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PREM 19/1572

SECRET

PART ONEConfidential filing

Visits of President Machel of Mozambique in

July 1982 & Sept 1985.

MOZAMBIQUE.PTI: June 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
29.6.81		25.10.83					
11.7.81		6.12.83					
28.1.82		29/11/84					
10.3.82		24/9/85					
17.6.82		25.9.85					
15.9.82		27.9.85					
16.9.82		28.9.85					
6.10.82		/					
8.10.82		PTI					
12.10.82		GNDS					
14.3.83		/					
6.4.83							
3.4.83							
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10.5.83							
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16.5.83							
10.8.83							
3.10.83							
18.10.83							
19.10.83							
21.10.83							

PART 1 ends:-

Maputo Tel No 457 28/1/85

PART 2 begins:-

CDP to Pm. 2/2/87

GRS 200

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MAPUTO

TO DESKBY 300900Z FCOLN

TELNO 457

OF 281500Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, LISBON, HARARE, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, LUANDA.

MY TELNO 456: PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VISIT TO LONDON.

1. MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN LEAD STORY IN PRESS AND RADIO WITH FRONT PAGE PICTURE FROM NO 10.
2. MOZAMBICAN SPOKESMAN IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT PRIME MINISTER HAD REACTED WITH 'INDIGNATION' FOLLOWING MACHEL'S ACCOUNT OF SOUTH AFRICA VIOLATIONS OF NKOMATI AND AS HAVING PROMISED BRITISH GOVERNMENT 'WOULD DO EVERYTHING' TO SEE THAT ACCORD WAS FILLED AND PEACE REESTABLISHED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.
3. OFFER OF 14000 TONS CEREALS FOOD AID WAS GIVEN SECOND PROMINENCE, FOR WHILE MACHEL 'THANKED AS WELL AS FOR ALL THE HELP BRITAIN HAD GIVEN MOZAMBIQUE'.
4. SYMBOLISM OF OFFICIAL LUNCH BEING OFFERED AT LANCASTER HOUSE IS NOTED. MR RIFKIND IS DESCRIBED AS RECALLING AS HOST AT LUNCH MOZAMBIQUES AND PRESIDENT MACHEL'S ROLE IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS ON ZIMBABWE AND AS PRAISING MOZAMBIQUES EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN THE REGION. MACHEL IN REPLY IS REPORTED AS PRAISED 'THE POSITIVE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN FOOD AID, COOPERATION AND CONFIDENCE' AND MAKING A PLEDGE FOR THE 'MULTIFORM DEVELOPMENT' OF THIS COOPERATION.
5. OF MACHEL'S OTHER MEETINGS, THOSE WITH PRIME MINISTER OF BAHAMAS AND WITH TINY ROWLAND WERE SINGLED OUT.
6. TO-DAYS PRESS ALSO BRIEFLY REPORTS DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR OF MARROMEU (ZAMBESI RIVER DISTRICT) NOTING AIR SUPPLY OF RENAMO CONTINUING IN HIS DISTRICT WITH VIOLATIONS OF MOZAMBIQUE AIR SPACE.

VINES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)

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MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

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10 DOWNING STREET

File VC
cc Sir P. Casade

From the Private Secretary

27 September 1985

Dear Sir,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

The Prime Minister received President Machel of Mozambique this morning. The President was accompanied by Sr. Chissano, Sr. Veloso, Sr. Honawa and Sr. Muradi. Mr. Rifkind was also present.

Renamo

The Prime Minister invited President Machel to tell her about the situation in Mozambique and particularly the continuing problems with Renamo. President Machel said that after his meeting with the Prime Minister in Moscow last March and her intervention with a number of other governments, matters had improved and external support for Renamo had declined. However, there continued to be problems with Malawi where the security forces were providing covert support for Renamo. Possibly President Banda was not aware of this. South Africa and Israel were both also continuing to provide Renamo with practical assistance. In Israel's case this appeared to be seen as means of putting pressure on Mozambique to establish diplomatic relations.

President Machel continued that since the meeting of the Front Line states in March and the provision of military help from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, Mozambique had achieved a number of successes in military operations against Renamo. These had unearthed very large quantities of ammunition, explosives and medical supplies (he provided a wealth of detail). More disturbingly, they had also revealed ample documentary evidence of South Africa's continuing involvement with Renamo. For instance, there was evidence that South Africa had deliberately infiltrated armed Renamo supporters into Mozambique immediately before signing the Nkomati Accord. There was clear proof that the former South African Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Nel, had visited Renamo bases as recently as the middle of August. President Machel said that he was inclined to regard this involvement as largely the work of the South African military, who were a state within a state. He had confronted Pik Botha with the evidence recently and had received no convincing explanation.

The Prime Minister said that she had raised the question of Renamo with Dr. Banda during his State Visit.

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He had denied that the Malawi Government was providing any support to them though he had implied that there might be some freelance help. The Prime Minister continued that she was very disturbed to hear of South Africa's duplicity in this matter. Would President Machel wish her to send a message to President Botha reporting on their discussion and urging South Africa to abide by its commitments under the Nkomati Accord? We might have some influence as a country which had stood out against economic sanctions. President Machel confirmed that this would be very helpful. The Prime Minister's earlier messages to the South African Government on Mozambique's behalf had been well received.

Bilateral Relations

The Prime Minister said that she was pleased that arrangements had been made to enable BMATT in Zimbabwe to provide training for Mozambiquean forces. She hoped that President Machel was content with them. President Machel said that he had met the Commander of BMATT and discussed the type of training with him. He was well content with what was being offered.


The Prime Minister said that we were ready to provide Mozambique with a further 14,000 tonnes of food aid to help overcome current difficulties. President Machel expressed gratitude for this. He added that President Reagan had asked him whether he enjoyed good relations with the Prime Minister and he had replied that they were excellent.

South Africa

The Prime Minister said that she understood that President Machel was not happy with her views on economic sanctions against South Africa. She would like to explain her position very clearly. Britain observed the mandatory United Nations' arms embargo against South Africa. As a matter of practice, we did not export crude oil to South Africa. But she did not believe that full economic sanctions were desirable. There was no point in creating unemployment in Britain in order to create it in South Africa. Rather, economic growth in South Africa offered the best prospect for the early dismantling of apartheid; and in the longer term such growth was essential if all the people of South Africa were to enjoy prosperity when apartheid was eventually abolished. Moreover, she did not believe that it made sense to talk of economic sanctions now at the very moment when the process of change and reform in South Africa was at last underway. There was no doubt that important changes were afoot even though they were not skilfully presented. Of course much remained to be done. In particular the South African Government must be prepared to negotiate with the chosen representatives of black people. The Prime Minister continued that we had recently announced a decision to recall our defence attaches from South Africa. She did not think this would have any practical effect, indeed it would deprive us of the means of finding out what the South African military were up to in Mozambique.

President Machel said that the Prime Minister was not properly informed about his position on economic sanctions. He attached particular importance to two changes in South Africa: the first was the establishment of common citizenship; the other an announcement that apartheid was to be abandoned and a framework established within which the future of the country could be discussed. He believed that the threat of economic sanctions was an important factor in encouraging the South African Government to move towards these steps. But he was not suggesting that economic sanctions should be applied immediately. They were a sort of reserve power for the future. The Prime Minister said that she found this clarification very useful.

I am copying this letter to John Mogg (Department of Trade and Industry), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTERCALL BY PRESIDENT MACHEL: 27 SEPTEMBER

He comes at 1100 for 45 minutes. He will be accompanied
by:

Sr. Chissano	-	Foreign Minister
Sr. Veloso	-	Minister for Economic Affairs
Sr. Honawa	-	Adviser
Sr. Muradi	-	Mamdhusen

Mr. Rifkind and Ewen Fergusson will attend for us.

You may prefer the meeting to be in the Cabinet Room since
there will also be interpreters present.

C.D.V.

Charles Powell

26 September 1985

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PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL

You may like to glance at the papers for this meeting tonight, since there will be little time tomorrow.

The attached flash telegram reports heavy explosions this afternoon in Maputo. This may induce Machel to go straight home from New York.

If he still comes the main subjects will be:-

- the activities of Renamo. There is recent evidence that the South Africans are still involved in supporting them (and ^{Renamo} they probably caused the explosions in Maputo). But we want to encourage Machel to stick to the Nkomati Accord. And you can tell him that you took up his complaints about external support for Renamo with President Banda and with the South Africans.
- Sanctions against South Africa. He is coming as the emissary of the Front Line States. But actually he has little appetite for sanctions, from which Mozambique would suffer badly. You will want to explain your reasons for opposing sanctions.

Bull points to mention are our decision to give Mozambique military training through BMATT in Zimbabwe; and the additional food aid of £1.3 million we are giving.

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You might show knowledge of the fact that Mrs. Machel, who doubles as Minister of Education, is staying on for an official visit until 5 October.

C.D.P.

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(C.D. Powell)

25 September, 1985

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→ cc Mr Powell (No 10)

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FM MAPUTO
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 447
OF 251555Z SEPTEMBER

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

[H/CAS]

H/S AF

J. H/S (PUS)

H/NEWS

PS

PS/R. R. L. L. L.

R. FERGUSON

~~MA JONES~~

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, HARARE, MBABANE
INFO ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM, LILONGWE, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MAPUTO: SECURITY SITUATION.

1. HEAVY EXPLOSIONS HAVE SHAKEN MAPUTO SINCE MID AFTERNOON (1545) WITH SMOKE AT AIRPORT PERIMETER. FROM MY PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE IT APPEARS THAT MUNITIONS STORE AT NORTH OF AIRPORT 6 KMS FROM TERMINAL APPEARS TO HAVE GONE UP, FORCE OF EXPLOSIONS HAVE BLOWN MANY WINDOWS IN CENTRE AND ELSEWHERE. SOME ROCKETS AND SHELLS HAVE FALLEN IN CITY. BUT IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR YET WHETHER THESE WERE STRAYS FROM EXPLOSIONS OR RENAMOS OWN EXPLOSIONS. EXPLOSIONS ARE NOW DIMINISHING.
2. WE HAVE TWO HOURS OF DAYLIGHT. DURING MY RECCE NEAR AUPPORT I HEARD NO SMALL ARMS FIRE BUT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MASKED BY THE HEAVY EXPLOSIONS. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THEN OF MILITARY SEALING OFF ROADS ENTRANCES TO TOWN BUT MANY HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE FROM THE REED CITY WERE CROSSING INTO THE MAIN TOWN. SOME SEALING OF ROADS HAS NOW BEEN DONE AND RADIO STATION NEXT TO EMBASSY IS HEAVILY GUARDED NOW AND ACCESS LIMITED. THE GUARDS AT MAIN BUILDINGS WERE ON ALERT BUT NOT UNDER OBVIOUS FRESH COMMAND. AIRPORT BUILDINGS AND AIRCRAFT ARE UNSAFE.
3. EMBASSY STAFF ARE SAFE AND GROUPED AT RESIDENCE OR WITH FRIENDS IN NEIGHBOURHOOD RATHER THAN CHANCERY, BECAUSE RADIO STATION WOULD BE MAIN TARGET OF ANY ATTACK.
4. TELEPHONES AND TELEX ARE STILL WORKING. WE ARE WORKING THROUGH CONTACT WITH COMMUNITY ALL WELL. QUALITAIR AT AIRPORT ALL SAFE AND HAVE COME INTO TOWN.
5. TODAY IS ARMY DAY CELEBRATING 21 YEARS OF FIRST ATTACK OF FRELIMO. MACHEL IS SPEAKING THIS AFTERNOON IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SABOTAGE IS WELL TIMED. IF IT IS MORE THAN A SALLY WE SHALL KNOW BY MORNING IF RENAMO SHOULD USE COVER OF NIGHT TO COME IN TO CITY. THE ARMY HAS FURTHER MOVED SINCE ABOVE INTO POSITION TO GUARD KEY AREAS AND TARGETS. RADIO MOZAMBIQUE HAS BROADCAST A STATEMENT CONFIRMING DESTRUCTION OF MUNITIONS DUMP, UPGING POPULATION TO REMAIN INDOORS AND REASSURING POPULACE THAT SITUATION IS UNDER CONTROL.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 September 1985

Dear Charles,

Please keep in
back-up folder
CDB copied
to back-up.

Call by President Machel: 27 September

I enclose three copies of a brief for the Prime Minister. You will see that we suggest she should take this opportunity to inform President Machel of our willingness to make another gift of food aid.

Machel is likely to be driven straight to No 10 from Heathrow, since there will probably not be time for him to stop off at his hotel on the way. He will be accompanied by Mr Rifkind, who will have met him at the airport (and who will be hosting a lunch for him at Lancaster House later in the day); Sr Chissano, the Foreign Minister; Sr Veloso, Minister for Economic Affairs; Sr Honwana from the Presidency, who will interpret for the President; Dr Isobel Taylor, our interpreter; and Sr Muradi Mamdhusen, President Machel's Private Secretary, as note-taker.

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that Sra Machel, who is also Minister for Education and Culture, will be staying on in Britain until 5 October for an official visit.

I am writing separately about one other aspect of the briefing for the Prime Minister.

The Mozambicans have asked for Press and TV photographs of the call. We shall be in touch about this separately.

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE
- FRIDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1985

OUR OBJECTIVES

- a) To encourage President Machel to maintain his Nkomati policies and reassure him of our continuing support.
- b) To explain our policy towards South Africa especially on sanctions.

ARGUMENTS

- a) We will maintain our political, economic and military support for him.
- b) Wish now to offer further assistance of 14,000 tonnes of grain valued at approximately £1.3m.
- c) Dismayed by South African breaches of Nkomati. Admired Machel's statesmanlike handling of issue. South Africans have told us will take steps to avoid repetitions. How Machel now sees future relations with South Africa?
- d) Understand current concentration on military operations; congratulate on recent Mozambique/Zimbabwean joint operation against Renamo headquarters.
- e) The arguments on sanctions are well-known to the Prime Minister.

TACTICAL ARGUMENTS

- a) We are ready to make sacrifices to achieve justice in South Africa, but need to believe that they will produce desired changes in a reasonable time; not the case with sanctions. [cf Machel's action in banning ANC military activity in Mozambique.]
- b) Severe economic damage to Mozambique of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.

HIS OBJECTIVES

- a) Our continuing support in struggle against Renamo, possibly asking for greater aid (economic and military), ECGD credit and private investment.
- b) To seek our support over South African breaches of Nkomati Accord.
- c) Greater UK pressure, including selective sanctions, on South Africa and Western aid to offset their effects on the FLS.

YOUR RESPONSE

- a) Following Foreign Minister's visit in July, have increased economic aid by £1m.
- b) Have made both bilateral and international approaches to reduce supply of arms and finance to Renamo. Have investigated reports of UK involvement. Will continue to act if further details are provided.
- c) The arguments on sanctions are well-known to the Prime Minister.

PRESS LINE

1. Prime Minister and President had a useful and positive discussion of Southern African issues. Shared views on need for peaceful solutions. Prime Minister emphasised continuing support for President's Nkomati policies.
2. Both attached importance to urgent progress on political reform within South Africa.
3. Prime Minister announced gift of further 14,000 tonnes grain valued at approximately £1.3m.
4. (If asked). Breaches of Nkomati Accord by South Africa. Prime Minister deeply disturbed by these revelations. We and partners have frequently stressed need to suppress supply of arms and finance to Renamo.

BACKGROUND

1. Prime Minister last met the President in Moscow in March this year.
2. President Machel calling this time at his request on way back to Mozambique from an official visit to the USA during which he addressed the UN General Assembly. Sra Machel, Minister of Education and Culture, staying on until 5 October for official visit.
3. Prime Minister also met President during his official visit to UK in October 1983.
4. See Annexes I, II and III.

Central African Department
September 1985



ANNEX I

MOZAMBIQUE: POLITICALInternal

1. Level of Renamo operations first half of year showed no sign of diminishing. Included Maputo province but unable to disrupt 10th Anniversary celebrations in June. Inflicted power cuts on Maputo and sabotaged Maputo-South African railway and roads.

2. Joint Mozambique/Zimbabwean offensive against Renamo headquarters in Central Mozambique launched late August. Full details not yet received but early reports indicate some success. Too soon to say, however, what effect on future Renamo activities.

Nkomati Process

3. In March, President Machel criticised South Africa over failure of Nkomati to bring peace. Reported his misgivings to Prime Minister in Moscow and requested military assistance. Training (due to start early 1986) and gift of radios agreed.

4. Machel still committed to Nkomati but more cautious in dealings with South Africa. His suspicions that South Africa still supports Renamo will have been deepened by the discovery, during the recent joint offensive, of evidence of their direct involvement. This evidence was presented to South African Foreign Minister Mr R F 'Pik' Botha by President Machel in Maputo just prior to his departure for the USA and consists of a diary containing accounts of contacts between South Africa and Renamo over a two-year period up to July this year. It mentions arms deliveries, a number of visits by the then Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa, Louis Nel, to Mozambique for contacts with Renamo and assistance to Renamo in the construction of an airstrip by South Africa.

5. At a further meeting on 19 September in Komatipoort between Mozambique and South African delegations, 'Pik' Botha is reported to have admitted the truth of some of the notes in the diary and added that contact with Renamo had been for humanitarian purposes. He described the violations of the Nkomati Accord as "technical".



6. The Mozambican Minister of Security has said that he is not convinced by Pik Botha's explanations. Analysis of documents not yet completed but South African interference in Zimbabwe also revealed. No further meetings planned between Mozambique and South Africa but Mozambique Interior Minister sees day to day cooperation with South Africa continuing. Nkomati still has value for Mozambique. South Africa DFA official has told us that revelations of breaches are embarrassing to South Africa. He added that steps would be taken to avoid a repetition.

UK/Mozambique Relations

7. Friendly since independence. Much warmer following President's official visit to UK October 1983 and subsequent meeting with Prime Minister in November 1984 (Delhi) and March 1985 (Moscow). Foreign Minister, Chissano, visited in July 1985. Sra Machel, President's wife and Minister of Education and Culture, staying on till 5 October for official visit. Princess Anne will visit Mozambique in November.

UK Military Assistance

8. Providing training team at BMATT, Zimbabwe for Mozambique officers and senior NCOs. Six instructors plus associated equipment and camp facilities. Begins early 1986. Cost £300,000.

9. Gift of radio equipment to be supplied (£200,000).

10. Two Mozambican students at Sandhurst. Doing well. Two places agreed for next year.

UK Political Assistance

11. Have continued lobbying to limit arms and financial flow to Renamo. Have covered bilaterally considerable number of countries, some at highest level. Inspired EC Declaration of February 1984. Have followed up Mozambique reports of UK citizens involvement; no evidence of activities supporting Renamo from UK but will keep under review.

ANNEX IIMOZAMBIQUE: ECONOMICAid

1. Over the past three years gross bilateral aid expenditure has increased from £2m to estimated £11m in current year.
2. Most of this for raw materials and spare parts to rehabilitate existing industries and infrastructure, principally in agriculture sector and light manufacturing.

Food Aid

3. New allocation of 14,000 tonnes grain (approximate value £1.3m) agreed under 1985 bilateral food aid programme: 11,000 tonnes was provided from 1984.

Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

4. In addition to bilateral programme over £11m has been agreed for railway and port improvement projects located in Mozambique but of regional benefit.

European Development Fund

5. Mozambique's provisional allocation under Lome III is 145m ECU (£83m), of which our contribution is some 17%.

IBRD/IMF

6. The World Bank have agreed an emergency rehabilitation credit of \$45m. Further credits are likely to carry greater conditionality.
7. The IMF have so far been unable to set up a programme for Mozambique but have offered assistance to improve the statistical data base.

ECGD Cover (Commitment levels NOT to be disclosed)

8. All cover, including Short Term, suspended April 1984 pending Paris Club rescheduling.



9. Outside Short Term field we have liabilities of £30m; £3m against Section 1 market limit and £27m against Section 2 limit. Most are caught up in rescheduling.

Rescheduling

10. Mozambique agreed with Paris Club, October 1984, to reschedule arrears at 30 June 1984 and debts falling due up to 30 June 1985. A goodwill clause included for further debts up to 30 June 1986.

11. Way is clear to agree a bilateral and officials are currently discussing this.

Outlook

12. Notwithstanding Paris Club agreement there is, in line with previous Ministerial decisions, no question of new ECGD medium term cover in foreseeable future. Question of resumption of short term cover currently under review within ECGD following settlement of short term arrears in accordance with Paris Club agreement.

Trade

13. Trade with UK modest and considerably fluctuating. Unlikely to increase while guerrilla war continues except to take advantage of multilateral trade following Mozambique accession to IBRD and Lome III.

14. Main UK exports: industrial plant and machinery, spares and transport equipment.

15.	£m		
	1982	1983	1984
UK Exports	14.5	28.6	15.7
UK Imports	10.6	9.2	8.6

UK Investment

16. Lonrho has invested in agriculture and is largest foreign investor. Extending its involvement into mining and tourism. BP has investment in oil storage and distribution facilities. Standard Chartered Bank have a subsidiary (Banco Standard Totta de Mocambique) in Maputo.



ANNEX III

REPORT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VISIT TO THE USA

General

1. The State Department have confirmed that the visit went well. Machel had talks and lunch with President Reagan, breakfast with Vice President Bush and separate talks with Schultz, Weinberger, Block, McPherson and members of both Houses of Congress. In addition to Washington, he also visited Atlanta, Houston and New York where he addressed the General Assembly. Crocker described the visit publicly as an important step in consolidating US/Mozambique relations.
2. Machel's meeting with President Reagan went exceptionally well; the two men established a good rapport.
3. No new bilateral agreements were signed and there was no discussion of aid levels.

South Africa

4. Machel expressed general interest in helping to promote dialogue between the Government and blacks but without putting forward any detailed ideas. He expressed support for Reagan's 9 September measures taking line that pressure on SAG worked and that more was needed. In his talks on the Hill, he was careful to call for more pressure and to avoid use of the word sanctions. He urged that consequent difficulties for Mozambique should be used as excuse for failure to exert pressure on SAG.

Nkomati Accord

5. In lengthy discussion with Americans Machel stressed that there was now clear proof of repeated South African violations. Captured documents would need further study. He implied that he expected further discussions with the South Africans.

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

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cc: P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET

24 September, 1985

From the Private Secretary

VISIT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 24 September about the arrangements for the Prime Minister's meeting with President Machel. We can agree to have all those for whom President Machel has asked to be present. If Mr. Rifkind and Mr. Fergusson want to attend I am sure the Prime Minister would not object, though they may themselves feel that it is not necessary for them both to be there.

(C.D. Powell)

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'C.D. Powell'.

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 September 1985

Dear Charles,

Visit of President Machel of Mozambique

Thank you for your letter of 4 September in which you conveyed the Prime Minister's agreement to receive President Machel on Friday 27 September. (The time of the call has since been changed to 1100-1145.)

The Mozambicans have now confirmed that President Machel will arrive in London from the USA at 0900 that day. The Mozambicans have told us that President Machel will be accompanied to No 10 by Sr Chissano, the Foreign Minister, and Sr Veloso, Minister in the Presidency for Economic Affairs (and leader of the Mozambican team which negotiated the Nkomati Accord). Sr Honwana from the Presidency would act as interpreter. We have made clear the Prime Minister's wishes about numbers, but the Mozambicans have asked if the President's Private Secretary could also attend as note-taker. On our side Mr Rifkind and Ewen Fergusson are available if wanted, and we shall provide an interpreter (Dr Isobel Turner). I should be grateful for a decision on the extra Mozambican.

We shall submit briefing on 25 September in the normal way.


*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique, visit of Michel; June 81.



SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

SIR J FREELAND

MR JOHNSON

MR O'NEILL

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

HD/UND

HD/NEWS DEPT

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SENT

23 SEP 1985

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

YELNO 440

OF 230600Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 432 (DTG 171500): PRESIDENT MACHELS VISIT TO UNITED STATES.

