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PREM 19/1544

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PROPOSED VISIT TO UK OF
MR. TAJA RAMADHAN, DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER OF IRAQ AND PROPOSED
VISIT OF HIS SUCCESSOR: TARIQ AZIZ

IRAQ.

NOVEMBER 1987

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
25.11.81							
14.1.82.							
9.3.82.							
17.1.83							
15.1.83							
20.1.83							
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30.9.83							
6.10.83							
7.10.83							
4.12.85							

PREM 19/1544

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SUBJECT CC MASTER.

JAI ACY

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CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 December 1985

Dear Peter,

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
OF IRAQ**

The Prime Minister met the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq this morning. Mr Tariq Aziz was accompanied by Mr al-Haddawi and by the Iraqi Ambassador in London. HM Ambassador Baghdad was also present.

The Prime Minister greeted Mr Tariq Aziz as a very welcome visitor to Britain. Mr Tariq Aziz said that he brought regards from President Saddam Hussain, who had asked him to stress the importance which he attached to strengthening the bilateral relations between Britain and Iraq. Iraq was well satisfied with the results of the recent visit to London by the Minister of Trade. They would like to see political contacts given the same priority.

Iran-Iraq War

Mr Tariq Aziz said that the war was not just a matter of concern to Iraq and Iran. It carried grave dangers for the whole region, particularly for the Gulf. Iraq was confident of its ability to defend itself but would like to see western countries taking a more direct interest in efforts to find a solution to the conflict. He appreciated the position taken by the British Government. The most pressing need was to get across to the Iranians the wider dangers of a continuing conflict and the penalties for their own people. The Iranians were not prepared to negotiate and constantly set absurd preconditions. Iraq was ready to talk either directly or indirectly to Iran and to use whatever channels of mediation appeared to offer the best prospects of success. But Iraq felt that other Governments were not making the political effort required to bring pressure on Iran to negotiate.

The Prime Minister said that we felt frustrated. Appeals to Iran appeared to have little effect. We had

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terminated the supply of weapons to Iran and even the supply of items which might possibly have a military application. Nonetheless Iran was continuing to receive weapons through Libya and Syria. We constantly raised the issue of the Iran-Iraq war in international meetings. It would be helpful to have a more precise idea of what particular action the Iraqi Government would like us to take.

Mr Tariq Aziz said that this was a subject on which the two Governments could exchange views. He would follow it up with the Foreign Secretary and officials. The basic need was for more political pressure on Iran. He was convinced that pressure on Iran would produce results in the long term. People in Iran were sensitive to external opinion. Iraq appreciated the efforts which Britain had made towards limiting the flow of weapons to Iran and was acting through the Soviet Union to stop supplies from Libya, Syria and North Korea.

The Prime Minister asked whether Iraq expected a further Iranian offensive. Mr Tariq Aziz thought that military operations against Iraq were largely a function of domestic political developments in Iran. There appeared to be instead difficulties at present, which made a new offensive more likely. But Iraq would succeed in crushing any attack. The Prime Minister referred to the support which Iraq received from the Gulf states. Mr Tariq Aziz observed that the Gulf States knew that, if Iraq were to lose the war, it would be doomsday for them.

The Prime Minister enquired about progress with the new oil pipeline through Saudi Arabia. Mr Tariq Aziz said that the first phase had been finished and exports through it were now running at 350 thousand bpd. The main pipeline would take another two years to complete and would enable Iraq to export 1.7 million bpd. There was also agreement with the Turkish Government to increase the capacity of the pipeline through Turkey to 1.5 million bpd by late 1986 or early 1987. He referred to the sad lack of responsibility shown by the Syrian Government in shutting the pipeline through Syria. Syria was the odd man out in the region.

Smith and Hagger

The Prime Minister said that she wished to raise the cases of Mr Smith and Mr Hagger. Both men had served sentences which seemed to British public opinion to be unfairly long in relation to the offences they had committed. These offences did not involve violence, as was the case with Salem Hassan, who had been convicted of murder. We very much hoped that President Sadam Hussain would consider clemency for Mr Smith and Mr Hagger.

Mr Tariq Aziz said that he would report the Prime Minister's remarks to President Sadam Hussain. Although the cases were not similar to that of Salem Hassan from the legal and technical point of view, Iraq also had to take account of popular feelings. It would not be understood if Mr Smith and Mr Hagger were to be released without any kind

of development in the situation of Salem Hassan. He was not proposing anything specific and recognised the sensitivity of the issue. But it would be helpful if representatives of both governments were to meet to discuss possible human and legal solutions. The Prime Minister said that there was no comparison between the two cases and therefore no scope for bargaining. Salem Hassan had been convicted of terrorist murder. Mr Tariq Aziz said that Iraq was strongly opposed to violence. The Prime Minister repeated that she hoped that Mr Tariq Aziz would convey her strong appeal to President Sadam Hussain.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), John Mogg (Department of Trade and Industry) and to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office).

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1985

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister: 11 am, 4 December

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister for the above call.

FCO officials held talks in Stockholm on 28 November on the UN Secretary-General's mediation proposals and the planned visit by the Swedish Political Director Mr Eliasson (appointed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr Olof Palme) to Tehran in December to explore the current attitudes of the parties. The briefing takes into account Mr Eliasson's latest thinking on the attitudes of the two parties.

On a separate point, the Iraqi Minister of Trade, Mr Hassan Ali, claimed when he met the Prime Minister that the Iraqi Government have already made their "gesture" on Mr Smith and Mr Hagger by commuting death sentences to ones of life imprisonment. This is not factually correct. Messrs Smith and Hagger were not sentenced to death. Either he misread his brief, or he may have meant to say that either man could have received the death sentence as the maximum penalty for their crimes.

As we agreed on the telephone, the following will be present at the call in addition to Mr Tariq Aziz:

HE Mr Abdul Jabbar Younis al-Haddawi; Ambassador and Head of First International Dept, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

HE Dr Abdul Amir al-Anbari; Iraqi Ambassador in London

Mr Terence Clark, HM Ambassador, Baghdad.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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Posten und Fernverkehrsbüro

London W. 1 A. 1985





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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
AND FOREIGN MINISTER, MR TARIQ AZIZ:

WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER

OUR OBJECTIVES

- a) To impress on Iraqis that Parliament will not permit our relations to improve further so long as Smith and Hagger remain in prison. Confirm we shall never accept link between Salem Hassan and Smith/Hagger.

- b) To emphasise British impartiality in the Iran/Iraq conflict and support for peace moves.

ARGUMENTS

- a) Economic and political relations show improvement. But Smith and Hagger problem will not go away. Continued press, public and parliamentary interest - because of long sentences. Not critical of Iraqi justice but scope for humanitarian act or amnesty? Hagger case is a

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time-bomb in media terms. Could undo at a stroke all improvement in Anglo/Iraqi relations.

b) Britain supports any realistic method of working towards peace. Full support for UN Secretary General's good offices. Acknowledge Iraq's willingness to enter peace process. Recognise difficulties of Iranian intransigence. But how can progress be made in the face of this Iranian attitude? How do Iraqis see internal Iranian scene?

TACTICAL ARGUMENTS

a) Smith. Understand seriousness of corruption offence in Iraq. Not all sentenced were hanged; some were released. Possibility of shortening Smith's sentence? He has done six hard years.

Hagger. Agree espionage serious; But Hagger not a spy. An old fantasiser whose mental health giving us increasing cause for concern. Request Iraqis accept examination by psychiatrists (perhaps jointly by British as well as Iraqi experts: we should like an outside opinion).

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:

b) Secretary General's 8 point proposals still offer best prospect for negotiations. New initiatives from outside powers not appropriate while Secretary General's proposals on the table.

c) Secretary General's special representative, Olof Palme, sending his Political Director (Eliasson) back to Tehran 8-12 December. We are in close touch with the Swedes (and Americans). Eliasson briefed FCO representative in Stockholm on 29 November. Mr Palme coming to London ¹⁶ December and will give us his view on how best to move forward in light of Eliasson's contacts in Tehran. Swedes have considerable experience of handling Iranians. Main aim is to develop linkage between a ceasefire and step by step proposals as set out in United Nations Secretary General's 8 points.

THEIR OBJECTIVES

a) To maintain demands for Salem Hassan's release as a condition of Smith and Hagger's freedom. Possibly to seek a deal over three Iraqis arrested at Eastleigh: ie a new link rather than the old one.

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b) To ensure conflict with Iran is not forgotten. Some Iraqis believe only solution is through wider internationalisation - hence attacks in Gulf. To obtain condemnation of Iran by UK, as Permanent Member of Security Council; or at least our agreement to come out openly against Iran in due course.

c) To get HMG to agree to a total ban on defence sales to Iran.

OUR RESPONSE

a) No deal. Would be a total compromise of British and Iraqi policy. Iraq, like us, rejects terrorist acts - President Saddam Hussein's letter to President Reagan underlined Iraqi position. Murder of Iraqi Airline manager in Nicosia. No-one is safe if terrorists allowed to operate without constraint. Urge Aziz to accept difference in kind between crime committed by Hassan and those of Smith and

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Hagger. Iraq's image as opponent of terrorism damaged if Iraqis maintain link between Salem Hassan and Smith and Hagger.

Eastleigh Three (if pressed)

3 Iraqis arrested at Eastleigh Airport have a case to answer. Still sub judice. Not possible for HMG to intervene.

b) UK is working behind the scenes to find common ground between parties. As UN Security Council Permanent Member, open criticism of either party to conflict not likely to produce solution. Condemnation of Iran will not result in willingness to negotiate, which must be our main objective. Give Swedes a clear run, at least for the next few weeks to see if they can come up with new proposals. Must avoid cutting across Eliasson's activities.

c) UK defence equipment supplies to Iran minimal. Strictly controlled. Do not enhance Iranian military capability. No equipment to either side which might prolong or exacerbate the conflict. UK policy poses no threat to Iraq, which is extremely well armed (in part by ourselves) but bears heavily on Iran.



