITH ZAGLYADIN AND ARBATOV

1. IN AN AFTER-SUPPER CONVERSATION AT THE EMBASSY ON 8 MAY, HEALEY REFERRED TO HIS ARMS CONTROL CONVERSATIONS WITH ARBATOV AND ESPECIALLY ZAGLYADIN (MY TELNO 668) AS VERY USEFUL. THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIFIC DISCUSSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. ON GENEVA, THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN DISCREET. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THEY WERE SPECIALLY OPTIMISTIC OR PESSIMISTIC FOR THE TALKS, BUT THERE SEEMED TO BE GENUINE BEWILDERMENT AND FRUSTRATION THAT THE AMERICANS ALLEGEDLY WERE NOT STICKING TO THE SPACE COMPONENT OF THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO AGREEMENT.

2. ZAGLYADIN HAD REFERRED TO THE MOST RECENT LETTER FROM REAGAN TO GORBACHEV (MY TELNO. 001 TO BONN), BUT HAD NOT, I THINK REVEALED ITS CONTENT.

3. SPECIFIC POINTS:-

(A) SDI: HEALEY SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE GENUINELY SCARED BOTH BY THE PROSPECTS OF HAVING TO COUNTER OR MATCH SDI, AND BY COMMENTS FROM WEINBERGER (?) THAT SDI WOULD MAKE THE US THE NO. 1 NUCLEAR POWER AGAIN. THE SOVIET ATTACK ON SDI AS BEING A SHIELD FROM BEHIND WHICH TO LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE WAS THEREFORE NOT JUST PROPAGANDA.

CONFIDENTIAL

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(E) STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND INF: THE 25% OR MORE SUGGESTION OF REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS REPEATED BUT NOT ELABORATED ON. THE MESSAGE WAS THAT NO REAL BUSINESS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE DONE ON STRATEGIC/INF WHILE THE US REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY (AS OPPOSED TO MAKING VAGUE ATTEMPTS TO "EXPLAIN" SDI) ON SPACE.

(C) KRASNOYARSK: FOLLOWING DOBRYNIN'S COMMENTS AT THE ATLANTA SEMINAR THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED TO SEND DATA ON THE INSTALLATION TO THE SCC IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. HEALEY IS TO HAVE AN ARTICLE IN THIS SUNDAY'S OBSERVER WITH HIS VIEWS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, AN AREA IN WHICH HE IS RATHER SCORNFUL OF GORBACHEV'S KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES AS DEMONSTRATED SO FAR.

SUTHERLAND

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD
DEFENCE DEPT.
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RESEARCH D
INFO D
PUSD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

2
CONFIDENTIAL

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CP



NBDM
COP
24/4

FCS/85/110

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY

British Export Opportunities: The GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland

1. You may find it useful to have my view of the bilateral trade prospects, following my visit to East Berlin, Prague and Warsaw. They vary. In East Berlin, if a quarter of what I heard is to be believed, the outlook shows some real promise. In Prague, the situation is less clear-cut, and in Warsaw it is pretty bleak.

Poland

2. Fresh credits from the West are the main Polish preoccupation. The Poles said they wanted more trade with Britain. Poland was trying hard to pay her debts and was grateful for UK support in the Paris Club and with the IMF. Frozen credits should now be released and bilateral discussions should begin on new credit.

3. They said Poland had faithfully honoured its coal delivery contracts during the British miners' strike. Yet Britain was still blocking completion of vital Polish/British projects such as Ursus and PVC by refusing credit. The West's sanctions had overall cost Poland US\$15 billion, had hurt the Polish people we claimed to love so much, and made it all the harder for Poland to move in the direction the West wanted. Poland wanted improved relations with Western countries, but not on her knees.

4. In response I stressed that Poland, like many other countries, had a legacy of over-borrowing. Some belt tightening and prudence was now needed. There could be no thought of new credit until a rescheduling agreement had been signed and was firmly in place.



- 2 -

5. Despite the increases in UK exports achieved in 1983 and 1984, it is clear that the prospects for the future are limited by Poland's continuing economic difficulties.

Czechoslovakia

6. The Czechoslovaks said they were aware of the criticism that they had tried to reduce foreign debt too quickly. After 1985, new imports would be possible. They were interested in buying British technology.

7. Specific instances of UK/Czechoslovak cooperation discussed were: Northern Engineering Industries with Skoda Plzen and Brown Boveri Kent with Sklounion. They said the Joint Commission, together with the BRNO fair and Czechoslovak Economic days, were important for furthering trade. I said Paul Channon was looking forward to his visit in May and would pursue these matters.

8. These Czechoslovak hints are encouraging. At this stage they are no more than words, but British firms in my view are well placed to take advantage of any expansion of Czechoslovakia's trade with the West.

East Berlin and the GDR

9. I was conscious of the good work put in by Paul Channon at the Leipzig Spring Fair. I went over some of the same ground with Honecker and the Politburo's trade man, Mittag. Mittag told me that he had been instructed to come up with concrete proposals to double total bilateral trade from DM1 billion a year to 2. He listed projects in which UK firms had shown a strong interest:

- an ammonia plant at Piesteritz worth over £70 million
- ICI plus two West German firms, Kloeckner and Uhde;

/- a



- a fluegas de-sulphurisation plant at Rummelsberg power station, East Berlin, worth over £30 m
 - Davy McKee;
- two natural gas purification plants, together worth over £70 m - Davy McKee;
- a film production plant for 'diskettes' worth from £30m-£45m - Kodak; and
- a variety of textile machinery - SPT Ltd and Crosrol.

10. Mittag estimated the value of these contracts at DM800-900 million. All of the projects figure in the GDR 5-year plan for 1986-90. The GDR side were keen that British textile machinery suppliers should exhibit at the Leipzig Fair in September this year. (I hope this will prove possible.) I also mentioned Catalytic International's interest in a lignite liquefaction plant, and ICI's ambition to treble their turnover in chemical products business with the GDR. The GDR side referred to a possible export opportunity for GKN in lorry components manufacture.

11. We have had fine words from the GDR in the past. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating. But in the light of these high-level GDR expressions of interest, I am sure that it is worth the while of the British companies concerned to strengthen their efforts in the market.

12. The GDR is proud of its hard-earned reputation for prompt payment: its financial position and track record are not perfect, but are in no way comparable with, say, Poland or Romania. Western banks are lending to the GDR. My time in East Berlin convinced me that Paul Channon is justified in investing effort in the GDR export market.



- 4 -

13. It is however a tough nut to crack. GDR negotiators drive a hard bargain, often threatening to buy from the Federal Republic on allegedly more favourable terms. (Incidentally, if Davy McKee feel that the GDR's standard contract conditions are unduly stringent, now is the time to thrash out the problem with the GDR. If they can come up with hard evidence that other companies are allowed more favourable contract terms, we can complain at a senior political level with some prospect of being heard.)

14. I am delighted that Michael Jopling intends to visit the Leipzig Fair in September. Ministerial visits bring access to GDR decision-makers which can be vital for the commercial prospects of British exporters. I hope that Politburo member Werner Felde, a rising figure in the Party, will see Michael Jopling. The Spring Fair is perhaps the grander of the two occasions, and the biggest event in the GDR's commercial calendar. The British Trade Information Office, set up each Spring under DTI auspices, served as the focal point for over 100 British firms represented at Leipzig last month and forms an indispensable part of the British trade effort.

15. If the GDR delivers one or more of the contracts listed in paragraph 2 above, I hope that you will be sufficiently encouraged to consider making your way to East Berlin/the GDR in the next 18 months to push the UK export effort still further. Your visit would be the first by a Cabinet Minister responsible for trade since Edmund Dell in February 1977.

16. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister,

/Nigel



Nigel Lawson, Michael Jopling, and Paul Channon.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'N. Lawson', is written in the center of the page.

24 APR 1964

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648



BF

Please return
to me on 16
April. COP 2/4.

Jp.034

Mr Powell

East-West Relations

At some point in the next few weeks when she has a moment, the Prime Minister may like to read the attached report of recent discussions between the Danes and a Soviet academic from the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada. (NOT TO BE FILED)

2. The talk is entertaining and revealing on basic Soviet attitudes: the blame lies entirely on the Americans - they forced the Russians to arm: Soviet descriptions of the West as wicked reflect scientific fact: Western strictures on the Soviet Union are fantasy: and so on. The final two sentences of the report sum it up.

3. You will see in paragraph 2 how the Danes used the Prime Minister's point on the fact that the Americans did not exploit the atomic monopoly while they had it.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

2 April 1985



*Already
Hd.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February, 1985

*CP
Mr Powell of*

Dear David,

Soviet Message for the Prime Minister

I enclose a slightly revised English translation of the message from President Chernenko to the Prime Minister which was delivered by the Soviet Ambassador on 18 February.

The revisions do not affect the substance of the message and we do not suggest that they need to be sent to the Prime Minister in Washington. But if you are keeping a copy of the original for your records you might also like to have a translation which reflects the Russian text as accurately as possibly.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq
10 Downing Street

Translation

Dear Madame Prime Minister

Thank you for your message of January 4. We value an exchange of views with you and we see its significance as lying in the broadening of mutual understanding in approaching the solution of key international problems. This, evidently, coincides with your intention.

Today, in our view, the efforts of all states should be directed at seeking the working out of effective measures to prevent the arms race in space and to stop it on Earth. It is precisely this objective that the forthcoming Soviet-American talks on a complex of questions related to space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range, should serve.

We have agreed with the USA that all of these questions will be considered and decided in their interrelationship. In this connection we are convinced that prevention of the arms race in space is of special significance. You, Madame Prime Minister, have also more than once expressed serious concern about the danger of the deployment of weapons in space and you have called for the holding of negotiations aimed at preventing such a dangerous course of events.

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the following. We are put very much on our guard by talk in the West about the undoubted permissibility of research work in the field of space weapons regardless of the course of Soviet-American negotiations. You yourself recognize that it is impossible to determine that critical moment when scientific research passes over into the phase of construction and deployment of weapon systems. Why proceed towards the development of space weapons - for in the final analysis that is what the relevant research work is aimed at doing, - if the objective is to prevent the arms race in space? One must state openly that reliance on the creation of space

weapons contradicts the objectives of the Soviet-American negotiations agreed in Geneva, and threatens to undermine them.

And conversely, progress in the prevention of the militarization of space would open up the possibility of productively resolving questions concerning the limitation of nuclear armaments and would strengthen international stability and security. An indispensable requirement here is strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security and the taking into account of all factors which determine the strategic situation in Europe and in the world as a whole.

The possibilities which are now opening up for curbing the arms race and removing the threat of nuclear war must not be missed. The Soviet Union will do all it can to achieve these objectives. We hope that the Government of Great Britain will act in this direction. That would undoubtedly facilitate the development of constructive co-operation between our countries both in the solution of international problems and in the field of bilateral relations.

With respect,

(signed) K. CHERNENKO

12 February 1985

Arms Control ?

CONFIDENTIAL

K/34



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1985

SOVIET MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Colin Budd wrote to me on 15 February to convey the request from the Soviet Ambassador to call on the Prime Minister on 18 February to deliver a reply from President Chernenko to the Prime Minister's letter to him of 3 January.

The Prime Minister would have wished to see the Soviet Ambassador to receive this message. When I telephoned at 0915 this morning to inform you of this I was told that the Foreign Secretary was already seeing him.

The Prime Minister is very angry indeed at being pre-empted in this way and wishes this to be known.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

trg

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

CDP
10/2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 February 1985

Dear Charles,

mb

Soviet Message for the Prime Minister

I enclose a copy of a translation of the message to the Prime Minister from President Chernenko which, due to an administrative oversight of which he was not aware, Sir Geoffrey Howe received from the Soviet Ambassador this morning before we had received your views in response to Colin Budd's letter of 15 February. The Foreign Secretary has asked me to say that he is sorry this misunderstanding occurred.

Before passing over the message, Mr Popov made some introductory remarks. The Soviet leadership attached importance to exchanges with the British Government on arms control matters and particularly the question of arms in space. While the Soviet approach to the Geneva talks was serious and constructive, recent declarations by senior US officials had caused concern. The US was preparing for the stage when space weapons would be produced and deployed. At a later stage Mr Popov alleged that the increased capability of the Minuteman and production of mobile radar stations were both violations of the 1972 ABM Treaty by the US.

Sir Geoffrey Howe said he would convey the message to the Prime Minister. It would be studied carefully. The essential basis of our position was the four points which had been agreed between the Prime Minister and President Reagan in Washington which had preceded the agreement reached in Geneva. Neither side had a monopoly on research. The fact was that the Soviet Union made twice as many launches into space as all other nations combined. The figure of \$26 billion for research was well known and publicly discussed. Since the Soviet Government was not open, and this kind of information was not released, it was not possible to say how great their effort was. The Foreign Secretary concluded by saying that there were arguments that the Soviet Union was in breach of the ABM Treaty: both sides would be discussing this at Geneva.

/ ...

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At the end of the meeting it was agreed that we would refer to Mr Popov's call as being to discuss matters affecting our bilateral relations and East/West relations generally. Mr Popov undertook to check with Moscow but thought it most unlikely that his authorities would wish to refer explicitly either to the fact of the message or to its contents.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram, MOD, and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

L. V. Appleyard

(L. V. Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



ofo
 Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 February 1985

Dear Charles,

Soviet Message for the Prime Minister

The Soviet Embassy have informed us that the Soviet Ambassador would like to call on the Prime Minister on 18 February to deliver a reply from President Chernenko to the Prime Minister's letter to him of 3 January (copy enclosed).

On this occasion the Foreign Secretary considers that it would be more appropriate for him to receive the Soviet Ambassador. If the Prime Minister were to do so it would attract a great deal of public attention and it would be difficult not to refer to the reason for the call. This would be likely to provoke considerable press speculation, given the rumours about President Chernenko's present state of health, as to whether the message had really been sent by him or on his behalf.

Unless the Soviet Ambassador makes it clear that the Russians intend to state publicly that he was transmitting a message from President Chernenko to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary proposes that the press should be informed that the Ambassador's call was to discuss matters concerned with our bilateral relations (our normal formula on these occasions).

If the Prime Minister is content, we will proceed on this basis.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 January, 1985

Dear President Chernenko,

Thank you for the message which Mr. Gorbachev conveyed to me on your behalf on 16 December.

I too found our own talk last February very valuable. I appreciated the opportunity of a more detailed exchange of views with Mr. Gorbachev, which I believe helped to increase our mutual understanding of one another's concerns. I am sure that Mr. Gorbachev will have reported my views to you.

I hope there will be more such exchanges at this and other levels. If we make a steady and consistent effort to increase them in all areas of interest to our two countries they could help us to achieve greater mutual trust and confidence. This is the only way in which lasting progress in the field of arms control can be achieved. We should work on the basis of mutual respect for each other's legitimate security interests and a clear acknowledgement of the differences between our two systems.

You referred to the importance you attached to the forthcoming talks in Geneva with the United States. I discussed these talks extensively with President Reagan on 22 December. He plainly shares your view of their importance, and so do I. I can assure you that President Reagan is determined to seek positive results.

/The President

The President and I discussed the implications of current research into strategic defence systems, and of the work already in hand in this area by the Soviet Union. I agreed with President Reagan that the aim of resumed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be to achieve for each balanced and enhanced security, with reduced levels of offensive forces on both sides. I welcome and endorse this approach. It reflects the search by countries of the Western Alliance for greater international stability and security. I feel sure that this approach will also correspond to Soviet interests.

1985 offers genuine opportunities for tackling the most fundamental question affecting our two countries and their allies. I recognise the considerable problems that will confront all of us in our efforts to make the world a safer place, and to divert more of our resources away from military expenditure into other fields of benefit to our peoples. I believe, however, that the will now exists on all sides to begin this process.

It is in this spirit that I send my greetings and sincere good wishes to you, President Chernenko, and to the Soviet Government, in the expectation that all concerned will now make the effort to translate our hopes into concrete achievements.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.

15 FEB 1985

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1 Apr - a
brief visit
in the best
course & the

10 DOWNING STREET ^{least}

Prime Minister ^{would}

The Foreign Secretary ^{not}
recommends that you do
not receive the Soviet
Ambassador on Monday, with
a reply to your message
to Chernenko.

I think you ought
to see him. Any
communication from Chernenko
on the eve of your
departure from Washington is
potentially important. I don't
see that the risk of
speculation matters.
Agree to see him?
C.D.P. 15/1.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 25A/85

Unofficial translation

Esteemed Mrs. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message of January 4. We value an exchange of views with you and we see its significance in the fact that it should broaden the mutual understanding in the approach to the solution of the key international problems. This, obviously, coincides with your intention.

Today, in our view, efforts of all the states should be directed at the working out of effective measures to prevent the arms race in space and stop it on Earth. It is precisely this objective that the forthcoming Soviet-American talks on the complex of questions related to the space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range, should serve.

We have agreed with the USA that all these questions will be considered and solved in their interrelationship. At that we are convinced that prevention of the arms race in space is of special significance. You, Mrs. Prime Minister, have also expressed more than once serious concern about the danger of the deployment of weapons in space and called for holding the talks aimed at the prevention of such a dangerous course of events.

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the following. We are very alerted by arguments going around in the West about indisputable admissibility of scientific and research work in the field of space weapons regardless of the course of Soviet-American talks. You yourself recognize that it is impossible to define that critical moment when scientific research turns into the phase of the construction and deployment of weapon systems. Why should one then lead things to the development of space weapons - and the corresponding research activities are, in the end,

aimed at this, - if the objective is to prevent the arms race in space? It should be openly said that the reliance on the creation of space weapons conflicts with the objectives of Soviet-American talks, agreed in Geneva, and threatens to undermine them.

And on the contrary, progress in the prevention of the militarization of space would open up possibilities to solve productively the questions of the limitation of nuclear arms and would strengthen the international stability and security. Immutable at that is the strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security, the account of all factors which determine the strategic situation in Europe and in the world as a whole.

Possibilities which open up now in curbing the arms race and removing the threat of nuclear war cannot be missed. The Soviet Union will do all it can to achieve these objectives. We hope that the Government of Great Britain will also act in this direction. It would, undoubtedly, contribute to the development of constructive co-operation between our countries both in the solution of international problems and in the field of bilateral relations.

With respect,

(signed) K.CHERNENKO

12th February, 1985.

[Removes in
December 10
1973]

Уважаемая г-жа Премьер-Министр,

благодарю Вас за послание от 4 января. Мы ценим обмен мнениями с Вами, видим его смысл в том, чтобы расширять взаимопонимание в подходе к решению узловых международных проблем. Это, очевидно, совпадает с Вашим намерением.

Сейчас, по нашему мнению, усилия всех государств необходимо направить на то, чтобы добиться выработки эффективных мер по предотвращению гонки вооружений в космосе и ее прекращению на Земле. Именно этой цели должны служить предстоящие советско-американские переговоры по комплексу вопросов, касающихся космических и ядерных вооружений - как стратегических, так и средней дальности.

Мы договорились с США, что все эти вопросы будут рассматриваться и решаться во взаимосвязи. При этом мы убеждены, что особое значение имеет предотвращение гонки вооружений в космосе. Вы, г-жа Премьер-Министр, также неоднократно выражали серьезную озабоченность по поводу угрозы размещения оружия в космосе, призывали провести переговоры с целью недопущения такого опасного развития событий.

В этой связи хотел бы привлечь Ваше внимание к следующему. Нас очень настораживают ведущиеся на Западе разговоры о безусловной допустимости научно-исследовательских работ в области космических вооружений независимо от хода советско-американских переговоров. Вы сами признаете, что невозможно определить тот критический момент, когда научные исследования переходят в стадию создания и развертывания систем оружия. Зачем же вести дело к разработке космического оружия - а ведь в конечном счете на это нацелена соответствующая исследовательская деятельность, - если задачей является предотвращение гонки вооружений в космосе? Нужно прямо сказать, что ставка на создание космического оружия противоречит согласованным в Женеве целям советско-американских переговоров, грозит их подрывом.

И наоборот, продвижение в деле предотвращения милитаризации космоса открыло бы возможность продуктивно решать вопросы ограничения ядерных вооружений, укрепляло бы международную стабильность и безопасность. Непременным при этом является строгое соблюдение принципа равенства и одинаковой безопасности, учет всех факторов, определяющих стратегическую ситуацию в Европе и в мире в целом.

Возможности, которые открываются сейчас в деле обуздания гонки вооружений, устранения угрозы ядерной войны, нельзя упустить. Советский Союз будет делать все от него зависящее для достижения этих целей. Надеемся, что правительство Великобритании будет действовать в том же направлении. Это, несомненно, способствовало бы развитию конструктивного сотрудничества между нашими странами как в решении международных проблем, так и в области двусторонних отношений.

С уважением

К. ЧЕРНЕНКО

12 февраля 1985 года

CC OPS
MASTER.



SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1A/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3.1.85

Dear President Gorbachev,

Thank you for the message which Mr. Gorbachev conveyed to me on your behalf on 16 December.

I too found our own talk last February very valuable. I appreciated the opportunity of a more detailed exchange of views with Mr. Gorbachev, which I believe helped to increase our mutual understanding of one another's concerns. I am sure that Mr. Gorbachev will have reported my views to you.

I hope there will be more such exchanges at this and other levels. If we make a steady and consistent effort to increase them in all areas of interest to our two countries they could help us to achieve greater mutual trust and confidence. This is the only way in which lasting progress in the field of arms control can be achieved. We should work on the basis of mutual respect for each other's legitimate security interests and a clear acknowledgement of the differences between our two systems.

You referred to the importance you attached to the forthcoming talks in Geneva with the United States. I discussed these talks extensively with President Reagan on 22 December. He plainly shares your view of their importance, and so do I. I can assure you that President Reagan is determined to seek positive results.

/The President

The President and I discussed the implications of current research into strategic defence systems, and of the work already in hand in this area by the Soviet Union. I agreed with President Reagan that the aim of resumed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be to achieve for each balanced and enhanced security, with reduced levels of offensive forces on both sides. I welcome and endorse this approach. It reflects the search by countries of the Western Alliance for greater international stability and security. I feel sure that this approach will also correspond to Soviet interests.

1985 offers genuine opportunities for tackling the most fundamental question affecting our two countries and their allies. I recognise the considerable problems that will confront all of us in our efforts to make the world a safer place, and to divert more of our resources away from military expenditure into other fields of benefit to our peoples. I believe, however, that the will now exists on all sides to begin this process.

It is in this spirit that I send my greetings and sincere good wishes to you, President Chernenko, and to the Soviet Government, in the expectation that all concerned will now make the effort to translate our hopes into concrete achievements.

Yours sincerely
Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Mr. Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.



10 DOWNING STREET

3 January, 1985

From the Private Secretary

Message to Mr. Chernenko

Thank you for your letter of 3 January enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Chernenko.

The Prime Minister would have preferred a message with rather more substance to it but concedes that this is not now feasible in the time available before the US/Soviet talks begin in Geneva. She has therefore approved the text enclosed with your letter with some amendments. I enclose a revised version and should be grateful if it could be telegraphed to Moscow for delivery as soon as possible.

The press line proposed in your letter seems very sensible.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



seen

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Reply to Chernenko

You might like to see the draft reply to Chernenko now, in case there are points which you want to raise with Geoffrey Howe this afternoon.

2. I attach Chernenko's message to you; e the text which you e President Reagan agreed in Washington. C.D.P. 3/1

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 January 1985

Dear Charles,

Message to Mr Chernenko

At her meeting on 16 December with Mr Gorbachev the latter conveyed a message to the Prime Minister from Mr Chernenko (copy enclosed). The Prime Minister said that she would send a considered reply.

In paragraph 2 of your letter of 23 December enclosing records of the Prime Minister's meetings with President Reagan at Camp David, you noted the Prime Minister's comment that we should draw on the text agreed with the Americans on the SDI in preparing a draft reply to President Chernenko's message.

I enclose a draft reply. Subject to the Prime Minister's comments a final text could be telegraphed to Moscow with instructions to Sir Iain Sutherland to deliver it before the US/Soviet talks in Geneva on 7/8 January.

The fact that a reply to President Chernenko's message had been delivered will probably become known to the press. Pravda would certainly report a call on either Mr Chernenko or Mr Gromyko. Clearly the content of the message should remain confidential but the press might be told that the reply referred to our approach to the development of our bilateral relations and to other international issues including the resumed US/Soviet negotiations at Geneva where we hoped to see real progress towards achieving increased security at reduced levels of weapons.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON SDI AT PRESS CONFERENCE
IN WASHINGTON ON 22 DECEMBER AS AGREED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

President Reagan and I have had a very thorough and extensive discussion of the prospects for arms control negotiations, in the course of which we also naturally touched on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

I was not surprised to discover that we see matters in very much the same light. I told the President that I had made it absolutely clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there was no question of the Soviet Union being able to divide the United Kingdom from the United States on these matters. Wedge-driving is just not on.

I told the President of my firm conviction that the SDI research programme should go ahead. Research is of course permitted under existing US-Soviet treaties; and we of course know that the Russians already have their research programme, and, in the US view, have already gone beyond research.

We agreed on four points:

- 1) The US, and Western, aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments;
- 2) SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation;
- 3) The overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence;
- 4) East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. This will be the purpose of the resumed US-Soviet negotiations on arms control, which I warmly welcome.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for the message which Mr Gorbachev conveyed to me on your behalf on 16 December.

CAVEAT.....

I too found our ^{own} talk in ~~February~~ last February very ^{valuable} useful. I appreciated the opportunity of a more detailed exchange of views with Mr Gorbachev, which helped to increase ^{our mutual} my understanding of ^{one another's} Soviet concerns. I am sure that Mr Gorbachev will have reported my views to you.

I hope there will be more such exchanges at this and other levels. If we make a steady and consistent effort to increase them in all areas of interest to our two countries they could help us to achieve greater mutual trust and confidence. This is the only ^{way in} basis on which lasting progress in the field of arms control can be achieved. We should work on the basis of mutual respect for each other's legitimate security interests and a clear acknowledgement of the differences between our two systems.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/You

CONFIDENTIAL

You referred to the importance you attached to the forthcoming talks in Geneva with the United States. I discussed these talks extensively with President Reagan on 22 December. He plainly shares your view of their importance, ^{and so} as do I. I can assure you that President Reagan is determined to seek positive results.

~~The President dismissed~~
~~During the discussions I had with him in Washington,~~
~~we took due note of~~ the implications of current research into strategic defence systems, and of the work already in hand in this area by the Soviet Union. I agreed with President Reagan that the aim of resumed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be to achieve ^{for each} balanced and enhanced security, with reduced levels of offensive forces on both sides. I welcome and endorse this approach, ^{jk} ~~which~~ reflects the search by countries of the Western Alliance for greater international stability and security. I feel sure that this approach ^{will} ~~should~~ also correspond to Soviet interests.

1985 offers genuine opportunities for tackling the most

/fundamental

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fundamental question affecting our two countries and their allies. I recognise the considerable problems that will confront all of us in our efforts to make the world a safer place, and to divert more of our resources away from military expenditure into other fields of benefit to our peoples. I believe, however, that the will now exists on all sides to begin this process.

It is in this spirit that I send my greetings and sincere good wishes to you, President Chernenko, and to the Soviet Government, in the expectation that all concerned will now make the effort to translate our hopes into concrete achievements.

3 JAN 1985

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

CC OPS
MASTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 210 D/84.

SUBJECT
A

16/12/84

K.U.Chernenko asked to convey to madame Prime Minister that he recalls very well his talk with her on February 14, this year. In the sphere of Soviet-British relations he intends to act in the spirit which was then discussed, that is to promote an active and serious political dialogue, to strive for a wider mutual understanding, to cooperate on the basis of mutual benefit.

K.U.Chernenko would like to hope that the line taken by the British government will be the same. In the present international situation as it has shaped up now, the need to establish certain mutual understanding between our countries is especially great.

The Soviet leadership attaches quite a serious importance to the forthcoming talks with the USA on the whole range of space and nuclear weapons. However there is a concern in Moscow that the opportunity arising with the start of these talks can be missed if Washington tries again to seek unilateral advantages and the unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

In present circumstances it is especially important to avert the arms race in outer space. If it is not achieved it would be unreal to hope to stop the nuclear arms race. In our deep conviction no nation, no people needs an outer space as a source of death, a source of war.

K.U.Chernenko also asked to convey that the Soviet Union remains fully devoted to the aims and ways of peaceful cooperation of European states as it has been layed down in the Helsinki Final Act.

K.U.Chernenko sends to madame M.Thatcher his greetings and greetings and sincere good wishes.

FROM UKDEL NATO 131930Z DEC 84 AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 14 DECEMBER 1984
TO IMMEDIATE FCO AND AMENDED COPY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 433 OF 13 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO MADRID REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA
UKDEL STOCKHOLM OTTAWA ANKARA ATHENS ROME ROUTINE MOSCOW TOKYO

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING: SUPER-RESTRICTED

SESSION: 13 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON THE RENEWAL OF US/SOVIET CONTACTS. THESE WERE WELCOMED, AS WAS SHULTZ'S FULL BRIEFING. GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT EARLY RESULTS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED AND THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE READY FOR THE LONG HAUL. EUROPEAN CONCERNS WERE AIRED ON SDI AND ON THE NEED TO KEEP INF IN THE PICTURE. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION WAS AGREED.
2. THERE WAS BRIEFER DISCUSSION ON AFRICA, TERRORISM, AND POLAND.

DETAIL

3. TODAY'S SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO THE FORTHCOMING TALKS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GROMYKO IN GENEVA. SHULTZ OPENED THE DISCUSSION AND SPOKE FOR AN HOUR. HE SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HOPE THAT THE TALKS MARKED A NEW STAGE IN THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE *US HAD* A BROAD AGENDA, WITH ARMS CONTROL WHICH WOULD BE HANDLED IN THE GENEVA TALKS.

ON THE ONE HAND, AND REGIONAL ISSUES (WHICH IN THE PAST HAD DERAILED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS), BILATERAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (WHICH WE MUST KEEP BEFORE US AT ALL TIMES), ON THE OTHER. THE ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND THE SUCCESSFUL CARRYING THROUGH OF INF DEPLOYMENT WERE THE ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND TO THE TALKS (HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF DUTCH AND BELGIAN DEPLOYMENT). FIRMNESS OVER THE LAST 4 YEARS HAD PAID OFF DESPITE THE ROUGHNESS OF THE PASSAGE.

4. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO CONSULTATION AND STRESSED THAT THE US WOULD BE GOING TO THE GENEVA MEETING IN A POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND THOUGH THEY WERE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET ATTITUDES. SPECULATION ABOUT SOVIET PROCESSES OF DECISION-MAKING WERE INTERESTING BUT HE WAS STRUCK BY HOW LITTLE WE REALLY KNEW. NEVERTHELESS THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR HOPING THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE WILLING TO TALK SERIOUSLY E.G SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE TECHNOLOGICAL RACE: ANXIETY OVER WHAT GROMYKO HAD CALLED LAST SEPTEMBER THE QUOTE QUESTION OF QUESTIONS UNQUOTE, IE THE SIZE OF THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES: THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES: AND THE INTERNAL IMPERATIVE OF A NEED TO MARK THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEADERSHIP.

5. WE HAD TO BE ON OUR GUARD AS THE TALKS CONTINUED AGAINST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS IN ADVANCE, EG THE VARIOUS CALLS OF MORATORIA. THE US GOALS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO STABILITY: EQUALITY: IF POSSIBLE, DRASTIC REDUCTIONS: AND VERIFIABILITY, ALTHOUGH THAT WAS A DIFFICULT AREA. THE US WAS WORKING ACTIVELY ON THE DETAILS AND WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTIONS. NITZE WOULD BE WORKING WITH HIM AND HE, WITH BURT, WOULD BRIEF NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SCG.

6. IN GREATER DETAIL SHULTZ SPOKE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF REDUCING WARHEADS AND THROW-WEIGHT AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY, THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND US ARMAMENT STRUCTURES, THE DIFFICULTY THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE IN RETURNING TO THE INF FORUM WHERE THEY HAD LEFT OFF, GIVEN THE MANNER OF THEIR GOING, AND THE PROBLEMS OF SPACE UNDER THE TWO HEADINGS ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES. VERIFICATION WAS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN THIS AREA.

7. SHULTZ SPOKE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE AND ARGUED THAT EVEN IF IT WERE NEVER 100 PER CENT EFFECTIVE (IF IT PROVED FEASIBLE) IT WOULD REDUCE THE TEMPTATION FOR A FIRST STRIKE AND WOULD THEREFORE BE STABILISING. IT WAS IN ANY CASE A RESEARCH PROGRAMME (WHICH COMPLICATED THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM) AND UNTIL WE KNEW MORE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WHAT PRECISELY SHOULD BE CONTROLLED. THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED IN GENEVA. IN ANY CASE IT WAS PRUDENT FOR THE US TO BE THINKING ABOUT DEFENCE.

8. THE TALKS IN GENEVA, SHULTZ CONTINUED, WOULD DISCUSS PROCEDURES AND OBJECTIVES THOUGH THEY WOULD BE BOUND TO STRAY INTO SUBSTANCE TO SOME EXTENT. IF EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN TOGETHER IN ONE NEGOTIATING BODY, PROGRESS WOULD TEND TO BE AT THE RATE OF THE SLOWEST. THERE MIGHT BE SOME NEED FOR AN OVERALL BODY WITH WORKING GROUPS, GIVING GUIDANCE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, BUT THE SOVIET UNION DISLIKED THE PHRASE QUOTE UMBRELLA TALKS UNQUOTE, DESCRIBING IT AS QUOTE ROMANTIC UNQUOTE. SHULTZ WAS TRYING TO DISENGAGE HIMSELF AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM DAY TO DAY WORK TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS WHOLE ISSUE.

9. ALL THE FOREIGN MINISTERS SPOKE IN TURN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CANADIAN. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

A. ALL WELCOMED SHULTZ'S STATEMENT AND THE RENEWAL OF US SOVIET CONTACTS.

B. CONSULTATION WAS IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY FOR ITSELF BUT IN ORDER THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST SHOULD BE REASSURED.

C. WE SHOULD AVOID MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY AND NOT TEMPT THE SOVIET UNION TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE IN THE MARKET PLACE.

D. DOUBTS WERE EXPRESSED ABOUT THE SDI: AS A CONCEPT DEFENCE MUST BE ATTRACTIVE BUT THE PROCESS, EVEN IF IT WAS FEASIBLE AND NOT TOO EXPENSIVE, WAS LIKELY TO BE DESTABILISING AS IT WAS PHASED IN.

E. THE SOVIET UNION'S MAIN INTEREST WAS LIKELY TO BE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT LIMITING THE QUOTE MILITARISATION OF SPACE UNQUOTE.

F. EAST/WEST RELATIONS INVOLVED MORE THAN ARMS CONTROL. THE OTHER FORA (CSCE, CDE, MBFR) WERE IMPORTANT AND THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FINAL ACT WOULD BE A GOOD OCCASSION TO MARK THIS AT A POLITICAL LEVEL (GENSCHER).

G. WE WOULD NEED PATIENCE AND REALISM BUT SHOULD AVOID CYNICISM.

H. THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE HAD INFLUENCED THE SOVIET DECISION AND WOULD BE HELPFUL IN NEGOTIATION.

I. THE EAST EUROPEANS HAD INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SOME WAY.

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J. WE SHOULD AIM AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS POSSIBLE PROVIDED THAT A VERIFIABLE BALANCE OF FORCES WAS MAINTAINED AND A MONOPOLY BY ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER WAS EXCLUDED.

K. THE ILLUSION THAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT COULD BE DONE AWAY WITH IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR THAT A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY COULD RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD SHOULD BE AVOIDED (DUMAS).

L. EUROPEAN ASPECTS NEEDED TO BE REMEMBERED, PARTICULARLY IN RELATIONSHIP TO INF.

10. YOU SAID THAT THE POLITICAL SELF-CONFIDENCE EVINced BY THE ALLIANCE DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS HAD ACHIEVED RESULTS. THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE HAD ALSO STOOD UP WELL. WE SHOULD CONSIDER DECLASSIFYING AND PUBLISHING THE BASIC DOCUMENT (MC 14/3) TO SHOW ITS INHERENT DEFENSIVE NATURE. WE NOW FACED OPPORTUNITIES BUT ALSO RISKS. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS: ECONOMIC PRESSURES PROBABLY PLAYED A PART IN THE SOVIET DECISION AS ALSO DID THE FEAR, THERE AS WELL AS IN THE WEST, OF THE NATURE OF WEAPONS NOW AVAILABLE, THE SOVIETS PERHAPS BEING MORE ALARMED BY THE WEST THAN WE WERE BY THEM. THERE WAS NO REASON HOWEVER TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ABANDONED ITS HOSTILE AND EXPANSIVE POLICIES, OR THE AIM TO SEPARATE THE US FROM EUROPE. YOU WELCOMED SHULTZ'S REMARKS ABOUT EQUALITY, LINKED TO THE ASYMMETRIES IN THE TWO STRUCTURES, WHICH WOULD GOVERN THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCE. ON SDI YOU SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS THE SOVIET FEAR THAT IT MIGHT WORK THAT MIGHT INDUCE THEM TO NEGOTIATE. IN ALL THIS WE SHOULD BE READY FOR A LONG HAUL, SHOULD PAY NO PRICE IN ADVANCE (EG MORATORIA), AND SHOULD NOT ALLOW DELAY IN ONE AREA TO HOLD UP PROGRESS ON OTHERS. THAT WAS WHY THE UMBRELLA CONCEPT HAD MERIT. INF SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN, NOR SHOULD CW. SHULTZ HAD DESCRIBED THE PROCESS AS LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT: IT SHOULD ALSO BE CEASELESS. ETERNAL DIALOGUE, LIKE ETERNAL VIGILANCE, WAS THE PRICE OF PEACE. YOU STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION IN ITS OWN RIGHT AND AS A SIGN OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CONDUCT OF A SENSIBLE DEFENCE POLICY AND IN ARMS CONTROL. SDI WAS LIKELY TO BE DIFFICULT NOT ONLY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION BUT VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC OPINION. YOU ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN PILLAR AND THE ROLE OF WEU AS A GINGER GROUP WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. FINALLY YOU NOTED THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE EAST EUROPEANS IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS.

11. SUMMING UP THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID:

A. SHULTZ WOULD GO TO GENEVA WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF ALL THE ALLIES.

B. NOBODY EXPECTED AN EARLY MIRACLE.

C. ALL HOPED THAT THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.

D. ALL ALLIES WERE READY TO PLAY THEIR PART IN CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST EUROPEANS, WHO WERE IMPORTANT (A NUMBER OF MINISTERS HAD REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE INF ISSUES TO BE PUT ON ONE SIDE).

E. CONSULTATION WAS IMPORTANT IN SUBSTANCE AND ALSO SO THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE SEEN PUBLICLY TO BE INVOLVED.

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12. TURNING TO OTHER MATTERS, THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKE BRIEFLY OF CANADA'S POLICY UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOWARDS NATO AND RAISED THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ACTION IN AFRICA IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES THERE, ESPECIALLY THE FAMINE. SHULTZ AGREED AND NOTED THAT THIS MAJOR CATASTROPHE WAS DUE IN PART TO DROUGHT BUT ALSO TO MISMANAGEMENT. OTHERS TOOK UP THIS POINT. ANDREOTTI URGED AID THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL AID GIVING AGENCIES IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFUSION AND BELIEVED THAT US AID TO ETHIOPIA WOULD HAVE A LASTING POLITICAL IMPACT. HALEFOGLU RECALLED A MEETING OF ISLAMIC MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN ANKARA, WHICH HAD DISCUSSED THE FAMINE PROBLEM, AND URGED THE EC TO RELEASE SOME OF ITS SURPLUS FOOD STOCKS. VAN DEN BROEK NOTED THAT THE EC HAD DECIDED AT DUBLIN TO STEP UP THE ALREADY CONSIDERABLE AID IT HAD GIVEN.

13. SHULTZ SPOKE OF TERRORISM, ESPECIALLY WHEN SPONSORED OR TOLERATED BY STATES, AS WARRANTING A HIGH PLACE ON THE AGENDA. WE SHOULD SHARE INTELLIGENCE AND WORK TOGETHER TO COUNTER IT. HALEFOGLU SUPPORTED THIS.

14. ANDROTTI SPOKE ABOUT POLAND AND RECOMMENDED THE CHURCH'S AGRICULTURAL PROJECT. HIS OWN VISIT TO POLAND WAS LIKELY TO GO AHEAD SOON. YOU SAID THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT POLAND WAS THE MOST OPEN OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THOUGH NO DOUBT SHE WOULD NEVER FULFIL ALL THE CONDITIONS FOR LIBERALISM. YOU APPEALED TO THE US TO RECONSIDER ITS ATTITUDE TO THE POLISH APPLICATION TO THE IMF FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE TWO LEADING DISSIDENTS. STRAY, AGREEING, QUALIFIED THIS BY SUGGESTING THAT POLAND WAS ALSO THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THERE WAS THE STRONGEST CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FORCES OF COMMUNISM AND THE PEOPLE. VAN DEN BROEK AGREED: CONTACTS WITH POLAND WERE IN ORDER BUT THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD DEPEND ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.

GRAHAM

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D
DEFENCE D
RESEARCH D
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
WED
ACDD -- PED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

Repetition to REYK JAVIK
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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DESKBY FCO 140900Z

FM BUDAPEST 131705Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 300 OF 13 DECEMBER 84

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE OTHER EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
BONN, UKDEL NATO.

HUNGARIAN VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

SUMMARY

1. THE HUNGARIANS ARE PLEASED THAT MOSCOW HAS MOVED TO A POSITION ON EAST-WEST CONTACTS WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN ADVOCATING ALL YEAR. THEY SAY MOSCOW IS POSITIVE AND IN EARNEST IN ITS APPROACH TO THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING. THEY EXPECT GORBACHEV, WHOM THEY DESCRIBE UNEQUIVOCALLY AS NO 2 IN MOSCOW, TO CONVINCING US OF THIS WHEN HE GOES TO LONDON.

DETAIL

2. I ASKED SZUROS FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON AND A RETROSPECTIVE ON HIS VISIT TO LONDON AND HAD AN HOUR WITH HIM TODAY. I ALSO TALKED WITH BANYASZ, WHO WAS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK, AND ESZTERGALYOS.