1. US EMBASSY HERE SAY WASHINGTON PART OF VISIT WENT WELL AND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MACHEL HIT IT OFF AFTER BUSINESSLIKE MEETING. BOTH WERE IN GOOD FORM AT OFFICIAL LUNCH ENJOYING EACH OTHERS COMPANY, WITH MANY EXCHANGES OF JOKES AND LAUGHTER. MACHEL MORE THAN HELD HIS OWN WITH CONGRESSMEN AT SEPARATE MEETING WITH FIRM ASSERTIONS OF MOZAMBIQUES INDEPENDENCE AND GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT.
2. LITTLE OF CONTENT OF MACHELS MEETINGS HAS BEEN REPORTED HERE. REPORTING HAS BEEN RESTRAINED AVOIDING BUILD-UP OF EXPECTATIONS OF FOR EXAMPLE SIGNIFICANT ANNOUNCEMENTS OF FURTHER US AID. WHILE EMPHASISING CORE OF MACHELS MESSAGE AS BEING THAT APARTHEID MUST BE ABOLISHED NOT JUST REFORMULATED AND THAT SANCTIONS WERE DESIRABLE IF IMPLEMENTED SERIOUSLY BY WESTERN COUNTRIES WITH STRONG ECONOMIC TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA WITH COMPENSATING SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIES OF THE FLS AFFECTED. PRESENTATION HAS BEEN THAT MOZAMBIQUE AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE MANY POSITIONS IN COMMON ON THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING SOUTHERN AFRICA. IF THERE WERE DIFFERING VIEWS ON PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE THAT WAS ONLY "NORMAL".
3. WE GATHER THAT AMERICANS WERE STILL TRYING TO DO A HEAD COUNT OF DELEGATION AND CHECKING WHO WAS THERE MANY HTURS AFTER ARRIVAL (SEE MIFT FOR FULL LIST NOW PASSED TO US). MACHEL ALSO ARRIVED TIRED AFTER OVER NIGHT FLIGHT, AS NO ONE HERE HAD REMEMBERED TO SPECIFY FULL SLEEPERS FOR THE CHARTERED AIRCRAFT.

COMMENT

4. ALTHOUGH MACHEL APPEARS TO HAVE CALLED FOR THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS TO END APARTHEID AND FOR SUPPORT FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO ENABLE SOUTH AFRICAS NEIGHBOURS TO AVOID THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS, IT IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR WHETHER MACHEL WAS CALLING FOR FULL MANDATORY SANCTIONS OR WHETHER HE WAS SIMPLY URGING THE AMERICANS TO BE METICULOUS IN APPLYING THEIR OWN, LIMITED MEASURES.

VINES

SRW AHX

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 September 1985

POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 3 September about President Machel's wish to visit London and meet the Prime Minister.

The date in question, 27 September, is difficult for the Prime Minister and she will be away from No.10 for most of the day. She is however ready to make a particular effort to see President Machel and could offer him 45 minutes from 1030-1115. But I must emphasise that this is the only time which the Prime Minister can manage on that day; and she cannot offer a lunch or dinner.

It would also be helpful if it could be made clear to the Mozambiques at this stage that attendance at the meeting will be very limited. (When Machel came to see the Prime Minister at our Embassy in Moscow earlier this year, he arrived with at least 20 staff who attempted to take the main staircase by storm and had to be physically restrained.) Attendance at the meeting should be limited to the President plus two (and an interpreter). A maximum of two other staff - ie, ADCs - will be admitted to No.10 to wait for the President.

[Handwritten signature]

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Charles,

POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

President Machel will be travelling to the USA for a meeting with President Reagan on 19 September and an address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September. His office have told our Embassy that he would like to pay a short visit to London as part of the same trip. The Mozambicans first asked for 16/17 September. When we explained that the Prime Minister would then be away, they proposed 27 September. President Machel has sent his Minister of Economic Affairs, Sr Veloso, and one other senior aide to London to try to work out mutually convenient timing. They will be calling on Mr Rifkind at 1430 on 4 September.

It is clear that President Machel attaches great importance to a call on the Prime Minister at this time. You will recall from the Prime Minister's conversation with him in Moscow in March his deep concern about the failure of the Nkomati Accord to bring an improvement in the security situation within Mozambique and his strong suspicion of South African motives. Since then the security situation has if anything worsened. It is important for our wider interests in the region to encourage him to persevere with the Nkomati process, and our recent offer of a package of military aid was made with that aim in mind. President Machel values his personal contact with the Prime Minister and would undoubtedly much appreciate agreement to his request for a meeting. We know that the US Administration would see such a call as useful both in bolstering President Machel's status and in countering criticism within certain circles in Washington of President Machel's visit there. A call on the Prime Minister would have the additional advantage to us of giving a high profile to our bilateral relations with a leading Front Line State prior to CHOGM and the expected controversy there over economic sanctions against South Africa.

There is however a complication. The guerrilla movement in Mozambique, Renamo, have seized a British technician, Mr Blakey. They have agreed to release him, so far without demanding conditions, but this may not have happened by the end of this month. There is a danger that they would see a

/visit

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visit by President Machel as a provocation and delay the release and possibly impose difficult conditions. This could lead to public criticism here that we should have foreseen and avoided such a development. Nevertheless, the danger of retaliation is only limited: there is some evidence that Renamo aim to free the prisoners with minimum fuss.

Given this difficulty - in addition to the great pressure on the Prime Minister's diary - we would not have recommended taking the initiative in inviting President Machel. However, in view of the pressure from President Machel for a meeting with the Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that we should run the limited risk of Renamo retaliation and agree to a visit by President Machel and a call on the Prime Minister. We realise that the Prime Minister's diary is very full in this period, but Sir Geoffrey Howe hopes that she will be able to offer a call on 27 September or a date soon thereafter.

Should the Prime Minister not feel able to agree to this, Mr Rifkind would need to explain the reasons carefully to President Machel's aides on 4 September. He would propose to say that the Prime Minister would have much liked to receive President Machel but unfortunately at this short notice her programme was completely full; she would wish to emphasise once more her strong support for President Machel in the difficult problems he was facing; and she hoped for another opportunity to meet him in the not too distant future. It would much help if Mr Rifkind were also authorised to say that the Prime Minister would be sending a personal message to President Machel (which we would envisage covering much the same ground: we would submit a draft).

It would be most helpful if you could let me know by lunch-time on 4 September whether the Prime Minister can agree to a call by President Machel and, if so, when.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

JKRA0J

bCPC



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November 1984

MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 28 November dealing with points raised with the Prime Minister by President Machel on 3 November.

The Prime Minister is content for HM Ambassador in Maputo to speak on the lines proposed in the last paragraph of your letter.

(C.D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CS

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 November, 1984

Prime Minister

These are the points
which President Machel
raised with you in Delhi.

Agree that our Ambassador
should reply in your name
on the lines suggested?

Mozambique

Yes no

CDP
20/11

Thank you for your letter of 5 November about the Prime Minister's meeting with President Machel in New Delhi on 3 November. We have consulted the other Departments concerned about the points raised.

Action has been taken in response to President Machel's request for help in deterring Portuguese citizens from giving assistance to Renamo. The Prime Minister, as you know, raised the question in general terms with Dr Soares on 21 November and the Foreign Secretary did so with Foreign Minister Gama on 8 November. The issue has also been discussed at official level with the Political Director of the Portuguese MFA. The Portuguese reaction has been largely negative, although they are considering some helpful steps. Not surprisingly, the Portuguese have pointed out that their Government cannot act against Portuguese Renamo leaders unless they have broken Portuguese law, and that in any case Renamo sympathisers, including those of Portuguese nationality, operate mainly from South Africa. Less convincingly, the Portuguese insist that the Renamo problem must be resolved by Mozambique, South Africa and Renamo. Despite this negative response, the Portuguese Government are considering whether there are grounds for prosecuting any of the Portuguese Renamo leaders: we must hope that this threat may induce Renamo to moderate their activities in Portugal.

We are well aware of the difficulties being experienced by Malawi as a result of dislocation of its traditional routes through Mozambique. This is due to a combination of mismanagement and Renamo activities within Mozambique. We have agreed to a Mozambican request for a management study of the Nacala railway line. We are also financing at a cost of some £0.9m the upgrading of the alternative road link from Malawi through Tanzania. This is probably the most we can do at present. Our main effort as regards Mozambique's transit routes is aimed at links with Zimbabwe (the Limpopo railway and Maputo port), and we do not have the resources for a major project for the links with Malawi. Rehabilitation of the Nacala link is in any

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/case



case already partly covered by a number of other Western countries. Incidentally, President Machel's reference to banditry and corruption in Malawi is difficult to understand. The banditry exists within Mozambique rather than Malawi, and corruption does not seem to play a large part in either country.

President Machel also asked the Prime Minister to encourage British firms to participate in the restoration of the Beira/Zimbabwe railway. This project is at a very early stage of planning and the Mozambicans would like us to find a preparatory study. It is very unlikely that we should be able to take on the whole restoration project: as stated above, our limited resources are already pledged for other aspects of Zimbabwe's transit links. Probably the most promising source of funds for the Beira/Zimbabwe railway would be a multilateral agency, and we propose to tell the Mozambicans that we would be ready to support any approach by them to an agency to which we contribute. We would of course encourage British firms to put in tenders for any contracts which might result. In addition we shall keep under review the possibility of making a limited contribution from our aid programme, though we shall have to weigh this against other claims on our limited resources.

If you agree, we shall ask our Ambassador in Maputo to inform President Machel of the action taken with the Portuguese authorities on the question of Renamo, and comment as suitable on aid for Malawi's transit routes and our attitude towards the Beira/Zimbabwe railway.



Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Mozambique : Relatins : Aug 79



28 NOV 1984

For Attention
John no.

SUBJECT



cc master
cc 710
Rm
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 204/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 December 1983

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your letter of 10 November. I too feel that your visit to London was of great importance in furthering friendship and understanding between our two countries, and share your hope that we may build upon this still more in the coming months and years. May I express once again my gratitude for your kind invitation: it remains my hope that I shall be able to take it up at a mutually convenient date.

Yours sincerely

Maya and Shalita

His Excellency President Samora Moises Machel

25

file

SSG

1 December 1983

PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VISIT

The Prime Minister has noted the contents
of your letter of 21 November.

A. L. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

lu



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 November 1983

Type letter pl.

AB $\frac{1}{12}$

Dear Sir,

/ I attach a letter to the Prime Minister from
/ President Machel of Mozambique, together with a
suggested short reply. The President has also written
in warm terms to The Queen.

There is, as you know, already much evidence for the
view that the visit of President Machel made a very
favourable impression upon the President and his party
(my letter of 21 November).

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+**FROM:**

Reference

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:**TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

HE Marechal Samora Moises Machel
President of the People's Republic
of Mozambique

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 10 November. I too feel that your visit to London was of great importance in furthering friendship and understanding between our two countries, and share your hope that we may build upon this still more in the coming months and years. May I express once again my gratitude for your kind invitation: it remains my hope that I shall be able to take it up at a mutually convenient date.

NR 1/12

Enclosures—flag(s).....

CONFIDENTIAL

2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

To note.

21 November 1983

A. J. C. ^{22.}/₁₁

AFSC

To see o.r.

MB

22/11

John T. ...

President Machel's Visit

You may wish to have a short assessment of the impact of the visit.

President Machel was clearly delighted by his reception here. He has told our Ambassador how impressed and touched he was by the warm reception by Her Majesty and by the friendliness, charm and knowledgeable understanding of Southern African affairs shown by the Prime Minister. The stay in London, together with that in Lisbon, was clearly the highlight of the Western European tour.

There is some ground to hope that this experience has influenced President Machel's political thinking. Both the South African Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, and the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Mr Frank Wisner, have told us what a great impression President Machel's visit to Europe made on him. Indeed, Mr Wisner went so far as to suggest that it had helped tip the balance in President Machel's mind in favour of trying to open up relations with the West, including South Africa and the USA. Mr Wisner's comments followed his own visit to Maputo which has convinced him that the Mozambique Government are in the process of a significant evolution in their external relations. Mr Wisner believes that a re-alignment is under way and that the Mozambicans are prepared to take risks in their relationship with the Soviet Union. He considers that an across the board agreement between Mozambique and South Africa is in prospect.

This might prove too optimistic. President Machel will continue to rely on the Soviet Union as long as his security is under threat. There are formidable obstacles to be overcome before a modus vivendi

/can be

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

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can be reached between Mozambique and South Africa. It is not clear whether Pretoria want such an arrangement and are prepared to restrict their support for the Mozambique Resistance Movement. However, Mr Pik Botha told Mr Rifkind that there might just be a possibility of coming to grips with Mozambique. A further bilateral meeting at ministerial level is likely to be held soon.

There is an obvious danger of disillusionment setting in after President Machel's euphoria over his visit to London and elsewhere in Western Europe. The aid and investment will almost certainly not meet his expectations. And agreement with South Africa could prove impossible. However there is now a better prospect than at any time in the past for lowering tensions between Mozambique and South Africa and for eventually breaking Mozambique's dependence on the Soviet Union. Even if these hopes run into the sand, President Machel's visit will not have been wasted. We know that his satisfaction with the visit has been carefully noted by neighbouring black African states. It will have given us greater flexibility to conduct our dialogue with South Africa without penalty and promote our interests in Southern Africa generally. There have also been two immediate returns. President Machel has kept his promise to urge Prime Minister Mugabe to mend his fences with us. And, unlike last year, Mozambique did not vote with Argentina in the UN General Assembly Falklands debate. The Mozambican delegation have told us it was deliberately absent from the vote. While bilateral difficulties with Argentina may have been a reason, the London visit almost certainly had an effect.

These developments confirm our belief that, whatever his Marxist leanings, President Machel is first and foremost an African nationalist, and that we are right to maintain our effort, together with our allies, to encourage his evident desire to lessen his dependence on the Soviet Union and cooperate with the West in seeking solutions to his country's problems.


I am writing in similar terms to Sir William Heseltine.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

21 NOV 1983





TRANSLATION

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T180^A/83

Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland

After our visit to the United Kingdom I am writing to you in the name of the people and of the Government of Mozambique, to thank you, as well as the English people and Government, for having made our visit a success. In the warmth and friendliness of the reception, in the efficiency with which the programmes were arranged and in the constructive frankness of the conversations we were able to appreciate the willingness of both parties to reach common objectives of cooperation in favour of the prosperity of our peoples.

Independently of the promising agreements concluded in the economic and financial spheres, we succeeded successfully in reinforcing the links of friendship and mutual comprehension between our two countries.

We feel that our visit to the United Kingdom was a high point in the relations between our countries. Furthermore we engage ourselves to raise these even higher through growing mutually advantageous cooperation.

In this context we would wish to reiterate our invitation that you should visit Mozambique at a mutually convenient date.

To finish, in the name of the Mozambique people, my Government, and from me personally, I ask you to accept our sincere and strong hopes for good health and success for yourself and your family.

Highest Consideration

Samora Moises Machel
Marshal of the Republic
President of the People's Republic
of Mozambique



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
LONDON

30 NOV 1983

12 1
2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9

For the Secretary of State
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of State



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No: T 180 A/83 *cc MASTER
OPS*

Maputo, 10 de Novembro de 1983

Após a nossa visita ao Reino Unido, escrevo-lhe em nome do povo e do Governo moçambicano para agradecer-lhe, assim como ao povo e governo inglês, por terem feito da nossa visita um sucesso.

No calor e amizade da recepção, na eficiência dos programas e na franqueza construtiva das conversações constatámos a vontade de ambas as partes de atingir objectivos comuns de cooperação em prol da prosperidade dos nossos povos.

Independentemente dos acordos prometedores concluídos nas esferas económica e financeira, conseguimos com sucesso reforçar os laços de amizade e de compreensão mútua entre

Sua Excelência

MARGARET TATCHER

Primeiro Ministro do Reino Unido
da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte

2.


os nossos dois países.

Sentimos que a nossa visita ao Reino Unido constitui um ponto alto nas relações entre os nossos países. Podemos, contudo, engajar-nos para elevá-las ainda mais, através de uma cooperação crescente e reciprocamente vantajosa.

Neste contexto, gostaríamos de reiterar o nosso convite para que visite Moçambique em data a acordar mutuamente.

Para terminar, em nome do povo moçambicano e do meu governo, e em meu nome pessoal, peço-lhe que aceite os nossos sinceros e bons desejos de boa saúde e de sucessos para si e sua família.

Alta consideração



SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
Marechal da República
Presidente da República Popular de Moçambique



BRITISH EMBASSY
MAPUTO

25 October 1983

The Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Prime Minister.

A.F.C. ^{31.}/₁₀

Dear Bobes,

I hope that President Machel will be writing to the Prime Minister to thank her for giving him the chance to meet her and for entertaining him at luncheon. However, largely because of the almost complete absence of experienced staff here, proprieties often go by default.

I can say that during the talks with the President during the latter half of the visit and during our trip back to Maputo, he was massively excited by the occasion and grateful. As you probably know, he has been a long time admirer of Mrs Thatcher and the talks with her confirmed him in that feeling. He was full of praise for her charm, sympathy and knowledgeable interest in the problems of Southern Africa and Mozambique.

I would like also to add my thanks and those of my wife for having had the chance to join in ~~an~~ what was a memorable and enjoyable occasion.

Yours ever

John Stewart

J A B STEWART

cc. Master
Ops.

file



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 165/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 October 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I write to thank you most warmly for the delightful statuette which you so kindly gave to me during your visit. Thank you also for the gift of cashew nuts.

I trust that you had an enjoyable return journey to Mozambique and that the relations between our two countries will continue to prosper.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency the President of the People's Republic of
Mozambique, Marechal Samora Moises Machel.

da

John

~~DUTY CLERK~~

21.10.83

This is to confirm that a statuette
and tins of cashew nuts are in the
Flat (presents from Pres. Machel).
I don't know whether they should
be thanked for if given personally?

Jay



10 DOWNING STREET

Press Notice

John Colley 20/10
This is what we
plan to issue at
1630 on Friday.
J. H. Add 29/10

VISIT BY HE THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
JOINT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

1. His excellency the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique Marshal Samora Moises Machel, paid a visit to the United Kingdom from 19-21 October at the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP.
2. The President was received and entertained to luncheon by Her Majesty The Queen on 19 October. Her Majesty invested the President with the insignia of a Knight Grand Cross of The Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George. The President held talks followed by luncheon with the Prime Minister on 20 October. These talks provided an opportunity for a wide-ranging exchange of views on bilateral and international subjects, particularly those relating to Southern Africa. The President invited the Prime Minister to visit Mozambique. In accepting the invitation the Prime Minister said that she hoped to be able to take it up at a mutually convenient time.
3. The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, called on the President on 19 October. The President was also entertained to dinner by the Rt Hon John Biffen, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, on 19 October and the Rt Hon the Viscount Whitelaw, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords, on 20 October. He also met representatives of the business community, and visited the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.
4. During the visit, the two Governments discussed opportunities for furthering trade and co-operation in a number of fields, and signed a number of aid agreements (listed in Annex overleaf).

21 October 1983

Telephone 01-930 4433

ANNEX

HMG and the People's Republic of Mozambique have agreed that Retrospective Terms Adjustment should be granted to Mozambique, that an additional 11,500 tonnes of Emergency Food Aid should be provided in order to combat the severe drought in Mozambique and that further UK assistance should be given in the training and health sectors. HMG and the PRM have also agreed to implement a £10m project to rehabilitate railway lines within Mozambique as part of their contribution to the implementation of SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference) projects. Under the same aegis both Governments agreed to identify a project to make improvements to Maputo port.

SUBJECT
cc Mafur

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 October 1983

Mr. Roger,

Visit of the President of Mozambique

The Prime Minister had a tête-à-tête conversation with President Machel at noon today. Colonel Honwana and I were present.

The Prime Minister said that she was very pleased that the President was paying this visit to the United Kingdom. We were anxious to learn about the situation in Mozambique. We were most grateful for the role which he had played in bringing Rhodesia to independence and in particular his efforts to persuade Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo that they should seek a solution by negotiation.

We were also grateful for the constructive role which President Machel was playing with regard to Namibia. This problem was proving more difficult and of longer duration than we had anticipated. The presence of the Cubans in Angola and the view taken of this by the United States were factors which could not be ignored.

President Machel said that our effort with respect to Zimbabwe had been mutual. The United Kingdom, and especially the Prime Minister herself, had played an extremely important part. Successive British Governments had tried to deal with the problem but had lacked the understanding and the courage to handle it successfully. The decisive stage was the UK's acceptance at Lusaka of its responsibility as a colonial power for solving the problem. That had enabled Mozambique to work with Mugabe though that had not been an easy task.

It was in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement that Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique and Botswana had taken the decision that Zimbabwe should participate in the Lancaster House talks. Mugabe and Nkomo had initially felt that the Front Line States were betraying the struggle but he himself had taken a firm position in favour of Zimbabwe's participation in talks.

The Prime Minister commented that the President's role in persuading Mugabe had been very important. She recalled a meeting

/ with

with Mugabe, Nkomo and Muzorewa towards the end of the negotiations when they had all undertaken to submit themselves to the ballot of the people. Each of them expected to win but each felt that he was entering the unknown. We had been very relieved that the election result was clear and decisive.

President Machel said that Mugabe, Nkomo and Ian Smith would all, at a certain point, have liked the talks to fail. But he had argued that Mugabe and Nkomo should not be the cause of breakdown; that should be Smith if anyone.

The Prime Minister said that we were also helped by the fact that the time was right for a settlement. President Machel agreed. In addition, the parties in Zimbabwe all believed that it was the wrong time to start a new stage in the war. If flexibility had not been shown at the critical moment, there could have been a breakdown in the talks even though it was the right time for a solution.

Some countries had been suspicious about the elections which were held. The Prime Minister said that we had gone to great lengths to ensure fair and free elections, for example by arranging for observers and even for British policemen to attend.

President Machel said that he wished to reiterate his personal admiration for the energy and vision that the Prime Minister had shown. The Prime Minister said that she had been greatly helped by the skill of Lord Carrington and by the decision taken at Lusaka to put the matter in the hands of Britain. Once we had a clear responsibility, we were able to act much more decisively than if we had been negotiating as a member of a group.

President Machel said that Britain still had a responsibility to exercise in Zimbabwe for the sake of stability in that country. Mozambique was concerned by the situation and in particular the rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU. When in London Nkomo had written many letters to him requesting that he intervene with Mugabe. The President had urged Mugabe to make it easy for Nkomo to return and had argued that the differences between them should be resolved in Zimbabwe and not through the media.

The Prime Minister said that Nkomo had behaved well during his stay in London in that he had not indulged overtly in political activity. We had always believed that, provided he obtained satisfactory guarantees, it was right for him as a political leader to return to his country. President Machel said that Mugabe well understood that point and had arranged secure guarantees.

Continuing, the President said that he wanted to ask the Prime Minister to talk to Mugabe. Perhaps she did not know him very well. The Prime Minister said that she expected to see Mugabe at CHOGM. President Machel said that that was why he was raising the matter. Mugabe had many problems. He was scarred with ten years of imprisonment and by his experience of the bloody

/ history

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

history of Zimbabwe. We should try to understand the effect these things had on him. He hoped that the Prime Minister would spend a couple of hours talking to Mugabe in New Delhi. The Prime Minister said that one was bound to feel rather reticent being the representative of the former colonial power. President Machel said that he understood that point. He himself had been colonized but he had good relations with many politicians in Portugal, particularly with the Portuguese who had been in Mozambique. The image of a colonial power which a subject state obtained was inaccurate in that it was based on the experience of settlers from that country. The settlers tended to be members of the administration, the police, the prison service and other institutions and were associated with ideas of injustice and discrimination. The colonial territory was ignorant of the true nature of the people of the metropolitan power.

The Prime Minister said that she hoped that Mr. Mugabe did not have this image of Britain. With regard to the Air Force officers imprisoned in Zimbabwe, we had made the same kind of representations to Mugabe as we would have done to any Head of Government where such things had happened to people who were either of British nationality or of dual nationality. Mugabe had perhaps not understood that we would have acted in the same way in the case of other countries. But that background made it a little difficult to talk frankly to him. President Machel said that he nevertheless wished to urge the Prime Minister to do so. He himself would talk to Mr. Mugabe before CHOGM.

The Prime Minister said that we well understood that Mugabe had problems. We tried to help. For example, our military advisers were doing a first-class job in welding together the armed forces. She would think further about the idea of a meeting at CHOGM. Mugabe had been rather forthright in public about her. But we were anxious that he should succeed. The decision to use the ballot box rather than the bullet had been a most important one. If Zimbabwe succeeded this would have a great influence on other Southern African problems.

The tête-à-tête conversation ended at 1225 hours and was followed by a plenary session. I enclose a record of the plenary talks.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

for Col.

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT
cc Mairis

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT
OF MOZAMBIQUE AT 1230 HOURS ON THURSDAY 21 OCTOBER 1983 AT
10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	President
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Major-General Chissano (Foreign Minister)
Sir John Leahy	Lt. General Guebuza (Interior)
Mr. Stewart	Major-General Veloso (Economic Affairs)
Mr. Coles	Mr. Ratilal (Bank Governor)
	Colonel Honwana (Special Adviser)

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that she wished to welcome President Machel and his delegation formally to London. As she had just told the President in their tête-à-tête conversation, Britain was most grateful for the role which he had played in bringing Zimbabwe to independence. He had exerted influence over Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe at a critical time. There had been close contact between the United Kingdom and Mozambique as a result of the Zimbabwe experience. We would like that close contact to continue.

