

PREM 19/1495



**TOP SECRET**

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East / West Relations

FOREIGN POLICY

PE 1: JULY 1979

PE 5: AUGUST 1985

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PREM 19/11/85



PART 5 ends:-

FEO to CDP 29/11/85

PART 6 begins:-

CDP to FEO 1/12/85







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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I think your instinct to send Gorbachev a message is right. The FO draft was very woolly. I've had another go, but you may want to personalize it.

29 November 1985

CDP  
29/11

Charles - this message is not worth sending. I will write another if time permits.

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Summit

In your letter of 25 November you said that the Prime Minister was considering whether she should take the initiative in writing to Mr Gorbachev about the outcome of the US/Soviet Summit.

The Foreign Secretary believes that it would be valuable for the Prime Minister to write to Mr Gorbachev. We know that Mr Gorbachev attaches importance to his personal exchanges with the Prime Minister. Sir Bryan Cartledge is now likely to pay his first call on Mr Shevardnadze on 3 or 4 December. This would be a suitable opportunity for him to hand over the message to Mr Gorbachev, since he is unlikely to get an opportunity to see Mr Gorbachev himself in the immediate future.

I attach a draft message. It seeks to convey the personal note which has proved so useful in the Prime Minister's letters to Mr Gorbachev. You will see that it reaffirms our interest in a visit to Britain by Mr Shevardnadze. It also refers to the possibility that the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev might resume discussions at a suitable moment. If the Prime Minister agreed, this might be a useful trailer to a possible visit to the Soviet Union in the course of next year.

The Prime Minister may also be interested to see a series of telegrams from Moscow with the background to Mr Gorbachev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 27 November.

[You have already seen them]

Yours ever,  
L. V. Appleyard

(L.V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





SW2AAJ

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

As you can imagine, I followed your meetings with President Reagan in Geneva with the greatest interest. They seem to me to have laid the foundations for better understanding between East and West, on which we now need to build.

I hope in particular that some basic misconceptions have been dispelled. I noted for instance that you appear to see defence spending in the United States as a dynamo in their economy, but rightly regard it as a brake on the Soviet economy. None of us in the West see defence expenditure as an essential part of economic growth. This really isn't how capitalist societies work. Nor, I am sure, does President Reagan think that the Soviet economy can be brought to its knees by a competitive arms race. I take these examples simply to illustrate the point that we need a sustained effort by both sides to remove the mistrust and misunderstanding which stand in the way of agreement.

I am encouraged by the Joint Statement issued at the end of your meeting with President Reagan to hope for fresh impetus in your negotiations with the United States on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, in the discussions of a global ban on chemical weapons, in the MBFR talks, and at the CDE in Stockholm. I believe it would be helpful if Sir Geoffrey Howe had an opportunity to discuss our thinking on some of these issues with M. Shevardnadze. I hope that we can soon agree a date for his visit to



Britain, in the course of which I look forward to seeing him myself.

I recognise that there is still a difficult road to be travelled before definite agreements are reached. We must not raise the hopes of our peoples too high. But I was struck by something which Mr. Kadar said to me during a recent talk we had: "Our peoples want peace and security and we must give it to them". The successful outcome of the Geneva meeting was an important step on the road to satisfying that basic demand and I pay tribute to your personal contribution to it. I hope that you and I will be able to resume our discussions at an appropriate moment.

I send you and Mrs. Gorbachev my best wishes.

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev



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MY 2 IPTS: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET

COMMENT

1. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH IS LONG, COMPREHENSIVE AND LARGELY FREE OF BOTH JARGON AND POLEMIC. THE IMPRESSION GIVEN IS OF A FAIR AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF GENEVA (WHICH, DESPITE THE LACK OF FIRM ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, ARE STILL DECLARED TO BE POSITIVE). MORE SURPRISINGLY THERE IS A FAIR ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN'S POSITION AT THE SUMMIT, AS WELL AS OF GORBACHEV'S OWN. INDEED, GORBACHEV'S ACCOUNT OF HIS OWN PERFORMANCE SQUARES VERY MUCH WITH THAT GIVEN AT AMERICAN BRIEFINGS.

2. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THIS MAJOR SPEECH WAS MADE TO THE SUPREME SOVIET RATHER THAN TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY INTENDED TO BE SEEN AS A PARALLEL TO REAGAN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS. BUT IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR THE SUPREME SOVIET TO HOLD ONE OF ITS RARE SESSIONS AT THIS TIME OF THE YEAR AND IT THEREFORE PROVIDED A CONVENIENT AND, IN SOVIET TERMS, WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE PLATFORM, INDEED ONE WHICH COULD HARDLY BE NEGLECTED.

3. ON SUBSTANCE, GORBACHEV DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DEPART FROM HIS PREVIOUS COMMENTS MADE AFTER THE SUMMIT. SOME COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES ARE INCLINED TO SEE SIGNS OF DEFENSIVENESS AND OF A RETREAT, IN THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO MATCH HIS STATEMENT THEN THAT "THE WORLD IS NOW A SAFER PLACE", EVEN OF HIS HAVING BEEN PULLED BACK BY THE SOVIET MILITARY. I DISCOUNT THIS AND FOR MY OWN PART SEE GORBACHEV STEERING A COURSE BETWEEN MAINTAINING THE IMPULSE (ABOVE ALL ATMOSPHERIC) IMPARTED BY THE SUMMIT, AND KEEPING SOVIET NEGOT-



ATMOSPHERIC) IMPARTED BY THE SUMMIT, AND KEEPING SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS INTACT. THIS COMES OUT MOST CLEARLY IN SOME OF HIS FORMULATIONS ON SDI AND ARMS CONTROL. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE IS NO BLUNT ULTIMATUM THAT UNLESS SDI IS SCRAPPED, ANY AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE (C.F. HIS 'TIME' INTERVIEW - NY TELNO 1127 - WHEN HE NOT ONLY ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE WHAT WAS PERMISSIBLE AND WHAT WAS NOT, BUT ALSO THREATENED THAT THERE WOULD BE 'NOTHING AT ALL' ON ARMS CONTROL IF SDI WENT AHEAD). NONETHELESS HE REMAINS FIRM THAT THE DOOR ON WEAPONS IN SPACE MUST BE COMPLETELY CLOSED, OR THERE CAN BE NO RADICAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. THIS FORMULA BLURS ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS, BUT STILL LEAVES A MAJOR US CONCESSION ON AS A (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) SINE QUA NON.

4. THIS WAS A POLISHED AND SOPHISTICATED PERFORMANCE BY GORBACHEV, COMBINING THE RIGHT DEGREE OF FIRMNESS WHICH WILL REASSURE THE PARTY AND MILITARY, AND STATESMANLIKE PRESENTATION WHICH WILL APPEAL TO HIS WIDER DOMESTIC AUDIENCE AND TO THE WORLD AT LARGE (ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE). THE SPEECH NATURALLY DID NOT IDENTIFY, BUT NEITHER BY IMPLICATION, DID IT CONCEAL THE CENTRAL DILEMMA WHICH THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT HAS LAID UPON GORBACHEV (AND TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN AS WELL). HE IS COMMITTED TO A POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL (NO HALT TO THE SDI PROGRAMME, NO STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS) WHICH, HE MUST NOW REALISE AFTER HIS ENCOUNTER WITH THE PRESIDENT, RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTANTIAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT - CONSISTENTLY CLAIMED BY THE RUSSIANS TO BE THE MAIN AND PROPER OBJECTIVE OF SUPER-POWER SUMMITRY - DURING THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY. BUT HE IS ALSO COMMITTED TO TWO FURTHER SUMMITS WITH REAGAN, THE FIRST OF THEM ON DIFFICULT AND UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY. ONE SUMMIT WITH A GOOD ATMOSPHERE BUT LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME CAN CREDIBLY BE PRESENTED - AS GORBACHEV HAS DONE - AS A SUCCESS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REPEAT THE TRICK ON A SECOND, LET ALONE A THIRD, OCCASION UNLESS THERE IS UNEXPECTEDLY GOOD PROGRESS AT GENEVA ON E.G. UP-DATING THE ABM TREATY OR INF (WHICH NOW SEEMS TO BE LESS DEFINITELY DECOUPLED FROM THE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS THAN BEFORE)., OR UNLESS EVENTS ELSEWHERE, E.G. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A RESOUNDING INITIATIVE OR DECLARATION ON A REGIONAL ISSUE WHICH COULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE ARMS CONTROL STALEMATE.

5. THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM MUST HAVE OCCURRED TO GORBACHEV AND HIS ADVISERS BEFORE OR DURING THE SUMMIT. HIS EVIDENT READINESS TO ACCEPT AND LIVE WITH IT, RATHER THAN DUCKING A COMMITMENT TO FUTURE MEETINGS OR ENDING THE LAST ONE IN A BLAZE OF ACRIMONY, INDICATES TO ME THAT HE ATTACHES MORE IMPORTANCE, FOR THE TIME BEING, TO AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF ENHANCED EAST/WEST STABILITY AS AN ESSENTIAL BACKDROP TO HIS DOMESTIC PROGRAMME THAN HE DOES TO A SUBSTANTIAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) PER SE.

CARTLEDGE

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MY TELNO 1545 : (NOT TO ALL) GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET ON 27 NOVEMBER.

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH CONCENTRATED ON FOREIGN POLICY, PRINCIPALLY REPORTING ON THE GENEVA SUMMIT. MIFT IS A SUMMARY OF THE "INTERNAL" POINTS. MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS COMMENT. BELOW ARE THE MAIN POINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY.

DETAIL

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

PRELUDE

2. THE ROAD TO THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN MADE DIFFICULT BY THE US CONFRONTATIONAL ATTITUDE. EXAMPLES WERE THE ASAT TEST, THE PRESENCE OF THE "IOWA" ARMED WITH LRCMS IN THE BALTIC, PERSHING DEPLOYMENT IN WEST GERMANY, THE DECISION ON BINARY CW DEVELOPMENT, A RECORD US MILITARY BUDGET, AND APPEALS TO REAGAN FROM WEINBERGER AND THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION.

3. BUT THOSE WHO HAD SOUGHT CONFRONTATION HAD MISCALCULATED.  
US.

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US/IN E E E E

USAXSOVIET INTER-DEPENDENCE WAS AS IMMENSE AS THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THE US HAD BEEN FORCED TO "MANOEUVRE" IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET INITIATIVES. FOLLOWING THE JANUARY GENEVA AGREEMENT, THE US/SOVIET ATMOSPHERE, AND TO SOME EXTENT US INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, STARTED TO CHANGE.

4. GORBACHEV HAD TOLD REAGAN THAT ARMS CONTROL WAS THE MAIN MEANING OF THE SUMMIT.

US/SOVIET PROPOSALS

5. AMONGST SOVIET PROPOSALS AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, THE 50% REDUCTION WAS "A BEGINNING" OF THE PROCESS TOWARDS ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WHICH OTHER NWS SHOULD BE INVOLVED. THE SOVIET UNION WAS FOR THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MEDIUM RANGE AND TACTICAL, FROM EUROPE. FOLLOWING US AND NATO /NON AGREEMENT



NON-AGREEMENT 'WE PROPOSED TO START AT LEAST WITH PROVISIONAL DECISIONS AND THEN TO WORK TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS'. SOVIET PROPOSALS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE US 'SPECIAL CONCERNS', INCLUDING ICBMS AND SS20S. BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WERE A STUMBLING BLOCK, HENCE THE SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR A 'DIRECT EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS'.

6. THE ADVANCEMENT OF US COUNTER PROPOSALS WAS IN ITSELF A POSITIVE FACT. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, LARGELY INEQUITABLE, ONE-SIDED AND AIMED TOWARDS SUPERIORITY.

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7. GORBACHEV HAD NOT AGREED WITH REAGAN'S PRESENTATION ON SDI, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL TO SHARE SYSTEMS AND OPEN LABORATORIES. SDI COULD BE BOTH 'DEFENSIVE' FOR A FIRST STRIKE ATTEMPT, AND 'OFFENSIVE' IN ITSELF. THERE WAS EVERY INDICATION THAT IT WAS CONCEIVED AS A COMPONENT OF AN INTEGRATED OFFENSIVE COMPLEX.

8. THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE 'WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE VERY NOTION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY'. CATASTROPHE COULD FOLLOW FROM COMPUTER ERROR. 'THE US STAND ON STARWARS IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL'.

9. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT RELY ON US ASSURANCES ABOUT SHARING. LABORATORIES SHOULD BE OPEN TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH A BAN, NOT DEVELOPMENT. TO REGAIN BALANCE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY, ACCURACY AND YIELD OF ITS WEAPONS. GORBACHEV ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW COMFORTABLE THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL IF THERE WERE SOVIET WEAPONS IN SPACE. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE US ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER CHALLENGE MIGHT BE 'LESS COSTLY THAN THE AMERICAN PROGRAMME'

10. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT FEEL ENMITY TOWARDS THE US, RESPECTED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND DID NOT SEEK STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. THE LEVEL OF ARMS SUFFICIENT FOR 'DEPENDABLE DEFENCE' WAS WELL BELOW PRESENT STOCKS. 'TANGIBLE, PRACTICAL STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTIONS ARE QUITE POSSIBLE'.

11. TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND FURTHER MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SALT II WERE NECESSARY.

12. 'WE DO NOT OVER-DRAMATISE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND SOVIET PROPOSALS: COMPROMISES ARE POSSIBLE HERE AND WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR THEM'. QUESTIONS OF 'DEPENDABLE VERIFICATION' COULD BE RESOLVED. 'BUT TO SOLVE ALL THESE PROBLEMS IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL HERMETICALLY TO CLOSE THE DOOR THROUGH WHICH WEAPONS COULD PENETRATE INTO SPACE. WITHOUT THIS, A RADICAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IMPOSSIBLE. I WISH TO STATE THIS WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE AND ITS HIGHEST SUPREME ORGAN OF POWER' (PROLONGED APPLAUSE). 'THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS CAN ONLY BLOCK THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE'. 'WE HOPE THAT WHAT THE US SAID ON SDI IN GENEVA WAS /NOT THEIR



NOT THEIR LAST WORD''. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PRESS, AS AGREED AT GENEVA, FOR RESOLVING THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE ''IN COMPLEX WITH THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS''.

13. THE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO ''STAR WARS'' WAS PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN SPACE, TO INCLUDE ''FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH PROJECTS'', DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, AND NEW SPACE TECHNOLOGY FOR THE EVENTUAL INDUSTRIALISATION OF NEAR-EARTH SPACE. US SOVIET COOPERATION COULD HELP IMPLEMENT A LONG TERM, COMPREHENSIVE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRAMME.

#### TEST BAN

14. THE QUESTION OF ENDING NUCLEAR TESTS HAD BECOME MORE AND MORE ACUTE. THE SOVIET UNION WERE READY TO EXTEND THEIR TEST MORATORIUM BEYOND 1 JANUARY 1986 GIVEN US RECIPROCITY. THEY EXPECTED A CONCRETE AND POSITIVE DECISION FROM THE US. VERIFICATION COULD BE EXERCISED WITH THE HELP OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (THE SOVIET UNION HAD REGISTERED AN UNANNOUNCED LOW YIELD TEST IN THE US THIS YEAR). THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, INCLUDING THE ''SIX COUNTRIES'' SUGGESTION.

#### BILATERAL RELATIONS

15. THERE HAD BEEN CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS, AND ON AIR SERVICES. THERE REMAINED MAJOR DIFFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, ''BUT WE ARE FAR FROM BELITTLING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS'', THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE NON-WINNABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR AND AVOIDANCE OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY. ALSO IMPORTANT WERE THE PLEDGES ON THE NPT REGIME, ON CW, ON THE ''EARLY COMPLETION'' OF THE CDE (WITH A DOCUMENT INCLUDING CONCRETE NUF OBLIGATIONS AND CBMS), AND ON CONTINUING POLITICAL CONTACTS, INCLUDING SUMMITS.

16. GORBACHEV HOPED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD BASE FOR INCREASING US/SOVIET TRUST. THE US POSITION HAD INCLUDED ''CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF REALISM'' : ''WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO SAY THAT THE OVERALL BALANCE SHEET OF THE GENEVA MEETING IS POSITIVE''. IF THE US DISPLAYED A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION IN PRACTICE, GENEVA WOULD BEAR REAL FRUIT.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

17. BOTH SIDES WERE CONCERNED, BUT THEIR APPROACHES TOWARDS SOLUTIONS WERE ''DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE''. THE US ''SPHERES OF INFLUENCE'' MENTALITY WAS AN ''ANACHRONISM''. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT THE US INTERPRETATION OF THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY. IT WAS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF EVERY PEOPLE TO FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.

18. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONSISTENTLY FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, FOR AN INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNED STATE AND GUARANTEED NON-INTERFERENCE: ''THE QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOP /WITHDRAWAL



WITHDRAWAL WILL ALSO THUS BE RESOLVED''. THE US, BY BACKING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES, WERE FRUSTRATING NORMALISATION.

19. IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION, THE SOVIET UNION WERE FOR THE BROADENING OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AMONGST ALL STATES. IT WELCOMED CHINA'S ATTITUDE AGAINST SPACE MILITARISATION AND ON NOFUN. BETTER RELATIONS WITH JAPAN WERE POSSIBLE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD A SPECIAL REGARD FOR INDIA.

20. IN LATIN AMERICAN, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST THE SOVIET UNION HAD ESTABLISHED RELATIONS OF EQUAL COOPERATION:

#### RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

21. A MECHANISM OF EFFECTIVE, CONCRETE TIES HAD BEEN CREATED. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY HAD BECOME MORE INTENSIVE.

#### RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

22. GORBACHEV SINGLED OUT THE PARIS SUMMIT, DURING WHICH 'SUBSTANTIAL STEPS' WERE TAKEN FURTHER TO DEVELOP BILATERAL COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. BUT THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY - 'NOT A PRIVILEGE' - FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENTS WAS BORNE BY THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

23. EUROPE HAD A SPECIAL ROLE IN SECURITY QUESTIONS, FLOWING FROM HELSINKI. TRADE AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES SHOULD BE USED NOT FOR POLITICAL 'PUNISHMENT' BUT FOR CONSOLIDATING CONFIDENCE.

24. SEE MIFT

CARTLEDGE

#### EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

[ COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET ]

SOVIET D	PS
DEFENCE D	PS/LADY YOUNG
R D	PS/MR RIFKIND
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RENTON
EED	PS/MR EGGAR
NAD	PS/PUS
WED	MR DEREK THOMAS
ACDD	MR GOODALL
CRD	MR FERGUSSON
FED	SIR W HARDING
NED	MR SAMUEL
PUSD	MR DAUNT
NEWS .D	MR DAVID THOMAS
INFO .D	MR LONG



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FM WASHINGTON

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 3293

OF 272000Z NOVEMBER 85

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MOD UK (NPS(A) @ DACU)

MY TELNO 3244: US/SOVIET SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. SOME GLOSSES ON THE JOINT STATEMENT. BUT ON MOST OF THE SUBJECTS IT COVERS, THERE IS NO MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE.

DETAIL

2. THE FOLLOWING GLOSSES ON THE SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT, GLEANED FROM OFFICIALS IN STATE, MAY BE USEFUL.

3. NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. EARLY US DRAFTS CONTAINED COMMITMENTS TO ADHERE TO THE ARM TREATY, COUPLED WITH LANGUAGE ABOUT THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PERMITTED RESEARCH ON ARM SYSTEMS. THESE FORMULAE WERE REJECTED BY THE RUSSIANS, AND THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITION OF PERMITTED RESEARCH, OR ARM TREATY GREY AREAS GENERALLY.

SECURING LANGUAGE ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WHICH INCLUDES A CALL FOR PROGRESS ON REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, BUT NO BALANCING REFERENCE TO PROGRESS ON THE DEFENCE/SPACE SIDE, IS REGARDED AS A SUCCESS. BUT VARIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS, POST-SUMMIT ABOUT OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE LINKAGE HAVE BEEN NOTED, AND OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PCNT REDUCTIONS "APPROPRIATELY APPLIED" SIDESTEPS THE SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENT ON DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE APPARENT SUCCESS OF SECURING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DECOUPLE THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IS REGARDED WITH SOME SCEPTICISM:

THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO SIGN IN GENEVA OF ANY CHANGE IN THE SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET POSITION ON INF, INCLUDING THE DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION FOR UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. AS FOR ACCELERATING WORK IN GENEVA, NEITHER SIDE HAS SUGGESTED BRINGING FORWARD THE 16 JANUARY RESUMPTION DATE. ON SALT II INTERIM RESTRAINT, OUR CONTACTS REPORT NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS EITHER AT OR (AS INACCURATELY REPORTED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES) BEFORE THE SUMMIT. US POLICY CONTINUES TO BE NOT TO UNDERCUT SALT II AS LONG AS THE RUSSIANS SHOW COMPARABLE RESTRAINT, AND NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA. (PART II OF PERLE'S RSVP REPORT HAS NOT YET BEEN CAST BEFORE THE STATE DEPARTMENT SWINE).

4. "RISK REDUCTION CENTRES." THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT IS ONLY LUKEWARM (BAND'S LETTER OF 27 NOVEMBER TO THOMAS): THEIR AGREEMENT TO STUDY IT AT EXPERT LEVEL WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO WIN APPLAUSE FROM THOSE SENATORS, EG BUNN AND WARNER, WHO FAVOUR THE IDEA.

5. NON-PROLIFERATION. AS YOU KNOW, THE JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE WAS PRE-COOKED. THE "REGULAR CONSULTATIONS" WHICH ARE TO CONTINUE ARE KENNEDY'S SIX-MONTHLY CONTACTS.

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6. CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THERE IS GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH THE JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE, IN PARTICULAR THAT VERIFICATION IS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS SINGLED OUT FOR INTENSIFIED BILATERAL DISCUSSION, AND THAT THE AIM OF A COMPLETE BAN TAKES PRIORITY IN THE DOCUMENT OVER THE NON-PROLIFERATION AIM.
7. MBFR/CDE. THE PRESIDENT DID APPARENTLY REFER TO THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM. BUT OFFICIALS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. SOME CLAIM THAT THE LANGUAGE ON CDE COMMITS THE RUSSIANS MORE FIRMLY THAN HITHERTO TO ACCEPTING CSBMS, AND ALSO IMPLIES ABANDONMENT OF THE SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR TWO DOCUMENTS.
8. 'PROCESS OF DIALOGUE.' AN INVITATION TO SHEVARDNAZDE TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN JANUARY IS A POSSIBILITY. (AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE HIGH ON THE US AGENDA.) BALDRIGE WAS ALREADY PLANNING TO ATTEND NEXT WEEK'S MEETING IN MOSCOW OF THE US/SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE; NO OTHER CABINET LEVEL VISITS HAVE YET BEEN CONSIDERED.
9. REGIONAL ISSUES. THE TIMING AND ORDER OF THE NEXT ROUND OF EXPERT LEVEL TALKS HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS WAS NOT MENTIONED BY REAGAN/GORBACHEV. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNAZDE HAD A BRIEF EXCHANGE, RESTATING KNOWN POSITIONS (DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS VERSUS FULL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE). NEITHER SIDE RAISED THE ISSUE OF SOVIET/ISRAELI RELATIONS. EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS WAS RAISED BY THE PRESIDENT, BUT AS A HUMAN RIGHTS, NOT A REGIONAL, ISSUE, AND INCONCLUSIVELY. (ON OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES DISCUSSED, SEE PARAS 3-5 OF TUR.)
10. CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES. LAST WEEK'S INITIALLING OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT OPENS THE DOOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW CONSULATES IN NEW YORK AND KIEV. BOTH WILL HAVE A CEILING OF THIRTY STAFF. (THE US ARE MEANWHILE GOING AHEAD WITH PLANS TO REDUCE, AND CAP, THE STAFF OF THE SOVIET UN MISSION.)
11. NUCLEAR FUSION. MOST REPLIES TO THE (RELATED) US APPROACH JUST BEFORE THE SUMMIT WERE GENERALLY POSITIVE BUT NON-COMMITTAL. THE ADMINISTRATION NOW ENVISAGE A FURTHER ROUND OF MORE DETAILED EXPLANATORY PRESENTATIONS TO POTENTIAL COLLABORATIVE PARTNERS.
12. GENERAL. THE JOINT STATEMENT IS GENERALLY SEEN AS VERY SATISFACTORY, SO FAR AS IT GOES. THE RUSSIANS WERE MADE TO WORK ON US DRAFTS, AND, AFTER SHULTZ'S BUST-UP WITH KORNIENKO, NEGOTIATED FAIRLY CONSTRUCTIVELY. BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE

/TEXT



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TEXT IS NOT THE TIP OF THE ICE-BERG: THERE WAS NOT MUCH BELOW THE WATERLINE. AND NO-ONE IN STATE IS DISPOSED TO DISAGREE WITH THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT LAY IN CREATING A NEW IMPETUS, AND A NEW ATMOSPHERE, FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATION, RATHER THAN IN ANY SIGNIFICANT NEGOTIATED PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE BEHIND THE SCENES.

WRIGHT

## US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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## POLITBURO DISCUSSION OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT RESULTS

## SUMMARY

1. THE GENEVA SUMMIT WAS APPARENTLY THE ONLY ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF A POLITBURO MEETING HELD ON 25 NOVEMBER. ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIQUE THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT WERE APPROVED. NO NEW POINTS EMERGED, BUT STRESS WAS LAID ON ARMS CONTROL, AND IN THIS CONTEXT THE 'ORGANIC LINK' BETWEEN NON-MILITARISATION OF SPACE AND NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS REITERATED.

## DETAIL

2. THE POLITBURO 'FULLY APPROVED GORBACHEV'S WORK, THE RESULTS ACHIEVED AND THE JOINT STATEMENT'. THE SUMMIT COULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON CHANGING THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE FOR IMPROVING US/SOVIET AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
3. GENEVA HAD REAFFIRMED THE CORRECTNESS OF SOVIET SECURITY INITIATIVES. US/SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY SECURITY ISSUES WHOSE CORE WAS THE PREVENTION OF SPACE MILITARISATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS 'IN THEIR ORGANIC CONNECTION'. THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES HAD 'COINCIDING POINTS' AND MADE POSSIBLE A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS ON RADICAL NUCLEAR CUTS 'ON THE CONDITION OF A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS'. THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE A COVER-UP FOR THE ARMS RACE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO IMPLEMENT THE JOINT STATEMENT AND EXPECTED THE SAME FROM THE US ADMINISTRATION.
4. IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE UNSWERVINGLY ON THE BASIS OF EVERY NATION HAVING THE 'SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO GO ITS OWN WAY AND CHOOSE ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES BY ITSELF'. 'THE CORRECTNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY IS DETERMINED BY ABILITY



TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REALITY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD ... AND TO SUBORDINATE THE RESOLUTION OF CONTENTIOUS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MAIN GOAL - PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR''.

5. THERE WERE NO CONTRADICTIONS MAKING US/SOVIET CONFRONTATION INEVITABLE. PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED ONLY THROUGH STRICT OBSERVATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, AND WITHOUT DAMAGING THE INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE DETERMINED SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE US.

COMMENT

6. FOR A POLITBURO MEETING TO BE GIVEN OVER TO ONLY ONE SUBJECT UNDERLINES THE IMPACT OF THE SUMMIT HERE, AND THE TWO-FOLD MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET AUDIENCE:

1) THE START OF A NEW DIALOGUE AND POTENTIAL FOR BETTER US/SOVIET RELATIONS:

11) THE UNCHANGING IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL, SPECIFICALLY ON THE BASIS OF THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO JANUARY AGREEMENT.

7. IT IS INTERESTING TO SEE THE REITERATION OF THE "ORGANIC LINK" FORMULA WHICH SEEMED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED TEMPORARILY FOLLOWING THE SOVIET SUGGESTION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON INF. ITS REAPPEARANCE HELPS TO EMPHASISE THE POINT THAT STRATEGIC CUTS (IF NOT, AS BEFORE, ALL NUCLEAR CUTS), ARE DEPENDENT ON THE NON-MILITARISATION OF SPACE.

8. THE REFERENCE TO THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO CHOOSE THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, WHILE NOT NEW (GORBACHEV USED THIS PHRASE THOUGH WITHOUT THE WORD "ALLIES", IN HIS STATEMENT AT HIS GENEVA PRESS CONFERENCE ON 21 NOVEMBER) APPEARED ODDLY IN THIS CONTEXT. ONE EXPLANATION, NOT NECESSARILY DEFINITIVE, IS THAT THIS REPRESENTS A SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE US ACCUSATION THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS HAVE SOVIET ORIGINS. FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW THE IRONY DISAPPEARS IF ONE ASSUMES THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS HAVE ALREADY MADE THEIR "CHOICE" OF FRIENDS: AS FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD. IT IS US INTERFERENCE THAT IS TRAMPLING ON INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.

CARTLEDGE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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Prime Minister  
CDP  
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MR POWELL

27 November 1985

FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE SUMMIT

1. The summit was strong on presentation but weak on substance. It was a personal and public relations success, but there was no movement on the central issues.
2. The presentation is not without importance. Reaffirmation of the need for a stable US/Soviet relationship is reassuring and the undertakings for regular meetings will act as a moderating factor and also an encouragement for further agreement. Nevertheless, beneath the wrapping the package remains rather empty.
3. Each side saw advantages in presenting this limited achievement as positively as possible. For President Reagan the approach allowed him to sidestep the central problem of SDI, and without giving anything away on it, to win Gorbachev's support for a process of better relations. Reagan has done well out of the deal.
4. For Gorbachev, the advantages are perhaps less obvious. Having insisted until the last minute that success was to be measured in terms of a check on SDI, he had to claim a success without its most important component. This may give him some problems with his military. But he has asserted the Soviet Union's right to be treated as an equal with the United States. With the prospect of further Summits he has strengthened his own prestige, which will be relevant to the forthcoming Party Congress. A better East/West atmosphere will allow him rather more freedom to pursue a major objective, namely the improvement of the Soviet economy. He lives to fight another day on SDI; and his calculation must be that by maintaining his stand on the issue whilst creating an atmosphere of East/West detente, he is

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establishing conditions in which that battle can be pursued on favourable terms. Western public opinion has proved in the past susceptible to the illusions of detente and Gorbachev has displayed formidable ability to exploit the Western media.

5. For Western Europe the outcome is welcome since it avoids hard choices: for the time being SDI has not precluded warmer East/West relations. Moreover it is possible that there could be progress over INF. This is now decoupled from SDI and the Soviet Union could see advantage in such progress as driving wedges between Western Europe and the Americans and as increasing the leverage on the United States to compromise over strategic weapons and space.

6. It will be interesting to watch Soviet behaviour in the Third World. It should be in Gorbachev's interest to tread softly and avoid too forward a policy in, for example, Central America and Southern Africa. Some Soviet gesture on Afghanistan may not be out of the question, though it is difficult to see how they could afford to withdraw entirely, given the prospect of a totally hostile Afghanistan. From what we have seen, I would guess that generally Gorbachev will seek to break out of the frozen Gromyko positions and look for maximum room for manoeuvre, always with an eye to the image of detente. One area where he cannot be satisfied is Soviet/Chinese relations. Why should the United States alone have the freedom of the Moscow/Washington/Peking triangle? I would expect considerable Soviet effort there.

7. All this, however, has a term set to it; US/Soviet relations cannot be maintained indefinitely by papering over the cracks. There will either have to be some compromise on SDI (not inconceivable but unlikely) or a reversion to more open antagonism. Nor, given the momentum of US research and



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the fact that Soviet national security is involved, can Gorbachev allow much time for achieving his objectives by way of detente. He may already be taking some risks, presumably in the interest of his economic goals. Much will depend on the Soviet perception of United States public and congressional attitudes, but my guess would be that SDI has now taken too deep a root to be abandoned when Reagan goes. Even now it would be only prudent for the Soviet Union to intensify its research into ballistic missile defence against the possibility that agreement with the US on space proves unobtainable.

*h*

PERCY CRADOCK



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Bm



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 November 1985

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT**

11

The Prime Minister is considering whether she should take the initiative in writing to Mr. Gorbachev about the outcome of the US/Soviet Summit. Her inclination is to do so. I should be grateful for advice and, if appropriate, a draft letter. This will of course need to take account of what Popov has to tell Mr. Rifkind.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



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MY TELNO 1122: GENEVA SUMMIT: GERMAN REACTION

1. KOHL HAS SAID LITTLE NOVEL IN PUBLIC, BUT WELCOMES THE OUTCOME OF THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT ON FOUR COUNTS:

- A) THE PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING ACHIEVED BY THE TWO MEN.
- B) THE DECLARED WISH ON BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE.
- C) THE FORWARD-LOOKING JOINT STATEMENT, WITH ITS SOBER TREATMENT OF POLICY DIFFERENCES.
- D) THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN VALUABLE, ENABLING PROPOSALS TO BE LAID ON THE TABLE ON BOTH SIDES, WHICH COULD SERVE AS A DEPARTURE POINT FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS.

KOHL NOTES THAT OVER RECENT MONTHS HE HAS REGULARLY URGED BOTH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW TO RESUME THE SUMMIT DIALOGUE.

2. GENSCHER IS MORE PRECISE. AN IMPROVEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD HAVE A FAVOURABLE IMPACT ON EUROPE. THE CHALLENGE FOR EUROPEAN AND GERMAN POLICY NOW WAS TO USE THE RESULTS OF GENEVA ACTIVELY, BUT CAREFULLY. GENSCHER THOUGHT IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE FRG THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INF MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. THE GENEVA RESULTS SHOULD NOT BE TALKED TO DEATH, BUT NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES SHOULD SET TO WORK TO UTILISE EVERY POSSIBILITY.

3. GENSCHER STRESSES THE ROLE OF THE FRG, AS PARTICIPANT, ON CW: MBFR: CDE AND ANY FURTHER CSCE CONFERENCE. THE FRG MUST IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH ALL WARSAW PACT STATES. THE EUROPEANS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE GENEVA SUCCESS BY CLARIFYING THE PRECONDITIONS: MAINTENANCE OF ABMT IN THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION: APPLICATION OF SALT II: AND THE BROADENING OF THE THEMES BEYOND DISARMAMENT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT GENEVA SHOULD NOT REMAIN A ONCE-OFF EVENT.

BULLARD

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SOVIET D

NEWS D

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PS/LADY YOUNG

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GENEVA SUMMIT: CALL BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON MR RENTON

1. O'ER THE WEEKEND, THE SOVIET EMBASSY ASKED FOR A CALL BY POPOV ON THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH NO.10, IT WAS DECIDED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF MR RIFKIND, POPOV SHOULD CALL UPON MR RENTON AT 1200 ON 25 NOVEMBER.

2. READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT, POPOV SAID HE WISHED TO GIVE HMG A SHORT ACCOUNT OF SOVIET VIEWS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. THE SOVIET UNION HE CLAIMED HAD BEEN SERIOUS FROM THE BEGINNING, DESIROUS OF PRACTICAL RESULTS AND HAD THEREFORE MADE MANY FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS. AS A RESULT OF THE SUMMIT THE SOVIET SIDE HOPED FOR A RADICALLY NEW APPROACH TO US/SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE WESTERN SIDE: IN PARTICULAR IT WAS HOPED THAT THE US WOULD WEIGH CAREFULLY IN THE LIGHT OF GENEVA WHETHER IT WAS IN THEIR INTERESTS TO CREATE A DANGEROUS SITUATION IN SPACE. POPOV DREW ATTENTION TO TWO POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE SUMMIT - THE AGREED STATEMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND THE NEED TO PREVENT ANY WAR BETWEEN THEM, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. HE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE EXCHANGE ON REGIONAL MATTERS WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A 'GENERAL PRINCIPALLED DISCUSSION'. HE ALSO WELCQMED THE RECOGNITION THAT MUTUAL CO-OPERATION ON THERMO-



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NUCLEAR FUSION WOULD BE OF BENEFIT. THE SOVIET UNION HOPED THAT THE US WOULD DRAW PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

3. MR RENTON SAID THAT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP. THE ATMOSPHERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY AND GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS. ON ARMS CONTROL HE HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW CLEAR THAT THE US DID NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY OR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE CAPACITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE CONCEPT OF A DEFENSIVE SHIELD COMMANDED CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES. MR RENTON WELCOMED THE MENTION IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT. WE HAD ALSO NOTED COMMENTS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE AND MBFR. MR RENTON SAID HE HAD GATHERED THERE HAD BEEN A LONG DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN: HE HOPED THAT THIS PRESAGED PROGRESS WITH THE UN INITIATIVE.

4. POPOV REPLIED THAT THE UN INITIATIVE HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF A SOLUTION TWO YEARS AGO, BUT WESTERN INTERESTS HAD PREVENTED THIS. HOWEVER, BETTER SOVIET/US RELATIONS WOULD HELP. HE ALSO REFERRED TO SOME USEFUL US/SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AT THE SUMMIT. HE HOPED THAT THESE WOULD ACT AS AN EXAMPLE FOR UK/SOVIET RELATIONS (ON WHICH HE QUOTED GORBACHEV'S FORMULATION USED IN PARIS OF THE SOVIET SIDE HAVING AS GREAT AN INTEREST AS THE BRITISH IN BETTER RELATIONS).

5. MR RENTON SAID THAT THE BRITISH SIDE DID INDEED WANT BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS: ANOTHER ASPECT OF THIS WAS, HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT YOU HAD BEEN WAITING FOR SOME TIME TO MAKE CALLS ON SHEVARDNADZE AND OTHER SENIOR SOVIET FIGURES. MR RENTON HOPED THAT THIS CALL WOULD SHORTLY GO FORWARD AND ALSO THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UK IN RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION THAT I HAD ALREADY EXTENDED. THIS WAS ALL PART OF THE PROCESS OF THICKENING UP RELATIONS.

6. AFTER A PREDICTABLE EXCHANGE ON SDI RESEARCH, THE MEETING ENDED WITH POPOV MAKING AN OBSCURE REFERENCE TO PLANNING STAFF TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF SAYING THAT HE WOULD REPORT MR RENTON'S REMARKS ON YOUR ACCESS TO SHEVARDNADZE. A SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONE CALL TO THE EMBASSY, HOWEVER, REVEALED THAT THEY DID NOT YET HAVE DATES TO



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PROPOSE FOR PLANNING STAFF TALKS.

7. FINALLY, POPOV HANDED OVER A TEXT WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS  
SETTING OUT SOME SOVIET VIEWS ON THE SUMMIT, FURTHER TO THOSE  
EXPRESSED BY GORBACHEV AT HIS GENEVA PRESS CONFERENCE. (COPY  
TO YOU BY BAG - THEY CONTAIN NOTHING ORIGINAL).

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LIMITED  
SOV. D  
DEF. D  
ACDD  
PLANNING ST.

PS

PS/MR RENTON

PS/MR RIFKIND

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR DAUNT

DEFENCE DEPT

ACDD

PLANNING STAFF



subject  
cc master.

38

file

cc PC ✓

JBU

## 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 November 1985

Prime Minister

Dear Sir,

You may like to  
refresh your memory  
on the McFarlane briefing before  
you see Kohl.

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: BRIEFING BY MR MCFARLANE

CDP.

The Prime Minister was given a briefing at Chequers yesterday evening on the US/Soviet Summit on Mr Robert McFarlane, President Reagan's national security adviser. The Foreign Secretary and the US Ambassador were also present. My record follows Mr McFarlane's chronological account interspersed with his comments and observations.

By way of setting the scene, Mr McFarlane said that the President had believed it important to establish a solid foundation for his relations with Mr Gorbachev. He had wanted to make clear how the United States viewed its role, its interests and its obligations to the Western Alliance. He had also wanted to give the United States view of the Soviet Union and the extent he thought it possible for the two countries to do business in the years ahead. He had decided to use the early sessions to establish these foundations himself without subordinates present. He had wanted to demonstrate that he himself was the author and promoter of United States policy, both long-term strategy and crisis management. He also wanted Gorbachev to know a lot about him personally.

FIRST MORNING

At their tete-a-tete discussion on the first morning the President had given Gorbachev a comprehensive account of United States policies ten years after Vietnam. The United States had a more sober view of the limitations of its power; but at the same time was more sensitive to overseas developments because of its greater dependence on foreign markets and raw materials from abroad. This translated into a willingness to pursue a more active role both in the Western Alliance and more widely.

The United States was bolder and more self-confident than in the years after after Vietnam.

The President had tried to help ease Soviet self-doubts by making clear that the United States was conscious of Soviet military power and respected it. He had then gone very thoroughly over the fundamentals of disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite these disagreements, the United States did not expect the Soviet system to change and did not seek to undermine it. But it could not accept Soviet attempts to expand its power and would react vigorously wherever it detected such expansion. Within these limits, the United States wanted

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to establish a more systematic and consistent approach to relations with the Soviet Union based on realism. The two countries were destined to compete. The United States wanted to ensure that the competition was peaceful. The Soviet Union must recognise the limits of United States tolerance. It could not hope to benefit from Western technology and trade without showing restraint beyond its borders and in the way it treated its own citizens. The President therefore wanted the Summit to deal with regional problems and human rights as well as with arms control in the hope of establishing improved understanding and setting US/Soviet relations on a sensible course for the rest of the decade.

Gorbachev had in response given an analagous description of what he wanted to accomplish. This had been very much on the lines of what he had said to Secretary Shultz and Mr McFarlane in Moscow. It was a doctrinaire Soviet view of the world. Mr McFarlane commented that the impression was that it was delivered more for the record than to change the President's mind. Gorbachev had argued that the US had a flawed notion of the Soviet Union and failed to acknowledge its strength. It believed that the Soviet economy was in decline and could be brought to the point of collapse by an arms race. In fact the Soviet economy was basically strong and could both provide an improved standard of living for the Soviet people and sustain a military build-up. US motivations were incompatible with peace. American foreign policy was guided by a cabal of ideologues rooted in the military-industrial complex. The success of the US economy depended on maintaining a strong defence industry and this in turn needed the artifice of a Soviet threat.

Mr McFarlane commented that Gorbachev's performance throughout this exposition was one of a self-confident, agile, articulate, argumentative, willful and impressive leader. The President had found the Prime Minister's assessment of Gorbachev right on the nail.

The discussion in Geneva had then moved on to an exchange of views on deterrence. President Reagan had given a firm, forceful and intellectually convincing presentation of the United States concept of deterrence in the past generation and the reasons why there were grounds for concern about its stability in the future. The notion of deterrence based on a balance of offensive weapons had been satisfactory. But recent Soviet development of a hard target capability had created an imbalance.

The point of greatest concern to the United States was Soviet introduction of mobile MIRV-ed systems. These posed enormous problems of verification. The US could never be certain how many such missiles and warheads the Soviet Union would have.

The President had gone on to explain his strategic defence initiative, citing three basic reasons for it. The first was the need to counter Soviet development of mobile MIRV-ed systems. Unless agreement could be reached to reduce these in a way which the US could verify with confidence, the United States would have no alternative but to move to strategic defence. Second, the strategic defence initiative was a hedge against the impressive Soviet research programme in this area which they had been pursuing for fifteen years. The President had given a detailed account



of US intelligence about Soviet work on lasers at Shary Shagan and elsewhere. Third, against the background of the dangers created by Soviet development of mobile ICBMs and clandestine pursuit of research into space weapons, the United States also had to take account of the possible proliferation of third country systems. All these factors made it reasonable for the US to try to establish whether strategic defence was a technical feasibility sometime after the turn of the century. The United States wanted to persuade the Soviet Union that it made sense to get together to seek a non-nuclear defence.

Mr McFarlane commented that the US side had the impression that Gorbachev was hearing some of these arguments for the first time. His first reaction was to become very animated. He did not accept what President Reagan was trying to make him believe.

The United States intended to develop offensive systems in space to threaten the Soviet Union under the guise of research into defence. They could not expect the Soviet Union simply to stand by. (Gorbachev made no specific reference to or admission of Soviet research activities.) President Reagan had denied that the US was developing an offensive capability in space.

But he had admitted that there was a risk of creating instability and had gone on to explain the open laboratories proposal. (Mr McFarlane interjected that this proposal stemmed from Mr Casey, Director of the CIA, who believed that it was possible so to organise US work as to be able to show the Soviet Union enough to convince them that the United States was not developing offensive systems, without exposing the most secret aspects of the research.

He also believed that the US could gain more than it would put at risk through reciprocal opening of laboratories.) Gorbachev had countered by proposing that the open laboratories approach should be adopted to prevent any development of weapons in space. The President had replied that, if he had confidence that the Soviet Union would really stop research and development, Gorbachev's proposal might influence him. But he did not. After a long pause Gorbachev had concluded with words to the effect: "you obviously feel this [SDI] very strongly. It strikes me your argument is an emotional one, not one built on military logic or scientific probability. I do not agree to it but you seem to believe it".

Mr McFarlane commented that, while Gorbachev probably did not believe what the President was saying, he could recognise that the arguments were likely to be attractive to Congress and to the American people, and were evidence of the President's determination to press ahead with the strategic defence initiative. The President had also expressed readiness to share the results of the strategic defence initiative research to give the Soviet Union greater confidence. Once again Gorbachev had seemed to find this more impressive as a political argument than as a practical possibility.

#### FIRST AFTERNOON

Gorbachev had opened the afternoon session by restating his notion of deterrence and the reasons why an imbalance existed in favour of the US. His arguments had not been very persuasive and were mostly to the effect that the United States was wrong about the numbers of Soviet systems and warheads. He had again alleged that the US was trying to achieve a first-strike capability



President Reagan had replied with an historical analysis. He recalled that when the US had alone possessed nuclear weapons in the 1940s and early 1950s it had not used them against the Soviet Union. He had gone on to develop the theme that the US could not tolerate Soviet use of power and subversion beyond its borders and was prepared to resist it. He had taken as an example the subversion of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. The United States Administration would have the support of Congress for supporting the freedom fighters in their modest aims and for stopping the Sandinistas from exporting their revolution to neighbouring countries. Mr McFarlane commented that once again he thought the President had been effective less in changing Mr Gorbachev's mind than in conveying a picture of a politically strong and determined leader, who would have political support at home for what he wanted to do.

The President had then gone back to the question of strategic balance and security, making clear that the US could not tolerate a trend towards an imbalance in offensive power in the Soviet Union's favour. Gorbachev had in reply left no doubt that the Soviet Union intended to press ahead with its various programmes for updating its offensive capability. At this point the President had taken Mr Gorbachev down to a lodge in the grounds for a private discussion. At this, he had handed over a note of four (it seemed in fact to be five) points of possible guidance to the negotiators in Geneva. These were: a commitment to accelerate the negotiations; instructions to work for a 50 per cent reduction in offensive weapons, the reduction to be applied to comparable systems; a commitment to seek an interim agreement on INF; an undertaking that American and Soviet defensive programmes were and would remain within the limits of the ABM Treaty; and agreement to negotiate concurrently on verification measures. Gorbachev had not found this acceptable because it did not provide for curtailment of the strategic defence initiative. The President said that American activities would be governed by the ABM Treaty and he was ready for US negotiators to discuss the SDI in Geneva. But he made no real progress in convincing Gorbachev. The session had ended with both men gloomy. As they parted, the President had asked Gorbachev whether he had found the day's talks useful. Gorbachev confirmed that he had. The President had proposed that they might agree to regular summit meetings and Gorbachev had agreed.

The dinner that evening had been entirely social, with the conversation dealing with family, films, California, Stavropol and other such matters. Mrs Gorbachev had been a very lively and active participant.

#### SECOND MORNING

The second morning had opened with a further private session between the two leaders. President Reagan had raised the question of human rights and explained why it was a high priority for the US. As a country of immigrants, the principle of freedom of emigration was important to them, in addition to the simple morality of how individuals were treated in the Soviet Union. He had acknowledged the difficulty of making progress if human



rights were treated as a headline issue. He was ready to deal with these matters privately and directly with Gorbachev. His concern was concerned with results not with propaganda. If the Soviet Union wanted to see relations with the United States, develop and trade and other exchanges improve, the support of Congress would be needed. It would be forthcoming only if there was progress on human rights issues.

Gorbachev had countered by criticising the US record on human rights and by citing Soviet success in providing full employment and equal opportunities. The President had responded robustly about the performance of the US economy, which was creating 30,000 new jobs a month. He had referred to the 30 pages of advertisements for jobs in the New York Times every day. Gorbachev had been rather nonplussed by this. But at the end he had said that he would try to make some headway on this issue. He would think about it and be in touch.

The subsequent plenary session had focussed on regional issues and dealt in considerable detail with Afghanistan. Gorbachev had made clear that he wanted to find a way to resolve this problem. He had acknowledged that no useful purpose was being served by Soviet troops. The Soviet Union would like to withdraw. (This statement had considerably agitated Kornienko.) But withdrawal was impossible while outside interference continued. The President had said that the US had no wish to embarrass the Soviet Union over withdrawal, indeed would be happy to co-operate in bringing it about. The outcome should be a non-aligned Afghanistan and a return of refugees. Perhaps experts could get together to explore formulae for getting talks started. Mr McFarlane said that it had been clear that the President was tacitly saying that the US would be willing to curtail support for Afghan rebels in the context of progress towards a settlement. Gorbachev had said he would think further about the problem and get in touch.

The President had referred to his United Nations speech and explained that his approach was a genuine attempt to help prevent regional problems from upsetting relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev had said that Western suspicions that the Soviet Union had ambitions to go beyond Afghanistan into Pakistan or to out-flank Iran were absurd.

#### SECOND AFTERNOON

The President and Mr Gorbachev had spent some time on the second afternoon on bilateral issues. But the discussion had not covered much ground. The United States wanted to avoid getting drawn into discussion of trade and technology and had focussed on cultural exchanges. Gorbachev had said that the Soviet Union could agree to a number of the United States proposals.

This had led on to a discussion of how to present the outcome of the Summit/<sup>on</sup> which officials had been unable to reach any agreement in a separate meeting. The talks had recessed while each side considered its position. During the recess, Gorbachev's spokesman had announced that Gorbachev would be giving a press

secret



conference the next day. The United States had interpreted this as a signal that he was not particularly concerned about making a joint appearance with the President or, by implication, about reaching an agreed outcome. When the leaders reassembled, the President had set out various possibilities: each side could report its views at separate press conferences, or they could gather in the same place and give separate reports, or there could be no reports at all. Gorbachev had simply said that the matter should be put back to subordinates and discussed further at dinner. But as the President was leaving, Gorbachev had taken George Shultz aside and said that an effort should be made to achieve a joint approach and there should be further discussions between officials on what might be said and how.

American officials then waited for three hours for a Soviet team to turn up. While the principals had a non-contentious and social dinner with hopeful toasts, officials had continued discussions. (The US side included Perle and Mrs Ridgway; the Soviet side Sokolov and Karpov) Once again no progress was made. When this was reported to the principals after dinner, George Shultz had lost his temper and said that it was a very poor effort. There had been a clear steer from Gorbachev to try to reach some agreement but this had been prevented by outrageous and obstructive behaviour on the Soviet side for which he blamed Kornienko (who was present). President Reagan had then intervened to say that he and Mr Gorbachev had talked candidly about their disagreements. It should be possible to set down a reasonable account of where they agreed and disagreed.

Negotiations had then been left to more senior officials. A breakthrough had finally come at about 2 am when Mr McFarlane had moved away from the original four points on arms control, and agreed that a joint statement should revert to the January formula for getting the Geneva negotiations started. ("Prevent an arms race in space and halt it on earth"). Surprisingly, the Soviet Union showed no interest to having a reference to the ABM Treaty in the joint statement. This seemed to have unlocked Soviet objections to the text and by 5 am agreement had finally been reached on a package.

Mr McFarlane's conclusion was that Gorbachev had been impressed by the President's self-confident and assured manner, supported by some good opinion polls released during the Summit. He thought that Gorbachev had absorbed the fact that he had witnessed a presentation of US positions which would be accepted by the United States Congress and people, assuring the President of wide political support for his policies including the strategic defence initiative.

#### COMMENT

The Prime Minister said that it was evident from Mr McFarlane's account that Gorbachev had not been able to meet the criteria which he had himself set for the Summit. He had said in advance that there would be no progress unless the strategic defence initiative was halted. In the event he had not made this a sticking point. As a consequence he had gone back to Moscow looking weaker than when he came and realising that the Soviet Union was not fully equal to the United States. She thought



she understood why he had not wanted a reference to the ABM Treaty in the Joint Statement. He would fear that this would simply give the US cover for research and development of a strategic defence system up to a certain point, after which it would break cover by denouncing the Treaty and going for full deployment. The Soviet Union would be left far behind. He would never believe that the United States would hand over the results of SDI research. Neither did she. (Nor, it was apparent, did Mr McFarlane). The Foreign Secretary said that he could see another reason. Gorbachev's refusal to agree to reductions in offensive weapons unless a stop was put to the strategic defence initiative was his trump card. Reaffirming the ABM Treaty would imply that the US work on the SDI within the Treaty was legitimate and acceptable. Mr McFarlane said that one could only conclude that there was agreement to differ on the SDI. The issue would have to be joined in Geneva. He recalled that at one point in the discussion the President had said in effect: if you do not have offensive ballistic missiles you do not need a strategic defence system. Gorbachev might therefore still see some plausible hope of bargaining reductions in offensive weapons for limitations on the strategic defence initiative. In the United States' view, Gorbachev's main concern was with being bankrupted by having to match the strategic defence initiative. It was basically an economic issue for him.

The Prime Minister asked whether Gorbachev had gone into detail of how the Soviet Union would match or counter the strategic defence initiative. Mr McFarlane recalled that Gorbachev had at one point said words to the effect: if you continue the strategic defence initiative, we shall not reduce offensive weapons. Rather we shall expand our programme of building offensive weapons and shall carry out development of systems capable of getting round a US defence system. I am very confident that they will be effective.

The Prime Minister said that she assumed that the prospect of a Summit next year would add dynamism to work in the meantime, particularly on arms control. Her worry was that without measurable results fairly soon, there could be a backlash from public opinion. The Foreign Secretary added that it was important for the establishment of a long-term, balanced relationship that neither side should be seen to be claiming victory from the Summit. Mr McFarlane agreed on the latter point and said that he was hoping to be able to restrain the defence establishment in Washington from crowing.

The Prime Minister asked how Mr McFarlane rated the prospects of progress on other arms control issues particularly chemical weapons. Had there been any real change in the Soviet position? Mr McFarlane said that he thought that the Soviet military, like their American counterparts, were getting disenchanted with chemical weapons. There was intelligence of a declining emphasis on chemical training, and of less attention being paid to providing protection to vehicles against chemical attack.

The Prime Minister concluded that it had been a remarkable summit, in which the President had clearly been most effective in putting over the United States' and western case.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Yours sincerely,  
Chris Powell





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You might  
like to say  
something in  
Cabinet about  
McFarlane's briefing  
on the US/Soviet  
summit.

C.D.P.



PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF MR MCFARLANE

You will want to let him give his account of the Summit.  
Depending on what he says, some of the questions you could ask are:

- does the President feel that he got through to Gorbachev on the United States peaceful intentions?
- is there any informal understanding on guidelines for the Geneva negotiations? Are we closer to an agreed definition of strategic systems?
- how far have the various arms control negotiations been de-linked? Is INF now definitely separated off from the rest?
- how does the US intend to address the SDI/START blockage in the light of the Summit?
- did the President try out any of your ideas on SDI e.g. agreement not to move beyond a certain point without negotiation or before a fixed date?
- was there any discussion of reaffirming or strengthening the ABM Treaty?
- what are US intentions on SALT II?
- are there new reasons to expect progress on chemical warfare?
- were there signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously about withdrawal from Afghanistan?



- do the Americans have reason to think that the Russians will take some action on human rights eg. release of more Soviet Jews?
- did the US reach any understanding about the level of Soviet involvement in Nicaragua?

I would not mention the Foreign Secretary's point about support for UNITA (Flag B), but you might raise arms for Argentina (Flag C) and EC/US steel. On this last we have a real political problem and you hope that the President will find time to look at it personally.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

22 November 1985





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CC PC  
BU

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1985

*Dear Charles,*

Visit of Mr McFarlane

I enclose by way of briefing:

- / a) a brief on issues arising from the US/Soviet Summit;
- / b) a copy of a letter which the Foreign Secretary has just sent to Mr Shultz arguing against US aid to UNITA;
- / c) a copy of a further message from the Foreign Secretary to Shultz, delivered today on arms sales to Argentina.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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A

## ANNEX A

## US-SOVIET SUMMIT, 19/21 NOVEMBER : INITIAL FCO ASSESSMENT

1. The Summit rates as a qualified success in the short term; as predicted, there was no breakdown but no breakthrough. In the words of HMA, Washington, more substance will be needed next time for an equivalent success to be registered. In crude terms, the US emerged ahead on points of the Soviet Union, with both sides scoring well for "artistic interpretation"; European interests were well served by the outcome. Over the next few days, there is likely to be some backlash in media and other comment on the outcome of the Summit, as the lack of real substance becomes more apparent. In the security field, the SDI remains at the core of the dilemma.

US

2. The US side appears to have given away very little on arms control, and nothing on the SDI. Despite this, the prospects for an interim INF agreement are a little brighter; the scope for progress on strategic arms (START), based on some convergence in the two sides' positions, remain roughly the same. The Joint Statement repeats some of the language from the Shultz-Gromyko communique of January, but pointedly omits its reference to the three areas being resolved in their interrelationship. This can be interpreted as a Soviet concession to the Western view that progress in each should not be held hostage to progress in others (notably SDI). If so, this is an important move. Some progress may have been made on the CDE and CW fronts, in the latter case perhaps helping us in our bilateral difficulties with the Americans. (We are unlikely to hear much more of President Reagan's statement to NATO that the US is prepared to engage in a test ban provided it enters into effect when both sides are at an equal stage of development.) The reference in the Joint Statement which reflects discussions in Geneva about improved verification, is particularly useful.

3. There were no apparent Soviet concessions on human rights. None were to be expected, but the President seems to have handled this tete-a-tete on this subject in such a way as to encourage Soviet movement by disclaiming the desire to extract propaganda credit.



Equally on regional issues, apart from the regularisation of contacts, there appears to be no new comfort for the US, although Mr Shultz described discussions with Shevardnadze as "significant" (on Afghanistan, and in less detail on the Middle East and South Africa). On the public relations side, the President's warm reception by Congress, and his encouragement by and of the Allies will all have helped his own position, and thereby his leverage with Gorbachev; in addition, the impact of the unprecedented media exposure he received in the Soviet Union itself throughout the Summit should not be ignored.

#### Soviet Union

4. Despite failing to move the President "an inch" on SDI (a sine qua non of the Soviet pre-Summit line), there appears to have been no threat of a walk-out by Gorbachev nor of an accompanying breakdown in US-Soviet relations. This in itself indicates a Gorbachev readiness to pursue the arms control dialogue, and a serious interest in doing so. Nonetheless, although the Russians can point to fewer plus marks for their side from the arms control talks, Gorbachev has succeeded in pointing up publicly the linkage between the SDI and cuts in offensive forces; the President told NATO that the issue of trade-offs was "left open" between the two leaders.

5. Any retreat from the January communique language is likely to be tactical and temporary. It can be expected that in their propaganda over the next few months the Soviet side will focus even more sharply on the ability of the West to have either arms control or SDI, but not both. In PR terms, Gorbachev maintained his individual hold on the high ground (but not higher than the President); the Soviet performance overall was impressive. Both in terms of public opinion and of substance, Gorbachev will have reckoned it a plus that he extracted from the US side an implicit recognition of Soviet equality with the United States across the wide range of areas discussed. Domestically, Gorbachev's profile will have been raised a notch by the media coverage, and particularly by the unedited live transmission of his performance at the press conference.



Europe

6. European interests have been well served by the apparent agreement to separate the INF and SDI issues, although this does leave the Russians free to pursue their compensation claim for third party systems as strongly as ever. In other security areas, it is helpful that the Joint Statement did not refer (as the Shultz/Gromyko communique had done) to the ultimate aim of eliminating nuclear weapons. The position over the ABM Treaty and SALT II constraints remains unclear, although it seems unlikely that the Allies will have achieved all they wanted. On SDI the Allies will continue to have to tread carefully the line between declaring opposition to US ideas and endorsing the wider principles of the initiative. As the Prime Minister told NATO, Allied support for research will continue to be important; but in due course the Allies may need to reach an agreement on whether this support is designed to maintain US leverage over the Russians in order to secure better arms reductions terms, to match Soviet equivalent research efforts and/or because eventually we may wish to endorse the very concept of "defensive deterrence/dominance".

7. In public opinion terms, the Geneva outcome is an undoubted success in the short term, giving rise to a new sense of confidence in the East-West relationship. This in turn should help to preserve Allied cohesion, and might affect support for extremist ideas (eg CND). The Opposition in this country and abroad can be expected now to take their theme from statements by both the President and Gorbachev at the end of the Summit: viz, that what is now needed is deeds, not words. They will no doubt press for early results which in turn may not be so easy to achieve. Since the Summit has been officially described by Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact as useful (making the world "a safer place"), this will also make life easier for the East Europeans in pursuing their own Westpolitik, including in the CSCE/CDE forum.

Conclusion

8. The President is undoubtedly right to describe the outcome of the Summit as "a step in the right direction". Whether he is also correct in calling it a "fresh start" is less clear. Certainly there are no grounds apparent for euphoria. The main obstacles,



notably SDI, remain. A good deal of hard, detailed negotiating work will be required if some of the areas outlined for agreement at Geneva are in fact to produce fruit. According to the President's briefing to NATO, there are no specific guidelines laid down in either the regional or arms control areas which negotiators can now use to ease their path towards compromise. In particular, there are no agreed formulae for how the 50% reductions in offensive forces are to be achieved, nor on how INF is to be separated from the SDI. There is no agreed timetable for further negotiations, nor (apparently) an agreed definition of strategic systems.