3. SZUROS SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE MANY OF THEM NOW REALISED THAT THEY COULD NOT ESTABLISH A POSITION OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT EVEN THE US ECONOMY WOULD BE OVERSTRAINED BY THE COSTS OF MILITARISATION IN SPACE. THEIR DECISION TO TALK WAS ALSO IN PART IN DEFERENCE TO WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS AND VIEWS WHICH DIFFERED FROM THEIR OWN. THE SOVIETS HAD CONCEDED SOMETHING IN AGREEING TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR AS WELL AS SPACE QUESTIONS. BUT SPACE WOULD BE THE MOST PROMINENT SUBJECT. THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETINGS WOULD BE A NEW START, NOT A CONTINUATION. AND TO MEET IN GENEVA WAS A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. THE RESUMPTION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WHICH GAVE GROUNDS FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. PATIENCE WOULD BE NEEDED. BUT OVER THE NEXT 6-12 MONTHS THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A DECISION FOR DETENTE AS SIGNIFICANT AS THAT TAKEN IN THE EARLY 70'S.

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14.

4. SZUROS ADDED THAT HE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY IN PRAGUE LAST WEEK TO COMPARE NOTES WITH PONOMAREV. HE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS SAW THINGS THE SAME WAY HE DID. THE AMERICANS WOULD FIND THEM SELF-CONFIDENT BUT DETERMINED IN THEIR SEARCH FOR A BREAK THROUGH.

5. I ASKED WHETHER MOSCOW DID NOT HAVE A SERIOUS PRESTIGE PROBLEM. AFTER ALL, AS RECENTLY AS JULY THEY HAD REBUFFED AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO TALK ON TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH CHERNENKO HAD NOW PROPOSED. SZUROS TRIED TO ARGUE THAT IT WAS WASHINGTON, NOT MOSCOW, WHOSE POSITION HAD DEVELOPED SUFFICIENTLY TO MAKE THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT CONTACTS POSSIBLE. BUT HE CONCEDED THAT MOSCOW'S EMPHASIS AND TACTICS HAD ALSO CHANGED.

6. I REMINDED SZUROS THAT GORBACHEV WOULD BE COMING TO LONDON THIS WEEKEND. SZUROS SAID THAT HE WAS SURE GORBACHEV WOULD BE FORTHRIGHT AND DETERMINED ABOUT THE NEED FOR EAST-WEST CONTACTS. HE HAD BEEN ASKED WHAT GORBACHEV MIGHT EXPECT IN LONDON AND HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD FIND BRITISH MINISTERS WELCOMING, FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE. SZUROS DESCRIBED GORBACHEV AS AN OPEN, CLEVER AND FAIR MAN WHO (ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF WOULD DENY IT) WAS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES NO 2 IN MOSCOW. HE SPOKE ABOUT GORBACHEV'S WORK IN LEADING THE CURRENT REVIEW OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. GORBACHEV HAD SPOKEN RECENTLY OF THE NEED FOR A STRONGER TECHNOLOGICAL BASE FOR THE ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS WHICH WERE NEEDED IF THE SOVIET PEOPLE WERE TO BE GIVEN A BETTER LIFE. GORBACHEV SAW THIS, SZUROS IMPLIED, (AND ESZTERGALYOS MADE THE SAME POINT MORE EXPLICITLY WHEN I SAW HIM EARLIER) AS DIRECTLY LINKED TO MOSCOW'S WILLINGNESS TO RESUME DIRECT EAST-WEST CONTACTS.

7. SZUROS RECALLED WITH PLEASURE HIS VISIT TO LONDON. KADAR AND LAZAR SIMILARLY RECALLED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST IN FEBRUARY. BRITAIN WAS, WITH FRANCE AND CHINA, A NUCLEAR POWER OF THE SECOND RANK. HUNGARY WAS BY ANY RECKONING VERY SMALL. NEVERTHELESS, UK-HUNGARIAN CONTACTS THIS YEAR HAD ILLUSTRATED WHAT THE NON-SUPER POWERS COULD DO TO MAINTAIN AND PROMOTE EAST-WEST CONTACTS WITHOUT DISLOYALTY TO THEIR ALLIANCE PARTNERS. THE HUNGARIANS FELT THAT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD YEAR IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. THEY HAD TRIED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE AND USEFUL BUT MODEST ROLE. THEY NAUGHT THAT SOME OF THEIR ALLIES WHO HAD CRITICISED THEIR ADVOCACY OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS HAD HAD TO CHANGE THEIR TUNE VALIDATED THE HUNGARIAN APPROACH. THEY WOULD CONTINUE ON THE SAME LINES THE PRIME PURPOSE OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY WOULD BE THE BENEFIT OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE, BUT THEY HOPED IT WOULD BENEFIT OTHER PEOPLES ALSO (AND HE MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO BENEFITTING HUNGARY'S SOCIALIST PARTNERS).

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CONFIDENTIAL

/8.

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8. ESZTERGALYOS AND BANYASZ WERE AT SIMILAR PAINS TO STRESS SOVIET GOOD INTENTIONS. BOTH LAID STRESS ON GORBACHEV'S IMPORTANCE AND ON THE WAY HE SAW SOVIET DEVELOPMENT AS INTIMATELY LINKED WITH EAST-WEST CONTACT AND IF POSSIBLE DETENTE. ESZTERGALYOS WAS RELATIVELY FRANK IN HALF ADMITTING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CLIMBED DOWN. HE HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HELP MOSCOW DOWN OFF ITS BRANCH BY AVOIDING RHETORIC. THERE WAS NO TALK FROM HIM, BANYASZ OR SZUROS ABOUT THE WEST PAYING A PRICE TO REWARD THE RUSSIANS FOR COMING BACK TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

COMMENT

- 9. IT IS NATURAL THAT THE HUNGARIANS SHOULD BE PLEASED AT THE WAY THINGS HAVE MOVED. THEY ARE SENSIBLY AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION TO CLAIM MORE THAN A MODICUM OF CREDIT. THERE IS PROBABLY SOME EXAGGERATION IN THEIR EMPHASIS ON SOVIET READINESS FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. BUT BY AND LARGE I BELIEVE THEY ARE TELLING THE TRUTH AS THEY SEE IT. AND I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE STRESS THEY LAID ON GORBACHEV'S ROLE.

UNWIN

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

~~FED~~
SOVIET D
DEFENCE D
RESEARCH D
PLANNING STAFF

~~FED~~

NAD
WED
ACDD
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

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rite SH

ccpk

10 DOWNING STREET

15 October, 1984


From the Private Secretary

Dear Len

East/West Relations

The Prime Minister has read with interest the note on East/West relations attached to the Foreign Secretary's minute of 11 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

C. D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Prime Minister
A useful but
uncontentious paper. I
doubt there is a need
for discussion in OD
at this stage.

PRIME MINISTER

EDD
11/x

East/West Relations

1. In the light of your exchange of messages with President Reagan over his recent meeting with Mr Gromyko in Washington, I attach a note on the recent background to East/West relations and some views on general policy guidelines for the coming year.

2. I am sending a copy of this minute to colleagues in OD and to Sir R Armstrong for information.

mb

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 October 1984

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PAPER ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. The recent US/Soviet discussions in New York and Washington have marked both the end of this phase of US/Soviet relations but also, in all probability, the beginning of the next.

2. At the end of four years the Soviet Union has lived through almost as many leadership changes as in its previous existence. It seems temporarily to have lost the nerve or capacity to take bold policy decisions leaving the initiative to a large extent to the West. In the middle of what may be an 8-10 year period of leadership transition from the wartime and Stalinist generation to the next, the present Soviet leadership can take little satisfaction from the results of their internal or external policies.

3. Internally, both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, the heart of the problem lies in the failure of central planning to meet the challenge of increasingly diversified and sophisticated needs. There has been failure in replacing the incentive of starvation and arbitrary punishment with the incentive of matching growth in real earnings with the goods that people want.

4. Andropov saw this clearly. The main thrust of his policies was for economic growth and efficiency. There are no doubt others who see the problem just as clearly. Gorbachev, the possible next General-Secretary, may be among them. But there is little evidence that the drive for greater efficiency, let alone reform, will be pressed with any real vigour at least under the present septuagenarian leadership. (Nor that the next generation would be likely to risk party control for economic reform). But the costs are mounting. This year's relative harvest failure resulting in the need to buy some 40 million tonnes of grain from the West (from the US in particular) is a strong reminder.

5. The Soviet Union remains capable of forcing its will on its Allies. It countermanded Honecker's proposed visit to the FRG in September and imposed a humiliating last minute cancellation of Zhivkov's visit also to the FRG. But there have been signs of increasing, even if manageable, strain in its own Alliance running through:

differing perceptions on relations with Western Europe;

an inconclusive CMEA Summit in June;

some public restiveness in the GDR and

Czechoslovakia at the stationing on their

territory of the Soviet "response" to Cruise and Pershing;
and the deep disappointment at the bloc (less Romania) pulling out of the Los Angeles Olympics.

6. In Moscow the failure of Soviet policy to disrupt INF deployment still remains a bitter setback. The continued cohesion of the Western Alliance through the first year of deployment serves as a painful reminder of this failure, even though the Soviet leaders must still hope that Western unity will break on this or some other issue before the programme is completed in 1988. The recent Labour Party defence paper was warmly welcomed in the Soviet press and Neil Kinnock and Denis Healey will no doubt be equally warmly received by the Soviet leadership when they visit Moscow in November.

7. It is in their central external relationship with the other superpower that the Russians have had most difficulty. Although the Americans have had their reverses in the Lebanon and in the Middle East generally, overall they have retained the initiative. Congress has so far done little to curb programmes which cause Soviet concern. In the Far East, President Reagan's visit to China and Mr Nakasone's support for Western security aims at Williamsburg and subsequently, represent major reverses for the Russians. In

Afghanistan a solution seems no nearer, while in Mozambique, Angola and to some extent Ethiopia the US and its Western Allies are seen to be undermining previously strong Soviet positions. Grenada has served as a reminder to the Cubans and the Soviet Union of the risks of misjudgement. In El Salvador a struggle involving the provision of arms and military assistance by the Cubans (and their supporters) on the one hand and economic (with some military) assistance by the US on the other has been joined, in which the Soviet Union must be aware of its inability to match US resources.

8. The Soviet response to the accumulation of internal and external problems has been a characteristic blend of internal repression and external defiance.

Sakharov, Shcharansky and others voicing criticism within, together with the BBC and other sources of impartial information from without have all been condemned, and, where possible, neutralised. President Reagan, the military industrial complex, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence have all been built up as the enemy without. No exaggeration, as Bitov's recent press interview in Moscow demonstrated, has been considered too extreme.

9. The Russians have marked time in all the remaining arms control negotiations; no progress has been achieved at the CDE conference in Stockholm, at the

MBFR talks in Vienna or anything but minor progress at the chemical weapons negotiations in Geneva.

10. Beneath the facade of virtual immobilism and outward truculence it is hard to tell what opinions and options are discussed within the Soviet leadership. There can, however, be little doubt that the problems of reconciling policies and even personalities sometimes present themselves in acute form. The recent abrupt dismissal of the Chief of Staff, Ogarkov, points this way. (There is persistent speculation in the West that a leadership change is imminent and that Chernenko will step down on grounds of ill health. The most recent evidence of his appearances in Moscow does not support this. But even if it happens either voluntarily or involuntarily and even assuming the election of a new leader from the next generation, it would take a considerable time before he would, on his own authority, be able to take major new initiatives.)

11. It is against this background that Gromyko held his talks with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz. At his meetings with me and other Western European Foreign Ministers he slipped into his familiar pattern of semi-automatic monologue on the iniquities of the Americans and the foolishness of their European Allies in trusting them. At times his lack of detailed grasp of the current issues, whatever his phenomenal memory

might be of past events, gave one the impression of an actor who had learnt his last lines some time ago.

12. I hope that this was a calculated performance and that it and his unrelenting public speech in the United Nations were designed primarily to set the scene for the main talks with the Americans. Although it was clear beforehand that Gromyko would try to place the blame on the Americans and the onus on them to make concessions, there will no doubt be a careful Soviet assessment of the results of his talks in Washington as there will be of the results of the US elections on 6 November together with the appointments made to key posts in the next administration.

13. In more than eight hours of talks, both President Reagan and Mr Shultz made it clear that they want a better and more realistic relationship with the Soviet Union. Gromyko made no forward movement on any of the issues discussed and at the first two meetings the Soviet public line was polemical, bleak and dismissive - "No sign of practical positive change in US foreign policy". No response was made to the President's suggestion of regular high-level contacts. Public handling of the final meeting with Mr Shultz was, however, much more factual. It included a reference to the two sides' agreement to meet as appropriate to

discuss regional matters and "possibly other questions". This cautious but not wholly negative tone was reflected in a Politburo communique on 5 October.

14. The US assessment of the visit is that Gromyko came prepared to listen carefully to what the President had to say. Nothing he said in response indicated any impending major change in Soviet policy. But Gromyko was also careful not to reject out of hand any of the suggestions for improving US/Soviet relations put to him. The President has indicated that he intends to be patient until the Soviet leadership is prepared to respond and negotiate seriously.

15. I would not expect there to be any rapid substantive developments. The Russians would no doubt like a period of relative external calm in order to deal with their pressing internal problems. Whether their leadership is capable of showing the necessary imagination or flexibility in finding a way out of the corner into which they have painted themselves on INF and START is very much an open question. 1985 might be spent marking time in the arms control field while some basic political decisions are taken on the Soviet side and an attempt made to reach some broader understanding with the Americans. On the other hand, their obvious concerns about competing in space with the Americans,

and apparent shifts in the US position may provide a new incentive for the Russians to re-engage in the arms control process. There is some evidence that they are becoming genuinely worried about the economic burdens involved in any unrestrained technological competition with the US.

Western policy

16. If 1985 proves to be another year in which little progress is made in US/Soviet relations or in arms control generally there could be strains within the Western Alliance and possibly a tendency to be as critical of the Americans as the Russians. In those circumstances we shall need to be patient. We should hold to the guidelines we agreed in January. However, in the event that new prospects for arms control emerge next year, we shall need to be properly prepared to present our own views with vigour and conviction. I therefore attach importance to the current work in hand on a range of arms control issues, including outer space. I hope that where necessary we can reach early agreement on the guidelines for new policies in these areas.

17. It will be important to maintain the closest possible co-ordination within the Alliance. Both with our Allies and in our own bilateral contacts, we should

encourage a new US Administration to continue to seek regular high level exchanges with the Soviet Union in the search for a better political understanding on the basis of which progress in arms control might be made.

18. We should pursue our own exchanges with the Soviet Union at every level with the aim of opening up as many opportunities as possible to get our views and values across in an increasingly closed-off society. Above all, at a time of uncertain leadership on the Soviet side, we need to avoid misunderstanding. We must continue to impress on the Soviet leadership our genuine desire for peace and that we will persevere in seeking progress on balanced arms control, though not on an agenda defined exclusively in Soviet terms.

19. We will also need to spend time and energy on public presentation in order to maintain domestic support for our policies.

20. Finally, we should take the time and trouble to expand our contacts with Eastern Europe. They can serve an immediate purpose as a channel for our views to the Russians. But more importantly, and over the much longer term they may offer opportunities for influencing their development away from the Soviet pattern.

Prime Minister (2)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER SAVING 19 OF 6 JULY

INFO SAVING YODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK, ALL NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, TOKYO, PEKING, MOSCOW, CG'S IN USA.

NY TELNO 2266: DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM: ARMS CONTROL, DEFENCE, AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

(A) SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

1. THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF THE PLATFORM IS DOMINATED BY A DISCUSSION OF SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS ACCUSED OF ALLOWING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO SPIRAL OUT OF CONTROL AND OF FAVOURING DESTABILISING NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES AT THE EXPENSE OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CRITICISED FOR PRESIDING OVER THE COLLAPSE OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, REJECTING SALT II, THREATENING THE ABM TREATY, AND ABANDONING THE GOAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN. HE IS ALSO CRITICISED FOR REFUSING TO ENTER INTO ASAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, FOR HIS STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE, FOR HIS PROPOSED BINARY CW PROGRAMME, AND FOR RELAXING CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. HE IS ACCUSED OF ALLOWING US/SOVIET RELATIONS TO REACH A NADIR.

2. THE PROGRAMME SETS OUT A QUOTE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE UNQUOTE TO THESE POLICIES, IE THE VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AS WELL AS THE MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENCE. THE PLATFORM SAYS THAT AMERICANS DO NOT DIVIDE ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS THEREFORE PLEDGED TO A STRONG DEFENCE, BUILT IN CONCERT WITH AMERICA'S ALLIES, BASED ON A COHERENT STRATEGY, AND SUPPORTED BY A SOUND ECONOMY. BUT MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE A SERIOUS AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE.

3. THE PLATFORM ADVANCES A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN SUPPORT OF THIS GENERAL OBJECTIVE. THE FIRST PROPOSAL WOULD BE FOR THE IMMEDIATE INITIATION OF TEMPORARY VERIFIABLE AND MUTUAL MORATORIA ON THE TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ASAT SYSTEMS: ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ALL WEAPONS IN SPACE: ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES: AND ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

4. THESE MORATORIA WOULD BE MAINTAINED FOR A FIXED PERIOD WHILE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE AND AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION ALSO OBSERVED SIMILAR RESTRAINT. IT IS HOPED THAT THEY WOULD LEAD TO

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THE NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE FREEZE ON THE TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- F. BUILDING ON THIS INITIATIVE, A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT WOULD:
- (A) PROPOSE THE MERGING OF INF AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE IF THE PRESIDENT JUDGED THAT THIS COULD ADVANCE A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE. PRODUCTION OF THE MX MISSILE AND THE B1 BOMBER WOULD CEASE. DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS WOULD BE PURSUED IN THE FRAME WORK OF SALT II, WHICH WOULD BE OBSERVED, UP-DATED, AND RESUBMITTED TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION:
 - (B) IMMEDIATELY RESUBMIT TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974, AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY OF 1976:
 - (C) CONCLUDE A VERIFIABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY:
 - (D) REAFFIRM US COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY AND ENSURE US COMPLIANCE WITH IT. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WOULD BE VIGOROUSLY SOUGHT IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AND THROUGH OTHER APPROPRIATE CHANNELS:
 - (E) ACTIVELY PURSUE A VERIFIABLE ASAT TREATY AND BAN ON WEAPONS IN SPACE:
 - (F) UNDERTAKE ALL-OUT EFFORTS TO HALT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SEEK A VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS GRADE FISSILE MATERIAL SUCH AS PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (A HART PROPOSAL):
 - (G) PROHIBIT THE PRODUCTION OF CW AND WORK FOR A VERIFIABLE CW TREATY BANNING SUCH WEAPONS:
 - (H) IMPROVE FACILITIES FOR CRISIS COMMUNICATION, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF US SOVIET NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTIONS CENTRES (A HART PROPOSAL):
 - (I) INVITE EMINENT MEMBERS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY TO REPORT ON THE LONGER TERM ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE WHICH WOULD FOLLOW A NUCLEAR WAR AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RESULTS OF SUCH A STUDY IN THE FORMULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES.

6. THE PLATFORM SAYS THAT A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION WOULD INITIATE, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES, A STRATEGY FOR PEACE IN EUROPE. ELEMENTS OF SUCH A STRATEGY WOULD INCLUDE:

- (A) ACHIEVING A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN ORDER TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND COMMIT THE ALLIANCE TO MOVING TOWARDS A QUOTE NO FIRST USE UNQUOTE POLICY:
- (B) NEGOTIATING WITH THE WARSAW PACT THE PULLING BACK OF BATTLE-FIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE FRONT LINE, TO AVOID HAVING TO MAKE A QUOTE USE THEM OR LOSE THEM UNQUOTE CHOICE:
- (C) NEGOTIATING NEW APPROACHES TO INF ARMS CONTROL ALONG THE LINES OF THE QUOTE WALK IN THE WOODS UNQUOTE PROPOSAL AND

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- THEN SEEKING TO MOVE TOWARDS THE ZERO/ZERO SOLUTIONS.
- (D) NEGOTIATING SIGNIFICANT MUTUAL AND BALANCED REDUCTIONS IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND ALSO CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

COMMENT

7. VERY MUCH AS EXPECTED, WITH A QUOTE COMPREHENSIVE, MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE UNQUOTE NUCLEAR FREEZE AS THE CENTRE-PIECE. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UK, IS THE CLEAR RE-COMMITMENT TO THE CONCLUSION OF A VERIFIABLE CTB.

(R) DEFENCE POLICY AND NATO

8. THE SECTION OF THE PLATFORM DEALING WITH DEFENCE POLICY STRESSES THE NEED TO CANCEL DESTABILISING AND DUPLICATIVE WEAPONS PROGRAMME, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMMES, AND THE STRENGTHENING OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. THERE IS ALSO STRESS ON THE NEED TO REORGANISE PENTAGON MANAGEMENT, CUT OUT WASTE IMPLEMENT A PROGRAMME OF MILITARY REFORM, INTRODUCE A SYSTEM OF FAIR AND OPEN COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN THE PROCUREMENT FIELD, AND GENERALLY SEEK QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE US DEFENCE EFFORT.

9. THE MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG ALLIANCE IS SEEN AS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY REMAINS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE. A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION WOULD WORK TO ENSURE THAT THE ALLIES CARRIED THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE DEFENCE BURDEN AND WOULD BE COMMITTED TO BETTER CONSULTATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. QUOTE WE MUST PERSUADE THE NEXT GENERATION OF EUROPEANS THAT AMERICA WILL USE ITS POWER RESPONSIBLY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THEM. WE DEMOCRATS AFFIRM THAT WESTERN SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE. WE HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE AND IT MUST ALWAYS REMAIN CLEAR THAT AN ATTACK UPON THEM IS THE SAME AS AN ATTACK UPON US - BY TREATY AND IN REALITY UNQUOTE.

10. A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION WOULD WORK WITH ITS NATO AND OTHER ALLIES TO ENSURE SECURITY AT SPENDING LEVELS GROWING AT A STEADY AND SUSTAINABLE RATE. THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD BE PRESSED TO INCREASE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO'S DEFENCE TO LEVELS OF EFFORT COMPARABLE TO THAT OF THE US. THE STRENGTHENING OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IS PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE IN ORDER TO REDUCE NATO'S NEED TO RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

COMMENT

11. AGAIN, NO SURPRISES. PERHAPS MOST INTERESTING IS THE STRESS ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. THE PLATFORM ACKNOWLEDGES MANY OF HART'S IDEAS ON MILITARY REFORM.

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(C) EAST/WEST RELATIONS

12. THE PLATFORM DESCRIBES US/SOVIET RELATIONS AS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF US SECURITY POLICY AND NOTES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS THE ONLY ADVERSARY WITH THE CAPABILITY OF DESTROYING THE UNITED STATES. A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION IS REQUIRED, NEITHER UNDERESTIMATING THE SOVIET THREAT NOR EXAGGERATING THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET REGIME. THE US AND ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS MUST MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT BUT THE KEY US REQUIREMENT IS TO PURSUE A QUOTE CLEAR, CONSISTENT, AND FIRM POLICY OF PEACEFUL COMPETITION UNQUOTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THIS REQUIRES A STEADY AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH THAT NEITHER TOLERATES SOVIET AGGRESSION AND OPPRESSION NOR FUELS SOVIET PARANOIA.

13. IN PURSUIT OF THIS POLICY, A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT WOULD PROPOSE AN EARLY US/SOVIET SUMMIT TO BE FOLLOWED BY REGULAR ANNUAL SUMMITS. THERE WOULD ALSO BE REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN SENIOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS.

14. THE PLATFORM CONDEMNS SOVIET PERSECUTION OF DISSIDENTS AND JEWS AND PLEDGES THAT A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT REMAIN SILENT IN THE FACE OF SUCH ACTIONS. THE CAUSE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE ADVANCED BY PURSUING POLICIES DESIGNED TO END THE ARMS RACE AND REDUCE EAST/WEST TENSION.

15. A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION WOULD ENCOURAGE THE PURSUIT BY EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICIES, AND GREATER LIBERALISATION IN THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS; AND WOULD SEEK INDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEM IN ORDER TO HELP THEM ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES. SOVIET REPRESSION IN POLAND AND THE ACTIONS OF THE JARUZELSKI REGIME ARE CONDEMNED. THE PLATFORM SAYS THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY CALLS FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS IN POLAND, THE RECOGNITION OF SOLIDARITY, AND THE RESUMPTION OF PROGRESS TOWARDS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE POLISH REGIME UNTIL IT MAKES SATISFACTORY PROGRESS TOWARDS THESE OBJECTIVES.

COMMENT

16. VERY MUCH THE DEMOCRAT MIXTURE AS BEFORE. THE STRESS ON SUMMITS IS DESIGNED TO SPOTLIGHT A PERCEIVED ADMINISTRATION WEAK SPOT.

WRIGHT

FCO (PALACE) / WHITEHALL
NAD

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No. 11 DOWNING STREET

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cc: Sir P. Cadock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 June 1984

CANADA/ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter of 19 June about Mr. Trudeau's message to the Prime Minister of 31 May on East West relations. The Prime Minister agrees that, since she discussed the matter with Mr. Trudeau at the Economic Summit, no further reply is necessary.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

da



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Mr. Trudeau's principles were
unwelcome: you told him so:
and he leaves office in a week.

19 June, 1984

Little point in
prolonging debate. Agree no reply?

Dear Charles,

Canada/Arms Control

C.D.P. 20/6
Anud no

Thank you for your letter of 11 June asking for a draft
reply to the message from Mr Trudeau enclosed with your letter
of 4 June.

In our view there is no need for the Prime Minister to reply
to Mr Trudeau's message at the beginning of this month since
she spoke to Mr Trudeau about his ten principles for East/West
relations during their bilateral meeting at the Economic Summit
(page 3 of the record enclosed with your letter of 8 June to
Peter Ricketts). We believe that the Prime Minister's reference
to Mr Trudeau's principles serve as an acknowledgement of the
message. From our point of view, we do not wish to prolong
the correspondence about Mr Trudeau's East/West initiative and
his follow-up.

If however the Prime Minister decides that she ought to
reply to the message, we should of course be happy to submit a
draft. In that case it would be useful to have an indication
of the particular points of difficulty which the Prime Minister
had in mind when she discussed the principles during her bilateral
meeting. Mr Trudeau would probably expect the Prime Minister to
follow up these points if she decided to write to him.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

For Poi East West
Relations Pt 4

London SW1A 0AB



Post Office

20 JUN 1984



For Poi East West
Relations Pt 4

File

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11 June 1984

CANADA/ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter of 6 June about the message from Mr. Trudeau referred to in my letter of 4 June.

Now that the Economic Summit is over, I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply to Mr. Trudeau's message, taking into account the discussion at the Summit.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 June 1984

MS
Jan John

Prime Minister.
To be aware of
Mr. Trudeau's proposals.
A.S.C. 6

Canada/Arms Control

Thank you for your letter of 4 June about the latest message from Mr Trudeau to the Prime Minister, sent to you in the Canadian High Commission's letter of the same date.

You asked for a brief on Mr Trudeau's proposals by close of play today. We have prepared a short brief to up-date the brief for the Prime Minister's bilateral meeting with Mr Trudeau which has already been circulated. It seemed easiest to distribute this extra brief through the Summit briefing machine, and this we have done. I enclose a copy for information.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

For POT : East West

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

relats Pt 4





File No

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

CANADA: ARMS CONTROL

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from the Counsellor of the Canadian High Commission, which transmits the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the Canadian Prime Minister.

I shall be most grateful if you could let me have a brief on Mr. Trudeau's proposals by close of play on Wednesday, 6 June.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

ST

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR



File 10

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

I write to thank you for your letter of today's date enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Canada. I shall bring this to Mrs. Thatcher's attention.

A. J. COLES

Mr. John Schram.

Subject

cc Master
OPS

HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA
DIVISION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES
ET ECONOMIQUES,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.



CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DIVISION,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.

Telephone: 01-629 9492 Ext.

June 4, 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T91/84

Mr. John Coles
Private Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

Dear Mr. Coles,

We have been asked to pass on to Prime Minister Thatcher the following letter from Prime Minister Trudeau concerning the ten principles Mr. Trudeau believes could form common ground and a basis on which both East and West could build in the current situation. We would ask you to bring this to your Prime Minister's attention, while we await the arrival of the original of the letter which is coming by diplomatic bag.

"Dear Margaret,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in London last November and again in Delhi during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

.../2

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won;
- both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought;
- both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack;
- both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons;
- both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management;
- both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other;
- both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost;
- both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation;
- both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each others legitimate security interests;
- both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons field. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.


I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre"

We have taken the liberty of passing a copy of the letter to Mr. Nigel Broomfield of the Soviet Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J. Schram', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

John Schram
Counsellor

Subject



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

Dear Margaret,

SERIAL No.

T91 / 84

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in London last November and again in New Delhi during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London, England

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

Quinn

East / West Relations Pt 4

Holland
Purchasing
Holland

File



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 May 1984

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

I did, in the end, show the Prime Minister your paper (your letter of 14 March). I did not expect her to welcome the idea, but I was quite sure that she would enjoy being stimulated by it. So it proved.

She has described your proposal as "unequal", going on to say that the Russians could return within 48 hours and that the threat of their return would still be present in every Eastern European country. By contrast, she believes, the Americans would never return to Europe once they had left. She fears that the proposal could lead to the Finlandisation of the whole of Europe.

But I have no doubt that she would welcome a talk about it all when she next sees you - and the opportunity will of course occur in the summer.

I shall be leaving here in mid-June. I have just been writing some hand-over notes - greatly aided by your own hand-over notes for me which I found on clearing out my desk. Time flies.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander, C.M.G.

NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

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Signed

J. Gray

Date

6/12/2013

PREM Records Team

PRIME MINISTER

Mr Coles o/v

EAST-WEST: A NEW INITIATIVE?

I attach a paper which Michael Alexander has sent to me on a strictly personal basis (he definitely does not want the FCO or anybody else to know about it).

The paper contains a bold new idea. It is described in paragraph 10. In its most extreme form it would involve NATO stating its readiness to see all American troops and weapons withdrawn from Western Europe provided that all Soviet troops and weapons were withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Michael hardly imagines that such a proposal, even if it were made, would be accepted by the Soviet Union. But he thinks it would be useful merely to put it forward.

I should like to think about it much more than I have yet had time to do. But it seems to me to be very much in the category of Easter reading, and I will therefore let you have it now.

If you agree, I will discuss it with Percy Cradock and let you have some views after Easter.

A.S.C.

16 April 1984

I am very unhappy about this idea. The suggestion is unequal. The Russians could return within 48 hours and their threats would still be present in every East European country. Once the U.S. had gone - they would never return. This proposal looks to me like a 1420 Finlandia the whole of Europe we will discuss. ms.



BRITISH EMBASSY,
VIENNA.

14 March, 1984

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear John,

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. When you and I talked with the Prime Minister last November, I mentioned in passing that I thought that efforts to change the present depressing scene in Europe would at some point necessitate reconsideration of the nature and scale of the American military presence here. What I had in mind is outlined in the attached paper. I drafted it some time ago and then pigen-holed it - mainly out of cowardice. Now that Messrs Kissinger and Schmidt have begun to make similar, if less radical, noises, I have dusted it off.

2. The paper, like the one I wrote last May and to which it is essentially a companion piece, is written in extremely simplistic terms. There are enough controversial and unsupported assertions in it (as well as omissions) to keep the IISS busy for the rest of the decade. But unless the issues are set out baldly, they rapidly disappear in the fog. The paper reflects conversations with journalists, academics, politicians and diplomats from East and West Europe. But the basic idea in it has been discussed with no one. I have never allowed it to appear that I might be thinking in these terms (at least I have not done so consciously).

3. I have not addressed the paper to the Prime Minister because I am uncertain whether or not you ought to show it to her. Clearly, and in contrast to my last effusion, its thesis would be unwelcome in the FCO and still more so in the MOD. I have not addressed myself to, say, Pauline Neville-Jones, partly because I do not particularly want to get the reputation of being a crank and partly, by the same token, because I doubt whether the paper would be taken seriously.

4. What you can judge far better than I is whether the concerns expressed in it and the suggested course of action come into the category of ideas which are "in the air" but not yet respectable,

/or



ow whether they are still in the realm of the lunatic. If the former, it might be worth showing the text to the Prime Minister for reading over Easter, with a covering note from Percy Cradock or yourself giving your views and explaining that the paper is a continuation of the last paper and of our talk together in the Autumn; if the latter, one had better write "BU in a couple of years" on it. In either case you may like to discuss the text with Percy.

5. I suppose the obvious criticism to make of the paper is that it fails to demonstrate that the dangers facing us in Europe are anything like sufficient to warrant stirring up the hornet's nest of controversy that would result from voicing such thoughts publicly. "Is the situation any more dangerous now than it was 10 years ago", "Why risk complicating things still more", etc. etc. This line of argument is difficult to counter. It is one reason why so few international initiatives which are genuinely innovatory ever get carried through except during and in the aftermath of wars.

6. I can only say that I am more and more struck by the fundamental instability of a situation in which, on the one hand, the West's unchallenged economic, technical and cultural predominance must be seen by the Soviet Government as an overhanging and ever-increasing menace; while, on the other hand, the collective inconstancy, disunity and unpredictability of the West's political leadership must appear in Moscow both as a temptation and a danger. The arms race, which on the Soviet side continued unabated throughout the period of detente, is in considerable measure explained by this lack of congruity in the positions of East and West. The arms race itself of course exacerbates the problem. (I leave aside the ideological, geopolitical, historical and other issues which serve to make things worse).

7. Putting things this way has a tendency to make the Soviet Union appear as a victim of the situation - which is obviously absurd. But insofar as the Soviet Union's acute sense of its (non-military) inferiority is arguably a prime source of trouble, it seems to me likely that initiatives to try to change matters will always have to come from our side (because initiatives to reduce the level of military confrontation will have an inherent tendency to accentuate the Soviet Union's disadvantage).

8. Neither the proposing nor the implementing of a mutual super power withdrawal from non-Soviet Europe would solve the basic problem. But either would change the terms of the equation in a

/way



way which no other initiative that I can think of would seem to do. Given the long lead times and the chance that our hands will be forced in the interim by some unforeseen event, my instinct is that the window for voluntary action will not remain open indefinitely.

9. I recognise that if next week's European Council is a failure, everyone's minds will be elsewhere for weeks to come; and that if it succeeds there could be a tendency to think that all our troubles are over. As seen from Vienna (and no doubt from Washington and Moscow) the outcome of the Community's travails is of vital importance as an indication of the organisation's future viability and of its members sense of priorities. But in themselves the questions at issue have no great significance or relevance to those in the wider world. The evolution of other more fundamental crises in Europe and beyond is not determined by the Community's timetable (nor by M. Rocard's constituents). So I thought I might as well write now - preoccupied though you must be.

Yours ever

Michael

(M O'D B Alexander)

Enc.

PS Since drafting the above, I have seen an account of the Prime Minister's recent speech to MEP's: "seizing the initiative on world problems, not reacting wearily to them; forging political links across the European divide and so creating a more hopeful relationship between East and West". I can only say: Amen!



THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE: THE CASE FOR AN INITIATIVE

The Problem

1. In more than one speech in late 1979 and early 1980 the Prime Minister referred to the '80s as "the dangerous decade". The description seems as valid now as four and a half years ago.

2. The problems of the Soviet bloc and the factors making for a continuing deterioration in East-West relations were summarised in a paper written last May. Events in the interim have been not inconsistent with the paper's main thesis.

3. The several advantages which the democratic capitalist countries enjoy relative to the Soviet bloc remain as marked as ever. But the West of course has weaknesses. These, particularly in Western Europe, continue to prevent us from either realising or deploying our strengths fully. The European Community is mired in internal squabbles. Many of the younger generation are disillusioned with the political process. Western Europe is falling behind "Jamerica" economically (the fact that the COMECON countries are falling behind a great deal more rapidly is no consolation). Transatlantic relations are showing signs of strain. The accumulation of armaments continues unabated. The overseas rôle of Western governments is largely confined to poorly co-ordinated fire fighting - too often in areas which must be taken seriously but which are of essentially secondary importance to the governments not immediately involved.

4. A fresh approach to the central East-West confrontation, that in Europe, is needed. The region may appear calm. But it is the calm in the eye of the storm. If the evident tensions and disparities in Europe get out of hand, the conflagration will be uncontrollable. Nor should the relative calm be seen as a reason for inaction: it may be a final opportunity.

5. There is a longing among Europeans, particularly the young, for a new and imaginative strategy, preferably one originating somewhere other than Washington. This is not in itself a reason for attempting to break fresh ground. But it does mean that a different approach, provided it was soundly based, would be widely welcomed.

6. The opening for an initiative, if it were agreed that an initiative was desirable and feasible, might come in the first half of 1985. President Reagan will have been re-elected or his successor will have taken office. The new Soviet Government will

/have



have had a year in power - though one may doubt whether the arguments between the old generation and the new will have been resolved. The British Government will have three years of its term to run. Messrs Kohl and Mitterrand should still have two years in hand.

7. No policy or course of action is risk free. That applies to the continuation of existing policies. The risks of the latter may be as great or greater than those of any other course. The fact that it is easier to avoid responsibility for the consequences of continuing an existing policy than of enunciating a new one is not an argument for refusing change.

8. A number of propositions can be made about the present situation in Europe:

- (a) the presence of 300,000 American soldiers in Western Europe is legitimate but unnatural. At some point in the future, it will come to an end;
- (b) the presence of 550,000 Soviet soldiers in Eastern Europe is both illegitimate and unnatural (though not incomprehensible). At some point it, too, will come to an end;
- (c) failing the negotiated, or at least controlled, withdrawal of these forces the risk of hostilities in Europe between the two super powers is bound to grow if there are other factors encouraging a deterioration in the overall relationship. There are such factors. The proximity of Soviet and American forces to each other is a source of concern rather than reassurance if one assumes that the situation in Eastern Europe may at some point deteriorate radically and unexpectedly;
- (d) the interests of the United States and of Western Europe are not in all respects identical. In recent years this unsurprising fact has become increasingly apparent - to the extent that a marked acerbity has entered the relationship in recent months (admittedly not for the first time but more strikingly perhaps than at any time since the last war);
- (e) it is conceivable that an American President will one day unilaterally reduce or even end the US military presence in Europe. He might do so in a

/fit



fit of isolationism, of irritation, or of domestic weakness. But if Western Europe were to fall under Soviet influence, the balance of power in an increasingly interdependent world would have been shifted irreversibly and decisively to the disadvantage of the US. It is inconceivable, therefore, for reasons of the purest self-interest, that any US Government would ever deliberately "abandon" (i.e. refuse to join in the defence of) Western Europe - always assuming that Western Europe maintains a substantially credible defence capability;

- (f) if reductions in the US presence were made as the result of a unilateral decision in Washington, there would be bitter recrimination from the Western Europeans and no quid pro quo from the Soviet Union. "Neutralist" tendencies in Europe would be greatly encouraged;
- (g) Western Europe's present defence effort is neither cost effective nor adequate. Western Europe will never make the defence effort appropriate to its economic and demographic strength so long as there is a substantial American military presence in the area. The new generation of "emerging technology" weapons may give European governments, if they are prepared to take the opportunity, a chance to make a quantum jump in their defence capabilities in a politically saleable manner;
- (h) for so long as Western Europe lacks some kind of defence identity, the development of all other aspects of European cooperation will be at best stunted. The ability of Western Europe to "help" the Americans in the rest of the world will be equally limited;
- (i) there is no longer any rational reason to fear the Germans, even if such fear is an entirely understandable emotion among the older generation. It is doubtful whether the populations of Western or Eastern Europe - as opposed to that of the Soviet Union - any longer do fear the Germans. Most of them probably also accept - if they think about the point at all - that the division of Germany is an artificial one and that it will come to an end at some point. The attitude of governments - in particular perhaps of the French Government - is more cautious;

/(j)



- (j) it is overwhelmingly in the interests of Western European governments either to get Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe or to force their own electorates and their intellectuals to re-acknowledge the nature of the Soviet military presence there (and its implications);
- (k) failing some change in the present situation and in present attitudes, the difficulty of securing adequate public support in Western Europe for a credible conventional and nuclear defence effort is going to grow inexorably;
- (l) there is no sign that arms control negotiations in the current format will ever make substantial progress. Partial and limited agreements may be possible. But measures which really bite are in present circumstances always going to founder on the conflicting fears and perceptions of the two blocs (see previous paper). The argument about data in the MBFR Talks is a locus classicus (when Soviet military planners play war games what assumptions do they make about the Polish army?);
- (m) there are conflicts of view within the Kremlin, particularly perhaps between the generations. We may not know who is in which faction. But we may assume that some will be in favour of experiments, whether with the economy or with foreign policy, and some opposed and that all can be influenced.

A Possible Initiative

9. If the argument is to be shifted on to new ground and the present downward spiral broken, something radical has to be attempted. The policy on East-West relations which HMG has been advocating since last summer is sensible and right so far as it goes. But it is unlikely to achieve a major change in the situation. Ideally we want an initiative which will preserve and ultimately strengthen our own position; appeal to our own electorates; and will put the Russians in a difficulty whether they accept or reject it.

10. One possibility would be for NATO (or the Head of a European member Government of NATO) to state formally its (or her) readiness to see all American troops and weapons withdrawn from Western Europe provided that all Soviet troops and weapons were withdrawn from Eastern Europe; and its readiness to open forthwith negotiations to achieve this objective within a finite time span - say, five years, i.e. by 1990. As an alternative, a good deal less clear cut but still radical, one could propose a reduction to some very low figure (say 25,000 on each side armed with conventional weapons) sufficient to maintain facilities for exercises and reinforcement but not much more.



11. The details of such an offer would require exhaustive advance consideration - at least nationally. (One of the most difficult points would be to make the offer public before it leaked). The offer could cover as much or as little as one wanted. But as an outline:-

Both withdrawals should be verified (- given the scale of the operation, on site verification would not need to be particularly rigorous).

Both military pacts, and their members' mutual obligations, should remain in being.

Each super power should undertake to refrain from re-introducing their forces into the withdrawal area except for annual inspected exercises of an agreed size, say, 30,000 men.

This undertaking should cease to be binding on the one super power if breached by the other.

Token conventional forces should remain in Berlin until such time as a settlement between the two Germanies, or a peace treaty, was negotiated.

Existing national nuclear and conventional capabilities should be unaffected by the agreement.

So should the stationing of forces other than those of the super powers in the member countries of the two pacts.

But no nuclear weapons should be deployed in either of the two Germanies, etc. etc.