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CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
FOREIGN MINISTER, MR TARIQ AZIZ: WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER

REFERENCES: A. Defence Sales. Individual contracts.
B. UN Secretary General's 8 point proposals.

BACKGROUND

1. Prime Minister last met Tariq Aziz during visit of
Arab League Delegation in May 1985.

a) Smith and Hagger. Prime Minister aware of general
background.

Recently Smith and Hagger cases have been re-examined in
light of arrest at Eastleigh of 3 Iraqis (includes 2
Army Officers) now awaiting trial on charges of criminal
arson. FCO officials suggested to Home Office on 17
October that Home Secretary might consider exercising
discretionary powers to deport Iraqis, before or after
trial, as a lever to secure Smith and Hagger's release.
Home Secretary has examined all options carefully but has
ruled out repatriation, remission of sentences, use of

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Royal Prerogative and deportation before trial. Has indicated possibility of deportation after sentence served, with prospect of early return of accused (particularly if they were to plead guilty). Likely to be of limited appeal to the Iraqis and unlikely by itself to sway them over Smith and Hagger.

Iraqis will probably continue to draw parallel with Salem Hassan. We must resist; try to delink. If they drop the link with Hassan, they may try to establish a new link with some or all of the Eastleigh three. Iraqi Embassy implicated but not clear if Iraqi Government knew. Trial date not yet set.

Hagger's mental balance may be deteriorating, but he remains physically fit. Concept of near 70 year old suffering in Iraqi jail a gift to the British press if he gets ill or dies in prison.

b) Stalemate in conflict continues. Iraqis eager for solution but no clear or consistent strategy. Hoping to force Iran to negotiate through military and economic pressures but attacks on Kharg now less

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frequent. Iran's oil exports back to normal. Attacks on Iranian economic targets unlikely to be sufficiently damaging to force Iranians to negotiate. Mediation efforts continue via UN. Secretary General's Representative Prime Minister Olof Palme is sending Mr Eliasson (Political Director of the Swedish MFA) to Tehran 8-12 December to explore the current Iranian position in detail. His aim is not to discuss the United Nations Secretary General's 8 points (Annex) - which the Swedes claim a hand in drafting - but to test Iranian pre-conditions for movement, eg possibilities for further Security Council action on CW, exchange of prisoners, or cessation of attacks on civilian targets; also possible attraction of a commission of enquiry into the origins of the war. Eliasson/Palme see this as a long term exercise, to draw the Iranians into talks with a third party in the hope that changes in the conflict and pressure on the Iranian economy will create opportunities for movement in 1986. Australians have also been active during November Presidency of Security Council but without apparent success. Iran believes Security Council is biased against it.

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c) Iraqis constantly seeking to put UK on spot about defence sales to Iran, particularly on small number of contracts recently fulfilled eg vehicle spares supplied under old contracts. Their wilder claims (boats, helicopter plants etc) are nonsense. (Annex for list). UK support for Iraq is implicit in quantity of defence equipment supplied to Iraq since war began in 1980; and in presence of 100 Iraqis who attended military training courses in UK last year. Pilots, aeronautical engineers also being trained.

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REF ID: A66317
The UN Secretary General's eight point plan to the Iranian and Iraqi representatives in Geneva in late March. He put the same points forward during his discussions in Tehran and Baghdad in early April. The text of these points has not been made public but is as follows:

- (1) The prime goal is the cessation of hostilities and proposals are therefore made for "global arrangements" to deal with the underlying questions, in accordance with a set timetable as preliminary steps thereto.
- (2) A restoration of the moratorium on attacks on civilian targets.
- (3) Cessation of threats against civilian aircraft.
- (4) Both parties should give confidential undertakings that they would comply with the 1925 Geneva Protocol (banning the use of CW) on the understanding that the undertakings would not be public, nor exploited by either side for propaganda purposes.
- (5) Cessation of attacks on unarmed merchant vessels.
- (6) Measures to prevent attacks on ports, terminals and other facilities so that they could be rebuilt and resume their activities.
- (7) Promises to cooperate with the ICRC in order to conclude arrangements which would lead to the exchange of prisoners of war within the framework of the Third Geneva Convention.
- (8) Each party should subscribe in good faith to the above and should press on with continuous discussions with the Secretary General on subsequent measures to normalise the situation.

NOTES

- (i) Point (1) in the UN Secretary General's plan refers to the prime goal being "the cessation of hostilities" which is interpretable as "a ceasefire".
- (ii) On withdrawal to frontiers, Riza has stated that:
 - (a) although it was not mentioned specifically in the eight points it was implied in the reference to "global arrangements"; but that
 - (b) this was an area at which the Secretary was looking, in particular following Iraqi representations, to see whether amendments could be made.



ANNEX A

VISIT OF IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER: 3-6
DECEMBER

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAN: INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS

CW: You know about this; a lorry overturned this summer in West Germany carrying insect aerosol sprays, not CW. Incident closed. Example of how innocent items can be misunderstood.

Boats: No trace of alleged supply to Iran of over 200 small boats by British civilian contractor. Boats over 7.5 metres long now licensable.

Helicopters: Have not supplied helicopters or spare parts for them. Servicing? No. Engine Test Facility? Ministers have agreed; but not yet supplied.

Ships/Vehicle Spares: Explained formally to Arab League Delegation in May and last year to you. Do not intend to go into detail again. (Contracts and payment pre-revolution; non-lethal; no reason to delay supply further.)

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VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR TARIQ AZIZ
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
3-6 DECEMBER 1985

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN
(To be read in conjunction with the
printed programme)

TUESDAY 3 DECEMBER

Arrival

When the aircraft has landed, a representative of the British Airports Authority will accompany His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to the aircraft and escort the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir John Stow, who will present (in order):

Mr T J Clark	HM Ambassador at Baghdad
Brigadier Alan Cowan	Secretary, Government Hospitality
Group Captain Robert Thomson	Government Hospitality Escort Officer
Air Commodore Philip Moore	Government Hospitality Escort Officer

Members of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq will be present.

Transport

Cars are provided for the Official Suite by Government Hospitality throughout the visit. (See car plan at Annex 1.)

Participation of the Official Suite in the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs' Programme

His Excellency Dr Abdul Amir Al-Anbari, the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to London, and Mr Terence Clark, HM Ambassador at Baghdad, will accompany His Excellency Mr Tariq Aziz throughout the programme.

The other members of the Official Suite, as listed at page 1 of the printed programme, are expected to accompany His Excellency Mr Tariq Aziz throughout the programme except for the call on the Prime Minister at which only His Excellency Ambassador Abdul Jabbar Younis Al-Haddawi will be present.


WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER

1500 Meeting with MPs - House of Commons

The visitors will be met at the Members Entrance by Mr Roy Hughes, MP, who will act as host during the House of Commons visit.

1500-1515 Mr Aziz will be escorted to the Distinguished Strangers Gallery by Mr Hughes, accompanied by Group Captain Thomson and a Special Branch officer. Mr Hughes will arrange for the other members at the official suite to be taken to the Jubilee Room in the interim to await Mr Aziz's return from the Distinguished Strangers Gallery at 1515.

NOTE: Visitors to the Distinguished Strangers Gallery are respectfully requested to maintain silence, or when necessary, to converse in as quiet a manner as possible so as not to disrupt the proceedings in the House.



T Wynn
Protocol Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
273 3586

ANNEX I

CAR PLANS

Heathrow Airport to the Savoy Hotel

Car 1	His Excellency Mr Tariq Aziz His Excellency Dr Abdul Amir Al-Anbari Special Branch Officer
Police Car	Special Branch Officer Iraqi Security Officer
Car 2	His Excellency Mr Abdul Jabbar Younis Al-Haddawi Mr Clark Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	Mr Adnan Nsayyif Jasim Dr Samir Khairy Air Commodore Moore

The above will be the basis of the car seating plan throughout the visit - adjusted by Group Captain Thomson as necessary.

DISTRIBUTION

10 Downing Street

PS (2)
Press Secretary (2)
Mr Joce (1)

House of Commons

Mr Roy Hughes MP (1)

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq

Dr Abdul Amir Al-Anbari (15)

Home Office

PS/Mr Hurd (2)

Department of Trade and Industry

PS/Mr Brittan (2)

Ministry of Defence

PS/Mr Heseltine (2)
Group Captain Dillon (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PS (2)
PS/Mr Renton (2)
Mr E A J Fergusson
Mr S L Egerton
Mr S P Day
MED (Mr D Harding) (6)
Miss R Hazell (1)

Government Hospitality Fund (25)



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Prime Minister~~

Iraqi Foreign Minister

1. He wants only half an hour.

2. Subjects are:

(a) Iran / Iraq war. Only

new fact is that Palme is sending his Political Director on an exploratory mission to Teheran next week on behalf of UN Secretary-General.

(b) Smith & Hagger.

3. You last met him with Arab League delegation in May. CDP.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 October 1985

Thank you for your letter of 11 October about the forthcoming visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister to London.

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr. Tariq Aziz and we have provisionally arranged that this should be at 11 o'clock on 4 December for half an hour. The Prime Minister has commented that we should let Mr. Aziz know in advance that we are expecting progress on the cases of Mr. Smith and Mr. Haggar.

(Timothy Flesher)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 October 1985

Prime Minister
This is difficult but not impossible in diary terms.

Agree to a brief meeting?

P.S. We might let him know in advance that we should be expecting progress on

Dear Charles,

CDP 14K.

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

As you know, we have an outstanding invitation from the Secretary of State to Tariq Aziz to visit the UK in December. The visit, accepted in principle by the Iraqis, is planned for 4/5 December.

