

SECRET

Confidential Filing

The Hijacking of a Tanzanian Boeing 737
at Starsted airport.

SECURITY

February 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
28.2.82							
2-3-82							
5-3-82							
28.4.82							
29.4.82							
19.11.85							

PREM 19/1630



FCS/85/302


SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTTanzanian Hijackers

1. Thank you for your letter of 14 November asking for an early reply on the action you propose to take regarding two of the five Tanzanian hijackers involved in the forced landing of a Tanzanian Airways aircraft at Stanstead on 27 April 1982.
2. I agree to what you propose with two provisos:-
 - (a) I hope it will be possible to avoid any undue publicity once the decision becomes known; and
 - (b) We should make it clear in any public comment that our decision to allow the Tanzanians to remain in the United Kingdom is a result of undertakings given here in 1982 and does not reflect a lack of trust in Tanzanian assurances.
3. Our High Commissioner has asked that we should give him as much notice as possible before any decision is made public, because it might take some days to get hold of the appropriate Tanzanian Minister. Obviously in present circumstances this will be impossible, and we have therefore asked the High Commissioner, having consulted your officials, to inform the Tanzanians about the decision as soon as possible.
4. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and the Lord President.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 November 1985

Security Hacking of Boeing 737; 2/82





QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

14th November 1985

CCPC

Dear Geoffrey, B/F / Await FCS reply
TANZANIAN HIJACKERS
con.

You will recall the incident in 1982 when five Tanzanians hijacked a Tanzanian Airways aircraft on an internal flight. After refuelling at Nairobi the plane travelled to Jeddah, Greece, Rome and finally arrived at Stansted on 27 April 1982. After negotiations the aircrew and passengers were released the following day and the five men surrendered to the authorities. They were all charged and convicted under the Hijacking Act 1971 and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from three to eight years.

All five men have applied for asylum. Two, Yassin Membar and Tahir Ahmed, completed their sentences last year. Following completion of his sentence Membar was detained under Immigration Act powers, but in November 1984 he was granted bail by the Divisional Court. Both men are now on temporary admission.

The two men indicated when interviewed that they would be prepared to accept resettlement in a third country and after protracted negotiations the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees secured the agreement of Sierra Leone to accept them for resettlement there. At the end of July this year, however, apparently under the influence of Mr Oscar Kambona, who acted as an intermediary at the time of the hijacking, they refused this offer of resettlement, and we resumed consideration of their asylum applications.

When they were interviewed all five men claimed to be members of the Tanzanian Youth Democratic Movement dedicated to the establishment of a democratic government in Tanzania. Neither we nor, I understand, the FCO, have any information about this organisation. Your Department's assessment has been that, while the hijackers were likely to be questioned and kept under surveillance for a period if returned to Tanzania they would not be subject to further punishment; and the Tanzanian authorities have indicated that they would not encounter any problems on their return to Tanzania. Having considered that, while the men clearly have a fear of return to Tanzania, they do not have a well-founded fear of persecution within the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and I therefore propose to refuse their applications.

If the men's applications for asylum are refused, they will have no other claim to remain here, and in normal circumstances removal to Tanzania would be indicated. (Sierra Leone could not be expected to take them unless they were prepared to go there willingly, which they are not.) To allow convicted hijackers to remain here risks being seen as inconsistent with the firm line that we have taken on terrorism and might well attract public criticism on that score, even though the cases so far have attracted very little publicity.

/But it is not

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP

But it is not as simple as that, because of undertakings that were given in the course of the negotiations that led to the men's surrender. Patrick Wall has taken a close interest in the fate of these men from the outset and is of the view that the undertaking precludes our returning them to Tanzania against their will. Tim Raison sent him a letter in April 1982, in which he said "Our records are quite clear in that what was agreed to be put to those men was, if they surrendered, they would be subject to British justice: they would not be at liberty but would not be returned to Tanzania". When David Waddington spoke to Patrick about the case earlier in the week he made it clear that he would react very strongly, including raising the matter on the adjournment, if any attempt were made to send them back. David has consulted Willie Whitelaw who was Home Secretary at the time and who, as Minister in charge of the operation, authorised the undertaking that was given. Willie's view is that it would be most unwise for us to do otherwise than honour the undertaking at its face value.