9. On the other hand, the decision to hold regular summits represents a genuine step forward. Bureaucracies in both capitals will now be under the gun to produce results prior to these meetings, pressure which until now they have not really had to face. Secondly, the establishment of some sort of personal relationship between the two leaders, the agreement to maintain direct communications between their summits, the regular meetings to be held between Foreign Ministers, and the thickening-up of the relationship at lower and non-official levels, all provide the basis for a sounder US-Soviet dialogue and relationship of the sort that has been missing throughout this decade.

✓ 10. If the above assessment (albeit provisional) is correct, then ✓ the West has reason to be satisfied with the outcome. It would however be a mistake to see, or let the Summit be seen in zero-sum terms. A gain for the West does not necessarily mean an equivalent loss for the East. Furthermore, to the extent to which Gorbachev is portrayed in the West as a "loser", dealings with the Soviet Union over the next few months will become correspondingly harder. It will therefore be important to pursue the line (despite the Alice in Wonderland associations) that everyone won and everyone will receive prizes.



## QUESTIONS FOR US/UK DISCUSSION, 23 NOVEMBER

GENERAL

1. President referred (NATO debrief) to Gorbachev's believing some of wilder accusations about US. Any impact on these sort of convictions, which are product of his background?

NUCLEAR AND SPACE/DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

2. Note President has said no agreement on timetable for negotiations. Any consensus/agreement on guidelines for negotiators other than 50% stipulation?

3. No reference to resolution of three areas "in inter-relationship" or to ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons in joint statement (cf January communique). What significance?

SDI

4. No surprise that no meeting of minds on SDI. Any sign of flexibility on Soviet side, given that Russians did not make this sticking point for satisfactory Summit? Presumably Russians will seek to use SDI to increase pressure on US to reach agreement on Strategic arms. How do US assess new Soviet argument that SDI will lead to creation of offensive arms (as noted in President's speech to Congress)?

5. Russians seem prepared to open laboratories to confirm that not performing SDI research. President referred to his own proposal in speech to Congress. Is this likely to be fruitful area for US-Soviet discussion/negotiation?

VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE

6. Notable achievement to get strong reference to verification/compliance. Content of discussion on SALT constraints and ABM Treaty?

7. Believe US response to Soviet violations should include continued observance of SALT II and strict interpretation of ABM Treaty.

/INF/START



INF/START

8. What detailed discussion? Any movement towards agreed definition of strategic systems? Does Soviet acceptance in principle of separate INF agreement imply reversion to "orthodox" strategic/INF distinction?
9. Note US emphasis that 50% reductions must be appropriately applied. US view on how to take forward, especially in strategic group?
10. Any reference to UK/French forces? Does US expect continued Soviet demand for compensation?

MBFR/CDE

11. Any substantive discussion? On CDE does helpful language reflect any substantive shift in Soviet position?

CW

12. Welcome any impetus the Summit may give to the CW negotiations, particularly bearing in mind UK Chairmanship of the CD CW Committee in 1986. Does Soviet agreement for bilateral contacts on CW proliferation and verification reflect new interest in progress? If so, will the President be in turn prepared to move on US challenge inspection proposals?

RISK REDUCTION CENTRES

13. What specific measures in addition to upgraded hotline?

REGIONAL ISSUES

14. President noted at NATO there had been little specific discussion of regional conflicts but that Gorbachev showed some sensitivity on these issues: any sense of movement on Soviet position on Afghanistan? Signs of Russian preparedness to pick up on President's regional initiative (which has attractive aspects for them)?

HUMAN RIGHTS

15. Soviet response on human rights questions raised (eg Germans in Soviet Union)? Do US see wording on humanitarian cases in Joint Declaration as opening for further moves?





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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*From the Secretary of State*

22 November 1985

*David Grogan*

UNITA

We were very glad to see Chet Crocker in London, and found the discussions on 18/19 November most useful.

It was clear from those discussions that your negotiations to bring about a settlement leading to Namibian independence are at a particularly delicate stage. We continue to believe that such a settlement would be in the best interests of both our countries and of the countries of the region. I want you to know that, as in the past, we shall give the fullest possible support to your efforts.

We are both conscious of the importance to Western interests in Southern Africa of pushing back Soviet influence by securing a negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops and the peaceful implementation of SCR 435. I am particularly concerned by recent moves in the US Congress to bring about military assistance to UNITA. Our own assessment is that any such aid is likely at least to be matched by the level of Soviet support reaching the MPLA government. Such a move by the US could strengthen the position of hardliners in the MPLA, increase the Angolan

/Government's

The Hon George Shultz

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Government's dependence on Russian and Cuban support and prolong a civil war which neither side can win outright. It would also almost certainly mark the end of the Namibia negotiations. The end result could only be a strengthening of Soviet influence in the region.

We do not envisage a similar change in our own policy towards Angola and Namibia. The German Government have told us that US aid to UNITA and an end to US-led negotiations on Cuban withdrawal might have the effect of bringing them under considerable pressure to abandon support for SCR 435. This is an additional important factor.

For all those reasons I very much hope that your Administration will resist pressure for military assistance to UNITA and enable our Governments to maintain our present common position.

GEOFFREY HOWE

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', with a horizontal line above it and a short vertical line below it.

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US ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE TO MR SHULTZ, 22 NOVEMBER 1985

'Dear George,

I understand that there were useful discussions on US policy in the security field towards Argentina in the course of the recent Pol/Mil talks in London. We appreciate the thorough way in which you are carrying out your commitment to consult us on this issue. It is a commitment we value very highly.

On developments in Argentina, we understand your satisfaction at the way Alfonsin appears to be developing, not least on the economic front. His determination gives some hope that democracy there may at last take root, although it will clearly be a very tender plant for a long time.

From the start, the Prime Minister and I and other Ministerial colleagues have publicly supported the efforts of Alfonsin and his Government to consolidate democracy in Argentina. We shall continue to do so. We have as you know been working to achieve more normal relations between Britain and Argentina by making numerous practical proposals in particular in the economic and commercial field. But the response from the Argentine Government has so far been very disappointing.

We understand how sensitive an issue the Falklands is in Argentina, and that President Alfonsin has to proceed with caution. But President Alfonsin's policy towards us has so far been unco-operative. We therefore remain very cautious in our assessment of Argentine intentions towards the Falklands in anything other than the short term. Alfonsin told the German press in September that the British 'must vacate the Islands'. Until Alfonsin and his successors have come to terms with the reality of the situation created in the Islands, no less than in Britain, by the conflict in 1982, we must remain wary.

//That

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-2-

That is the background against which we have to assess the supply by the US Government of military equipment that could enhance the capability of the Argentine armed forces to strike again at the Islands if and when they are so minded. The Prime Minister has raised this on several occasions with the President, and you and I have discussed this as well. So I know you have our concerns very much in mind. But I thought it worth emphasising again that a decision to release such equipment to Argentina would be received here with the utmost dismay. I have in mind in particular Skyhawk aircraft, although certain other equipment would give rise to equal concern. A further concern is that sales by you would encourage other Allies to do likewise.

The Prime Minister and I therefore very much hope that in developing a closer security relationship with Argentina you will keep our own security requirements at the top of you minds.

Yours sincerely,

Geoffrey<sup>14</sup>

SECRET







16



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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS (2)  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PJS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
~~MR SAMUEL~~  
~~MR DAVID BAUN~~  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST  
MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
B. NPS (S) }  
DACU }

HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

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INFO PRIORITY : EAST EUROPEAN POSTS.

MY TELNO 1522 : US/SOVIET SUMMIT : SOVIET PRESS PRESENTATION OF THE OUTCOME

SUMMARY

1. FAIR, FACTUAL SOVIET TV AND PRESS COVERAGE OF THE SUMMIT'S CONCLUSION ALBEIT WITH GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE HOLDING CENTRE STAGE. AN IMPRESSION CONVEYED TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE OF A RE-ASSERTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S SUPER-POWER STATUS, OF GORBACHEV'S CLEAR AUTHORITY, AND OF A START TO A NEW, LESS HOSTILE, MORE COOPERATIVE SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. THE SOVIET UNION NOT SUCCESSFUL IN ORIENTING THE SUMMIT TOTALLY TO ARMS CONTROL BUT DID MANAGE VIRTUALLY TO EXCLUDE ANY HUMAN RIGHTS ELEMENT.

DETAIL

2. THE CONCLUDING CEREMONY IN GENEVA AND GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE WERE COVERED LIVE ON SOVIET TELEVISION AND REPEATED IN FULL ON THE CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMME VREMYA AT PRIME EVENING



2. THE CONCLUDING CEREMONY IN GENEVA AND GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE WERE COVERED LIVE ON SOVIET TELEVISION AND REPEATED IN FULL ON THE CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMME VREMYA AT PRIME EVENING VIEWING TIME. AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL THE EVENING COVERAGE ONLY EDITED OUT LINKING PASSAGES AND NOTHING SIGNIFICANT WAS LOST.

3. THE SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS TODAY, 22 NOVEMBER, PUBLISHES THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT IN FULL, THE STATEMENTS OF BOTH LEADERS AT THE CONCLUDING CEREMONY IN FULL AND THE FULL TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S PRESS STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: AGAIN WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT EDITING.

4. PRAVDA ALSO PUBLISHES FRONT PAGE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TWO LEADERS AT THE CONCLUDING CEREMONY, SITTING ALONE BENEATH THE TWO FLAGS WITH GORBACHEV SMILING AT REAGAN.

5. CORRESPONDENTS' ARTICLES FROM GENEVA HIGHLIGHT GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC PERFORMANCE WITH REFERENCE TO HIS HAVING HARDLY REFERRED TO HIS NOTES AND TO THE REMARKABLE EFFECT HIS PRESENTATION HAD ON WESTERN, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, JOURNALISTS. THE PRESS ALSO PLAYS UP THE THEME THAT ONLY THOSE WHO EXPECTED EITHER A MIRACLE OR COMPLETE FAILURE WERE DISAPPOINTED.

#### THE MESSAGE FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE

6. WE CAN EXPECT AUTHORITATIVE AND REFLECTIVE COMMENTARY FOR SOME TIME TO COME. BUT THE IMMEDIATE IMPRESSION CREATED FOR THE DOMESTIC PUBLIC BY THE FAIR AND EVEN SYMPATHETIC COVERAGE HAS A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS:-

(A) THE SUMMIT WAS A SERIOUS BUSINESSLIKE OCCASION WITH A GREAT DEAL OF DETAILED NEGOTIATION AND FRANK RECOGNITION OF WIDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

(B) THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND THAT THIS WAS A SUMMIT BETWEEN SUPER-POWERS OF EQUAL STATUS.

(C) A NUMBER OF USEFUL PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED.

(D) A PROCESS HAS BEEN LAUNCHED IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WISH TO SEE IMPROVED RELATIONS IN REAL TERMS. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO BREAK THROUGH IN SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, AS GORBACHEV SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THE WORLD IS NEVERTHELESS PROBABLY A SAFER PLACE AS A RESULT OF THE SUMMIT.

(E) GORBACHEV'S OWN STATURE AND STATUS IS EVEN MORE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED.

(F) REAGAN'S IMAGE HAS ALSO INEVITABLY SOFTENED AND WITH ANNUAL SUMMITS IN PROSPECT AND A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE, A GREATER AIR OF REALISM AND OF POSITIVE PROSPECTS IS IN EVIDENCE.

#### COMMENT

7. IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT THE RUSSIANS FOCUSED ALMOST



177 REAGAN'S IMAGE HAS ALSO INEVITABLY SOFTENED AND WITH ANNUAL SUMMITS IN PROSPECT AND A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE, A GREATER AIR OF REALISM AND OF POSITIVE PROSPECTS IS IN EVIDENCE.

COMMENT

7. IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT THE RUSSIANS FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON ARMS CONTROL AND SDI. REAGAN HAD BEEN STRONGLY CRITICISED FOR SEEKING TO DIVERT THE SUMMIT TO OTHER AREAS. HOWEVER IN THE EVENT NOT ONLY WAS GORBACHEV FORCED TO CONCEDE PUBLICLY THAT AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE, BUT HE PUT HIS NAME TO A JOINT STATEMENT IN WHICH THE AREAS OF CLOSEST AGREEMENT ARE THOSE FURTHEST FROM PUBLICLY DECLARED SOVIET PRIORITIES AND FOCUS MOST ON BILATERAL RELATIONS AND NOT AT ALL ON SDI. HE WAS ALSO SEEN TO APPLAUD REAGAN'S CONCLUDING STATEMENT IN WHICH HE GOT IN AN IMPLIED PLUG FOR SDI ('GOING OVER TO NON-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF DEFENCE, THAT IS SYSTEMS WHICH MAKE OUR WORLD MORE SECURE'), FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ('WILL THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM BE ADVANCED - THE PEOPLES OF AMERICA, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD ARE READY TO ANSWER YES') AND FOR RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS ('SO THAT THE PEOPLES LIVING IN ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA CAN DETERMINE THEIR OWN FATE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE'). NO DOUBT THIS IMBALANCE WAS WHY GORBACHEV FOCUSED SO EXCLUSIVELY ON ARMS CONTROL IN HIS LONG AND REPETITIVE PRESS STATEMENT. HE CLEARLY FELT THE NEED TO RE-STATE SOVIET PRIORITIES IN THE FACE OF WHAT HAD IN ESSENCE BEEN A SUMMIT MORE ON AMERICAN THAN ON SOVIET TERMS.

8. THE COVERAGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ELEMENTS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN STRANGELY MUTED. THE MINIMAL REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT SEEMS NOT TO HAVE BEEN PICKED UP AND THERE WERE NO QUESTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE, ALMOST AS IF A BAN HAD BEEN IMPOSED. SO MUCH FOR THE STRONG RUMOURS OF JEWISH EMIGRATION (MY TELNO 1432 - NOT TO ALL). PERHAPS IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE AMERICANS TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT THE SUMMIT AS AT LEAST A PARTIAL SUCCESS AND AS THE START OF A PROCESS OF COOPERATION IN WHICH NEITHER SIDE WILL BE ABLE, FOR A SECOND TIME, TO APPEAR TO HAVE SWEEPED QUITE SO MUCH UNDER THE CARPET.

CARTLEDGE

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MXHPAN 1874

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18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS (2)  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
~~MR SAMUEL~~  
~~MR DAUNT~~  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) }  
B. NPS( ) } MOD  
DACU }  
CSI }

HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
MD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRAGUE

TO DESKBY 221130Z FCOLN

TELNO 233

OF 221100Z NOVEMBER 85

AND TO DESKBY 221700Z WASHINGTON

AND TO DESKBY 221130Z MOSCOW

AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

AND TO IMMEDIATE WARSAW, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, BELGRADE

AND TO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN.

M I P T: GORBACHEV IN PRAGUE.

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER BRIEFING  
WARSAW PACT LEADERS.

BEGINS.

A MEETING OF LEADERS OF WARSAW PACT MEMBER

STATES WAS HELD IN PRAGUE ON 21 NOVEMBER 1985 ON THE BASIS OF  
MUTUAL ACCORD.

THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY- TODOR ZHIVKOV, GENERAL SECRE-  
TARY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND  
CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,  
GUSTAV HUSAK, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST  
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SO-  
CIALIST REPUBLIC, JANSO KADAR, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE HUNGARIAN  
SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY, ERICH HONECKER, GENERAL SECRETARY  
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED SOCIALIST PARTY OF  
GERMANY AND PRESIDENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE GERMAN DEMO-



OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED SOCIALIST PARTY OF GERMANY AND PRESIDENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PRESIDENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND PRESIDENT OF THE ROMANIAN SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

LUBMOIR STROUGAL, A MEMBER OF THE PRAESIDIUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PRIME MINISTER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND VASIL BILAK, A MEMBER OF THE PRAESIDIUM AND SECRETARY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WERE ALSO PRESENT ON BEHALF OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE MEETING WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PETR MLADENOV, OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC BOHULAV CHNOUPEK, OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PETER VARKONYI, OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OSKAR FISCHER, OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MARIAN ORZECOWSKI, OF THE ROMANIAN SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ILIE VADUVA, OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV DELIVERED A THOROUGH REPORT ON THE COURSE AND RESULTS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING WHICH ENDED IN GENEVA ON THURSDAY.

THE LEADERS OF THE FRATERNAL PARTIES AND COUNTRIES EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION ADOPTED BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT HIS TALKS WITH THE US PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN IN THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LINE SET IN THE DECLARATION OF WARSAW PACT MEMBERS STATES OF 23 OCTOBER 1985.

THE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES VALUED HIGHLY THE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION RENDERED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT THE GENEVA MEETING TOWARDS THE PROMOTION OF THE JOINTLY- PREPARED PEACE POSITIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY COUNTRIES. IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY STATED THAT THE DIRECT AND OPEN DIALOGUE AT THE MEETING WAS NECESSARY AND ITS RESULTS WERE USEFUL.

ALTHOUGH THE CONCRETE PROBLEMS OF THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF THE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS WERE NOT SOLVED IN GENEVA, IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT THE MEETING CONFIRMED THE JANUARY 1985 SOVIET-AMERICAN ACCORD ON THE NECESSITY OF SEEKING OPPORTUNITIES OF AVERTING FEVERISH ARMAMENT IN OUTER SPACE AND HALTING IT ON EARTH.

OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IS THE JOINT STATEMENT ABOUT THE INADMISSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR AND ABOUT BOTH SIDES' REFRAINING FROM EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE GENEVA MEETING.

THE GENEVA MEETING IS ALSO VERY SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT MEANS THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING CHANCES FOR THE BETTER IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS



THE GENEVA MEETING IS ALSO VERY SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT MEANS THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING CHANCES FOR THE BETTER IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND IN THE WORLD IN GENERAL.

ON THE WHOLE THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING BETWEEN MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND THE US PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN HAVE CREATED MORE FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND A RETURN TO DETENTE. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH SIDES TO TURN THESE OPPORTUNITIES INTO PRACTICAL ACTS.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL FOR ITS PART EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THE PRACTICAL FULFILMENT OF THE TALKS OF REDUCING FEVERISH ARMAMENT AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE. THE MEETING CONFIRMED THE PRINCIPLED LINE OF THE ALLIED SOCIALIST STATES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE HALTING OF FEVERISH ARMAMENT ON EARTH AND THE PREVENTION OF ITS SPREADING INTO OUTER SPACE, THE ASSURING OF A TRANSITION TOWARDS REAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF WORLD PEACE. THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES RE-AFFIRM THAT THEY DO NOT STRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY BUT WILL NOT PERMIT OTHERS TO GAIN SUCH A SUPERIORITY OVER THEM.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING DECLARED THAT THE PARTIES AND STATES REPRESENTED WERE DETERMINED IN FUTURE TO DO THEIR UTMOST IN A COORDINATED WAY TOWARDS ACHIEVING A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN EUROPEAN AND WORLD AFFAIRS. THEY ARE UNANIMOUS IN THE OPINION THAT THE UNITY AND COHESION OF ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, CLASS SOLIDARITY AND THE STRENGTHENING OF MUTUAL COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS ARE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE IN THE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

THE MEETING WAS HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRIENDSHIP AND FULL UNITY OF OPINION ON THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED.

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR SAMUEL  
MR ~~DAUNT~~ DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST  
MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
B. NPS( ) }  
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15.1.85

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DESKRY 220600Z FCO (FOR RESIDENT CLERK)

FM WASHINGTON 220330Z NOVEMBER 85

TO IMMEDIATE DESKRY FCO,

TELNO 3232

OF 220330Z NOVEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN,  
ROME, MODUK

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE,  
BUDAPEST, SOFIA

UKDEL NATO TEL NO 295, US/SOVIET SUMMIT, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S

**IMMEDIATE**  
**ADVANCE COPY**

REPORT TO CONGRESS

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBES SUMMIT AS A FRESH START, WHICH ACHIEVED NO MEETING OF MINDS, BUT BETTER PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF A QUOTE NEW REALISM UNQUOTE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS. FRANK TALKING, ESPECIALLY ON SDI AND REGIONAL ISSUES. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT CHANGE OVERNIGHT, THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO PEACEFUL COMPETITION. THE US WAS READY FOR STEP BY STEP PROGRESS, AND THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN WORTHWHILE FOR BOTH SIDES. NO NEW DETAILS.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED CHEERS AND AN OVATION OF SEVERAL MINUTES WHEN HE ARRIVED TO REPORT ON THE SUMMIT IN A NATIONALLY TELEVISED ADDRESS TO CONGRESS TONIGHT. HE THANKED CONGRESS AND THE ALLIES FOR THEIR FULL-HEARTED SUPPORT, WHICH WAS CRUCIAL TO SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE POLICIES OF HIS ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAD MADE AMERICA STRONG AGAIN MUST BE CONTINUED IN THE FUTURE.
3. THE MEETING HAD PRODUCED A FRESH START - NOT A MEETING OF MINDS ON IDEOLOGY OR NATIONAL PURPOSE - BUT A BETTER PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN AN ELOQUENT SPEAKER AND GOOD LISTENER, AND THEIR MEETINGS HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, ONE COULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE USSR, BUT IT WAS VITAL TO ENSURE THAT COMPETITION REMAINED PEACEFUL. CANDID DIALOGUE WAS ESSENTIAL.



ESSENTIAL.

4. ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL,

THE SUMMIT HAD MADE QUOTE A MEASURE OF PROGRESS UNQUOTE. (APPLAUSE) THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS WERE INSTRUCTED TO HASTEN THEIR WORK ON ACHIEVING 50 PERCENT CUTS IN APPROPRIATE CATEGORIES OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT, LEADING, HE HOPED, TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS. THESE SHOULD INCLUDE TOUGH VERIFICATION PROVISIONS (APPLAUSE). DISCUSSION ON SDI HAD PRODUCED A VERY DIRECT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. GORBACHEV HAD EXPRESSED A FEAR THAT THE US MIGHT USE SDI TECHNOLOGY TO PUT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO SPACE. HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE PROJECT WAS CONCERNED ONLY WITH NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND THAT IF RESEARCH WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE RESULTS WOULD BE SHARED. THE US WAS A DEFENSIVE NATION, AND ONE OF HIS AIMS WAS TO ELIMINATE FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY. HE HAD PROPOSED A RECIPROCAL PROGRAMME FOR OPEN LABORATORIES ON SDI RESEARCH.

5. THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THEIR AGREEMENT TO HOLD A DIALOGUE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHILE MOVING TO BAN THEM ALTOGETHER (APPLAUSE), AND GIVE A BOOST TO MBFR, AND CDE, AND TO BEGIN WORK ON RISK REDUCTION CENTRES.

6. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED HIS PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS (APPLAUSE).

CONFLICTS AROSE WHERE REGIMES DID NOT REPRESENT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM WAS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE HEROIC EFFORTS OF THOSE WHO FOUGHT FOR FREEDOM, WHILE BEING PREPARED TO TALK TO THE SOVIET UNION IN A SEARCH FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS.

7. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PRESIDENT SAID SIMPLY THAT HISTORY TAUGHT THAT COUNTRIES WHICH RESPECTED THE RIGHTS OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE TENDED TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF THEIR NEIGHBOURS, THIS WAS THEREFORE A PEACE ISSUE.

8. THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF FURTHER MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ALSO DREW APPLAUSE. HE HOPED THAT THE CULTURAL AGREEMENT AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES WHICH THEY HAD DISCUSSED WOULD BREAK DOWN STEREOTYPE AND PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROPAGANDA. THE AGREEMENT ON NEW CONSULATES WOULD CREATE A PERMANENT US PRESENCE IN THE UKRAINE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. (APPLAUSE) REFERRING BRIEFLY TO THE PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT, HE SAID QUOTE WHAT HAPPENED BEFORE SHOULD NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN UNQUOTE.

9. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT THE RESULTS HAD BEEN WORTHWHILE FOR BOTH SIDES. PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE UNREALISTIC OR IMPATIENT FOR RESULTS. BUT THE US WAS READY FOR STEP BY STEP PROGRESS.

COMMENT

10. THE ACCLAIM WAS BOTH FOR THE MAN AND HIS PERFORMANCE AND FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT HE SAID. BUT MEDIA COMMENT SO FAR, WHILE MORE RESERVED, HAS ALSO GENERALLY ACCOUNTED THE MEETING A SUCCESS IN TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT'S OWN OBJECTIVES. THE FACT THAT FURTHER MEETINGS HAVE BEEN AGREED IS THOUGHT LIKELY TO EXERT A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON NEGOTIATIONS. THE VALUE OF THIS SUMMIT WILL ONLY BE JUDGED OVER TIME. BUT THE NEXT MEETINGS WILL HAVE TO PRODUCE MORE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

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FCO PASS SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, SOFIA

ORWAN 3868

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CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM UKDEL NATO  
 TO DESKBY 220800Z FCO  
 TELNO 295

Repetition to REYKJAVIK  
 referred to departmental decision.  
 repeated as requested to other posts.

OF 211937Z NOVEMBER 85  
 INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, MOSCOW  
 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS TO S OF S), DUS(P), CDS  
 SEC(NATO/UK)(P), AND DACU)  
 INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, SOFIA  
 INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP EC

MIPT: REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING, GENEVA, 19-20 NOVEMBER: PRESIDENT  
 REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 21 NOVEMBER

## SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBED THE SUMMIT AS A SUCCESS, A GOOD BEGINNING. HE AND GORBACHEV HAD NOT GONE INTO SPECIFICS, BUT HAD AGREED THAT THE GENEVA NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD QUOTE GO TO IT UNQUOTE ON THE BASIS OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND THAT INF COULD BE NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY. SIMILARLY THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIFIC DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV OF REGIONAL ISSUES AND NOTHING TO REPORT THERE FROM THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS BEYOND THE AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED REGULARLY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD URGED GORBACHEV TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS, EMPHASISING THAT HE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE A PROPAGANDA POINT OF IT IF GORBACHEV DID, BUT THAT PROGRESS WOULD HELP TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENT IN OTHER FIELDS.

## DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN OPENED BY THANKING THE ALLIES FOR THEIR PART IN THE PREPARATION OF THE SUMMIT AND THEREFORE IN ITS SUCCESS - AND HE BELIEVED IT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. WHEN HE PARTED FROM GORBACHEV THE LATTER HAD SAID HE WAS ON THE WAY TO PRAGUE TO BRIEF THE WARSAW PACT AND HAD SENT HIS BEST WISHES TO THE MEMBERS OF NATO, WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD RECIPROCATED.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS SHOULD BE FOUNDED ON REALISM, STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE. HIS ADMINISTRATION HAD WORKED TO REPAIR U S DEFENCES, TO RE-ESTABLISH THE ECONOMY AND TO CREATE SOLIDARITY. A DIALOGUE BASED ON REALISM AND STRENGTH HAD TO BE GRADUAL. THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV WAS NOT AN END BUT A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, A FRESH START.

4. THE OPENING MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR 15 MINUTES BUT HAD LASTED ONE HOUR. THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THE U.S DESIRE FOR A STABLE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. HE HAD SAID THAT TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL WAS IN A SENSE TO PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. NATIONS DID NOT DISTRUST EACH OTHER BECAUSE THEY WERE ARMED BUT WERE ARMED BECAUSE THEY DISTRUSTED EACH OTHER. WORDS ALONE WERE NOT ENOUGH: DEEDS WERE NECESSARY. GORBACHEV HAD AGREED.

5. GORBACHEV HAD CLAIMED THAT US/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE AT THEIR *LOWES*

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LOWEST LEVEL EVER, BUT HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS QUOTE NO OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP UNQUOTE TO AN IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT. COMMENTING ON GORBACHEV THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IN CHARGE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THAT HE EVIDENTLY BELIEVED DEEPLY IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ALSO BELIEVED SOME OF THE WILDER ACCUSATIONS ABOUT THE U.S. E.G. THAT IT WAS OUT TO BANKRUPT THE SOVIET UNION, WAS DRIVEN BY THE ARMS MANUFACTURERS, ETC. GORBACHEV HAD REMINDED PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD ONCE BEEN ALLIES AND HAD SAID QUOTE I PRAY TO GOD THAT WAR BETWEEN US WILL NEVER HAPPEN UNQUOTE. HE HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WANTED TO FREE RESOURCES WHICH WERE NOW GOING ON DEFENCE.

6. ON SDI, GORBACHEV HAD BASED HIS OPPOSITION TO RESEARCH ON AN ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT HE NOT THOUGHT ANYBODY WOULD USE, NAMELY THAT RESEARCH MIGHT RESULT IN THE DISCOVERY OF HITHERTO UNKNOWN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR USE FROM SPACE. THE PRESIDENT HAD REAFFIRMED THAT IF RESEARCH SHOWED THAT STRATEGIC DEFENCE WAS POSSIBLE, THE U S WOULD SHARE IT WITH ITS ALLIES AND WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

7. GORBACHEV HAD REAFFIRMED HIS WISH TO PROCEED TO REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON THE BASIS OF 50 PERCENT. THE U.S. HAD AGREED. THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA WERE TO GO FORWARD ON THAT BASIS. REAGAN HAD OFFERED AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INF, INVOLVING A LIMIT ON NATO DEPLOYMENTS AT THE LEVEL WHICH WOULD BE REACHED AT THE END OF THE YEAR, THE SOVIET UNION REDUCING TO THAT LEVEL. THEY HAD TALKED ALSO OF THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL LIMIT. GORBACHEV HAD AGREED TO TACKLE INF SEPARATELY. REAGAN HAD MADE PLAIN THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT GIVE UP RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENCE.

8. THE PRESIDENT THEN LISTED SOME OF THE TOPICS COVERED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT: THE NPT, JOINT RISK REDUCTION CENTRES, A CW BAN, MBFR AND THE CDE.

9. ON HUMAN RIGHTS THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD MADE PLAIN THAT THE U.S HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE SOUGHT NO AGREEMENT ON THE MATTER AND WOULD NOT BRING IT UP IN PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS EASIER TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENTS IN OTHER FIELDS IF THERE COULD BE SOME PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: AND IF THERE WERE, THE U.S. WOULD NOT CLAIM CREDIT FOR IT. HE HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED THE CASE OF GERMANS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

9. REGIONAL PROBLEMS. THE PRESIDENT HAD POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET ACTION IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD WAS UNACCEPTABLE, NOTABLY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND SE ASIA THROUGH CUBAN AND VIETNAMESE SURROGATES. HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT SEEKING ADVANTAGE AND HAD RE-STATE THE PROPOSALS IN HIS SPEECH TO THE U N GENERAL ASSEMBLY. GORBACHEV HAD SHOWN SOME SENSITIVITY TO THE ISSUES. THEY HAD AGREED TO DISAGREE ON THE SUBSTANCE WHILE AGREEING TO HOLD REGULAR MEETINGS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES.

10. GORBACHEV WOULD VISIT THE U.S. IN 1986 AND THE PRESIDENT MOSCOW IN 1987.

11. CONCLUDING, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE MEETING WAS NOT AN END BUT A BEGINNING. THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CORDIAL. GORBACHEV WAS FORCEFUL IN RECOGNISING THAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT MATTERS OF POTENTIAL BENEFIT TO THE WHOLE WORLD. WHILE CLEARLY BE BELIEVED SOME THINGS THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT, THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. /1



12. IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED ALL SPEAKERS THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR COMING TO NATO AND EXPRESSED SOLIDARITY WITH HIM IN HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A BETTER EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP. MARTENS (BELGIUM) OPENED. FOR BELGIUM SECURITY DEPENDED ON THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. HE ASKED HOW REAGAN INTERPRETED THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO INF AND WHETHER THEY SOUGHT EQUALITY WITH THE U.S. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT GOT DOWN TO SPECIFICS. THE SOVIET SIDE KNEW THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS ZERO. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, AGREED ON THE SEPARATION OF INF FROM SDI.

13. KOHL (FRG) CONTRASTED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH THE QUOTE NEW ICE AGE UNQUOTE TWO YEARS AGO WHEN INF DEPLOYMENT STARTED. THE MEETING HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, IN LINE WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIALOGUE ON A REGULAR BASIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO EUROPE, AS WAS THE CW ISSUE. HE AGREED THAT IF WE WANTED TO HELP PEOPLE WE SHOULD AVOID PROPAGANDA. HE ASKED IF A TIMETABLE FOR THE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN ENVISAGED, BUT RECEIVED NO ANSWER, THE PRESIDENT TAKING TO OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT THAT HE HAD TOLD GORBACHEV THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT LOOKING FOR SUPERIORITY BUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET SUPERIORITY.

14. ORDONEZ (SPAIN) ASKED IF ANY TRADE-OFFS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPACE DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE U.S. RIGHT TO RESEARCH MUST NOT BE BARGAINED AWAY. SUCH RESEARCH WAS BEING CONDUCTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION. THE ISSUE HAD BEEN LEFT OPEN BETWEEN HIM AND GORBACHEV.

15. WILLOCH (NORWAY) AGREED THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD NOT CARRY THE WHOLE BURDEN OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. REGIONAL ISSUES WERE IMPORTANT. THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY IN SUCH MATTERS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, WE SHOULD TRY GRADUALLY TO REINTEGRATE THE SOVIET UNION INTO EUROPE. NORWAY FAVOURED FLEXIBILITY IN STRATEGIC DEFENCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. HAD THERE BEEN DISCUSSION OF EXTENDING SALT II AND OF THE ABM TREATY? HAD THE SOVIET UNION ABANDONED ITS INSISTENCE ON AN END OT RESEARCH? THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE LAST POINT WAS UNRESOLVED. IN ANSWER TO THE OTHER TWO HE REFERRED TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS: THE U.S. HAD NOT COME TO A FINAL DECISION ABOUT SALT II.

16. THE PRIME MINISTER CONGRATULATED THE PRESIDENT WARMLY, FIRST, ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND GORBACHEV AND ON THE WAY THAT THAT HAD COME ACROSS IN PUBLIC AND, SECONDLY, ON THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH HAD CONTAINED RATHER MORE DETAIL THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. MAKING THREE POINTS SHE SAID SHE BELIEVED WE SHOULD PRESENT THE MEETING IN A POSITIVE BUT NOT EUPHORIC LIGHT: THERE WAS A RISK THAT IF WE RAISED EXPECTATIONS TOO HIGH THERE MIGHT BE DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS RAN INTO THE INEVITABLE DIFFICULTIES. SECONDLY WHILE THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD CHANGED, THE SYSTEM REMAINED THE SAME. GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS ON CONDITION THAT THE U.S. GAVE UP SDI RESEARCH: SHE BELIEVED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MOUNT A CAMPAIGN TO PRESS THAT THESIS AND THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NEED TO DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. OVER ITS RESEARCH. THIRDLY, SHE WELCOMED THE CONFIRMATION THAT THE U.S. WAS STICKING TO THE ABM TREATY AND WAS READY TO GO ON OBSERVING THE SALT II LIMITS. /IN 1



IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD IT WAS VITAL THAT THE TWO GREAT POWERS SHOULD OBSERVE THOSE TREATIES.

17. MULRONEY (CANADA) MADE A GENERAL AND EFFUSIVE STATEMENT OF SUPPORT. CANADA WAS PLEASED WITH THE PROOF OF THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. DUMAS (FRANCE) AGREED THAT CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD AIM AT MAINTAINING OUR OWN NUCLEAR DETERRENT WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED FOR SOME TIME. THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF SUCH WEAPONS, A DIFFERENCE FROM THE STATEMENT OF 8 JANUARY. HE WELCOMED ALSO THE INDICATION THAT A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BASED ON A SOVIET/U.S. BALANCE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL AND NOT A BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL THE REST. HAD THERE BEEN ANY PROGRESS ON A DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREED 50 PERCENT REDUCTION? AND WHAT WERE THE ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE BELIEF THAT AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE? THE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT HE HAD NOT GONE INTO SPECIFICS. SHULTZ CONFIRMED THIS: THERE HAD BEEN NO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ABOUT WHAT THE 50 PERCENT SHOULD APPLY TO, NOR THE INF DETAILS: THEY HAD MERELY WISHED TO ESTABLISH THAT INF COULD BE NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY.

18. CRAXI (ITALY) GAVE A GENERAL WELCOME TO THE MEETING. THE PEACE OF THE WORLD DESERVED CONTINUOUS COMMITMENT COUPLED WITH CAUTION. OZAL (TURKEY) AGREED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT LIKELY FUTURE SOVIET PROPAGANDA. HAD THE MIDDLE EAST OR THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR BEEN DISCUSSED? SHULTZ CONFIRMED THAT BOTH HAD BEEN RAISED WITH SHEVARDNADZE BUT THERE WAS NOTHING PARTICULAR TO REPORT. THEY HAD NOT COME UP IN PLENARY EXCEPT IN THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF REGIONAL ISSUES.

19. SHLUTER (DENMARK) ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF EVEN LIMITED SDI WEAPONS, TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT AT LEAST THEY KNEW HOW STRONGLY THE U.S. FELT ABOUT THE ISSUE. CARRACO SILVA (PORTUGAL) STRESSED THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION AND STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION. EAST/WEST RELATIONS COULD NOT CONSIST ONLY OF ARMS CONTROL. REGIONAL ISSUES WERE IMPORTANT. HAD SOUTHERN AFRICA BEEN DISCUSSED? THE PRESIDENT REPLIED QUOTE NOT WITH GORBACHEV UNQUOTE AND SHULTZ ADDED BRIEFLY WITH SHEVARDNADZE. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD RECOGNISED THEIR IMPORTANCE PARTICULARLY AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD BEEN GONE INTO IN GREAT DETAIL, AND HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THEM ON A REGULAR BASIS.

20. HARALAMBOPOULOS (GREECE) SAID THAT GREECE FAVOURED THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AND REMINDED THE COUNCIL (UNNECESSARILY) THAT GREECE WAS A SIGNATORY TO THE FIVE CONTINENT PEACE APPEAL. HERMANNSSON (ICELAND) SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN LEADERS OF NATIONS AND PEOPLES AND WONDERED WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS PAST STATEMENTS ABOUT THE HOPELESSNESS OF SPEAKING TO THE RUSSIANS, PRESIDENT REAGAN FELT A REAL STEP HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT OF COURSE THE U.S WAS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A TEST BAN, PROVIDED THAT IT ENTERED INTO EFFECT WHEN BOTH SIDES WERE AT AN EQUAL STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. HE /RECALLED



# CONFIDENTIAL

RECALLED THAT THE LAST THREE YEAR TEST BAN HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A BURST OF SOVIET TESTING WHICH HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN PREPARED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE BAN.

21. LUBBERS (NETHERLANDS) REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO CO-ORDINATE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST, AND STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID DISTRUST. SANTER (LUXEMBOURG) SPOKE BRIEFLY, SAYING THAT THE FURTHER PLANNED MEETINGS WERE A DECISIVE STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

22. CONCLUDING, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT NO TIMETABLE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED FOR THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT HAD BEEN MADE PLAIN THAT THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD QUOTE GO TO IT UNQUOTE. MOREOVER HE AND GORBACHEV HAD AGREED ON A DIRECT METHOD OF COMMUNICATION, TO BE USED BETWEEN MEETINGS.

23. CARRINGTON MADE NO ATTEMPT TO SUM UP BUT WISHED THE PRESIDENT WELL WITH CONGRESS.

GRAHAM

## US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED  
ACDD  
DEFENCE D  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES D  
INFO D  
PUSD  
NED

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR SAMUEL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR O'NEILL

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# CONFIDENTIAL



Transcript by  
JAMES LEE of:

Mr Powell

PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER,  
MRS. THATCHER, AT DOWNING STREET, ON THURSDAY,  
NOVEMBER 21, 1985  
=====

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have just returned from Brussels where, together with 15 other nations, we went to receive a briefing from President Reagan and Mr. Schultz on the meeting which has been held between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

I think we obviously had a similar impression to that which you have already received. First, that the meeting was very cordial, very constructive, and gave rise to a basis of confidence and hope for the future.

Second, that although no details were negotiated, it is expected that that meeting will result in a strong impetus to the arms control negotiations. You have seen from the Joint Statement that the arms control negotiations include those on chemical warfare and the those on mutual and balanced force reductions going on in Vienna.

The SDI matter was not, of course, resolved. The two nations, I think, discussed it very very thoroughly indeed, each rehearsing their own arguments and talking them through with the other.

But the only thing which I think is absolutely clear of SDI and the nuclear arms control negotiations are those on the



PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

intermediate nuclear forces, upon which you will have seen from the Joint Statement that they expect an interim statement to be reached at Geneva itself.

So we had two things: first, the basis of confidence; second, an impetus to the arms control negotiations; and thirdly, it is quite clear that the existing treaties will in fact be honoured, in particular the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the SALT honoured on a reciprocal basis because, as you know, it was never formally ratified by the United States, although its terms have in fact been upheld.

A number of regional issues were discussed, but mainly between George Shultz and Mr. Shevadnardze.

Other matters, you will have seen in the Joint Statement about possible progress on nuclear fusion by cooperation between nations and various other matters in the Joint Statement, some of them, I think, which possibly exceeded what we were expecting, and therefore I do think that it has been a success, both from President Reagan's viewpoint, from Mr. Gorbachev's viewpoint, from the viewpoint of the whole Western Alliance, and I think from the viewpoint of ordinary people, who will be very grateful indeed that the meeting has taken place, that it will be the prelude to two more meetings, and that they feel that whatever the difficulties, they are being discussed and therefore there is greater hope of resolution and greater hope of peace and stability than there was perhaps before the meeting took place.

Every one of the Heads of Government and the Foreign Secretaries at the NATO meeting was both very complimentary to President Reagan and very supportive of him, very supportive indeed.



PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

Grateful to him for his efforts, grateful in particular for the amount of work that he personally did and for the amount of direct negotiation that he did with Mr. Gorbachev.

Now, your questions!

=====



QUESTION

Prime Minister, you mentioned as your third point that it was quite clear that existing treaties will be honoured. There was some confusion in Geneva, I gather, as to whether in fact any assurances had been given by President Reagan on both the ABM treaty and prolonging SALT 2. But you can say quite categorically, can you, that such assurances were given?

PRIME MINISTER

No, I cannot say categorically on SALT 2, which is why I said that SALT 2 will be honoured on a reciprocal basis, because you are quite right, SALT 2 in any case was never ratified because you will remember of Afghanistan. That is why I specifically said SALT 2 will be honoured on a reciprocal basis.

I think, if you look at what President Reagan said in their joint press conference this morning, I seem to recall that one of his points, when he said: "We know the right questions to ask!" and one was: "Will past and present agreements be fulfilled?" and then he said: "America is ready to answer 'Yes'". If you will just check on that, I am sure you will have the text.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, was President Reagan given any indication that he could expect something - or the West could expect something - on Afghanistan?

PRIME MINISTER

There were, I think, perhaps more detailed discussions, I understand, on Afghanistan than on many of the other particular



PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

matters. I cannot tell you what the result was, but it was very thoroughly discussed.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, did President Reagan give any idea of the sort of interim agreement on INF that might be on the table or that might be worked out?

PRIME MINISTER

No. I had the impression that the kind of interim agreement he was hoping for was the one for which proposals are already on the table in Geneva. I would not like to go further than that, because I am not quite certain how far he wishes one to go.

QUESTION

Did President Reagan give you any hint as to how the gap between the two sides on SDI could possibly be bridged?

PRIME MINISTER

No. There is clearly a gap. We are very much aware of it, but the United States will continue with research. I believe they are absolutely right so to do. I believe the President put his view very very strongly indeed, which as you know, is that it would be very strange if one did not attempt to find a defence to the world's most dangerous weapon, when throughout history, one has always tried to find a defence to the latest offensive weapon. That, I am afraid, is still what he called an "open question".



QUESTION

But is it absolutely right, Mrs. Thatcher, for President Reagan to proceed with Star Wars, since Mr. Gorbachev has made it plain that if he does there cannot really be any proper deal on arms control?

PRIME MINISTER

It is absolutely right to proceed with the research for the reason which I have indicated. Most people would find it very strange indeed if, faced with the world's most dangerous weapon, one did not try to find a defence to the world's most dangerous weapon, when we tried to find a defence to all the world's other weapons and moreover, as you know, the Soviet Union is doing a considerable amount of research on anti-ballistic missiles - a different kind of research in some respects from that which America is doing - but she already has an effective anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow, and that is being updated, and she has already done quite a lot of work on lasers; and, of course, she has an anti-satellite satellite system which, of course, is ahead of anything that the United States has got in that particular sphere.

So I do not think there is any question of the United States dropping SDI research, nor indeed do I believe that the Soviet Union will drop hers. Perhaps you might say therein lies the possibility of reconciliation, because they are doing it, each in their own way.



QUESTION

Mrs. Thatcher, you said that existing treaties would be honoured. Does that imply that the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Agreement are now going to be honoured, specifically those relating to Soviet Jews?

PRIME MINISTER

Well now, I was not referring to any briefing from the Soviet Union, because I have had none. I believe that the anti-ballistic missile treaty will be honoured and I believe that was the meaning of what the President said this morning and, of course, he indicated again that the treaties will be honoured and SALT 2 honoured on a reciprocal basis. Always, of course, there are discussions of human rights which, of course, is what you are getting at, with the Helsinki Accords. The United States, as you know, has indeed honoured the Helsinki Accords. We very much hope that there will be greater freedom of movement and a greater observance of human rights on the Soviet side than there has been, but there is nothing specific coming out of the Summit. But you will recall that on other occasions when the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union have been much better, then there have been more people coming out of the Soviet Union.

DAVID ADMANSON

Prime Minister, do you think agreement can be reached quickly on chemical weapons and MBFR, for instance, before the next Summit Meeting?

PRIME MINISTER

I would not like to give you heightened expectations of



PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

particular agreements. I think that the IMF might perhaps be the one that comes out first, but as one did point out there, discussing the general approach and reaching agreement on the general approach and in such a cordial atmosphere and convincing the Soviet Union of the total sincerity of the United States and that the United States would never start a war and democracies do not, is extremely valuable. But getting down to the nitty gritty of those complex nuclear arms negotiations is very difficult and, of course, on chemical weapons there has been a verification problem which we have not yet solved. So do not expect sudden...I would not expect sudden results on those matters. There is still a lot of hard negotiation, detailed negotiation, in those separate arms negotiations for a still to do.

President Reagan himself said the results of this Summit will be tested over the months, indeed over the years, but do not have sudden expectations of sudden results.

QUESTION

From time to time, the United Kingdom has been contributing very much to the peace of the world and preventing nuclear war is the responsibility of the whole world, so what do you think how the Fifth World countries, such as China, some Asian country or some African country can create a united force and a concerted effort against the nuclear war and to what extent the Fifth World has been contributing to maintain the peace of the world?



PRIME MINISTER

Well, the most obvious way, for those nations who have not yet done so, is by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement. You know that the Review Conference was held this year and I think we have been very fortunate in the years since it was signed that I think there has only been one more nuclear weapons power and it is thought that in the coming ten or more years there might be a number of other nuclear powers, so the really important thing is for nations which have not done so to sign that agreement.

QUESTION

Were you personally surprised at how well both leaders got on or, from what you know of both of them, was it was you expected and is there anything you can say about President Reagan's personal observations about Mr. Gorbachev?

PRIME MINISTER

No, I was not personally surprised that they personally got on very well. I thought that they would, because I have had discussions myself with Mr. Gorbachev and he discussed and debates very freely and very easily and I knew that President Reagan was working extremely hard and I knew his views and how strongly he feels, for example, on SDI, and I knew that he was totally sincere in that the United States would never have a first strike attack or start a war; but that has always been the difficulty - in getting that message across to the Soviet Union.

No it was not a question of personal observations. The chemistry was right or the alchemy, whichever you like to call it, and they did get on very well with each other.



QUESTION

Yes. Did he actually say anything....

PRIME MINISTER

I am not going to repeat every single thing! They got on very well together.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, was the British or French deterrent mentioned in the talks?

PRIME MINISTER

No, because we already agreed that they would not be.

QUESTION

So do we take it that that rules them out of any subsequent negotiations?

PRIME MINISTER

No, they have never been in the START negotiations nor in the INF negotiations. They really are our own independent deterrent and as you know, Polaris is already at an irreducible minimum.

QUESTION

The President got no pressure from Mr. Gorbachev ?

PRIME MINISTER

As far as I am aware, no.



QUESTION

In this improved atmosphere, Prime Minister, do you believe that there is now an improved possibility that Mr. Shevadnardze will be coming here in the near future and that you will be visiting Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow?

PRIME MINISTER

I think perhaps there are enough international visits between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev scheduled for the future at the moment. I have no plans to go to Moscow. We have asked Mr. Shevadnardze to come here this coming year to visit the Foreign Secretary.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Yes, he has accepted the invitation originally extended to Mr. Gromyko, and we are still awaiting the fixing of dates. That is in prospect.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, you said that you could do business with Mr. Gorbachev. As he said really quite clearly today that so long as SDI was dropped then there was the prospect of deep arms cuts, is that not a basis on which you would like to see business done?

PRIME MINISTER

is a  
This/matter upon which business will indeed have to be done, but do not think that all the work on SDI is on the side of the United States. There is a great deal of work on strategic defence against nuclear weapons going on in the Soviet Union. So both sides are doing some.



SAME QUESTIONER

Does that not cast a potential shadow over everything else in the last 48 hours?

PRIME MINISTER

No. I do not think it does. I do not think you should underestimate the atmosphere of cordiality and confidence, but also the realism that there is a great deal more to be done, and I think it is this balance which I found so striking. The atmosphere is confident, but there is no euphoria or complacency. It is confident, but both sides, I think, are aware that the real hard grind will be done in the nuclear arms talks and they are aware of the difficulties and they are aware that SDI has not yet been resolved, and I cannot go further, because there is not any further to be gone at the moment.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, you were reported on one news bulletin this evening as having chided President Reagan for losing the propaganda competition in the run-up to the Summit? Is this in fact true?

PRIME MINISTER

No, I have said nothing about propaganda in the run-up, nothing at all about propaganda in the run-up.

QUESTION

Did you chide him at all?

PRIME MINISTER

I did not chide him! Whoever misreported that?



QUESTION

Prime Minister, did anybody chide him?

PRIME MINISTER

No, no. It was fully supportive, fully supportive.

BERNARD INGHAM

You are trying hard!

QUESTION

Prime Minister, there have been previous thaws in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, but they have always ended in tears. Do you think there is a greater will this time to actually make it work?

PRIME MINISTER

I think that there is more hope since the meeting than there was before the meeting. I think the reason for that hope is not only the personalities of the two, but I think it has also something to do with the historic stage that we have reached, both with nuclear weapons and perhaps the economic stage that the Soviet Union has reached; that undoubtedly, the leadership of the Soviet Union would very much like to have enough economic room to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people; that that is very important for them and that is an additional reason for trying to reach arms control agreements, but both sides - as you will notice in the Joint Statement and in the press conference - neither side is seeking superiority over the other. Both sides reckon that security comes from a balance of arms and verification. So I think that there is



PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

more hope of continuing improvement than there has been for a long time.

QUESTION

It might be a little cheeky to ask this question, Mrs. Thatcher, but do you think that the role of television over the last few days may have affected the way you voted last night?

PRIME MINISTER

No, not at all, not at all. I do not know whether you actually listened. I went in last night. As you know, it took me quite a time to decide how I would vote last night and I did decide early evening and then I went into the House to listen to the last speeches as if you listen to the last speeches, if I had not already decided to vote the way I did, by the time I had heard those speeches I would have decided to vote the way I did.

QUESTION

Will you sleep more soundly tonight, Prime Minister?

PRIME MINISTER

I sleep quite soundly in any event, because I do not get a lot of sleep, so I sleep quite soundly. As I<sup>say, I</sup> think it is this balanced assessment. It is excellent; they are confident; I think that both of them heard arguments from the other that they had not heard put that way before and therefore there is a much greater understanding of how the other thinks. That is good.



PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

But there is a realisation, a realism, a word that you heard used frequently by President Reagan, that the hard grind of negotiation would have to be done, but they are willing to give an impetus to those negotiations and therefore the will to settle some of the outstanding problems.

=====



R help

PRIME MINISTER'S OPENING REMARKS AT REAGAN DEBRIEFING

The Prime Minister congratulated the President warmly on the outcome of the meeting and on the achievement of a degree of confidence in relations with Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.

She thought the result had been presented very effectively to the public.

The areas of agreement listed in the Joint Statement exceeded expectations.

The Prime Minister stressed three points:

- the Alliance should follow the President's example in presenting the results positively but not euphorically. As the President himself had said, deeds not words would count. There was no doubt that very difficult detailed negotiations lay ahead. We should not build public expectations too high. Otherwise we would only create difficulties for ourselves.
  
- It was very important always to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was making great efforts to improve its image. But the Soviet system had not changed. Nor had their opposition to SDI weakened. We must calculate that they will spend the next year in a concentrated propaganda campaign to convince Western (and particularly European) public opinion that the SDI was the main obstacle to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. We must be ready to counter this and support the USA



in continuing SDI research.

- She was pleased that the President had confirmed that the US continued to observe the ABM Treaty and would observe SALT II limits on a reciprocal basis. It was vital in an uncertain world that big powers should observe their agreement.

The Prime Minister concluded that she congratulated the President, fully supported him in the course he had charted and expressed particular appreciation of the great personal role which he had played in the Summit.



FROM: C J R MEYER, NEWS

DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1985

Private Secretary

cc: Mr Pakenham  
Mr Llewellyn Smith  
Mr Alston

+ Strong support  
for President from NATO Allies  
  
+ dangers of Soviet  
propaganda campaign.

GENEVA SUMMIT: GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. Gorbachev made an opening statement at 10.00 am London time which lasted about an hour. The following are the main points recorded in the order in which they were made. I have not had time to record any answers to questions.

Introduction

- The importance of the Summit for bilateral and international relations would become clearer as time passed. It had taken place at a very difficult period for bilateral and international relations.
- Before the Summit there had been great expectations for a reduction of tension, which many feared had gone too far.
- The Soviet Union had no illusions about US policy: the militarisation of the US economy, of US political thinking.
- The Soviet Union believed the situation had got too dangerous and would make every effort to improve it. Thus various Soviet arms control initiatives to improve the atmosphere before the Summit.
- Though the US did not respond appropriately, the Soviet Union decided to stick to trying to change the course of events. That was why direct talks with Reagan had been necessary. In the complex international situation an enormous responsibility rested on the Soviet Union and the US.
- Moscow and Washington must learn the art of living together. Deeply convinced that both peoples want peace (long aside on need for peace, yearnings of all peoples).



- "In a nutshell" enormous responsibility of the super powers. Propaganda could not replace responsible politics. "That's my deep conviction".

#### Summit Talks

- The tete a tete talks had been frank, sometimes extremely sharp. But nevertheless productive to a certain degree. The two leaders had talked to each other in this way longer than expected.
- Open and frank talks over eight hours in all, tete a tete, in plenary, between experts. This effort was decisive, allowing serious work to be done.
- Reagan had been given an analysis of the world situation. The choice was not just between two social systems but between survival and destruction: that was at the centre of world politics.
- Had told Reagan that it had become very difficult to have productive dialogue on stopping the arms race. That was why the Summit had been necessary: a point had been reached when as a matter of national interest, widely defined, consideration had to be given to what to do next.
- Enormous effort put in to understanding the US position. "We tried to be responsible and unprejudiced."
- Despite all the differences that were revealed, the two sides discovered points in common which could serve as a basis for developing relations. The common point was that nuclear war could not be fought and won.
- The central problem of US/Soviet relations was security. The two sides had to strive for agreements giving equal security. This was the only way to mutual trust, further dialogue and contacts and improving the atmosphere.
- Reagan was told Soviet Union not working for superiority and that the US must not do so either. The two leaders had to discuss security at a lower level of parity on a basis of reciprocity.
- Nothing must be done to start arms race in space otherwise arms race would become irreversible. Arms race in space would make reduction of tension far less likely. Point reached where next steps in this area could be of gravest kind.



International Relations/Regional Conflicts

- [Lengthy analysis of international situation in classic Marxist/Leninist terms. Reference to Palmerston - nations don't have allies, only interests; mention that he had quoted this to Mrs Thatcher.]
- Reagan told that in the world Soviet Union not playing a double game.

Bilateral Relations and SDI

- Improvement in bilateral relations possible although backlog of problems. Reagan told that this opportunity to improve the situation must not be lost.
- Main question: war and peace, arms control. This was the basic topic of the Summit.
- The Americans had said Starwars was defensive. Soviet Union ready radically to reduce nuclear weapons on condition no arms race in space. As a first step ready to reduce by 50%; at a second stage ready for discussions with other nuclear powers.
- SDI was not defensive. The Soviet Union was being offered arms competition in space. Risk that this would get out of control; danger of accidents, false alarms in space.
- On SDI, neither side liked each other's logic. "Why should we believe your good intentions if you won't believe ours?"
- The Soviet Union was open to verification. But it objected in principle to "open laboratories" while new weapons systems were being developed. Verification should be in the context of reductions.
- Not dramatising the differences: looking for mutually acceptable solutions.
- Agreements reached on exchanges in science, culture, education, information, sports. Reference to joint initiative on nuclear fusion.



Conclusion

- Summit has had enormous political effect, has activated world opinion.
- At a watershed, turning point like this, moment of truth needed.
- A direct dialogue was the best way of clearing the air: the talk had been straight.
- Agreement that the main problem was arms control. Too complicated to be settled in two days. But better understanding now of the problems which helped create trust. Reagan's statement that he didn't want ~~confrontation~~ appreciated.
- A beginning of a dialogue to improve relations and international situation. Opportunities created for progress. Looking to the future with optimism.

Confrontation

C. J. R. Meyer,

C J R Meyer



GRS 400

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FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1122

OF 211655Z NOVEMBER 85

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, UKMIS GENEVA, MOSCOW

GENEVA SUMMIT: INITIAL GERMAN REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. INITIAL GERMAN REACTIONS, PURELY ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC DECLARATIONS IN GENEVA, VERY POSITIVE.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW GENSCHER TODAY HE SAID THAT THE US/SOVIET DECLARATION CONTAINED A LOT THAT THE FRG HAD BEEN HOPING TO HEAR. THE TWO LEADERS HAD MENTIONED ALL THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN A HELPFUL WAY. ALL IN ALL, ONE COULD SAY THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD AT LEAST GONE SOME WAY TOWARDS CONSTRUCTING THE SORT OF GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONS WHICH NIXON AND BREZHNEV HAD PUT THEIR NAMES TO IN 1972.

3. AUSWAERTIGES AMT OFFICIALS THIS MORNING WERE IN HIGH SPIRITS AT THE APPARENT OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. THE DRAFT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMENT (NOT YET ISSUED) IS VERY UP-BEAT. POINTS WHICH STRIKE THE GERMANS AS PARTICULARLY POSITIVE ARE:

(A) THE VERY FACT OF SUCH A DETAILED DECLARATION, AND THE PARALLEL SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE:

(B) THE ABSENCE OF SOVIET LINKAGE TO SPACE, WHICH GORBACHEV WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE SOUGHT TO WRITE INTO THE DECLARATION:

(C) THE PUSH FOR A GLOBAL BAN ON CW:

(D) ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THE LANGUAGE ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTION AND ON AN INF INTERIM AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE SELECTIVE REITERATION OF THE 8 JANUARY COMMUNIQUE FORMULA (IE NO REFERENCE TO ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS).

4. ONE COMMENT ON THE APPARENT SUCCESS OF WESTERN IDEAS IS THAT GORBACHEV MAY SIMPLY BE BIDDING HIS TIME, CALCULATING THAT THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT WILL RAISE EXPECTATIONS IN THE WEST, IN THE RUN UP TO VARIOUS ELECTIONS, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN PLAY THIS TO ADVANTAGE IN THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS.

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5. THE CDU PARTY (RUEHE) HAVE WELCOMED THE OUTCOME, SEEING IT AS LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS: THIS POSITIVE IMPULSE MUST NOW BE STRENGTHENED.

6. FOR THE SPD BRANDT DESCRIBED THE RESULT AS THE BEST THAT COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED AT PRESENT FROM A 2 1/2 - DAY MEETING. THIS COULD LEAD TO A NEW PHASE IN THE DETENTE PROCESS. VOGEL COMMENTED THAT GENEVA HAD IMPROVED THE CHANCES FOR A HONECKER VISIT TO THE FRG.

BULLARD

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED PS  
ACDD PS/LADY YOUNG  
DEFENCE D PS/MR RIFKIND  
SOVIET D PS/MR RENTON  
NEWS D PS/PUS  
NAD MR DEREK THOMAS  
EED MR GOODALL  
WED MR SAMUEL  
PLANNING STAFF MR DAUNT  
RES D MR DAVID THOMAS  
INFO D MR BRAITHWAITE  
FUSD MR O'NEILL  
NED

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:  
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS

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Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 a.m. Local  
4:00 a.m. EST

November 21, 1985

JOINT STATEMENT

By mutual agreement, President of the United States Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva November 19-21. Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George Shultz; Chief of Staff Donald Regan; Assistant to the President Robert McFarlane; Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman; Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control Paul H. Nitze; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rosanne Ridgway; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Korniyenko; Ambassador to the United States A. F. Dobrynin; Head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. N. Yakovlev; Head of the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. M. Zamyatin; Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. M. Aleksandrov.

These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of U.S.-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages.

MORE



## SECURITY

The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

## NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

## RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernization of the Soviet-U.S. hotline.

## NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR and the U.S. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, inter alia by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.



The USSR and the U.S. reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the Agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-U.S. consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favor of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

#### MBFR

The two sides emphasized the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

#### CDE

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

MORE



### PROCESS OF DIALOGUE

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State, as well as between the heads of other Ministries and Agencies. They agree that the recent visits of the heads of Ministries and Departments in such fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been useful.

Recognizing that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agreed to continue such exchanges on a regular basis.