The future of Southern Africa was of vital importance to the world as a whole. We should all seek to influence that future positively. Britain was passionately concerned for freedom and justice for all peoples.

She believed that the two delegations had discussed bilateral issues separately and she hoped that satisfactory conclusions had been reached.

President Machel thanked the Prime Minister for her welcome. It was true that Mozambique had helped in a modest way to produce a solution in Zimbabwe but he also paid tribute to the Prime Minister's own courage. The decisive step had been Britain's assumption of responsibility for a solution at the Lusaka Conference.

/ The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The Prime Minister said that she would be interested to hear the President's views on the situation in Mozambique and in Southern Africa more widely.

President Machel said that the first need was a solution to the problem of Namibia. This was an international question. It concerned basically the desire of a people for independence. No price should be paid for independence. It could not be given on conditions. All the other former German colonies in Africa were now independent. Namibia was still occupied. It was not in the interests of the United Kingdom or the United States nor of Africa that Namibia should remain occupied.

Angola had obtained its independence under very difficult conditions. South Africa had invaded Angola at the invitation of UNITA. South Africa now wished to maintain UNITA in Namibia so that it could continue to destabilise Angola. Furthermore, South Africa was hoping that there would be a UNITA government in Namibia which would remain dependent on South Africa even after independence. If South Africa were sure that a puppet government could be retained in Namibia, it would accept Resolution 435. But because it did not have that certainty it was seeking a pretext to delay the implementation of the Resolution.

South Africa did not have a border with Angola. So it should not be preoccupied with the Cuban presence there which was a recent problem.

The United States had still not recognised the Government in Luanda and was hoping that UNITA would participate in a government of national unity. Part of Angola's territory had been invaded but the world seemed to accept their situation as normal. South Africa wished to keep a strong UNITA presence in Angola so that if SWAPO won elections in Namibia South Africa would still be well placed to influence the situation there. The basic problem was the South African desire for hegemony. It was not an East/West /problem.

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problem. The Contact Group should be more solid and more effective in seeking the implementation of Resolution 435.

Mozambique had had a long meeting with the United States last December. This had been a new development. During the Carter Administration there had been reasonable relations but with the election of President Reagan relations had deteriorated. It was Reagan who had defined South Africa as an unconditional ally of the United States. Africans asked "ally against whom?".

In Mozambique, there had been an anti-colonial war. The Portuguese had brought more than 100,000 Mozambicans into the fighting, there had been terrible massacres and much use of secret police who had acted like the Gestapo. When Mozambique had obtained its independence many of these people had gone to Rhodesia. When Mozambique had applied sanctions, Smith had then used these people to destabilise Mozambique. Later many of them moved to South Africa which now used them to attack Mozambique.

The aim of South Africa was to destroy the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and turn all neighbouring countries into eternal clients of South Africa's transport interests. Mozambique lost \$75 million a year because of South African behaviour. When Portugal had ruled Mozambique it had sent workers to South Africa in return for gold at a specially low price. But when Mozambique had imposed sanctions, it had found that it could only obtain gold at the international price.

Similarly, Mozambique used to send about 80,000 labourers to Zimbabwe to work on the plantations and in the mines. That had also stopped when sanctions had been applied.

When he saw Western comments about the bankruptcy of Mozambique he was surprised that the economic situation in his country was not attributed to South African destabilisation.

/ What

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- 4 -

What could be done? The first need was for political and diplomatic action, especially by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Secondly, economic action. He did not ask that we should withdraw investment from South Africa but investment by the West in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Malawi was a form of economic liberation.

The Prime Minister said that she was grateful for President Machel's cogent and candid explanations. These helped us to understand his thinking.

On a specific point, she hoped that Mozambique would protect those British technicians who would work on the Zimbabwe/Maputo railway.

President Machel said that he wished to thank the Prime Minister for retrospective terms adjustment. He also wished to invite her to visit Mozambique. The Prime Minister said that she accepted the invitation and hoped to take it up at a mutually convenient time. Conversation could continue over lunch.

A joint press release was agreed and the discussion ended at 1305.

A. J. C.

20 October 1983

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DE DA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 October 1983

Visit of President Machel of Mozambique

You should know that during lunch here today the Prime Minister raised with the President of Mozambique the case of Mr. Dion Hamilton. President Machel noted the Prime Minister's concern but made no specific undertaking.

AR

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

PRESIDENT MACHEL

I attach a brief, a card and a draft speech for lunch. On this occasion, to aid the interpreter, it would be helpful if you could stick fairly closely to the text you approve.

After the guard of honour, there will be a tête-à-tête (with interpreter and notetakers) in, I suggest, the White Room. This might last for 15 minutes followed by:-

Plenary in the Cabinet Room - to be attended by

Prime Minister	President
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Major-General Chissano (Foreign Minister)
Mr. Rifkind	Lt. General Guebuza (Interior)
Sir John Leahy	Major-General Veloso (Economic Affairs)
Mr. Stewart (our Ambassador	Mr. Ratilal (Bank Governor)
	Colonel Honwana (Special Adviser)

You met Chissano in 1981 - and I am told that you may recognise Honwana who was in Lusaka at the time of CHOGM.

The F.C.O. make the point that anything we say to Machel may well get back to Mugabe. The latter is already upset because, he says, we have been pressing other countries to intervene with him over the Air Force officers. Machel is not likely to be helpful in this connection - and if we ask him to try it will only make matters worse.

You agreed earlier that we should try to meet the Mozambique request for a joint communique. Officials will be working on the text today and we shall let you know about progress tomorrow. The idea is that the text should be agreed formally in plenary. We must of course avoid any haggle about wording at your level.

He is said to be bringing a gift. We have wrapped 6 Webb crystal glasses for you to give him.

A. J. COLES

19 October, 1983



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 October 1983

Joe Sch

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

In the course of discussions with President Machel's party at Heathrow this morning, it became clear that the President may raise the issue of relations between the developed and developing world during the talks with the Prime Minister tomorrow.


I therefore attach an additional brief on 'Developing Country Issues'.

Joe Sch
(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR, FBI, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SEP 11 1963





VISIT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL
DEVELOPING COUNTRY ISSUES

Points to make (if raised)

Prospects for World Recovery

1. There are now signs that world recovery is firmly launched particularly in North America. Important that developing countries are able to take advantage of recovery as it proceeds. Markets must be kept open and protectionist trends reversed. Williamsburg Summit meeting and Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting recognised this.

UNCTAD VI

2. Some modest progress made at UNCTAD VI. Over 20 resolutions adopted by consensus. But the Conference was a difficult one. Effective dialogue hampered by UNCTAD's unwieldy procedures. Hope future UNCTADs can achieve rather more, building on the desire for dialogue obvious on both sides at Belgrade.

DEVELOPING COUNTRY ISSUES

3. The dialogue between industrialised and developing countries continues. A number of international economic meetings in 1983. Renegotiation of Lomé convention has now started. Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in November will make an important contribution. Negotiations for Seventh Replenishment of International Development Association have begun. UK hopes that agreement



will be reached soon on basis of fair burden-sharing. UK's proposal at IMF Annual Meeting on access to IMF resources after 8th General Review of Quotas was accepted by the Fund's Interim Committee. UK is active in promoting consensus on new funding for World Bank. UK recognises importance of debt problem for some developing countries and is playing its part in international efforts to deal with it.

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RLSAEG



Essential Facts

Prospects for World Recovery

4. Prospects for 1983 and 1984 are for a solid improvement in international economic climate. Resumption of lasting growth amongst industrialised countries will enable developing countries to export more, increase their earnings, service their debts and invest in the future.

UNCTAD VI

5. Developing countries may be disappointed at failure to make more progress at UNCTAD VI (6 June to 3 July, Belgrade) towards the ambitious programme put forward at their Ministerial meeting in Buenos Aires (28 March to 9 April). Despite rumours of a walk-out by developing countries, Conference finally adopted more than 20 resolutions by consensus after President (Yugoslavia) put together compromise package.

DEVELOPING COUNTRY ISSUES

6. Renegotiation of Lomé Convention started 6 October: Mozambique is a candidate member, ie intends to join Lomé and is attending negotiations. Question of contributions to Seventh Replenishment of IDA unresolved at IMF/IBRD meetings in Washington last month but negotiations will continue in November. We recognise IDA is one of most effective multilateral aid agencies.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER

LIST OF BRIEFS

CHECK-LIST OF POINTS TO MAKE

BRIEF NO	SUBJECT
1	Steering Brief
2	Bilateral Relations: Political
3	Bilateral Relations: Aid, Trade/ECGD and Defence
4	Bilateral Relations: Consular and Claims for Compensation
5	International Relations: Southern Africa
6	International Relations: Chad/OAU
7	International Relations: Falkland Islands
8	Background Brief: Mozambique Internal

PERSONALITY NOTES



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER

BRIEF NO 1

STEERING BRIEF

1. President Machel will be making an official visit at the invitation of the Prime Minister on 19-21 October. He will be accompanied by his wife. The most important members of his party are:-

Major-General Chissano, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Senhora Chissano.

Lieutenant-General Guebuza, Minister of the Interior.

Major-General Veloso, Minister for Economic Affairs in the Presidential Office.

Senhor Ratilal, Governor of the Bank of Mozambique.

He will beforehand have visited Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Yugoslavia and France. The visit has been twice postponed: in July 1983 because of his internal problems, and in May this year because of our general election.

2. President Machel is known to have a high respect for the Prime Minister and greatly to admire British policy towards Zimbabwe. Although a Marxist he resents his dependence for survival on the Soviet Union, and wants more open relations with the West. He is very status-conscious and responds to attention and flattery.

Mozambican objectives

3. i) To obtain our help in reaching an accommodation with South Africa which would end South African support for the NRM (Resistance Movement of Mozambique).

/ii)



ii) To obtain further British aid and ECGD cover and the establishment of more British firms in Mozambique.

iii) To bolster President Machel's image as an international statesman.

S.A. +

aid

The first two aims are of great importance to President Machel. He is desperate to contain the growing disruption caused by the NRM. He does not want to call in the Cubans. With US help he has begun discussions with the South Africans. He will look for our help with both Pretoria and Washington. His economy is in dire straits. In return for his greater openness to the West, he hopes for more Western economic assistance. Despite our warnings, he may have unrealistic expectations.

4. Mozambique is important to us as an influential FLS in the Namibia negotiations, as a crucial transit route for Zimbabwe and Malawi and as a country wishing to lessen its dependence on the Soviet Union. Our main objectives are:-

British objectives

5. i) To express appreciation for President Machel's assistance over the Lancaster House Agreement on Zimbabwe, and to encourage him to continue to play his helpful rôle in the search for a Namibia solution.

ii) To assure him of our general support in the face of South African de-stabilisation and more specifically for direct Mozambique/South African negotiations: but to impress on him the limits on our influence in Pretoria.

iii) To show willingness to help over his economic difficulties; but to explain the restrictions on our resources and encourage him to join the IMF and World Bank. We shall need to make the most of the package of aid/ECGD cover being announced during the visit.

iv) To ask for clemency for Mr Dion Hamilton.

v) To raise some claims and remittance problems.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 2

BILATERAL RELATIONS: POLITICAL

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Good bilateral relations. Virtually no problems.
2. Grateful for President's contribution to Lancaster House Agreement leading to independence of Zimbabwe.
3. Importance of Mozambique as FLS, influential member of OAU and crucial transit route for Zimbabwe and Malawi. Welcome constructive rôle over Namibia (Brief 5(b)).
4. Sympathy over internal problems: drought and floods over last 4 years; terrorism (NRM).
5. We have made clear to South Africa our opposition to destabilisation activities in region and our wish for stability in Mozambique. South Africans of course deny they support NRM. We have also condemned South African raids on Mozambique (Matola May 1983). We welcome Mozambique/South African dialogue (Brief 5(a)).
6. We shall maintain our efforts to influence South Africa. We have the impression that our African friends want us to maintain our contacts with South African Ministers and officials in order to do this. It is a long process of persuasion. (Brief 5(a)).
7. [If asked] We have no contact with NRM.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 2

BILATERAL RELATIONS: POLITICAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. UK/Mozambique relations improved substantially as a result of the Lancaster House Settlement. President Machel, who had been the principal supporter of Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party during UDI, put pressure on Mugabe to reach a peaceful settlement at Lancaster House, thus pursuing a line independent of Mozambique's Soviet bloc mentors and helpful to the West.
2. This independence from the Soviet bloc where important regional questions are concerned has more recently been in evidence in Mozambique's constructive intervention over Namibia (see Brief 5(b)).
3. Mozambique is severely troubled by the activities of the NRM (Mozambican National Resistance) which is heavily supported by South Africa (the South Africans deny this: they have themselves made overt attacks on ANC targets near Maputo.) President Machel undoubtedly hopes to use his visit to Western Europe to enlist the West in urging South Africa to curb the NRM. We have repeatedly made clear to the South African Government that we are opposed to their destabilisation activities in Mozambique.
4. Mozambique for its part has shown itself willing to negotiate with South Africa over mutual security and seems prepared to curb still further the activities of the ANC in return for a reduction in South African support for the NRM. We should encourage this dialogue: the alternative would be an escalation of the conflict, which could result in the introduction of Soviet bloc combat troops despite Machel's reluctance to resort to this. However in view of the current South African policy of destabilisation it is unlikely that Mozambique/South Africa negotiations will lead to any dramatic reduction in Mozambique's security problems.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19/21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 3

BILATERAL RELATIONS: AID, TRADE AND DEFENCE

POINTS TO MAKE

a) AID

1. You will know that we have been able to agree a number of initiatives in the field of our bilateral aid -
 - i. Restrospective Terms Adjustment (conversion of all past loans to grant aid);
 - ii. a further 11,500 tons of emergency food aid to alleviate effects of drought;
 - iii. a training agreement;
 - iv. a new project in the health sector.

These announced at a meeting between Mr Raison and your Ministers, Sr Ratilal and Sr Sumbana, yesterday

2. Pleased also that Mr Raison able to announce -
 - i. approval of £10m. project to rehabilitate the railway line from Maputo to Chicualacuala;
 - ii. our intention to identify a project to help with the management of Maputo port.

These will be funded from our aid to the SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference).

3. I am sure you will ensure safety of our British technical workers on the railway line, as elsewhere in Mozambique.

4. Welcome Mozambique Government's decision to take part in Lome III talks later this year. Mozambique's accession to Lome would enable her to benefit from EC assistance. Urge Mozambique to consider association with IMF which could bring the country further benefits.



Further commitments of capital aid (if raised)

5. UK aid programme not exempt from our policy of cutting Government expenditure. Partly because of our commitment to channel a large proportion of our assistance through multi-lateral organisations such as EC there is heavy pressure on the UK bilateral programme at this time. It is not possible to extend offers of capital aid beyond those already referred to.

b) ECGD TRADE

6. We have already far exceeded ECGD limit for medium-term credit. There are therefore considerable restraints on new cover. Nevertheless we will do our best for you. Perhaps your Ministers would like to discuss in detail during the visit.

(If pressed)

7. ECGD cover for business where credit does not exceed 180 days continues to be freely available.

8. Cover for small contracts on continuing existing British business can be considered on a case-by-case basis.

9. Understand ECGD are prepared to extend the period of cover for spare parts up to 12 months (double the standard period) for a package of £1m. provided these are of an appropriate unit value, eg gear boxes rather than nuts and bolts.

10. ECGD are prepared to offer further support for the supply of equipment worth £3.1m. for the land rover rehabilitation project. This would be in addition to the £5m of new medium/long term cover made available in 1983.

/11.



11. Regret that some defaults by Bank of Mozambique have recently appeared. These are preventing agreed business with Pilatus Britten-Norman (aircraft) and Tate & Lyle (sugar industry) from going ahead. Hope these can be cleared soon to allow this important business to proceed.

12. Pleased that notwithstanding some difficulties over ECGD cover there is a significant volume of trade between the UK and Mozambique. We hope that this volume will increase, perhaps by means of joint ventures.

13. However we need some positive action by Mozambican Government to encourage greater trade and investment -

- i. easier availability of visas for British businessmen;
- ii. investment incentives;
- iii. companies would be stimulated to invest in Mozambique if an Investment Promotion and protection Agreement were drawn up.

14. No doubt such questions will be discussed at the BOTB Conference this afternoon.

c) MOZAMBIKAN MEMORANDUM (if raised)

15. Have read contents with sympathy. We are able to meet some of your requests (paras 1,2,9 and 10 above) but our own financial constraints prevent us making further concessions at present.



d) DEFENCE

16. Welcome defence links established by visit of General Chipande last year and accreditation of British DA. Hope these relations can be strengthened.

17. Hope President enjoys his visit to Sandhurst. Should be glad to finance one or two places for officer training at Sandhurst if Mozambican side would like to nominate candidates. But NB our courses are popular and booked well ahead.

18. There is also a possibility of one or two places on BMATT's staff college courses next year. We have not yet looked into this in detail, because it would be dependent both on the agreement of the Zimbabwean government and on the outcome of our forthcoming annual review of BMATT's future. However if President Machel so wished we would be willing to keep this possibility in mind and, as appropriate, approach the Zimbabwean authorities on Mozambique's behalf.

19. (If raised) RN visit might usefully supplement these growing defence links.

20. (Defensive) Regret we have no budget for gifting of military equipment. Unable to help with further credit financing until current level of loans can be reduced. But glad to note recent uniform contract - hope other mutually advantageous deals will follow.

21. (Defensive) Understand desire for technical training. But regret our resources in that direction are already over-committed.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 3

BILATERAL RELATIONS: AID, TRADE/ECGD AND DEFENCE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Mr Raison will meet Sr. Ratilal, Governor of the Bank of Mozambique and Sr. Sumbana, Secretary of State for International Co-operation on 19 October.

2. ODA's bilateral aid programme for Mozambique has been running down over recent years following commitments of capital aid in the late '70s totalling £22.5m. There has been no new commitment of aid since 1978.

3. The level of expenditure on the bilateral programme (including food aid - see paragraph 4) is running at about £3m per annum, including Technical Cooperation. The following are the principal projects being supported under the programme:

(a) Pemba Power Station

A total of £2.8m capital aid and £300,000 technical cooperation has been approved to provide for the extension to Pemba Power Station.

(b) Landrover Reconditioning Project

£1.2m has been allocated from the 1977 Programme Loan to provide Landrover personnel, equipment and spares kits to set up workshops and to train Mozambican personnel in the reconditioning of Landrovers. The project is held up at present because the Mozambicans have not paid Landrovers Facilities Planning fee of £110,000 which was due in January 1983. Landrover refuse to carry out further work on the project until their fee is paid.

(c) ATP Project: Leyland Buses

Under ATP arrangements, a grant of £1m was approved for a maintenance and training programme in support of a contract by Leyland Vehicles Ltd
/for



- 2 -

for the supply of 200 buses to Mozambique. Leyland's team arrived in Maputo in May this year.

(d) UK Training

During the meeting between Sr. Ratilal, Sr. Sumbama and Mr Raison an agreement covering the Training allocations for the next two financial years will be signed: These are £218,000 for 1984/85 and £132,000 for 1985/86. During 1982/83 16 students benefited from training in the UK at a cost of £96,200.

Drought

4. For the second consecutive year Mozambique is suffering the effects of drought, this time severely affecting the Southern provinces. More than four million people live in this area. Earlier this year, the Mozambican Government made an international emergency appeal for food aid in response to which ODA provided 3,000 tonnes of maize. We have also contributed £100,000 towards the cost of shipping food from Maputo up the coast to Inhambane and Santa Carolina.

5. A further allocation of 11,500 tonnes of cereals from the Bilateral Food Aid programme, estimated to cost £1.5m was announced during Mr Raison's meeting with the Mozambicans.

Assistance to Health Sector

6. Mr Raison will present to the Mozambicans a proposal for a wholly new project (of about £100,000) to provide assistance to the Health Sector in Mozambique.

SADCC

7. Pledges totalling £12m have been made to SADCC for regional projects. At ZIMCORD in March 1981, Lord Soames pledged £10m to projects of a regional character within the SADCC area; and more specifically rail links between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In January this year, Mr Raison pledged a further £2m for regional projects at the SADCC conference at Maseru, mentioning our interest in providing additional assistance for port management, fisheries research and manpower development. Mozambique stands to benefit from two of these projects: the rail link between Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Rehabilitation of the Limpopo line)

/and



and the port management project.

Rehabilitation of Limpopo Railway Line

8. Mr Raison has approved an allocation of £10.1m for the rehabilitation of the Limpopo railway line running between Maputo and Zimbabwe and tele-communications equipment for the Beira-Machipanda line. Consultants will be provided under the project to supervise the rehabilitation work, provide on the job training and to be responsible for procuring equipment and materials from UK. The project will proceed against the background of security problems posed by the guerrilla activities of the Mozambican National Resistance (NRM) one of whose targets is the railway lines between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Although there is a degree of risk both to TC personnel and to the investment in the project, at present the threat to British personnel and to the economic viability of the project is not of scale to justify a decision to prevent the project proceeding. However final approval will be subject to the condition that the Government of Mozambique should undertake to make adequate provision for the safety of personnel (both UK and Mozambican) working on the line and to take every precaution to safeguard the line from attacks by the NRM.

9. A formal Exchange of Letters which will include this condition will need to be signed by the two Governments before the project can proceed. However a Letter of Intent will be signed by Mr Raison and the Secretary of State for International Co-operation (Sr. Sumbana) during the visit.

SADCC Port Project

10. Early in 1982, UK Consultants were appointed to advise the Government of Mozambique on improvements to the container handling facilities at Maputo port. The consultants reported in September 1982 and among their recommendations was the appointment of a six-man integrated team of expatriates with specialist skills in container port operations. In January this year the Minister pledged a further £2m at the SADCC

/Conference



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Conference in Maseru and mentioned in his pledge that we were considering providing a Management Team for the container operations at the port. Although consideration of the Project has been deferred until the Railways project was approved.

EC/IMF

11. Mozambique has until recently refused either to accede to the Lomé Convention or seek association with the IMF. Both these moves would greatly increase Mozambique's practical aid resources and reduce their pressure on bilateral donors. President Machel has now made clear his active interest in accession to the successor to the Lomé Convention.

b) ECGD/TRADE

Cover Arrangements

12. Cover for Short Term business on credit of up to 180 days remains freely available. The Section One (Commercial account) Market Limit of £8m is fully committed. Against the Section Two (National Interest) account Market Limit of £33m are current firm commitments of £55m. The £22m overrun was sanctioned by the Export Guarantees Committee in March 1982, when it was agreed that no new cover should be made available in view of Mozambique's apparently poor economic prospects and the absence of economic data on which to base a proper review of the market.

13. While ECGD has since had to decline cover for £128m of Medium/Long Term business including all the items (telecommunications equipment, coal washing plant, etc) for which the Mozambicans are currently seeking support, cover has exceptionally been agreed in 1983 amounting to about £5m for aircraft maintenance (Qualitair) and tractor rehabilitation. Cover is also now available for £3.1m of Landrover kits and spares for a rehabilitation programme for which ODA have also provided funding (the £1.7m ECGD support was already within the Section Two calculations). ECGD have also agreed

/exceptionally



exceptionally to allow spare parts to be provided on terms of 12-months credit cover up to a value of £1m

Defaults by Bank of Mozambique (BOM)

14. Several UK lending banks are currently (21.9.83) reporting defaults, total value £566,521 on ECGD guaranteed loans where BOM is either the borrower or the co-obligor. These have prevented business with Pilatus, Britten, Norman and Tate and Lyle from going ahead and both firms have urged us to press President Machel to rectify the situation in order that the business can proceed. Cross-default clauses could render other Buyer Credit Loans technically in default unless the outstanding payments are met. BOM trying to ensure that Mozambique is not in default when the President visits. Earlier defaults on payments due in January 1983 were remedied, although ECGD was obliged to pay one claim.

Counter Trade and Extended Credit for Short Term Goods

15. ECGD cannot agree to BOM request for further credit cover on the basis of counter trade eg UK capital goods for Mozambique coal and oil; nor (because of international understandings) to 2 years credit cover for goods normally sold on cash or Short Terms of credit.

1980 Exchange of Letters

16. In July 1980, at request of BOM, ECGD and BOM exchanged letters on ECGD credit for the following 3 years, providing for £20m for Short Term cover and £30m for Medium/Long Term cover (Section 2, split £15m sugar industry and £15m unspecified project business).

17. Short Term cover is still available without restriction; and payment experience good. The Medium/Long Term £15m for the sugar industry has been fully allocated. The Mozambicans are seeking a one year extension to the ordering period - which can probably be agreed if the current default is cleared; and an increase of £4m for 'inflation' - which cannot be agreed. The Medium/Long Term £15m balance for projects has been fully allocated (indeed current commitments total about £40m). A new credit proposed by the Mozambicans cannot be

/considered



- 6 -

considered, because of the current over-commitment and the poor economic outlook.