12. A proposition on these lines would have - or should have - the great merit of being extremely easy to understand and relatively difficult to distort or misrepresent. It may be utopian to suppose that it could ever be made or negotiated. But if it were to be made - and whether accepted or not - it would radically change the nature of the political debate about the future of Europe. The mere fact of putting it forward might be expected to have a number of positive consequences:-

- (i) it would force European electorates (and their governments) to take seriously the need both to provide for their own security and to cooperate effectively in preserving it;

/(ii)

*and its
merit.*



- (ii) Western Europe's acceptance of a much greater degree of responsibility for its own fate would give a new impetus to the European idea. It would force governments to raise their eyes from the (essentially minor) disagreements which have in recent years acquired such overriding significance within the Community;
- (iii) it would throw the Soviet Government on to the defensive but with a tactic they could hardly describe as threatening. It would force them to face publicly and privately some very uncomfortable facts about their rôle in Eastern Europe. It would undermine their present propaganda campaign in Western Europe;
- (iv) it would give rise to acute disagreements between the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and those of the Soviet Union. Hopefully it would also give rise to disagreements within the Kremlin. There may be some to whom a measure of disengagement from Eastern Europe would be attractive for economic reasons. There may be others who would welcome the chance of reducing both the risk of conflict in Europe and the influence of the military.

Western Reactions

13. Any attempt to change a strategy which has achieved its main objectives over a period of 35 years is going to be unpopular. Specifically an initiative envisaging the departure of the Americans from Europe will be unpopular:

- (a) with most of the military, because the necessity of a strong US nuclear and conventional presence in Western Europe has been the foundation of their strategic thinking since the War;
- (b) with all those who doubt that Western Europe is capable of making the necessary effort to cover the gap that an American departure would leave;
- (c) with many West Germans because they will feel exposed, threatened and uncertain about the future (and because, presumably, they would lose a good deal of income if the Americans left);

/(d)



- (d) - paradoxically - with the French and many of the minor member governments of the Alliance because they would feel nervous not only about the Soviet threat but also about the Germans;
- (e) with many Americans because of the need to rethink deeply entrenched strategic assumptions; because redeployment would no doubt be an extremely expensive business; and because the prospect of a resurgent European defence capability would ultimately, though not immediately, threaten the sales prospects of the US defence industry.

None of these drawbacks, important though they are, would seem to be overriding or to be of similar magnitude to the possible gains. Several of them would diminish rapidly once the initial shock had worn off. They do however mean that it would be extremely difficult to secure agreement in advance from the Alliance as a whole that the offer should be made.

Soviet Reactions

14. The least likely outcome of such an offer would be Soviet acceptance and implementation. But were this to happen the prospects for Europe and for the world would have been changed fundamentally. Eastern Europe would remain Communist and allied to the Soviet Union. But Moscow would of course have signalled its willingness to accept far-reaching changes in Eastern Europe as the price of reducing the risk of a direct confrontation with the Americans. Such change would no doubt occur. The situation would still be fraught with considerable danger, particularly in the interim period, but at least the possibility of a controllable evolution in Eastern Europe - which does not at present exist - would have been created. (We should be wary of arguing that the dangers of change would be greater than those we now face because we would then be arguing that in fact we prefer to have the Russians in Eastern Europe. And that is almost certainly a recipe for disaster sooner or later.)

15. What would not be true - or certainly need not be true if Western Europe has any stomach for the future at all - is that the prospects of successful Soviet aggression against Western Europe or of the creeping "Finlandisation" of the area would be any greater than they are now. There would no doubt be much talk about credibility, reinforcement times, the difficulty of evaluating Soviet exercises, reversion to a trip-wire strategy etc. etc. But would Western Europe (and in particular West Germany) really be in a worse position strategically following a mutual withdrawal? It seems very doubtful.

/16.



16. A somewhat less unlikely outcome is an outright Soviet rejection of the offer as a trick, a provocation or whatever. This possibility might be said to be a strong reason for making the offer as soon as possible rather than for withholding it. The Russians would have incurred a major propaganda reverse. The firm attribution of responsibility for the US military presence in Western Europe to the Russians will make it significantly easier to defend the former etc. etc.

17. There is the counter-balancing risk that once a Western Head of Government, or group of governments, has advocated the withdrawal of American troops in certain conditions, such a withdrawal may ultimately become more difficult to resist even if the conditions are not met. But this ought not to be a decisive objection. If it is the case that the present disarray in Western Europe is undesirable and if it is also the case that only the prospect of US withdrawal is likely to focus the minds of Western Europeans effectively, then the risk that we may end up with unrequited US withdrawals should be accepted.

18. A much more likely scenario than outright Soviet acceptance or rejection is a prolonged East-West haggle leading, perhaps, to partial withdrawals by both super powers. But providing Western negotiators start from a publicly stated willingness to envisage the departure of all US forces, then the advantages of discomfiting the Russians, stimulating the West Europeans and making the Americans think anew about where their real interests lie should have been won.

Conclusion

19. The idea of proposing a total US withdrawal probably comes into the "too difficult" category. But if so - and if the analysis in the first half of this paper and in last year's is broadly correct - we need to think very carefully indeed about where we are headed and how we are going to avoid arriving there.

14 March, 1984

MR COLES ✓ A.S.C. 9/3 .

EAST/WEST RELATIONS: FURTHER STEPS

1. The Prime Minister's visits to Budapest and Moscow were successful: they attained the limited objectives set. But we need to look further ahead and consider how to maintain the momentum, although without conning ourselves, or the public, on what crops can be grown on this very stony soil.

2. There are two main aspects:

(a) better high level Soviet/British contacts.

(b) visible British activity in serious arms control and disarmament proposals.

3. On (a), the obvious objective is a visit by a Soviet leader with potential, ideally Gorbachev, to the United Kingdom. The timing might be the end of this year or early next. I am, however, doubtful whether the Russians would be prepared to give us this prize without our having earned our passage with lower level contacts first, and possibly without greater signs of receptivity on our part to Soviet arguments. There are dangers in this, since a ground rule of the game has to be that we are not prepared to pay for activity as such with any concession of substance. At the least I think further exchanges between the Foreign Secretary and Mr Gromyko will be inevitable as preliminaries and there may be middle level contacts we ought also to be trying to activate as a step towards the ultimate high level visit.

4. On (b) we need to select the most promising areas. There are some, like INF/START, where the initiative is not in UK hands and others which would probably not serve Western interests, eg a comprehensive test ban. The best runner at the moment is

chemical weapons. We have been prominent in advocating a ban and in February tabled a paper on challenge inspection. The Russians have gone some way towards the idea of challenge inspection and have accepted the principle of continuous on-site inspection for stockpile destruction. Chernenko on 2 March supported a complete ban on chemical weapons, not just a weapon-free zone in Europe, and referred in vague terms to Soviet agreement to monitor their destruction. I am not clear why the Russians have gone so far towards accepting some kind of verification, particularly given the scale of their activity in this field, but it is in the Western interest to pursue this and in British interests to be seen to be playing a prominent part. I think our knowledge of Soviet chemical warfare capability reinforces rather than upsets this reasoning and would argue that any decision on a new Western or West European retaliatory capability should await a serious effort in the disarmament field. The next step is for the Americans to table a draft Treaty in Geneva. We should urge them to expedite this. But in the meantime we should seek to publicise the role the UK are playing. This is solid disarmament work and we should extract as much mileage as possible from it.

5. The next possibility is MBFR. The problem here has been an over-enthusiastic and naive German proposal, exemplifying the chronic weakness of Western negotiators, a penchant for concessions of substance in order to maintain momentum. We have won the Americans over to a more robust view and were hoping that a sensible but positive Western proposal would emerge before MBFR negotiations resume on 16 March. The latest news is that the Germans still need more persuading. But the prospects are reasonable and MBFR looks like the second area where we and the West will be able to show activity.

6. The third is probably the most important and certainly the most difficult, ie military use of space. Our own thoughts on ASATS need to be looked at against the background of the US Strategic Defence Initiative (formerly Star Wars). This is a specialist's world. But it is permitted to doubt whether a really fool-proof ballistic missile defence system, capable of preventing as distinct from blunting a nuclear attack, can be devised. The Americans look as though they are set on their present course; and the danger is that their research programme will acquire a momentum of its own, prompting Soviet counter development and seriously upsetting the present strategic balance. In the process an opportunity for closing off one sector of East/West arms competition could be missed. This is currently an issue first for our own private reflection, secondly for US/UK consultation. But time is short.

John - I believe
a paper is being
from MOD.
mt.

U
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PERCY CRADOCK

9 March 1984

E/vi Pelm 2

Prime Minister



MS

8th March 1984

A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST ISSUES

Could you contemplate an initiative with some (though not all the) European allies to suggest that we work out together our approach to the USSR in the post-Andropov era?

The countries with whom we could collaborate in such an idea might be France, Germany and Italy - the three Western European countries who take risks direct with their territory by having strategic and nuclear weapons on it (Spain might be added, if we thought that worthwhile).

This would be plainly a "European" initiative, but one taken outside the community and so would not be hamstrung by all these minor nations, such as Greece or Holland, who are inclined to take up strong up moral attitudes on subjects for which they wish to evade responsibility.

The benefits of this would be that it would help on the one hand to calm people who say we are doing nothing about the "post-Andropov opportunity" in the U.S. election year, and on the other hand perhaps help towards recovery of some of the lost souls tempted towards neutralism - of whom there are on the continent a vast number and many inside the supposedly "right of centre parties".

Another benefit would be that it would limit the unseemly business which we have so often seen over the last forty years, of individual European leaders trekking off to Moscow with their hopes of securing political benefits - e.g. Wilson, Schmidt, Giscard - with no real impact on Soviet thinking.

Finally, well managed, an initiative of this sort could help to promote the Government's reputation in this country as interested in the larger as well as the smaller scale of "Europe".

If this idea were to be accepted, it should, of course, be sold to the U.S. beforehand and the point about European neutralism stressed.

Hugh

Hugh Thomas



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 March 1984

file
da
cc. Lebanon: Int
Foreign Pol
East/West

Visit of President Mitterrand

I have sent to you separately a record of the discussion which took place at Chequers today about European Community issues.

I should record that over lunch there was also a brief discussion of the situation in the Lebanon and the Gulf and an exchange about East/West relations.

On the Lebanon, President Mitterrand said that the French were contemplating withdrawal but the problem was that withdrawal from the particular part of Beirut where French troops now were could result in an upsurge of fighting and many deaths. His present pre-occupation was therefore that suitable arrangements should be made to avoid this.

Taking up a reference by the Prime Minister to Syria, the President said that there had certainly been an attempt at a coup d'etat. But it was not clear whether President Assad's brother or some other general had been behind this.

The discussion on the Gulf provided no new insights.

With regard to East/West relations, President Mitterrand said that he expected no dramatic changes in Soviet policy following the change in leadership. He expressed the view that the Soviet system would crack before the year 2000 - though he later modified this and spoke in terms of a serious crisis occurring before then. His fear was that the Soviet Army would then take over. They were now the real party - and there was less corruption in the Armed Forces than elsewhere.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

CONFIDENTIAL

EST.



Members' Brief

Hi-AJ edes
No. 3
23rd February 1984

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Prime Minister visited Moscow on 13th and 14th February 1984 to attend the funeral of President Andropov and had talks with the new Soviet leader Mr. Constantine Chernenko. At the beginning of the month she paid an official visit to Hungary. These talks were the latest steps in moves by the Government to lay the foundations for an improvement in relations between East and West. In a statement in Moscow on 14th February, the Prime Minister explained the background to the current contacts:

'It was plain to me and the Foreign Secretary last summer that the time had come for a serious review of relations with the East. The build-up of arms - the increasing number of SS20s - and the West's need to respond with Cruise and Pershing had created disquiet. The various arms control negotiations were getting nowhere and contacts between East and West were so limited that the risk of misunderstanding was grave'.

Mrs. Thatcher emphasised that the Government's policy does not in any way mean a weakening in its commitment to the defence of the Western way of life. She said that: 'I believe as strongly as ever in basic Western freedoms - and I make it plain to all in the East privately and publicly that I will defend them anywhere any time'.

The Soviet Record. 1983 was a particularly bad year for East-West relations. The Russians did not negotiate seriously in the various disarmament negotiations and in November unjustifiably walked out of the Geneva talks on Intermediate Nuclear Forces. They maintained their oppression in Afghanistan, where over 100,000 Soviet troops still fight to prop up the puppet Karmal regime in the face of fierce popular resistance. They continued to ensure that all vestiges of freedom in Poland were crushed. The international situation became particularly strained in the days following 31st August, when the Soviet Air Force shot down a civilian South Korean airliner, which had strayed into Soviet airspace killing all 269 passengers and crew.

The Madrid Agreement. A modest step towards better East-West relations came on 9th September 1983, with the formal signing by 35 foreign ministers of a document concluding the Madrid review meeting on the implementation of the Helsinki Agreement. The participants undertook once more to implement its provisions, which have all too often been flouted by the Soviet Union and its allies, particularly in the field of human rights and contacts. For example, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union fell from 51,000 in 1979 to 2,600 in 1982 and declined still further in 1983. As the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, commented in his speech at Madrid on 7th September:

'Liberty does not consist in mere general declarations of the rights of men. It consists in the translation of these declarations into definite actions'.

The Stockholm Conference. Various further meetings were arranged for the next few years at the end of the Madrid Conference. The most important of these opened at Stockholm on 16th January 1984. This is now considering military confidence and security building measures, such as observation and inspection of military activities, prior notification of manoeuvres and steps designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack. Although the Conference is concentrating on such specific and detailed questions, its opening provided an opportunity for fresh attempts to improve East-West relations on a wider front. This was particularly important in view of the recent suspension of both the Strategic Arms talks (START) and the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks (INF) at Geneva as well as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) at Vienna.

In his speech to the conference on 20th January 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe said that
'The dialogue between East and West must be widened and given more substance.
We all exist in one world. We have to live together for good or ill, and, to
achieve that, we need to know and understand each other better. The British
Government, for its part, will do all it can to that end'.

The Deployment of Cruise Missiles. The Soviet Union alleges that a prime reason for the poor state of East-West relations is the first deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe in accordance with NATO policy, including the first 16 Cruise missiles at Greenham Common. It cannot be repeated too often that this deployment is a response to the massive Soviet deployment of SS20 missiles. 378 of these missiles, each with three warheads, of which two-thirds are aimed at Western Europe, have been deployed since 1977. It is vital that the Soviet Union soon returns to the various arms control talks and negotiates seriously on multilateral and balanced disarmament. As the Prime Minister said in Budapest on 3rd February:

'This is no time for empty chairs in Geneva. This is the time to talk. The time to negotiate. The time to succeed'.

Political Will and Mutual Respect. Mrs Thatcher went on to outline how disarmament negotiations should be handled:

'We shall need political will as well as mutual respect. Political will - because arms control agreements do not make themselves. Mutual respect - for it is useless to suppose that East or West will agree to dismantle weapons unless at every stage we are left with a balance which preserves our security'.

'We must both be ready to adopt practicable measures. We must both be ready to have them verified. We must each recognise the other's need for security. If all accept this approach, there could be fewer nuclear weapons, fewer conventional weapons, and for a start perhaps chemical weapons could be abolished altogether, as Britain has already done'.

The Contrast with Labour. The contrast between Mrs. Thatcher's and Mr. Kinnock's activities last week could hardly be more marked. While the Prime Minister was engaged in realistic moves to improve East-West relations, the Labour leader was visiting Washington explaining to baffled listeners his support for total, one-sided nuclear disarmament for Britain and the unconditional removal of all American nuclear bases from Britain.

- * He had an undignified row with the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, who told him that his one-sided views on Central America were misinformed and misguided. He later remarked somewhat obscurely that Mr. Shultz had 'got out of his pram'.
- * He preposterously compared his performance in Washington with that of the skaters Torvill and Dean.
- * Last year, when asked whether he considered the Soviet Union a greater threat to world peace than the United States or Britain, he replied: 'there is an almost miserable equality of threat' (Times, 29th August 1983).

Steady Progress. The Prime Minister has emphasised that it would be unrealistic to imagine that there will be a rapid breakthrough in East-West negotiations. As she said in Moscow:

'It will be at best a long slow task ... But I am absolutely sure that all Western leaders are prepared to work for this goal. I am not looking for instant and ephemeral success but steady and sustainable progress'.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 17 FEBRUARY 84

INFO EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN.

HUNGARIAN VIEWS ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT IN THE
LIGHT OF CHERNENKO'S SUCCESSION.

SUMMARY

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY.
HE SAID THAT THE HUNGARIANS HAD NOTED WITH PLEASURE THE
PRIME MINISTER'S DECISION TO GO TO MOSCOW FOR ANDROPOV'S
FUNERAL, WHICH THEY SAW AS 'A SIGNAL'. THEY BELIEVED
THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS AND WEST HAD NOTHING TO FEAR FROM
CHERNENKO'S SUCCESSION. HE STOOD FOR THE CONTINUITY OF
MOSCOW'S COLLECTIVE POLICY. PROSPECTS FOR FRUITFUL EAST-WEST
DIALOGUE MIGHT EVEN BE BETTER NOW THAT THE PROBLEMS POSED BY
ANDROPOV'S SICKNESS HAD BEEN RESOLVED.

DETAIL

2. I SUGGESTED TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ESZTERGALYOS THAT
WE MIGHT REVIEW THE PROSPECTS FOR ANGLO-HUNGARIAN AND
EAST-WEST RELATIONS NOW THAT THE DUST HAD SETTLED AFTER THE
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT AND IN THE LIGHT OF CHERNENKO'S
ACCESSION.
3. ESZTERGALYOS SAID THAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH
REVIEWED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT YESTERDAY, HAD BEEN
HONESTLY PLEASED BY HIS SUCCESS. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WERE
KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH THE FOLLOW-UP.
THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO BEEN PLEASED BY THE PRIME
MINISTER'S DECISION TO GO TO MOSCOW AND SAW IT AS 'A SIGNAL'.
4. THE HUNGARIANS BELIEVED THAT THE ONLY WAY FOR THE WEST AND
EAST TO GET OUT OF THE HOLE THEY HAD DUG BETWEEN THEM
WAS THROUGH DIALOGUE. BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO REVIEW THEIR POSITION.
IN PARTICULAR, THE TWO SUPERPOWERS DID NOT UNDERSTAND
EACH OTHER'S PSYCHOLOGY. SOVIET LEADERS LAID SUCH EMPHASIS
ON BEING TREATED AS EQUALS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THEIR INSECURITY
COMPLEX. THIS FLOWED FROM HISTORY BUT WAS EXACERBATED BY THE
WAY PRESIDENT REAGAN SPOKE.

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5. THE HUNGARIANS WERE TRYING TO ARGUE THE ADVANTAGES OF DIALOGUE WITHIN THEIR OWN ALLIANCE SYSTEM, JUST AS WE, NO DOUBT, WERE DOING IN OURS. IF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THIS REGARD WAS MORE ACTIVE AND OPEN THAN THAT OF SOME OF ITS NEIGHBOURS, THIS DID NOT JUST REFLECT THE FACT THAT THEIR INTERESTS MIGHT DIFFER. IT ALSO REFLECTED THE GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION HUNGARY ENJOYED, IN PART BECAUSE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO TALK TO IT. OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PLAY THE SAME ROLE BUT THEY LACKED HUNGARY'S WESTERN CONTACTS.

6. I COMMENTED THAT THE TONE OF CZECH COMMENT ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. ESZTERGALYOS AGREED. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE CZECHS WERE MORE DETERMINED TO ATTACK HUNGARY OR THE UK ABOUT THE VISIT. BUT SOME SURPRISING EAST EUROPEANS, SUCH AS THE EAST GERMANS, WERE MUCH MORE OPEN-MINDED THAN THE CZECHS. WITHIN THEIR OWN ALLIANCE SYSTEM, THE HUNGARIANS BELIEVED IN A DIVISION OF LABOUR. HE FELT THAT THE WEST WERE NOT PRACTISING THIS IN THEIR APPROACH TO HUNGARY.

7. I COMMENTED THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE MORE PREPARED TO TALK TO HUNGARY THAN ITS NEIGHBOURS PRECISELY BECAUSE IT REPRESENTED THE MORE ACCEPTABLE FACE OF SOCIALISM. ESZTERGALYOS AGREED: BUT HE LEFT ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS MAKING A CONSIDERED PLEA THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND SPECIFICALLY TOWARDS EAST GERMANY, THE RELATIVELY OPEN POLICY WE HAVE ADOPTED TOWARDS HUNGARY.

8. ESZTERGALYOS POOH-POOHED SUGGESTIONS THAT CHERNENKO'S ACCESSION MIGHT CALL HIS OPTIMISM ABOUT THE VALUE OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS INTO QUESTION. WESTERN PRESS COMMENT MISSED THE POINT ABOUT CHERNENKO. HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE DETENTE POLICY EVER SINCE HELSINKI. HE MIGHT HAVE LITTLE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEST BUT HE HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE TO BREZHNEV. MORE IMMEDIATELY, MOSCOW'S POLICY WAS A COLLECTIVE ONE. CHERNENKO HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUITY OF POLICY. THAT WAS EVEN MORE BELIEVABLE WITH CHERNENKO AT THE HELM THAN IF A YOUNGER MAN, WHO MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO INTRODUCE TOTALLY NEW CONCEPTS, HAD BEEN ELECTED. IN ANY CASE, THE LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW HAD HAD A LONG TIME TO PREPARE ITSELF FOR ANDROPOV'S DEATH.

9. IT WAS EVEN POSSIBLE, ESZTERGALYOS THOUGHT, THAT CHERNENKO REPRESENTED A BETTER OPPORTUNITY FOR EAST-WEST CONTACT THAN THE STATUS QUO ANTE, WHEN ANDROPOV'S ILLNESS HAD GOT IN THE

WAY OF PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS TRUDEAU'S PROPOSED VISIT TO MOSCOW. BUT IT WAS UP TO THE WEST TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE. AS WE KNEW, HUNGARY WELCOMED INITIATIVES SUCH AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST AND MOSCOW. BUT THERE CONTINUED TO BE DOUBTS IN HUNGARY ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN, PARTICULARLY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTION.

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10. I ASKED ESZTERGALYOS IF HE WAS REALLY SAYING THAT CHERNENKO'S SUCCESSION HAD OPENED A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY. HE IS EASILY CARRIED AWAY BY HIS OWN IDEAS AND NEEDS TO BE TAKEN WITH A PINCH OF SALT, BUT ESZTERGALYOS WAXED ELOQUENT IN REPLY. THERE MIGHT INDEED BE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY, BUT IT WAS RUSTED AND FROZEN SHUT. THE EFFORTS OF ALL CONCERNED WOULD BE NEEDED TO FORCE IT OPEN AND LET FRESH AIR INTO ROOMS FILLED WITH THE SMOKE OF PAST HAGGLING.

11. LASTLY, I ASKED ESZTERGALYOS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE OF GUARD IN MOSCOW ON EASTERN EUROPE AND, SPECIFICALLY, HUNGARY. HE REPLIED THAT THE WESTERN PRESS (AND HE MIGHT HAVE SAID MOST HUNGARIAN COMMENTATORS TOO) HAD EXAGGERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF ANDROPOV'S PREVIOUS CONNECTION WITH HUNGARY. IT HAD BEEN AN ADVANTAGE THAT HE KNEW HUNGARY AND KADAR PERSONALLY. BUT KADAR HAD GOT ON WELL WITH KHRUSCHEV AND BREZHNEV TOO. AND HE SAW NO DIFFICULTIES ABOUT HIS OWN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHERNENKO.

COMMENTJ

12. ESZTERGALYOS WAS MANIFESTLY SINCERE ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. ON CHERNENKO, METHINKS HE DOUBT PROTEST TOO MUCH. MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE WAS WITH HIM AT THE AIRPORT WHEN THE NEWS OF CHERNENKO'S APPOINTMENT CAME THROUGH AND SAYS THAT ESZTERGALYO'S FACE FELL WHEN HE HEARD IT. I SUSPECT THAT HIS LINE WITH ME ON CHERNENKO CONTAINS MORE THAN AN ELEMENT OF WISHFUL THINKING. IT IS NEVERTHELESS INTERESTING THAT EVEN WITH A NEW GENERAL SECRETARY ABOUT WHOM THE HUNGARIANS MAY ENTERTAIN DOUBTS AND FEARS HE FELT FREE TO ADVOCATE CONTINUING EAST-WEST DIALOGUE SO OUTSPOKENLY.

13. SEE MIFT FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION HERE OF CHERNENKO'S SUCCESSION.

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FROM MOSCOW 160800Z FEBRUARY

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 16 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN AND PARIS

MY TELNO 223 : VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING ON 14 FEBRUARY WITH
 CHERNENKO.

1. ACCORDING TO MY U S COLLEAGUE, AT HIS MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT IN THE KREMLIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 14 FEBRUARY CHERNENKO READ OUT A 2 - 3 PAGE PREPARED PAPER . THIS OPENED BY EMPHASISING THE CONTINUITY OF SOVIET POLICY IN ITS OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING TO PRESERVE PEACE ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, MUST SAFEGUARD ITS OWN SECURITY AND THAT OF ITS FRIENDS AND THE U S GOVERNMENT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING EQUILIBRIUM IN BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NOT TAKE ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES VIEWED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH CONCERN. (I AGREE WITH HARTMAN IN SEEING THIS RECOGNITION OF SHARED CONCERN AS NOVEL AND SIGNIFICANT). THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST SEE IF THEY COULD NOT IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP BY " INTER - ACTION ". (ACCORDING TO HARTMAN, THIS TERM WAS USED SEVERAL TIMES BY CHERNENKO). THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY ASKED BUSH TO TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT BALANCED , INDEED BETTER RELATIONS. A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

2. CONTINUING TO READ FROM HIS PAPER , CHERNENKO NOTED THAT, IN HIS SPEECH ON JANUARY 16, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD CALLED FOR CO-OPERATION . THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WORK TOWARDS THIS. BUT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD KNOW THAT THREE PRINCIPLES MUST BE RESPECTED - RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INTEREST , NO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RECOGNITION THAT IDEOLOGY SHOULD NOT PLAY A ROLE IN INTERSTATE RELATIONS.

3. THERE WAS A NEED FOR PRACTICAL STEPS TO CHECK THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. SUCH STEPS WOULD NOT HARM EITHER PARTY. WHY HAD THE UNITED STATES REJECTED THE SOVIET " NO-FIRST-USE " PROPOSALS ? MANY QUESTIONS AWAITED A JOINT US/SOVIET APPROACH AND THERE WAS THEREFORE NEED FOR MORE CONTACTS - CONTACTS TO CONSIDER ARMS CONTROL, COMPETITION IN ARMAMENTS AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

4. AFTER A PASSAGE ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO " INCREASINGLY CONSTRAINED " BILATERAL RELATIONS WHICH HARTMAN SKIPPED BUT WHICH , I THINK, INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO TRADE , CHERNENKO CALLED FOR A PROCESS TO CORRECT THIS LACK OF " INTER-ACTION " BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED , WERE NOT DOOMED TO A FATAL CONFRONTATION.

THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED, WERE NOT DOOMED TO A FATAL CONFRONTATION.

5. AFTER CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF ANDROPOV, BUSH HANDED OVER A PERSONAL LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT, WHICH, ACCORDING TO HARTMAN WENT OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS HIS SPEECH OF JANUARY 16 AND IN SIMILAR TERMS. THERE WAS NOT TIME TO READ THE LETTER AT THE MEETING. PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO MR CHERNENKO'S RESPONSE. THE VICE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE NOT DOOMED TO FATAL CONFLICT. IN HIS JANUARY 16 SPEECH THE PRESIDENT HAD INDEED LOOKED FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED STATES WERE FUNDAMENTAL AND THE U S WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES. BUT THEY DID NOT CHALLENGE SOVIET INTERESTS SEMICLN AND AS MR SHULTZ HAD TOLD GROMYKO IN STOCKHOLM THE U S WISHED TO MOVE ON FROM WORDS TO DEEDS AND TO MAKE PROGRESS IN VARIOUS AREAS. IF PROGRESS WERE MADE, THE PRESIDENT REMAINED INTERESTED IN A SUMMIT MEETING.

6. BUSH WENT ON TO ENUMERATE SOME SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE THE UNITED STATES WISHED TO SEE PROGRESS.

(A) REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SEEK CONFLICT IN THE LEBANON OR A PERMANENT PRESENCE THERE.

(B) ARMS CONTROL. THE UNITED STATES WISHED TO RESUME THE START NEGOTIATIONS. THEY CONSIDERED CERTAIN CONCRETE STEPS WERE POSSIBLE AND WOULD WELCOME SOVIET IDEAS. THERE WAS NEED FOR A "COMMON FRAMEWORK" AND THERE COULD BE "TRADE-OFFS". (HARTMAN INDICATED THAT THIS, INCLUDING THE INVITATION TO COME FORWARD WITH IDEAS, WAS COVERED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER - BUT DID NOT ELABORATE).

(C) THE VICE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED WHAT CHERHENKO HAD SAID ON REFRAINING FROM INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. BUT THE U S GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HAD AN INTEREST IN ISSUES AFFECTING HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH, AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST RECOGNISE, HAD A PRACTICAL EFFECT ON RELATIONS. BUSH INSTANCED THE CONCERN FELT OVER SAKHAROV, SHCHARANSKY AND ORLOV. HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME SPECIAL UNPUBLICISED DIPLOMATIC MECHANISM FOR DISCUSSING SUCH IDEAS.

THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED BY EMPHASISING THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT GENUINELY WISHED TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS.

7. CHERNENKO, NOW SPEAKING EXTEMPORE, SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY STUDY AND ANSWER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. GROMYKO, IN HIS SOLE INTERVENTION THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, INTERJECTED "IF THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE LETTER WHICH REQUIRES A REPLY". CHERNENKO WENT ON TO REQUEST BUSH TO CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION OF MR REAGAN'S HUMAN RESPONSE TO THE DEATH OF MR ANDROPOV BY SENDING A DELEGATION LED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT TO THE FUNERAL AND ALSO HIS WISH FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS. THE MEETING HAD SHOWN THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE PROBLEMS AWAITING SOLUTION. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WERE TWO GREAT NATIONS WHICH SHOULD CHART A COURSE TOGETHER AND WHICH BOTH NEEDED WISE AND KIND LEADERS WHO COULD BE REMEMBERED AS SUCH. OPPORTUNITIES TO SOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE MISSED.

8. HARTMAN PROVIDED THIS ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING ON A PERSONAL BASIS ON 15 FEBRUARY. MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES WERE ALSO PRESENT. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WAS NOT TIME TO PUT QUESTIONS AS HARTMAN HAD TO LEAVE FOR A LUNCH WITH DOBRYNIN SEMICLN ! TO A LUNCH WITH YURI BREZHNEV WHO SOBBERED WHEN I SPOKE OF THE PREVIOUS DAY'S FUNERAL. I HAD NOT THE HEART TO ASK HIM WITH THE LAST TWO SENTENCES OF PARA 7 ABOVE IN MIND, WHETHER HE DID NOT THINK THAT IN THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY THERE WERE HINTS OF HIS FATHER RESURRECTED.

9. ADVANCE COPIES TO PRIVATE SECRETARY AND PS TO PRIME MINISTER.

PRIME MINISTER

*Don't say anything
much. Please
keep on us
Jim*

In view of your recent visits to the Eastern Bloc I thought you might be interested in the attached observations from the Reverend John Russell who last summer spent two months visiting churches in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

He is the incumbent of one of the Lord Chancellor livings in the Birmingham Diocese and is coming to see me on 2 March to discuss his own future. This note was sent to me purely as a matter of interest. From all that I know of him he is a level-headed and perceptive priest with an enquiring mind. It is so difficult to get any information from visits of this nature but you might find his comments of interest.

Geoffrey Butler

MTJ

15 February 1984

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

In July 1960 I met theological students from all over the world, at a World Council of Churches' international conference. Three have particularly kept in touch with me - two are now pastors in Poland, one in East Germany. They are not allowed to travel out, so I have been glad of the chance, this summer, to go behind the Iron Curtain and visit them. Indeed the visit stretched into a two-month tour, visiting as many Christians and churches as I could in East Germany, and more briefly in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The churches I visited were mainly Lutheran.

These three ²countries are very different. Further, my observations arise out of a very brief visit, and any conclusions drawn from them would have to be very tentative.

In East Germany you go to church, and it feels like England - the empty pews, the way that religion is only for the minority who are interested, churches often lacking young people. Minor awkwardnesses, like sitting for the hymns and standing for the prayers; and Holy Communion only once a month, inevitably on the Sunday when I'm not there. It's when you get talking to individual Christians that you begin to see what it's about.

One problem at the moment is that of Peace. The East German government never stops talking about Peace: it is a peace-loving country, it works for peace, it is strongly opposed to new Western nuclear missiles. One hears all this daily. But it is combined with a total lack of self-criticism about the East German government's own military activities. It is a bone of contention for many Christians that army cadet training is compulsory from the age of 14, also National Service; that children in schools are taught that one must hate one's enemy (enemies are trying to prevent the rightful struggle of the workers); and that any peace slogan that suggests an arms reduction on both sides is totally banned.

I got the feeling that such points can be spoken of freely only inside church circles. Therefore young people with or without a Christian connection are attracted to the Church. The Church begins to become a focus for criticism of the State, which is an unwelcome development, both to the government, and to the majority of churchmembers who value the government's toleration of the Church. But other Christians are glad that by this Peace debate young people from outside the Church are being drawn into lively contact with young Christians.

Another problem is what amounts to discrimination against Christians. This is not uniform, it appears to be stricter in some places than others. Thus, children of Christian parents find it hard to be accepted for an A-level course, and rarely get into university. So unless the parents and children keep clear of Church entanglements for several years, the children are restricted to theological training by the Church, or non-academic training. Many families find this hard. Or again: Christians who don't conform to the system cannot usually get a teaching post, or any responsible post in business or public life. Conforming to the system may involve such things as joining the Communist Party, breaking off contact with one's own relatives in the West, and always saying things favourable to the government.

I was most impressed by a large Kirchentag, or lay Christian Congress, permitted by the Government for this Luther's 500th anniversary year. Seven such Congresses are being held, in different places; at the one I was at several thousand came together, mainly young people, for discussion, worship and fellowship. The young people I spoke to said that they need the encouragement they get from this kind of event to carry them through the discouragements of ordinary day-to-day Christian living.

Poland was so different: full churches, both Roman Catholic and Lutheran, you feel that the Church is the voice of the people. It is said that on a typical Sunday, on average over the whole country, 80% of Polish adults are at Mass - compare that with Britain! Some of this is clearly influenced by Polish nationalist feeling. I also noticed the continuing poverty in Poland.

As to the political temperature there, many said everything is fine, but I heard of others who are suffering harassment as churchmembers. Often I felt that people were afraid to say anything. One church leader, when I asked how things were for Christians in his church, said only "We can eat, we can live". I had the impression that he was implying problems about everything else; but he would not be drawn further. I found it impossible to get a true picture.

In Czechoslovakia I unfortunately lost nearly all my luggage - stolen out of a locked left-luggage locker. This caused me to discover the difficulties of shopping in a Communist country. By Western standards, nearly all goods are of poor quality and unattractive to look at, and some (like handkerchiefs and envelopes) simply not available.

I found repression in Czechoslovakia, although I was only in Prague, a tourist city, where I expect things are better than anywhere else in the country. The official line is this: the Church democratically governs its own affairs, it supports the State, the State pays the pastors' salaries. Meetings for young people and any form of evangelism are, however, forbidden. (A special youth assembly was arranged last year, on the occasion of a visit by Billy Graham, who was greatly impressed; but I was told that was window-dressing, quite untypical.)

So the Church becomes a set of isolated small groups. When a pastor moves even a little outside the circle of his group, he is liable to be dismissed, and must find whatever low-grade secular work he can. If he is obstinate he will go to prison with hard labour. I met some who had so suffered. Some interest in the Church remains; I was at a church where three teenagers and a young woman had recently been drawn into membership. But I couldn't speak much with Christians in Czechoslovakia.

Everywhere I went, in these countries, I found great interest in the West, and delight that we are making the effort to keep links open. They value our interest, indeed I believe they need it.

My thanks go to the Bishop of Birmingham, to the Board of Mission and Unity of the Church of England, to the Harold Buxton Trust, and to all others who made this visit possible. I would gladly tell anyone more about it. In particular I kept a detailed diary, at some length, and anyone particularly interested could borrow it.

John Russell.

Rowley Regis. July 1983.

Original on Hungary - Relations - Pt 2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 February 1984

Jan Th...

Revised copy submitted to

The Prime Minister's Visit to Hungary

P.R. A.F.C. 7/2.

The Prime Minister told President Reagan in her letter of 19 January that she would let him have her impressions of her visit to Hungary. I enclose a draft which the Foreign Secretary has seen.

I understand that the Prime Minister would welcome suggestions as to how to carry forward the impetus given to East/West relations by her visit. The Foreign Secretary has already commissioned urgent work on this and will be sending you advice in a day or two.

*Yours
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1494</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Mr Gromyko's jokes are thin and cold, hanging like icicles in the wintry diplomatic air. But he himself has something to smile about just now. The Gadarene shuffle back to Moscow - symbolised by his long queue of visitors in Stockholm - is now underway. It is easier for the West to stand fast together than to move forward in decent formation. Having failed to split allied governments and peoples, the Russians will now put the accent on dividing the Alliance itself.

Their affected indifference to President Reagan's speech shows that they want it to become a starting signal for competitive concessions by the West. The wedge driving is often crude, but can be effective. The Soviet soldier manning the new missile close to West Germany dwells, in the Soviet Press, on its

horrifying destructive power ...

TASS issues a frosty communique on Gromyko's talk with Shultz two hours before the end of the (slightly warmer) talks themselves. The Russians want to scare and cajole the Europeans, though without sacrificing the option of a new relationship with America. Hence the resumption of the MBFR talks, but not the nuclear ones.

The obvious reaction is to close ranks - but not around a policy vacuum. An orderly return to dialogue with Moscow means a dialogue in the Alliance first to

develop a concerted and consistent political strategy. NATO has modernised its nuclear weapons: it should now modernise its diplomacy too.

That means being frank about the past. There is no point in disguising that the West is in a less than ideal posture. We are living with the consequences of the failure to play the diplomatic card as energetically as the defence card - to walk on two legs as Chairman Mao would have said. The pressure on the President to restart the arms talks is greater than on Mr Andropov. The Russians have no elections this year, or next ... It was not especially clever to get into this position. That is water under the bridge - ^{though} there are lessons here too. Those who think it wrong to criticise one's major ally even when it is manifestly ^{mistaken} ~~wrong~~ should imagine what we would look like today if we had not refined our attitude to Moscow well in advance of the President. Britain is not Bulgaria. Maybe we should even be giving Mrs Thatcher a little credit for showing Washington the way?

Looking back, we are struck by the extraordinary disproportion between the real sources of East/West tension, and all the war talk and nuclear neurosis. The tensions are real enough, and result largely from Soviet actions. **B**ut they can be contained with firmness and imagination. Once the fundamental sense of proportion goes, other disproportions follow. Because the Americans mismanage

their relations with the Russians, people start to equate the two. Then the Alliance coughs, and there is instant talk of drastic cures.

Once the debate is derailed, false strategies abound. Should America revert to isolationism in the face of Europe's "neutralism"? False policy options duly follow: why didn't the West "do something" about Poland?

The main debate - on Soviet policy itself - is falsified too. Some insist that the Russians are inherently aggressive, others that they are just insecure. Surely it is a truism of individual psychology that aggressiveness and insecurity are two sides of the same coin? The Soviet Union is self-evidently both. ^{recurring discussion about} ~~The same debate mirrors in~~ whether her policies are driven by nationalism, or ideology, is often equally academic. Wisely, the Afghan patriots do not break off their struggle to argue the point.

The West's view of Moscow is dangerously volatile. We now face a horribly predictable reaction to some of the moralistic extremism of recent years. Revisionism always revises too much: already some are straining over backwards to get the Soviet angle of vision on everything, forgetting that the purpose of knowing more about the Russians is to promote our interests, not theirs. Mr Kinnock himself is reverting to the traditional Socialist search for a cosy niche between the Superpowers.

He could shorten his apprenticeship by reading Professor Bullock's splendid biography of Bevin.

Others are asking whether there is really a Soviet threat at all? We don't need all these earnest reappraisals. The threat is real, and doesn't wax and wane with our re-evaluations. Like Dr Johnson's famous stone, it is just there. And if anyone doesn't believe it, he should try asking a Czech to kick a Russian, and see what happens.

Paradoxically, the relentless continuity of the Soviet system is symbolised by the intermittencies of Mr Andropov himself. We are dealing with a country which can function on automatic pilot, without visible leadership, for months on end. Imagine the strength of inertia at the other end of Soviet society.

Unstable assessments lead to inconsistent policies. The spasmodic approach to Moscow has a disastrous effect on Alliance relationships and public opinion. Dr Kissinger recently spelled out eight wise principles for dealing with the Russians, and chief among these was consistency. With the best will in the world, it is difficult to sway in time with American moods - and damaging domestically if you are seen to try.

So we are back to the need for long term policies of containment. Fancy talk about "crisis control" is not enough. The political context for controlling crises

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must be built up over long periods. Eastern Europe - a sullen mass of discontent - is a prime example. It is not hard to imagine the atmosphere in Berlin in ten years' time if half of what has happened in Poland is repeated in East Germany. Mr Shultz's remarks in Stockholm about the illegitimacy of the present structure in Europe may make the Poles of Chicago feel good, but they won't do much for those in Warsaw. He could have gladdened the hearts of both, and avoided a pointless exacerbation of Soviet neuroses, by asserting the West's legitimate right to economic, cultural and political contacts with the peoples of Eastern Europe as a whole.

But the immediate problem is the missiles. Here the lesson is simple: we ~~shall~~^{can} not build an alliance consensus around pure mathematics. Numbers may tyrannise technocrats, but they simply frighten, and destabilise, the public. It is bad enough when they are large and abstract; it is even worse when they turn out to be wrong - like the CIA's over-estimate of Soviet military spending. It is especially dangerous to probe the paradoxes of nuclear weapons too far, and too frequently. They exist not to be used. Refinements and ramifications are infinite, but in political terms, they lead nowhere. There is a difference between facing nuclear realities, and rubbing people's noses in them. Western governments insist that weapons alone do not cause war; it follows that we should pay at least as much attention to the politics.