The sides intend to expand the programs of bilateral cultural, educational and scientific-technical exchanges, and also to develop trade and economic ties. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU attended the signing of the Agreement on Contacts and Exchanges in Scientific, Educational and Cultural Fields.

They agreed on the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation.

They believe that there should be greater understanding among our peoples and that to this end they will encourage greater travel and people-to-people contact.

### NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY

The two leaders also noted with satisfaction that, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific and have worked out steps to implement them.

### CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES

They acknowledged that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations aimed at resumption of air services. The two leaders expressed their desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement at an early date. In this regard, an agreement was reached on the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Both sides agreed to contribute to the preservation of the environment -- a global task -- through joint research and practical measures. In accordance with the existing U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area, consultations will be held next year in Moscow and Washington on specific programs of cooperation.

MORE



### EXCHANGE INITIATIVES

The two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts including some of their new forms in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields (inter alia, cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school instruction; measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR; the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education; mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences and humanities for the period of an academic year; holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events). The two sides agreed to resume cooperation in combatting cancer diseases.

The relevant agencies in each of the countries are being instructed to develop specific programs for these exchanges. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

### FUSION RESEARCH

The two leaders emphasized the potential importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and, in this connection, advocated the widest practicable development of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for the benefit for all mankind.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 November 1985

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Summit: Update on  
Briefing for NAC

I sent you on 18 November a provisional brief for the Prime Minister's use at today's meeting of the NAC when President Reagan will brief the Allies on the outcome of the Summit. Detailed information on the latter is still coming in from Geneva, but the latest developments are summarised at Annex.

In short, the Summit at this stage appears to have been a qualified success, and to have made more progress than Washington or Moscow appeared to have expected. The line-to-take in the provisional brief remains valid, including the welcome for the impulse given to arms control negotiations and to the agreement of a further meeting in 1986.

In speaking to the press, against the background of the up-beat tone adopted by both President Reagan and Gorbachev this morning, the Prime Minister may feel able to be rather more positive than suggested earlier. She may wish to refer to her earlier hopes for the Summit, expressed at the Lord Mayor's Banquet - Annex A of the provisional brief. With the possible exception of the SDI reference, on which further information is awaited, these appear to have been realised.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram and Michael Stark.

Yours ever,

Le Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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US/Soviet Summit: Developments, 21 November

1. Mr Shultz and Mr Shevardnadze signed a joint document this morning; details of its contents are still awaited.
2. In statements at their concluding ceremony, President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev agreed that their discussions, which had covered all aspects of bilateral and international relations, had been useful; Mr Reagan spoke of a fresh start, with the two sides heading in the right direction. The talks had produced a number of interim results, summarised in the joint document.
3. Among these were: a decision to accelerate the nuclear negotiations; agreement to hold further consultations on regional questions; commitment to further meetings in 1986 and 1987; and the establishment of a process for a more intensive relationship, which may include new agreements on bilateral relations (air services, consulates etc). Mr Gorbachev said that solutions had not however been achieved to the "most important" questions.
4. Both leaders committed themselves to pursue practical steps for halting the arms race (Mr Gorbachev specifically referred to space), and reducing nuclear arsenals; Mr Gorbachev spoke of the search for stability, and Mr Reagan of the need to advance the cause of liberty. Both agreed that the test of the Geneva Summit would be shown in subsequent deeds, not words, and might take time to emerge.
5. In his subsequent press conference, Mr Gorbachev spoke of the need for the US to accept the Soviet Union as an equal, and of the need for equal security for both sides. A lack of Soviet security was destabilizing and therefore bad for the US. On SDI the US side had tried to explain the defensive nature of their intentions, but the Soviet side did not accept this.



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● LNO 186

OF 211245Z NOVEMBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (PS/S OF S, DUS(P), NPS(A), DACU)

AND TO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MIPT: US/SOVIET SUMMIT: INITIAL VIEWS ON JOINT STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING ARE INITIAL REACTIONS HERE TO THE US/SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT.

2. ON THE SECURITY SIDE, IT IS STRIKING THAT THE TWO LEADERS HAVE ENDORSED THREE OUT OF THE FOUR CAMP DAVID POINTS: NO SEARCH FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THE ENHANCEMENT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND THE NEED TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, ON THE ISSUE OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH (SDI) THEY APPEAR TO HAVE AGREED TO DISAGREE. GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, AND THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT TO 'SERIOUS DIFFERENCES' WHICH REMAIN ON A NUMBER OF CRITICAL ISSUES, 'INDICATE LITTLE SHIFT IN EITHER SIDE'S POSITION. NONETHELESS, THE RUSSIANS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN THE DECISION TO GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE GENEVA PROCESS. IN TERMS OF THEIR PRE-SUMMIT PROPAGANDA THIS MAY REPRESENT A CONCESSION ON THEIR PART.

3. ON THE SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL AREAS, THE REFERENCES IN THE JOINT STATEMENT TO 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS, AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT, AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION, ARE ALL WELCOME. THE LANGUAGE ON CW AND CDE APPEARS TO REPRESENT PROGRESS, THAT ON MBFR LESS SO. THE REAL INTEREST LIES OF COURSE IN THE DETAIL OF THE PAST TWO DAYS DISCUSSIONS. BUT AT FIRST GLANCE, THE JOINT STATEMENT APPEARS TO INDICATE RESULTS WITH WHICH THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE SATISFIED.

4. THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT TO SERIOUS DIFFERENCES PRESUMABLY APPLIES TO REGIONAL AS WELL AS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. EXCHANGES ON REGIONAL ISSUES ARE TO BE REGULARISED, (WHICH IS WELCOME). BUT THERE IS NO SUGGESTION IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF A MEETING OF MINDS ON THIS AREA. THE LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (PARA 3 (IX) OF MIPT) IS VERY THIN, SUGGESTING SOVIET RESISTANCE TO US PRESSURE.

HOWE

*What do they have in mind about centres for reduction of reduce nuclear risk-taking?*



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INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT

1. FULL TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT SIGNED BY SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE THIS MORNING HAS BEEN FAXED TO YOU. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS.
2. THE MEETINGS DURING THE SUMMIT ARE DESCRIBED AS FRANK AND USEFUL, "BUT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON A NUMBER OF CRITICAL ISSUES". SOME GREATER UNDERSTANDING WAS ACHIEVED, AND THE NEED AGREED TO IMPROVE BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ON-GOING DIALOGUE, AND THE DESIRE TO SEEK COMMON GROUND WERE UNDERLINED.
3. A SERIES OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED:
  - I) FOR AN EXCHANGE OF TOP LEVEL VISITS (SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS TO BE AGREED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS).
  - II) SECURITY: IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING WAR (NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL) EMPHASIZED. "THEY WILL NOT SEEK TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY".
  - III) NUCLEAR/SPACE TALKS: AGREEMENT TO ACCELERATE GENEVA WORK, AND ACCOMPLISH TASKS IN SHULTZ/GROMYKO JANUARY COMMUNIQUE (PREVENTION OF ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TERMINATION OF IT ON EARTH, LIMITS AND REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMS, AND ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY). EARLY PROGRESS URGED, ESPECIALLY ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR FORCES AND INTERIM INF AGREEMENT. EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE TO BE AGREED.
  - IV) RISK REDUCTIONS CENTRES: TO BE STUDIED BY EXPERTS.
  - V) NON-PROLIFERATION: REAFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENT TO NPT, SATISFACTION WITH OVERALL POSITIVE RESULTS OF REVIEW CONFERENCE. BOTH SIDES TO FULFIL ARTICLE VI COMMITMENT TO PURSUE NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS. WILL PROMOTE STRENGTHENING OF IAEA, ENDORSE REGULAR SOVIET/US CONSULTATIONS.



VI) CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ENDORSEMENT OF TOTAL BAN, AGREEMENT  
"TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE  
CONVENTION". WILL INTENSIFY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ALL ASPECTS,  
INCLUDING VERIFICATION. WILL INITIATE DIALOGUE ON PREVENTING  
PROLIFERATION.

VII) MBFR: WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR POSITIVE RESULTS.

VIII) CDE: INTENTION TO FACILITATE EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL  
COMPLETION OF CONFERENCE. NEED FOR DOCUMENT INCLUDING ACCEPTABLE  
CSBMS AND GIVING CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO NUF PRINCIPLE.

IX) DIALOGUE: REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS  
AND BETWEEN OTHER DEPARTMENTAL HEADS. EXCHANGES OF REGIONAL ISSUES  
TO CONTINUE ON REGULAR BASIS. EXPANSION OF BILATERAL, CULTURAL,  
EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMMES, AND  
DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES. SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENT  
ON CULTURAL ETC CONTACTS. AGREEMENT ON "IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING  
HUMANITARIAN CASES IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION". GREATER  
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PEOPLES TO BE ENCOURAGED BY MORE TRAVEL AND  
PERSONAL CONTACTS.

X) NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY: AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN  
NOTED WITH SATISFACTION.

XI) CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES: NEGOTIATIONS STARTED ON  
RESUMPTION OF AIR SERVICES, EARLY AGREEMENT TO BE SOUGHT.  
SIMULTANEOUS OPENING OF NEW YORK AND KIEV CONSULATES AGREED.

XII) ENVIRONMENT: JOINT RESEARCH AND PRACTICAL MEASURES,  
WITH CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, TO HELP PRESERVE  
ENVIRONMENT.

XIII) EXCHANGE INITIATIVES: A NEED TO PROMOTE EXCHANGES  
AND CONTACTS IN WIDE NUMBER OF FIELDS, SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES TO  
BE DEVELOPED.

XIV) FUSION RESEARCH: CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  
TO EXPLOIT PEACEFUL USE FOR BENEFIT OF ALL.

4. SEE MIFT.

HOWE



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OF 211353Z NOVEMBER 1985

INFO DESKBY 211515Z MODLN AND UKDEL NATO

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IN NEW YORK, NEW DELHI

ACTION FOR COOPERATION

MY TWO MIPTS: US/SOVIET SUMMIT: GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE.

1. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE LASTING OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF THIS MORNING (21 NOVEMBER) GORBACHEV SUMMARISED THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, GAVE A LONG PERSONAL INTERPRETATION OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE, AND ANSWERED NUMEROUS QUESTIONS FROM WESTERN AND EASTERN PRESS. HE SPOKE IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD, LIVELY AND CONVINCING MANNER, LARGELY OFF THE CUFF.

2. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE TALKS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ITEMS ON THE ORIGINAL AGENDA, AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN FRANK, LIVELY ('ALMOST TOO LIVELY AT ONE POINT') AND PRODUCTIVE. THE TWO LEADERS HAD DISCUSSED NOT ONLY US-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE. REGIONAL ISSUES HAD NOT BEEN EXAMINED IN DETAIL, BUT DISCUSSION HAD CENTRED RATHER ON THE GENERAL NEED FOR GREATER STABILITY IN TROUBLED AREAS. IN THE CURRENT DIFFICULT POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE WORLD, THE FIRST STEPS WOULD BE HARD ONES.

3. BOTH SIDES WERE FULLY AWARE OF EACH OTHER'S GLOBAL INTERESTS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THESE SHOULD NOT BE A SOURCE OF CONFRONTATION AND THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD ACT RESPONSIBLY. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE WORLD WERE UNAMBIGUOUS AND OPEN. WHERE THERE WERE OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SOVIET WILL TO CLEAR THE PATH. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SIDES WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS.



4. THE CENTRAL THREAD IN ALL THEIR DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN ARMS CONTROL. FAILURE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE WOULD NULLIFY THE VALUE OF ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS REACHED. SDI WOULD INEVITABLY EXTEND THE ARMS RACE. IN REALITY SDI WAS NOT THE IMPENETRABLE DEFENSIVE SHIELD THAT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED. IT WOULD MEAN THE CREATION OF MORE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THERE WERE QUITE ENOUGH OF THESE AS THINGS STOOD. IN ADDITION THE POTENTIAL FOR ERRORS AND MISHAPS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. COMPUTERS WOULD TAKE OVER IF SDI WERE EVER IMPLEMENTED: LEADERS WOULD HAVE INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TALK AND CONSIDER MATTERS.

5. IF THE STAR WARS DOOR WERE FIRMLY CLOSED NOW, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN RADICAL CUTBACKS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN ADDITION, THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF VERIFICATION COULD BE SOLVED. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD OPEN ITS LABORATORIES TO ANY SORT OF CHECKS. THERE REMAINED, HOWEVER, A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S REASONING ON THE SDI ISSUE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD UNDERTAKEN NOT TO STRIKE FIRST. THIS WOULD SEEM TO REMOVE ANY NEED FOR SDI.

6. THE WEST ALSO SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ILLUSION THAT IF THE AMERICANS WENT AHEAD WITH SDI, THIS WOULD LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION BEHIND. THE INTRODUCTION OF SDI WOULD CERTAINLY 'COMPLICATE MATTERS' FOR THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THEY WOULD RESPOND AS THEY HAD DONE BEFORE AND CLOSE THE GAP.

7. THE SUMMIT MARKED A WATERSHED IN HISTORY. WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS AN HONEST ATTITUDE BY BOTH SIDES. THE SUMMIT HAD ALLOWED AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND A REMOVAL OF SOME OF THE PREJUDICES. CREATION OF TRUST WAS A DIFFICULT AND NOT AN INSTANT PROCESS, BUT GENEVA HAD BEEN A GOOD FIRST STEP. THE OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TALKS HAD BEEN THE CREATION OF THE POSSIBILITY TO MOVE FORWARD. GORBACHEV LOOKED FORWARD OPTIMISTICALLY TO THE FUTURE, AND SAID HE BELIEVED THE WORLD WAS A SAFER PLACE THANKS TO THE GENEVA TALKS.

MOSS



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IN NEW YORK

*ACTION MR GOODERMAN*

MIPT: US/SOVIET SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED IN GENEVA THIS  
MORNING (21 NOVEMBER).

BY MUTAL AGREEMENT, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RONALD REAGAN AND  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF  
THE SOVIET UNION MIKHAIL GORBACHEV MET IN GENEVA NOVEMBER 19-21.  
ATTENDING THE MEETING ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE SECRETARY OF STATE  
GEORGE SHULTZ., CHIEF OF STAFF DONALD REGAN., ASSISTANT TO THE  
PRESIDENT ROBERT MCFARLANE., AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR ARTHUR  
HARTMAN., SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL PAUL H. NITZE., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ROZANNE RIDGWAY., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO  
THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS JACK MATLOCK. ATTENDING  
ON THE SOVIET SIDE WERE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS E.A.  
SHEVARDNADZE., FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER G.M. KORNIYENKO.,  
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES A.F. DOBRYNIN., HEAD OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, A.N.  
YAKOVLEV., HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION OF  
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU L.M. ZAMYATIN., ASSISTANT TO THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, A.M.  
ALEKSANDROV.



THESE COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE BASIC QUESTIONS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE MEETINGS WERE FRANK AND USEFUL. SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON A NUMBER OF CRITICAL ISSUES.

WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFERENCES IN THEIR SYSTEMS AND APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, SOME GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE'S VIEW WAS ACHIEVED BY THE TWO LEADERS. THEY AGREED ABOUT THE NEED TO IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE.

IN THIS CONNECTION THE TWO SIDES HAVE CONFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ONGOING DIALOGUE, REFLECTING THEIR STRONG DESIRE TO SEEK COMMON GROUND ON EXISTING PROBLEMS.

THEY AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN THE NEAREST FUTURE. THE GENERAL SECRETARY ACCEPTED AN INVITATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTED AN INVITATION BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION. ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND TIMING OF THE VISITS WILL BE AGREED UPON THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

IN THEIR MEETINGS, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. AREAS OF AGREEMENT ARE REGISTERED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES.



SECURITY

THE SIDES, HAVING DISCUSSED KEY SECURITY ISSUES, AND CONSCIOUS OF THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. FOR MAINTAINING PEACE, HAVE AGREED THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. RECOGNIZING THAT ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. COULD HAVE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES, THEY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING ANY WAR BETWEEN THEM, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. THEY WILL NOT SEEK TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS.

THEY AGREED TO ACCELERATE THE WORK AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS SET DOWN IN THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 8, 1985, NAMELY TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TO TERMINATE IT ON EARTH, TO LIMIT AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS AND ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY.

NOTING THE PROPOSALS RECENTLY TABLED BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION, THEY CALLED FOR EARLY PROGRESS, IN PARTICULAR IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS COMMON GROUND, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50% REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS OF THE U.S. AND THE USSR APPROPRIATELY APPLIED, AS WELL AS THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT.

DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS, EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED WILL BE AGREED UPON.



## RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

THE SIDES AGREED TO STUDY THE QUESTION AT THE EXPERT LEVEL OF CENTERS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR RISK TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THEY TOOK SATISFACTION IN SUCH RECENT STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION AS THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET-U.S. HOTLINE.

## NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED THE COMMITMENT OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR INTEREST IN STRENGTHENING TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, AND IN FURTHER ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY, INTER ALIA (UNDERLINED) BY ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP.

THEY NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THE OVERALL POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE RECENT REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(-3-)

THE USSR AND THE U.S. REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT, ASSUMED BY THEM UNDER THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON MATTERS OF NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY.

THE TWO SIDES PLAN TO CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE STRENGTHENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENCY IN IMPLEMENTING SAFEGUARDS AS WELL AS IN PROMOTING THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.



THEY VIEW POSITIVELY THE PRACTICE OF REGULAR SOVIET-U.S. CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH HAVE BEEN BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND EXPRESS THEIR INTENT TO CONTINUE THIS PRACTICE IN THE FUTURE.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING SECURITY PROBLEMS, THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THAT THEY ARE IN FAVOUR OF A GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKPILES OF SUCH WEAPONS. THEY AGREED TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THIS MATTER.

THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO INTENSIFY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE LEVEL OF EXPERTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF SUCH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. THEY AGREED TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE ON PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

#### MBFR

THE TWO SIDES EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE VIENNA (MBFR) NEGOTIATIONS AND EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR POSITIVE RESULTS.

#### CDE

ATTACHING GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND NOTING THE PROGRESS MADE THERE, THE TWO SIDES STATED THEIR INTENTION TO FACILITATE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. TO THIS END, THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE.



PROCESS OF DIALOGUE

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AGREED ON THE NEED TO PLACE ON A REGULAR BASIS AND INTENSIFY DIALOGUE AT VARIOUS LEVELS. ALONG WITH MEETINGS BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THIS ENVISAGES REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN THE USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF OTHER MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES. THEY AGREE THAT THE RECENT VISITS OF THE HEADS OF MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS IN SUCH FIELDS AS AGRICULTURE, HOUSING AND PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT HAVE BEEN USEFUL.

RECOGNIZING THAT EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON REGIONAL ISSUES ON THE EXPERT LEVEL HAVE PROVEN USEFUL, THEY AGREED TO CONTINUE SUCH EXCHANGES ON A REGULAR BASIS.

THE SIDES INTEND TO EXPAND THE PROGRAMS OF BILATERAL CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL EXCHANGES, AND ALSO TO DEVELOP TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU ATTENDED THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT ON CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL FIELDS.

THEY AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING HUMANITARIAN CASES IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION.

THEY BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER UNDERSTANDING AMONG OUR PEOPLES AND THAT TO THIS END THEY WILL ENCOURAGE GREATER TRAVEL AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACT.



## NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY

THE TWO LEADERS ALSO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT, IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREED TO A SET OF MEASURES TO PROMOTE SAFETY ON AIR ROUTES IN THE NORTH PACIFIC AND HAVE WORKED OUT STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

## CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES

THEY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DELEGATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEGUN NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT RESUMPTION OF AIR SERVICES. THE TWO LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO REACH A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. IN THIS REGARD, AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE SIMULTANEOUS OPENING OF CONSULATES GENERAL IN NEW YORK AND KIEV.

## ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

BOTH SIDES AGREED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT -- A GLOBAL TASK -- THROUGH JOINT RESEARCH AND PRACTICAL MEASURES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING U.S.- SOVIET AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA, CONSULTATIONS WILL BE HELD NEXT YEAR IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON ON SPECIFIC PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION.



EXCHANGE INITIATIVES

THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE UTILITY OF BROADENING EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS INCLUDING SOME OF THEIR NEW FORMS IN A NUMBER OF SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL, MEDICAL AND SPORTS FIELDS (INTER ALIA, (UNDERLINED) COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES AND SOFTWARE FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL INSTRUCTION: MEASURES TO PROMOTE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE STUDIES IN THE USSR., THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF PROFESSORS TO CONDUCT SPECIAL COURSES IN HISTORY, CULTURE AND ECONOMICS AT THE RELEVANT DEPARTMENTS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION., MUTUAL ALLOCATION OF SCHOLARSHIPS FOR THE BEST STUDENTS IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES FOR THE PERIOD OF AN ACADEMIC YEAR., HOLDING REGULAR MEETS IN VARIOUS SPORTS AND INCREASED TELEVISION COVERAGE OF SPORTS EVENTS). THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO RESUME COOPERATION IN COMBATTING CANCER DISEASES.

THE RELEVANT AGENCIES IN EACH OF THE COUNTRIES ARE BEING INSTRUCTED TO DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROGRAMS FOR THESE EXCHANGES. THE RESULTING PROGRAMS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE LEADERS AT THEIR NEXT MEETING.



## FUSION RESEARCH

THE TWO LEADERS EMPHASIZED THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK AIMED AT UTILIZING CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR FUSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, ADVOCATED THE WIDEST PRACTICABLE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN OBTAINING THIS SOURCE OF ENERGY, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY INEXHAUSTIBLE, FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL MANKIND.

MOSS



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OF 211227Z NOVEMBER 1985

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IN NEW YORK, NEW DELHI

*ACTION MR COODERHAM*

MY TELNO 426 (NOT TO ALL): US/SOVIET SUMMIT

1. AT SHORT CEREMONY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CENTRE THIS MORNING (21 NOVEMBER) PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MADE BRIEF STATEMENTS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. TEXT OF A 32-PARAGRAPH JOINT STATEMENT WAS RELEASED SIMULTANEOUSLY. SCHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE THEN SIGNED A US/SOVIET GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. THERE WAS ALSO AGREEMENT THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD OPEN CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK (CONTINGENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RESUMPTION OF CIVIL AIR SERVICES). IT WAS ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE US, USSR AND JAPAN HAD SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON 19 NOVEMBER ON PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT THE NORTH PACIFIC AIR SAFETY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

2. THE JOINT STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL) AND ALREADY MUFAXED TO ACDD AND SOVIET DEPARTMENT) HAS SECTIONS, AFTER THE PREAMBLE, DEALING WITH SECURITY, NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, RISK REDUCTION CENTRES, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MBFR, CDE, PROCESS OF DIALOGUE, NORTH PACIFIC AIR SAFETY, CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, EXCHANGE INITIATIVES AND FUSION RESEARCH.



3. IN HIS SHORT OPENING STATEMENT PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THE THIS SUMMIT WAS A FRESH START IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR. THERE HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH USEFUL INTERIM RESULTS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO A FURTHER MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN WASHINGTON NEXT YEAR (A POINT NOT EXPLICITLY MENTIONED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT). BUT CONFIDENCE HAD TO BE BUILT ON DEEDS, NOT JUST WORDS AND CERTAIN QUESTIONS REMAINED UNANSWERED. THE FULL "REPORT CARD" ON THE GENEVA SUMMIT WOULD NOT COME IN FOR SOME TIME.

4. IN HIS SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN PRODUCTIVE AND "LIVELY". A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN STRAIGHTFORWARD TERMS. FRESH THINKING WAS NEEDED ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. THE KEY ISSUE REMAINED THE CHOICE BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND MUTUAL DESTRUCTION AND THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN GIVEN PRIORITY IN THE DISCUSSIONS.

5. THE JOINT EXCHANGES AGREEMENT COVERS TRAVELLING EXHIBITIONS, EXCHANGES OF PERFORMERS AND ACADEMICS, EXCHANGES IN A WIDE VARIETY OF PROFESSIONAL FIELDS AND OF PUBLICATIONS AS WELL AS EXCHANGES OF PARLIAMENTARIANS AND OFFICIALS.

6. BOTH REAGAN AND GORBACHEV ARE DUE TO LEAVE GENEVA AROUND LUNCH-TIME TODAY.

MOSS



BELGIUM: M. W. MARTENS, Premier Ministre  
M. L. TINDEMANS, Ministre des Relations Extérieures

CANADA: The Rt.Hon. B. MULRONEY, Prime Minister, Head of Delegation  
The Rt.Hon. J. CLARK, Secretary of State for External Affairs

DENMARK: Mr. P. SCHLÜTER, Prime Minister  
Mr. U. ELLEMAN-JENSEN, Minister of Foreign Affairs

FRANCE M. R. DUMAS, Ministre des Relations Extérieures  
M. C. ARNAUD, Ambassadeur de France, Conseiller du Ministre

GERMANY: Dr. H. KOHL, Federal Chancellor  
Mr. H.-D. GENSCHER, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs

GREECE: S.E.M. Y. HARALAMBOPOULOS, Vice Président du Conseil des Ministres,  
de la République Hellénique  
M. St. VASSILICOS, Ambassadeur, Représentant Permanent

ICELAND: H.E. S. HERMANNSSON, Prime Minister  
H.E. G. HALLGRÍMSSON, Minister for Foreign Affairs

ITALY: On. B. CRAXI, Président du Conseil des Ministres  
On. G. ANDREOTTI, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

LUXEMBOURG. M. J. SANTER, Président du Gouvernement, Ministre d'Etat  
M. J.F. POOS, Vice-Président du Gouvernement, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

NETHERLANDS: H.E. Mr. R.F.M. LUBBERS, Prime Minister  
H.E. Mr. H. VAN DEN BROEK, Minister for Foreign Affairs

NORWAY: H.E. K. WILLOCH, Prime Minister  
H.E. S. STRAY, Minister of Foreign Affairs

PORTUGAL S.E. Prof. A. CAVACO SILVA, Premier Ministre  
S.E. M. P. PIRES DE MIRANDA, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

SPAIN: S.E.M. F. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ, Ministre des Affaires Extérieures  
S.E.M. J. DE OJEDA, Représentant Permanent

TURKEY: S.E.M. T. ÖZAL, Premier Ministre  
S.E.M. V. HALEFOGLU, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

UNITED KINGDOM: The Rt.Hon. Mrs. M. THATCHER, Prime Minister  
The Rt.Hon. Sir Geoffrey HOWE, Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs

UNITED STATES: President R. REAGAN  
The Honorable George C. SHULTZ, Secretary of State



DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE

The Foreign Secretary and I have just returned from the NATO headquarters in Brussels where this afternoon President Reagan gave his NATO Allies a valuable and encouraging briefing on his two days of talks with Mr Gorbachev in Geneva.

My overall impression - and I believe it is shared by my NATO colleagues who heard his account - is that the Summit was a successful meeting - and a meeting which has indeed brought a new start in relations between the US and the Soviet Union.

Geneva in other words is a beginning and not an end.

President Reagan said in his statement this morning "there is hard work ahead" - a sentiment which Mr Gorbachev agreed.

There is indeed much work to be done if we are to secure a safer world but the Summit has I believe, created the opportunity for that work to go ahead - <sup>and for arms reduction</sup> negotiations to be accelerated.

First however, I would like to pay tribute to President Reagan's work at the Summit. He clearly went there extremely well prepared, as I knew he would be, and determined to make progress.

He and Mr Gorbachev talked together for far longer than had been expected and I know how demanding such discussions can be. He deserves our thanks for his great efforts for peace.

You will recall that in my speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on 11 November I expressed four hopes for Geneva.

First was that it would establish a better basis of confidence between the US and the Soviet Union. Both President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev seem satisfied it has done this. Certainly they seem to have established a better understanding and a personal rapport.



My second hope was that it would give an impetus to negotiations on substantial reductions in nuclear weapons.

Again my hopes have been realised. Both President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev are clear this is one important outcome of their talks.

X My third hope <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ that the Summit would strengthen existing arms control agreements and I am assured by President Reagan that this is indeed the aim of both the USA and the Soviet Union. Finally I expressed the hope that the Summit would lead to a better understanding on the goals of SDI research programmes and on the constraints which will be observed in developing them.

Here, Mr Gorbachev has expressly stated that he understands the US position on SDI better as a result of meeting President Reagan, while <sup>not</sup> ~~of~~ course accepting the American point of view. President Reagan has also reiterated to his NATO colleagues today the four points on SDI which he and I worked out at Camp David nearly a year ago .

I said at the Guildhall that if each of these four hopes were realised the Summit would have achieved a realistic outcome.

It follows from this that I am encouraged by what I have heard and seen since the Geneva Summit.

However the real report on Geneva, as President Reagan said this morning, will come over the months and years ahead as the negotiations in Geneva proceed and the USA and Soviet Union develop, as we hope they do, their relationship.

But it is encouraging that after six years without a Summit the meeting went so well and that new impetus is not merely to be given to developing a better relationship between the two great powers but also to the momentum of arms control negotiations.



●believe the world tonight is a more hopeful place than it was this morning. We as Allies of the United States must do all in our power to assist President Reagan in the hard and no doubt sometimes frustrating work that lies ahead, to achieve the safer world which is so manifestly his goal and to which Mr Gorbachev also seems to have committed himself.



① A STRATEGIC QUESTION:

BOTH ALPES ON NEED TO  
ENHANCE STABILITY WITHOUT  
SEEKING SUPERIORITY —

DO YOU THINK YOU  
HAVE ESTABLISHED / CAN ESTABLISH  
A CONVICTION IN WIS  
MIND THAT, U.S.A / WEST  
REALLY DOESN'T SEEK  
SUPERIORITY, BUT ONLY  
SECURITY?

② A PRACTICAL QUESTION:

BOTH SIDES ALPES THEY WANT  
A WORLD WIDE BAN ON  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. DO YOU  
THINK THEY'RE SERIOUS +  
SINCERE IN THAT?





10 DOWNING STREET

*ms*

Prime Minister

Some useful  
background papers  
here.

We can work  
out a line for  
the meeting in the  
plane on the way  
over;

and a line for  
the press on the  
way back.

C.D.P. 287/ki'



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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20.11.85

*CMG.*

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Visit to Brussels, 21 November: President  
Reagan's Briefing of the NAC

In preparation for the Prime Minister's visit to Brussels on 21 November, I enclose a provisional brief. This will be updated as necessary, in the light of the outcome of the Summit.

I enclose a list of possible participants from other countries in the NAC meeting, and the programme. We suggest that the three delegates at the meeting should be Sir John Graham, yourself plus me to take the note.

We expect that the Prime Minister will not wish to make an official statement on the summit until after the President has briefed Alliance leaders. The US are concerned in any event about critical comment by Allies leaders, especially before the President has briefed Congress and the US public on the evening of 21 November. We suggest that in her immediate, post-NAC comment the Prime Minister might welcome the briefing; congratulate the President on his handling of the Summit; emphasize that the meeting was only one step (perhaps encouraging) in a long haul; and welcome the impetus it has given towards a sounder US-Soviet relationship and progress in arms control. Clearly the detailed line will need to be brought up to date after the briefing itself.

*Yours ever,*

*Le Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary


C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: 21  
NOVEMBER 1985

[List of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers attending (other than UK and US)]

<u>Country</u>	Head of Government	Foreign Minister
Belgium	Wilfred Martens	Leo Tindemans
Canada	Brian Mulroney	Joe Clark
Denmark	Paul Schluter	Uffe Elleman-Jensen
France	-	Roland Dumas
Germany	Helmut Kohl	Hans Dietrich Genscher
Greece	Yannis Haralambopoulos (Deputy PM)	-
Iceland	Steingrimur Hermansson(?)	Geir Hallgrimsson
Italy	Bettino Craxi	Giulio Andreotti
Luxembourg	Jacques Santer	Jacques Poos
Netherlands	Ruud Lubbers	Hans van den Broek
Norway	Kare Willoch	Svenn Stray
Portugal	Kavaco Silva	Pedro Pires Miranda
Spain	Felipe Gonzales(?)	Fernandez Ordonez(?)
Turkey	Turgut Ozal	Vahit Halefoglou









PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:  
21 NOVEMBER 1985 PROGRAMME

(all times local)

- 1300 Prime Minister and party depart London Heathrow  
(South Side)
- 1510 Arrive Brussels Abelag. Met by Sir J Graham
- 1515 Party leave airport
- 1525 Party arrive NATO HQ and go to UK Delegation offices
- 1540 Delegates (other than principals) go to conference  
room
- 1545 Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Sir J Graham  
go to foyer outside conference room
- [1600] President Reagan arrives. "Family Portrait".
- 1615 Special Council Meeting begins
- 1745 Special Council Meeting ends  
President Reagan leaves
- 1755 Prime Minister and party leave NATO HQ
- 1805 Prime Minister and party depart Brussels airport
- 1815 Arrive London Heathrow
- 2000 Press Conference at No 12 Downing Street



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF THE NAC, 21 NOVEMBER 1985:  
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

Your Objective

- To underline Allied unity behind the US position.
- To encourage the US to press ahead in the Geneva negotiations.
- (if appropriate) To emphasize need to maintain existing arms control regime (SALT-ABM Treaty).
- (if appropriate) To welcome progress made on regional issues and human rights.

Arguments

- Congratulate President on handling of difficult negotiations. Welcome consultations.
- Allied cohesion essential. Already extracted Soviet counter-proposals before Summit. Now greater need to stick together.
- Right to have engaged Gorbachev across whole agenda of East-West relations. Useful to have shown that non-arms control issues not gratuitous irritants introduced by US; influence wider Western perception of Soviet behaviour.
- (if appropriate) Welcome impulse given to arms control negotiations, and progress in other areas. [Regional] Right to show Soviet behaviour in Third World will not be overlooked, whatever progress on arms control. [Human Rights] Valuable to have raised.
- Need to maintain existing arms control regime viz. SALT-ABM Treaty (Annex A).
- (if appropriate) Welcome agreement on further meeting(s). Hope can build on this prospect.

Tactical Arguments

- Summit first step in long process. Should not under-sell results. Maintain impetus, without creating unrealistic expectations of results.
- Important West continue to hold high ground on arms control. Ensure we keep the initiative. Unhelpful to cast doubt on agreed Allied positions on existing arms control regime.

President Reagan's Objectives

- To secure public Allied endorsement of US handling of Summit; and continued Allied support for US approach to negotiations with Soviet Union.

/Media



Media

US Government concerned to avoid detailed Allied comment before President Reagan briefs Congress late on 21 November, and any subsequent Allied criticism about outcome. Lord Carrington will make short factual statement. Allies should agree to express:

- appreciation for US briefing;
- broad support for US approach to, and handling, of summit (on lines of October NPG Ministerial communique (Annex B)).



BACKGROUND

1. A summary of current US and Soviet proposals is at Annex C.
2. In arms control terms, the degree to which the Summit can be judged a success depends upon the amount of agreement on the following points, in ascending order of importance:
  - i) to meet again at an unspecified time;
  - ii) to urge the need for progress at Geneva;
  - iii) to hold another summit in 9 months/1 year;
  - iv) to issue more precise guidelines to the Geneva negotiator (perhaps incorporating a range of numbers for reductions) for pursuing their work;
  - v) to seek to have this completed by the next meeting;
  - vi) to agree to preserve the SALT constraints;
  - vii) to reaffirm the ABM Treaty;
  - viii) to agree on the need for mutually acceptable clarifications of ambiguities in the Treaty;
  - ix) to extend to 5 years the notice period for withdrawal from the Treaty;
  - x) to explore possible limitations on anti-Satellite systems (ASATs).

Anything beyond (iii) above would produce a qualified success for the Summit; it is most unlikely that the two leaders could get as far as (ix). A mere agreement to meet again, even at an unspecified date, would have to rank as a qualified failure.

3. The key issue will be the extent to which President Reagan is prepared to accept what will in practice increasingly become constraints on the strategic defence research programme of the US, while being able to represent it as in principle unconstrained. If this is to happen, Mr Gorbachev will have to offer the President some real concessions over offensive arms (particularly in START). And for this in turn to happen, Mr Gorbachev will have to take the view that the short-term advantage of resisting any movement towards compromise, and of hoping over the next year to draw on Western disappointment with the result of this Summit, is outweighed by the strategic problems he faces over the next decade: the twin prospects of unconstrained US modernisation of offensive forces, and of an unconstrained SDI building an unstoppable momentum; of a future US Administration no less easy to handle than the present; and of the growing internal problems of the Soviet economy. If Mr Gorbachev returns the ball, which is now in his court,

/it will



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it will be an indication of where over the next few years his priorities and concerns are likely to lie.

4. The Soviet Union will continue trying to exploit potential divisions within the West, and in Washington. The latest example of the latter is the leak on 17 November of a letter from Mr Weinberger to the President arguing against any US commitment at the Summit to maintain the SALT constraints; to any restraints on SDI research, development and testing; and to any formula which glosses over Soviet arms control violations.

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EXTRACT FROM SPEECH GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER AT THE LORD MAYOR'S  
BANQUET, GUILDHALL, ON MONDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1985

"My hopes for the Geneva meeting are therefore :

- That it will establish a better basis of confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- That it will give an impetus to negotiations on substantial reductions in nuclear weapons;
- That it will strengthen existing arms control agreements;
- That it will lead to a better understanding on the goals of their SDI research programmes and on the constraints which will be observed in developing them.

I believe this would be a realistic outcome."

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER AT THE DEBATE  
ON THE ADDRESS ON 6 NOVEMBER 1985

"Indeed, I believe that a reaffirmation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty would be a positive and commendable outcome of the summit."



EXTRACT FROM NPG MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE, 30 OCTOBER 1985

"We declare that the President goes to Geneva with the full support and solidarity of the Alliance ... We welcome the opportunity for effective arms control offered by the Geneva negotiations now underway. We expressed strong support for US positions concerning intermediate, strategic, and defence and spaces systems. We (stressed) that close consultation among the Alliance partners remains essential. We hope that the recent Soviet counter-proposals, despite their one-sided and self-serving nature, indicate a Soviet willingness to accept verifiable and equitable arms control agreements involving deep reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons. We stressed the flexibility contained in the US proposals for significant reductions, which have been on the table since the opening of the negotiations".



ANNEX: US AND USSR POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PROPOSALS TABLED AT GENEVA SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1985)

## US PROPOSALS/VIEW

1. Linkage

Accept that three issues - space/defence; START; INF - to be resolved "in inter-relationship" (Shultz/Gromyko communique). But progress in one area not to be held hostage to progress in another. Separate agreements in each not to be excluded if desirable/necessary

2. Nuclear Arms Control

START (31 October)  
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs)

- limits on ICBM/SLBM 1250-1450
 

Bombers	350
Total SNDVs	1800
- but no agreement to single limit on both ballistic missiles and bombers
- ban "new" heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs
- reiteration of "build down" proposal to assure prompt reductions

Strategic Warheads

- reduce warheads on all ballistic missiles to 4500 of which 3000 on ICBM

## SOVIET PROPOSALS/VIEW

Still insist on all issues, but especially space/START, to be resolved in inter-relationship. No progress on START if SDI continues unchecked. But prepared to de-link INF basket from other two.

All offensive nuclear weapons (30 September/1 October 1985)

Delivery Vehicles

- 50 per cent reduction in each side's "strategic" systems, ie those capable of striking the other's territory. Includes: ICBM, SLBM and bombers on each side. Plus US medium range aircraft and missiles (including GLCM) and carrier-based aircraft. But excluding comparable Soviet systems - eg SS20 and medium range aircraft.
- Reductions would result in:
  - 1680 US delivery vehicles
  - 1250 Soviet delivery vehicles



## US PROPOSALS

- ALCM limit of 1500
- But no single aggregate limit on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs.
- SLCM: not covered in proposals

- Gravity bombs/SRAMs: not covered in proposals

Throw-weight

- 50 per cent cut in maximum ballistic missile throw-weight

## SOVIET PROPOSALS

- PERSHING II: no deployment permitted whether considered in INF or strategic category
- A ban on all long-range cruise missiles. (But see INF below for GLCM)
- A ban on all new types of delivery systems defined as those not flight tested on an agreed date.

"Nuclear charges"

- Maximum aggregate of 6000 "nuclear charges" on each side ie including gravity bombs and short range attack missiles (SRAMs), as well as ballistic missile warheads
- 60 per cent maximum of total weapons permitted on any one leg of the triad.
- Throwweight: no proposal
- Freeze US and Soviet medium range systems, followed by deepest possible reductions
- No deployment of nuclear arms in states where none currently exists
- No increase in stockpile, or replacement with new weapons, in those countries where weapons already deployed
- As confidence building measure, remove from combat alert and dismantle agreed number of nuclear systems, including 200-300 ICBM



US PROPOSALS

INF (31 October)

- Previous US proposals remain on table: zero/zero outcome remains ultimate objective
- But interim proposals as follows:
  - cap on US LRINF missiles in Europe of 140 launchers (31 December 1985) level)
  - USSR to reduce SS20s in range of Europe to 140 launchers
  - US to have freedom to mix between GLCM and PII but mix subject to discussion
  - proportional reductions of Soviet SS20s in Asia
  - resulting in equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads
- collateral constraints on SRINF systems
- discussion of constraints on aircraft

SOVIET PROPOSALS

INF (tabled informally 14 October)

- US to freeze its INF deployments as of 1 December 1985
- USSR to continue moratorium declared on 7 April
- As interim measure, US reductions over following 18 months to 100-120 GLCMs; and
- Soviet reductions in Europe to level of US GLCM warheads plus the level of UK/French warheads
- Final outcome would be no US GLCM deployments, and Soviet forces to equal UK/French levels
- SOVIET LRINF warheads in Asia to be frozen



## US PROPOSALS

Duration of nuclear arms control agreement: not specified

3. Space/  
Defence  
Proposals

Want in-depth discussion (but not at this stage negotiation) of offensive/defensive relationship, focussing on greater role for defensive systems. Not ready for any constraints on SDI research.

- Envisage "open labs" ie, exchange of information/visits on respective research projects.

- Krasnoyarsk LPAR: violation of ABM Treaty

4. BMD  
Research

(a) SDI research programme designed to establish if greater stability achievable by more defences. Consistent with ABM Treaty, and other obligations. Commitment to discuss with Allies steps beyond research and negotiate with Russians on deployments. But no Soviet veto.

(b) Russians carry out extensive BMD research.

## SOVIET PROPOSALS

Duration: not specified. Soviet willingness to extend observance of SALF II limits until end 1986.

Want ban on "space-strike" weapons defined as weapons based in space or air and capable of striking objects in space (ie omitting systems). Permit laboratory research, but insist on "traditional" ABM Treaty limits on and steps beyond that. Owing to objective, SDI research illegal, must be banned.

- Large phased array radars: Soviet Union to cease construction on Krasnoyarsk if US forego modernisation of existing BMEWs at Thule and Fylingdales (tabled informally 14 October)

(a) US SDI (but not Soviet BMD) research is intended as first stage in development of new systems, prohibited by ABM Treaty as such it contravenes the Treaty.

(b) Soviet Union carries out non-weapon scientific research in space, including some military research, eg space early warning.



5. ASATs

(a) US testing of current ASAT essential, consistent with ABM Treaty, Claims ready to seek ASAT limitations, though no evidence of real interest.

(b) Soviet Union has only deployed ASAT system. Constraints inhibited by verification difficulties.

(a) US developed first ASAT, in 1950s. No catch-up necessary. Current testing a breach of ABM Treaty since involves first component of ABM system.

(b) Proposed ban on "space-strike" weapons covers US ASAT.



ANCE COPIES

18/19

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS (2)  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR SAMUEL  
MR ~~WILSON~~ DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) }  
B. NPS ( ) } MOD  
DACU

**IMMEDIATE**



HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D

RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS GENEVA

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 423

OF 191434Z NOVEMBER 1985

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

AND TO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, BERNE, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 422: REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT: NEWS BLACKOUT

1. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO AND SINCE INTRODUCED A NEWS BLACKOUT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. ACCORDING TO SPEAKES (US SPOKESMAN), THE DECISION WAS MADE DURING THIS MORNING'S TALKS IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION AND OF THEIR FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS.

2. AS A RESULT THERE WILL BE FEWER PRESS CONFERENCES AND NO PRIVATE MEDIA INTERVIEWS. ONLY SPEAKES OR ZAMYATIN WILL GIVE PRESS CONFERENCES., AND THEY ARE SUPPOSED ONLY TO GIVE DETAILS OF LENGTH OF SESSIONS AND NAMES OF PARTICIPANTS. SPEAKES INSISTED THAT THE DECISION WAS ENTIRELY MUTUAL, AND HINTED THAT THE BLACKOUT WOULD BE LIFTED WHEN THERE WAS SOMETHING OF SUBSTANCE TO REPORT, PROBABLY ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON (20 NOVEMBER) OR THURSDAY MORNING (21 NOVEMBER). SOVIET SPOKESMAN LATER CONFIRMED THIS ARRANGEMENT.

3. THIS MORNING'S ONE-TO-ONE SESSION LASTED OVER AN HOUR, MUCH LATER THAN EXPECTED.

MOSS





JD

cc FCO  
(telegraphed  
to Brussels in  
advance)

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 November 1985

Dear Peter,

Thank you for your letter of 13 November.  
I entirely agree with what you say about the  
conduct of the meeting on Thursday. I shall  
try to set a good example.

Yours ever  
Raymond

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, KG, CH, GCMG, MC.

SRW



MRS. GOODCHILD

The Prime Minister has invited Mr. Robert McFarlane to Chequers on Saturday 23 November. He will come with the American Ambassador at 1800 to brief the Prime Minister on the outcome of the Reagan/Gorbachev Summit. Thereafter the Prime Minister intends to give a dinner for him and his wife to which the following should please be invited:

The Foreign Secretary and Lady Howe  
The Defence Secretary and Mrs. Heseltine  
The US Ambassador and Mrs. Price  
Mr. and Mrs. Powell

The McFarlanes will stay overnight and the Prime Minister now asks whether the Prices would like to stay overnight too.

Could you please:

- (a) issue invitations for the dinner which I suggest should be 7.30 for 8.00;
- (b) discover whether the Prices would also like to stay overnight; and
- (c) let Lady Howe know that if she wishes to arrive at 6.00 with the Foreign Secretary and stay in the library that would be perfectly acceptable.

(Charles Powell)

17 November 1985





*Delisted  
Ketchum ①*

*7 Mrs.?  
no*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Dinner for the McFarlanes

Lord & Lady Camington

have accepted. Net wishes

no 13. I don't think

you mind, but others sometimes

do.

Ask Lord to invite a friend?

CDP



PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF MR. MCFARLANE, 23 NOVEMBER

Mr. McFarlane accepts with great pleasure your invitation to him and his wife to dinner at Chequers and to stay the night.

I suggest the following programme:

(a) 1800-1900 Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Price to brief you and the Foreign Secretary on the outcome of the Summit.

(b) 1900 Other dinner guests arrive.  
Mrs. McFarlane ✓  
Mrs. Price ✓  
Lady Howe ✓  
Mr. & Mrs. Heseltine ✓  
Mr. & Mrs. Powell ✓  
(Please tick those you want).

(c) 2230 Guests depart.  
McFarlanes stay overnight.

(d) Sunday am McFarlanes depart.

Agree this programme?

C D P

(C.D. Powell)

Would the Prices like  
to stay the night too?  
me

15 November 1985



GRS 1200

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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 3180

OF 152356Z NOVEMBER 1985

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GENEVA SUMMIT PROSPECTS

SUMMARY

1. NOT A PRE-SCRIPTED SET-PIECE, AND SOME STAGE-HANDS NOT ENTIRELY CONFIDENT THAT ALL WILL BE RIGHT ON THE NIGHT. BUT THE PRESIDENT'S WISH TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS NOT IN DOUBT. NO MAJOR ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS LIKELY THIS TIME ROUND: BUT THE PLAY SHOULD HAVE MORE THAN ONE ACT.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT FLIES TO GENEVA ON 16 NOVEMBER, FOR EIGHT HOURS OF (SIMULTANEOUSLY TRANSLATED) TALKS WITH GORBACHEV ON 19/20 (AND PERHAPS 21) NOVEMBER. ON 21 NOVEMBER HE WILL BRIEF ALLIANCE LEADERS IN BRUSSELS ON THE OUTCOME, AND REPORT BACK TO THE US PEOPLE IN A JOINT STATEMENT TO CONGRESS.
3. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST SUCH SUMMIT FOR 6 YEARS. BUT IT IS UNUSUAL ALSO IN A NUMBER OF OTHER RESPECTS.
4. FIRST, IT HAS NOT BEEN PRE-COOKED. THERE IS NO RAFT OF MAJOR INITIALLED DOCUMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE AND RELEASE, AND THE US AIMS, AS OUTLINED PUBLICLY (MY TELNO 3157), AND PRIVATELY (PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 3135), ARE FAIRLY ABSTRACT. VARIOUS MINOR TEXTS (EG ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES) ARE READY NOW, AND OTHERS (EG ON THE RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL CIVIL AIR SERVICES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CONSULATES) MAY STILL BE READIED IN TIME: AND JOINT FORMULAE ON SOME NON-CENTRAL ISSUES (EG NON-PROLIFERATION) HAVE BEEN AGREED. ANNOUNCEMENT OF A JOINT DECISION TO BUILD A PROTOTYPE NUCLEAR FUSION PLANT, WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION, IS ALSO PROBABLE. BUT THERE IS NO AGREED DRAFT, OR EVEN OUTLINE, COMMUNIQUE, AND NO ADVANCE AGREEMENT EVEN ON THE PARAMETERS OF A POSSIBLE SUMMIT QUOTE ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL.
5. SECONDLY, THERE IS WIDESPREAD UNCERTAINTY HERE AS TO WHAT GORBACHEV WANTS, OR HOW HE IS LIKELY TO PLAY THE SUMMIT. THE SHULTZ/MCFARLANE RECONNAISSANCE VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 4/5 NOVEMBER LEFT THE US TEAM PUBLICLY PESSIMISTIC, PRIVATELY UNCERTAIN, FOLLOWING A COMBATIVE PERFORMANCE BY GORBACHEV.
6. THIRDLY, THERE IS ALSO A DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY (AND IN SOME QUARTERS APPREHENSION) ABOUT WHAT THE PRESIDENT WANTS, AT LEAST ON ARMS CONTROL. THE REAGAN OF THE SECOND TERM PRESIDENCY REMAINS AS DESCRIBED IN MY DESPATCH OF 6 NOVEMBER 1984: FEELING THAT HE HAS RECOUPED AMERICAN STRENGTH, HE WANTS TO GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS A MAN OF PEACE. BUT HE HAS MADE NONE OF THE PERSONNEL CHANGES WHICH I WARNED MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO PRODUCE A COHESIVE TEAM

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/DRIVING



DRIVING TOWARDS THIS GOAL. THE PENTAGON WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF HIS 1 NOVEMBER ARMS CONTROL COUNTER-PROPOSAL AT GENEVA, AND REMAIN HOTLY OPPOSED TO HIS GIVING ANY MORE GROUND AT THE SUMMIT. (PERLE WILL BE IN THE TEAM THERE, BUT WEINBERGER - TO HIS CHAGRIN - WILL NOT: THEIR APPROACH IS QUITE UNLIKE THE PRESIDENT'S).

7. LASTLY, UNEASE AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISERS ABOUT HOW HE MAY PLAY THE SUMMIT EXTENDS BEYOND THE PENTAGON HARD-LINERS, FOR WHOM THE FACT OF A SUMMIT REPRESENTS A DEFEAT. ALTHOUGH HIS TELEVISION ADDRESS LAST NIGHT (MY TELNO 3157), LIKE HIS UNGA SPEECH ON 25 OCTOBER, PLAYED WELL DOMESTICALLY, THE WHITE HOUSE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFENSIVE IN THE LAST 3 WEEKS HAS FALTERED WHEN UNSCRIPTED INTERVIEWS HAVE TOUCHED ON DETAILED OR TECHNICAL ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTIONS, IN THE IZVESTIA INTERVIEW RELEASED ON 4 NOVEMBER, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SDI DEPLOYMENT UNTIL ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVERYWHERE HAD BEEN ELIMINATED, AND, ON 12 NOVEMBER, THAT THE US WOULD DISCUSS WITH THE RUSSIANS A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, HAVE BEEN THE MOST STRIKING OF A SERIES OF MIS-STATEMENTS, WHICH HAVE KEPT ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN BUSY WITH CORRECTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS.

8. IN SHORT, THE SUMMIT IS NOT JUST TERRA NOVA, BUT TERRA INCOGNITA, AND THE US SHERPAS ARE LESS THAN 100 PCNT CONFIDENT.

9. THIS MAKES PREDICTION PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. I OF COURSE SEE NO CHANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT THE RUSSIANS CAN BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT HIS FULL SDI VISION WILL BEAR FRUIT. BUT I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT HE GENUINELY WANTS TO ESTABLISH A PROPER DIALOGUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP ACROSS THE BOARD. FOR PRIMARILY DOMESTIC REASONS, HE HAS TO BE SEEN TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS IN A DISCUSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND QUOTE REGIONAL ISSUES UNQUOTE - PARTICULARLY AFGHANISTAN AND NICARAGUA. BUT I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL TRY TO DO SO IN A NON-HECTORING FASHION. IF GORBACHEV TOO STAYS COOL, WE SHOULD SEE IMPROVED ATMOSPHERICS. IF SO, MY HUNCH IS THAT NEW GUIDELINES TO THE KAMPELMAN/KARPOV GENEVA NEGOTIATORS, DESIGNED TO GIVE THEIR DISCUSSIONS GREATER IMPETUS, AND AGREEMENT ON FURTHER (PERHAPS ANNUAL) SUMMITS SHOULD BE ATTAINABLE.

10. BY THE NEXT SUMMIT THE PRESIDENT MAY BE READY TO ACCEPT THAT SOME CONSTRAINTS ON SDI ARE A NECESSARY AND ACCEPTABLE PRICE FOR THE OFFENSIVE ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT I BELIEVE HE CERTAINLY WANTS BY 1988.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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SOVIET D

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PLANNING STAFF

REB D

INFO D

FUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR SAMUEL

MR DAUNT

MR DAVID THOMAS

MR BRAITHWAITE

MR O'NEILL

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NY TEL NO 3180: GENEVA SUMMIT: REGIONAL ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. THE B FEATURE AT THE SUMMIT. PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL PUSH HIS REGIONAL INITIATIVE, BUT WITHOUT HOPE OF ACCEPTANCE. AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE BILATERAL EXPERTS DISCUSSIONS LIKELY.

DETAIL

2. FOR ALL THE ADMINISTRATION'S INSISTENCE THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS DEPENDS ON PROGRESS IN ALL FOUR AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP (ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS), NO ONE DOUBTS THAT THE FIRST IS FOREMOST, AND THAT THE PROSPECTS OF REAL US/SOVIET COOPERATION IN RESOLVING THIRD COUNTRY CRISES ARE POOR. THE PRESIDENT'S REGIONAL INITIATIVE

3. AT GENEVA THE PRESIDENT WILL CERTAINLY SEEK, HOWEVER TO ENGAGE GORBACHEV IN DISCUSSION OF THE CONFLICTS (AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA AND CAMBODIA) MENTIONED IN THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED IN HIS UNGA SPEECH ON 24 OCTOBER. BOTH SUPERPOWERS, HE WILL ARGUE, SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE FIVE AREAS, TO ALLOW SELF-DETERMINATION. IF THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT DO SO, THE WORLD WILL NOTE THAT, AND US ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE FORCES WILL CONTINUE. HIS PROPOSAL THEREFORE CONTAINS BOTH A GENUINE OFFER TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED (EG FOR THE SAKE OF IMPROVED US/SOVIET RELATIONS) TO WITHDRAW THEIR OWN OR SURROGATE FORCES, AND A STRONG PROPAGANDA ELEMENT. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE RUSSIANS HAVE SO FAR SHOWN NO KEENNESS TO DISCUSS IT.

AFGHANISTAN

4. ON AFGHANISTAN THE PRESIDENT WILL EXPRESS FIRM SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN. HE WILL DISMISS ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE FAILURE OF PAKISTAN TO ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS WITH BABRAK KARMAL, IS AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, THE PRIOR NECESSITY IS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE US UNDERSTAND SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS, IF GORBACHEV IS INTERESTED IN A WAY OUT (OF WHICH THE ANALYSTS HERE SEE NO EVIDENCE) THE US WILL BE PREPARED BY GUARANTEES ETC TO HELP FACILITATE THE PROCESS.

NICARAGUA

5. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ONLY A GENUINE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SANDINISTAS AND THEIR FOES, COUPLED WITH A SHARP REDUCTION IN THE SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE, CAN SATISFY US SECURITY INTERESTS AND



BRING PEACE TO NICARAGUA. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT IN SOVIET/CUBAN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA IS LIKELY TO BE EMPHASIZED. THE RECENT BILATERAL EXPERT LEVEL TALKS MAY HAVE INCREASED SOVIET AWARENESS OF US RESOLVE. FEW HERE HOWEVER EXPECT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL REFRAIN, OR WISH TO RESTRAIN THE CUBANS FROM LOW-COST MEDDLING IN THE US BACKYARD. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, SEEMS LIKELY TO RAISE AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST QUOTE DEMOCRATIC UNQUOTE NICARAGUA, AND TO BROADEN THE DISCUSSION TO INCLUDE US CONDUCT ON WIDER CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN ISSUES.

#### ANGOLA

6. IN HIS NEW YORK SPEECH, THE PRESIDENT FOCUSED ON ANGOLA'S INTERNAL CONFLICT. HITHERTO THE US EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON A WIDER REGIONAL APPROACH, WITH A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA BEING COUPLED WITH CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. RECONCILIATION WITHIN ANGOLA HAS NOT BEEN THE ADMINISTRATION'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION, NOR HAS IT YET PROVIDED MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME. THE RUSSIANS CAN HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN RESCUING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMBATTLED SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY BY SHOWING FLEXIBILITY ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THEIR RECENT INCREASED INVESTMENT IN ANGOLA, AND OF THE ANGOLAN ARMY'S SUCCESS AGAINST UNITA. BUT A RIGID SOVIET APPROACH ON ANGOLA COULD CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT OF THE NEED TO AID UNITA.

#### ETHIOPIA

7. THE AMERICANS ARE NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL CONFLICT. THEIR INTEREST IS IN PREVENTING THE RUSSIANS FROM DOMINATING THE STRATEGIC AREA OF THE HORN, AND THE ETHIOPIANS FROM FOSTERING INSTABILITY IN SUDAN. THE AMERICANS ARE ALSO DEEPLY FRUSTRATED THAT THEIR MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN AID TO ETHIOPIA SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT THEM SO FEW POLITICAL BENEFITS. SUCH FACTORS MUST ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THE U.S. AT BAY, AND THE ETHIOPIANS BEHOLDEN TO MOSCOW. BUT THE WAR IMPOSES A BURDEN ON THE RUSSIANS WITHOUT CAUSING THE US COMPARABLE DISCOMFORT. CROCKER HAS JUST GIVEN A SPEECH ON US OBJECTIVES IN THE HORN WHICH REPEATS THE US OFFER OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ETHIOPIANS.

#### CAMBODIA

8. THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE RUSSIANS TO GET THE VIETNAMESE TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA, AND WILL PRESS THE ASEAN PROPOSAL FOR PROXIMITY TALKS.

#### THE MIDDLE EAST

9. THE MIDDLE EAST - A CONSPICUOUS OMISSION FROM THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE-SEEMS PARADOXICALLY TO OFFER MORE SCOPE FOR GENUINE DISCUSSION AT GENEVA. THE ADMINISTRATION DO NOT HOWEVER BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CAPABLE OF ACTING CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE PEACE PROCESS, SHULTZ AND RABIN AGREED ON 15 NOVEMBER THAT SOVIET VIEWS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CHANGED. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY, AT PERES' BEHEST, TO SEEK RELAXATION OF SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON JEWISH EMIGRATION, AND TO URGE GORBACHEV TO ESTABLISH FULL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. PRE-SUMMIT



CONTACTS HAVE REVEALED NO SIGN OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON EITHER ISSUE, DESPITE THE MANY RUMOURS, THOUGH SOME DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE MOVE. IN ORDER TO KEEP JORDAN IN PLAY, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO A LIMITED SOVIET ROLE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, PROVIDED ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS WERE MET. BUT THEY DO NOT EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO BE INTERESTED IN PLAYING ONLY A TOKEN ROLE.

10. IF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS DISCUSSED, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO CUT SUPPLIES OF ARMS TO IRAN THROUGH ITS FRIENDS (NORTH KOREA, EASTERN EUROPE, SYRIA AND LIBYA). SHULTZ SPOKE ON THESE LINES TO SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW, BUT THERE WAS NO RESPONSE ON THIS OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THE WAR.

CONCLUSION

11. THE AMERICANS WILL BE AGREEABLY SURPRISED IF THE RUSSIANS BITE ON ANY OF THE ABOVE ISSUES, LET ALONE THE UMBRELLA QUOTE INITIATIVE UNQUOTE. AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE THE SERIES OF BILATERAL TALKS ON INDIVIDUAL REGIONS AT EXPERT LEVEL SEEMS A LIKELY OUTCOME.

WRIGHT

YYYY

FCC PASS SAVING PEKING PRETORIA AMMAN ISLAMABAD MEXICO CITY TEL AVIV  
NEW DELHI CARIO KUALA LUMPUR ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN  
LISBON LUXEMBOURG OTTAWA OSLO REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE UKDEL VIENNA  
CANBERRA

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

US/BOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD

DEFENCE D

SOVIET D

NEWS D

HAD

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THE SUMMIT: PRESIDENTIAL BROADCAST  
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBES HIS JOURNEY TO GENEVA AS A QUOTE MISSION FOR PEACE UNQUOTE WHICH HE HOPES WILL BEGIN A DIALOGUE LASTING BEYOND HIS PRESIDENCY. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON PEOPLE TO PEOPLE CONTACT. KEYNOTE IS QUOTE HOPE WITHOUT ILLUSION UNQUOTE. NO NEW PROPOSALS.