Smith Hagger at such a meeting. CDP

Since our last correspondence, the new Iraqi Ambassador, during a call on the PUS, has made it clear that Tariq Aziz is expecting substantive high level discussions, including with the Prime Minister, during his stay. We have been told that Tariq Aziz would rather postpone his visit than not see the Prime Minister (whom he last met when the Arab League Delegation called on the Prime Minister in November last year). Sir Geoffrey fully understands the pressures on the Prime Minister's time and entirely agrees with the need to keep down calls on the Prime Minister by Foreign Ministers. But he feels that there will inevitably be a small number of exceptional cases in which it will be necessary to ask the Prime Minister to see a Foreign Minister. He considers that there are grounds for making an exception in the case of Tariq Aziz.

First, a call would enable the Prime Minister to register at the highest level our concern over the cases of Smith and Hagger.

Second, it would provide an opportunity to dispel at the highest level the ever-present suspicion in Iraqi minds that HMG is officially and secretly sustaining the Iranian regime's ability to continue the war by the supply of vital defence equipment.

Finally, Tariq Aziz is aware that the Prime Minister had been prepared to offer him a call when the visit was originally planned in February. The Iraqis would interpret a refusal to receive him at Prime Ministerial level as a change

/in HMG's

[you've already done that].

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in HMG's attitude towards Iraq. As a Deputy Prime Minister and senior member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Tariq Aziz ranks second only to Taha Ramadan in his ability to influence Saddam Hussein. If anything, he has gained in domestic and international stature since February, as Iraq's fortunes in the war have prospered.

In the light of the above, Sir Geoffrey Howe hopes that the Prime Minister will agree that it would be right to see Tariq Aziz on 4 or 4 December.



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Yr ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

29 July 1985

From the Private Secretary

VISIT OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TO LONDON

Thank you for your letter of 26 July about the visit of Tariq Aziz.

As you know, we are trying to put a stop to the notion that Foreign Ministers are entitled to expect to call upon the Prime Minister. I have consulted the Prime Minister about this particular case and she has said that no commitment should be given that she will see Tariq Aziz. I suggest therefore that arrangements for the visit should go ahead without anything being said on the subject of a meeting with the Prime Minister. If the Iraqis enquire you will have to say that we cannot make any commitment at this stage.

(C.D. Powell)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July, 1985

He's a very tiresome man: and we are trying to limit calls on you by Foreign Ministers. But having originally agreed to see him, it will be hard to refuse now that the visit is to be held. Agree to a Charles, short meeting?

Challen
4th December is slightly outside Euro Council, but statement ch. The 5th would be better, if we have to do it. M6A257

No commitment

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

COJ 27/7

A long standing invitation from Sir Geoffrey Howe to Tariq Aziz to pay an official visit to London has now been accepted by the Iraqis for 4-5 December. Previous plans for a visit in February fell through when Tariq Aziz was unable to make the dates we proposed.

The Prime Minister agreed to see Tariq Aziz when we were making plans for the February visit (your letter of 31 January). In proposing those dates, we confirmed to the Iraqis that the intended programme would include a call on the Prime Minister. As well as being Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz holds the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and is a member of the influential Ba'ath party junta, the Revolutionary Command Council. As in the case of the February visit, we would also propose to arrange calls for Tariq Aziz on other Government Ministers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe continues to believe that a visit by Tariq Aziz would be useful and endorses our post's view that the success of the visit is likely to depend on the level of Ministerial attention he is granted. Having been offered a call on the Prime Minister last time, the highly protocol-conscious Iraqis would certainly react badly if they were not offered a similar call this time. They could well decide not to go ahead with the visit. Our relations with Iraq have never been smooth and the furtherance of Britain's commercial and other interests in Iraq depend to a large extent on taking the occasional opportunities that come up for high-level Ministerial contacts with the Iraqis. In particular, a call on the Prime Minister would enable us to emphasise at the highest level the importance we attach to the early release of the two Britons who have spent a number of years in Iraqi jails, Messrs Smith and Hagger. There is continuing concern in this country for the welfare of these two men.

Sir Geoffrey has therefore reluctantly concluded that it would be right to ask the Prime Minister to

/agree

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agree to a call by Tariq Aziz on 4 or 5 December.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Maureen Dodsworth (DTI).


Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 February 1985

*sub
12-DB to note*

Q 12/2

Dear Charles,

Visit of Tariq Aziz to London

In your letter of 31 January, you confirmed that the Prime Minister would be able to receive a call from the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, at 11.00 am on 26 February. Since then the Iraqis have told us that the dates we proposed to them (i.e. 25-27 February) are not suitable, and the visit has therefore been postponed.

We have left it to the Iraqis to suggest alternative dates to us. We shall be in touch with you again in due course about revised dates.

Yr ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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
Relations

~~Relations~~

July 1979.



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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

1-19 VICTORIA STREET

LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215

GTN 215

(Switchboard) 215 7877

*Advised by
DRI:- Mm now OFF
11/2/85*

CR

From the Minister for Trade

CONFIDENTIAL

P F Ricketts Esq
Private Secretary to
Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London
SW1A 2AH

*NBPT
COP
1/2*

11 February 1985

Dear Peter

VISIT OF IRAQI MINISTER TO LONDON

Mr Channon has seen your letter of 30 January to Charles Powell and his reply of 31 January.

Mr Channon will be happy to see Mr Tariq Aziz, whom he met in Baghdad in November. He would be prepared to offer a meeting and lunch on 27 February, or, if Mr Tariq Aziz has left the UK by then, a meeting on 25 or 26 February. Officials in our Departments will keep in touch about dates.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10 Downing Street) and Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours sincerely
Steve*

STEPHEN NICKLEN
Private Secretary to
the Minister for Trade

IRAQ; Relations; July 1979

11 FEB 1985

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4 5 6 7 8 9



bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1985

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

Thank you for your letter of 30 January about the forthcoming visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to London.

The Prime Minister will be able to see Tariq Aziz on 26 February at 1100 for half an hour.

BE/

The Prime Minister has had reports that both the Iraqis and a number of Governments in the Gulf believe that considerable quantities of British arms, ammunition and spare parts beyond the limited quantities authorised by Ministers are still reaching Iran; and that Tariq Aziz is likely to make a great deal of this during his visit to the United Kingdom. I should be grateful if the briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting could provide a firm, comprehensive defence against these allegations.

I am sending copies of this letter to Steve Nicklen (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LS

26 Feb 11.1130

CONFIDENTIAL

CCP ①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January, 1985

Prime Minister
Agree to see Iraqi
Foreign Minister? (1st after the
Washington visit).

CDP
30/1

Dear Charles,

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

In November Sir Geoffrey Howe invited the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to stop off in London for talks on his way to an official visit to Washington. In the event, Tariq Aziz was unable to travel to London due to the death of his mother, but Mr Luce (during his visit to Baghdad in November) subsequently invited the Foreign Minister to reinstate the visit, some time in the New Year.

We should now like to suggest firm dates to the Iraqis and have identified 25-27 February as a convenient period. However, in proposing these dates to the Iraqis we shall, at the same time, have to give them some idea of what the programme is likely to include. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has strongly recommended a call on the Prime Minister, pointing out that as well as being Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz holds the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and is a member of the influential Baath Party junta, the Revolutionary Command Council. Apart from arranging a call on the Prime Minister, we would also propose to arrange calls for Tariz Aziz on Mr Heseltine and Mr Channon.

Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that a visit by Tariz Aziz soon would be useful, and endorses our Ambassador's view that the success of the visit is likely to depend on the level of Ministerial attention. Our relations with Iraq have always been difficult, but the atmosphere has improved in recent months, following the visits by Mr Luce and Mr Channon at the end of last year. We are keen to build on this improvement by having a further round of exchanges with Tariz Aziz. We continue to regard Iraq as an important market in the future for British companies (our visible exports are even now running at £330m per year); prospects in the medium and long-term should be enhanced when the conflict with Iran is over and Iraq resumes her position as a leading oil exporter in the Middle East. In addition, we would value another opportunity to make further high level representations on behalf of the two British subjects imprisoned in Iraq, John Smith and Donald Hagger, and if necessary explain further our policy on the question of UK defence sales to Iran, which has been a contentious issue with the Iraqis and their Arab allies.

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/Sir Geoffrey

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Sir Geoffrey appreciates that the Prime Minister's diary for this period will already be very full, but would be grateful if she could consider receiving Tariz Aziz for a brief meeting at some time during the dates we intend to propose to the Iraqis, ie on 25 or 26 February.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Nickeln (DTI) and Richard Mottram (MOD).

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 October, 1983

VISIT OF THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
OF IRAQ

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Ramadhan on his departure from the United Kingdom.

A. J. COLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

fy

Prime Minister

(2)

AM 3.
10

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ - CONVEYED BY TELEPHONE FROM GROUND AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL

On the occasion of the departure of myself and my delegation from the British sky I would like to express to your Excellency once again my profound thanks and gratitude for the warm reception and cordial hospitality accorded to us during our visit to your friendly country. I feel confident that the talks we held will further strengthen the ties of co-understanding and co-operation existing between us in the interest of our two friendly countries and people.

I wish your Excellency good health and the friendly British people further progress and prosperity.

mt

7 October, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1983

Dear John,

VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I enclose a record of the formal talks between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq which took place at 10 Downing Street this morning.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

JH Gls.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

6

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

ce master.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ ON THURSDAY 6 OCTOBER AT 10 DOWNING STREET
AT 12 NOON

Present:

Prime Minister	H.E. Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadhan (Deputy Prime Minister)
Minister of State, FCO (Mr. Richard Luce MP)	Mr. Hassan Ali (Minister of Trade)
Minister of State, DTI (Rt. Hon. Paul Channon MP)	Mr. Ahmed Taqi (Minister of Oil)
H.E. Mr. J. C. Moberly	Mr. Qaraghuli (Ambassador)
Mr. S. L. Egerton	Mr. Sahhaf (MFA official)
Sir A. Parsons	
Mr. A. J. Coles	

* * * * *

Welcoming Mr. Ramadhan, the Prime Minister said that she would be glad to hear his views on world problems, especially those affecting the Middle East, and on the economic situation in Iraq. We were particularly interested in the current problems of the Gulf and especially the prospects for bringing the Iran/Iraq war to an end. Both our countries were oil producers. We were both interested in the price of oil and in future oil supplies.