This is vexing because officials here who were concerned with the Stansted incident are satisfied that the intention, at the time that the undertaking was authorised, was to guarantee not to return the men to Tanzania for trial rather than to let them stay here in perpetuity. Other letters written at the time do convey the undertaking in narrower terms and even the letter to Patrick Wall, when read in its entirety, is somewhat ambiguous. That said, the words in Tim Raison's letter cannot now be unsaid. In addition, there is evidence from the transcripts that during the course of the negotiations at Stansted the men were given promises which they could reasonably have understood as guaranteeing them from forcible return to Tanzania at any time in the future.

In all the circumstances I have concluded that we should not attempt to send the men back to Tanzania and run the risk of being accused of breaking our word. Since we cannot require them to go to a third country against their will, that effectively means that we shall have to let them stay here until and unless they chose to leave.

It appears from David Waddington's discussion with Sir Patrick Wall that those representing the men would not contest a refusal to grant asylum, if they were allowed to remain here on a temporary basis. The understanding would be that they would return to Tanzania in due course if the situation allowed. I propose therefore that they should exceptionally be given leave to remain here for 12 months in the first instance, with the situation being reviewed at the end of that period. Unless there was a sudden change in the situation in Tanzania, the next two men to be released, in March 1986, would be treated in the same way.

I hope that this decision will not create difficulties for you in our bilateral relations with Tanzania. The Tanzanians have not been pressing for the men's return, and it should be helpful in explaining the decision to them to make it clear that we did not regard the asylum applications as well-founded; and that the decision not to return them was taken primarily because of undertakings given at the time of the hijacking and does not reflect a lack of trust on our part in the assurances that the Tanzanians have given that the men would not be punished if returned.


/We are under some

We are under some pressure to announce a decision in this case. An application for judicial review initially lodged on Membar's behalf in November 1984 has now been adjourned twice pending a decision on his and Ahmed's asylum applications, and there has been some criticism by the court of the delay in reaching a decision, which has been largely due to the time taken to try to find an acceptable country of resettlement. A further hearing has now been fixed for next Wednesday, 20 November, and we shall be in some difficulty if we cannot indicate then that a decision has been reached. I should be grateful therefore if you could let me know early next week if you have any comments on the course of action proposed.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and the Lord President.

Yours,

Douglas



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Security

From the Private Secretary

Mr. Wright

Stansted Hijack

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 28 April A08254. She was grateful for this report, which she has endorsed.

I am sending a copy of this minute to John Halliday (Home Office).

W. P. S. RICKETT

29 April, 1982.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Ref. A08254

PRIME MINISTER

Sir Robert Armstrong has identified a number of ways in which our procedures for handling incidents of this kind can be improved. Content to endorse his report?

Stansted HijackLM
28/4

You will remember the events that followed the hijacking of an internal flight of Tanzanian Airlines by a small group of opponents of President Nyerere on the evening of Friday 26th February. It was flown first to Nairobi, but the Kenyans allowed the aircraft to be refuelled, and it proceeded via Jeddah to Athens. After further refuelling it took off and headed westwards and later northwards, entering British air space at about 2 pm on Saturday 27th February and being directed to Stansted, where it landed at about 2.30 pm. The hijack ended peacefully about 4.30 pm the following day with the surrender of the hijackers. There were no casualties other than to the co-pilot who had been shot and wounded before the aircraft reached Athens. Five Tanzanian citizens are in custody in the UK facing hijacking charges.

2. You expressed some concern about our speed of response when it seemed likely that the aircraft was heading for this country,

The Cabinet Office, the Home Office and other Departments concerned have carried out a post-mortem, so as to learn the lessons to be drawn from this and other aspects of the handling of the incident. Some points are still being followed up, but you and the Home Secretary may like to have now this preliminary account of our conclusions.

3. This was the first hijack affecting British territory for nearly seven years. Despite our well-known policy of firmness towards hijacking, the United Kingdom became the destination for what began as a domestic flight in Tanzania. The hijackers had no quarrel with us, only with their own Government. The fact that they came here probably resulted from the presence in this country of President Nyerere's former colleague and now opponent Mr Oscar Kambona, and more generally from our former role as the colonial power. There was no firm indication until

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT



the aircraft was reported as flying in a northerly direction east of Paris that the United Kingdom might be its destination. Nevertheless, as a precaution the Cabinet Office alerted the Home Office and the Department of Trade early on the morning of Saturday 27th February. The Department of Trade alerted Air Traffic Control so that, if it came in our direction and persisted in seeking to land here, instructions could be given to direct it to Stansted, one of the preferred destinations for hijacked aircraft in this country. The Essex Police and the police forces at Heathrow and Gatwick airports were also warned.