DETAIL

2. IN A BROADCAST TO THE NATION TONIGHT, PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBED HIS HOPES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE GENEVA SUMMIT. IT WOULD BE QUOTE A MISSION FOR PEACE UNQUOTE. IT WOULD NOT REMOVE THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT HE HOPED IT MIGHT QUOTE BEGIN A DIALOGUE THAT ENDURES BEYOND MY PRESIDENCY UNQUOTE, AND COULD HELP TO BUILD THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A LASTING PEACE. TRUE PEACE DEPENDED UPON HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW. HIS AGENDA FOR THE MEETING WAS THE STEADY EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUPPORT FOR RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE BROADENING OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES, AND THE STEADY REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD QUOTE NO HIGHER PRIORITY UNQUOTE THAN TO LIMIT AND END THE DANGEROUS COMPETITION IN NUCLEAR ARMS. QUOTE WE HAVE GONE THE EXTRA MILE, BUT OUR OFFERS HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN WELCOMED ... I AM PLEASED NOW, HOWEVER, BY THE INTEREST EXPRESSED IN REDUCING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BY THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP ... THE US IS PREPARED TO REDUCE COMPARABLE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BY 50 PER CENT. WE SEEK REDUCTIONS THAT WILL RESULT IN A STABLE BALANCE BETWEEN US WITH NO FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AND VERIFIED FULL COMPLIANCE ... THE WHOLE WORLD WOULD BENEFIT IF WE COULD BOTH ABANDON THESE WEAPONS ALTOGETHER AND MOVE TO NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN NO-ONE. UNQUOTE



4. THE PRESIDENT SAID PEACE WAS ALSO UNDERMINED BY THE USE OF FORCE, SUBVERSION AND TERROR, AND RECALLED HIS UN PROPOSAL FOR SUPER-POWER COOPERATION IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, NICARAGUA, ETHIOPIA AND CAMBODIA.

5. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT FREEDOM WAS AMERICA'S CORE, AND THAT THE AFFIRMATION OF FREEDOM WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR SUCCESS AT GENEVA. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE AS FUNDAMENTAL A PIECE AS ARMS CONTROL. THE US STOOD FOR OPENNESS. HE HOPED THE SUMMIT WOULD OPEN NEW AVENUES FOR COOPERATION AND CONTACT THROUGH CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND SPORTING EXCHANGES. HE REPEATED HIS REQUEST FOR RECIPROCAL MEDIA ACCESS FOR LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. HE BELIEVED THAT PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE YOUNG GENERATION, COULD QUOTE BUILD GENUINE CONSTITUENCIES FOR PEACE IN BOTH COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO GENEVA WITHOUT ILLUSIONS BUT WITH HOPE. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD FACED A COMMON ENEMY IN THE PAST. QUOTING A LETTER FROM A MOTHER OF CHILDREN IN LOUISIANA, HE SAID THE CENTRAL TRUTH OF THIS GENERATION WAS THE CRY OF ALL THE CHILDREN OF THE WORLD FOR PEACE, AND FOR LOVE OF FELLOW MAN, AND HE PRAYED FOR GOD'S GUIDANCE.

WRIGHT

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MY TELNO 1490 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 3135 : SUMMIT PREPARATIONS

1. HARTMAN SAW SHEVARDNADZE AGAIN YESTERDAY EVENING. THE AMERICAN DCM (PLEASE PROTECT) SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD MINISTER THAT THE CALL HAD BEEN AT HARTMAN'S OWN REQUEST. HE HAD HAD NO FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF CLEARING THESE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON. HIS PURPOSE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN TO PUT TO SHEVARDNADZE THE ARGUMENTS WHY IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DROP THE IDEA OF TRYING TO ISSUE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE. ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS HERE, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MARRYING THEIR RESPECTIVE DRAFTS ON SUBJECTS OTHER THAN THE ALL IMPORTANT QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL, WHICH WAS BEING LEFT BLANK. HARTMAN ARGUED, IN FACE OF STUBBORN RESISTANCE FROM SHEVARDNADZE, THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE ON ARMS CONTROL, WITH THE RESULT THAT WHATEVER MINIMAL WORDING COULD BE ACHIEVED WOULD LOOK LIKE FAILURE. SHEVARDNADZE, WHO STILL STRIKES THE AMERICANS AS UNCERTAIN AND ILL-BRIEFED, HAD EN PASSANT REVEALED THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM GORBACHEV TO TRY TO AGREE, BEFORE THE MEETING, A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. HE COMMENTED WRYLY THAT THE TWO SYSTEMS OF WORKING WERE COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO ONE ANOTHER, IN THE AMERICAN CASE WITH PROPOSALS GOING UP TO THE PRESIDENT, AND IN THE SOVIET CASE WITH INSTRUCTIONS COMING DOWN FROM THE TOP. THE QUESTION REMAINED UNRESOLVED AT THE END OF HARTMAN'S CALL.

2. MEANWHILE, THE AMERICANS TELL US OF SOME PROGRESS ON PERIPHERAL FRONTS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW AT LAST GIVEN WAY ON THE FINAL OUTSTANDING POINT AS REGARDS THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. THIS RELATED TO THE EXCHANGE OF TELEVISION MATERIAL AND THE AMERICANS HAD THEMSELVES BEEN ON THE POINT OF CONCEDED THE POINT WHEN THE RUSSIANS BEAT THEM TO IT. AN AMERICAN TEAM IS THIS WEEK IN KIEV LOOKING AT POSSIBLE NEW BUILDINGS FOR A CONSULAR-GENERAL THERE, IN COUNTERPART TO NEW YORK. THE AMERICANS ARE TRYING TO HARNESS ENERGY GENERATED BY THE IMPENDING SUMMIT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE AND OTHER BI-LATERAL DOSSIERS WHICH, THOUGH SUBSTANTIVELY UNRELATED, ARE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS NEGOTIATING LINKS ON EITHER SIDE.

CARTLEDGE

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PRIME MINISTER

Bud McFarlane has been in touch to say that he is likely to pass through London on Saturday 23 November on his way back to Washington after the Summit. If you would find it useful he would be happy to pop down to Chequers to give you a rather fuller and more personal briefing about it than would be possible in the NATO Meeting. The most convenient time for him would be after 5.00 pm on Saturday afternoon. You will be at Chequers then and at present have no engagement.

He has let it be known in a neutral way that his wife will be with him. You may like to consider whether you should ask them both to come down to Chequers and stay for supper, although you have a small lunch party (Sir John Junor and Lord Forte) the next day. In that event, you might want to invite the Foreign Secretary and Lady Howe, the Defence Secretary and Mrs Heseltine and the American Ambassador and Mrs Price for instance.

Agree to invite Mr. McFarlane to Chequers to brief you?

*Yes*

Agree that the Foreign Secretary should be present for the briefing?

*Yes*

Agree to invite both McFarlanes to stay for supper alone?

Agree to invite 2 or 3 other couples?

*Yes*

*↓ would they like to stay the night?*

*CDP*

*mt*

C.D. POWELL

14 November 1985





10 DOWNING STREET

Cardine

CR

Please see the  
attached note. I  
will now find out  
whether Acton is  
correct.

But could you please  
have cheques:

- (a) possible dinner for  
10 people on 23 number;
- (b) possible two overnight  
guests 23/24 number.

CDP



cc fco.

*clg*

ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ  
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*Rene Minster*  
*CDP*  
*10/21*

SG/85/686

Brussels, 13th November 1985

*My Dear Prime Minister*

I am much looking forward to seeing you here at NATO Headquarters next Thursday. President Reagan's initiative in coming here immediately after the Summit is very welcome, and I am delighted to see reinforced at this level what has in any case been a very close and worthwhile process of consultation.

As you know, the timing will be tight: the President has to be in Geneva on the Thursday morning; and he is to address a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday evening. We shall therefore do everything we can to cut down on time-consuming protocol at this end. But, however much we try to cut down on the inessentials, we shall be left with a schedule which allows us just about one hour, once the President has made his opening remarks, in which to exchange views on the substance. And that, if we divide it equally, would work out at just under four minutes per person.


I am not at all sure that a formal tour de table would be the most productive use of our time. I wonder therefore if it would not be better to avoid set speeches, and to try rather to encourage discussion and to seek clarifications where they may be thought helpful.

/2...

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,  
London,  
U.K.



In other words, we have a problem; and I am writing to you and to your colleagues to ask for your help in getting the best out of a very important but in the circumstances inevitably short meeting.

 J. P. Carrington  
CARRINGTON



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GENEVA SUMMIT, 19/21 NOVEMBER : FINAL PREPARATIONS.

1. AT THE WEEKLY MEETING OF THE 4 (US/FRG/France/UK) ON 13 NOVEMBER MY US COLLEAGUE (WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD PLEASE BE RESPECTED) GAVE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE GENEVA SUMMIT.

MODALITIES

2. IT IS PLANNED THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO FULL SESSIONS, EACH LASTING PROBABLY THREE HOURS, ON BOTH 19 AND 20 NOVEMBER. THE MORNING OF 21 NOVEMBER IS BEING LEFT CLEAR FOR A POSSIBLE PRESS CONFERENCE (IT HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE JOINT ON THE PARIS PATTERN) AND A POSSIBLE FINAL TETE A TETE.

3. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL BE: GORBACHEV, SHEVARDNADZE, DOBRYNIN, KORNIENKO, YAKOVLEV, ZAMYATIN AND ALEXANDROV-AGENTOV. THE US DELEGATION IS LIKELY TO BE: PRESIDENT REAGAN, SHULTZ, MACFARLANE, HARTMAN, NITZE AND TWO OTHERS, ONE OF WHOM MAY BE DONALD REGAN. A STRONG TEAM OF SOVIET EXPERTS AND PROPAGANDISTS - INCLUDING VELIKHOV, ARBATOV AND CHERVOV - ARE ALREADY IN GENEVA TO SOFTEN UP THE WESTERN PRESS CORPS WITH BRIEFINGS AD LIB. ON THE US SIDE, RICHARD PERLE AND FRED IKLE (DOD) WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY BUT NOT AS MEMBERS OF THE FORMAL DELEGATION.

4. ALTHOUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT (MARK PALMER) IS STILL BEAVING AWAY WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN SEARCH OF AGREED FORMULATIONS, THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ HAVE VIRTUALLY RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY CONCLUDING JOINT STATEMENT OR COMMUNIQUE. HARTMAN HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE ON 14 OR 15 NOVEMBER TO PROPOSE

*Yakovlev  
Zamyatin came  
with Gorbachev.  
Alexandrov was  
at the Kremlin  
meeting.*



East West Relg.

IPm

TIT OF ANY CONCLUDING JOINT STATEMENT OR COMMUNIQUE.  
INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE ON 14 OR 15 NOVEMBER TO PROPOSE  
NEW LANGUAGE ON ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL (UNSPECIFIED) BUT THERE IS  
APPARENTLY LITTLE CHANCE THAT IT WILL BE ACCRPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS.  
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON AIR SAFETY IN THE NORTH PACIFIC ARE PROCEEDING  
TOO SLOWLY TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT. AN  
AGREEMENT ON BEEFED-UP CULTURAL EXCHANGES IS, HOWEVER, ALMOST  
CERTAIN TO BE READY FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA, SUBJECT TO THE  
RESOLUTION OF A FEW REMAINING DIFFERENCES THIS WEEK. THE SOVIET  
SIDE HAS PROPOSED AN AGREEMENT ON US/SOVIET COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR  
FUSION RESEARCH, ON THE SAME LINES AS THAT PROPOSED TO THE FRENCH  
DURING GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO PARIS. THE RUSSIANS FAVOUR AUSTRIA AS  
THE SITE FOR A JOINT RESEARCH PROJECT, THE AMERICANS GENEVA.  
ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NUCLEAR FUSION IS CONSIDERED BY  
EXPERTS TO HAVE SCANT CHANCE OF LEADING ANYWHERE, THE AMERICANS  
ARE NEVERTHELESS DISPOSED TO VIEW THE SOVIET INITIATIVE FAVOURABLY:  
THEY ARE LIKELY TO APPROACH OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITH WHOM THEY HAVE  
AGREEMENTS IN THIS FIELD, INCLUDING HMG, ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL  
WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS THERE ARE NO  
INDICATIONS OF ANY SOVIET CONCESSIONS APART FROM ELENA BONNER'S  
EXIT VISA FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT IN ITALY.

5. DOBRYNIN IS APPARENTLY FALLING OVER HIMSELF TO REASSURE THE  
AMERICANS THAT GORBACHEV WILL NOT ADOPT THE SAME TONE WITH PRESIDENT  
REAGAN AS HE DID WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ IN MOSCOW ON 5 NOVEMBER (MY  
TELNO 1469)

COMMENT

6. AT THIS LATE STAGE, CLEARLY, NEITHER SIDE IS EXPECTING A  
SUBSTANTIAL OUTCOME FROM THE SUMMIT. AGREEMENT ON A FURTHER  
MEETING, MORE URGENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATORS  
AND ONE OR TWO BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SEEM TO BE THE MOST WHICH CAN  
REALISTICALLY BE ANTICIPATED. THE RUSSIANS ARE CLEARLY BANKING ON,  
AND WORKING HARD FOR, AT LEAST A PROPAGANDA SUCCESS WHICH WILL  
SECURE FOR THEM THE HIGH GROUND DURING THE INTERVAL BETWEEN GENEVA  
AND ANY FUTURE MEETING AT THIS LEVEL.

CARTLEDGE

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SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND SUMMIT PROSPECTS

SUMMARY

1. US PRESS MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT SUMMIT PROSPECTS, BUT ADMINISTRATION STILL BELIEVE SOME USEFUL PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE.

DETAIL

2. SINCE SHULTZ'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW, COMMENT IN THE US PRESS HAS TAKEN A MORE PESSIMISTIC TURN. THEIR GENERAL VIEW IS NOW THAT MEETING OF MINDS IS UNLIKELY, AND THAT ANY CONCRETE AGREEMENTS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO SECONDARY BILATERAL ISSUES. THIS THEME REFLECTS TWO FACTORS, PESSIMISTIC COMMENT BY US OFFICIALS IN SHULTZ'S PARTY, WHO HAVE DWELT ON SOVIET MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S UNDERLYING POLICIES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION, AND GORBACHEV'S QUOTE COMRATIVE AND ARGUMENTATIVE UNQUOTE PERFORMANCE: AND SECONDLY, THE SERIES OF RECENT US/SOVIET INCIDENTS (YURCHENKO, MEDVED, SUKONOV (MY TELNO 3051), THE SOVIET REFUSAL OF A REAGAN TELEVISION INTERVIEW, AND THE MIX-UP OVER THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON SDI IN HIS IZVESTIA INTERVIEW) WHICH HAVE BEEN LUMPED TOGETHER AS SYMPTOMS OF A WORSENING ATMOSPHERE, AND OF LACK OF COHESION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION.

3. THERE IS OF COURSE AN ELEMENT OF DELIBERATE EXPECTATION-LOWERING BY THE ADMINISTRATION. ARMACOST (STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD ME ON 7 NOVEMBER THAT OPTIMISM AMONG OFFICIALS WAS HIGHER, EVEN POST-MOSCOW, THAN WAS BEING ADMITTED PUBLICLY. COMPARING THIS WITH THE RUN-UP TO PAST SUMMITS, HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR THERE TO BE BILATERAL COMPLICATIONS IN THE PRECEDING DAYS, AND SUMMITS HELD EVEN UNDER UNPROMISING AUGURIES HAD ACHIEVED USEFUL RESULTS. THE TOUGHNESS WHICH GORBACHEV HAD EXHIBITED TO SHULTZ WAS A REFLECTION OF HIS CHARACTER AND SELF-CONFIDENCE. HE HAD CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION VERY QUICKLY. BUT HE BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV'S INTEREST WAS IN HAVING A SUCCESS TO PRESENT AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY 1986. THEREFORE THE SOVIET APPROACH, LIKE THAT OF THE US, WAS PROBABLY SERIOUS, THOUGH THE GOING WOULD BE TOUGH ON THE KEY ISSUES.

/4.

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4. WHEN I SAW MCFARLANE (NSC) ON 7 NOVEMBER, HE COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE GREAT GAPS IN GORBACHEV'S KNOWLEDGE. GORBACHEV SEEMED GENUINELY TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROSPERITY OF THE WEST DEPENDED ON THEIR DEFENCE INDUSTRIES, AND THAT THE WEST NEEDED THE SOVIET THREAT TO SUSTAIN ITSELF. THIS WAS PALPABLY FALSE. GORBACHEV WAS ALSO CLEARLY DEFICIENT IN HIS KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND OF THE REASONING BEHIND SDI. MCFARLANE SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE LATEST US GENEVA PROPOSALS WERE NEW AND MARKED AN ADVANCE. MCFARLANE WAS ON BALANCE STILL OPTIMISTIC, THOUGH LESS PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SO FAR TH

IN THE ADMINISTRATION FELT WAS NECESSARY.

6. WHAT YOU SAID ABOUT SUMMIT PROSPECTS IN THE HOUSE ON 8 NOVEMBER SEEMS EXACTLY RIGHT.

WRIGHT

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MY TELNO 1467.

*A more down-beat  
report. Hartman was  
present, but is also a  
rather pessimistic fellow.  
CDP*

*MF*

SECRETARY SHULTZ IN MOSCOW - 4/5 NOVEMBER: SUMMIT PROSPECTS

1. MY US COLLEAGUE TODAY GAVE ME AND THE FRG AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE. AS SHULTZ WILL NOT HIMSELF HAVE YET HAD TIME TO REPORT PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, HARTMAN URGED WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS THAT HIS CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE RESPECTED: I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS TELEGRAM COULD BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY.

SHEVARDNADZE

2. AT THEIR MEETING ON 4 NOVEMBER, SHEVARDNADZE WAS NOTABLY RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE RUNNING AND PASSED THE LEAD TO SHULTZ BY ASKING FOR A FULL EXPOSITION OF THE US POSITION ON ALL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. SHULTZ OBLIGED WITH A SUBSTANTIAL PRESENTATION OF BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND DETAILED CONTENT, COVERING NOT ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL CATEGORIES BUT ALSO CW, MBFR AND CDE. THE US TEAM HAD COME ARMED WITH A DRAFT 'COMMUNIQUE', NOT WITH ANY INTENTION OF AGREEING SUCH A DOCUMENT BUT FOR USE AS A QUARRY FROM WHICH TO COMPARE US AND SOVIET FORMULATIONS. A WORKING GROUP OF THREE OFFICIALS FROM EACH SIDE WENT THROUGH THE DOCUMENT TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE POINTS OF AGREEMENT BUT ACHIEVED ONLY MEAGRE RESULTS: A POSSIBLE STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES (ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES STILL REMAIN), . ALTHOUGH SHEVARDNADZE REPEATEDLY URGED THE DESIRABILITY OF SOME KIND OF FINAL DOCUMENT FOR THE SUMMIT, IT WAS CLEAR AT THE END OF THE MEETING THAT THE MATERIAL FOR ONE SIMPLY DOES NOT EXIST - AND PRESIDENT REAGAN IS IN ANY CASE OPPOSED TO SUCH DOCUMENTS IN PRINCIPLE. THE SESSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE WAS THEREFORE UNPRODUCTIVE: HARTMAN DESCRIBED IT AS A 'POTEMKIN' MEETING, SET UP FOR APPEARANCE'S SAKE ONLY, AS A PRELUDE TO THE KEY DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV.

GORBACHEV

3. IN A DISCUSSION LIMITED TO THREE ASIDE (GORBACHEV, SHEVARDNADZE, DOBRYNIN: SHULTZ, MACFARLANE, HARTMAN) WHICH LASTED FOR FOR FOUR HOURS, GORBACHEV ADOPTED HIS TOUGHEST TONE,

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*WHILE*



WHILE NOT EXCEEDING THE BOUNDS OF COURTESY. HE BLAMED THE UNITED STATES FOR EVERY ASPECT OF THE DETERIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS AT GENEVA: THE VILLAIN ON ALL COUNTS WAS THE ABSURD US ASPIRATION TO PUT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN SPACE. HE ACCUSED THE US OF AIMING AT MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND OF HARBOURING ILLUSIONS ABOUT SUPPOSED SOVIET WEAKNESS AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO PRESSURE. GORBACHEV REVEALED AN EXTRAORDINARY IGNORANCE OF WESTERN REALITIES AND A DEPRESSING ATTACHMENT TO MARXIST-LENINIST SHIBBOLETHS: THE US AND OTHER CAPITALIST SOCIETIES WERE ENDEAVOURING TO ESCAPE FROM THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BY ACCELERATING THE ARMS RACE, SPURRED ON BY THE GREED AND AMBITIONS OF THE MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. HE QUOTED FREQUENTLY FROM THE HOOVER INSTITUTE PAPER "AMERICA IN THE 80S", CLAIMING THAT ALL ITS PROPHECIES OF REDUCED SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, SWOLLEN MILITARY CAPACITY AND A CRUSADE AGAINST COMMUNISM HAD BEEN FULFILLED IN THE EVENT. HE CLAIMED, BY CONTRAST, THAT THE RECENT SERIES OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE FOR RADICAL CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, HAD GIVEN RISE TO PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET MILITARY WHICH HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN OVERCOME.

4. GORBACHEV REPEATEDLY INTERRUPTED THE INTERPRETER, WITH THE RESULT THAT MANY OF SHULTZ'S REJOINDERS WERE NEVER TRANSLATED. HE CONDUCTED THE DIALOGUE LIKE A TRIAL LAWYER, POUNCING ON WHAT HE SAW AS WEAK POINTS IN HIS OPPONENT'S ARGUMENT WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE END OF THE STATEMENT. SHULTZ ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE US APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AND PARTICULARLY THE US VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS: THIS MADE NO IMPRESSION ON GORBACHEV: WHO QUOTED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REMARK TO THE EFFECT THAT "HE WHO CONTROLS SPACE CONTROLS THE EARTH". VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO ARMS CONTROL. SHULTZ'S ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE THE ROOTS OF US CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES CUT NO ICE, AND GORBACHEV BRUSHED ASIDE REFERENCES TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS BY ACCUSING THE US OF SEEING THE SOVIET HAND IN EVERY THIRD WORLD PROBLEM: THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS ON REGIONAL ISSUES SINCE THEY WERE DESIGNED TO PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN THE DOCK.

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## CONCLUSION

5. HARTMAN'S OWN CONCLUSIONS FROM SHULTZ'S MEETINGS HERE IS THAT THEY HAVE ADVANCED THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT VERY LITTLE, IF AT ALL. SHULTZ HIMSELF APPARENTLY TAKES A LESS PESSIMISTIC VIEW AND STILL BELIEVES THAT IT MAY BE ALL RIGHT ON THE NIGHT. HARTMAN ACCEPTS THAT GORBACHEV'S AGGRESSIVE APPROACH AND HIS NOTABLY HISTRIONIC PERFORMANCE WERE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO IMPRESS SHULTZ WITH THE MESSAGE THAT UNLESS PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PREPARED TO RETREAT ON THE SDI, THERE CAN BE NO SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, COMMENTED AT THE END OF THE MEETING THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED IN GENEVA, THERE WOULD STILL BE A US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, BUT NOT A VERY GOOD ONE.

CARTLEDGE

### US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD

DEFENCE D

SOVIET D

NEWS D

HAD

EED

WED

PLANNING STAFF

RES D

INFO D

PUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR SAMUEL

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OF 061759Z NOVEMBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DACU AND DNPS)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL VIENNA

MPT: US NAC BRIEFING ON SHULTZ'S MOSCOW TALKS: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

## SUMMARY

1. NITZE UPDATED THE COUNCIL ON PROGRESS IN GENEVA AND REVIEWED SHULTZ' VISIT TO MOSCOW: THE US GENEVA TEAM WOULD RETURN DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON AFTER TOMORROW'S FINAL PLENARY. THE US SIDE HAD SET THEIR QUOTE COUNTER COUNTER UNQUOTE PROPOSALS IN FULL BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT ELABORATED ON THEIRS. THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE VIGOROUS UNQUOTE EXCHANGES IN MOSCOW BUT US/SOVIET POSITIONS ON SPACE AND DEFENCE, DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES, AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, REMAINED FAR APART.

## DETAIL

2. IN REVIEWING EVENTS IN GENEVA, NITZE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ADDED LITTLE CLARIFICATION SINCE HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON 9 OCTOBER. THE SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD BEEN FLAWED AND SELF-SERVING, BUT THE PRESIDENT REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AND HAD CONSEQUENTLY DIRECTED THAT ADDITIONAL US PROPOSALS BE ADVANCED TO ADD MOMENTUM. THESE HAD BEEN SUMMARISED IN THE PLENARY SESSION ON 1 NOVEMBER AND DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL IN SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS OF THE 3 GROUPS.

3. NITZE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE NEW US PROPOSALS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN COMMUNICATED TO ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (YOUR TELNO 1744 OF 1 NOVEMBER NOT REPEATED TO ALL). IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD HE STRESSED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGGREGATION OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH FAILED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT OR CRUISE MISSILES. NOR COULD THEY ACCEPT THE EQUATION OF GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS WITH OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC WARHEADS. ON INF HE CONFIRMED THAT THE US WOULD SEEK AN EQUAL GLOBAL LIMIT ALTHOUGH THE US HAD NO CURRENT PLANS TO DEPLOY LRINF IN THE FAR EAST. THE US PROPOSAL FOR PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN THE FAR EAST, AS OPPOSED TO A QUOTE FREEZE UNQUOTE ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENT, HAD DRAWN A SHARP RESPONSE FROM KVITSINSKY.

4. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ADHERED TO FAMILIAR POSITIONS. NOTHING WOULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT A BAN ON QUOTE SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS UNQUOTE AND A US DECISION TO ABANDON

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EXTRA.



EXTRA-LABORATORY WORK ON THE CREATION OF SUCH WEAPONS. THEY CONTINUED TO DEMAND FULL COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, AND TO INSIST ON THEIR DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS I.E. WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY. THE US HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT WITH THIS DEFINITION BECAUSE IT FAILED TO LIMIT SOVIET FORCES CONSTITUTING A THREAT TO US FORCES DEFENDING EUROPE AND ALLIED FORCES THERE. ALTHOUGH NITZE FELT THEY HAD GOT THE BETTER OF THE ARGUMENT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE ANY CLOSER TO RESOLVING THIS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF VIEW.

5. IN RESPONSE TO A RANGE OF QUESTIONS NITZE ALSO PROVIDED SOME CLARIFICATION OF THE NEW US PROPOSALS:

A) THE 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW WEIGHT WOULD APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE OF FORCES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTION WOULD BE SPREAD BETWEEN LIGHT AND HEAVY REENTRY VEHICLES. IT LATER EMERGED THAT THE RELEVANT REDUCTION WOULD BE 50 PER CENT OF THE CURRENT SOVIET AGGREGATE, I.E., FROM ABOUT 6,000 TO 3,000 KG.

B) BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO HAVE MORE THAN 3,000 SLBM WARHEADS, BUT NOT MORE THAN THAT NUMBER OF ICBM WARHEADS.

C) ALL MOBILE ICBMS WOULD BE BANNED (NOT JUST NEW ONES) AND THERE WOULD BE NO NEW HEAVY ICBMS, INCLUDING MODERNISED SS18S.

D) THE PROPOSAL TO CAP US LRMF LAUNCHERS IN EUROPE AT 140 DID NOT IMPLY THAT THE MIX OF GLCM AND P2 COULD NOT BE CHANGED AND THE WARHEAD TOTAL CONSEQUENTLY INCREASED. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN THE SUGGESTION THAT WARHEAD TOTALS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BE REDUCED BELOW 420.

6. SUMMARISING, NITZE SAID HE COULD NOT PUT HIS FINGER ON ANY PARTICULAR AREAS OF CONVERGENCE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD BUT THE QUOTE UPBEAT TONE UNQUOTE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S FINAL PRESENTATION SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT WISH TO SEE A FAILURE AT THE SUMMIT.

PIKE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED  
ACDD  
DEFENCE D  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES D  
INFO D  
FUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
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ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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**US NAC BRIEFING ON SHULTZ'S MOSCOW TALKS**

## SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING SERIOUSLY FOR THE GENEVA SUMMIT. CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ARE NOT RULED OUT. BUT THERE IS NO CLEAR SIGN THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE YET READY TO TAKE THE TOUGH DECISIONS NECESSARY TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE SUMMIT.

## DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS NITZE AND MS RIDGEWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, BRIEFED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND ON SHULTZ'S MEETINGS ON 4-5 NOVEMBER IN MOSCOW. THIS LATEST STAGE IN THE SUSTAINED US EFFORT TO KEEP ALLIANCE PARTNERS INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT WAS WARMLY WELCOMED BY ALL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE.

3. FOR NITZE'S OPENING BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SEE NIFT. MS RIDGEWAY FOLLOWED WITH OUR ACCOUNT OF THE NON-NUCLEAR TOPICS COVERED IN MOSCOW AND SUBSEQUENTLY FIELDDED QUESTIONS. THESE COVERED THE SOVIET RESPONSE ON REGIONAL ISSUES (CANADA, DENMARK, SPAIN); SOVIET PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERE (NETHERLANDS, ITALY); HUMAN RIGHTS (DENMARK); CDE (NORWAY); AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS AND FUTURE SUMMITS (GERMANY, BELGIUM).

4. MS RIDGEWAY SAID THAT MR. SHULTZ HAD GONE TO MOSCOW AT SOVIET INVITATION. HE HAD SEEN SHEVARDNADZE FOR 8 HOURS ON 4 NOVEMBER, INCLUDING 1.1/2 HOURS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON 5 NOVEMBER HE HAD 4 HOURS WITH GORBACHEV IN THE MORNING AND NEARLY 3 HOURS THAT AFTERNOON WITH SHEVARDNADZE, INCLUDING A BRIEF TETE-A-TETE. GROMYO HAD NOT PARTICIPATED. WITH SHEVARDNADZE TALKS HAD BEEN 10 OR 11 A SIDE. APART FROM KWITSINSKY, SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN SURROUNDED BY SOVIET MFA EXPERTS ON THE US, INCLUDING DOBRYMIN. THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN 3 A SIDE (SHULTZ, MCFARLANE AND AMBASSADOR HARTMAN FOR THE US).

## ATMOSPHERE

5. GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY THE COMMANDING PRESENCE, SPEAKING WITH MORE AUTHORITY THAN SHEVARDNADZE. THERE HAD BEEN LIVELY GIVE AND TAKE WITH BOTH AND AN UNUSUAL DEGREE OF QUOTE CONCRETENESS UNQUOTE. EXCHANGES

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WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY QUOTE VIGOROUS UNQUOTE, CANDID AND FRANK. BUT SHEVARDNADZE HAD PROVED LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN ANTICIPATED, INDULGING IN SET PIECE STATEMENTS FOLLOWED BY EXCHANGES ON A POINT BY POINT BASIS. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE QUOTE COLLEGIAL UNQUOTE NATURE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH, ALTHOUGH NEITHER GORBACHEV NOR SHEVARDNADZE APPEARED TO BE FULLY ABREAST OF ALL THE DETAILS: BOTH WERE EVIDENTLY STILL ON A LEARNING CURVE.

6. SHULTZ HAD BEEN INVITED TO OPEN ON 4 NOVEMBER AND HAD COVERED A FULL RANGE OF ISSUES, BEGINNING WITH ARMS CONTROL ON WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPONDED IN FAMILIAR QUOTE BLACK AND WHITE UNQUOTE TERMS. THE OTHER TOPICS BELOW ARE IN RIDGEWAY'S ORDER OF PRESENTATION.

#### NON PROLIFERATION

7. SHULTZ HAD NOTED A MEASURE OF US/SOVIET CO-OPERATION AT THE NPTRC. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SUBJECT COULD BE ADDRESSED AT THE SUMMIT.

#### CW

8. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHULTZ HAD STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A GLOBAL BAN AND HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE BASIS OF THE US DRAFT TREATY. THE TWO SIDES HAD DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF PREVENTING CW PROLIFERATION AND WAYS OF ADDRESSING THIS QUESTION FURTHER.

#### CDE

9. SHULTZ HAD CONFIRMED THAT REAGAN'S DUBLIN SPEECH OFFER ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) STILL STOOD. A FORMULATION ON NUF WAS POSSIBLE IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO CONCRETE SBMS. NEITHER RIDGEWAY NOR MITZE COULD RECALL ANY SPECIFIC SOVIET RESPONSE ON THE SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, RIDGEWAY COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS SOME INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS A CDE CONCLUDING FORMULA.

#### MBFR

10. SHULTZ HAD STRESSED THE US COMMITMENT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS: THE US WAS CONTINUING TO STUDY THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1985 PROPOSALS. HE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THE WEST WAS CONSULTING ON WAYS TO MOVE THE TALKS FORWARD.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

11. SHULTZ HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET MOVEMENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT AND HAD RAISED SPECIFIC CASES. SHEVARDNADZE HAD RESPONDED IN STANDARD TERMS, OCCASIONALLY WITH CONSIDERABLE FEELING. BUT HE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONSIDER THE CASES RAISED. RIDGEWAY COMMENTED THAT WHILE MRS BONNER'S LIKELY DEPARTURE MIGHT BE SEEN AS A SOVIET GESTURE IT WAS MEAGRE RECOMPENSE FOR YEARS OF WESTERN PRESSURE AND THERE WAS STILL NO INDICATION THAT SHE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN SUM, NEITHER GORBACHEV NOR SHEVARDNADZE HAD GIVEN ANY HINT OF DRAMATIC SOVIET MOVES BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

BILATERAL



#### BILATERAL ISSUES

12. A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED INCLUDING A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, AVIATION QUESTIONS, THE ESTABLISHMENT, NEW CONSULATES AND A VARIETY OF NEW IDEAS ON QUOTE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE UNQUOTE CONTACTS.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

13. SHULTZ HAD ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO REGULARISE THE BILATERAL REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETINGS WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, LISTING THE AREAS ALREADY COVERED AND IMPLYING THAT THEY SHOULD BE REPEATED IN THE SAME ORDER. THE TWO SIDES HAD ALSO DISCUSSED REAGAN'S REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROPOSALS (THE UNGA SPEECH). THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAD BEEN QUOTE MINIMAL UNQUOTE ESPECIALLY ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE IDEA OF REGULARISING THE EXPERT TALKS. BUT THEY HAD REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING SPECIFIC REGIONS DESERVING JOINT CONSIDERATION AND THERE WERE CONSEQUENTLY NO QUOTE TEA LEAVES UNQUOTE TO BE READ ON THEIR OVERALL APPROACH, INCLUDING THAT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE US WOULD CERTAINLY, HOWEVER, BE RAISING REGIONAL ISSUES AGAIN AT THE SUMMIT AND IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT GORBACHEV WOULD AGAIN PROVE SO RETICENT.

#### TERRORISM

14. SHULTZ HAD ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF CO-OPERATION ON COMBATTING TERRORISM. AS IN NEW YORK, THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL.

#### FUTURE SUMMITS

15. RIDGEWAY WAS ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT ON HOLDING FUTURE SUMMITS. SHE REPLIED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE QUESTION WAS A VALID ONE BUT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WOULD BE, AND THEIR NATURE, BUT THE US HOPED THAT AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE COULD BE AGREED IN GENEVA, THUS IMPLYING THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER SUMMITS.

#### SUMMIT AGENDA/FINAL DOCUMENT

16. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT TRIED TO WORK OUT A PRECISE SUMMIT AGENDA. THERE WAS NOW, HOWEVER, BROAD AGREEMENT ON THE FOUR US CATEGORIES FOR DISCUSSION, ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL ISSUES, WHICH HAD GRADUALLY EMERGED OUT OF THE SIFTING PROCESS INITIATED BY SHULTZ AND SHEVARNADZE AT HELSINKI. THERE WAS ALSO A SENSE OF HOW THE FLOW OF DIALOGUE AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WOULD GO. PERIODS OF TIME WHICH MIGHT BE ALLOTTED TO EACH SUBJECT HAD BEEN TENTATIVELY PROPOSED, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE FOR THE TWO LEADERS TO MAKE FINAL DECISIONS.

17. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO SHOWN SOME INITIAL INTEREST IN A FINAL SUMMIT DOCUMENT, THE US COUNTERING THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT WOULD EMBODY SUBSTANCE. THE TWO SIDES HAD, NEVERTHELESS, EXCHANGED IDEAS ABOUT, AND LISTS OF ITEMS



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FOR INCLUSION IN, POSSIBLE DOCUMENTS. THE QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE INCLUDED THE PREPARATION OF SEPARATE DOCUMENTS, A COMMUNIQUE, OR A SIMPLE STATEMENT RECORDING THE FACT OF THE MEETING. WHAT FINALLY EMERGED WOULD DERIVE FROM THE SUMMIT ITSELF BUT CURRENT US THINKING WAS THAT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE QUOTE FORWARD LOOKING RELATIONS UNQUOTE THEY SOUGHT IF IT DID NO MORE THAN RECORD DEEP AND FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES.

## CONCLUSION

18. RIDGEWAY SUMMED UP AS IN PARA 1: THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT RULED OUT AGREEMENTS ON NON-NUCLEAR ISSUES. MOREOVER, SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESENTATION AT THE FINAL SESSION HAD BEEN QUOTE UPBEAT UNQUOTE. THIS SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE SUMMIT FAIL. THE AMERICANS WERE FOR THEIR PART DETERMINED TO WORK HARD FOR RESULTS. THEIR JUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME WOULD BE BASED NOT ON THE DOCUMENTS WHICH EMERGED BUT ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUMMIT LAYED DOWN A FIRM BASIS FOR FUTURE PROGRESS AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

18. SEE MY LFT.

PH/KE

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
RESEARCH D  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
ACDD  
CRD  
FED  
NED  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
SIR W HARDING  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR GOODALL  
MR SAMUEL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

-4-

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cc: B1  
R2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 November 1985

Dear Len,

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF NATO

We need to decide whether the Prime Minister should give a press conference and/or television interviews immediately after President Reagan's briefing of Alliance leaders in Brussels on 21 November on the outcome of his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. But before taking any firm position on this, we need to know how both Lord Carrington and the Americans intend to handle the press and what they would find helpful from us. For instance, is it the intention that Lord Carrington himself should speak to the press immediately after the briefing? Is the working assumption that most other Heads of Government will brief their national press? Or are the Americans likely to seek some degree of restraint at least until after the President has briefed Congress?

BT

It would be helpful if you could establish Lord Carrington's and the US Administration's views on these points as soon as possible. Subject to their views, my own impression is that it would be helpful from the American and Alliance point of view for the Prime Minister to speak to the press in Brussels. Her voice is likely to be the most authoritative of the Allied leaders present in establishing an Alliance line on the outcome of the Summit.

Yours sincerely,  
*Charles Powell*  
(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

dg



SECRET



37 file No  
cc: Sir P. Caswell

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 November 1985

MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR. GORBACHEV

I enclose for the Foreign Secretary's information a copy of a further, short message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan, thanking her for her support on his new arms control proposals.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



cc OPS, Master ✓  
WAGO38  
OO WTE24  
DE WTE £1317 3092014  
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO THE CABINET OFFICE  
ZEM

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T207/35

36  
Prime Minister  
5/11

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO1317

NOVEMBER 5, 1985

DEAR MARGARET,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR QUICK MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. COUNTERPROPOSAL THAT I OUTLINED TO YOU ON OCTOBER 31. WE INTEND TO KEEP THE CENTER-OF-GRAVITY OF THE PROPOSALS AROUND THE STRATEGIC AND INF DEFINITIONS WITH WHICH BOTH THE WEST AND THE SOVIETS ARE WELL FAMILIAR. OUR NEW PROPOSALS SEEK A BRIDGE BETWEEN SOME OF THE NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES THEY HAVE ON THE TABLE AND OUR OWN FORMULATIONS FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS.

THE IMPRESSIONS YOU PASSED FROM KADAR WERE ENCOURAGING. AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR VALUED COUNSEL, BOTH DURING OUR MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AND IN THIS LATEST EXCHANGE.

WITH WARM, PERSONAL REGARDS,

RON

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£1317

US Declassified

NNNN



Now OVERTAKEN

CDN

- Perhaps we could discuss this. What you say will be very influential in determining the general western reaction.
1. ~~MR POWELL~~
  2. ~~PRIME MINISTER~~
- C.D.P. b/xi

NATO BRUSSELS - REAGAN DE-BRIEFING

You should be aware that virtually the entire world - or so it seems - wants to interview you after the Reagan de-briefing in Brussels on November 21.

You need to think very carefully your stance, and there is no need at this stage to take a decision.

But what is clear is that your voice will count for more than any other after the de-briefing. There will be faint hearts who will need to be rallied and there will be loyal and true friends who may well equivocate, especially if President Reagan has not covered himself with glory.

Your voice will be very important after this de-briefing, and we should together consider the kind of media programme, given this is your sole engagement on November 21, you should undertake.

Would you like me to make recommendations?

BERNARD INGHAM  
4 November 1985



SECRET



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35  
cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*


4 November 1985

**GENEVA ARMS CONTROL: NEW US PROPOSALS**

Thank you for your letter of 31 October enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan's recent message about his new arms control proposals.

I enclose a revised version which the Prime Minister has signed and which was despatched on the direct line to the White House during the weekend.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

  
(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



cc OPS, MASTER

SECRET

34A



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T206/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 November 1985

Dear Ron,

I was most grateful for your message of 31 October on the negotiations at Geneva. This advance notice was most valuable and a further example of the splendid way you have kept your allies in touch.

Your further proposal is a most positive step, exactly on the lines we discussed last week. It puts you in a very strong position diplomatically and will have a favourable impact on public opinion in the West. It will have my full support.

You would not expect me to comment in detail at this stage. But it may be helpful to give you a few initial impressions. On offensive weapons, your determination to bring the Russians back to the strategic and INF definitions which they had previously accepted is absolutely right. It is only on this basis that you can work towards significant reductions that provide for equal limits on both sides. In the INF context, your proposals have implications for the deployment programme in Europe. These will need to be looked at in the appropriate NATO body. On the strategic defence side, I hope that the suggestions I left with you in New York last week on the line of approach you might follow with Gorbachev will prove helpful.

SECRET



I've just had a talk about these issues with Kadar, the Hungarian Communist Party leader, who is here on a visit. He made three points:

- Gorbachev is sincere in wanting major reductions in nuclear weapons and is ready for substantive talks with you on this;
- what matters most to the Russians is broad equality with the US in nuclear strength;
- the Soviet Union will go ahead with developing its own SDI, whatever the burden on the Soviet economy, if you and Gorbachev are unable to agree on permissible limits on such work.

On balance, he was optimistic about the prospects for success at your meeting in Geneva. He is in no doubt that the Alliance is fully behind your approach and will I hope pass this message on to Gorbachev.

With my warm best wishes for success in your historic task.

*Yours ever*  
*Ronald*

---

The President of the United States of America



(copy sent via co to Reagan) 34



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I have rather amended the message. Agree to sign attached message?

31 October 1985

Dear Charles,

C.D.P. 'x. Yes no

Geneva Arms Control: New US Proposals

The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to send an early acknowledgement of President Reagan's message of 30 October about his new arms control proposals. I enclose a draft which has been approved by the Foreign Secretary.

And for gen.

The Administration's decision to table an early counter-proposal is very welcome and represents a victory for those in the State Department and NSC who had advocated doing this before the Summit on 19 November. We have been told that "skilfully applied pressures from Britain had been extremely helpful in getting the right result". But the inter-agency debate in Washington appears to have left unresolved the question of how to move forward the problem of defining the limits on permissible space research. The President has not therefore, at least at this stage, taken up the ideas which the Prime Minister suggested last week. The draft reply makes a reference to this.

US and Soviet spokesmen have already confirmed that the round is to be extended after 1 November. The White House spokesman has today announced that the President will write to Mr Gorbachev expanding on new proposals before they meet on 19-20 November, and indicated that the President had approved a new move at Geneva. Details of the US proposals will probably be published over the next few days. If so, the Foreign Secretary proposes that his spokesman should warmly welcome the tabling of further US proposals; confirm that we were consulted in advance; and say that we hope the Soviet Union will now seriously begin the process of give-and-take which will be necessary if agreement is to be reached: the US move is exactly what we had been advocating and makes US commitment and sincerity in the Geneva negotiations admirably clear in the run-up to the summit. The Prime Minister may herself wish to make an on the record comment along these lines (possibly in next Wednesday's speech in the House) in view of her discussion with the President last week.

FCO and MOD officials are preparing a detailed analysis and assessment of the US and Soviet proposals on the table in Geneva. I will let you have this in due course.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram and Michael Stark.

Yours ever,  
Her Appleyard  
(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



T206/85 Draft



S E C R E T

Please type  
for PM's signature

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I was most grateful for your message of 31 October on the negotiations at Geneva. This advance notice was most valuable and a further example of the splendid way you have kept your allies in touch.

This is a most positive step, exactly on the lines we discussed last week. ~~I am sure~~ <sup>very strong</sup> it puts you in a ~~much better~~ position diplomatically and will have a favourable impact on public opinion in the West. It will have my full support and I ~~will~~ <sup>shall</sup> urge the Russians to follow it up. // You would not expect me to comment in detail on the proposals at this stage. But it may be helpful to give you a few initial impressions.

On offensive weapons, your determination to bring the Russians back to the strategic and INF definitions which they had previously accepted is absolutely right. <sup>URS only on this basis</sup> ~~This should enable the US~~ <sup>but you can work</sup> negotiations to work towards significant reductions that provide for equal limits on both sides.

In the INF context, your proposals ~~will~~ have implications for ~~management~~ of the deployment programme in Europe <sup>these</sup> which will need to be looked at in the appropriate NATO body.

On the space and defence side, ~~you have produced imaginative ideas which I hope may help to engage the Russians' attention.~~ <sup>(I hope these will)</sup> The ideas I left with you in New York last week might then find their place in following up this issue in your discussion with Mr Gorbachev.

<sup>[insert new para. from over]</sup>  
I ~~too~~ <sup>very much</sup> look forward to seeing you in Brussels on 21 November.

S E C R E T









PA

has an

copy.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You could tell

Cabinet:

① That you have just had a letter from the President giving details of the new arms control proposals which he will shortly make.

② They build on the Soviet proposals & accept the concept of a 50% in ballistic missile warheads & throw-weight.

③ an interim step on INF



④ dialogue on Strategic  
defense, plus an  
"open laboratories"  
proposal.

⑤ This is a good  
return for the constant  
pressure you have  
put on the President to  
come forward with  
further proposals.

C.D.P.



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1495</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>T 204/85 US President to PM dated          31 October 1985</i>	
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BBC RADIO NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS

Any queries to Stuart Dew. 01-580 4468 Ext. 3503

*Roger Penster*  
*I've underlined some interesting passages. Please see in particular pages 4 e 14*

Transcript of interview with President Reagan conducted by Brian Widlake of 'The World at One' on BBC Radio 4 at The White House on Tuesday October 29 1985.

*CDP  
30/x*

Strict embargo: not for use before broadcast in 'The World at One' on BBC Radio 4 at 1300 on Wednesday October 30.

Widlake: Mr President, your meeting with Mr Gorbachev is only three weeks away now. Everyone regards it as crucial. What do you hope personally to get out of the summit with Mr Gorbachev?

Reagan: Well I think that the most that we could get out is if we could eliminate some of the paranoia, if we could reduce the hostility, the suspicion that keeps our two countries particularly but basically, should we say the Warsaw Bloc and the West, at odds with each other and, well I know everyone is looking toward and emphasising a reduction in arms. This is vital and important, but I see reduction in arms as a result, not a cause. If we can reduce those suspicions between our two countries the reduction of arms will easily follow because we will reduce the feeling that we need them.



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Widlake: Mr Shultz is off to Moscow on Saturday to do the groundwork for this summit fully aware, as he himself admits, that there are major differences between the United States and Russia. Apart from the paranoia which you talk about, what are those differences as you see them?

Reagan: Oh my heavens. Here are two systems so diametrically opposed that, I'm no linguist, but I've been told that in the Russian language there isn't even a word for freedom and two nations everyone's referring to as the Superpowers obviously are competitive and our philosophies and our ideas in the world, and that probably can't be corrected, but we can have a peaceful competition. We have to live in the world together. There is no sense in believing that we must go on with the threat of a nuclear war hanging over the world because of our disagreements. We don't like their system, they don't like ours, but we are not out to change theirs. I do feel sometimes they are out to change ours, but if we could get along. They have a system of totalitarian Government and rule of their people; we have one in which we believe the people rule the Government and there isn't any reason why we can't co-exist in the world, where their legitimate areas of competition compete, but do it in a manner that recognises that neither one of us should be a threat to the other.

??  
SVOBODA



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Widlake: When Mr Shultz talks to Mr Gorbachev and Mr Shevardnadze what will be the topics of discussion? Will it be trying to find some groundwork for example on arms control and reduction?

Reagan: No I would think that probably the main point in their meeting ahead of the major meeting, is to establish an agenda. In other words, Secretary Shultz will tell them the things that we feel important to be discussed. Minister Shevardnadze will probably have a list of things that are on their agenda, so that we can plan and neither one of us be caught by surprise at the summit with hearing a subject coming up that hadn't even been considered, so I think that is probably the main useful purpose that will be served by their getting together.

Widlake: Is there any chance at all that the discussions Mr Shultz has in Moscow might enable you to produce an initiative before you go to Geneva?

Reagan; Right now we are in the position of studying what we call a counter proposal. In Geneva, where our arms control delegations are meeting and have been meeting for a long time, we have had a proposal for a reduction of nuclear weapons. Now for the first time the Soviet Union has made a counter proposal. We have put that in the hands of our people in Geneva now for them to look at.



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(cont.) We ourselves are studying. There are some elements in there - we have called them seeds to nurture - things that we look at and say yes, these could very easily be acceptable. At the same time, in their proposal there are some things that we believe are so disadvantageous to us that these should be negotiated and some changes made and with all of this going on I'm not in a position to say now at what point will we make our reply to their counter offer and state where we are or where we differ, and so forth and then that should be the area in which negotiations would take place. Now whether that doesn't happen prior to the summit meeting or whether our team in Geneva tables it before they adjourn for their recess that is coming up, that I can't answer. That still remains to be seen.

Widlake: But I must tell you Mr President that Mrs Thatcher has already told the leader of the Opposition, and she said this today in the House of Commons, that you were going to come up with an initiative before Geneva. Has she been talking ...

Reagan: I'm personally hopeful of that also, so she's right that that is what we are striving to do.



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Widlake: Now can we look at some of the things which obviously are going to affect Geneva, but particularly I would like to talk to you about the strategic defence initiative and how important that is going to be. Can anything be achieved at Geneva without some understanding from both sides in this area?

Reagan: Probably not, but I think there can be an understanding when they hear what we have in mind. I believe that this is something that is probably one of the most momentous things in the century. We have a team that within the terms of the A.B.M. Treaty is researching to see if there is a possibility of a defensive weapon that could intercept missiles before they reach their target, instead of having a deterrent to wars that we have now, which is both sides with massive weapons of destruction - nuclear missiles - and the only thing deterring war is the threat we represent to each other of killing millions and millions of citizens on both sides. Now if we can come up with a defensive weapon and we know that we have it, that it is there, that it is practical, that it will work, then my idea is that we go to the world, we go to our allies, we go to the Soviet Union and we say look, we are not going to just start deploying this at the same time we maintain a nuclear arsenal. We think this weapon, this defensive weapon, we would like to make available and let's have the world have this for their own

Continued ../6



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(cont.) protection so that we can all eliminate our nuclear arsenals and  
the only reason then for having the defensive weapon would be  
because since everyone in the world knows how to make one, a  
nuclear weapon, we would all be protected in case some madman  
some day down along the line secretly sets out to produce some  
with the idea of blackmailing the world and the world wouldn't  
be blackmailed because we would all be sitting here with that  
defence. I've likened it to what happened when in 1925, after  
World War I, all the nations got together and outlawed poison gas,  
but everybody kept their gas masks, so we would have a world  
with some nuclear gas masks and we could sleep at night without  
thinking that someone could bring this great menace of the  
nuclear threat against us.

Widlake: Why do you say Mr President you would go to the world once  
you had proved satisfactorily to yourself that here was a  
weapon which would actually work? If you go to the world, would  
you include Russia in that?

Reagan: Yes. I think that what could be safer than ... Today  
everything is offensive weapons. It's the only weapon I know of  
that's ever been developed in history that has not brought about  
a defence against it, but what would be safer than if the two great  
Superpowers, the two who have the great arsenals, both of us sat

Continued .../7



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(cont.) there with defensive weapons that ensured our safety against the nuclear weapons and both of us eliminated arms .....

Widlake: But the Russians presumably would have to make their own S.D.I.?  
You wouldn't offer it to them would you off the shelf?

Reagan: Why not? And I think this is something to be discussed at the summit as to what kind of an agreement we could make in the event. I would like to say to the Soviet Union we know you have been researching for this same thing longer than we have. We wish you well. There couldn't be anything better than if both of us came up with it, but if only one of us does, then why don't we instead of using it as an offensive means of having a first strike against anyone else in the world, why don't we use it to ensure that there won't be any nuclear strikes.

Widlake: Are you saying then Mr President that the United States, if it were well down the road towards a proper S.D.I. programme, would be prepared to share its technology with Soviet Russia, provided of course there were arms reductions and so on, on both sides.

Reagan: That's right. There would have to be the reductions of offensive weapons. In other words, we would switch to defence, instead of offence..

Continued .../8



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Widlake: That of course is quite a long way away, this idealistic world of yours, if I may say so?

Reagan: Yes, yes. We are optimistic. We have had some good breakthroughs in our research so far.

Widlake: It's going well is it?

Reagan: Yes.

Widlake: And is the research going so well as to suggest to you that a defensive weapon of this kind is really practical now?

Reagan: As a matter of fact very leading scientists who are involved in this have said that, that they can foresee us achieving this weapon.

Widlake: Will it take long?

Reagan: Oh, I think we are talking a matter of years.

Widlake: Let us say though that this isn't going to come about, as you say, for a matter of years and Mr Gorbachev, as we all know, is very worried about S.D.I. Would you be prepared to negotiate on S.D.I. at Geneva?

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Reagan: Well, negotiate in a sense of coming to an agreement, which we are bound by in the future for whenever that weapon happens - bound to this matter of world-wide sharing.

Widlake: I wonder if you would be kind enough to clear up one point on the S.D.I. and it's this. Mr Gorbachev, I think, accepts the idea that you could do nothing about research because it's not really verifiable. Testing, on the other hand, worries him. Now does testing, in your view, come within the A.B.M. Treaty?

Reagan: Yes, I believe it does. I think that we are well within it and within a strict adherence to the treaty, although you could have a more liberal interpretation of the treaty that I believe is justified, but rather than have any debate or argument about that, we are staying within the strict limits of the treaty.

Widlake: Do you think the S.D.I. is likely to be a stumbling block at Geneva, bearing in mind what Mr Gorbachev thinks about it and his reservations?

Reagan: I think it should be the other way around. I think it should be one of the most helpful things in erasing some of that paranoia I mentioned or that hostility or suspicions between us.



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Widlake: You have a horror of nuclear weapons and that's why you say that S.D.I. is a good thing. If we had S.D.I. world-wide, would there still be nuclear weapons available?

Reagan: I wouldn't see any need for them at all. I wouldn't know why a nation would strap itself to invest in them, but, as I say, there is always the possibility of a madman coming along and, as I say, you can't eliminate the knowledge about building those weapons, who might seize upon them. We've had an experience in our lifetime of a madman in the world who caused great tragedy world-wide, and so I would think that this would be our gas mask.

Widlake: Mr President, can we turn now to some of the things you said in your U.N. speech. One of the central themes you brought up there concerned those areas of regional conflict, such as Afghanistan, in which the Soviets have a hand. Are you going to bring these up with Mr Gorbachev, and if so, do you expect him to respond positively?

Reagan: Well, I would think that this is very much a part of trying to rid the world of the suspicions. They claim that they fear that we of the Western world threaten them, that somehow we are lying here in wait for a day when we can eliminate their method of

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(cont.) Government and so forth. There is no evidence to sustain that. If you look back to the end of World War II our country, for example, absolutely undamaged; we hadn't had our industries destroyed through bombings and so forth and we were the only nation with the bomb, the nuclear weapon. We could have dictated to the world. We didn't. We set out to help even our erstwhile enemies recover and today those erstwhile enemies are our staunchest allies in the NATO Alliance. They on the other hand, have created, well, they have gone through the biggest military build-up in the history of man and it is basically offensive. Now we, therefore, claim we have got some right to believe that we are threatened, not the other way round. Now to eliminate that suspicion of that fear, if they really want to live in a peaceful world and be friends and to associate with the rest of the world, then we need more than words and the deeds could be the stopping of their attempt to, either themselves or through proxys and through subversion, to force their system on other countries throughout the world and that could be one of the greatest proofs there is.

Widlake: Do you think you were being a bit optimistic in your U.N. speech - you proposed the idea that these areas of regional conflict should be discussed, but of course you took it much further than that. What you are actually saying is that they should be

Continued .../12



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(cont.) discussed up to the point when they are just eliminated.

Now do you think you are being optimistic when you recognise the fact that the fellow sitting opposite you is Mr Gorbachev and he's tied up in these things?

Reagan: Yes, but on the other hand he has some practical problems in his own country. Some problems of how long can they sustain an economy that provides for their people under the terrific cost of building-up and pursuing this expansionist policy and this great military build-up.

Widlake: His economic problems?

Reagan: Yes, and if we can show him that he can resolve those economic problems with no danger to themselves, convince him that we represent no threat, then I could see us, as I have said before. We don't like each other's systems, maybe we don't like each other, but we are the only two nations who could probably cause a world war. We are also the only two nations that can prevent one.

Widlake: Will you want to talk to him about human rights? You have probably heard that Mrs Yelena Bonner has just been granted a visa to come to the West so she can get medical treatment, but

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(cont.) she'll have to go back to Russia of course. Do you see that as a propoganda move by the Russians, or is it a step along the road?

Reagan: I would like to feel it's a step along the road and there needs to be more. I don't think however that the human rights thing should be a kind of a public discussion and accusing fingers being pointed at each other and their claim that this is an internal matter with them, but I think it should be explained that some of these violations, well, first of all is the violation of the Helskinki pact. This was one of the main reasons why we are signatories to that pact is this agreement about not separating families and so forth and allowing people freedom to choose. What they have to understand is that in some of the major areas where we could seek agreement we have a better chance in our type of society of getting the approval that we need from our congress, from our people, of some of these agreements, if these issues, these human rights problems are not standing in the way and maybe I can point that out.

Widlake: Mr President there have been fears expressed in Europe that arms control will be pushed right down the agenda at Geneva in favour of issues like regional conflict and human rights, which we've been discussing. Can you give an assurance that that is not the case?

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Reagan: | I certainly can. As far as I'm concerned that is, but as I've said, that follows another thing. The effort is to arrive at an understanding about our ability to live in the world together and at peace and the other, that can follow. Now someone - if I can only remember the quote correctly - the other day said, nations aren't suspicious of each other because of their arms, they are armed because they are suspicious.

[M.T.  
I think!]

Widlake: There is a feeling Mr President that Mr Gorbachev has seized the initiative in Europe - European leaders have undoubtedly been impressed by his performance. Mrs Thatcher, as you know, said that he's someone she can do business with. What do you think about it?

Reagan: Well I don't know him as yet but he seems to have shown more of an interest in the people - the man in the street - than other Soviet leaders have. He has expressed great concern about the economic problems and the improvements that he feels that should be made there and he's younger and more energetic than some of the more recent leaders have been. And I'm optimistic by nature but I have to be optimistic that he is looking at the entire picture. On the other hand I don't think we should believe that he is not dedicated to the principles of their system - to Communism and so forth. If he wasn't he wouldn't be where he is.



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Widlake: Do you think he's, in terms of youth, energy if you like, intelligence and obviously a powerful grasp of public relations, do you think he's a pretty formidable Russian leader to deal with compared with his predecessors?

Reagan: Well I don't know. On the public relations thing he did far better with some of our own press than he did with the French press who were on his recent visit when he was there. I can't judge him on that. Sometimes public relations are made by those reporting not by those doing.

Widlake: Can I take one or two other areas with you Mr President? The first is terrorism. We know how you handled the Achille Lauro affair but does that carry the risk of alienating friendly governments - Egypt, if you remember, wasn't too pleased.

Reagan: Well, I know and yet we felt that we had no choice in the matter if we were going to prevent those terrorists from suddenly, as so many in the past have, disappearing into the rabbit warrens, bound to the Middle East, mid-Lebanon and so forth, and therefore they would escape being brought to justice. They had murdered a man, a helpless individual. We felt we had to do it. But I'm pleased to say now that I think the flurry is over and that both Egypt and Italy want to continue the warm relationship that we've

Continued.../16



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(cont.) had and so that has worked out all right.

Widlake: Mr President would you do it again even if it meant, say, violating international law?

Reagan: Well it actually didn't violate international law.

Widlake: Perhaps say could in the future.

Reagan: It could I suppose - it's a hypothetical question.

Widlake: But terrorism is always with us.

Reagan: Yes and I think that you just have to say you'd have to judge each case on its own as to the need to bring terrorists to justice, the need to convince them that terrorism is not going to be successful, it is not going to make governments like your own or our own change their policies out of fear of terrorism. If that ever happens, then the world has gone back to anarchy. So you'd have to judge that against how much you would be violating international law to achieve your goal.

Widlake: But if it was necessary I take it you would.



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Reagan: Yes.

Widlake: And you'd pursue terrorism as hard as you can, as often as you can?