Mr. Ramadhan thanked the Prime Minister for her invitation to him to visit this country and for the opportunity which this provided for direct consultations on matters affecting mutual interests. He firmly believed that direct contact at this level offered the best opportunity to create understanding, especially on fundamental issues.

/ He would

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He would like to deal with two questions - the bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom, and the Iran/Iraq war.

In recent years there had been a considerable development in our relationship. He believed that the background to this relationship, especially in the cultural field, would enable us to develop relations still further. He had frequently said to his colleagues that they must take opportunities to inform British representatives of developments in Iraqi society. It was important that Britain did not have an out-dated idea of Iraq.

Iraq was rich in resources and in ambition. The constant goal of the leadership was to develop Iraq socially and economically so that it was able to play an important role on the world stage. In the past Iraq had been hampered by illiteracy, ignorance and political chaos. That stage was now over. The country had now reached the stage of political maturity and had taken the lead in eradicating illiteracy.

It followed an independent policy. It took its decisions and developed its relationships on a basis of joint interests. The closeness or distance of its relations with each country depended on the nature of the response it received. Unquestionably political attitudes had an effect on the quality of relations. The closer political attitudes were, the more fruitful relations were.

The economic agreements arrived at during the present visit were an important step towards the further development of relations. He wished to express his pleasure at the reports that he had received of the progress in the negotiations. There were great hopes for further development. He wished to assure the Prime Minister that the horizons were wide for developing relations and that the opportunities for cooperation could be multiplied.

/ He would be

He would be pleased to brief the Prime Minister on the economic situation of Iraq even though this was an internal matter.

Under the five year plan Iraq had reached a new economic stage which could be termed "explosive development". Iraq had passed from the stage of being an under-developed country. Now was a period of special experiment. Much had been done in construction, industry and agriculture. Unemployment had been completely eliminated, even though there were 1½ million non-Iraqis working in Iraq. Investment during the first two years of the war had reached \$25 milliards. This was less than Iraq could have accommodated had there been the means to implement projects. But prospects had been reduced by the severance by Syria of the oil pipeline and the cutting off of Gulf oil early in the war.

In the last year the financial situation, but not the economic situation, had been difficult. The fact that the war was fought on a front of 1,180 kms. indicated Iraq's difficulties. The closure by Syria of the pipeline meant that 700,000 barrels of oil per day did not flow. This had led to financial difficulties. But it was a temporary situation.

Countries other than Iran had tried to contribute to Iraq's economic difficulties with the aim of bringing about a collapse of the economy. Many parties were basing their policy on an out-dated assessment of Iraq. They took no account of the strength of contemporary Iraq. The Government had taken a number of wise economic measures to frustrate these attempts. In order to cope with temporary problems, billions of dollars had been spent on directing consumption and stimulating the economy. There was close contact with foreign companies which were working in the development field. Steps had been taken to remedy the slowness of payments due to these companies. Agreements had been made with no less than 90% of them.

/ Even

Even if the war lasted for ten years, Iraq's future prospects were rosy. The Prime Minister said that the war had already gone on for four years and that was long enough. Mr. Ramadhan said that Iraq was determined to do what was necessary. It had a very large population and the birthrate was high. Britain should speak to the party that did not want peace. Iraq had decided not to bend its knee to the aggressor.

But returning to Iraq's future prospects, as soon as the war ended the economy would pick up. Steps had been taken to implement a number of export-oriented projects. The Iraq/Turkey pipeline was being extended and would be finished in March next year. This would increase oil exports by 50%. Iraq would also soon sign a gas agreement. It was negotiating with Saudi Arabia for a pipeline across her territory which would have a capacity of 1½ million barrels daily. Agreement in principle had been reached. The project now had to be implemented. Taken together, these projects would give Iraq the capacity to export about 3 million barrels of oil a day, which was roughly its capacity before the war. This capacity would be much increased after the war when other pipelines came on stream. The most difficult phase of development was now over. Implementation of the projects he had described would begin early in 1984. Growth would not be rapid but it would be evident. Iraq had excellent cooperation with friendly countries. It was known to respect its obligations. Companies working in Iraq could be sure of a fair deal.

He wished to repeat his satisfaction at the agreements reached with the United Kingdom. He hoped that they would be implemented with the same enthusiasm because the prospects for the future were good.

Turning to the Iran/Iraq war, the question arose of why it had lasted so long. He wished to speak frankly. If the two super-powers had wished to, they could have stopped it long ago. But they viewed the conflict in the light of their own interests.

/ The

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Ramadhan could elucidate. How could the super-powers have stopped the war? It seemed to us that many people had tried to, but none had been successful.

Mr. Ramadhan said that Iraq had from the beginning consistently called for peace and was ready to implement all resolutions which called for peace. So it was clear that it was Iran that was the aggressor. The declarations of the Iranian authorities proved that Iran wished to continue the war, to extend it and to export revolution. Recent history showed that the super-powers had been able to stop war. But countries had developed their relations with Iran, taking no account of its desire to continue the war. That country had begun to threaten the world and to implement a policy of blackmail. It had threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz if France delivered five Super Etendards to Iraq. How had the international community reacted? The United States had brought pressure on France not to deliver the aircraft to Iraq because, in their view, this would threaten the export of oil. But Iran was itself threatening to stop oil exports. Was the attitude of these powers likely to encourage Iran to work for peace or to carry on the war? The day would come when Iran would say to countries like France and Britain that if they sold bread to Iraq the Straits would be closed. The United States and other countries knew that the only country which had been denied the benefits of the Gulf, in terms of oil and trade, since the start of the war was Iraq. But he had seen no protest from the international community.

He wanted to make it clear that Iraq was genuinely concerned for the true interests of the Arab states in the Gulf. These interests were best served by a strong Iraq. If Iraq collapsed, Iran's principal aim would have been achieved.

He had to say that he was uneasy at the action of the United Kingdom in expressing its concern to France about the delivery of the Super Etendards. This matter had been discussed in the Revolutionary Command Council which could not understand the British attitude.

Iraq had made proposals for the partial cessation of hostilities. It had also proposed the resumption of normal activities on the basis of the cessation by all Gulf States of military activity.

Iraq had been told that the United States' motive in bringing pressure to bear on France was that the Gulf States had expressed unease about the aircraft. But when Iraq had contacted the Gulf States they had found that this was not the case. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had specifically urged France to implement the contract.

There was considerable potential for the great powers to play a role in bringing an end to the war. Iraq had taken many initiatives for peace in order to create a better atmosphere. Iran would do anything in its own country, even murder children and pregnant women. Iraq would continue to develop its military potential because it wished to be strong. They would adopt all necessary measures, including the purchase of Super Etendards from France.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Ramadhan for his frank exposition to which we had listened carefully. No-one in Britain under-estimated the development achievements or the technological requirements of Iraq. The speed of its development was remarkable. This was greatly to the credit of the Iraqi leadership. The pipeline projects, pursued in spite of the war, were encouraging. We recognised the importance of Iraq to the Middle East, the Arab world and the whole of the Western world. We shared Iraq's desire for peace and were frustrated that efforts to bring it about had been fruitless. We were impressed by Iraq's enormous potential for development when the war was over. We recognised that it would become a powerful and influential nation. We wished to use power and influence for good.

We were pleased with his visit and hoped he was too. Conversation could continue informally over lunch. She hoped

/ that

CONFIDENTIAL

-7-

that Mr. Ramadhan would take a message of greeting from her to President Saddam Hussein.

The talks ended at 1300 hours.

A.J.C.

6 October 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Excellency,

Your visit to this country is long overdue and we are delighted that on this occasion there was no last minute postponement. I accept full responsibility for the postponement of your visit in June. Although the clash of dates with the General Election was unfortunate, I was always confident that I would be in a position to renew the invitation personally after the election, and I am glad that the visit is now taking place.

Although I have not yet had the pleasure of visiting Baghdad, I have heard much about the ambitious development plans which have transformed Baghdad in recent years and I am delighted that a number of British firms have been able to participate in this development. It is encouraging that this progress has continued despite the sad and costly war with Iran which all of us sincerely hope will soon be ended.

I am also aware that there are a number of similarities between our two countries. I know that Iraq, like Britain, is blessed with a remarkable diversity of scenery and peoples, and the two countries also enjoy substantial oil riches in a world where this precious commodity means so much to our future prosperity.

/We

We attach great importance to our relations with Iraq and we earnestly hope that these relations will be further strengthened as a result of your visit.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

YOUR VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY IS LONG OVERDUE AND WE ARE

DELIGHTED THAT ON THIS OCCASION THERE WAS NO

LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT,

I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POSTPONEMENT

OF YOUR VISIT IN JUNE.

ALTHOUGH THE CLASH OF DATES WITH THE GENERAL

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THAT I WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RENEW THE

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I AM GLAD THAT THE VISIT IS NOW TAKING PLACE,

/ALTHOUGH

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/I AM ALSO

I AM ALSO AWARE THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SIMILARITIES
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COMMODITY MEANS SO MUCH TO OUR FUTURE PROSPERITY,

WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ
AND WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THESE RELATIONS WILL
BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT OF YOUR
VISIT,

VISIT OF HE MR TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN,
FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

5-7 OCTOBER 1983

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(to be read in conjunction with programme attached)

ARRIVAL

The First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq HE Mr Taha Ramadhan and party will arrive by special aircraft at LHR Southside. As soon as the aircraft doors open a representative of the British Airport Authority will escort the greeting party to the aircraft. The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq HE Dr Wahbi Abdul-Razaq Fattah Al Qaraghuli will board the aircraft and escort the First Deputy Prime Minister to the tarmac where he will introduce the welcoming party (in order).