The most recent NATO communique spoke of the need for "adequate" defence. The expression could do with greater currency. In nuclear terms, it should mean a reliable sufficiency, rather than the illusory search for exact equivalence, let alone superiority. The eventual judgement will have to be political and will depend on a minimum of mutual confidence - a good reason in itself for meeting the people with whom you are negotiating.

Britain's credentials in all this are unquestioned: judged by the sophisticated "prosperity index share" which we deploy to some effect in the Community budget negotiations, we spend up to twice as much as most of our allies on defence. It is all the more important for us to be seen to "walk on two legs" as well. The Prime Minister's visit to Hungary, a country which embodies many of the contradictions and complexities of the communist system, will add to the collective wisdom of the Alliance.

Inevitably, the US election will give the Russians tempting openings. But they would do well to remember that the Alliance is far more stable than it contrives to appear. It is like one of those Russian dolls with weighted bottoms, which wobble but never fall over. Yet we on our side should remember that wobbling itself is a distracting activity. It unnerves one's friends, and God knows what it does to the adversary.

GEORGE WALDEN

Russia and the West

World Power by Jonathan Steele

Michael Joseph, £14.95

All Stalin's Men by Roy Medvedev

Basil Blackwell, £8.95

Life in Russia by Michael Binyon

Hamish Hamilton, £8.95

Among the Russians by Colin Thubron

Heinemann, £8.95

Behind Russian Lines by Sandy Gall

Sidgwick & Jackson, £8.95

A Hitch or Two in Afghanistan

by Nigel Ryan *Weidenfeld, £8.95*

AS A POSTGRADUATE student at Moscow University, I heard my share of Soviet political humour. During the Berlin crisis the anxious question was asked: would there be a war? The answer was no, no war, but such a fight for peace that not a single stone would be left upon another.

More than 20 years later, we are still fighting. But there have been two major changes. One is the growth of Soviet military power. The other is the decline of Western interest in and knowledge about the Russians. Pretty well every famous general or strategist, from Sun Tze to Robert E. Lee, has had some wise words to say about knowing your adversary. And yet we can't bring ourselves to muster more curiosity about Moscow, despite current tensions.

One reason, I suspect, is that Soviet society exudes, as it decays, a colossal cultural tedium. Who wants to chart the political and economic inertia of the system, or follow the careers of those grey, elderly gentlemen? Popular interest has also waned dramatically. In Britain there is a potential streak of generosity towards the Russians, but it hasn't been seen for years, not perhaps since Khrushchev jollied things up a bit.

This vast indifference can have curious consequences. In discussions of international affairs, the Soviet Union is sometimes elided from the argument, simply because people literally don't want to know. We have seen some of this over Cruise: many protestors are not so much pro-Soviet, as convinced that the problem is between us and the Americans. By not being present at all in people's minds, Moscow itself is sometimes silently discounted, just as one might overlook some huge, gloomy structure on a familiar route. I know of no better reason for resuming contacts with the Soviet Union at all levels.

So it is consoling to see a new batch of books about Russia. Jonathan Steele's book on Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev and Andropov is the most ambitious. The main problem lies in the self-consciousness of its revisionism. We have had so much harsh, one-sided commentary on Soviet policies, that it was horribly predictable that someone would try to correct the balance. The danger of revisionism

is that it often simply leaves you stranded with an antithesis, but no hard synthesis. That basically is what we are left with after reading Mr Steele's book.

Swings in opinion on the Soviet Union are inevitable, and result from Soviet actions themselves, from changes in our own perceptions and priorities, and from the very state of our knowledge. It has been a bad time for all three recently, and we are in a dangerously volatile state of mind about the Soviet threat. By helping us to understand how the Soviet Union sees the West, Mr Steele contributes to a more balanced view. But he does not entirely avoid the danger of getting carried away with his corrective function. There is not much future in impaling oneself on a pendulum.

The discussion of the Soviet view of national security contains much that is worth restating. The sense of encirclement; past invasions; and the awareness that any new war would be the last. The cliché I have always found most persuasive is the Soviet desire for Western respect. This Mr Steele illustrates and argues effectively. The Russians wish to be seen as a state with a legitimate interest in their own security. It is a simple point, too often forgotten by some of our more excitable commentators. If we are to regard the Soviet Union as a thoroughly illegitimate state, certain stark consequences follow. If it is a legitimate state (however much we dislike its ideology or foreign policy) then we must expect it to try to exert its power and influence beyond its frontiers in the way that any state of its size is likely to do, only more so because of the ideological component. We must deal with it as we would with any other state, only more so too.

Mr Steele tends to suggest that every Soviet action which has been disapproved of by the West — the arms build up, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, is a reaction to Western forward policy; a result of fear; or a proof of weakness. The cumulative picture is of, if not an innocent, a misunderstood Russia. And where the Russians are not misunderstood, they are inefficient. It is easy to finish the book feeling rather sorry for them.

The book is also pervaded by a curiously dated reluctance to make what used to be called in the Sixties "value judgements", (i.e. common sense assumptions); and by over-anxiety to balance the books. We have phrases like "While the West has made much of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine..." Surely the Poles and Afghans must ponder the implications for themselves of this doctrine too? And worst of all we have a value-free comparison between Soviet ideological expansionism and Western notions of human rights. Both, says Mr Steele, override national boundaries. Yes, but Western concepts of individual human rights, liberty, democracy and justice are simply *superior* to the crude, dangerous and old-fashioned Soviet world view of international class conflict. Unless we make that highly defensible "value judgement", hard policy analysis is paralysed, and we are left swinging in a moralistic mist.

Medvedev's book is the real thing. It is a brilliant illustration of the ordinariness of evil. It consists quite simply of six short biographies (Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Suslov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov). Karl Kraus once said "when I think of Hitler, nothing occurs to me". The same is true of this sextet (with the possible exception of Mikoyan). Medvedev mostly avoids commentary in these essays, allowing the full brutal force of the biographies of these hideously banal men to speak for themselves. The flat, sober tone highlights the horror. The subjects are selected because they spanned the whole period from Lenin, through Stalin to

Krushchev. All (though not Molotov) were of humble birth. All were men of the utmost mediocrity, despite their administrative abilities, without culture or any nobility of soul – again with the exception of Mikoyan. One is constantly reminded of Ortega Y Gasset's warnings about mass-men, and the danger of politics absorbing life.

Voroshilov, the courageous, but rather dense Marshal who tended to agree with people because he was not very clever, did not play a central role in the massacre of the military cadres in 1937. But he didn't disagree with that either, and added to the atmosphere of spymania. Nicely judged human touches offset the inhumanity. The Marshal was once embarrassed at his inability to dance at receptions abroad, and so ordered his officers to be instructed in the latest European dances.

Medvedev confirms our suspicions that Suslov was the ultimate bore. As chief ideologist of the Communist Party, he would have made a good provincial teacher of social sciences. As anyone who has had the misfortune to read his speeches will confirm, he too is a paragon of sheer ordinariness. His academic preoccupations at least spared him direct involvement in the murders of the late thirties. But he is a symbol of the mournful continuity of the system, and its inability to innovate. Yet even he had a human side: he once fell in love with a young girl, and only the "Boss's" reprimand saved his marriage.

Molotov is perhaps the nastiest of the bunch. His habit of adding obscene abuse to his signature on the blacklists of those condemned is particularly repellent. It is that same signature, incidentally, that appears on the Charter of the United Nations on behalf of the Soviet Union. . . . The Soviet purges ate up not only their own, but their wives too. Molotov's was arrested before the war, but given back to him as a birthday present on Stalin's death. Medvedev recounts a revealing scene after his disgrace: "On another occasion, Molotov joined a queue for tomatoes that had formed in a shop at Zhukovka. A woman immediately left the line and loudly announced that she would not stand in any line with an executioner." Executions, the persistence of some spirit of decency, the lack of tomatoes, the queues, everything is there. . . .

Kaganovich, who took an active part in the collectivisation in the Ukraine, and the deportations, comes a close second to Molotov. He spoke in the language of the gutter, and is said to have resorted to physical violence against his own assistants. Responsible for the demolition of many Moscow churches, he once justified one piece of vandalism near Red Square by insisting that "my aesthetics demands that the demonstration processions from the six districts of Moscow should all pour into Red Square at the same time". (Comparisons with some of the little philistines who wield local power in this country today are unfair, but irresistible). As a Jew, his position was threatened during the "Doctor's Plot". But he stood by while his own brother was hounded to suicide in 1941.

Malenkov was physically as well as morally unappealing. It is nice to know there was enough wit around to call him "matryenka" because of his soft, effeminate appearance. But according to Medvedev, he was active in the wings during the Terror, and present when party leaders were tortured. Again the boorishness and lack of minimal culture comes out strongly: Malenkov once asked what the difference was between a "thick" journal (i.e. a serious literary periodical) and a "thin" one – a good sign of ignorance in Russia.

Mikoyan arouses more wonder than revulsion. How did he survive? There is no real answer, except that he seems to have been extraordinarily clever and useful. His earlier uses had included the publication of the first Soviet cookery book whose opening words by Stalin were: "life has become better, life has become merrier". That was in the early 1930s. Obviously he was not untainted by the Terror. But we have to ask ourselves the interesting moral question: would we have preferred him to sacrifice himself by protecting, or preserve himself, if only for his role in heading off the Cuba

crisis? Perhaps we are fortunate that, unlike Voroshilov, Mikoyan could dance.

Medvedev's book is by far the most powerful of this group, simply because it is true and written by an insider who himself has shown extraordinary courage. There is very little argumentative commentary. It is all too serious and awful for that. Instead we have a brilliant evocation of the mass-men of totalitarianism. This book tells us more about the mechanisms that produced the Korean airline incident than any amount of contemporary commentary.

I confess to a mysterious prejudice against travel books. The best description I know of the United States is by Franz Kafka, who never went there. But in the present low ebb in Soviet studies, any travel helps. Michael Binyon's and Colin Thubron's books rediscover different aspects of Soviet reality. One deals with the surface of Soviet life; the other with its soul.

Mr Binyon produces few insights, and no sense of the deep melancholy of Soviet existence. It is a measure of where we have got to that it becomes necessary to say that "the Russians are people", but I suppose somebody has to do it. Mr Binyon, who was *Times* correspondent in Moscow for several years, does it as well as anyone, and the facts that he has collected tell their own tale. We all know about abortion, for example, but the figures are startling: every woman has six to eight abortions during her lifetime. The statistics on drink fail to make their full impact: "escapism is a strong motive for drinking. . . ." is true around the globe. It is what the Russians are escaping from that needs description.

Mr Binyon's chapter on the arts is the least satisfactory. He talks of a "somewhat old-fashioned respect for culture", and notes that all schoolchildren are taught Pushkin and Tolstoy. I would gladly settle for a system in this country where children read their own classics. Apart from anything else, understanding of our own culture would



Freedom fighters in Afghanistan with a captured Russian AGS17 (automatic grenade launcher). From *Behind Russian Lines*.

gives us a better perspective on that of other countries, including the Soviet Union. The "old-fashionedness" of the Soviet educational system has been one of its few successes. Reading Dostoevsky in modern Russia must do a lot to keep the spirit alive.

There is a good deal of information here, and some amusing anecdotes: "What is a musical trio - a Soviet quartet that has been to the West". Commenting on the dullness of Soviet television news programmes, one woman told the author that she always knew when the evening news came on, because all the toilets in her block started flushing, doors began to bang and people began moving about. But the book as a whole is rather like a painting by Frith: accurate, rather than inspiring.

If Mr Binyon is strong on fact, Colin Thubron's *Among the Russians* is equally strong on feeling. He brings a writer's eye to the country (though occasionally *il se regard écrire*), and captures the mood of spiritual desolation well.

The author made an immense trip, on his own - ten thousand miles between the Baltic and the Caucasus - and an enormous range of contacts with minimal harassment from the KGB. Indeed, by an act of bureaucratic insouciance or arbitrariness, they spared him the notebooks on which this work is based.

There are some fine descriptive passages (though Mr Thubron never quite gets over the size of the place), and his sensitive ear catches the curious mixture of ancient and modern English talked by some Russians, which reflects so poignantly their cultural isolation: "It is not allowed to guides to tittle alone with foreigners... there is a game reserve where I have a certain buddy. I do not wish to press my insistences upon you, but you are a sportsman are you not?" The same guide, Misha, personifies the moral disintegration of the regime. He is a flabby, drunken and repellent petty KGB informer, given to boasting about

imaginary conquests of women. In fact he reminds one, in an odd way, of Malenkov, in a different age and a different career.

This is a good, and above all intellectually honest book. If there is a flaw, it lies in a certain strain of sentimentalism, and the implied dissociation of the Russian people from their regime. An acquaintance says "if only I were head of the Politburo and you were President of America, we'd sign eternal peace at once and go mushroom picking together". The author's comment is troubling: "I never again equated the Russian system with the Russian people". After a similar conversation later in the book, he says "in him I heard the Russian people".

Now this will not do. There is a direct link between Rousseau and totalitarianism, and in Russia, sentimentalism and totalitarianism seem to be endemic. The suspect sweetness is there in the wine; it is there in a good deal of the literature; it is there in the poignant appeals to peace and brotherhood of the slogans; and it is there in the occasional tears of Soviet leaders. Let us remember Rousseau's own phrase: "I was, if not virtuous, at least intoxicated with virtue".

But Mr Thubron avoids the worst, and leaves Russia a more contemplative person than when he went there. We should be grateful that he went at all. More people of his imaginative powers, intellect and - yes - sensibility - should go there more often.

From contemplation to action. In the summer of 1982, the familiar features of Sandy Gall could be seen through Soviet binoculars scrambling up the hillsides in central Afghanistan. With him was his friend, Nigel Ryan. They produced parallel books. It is naturally exhilarating, after the arguing, description and worried reflection, to come across some straightforward action.

For a host of reasons it is important that the Russians should not get away with Afghanistan. There are three means to ensure that they do not. The first is to arrange for the freedom fighters to be well armed; the second is to ensure that there is permanent diplomatic pressure on the Russians to withdraw; and the third is that the war should be publicised. The modern sensibility is visual; if something ceases to be seen, it ceases to exist. Sandy Gall explains this in somewhat incongruous language to the splendid guerilla leader, Commander Masud: "We have come to make a major one hour documentary for British independent television... It's a big budget documentary..." Masud agrees, but remarks poignantly that weapons would be welcome too.

The Russians have fewer material problems and no inhibitions. The vicious, anti-personnel mines that they drop from aircraft for children to pick up are heart-shaped (Mr Thubron please note). There seems no obvious end to the war in sight. Nigel Ryan "if the Mujahedin were displaying a lamentable lack of professional competence, the Russians and Afghan Government forces were happily matching it". That dreadful diplomatic phrase "the long haul" springs to mind. Unless, that is, the world keeps the struggle to the forefront of its concerns, and gives it the diplomatic, military and propaganda support it deserves. Messrs Gall and Ryan have done their bit.

If, like me, you believe in giants, you will be a trifle disappointed by most of these books. We are a long way from the magnificent polemics of Nicolas Berdyayev against the Soviet regime; from the brilliant and passionate debates about communism recounted in Raymond Aron's memoirs; or from George Kennan, who a year or two ago made a most acute comment on East/West relations when he warned against our tendency "to see in the Soviet Union only a mirror in which we look for the reflection of our own virtue".

But, as the Russians say, when the fishing is bad even a crayfish is a catch. There is an overwhelming need for a sober, informed and consistent Western policy towards the Soviet Union. Some of these books lay some of the groundwork for a revival of critical interest. But I am not optimistic.



Pallbearers at Stalin's funeral, Kaganovich (left), Molotov (middle) and Malenkov (right): "A brilliant illustration of the ordinariness of evil." From *All Stalin's Men*.

One of the more dismal scenes in English literature comes in Gissing's *Henry Ryecroft* (itself a pretty depressing book), where a labourer on a spree is driven out of a restaurant because he is intimidated by the formalities which go with the food. He ends by wrapping the lot in a newspaper and bolting.

Bevin completely lacked class-consciousness – in the crabbed sense of the term, though he took a natural pride in his humble origins. He once told his Private Secretary's wife that he used to collect washing from her mother's house. Nobody dreamt of disapproving of him, and the idea of patronising a man like Bevin did not arise. Only the Russians, with their old-world, Marxist preconceptions, found him not quite the thing: 'Eden is a gentleman, Bevin is not,' said the thoroughly ungentlemanly Molotov in a successful attempt to provoke him.

He seems to have been quite unflustered by the dignified element of office: the bold pin-striped suit, the morning coat and evening dress, were obviously just the togs of the trade to him. Bevin was uncomplicated as well as uncomplicated, and his instincts were as sound as a Bow bell. He could not find it in himself to dislike the upper classes: 'They may be an abuse, but they are often as like as not intelligent and amusing.' But he couldn't stand the middle classes.

This clarity of definition surrounds the man and his policies, as well as the challenges which faced him, and the West, at the time. Imagine for a moment the opposite. Think what it would have been like to have a post-war British Foreign Secretary who was a well-born, class-conscious, leftist intellectual, complete with inverted sartorial snobbery. Think how anxious he would have been for Left to talk unto Left, to see the best in Stalin, to put his faith in the frail infant of the United Nations and resist the 'return to power politics', while Russia secured herself in Eastern Europe and prepared for the next moves. Think of the effects on Europe, on the United States and on the Soviet Union of this specifically British form of social self-indulgence – and thank God for Bevin, and for Nato.

The expansiveness of the real Bevin is exhilarating, even in print. There is no trace here of foetid introversion. He saw foreigners as he did social classes: some of them were really all right, despite their origins – though he seems to have had the same problem about Jews as he did about the middle class. Inevitably it was said that he had been stifled by the embrace of the Foreign Office. The notion of Bevin being stifled by anyone is rather like that of his being patronised.

It is said that these men do not carry out my policies. I deny that. What the Civil Service likes is a minister who knows his mind and tells the officials what to do. They will then do it. If it is wrong, the minister must take responsibility and not blame the Civil Service.

No peevish scapegoatism here. Exposure to international reality had a strong educative effect on Bevin (it would have been alarming if it had not). But his policies bore the stamp of his personality. There was no sense of a man abandoning his own ideals, or being sucked under by the dictates of expediency. He sought to give a social and economic edge to foreign policy, and his experience in the War Cabinet, and his trade-union background, meant that he was well placed to do so. Above all, he knew that no foreign policy could work without stable economic underpinning. British policy must be an organic expression of the country's interests and potential, and not some wispy intellectual schema or moralistic spasm. He knew our strengths and limits, and translated his experience into a

Capability Bevin

George Walden

Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951

by Alan Bullock.

Heinemann, 896 pp., £30, 7 November 1983, 0 434 09452 8

concrete vision of world affairs. He saw immediately that the best way to fight Communism in the area between Turkey and Afghanistan, for example, was to raise the living standards of the hundred million people who lived there, and he pressed for the economic development of the Empire.

He was also unsentimental about industrial relations at home. He could tell the miners the truth about the importance of production for the independence of the country, as his putative middle-class-intellectual equivalent could never dare to do. His remarks on economics ('if you go on merely borrowing money and living in a fool's paradise you will never get your own economy right'), and allied subjects make him sound like a cross between Cobbett and Mrs Thatcher. The pragmatic nature of his idealism is nicely illustrated in his touching and prophetic concern for the educative effect of travel. Time and again, he harked back to his early connection with the Workers' Travel Association.

Bevin might not like to have been thought of as a barefoot philosopher, but in a way he was. He would have been surprised to learn that he was merely restating Kant's optimism when he said that 'there has never been a war yet which, if the facts had been put calmly before the ordinary folk, might not have been prevented.' But his optimism never got out of step with his realism, notably on the United Nations. Heidegger once remarked that 'nationalism is not overcome by mere internationalism; it is rather expanded and elevated thereby into a system.' Bevin's scepticism about the UN was more down to earth: 'it seems vital to me not to deceive the people of the world by leading them to believe that we are creating a United Nations Organisation which is going to protect them from future wars, in which we share our secrets, while we know, in fact, that nothing of the kind is happening.'

All of which leads us naturally to Bevin and the bomb. His attitude was just what you might have expected – a mixture of healthy moral impulse, tempered by common sense. He seized immediately on the key point: 'War is not caused by the invention of weapons. It is policy which makes war.' His first reaction to a suggestion that the West should give the bomb to the Russians was positive. Today that sounds slightly batty. But it would at least have made *some* sort of sense, in both idealistic and pragmatic terms, to have given the Russians the means of creating a nuclear balance. That is more than can be said for the notion of sacrificing our own bomb today and thereby upsetting a working balance. Within a week, Bevin's shrewdness got the better of him. The Russians, he decided, were likely to receive the offering with more suspicion than gratitude, and see it as a sign of weakness. The paradox of nuclear weapons dawned quickly on the Labour government of the time. Attlee rejected a suggestion that international control of nuclear weapons could be made effective by a threat of collective nuclear retaliation against the culprit: 'What British government would accept an obligation to embark on atomic warfare when this might mean the destruction of London?'

But there is another paradox too. The reason Bevin thought it indispensable for Britain to have atomic weapons had less to do

with deterrence than with his reluctance to leave the Americans in sole control: 'We could not afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this new development.'

This book illustrates the remarkable permanence of our foreign policy concerns. On the Middle East, 'Bevin never got over his indignation at the willingness of the President (and Congress) to let the Jewish vote and Jewish contributions to party funds influence their policy on Palestine – ignoring the complexities of the situation.' There was also a lurking fear of a Soviet/United States deal over the heads of Europe, especially with American diplomacy in the hands of Ambassador Byrnes in the early post-war years. And above all, Britain was preoccupied then, as now, with the strains of the defence budget: 'What shall it profit Britain to have even 1½ million men in the forces and supply, and to be spending nearly £1,000 million a year on them, if we come an economic and financial cropper two years hence?' In fact, the Government came a cropper over dollars within two weeks.

Professor Bullock reminds us how slow in coming was the confrontation between East and West. Bevin did nothing to hasten it. The detailed reconstruction of this period which is provided in the book reminds us, too, just how thin is the case of the post-Vietnam revisionists who accuse the West of responsibility for the Cold War. If one thing stands out from Bullock's account, it is the lengths to which the British and Americans went to try to make a go of it with Stalin. Indeed, their efforts were almost culpably persistent and sincere. At the first meeting in London in September 1945 of the Council of Foreign Ministers set up in Potsdam nothing at all had been done to concert a Western position. Another detail speaks volumes: two-thirds of UNRRA supplies after the war went to Eastern and Central Europe – including the Soviet Union and Byelorussia – without discrimination. Ninety-four per cent of the funds came from the UK, the US and Canada, at a time when Britain was introducing bread rationing.

And when the blocs were born, solidarity in the West came gift-wrapped from Moscow. The Russians did everything they could to drive us together. And yet there had been no lack of dialogue. It is awe-inspiring today, when the lines of communication have gone dead, to think just how many hours, days and weeks of talking went on between the Russians and the West. It could be argued that it was to little avail. But then it could equally be argued that the risk of war might have been even greater without the talk. There seems to have been none of the contemporary moral squeamishness about sitting down at the same table with those unappetising men, though enough was known or suspected about Stalin. Molotov was an exceedingly unpleasant customer too, as well as being a harsh negotiator. I wonder how Bevin would have reacted had he known that the hand that shook his own on many occasions, and signed the United Nations Charter at San Francisco for the USSR, was in the habit of adding obscene comments (according to Roy Medvedev) against the names of those condemned to die in Stalin's purges?

Fortunately for us, Bevin seems to have approached the Russians without idealistic urges or evangelical zeal. In his hyper-empirical

way, he was always ready to learn by experience, most of which was pretty bitter. One of the most persuasive passages of this wise book is the author's characterisation of Bevin's beliefs during the Berlin blockade: 'What sustained Bevin's confidence was the conviction, by no means common at the time, that if the Western powers could get through the immediate future without suffering a collapse of nerve, history would prove to be on their side, and not on the Russians'. And this, in turn, derived from his belief that in the USA there was available the basis of power necessary to restore sufficient sense of security to release the European peoples' own talents and energies.'

The dual debt to both Bevin and the Americans is still there today. We have inherited a landscape moulded in good part by the energetic foresight of Capability Bevin. We tend to take the exertions of former generations for granted, as we do our public parks or Georgian houses. Living on past capital is a national disease, as is the luxury of self-criticism. It is easy to find fault with what we have inherited, and the expense of the upkeep is appalling. But few can think of anything better.

The author tackles head-on the major criticism of Bevin and his generation. Why did they fail to foresee the necessity of Europe? Many of us have felt a retrospective sense of lost opportunities. But Professor Bullock induces, on this subject, a healthier sobriety. It was easy for Churchill to exercise in opposition his visionary talents. Indeed, it was his role. But the inspired rhetoric should be measured against his own conservatism when he was back in power. It is easy to accuse Bevin of plodding caution and lack of vision. But if his eyes had been straining too far beyond the immediate future, he might have stumbled over the more insistent practical priorities of defence – the Brussels Pact and Nato – without which there would have been no security, and ultimately no Europe. It is like accusing a gardener of preparing the soil, but failing to plant the roses. Better rich soil than dead roses.

Britain played an active role in the European Payments Union and OEEC. But, as Professor Bullock points out, the fact that Europe became synonymous with instant federalism and the end of sovereignty was a serious drawback. The Coal and Steel Community sounds now like a natural British stepping stone to Europe. But it didn't look like that then, for good reasons. 'The question was whether the British were ready to set themselves as an immediate aim the pooling of their coal and steel production and the institution of a new high authority with binding decision-making powers.' It is difficult to dissent from the realpolitik verdict of Morrison: 'It's no good, we can't do it, the Durham miners won't wear it.' Professor Bullock might indeed have made more of the spectacle offered to Britain at the time by France and Germany. We would not have been throwing in our lot with mature democracies, as we did later, and it was asking too much of us – given, in particular, the inheritance of Empire – to take the lead.

In foreign affairs we need less ideology and pure mathematics, and more rumbustious humanity: more Falstaff and less Faust. In international relations, as in art, we are living through a period of mannered decadence. This is as true of the tired and expensive imitators of Dada as of the fancier nuclear theorists. We cannot afford it to be true of today's Nato or of the Atlantic partnership. The groundwork of our security was laid by intelligent, workmanlike hands. Look back at the quality of the men in question – not only

Bevin himself, but Acheson, Kennan and Marshall.

We have enjoyed this security for a third of a century: Nato and Berlin are still here, and so are we. The danger now is of running

to fat, and to excitable extremes. The importation of UHT milk is, we are told, the end of Europe. The slightest tremor of dissent in the Atlantic Alliance is the end of Nato. We permit ourselves delicious frissons of nuclear

neurosis. A bit of bullish Bevin diplomacy might prevent our overwrought imagination getting the better of common sense. Reading about him is an energising experience. After the unrelenting erosion of national self-

confidence, and all those revelations in the Sunday papers, it is good to be reminded by the present book that while Blunt was working for his strong-man, Stalin, Bevin was working for Britain. □

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FM OTTAWA 311550Z JAN 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 65 OF 31 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BUCHAREST,
EAST BERLIN

INFO SAVING TO PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, OTHER NATO POSTS, UKHIS NEW YORK

THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE

1. MR TRUDEAU WAS IN PRAGUE LAST WEEK. THE CZECH PREMIER IS REPORTED TO HAVE PREDICTABLY ATTACKED THE UNITED STATES. MR TRUDEAU'S REPLY, CIRCULATED HERE, CONTAINS NO ANSWER TO THESE CHARGES, NO REFERENCE TO NATO OR NATO POLICY OR TO NATO ARMS CONTROL OFFERS. MR TRUDEAU IS REPORTED AS SUGGESTING THAT CANADA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE IN A SIMILAR POSITION IN RELATIONS TO THE SUPER POWERS.

2. HITHERTO MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE HAS ENJOYED BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT IN CANADA. MOST CANADIANS HERE APPEAR TO FEEL THAT HE WAS RIGHT TO TRY TO REDUCE TENSION, HOWEVER DIFFICULT THIS MIGHT BE. THE CONSERVATIVES HAVE THOUGHT IT PRUDENT NOT TO CRITICISE HIS INITIATIVE AND HAVE INDEED SENT MR JOE CLARK ABROAD TO EXPLORE ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES IN A "ME TOO" EXERCISE - HE IS CURRENTLY IN WASHINGTON.

3. OVER THE WEEKEND REPORTS WERE CARRIED PROMINENTLY ON THE REMARKS MADE BY MR TRUDEAU AT AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM IN DAVOS ON SATURDAY AT WHICH HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY AND CORRECTNESS OF NATO NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND CLASHED WITH MR KENNETH DAM AND MR BARRE (TEXT OF EXCHANGES FOLLOWS BY BAG). AT A PANEL DISCUSSION, FOLLOWING REMARKS BY MR DAM UNDERLINING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES'S COMMITMENT TO PROTECT ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, MR TRUDEAU ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD IN FACT START WORLD WAR III BECAUSE EUROPE WAS BEING OVERRUN. MR DAM SAID THAT MR TRUDEAU'S REMARKS RESTED ON AN ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD STEADILY BUILT UP ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL WHEREAS IN FACT MEGATONNAGE HAD BEEN STEADILY REDUCED. MR BARRE REFUSED TO JOIN MR TRUDEAU IN CASTING DOUBT ON THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND SAID THAT IF THERE WAS, AS MR TRUDEAU CLAIMED, NO CREDIBILITY IN THE ALLIANCE, THAT WOULD LEAD TO NEUTRALISM AND PACIFISM.

4. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE BEGAN, THE MEDIA HAVE HIGHLIGHTED MR TRUDEAU'S DIFFERENCES WITH NATO POLICY AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY HAS, FOR THE FIRST TIME, BEEN CRITICAL.

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/5.

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5. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT AT DAVOS MR TRUDEAU HAS, IN HIS CHARACTER-
ISTIC FREE-WHEELING ACADEMIC STYLE, LET THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG,
AND IS SAYING WHAT HE REALLY THINKS AND WHAT I BELIEVE HE HAS
ALWAYS THOUGHT ABOUT NATO AND NATO POLICY. HIS VIEWS HAVE NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED SINCE HE CAME TO POWER IN 1968, SUBSEQUENTLY
TRIED TO TAKE CANADA OUT OF NATO AND, AFTER BEING DISSUADED FROM
THIS COURSE, REDUCED CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE BY A HALF. I DO NOT
THINK THAT HE REALLY BELIEVES IN NATO OR NATO STRATEGY. HE PUTS
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE SAME LEVEL AND REGARDS
HIMSELF AS AT SOME MID-POINT BETWEEN THE TWO. THIS WEEK HE IS AWAY
TO EAST BERLIN AND BUCHAREST.

6. SO FAR HE HAS GOT AWAY WITH IT IN CANADA WHERE HE IS CLAIMING
CREDIT FOR EVERY FAVOURABLE DEVELOPMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS -
THE ATTENDANCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE OPENING OF THE CDE
CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM, THE DECISION TO RESUME THE MBFR TALKS, THE
SOFTER LINE TAKEN PUBLICLY BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND, HE CLAIMS, BY
MRS THATCHER. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY NOW HAVE GONE TOO
FAR FOR THE CANADIAN PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE FEW HERE IN
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OR THE MEDIA WHO HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CAPACITY TO BRING THE FACTS HOME TO THE CANADIAN PUBLIC. THOSE
WHO ARE UNHAPPIEST ABOUT WHAT MR TRUDEAU IS DOING - MAINLY OFFICIALS
AND EX OFFICIALS - HAVE NO PUBLIC VOICE. BUT SOME OF THEM ARE
MUCH CONCERNED. A FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO NATO SAID TO ME
YESTERDAY OF THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE: 'IT IS THE WRONG MAN AND
THE WRONG COUNTRY AND WE HAVEN'T IN FACT ANY USEFUL IDEAS TO PUT
FORWARD'. CANADIANS WILL NOW, I THINK, WAIT TO SEE WHETHER
AUTHORITATIVE VOICES IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER
NATO GOVERNMENTS TAKE MR TRUDEAU TO TASK OR NOT.

7. PLEASE PASS TO SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG AND NO.10 DOWNING STREET.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

MORAN

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

STANDARD
DEF D
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COPIES TO
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG CABINET
OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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B.06946

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD: East-West Relations

BACKGROUND

1. Neither the Cabinet nor OD has considered East-West relations in recent years other than in relation to particular events such as the Siberian pipeline dispute, Cruise and Pershing II deployment, the destruction of the Korean airliner, and most recently, the opening of the CDE in Stockholm. The paper circulated under cover of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 14 November provides a general overview of East-West and Anglo-Soviet relations and suggests guidelines which should govern United Kingdom policy over the next five years.

hag A

2. The Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Defence (their minutes of 17 and 23 November respectively) endorsed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's approach.

hags B + C

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary takes as his starting point that East-West relations have reached their lowest point since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Public concern about nuclear war has been intensified by the Soviet walk-out from the INF negotiations and refusal to set a date for the resumption of the START talks. Doubts about the Soviet leadership, electoral considerations in the United States and conflicting currents of opinion within NATO are likely to make 1984 even more difficult than 1983 for the management of East-West relations. The central message of the paper is that change in the Soviet system will come, if at all, only very slowly and cannot be accelerated from outside; and that meanwhile the West,



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while not allowing itself to be rattled and maintaining its defences, should seek to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation through Ministerial dialogue and various forms of contact. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary concludes that Britain should seek to play a more forward and positive part in the East-West dialogue than it has tried to do since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

4. In the short space of two months since the paper was drafted, a sea change in Western attitudes of the kind recommended by Sir Geoffrey Howe is beginning to be apparent. President Reagan's speech on 14 January, re-affirming American willingness to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship, could, as you put it in your letter of 19 January to the American President, "mark the beginning of a new phase of relations with the Soviet Union". Although the immediate response, delivered by Mr Gromyko in Stockholm, was negative and apparently uncompromising, Mr Shultz formed the impression that for all their tough talk the Soviets were somewhat on the defensive. Their willingness to set a date for the resumption of negotiations in MBFR could be a harbinger of better things to come on the arms control front. Your own visit to Hungary on 3 February will be a tangible demonstration of the British desire to seek a better relationship between East and West.

5. The Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Antony Acland have been invited to attend.

HANDLING

6. You may wish to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the paper and update it in the light of recent developments. Discussion might then concentrate on the policy guidelines in Annex A. Other colleagues will then wish to comment, including the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on



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the economic aspects, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the possibilities for closer relations between Eastern European countries and the International Monetary Fund.

7. Given the changes in the international scene, and in the public posture of both the United States and British Governments since the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper was drafted, a lengthy discussion of the issues is unlikely to be needed. But points to be covered include -

(a) does anyone dissent from the central judgement, namely that the West can do little to accelerate change in the Soviet system from outside?

(b) how far is it realistic for the United Kingdom to pursue a distinctive policy towards the Soviet Union in the absence of a stable relationship between the Super Powers? How can policy co-ordination be ensured:

(i) with the Americans; and

(ii) with the other allies?

(c) are our existing aid policies consistent with what the guidelines suggest (paragraph 13(c)(i)-(v) of Annex A)?

(d) following President Reagan's speech on 14 January (and your own interview with the New York Times carried in the Herald Tribune on 23 January), is the public line suggested in paragraph 15 of the paper right - i.e. no announcement of any change in policy? Or is it more appropriate to stress that there is now a change of emphasis in our approach to East-West relations? →



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CONCLUSION

8. Subject to the discussion, you might guide the Committee to the following conclusions -

- (a) approve the policy guidelines, updated as necessary, in Annex A of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper;
- (b) invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to give a brief account of the discussion and conclusions to the Cabinet (or alternatively to circulate a short memorandum);
- (c) invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to keep the Committee informed of progress in implementing the new policy.

David Goodall

A D S GOODALL

24 January 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

cc FCO

LPO

SUBJECT

cc Notes
+
ONS



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 January 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 13/84

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your letter of 14 January and the advance copy of your speech on US/Soviet relations which George Shultz gave me on 15 January.

If I may say so, I thought you struck exactly the right note and at the right time. As we enter 1984, and against the background of public disquiet at the Soviet interruption of the arms control talks in Geneva and Vienna, it was good to put on record your willingness to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

As you say, this is a long-term policy. We cannot expect rapid changes. The Soviet system is too rigid for that, as their initial public response to your speech has demonstrated. But I am sure that it is right to try: and that the best way is to engage the Soviet Union in a dialogue on a broad range of questions - bilateral and regional, political and economic. Against this background it may be easier to make progress on arms control issues.

My views on the arms control problem are very much in line with yours. I warmly welcome your aim to reduce nuclear arsenals and to create greater stability and confidence. It would obviously be wrong to make concessions just to get the

/Russians

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- 2 -

Russians back to the negotiating table. But they have problems of their own, both of substance and of presentation. Thanks to your own imaginative proposals, and to the unity we have been able to maintain within the Alliance, the initiative rests with the West. We now have an opportunity to consider whether we can find fresh ways forward on nuclear arms reductions. I am glad that the various consultative groupings within the Alliance are beginning to discuss this possibility. We must not only convince our own peoples of our dedication to the pursuit of real reductions but also seek that greater stability of which you spoke.

I hope that your speech will mark the beginning of a new phase of relations with the Soviet Union. That depends on them more than us. But in the Alliance we can all seek to build on the lead you have taken.

I look forward to hearing the outcome of George Shultz's meeting with Gromyko on 18 January. Geoffrey Howe will be meeting Gromyko on 19 January. I shall let you have my impressions of my visit to Hungary from 2 to 4 February.

Yours ever
Ronald

The President of the United States of America.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1984

East/West Relations

Would you please refer to Brian Fall's letter of 18 January enclosing a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan's message of 14 January about East/West relations.

The Prime Minister has approved a slightly revised text. I enclose the signed version. I should be grateful if H.M. Embassy in Washington could be instructed to deliver the text and to follow this up in due course with the signed letter.

JOHN COLLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

JRH

No 10 DOWNING STREET.

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IMMEDIATE



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OO STOCKHOLM
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TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM
TELEGRAM NUMBER 24 OF 19 JANUARY
AND TO WASHINGTON

MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RELAYED BY US EMBASSY THIS EVENING
QUOTE

DEAR GEOFFREY:

FOLLOWING UP ON OUR EARLIER EXCHANGES ON THE GENERAL QUESTION
OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME INITIAL
IMPRESSIONS FROM MY MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
IN STOCKHOLM ON JANUARY 18TH.

AS YOU KNOW, GROMYKO DELIVERED A HARDLINE SPEECH TO THE
ASSEMBLED FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING THE OPENING SESSION OF THE
CDE THAT MORNING. HE BROKE NO NEW GROUND, BUT RATHER REITERATED
FAMILIAR SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEIGHTENED
EAST-WEST TENSIONS RESTED ENTIRELY WITH THE WEST, AND WITH THE
UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR. AS SUCH, HIS PRESENTATION STOOD IN
STARK AND DISAPPOINTING CONTRAST TO THE EMPHASIS THE PRESIDENT HAD
PLACED IN HIS ADDRESS OF EARLIER IN THE WEEK ON THE NEED TO EXPLORE
WAYS OF FURTHERING A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE -- A
MESSAGE WHICH I UNDERLINED IN MY OWN SPEECH TO THE CDE ON JANUARY
17TH.

DESPITE THIS PRELUDE, I FOUND MY SUBSEQUENT FIVE-HOUR SESSION
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO HAVE BEEN USEFUL. WE COVERED AT
SOME LENGTH AND DETAIL THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES NOW BETWEEN OUR
TWO COUNTRIES -- INCLUDING VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY
QUESTIONS, REGIONAL PROBLEMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL MATTERS.
OUR VERY REAL DIFFERENCES CONTINUE, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO THE
BASIC QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS. NONETHELESS,
IN CONTRAST WITH HIS PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, GROMYKO WAS CAUTIOUSLY
UPBEAT IN DISCUSSING FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS,

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13987 - 1

A RESUMPTION OF THE MBFR TALKS, AND THE CDE ITSELF. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR US TO CONTINUE A HIGH-LEVEL EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, TO WHICH GROMYKO ASSENTED.

I CAME AWAY FROM MY MEETING WITH A SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS - - FOR ALL OF THERE TOUGH TALK - - WERE SOMEWHAT ON THE DEFENSIVE. - THEY CLEARLY DO NOT WANT TO CLOSE OFF DIALOGUE AND INDEED, MAY BE READY TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY FORWARD ON SOME ISSUES, BUT ARE NOT YET PREPARED IN THEIR OWN COUNCILS TO ADDRESS THE MORE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT THE COMING MONTHS WILL BRING IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS. OUR DIFFERENCES WILL CONTINUE TO OUTNUMBER AREAS OF AGREEMENT. NONETHELESS, I WAS SOMEWHAT HEARTENED BY THE SERIOUSNESS AND COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THIS EXCHANGE WITH GROMYKO.

SINCERELY

GEORGE

UNQUOTE

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PLANNING STAFF

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PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR JENKINS

MR CARTLEDGE

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

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SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You ought to
be aware of the
attached report of a
speech by Francis Pym.

TA

18/1

PYM URGED REAGAN-ANDROPOV SUMMIT

MR FRANCIS PYM DISCLOSED IN LONDON TONIGHT THAT AS BRITAIN'S FOREIGN SECRETARY HE HAD UNSUCCESSFULLY URGED A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SOVIET LEADER YURI ANDROPOV AFTER THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV AS A MEANS OF EASING EAST-WEST TENSION.

MR PYM, WHO WAS SACKED BY MRS THATCHER AFTER THE JUNE ELECTION, DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY HIS INITIATIVE - WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A LOST OPPORTUNITY - DID NOT MATERIALISE.

SPEAKING AT A MEETING IN LONDON, MR PYM SAID EAST-WEST RELATIONS WERE NOW GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF GREAT STRAIN.

HE SAID: "I FEEL THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT ANDROPOV HAVE BEEN TALKING PAST EACH OTHER. THE SLANGING MATCH HAS HELPED NO ONE AND FRIGHTENED MANY.

"THE RHETORIC HAS BEEN WRONG, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN WELCOME SIGNS OF CHANGE RECENTLY."

HE SAID THE RESULT HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WITH ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND AN ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE.

MR PYM SAID: "AN OPPORTUNITY TO ALTER THIS UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT WAS MISSED WHEN BREZHNEV DIED.

AS SOON AS MR ANDROPOV SUCCEEDED MR BREZHNEV, I URGED UPON THE USA AN IMMEDIATE SUMMIT.

"THE PURPOSE WAS NOT TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT - THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE - BUT TO ENABLE THE TWO LEADERS TO MEET AND TO BE SEEN TO MEET.