Reagan: Yes. It's been very frustrating for a number of the things that have happened and I've been taken to task by members of the Press that I talked but I didn't take action. But, just look at the nature of some of those terrorist acts. The terrorist blows himself up with all the innocent people that he also kills at the same time so there's no way you're going to punish him. You now seek to find who does he belong to, what group brought this about. Well there the difficulty is almost insurmountable. But also even if you do get some intelligence that indicates it's a certain group, they're in some foreign city and you say, well how do we punish them without blowing up a neighbourhood and killing as many innocent people as they did? And this has been our problem up until this last time when we had a very clear-cut case.

Widlake: Mr President, this may be a difficult question for you to answer but what would you most like to be remembered for by history?

Reagan: Well, five years ago when we came here the United States had allowed its defences to decline. The United States economy - I

Continued..../18



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(cont.): I remember attending my first economic summit in Ottawa, Canada and that was just in the Spring of my first year here and I remember our friends and allies, the Heads of State of the other summit nations there, beseeching me to stop exporting our inflation and our recession to their countries in this world of international trade and all that we were exporting bad economic situations to the rest of the world. The Soviet Union - again as I say through surrogates - are on their own. There was Afghanistan, there was Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Nicaragua - they enforced governments of their choosing into all those countries. Well it's been five years now. We have the greatest economic recovery that we've ever had in our history. It is not we who are exporting inflation anymore. Inflation is down from those double digit figures - well for the last five months it's only been 2½% and none of our trading partners can match that. Our interest rates are down. We have created almost nine million new jobs over these five years with our economic recovery and in the world abroad the Soviet Union has not stepped in or created a government of its kind in any new country these five years. It has not stepped into one additional inch of territory and I just don't feel that maybe some of things we did here - the American people, their spirit was down and they had heard talks prior to our arrival that maybe we should give up our high expectations, that never again could we look toward the future as we had in the

Continued.../19



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(cont.): past, lower our expectations and so forth. Today, we have a volunteer military, we exceed our enlistment quota every year, we have the highest level of education in the military, in this volunteer military, that we've ever had in our history even in wartime drafts. The American people have rallied and with a spirit of volunteerism, voluntarily stepping into problems that once they just let go by and thought somebody in the Government would take care of them. And as I say the economy last year - some six hundred thousand new businesses were incorporated in our country. I would like to be remembered not for doing all those things. I didn't do them. The American people did them. All I did was help get Government out of their way and restore our belief in the power of the people and that Government must be limited in its powers and limited in its actions. And that part I helped in, I'd like to be remembered for that.

Widlake: One final question Mr President, it's about your health. How do you feel and what do the doctors say?

Reagan: The doctor said that I've had a one hundred percent recovery. I'm riding horses regularly now as I've always done and I'm doing my exercises in the gym every day at the end of the day - I have a little gymnasium upstairs, some weights and so forth and I'm doing all those things and I've just never felt better.

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Reagan interview - Page 20

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Widlake: Well Mr President you look remarkably fit. It's been a pleasure to talk to you. Thank you.

Reagan: Well, my pleasure and I thank you.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

1300 EMBARGO WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 30 1985



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US/SOVIET MEETINGS IN NEW YORK

1. PALMER (EUR/STATE) BRIEFED NATO MISSIONS (PLUS JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, BUT NOT NEW ZEALAND) ON 26 OCTOBER ON SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 24 OCTOBER AND WITH SHULTZ ON 25 OCTOBER. THE FORMER HAD LASTED SOME 45 MINUTES, INCLUDING A 15 MINUTE TETE A TETE, THE LATTER FOR SOME 2 HOURS, INCLUDING A ONE HOUR PRESENTATION BY SHEVARDNADZE ON ARMS CONTROL.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN CONCERNED TO EMPHASISE TO SHEVARDNADZE THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO THE FORTHCOMING GENEVA MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE US APPROACH. HE HAD EXPLAINED THE QUOTE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE IDEA IN HIS UNGA SPEECH (OF WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD HAD EARLIER ADVANCE WARNING QUOTE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL UNQUOTE), HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON BILATERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, AND HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE STUDYING THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COUNTER-PROPOSALS, AND QUOTE WOULD BE RESPONDING IN DUE COURSE UNQUOTE. SHEVARDNADZE HAD STRESSED THAT PRE-SUMMIT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THAT THE BALL ON THE KEY ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WAS IN THE US COURT. THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MEETING WAS AGREEMENT ON SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS ON 4 AND 5 NOVEMBER, WHICH WOULD BE PRIMARILY WITH SHEVARDNADZE, BUT WOULD ALSO INVOLVE GORBACHEV (SHULTZ WILL TRAVEL TO MOSCOW ON 2 NOVEMBER; DEBRIEFING ON THE TALKS WILL BE DONE BY US POSTS IN CAPITALS ON 6 NOVEMBER).
3. THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING HAD BEEN IN THREE PARTS, COVERING REGIONAL ISSUES, ARMS CONTROL AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. SHULTZ HAD TOUCH ON HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY GLANCINGLY.
4. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, SHULTZ HAD EXPLAINED THE FRAMEWORK INITIATIVE IN SOME DETAIL, ACKNOWLEDGING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL TO THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP BUT POINTING OUT THAT EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS DAMAGED THAT RELATIONSHIP AND SO AFFECTED ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS, EG. WHEN THE RATIFICATION OF SAL II BECAME POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE AS A RESULT OF AFGHANISTAN). SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THE FRAMEWORK IDEA, OR INDEED TO THE UNGA SPEECH AS A WHOLE.

CONFIDENTIAL /BUT.



BUT HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY TO TRY TO SOLVE REGIONAL ISSUES, AND AGREED THAT THE SUBJECT COULD BE PURSUED IN GENEVA. (PALMER MAINTAINED THAT THE SECOND AND THIRD STAGES FORESEEN IN THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL (IE. MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT, AND MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE) MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE FOR MOSCOW, AND CLAIMED THAT AFRICAN AND ASIAN FIRST REACTIONS TO THE SPEECH HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE BY CONTRAST TO THE SCEPTICISM OF SOME NATO ALLIES).

5. ON ARMS CONTROL, SHEVARDNADZE'S LENGTHLY EXPOSITION HAD COVERED THE FULL WATERFRONT, FROM THE GENEVA TALKS THROUGH MBFR AND CDE TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND CW. BUT THERE HAD BEEN FEW SURPRISES, OTHER THAN THE OFFER OF AN EXTENSION OF SAL II RESTRAINTS FOR ANOTHER YEAR, IE. TO THE END OF 1986. THE TWO MOST RECENT PROPOSALS IN GENEVA ON A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT AND A KRASNOYARSK/THULE - FYLINGDALES TRADE -OFF HAD BEEN EXPLAINED AT LENGTH, AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD URGED US ACCESSION TO THE CURRENT SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM, US AGREEMENT TO THE RESUMPTION OF CTR TALKS, US FLEXIBILITY AT THE CDE AND MBFR TALKS, AND THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CW NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. IN RESPONSE SHULTZ HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET-GENEVA QUOTE COUNTER-PROPOSALS UNQUOTE WERE BEING CAREFULLY STUDIED, AND THAT THE US WELCOMED SOVIET WILLINGNESS AT LEAST TO RESPOND TO EARLIER US PROPOSALS. HE HAD THEN SPELT OUT AT SOME LENGTH THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OF THE SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSALS, AND HAD ALSO CALLED FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH TO NUCLEAR TEST VERIFICATION AND ON CDE AND MBFR.

6. THIRDLY, A BRIEF REVIEW OF PROGRESS ON CURRENT BILATERAL ISSUES (PACIFIC AIR SAFETY, RESUMPTION OF PANAM/AEROFLOT SERVICES AND THE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT) HAD PRODUCED AGREEMENT THAT SOME SHARP ACCELERATION WOULD BE NECESSARY IF AGREEMENTS WERE TO BE READY BY 19 NOVEMBER. IN A NEW US INITIATIVE, TO WHICH SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY, SHULTZ HAD SUGGESTED A JOINT EFFORT TO COMBAT TERRORISM (WHICH PALMER EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE REGULAR TALKS BETWEEN OAKLEY AND A SUITABLE SOVIET INTERLOCUTOR IF ONE COULD BE FOUND).

7. THE US OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO MEETINGS WAS POSITIVE: AS IN HIS UNGA SPEECH, SHEVARDNADZE HAD PROVED MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN HIS PREDECESSOR. BUT HIS FOURTH EXTENDED MEETING WITH SHULTZ HAD DEMONSTRATED HOW MUCH WORK STILL NEEDED TO BE DONE BEFORE THE SUMMIT. ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SHEVARDNADZE HAD HANDED OVER SOME ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE FOR POSSIBLE INCORPORATION IN A SUMMIT DOCUMENT: THE US TOO HAD PROVIDED SOME FORMULAE, BUT NOT ON ARMS CONTROL. THE US WERE NOT COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A JOINT DOCUMENT: THEY WOULD WANT ONE ONLY IF THERE WERE SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL TO SAY. IT WAS STILL TOO SOON TO PREDICT SUMMIT ACHIEVEMENTS: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WOULD BE IMPORTANT.

<sup>-2-</sup>  
CONFIDENTIAL

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

8. PALMER DUCKED ALL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TIMING AND LIKELY NATURE OF THE US RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL. THE MATTER WAS NOW UNDER INTENSIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATION.

9. ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AFTER THE SUMMIT (UKDEL NATO TELNO 263), PALMER SAID THAT THE US HAD MADE THE OFFER, AND THAT IF THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS WAS FOR ACCEPTANCE, THE PRESIDENT WOULD STOP OVER IN BRUSSELS ON THE AFTERNOON OF 21 NOVEMBER. THE PLAN WAS TO REMAIN IN GENEVA FOR THE MORNING OF 21 NOVEMBER, IN CASE ONE FINAL SESSION WITH GORBACHEV WAS REQUIRED.

WRIGHT

YYYY

FCO PASS SAVING TO BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW, ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, OTTAWA, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

**US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS**

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DEFENCE D	PS/MR RIFKIND
SOVIET D	PS/MR RENTON
NEWS D	PS/PUS
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EED	MR GOODALL
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 October 1985

GENEVA TALKS: SOVIET COUNTER PROPOSALS

Thank you for your letter of 9 October enclosing a copy of the Foreign Secretary's proposed reply to Secretary Shultz's message about the recent Soviet proposals on arms control.

Given the difficulties of consulting the Prime Minister this week and the need to get the reply off, I think it would be right to assume that the Prime Minister would be content with it. Her main concern is that the Americans should react to the Soviet proposals with fresh ones of their own, even if these are in part a restatement of what is already on the table in Geneva. Otherwise the Soviet proposals will appear publicly as the only major initiative in advance of the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting. This point could be made rather more strongly in your draft.

C D Powell

C. R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

DA (7)

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Handwritten initials or signature, possibly 'CDP' or similar, written in the bottom right corner of the page.



SECRET



31  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1985

*Dear Charles,*

Geneva Talks: Soviet Counter Proposals

/ With reference to the penultimate paragraph of my  
letter of 4 October, I enclose a draft letter to Mr Shultz  
which the Foreign Secretary proposes to send if the  
Prime Minister agrees. It is in reply to Mr Shultz's  
/ message of 29 September, of which I enclose a further copy  
for ease of reference.

The draft has been cleared with the MOD at official level.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET



Foreign Policy; East/West lets P+5

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Mr Shultz

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

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PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I was most grateful for your message of 29 September about the meetings which you and President Reagan had with Mr Shevardnadze. I have also now seen a more detailed account of the Soviet "counter-proposals" which were recently tabled in Geneva. It may be useful to let you have my initial impressions.

A good deal may turn on whether the Russians have conceded that laboratory research on strategic defence is permissible. Their position still seems to me to be ambiguous, although I understand that your people assess, largely on the basis of Gorbachev's letter to the President, that the point is conceded. I certainly hope so.

The Soviet proposals on offensive weapons contain several old chestnuts. Some of these are obviously objectionable, notably the definition of strategic systems and the associated arithmetic, and the moratoria on testing and INF deployments. They seem to have gone all the way back to their original definition of strategic

Enclosures—flag(s).....



systems as those which can hit the other side's territory. The proposition that your LRINF and carrier-based aircraft should be included whilst comparable Soviet systems are not is clearly unacceptable, and Gorbachev must know it is. But as you say, it is encouraging that they have begun to concentrate on the central issues. It is one measure of progress that they actually have come up with their own proposals and thereby committed themselves to a number of specific ideas.

The situation over INF seems from what I have seen to be unclear. Are the Russians proposing to merge the strategic and INF negotiations, which could concede the principle that US LRINF deployments are permissible? Or are they sticking to the line that Soviet INF missiles must be equated with British and French strategic nuclear forces? They may of course be aiming at both. The proposal for dialogue with the French and ourselves, for which the motive seems to me to be transparent, suggests that they remain intent on the latter objective. But I am reluctant to play into Soviet hands and turn the proposal down when it has not even been made to us direct - megaphone diplomacy! I should welcome your views.

There is now, as you rightly say, a chance for you to engage the Soviet Union in a substantive negotiation and to draw them out on the detail. It will be essential to show that, by the time of the President's meeting with Gorbachev, every effort has been made to do this. Public expectations have been raised and, should they have to be

/disappointed



disappointed, it will be very important to show that the Russians alone were responsible. You have made it clear ever since the Geneva talks resumed in March that the US negotiating team have the necessary flexibility in their instructions to respond in the event of a serious indication of Soviet willingness to negotiate. I am sure that you<sup>2</sup> will now be considering with Max Kampelman the appropriate moment to deploy this. Potential trade-offs in the negotiations will need to be thoroughly probed. I hope that you may think it worthwhile to follow-up some of the ideas outlined in the Prime Minister's letter of 12 September to the President.

Gorbachev's line in Paris shows again that he will not cease to seek propaganda advantages. To deny him these it will be necessary to show that the American side has been willing to show firmness of purpose allied to flexibility across the negotiations.



# SECRET

September 29, 1985

Dear Geoffrey:

I want to share with you some initial impressions from my recent meetings and that of the President with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Our discussions were broad-ranging, covering considerable ground. We touched upon the full agenda of US-Soviet issues, including various regional, bilateral and human rights questions, but with a special emphasis on arms control and security problems. The President put forward a comprehensive view of his thoughts about the upcoming meeting in Geneva with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, making clear both our concerns with unacceptable Soviet activities in various areas and our hopes for progress towards a more stable and productive relationship with the Soviet Union.

The tenor of the Foreign Minister's response was serious and businesslike. Our exchanges involved a good deal of straightforward give and take over particular issues. While we were not surprised by the persistent differences that these discussions underscored, we believe the past week's meetings with Shevardnadze laid a useful foundation for the Geneva meeting in November and any resulting process of more constructive US-Soviet dialogue.

The Foreign Minister took the occasion of his meeting with the President both to deliver a personal letter from General Secretary Gorbachev and to offer an oral gloss of this message, in which he outlined and expanded upon various Soviet proposals for nuclear arms reductions. In doing so, however, Shevardnadze made clear that a fuller and more detailed elaboration of these Soviet proposals would shortly be forthcoming at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva. Thus, the end effect of his presentation was not unlike the pattern of previous Soviet arms control statements -- heavy on generalized statements of intent and promise, all contingent on Western acceptance of Soviet terms, with hints, but few details, of Soviet movement on some issues.

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As these Soviet presentations in Geneva unfold and as we have the opportunity for detailed questioning at the negotiating table to gain a better picture of just what any new Soviet positions might entail, we will, of course, wish to consult with you closely. In the interim, however, I would note for you that, consistent with the Soviet public line of recent weeks, Gorbachev's message and Shevardnadze's comments laid great stress on the possibilities for progress offered by the November meeting with the President, but in terms of actual substance, reiterated many of their familiar and unacceptable declaratory proposals, such as a nuclear testing moratorium and deployment freeze. Most importantly, they continued to assert a rigid and automatic link between an agreement on so-called space strike weapons with negotiating progress towards reductions of offensive nuclear arms.

In response to our charges of a lack of specificity on their part, the Soviets put forward the number fifty percent as a possible degree of reductions in "relevant nuclear arms," with the Foreign Minister verbally citing a hypothetical end result of 6,000 "nuclear charges," which would include weapons capable of striking the other side's territory. Their comments indicated an effort to characterize and aggregate strategic arms in an unacceptably sweeping and one-sided way, seeking, for instance, to include U.S. LRINF missiles and carrier-based aircraft as strategic while excluding Soviet LRINF systems and to equate bomber-carried gravity bombs with ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets repeated earlier Soviet calls for a freeze and the assertion that they sought no greater quantity of "medium-range" weapons in Europe than the number of British and French warheads.

For our part, we made clear our basic objections to this sort of approach. The Soviets also suggested a mutual understanding to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and not to increase the stock of nuclear weapons and not to replace them with new ones in countries where such weapons now exist. This, of course, attacks directly not only NATO's 1979 decision, but also the basis for our

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Montebello decision to reduce the size of the overall NATO stockpile. As in the past, the net impact of such terms would be to lock in Soviet advantages, diminish NATO's conventional capabilities, and divide us from our allies.

As you are aware, we have indicated in our initial public statements that we are prepared to deal with new Soviet ideas seriously. To that end, we believe that the proper next step is for our negotiators to explore both the U.S. proposals already on the table in Geneva and these Soviet counterproposals.

We will see what, if any, possibilities for progress emerge from these follow-on exchanges. Thus far, the new Soviet position appears to represent some interesting changes, but as it currently stands, does not constitute an appropriate basis for agreement in Geneva. The Soviets seem to be slowly moving towards discussion of what must be a central issue in any strategic arms control agreement -- significant reductions that might affect their own already massive strategic arsenal -- but remain preoccupied with seeking to preserve unilateral offensive and defensive advantages through these negotiations.

As our negotiators discuss these issues further in Geneva over the next few weeks, we will be carefully assessing any new Soviet positions by the potential contribution they can make to solving the problems of greater strategic stability, equality at reduced levels of weaponry, and effective verification of compliance by all parties. While we are pleased to see the Soviets at last moving to a discussion of specific numbers in connection with offensive reductions, we must also note that, judged against these important criteria, a simple percentage is meaningless without reference to what is to be included and to the data baselines. Similarly, loosely-defined "nuclear charges" are not the same as "warheads." We will have to see whether the more detailed Soviet formulation addresses the basic threat to strategic stability posed by growing capability of highly-MIRVed Soviet ICBMs to threaten our own land-based deterrent forces.

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That said, we are basically pleased that, after putting forward our own proposals for deep offensive reductions in Geneva during the past two rounds, the Soviets are now responding with a counterproposal of their own. We hope that this can lead to the sort of serious give and take across the negotiating table that we have been working to encourage.

What all of this gives evidence of is the correctness of the Alliance's strategy thus far. In the face of an unwarranted Soviet walkout from the earlier negotiation, Western unity and firmness eventually brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. After two rounds of talks, the combination of positive U.S. proposals and the patience to stand by those positions have brought about modest signs of evolution in the Soviet position. As we continue our negotiating efforts at Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna and elsewhere, the Alliance will continue to need this sense of realism, determination and common purpose.

It is important that we keep the pressure on the Soviets to keep moving toward a serious discussion of offensive arms reductions. Continued Allied support and solidarity will be especially important in this regard as we negotiate these issues in Geneva and as we approach the November meeting.

We will, of course, continue to be in close touch on these matters. As always, I would welcome your personal thoughts and counsel.

Sincerely,

/S/

George P. Shultz

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SECRET



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 October, 1985

**GENEVA TALKS: SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSALS**

Thank you for your letter of 4 October setting out a preliminary analysis of the Soviet proposals on arms control.

The Prime Minister has read this with interest.

The question arises whether we should reply formally to the Soviet communication in due course and the means by which this should be done. It would be helpful to have your views on this.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

L. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



4 October 1985

Prime Minister

A very preliminary analysis of the Soviet proposals.

Dear Charles,

Geneva Talks: Soviet Counter-Proposals

In his speech in Paris yesterday suggesting dialogue with France and Britain on nuclear weapons reductions, Mr Gorbachev also indicated that the Geneva linkage between all three elements under negotiation might no longer apply to the INF basket. In addition, he revealed the broad outline of the Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva on 30 September/1 October. The US have now provided us with a more detailed account of these "counter-proposals" (the US term). And the Soviet Charge called at the FCO today to hand over the text of Mr Gorbachev's remarks suggesting dialogue, with the request that they be drawn to the Prime Minister's attention. I enclose a copy of Paris telegram No 836, which contains the complete text.

The main elements in the Soviet proposals, as conveyed earlier this week and last to the Americans, are set out at Annex A. We shall be preparing, in coordination with MOD, a full assessment as soon as documents and all the details are available from Geneva.

On strategic defence, the Soviet position appears ambiguous. It is not clear whether the Russians have in fact conceded that laboratory research is permissible, as Gorbachev hinted in his Time interview, or whether they are still insisting on a blanket ban. The initial State Department assessment (largely on the basis of Mr Gorbachev's letter to the President) is that the Russians have conceded the permissibility of laboratory research.

I am inclined to think that in due course we should reply formally to the Soviet communication. An oral message from you to Gorbachev conveyed by Bryan Cutledge to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.  
CDP/At/E





On offensive weapons, Soviet counting methodology remains unacceptable. They have gone all the way back to their original definition of strategic systems as those which can hit the other side's territory, rather than continuing to work (as they did under SALT) on the basis of defining such systems as those over 550km range. This allows them to include US LRINF, and carrier-based and other medium range aircraft, whilst excluding their own systems of a similar type. The Soviet counting rules also refer to nuclear charges, not warheads. This is a standard Soviet term but it could, for instance, enable them to equate free-fall bombs with MIRVed warheads and thus to distort the overall balance. Further analysis will be needed to establish how far the Soviet Union would be forced to constrain its own ICBM force as a result of a 60% limit on any one leg of the strategic triad; and whether in that case there would be any improvement from the US point of view in the present imbalance in throwweight.

The situation in INF remains unclear. The Russians seem to be offering two options:

- (a) to merge the two sets of negotiations (START and INF), but to constrain further US deployments of INF; or
- (b) to equate totals of Soviet INF missiles with UK and French strategic nuclear forces.

The first option seems to concede the principle that US INF deployments are permissible. The second option restates their previous position.

There are a number of elements in the Soviet proposals which are obviously unacceptable: these include not only their counting methodology but also the moratoria on INF deployments and nuclear testing. On the other hand, there may on detailed analysis and as a result of further contacts in Geneva turn out to be positive factors as well. It is in any case a step forward that the Russians have now come up with specific figures. And the fact that they have called for reductions in offensive forces as extensive as 50% might make it easier for the Americans to consider the sort of limited restraints on SDI deployment which the Prime Minister has canvassed.

The French have turned down the Gorbachev offer of dialogue on nuclear reductions, stressing that French forces are not comparable to Soviet forces. For our part, the offer on the face of it does not require us to alter our basic approach, set out in the Foreign Secretary's speech to the UNGA in September 1983. Nonetheless the current Gorbachev thesis, that British and French systems cannot be ignored at a time when major reductions by the superpowers are being negotiated, and his offer of dialogue, will both strike a favourable chord with public opinion. The Foreign Secretary is clear that we should avoid being bounced into a definitive reaction; he will offer advice on a response to the Soviet proposal after consultation with Allies, particularly the US and the French.





We must evidently beware of giving the Russians any more room to exploit one of their two INF options (paragraph 5(b) above): their attempt to exclude US forces from Europe by establishing a Euro-balance of their own INF against UK and French strategic systems. For the time being we can rest on our UNGA conditions. Whilst dialogue on the terms the Soviets propose and which are designed to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the US would not be acceptable, the possibility of a deeper dialogue at the bilateral level on nuclear issues need not be ruled out.

The Foreign Secretary believes that the need for flexibility in the US position at Geneva in the run-up to the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting may before long need to be re-emphasised. This could be done in reply to the message which Mr Shultz sent him on 29 September (copy enclosed): he would clear the reply with the Prime Minister in draft. Although the Americans have done very well in keeping us informed and have reacted with admirable public restraint to the Soviet counter-proposals, Western opinion is unlikely to remain steady unless a real effort is seen to be made to engage Gorbachev in a substantive negotiation on defensive systems as well as offensive nuclear weapons.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,*

*Le Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



Prime Minister  
 You might glance at  
 the passages which I  
 have underlined.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND  
 CHANCELLOR KOHL IN BONN ON 3 OCTOBER

COP  
 4/x.

Present:

Chancellor Kohl  
 Dr Immo Stabreit  
 Interpreter

Secretary of State  
 Mr C R Budd

1. Kohl said he was very happy to welcome the Secretary of State to Bonn. He hoped the Prime Minister was well, and looked forward to seeing her in New York. Meanwhile, he sent her his very best regards.
2. He said that he himself would be attending the Summit Seven lunch on 24 October and would also be having private talks with President Reagan, but he would leave the speech-making to Genscher. He did not think the Summit Seven lunch a very happy idea; the negative reaction from President Mitterrand had been no surprise. One could but hope all would turn out well. The Secretary of State said our impression was that the idea had not been properly thought through. What seemed to lie behind it was the wish that the democracies should put on a show of unity in advance of the US/Soviet summit. Kohl commented that in that case the matter should have been tackled differently. But the proposal had helped him in one way, since it had rescued him from the difficult debate now in progress in the Federal Republic on the extension of the standard period for military service from 15 months to 18 months! He had thought it best to grasp this nettle firmly now rather than leave the whole question in suspense, not least because the alternative SPD idea of a People's Militia would be quite catastrophic.
3. Kohl added that the business world was unhappy about the proposal for extending the draft period, but on the positive side he was glad to say that he could now feel a fundamental change in the economic mood of the country. He felt that in the last three years he had overcome the biggest obstacles to economic progress. It was now becoming clear that the sacrifices had been worthwhile, and the prospects for 1986-87 looked quite bright. Some success was at least being achieved in cutting unemployment (he interjected here that the unreliability of statistics was a constant problem. The figures showed 2 million as unemployed, but also a great many vacancies. Among the 2 million unemployed there were probably half a million or so who had no intention of trying to get work).



- 2 -

4. The Secretary of State said that a number of countries had this economic upturn in common. In the UK we had good figures for growth, though unemployment had still not clearly turned down. Both the UK and the FRG would be helped by the US decision to allow the dollar to move downwards; that had been a very positive change. Kohl interjected that it would indeed be positive, if it actually happened. It was absolutely crucial that the Americans should get their deficit under control. When he had last met President Reagan he had asked him how he could possibly live with so large a deficit. President Reagan's successor would feel the consequences all too sharply.
5. The Secretary of State commented that the problems of the US economy were not unrelated to the question of arms control, where one of the many preoccupations was the need to prevent the continuing sharp escalation in levels of defence expenditure. He thought that the latest Soviet proposals formed a skilfully designed package. Kohl noted that it would be extremely important to prevent the Americans being driven on to the defensive with Western public opinion. He was not sure that the US Government realised the full extent of the danger facing them: the situation in Europe was quite different from that in the USA, with various forces on the Left combining in their first major wave of activity since the drive against Cruise missile deployment.
6. The Secretary of State said it was precisely because the political perceptions of the two Governments were broadly speaking the same that he valued the chance to have talks with the Chancellor. One prominent example of this identity of views was SDI research, which both Governments considered both prudent and necessary. It also seemed common ground that that research programme should not be allowed to appear as a threat to arms control. That was why there was concern in the UK when some US spokesmen seemed not to take arms control seriously. It was important that the Americans should appreciate the value in the arms control process of the concept of predictability, which would offer the Soviet Union the prospect of a world in which neither side was pressing to win.
7. Kohl said that much of all this hinged on the question of terminology. "Star Wars" had been a terrible term to use, and still constituted his main problem in psychological terms when it came to managing public opinion; the Left in the Federal Republic were all too ready to take up GDR propaganda on this subject. The FRG delegation which had recently visited the USA to discuss SDI research had come to certain clear conclusions. One was that the SDI research programme should go forward, and another that the economic considerations involved were at least as important as the strategic and military considerations. In passing he noted the great irony of the fact that while the

/Americans



Americans constantly attacked Europeans for over-subsidising their industries, the whole SDI programme was in fact an arch example of such over-subsidisation. A further conclusion arrived at by the FRG delegation related to the view relayed to them by the Americans that at least five years would be needed for the completion of the research phase. The delegation was clear that research was both essential and morally justifiable, but also that decisions on the programme proper could only be taken once the research phase had come to an end.

8. Kohl then mentioned that Lord Carrington during his recent visit to Bonn had put forward an interesting and worthwhile idea, referring to the fact that the ABM Treaty stipulated only a six month notice period. Carrington's idea had been that the USA and the Soviet Union should both agree to extend that period to five years, which would of course cover the period due to be devoted to SDI research. Once the five year period had elapsed then the two parties would be compelled to enter into negotiations. This suggestion deserved further study. The Secretary of State commented that it echoed British ideas about the need for predictability. The central point was that it had to be made possible to conduct research without jeopardising the arms control process. Kohl said that it would be very helpful for the UK and the FRG if they could support Lord Carrington's idea. This would be of great psychological importance in the Federal Republic.

9. It was not true, he went on, that the US had a monopoly of the knowledge relevant to the SDI programme; there were of course some fields where the Europeans were more advanced. In the German case, all the firms in question were completely private, and thus free agents not subject to government control. The FRG did not want to make public funds available for the SDI research programme, but they would need some assurances from the Americans - eg on patents, prices and exploitation. Participation in the programme would lose its attractiveness if it were simply to involve US theft of European inventions. The Secretary of State commented that the British approach to these questions was very similar. We too had in mind the need for a framework agreement covering the substance of the matter as well as volume, price and technological aspects.

10. The Secretary of State then raised the question of President Reagan's reaction to the UK/FRG proposals on MBFR. The British Government thought it important to respond by encouraging the President to take the UK/FRG ideas seriously. It was well

/worth



- 4 -

worth trying to achieve progress in this area. Forward movement here would in itself be politically useful, all the more so because several European countries were directly involved in the MBFR negotiations. Kohl said he agreed absolutely with this approach. We should make it clear to the US Government that the West was now in a very promising position so far as relations with the East were concerned. President Reagan had left the shadows of Watergate and Vietnam well behind, and himself had of course no re-election worry. He thus had great freedom of manoeuvre, rather as de Gaulle had had in the period when he had solved the Algerian problem. The Russians now needed to be told that it was very much in their interests to negotiate seriously with this American President. After all, if they were to wait to do business with his successor, then they would in effect be ruling out progress before 1990. In Europe too the political constellation was more promising from the American point of view than it was likely to be again for a long time. President Mitterrand had a very firm policy towards the Soviet Union, while the British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor were of course also reliable. Even Italy's leadership was tolerably robust, while the Belgian and Netherlands Governments, given the difficulties inherent in those two societies, were also as firm in their attitude towards the Russians as the US could possibly expect. The overall situation was thus an optimal one from the American point of view, provided they acted wisely. President Reagan would have to be made to see that clearly, not least in relation to the MFBR negotiations.

11. The Secretary of State said that also illustrated the importance of working together in Europe. Kohl, reverting to East/West matters, commented that Gorbachev's underlying position was not in fact as advantageous as all that. He could certainly expect to have a long stay in office, but faced an enormous problem of inflated expectations, and serious economic difficulties. It was striking that the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria all had higher incomes per head than the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State commented that the only parts of the world now no longer able to feed themselves were some areas of Africa and the Soviet Union. Kohl said that Gorbachev would have to do something to solve these economic problems. The choice was between reverting to Stalinist methods, which in present circumstances was hardly appropriate, and introducing a kind of Goulash Communism, rather as Krushchev had done. If he followed the latter course he would have to run his people on a rather looser rein. The Germans had recently heard from sources in Budapest that Kadar had just returned from Moscow a much relieved man, secure in the knowledge that Gorbachev was happy for the Hungarian economic experiment to

/continue.



continue. This tended to suggest that Gorbachev would favour similar policies in the Soviet Union. It was also striking that he had brought to Moscow from Novosibirsk a whole team of people who had been involved in a quite radical policy of economic reform in the Soviet Far East.

12. Kohl went on to comment that Gorbachev was of course young; he could deal with Western journalists, and had a most elegant wife. This had led a number of stupid people in Europe to describe him as liberal. For Western European Governments the danger was that Europeans would now conclude that with the advent of Gorbachev the Soviet threat had somehow diminished. In the next 48 hours the Soviet message in Paris would almost certainly be stressing the common identity of Europeans from the Western and Eastern parts of the continent, and the need for independence from the Americans. This was bound to have some effect on public opinion. There were more and more people in Western Europe who felt that one could get freedom for nothing. This was a noticeable phenomenon in the debate in the FRG on extending the draft. In some European countries the policies of the governments in question left much to be desired. This was particularly true in Greece. In Denmark, while Schluter himself was perfectly sound, there was a majority in Parliament which was not. And in both Belgium and the Netherlands the Christian Democrats, sister parties to the CDU, were all too liable to go off the rails. The FRG would simply not accept a Europe in which one set of countries were responsible for trade and industry and another for defence. The latter had to be a burden shared by all.

13. The Secretary of State said the British Government very much shared this concern. That was why the UK felt it so important that the Luxembourg European Council should come to sensible conclusions. He recalled the grand design laid down by the Chancellor during the Stuttgart European Council. Much had been achieved since then. But there was a long way still to go, and the UK for its part remained determined to overcome the setback the Community had suffered at Milan. We would be approaching the Luxembourg Council in a pragmatic way, with no prejudices. The UK had always found treaty change difficult to contemplate, but our position on that was in no way dogmatic (Kohl interjected that he thought this was very important).

14. The Secretary of State recalled remarks Kohl had made to him during dinner at Chequers in May, expressing anxiety about the need to help the European Parliament. The UK recognised that the Parliament had to be taken seriously as one of the organs indispensable to the future of the Community, an organ to some extent marked by frustration. But great care would have to be taken to avoid changing the role or powers of the Parliament in such a way that the net outcome was to frustrate the further development of Europe as a whole. Europe must be allowed to work

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in the most effective way possible. Kohl pointed out that as Chairman of the CDU he was responsible for his party's supporters not only in the Bundestag but also in the European Parliament. There was a real danger that the two groups would become split over the question of what to do about the place of the Parliament in the Community.

15. In referring to agreement between the two countries on the need for a new treaty on PoCo and security matters, the Secretary of State reminded Kohl that the Prime Minister had given him the text of a draft treaty at Chequers back in May. He thought it best to speak frankly about that episode: it was no secret that the subsequent treatment of the proposal had not helped to set the scene for the Milan European Council. The Prime Minister had been understandably dismayed that the special confidence which she had quite deliberately reposed in the Chancellor had for some reason not quite been reciprocated. The Prime Minister had perceived a very plain need for the UK and the Federal Republic to work together - though not in any exclusive fashion, and certainly not in competition with the Franco-German relationship: what was needed was a whole network of such relationships.

16. Kohl then described a separate incident which could be seen with hindsight to have formed part of the background to the misunderstanding which had arisen. It had been agreed at Chequers that the British side would give President Mitterrand a copy of its draft text. But when some time later he had had talks with Mitterrand, and had raised the subject of the British text, the President had seemed to have had no idea of what he was talking about. The Secretary of State said that the fault for that had certainly not been ours: he himself had given a copy of the text to Dumas three days after the Chequers meeting.

17. Kohl stressed that he really was full of goodwill towards the UK. His own interest was of course for the Conservative Party in the UK to be successful. The prospect of the Labour Party coming to power was simply too gruesome to contemplate. It was striking that all the Socialist parties in Northern Europe were so unsound on security matters, while the opposite was true of Socialists from the Latin countries (Kohl recalled that only the previous Monday he had talked for four hours after dinner, until the early hours of the morning, with Gonzalez of Spain, with whom he had got on extremely well).

18. Kohl underlined his conviction that Europe and the world were now at an extremely important historical stage: matters would be coming to the boil over the next five years the consequences of which would be felt until the end of the century and beyond. At a time like this the UK and the FRG simply could not afford misunderstandings.



19. The Secretary of State said he thought it would be most important for the UK and FRG to keep very closely in touch in the run-up to the Luxembourg Council. To that end he thought it would be most useful for there to be contacts between Messrs Williamson and Teltschik. Kohl said warmly that he thought it would be an excellent idea. He was looking forward to coming to London for the bilateral summit at the end of November. The Secretary of State stressed the need to avoid surprises in the run-up to Luxembourg. Kohl agreed that would be most important.

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Original on  
Pm TOURS: CHOGM!  
June 1984.

Copy of:  
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O 031040Z OCT 85  
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
BT  
S E C R E T  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

BEGINS:

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE SUGGESTING THAT THE LEADERS OF THE SEVEN ECONOMIC SUMMIT COUNTRIES SHOULD MEET OVER LUNCH IN NEW YORK ON 24 OCTOBER TO DISCUSS YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH MR. CORBACHEV. I AGREE THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL AND ALL BEING WELL WILL PLAN TO COME UP TO NEW YORK AFTER OUR COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN THE BAHAMAS. IN MY VIEW, THE MEETING WILL BE MOST USEFUL IF IT IS SMALL AND THEREFORE LIMITED TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

IT WAS GOOD TO HEAR YOU SOUNDING SO STRONG AND WELL ON THE TELEPHONE LAST WEEK AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN NEW YORK.

WITH WARM REGARDS TO YOU AND TO NANCY.

YOURS,

MARGARET.

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PUS, AND HEAD OF DEFENCE EXPORT SERVICES)

MY TELNO 2712: MSE

1. THERE WILL BE NO ANNOUNCEMENT, AND I BELIEVE NO DECISION, THIS WEEK. AND IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT NEXT WEEK WILL BE FEASIBLE.

2. THE ARMY APPEAR TO HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCT A COMPLETE REBUTTAL OF THE COST EVALUATION GROUP'S ANALYSIS. BUT THEY STILL SEEM DETERMINED TO STICK WITH A RECOMMENDATION FOR GTE.

3. ROCKWELL LOBBYISTS HAVE KEPT UP THEIR PRESSURE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE WHITE HOUSE. BOTH MCFARLANE AND REGAN ARE BEING DRAWN INTO THE DECISION-TAKING PROCESS, AND WE KNOW THAT REGAN HAS ASKED WEINBERGER TO BRIEF HIM BEFORE ANY DECISION IS ANNOUNCED.

4. WE HAVE BEEN STRESSING, TO THE NSC/WHITE HOUSE, THAT UK PUBLIC OPINION WOULD FIND IT PARTICULARLY HARD TO UNDERSTAND A DECISION IN FAVOUR OF THE FRENCH GIVEN THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE FRENCH REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION FOR 24 OCTOBER AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE HER PLANS, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE INCONVENIENCE, AND GO TO NEW YORK. I HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT TO MCFARLANE (VIA LEHMAN) THAT A DECISION IN FAVOUR OF PTARMIGAN WOULD GO DOWN PARTICULARLY WELL AT NEXT WEEK'S PARTY CONFERENCE. I AM SEEING WEINBERGER TONIGHT, AND WILL MAKE BOTH POINTS TO HIM.

5. PLEASE ADVANCE COPIES TO POWELL (NO 10), AND MOTTRAM (MOD).

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWRAN 2733



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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS (MEGAR)

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PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR ~~WILSON~~ DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
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MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
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OF 031519Z OCTOBER 85  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, MOSCOW.

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MY TELNO 236 : ALLIANCE CONSULTATION

1. WHEN CARRINGTON SAW SHULTZ LAST NIGHT, THE LATTER READILY AGREED THAT THE BEST THING NOW WOULD BE FOR HIM TO ATTEND A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS, AND THE EARLIER THE BETTER. AN ANNOUNCEMENT IS TO BE MADE TODAY IN WASHINGTON BUT WITHOUT A DATE. SHULTZ WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ALLIANCE COLLEAGUES TO AGREE THIS.  
GRAHAM

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UBLNAN 0084

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR ~~W~~ DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
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RESIDENT CLERK  
MR O'NEILL

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OF 031332Z OCTOBER 85  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 833: SUMMIT SEVEN MEETING IN NEW YORK.

1. THE QUAI NOW TELL US THAT FABIUS WILL NOT (NOT) GO TO NEW YORK.  
DUMAS WILL REPRESENT FRANCE AT THE U.N. COMMEMORATIONS. IT IS NOT  
YET DECIDED WHETHER DUMAS WILL ALSO ATTEND THE SUMMIT SEVEN MEETING.

FRETWELL

YYYY

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FM PARIS  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELNO 826  
OF 011410Z OCTOBER 85  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON AND BONN.

MOSCOWE TELNO 1276: GORBACHEVS VISIT TO PARIS.

SUMMARY

1. FRENCH OFFICIALS SAY THAT FRANCE WILL NOT BE TAKEN IN BY THIS NEXT STAGE OF GORBACHEV'S CHARM CAMPAIGN, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT SPACE IS LIKELY TO FEATURE PROMINENTLY, THEY DO NOT EXPECT GORBACHEV TO HAVE MUCH TO ADD TO SOVIET PROPOSALS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. MITTERRAND WILL LOOK TO THE VISIT TO IMPROVE HIS IMAGE, TARNISHED BY THE GREENPEACH AFFAIR.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV WILL VISIT PARIS FROM 2-5 OCTOBER ACCOMPANIED BY SHEVARDNADZE AND ARKHIPOV AMONG OTHERS. IN PROTOCOL TERMS THE FRENCH WILL TREAT THIS AS THE EQUIVALENT OF AN OFFICIAL VISIT BY A HEAD OF STATE. GORBACHEV WILL REMAIN IN THE PARIS AREA THROUGHOUT. IN ADDITION TO TWO TETE-A-TETES WITH MITTERRAND THERE WILL BE AN ENLARGED MINISTERIAL SESSION, AS WELL AS SEPARATE TALKS WITH FABIUS. GORBACHEV WILL CALL ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND HAVE MEETINGS WITH THE FRANCO-SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY FRIENDSHIP GROUP AND WITH THE COMMUNIST LEADER MARCHAIS. NO COMMUNIQUE IS PLANNED BUT THERE WILL BE A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE ON 4 OCTOBER WITH SEPARATE INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS BY EACH SIDE, TEXTS OF WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED IN ADVANCE.

3. FRENCH OFFICIALS ARE RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN ABOUT THEIR EXPECTATIONS. BUT IN GENERAL THEY CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT FRANCE IS BY NO MEANS STARRY EYED AND WILL TAKE A STEADY AND FIRM LINE ON ALL MAJOR SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. THEY EXPECT SPACE TO FEATURE STRONGLY IN GORBACHEV'S LIST OF PRIORITIES AND DO NOT EXCLUDE THAT HE MAY TRY A GOOGLY OR TWO TO TEST ALLIANCE UNITY. BUT THEY ASSUME THAT THE MAIN THRUST OF THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE HAS BEEN SET OUT IN GORBACHEV'S RECENT LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THAT THE SOVIET LINE IN PARIS WILL BE NO MORE THAN A SET OF VARIATIONS ON THIS. AMONG OTHER ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS THE FRENCH ARE EXPECTING CDE TO FEATURE FAIRLY PROMINENTLY AND IT IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED THAT THEY WILL CLAIM TO HAVE MADE PROGRESS DURING THE VISIT ON THIS FRONT

4. THE FRENCH WILL ALSO USE THE VISIT TO RE-ENGAGE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE WIDER EAST-WEST CANVAS AS WELL AS ON KEY REGIONAL ITEMS SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA. THEY CLAIM THAT THEY INTEND TO TAKE UP HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVELY, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF PERSONAL CASES WHERE FRANCE HAS A LOCUS STANDI.

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5. THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF BILATERAL AFFAIRS WILL BE DEALT WITH LARGELY BY FABIUS. THE FRENCH ARE EXPECTING TO SIGN A ROUTINE RENEWAL OF THEIR FRAMEWORK ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD 1986-90. THEY HAVE NO GRANDIOSE EXPECTATIONS OF WAYS TO IMPROVE LAST YEAR'S TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE RUSSIANS. BUT THE FIGURES FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THIS YEAR HAVE ALREADY SHOWN A SMALL SURPLUS IN FRANCE'S FAVOUR AND ALTHOUGH THE ANNUAL FIGURE FOR 1985 IS LIKELY TO BE ONCE AGAIN A DEFICIT, THE FRENCH DO NOT EXPECT IT TO BE AS GREAT AS IN 1984. THEY NOTE WITH INTEREST THAT PURCHASES OF CAPITAL GOODS BY THE SOVIET UNION HAVE PICKED UP SIGNIFICANTLY (AND THE PRESS REPORT PROSPECTS OF FURTHER CONTRACTS).

6. ALL IN ALL THE FRENCH ARE FLATTERED TO BE THE FIRST ALLIANCE COUNTRY TO RECEIVE GORBACHEV SINCE HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. MITTERRAND WILL ALSO HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY THE GENERAL TENOR OF REAGAN'S FULL-PAGE INTERVIEW WITH FIGARO YESTERDAY IN WHICH REAGAN STATES HIS CONFIDENCE IN MITTERRAND AS A QUOTE PARTISAN OF A STRONG AND UNITED WEST UNQUOTE WHO HAS NO ILLUSION ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, AND REAFFIRMS THE TOTAL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT. IF MITTERRAND CAN HANDLE THE GORBACHEV VISIT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO JUSTIFY REAGAN'S PUBLIC CONFIDENCE, WHILE DOING SOMETHING TO BOLSTER HIS OWN RATHER TARNISHED IMAGE AS A MAJOR PLAYER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HE WILL HAVE PROVIDED A WELCOME (IF ONLY TEMPORARY) DISTRACTION FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL PREOCCUPATIONS. GORBACHEV FOR HIS PART WILL DO WELL IF HE EMERGES UNSULLIED AFTER THE MAULING TO WHICH THE VOCIFEROUS FRENCH HUMAN RIGHTS LOBBY ARE HOPING TO SUBJECT HIM (DESPITE A BAN ON ALL DEMONSTRATIONS IN PARIS THROUGHOUT THE VISIT.)

FRETWELL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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RELATIONS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/FUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
SIR W HARDING  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 October 1985

Thank you for your note about my record of Bud McFarlane's remarks on the particular point of "Agreed Statement D". I pursue it only because I think it is an important one.

The notes which I sent you do not pretend to be a verbatim record. But I did in fact take very detailed notes at the time, which I have now looked up. The passage in question reads:

"The President explained to Mr. Shevardnadze that the programme was designed to conduct research in several areas of strategic defence, that it would require testing, but that it would be carried out within the ABM Treaty. Kornienko read out various excerpts from the ABM Treaty to refute this. The President replied, basing himself upon Agreed Statement D. The President said that the concept was to conduct research and tests, but not operational tests or deployment without negotiation."

I am absolutely confident that Bud McFarlane used the words in that last sentence. I made a point of noting it because it seemed to me an important and interesting distinction, particularly in the use of the word "operational".

On your second point, the sentence beginning with "Mr. McFarlane" does continue, but goes on into some comments which are perhaps best reserved for British eyes!!

Many thanks for drawing the point to my attention.

Charles Powell

cst

His Excellency The Honourable Charles H. Price II





Charles H. Price, II  
American Ambassador

052101

Sparks -

Just a couple  
of items reference  
your notes which  
I very much  
appreciated.

Sparks



Page 3 - 2nd paragraph:

McFarlane stated that "Agreed Statement D" permitted the research testing, and development (but not deployment) of new systems or technology beyond those which existed at the time of the ABM treaty. I do not think he said "there will be no operational testing without negotiations."

Bottom page - Alliance Aspects. Last sentence bottom of page beginning with "Mr. McFarlane" does not continue.



original on  
Pm TOURS:

CHOGM: June 84. CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO NEW YORK

President Reagan has invited you to lunch with other Heads of Government of the Economic Summit Seven in New York on Thursday, 24 October. It is not yet clear whether all will attend: there must be some doubt about President Mitterrand, given the French dislike of using the Economic Summit framework for political purposes. Equally the opportunity to show off about his recent visit from Gorbachev will probably be irresistible. Genscher is leading a move to get Foreign Ministers invited as well.

We need to consider the implications for your programme. There are various options. The starting point is the closing time of CHOGM, which is 1400 hrs on Tuesday, 22 October. It is probably essential for you to stay until the end in case of last minute problems on the Communique.

Option A

- fly back to London on Tuesday, 22 October. Because of time difference this will not get you back before 0430 am on Wednesday, 23 October.

- spend Wednesday, 23 October in London holding Cabinet that day and (?) making a statement on CHOGM.

- fly back to New York leaving at 0700 hrs on Thursday, 24 October, getting to the UN at 1000. (Or conceivably by Concorde which leaves at 1030 and gets in at 9.20: but there are problems about the return journey.)

~~fly~~ fly back to London overnight 24/25 October.

The advantages are that it gives you maximum working time in London (and allows you to attend the Wakehams' reception on 23 October). But it will be tiring and disorientating, with two nights out of three spent travelling. It would probably also

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rule out speaking at the UN, since our slot is on 23 October (though the options would remain for the Secretary of State speaking that day; or just possibly of moving the slot to 24 October).

Option B

- travel from Bahamas to Bermuda on the afternoon of 22 October, for a half-day visit and talks with Premier Swann.
- either overnight in Bermuda or straight on to New York.
- spend 23 October in New York. This would allow you to speak at the UN if you wanted and have a number of bilaterals with non-Commonwealth Heads of Government.
- we could also more interestingly arrange for you to have lunch or dinner with leading New York bankers and Wall Street people. Also perhaps a meeting with the editorial Board of the New York Times or Time Magazine.
- attend the President's lunch on 24 October.
- fly back overnight 24/25 October with Cabinet on the morning of 25 October. Your Statement on CHOGM would be postponed until the following Monday, (28 October) - or conceivably the Foreign Secretary could deliver it if he had returned earlier.

The disadvantages are that you will be absent for nine full days, will probably have to speak at the UN at a time when you have many other speeches, and will miss the Wakeham reception. The advantages are that it will be less exhausting, enable you to carry out a brief promised visit to Bermuda and give you a chance to meet some leading financial figures in New York which you have long wanted to do.



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- 3 -

<u>Agree:</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
- to base planning on Option B?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- to include brief visit to Bermuda?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- to speak at UN?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- to meet financial people in New York?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- to possible off the record meeting with editors of major New York publications (New York Times, Time Magazine)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- to postpone Cabinet till Friday, 25 October?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(C.D. POWELL)  
1 October 1985

(RAMABK)



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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 010800Z FCO

TELNO 1276

OF 301450Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

GORBACHEV/MITTERRAND MEETING : THE SOVIET APPROACH

SUMMARY

1. BUILD UP IN THE SOVIET PRESS HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY LOW KEY EMPHASISING IN GENERAL TERMS "TRADITIONALLY" GOOD FRENCH/SOVIET RELATIONS, AND SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE. THERE HAVE BEEN FEW HINTS HERE OF WHAT MAY COME OUT OF THE VISIT AND IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT THEY MIGHT BE, ESPECIALLY ON ARMS CONTROL WHERE, DESPITE THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TO SDI, THE FOCUS IS INCREASINGLY ON GORBACHEV'S MORE IMPORTANT MEETING IN NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. FOR THE FIRST VISIT BY A SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY TO A WESTERN COUNTRY SINCE BREZHNEV VISITED THE FRG IN 1981 (AND IN CONTRAST TO IT) THE SOVIET MEDIA BUILD-UP HAS BEEN MODEST: AN ARTICLE IN EACH OF IZVESTIA, PRAVDA, AND THE WEEKLY NOVOYE VREMYA, AN INTERVIEW WITH MME CRESSON, AND MISCELLANEOUS PRESS COMMENT. A FRENCH TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH GORBACHEV IS TO BE BROADCAST HERE AND IN FRANCE ON THE EVENING OF 1 OCTOBER. THE LE MONDE CORRESPONDENT HAS SEEN THE QUESTIONS AND DESCRIBED THEM AS "IDIOTIC". ALTHOUGH LACKING IN MUCH INTEREST OR SUBSTANCE, THE TONE HAS BEEN WARM. THUS NOVOYE VREMYA OF 20 SEPTEMBER DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS "A TRIBUTE TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE FOR WHOM THE SOVIET PEOPLE ENTERTAIN THE WARMEST FRIENDSHIP AND SYMPATHY, AND A RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF SOVIET/FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS FAVOURED GOOD, FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH FRANCE ...".

3. THERE IS ALSO RECOGNITION OF FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR THE NATO INF DECISION, AND OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANTI-SOVIET (SYNONYMOUS WITH ATLANTICIST) AND EVEN REVISIONIST ELEMENTS. BUT THE OVERWHELMING EMPHASIS IS ON FRANCE AS "OUR TRADITIONAL PARTNER" AND ON THE "TRADITIONAL POLITICAL DIALOGUE" (PRAVDA OF 22 AND 29 SEPTEMBER, RESPECTIVELY), WITH FRANCE'S ATTITUDE TO SDI, ITS ROLE IN THE "POSITIVE CHANGES" OF THE 60S AND 70S, AND MITTERRAND'S RESISTANCE TO US PRESSURES ON EAST/WEST TRADE BEING SINGLED OUT. BEYOND THIS, SOVIET COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP ARE GENERALISED, PUTTING THE VISIT IN THE CONTEXT OF "IMPROVING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD".

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/4.



4. ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MOST EMPHASIS IS PUT ON THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES, WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOUBLING OF TRADE VOLUME SINCE 1980 OVER THE PRECEEDING FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, AND LOOKING FORWARD TO A NEW ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT FOR 1986-1990. (MME CRESSON, IN IZVESTIA ON 29 SEPTEMBER, DESCRIBED THE SOVIET UNION AS A "RELIABLE PARTNER".) MENTION IS ALSO MADE OF GOOD SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION SEMI COLON CO-OPERATION IN SPACE EXPLORATION SEMI COLON AND STABLE, LONG-STANDING CULTURAL RELATIONS.

5. THE FRENCH/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON SPACE ISSUES HELD HERE BETWEEN MME RENOUARDE AND ADAMISHIN ON 19 SEPTEMBER SEEMED TO IDENTIFY SOME DIFFERENCES. THE FRENCH HAD RESISTED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO EQUATE THEIR PROPOSALS ON THE NON-MILITARISATION OF SPACE WITH THE EARLIER (PRE-GENEVA) FRENCH PROPOSALS ON DEMILITARISATION. ON ASATS THE FRENCH POINTED TO THE EXISTENCE OF LOW-ORBIT SYSTEMS, AND THE ABSENCE OF RELIABLE MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR A BAN, WHICH MUST INCLUDE LAND-BASED AS WELL AS SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS. BUT THEY SAW AS AN ADVANCE ON PBETROVSKY'S POSITION IN PARIS IN MAY, A SOVIET ASSERTION THAT ALL SYSTEMS INCLUDING LAND-BASED "COULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION". THE RUSSIANS THROUGHOUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADHERENCE TO THE LETTER OF THE ABM TREATY.

COMMENT

6. THERE IS A SENSE HERE THAT THE MEETING IN PARIS HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT OVERSHADOWED BY EVENTS SINCE THE VISIT WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED ON 4 JULY. THE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE MEETINGS WITH MITTERAND AND REAGAN, LESSENE, AT LEAST PRESENTATIONALLY THE IMPACT TO SOVIET READERS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LATTER. BUT NOW, WITH THE EVIDENT SIGNIFICANCE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON (AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROPOSALS HE BROUGHT, ENHANCED BY THEIR CONFIDENTIALITY) AND THE ST

CONFIDENTIALITY) AND THE STRESS GIVEN HERE TO THE INTENSITY OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE GENEVA SUMMIT, THE MITTERAND VISIT APPEARS INCREASINGLY AS RATHER THIN FILLING TO AN ALTOGETHER THICKER SANDWICH.

2  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

/7.



# CONFIDENTIAL

7. FOR ALL THEIR RESTRAINTS IN REPORTING THE RAINBOW WARRIOR AFFAIR (CONFINED MAINLY TO BRIEF FACTUAL ACCOUNTS DRAWN FROM FRENCH PRESS REPORTS) THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT WISH TO RISK TOO GREAT A POLITICAL INVESTMENT IN THE VISIT WHEN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT THEY WILL NONETHELESS SEEK TO ESTABLISH MAXIMUM HARMONY OF VIEW AND AGREEMENT IN THE MOST FEASIBLE AREAS - PRINCIPALLY THE NEED TO STOP SDI AND POSSIBLY AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE ABM TREATY, COUPLED WITH APPEALS FOR A RETURN TO DETENTE AND GREATER EAST/WEST COOPERATION VIA EUROPE (INCLUDING PERHAPS EC/CMEA LINKS). BUT IT IS HARD TO SEE ANYTHING OF INTERNATIONAL SUBSTANCE, ESPECIALLY ON ARMS CONTROL, EMERGING FROM THE VISIT, GIVEN THAT PROPOSALS (AS OPPOSED SIMPLY TO PROPAGANDA) HAVE NOW BEEN FORWARDED TO THE US/SOVIET NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA TO GET ON WITH. THE THUNDER OF THE PARIS VISIT HAS TO SOME EXTENT BEEN STOLEN.

CARTLEDGE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
RESEARCH D  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
ACDD  
CRD  
FED  
NED  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
SIR W HARDING  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS

3

# CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET

Copied to  
pm TOURS:  
CROGM: June '84



26

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1985

I enclose a copy of President Reagan's message to the Prime Minister inviting her to attend a lunch in New York on 24 October with leaders of the other Economic Summit countries to discuss his forthcoming meeting with Mr Gorbachev.

The Private Minsiter is likely to accept, but it will be helpful to establish as rapidly as possible the intentions of the Heads of Government of the other Economic Summit countries. We have not yet had time to consider detailed arrangements, but a point on which we shall need early advice is whether it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to speak at the United Nations if she is in New York that day. In the event that it may be, it would be prudent to start work straightaway on a draft speech.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'CP'.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



25

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

September 30, 1985


e.d.p.

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached letter from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy today.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W. 1.



Subject  
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Copied to  
PM TOURS:  
CHOGM: June 84 24

Prime Minister

**US SECRET**  
**Declassified**

CDD  
209.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T108C185

September 30, 1985

*ms*

Dear Margaret:

I am writing to you and other leaders of the Economic Summit countries to seek your further advice and counsel as preparations proceed for my meeting in November with General Secretary Gorbachev. I am sending you separately in greater detail my preliminary thoughts on what we hope to achieve and look forward to your comments.

As you well know, I would like to do more, however, than simply exchange letters and ensure our Foreign Ministers and other officials stay in close touch. Bud McFarlane's visit with you this weekend was a step to that end. As events over the past few years demonstrate, a constructive outcome in November will depend heavily on intensive consultations and on maintaining Western unity.

I will be in New York City on October 24 to participate in the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. I would like to take that opportunity to host a lunch of the leaders of the seven Economic Summit countries to discuss our planning for the Geneva meeting, in light of my discussions last week with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

I believe it would be very useful to discuss as a group our planning for the Geneva meeting. This will enable me to share my personal views with you and to benefit at first hand from your own suggestions on how we might best pursue our common objectives. Such a meeting will also permit us to continue and expand on the stimulating and extremely useful discussions we have had on East-West issues during recent summit meetings.

With warm regards.

/s/

Ron

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**FLASH**

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GRS 200

~~Mr Powell~~ } No 10 DSt.  
Mr Ingham }

P.S.

Mr DAUNT.

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INFO IMMEDIATE BONN PARIS OTTAWA ROME TOKYO UKMIS NEW YORK  
UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

- PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT 7 MEETING IN NEW YORK: 24 OCTOBER
1. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONING FOLLOWING AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN BONN TODAY, THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE THIS MORNING CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ISSUED INVITATIONS TO OTHERS OF THE SUMMIT 7 TO ATTEND A LUNCH IN NEW YORK ON 24 OCTOBER AT WHICH HE WOULD BRIEF ON HIS PLANS FOR THE 19/20 NOVEMBER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV.
  2. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT - AS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED - THE PRESIDENT WAS IN ANY CASE TOBE IN NEW YORK ON 24 OCTOBER FOR THE UN ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS.
  3. ADVANCE COPIES TO POWELL AND INGHAM (NO 10), AND APPELYARD, DAUNT AND MEYER (FCO).

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 2607

NNNN



23

2 cjk

Prime Minister  
Pretty much what  
Mr. McFarlane told you,  
though less detailed.  
Re Foreign Security may  
mention it tomorrow.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON


September 30, 1985

Dear Geoffrey: *COP*

Enclosed is a letter which Secretary of State  
Shultz has asked me to pass along to you.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W. 1.



# SECRET

September 29, 1985

Dear Geoffrey:

I want to share with you some initial impressions from my recent meetings and that of the President with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Our discussions were broad-ranging, covering considerable ground. We touched upon the full agenda of US-Soviet issues, including various regional, bilateral and human rights questions, but with a special emphasis on arms control and security problems. The President put forward a comprehensive view of his thoughts about the upcoming meeting in Geneva with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, making clear both our concerns with unacceptable Soviet activities in various areas and our hopes for progress towards a more stable and productive relationship with the Soviet Union.

The tenor of the Foreign Minister's response was serious and businesslike. Our exchanges involved a good deal of straightforward give and take over particular issues. While we were not surprised by the persistent differences that these discussions underscored, we believe the past week's meetings with Shevardnadze laid a useful foundation for the Geneva meeting in November and any resulting process of more constructive US-Soviet dialogue.

The Foreign Minister took the occasion of his meeting with the President both to deliver a personal letter from General Secretary Gorbachev and to offer an oral gloss of this message, in which he outlined and expanded upon various Soviet proposals for nuclear arms reductions. In doing so, however, Shevardnadze made clear that a fuller and more detailed elaboration of these Soviet proposals would shortly be forthcoming at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva. Thus, the end effect of his presentation was not unlike the pattern of previous Soviet arms control statements -- heavy on generalized statements of intent and promise, all contingent on Western acceptance of Soviet terms, with hints, but few details, of Soviet movement on some issues.