Mr Richard Luce MP
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Mr J C Moberly
HM Ambassador at Baghdad

Brigadier Alan Cowan
Secretary, Government Hospitality

Group Captain Robert Thomson
Escort Officer

Colonel Philip Worrall
Escort Officer

Transport

Cars are provided by Government Hospitality Fund. The seating which is shown at Annex 1 is for the arrival and departure only. Car plans throughout the visit will be made on a daily basis by the Escort Officers.

5 October

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP, will host a luncheon. See separate programmes for Mr Hassan Ali and Mr Taqi. The following members of the official suite are also invited: Mr Al Sahhaf, Mr Adham and Mr A'jam.

6 October

The following will accompany the First Deputy Prime Minister aboard the 'Royal Nore' to the Thames Barrier:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Taqi

Mr Qaraghoul

Mr Sahhaf

Mr Adham

Mr A'jam

plus 4 others whose names are yet to be announced. The party will be accompanied by Mr Adrian Franklin, Area Development Manager, Middle East Costain International Ltd and Mr Colin Clark, Area Manager for the Middle East, Costain International Ltd.

Talks with the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Taqi

Mr Qaraghoul

Mr Sahhaf

Luncheon at No 10 Downing Street

The following are also invited:-

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Qasim Taqi

Mr Mohammed Sa'id Sahhaf

Mr Abdul Razzak Qaraghoul

Mr Abdul Munim Hassan 'Alwan As Sammarai

Mr Majid Adham

Mr Waddad A'jam

Mr Abdul Wahhab Al Mufti

Visit to British Aerospace

The following will accompany the First Deputy Prime Minister in the helicopter: Mr Hassan Ali and Mr Qaraghoul plus two whose names are yet to be announced.

Dinner: Host The Rt Hon Viscount Whitelaw

The following are also invited:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Qasim Taqi

Mr Mohammed Sa'id Sahhaf

Mr Abdul Razzak Qaraghoul

Mr Adjul Minim Hassan 'Alwan As Sammarai

Mr Majid Adham

Mr Waddad A'jam

Mr Abdul Wahhab al Mufti

Mr Farook Dawood Salmaan al Obeidi

Friday 7 October

Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst

The following will accompany the First Deputy Prime Minister:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Mohammed Sa'id Sahhaf

Mr Abdul Razzak Qaraghoul

Mr Majid Adham

Mr Waddad A'jam

Mr Na'el Kemal Abdul Majid

3 Security Officers

7 October

DEPARTURE

Details to be announced.

Anne Hutchison

Anne Hutchison (Miss)
Inward Visits Section
Protocol Department


VISIT OF

VEHICLE SEATING ARRANGEMENT

Car No. 1


- 1 HE Mr Ramadhan
 2 _____
 3 HE Amb of Iraq
 4 ADC
 5 _____
 6 Spec. Branch
Officer

Driver _____

Car No. 4


- 1 Mr Bafi
 2 Mr Majid
 3 Mr Latij
 4 Mr Ibrahim
 5 ADC
 6 _____

Driver _____

Car No. 2

- 1 HE Mr Ali
 2 _____
 3 HE Mr Taqi
 4 Mr Moberly
 5 Spec. Branch
Officer
 6 Grp Capt Thomson


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
- 1 _____
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 3 _____
 4 _____
 5 _____
 6 _____

Driver _____

Car No. 3

- 1 Mr Sahhef
 2 _____
 3 Mr Adham
 4 Mr A'jam
 5 Spec. Branch
Officer
 6 Col Worrall


Driver _____



Car No. _____

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Driver _____



DISTRIBUTION

10 DOWNING STREET

Private Secretary (2)
Press Office (2)

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ (6)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Private Secretary (2)
PS/Mr Luce (2)
PS/PUS (1)
Sir John Leahy (1)
Mr Egerton (1)
Mr Haskell (1)
Mr Henderson - MED (6)
News Dept (3)
Resident Clerk
Protocol Dept (6)
Miss Lothian

GOVERNMENT HOSPITALITY FUND (15)

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Private Secretary (2)
PS/Mr Channon (2)

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Private Secretary

Viscount Whitelaw,
Privy Council Office, Whitehall SW1

TREASURY MEDICAL ADVISER

Dr Semmence

059

File



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1983

VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I am sending to you separately the record of the formal talks.

The Prime Minister raised informally with Mr. Ramadhan the cases of Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger. She said that she wished to appeal to him on the basis of humanity to review the sentences and to improve the conditions of imprisonment of the two men. I believe that the Prime Minister spoke twice to this effect.

Mr. Ramadhan simply took note.

I am sending copies of this letter to Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

ALCOLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Top Copy on
~~Defence~~
Middle East
Arms Sales, P43



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 26/9/22

5th October 1983

Dear Tim

IRAQ: SALE OF NIMROD AIRCRAFT

The Prime Minister's brief for her talks and lunch tomorrow with Mr Taha Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, included reference to the possible sale of Nimrod Aircraft to Iraq. The British Aerospace/MOD team referred to in the brief returned from Baghdad last night, and you might find it useful to know the latest position.

BAe's formal response to the Iraqi request for a Company-to-Government contract was given by two senior directors, who explained that the deal could only be achieved on a Government-to-Government basis, given the background of the Iraqi request for onerous bank guarantees. The Iraqis took this in good heart (not least because the message was given at senior level) and after some discussion the Iraqis agreed to reconsider Government-to-Government terms. The plan is to return to Iraq towards the end of November with a draft Government contract.

The fact that the Iraqis have reverted to a Government-to-Government structure is no panacea. The problems that caused the breakdown of the Government-to-Government talks in March will still have to be resolved (for example, a settlement of the bank guarantee problem, payment terms, applicable law and termination liability). Moreover, the Iraqis made no secret of their acute financial problems and made it clear that they could not accept the substantial advance payments required by BAe. In order to maintain a positive cash flow on the sale - essential given the volatile political scene in the region - we would be looking for around 30% on signature with at least 5% every 6 months thereafter. The Iraqis also referred to the possibility of credit for Nimrod, but in line with OD Committee's decision in November 1982 it was made clear that the deal had to be on cash terms.

T Flesher Esq

CONFIDENTIAL



None of the points arising from the discussions in Baghdad alter the original Defence Sales assessment in the brief on Nimrod. We are effectively in an end-game; a sale seems increasingly unlikely (the Iraqis have not yet heard the full price of around £1.8bn on forward fixed rates); and our best short-term hopes are to disengage amicably and to try again later when Iraqi finances (or her Arab backers) allow. The Prime Minister's firm statement of support to Mr Ramadhan for the deal will therefore be a key feature in this short-term strategy.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Ruth Thompson (DTI).

Yours
A H Lowe

(S H LOWE)

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 October 1983

mf

Dear John,

Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister's Call on the Prime Minister
6 October 1983

I enclose briefs for Mr Ramadhan's call on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

MR Ramadhan proposes to be accompanied by the Minister of Trade, Mr Hassan Ali, the Minister of Oil, Mr Ahmed Taqi, Mr Qaraghuli the Iraqi Ambassador, and Mr Sahhaf a senior official of the Iraqi MFA. On the FCO side, Mr Luce, Mr Moberly (HM Ambassador, Baghdad) and Mr Egerton are free to attend if the Prime Minister wishes. You may wish to have support from DTI also.

*N. Channon
will attend.
MR 1/11.*

I would draw your attention particularly to the briefs on credit (No 3(a)) and consular cases (No 2(b)). Credit is likely to be the centre-piece of the visit as far as the Iraqis are concerned. Ministers have yet to take a final decision on this issue and the briefing takes account of this.

From our point of view the visit represents a unique opportunity to tackle the Iraqis at a high level on the question of our consular cases. The prison conditions under which the two British nationals (Smith and Hagger) are held are appalling. We have been pressing for some time for improvements. But our main objective during this visit will be to persuade the Iraqis that an early review of the long sentences imposed on both prisoners would be widely welcomed in this country.

The Foreign Secretary is calling on Mr Ramadhan today. I will let you know if any particular points arise. I enclose a copy of the full programme.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5144
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

Andrew Turnbull Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

5th October 1983

Dear Andrew,

Before the Prime Minister sees Mr Ramadhan tomorrow, it might be helpful to let you and copy recipients know how Mr Channon's Joint Commission meeting with Trade Minister Hassan Ali went this afternoon.

Hassan Ali's initial reaction to our offer of £250M 5 year credit was that of a good Souk haggler - grudging appreciation, coupled with comments "not enough", and an immediate attempt to bargain into our offer "strategic" consumer goods, such as medicines, food and clothing. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that the Iraqis are well pleased - as they should be.

The Ministers then adjourned so that officials could begin negotiations, likely to continue late into the night, of the text of a Financial Protocol. This will be in general terms - ECGD will have to negotiate in detail in coming months - but must contain tough conditions safeguarding our own interests. It seems likely, to judge from the atmosphere at the Ministerial meeting, that the Protocol will be ready for Mr Channon and Hassan Ali to sign tomorrow, along with the Agreed Minutes of the Joint Commission covering lesser matters, at 11.00 immediately before the meeting with the Prime Minister; but should officials fail to reach agreement, the fall-back would be for signature to be delayed until Mr Channon's visit to Iraq early next month for the Baghdad Fair. I shall confirm the outcome by telephone tomorrow morning.