"THEY COULD HAVE DECIDED TO MEET AGAIN IN A YEAR OR TWO IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THEY WOULD WORK TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT.

THAT OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST AND IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE TODAY WHEN THE NEXT WILL OCCUR, SAID MR PYM.

--

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T10/84

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

cc Master
OPS

January 14, 1984

Dear Margaret:

When you and I met at the end of September, we had a useful talk on how to deal with the Soviet Union over the longer term. I greatly value the advice and counsel you shared with me. At that time, the Korean Air Lines tragedy was very much on our minds. With Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms control negotiations, East-West relations have entered an even more difficult period.

Against this background, I have decided that it is important to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the key element in East-West relations -- the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I will do this in a major address from the East Room at the White House on Monday, January 16.

My address will reaffirm our willingness to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. While I will not be announcing any specific new initiatives, I will be setting forth a framework for future U.S.-Soviet relations.

Given our close relationship and the special significance that I attach to this statement of U.S. policy, I want to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives of setting a positive tone both for the opening of the CDE meeting in Stockholm and for George Shultz's bilateral

US Declassified

meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. I am particularly pleased that George will have an opportunity to give you a personal preview before his meetings in Stockholm.

With warm regards,

Ron

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 January 1984

Invitation to the Soviet Foreign Minister

Thank you for your letter of 9 January.

The Prime Minister is content that when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary meets Mr. Gromyko in Stockholm on 19 January, he should invite him to visit London in 1984. Mrs. Thatcher would very much prefer the meeting to be in London rather than Moscow.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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NR

John: Re yr m. of
6 Jan.

Press office have asked
if Cardinal Humel
may release the
exchange of
correspondence?

Skete Andrew M. in P.O.
PE
10/11 ✓ I have told the

Peter
10/11

Cardinal's office that the
Prime Minister has no
objection to his releasing
the correspondence on 29
January. A.F.C. 10/11.

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Prime Minister.

Content that the Foreign Secretary should meet Gromyko in Moscow or London during 1984?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 January 1984

Dear Sir,

A.F.C. 10/1

Would prefer London

The paper on East West relations circulated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 14 November included the suggestion that Gromyko should be invited to visit the UK during 1984.

OD has not yet discussed this paper, and I gather it may not do so until 26 January at the earliest. Meanwhile Sir Geoffrey is to meet Gromyko in Stockholm on 19 January during the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The question of future Anglo/Soviet contacts seems certain to come up then. The line which Sir Geoffrey would propose to take is that brief meetings such as this one and the previous encounter in Madrid do not allow time to get very far into the substance; that there is currently material for a really substantial discussion between the Foreign Ministers of Britain and the USSR; that he would like to see this take place; and that he would be ready either to visit Moscow, where he was briefly with the Prime Minister on their way to Tokyo in June 1979, or to welcome Gromyko to London if this is what he would prefer.

Sir Geoffrey would propose to inform Mr Shultz of his intentions when they meet here on 15 January, and subsequently, to inform his French and German colleagues.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

FOREIGN Pouch: East/West

PK4

POSTAGE AND TELEGRAPH OFFICE

LONDON, ENGLAND



FILE SH

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mr. Ingham

East/West Relations

Cardinal Hume's office have asked me whether you would have any objection to the publication of the attached correspondence between yourself and the Cardinal. He wants to publish it, together with similar exchanges with the Americans, on 29 January which is apparently "Peace Sunday".

I see no objection to this and will so inform Cardinal Hume's office if you agree.

A. J. COLES

6 January, 1984

For Pol: East/West Relations: P-4.

Nine Minutes.

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RESTRICTED

We shall receive advice
- a bad proposal, in my
view. A.S.C. 9/1

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 062230Z JAN 84
TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA

PROPOSAL BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR A
SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT MEETING

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, MR ANDROPOV AND MRS GANDHI TO PROPOSE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SUMMIT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1984 IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DETERIORATING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE.
2. WE HAVE TRIED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO OBTAIN COPIES OF THE LETTERS. THE INDIAN MISSION TOLD US THAT THE LETTER ADDRESSED TO MRS GANDHI IS STILL REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL BUT THAT IN IT ILLUECA STRESSED THE DANGER OF THE ESCALATING ARMS RACE AND THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. HE ALSO SAID THAT ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE 'INVALUABLE OPPORTUNITY' PRESENTED BY INDIA'S CONCURRENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.
3. THE US MISSION HAVE CONFIRMED THAT ILLUECA'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SENT VIA THEM BUT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO TRACE COPIES. THEY BELIEVE THAT IT WAS HANDLED PERSONALLY BY MRS KIRKPATRICK. THEY HAVE INFORMED THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF OUR INTEREST AND WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR APPROACHING THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECT FOR A COPY. WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY ASKED HM EMBASSY WASHINGTON IF THEY COULD PURSUE THIS.
4. ILLUECA'S INITIATIVE IS BASED ON HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (MY TELNO 1704) AND IT IS TYPICAL OF HIM NOT TO HAVE WRITTEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT IT SEEMS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE US - OR THE USSR FOR THAT MATTER - WOULD BE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THIS IDEA.

THOMSON
STANDARD
UND
NAD
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED



R M

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 December, 1983

OD:LCO	CDL
FCO	CO
HMT	DTI
LPO	+ MAFF
MOD	
LPS	

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE USSR

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of your Secretary of State's letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's reply.

The Prime Minister is content with the conclusion reached in this correspondence that the Community's import restrictions against the Soviet Union should be allowed to lapse at the end of December.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Ivor Llewelyn (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(David Barclay)

S. Nicklen, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry

K



FCS/83/278

SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Prime Minister

Content?

Yes mt ^{ends} 23/12

Import Restrictions Against the USSR

1. Thank you for your letter of ^{attached} 19 December. I agree that the Community's import restrictions against the Soviet Union should be allowed to lapse at the end of this month. The measures were intended as a political signal to the Soviet Union of our disapproval of their share of responsibility of martial law in Poland. But they are no longer a necessary part of our response to the situation there, and are causing increasing difficulties for legitimate British trade interests. A consensus has emerged in the EC that they should be allowed to expire and we should go along with this.

2. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, other members of OD, Michael Jopling and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

23 December, 1983

Foreign Policy

East / West Relations
Pt 4

23 JUL 1983

10 11 12 1
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2



JF5 108

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

1-19 VICTORIA STREET

LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422

GTN 215

(Switchboard) 215 7877

mf

CONFIDENTIAL

19 December 1983

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

Prime Minister.

You may wish to await the
Foreign Secretary's reply.

D. Geoffrey

A.S.C. 20/12

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE USSR

In commenting on your minute to the Prime Minister about East/West relations (PM/83/89), I suggested in my letter of 30 November that we should respond to the Russians' wish for a better trade relationship to an extent consistent with our commercial interests. In my view it would entirely accord with this approach if, in conjunction with our colleagues in the European Council of Ministers, we were now to agree to allow the import restrictions imposed in March 1982 to lapse at the end of this month: I am raising this now in correspondence since we did not have time to deal with it at OD last week.

2 You will recall that EC restrictions were imposed on some sixty manufactured and luxury goods (including tractors, aluminium, chipboard, caviar and tinned salmon) and that these measures were renewed for twelve months last December; on the UK's part your predecessor's minute of 1 December 1982 (FCS/82/198) recommending renewal, with which the Prime Minister concurred, is relevant.

3 While these restrictions undoubtedly served notice of the EC's disapproval of the introduction of martial law in Poland, it now seems clear to us that they have outlived their value as a political gesture and have become a real commercial nuisance to several British firms which are very dependent on Anglo-Soviet trade. Whatever the effect of the measures brought in to replace martial law in Poland, martial law itself was formally ended in July and I am not aware of any feeling among our European colleagues that these particular restrictions should be renewed again. Several, including the Germans, Danes, Irish and Greeks, are certainly against renewal and any initiative on our part to reintroduce quota restrictions of this kind would harm UK manufacturers and consumers and be very unhelpful indeed to our commercial relations with the Soviet



Union at a time when these seem likely to benefit from the more encouraging stance taken by Deputy Prime Minister Kostandov during his visit in October.

4 I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of OD, Michael Jopling and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Norman Tebbit', written in a cursive style.

NORMAN TEBBIT

Foreign Pd,
East/West,
p24

20 DEC 1983

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Ref: B06920

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD: East-West Relations

BACKGROUND

Neither the Cabinet nor OD has considered East-West relations in recent years other than in relation to particular events such as Cruise and Pershing II deployment, the destruction of the Korean airliner or the Siberian pipeline dispute. The paper circulated under cover of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 14 November provides a general overview of East-West and Anglo-Soviet relations and suggests guidelines which should govern United Kingdom policy over the next five years. The paper does not address arms control and disarmament issues, which will have been discussed in the more restricted forum of OD(D) on Wednesday 14 December.

FLA A.

2. The Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Defence (their minutes of 17 and 23 November respectively) have already endorsed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's approach.

FLA B+C

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary takes as his starting point that East-West relations are now worse than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Public concern about nuclear war has been intensified by the Soviet walk-out from the INF negotiations (which has since been followed by their refusal to set a date for the resumption of the START talks). Doubts about the Soviet leadership, electoral considerations in the United States and conflicting currents of opinion within NATO are likely to make 1984 even more difficult than 1983 for the management of East-West relations. The central message of the paper is that change in the Soviet system will come, if at all, only very slowly and cannot be accelerated from outside; and that meanwhile

the West, while not allowing itself to be rattled and maintaining its defences, should seek to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation through Ministerial dialogue and various forms of contact. The importance of dialogue with the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly endorsed at last week's series of NATO Ministerial meetings in Brussels, at which the North Atlantic Council adopted a Belgian proposal for "a thorough appraisal of East-West relations with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue" and a Declaration reaffirming the defensive character of the Alliance and its commitment to the pursuit of equitable arms control agreements. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggests that Britain should seek to play a more forward and positive part in the East-West dialogue than it has tried to do since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

4. The Chief of the Defence Staff has been invited to attend.

HANDLING

5. You will probably wish to focus the discussion on the policy guidelines; and you might invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce his paper. Other colleagues will then wish to comment, including the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on the economic aspects, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the possibilities for closer relations between Eastern European countries and the International Monetary Fund.

6. Points to be covered in the discussion include -

a. is the central judgement right, namely that there is little the West can do to accelerate change in the Soviet system from outside?

b. how far is it realistic for the United Kingdom to pursue a distinctive policy towards the Soviet Union in the absence of a stable relationship between the Super Powers? How will the new policy be co-ordinated -

- i. with the Americans; and
- ii. with the other allies?

- c. specifically, is it agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should invite Mr Gromyko to visit the United Kingdom in 1984 (paragraph 5 of Annex A)?
- d. are our existing aid policies consistent with what the guidelines suggest (paragraph 13(c)(i)-(v) of Annex A)?
- e. is the public line suggested in paragraph 15 of the paper right - ie no announcement of any change in policy? Or would it be advantageous to stress that there is some change of emphasis in our approach to East-West relations (as commentators have already been saying)?

CONCLUSION

- 7. Subject to the discussion, you might guide the Committee to the following conclusions -
 - a. approve the policy guidelines in Annex A of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper;
 - b. invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to give a brief account of the discussion and conclusions to the Cabinet;
 - c. invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to keep the Committee informed of progress in implementing the new policy.

David Goodall

13 December 1983

A D S GOODALL

CK 103? NT
GR?



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 December 1983

Dear Sir,

Type letter pl.

A.S.C 2/12.

Thank you for your letter of 1 December enclosing a copy of the letter of 29 November from Cardinal Hume to the Prime Minister. I enclose a draft reply, agreed by Ministers here (Mr Luce), and in the Ministry of Defence.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

The Archbishop of Westminster

A. C. My...

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you very much for your letter of 29 November about the current state of East/West relations. ~~I was most interested to read your perspective on the present situation.~~

I welcome the fact that you accept the moral validity of deterrence for the time being and that the Roman Catholic Bishops of England and Wales have noted the recent decision of NATO Governments to make a major cut in the number of United States warheads held in Europe. This decision, taken at the end of October, has not yet received sufficient public attention; it will reduce the number of US nuclear weapons in Europe to their lowest level for 20 years and is proof of NATO's determination not to hold more weapons than we need to support deterrence.

You expressed concern at the technical modernisation of nuclear arms. I do not believe that modernisation programmes are taking place unchecked. These programmes are necessary if we are to maintain an effective deterrent. Our own programme to purchase the Trident

/system

Enclosures—flag(s).....

system, for example, will be tailored to our need to maintain the minimum force level for a deterrent to be effective and credible at all times. Despite allegations to the contrary the number of warheads we shall deploy on our Trident missiles, for example, has not yet been decided. The modernisation of American strategic forces affects all three types of US strategic nuclear weapons, the land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and the strategic bombers, but there has been little or no modernisation of American forces for many years and over that period the threat posed to them, and to NATO as a whole, by Soviet strategic weapons has increased enormously. ~~But I should~~ ^{nevertheless} emphasise that our commitment to the search for balanced and verifiable arms control agreements remains as strong as ever.

I agree with your call for a reduction of hostility, friction and mistrust between nations. Given the nature of the Soviet system and its political aims the challenge which the Soviet Union makes to Western societies is likely to be with us for many years and it would be foolish to belittle the threat we face. But our aim is to strive to achieve a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, taking account of the wide difference of views on many important questions. We are ready to pursue, in the right circumstances, a sensible dialogue with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. In that spirit I shall be visiting Hungary ~~in the New Year.~~ ^{early next year.}

SECRET

GRS 850

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 060050Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3668 OF 5 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO BONN PARIS MOSCOW

YOUR MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ: EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

1. YOU WILL WISH TO HAVE SOME INDICATIONS OF WHAT IS ON SHULTZ'S MIND BEFORE YOUR MEETINGS WITH HIM NEXT WEEK: THE MORE SO, PERHAPS, AS SHULTZ'S NATURAL TENDENCY TOWARDS DISCRETION LEADS HIM AT TIMES TO BE SOMEWHAT RESERVED EVEN IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. THIS AND MIFT ARE ADDRESSED TO THE SUB-TEXT AS WELL AS THE TEXT OF WHAT SHULTZ WILL BE SAYING NEXT WEEK.

2. THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN THROUGH A DIFFICULT YEAR. THE AMERICANS ARE RELEIVED THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS HELD FIRM: AND THAT INF DEPLOYMENT HAS NOT SO FAR BEEN MARKED BY VIOLENT DISTURBANCES IN THE FRG, OF THE KIND WHICH WERE FEARED HERE. THEY GIVE GREAT CREDIT TO KOHL FOR HIS STEADINESS, BUT ARE WORRIED AT THE POLARISATION OF GERMAN OPINION.

3. THEIR MAIN CONCERN NOW IS TO AVOID TALK OF A FREEZE OR PAUSE AFTER THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS, WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT NEW DECISIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THEIR CONTINUANCE. THEIR APPROACH, LIKE OURS, IS TO EMPHASISE INSTEAD THAT THE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS CAN BE HALTED OR REVERSED AS SOON AS THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO COME TO ANY AGREEMENT BASED ON PARITY.

4. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON THE ADMINISTRATION THAT IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN AND, WE SUSPECT, US OPINION THE ALLIANCE CAN CERTAINLY NOT AFFORD NOW TO REST ON ITS OARS. IN THE INEVITABLY CHILLY PERIOD AHEAD SUSTAINED EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUANCE OF A HIGH LEVEL US/SOVIET DIALOGUE. IT IS NOW PRETTY WELL CERTAIN THAT SHULTZ WILL GO TO STOCKHOLM AND OFFER TO MEET GROMYKO THERE. HE HAS HAD A SERIES OF NOT VERY PROFITABLE MEETINGS WITH DOBRYNIN, AS HAS THE US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW WITH GROMYKO. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ANDROPOV MAY REAPPEAR TOWARDS THE END OF THE MONTH, BUT FEEL THERE IS AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRANSITION IN MOSCOW, CONTRIBUTING TO A WOODEN AND UNYIELDING SOVIET APPROACH. THEY ARE NOT GETTING MANY MESSAGES BACK DOWN THE WIRES. THE PROSPECTS OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT GOOD FOR PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL OR ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY NEXT YEAR, WITH THE RUSSIANS CONCERNED TO KEEP SOME COMMUNICATIONS OPEN, BUT PROBABLY DISPOSED TO TRY TO SIT THIS ADMINISTRATION OUT, WHILE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK ON EUROPEAN OPINION.

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15.

SECRET

5. SHULTZ HAS BEEN DISCOURAGED BY HIS OWN EXPERIENCES WITH GROMYKO AND WILL NOT EXPECT PROGRESS AT A MEETING IN STOCKHOLM IF IT TAKES PLACE. HE HAS STRONG FEELINGS HIMSELF ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOUR EG OVER SHCHARANSKY AND THE KOREAN AIRLINER. THE PRESENT ROUND OF START NEGOTIATIONS WILL END ON 8 DECEMBER: THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL PLAYING HARD TO GET IN TERMS OF SETTING A DATE FOR THEM TO RESUME. BUT THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO EXPECT A RESUMPTION NEXT YEAR. THEY CONSIDER THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE WRONG-FOOTED THEMSELVES BY WITHDRAWING FROM INF AND WILL NOT WANT TO DO THE SAME IN START. SOME THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN HERE TO SOME POSSIBLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION IN START. THE AMERICANS DO NOT FAVOUR A MERGER OF INF AND START.

6. THE AMERICANS NOTE THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS HAVE BEEN REACTING WITH SOME UNHAPPINESS TO THE BREAKING OFF OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN A LESS REGIMENTED MANNER THAN THE AMERICANS HAD EXPECTED TO SOVIET TACTICS GENERALLY, INCLUDING THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SOVIET SHORTER RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE POLES AND HUNGARIANS HAVE SHOWN NO DESIRE TO HAVE THESE ON THEIR TERRITORY AND EVEN THE CZECHS AND EAST GERMANS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF ANXIETY TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST.

7. THERE ARE TWO DEVELOPMENTS HERE THAT NEED CAREFUL WATCHING. THE PRESIDENT IS MOVING TOWARDS AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY (MY TELNO 3622). WE HAVE IMPRESSED ON THE PENTAGON AND THE WHITE HOUSE, AS WELL AS ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OUR CONCERN THAT THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED IN A WAY DESIGNED TO MINIMISE AND NOT MAXIMISE THE DIFFICULTIES THIS COULD CAUSE IN EUROPEAN OPINION. WEINBERGER WILL BE HAVING A WORD WITH MR HESELTINE ABOUT THIS IN THE MARGINS OF THE DPC: SHULTZ MAY ALSO REFER TO THE MATTER. I DOUBT IF CONGRESS WILL ALLOW THE ADMINISTRATION TO GO IN FOR AN EXTREMELY AMBITIOUS PROGRAMME: AND MUCH OF THE RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY IS FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, NOT THIS ONE. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT ANY US ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY ABM AND OUTERSPACE TREATIES. THIS MESSAGE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AT LEAST PARTIALLY RECEIVED. I HAVE JUST SOUGHT TO IMPRESS IT AGAIN ON KEN DAM.

8. THE ADMINISTRATION IS OBLIGED TO REPORT TO CONGRESS IN JANUARY ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, IN PARTICULAR ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF YELLOW RAIN IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE CONCERN HERE THAT THE NEW ABAKOLOVO RADAR APPEARS TO BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ABM TREATY, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO BE TESTING TWO NEW ICBMS, RATHER THAN THE ONE ALLOWED IN THE SALT II AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE EXTENT OF ENCRYPTION OF

SECRET

SOVIET MISSILE TESTS IS SERIOUSLY INHIBITING US ABILITY TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH SALT II. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT IN ALL THESE CASES THE VIOLATIONS ARE PROBABLE OR POSSIBLE, RATHER THAN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR-CUT. THERE ARE THOSE HERE, OPPOSED TO ARMS CONTROL GENERALLY, WHO WOULD LIKE THEM TO BE DENOUNCED IN EXCESSIVELY CATEGORICAL TERMS. WE HAVE IMPRESSED ON ALL THOSE CONCERNED HERE THAT OUR OWN ASSESSMENTS, IN SOME CASES, DO NOT SUPPORT THIS, AND OUR NEED TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT THE TERMS IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION ADDRESSES THIS PROBLEM, GIVEN THAT WE SHALL BE ASKED IMMEDIATELY ANY STATEMENT IS MADE WHETHER WE AGREE WITH IT. THE HANDLING OF THE QUESTION OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE, THEREFORE, WILL BE WORTH RAISING WITH SHULTZ IF THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERS.

WRIGHT

STANDARD
NAD
SOVIET D
DEF D

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

-3-
SECRET

File
Archbishop of

WESTMINSTER

Arms Control

7/12

DSE

1 December 1983

Reminded FC0 - it's coming shortly.
8/12

ARMS CONTROL

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Archbishop of Westminster. I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply by Wednesday 7 December.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ML



JF4982

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

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2

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November 1983

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

Prime Minister.

A.P.C. 1/12

MS

D. Geoffrey,

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

I was very interested to see a copy of your minute (PM/83/89) to the Prime Minister of 14 November since I share your view that it is now timely to review this subject and generally agree with both the analysis and conclusions. There have recently been signs that the Russians are looking for a better trade relationship and I think that we should respond to an extent consistent with our commercial interests. The Soviet Union offers a large and under-exploited market for British exports, though the Russians' persistence in seeking credit at unrealistically low interest rates will continue to have an inhibiting effect.

2 There are only two substantive points which I would like to make at this stage, relating to the need for close co-ordination with our allies and to the policy of diversification in Eastern Europe over Ministerial visits. There can of course be no argument about the need to preserve the integrity of the Alliance, but we should be prepared to take a robust line either when lack of complete agreement leads to inaction or when one of our partners fails adequately to take account of the interests of the Alliance as a whole. We surmounted such a problem at a cost over the Siberian gas pipeline and are now faced with another potential problem in COCOM, in particular on computers. I think it important that we continue to stand firm on preserving the principle that COCOM is intended to restrict exports of technology and equipment of direct military/strategic relevance, and not a means of imposing an embargo for political or economic reasons.



3 Some differentiation in political relations with Eastern Europe is clearly desirable. Nevertheless, visits by you to countries such as Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria could materially help our trade interests: I do not think that these should necessarily be discounted simply to give the appearance of being in a closer relationship with others, such as Hungary and Romania, particularly when contacts with the Russians are being increased. We are already doing our bit for Hungary in the EC, and Romania is unlikely to be a worthwhile trading partner in the near future.

4 As regards contact with Soviet Ministers on technical matters, my experience at my recent meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Kostandov was that he had no wish to pursue political differences. Indeed, having paid the minimum attention to such topics, he proceeded to take a vigorous and practical approach to improved trade and industrial contacts. We should build on such contacts to develop a commercially sound and mutually advantageous relationship. But there is no advantage in promoting business which does not benefit our companies, or which we have to subsidise beyond what we can agree is the minimum necessary to preserve the overall competitiveness of British firms in international markets.

5 One further way of advancing our interests would be the adoption within the CMEA of a system of trade for money in place of the present clearing accounts. There is little we can do directly to promote this, but external pressure would help countries like Hungary which want to see a change, and a more open system would improve our access to the markets.

6 I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister, other colleagues in OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Norman Tebbit', with a stylized flourish above the name.

NORMAN TEBBIT

Foreign Pol
East West,
p. 4

1 DEC 1983



D 290330Z NEW DELHI

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 290330Z NEW DELHI

DESKBY 290730Z UKREP BRUSSELS

FM FCO 281830Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 929 OF 28 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED

ON **29 NOV 1983**

DUPLICATES

OF LETTER _____

OF ENCLOSURES _____

LOCATION _____

Prime Minister.

Agree the line?

A.S.C. 29/11

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER AND PUS

GOA DECLARATION: EAST/WEST AND ARMS CONTROL

1. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN BRUSSELS, AND WITH AN EYE ON POSSIBLE REACTIONS IN WASHINGTON. WE PROPOSE THAT THE LEADER OF THE HOUSE SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE GOA DECLARATION IN THE HOUSE ON 29 NOVEMBER. THIS WOULD ALSO SERVE AS GUIDANCE TO FCO NEWS DEPT IN RESPONDING TO PRESS ENQUIRIES.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

2. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MADE CLEAR IN A NUMBER OF SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS, FOR EXAMPLE IN HER GUILDHALL SPEECH ON 14 NOVEMBER, THAT HMG WANT A BETTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND ARE READY TO PURSUE A SENSIBLE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT HUNGARY EARLY NEXT YEAR. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIALOGUE FOR ITS OWN SAKE. THE POINT IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TO RESTORE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. THAT IS ALSO THE MESSAGE OF THE GOA DECLARATION.

IS THIS A TIME OF CRISIS?

3. CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS IS A MATTER FOR SERIOUS CONCERN. MANY ASPECTS OF THIS, INCLUDING A SOVIET MILITARY BUILD UP, INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS NECESSARY TO DEAL COOLLY AND AS CONSTRUCTIVELY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS ON THE AGENDA. BUT SUCCESS DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE WEST ALONE. PROGRESS CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE SOVIET RESPONSE. THE SOVIET WALK-OUT FROM GENEVA IS A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE

4. WE FULLY SHARE HIS BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. BUT, AS HE KNOWS, WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRACTICALITY OF SOME OF HIS SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS.

FIVE POWER NEGOTIATIONS (IF PRESSED)

5. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE. THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WE THEREFORE REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD SOON RETURN TO THE INF TALKS AND THAT THEY SHOULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN THE START TALKS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

HOWE

NNNN

LUK 675/24

FDW G 221/24

PP DELHI

PP MOSCOW

PP TOKYO

PP PEKING

GRS 330

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241655Z NOVEMBER

TO PRIORITY OTTAWA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 417 OF 24 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), NEW DELHI (FOR UKDEL), UKDEL
NATO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, ROUTINE TOKYO, PEKING, UKDEL VIENNA,
PARIS

YOUR TELNO 622 : TRUDEAU EAST/WEST INITIATIVE

1. SCHRAM (CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION) HAS CALLED, ON INSTRUCTION
ON DEFENCE DEPARTMENT TO ASK FOR OUR REACTIONS TO THE SPECIFIC
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE.

2. STRESSING THAT OUR REACTIONS WERE AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ONLY
AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NO DOUBT BE GIVING HER OWN
VIEWS TO MR TRUDEAU IN DELHI, WE OUTLINED OUR RESERVATIONS ALONG
THE LINES OF THE BRIEF SUBMITTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR CHOGM

3. SCHRAM (PLEASE PROTECT) DESCRIBED THE REACTIONS OF OTHER
GOVERNMENTS TO TRUDEAU'S PROPOSAL:

(A) ANDROPOV HAD REPLIED TO TRUDEAU'S MESSAGE IN MODERATELY
ENCOURAGING TERMS WITHOUT SAYING MUCH OF SUBSTANCE. WE KNOW
FROM OTHER CANADIAN SOURCES (WHICH SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT,
PLEASE BE QUOTED) THAT AT A MEETING WITH ARBATOV IN TOKYO ON
19 NOVEMBER MR TRUDEAU ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF A VISIT
TO MOSCOW PERHAPS JUST BEFORE OR AFTER THE NEW YEAR. ARBATOV
REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT ANDROPOV WOULD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE HIM
(ALTHOUGH HE TOOK CARE NOT TO MAKE ANY FIRM COMMITMENTS) BUT
THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT TIMING:

(B) PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SPOKEN TO MR TRUDEAU A WEEK AGO. HE
HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT IN VERY GENERAL TERMS FOR THE INITIATIVE
BUT US OFFICIALS WERE GIVING A FROSTY RECEPTION TO THE
SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH NO DATE WAS YET FIXED
A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE SOON:

(C) AMBASSADOR PEARSON HAD HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS IN PEKING
WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HIMSELF WAS DUE TO VISIT
CANADA IN THE NEW YEAR. WU HAD BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO TRUDEAU'S
OVERALL INTENTIONS AND HAD DILATED ON THE DANGERS OF DETERIORAT-
ING US/SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT HAD NOT BEEN DRAWN ON THE PROPOSAL
FOR A FIVE-POWER MEETING.

HOWE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



MO 13/7



PRIME MINISTER

*DWS
24/11*

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

copy attached

I have seen the Lord Chancellor's minute of 17th November about East-West relations.

2. I merely wish to record that I agree with every word of it.
3. I am copying this minute to the other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

WDS



*N.A.S.O.
High level contacts
- can to Soviet
listeners.*

Information.

Ministry of Defence
23rd November 1983

Foreign Post
East/West
P+3

24 NOV 1983



POSTAGE
PAID
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Prime Minister

The Foreign Secretary's minute and paper to yourself and OD colleagues is timely. I myself am confident that the feeling to which he makes reference in his first paragraph is indeed widespread and not without foundation.

There was an old saying to the effect that wars are not fought about small issues, but do occur as the result of trivial incidents and the classic recipe for war is the development of two massive and mutually hostile alliances with client states in a "third world" of lesser states in a condition of near anarchy - and a single spark, say a pistol shot in Sarajevo or a riot in Corfu to set the whole explosive mixture ablaze.

I was glad that the introduction to the paper made reference to the shooting down of the Korean Airliner. It was in itself a small incident, but it has given rise to serious consequences. What I found particularly disturbing about the incident was less the barbarous inhumanity of the act than the distinct impression I received that somewhere hidden under the whole event was less a piece of deliberate criminality than an example of owlish bureaucracy operating under rigid rules and incapable at its lower levels of showing either initiative or common sense. The absurd equivocation and want of candour on the part of the higher authorities seems to be part of the mystique of Soviet Government. The malevolence and brutality of the Soviet system are not in doubt. It is easy to condemn them. But it will be more important to prevent events like these from developing into a general conflagration, as might easily have happened had something of the kind taken place in the Middle East.

I am quite convinced myself that there is too much rhetoric flying about. The worst offenders are undoubtedly the Communist powers. One only has to differ from them in the slightest respect to incur allegations of bad motives, vituperative epithets and long malicious and ultimately nonsensical tirades. I believe that these are dangerous, and will become more so in proportion as we respond in like vein. But there is no reason why we should follow suit. Not a little of the feeling that the Reagan administration is at least partly responsible for the deterioration of the situation to which the Foreign Secretary refers lies I believe in the emotional and at times almost hysterical way in which the President gives vent to his otherwise legitimate

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CONFIDENTIAL

condemnation of the USSR and all it stands for. I do not believe that any good comes of such denunciations. A cold and clinical analysis would be far more effective. For instance, the affair of the Korean Airliner would have been far more effectively denounced by an objective analysis of the facts followed by a cold appraisal of the immense harm throughout the world that the Soviets would certainly suffer as a result. It was an opportunity missed. In the same way the fates of Afghanistan, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States are more valuable to us as warnings of what might befall if we were to lower our guard than as prizes to be won from Communism.

I am equally unconvinced by attempts directly to "punish" the USSR and their allies for breaches of international law (e.g. Afghanistan, Poland). We should be far more objective in assessing our own interests and avoid wherever possible cutting off our nose to spite our face. We should never enter into commercial relations with the Communist bloc unless we reap an advantage. If we do reap an advantage we should not be deterred by their inhumanity unless our national security is involved. Sanctions never work, and even if they did they should only be applied when it is to our interest to do so.

I am sure we have been wrong to avoid Ministerial and other contacts. The USSR is our enemy. It is to our advantage to study him at first hand wherever possible, and, if possible, to influence him by personal contact intelligently applied.

I believe the same to be true of contacts at lower levels. The thing to avoid is to permit contacts to be limited to Soviet sympathisers going to the USSR, or visiting Soviet figures to be allowed to limit their contacts to Soviet sympathisers here.

In the meantime although I remain intensely critical of it I am sure we must mend our fences with the Reagan administration. Britain has never gained much from a Republican administration, but all our hopes and fears must be centred on the solidity of the alliance, and the Republican administration is all we have at the present, and for ought I can see all we are likely to have at least during the foreseeable future (i.e. the next four or five years).

HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE C.

Copies to members of OD Committee and Sir Robert Armstrong.

17th November, 1983

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CHANCERY REGISTRY
22 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES

OF LETTER.....
OF ENCLOSURES.....
LOCATION.....

LUK 337/22

DWE 6120/22

OO NEW DELHI

GRS 402

CONFIDENTIAL

M FCO 221220Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 828 OF 22 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING FOR PS/P.M. AND PS/SECRETARY OF STATE

COLE'S LETTER OF 18 NOVEMBER TO BONE : CANADIAN PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL.


1. IN HIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF 18 NOVEMBER, MR TRUDEAU PROPOSED THAT ALL NATO MEMBERS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT A QUOTE HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL UNQUOTE AT THE OPENING SESSION OF CDE ON 17 JANUARY. THIS REPLACED HIS EARLIER MORE SPECIFIC CALL FOR ATTENDANCE BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. OUR ADVICE ON THE QUESTION ON ATTENDANCE BY MINISTERS AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CDE REMAINS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO START OFF THE CDE AT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL AND THAT IT WOULD BE POSITIVELY DAMAGING TO ALLIANCE UNITY TO ATTEMPT TO DO SO. AS FOR ATTENDANCE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, THE UK POSITION IS THAT WE WILL BE REPRESENTED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AT THE OPENING CEREMONY, BUT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS NOT COMMITTED HIMSELF PERSONALLY AND WOULD PREFER THIS DECISION TO BE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF FURTHER DISCUSSION IN NATO WHEN WE SEE WHETHER SHULTZ CAN BE PERSUADED TO ATTEND.

2. MR TRUDEAU ALSO ARGUED THAT NATO SHOULD RESPOND EARLY NEXT YEAR TO THE EAST'S LATEST MBFR PROPOSALS AND BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THIS UP WITH A MEETING IN VIENNA AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THE LATEST EASTERN POSITIONS IN VIENNA REPRESENT SOME ADVANCE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE VERIFICATION AND MONITORING MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT. BUT THEY ARE AS ADAMANT AS EVER IN REFUSING THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR PRIOR ACCORD ON EXISTING FORCE LEVELS BEFORE ANY COMMITMENTS ARE FORMALLY UNDERTAKEN. (THE EAST HAS AN UNACKNOWLEDGED NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE OF 200,000 MEN IN THE MBFR AREA). THE SCOPE FOR A BREAKTHROUGH IS THUS NEGLIGIBLE, UNLESS THE WEST WERE PREPARED TO ABANDON A KEY NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLE AND MAKE A LEAP OF FAITH RELYING MERELY ON EASTERN GOOD INTENTIONS. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THERE IS ANY EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THIS. THEREFORE, WHILE A RESPONSE TO LATEST EASTERN POSITIONS IS CERTAINLY DESIRABLE ON VERIFICATION (AND THE UK WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THIS WITHIN NATO) AND A WIDER EVALUATION OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO MBFR WOULD ALSO BE TIMELY IN BRUSSELS, WE SEE NO CASE FOR RECOMMENDING A MEETING IN VIENNA AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THIS COULD ONLY GIVE RISE TO POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS WHICH THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SATISFYING ON THE BASIS OF DECLARED AND LONG-STANDING WESTERN NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

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DBB to note


	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
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CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
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PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI FOR CHOGM DELEGATION
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PS/P.M. and PS/Secretary of State
	10	COLE'S LETTER OF 18 NOVEMBER TO BONE : CANADIAN PROPOSALS ON
	11	ARMS CONTROL.
	12	I. In his message to the Prime Minister of 18 November, Mr
	13	Trudeau proposed that all NATO members should be represented at
	14	a quote high political level unquote at the opening session of
	15	CDE on 17 January. This replaced his earlier more specific
	16	call for attendance by Heads of Government. Our advice on the
	17	question on attendance by Ministers at the opening session of the
	18	CDE remains that it would not be appropriate to start off the CDE
	19	at Heads of Government level and that it would be positively dam-
	20	aging to Alliance unity to attempt to do so. As for attendance
	21	at Foreign Minister level, the UK position is that we will be
///	22	represented at Ministerial level at the opening ceremony, but
//	23	the Foreign Secretary has not committed himself personally and
/	24	would prefer this decision to be taken on the basis of further
	25	discussion in NATO when we see whether Shultz can be persuaded

DBB
22/11

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File number	Dept DEFENCE	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) P J WESTON		Limited Defence Dept Soviet Dept EED WED NAD Planning Staff PS PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Mr Luce	PS/PUS Sir J Bullard Mr Wright Mr Cartledge cc Col Cross (MOD)
Telephone number 233 3372			
Authorised for despatch	<i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	IMMEDIATE	Page
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 to attend.
 2. Mr Trudeau also argued that NATO should respond early next year to the East's latest MBFR proposals and be prepared to follow this up with a meeting in Vienna at Foreign Minister Level. The latest Eastern positions ~~advanced~~ ^{VER} in Vienna represent some advance in their approach to the ~~verification~~ ^U and monitoring measures which would be required in an MBFR agreement. But they are as adamant as ever in refusing the Western demand for prior accord on existing force levels before any commitments are formally undertaken. (The East has an unacknowledged numerical advantage of 200,000 men in the MBFR area). The scope for a breakthrough is thus negligible, unless the West were prepared to abandon a key negotiating principle and make a leap of faith relying merely on Eastern good intentions. We do not consider there is any evidence to justify this. Therefore, while a response to latest Eastern positions is certainly desirable on verification (and the UK will contribute to this within NATO) and a wider evaluation of the Western approach to MBFR would also be timely in Brussels, we see no case ^{This} for recommending a meeting in Vienna at Foreign Minister level, ~~which~~ could only give rise to political expectations which there is little prospect of satisfying on the basis of declared and long-standing Western negotiating objectives.

HOWE
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 November 1983

John Tahan,

A.S.C. 24/11
H.C.

Visit of Prime Minister of Canada

In your letter of 11 November you asked for advice on Mr Trudeau's idea that the CDE should open in Stockholm in January at the level of Heads of Government.

The Foreign Secretary's advice is that it would not be appropriate to start off the CDE at Heads of Government level, and that it would be positively damaging to allied unity to attempt to do so.

As the Prime Minister indicated when she saw Mr Trudeau on 11 November, there is a danger of over-loading the CDE politically. The CDE, although important, is only one of a number of follow-up meetings envisaged in the Madrid Concluding Document. None of the other meetings, which include those on Human Rights and Human Contacts, will be treated in this way. To highlight the CDE as Mr Trudeau proposed would therefore damage the Western aim of maintaining balance between the security and the human rights parts of the CSCE, and Sir Geoffrey would advise strongly against it.

In practice the idea which is running is that the CDE opening should be attended by Foreign Ministers. Mr Shultz emphasised to Sir G Howe at the time of the UNGA that he personally had considerable reservations even about that. The French and Germans have however been active in seeking to get Mr Shultz to agree to attend the opening meeting in Stockholm on 17 January, and Sir Geoffrey sees some merit in this in terms of resuming contact between the US and the Soviet Union at a senior level. Nevertheless in discussion with our Partners in the Ten, we have so far taken the position that, while we will be represented at Ministerial level at the opening ceremony, it has not yet been decided whether the Foreign Secretary himself would attend. We would prefer this decision to be taken on the basis of further discussions in NATO, possibly with a preliminary airing among our closest allies.

You have also asked for views on the detailed paper which the Canadians have given us elaborating Mr Trudeau's ideas about a five-power conference on nuclear arms control.

/We have looked

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We have looked at the Canadian paper, and are frankly very sceptical. We believe it would not improve the prospects for US/Soviet agreement on strategic nuclear arms control; and, as a recipe for procedure after such reductions are agreed and implemented, is premature and only one of a number of theoretical possibilities for the future. The brief prepared for the Prime Minister's use at the CHOGM (as amended by my letter to you of 18 November) sets out our reservations on this and the other arms control proposals (including MBFR and the Non-Proliferation Treaty). We could, in conjunction with the MOD, provide a more detailed commentary covering all these points if you so require.

Finally, Sir Geoffrey considers that it might be useful if we were now to take an overall view on the value of Mr Trudeau's initiative. His judgement is that, while we would agree with Mr Trudeau on the importance of the political dimension in East/West relations, and the need to maintain regular contacts with the Soviet Union, it would be damaging if Mr Trudeau were to put his detailed views on arms limitation questions to the Russians and imply that they commanded general assent in the West. I enclose a Speaking Note on which the Prime Minister might draw in talking to Mr Trudeau in the margins of the CHOGM.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

East/West Relations

Talking Points for use with Mr Trudeau at CHOGM

1. Have been reflecting on views you put to me on 11 November. Interested to hear what response you got from Japanese and others.
2. Agree on importance of political dimension in relations with the Soviet Union and political control over individual arms limitation negotiations.
3. Have in my recent public statements made it clear that we are looking for sensible and realistic dialogue with Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Intend to make sure that our contacts are adequate for conveying our views clearly to Russians and Eastern Europeans (contacts with Russians where a good case for them at senior official not Ministerial level; going myself to Hungary in 1984). Important to use contacts to try to avoid misunderstandings.
4. Believe main message we should be trying to get over to Russians is that West and specifically Americans, are interested in genuine arms control agreements. Progress must be achieved in the specific negotiations. Will not be achieved by public propaganda statements aimed at Western public opinion.
5. Concerned that if in any meeting with, or message to, Andropov you were to imply that five-power nuclear conference or other specific arms control suggestions in your speeches had general Western backing without prior coordination and agreement in NATO, we might send wrong signal to Russians and actually make them less inclined to negotiate flexibly in various fora. They might believe that Western concessions were imminent.
6. [If discussion turns to specific issues, these are covered in Brief PMVE(83) for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.]

CONFIDENTIAL

for . Pol - : mky with Trudeau +
follow up on EA/West
Relation

21 NOV 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

Pamie Martin
only desk
19/11



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Handwritten mark

18 November 1983

See John

CHOGM Brief: Trudeau Initiative

Sir Geoffrey Howe has commented on para 11 of the CHOGM Brief on the Trudeau initiative (PMVE(83)(B30) that it takes an insufficiently firm line on the proposal for a 5-power negotiation on nuclear disarmament.

We would suggest that it be substituted by the following text:

'Britain has stated publicly the circumstances in which we would be ready to review the position on the British nuclear deterrent in relation to arms control. Five power negotiations on nuclear disarmament are only one among a number of theoretical possibilities for the future. If we had to take a position on this now, it would be negative. The circumstances are premature. The first necessity, as we have repeatedly stated is for super powers to negotiate substantial reductions.'

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(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1983

Arms Control : Canadian Proposals

I enclose a copy of a further letter which I have received from Mr. Schram of the Canadian High Commission. This contains the text of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Trudeau.