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As these Soviet presentations in Geneva unfold and as we have the opportunity for detailed questioning at the negotiating table to gain a better picture of just what any new Soviet positions might entail, we will, of course, wish to consult with you closely. In the interim, however, I would note for you that, consistent with the Soviet public line of recent weeks, Gorbachev's message and Shevardnadze's comments laid great stress on the possibilities for progress offered by the November meeting with the President, but in terms of actual substance, reiterated many of their familiar and unacceptable declaratory proposals, such as a nuclear testing moratorium and deployment freeze. Most importantly, they continued to assert a rigid and automatic link between an agreement on so-called space strike weapons with negotiating progress towards reductions of offensive nuclear arms.

In response to our charges of a lack of specificity on their part, the Soviets put forward the number fifty percent as a possible degree of reductions in "relevant nuclear arms," with the Foreign Minister verbally citing a hypothetical end result of 6,000 "nuclear charges," which would include weapons capable of striking the other side's territory. Their comments indicated an effort to characterize and aggregate strategic arms in an unacceptably sweeping and one-sided way, seeking, for instance, to include U.S. LRINF missiles and carrier-based aircraft as strategic while excluding Soviet LRINF systems and to equate bomber-carried gravity bombs with ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets repeated earlier Soviet calls for a freeze and the assertion that they sought no greater quantity of "medium-range" weapons in Europe than the number of British and French warheads.

For our part, we made clear our basic objections to this sort of approach. The Soviets also suggested a mutual understanding to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and not to increase the stock of nuclear weapons and not to replace them with new ones in countries where such weapons now exist. This, of course, attacks directly not only NATO's 1979 decision, but also the basis for our

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Montebello decision to reduce the size of the overall NATO stockpile. As in the past, the net impact of such terms would be to lock in Soviet advantages, diminish NATO's conventional capabilities, and divide us from our allies.

As you are aware, we have indicated in our initial public statements that we are prepared to deal with new Soviet ideas seriously. To that end, we believe that the proper next step is for our negotiators to explore both the U.S. proposals already on the table in Geneva and these Soviet counterproposals.

We will see what, if any, possibilities for progress emerge from these follow-on exchanges. Thus far, the new Soviet position appears to represent some interesting changes, but as it currently stands, does not constitute an appropriate basis for agreement in Geneva. The Soviets seem to be slowly moving towards discussion of what must be a central issue in any strategic arms control agreement -- significant reductions that might affect their own already massive strategic arsenal -- but remain preoccupied with seeking to preserve unilateral offensive and defensive advantages through these negotiations.

As our negotiators discuss these issues further in Geneva over the next few weeks, we will be carefully assessing any new Soviet positions by the potential contribution they can make to solving the problems of greater strategic stability, equality at reduced levels of weaponry, and effective verification of compliance by all parties. While we are pleased to see the Soviets at last moving to a discussion of specific numbers in connection with offensive reductions, we must also note that, judged against these important criteria, a simple percentage is meaningless without reference to what is to be included and to the data baselines. Similarly, loosely-defined "nuclear charges" are not the same as "warheads." We will have to see whether the more detailed Soviet formulation addresses the basic threat to strategic stability posed by growing capability of highly-MIRVed Soviet ICBMs to threaten our own land-based deterrent forces.

# SECRET



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-4-

That said, we are basically pleased that, after putting forward our own proposals for deep offensive reductions in Geneva during the past two rounds, the Soviets are now responding with a counterproposal of their own. We hope that this can lead to the sort of serious give and take across the negotiating table that we have been working to encourage.

What all of this gives evidence of is the correctness of the Alliance's strategy thus far. In the face of an unwarranted Soviet walkout from the earlier negotiation, Western unity and firmness eventually brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. After two rounds of talks, the combination of positive U.S. proposals and the patience to stand by those positions have brought about modest signs of evolution in the Soviet position. As we continue our negotiating efforts at Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna and elsewhere, the Alliance will continue to need this sense of realism, determination and common purpose.

It is important that we keep the pressure on the Soviets to keep moving toward a serious discussion of offensive arms reductions. Continued Allied support and solidarity will be especially important in this regard as we negotiate these issues in Geneva and as we approach the November meeting.

We will, of course, continue to be in close touch on these matters. As always, I would welcome your personal thoughts and counsel.

Sincerely,

/S/

George P. Shultz

SECRET





File Kb  
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1985

I enclose strictly for your own personal use a set of my notes of Saturday's meeting at Chequers between the Prime Minister and Bud McFarlane.

CHARLES POWELL

His Excellency Charles H. Price II.



cc Master

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES  
COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES



File.  
21.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. MCFARLANE:

During their meeting at Chequers today, the Prime Minister asked Mr McFarlane whether the United States proposed exchanges with France on nuclear matters would cover only nuclear weapons safety and security or were designed to lead to something wider. Mr McFarlane said that the intention was to discuss safety and security only, although that encompassed the vulnerability of French systems to weapons' effects. There was no intention of embarking upon wider cooperation.

I am copying this minute to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence). It should be given a very restricted circulation indeed and no reference should be made to the conversation with Mr McFarlane in contacts with US officials.

C.D.P.

C D POWELL

28 September 1985

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TOP SECRET



cc Master

File 20



10 DOWNING STREET

28 September 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. MCFARLANE:  
US/SOVIET SUMMIT

Much of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr McFarlane today covered preparations for the United States/Soviet Summit, particularly the question of arms control. Mr McFarlane gave a lengthy account of the President's meeting on 27 September with Mr Shevardnadze and handed over a copy (enclosed) of a message from Gorbachev to President Reagan.

Arms Control

Mr McFarlane said that, at his meeting with the President, Mr Shevardnadze had put forward a new arms control proposal. This was very skilful and worrisome in its likely effect on public opinion. The main elements were:

- (i) a complete ban on all "space strike" weapons. The weapons were so defined as to exclude the Soviet Union's existing ABM system, even though at the January meeting with Secretary Shultz the Russians had agreed to include this system.
- (ii) A 50 per cent reduction in existing "nuclear charges" from a base assumed to be 12000 "nuclear charges". Mr McFarlane said that the term "charges" was used because the Russians wanted to include the weapons which the Americans needed to penetrate the Soviet ABM system. The Americans would thus in effect pay a penalty for the existing asymmetry between Soviet possession of an ABM system and their own lack of one. The Prime Minister commented that a remaining total of 6000 warheads should leave plenty of scope for overwhelming the present Soviet ABM system.
- (iii) Within the aggregate of "nuclear charges", each country would be free to decide the allocation of its total between land, sea and air-based weapons, but could not put more than 60 per cent in any one leg of the triad. Mr McFarlane



commented that this gave the Soviet Union the possibility of retaining all their existing heavy systems. The strategic implication was that they would preserve a first-strike capability while the Americans would have neither a defence system nor a corresponding first-strike capability.

- (iv) Weapons to be counted in the reduced totals would be only those capable of reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. Mr McFarlane commented that this would exclude the SS20 but include Pershing and GLCM.
- (v) A ban on all new types of missiles. Mr McFarlane said that such a ban would seem plausible to public opinion. But in the Soviet interpretation it would mean that the Americans could not have Trident or Midgetman, while they themselves could have the SS24 and/or SS25 which were regarded as modernised weapons not new ones.
- (vi) Both sides would commit themselves not to place nuclear weapons in any country where they were not at present stationed. Mr McFarlane commented that this was clearly aimed at INF deployment in the Netherlands.

Mr McFarlane continued that President Reagan had given Mr Shevardnadze a long and fluent account of the American view of Soviet policies. He had put on record that the United States had no hostile intent towards the Soviet Union. He had suggested that public opinion in the United States was settling down to a midway point between the extremes of detente and cold war. People recognised that ideologies would not change, they respected the Soviet Union as a great power and they were ready for peaceful competition. The central issue was whether it was possible to establish a stable military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The President had then gone through the history of offensive deterrence, with the purpose of explaining how in American eyes the Russians had introduced new systems which threatened stable offensive deterrence, above all through the decision to introduce mobile MIRVs. Because of the restraints exercised by public opinion, no United States Administration could match the Soviet Union in building new offensive systems. They had therefore been forced back on strategic defence. (The Prime Minister interjected that this was a new and not a very good argument for the Strategic Defence Initiative. If the Russians offered not to introduce mobile MIRVs, the United States would have no justification for proceeding with the Strategic Defence Initiative.) The President had then gone into the fundamentals of why it was in the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States to pursue strategic defence in the longer term. Particularly with the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was better to rely on defence than on destruction. For these reasons the United



States was firmly resolved to pursue its strategic defence research programme which would encompass some testing, but would be ready to consult and negotiate on deployment. They wanted a serious dialogue with the Soviet Union on the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons.

Shevardnadze had little to say in reply beyond repeating the public Soviet line about not carrying war into the heavens. Kornienko had asserted that testing was not compatible with the ABM Treaty. The President had made clear that the United States relied on Agreed Statement D to the ABM Treaty. There would be no operational testing or deployment without negotiation.

The Prime Minister said that it was important that the United States should now come forward with convincing counter-proposals to those introduced by the Soviet Union. The Russians clearly feared that the Strategic Defence Initiative would upset the strategic balance. They hankered after predictability. Was it feasible to think in terms of negotiations about what each side would regard as permissible developments in strategic defence within certain specified time-limits? Might it not also be possible to propose reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty perhaps with some changes such as extending the period of notice to withdraw? This might increase Soviet confidence.

Mr McFarlane said that the United States had already put forward proposals in Geneva on offensive weapons which offered a variety of alternative means to reduce the total number of warheads to levels ranging from 5000 - 9000. They had also indicated that they could tolerate any number of launchers in the band 1200 - 1800. All their proposals had the goal of achieving a lower warhead/target ratio.

So far as strategic defence was concerned, the United States was not very attracted by the idea of trying to set time-limits for permissible developments. One reason was their unhappy experience with time-limited agreements. Treaties intended to lapse, such as the SALT agreements, had not been allowed to do so by public opinion. Another was that the United States had little idea yet what it might want to or be able to introduce and when. All that could be predicted at the moment was that they might want to deploy a ground-based, terminal-phase defence in about five years.

Mr McFarlane continued that the United States had received one hint of what the Soviets might regard as a tolerable outcome on strategic defence from the forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev. This had come from a discussion between Dr Kissinger and Mr Arbatov. It was not clear what the latter's role and influence were these days, but he had been speaking from a written brief. Arbatov's question had been: how could the United States and Soviet Union come to terms in Geneva? McFarlane had authorised Kissinger to suggest that the outcome might be:

- (a) the parties would commit themselves to negotiating within one year an agreement to



reduce the total number of warheads each held to X; and

- (b) they would also commit themselves to a serious discussion of the relationship between offence and defence, leading to greater reliance over time on defensive systems, but with an undertaking not to deploy such systems without negotiation under the ABM Treaty.

Arbatov had seemed to think this might be acceptable.

#### Other Subjects

President Reagan and Shevardnadze had also discussed regional issues although the exchanges had been largely sterile. The President had said that the aim at his meeting with Gorbachev should be to find ways to reduce the threat of the use of force. In Afghanistan, for instance, the United States could respect the Soviet Union's need for a secure southern border but could not accept the expansion of Soviet control. Shevardnadze had given the impression in reply that if a way could be found to guarantee the Soviet Union against external interference, Soviet withdrawal might be in the interests of all. But he had failed to respond when the Americans had suggested various channels for talks on this. The impression was that the Russians might envisage concessions on Afghanistan if these could be traded off against gains elsewhere. The Middle East had not been mentioned in the talks with President Reagan.

Mr McFarlane commented that Shevardnadze had spoken with authority but had followed closely a written brief. He had appeared at ease and articulate although he tended to avoid eye-contact. He would appeal to a western audience as a gentle man.

#### Alliance Aspects

Lord Carrington, who appeared briefly at the end of the meeting with Mr McFarlane, urged strongly the need for full American consultation with the Alliance at foreign minister level before the United States/Soviet Summit and prompt arrangements to brief the Allies afterwards. McFarlane registered the importance of this while mentioning timetable difficulties. He thought that the President would return direct from Geneva to report to Congress.

Lord Carrington stressed the importance from the point of view of public opinion in Western Europe of the United States coming forward with a credible and attractive counter to the Soviet proposals. This must in particular deal with the perception that the United States was being inflexible about the Strategic Defence Initiative and thus responsible for obstructing progress on arms control. Mr McFarlane betrayed some nervousness about Gorbachev's visit to France which was clearly designed to open up divisions in the Alliance.




Follow-up

It is probable that details of the new Soviet arms control proposals will begin to emerge very soon and certainly once they are formally tabled in Geneva on Monday. The Prime Minister has said that we should avoid rushing into a public reaction. She would like to consider our proposed response before any statement is made. I understand that the Americans are likely to be sending out messages very shortly describing the Soviet proposals and their own reactions.

The Prime Minister has instructed that this letter should be given a very restricted circulation indeed. On no account should any reference be made to it or to the meeting with Mr McFarlane in contacts with other United States officials.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely  


(C D POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL



Dear Mr. President,

I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations in continuation of the correspondence between us and specifically with a view to our forthcoming personal meeting.

I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has been fairly clearly recognized. They rival each other in their importance.

Sure, the distinctions between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to a number of matters of principle are different. That is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military collision that would entail catastrophe for our countries, for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also accept the impermissibility of military collision between the USSR and the USA.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war, removing military threat is our mutual and, for that matter dominant interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes into the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive, stable and thus contribute

His Excellency  
Ronald Reagan  
President of the United  
States of America



to the improvement of the world situation in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

There, we are convinced, lie considerable opportunities. My meeting with you may serve as a potent catalyst for their realization. As it seems, we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the impermissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such war, we could resolutely speak out against seeking a military superiority, against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by clearly expressed intentions of the sides to take actions of material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the sides to act in the direction of removing the military threat. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us, I think, to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems.

What specific measures should get priorities? Naturally those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarisation of space is the only road to very radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favour to follow this road



unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically without postponing decisions. I would like to count upon having obtained some positive results by the time of our meeting with you.

In connection with certain provisions contained in your letter of the 27th of July I would note that our attitude to the American programme of the development of strike space weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system we have made explicit on several occasions. That opinion is based not on emotions or personal biases but on facts and realistic assessments. I would stress once again--the implementation of this programme would not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it and at that with most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries in order to slow down and bring to a halt the arms race above all in its main, nuclear field. It is indeed for this and no other purpose that we made a number of unilateral steps of practical nature.

Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the point of view of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of their new types. Consequently the termination of nuclear tests would act in the opposite direction. This is what we were guided by in making our decision to stop any



4.

nuclear explosions and appealing to the USA to join us in this. Look at the matter unbiassedly. Now it is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt the security of either of them.

Therefore if there is a true intention to move to halting the arms race, then the mutual moratorium cannot raise objections, while the benefit it brings could be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests--though in the presence of somebody's observers--would be nothing else but the same arms race. The US still has time to take the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

However the moratorium on nuclear tests is, of course, not yet a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

For that it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final run the outcome of these talks will decisively determine whether we shall succeed in stopping the arms race, solving the task of eliminating nuclear weapons as such. Regrettably the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious alarm.

We have thoroughly and from every point studied once again what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula: the two sides agree to ban completely strike space weapons and to reduce really radically, say, by 50 percent their relevant nuclear arms.



In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiation--not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but also drastically reduced would be the level of nuclear countervalance, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result the strategic stability would be strengthened multifold, mutual confidence would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and the USA would be, I believe, an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realise that such a radical solution would require time and efforts. Nonetheless we are convinced that this problem can be solved. For this, first of all, a coincidence in principle of political approaches is needed. And, second, given such a coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of strike space weapons and a freeze on nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

Alongside with that major practical measures to be taken could include: making non-operational and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as the mutual undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in the countries which are now nuclear-free, and not to increase the stock of nuclear weapons and not to replace them by new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.



Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires solution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favours its radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone not more weapons of this type, counting the warheads, than Britain and France have.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiation has due instructions, and it intends to present in the nearest future our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give exhaustive clarifications. We count on the positive reaction of the American side and hope that it will be possible to reach certain results already at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the field of confidence-building and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference should make a maximum effort to turn the work of the Conference to a successful completion. Such an opportunity, as it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the US Secretary of State--we are in favour of making the subject matter of the Stockholm Conference an asset at our meeting with you.

It largely depends on our two countries if an impetus is given to the Vienna talks. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the American side would once again closely look at the possibility of initial reduction of Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have



proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favourable impact on the development of the all-European process as well. I see no reasons why it should not be in the interests of the USA.

Proposing practical measures of arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification procedures. In some cases it would be national technical means, in other cases, when it is really necessary, they could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the American side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in constructive direction in order to build up useful basis, including, if possible, the one for the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I payed particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing closer our positions and, better still, finding wherever possible practical solutions.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm, in Vienna, by exchanges in diplomatic channels it will be possible in the time left before our meeting with you to attain such a situation that the meeting will be really productive.



29 21

We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of our discussions with you at the meeting itself could be incorporated in the relevant joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our Ministers to figure out how the work over such final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

12 September 1985



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10 DOWNING STREET

28 September 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR McFARLANE

The Prime Minister's meeting with Mr McFarlane at Chequers today covered a number of subjects, most of which I am recording separately. In summary they were:

- US/Soviet Summit: Arms Control. This was the main subject and I have recorded the discussion in a separate letter.
- SDI. The Prime Minister confirmed to Mr McFarlane our continuing interest in reaching an agreement on United Kingdom participation in SDI research. There was also some discussion of the United States research programme which I have recorded separately. The Prime Minister has agreed that I shall show my note to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary when they are next at No. 10.
- Middle East. I have written separately on this.
- Libya. This is a subject of a separate note which I can show to the Foreign Secretary when he is next here.
- [redacted] I have minuted to Sir Robert Armstrong.
- MSE. Mr McFarlane allowed that he was very but very familiar with the arguments in favour of Ptarmigan.
- South Africa, Ireland and Arms Sales to Argentina were not raised for lack of time.
- MBFR. The Prime Minister promised that she would reply shortly to the President's message. Mr McFarlane showed some (uncharacteristic) irritation that knowledge of the message had reached the State Department through the United Kingdom.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*John [unclear]*  
C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office





10 DOWNING STREET

28 September 1985

*From the Private Secretary**Dear Peter,*PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR MCFARLANE: MIDDLE EAST

During the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr McFarlane today, there was some discussion of the Middle East.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to ask Mr McFarlane a blunt question: had the US Administration put the Middle East on the backburner because it already had too many other problems with Congress? Mr McFarlane said that unfortunately it had not. The President had identified the reduction of nuclear arms and the Middle East as the two global issues on which he wanted to achieve progress. He accepted that, in the case of the Middle East, this would mean hard decisions which would be bitterly opposed by the Jewish lobby. But the reality was that over the next two months he would be totally preoccupied with the US/Soviet Summit and would have no time for Middle East problems. Unfortunately this did not fit King Hussein's time-scale.

Mr McFarlane continued that the Americans recognised their obligation to King Hussein. They had notified the arms package for Jordan to Congress while warning him that it was likely to have a difficult passage. But the President felt there was a basic disagreement over the objectives of the King's strategy. The King seemed to want a process involving the Arabs but not Israel. Moreover it was not altogether clear that he could deliver on the four steps, particularly the second stage in which the PLO would accept 242 and renounce violence. Even if the PLO did this, it was not clear that it would help bring Israel to the negotiating table. Above all the Americans needed to know whether or not the process would lead to direct negotiations. It was King Hussein's unwillingness to say that it would which had put the President off.

Mr McFarlane continued that the Americans had had two meetings with King Hussein in New York. The King appeared to be willing to put the proposed meeting between Ambassador Murphy and a joint delegation on the backburner, and to focus instead on the question of an international conference. They had discussed a proposal under which the UN Secretary-General would invite the parties and the permanent members of the Security Council who had diplomatic




relations with the parties to attend a Conference. This would be convened at Head of Government level for the parties and Foreign Minister level for the members. The purpose of the Conference would be to endorse direct negotiations. In these, there would be a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation which would eventually include bona fide members of the PLO once they had recognised Israel's right to exist. If the King and President Reagan were to agree to this, invitations to such a conference might issue within a month.

The Prime Minister asked about membership of the joint delegation. Mr McFarlane said that it would presumably consist of those who would have met Murphy. In reply to my question whether the Palestinians would be present at the proposed conference, Mr McFarlane said that the PLO would not be present. He added that he thought that our decision to meet a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation would be useful in lending legitimacy to the concept that direct negotiations would have to take place with such a delegation.

It was not entirely clear from all this whether the idea described above was of American or Jordanian origin. Whichever it is, there are many unanswered questions about it.

The Prime Minister has instructed that this letter should be seen only by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Antony Acland and Mr Egerton. No reference should be made to the conversation in any contact with American officials.

Yours sincerely,  


(C D POWELL)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1495</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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## NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR McFARLANE:  
STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE

The Prime Minister asked Mr McFarlane at their meeting today about progress with the SDI research programme. Mr McFarlane said that it was going very well. More work had been done on lasers powered by nuclear explosions. The Excalibur experiment had exceeded all expectations and appeared to offer a very promising solution for interception/destruction of offensive missiles in the boost phase. Work in the related area of mirror tracking systems was going well, although he personally was not convinced that this aspect of the SDI would prove practicable. He also commented that he rather regretted that strategic defence seemed likely to rely on a nuclear component. One of the most appealing aspects of the SDI was its claim to be leading towards a non-nuclear world.

C.D.P.

C D POWELL

28 September 1985





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1985

*Dear Charles,*McFarlane: Middle East

The visit offers a most valuable occasion to explain our views and discuss how US policy towards the Arab/Israel dispute may develop. There have been some hints that the Americans may wish to abandon the "Murphy meeting" altogether and try another tack. This need not be a bad thing, if they genuinely have something constructive and helpful to offer in its place. The Prime Minister urged the President in her message of 20 September (copy enclosed) to agree to a "Murphy meeting". She might develop our thinking on the need for US action on the following lines.

The natural starting point would be the Prime Minister's own impressions of Egypt and Jordan and her decision that Sir Geoffrey Howe should see the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. She might stress how far the moderate Arabs are our natural allies and look to the West for support, yet are becoming dangerously disillusioned by what they consider an inadequate US response. King Hussein feels strongly that he has shown flexibility which others have failed to match. He is seriously considering cutting his losses. This would be a sad defeat not only for him but for the West. It would give golden opportunities to those hostile to Western interests. The latest wave of terrorist attacks by Palestinians highlights the dangers of the situation.

King Hussein's step by step process is the only real game plan on offer. He has rallied important Palestinian support for it. He is convinced that he cannot go further without real US help. This is our view also. We must always be sceptical at PLO aims, but he has brought them along so far. It is tempting to push for the maximum before giving the King a positive response. The obstacles in Israel are great. We all appreciate Peres' delicate position. But if we hold out much longer, there will be nothing left to support; the process will collapse. Shamir is waiting in the wings.

/We





We therefore concluded in Amman that the time had come to agree to the gesture of receiving the delegation in London. This in no way cuts across Jordanian/US exchanges. It is a gesture in support of the King, not British meddling in the peace process whose fate lies solely with the parties, and the US help without which they cannot move. But we were convinced that the time was right for us to contribute what we could. This will not be without political difficulty at home, but we intend to stick with a course which is overwhelmingly in Israel's interests, whatever the less enlightened supporters of Israel may say to the contrary. So far their reaction has been within the bounds of what is tolerable. In our view this argues equally forcefully for a similar early US gesture, though we are fully aware that US domestic considerations make this still more difficulty for them.

The Prime Minister may wish to note that King Hussein's meeting with the President on 30 September may be a crucial test. If no step forward can be agreed then, it may be impossible to save the gains the King has already made. The atmosphere in the region continues slowly to deteriorate. Mr Shultz told Sir Geoffrey Howe on 26 September that he personally thought the Prime Minister's decision positive and helpful. This is welcome, but what matters is whether the Americans will now make their own contribution, for which no European gesture(s) can substitute.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



SECRET

11540 - 1

20. Sep 1985

' 'DEAR RON,

I AM JUST COMPLETING A VISIT TO EGYPT AND JORDAN AND WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY STRAIGHT WAY HOW WORRIED I AM BY THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN FOLLOWING UP KING HUSSEIN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. I FOUND THE KING VERY DISPIRITED ABOUT THIS. I AM SURE YOU REALISE HOW MUCH HE RISKED PERSONALLY IN PUTTING FORWARD THE PROPOSALS AND HOW MUCH STANDING HE WOULD LOSE IF HIS INITIATIVE FAILS.

ALL SEEMED TO BE ON COURSE UNTIL YOUR PEOPLE STIPULATED THAT THERE MUST BE DIRECT, VISIBLE CONTACT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AS A CONDITION FOR A MEETING WITH THE JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION. I AM SURE YOU WILL RECALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH KING HUSSEIN'S GRANDFATHER, KING ABDULLAH, WAS ASSINATED IN 1951. IF KING HUSSEIN UNDERTAKES DIRECT VISIBLE CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, IT COULD SO AGAIN PROVE FATAL FOR THIS COURAGEOUS AND STEADFAST FAMILY.

KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD ' 'COME TO THE END' '. HIS MEETING WITH YOU ON 30 SEPTEMBER WOULD BE DECISIVE. HE HAD GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS WITH ARAFAT TO PERSUADE HIM TO JOIN IN HIS INITIATIVE. HE HAD GOT ARAFAT TO ACCEPT TWO PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR THE JOINT DELEGATION AT THE UNITED STATES INSISTENCE. HE NATURALLY FEELS NOW THAT IT IS NOT TOO MUCH TO ASK THE UNITED STATES TO ACCEPT TWO OTHERS FROM THE REMAINING FIVE. INDEED I UNDERSTAND THAT YHOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE FURTHER TWO IF YOUR NEW PRECONDITION WAS MET.

I REALLY FEEL THAT IF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS IS MISSED, IT WILL NOT OCCUR AGAIN. FAILURE WOULD BE A GREAT BLOW TO WESTERN DIPLOMACY, ESPECIALLY WHEN WE NEED A SUCCEES AHEAD OF YOUR NOVEMBER MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV. MOREOVER THE RISK OF CONTINUINTG GROWTH OF MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM AND SHI' ITE EXTERMISM



SECRET

11540 - 1

IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAKES IT MORE VITAL THAN EVER THAT WE ARE SEEN TO BE MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLVING THE (NEXT WORK UNDERLINED) PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IT IS A QUESTION OF KEEPING HOPE ALIVE.

I DO NOT SEE THAT ANYTHING IS TO BE LOST BY A MEETING WITH A JOINT DELEGATION. UNDER KING HUSSEIN'S PROPOSED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, RECOGNITION OF THE PLO WOULD COME ONLY IF AND AFTER THE PLO THEMSELVES HAD PUBLICLY ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242 AND RENOUNCED VIOLENCE. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD THEN TAKE PLACE SO LONG AS WE CAN PROVIDE THE KING WITH SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL COVER. I KNOW THAT BOTH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN REMAIN ATTACHED TO A FULL SCALE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BUT I THINK I MADE SOME HEADWAY IN POINTING OUT THE RISKS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROBABLY TRY TO FRUSTRATE A CONFERENCE AND WRECK THE KING'S INITIATIVE. IT MAYH BE THAT GORBACHEV WILL RAISE THIS WITH YOU IN NOVEMBER. BOTH MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN ARE CERTAINLY EXPECTING THE MIDDLE EAST TO FEATURE AS ONE OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS YOU WILL DISCUSS WITH GORBACHEV.

I WANT TO DO ALL I CAN TO HELP KING HUSSEIN IN HIS PRESENT DIFFICULT POSITION. I HAVE THEREFORE TOLD HIM THAT WE SHALL BE READY TO SEE A JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IN LONDON. THE PALESTINIAN MEMBERS WILL BE TWO WELL-KNOWN MODERATES WHO PERSONALLY SUPPORT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BORDERS AND OPPOSE VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM. THEY WILL STATE THIS PUBLICLY WHEN THEY COME TO LONDON. I SHALL PROBABLY BE ANNOUNCING THIS TOMORROW BEFORE I LEAVE JORDAN. I HAVE ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO MR. PERES ABOUT THIS AS I FEEL SURE HE WILL WISH TO KNOW.

I DO MOST EARNESTLY HOPE THAT YOUR TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN WILL BE SUCCESSFUL AND WILL TAKE THE PEACE PROCESS A FURTHER STAGE FORWARDS.

YOURS SINCERELY.

MARGARET

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SECRET









14      CEB

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1985

CDD 25/9

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr McFarlane: Iran/Iraq

There is growing concern that any further successful low level attacks by the Iraqis on Kharg Island could leave Iranian capacity to export oil at well below half the level they need to sustain the war. Our view is that the economic pressure on Iran is undoubtedly mounting, but their capacity for defending Kharg effectively or retaliating in kind is limited. The danger is that they could be forced into irrational retaliation, possibly including increased interference with shipping and direct or indirect attacks on Iraq's neighbours. Perhaps the easiest option for them is increased subversion within Kuwait.

We would welcome Mr McFarlane's views on:

- (i) how near the Iranians are to this economic trigger;
- (ii) what retaliatory measures they might adopt to halt Iraqi attacks;
- (iii) can Iran's economic weakness be exploited to press for a ceasefire, and if so how.

The immediate concern to the US and UK is the threat to shipping in the Gulf from a sharp escalation in the war. We are consulting the Americans closely at official level about contingency planning. A State Department party has been in London this week, and Anglo-US Pol-Mil talks will be held in London on 23/24 October.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street









Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1985

CD  
27/9

Dear Charles,

Talks with Mr McFarlane: Arms Control

The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to discuss with Mr McFarlane the arms control element of the US/Soviet Summit. In doing so she could perhaps seek to influence the US approach to the Summit along the lines of her message to President Reagan of 12 September; to encourage the President to inject a new impetus into the Geneva negotiations; and to forestall any inclination on the US side to allow the future of the SDI to block progress. For his part, Mr McFarlane will no doubt wish to brief the Prime Minister on US preparations for the Summit and, perhaps, to play down the significance of the President's remarks at his press conference on 17 September.

The thrust of the Prime Minister's earlier message was to sound a note of caution, which will have been endorsed in Washington, about the effect on Western public opinion of current Soviet initiatives and the apparently more reasonable approach by Gorbachev. She urged the need for the Summit to inject a new impetus in the Geneva talks, and made a number of concrete suggestions. These included the need:

- to seek deep cuts in offensive weapons; to reaffirm and to clarify the ABM Treaty;
- to instil an element of predictability into the future strategic balance, taking account of defensive developments but not imposing definitive constraints upon them;
- to initiate a long-term dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in order to encourage this predictability;
- and to seek progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

The President's reply was set in a rather broader context and did not address these specific points. However, he expressed optimism that the Summit could set in motion the resolution of specific problems. He reaffirmed his determination not to endanger the SDI which he described as

/"vital





"vital to our arms control efforts and our hopes for a better, safer future"; and he agreed about the risk of the Russians exploiting any appearance of Western divisions in this and other security areas.

At his 17 September press conference (text attached), the President spoke in terms which offer some encouragement for progress at the Summit. But in his comments on the SDI he seemed less flexible than he has been in recent months. He underlined his wish to eliminate nuclear weapons as a result of SDI deployments, thus moving away from deterrence by the threat of retaliation towards deterrence by denial of the objectives of attack. He described the SDI as too important to be a bargaining chip, and claimed that not only research but development and testing (specifically banned by the ABM Treaty) were all legitimate. He also spoke of negotiations on the SDI at some later stage as acceptable, but apparently in the context of how rather than whether defensive systems should be deployed.

The most recent development has been a message from the Americans indicating that a new Soviet proposal may be on the way, but that the seriousness of Soviet intentions still requires further concrete proof. The latest assessment from our Embassy in Washington is that the US negotiating team at Geneva have taken no new instructions with them, on the grounds that the ball is in the Soviet court and there is sufficient flexibility already in the US position. The general view in Washington is that there is little prospect of any new progress in the third round of the talks; and that success at the Summit will depend on Soviet proposals. The overall forecast is generally pessimistic about progress there, especially in the light of the President's remarks at his press conference.

Mr McFarlane himself has been more active in recent months making public his own views, notably in a well-publicised speech in California on 19 August, at the end of which he spoke of the need to do more than seek small improvements from the Soviet Union, and implied there would be much value in making major changes in the overall relationship. In other comments he has reaffirmed his personal view that the SDI has intrinsic value in the new strategic situation created by the Soviet build-up over the past decade. He believes that build-up has upset the strategic balance and that there would be very considerable problems in terms of Western domestic politics in redressing this by further increases or improvements in offensive weapons. Coupled with the advent of new technology which may make defences more feasible, the SDI therefore appears to him to offer the prospect of a way out from this increasingly uncomfortable position for the West. (In background comments to the press he recently described NATO's strategy as "surreal"). In addition, his own personal loyalty to the President is undoubtedly a factor in his support for the Research programme.

/As





As the Prime Minister knows, the fundamental difficulty at Geneva will be the task of persuading the Russians to agree to cuts in offensive forces while not conceding so much to their opposition on SDI that even the Research Programme is constrained. The President's latest public comments will make this circle even harder to square. But the fundamental argument about strategic predictability and the relationship between offensive and defensive forces is worth repeating.

SDI may or may not, at some distant point in the future, be shown to work. It may not need to work fully, in order to enhance deterrence. Clearly in the foreseeable future its only chance of working even imperfectly (as Mr Nitze has recognised) is if defensive systems face decreasing rather than increasing numbers of offensive forces. The Soviet Union however will be no more willing than would the US to accept radical cuts in offensive forces until/unless they have a much clearer idea of the shape of defensive systems over the next decade(s).

The sort of dialogue on the offence/defence relationship which the Americans are pushing at Geneva will not be sufficient for these purposes. What the Russians (and the Americans) will need is a firm, legal commitment by both sides to specified limits on defensive developments over a given period. This does not mean constraining the SDI research programme, which according to US projections is not designed to produce results requiring steps beyond research for perhaps another decade. During this period, however, sticking to the ABM Treaty carries added importance because that Treaty can provide the framework of defensive predictability which is essential to offensive cuts.

A further point which the Prime Minister may wish to bear in mind is the danger that the Summit will not, as widely expected, lead to a further meeting at which more specific agreements may prove possible. Instead, the Russians, faced with a bland but inflexible US position, may conclude that they can afford to wait until the next President is elected, and in the meantime increase the pressures on Western public opinion. Such a waiting period would not only be dangerously divisive and destabilising for the Alliance; it would also remove the opportunity which President Reagan may now have to reach an historic and forward-looking agreement with the Soviet Union.

Against that background we suggest that the Prime Minister might draw on the following points in her discussion with Mr McFarlane:

- (i) she might welcome the President's reply to her message: it demonstrates that we see the prospects and potential for the Summit in very much the same light. We noted with interest and encouragement Mr McFarlane's recent prediction that there were "very good prospects" of reaching an arms control agreement in the coming year;





- (ii) We are not suggesting that SDI research should be reduced to a bargaining chip at Geneva, in the sense that it would then be abandoned. As has been repeatedly made clear since the Camp David meeting last December, we continue to support the research programme as a counter to Soviet efforts.
- (iii) Nonetheless, we are concerned that the US should not miss the opportunity offered by the Summit to put forward and to reach agreement on bold and concrete proposals, including the place of SDI in relation to offensive forces and arms control. It is clear that the research programme will continue to play a crucial role in determining the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, and thus in dictating the extent of movement possible at Geneva.
- (iv) It therefore seems to us desirable, and probably essential, to establish with the Russians at Geneva the way in which research on both sides may continue within the limits of present treaty obligations. The key element will be to establish the essential degree of predictability in developments of defensive forces against which offensive arms reductions can be matched.
- (v) The concrete proposals put forward in my letter to the President were intended to offer the basis for a sensible way ahead, and I hope that he will feel able to act upon them. The Russians are being driven off their untenable position which denies the permissibility of research, and this in itself represents a step forward. At the same time, the extent of permissible research still requires further clarification. This must be addressed in the context of ensuring confidence in Soviet compliance.

In subsequent discussion the Prime Minister may wish to reaffirm her agreement with the President that "nothing could more undercut our prospects for success than for Gorbachev to sense that we are divided". We have always seen a direct link between Soviet preparedness to negotiate seriously at Geneva and allied cohesion. However, that cohesion is also directly dependent on discipline and consistency in public utterances, a point we have urged consistently in public utterances, a point we have urged consistently on other Allies. The Four Points of Camp David and the US statement of 4 June on the SDI have pointed us in very much the right direction. It is important not to undercut the basic Western position, including the need to strengthen deterrence, by reverting to more contentious language.

/It





It therefore came as something of a disappointment to us that in his 17 September press conference the President appeared to revert to the total elimination of nuclear weapons as a prime objective of the SDI. In our view it is simply unrealistic to expect the SDI to obviate the need for nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future, although we do accept the legitimacy of trying to remove the threat of aggression in the context of general disarmament. We were also concerned at the President's description of SDI development and testing as "a legitimate part of research". As Mr McFarlane will know, development and testing are specifically banned by the ABM Treaty. All this points up the importance of public and policy utterances being wholly consistent with the President's previously expressed desire, which we fully share, to see the Treaty strengthened and its erosion prevented.

In addition, the Prime Minister may wish to underline her concern about progress in the CW negotiations. These have remained stagnant for the past year, largely because of Soviet refusal to negotiate seriously which they can reasonably justify to other parties by pointing to the unacceptable nature of the US proposals for challenge inspection (Article X, "no refusal"). We have put new ideas to Washington on this, but it will require a high-level political decision to drive the Pentagon off their attachment to the present text.

In his message of 25 September, the President has asked for the Prime Minister's views on MBFR. A substantive reply to the message will be submitted next week but there may be further inter-agency discussion, possibly involving Mr McFarlane, in the meantime. We believe that Mr Shultz broadly favours the proposal put to him by the Foreign Secretary and Herr Genscher, but the Pentagon are arguing against movement. There is evidence from the course of earlier decision-making in Washington on MBFR that the President attaches particular weight to the Prime Minister's own views, from her political perspective, on the desirability of movement in this technical negotiation. It could be helpful to the outcome of our initiative if the Prime Minister could tell Mr McFarlane that she was fully aware of, and gives her support to, the Anglo-German proposal. She might add that we believe it to be fully consistent with Western security interests but that MBFR also needs to be considered in a broader political context. She is very grateful to the President for the opportunity to contribute to the development of the US position and hopes to reply substantively early next week.

On handling the Russians, there is one point the Prime Minister might re-emphasise: the need to cover human rights questions without vitiating the atmosphere of the talks as a whole. On 22 September, McFarlane gave a TV interview to which he said that human rights issues "will remain high, in fact, the leading issue on our agenda". The phraseology was

/probably





probably accidental, but it is unfortunate. The Prime Minister might refer to her advice to Reagan to tackle the subject in a measured way, making clear that raising human rights is not an attempt to undermine the Soviet system.

If McFarlane asks about the Foreign Secretary's meeting with Shevardnadze, the Prime Minister might say that in the circumstances it went as well as it could have done, and that both sides agreed they had said "what they had to" on expulsions.

*Yours ever,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1985

Dear Charles,

CDD  
28/9

Prime Minister's Talks with Mr MacFarlane: 28 September:  
South Africa

You asked for a letter setting out the general approach the Prime Minister might adopt. She might like to concentrate on the following points.

Britain has consistently supported American policies in Southern Africa, both as regards South Africa itself and over US efforts to achieve a regional settlement leading to Namibian independence. We share the same objectives and approach. We both want to encourage peaceful change in South Africa and to improve the stability and economic well-being of the whole region, thereby reducing the scope for Soviet meddling.

But there is in our view a serious danger that these objectives could be undermined by the international drift towards sanctions. Britain faces increasing pressure, not least because of the recent US decision to introduce a list of economic (Krugerrands, Bank loans) and non-economic measures. This action directly influenced the decision by our partners in the Ten to introduce a package of their own. Inevitably there will be calls for yet more sanctions in the months to come, particularly at CHOGM and in the Security Council, where further debates on Namibia and on apartheid are expected before Christmas.

We remain convinced that economic sanctions are utterly counter-productive to what we are both trying to achieve in Southern Africa. They can only further destabilise the South African economy and make the situation inside that country even more volatile. They would also undermine efforts to bring about a Namibia settlement.

It is essential that Western countries do not allow themselves to be played off against each other over sanctions. If we take a firm stand now we could prevent this happening. That is why we would welcome an assurance about US willingness to support us in vetoing calls for mandatory sanctions in the Security Council - both full sanctions and more limited ones modelled on US measures. Once mandatory UN sanctions are introduced, the West will not have it in its power to remove them.

/The





The pressure for sanctions would obviously be eased by early movement either over internal reforms or over the Namibia negotiations. How does Mr MacFarlane assess the prospects for this over the next few months? Might the South Africans now be prepared to make concessions over Namibia in order to buy more time for internal reform? Is there any prospect of an early resumption of US-led negotiations on Cuban withdrawal?

/ I enclose as background the report on the Foreign Secretary's discussion with Mr Shultz yesterday.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



GRS 610

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
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OF 262306Z SEPTEMBER 85  
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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ  
SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD TWO POINTS WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE. FIRST, WAS THERE MORE THAT WE COULD DO TO ENCOURAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN DIRECTIONS WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE PROMOTION OF PEACEFUL CHANGE? IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THEY KEPT CONSISTENTLY PLAYING THEIR CARDS TOO LATE. SHULTZ AGREED. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD DONE A LONG TIME AGO WHAT THEY WERE DOING NOW, THIS WOULD HAVE MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION HAD GONE FURTHER THAN WE WERE PREPARED TO DO IN THE DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES, INCLUDING ACTION ON KRUGERRANDS AND NEW LOANS. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MANAGED TO DELETE FROM THE BILL MAJOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE BILL WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED OVER HIS VETO. SO WHAT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF SENATOR LUGAR. THE MEASURES ON KRUGERRANDS WERE ESSENTIALLY SYMBOLIC. ALTHOUGH DOLLARS 500 MILLION KRUGERRANDS WERE BOUGHT BY THE U S, MOST OF THIS WAS GOLD, WHICH COULD BE SOLD OFF AS BULLION. THE OTHER PORTION WAS MAINLY KRUGERRANDS BOUGHT BY U S FINANCIAL HOUSES FOR SALE OVERSEAS. VERY LITTLE WAS FOR FINAL SALE IN THE U S.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE NOW RECALLING OUR DEFENCE ATTACHES FROM PRETORIA IN LINE WITH THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE U S AMBASSADOR HAD NOW GONE BACK TO PRETORIA AND CREDENTIALS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SENT THEIR AMBASSADOR BACK.

14.

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4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT OUR MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE U S SHOULD CONTINUE TO VETO UN MANDATORY SANCTIONS, EVEN IN AREAS WHICH WERE COVERED BY THE U S LEGISLATION. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE BOTH SHOULD STAND FIRM. WE WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT HAND AT CHOGM. OUR POSITION WOULD BE VERY SEVERELY UNDERCUT IF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON UN MANDATORY SANCTIONS CHANGED. WE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IN TOUCH. WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE.

5. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION AGREED WITH OUR POSITION ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND WOULD STAND FIRM IN VETOING UN MANDATORY SANCTIONS. THE OTHER DAY THERE HAD BEEN A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH HAD BEEN CLOSE TO THE MEASURES ALREADY AGREED BY THE PRESIDENT, BUT THIS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CIRCUMVENTED.

THOMSON

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SOUTHERN AFRICA  
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MR J R J JOHNSON  
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~938 7032~~ 218 2111/3

MO 26/8/2V

27th September 1985

EDP 27/9.

Dear Charles,

Your letter of 23rd September asked for briefing in preparation for the Prime Minister's talks with Mr Macfarlane tomorrow. The Prime Minister will be very familiar with the background both to the discussion with the US over United Kingdom participation in SDI research and to Ptarmigan, but I attach short notes setting out the current state of play on each.

On Ptarmigan, we have also just heard from Washington that Mr Macfarlane's line may be that, whilst he is sympathetic to our position, it is not possible to award a contract other than to the lowest bidder. The Prime Minister could rebut this point quite firmly. The invitation to tender on MSE set out clearly the factors to be taken into account in making the award: operational suitability (most important) then cost, and then logistics, technical and management. This reflected the United States regulations which, whilst recognising that cost will probably be the deciding factor in most cases, explicitly permit selection of a proposal which offers the greatest value in terms of performance and other factors.

Yours ever,  
*Jeremy Wright*

(J S WRIGHT)

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street



MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT

1. At the beginning of this competition some 18 months to two years ago the PTARMIGAN based system was far ahead technically because of its later technology and more flexible design. But GTE in America has moved rapidly within the last 18 months or so to develop a system around Rita and there is now little to choose technically between the two; but the Rita based system has yet to be fully proven and as such does not meet the NDI (Non-Developmental Item), off the shelf, purchasing philosophy originally espoused by the US Army on this project.

2. The Pentagon faces strong criticism on budget extravagance, and could not support a massive premium for the winner. GTE with the French have always aimed at a rock bottom bargain price; but we have moved both financially and technically to close the \$1Bn gap to something nearer the order of \$100-200M which should be politically acceptable. (These figures from confidential sources.) As a result of Mr Heseltine's exchanges with Mr Weinberger, an American Cost Evaluation Group (CEG) is now reassessing the US Army figures to take into account all the factors we have been stressing such as difference in financing provision, exchange rate problems, inflation rates, disparity of technical specification.



3. There is little point in arguing technicalities. The essential point to get over to the Americans is that the size of the programme, the impact on the two-way-street, the important implications for world-wide sales mean that this is much more than a domestic decision for them; the American decision will attract considerable notice, both domestically and within NATO and the choice will be seen as reflecting the extent to which support of Alliance goals and wider Western interests is recognised in Washington. And although much of the equipment will in any case be manufactured in America, the issues have willy nilly come to be seen as Britain versus France.

4. LINE TO TAKE:

- The British PTARMIGAN system represents a fully competent solution to the MSE requirement.
- As a result of action Rockwell and Plessey have made adjustments to save the American Government more than \$1Bn; there is now virtually nothing in the prices.
- We have offered the US Administration wholehearted support on cruise missiles, SDI and co-operation between our Armed Forces (e.g. in the Middle East): the closeness of our relationship is politically



controversial within Britain. The contrast with the approach of France is well understood. Should the order go to France the conclusion will be drawn both in Britain and internationally that it pays not to be supportive of the United States and not to play the game in the Alliance.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1985

CDP27/9.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's meeting with Mr McFarlane: Central America

Central America was not among the topics listed in your letter of 23 September. But in case Mr McFarlane raises the subject you may like to have a copy of the brief prepared for the Foreign Secretary's meeting with Mr Shultz on 26 September.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH MR SHULTZ, UNGA, 26 SEPTEMBER

CENTRAL AMERICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Support US objectives to promote stability and democracy and prevent establishment of Soviet client state in Central America.
2. We support US policies in El Salvador and our garrison in Belize in a contribution towards stability in the area.

Luxembourg meeting of 11/12 November of EC/Central America/Contadora Foreign Ministers

3. Will bear US interests very much in mind. But Ten's objective is negotiated settlement which must include Nicaragua. Hence commitment to non-discriminatory economic cooperation between Community and Central American region as back-up to Contadora. Ten have put on record their belief that the problems of the region cannot be solved by armed force.
4. Believe effective Contadora Treaty best means of containing and controlling Nicaragua. Growing concern in Europe and Latin America that US has abandoned negotiating option.
5. Agree pressure needed on Nicaragua but trade embargo and contras tend to drive her further into dependence on the Soviet camp. Contra insurgency provides plausible justification for Nicaraguan arms build up.
6. Important for US to put more weight on the negotiating track. Assessment of prospects for a negotiated solution?
7. [If necessary] Concerned that US may contemplate surgical strike against Nicaragua as response to terrorism in Central America. We could not support action contrary to international law. Important that we maintain high moral ground when facing terrorist threats.



SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH MR SHULTZ, UNGA, 26 SEPTEMBER

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Introduction

1. Tension in the area is increasing and leading to border incidents on Nicaraguan borders with Honduras and Costa Rica as Nicaragua seeks to push back or prevent infiltration of contras. Contra strength and capability growing and fighting likely to intensify. Contadora group have produced new draft Act and have gained stronger support from Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay) but gulf between Nicaragua and El Salvador/Costa Rica/Honduras growing. In Washington emphasis is wholly on the contras and military pressures: no sign of willingness to negotiate. Nicaragua's position has also hardened: Sandinistas will not say "Uncle". Mr Shultz may ask for British help in preventing outcome at EC/Central America Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg inimical to US interest. US need for help gives us limited leverage to argue for negotiated settlement and express international concern.

Contadora

2. At 12/13 September Contadora nine meeting, the 4 Contadora Ministers presented a revised final draft Act and imposed a time limit on the Central Americans to resolve outstanding issues themselves. Most of the revised draft has reportedly been accepted by consensus but the major issues of timing of implementation, verification procedures, arms levels and foreign military exercises have yet to be resolved. A meeting of Plenipotentiaries is planned for 7 October. The Contadora Four have requested the Central Americans to resolve outstanding issues within 45 days thereafter with a view to signature of the Act in November. Further US pressure on Honduras/Costa Rica/El Salvador to reject any text unacceptable to them can be expected. There seems little prospect of agreement between Nicaragua on the one hand and El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras.



Luxembourg Ministerial Meeting 11/12 November

3. In three public statements in support of Contadora, the Ten have stated that the problems of region cannot be solved by armed force but only by a political solution springing from the region itself. Before the 1984 San Jose meeting the US asked that EC would ensure that Nicaragua would not benefit from the meeting or be given EC aid. The San Jose meeting decided that EC aid should be non discriminatory to promote regional cooperation and support the Contadora initiative.

The Contra War/Border Incidents

5. A large scale attack by contra forces which penetrated deep into Nicaragua at the end of July represented a significant increase in contra operations in the north. It presumably reflected the unblocking of US aid to the contras as well as a need to show that the contras were still a credible force after earlier reverses. Honduras reacted with unprecedented sharpness to an incident on 13 September on her border with Nicaragua in which one Honduran soldier was killed by attacking targets inside Nicaragua.

US/Nicaragua

6. The Americans have made it clear to us that they have placed their reliance on the contras effecting change in Nicaragua, rather than the negotiating option. They have no intention of resuming the Manzanillo talks. They do not expect a major qualitative change in the fighting soon. Mr Renton told Mr Abrams on 6 August in La Paz that "retaliatory surgical strikes" against Nicaraguan targets would cause great concern in the UK and strain the Alliance. Mr Abrams replied that such strikes were improbable but not impossible.

7. The International Court of Justice has started hearing evidence on the Nicaraguan complaint against the US. The US having refused to participate in the proceedings have published a new booklet accusing Nicaragua of terrorism.



El Salvador

8. In El Salvador the army is showing its improved capability against the FMLN guerrillas although the latter's economic warfare policy is exacerbating the major economic problems which President Duarte is currently facing. Neither side appears anxious to resume the dialogue as long as it considers it holds military advantage over the other.

9. President Duarte's daughter Ines Guadalupe was kidnapped on 10 September. The Prime Minister sent a message of sympathy which the US welcomed.



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Policy





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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 September 1985

CDD 2071

Dear Charles,

Arms Sales to Argentina: American Approach

In your letter of 23 September you asked us to put briefing in hand for the Prime Minister's tete-a-tete conversation with Mr MacFarlane on 28 September.

Following the election of a democratic government in Argentina and certification in 1983 by President Reagan that Argentina had made significant improvements in human rights, the way for American arms sales was reopened but kept under control by President Reagan's commitment to consult about any major sale. The Americans have scrupulously observed this undertaking since, and it was repeated personally to the Secretary of State by Mr Shultz in Helsinki in July. The Americans, at the highest political level, are in no doubt of our views. However, over the past nine months or so, the pressure in and from Washington to make sales has increased considerably, and made itself felt through political, military and official channels. The Prime Minister may recall her conversation in February with President Reagan, and her conversations with Secretary Weinberger, and Chairman Volcker in July. The latest manifestation of this pressure is a proposal made earlier this month for "technical" talks between British and US officials on security relations with Argentina. The proposed American agenda would cover inter alia arms sales and military training.

The Foreign Secretary takes the view that the Americans intend this offer of dialogue as a fulfilment of their commitment to consult us. It represents our best opportunity to influence them. If we remove the opportunity to consult by turning down this meeting, there will be many in Washington who will argue that the obligation to consult has equally been removed. The Foreign Secretary has had a preliminary exchange with the Defence Secretary. Mr Heseltine feels that such talks would be inappropriate and favours a reply to this effect being sent at a political level. Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Heseltine propose to revert to this question on Sir Geoffrey's return from North America at the end of the week.

/The Americans

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- 2 -

The Americans have been told meanwhile at official level that there was never any chance of their original proposal (talks in the week beginning 23 September) being feasible on timing grounds alone, and that their proposal raised important political considerations.

Given growing American determination to do something for Argentina, Mr MacFarlane may well raise this topic. In that case, the Prime Minister might like to remind him of the reasons why we object to arms sales to Argentina, to note that Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Heseltine will be considering the matter on Sir Geoffrey's return, and that we shall let the Americans have a reply in due course.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*


(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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East/West Rel's; Foreign Policy; 175





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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. SHULTZ SAID THERE WAS VERY LITTLE TO ADD ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS WHICH HAD NOT ALREADY BEEN COVERED IN VARIOUS MEETINGS THIS WEEK. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT AGENDA WAS FAIRLY CLEAR. IT WOULD DIVIDE INTO THREE PARTS. THESE WERE SECURITY ISSUES, GENERAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL ISSUES. SOME OF THE BILATERAL ISSUES MIGHT WELL FALL INTO PLACE BEFORE THE SUMMIT, BUT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT LOOKING FOR AGREEMENT ON THESE FOR ITS OWN SAKE. HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE ON THE AGENDA. THAT WOULD BE A MATTER OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE FOR PRESIDENT REAGON. THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO TREAT HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DISCUSSIONS AS IF THEY WERE RELATED TO MEDICAL CARE, HOUSING ETC. BUT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT LETTING THEM GET AWAY WITH IT.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EMPHASISED THE NEED NOT TO ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO WIN THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE COMMENDED SHULTZ'S UNGA SPEECH, WHICH HAD COVERED THE NEED FOR BALANCE, THE NEED TO ENHANCE AND NOT UNDERMINE DETERRENCE AND RESPECT FOR TREATY OBLIGATIONS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS MORE ADEPT AT PRESENTING THE BASICALLY UNCHANGED SOVIET CASE THAN HIS PREDECESSORS.

3. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO THROW A PEBBLE AND THE PRESS CREATED THE RIPPLES. THE U S WAS VERY CONCERNED TO PORTRAY A SERIOUS APPROACH, BUT THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS EVERY HOUR. THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON PREPARING A STRONG POSITION FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR POSITION AT GENEVA WAS VERY CAREFULLY WORKED OUT AND INVOLVED RADICAL ACTION IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO RESPOND. MAYBE, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID, NOT ENOUGH PEOPLE KNEW ABOUT THIS. THE NEGOTIATORS WERE RELUCTANT TO HAVE THEIR PACKAGE SPELLED OUT IN TOO MUCH DETAIL, BUT PERHAPS IT WAS NOW TIME TO DO THIS. MEANWHILE, HE HOPED WE WOULD CHALLENGE THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THEIR SDI RESEARCH, WHICH THEY PRESUMABLY THOUGHT WAS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ABM TREATY.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASSURED SHULTZ THAT HE HAD MADE THE POINT VERY FIRMLY TO SHEVARDNADZE ON MONDAY THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONDUCTING COMPARABLE RESEARCH. WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD ADMITTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING RESEARCH, KORNIENKO HAD DISSENTED.

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5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME VIEW AS THE U S ADMINISTRATION ON MBFR. HE MENTIONED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO OUR THINKING. THE UK/FRG INITIATIVE WOULD BE A WAY OF BREAKING THE LOG JAM, WITHOUT MAKING UNACCEPTABLE CONCESSIONS, AND WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT POLITICALLY. MBFR WAS ONE SET OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE AND THE OTHER EUROPEANS WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.
6. SHULTZ SAID JOKINGLY THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A SEVERE CULTURE SHOCK. NORMALLY THE BRITISH REFUSED TO SHIFT THEIR POSITION IN MBFR WHATEVER THE AMERICANS PROPOSED. NOW THE BOOT SEEMED ON THE OTHER FOOT. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM TO HANDLE WITHIN THE U S GOVERNMENT. SOME PEOPLE WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE EUROPEAN PROPOSALS: OTHERS WERE VERY STRONGLY AGAINST.
7. SHULTZ WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THE CDE THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT WE HAD IDENTIFIED SOME PROBLEMS OVER THE NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH HE WAS ASKING HIS OFFICIALS TO LOOK INTO. MR THOMAS EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEM LAY IN THE NEGOTIATING STRUCTURES WHICH, IN THE PRESENT DRAFT UNDER DISCUSSION, TILTED MORE TOWARDS RESTRAINTS THAN WE FELT WERE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. BUT WE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS FURTHER.
8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE ALSO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CW. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD POINTED OUT THAT WE SHOULD MAKE PLAIN THE MASSIVE SCALE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THIS AREA. U S AND BRITISH OFFICIALS WERE STILL EXCHANGING IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT. THIS WAS VERY USEFUL.
9. SHULTZ ENQUIRED ABOUT PROGRESS ON OUR PARTICIPATION IN SDII RESEARCH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EXPERTS AND THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER MEETING NEXT MONTH. SHULTZ SAID THAT, IF EVERYTHING COULD BE SORTED OUT BEFORE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE UK POTENTIAL PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL TO REFLECT OUR INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY AND THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT WE HAD GIVEN THE PROGRAMME. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR HESELTINE HAD MADE THIS POINT.

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10. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ITALIANS AND THE GERMANS WERE TAKING A FAVOURABLE POSITION. THE FRENCH WERE TALKING ABOUT DISCUSSING THEIR OWN IDEAS ON STRATEGIC DEFENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS, BUT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND OUT WHAT THIS MEANT. SHULTZ CONCLUDED WITH A STRONG EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS, WHICH HE SAID HAD PROVIDED A VERY SOLID BASIS BY WHICH PEOPLE COULD BE GUIDED.

THOMSON

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

SOVIET D	PS
DEFENCE D	PS/LADY YOUNG
RESEARCH D	PS/MR RIFKIND
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RENTON
EED	PS/PUS
NAD	MR DEREK THOMAS
WED	SIR W HARDING
ACDD	MR FERGUSSON
CRD	MR GOODALL
FED	MR JENKINS
NED	MR DAUNT
PUSD	MR DAVID THOMAS

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CDD  
2071

Ref. A085/2469

PRIME MINISTER

Mr Robert McFarlane's Visit:

During your discussions with Mr McFarlane you may wish to refer to the United States intention to amend their 1961 agreement for nuclear defence collaboration with the French. This would signal in a helpful way the importance which you attach to the proposed Cabinet Office/White House discussions on this issue which we have proposed.

BACKGROUND

2.

The amendment to the United States/French agreement, subsequently transmitted by President Reagan to Congress, restricts classified exchanges with the French to matters affecting nuclear weapons safety and security; wider discussions would require further amendments. It is unlikely that talks between the United States and France will start before summer 1986.

3. Our response to the Americans about their proposed initiative with the French was passed to Mr McFarlane in my telexed letter of 19 September. This underlined the significance to us of the United States proposal and requested Cabinet Office/White House discussions on the aims and implications of the proposed exchanges with the French.

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OUR OBJECTIVES

4.

The objective of the proposed Cabinet Office/White House discussions will be to find out more about United States intentions so that we can better assess whether we



could seek closer contact with the French without putting at risk our crucial nuclear relationship with the United States. Our motives for any closer contact with France could include:

- a. building up our relations with France as a counter-weight to the close co-operation between Paris and Bonn for the sake of our influence in the European Community as well as NATO;
- b. avoiding an erosion of our special position under the 1958 nuclear agreement with the Americans through the creation of a United States/French dialogue from which we should be excluded;
- c. technical benefits to our own nuclear programme.

CONCLUSION

5. When you see Mr McFarlane, I suggest that you should underline the importance which you attach to continued close liaison with the United States

The significance and potential value of the United States intention to breathe new life into this agreement is clear and this is why you have proposed early Cabinet Office/White House discussions to hear more of the United States plans. The questions of particular interest, set out in my letter, are:

- a. whether the United States hope the proposed exchanges on nuclear weapons safety and security will lead to discussions of other aspects of nuclear weapons technology;
- b. whether the United States have indications that France would be interested in developing a wider dialogue and the extent to which such dialogue might take place.

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c. whether,

[redacted] the United States initiative on nuclear exchanges is part of a wider policy of building up defence relations with France and, if so, what the other elements of such a policy might be.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 September 1985



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1495</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATES MEETING WITH SHEVARDNAZDE: 23 SEPTEMBER

## SUMMARY

1. CANDID, BRISK AND BUSINESS DISCUSSION, WITH BOTH SIDES AFFIRMING THE WISH TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THE EXPULSIONS ISSUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED STRAIGHTAWAY ON EXPULSIONS, SPEAKING FIRMLY BUT INDICATING THAT HE ALSO WANTED TO DISCUSS OTHER QUESTIONS. SHEVARDNAZDE REPLIED IN SIMILAR TERMS. DISCUSSION OF US/SOVIET SUMMIT PROSPECTS AND ARMS CONTROL, WITH SHEVARDNAZDE RECALLING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO EARLIER INVITATION TO SHEVARDNAZDE.