4. Up to the time when a decision was taken to activate the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), the necessary consultations had involved the Duty Officers in the various Ministries and the appropriate officials who could be contacted at their homes. The full operation of the COBR was achieved in slightly more than the one hour on which our plans are based, but a number of officials were at several hours distance from Whitehall and did not arrive until later. Fortunately you happened to be in 10 Downing Street and were thus able to take charge before the arrival of the Home Secretary from Cirencester. Your office was not informed as early as it should have been, and steps are being taken to ensure that in future you are informed as soon as there is reason to believe that a hijacked aircraft may be heading for this country.

5. I have considered whether the Alert Procedures need revising in the light of this incident. My conclusion is that in general they worked well, but that more specific instructions are required for certain Duty Officers, and there would be advantage in certain staff having with them at home procedural instructions to supplement the existing list of telephone contacts which they keep. Certain junior staff are already, on a rota basis, on permanent standby for such incidents; they are paid an allowance for this. The number of senior staff trained and experienced in dealing with incidents of this sort is small; many of them live some way from central London, particularly at the weekend. Though senior staff notify Duty Officers of their whereabouts outside working hours, they will not always be near a telephone nor within range of paging devices. They will be out of contact during the time it takes to travel to Whitehall from their homes.

There may well be times when it makes sense for them to remain at home in telephone contact rather than leave to join other staff in the COBR. Finally, the operation of the COBR outside working hours is dependent, at all levels, on volunteers. I am glad to be able to report that there was no difficulty in obtaining volunteers on this occasion, and I have no reason to foresee such difficulty in future.

6. The incident also showed that we need to have in the COBR facilities for monitoring radio broadcasts. These are being provided.

7. The standing arrangements with the Metropolitan Police for the provision of food broke down on this occasion. We are looking into alternatives; but the Metropolitan/^{Police}remains the cheapest solution and our first thought is to see whether supplies from that source can be guaranteed.

8. At the Stansted end, some matters are still being followed up. It appears that our contingency plan for dealing with incidents of this kind is sound. The chief officer's coordinating group, the intelligence group, the technical support and negotiator arrangements all worked well. Refinements to the plan will be needed to cover such issues as improved reception arrangements for the military and other agencies attending the scene, and improved post-incident procedures. As you know, the media gave rise to a number of problems.

Discussions are planned to try to draw up guidelines on the coverage, by the media, of continuing acts of terrorism to supplement those which already exist in relation to kidnappings. Steps are also to be taken to remind the media that it is an offence under the Wireless Telegraphy Act to publish the content of transmissions over the air traffic control network.

9. Finally, the incident showed the immense value of the anti-terrorist exercises which we have regularly conducted. Although they had not had the Metropolitan Police's previous experience of counter-terrorist operations, the Essex Police conducted themselves with great efficiency: together with the Home Office and the Security Service they had carried out an exercise to

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test the Stansted contingency plan only a month previously, and many of those involved in the COBR had taken part in a counter-terrorist exercise last October.

10. I am sending a copy of this report to the Home Secretary.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the letters 'RA' in a stylized, cursive font.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28th April 1982

SUBJECT



file

cc to
Ops

VB

10 DOWNING STREET

Security

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 March 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 37/82

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your kind message about the recent hijacking incident.

We were delighted that it was brought to a satisfactory end without injury or loss of life. Many people played a part in this success but, as you recognised in your message to the Chief Constable of the Essex Constabulary, most of the credit must go to the Essex Police.

Thank you for the prompt cooperation and assistance offered by the Tanzanian authorities throughout the affair. In particular, your High Commissioner, Mr. Nyakyi, was most helpful to the negotiators at Stansted airport. He has continued to give every assistance in the aftermath. Please convey my personal thanks and those of Her Majesty's Government to all concerned.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd)

MT

His Excellency Mwalimu Dr. Julius K. Nyerere

BK



508

4

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 March 1982

TANZANIA: HIJACKING

Thank you for your letter of 4 March.