Trade

18. UK trade with Mozambique is relatively modest, and constrained by lack of ECGD cover. Business visas for Mozambique are slow (state entity sponsorship necessary). The UK exports largely road vehicles, machinery, telecommunications and power generating equipment, and imports sugar, coffee, tea, fruit, and cashew nuts. UK exports totalled £22m in 1981, £15m in 1982, and £21m in the first half of 1983: our imports for the same period were £6m, £11m, and £3m.

19. Notwithstanding Mozambique's links with the Eastern bloc, notably Russia and East Germany, the bulk of its trade remains with the West. The major exporting countries in 1982 were France, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Bangladesh, Netherlands, USA and Portugal. (and South Africa is expected to remain a major supplier of raw materials, services and equipment). Priority development areas include agriculture, transport and road rehabilitation, and potentially coal and oil.

c) MOZAMBICAN MEMORANDUM *(Text at Flag E - no need to read)*.

20. The Mozambique Government presented a Memorandum of Cooperation shortly before the President's departure.

21. The Memorandum begins with a long explanation of the causes of Mozambique's economic difficulties (see Brief 8 (b)), laying particular emphasis on the disruptive effects of the Rhodesian War and the implementation of South Africa against Mozambique (ie the activities of the NRM).

22. The Memorandum then proposes a number of areas of 'cooperation':

A. Increase in food aid; (Comment: 11,500 tonnes of new aid already announced: see para 5 above).

B. Help for the balance of payments in the form of credit on favourable conditions for the purchase of crude oil, oils and lubricants, /chemical



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chemical products, metallic products and spare parts for British equipment; (Comment: Direct Balance of Payments support is provided by the IMF: see para 11 above; ECGD have exceptionally agreed to give credit cover for spare parts, para 13 above).

C. Development of joint projects leading to the definition of a new financial credit from ECGD, supported by Government finance to cover down payments and for a reduction in the interest rates in respect of the following projects:

- the sugar industry
- the textile industry
- purchase and rehabilitation of Landrovers
- coal washing

(Comment: ECGD cover for the Landrover project announced para 13 above: We are unable to help at present over the other projects. We cannot finance down-payments).

D. In the military field, the provision under the special credit conditions of telecommunications materials (Racal), logistic material and uniforms and shoes: (Comment: As point C: military business: is also dependent on ECGD cover being available).

E. Within SADCC, effective renewal of the railway line Maputo to Chicualacuala and technical assistance at construction site. (Comment: Now agreed: para 8 above).

23. The Memorandum also outlines proposals for cooperation with BP, Lonrho and Tate and Lyle. The President and his party will have the opportunity to discuss these with the companies concerned during the visit.

d) DEFENCE

24. The improvement in bilateral relations that has occurred since the settlement of the Rhodesian problem has been reflected to some
/extent



- 8 -

extent in terms of defence relations. In 1981 Mozambique agreed to the accreditation of our Defence Attache in Harare to Maputo; this was the first accorded to a Western DA since independence. General Chipande, the Defence Minister, visited the UK last autumn.

25. Mozambique remains massively dependent on Soviet bloc military assistance. There are over 1,000 Soviet, East German and Cuban military advisers in the country, and the Soviet Union supplies most of the military equipment. Nonetheless, the recent improvement in our own defence relations reflects a more general move by Mozambique to diversify away from exclusive reliance on Soviet bloc assistance. Approaches for training help have been made to Portugal, Yugoslavia and France, and a Tanzanian training team is already at work. It would seem clearly in our interest to encourage this trend.

26. During his visit Chipande made clear that the Mozambicans would like our help in two areas - training and equipment. They want technical as well as officer training. (Their defence relations with Zimbabwe are close, so they appreciate the quality of BMATT's training). In response, Ministers have agreed that we should be ready to make the two modest offers in the Line to Take.

27. On equipment, there is little we can do. Ministers decided earlier this year to relax somewhat our previously very restrictive policy on categories of equipment we would be ready to supply to Mozambique. But the Mozambicans have little money to spend. They have asked for gifts; but we have no budget for such purposes. The possibility of offering some surplus items (eg clothing) has been investigated, but nothing suitable is available. The other Mozambican line of attack is likely to be to ask for their ECGD cover to be extended. The present state of their economy and the amount of outstanding credit rules this out. Nonetheless, a British uniform firm has recently won a non-ECGD-backed contract worth over £600K.

/28,



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28. In the light of preliminary indications that a Naval visit would be welcome, diplomatic clearance was sought for a visit by two RN frigates last autumn. The Mozambicans stalled; and in the absence of a reply at the end of the year the visit (planned for January) had to be called off. No further action has been taken but the RN remains interested in visiting Mozambique should an opportunity present itself. Before this can happen, however, it seems likely that Mozambique will insist on having some written understanding covering indemnity arrangements and other legal points; we are not attracted by this.

29. A team of 5 Army parachutists participated in the Mozambique International Parachute Championships last December. Despite Russian cheating, the British team won the event.



TRANSLATION

MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Elements concerning the Economic and Financial Situation of the People's Republic of Mozambique (RPM)

1. At the time when independence was proclaimed in Mozambique in June 1975, Mozambique presented an economic structure in which certain principle aspects were prominent. In the agricultural sphere rudimentary techniques were utilised, characterised by low productivity and based on the uncontrolled exploitation of human labour. Industry, which was centered in Maputo and Beira, only carried out unimportant transformations of imported products and occupied only 2% of the workforce. The principle source of hard currency earnings came from the use of the port and railway services by neighbouring countries and by the provision of labourers to South Africa and Rhodesia. It was the gold paid by South Africa in exchange for the work of Mozambique miners which enabled Colonial power to finance the chronic deficit of the Mozambique balance of payments. In this context the transport sector was at that time the most highly developed. The economy was dependent on foreign technicians and the number of Mozambican qualified workers was insignificant. 93% of all persons over the age of 7 were illiterate. In the University only 40 of the under-graduate students were Mozambicans. This was the economic and social situation at the end of the Colonial period. From the middle of the 60's colonialist manoeuvres against the independence of Mozambique aggravated the crisis which touched the Mozambique economy and led it into economic and social chaos. Foreign currency reserves did not exist and the economy was almost paralysed by the massive flight of technicians. Production suffered a substantial fall.

2. In that complex reality the Mozambique Government is adopting a series of measures in order to normalise progressively the



- 2 -

situation. It carried out transformations in the economy which have led to the establishment of social and labour discipline. Since 1977 the economy has started to feel some effects of the efforts concentrated on the production front. Between 1977 and 1981 total production of the RPM increased by 11.6%. This growth can be separated as follows:

- Rise in crude agricultural products 8.8%
- In crude industry product 13.7%
- Crude increase of production in transport and communications 15.4%
- Crude increase in the construction sector 25%.

3. Economic and social development in the last 8 years was carried out against immense difficulties caused by the factors previously mentioned and the following.

- massive flight of technicians and specialists
- sabotage of equipment, vehicles and economic infrastructure
- sanctions applied against Rhodesia in compliance with decisions of the United Nations and Rhodesian aggressions during 4 years caused damages calculated at more than 555 million dollars, which corresponds to more than 2 years normal exports from the country.
- natural calamities which have affected the country in each of the years since independence and more recently the prolonged drought - the greatest of this century - which during the last 4 years have caused incalculable damage and seriously aggravated famine.
- the international economic crisis which has caused a reduction in the price of Mozambican exports and an accelerated increase in the price of imports; in particular that of petroleum, which since the independence of Mozambique has increased 10 times.
- the increase in real interest rates, international inflation and more recently the general reduction in credits granted by



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international banks and organisations.

4. On top of these factors which caused catastrophic effects on the economy, Mozambique is gravely affected by the facts of the undeclared war, which the South African regime pursues against the RPM. The permanent state of tension, of menace and blackmail and the acts of aggression either direct or indirectly through the armed bandits, equipped and trained by the South African army, are prejudicial to the Mozambique economy and society. The marked effects of this undeclared war unleashed against Mozambique are as follows:

- a. In addition to the progressive diminution of the numbers of Mozambique workers (expatriate workers in South Africa), Mozambique has ceased to benefit from the "gold clause" which during many years covered and financed deficits in the current balance of the colonial economy.
- b. the reduction by at least half of the traffic to and from South Africa through Mozambique. (in thousands of tonnes).

1973	-	6 377,0	1978	-	4 064,7
1974	-	5 309,3	1979	-	4 155,1
1975	-	5 638,6	1980	-	3 428,0
1976	-	4 974,3	1981	-	3 023,8
1977	-	4 248,2	1982	-	2 216,7

- c. Unceasing acts of provocation in various points along the frontier and direct attacks on the capital of the RPM in 1981 and 1983. The acts of sabotage of the South African army and the activity of the armed bands (the prolongation of the armed forces of South Africa) have already caused damages greater than 200 million dollars. In the countryside more than a thousand retail centres have been destroyed. Railway lines, port installations, vehicles, equipment and electrical

/transmission



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transmission lines have been sabotaged. Technical cooperation workers from Western and Socialist countries of various nationalities who help towards national reconstruction and in the struggle under development have been assassinated and kidnapped.

- d. Railway lines, instalations, and petroleum storage tanks in Beira and the pipeline to Zimbabwe have been sabotaged with the object of destroying the viability of regional cooperation within SADCC.

5. The South African regime which faces growing internal and international opposition to apartheid seeks to gain time to try out reforms which will permit it to maintain the hegemonistic domination in the association of SADCC. To gain time the South African regime continues to act towards economic weakening of the independent states of Southern Africa. More than 2 billion dollars represent up till now the effects of the sanctions against and the aggressions by the Rhodesians, from the stopping of the profits from gold, from the climb in petroleum prices and the losses resulting from the South African aggression either direct or through its armed bandits. In this sum we have not taken into account other facts resulting from the colonial economy, the deterioration in the terms of exchange, the reduction in traffic to and from South Africa through Maputo and the drought, which affects half of this country.

6. All these accumulated facts have throttled the economy, in transport, in distribution and in travel, with direct consequences to Mozambique production and exports and have imposed great sacrifices on the Mozambique people.

7. Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the World, with per capita GNP lower than 2 million dollars. However we have

/potential



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potential resources which could constitute a base for the development of the Mozambican economy. In the efforts lent to the fight against underdevelopment we have taken note of the participation of the United Kingdom (UK) with whom there are currently several projects, some, in preparation, others already in a state of advanced execution.

8. As the projects which we are carrying out together are not producing the effects foreseen it will be desirable to attain major support from the UK, which would allow the preservation of the commercial links already created, which we think should be usefully developed continually and at the same time create a future possibility for a balance in our commercial exchanges in a determined period.

9. Peace for Southern Africa is a condition for progress, stability and cooperation between states. The region of Southern Africa and the countries of SADCC constitute a vast market for the placing of British goods and an enormous reserve of fundamental primary materials for the British economy. It is in this context that a major support from the UK in strengthening the defensive capacity of the RPM and in the struggle against hunger is urgent. So the Government of the RPM proposes to the Government of the UK the following areas of cooperation:

- A. Increase in food aid;
- B. Help for the balance of payments in the form of credit on favourable conditions for the purchase of crude oil, oils and lubricants, chemical products, metallic products and spare parts for British equipment;
- C. Development of join projects leading to the definition of a new financial credit from ECGD, supported by Government finance to cover down payments and for a reduction in the interest rates in respect of the following projects -
 - the sugar industry
 - the textile industry

/ - purchase



- 6 -

- purchase and rehabilitation of Landrovers
 - coal washing.
- D. In the military field, the provision under the special credit conditions of telecommunications materials (Racal), logistic material and uniforms and shoes;
- E. Within SADCC, effective renewal of the railway line Maputo to Chicualacuala and technical assistance at construction site.

Long and Medium term cooperation

BP

- Petroleum investigation;
- Coal exploration and exploitation at Sanagoe;
- Construction of fuel tanks at Beira.

LONHRO

- The pipeline;
- Tourism;
- Development of fishing in Luabo.

TATE AND LYLE

- Rehabilitation of the sugar industry at Mafambisse.

During the Presidential visit these ideas may be discussed with the interested parties and members of the Presidential Delegation.



VISIT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983
BRIEF NO 4

BILATERAL RELATIONS: CONSULAR AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION

POINTS TO MAKE

(a) CONSULAR

Dion Hamilton

1. Understand gravity of charges against him. But considerable concern about circumstances of trial (trial in secret, defence only by army officer whom Embassy not allowed to meet) and in particular by his pre-trial vilification at a public meeting and treatment in custody (for a time handcuffed and blindfolded; now no mail, poor conditions.) Know Portuguese Government also much concerned about its nationals in same case. Bad effect on image of Mozambique. Grateful for clemency for Hamilton and others detained with him.

Ruth First

2. Have Mozambican authorities been able to establish who was responsible for murder?

(b) CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION

3. Hope for some progress on claims for property expropriated since Independence. We have presented a memorandum on this subject to Sr. Ratilal.



VISIT  PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983
BRIEF NO 4

BILATERAL RELATIONS: CONSULAR AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION

ESSENTIAL FACTS

(a) CONSULAR

Dion Hamilton

1. Mr Hamilton, a British national, was a prominent businessman in Beira. In December 1982 he was arrested on suspicion of involvement with the NRM (Mozambican National Resistance), in particular in a guerrilla attack against the BP oil installations in Beira. In February he was sentenced by 'military tribunal to 20 years' imprisonment on charges of illegal possession of weapons and 'acts equivalent to terrorism'.
2. The circumstances of Mr Hamilton's arrest and trial were far from satisfactory. He was refused consular access until after the trial and was with four Portuguese (two of whom were later acquitted) paraded in front of a large crowd and publicly denounced as a criminal before his trial took place. At the military tribunal he was represented only by a state-appointed military advocate. The Embassy were not informed of the proceedings until after they were over.
3. Since the trial consular access had been granted. However in April Mr Hamilton was moved from Beira to Machava military prison near Maputo without the Embassy being informed and was mistreated (blindfolded for several days, hand-cuffed and kept in solitary confinement). Under pressure from our Embassy the conditions of his captivity have been improved although he is still held by the military authorities and has not yet been allowed to receive mail.
4. Our Embassy in Maputo have repeatedly raised this case with the Mozambican Government and HMA last discussed it with President Machel on 3 June. Although we have made clear that we would support a plea for clemency for Mr Hamilton, the Ambassador was told by Sr Chissano, the Mozambican Foreign Minister, on 24 May that the Mozambicans were convinced that he had been guilty of 'more than he had been convicted of' and that such a plea was not at that time opportune. Sr Chissano suggested however that the visit by President Machel to this country



- 2 -

might prove an opportune moment to press for clemency. Despite constant pressure, the Ambassador was not allowed access to discuss the case with the President before his departure.

5. Our request for clemency is based on the abnormal conditions of his imprisonment and trial. We would not wish to challenge the Tribunal's verdict (Mr Hamilton admitted the charge of illegal possession of weapons which itself carries a sentence of 20 years). Although we know nothing to confirm that Mr Hamilton was involved with the NRM in any sinister sense, he did have some social links (which he used to help us over an earlier consular case).

6. We have throughout kept in close contact with Mr Hamilton's family, both in this country and South Africa. They have in general adopted a helpful attitude over publicity and the case has not as yet attracted great attention in the British press.

Ruth First

7. Ruth First, a naturalised British citizen born in South Africa, was a prominent member of the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. In August 1982 she was killed in Maputo by a letter bomb.

South African agents are widely believed to have been responsible, but it is possible that a rival ANC faction was behind the murder.

8. The case has attracted press and parliamentary interest. Our Embassy in Maputo are in touch with the Mozambican authorities who are conducting a police investigation into her death.

(NOT FOR USE) Rumour in Maputo, however, suggests that this investigation has come to nothing.

(b) CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION

9. Several claimants have asked for this to be raised with President Machel. There are some 96 claims from British subjects on the

/Mozambique



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Mozambique Government for compensation for property and goods, dating back to 1975. The authorities have told us that until general legislation on compensation has been passed, it is most unlikely that any action will be taken on individual cases. In view of the country's grave economic difficulties headway on these claims in the near future is unlikely, but some pressure now may pave the way for eventual progress.

10. To this end we will present Sr Ratilal, Governor of the Bank of Mozambique with a memorandum drawing attention to the outstanding British claims and authorising our Ambassador in Maputo to follow this up.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 5

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SOUTHERN AFRICA
POINTS TO MAKE

a) SOUTH AFRICAN DESTABILISATION

1. Deeply concerned at growing insecurity in Southern Africa. Especially conscious of Mozambique's difficult relationship with South Africa and of South African raids on Mozambique (Matola, 23 May 1983). We have condemned these forthrightly.
2. South Africans are in no doubt of our views on their policies. Strongly believe that each country must be allowed to decide its own future. Relations between states must be based on non-violence, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for borders.
3. We realise that our African friends want us to maintain our efforts to restrain South Africa. But difficult process of education and persuasion. We do our best at both Ministerial and official level.
4. Our influence limited. Problems of Southern Africa cannot be solved by outsiders. Though we may be able to contribute, it is fundamentally for those in the region to settle.
5. Fully understand that South Africa's internal policies are central to the problem. Complex problem; will not be resolved overnight. For the people of South Africa to deal with this issue. Understand African frustration, but cannot condone use of violence by ANC. Many blacks in South Africa oppose this.

/6.



6. Welcome your recent contacts with South Africa. Essential that South Africans are exposed to your views. Must keep trying. Bear in mind they have legitimate concerns.

7. Will be discussing these issues at CHOGM with many of your colleagues in the region.

b) NAMIBIA

Mozambique Role

8. Grateful for constructive role of Mozambique and other FLS at UN and in private. Important that we work together.

Secretary General's Mission under SCR 532

9. Encouraged by progress made. SAG more forthcoming than expected. SG confirmed commitment to implementation of UN Plan and stood by agreements negotiated previously on outstanding issues under SCR 435. Valuable that SAG stated explicitly that Cuban withdrawal only issue to be resolved before implementation. We welcome SG's report and his willingness to stay involved. Hope discussion in Security Council will avoid confrontation.

US/Angola

10. Positive response to US by Angolans on Cuban troop withdrawal is urgent. We understand dialogue alive and continuing. We presume Angolans would not continue to talk if they did not themselves see long-term advantage in Cuban withdrawal. Even so, understand that UNITA pressure makes it difficult for Angola to agree to do without Cubans. What is Mozambican assessment? Can Angolans make necessary commitment? What measures could the Five or the US take which would help? Angolans should recognise the need to enter a detailed negotiation. Bargaining possible.

/11.

Linkage

11. 'Linkage' not part of SCR 435. Cuban withdrawal not a pre-condition for us. But we recognise there will be no settlement without some accommodation on this issue. In any case we would welcome withdrawal of all foreign troops (including South Africans) from Angola. Important for regional security.

The Five

12. SG told Five their role 'more necessary than ever'. We believe Five can still contribute usefully. We remain committed to help find negotiated settlement. Hope you share this view and commitment. [French unhappy but no sign of withdrawal from Contact Group.]

MPLA/UNITA [if raised]

13. UNITA successes striking, but no evidence they could win the war or administer whole country. Do you believe any prospect for MPLA/UNITA reconciliation?

South African Attitude

14. Important that SAG have said they will implement UN Plan if Cubans removed. But they will not give way on Cuban requirement. We are ready to do what we can to persuade South Africans to proceed if US/Angola negotiations succeed. If it is to last, Namibia settlement can not be imposed against the will of parties concerned. We must be realistic about the pressures that can be put on South Africa. No question of sanctions. But we will use all our moral and political influence to secure their acquiescence.

c) ZIMBABWE

15. We are continuing with our policy of support for Zimbabwe and with our development aid and military training. Significance of multi-racial Zimbabwe for Southern African region.

16. Importance of Zimbabwe transit routes through Mozambique. Glad security position on transit routes recently improved.

[Zimbabwe]



[Zimbabwe troops help to guard oil pipeline.] We are contributing to rehabilitation of Maputo-Zimbabwe railway (announcement of implementation stage during President Machel's visit).

d) MALAWI

17. Importance of Malawi's transit routes through Mozambique. Disruption by NRM of railways from Malawi to Beira and Nacala has recently increased. Malawians very concerned.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 5

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SOUTHERN AFRICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

a) SOUTH AFRICAN DESTABILISATION

1. South Africa's policies towards its neighbours have been increasingly aggressive in the past two years. They are aimed at: firstly and most importantly elimination of, and ending of facilities for African National Congress (ANC); in addition, reduction of Communist influence; and the maintenance of neighbouring states in a condition of weakness and dependence on South Africa. South African forces have engaged in cross-border operations allegedly against the ANC (attacking targets in Lesotho in December 1982 and in Mozambique, in May) and there is considerable evidence of direct overt South African activity and covert support for movements in Mozambique (NRM), Lesotho (Lesotho Liberation Army) and Angola (UNITA). We believe South African support for the NRM's operations against Machel's government is considerable.

2. This policy has brought South Africans some short-term gains; both Lesotho and Mozambique are negotiating directly with South Africa on a range of issues (in Mozambique's case including the question of ANC facilities). But long-term effects are damaging to Western interests: have made Mozambique dependent on Soviet Union for survival, and danger of further increase in Soviet influence in region.

3. We have very little influence with the South Africans over what they regard as questions of national security and see nothing to be gained by being drawn in as intermediaries. The Americans have tried to promote discussion of security issues but have not been notably successful. Our efforts have been limited to privately urging restraint to the South Africans, and public condemnation of cross-border military activity. In the case of Lesotho we have also encouraged direct dialogue with South Africa. For their part, the South Africans deny they are engaged in a policy of regional destabilisation, claiming that they are the ones who are being

/destabilised



destabilised by a Communist directed plot, of which the ANC are an important instrument.

SA Raid on Maputo

4. On 23 May, in response to the ANC car bomb in Pretoria which left 17 dead and 170 wounded, SA aircraft attacked Matola, a suburb of Maputo in Mozambique. SA and Mozambique issued widely differing accounts of the raid. The South Africans claimed to have hit 5 ANC bases and killed 64 people including 40 ANC members. But the Mozambican version of events was that South Africans had attacked a jam factory, day care centre and a house long since abandoned by the ANC and had killed 6 people (only one of whom was a South African refugee). Balance of evidence tends to support the Mozambique version. On the day of the raid the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary issued a statement ~~(attached)~~ deploring it.

See at Addendum Brief on the latest raid on Maputo - on 17 October.

Mozambique and South Africa

5. Mozambique, like many other countries in Southern Africa, has an ambivalent relationship with South Africa. There is a close economic relationship, and practical co-operation in areas of common economic interest (eg the South Africans help to run Maputo's harbour, and assist the Mozambique railways, which are both important for South African exports). Politically relations have varied: they were calm following Mozambique's independence in 1975, but deteriorated as Mozambique hostility towards South Africa's internal policies became clearer; Mozambique's support for ZANU during the Rhodesia war, and its increasingly close links with Communist countries further exacerbated relations. Moreover Mozambique has provided a refuge for black refugees from South Africa and given support and facilities to the ANC. The South Africans now believe that Mozambique is the main infiltration route for ANC guerillas into South Africa (via Swaziland). South African promotion of and support for the NRM is partly at least an attempt to bring pressure on the Mozambique government to abandon its support for the ANC. In addition South African forces have twice (Jan 1981 and May 1983) attacked alleged ANC bases in Maputo suburbs; and in August 1982 Ruth First, a British National and prominent ANC member was killed by a letter bomb in Maputo, probably by the South Africans.



6. Mozambique's response has been pragmatic. Encouraged by the US they have held two ministerial-level meetings with the South Africans since December 1982 and a number of official-level meetings. They have exerted greater control over the ANC and are clearly seeking a relationship which will avert further South African attacks and diminish South African support for the NRM. Most recent reports suggest the South Africans recognise Mozambican efforts but relations remain uneasy and could quickly deteriorate again. It seems that at least some South African officials hope eventually to overthrow President Machel.

b) NAMIBIA

SG's Report

7. SG's report acknowledges SAG insistence on Cuban withdrawal, but rejects as outside of UN Plan. FLS intend to initiate Security Council debate on report in mid/late October. Their goals for the meeting not yet known.

US/Angola

8. [NOT FOR USE] Still no substantive response by Angolans to US proposal on Cuban troop withdrawal. But success of SG's mission has won more time for dialogue to run its course. Latest reports suggest growing Angolan distrust of Americans and possible hardening of attitude on Cubans. US are trying to establish what is real impediment to Angolan agreement (threat from South Africans or UNITA). Preliminary and conditional South African withdrawal from Cunene could provide key to further progress but Americans reluctant to seek unilateral concessions from South Africans whilst Angolans are not prepared to make realistic bid on Cubans.