In Mr Channon's view, the Prime Minister should be advised to reiterate to Ramadhan, as he has done to Hassan Ali, that we have made a unique effort to be helpful, and have very little flexibility in negotiation on terms and conditions - in short, something close to "take it or leave it".



In addition, Mr Channon was only able to mention the Kier problem over lunch, the meeting itself becoming too confused (on the Iraqi side) to repeat it. He is not confident that Hassan Ali has taken in how seriously we regard it. Since Ramadhan himself is the source of the problem, he thinks it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could make a point of telling Ramadhan that, if efforts to reach a compromise this week fail (as is very likely), the best solution would be for the Iraqis to return Kier's bond money and agree to an amicable suspension (ie termination) of the contract; it was, after all, an Iraqi default on a cash contract which caused the problem in the first place.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Jonathan Rees

JONATHAN REES
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (PAUL CHANNON)

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

I suggest that the talks (at noon) are held in the Cabinet Room - though you will need to end Cabinet by 1150 in order that the room can be prepared.

He will be accompanied by:

Mr. Hassan Ali	(Minister of Trade)
Mr. Ahmed Taqi	(Minister of Oil)
Mr. Qaraghuli	(Ambassador)
Mr. Sahhaf	(MFA official)

We shall have Mr. Luce, Mr. Channon, Mr. Moberly (our Ambassador) and Mr. Egerton.

The briefs are not easy to summarise and I hope you will have time to glance through them.

The following are perhaps the main points you should make:

- (a) Encouraged by improvement in relations. This visit should improve further.
- (b) Have made effort on credit. Expect prompt payment to UK firms, some of whom are suffering badly.
- (c) Hope Consular cases will not prevent further progress (mention specific cases of Hagger and Smith informally over lunch).
- (d) Hope we can make progress with Nimrod and Hawk Trainer sales.
- (e) Hope Iraq will not support Argentine resolution on Falklands.

(f)

(f) How do they see the war with Iran.

(g) Oil - March OPEC agreement successful in restoring order but market remains fragile.

I shall let you have separately an up-to-date brief on credit, following Mr. Channon's talks today.

Mr. Ramadhan speaks no English. There will therefore be Arabic/English ineterpretation which will reduce the time for talking.

gjc

5 October 1983

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister

I suggest that the talks (at noon) are held in the Cabinet Room - though you will need to end Cabinet by 1150 in order that the room can be prepared.

He will be accompanied by:

Mr. Hassan Ali	(Minister of Trade)
Mr. Ahmed Taqi	(Minister of Oil)
Mr. Qaraghuli	(Ambassador)
Mr. Sahhaf	(MFA official)

We shall have Mr. Luce, Mr. Channon, Mr. Moberly (our Ambassador) and Mr. Egerton (FCO).

The briefs are not easy to summarise and I hope you will have time to glance through them.

The Foreign Secretary had an unproductive meeting with Ramadhan this afternoon. The latter spent a lot of time setting out his views on the world. When Sir Geoffrey raised the cases of Mr. Hagger and Mr. Smith he immediately linked them to the case of the convicted terrorist, Salim Hassan, and virtually implied that the latter's actions had the approval of the Iraqi Government. It will be necessary to make it plain that there can be no exchange of prisoners.

I attach a letter describing Mr. Channon's meeting with the Iraqi Trade Minister this afternoon. The Iraqis were, predictably, not very gracious about our offer of credit. But there is every prospect that the two sides will sign a satisfactory agreement at 11 o'clock tomorrow, before your talks. Mr. Channon will attend the talks.

/As Mr. Ramadhan

8. R.
As Mr. Ramadhan speaks no ^{English} ~~Arabic~~ there will have to be interpretation, which will cut down the time for talking.

You may think that the best way to handle the formal talks is to keep them fairly general. You may like to follow these headings:

- a) His view of the situation in the Gulf and the Iran/Iraq war.
- b) Oil - March OPEC agreement successful in restoring order but market remains fragile.
- c) Encouraged by improvement in bilateral relations. Have made effort on credit (see attached letter from DTI). Expect prompt payment to UK firms, some of whom are suffering badly.
- d) Hope Consular cases will not prevent further progress (mention specific cases of Hagger and Smith over lunch).
- e) Hope we can make progress with Nimrod and Hawk trainer sales.
- f) Hope Iraq will not support Argentine resolution on Falklands.

I attach some notes for an after lunch speech.

A.S.C.

5 October 1983



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 August 1983

Dear Willie,

DH/K

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister
of Iraq

John Coles wrote to me on 25 July to say that the Prime Minister could offer talks and lunch for Mr Taha Ramadhan on Thursday 6 October. Baghdad have now confirmed that Ramadhan has accepted the dates for the visit. 6 October fits well for the Prime Minister's involvement.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street

Waq.
Possible visit
to Ramadhan
Nov. 8/

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CONFIDENTIAL

Brc



file
bc: Tim Fletcher

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1983

VISIT OF FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I am sorry that it has not been possible to give you an earlier reply to your letter of 1 July proposing that Mr. Taha Ramadhan should be invited to visit the United Kingdom some time in October. Before taking a view on this, it has been necessary to fix dates for certain other foreign affairs engagements for the Prime Minister.

bc

Mrs. Thatcher would be able to offer talks and lunch for Mr. Ramadhan on Thursday 6 October. Perhaps you could let me know in due course whether this is acceptable? (I should warn that it will be difficult to find alternatives).

I am copying this letter to Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 July, 1983

Agree to hold talks,
followed by lunch, on
Thursday, 6 October?

A J. C. $\frac{22}{7}$

Yes not

Dear John,

Visit of Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

You will recall that this visit, which was due to take place from 8-10 June, was postponed because of the general election. The visit has been postponed on two previous occasions and the Prime Minister's invitation to Mr Ramadhan has now been open for over eighteen months.

The arguments in favour of Mr Ramadhan's visit to the United Kingdom were set out in my letters to you dated 7 January and 15 March (copies enclosed). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that a visit by Ramadhan would still benefit our relations with Iraq, and that it is in our interest that the visit should go ahead. On previous form the Iraqis will no doubt wish to link the Ramadhan visit to a meeting of the UK/Iraq Joint Commission. We and the Department of Trade are again happy to go along with this but as before we will make it clear to the Iraqis that the Prime Minister will take no substantive part in the talks on the UK side.

You will be aware from the previous correspondence on this visit that talks with the Prime Minister followed by a meal would be an essential part of the programme for Ramadhan if it was to be a success.

On timing, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that sometime after the summer months, preferably October, would be best. Sir Geoffrey would therefore be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to reschedule the arrangements for talks and a meal with Mr Ramadhan to sometime in October and if you could offer a specific date for this which we could put to the Iraqis.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Unfortunately, Mr Ramadhan can be very touchy about protocol. We need to offer him a programme which takes account of this and of his position as number two in the Ba'ath regime. So far as the official part of the programme is concerned, Mr Pym envisages a round of calls, as well as hospitality. He hopes that the Prime Minister as nominal host will agree to talks and a meal (as envisaged in Francis Richards's letter under reference). A call at noon followed by lunch might be the best arrangement. Mr Pym believes that it would jeopardise the success of the visit if the programme did not include the offer of a meal hosted by the Prime Minister. It would be better therefore to offer dates some way ahead, if necessary, than to offer earlier dates without the prospect of hospitality by Mrs Thatcher. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has advised that Mr Ramadhan will probably refuse to come if he is not offered hospitality by the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to talks and a meal as proposed, and if you could let me have perhaps alternative dates which we could put to the Iraqis for the visit.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and David Oman (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



for talks and a meal to some time between mid-May and 12 June and if you could offer a specific date for this which we could put to the Iraqis.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours sincerely
J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

*Tracy, N. S.
Visit of Ramadhan*

-1 JUL 1983



~~SECRET~~ OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

Precedence Deskby

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
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CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

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3 CONFIDENTIAL
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6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

~~CC MATTER~~
~~OPS~~

~~PRIME MINISTER'S~~
~~PERSONAL MESSAGE~~
~~SERIAL No.~~

9 RAMADHAN VISIT
10 1. The timing of the election means that Ramadhan's visit will
11 have to be postponed. Please pass the following message from the
12 Prime Minister to Ramadhan:
13 BEGINS: 'Your Excellency

14 I am sorry to have to tell you that I shall not now be
15 able to receive you as planned in June. As you may have
16 heard, I have decided that a general election should be held
17 on 9 June. I am afraid that our proposed meeting on 10 June
18 cannot therefore take place.

19 As you know, I attach ~~considerable~~ importance to our relations
20 with Iraq and I know that your visit would have been a
21 valuable means of strengthening these links. I very much hope that
22 we shall be able to find mutually agreeable dates again for you
23 to come to London soon.

24 Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. ENDS
25

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword PYM
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution MEO PCD TRED PS PS/MHnd PS/PUS
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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Catchword

FILE
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10 May, 1983

VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 9 May.
The Prime Minister has approved the proposed message to Mr. Ramadhan (with the deletion of the word "considerable" from the second paragraph) and I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

9



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1983

Dear John,

Visit of Taha Ramadhan

This visit is obviously affected by the general election on 9 June. Relations with Iraq are tricky and though the Iraqis have have twice postponed the visit themselves, it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could send a short message to Ramadhan on the lines of the attached draft.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Classification and Control

Precedence/Deskby

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
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 CAVEATS 4
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 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 RAMADHAN VISIT


10 1. The timing of the election means that Ramadhan's visit will
 11 have to be postponed. Please pass the following message from the
 12 Prime Minister to Ramadhan:

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 15 able to receive you as planned in June. As you may have
 16 heard, I have decided that a general election should be held
 17 on 9 June. I am afraid that our proposed meeting on 10 June
 18 cannot therefore take place.