The Tanzanian High Commissioner duly called on the Prime Minister this morning and delivered the original version of President Nyerere's message of 1 March to Mrs. Thatcher. After the meeting I handed the Prime Minister's reply to Mr. Nyaki and requested him to arrange for its delivery. A copy of the Prime Minister's reply is enclosed.

The conversation during the call, which lasted for 15 minutes, was concerned exclusively with the hijacking incident. I should record that the High Commissioner said that he wished, following his call on the Lord Privy Seal yesterday, to repeat his Government's assurance that they would take no action against the families of the hijackers and would, insofar as this was in their power, ensure they were protected from any action by others in Tanzania.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

4 March 1982

Agree to see him at
12.30 on Friday, 5 March
for 15 minutes and to
sign attached message?

Dear John,

Yes
mt

Tanzania : Hijacking

You will already have seen the texts of two personal messages of gratitude and congratulations on the successful outcome of the Tanzanian hijacking incident from President Nyerere of Tanzania to the Prime Minister and to the Chief Constable of Essex. I enclose copies for ease of reference.

A.F.C. $\frac{4}{3}$

The Tanzanian High Commissioner, Mr Nyakyi, has been instructed to deliver these messages personally and has asked if it would be possible to call briefly on the Prime Minister to deliver the message to her.

We hope that, if this can be fitted in, the Prime Minister will agree to see Mr Nyakyi very briefly. He personally played a valuable role throughout the incident and of course went to Stansted to talk to the hijackers. He also helped with the arrangements for the Tanzanian passengers during their temporary stay in the UK. It would be an opportunity for the Prime Minister to express her personal thanks to Mr Nyakyi for his help and cooperation.

There would also be advantage in the Prime Minister replying briefly to President Nyerere's message. A call by the High Commissioner would be an opportunity to hand over the reply with a request that it be passed to his President. I enclose a draft.

Yours ever

John Holmes

J E Holmes
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: His Excellency Mwalimu
Dr Julius K Nyerere
President of the United
Republic of Tanzania

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

~~I write to~~ Thank you for your kind message about
the recent hijacking incident.

~~Like you,~~ ^{delighted} ~~we were pleased~~ ^{was brought} that it ~~could be brought~~
to a satisfactory end without injury or loss of
life. ^{His happy many people played a part in this success} Although obviously it was a team effort,
^{but, as you recognized in} ~~most of the credit must go to the Essex police~~
and I ~~was therefore glad to see your message to~~
the Chief Constable of the Essex Constabulary, ^{most}
~~of the credit must go to the Essex police.~~

^{Thank}
~~I should like to take this opportunity to thank~~
you for the prompt cooperation and assistance
offered by the Tanzanian authorities throughout
the affair. In particular, your High Commissioner,
Mr Nyakyi, was most helpful to the negotiators at
Stansted airport. ~~and he~~ has continued to give

/every

Enclosures—flag(s).....

every assistance in the aftermath. Please
convey my ^{personal} thanks and those of Her Majesty's
Government to all concerned.

M 4/3.

Security

SUBJECT

GRS 450
RESTRICTED
DESKBY 021000Z
FM DAR ES SALAAM 020735Z MAR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 071 OF 02 MARCH 1982

RESTRICTED
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 36/82

MIPT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

vc. master set
opt

DEAR MRS. THATCHER,

I WRITE TO EXPRESS MY OWN VERY DEEP APPRECIATION
AND THANKS, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
PEOPLE OF TANZANIA, TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND TO
THE BRITISH POLICE FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH BROUGHT TO
A SATISFACTORY END THE HI-JACKING OF THE TANZANIAN PLANE.

YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE ANXIETY AND THE FEELING OF
HELPLESSNESS HERE WHEN WE HEARD THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN
TAKEN OVER. WE REALISED THAT WE WERE ENTIRELY DEPENDENT
UPON THE GOODWILL AND THE CAPACITY OF THOSE COUNTRIES
WHERE THE HI-JACKERS CHOSE TO LAND. WHEN THERE SEEMED TO
BE A POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD FORCE THE PLANE TO COME
TO BRITAIN, I THEREFORE CALLED SIR PETER MOON, YOUR HIGH
COMMISSIONER HERE, TO ASK FOR BRITISH HELP. BEFORE I
COULD DO SO HE ASSURED ME THAT BRITAIN WOULD BRING THE
HI-JACK TO AN END. I DID APPRECIATE THIS IMMEDIATE
GESTURE.