/9.

The Five

9. SG told Five in New York on 14 September that he wants them to stay engaged. [NOT FOR USE. His remarks should inhibit French withdrawal.]

UNITA/MPLA

10. Recent capture of Cangamba and attack on Calulo significant coups for UNITA. Latter showing capacity to disrupt Angolan economy and communications well beyond tribal base. Savimbi hoping increase of pressure on MPLA will force talks on reconciliation. Continued UNITA successes complicate, though not rule out, agreement on Cuban withdrawal by increasing MPLA dependence on Cubans. MPLA recognise that only sure way of removing South African presence from Southern Angola and reducing South African support for UNITA, would be Cuban withdrawal and independence settlement for Namibia.

Mozambican Attitude [NOT FOR USE]

11. Machel closely involved with Namibian problem. Publicly critical of linkage but has been more realistic than some FLS colleagues about need for agreement on Cuban withdrawal if a Namibian settlement is to go ahead. Since improvement in US/Mozambique relations, Mozambicans have this year played active and constructive role encouraging positive approach by Angola, using personal and official contacts in Luanda. US impressed by their handling of the situation and seem confident that this channel could be a safe and useful addition to other methods of communicating with Angolans.

c) ZIMBABWE

Mozambique/Zimbabwe

12. Relations between the two countries are close. President Machel was the main supporter of Mugabe during the civil war. Mugabe visited Mozambique in April when he addressed the Frelimo Fourth Party Congress. The transit routes through Mozambique are crucial to Zimbabwe. Have been severely disrupted by the NRM, but situation



has recently improved. The Zimbabwe army helps to guard the Beira pipeline.

Political

13. No progress towards reconciliation between Mugabe and Nkomo since latter's return. Inter-Party talks between ZANU (PF) (Mugabe) and ZAPU (Nkomo) stalled.

Military

14. Both army and dissident activity continues in Matabeleland, but at a lower level. A Commission has been appointed to look into 'alleged atrocities in Matabeleland'.

Zimbabwe/UK

15. Re-detention of the AFZ officers has been a setback for Anglo-Zimbabwe relations. We have made clear that we are not interfering in internal affairs or threatening to cut off aid. But several officers are dual British citizens, and there is widespread public concern. We continue to press for early release of four officers still in detention.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE, 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 5 (ADDENDUM I)

International Relations: Southern Africa

South African Destabilisation

POINTS TO MAKE

1 Have publicly deplored raid earlier this week by South African forces on targets in Mozambique. Have repeatedly made clear our condemnation of cross-border violence and our views that problems in South Africa cannot be resolved by violence.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 On the night of 16/17 October South African forces made an attack on buildings in Maputo said to be used by the African National Congress of South Africa. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a statement deploring the raid on 17 October. A copy is attached.

2 Details of the raid are still sketchy. The South African Defence Minister, General Malan, confirmed the strike in a statement from Pretoria on 17 October. There appear to have been no deaths but some injuries. The raid is in retaliation for a series of bombing incidents, attributed to the African National Congress, in South Africa. The most recent of these took place last week at the Transvaal town of Warmbad.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Southern African Department

17 October 1983



FCO STATEMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN RAID INTO MOZAMBIQUE

We have not yet received full details of this further attack by South African forces on targets in Mozambique. But it is clear that Mozambique's sovereignty has once again been seriously violated. We deplore this.

We have in the past made clear our strong opposition to cross-border violence. We do not believe the problems of Southern Africa can be resolved by violence.

We condemn this raid by South African forces just as we condemn the bombing incidents in South Africa last week.

CONFIDENTIAL



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 5 (ADDENDUM II)

South African Destabilisation

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Ministerial contact important in our attempts to persuade South African Government to moderate their policies. You will wish to know in confidence that Mr Rifkind plans to visit South Africa (as well as Angola and Zimbabwe) from 31 October to 8 November as part of this process.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Central African Department

18 October 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 6

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CHAD/OAU (DEFENSIVE)

POINTS TO MAKE (IF RAISED)

(a) CHAD

1. Direct British interests in Chad minimal. Recognise States not Governments. Deal with the Habré administration on a routine basis. Have contributed £0.4m in bilateral humanitarian aid over past two years, plus contributions through international agencies.
 2. We deplore any foreign attempts to destabilise the Chadian Government. Concerned at threat to stability posed by illegal presence of Libyan troops in Northern Chad. Would like to see the country left in peace to tackle its daunting economic problems. Under Habré for the period June 1982 - June 1983 there seemed a good chance of this.
 3. Disappointed when Security Council unable to take any positive action in August. UK supported Habré's government and French and American policies and were prepared to co-sponsor a resolution.
 4. We support the peace initiatives resting with the OAU, and wish them success; see a negotiated solution as only source of long-term peace. The recent Franco-African Summit could not agree on a formula. As member of OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Chad, how do you see matters developing?
- (b) OAU
5. Pleased at success of OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in June. HMG see OAU as factor for stability in the continent.
 6. Welcome OAU's efforts to bring peace to Chad (see Brief 6(a)) and to Western Sahara. Will there be progress towards implementation of Addis Resolution on the Western Sahara by the end of the year?



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 6

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CHAD/OAU (DEFENSIVE)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

(a) CHAD

1. Chad has been plagued by internal strife since independence in 1960. In June 1982 Hissein Habré over-threw President Goukouni and formed a broadly-based government. In June 1983, using Libya as a base, Goukouni resumed hostilities, bringing to an end a year of comparative peace and stability and preliminary steps to rehabilitate the economy. With direct Libyan military involvement (tanks, aircraft, troops) by early August Goukouni had gained control of Northern Chad. His advance was only halted by US and French intervention. (USA sent \$25 million of military aid; French despatched about 3000 well-equipped troops to Chad. Also 2700 Zairean troops are in support of Habré). Despite sporadic skirmishes, military stalemate has ensued.

2. Security Council proved ineffectual in August in discussing the issue. Peace initiatives now rest with the OAU; OAU Acting Secretary General and Ethiopian Foreign Minister have visited Paris and Tripoli. Reports of

- (i) French and Libyan intentions to arrange a meeting between Habré and Goukouni;
 - (ii) a commitment from France and Libya to finance an African peace-keeping force;
 - (iii) an OAU group to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces;
- but no evidence of any of this being put into practice. At the Franco-African Summit at Vittel earlier this month, despite strenuous efforts, particularly by the President of Guinea, no formula for a solution emerged, though Habré seems ready to negotiate provided his formal position as Head of State is recognized.

3. Mozambique is member of OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Chad set up in 1977. It has not met to discuss the present situation. In the past Mozambique has lined up with the African countries who support Goukouni.

/(b) OAU



- 2 -

(b) OAU

4. After more than a year when the OAU was in disarray following the contested admission of the SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, ie the Polisario Movement in the Western Sahara) as 51st member of the Organisation, it succeeded in June in holding its 19th Summit. Two previous attempts to hold the Summit in Tripoli, Libya in July and November 1982 had failed to achieve a quorum as a result of disputes over the SADR and the representation of Chad. [NOT FOR USE] These disputes reflected a more fundamental division between the radicals led by Libya (and included Mozambique) and the more moderate pro-Western states, who do not recognise the SADR.

5. The Summit at Addis was a success for the Organisation and for the moderates within it. These stood their ground and refused to accept the presence of the SADR in the conference chamber. It was the pro-SADR states who conceded defeat and persuaded the Polisario representatives to withdraw 'voluntarily and temporarily'. Only Libya refused to accept this, and Col Qadhafi left Addis isolated even from his former supporters. He thus lost the chance to become Chairman of the Organisation (Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu was elected to the post).

6. [NOT FOR USE] Despite the success in convening a quorate Summit, the OAU has yet to demonstrate convincingly its ability to solve the crucial disputes on the continent, although we have made clear our support for its rôle.

7. The resolution adopted in Addis on the Western Sahara called inter alia for an immediate ceasefire, and for a referendum to be held before December 1983 under the joint supervision of the UN and the OAU. It seems unlikely, however, that this will be achieved so quickly (there is little agreement even on who should be entitled to vote), particularly after the failure of the OAU's implementation committee, which met on 21-22 September to persuade Morocco to negotiate directly with Polisario.

/8.



- 3 -

Mozambique's Position

8. Mozambique has since Independence aligned itself to the 'radical' camp of the OAU and has supported both the SADR and the claims of Goukoui Oueddei, Libya's protégé in Chad. It has not however played a particularly conspicuous rôle in the organisation.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 7

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FALKLAND ISLANDS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Disappointed that Mozambique voted for UNGA Resolution 37/9 last year.
2. Argentines have made clear in the General Assembly this year that the right of self-determination should not apply to the people of the Falkland Islands. And when they speak of 'negotiation' they continue to mean discussion of the transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands, irrespective to the wishes of the Islanders. In these circumstances, see no prospect of negotiations.
3. We have sought development of more normal bilateral relationship and reduction of tension. Argentines have shown no interest in responding. Must be radical change of approach in Argentina. Hope that Mozambique will therefore reconsider its vote on any resolution this year which is similar to Resolution 37/9.

[For defensive use]

'Militarization' of Falklands

4. Our dispositions in the Islands are those necessary for their defence against Argentine aggression. Nonsense to suggest they have wider purpose.

Construction of airfield

5. New airfield is necessary to defend the Islands against renewed Argentine attack. And its construction meets recommendations made by Lord Shackleton in 1976 and 1982: he advised that a new airfield with a large runway was necessary for most of the proposals he had considered to assist the economic development of the Islands.

Links with South Africa

6. The proposed use of Cape Town as a staging post between Britain /and



- 2 -

and the Falklands will apply only to the civilian workforce. All military personnel will continue to use the Ascension Island route. There is therefore no question of the arrangement implying any change in our policy of no military cooperation with South Africa.

7. This is a private commercial arrangement by the civilian contractors, who judge this to be the most efficient and economic route to use.

8. HMG will continue fully to comply with their obligations under the mandatory United Nations arms embargo. The limited transit use of South Africa by civilian contractors does not in any way breach the embargo.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

BRIEF NO 7

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FALKLAND ISLANDS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Mozambique voted for the Argentine Resolution in the UN General Assembly last year.
2. The statement by the Argentine Foreign Minister in the General Assembly contained nothing genuinely constructive. He sought to depict our defensive measures in the Falklands as part of 'an expansionist military strategy' with innuendoes about NATO involvement.
3. Other African frontline states voted for the Resolution last year, and they are likely to be sensitive on the use of South Africa as a staging post for construction of the new airfield. Though the Argentines may be inhibited from making the running themselves on this argument, since they value their relationship with South Africa, it is likely that the Cubans and others will use it as a point to encourage African states to vote for a pro-Argentine resolution.
4. We have instructed posts to reject suggestions that the use of South Africa in this way should affect United Nations consideration of the Falklands problem. The issue at the UN is primarily one of the right of the people of the Falkland Islands to self-determination.



BRIEF NO 8

BACKGROUND BRIEF: MOZAMBIQUE INTERNAL

a) Political

1. On independence from Portugal in 1975 the Marxist-Leninist Frelimo party led by President Machel came to power. Under the constitution, state organs are directed by Frelimo and supreme power resides with the People's Assembly. Effective power rests with the Politburo and Central Committee and the thrust of policy is determined by Party Congresses, the Fourth of which was held at the end of April 1983. The President of Frelimo is ex-officio President of the People's Republic and Commander-in-Chief.
2. Although imbued with Marxist ideology, President Machel and his colleagues are strongly nationalistic and would prefer to avoid their dependence for survival on the Soviet Union.
3. The Frelimo Government is severely troubled by the NRM (Mozambique National Resistance). This guerrilla organisation was founded with the aid of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, and is now heavily supported by South Africa (a charge the South Africans consistently deny). The NRM have had considerable success against economic targets, disrupting in particular rail and road links between Mozambique and her neighbours. They are not at present capable of overthrowing the Machel Government militarily, and appear to lack either coherent policies or leaders of stature. Equally, it seems unlikely that the Government can defeat the NRM. The continued guerrilla activities, combined with economic problems, have led to a decline in public support for the Government.
4. Repressive measures have increased as economic and security difficulties have multiplied. Capital punishment has been extended to cover a wide range of crimes, and corporal punishment (abolished when Frelimo took power) has been re-introduced. In the wake of the Fourth Party Congress, a campaign to remove 'unproductive elements' from the cities back to the countryside has resulted in the forcible deportation of up to 50,000 people from Maputo alone. Both the NRM and Army use brutal tactics with the civilian population.

/b) Economic



- 2 -

b) Economic

5. Mozambique has a population roughly estimated to be between 10 and 12 million and a per capita GNP of about \$250, making it one of the poorest LDCs. The economy is largely dependent on agriculture which provides a source of subsistence for about 80% of the population, accounts for just over half of the GDP and provides the main export earnings (sugar, cashew nuts, cotton, tea, copra, citrus and sisal).

6. Transport and communications account for about a quarter of GNP due to the transportation through Mozambique of imports and exports to and from other southern African countries. Industrial development is confined to light industry which contributes a further 14% of GNP. The country has substantial, but largely unexploited, mineral wealth.

7. By the time Mozambique became independent in 1975, most of the 300,000 Portuguese settlers had left, depriving the economy of the benefits of a skilled professional class of artisans, of experienced junior management and of smaller wholesalers and retailers. As a result, management of business and maintenance of infrastructure deteriorated rapidly and the rural marketing system collapsed: the peasantry effectively stopped producing a marketable surplus, as a result of which the cities experienced food shortages and Mozambique's dependence on food imports increased.

8. These economic problems have been compounded by factors outside the Government's control, particularly the disruption of transit routes during the Rhodesian war, and more recently, the guerrilla activities of the NRM. Floods in the late 1970's followed by drought have added to its difficulties. Government policies, however, have also contributed to Mozambique's weak economic position. Large-scale nationalisation and an attempt to control most areas of economic life have led to the growth of an inefficient public sector and an erosion of producer price incentives with a consequent decline in agriculture and industrial production.

/9.



- 3 -

9. The country now faces a severe balance of trade deficit due, in part, to rising imports of food and petroleum. Severe foreign exchange shortages, combined with the acute lack of skilled manpower, have contributed to the decline in the industrial sector.

10. On account of its weak economic situation Mozambique is heavily reliant on financial aid. Until recently the Government has declined to contemplate membership of the IMF or World Bank which would provide it with access to much needed finance. The most recent indications are, however, that a change of heart may be imminent.

11. As an important transit route for Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Swaziland, from which it derives substantial revenues, Mozambique's membership of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) is particularly significant for its present and future prospects. Another potentially very important area of development is the energy sector. Bidding has just opened for oil exploration rights in 17 off-shore blocks where it is not expected within five years, in view of the cost of fuel imports (thought to be about a half of Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings,) domestic production would clearly be of potentially enormous benefit to the economy.



MACHEL, SAMORA MOISES

President of FRELIMO and of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces (FPLM). Marshal.

Born 1933 in Gaza province, of a peasant family of some standing. Father Methodist Minister. Attended a Catholic primary school for 6 years, later receiving some part-time secondary education. Trained and worked as male nurse. Left Mozambique in 1963 and received his military training in Algeria. Organised training at first FRELIMO camp in Tanzania and infiltration into Mozambique of their first guerrillas in September 1964. Chief Military Commander 1966 until Mondlane's assassination in 1969; Machel then became a member of the three-man Council of the Presidency set up to run FRELIMO. May 1970 appointed President, thereafter spending most of his time in Dar-es-Salaam or in the war zone in Mozambique. Made frequent visits to Communist countries. 1974 Machel led the FRELIMO delegation at the final independence negotiations in Lusaka with the Portuguese, becoming President of Mozambique on independence.

Machel is a charismatic and down to earth leader who originally made his reputation as a guerrilla chief. He is a natural, if verbose, orator. Although his education was limited, he has considerable intelligence and an excellent memory. Despite basic Marxist-Leninist convictions, he is fundamentally a nationalist in African as well as Mozambican terms. His pragmatism and resistance to Soviet pressure was evident when helping to get ZANU to accept a settlement in Rhodesia. Eye condition which has apparently deteriorated over the last year means he often wears dark glasses and is sometimes in obvious discomfort.

/Speaks

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Speaks Swahili, some French and a very little English. A keen boxing fan.

May 1969 he married Josina Machel, who died in 1971: there was one child, Samora Jnr. September 1975 he married Graca Simbine, Minister of Education and Culture; one son and one daughter born 1976 and 1979. Had children by two other women before independence.

Four brothers, one worked in South Africa for 18 years as a salesman and now has a clothing shop in Maputo; elder brother works at FRELIMO party HQ.

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MACHEL, GRACA SIMBINE

Minister of Education and Culture, Member of Central Committee.

Born in Gaza 17 October 1945. Married President Machel, September 1975. Mission education at Marrabene, near Inhambane. High School in Lourenco Marques. Left for Portugal in 1967. Also studied in Switzerland. Entered the Faculty of Languages. Became FRELIMO militant and concluded her studies in secrecy. In October 1973 left for Tanzania, joined FRELIMO. Appointed teacher and vice-rector of the FRELIMO High School. Accompanied Machel on a visit to East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania in December 1974. Junior Minister for Education and Culture in the transitional government.

Elegant, with a reputation for toughness.

Had children in 1976 and 1979.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000



CHISSANO, JOAQUIM ALBERTO

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Member of the Permanent Political Committee and the Central Committee, and Party Secretary for Foreign Relations. Major-General.

Born in Gaza province. Son of a Methodist Minister. Shangaan. Left Mozambique as a student for Portugal in 1960, one of the first black Mozambicans to do so, to study medicine. Left Portugal for political reasons for France in 1961, where he studied medicine for a year at Poitiers and then turned to politics. Founder of the National Union of Mozambican Students. Member of FRELIMO since its foundation in 1962. Member of the Central and Executive Committees of FRELIMO since 1963. Attended Lusaka independence talks in 1974. Formerly FRELIMO Secretary for Security and Defence, and for several years in the 1970s in charge of FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Prime Minister in Transitional Government. He travels a good deal, accompanying President Machel on State visits. Met Dr Owen several times. And in 1981 paid an official visit to UK including talks with Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington.

Earned a reputation for good administration during the Transitional Government. Urbane, and intelligent. Pragmatic, but probably a devout Marxist-Leninist too. Popular in the country; but, probably because of occasional rumours that he might replace Machel, takes care to remain in background publicly and, when they meet foreign delegations, to defer to Machel, with whom he probably gets on very well: he does not seem to have ambitions to be President. Charming, statesman-like, and impressive.

/Married

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- 2 -

Married with three children. Speaks very good English and French, some Swahili. His wife, who will accompany him on this occasion, is a trained midwife, also Shangaan, who speaks neither English nor French. Very conscious of her position.

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GUEBUZA, ARMANDO EMILIO

Minister of the Interior (since May 1983), Member of Central Committee, the Permanent Political Committee and the Control (disciplinary) Committee. Minister National, Political Commissar of the Forces. Lt General.

Born 1944 in Nampula province. Attended High School in Lourenço Marques. Joined FRELIMO in 1963 and did clandestine work in Lourenço Marques. Imprisoned in 1964, then left for Tanzania. In 1966 he became a member of the Executive Committee, and was at one time FRELIMO Secretary for Education. Attended second Lusaka talks. Minister for Internal Administration in Transitional Government. Minister of Interior from June 1975 to June 1977. 1978-80 acting Governor of Cabo Delgado province. 1981 private visit to UK. 1981 Resident Minister of Sofala Province.

Small, bespectacled and mild-looking; highly intelligent and agreeable personality. Reputedly an ideological hard-liner who has Machel's ear. A poet. Said to be very ambitious and close to Chissano. Good English.



VELOSO, JACINTO SOARES

Minister in the Presidency for Economic Affairs (since May 1983). Member of Central Committee and (Standing Political Committee) of FRELIMO and member of the General Staff of the army. Major-General.

Born c.1940 in Lourenco Marques. Portuguese origin. Secondary studies in Mozambique. Trained as a pilot at the Military Academy of Lisbon. Returned to Mozambique on Military Service, from where he deserted by Portuguese Air Force plane to Tanzania in 1963, where he joined FRELIMO. From 1964-66 worked as representative of FRELIMO in Algeria. From 1966-68 Professor at the Secondary School of FRELIMO. Member of the Joint Military Commission of Transitional Government. Attended Lusaka talks in 1974. Appointed to head of National Food Supply Committee in 1977. Minister of Security in April 1980. Headed Mozambican Team which met P W Botha at Komatipoort in December 1982, and made (unpublicised) visits to USA in 1983.

Took part in talks with Field Marshal Lord Carver in January 1978. A man of few words, but sensible and decisive. Speaks halting English.



RATILAL, PRAKASH

Governor of the Bank of Mozambique since December 1981.

Born c. 1943 of Indian origin. Hindu. 1976-77 Chairman of the State Insurance Company EMOSE. July 1978 visited UK to discuss insurance matters, meeting Mrs Hart, Bank of England and ODM officials. April 1978 appointed Vice Governor of the Bank of Mozambique: this surprised observers as he had no banking experience: but he has proved himself to be extremely capable and has impressed visiting British Bankers. July 1980 paid sponsored visit to UK. Met Lord Soames and Mr Luce. He is amiable but a tough negotiator: can be long-winded. He is clearly committed to the system but is no ideologue and is pursuing strongly Machel's policy of closer economic links with the West. Has quite good English, but prefers to do business through an interpreter. Has relations in the UK. Visited USA in 1982 and in 1983. Visited UK in July 1983.

Demoted from rank of 'Minister-Governor' in reshuffle in May 1983.

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HONWANA, FERNANDO

President's office.

Born 1950. Ronga. Studied at Waterford School in Swaziland, then read politics at York University in the United Kingdom. Accompanied Machel to Eastern Europe in 1974. Director of Immigration 1975-78. Attended Geneva Conference as deputy Mozambican observer in 1976. Lt Colonel.

Accompanies President Machel on foreign visits. Works closely with him on Namibian and other foreign policy issues, and as chief interpreter. Played a key role during the Rhodesian Independence negotiations at the Lusaka CHGM, Lancaster House Conference and as head of the Mozambican office in Salisbury during the transition. Late 1982 sent to North Korea for further military studies. Tipped as possible future head of Mozambique army.

Speaks faultless and perfectly-accented English. Married, one child.

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Mozambique



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May, 1983

Dear John,

Postponement of President Machel's Visit

In your letter of 10 May you authorised a message from the Prime Minister about the postponement of President Machel's visit. HM Ambassador in Maputo has now passed this to the Mozambican authorities, although he was unable to see President Machel personally owing to the President's illness.

The Mozambicans have reacted sensibly. However the Ambassador has recommended that a signed message from the Prime Minister should be sent if possible. This would help to alleviate any personal disappointment on the President's part at the postponement of his long-planned visit.

More important, perhaps, the delivery of a personal letter from the Prime Minister would enable the Ambassador to gain a personal audience with the President which might not otherwise be possible. This would allow him to raise a worrying consular case, that of Mr Dion Hamilton, with President Machel in person. Access to the President about this case has proved difficult in the past, and we consider it highly desirable that the Ambassador should have an early opportunity to discuss it with him. I enclose a copy of a recent telegram from Maputo which sets out some of the background.

I enclose the text of the message which was sent telegraphically. A signed version of this, perhaps with a manuscript addition along the lines suggested, would serve the purpose admirably.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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FM MAPUTO 101000Z MAY 83
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 10 MAY

TOP COPY

DION HAMILTON.

1. CONSUL VISITED BEIRA YESTERDAY IN THE HOPE OF SEEING HAMILTON BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR LONDON TOMORROW. SHE WASNABLE TO SPEAK THERE TO RESIDENT MINISTER GUEBUZA WHO INFORMED HER THAT THE MATTER WAS NOW OUT OF HIS HANDS AND THAT SHE WOULD BE ADVISED TO RETURN TO MAPUTO TO AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS. WE WERE TOLD ON HER RETURN YESTERDAY THAT HAMILTON WAS IN MAPUTO AND THAT A CONSULAR VISIT HAD BEEN ARRANGED AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FOR THIS MORNING CONSUL REPORTED THERE THIS MORNING TOGETHER WITH SR NAVESSE, DIRECTOR OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS AT THE M F A. BOTH WENT WITH A CAPTAIN CANIVETE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO MACHAVA PRISON WHERE THEY WERE MET BY A LARGE RECEPTION COMMITTEE OF UNIFORMED SOLDIERS INCLUDING

A PHOTOGRAPHER. CONSUL OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE PHOTOGRAPHY, WHICH NEVERTHELESS PERSISTED UNTIL HAMILTON WAS BROUGHT IN. CAPTAIN CANIVETE AND A COLLEAGUE REMAINED THROUGHOUT THE THIRTY MINUTE INTERVIEW, WHICH WAS IN PORTUGUESE.