## DETAIL

2. AT SHEVARDNAZDES INVITATION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED THE DISCUSSION. HE SAID THAT EVENTS OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS WERE VERY MUCH IN EVERYONES MIND AND HE THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO BEGIN BY DISCUSSING THEM. BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THESE EVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE SINCE THERE WERE OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH HE WISHED TO DISCUSS, AND WHICH HAD BEEN TOUCHED UPON IN HELSINKI.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NO FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION INVOLVING EXPULSIONS ON THIS SCALE UNLESS THERE WERE VERY GOOD REASONS. NO ONE WOULD WANT TO DISTURB THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITHOUT VERY STRONG CAUSE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD BOTH DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TO ACHIEVING STABLE LONGTERM RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE WISHED TO STRESS THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE ALLEGATION IN PRAVDA THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTED TO POISON RELATIONS.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONTINUED, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, LIKE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM INFORMATION THAT HAD REACHED US THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KGB IN BRITAIN WERE ON A SCALE, AND OF SUCH AN UNACCEPTABLE NATURE, THAT THEY WERE WHOLLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD RETALIATED IN THE WAY THAT IT DID. NOTHING



## CONFIDENTIAL

WOULD PREVENT US FROM TAKING ACTION TO DEFEND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. BUT WE WERE ALSO EQUALLY SERIOUS IN THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO ACHIEVING GREATER UNDERSTANDING. WE LOOKED TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THE ACTION OF THOSE AGENCIES WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT EVENTS IN ORDER TO PREVENT THREATS BOTH TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND TO BETTER RELATIONS. THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV TO PUT SUCH AN EFFORT INTO IMPROVING RELATIONS REMAINED EQUALLY STRONG TODAY. THIS TASK SHOULD NOT BE INTERRUPTED OR PREVENTED BY RECENT EVENTS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN MOVED ON TO DISCUSS THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE, AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, ATTACHED TO THE SUMMIT. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW IN TIME MAGAZINE, WHERE HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN SEEN BY SOME AS A POTENTIAL BATTLE BETWEEN SUPER-GLADIATORS. THIS WAS INDEED HOW THE MEDIA TENDED TO PRESENT IT BUT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE THE MEETING. HE WELCOMED WHAT GORBACHEV HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED TO TACKLE QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE. WE KNEW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SHARED THIS DESIRE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. WE HOPED IT WOULD REPRESENT THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS GENUINE AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD REDUCE TENSION AND MISTRUST.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WOULD COVER BOTH SPACE AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SECURE A REDUCTION IN THE MASSIVE SCALE OF EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW MOVE TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RATHER THAN POSTPONING DISCUSSIONS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS UNTIL SPACE ISSUES HAD BEEN AGREED. WE WERE CONCERNED BY THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON SDI RESEARCH. GORBACHEV HAD ACKNOWLEDGED BY IMPLICATION THAT SDI RESEARCH WAS LEGITIMATE, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PARTICIPATING IN IT. (KORNENKO DISSENTED). THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENDED THE CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS AS THE RIGHT BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERING TO EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS. WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR INSTALLATION MIGHT BE IN CONFLICT WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO USE THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES TO DETERMINE IF BREACHES HAD TAKEN PLACE.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE WITH A WORD ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE WAS A COMMON WORLDWIDE INTEREST IN FINDING A WAY FORWARD TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTERS RECENT VISIT TO EGYPT AND JORDAN HAD ENABLED US TO SEE WHAT PART WE COULD PLAY IN THIS PROCESS. WE HAD AGREED TO MEET A JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IN LONDON. BUT SYRIA WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY PART IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION'S CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, WE HOPED THAT SYRIA COULD BE PERSUADED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

CONFIDENTIAL -9-



## CONFIDENTIAL

8. IN REPLY, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SPEAK CANDIDLY. HE HAD FOUND THE PREVIOUS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HELSINKI USEFUL, OPEN AND FRANK. THEY HAD HAD A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF MAJOR ISSUES AND HE HAD BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO A SIMILAR DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK. HE HAD PREPARED SERIOUSLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. HE ALSO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE, AS DID ALL COUNTRIES, TO THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT IN GENEVA. PEOPLE WHO THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE A RUN-OF-THE-MILL, GETTING-TO-KNOW-YOU MEETING, WERE QUITE MISTAKEN.

9. SHEVARDNADZE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THAT CONTEXT IT WAS ESSENTIAL NOT TO POISON THE ATMOSPHERE BEFORE THE SUMMIT OR TO WHIP UP TENSION. AT THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HELSINKI, BOTH HAD AGREED TO COOPERATE TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE. HE HAD TO SAY FRANKLY THAT THE HOSTILE ACTIONS BY THE BRITISH SIDE HAD BEEN HARMFUL TO THE ATMOSPHERE AND HAD WHIPPED UP TENSIONS. THESE ACTIONS HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY IMMEDIATE SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS ONLY. HE DID NOT INTEND TO REPEAT WHAT THE MFA HAD TOLD OUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW. A GREAT DEAL HAD CHANGED FOR THE GOOD IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AFTER GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO LONDON. BUT HE FELT THAT SOME CIRCLES IN BRITAIN (HE DID NOT KNOW WHO) FEARED THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE RELATIONS.

10. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED THAT EACH SIDE HAD EXPELLED 25 DIPLOMATS, REMARKING THAT WE KNEW WHAT OUR PEOPLE WERE DOING AND WHO THEY WERE. BRITAIN TOOK THE NEXT STEP AND THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWED SUIT. SOVIET ACTIONS WERE EQUALLY MOTIVATED BY NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. HE HAD NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID IN EGYPT THAT WE WANTED TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THE INCIDENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD REPEATED THAT REMARK. THE SOVIET UNION EQUALLY FAVOURED SUCH AN APPROACH. SHEVARDNADZE WAS INTERESTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS-LIKE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. THERE WERE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. HE WAS READY TO CONSIDER WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS ANY PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE.

11. MOVING ON TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE GREATLY VALUED THE SECRETARY OF STATES ADVICE ON THESE ISSUES, IN WHICH HE WAS A VERY EXPERIENCED WORLD STATESMAN. BUT HE COULD USEFULLY GIVE SIMILAR ADVICE TO BRITAIN'S CHIEF ALLY. THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHED THE UTMOST, PRINCIPLED IMPORTANCE TO AVOIDING THE MILITARISATION OF SPACE. WHETHER YOU CALLED IT SDI OR HARMLESS RESEARCH, A SERIOUS MILITARY PROGRAMME WAS UNDER WAY TO MILITARISE SPACE. IT MUST BE STOPPED TODAY. TOMORROW WOULD BE TOO LATE. THE PROCESS COULD BE UNCONTROLLABLE. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS VIOLATING SALT II OR THE ABM TREATY WERE TOTALLY UNSUBSTANTIATED. THE SOVIET UNION OBSERVED TREATIES METICULOUSLY TO THE LETTER. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE DEPENDED ON IT.



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12. THE SOVIET UNION, SHEVARDNADZE CONTINUED, HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS IN NEW YORK FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF SPACE. IT WAS READY TO ACCEPT DEEP CUTS IN EXISTING NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. IT HAD TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, ON THE NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM, AND NOFUF. BUT THIS WAS STILL A ONE-WAY STREET. THE DESIGNATION AND TASKS OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR STATION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES AND HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY EXPERTS IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL READY TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

13. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SHAVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF SYRIA, WHICH WAS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. BUT IF WE HAD INTERESTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HE WAS READY TO LISTEN AND COOPERATE, PROCEEDING FROM THE STANDPOINT THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OF ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE. THE SOVIET UNION, AS WE KNEW, FAVOURED AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN TO WORK OUT THE PRINCIPLES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

14. KORNIENKO INTERVENED TO ARGUE THAT UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE ABM TREATY EACH SIDE HAD UNDERTAKEN NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SPACE WEAPONS, WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE PRESENT POLICIES OF THE US GOVERNMENT.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN CONCLUSION REBUTTED KORNIENKO, BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR BOTH SIDES TO PURSUE THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL. ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE OBSERVATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY OUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW AND WHAT HE HIMSELF HAD ALREADY SAID EARLIER IN THE DISCUSSION. (SHEVARDNADZE NODDED). HE NOTED AND WOULD REFLECT ON WHAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. HE HOPED THAT OUR EXPERTS COULD GET TOGETHER AGAIN TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CLOSED BY RECALLING THE INVITATION WHICH HE HAD ISSUED TO SHEVARDNADZE TO VISIT THE UK.

16. SHEVARDNADZE FINALLY REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED BUSINESSLIKE CONTACTS. ON KRASNOYARSK, HE SAID HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON WHAT WAS BEING DONE IN THE UK, OTHERWISE THE EXCHANGES WOULD NEVER END. THEY HAD HAD A CANDID DISCUSSION, SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED, IN WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SAID WHAT HE HAD TO SAY, AND HE HAD SAID WHAT HE HAD TO SAY. OF COURSE HE RECALLED THE INVITATION WHICH HAD BEEN ISSUED TO HIM.

THOMSON

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PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS  
SIR W HARDING  
MR GOODALL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR EGERTON



(42) 889  
8

file



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 September 1985

BC

As you will be aware the Prime Minister has invited Mr. Macfarlane to talks at Chequers on 28 September. Mr. Macfarlane has not yet confirmed that he can manage that date. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to start to put together some briefing material for the occasion. At the same time the Prime Minister would wish knowledge of the visit to be kept as restricted as possible, at least for the time being.

The main subject for discussion will of course be the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit. The Prime Minister's message to the President and his reply form the basic documents for the meeting. But there will undoubtedly be a number of other subjects to cover. These include at least the present state of discussions on United Kingdom participation in SDI research, the Middle East, South Africa, Ptarmigan, Northern Ireland and Franco-US nuclear co-operation. There may be other subjects which you think should be added.

Given that this will be a long conversation rather than a meeting in the normal sense, I suggest that you should not put in formal briefs but rather a number of letters on each of the main subjects suggesting the general approach which might be used with Mr. Macfarlane.

I understand from Len Appleyard that the Foreign Secretary will definitely not be in the United Kingdom on 28 September. The Prime Minister will therefore see Mr. Macfarlane alone, with me.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



11.30 Talks AM  
1300. Mel CJP  
A Hon. B.M.  
C.P.

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had Carrington - too?

please file.

COO 24/9.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. CHARLES POWELL, FROM  
MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE.

BEGIN TEXT

SEPTEMBER 23, 1985

DEAR CHARLES,

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE INDICATING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER  
CAN SEE ME ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28. IN LINE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION,  
I WILL PLAN ON ARRIVING ON AT CHEQUERS MID-MORNING, STAYING FOR  
LUNCH AND DEPARTING IN THE AFTERNOON. I PLAN ON ASKING AMBASSADOR  
PRICE TO JOIN ME.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND MRS. THATCHER ON SATURDAY.

BEST REGARDS,

BUD

END TEXT  
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FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
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S E C R E T  
FOLLOWING FOR MR. MCFARLANE FROM CHARLES POWELL 10 DOWNING  
STREET. BEGINS,

DEAR BUD,  
THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT'S  
REPLY TO HER MESSAGE ABOUT HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH  
GORBACHEV. SHE WAS ALSO VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU COULD  
COME OVER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TALK TO HER ABOUT IT ON  
28 OR 29 SEPTEMBER. OF THE TWO, SATURDAY 28 SEPTEMBER  
WOULD SUIT HER BETTER. IF IT WERE CONVENIENT FOR YOU SHE WAS  
THINKING IN TERMS OF TALKS BEGINNING MID MORNING THAT DAY  
AT CHEQUERS AND CONTINUING OVER LUNCH AND INTO THE AFTERNOON.  
THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED AT MOST BY SIR  
GEOFFREY HOWE (THOUGH ON PRESENT PLANS HE WILL BE OUT OF THE  
COUNTRY) AND BY ME.  
COULD YOU LET ME KNOW IN DUE COURSE IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS  
WOULD BE CONVENIENT. IF IT SUITED YOU BETTER THE PRIME  
MINISTER COULD MANAGE MEETINGS LATER ON THE 28TH AND WOULD  
BE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE YOU TO STAY OVERNIGHT AT CHEQUERS.

WITH BEST WISHES,  
CHARLES POWELL''

ENDS

BT

NNNN

Sent at 190959Z



2. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS THEREFORE AGREED THAT I SHOULD SEND BUD MCFARLANE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON THE DIRECT LINE:

''FOLLOWING FOR MR. MCFARLANE FROM CHARLES POWELL 10 DOWNING STREET. BEGINS,

DEAR BUD,

THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO HER MESSAGE ABOUT HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. SHE WAS ALSO VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU COULD COME OVER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TALK TO HER ABOUT IT ON 28 OR 29 SEPTEMBER. OF THE TWO, SATURDAY 28 SEPTEMBER WOULD SUIT HER BETTER. IF IT WERE CONVENIENT FOR YOU SHE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF TALKS BEGINNING MID MORNING THAT DAY AT CHEQUERS AND CONTINUING OVER LUNCH AND INTO THE AFTERNOON. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED AT MOST BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE (THOUGH ON PRESENT PLANS HE WILL BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY) AND BY ME.

COULD YOU LET ME KNOW IN DUE COURSE IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONVENIENT. IF IT SUITED YOU BETTER THE PRIME MINISTER COULD MANAGE MEETINGS LATER ON THE 28TH AND WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE YOU TO STAY OVERNIGHT AT CHEQUERS.

WITH BEST WISHES,  
CHARLES POWELL''

ENDS

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEND THIS OVER THE CABINET OFFICE/  
WHITE HOUSE LINK.



Re Powell (2).

Message sent

On X, FCS, on present plans, does not return for UN until late Saturday. But Colin Budd says he may reverse his plans so he could attend. Could you pl keep FCO in touch in relation to when McFarlane comes. I did not want to let PC's possible involvement.

**ADVANCE COPY**  
**IMMEDIATE**

N.C.W.  
19-9

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PERSONAL  
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TELNO 497  
OF 190620Z SEPTEMBER 85

FOLLOWING FOR 10 DOWNING STREET

PERSONAL FOR NIGEL WICKS, 10 DOWNING STREET  
FROM CHARLES POWELL

X |

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S OFFER TO SEND MR. MCFARLANE OVER ON 28 OR 29 SEPTEMBER FOR TALKS ABOUT THE US SOVIET SUMMIT. 28 SEPTEMBER AT CHEQUERS WOULD SUIT HER BEST. SHE WOULD WISH THE TALKS TO BE RESTRICTED ONLY TO HER, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY (IF HE IS NOT OUT OF THE COUNTRY) AND ME AS NOTETAKER.



2. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS THEREFORE AGREED THAT I SHOULD SEND BUD MCFARLANE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON THE DIRECT LINE:

'FOLLOWING FOR MR. MCFARLANE FROM CHARLES POWELL 10 DOWNING STREET. BEGINS,

DEAR BUD,

THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO HER MESSAGE ABOUT HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. SHE WAS ALSO VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU COULD COME OVER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TALK TO HER ABOUT IT ON 28 OR 29 SEPTEMBER. OF THE TWO, SATURDAY 28 SEPTEMBER WOULD SUIT HER BETTER. IF IT WERE CONVENIENT FOR YOU SHE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF TALKS BEGINNING MID MORNING THAT DAY AT CHEQUERS AND CONTINUING OVER LUNCH AND INTO THE AFTERNOON. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED AT MOST BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE (THOUGH ON PRESENT PLANS HE WILL BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY) AND BY ME.

COULD YOU LET ME KNOW IN DUE COURSE IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONVENIENT. IF IT SUITED YOU BETTER THE PRIME MINISTER COULD MANAGE MEETINGS LATER ON THE 28TH AND WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE YOU TO STAY OVERNIGHT AT CHEQUERS.

WITH BEST WISHES,  
CHARLES POWELL''

ENDS

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEND THIS OVER THE CABINET OFFICE/  
WHITE HOUSE LINK.

  
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

4. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL PURSUE THE QUESTION OF LORD CARRINGTON'S POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT SEPARATELY ON HER RETURN.

END

COLES

YYYY

ALHPAN 0462

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File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification  
SECRET

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) C D POWELL

TELEGRAM

Precedence  
IMMEDIATE

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PREAMBLE

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TO IMMEDIATE 10 DOWNING STREET Tel. No. 497 of  
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copies to  
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Private office

Copies to:—

[TEXT]

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR NIGEL WICKS, 10 DOWNING STREET  
FROM CHARLES POWELL

1. The Prime Minister would like to take up President Reagan's offer to send Mr. McFarlane over on 28 or 29 September for talks about the US Soviet Summit. 28 September at Chequers would suit her best. She would wish the talks to be restricted only to her, the Foreign Secretary (if he is not out of the country) and me as notetaker.

2. The Prime Minister has therefore agreed that I should send Bud McFarlane the following message on the direct line:



"Following for Mr. McFarlane from Charles  
Powell 10 Downing Street. Begins,

Dear Bud,

The Prime Minister was very grateful for the President's reply to her message about his forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. She was also very pleased to hear that you could come over to the United Kingdom to talk to her about it on 28 or 29 September. Of the two, Saturday 28 September would suit her better. If it were convenient for you she was thinking in terms of talks beginning mid morning that day at Chequers and continuing over lunch and into the afternoon. The Prime Minister would be accompanied at most by Sir Geoffrey Howe (though on present plans he will be out of the country) and by me.

Could you let me know in due course if these arrangements would be convenient. If it suited you better the Prime Minister could manage meetings later on the 28th and would be very happy to have you to stay overnight at Chequers.

With best wishes,

Charles Powell"

Ends

3. Grateful if you could send this over the Cabinet Office/White House link.

4. The Prime Minister will pursue the question of Lord Carrington's possible involvement separately on her return.

End

CDP

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 497  
OF 190620Z SEPTEMBER 85

FOLLOWING FOR 10 DOWNING STREET

PERSONAL FOR NIGEL WICKS, 10 DOWNING STREET  
FROM CHARLES POWELL

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S OFFER TO SEND MR. MCFARLANE OVER ON 28 OR 29 SEPTEMBER FOR TALKS ABOUT THE US SOVIET SUMMIT. 28 SEPTEMBER AT CHEQUERS WOULD SUIT HER BEST. SHE WOULD WISH THE TALKS TO BE RESTRICTED ONLY TO HER, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY (IF HE IS NOT OUT OF THE COUNTRY) AND ME AS NOTETAKER.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS THEREFORE AGREED THAT I SHOULD SEND BUD MCFARLANE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON THE DIRECT LINE:

''FOLLOWING FOR MR. MCFARLANE FROM CHARLES POWELL 10 DOWNING STREET. BEGINS,  
DEAR BUD,  
THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO HER MESSAGE ABOUT HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. SHE WAS ALSO VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU COULD COME OVER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TALK TO HER ABOUT IT ON 28 OR 29 SEPTEMBER. OF THE TWO, SATURDAY 28 SEPTEMBER WOULD SUIT HER BETTER. IF IT WERE CONVENIENT FOR YOU SHE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF TALKS BEGINNING MID MORNING THAT DAY AT CHEQUERS AND CONTINUING OVER LUNCH AND INTO THE AFTERNOON. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED AT MOST BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE (THOUGH ON PRESENT PLANS HE WILL BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY) AND BY ME.  
COULD YOU LET ME KNOW IN DUE COURSE IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONVENIENT. IF IT SUITED YOU BETTER THE PRIME MINISTER COULD MANAGE MEETINGS LATER ON THE 28TH AND WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE YOU TO STAY OVERNIGHT AT CHEQUERS.

WITH BEST WISHES,  
CHARLES POWELL''

ENDS

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEND THIS OVER THE CABINET OFFICE/  
WHITE HOUSE LINK.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL PURSUE THE QUESTION OF LORD CARRINGTON'S POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT SEPARATELY ON HER RETURN.

END

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Please pass following message to  
Mr. DeBorja from Charles Powell,  
10 Downing Street.

The Prime Minister was  
most grateful for the ~~message~~  
Arlight's message about his  
forthcoming meeting with Colbader.  
She was particularly pleased to  
hear that you could manage a  
brief visit here on 28/29  
September. The dates would suit  
her well and she would be





Very pleased if you would  
 stay over <sup>to</sup> Saturday night at  
 Cheques.



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UNCLASSIFIED

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 23A

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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OF 180248Z SEPTEMBER 85

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, ROME  
AND TO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, TOKYO, PEKING, UKDIS GENEVA  
AND TO PRIORITY HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK  
AND TO SAVING EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, WARSAW, SOFIA,  
AND TO SAVING BUCHAREST, BELGRADE

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE, 17 SEPTEMBER, PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THE TWO MAJOR TOPICS WERE TRADE AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE GENEVA SUMMIT.

EXPECTATIONS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT.

2. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD BEEN WORRIED THAT A DEGREE OF EUPHORIA MIGHT BE GENERATED WHICH WAS UNWARRANTED BY THE RECORD OF PAST SUMMITS. BUT HE WAS TAKING THIS OPPORTUNITY VERY SERIOUSLY. IT HAD TO BE MORE THAN A GET-ACQUAINTED MEETING. THE US OBJECTIVE WAS TO HAVE REAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A CHANGE

IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR, AND REMOVE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. THOUGH THEY MIGHT NOT LIKE EACH OTHER, THE TWO SIDES SHARED ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITIES AND HAD TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE. ASKED IF HE WAS AFRAID OF LOSING THE PROPAGANDA WAR, PRESIDENT SAID WE WERE SEEING THE CONTINUATION OF A LONG TERM SOVIET CAMPAIGN, AIMED PRINCIPALLY AT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT HAD REGISTERED WITH THEM. HE WAS PREPARING SERIOUSLY FOR THE SUMMIT.

GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS ANY NEW PROPOSALS. THEIR ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED ADEQUATE FLEXIBILITY. THE US HAD ALREADY MADE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF WARHEADS, AND PRESENTED SIX WAYS IN WHICH THIS COULD BE DONE, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERING MIXES OF WEAPONS ON THE TWO SIDES. SO FAR THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE NO COMMENT OR COUNTER PROPOSAL. THE US WERE STILL WAITING FOR SOMETHING TO BE PUT ON THE TABLE. SDI.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE SDI AS A BARGAINING CHIP. IT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD TO TRADE OFF AGAINST A GIVEN NUMBER OF MISSILES, WHEN THERE ARE MORE THAN ENOUGH TO BLOW UP THE WHOLE WORLD. SDI WAS PURELY A SEARCH FOR A DEFENSIVE WEAPON TO END OUR DEPENDENCE UPON MASSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION. RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE (IT AWAY) HE WISHED TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE TO GREATER RELIANCE UPON DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. IF THIS COULD BE DONE, THERE WAS A REALISTIC HOPE OF ELIMINATING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ENTIRELY. ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT SEE SDI WEAPONS AS HAVING OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT

THAT



THAT WAS NOT WHAT THE US WAS RESEARCHING OR TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. HE WOULD WISH TO EXPLAIN THIS CONCEPT OF SDI AT THE SUMMIT. THERE WAS ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION. RESEARCH TO SEE WHETHER DEFENSIVE WEAPONS WERE FEASIBLE WAS NOT AGAINST ANY TREATY, AND HE REGARDED TESTING AS A LEGITIMATE PART OF RESEARCH. BUT, PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT, THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK, TO THE ALLIES, AND TO THE SOVIET UNION AND SAY 'HERE - ISN'T THIS THE ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS'.

5. THE PRESIDENT DEFENDED THE RECENT ASAT TEST ON STANDARD LINES. THE US WAS 'PLAYING CATCH-UP'. THE TEST WAS CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO A SCHEDULE AND NOT WITH THE SUMMIT IN MIND.

6. FOR PASSAGES ON TRADE, SEE MIFT. (NOT TO ALL).

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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*Time Abstr  
Not much here  
C/O*

*[FRAME EXTERNAL]*

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR GENEVA ROUND THREE

SUMMARY

1. NO SUBSTANTIVE NEW ELEMENTS IN THE US APPROACH TO THE THIRD ROUND IN GENEVA. THE BALL IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE SOVIET COURT AND THE ADMINISTRATION INSIST THAT ACTUAL SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE REQUIRED IN GENEVA BEFORE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. PRIMARY US OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO ELICIT FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET THINKING, ESPECIALLY ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.
2. THE THIRD ROUND ENDS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING ON 19-20 NOVEMBER. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS AT THAT MEETING ARE THOUGHT TO DEPEND VERY LARGELY ON WHETHER ANY SUCH SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE FORTHCOMING, EITHER IN GENEVA OR DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO THE US NEXT WEEK. MORE PESSIMISTS THAN OPTIMISTS ON PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON SDI ON 17 SEPTEMBER (SEE MIFT).

DETAIL

3. THE THIRD ROUND OF THE US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA BEGINS ON 19 SEPTEMBER AND IS DUE TO END 4 DAYS BEFORE THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING ON 19-20 NOVEMBER. OBTAINING INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT TO THE US DELEGATION'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD ROUND (WHICH HAVE NOW BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT) HAS PROVED AN UNCONTENTIOUS PROCESS: FOR THE GENERAL VIEW IS THAT NO NEW US INITIATIVES ARE REQUIRED UNTIL THERE IS REAL EVIDENCE OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS, AND THAT THE US SHOULD THEREFORE WAIT AND SEE WHETHER SOVIET HINTS OF READINESS TO CONSIDER NEW MOVES (ESPECIALLY ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS) ARE REFLECTED IN ACTUAL PROPOSALS EITHER IN GENEVA OR FROM SHEVARDNADZE DURING HIS VISIT TO THE US NEXT WEEK. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SDI APPEARS TO TAKE PLACE ON AN INFORMAL AND UNSTRUCTURED BASIS ONLY, AND ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL.

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/STRATEGIC



# CONFIDENTIAL

## STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

4. TOWER HAS NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDER THAT HE HAS ALL ALONG HAD CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY. IN PARTICULAR, HE IS FREE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CAN ACCEPT TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN THE US ADVANTAGE IN BOMBERS AND THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND COULD ENVISAGE VARIOUS WAYS OF ACHIEVING THIS.

5. THE MAIN US OBJECTIVE IN THE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS NEGOTIATING GROUP WILL BE TO DRAW OUT THE RUSSIANS ON THE PRECISE CONTENT OF IDEAS THEY INTRODUCED, MAINLY INFORMALLY, DURING ROUND TWO AND TO SEEK TO CLARIFY WHAT MAY LIE BEHIND REMARKS (EG BY GORBACHEV TO TIME MAGAZINE) ABOUT CONDITIONAL SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ENVISAGE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE US DELEGATION IS THEREFORE INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE SOVIET HINTS OF READINESS TO MAKE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN SNDVS AND COMPARABLE REDUCTIONS IN WARHEADS/WEAPONS (THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT SPECIFIED WHICH), AND PLACE A PERCENTAGE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS/WEAPONS CARRIED BY ANY ONE TYPE OF SNDV. AMONG THE KEY QUESTIONS TO WHICH THE US DELEGATION WILL BE SEEKING ANSWERS ARE:

- (A) FROM WHAT CEILINGS ANY PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS ON THESE LINES WOULD BE TAKEN,
- (B) HOW LARGE ANY SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE,
- (C) HOW LARGE THE PERCENTAGE OF WARHEADS PERMITTED ON ANY SINGLE TYPE OF SNDV WOULD BE,
- (D) HOW BOMBER WEAPONS WOULD BE COUNTED,
- (E) WHETHER THERE IS ANY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT LIMITS ON THROWWEIGHT.

## INF

5. GLITMAN HAS NOT ASKED FOR NEW INSTRUCTIONS AND HAS RECEIVED NONE. HE ALREADY HAS FLEXIBILITY (A) TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS MORE INFORMATION ABOUT TYPES OF AIRCRAFT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SEE CONSTRAINED IN AN INF AGREEMENT, AND (B) TO TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO QUOTE SATISFY UNQUOTE THE RUSSIANS ON US INF DEPLOYMENTS OUTSIDE EUROPE IF A SATISFACTORY OVERALL INF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. THIS IS BELIEVED TO BE AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS HE NEEDS, IN THE ABSENCE OF MOVES BY THE SOVIET SIDE.



## CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENCE/SPACE

6. AGAIN, THE US NEGOTIATORS HAVE NO SUBSTANTIVELY NEW INSTRUCTIONS. THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO TRY TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ARM TREATY DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS, AND ALSO OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE TRANSITION FROM AN OFFENCE-DOMINATED STRATEGIC POSTURE TO A DEFENCE-DOMINATED ONE. THE DELEGATION IS EQUIPPED TO OFFER FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THE US APPROACH ON BOTH QUESTIONS. US ATTEMPTS IN ROUNDS ONE AND TWO TO DRAW THE RUSSIANS INTO A DIALOGUE IN THESE TWO AREAS HAVE MET WITH ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS. BUT THE SOVIET REACTION HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE AND THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT, FOLLOWING THE TIME INTERVIEW AND GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH US SENATORS IN MOSCOW, THE RUSSIANS MAY HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO SAY ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO PERMITTED RESEARCH UNDER THE ARM TREATY.

7. IN SHORT THE BALL IS THOUGHT TO BE SQUARELY IN THE SOVIET COURT AND HOW THE RUSSIANS PLAY THEIR HAND DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS OR SO IN GENEVA AND DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK IS CONSIDERED THE CRUCIAL DETERMINANT OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS FOR THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING IN NOVEMBER. OFFICIALS AND OBSERVERS PREPARED TO FORECAST THESE PROSPECTS RANGE FROM THE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC TO THE DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC. BUT THE PESSIMISTS ARE IN THE MAJORITY AND THE OPTIMISTS TEND TO BE OPTIMISTIC BECAUSE THEY PRIVATELY ASSUME THAT, IF THE RUSSIANS SHOW THEMSELVES SERIOUS ABOUT OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, THE PRESIDENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND BY OFFERING SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINTS ON THE SDI. AND ANY SUCH ASSUMPTION, AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE NEAR FUTURE IS CONCERNED, LOOKS EVEN SHAKIER TODAY THAN IT DID YESTERDAY (SEE MIFT).

WRIGHT

FRAME EXTERNAL

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THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET



BM

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 September 1985

I enclose the telex containing President Reagan's reply to the Prime Minister's letter of 12 September.

I should be grateful if you and Richard Mottram (to whom I am copying this letter) would ensure that the circulation of the telex is strictly restricted to those who need to see it.

I should also be grateful if you would arrange for President Reagan's reply to be telexed immediately to the Prime Minister's party, under the appropriate classification, and for receipt only by a Private Secretary.

(Mark Addison)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

MB



US Declassified

CC MASTER

T 166/85 1

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 166/85

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DE WTE 4414 2601546  
Z 171529Z SEP 85  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
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SEPTEMBER 17, 1985

DEAR MARGARET,

ON THE DAY YOUR LETTER ARRIVED, I WAS ABOUT TO ASK YOUR COUNSEL IN THE RUNUP TO MY MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV, SO THE TIMING OF YOUR LETTER WAS PERFECT. AS ALWAYS, YOUR VIEWS CAPTURED NOT ONLY THE IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, BUT EXPRESSED AS WELL HOW THESE MEETINGS CAN SET US ON A COURSE TOWARD LONG-TERM STABILITY.

I HAVE GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE MEETINGS AND OF THE NECESSITY OF CONSIDERING THE PUBLIC CLIMATE THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, THESE MEETINGS ARE A SYMBOL BOTH OF DIFFICULTIES AND OF HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE. WHILE WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO BUILD UP UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS, WE CANNOT APPROACH THESE MEETINGS UNPREPARED TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS IS POSSIBLE. WE ARE PREPARED, AND WE MUST LET THAT BE KNOWN.

THUS FAR, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO PLACE GREAT PRESSURES ON THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO OFFER DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES IF ONLY WE WILL GIVE UP OUR SDI PROGRAM. IN REALITY, THEY HAVE MADE NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR DEEP AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS, AND THEY HAVE BEEN CONTINUING A MASSIVE ABM AND SDI PROGRAM OF THEIR OWN. NOT ALL OF THEIR EFFORTS ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY.

FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE PUT FORTH SOUND, CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA. WE HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK ON HOW THESE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT PROGRESS. I HAVE GIVEN OUR NEGOTIATORS BROAD AUTHORITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS -- AGREEMENTS THAT ARE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES AND OF OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS AS WELL.

END OF PAGE 01



I WOULD WELCOME A SERIOUS AND SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FROM MOSCOW THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS AND GREATER STABILITY. I HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT BRING THIS ABOUT. REST ASSURED THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT AND READY FOR ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION IS MAKING A GREAT DEAL OF NOISE IN PUBLIC, BUT THEY ARE MAKING THEMSELVES VULNERABLE TO THE CHALLENGE THAT PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE NOMINATION BATTLE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION LAST YEAR -- +WHERE'S THE BEEF?+ THE TIME IS COMING WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE GOOD ON THEIR PROMISES.

THROUGHOUT ALL OF THIS, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IS VITAL TO OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND TO OUR HOPES FOR A BETTER, SAFER FUTURE. I CANNOT, AND WILL NOT, ENDANGER THIS RESEARCH PROGRAM WHICH MEANS SO MUCH TO ALL MANKIND. DURING THESE DIFFICULT MONTHS AHEAD, I TRUST THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF OUR GOVERNMENT. OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE EFFECTIVELY AND ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES IS DEPENDENT UPON A SOUND SDI PROGRAM.

I BELIEVE WE ARE IN A STRONG NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT GORBACHEV HAS MANY INCENTIVES TO TRY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET SYSTEM DOES NOT ENCOURAGE ITS LEADERS TO COMPROMISE EASILY IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY A LEADER WHO MAY NOT YET HAVE COMPLETELY CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION OR WHO MAY OWE GREAT DEBTS TO THE MOST HARDLINE ELEMENTS. HE WILL BE FIRM, BUT SO WILL I. I AM CONFIDENT AND READY. WE WILL, OF COURSE, NOT SOLVE THE GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, BUT I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT WE CAN MAKE SOME PROGRESS AND SET IN MOTION THE RESOLUTION OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, NOTHING COULD MORE UNDERCUT OUR PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS THAN FOR GORBACHEV TO SENSE THAT WE ARE DIVIDED OR THAT MERE PROPAGANDA WILL BE SUFFICIENT.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LIKE YOU WE WILL NOT SHY AWAY FROM RAISING THESE ISSUES WITH THE SOVIETS. I UNDERSTAND YOUR POINT THAT THIS IS AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ISSUE WITH GORBACHEV, BUT WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THE NECESSITY OF LIVING UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AT HELSINKI. AND I WILL MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT WE HAVE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. IN PARTICULAR, I WILL TALK TO HIM ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT HE HAS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBTS ABOUT HOW STRONGLY WE FEEL.

I APPROACH THIS NOVEMBER MEETING WITH CONFIDENCE. THE GENERAL SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS THAT WE AMERICANS, UNITED WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, HAVE REBOUNDED FROM A PERIOD OF DEMORALIZATION IN EARLIER YEARS. THEN WE FAILED TO CONFRONT SOVIET AND MOSCOW-SPONSORED AGGRESSION THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD.



THEN WE ALLOWED OUR DEFENSE TO LAG BEHIND. TODAY, WE ARE EXPERIENCING RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH, WE ARE STABILIZING THE MILITARY BALANCE, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE HAVE RENEWED OUR SENSE OF PURPOSE. THE STEADFASTNESS WE AS AN ALLIANCE SHOWED IN 1983 AS WE DEPLOYED THE NATO MISSILES WILL PAY OFF. GORBACHEV, I SUSPECT, IS COMING TO REALIZE THAT HE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH US IN REALISTIC TERMS. IF SO, WE MAY BE ABLE TO REDUCE GLOBAL TENSIONS AND ESTABLISH A PRODUCTIVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE MUST MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST COMMUNICATION. I WELCOME YOUR INVITATION TO HAVE BUD MCFARLANE COME TO LONDON. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH BUD. HE IS PREPARED TO COME ON ABOUT THE 28TH OR 29TH OF SEPTEMBER.

SINCERELY,

RON

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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Gorbachev Message no

Unofficial translation

President Reagan.

28/9. CDD

Return to  
Charles Powell

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations in continuation of the correspondence between us and specifically with a view to our forthcoming personal meeting.

I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has been fairly clearly recognized. They rival each other in their importance.

Sure, the distinctions between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to a number of matters of principle are different. That is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military collision that would entail catastrophe for our countries, for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also accept the impermissibility of military collision between the USSR and the USA.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war, removing military threat is our mutual and, for that matter dominant interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes into the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive, stable and thus contribute

His Excellency  
Ronald Reagan  
President of the United  
States of America



to the improvement of the world situation in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

There, we are convinced, lie considerable opportunities. My meeting with you may serve as a potent catalyst for their realization. As it seems, we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the impermissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such war, we could resolutely speak out against seeking a military superiority, against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by clearly expressed intentions of the sides to take actions of material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the sides to act in the direction of removing the military threat. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us, I think, to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems.

What specific measures should get priorities? Naturally those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarisation of space is the only road to very radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favour to follow this road



unwaveringly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically without postponing decisions. I would like to count upon having obtained some positive results by the time of our meeting with you.

In connection with certain provisions contained in your letter of the 27th of July I would note that our attitude to the American programme of the development of strike space weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system we have made explicit on several occasions. That opinion is based not on emotions or personal biases but on facts and realistic assessments. I would stress once again--the implementation of this programme would not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it and at that with most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries in order to slow down and bring to a halt the arms race above all in its main, nuclear field. It is indeed for this and no other purpose that we made a number of unilateral steps of practical nature.

Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the point of view of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of their new types. Consequently the termination of nuclear tests would act in the opposite direction. This is what we were guided by in making our decision to stop any



nuclear explosions and appealing to the USA to join us in this. Look at the matter unbiasedly. Now it is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt the security of either of them.

Therefore if there is a true intention to move to halting the arms race, then the mutual moratorium cannot raise objections, while the benefit it brings could be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests--though in the presence of somebody's observers--would be nothing else but the same arms race. The US still has time to take the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

However the moratorium on nuclear tests is, of course, not yet a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

For that it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final run the outcome of these talks will decisively determine whether we shall succeed in stopping the arms race, solving the task of eliminating nuclear weapons as such. Regrettably the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious alarm.

We have thoroughly and from every point studied once again what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula: the two sides agree to ban completely strike space weapons and to reduce really radically, say, by 50 percent their relevant nuclear arms.



In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiation--not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but also drastically reduced would be the level of nuclear countervalance, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result the strategic stability would be strengthened multifold, mutual confidence would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and the USA would be, I believe, an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realise that such a radical solution would require time and efforts. Nonetheless we are convinced that this problem can be solved. For this, first of all, a coincidence in principle of political approaches is needed. And, second, given such a coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of strike space weapons and a freeze on nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

Alongside with that major practical measures to be taken could include: making non-operational and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as the mutual undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in the countries which are now nuclear-free, and not to increase the stock of nuclear weapons and not to replace them by new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.



Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires solution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favours its radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone not more weapons of this type, counting the warheads, than Britain and France have.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiation has due instructions, and it intends to present in the nearest future our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give exhaustive clarifications. We count on the positive reaction of the American side and hope that it will be possible to reach certain results already at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the field of confidence-building and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference should make a maximum effort to turn the work of the Conference to a successful completion. Such an opportunity, as it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the US Secretary of State--we are in favour of making the subject matter of the Stockholm Conference an asset at our meeting with you.

It largely depends on our two countries if an impetus is given to the Vienna talks. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the American side would once again closely look at the possibility of initial reduction of Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have



proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favourable impact on the development of the all-European process as well. I see no reasons why it should not be in the interests of the USA.

Proposing practical measures of arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification procedures. In some cases it would be national technical means, in other cases, when it is really necessary, they could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the American side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in constructive direction in order to build up useful basis, including, if possible, the one for the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I payed particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing closer our positions and, better still, finding wherever possible practical solutions.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm, in Vienna, by exchanges in diplomatic channels it will be possible in the time left before our meeting with you to attain such a situation that the meeting will be really productive.



We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of our discussions with you at the meeting itself could be incorporated in the relevant joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our Ministers to figure out how the work over such final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

12 September 1985





*File*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*


12 September 1985

*Dear Len,*

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I enclose the signed original of the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan about the US/Soviet Summit. I should be grateful if it could be sent to the Embassy in Washington to pass to the White House. We have already transmitted the text to the White House on the direct telex link.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*pg*



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 September 1985

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No; T161/85**

*a MASTER  
OPS*

*Dear Ron,*

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to give my own views nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. And his performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which he cannot always conceal.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to Gorbachev's more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is

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something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has appealing proposals of its own on which you will be prepared to begin the process of negotiation when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

Clearly we must not build up your first meeting with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. If the meeting is to be judged a success, it must give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There may be genuine prospects of useful progress provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, at the same time, show that we are serious in seeking balanced agreements. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or could, deliver



against the entrenched interests in the Soviet Union. We should put him to the test.

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Geneva. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals on the place of strategic defence in relation to offensive forces and arms control. The key element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals might also cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out too the prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre on defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

I believe that agreement in principle on proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in the detailed arms control talks. But I also believe that progress will be maintained only if there is direction from the top by you and Gorbachev and that, for this purpose, you should be thinking in terms of a further meeting at your level within a reasonable time.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in



other arms control negotiations, above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a chance for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results; and to bring home to the public that it is the Soviet Union which is reluctant to control or abolish these weapons.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;
  
- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: not just because both East and West have committed themselves to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is more likely to produce stability and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in free democratic societies.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their



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- 5 -

part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear now that the US is utterly serious about making the maximum progress at Geneva; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

Warm regards

Yours ever

Ronald Reagan

---

The President of the United States of America



D.R.

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Have type  
fair: 1 + 4

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to speak my mind nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. <sup>And</sup> His performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which ~~he occasionally breaks through.~~ <sup>he cannot always conceal</sup> I gather that he treated some of your senior senators rather disdainfully.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to his <sup>more skilful</sup> tactics. <sup>make all the cunning</sup> But it is essential that we should not let him succeed in his play. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign. [ We must warn our people what to expect and expose his proposals and initiatives for the sham they are. I feel that not enough is yet being done to get this over, though I had a go in my own speech to the International Democratic Union in Washington in July. ]

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has fresh and appealing proposals of its own on which you will be

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begin the process of negotiation

prepared to negotiate when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

first meeting

Clearly we must not build up your ~~encounter~~ with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. ~~In the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that,~~ if the meeting is to be judged a success, it ~~should~~ <sup>must</sup> give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There ~~are~~ <sup>may be</sup> genuine prospects of useful progress.

*provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, or balanced could, deliver against the extended interests in the Soviet Union. We should put him to the test*

*the same time, show that we are serious in dealing with him. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or*

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in <sup>Geneva</sup> Vienna. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals <sup>on no place</sup> in the area of strategic defence, *in relation to offensive forces and arms control.*



These might <sup>also</sup> cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out <sup>the</sup> prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of ~~truly mutual~~ restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre on defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

I believe that agreement in principle on proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to ~~set the framework for a future agreement which the negotiators at Geneva could then flesh out.~~ I believe also that progress will be maintained only if there is direction from the top by you and ~~Mr~~ Gorbachev and that, for this purpose, ~~we~~ you should be ~~seeking~~ a further meeting at your level in say 6 months' time. *within a reasonable time*

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations, ~~MBFR, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe~~ and above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we

The key element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals

thinking in terms of

unlock the door to progress in the detailed arms control talks. But I also believe



know we have to live with it in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: Not just because ~~these rights are universal~~ <sup>have</sup> ~~and~~ both East and West <sup>themselves</sup> ~~were~~ committed to them at Helsinki, but also because justice at home is ~~linked~~ <sup>more likely</sup> with stability, ~~prosperity~~ and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, ~~on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded~~, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear <sup>now</sup> that the US ~~will be ready~~ <sup>is already utterly</sup> ~~to make new and far-reaching proposals~~; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-930 7022

*com.*  
*48*

MO 14/2V

11th September 1985

*Dear Charles.*

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

Thank you for copying to me your letter of yesterday's date to Peter Ricketts about the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan.

The Defence Secretary is out of London today and I have not been able to discuss your draft with him, but what follows reflects my earlier discussions with him on the FCO draft, about which we spoke on the telephone at the time. I believe that your re-draft both reads better and is much more in line with the Defence Secretary's own preferred approach. There were, however, two general points which struck me about it;

a. The first part of the message implies that Mr Gorbachev's approach is entirely propogandist but the second half suggests that there is scope for an agreement. I wondered if we should not tone down slightly the emphasis on propoganda and bring out more on the arms control front our uncertainty over the Soviet position but the need to put it to the test;

b. The message implies that we are looking to the meeting to produce an agreement. This seems unrealistic. Are we not seeking a framework to be filled in at Geneva (or by some other channel) over a specified period of time? The Defence Secretary is strongly of the view that this process will succeed only if the first meeting is followed fairly quickly by another Summit and I have worked this thought into the attached suggested re-draft of the first paragraph of page 3.

A number of largely drafting points also struck me and are offered in a spirit of helpfulness! I attach at annex a series of amendments which are I hope self-explanatory.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO).

*Yours ever,*

*Richard Mottram*

(R C MOTTRAM)

C Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



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Page 2, last paragraph, line 2 - Vienna is Geneva.

line 7 to the end of the first paragraph  
on page 3. Could I offer for your consideration a re-ordering  
of this material and a fleshing out along the lines of my  
covering letter, as follows:



ANNEX

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Page 1, paragraph 2, line 4 - delete last two sentences? I am not sure that Western public opinion noticed the way Gorbachev treated US Senators. ✓

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 8-9 - amend to read:

"tactics. It is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise...." ✓

Page 2, line 1 - amend to read:

"prepared to begin the process of negotiation when...." ?

Page 2, 2nd paragraph, line 1 - amend to read:

"....build up your first meeting with..." ✓

Page 2, 3rd paragraph, line 3 - amend to read:

"....full flavour of the United States's - and the West's - genuine commitment to peace and mutual security, our greatest single asset.

lines 7-8 - delete:

"in the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that,"  
(the desire for progress in Europe has not been created by Gorbachev) ✓

last sentence - amend to read:

"There may be genuine prospects of useful progress provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, at the same time, show that we are serious in seeking balanced agreements. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or could, deliver against the entrenched interests in the Soviet Union: we should put him to the test" ✓



CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 September 1985

Dear Charles,

CD - UK.

US/Soviet Summit

Thank you for your letter of 10 September enclosing a re-draft of the message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

The arms control experts here have looked carefully at this. They have suggested a number of small changes marked on the text below - some as you will see intended to avoid the impression that the US will be putting forward new proposals in Geneva. They have also suggested a re-draft of the key arms control paragraph beginning at the bottom of your page 2. This I enclose as a separate draft.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



[ New  
thought ]

On arms control, I see your meeting as a potential turning-point, offering the chance to take a giant step towards the agreement which we all wish to see concluded under your leadership, but equally risking a period of further frustration if you are unable to get to grips with the substance of these problems. Evidently, as we agreed last December the key priority will be to press Gorbachev for the sort of radical reductions in offensive nuclear forces which he appears willing, ~~or~~ at least in principle, to consider. And I hope that you will also engage him in a substantive exchange of the corollary, the role of defensive forces in the strategic equation. You will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. But I personally believe it important that you should go further, and outline the sort of wider approach, governing both offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time, which the logic of the equation dictates.

I recognise the difficulties in accepting at this stage specific constraints beyond those in the ABM Treaty on defensive developments. I therefore see the main aim of your meeting as establishing with Gorbachev not only the extent of bona fides on both sides but, also as finding ways to agree on how the all-important element of predicatability can be built into the strategic balance, allowing offensive force deployments and



programme decisions to be properly matched against the likely development of defensive research over the next decade. The sort of elements which could contribute to this predictability would include:

- an outline of the significant cuts in offensive nuclear forces that both sides would be prepared to take;
- a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty in its present form;
- an agreement on permissible research, including where necessary an agreed clarification of any 'grey areas' especially those that bear on the distinction between research and development;
- a commitment not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain dates;
- a discussion of how to preserve the elements of the SALT agreement which would continue to be relevant, within what you have called this interim framework of agreed restraint;
- to establish a new commitment to compliance with existing agreements, and to cooperation in resolving points of outstanding difficulty.

All this would, of course, need to be backed by a commitment to engage in the sort of serious and sustained dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces which you have sought to introduce already in the Geneva negotiations and which can be expected to evolve in the light of your own research programme. I realise that this is a full basket of ideas but I hope you will agree that taken together they would represent a real step forward. Obviously, the details will need



<sup>elaboration</sup>  
~~negotiation~~, and I would see much advantage in an  
agreement with Gorbachev on a structured approach  
to these further negotiations.



DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to speak my mind nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. His performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which occasionally breaks through. I gather that he treated some of your senior senators rather disdainfully.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to his more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him succeed in his ploy. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign. We must warn our people what to expect and expose his proposals and initiatives for the sham they are. I feel that not enough is yet being done to get this over, though I had a go in my own speech to the International Democratic Union in Washington in July.

✓  
X But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has [fresh and] appealing proposals of its own on which you will be



X prepared to <sup>discuss</sup> [negotiate] when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

Clearly we must not build up your encounter with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. In the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that, if the meeting is to be judged a success, it should give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There are genuine prospects of useful progress.

Geneva I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in [Vienna] [On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals in the area of strategic defence.



These might cover for instance agreement on permitted research, a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, and commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates. This would be part of a wider approach designed to govern both offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time. It would be combined with proposals for deep cuts in offensive weapons and a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. The aim would be to achieve predictability in terms of the possible deployment of defensive systems against which offensive force deployments and programme decisions over the next decade could be matched. I believe that proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in Geneva.]

See  
new  
para.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations - MBFR, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe and above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we



know we have to live with in in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business. Not just because these rights are universal, and both East and West were committed to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is linked with stability, prosperity and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear <sup>now</sup> that the US <sup>is deeply serious about</sup> ~~will be ready~~ to make new and far-reaching proposals; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

*X*  
 (I know that Geoffrey Howe will be seeing George Shultz later this month on these and other issues.)  
 I should be very ready to discuss these [points] more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.







D. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

C.D.P.

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

As you requested, I have had a go at producing a message from you to President Reagan about the Summit and I attach the result. Percy Cradock has seen it and approves.

C.D.P.

Charles - brilliant -  
only 2 comments -  
on my memo -  
P.1 the other on  
should report on  
or P.3 where we  
have the  
prop of under  
advantage  
nd

C D POWELL

11 September 1985

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to <sup>give</sup> speak my <sup>own</sup> mind *miss* nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. And his performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which he cannot always conceal.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to Gorbachev's more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has appealing proposals of its own on which you will be prepared to begin the process of negotiation when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

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Clearly we must not build up your first meeting with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. If the meeting is to be judged a success, it must give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There may be genuine prospects of useful progress provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, at the same time, show that we are serious in seeking balanced agreements. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or could, deliver against the entrenched interests in the Soviet Union. We should put him to the test.

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Geneva. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals on the place of strategic defence in relation to offensive forces and arms control. The key



D. R.

element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals might also cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out too the prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre on defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

I believe that agreement in principle on proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in the detailed arms control talks. But I also believe that progress will be maintained only if there is direction from the top by you and Gorbachev and that, for this purpose, you should be thinking in terms of a further meeting at your level within a reasonable time.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations, above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results. *And to bring home to the public that it is the Soviet Union which is reluctant to <sup>control</sup> these weapons.*

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly



bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;
  
- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: not just because both East and West have committed themselves to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is more likely to produce stability and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in free democratic societies.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear now that the US is utterly serious about making the maximum progress at Geneva; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our



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- 5 -

people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 September 1985

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT**

Len Appleyard's letter of 6 September enclosed a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit.

The Prime Minister was very far from content with this draft, which she has decided not to send. At her request, I have tried my hand at an alternative version. I do not know whether it will appeal to her any more than the FCO draft. But on a personal basis it would be helpful to have any comments particularly on the arms control aspects by 3.00 pm tomorrow, before I put the draft to her.

BF

I am copying this letter and enclosure on the same personal basis to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to speak my mind nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. His performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which occasionally breaks through. I gather that he treated some of your senior senators rather disdainfully.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to his more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him succeed in his ploy. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign. We must warn our people what to expect and expose his proposals and initiatives for the sham they are. I feel that not enough is yet being done to get this over, though I had a go in my own speech to the International Democratic Union in Washington in July.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has fresh and appealing proposals of its own on which you will be



prepared to negotiate when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

Clearly we must not build up your encounter with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. In the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that, if the meeting is to be judged a success, it should give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There are genuine prospects of useful progress.

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Vienna. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals in the area of strategic defence.

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These might cover for instance agreement on permitted research, a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, and commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates. This would be part of a wider approach designed to govern both offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time. It would be combined with proposals for deep cuts in offensive weapons and a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. The aim would be to achieve predictability in terms of the possible deployment of defensive systems against which offensive force deployments and programme decisions over the next decade could be matched. I believe that proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in Geneva.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations - MBFR, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe and above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we



know we have to live with in in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business. Not just because these rights are universal, and both East and West were committed to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is linked with stability, prosperity and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear that the US will be ready to make new and far-reaching proposals; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 September 1985

GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS:  
WESTERN STRATEGY

The Prime Minister has noted without comment the Foreign Secretary's minute of 6 September on this subject.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office..

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*JB*



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PRIME MINISTER

*See summary  
mt*

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

The Foreign Secretary advised you last week that your message to President Reagan about the summit ought to go fairly soon if it was to be properly taken into account in American preparations. He has now provided the attached draft. It comes in two parts: a message and an annex.

It would be helpful to have your reaction. I find it bland, uninteresting and too inclined to accept - indeed encourage - the view of those in the US Administration who take a minimalist view of the Summit. If you are to send a message, you should set what we think the West's aims should be and then suggest what progress can feasibly be made at the summit towards them. The aims should include precise ideas on arms control. The message should also propose a number of criteria by which the success of the summit could be judged. I don't think much of the idea of splitting the message into two parts, especially since the more interesting bits on arms control are in the Annex. It simply doesn't make sense to divide the substance from the style. When set against the vast amount of briefing material which the President will be getting, this simply won't make an impact. It's a pity the Foreign and Commonwealth Office didn't pay more attention to the guidance you gave them in advance (attached).

If you agree that the draft is substandard, what next?

(a) We can try to assemble some outside experts. But you had the Sovietologists pre-Gorbachev and didn't get much out of them: and it's you not they who have had the direct experience of him. Anyway, your diary hardly allows it.

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(b) We can have a meeting of Ministers and senior officials to commission a fresh draft.

(c) Or Percy Cradock and I can have a go at producing a version.

Another possibility would be to invite Bud McFarlane over here, so that you can put your views directly to him. I think you should do this, but after you've sent a message and rather nearer the time of the summit.

Agree (b) or (c)?

The next draft is worse than unless. I should dream of writing it. Try (C). Above - let's into account the judgement we have to take

P.O.

C.D.P.

Port- divide into 2 papers not

(C.D. POWELL)

6 September 1985

M.B. The talks must unblock the door to progress at Geneva. A general 'letting to know you' is not enough.

SRWAID





hws

RJ  
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 July 1985

Dear Sir,

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

The Prime Minister has now on several occasions told the US Administration that we shall be letting them have our thoughts on the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit. Although we have not said when we shall do so, a sensible target date would be the middle of October.

I am sure that the Prime Minister will in due course want to hold a discussion of the views that we might put forward. This is unlikely to be practicable before the second half of September, so I think it would be useful to have a preliminary draft of a substantial message on paper for the Americans by then which could form the basis of discussion at a meeting. You will certainly have ideas on what this should cover. My suggestions are:-

- i) there should be an introductory section on Mr Gorbachev himself, based on the Prime Minister's experience of him here. This could contain some suggestions on how to handle him.
- ii) this would be a lead in to our analysis of what we expect the Soviet Union's aims to be at the Summit and the various tactical ploys which they will use in support of these aims, in particular to influence public opinion in Europe.
- iii) the most important section would then deal with what we suggest that United States' aims at the Summit should be. The main message here would be that we acknowledge that there will be no substantial agreements prepared in advance for signature at the Summit. Equally, a getting-to-know-you meeting alone will not be enough to satisfy public opinion, at least in Europe, that the United States has made a serious effort to achieve some forward movement in East/West relations. The Summit must give a specific impetus to negotiations on a wide range of

RJ




issues, above all on arms control. This means not just to the Geneva negotiations, but to negotiations on chemical weapons, on a test ban and perhaps also on MBFR.

- iv) there might then be a separate section on the handling of the Strategic Defence Initiative in the context of the Summit. This is obviously delicate ground. The sort of ideas which we have trailed since the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in February - reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, an agreement on permitted research within the Treaty, reductions in offensive weapons and provision for formal review of the offence/defence balance after a fixed period - have received no specific US response (in part because we have never fully deployed them). We may just want to put them forward again. But we might also consider whether we want to encourage the Americans to put some slightly more radical proposals to the Russians, covering for instance deep cuts in offensive missiles combined with limited deployment of a strategic defence system by both sides.
- v) next would be any points we want to put to the Americans on regional issues (Middle East) or more general problems (Jewish emigration).
- vi) finally there might be a section on how we suggest the Alliance be handled to assure the maximum degree of solidarity at the time of the Summit.

It would be helpful to have a draft covering these points and others by the time of the Prime Minister's return from the Middle East.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



*see PC.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 September 1985

*see PM's comments**CDP  
11/9.**Dear Charles,*US/Soviet Summit

In your letter of 31 July you asked us to draft a substantial message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, following up the undertaking she made in her letter of 9 July to the President (and repeated with Vice-President Bush) to offer some thoughts on the handling of the November Summit. I am sending you the enclosed material now, earlier than you suggested, because as you know we think it important (and have been strongly advised by the Embassy at Washington) that the Prime Minister's message should reach the President before he receives Shevardnadze on 26 September.

This timing should give our input a chance to influence the briefing, not just for the Summit itself, but also for the crucial preparatory meetings. It should also ensure that the Prime Minister's thoughts reach the President before any exchange between him and President Mitterrand over Mr Gorbachev's visit to Paris. We expect, however, that there may be grounds and opportunity for the Prime Minister to send the President some further thoughts nearer the actual time of the Summit: and the last paragraph of the present letter is drafted to provide a peg for this.

The Foreign Secretary would like to explain something of the thinking behind the drafts. Our first concern was not to make the message to President Reagan too long. We know from NSC contacts that policy submissions are normally made to him in abbreviated style, focusing on the essentials. To accommodate his preferences while getting all the important points across, we suggest that the Prime Minister's message should take the form of a reasonably brief covering letter on questions of strategy and style, with a short enclosure about the substance of the President's discussions. Both elements have been so drafted as to come clearly from the Prime Minister herself. They take account among other things of the latest indications of Gorbachev's approach ("Time" article, meetings with US Senators) and of the US public response.

Most of the drafts should be self-explanatory. The covering letter stresses our appreciation for the way the President himself is approaching the Summit but injects some

/ important ...





important nuances, especially on the handling of Gorbachev. HM Ambassador Washington, whom we have consulted, confirms that this style should serve us better than the offer of more categorical advice. (The actual word "Summit" has been avoided because US spokesmen themselves prefer not to use it, for fear of inflating the occasion.)

On substance we have covered everything in your letter, though in a rather different order. In dealing with the Geneva arms control negotiations (and MBFR, CDE, CW etc) we have suggested a rather less direct and specific approach than you originally proposed. We share the concern not to lose the opportunity the Summit offers for giving a fresh impetus to the talks. There are those in Washington who will be seeking to put as much substance as possible into the arms control discussion. But we believe it would be going too far to give the Americans the clear impression that we were proposing a comprehensive game-plan for the future of arms control. None of the current arms control negotiations will have reached the point by November where detailed agreements satisfactory to both sides can be signed. The Russians have so far shown little sign of genuine flexibility and their public offers seem designed mainly to unnerve the US into offering unwarranted concessions. Trying to manoeuvre the Americans into too forward a posture, even if it only produced an eventual agreement at a later stage, could lead to undue concessions on their part and consequent damage to Alliance interests, not to mention increased problems of Western consultation and coordination. (We have not mentioned ASATs on the rather different ground that this issue is unlikely to figure seriously in the Summit discussions, given the overall limits on time - indeed CW, CDE and MBFR may not be reached either - and we have not included nuclear test issues because there is no particular UK point to make on these at present.)

So we have preferred in our drafts to go for a more indirect approach, flagging the ideas to which you referred. This would complement other elements of the Summit designed to improve personal relations between the two leaders. Together with the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements, some with direct relevance to security, the sum total should contribute to building the stable, interdependent framework of relations which will be necessary to open the way for real progress in arms control. If a firmer structure for further negotiations can also be agreed, so much the better. Nonetheless, we must recognise that even this indirect approach on arms control may not achieve all we wish, and may go beyond the advice being currently prepared for the President by his own officials.

/ We note ...



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We note the Prime Minister's comment that it might be useful to arrange a meeting with outside experts; timing apart, you will doubtless bear in mind the publicity which might result from any such meeting.

I am copying this letter, like yours, to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing St

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DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

When I wrote on 9 July I said I would be taking up your kind invitation to offer some thoughts on your meeting with Mr Gorbachev in November. You of all people know how to handle this, and what we have heard of your plans so far makes great sense. But it might be worth underlining a few points from my own experience of the man: and my sense of how people in Europe are approaching this historic meeting.

Like your own people they look to it with hope, as the first such event for many years. But because of that very lack of recent parallels, they cannot be certain what exactly to expect. We must persuade them to look neither too high or too low: above all by stressing, as you have rightly stressed already, that this is the start of a creative process and not the end. One encounter cannot magic away the differences between systems, or solve complex security problems at a stroke. But it can and should have a clear productive purpose: laying the groundwork - as your spokesmen have put it - to address the great issues facing your two nations. It can put in place the first elements of a more stable, workmanlike relationship between the two major powers on this planet.