EVEN SO, HI-JACKERS ARE UNPREDICTABLE. I WOULD
THEREFORE LIKE TO PAY A VERY GENUINE TRIBUTE TO
MR. WILLIAM WHITELAW WHO TOOK OVERALL CHARGE OF THE
OPERATION AND PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY. I WOULD ALSO
LIKE TO PAY A SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO MR. ROBERT BUNYARD, THE
CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE ESSEX POLICE, AND ALL THOSE WHO
WORKED UNDER HIS DIRECTION. IT WAS A TREMENDOUS
ACHIEVEMENT TO PERSUADE THE HI-JACKERS TO RELEASE ALL THE
HOSTAGES, AND FINALLY TO SURRENDER THEMSELVES WITHOUT
DAMAGING THE PLANE. I REALISE THE STRAIN THAT MUST HAVE
BEEN FELT BY ALL THOSE AT STANSTED AIRPORT THROUGHOUT
THEIR LONG NEGOTIATIONS WITH THESE UNKNOWN BUT ARMED
INDIVIDUALS.

I AM VERY HAPPY INDEED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO
TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD HAVE INVOLVED RISK TO THE
LIFE OF ANY PERSON, BUT I DO NOT IN CONSEQUENCE
UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF WHAT WAS DONE. NOR AM
I LACKING IN APPRECIATION OF THOSE WHO 'STOOD BY' IN

RESTRICTED

/CASE

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CASE SOME OTHER KIND OF ACTION PROVED TO BE UNAVOIDABLE.

AS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO THANK ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION I SHALL BE FURTHER INDEBTED TO YOU IF YOU WOULD CONVEY TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE THE GRATEFUL THANKS OF ALL TANZANIANS.

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND MY WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO YOU. I AM TOLD THAT YOU YOURSELF SPENT A LONG TIME AT STANSTED ENSURING THAT EVERYTHING WENT WELL, AND CAN ONLY SAY THAT I DO APPRECIATE THIS DEMONSTRATION OF YOUR PERSONAL CONCERN.

YOURS SINCERELY,
JULIUS K. NYERERE

MOON

HI-JACKING: NON-BRITISH AIRCRAFT

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ATTACKS ON NON-BRITISH
AIRCRAFT

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RESTRICTED

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 020750Z MAR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 072 OF 02 MARCH 1982

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE
TO CHIEF CONSTABLE OF ESSEX:

DEAR MR. BUNYARD,
ON MY OWN BEHALF, AND ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC, I WISH TO EXPRESS
APPRECIATION TO YOU PERSONALLY AND TO YOUR COLLEAGUES
FOR THE WORK WHICH WAS DONE TO BRING TO AN END THE
HI-JACKING OF THE TANZANIAN PLANE. YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES
SUCCEEDED SO WELL IN YOUR SKILLED ENDEAVOURS TO GET A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM THAT YOU ALMOST MADE IT
LOOK EASY. BUT WE KNOW THAT IT WAS A VERY DIFFICULT
OPERATION, AND WE CONGRATULATE YOU AT THE SAME TIME AS
WE THANK YOU. BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS OF THE ESSEX POLICE
AND THOSE WHO WORKED WITH THEM IN THIS MATTER, NO LIVES
WERE LOST AND THE HI-JACKERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED.

PLEASE CONVEY OUR APPRECIATION TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE
ESSEX POLICE FORCE SEMICOLON WITHOUT THEIR DISCIPLINE
AND THEIR READINESS TO MEET THIS EMERGENCY THE OUTCOME
MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFERENT.

YOURS SINCERELY,
JULIUS K. NYERERE

MOON

HI-JACKING: NON-BRITISH AIRCRAFT
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ATTACKS ON NON-BRITISH
AIRCRAFT

-4 MAR 1982

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ADVANCE COPIES: HI-JACKING

11/11/82

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR LPS (\$) (S)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
LORD BRIDGES
Mr BRAITHWAITE Adams

SEC OF STATE FOR TRADE)
MR N PEACE) DOT
MR R E CLARKE)
MR H J BLANKS) 1 VIC ST
MR LANGLEY)

UNDER SEC/GEOSG Bullard
Goodson

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
DIO CABINET OFFICE

ED/MAED
ED/PUSD (2)

SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE

ED/GEOSG
SEA

Home Office
Secretary of State

ED/CONS D WES
CONS EM UNIT MED
ED/COD NENAS
ED/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK [Mr. Huckle, EAD]

Debra R/MOS
Cab. Off.