2. HAMILTON'S APPEARANCE AND MORALE HAD DETERIORATED BADLY. HE WAS REASONABLY WELL DRESSED, WITH A NEW, GREY, BEARD, HOWEVER HE LOOKED THIN AND ILL, WITH RED EYES THAT APPARENTLY HAD DIFFICULTY IN FOCUSING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN A MILITARY ANTONOV TO MAPUTO ON 3 APRIL. HE HAD BEEN BLINDFOLDED, AND THIS CONTINUED FOR FOUR DAYS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. SINCE THAT TIME HE HAD BEEN IN HANDCUFFS 24 HOURS A DAY, IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A SMALL CELL IN BLOCK 8. WHEN THE BLINDFOLD WAS FIRST REMOVED, AND OCCASIONALLY SINCE HE HAD HAD PROBLEMS WITH DOUBLE VISION. HE BELIEVED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE BLINDFOLDING AND ISOLATION HAD BEEN TO DISORIENTATE HIM. HE SAID THAT HE WAS FEELING VERY LOW, AND AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE INTERVIEW WAS ON THE VERGE OF TEARS. HE HAD ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH THE EMBASSY ONLY LAST WEEK, WHEN HE BEGAN TO SUSPECT THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED OF HIS WHEREABOUTS.

3. HAMILTON HAS RECEIVED NO SUPPLEMENTARY FOOD FROM OUTSIDE SINCE HIS TRANSFER FROM BEIRA, SINCE WHEN HE HAS ALSO NOT SEEN HIS GLASSES, RAZOR AND TOILETRIES. HE BELIEVES THAT SOME OF THESE ITEMS HAVE NOW ARRIVED AT MACHAVA AND ASKED THE CAPTAIN PRESIDING IF HE COULD SEE WHAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT FOR HIM. HE NEEDS SOAP, CIGARETTES, MATCHES

VITAMINS, FRUIT AND VEGETABLES. THE FOOD PROVIDED IS BETTER THAN IN BEIRA BUT IT IS INSUFFICIENT. HE OFTEN GOES WITHOUT BREAKFAST. HIS OTHER MAIN WORRY, APART FROM THE HANDCUFFS, WAS THE RISK OF MALARIA, AS THE NETTING ON HIS CELL WINDOW IS TORN AND HE IS BADLY BOTHERED BY MOZQUITOES. HE ASKED IF WE COULD SUPPLY MALOPRIM. HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS FAMILY ESPECIALLY MIZE, AND WISHED TO BE REASSURED THAT THEY WERE ALL WELL.

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/4. HAMILTON

4. HAMILTON THEN WENT ON TO SPEAK ABOUT HIS CASE. HE HAD PREPARED A 32-PAGE DOCUMENT OUTLINING HIS DEFENCE, AND IN PARTICULAR ANSWERING THE POINTS MADE AT THE TRIAL AFTER HE SPOKE, WHICH HE HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER. HE SAID THAT, FOLLOWING HIS BAD CAR ACCIDENT 3 AND A HALF YEARS AGO, THERE WERE PARTS OF HIS MEMORY WHICH HAD BEEN WIPED OUT. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD NOT SEEN THE ARMS ALLEGEDLY DISCOVERED IN HIS HOUSE FOR OVER 4 YEARS. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD HAD ONLY A BRIEF MEETING WITH HIS DEFENCE COUNSEL ON THE DAY OF THE TRIAL AND THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GIVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF. WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORITIES, HE HAD HANDED THE DOCUMENT TO A FRIEND WHO HAD VISITED HIM IN PRISON IN BEIRA QUOTE A FEW DAYS UNQUOTE BEFORE HE WAS TRANSFERRED TO MAPUTO (THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) AFTER THE VICE CONSUL'S VISIT ON 28 MARCH), FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSMISSION TO THE EMBASSY. CONSUL INFORMED HAMILTON THAT WE HAD NEVER RECEIVED SUCH A DOCUMENT. HAMILTON WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW OF THE PROGRESS OF HIS CASE AND OF THE FATE OF HIS APPEAL. CONSUL EXPLAINED THAT THE AUTHORITIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, AND THAT THE QUESTION OF HIS CASE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE RAISED BY JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS DURING THE VISIT. SHE EXPLAINED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MOZAMBICANS IN ATTENDANCE THAT A FULL REPORT FROM HERE ON HIS CONDITION WAS VITAL IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BRITAIN NEXT MONDAY. SHE THEN HANDED OVER TO CAPT CANIVETE THE LETTERS FROM HAMILTON'S MOTHER, BROTHER AND SON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING. HE PROMISED THAT THESE WOULD BE FORWARDED, OR RETURNED TO ME, AS SOON AS THEY HAD BEEN READ. HAMILTON ASKED FOR PAPER AND PEN FOR HIMSELF.

5. AFTER HALF AN HOUR'S TALK AND SOME IMPROVEMENT IN HAMILTON'S SPIRITS CONSUL WAS ASKED TO LEAVE. HAMILTON PRESSED A HANDKERCHIEF, APPARENTLY CONCEALING A NOTE, INTO HER HAND IN FULL VIEW OF THE MILITARY, WHO PREDICTABLY ASKED FOR IT BACK AS SOON AS CONSUL LEFT THE ROOM. THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE MEETING, AND, ONE IMAGINES, HAMILTON'S DETENTION AND TREATMENT IN MACHAVA WAS ALTOGETHER HARDER AND MORE PROFESSIONAL THAN WHEN HE WAS BEING HELD BY S N A S P IN BEIRA. THE APPARENTLY GENUINE IGNORANCE DISPLAYED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO WORKED HARD TO ARRANGE CONSUL'S POINTLESS VISIT TO BEIRA, AND THE OBVIOUS AUTHORITY OF CAPTAIN CANIVETE IN THE MATTER OF PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC., INDICATED STRONGLY THAT THE MILITARY AND NOT THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES NOW HOLD SWAY OVER HAMILTON. WE CANNOT DEAL WITH THEM EXCEPT THROUGH THE M F A. THEIR METHODS AND PROCEDURES ARE A MYSTERY, BUT WHAT WE DO HEAR OF THEM IS OMINOUS.

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/6. CONSUL

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6. CONSUL AGREED THAT , ON THE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS FOOD AND MEDICINES, WE WOULD SEND A NOTE TODAY TO THE M F A DETAILING OUR REQUEST TO SUPPLY HAMILTON ON A REGULAR BASIS. CONSUL ALSO WARNED THAT WE WOULD PROTEST OVER THE HANCUFFS, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND FAILURE TO INFORM US OF HIS WHEREABOUTS.

7. I HAVE JUST SEEN F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 131. I AM PESSAMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT ON HAMILTON'S CASE AND WILL SEND YOU MY CONSIDERED RESPONSE ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO NEXT ONCE I HAVE BROKEN THE NEWS TO THE PRESIDENT.

STEWART

LIMITED

C A F D

CONS.D

S A F D

T R E D

NEWS.D.

P d C D

P S

P S / M R . O N S L O W

P S / P U S

S I R . J . L E A H Y

M R . S Q U I R E

L O R D . N . G . L E N N O X

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

19-21 OCTOBER 1983

SPEAKING NOTES

MAY I EXPRESS TO YOU, PRESIDENT MACHEL AND MRS. MACHEL, AND

TO YOUR DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION A WARM WELCOME.

WE HAVE LOOKED FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT WITH KEEN EXPECTATION.

WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT IT HAD TWICE TO BE POSTPONED.

BUT A PLEASURE DELAYED IS A PLEASURE DOUBLED.

AND WE ARE DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU HERE NOW.

PRESIDENT MACHEL, WE WELCOME YOU IN THE FIRST PLACE AS THE LEADER

OF MOZAMBIQUE, A COUNTRY WITH WHICH BRITAIN ENJOYS

FRIENDLY AND FRUITFUL RELATIONS.

OUR TALKS TODAY HAVE SHOWN HOW FEW PROBLEMS THERE ARE
BETWEEN US.

/ WE

WE WELCOME YOU ALSO AS AN EMINENT AFRICAN STATESMAN.

WE IN BRITAIN DO NOT FORGET THE PART WHICH YOU PLAYED
IN BRINGING TO AN END THE BLOODY CIVIL WAR IN WHAT IS
NOW ZIMBABWE.

YOU INSISTED THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND
TO WHAT THEN SEEMED AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM.
YOU WERE PROVED RIGHT.

YOU ARE NOW SHOWING THE SAME TENACITY OF PURPOSE IN THE SEARCH
FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.
AND YOU HAVE LAUNCHED A PROCESS OF DIRECT BILATERAL
NEGOTIATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

/ WE HERE

WE HERE APPLAUD YOUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY.

WE DEEPLY DEPLORE THE USE OF VIOLENCE.

WE HAVE MADE VERY CLEAR THAT, IN OUR VIEW, THE PEOPLE

OF EACH COUNTRY MUST BE LEFT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN

FUTURE, FREE FROM FOREIGN DESTABILISATION WHETHER

FROM WITHIN THE REGION OR OUTSIDE IT.

WE SHALL CONTINUE AS A MEMBER OF THE CONTACT GROUP

TO WORK FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

WE SHALL USE WHAT INFLUENCE WE HAVE TO PROMOTE PEACE,

SECURITY AND STABILITY FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES IN

SOUTHERN AFRICA.

/ YOUR EXCELLENCY

YOUR EXCELLENCY, THESE HAVE NOT BEEN EASY YEARS FOR MOZAMBIQUE.

FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS HAVE FACED YOU - PROBLEMS WHICH
REFLECT THE TENSIONS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION -
AND ON TOP OF THEM THE NATURAL DISASTERS OF FOUR YEARS
OF DROUGHT AND FLOOD.

WE HAVE BEEN HAPPY TO CO-OPERATE WITH YOU IN OVERCOMING THESE
DIFFICULTIES AND IN DEVELOPING THE GREAT POTENTIAL
OF YOUR COUNTRY.

BRITISH EXPERTS, BRITISH FIRMS, BRITISH FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, AS WELL AS OFFICIAL FORMS OF ASSISTANCE,
HAVE PLAYED THEIR PART.

/ WE HAVE

WE HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF MOZAMBIQUE

UNDER YOUR EXCELLENCY'S VIGOROUS AND WISE LEADERSHIP.

WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU.

/TOAST TO FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN

PEOPLES OF MOZAMBIQUE AND BRITAIN/

TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

INTRODUCTION

Praise his

- (a) role over Lancaster House.
- (b) efforts over Namibia.
- (c) attempts to solve problems with South Africa peacefully.

Sympathy for problems caused by

- (a) floods of late 1970's, then drought.
- (b) internal terrorism.
- (c) South African destabilisation (including latest raid on Maputo on 17 October which we have publicly deplored).

SOUTHERN AFRICA (Brief 5)

- (a) ask his views.
- (b) our concern about South African destabilisation; we urge restraint on South Africa; how are his discussions with South Africa proceeding?
- (c) Namibia - we continue efforts to reach settlement; co-operation of Machel and other front-line states important; positive Angolan response to U.S. on Cuban withdrawal now urgent.

/FALKLANDS (Brief 7)

FALKLANDS (Brief 7)

Hope Mozambique will abstain on UNGA resolution.

BILATERAL

- (a) Seek clemency for Mr. Dion Hamilton
(Brief 4)

- (b) UK economic aid
new package announced (Brief 3)
includes rehabilitation of Zimbabwe/
Maputo railway but:- please ensure
safety of British technical workers
on line.

ECGD cover(if raised): new cover for
landrover rehabilitation and some
spare parts. But we are overcommitted
on medium/long-term cover.

- (c) UK military aid

Hope he enjoys Sandhurst visit
tomorrow. Can finance one or two
places for officer training there.

Also possible places at BMATT's staff
college.

- (d) Mozambique memorandum

See page 6 of Brief 3.

JOINT PRESS RELEASE

Shall we approve it formally?

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND SENHORA MACHEL 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

Wednesday 19 October

Arrival

When the aircraft has landed a representative of the British Airports Authority will escort the greeting party to the tarmac. Lieutenant Colonel Honwana will board the aircraft. The official press party and photographer will disembark via the rear steps and enter the press enclosure. Lieutenant Colonel Honwana will then accompany the President and Senhora Machel to the tarmac where the following will welcome them:-

The Lord Skelmersdale, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen.

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Mr J A B Stewart, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Maputo

Mrs Stewart

Brigadier Alan Cowan, Secretary Government Hospitality Fund

Group Captain R Thomson, Escort Officer, Government Hospitality Fund

The Hon Diana Makgill, Lady Ceremonial Officer

The party will proceed to the VIP Suite where the President will present the members of his official suite. Thereafter the members of the official suite will be escorted to their cars for the journey into London.

Transport

Cars are provided throughout the programme for all members of the official suite and seating plans for journeys during the visit are shown at Annex 1. The Escort Officer will allocate cars as necessary during the visit.

Interpreters

Her Majesty's Government has engaged the following interpreters during the visit. Mr Richard Kingsbury will interpret for the President throughout the visit. His first engagement will be the call by Lord Soames at Claridges at 10.45 on 19 October. Mrs Turner will interpret as required for Senhora Machel throughout the visit. Mrs Everett will interpret for Senhora Chissano and Mr C Alves for Major General Veloso at the lunch at Buckingham Palace on 19 October and at dinner at 1 Carlton Gardens that evening. All the interpreters involved with the Palace luncheon will arrive at the Privy Purse entrance to Buckingham Palace at 1215 hours on 19 October and ask for Mr Mordaunt who will explain what is required.

Mr Alves will interpret for Senhor Ratilal and Senhor Sumbana during the call on Mr Raison at Eland House at 1055 hours on 19 October.

On 20 October Mr Alves will interpret for Major General Veloso during his call on the Uniform Clothing and Equipment Company at 0830 hours (leaving Claridges 0805); during lunch at 10 Downing Street that day, during a call at Claridges at 1830 hours by Mr Frost of the Intermediate Technology Group, and during dinner that night at Lancaster House.

Ms Santa Rita will interpret for General Guebuza and Senhor Sumbana during a call at Claridges at 1700 hours by five representatives of British non-Governmental organisations.

Mrs Everett will interpret for Senhora Chissano at 10 Downing Street lunch and at the Lancaster House Dinner on 20 October. On 21 October Mr Alves will interpret for Major General Veloso during the trip to Sandhurst.

Participation of the Official Suite in the President's Programme

Wednesday 19 October

Luncheon given by Her Majesty The Queen

His Excellency the President will be met on arrival by the Master of the Household and Lady Rose Baring.

The following are also invited:-

His Excellency Major General Chissano
Senhora Chissano
His Excellency Lieutenant-General Guebuza
His Excellency Major General Veloso
Lieutenant Colonel Honwana

The following are invited to lunch with members of The Queen's Household:-

Senhor Calvo Monteiro
Senhor Evaristo Oviedo
Captain Faustino Tenesse
The Hon Diana Makgill
Group Captain Robert Thompson

In addition, Captain Flavio Meque will be accommodated by the Palace Police

Reception given by the South/North Business Forum

Entry will be into New Palace Yard and then into Star Chamber Court where Mr Nigel Forman MP will meet and escort the President and Official Suite to the Members Dining Room.

All of the Official Suite are invited to attend, with the exception of Senhora Machel and Senhora Chissano who have separate programmes.

Call by Senhor Rati1al and Senhor Sumbana on The Rt Hon Timothy Raison MP

Mrs Joan Laurance, Central and Southern Africa Department, will meet on arrival.

Dinner at 1 Carlton Gardens

The following are also invited:-

His Excellency Major General Chissano
Senhora Chissano
His Excellency Lieutenant-General Guebuza
His Excellency Major-General Veloso
His Excellency Senhor Ratilal
His Excellency Senhor Osman
His Excellency Senhor Sumbana

The following will be accommodated inside 1 Carlton Gardens

Senhor Calvo Monteiro
Senhor Evaristo Oviedo
Captain Faustino Tenesse
Captain Flavio Meque
Lieutenant Bernardo Chicoco

Thursday 20 October

Guard of Honour

The procedure is described at Annex 11.

Talks with the Prime Minister

1200-1215 Tête-à-Tête

The President and Prime Minister will each be accompanied by an interpreter. There will be a British note-taker.

1215-1300 Plenary Talks and lunch

His Excellency Major General Chissano
His Excellency Lieutenant General Guebuza
His Excellency Major General Veloso
His Excellency Senhor Ratilal
Lieutenant-Colonel Honwana

will attend the talks and lunch

Senhora Machel and Senhora Chissano will attend the lunch.

In addition to the persons listed above the following will be admitted to 10 Downing Street:

Senhor Calvo Monteiro
Senhor Evaristo Oviedo
Captain Faustino Tenesse
Captain Flavio Meque
Lieutenant Bernardo Chicoco

Conference at Painters Hall

All the official suite will accompany the President with the exception of Senhora Machel and Senhora Chissano who have a separate programme.

Call on His Excellency Major-General Veloso

Mr Denis Frost, Chief Executive of the Intermediate Technology Group will call at 1830 hours. Mr Alves will interpret.

Call on His Excellency Lieutenant General Guebuza and His Excellency Senhor Sumbana

The representative of British non-Governmental organisations will call at 1700 Ms Paola Santa-Rita will interpret.

Dinner at Lancaster House

All members of the official suite are invited.

The following will also be admitted to Lancaster House:

Senhor Calvo Monteiro
Senhor Evaristo Oviedo
Captain Faustino Tenesse
Captain Flavio Meque
Lieutenant Bernardo Chicoco

Friday 21 October

Visit to Sandhurst

The following will also attend:-

His Excellency Major General Chissano
His Excellency Lieutenant-General Guebuza
His Excellency Major General Veloso
Senhor Andrade
Lieutenant Colonel Honwana
Senhor Mendonca
Senhor Mamadhusen
Lieutenant Vitorino

Departure Arrangements

The President and suite will depart by a special flight leaving London Heathrow Airport at 2205 hours.

The following special arrangements have been made for the departure.

Special Arrangements for the Unofficial Suite

Members of the unofficial suite should arrive at Terminal 3 Departure Building by 2030 hours. They should enter by the far door where desks 1 and 2 on Island 'E' have been set aside for their use. These desks will be staffed especially for the unofficial suite which will be directed to the aircraft at the appropriate time.

The Official Suite

Members of the Official Suite will depart via the Hillingdon VIP Suite. As well as members of the Official Suite the following will be admitted to the VIP Suite:-

Senhor Calvo Monteiro
Senhor Evaristo Oviedo
Captain Faustino Tenesse
Captain Flavio Meque
Lieutenant Bernardo Chicoco

The Official Suite should arrive at the Hillingdon VIP Suite by 2130 hours.

The Lord Skelmersdale, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen and Sir David Muirhead, Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will bid farewell.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Press



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22.
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h. a. >

18 October 1983

for John.

Visit of President Machel: Press Release

In your letter of 4 October, you said that the Prime Minister was willing to meet the Mozambican request for a joint communique. I enclose a draft text which - unless you see objection - we propose to put to the Mozambicans on their arrival tomorrow morning. The objective, as you requested, is to reach agreement on it in advance of the talks at No 10, so that the text might then be formally agreed between the President and the Prime Minister.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



VISIT BY HE THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

JOINT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT: DRAFT TEXT

1. His Excellency the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Marshal Samora Moises Machel, paid a visit to the United Kingdom from 19-21 October at the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP.
2. The President was received and entertained to luncheon by Her Majesty The Queen on 19 October, and held talks followed by luncheon with the Prime Minister on 20 October. These talks provided an opportunity for a wide-ranging exchange of views on bilateral and international subjects, particularly those relating to Southern Africa. The President invited the Prime Minister to visit Mozambique. *In accepting the invitation the Prime Minister ~~looked~~ said that ~~she hoped to be able to take it~~ ~~up at a mutually convenient time~~*
3. The President was also entertained to dinner by the Rt Hon John Biffen, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, on 19 October and the Rt Hon the Viscount Whitelaw, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords, on 20 October. *up at a mutually convenient time*. He also met representatives of the business community, and visited the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.
4. During the visit, the two Governments discussed opportunities for furthering trade, and signed a number of aid agreements (listed in Annex).


Annex

HMG have agreed to grant Retrospective Terms Adjustment to Mozambique, to provide an additional 11,500 tonnes of emergency food aid in order to combat the severe drought in Mozambique, and to give further assistance in the training and health sectors. HMG have also announced their intention to implement a £10m. project to rehabilitate railway lines within Mozambique as part of its aid to the SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference). Under the same aegis HMG also hope to identify a project to make improvements to Maputo port.

Morumbogu,
June 81,
Visit of Pres. Machel



18 JUL 1981



Please type in good form 1+3.

VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

SPEAKING NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

May I express to you, President Machel and Mrs Machel, a warm welcome. *and to your distinguished delegation*

We have looked forward to your visit with keen expectation. We were disappointed that it had twice to be postponed. But a pleasure delayed is a pleasure doubled. And we are delighted to have you here now.

President Machel, we welcome you in the first place as the Leader of Mozambique, a country with which Britain enjoys friendly and fruitful relations. Our talks today have shown how few problems we have, and ~~how much in common~~ *there are between us*

We welcome you also as an eminent African statesman. We in Britain ~~cannot~~ *do not* forget the part which you, ~~President Machel~~, played in bringing to an end the bloody civil war in what is now Zimbabwe. You insisted that a peaceful solution could be found to what then seemed an intractable problem. You were proved right. You are now showing the same tenacity of purpose in the search for a Namibia settlement. And you have launched a process of direct bilateral negotiation with South Africa. *We have applauded your efforts to resolve problems peacefully.* ~~My Government share your conviction that dialogue and negotiation are the way forward.~~ We deeply deplore the use of violence ~~to solve problems~~. We have made very clear that, in our view, the people of each country must be left to determine their own future, free from foreign destabilisation whether from within the region or outside it. We shall continue as a member of the Contact Group to work for a Namibia settlement. We shall use what influence we have to promote peace, security and stability for all the countries in Southern Africa.

/Your

22

Your Excellency, these have not been easy years for Mozambique. Formidable problems have faced you - problems which reflect the tensions of the Southern African region - and on top of them the natural disasters of four years of drought and flood.

We have been happy to co-operate with you in overcoming these difficulties and in developing the great potential of your country. British experts, British firms, British financial institutions, as well as official forms of assistance, have played their part. We have confidence in the future of Mozambique under Your Excellency's vigorous and wise leadership. We wish to continue to work closely with you.

[Toast to friendship and close co-operation between peoples of Mozambique and Britain]

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1983

Mr 19/10

Dear Sir,

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique: Additional Briefing

/ As requested, I enclose a copy of the Mozambican memorandum of cooperation, and two addenda to Brief No 5, one on the recent South African raid on Maputo and the other on Mr Rifkind's forthcoming visit to Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

/ I also enclose fair copies of the Personality Notes on the Mozambicans who will attend the talks and luncheon on Thursday.

You also enquired about the standard of the Interpreter who will be provided. I understand that, although not bilingual, Mr Kingsbury is a first-grade Conference Interpreter, and is of a high standard.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



STATEMENT BY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

I was shocked to hear of the incidents this morning involving attacks by South African forces on targets in Mozambique. I deeply regret the human suffering these will have caused, and I deplore this violation of Mozambique's sovereignty. I have repeatedly made clear my view that the problems of southern Africa cannot be solved by violence. I condemn these actions, just as I condemn the violence in Pretoria on Friday, when a car bomb caused loss of life and injury. There is a desperate need to break the vicious circle where violence begets violence and to seek peaceful solutions to the region's problems.



MACHEL, SAMORA MOISES

President of FRELIMO and of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces (FPLM). Marshal.

Born 1933 in Gaza province, of a peasant family of some standing. Father Methodist Minister. Attended a Catholic primary school for 6 years, later receiving some part-time secondary education. Trained and worked as male nurse. Left Mozambique in 1963 and received his military training in Algeria. Organised training at first FRELIMO camp in Tanzania and infiltration into Mozambique of their first guerrillas in September 1964. Chief Military Commander 1966 until Mondlane's assassination in 1969; Machel then became a member of the three-man Council of the Presidency set up to run FRELIMO. May 1970 appointed President, thereafter spending most of his time in Dar-es-Salaam or in the war zone in Mozambique. Made frequent visits to Communist countries. 1974 Machel led the FRELIMO delegation at the final independence negotiations in Lusaka with the Portuguese, becoming President of Mozambique on independence.