19 As you know, I attach ~~considerable~~ importance to our relations
 20 with Iraq and I know that your visit would have been a
 21 valuable means of strengthening these links. I very much hope that
 22 we shall be able to find mutually agreeable dates again for you
 23 to come to London soon.

24 Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. ENDS
 25

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File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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5 May 1983

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 4 May.

I confirm that the talks with Mr. Ramadhan will begin at noon on 10 June.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 May, 1983

Dear John,

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 24 March.

I can now confirm that the Iraqis have agreed to our proposed date of 10 June for Ramadhan's talks and lunch with the Prime Minister. May we assume that the talks will start at noon? We are now proceeding on the basis of a three day visit from 8-10 June.

You mentioned in your letter that these new dates might cause problems for the Secretary of State for Trade. This has now been resolved. We have made it clear to the Iraqis that Lord Cockfield may be away during this period, but that Dr Vaughan who visited Baghdad last autumn has agreed to co-chair the Joint Commission talks if required.

I shall let you have a draft guest list for the lunch as soon as possible.

I am copying this to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Gray: Visited for Ramadan New 1983

Gray: Visited for Ramadan New 1983

Gray: Visited for Ramadan New 1983

4 MAY 1983

98
MAY 4 1983



da
Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 March 1983

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 15 March.

The only day in the period between mid May and 12 June when the Prime Minister could hold talks and give lunch to Mr. Taha Ramadhan is Friday, 10 June. I have today seen John Rhodes' letter to you of 24 March which suggests that the Secretary of State for Trade may have some difficulty about this date. If that difficulty can be resolved, the Prime Minister would be content for you to put the new date to the Iraqis.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



From the Secretary of State

John Holmes Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London, SW1A 2AL

24 March 1983

Dear John,

VISIT OF TAHA RAMADHAN, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

in box
I have seen a copy of your 15 March letter to John Coles, suggesting revised dates for Mr Ramadhan's visit of sometime between mid-May and 12 June.

The Secretary of State is thinking in terms of making overseas visits during this period. I am not yet in a position to approach you formally for the Foreign Secretary's approval, but it is very probable that he will be making a European visit between Thursday 26 May-Tuesday 31 May inclusive, and quite likely that he will be looking to make a Far Eastern visit very shortly afterwards in the first two weeks of June.

From the Secretary of State's point of view, therefore, it would clearly be preferable if any visit by Mr Ramadhan took place in the third or fourth weeks of May, and preferably the third week beginning Monday 16 May. Clearly, real difficulties could arise if, in the event, the Secretary of State was expected to co-chair a Joint Commission with Mr Ramadhan.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Coles (Number 10) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary

Irag : Proposed visit by 1st Dep. P.M
11/87

24 MAR 1983

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The only possibility
is talk followed by lunch
on Friday, 10 June.

15 March 1983

Agree?

A.F.C. 15/3.

*Simply that in
in the situation
means? If not - yes.*

Dear John,

Visit of Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime
Minister of Iraq

As you know, the above visit, which was to have taken place between 8-10 March, was postponed late in February by the Iraqis. They pleaded the war, the deteriorating economy and the call of the NAM Summit. They suggested rescheduling the visit to the second half of May or the month of June. The UK/Iraqi Joint Commission talks, and visit of Trade Minister Hassan Ali, due to take place between 8-10 March, were also postponed.

The Prime Minister's invitation to Mr Ramadhan has now been open for over a year. The arguments in favour of Mr Ramadhan's visit to the United Kingdom were set out in my letter to you of 7 January. These arguments remain valid, and while Iraqi behaviour so far is tiresome and there can be no guarantee that things will be better next time round, Mr Pym believes that it is in our best interests that the visit should go ahead, preferably before 12 June (since the fasting month of Ramadhan begins then, which could lead to complications for a visit later in the month). The Iraqis have asked that the Joint Commission talks should also be rescheduled to June, so that Taha Ramadhan can 'take the chair' on the Iraqi side. We and the Department of Trade are content to go along with this, but we have made it clear to our Ambassador in Baghdad that the Prime Minister would take no substantive part in the talks on the UK side, though some association between the joint Commission and the high level visit may in the event be appropriate.

The essential part of the programme for a visit by Ramadhan would be talks with the Prime Minister, followed by a meal. I should therefore be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to reschedule the arrangements

/for

CONFIDENTIAL



for talks and a meal to some time between mid-May and 12 June and if you could offer a specific date for this which we could put to the Iraqis.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Younger
for Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary



A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

T. Paul, N. 181,
visit of PM
deputy



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PS No 10.



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With the compliments of
MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH**

25.2.83.

GR 500

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 23 FEBRUARY, 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE DOT (OT5), MODUK (FOR DEFENCE SALES)

CONFIDENTIAL

cc J. Dawson.

PS No: 10

MY TELEGRAM NO 123 (NOT TO ALL): VISIT OF TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN.

1. SAHHAF, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, SUMMONED ME TO THE MFA THIS MORNING TO ANNOUNCE, WITH CONSIDERABLE REGRET, THAT, AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAD RELUCTANTLY COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT AFTER ALL BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 MARCH. SAHHAF, WHO WAS EVIDENTLY EMBARRASSED, SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE REASONS FOR RAMADHAN'S DECISION:-

- (A) THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE DELHI NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT FROM 7 TO 11 MARCH AS HEAD OF THE IRAQI DELEGATION SEMICOLON
- (B) THE THREAT OF A RENEWED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE TOWARDS AMARA FOR WHICH RAMADHAN'S RESPONSIBILITIES AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE THE POPULAR ARMY WOULD NECESSITATE HIS REMAINING IN THE COUNTRY SEMICOLON
- (C) RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE ECONOMY WHICH WAS NOW UNDER ACUTE PRESSURE.

2. RAMADHAN HAD INSTRUCTED SAHHAF TO SAY THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED WITH THE UTMOST RELUCTANCE BECAUSE RAMADHAN SINCERELY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN PARTICULAR TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WARMLY RECIPROCATED THE VIEW THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS OF THE KIND ENVISAGED WOULD ONLY BE OF BENEFIT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WHILE OFFERING HIS MOST SINCERE APOLOGIES FOR THE INCONVENIENCE THAT THIS LATE CHANGE OF PLANS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE, RAMADHAN HAD HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO RESCHEDULE THE VISIT EITHER TO THE SECOND HALF OF MAY OR TO ANY DATE IN JUNE. SAHHAF ADDED THAT RAMADHAN HAD WISHED HIM TO SAY THAT HE WOULD GIVE THE MOST CATEGORIC UNDERTAKING THAT, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS, A VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

3. I REPLIED TO SAHHAF THAT WHILE I WOULD OBVIOUSLY REPORT THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER'S DECISION HE COULD NOT EXPECT THAT YOU WOULD BE PLEASED. I DID NOT REFER TO THE LAST TWO OF THE THREE REASONS OFFERED FOR THE POSTPONEMENT (WHICH I REGARDED IN ANY CASE AS SPECIOUS WINDOW-DRESSING) BUT I SAID THAT I WAS ASTONISHED TO LEARN

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

THAT THE COINCIDENCE OVER THE DATES OF THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN RAMADHAN INITIALLY AGREED TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 MARCH, AT HIS MEETING WITH HM AMBASSADOR ON 22 JANUARY. SAHHAF ADMITTED LAMELY THAT THE POINT HAD INDEED BEEN OVERLOOKED. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO RAMADHAN HAD REMAINED OPEN NOW FOR OVER A YEAR AND THAT RESCHEDULING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS OF THIS SORT WAS INEVITABLY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. SAHHAF SAID THAT THE IRAQIS ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT NONETHELESS HOPED THAT ALTERNATIVE DATES IN THE PERIODS MENTIONED COULD BE FOUND.

4. I ASKED SAHHAF WHETHER THE DECISION TO POSTPONE RAMADHAN'S VISIT ALSO INCLUDED THE JOINT COMMISSION TALKS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN POSTPONED ONCE. DID THE IRAQIS NOW PROPOSE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSTPONED YET AGAIN IN ORDER TO TAKE PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH RAMADHAN'S VISIT (ASSUMING WE WERE ABLE TO ARRANGE ONE) OR WERE WE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE HASSAN ALI ALONE BETWEEN 8 AND 10 MARCH? SAHHAF REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE MINISTER OF TRADE'S PLANS BUT WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS MINISTRY IMMEDIATELY AND LET ME HAVE THE ANSWER WITHIN 24 HOURS.

RAMSAY

LIMITED)
ME)
MV)
PC)
NEWS)
PUS)
PS (MR HUR)
MR EYERTON

COPIES TO:
MR MARTIN,
OTS, D.O.T.

²
CONFIDENTIAL

Iraq

cf.



please
file.

cf. 14/2

10 DOWNING STREET

MR COLES

[Handwritten signature] 14/2

VISIT OF THE DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER OF IRAQ TO LONDON

As the Foreign Office have not heard from the Iraqis they are assuming that he will not be here next week. I have therefore taken the lunch out of the diary for the 16th.

[Handwritten signature]

11 February, 1983



file 207
Tracy

10 DOWNING STREET

MR COLES

cc:- Mrs Goodchild

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

Tom King's Office rang . He is a good friend of Mr. Ramadhan and would like to be included on the luncheon guest list when he comes.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

26 January, 1983



From the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

A J Coles Esq
 Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
 10 Downing Street
 London
 SW1

Prime Minister

IRAQ

Can we try to find 30 minutes
 for the Iraqi Trade Minister in
 the first few days of March?

A. J. C. 26/1

20 January 1983

VISITS OF IRAQI MINISTERS

The Secretary of State very much welcomed the Prime Minister's agreement to meet and host a lunch for the Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Ramadhan, when he visits this country in the second half of February.

Our exports to Iraq are likely to total about £800 million last year. It is a country where the award of any contracts of significance are very strongly influenced by political considerations. The Prime Minister's hospitality will be of great assistance in sustaining and improving our export effort.