DARFO 002/02

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO: T 36/82
(see final copy of telegram)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

LTX 846/02

OO FCO DESKBY 021000Z

GRS 450

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 021000Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 020735Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 071 OF 02 MARCH 1982

John I understand
The High Commissioner is
likely to ask whether he
can present the top copy
of this to the Prime Minister
in person. ? mind we shall
have to agree.
LM
2/3

MIPT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

DEAR MRS. THATCHER,

I WRITE TO EXPRESS MY OWN VERY DEEP APPRECIATION

I WRITE TO EXPRESS MY OWN VERY DEEP APPRECIATION AND THANKS, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF TANZANIA, TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND TO THE BRITISH POLICE FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH BROUGHT TO A SATISFACTORY END THE HI-JACKING OF THE TANZANIAN PLANE.

YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE ANXIETY AND THE FEELING OF HELPLESSNESS HERE WHEN WE HEARD THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN TAKEN OVER. WE REALISED THAT WE WERE ENTIRELY DEPENDENT UPON THE GOODWILL AND THE CAPACITY OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE THE HI-JACKERS CHOSE TO LAND. WHEN THERE SEEMED TO BE A POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD FORCE THE PLANE TO COME TO BRITAIN, I THEREFORE CALLED SIR PETER MOON, YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE, TO ASK FOR BRITISH HELP. BEFORE I COULD DO SO HE ASSURED ME THAT BRITAIN WOULD BRING THE HI-JACK TO AN END. I DID APPRECIATE THIS IMMEDIATE GESTURE.

EVEN SO, HI-JACKERS ARE UNPREDICTABLE. I WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO PAY A VERY GENUINE TRIBUTE TO MR. WILLIAM WHITELAW WHO TOOK OVERALL CHARGE OF THE OPERATION AND PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO PAY A SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO MR. ROBERT BUNYARD, THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE ESSEX POLICE, AND ALL THOSE WHO WORKED UNDER HIS DIRECTION. IT WAS A TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENT TO PERSUADE THE HI-JACKERS TO RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES, AND FINALLY TO SURRENDER THEMSELVES WITHOUT DAMAGING THE PLANE. I REALISE THE STRAIN THAT MUST HAVE BEEN FELT BY ALL THOSE AT STANSTED AIRPORT THROUGHOUT THEIR LONG NEGOTIATIONS WITH THESE UNKNOWN BUT ARMED INDIVIDUALS.

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AS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO THANK ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION I SHALL BE FURTHER INDEBTED TO YOU IF YOU WOULD CONVEY TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE THE GRATEFUL THANKS OF ALL TANZANIANS.

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND MY WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO YOU. I AM TOLD THAT YOU

SEND MY WARM PERSONAL
YOU. I AM TOLD THAT YOU
~~STANSTED ENSURING THAT~~
~~ONLY SAY THAT I DO~~
~~OF YOUR PERSONAL CONCERN.~~

SINCERELY,
K. NYERERE

~~you~~ yourself spent a long time at Stansted
ensuring that everything went well,
and can only say that I do
appreciate this demonstration of
your personal concern

Yours sincerely
J.K. Nyerere

RECEIVED CHARGE DE THE
MINDLINE SUBIRRE 10
MEDICLINES 1 8000

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UNLE IAN 15 1974

UNLE IAN 15 1974

UNLE IAN 15 1974

UNLE IAN 15 1974

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SUBJECT



THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

1st March, 1982.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 36/82

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I write to express my own very deep appreciation and thanks, as well as that of the Government and People of Tanzania, to the British Government and to the British Police for the actions which brought to a satisfactory end the hi-jacking of the Tanzanian plane.