Mr. Trudeau seeks the Prime Minister's support for two propositions:

- (a) that all NATO members will be represented at a high political level at the inaugural meeting of the Stockholm Conference on January 17; and
- (b) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposals on MBFR early in the New Year and will be prepared to follow-up its response with a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level.

He also states that he is sending a personal emissary to Peking and Moscow to express his concerns about the current international situation.

I shall be showing this letter to the Prime Minister over the weekend. Clearly, Mr. Trudeau can be expected to refer to it in New Delhi next week. I should therefore be grateful if you could ensure that guidance reaches me, if necessary telegraphically, by the morning of 22 November.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Rf

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SUBJECT

Canadian High Commission



Haut Commissariat du Canada

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T191/83

T

Mark.
pl. take with
to CHOGN.
on 21/11

1 Grosvenor Square
London W1X 0AB

November 18, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. John Coles
Private Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

ms

Prime Minister.

Another message from Mr. Trudeau.

I have commissioned briefing for
CHOGN and will let you have a
reply. A.J.C. 18/11

Dear Mr. Coles,

Following is the text of a letter from Prime
Minister Trudeau which we have been asked to pass to you
for transmission to Prime Minister Thatcher:

"My Dear Margaret,

In my letter of October 25 I expressed to you my
concern about the current unsatisfactory state of East-West
relations and international security and stated my intention
to work to ameliorate this situation.

In Europe last week I had the opportunity to meet
directly with six of our NATO colleagues to discuss this
subject and was heartened by the reception I received. I
found that a general consensus existed on the urgent need to
re-establish a climate of confidence and to build toward a
concerted and sustained dialogue between East and West.
Beyond its own intrinsic long-term merits, such a climate
and web of contacts could act as "safety net" which could
well be required in the new year.

My visit to Europe also provided me with a
valuable opportunity to discuss in detail some of the more
specific proposals mentioned in my earlier letter including
the need for: a forum in which global limits might be
negotiated for all five nuclear weapon states; further efforts
to reaffirm the principles of non-proliferation; and a high
level political impetus to be given to the MBFR negotiations

and to the forthcoming Conference in Stockholm on "Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe".

My colleague, Allan MacEachen, intends to raise the latter subject at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels on December 8 and I would like to seek your personal support so that a decision can be reached in Brussels on the following two proposals:

- (A) that all NATO members will be represented at a high political level at the inaugural meeting of the Stockholm Conference on January 17; and
- (B) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposals on MBFR early in the new year and will be prepared to follow-up its response with a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level.

I am convinced that agreement on these two proposals would go a considerable way to demonstrating to the East and to our own publics our desire at a political level to make meaningful progress in the arms control field aimed at reducing the current level of tension.


I also wish to inform you that I have written to both the Chinese and Soviet leaderships and shortly will be sending a personal emissary to Peking and Moscow to express my concerns about the current international situation. I will keep you informed of the results of these meetings.

I would welcome any comments you might have and look forward to maintaining close contact on this subject in the months ahead. Thank you again for finding time in your very busy schedule to receive me last week at short notice and for the superb hospitality you so generously offered. I talked to Ron about the idea of a summit in Stockholm in January, or very soon thereafter; he undertook to think further about it. Do have a word with him if you can.

All the best,

Pierre"

Yours sincerely,


John Schram
Counsellor

FOREIGN
PDC,
East/West Plus
Pt. 5.



da

10 DOWNING STREET


From the Private Secretary

18 November 1983

Thank you for your letter of 18 November containing the text of a message from Prime Minister Trudeau to the Prime Minister. I shall be bringing this to Mrs. Thatcher's attention over the weekend.

A. J. COLES

Mr. John Schram



T 188B/83
SUBJECT



of Minister
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 188B/83

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

November 16, 1983

My dear Margaret,

In my letter of October 25 I expressed to you my concern about the current unsatisfactory state of East-West relations and international security and stated my intention to work to ameliorate this situation.

In Europe last week I had the opportunity to meet directly with six of our NATO colleagues to discuss this subject (including the most fruitful meeting at 10 Downing Street on November 11) and was heartened by the reception I received. I found that a general consensus existed on the urgent need to re-establish a climate of confidence and to build toward a concerted and sustained dialogue between East and West. Beyond its own intrinsic long-term merits, such a climate and web of contacts could act as a 'safety net' which could well be required in the new year.

My visit to Europe also provided me with a valuable opportunity to discuss in detail some of the more specific proposals mentioned in my earlier letter including the need for: a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear weapons states; further efforts to reaffirm the principles of non-proliferation; and a high level political impetus to be given to the MBFR negotiations and to the forthcoming conference in Stockholm on 'Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe'.

The Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, England

My colleague, Allan MacEachen, intends to raise the latter subject at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels on December 8 and I would like to seek your personal support so that a decision can be reached in Brussels on the following two proposals:

- (a) that all NATO members will be represented at a high political level at the inaugural meeting of the Stockholm conference on January 17; and
- (b) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposals on MBFR early in the new year and will be prepared to follow-up its response with a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level.

I am convinced that agreement on these two proposals would go a considerable way to demonstrating to the East and to our own publics our desire at a political level to make meaningful progress in the arms control field aimed at reducing the current level of tension.


I also wish to inform you that I have written to both the Chinese and Soviet leaderships and shortly will be sending a personal emissary to Peking and Moscow to express my concerns about the current international situation. I will keep you informed of the results of these meetings.

I would welcome any comments you might have and look forward to maintaining close contact on this subject in the months ahead.

Thank you again for finding time in your very busy schedule to receive me last week at short notice and for the superb hospitality you so generously offered.

*- I talked to Owen about the idea of a Summit in Stockholm in January, or very soon thereafter. He undertook to think further about it. Do have a word with him if you can. All the best,
P. ...*

22 NOV 1960



CONFIDENTIAL



cc CO

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 November 1983

East/West Relations

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 14 November and the accompanying OD paper.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that the paper should be discussed as soon as possible in OD.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL*Polys...
for security...*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM OTTAWA 152230Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 615 OF 15 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO AND TOKYO

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA AND UKMIS NEW YORK

A.S.C. 10/11

MY TELNO 610 TO FCO: EAST/WEST RELATIONS: TRUDEAU INITIATIVE.

SUMMARY

1. CANADIAN COMMENT ON TRUDEAU'S MONTREAL SPEECH HAS BEEN MIXED. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS. THE GOODWILL WHICH TRUDEAU HAS SO FAR RECEIVED FOR HIS INITIATIVE FROM THE OPPOSITION AND MOST LEADER-WRITERS HAS DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF HIS CHOICE OF A PARTY FORUM RATHER THAN PARLIAMENT IN WHICH TO DIVULGE DETAILS OF HIS PROPOSALS AND TO REPORT ON HIS EUROPEAN TOUR.

DETAIL

2. THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT THAT TRUDEAU WAS PLANNING A MAJOR INITIATIVE WAS GREETED IN SOME QUARTERS WITH SCEPTICISM AS A MOVE TO COUNTER THE PRESENT UNPOPULARITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER ONCE TRUDEAU'S TRIP TO EUROPE GOT UNDERWAY AND REPORTS WERE RECEIVED OF THE REPORTEDLY POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM SOME EUROPEAN LEADERS THE STATUS OF THE INITIATIVE ROSE IN PUBLIC PERCEPTION: AND DETAILS OF HIS PROPOSALS WERE AWAITED WITH INTEREST. TRUDEAU HAS NOW DISSIPATED MUCH OF THAT ADVANTAGE BY CHOOSING TO REPORT PROGRESS NOT TO PARLIAMENT, BUT TO A LIBERAL PARTY FUND-RAISING LUNCHEON IN MONTREAL.

3. THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, MULRONEY, HAS POINTED OUT, QUIETLY BUT EFFECTIVELY, THAT THE PROPER COURSE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO REPORT TO THE CANADIAN PEOPLE BY WAY OF PARLIAMENT. TRUDEAU MADE THINGS WORSE BY NOT EVEN BOTHERING TO BE PRESENT DURING PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION TIME YESTERDAY. HE COULD HARDLY HAVE MADE HIS CONTEMPT FOR PARLIAMENT PLAINER.

4. ON THE SUBSTANCE, COMMENTATORS GENERALLY AGREE WITH TRUDEAU ON THE NEED FOR SPECIAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS, BUT SEE LITTLE EVIDENCE FROM HIS MONTREAL SPEECH THAT HE HAS YET COME UP WITH ANYTHING EITHER RADICALLY NEW OR LIKELY TO PROSPER. HIS STAFF MEANWHILE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE SUGGESTIONS - SOMEWHAT PREMATURE IN MY VIEW - THAT HE MIGHT BE IN THE RUNNING FOR A NOBEL PRIZE, AND IN HIS MONTREAL SPEECH HE HIMSELF DID NOT FAIL TO MAKE A PASSING MENTION OF ALFRED NOBEL.

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5. ON CONTACTS WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION, MACEACHEN HAS TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SUGGESTED A MEETING. TRUDEAU'S OFFICE HAVE INDICATED THAT THIS WILL NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE TRUDEAU LEAVES FOR JAPAN, NEW DELHI AND THE GULF ON 17 NOVEMBER. HE RETURNS ON 5 DECEMBER. MR KENNETH DAM IS IN OTTAWA TODAY, PRIMARILY TO TRY TO EXPLAIN GRENADA, BUT HE WILL NO DOUBT TELL CANADIAN MINISTERS HOW TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE IS SEEN IN WASHINGTON.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

MORAN

STANDARD

NAD

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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File 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1983

Thank you for your letter of 14 November containing a paper setting out Prime Minister Trudeau's ideas on a five-power nuclear conference, together with a copy of Mr. Trudeau's speech in Montreal on 13 November.

I shall bring these to the attention of the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

Mr. John Schram.

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file 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1983

ARMS CONTROL: MR. TRUDEAU'S IDEAS

Following Mr. Trudeau's discussions with the Prime Minister here last Friday, I have received from the Canadian High Commission the enclosed paper setting out in more detail Mr. Trudeau's proposal for a five-power nuclear conference, together with the enclosed text of the speech which he gave in Montreal on his return to Canada.

SK1

I should be grateful for early comments on Mr. Trudeau's ideas.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PM/83/89

PRIME MINISTER

The paper has been amended to meet our points (you need not read it again now)

Yes
 not
 after 6 early OD discussion?

A. J. C. 14/11

East-West Relations

1. In the country at large I sense a widespread feeling that:

- East-West relations are now worse than at any time since the Cuban crisis of 1962;
- part of the responsibility for this lies with the West, especially the Regan administration;
- Britain could and should do more to put matters right.

2. I believe that this contains some exaggeration but also some good sense. I am therefore circulating the attached paper. It sets out in summary form the reasons why East-West and Anglo-Soviet relations are as they are, the nature of the Western interest and the means available to promote it. Attached at Annex are recommended policy guidelines for the specific steps which I believe should be taken. The timescale is roughly the next five years. I should welcome an early opportunity to discuss the paper in OD.

3. I am sending copies of this minute and attachments to OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 14 November 1983

UK/SOVIET AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Introduction

1. The recent shooting down of the Korean airliner and the current INF debate have focussed attention on two important characteristics of the Soviet Union. The first is its paranoid view of its own security, an historical concern of all Russian/Soviet states. The second, underlined also by the START talks in Geneva, is its enormous military power. This combination of qualities, together with a political ideology which predicts as inevitable the final triumph of communism over all other political systems, confronts the Western democracies with one of our severest challenges. Since the last war, the West's response, which has included containment, roll-back and most recently detente, has at times been ambivalent and even contradictory.

2. The US Secretary of State in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations committee on 15 June said that the long term US aim was "to encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system towards a more pluralistic political and economic system". The rigidity and strength of the present Soviet state is such however that it is very doubtful whether, in the foreseeable future, any greater diversity can be expected. Our policies should therefore be based on the assumption that any change in the system, at least in the next four to five years will not be fundamental, however much Andropov himself may recognise the problems and the need for some change. If change does come, it will come very slowly and mainly as a result of internal, not external, pressure.

3. This paper outlines the main considerations affecting relations with the Soviet Union and East/West relations generally. Annex A recommends policy guidelines for the long term security of the UK. To be effective, these will

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need to be closely coordinated with those of our allies and partners and followed consistently.

Security

4. Only if the nuclear balance between the two super-powers remains stable can middle ranking powers pursue their own bilateral interests with the Soviet Union on a sound or lasting basis.

5. As a general rule, at every level, strategic, nuclear and conventional, the West should continue to confront the Soviet Union with the certainty that the Western alliance will do whatever is necessary to maintain adequate defences. The Russians should not be allowed to gain the impression that they can divide the West or undermine its resolve by appeals to public opinion.

6. In parallel, we should continue to offer the Soviet Union the serious possibility of balanced and verifiable arms control agreements which would maintain security at lower levels.

7. The detailed policies we should pursue on the individual questions now under current negotiation with the Soviet Union are the subject of separate consideration.

Political Relations

8. The main means of assisting change in the Soviet Union is through the spread of information. Information can be conveyed at a number of levels and in a variety of ways.

9. At the political level, meetings of senior ministers or heads of Government give us opportunities to put across our views on specific policies and problems of the day and expose their Soviet interlocutors to the sort of direct questioning and criticism which their own system is designed to prevent. Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's visits to

the West made a profound impression on them both. Andropov has yet to set foot in a free Western country.

10. High level contacts also present the West with opportunities of penetrating the system of Soviet decision making and assessing the relative strength of the various views and protagonists involved. This helps to reduce the likelihood of dangerous misunderstandings. Exposing the most senior ranks of the self-contained Soviet military caste to direct Western political and military argument is not the least benefit of such contacts.

11. Clearly the extent, timing and content of East/West political contacts should be a matter of careful planning and coordination among Western countries. UK practice since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been to avoid high level and Ministerial contacts except where these are clearly advantageous to us. But other post-Afghanistan measures have been progressively relaxed by our allies who have been influenced by differing national problems and interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

12. Our aim now should be to build up contacts over the next few years, while continuing to give careful consideration to the nature and timing of such exchanges. Incidents such as the shooting down of the KAL airliner will inevitably lead to the postponement or cancellation of particular events but should be treated in the framework of a long term consistent policy. We should also continue our present policy of strongly criticising the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and making the Soviet Union pay as high a price as possible for its military presence there, with the long term aim of bringing about its withdrawal.

13. Political contacts at Senior Ministerial level with the Soviet Union have for the most part been confined to meetings between Mr Gromyko and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the margins of the UN or other international

meetings in third countries. Political consultations between the FCO and Soviet MFA also take place on an annual basis. In April this year they were held in Moscow between Mr Rifkind, Minister of State at the FCO and Mr Kornienko, the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister. The next step might be for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to issue an invitation to Mr Gromyko to visit the United Kingdom some time in 1984.

14. Visits to the Soviet Union by, or invitations to their opposite numbers from, British Ministers with specific responsibilities in technical fields should be considered on their merits. The opportunities these meetings might provide for putting our views on political matters directly and forcefully to senior Soviet figures should not be overlooked.

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Information

16. At a more popular level the influence of Western thought and culture are strong where they are allowed to penetrate. A variety of ways can be used to expose the Soviet people to Western ideas and ideals. These include of the provisions on the freer flow of information and other human contacts provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid CSCE

documents and also use of contacts arising from the UK/Soviet cultural agreement, under which exchanges of teachers and students, exhibitions and films take place. These activities are, however, all subject to Soviet agreement and are therefore to some extent restricted but nevertheless provide useful opportunities to present Western ideas and values to the Soviet public.

17. The most effective means of getting information into the Soviet Union at present is by radio transmissions. These are not subject to censorship but they are subject to selective jamming. A re-examination of the role of the BBC External Services to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is now in progress.

Economy

18. Studies in OECD, NATO and elsewhere earlier this year, following the dispute over the Siberian pipeline, have confirmed that there is no reason to object to commercially sound and mutually advantageous financial and trade relations between East and West, provided always that the West abstains from the export of goods and technology which could contribute to the Soviet military build-up. The Soviet Union is broadly self sufficient in all raw materials. Trade with the West is small in both relative and absolute terms. Currently Soviet imports from OECD countries represent 2.5% of the Soviet GNP.

19. Efforts in the West have concentrated on refining COCOM rules on the export of militarily significant technology and equipment and on improving the national enforcement procedures of the strategic embargo. Given the nature of the Western free market system and the widespread availability of technology, a total ban on the transfer of technology would prove impossible. But our security interests require that the utmost care should be taken to ensure, as far as possible, that exports which could have

significant military application or give the Soviet Union significant military advancement do not occur.

20. Other areas have also been looked at in the studies mentioned above. There has been agreement to tighten up credit terms and to keep imports of Soviet energy (especially Siberian gas) to proportions that do not create undue dependence. Financially, the Soviet Union has a debt service ratio of 17% which is the lowest by far of all the CMEA countries and easily within its capacity to service.

21. In order to pursue their commercial relations all Western countries have, to some extent, to match the state structure on the Soviet side through the creation of intergovernmental Joint Commissions and Committees. Without these, the actual traders on the Western side (ie the firms concerned) would be seriously handicapped in conducting business. These inter-governmental links are necessary and should continue. Although of itself trade with the West can have beneficial political effects by exposing the Soviet Union to Western ideas and standards, it should be conducted on the basis of mutual advantage and financial prudence. It should also be compatible with our broad security interests.

Eastern Europe

22. The system imposed on Eastern Europe after the Second World War runs counter to the traditions, state of development, cultural links and religious ties of the countries involved (with the possible exception of Bulgaria). Attempts to remove or lighten the yoke have been put down at regular intervals. A direct confrontation would provoke the same Soviet response whatever the damage to the Soviet Union's international reputation. Those concerned in Eastern Europe understand that in their struggle they cannot look to the West for military assistance. Change will come slowly. Dramatic developments have always led to military response. There is no possibility in the foreseeable future

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of the Russians allowing any of these countries to become completely independent of the Soviet Union.

23. For its part the West must take care that the presentation of its policy towards Eastern Europe does not have the effect of making the Soviet Union adopt even more repressive policies towards its neighbours. But we must also make clear to the Soviet Union that while we understand its legitimate interest in its national security, the domestic, economic and social systems of individual East European countries must be for the peoples of those countries to decide for themselves and cannot, legitimately, be imposed from outside.

24. While taking care over its public presentation we should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania). Poland is a special case, and we should not rule out a substantial relationship if its internal social and economic systems develop in a manner more comparable to, say, Hungary than Czechoslovakia.

25. Ministerial visits are one way of indicating this differentiation. They also provide additional indirect channels for getting our views across to the Russians on particular points. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary visited Hungary in September, and a Minister of State visited Czechoslovakia and the GDR in October. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might also consider visits to Romania and perhaps Bulgaria. In the case of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, visits at above the level of Minister of State are not necessary nor desirable in 1984 but might be appropriate in 1985. A policy of differentiation should be presented, not on the basis of rewards and punishments but as a consequence of our view that the quality of bilateral relations is inevitably enhanced the more that the two countries have in common. As East European countries

liberalise their economic and social systems the opportunities for a more substantive relationship are increased.

26. Information will be one of the most effective means at the West's disposal to influence developments in Eastern Europe. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available. In the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe both the vernacular and English language world service broadcasts are important. The vernacular services reach the greater numbers but world service broadcasts are listened to in some Party and intellectual circles as an impartial source of information.

27. The British Council's programme of exchanges should be maintained. Schemes involving young people should be encouraged. Other exchanges through the arrangement of British cultural events in Eastern Europe, and vice-versa, although popular in Eastern Europe, should be considered selectively so as to ensure that the resources and prestige involved are commensurate with the returns. They should also be looked at in the overall framework of our relations with each individual country.

28. The UK should continue to pursue trade on its commercial merits while having regard to the wider interests of security. For those countries like Hungary, which appear genuinely determined to introduce economic reforms, the UK should do what it can to help with links with the major Western institutions like the IMF, although each case would have to be decided on its merits. There may be some limited scope for closer links with the EC, but improved access to the EC market will continue to be limited by economic conditions in Western Europe and by agricultural over-supply. These will have to be balanced against the undoubted political benefit of a closer EC-Hungary relationship which, inter alia, would reduce prospects for closer CMEA integration.

The Third World

29. Since the War the Soviet Union has been able to gain influence in a number of Third World countries by claiming to be on their side in the struggle against colonialism, by offering limited technical and economic assistance and by supplying arms and advice to revolutionary parties and Governments in internal struggles. In the 1970s the Soviet Union, through the use of Cuban and other surrogates, made major advances in Africa. The countries concerned are beginning to realise however that the Soviet Union is not able to provide the trade, aid or technology on a scale which they need. Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have all recently turned to the West for assistance. We should exploit these opportunities and look for similar openings in countries like the Seychelles. The West should not tacitly accept a Soviet or surrogate fait accompli, eg Afghanistan.

30. With the passage of time the fundamentally different approach to the Third World between the West and the Soviet Union is becoming more widely appreciated. The West, although criticised for not doing more, is seeking to resolve the underlying problems of particular regions, while the Soviet Union seeks to capitalise on them.

31. With its economic and technological advantages, the West should be able over time to contain and even reverse some Soviet gains. It is however to be expected that the Soviet Union will continue to seize low cost opportunities for enlarging its sphere of influence and to exploit instability as it is now doing in Central America.

China

32. The internal economic and political systems of China and the Soviet Union are in many ways similar. Recently there has been an increase in contacts between the two sides and a resumption of talks on the normalisation of relations.

However a number of obstacles - Cambodia, Afghanistan, Soviet force levels in East Asia and the border disputes - will continue to block progress and the atmosphere of Sino/Soviet relations remains essentially cool. The Chinese still see the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to China's national security and to world peace. Closer relations with the US and the West generally are the key to the success of their central policy of economic modernisation. The West should build on this essential Chinese requirement so that China continues to see the balance of her interests as lying in development of relations more with us than with the Soviet Union.

33. Recommended policy guidelines are attached at Annex A.

ANNEX A

POLICY GUIDELINES

General

1. The process of change in the Soviet Union will be slow. Our policy should be based on the assumption that any change in the system, in at least the medium term, will not be fundamental. To be effective our policy must be closely coordinated with our Allies and partners and followed consistently.

Security

2. The West should, at every level, continue to confront the Soviet Union with the certainty that the Western Alliance will do whatever is necessary to maintain adequate defences. We should, at the same time, seek balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, capable of maintaining security at lower levels.

Political Relations

3. The main means of influencing developments in the Soviet Union is through the spread of information.

4. High level political contacts expose Soviet leaders, including the military, to some direct questioning and criticism. They provide opportunities of assessing Soviet leaders and help to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding. Our aim should be to build up our contacts over the next few years while continuing to give careful consideration to the nature and timing of such exchanges which should be closely coordinated with our Allies and partners. We should not, however, abandon our present policy on Afghanistan.

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might invite Mr Gromyko to visit the UK during 1984.

Information

6. The most effective means of getting information into the Soviet Union at present is by radio transmissions. The role of the BBC External Services should be re-examined.

7. Other opportunities arising from our bilateral cultural agreement and the CSCE process for exposing Soviet people to Western ideas and ideals should be exploited.

Economy

8. Western policy should be guided by the following:

- (a) East/West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests;
- (b) The nature of the Western free market system and the widespread availability of technology rule out a total ban on the transfer of technology;
- (c) Strategically significant exports should continue to be identified and embargoed under effective COCOM procedures;
- (d) Governments should exercise financial prudence in trading with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and avoid granting preferential treatment;
- (e) The West should avoid over-dependence on imports from or exports to the Soviet Union in all trade sectors, including energy (imports) and grain (exports);

- (f) Although trade may have certain desirable political effects-(eg contacts with Western methods and standards) this can seldom justify conducting trade on economic or commercial terms disadvantageous to the Western partner.

Eastern Europe

9. We should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania).

10. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available.

11. The British Council's programme of exchanges, particularly academic and youth exchanges, should be maintained. Other major cultural exchanges should be considered selectively.

12. Economic assistance is what the Eastern Europeans most want. But this will be hard to provide. Access to Western economic institutions, in particular the IMF, might be one of the best ways of introducing Western standards and ideas into the Eastern economies.

Third World

13. Western policy should be guided by the following:

- (a) The Russians are facing increasing problems in responding to developing countries' real needs. Even where Soviet/Cuban influence has been established (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) countries are increasingly turning to the West for assistance. We should take advantage of this;

- (b) Western policy should be aimed at resolving the underlying problems of a region, as well as eliminating Soviet/Cuban intervention;
- (c) So far as potential future Third World problems are concerned, measures which would contribute to world stability and build up resistance to the Soviet Union would be:
 - (i) to give practical help, including aid to developing countries which are vulnerable to Soviet pressure (EC Member States provide nearly half of all OECD aid);
 - (ii) to encourage the creation and strengthening of independent moderate regional groups such as ASEAN but to be wary of proposals for alliances which are purely dependant on Western backing;
 - (iii) to encourage influential moderates in the non-aligned movement and to promote the recent tendency away from the Cuban concept (advanced during their chairmanship of the movement) that the NAM have a natural ally in the Soviet Union;
 - (iv) to work on a multilateral basis through the appropriate international organisations (eg the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and the UN system) to promote Third World economic development and a sense of partnership and interdependence between the Western industrialised and the

developing countries;

- (v) to expose the hollowness of Soviet claims to provide either the political answers for developing countries or the practical assistance they need for their development.

China

14. Western relations with China should be pursued on their own merits, but also with an appreciation of the likely effect on Sino/Soviet relations.

BULACL



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F. 2 -

Clean version of OD paper
attached to a package of 14/11

East West Relations

With the compliments of

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

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UK/SOVIET AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Introduction

1. The recent shooting down of the Korean airliner and the current INF debate have focussed attention on two important characteristics of the Soviet Union. The first is its paranoid view of its own security, an historical concern of all Russian/Soviet states. The second, underlined also by the START talks in Geneva, is its enormous military power. This combination of qualities, together with a political ideology which predicts as inevitable the final triumph of communism over all other political systems, confronts the Western democracies with one of our severest challenges. Since the last war, the West's response, which has included containment, roll-back and most recently detente, has at times been ambivalent and even contradictory.

2. The US Secretary of State in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations committee on 15 June said that the long term US aim was "to encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system towards a more pluralistic political and economic system". The rigidity and strength of the present Soviet state is such however that it is very doubtful whether, in the foreseeable future, any greater diversity can be expected. Our policies should therefore be based on the assumption that any change in the system, at least in the next four to five years will not be fundamental, however much Andropov himself may recognise the problems and the need for some change. If change does come, it will come very slowly and mainly as a result of internal, not external, pressure.

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Security

4. Only if the nuclear balance between the two super-powers remains stable can middle ranking powers pursue their own bilateral interests with the Soviet Union on a sound or lasting basis.

5. As a general rule, at every level, strategic, nuclear and conventional, the West should continue to confront the Soviet Union with the certainty that the Western alliance will do whatever is necessary to maintain adequate defences. The Russians should not be allowed to gain the impression that they can divide the West or undermine its resolve by appeals to public opinion.

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11. Clearly the extent, timing and content of East/West political contacts should be a matter of careful planning and coordination among Western countries. UK practice since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been to avoid high level and Ministerial contacts except where these are clearly advantageous to us. But other post-Afghanistan measures have been progressively relaxed by our allies who have been influenced by differing national problems and interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

12. Our aim now should be to build up contacts over the next few years, while continuing to give careful consideration to the nature and timing of such exchanges. Incidents such as the shooting down of the KAL airliner will inevitably lead to the postponement or cancellation of particular events but should be treated in the framework of a long term consistent policy. We should also continue our present policy of strongly criticising the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and making the Soviet Union pay as high a price as possible for its military presence there, with the long term aim of bringing about its withdrawal.

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18. Studies in OECD, NATO and elsewhere earlier this year, following the dispute over the Siberian pipeline, have confirmed that there is no reason to object to commercially sound and mutually advantageous financial and trade relations between East and West, provided always that the West abstains from the export of goods and technology which could contribute to the Soviet military build-up. The Soviet Union is broadly self sufficient in all raw materials. Trade with the West is small in both relative and absolute terms. Currently Soviet imports from OECD countries represent 2.5% of the Soviet GNP.

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Eastern Europe

22. The system imposed on Eastern Europe after the Second World War runs counter to the traditions, state of development, cultural links and religious ties of the countries involved (with the possible exception of Bulgaria). Attempts to remove or lighten the yoke have been put down at regular intervals. A direct confrontation would provoke the same Soviet response whatever the damage to the Soviet Union's international reputation. Those concerned in Eastern Europe understand that in their struggle they cannot look to the West for military assistance. Change will come slowly. Dramatic developments have always led to military response. There is no possibility in the foreseeable future

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23. For its part the West must take care that the presentation of its policy towards Eastern Europe does not have the effect of making the Soviet Union adopt even more repressive policies towards its neighbours. But we must also make clear to the Soviet Union that while we understand its legitimate interest in its national security, the domestic, economic and social systems of individual East European countries must be for the peoples of those countries to decide for themselves and cannot, legitimately, be imposed from outside.

24. While taking care over its public presentation we should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania). Poland is a special case, and we should not rule out a substantial relationship if its internal social and economic systems develop in a manner more comparable to, say, Hungary than Czechoslovakia.

25. Ministerial visits are one way of indicating this differentiation. They also provide additional indirect channels for getting our views across to the Russians on particular points. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary visited Hungary in September, and a Minister of State visited Czechoslovakia and the GDR in October. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might also consider visits to Romania and perhaps Bulgaria. In the case of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, visits at above the level of Minister of State are not necessary nor desirable in 1984 but might be appropriate in 1985. A policy of differentiation should be presented, not on the basis of rewards and punishments but as a consequence of our view that the quality of bilateral relations is inevitably enhanced the more that the two countries have in common. As East European countries

liberalise their economic and social systems the opportunities for a more substantive relationship are increased.

26. Information will be one of the most effective means at the West's disposal to influence developments in Eastern Europe. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available. In the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe both the vernacular and English language world service broadcasts are important. The vernacular services reach the greater numbers but world service broadcasts are listened to in some Party and intellectual circles as an impartial source of information.

27. The British Council's programme of exchanges should be maintained. Schemes involving young people should be encouraged. Other exchanges through the arrangement of British cultural events in Eastern Europe, and vice-versa, although popular in Eastern Europe, should be considered selectively so as to ensure that the resources and prestige involved are commensurate with the returns. They should also be looked at in the overall framework of our relations with each individual country.

28. The UK should continue to pursue trade on its commercial merits while having regard to the wider interests of security. For those countries like Hungary, which appear genuinely determined to introduce economic reforms, the UK should do what it can to help with links with the major Western institutions like the IMF, although each case would have to be decided on its merits. There may be some limited scope for closer links with the EC, but improved access to the EC market will continue to be limited by economic conditions in Western Europe and by agricultural over-supply. These will have to be balanced against the undoubted political benefit of a closer EC-Hungary relationship which, inter alia, would reduce prospects for closer CMEA integration.

The Third World

29. Since the War the Soviet Union has been able to gain influence in a number of Third World countries by claiming to be on their side in the struggle against colonialism, by offering limited technical and economic assistance and by supplying arms and advice to revolutionary parties and Governments in internal struggles. In the 1970s the Soviet Union, through the use of Cuban and other surrogates, made major advances in Africa. The countries concerned are beginning to realise however that the Soviet Union is not able to provide the trade, aid or technology on a scale which they need. Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have all recently turned to the West for assistance. We should exploit these opportunities and look for similar openings in countries like the Seychelles. The West should not tacitly accept a Soviet or surrogate fait accompli, eg Afghanistan.

30. With the passage of time the fundamentally different approach to the Third World between the West and the Soviet Union is becoming more widely appreciated. The West, although criticised for not doing more, is seeking to resolve the underlying problems of particular regions, while the Soviet Union seeks to capitalise on them.

31. With its economic and technological advantages, the West should be able over time to contain and even reverse some Soviet gains. It is however to be expected that the Soviet Union will continue to seize low cost opportunities for enlarging its sphere of influence and to exploit instability as it is now doing in Central America.

China

32. The internal economic and political systems of China and the Soviet Union are in many ways similar. Recently there has been an increase in contacts between the two sides and a resumption of talks on the normalisation of relations.

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However a number of obstacles - Cambodia, Afghanistan, Soviet force levels in East Asia and the border disputes - will continue to block progress and the atmosphere of Sino/Soviet relations remains essentially cool. The Chinese still see the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to China's national security and to world peace. Closer relations with the US and the West generally are the key to the success of their central policy of economic modernisation. The West should build on this essential Chinese requirement so that China continues to see the balance of her interests as lying in development of relations more with us than with the Soviet Union.

33. Recommended policy guidelines are attached at Annex A.

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ANNEX A

POLICY GUIDELINES

General

1. The process of change in the Soviet Union will be slow. Our policy should be based on the assumption that any change in the system, in at least the medium term, will not be fundamental. To be effective our policy must be closely coordinated with our Allies and partners and followed consistently.

Security

2. The West should, at every level, continue to confront the Soviet Union with the certainty that the Western Alliance will do whatever is necessary to maintain adequate defences. We should, at the same time, seek balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, capable of maintaining security at lower levels.

Political Relations

3. The main means of influencing developments in the Soviet Union is through the spread of information.

4. High level political contacts expose Soviet leaders, including the military, to some direct questioning and criticism. They provide opportunities of assessing Soviet leaders and help to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding. Our aim should be to build up our contacts over the next few years while continuing to give careful consideration to the nature and timing of such exchanges which should be closely coordinated with our Allies and partners. We should not, however, abandon our present policy on Afghanistan.

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5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might invite Mr Gromyko to visit the UK during 1984.

Information

6. The most effective means of getting information into the Soviet Union at present is by radio transmissions. The role of the BBC External Services should be re-examined.

7. Other opportunities arising from our bilateral cultural agreement and the CSCE process for exposing Soviet people to Western ideas and ideals should be exploited.

Economy

8. Western policy should be guided by the following:

- (a) East/West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests;
- (b) The nature of the Western free market system and the widespread availability of technology rule out a total ban on the transfer of technology;
- (c) Strategically significant exports should continue to be identified and embargoed under effective COCOM procedures;
- (d) Governments should exercise financial prudence in trading with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and avoid granting preferential treatment;
- (e) The West should avoid over-dependence on imports from or exports to the Soviet Union in all trade sectors, including energy (imports) and grain (exports);

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- (f) Although trade may have certain desirable political effects (eg contacts with Western methods and standards) this can seldom justify conducting trade on economic or commercial terms disadvantageous to the Western partner.

Eastern Europe

9. We should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania).

10. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available.

11. The British Council's programme of exchanges, particularly academic and youth exchanges, should be maintained. Other major cultural exchanges should be considered selectively.

12. Economic assistance is what the Eastern Europeans most want. But this will be hard to provide. Access to Western economic institutions, in particular the IMF, might be one of the best ways of introducing Western standards and ideas into the Eastern economies.

Third World

13. Western policy should be guided by the following:

- (a) The Russians are facing increasing problems in responding to developing countries' real needs. Even where Soviet/Cuban influence has been established (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) countries are increasingly turning to the West for assistance. We should take advantage of this;

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- (b) Western policy should be aimed at resolving the underlying problems of a region, as well as eliminating Soviet/Cuban intervention;
- (c) So far as potential future Third World problems are concerned, measures which would contribute to world stability and build up resistance to the Soviet Union would be:
 - (i) to give practical help, including aid to developing countries which are vulnerable to Soviet pressure (EC Member States provide nearly half of all OECD aid);
 - (ii) to encourage the creation and strengthening of independent moderate regional groups such as ASEAN but to be wary of proposals for alliances which are purely dependant on Western backing;
 - (iii) to encourage influential moderates in the non-aligned movement and to promote the recent tendency away from the Cuban concept (advanced during their chairmanship of the movement) that the NAM have a natural ally in the Soviet Union;
 - (iv) to work on a multilateral basis through the appropriate international organisations (eg the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and the UN system) to promote Third World economic development and a sense of partnership and interdependence between the Western industrialised and the

developing countries;

- (v) to expose the hollowness of Soviet claims to provide either the political answers for developing countries or the practical assistance they need for their development.


China

14. Western relations with China should be pursued on their own merits, but also with an appreciation of the likely effect on Sino/Soviet relations.

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16 NOV 1983



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ONT
HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA.
DIVISION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES
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Telephone: 01-629 9492 Ext.

November 14, 1983


Mr. John Coles
Private Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

Dear Mr. Coles,

Mr. Robert Fowler, our Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy, has asked us to pass to you copies of the attached papers expalining Prime Minister Trudeau's ideas on the five-power nuclear conference which he discussed with you at Prime Minister Thatcher's lunch last Friday. The papers may go some distance in responding to concerns raised by Prime Minister Thatcher as to how the Canadian proposals would deal with the aggregation of the U.S.A., U.K. and French deterrents, and the need for modernization of U.K. nuclear forces.

We are also forwarding copies of the speech which Prime Minister Trudeau gave in Montreal November 13th.

Yours sincerely,


John Schram
Counsellor

I have asked the F.I.C.O.
to comment.

A.S.C. 15
h.a.

I Subject:

This paper describes the substance of an initiative which could result in a structure of arms limitation for the five declared nuclear weapons states.

II Background

Arms control negotiations designed to limit strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The other three declared nuclear weapons states (France, Great Britain and China) have not been involved, and their arsenals remain unconstrained by international agreement.

III The Proposal

A framework for the regulation of nuclear forces would lend overall predictability to the strategic balance, thereby reducing incentives to increase deterrent forces. Should negotiations produce a ratio of allowed strategic forces as between the parties, the expansion of forces beyond these mutually agreed levels would be constrained. This predictability, and the quantitative ceiling on national forces, would in turn increase the chances for meaningful arms reductions.

This initiative is designed to avoid the serious pitfalls contained in other proposals of this type. These include: the unacceptable aggregation of British, French and U.S. forces; the discussion of the forces of other states in bilateral fora; and unwarranted and unacceptable restraints on national deterrents in the absence of significant reductions in Superpower forces.

The following are designed to serve as general guidelines and considerations bearing upon the substance and process for negotiations designed to create an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

Process

- (a) Formal negotiations should be preceded by working-group consultations designed to set the agenda, terms of reference, and guiding principles of subsequent talks.
- (b) These initial meetings should be convened without substantive preconditions except for agreement as to the overall purpose of the process. Preconditions as to substance are to be avoided since these may well decrease incentives to participate.

- (c) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreements.

Substance

- (a) The overall purpose of the negotiations would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (b) In order to secure Superpower agreement, those ratios would have to reflect Superpower de jure equality, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of such approaches as the current Soviet INF proposals.
- (c) Actual ratios should be the subject of negotiations.
- (d) The unit of account should be left open to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of corresponding to Western and Soviet principles in the INF and START negotiations; of encouraging a move towards less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of not "handicapping" British, French, and Chinese forces which generally have less MIRV potential.
- (e) Currently planned modernization programs would have to be accommodated within the negotiated ratios, in order to secure agreement.
- (f) These negotiations and the resulting agreement should not be a substitute for ongoing START and INF talks, or their successors, but rather a complement. Should circumstances dictate, the agreement could be renegotiated to reflect the outcome of these other negotiations. These other agreements could not, however, violate the agreed limits contained in the global accord. They might, however, result in additional constraints and measures designed to reduce weaponry beyond those measures agreed to in the five-power agreement.
- (g) Parties should be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification (to be negotiated) in situations of perceived threat to their national security.

- (h) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (i) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (j) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this was deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements. (This could force a tradeoff between Superpower intercontinental and theatre forces which could both dampen incentives for an arms race in the European theatre, and at the same time allow some asymmetries in the theatre deployments which could solve some of the problems arising in the current INF negotiations in Geneva).
- (k) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties.
- (l) In order to accommodate ongoing arms control efforts, the establishment of precise ratios may have to await the outcome of the START and INF negotiations. These negotiations will provide the necessary predictability for the establishment of realistic ratios. In order to provide incentives for agreement in START and the INF talks, it would be desirable if the Superpowers committed themselves to global talks as part of these other agreements, should they be negotiated.
- (m) Other agreed qualitative restraints could be negotiated as desired by the parties, as could collateral measures designed to enhance crisis management and increase confidence between the parties. These might include:
 - (i) a ban on high altitude ASAT systems.
 - (ii) a requirement for verifiability by National Technical Means
 - (iii) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

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---PM MONTREAL SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF PM S SPEECH

2. EMBARGO UNTIL 12:30 OTTAWA TIME. TEXT BEGINS:

NOTES FOR REMARKS BY THE PM ON PEACE AND SECURITY MONTL 13NOV.

ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, I HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY OF THESE EVENTS TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC AND OF CDA. BROADENING OUR HORIZONS TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT PEACE, ABOUT DISARMAMENT, AND ABOUT OUR FUTURE AS INHABITANTS OF A WORLD IN DISARRAY.

WE MEET TOGETHER AS PART OF THE LONG-STANDING DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THIS COUNTRY--A PROCESS WHICH, AS YOUR GENEROUS PRESENCE SHOWS, IS ALIVE AND WELL IN CDA. WE TAKE PRIDE IN THE VIGOUR AND DIVERSITY OF OUR POLITICAL LIFE, IN THE BRIGHT PROMISE OF OUR FUTURE.

IF OUR FUTURE DEPENDED ON CDNS ALONE, WE COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT IT WAS SAFE AND SOUND.. BUT NO/NO NATION TODAY HOLDS ITS FUTURE SECURELY IN ITS OWN HANDS. WE SHARE THIS PLANET WITH ABOUT 160 OTHER NATIONS, ALL OF WHOM INTERACT WITH US IN A GLOBAL SYSTEM EMBRACING OUR SECURITY, OUR ECONOMY, THE HEALTH OF OUR ENVIRONMENT, AND THE QUALITY OF OUR LIVES.

...2

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THOSE 160 GOVTS ARE, HOWEVER, BY NO MEANS THE ONLY PLAYERS. THE STAGE IS CROWDED WITH ALLIANCES, WITH REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, WITH INNATL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE UN, WITH MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, WITH CARTELS, PRESSURE GROUPS AND LOBBIES OF ALL KINDS.

WE ARE ALL OF US--YOU AND I AND OUR FAMILIES, CITIZENS, GOVTS AND CORPORATIONS--ON THAT CROWDED GLOBAL STAGE, WHICH IS ALIVE WITH OUR HOPES AND OUR FEARS, OUR FAILURES AND OUR SUCCESSES. BUT THERE ARE TODAY THREE DOMINANT AND DISTURBING TRENDS WHICH, WHEN SET SIDE BY SIDE, THREATEN TO BRING DOWN THE CURTAIN ON OUR HUMAN PERFORMANCE.