Any bilateral agreements that can be presented as an indication of progress will obviously help. But a more general aim should be to start building the climate of greater understanding and confidence we shall need, if Mr Gorbachev is ever to help open the way for true progress on arms control. The first essential step is for you to get across to him your own deep commitment to peace and a stable and safer world. If you can then draw him into a searching debate on the key issues; reaffirm such basic aims as the two sides share; explore the way ahead, and perhaps produce a structured approach to further negotiations - this kind of outcome? should in my belief be not

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only worthwhile in substance but deeply reassuring to opinion in the West. !?

Mr Gorbachev himself seems to see your meeting at the moment mainly as a licence for public diplomacy, a chance to probe US nerve and the strength of Western positions. We can expect more propaganda ploys both before and during Geneva, aimed at the most sensitive links in the Allied chain. The essential will be to meet these with firmness and keep Western opinion solid - a task we all share - while ensuring the event is not driven off its proper course. The hardest response for Mr Gorbachev to evade is the calm, measured one which points out that the Soviets have not addressed - and should not waste the chance your meeting offers to address - the real core of the issue.

For he also struck me as a man who knows, deep down, he cannot tackle his formidable economic problems without a durable peace and stable relationship with the US. In my long talk with him last December, his personal commitment to raising Soviet living standards - and his conviction that the task is possible - came across clearly. He knows and has once spoken publicly of the "immense" commitment military spending means for his people. Of course he will always give priority to what he sees as "adequate" security. His skill in manipulating opinion in the West is matched by a personal vision of the world still fixed in naively orthodox Communist terms. But in his meeting with you he will be exploring too - looking as always for concessions, but looking also at the possibility (and costs) of greater cooperation.

Even last December, before his elevation, Mr Gorbachev was speaking as a man who intends to be around for a good while and whose authority will grow with experience. Now is the time for efforts to convince him of Western good faith, to show him that with application and patience deals can be done to the benefit of





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all. And now is the time to press him, as a statesman, to devote his talents constructively to the crucial East-West issues. This long-term strategy needs great maturity, firmness and patience on the Western side. I cannot imagine any Western leader better qualified than you to carry it through.

You will be speaking to Mr Gorbachev for the whole of the West, as leader of a free alliance. He has nothing like that behind him and he knows it. The more this strength can be reflected in the handling of all aspects of the event, the better. Sharing your general aims with the Allies in advance will help them to speak and act supportively. And I welcome the excellent practice you have established for briefing NATO quickly through qualified emissaries.

I may seek a chance to return to some of these issues between now and November and would be glad to take further any particular points you want to pursue. For the moment, I am / enclosing some further thoughts of mine on the subject-matter of your meeting.

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[ENCLOSURE]

THOUGHTS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES

Who?  
1. Given the current Soviet approach to Arms Control, one meeting is unlikely to sweep away the obstacles. But your discussions do have an all-important task to perform in laying the foundation for serious negotiations on the Geneva issues and giving them a fresh impetus. The first step is to make Mr Gorbachev accept our seriousness of purpose in seeking agreements, and your readiness to define with him the shared interests which such agreements should serve.

2. On the central Geneva topics, the four points which we agreed at Camp David remain an excellent starting point: the emphasis your people have put on them in recent presentations is much appreciated here, and healthy for Western solidarity. Against that background, I wonder if the way ahead may lie in beginning to explore with Mr Gorbachev a combination of measures which would not preclude potential options for a later stage. They would be designed to provide greater security over the medium-term, while at the same time improving chances of securing the radical reductions in offensive arms which you and I wish to see.

3. The sort of ideas I have in mind, on which we have already touched in our previous talks, might include eventual agreements

- to cut nuclear forces significantly;
- to halt the erosion of the ABM Treaty by reaffirming the commitment to observe the Treaty in its present form, with subsequent clarification of the ambiguous areas in it and especially those that bear on the distinction between research and development;

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- to discuss the maintenance of those elements of the SALT agreements which would continue to be relevant, within an interim framework of agreed restraint;
- to establish a new commitment to compliance with existing agreements, and to cooperation in resolving points of outstanding difficulty;
- and to engage in a serious and sustained dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, as this continues to evolve in the light of your SDI research programme.

*- to stand firm on SDI.*

An agreement on a structured approach to further negotiations would be a bonus.

*? But limited ground?*

4. The Soviets claim an interest in all these aspects, though their actions so far have not done much to reflect it. November could be the right time to put them to the test at the highest level. The details of any such agreements would of course have to be worked out later in negotiation. But I feel even a tentative accord on these lines would be a major success for you and the Western Alliance. Much will of course depend on Mr Gorbachev's preparedness for detailed discussion: and your agenda will already be very full. But I hope you will be able to do more than skim the surface with him on these key issues. It would also be worth reflecting in a public statement any common ground you were able to reach.

5. Time permitting, the meeting could also offer you a chance to review prospects in other arms control negotiations - Chemical Weapons, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and MBFR. I doubt if an immediate breakthrough - which means major Soviet concessions - will be possible in these areas. But I do hope you can stress to Mr Gorbachev the importance we all attach to concrete results. These would enhance US-Soviet relations and global stability: but they can only be gained by negotiating seriously, without sticking to plainly unacceptable positions.

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6. I am sure you will want to <sup>raise</sup> ~~focus~~ on Human rights. In <sup>doing</sup> ~~raising~~ them I know you will carry with you the thought, which we share, that despite changes in the presentation of Soviet policies there has been no change in their practice. Mr Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations - neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions:

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;
- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business. Not just because these rights are universal, and both East and West were committed to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is linked with stability, prosperity and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

7. I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

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East/West Relations:

Foreign Pol. PLS





CEP



PM/85/79

PRIME MINISTER

*ms*

*The Prime Minister*  
*This codifies the ideas*  
*which been batted about*  
*over the past 6 months.*  
*It is not intended as an*  
*"initiative" but as guidance for*  
*those who discuss these matters*  
*with the*  
*US & other Allies.*

Geneva Arms Control Talks: Western Strategy

1. My Private Secretary has written separately in response to the request in your Private Secretary's letter of 31 July for a draft message which you might send to President Reagan on the handling of the November Summit. *COP*  
*6/9*
2. As explained in that letter, the prospects of concrete arms control agreements emerging from the November Summit are not at present good. I therefore believe that we should be cautious about pressing specific ideas about the arms control negotiations on the US Administration at this stage. But, as you yourself told Secretary Weinberger in Washington last July, we must still look to the Summit to provide the Geneva negotiations with a fresh impetus. At the least, the Summit may produce agreement on further high-level meetings designed to advance the Geneva talks. It is therefore in my view none too soon to consider how we can best influence the process in a direction helpful to our interests, and how to make the best of our on-going exchanges with the Americans on this subject.
3. Against this background, I asked officials to work up some ideas which might be developed in the course of Alliance consultations about the Geneva negotiations. The attached paper, which has been prepared in consultation with MOD officials, and with whose thrust I understand Michael Heseltine to be generally content, builds upon thinking which was initially reflected in the briefing prepared for your visits to Washington in December and February and later elaborated in further contacts with the Americans. It is not a blueprint for a US/Soviet agreement,

/ rather





rather a quarry of negotiating possibilities which can be drawn upon in briefing for future exchanges over the coming months. The suggestions made in the paper, if pursued by the Americans, would certainly help to impel the negotiations in the direction of the longer-term strategy we hope to see them develop.

4. The paper does not address the separate chemical weapons ban negotiations in Geneva. Officials have as instructed been discussing with the Americans the major problem of the contentious Article X of the US draft Treaty. Resistance on the part of the US Department of Defence to any amendment to the present US concept of "no refusal" inspection has meant little progress has been made. I may need to consult you at a later stage if the impasse, which has blocked possible progress at Geneva, continues. But at this stage I do not believe a specific reference to this point in your message to the President is merited.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Michael Heseltine and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
6 September 1985



## GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS : WESTERN STRATEGY

Introduction

1. This paper addresses the state-of-play in the current Geneva talks, and suggests an approach over the coming months which would be consistent with Western interests and could assist the negotiations to make progress. It reflects and tries to elaborate upon ideas which have already been addressed in bilateral contacts with the Americans, both at Ministerial and official level. There is an obvious limit to the extent to which even the closest Allies can exert a decisive influence over US strategy. Nonetheless, the following points are put forward as a starting-point for further consultations with them, and perhaps other close Allies.

## CURRENT POSITION

2. The strategic balance has altered since the SALT I agreement was signed. The shift has been in favour of the Soviet Union, although the US continues to lead in some significant areas. The extent of this change should not be exaggerated. The Scowcroft Report of 1983 recognised, and President Reagan agreed, that there was no immediate danger to strategic stability, and concern about the vulnerability of US ICBM forces was alleviated by the fact that the Soviet Union could not eliminate US ICBM fields, submarines and bomber bases simultaneously. The Report recognised at the same time the importance of modernisation programmes, in order to strengthen all three legs of the US strategic triad.

3. New and complex issues have been introduced into the strategic equation in recent years, notably the long-range cruise missile (particularly when based on submarine platforms) and the mobile ICBM. Both will need addressing in the new round of strategic arms talks. Nonetheless, while in 1983 the positions of the two super-powers in a START negotiation were ostensibly far apart, possible avenues of accommodation between them could even then be identified. Recent developments suggest that there remain real chances for progress in this area. In the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), such relative optimism would not be easily justified. The Soviet Union apparently remains wedded to the principle that they will not accept the stationing of



new US missiles of this type in Europe.

4. The renewed emphasis on ballistic missile defences as a factor in the strategic equation, engendered by the SDI and concern about Soviet research, has imposed a qualitative change on the traditional debate, and added a special complication. Although radical restructuring of the forces on either side would take many years, the notion of sharp cuts in current offensive forces is now accepted at least in principle by both sides. But it is most unlikely that either would accept such cuts so long as the future of strategic defences is allowed to run free. And US insistence on deep offensive reductions is matched by their present determination to accept no long-term constraints on SDI research.

5. A wider and more basic problem is the enduring difference between US and Soviet perceptions. The US continue to see a need to redress the long-standing Soviet advantage in a particular type of strategic forces (ICBMs), while seeking to avoid tight constraints on new technologies in which they still lead over the Soviet Union. On the other hand, having made strenuous and largely successful efforts to catch up with the Americans over the past two decades, the basic Soviet interest could now be said to be the maintenance of the status quo in terms of the strategic balance.

6. There is a further aspect to this difference between US and Soviet perceptions. Their time-scales for decision-making on procurement of new weapons systems have never been identical and continue to be out of step. It has become progressively harder to identify a moment at which successful talks could codify a de facto balance, especially when the factors relevant to any agreement have increased in complexity and sensitivity. Each side perceives itself as about to be overtaken by the other, and as a result sets in motion a series of procurement decisions whose results only become evident in a number of years. Such decisions are generally irrevocable, but in the meantime they serve as an impetus to the other side to take another step down the modernisation track.



## SOVIET/US VIEWS

7. Currently the Soviet leaders appear dedicated to two main objectives: the constraint of the US technological potential to develop strategic defences, and limits on new US offensive forces. At this stage the Russians show no signs of having decided to negotiate seriously. For the time being they probably see sufficient potential to undermine US positions by playing on weaknesses in Alliance unity and by mobilising public pressure both from Europeans and within the US through a mixture of public negotiating "initiatives" and attacks on US policy. An eye-catching move in connection with the November Summit, which could include elements of genuine attraction to the US, cannot be excluded; but this is likely to stop short of providing a real breakthrough at Geneva. Soviet thinking will continue to reflect security over-insurance and conservative military assumptions. They will want to ensure that any steps towards the US taken in order to achieve constraints on SDI will not seriously jeopardise key elements in their offensive weapons modernisation programme.

8. In Washington the Administration and the President remain firmly committed to pursuing the arms control track. Nonetheless, recent evidence of what the Americans perceive as Soviet non-compliance with their arms control obligations gives them cause for serious concern, not least because of the apparent Soviet unwillingness to address Western anxieties seriously (although there have been some signs of readiness to justify how they abide by the rules through limited discussion in the SCC). The issue has been elevated into a debate within Washington about the future of arms control, with some wishing to use the debate to destroy the whole process, especially as it applies to the ABM Treaty and the SALT agreements. The President's decision on 10 June to stay within current constraints does not mean the end of the battle, which is likely to flare up again just before the Summit in November. Any attempt to impose firm constraints on future US offensive deployments and, more sensitive, the further evolution of strategic defences will meet with stern opposition. The Administration have stated that they will not accept a Soviet veto on such programmes, although this is not the same as refusing an agreed series of constraints; and of course the attitude of future US Administrations cannot reliably be



forecast. So long as the Russians show few signs of interest in substantive discussions, however, there will be little US disposition to grapple with the tough issues which a more flexible negotiating position for Geneva would involve.

## PROSPECTS

9. Against this background the present prospects for success at Geneva are not encouraging. There has until now been no reason to argue for the US to give thought to new negotiating positions, let alone to launch new US initiatives. Public pressure remains at a low level, and a significant shift in negotiating positions would have been inappropriate. The immediate priority <sup>has</sup> <sup>been</sup> to maintain Alliance cohesion in the face of Soviet propaganda tactics. They should not be allowed to force constraints on the West away from the negotiating table.

10. Nonetheless, a new negotiating concept takes time to develop. If the US is to be able to move swiftly when the moment is ripe with the prospect of full Allied support, then it is no longer premature to start injecting into US thinking some more detailed ideas for ways in which the negotiations could usefully develop. Such an approach has to recognise that the US alone is at the negotiating table: but that the outcome of the negotiations will profoundly affect the strategic interests of the Allies.

11. The answer may lie in a deliberate effort

- (i) to limit the duration of arms control agreements,
- (ii) expand the scope of agreements in terms of weapons and of forces covered; but
- (iii) to avoid linkage between agreements unless demonstrably essential and/or advantageous to the West.

The arms control process has always struggled to catch up with technological developments, which continually overtake agreements and render them increasingly irrelevant. To recognise that arms control and technology must interact is both realistic and may point a useful way ahead. If such an approach is adopted (and it has already been hinted as the most fruitful approach by some senior US

h But  
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apparently  
suggest  
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the President!

Some of these  
are obvious  
which is likely  
to do this.



officials) it could be composed of the following elements.

#### NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES

12. An interim regime could be constructed to incorporate further constraints on offensive forces, beyond those already imposed by the present SALT agreements. Such a core agreement might last for perhaps the next decade. It would be based on a compromise between the US requirement for reductions in throwweight and numbers of warheads, and the original Soviet insistence on limiting only launchers. Signs of Soviet and US flexibility on such a compromise are beginning to emerge. The agreement would also need to:

- FAK  
a bit  
general  
shud!*
- address future modernisation programmes (perhaps through one of the variations on the approach known as "build-down", where old systems are replaced by fewer but better systems);
  - establish acceptable conditions for ICBM mobility;
  - address the long-range cruise missile problem;
  - achieve reduced levels of LRINF forces on each side.

Such an agreement could be represented as establishing "an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms" the terms in which President Reagan defined near-term US aims in his 10 June statement on SALT limits.

13. The existing regime of restraints should be maintained over the same period. This would need to contain some important sub-elements:

- (a) a continuing commitment would be needed to maintain the SALT regime and its accompanying limitations, coupled with a vigorous effort to resolve compliance issues through co-operation within the US/Soviet bilateral Special Consultative Committee (SCC). The US readiness to follow this path until now is most welcome and should be encouraged;



(b) Particular care should be taken to keep under review one item of special military significance - the mobile ICBM (exemplified in the case of the Soviet Union by the SS-X 25 and of the US by the proposed Midgetman). The timetable for the introduction of both systems may conceivably make it possible to accommodate them within future reductions, although the more advanced Soviet development of the SS-X-25 will make a direct balance hard to negotiate. The effect upon the strategic balance and upon strategic stability of mobile systems (which reduce the threat to each side of a successful first strike by the other) needs to be weighed against the military disadvantages of the targetting difficulties to which such systems give rise;

✓(c) the ABM Treaty should continue to be given full political support and its erosion prevented. This would involve in particular a clarification of the borderline between research and development (in terms of the Treaty); and the meaning of critical but ambiguous terms such as "an ABM component", "an ABM sub-component" and "testing in an ABM mode". Further understandings might also be necessary on the potential ABM applications of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) or anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs). The purpose of this activity would be on the one hand to constrain a Soviet potential for the rapid extension of conventional ABM systems; and to establish on the other the basis for a clear distinction between the research and development phases of both the SDI and the equivalent Soviet programme.

(d) A further and useful elaboration of this concept would involve commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specified dates. An extension to 5 years of the period of notice required to withdraw from the Treaty has been canvassed as a means of reaffirming the stability of the Treaty regime. This seems likely to run into determined opposition in Washington. Nonetheless, if agreed arrangements were reached to govern offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time, it should not prove impossible to secure at least informal agreement on such



an extension.

14. In summary, the aim would be to establish an element of predictability, in terms of possible defensive developments, against which offensive force deployments and programme decisions must be matched over the next decade. The key point here is not to try to establish any form of formal constraint which would foreclose US options to proceed further with defensive developments within their own timescales, ie the mid-1990s onwards; but to achieve sufficient inhibitions to allow room for offensive reductions to take place in the meantime against the background of the predictable shape and scope of future defences. The net result would be to allow research to continue on both sides on defensive possibilities, while establishing an equitable balance of offensive forces over the next decade; in other words, to achieve the objective the US Administration proclaims: preservation of stable deterrence based on a mix of offensive force reductions now and the possibility of defensive deployments in the longer-term future.

15. Finally, a further attempt should be made to reach some sort of negotiated agreement on the testing and deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, and in particular a ban on high level ASATs. Earlier studies by UK officials concluded that there could well be advantage to the West in the sort of time-limited agreements covering certain elements of anti-satellite activity which could complement a broader regime covering both offensive and strategic defensive forces. Their continued development puts at risk the present key strategic assets (in the form of communications and surveillance satellites) on which the security of both sides rests. There is admittedly a difficulty in ASAT constraints, in that there is a degree of complementarity between ASAT and BMD systems. Nonetheless, the relevant time-scales for deployment differ sufficiently to allow for an interim measure of constraint on the former without jeopardising the prospects for developing the latter. ASATs are already deployed by the Soviet Union; and likely to be shortly deployed by the US. An agreement which limited



both sides to the present or predicted deployments over a time-scale of the next decade and banned the testing or deployment of high-level ASATs over a similar, extendable period, would introduce an element of both stability and predictability, which could only be helpful to the preservation of stable deterrence.



Foreign Policy. "East West Relations" Pt 5





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MY TELNO. 1132: U S SENATORS' MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

1. THE U S CHARGE HAS NOW GIVEN ME (AND MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES), IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING WHICH SENATOR BYRD AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD WITH GORBACHEV ON 3 SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH HE WAS PRESENT. HIS ACCOUNT IS AT LEAST AS INTERESTING FOR THE LIGHT WHICH IT THROWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF GORBACHEV'S STYLE AS FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSION.

SUBSTANCE  
-----

2. IN HIS RESPONSE, LASTING OVER ONE HOUR, TO SENATOR BYRD'S EQUALLY LENGTHY INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT, GORBACHEV GAVE PRIDE OF PLACE TO THE SDI AND US/SOVIET RELATIONS. HE SPENT SOME TIME COVERING THE SAME GROUND ON SDI RESEARCH WHICH HAD FEATURED IN THE UNSCRIPTED PART OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE (MY TELNO. 1127 PARA. 3 (C)). GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE RESEARCH ISSUE MIGHT BE LARGELY SEMANTIC; HE THEN WENT ON TO REITERATE HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNVERIFIABLE "FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH" AND ANY KIND OF RESEARCH WHICH TOOK PLACE BEYOND THE WALLS OF THE LABORATORY, BY DEFINITION VERIFIABLE. THE LATTER CATEGORY, HE SAID, MUST BE BANNED COMPLETELY. IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD "ON THE VERY NEXT DAY" TABLE "RADICAL PROPOSALS" FOR THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THESE PROPOSALS WERE ALREADY FULLY PREPARED. GORBACHEV MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE OF UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THERE WAS LITTLE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AS SUCH, APART FROM A LAST MINUTE BID BY SENATOR NUNN TO INTEREST GORBACHEV IN THE PROPOSAL WHICH NUNN AND SENATOR WARNER ARE SPONSORING FOR THE CREATION OF A "NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRE" TO MONITOR AND TAKE ACTION ON NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, TERRORIST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ETC. ALTHOUGH SOVIET MILITARY EXPERTS HAD ON THE PREVIOUS DAY TAKEN A S WHOLLY DISMISSIVE LINE ON THIS PROPOSAL, GORBACHEV DESCRIBED IT AS "INTERESTING" AND DESERVING OF FURTHER STUDY: HE AGREED TO ACCEPT THE PAPER IN WHICH THE TWO SENATORS HAD SET OUT THEIR PROPOSALS IN DETAIL. ON HIS OWN PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS, GORBACHEV VIGOROUSLY DENIED SENATOR BYRD'S ASSERTION THAT THE MORATORIUM HAD BEEN DECLARED WHEN THE SOVIET UNION HAD COMPLETED ITS OWN CURRENT SERIES OF TESTS AND IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT: HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY HAD ENTERED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ON THE DECLARATION OF A MORATORIUM, WHICH HAD BEEN AN ENTIRELY POLITICAL DECISION.

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3. ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS, GORBACHEV STRESSED THAT HE HAD PURPOSELY AVOIDED, IN HIS TIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEW, RAKING OVER<sup>R</sup> PAST HISTORY OR CATALOGUING THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: HE HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ADOPT THE SAME APPROACH. THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO MAKE A FRESH START, "AS FROM TODAY", WITH A CLEAN SLATE. BUT WASHINGTON'S WHOLLY ONE-SIDED APPROACH CREATED A MAJOR DIFFICULTY: THE UNITED STATES INSISTED THAT ALL THE CONCESSIONS SHOULD COME FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. SENATOR BYRD'S OPENING STATEMENT HAD CONTAINED NOTHING NEW: EVERYTHING WAS THE FAULT OF THE RUSSIANS, EVERYTHING WHICH THE SOVIET UNION DID WAS BLACK WHEREAS EVERYTHING THE U S DID WAS WHITE. THIS APPROACH WAS UNACCEPTABLE: THERE MUST BE RECIPROCITY. IN AN ALMOST MINATORY TONE, GORBACHEV TOLD THE SENATORS: "SOMETIMES YOU SEEM TO FORGET THAT IT IS THE SOVIET UNION YOU ARE DEALING WITH"

4. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR BYRD'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GORBACHEV DELIVERED A STRONG COUNTER-ATTACK. HOW COULD THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAD FAILED TO RATIFY SIX MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, HAVE THE NERVE TO TALK TO THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS SUBJECT? AND WHAT MORAL AUTHORITY DID THE UNITED STATES HAVE IN THIS AREA? THE UNITED STATES HAD PLENTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN. FINALLY, THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS WAS ENTIRELY ONE-SIDED AND BIASED: AMERICAN COMPLAINTS WERE ADDRESSED ONLY TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IGNORING THE SITUATION IN E.G. SOUTH AFRICA AND CHILE. GORBACHEV NEVERTHELESS ACCEPTED WITH RELATIVELY GOOD GRACE A NUMBER OF LETTERS AND APPEALS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WHICH THE SENATORS HAD BROUGHT WITH THEM.

5. THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES: ON AFGHANISTAN, GORBACHEV INTERRUPTED THIS PASSAGE IN SENATOR BYRD'S OPENING STATEMENT TO SAY THAT THE U S CONGRESS WAS HELPING TO FUND THE CONFLICT AND DID NOT SUBSEQUENTLY RETURN TO THE SUBJECT.

### STYLE

6. THE U S CHARGE, AND THE SENATORS THEMSELVES, WERE STRUCK BY GORBACHEV'S OVERWHELMING SELF-CONFIDENCE WHICH AT CERTAIN POINTS DURING THE THREE AND HALF HOUR MEETING BORDERED ON ARROGANCE. HE TREATED THE GROUP OF EMINENT AND DISTINGUISHED U S SENATORS AS IF THEY WERE MIDDLE-RANKING APPARATCHIKI. HE WAS CONTROLLED BUT FREQUENTLY CUTTING AND FROM TIME TO TIME DELIBERATELY ALLOWED ANGER TO SHOW THROUGH. HIS REMARK ABOUT THE SENATORS APPEARING TO FORGET

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THAT THEY WERE DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS TYPICAL OF HIS GENERAL APPROACH AND CHARACTERISTICALLY "GREAT RUSSIAN". HE SHOWED NO REAL CURIOSITY ABOUT THE SENATORS' OWN VIEW AND LITTLE DISPOSITION TO DEBATE: HE SEEMED INTERESTED ONLY IN VIGOROUS AND SWINGING REBUTTAL. TO JUDGE BY THIS ACCOUNT, THE CHEMISTRY OF POWER IS BEGINNING TO WORK ON HIM, AND RATHER EARLY.

CARTLEDGE

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D

DEFENCE D

RESEARCH D

PLANNING STAFF

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

MR DAUNT

MR DAVID THOMAS

-3-

# CONFIDENTIAL



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(CR7)

10 DOWNING STREET

4 September, 1985

*From the Private Secretary*

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

The Foreign Secretary suggested to the Prime Minister this afternoon that it might be necessary to bring forward the message which she was proposing to send to President Reagan about the US/Soviet Summit to the end of September. It was evident that work within the US Administration was already well advanced in preparation for the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit; and if our views were to be taken into account, a first message at least should go before that visit. The Prime Minister commented that it might be useful to arrange a meeting with a number of outside experts, particularly on Soviet affairs, before finalising our views. But she would consider the need for this once she had seen the Department's draft.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

L. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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# OFFICIAL TEXT

August 21, 1985

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. EMBASSY, 55/56 UPPER BROOK STREET, LONDON W1A 2LH

## CHANGE IN SOVIET APPROACH NEEDED FOR ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS

(Text: McFarlane on US-Soviet Relations)

Santa Barbara -- Without a radical change in the Soviet approach to security issues, President Reagan's national security affairs adviser says, it will be difficult to reach "even incremental improvements" in relations with Moscow.

Robert McFarlane, addressing two civic clubs in Santa Barbara, California, August 19, declared that President Reagan "has committed himself to meet the Soviet Union halfway in developing responsible solutions to outstanding problems." But he warned that without a change in Soviet thinking, whatever improvements are made "will be much less likely to gather momentum, to build on each other." Reagan is vacationing at his ranch near Santa Barbara.

McFarlane told the clubs that Moscow's attitude on regional matters such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Kremlin support for terrorist nations such as Libya, and Moscow's backing of Cuba raises questions about Soviet motivation. "It makes improvements in other areas" of the relationship, he said, "more difficult. It all but guarantees that any small steps forward we may be able to take will be isolated, hard to preserve, and perhaps devalued in advance by both sides."

Following is the text of McFarlane's remarks:

Before long President Reagan will meet in Geneva with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev.

The meeting comes at an historic moment as measured by the enormity of change that has taken place in the West and the apparent potential for change in the East. In the past four years here in the United States, and more broadly in the west, we have experienced a political, economic and social renewal of historic proportion.

Four years ago we seemed paralyzed by the moral and institutional aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate; our economic problems seemed beyond our comprehension with solutions nowhere in site; the military balance had shifted dramatically against us and its effects were reflected in growing Soviet influence from Angola to Ethiopia to Indochina, Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Our alliances were severely shaken and leaders from London to Paris to Moscow were asking whether the United States had lost its way, and whether we could regain our ability to play a positive role of leadership in international affairs.



Today the picture is dramatically different. President Reagan has set our economy solidly on the road to recovery. Our foundation of strength is being restored. Soviet expansion has been checked and even rolled back on a tiny island in the Caribbean. In sum, America has regained its moorings; she is leading and peace is more secure.

On the Soviet side of the ledger, the picture is less clear; but surely the possibility for a more promising future exists. A new Soviet leader is in place -- a man unencumbered by the vicissitudes of primary elections and campaigns; and therefore a man who may endure through the turn of the century.

Here in the United States -- a nation of optimists led by the greatest optimist in our history -- we hope for the best. We are sobered by the knowledge that seldom has our optimism been vindicated. And yet it endures. But as we set out on what we hope will be a more promising period, we should proceed forthrightly, honestly stating both our purposes and our misgivings, hiding neither our hopes nor our fears.

This is a time of considerable flux and introspection in the Kremlin. They deserve to know from whence we are coming if they are to reach coherent decisions. Perhaps by stating some of our frustrations we can shape their thinking. That is my purpose today.

It's often said that the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union is close to immutable, and that our job is not to end it but merely to keep it under control. Some say that since 1945 there's been only one way to end it, and that it's too terrible to contemplate. But for many others, the inevitability of competition is not caused simply by the gruesome facts of the nuclear age. It has much deeper, older and -- as some see it -- even more ineradicable causes. For some, de Tocqueville's famous predictions 150 years ago have taken on a folkloric, if not intellectual legitimacy.

Anyone who works on the concrete issues dividing these countries knows that practical policy decisions are never made on the assumption that a fundamental change in Soviet-American relations is anywhere in sight. To the contrary, we have to take competition as a given and do the best that we can. But this should not become an excuse for not thinking about what is at the heart of our disagreements. I have studied, reflected and worked on international affairs for many years, and no one has ever convinced me that there is some law of nature requiring two populous and powerful nations halfway around the world from each other to be locked in permanent hostility. If they are hostile, it's probably for reasons other than their two-ness, their populousness, their powerfulness, or their distance from each other.

I think the real forces of conflict are things that can -- and do -- change. If there is a military rivalry between two great countries, it's caused less by the arms themselves than by the way the two sides think about military security. If there is a geopolitical rivalry, it's not caused by the facts of geography but by the way the two sides define their political security and their other interests. If there is a clash of ideas -- well, not even ideologies are permanent. Some political ideologies are a source of mere boundless energy and creativity, but others are true prisons, confining not only those who believe in them but many who don't. Nothing can hinder human energy and creativity like a bad idea. But, as I have said, it is our good fortune that ideas are not immortal. They are subject to what is sometimes called "reality therapy" -- the test of time and experience. Sometimes, with any luck, they can be cast off. Mental prison walls do come down. As rare as it seems in this century of institutionalized fanaticisms, people do change their mind.



We know from the statements of Soviet leaders that these days, many existing policies are getting especially close scrutiny. Certainly the test of time and experience has been a very harsh one. General Secretary Gorbachev himself recently called for "a fresh look at all the shortcomings, negative phenomena, all sorts of blunders." He made clear that reevaluation has been long deferred. In the future, in his words, "more order will be required, more scientific inquiry, more major important decisions, and so forth. Overall, it will require immense mobilization of creative forces, and the ability to restructure and conduct matters in the country in a new way, not only in the economy but also in the social sphere, and that of culture, ideology, and all spheres."

These seem like hopeful words, but perhaps you will agree that those of us in the West, on the outside, have a hard time knowing how to interpret them. We cannot know whether a process of comprehensive change is underway or not. In the past, the appearance of change has been no more than a mask behind which systemic rigidities endure. Each new leader -- however strongly he might favor change -- has found that having risen by following the rules of the system, he becomes captive to it. If such a process is beginning, it will be difficult to discern, we may or may not be able to make a contribution to it, and we cannot predict its outcome. But inasmuch as it does greatly affect us, it is certainly appropriate for us to suggest the kinds of questions that we will be asking about it -- the questions whose answers will make a large difference in our own policy. I assume that Soviet officials would also like to know our thinking as to what kinds of change would do the most to make Soviet-American relations more stable. We sometimes hear the Soviet complaints that they don't know what we're after, so let us be clear.

Let me begin with military issues. I have said that the wheels of military rivalry are not set in motion by arms themselves but by the thinking that governs the arms, by the political doctrines, decisions and interests that are reflected in the organization, shape and size of a military machine. In recent years many Soviet decisions have been quite troubling to us, suggesting an outlook on security issues that is very different from our own. By this I don't mean simply that Soviet military spending is so high -- although it is. But, that isn't what concerns me here. I want to call your attention to something different -- to decisions that resume or initiate competition in an area where there hadn't been any at all.

Take the case of chemical weapons. In this century, these weapons have created a revulsion and horror in western publics, second only to nuclear weapons. It was a horror, moreover, that our governments were able to act on quite successfully. The Geneva protocol of 1925 was for many years one of the most widely supported and observed arms control agreements on record. As a result, our own capabilities, stocks and training experienced a long decline. We haven't produced chemical weapons in 15 years. Unfortunately, this was not paralleled on the Soviet side, whose major efforts became impossible to ignore. For this reason, we have now proposed to modernize our own CW program. We'd rather not do this, and Congress also would rather not, and we've tried to head it off. In April 1984 President Reagan sent Vice President Bush to Geneva with proposals to negotiate a complete ban on chemical weapons, but since then the talks have not made progress.

This record suggests a specific question: what has the Soviet side gained from reviving this competition? Particularly now, as



chemical weapons are being made (cheaply) and used (lethally) by small countries, isn't it imperative that we find the verifiable controls?

I wish this were an isolated case. But we see the same pattern in the issue that dominated Soviet-American arms control talks, as well as public controversy, during the president's first term -- medium-range nuclear missiles. Again, a bit of history may be useful. You may know that over many years the United States scaled back its medium-range missile capabilities in Europe; the Soviets did not. During the fifties and sixties, many plans were developed within the Western alliance to counter the Soviet edge, but they were abandoned one after another, for a series of different reasons. A sense of urgency about the problem began to subside with the emergence of detente in the late 1960s. And the specifically military worry created by enlarged Soviet missile advantage was softened over time: The Soviet Union seemed to be letting its large, medium-range missiles grow old.

But then an odd thing happened. The Soviets began instead to add to their force, introducing the SS-20, one of the most formidable weapons ever fielded by the East. To make a long story short, the result was a NATO decision that, after all, these new Soviet deployments had to be answered. In 1983, after two fruitless years of trying to negotiate a solution to the INF problem, the West began to put its own missiles in place.

INF isn't in the headlines much these days, and there may be an analytical advantage in this. We now have a little distance on this sequence of events, and a responsibility to judge them critically. What happened? An East-West dispute took shape on an issue that some thought had gone away. Two questions come to mind that I still find hard to answer: What can the Soviet Union imagine that it got out of re-igniting this competition? What did it get out of several years of one-sided negotiating positions, premised on an expectation of Western disunity?

Finally, let me take up the military question that is in the headlines -- the relation between offensive and defensive strategic systems. As you may know, in 1972, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that neither side should build a defense against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has since built and maintained the defensive system around its capital allowed by the agreement; the United States has not. Both sides have pursued research, as the treaty permits; the Soviet research effort has been extremely large.

Now, while keeping strictly within the limits of the ABM Treaty, President Reagan has proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative, to re-investigate the feasibility of defenses. Two reasons above all others produced this decision -- first, the past decade's enormous ~~Soviet offensive buildup, which has put the survivability of our forces in question~~, and secondly, the president's desire to see whether the fragility of the nuclear balance can be reduced by moving us away from a ~~morally unsatisfactory doctrine of nuclear retaliation~~. As the president has said many times, this is one of the most hopeful possibilities of our time. We believe it could contribute to both sides' security, especially if we make progress in the Geneva arms talks. We have hopes in these talks to explore each side's thinking on how to stress strategic stability. But what has been the Soviet response? Soviet public statements, with which many of you will be familiar, simply propose something we believe is non-negotiable and non-verifiable -- a ban on research even as they pursue the largest research program on earth. And in a masterpiece ofchutzpah



they insist repeatedly that ours is a program designed to acquire a first-strike capability.

In short, we're having a lot of trouble establishing a real dialogue. And bearing in mind the other examples I've cited, we have to face some disturbing questions. Will the Soviet Union start to approach this matter as a potentially cooperative one or approach everything on a zero-sum basis? The other instances -- chemical and INF -- suggest that these all-or-nothing tactics don't serve the Soviets well.

Obviously, a great deal hangs on the answers to these questions. The president has committed himself to meet the Soviet Union halfway in developing responsible solutions to outstanding problems. I can restate that commitment today. But without some change in the Soviet approach to security issues, in fact in the thinking that underlies it, I fear that even incremental improvements will be extremely hard to reach. And they will be much less likely to gather momentum, to build on each other.

The issues of Soviet-American rivalry, of course, go beyond military matters. There is the critical question of how each side defines its interest in the world. Many in the West are looking for signs of change in the Soviet Union's thinking on international political issues. Some students of the problem argue that it is now what they call a "mature" power; that it is not guided by Lenin's old dictum, "The worse, the better;" that it is not so deeply driven by an ideological animus against the West; and that it need not leap at every opportunity to hamstring American policy for its own sake.

These would obviously be important changes. How should we decide whether they are true? Obviously, by practical measures. As these matters come to be discussed in Moscow, the Soviet leadership should know that we have practical measures like Afghanistan, Cuba and Libya in mind.

Take Afghanistan. Today 120,000 Soviet soldiers there are waging the most brutal war now underway on the face of the Earth. For what? It's not so easy to say. Some in the West believe that the Soviet Union instigated the 1978 communist coup that preceded the 1979 invasion. As you may know, Soviet officials and commentators always disassociate themselves from this, and explain that they had nothing to do with it. We can't know, but we can ask questions about Soviet policy to clarify its objectives.

If the Soviets truly propose to disassociate themselves from it, to indicate that they have no interest in fomenting such events, then why are 120,000 troops in Afghanistan protecting the small number of people who made that coup from the opposition of the Afghan people? Soviet officials say that they need a friendly Afghanistan on their border. We can perhaps understand this desire, but how was friendship to be built? Our proposition to the Soviet leadership is that their present policy is only increasing the Afghan people's hatred. Does the Soviet side have a non-military strategy for dealing with that problem? If so, they will find us ready to help put it in place.

Or take Libya. There are few, if any, governments today whose policy as a whole could be better described as, "the worse, the better." Colonel Qaddafi is an heir to that tradition of seeking to provoke or benefit from trouble and instability. That being the case, Americans have to ask some serious questions about Soviet support for him. A small example will suffice: With all the problems of terrorism in that part of the world, what good is served by providing Soviet submarines to Qaddafi? Or, given the war in the Persian Gulf,



troubled  
So far

which seems to drag on endlessly, what good is served by giving missiles to Colonel Qaddafi which then find their way to Iran and finally land in downtown Baghdad, the capital of a country that has a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union? Is this what friendship treaties mean? Americans are entitled to ask with utmost seriousness: If Soviet policy is not, "the worse, the better," then shouldn't the Soviet Union's relationship with Colonel Qaddafi be very different?

Finally, take Cuba. The price tag of Soviet support for Cuba is calculated by our experts as something like 5,000 million dollars a year. As a benchmark of sorts, that's about as much as we provide to Egypt and Israel combined -- and together their population is five times that of Cuba. This must be, in other words, a massively important commitment of Soviet policy. But what is it a commitment to? To us, frankly, it seems that the principal benefit is in the offensive purposes to which Cuba -- Cuban troops, Cuban advisors, Cuban bases -- can be put.

The record of Cuban policy in the past 10 years is an extraordinary one, and it is all the more extraordinary because it did not have to be this way. For the first 10 years or so after the missile crisis of 1962 Cuba was not a major irritant in Soviet-American relations. Now it is. Its military personnel are in the thick of wars on two continents, and despite international pressures from many directions, show no signs of returning home. The pattern is something like what I sketched in talking about chemical weapons, or missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union has reignited a source of conflict. Has it benefited by doing so? We hope this question is being asked in Moscow.

There should be no doubt about the ability of the United States to deal with these difficulties when they are placed in our way. That's not the issue. Naturally, we have to pay more attention to the security of Pakistan than we did some years ago, but we can do it. Similarly, we now have to pay more attention to the security of El Salvador than we used to, but we can manage that, too. And we don't look the other way at the problems that Libya creates for neighboring countries, among them some good friends of the United States.

The question that remains, however, concerns the broader impact of all this on Soviet-American relations and whether this is the impact that the Soviet side wants. It certainly sends us loud messages that can't be ignored about the motivations of Soviet policy. It makes improvements in other areas more difficult. It all but guarantees that any small steps forward that we may be able to take will be isolated, hard to preserve, and perhaps be valued in advance by both sides.

None of this, I might add, is much changed by hearing from the Soviet side of their responsibility to help other "socialist" countries. For us, of course, that comes down to helping other governments oppress their people. We believe that Soviet-style socialism has brought hardship to and restricted the potential of many great nations. That is our deeply held view. No doubt the Soviet leadership disagrees, but let's not leave the matter there. I hope they will at least ponder a different question. That is, whether such Soviet involvements can be justified even in their own terms. Here in the West, for example, we remember General Secretary Andropov's comments about the difference between building socialism and merely proclaiming it.

We hope that such skepticism can be a source of doubt about whether the Soviet policies I've been describing have really served their interests.



So far, I have dealt with the political-military issues that trouble our relations. They almost always dominate the agenda of problems between us. They are what our negotiators focus on. There are many more issues I could touch on -- from Poland to nuclear proliferation. But, as important as all these are, they are not the area in which the most momentous changes could take place. Frankly, the most durable and far-reaching kind of improvement in Soviet-American relations -- and probably in the Soviet Union's relations with almost every country of the world -- would be created by events inside the Soviet Union.

When Americans raise the issue of human rights with Soviet officials, they know what to expect. It is the Soviet position that we are treading on, quote, "internal matters." The Soviet side, by now, is also quite accustomed to what we usually say in return -- that many of these matters involve commitments made in the Helsinki Final Act. We're talking about obligations that the Soviet Union freely assumed.

This is an important point. Treaties signed have to be taken seriously. But it's not the main reason Americans take an interest in human rights and democracy. And the reason isn't just that we believe in morality in politics. Or that our hearts go out to Soviet Jews who wish to emigrate, and can't. No -- it's that real progress in that direction would have a fundamental effect on the international system, on the way we do business with each other.

When President Reagan was in China in April 1984, he gave a speech that must surely rank as one of the most candid ever made by a leader visiting a country with a different political system. He put his message simply: "Trust the people." For us, the meaning of a phrase like that is obvious, but many of the ideologies of the 20th century rest on suspicion of the people, on the conviction that they cannot handle their own affairs. Since that's the case, let me say briefly what trusting the people means in practical terms. Let's leave aside sentiments and turn to some specifics. What can the people do if they are trusted?

First, only the people can revolutionize agricultural productivity. All other approaches are hopelessly irrelevant. Over 20 years ago, the communist party of the Soviet Union accused the Chinese party of believing that "if a people walks in rope sandals and eats watery soup out of a common bowl -- that is communism." No such sarcastic accusation could be made today. In the past seven years, agricultural productivity in China has actually doubled. And Prime Minister Gandhi, during his recent visit here, spoke to us of the gains made in Indian agriculture through increased incentives. Today India is a net exporter of grain. How? The people have done it.

Second, only the people can lead the scientific-technological revolution. They are leading it in those countries enjoying the most rapid economic growth today. No ministry of central planning can lead it. In the United States, the watchword of change in the structure of our economy is decentralization -- the spectacular growth of new companies offering new products in a field like information technology. In the speech in China that I just quoted, President Reagan said, "Make no mistake: those who ignore this vital truth will condemn their countries to fall farther and farther behind..."

Finally, only the people can invigorate national culture. I mean culture in both the low- and the high-brow sense. I mean, as it happens, both the entertainment and the enlightenment that are captured by the term "Chautauqua." I mean arts and letters, music and



film. Only the people can build national self-heightened esteem and self-heightened expression out of malaise. No ministry of culture can do it.

Now every people will perform these tasks in its own way. Cultures come out differently. For all the changes underway, China remains distinctly Chinese and recognizably socialist. But, in every case, to succeed at the tasks I've mentioned, the people have the same basic needs. They need to make more of their own decisions, they need to act on their own brainstorm, they need to be able to learn from each other, they need to know the basic facts of their own economic and social life. They need to shake off an institutionalized secrecy that the rest of the world finds absurd and self-defeating. They need to know simple things, like the size of last year's wheat harvest, and big things, like what's going on in the world at large. They need to be able to leave, if they want. If they are denied all these, they cannot do very much at all.

To the Soviet leadership, I would say that these things are not our romantic ideals. Rather, they are the practical requirements of some of your own goals. And of one of our goals as well, for they are the key to transforming East-West relations.

In conclusion, let me return to the practical perspective with which I began: we don't plan policy in the expectation of transforming East-West relations. We seek incremental improvements, and we don't dismiss their value. The Soviet leadership should know that President Reagan is ready -- patiently, methodically -- to take small steps forward, and that we will respond in proportion to what we see from them.

But at this time of questioning in the Soviet Union, it seems to me that we should ask more of ourselves and of the Soviet side as well. We should recognize that those who seek only small improvements often end up with none. We know cosmetic improvements when we see them, and we know the meaning and the value of major change. We should ask those questions and insist on the answers that point the way.

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Transcript by  
JAMES LEE of:

PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY,  
SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, IN HELSINKI, ON THURSDAY,  
AUGUST 1, 1985

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FOREIGN SECRETARY

Good morning. In 1975, 10 years ago, high expectations were aroused by the Helsinki Final Act. Ten years on, these expectations have been largely disappointed. So what is the significance of today's anniversary?

Britain's view is that the Helsinki Final Act and the process that it set in motion continue to occupy a central position in European affairs and East-West relations. The Final Act has in many respects not been implemented. Human rights continue to be widely abused in the East. But that only emphasises the importance of keeping the Final Act before us as a blueprint for the conduct of relations between States; as a charter for cooperation and contacts between peoples; and as a benchmark by which the behaviour of all governments can be judged.

Thanks to Helsinki, human rights and humanitarian issues have become a permanent and legitimate topic of discussion in the East-West dialogue, and that is an asset not to be lightly discarded. It is one to which I attached particular value during my recent visits to Eastern Europe.

So Britain regards the anniversary as an occasion to



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renew the commitment made by the 35 signatory powers ten years ago. Steady, sustained, patient pressure must continue if that commitment is to be honoured.

Much work remains to be done to improve implementation in all three of the so-called "baskets".

The Final Act brings together the full agenda of East-West relations: political dialogue, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, confidence-building in the military sphere, contacts between individuals. But more than that, it expresses truths that lie at the foundation of any lasting improvement in East-West relations: first, that security cannot be separated from other aspects of relations; second, that mutual understanding will not grow without a free flow of ideas and people in both directions; and third, that the European continent is not so much one of governments, as of individual human beings.

These thoughts have been in my mind at the many meetings I have held in the last 48 hours with distinguished representatives of the CSCE powers. Of course, they have included Mr. Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, whom I met earlier this morning. This was our first meeting. I was glad of the opportunity to offer him personally my congratulations on his appointment. We had a relaxed and useful meeting and I hope it will have advanced our mutual understanding on a number of international issues as well as on the prospects for cooperation between our two countries.

At this first meeting, I thought it was important particularly to emphasise Britain's search for a steady, sustained improvement in bilateral relations; the West's sincerity in working



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for greater security through balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, the need for a marked improvement in human rights. Without that, it will be difficult to engage the support of our public opinion in the search for better East-West relations.

I look forward to continuing the dialogue with Mr. Shevardnadze at the UN General Assembly in New York later this year and in due course in London.

Obviously, finally, I would like to take this chance of thanking our Finnish hosts for the warmth of their hospitality and congratulating them on the model efficiency of the arrangements they have made.

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JOHN DICKIE ("DAILY MAIL")

Secretary of State, after your meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, do you think we can look forward to a new chapter of better relations and, to quote a well-known prime minister, do you think Mr. Shevardnadze is a man you can do business with?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think that my meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze follows very naturally in sequence with the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Britain last Christmas. I think that we were able to establish that we could have sensible, practical, useful discussions with each other, and I look forward to those playing their part in a steady improvement of our bilateral relationship on a stable basis.

QUESTION

Sir Geoffrey, do you think this conference and the bilateral meetings during these last few days in Helsinki has increased security and the means of cooperation in Europe?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think that it has been very valuable to have Foreign Ministers of the 35 signatory powers here together, together seeking to reaffirm the original commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and taking advantage of opportunities to meet each other bilaterally. I think all that will certainly have contributed



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to improved prospects for greater security for all our peoples.

QUESTION ("THE GUARDIAN")

(very difficult to hear!) Two questions. First, did the Soviet Foreign Minister set a date for coming to London? Secondly, what can you tell me about the.....

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Three. Take that first. I left the NATO breakfast shortly after it started in order to be sure of being on time to meet Mr. Shevardnadze, so you will have to seek elsewhere for conclusions, but I had the strawberries!

On the first one, the date of the visit by Mr. Shevardnadze to the United Kingdom, that is something that will be arranged through diplomatic channels. We did not embark on a discussion of each other's diaries, but he is plainly looking forward to coming.

On the second one, the European Community discussion last night led to agreed conclusions to which I have nothing to add.

QUESTION

Sir Geoffrey, what was the British stand on the question of the final communique?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

The final communique was a document on which we were able to agree with all our colleagues.



QUESTION (SAME MAN)

I mean the Finnish draft proposals for a document.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I am sorry! You are talking about a different meeting!

We took the view that although it is always agreeable to reach agreed conclusions in documentary form if you can, that it would not have been a constructive contribution to these proceedings if we had actually set about that search here. I think we could readily have agreed on the communique identifying those who had attended. If we had sought to extend it beyond that, we might have had a less useful and constructive meeting than we have in fact had.

QUESTION (SAME MAN)

Did you object to any particular points in the Finnish draft?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I did not actually seriously apply myself to the consideration of a draft. I think that if all 35 of us had set about doing that, it would have been a less useful meeting than it was.

QUESTION

Mr. Shultz is reported to feel a certain exasperation at the fact that the Soviets have been leaking certain ideas, proposals, suggestions, .... <sup>cutting</sup> (~~touching?~~) nuclear missiles and in the corridors of Geneva and to certain third parties without putting them on the table during the talks. Is this something



QUESTION (CONTD.)

that you share and have the Soviets in any forum suggested any of these proposals for 25%, 30% or even greater cuts in nuclear missiles to you?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I do not think one could claim in today's world, with the attentiveness of you and your colleagues, that any capital or any society is free from the risk of proposals leaking out in an unintentional fashion. I think that the important thing is that proposals should be seriously discussed with a view to reaching agreement on a credible, effective, confident basis, and that whatever may leak or be said publicly or for public consumption, the key thing is that serious negotiations should be taking place between those responsible for the negotiations. That is why we were so glad that the Geneva talks were resumed at the beginning of this year; that is why we are glad that there is going to be a meeting between President and Mr. Gorbechev later on.

The most important thing is that those taking part in those talks should have the opportunity of knowing that they will be preparing for them seriously with a view to reaching agreed conclusions.

QUESTION (INAUDIBLE)

FOREIGN SECRETARY

It is very hard, is it not, for anyone to be asked to convey a personal impression after less than an hour's discussion?



FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think that it was possible for us to have the kind of discussion which can be the foundation of much fuller and more useful discussions further on, later on. The atmosphere was, as I said in my original statement, relaxed and we were able to discuss in that short time serious issues across the table usefully. I look forward to many more meetings of a more extended kind.

BOB MORTNER ("FINANCIAL TIMES")

What did Mr. Shevardnadze say to you? What were the main points he made to you?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

My custom is normally to tell conferences of this kind what I have said to my opposite number, rather than the reverse, and I think that I shall only depart a limited extent from that quite useful rule.

I think the effect of the discussion was to confirm our view that there was great value to be derived from further meetings of this kind; that the discussions that took place when Mr. Gorbachev was in London were in themselves useful; that the talks that Mr. Gromyko and I had had on many occasions have also been useful in helping to understand each other; and that there is therefore a lot more value to be secured from further meetings of this kind.

QUESTION

(inaudible)



FOREIGN SECRETARY

Again, I think it is actually pressing interrogation beyond the point of courtesy to invite me to offer for you a profile of someone who is recently appointed to a most important position.

I got the impression - and no-one will be surprised by this - that Mr. Shevardnadze is addressing himself seriously and sincerely to the important issues that are of interest to all of us. It was possible for us to have a discussion which made effective use of the limited time available to us, and suggests that further meetings of that kind would be useful.

QUESTION (REUTERS)

If I could just go on from that. Was it substantially different dealing with Mr. Shevardnadze than with Mr. Gromyko?

Secondly, how did he react to your points on human rights?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

On your second point, he reacted, when I raised specific cases as I did of Sheransky(phon) and Sakharov (phon.) as illustrations of cases of that kind, by saying that they were matters for the enforcement and application of customary Soviet procedures.

On your more general question, it is manifest that Mr. Shevardnadze is not Mr. Gromyko and each person approaches this important task in his own way.



JOHN MILLER (VERY HARD TO HEAR!)

Do you think the Russians give a damn about our protests and...cases and so on and so forth....but is there anything that the West can really do to make an impression upon on them and to change.....is there anything the West can really do .....

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think that is the most important way, obviously, in which we can continue to press this point and go on pressing it we shall. Those of you in this room recognise that the instruments which you have at your disposal are words - spoken words, printed words, written words - and you would not be doing the job you are if you did not think there was some point in deploying words in that way.

The Helsinki Final Act, as I said in my statement, lays a foundation for the legitimacy of this debate, which we shall continue to press. It is important, not just for the sake of the human beings concerned with the deprivation of human rights; it is important if we are to secure a growth in confidence and understanding which is essential to a real lasting, sustained, improvement of East-West relations. So we shall go on pressing it at conferences of this kind, privately, and tenaciously, and I think we are justified in doing that in the same way as you are pressing your points in the same fashion.

QUESTION (INAUDIBLE)



FOREIGN SECRETARY

Well, we are of the same view as a number of other countries, that economic sanctions have not been shown by experience to be effective; are not, we believe, likely to be effective in this case. We share passionately the view that apartheid is an evil foundation for a system of government; one that one cannot defend. We wish to see it changed. We wish to secure progress in that direction as quickly as possible to secure a better prospect for all the peoples of South Africa. But we do not believe that we are more likely to advance that process by the application of economic sanctions.

NICHOLAS ASHWOOD ("THE TIMES")\*

Having seen both Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze on this visit, do you get any sense of real progress at the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think it is very important that nobody should have unduly high expectations on any single meeting at whatever level. I think it is important for any single meeting of that kind to be well prepared and seriously prepared, and I believe that both Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze are approaching that important meeting in that way. So I believe that provided nobody has unduly high expectations, provided people regard that meeting as an important stepping stone towards the enhancement of confidence, then I think it is being approached in exactly that fashion.



GERRY (???)

....US-Soviet relations are improving.....

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think that the US-Soviet relations over some months now have been setting themselves on a course towards gradual improvement. I think that the enhancement of that relationship, the improvement of confidence which is the framework in which progress can be made on issues on substance, is bound to be a long-term business at which both sides have to keep applying...to which both sides have to go on applying themselves patiently and tenaciously. I am sure the United States is doing that and I believe that is securing a response that will help that process forward.

QUESTION (VERY FAINT)

Talking about your meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze, you said it was in the spirit of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev rather than in the spirit of your own previous meetings with Mr. Gromyko. Do you think that there is a kind of new team in charge now in Moscow that is taking a different tack in these bilateral discussions with Western leaders, perhaps less confrontational, less lecturing, more easy, friendly discussion? What is the difference in tone, or am I mistaken here?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think that the essential case being presented is that of the Soviet Union as we have come to know and understand it and when Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Gorbachev were serving together, as



FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONTD.)

they were, they were presenting the Soviet Union's view of the world and of the future. So now, Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze are doing so, but I think that it is right to say that there is bound to be a difference in personality and style as the baton is passed on from one generation to another.

QUESTION

...discussions this morning, whether you noted any shift whatsoever in any of their positions?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think it would be difficult to press that analysis too far if one contemplates the many hours of discussion that I had with Mr. Gromyko compared with the much shorter time that I had with Mr. Shevardnadze, but I think the essence of their position is the same, but I believe that the relationship between their position and ours is something where we are capable of achieving an advance and an improvement.

I think that this meeting can be seen as one more step in that road towards better relations. So it seemed to me to be a progressive relationship, about which nobody should have unduly high expectations, but where it is of some value that the relationship is improving and moving forward.

DAVID ADAMS ("DAILY TELEGRAPH")

.....South Africa seems to indicate a slight shift in his position. Do you anticipate any further shifts as a result



QUESTION (CONTD.)

of the Foreign Ministers meeting .....discuss South Africa?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think the fact about South Africa is that as each week goes by, as each month goes by, different things happen. There have been some events since we last met amongst the Ten in Brussels last week and in light of that, we have asked for the kind of appraisal and report to be before us at our next meeting. It is much too early to conclude whether there will be any change at all at that time.

Our essential position remains the same. We want to promote within South Africa the kind of dialogue which was commended in our conclusions last night, which we believe is essential if the prospects in that country are to improve in the way in which we all wish. We shall have to wait and see.

QUESTION

I would just like to follow up on my own question. You referred to a difference in style as the baton is passed from one generation to the next. How would you contrast the style of this generation with the style of the last one?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I think you are pressing me too far on an occasion of this kind! You have had opportunities yourselves to see the people concerned and you may make your own judgments. I shall look forward to reading them!



QUESTION

What kind of future can you see ahead for the CSE...can you imagine that Secretaries of State will be meeting from 9 to 5 saying that they are .....

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Well the CSE process includes various components doesn't it? There is the Stockholm meeting which is itself important, where we hope there will be progress towards conclusions on confidence-building measures.

I think on the much longer-term, wider approach to CSE, I hope very much that Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of State will be meeting not only here in Helsinki but in other places, not just 10 years, but 5 years, 2 years, one year's time, because the whole process of creating the kind of confidence that is essential if we are to live together more peacefully with less confrontation over the years ahead, must depend upon continued and improving contact of this kind.

So I cannot tell you precisely what form it will take 10 years out. The agenda will remain the same. We shall go on pressing for progress on every part of that agenda, including human rights.

QUESTION

Mr.

Could you be more precise about whether/Shevardnadze has agreed to come this year....and secondly.....

(inaudible)



FOREIGN SECRETARY

As far as the date is concerned, Mr. Shevardnadze has accepted or re-accepted the invitation which I renewed to him on his succession to Mr. Gromyko.

There is no conclusion about the date and I think you would hardly expect that when he must be looking at a substantial list of engagements in what must be a very busy diary, but we shall be establishing that in the ordinary way.

As far as the South African question is concerned, it was thought useful for us to secure the advice of our Ambassadors in the context of the particular meeting of the Political Committee and it is for that reason that we are inviting them to come to consultation with us.

QUESTION

As a result of all your talks here, are you now convinced that the Russians are perhaps more ready now to negotiate a better means of living with the West than they were say six months ago?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I believe that there is, on all sides, an increasing realisation of the need for us to seek progress in that direction and I think that over the last 6/9 months we have been moving forward in the right direction rather than moving backwards, but I choose my words very carefully because I do not want in any sense to give you or anybody else the impression that the world is in sight of a dramatic transformation of conditions that have existed for



FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONTD.)

a long time, but that the world is trying to move in the direction of that kind of change I think is the case.

JOHN ALLISON

...not resist the suggestion that our ambassador should be recalled from South Africa on the basis that we could perfectly well get his opinions on the situation down there without bringing him back here?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Our ambassador is not being recalled from South Africa in that sense of the word and we adhere to our own view that at a time like this in particular it is important that our ambassador should be continuing to represent Britain and our views in South Africa.

But in the context of a general consideration of this kind within the Community as a whole, we found it possible to agree that it made sense to bring him in for consultation for the purposes of that meeting, but he will remain representing the views of the British Government in South Africa.

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← W relating



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

US/Soviet Summit

I want to give the  
 FCO a steer on the  
 work they should be doing  
 between now & the  
 early autumn, to  
 prepare your message to  
 President Reagan on the  
US/Soviet Summit.

Agree to attached  
 letter, which I would send?

LS Miller... (C.D.)  
 Tharbyson  
 not





hws

My  
CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET

31 July 1985

*From the Private Secretary*

Dear Sir,

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

The Prime Minister has now on several occasions told the US Administration that we shall be letting them have our thoughts on the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit. Although we have not said when we shall do so, a sensible target date would be the middle of October.

I am sure that the Prime Minister will in due course want to hold a discussion of the views that we might put forward. This is unlikely to be practicable before the second half of September, so I think it would be useful to have a preliminary draft of a substantial message on paper for the Americans by then which could form the basis of discussion at a meeting. You will certainly have ideas on what this should cover. My suggestions are:-

- i) there should be an introductory section on Mr Gorbachev himself, based on the Prime Minister's experience of him here. This could contain some suggestions on how to handle him.
- ii) this would be a lead in to our analysis of what we expect the Soviet Union's aims to be at the Summit and the various tactical ploys which they will use in support of these aims, in particular to influence public opinion in Europe.
- iii) the most important section would then deal with what we suggest that United States' aims at the Summit should be. The main message here would be that we acknowledge that there will be no substantial agreements prepared in advance for signature at the Summit. Equally, a getting-to-know-you meeting alone will not be enough to satisfy public opinion, at least in Europe, that the United States has made a serious effort to achieve some forward movement in East/West relations. The Summit must give a specific impetus to negotiations on a wide range of

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


issues, above all on arms control. This means not just to the Geneva negotiations, but to negotiations on chemical weapons, on a test ban and perhaps also on MBFR.

- iv) there might then be a separate section on the handling of the Strategic Defence Initiative in the context of the Summit. This is obviously delicate ground. The sort of ideas which we have trailed since the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in February - reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, an agreement on permitted research within the Treaty, reductions in offensive weapons and provision for formal review of the offence/defence balance after a fixed period - have received no specific US response (in part because we have never fully deployed them). We may just want to put them forward again. But we might also consider whether we want to encourage the Americans to put some slightly more radical proposals to the Russians, covering for instance deep cuts in offensive missiles combined with limited deployment of a strategic defence system by both sides.
- v) next would be any points we want to put to the Americans on regional issues (Middle East) or more general problems (Jewish emigration).
- vi) finally there might be a section on how we suggest the Alliance be handled to assure the maximum degree of solidarity at the time of the Summit.

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It would be helpful to have a draft covering these points and others by the time of the Prime Minister's return from the Middle East.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PART 4 ends:-

Washington Tel 1991 29.85

PART 5 begins:-


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~~FCO Press Conference 1.8.85~~



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