You will understand the anxiety and the feeling of helplessness here when we heard that the plane had been taken over. We realised that we were entirely dependent upon the goodwill and the capacity of those countries where the hi-jackers chose to land. When there seemed to be a possibility that they would force the plane to come to Britain, I therefore called Sir Peter Moon, your High Commissioner here, to ask for British help. Before I could do so he assured me that Britain would bring the hi-jack to an end. I did appreciate this immediate gesture.

Even so, hi-jackers are unpredictable. I would therefore like to pay a very genuine tribute to Mr. William Whitelaw who took overall charge of the operation and prepared for any eventuality. I would also like to pay a special tribute to Mr. Robert Bunyard, the Chief Constable of the Essex Police, and all those who worked under his direction. It was a tremendous achievement to persuade the hi-jackers to release all the hostages, and finally to surrender themselves without damaging the plane. I realise the strain that must have been felt by all those at Stansted Airport throughout their long negotiations with these unknown but armed individuals.

I am very happy indeed that it was not necessary to take any action which would have involved risk to the

life of any person, but I do not in consequence underestimate the difficulty of what was done. Nor am I lacking in appreciation of those who 'stood by' in case some other kind of action proved to be unavoidable.

As it is not possible for me to thank all those involved in this operation I shall be further indebted to you if you would convey to the British people the grateful thanks of all Tanzanians.

I take this opportunity to send my warm personal greetings and good wishes to you. I am told that you yourself spent a long time at Stansted ensuring that everything went well, and can only say that I do appreciate this demonstration of your personal concern.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

Hijack

Prime Minister

*WR
1/3*

GRS 30
UNCLASSIFIED
FM DAR ES SALAAM 281918Z FEB 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 067 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI

mf

HIJACK.

AFTER BEING INFORMED THAT THE HIJACK WAS OVER, PRESIDENT
NYERERE ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS APPRECIATION OF ALL
THAT WE HAD DONE AND HIS CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME.

MOON

HI-JACKING: NON-BRITISH AIRCRAFT

STANDARD

MAED
WED
EAD
SED
MED
NENAD
SECURITY D
MVD

NAD
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
COD
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ATTACKS ON NON-BRITISH
AIRCRAFT

HERE CONFIRMATORY COPY OF YOUR OUT TEL

fw

COBR 016/28

ZZ DAR ES SALAAM

ZZ NAIROBI

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CABINET OFFICE 281158Z FEB 82

TO F L A S H DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC 60 OF 28 FEB

INFO F L A S H NAIROBI (FOR P/S).

MY TELNO 32: HIJACK

1. PRESENT SITUATION IS AS FOLLOWS. NEGOTIATORS KEPT THE HIJACKERS IN PLAY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND SIX WOMEN AND A BABY HAVE NOW BEEN RELEASED. THE HOSTAGES WERE CARRYING SLOGANS. UNKNOWN TO HIJACKERS AND PRESS KAMBONA PLUS HIS BROTHER MATTHEW ARE NOW AT STANSTED AND ARE WILLING TO TALK TO HIJACKERS. NO DECISION ON THIS HAS YET BEEN TAKEN. THE HIJACKERS HAVE NOT REPEATED THEIR REQUEST YESTERDAY TO SEE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE TANZANIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IS WILLING TO HELP IF NEEDED: BUT WE DOUBT IF HE WOULD TAKE PART IN THREE-WAY MEETING AS DEMANDED BY HIJACKERS AT ONE POINT. OUR TACTICS ARE TO CONTINUE PLAYING FOR TIME.

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KKKK

hw

COBR 020/28

ZZ DAR ES SALAAM

ZZ NAIROBI

GP 140

CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 281200Z FEB 82
TO FLASH DAR ES SALAAM
TELEGRAM NUMBER 35 OF 28 FEBRUARY
INFO FLASH NAIROBI

FROM CABINET OFFICE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE CONVEYED BY THE HIJACKERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER VIA ONE OF THE RELEASED HOSTAGES.

ON BEHALF OF THE TANZANIA YOUTH DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT I SPEAK AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE MOVEMENT THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE MUST RESIGN IMMEDIATELY OR ELSE FAILURE OF THAT HE SHOULD FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL WAR UP TO THE LAST YOUTH WE ARE AGAINST SOCIALISM, FASCISM OF DICTATOR NYERERE. IF NYERERE BELIEVES THAT HE FOUGHT FOR TANZANIAN FREEDOM ALONE THEN HE BETTER RETURN THE FREEDOM BACK TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THEN WE WILL START IT AFRESH.