THE FIRST TREND IS AN INCREASING RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INNATL DISPUTES. DESPITE THE SOLEMN AFFIRMATION OF THE UN CHARTER THAT QUOTE ALL MEMBERS SHALL REFRAIN IN THEIR INNATL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE THERE HAVE BEEN, SINCE 1945, APPROXIMATELY 130 CONFLICTS IN WHICH 35 MILLION HUMAN LIVES HAVE BEEN LOST.

THERE IS A HABIT OF AGGRESSION WHICH IS GAINING GROUND. AN ABDICATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS. A COARSE ELEMENT OF BELLIGERENCE, OF MENACING RHETORIC, OF GOVTS WHICH RISE AND FALL AT GUN-POINT. THE TREND IS GLOBAL--AND IT IS GATHERING SPEED.

THIS BRUTALIZATION OF POLITICAL LIFE TAKES ON A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS TONE WHEN IT IS DRIVEN BY THE CLASH OF CONFRONTATIONAL IDEOLOGIES, AND ARMED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. WEAPONS CLAIMING AN ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON THE ORDER OF 600 BILLION DOLLARS FOR

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0128 RESTR

NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS COMBINED. WEAPONS CLAIMING TOO GREAT A SHARE OF THE BUDGETS OF IMPOVERISHED THIRD WORLD NATIONS. WEAPONS WHICH PROMOTE A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE AND ENGULF MORE PEACEFUL WAYS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES.

THE SECOND TREND IS THE STEADY UNRAVELLING OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THIS PROLIFERATION HAS TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIRECTIONS. WE CALL IT VERTICAL PROLIFERATION WHEN WE MEAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER-LARGER NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS, EVER MORE-ADVANCED IN DESTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, BY THE FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES: THE USA, USSR, FRANCE, UK AND CHINA. WE CALL IT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION WHEN WE MEAN THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER STATES. SOME OF THESE OTHER NATIONS HAVE THE CAPACITY NOW TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR ARMS. SOME ARE ON THE VERGE OF DOING SO.

WE ARE TODAY PREOCCUPIED MAINLY WITH THE EVIDENT NEED TO ASSERT RESTRAINT OVER THE ARSENALS OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. BUT FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, AND IN THE NEAR TERM, THE CONSEQUENCES OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION POSE AN EQUALLY GRAVE THREAT. PERHAPS MORE GRAVE, SINCE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY OTHER NATIONS WOULD BE UNCHECKED BY THE ASSURANCE OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION WHICH OBTAINS AMONG THE FIVE POWERS.

IT WAS PRECISELY TO ARREST BOTH KINDS OF PROLIFERATION THAT A FORMAL AGREEMENT--THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY--CAME INTO EFFECT IN 1970,

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AND IS UP FOR REVIEW IN 1985. THAT TREATY REPRESENTED AN IMPLICIT COVENANT BETWEEN THOSE NATIONS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THOSE WITHOUT: AN UNDERTAKING BY THE NUCLEAR POWERS THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON ARMS CONTROL AND ON LIMITING THE SPREAD OF THEIR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY; AND AN UNDERTAKING BY OTHER STATES THAT THEY WOULD FOREGO THE MILITARY USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN RETURN FOR THE BENEFITS OF ITS PEACEFUL USE, IN FIELDS SUCH AS ENERGY, MEDICINE, OR AGRICULTURE.

BUT THE TREND IS FOR THIS BARGAIN TO COME UNSTUCK. THE TREATY STANDS NOW AT A CROSS-ROADS BETWEEN PEACEFUL ASPIRATION AND MILITARY STRATEGY. IT IS THE CROSSROADS AT WHICH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES--EAST AND WEST, NORTH AND SOUTH--PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR SURVIVAL, WITH THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, OR WITH CURRENT CONFLICTS, WILL DECIDE WHETHER THE COVENANT STILL HOLDS.

THE THIRD TREND WHICH THREATENS THE GLOBAL SYSTEM IS THE WORSENING STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, PARTICULARLY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. TWO WEEKS AGO, WHEN I SPOKE IN GUELPH, I DEPLORED THE ABSENCE OF HIGH POLITICS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND THE TENDENCY FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO RUN THEIR COURSE OUTSIDE ANY STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING OF, AND RESPECT FOR, EACH OTHERS SECURITY NEEDS. I REAFFIRMED OUR FIDELITY TO THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION, AND DECLARED MY HOPE THAT WE MIGHT ADD A QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE OF POLITICAL ENERGY, OF DIALOGUE AND OF CONFIDENCE, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE DOWNWARD COURSE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

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PAGE FIVE IDDZ0128 RESTR

I ASK YOU NOW TO CONSIDER THESE THREE TRENDS IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER--LAMINATED TOGETHER, AS THEY ARE IN LIFE. AN INCREASING RESORT TO USE OF FORCE. THE GROWING REALITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND A SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS CHARGED WITH ANIMOSITY. I BELIEVE IT IS EVIDENT THAT ONLY A GLOBAL APPROACH TO PEACE AND SECURITY CAN REVERSE THE PATH OF THIS SINISTER, COMPOSITE TREND-LINE.

BECAUSE, AS TENSIONS BUILD, THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP BECOMES PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO EVENTS ON THE PERIPHERY. AN ENDEMIC INSTABILITY IS EVIDENT IN AREAS LARGELY UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF ONE OR THE OTHER SUPERPOWER. AT OTHER FLASHPOINTS, SUCH AS THE EVER-VOLATILE MIDDLE EAST, WE SEE THE TINDER FOR A SPREADING CONFLAGRATION.

THE PENETRATION OF EAST-WEST RIVALRY INTO THE THIRD WORLD WILL REACH ITS DEEPEST AND MOST DANGEROUS POINT IF, DESPITE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, FRONT-LINE ANTAGONISTS--LOCKED IN RIVALRY OR COMBAT--BEGIN TO ARM THEMSELVES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(TRANSLATION)

AS CDNS, OUR ENERGIES ARE DEEPLY DEVOTED TO THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN COMMUNITY, ON THIS CONTINENT AND IN EUROPE. BUT OUR LOYALTIES, OUR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS, BY NO MEANS END THERE.

CDAS PLACE ON THE PACIFIC RIM GIVES US A PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN, WITH CHINA, AND WITH THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS AND, OF COURSE, WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

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PAGE SIX IDDZ0128 RESTR

OUR EXTENSIVE PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TAKES US TO MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, REMOTE IN DISTANCE, BUT CLOSE IN PARTNERSHIP. OUR STANDING IN THE COMMUNITY OF FRANCOPHONE NATIONS, AND IN THE COMWEL, DEMANDS THAT WE SHARE THE FULL RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONCERNS TO WHICH OUR NATIONAL CHARACTER GIVES US ACCESS.

THAT IS WHY, IN PURSUING AN INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, I DETERMINED FROM THE START THAT OUR APPROACH MUST BE GLOBAL IN SCOPE AND IN PERSPECTIVE. SUCH AN APPROACH IS DICTATED BY THE COMPLEX INTERLINKAGE OF DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT; OF SUPERPOWER ANIMOSITY AND THIRD WORLD RIVALRIES; OF THE RESORT TO FORCE AND THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS; OF NUCLEAR BALANCES IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA.

ONE MAN REPRESENTING ONE COUNTRY CANNOT PROMISE A MIRACLE, LET ALONE DELIVER ONE. I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES IN PLAY. NONETHELESS IT IS ESSENTIAL, IN MY JUDGEMENT, TO SEEK STABILITY AT A NUMBER OF POINTS ALONG THE DOWNWARD TREND-LINE, AND TO RECOGNIZE THAT PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MODERN AGE ARE INDIVISIBLE.

MOREOVER, I AM NOT ALONE. OTHER LEADERS HAVE JOINED THEIR CONCERNS WITH MINE. THERE IS A GROWING COMMUNITY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHICH IS DETERMINED TO SUBJECT THE SCIENCE OF ARMS TO THE ART OF POLITICS. I DRAW ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE SUPPORT OF THAT COMMUNITY.

YOU WILL KNOW THAT I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MEETINGS IN EUROPE WITH
...7

PAGE SEVEN IDDZ0128 RESTR

SEVERAL LEADERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WITH HIS HOLINESS THE POPE, AND WITH HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS. I RETURN FROM EUROPE WITH CLEAR EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR MY INITIATIVE, CONFIDENT THAT MY SENSE OF URGENCY IS SHARED BY OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. I FOUND A PARTICULAR CONSENSUS ON THE NEED TO LAY DOWN A THIRD RAIL OF CONFIDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS--A RAIL CHARGING OUR DEALINGS WITH THE OTHER SIDE WITH A CURRENT OF POLITICAL ENERGY..

I TOOK TO MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES FOR DISCUSSION, AND FOR REFINEMENT IN LIGHT OF THEIR OWN VIEWS, ELEMENTS OF A PROGRAM FOR POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. I RETURN WITH THE ASSURANCE OF THEIR PERSONAL ATTENTION TO THIS PROGRAM. LET ME SET OUT SOME OF THE ELEMENTS.

THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING YEAR, A FORUM IN WHICH GLOBAL LIMITS MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED FOR ALL FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES. THIS PROPOSAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INF OR START TALKS BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR. BUT THOSE TALKS, AND RIGHTLY SO, DO NOT COVER BRITISH, FRENCH OR CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES.

WHAT WE MUST SEEK TO PROVIDE IS A NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR THOSE FIVE STATES WHICH RECOGNIZES THE RIGHTS OF THE USA AND THE USSR AS STRATEGIC EQUALS--WHAT A RECENT TRILATERAL COMMISSION REPORT CALLS QUOTE INEVITABLE PARITY UNQUOTE BETWEEN THEM--AND WHICH PROVIDES A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND STABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE OTHER THREE STATES AND THOSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

PAGE EIGHT IDDZ0128 RESTR

IN THIS WAY NEITHER BRITAIN, NOR FRANCE, NOR CHINA NEED FEAR THAT THEIR FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO RESTRAINTS WHICH DO NOT/NOT RECOGNIZE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

ONCE RELATIVE LEVELS OF ARMAMENT WERE STABILIZED, I BELIEVE THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS COULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR BY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND TO CONSIDER MEASURES TO CONTROL THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

A SECOND ELEMENT IS REMEDIAL ACTION TO SHORE UP THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ITSELF--THAT COVENANT BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WHICH I MENTIONED A FEW MINUTES AGO. THE TREATY HAS BEEN SIGNED BY SOME 119 NATIONS. BUT A NUMBER OF KEY STATES REMAIN ALCOF, INCLUDING SEVERAL WITH THE CAPACITY NOW, OR THE POTENTIAL SOON, TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ARMS.

IF THE FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES COULD BEGIN TO STRENGTHEN THEIR SIDE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION BARGAIN, THEN THE REST OF US COULD MORE EASILY BRING GOOD SENSE TO FEAR ON THOSE WHO HAVE NOT/NOT YET SIGNED ON. NO/NO DOUBT WE NEED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVES FOR THIRD WORLD STATES TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS--THERE MUST BE A DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. AND WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO ENSURE THAT A FULL RANGE OF SAFEGUARDS ADEQUATELY GOVERNS THE TRANSFER, FROM ALL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE AREA OF SAFEGUARDS IS ONE IN WHICH CDA HAS TAKEN A LEADING PART FOR MANY YEARS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

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PAGE NINE IDDZ0128 RESTR

THOSE TWO ELEMENTS BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE GLOBAL DIMENSION OF SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. BUT WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS IN THE HEART OF EUROPE A MOST DANDEROUS CONCENTRATION OF FORCES --CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR. A WAR IN EUROPE COULD DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT EACH SIDE DESIRES TO PROTECT.

THROUGHOUT MY TALKS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS, THERE RAN A COMMON THEME OF CONCERN AT THE PRESENT IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE WSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES HEAVILY OUTWEIGHT THOSE OF NATO. THERE IS AN APPREHENSION IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT THE WSAW PACT FORCES COULD BE TEMPTED TO GAMBLE ON A CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED ATTACK. THEY WOULD THROW DOWN THE CHALLENGE TO WESTERN LEADERS EITHER OF ACCEPTING DEFEAT, OR OF BEING THE FIRST TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR OWN DEFENSE..

AS LONG AS THIS IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES PERSISTS, SO DOES THE RISK THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO ACTION AT AN EARLY STAGE OF ANY CONFLICT. THAT IS WHY WE SAY THAT THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE IS TOO LOW. AND OF COURSE WE CAN NEVER BE CERTAIN THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE WOULD NOT/NOT ESCALATE RAPIDLY TO EVER MORE-MASSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION ON AN INTERCONTINENTAL SCALE. THE CONCLUSION WE DRAW IS THAT THE BEST WAY TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IS TO ESTABLISH A MORE REASONABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

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PAGE TEN IDDZ0128 RESTR

HOW THEN DO WE ACHIEVE THIS BALANCE? THIS QUESTION PROMPTS THE THIRD ELEMENT OF MY APPROACH. THE SIMPLE, THOUGH EXPENSIVE, ANSWER IS FOR THE WEST TO INCREASE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES UNTIL THEY MATCH THOSE OF THE WSAW PACT. I SEE THIS AS A LAST RESORT. THE FAR MORE SENSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO REDUCE THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO MUTUALLY AGREED LEVELS, A TASK TO WHICH WE HAVE DEVOTED THE PAST TEN YEARS AT THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS IN VIENN. THERE IS TODAY SOME SIGN OF MOVEMENT IN THOSE TALKS, BUT AT FAR TOO SLOW A PACE. HARD QUESTIONS REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED. THAT IS WHY I EXPLORED, WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN THE ALLIANCE, WAYS TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN VIENN, WAYS TO GIVE FRESH POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE MBFR TALKS.

ANOTHER NEGOTIATING FORUM WILL OPEN IN STOCKHOLM THIS JANUARY. ITS LENGTHY TITLE, SHOWING THE COMPLEXITY OF ITS TASK, IS THE QUOTE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE UNQUOTE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THIS CONFERENCE NOT/NOT LOSE ITS WAY IN LITIGATION ABOUT PROCEDURES, OR IN THE LINGUISTICS OF TECHNICALITY. I HAVE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT WE CONSIDER THE MERITS OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT THE VERY START OF THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS.

A FOURTH ELEMENT IN MY INITIATIVE FLOWS FROM THE STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION WHICH I FIRST PROPOSED TO THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN 1978. THAT STRATEGY--WHICH STILL REQUIRES, AND AWAITS,

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PAGE ELEVEN IDDZ0128 RESTR

THE SUPPORT OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION--NEEDS FURTHER ELABORATION TO KEEP PACE WITH TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES. ARMS CONTROL MEASURES MUST ADDRESS THOSE NEW TECHNOLOGIES WHICH, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, WOULD MAKE STABILITY A MORE ELUSIVE GOAL.

I HAVE IN MIND A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT HIGH ALTITUDE. SUCH WEAPONS COULD ATTACK THE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ARE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT. DESTRUCTION OF THE OTHER SIDES COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORK, AT A TIME OF CRISIS, WOULD LEAVE HIM BLIND AND MUTE AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN STABILITY DEMANDS AWARENESS AND RESPONSE, NOT/NOT THE PANIC REACTION OF QUOTE LAUNCH ON WARNING UNQUOTE.

NEITHER SUPERPOWER HAS YET DEVELOPED AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM FOR HIGH ALTITUDES. AN AGREEMENT NOT/NOT TO DO SO IS THEREFORE STILL POSSIBLE. NO/NO AGREEMENT MEANS VAST EXPENDITURE BY BOTH SIDES--FUNDS SPENT ON MORE WORTHY PROJECTS. NO/NO AGREEMENT MEANS A FURTHER RENEWAL OF COMPETITION--A COMPETITION PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO ACCIDENT OR MISCALCULATION. MOREOVER AN AGREEMENT COULD ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONRY DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT LOWER ALTITUDES.

I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT ANOTHER POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING DEVELOPMENT, WHICH IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEW INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS MAY BE SO HIGHLY MOBILE AS TO BE VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE.

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PAGE TWELVE IDDZ0128 RESTR

THIS WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE ABILITY OF EITHER SIDE, OR ANY
INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO VERIFY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

CDA CONTINUES TO DEVOTE ATTENTION, AND RESOURCES, TO PROBLEMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IF ARMS-CONTROL MEASURES ARE TO
BE DURABLE AND TRUSTED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS
CONTROL WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED IF THE VERIFICATION FACTOR
WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE OF ANY NEW
STRATEGIC SYSTEM--RATHER THAN LEAVING IT TO THE POINT WHERE SYSTEMS
ARE PUT ON THE BARGAINING TABLE.

IT IS THEREFORE MY INTENTION TO INTRODUCE, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME
AND IN THE APPROPRIATE DISARMAMENT FORUM, PAPERS CALLING FOR (A) INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT TO BAN THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-
SATELLITE SYSTEMS; (B) TO RESTRICT EXCESSIVE MOBILITY OF ICBMS; AND
(C) TO REQUIRE THAT FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS BE FULLY
VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THESE ARE MEASURES OF SUBSTANCE, OFTEN TECHNICAL IN THEIR DETAIL. BUT
IF WE CAN GENERATE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TOWARD A FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR
CONFERENCE, TOWARD RENEWED POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO THE NON-PROLIFERA-
TION TREATY, TOWARD ACTION AT THE MBFR TALKS TO BALANCE CONVENTIONAL
FORCES AND TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE, TOWARD A
RESTRICTION OF QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY, AND
TOWARD THEIR VERIFICATION, THEN WE WOULD HAVE MOTIVATED A TRULY GLOBAL
AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE CRISIS OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

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PAGE THIRTEEN IDDZ0128 RESTR

IT IS ESSENTIAL, AS I TOLD MY COLLEAGUES IN EUROPE, THAT THIS INTERLOCKING PROGRAM, THIS SAFETY NET FOR OUR VERY SURVIVAL, BE GUIDED BY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THAT OUR OWN CONSULTATIONS, AND TALKS WITH OTHERS, BE QUICKENED BY A JOLT OF POLITICAL ENERGY. THAT WE WORK TO IDENTIFY STEADILY INCREASING AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, STARTING FROM OUR COMMON HUMANITY AND OUR COMMON FATE ON THIS EARTH.

I RETURN FROM EUROPE PROFOUNDLY ENCOURAGED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH MY PURPOSES ARE SHARED BY A COMMUNITY OF OTHER LEADERS. THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM TONIGHT MY INTENTION TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN, TO CONSULT PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE IN TOKYO NEXT SATURDAY.

JAPAN'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION LAST MAY, IN WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AGREED TO DEVOTE OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR, EXPRESSES BOTH THE RESONANCE OF HISTORY AND THE REALITY OF THE PRESENT DAY. MY VISIT THERE WILL BEAR WITNESS TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

I CAN ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE CONSULTATIONS UNDER WAY WITH THE USA, I HAVE INITIATED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USSR AND WITH CHINA--TWO NUCLEAR POWERS ON WHOM MUCH DEPENDS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THE DISCUSSION OF PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE DELHI MEETING OF COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT, WHERE I WILL BE HEADING AFTER JAPAN. I LOOK FORWARD PARTICULARLY TO CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI ON THE MATTER OF NON-PROLIFERATION, AND ON HER PERSPECTIVE, AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS, ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

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PAGE FOURTEEN IDLZ 2128 RESTR

I AM ENCOURAGED BY THIS MOMENTUM, AND HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE. BUT I AM ALSO WELL AWARE THAT CRITICS OF MY INITIATIVE HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GRASPING THIS STEP BY STEP APPROACH. SOME WOULD PREFER THE PASSIONATE EMERACE OF AN UNATTAINABLE IDEAL. OTHERS ARE PARALYZED BY THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUES IN PLAY. I BELIEVE THAT PEACE MUST BE WAGED STEADILY, WITH CAUTION AND WITH REALISM. WE MUST WORK WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE FRAGILITY OF POLITICAL TRUST, FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING CAREFULLY, FOR THE NEED TO SEARCH OUT COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO STAND.

THE IMPERATIVE OF POLITICAL ACTION IS MADE ALL THE MORE URGENT BY THE PACE OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION, WHICH THREATENS TO OVERTAKE OUR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING, AND OUR CAPACITY TO MANAGE IT.

LET ME REMIND YOU TAHT WHEN ALFRED NOBEL INVENTED DYNAMITE IN 1867 HE BELIEVED THAT THE PROSPECT OF ITS MILITARY APPLICATION WAS SO AWESOME THAT GOVTS WOULD BE FORCED TO LIVE IN PEACE. AND YET TODAY WE HAVE LONG SINCE LOST THE ABILITY TO COMPREHEND THE FORCE OF A NUCLEAR BLAST IN TERMS OF ANY COMPARISON WITH TRADITIONAL EXPLOSIVES.

PEACE AND SECURITY ARE NOT/NOT COLD ABSTRACTIONS. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO PRESERVE THE FUTURE OF MANKIND, THE GROWTH OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT, AND THE PATRIMONY OF OUR PLANET.

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PAGE FIFTEEN IDDZ0128 RESTR

THE CHOICE WE FACE IS CLEAR AND PRESENT. WE CAN WITHOUT EFFORT
ABANDON OUR FATE TO THE MINDLESS DRIFT TOWARD NUCLEAR WAR. OR WE CAN
GATHER OUR STRENGTH, WORKING IN GOOD COMPANY TO TURN ASIDE THE FORCES
BEARING DOWN ON US, ON OUR CHILDREN, ON THIS EARTH.

AS FOR ME, I CHOOSE TO MOVE FORWARD, AND I KNOW I DO SO WITH YOUR
SUPPORT. TEXT ENDS.

CCC/079 130138Z IDDZ0128

DD FCO 110245Z

RR OTTAWA

RR UKDEL NATO

RR HELSINKI

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 240

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110245Z

FM JOHN 110715Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1012 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO, HELSINKI (FOR CDE DELEGATION), WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING MOSCOW, PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA.

OTTAWA TELNO 601.

TRUDEAU'S MEETING WITH KOHL 10 NOVEMBER:
EAST WEST RELATIONS

1. GERMAN OFFICIALS PRESENT AT TRUDEAU'S MEETING WITH KOHL HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT, WHICH MAY PROVIDE USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH TRUDEAU LATER THIS MORNING.

2. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT CONTACT AS WELL AS DETERRENCE WAS NEEDED. TRUDEAU DID NOT RAISE THE POINT IN HIS GUELPH SPEECH ABOUT SEEKING TO AMELIORATE THE INTENTIONS OF THE USSR BY MEANS OF A NEW STRUCTURE FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. NOR DID HE RAISE THE PROS AND CONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WHICH, THE GERMANS BELIEVE FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN HIS TALKS IN PARIS.

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- THE CONCRETE POINTS WHICH TRUDEAU RAISED WERE:-
- A) FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT ONLY ATTEND THE OPENING OF CDE BUT SHOULD STAY ON AT THE CONFERENCE FOR A PERIOD.
 - B) MBFR TOO SHOULD BE RAISED ABOVE THE BUREAUCRATIC LEVEL.
 - C) BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT NEXT MONTH'S NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.
 - D) TRUDEAU REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD HOLD ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.
 - E) HE WILL RAISE NONPROLIFERATION AND PROBABLY (D) ABOVE AT CHOCM.
 - F) ANDROPOV AND REAGAN SHOULD MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE NO BAR TO THIS IN 1984.

4. ADVANCE TO PRIVATE SECRETARY, HEAD OF SOVIET DEPT AND 10 DOWNING ST.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAYING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 110750Z GU



File ~~B~~ 2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 November, 1983

Dear Peter,

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr. Trudeau at No. 10 this morning and a note of the main points made at the working lunch which followed.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if Mr. Trudeau's idea that the CDE should convene in Stockholm in January at the level of Heads of Government could be further examined. She would be grateful for any views which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence may wish to offer.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

You are

Yours truly,

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA AT NOON ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983 AT
NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

Present

Prime Minister
Mr. Coles

Mr. Trudeau
Mr. Fowler

* * * * *

Mr. Trudeau said that he believed that he and the Prime Minister were on the same wave length with regard to the general approach to East/West relations. In her Blackpool speech, she had made it plain that the door was open for dialogue since "we had to live on the same planet". That was the premise of his own thinking on these matters. Following the Korean airliner incident, he was worried that if we did not talk to the Soviet Union for several months, the American elections would then intervene and the net result would be that over a period of some 18 months, there would be no high level contact. Earlier, he had worked on the assumption that President Reagan would wish to see Andropov some time in the Spring of 1984 and there had been signs that the United States was preparing for such a meeting. At the Williamsburg Summit he had told President Reagan and Mr. Bush that they were taking too hard a line publicly about the Soviet Union. They had replied that they wanted peace and he believed this. But the hopes of a Summit were reduced by the Korean airliner disaster and the tragedy in Lebanon; the invasion of Grenada had not helped. Given that President Reagan would be visiting China in April, the chances of a US/Soviet Summit in the Spring were now remote.

Part of his motive was to try to break the present inertia. President Reagan and the American public now probably thought that it was too late to consider a Summit before the US elections. Unless some of America's friends kept alive the idea of dialogue and tried to inject a greater political input into East/West relations there would be no Summit for 18 months and that seemed a dangerously long period.

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He had therefore come to Europe to discuss a number of initiatives, partly to fulfil the Williamsburg commitment to do everything possible for peace. Although the reception for his initiatives had been better than he had expected, they were not essential to the overall design. They could be replaced by others or simply by the insertion of political leadership into present "accounting" exercises. What could be done to politicise East/West relations at a high level? President Reagan had shown himself on earlier occasions to be open to persuasion by other elected political leaders. If enough of his friends conveyed the message that there had been sufficient hostile talk, the President might still consider holding a meeting with Andropov, if he were available, before the US elections were in full swing. Even if the idea of a Summit was a pipe-dream, it was good in itself and good politics to reassure people that we were concerned at the rising temperature of East/West relations and that we were working for peace.

The Prime Minister said that on his last visit to London, President Mitterrand had been critical of the timing of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow. Mitterrand took the view that a US/Soviet Summit could only be held once and that it should be properly timed. Her own objective was to persuade more Soviet leaders to visit the West. It was worth recalling that Brezhnev, even when he had been ill, had left the Soviet Union from time to time. In several recent speeches she had tried to convey the thought that East/West relations should not be allowed to go wrong because of a lack of understanding. It was possible that they would go wrong anyway because of the Soviet military build-up and because of Russia's economic difficulties. The Soviet leadership might conclude that expansion was the natural course open to them. In that case military deterrence was our only response. But she felt strongly that we did not see sufficient Soviet visitors below the highest level. The Americans perhaps did more in this respect. Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Canada had been a useful contribution, but she was doubtful whether it was possible to proceed straight to a Summit without building up contacts at lower levels.

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It was relevant to ask whether we were indeed misunderstanding the Soviet Union - or did we fear it because we did understand it?

There was some evidence that, over the years, world opinion had influenced the Soviet Union, e.g. through the Helsinki process. The fact that the Eastern European satellites saw the Soviet Union exposed to cross-examination at international conferences must have had an effect.

The convening of a Summit would raise the expectation that the West had something to offer. But the truth was that there was not much to offer in the field of arms control. Should one instead be thinking of a thawing of economic relations? Were there some in the Politburo or the Communist Party who were seeking a period of security in order to improve the Soviet Union's economic performance? This was probably a more urgent requirement now since there was a generation whose expectations had been raised. If one discovered that there was such a body of opinion, then there might be more scope for movement.

In short, she was more cautious than Mr. Trudeau about a Summit. When we deployed INF weapons in Europe, the Russians were likely to break off the Geneva talks. But we hoped they would return to them. One weakness of the dialogue argument was that people had talked to Gromyko for years and had no effect on him.

She was not enamoured of the idea of a conference of the five nuclear powers. If the time came when there had been substantial reductions in strategic weapons, perhaps this idea could be examined. Meanwhile, there were various obstacles on the road to a better East/West dialogue. For example, Europe, the United States and Canada should not compete to sell surpluses to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Trudeau said that there was perhaps a difference between us on how we could bring about a dialogue. He had agreed with President Mitterrand that no initiative should be capable of

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interpretation as a weakening of NATO's resolve to implement the dual track decision. He himself would not contemplate any such initiative. His agreement to the testing of Cruise missiles in Canada was evidence of that. Mitterrand had said that any initiative should be timed to follow the initial deployment in Europe of INF weapons; the Russians would walk out of the Geneva talks and would then need to be tempted back.

He was not seeking a big break-through in East/West relations. His objective was rather to make sure that the political dimension was reintroduced after a period when politics had been absent from the most important relationship of our time. He would not expect a Summit between President Reagan and Andropov to produce a major break-through.

More and more countries were coming round to the idea that the CDE Conference in Stockholm should meet at Foreign Minister level. This would be a sign that politicians were taking a personal interest. For the same reason, we should make one last stab at the MBFR negotiations.

He also wished to mention an idea which he had not discussed elsewhere in Europe because he was uncertain how it would be received. This was that the Stockholm meeting should begin at Summit level. The aim would be that President Reagan and Andropov would attend, with other Heads of Government, for a ceremonial opening. That would not raise expectations too much because it would be clear that little could be achieved at such a ceremony. The Summit would give the Stockholm Conference a deadline, i.e. Ministers might agree to return in the Autumn 1984 to check progress and perhaps set a new agenda. It was possible that this idea was merely a dream, but he was trying to find a way to force Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko to attend the opening of the CDE. The aim was to give a political jolt to the downward turn in the armaments race. He should not be misunderstood. He was not proposing a break-through on START or INF. But perhaps the smaller countries could act in the margin to reduce the shouting match. It was necessary to ensure that the Soviet Union knew both that our intentions were peaceful, but also that if forced to, we should use the deterrent.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that it sounded as though Mr. Trudeau was trying to arrange in Stockholm an event like Tito's funeral. People might see through the hollowness of the idea. Would it not be better for Ministers to attend the end rather than the beginning of the Conference as at Helsinki? Mr. Shultz's meeting with Mr. Gromyko in Madrid had been very unsuccessful. We should not put him in a difficult position with regard to Stockholm. She doubted whether a meeting which was attended on the Soviet side only by Gromyko would achieve anything. Mr. Trudeau was aiming for immediate contacts at the highest level. Her instinct was to follow a more gradual approach. Was Mr. Trudeau saying that no progress could be made until the Soviet Union was reassured? Mr. Trudeau replied that that was indeed his point. The Americans and others were constantly telling Moscow that Communism would wither away. That created the wrong atmosphere. The Prime Minister said that when she had spoken in these terms to President Reagan in September the President had said that, following the Korean airliner incident, the Russians would have to make a move first. Mr. Trudeau commented that the collective response in the West to that incident had simply confirmed the Soviet Union in their feeling of isolation. The Russians knew that they had made a horrible mistake but they could not say so. We in the West knew it was a mistake and was not an act of war and yet we had accused the Russians of all kinds of things. They had not wanted to shoot down a civil airliner. The Prime Minister said that the point was they they did not care if they did. Mr. Trudeau said that nor would he have cared if in similar circumstances a suspicious aircraft had flown over Canada with unknown intentions. The Prime Minister observed that the incident had revealed an inadequate command structure and a lack of political control in the Soviet Union. Mr. Trudeau commented that it also revealed that the Soviet Union's capacity to defend its territory and deal with an intruder was very weak. After a period of 2½ hours when the system had not functioned well, it had become essential to shoot the aircraft down in order to demonstrate that an intrusion of this kind could be handled. This was the psychology of people living in fear. They were afraid of us for technical reasons and for ideological reasons. Because of this fear, they could start a nuclear war

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by accident. The Prime Minister said that they was why we must ensure that there was no misunderstanding. On that point we were agreed but she wished to start the contacts at a lower level. Mr. Trudeau commented that this was to assume that we had unlimited time to deal with the problem. He wanted Foreign Ministers to be at Stockholm from the beginning.

The Prime Minister asked whether the gathering at Tito's funeral had been useful. A series of rapid bilaterals did not achieve very much. Mr. Trudeau said that the better analogy might be Brezhnev's funeral. If Reagan had attended, that would have sent the right signal. It would be a mistake to have Heads of Government at Stockholm for a period of some three days; people would then expect too much. The Prime Minister asked whether the Soviet Union might not refuse to go to Stockholm because of INF deployment. Mr. Trudeau said that that would be a psychological victory for the West. If Gromyko went to Stockholm, Shultz would have to.

The Prime Minister said that we needed to know whether Andropov would be fit enough to attend such a gathering; we should then have to sell the idea to President Reagan. This matter needed further thought.

The discussion ended at 1300 hours and was followed by a working lunch.

A.J.C.

11 November 1983

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NOTE OF MAIN POINTS MADE AT A WORKING LUNCH GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA AT 1300
HOURS ON FRIDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1983 AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET

PRESENT

Prime Minister	The Rt. Hon. Pierre Trudeau
Sir Antony Acland	The Canadian High Commissioner
Mr. Wright	Mr. Fowler
Mr. Coles	Mr. Smith

Mr. Trudeau said that he believed that NATO Summits should take place more regularly and last longer. Could we not allot at least two days for these meetings when CHOGM took a week and even Cancun lasted for two days? NATO Summits were devised at present in such a way that there were no political exchanges. He believed that Lord Carrington when he became Secretary General would re-vitalise this organisation which was politically moribund. Sir Antony Acland remarked that Mr. Genscher was keen that NATO Foreign Ministers should hold informal weekend meetings. Mr. Trudeau said that such a meeting had been successful at La Sapiniere.

The Prime Minister said that she had found Signor Craxi resolute on defence issues when he visited London. He had made a generally good impression. Mr. Trudeau said that his own meeting with Signor Craxi this week had been less successful. He had seemed distracted. Signor Andreotti had done most of the talking.

In the Netherlands, Mr. Lubbers seemed to be hoping that something would happen so that he did not have to deploy INF weapons. Belgium, which was encumbered with problems, seemed to be hoping that the deployment issue would simply disappear.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister asked where the next meeting of CHOGM ought to be held. What about Vancouver? Mr. Trudeau said that the issue did not necessarily have to be settled in Delhi. Canada was ready to be drafted if requested. But he first wished to see if any Pacific country wanted to offer facilities.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia would not be going to Delhi. He had written to him to persuade him to change his mind but had not succeeded.

During a discussion of the situation in Grenada, Mr. Trudeau said that Canada was not particularly keen to participate in a Commonwealth force. The suggestion that he had made in this respect when he had telephoned the Prime Minister had been partly based on the Canadian assumption that the fighting would last for a long time. But the intelligence had been erroneous in this respect.

Mr. Fowler said that the OECS States had been particularly concerned about the new transmitter on Grenada which had been beaming propaganda at their peoples.

Mr. Trudeau said that it was possible that Canada could now cut its bilateral aid in the Caribbean. President Reagan had constantly tried to get Canada to participate in his Caribbean aid initiative. But he had failed to take Canada into his confidence about the military operation in Grenada. On the Sunday preceding the invasion Canada had obtained authority from Austin to evacuate its citizens and had planned to do this the following day but Barbados had refused permission for the relevant aircraft to land there. The fact that Austin had given this permission made it clear that the United States' account of the threat to their own citizens was not valid.

Towards the end of the lunch, Mr. Trudeau reverted to his idea of a conference of the five nuclear powers. He wished to make it plain that in his view the Russians had no right to insist on parity with the United States, France and Britain combined.

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He envisaged a meeting of five sovereign and independent nations meeting as such, not in a bloc-to-bloc relationship. The Non-Proliferation Treaty put an obligation on all nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear armaments. But it was up to the British to decide what their irreducible minimum was and to make that plain at the negotiating table.

The Prime Minister said that she did not find this proposal attractive. It needed much more thought. She had made plain the circumstances in which we could look again at the relationship of the British strategic deterrent to arms control.

A.J.C.

11 November 1983

SECRET

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RR OTTAWA

RR UKDEL NATO

RR HELSINKI

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 240

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FM BONN 110715Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1012 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO, HELSINKI (FOR CDE DELEGATION),
WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING MOSCOW, PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA.

OTTAWA TELNO 601.

TRUDEAU'S MEETING WITH KOHL 10 NOVEMBER:

EAST WEST RELATIONS

1. GERMAN OFFICIALS PRESENT AT TRUDEAU'S MEETING WITH KOHL HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT, WHICH MAY PROVIDE USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH TRUDEAU LATER THIS MORNING.

2. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT CONTACT AS WELL AS DETERRENCE WAS NEEDED. TRUDEAU DID NOT RAISE THE POINT IN HIS GUELPH SPEECH ABOUT SEEKING TO AMELIORATE THE INTENTIONS OF THE USSR BY MEANS OF A NEW STRUCTURE FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. NOR DID HE RAISE THE PROS AND CONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WHICH, THE GERMANS BELIEVE FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN HIS TALKS IN PARIS.



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3. THE CONCRETE POINTS WHICH TRUDEAU RAISED WERE:-

- A) FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT ONLY ATTEND THE OPENING OF CDE BUT SHOULD STAY ON AT THE CONFERENCE FOR A PERIOD.
- B) MBFR TOO SHOULD BE RAISED ABOVE THE BUREAUCRATIC LEVEL.
- C) BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT NEXT MONTH'S NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.
- D) TRUDEAU REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD HOLD ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.
- E) HE WILL RAISE NONPROLIFERATION AND PROBABLY (D) ABOVE AT CHOGM.
- F) ANDROPOV AND REAGAN SHOULD MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE NO BAR TO THIS IN 1984.

4. ADVANCE TO PRIVATE SECRETARY, HEAD OF SOVIET DEPT AND 10 DOWNING ST.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

TAYLOR

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SENT AT 110750Z GU

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FM THE HAGUE 101505Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 10 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA
INFO SAVING BONN ROME PARIS BRUSSELS MOSCOW AND PEKING

No 10
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OTTAWA TELNO 578 TO YOU: TRUDEAU'S EAST/WEST INITIATIVE

1. TRUDEAU PAID A BRIEF VISIT TO THE NETHERLANDS ON 8 NOVEMBER. THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS BASED ON TALKS BETWEEN SIR J BULLARD AND JACBOVITS (NETHERLANDS POLITICAL DIRECTOR) AND ON A COMMUNITY BRIEFING.
2. WHAT TRUDEAU SAID HERE ADDED LITTLE TO HIS SPEECH AT GUELPH. HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THE DETERIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL NEGLECT AND THE OVER-INVOLVEMENT OF TECHNOCRATS/MILITARY SPECIALISTS, PARTICULARLY IN DISARMAMENT TALKS. HE ARGUED THAT - DESPITE ITS OBVIOUS DANGERS - INF DEPLOYMENT (WHICH HE EXPLICITLY SUPPORTED) MIGHT HAVE A BENEFICIAL IMPACT ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS. THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL ABLE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ONCE THEIR DETERMINATION HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED, AND THE RUSSIANS WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS ABOUT INF REDUCTIONS, BECAUSE THEIR PEACE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.
3. HE DESCRIBED CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS (PARTICULARLY MBFR) AS THE MAIN AREA IN WHICH AMERICA'S ALLIES COULD BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE VIENNA TALKS WERE BOGGED DOWN IN TECHNICALITIES AND A MAJOR IMPETUS WAS NEEDED FROM WESTERN POLITICIANS - OTHERWISE THEY MIGHT AS WELL 'KILL OFF' THE MBFR PROCESS FOR GOOD AND ALL. SIMILARLY, HE ARGUED THAT POLITICANS SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN THE CDE (EG BY FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING THE OPENING CEREMONY IN STOCKHOLM).
4. ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TRUDEAU DID NOT ENLARGE SIGNIFICANTLY ON HIS GUELPH PROPOSALS, BEYOND STRESSING THAT 5-POWER NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE 'BLOC-TO-BLOC', AND THAT THE CAUSE OF HORIZONTAL NON-PROLIFERATION WOULD BE HELPED BY SUCH A DISPLAY OF INTEREST IN VERTICAL NON-PROLIFERATION AMONGST THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

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5. THE DUTCH APPEAR TO HAVE LISTENED MUCH MORE THAN THEY TALKED. THEY AGREE THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS ARE IN THE DOLDRUMS, BUT QUESTION BOTH TRUDEAU'S ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES AND HIS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION RESULTS FROM A LACK OF POLITICAL WILL-POWER OR THAT POLITICAL ACTS OF WILL CAN OVERCOME THE NEED FOR GENUINE, DETAILED AGREEMENTS IN FIELDS SUCH AS MBFR. THEY ALSO THINK IT WRONG TO UNDERESTIMATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH CURRENT HAWKISH US POLICY IS A REFLECTION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, RATHER THAN MERELY THE CREATION OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. THEY DO HOWEVER SHARE TRUDEAU'S VIEW THAT THE WEST NEEDS TO RECOVER THE INITIATIVE IN THE MBFR TALKS.

6. THUS, WHILE AGREEING THAT CLOSE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS IMPORTANT, THE DUTCH FEEL THAT TRUDEAU NEEDS TO PUT A LOT OF FLESH ON THE BONES OF HIS IDEAS BEFORE THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY BY ANYBODY IN EAST OR WEST. THEY VIEW THE REACTIONS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENT AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF TRUDEAU'S IDEAS ABOUT A MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

FCO PASS SAVING ALL

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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10 DOWNING STREET

MR. COLES

Canadian Visit
Friday, 11 November

Mr. Garry Smith will be
the notetaker on the Canadian
side for the meeting tomorrow
morning with the Canadian PM.

Sue

10 November 1983

LUNCH FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA ON FRIDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1983
AT 12.45 PM FOR 1.00 PM

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, PC, MP

His Excellency the High Commissioner for Canada

Mr. Robert Fowler

Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
(Foreign and Defence Policy)

Mr. Garry Smith

Director of Arms Control and
Disarmament Division, Department
of External Affairs

Sir Antony Acland

? Mr. Patrick Wright

Mr. John Coles

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 November 1983

Dear John,

*in folder
attached to file*

MR

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr Trudeau: 11 November

I enclose briefs for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Trudeau on 11 November.

Mr Trudeau's visit to London comes at the end of a European tour during which he is also visiting Rome, Bonn, Paris, Brussels and The Hague. His main purpose has been to discuss with European leaders the ideas he has recently been advancing about East/West relations and Arms Control issues.

We believe Mr Trudeau's present initiative arises from a genuine concern to do something to reduce East/West tension. But he is also motivated by personal and political considerations. He would like to be seen to play a role in East/West relations as he previously sought to do in the North/South dialogue. A success in this field might help revive the fortunes of the Liberal Party and could conceivably lead him to stay on in politics, although Canadian officials have also told us that Mr Trudeau sees his present activity as his "Swan Song".

The Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Trudeau will be a logical follow-up to their meeting in Ottawa in September. Mr Trudeau will be seeking support for his belief that there is a need to re-establish a political dialogue with the Soviet Union and that he himself could serve as the initial go-between. He also has ideas for a number of specific measures in the arms control field. We have important reservations about some of Mr Trudeau's ideas and there is little chance that his approach will find widespread support among other NATO countries. The meeting will nevertheless present an opportunity for the Prime Minister to reiterate that the UK is ready to look positively at serious attempts to reduce East/West tension, and more generally to reaffirm the value which we attach to our links with Canada.

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Although the main purpose of Mr Trudeau's visit is to focus on East/West relations it seems likely, in view of Canada's interests in the area and the unfavourable reaction in Canada to the US-led intervention, that he will wish to talk about the future of Grenada, about which he also spoke to the Prime Minister by telephone on 27 October. We have also provided briefs on the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference and on Belize which might also be raised. In view of the recent exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and Mr Trudeau on the latter's talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister, a brief on Hong Kong will follow separately, in case the Canadians should raise this.

We have included a brief on UK/Canada bilateral issues following up some of the points which came up during the Prime Minister's visit to Canada. However, we have been told by the Canadians that Mr Trudeau is very unlikely to raise any of these and we do not recommend that the Prime Minister should do so.

/ I also enclose copies of Ottawa telegram No 601 of 8 November which provides further background to Mr Trudeau's visit as seen from Ottawa on the eve of his journey; and / of Moscow telegram No 1275 recording the public Soviet reaction to Mr Trudeau's initiative.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRS 105

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FM OTTAWA 091940Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 602 OF 09 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE TO MOSCOW AND TOKYO

INFO SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, PEKING AND OTHER NATO POSTS.

(17) - MY TELNO 601: (NOT TO TOKYO)

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR TRUDEAU ON 11 NOVEMBER

1. PARA 2 OF MY TUR. I NOW LEARN FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY THAT A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE LETTER MR TRUDEAU SENT HIM (AT THE SAME TIME AS HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT) HAS NOT YET BEEN HANDED OVER, BUT THEY EXPECT ONE TO BE READY IN TWO OR THREE DAYS.

2. MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT TRUDEAU NOW PROPOSES TO VISIT JAPAN (ON 19 NOVEMBER) TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS WITH MR NAKASONE. THEREAFTER HE WILL VISIT BANGLADESH BEFORE GOING TO NEW DELHI FOR THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING.

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FM WASHINGTON 100035Z NOVEMBER, 1983

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3381 OF 9 NOVEMBER

INFO OTTAWA, MOSCOW, TOKYO AND UKDEL NATO.

OTTAWA TELNO 602 TO FCO: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR TRUDEAU.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT TRUDEAU'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN CLOSELY FOLLOWS HIS SPEECH AT GUELPH (OTTAWA TELNO 578). ITS ONLY SPECIFIC ELEMENTS ARE A DESIRE FOR PROGRESS IN MBFR, FOR GREATER EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY AND FOR A FIVE-POWER NEGOTIATION ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS. THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS IN THE INF TALKS. THE AMERICANS PROFESS TO ACCEPT THAT THE CAUSES OF TRUDEAU'S CONCERN - THE STATE OF NERVOUSNESS IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE QUOTE RYTHM OF CRISES UNQUOTE AND ABSENCE OF HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS - HAVE SOME JUSTIFICATION, BUT THEY SEE DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH TRUDEAU'S LETTER DISCLAIMS ANY INTENTION TO UPSET THE INF TALKS OR INTERFERE IN SOVIET/US RELATIONS, STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE HIS PROPOSALS WOULD INEVITABLY CREATE SOME BACKWASH IN THESE AREAS. THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY (WHICH WAS NOT SIGNED BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE FAR EAST AND HAS THEREFORE BEEN DELAYED) IS LIKELY THEREFORE TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING BUT TO BE NON-COMMITTAL ON SUBSTANCE. THE AMERICANS HOWEVER, WILL WISH TO AVOID GIVING TRUDEAU A PUBLIC REBUFF.

WE UNDERSTAND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF A BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN REAGAN AND TRUDEAU IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET DECIDED ABOUT THIS.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 November 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T177/83

Pierre

Thank you for your letter of 26 October about East/West relations and international security. I have also read your speech at the University of Guelph.

You raise a number of very important points which I look forward to discussing with you at our meeting here on 11 November.

Louise

Raymond

The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, M.P.

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FM OTTAWA 082315Z NOV 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 601 OF 08 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE TO MOSCOW
INFO SAVING TO UKDEL NATO PEKING OTHER NATO POSTS

MY TELNO 589: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR TRUDEAU ON 11 NOVEMBER

1. MR TRUDEAU WILL BE TALKING TO THE PRIME MINISTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETINGS WITH FIVE OTHER NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. HE SHOULD THEREFORE BE IN A POSITION TO EXPAND ON HIS IDEAS, AND TO TELL THE PRIME MINISTER WHAT REACTIONS HE HAS RECEIVED FROM THE FRENCH, GERMANS, DUTCH, BELGIANS AND ITALIANS. HE WILL, OF COURSE, BE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO HIS LETTER TO HER OF 25 OCTOBER, TO HIS GUELPH SPEECH (MY TELNO 578) AND TO ANY FURTHER POINTS HE BRINGS FROM HIS MEETINGS IN EUROPE.

2. MR REAGAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE REPLIED TO MR TRUDEAU'S LETTER, INVITING HIM TO COME TO WASHINGTON. COMMENTATORS HERE SUGGEST THAT IF MR TRUDEAU HAS, ON BALANCE, A REASONABLY POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM EUROPEAN LEADERS THIS WEEK A VISIT TO WASHINGTON MAY TAKE PLACE FAIRLY SOON THEREAFTER, PERHAPS EVEN NEXT WEEK.

3. MEMBERS OF MR TRUDEAU'S IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE HAVE INDICATED TO US SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS ABOUT MR DAM'S MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER. THEY APPEAR TO SEE DAM'S TOUR OF WESTERN EUROPE AS, IN PART, AN ATTEMPT TO GET THE AMERICANS' WORD INTO EUROPEAN EARS AHEAD OF MR TRUDEAU'S VISITS. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE VISIT WAS PRIMARILY TO EXPLAIN THE AMERICAN POSITION ON GRENADA.

4. MR TRUDEAU WOULD, I AM SURE, LIKE TO HAVE VIEWS ON ANDROPOV'S HEALTH AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR SOVIET ATTITUDES IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. THIS AND THE STRENGTH OR OTHERWISE OF ANDROPOV'S POSITION WILL CLEARLY HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON THE TACTICS AND PARTICULARLY THE TIMING OF ANY EAST/WEST MOVES AND I BELIEVE THAT TRUDEAU IS WORKING TOWARDS AN EARLY VISIT TO MOSCOW. (IF WE DO NOT SHARE THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN TRUDEAU'S LETTER OF 25 OCTOBER, THAT ANDROPOV "SEEMS TO BE ENCOUNTERING CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING HIS POLITICAL CONTROL" IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF PRIME MINISTER WOULD LET HIM HAVE OUR VIEW ON THAT).

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Please see *
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5. GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF CANADIAN FEELINGS ON THIS ISSUE (THEY ARE FEELING VERY SORE WITH THE AMERICANS (MY TELNO 573) TRUDEAU MAY VERY WELL WISH TO DISCUSS IT. FOR CURRENT CANADIAN THINKING ON A POSSIBLE COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE, PLEASE SEE MY TELNO 598.

COMMONWEALTH MEETING IN DELHI

6. THIS, TOO, MAY COME UP IF TIME ALLOWS. FOR CURRENT CANADIAN THINKING, PLEASE SEE MY TELNO 599.

HONG KONG

7. TRUDEAU MAY THANK THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER LETTER OF 2 NOVEMBER. IF TIME ALLOWS HE WOULD NO DOUBT BE INTERESTED IN ANYTHING SHE FEELS ABLE TO ADD TO IT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

UK/SOVIET AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute and the paper which he enclosed for circulation to OD colleagues for discussion at the next convenient meeting.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that the paper should be circulated but would prefer that references to the possibility of a meeting between herself and President Andropov and the possibility of a visit by her to Hungary should first be deleted. The Prime Minister does not disagree with these references but does not wish to give them wide currency at this time.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1983

John Taylor,

Canadian Views on East/West Relations

In your letter of 26 October you asked us to co-ordinate with the Ministry of Defence a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Trudeau's message about East/West relations and international security. Since then we have received the text of Mr Trudeau's speech at Guelph on 27 October (copy enclosed) and the Prime Minister has agreed to see him for talks and a working lunch on 11 November.

You may think it preferable for the important and in some cases controversial points raised in Mr Trudeau's message and in his speech were dealt with when he meets the Prime Minister next week. The enclosed draft reply is therefore in the form of a simple acknowledgement.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours faithfully
Robert Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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*Canadian High Commission
Haut-Commissariat du Canada*

*Public Affairs Information
Affaires Publiques Service d'Information*

Canada House
Trafalgar Square, London SW1Y 5BJ
Telephone 01-629 9492 ext 245/264

Canada 

NOTES FOR REMARKS BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU

PRIME MINISTER

TO THE CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIES FOR PEACE
AND SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH, ONTARIO

27 OCTOBER 1983

Let me, first, congratulate the organisers of this Conference. The theme is compelling; your membership is eminent; and your location is appropriate. It is appropriate because the name of Guelph reminds us of another age which was torn by hostile systems, competing alliances and profound ideological division.

The depth and violence of the dispute between Guelphs and Ghibellines tore Europe apart for much of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The argument was fundamental for the time. Who supreme, Pope or emperor? It spread from Germany to Italy, France and Sicily, drawing other powers and interests in its wake. No country, church, class or family in Europe was immune from the destructive force of that question.

Popes excommunicated emperors. Emperors took up arms against successive Popes. The battle between Guelphs and Ghibellines was remarkable for its ferocity, for the loss of life and the wreck of cities, for its pervasive and lasting influence throughout European politics and culture. It was an early version of total war - on a continental scale. And, because both history and geography are written by the victorious, the name of Guelph lives on, given to this place as the proud heritage of a ruling dynasty.

That this city of Guelph is to be found in Canada encourages me to underline a further proposition, familiar but profound, that we Canadians have a framework of long-standing and deep-rooted ties with Europe and with European conflicts. There is a European-ness, well beyond place-names, in our

history, in our culture and in the predisposition of many of our government policies. I do no disservice to our north American nature nor to our place on the Pacific Rim. But our engagement with Europe comes home with particular force in questions of peace and security.

Canada's participation, from the beginning, in both World Wars of this century, our founding and loyal membership in NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), our decision to test the Cruise missile in Canadian territory, all demonstrate the recognition that our own security is tightly bound with the security of our European allies.

A nation of our size and geographic location could, in the past or in the present, have considered other options, those options, whether of isolationism, or of being a nuclear-weapons state ourselves, have in Canada been invariably set aside in favour of a commitment to collective security. Our dedication to the Western Alliance, and to our partnership with the United States in the defence of this continent, is part of the bedrock of our foreign policy.

But the political, economic and military obligations we have undertaken for our common defence offer commensurate rights and duties. Among them is the right to speak about the full range of Western policies, and the duty to reflect about where we are and where we should be going.

We are not silent partners in any of the councils we have joined - because silence would mean the abdication of

responsibility in the face of crisis. We are not ambiguous about our international commitments - because we recognize our deep engagement with an interdependent world. We are not afraid to negotiate with those who may threaten us - because that fear would betray lack of confidence in the vital strength of our own values.

That is the mood I want to bring to you this evening, and the spirit in which I want to share with you some of my own reflections on your theme 'Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age'.

I will tell you right away that I am deeply troubled: by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over machines of war.

There is today an ominous rhythm of crisis. Not just an arms crisis. It is a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others. How can we change that ominous rhythm? That is the question which brings me here tonight.

I start from what I suppose is a problem in epistemology - the difficulty all of us experience in trying to know what is going on in the world - to know it and to understand it in a manner that is accurate, that provides the ground for useful action.

Too often our knowledge and our judgments are true and false at the same time. This is often the distinctive sign of rapidly changing realities which tend to elude our understanding. For example we know that there are, in the eighties, many new kinds of power and many new centres of power. There is the power of oil, or of cheap labour, or of regional hegemony. We call it a multipolar world - which suggests that no nation can act in isolation, that no power is truly dominant. But surely it is also true, and perhaps now with a special force, that the superpower relationship is at this time as dominant and as crucial as it ever was in the fifties - when we had a more simplistic bipolar model with which to understand the world. Another example: military strategy is the subject of much debate these days. This is a positive sign. Many strategists, in rightly trying to increase the odds against the nuclear gamble, advocate increased strength in conventional weapons, and new doctrines for conventional deterrence. Some of these doctrines have the sound purpose of delaying, or even preventing, the terrible resort to nuclear weapons in any European conflict.

I believe that such a raising of the nuclear threshold in Europe is a concept of the first importance. It would not be an easy, or an inexpensive task. But even as I am attracted to this concept in its application to Europe, I am troubled by a broader implication. Non-nuclear weapons are in an advanced state of technology, and are widely marketed. Sea-skimming missiles, laser-guided bombs and fragmentation weapons are

available for distribution. Is it the purpose of nuclear arms control to make the world safe for conventional warfare? Surely a basic term is missing in this equation: it is the encouragement of an equilibrium of conventional arms and forces, balanced at lower rather than higher levels. An agreed framework of conventional deterrence against armed aggression - but significantly reducing any dangerous concentration of forces. This is to some extent the task of the mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna. But those talks will not succeed unless their importance in terms of military strategy is developed within a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will. Let me suggest a further example of our difficulty in understanding a time which appears to be out of joint. A moment ago I used the word interdependence. It is the accepted description of the world as we know it. We think it describes a rational and positive condition, an ethic to be encouraged. But we are also learning that the consequences of interdependence are frequently unforeseen, often irrational, negative, and out of control - rogue trends which promote inequality among states, and deep strains between them.

If we have difficulty understanding the intricacies of interdependence, we are not yet even close to managing the economic linkages with peace and security.

Consider Poland. Its economic collapse strongly suggested action to assist. Western banks were deeply exposed.

There seemed to be a common interest in the renewed viability of the Polish economy. But the overriding political considerations, in light of the brutal declaration of martial law, pointed in quite the opposite direction. Thus, the debate over East-West economic relations - which haunts every Western council - reveals the fundamental and unresolved question of how much economic interdependence is desirable between the two systems. Some say less. Some say more. Those who argue for less are often, paradoxically, the first to advocate the punitive merit of economic sanctions - which are only effective if interdependence exists, and if Soviet behaviour is modified by the expectation of economic benefit. Moreover, some who argue for economic sanctions in the civilian sector apparently believe that this will influence Soviet military spending. Yet they may add that there is little if any relationship between civilian and military economies in the Soviet Union.

This particular debate tends also to lay open one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of the current period. That is the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations. There have been days when I, or Ronald Reagan, or Margaret Thatcher may seem to have been accused, for whatever reason or passion of the moment, of posing a greater threat to the security of the West than do the Russians and their associates.

It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through

the alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the alliance.

The alliance in arms against itself is a paradox rich with historical allusion. NATO will avoid that fate if we are wise. But institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate - their intellectual universe of discourse - does not expand to meet the changing realities of our environment.

Therefore, I am uneasy with these paradoxes. I am not satisfied with our ability to analyze and understand the complexities of an entirely new phase in East-West relations. I am not reassured by the posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age - an age, by the way, in which Canadian nerves were not found to falter.

For it is not our nerves which are being tested now, and these are not playing fields on which we stand and cheer. It is the killing-ground of life itself - and what is being tested is whether the force and will of our statecraft can reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race.

When I spoke in June of last year at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, I said:

'... I understand full well the people's anguish and confusion. The nuclear debate is difficult and seems to pursue an inverse logic. It deals with power that, by common consent, is unusable. It argues for more nuclear weapons in order that, in the end, there may be fewer. It perceives the vulnerability of cities and of human beings as an element of stability in the nuclear balance. And worst of all, the debate goes on without

much evidence of any light at the end of the tunnel.'

More than a year later, I still see little light ahead. How did we arrive at such an impasse? Some of the answers lie in the ragged course of East-West relations over the past fifteen years. Those relations have an innate tendency to defy management and control. They are animated by competing philosophies and civilizations, and armed with weaponry that is global in scope. Like Guelphs and Ghibellines, the two sides advocate radically different visions of political order, human values and social behaviour.

As Canadians, we know where we stand. We have a distinguished record of accomplishment in working for international peace and security. NATO has without doubt been one of the instruments preventing nuclear war for the past thirty-five years. Canada has done pioneering work in the United Nations and elsewhere on arms control and disarmament. Our nuclear power industry has perforce made us experts on safeguards agreements and has given us a special commitment to the cause of non-proliferation. We have continuously pressed for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, and for the prohibition of all weapons for use in outer space.

We have played our part in periods of cooperation, and pulled our weight in periods of confrontation. We have identified a distinctive Canadian space in East-West relations, determined by our history and geography, by our membership in NATO, by successive waves of immigration, by such priorities as

trade and human rights, and by that sense of realism which is, to paraphrase John Holmes, both the achievement and the comfort of the middle-powers' middle age. I do not believe we have any illusions about the short-lived and much-maligned period of detente. I certainly have no embarrassment about my own part in that process, bred in a conjuncture of geopolitics, economic aspirations, and collective leadership on both sides.

But the process too soon became part of the problem. . The main achievements of the late sixties and early seventies were carried forward with difficulty, perhaps with an overload of linkage. Historians may reflect on the reasons why 1975 was the year which saw both the high point of the formal structure of detente in the conclusion of the Helsinki final act - and the imminent erosion of its broader purpose as a result of Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Angola. Detente rapidly showed signs of a process being drained of its substance. Core issues were held hostage by one side or the other - human rights, economic cooperation, hegemony in key spheres of influence. Detente became both divisible, and reversible.

And yet, I am not ready to call detente a failure. There were clear benefits of stability and cooperation. Its long-term impact, for example on Soviet elites, cannot yet be judged. Moreover it did coincide with, or provoke, an important impulse in the early seventies, which seems to have been lost without trace. It is the impulse toward political dialogue, toward regular consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system.

This was not talk for the sake of talk. It led to a set of interlocking bargains or understandings on strategic arms, on Vietnam, on the place of China in the world, on cooperation in outer space. Techniques of crisis management were put tenuously in place. It was an impulse in which elements of mutual respect contended with the search for advantage - which is to say it was high politics in action. With the loss of that impulse, and in the absence of high politics in the East-West relationship, it is not surprising that any shred of trust or confidence in the intentions of the other side appears to have vanished as well. Also missing, and this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is a disturbing complacency, a readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better. We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have.

The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments, and their leadership responsibilities. Naturally, they differ greatly - and I am not committing the fallacy of describing them as equals in any moral sense at all. Nevertheless, they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves, and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates.

And there are some other features which both powers have in common: continental land-mass and considerable economic self-sufficiency; ambivalent relationships with Europe and with Asia; complexities of demography; a central focus on each other in their policies; spasms of unilateralism and isolationism.

It is therefore facile to deny the grave responsibilities which are shared in Washington DC and Moscow, or to deny that what both seem to lack at the present time is a political vision of a world wherein their nations can live in peace. What is essential to assert is that, just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone. Military scientists make a routine distinction between capabilities - what weaponry the enemy has; and intentions - when, how and why he intends to use it. I am profoundly concerned that we are devoting far too great a proportion of our time to the enumeration of capabilities, and far too little to the assessment of intentions which govern the use of arms. We may at some point be able to freeze the nuclear capability in the world at greatly reduced levels. But how do we freeze the menacing intentions which might control those weapons which remain? Therein lies the inadequacy of the nuclear freeze argument.

Although known as the architect of total war, Von Clausewitz himself insisted on a political framework for military capabilities.

He said:

'War cannot be separated from political life; whenever this occurs in our thinking ... we have before us a senseless thing without an object.'

On that point, I agree with him. I am convinced that casting a fresh linkage - of military strategy with, and subordinate to, strong political purpose - must become the highest priority of East and West alike.

This is a period of deep questioning of many of the strategic concepts which have dominated the post-war world. New-school strategists, and critics from left and from right, are probing the fundamentals of strategic thought in the nuclear age from many points of view. They are in agreement, however, when they point to changing realities, to evolution in the psychology of those who live constantly with the spectre of nuclear war, and to the importance of weeding out obsolete ideas.

But much of this questioning, provocative as it is, strikes me as missing an important point. And that is the place of military strategy in the nuclear age. I believe that military strategy must, above all, serve a comprehensive set of political objectives and controls, which dominate and give purpose to modern weapons and to military doctrine. Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations, or ambitions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force.

Therefore it is essential to Western purposes, in my judgement, to maintain in our policies elements of communication, negotiation, and transparency about our own intentions - plus a measure of incentive for the Soviet Union first to clarify, and then to modify, its own objectives towards the West.

This was, in a limited sense, the philosophy which underpinned the NATO response to the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles in Europe. We had to ask ourselves what purpose of political intimidation could be served by that build-up. That is why we decided to respond with a two-track approach - deployment and negotiations. This approach has given the Soviet Union both the clear incentive to reach agreement, and the table at which to do so. I and my fellow NATO heads of government remain firmly committed to that two-track decision.

The tragic shooting down of the Korean airliner raises further questions about military dominance on the Soviet side. It is the Soviet military system edging beyond the reach of the political authorities? Are we contributing to such a trend by the absence of regular contact with the Soviet leadership?

These considerations suggest that our two-track decision may also require, as the time for deployment comes closer, a 'third rail' of high-level political energy to speed the course of agreement - a third rail through which might run the current of our broader political purposes, including our determination not to be intimidated.

The risk of accident or miscalculation is too great for us not to begin to repair the lines of communication with our adversaries. The level of tension is too high for us not to

revive a more constructive approach to the containment of crises. The degree of mutual mistrust is too intense for us not to try to rebuild confidence through active political contact and consultation. Only in this way can the quality and credibility of efforts towards peace and security, from whatever quarter, be animated and reinforced. But it is a precondition of that goal that Western councils, particularly at the head of government level, benefit from the free flow of ideas which we maintain in our own societies, and which we advocate for others. That, too, forms part of our armament and we should not hesitate to deploy it.

Because the trend is for arms negotiations, like military strategy itself, to become ever more distanced from the political energy of the participants, I have mentioned the MBFR talks in Vienna. That forum has laboured for over ten years and produced very little by way of results. Those talks require urgent political attention if they are to move off dead centre. Over the years, other leaders and I have made several proposals in that direction - proposals which now merit wider support.

We have high hopes for the conference on disarmament in Europe, established by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), and due to open in Stockholm next January. Canada will do its utmost to make that conference productive. We recognize the importance of agreement on confidence-building measures of a military nature. But these

negotiations, important as they are, will not advance our larger hopes if they proceed in a political vacuum. The delegate framework of security in Europe cannot be balanced on the fate of one or two sets of negotiations alone. These negotiations must be grounded in a structure of stable East-West understanding: reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue, and a determined approach to crisis management.

Here again, we require that jolt of political energy which I have described as the third rail.

What is missing is a strategy of confidence-building measures of a political nature:

- steps that reduce tensions caused by uncertainty about objectives, or caused by fear of the consequences of failure;
- steps that mitigate hostility and promote a modicum of mutual respect;
- steps that build an authentic confidence in man's ability to survive on this planet.

In short, we must take positive political steps in order to reverse the dangerously downward trend-line in East-West relations. I shall be exploring such steps with our allies, with other leaders, and with groups such as yours. We must work in a balanced and rational fashion, with a degree of trust, a degree of belief in the good sense of mankind, and with a strong recognition that the task is urgent. The negotiations

on theatre nuclear forces in Europe, and on strategic forces, are taking place between the superpowers. Canada is not at the table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my hope, however, that we might help to influence the atmosphere in which these negotiations are being conducted, and thereby enhance the prospects of early agreement. We need to be realistic about the hard factors in play. We must appreciate the primordial drive for security and for sovereignty which is never very far below the surface of the arms control debate.

Let us begin the search for what Franklyn Griffiths has termed a strategic Keynesianism - counter-cyclical measures which work to moderate the terrible lurch from hope to crises. We shall have to go against the flow.

I intend to speak further, in other speeches in the weeks ahead, about these issues of confidence stability, arms control and political will, which dominate not only our times, but our lives as well. I have this week begun a process of close discussion with President Reagan. My consultations with other leaders have already commenced. I plan to take to them in person my own recommendations for a strategy of political confidence-building.

We will want to look at several elements:

- ways of designing a consistent structure of political and economic confidence with which to stabilize East-West relations;
- ways to draw the superpowers away from their

concentration on military strength, toward regular and productive dialogue, toward a sense of responsibility commensurate with their power;

- ways to persuade all five nuclear-weapons states to engage in negotiations aimed at establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals;
- ways of improving European security through the raising of the nuclear threshold, including the imposition of a political dynamic upon the static MBFR talks in Vienna; and
- ways to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other states.

It is my personal purpose to live up to the undertaking, made by leaders at the Williamsburg Summit last May, 'to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war.' The questions to be raised, as I believe I have shown to you tonight, are not easy. There are priorities which inevitably conflict. A new climate of East-West confidence cannot be instilled in a day, nor can the arms race be stopped overnight. But in so far as I, and other leaders who share this purpose, can work together to build authentic confidence, I pledge to that we shall.

Not to do so at this time would, I believe, amount to a form of escapism - an escapism well defined by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group in their thoughtful book, *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. The book cautions against two forms of escapism: the first form is to believe that nuclear weapons will go away. The authors rightly and regretfully say that they will not. But the second

form of escapism, they point out, is to think that nuclear weapons can be treated like other military weapons in history. Surely it is clear that they cannot.

And therefore I would add a third form of escapism, which we indulge in at our peril. That is the escapism of allowing shrill rhetoric to become a substitute for foreign policy, of letting inertia become a substitute for will, of making a desert and calling it peace. Thank you.



010

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

*1. Thank the President
reference to Hungary should
also be deleted
mb*

You asked the Foreign Secretary to
prepare an OD paper for circulation
at about the time.

PM/83/87

PRIME MINISTER

2. I wonder whether it is wise to refer in
a paper to the whole of OD to the
possibility of a meeting between you and
Andropov?

UK/Soviet and East/West Relations

*Yes
mb*

3. Would you like those
references to be excised
and the paper circulated?

A.S.C. 3/4

/ 1. I enclose a paper on this subject which I would propose,
if you agree, to circulate to colleagues for discussion at the
next convenient meeting of OD. I would add a brief covering
minute making the point that the concern felt in many quarters
about the current state of East/West relations, and especially
relations between Washington and Moscow, makes it all the more
important to be clear in our own minds about the long term
possibilities and objectives in this field.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UK/SOVIET AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Introduction

1. The recent shooting down of the Korean airliner and the current INF debate have focussed attention on two important characteristics of the Soviet Union. The first is its paranoid view of its own security, an historical concern of all Russian/Soviet states. The second, underlined also by the START talks in Geneva, is its enormous military power. This combination of qualities, together with a political ideology which predicts as inevitable the final triumph of communism over all other political systems, confronts the Western democracies with one of our severest challenges. Since the last war, the West's response, which has included containment, roll-back and most recently detente, has at times been ambivalent and even contradictory.

2. The US Secretary of State in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations committee on 15 June said that the long term US aim was "to encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system towards a more pluralistic political and economic system". The rigidity and strength of the present Soviet state is such that it is very doubtful whether, in the foreseeable future, any greater diversity can be expected. Our policies should therefore be based on the assumption that any change in the system, at least in the next four to five years (possibly the length of Andropov's period in office), is not likely to be fundamental, however much Andropov himself may recognise the problems and the need for some change. If change does come, it will come slowly and mainly as a result of internal, not external, pressure.

3. This paper outlines the main considerations affecting relations with the Soviet Union and East/West relations generally. Annex A recommends policy guidelines for the long term security of the UK. To be effective, these will

need to be closely coordinated with those of our allies and partners and followed consistently.

Security

4. Only if the nuclear balance between the two super-powers remains stable can middle ranking powers pursue their own bilateral interests with the Soviet Union on a sound or lasting basis.

5. As a general rule, at every level, strategic, nuclear and conventional, the West should continue to confront the Soviet Union with the certainty that the Western alliance will do whatever is necessary to maintain adequate defences. The Russians should not be allowed to gain the impression that they can divide the West or undermine its resolve by appeals to public opinion.

6. In parallel, we should continue to offer the Soviet Union the serious possibility of balanced and verifiable arms control agreements which would maintain security at lower levels.

7. The detailed policies we should pursue on the individual questions now under current negotiation with the Soviet Union are the subject of separate consideration.

Political Relations

8. The main means of assisting change in the Soviet Union is through the spread of information. Information can be conveyed at a number of levels and in a variety of ways.

9. At the political level, meetings of senior ministers or heads of Government expose their Soviet interlocutors to the sort of direct questioning and criticism which their own system is designed to prevent. Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's visits to the West made a profound impression on them both. Andropov has yet to set foot in a free Western country.

10. High level contacts also present the West with opportunities of penetrating the system of Soviet decision making and assessing the relative strength of the various views and protagonists involved. This helps to reduce the likelihood of dangerous misunderstandings. Exposing the most senior ranks of the self-contained Soviet military caste to direct Western political and military argument is not the least benefit of such contacts.

11. Clearly the extent, timing and content of East/West political contacts should be a matter of careful planning and coordination among Western countries. UK practice since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been to avoid high level and Ministerial contacts except where these are clearly advantageous to us. But other post-Afghanistan measures have been progressively relaxed by our allies who have been influenced by differing national problems and interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

12. Our aim now should be to build up contacts over the next few years, while continuing to give careful consideration to the nature and timing of such exchanges. Incidents such as the shooting down of the KAL airliner will inevitably lead to the postponement or cancellation of particular events. We should also continue our present policy of strongly criticising the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and making the Soviet Union pay as high a price as possible for its military presence there, with the long term aim of bringing about its withdrawal.

13. Political contacts at Senior Ministerial level with the Soviet Union have for the most part been confined to meetings between Mr Gromyko and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the margins of the UN or other international meetings in third countries. Political consultations between the FCO and Soviet MFA also take place on an annual basis. In April this year they were held in Moscow between Mr Rifkind, Minister of State at the FCO and Mr Kornienko,

the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister. The next step might be for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to issue an invitation to Mr Gromyko to visit the United Kingdom some time in 1984. Depending on the circumstances, there might be advantage thereafter in a meeting between the Prime Minister and the General Secretary of the CPSU and Soviet President, Andropov. This meeting might take place at an appropriate place in a third country or alternatively Mr Andropov should be invited to visit the UK. (In protocol terms it is the Soviet turn to visit the UK in return for Mr Wilson's visit to Moscow in 1975.)

14. Visits to the Soviet Union by, or invitations to their opposite numbers from, British Ministers with specific responsibilities in technical fields should be considered on their merits. The opportunities these meetings might provide for putting our views on political matters directly and forcefully to senior Soviet figures should not be overlooked.

15. Our public line on high level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan was that they were to be avoided. This was modified in 1981 to allowing "occasional high level and Ministerial contacts when these are deemed advantageous". In the aftermath of the KAL incident and in the run-up to INF deployment we should not now announce any change in policy. But we might instead say that Ministerial contacts are judged on a case by case basis and, where we see advantage, they take place. In practice we would gradually increase the number and level of contacts at Ministerial level, but with due regard always to the actual benefit to our interests in each case.

Information

16. At a more popular level the influence of Western thought and culture are strong where they are allowed to penetrate. A variety of ways can be used to expose the

Soviet people to Western ideas and ideals. These include of the provisions on the freer flow of information and other human contacts provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid CSCE documents and also use of contacts arising from the UK/Soviet cultural agreement, under which exchanges of teachers and students, exhibitions and films take place. These activities are, however, all subject to Soviet agreement and are therefore to some extent restricted.

17. The most effective means of getting information into the Soviet Union at present is by radio transmissions. These are not subject to censorship but they are subject to selective jamming. A re-examination of the role of the BBC External Services to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is now in progress.

Economy

18. Studies in OECD, NATO and elsewhere earlier this year, following the dispute over the Siberian pipeline, have confirmed that there is no reason to object to commercially sound and mutually advantageous financial and trade relations between East and West, provided always that the West abstains from the export of goods and technology which could contribute to the Soviet military build-up. The Soviet Union is broadly self sufficient in all raw materials. Trade with the West is small in both relative and absolute terms. Currently Soviet imports from OECD countries represent 2.5% of the Soviet GNP.

19. Efforts in the West have concentrated on refining COCOM rules on the export of militarily significant technology and equipment and on improving the national enforcement procedures of the strategic embargo. Given the nature of the Western free market system and the widespread availability of technology, a total ban on the transfer of technology would prove impossible. But our security interests require that the utmost care should be taken to ensure, as far as possible, that exports which could have

significant military application or give the Soviet Union significant military advancement do not occur.

20. Other areas have also been looked at in the studies mentioned above. There has been agreement to tighten up credit terms and to keep imports of Soviet energy (especially Siberian gas) to proportions that do not create undue dependence. Financially, the Soviet Union has a debt service ratio of 17% which is the lowest by far of all the CMEA countries and easily within its capacity to service.

21. In order to pursue their commercial relations all Western countries have, to some extent, to match the state structure on the Soviet side through the creation of intergovernmental Joint Commissions and Committees. Without these, the actual traders on the Western side (ie the firms concerned) would be seriously handicapped in conducting business. These inter-governmental links are necessary and should continue. Although of itself trade with the West can have beneficial political effects by exposing the Soviet Union to Western ideas and standards, it should be conducted on the basis of mutual advantage and financial prudence. It should also be compatible with our broad security interests.

Eastern Europe

22. The system imposed on Eastern Europe after the Second World War runs counter to the traditions, state of development, cultural links and religious ties of the countries involved (with the possible exception of Bulgaria). Attempts to remove or lighten the yoke have been put down at regular intervals. A direct confrontation would provoke the same Soviet response whatever the damage to the Soviet Union's international reputation. Those concerned in Eastern Europe understand that in their struggle they cannot look to the West for military assistance. Change will come slowly. Dramatic developments have always led to military response. There is no possibility in the foreseeable future

of the Russians allowing any of these countries to become completely independent of the Soviet Union.

23. For its part the West must take care that the presentation of its policy towards Eastern Europe does not have the effect of making the Soviet Union adopt even more repressive policies towards its neighbours. But we must also make clear to the Soviet Union that while we understand its legitimate interest in its national security, the domestic, economic and social systems of individual East European countries must be for the peoples of those countries to decide for themselves and cannot, legitimately, be imposed from outside.

24. While taking care over its public presentation we should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania). Poland is a special case, and we should not rule out a substantial relationship if its internal social and economic systems develop in a manner more comparable to, say, Hungary than Czechoslovakia.

25. Ministerial visits are one way of indicating this differentiation. They also provide additional indirect channels for getting our views across to the Russians on particular points. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary visited Hungary in September, and a Minister of State visited Czechoslovakia and the GDR in October. Consideration should be given to a visit by the Prime Minister to Hungary to follow up the visit by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might consider visits to Romania and perhaps Bulgaria. In the case of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, visits at above the level of Minister of State are not necessary nor desirable in 1984 but might be appropriate in 1985. A policy of differentiation should be presented, not on the basis of rewards and punishments but as a consequence of our view that the quality of bilateral relations is inevitably enhanced the more that the two countries have in common. As East

European countries liberalise their economic and social systems the opportunities for a more substantive relationship are increased.

26. Information will be one of the most effective means at the West's disposal to influence developments in Eastern Europe. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available. Both the vernacular and English language world service broadcasts are important. The vernacular services reach the greater numbers but world service broadcasts are listened to in both Party and intellectual circles as an impartial source of information.

27. The British Council's programme of exchanges should be maintained. Schemes involving young people should be encouraged. Other exchanges through the arrangement of British cultural events in Eastern Europe, and vice-versa, although popular in Eastern Europe, should be considered selectively so as to ensure that the resources and prestige involved are commensurate with the returns. They should also be looked at in the overall framework of our relations with each individual country.

28. The UK should continue to pursue trade on its commercial merits while having regard to the wider interests of security. For those countries like Hungary, which appear genuinely determined to introduce economic reforms, the UK should do what it can to help with links with the major Western institutions like the IMF, although each case would have to be decided on its merits. There may be some limited scope for closer links with the EC, but improved access to the EC market will continue to be limited by economic conditions in Western Europe and by agricultural over-supply. These will have to be balanced against the undoubted political benefit of a closer EC-Hungary relationship which, inter alia, would reduce prospects for closer CMEA integration.

The Third World

29. Since the War the Soviet Union has been able to gain influence in a number of Third World countries by claiming to be on their side in the struggle against colonialism, by offering limited technical and economic assistance and by supplying arms and advice to revolutionary parties and Governments in internal struggles. In the 1970s the Soviet Union, through the use of Cuban and other surrogates, made major advances in Africa. The countries concerned are beginning to realise however that the Soviet Union is not able to provide the trade, aid or technology on a scale which they need. Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have all recently turned to the West for assistance. We should exploit these opportunities and look for similar openings in countries like the Seychelles. The West should not tacitly accept a Soviet or surrogate fait accompli, eg Afghanistan.

30. With the passage of time the fundamentally different approach to the Third World between the West and the Soviet Union is becoming more widely appreciated. The West, although criticised for not doing more, is seeking to resolve the underlying problems of particular regions, while the Soviet Union seeks to capitalise on them.

31. With its economic and technological advantages, the West should be able over time to contain and even reverse some Soviet gains. It is however to be expected that the Soviet Union will continue to seize low cost opportunities for enlarging its sphere of influence and to exploit instability as it is now doing in Central America.

China

32. The internal economic and political systems of China and the Soviet Union are in many ways similar. Recently there has been an increase in contacts between the two sides and a resumption of talks on the normalisation of relations. However a number of obstacles - Cambodia, Afghanistan,

Soviet force levels in East Asia and the border disputes - will continue to block progress and the atmosphere of Sino/Soviet relations remains essentially cool. The Chinese still see the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to China's national security and to world peace. Closer relations with the US and the West generally are the key to the success of their central policy of economic modernisation. The West should build on this essential Chinese requirement so that China continues to see the balance of her interests as lying in development of relations more with us than with the Soviet Union.

33. Recommended policy guidelines are attached at Annex A.

BULACL

ANNEX A

POLICY GUIDELINES

General

1. The process of change in the Soviet Union will be slow. Our policy should be based on the assumption that any change in the system, in at least the medium term, will not be fundamental.

Security

2. The West should, at every level, continue to confront the Soviet Union with the certainty that the Western Alliance will do whatever is necessary to maintain adequate defences. We should, at the same time, seek balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, capable of maintaining security at lower levels.

Political Relations

3. The main means of influencing developments in the Soviet Union is through the spread of information.

4. High level political contacts expose Soviet leaders, including the military, to some direct questioning and criticism. They provide opportunities of assessing Soviet leaders and help to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding. Our aim should be to build up our contacts over the next few years while continuing to give careful consideration to the nature and timing of such exchanges which should be closely coordinated with our Allies and partners. We should not, however, abandon our present policy on Afghanistan.

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might invite Mr Gromyko to visit the UK during 1984. The policy of increased contacts might justify a meeting between the Prime

Minister and Mr Andropov in the next years, either in a third country or by inviting him to visit the UK.

Information

6. The most effective means of getting information into the Soviet Union at present is by radio transmissions. The role of the BBC External Services should be re-examined.
7. Other opportunities arising from our bilateral cultural agreement and the CSCE process for exposing Soviet people to Western ideas and ideals should be exploited.

Economy

8. Western policy should be guided by the following:
 - (a) East/West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests;
 - (b) The nature of the Western free market system and the widespread availability of technology rule out a total ban on the transfer of technology;
 - (c) Strategically significant exports should continue to be identified and embargoed under effective COCOM procedures;
 - (d) Governments should exercise financial prudence in trading with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and avoid granting preferential treatment;
 - (e) The West should avoid over-dependence on imports from or exports to the Soviet Union in all trade sectors, including energy (imports) and grain (exports);

- (f) Although trade may have certain desirable political effects (eg contacts with Western methods and standards) this can seldom justify conducting trade on economic or commercial terms disadvantageous to the Western partner.

Eastern Europe

9. We should continue the policy of differentiating between Eastern European states on the basis of their willingness and ability to move away from the Soviet pattern of internal development (like Hungary) or from the Soviet line in foreign policy (like Romania).

10. The BBC External Service's broadcasts to Eastern Europe should be maintained at the highest level compatible with the resources available.

11. The British Council's programme of exchanges, particularly academic and youth exchanges, should be maintained. Other major cultural exchanges should be considered selectively.

12. Economic assistance is what the Eastern Europeans most want. But this will be hard to provide. Access to Western economic institutions, in particular the IMF, might be one of the best ways of introducing Western standards and ideas into the Eastern economies.

Third World

13. Western policy should be guided by the following:

- (a) The Russians are facing increasing problems in responding to developing countries' real needs. Even where Soviet/Cuban influence has been established (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) countries are increasingly turning to the West for assistance. We should take advantage of this;

- (b) Western policy should be aimed at resolving the underlying problems of a region, as well as eliminating Soviet/Cuban intervention;

- (c) So far as potential future Third World problems are concerned, measures which would contribute to world stability and build up resistance to the Soviet Union would be:
 - (i) to give practical help, including aid to developing countries which are vulnerable to Soviet pressure (EC Member States provide nearly half of all OECD aid);

 - (ii) to encourage the creation and strengthening of independent moderate regional groups such as ASEAN but to be wary of proposals for alliances which are purely dependant on Western backing;

 - (iii) to encourage influential moderates in the non-aligned movement and to promote the recent tendency away from the Cuban concept (advanced during their chairmanship of the movement) that the NAM have a natural ally in the Soviet Union;

 - (iv) to work on a multilateral basis through the appropriate international organisations (eg the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and the UN system) to promote Third World economic development and a sense of partnership and interdependence between the Western industrialised and the

developing countries;

- (v) to expose the hollowness of Soviet claims to provide either the political answers for developing countries or the practical assistance they need for their development.

China


14. Western relations with China should be pursued on their own merits, but also with an appreciation of the likely effect on Sino/Soviet relations.

PART 3 ends:-

ATC to FCO 31/10

PART 4 begins:-

FCS to AM (Am/83/87) ~~Nov 83~~
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