Machel is a charismatic and down to earth leader who originally made his reputation as a guerrilla chief. He is a natural, if verbose, orator. Although his education was limited, he has considerable intelligence and an excellent memory. Despite basic Marxist-Leninist convictions, he is fundamentally a nationalist in African as well as Mozambican terms. His pragmatism and resistance to Soviet pressure was evident when

/helping

CONFIDENTIAL

helping to get ZANU to accept a settlement in Rhodesia. Eye condition which has apparently deteriorated over the last year means he often wears dark glasses and is sometimes in obvious discomfort.

Speaks Swahili, some French and a very little English. A keen boxing fan.

May 1969 he married Josina Machel, who died in 1971: there was one child, Samora Jnr. September 1975 he married Graca Simbine, Minister of Education and Culture; one son and one daughter born 1976 and 1979. Had children by two other women before independence.

Four brothers, one worked in South Africa for 18 years as a salesman and now has a clothing shop in Maputo; elder brother works at FRELIMO party HQ.

MACHEL, GRACA SIMBINE

Minister of Education and Culture, Member of Central Committee.

Born in Gaza 17 October 1945. Married President Machel, September 1975. Mission education at Marrabene, near Inhambane. High School in Lourenco Marques. Left for Portugal in 1967. Also studied in Switzerland. Entered the Faculty of Languages. Became FRELIMO militant and concluded her studies in secrecy. In October 1973 left for Tanzania, joined FRELIMO. Appointed teacher and vice-rector of the FRELIMO High School. Accompanied Machel on a visit to East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania in December 1974. Junior Minister for Education and Culture in the transitional government.

Elegant, with a reputation for toughness.

Had children in 1976 and 1979.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

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CHISSANO, JOAQUIM ALBERTO

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Member of the Permanent Political Committee and the Central Committee, and Party Secretary for Foreign Relations. Major-General.

Born in Gaza province. Son of a Methodist Minister. Shangaan. Left Mozambique as a student for Portugal in 1960, one of the first black Mozambicans to do so, to study medicine. Left Portugal for political reasons for France in 1961, where he studied medicine for a year at Poitiers and then turned to politics. Founder of the National Union of Mozambican Students. Member of FRELIMO since its foundation in 1962. Member of the Central and Executive Committees of FRELIMO since 1963. Attended Lusaka independence talks in 1974. Formerly FRELIMO Secretary for Security and Defence, and for several years in the 1970s in charge of FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Prime Minister in Transitional Government. He travels a good deal, accompanying President Machel on State visits. Met Dr Owen several times. And in 1981 paid an official visit to UK including talks with Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington.

Earned a reputation for good administration during the Transitional Government. Urbane, and intelligent. Pragmatic, but probably a devout Marxist-Leninist too. Popular in the country; but, probably because of occasional rumours that he might replace Machel, takes care to remain in background publicly and, when they meet foreign delegations, to defer to Machel, with whom he probably gets on very well: he does not seem to have ambitions to be President. Charming, statesman-like, and impressive.

Married with three children. Speaks very good English and French, some Swahili. His wife, who will accompany him on this occasion, is a trained midwife, also Shangaan, who speaks neither English nor French. Very conscious of her position.

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GUZUZA, ARMANDO EMILIO

Minister of the Interior (since May 1983), Member of Central Committee, the Permanent Political Committee and the Control (disciplinary) Committee. Minister National, Political Commissar of the Forces. Lt General.

Born 1944 in Nampula province. Attended High School in Lourenço Marques. Joined FRELIMO in 1963 and did clandestine work in Lourenço Marques. Imprisoned in 1964, then left for Tanzania. In 1966 he became a member of the Executive Committee, and was at one time FRELIMO Secretary for Education. Attended second Lusaka talks. Minister for Internal Administration in Transitional Government. Minister of Interior from June 1975 to June 1977. 1978-80 acting Governor of Cabo Delgado province. 1981 private visit to UK. 1981 Resident Minister of Sofala Province.

Small, bespectacled and mild-looking; highly intelligent and agreeable personality. Reputedly an ideological hard-liner who has Machel's ear. A poet. Said to be very ambitious and close to Chissano. Good English.



VOSO, JACINTO SOARES

Minister in the Presidency for Economic Affairs (since May 1983). Member of Central Committee and (Standing Political Committee) of FRELIMO and member of the General Staff of the army. Major-General.

Born c.1940 in Lourenco Marques. Portuguese origin. Secondary studies in Mozambique. Trained as pilot at the Military Academy of Lisbon. Returned to Mozambique on Military Service, from where he deserted by Portuguese Air Force plane to Tanzania in 1963, where he joined FRELIMO. From 1964-66 worked as representative of FRELIMO in Algeria. From 1966-68 Professor at the Secondary School of FRELIMO. Member of the Joint Military Commission of Transitional Government. Attended Lusaka talks in 1974. Appointed to head of National Food Supply Committee in 1977. Minister of Security in April 1980. Headed Mozambican Team which met P W Botha at Komatipoort in December 1982, and made (unpublicised) visits to USA in 1983.

Took part in talks with Field Marshal Lord Carver in January 1978. A man of few words, but sensible and decisive. Speaks halting English.

CONFIDENTIAL



RATILAL, PRAKASH

Governor of the Bank of Mozambique since December 1981.

Born c.1943 of Indian origin. Hindu. 1976-77 Chairman of the State Insurance Company EMOSE. July 1978 visited UK to discuss insurance matters, meeting Mrs Hart, Bank of England and ODM officials. April 1978 appointed Vice Governor of the Bank of Mozambique: this surprised observers as he had no banking experience: but he has proved himself to be extremely capable and has impressed visiting British Bankers. July 1980 paid sponsored visit to UK. Met Lord Soames and Mr Luce. He is amiable but a tough negotiator: can be long-winded. He is clearly committed to the system here, but is no ideologue and is pursuing strongly Machel's policy of closer economic links with the West. Has quite good English, but prefers to do business through an interpreter. Has relations in the UK. Visited USA in 1982 and 1983. Visited UK in July 1983.

Demoted from rank of 'Minister-Governor' in reshuffle in May 1983.



HONWANA, FERNANDO

President's office.

Born 1950. Ronga. Studied at Waterford School in Swaziland, then read politics at York University in the United Kingdom. Accompanied Machel to Eastern Europe in 1974. Director of Immigration 1975-78. Attended Geneva Conference as deputy Mozambican observer in 1976. Lt Colonel.

Accompanies President Machel on foreign visits. Works closely with him on Namibian and other foreign policy issues, and as chief interpreter. Played a key role during the Rhodesian Independence negotiations at the Lusaka CHGM, Lancaster House Conference and as head of the Mozambican office in Salisbury during the transition. Late 1982 sent to North Korea for further military studies. Tipped as possible future head of Mozambique army.

Speaks faultless and perfectly-accented English. Married, one child.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique
Visit of Pres Machel

Lib

MRS. GOODCHILD

cc. Mr. Taylor
(with copy of minute
dated 12 October)

Visit of the President of Mozambique

20 October

Ref. your minute dated 12 October.

I have discussed this matter with FCO Protocol, who, to no avail, have tried to persuade the Mozambique authorities to omit the "2 security people". Consequently, we shall have to admit these five officers. However, I have asked FCO to ensure that the GHF Escort Officer will escort and generally be responsible for them while they are in No. 10.

Ts J
P. S. JOCE

18 October, 1983



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 October 1983

Handwritten initials and date: 20. 10

Dear John,

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique: Talks with
the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 3 October.

We have now consulted the Mozambicans and believe that it would be more appropriate that all those members of the official suite who are to attend the lunch given by the Prime Minister, with the exception of the ladies, should take part in a plenary session in the Cabinet Room.

We would therefore suggest that the following should be present:

(i) For the tête-à-tête

The Prime Minister

H.E. The President

Mr R Kingsbury (interpr.)

Lt Col Honwana (who will act as the President's personal interpreter for the meeting)

Private Secretary

(ii) For the Plenary

The Prime Minister

H.E. The President

Sir Geoffrey Howe

H.E. Maj-Gen Chissano
(Foreign Minister)

Mr Rifkind (if available)

H.E. Lt-Gen Guebuza
(Interior Minister)

Sir John Leahy (Deputy
Under-Secretary FCO)

H.E. Maj-Gen Veloso
(Minister for Economic
Affairs in the President's
Office)

/



H.E. Mr J A B Stewart
(HMA Maputo)

HE Sr Ratilal (Governor of
the Bank of Mozambique)

Mr R Kinsbury (Interpreter)

Lt-Col Honwana (Special
Adviser to the President)

(The full titles of the Mozambique delegation are
included in the enclosure to my letter of 30 September.)

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

MOZAMBIQUE : Visit of Pres. Machel
June '81

17 OCT 1983





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October, 1983

Jan John.

na 6/9

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

/ I attach the briefing for the Prime Minister for her
// meeting and luncheon with President Machel on 20 October,
together with two copies. I also attach draft speaking
notes for the toast at the luncheon. The programme will
be forwarded next week.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983

CHECK-LIST OF MAIN POINTS TO MAKE

1. Our appreciation: Machel's role over Lancaster House Agreement; his present role over Namibia; his Government's direct dialogue with South Africa.
2. Our sympathy: drought/floods; internal terrorism; South African destabilisation.
3. British citizen: clemency for Mr Dion Hamilton.
4. British claims: memorandum given to the President's party.
5. UK economic aid: package of future aid to be announced during visit. Rehabilitation of Zimbabwe/Maputo railway: we need Mozambique protection for British personnel.
6. UK military aid: Sandhurst places; possible places in BMATT courses in Zimbabwe.
7. British aid/ECGD (defensive): new cover for Land-rover rehabilitation and some help over provision of spares; but ECGD over-committed on medium/long-term cover.
8. South African destabilisation: our concern; mainly for countries in the region to solve; we urge restraint on South Africa: We believe our African friends want us to continue to use our contacts with South Africa for this purpose. What are the prospects for Machel's discussions with South Africa?
9. Namibia: we continue efforts to reach settlement; importance of co-operation of Machel and other Front Line States; positive response to US by Angolans on Cuban troop withdrawal is urgent.
10. Falklands: hope for Mozambique abstention on UNGA Resolution.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE: 19-21 OCTOBER 1983
SPEAKING NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

May I express to you, President Machel and Mrs Machel, a warm welcome.

We have looked forward to your visit with keen expectation. We were disappointed that it had twice to be postponed. But a pleasure delayed is a pleasure doubled. And we are delighted to have you here now.

President Machel, we welcome you in the first place as the Leader of Mozambique, a country with which Britain enjoys friendly and fruitful relations. Our talks today have show how few problems we have, and how much in common.

We welcome you also as an eminent African statesman. We in Britain cannot forget the part which you, President Machel, played in bringing to an end the bloody civil war in what is now Zimbabwe. You insisted that a peaceful solution could be found to what then seemed an intractable problem. You were proved right. You are now showing the same tenacity of purpose in the search for a Namibia settlement. And you have launched a process of direct bilateral negotiation with South Africa. My Government share your conviction that dialogue and negotiation are the way forward. We deeply deplore the use of violence to solve problems. We have made very clear that, in our view, the people of each country must be left to determine their own future, free from foreign destabilisation whether from within the region or outside it. We shall continue as a member of the Contact Group to work for a Namibia settlement. We shall use what influence we have to promote peace, security and stability for all the countries in Southern Africa.

/Your



Your Excellency, these have not been easy years for Mozambique. Formidable problems have faced you - problems which reflect the tensions of the Southern African region - and on top of them the natural disasters of four years of drought and flood.

We have been happy to co-operate with you in overcoming these difficulties and in developing the great potential of your country. British experts, British firms, British financial institutions, as well as official forms of assistance, have played their part. We have confidence in the future of Mozambique under Your Excellency's vigorous and wise leadership. We wish to continue to work closely with you.

[Toast to friendship and close co-operation between peoples of Mozambique and Britain]

MR. JOCE

Visit of the President of Mozambique
Thursday, 20 October

The Foreign Office have been on the 'phone about the Prime Minister's lunch for the President of Mozambique.

The following will be sitting in the outmess at all the various other functions the President will be attending during his stay.

ADC

2 doctors

2 security people (Chief of Security
and his assistant)

Are you content that the two security men should be fed upstairs?

If so, I will confirm this with the FCO

Sue Goodch. Id
—

12 October 1983





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1983

VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL: PRESS RELEASE

Thank you for your letter of 26 September about the Mozambican suggestion that we should issue a joint communique at the end of the visit by the President of Mozambique later this month.

The Prime Minister has no enthusiasm for the device of a joint communique, but is willing on this occasion to meet the Mozambican request, provided of course that we can reach agreement on satisfactory wording. We would hope that there would be no need for the Prime Minister and the President to become involved in discussing the joint communique and assume that you will reach agreement on it with the Mozambicans in advance of the talks at No. 10. The text could then be formally agreed between the President and the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF MOZAMBIQUE

The Mozambiquans are pressing for a joint communique
to be issued at the end of their visit.

This is not our normal practice, and there are risks -
they may haggle about the wording endlessly.

But the advice is that we should meet their request -
and there will of course be no question of you being involved
in the haggling.

Agree that we should accept the Mozambiquan request?

A.S.C.

provided we
can agree
ms

3 October 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 October 1983

BT
Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

Thank you for your letter of 30 September.

On your last paragraph, we can begin the talks with a 15 minute tete-a-tete, as you suggest, with only interpreters and note-takers being present.

Could you then establish the wishes of President Machel as to the form talks should take thereafter. We could agree either to Foreign Ministers joining the two principals or to a Plenary Session in the Cabinet Room with the whole Mozambican delegation listed in the enclosure to your letter being present.

A J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MP



Copy to the President and
section 15 map. M3/10.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1983


Dear Sir,

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

As you know, the Prime Minister has kindly offered to host a lunch for President Machel of Mozambique on Thursday 20 October, to be preceded by a Guard of Honour at 1145 and talks at 1200.

The Mozambicans have now given us the composition of the party accompanying President Machel and his wife during the visit. I attach a list of those whom we believe should be included as guests for the lunch in place of those tentatively suggested in the guest list I sent to you on 12 September. (I understand that, in addition to the President and his wife, there would be no difficulty about including six).

We should be grateful in due course for guidance on the format that the talks should take. I am sure that President Machel would greatly appreciate a short tete-a-tete with the Prime Minister (perhaps 15 minutes), with only interpreters and note-taker being present (we believe that the President will use Lt Col Honwana as his interpreter on this occasion). They might then be joined, if you agree, by Foreign Ministers. We will, of course, provide full briefing nearer the time.


(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Normanby
sent by Mrs. Rachel
June 81

Forster and Co. Stationers & Printers

London, W.C.2



His Excellency the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique and
Her Excellency Senhora Dona Graça Machel.

His Excellency Major-General Joaquim Alberto Chissano,
Member of the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly and
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Senhora Marcelina Chissano

His Excellency Lieutenant-General Armando Emílio Guebuza,
Deputy of the People's Assembly and Minister of the Interior

His Excellency Major-General Jacinto Soares Veloso,
Deputy of the People's Assembly and Minister for Economic Affairs
in the Presidential Office

His Excellency Senhor Prakashandra Ratilal,
Deputy of the People's Assembly and Governor of the Bank of Mozambique

Lieutenant-Colonel Fernando Luis Honwana,
Deputy of the People's Assembly and Special Advisor to
His Excellency the President

1403 antique
Visit Mrs. Harbel
June 87

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 September 1983

Visit by President Machel: Press Release

As you know, President Machel of Mozambique is to visit this country from 19 - 21 October, and is to have lunch with The Queen on 19 October and talks and lunch with the Prime Minister on 20 October.

The Mozambicans have asked that we should agree to a joint communique to be issued at the end of the visit. Our Ambassador in Maputo has supported this request.

It is not our normal practice to issue joint communiques. We nevertheless see some advantage in agreeing to do so on this occasion. It would enable us to ensure that the Mozambicans do not themselves unilaterally release a distorted version of the proceedings to the press. We could also use it to draw attention to positive moves in the aid field which we hope to announce in the course of the visit.

A short draft text would be provided to President Machel's party on arrival on 19 October, be formally agreed following the talks between the President and the Prime Minister, and released either on Friday, 21 October or the following Monday.

Would you let me know whether this proposal is acceptable?

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street


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Mozambique Visit of Pres. Machel June 81

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250

26 SEP 1981



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

da



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 August 1983

BF/ Thank you for your letter of 4 August about the forthcoming visit of President Machel of Mozambique. The Prime Minister has agreed that she will see President Machel and offer him lunch on Thursday 20 October.

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten signature or initials.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 August 1983

Prime Minister:

We could offer Machel talks
lunch on Wednesday 29 October
(which would mean postponing your
lunch with the Euzenat) or after
Cabinet on Thursday 20. The former seems
preferable. Agree? *RT*

Dear John

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

4/8

You will recall that President Machel was to have visited this country from 16-18 May as a Guest of Government. The visit was postponed on 9 May as a result of the decision to call a General Election, and the Prime Minister subsequently wrote to President Machel expressing the hope that a convenient date could be found later in the year.

The original grounds for the invitation remain valid. It will enable us to encourage President Machel's proven pragmatism over the Namibia negotiations and over Mozambique's bilateral relations with South Africa. It will aid the Western effort to wean Mozambique away from reliance on the Soviet bloc. Moreover, a failure to extend an early renewed invitation would undoubtedly cause offence.

Sir Geoffrey Howe therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should approve the issue of a further formal invitation to President Machel for a three-day Guest of Government visit, and that she should agree to offer him luncheon, after a Guard of Honour in the FCO courtyard and talks at 10 Downing St. The timing we are considering is 19-21 October, dates which we believe would accord with the Mozambicans' plan for a wider European tour. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether this would be convenient for the Prime Minister. One of the possible dates for the Anglo-French Summit is 21 October (we still await further word from the French), but this is not incompatible with a visit by President Machel, although it would of course mean that the Prime Minister's involvement would be confined to Wednesday and Thursday, 19 and 20 October.

I should add that the Royal Visits Committee has agreed that the visit should be reinstated in the autumn if this is possible.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

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Morambaque

June 8th 1883
Visit of Machel.

- 4 AUG 1883



16 May 1983


Visit of President Machel

Thank you for your letter of 13 May.

I now enclose a letter to President Machel which the Prime Minister has signed. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its delivery.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

We sent this message
telegraphically but our Ambassadors
believe that the President would
appreciate a signed letter.

You may like to add in
manuscript: "I do hope we
shall be able to arrange a
new date soon."

A.S.C. ¹³/₅.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 May 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 64A/83 cc MASTER
ops

Dear Mr. President,

I had been looking forward with so much pleasure to your visit next week. There are issues of importance which we should discuss together. But as you will probably have heard, we shall now be holding a general election here on 9 June.

It is our long-standing tradition not to entertain world political leaders in this country during a general election campaign and with the greatest regret I therefore have no option but to suggest that your visit should be postponed to a later date. I very much hope that mutually convenient dates for your visit can be found later in the year.

I do hope we shall be
able to arrange a new date soon.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Samora Moises Machel

HL



Typed.

DRAFT TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO BE SENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO H.E. PRESIDENT SAMORA MOISES MACHEL OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

I had been looking forward with so much pleasure to your visit next week. There are issues of importance which we should discuss together. But as you will probably have heard, we shall now be holding a general election here on 9 June.

It is our longstanding tradition not to entertain world political leaders in this country during a general election campaign and with the greatest regret I therefore have no option but to suggest that your visit should be postponed to a later date. I very much hope that mutually convenient dates for your visit can be found later in the year.


~~[To be added in the Prime Minister's hand]~~

~~I do hope that we shall be able to meet before the year is out.~~

AM 13/5



3 MAY 1983



CC MASTER
OPS

4/11/83

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY
7430 - 1

ZZ MAPUTO

GRS 159

RESTRICTED

FM F C O 100920Z MAY 83

TO FLASH MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 131 OF 10 MAY 1983,

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS,

INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, MOD (DS11).

1. OWING TO THE DECISION TO HOLD THE GENERAL ELECTION ON 9 JUNE IT IS UNFORTUNATELY NECESSARY TO POSTPONE PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VISIT. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MACHEL: BEGINS. I HAD BEEN LOOKING FORWARD WITH SO MUCH PLEASURE TO YOUR VISIT NEXT WEEK. THERE ARE ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE WHICH WE SHOULD DISCUSS TOGETHER. BUT AS YOU WILL PROBABLY HAVE HEARD, WE SHALL NOW BE HOLDING A GENERAL ELECTION HERE ON 9 JUNE.

IT IS OUR LONGSTANDING TRADITION NOT TO ENTERTAIN WORLD POLITICAL LEADERS IN THIS COUNTRY DURING A GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND WITH THE GREATEST REGRET I THEREFORE HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO SUGGEST THAT YOUR VISIT SHOULD BE POSTPONED TO A LATER DATE. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATES FOR YOUR VISIT CAN BE FOUND LATER IN THE YEAR. ENDS.

PYM

NNNN

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huc
B/P
10 May, 1983VISIT OF PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

The Prime Minister has approved the message proposed in your letter of 9 May about the postponement of President Machel's visit, subject to some minor amendments. The final text of the message is enclosed with this letter and I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch.

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

h

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1983

John Thur...

Postponement of Visit by President Machel of
Mozambique

/ I enclose a draft telegram containing a personal
message to President Machel.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	RESTRICTED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NO
	9	AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS,
	10	UKREP BRUSSELS
	11	1. Owing to the decision to hold the General Election
	12	on 9 June it is unfortunately necessary to postpone
	13	President Machel's visit. Please pass following message
	14	from the Prime Minister to President Machel:
	15	BEGINS. I ^{had} have been looking forward with so much
	16	pleasure to your visit next week. There are issues of
	17	importance ^{while} we should discuss together. But as you will
	18	probably have heard, we shall now be holding a General
	19	Election here on 9 June.
	20	It is our longstanding tradition not to entertain
	21	world political leaders in this country during a general
///	22	election campaign and with the greatest regret I
//	23	therefore have no option but to suggest that your visit
/	24	should be postponed to a later date. I do hope you will
	25	understand . I very much hope that mutually convenient

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword dates
File number	Dept	Distribution LIMITED
Drafted by (Block capitals) R B BONE		CAFD, OAD, Defence Dept, News Dept
Telephone number 233-4831		PCD, TRED, MR SQUIRE, Sir J Leahy BS/PUS, PS/Mr Onslow, PS/Lord Belstead, PS/Mr Rifkind, PS/Mr Hurd PS
Authorised for despatch		cc: PS/No 10, ODA (Mr Buist) DOT (Mr Titchener, ECGD (Miss West) MOD (DS11), Defence Sales (Mr May)
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats RESTRICTED	IMMEDIATE	Page 2
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<<<<

1	<<<<
2	dates for your visit can be found later in the year. ENDS
3	
4	PYM
5	NNNN
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
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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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-9... 1900





FCS/83/85

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE

1. As you may know, President Machel of Mozambique will visit this country from 16-18 May. We attach considerable importance to the success of this visit. Over the last few years the Mozambicans, and President Machel in particular, have shown themselves increasingly prepared to cooperate with the West. They exercised a moderating influence during the Lancaster House negotiations. In recent months, following a considerable improvement in Mozambican/US relations, they have been playing a constructive role in connection with the negotiations between Angola and the USA over Namibia; and they have also been willing to enter into a dialogue with South Africa.

2. We know that President Machel will have as a major aim to obtain some further ECGD cover. Their top priority will be a contract with the Racial Group for communications equipment for the Mozambique and Armed Forces. This equipment is particularly important to them in the context of their operations against the NRM (Mozambican National Resistance). Your Department will recall that this question was pressed by the Mozambican Minister of Defence during his visit in November. It is certain to be raised again by the President when he calls on the Prime Minister on 16 May. Although the total value of the contract would be £12m, Sir Ernest Harrison told John Nott in November that his firm would take on half the total risk provided ECGD would agree to give cover for the rest (some £6.2m). We believe this offer still stands.

3. There are other contracts to which the Mozambicans also attach importance: a coal washing plant (Kuwaiti Fund providing \$10m, leaving ECGD cover for £3.4m), a Landrover project (£800,000) and a rehabilitation project for the sugar industry (£4m). The President will also be briefed to raise these during his visit.

Prime Minister

To be aware, pending
Lord Colville's reply.

A.S.C. 29/4.



4. It would make a considerable difference to the success of the visit if the Prime Minister were able to make some sort of positive response on ECGD cover. I realise that it might be difficult for you to cover all four of the contracts I have mentioned. I very much hope that you will at least be able to agree to £6.2m cover for the Racal contract.

5. I am copying this to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Defence.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

27 April, 1983

file BOC
13 April 1983

VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL

Thank you for your letter of 12 April.