2. AS INSTRUCTED BY TELEPHONE YOU SHOULD PASS THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE TO NYERERE FOR INFORMATION. REPEAT FOR INFORMATION, AS PART OF OUR DESIRE TO KEEP HIM CLOSELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS

NNNN

QSL 020

GRS 210
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DAR ES SALAAM 281110Z FEB 82
TO FLASH FCO
TEL NO 064 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1982
8.79
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI

fm

YOUR TELNO 33 : HIJACK

FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS :-

A) THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENT BUT OFFICIALS, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS FROM PRESS, HAVE GIVEN FACTUAL INFORMATION SUCH AS NUMBERS OF PASSENGERS DROPPED OFF IN NAIROBI.

B) HIJACK IS MAIN FRONT PAGE STORY TODAY IN THE TWO NATIONAL PAPERS QUOTES UHURU AND SUNDAY NENS. QUOTE SUNDAY NENS UNQUOTE BANNER HEADLINE IS QUOTE HIJACKED PLANE IN BRITAIN UNQUOTE OVER PHOTOS OF THE BOEING ON ITS MAIDEN FLIGHT AND PASSENGERS RELEASED IN NAIROBI. STORY IS FACTUAL AND DRAWS HEAVILY ON FOREIGN NEWS AGENCY REPORTS BUT GIVES NO (REPEAT NO) DETAILS OF HIJACKERS' DEMANDS. MANY EDUCATED TANZANIANS, HOWEVER, FOLLOW BBC OVERSEAS SERVICE AND ARE AWARE OF DEMANDS FOR THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND MEETING WITH KAMBONA.

C) ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN SUCH AN EXTRAORDINARY EVENT, AS FAR AS WE KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS IN THE STREETS BY DISAFFECTED ELEMENTS. IT IS THE SUBJECT OF STREETCORNER GOSSIP RATHER THAN POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS EITHER FOR OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

MOON

NNNN

ACK 015

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Home Office Press
Cabinet Office
+ board. 28.2.82

HIJACK: SIX RELEASED

SIX PEOPLE, INCLUDING A BABY, WERE RELEASED THIS MORNING FROM THE HIJACKED TANZANIAN JET AT STANSTED AIRPORT. ESSEX CHIEF CONSTABLE MR ROBERT BUNYARD SAID IT WAS THOUGHT THAT NONE OF THEM - THE OTHERS WERE FOUR WOMEN AND A MAN - WERE HURT.

MR BUNYARD SAID THAT ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOW BEING MADE FOR THE FOUR HIJACKERS TO TALK TO MR OSCAR KAMBONA, A FORMER TANZANIAN.. MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE.

HE SAID: "THIS IS THE FIRST POSITIVE STEP WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE SO FAR AFTER A VERY LENGTHY PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE HAVE AT LEAST GOT THESE PEOPLE OFF THE PLANE NOW."

MR BUNYARD SAID DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON NON-STOP IN AN EFFORT TO RELEASE THE REST OF THE HOSTAGES.

"WE ASKED THEM TO RELEASE SOME HOSTAGES AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH AND THIS THEY HAVE NOW DONE".

THERE ARE NOW BELIEVED TO BE 83 PASSENGERS AND CREW LEFT ON BOARD THE TANZANIAN BOEING 737, WHICH HAS BEEN PARKED ON THE TARMAC AT STANSTED FOR 22 HOURS.

THEY AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING HAS BEEN SEALED OFF BY POLICE

MORE THAN 100 REPORTERS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD ARE AT THE AIRPORT, BUT THEY ARE BEING KEPT WELL AWAY FROM THE HIJACKED PLANE.

P.A. 1233

REC 7

SECRET

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LOG ⁸19 1130 - 1152 SUNDAY 28 FEBRUARY 1982

1140 Kambona arrived at Stansted.

Six hostages and one baby released from the aircraft carrying placards.

SECRET

LOG 17 1030 - 1129 SUNDAY 28 FEBRUARY

RLI

1109 Home Office reported:

Kambona now expected to arrive at Stansted at 1140.

2. The negotiators were about to send the terrorists the sheets of paper for which they had asked; they understood that the hostages to be released would carry a message for the Prime Minister.

SECRET