A similar, if smaller, problem applies to the visit of the Iraqi Trade Minister, Hassan Ali, (shortly after Mr Ramadhan's own visit) for the new Anglo-Iraqi Joint Economic Commission scheduled for the week of 28 February. Mr Ali ranks highly in the Revolutionary Command Council, and was received by the Prime Minister when he last visited Britain to sign the agreement which established the Commission in June 1981. The businessmen who form our Department's Area Advisory Group - COMET - have frequently expressed the view that the rapid growth in our exports to Iraq over the past 18 months owes much to the success of Mr Ali's 1981 visit. The call on the Prime Minister then had clear substantial impact. A similar short courtesy call this year is very strongly advised. It is unfortunate that this would follow so shortly after Mr Ramadhan's own visit. But whether we like it or not, the Iraqis are extremely protocol conscious. If Mr Ali were disappointed, it would act to undermine the very favourable impression created by the hospitality for Mr Ramadhan. Mr Ali will be in London from 1 March to midday 4 March.

I am copying this to John Holmes (FCO), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), David Edmonds (Environment), and to David Hayhoe (Lord President's office), to whom I am writing separately suggesting that their Ministers might also be involved in Mr Ali's visit.

JOHN RHODES
 Private Secretary

16 Feb or 19 March. J. Peeg

FIVE SW



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January, 1983

Visit by First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 7 January. The Prime Minister could offer Mr. Ramadhan talks at noon followed by lunch on either 16 or 25 February.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Jonathan Spencer (Department of Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Iraq.



10 DOWNING STREET

Note for File

25th Feb is no longer a suitable date for PM to give a lunch for the Deputy PM of Iraq. This is one of the dates set aside for Anglo/Italian Summit.

Steve

17/1/83



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You could offer the Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister talks
followed by lunch on
either 16 or 25 Feb?
Contact?

7 January 1983

A. & C. $\frac{17}{1}$

Yes
m

Dear John,

Visit by Mr Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister

Francis Richards wrote to Michael Alexander on 23 November 1981 with a proposal that the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr Taha Ramadhan, should be invited by the Prime Minister to visit the United Kingdom as her guest. Michael Alexander's reply of 25 November 1981 recorded the Prime Minister's agreement.

Iraq's preoccupation with the war against Iran and Mr Ramadhan's ministerial responsibilities have prevented him from taking up the invitation before but he has spoken warmly of his interest in coming at the earliest possible time. He has now told us that he would like the visit to take place in late January or February. We understand that the Prime Minister's diary over both these periods is such that while she might be able to receive Mr Ramadhan for talks, she would be unable to offer him a meal.

Mr Pym believes that a visit by Mr Ramadhan soon would be useful. There has been a steady improvement in our bilateral relations over the past three years. Exports have risen steadily. 1982 figures seem certain to outstrip comfortably the 1981 record total of £680 million. Iraq's current economic problems caused by the war mean that we, and our competitors, are unlikely to sustain these levels next year. But when the war ends, Iraq promises to be a very lucrative market for our exporters. It is a difficult regime. There remain a number of thorny problems in our bilateral relations, mainly consular cases, but we have much to gain from developing closer links. Mr Ramadhan continues to be the economic overlord in Iraq. His visit would provide us with an opportunity to show him British industry and in particular to promote specific projects in which he will have a direct interest, eg Nimrod and Hawk.

/Unfortunately



Unfortunately, Mr Ramadhan can be very touchy about protocol. We need to offer him a programme which takes account of this and of his position as number two in the Ba'ath regime. So far as the official part of the programme is concerned, Mr Pym envisages a round of calls, as well as hospitality. He hopes that the Prime Minister ~~as nominal host~~ will agree to talks and a meal (as envisaged in Francis Richards's letter under reference). A call at noon followed by lunch might be the best arrangement. Mr Pym believes that it would jeopardise the success of the visit if the programme did not include the offer of a meal hosted by the Prime Minister. It would be better therefore to offer dates some way ahead, if necessary, than to offer earlier dates without the prospect of hospitality by Mrs Thatcher. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has advised that Mr Ramadhan will probably refuse to come if he is not offered hospitality by the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to talks and a meal as proposed, and if you could let me have perhaps alternative dates which we could put to the Iraqis for the visit.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and David Oman (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Iraq, Nov '81, visit by Mr Ramadan

17 JAN 1983

17 JAN 1983



R. R.

Carlisle
I agree. - 14/1
MR 14/1

MR. COLES

Visit of the Deputy Prime Minister of
Iraq

The Foreign Office have asked whether the Prime Minister could see him on Wednesday, 5 May, at 0930, as well as giving him lunch on Friday, 7 May, as she is nominal host. I am told she ought to see him on the first day of his visit.

It is OK by me if it is OK by you.

C.S.

14 January, 1982.

116

Tracy

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INDEX	PA	Section Take

GRS129
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FM FCO 241745Z NOV 81
 TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 685 OF 25 NOVEMBER

YOUR TEL 682: INWARD MINISTERIAL VISITS FROM IRAQ

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED TO INVITE TAHA RAMADHAN TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT AND TO ACT AS HIS NOMINAL HOST. YOU SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS A VISIT WITH TAHA RAMDHAN AND TO SEEK HIS VIEWS ON POSSIBLE TIMINGS. THE BEST DATES FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE 2/3 DAYS AROUND EITHER 7 MAY OR 16 JUNE, ON EITHER OF WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE FREE TO TAKE PART IN HIS PROGRAMME. YOU WILL NEED TO STRESS THAT ONCE DATES HAVE BEEN AGREED, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ALTER THEM.

2. WHEN DATES HAVE BEEN AGREED, WE SHALL ARRANGE FOR A FORMAL INVITATION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE FORWARDED TO YOU FOR DELIVERY.

CARRINGTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1981

VISIT BY THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 23 November suggesting that the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Taha Ramadhan, should be invited to this country. The Prime Minister is content that an invitation should be issued. You may, therefore, like to arrange for the despatch of the telegram enclosed with your letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1981

*NOT a very attractive guest,
I fear, but the visit might
be lucrative in the long run.*

Dear Michael,

Appl?

Amul. 23/x1

Yes mt

Lord Carrington has read with interest Mr Biffen's report to the Prime Minister of his successful visit to Baghdad at the beginning of October.

*filed on
Iraq July 89
Iraqi Iraq relations*

Lord Carrington has been considering proposals for further inward visits by Iraqi Ministers, and in particular a recommendation that the Prime Minister should be asked to extend an invitation to Mr Taha Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister, to come here as a guest of the Government.

The steady improvement in our relations with the Iraqis over the past year or so is encouraging. High-level visits have undoubtedly played a very valuable part in strengthening our links. The visits this year of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Trade Minister, and Oil Minister provided opportunities for frank exchanges on bilateral, regional and international issues. The Iraqis place much importance on these visits. Lord Carrington believes that they have contributed enormously towards improving our bilateral relations with the Iraqis. We are reaping the rewards in trade. As Mr Biffen has pointed out, Iraq is a lucrative market, albeit one which, for political reasons, we must watch carefully. The prospects are good, with exports currently running at a rate of £700 m.p.a.

Lord Carrington thinks that we need to keep up the momentum. He therefore believes that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to invite Taha Ramadhan to pay an official visit.

Ramadhan is in charge of Iraq's overall economic policy, is Commander of the People's Army, a 200,000 strong party militia, and is a senior member of the Revolutionary Command Council, second only to Saddam Hussein. His standing has grown since the war with Iran started to go wrong. He has considerable influence in the awarding of major contracts in industries immediately within his control. A visit here would provide an occasion for him to have useful talks and to see something of our industry. Ramadhan considers himself to be of Prime Ministerial rank (rather like Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, also a 'First Deputy Prime Minister'). This would necessarily mean some involvement by the Prime Minister with his programme, for the Iraqis are very conscious

/of their



of their dignity (and Taha Ramadhan can be personally very awkward on occasion). Lord Carrington would envisage therefore a round of official talks, and the Prime Minister being host at a lunch or dinner. In inviting Taha Ramadhan here, we would have to accept that he would be likely to invite the Prime Minister to repay his visit, perhaps in 1983. While the war with Iran continues, this would be out of the question. But if and when it ended, there could be arguments in favour of her accepting, perhaps including Iraq as part of a trip to other countries, eg Jordan or Turkey.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree in principle to invite Mr Taha Ramadhan sometime in May/June 1982. The Iraqis will be preoccupied next year with arrangements for the November Non-Aligned Movement summit, to which they are host, and this might lead them to use the summit as an excuse for putting off their acceptance until later in the year. But it would be appropriate, nevertheless, to put in our offer soon to demonstrate our interest. I enclose a draft of a telegram which subject to the Prime Minister's views we would propose to send to Baghdad.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Dept of Trade), Ian Ellison (Dept of Industry) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Francis Richards".

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	CONFIDENTIAL	PRIORITY

ZCZC
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CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

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3	CONFIDENTIAL
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5	
6	FM FCO 241745Z NOV 81
7	TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	YOUR TEL 682: INWARD MINISTERIAL VISITS FROM IRAQ
10	1. The Prime Minister has agreed to invite Taha Ramadhan to
11	pay an official visit and to act as his nominal host. You
12	should seek an early opportunity to discuss a visit with
13	Taha Ramdhan and to seek his views on possible timings. The
14	best dates from our point of view would be 2/3 days around
15	either 7 May or 16 June, on either of which the Prime Minister
16	would be free to take part in his programme. You will need to
17	stress that once dates have been agreed, it will be very
18	difficult to alter them.
19	2. When dates have been agreed, we shall arrange for a formal
20	invitation from the Prime Minister to be forwarded to you for
21	delivery.
22	///
23	//
24	/
25	


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