I confirm that the timings you suggest for President Machel's talks and lunch with the Prime Minister are acceptable and that there should be a welcoming ceremony in the FCO Quadrangle on the same lines as that arranged recently for King Hussein.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SH

070
CONFIDENTIAL



Caroline
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Timing acceptable?

A.S.C. $\frac{12}{4}$

12 April, 1983

- Know, Mark you
lunch 13.15 for 13.30
Ch. 13/4

See John.

Visit by President Machel

As you know President Machel of Mozambique has now accepted an invitation to visit the United Kingdom as a guest of Government from 16 to 18 May. The Prime Minister has agreed (your letter of 14 March) to have talks with the President at 1200 hours, and afterwards give an official luncheon in his honour, on Monday 16 May.

When the President's visit was first planned to take place last year, you said in a letter dated 23 April, 1982, that the Prime Minister agreed that she should welcome the President at a Guard of Honour ceremony in the FCO Quadrangle immediately before the talks.

It has been made clear to us that the President attaches considerable importance to ceremony, and this Guard of Honour would be a key element in the programme. We would therefore propose to go ahead with the necessary arrangements. There is a slight complication over timing, however, as a Guard Mounting from Horseguards is already scheduled to take place on the morning of 16 May, which means that the Guard of Honour ceremony for President Machel could only start at 12 noon. This would suggest that the talks would have to be put back a quarter of an hour to 1215, with lunch presumably at 1315.

I should be grateful to know whether we may plan on this basis, and these timings; and if so, for confirmation that we should make the same arrangements in the FCO Quadrangle as were made recently for King Hussein.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Molmoué
Visit of Mrs. Machel
June 1987

FORN AND DOMESTIC
HALLS, SWITZERLAND



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

See Goodchild informed *See 11/4/83* *Stor*
8 April 1983
For action pl.

for John.

A.J.C. ^{u.}/₄

Lunch for the President of Mozambique given
by the Prime Minister, Monday 16 May

/ As requested by Mrs Goodchild in her letter of 28 March to Miss Lothian, I enclose a draft guest list and list of reserves for the lunch which the Prime Minister has agreed to host for President Machel on Monday 16 May.

See memo,
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR PRESIDENT MACHEL,
MONDAY 16 MAY

Proposed Guest List

The Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher
President Machel

Official party (7 guests): not yet known

British Ministers

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP and Mrs Pym
The Rt Hon Timothy Raison MP and Mrs Raison
The Rt Hon Cranley Onslow MP and Lady Onslow

Parliamentarians - House of Commons

The Rt Hon Michael Foot MP and Mrs Foot
(Leader of the Opposition)
The Rt Hon David Steel MP and Mrs Steel
(Leader of the Liberal Party)
Rt Hon R H Jenkins MP and Mrs Jenkins
(Social Democrat Party)

Parliamentarians - House of Lords

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington and Lady Carrington

Business

Mr M G Bird and Mrs Bird
Chairman and Managing Director, Massey-Ferguson Holdings Ltd
(active in Mozambique)

Sir Austin Bide and Lady Bide
Chairman and Chief Executive B L Limited
(Bus and Landrover operations in Mozambique)

Earl Jellicoe PC, DSO, MC and Lady Jellicoe
Chairman, British Overseas Trade Board
(Tate and Lyle involved in Mozambique)

Mr David Sinker and Mrs Sinker
Managing Director, Hunting Surveys and Consultants Ltd
(Have carried out consultancy work in Mozambique)

Mr P I Walters and Mrs Walters
Chairman, British Petroleum Company Ltd
(operating in Mozambique)

Media

Mr Andrew Knight and Mrs Knight
Editor of the Economist

Mr Peter Preston and Mrs Preston
Editor of The Guardian

Others

General Sir John Stanier and Lady Stanier
Chief of the General Staff

Dr James Mayall and Mrs Mayall,
Department of International Relations, London School of
Economics, (African Specialist)

Officials

Sir William Ryrie and Lady Ryrie
Permanent Secretary, ODA

Sir John Leahy KCMG and Lady Leahy
DUS, FCO

Mr John Stewart CMG OBE and Mrs Stewart
British Ambassador, Maputo

[+PS/No. 10]

Reserves

British Ministers

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MBE MP and Mrs Walker
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine and Mrs Heseltine
Secretary of State for Defence

/Parliamentarians

Parliamentarians

Mr James Callaghan MP and Mrs Callaghan
(Former Labour Prime Minister)

Rt Hon David Owen MP and Mrs Owen
(Former Foreign Minister)

Business

Mr Michael Goldsmith and Mrs Goldsmith
Divisional Managing Director
British Aerospace
(Operations in Mozambique)

Sir Ernest Harrison OBE and Lady Harrison
Chairman and Managing Director of Racal Electronics
(sales to Mozambique)

Media

Mr Charles Douglas-Home and Mrs Douglas-Home
Editor of The Times

Mr Geoffrey Owen and Mrs Owen
Editor of Financial Times

Mr Peter Robbs and Mrs Robbs
African Economic Digest

Officials

Mr C W Squire and Mrs Squire
AUS, FCO

Mr A R Titchener
DOT 1 Victoria St

Miss Tessa Solesby
Head of Central African Department, FCO



10 DOWNING STREET

John

President Machel 16 May

As you are aware talks
were planned for 1200 but
because it will not be
possible to hold the Guard of
Honour until Noon (practical
difficulties because of rehearsals
for Trooping the Colour) Fco have
asked if the talks can begin
at 12.15 followed by lunch.
There are no difficulties from a
military point of view.

Content?

Fco
Sir Goodchild
informed

Logie 6/4

Logie

Can lunch be
1.15 to 1.30 ^{yes} - or

Logie have invitations
issued? - No.

A-J-C-2

CONFIDENTIAL

HL

bcc CS

B

14 March 1983

B/K

Visit by President Machel

Thank you for your letter of 9 March.

The latter half of May will be a particularly busy time for the Prime Minister but she would be willing to offer talks at noon, followed by lunch, on Monday 16 May. She further agrees that a formal invitation should be issued to President Machel for a guest of government visit from 16-18 May.

JOHN COLES

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree to invite President
of Mozambique and offer him talks
and lunch on Sunday, 16 May?

9 March 1983

A.J.C. 10/5

John [unclear]

If possible but
we have to prepare
for Williams - and
several speakers
inc. Scotland

Visit by President Machel

In your letter of 6 October you informed me of the Prime Minister's agreement that an invitation should be issued to President Machel for a guest of government visit from 4 - 6 May. Wren's
Catherine
CW

We have at last had a reply to this invitation. President Machel is unable, because of important party meetings, to accept on those dates, but would like to come in May and would be free any time after 10 May. MS

Given the long delay in replying to our invitation, the Mozambicans would have no grounds for complaint if it proved impossible to offer alternative dates in May. Nevertheless, we would recommend a favourable response if this is practicable.

President Machel has in recent months shown an increased readiness to strengthen relations with the West and to seek an accommodation with South Africa (the Komatipoort meeting). This has important implications for relations between South Africa and all its neighbours. He needs encouragement to help with hardliners within his party: a visit to this country would help the overall western effort, spearheaded by the US. It would also encourage President Machel to continue his co-operative stance over the Cuban withdrawal aspect of the Namibia negotiations. In addition, by giving us a further opportunity to demonstrate a friendly attitude towards the Front Line States, it should help to moderate their reaction over what they see as our support for the US stand on Cuban withdrawal.

/It is

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It is possible that the recent trial of a British subject, Mr Dion Hamilton, on charges of collaborating with the NRM (Mozambique National Resistance) will provoke public and Parliamentary criticism of a visit by President Machel. However, there is some hope that we could obtain Mr Hamilton's deportation in connection with the visit: at least, a successful visit should improve the prospects.

On balance the Secretary of State recommends that we should try to offer President Machel a visit later in May. I understand that the only period when both the Prime Minister and The Queen might be available would be 16 - 18 May. I would be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister agrees that a formal invitation be issued to President Machel for a guest of government visit on those dates (it may be necessary to extend the visit overnight in either direction to fit in with air timetables). I would also welcome confirmation that Mrs Thatcher would be able to offer talks on 16 May, followed by lunch.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone'.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique . June 81 -

Visit of Pres Machel

13 MAR 1983



E. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique
Carline *CS*

How sad.

MR. COLPS ✓

A.S.C. 2 1/2.

President Machel of Mozambique has postponed his visit on Wednesday 4 May.

The Foreign Office will be writing suggesting new dates.

CS

21 February 1983

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(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)	

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.....	GRA 168
PIECE/ITEM	49
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)	

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1572</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Moore to Beillard dated 7 September 1982</i>	
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Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES		GRA 168	
PIECE/ITEM		49	
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)			

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that
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document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to
TNA)

FCO will
✓ I don't understand.
P.L. take them to tell to
me.
A.S.C. $\frac{21}{2}$
John ✓ ASC

FCO have phoned about
the visit of the President
of Mozambique in May.

The PM was due to
meet him on 4 May
but this date has
now proved to be
impossible.

FCO have asked if
another date could be
arranged between 10-21 May.

Grey



MOZAMBIQUE *lu*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October, 1982.

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

Thank you for your letter of 4 October.

The Prime Minister agrees that a formal invitation may be issued to President Machel for a three day guest of Government visit. Mrs. Thatcher would be able to offer talks from 12 o'clock to 1 o'clock on Wednesday, 4 May, followed by lunch.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

B



Prime Minister

You would offer talks
and lunch on Wednesday,
4 May. Agree? *Yes*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C. $\frac{4}{10}$

4 October, 1982

Dear John,

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

President Machel of Mozambique was due to visit the UK in July this year as a Guest of Government, but had to cancel the visit because of the internal situation in Mozambique. The Royal Visits Committee has now given its agreement to reinstating the proposed visit.

The President was originally invited in gratitude for his role in persuading Mr Mugabe's ZANU party to accept a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe. Our relations with Mozambique improved greatly following the Lancaster House agreement, with the exchange of ministerial visits and increased opportunities for UK business in Mozambique. We wish to maintain this link which helps to remind the Mozambicans of the alternative to dependence on the Soviet Union and could lead to further trade opportunities in the longer term, notwithstanding Mozambique's present economic difficulties. Moreover, President Machel has again helped the West's interests recently in encouraging President dos Santos to adopt a positive attitude on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which could create a breakthrough in the Namibia negotiations.

Mr Pym therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should approve the issue of a further formal invitation to President Machel for a three-day Guest of Government visit and that she should receive him during his visit if possible. The time we are considering is the first three weeks of May. I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister is content with this, and if so which dates would be most convenient for her. The Prime Minister had earlier offered to entertain President Machel to lunch after talks at 10 Downing Street: it would be very helpful if a similar arrangement could be made this time.


Yes
Agree

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

Morambque, June '81, visit of
Pres. Machel.

24 OCT 1982



CONFIDENTIAL



285
Mozambique

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

16 September 1982

Dear Bulhard,

VISIT BY PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

I have seen your letter of 3 September to Sir Philip Moore. The Prime Minister would be content that President Machel's visit should be reinstated next year as an additional Guest of Government visit.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

Sir Julian Bullard, K.C.M.G.

CONFIDENTIAL

285

E. R.
PRIME MINISTER

You may recall that President Machel of Mozambique was due to visit this country as a guest of the Government in July and had to cancel. In acknowledging his letter of apology, you said that you hoped that his visit would not have to be postponed for long and that we could look forward to seeing him in London in the near future.

The FCO have proposed that his visit should be reinstated in 1983 as an additional visit - visits have been already proposed by the Presidents of Brazil, Korea and the Ivory Coast. It would involve you in giving a lunch and having a session of talks.

The Palace have agreed to reinstate the visit of President Machel as an additional guest in 1983. Can I say that you are also content?

Yes mib

F.E.R.B.

15 September 1982



CABINET OFFICE

F E R Butler, Esq

With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319

CONFIDENTIAL



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref. A09413

10th September 1982

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

Julian Bullard sent me a copy of his letter of 3rd September to Philip Moore proposing to reinstate the visit of President Machel to this country. As he says, the original reasons behind the invitation still hold good with the added factor of the help that President Machel is providing over Namibia. I, therefore, agree that the visit should be reinstated next year as an additional Guest of the Government visit.

I am copying this letter to Philip Moore and Robin Butler.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Sir Antony Acland, KCMG, KCV0

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1572</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Bullard to Moore dated 3 September 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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.....*GRA 168*.....

PIECE/ITEM*49*.....

(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

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TNA)

SECRET
at Mark
9/82



22 Feb *Sh* *Moyam bigw*
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No.T.1344/82

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 June, 1982.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 8 June, brought by Sr. Honwana, explaining why your visit to Britain had to be postponed. I quite understand your decision.

We were very grateful for your courtesy in sending Sr. Honwana to convey this message and I am sorry that I was unable to see him personally. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Francis Pym, and Cranley Onslow, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were, however, both able to meet Sr. Honwana and were briefed by him on the situation in Mozambique.

I hope that your visit will not have to be postponed for long and that we can look forward to seeing you in London in the near future.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

His Excellency President Samora Moises Machel

SD

sw
RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1982

Dear John,

Letter from President Machel of Mozambique

President Machel of Mozambique was due to visit the UK from 6 to 9 July as a guest of HMG, but has had to cancel the visit because of the internal security situation in Mozambique.

/ President Machel sent a personal envoy, Sr Fernando Honwana, to convey his apologies to HMG, and I enclose a letter from the President to the Prime Minister, which Sr Honwana left with the Secretary of State on Friday, 11 June, setting out the security problems which Mozambique faces at the moment.

/ I also enclose a draft letter which the Prime Minister may wish to send in acknowledgement of the President's letter.

Yours ever.

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/teleletter/despatch/note
XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

TO: H E President Samora Moises
Machel,
The People's Republic of
Mozambique

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 8 June, brought by
Sr Honwana, explaining why your visit to Britain had
to be postponed. I quite understand ~~the reasons~~ *your decision*.

We were very grateful for your courtesy in sending
Sr Honwana to convey this message and I am sorry that
I was unable to see him personally. The Secretary,
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Francis Pym,
and Cranley Onslow, Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, were, however, both able to meet
Sr Honwana and were briefed by him on the situation
in Mozambique.

I hope that your visit will not have to be postponed
for long and that we can look forward to seeing you
in London in the near future.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

A.J.C. 15.
6

Svane
cc Harter
9/10



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. *T 1234A/82*

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA
GABINETE

Maputo, 8th, June, 1982

Dear Madam,

I have the pleasure of sending you this message through Mr. Fernando Honwana, my Special Assistant, to explain why we were forced to postpone our official visite to the United Kingdom.

Our visit to the United Kingdom would have provided an excellent opportunity to thank you personally for the crucial role your Government has been playing in the context of Southern Africa. This would have also been the occasion to express our satisfaction with the United Kingdom's growing cooperation with the People's

The Rt. Honourable
MARGARET THATCHER
Prime Minister
United Kingdom

2.

Republic of Mozambique.

We are particularly aware of the fact that cooperation between our countries has reached a level which requires contact at the highest level with a view to consolidating and developing our relations on the basis of mutual advantage for both our countries and peoples.

Unfortunately, however, owing to reasons which we have already conveyed to your Embassy in Maputo, the leadership of Frelimo Party and the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly felt that the Head of State's absence from the country at this moment would not be opportune.

In effect the racist South African regime's aggression against our country has been escalating, through the use of armed bandits who have been committing crimes and atrocities against nationals and foreigners, carrying out sabotage against economically strategic targets and cutting off communications with the neighbouring countries, particularly with Zimbabwe.

3.

This situation has already caused heavy human and material losses, it further complicates our difficult economic situation and it might seriously delay the implementation of our economic and social development programmes for the present decade, some of which we are undertaking with the United Kingdom's cooperation.

We have with us material evidence of the South African regime's direct involvement in these operations by recruiting, financing, training, arming and supplying the armed bandits.

My Special Assistant, Mr. Honwana has been instructed to brief you fully on the present situation.

It is with the greatest pleasure that we reaffirm our wish to visit the United Kingdom at a date to be fixed later.

4.

I should like to renew to you our best wishes of
good health, long life and good work.

Highest consideration,

MARESHAL SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
President of the People's Republic
of Mozambique



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA

Maputo, 08 de Junho de 1982

Minka Senhora;

Tenho o prazer de lhe enviar esta mensagem através do Senhor Fernando Honwana, meu Assistente Especial, com o objectivo de lhe explicar as razões que nos levaram a adiar a nossa visita de trabalho ao Reino Unido.

A nossa visita ao Reino Unido seria uma excelente oportunidade de agradecermos pessoalmente o papel cor-cial jogado por si e pelo seu Governo no contexto da África Austral. Teria também sido uma boa ocasião de manifestarmos a nossa satisfação pela cooperação crescente entre o Reino Unido e a República Popular de Moçambique.

Sua Excelência
MARGARET THATCHER
Primeiro Ministro
Reino Unido

2.

Estamos conscientes que o nível de cooperação atingido entre os nossos dois países exige já um contacto entre dirigentes dos dois países ao nível mais elevado para consolidarmos e desenvolvermos essas relações numa base de vantagens mútuas, no interesse dos nossos dois Povos e países.

Infelizmente e por razões que já tivemos ocasião de transmitir à sua Embaixada em Maputo, a Direcção do Partido Frelimo e a Comissão Permanente da Assembleia Popular achou inoportuna a ausência do Chefe do Estado neste momento.

Com efeito, as agressões do regime racista da África do Sul contra a República Popular de Moçambique tem vindo a conhecer uma escalada progressiva, através da utilização de bandidos armados que têm vindo a cometer atrocidades contra cidadãos nacionais e estrangeiros, têm cometido sabotagem contra alvos de importância económica estratégica e contra meios

3.

de comunicação visando cortar a ligação com os países vizinhos, em particular com o Zimbabwe.

Esta situação que já causou avultados prejuízos humanos e materiais, complica ainda mais a nossa já difícil situação económica e pode atrasar a implementação dos planos económicos e sociais de desenvolvimento para a Década, nalguns dos quais contamos com a cooperação do Reino Unido.

Temos connosco provas materiais que confirmam o envolvimento directo do regime da África do Sul nestas operações, que recruta, financia, treina, equipa e abastece os bandos armados.


O meu Assistente Especial, Senhor Honwana, está devidamente instruído para lhe explicar pormenorizadamente a situação actual.

É com grande prazer que reafirmamos a nossa disposição de efectuarmos uma visita ao Reino Unido em

4.

data a acordar posteriormente.

Permita-me reiterar-lhe os nossos desejos de boa
saúde, longa vida e os nossos votos de bom trabal
ho.



MARECHAL SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
Presidente da República Popular
de Moçambique

MFJ

Mozambique

Miss Stephens

BF

23 April 1982

President of Mozambique

Thank you for your letter of 20 April.

The Prime Minister agrees with your proposal that she should receive the President in the FCO Quadrangle at 1145 a.m. on 9 July.

JC

S

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Prime Minister
Content? A.J.C. $\frac{20}{4}$

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 April, 1982

Yes. *mf*
Dear John.

As you know President Machel of Mozambique has accepted our invitation to visit the United Kingdom as guest of Government from 6 to 9 July. The Prime Minister has agreed to have talks with the President at 1200 hours, followed by an official luncheon in his honour on 9 July. I understand the Prime Minister would like a guard of honour arranged for him.

We propose the Prime Minister should welcome the President with a guard of honour immediately before the talks and that this should take place in the FCO Quadrangle, the arrangements being the same as on the two recent occasions.

If this proposal is acceptable to the Prime Minister, would you let me know, please, whether it would be convenient for her to receive the President in the FCO Quadrangle at 1145 am.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

E. R.

NOTE FOR THE FILE

President Machel of Mozambique

The Foreign Office rang today to confirm that he would be lunching with the Prime Minister on Friday, 9 July.

CS.

10 March, 1982.

Mozambique
Min. Stephen *CS 28/1*
Harlow
MR 7

MR. COLES

cc. Mrs. Goodchild

The Palace want to entertain
President Machel of Mozambique to lunch
on Wednesday, 7 July, the date he was
supposed to be coming to us, so I have
offered the Foreign Office Friday,
9 July and switched the industrialists
to the 7th.

CS.

28 January, 1982

82
be. c. Stephens.

5 January 1982

Mozambique: Visit by President Machel

Thank you for your letter of 4 January.
I confirm that the Prime Minister is still
free on 7 July and could offer talks with
President Machel at 1200 hours followed by
lunch at 1300 hours.

A. J. COLES

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AB



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister.

Agree to talks at 1200
followed by lunch at 1300
on 7 July (Wednesday)? It is at
present a comparatively free day.

4 January 1981

A.F.C. $\frac{4}{1}$

Yes no

Dear Sir,

Mozambique: Visit by President Machel

Michael Alexander said in his letter of 14 July that the Prime Minister would be able to receive President Machel of Mozambique on 7 July 1982 for talks followed by lunch.

President Machel has now accepted the invitation to visit this country as an official guest of HMG from 6-9 July: I should be grateful if you could confirm that the Prime Minister is still free on 7 July.


Yours ever,

JP

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

4 JAN 1982



RECEIVED
FBI - NEW YORK
JAN 4 1982

MFJ

Mozambique

14 July 1981

Mozambique: Visit by President Machel

Thank you for your letter of 13 July. I think we should go firm on Wednesday 7 July for talks followed by lunch. It would, clearly, be helpful if you could avoid suggesting any other bilaterals in that month.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 July 1981

Dear Michael,

We had a word on 10 July about the proposal that President Machel's official visit to Britain might be timed for July 1982. We proposed this month because at present no other foreign Heads of State are due to visit London in July 1982 (as you know, certain other African leaders such as President Banda are expected earlier in the year). With European and Parliamentary business, plus ad hoc visits to London by other overseas visitors, July may once again turn out to be a busy month. If you would prefer not to commit the Prime Minister to talks and a lunch in July, you may wish to suggest alternative dates which would be more convenient.

Yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R Lyne)
Private Secretary


M O'D B Alexander Esq

RECEIVED THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1917

13 JUL 1917



TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[Illegible text follows, appearing to be a memorandum or official communication.]

CF
Mozambique. 1
PRIME MINISTER

Visit by President Machel of Mozambique:
July 1982

Michael Alexander put this to you over the weekend, and you were not happy with it as you said July was so busy. In fact, the Foreign Office suggestion that President Machel should be invited is the first we have received for July, and they will have to be told that you are not able to do too many similar ones.

But can we go firm on this one?

Do this really with
to give this
exclusive priority?
E.S.

Spoke to
not Chris Jobb - he
will come back.

29 June, 1981.

C.S. 31/7.

MR. ALEXANDER

Prime Minister: Agree
that we should offer these dates:
in the unlikely event of the Economic Summit
clashing we could reschedule by a day or two
Visit by President Machel of Mozambique

I can manage talks followed by lunch
on Wednesday, 7 July, and Wednesday, 14th. 1982

I shall keep both days free, but I
wonder about dates for the Economic Summit
which we do not yet have.

ES.

July is very
busy - do we have

25 June, 1981.

Is there so many
good winter then?

no



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 June 1981

Dear Michael,

Mozambique: Visit by President Machel

When Mr Luce visited Mozambique last September he discussed in general terms with the Foreign Minister the possibility of inviting President Machel to visit Britain. The Royal Visits Committee have agreed that Machel should be invited as a Guest of Government in 1982 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that a formal invitation should now be issued. We would expect President Machel to be accompanied by his wife and for the visit to last about four days.

The Zimbabwe settlement was something of a watershed in our relations with Mozambique, and President Machel played a helpful role during the Lancaster House negotiations. You will recall that he subsequently sent his personal representatives (Sr Cabaco and Sr Honwana) to convey his congratulations to the Prime Minister on the settlement, and that he invited Lord Soames to visit Maputo in April 1980. We have maintained the momentum of these improved relations with visits by Mr Luce to Maputo last September, and by the Foreign Minister, Sr Chissano, to London in January (when he called on the Prime Minister).

Despite its Marxist trappings and the close relationship with the Soviet bloc, President Machel evidently considers that the best way to develop his country is to seek closer links with the West. We need to encourage this, both from the point of view of increasing our trade with Mozambique and in order to wean Machel away from complete dependence on the Soviet Union.

I should be grateful for your views on the most convenient timing for the visit. Machel has indicated that he would not wish to come in the winter. We think it important that the Prime Minister should be involved in his programme; and, as we are not according Machel the State Visit which he clearly wanted, we shall be recommending that he be received by The Queen. Mrs Gandhi is due in March: State Visits are planned for March/April and June: President Ahidjo has been invited for April and President Banda (and the Pope) for May. July might therefore be the best month for Machel: are there dates in that month which we could offer?


Yours sincerely
Roderic Lyne


(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
 No 10 Downing Street

FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI
WASHINGTON, D.C.

25 JUN 1981





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